PLANNED BY
the late LORD ACTON
EDITED BY
A. W. WARD; G. W. PROTHERO; STANLEY LEATHES
VOLUME IX
NAPOLEON
PREFACE.
THE Ninth Volume of this work naturally takes its
title from the name of the man whose actions form the principal part of its
theme. No other period in Modern History—no other historical period, it may be
said, except those of Alexander the Great, of Julius Caesar, and of
Charlemagne—was so completely dominated by a single personality. The ages of
Charles the Fifth and of Louis the Fourteenth may in some respects be compared
with that of Napoleon; but in neither was the personal influence of the
sovereign so overpowering; in neither was the supremacy of the State or group
of States under his immediate control so extensive or so decided. Moreover, the
ascendancy of Charles the Fifth was mainly due to the agglomeration of vast and
wealthy territories in the hand of a monarch to whom they passed by hereditary
descent; while that of Louis the Fourteenth was rather the work of predecessors
and subordinates than his own. Napoleon, on the contrary, was not only the
architect of his own fortunes, but the prime creator of that enormous power
with which he overawed Europe. If, again, the personalities of Alexander,
Julius, and Charlemagne dominated their epochs as did that of Napoleon, the
areas over which they bore sway were not comparable with that directly or
indirectly affected by Napoleon’s power. Never before had the whole of Europe,
from the Urals to the Atlantic, from Archangel to Cape Matapan, been knit
together in one vast partnership of strife or subjugation; never before had the
fortunes of all the nations of the West depended upon the fate of one man. Nor
was Europe alone concerned in the success or failure of his far-reaching
ambitions; vast regions of Asia, Africa, and America were drawn into the
conflict to which they gave rise. If it has been reserved for statesmen of our
own time to speak with truth of Weltpolitik;
if, in the latter days of the nineteenth century, the whole world for the first
time felt the mutual action and reaction of all-embracing political forces, the
opening years of that century witnessed a marked advance towards such a
consummation; and that advance was, in the main, the work of Napoleon.
The period covered by this volume is but little longer
than that covered by its immediate predecessor. No event in Modem History can
be said to possess greater significance than the French Revolution; but the
consequences of that event beyond the borders of France would have been
comparatively slight, had not the forces which it engendered been gathered up
in one hand, and launched under the direction of a single will against the
antiquated polities of Europe. This is not the place to discuss the effects of
an impact whose force, however developed or diverted, is not yet exhausted; we
need only remark that, if many of the ideas which have been most potent in nineteenth-century
Europe first sprang into practical life in revolutionary France, it is
principally to Napoleon that they owe their diffusion. The historical events
narrated in this volume possess, through this fact and through the dominance of
an overwhelming personality, a cohesion, a unity, which no preceding period of
Modem History can claim. They unfold themselves with dramatic continuity, as a
great tragedy played out upon the stage of the world, exhibiting the rise and
development, the triumph, and the fall of a personage whose actions and
fortunes, from first to last, dominate the piece.
The estimates of Napoleon’s character, and the
valuations of his work, have varied, and will always vary, as widely as do the
tempers and opinions of his judges. It will not be expected that a work of this
nature should add to the number of these judgments; our task is rather to lay
before our readers an impartial survey of the facts on which any fair
conclusion must rest. That Napoleon, during the greater part of his life, was
hostile to this country will not, after the lapse of nearly a century, blind
Englishmen to his greatness; and friendship has happily taken the place of our
prolonged and often bitter rivalry with the country over which he ruled. Nor
should it be forgotten that the struggle with Napoleon, besides sowing the
seeds of national revival and political reformation throughout Europe, had
another result of happy augury for the future. If Great Britain bore the
leading part in that struggle; if, in the words of Pitt, having saved herself
by her exertions, she saved Europe by her example, it is equally true that
final victory could never have been gained by the efforts, however persistent,
of a single State. It was to Europe in arms that the conqueror of Europe
succumbed; and victory in war was immediately followed by a combined effort to
ensure the continuance of peace. The Congress of Vienna was the first occasion
on which all the Powers of Europe met to settle international affairs by peaceful
deliberation. The political unity which marks the epoch reached its climax in
that assembly; and, however chequered was the success of that first experiment,
it has borne remarkable fruit. The peace of Europe has frequently been broken
since 1815; the European Concert has often failed; but pacific statesmen have
striven throughout the last century to follow the example set at Vienna, as the
best means of avoiding war. This is not the least of the benefits that may be traced
to the hand of Napoleon.
To all our contributors, especially to those foreign
writers of distinction whose aid we have been fortunate enough to obtain, we
express our hearty thanks. To them and to our readers we owe an apology for the
delay in the appearance of this volume; but we need not enumerate the
unexpected difficulties to which that delay has been due. We desire to express
our gratitude to the Right-Hon. Sir A. C. Lyall, K.C.B., and to Sir Charles Lyell,
K.C.S.I., for assistance kindly rendered in regard to Indian words and some
facts of Indian history. The system adopted in the spelling and accentuation of
Indian names is based on that of Sir William Hunter, but modified in the case
of certain forms on which use and convention seem to have conferred a
prescriptive right. We are also grateful to Dr Charles Schmidt for a valuable
note on the contents of the National Archives in Paris; and to Professor
Pariset for most kindly revising the entries of the French books in the copious
bibliographies.
The next volume to be published (Vol. IV) is far
advanced, and will, it is hoped, appear in the course of the next four months.
A. W. W.
G. W. P.
S. L.
Cambridge,
April, 1906.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I THE CONSULATE, 1799-1804. By Georges Pariset
CHAPTER II.THE ARMED NEUTRALITY, 1780-1801.Sect. I. By the Rev. T. A. Walker,
CHAPTER III. THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1799-1802. By
Anton Guilland
CHAPTER IV. FRANCE AND HER TRIBUTARIES, 1801-3. By
Professor Guilland.
CHAPTER V. FRANCE UNDER THE EMPIRE, 1804-14. By
Professor Pariset.
CHAPTER VI. THE CODES. By H. A. L. Fisher
CHAPTER VII. THE CONCORDATS. By L. Gr. Wickham-Legg
CHAPTER VIII. THE COMMAND OF THE SEA, 1803-15. By H.
W. Wilson
CHAPTER IX. THE THIRD COALITION. I. 1805-6. By Colonel
E. M. Lloyd
CHAPTER X. THE THIRD COALITION. II. 1806-7. By Colonel
Lloyd.
CHAPTER XI. THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT,
1807-9. By J. Holland Rose
CHAPTER XII. THE WAR OF 1809. By August Keim,
Major-General.
CHAPTER XIII. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, 1809-14. By J.
Holland Rose
CHAPTER XIV. THE FRENCH DEPENDENCIES, AND SWITZERLAND,
1800-14. By H. A. L. Fisher and Professor Guilland.
CHAPTER XV. THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-14. By C. W.
Oman,
CHAPTER XVI. RUSSIA UNDER ALEXANDER I, AND THE
INVASION OF 1812. By Eugen Stschepkin,
CHAPTER XVII. THE WAR OF LIBERATION, 1813-4.By Julius
von Pflugk-Harttung
CHAPTER XVIII. THE FIRST RESTORATION, 1814-5. By H. A.
L. Fisher
CHAPTER XIX. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, I. 1814-5. By A.
W. Ward
CHAPTER XX. THE HUNDRED DAYS, 1815. By Professor Oman.
CHAPTER XXI. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, II. 1815. By Dr
A. W. Ward.
CHAPTER XXII. GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 1792-1815. By
G. P. Gooch
CHAPTER XXIII. THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1783-1815.
India and Ceylon. By the Rev. W., H. Hutton,
The Colonies. By H. E. Egebton
CHAPTER XXIV. ST HELENA. By H. A. L.
CHAPTER I.
THE CONSULATE, 1799-1804.
The law of 19 Brumaire
served as a Constitution from November 11 to December 25,1799. The “ Consuls of
the French Republic,” Sieyes, Roger Ducos, and Bonaparte, formed an “executive
Consular Commission invested with the full powers of the Directory.” They
governed collectively; all three enjoyed equal powers, Bonaparte ranking no
higher than his colleagues; and they were to assume the presidency in turn and
in alphabetical order. Thus the Provisional Consulate was nothing else, to
employ Aulard’s expression, than a “Directory reduced to three members.” The
Consuls reorganised the Ministry; they retained Cambaceres as Minister of
Justice, and Fouche as Minister of Police; they appointed Gaudin to the
Ministry of Finance, Berthier to that of War, and Talleyrand to that of Foreign
Affairs. Maret acted as Secretary to the Consulate. It devolved on the two
intermediate Commissions, those of the Council of Five Hundred and the Council
of the Ancients, to embody in laws “ the resolutions laid before them
definitely and obligatorily by the executive Consular Commission for dealing
with all urgent matters of police, legislation, and finance.” These bodies met
in the former meeting-places of the two assemblies and held regular sittings,
to which the public were not admitted. Such was the organisation of the
provisional consular government.
The Consuls aimed solely at avoiding disturbances; and, as they were most
careful not to offend anyone, and at the same time to remain independent, their
policy wore the appearance of liberalism. By their proclamation of November 12,
in which the Consuls swore “to be faithful to the Republic, one and
indivisible, founded on equality, liberty, and the representative system,” they
reassured the republicans. On the other hand they procured (November 13) the
repeal of the revolutionary Law of Hostages (of 24 Messidor, year VII, or July
12, 1799) which threatened the relatives of emigres, ci-devant nobles, and
persons notoriously opposed to the Revolution. Moreover, the coup d'etat having
betn organised with a view to thwarting the plans of the
Jacobins, some sixty citizens, conspicuous for their advanced views, were
condemned on November 17, some to transportation to French Guiana, and some to
detention in the Charente Inferieure under the observation of the police. In
the end, however, no one was punished; for the sentence of transportation was
commuted for detention on November 25. and the sentence of detention was annulled
on December 26. In order to “ enlighten citizens in all parts of the Republic
as to the causes and the true object of the transactions of 18 and 19
Brumaire,” the Consuls sent delegates into the departments, one for each of the
24 military districts. These delegates displaced such officials as were hostile
or undeserving, but otherwise exercised no executive authority. Finally, on the
day of their last sitting (December 24), the Commissioners passed a law
empowering the Government to authorise the return to France of “ every
proscribed person who had been condemned by name to deportation without trial
and by a simple act of the Legislature.”
But it was not enough to keep public opinion quiet; the Government was
confronted by want of funds. It is said that, when Gaudin took over the
Ministry of Finance, not more than 167,000 francs (.£6680) in cash remained in
the treasury. Gaudin, however, had worked in the Finance Department since his
nineteenth year (he was bom in 1756); and his skill, experience, honesty,
industry, and adaptability secured him the possession of his portfolio until
1814. He contrived in the first place to provide for immediate necessities. In
conjunction with Bonaparte he obtained (November 24) an advance from the Paris
bankers, and supplemented it by an extraordinary lottery; at the same time he
reorganised with a master-hand the administration of the direct taxes, which
then formed the principal resource of the State. The law of November 24 created
in each department an office for the collection of the direct taxes, under the
control of the Ministry of Finance. The administration thus created speedily
wiped out the enormous arrears left by the local officials of the Revolution in
regard to the drawing-up of tax-rolls. The current price of government
annuities (tiers consolide a 5 %) marks the improvement effected. It had fallen
to 7 francs in 1799; but the price rose steadily after Brumaire, and reached 44
francs in 1800.
In the west the work of pacification had begun before 18 Brumaire, and
proceeded, at first, independently of the political changes which had occurred
in Paris. The Chouans bad again taken up arms in 1799. The royalist forces were
divided into six principal bodies. Suzannet and d’Autichamp were in Lower
Poitou and the Vendee; Chatillon and d’Andigne commanded in Anjou against
Nantes; Bourmont in Maine kept watch on Le Mans; La Pr£valaye lay in Upper
Britanny round Fougeres; in the Morbihan, Georges Cadoudal lay near Vannes;
while in Normandy Frottd and Bruslart had carried on the campaign without any
great success, though without disaster. With & view to resisting the
royalists, the Directory had given the command of the “ Army of
England” (as the forces operating in the western departments were still
called) to General d’H^douville. The choice was an excellent one.
D’H&louville had been the friend and the chief assistant of Hoche during
the first pacification of the west, and had a thorough knowledge of the men and
conditions to be dealt with, and the best way of dealing with them. He fixed
his head-quarters at Angers on November 3,1799, and, instead of fighting,
opened negotiations. Hostilities were suspended; and the existing armistice was
confirmed by a proclamation of d’Hedouville on November 24. The royalist chiefs,
satisfied as to the pacific intentions of the General, met for consultation at
Pouance on December 9. The tidings which were received of the general course of
the war were far from encouraging; and Monsieur (the Comte d’Artois, brother of
the King), whose presence was expected, did not appear. The meeting therefore
almost unanimously declared for peace. The armistice was regulated and extended
to January 21, 1800; a plan for a general pacification was submitted to
d’Hedouville on December 23; and d’Andigne was deputed to discuss its terms
with the authorities in Paris.
It was now necessary to determine the form of government. The law of 19
Brumaire had not abolished the Directorial Constitution. The Legislative Body
merely stood adjourned to February 20, 1800, and was legally bound to
“reassemble at Paris on that date in the buildings allotted to it.” It is true
that the two intermediate legislative commissions were “ charged with the task
of formulating the necessary organic changes in the Constitution”; and in this
matter the initiative rested with them. The Executive Consular Commission might
“ lay before them its views on the matter”; but there was no question of “a
definite and obligatory proposal.” Thus the men of Brumaire themselves admitted
that the Legislative Body, immediately on its reassembling, should, of its own
authority, carry through the revision of the Directorial Constitution : this
was the very end for which it had been purged. But things fell out otherwise;
and the most important work of the Provisional Consulate was the framing of a
new Constitution.
Each of the intermediate Commissions appointed a “ section ” to examine
proposals relating to the Constitution; and the sections consulted Sieyes.
Nothing could be more natural, since from the beginning of the Revolution
Sieyes had enjoyed the reputation of a philosopher and a political thinker.
Many of his phrases had lived; he was, even more than Bonaparte, the leader of
the men of Brumaire, who had appointed him to the Provisional Consulate. Both
his past and his present marked him out as the oracle to be consulted.
So early as November 11 he had begun to disclose his opinions on the
subject of a Constitution, his confidant being Boulay de la Meurthe, a member
of the constitutional section of the Intermediate Commission of the Five
Hundred. Sieyes began with aphorisms : “ Crude democracy is an absurdity.” It
was necessary therefore to organise it. From this
followed a twofold principle. “ No one should hold office except with the
confidence of the governed; and no one should be appointed to office by those
he has to govern.” In other words: “ Confidence should come from below,
authority from above.” Little by little, in fragmentary fashion, Sieyes gave
shape to his ideas. The nation was to prepare lists of Notables, out of whom
the members of the Assemblies and the officials of the State should be chosen.
At the head of the official hierarchy, a Grand Elector, enjoying an annual
grant of 5,000,000 francs, was to personify France. The Grand Elector was to
appoint the two chiefs of the executive, the Consul for Home Affairs and the
Consul for Foreign Affairs; and they in their turn were to appoint their respective
agents. The legislative authority was to be entrusted to two bodies, the Tribunate,
whose business it was to discuss laws, and the Legislative 3ody, which voted on
them. Behind both these assemblies was the Senate, a body conservative in
character, coopting its own members, and generally supervising the work of the
state machinery. The Senate was to appoint the Tribunes, the members of the
Legislative Body, and the Grand Elector; if he or any other person seemed
likely to become a danger to the Constitution, the Senate was to efface him by
absorption, that is to say, by appointing him a senator.
Bouluy de la Meurthe, Roederer, and Talleyrand had arranged interviews
between Bonaparte and Sieyes; but the two Consuls could not agree. Bonaparte
thereupon took to receiving each evening in his rooms at the Luxembourg his two
colleagues, the constitutional sections (December 2), and subsequently the
members of the Intermediate Commissions. These meetings were in no sense
official. There was general discussion; Sieyes propounded his ideas; Bonaparte
examined them. “ The Grand Elector,” said he, “ will be a shadow, the
colourless shadow, of a roz faineant”; and he went on, in a familiar tone, “How
can you imagine that a man of any talent or activity would consent to settle
down hke a pig fattening on so many millions ? ” This provoked a retort.
Roederer pictured a “ First Consul ” overriding the other two. The destiny of
France was bandied about in easy repartee.
After a few days, Daunou, who belonged to the section of the Five
Hundred, was requested to draw up, in a series of articles, a resume which
would serve as the basis of a formal discussion. Then the work began again.
Bonaparte alternately opposed and approved the respective plans of Sieyes and
Daunou, selecting from each what was most in accordance with his own views. His
influence grew; he began to speak with authority. On the evening of December 10
the discussion of the clauses relating to the legislative and the executive
authorities had been completed; there remained the detailed study of the
organisation of the judiciary and the departments, and finally the submission
of the whole to the regular deliberations of the two Commissions. But Bonaparte
chafed at the delay; it almost made him ill, and he determined to put
an end to it. On the evening of December 13 the usual meeting was held in
his apartments. He suggested to the members of the commissions that they
should affix their signatures to the articles as drawn up; and they consented.
It was a drawing-room coup (Titat. Bonaparte, Cambaceres, and Lebrun were named
Consuls; Sieyes and Roger Ducos were placed at the head of the list of future
senators. The Constitution was complete (22 Frimaire, year VIII: December 13,
1799).
The 95 articles of which the Constitution was composed fall under three
principal heads: the electoral system, the Assemblies, and the executive The
electoral system was simply that devised by Sieyes under the name of Lisles de
notabilite. Universal suffrage formed its base, In each “communal district” the
electors chose a tenth of their number, this tenth forming the “communal list”;
those named on the “ Gommunal list ” chose in each department a tenth of their
own number, who formed the “departmental list”; those again named on the “
departmental list ” chose a tenth part of their number, who formed the “national
list.” From these three lists respectively were selected the public officials
of the districts (arrondissements) and the departments, and those destined for
the service of the State. As a matter of fact, the lists were not completed
till the year IX (September, 1801); and in the interval the composition of the
various Assemblies and of the official hierarchy had been settled in its
entirety, so that the lists were only useful for the purpose of filling up
vacancies. Under this system popular suffrage was rendered completely
ineffective.
The Assemblies were four in number; the Conservative Senate, the
Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the Council of State. The Senate chose the
Legislators, the Tribunes, and the Consuls from the “national list”; it confirmed
or annulled as unconstitutional the measures referred to it by the Tribunate or
the Government. The senators were appointed for life, and were irremovable;
each received an annual salary of 25,000 francs. They were sixty in number, to
begin with; and two were to be added yearly during ten years, when the maximum
number of eighty would be reached. The first two senators nominated (Sieyes and
Roger Ducos), in conjunction with the Second and Third Consuls (Cambaceres and
Lebrun), were to appoint a majority of the Senate; after which the Senate was
to add to its own numbers by cooptation from lists of three candidates, the
Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the First Consul presenting one apiece.
The Government alone could initiate legislation. Treaties, whether of
peace, alliance, or commerce, were to be proposed, discussed, passed, and
proclaimed in the same manner as legislative enactments. The Budget, in the
shape of a yearly financial law, went through the same process. Proposals for
legislation and ordinances regulating the public administration were drawn up
by the Council of State; but the organisation of the Council of State was left
indefinite in the Constitution.
s
CH. I.
The Tribunate was to discuss projects of law; it could pass or reject
them, but it could not amend them; it could state its opinion on laws passed,
or to be passed, but the Government was not obliged to take it into account.
The Tribunate numbered one hundred; each Tribune received a yearly salary of
15,000 francs. The Legislative Body “made the law”; it heard the three Tribunes
and the three Councillors of State, who appeared before it as delegates of
their respective bodies, and then gave a secret vote without previous
discussion. The Legislators numbered 300, and each of them received 10,000
francs. Both Tribunes and Legislators were nominated by the Senate from the
national list; and a fifth part of their body was to be renewed every year.
1 To sum up, the power of the legislature
was very slight, not only because it was divided between two Chambers, neither
of which possessed initiative, while both were hemmed in by the Council of
State and the Conservative Senate, but still more because neither legislative
body had any popular foundation. The Senate created itself; the Tribunate and
the Legislative Body were merely creations of the Senate. On the other hand,
the executive power was strongly organised; and all real authority was
concentrated in one man.
The executive was entrusted to three Consuls appointed by the Senate for
ten years, and always reeligible.' For the first time the Consuls were
mentioned by name in the Constitution. The First Consul, Bonaparte, was alone
to promulgate laws, and to appoint and dismiss at pleasure all functionaries,
whether civil or military; even in regard to other acts of the Government the
Second and Third Consuls possessed merely “a consultative voice.” The First
Consul received 500,000 francs a year; the Second and Third Consuls received
125,000 francs each; either of these might, if occasion arose, temporarily
supply the place of the First Consul; but in point of fact the First Consul
alone possessed authority. It is true that no measure of the Government could
become effective unless it were signed by a minister, and that the ministers,
being responsible, might be prosecuted by order of the Legislative Body on a
charge laid by the Tribunate. The Consuls, however, were irresponsible; and no
servant of the Government, other than the ministers, could be prosecuted with
respect to transactions relating to his office except on the decision of the
Council of State. The irresponsibility of the Consuls and the quasiirresponsibility
of the various functionaries nullified ministerial responsibility both from
above and from below. The checks imposed by the Constitution on the First
Consul were purely illusory.
That the Constitution was drawn up in great haste is plain from the
irregular order of the concluding clauses and from certain remarkable
omissions. The communal district (arrondissement) is not defined; the
organisation of the judiciary is barely outlined; and the organisation of the
departments is not indicated at all. A clause framed with dangerous ' agueness
places “local administration” under the control of the ministers.
No machinery is provided for filling vacancies in the Legislative Body
and the Tribunate. True, the Constitution guaranteed the rights of those
persons who had acquired national property, and confirmed existing legislation
against the emigres-, but, contrary to the custom of the Revolution, it made no
declaration of principles, and it was silent as to liberty of the press,
liberty of meeting, liberty of association, and liberty of conscience. By its
omissions no less than by its positive enactments the Constitution tended towards
an undivided despotism.
The last clause of that document stated that the Constitution should
forthwith be offered for acceptance by the French people. The law of December
14, supplemented by the Consular decree of December 15, regulated the
arrangements for the plebiscite. The voting was not secret. The poll in each
commune was to continue for three days from the date of arrival of the
necessary instrument at the chief town of the canton. In consequence of this
provision, the taking of the pl&biscite lasted, in the departments, till
nearly the end of January.
The period of waiting seemed long to politicians in the capital. Only
five men were actually in office: those, namely, who had been mentioned by name
in the Constitution—the three former provisional Consuls and the two new
Consuls. Bonaparte had shown great judgment in his choice of the two latter.
Cambaceres was a native of the South; cautious and subtle, he had been a member
of the Convention, and was rightly regarded as an able lawyer. He justified the
confidence which Bonaparte placed in him, and proved himself a skilful, coolheaded,
and sound adviser. If he did nothing to prevent Bonaparte from becoming a
despot, if he even aided him to become one, he succeeded in sometimes tempering
the eccentricities and harshness of his master, at any rate in matters of
detail. Lebrun was thirty years older than Bonaparte; he was a Norman,
phlegmatic and cunning, and was believed to be still at heart a royalist. It
was possibly for this very reason that Bonaparte chose him, in the hope that
his example would win over the waverers; for Lebrun was by no means a
well-known man, and had played no prominent part during the Revolution. His
name was the first on the list of the Intermediate Commission of the Council of
Ancients, and he was said to possess literary talent and some knowledge of
finance; but he never showed any disposition to take the lead.
Thus, while a few of the men of Brumaire had made their fortunes, the
rest were still kept waiting. Once again Bonaparte resolved to force the pace;
and he was the more inclined to this, since the information received as to the
result of the plebiscite was encouraging. A law passed by the Intermediate
Commissions on December 23 provided that the new Constitution should come into
force two days later (4 Nivose, year VIII), in other words, on Christmas Day.
Bonaparte intentionally chose the date of a great Christian festival for the
inauguration of his government.
Siey&s and Roger Ducos, in conjunction with Cambaceres and Lebrun,
had already drafted the list of the first senators; they settled it definitely
on the evening of December 24. The Senate filled up its own number on the
following day, and proceeded forthwith to nominate the members of the Tribunate
and the Legislative Body. Bonaparte interfered little in these appointments,
which were made chiefly under the influence of Sieyes and in a sufficiently
liberal spirit. The Senate was reserved for distinguished men, and included
several men of science and philosophers who had served the Revolution as
members of public bodies or by their works, and several former ministers and
members of the various revolutionary assemblies. Similarly, 65 former members
of the Councils of Five Hundred and of the Ancients were included in the
Tribunate, and 230 in the Legislative Body. As was fitting, orators and men of
letters, speakers and writers, were appointed to the Tribunate; less well-known
deputies, with some miscellaneous celebrities, composed the Legislative Body.
The appointments were made with a view to the task which the Constitution
assigned to each body. The Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate were
fairly representative of the surviving politicians of the Revolution. By this
time, however, the men of the Revolution no longer formed the only party in
France; they were confronted by the group encircling Bonaparte—the Councillors
of State and the heads of the bureaucracy.
The ordinance of 5 Nivose, year VIII (December 26,1799), defined the
powers and the composition of the Council of State, as to which the
Constitution had been silent. Two days before (December 24) the councillors had
been appointed by the First Consul, and they had been installed on the day when
the Constitution was inaugurated (December 25). Their maximum number was forty,
which was raised to fifty by the Senatus Consultum of 16 Thermidor, year X
(August 4, 1802); but in point of fact it never exceeded forty-five. It
included former revolutionaries of every section, generals, admirals, lawyers,
administrators who
had held office before the Revolution, former exiles
and former nobles_____________
all men of high attainments, energy, and ability.
They were divided into five sections—those of finance, civil and criminal
legislation, war, admiralty, and home affairs—with a president at the head of
each. Locre acted as General Secretary. Questions were first discussed in “
sections,” afterwards in a general meeting under the presidency of the First
Consul. Each councillor received a yearly salary of 25,000 francs. The
ministers, who at the outset could only attend the Council for the purpose of
consultation, had, after 1802, the right to seats in the Council according to
their rank, and took part in its deliberations. Certain high functionaries,
such as Frochot, Prefect of the Seine, and Dubois, Prefect of Police, enjoyed
the same rights.
The activity of the Council of State, which at the outset was
considerable, went on increasing from year to year. The number of
subjects discussed in general meetings rose from 911 in 1800 to 3,365 in
1804. In short, the control exercised by the Council was all-embracing. To be
more precise, the subjects coming under the purview of the Council may be
classified under six principal heads; the drafting of codes, laws, and Consular
decrees; the drawing-up of ordinances relating to the public administration ;
the interpretation of statutes by means of opinions given on points stated by
the Government; the settlement of administrative disputes; the consideration of
demands for the prosecution of functionaries other than ministers, for acts
done in their official capacity; and finally an appellate jurisdiction as a “
Court of Redress ” (appel comme tTabus) in pursuance of the articles organiques
of 18 Germinal, year X (April 8,1802). In short, the Council of State was at
once an administrative body comprising the heads of all the great departments,
a quasi-legislative body, and a judicial body with special powers. It filled
the place of a tribunal, a Chamber, and a council of ministers, and was
responsible to the First Consul alone.
The Council or its sections met daily. At certain times Bonaparte
summoned general meetings at the Tuileries almost every evening. On these
occasions Bonaparte was, as it were, en Jamille. When the discussion turned on
questions which related neither to the personal aims of the First Consul nor to
his secret schemes for a dictatorship, everyone spoke his mind freely.
Bonaparte himself set the example; and his “ opinions in council ” are amongst
the most striking testimonies of his astonishing genius for organisation.
Simultaneously with the installation of the Council of State, Bonaparte
was occupied with the reconstruction of the ministry. Cambaceres, who had
become Second Consul, was replaced by Abrial as Minister of Justice; while
Lucien Bonaparte became Minister of the Interior. Of those who had held office
before 18 Brumaire, Fouche alone retained his place, as Minister of Police.
Important ministerial changes followed shortly after. The chemist Chaptal
succeeded Lucien Bonaparte (January 21, 1801); Deeres became Minister of the
Navy (October 3, 1801); Barbd-Marbois became the first Minister of the Public
Treasury (September 27, 1801), and Dejean the first Minister of Military
Affairs (administration de la guerre') March 21, 1802. Finally, Regnier
replaced Abrial with the title of “Chief Judge and Minister of Justice”
(September 14, 1802). The list of portfolios and of their holders under the
Consulate was now complete. There were in all ten ministerial departments:
foreign affairs, war, military affairs, navy and colonies, finance, the
treasury, justice, home affairs, police, and the office of Secretary of State.
The fear that his ministers might grow too important was ever present in
Bonaparte’s mind. He never summoned them to deliberate in common, but
communicated his orders to them or worked with one of them apart from the rest.
We have seen that originally the ministers
had merely a consultative voice in the Council of State, and that, under
the Constitution, they alone of all functionaries were responsible for their
acts. These precautions were, however, insufficient to satisfy Bonaparte. Owing
to the nature of their duties, five of the ministers might have gradually
assumed a dominant position, viz. the Ministers of War, Finance, the Interior,
and Police, and the Secretary of State. It is unnecessary to dwell on the
importance that might have attached to the Ministers of War and Finance in the
France of that period; The Minister of the Interior wielded a very wide
authority; matters relating to public order, local administration, public
works,! education, relief of the poor, religion, agriculture, manufactures, and
commerce, fell within his province. Still less definite and more formidable
were the powers of the Minister of Police. Ubiquitous and irresponsible, his
eye was everywhere; if a plot were to be denounced, he denounced it; if, as
sometimes happened, one were to be invented, he invented it. Finally, every
document emanating from the First Consul and all reports addressed to the First
Consul passed through the hands of the Secretary of State. He moved about with
Bonaparte, received directly from him his curt commands, put them into official
language, and countersigned them. His office raised him above the rest; but
Bonaparte would not hear of a prime minister, and took his measures
accordingly.
In the first place, he was most careful in his choice of men. Berthier,
an admirable minister and in the field an excellent Chief of the Staff, was
helpless without a leader. “If you leave him to himself,” said Bonaparte, “ he
is not capable of commanding a battalion.” Maret was, as some one said, “ a
civilian Berthier ”; and he only used his influence to secure the most
lucrative places for his relations and friends. Gaudin’s subserviency we have
already had occasion to notice. Two men alone eluded their master’s
domination—the mysterious Fouche, and, in another department, Talleyrand.
In the second place, Bonaparte lessened the importance of the principal
ministries by dividing their functions between two holders, a measure analogous
to that which weakened the legislative authority by distributing it amongst
several bodies. It was not only with a view to improving the administration,
but also for a political purpose, that, by the side of the Ministry of Finance,
a Ministry of the Public Treasury was created: the first to deal with income—“
foresight without action ”; the second with expenditure—“ action without
foresight a plan which resulted in incessant disputes between the two
departments. In like manner, by the side of the Ministry of War was placed the
Ministry of Military Affairs; beside the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministay
of the General Police (created on January 2, 1796); beside the Ministry of
General Police, the Prefecture of Police in Paris ■ March 8 and July 1,
1800). The last-named magistrate controlled the police of Paris and of the
department of the Seine, and at the
same time, in conjunction with the Prefect of the Seine, took an active
part in the municipal administration. He was subordinate to the Minister of
General Police, bnt only in his capacity as a police official; and his
semi-independence, the importance of his district, and the personal rivalry
between Dubois and Fouche, rendered the Prefecture a counterpoise to the
Ministry of Police.
Finally Bonaparte established, within the principal ministries themselves
and with the view of still further diminishing their importance, independent
bodies, temporary or permanent according to their functions, which, under the
name of General Boards (Directions Generates), were almost always entrusted to
Councillors of State. The system of General Boards was one of the original
features of the Napoleonic system. It often contributed to the rapid transaction
of business; from a political point of view, it in a manner legalised the
assumption of executive power by the Council of State to the detriment of
ministerial authority
While the appointments to the various political and governmental offices
were thus being completed, the work of the plebiscite was proceeding but
slowly In a proclamation issued in view of this event (December 15), Bonaparte
had formulated in remarkable language the principles of the new Constitution
“The authorities which the Constitution creates are strong and stable,
competent in all respects to guarantee the rights of the citizen and the
interests of the State. Citizens! the Revolution has remained faithful to the
principles from which it sprang. It is now at an end ” Bonaparte moreover, when
he became First Consul, took care to mark his accession to power by a series of
measures calculated to prove, in a striking fashion, that a new era of harmony
and peace had dawned for France. On December 26,
1799, he
despatched a letter to the King of England advocating peace; and, by an
application of the law of December 24, he authorised the return to France of
forty proscribed persons belonging to the Moderate party or to the Mountain. On
December 27 the Council of State, pronouncing for the first time a formal
“opinion,” declared that the Constitution had revoked by implication the
enactments which excluded the ci-devant nobility and relations of emigres from
public office. On December 28 a consular decree substituted for the oath
hitherto imposed on functionaries and ministers of religion a simple
declaration of fidelity to the Constitution. New Year’s Day, 1800, was, with
revived respect for the Christian calendar, fixed for the opening of the
legislative session. The pUbiscite closed with a general sense of
reconciliation, of weariness, and of peace. The result was proclaimed on
February 18; the Constitution was adopted by 3,011,007 votes against 1,526.
Local administration had still to be organised. The law of 28 Pluviose,
year VIII (February 17, 1800), was the last of the series of great organic
enactments which marked the beginning of the Consulate
and supplied what was lacking in the Constitution. It forms the basis of
the French administrative system to the present day.
As we remember, the Constitution omitted to define the communal
arrondissements. It was a question whether the cantonal municipalities of the
Directory should be retained under this name. The law in question decided the
matter by grouping the 6000 or 7000 cantons of the Republic in 398 communal
arrondissements. At one end of the scale, the system of division into
departments was preserved; at the other, there reappeared the 36,000 to 40,000
communes (cities, towns, and villages) of former days. Had these communes been
grouped together in cantonal municipalities, the spirit of local
self-government might have been developed; divided amongst 40,000 petty units
it joirid not fail to die out. This was precisely the end in view; the
administration was destined to pass altogether from the inhabitants themselves
to the central authority. When introducing the law of 28 Pluviose before the
Legislative Body, Roederer pointed out three distinct activities which it was
intended to direct: (1) the administration properly so-called; (2) official
decisions on points relating to taxation, involving the distribution of
assessments as between groups and individuals; (3) the decision of litigated
points in dispute in all departments of administration. According to him, “To
administer is the business of one man, to judge is the business of several.”
The duty, then, of administration was “ confided to a single magistrate
in each administrative division,” viz. to the prefect in the department, to the
sub-prefect in the district (arrondissement), and to the mayor and his
assistants in the commune. The assessment of the direct taxes was to be
adjusted as between the districts by the council of that department, and as
between the communes by the council of the district. The Geneiai Councils and
the District Councils could initiate proposals; they voted the additions to the
direct taxation necessary to meet the special needs of their respective areas;
and they supervised the expenditure of these funds by the local officials. In
the cities, towns, and villages, Municipal Councils were to assist the mayor
and his coadjutors in “ settling the domestic affairs of the community,” to
audit and criticise the municipal accounts, to consider questions relating to
the administration of the property and estates of the commune, loans, octrois,
and additional taxes. The mayor and his coadjutors kept the public registers
and supervised the local police, in coiv unction with commissioners
of police in towns of more than 5000 inhabitants, and with commissioners general
of police in towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Finally, the power of
deciding matters in litigation throughout the department was entrusted to the
council of the prefecture, the prefect acting as president and having a casting
vote.
All the appointments to posts in the administration and in the judiciary
were made by the First Consul or by the prefect from the
Lists of Notability. All autonomy disappeared. Popular election was a
thing of the past. The “administration and the administered were brought
together ”—such was the phrase ; but the administration was, in fact, notiiing
else than the central power, which pressed heavily on the local government.
Monarchical centralisation was now more thorough and more burdensome than
before 1789.
The first prefects were appointed on March 3; and Bonaparte, as his
maimer was, chose well. The first generation of his administrative officials
consisted, as a rule, of men of a superior type. Bonaparte did not trouble
himself to enquire to which party a man had belonged or what was his origin; he
appointed former members of revolutionary assemblies, men who had filled posts
during the Revolution or even under the monarchy, generals, and (later) members
of the nobility; all he required was industry, experience, and obedience. Under
the energetic impulse of a picked body of functionaries the local
administration worked with an apparent smoothness which hid its defocts, with a
rapidity often excessive, but with admirable regularity throughout.
On February 19,1800, two days after the promulgation of the law which
completed the equipment of his government, Bonaparte established himself at
the Tuileries, the former palace of the Kings of France. On that day Bonaparte
took visible possession of power. His political methods were now very different
from those he had adopted during the Provisional Consulate. His object was the
maintenance of order rather than pacification; and the distinction is mportant.
According to circumstances, he employed in turn repression and indulgence.
In his dealings with the Chouans in the west, Bonaparte had just shown
that he was quite ready to employ repression. His patience had been tried by
d’Hedouville’s attempts at negociation; and when (December 27) d’Andigne,
accompanied by Hyde de Neuville, one of the leading royalist agents in Paris,
came to discuss with Bonaparte the question of peace, the interview ended in
acute disagreement. On the following day (December 28) an ordinance and
consular proclamation announced that all Chouans who failed to surrender within
ten days would be treated as rebels, but it granted an amnesty to those who
laid down their arms. Subsequently, on January 8,1800, at the expiration of the
days of grace, still severer measures were decided on. The Army of England
became the Army of the West: General Brune was to replace d’He'douville, and
was to quarter his army of 60,000 men in the disaffected districts, and subject
the inhabitants to all the miseries of war. On January 16 the Constitution was
suspended for three months in the departments of the west; and Brune received
powers to make regulations, even to the extent of inflicting the death penalty.
Bonaparte’s strong methods took the place of the mild and sagacious treatment
of d’Hedouville; and the intention of the Government was to strike
hard and quickly, so as to make an end of the matter before beginning the
campaign of 1800 against the Coalition.
D’Hedouville had not despaired of the success of his policy, and was
continuing his negociations; while the Abbe Bernier, the parish priest of St
Laud d’Angers, was secretly urging the cause of peace upon the royalist
leaders. The amnesty was to expire on January 21. D’Autichamp and Suzannet
submitted on the 8th; Chatillon and the royalists of Anjou on the 20th. The
process of disarmament began forthwith; and d’Hedouville conducted it with his
habitual prudence and moderation. He had disinterestedly accepted the post of
Chief of the Staff to his successor, and he remained at Angers while Brune
marched into Britanny in order to commence operations. Brune’s task was an easy
one. La Prevalaye surrendered without a blow (January 22); and, after some
fighting,Bourmont (January 26) and Georges Cadoudal (February 14) submitted in
their turn. Organised Chouannerie was at an end.
Normandy was within the military authority of General Lefebvre in Paris,
whence Generals Gardanne and Chambarlhac, at the head of 10,000 men, were
despatched against Frotte (January 29). The latter became aware that the
struggle was hopeless, and restrained his adherents from any military movement
after February 4. He sent representatives to Alen^on to treat with Guidal, the
general in command there, who was soon after joined by Chambarlhac. On February
1, Bonaparte declared that Frotte “ should surrender at discretion, and that he
might count on the generosity of the Government, which was anxious to forget
the past and to unite all Frenchmen.” It is not known whether the order and the
promise of the First Consul were transmitted to Frotte, or, if they were, in what
circumstances; what is certain is, that be surrendered without suspicion at
Alenin. There he was arrested with some of his officers and sent forthwith to
Paris (February 15). On the way he was met at Vemeuil by an order from Lefebvre
that he should be tried by court-martial; sentence was pronounced on the 17th;
and on the 18th Frotte and his companions were executed.
Several of the royalist leaders came to Paris, some of their number
hoping to find in Bonaparte the long-expected restorer of monarchy. Bourmont
became the intimate of Fouche, with whom he had natural affinities. Cadoudal
obtained an interview with the First Consul (March 5). He was prepared, after a
certain delay, and on condition that he should be paid for it, to give his
support to the Government. Moreover, while the European war lasted, there was
always a possibility that a disaster to the French arms might retrieve the
royalist cause. The agents at Paris were already planning fresh schemes, when
Fouche got wind of the matter and seized their papers, which were laid before
the Council of State (May 3). Those members of the party who thought they were
compromised sought safety in flight; Cadoudal and Hyde de Neuville escaped to
England.
The First Consul dealt with republican opponents as he had dealt
i8oo]
Journals.—^migrds.—Italian campaign. 15
with the Chouans—by repression. Immediately upon its assembly, the
Tribunate took upon itself to play the part assigned to it by the Constitution.
On January 3 Duveyrier, and on January 5 Benjamin Constant, made open allusion
to the autocratic tendencies of Bonaparte. A newspaper war followed. Bonaparte,
much annoyed, at first took part in it, and attacked his adversaries through
the inspired press; then suddenly he cut the matter short. There were 73
political newspapers in circulation at that time in Paris; an ordinance of
January 17,
1800, suppressed
60 and forbade the publication of any fresh ones. But more was to follow. On
April 5, 1800, Fouche was informed that the Consuls intended to suppress three
of the existing journals “ unless the proprietors could show their editors to
be men of such character and patriotic principles as to be proof ag nst
corruption.” One paper only succeeded in furnishing the necessary guarantees;
the other two disappeared. In the following month yet another newspaper was
suppressed for misbehaviour, so that not more than 11 political journals were
left, in addition to the Moniteur, which had become the official organ. A press
bureau was in operation at the Ministry of the General Police; and by an order
of the First Consul, dated April 5,1800, a theatrical censorship was
established at the Ministry of the Interior.
On the other hand, Bonaparte treated with indulgence those who had taken
the losing side in the Revolution. The measures passed on November 13, and on
December 24, 26, and 27, 1799, restored some peace of mind to the two or three
hundred thousand Frenchmen— ci-devant nobles or relations of emigres—who, under
the revolutionary laws, had suffered a species of proscription while still
remaining in France; and a few of the proscribed were allowed to return from
abroad. But there still remained outside France about 145,000 Emigres, against
whom the Constitution maintained in its full force the severity of the Revolution.
There could as yet be no question of recalling these exiles; but the law of
March 3, 1800, fixed December 25, 1799, as the date for closing the list of
emigres.
The second Italian campaign interrupted Bonaparte’s domestic activity. He
set out to join the army on May 6, 1800; Cambaceres took his place during his
absence. The victory of Marengo (June 14) was important, not merely from a
military point of view, but because it was, in the words of Hyde de Neuville, “
the consecration of Napoleon’s personal authority.” It added to his glory and
popularity, and, while not raising his ambition, brought it into greater
prominence. A pamphlet written by someone in his confidence, probably Fontanes,
already compared Napoleon, not to the “ villain ” Cromwell, or to the “
turncoat ” Monk, but to Caesar. Bonaparte made haste to return to Paris, and
was there at the beginning of July. He feared that, during his absence, both
royalists and republicans would reassert themselves, and he wished to make an
end of party strife.
Louis XVIII himself had long cherished the hope that Bonaparte would
restore the monarchy; and he went so far as to write to him on February
20,1800. Bonaparte waited till after Marengo, and then sent a plain answer: “
Your return is not a thing to be wished for; it could only be made over 100,000
corpses” (September 7). Cadoudal had returned from London to Britanny (June 3);
but Chouannerie had degenerated into a form of brigandage similar to that which
disturbed the South and certain districts of Central France. A law of February
7,
1801, empowered
the Government to establish in the departments, wherever it thought necessary,
special tribunals, half civil, half military: these courts were subject to no
appeal, and were empowered to inflict every degree of punishment, including
capital, in cases of brigandage, incendiarism, seditious assemblage, and
attacks on the purchasers of nationalised property. These exceptional courts
were of much use in the suppression of brigands and Chouans. Cadoudal returned
to England at the close of 1801; the last shot was fired on January 3, 1802.
The Army of the West was disbanded on May 21; and the maintenance of order was
handed over to the gendarmerie. In Paris the royalists had renounced all
thought of action; and their agency confined itself to correspondence and the
collection of intelligence. The party seemed to have suffered final defeat.
The republicans were relatively numerous in the Senate, in the Tribunate,
and in the Legislative Body; but they had no leaders, no jrgar’sation, and no
genuine support in the country. “ They accepted,” said Fauriel, “ the
Constitution of the year VIII, as safeguarding the greatest extent of liberty
which it was possible to enjoy after the evils and the excesses of the Revolution.”
They said, however, that the Republic was doomed. Bonaparte called them
ideologues, and they in turn called him an ideophobe. The advanced
republicans—“Jacobins,” “enthusiasts,” “anarchists,” “exclusives, and
others”—looked back with regret on the democratic institutions of the
Revolution; they were few in number, but were reported to be resolute.
Bonaparte held them up as a warning to the constitutional republicans. “ Do you
want me to hand you over to the Jacobins ? ” he asked. They protested loudly against
the idea of any understanding with those “ enthusiasts.” Less even than the
royalists did the republicans seem to be in a position to Dffer any serious
resistance to Bonaparte.
In keeping watch on both par :2S alike, the
police played an important part, and soon developed into one of the fundamental
supports of Bonaparte’s government. Fouche and his agents, Dubois and the
Prefecture of Police, were not sufficient. The chief staff of the Paris
garrison, the gendarmerie and the agents of the Home Office in the departments,
the Post Office officials who opened letters, the innumerable spies and
informers in Bonaparte’s pay, all became part of his police. His informers
denounced each other and the public. By Bonaparte’s orders
everyone was kept under observation except himself; spying and denunciation
were universal. This system contributed not a little to lower the tone of
public life and of individual character. Constitutional opposition became
impossible; Chauarmerie had been stamped out; conspiracy offered the only means
of contending with Bonaparte. “ They conspire in the street; they conspire in
the salon," said the ex-deputy Arena; and the remark (adds Desmarest) is
characteristic of the time. The police were prepared, on occasion, to organise
plots in order to gain credit by denouncing them, and by supplying the
Government with opportunities for emplo; .ng harsh measures with a greater
appearance of justice. There can be no doubt that the pretended conspiracy of
the Jacobins, Demerville, Arena, Topino-Lebrun, and Ceracchi, who were arrested
on October 10, 1800, on the charge of plotting the assassination of
the First Consul at the Opera, had been organised by agents of the police.
Nevertheless, much was made of it; the parliamentary bodies formally congratulated
the First Consul on his happy escape; and the Jacobins were forthwith put on
their trial.
On the other hand the royalists conspired, and conspired seriously. On
June 19 Cadoudal wrote that the “indispensable blow” was about to be struck at
Paris. Of the five or six Chouans despatched to Paris, two only—LimoeLan and
Saint-Rejant—persisted in the attempt. They were joined by Jean Carbon, who
happened to be in the capital. They hid themselves so skilfully that the police
lost sight of them, but on December 24 they made their presence felt. On the
evening of that day, when Bonaparte was on his way from the Tuileries to the
Opera, the conspirators exploded an infernal machine. Many were killed and
injured, but Bonaparte himself escaped unhurt.
There was violent indignation. Bonaparte himself, the police who had been
taken unawares, the best instructed royalists then at Paris (Bourmont and Hyde
de Neuville), vied with each other in accusing the Jacobins. Fouche drew up a
list of suspects (January 1, 1801); and the Government framed a decree
condemning them to deportation. The Council of State gave its opinion that this
decree was in the nature of a formal “order of the State Police,” and that “it
was unnecessary to embody it in statutory form.” The Senate was then called
upon to rule, by a Senatus Consultum, that this “ Order of the Government ” was
a “measure tending to preserve the Constitution” (January 5). There was some
show of resistance; but Sieyes met it by alleging that the welfare of the country
was at stake; and the constitutional republicans in the Senate shrank from
making common cause with the Jacobins. It was thus, by means of more than
doubtful legality, that the first Senatus Consultum was forced through. A
hundred and thirty anarchists, Jacobins, and “ Septembrists ” were, by a
precautionary act of government, condemned to deportation. They were forthwith
despatched to Nantes, but not more than fifty were deported to the colonies;
the
18 Treaty of Luniville.—Assemblies purged. [1801-2
rest were allowed to remain under the supervision of the police. The
persons implicated in the pretended Opera conspiracy were sent to the
guillotine (January 31). The Jacobin party, so far as it can be called a party
at all, was disposed of; and the constitutional republicans, who had supported
the Consuls in their policy of terror, were reduced to compulsory silence. The
police in the end discovered the true authors of the explosion in the Rue St
Nicaise. Limoelan succeeded in escaping to America, where he became a Catholic
priest; Saint-Rejant and Carbon were taken, condemned (April 6), and executed
forthwith (April 21).
Bonaparte’s popularity was increased through the general horror excited
by the attempt on his life. It was increased still more by the glory derived
from the conclusion of the Treaty of Luniville (February 9, 1801). The main
lines of his policy now became clear; his aim was to reconcile the old France
with the new, those who had suffered by the Revolution with the Government
which had sprung from it. The first steps taken in this direction were the
negotiations relating to the Concordat, to be discussed in a later chapter. The
treaty with the Pope was signed on July 15,1801; and the ratifications were
exchanged on December 10. A statutory enactment was, however, necessary to
render the arrangement binding; and in spite of every effort the measure seemed
likely to encounter strenuous opposition in the Tribunate and the Legislative
Body. The time had come for the partial renewal of those two bodies; and the
method of renewal was not defined by the Constitution, except that twenty
Tribunes and sixty Legislators were to retire. Instead of determining the
selection by lot, the Senate decided, on January 18, 1802, that it would name
by vote the 80 Tribunes and the 240 Legislators who were to continue in office.
This was a mere contrivance, designed to facilitate the exclusion of some under
pretence of retaining others. The result was that no leader of the Opposition
remained a member of the Tribunate. The bodies, thus purged, were convoked in
extraordinary session; and the Concordat, together with the Articles
Organiques, became the law of 18 Germinal, year X (April 8, 1802). Meanwhile
the Peace of Amiens (March 25) had still further enhanced the prestige of the
First Consul. A Te Deum was sung at Notre Dame on Easter Day, April 18,1802,
and was attended by the Consular court, in all the pomp of the bygone monarchy.
This act appeared to sanction what had occurred, and to reconcile France with
the Church.
In order also to reconcile the new France with the old, the Senatus
Consultum of April 26, 1802, granted an amnesty in respect of the crime of
emigration to all persons “who may be guilty thereof.” The exceptions were not
numerous. The decree of October 20, 1800, had authorised the first general
exemption in favour of the plebeian emigres, with their wives and children. The
individual exemptions of the d-devcmt nobility had been largely added to by
reason of the tolerance of the Government and the venality of the police. The
Senatus
Consultum of April 26 put an end to bargains in detail; it specified the
various classes of imigres who were not to profit by the amnesty— recalcitrant
leaders of risings against the Republic, persons who had taken office abroad,
and a few others; but the total number of those excepted was not to exceed a
thousand. The imigres were required to return before 1 Vendemiaire, year XI
(September 23,1802), and to swear fidelity to the Constitution. Having
fulfilled these requirements, they were at once to resume possession of so much
of their property as had not been alienated; but they were declared incapable
of reclaiming, under any pretext, estates which had been nationalised or sold.
The rights of those who had purchased such property were thus again implicitly
guaranteed by the senatorial decree.
Successes such as these deserved their reward; and Bonaparte had already
made up his mind that this reward should take the shape of the Consulate for
Life; but this he was not to: obtain without further manipulation of the
Constitution. On May 6, 1802, a message from the Consuls announced the Treaty
of Amiens to the Tribunate and the Legislative Body. It was received with
enthusiasm in both bodies; and the Tribunate unanimously adopted a resolution,
proposed by Chabot de l’Allier, that there should be given to General
Bonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, “ a signal pledge of the gratitude of
the nation.” This resolution was communicated to the Senate. So far the
proceedings were quite regular; but the question then arose what the pledge
should be. The republicans expected that it would be merely titular; but
Bonaparte’s supporters, secretly incited by Camba- ceres, proposed the
Consulate for Life. The Senate adopted a middle course, and resolved by a
Senatus Consultum (May 8) to re-elect Bonaparte for the ten years immediately
following the ten years for which he had originally been appointed.
Bonaparte expected more than this; but, yielding to the advice of
Cambaceres, he concealed his dissatisfaction. He thanked the Senate, adding:
“You deem that I owe a fresh sacrifice to the nation; I am ready to perform it,
if the commands of the people confirm what your vote allows ” (May 9). It was
thus that he referred the question from the Senate to the people. But he did
more than this. The Council of State, when consulted (May 10) on the wording of
the question to be put to the nation, formulated it thus: “ Is Napoleon
Bonaparte to be made Consul for Life ? ” For the first time the sonorous Christian
name accompanied the surname Bonaparte, and it took its place in history by an
illegal act; for there was nothing to justify the Council of State in thus
framing the question to be solved by a new plebiscite. A Consular edict
published the same day (May 10) arranged for the taking of the ballot. The
Assemblies yielded, Carnot being the only Tribune who opposed the Consulate for
Life.
It was not enough for Bonaparte to receive rewards ; he desired also
ch.
i.
2—2
20
The
Legion of Honour. [1799-18O6
to be in a position to bestow them. The Constitution had decided, that
soldiers should receive a recompense from the State, in the shape (it would
appear) of grants from the national property. Bat the Consular decree of
December 25, 1799, gave general application to a custom instituted by Bonaparte
in the armies which he commanded, of presenting “arms of honour” to soldiers
who had distinguished themselves. The law of May 19, 1802, created a “ Legion
of Honour,” with the view of rewarding merit and services both military and
civil.
A “ Grand Council,” presided over by the First Consul as Chief of the
Legion, was to appoint the legionaries. These were divided into 15 “cohorts,”
each composed of 7 Grand Officers, 20 Commanders, 30 officers, and 350
legionaries; each Grand Officer received 5000 francs a year, each Commander
2000 francs, each officer 1000, and each legionary 250 francs. At the
head-quarters of each “ cohort ” there was to be a hospital for the reception
of sick, infirm, and needy legionaries, the expense of which was to be defrayed
out of the State domains. Soldiers who had received “arms of honour” became
legionaries as a matter of course. The details of the organisation were to be
the subject of future regulations. In 1805 the rank of Grand Eagle was created,
and made superior to that of Grand Officer. The number of members largely
exceeded the figure originally fixed. In 1806 Napoleon had already made 14,560
appointments. The number of legionaries averaged during his reign 30,000, of
whom 1200 were civilians.
In expounding the motives of the law, Roederer remarked that the creation
of the Legion of Honour “resembled the issue of a new coinage; but that, unlike
money issued from the Treasury, this new coinage, drawn from the mint of French
honour, was unvarying in value and inexhaustible in amount.” Bonaparte held
that men’s actions are guided, not by a sense of duty, but by a desire for
honour, if not for honours; and this belief has ever since exerted a
detrimental influence on the French people. The republicans strenuously opposed
the measure; it passed the Council of State by only 14 votes to 10, the
Tribunate by 56 to 38, and the Legislative Body by 166 to 110. The Legion of
Honour attained great prestige, and became a valuable aid to government; but,
at the outset, it was so repugnant to public opinion that Bonaparte did not
venture to hold formal distributions of the first decorations till after the
establishment of the Empire.
It now became more and more evident that Bonaparte aimed at personal rule.
After the proscription of the Jacobins and the rout of the royalists, the
opposition consisted of the republican party alone; they were very weak, but
the peace brought them substantial reinforcements. The army was still deeply
imbued with republicanism and free thought; and Napoleon was aware of this. He
had therefore got rid of the regiments most attached to the spirit of the
Revolution, by sending them to San Domingo. They had embarked on December 21,
1801, shortly
after the signature of the preliminaries of the peace with England. On
the conclusion of peace, the generals, now released from service, flocked to
Paris; and even those who had supported Bonaparte on 18 Brumaire were
now—whether owing to a spirit of republicanism, or to jealousy of the First
Consul, it is difficult to say—in opposition. Augereau, Brune, Delmas, Gouvion
St Cyr, Jourdan,Lannes, Lecourbe, Oudinot, Macdonald, Richepance, Souham,
Massena, Bemadotte, Moreau—all, especially the three last, were hostile to
Bonaparte.
The details are obscure, but it seems probable that the most serious
danger which threatened Bonaparte in his progress to supreme power was to be
found in this quarter. From April to June, 1802, the generals met frequently to
discuss in secret conclave their grievances against “Sultan” Bonaparte. What
was still more serious, the military opposition was joined by the civilians; by
Sieyes and the republican senators, by Madame de Stael and her following, and
by the ideologues who met at Auteuil in the house of Cabanis.
Bemadotte, rather than Moreau, appears to have been the pivot of the
military conspiracy. But* on principle, as he said, and also, no doubt, to
protect himself in case of failure, Bemadotte was disposed to act by legal
means only, after obtaining a vote of the Senate. Various plans of government
were proposed, one being the division of France into military districts which
should be assigned to various generals, the district of Paris being given to
Bonaparte. Bonaparte suspected what was in the wind, and hastened to discredit
militarism. “Never will military government take root in France,” he declared
at the Council of State on May 4, 1802, “unless the nation has first been
brutalised by fifty years of ignorance. The army is the nation.” The police
thereupon set to work. They first attempted to repeat the coup which had
succeeded so well against the Jacobins; they tramped up a conspiracy of
assassination, and two officers, Donnadieu and Fournier, were arrested on the
charge of compassing the death of the First Consul (May 7). The actual
conspirators were to be sought elsewhere. On May 20 General Simon, Bemadotte’s
Chief of the Staff, began secretly to despatch from Rennes into every comer of
France pamphlets violently attacking Bonaparte. “Soldiers” (such was their
language), “you have no longer a country; the Republic has ceased to exist. A
tyrant has seized upon power; and that tyrant is Bonaparte.”
Dubois, the Prefect of Police, was the first to draw Bonaparte’s
attention to this “ libel plot.” Fouche started the theory of a royalist
conspiracy; but before long General Simon, with some other officers, was
arrested at Rennes (June 23). Bonaparte wisely hushed the matter up ; nothing
became known; Simon was dismissed without trial, and Berna- dotte was sent to take
the waters at Plombieres. Fouche was appointed a senator (September 14, 1802);
and the General Police Office was again attached to the Department of Justice
(September 15,1802). One by
one, the opposition generals were sent away from Paris on distant embassies.
Madame de Stael, who had returned to Coppet in May,
1802, was
forbidden to re-enter Paris; and when, in the following year, she ventured into
France, she was actually expelled (October 15, 1803). The steps taken to
suppress the plot were as obscure as the plot itself; but for Bonaparte there
was still a lion in the path—Moreau.
While Bemadotte’s conspiracy had thus come to nothing, the plebiscite
sanctioned anew the position taken by Bonaparte. The result of the count, which
was made public on August 2, 1802, was 3,568,885 “ ayes ” against 8,374 “noes.”
It would seem that, speaking generally, the ideologues had abstained; and it
will be noticed that the number of those who voted “no” had sensibly increased.
Nevertheless, this plebiscite marks, without doubt, the political abdication of
the French nation in favour of Bonaparte and the system of Caesarism.
Now that Bonaparte was master of the situation, he drew up, of his own
authority, a fresh Constitution, which he first laid before his two colleagues
and certain confidential friends. He then sent it to the Council of State,
which approved it forthwith, and later on the same day to the Senate (August 4,
1802). As if by accident, “ the approaches, the court, and the ante-rooms of
the Luxembourg were filled with grenadiers.” The Senate accepted the measure,
voting on it without discussion; and it was henceforth known as the “ Organic
Senatus Consultum of the Constitution, of 16 Thermidor, year X.”
Under it the Consuls were appointed for life, the Second and Third
Consuls being appointed by the Senate on the presentation of the First. The
First Consul had the right to nominate his successor; if his candidate were
rejected by the Senate, the right of nomination reverted to the two other
Consuls. The First Consul retained all the power given him by the Constitution
of the year VIII; and, in addition, he was to enjoy the sole right of ratifying
treaties of peace and alliance, which were no longer looked upon as matters for
legislation. On these subjects, he had only to confer with his Privy Council,
whose members he nominated before each sitting. A Privy Council was to draft
the Senatus Consulta.
The Consuls were to preside in the Senate, which, at the time, consisted
of 66 members. The number was raised to 120; and the appointment of senators
was thenceforth left to the First Consul, who had the right of presentation in
case of a senatorship created by the Constitution of the year VIII, and of
absolute appointment to the senatorships created since that date. In this
fashion Bonaparte disposed of 54 seats and could easily obtain a majority. The
Senate was to settle by organic Senatus Consulta any point not provided for by
the Constitution; it could dissolve the Legislative Body and the Tribunate, and
if necessary suspend the Constitution. Its powers were enlarged in proportion
as it became more subordinate to the First Consul, and it was henceforward his
servile instrument. The creation of senatoreries (January 4, 1803) completed
its subjugation. In each of the districts into which the country was
divided for the purpose of legal appeals, a senator whom Bonaparte wished to
reward received a life-grant from the national lands, yielding an income about
equivalent to a senatorial salary. The only conditions imposed on the grantee
were a three months’ residence in the locality during each year, and the
furnishing of a report on the state of public opinion in the district.
The Lists of Notability were replaced by a fresh system. The cantonal
assemblies, composed of all citizens domiciled in the canton, were to be
summoned by the Government; and their presidents were to be appointed by the
First Consul. They were to nominate, under certain conditions, the candidates
for the municipal councils, and also, from among the 600 most highly taxed
citizens of the department, the members of the electoral colleges of the
districts, and of the electoral college of the department. The latter were
chosen for life; and their presidents were appointed by the First Consul. Two
candidates for each vacancy in the district and departmental councils, also for
each vacancy in the Tribunate, the Legislative Body, and the Senate, were to
be nominated by the duly qualified colleges, whether district or departmental,
respectively. In fact, in spite of the democratic air of the cantonal
assemblies, the scheme created a system of nomination of those pecuniarily
qualified, combined with a power of actual appointment reserved to the First
Consul. The Tribunate was to be reduced to fifty members from the beginning of
the year XIII (1804-5). The organic Senatus Consultum of 28 Frimaire, year XII
(December 20, 1803), placed the appointment of the President of the Legislative
Body in the hands of the First Consul.
It is not without reason that the Senatus Consultum of 16 Thermidor, year
X, is generally known as the Constitution of the year X. The Constitution of
the year VIII was still in existence, but it was so changed as to be hardly
recognisable. The First Consul had become an autocrat; and no constitutional
limit to his authority remained.
Apart from the establishment of the Consulate for Life, so fraught with
evil for the future, the year 1802 might be reckoned one of the most splendid
in the history of France. The restoration of peace, the victories won, the
conquests achieved, the memories of revolutionary enthusiasm, the personal fame
of Bonaparte, the return of order and the revival of trade—all combined to make
existence brilliant and enjoyable.
A new Court had by degrees been formed at the Tuileries. A Governor of
the Palace (Duroc), four Prefects of the Palace, and four ladies (of whom
Madame de Remusat was one) in waiting on Madame Bonaparte, had been appointed
by Bonaparte. Josephine, who was accustomed to the ways of good society, and
Bonaparte, who was anxious to insist on them, were agreed in requiring a
certain amount of decorum from the crowds attending their receptions; and royal
usages and etiquette reappeared by degrees at the consular Court.
24
The imperial Court.—French society.
[1800-4
Bonaparte soon wearied of all this grandeur, and gladly resumed a simpler
life during the days which he passed in the company of his intimates at St
Cloud or at Malmaison, the estate acquired by Josephine in 1799.
In Paris, the salons, those centres of conversation in the days before
the Revolution, were once more formed. The idiologues met at Auteuil at the
house of Cabanis. Madame de Stael had a circle composed of Camille Jordan, de
Gerando, Benjamin Constant, Fauriel, and others. Two intimate friends of Madame
de Stael, the melancholy and pathetic Madame de Beaumont and the lovely Madame
Recamier, the wife of a rich Paris banker, also held their salons. In the
aristocratic Faubourg St Germain a few royalist houses already half opened
their doors. The politeness of old France reasserted itself, and elegance in
dress again prevailed. Whenever a new office was created, a minute description
was given of the uniform of the new officials; Paris fashions again ruled; the
practice of tutoiement ceased; a lady was no longer addressed as
“Citoyerme" but as “Madame1’; and “Citoyen" was not heard
after 1804.
The consular Court and the refined society of the salons had thrust into
the background the nouveaux riches—the stock-jobbers, financiers, bankers,
speculators in national property, army contractors, gorged officers, gamblers
and adventurers, who had been in the ascendant under the Directory, and whose
misconduct had discredited the system which allowed them the foremost place.
The shopkeeping classes lived as they had done during the Directory, much out
of doors. They frequented the cafes on the boulevards, and filled the
well-known restaurants of the Palais Royal; thence they betook themselves to
the public gardens, to dancing saloons, to gaming-houses, or to the theatres.
Paris was very gay during the winter of 1802-3. Never before had so many
foreigners been seen. Miss Helen Williams entertained at her tea-table, at one
and the same time, Carnot, a Neapolitan bishop, Kosciuszko, and Fox. Twenty-two
accounts are extant of journeys to Paris or other parts of France undertaken by
Englishmen between 1801 and 1803; and in September, 1802, there were said to be
10,000 English tourists in Paris.
In the departments, to be sure, the aspect of things was less brilliant.
During 1801 certain Councillors of State had been sent on a tour of inspection
through the military divisions; and their reports, published by Rocquain, show
how much still remained to be done. The evil plight of the communal finances,
the destruction of property, the dilapidated state of bridges, ports, canals,
public buildings, and roads, the continued insecurity, the prevalence of
brigandage, the poverty of hospitals and public charities, the almost complete
interruption of public works during long years, often lent to the districts
inspected the appearance of ruin and distress. It was, however, an appearance
only. In the country districts, the 1,200,000 purchasers of national domains
had had their titles guaranteed by the Constitution; and Bonaparte was careful
to allay their fears whenever an opportunity occurred. The populace of
1801-4]
Provincial society.—Finance.—Public debt. 25
the towns were fax from sharing the republican regrets of the middle
classes; they were enthusiastic for Bonaparte, for his military glory, and for
the blessings of peace. Work was plentiful and wages were high ; and the two
industrial exhibitions, which Chaptal, the Minister of the Interior, had
organised in Paris in 1801 and 1802, gave brilliant proof of the progress that
had been achieved. One more fact will help us to understand the amazing
rapidity with which the Consular administration reorganised the public
services, and the deep-seated optimism of which successive plebiscites gave so
signal a proof. In 1789, according to Levasseur, France contained not more than
26,000,000 inhabitants. The census of the year IX showed 27,347,800 or,
including the newly- annexed territories, 33,111,962. This implies, even during
the Revolution, a remarkable increase of the population.
We shall consider, in a later chapter, the reforms and undertakings
which, begun under the Consulate, were continued under the Empire. We propose
to deal in the same way with agriculture, manufactures, trade, literature,
science and art, and to confine ourselves for the present to the finances. The
first thing necessary was to clear off existing obligations. The market was
still loaded with paper of all sorts, requisition vouchers, assignments,
warrants for arrears of interest, exchequer bills of former issues, etc. There
were securities of more than sixty descriptions; all were more or less
depreciated; their total amount it is impossible to estimate. In order to
relieve the money market and restore healthy conditions, Gaudin took steps to
buy up these various securities; that is, he called them in, and, on their
being returned to the Treasury, gave in exchange for them consols of an amount
proportionate to their nominal value. The operation was carried through rapidly
and on the strictest lines, sometimes so strictly that it had almost the
appearance of partial repudiation. What was done, however, was justified by the
needs of the moment and by the shameless jobbery which had prevailed under the
Directory. Steps were also taken to consolidate various portions of the Public
Debt outstanding. This operation was not complete at the close of the
Consulate, and was continued under the Empire.
The combined result of all these operations was an increase in the Public
Debt. In the year XII (1803-4) it showed a total of about
45,000,000 francs in perpetual annuities (without
counting life annuities), being an increase of 9,000,000 francs on the amount
existing after the last budget of the Directory. But, if the Public Debt was
thus increased, it was done for the purpose of discharging existing
obligations. Bonaparte issued no annuities to cover loans; in this respect, he
adhered to older systems of finance. He found the necessary resources in the
extraordinary receipts; these were of two sorts, external and internal. The
extraordinary external receipts consisted of the war contributions, subsidies,
and payments of every sort made by conquered countries or by foreign
26
Receipts and
Expenditure. [1799-1804
Powers. An estimate of their total value, even approximate, is unfortunately
impossible. They reached by far their highest point under the Consulate in the
year XII (1803-4), when they amounted to
122.000.000 francs,
of which 50,000,000 francs represent what was paid by the United States for
Louisiana. The extraordinary internal receipts were the result, in the first
place, of the special measures adopted at the beginning of the Provisional
Consulate. In the second place, the sale of the national domains, wisely
conducted, provided yearly an appreciable sum. According to Stourm, the
Consulate received in all nearly
300.000.000 francs
from the extraordinary internal receipts.
The ordinary receipts under the Revolution consisted almost entirely of
direct taxes; and we have seen with what care Gaudin, so soon as he was
appointed, proceeded to reorganise them. The finance law of February 25, 1804,
provided that “ all collectors of direct taxes should be appointed by the First
Consul,” and that there should be, “so far as possible, one collector in each
city, town, and village.” The administrative hierarchy was thenceforward
complete and fully centralised under the State. By its wise management the
taxes were got in with far greater facility and produced better results.
Under the Revolution the indirect taxes had been reduced to a minimum.
Besides the customs and the postal revenue, there only remained the
registration and stamp duties, with certain miscellaneous taxes on public
conveyances, articles of gold and silver, playing-cards, and tobacco. Contrary
to Gaudin’s advice, Bonaparte refused for a long time to impose any new
indirect taxation, not because he condemned it in principle, but because he
called to mind the dangerous unpopularity of the aides and gabelles of the
ancien regime. Eventually he consented ; but he proceeded at first with the
greatest caution. Even under the Directory, town dues (octrois) were again
levied in Paris and certain other cities, in respect of articles intended for
local consumption ; and the law of February 24, 1800, made the levying of town
dues obligatory “ in towns where the public hospitals had not revenues
sufficient for their wants.” Thus the new indirect taxation was at first
devoted to local purposes. Subsequently, Bonaparte decided to avail himself of
it for State purposes also; and a law of February 25,1804, imposed a tax on
liquors, and provided for concentrating the management of all indirect taxes,
old and new, in the hands of a single General Board, the combined Octroi and
Excise Office (droits reunis).
The two first budgets of the Consulate (years VIII and IX, 17991801)
were still loaded with arrears which were in process of liquidation. But the
typical budget, and the one which exemplifies best the happy results of
Bonaparte’s financial policy, was that of the year X (1801-2). According to the
corrected figures, the payments (701,241,518 francs) and the receipts
(701,466,299 francs) practically balanced each other. According to the figures
given by Nicolas, 46 per cent, of the receipts
1800-4] Taxes.—The budget.—The Bank of France. 27
were derived from direct taxation, 22 per cent, from the forests and
national domains (including the amount produced by sales), 27 per cent, from
indirect taxation, 5 per cent, from various sources and extraordinary receipts.
Of the payments, the charges in connexion with the finances and the public debt
absorbed 47 per cent., the army and navy 45 per cent., and the expenses of
administration 8 per cent. An exact balance was secured by strictly adjusting
expenses to receipts; and the taxes were collected easily because they were
relatively very light. In 1789, according to Taine, of every 100 francs of net,
income, the peasant paid 14 francs to his seigneur, 14 to the Church, 53 to the
King, and kept only 19 for himself. After 1800 he paid nothing to the seigneur
or to the Church; he paid 21 francs in all to the State, the department, and
the commune; and he kept 79 francs for himself. “These figures,” as Taine
remarks, “are all-important.” Further, on August 11, 1800, the State was able
to announce that the government annuities would be paid punctually and in cash
as they fell due. This promise was strictly kept.
From a financial point of view, as well as in other respects, the year
1801-2 marked the zenith of success. After the year XI, the expenses entailed
by the renewal of war and the reappearance of extraordinary sources of income
lowered the character of the budget. On the other hand, Bonaparte was
perpetually tampering with the legitimate control of the Assemblies. On no
single occasion were his financial proposals presented in a strictly legal and
candid fashion. The consequence was that, in spite of the results achieved,
complete confidence was never felt. The average price of the 5 per cent,
annuities did not exceed 60 francs. This was, to use Stourm’s forcible
expression, “ a masked affront offered daily to Bonaparte by an irreconcilable
Bourse.”
It was a sounder policy which prompted the creation of the Bank of
France. There were several houses at Paris which carried on a discount business,
collected debts, received deposits, opened current accounts, and issued notes
payable to bearer and at sight. The oldest of these was the Bank of Current
Accounts (Came des comptes courants), founded June 29, 1796, with a capital of
5,000,000 francs. Its condition was very prosperous; and Bonaparte decided
that, under a fresh name, it should extend its field of operations. On January
18, 1800, a general meeting of the shareholders voted the dissolution of the
company; and on the same day an ordinance decreed the establishment of the Bank
of France. Its capital amounted to 30,000,000 francs.
The operations of the Bank of France resembled those of the Bank of
Current Accounts; and its managers and directors, known as regents and censors,
were elected by the shareholders. What distinguished the Bank of France from
the company which it replaced was its intimate relation with the Government.
The First Consul, the members of his family, and the high officers of state
took shares in it. It was over the counter of the Bank that during several
years the holders of
government annuities received their arrears. The Bank was moreover
entrusted with other financial duties; for instance, with the custody of the
funds subscribed to the national lotteries. The law of April 14,
1803, increased
the capital of the Bank to 45,000,000 francs, and granted it for fifteen years
the exclusive privilege of issuing bank-notes. The other banks which enjoyed a
right of issue either went into liquidation or were bought up by the Bank of
France.
Bonaparte meanwhile pursued his ambitious designs. Through the medium of
Prussia he proposed to Louis XVIII, who was then at Warsaw, that he should
renounce his right to the Crown in return for an indemnity. Louis declined the
offer, and in a decisive reply, published on March 3,1803, he reaffirmed all
his rights. A crushing victory was required to reduce him to impotence.
Bonaparte’s famous outbreak against the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth, at
the diplomatic reception on March 13, 1803, was intended to be at once a reply
to the declarations of Louis XVIII and to the reluctance of the British
Government to carry out the terms of the Peace of Amiens. War with Great
Britain broke out afresh in May, 1803. Public opinion was not in favour of war;
but, of all the members of the former Coalition, England was the most detested
in France. Bonaparte’s popularity was not affected. With much parade he
organised the camp at Boulogne for an invasion of England. Some historians have
doubted whether invasion was his real design; but in any case all his available
troops remained till 1805 concentrated at Boulogne and in the neighbourhood,
practising the same manoeuvres and inspired by a common enthusiasm. The camp at
Boulogne was a crucible in which the various divisions of the republican forces
were fused together, and from which emerged, homogeneous and trained to his
hand, the “ Grand Army ” of the Emperor.
Like Bonaparte, the royalists hailed with joy the resumptibn of
hostilities. They persuaded themselves, and their correspondents at Paris
stated, that “no one believed in the permanence of the new regime." The
exiles in London were much excited. They hoped that the British Government
would once more lend them its support; and, as a matter of fact, the proceedings
of certain British agents—of Drake at Munich, and of Spencer Smith at
Stuttgart—were of a nature to encourage the conspirators. In February, 1803, a
certain Mehee de la Touche arrived in London with the information that the
Jacobins and republicans still formed a powerful party, which was ready to
associate itself with the royalists in overthrowing the tyrant. The idea was
attractive. A plan of operations was devised: it embraced an insurrection at
Paris, risings in the west and south, assistance to be sent by England, and the
landing in France of the Comte d’Artois or some other member of the royal
House. Success seemed to be assured.
Now Mehee de la Touche was probably a secret agent of Fouche.
1803-4]
29
The former Minister of the General Police had obtained a subvention from
Bonaparte; and his personal agents acted independently of the official police,
who were now attached to the Ministry of Justice. Fouche, with consummate
skill, took advantage of the situation thus created. The conspiracy of 1803-4
was in part his work. His ambition was to become a minister once more; and he
saw the advantages which Bonaparte might reap by the discovery of a fresh plot.
On August 21,1803, Cadoudal left London with a few trusted friends, of
whom one, by name Querel, seems also to have been a police agent in disguise.
Cadoudal crossed the Channel on a cutter from the British fleet commanded by
Captain Wright, landed at night at Biville, near Dieppe, and proceeded to
Paris. He was furnished by the British Government with drafts for a million
francs to enable him to organise the insurrection in the capital. Meanwhile
General Lajolais, an old friend of Pichegru, had seen General Moreau at Paris,
and had talked to him of Pichegru; and, as Moreau seemed to preserve the
friendliest recollection of him, Lajolais thought himself justified in
announcing that Moreau was inclined to follow Pichegru’s example and make
common cause with the royalists. On January 16,1804, Pichegru, Lajolais, Riviere,
and the Polignacs landed, and secretly entered Paris.
It only remained for the royalists to come to an understanding with
Moreau, the leader of the republican party, with a view to common action.
Lajolais arranged an interview between Pichegru and Moreau on January 24; and
an appointment was made for 7 p.m. on January 27 in the Boulevard de la Madeleine.
Moreau proceeded thither with Lajolais; but Pichegru also brought a companion
whom Lajolais introduced: it was Cadoudal. Moreau at once withdrew. During the
following days (February 2 and 8) Pichegru called on Moreau; but his visits
were vain; Moreau had never been willing, and was at this moment less willing
than ever, to associate himself with the royalists.
The official police were at a loss. They had arrested some conspirators,
of whom Querel was one; but the whole affair remained a puzzle. They suspected
a plot of some sort, but they were ignorant of its nature; and Bonaparte
taunted them with their ignorance. At the end of January, however, when the conspiracy
was ripe, and Moreau appeared to be sufficiently compromised, Bonaparte and
Fouche resolved to act. Orders were given to place on their trial certain of
the royalists who had been arrested by the police. Querel was one of these; and
he made haste to confess (January 25) all he knew,—the nature of the
conspiracy, the presence of Georges Cadoudal at Paris, and the expected arrival
of a prince. There was great excitement. On February 1 a General Board of
Public Safety was opened at the Ministry of Justice; at the head of it was
Real, a friend of Fouchd Action was delayed for a few days in the hope of
obtaining fresh evidence against Moreau. When it became clear that he would not
move, he was arrested (February 15).
A general uproar suddenly succeeded the mysterious silence of the
previous weeks; and the public excitement reached its height when the police
discovered and arrested Pichegru (Febi aary 29), George* Cadoudal (March 9),
and soon afterwards most of the other conspirators.
The whole performance had been arranged with the greatest skill; but what
rendered the conspiracy of 1804 a model of police perversity, was the fact that
a real conspiracy existed, and that Fouche himself did not know everything.:
The conspirators were expecting a prince. The question was, which prince, and
where was. he ? , Savary, chief of the gendarmerie d'elite, betook himself to
Biville to keep an eye on Monsieur, the Comte d’Artois. But it was not
Monsieur’s way to run any risks; he remained where he was. Enquiries were
hastily made as to the residence of the other princes; and on May 8 there came
from Strassburg some astonishing information.
The Due d?Enghien, son of the Due de
Bourbon,, and grandson of the Prince de Conde, was living at Ettenheim, less
than two leagues from the Rhine. He came now and then secretly into Strassburg.
With him were supposed to be Dumouriez and an English agent, Colonel Smith, who
had just come from London and was clearly in correspondence with Drake. The
expected prince could be no other than the Due d’Enghien. On March 10 Bonaparte
summoned his colleagues, the two Consuls, with Talleyrand, Fouchd, and Regnier,
to a privy council, at which it was decided to arrest the Duke, in spite of the
fact that Ettenheim was in the territory of Baden. Generals Ordener,
Caulaincourt, and Fririon were sent at the head of a small force; and during
the night of March 14 they arrested the Duke at Ettenheim. He was at once sent
on to Paris. Meanwhile, the papers seized at Ettenheim, and the reports of the
officer commanding the expedition, had reached Bonaparte. Everything pointed
to a mistake. The Duke was not conspiring; he was living quietly at Ettenheim.
With him was, not Dumouriez, but the old Marquis de Thumery, whose name,
disguised by German pronunciation, had occasioned the blunder; Schmidt (not
Smith), came from Freiburg, not from London; the Duke had never been at
Strassburg; and, if it was true that he had wished to take service in England
against France, and that he was in receipt of a pension from the British
Cabinet, there was in all this nothing that was not natural in the case of an
emigre of royal blood. .
Bonaparte, however, paid no attention to these facts. Was he under the
influence of one of those fits of rage, genuine or simulated, to which he was
subject? Was his object to make a terrible example, to avenge himself in the
person of the Duke on the prince who had not arrived to take command of the
“assassins”? Was it to prove to the republican party that the blood which was
about to flow would render reconciliation between himself and the Bourbons
impossible; or was it to bind to himself, by making them his accomplices, those
of his followers whom he
1804] Arrest and execution of the Due d'Enghten. 31
suspected of
sympathy with the fallen dynasty ? At all events, Bonaparte was resolved that
the Duke should die.
On the
morning of March 20, a meeting of the privy council decided to summon
immediately a military commission of seven members, to be named by Murat, as
Governor of Paris. At 11 o’clock Murat made his nominations, appointing as
president General Hulin, who commanded the Consular Guard. At half-past five
the Duke arrived at the castle of Vincennes, where two hours before his grave
had been dug. At nine in the evening the members of the commission met at the
castle. A detachment of troops commanded by Savary was also present. At
11 o’clock the Duke was subjected to a
preliminary examination in his room. At 1 a.m. on the 21st he appeared before
his judges, Savary standing immediately behind Hulin. The examination was
short, and revealed nothing. At half-past two the Due d’Enghien was shot.
By midday on
the 21st the news-boys were shouting the news in the streets of Paris. An
immense sensation was created; and Bonaparte strove to profit by it at once
with a view to carrying out his grand design. On March 22 he caused Regnier to
send in a report on the intrigues of Drake; and on March 23 he laid this report
before the Senate. The result, however, did not answer the expectations of the
First Consul. Not till four days later did the Senate draw up an address, in
which, while reprehending the recent plots, they urged that, with a view to
punishing similar attempts, a “ High Court or National Jury ” should be
established, in order to safeguard the existing system of government. They
further besought the First Consul “to complete his work, by rendering it, like
his glory, immortal.”
The wish thus
expressed was exceedingly vague; and the most determined supporters of
Bonaparte dared not as yet pronounce the word “ hereditary.” A series of
intrigues, of which very little is known, occupied the following weeks. On the
surface a great movement of opinion, partly genuine, partly manufactured by the
Government, swayed the country in favour of Bonaparte, by whose death the
English and the conspirators had meant to compass the destruction of France.
The columns of the Moniteur were filled with addresses breathing devotion and
enthusiasm. The Opposition was finally overcome. When Bonaparte at last, on
April 25, replied to the address of the Senate, he put the question in plain
terms: “You have resolved that it is necessary
that
the supreme magistracy should be hereditary I
now ask you
to explain
fully what is passing in your minds.”
Already, on
April 23, Curee, a member of the Tribunate, had brought forward a resolution
that Bonaparte “ should be declared Emperor,” and “ that the Imperial dignity
should be declared hereditary in his family.” The debate began on April 30.
Carnot alone spoke and voted against the proposal. The decision of the
Tribunate, given on May 3, was communicated on May 4 to the Senate, which
replied to the message of
April 25 as
follows: “ Glory, gratitude, devotion, reason, the interests of the State, all
unite to proclaim Napoleon hereditary Emperor.”
For some days
Bonaparte was engaged in drawing up, with the aid of his privy council, a new
constitutional instrument, which was approved by the Council of State on May
13, and laid before the Senate three days later. After a short debate, the
Senate passed the measure, which thus became the “Organic Senatus Consultum of
28 Flor&d, year XII” (May 18, 1804). By Clause 1, the “government of the
Republic is entrusted to an Emperor, who takes the title of Emperor of the
French.” By Clause 2, “ Napoleon Bonaparte, now First Consul of the Republic,
is Emperor of the French.” By Clause 3, “ the Imperial dignity is declared
hereditary.” So soon as the vote had been given, the Senate went in a body to
St Cloud; and there Cambaceres, Second Consul and President of the Senate,
hailed Napoleon by the title of “ Imperial Majesty.”
A fresh
plebiscite, ordered by a decree of May 19, was to give its sanction to the
Imperial Constitution. Meanwhile the trial of the conspirators went on. There
is no doubt that many of them were put to the torture in prison. Pichegru died
there on April 16; whether he was murdered, after being tortured to no purpose,
or committed suicide, we cannot say. During the trial Moreau retained his quiet
self-possession; and his replies were repeatedly applauded. Cadoudal showed
courage and firmness. The judges were at first, by seven votes to five, in
favour of acquitting Moreau; butSavary and Real, who watched the proceedings
from an adjoining room, induced them to reconsider their decision. In the end,
the court sentenced Cadoudal and nineteen of his companions to death; Moreau,
Jules de Polignac, and three others, were condemned to two years’ imprisonment;
the rest were acquitted or sent before another tribunal. Bonaparte eventually
agreed to pardon Moreau. Yielding to Josephine’s entreaties, he commuted, for
imprisonment, the death sentence passed on eight of the accused, viz. Lajolais,
Riviere, Armand de Polignac, and the other members of the nobility who were
implicated with Cadoudal. The conspirators of meaner birth were executed, with
their leader, on June 24; and on the following day Moreau sailed for America.
The result of the plebiscite was not published till November 26, when the
corrected figures gave 3,572,329 “ayes” against 2,569 “noes.” “We have done
more than we hoped to do,” Cadoudal had said in prison; “ we meant to give
France a King, and we have given her an Emperor.” Such was in fact the final
outcome of the Consulate. From 18 Bru- maire onwards Bonaparte had toiled
without ceasing at the reorganisation of France, but always with a view to his
own interest. Hence the double aspect of the whole history of the Consulate. On
the one hand, there is Bonaparte’s continuous ascent to supreme power.
Profiting as much by the general feeling of weariness as by the popular
enthusiasm which he aroused, he forced his way, by a series of small coups
d'etat, by slight breaches of the Constitution, by misstatements, by the greed
and the
fears which
he excited, and by the ever-increasing personal influence which he exercised on
those around him. His policy was at once very simple and highly diversified. He
persisted in holding himself aloof from party; he belonged “neither to the Red
Heels nor to the Red Caps,” to quote the picturesque phrase of a contemporary
writer; he was “ neither royalist, nor republican”; he meant that there should
be but one party in France—his own. But in the rapid development of his policy
he showed marvellous versatility. During the Provisional Consulate he
maintained a waiting attitude. Afterwards, down to Marengo, his aim was to
bring about pacification, either by repression or by milder methods. Between
Marengo and the Peace he maintained order and laboured systematically to
reconcile the old France and the new. After the Peace and the Consulate for
Life there was a halt in his triumphal progress, which gave him time to prepare
for the Empire.
On the other
hand, it was Bonaparte who directed the reorganisation of France; and never
perhaps in history was a work so formidable accomplished so quickly. Order and
regularity were established in every branch of the administration. The greater
part of the institutions founded during the Consulate have survived to the
present day; and it is no exaggeration to state that it was Bonaparte who
created contemporary France. For this very reason, however, the Consular
system weighed heavily on France during the nineteenth century. Devised by one
man for his own ends, concentrating everything at Paris, leaving to the nation
at large neither liberty nor initiative, and affecting a democratic guise the
better to crush democracy itself, it deranged the political balance of the
country and for a long time paralysed the national spirit. From the civil and
economic point of view, Bonaparte confirmed the work of the Revolution: all
Frenchmen retained their equality before the law; and those who had become
owners of national property were secured in their possessions. But, from the
political point of view, Bonaparte revived the arbitrary traditions of the old
monarchy; and often his institutions were mere replicas of the past. The
Council of State and the King’s Council, prefects and mtendcmts, sub-prefects
and sub-delegates, the Prefect of Police and the Lieutenant-General of Police,
the droits reunis and the aides, are but brothers and sisters, the children of
one father—who is no other than absolutism. And the consequence is that,
although starting from the Consulate, the history of France during the
nineteenth century has been, in many respects, nothing but a long and toilsome
reaction against the system created by Bonaparte.
THE ARMED
NEUTRALITY.
Sect. I.—THE
BALTIC POWERS (1780-1801).
On November 17,
1796, Catharine II died. Paul Petrovitch was proclaimed as Tsar of the Russias.
During the long and momentous reign of his mother, Paul had been rigidly
excluded from all government iffairs. A man of forty-two at the time of
Catharine’s death, he had been kept for years in a condition of tutelage. While
princes* archbishops, and foreign ambassadors were crowding to the
toilet-chamber of a Potemkin or a Platon Zuboff, the heir to the throne was
devoid of all political influence. His very children were removed from his
control on their birth, and educated without reference to his wishes. Exposed
at the Winter Palace or at Tsarskoie Selo to the humiliation of the presence of
the successive favourites of Catharine and covertly jibed at in the circle
surrounding the Empress, Paul avoided the Court. Living during the summer at
his country-house, Pavlovsk, during the autumn at another country place,
Gatchina, he amused himself after the fashion of his father. Just as Peter III
had had his Holstein guard drilled after the pattern of Frederick the Great, so
Paul, ndulged by Catharine with the title of Grand Admiral and with permission
to retain in service some battalions of marines, had set up a small army which
he clothed and drilled on the Prussian model.
It would have
been a powerful or singularly sweet nature which should have endured unsoured
the position of the Grand Duke Paul. Paul’s nature was not of the equable,
forgiving type. It was marked by many of the worst peculiarities of the
murdered Peter III and of Peter the Great. He was morose, fitful,
narrow-minded, and given to sudden fierce gusts of wild, unreasoning passion.
He was capricious, erratic, unstable, veering from point to point with each
changing mood and influence. Not perhaps naturally cruel, and capable at times
of thoughts and deeds of generous chivalry, he was a bitter and vindictive
enemy. Evil spirits there had been, ready to suggest to Paul that the sceptre
swayed by his mother was rightly his own; but the Grand Duke had been possessed
of sufficient wisdom to refrain from any overt attempt against Catharine’s
rule. The poison had, nevertheless, not been without
its effects
Mother and son were divided; and, in the later years of Catharine, the
estrangement became ever more acute. It was universally believed at St
Petersburg that, at the time of her sudden decease, she was on the point of
promulgating an ukase nominating her grandson Alexander as her successor, to
the exclusion of Paul.
Thus an
explanation is found for the first internal legislative act of Paul’s reign,
and for the trend of his earliest proceedings; Immediately after his
coronation, an Imperial edict declared the order of succession to the Russian
throne to be that of primogeniture from male to male in the direct line. A
deep-seated hostility against the confidants and conceptions of his mother
constitutes the first key to his initial policy. “Never was there any change of
scene at a theatre so sudden; and so complete as the change of affairs at the
accession of Paul I. In less than a day costumes, manners, occupations, all
were changed.” So writes the future minister of Alexander, the great Pole, Adam
George Czartoiyski. The army of Gatchina made its ceremonious entry into St
Petersburg; its rank and file were distributed among the existing Imperial
Guards, in which corps its officers received high promotion. The aristocratic
guardsmen, who had made merry with the Gatchina force, found themselves
suddenly under its heel. The military profession became a teal thing. Favoured
courtiers who had attfehded drill once a year, and old officers who had never
smelt powder, whilst yet imagining: that Russian troops could march anywheie,
were called out for daily military parties under a martinet discipline. The
dress and accoutrements of the Prussian army superseded the old Russian
equipments.
The Court was
revolutionised. Platon Zuboff was permitted to retire to his Lithuanian estates
; his brother Nicholas was actually prbmoted; but the dramatic incident of the
exhuming of the coffin of Peter III at the Alexander Nevski Convent, and its
conveyance to the Winter Palace to lie by that of Catharine, when Prince
Bariatinskii and Alexis Orloff were compelled to watch by its side, and to walk
behind it till both Imperial corpses were laid in the same vault, strudk the
note of the new reign. Count Bezborodko, alone amongst the trusted ministers of
Catharine,- was singled out for continued confidence; and Bezborodko was
believed to have earned the title of Prince and the immense gifts which the
Emperor showered upon him, by handing over to Patil no less a document than the
decree whereby Catharine had proposed, on her next birthday, to declare his
exclusion from the throne. Bezborodko was entrusted with the conduct of forJgn
affairs. Rostopchin, who had been crafty enough to solicit from the Grand Duke
in fotmer days the privilege of wearing the Gatchina uniform, became Minister
of War. Arakcheieff, a poor artillery captain of 27 years of age, who had
earned Paul’s gratitude by organising his tiny Gatchina battery, took charge of
the police as Commandant of the capitals, Familiarity with Gatchina and
fidelity to Peter III were the first passports to distinction.
Nor was it
the Court only that felt the change. Russia in general speedily realised the
worst that had been prophesied of Paul. That he should attempt to introduce
order into Russian finance, and that corrupt officialdom, alike in St
Petersburg and in the provinces, should learn to tremble at his name, was only
too desirable; but in other directions his domestic changes were less satisfactory'.
Paul was a bom despot, and had the old Russian sense of his own dignity. Not
only was a stilted court ceremonial introduced and enforced with a rigour which
made each day’s attendance a dangerous ordeal for the trembling courtiers, but
in the streets of the capital the signs of the humblest submission were exacted
by the new Tsar. Princes and ladies were compelled to descend from their
vehicles into the snow to salute the passing Imperial carriage. At the
coronation at Moscow, the Poles saw their King relegated to a side gallery;
and, when the unhappy Stanislas, ill and wearied by the inordinate length of
the ceremonial, ventured to sit down, a messenger sent directly by Paul
compelled him to stand during the remainder of the service. The atmosphere of
dignified yet easy and kindly familiarity, which had surrounded Catharine, was
exchanged for a reign of terror.
In his early
dealings with foreign Powers, Paul’s proceedings were not unmarked by wisdom.
He recalled the Russian forces from Persia and Georgia. He released Potocki and
other distinguished Polish prisoners. He invited Stanislas to St Petersburg and
received him with royal honours. He even went so far as to express to
Kosciuszko his personal disapproval of the partition of Poland. He instructed
Osterman to announce by circular to foreign Courts a policy of peace. Russia,
and Russia alone, he said, had been engaged since 1756 in wars. The nation was
exhausted; he could not refuse to his subjects the repose for which they
sighed. He would remain faithful to Russia’s alliances, and oppose by all
possible means the purposes of the mad French Republic; but he could not in the
first days of his reign send a Russian army beyond his borders. Kolycheff,
despatched to Berlin, was commissioned to declare that the new Emperor sought
neither conquests nor aggrandisements; he was even permitted to inform
Caillard, the French envoy at the Prussian Court, that the Tsar did not
consider himself at war with France, that he was disposed to live on friendly terms
with her, that he would engage his allies to hasten to conclude the war, and
would offer Russian mediation for the purpose. The Baltic policy of Catharine
was continued. The close relations of friendship with neutral Denmark, which
had been reknit by Catharine, were naturally continued. Count Grigorii Golovkin
was sent to Stockholm to announce the accession of Paul; and advantage was
taken of the occasion to reopen the negotiations for the match between the
Swedish King and the Grand Duchess Alexandra. In these proceedings, the
Tsaritsa Maria and the talented favourite, Mademoiselle Nelidoff, who combined
to exercise a consistently restraining influence on the mind of Paul, lent
their aid.
Paul was as
good as his word. The Russian squadron, which had been cooperating with the
British in the North Sea and the Channel, was recalled. The design of
despatching a Russian army of 60,000 men to the Rhine, which Catharine had been
nursing, was dropped. The oppressive system of recruiting which she had enforced
was given up. But there was no slackening of vigilance against the progress of
French republican principles. Hostility to the French Revolution was, indeed, a
religion with Paul; it has been rightly recognised as the dominant principle of
his reign. When, in his later days, he leant towards Bonaparte, it was because
he recognised in him the most powerful foe of Jacobinism. Russian subjects were
recalled forthwith by Paul from western travel. A strict censorship, directed
against revolutionary principles, was imposed upon the theatre and the press.
Frenchmen entering Russia were required to present passports attested by a
Bourbon Prince. In certain directions Paul’s virulence against Parisian manners
under the new regime was bizarre and even sank to the level of comedy.
Frockcoats, waistcoats, and high collars were denounced as symbols of
liberalism. The unhappy wearer of a round hat was chased by the police in the
streets of the capital and castigated at the nearest guard-house. Even the
ambassador Whitworth found it necessary to change his headgear.
It was
impossible that a ruler with Paul’s want of mental balance should succeed in
avoiding for any long period serious commotion, international or domestic. His
first diplomatic failure was with Sweden.
Gustavus III
and Catharine II had made peace at Werela in August, 1790. Gustavus, in his
eagerness to engage in active opposition against revolutionary Frarice, had
shown a desire to compose his differences with his ancient foe. The outcome
was the defensive Treaty of Drottningholm, October 19, 1791. Gustavus required
money for his proposed campaign. He had irretrievably lost the subsidies
formerly contributed from Versailles to impoverished Sweden; he obtained by the
treaty the financial aid of Russia. In the course of the negotiation, Gustavus
formulated the suggestion of a marriage between his heir and the Grand Duchess
Alexandra, the daughter of Paul and the favourite grand-daughter of Catharine.
The dowry of a Russian Grand Duchess was a matter of serious consideration for
Sweden.
The
assassination of Gustavus (March, 1792) shook the Swedish monarchy, whose power
had recently been on the increase, and put an end to the anti-French projects
of Sweden. The Regent, Charles of Sudermania, took a different line from his
predecessor in international politics. Baron Reuterholm, who was recalled to
Court as the Regent’s confidential adviser, was a fanatical Lutheran purist,
who, having been in Paris during the revolutionary ferment, had, seemingly
without much warrant, earned the reputation of a Jacobin. Returning to
Stockholm, he played with France and intrigued with the Porte against Russia.
Catharine II was speedily made aware of Sweden’s return to her old
paths; hut
Count Stackelberg, the Russian Minister at Stockholm, was instructed to keep on
foot the negotiations for the proposed marriage. Stackelberg remonstrated
somewhat strongly against the dealings of the Regent with Constantinople, and
his recall was demanded (May, 1793); while Catharine on her side stopped the
Swedish subsidy. Though the marriage treaty continued to be mooted, various
circumstances combined to widen the breach between Catharine and the Swedish
Government. Baron Armfeldt, a personal enemy of Reuterholm and a Russian
sympathiser, headed a plot against the Regent. The consp* acy was discovered.
Armfeldt escaped, and ultimately took refuge in the dominions of Catharine, who
haughtily refused his extrad'*,ion. The Regent retaliated by publicly
announcing in Stockholm a match between Gustavus Adolphus and a Princess of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The French party was again in the ascendant in the
Swedish capital.
Catharire II
exerted herself to stave pff this diplomatic defeat. It was at length announced
that Gustavus IV Adolphus would, in company with his uncle, visit St
Petersburg. The Regent and Reuterholm suddenly displayed seeming eagerness for
the Russian marriage. The visit was duly paid. The preliminaries were
apparently arranged to mutual satisfaction; the day of the formal betrothal was
fixed, and the company actually assembled for the ceremony. But the bridegroom
came not. He had refused to sign the document dictated by Catharine and presented
to him at the last moment, whereby the future Russian Queen of Sweden was to be
permitted the free exercise of the Orthodox faith. The Regent and Reuterholm
had only too surely gauged the character of the young Swedish (King. Reputed a
prodigy of learning, he was gauche, narrow-minded, irreclaimably obstinate, and
a fanatic in religion. Moreover he was as little ready as was his father to
stomach the attitude of superiority which was assumed by Catharine towards
decaying Sweden. The marriage negotiations were abruptly broken off. The
excitement caused by tbi; incident was the immediate cause of the apoplectic
seizure wliich carried off Catharine.
That Paul
should have suffered the pourparlers to be resinned affords strong testimony of
his desire to be on good terms with his Swedish neighbour. Golovkin, despatched
to Stockholm in the first instance to announce the accession of the new Tsar,
exerted himself to reopen the marriage treaty. He met with an absolute rebuff.
The position of neither party had in feet changed in the least since the
contretemps of October—November, 1796. Gustavus Adolphus endeavoured to atone
for his treatment of Golovl m by a civil communication to Paul; but the Tsar’s
patience was at an end. Golovkin was recalled; the Swedish agent, KKngsporre,
was ordered to leave St Petersburg; and the match was finally at an end (March,
1797). Gustavus IV Adolphus married Frederica Dorothea of Baden (October 31,
1797), whilst the Grand Duchess Alexandra found a husband in Austria.
The attitude
of Paul towards Prance did not remain long unchanged. His initial bias was
against the republican government. On their side, the Directory displayed no
consistent aptitude for cultivating the friendship of the eccentric and
capricious Tsar. The magnificent career of Bonaparte in Italy, closing with the
Peace of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797), made them less careful of Russian
susceptibilities. The possession by the French of the Ionian Islands conflicted
with Russian schemes of future Mediterranean aggrandisement. On the other hand,
Austria was little content either with the peace or with the action of the
French negotiators at Rastatt; whilst England, whose peace negotiations at
Lille (Juna-r^September, 1797) had failed, was willing enough to acquire a
powerful, active ally. Already on February 21, 1797, the signature of a treaty
of commerce marked the progress made at St Petersburg by British diplomacy.
Whitworth endeavoured deftly to involve Paul in German politics as guarantor of
the Peace of Teschen; the Tsar took the bait; and the refusal of the French to
admit his representative, Rasumovski, to the deliberations at Rastatt was a
severe blow to the Imperial amour-propre.
In January,
1797, Paul embarked upon that patronage of the Knights of St John which lent a
singular colour to his whole remaining career. Years later, Alexander I
affected to have discovered in this proceeding on the part of his father a vast
der.ign to knit together all the nobility of Europe in an alliance of loyalty
and honour against the invasion of those equalising ideas which were attacking
and undermining all ranks of society. Paul was, in a word, an eighteenth
century Crusader. While not sharing Catharine’s pseudo-liberalism, Paul had all
her willingness to shine in European politics, a willingness which, in her
case, had produced the mediation of Teschen and the First Armed Neutrality. At
one period in her career, Catharine, in pursuance of her anti-Turkish designs,
had endeavoured to establish useful relations with Malta; and her heir had been
roused to enthusiasm for the Knights of St John by the perusal of Vertot’s
history.
Shortly after
Paul’s accession, the Bailli of the Order, Count Giulio Litta, appeared at St
Petersburg with a petition for the reestablishment of a Grand Priory of the
Knights which had formerly been founded without much success in Volynia. On
January 15, 1797, Paul entered into a convention with Litta; he reestablished
the Order in his dominions, and endowed it with large revenues. Cardinal Litta,
Papal Nuncio in St Petersburg, worked hand in hand with his brother in
pursuance of a Latin Church intrigue.
The Grand
Master, the Prince de Rohan, and the Jesuit Fathers were alike looking to find
their account in St Petersburg. Rohan nominated Count Litta as ambassador of
the Knights to the Russian Court, offered Paul the title of Protector of the
Order, and sent him La Valetta’s cross. Paul accepted the offer with enthusiasm
(November—*
December,
1797). Already in February, 1797, Bonaparte had captured at Ancona despatches
of Paul which revealed a design on the part of the Tsar to secure Malta. When
the news arrived of the surrender of Malta to the French in June, 1798, the
Russian Knights met, declared the deposition of the treacherous successor of
Rohan, the Rhinelander Baron Hompesch, and threw themselves uppn the grace of
Paid. By an act signed on September 10, 1798, Paul proclaimed his determination
to take the Order under his supreme direction, promising not only to maintain
its privileges but to reestablish it in its ancient splendour.
On October
27, 1798, the Knights pushed their cause by electing Paul to the Grand
Mastership. The little, ungainly Tsar of Orthodox Moscow assumed the insignia
of the headship of the great medieval Latin Crusading Order, created a second
Grand Priory for Russia, inaugurated a pompous ceremonial of initiation, and
decorated his favourites with knightly uniforms and crosses. Any diplomacy
would be unfortunate which should come athwart such a craze. The Elector of
Bavaria having declined to recognise the new Grand Master, his representative
at St Petersburg was forthwith arrested and conducted to the frontier by
Cossacks; Meantime the French Directors had been adding further fuel to the
fire of Paul’s resentment. They authorised the exiled Dombrovski to collect
Polish legions in Italy. Nikita Petrovitch Panin, the Russian representative at
Berlin, intercepted (January, 1798) a French despatch wherein there was talk of
the revival of an independent Poland. Paul, on his part, had furnished cause
of offence to France. He had taken into his pay (December, 1797) Conde’s corps
of emigres, which had been discharged from the Austrian establishment after the
signature of the Peace of Campo Formio, and had established Louis XVIII in the
palace of the old Dukes of Courland at Mittau with a pension of 200,000 roubles
(February, 1798). On the part of Paul, these were mere acts of chivalry; but
for the French they wore nevertheless a look of hostility. A Russian squadron
joined the fleet under Lord Duncan in July. When word reached St Petersburg
that a French expedition was fitting out at Toulon, Paul, suspecting that he
might be the object of attack, caused the Russian Black Sea coast to be put in
a state of defence. Negotiations were opened with Vienna for a new coalition
against France.
A palace
revolution at St Petersburg quickened the course of events. Kutaisoff, Paul’s
Turkish valet, had obtained over his master’s mind an influence well-nigh
magnetic. Without troubling himself to embark upon the uncertain tide of
political affairs, Kutaisoff was open to traffic with candidates for place.
Mademoiselle Nelidoff, in an evil hour, induced Paul to dismiss Rostopchin, the
ablest of the new ministers, from the charge of the War Department, and to
substitute in his room her own nephew. Rostopchin, banished to Moscow, found
means to ally himself with Kutaisoff, who looked askance at the rival influence
of Mademoiselle
Nelidoff. A
deft suggestion that the world regarded Paul as in feminine leading-strings
excited the ire of the Tsar. The introduction to Court of a young heauty,
Mademoiselle Lopukhin, did the rest. The star of the Empress and her confidante
paled. Rostopchin came back to St Petersburg to take charge of foreign affairs.
It was Rostopchin who was the soul of the Russian alliance with Pitt.
The campaigns
of the Second Coalition and the sources of the estrangement of Paul from
Austria have been described in a previous volume. When Suvdroff led back the
remains of his gallant army into Bavaria in the autumn of 1799, all Russia
accused the Austrians of treachery. To Paul’s anger at political betrayal was
added the fury of personal resentment. His favourite daughter, the Grand
Duchess Alexandra, had, after the failure of the Swedish match, married the
Archduke Joseph, Prince Palatine of Hungary. The jealousy of the Empress drove
the beautiful Russian from the Austrian Court. When Paul heard of this, his
rage was boundless. For a time British diplomacy prevented a violent explosion;
but, long before the insult offered to the Russian flag on the capitulation of
Ancona (November 29, 1798) had become known in St Petersburg, Cobenzl,
challenged by Paul to answer, “ without if or but,"" whether Austria
would restore the Pope and the King of Sardinia to their dominions and
sovereignty, had failed to give a satisfactory reply and been forbidden the
Court; and the troops of Suvdroff had begun their homeward march through
Bohemia and Moravia. The sole result for Russia of the campaign of 1799 was the
conquest of the Ionian Islands in alliance with the Turks. Paul longed to
avenge himself upon Austria. He was still willing to act against France, hut it
must be with other allies. He proposed a new coalition formed of the northern
Powers, to the exclusion of Austria. But for such a league neither Prussia nor
England was prepared.
Meanwhile
causes of difference between England herself and Russia were not wanting. The
combined Anglo-Russian expedition in Holland was a total failure. The Russians
had suffered heavily; and the Duke of York capitulated at Alkmaar (October 18).
On October 9, 1799, Bonaparte landed at Frejus. On November 9 (18 Brumaire,
year VIII) the Directory was overthrown; and on the next day the Consulate was
established. The eagle eye of Bonaparte took in at a glance the political
situation. His first thought was to entice Prussia from her attitude of neutrality;
his next to draw off Paul from the Coalition. The first approaches to Paul were
made through Hamburg; hut negotiations soon centred in Berlin, whither Paul had
sent Kriidener as agent to restore friendly relations with Frederick William.
In Malta,'then close pressed by a British squadron, Bonaparte recognised the
inevitable apple of discord between England and Russia. He offered, should the
garrison be compelled by famine to evacuate the place, to hand over the island
to the Tsar as Grand Master of the Knights of St John. No suggestion
could have
been better fitted for its purpose. The victory of Marengo (June 14, 1800) had
fixed the admiration of Paul upon Bonaparte. Shortly afterwards the wily First
Consul baited yet another hook. The British Government had declined to receive
in exchange for French prisoners Russians who had been captured in Holland and
elsewhere. Bonaparte offered to restore without ransom the Russian prisoners,
some 6000 in number, as a particular mark of his esteem for the brave Russian
troops, and of his desire to please the Tsar. He made known his recognition of
the interest taken by Paul in Sardinia, Naples, and Rome. Paul was ensnared
alike through his chwalry and his inordinate pride. General Sprengporten was
despatched (October 10) to Paris to open, under cover of receiving the Russian
prisoners, direct negotiations with the First Consul. He was received by
Bonaparte on December 20.
Meanwhile, on
September 5, 1800, Malta capitulated; but the British Government showed no disposition
to surrender the island to the Tsar. Paul’s anger found vent in the Second
Armed Neutrality.
For the
initial conception of this league it is necessary to go back twenty years. In
1780 Great Britain was at war with her revolted American colonies, with France,
and with Spain. The commerce of neutral Powers must always suffer more or less
at the hands of powerful naval belligerents. Such belligerents had always
claimed the right to capture at sea, not only the public property of a hostile
State, but the private property of hostile owners found on the high seas under
a hostile fiag. They had assumed, in the exercise of the right of blockade,
authority to cut off all approach by sea to certain ports and coast-lines; and
they had seized, as contraband, goods of certain kinds when carried on the high
seas to a hostile des1 nation, even when under a neutral flag. Until the close
of the first half of the eighteenth century, they had claimed and exercised,
without general protest, the power to capture on the -high seas hostile
property, though laden on board neutral merchantmen. Finally, in order to
secure their rights in these and other particulars, they had exercised a right
of visit and search over all merchantmen encountered on the high seas.
The interests
of belligerent and neutral in respect of these practices were obviously
divergent. It was to the interest of the belligerent to spread the net wide; it
was to the interest of the trader to secure the utmost freedom of traffic. So
early as the seventeenth century the Dutch, as great carriers, made it a point
of diplomacy to secure by special treaties with various Powers the recognition
of the principle “free ships, free goods,” i.e. that the neutral flag exempts
from seizure ordinary belligerent property laden thereunder. Frederick the
Great had endeavoured, with indifferent success, to erect the principle into an
universal rule. In a spirit dictated by less purely selfish considerations,
various treaties had been contracted for the definition of contraband, and for
the determination of the rights and duties of the neutral merchant in general.
The
shippers of
the Baltic dealt meinly in articles which were of direct belligerent
utility—timber, tar, hemp, cordage, and provisions. The leading exports of Russia
included com, leather, iron, hemp, sail-cloth, pitch and tar; Sweden and
Germany traded in similar products; and Denmark exported provisions. It was
natural that these Powers should feel with particular severity the restrictions
imposed alike by Great Britain and by her opponents in the naval contest
arising out of the American struggle for independence. The practice of Great
Britain was based upon the medieval Consolato del Mare and the precedents of
several centuries: the practice of France and Spain, embodied in various royal
instructions and in particular in a French ordinance of 1681, was even more
severe.
Out of these
circumstances the jalousy of two rivals for Catharine II’s favour created the
First Armed Neutrality. Sir James Harris was seeking to draw Catharine more
closely into a Bi .ish alliance; and Potemkin was apparently supporting him.
They sought to make capital of some Spanish mishandling of Rusr'an commerce in
the Mediterranean. Nikita Ivanovitch Panin, whose star was paling before that of
Potemkin, replied with a scheme which, while it offered to Catharine the proud
position of the protectress of the north, struck hard, under cover of rules of
general application, at the naval power of Great Britain. On February 28, 1780,
a circular declaration was forwarded to foreign Courts, wherein Catharine
announced certain principles “founded on the primitive law of peoples,” which
she proposed in future to defend by calling out, if necessary, her maritime
forces. These principles were, in brief: (1) that neutral vessels may navigate
freely from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war; (2) that
belligerent merchandise, with the exception of contraband, is protected by the
neutral flag; (8) that the character of a blockaded port belongs only to that
before which there is a force of vessels, anchored and sufficiently near to
make the attempt to enter manifestly dangerous; (4) that the nature of
contraband is strictly defined. Each of these principles pointed to a possible
real abuse of belligerent power. They were designed to reflect upon, and could
in fact be turned against, certain features of the British maritime practice
which, however, admitted of serious defence; namely, che legal principle known
as “the Rule of 1756,” the doctrine of Occasional Contraband, and the
contention that a notice sent by a government to neutral Powers that a
blockading squadron is on any coast constitutes a sufficient warn .ig of the
existence of a blockade. Gustavus III of Sweden, personally piqued against George
III, and ready to revive his waning popularity with his Swedish subjects by
becoming the champion of greater neutral trading freedom, quickly ranged
himself with Catharine. Denmark was yet more prompt; Bemstorff, in a
state-paper of May, 1780, declared the Baltic elose d to the armed vessels of
oelligerent Powers. By a series of conventions
signed at
Copenhagen and St Petersburg, a league was established between the three Powers
for the common support of the cause. Thus the First Armed Neutrality came into
being (1780). France and Spain hailed Catharine’s programme with more
enthusiasm than regard for consistency, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Portugal,
and the Two Sicilies, in the course of three years, successively acceded to the
league. Great Britain acquitted herself with consummate skill. She replied in
studied terms of courtesy to the communication of the Northern Powers; she
anticipated the accession of the States General to the Armed Neutrality by a
declaration of war; and the Dutch, receiving no succour from Catharine, were
severely punished.
The First
Armed Neutrality, as an onslaught upon British naval power, was a failure. The
long-standing commercial ties which bound the two countries were too close to
admit of Catharine embroiling herself with England in pursuit of what for her
was little more than a crusade of empty glory. The efforts of Gustavus III to
bring about the meeting of an international congress, by which the principles
of the Neutral League should be embodied as a maritime code, were fruitless.
When the revolutionary war broke out, the Powers of the Armed Neutrality, as
they became involved in the struggle, threw their principles to the winds.
Catharine herself united with England in the endeavour to prevent other “
Powers not implicated in this war from giving, on this occasion of common
concern to every civilised State, any protection whatever, directly or
indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce or property of
the French on the seas or in the ports of France” (Convention of March 25,
1793). Spain, Prussia, and Portugal entered into similar undertakings. A
Russian fleet cruising in the Baltic and the North Sea arrested all neutral
vessels bound for French ports, and compelled them either to return or make for
a neutral harbour. Ground between the upper millstone of the allied Powers and
the nether of French retaliatory measures, the neutral States suffered
severely; and in March, 1794, Denmark and Sweden were constrained to form an
alliance for the common defence of their trade.
But the
lesson of the First Armed Neutrality had hot been entirely lost. Various
treaties adopting its principles had been made between 1781 and 1789; and, down
to and throughout the dark days of the revolutionary struggle, one Power remained
true to its allegiance. Denmark, under the guidance of Andrew Peter, Count
Bemstorff, an honest, painstaking patriot, remained consistently neutral, and a
bold and firm supporter of the claims of neutral nations. A new item was now
added to the programme of the neutral States. In 1781 an old dispute was
revived between England and the Scandinavian Powers. Queen Christina, the
daughter of the great Gustavus, had in 1653 advanced the pretension that the
declaration of a neutral convoying officer as to the character of the cargoes
of the vessels under his convoy
should
invalidate the right of search; and the Dutch had occasionally ventured to
advocate this innovation. By Great Britain, as by other strong naval Powers,
the contention was always repelled. When, in 1781, the suggestion was again
brought forward by Gustavus III, Catharine declared that the principle
contended for was implied in her programme ; and she included it in her
treaties.
In 1798 the
convoys of the Danes and Swedes were largely increased, in consequence of
renewed activity on the part of the French Directory; and this particular
question rapidly assumed importance. In January, 1798, a large company of
Swedish merchantmen bound for the Mediterranean, under the convoy of a Swedish
frigate, was stopped in the Channel by a British squadron under Commodore
Lawford; and, on offering a show of forcible opposition to search, the
merchantmen were brought in for adjudication. In June, 1799, in the case of the
Maria, one of the captured vessels, Sir William Scott, the famous admiralty
judge, after the production of the Swedish official instructions which
expressly prohibited submission to search, pronounced sentence of condemnation
on the broad general ground of resistance to the exercise of “an incontestable
right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation.” With
Denmark the question was debated in a yet more striking fashion. In December,
1799, the commander of a Danish convoying frigate fired upon British boats
which were endeavouring to search vessels under his charge off Gibraltar.
Merry, the British charge d'affaires at Copenhagen, demanded an explanation.
Count Bernstorff, far from disavowing the proceedings of the officer, defended
his conduct and called upon the British Government for reparation. This affair
was still under discussion, when in July, 1800, in similar circumstances, the
Freya, a Danish frigate, was captured with the six vessels under her convoy,
after a smart action with a British squadron in the English Channel. The Danish
Government demanded the immediate restitution of the vessels and prompt
satisfaction for what they deemed a signal insult to the honour of their flag.
The reply of Great Britain was the immediate despatch of Lord Whitworth to
Copenhagen, while a British fleet under Admiral Dixon entered the Sound. A
lively and peremptory interchange of state papers ensued. Neither party would
abate its pretensions ; but at length mild counsels prevailed, and on August
29,1800, a convention was arrived at whereby Great Britain restored the Freya
and the other captured ships, and on her side Denmark agreed to suspend for the
present the grant of convoy.
Denmark, as
was natural, had communicated early with Russia. Paul’s indignation against
Great Britain was already rising fast. Earlier in the year he had dreamed of a
Northern League against France: he now fell back upon his mother’s diplomacy
and launched his bolt at his late ally. On August 27, 1800, he issued a
declaration wherein, after referring to the Freya incident, he invited the
monarchs of Prussia,
Denmark, and
Swedbii ta unite with him in the reestablishment of the principles of the Armed
Neutrality in their full force, and announced his determination to place his
subjects and those of his allies “ out of the reach of a sifnilar infraction of
thei right respected by every people.” When news arrived that a British
squadron had passed the Sound* Paul ordered the sequestration of all British
property found within his dominions (August 29). The signature of the
Anglo-Danish convention temporarily disconcerted his plans; then Malta fell,
and Paul was thoroughly aroused. On November 7, 1800, the Court Gazette of St
Petersburg announced the imposition of an embargo on British vessels in Russian
ports* to be maintained until such time as the island of Malta should be
surrendered to the Order of St John. The crews of two British Vessels having
successfully resisted the execution of this decree and made their escape from
the port of Narva, the Tsar ordered the burning of a third vessel which had
remained in the harbour. Many British seamen were marched as prisoners into the
interior of Russia, and were exposed to terrible hardships.
Other Powers
contributed to inflame the fury of Paul to the point of madness. On September
4, a British squadron cut out two Spanish frigates from the port of Barcelbnai.
The Spaniards declared that in this action use had been made of a neutral
Swedish galliot* and preferred a wholly unjustifiable demand that the captured
ships should be restored by Sweden. Prussia supported the Spaniards in their
claim. On November 23* the Prussian Government took possession of Cuxhaven, on
the pretext that a British cruiser, driven with its Prussian prize into that
neutral pdrt by stress of weather, had thereby violated the neutrality of
northern Germany, of which neutrality Frederick William openly claimed for
himself the role of protector. The Tsar’s brain was whirling. With one hand he
drew together his Baltic neighbours; the other he held out to Bonaparte.
GustavUs IV
Adolphus, who oh attaining his majority had recalled the Russophil Armfeldt,
hurried in persdh to St Petersburg, where he arrived on November 29. Within a
few days’ time (December 16-18, 1800) a series of treaties knit together
Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia in the Second Armed Neutrality. Rostopchin
was the Russian negotiator. The articles agreed on were, in effect, as follows.
(1) Every neutral Vesse1 may
navigate freely from port to port and on the coasts of nations at war1.
(2) Goods belonging to subjects Of the
belligerent Powers, with the exception of contraband, are free on neutral
vessels.
(3) In order to determine what characterises a
blockaded port, this denomination shall' be givefi only to one where there
exists, owing to the blockade being ma, ntaih^d by vessels anchored and
sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering; and no vessel navigating
towards a blockaded port shall, be regarded as having contravened the present
convention,
unless she shall, after having been warned by the commander of the blockading
squadron, attempt to enter by force or stratagem.
(4) Neutral vessels can be arrested only for
just cause and in view of evident facts; they shall be adjudicated upon without
delay; the procedure followed shall be uniform* prompt and legal; and on each
occasion, over and above the compensation accorded to those who have suffered
loss without having been in fault, there shall be granted complete satisfaction
for the insult done to the neutral flag.
(5) The declaration of the officer, commanding
the vessel or vessels of the Royal or Imperial Marine, accompanying the convoy
of one or more merchant vessels, that his convoy has not on board any
contraband merchandise, shall suffice to prevent any visit on board his vessel
or any vessel of his convoy.
These
principles of 1800 differed from those proclaimed in 1780 in (1) the addition
of the article tou. King convoy; (2) the greater stringency with respect to
what constitutes a valid blockade; (3) the provision as to the necessity for
formal apology to the neutral flag.
Bonaparte was
eagerly watching the course of events in the north. On December 7,1800, he
instructed' Talleyrand to announce to neutral and allied Powers “ that the
French Government, having principally at heart to oppose the invasion of the
seas and to concur with neutral Powers in causing their flags to be respected,
and appreci ating the truly patriotic zeal of the Emperor of Russia for the
common cause of all Continental Powers, will not treat for peace with England
until, these sacred principles having been recognised, the Russian, Danish,
Swedish, American, and Prussian flags shall be respected on the sea as the
armies of these Powers are on land, and until Fjigland shall have! acknowledged
that the sea belongs to all nations.” On January 20,1801, on hearing of the
British embargo on Russian vessels, the First Consul forbade forthwith any
captures of Russian ships, declared that he regarded the Republic as already at
peace with the Tsar, and attributed only to the great distance which separated
the two countries the delay in the formal signature of a treaty.
On January
15, Paul despatched Kolycheff to Paris to treat definitely for peace. Great was
Bonaparte’s excitement when he heard of this: “Peace with the Emperor is
nothing in comparison with an alliance which will overcome England and preserve
to us Egypt.” Paul wrote to Bonaparte (January 27) suggesting a French
diversion on the coasts of England, a proposition to which the First Consul
readily agreed. He requested Bonaparte (February 16) to concert with Spain to
obtain the accession of Portugal and of the United States to the maritime programme
of the north. He proposed a vast scheme for the invasion of India. A Russian
army under Snorting was to march from Orenburg by way of Bokhara and Khiva; a
French army under Massena was to pass down the Danube to Taganrog, thence by
the Don and the Volga to
Astrakhan,
whence, combined with a Russian force, it was to proceed by way of Herat and
Candahar. The difficulties of the long journey through wild and hostile lands,
difficulties which Bonaparte clearly recognised, sank into insignificance in
the eyes of the excited Tsar. The recent peaceful annexation (January, 1801) of
the territories of the Georgian prince, George the son of Heraclius, seemed to
pave the way for this eastern campaign. The Hetman of the Don Cossacks actually
set out on the march.
Bonaparte, on
his side, was looking forward to and actively furthering the establishment of a
system which aimed at the commercial exclusion of Great Britain from the
Continent. The British Government, informed of what was passing, demanded an
explanation from Denmark. Count Bemstorff frankly admitted that the
negotiations in which the Northern Powers were engaged had for their object the
renewing of the engagements of 1780, but maintained that the views of Denmark
were absolutely defensive, pacific, and incapable of giving any offence, and
that her accession to the Northern Alliance was in no way incompatible with the
convention of August 29,1800. The mental powers of the peace-loving Christian
VII were failing, but the Prince Royal supported Bemstorff in a determined
stand; The British Government was not prepared to accept the Danish
contentions, however courteously urged. On January 14, 1801, an embargo was
placed on all Russian, Danish, and Swedish vessels in British ports; and a
British fleet under Parker and Nelson was fitted out for the Baltic. The
threatened Powers prepared energetically for resistance. Denmark had not
hitherto ratified unconditionally the convention of December 18: she now gave
in her formal adhesion (February 27,1801). On March 29,1801, an embargo was
placed on British vessels in Danish ports; and on the same day Danish forces
entered Hamburg and declared the Elbe closed to the English. A few days later
Danish troops took possession of Liibeck. On March 13 Gustavus IV Adolphus
tightened his relations with St Petersburg by a new treaty of commerce, in
which Paul suffered himself to depart from the arrogant position of superiority
which Sweden had found so obnoxious in Catharine. The vacillating Government
of Prussia at length abandoned its neutral attitude; Prussian troops occupied
Hanover and Bremen; the Weser and the Ems were shut to British trade. The voice
was the voice of the Northern League; but the hands were the hands of
Bonaparte. “ Every sea,” he wrote in his message to the Senate, February
13,1801, “ must needs be subject to the exclusive sovereignty of England! She
arms against Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, because Russia, Sweden, and Denmark
have ensured, by treaties of guarantee, their sovereignty and the independence
of their flag. The Powers of the North, unjustly attacked, may rightly count on
France. The French Government will avenge with them an injury common to all
nations, without losing sight of the’fact that it fights only for peace and the
welfare of the world.”
The vengeance
of England fell, not on the arch-instigator, Russian or Corsican, but on the
Danes. On March 30 Parker and Nelson forced the passage of the Sound, the task
being materially facilitated by the supineness of the Swedes; and on April 2
was fought the battle of Copenhagen. But one arch-instigator had already met
his doom.
For months
past the madness of Paul had been becoming more and more apparent. His wild
fits of ungovernable and unreasoning rage wrought havoc around him. Imperial in
moments of generosity, he was terrible in his anger. There was no consistency
in his favour. Undeserved degradation followed with alarming closeness
promotion equally unmerited. Men of all ranks were persecuted on the shadow of
suspicion. Officers of the guard were kicked and cuffed or confined in
casemates for the most trivial offences. Ministers were exiled to their estates
for a chance word. Scores of unfortunates were despatched to Siberia. One by
one, Paul drove from him his most faithful servants. SuvorofF, returning from
his glorious efforts in Italy, was hotly reprimanded upon a formal punctilio,
and sank under the blow. Rostopchin was again exiled. The inflexible
Arakcheieff was disgraced. In the provinces Paul was not unpopular. He was
known to nurse schemes for ameliorating the lot of the serfs; and the country
landowner, who was not brought into contact with his momentary resentment, was
by no means dissatisfied with a monarch who was the terror of officialdom. The
soldiery looked with no disfavour upon the tyrant who maltreated their
superiors. But in the Court, in official circles, and in the capital in general
the atmosphere of suspense became unbearable. The universal fear found vent in
a conspiracy.
It was not
the conspiracy of a populace demanding liberty, or of politicians desiring to
form new connexions. The merchants were indeed suffering in consequence of the
cutting off of British trade; but that alone would have been of small avail to
raise a Russian revolt. It was the combination of men within the Imperial
circle who trembled each moment for their property and lives. Count Nikita
Petrovitch Panin, formerly Minister at Berlin and now a member of the Council
for Foreign Affaire, led the way. He enlisted Count Pahlen, who, in addition to
other high appointments, held the post of Commandant of the capital, which gave
him control over the police. Pahlen, a man of iron nerve, the trusted agent of
Paul, became the protector and central figure of the plot. A skilful intrigue
brought about the recall of the two Zuboffs, Platon and Nicholas. General
Bennigsen and other great officers were brought in. But without the sanction of
the Grand Duke Alexander the conspirators dared not proceed. Alexander was
approached. The dangers of the situation were pointed out to him. It was
proposed to him that Paul should be deposed. Alexander stipulated that no
bodily ill should befall his father. He forgot that in a land like Russia there
can be but a step for a deposed sovereign between a prison and a grave. Still,
Alexander hesitated to give the signal even for deposition. The crisis came
when
it transpired
through Pahlen that the Tsar was meditating the imprisonment of the Empress
and her sons, and the adoption as his successor of the young Prince Eugene of
Wurtemberg. At any moment the blow might be struck by the Tsar: at any moment
Arakcheieff might be recalled, when Pahlen’s ability to protect the plotters
would be at an end. At two o’clock in the morning of March 23, 1801, after
supping and drinking freely, two parties of officers, led by Pahlen, Bennigsen,
and the Zuboffs, entered the Mikhailovskii Palace; Paul I was brutally strangled;
and Nicholas Zuboff reported to the horrified Alexander his accession to the
throne.
The Second
Armed Neutrality had received its death-blow. The spirit of the North was not
crushed by the battle of Copenhagen; Sweden maintained a bold front; and Bonaparte
filled the air with indignant, encouraging cries. But no glamour of Maltese
dreams blinded the eyes of Alexander. He made known forthwith his willingness
to negotiate with England. Duroc, despatched to St Petersburg on April 26, had
soon to report that Prance had nothing to hope or to fear from Alexander. Under
a maritime convention negotiated by Lord St Helens with Panin, and sighed on
June 19, 1801, amicable relations were restored between Russia and Great
Britain. The latter accepted verbally certain of the principles of the Armed
Neutrality ; namely, that neutral vessels might navigate freely to the ports
and on the coasts of nations at war; that such vessels should only be stopped
for just cause and in respect of evident fact; that they should be adjudicated
upon without delay; and that the procedure followed should always be uniform,
prompt and legal. She agreed that the right to visit merchantmen under neutral
convoy should not be exercised by a privateer. But she obtained the recognition
of the general right of her belligerent vessels of war to visit and search
neutral convoys, of her belligerent right to capture hostile property under the
neutral flag on the high seas, and of the validity of a blockade maintained by
cruising ships. The convention was drafted in terms which were calculated to
satisfy the amour-propre of Alexander; but the substantial fruits of victory in
the maritime discussion were practically left in the hands of England. Already
an end had been put to the war of hostile embargoes between Great Britain and
the Baltic Powers; and Alexander had mediated the withdrawal of the Danish
forces from Hamburg (May 23). The retirement of the Prussians from Hanover and
Bremen was delayed some time longer; the Swedes and the Danes for some months
stood out for better terms; but on October 23, 1801, Copenhagen unwillingly
adopted the convention of St Petersburg; and on March 30, 1802, Gustavus IV
Adolphus sullenly handed in his adhesion.
Sect. II.—NAVAL OPERATIONS (1800-1).
When Napoleon
set sail for Egypt in 1798, the Directory’s plan of invading England was
abandoned. But one of the first consequences of the renewed French successes on
the Continent in 1800 was that the First Consul revived the project; and in
1801 he decided to construct a flotilla of gunboats and small craft on the
coast of the Channel. So little, however, was actually done that he probably
only intended to use this flotilla as a means of obtaining a satisfactory peace
by playing upon British fears. It was not till the summer of 1801 that the
flotilla began to take serious shape. Meantime the attention of the British
navy was attracted to another quarter, viz. to the Baltic. The Armed Neutrality
of the Northern Powers, described above, threatened not only the commercial but
the political interests of Great Britain. As these Powers possessed forty-one
sail of the line in condition for service, the British Government at once
determined to strike a vigorous blow against them, so as to render them
innocuous in the war with France.
A fleet of
eighteen sail of the line and a number of smaller craft was hastily assembled
at Yarmouth, under the orders of Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson, now a
Vice-Admiral, as second in command. Undoubtedly the Admiralty looked askance at
Nelson, after his supposed disobedience to Keith in the Mediterranean in 1799.
But this appointment of a superior officer who lacked decision and energy was a
grave mistake, and came near causing a failure. Owing to Parker’s delays, the
expedition was slow in starting; Nelson was not admitted to his chief’s
confidence; and, when the Sound was reached, Parker preferred to negotiate,
instead of striking, and did not listen to Nelson’s sagacious and bold advice
to aim the intended blow at Russia, disregarding Denmark. Compelled to act as
his superior decided, Nelson was finally entrusted with an attack on
Copenhagen, where the Danes had collected a formidable flotilla to cooperate
with the fixed defences. Their forts and ships together mounted some 700 guns.
Nelson’s plan
was to pass to the south of Copenhagen before a north wind, sailing through the
Outer Deep, which joins the King’s Channel a little to the south of Copenhagen.
The King’s Channel runs under the forts of the city ; and he intended to move
northwards up it, as soon as the wind shifted to the south. The British ships
would thus have their retreat assured in the event of the attack miscarrying.
Nelson was personally charged with the conduct of the action, which involved
great hazard both from the Danish guns and from the shallow water. He asked for
ten sail of the line and was given twelve, while
ch.
h.
4—2
Parker
remained in reserve with eight ships, including six of light draught—a very
injudicious disposition, since the first principle in war is to employ all
possible force at the point of contact. For this, however, the
commander-in-chief must be held responsible; he had shown so much timidity and
hesitation that Nelson probably feared to alarm him by asking for every
serviceable ship. It is also true that Nelson underestimated the strength of
the Danish defences.
On April 1,
1801, Nelson’s division sailed southward before a north wind to the point where
the channels join below the city, and there anchored, waiting for the wind to
shift. On the 2nd the change came; and about 9 a.m. the division weighed and
stood up the King’s Channel to attack the Danes. There were many misadventures;
one ship could not weather the shoal which parted the two channels; two others
ran aground through errors of the pilots. But, with the rest, Nelson anchored
in line parallel to the Danes, making no attempt to concentrate on a part of
their force, and fought a fierce and protracted battle, in which the greater
capacity to take and give hard knocks carried the day. To Parker’s eye, matters
seemed to be going so badly that in the midst of the battle he made signal No.
39, “Discontinue the action”; and the signal was reluctantly acted upon by
Captain Riou with the smaller craft. Nelson, however, was equal to the
emergency. He turned his blind eye to his telescope when the signal was
reported to him; and gave orders that it should not be repeated by his ships,
and that his own battle-signal, No. 16, “Engage more closely,” should be kept
flying. His independence was triumphantly justified. The other ships in the
line did not flinch or obey the order to withdraw; and Parker’s signal had no
influence on the engagement. If executed, it must have resulted in a British
defeat and in the loss of the ships which were aground. At no point in his
career did Nelson give evidence of greater judgment and tenacity.
The crisis
passed with.the signal; the Danish fire began to slacken; and flames showed in
several of the Danish ships. Unwilling to destroy the disabled vessels of the
enemy’s flotilla,. filled as they were with wo'inded, anxious to avoid
inflicting further injury upon a nation which he would have spared had his own
policy been adopted, and, it may also be, feeling some concern for the safety
of his injured or grounded vessels, he proposed to the Danes that firing should
cease and that he should take possession of the prizes, threatening that if the
action continued he would blow them into the air, ships: and crews. A truce was
arranged; Nelson took possession of the Danish fleet; and after some days of
negotiating, his mingled boldness, tact, and firmness brought the Danes to
consent, on April 9, to a suspension of hostilities.
The news of
Parker’s dilatory proceedings and of his signal reached the Admiralty at home,
and led to his supersession. Nelson thenceforward directed the movements of
the fleet. There is no documentary
foundation
for the story that the signal of recall was merely permissive, and had been
arranged for beforehand. On the contrary, the evidence of journals and logs is
decidedly against such a view; and Graves, the junior admiral under Nelson,
thought that, if the signal had been obeyed, the fleet would have been
destroyed. His judgment as to the brilliancy of Nelson’s conduct will be
endorsed by posterity. “Considering” he said “ the disadvantages of navigation,
the approach to the enemy, their vast number of guns and mortars on both land
and sea, I do not think there was ever a bolder attack.” The British loss was
943 killed and severely wounded; the Danes lost between 1600 and 1800.
There was no
further fighting in the Baltic, as the death of the Tsar Paul was followed by a
change in Russian policy. Nelson returned to England, andj much against his own
wishes, was placed in charge of the flotilla watching the French in the
Channel. It was a service in which his life was unnecessarily risked, while his
talents for grand strategy found in it no scope. Nor was his presence really
required, for it does not appear that the Admiralty took the French
preparations at all seriously. On August 15,1801, anxious to force a decisive
action, he delivered a desperate attack on the French craft at Boulogne, but
was repulsed with heavy loss. In October an armistice was concluded between the
two Powers, and fighting ceased.
In the Mediterranean,
great efforts were made by the French to send reinforcements to Egypt and to
prevent Lord Keith, the British commander-in-chief on the station, from
disembarking an expeditionary force there. Rear-Admiral Ganteaume, with seven
battleships of the fleet which Bruix had brought to Brest in the previous year,
put to sea in January, 1801, evading the British fleet, passed the Straits of
Gibraltar without misadventure, and might have stood away for Egypt, to land
his 5000 troops Under General Sahuguet. But his heart appears to have failed
him. He steered for Toulon, fully believing that powerful British forces were
pursuing him, and that Keith was in front of him. He also alleged as an excuse
the many mishaps that occurred on board his ships. Jerome Bonaparte, who was on
board the flagship, has given a vivid picture of the alarms of the Admiral and
the panic which seized him at the mere report that twelve sail had been sighted
in the night. He was ordered once more to put to sea and carry out his mission,
making an attempt on Porto Ferraio on the way. The attempt failed; but in June
he came within 200 miles of Alexandria, and only retired when he found that the
British were there in some force. He failed to land his men on the coast of
Tripoli, as he had intended, since British vessels were sighted just as the
disembarkation was about to begin; and in July he returned to Toulon, having
captured a British line of battleship on the rim westward.
In June
Rear-Admiral Linois was ordered to sail from Toulon with three ships of the
line and proceed to Cadiz, there to take under his
command six
Spanish ships of the line, which had been given to France by the Spanish
Government and manned with French crews. Learning, however, that the British
Admiral Saumarez was off Cadiz with six ships of the line, Linois put into
Algeciras and anchored there. As soon as Saumarez knew of the arrival of1
the French, on July 5, he sailed for Algeciras, and on July 6 stood into
Algeciras Bay and attacked Linois, who was anchored close inshore, under the
protection of powerful batteries and supported by a large number of Spanish gunboats.
The failure of the wind hampered the attack; and a British ship of the line,
the Hannibal, ran aground and was captured by; the French. Saumarez sustained a
distinct repulse, though he inflicted a heavier loss in men upon the French
than he himself suffered. He took the battered remainder of his fleet to
Gibraltar,' and there refitted his ships with the utmost energy; while Linois
appealed to the French Rear-Admiral Dumanoir le Pelley and the Spaniards at
Cadiz, to come at once to his help before the British should again attack him.
On July 9, a
Franco-Spanish squadron of six sail, under Vice-Admiral Moreno, joined Linois
at Algeciras; and on the 12th the allies sailed for Cadiz, leaving behind the
prize taken from the British. The allied admirals were ;ogethei in a frigate;
no signals for the two fleets had been issued. Saumarez, with his five
serviceable ships, followed them at once, and began a running action with them
in the late hours of the night. A Spanish three-decker was the first ship
brought to action; she speedily caught fire, and dropped astern, when she fell
in with two of her consorts, which opened fire on her, mistaking her for a
British vessel. As the final result of this tragic error, two great Spanish
three-deckers destroyed one another, both being burnt with the greater part of
their crews. A third vessel surrendered to the British after a short engagement
at dose quarters. The rest of the allied fleet reached Cadiz after sustaining
the British attack, and on this ground claimed a victory. It was a strange
claim, for the allies lost three ships and 2500 killed, wounded, and prisoners
to a far inferior force, while inflicting on the British but insignificant
loss. But, though Linois’ fleet had not obtained any success of importance, it
fought better than any French fleet in this first period of the war; and it
deserved every credit for the action at Algeciras, which illustrated anew the risk
of attacking even an inferior enemy when covered by forts and gunboats.
THE
PACIFICATION OF EUROPE (1799-1802).
Shortly
before the coup d'etat of Brumaire, the President of the Directory, when
celebrating the fete of the Tenth of August, had declared that monarchy would
never again raise its head in France, and that the last had been seen of those
self-styled delegates of Heaven, who held Frenchmen in subjection and looked
upon the law of the land merely as the instrument of their own good pleasure.
The sight which men were never to see again, they saw almost immediately.
France desired rest and peace, and she called Bonaparte to her aid, a man who
was by nature incapable of giving her either. War was essential to the
political ends which Bonaparte was pursuing; for he held, as did the Directory,
that the fortunes of the Republic depended on the continuous extension of its
rule. The Republic, however, was henceforth to be merged in the personality of
Bonaparte; and the elevation of war into a system of government was a policy
which he made his own. The object in view was no longer, as it had been under
the Convention, to restore to France her “natural” limits, the Rhine, the Alps,
and the Pyrenees,but the making of fresh conquests beyond her borders. On the
morrow of Brumaire Napoleon proclaimed the fact to his soldiers. “ Our task,”
he said, “is not to defend our own frontiers but to invade the territory of our
foes.” Moreover, in spite of his pacific assurance at the commencement of the
Consulate and of his protests that the function which he had assumed was purely
civil, it was on the army that he relied for the accomplishment of “ those
great things ” which since 1797 his fervid and enthusiastic imagination had
kept in view. At the end of 1799 the French treasury had run dry: Bonaparte
proclaimed that it should be replenished with funds taken from hostile States,
from their towns, their convents, and their citizens. The army was starving.
Bonaparte promised his soldiers a speedy end to their troubles; “Victory,” he
told them, “will give you bread.”
The majority
of Frenchmen did not share these views. Weary with its long struggle, and
feeling that its independence was safely guarded by the Rhine and the Alps, the
nation longed for peace. Out of respect
for its
wishes, pacific overtures were made to Great Britain and Austria. Writing to
George III on December 26, 1799, the First Consul declared that no one was more
desirous than he was of helping to bring about a general peace, and that he
would use every means to attain that end. Bonaparte, however, inspired no
confidence in the minds of the British ministers, who looked upon him merely as
a soldier of fortune, a vulgar Jacobin. They also conceived France to be more
exhausted than she really was, and calculated that, by continuing the war for a
few months, the Coalition would secure better terms. Consequently they declined
Bonaparte’s offer, and informed him that the only sure basis of peace would be
the withdrawal of France within her former frontiers and the reestablishment of
the monarchy as a pledge of the permanence of peace.
In Austria,
Bonaparte’s proposals, which suggested the Treaty of Campo Formio as the basis
of an understanding, were equally unsuccessful. Francis II, after the successes
gained by his armies in Italy, declined to entertain any convention based on
that treaty, and declared moreover that without the concurrence of his allies
he could not conclude any convention at all. Hostilities therefore continued;
and Bonaparte, who had taken every step with ostentatious display, so that all
France might see how anxious he was for peace, got what he really wanted— war;
while at the same time he succeeded in throwing the whole responsibility on
his adversaries.
France opened
the campaign of 1799 under conditions more favourable than in 1798. The
Coalition had finally lost the aid of Paul I, who, annoyed by the policy of
Thugut, by the conduct of the war in Italy by the Court of Vienna, and by the
check inflicted on the allied forces in Holland, had accused his allies of
breach of faith, and had definitely broken with them. Prussia clung more
closely than ever to her policy of neutrality, which left her free at any time
to turn against France if fortune favoured the Coalition. For the moment,
however, she seemed rather to lean towards the side of Bonaparte, who had been
adroit enough to suggest to Frederick William III a rectification of the Rhine
frontier in a sense favourable to Prussia. In Germany, the rulers of Bavaria
and Wurtemberg and the Elector of Mainz had indeed promised subsidies to
Austria, who hoped by these means to recoup herself for losses suffered during
the retreat of the Russian soldiery. But in Austria everything was going from
bad to worse; the financial position was deplorable. From the military point of
view, it was unfortunate that Thugut’s zeal in the task of preparation produced
such inadequate results; he was baulked by the traditional lethargy, slowness,
and want of method in the Austrian administration. Moreover, the newly appointed
generals were inferior to their predecessors; Archduke Charles, sick of the
struggle and broken in health, had retired in December from active service; and
his place at the head of the army in Germany had been filled by Kray, a good
soldier but a second-rate commander. As
for the army
in Italy, General Melas, enfeebled by age, slow of mind, and over-cautious in
action, had taken the place of the brilliant and impetuous Suvdroff.
It was only
in the matter of numbers and position that the Anstrians had an advantage over
the French. General Kray, with an army
150.000 strong, occupied in the neighbourhood of
Donaueschingen a wooded and hilly district, almost resembling a vast entrenched
camp, flanked on one side by a river and a lake, and on the other by mountains
and dense forests, from which he could swoop down at pleasure on the frontiers
of Alsace or Switzerland. The Austrians had at last recognised the strategic
importance of the latter country, and they purposed occupying it. On the other
side of the Rhine, confronting Kray, Moreau was at the head of 110,000 men
distributed en echelon between Strassburg and Constance. They were veteran
soldiers; and their commander, cautious, precise, and skilful, was the best
general of the Republic. In Italy Melas had under his orders rather more than
100,000 men, of whom
30.000 were required to garrison the fortresses
of Upper Italy; but, after sending certain detachments into Tuscany, he still
had 75,000 men left for operations in the field. The French army of Italy,
under the orders of Massena, was but the shadow of the fine force that
Bonaparte had led. Decimated and disorganised, it did not number more than
30,000 men; and it needed all its general’s energy to give it any cohesion.
To remedy his
inferiority in numbers, Bonaparte had busied himself since January with the
creation of a fresh army. The final pacification of the Vendee released troops
sufficient to form the nucleus of the new force; and in March, with the arrival
of contingents from Paris and the south, the army itself was nearly complete:
it numbered from 40,000 to
50.000 men. Bonaparte, whose first idea was to
make the banks of the Rhine the chief theatre of war, was on the point of
sending these soldiers thither, when Moreau’s reluctance to serve under him
necessitated a change of plan. He now decided to lead his new army into Italy,
where he himself could take the command. Early in April he ordered Moreau to
begin hostilities on the Rhine, while he himself with his army was to march to
the help of Massena. Bonaparte’s idea was that Moreau should boldly cross the
Rhine at Schaffhausen with his whole force, and fall upon Kray in his
stronghold at Donaueschingen. Moreau however was too cautious to compromise his
whole army by a single movement, since, in the event of defeat, it would have
been doomed to certain destruction. In spite therefore of Bonaparte’s wishes,
Moreau crossed the Rhine at several points simultaneously; but he manoeuvred in
such a way as to lead Kray to believe that the whole French army would pass the
stream between Basel and Strassburg, so as to penetrate into the Black Forest
by the Hollenthal, as he had done in 1796. Kray fell into the trap, abandoned
his position at Donaueschingen, and marched with part of his force towards the
bend of the Rhine, in the
ch. m.
hope of
bringing Moreau to a stand before he reached the Black Forest. Moreau meanwhile
turned suddenly up stream on the right bank, marched rapidly towards
Donaueschingen, and rejoined the rest of his force which had crossed the river
between Basel and Schaffhausen. Kray, seeing his mistake, though somewhat late
in the day, hurried back to protect his magazines at Stockach and cover the
line of the Danube. Various engagements took place; on May 3 at Engen and
Stockach, on May 5 at Moesskirch, and on May 10 at Biberach. Everywhere the
Austrians were forced back. In vain did Kray strive to gain Vorarlberg and so
keep touch with the army in Italy; he was flung back towards the north with
60,000 men and driven to seek shelter under the walls of Ulm. That town,
defended by a chain of forts perched on the hills, formed in fact an entrenched
camp; and there the army, sorely tried by these opening conflicts, had time to
recruit its strength and recover its moral. Meanwhile Moreau, whose orders were
to thrust back Kray as far as possible towards the north without risking a
battle, occupied the district which lies between the Iller, the Danube, and the
Lech.
The campaign
in Italy opened less favourably for the French. Vlassena, who occupied with
25,000 men a line thirty-five leagues in (ength in the neighbourhood of Genoa,
had been ordered by Bonaparte to withdraw his forces from the passes of the
Alps, where the winter snows formed an adequate defence, and to concentrate
round that city. While preparing to carry out his instructions he was suddenly
attacked by the Austrians, who, after they had occupied the heights which
commanded Genoa, cut his army in two; the left wing under Suchet was driven
back to the banks of the Var; and Massena with the remainder— the divisions of
Soult and Miollis—was compelled to retreat into the town. Against the second of
these fragments Melas despatched General Ott, with orders to keep the French
closely shut up in Genoa; General Elsnitz, who was sent against Suchet,
flattered himself that, after defeating that general, he would be able to
force his way into Provence, where it was believed by the Austrians that a
popular movement would overturn the rule of the Republic.
Suchet,
however, defended himself with much energy on the Var, and frustrated the
designs of Elsnitz. Massena, on his side, by vigorous and repeated sorties,
harassed the Austrians so constantly that for several weeks they made no
visible progress. Still the position at Genoa became more critical from day to
day. It was impossible to revictual the town through the port, which was closed
by the British fleet under Lord Keith; and the inhabitants suffered terribly
from hunger, being driven after a time to support life on a substitute for
bread made of cocoa and starch. It was to be feared moreover that the famished
population, with the British and Austrian flags floating before their eyes,
might rise at any time; Genoa must be relieved, and that without delay. An
officer succeeded in passing through the hostile lines and
informed
Bonaparte in Paris of the desperate plight of the town; Bonaparte answered that
the army of reserve was ready, that he himself would cross the Alps
immediately, and that in a few days Italy would be conquered and Genoa
relieved. It was now April 20; Genoa had been besieged for fifteen days, and it
was destined to hold out till June 4.
The army of
reserve, four divisions strong, was already marching towards Lausanne and
Geneva, where large quantities of stores had been collected. Bonaparte,
however, no longer thought of carrying help to Massena; his plan was to
reconquer by a short and brilliant campaign all those districts of Italy which
the Austrians had taken from the French. This plan, revealed only at the last
moment, would, he calculated, strike his adversaries dumb, proclaim his genius
to all Europe, and secure a notable triumph for the arms of the Republic. The
task which he set himself was to burst like a thunderbolt upon the plains of
Lombardy, to occupy that province by a series of rapid movements, and so
threaten Melas, who in order to check the advance of the French army would be
forced to raise the siege of Genoa. Now Bonaparte could only enter Lombardy
through some pass of the Swiss Alps—the St Gothard, the Simplon, or the Great
St Bernard—each of which at that season presented great difficulties. The St
Gothard was rejected as being too distant and as insufficiently protected
against an Austrian attack. The Simplon was rejected also, as, in order to
reach it, it was necessary to ascend the whole valley of the Rhone; and this
enormously complicated the question of transport, already difficult enough in
that mountainous country. The Great St Bernard had this disadvantage that,
after leaving Bourg St Pierre, the path becomes narrow and dangerous.
Bonaparte, however, did not hesitate to choose the last-named pass; and he
declared to Berthier, who was in command, that it must be crossed at any price,
“ even if it cost half the force.” The troops marched forthwith from Lausanne
and Geneva into the Valais. Bonaparte himself arrived; and on May 15 the
crossing of the pass began.
Bonaparte,
who had traced the plan of campaign and who superintended its execution, was
not in command of the new army. It is true that in March a Consular decree had
invested him with the command; but the Consuls, thinking it imprudent to
infringe the spirit of the constitution, which provided that the first
magistracy of the Republic should be a civil magistracy, had revoked the
decision and had appointed Berthier instead. Bonaparte, however, had no idea of
being thrust into the background. He was before all things a soldier; he had
won all his glory on the battlefield; and it was no part of his scheme to allow
himself to be eclipsed. On the other hand, as he was not commander-in-chief, he
escaped responsibility for any failure that might occur. Berthier superintended
the organisation of the army; Bonaparte did not appear till it was ready to
cross the Alps.
The passage
of the Great St Bernard, which took place between
May 15- and
May 20, was completely successful. An army of 35,000 foot and 5000 horse had to
cross the pass—no easy matter. Lannes, the hero of Lodi, commanded the
advance-guard: his task was to open the road and effect a junction in the
valley of Aosta with the division of General Chabran, which crossed by the
Little St Bernard. When the road had been cleared, the advance of the rest of
the army was less laborious; and the only remaining difficulty was the transport
of the artillery. As the guns on their carriages could not climb the narrow
track, it was necessaiy to dismount them at Bourg St Pierre and to convey the
various parts on carts or on mule-back. With a view to this, all available
transport in the Rhone valley had been requisitioned; but, in spite of the
liberal prices offered* the country people, fearing the French, had taken
refuge in the mountains, where they hid their mules. In the end the guns had to
be transported by the soldiers: pine-trunks were hollowed out, the guns were
placed within them, and each gun was dragged over by a hundred men working in
relays. At St Remy, on the Italian slope, an artillery workshop put the
gun-carriages together again and remounted the guns upon them. Bonaparte crossed
the St Bernard with the rear-guard, not on a fiery war-horse, as David’s
picture portrays him, but on a humble mule led by a peasant from Bourg St
Pierre. Was this passage, after all, as wonderful as contemporaries would have
us believe and as certain historians still affirm it to be ? It was no doubt a
brilliant military exploit; but material difficulties alone had to be overcome.
Other generals before and after Bonaparte— Lacourbe on the St Gothard and
Macdonald on the Spliigen—accomplished marches more full of peril; but, as
they lacked both Bonaparte’s eye for theatrical effect and his incomparable
talent for self-advertisement, their achievements passed almost unnoticed.
The
Austrians, who never dreamt that any considerable force could descend into Italy
by the high passes of the Great and the Little St Bernard, had sent only some
weak detachments to guard those approaches. Lannes, who during his march had
met with but little opposition, occupied Aosta almost without striking a blow,
and effected his junction with Chabran. At Chatillon he met with a more considerable
Austro-Sardinian force, commanded by Briey. He defeated it, and then marched
against the fortress of Bard. That little fort, built on a precipitous rock
which completely closed the valley, was the only serious obstacle met with by
the French. A mountain-track existed, by which the fort could be turned; but it
was not practicable for artillery, and the army had so little time to spare
that a regular siege was out of the question. Marmont, who commanded the
artillery, had recourse to a stratagem; he wrapped the guns and their carriages
in ropes of hay and straw, and during the hours of darkness caused
stable-litter to be spread along the road. Taking advantage of a stormy night,
he marched his guns past under the cannon of the fort. The garrison were indeed
1800]
61
alarmed, and
their fire killed a few French soldiers; but by the morning the obstacle had
been turned. From that point the French troops marched down the valley with
great rapidity.
The Austrians
had meanwhile divined Bonaparte’s plan. They suspected that Moreau’s sudden
attack in the south of Germany had been delivered with the object of making an
invasion of Italy. Melas received forthwith from Vienna an order to march with
all haste on Turin. For the defence of that city there were available in the
north of Piedmont not more than 10,000 men; they were commanded by General
Haddick, who occupied a series of very strong positions behind the Chiusella
and on the heights of Romano. On May 26 Lannes attacked Haddick and compelled
him to withdraw behind the Oreo. The Austrian general hastened to warn Melas
that, if he did not return with all speed, Piedmont would be overrun by the
French. Melas thereupon decided to quit Genoa, leaving 30,000 men under Ott
before the city, and 20,000 men under Elsnitz to watch Suchet beyond the Var.
Convinced that the object of the French was to cross the Po, conquer Piedmont,
and march to the help of Massena, Melas judged that with his own army and that
of Haddick he could succeed in stopping their advance. When, however, Melas
drew near to Turin the French were no longer in Piedmont. They had collected a
number of boats and pontoons and made a feint of crossing the river at Chiasso;
they then turned sharply to the east, crossed the Sesia and the Ticino, and
after an engagement with General Vonkassowitch, who was charged with the
defence of the latter river, invaded the Milanese. On June 2 Bonaparte made his
triumphal entry into Milan.
Once master
of Lombardy, Bonaparte had at his command all the forces available for his
campaign in Italy. In addition to the army of reserve, 18,000 men detached from
Moreau’s force had just arrived by the St Gothard under General Moncey; and
they, with Turreau’s division, which had marched into Piedmont by the Mont
Cenis, made up the total number of French troops in Italy to 70,000 men. To
oppose to these troops, fresh and flushed with success, Melas could bring but a
weary and disheartened soldiery. Surprised by the unexpected turn of events and
the rapidity of Bonaparte’s movements, the Austrian general stood for a moment
paralysed and bewildered, but finally decided to recall his forces from Genoa;
he ordered them to concentrate on Alessandria and marched thither himself. He
hoped in a few days to collect 40,000 men to chastise the audacity of Bonaparte
by a well-deserved defeat.
These hopes
were far from being realised. To begin with, it proved impossible to effect the
concentration on Alessandria so quickly as had been expected. Elsnitz, in his
retirement from the Var, was involved in repeated combats with Suchet, who
harassed his retreat; when he arrived, it was with diminished forces. Ott, on
the very day when the order reached him to raise the siege of Genoa, received
the capitulation of
Massena, and
was compelled to leave a garrison in the city. He then, in pursuance of further
orders, marched to the east of Alessandria in order to reconnoitre the line of
the Po; he was there beaten by the advance-guard of the French army, and, after
losing heavily, was forced to fall back on Alessandria. Thus, from every point
of view, the position of the Austrians seemed unsatisfactory.
Bonaiparte,
meanwhile, had occupied Lombardy as far as the Oglio, driven the Austrians from
all the cities, and seized Cremona with its important stores of provisions,
arms, and war material. His advance- guard, consisting of Lannes’ and Murat’s
corps and a division of Victor’s, crossed over to the right bank of the Po,
took Piacenza, and occupied the numerous villages to the west of that town,
with the defiles of the Stradella. It was there that on June 9 the combat of
Montebello took place. Ott, who attempted to force the passage, was compelled,
after a desperate struggle, to retreat on Alessandria. Bonaparte, learning at
this moment, through some intercepted despatches, that the Austrians had not
yet effected their concentration, crossed the Po with the rest of his troops,
and resolved to attack them without delay.
To the east
of Alessandria stretches a plain separated from the town by the river Bormida;
it is covered with cornfields and vineyards, and contains a few villages and
hamlets, Castel-Ceriolo, San Giuliano, and Marengo. It was here that the French
awaited the Austrians. As three days' passed without their arrival, Bonaparte
concluded that they were retreating either to the north or the south. The
intelligence which came from the north making it clear that no movement of
troops was taking place in that direction, the First Consul was convinced that
Melas had moved south with a view to regaining Genoa. He immediately despatched
6000 men under Desaix, who had just arrived from Egypt, in the direction of
Novi. In the plain of the Bormida he left only the corps of Lannes and Victor,
14,000 strong, supported by Murat’s cavalry. He himself fixed his head-quarters
considerably to the east, on the banks of a little river, the Scrivia; and he
had with him a reserve force consisting of Monnier’s division, numbering 3600
men, two regiments of cavalry, and the Consular Guard, 1200 strong.
At the moment
when Bonaparte was thus dividing his forces, the Austrians resolved on
attacking. On the morning of June 14 they crossed the Bormida at three points
simultaneously: Ott with the cavalry of Elsnitz to the north; Melas with the
divisions of Haddick, Kaim, Morgue, and Lobkowitz in the centre; O’Reilly to
the south. The corps of Lannes and Victor, which occupied the villages of
Castel- Ceriolo and Marengo, offered a vigorous resistance during six hours to
the Austrian attacks; but, inferior as they were in numbers as well as in
artillery and cavalry, they were eventually compelled to retreat and abandon
their positions to the enemy. In vain Bonaparte hurried up from the Scrivia to
their relief with Monnier’s division and the Consular
Guard. The
French were unable to regain the ground they had lost; and by three in the
afternoon the Austrians were masters of the battlefield. Melas, who felt the
weight of his years and had been slightly wounded, considering that his
presence on the field was no longer necessary, returned to Alessandria and
despatched a courier to Vienna to announce his victory.
The
announcement was premature. Hardly had Melas quitted the plain of the Bormida,
when a second battle began. Desaix, with his 6000 men, after searching in vain
for Melas in the direction of Novi, returned in all haste towards Alessandria;
and, hearing the sound of the distant cannonade, he concluded that the
Austrians had not withdrawn and that they were giving battle to the French.
When he arrived on the plain of the Bormida a hurried council of war was held.
The French generals acknowledged their defeat. “ A battle has been lost,” said
Desaix, “but another battle can be won.” He offered to make the attempt on
condition that he was “ vigorously supported by artillery.” Marmont’s guns were
moved up, and the whole line resumed the offensive. The French, encouraged by
the arrival of fresh troops, fought with spirit. The Austrians, who had not
expected an attack and, looking upon the victory as won, had partly lost
formation, stood for a moment bewildered. They made an attempt at resistance,
but were driven in on all sides; a panic seized them, and they fled
precipitately. At nightfall the field of battle remained in the hands of the
French; and the whole Austrian army, in great confusion, sought shelter under
the walls of Alessandria. The Austrians lost more than 9000 men killed and
wounded; the French 7000.
Among the
killed was Desaix, the hero of the day, who fell at the head of his troops,
while cheering them on to the attack; his body was found where the dead lay
thickest. When he saw it, Bonaparte exclaimed : “ A glorious day’s work if
only I could have embraced Desaix upon the battlefield. I should have made him
minister of war, and a prince too, had it lain in my power.” Bonaparte was
right: it was Desaix who saved him on that day. The victory of Marengo
confirmed the power of the First Consul; had he been beaten there, his brother
Lucien remarked, the proscription of the Bonaparte family would have certainly
followed. The military results of the victory were immediately apparent. The
Austrians were too demoralised and too weak to hazard another battle; and Melas
sent an officer to the French head-quarters to request an armistice. Bonaparte
agreed, on the following conditions. The French troops were to occupy Lombardy
as far as the Mincio; and the Austrian garrisons in Tuscany and Ancona were to
retire beyond that river until the proposals of peace submitted to the Emperor
had led to some definite result. A special messenger, Count Saint-Julien,
started immediately for Vienna, bearing with him the convention and a letter
from Bonaparte to Francis II, in which he said: “If your Majesty desires peace,
it is easy to have it. Let both parties carry out the Treaty of Campo Formio.”
Bonaparte had
the more reason for believing that Francis would consent to make peace, since
the Austrian army in Germany had just suffered a series of reverses. Kray,, who
had been forced to retreat beneath the walls of Ulm, made repeated attempts to
drive off Moreau, who, advancing cautiously but steadily, was all the while
closing in upon him. On May 28 the French general had occupied Augsburg and
established himself in the district between the Danube, the Iller, and the
Lech. Kray attacked him on June 5, but without success; Moreau thereupon
crossed the Danube near Blindheim and cut off the enemy’s retreat. Kray
attempted in vain to drive Moreau back to the right bank of the river. The
Austrian attacks were repulsed, and Kray was compelled to abandon his
entrenchments. On June 19, as the result of another French victory gained at
Hochstadt, Kray was compelled to retreat towards the north.
Moreau had
conducted the second part of the German campaign with the greatest skill; and
Kray, when he heard of the defeat of Melas, considering further resistance
impossible, proposed an armistice to the French general. Moreau refused, but
refrained from further pursuit, as the enemy had now plunged into a woody and
difficult country. With part of his force Moreau laid siege to Ulm and
Ingolstadt; with the remainder he marched into Bavaria, occupied Munich, seized
the passes into Vorarlberg and Switzerland, and so placed himself in
communication with the French armies which were operating on the frontiers of
Tyrol and of the Grisons. Once master of the line of the Isar, Moreau, cautious
as ever, preferred not to venture further to the east; and, receiving a second
proposal for an armistice from Kray, he agreed to sign a convention at Parsdorf
on July 15. This convention provided that hostilities should be indefinitely
suspended in Germany, and that the French should occupy Bavaria west of the
Isar, as far as Munich in one direction and Batisbon in the other.
In spite of
its reverses in Germany and Italy, the Imperial Government, contrary to
Bonaparte’s expectations, seemed very little disposed to sign a treaty of
peace. It refused to consider the situation as desperate, and looked upon
Marengo and Hochstadt as defeats that might easily be repaired; in any case it
declined to discuss proposals based on the Treaty of Campo Formio. Francis II
had a short time before concluded a treaty with Great Britain, by which, in
consideration of a subsidy of £2,500,000, he bound himself not to sign a peace
with France before February 1, 1801. What was he now to do ? He could not
answer Bonaparte’s proposals with an absolute refusal, for that involved an
immediate resumption of hostilities under conditions distinctly unfavourable
to Austria; he therefore used all his efforts to amuse Bonaparte by the
prospects of an understanding, hoping thus to gain the time necessary to
receive the English subsidy and to reinforce his army. It was with this object
that he consented to discuss Bonaparte’s
proposals;
and to that end he despatched two representatives—Count Saint-Julien and Count
Neipperg—on a mission to Paris.
The
instructions given to these envoys gave them no authority to treat; they were
merely authorised to sound Bonaparte as to the proposals he was prepared to
make. Saint-Julien, however, who was vain and incapable, was cajoled by the
First Consul and Talleyrand into believing that he was clothed with plenary
powers. They pictured to him the immense service which he would render to the
two nations by securing tViPm the blessings of peace, and they induced him to
sign the draft of a document which was nothing else in its main lines but the
Treaty of Campo Formio. Saint-Julien, whose self-conceit was flattered, affixed
his signature, saying: “ I sign provisionally, pending ratification by my
government. Without such ratification any convention is null and void.”
Bonaparte and Talleyrand assented; and the trick was played.
At Vienna the
anger of the Government was extreme. The Austrian Court had meant to outwit
Bonaparte, but it was Bonaparte who had outwitted them. The imprudent envoy was
loudly disavowed and, with his colleague, shut up in a fortress. Thugut, in his
anxiety to reassure the English, disclosed to them the duplicity of the French
and pushed on his military preparations with activity. This, however, was mere
pretence. Austria was in no condition to recommence the struggle; her army was
completely disorganised. The confusion which reigned in the higher commands at
the beginning of 1800 had gone on increasing. Her beaten generals had been
replaced by officers still more incompetent. A headstrong youth, Archduke John,
succeeded Kray. The Archduke himself was nothing more than the nominal superior
of General Lauer, who himself was a mere mouthpiece of the Government; for,
under the old-fashioned system still in vogue at the Austrian Court, military
operations were conducted from Vienna. With the army in Italy things went no
better; as a result of his defeat at Marengo, Melas was deprived of his
command, which was given to a man still more diffident and incapable, General
de Bellegarde.
At the moment
when Austria was preparing to renew the contest, Francis II himself went to the
camp on the Inn to study the military situation on the spot. He found such a
state of disorganisation that, on his return to Vienna, he applied to Bonaparte
for a prolongation of the armistice; and to this Bonaparte agreed, on condition
that the Austrians should surrender Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. A change
of opinion in favour of peace was now perceptible at Vienna. Thugut, who
belonged to the war party, was replaced by Cobenzl, who had negotiated the
Treaty of Campo Formio : and the negotiations between Vienna and Paris, which
had been broken off, were resumed. The chief wish of the Austrians all through
was to gain time; but they believed also that Bonaparte was ardently desirous
of peace, and they hoped to obtain from him terms such as Great Britain would
be able to accept.
Bonaparte,
however, was not a man to be played with; he was willing to treat on the basis
of Campo Formio and on no other. He consented indeed to negotiate; even the
meeting place, Luneville, was agreed upon by his brother Joseph as representing
France and Cobenzl as representing Austria. Before, however, Cobenzl reached
Luneville, Bonaparte, who wished to find out what the real intentions of
Austria were, invited him to Paris. Once there, Bonaparte had no difficulty in
finding out what he wanted. When Cobenzl had been driven to make a definite
statement of his views, Bonaparte saw that the object of Austria was to secure
a loophole of retreat, and that she meant to sign no treaty without the
concurrence of England. Bon&parte at once understood that nothing but a
signal victoiy would bring Austria to terms, and he took measures accordingly.
From the
moment of his return to Paris after the campaign of Marengo, Bonaparte had been
continuously engaged in military preparations. A fresh army of reserve had
been formed at Dijon and was ready, in case of war, to march into Italy by the
Spliigen. The Dutch had been ordered to furnish a corps of 8000 men, who under
Augereau were to reinforce Moreau in Germany. After the interview between
Bonaparte and Cobenzl in Paris, these preparations were pushed on with the
greatest energy; and notice was given to Austria that the armistice would
terminate on November 5.
The Austrian
Government, which was not ready, made a supreme effort to preserve peace. The
two envoys were at Luneville, where they were engaged in formulating the
arguments which bore upon the questions whether an English plenipotentiary
should be admitted to their conferences or not, and whether the Emperor should
sign as prince of his hereditary States or as the head of the Holy Roman
Empire. Suddenly it was proposed from Vienna that the treaty of peace should be
signed without waiting for the concurrence of England, on condition that the
transaction should be kept secret until February 1, 1801, on which date the
arrangement between Austria and England would come to an end; and that, to save
appearances, a British plenipotentiary should be admitted to the negotiations
at Luneville. Bonaparte agreed to a secret treaty of peace, but insisted that
it should be concluded within forty-eight hours, and declined altogether to
admit a British representative to the deliberations. Austria could not accept
this last condition, and nothing was left but a fresh resort to arms.
At the end of
November, 1800, hostilities were renewed both in Germany and in Italy. In
Germany, Moreau held the line of the Isar with 120,000 men. The Austrian army
commanded by Archduke John numbered only 80,000; but this inferiority was
balanced by the great strength of the position which it held on the right bank
of the Inn, protected on the north by wooded and swampy plains and on the south
by steep heights very difficult of access. Moreau, confident that
the Archduke
would remain on the defensive, decided to attack him, and marched towards the
Inn in order to clear the approaches to the river and force back the Austrian
outposts to the other side. At the moment, however, that he put his force into
motion, his left was suddenly attacked by Archduke John, who, contrary to all
expectation, had quitted his commanding position. Fired by the exploits of
Bonaparte, the Archduke formed the ambitious project of outflanking the French,
cutting off their retreat, and attacking them before they were able to
concentrate. The success of this plan, however, depended upon its being
executed with skill and rapidity. It was executed with neither. Through the
plains to the north, low-lying and sodden with rain, the progress of the army
was exceedingly slow, so much so that when the Archduke reached the opposite
bank of the river he had already begun to lose heart. After holding a council
of war, he decided to abandon his plan and to attack the French forthwith.
Moreau’s left wing under Grenier was at Ampfing near Muhldorf, isolated from
the rest of the army. These troops gave way before the Austrian attack, but,
thanks to a division sent to their assistance, they made their retreat in good
order.
Elated by
this petty success, the Archduke imagined that he could dispose without
difficulty of the rest of the French army. Thus threatened, Moreau concentrated
his troops in the middle of the plateau, which is clothed by the great forest
of Ebersberg. In an open space in the very middle of the forest stands the
village of Hohenlinden; and there Moreau halted on ground which was well
adapted to defence and gave little opportunity for the manoeuvres of the
splendid Austrian cavalry. The Austrian generals pointed out the rashness of
marching through country so thickly wooded, but the Archduke would not listen.
On December 2, a dull, snowy day, his army plunged into the forest, some by the
main highway and some by other roads. Meanwhile, Moreau, leaving General
Grenier’s force strongly posted in the open space, moved the divisions of
Richepance and Decaen back through the forest with orders to attack the
Austrians in the rear. The operation was perfectly successful. The van of the
Archduke’s army came into collision with the troops massed at Hohenlinden,
while its rear-guard was attacked by the rest of the French force. Caught
between two fires, the Austrian regiments surged back on themselves; the ranks
were broken; the soldiers fled right and left into the forest, climbing steep
banks and falling into bogs. Very soon the high road was nothing but a confused
mass of dead and wounded, loose horses, wrecked carts, abandoned guns and
ammunition-waggons. The rest of the troops, who during the afternoon converged
on the open space by other roads, met the same fate; and by half-past three the
Austrian army was completely routed, with the loss of 20,000 men killed,
wounded, and prisoners, besides a large number of guns and an immense baggage
train. In a bulletin admirably simple in its terms, Moreau conveyed to Paris
the news
ch.
hi. 6—2
of the battle
of Hohenlinden, a victory more brilliant and more complete than that of
Marengo.
In spite of
the wintry weather, which rendered the roads in this mountainous district
exceedingly difficult, Moreau continued his advance. He occupied successively
the lines of the Inn, the Salzach, the Traun, and the Enns, and defeated the
enemy in a series of combats, capturing men and guns. On December 22 he was
within 65 miles of Vienna; and his generals were already rejoicing at the
prospect of entering the Austrian capital in triumph. But Moreau, who was
anxious, as he said, to secure peace without driving the Austrians to
extremities, agreed with the Archduke Charles, who had succeeded his unlucky
brother, to sign an armistice at Steyer on December 25. It was stipulated that
those towns in Bavaria and Tyrol which still resisted should be handed over to
the French; and that Austria, in spite of her existing engagements, should
sign a treaty without the concurrence of England.
The campaign
in Italy brought no less glory to the French arms. Brune, who had succeeded
Massena as commander-in-chief of the army in Italy, had 80,000 men under his
orders. Bellegarde commanded a force about equal in number; but he had the
advantage of being protected by the famous fortresses of the Quadrilateral,
Peschiera, Legnano, Mantua, and Verona. Bonaparte had forbidden Brune to attack
the Austrian positions till he had been reinforced by Macdonald, who was in the
Grisons with 12,000 men. Macdonald, in order to reach the Valtelline, and
thence Tyrol, was compelled, late as it was, to cross the Spliigen. He
accomplished that dangerous feat successfully, in spite of ice and avalanches,
and reached the Lake of Iseo, from which point he could join Brune without
difficulty. Brune was now able to move; between the 20th and 24th of November
he drove the Austrians from their positions on the Mincio, and two days later
he forced the passage of that river at Pozzolo and at Mozembano. He then pushed
back the enemy towards the Adige, crossed to the left bank at Bussolengo on
December 3, and occupied Verona. Next, after effecting his junction with
Macdonald, who marched up from Trent, he thrust back Bellegarde beyond the
Tagliamento. The Austrian general, finding it impossible to keep the field,
proposed an armistice, which Brune accepted readily and signed at Treviso on
January 16, 1801. By the terms of this convention the French were to occupy the
line of the Adige with Verona, Peschiera, and Legnano.
The French
were no less successful in other parts of Italy. In Tuscany General Miollis
defeated a small Neapolitan force, which had come to the help of the Austrians;
and Murat, after forcing his way into the kingdom of Naples, compelled
Ferdinand IV to sign a convention at Foligno. This convention was subsequently
turned into a formal treaty of peace, the Treaty of Florence, signed in March,
1801. By it Ferdinand undertook to close his ports to the English, to hand
69
over Taranto
to the French, and to maintain there a French garrison of
15,000 men till a general peace should be concluded.
Thus, in a few months, Italy was once again brought under French control.
The result of
the French victories was to facilitate the conclusion of peace; but Bonaparte
was more exacting at the beginning of 1801 than he had been in the autumn of
the preceding year. He was no longer satisfied with the line of the Mincio as
the frontier of the Cisalpine Republic; he insisted on the frontier of the
Adige with the cession of the fortress of Mantua. The improved external
relations of France placed Bonaparte in a position to increase his demands.
Paul I, full of admiration for the victor of Marengo, had made advances; and
Bonaparte, profiting by this friendly attitude, ceded to him the island of
Malta, at the moment when it was about to fall into the hands of the English.
The Tsar, who attached a serious value to his position as Grand Master of the
Knights of Malta, called upon the British Government to surrender the island,
and, on receiving a refusal, laid an embargo on three hundred English ships.
More than this, he had, as was related in the previous chapter, challenged the
maritime supremacy of England by renewing the famous League of Neutrals with
Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia. All this had undoubtedly been of great assistance
to Bonaparte, and had made him less than ever disposed to yield to Austria. At
Luneville, Cobenzl had offered the Oglio, the Chiese, and the Mincio, one after
the other, as the frontier of the Cisalpine Republic. Bonaparte was immovable:
he would sign no treaty that did not give him the frontier of the Adige. At
last Austria gave way; and on February 9, 1801, Cobenzl signed at Luneville the
treaty which he described as “ terrible.”
This treaty
was for France a great diplomatic success. The boundaries for which she had
fought so long were ceded to her by the Emperor, who signed as head of the Holy
Roman Empire; France acquired, in addition to the German districts on the left
bank of the Rhine, Belgium and Luxemburg. In Germany she gained the right to
take part in determining the indemnities to be granted to the dispossessed
princes; and the principle of secularisation which she imposed was to be of
great assistance to her policy. In Italy she had secured advantages not less
substantial: she occupied Piedmont; the Cisalpine Republic and Liguria were
under her protection; Tuscany, which had been converted into the kingdom of
Etruria, was governed by the young Duke of Parma, who had married a Spanish
Infanta and was completely under the thumb of Bonaparte; Rome lay at his mercy;
the King of Naples, who owed his crown solely to the intervention of the Tsar,
was compelled to maintain a French garrison at Taranto.
Nothing could
be more flattering to the national vanity of the French than a treaty such as
this, which established the complete failure of the Second Coalition. The
republics, which the Coalition was formed to crush, maintained their existence
under the protection of France.
Paul I, who
had chivalrously embarked on a crusade to restore the Bourbons to the throne,
had ended by leaguing himself with the usurper and helping to consolidate his
influence. There was, indeed, a shadow on the picture—Great Britain; but she
was isolated for the moment, and Bonaparte cherished the hope of forcing her to
make peace.
In the spring
of 1801 Bonaparte believed the moment had come when, with the aid of the
neutrals, he would be able to humble England. He flattered himself that he
could contend successfully with the British fleet, divided, as it necessarily
was, between the Baltic, the French coast, and the Mediterranean. The idea of a
descent upon Ireland or the English coast was never absent from his mind. “
With three days of east wind,” he remarked, “ I could repeat the exploit of
William the Conqueror.” At the same time he was pursuing the idea, which he had
cherished in 1798, of attacking Great Britain through Egypt and India; and he
made preparations for the necessary supplies to be forwarded to the forces in
Egypt. He had already planned to send Massena to join the Russians by way of
the Danube, the Black Sea, and Astrakhan. Each day’s march had already been
arranged; proclamations to the inhabitants had been drawn up; nothing had been
forgotten, not even the balloon-staff and the savants. But when Bonaparte’s
preparations had reached this point, two pieces of intelligence were almost
simultaneously received which ruined the whole scheme. These were the battle
of Copenhagen and the assassination of the Tsar.
This latter
event, in particular, affected Bonaparte deeply. On hearing of it, he uttered cries
of rage and declared that he saw in it the hand of perfide Albion. “The English
failed to strike me on the third of Nivose,” he said, “...but they have not
failed to strike me at St Petersburg.’' The Moniteur published the news in
these terms: “ Paul I died on the night of March 24; the British squadron
passed the Sound on the 31st. History will teach us the connexion which may
exist between the two events.” In spite of all this rodomontade, Bonaparte was
anxious. The death of Paul had practically dissolved the League of Neutrals;
and the blockade of the English coast which Bonaparte had dreamed of was no
longer possible. He had even to abandon the hope of driving the English from
the Mediterranean. At the same time there were, after the Peace of Luneville,
important matters in France which demanded Bonaparte’s attention—the Concordat,
the Civil Code, the reform of the finances, the organisation of public
instruction—while abroad, the political systems of Italy, Holland, and
Switzerland, needed reorganisation in accordance with his ideas. For every
reason, a truce with England was necessary; and Bonaparte turned his thoughts
in that direction.
In Great
Britain also there was a general inclination towards peace. Although they had
won great successes at sea in the East and West Indies, had taken Copenhagen
and landed in Egypt, the English recognised the fact that, in spite of all
this and of the toil and money which
they had
expended, Bonaparte was still the strongest power on the Continent. Should they
continue the struggle or should they abandon it, husband their strength,
restore their finances, and wait for better times ? Both views were represented
in Great Britain, but it was the peace party which was gaining in numbers,
including, as it did, the whole business world. The country was passing through
a crisis: from the agricultural phase it was passing into the industrial. The
steam- engine, which had increased tenfold the manufacturing capacity of the
population as well as the producing capacity of the mines, had covered the
ground with a multitude of factories and workshops. The manufacturing
industry, which had already attained importance in 1801, demanded new outlets.
To the markets of the colonies and America, it was indispensable to add those
of Europe, for the most part closed during the war. It was hoped that, with
peace, British goods would find their way to the Continent; merchants,
manufacturers, and bankers became in consequence ardent partisans of peace.
This
movement, which became general after the Peace of Luneville, was one of the
causes which led to the retirement of Pitt on February 4, 1801, and the
formation of a ministry under Addington. From this moment a better feeling
began to prevail between England and France; and the Foreign Minister, Lord
Hawkesbury, intimated to Otto, who had been sent by the French to London to
arrange an exchange of prisoners, that the British Government was disposed,
should France be favourably inclined, to reopen negotiations.
Bonaparte, as
we have seen, also desired peace; but, in order to have it on the most
advantageous terms, he proposed to himself, as a preliminary step, to complete
the isolation of his rival. To that end, in spite of the Treaty of Luneville,
he prepared for intervention on the Continent by occupying positions favourable
both for attack and defence, and surrounding the Republic with what may be
described as a more complete system of outlying forts. Foreseeing possible
complications with Great Britain, Bonaparte made it his primary object to
confront the English with accomplished facts. The first step in that direction
was the annexation of Piedmont. Hitherto the wishes of Paul I, the
self-constituted champion of the King of Sardinia, had formed the chief
obstacle to this step. The Tsar once out of the way, Bonaparte’s hands were
free. On the day when he heard of Paul’s death he decided on annexation, taking
care to antedate the document, so that the connexion between the two events
should not be apparent. Anxious also not to alarm Europe, he announced to the
various Courts that the organisation of the country was his sole object. In his
secret instructions to General Jourdan, who commanded the corps of occupation
in Piedmont, he held very different language. “ This organisation,” he said, “
is merely a first step towards annexation.” At the same time he informed the
agents of the King of Sardinia, who had taken refuge at
ch. in.
Cagliari,
that, so long as the ports of the island were not closed against the English,
no proposals from him would be received.
In
Bonaparte’s view, to close the ports of western and southern Europe against
Great Britain was the surest means of isolating her and forcing her to come to
terms. Holland, Belgium, Spain, Tuscany, Liguria, and Naples, were already on
his side; he hoped to bring over Portugal also. But Portugal was an
agricultural country which derived its chief revenue through its export of com
and wine to England; and her Government refused to obey the behests of
Bonaparte. In order to enforce obedience, Bonaparte persuaded the King of
Spain, Charles IV, to invade Portugal, with the avowed object of annexing that
country. This was not done without difficulty, as Charles IV was father-in-law
of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and had no cause of complaint against him. It
was therefore with great reluctance that he made the expedition ; and, in
order to deprive the French of any pretext for intervention in Portugal, he
lost no time in coming to an agreement with his son-in-law. The latter, only
too glad to have escaped a French invasion, signed a treaty at Badajoz on June
6,1801, in which he undertook to close the ports of his kingdom against the
English, to leave the province of Oliven^a in the hands of the Spanish, and to
pay an indemnity of 20,000,000 francs to France.
This did not
satisfy Bonaparte, who had reckoned on the complete submission of Portugal. He
even refused to ratify the treaty, although it had been signed in the presence
of his brother Lucien, who was ambassador at Madrid, and although Lucien’s
instructions directed him to “settle the matter on the one condition that the
Portuguese ports were closed to the English.” The Spanish Government was
extremely indignant, declared the treaty irrevocable, and showed itself ready
to resist compulsion, even by force of arms. Bonaparte resorted to threats, and
proclaimed that “the last hour of the Spanish monarchy” was about to strike.
But he went no further than threats, for the announcement of two untoward
events compelled him to refrain from action: namely, the formal occupation of
Egypt by the English, and the reconciliation of Russia and Great Britain.
Nothing lay
nearer Bonaparte’s heart than the possession of Egypt. He was determined that
it should never be said that the expedition which he had himself directed was a
futile or irrational undertaking. From the beginning of February, 1801, he had
been occupied with fitting out a great fleet that was to carry provisions and
reinforcements to the army of occupation. This fleet, however, had been stopped
by British cruisers and had never reached its destination. The British, on the
other hand, had landed a force in Egypt and gradually reduced the country; on
June 27 Cairo, the bulwark of French power in the valley of the Nile, fell into
their hands.
The question
of Egypt had been one of the principal obstacles to an
understanding
with Great Britain, for on this point Bonaparte would not yield. Alexander I,
who, since the death of his father, had shown himself desirous of an
understanding with England, had declared that the occupation of Egypt by the
French, and their evident determination to remain there, created an
inexhaustible source of difficulties and disputes. A more friendly feeling was
now growing up between the Russian and British Governments. Alexander had
raised the embargo on British ships and renounced the Grand Mastership of
Malta; while the English, on their side, had restrained the further activity of
Nelson in the Baltic. In short, by the end of the spring, everything was ready
for a definite understanding; and this was arrived at by the signature on June
17, 1801, of the Treaty of St Petersburg, which formally defined the rights of
the neutral Baltic Powers.
Nothing could
affect Bonaparte more than this drawing together of Russia and Great Britain;
it meant the ruin of his eastern policy and the indefinite postponement of his
plans. Thenceforward, in everything that he did, he would have to reckon with
St Petersburg; and, what was still worse, he saw in the young Tsar a possible
rival in European politics. Alexander had wide ambitions; he could not forgive
the Corsican upstart, who filled the political stage and imposed his will on
the sovereigns of Europe. The Tsar longed to replace the supremacy of France by
the supremacy of Russia, and to play the part of arbitrator in European
disputes. In Italy he posed as the champion of the Kings of Sardinia and
Naples, claiming for the former a territorial indemnityin the peninsula, and
for the latter the preservation of his crown. In Germany he was about to
intervene in favour of the dispossessed Princes, “ with a view to
establishing,” as he said, “ such a balance of power as would afford mutual
guarantees and preserve the peace of Europe.”
At this
moment France appeared to be completely isolated. Even Prussia seemed inclined
to secure some advantage from the new political situation. Her King, it is
true, did not go so far as to abandon the neutral policy which had answered his
purpose so well. In 1801 he was no more ready to give up his political system than
he had been in 1798, when the Second Coalition held out to him the prospect of
filling up the gap in his dominions, and of adding thereto certain territories
on the left bank of the Rhine, or than he was in 1800, after Marengo, when
Bonaparte offered him Hanover as the price of his alliance. It was in vain that
Lucchesini, Prussian ambassador in Paris, pointed out to Frederick William that
Bonaparte, through his policy in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, had brought
about a European coalition against himself, and was even losing his popularity
in France; the King would not listen. Nevertheless, aided by the Tsar, he made
an adroit attempt to secure for himself a wide stretch of German territory by
way of compensation for his trifling losses on the left bank of the Rhine. At
the same time, in order to reassure Austria, he was at pains to prove
that such an
addition to his territory would be chiefly to the detriment of France. “ The
establishment of several great Powers in Germany,” said his minister Haugwitz,
“ is the only possible barrier which we can oppose to the supremacy and the
revolutionary zeal of France.”
Confronted by
so many rival ambitions; face to face with Russia, whose aim it was to keep him
at a distance and to challenge his supremacy over Germany and Italy; with
Prussia, who offered nothing but a precarious neutrality for which she expected
to be handsomely paid; with Austria, whose only object was to evade and whittle
away the Treaty of Luneville—Bonaparte saw that there was but one thing to be
done, viz. to make terms with England. The necessity of this step was brought
home to him by the formidable difficulties of the work which he had undertaken
in the countries owing allegiance to France. It was true that these countries
owed some liberties to France ; but the system of contributions and
conscriptions which she had forced upon them proved more onerous than the
burdens which they had borne under their former rulers, and they were far from
being attached to the Republic. Bonaparte saw clearly that, if he wished to
bind their peoples to him, it was necessary to bestow upon them just and
regular government. To organise the French Republic, to organise also the
governments of Italy, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland, in other words, to
secure the supremacy of the First Consul in France itself and the supremacy of
France outside her own borders, was a task which could not be deferred. He
resigned himself, therefore, to a truce with England, which he knew to be
precarious, but which he hoped would hold long enough to enable him to complete
the work of political organisation.
Negotiations
had gone on without a break between London and Paris; but it was rather the
scope of the understanding than the understanding itself which had been under
discussion. The British Government had, in the first instance, proposed the
principle of uti possidetis, as the basis of the future arrangement; that is to
say, the simple retention by both parties of their respective conquests. This
the French Government rejected, under the pretext that it would work to the
prejudice of their allies, Holland and Spain, who had lost several of their
colonies. They had failed also to agree on what was implied by the status ante
helium, as each party strove to interpret those words in the sense most
favourable to itself. Eventually a basis of agreement was found in “ reciprocal
compensation.” Frantie formally recognised the greater part of the conquests
which England had made; Great Britain did the same with respect to the
conquests of France; while Malta and Egypt were restored to their former
owners, the Knights and the Sultan respectively.
The
discussion on this question of compensation lasted throughout the summer. The
British Government could not consent to an official recognition of the recent
establishment of the Republic, but it knew
well enough
that to raise this question would render agreement impossible ; it therefore
evaded the difficulty by ignoring its existence and by limiting discussion to
those points which were indispensable. The French Government, on the other
hand, refused to concur in the retention by Great Britain of all the colonies
which she had taken from the allies of France, and required the restitution of
the Cape to Holland and of Trinidad to Spain. On the question of Trinidad
especially Bonaparte was at first immovable, since its possession would secure
to his foes “ a dangerous foothold on the vast continent of South America.”
When, however, the Spaniards had played him false in the matter of Portugal, Bonaparte
was less anxious to protect their interests. On September 29 he had reluctantly
signed at Madrid a treaty with Portugal, which was nothing more than a
confirmation of the Treaty of Badajoz; and, at Talleyrand’s suggestion, he
decided to leave Trinidad in the hands of England. This concession expedited
the negotiations in London and quieted the doubts of the British Cabinet; and
on October 1, 1801, the preliminaries of peace were signed in London.
By these
preliminaries Great Britain undertook to restore to France and her allies,
Spain and Holland, all her maritime conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad, which
became hers permanently. She restored the Cape, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo,
and Surinam to the Dutch; Martinique and Guadeloupe to the French; Minorca to
the Spaniards; and Malta to the Order of St John of Jerusalem, under the
guarantee of one of the great Powers. She abandoned Porto Ferraio, which, with
the rest of the island of Elba, became the property of the French. In return
for this the French were to evacuate Naples. The armies of both nations were
withdrawn from Egypt, which was restored to Turkey. The integrity of Portugal
was guaranteed; and the independence of the Ionian Islands was recognised. The
question of the Newfoundland fisheries was deferred.
The news that
preliminaries had been signed in London caused great joy in France. It
announced the general peace so long desired, which was to give lasting
tranquillity to the Continent, remove the necessity for European coalitions,
and furnish the nation with fresh opportunities for the development of its
industry and commerce. In Paris the news spread rapidly, and the city was
spontaneously illuminated. In London the rejoicings were not less intense. The
people, delivered from the nightmare of invasion, and believing that dearth,
high prices, and all the other ills which war produces, were at an end,
persuaded also that profitable markets would now be opened to their foreign
trade, gave themselves up to transports of joy. The public conveyances which
started from London bore enormous placards announcing “ Peace with France.”
When Lauriston, Bonaparte’s aide-de-camp, arrived from Paris with the
ratification of the preliminaries, the crowd, in its excitement, took the
horses from his carriage and dragged him in triumph, amidst loud cheers for
Bonaparte.
In England
this joy was short-lived. No sooner were the terms of the convention made known
than the liveliest displeasure was manifested. Politicians could not believe
that no stipulations had been made in respect of Holland, the Rhine,
Switzerland, or Italy, and that, of all her conquests, England had retained
only Ceylon and Trinidad. Business men, on their side, were deeply disappointed
that the stipulations embodied no treaty of commerce, and that, instead of the
wide facilities which they expected, the Continent remained closed, as in the
past, with a system of prohibitive tariffs more ruinous than war. The opinion
of the mercantile world became before long the opinion of the whole nation. “It
is nothing but a frail and deceptive truce,” said Lord Fitzwilliam in a speech
in Parliament. The Government inwardly shared this view, and hoped, before
signing a definite peace, to obtain more favourable conditions and so render
the treaty acceptable to the nation.
The town of
Amiens was the place chosen for the discussion of the articles of the treaty.
The British envoy was Lord Cornwallis, who had commanded in America and in the
East, and had governed India and Ireland. The French envoy was Joseph Bonaparte,
who was already called “Grand Signatory of the Consulate,” from having signed
the treaty of Morfontaine with America and that of Luneville with Austria.
Joseph, who liked to pose as a liberal and as an opponent, on many points, of
the policy of his brother, professed great sympathy with England, and was ready
to make genuine efforts to bring about a definite reconciliation between the
two countries. Personally he was inclined to make concessions with a view to
removing causes of disagreement in the future; but the First Consul ordered
Talleyrand to draw up instructions which confined Joseph’s power of negotiation
within very definite limits. Joseph, accordingly, was compelled to decline all
discussion which related to the King of Sardinia, to Holland and the Stad-
holder, or to the affairs of Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. “All these
subjects,” said Napoleon, “ are completely outside our deliberations with
England.” With all vexed questions thus eliminated, the treaty of peace became
nothing more than a simple acceptance of the preliminaries. The British
Government had to agree to these conditions; for Bonaparte declared that,
rather than yie)d on this essential point, he would recommence hostilities. The
questions of India, Malta, and Egypt were settled in accordance with the terms
of the preliminaries.
There
remained what the English people had most at heart, the question of commercial
treaties. Bonaparte, who had inherited from the Committee of Public Safety and
from the Directory their spirit of absolutism, had also inherited from them
their economic methods. The Draconian law of 10 Brumaire, year V, which was the
reenactment in an aggravated form of the Terrorist law of 19 Vendemiaire, year
III, was rigorously enforced; it placed British merchants on the same footing
as French emigres, declared their merchandise to be enemy’s goods,
and forbade
its importation or sale throughout the territory of the French Republic. In
vain did the British strive to obtain more equitable conditions; Bonaparte
flatly refused and declared that he preferred to renew hostilities. “ Rather
immediate war,” said he, “ than illusory arrangements.” The British Government
was compelled to submit, and only obtained some unimportant concessions in
matters of detail. The legotiations, however, dragged on for nearly six months.
Many protocols of a dilatory nature were drawn up; there was much discussion
and much going and coming between Amiens, London, and Paris. Bonaparte grew
impatient, and frequently threatened to resort to war. It was his wish that the
treaty should be signed on March 10, the day on which the Concordat was to be
promulgated in France. It was not, however, till March 27,1802, that the
signatures were exchanged.
The Treaty of
Amiens was also signed by Azarea and Schimmel- penninck, the representatives of
Spain and Holland, who, as a matter of fact, had merely to ratify what
Bonaparte had decided. It contained the following provisions. Peace was
proclaimed between the French Republic, the King of Spain, and the Batavian
Republic on the one part, and the King of Great Britain and Ireland on the
other. Great Britain retained Ceylon and Trinidad, and restored the other
colonies taken from France and her allies. The integrity of Turkey was guaranteed
; the Prince of Orange was to receive an indemnity; Malta was to be restored to
the Order, to remain neutral and independent under the guarantee of the Great
Powers, and to receive a Neapolitan garrison for a year, and if necessary for a
longer period. Great Britain was to evacuate the island within three months of
the ratification of the treaty, while France was to evacuate Taranto and the
States of the Church; Great Britain was to surrender the points which she
occupied on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean in the month following the
ratification, and her colonial conquests within six months of that date.
This treaty
was far more advantageous to France than to England, where it was regarded with
very mixed feelings. It was in vain that Addington declared, “This is no
ordinary peace, but a genuine reconciliation between the two first nations of
the world ”: the country did not believe him. The leaders of commerce, when
they saw that the prohibitions imposed in the heat of a violent struggle were
in no way relaxed, looked upon the arrangement as a fool’s bargain. The lower
orders, to whom it did not bring the cheap food on which they had counted, were
still more dissatisfied. The great landowners, who had hoped for relief from
fiscal burdens, and the middle class, which called for the abolition of the
income-tax, openly expressed their dislike for a treaty which did not fulfil
their wishes. But what perhaps more irritated the nation as a whole, was the
discovery that the Government had taken no measures to check the insatiable
ambition of Bonaparte. This feeling of discontent made itself heard when the
treaty was discussed in Parliament.
In the House
of Lords, Lord Grenville declared the peace to be both “unsafe and
dishonourable,” and asserted that the country, instead of being secure, “stood
in greater danger than ever.” Lord Carnarvon, stigmatising the peace as
disgraceful, remarked that it “ even contrived to remove all security for those
rights which still remained unconceded.” In the House of Commons, where the criticisms
were equally bitter, Addington expressed his regret at being made a party to
the aggrandisement of Prance, but he addeu: “ I am wet persuaded that,
whatever may happen, it is the wisest course for us to husband our resources at
present that we may the better be prepared, if that should be our lot, to
exert
ourselves with energy and effect I
think therefore that we
should take
care not to exhaust our resources when there is nothing to be gained by it.”
The treaty was ratified accordingly.
In Prance, on
the contrary, the joy caused by the announcement of the Peace of Amiens was
without alloy. Mistress as she was of Holland, Belgium, the left bank of the
Rhine, Switzerland, and Italy, never at any peridd of her history had Prance
appeared to be more powerful. Moreover, the fact that the peace affected almost
the whole Continent was a reason for believing that it would prove durable;
for, simultaneously with the signature of the preliminaries of London, treaties
had been signed with other countries, Prussia, Bavaria, Turkey, and Russia.
On May 23,
1802, Prance concluded a treaty with Prussia, by which the latter secured the
possession of the bishoprics of Paderbom and Hildesheim, part of Munster,
Eichsfeld, Erfurt, etc., and several abbeys, in compensation for the
territories surrendered to France on the left bank of the Rhine. In return,
Prussia formally recognised the changes effected by France in Italy. The
Stadholder received from France a share of German territory consisting of the
bishopric of Fulda and certain abbeys; and he on his side recognised the
existence of the Batavian Republic. By a treaty dated May 24, France obtained
from Bavaria the surrender of all territory possessed by the latter on the left
bank of the Rhine; in consideration of this, she undertook to use her influence
in the negotiations which were shortly to take place with reference to the
affairs of Germany, to obtain for Bavaria adequate and conveniently situated
compensation. The treaty of October 9 with Turkey provided for the restitution
of Egypt to the Porte, for the reestablishment of former relations with France,
and for the strict enforcement of all previous treaties of commerce and
navigation.
The treaty of
October 11 with Russia was still more important. France undertook to settle in
conjunction with Russia the question of indemnifying the German princes, and
also the Italian question, so far as the latter had not been disposed of by the
treaties concluded with the Pope, Austria, and Naples. The most thorny question
was that of Piedmoxlt. During the negotiations in London, Bonaparte, emboldened
by the silence of the British Government, had completed the definite
79
incorporation
of that country, which he had previously delayed. He now made up his mind not
to surrender it to the King of Sardinia. The Tsar, in spite of his championship
of that sovereign, was compelled to rest satisfied with a clause by which
Prance and Russia mutually promised “to concern themselves in friendly concert
with the interests of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, and to treat them with
all the consideration compatible with the actual state of things.”
It needed no
prescience to foresee, even so early as 1802, that this universal peace, which
was the admiration of contemporaries,: could not, from its very nature, be
anything more than a truce. Austria had suffered the Treaty of Luneville to be
wrung from her; and it was clear that she would seize the first opportunity to
tear it up. In the instructions which Cobenzl had set down for his own
guidance at the moment of star ;ng for Luneville, he wrote, “ In
case it should be impossible to obtain better conditions from France, we must
consider, in conjunction with the English Government, which course would best
further the common cause—whether to expose Austria to the dangers of continuing
the war, or to secure to her by a separate peace the respite necessary to
enable her to recover her strength and so remain a serviceable ally of
England.” Austria had not lost the hope, or at any rate the desire, to deprive
France of her supremacy in Europe, and to force her back within her ancient
limits or even beyond them. Acknowledging that for the moment she was beaten,
she compromised but did not capitulate.
Great
Britain, for analogous reasons, could only look upon the Peace of Amiens as a
truce. Bonaparte showed plainly that his intention was to rob her of her
ascendancy in the Mediterranean and to dispute her supremacy at sea. England
would have ceased to be England had she agreed to such conditions. A nation
brimming over with strength and vitality, with her traditions, her passions,
and her pride, with her banks, her mines, her manufactures, her superfluous
population, her fleets, her trade, her vast capital and her inexhaustible
credit, would have decreed her own destruction had she given up the contest. It
suited her to discontinue it for a time, to secure her acquisitions and gather
fresh strength; but she knew that a resumption of the conflict was inevitable.
But what,
above everything else, rendered the peace precarious and short-lived was the
personal ambition of Bonaparte. Reviewing his past life at St Helena, Napoleon
said: “ I was honestly persuaded that
both
the future of France and my own was settled at Amiens..................................... It was
my intention
to devote myself entirely to the administration of France; and I believe that I
should have worked wonders. I should have made the moral conquest of Europe, as
I conquered it, or very nearly conquered it, by force of arms.” Bonaparte’s
language in 1802 was very different. “ France,” he said, “ must be first among
States, or she must disappear. I will keep the peace as long as my neighbours
keep it; but the advantage will be mine if they force me to take up arms again
before they grow
rusty.
Between old monarchies arid a young republic the spirit of hostility must
always exist. In the existing situation every treaty of peace means to me no
more than a brief armistice; and I believe that, while I fill my present
office, my destiny is to be fighting almost continually.”
No sooner was
the Treaty of Amiens signed than Bonaparte began to make ready for the struggle
which he foresaw and foretold. In domestic affairs he displayed an
all-consuming activity: roads, canals, improvements in the ports, were all
undertaken at once. He paid a visit to Normandy, admired its cloth-factories,
its looms, its workshops, and resolved to extend throughout France the
industries to which that province owes its wealth. He fitted out extensive
colonial expeditions for the Antilles, Louisiana, Mauritius, Madagascar, and
India. All the dockyards were filled with scaffolding, in the midst of which
rose the hulls of vessels. Bonaparte’s great ambition was to have a fleet equal
to that of England. “It will take us at least ten years,” he said to Admiral
Deeres; “ after that time, with the help of Spain and Holland, we may perhaps
hope to challenge the power of Great Britain with some chance of success.” To
this end, and in order to profit by a period of aggressive peace which was to
secure the hegemony of France on the Continent, he began by pressing into his
service those maritime Powers which were already dependent on the Republic.
Already controlling Holland and Italy, he was determined to be master of Spain
and Portugal; and, pending the annexation of those countries, he sent his own
generals in the guise of ambassadors,, who were to dragoon the governments,
keep watch on their doings, frustrate intrigues, and take care that the ports
were rigidly closed to the English. Foreseeing, moreover, that in the event of
a maritime war the struggle would extend to the Continent, he took measures to
strengthen his position on the French frontier; and this entailed interference
with the politics of Italy, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland.
FRANCE AND
HER TRIBUTARIES (1801-3).
In 1798 it had
been the aim of the Coalition to destroy those revolutionary creations of the
Directory—the Ligurian, Cisalpine, Batavian, and Helvetian Republics. The
result of the campaign of 1800 was to affirm their existence and their
independence. More than this; under the terms of the Treaty of Luneville,
Bonaparte intervened in Germany on the question of the indemnities to be paid
to the dispossessed Princes of the left bank of the Rhine; and he proposed, by
enforcing his own doctrine of “secularisation,” to bring about the
jggrandisement of certain lay Princes and so create allies in the heart of
Germany. It was only under the rule of Bonaparte that the political effects of
the Revolution acquired any degree of durability in the tributary States. He
had himself lost no time, after the events of Brumaire, in making important
modifications in the constitutions of the Cisalpine Republic, Holland, and
Switzerland. After the Peace of Amiens he was able to undertake the reorganisation
of these countries.
At the
outbreak of the revolutionary wars, the educated classes in Italy had welcomed
the French as deliverers, in the hope of obtaining from them what as yet the
Italians lacked—liberty and a fatherland. The French Revolution, while it
ushered in the civil reforms which had been so ardently longed for by the
majority of the people, had laid down, as a first principle, the independence
of nations, and had aimed at giving them their freedom and at uniting them in
appropriate groups by the ties of patriotism. It was this feature of the great
movement of political emancipation in France which struck enlightened Italians,
and caused all inhabitants of the peninsula to hail that movement with
enthusiasm. This enthusiasm did not, however, survive the wars of the Republic.
The Italians believed that it was the sole object of the French to free them
and to ensure their liberty. The French, indeed, were willing to free the
Italians and to share with them the gains of the Revolution; but the protection
thus given was primarily intended to attach them to the Republic. The war, too,
was costly; and by whom should the cost be defrayed if not by those who
benefited by it ? Before long, however, the necessities of the conqueror
brought with them the
desire of
gain; and, by degrees, the wars of liberation were turned into wars of
conquest. The Convention had treated the nations which submitted to it with a
certain degree of generosity; the Directory, in its dealings with them,
displayed only greed and cruelty. Generals and administrators rivalled each
other in the art of making war at a profit. Bonaparte, during his first Italian
campaign, showed a special aptitude in this direction. Not only did he levy
enormous contributions upon the towns, sequestrate the estates and goods of the
clergy, and quarter his soldiers upon the inhabitants, but he sent to Paris
“everything which could be carried off and which might be useful.” Moreover his
officers, agents, and commissioners, not content with enforcing requisitions on
behalf of the army or the Directory, pillaged so shamelessly on their own
account that Bonaparte was occasionally compelled to intervene.
During the
second Italian campaign the people were subjected to the same exactions; and
risings took place everywhere after the arrival of the French. Bonaparte,
however, flattered himself that he would be able to win over the Italians by
fair speeches and promises of good government. One of the chief mistakes of the
Directory had been the persecution of religion. The First Consul, on the other
hand, as soon as he entered Italy, declared himself its defender. In all his
proclamations this advice was repeated: “Let your priests say mass; power lies
with the people; if they wish for religion, respect their wishes.” This respect
for religion went a long way towards smoothing down Italian opposition. An
entirely new section of adherents were gained over—the middle classes and the
people. To reconcile the Liberals with the new regime, Bonaparte boasted the benefits
of the Revolution, civil equality and the suppression of abuses and privileges.
He led the patriots to believe that, by means of the institutions which were to
be given to Italy, he was preparing the way for national unity, which had
already been brought about in France by the creation of a unity of principles
and of legislation, of thought and sentiment—the tie which never fails to bind
together all human communities. He thus led all parties to cherish the illusion
that the new polity, half national republic, half protectorate, would
eventually lead them to the full possession of their independence.
It was
certainly no part of Bonaparte’s scheme to promote Italian unity. At Campo
Formio, in spite of the wishes of the Directory, who had planned the creation
of a strong republic in North Italy, he himself had been the foremost to
mutilate that great scheme by the surrender of Venice, and, later, by the
annexation of Piedmont. To enable him to become master of Italy, it was
necessary that the country should be split up. In his private conversations
with Frenchmen he declared that the Italian people, enervated by centuries of
bondage, was unfitted for liberty and independence. To Italians he held out the
splendid prospect of a united Italy; but he was well aware that the bulk of the
nation,
keenly interested in local and municipal matters and at heart indifferent to
forms of government, would sooner or later be gained to France by the
dispensing of equal justice and by a wise and careful administration. It was
with these views that he organised Piedmont, Liguria, and the Cisalpine
Republic.
The future of
Piedmont had been provisionally settled by a decree of April 21, 1801, which
made of it a French military province. By a decree of September 21, 1802, the
administration was made civil instead of military; and the country was divided
into six departments. This incorporation with France had been long foreseen;
and the people accepted it willingly. Forced, after the Austro-Russian
invasion, to submit to the excesses of a reaction which had not even restored
their reigning family; invaded once more by the French, whom they had hailed as
liberators; and governed subsequently by commissioners who were hampered by
incessant financial difficulties, the Piedmontese desired nothing so much as
peace, even at the expense of their nominal independence. During a year and a
half they had become accustomed to the French administration, and had found it
to be just and careful of the general good; the change made by Bonaparte did
not affect them; it was merely a substitution of the permanent for the
provisional. For the rest, they were by no means badly off under French rule.
Agriculture, which had suffered much from the wars, was generally resumed; manufactures
and commerce prospered; the people, who could now pursue their callings in
peace, became reconciled to a regime which, if it did not give them liberty, at
any rate ensured them security and a certain degree of comfort.
While
Bonaparte was incorporating Piedmont with the French Republic, the government
of the Ligurian Republic underwent important changes at his hands. The existing
constitution of the latter country was a copy of the French constitution of the
year III: it provided for government by a Directory with two elective Chambers.
This constitution Bonaparte abolished; and, in concert with Salicetti, the
French representative at Genoa, he created a new form of government, composed
of a Senate and a Doge, who was to be his nominee. The change was made without
opposition; and the new authorities took office on June 29,1802. From that time
forward, the Republic of Genoa was a docile instrument in Bonaparte’s hands,
and continued to lend him useful support in his struggle with Great Britain
until its incorporation with the French Empire in 1805.
In the
Cisalpine, Bonaparte had no difficulty in reestablishing his authority; for
Austrian ill-usage had caused the French to be remembered with regret. Not
less intent than the French had been on absorbing the riches of the country,
the Austrians had made themselves especially odious by the mean vengeance
which they wreaked on those who had borne office under the Republic. Far-seeing
men had
not been
wanting in Austria to warn the Government against these excesses, but their
warnings were in vain. Patriots had been publicly flogged, and many had been
thrown into prison. All the high functionaries of the Cisalpine Republic had
been compelled to expiate their crime by forced labour on the government works
at Cattaro. The gains of the Revolution had been nullified by a stroke of the
pen ; and the former regime, aggravated by the abuses peculiar to Austrian
rule, had been reestablished.
In its
beginnings, however, French rule proved harsh enough. Before it obtained a
regular polity, the Cisalpine had to submit to a Provisional Government which
literally sucked the country dry. Bonaparte had indeed promised to reorganise
the Republic in accordance with the principles which had triumphed in France
in Brumaire— “religion, equality, and good order.” A year, however, was to pass
before the promise was fulfilled; and during that time the Cisalpine was
governed, first by a French agent, General Petiet, a former war minister of the
Directory; then by a commission of nine, which was reduced subsequently to a
triumvirate composed of three Milanese advocates, Sommariva, Visconti, and
Ruga. In addition to this executive, there was a Legislative Assembly or
Consulta, the members of which, limited in number, had been selected by
Bonaparte. This Assembly was powerless; and the country lay at the mercy of the
Triumvirate, two of whom, Sommariva and Ruga, governed with the sole object of
enriching themselves at the expense of the State. The condition of the
Cisalpine was for some time pitiable: compelled, according to the principle
laid down by Bonaparte, to support the army of occupation, the Republic had
under this head to make a monthly payment of 100,000 francs into the French
Treasury. To this heavy charge were added innumerable and never-ending requisitions
in kind. The country districts had been ravaged; and a succession of bad
harvests added to the general misery.
It was high
time for Bonaparte to intervene, if he were not to lose the fruits of his
conquest. After the signature of the Treaty of Luneville, he announced to the
inhabitants of the Cisalpine that he was about to organise their Republic on a
permanent basis. Bonaparte had no intention of leaving to the Lombards the task
of framing their own constitution. It was at Paris that the Constitution of the
Cisalpine was drawn up, on the model of the French Consular Constitution. In
September, 1801, when the draft was ready, Bonaparte summoned four of the most
considerable citizens of the Republic, Marescalchi, Melzi, Aldini, and
Serbelloni, submitted the result of his labours to them, and asked for their
criticisms. But, subject to some slight modifications made at their suggestion,
the Constitution remained essentially such as he himself had evolved it. The
complete instrument was referred in secret to the Consulta at Milan, which
adopted it without amendment.
As the
foundation of the whole system, Bonaparte created a body of electors, divided
into three colleges, the proprietors (possidenti), the learned classes (dotti),
the trading classes (commercianti). These electors, 700 in number, appointed
various bodies : a Commission of Censorship ([Censura) of 21 members, whose
duty it was to safeguard the constitution, and which resembled the French
Senate; a Cormdta of 8 members, whose business it was to draw up new laws, and
who corresponded to the French Council of State; a Legislative Council of 10
members, whose task, like that of the French Tribunate, was to discuss proposed
legislation; and lastly a Legislative Body of 75 members, condemned, like its
French prototype, to silence, whose only function was to countersign such laws
as were passed. But the powers of these various bodies were still further
curtailed to the advantage of the executive. The executive authority was
concentrated entirely in the hands of a President and a Vice-President, the
powers of the latter being even more shadowy than were those of a Second
Consul. These two magistrates were appointed for ten years.
In organising
the Cisalpine Republic after this fashion, Bonaparte set before himself a
double object. He strove, on the one hand, to set up a stable government which
might reassure threatened interests and satisfy to a certain extent the
national aspirations; on the other hand, to establish French rule in the north
of Italy on a durable footing. Bonaparte attained the first end by the grant of
a Constitution, and the second by reserving to himself the nomination of all
the functionaries of the Republic. As usual, he was astute enough to make it
appear that, in so doing, he was only carrying out the wishes of the people.
Prompted by his agents, certain of the citizens came to Paris to beg him to
choose their officials and so render a service to their country. Bonaparte
replied that it was not possible for him to perform the task unaided; and he
proposed to do so in concert with the most influential members of the Republic.
It was arranged that this new Commission, the members of which had been chosen
by Bonaparte, should meet at Lyons, in order, as he said, that its deliberations
might be free from local influences. Four hundred and fifty-four deputies, all
favourable to France, went to Lyons at the beginning of 1802, and in concert
with Bonaparte distributed the offices of the Republic. When they came to the
choice of the chief magistrate—the President—a committee appointed for the
purpose nominated Count Melzi, the most prominent person in Lombardy and a man
who appeared to stand high in Bonaparte’s favour. Bonaparte, however, strongly
disapproved of their choice. What was his reason for doing so the Lombards
failed to understand, until Talleyrand enlightened them by enquiring why they
did not nominate Bonaparte himnplf The Italians took the hint at once, and lost
no time in offering to Bonaparte the first place in their Republic. Bonaparte
received the proposal as a matter of course. He told the Lombards that he
accepted,
“because he
had found no one amongst them who had sufficient claims on popular esteem...and
who had rendered services to his country sufficiently important to make him
worthy of the chief magistracy.”
Not to have a
President of their own nationality was a rude disappointment to the Lombards ;
but Bonaparte, by way of consolation, announced at the last sitting of the
Commission, January 25, 1802, th&t from that time forward the name “
Italian " should be substituted for that of “ Cisalpine.” These words were
received with unanimous applause. Did they not proclaim to the whole of Italy
that the Republic might be welcomed as the first step towards national unity,
towards that Italia virtuosa, magnanima ed una, which their poet Alfieri had
foretold ? Melzi was at the same time appointed Vice-President, with the task
of governing in Bonaparte’s absence.
This first
experiment of an Italian Republic was, at least at the outset, fairly
successful. Melzi, a man of a gentle and conciliatory disposition, who
belonged to an old Lombard family, and carried great weight in the country,
succeeded by his personal influence in smoothing down to a great extent the
opposition of the privileged classes—the nobility and the clergy. The clergy in
particular, already reassured by Bonaparte, were completely won over. The
well-tordo classes, who had hitherto suffered severely from the depredations of
French agents and the incessant requisitions imposed by the army, were harassed
no longer. The support of the corps of occupation was arranged for on a
definite basis, so that the burden could not be increased by arbitrary demands.
From the
political point of view also, the situation seemed at first to promise fairly.
Melzi, it is true, did not share Bonaparte’s ideas; he was a Liberal, and would
have preferred a Constitution on the English model; but he administered with
strict impartiality the Constitution which had been given to his country. He
received valuable assistance in his task from the officials whom Bonaparte had
chosen, particularly from Prina, the famous minister, a very able man. In less
than a year all the chief departments of state were organised; and the machine
of government was put into working condition. Order was reestablished in the
finances; a national army was created; and military schools for the instruction
of officers were opened at Pavia and Modena. Public instruction, which under
the Austrians had fallen into neglect, made a fresh start; and the universities
of Bologna and Pavia were reopened.
But these
auspicious beginnings led no further. Melzi did not receive that support from
the people which might have given durability to his work. The nation, whose
moral and national unity he strove to bring about, was strongly particularist
at heart. The local spirit of the towns rebelled against the decisions of the
central authority. The States to the south of the Po were impatient of the
supremacy of Milan, and, in the words of the Vice-President, were “ constantly
hankering after federation.” Of devotion to the common cause there was none;
each
man thought
only of himself. At the same time there was perpetual friction with the French.
No one spoke well of the administration. “ Why,” it was asked, “ do we need an
army of occupation ? Are we not ourselves capable of keeping order in our own
country?” Strange to say, as better order was established, discontent
increased. “ The feeling of animosity against the French,” wrote Melzi, “ is
universal.”
To make head
against so many difficulties a man of energy was needed, a man capable of
combining all parties by the force of his own will. Melzi was not of this
stamp; he lacked the higher qualities of a statesman. As a great noble, moreover,
Melzi could not but feel an instinctive aversion to the Jacobin leaders, men
who sprang from the middle or lower classes, and many of whom still sat on the
various councils. Now these Jacobins were the representatives of French ideas;
and, if they were no favourites of Bonaparte, he knew how to make use of them.
On all occasions they found a ready listener in Murat, who commanded the army
of occupation; and he omitted no opportunity of keeping the First Consul
informed of what was happening in Lombardy. Naturally the tendency of these
reports was to give the impression at Paris that Melzi was an enemy of France.
An event
happened which for the moment almost lent credibility to these accusations. A
captain in the Italian army, Ceroni, published under a pseudonym a collection
of sonnets in which he sang the former glories of Italy, and contrasted them
with her present humiliation, bewailing “ the fatherland prostrate beneath the
heel of the stranger.” In Bonaparte’s eyes such a book was treasonable; and he
expressed surprise that Melzi should have allowed it to be published. So harsh,
indeed, was his reprimand, that the Vice-President of the Italian Republic,
disheartened already by the ill success of his policy, sent in his resignation.
Bonaparte declined to accept it. He was already, in his own mind, tracing the
future of Lombardy. On the point of being proclaimed Emperor of the French, he
dreamt of reviving in his own favour the kingdom of Italy; until that dream
could be realised, it was necessary that Melzi should retain his office. The
latter was compelled to sacrifice his own wishes and remain as Vice-President
till Bonaparte came to Milan to assume the iron crown of Lombardy (May, 1805).
Compared with
the north, which prospered in spite of French domination, the condition of the
rest of Italy was deplorable in the extreme. The remaining States, unlike the
Cisalpine and Piedmont, had not only lost their political independence, but
were ill-governed and ill-administered into the bargain. In spite of the wealth
of the soil, agriculture was at its lowest ebb. Industry and commerce were
stifled under an antiquated system of laws. The commercial decline of Venice,
which had begun in the middle of the eighteenth century, was hastened under the
Austrian rule. Tuscany, which had been turned into the kingdom of Etruria, for
the benefit of the Duke of Parma, the son-in-law of the King of Spain,
was in a
pitiable state: the King, feeble in mind and body, and affected by epilepsy,
was entirely dominated by his wife, the bigoted Marie-Louise, who in her turn
was dominated by the priesthood; the last vestiges of liberty had been
abolished, and the privileges of the clergy augmented to a corresponding
extent. At Rome the situation was no better. Pius VII, a man adorned with great
virtues in private life, possessed no aptitude for government; and his States,
administered as they had been in the Middle Ages, were reputed the most
wretched in Italy. At Naples, Ferdinand IV was equally careless in promoting
the prosperity of his kingdom; the policy on which he was wholly bent was one
of feigning blind submission to Bonaparte, while he secretly intrigued against
him with the Governments of Vienna, London, and St Petersburg.
Compared with
these peoples, so execrably governed, northern Italy seemed fortunate. Her
citizens, if they did not enjoy liberty, possessed at all events equality and
equitable laws. If Bonaparte did not give the country its independence, he
developed its wealth by undertaking great works of public utility. He made
roads, cut canals, improved the ports, and transformed the cities.
Consequently, among the Venetians, the Romans, and the Neapolitans there were
many who would have welcomed French rule or annexation to the Italian Republic.
Bonaparte, too, did not fail to encourage the belief that what he had effected
in Piedmont and Lombardy had been effected in the interest of the Italians. In
his official 'speeches he declared that the state of semi-subjection in which
he held their country was only a stage on the road to absolute freedom, and
that the day would come when he would restore to Italy the control of her own
destinies. This illusion of the Italians was not to last long. In 1804 the
Empire was established in France; and this involved for Italy the complete
subjection of the country.
If the Dutch
did not show the enthusiasm of the Italians for the doctrines of the French
Revolution, those doctrines had, nevertheless, made their way into Holland even
before the arrival of the armies of the Republic. The fragments of the old
republican party, whose chief men had taken refuge in France after the
revolution effected by the Stad- holder William V in 1787, still existed in the
country. In imitation of what had been done in Paris, these republicans founded
clubs in most of the towns; after the French conquest, many of them became
leaders in the new polity and the first office-bearers in the Batavian
Republic. The first republican government was remarkable for its wisdom and
moderation, but it was incapable of grappling with its political and financial
difficulties. The ancient particularist tendencies of the Dutch showed
themselves in each province and even in each town; and the military
requisitions, which were often crushing, caused general discontent. An attempt
at centralisation made in 1796, in the shape of a National Convention, whose
members chose the executive, succeeded no
better; and
after two years the plan was abandoned. For some time (1797-8) all political
life in Holland was paralysed by a series of coups d’etat. Government by a
Directory, modelled on that of France, at last secured to the country three
years of comparative repose.
The Dutch
Directory consisted of an executive body of five members. The legislative
authority was shared between two Chambers: a Grand Council, which was
representative in character, and a Council of Ancients. This system worked
fairly well, and at any other time would probably have secured the well-being
of the country. At the head of the Republic were active men of moderate views,
capable of restoring to Holland her financial prosperity, which had been
compromised by a series of revolutions. Progress, however, in that direction
was once more blocked by the war of 1799; and on the morrow of Brune’s
victories the Republic sank under the weight of its debt. Augereau, who
commanded the army of occupation, drained the provinces dry by his incessant
requisitions; and, as a last resource, the legislature was compelled to vote
for the year 1800 a forced loan of 3 per cent, on capital values. Under these
conditions the Government was quickly discredited.
This state of
things afforded Bonaparte abundant excuse for interference in Holland. Ever
since the revolution of Brumaire, his wish had been to change the system of
government; and Semonville, the representative of France at the Hague, had
written, “Batavia will accept whatever Constitution you give her.” In 1801
Bonaparte considered that the moment for intervention had come; and he drew up
a Constitution which strengthened the executive, while it diminished the
authority of the legislature to a corresponding extent. He created a Council of
twelve members (Staatsbewind!), with a Secretary-General and four Secretaries
of State. The legislative power rested with a single Chamber of 35 members,
chosen, in the first instance, by the Government, and afterwards to be renewed,
one-third at a time, by the electors. This Chamber could only vote by a simple
“ aye ” or “ no ” on the bills placed before them.
Bonaparte
resolved to submit this Constitution to the two Chambers for ratification,
convinced that they would accept it eagerly. He was mistaken: the Chambers
declined to give it their sanction, and they were supported in their refusal by
two of the Directors. Bonaparte did not hesitate. On Sept. 26, 1801, Augereau
proclaimed the dissolution of the two Chambers; and, as the people made no
sign, the Moniteur was able to say that “ the operation had been accomplished
without the smallest disturbance.” Bonaparte declared that he would appeal to
the nation; and he did in fact, a few days later, submit his Constitution to
the suffrages of the Dutch. Of 416,419 electors, 52,219 voted ag^nst the
Constitution, and 16,771 for it; the rest abstained. This abstention was
treated by Bonaparte as acqi ;scence; and on October 6, 1801, he declared that
the Constitution had been accepted. In order to reconcile
90
Disappointments
of the Dutch. [isoi—i
the Batavians
to the new arrangement, he agreed to reduce, from 25,000 to 10,000 men, the
number of soldiers which Holland was to support till the conclusion of peace
with England. But, as a set-off to this reduction, he exacted a contribution of
65,000,000 florins.
This
intervention of France in Holland took place only a few days before the
signature of the Preliminaries of London, and could not fail to be displeasing
to the British Government. Was it a prelude to the annexation of the country,
in spite of the engagements which Bonaparte had entered into at Luneville ? To
an enquiry made on this subject by the British Cabinet the First Consul replied
“ that every State had a right to organise itself as it thought fit; that
Holland was free; and that, like the other Powers, she had her representative
at Paris.” This reply could not deceive the British Government. They did not,
however, press the point, probably hoping that Bonaparte, tied down as he was
by the Treaty of Luneville, and by Article 2 of the Convention of the Hague,
whicb bound him, on the conclusion of peace with England, to evacuate Holland, would
refrain from further intervention.
In Holland
the coup d'etat of September 18,1801, was received, not with the enthusiasm
described by Semonville in his despatches to Paris, but with resigned
indifference. The most that could be said was, that those of the nation who
longed for repose saw in it some hope of a period of tranquillity. This hope
became almost a certainty after the signature of the Treaty of Amiens. Freedom
of navigation encouraged the Dutch to look forward to a renewal of their trade
and to the end of the evils which had accumulated during nine years of war. At
the same time, the struggle which had hitherto raged between the Orangists and
the Patriots was terminated by the action of the Prince of Orange, who, on
behalf of himself and his heirs, renounced all claims to the Stadholdership,
and accepted in exchange the grant of the secularised German bishopric of
Fulda, and the abbeys of Corvey and Weingarten. All this seemed to promise a
brighter future..
These hopes,
however, were doomed to disappointment. The Government, composed of men of
undoubted honesty but lacking in ability and courage, was incapable of securing
the repose and prosperity of the country. The gravest question which it had to
deal with was the question of finance. There was a deficit of 50,000,000
florins ; and the Council adopted most unpopular measures to make it good. They
imposed, for example, a tax of 4 per cent, on property and of 10 per cent, on
income for eight years. They showed, moreover, intolerance towards Jews and
Catholics, who, as under the former regime, were excluded from political life ;
and this policy irritated the Liberals. Other measures alienated the sympathies
of the army; and a conspiracy, stirred up by Generals Daendels and Dumonceau,
very nearly succeeded. It was only due to the interference of Bonaparte, who
managed to reduce the soldiery to order, that a fresh coup d'etat did not take
place.
The rupture
of the Treaty of Amiens finally ruined the hopes of the Dutch. On June 25,
1803, Bonaparte imposed on them, in addition to the maintenance of the French
army of occupation, the duty of providing 16,000 men, of fitting out five
men-of-war and five frigates, and of building transports and boats sufficient
for the accommodation of more than 60,000 men. This was too much for a country
whose finances were exhausted. The Government, driven into a comer, attempted
to evade its engagements, and to delay the outbreak of hostilities with Great
Britain. Bonaparte, who got wind of these measures, proposed in 1803 to bind
Holland more closely to France by placing, as he said, “ a man of character ”
at the head of affairs—he had already Schimmelpenninck in his eye—but the mass
of business on his hands forced him to defer the execution of this plan.
In Germany the
effects of the French Revolution were not less important than in Italy. The
people had become familiar with the ideas of liberty, fraternity, and equality
through the teaching of their philosophers and poets, who at the end of the
eighteenth century were essentially humanitarian and cosmopolitan. But these
ideas would have had little chance of taking practical effect, had not the
blows dealt by the revolutionary armies, and still more by those of Napoleon,
shattered the political fabric which had so long kept Germany disunited and
strangled all efforts at reform. Even after the rearrangement of 1803 had
recast the map of Old Germany and given the States their more modem shape, the
process of reform would never have been completed had not the Holy Roman Empire
been dissolved, and had not, above all, the Napoleonic wars, by exciting the
patriotism of the Germans, aroused in them an ardent spirit of nationality.
Indirectly, then, the French Revolution and the events that followed produced
great results in Germany. But its immediate effects hardly made themselves felt
in that country except on the left bank of the Rhine. There the conditions of
life bore a strong resemblance to those existing in France. Landed estates had
been broken up; and the peasant proprietors enjoyed sufficient civil liberty to
give them a taste for more. The feudal system had been so much relaxed as to
suggest the idea of casting it off altogether. If we add to this the absence of
historical traditions, we can understand the ease with which French ideas were
acclimatised in the newly-conquered districts.
The
inhabitants of the Rhenish provinces welcomed the French, who freed them from
ecclesiastical and feudal burdens and gave them civil equality. The people were
by no means strongly imbued with the sentiment of German patriotism. The young
publicist, Gorres, a native of Coblenz, accepted annexation with the words:
“The Rhine was created by nature to serve as the boundary of France.” It is
true that, at the outset of the French conquest, the people had much to put
up with, and
that the requisitions imposed upon them caused great discontent; but from 1797
onward they had a regular and definite government. The German districts on the
left bank, divided into four departments under a French Commissioner who
resided at Mainz, were attached to the great Republic and enjoyed the
advantages of the connexion. Bonaparte merely confirmed this arrangement,
which lasted till 1814. During the whole of this period the left bank of the
Rhine, defended by the line of fortresses which Napoleon had carefully constructed
along the course of the river, enjoyed absolute peace. The district was indeed
traversed by the Imperial armies, but remained untouched by war. The
development of agriculture followed rapidly on civil freedom. The sale of the
national domains at low prices created a multitude of peasant proprietors; and
the various industries, freed from oppressive restrictions, grew rapidly and
found important outlets in France. Napoleon encouraged the growth of the towns
by the promotion of public works. In the rural districts roads were
constructed; fruit trees were planted, and new breeds of horses, homed cattle,
and merino sheep introduced. Liberty, it is true, existed no more on the banks
of the Rhine than it did in France, and the press and all books sent from
Germany were subject to a strict censorship; but, as the administration was
fair and honest, the people were not dissatisfied with their lot. Till 1814
they remained attached to France.
The
occupation of the left bank of the Rhine by the French brought about an
important revolution in Germany. The Treaty of Luneville provided that the
dispossessed princes should be indemnified, and that the polity of
“secularisation” should be put into force. When the Emperor Francis II
announced this arrangement to the Diet at Ratis- bon, that body was roused from
its torpor and began to display an unwonted activity. On March 6,1801, the
three Colleges met to consider the Imperial communication. The King-Elector of
Brandenburg proposed the ratification of the treaty, subject to certain
reservations for the future, and to the condition that the Estates of the
Empire should take part in the rearrangement of territory which must follow as
a necessary consequence. This proposal was adopted by a majority.
Though not
too well pleaseid to see the number of beneficiaries increased by the addition
of the Stadholder and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the temporal Princes were, on
the whole, enchanted with the prospect of secularisation. They called to mind
the vast confiscations of church property which had followed on the
Reformation, and which the Treaties of Augsburg and Westphalia had confirmed.
The fortunes of Prussia, Saxony, and Electoral Hesse dated from that time; and
the rulers of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria looked forward to obtaining, by
the aid of Bonaparte, similar aggrandisement. On the other hand, the Princes of
the Church would not listen to the proposals for secularisation, and protested
loudly against them, averring that, if their
claims were
disregarded, the Empire and the Catholic religion would alike perish.
Between two
extremes—the party which adopted the policy of wholesale secularisation and
that which repudiated it altogether—a third party sprang up, the party of
limited secularisation, headed by Austria and Saxony. These three views were
debated at great length; and, as no one was prepared to make concessions,
discussion only served to intensify the divergence. Not only had the principle
of redivision to be decided, but also the question of the amount of the
indemnities themselves. The rivalry was bitter; Austria and Prussia were
peculiarly jealous of each other. At one time it seemed that these two Powers
had come to an understanding with the object of settling all matters between
themselves in a friendly way. They fell out, however, over the electorate of
Cologne and the bishopric of Munster; and the discussions in the Diet grew more
and more violent. Eventually, Bonaparte, in concert with the Tsar Alexander,
resolved to intervene.
Bonaparte had
long been waiting for this opportunity to meddle in the affairs of Germany.
Master of the left bank of the Rhine, he called to mind the advice of Turenne,
“ If you would defend the left bank of the Rhine, cross to the right.”
Accordingly, while deferring the project of creating, after Mazarin’s idea, a
League of the Rhine, he aimed at establishing on the right bank friendly Powers
who would mount guard for him. The Tsar, on his side, invoking the Treaty of
Teschen (1779), declared that no rearrangement of German territory could take
place without his participation. Bonaparte, who was not sorry to associate a
great Power with the transformation which he contemplated in Germany, gave a
cordial welcome to the Russian overtures. Their acceptance left him still
master of the situation; and it was he, in the last resort, who determined the
apportionment of property in Germany.
The German
Princes knew well enough that the division of the spoil depended finally upon
Bonaparte, and they forthwith hastened to Paris. In 1802 the capital of France
presented a curious spectacle. An auction might have been going on for the sale
of German lands, with Bonaparte as auctioneer. He bound all the Princes who
received benefits by special and separate treaties, which placed them at his
discretion. The Tsar, whose vanity he had flattered by giving him the credit of
a successful mediation, and by satisfying him on all points in which the
interests of France and Russia were identical, gave his approbation to the
scheme, which was laid before the Diet on February 25, 1803. The question
before the deputies involved readjustments of territory so important as to
recast the whole map of Germany from one end to the other; the majority however
approved the scheme; and the Emperor, Francis II, having no alternative,
ratified their decision. The only objections which he put forward were in
relation to the balance of votes in the Diet. The Protestants in that body,
hitherto in a minority of 45 to 67, became, by
virtue of the
new arrangement, a majority of 67 to 53. This change entailed the defeat of the
Austrian and the triumph of the Prussian party. In spite of this opposition,
the new Imperial Constitution came into force in 1803; and it was destined to last,
in essentials, until the complete destruction of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.
By this
decision of the Diet (Rekhsdeputationshauptschlms) the sixth part of Germany,
with a population of four millions, was redistributed amongst certain secular
States, which gained more strength by consolidation than the Empire had lost by
curtailment. Austria, which ceded the Breisgau and Ortenau to the Duke of
Modena, received the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent. The Grand Duke of Tuscany,
an ally of Austria, obtained the archbishop), ic of Salzburg, with the
surrounding territory. Bavaria was very favourably treated. She received an
area of 17,000 square kilometres with 900,000 inhabitants in exchange for the
12.000 square kilometres with 700,000
inhabitants which she surrendered on the left bank of the Rhine, and was
rendered far more compact by the addition of these new territories. Wiirtemberg
got nine free cities and a number of abbeys. Baden, which had lost nothing but
a few petty lordships, received the bishopric of Constance, the towns of
Heidelberg and Mannheim, ten abbeys, seven free cities, and gained
237.000 additional inhabitants. The Landgrave of
Hesse-Cassel was liberally indemnified at the expense of the territory of
Mainz. Hesse- Darmstadt, Nassau, and other of the minor lay Princes each
received a substantial increase of territory. But, of all the States, it was
again Prussia that came off best. In the place of the 2750 square kilometres
and the 125,000 subjects which she lost, she acquired 12,000 square kilometres
and 500,000 inhabitants in Westphalia, the veiy heart of Germany; she was thus
placed in a position to renew her designs on the hegemony of the north.
The effect of
all these changes was to add materially to the concentration of Germany. The petty
Princes, especially the Princes of the Church, were nearly all dispossessed. Of
these latter, numerous as they had formerly been, only three remained, viz.
Dalberg, Elector of Mainz, who through Bonaparte’s influence was translated to
the see of Ratisbon, now raised to an archbishopric, the holder of the see
being made ex officio President of the Diet; the Grand Master of the Teutonic
Order; and the Grand Master of the Order of the Knights of St John. The number
of the electors was raised from 7 to 10; and that increase was favourable to
the Protestants, 6 being Protestant and 4 Catholic. The free cities were
reduced in number from 50 to 6, namely Hamburg, Liibeck, Bremen, Frankfort,
Augsburg, and Niimberg. The upshot of it all was that the Germany of the Middle
Ages, with its ecclesiastical States, its orders of knighthood, and the
preponderance of the Habsburgs, vanished, never to return. The independent
nobility (Reichsadel) disappeared, to the advantage of the Princes; and the
most powerful
among the latter were the chief gainers. Another stage on the road towards a
united Germany was accomplished; and, for this reason, the Imperial Recess of
1803 was in its way a revolution as radical as was the French Revolution of
1789.
In
Switzerland, the effects of the French Revolution resembled those in Germany:
the ancient federation of 13 cantons with its subject and allied provinces,
together with the extraordinary inequalities which existed between the country
districts and the towns, disappeared once for all. In its place was created the
Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible, which, by abolishing ecclesiastical and
feudal burdens and the monopolies that clogged manufactures and commerce, and
by establishing civil equality and liberty of conscience, laid the foundation
of the democratic Switzerland of the nineteenth century. This work, it must be
admitted, was accomplished less by the will of the citizens than by the
conquering armies of the Revolution. The ideas of 1789 had indeed penetrated
into Switzerland, where they found a ready response. The peasants, who were in
subjection to the oligarchy of the towns, and the populations of the subject
provinces—Vaud, Aargau, Thurgau, St Gallen, Ticino—who bore with impatience the
yoke of their rulers, sympathised with the French revolutionaries. At Paris a
Helvetian Club was founded in 1790, with the object of propagating
revolutionary ideas in Switzerland: it flooded the towns and country districts
with tracts and pamphlets preaching war against the oligarchy. Some risings
took place in certain parts of Switzerland, at Schaffhausen and in Vaud, where,
at the instigation of Frederic-Cesar de La Harpe and a knot of patriots, trees
of liberty were planted and tricolour flags displayed, to the refrain of “ Qa
ira.” But these movements were promptly put down. The existing Governments in
Switzerland were strongly reactionary ; and even in the small democratic
cantons of Old Switzerland, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, which had furnished
many officers to France, Jacobinism was held in abhorrence. Consequently, in no
part of Europe were French emigres more numerous, relatively speaking, than in
Switzerland; and they were generally welcomed.
This
hospitality accorded to the refugees prejudiced the French revolutionary
Government against Switzerland, and supplied it with an excuse for
intervention. The strategical importance of the country had not escaped the
Directory, which, after the coup d’Uat of Fructidor, 1797, had prepared a
scheme of invasion. Returning from his first Italian campaign, Bonaparte passed
through Switzerland on his way to the Congress of Rastatt, and satisfied
himself that France, if she intervened in that country, would receive the
support of certain sections of the population. The resolution of the Directory
was taken forthwith: French agents, under the guise of travellers, overran the
country, inciting the inhabitants to rebellion and promising the aid of France.
Not long
afterwards,
French troops arrived in the Bernese Jura (then the bishopric of Basel) and in
Vaud; and a few months later (March, 1798) the whole of Switzerland was under
the rule of French generals, who announced themselves as liberators and
promised to respect persons and property.
This
pretended respect for persons and property was a cruel irony. Of the countries
invaded by the revolutionary armies, none was worse treated than Switzerland. “
The Directory,” said Carnot, “ has looked for the country where it could find
the greatest number of free men to sacrifice, and has thrown itself upon
Switzerland.” Merciless contributions were levied on all the cantons and
towns. The rich treasure lying at Bern found its way to Paris. Arsenals were
pillaged, old banners carried off. The Confederation was impotent and could not
interfere. As yet the cantons had not learned to make common cause. Each one
fought for itself; and Bern opposed a heroic resistance to the foreign
invaders. In the end, however, the country was subdued.
General Brune
drew up a Constitution, under which the country was divided into three
republics—the Rhodanique or Latin Switzerland, the Telliane or Old Switzerland,
and the Helvetique or German Switzerland. This scheme, the work of a man who
knew nothing of Swiss affairs, turned out impracticable, and at the end of
seven days it was abandoned.
A new
Constitution drawn up by Peter Ochs of Basel, one of the chiefs of the Swiss
revolutionary party, was next established. It was copied from the French
Constitution of the year III, and divided Switzerland into 23 cantons
administered by prefects. The central legislative authority was divided between
two bodies, the Senate and the Grand Council. The executive authority was in
the hands of a Directory of five members chosen by the legislative bodies. A
supreme tribunal was also created. This Constitution, however, was never
accepted by the Swiss people as a whole. The mountain cantons, in particular,
opposed it so strenuously that it was necessary, in order to enforce
submission, to call in the French troops; and these unhappy districts were also
deluged with blood.
The new
Government, supported as it was by French arms, might have been accepted by the
country had it not proved altogether inefficient. Its ideas were ambitious; it
aimed at establishing a system of civil law, at organising public instruction,
which was very backward in most of the cantons, at developing agriculture,
manufactures, commerce, and art; but, having no funds at its disposal, it
could effect nothing. The country, beneath the exactions of the French troops,
had been taxed to the uttermost; and yet it was called upon every year to
submit to fresh sacrifices of men and money. Aristocrats and democrats, who had
been overawed by the French bayonets, began to grow restless when the Coalition
defeated the French in Germany and Italy in 1799. But after Massena’s victories
at Zurich, which confirmed once more the French protectorate in Switzerland,
that country gave up the struggle.
iV99-i8oo] Parties and coups d’dtat in Switzerland.
97
For some
years the revolutionary Government of the Helvetic Republic had much difficulty
in maintaining its authority; and, attacked as it was by the aristocrats of the
towns and the democrats of the old cantons, its members perceived that a coup
d'etat was the only means of establishing their power. They proposed to
accomplish at Bern in the beginning of 1800 what Bonaparte had recently
accomplished at Paris in Brumaire. The Federalists, on the other hand,
believing tha/t they could count upon Bonaparte (who had confided to one of
them, the Bernese Jenner, his sympathies with the federal form of government),
began an active agitation in certain of the cantons.
Bonaparte was
not indifferent to what was passing in Switzerland; and, as in the case of
Holland, he was on the watch for an opportunity to intervene. He gave the
preference to neither of the two extreme parties which divided the country, but
inclined rather to an intermediate group which recognised at once the
advantages of the new rigime and of certain institutions belonging to the past
which it considered indispensable. This party, known in Switzerland as the
Republican, stood midway between the patriots or Jacobins on the one side and
the reactionaries or Federalists on the other. It was moderate in its claims
and unionist in its objects. But the party was weak in numbers; its members
were men of distinction who had been trained in the school of the Republic, and
they formed, so to speak, a staff of officers without an army. Bonaparte
nevertheless approached them; and on January 8,
1800, a coup d'etat was effected at Bern which placed
these men in power.
This coup
d'etat was chiefly aimed at the Jacobin members of the Directory, La Harpe,
Secretan, and Oberlin, who since the beginning of December, 1799, had been
covertly preparing a coup d'etat of their own. The two Directors who belonged
to the Moderate party, Dolder and Savary, proposed in the Directory that it
should dissolve itself. On the refusal of the majority to do this, the
Moderates placed the matter before the two Councils, which were hostile to the
Jacobin Directors. The two Councils dissolved the Directory, and entrusted the
executive power to Dolder and Savary. Soon afterwards, instead of nominating
fresh Directors, the Councils appointed an Executive Committee of seven members,
moderate and experienced men, who were to act as a Provisional Government till
another Constitution could be proclaimed.
This coup
d'etat was speedily followed by another. Bonaparte could not tolerate the
existence in Switzerland of two Assemblies, each with a Jacobin majority. He
therefore encouraged the Executive Committee to substitute for the two Councils
a Legislative Body composed of 43 members, of whom 35 were to be chosen from
the Councils by the Executive Committee, while the remaining 8 were to be
co-opted by the 35. The Legislative Body thus constituted was in its turn to
appoint the executive in the shape of a Council of seven members. The Grand
Council, on this proposal being submitted to it, discerned in it the hand
of Bonaparte
and voted it unanimously. The Senate, after a show of resistance, also
acquiesced (August 8,1800).
The
Republican party formed the majority in the new Government, both in the
executive and in the legislative departments; and they thought themselves
strong enough to establish a Constitution framed in accordance with their own
ideas, that is to say, at once unionist and liberal. It was, however, no part
of Bonaparte’s plan to favour the creation of a centralised Switzerland which
would be less under his control than a federation. The new Government submitted
a scheme based on the French Consular Constitution. To this Bonaparte replied
by a counter-project, the Constitution of Malmaison; and this he imposed upon
the country in defiance of the Treaty of Luneville, which had recognised
Switzerland as an independent State.
The
Constitution of Malmaison (May, 1801) divided Switzerland into 17 cantons, to
each of which was given autonomy in various matters, particularly in those
relating to finance and public instruction. Each canton was placed under the
authority of a prefect; and the administration was in each case adapted to
local needs. The central authority consisted of a Diet of 77 members and a
Senate of 25 members; and from the latter was chosen the First Magistrate of the
country, who bore the title of Chief Landammann of Switzerland. The Landammcmn
presided over a Council of Four, who formed the executive authority.
This
Constitution, in spite of its imperfections, was the best that the country
could hope for at the time. Taking into account recent events, it met the
requirements of nature and history better than the unionist Constitutions which
had preceded it; it may even be said that in certain respects it was superior
to the Act of Mediation which followed it (1803). Had it been loyally applied,
it would have restored peace to Switzerland and spared her many misfortunes;
but, as things turned out, it found favour nowhere. The Republicans complained
that it did not centralise sufficiently; the urban aristocrats could not forget
the fact that it transformed the provinces which had formerly been held in
subjection into autonomous cantons. The democrats of the smaller cantons
declared roundly that they would never accept a Constitution imposed by a
stranger. All parties therefore agreed in demanding its modification; and the
Republicans, who formed the majority in the Diet, appointed a committee to
reconstruct Bonaparte’s work. Nothing was better calculated to irritate the
First Consul than this piece of audacity; and his annoyance was aggravated when
the Diet declared that “ the absolute integrity of Helvetian territory was a
fundamental article of the Constitution.” This declaration was an answer to the
proposal attributed to Bonaparte, of detaching Valais from the rest of
Switzerland, so as to ensure the control of the passes into Italy.
The reply of
the irate First Consul was not long delayed. On October 28, 1801, a third coup
d'etat at Bern swept away the Govern-
ment of the
Moderates. The stroke was secretly planned at Bern by Bonaparte’s agent
Veminac, in collusion with the Bernese aristocrats. These latter, finding that
Bonaparte was annoyed with the Republicans, made common cause with the
Federalists of the small cantons in order to upset the Government. They succeeded,
thanks to the support of French troops under General Montchoisy. The Diet was
declared to be dissolved; the Constitution of Malmaison was reestablished; and
for the office of Landammann of Switzerland the choice fell on Aloys Reding, an
ardent Federalist of Schwyz, who had organised the resistance of the smaller
cantons to France in 1798. Meanwhile, Valais was occupied by the troops of
General Thureau.
When he heard
what had happened at Bern, Bonaparte feigned the liveliest indignation.
Montchoisy was disavowed and recalled; but Veminac, who had pulled the strings,
retained his post. In point of fact, the First Consul was very well satisfied
with this fresh revolution, which increased the confusion in Switzerland. He
received the new Landamrrmvn at Paris, and, according to his own expression,
talked to him “as the First Magistrate of the Gauls might have done at the time
when Helvetia formed part of Gaul.” The Federals demanded three things—the
withdrawal of the French troops, the restitution to the cantons of their
subject lands, and the retention of Valais as part of Switzerland. Bonaparte
was unable to give a satisfactory reply on any of these points, but he left
Reding in the belief that he was favourably disposed towards the Federal party.
Reding returned to Switzerland full of hope, but subsequently, when he found
that Bonaparte had put him off with fair words, he turned to the other European
Powers and sent agents on secret missions to Berlin, London, Vienna, and St
Petersburg, to beg those Governments to maintain the independence and the
neutrality of Switzerland.
Bonaparte, on
hearing of this proceeding, was deeply incensed, withdrew his support from the
Federals, and, shifting his position in the manner familiar to him, made a show
of sympathy with the Republicans. The latter, believing that the moment had
come for a fresh coup d'etat, took advantage of the absence of many of the
Federals from Bern during the Easter recess, declared the Senate indefinitely
adjourned (April 17, 1802) and summoned an assembly of notables from all the
cantons to agree on the changes to be made in the Constitution of Malmaison.
Bonaparte allowed them to proceed, foreseeing that their action would but add
to the existing confusion, and so furnish him in the eyes of Europe with the
necessary pretext for forcible intervention. The convention was thereupon drawn
up: it was a compromise between the Malmaison scheme and the Constitution
designed by Ochs. On being submitted to the nation for approval, it was
rejected by 92,000 votes against 72,000; but the Republicans, following the
example of Bonaparte, declared that the 167,000 abstentions should count in its
favour.
This new
Constitution, imposed by force, gave rise to incessant troubles. In Vaud the
peasants, irritated by the revival of taxes and tithes, rose in revolt,
plundered the archives of castles and towns, and burnt their contents. To quell
the rising, the aid of French troops was required. This was the very moment
chosen by Bonaparte, with Machiavellian astuteness, to withdraw his soldiers
from Swiss territory. Bonaparte had not miscalculated; hardly had the last
French soldier quitted Swiss soil than risings took place in all directions.
Instigated by Aloys Reding, the smaller cantons, with some of the others—Zu. ch
being one—formed themselves into a federal State. Before long, this federation,
which included the partisans of the old regime, grew so strong that the
Helvetian Government was powerless to compel its dissolution by force of arms.
General Andermatt, who commanded the government troops, after an unsuccessful
attack on Zurich, was compelled to retire. The Federalists, under experienced
leaders, made themselves masters of Bern, and expelled the Government. They
then defeated their rivals at Morat, October 4, 1802, and marched on Lausanne
in order to overthrow the Government, which had taken refuge there. At this
point Bonaparte intervened. General Rapp, one of his aides-de- camp, brought
the following message to the Swiss : “ As you cannot agree amongst yourselves I
have decided to step in as mediator.”
While he
appeared merely to offer mediation, Bonaparte in reality imposed it by force.
At the very moment when Rapp presented himself before the Helvetian Government,
General Ney was ordered to march into Switzerland with 30,000 men and “crush
all opposition.” He issued proclamations in which he stated that it was “ at
the request of the nation, and particularly on the demand of the Senate and the
smaller cantons, that the First Consul intervened as mediator.” It was true;
but, at the moment when the French invaded the territory of Switzerland, the
Federalist Government despatched a protest to London, Vienna, and Berlin. The
Emperor Francis II vouchsafed no reply, though the action of Bonaparte was in
direct violation of the Treaty of Luneville. The King of Prussia, Frederick
William III, also kept silence. The British Government alone protested against
the aggression, although infinitely less interested in Swiss affairs than were
the continental Powers. On October 10, 1802, Lord Hawkesbury despatched a note
to the French Government, reminding them that the principle of the neutrality
of Switzerland was closely bound up with the questions of peace and the balance
of power in Europe; that the Treaty of Luneville, signed only a year before,
had solemnly recognised and guaranteed that principle ; and that, in spite of
all that was happening in Switzerland, he was unwilling to believe that it
could be intended to reduce a free people to slavery.
In answer to
this note, moderate in form but firm in tone, the First Consul, on October 23,
caused Talleyrand to forward a declaration to
1802]
British protests. Increasing friction.
101
Otto, French
minister in London, which stated that, “ if the British ministry made any
public statement from which it might be inferred that the First Consul had
refrained from doing any particular thing because he had been prevented, he
would do it forthwith.” When Talleyrand despatched this note, the relations
between England and France were already much strained. In Great Britain, public
opinion was growing exasperated because the Government had failed to obtain a
treaty of commerce from France. Bonaparte evaded their demands, and put off the
proposal for a definite agreement by vague promises. As nothing came of this,
the English began to lose patience. Bonaparte had his own grievances against
the British Government. He resented the hospitality offered to refugees who
were his enemies, and to the French Princes who conspired against him. He complained
also of the attacks directed against him in the English press.
But, more
than anything else, it was Bonaparte’s policy in Europe which embittered the
relations of the two peoples. He was well aware of this; and his vigorous abuse
of the English newspapers was due to the fact that they persisted in exposing
and condemning his unworthy treatment of the weaker States, the hypocrisy of
his high-handed proceedings glossed over by the falsehoods of the Moniteur, and
the acts of violence of which he had been guilty towards Portugal, Spain,
Holland, and Switzerland. Bonaparte sought to justify his long premeditated
aggressions on the Continent by the refusal of the British Government to
satisfy his demands, which he sought to represent as measures of precaution taken
in view of a possible attack on the part of Great Britain. Thus, in August,
1802, after Lord Hawkesbury had formally refused to reply to Bonaparte’s
menacing communications on the subject of the Emigres, the exiled French
Princes, and the measures to be taken against the English press, the First
Consul had retaliated by the definite annexation of Piedmont and the Isle of
Elba, by a refusal to evacuate Flushing and Utrecht, and, a little later, by
sending his forces under General Ney to occupy Switzerland.
All these
acts, following on Bonaparte’s usurpations in Italy, and on the steps which he
had taken to secure for himself the Presidency of the Cisalpine Republic, amply
justified the apprehensions of British statesmen, who saw no limits to his
aggressive career. They, too, sought protection against Bonaparte’s growing
ambition; and it was with this object that they persistently demanded a return
to the conditions which existed at the time of the Peace of Amiens. To this
Bonaparte retorted : “ At the time of the Peace of Amiens we had 30,000 men in
Piedmont and 40,000 in the Cisalpine Republic; it follows that, if the English
desire the state of things which existed at that date, they cannot
complain
of the state of things which exists to-day As
for Switzerland,
we cannot do
without her.” Switzerland was clearly the weak point in Bonaparte's argument;
the silence of the Treaty of Amiens on this
subject could
not be urged in his favour, for his intervention as mediator was subsequent to
the declaration of peace.
Bonaparte was
well aware that the British Government was deeply interested in the questions
of Switzerland and Holland, and that these questions would in the end form the
pivot of the discussion. At the time of his intervention in Switzerland, Otto wrote
to Talleyrand: “The general opinion is that the evacuation of Malta will depend
on the result of the negotiations relating to Switzerland.” Bonaparte declined
in any circumstances to allow England to connect the two questions. “ As to
Switzerland,” he wrote to Talleyrand, “we cannot permit England to meddle
there, for, if she did so, it would be only to spread disorder; she would make
it a second Jersey from which to encourage agitation against France”; and he
added, “I require, first and foremost, a frontier to cover Franche Comte. I
require (in Switzerland) a firm government, friendly to France; this is my
first aim, and, if I cannot secure it, I shall know what to do in the interests
of France.”
Such was the
position in October, 1802, when Bonaparte intervened in Switzerland. With so
much suspicion on the one side and so much menace on the other, a rupture
between the two Powers seemed only a question of days. Nevertheless both
nations were so deeply interested in the preservation of peace, and each was so
firmly convinced that the other desired peace and was prepared to make
concessions to secure it, that a few weeks later regular diplomatic relations
were renewed, Count Andreossy being sent as ambassador to London, and Lord
Whitworth to Paris.
In order to
arrive at a mutual understanding, it was arranged to avoid all burning
questions; but this was a difficult matter. At the opening of Parliament at the
end of November, 1802, King George, while expressing his desire for the
preservation of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all the
Powers, added that ~F.ngln.nH could not cease to emphasise the interest which
she took “in certain States.” The States referred to were evidently Switzerland
and Holland. Sheridan, speaking in Parliament, exposed in plain language
Bonaparte’s policy of conquest. “ Look at the map of Europe,” he exclaimed, “
and you will see nothing but France.” Great Britain was consequently compelled
to take certain measures of precaution; and, in spite of the pacific assurances
of the King, the ministry asked for and obtained, with a view to the protection
of Ireland, an addition of 66,000 men to the army and of 20,000 men to the
navy.
Bonaparte had
no belief in the warlike intentions of England; and, as the reports which he
received from London spoke of the people as keenly desirous of peace, he
imagined that the British Cabinet would yield to threats. Not a day passed but
he abused the British Government. When in January, 1803, he received the Swiss
delegates at Paris, he declared to them that, if the Cabinet of St James made
representations
on the
subject of Switzerland, he would annex their country outright. A few days
later, in a sitting of the Legislative Body, he announced that he was about to
equip an army of 500,000 men against England, which he spoke of as “ isolated
and powerless.” Finally, on January 30, there appeared in the Monitmr, with his
approbation, the report of Colonel Sebastiani, who had been sent on a special
mission to Egypt. This report described the army of occupation as an ill-armed
and undisciplined rabble, worn out by debauchery, and went on to say that 6000
French soldiers would suffice for the reconquest of Egypt. It was by utterances
of this sort that Bonaparte believed that he could force England to yield to
his demands. The very opposite took place. Sebastiani’s report, added to the
provocations already received, decided the British Government to declare that
their troops would not be withdrawn from Malta until the conditions of March
1802 had been reestablished.
Bonaparte’s
anger knew no bounds. On February 18, 1803, in the course of a violent scene
with Lord Whitworth, he declaimed against British perfidy. When the British
ambassador referred to the aggressive nature of Bonaparte’s policy in Europe,
the First Consul answered, “ Piedmont, Switzerland, Holland, are mere trifles
”; and he went on to use language so coarse that Lord Whitworth wrote to his
Government, that “ he talked more like a captain of dragoons than the head of
one of the greatest States in Europe.” On March 8 the King replied to this
fresh provocation by asking Parliament for supplies. On the 10th the militia
was embodied, and an addition of 10,000 men to the navy was voted. This gave
Bonaparte the opportunity of making another scene with Lord Whitworth—the
historic scene of March 13, when, in the presence of all the other ambassadors
assembled at the Tuileries, Bonaparte addressed him with threatening words. “
It is you who are determined to make wax against us; you want to drive me to
it. You will be the first to draw the sword; I shall be the last to sheathe it.
Woe to those who show no respect for treaties ! ”
In spite of
all this rodomontade, Bonaparte in his heart wished to maintain peace. He was
informed by Duroc from Berlin and by Colbert from St Petersburg that neither
the King of Prussia nor the Tsai’ approved his polity. The situation, however,
had become so strained by reason of this very conduct that peace was no longer
possible; or rather war could only have been avoided by his agreeing to the
fresh conditions laid down by Great Britain. These were—(1) that she should
retain Malta for ten years; (2) that Lampedusa should be ceded to her in perpetuity;
(3) that the French troops should evacuate Holland and Switzerland. These terms
Bonaparte could not bring himself to accept. Negotiations between London and
Paris did indeed continue for a fewweeks longer. Among the men who surrounded
Bonaparte there was a peace party, whose leaders were Talleyrand, Cambaceres,
and Joseph Bonaparte; and they made every effort to avert a rupture. The
British Government,
on its side,
made what concessions it could, even undertaking by a secret article to
evacuate Malta when the French should have withdrawn from Holland. But
Bonaparte would not come to terms; and on May 12, 1803, Lord Whitworth left
Paris. •
Bonaparte had
foreseen that the war could not be confined to France and England, but would
involve the rest of the Continent. This, indeed, was his reason for occupying
Piedmont, for reorganising Lombardy and Holland, and for recasting the map of
Germany. His latest intervention in Switzerland gave him the control of the
most important strategic position in central Europe.
Among
Bonaparte’s works of constructive policy none has been more generally admired
than the Act of Mediation. It has been termed a masterpiece, and such it may
have been; but it was a masterpiece of Machiavellian policy. Bonaparte did not
consult the Swiss when he gave them a Constitution. In conformity with the promise
which he had made them in October, 1802, he summoned to Paris in the beginning
of 1803, as a consultative assembly, the members of the Senate and all the
citizens who' had during the last three years filled the higher posts in the
central administration. Some sixty deputies obeyed the summons, the greater
part of whom belonged to the party of progress and unity. Bonaparte, however,
was no more disposed in 1803 than he had been in 1800 to show special favour to
any one party. Accordingly, at the first sitting, he asked for the appointment
of a commission of ten members, five Federals and five Unionists, who, together
with four French delegates, should study the question of the Constitution.
The scheme of
the First Consul was a skilful compromise between new ideas and the traditions
of Old Switzerland. The Unionists did not obtain the centralised authority
which they demanded, while the aristocrats of the towns were compelled to
renounce their privileges, and to include the former subject districts in the new
Federal Constitution on an equal footing with the other cantons. The
commissioners, in conjunction with the French delegates, were required to draw
up memoranda containing their observations on the scheme. A preliminary draft
was then prepared, which was read and discussed on January 29, 1803, at a
meeting of the commission, presided over by Bonaparte. He listened to all the
objections which were urged, and consented to modify certain points of detail;
but in its essence the scheme was left precisely as he had conceived it. On
February 19, 1803, the ten commissioners added their signatures in the name of
the Swiss nation, which had not been consulted and upon which this constitution
had been thrust.
The Act of
Mediation replaced the Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible, by a Swiss
Confederation of nineteen cantons, each enjoying sovereign powers and equal
rights. The Confederation was identical with the Swiss Federation of to-day,
except that it did not include Valais, Geneva, NeucMtel, or the former bishopric
of Basel, i.e. the Bernese
Jura.
Politically, the cantons were divided into three groups, the rural cantons, the
urban cantons, and the former subject districts. The rural cantons comprised
the rural and mountain districts of central Switzerland as well as the Grisons;
they recovered their ancient democratic organisation with their
Landesgemeinden, or popular assemblies, which voted on the bills prepared by
their Grand Councils; the executive authority was placed in the hands of a
small Council, presided over by a supreme magistrate, or Landammann. The urban
cantons received a political organisation aristocratic in character; the
supreme magistrate (avoyer or burgomaster) governed with the aid of a Senate, a
Council, and a Representative Body, elected on a limited suffrage, which
contained deputies from the country districts. As for the districts formerly
subject, now recognised as independent cantons, they also had Petty and Grand
Councils; but, as in their case the electoral qualification was lower, their
Governments were more democratic in character.
All the
cantons were bound to conform to the terms of the federal compact, and were
forbidden to conclude alliances either amongst themselves, or with a foreign
Power. The local militias could, in case of necessity, be formed into a Federal
contingent of 15,000 men; and it was decided that every canton should
contribute to the common expenses, which were estimated at 500,000 francs per
annum. Six of the cantons, viz. Bern, Fribourg, Luzern, Zurich, Solothum, and
Basel, became in successive years the seat of the central authority. This “
directorial ” canton was known as the Vorort; and its first magistrate became
Landammann of Switzerland. The powers of the Landammann were restricted; he had
the general management of foreign affairs, opened and presided over the Diet,
and was responsible for the maintenance of internal order. He was authorised
to convoke the cantonal authority in the event of disorders taking place, or of
urgent operations being necessary in connexion with roads or rivers. He
received a salary paid by his canton, which fixed its amount and also paid the
salaries of his aide-de-camp, of the Chancellor of the Confederation, and of a
clerk, the only three functionaries who held permanent office in the
Government.
In addition
to the Lemdammarm, the central power consisted of the Federal Diet, which met
every year during a month in the summer at the Vorort. Each canton sent a
single deputy to the Diet, making 19 in all; but there were 25 votes, as every
canton containing more than
100,000 inhabitants possessed two votes. The Diet
dealt with treaties, raised the troops necessary to provide the Federal
contingent, appointed the commander-in-chief, and settled disputes between the
cantons when arbitration had failed. It had no other powers. The State
possessed no standing army, hardly any revenue, and no diplomatic agents, and,
in obedience to the will of Bonaparte, was compelled to accept the position of
absolute neutrality.
. It cannot
be denied that Bonaparte showed marvellous penetration in dealing with the
conditions existing in Switzerland. The Swiss were so sharply divided in
political matters that a general agreement was impossible; and neither of the
two great parties was willing to make concessions. By the compromise involved
in the Act of Mediation, which aimed at holding the balance equal between the
two sections, Bonaparte restored peace to the country. Between the premature
aspirations of the Republicans and the purely federal tendencies of those who
wished to revive in Switzerland, emancipated as she had been by the Revolution,
the obsolete forms of the old regime, Bonaparte chose the form of Constitution
best fitted to the circumstances. But it is open to question whether, when
engaged in his task of construction, Bonaparte took the interests of the Swiss
sufficiently into account. Their true interest would have demanded a better
grouping of the various districts, greater centralisation, an army capable of
enforcing respect for their neutrality, and a common treasury which would have
enabled them to carry out urgent public works. A strong and compact
Switzerland, however, was not what Bonaparte wanted; it was to his interest
that she should be helpless without the aid of France, and strictly under her
guardianship. By the Act of Mediation he obtained what he wanted: from 1803 to
1814 Switzerland ceased to have a distinct political existence; she became a
mere satellite of France.
From the
domestic point of view, the Act of Mediation was beneficial. After many years
of barren strife Switzerland had at last time to breathe and work. The Act did
not please everyone, for the country was neither free nor independent; but the
bulk of the nation, satisfied with civil equality, and with the final suppression
of the abuses of the old regime and of the gross injustice of the old relations
between the cantons and subject districts, acclaimed with joy the work of
Bonaparte. Above all, the inhabitants of the smaller cantons were overjoyed to
return to their ancient form of government; and they drank to the health of the
great mediator “ who had relieved them from the intolerable yoke of Unionism.”
They sent addresses of congratulation to Bonaparte, to which he graciously
replied with the words, “ The title of restorer of the liberty which you
received from Tell is more dear to me than the most brilliant of my victories.”
In later days the nation was to change its tone; but in 1803 it was in full
enjoyment of its newly recovered tranquillity and peace.
FRANCE UNDER
THE EMPIRE.
The organic Senatus Consultum of 28 Floreal, year XII
(May 18, 1804), generally known as the Constitution of the year XII, ordained
that “ the Imperial Succession should thenceforth be vested in the direct issue
of Napoleon Bonaparte, natural and legitimate, descending always in the male
line, by order of primogeniture, to the perpetual exclusion of females and
heirs claiming through female descent.” In default of male heirs, Napoleon was
empowered to adopt his brother’s children or grandchildren; in default of
either legitimate or adoptive male heirs, the succession was to pass, first, to
his eldest brother, Joseph, and his descendants; then to his younger brother,
Louis, and his descendants. The Emperor had two other brothers, Lucien and
Jerome. But, in spite of Napoleon’s opposition, Lucien had recently married
beneath him; and the breach between the two brothers lasted until the end of
the Empire. Jerome went into the navy, and, on his return home from the
Antilles by way of the United States, had married Miss Eliza Paterson (1803)
without his brother’s consent. To obtain his restoration to favour (March 2,
1805) and recover his rights to the Imperial succession (September 24, 1805),
he was forced to abandon his wife and the son she had borne him; and, for the
time being, he was shut out from the Imperial family.
On March 7,
1796, just before his departure for Italy, Napoleon had entered into a civil
marriage with Josephine Tascher de la Pagerie. Bom at Martinique on June 23,
1763, she was, at the time of her marriage to Napoleon, the widow of General de
Beauhamais. By her first marriage she had two children, Eugene and Hortense,
the latter of whom married Louis Bonaparte in 1802; her second marriage was
without issue. When Pope Pius VII came to France in 1804 for the ceremony of
the unction he refused his blessing to a couple who had only been through a
civil marriage. Consequently, on the night of Dec. 1, in the utmost secrecy,
the religious marriage was performed by Cardinal Fesch, in the presence of only
two witnesses, Talleyrand and Berthier. On the following day (Dec. 2) the
ceremony of the unction was celebrated at Notre Dame with great pomp. The
occasion was remarkable rather for splendour
than for
popular enthusiasm. The Emperor crowned himself, afterwards placing the crown
on the Empress’s head.
The
distance travelled since 18 Brumaire was great indeed ! But, as a matter of
fact, the Constitution of the year XII added nothing to Napoleon’s power: the
Consulate for Life had already given him everything. Even the Republic was not
nominally suppressed. “ The government of the Republic,” so runs the first
clause, “ is vested in an Emperor, who will assume the title of Emperor of the
French.” This was of course a contradiction in terms. Napoleon met the
difficulty by gradually and patiently suppressing the word “Republic” wherever
it cropped up. “The first representative of the nation,” he wrote in the
Moniteur of December 15, 1808, “ is the Emperor; for all authority is derived
from God and the nation If there existed
in our Constitution a body representative of the nation, that body would be
supreme; no other institution could compare with it; its will would be
all-paramount. But to put the nation itself before the Emperor would be at once
chimerical and criminal.” All authority, therefore, was vested in the Emperor,
since, by the will of God, he was the sole representative of the Sovereign
People.
“ In the
order determined by our Constitution,” continued Napoleon, “the Senate comes
next to the Emperor in representative authority.” The Constitution of the year
XII rendered the Senate still more subservient than it had been in 1802.
Senators were nominated by the Emperor, and were no longer limited in number.
The French Princes and the Grand Dignitaries were members of the Senate ex
officio. The president was appointed by the Emperor and drawn from the
senatorial ranks. The Senate was thus, more than ever before, dependent upon
Napoleon. On the other hand, from this time forward, it appointed two permanent
bodies, known as “ Senatorial Commissions,” charged respectively with the
maintenance of “ individual liberty ” and the “ liberty of the press.” Bills
passed by the Legislative Body were sent before the Senate, which, “by
expressing the opinion that it saw no occasion for promulgating the measure in
question,” could exercise a certain right of veto. Such were the new rights
conferred upon the Senate; and, as senators were appointed for life, they
seemed to be favourably situated for the full exercise of their powers.
The
Commission for the protection of individual liberty displayed, it is true,
certain hankerings after activity. But it could do nothing of any real
importance in the face of arbitrary axrests and imprisonments for reasons of
State; and, in his decree of March 3, 1810, regarding state prisons, the
Emperor did not shrink from reviving and regularising, in some degree, the old
system of bastilles and lettres de cachet. The Commission charged with
protecting the liberty of the press was not intended to concern itself with
newspapers or periodicals; and the powers conferred by the decree of February
5, 1810, upon the “ General Board for the control of Printing and Publishing”
deprived the Commission of
almost all
power of intervention. The right of veto could he exercised only with the
Emperor’s consent. In a word, the rights conferred upon the Senate remained a
dead letter. So it came about that the senators gradually ceased to discuss
anything, even the drafting of Senatus Consulta; and, when the Government sent
them a bill to pass, the terms of which were already decided, it became their
practice in the most important cases to express their gratitude for the
communication which had been vouchsafed to them; and that in terms of
grovelling servility.
By the
Constitution of the year XII the Tribunate was divided into three sections,
dealing respectively with legislation, home affairs, and finance. These
sections deliberated separatdy, either by themselves or with the corresponding
sections of the Council of State. The Tribunate thus became nothing but a
useless duplication of the Council of State. The Legislative Body was recruited
more and more from among officials and ex-officials; and, in accordance with
the Constitution of the year VIII, its voice was never heard. By the Senatus
Consultum of August 19,1807, three commissions, of seven members each, were
established within the Legislative Body itself, whose business was to discuss
legislative proposals, and to defend or oppose them before the whole body in
full session. These commissions were intended to take the place of the sections
of the Tribunate. The Tribunes, as their powers successively expired, were,
some of them, provisionally regarded as belonging to the Legislative Body; the
rest received for the most part public appointments, chiefly at the Cour des
Camptes, established on September 16, 1807. So vanished the Tribunate. Only two
Chambers remained; the Senate and the Legislative Body. But even the imaginary
power enjoyed by them loomed too large to the despotic eye of the Emperor; and
he almost entirely abandoned the practice of making “laws.” He governed by
means of Senatus Consulta, which he sent straight to the Senate for
ratification, or by decrees drawn up for him by the Council of State.
By the
Constitution of the year XII the French Princes and Grand Dignitaries received
seats in the Council of State. Their sittings were presided over either by the
Emperor in person, or by a Grand Dignitary, usually either the Arch-Chancellor
or the Arch-Treasurer, who acted as his deputy. The importance of the Council
of State was no less under the Empire than under the Consulate. The number of
questions discussed in full session rose from 3,756 in 1805 to 6,285 in 1811.
The honorary title of “ Councillor of State ” was conferred in certain cases.
The second
generation of Napoleon’s officials (i.e. from about 1807 onwards, and
especially from 1810-11) was by no means equal to the first. The new officials
were sometimes very young men, endowed with a certain pride and self-confidence
which gave them the air of experience. They were drawn more and more from old
aristocratic families or the upper bourgeoisie, who had suffered under the
Revolution and hated it accordingly. Though selected with less care than
before,
110
The Imperial hierarchy.—The Grand
Dignitaries. [1804-8
owing to the
scarcity of men and the ever-increasing extent of territory to be administered
by a master who mistook obedience for devotion, and fondly imagined that in
bestowing his favour he could also ensure merit, these men undoubtedly showed
themselves capable of much hard work; but they fell far short of the
distinguished body which, under the Consulate, bad reflected so much credit on
Napoleon.
The great
work of administrative creation was now complete. Fouche, as a reward for his
services in establishing the Empire, again received the Ministry of Police
(July 10, 1804). Two new ministries were created: that of Public Worship (July
10,1804), and that of Trade and Manufactures (June 22,1811). The honorary title
of Minister of State was sometimes granted to high officials, ministers,
diplomatists, and presidents of sections in the Council of State.
While the
legislative machine was being simplified out of existence and the
administrative system suffered no marked change, a new and complicated
hierarchy, with numerous grades, was being elaborated. It was the only
constitutional innovation which owed its origin to the Empire, and it did not
survive its author.
The reader
will have noticed the appearance, in the ranks of the bureaucracy, of certain
honorary titles, such as Councillor of State and Minister of State. The Legion
of Honour had also created certain honorary distinctions. The decree of 24
Messidor, year XII (July 13, 1804), which, for want of something better, is
still occasionally invoked in France, laid down an order of precedence for
dignitaries and officials, administrative, legal, ecclesiastical, and military,
in the conduct of public ceremonies. There was a hierarchy even for localities;
and the mayors of 36 towns mentioned in the decree of June 22, 1804, were
singled out for the enjoyment of certain special privileges. The list of bonnes
villes was subsequently enlarged, as fresh territories were added to the
Empire.
Besides all
this, the Constitution of the year XII created two new honorary hierarchies.
After the French Princes, that is, “ the members of the Imperial Family in the
order of heredity,” it instituted, by a quaint combination of the great offices
of the Holy Roman Empire with those of the old French monarchy, six Grand
Imperial Dignities, viz. the Grand Elector (Joseph Bonaparte), the
Arch-Chancellor of the Empire (Cambaceres), the Arch-Chancellor of State
(Eugene de Beau- hamais), the Arch-Treasurer (Lebrun), the Constable (Louis
Bonaparte), and the Grand Admiral (Murat). Subsequently, by the decree of
August 9, 1807, Talleyrand was appointed Vice-Grand Elector, and Berthier
Vice-Constable; and the Senatus Consultum of February 2, 1808, raised to the
rank of a Grand Dignity the Govemor-Generalship of the Departments beyond the
Alps, a post held by Borghese, husband of Pauline Bonaparte.
After the
Grand Dignitaries came the military Grand Officers of the Empire. By the terms
of the Constitution of the year XII, these
were to
consist, first, of Marshals of the Empire, chosen from amongst the most
distinguished generals. They were not to exceed Sixteen in number, exclusive of
the generals having seats in the Senate, upon whom also the title of Marshal of
the Empire might be bestowed. Napoleon shortly afterwards selected four
military senators, and fourteen other generals for this honour. Eight others
were subsequently added. After the Marshals came the Inspectors and the
Colonel-Generals, who originally numbered eight. Lastly, the great civil
functionaries of the Crown, viz. the Grand Almoner (Fesch), the Grand Marshal
of the Palace (Duroc), the Grand Chamberlain (Talleyrand), the Grand Master of
the Horse (Caulaincourt), the Grand Huntsman (Berthier), and the Grand Master
of the Ceremonies (Segur), performed the various court duties connected with
the Imperial household, followed by a long train of subordinates—prefects of
the palace, chamberlains, equerries, aides-de-camp, pages, and others.
Nor was this
all. By a series of decrees, dated March 30, 1806, which the Senate was obliged
to register on the following day, Napoleon created yet another hierarchy.
Joseph Bonaparte was proclaimed King of Naples and Sicily; the principality of
Guastalla was given to Pauline Bonaparte in full ownership and sovereignty; the
duchies of Cleves and Berg were bestowed upon Murat, the principality , of
Neuchatel upon Berthier. /Besides these, the Emperor reserved to himself in
Italy, certain dacal “grand-fiefs”—title-bearing domains and territorial revenues—the
hereditary ownership of which he bestowed when and where he thought fit. These
were the three duchies, of Parma (granted to Cam- baceres), Piacenza (to
Lebrun), and Massa (to Regnier); and, among the erstwhile Venetian States, now
incorporated in the kingdom of Italy, the twelve duchies—of Dalmatia, granted
to Soult; Istria, to Bessieres; Friuli, to Duroc; Cadore, to Champagny;
Belluna, to Victor; Conegliano, to Moncey; Treviso, to Mortier; Feltre, to
Clarke; Bassano, to Maret; Vicenza, to Caulaincourt; Padua, to Arrighi; and
Rovigo, to Savary. In the kingdom of Naples, the principalities of Benevento
(with the title of Prince and Duke) and of Ponte-Corvo were granted to
Talleyrand and Bemadotte respectively; while the duchy of Reggio was given to
Oudinot, that of Taranto to Macdonald, of Gaeta to Gaudin, and of Otranto to
Fouche. Suchet was made Duke of Albufera, in Spain.
A new
nobility was in the making, but it was at first located outside France. Napoleon
had his own plan, which he patiently pursued. A Senatus Consultum, dated August
14, 1806, authorised Pauline to cede Guastalla to the kingdom of Italy, and to
buy, with the proceeds of this transaction, estates within the territory of the
French Empire. The other ducal grand-fiefs might eventually be exchanged in the
same way. The privileges attaching to noble tenure were to be transferred to
the estates thus acquired by exchange; and this right was to go with “ the
grant of any further duchies or other titles which the Emperor
might create
in future.” A further step was taken when, during the Polish campaign of 1807,
Napoleon ordered Lefebvre to lay siege to Danzig. It was with set purpose that
he selected the Marshal-Senator for this command. Lefebvre was an old
campaigner, quite incapable of conducting a difficult operation, but he was a
veteran of the Republican armies, very brave, very popular, and above all very
plebeian. When the place capitulated, Lefebvre was made Duke of Danzig: the grant
accompanying the new title was to be composed of lands situated within the
territories of the Empire.
A precedent
had thus been created, to which the decree of March 1,
1808, gave the fullest application. The Grand
Dignitaries were to bear the title of Prince, and their eldest sons that of
Duke; Ministers, senators, life-members of the Council of State, presidents of
the Legislative Body, and archbishops, that of Count; presidents of the
electoral Colleges, the first presidents and procurators-general of the courts
of justice, bishops, and mayors of bonnes viUes, that of Baron; members of the
Legion of Honour, that of Knight (Chevalier). These titles were to be
hereditary, provided they were endowed with property bringing in an annual
income of not less than 200,000 frs. in the case of Princes;
30,000 frs. in that of Counts; 15,000frs. in
that of Barons; and 3,000 frs. in that of Knights. The Emperor reserved to
himself the right to bestow, on the same terms, suitable titles upon generals,
prefects, and such other of his subjects as should attain distinction through
services rendered to the State. The old French nobility, however, was not
restored. Camba- ceres read to the Senate the decree which so profoundly
modified the social order created by the Revolution; the Senate, in an address
carried at the sitting of March 12, “ offered to His Imperial and Royal Majesty
its humble and respectful thanks for his kindness in communicating to them
through the medium of His Serene Highness the Prince ArchChancellor of the
Empire the regulations dealing with the creation of the Imperial titles.”
The
hierarchical system was now complete. Napoleon created three princely titles
after the campaign of 1809. That of Wagram was conferred on Berthier, Prince of
Neuchatel; of Essling on Massena, already Due de Rivoli; and of Eckmiihl on
Davout, already Due d’Auerstadt. After the Russian campaign, a fourth, viz.
that of Moscowa, was bestowed upon Ney, already Due d’Elchingen. Besides these,
Napoleon created 31 Dukes, 388 Counts, 1090 Barons, and about 1500 Knights.
There were only two Marshals of the Empire, namely, Brune and Jourdan, who were
not ennobled. Napoleon showed himself extremely generous in the matter of
grants designed to help in the formation of the necessary endowments and to
maintain the splendour of the new titles. Berthier, for instance, had over
1,300,000 frs. a year in grants; Davout over 700,000 frs.; Mass&ia over
600,000. To these figures must be added the large salaries attached to the
offices held by
the grantees,
also the amount of the private fortunes they had succeeded in amassing, by
illicit means, in the discharge of their official duties.
Napoleon took
care not to see what went on. He held that a monarchy required the support of a
noble class, and believed that by making the fortunes of those who served him
he would bind them to himself. “ We have been guided,” he declared to the
Senate, in communicating to it the decrees of March SO, 1806, “ by the great
desire to consolidate the social order and our own throne, on which that order
is based.” He imagined that, by multiplying the number of social grades between
him and his subjects, he was enhancing the sacredness of his Imperial majesty
and arousing a spirit of emulation in those who were ranged in successive
stages beneath him. “ For,” said he, “ in ambition is to be found the chief
motive-force of humanity, and a man puts forth his best powers in proportion to
his hopes of advancement.”
The formation
of a new society, depending entirely on himself, was, in the field of internal
politics, Napoleon’s great idea. It was also his great blunder. The old-time
nobility filled the posts about the new Court. Napoleon had the proud
satisfaction of numbering among those attached to his own Court, or in the service
of members of his family, the greatest names of pre-revolutionary France.
The Emperor’s
household was conducted with the most perfect method, under the personal eye of
the master; it was a model of order, luxury, and economy combined. On the other
hand, Josephine’s expenditure was prodigal. According to Masson, she spent,
between 1804? and 1809, 6,647,580 francs on dress alone; and several times
Napoleon was forced to pay her debts. The dress worn by the courtiers was-
sumptuous; men and women alike appeared covered with gold and jewels. The
concerts, the theatre, and the receptions were magnificent.
Swallowing
their pride, the old-time nobility accepted the titles Napoleon gave them, but
they haughtily remembered those older titles they had no longer the right to
bear. Nothing could obliterate from their minds the feeling that they were in
the employ of a parvenu; and they felt nothing but contempt for the new
nobility. As for the latter, their devotion to the Emperor diminished in
proportion to the favours they received; for, the more he loaded them with
honours and wealth, the less they had to expect. Thus the society which the
Emperor had created round him was largely composed of secret royalists or of
sated upstarts: it was imperialist only in name. Moreover—and this was a point
of even graver importance—Napoleon was isolated from the nation by his Court,
whose etiquette, growing stricter every year, gradually excluded all who were
not in regular attendance. The Constitution had been narrowed to one man; and
that man had ceased to be national. The popularity of Napoleon Bonaparte, which
had waxed steadily under the Consulate, slowly waned under the Empire.
114
The
army. Conscription. [isoo-u
“I can use up
25,000 men a month,” said Napoleon one day. It was from the nation that those
men came. If our calculations are accurate, in order to maintain the army at
its full effective strength the nation was called upon to provide 30,000 men in
1800, 60,000 in
1801, 60,000 in 1802, and 60,000 in 1803, or 210,000 in
all under the Consulate. It provided 60,000 men in 1804, 210,000 in 1805,
80,000 in 1806, 80,000 in 1807, 240,000 in 1808, 76,000 in 1809, 160,000 in
1810, 120,000 in 1811, 237,000 in 1812, and 1,140,000 in 1813, or
2.403.000 in all under the Empire. The total amounts to
2,613,000 men during the reign of Napoleon. If the figures of his armies are to
be complete, we must add to them the soldiers raised by the levee en masse of
1814; volunteers and time-expired men who had rejoined the colours at high pay;
young men who received commissions on leaving the military schools; foreign
regiments in the service of Prance, composed of Swiss, Irish, and volunteers
of various nationalities; deserters; prisoners of war enrolled either with or
against their will; and lastly, the contingents contributed by subject or
allied foreign Powers. But we are here concerned only with the share taken by
the French departments in the recruiting of Napoleon’s armies.
There were
three regular methods of procedure: (1) the first levy (afpel) of the “ classes
de la conscription,” numbering 1,447,000 men; (2) the supplementary levy
(rappel) of the same classes, for such men as had not yet served, amounting to
746,000 men; (3) the levy of the National Guard, 370,000 men. To these should
be added the “ exceptional levies,” amounting to 50,000 men, which included the
young men on the naval lists (inscription maritime), and the “ guards of honour
” equipped and mounted at their own expense, of whom each department had to
provide a certain number, and who gained their commissions after a year’s
service. These totals amount to 2,613,000 men (as above).
The
Conscription was regulated by the law of 1798, which underwent no serious
modification. The system of drawing by lot was used to weed out those
conscripts of any particular class who would not be called upon to serve.
Substitution was legalised. The payment for a substitute varied from 1500 to
4000 francs, according to the district and the year. Thus the escape from
military service was open only to those possessed of some means. On an average
we may reckon one substitute in eveiy ten conscripts called. Exempted persons
had to pay a military tax. Young men married immediately before the summons
were exempt. It naturally followed that the number of marriages increased in
proportion to the greater frequency of the calls to arms. In 1811 there were
203.000 marriages in France; in 1812, 222,000; in
1813, 387,000; and in 1814,193,000. Similarly, the number of recalcitrants,
insubordinates, and deserters rose in proportion to the number of the levies.
At certain moments the number of conscripts in hiding was considerable,
especially in the west, south, and centre, and in the newly annexed provinces.
I800-14] ’ Manipulation of the conscription.
115
Some had
recourse to self-mutilation; others bribed the authorities to include them in
the lists of exemption or to falsify their civil status. It often happened that
the conscripts who joined were delicate or sickly youths, unfit for service,
whom the officers were obliged to reject, while the sound conscripts stayed at
home in hiding. The police hunted them down, or quartered watchers on the
relations of the refractory; while flying columns scoured the country in search
of the insubordinate. Almost always the people were in league with the
recalcitrants. In spite of the amnesties declared in 1803, 1804, and 1810, the
shirkers and the insubordinate went on increasing in number. Thus the number of
the levies estimated on paper must be taken rather as representing the effort
asked of the country than the actual result obtained. Between the two there was
always a large discrepancy.
By a natural
consequence, in proportion as the actual return from conscription fell off,
Napoleon was forced to raise the nominal number required. In 1800 he only
summoned 30,000 conscripts to the colours; but the number rose to 60,000 per
annum during the years 1801-5,
80,000 during 1806-9, 110,000 for 1810, 120,000
for 1811 and
1812, 137,000 for 1813, 150,000 for 1814, and 160,000
for 1815— a total of 1,447,000 (see above). Moreover, it frequently happened
that the Emperor kept the conscripts enrolled beyond the statutory five years,
or he summoned the yearly classes before their turn. For example, the 1806
class was summoned on September 23, 1805, the
1808 class on April 7, 1807, that of 1809 on
January 21, 1808, that of 1810 on September 10,1808, that of 1813 on September
1, 1812, that of 1814 on January 11, 1813, and that of 1815 on October 9,1813.
When the
conscription, even with its heightened demands, failed to provide enough men,
Napoleon recalled the earlier classes to the colours; and then those who by
good luck in the drawings had not been included in the lists, those who had
found substitutes, and even those who were exempt—had all alike to go or find
substitutes. It was in accordance with this plan, that, in 1805, he summoned
afresh the classes from 1804 back to 1800, in 1808 those from 1809 to 1806, in
1809, those from 1810 to 1806, in 1813 first those from 1812 to 1809, then
those from 1814 to 1812, and finally all the classes from 1814 to 1802. In this
way all the classes were actually called upon to serve several times over.
Moreover, the
use Napoleon made of the National Guard was in reality only a recall in
disguise. By the Act of 1798 the National Guard had not been suppressed; but
Napoleon viewed it with distrust. He remembered the important part it had
played in the revolutionary movements; and indeed there was no room in a
despotic system for a citizen militia. In Paris the Government organised a
Municipal Guard (October 4, 1802), composed of picked veterans, and maintained
at the cost of the city. In reality it was a reserve force in the service of
the State; and the cost of its maintenance was extorted in spite of
protests on
the part of both the Municipal Council and the Prefect of the Seine, who was
acting as Mayor of Paris. As for the National Guard, it existed on paper; and
the Government could at any time place it on an active footing in case of need.
Fouche, in fact, did so in
1809. Subsequently Napoleon reorganised it by the
Senatus Consultum of March 13, 1812. It was to consist of all male citizens of
sound health, divided into three levies (bans). To the first levy belonged all
those men, aged from 20 to 26, who did not belong to the regular army; to the
second those between 26 and 40; and to the third all those between 40 and 60.
The National Guard was liable to serve only in the home defence of the Empire,
in the maintenance of public security, and on the frontier and the coast. In
the event of the country being invaded (an eventuality which was not long in
presenting itself) its “ cohorts ” and its “ legions ” would have been an
invaluable resource, and as it were a last refuge for French patriotism. But,
in 1813, Napoleon destroyed the original character of the National Guard by
enrolling all its best men as regular troops in the first levy for service in
Germany. Henceforth the National Guard was as hateful in the eyes of the people
as conscription itself; and when, at the end of 1813 and in 1814, the Emperor,
as a last resource, called up all the classes and ordered a levee en masse, the
country did not respond.
But it was
not enough to recruit soldiers; it was necessary to provide for the cost of
their maintenance. The history of finance under the First Empire would seem,
viewed superficially, to show a more satisfactory record than that of army
recruiting. And yet, when Napoleon fell, but one cry went up from the whole of
France: “ Down with conscription and the droits reunis /”
The outset of
the reign was distinguished by what was, relatively, a serious financial
crisis. In 1804 there was formed under the name of “ The Company of United
Merchants ” (Negociants Retmis), an association of faiseurs de service,
purveyors and speculators, the leading spirit among whom was a man named
Ouvrard. The Company engaged in certain speculations in connexion with the
Spanish colonies, the success of which depended on being able to avoid the
British cruisers. It also undertook to advance money to the French Treasury,
and to supply the army with provisions. Now, in France, ready money was very
scarce; and the Government failed to pay for the supplies furnished to the
army. The Company thus found itself exposed to a heavy risk. In this emergency,
with the consent of Barbe-Marbois, the embarrassed Company appealed to the Bank
of France, which agreed to make advances by means of an issue of bank-notes.
The notes decreased in value by 10 per cent, and more; and the situation became
extremely grave. By a natural consequence the business in commercial bill-discounting
was paralysed; and the crisis extended itself to trade. There were several
startling failures. The interests of the Treasury, of the
1805-iq] Economic crisis.—The
Bank.—Taxes.
Bank, and of
the Company—that is to say public, semi-public, and private interests—were
disastrously entangled and jointly endangered. The news of the victory of
Austerlitz (December 2, 1805) did something to restore confidence. On Napoleon’s
return to Paris, Barbe- Marbois was dismissed and replaced by Mollien, who drew
up an account of the loans made to the United Merchants. The total amounted to
141,000,000 francs. The Company was forced to hand over all it possessed; and,
thanks to the cash brought in from Austria, the Bank was put in a position to
resume payment. But the Emperor was determined to prevent the recurrence of
such crises in future.
“The Bank,”
he declared, “belongs not only to the shareholders but also to the State, since
it was to the State that it owed its privilege of issuing notes.” And he added,
“It is my desire to see the Bank under the control of the State, but not too
much so.” The law of April 22, 1806, consequently enacted that the Bank should
be under the direction of a Governor (Cretet, Councillor of State) and two ViceGovernors,
appointed by the State, and adopted other provisions to secure state control.
In these affairs the Emperor himself did not scruple to interfere. For instance
he fixed the rate of discount at 5 per cent, in 1806, and at 4 per cent, in
1807. In return for this, the Bank’s privilege was extended for twenty-five
years beyond the fifteen originally conceded, i.e. to 1843; its capital was
raised from 45,000 to 90,000 shares of 1000 francs each; and the decree of May
18, 1808, empowered it to open branches in the provinces, under the name of
Comptoirs d'Escompte de la Banque de France. Three branches were opened under
the Empire, at Lyons, Rouen, and Lille. Thus, after 1806, to use the words of Courtois
the younger, the Bank became “a state institution in the form of a limited
liability company.”
The due
control of the Treasury was ensured by the establishment of the Cour des
Comptes, created by the law of September 16, 1807, to take the place of a commission
with similar duties (the Commission nationale de comptabilite), which under the
Constitution of the year VIII was composed of seven titular members only. The
new Court was far larger. It had a President-in-Chief (Barbe-Marbois), three
Presidents, eighteen consdUers maitres des comptes, sixty or seventy advisers
{referendaires), and an Imperial Attorney-General. The Cour des Comptes took
rank immediately after the Court of Cassation, and was charged with the
“auditing” (Jugement) of all the national accounts. It was the last financial
creation that owed its origin to Napoleon.
Direct
taxation underwent no essential modification. On the other hand, indirect taxes
were considerably increased. The duties on liquors were remodelled and enhanced
by a series of measures dealing with their manufacture, circulation, and
consumption; salt was taxed (1805-6) in spite of the unpopularity of the
gabelle; tobacco was made a government monopoly (1810). The administration of
the
118
Income from abroad.—The Budget. [1804-13
droits reunis was clumsy and vexatious, and became hateful in the eyes of
the people. In 1813 Napoleon took upon himself to increase both direct and
indirect taxes by means of a simple decree.
But what
constituted the essential characteristic of Imperial finance was the abnormal
growth in the receipts from abroad. Of these, two kinds must be clearly
distinguished: (1) the immediate contributions of war (such as war-indemnities
paid by the vanquished at the conclusion of the war, requisitions, captures,
and seizures made in the course of the war); (2) such property, real or other,
as the Emperor reserved to himself by right of conquest in countries either
conquered or otherwise acquired. The exact amount of the actual war
contributions is impossible to estimate. All the accumulated wealth was formed
into a special fund, variously named tresor de guerre, tresor de Va/rmee,
caisse des contributions, and finally domaine extraordinaire. The fund was
actually established after the Austrian campaign in 1805; but it was not till
much later that it received an official organisation by the Senatus Consultum
of January 30, 1810. Its disposition was in the hands of the Emperor alone; he
gave his orders to Defermon as mtendant general of the domaine extraordinaire,
just as, through his intendcmt Daru, he disposed of his Civil List of
25,000,000 francs and of the property which formed the dotation de la couronne.
The formation of a War Reserve- Fund; the maintenance of the army in the field
(the expenses of its preparation came out of the ordinary Budget); rewards,
gifts and favours, endowments and pensions paid to the soldiery, the new
nobility and the official class; a portion of the expenses incurred in
connexion with the Public Works; all the expenses incidental to the repairs,
up-keep, and decoration of the Imperial palaces; an occasional contribution to
the normal receipts in order to balance the Budget; subventions and loans to
declining industries—such were the principal uses to which the extraordinary
receipts derived from abroad were put during the Empire. There was, thus, a
secret Budget, drawn up independently of that which was published, but
indispensable to it.
It follows
that the Budget figures, as passed by the Legislative Body, were in reality
fictitious; and the requisite equilibrium was no longer obtained, as in the
days of the Consulate, by an approximate balance between income and
expenditure. In 1811 the Budget showed an income amounting to 1,309,674,642
francs, and an expenditure of 1,309,000,246 francs; there was therefore a small
surplus. According to the figures furnished by Nicolas, we may apportion the
receipts for 1811 as follows : 30 per cent, from direct taxation; 6 per cent,
from forests and lands; 40 per cent, from indirect taxation; and 24 per cent,
from divers sources and the “ extraordinary receipts.” The expenditure may be
thus apportioned: 40 per cent, for the finances and interest on the public
funds; 51 per cent, for the army; and 9 per cent, for the expenses of
administration. Deficits only made their appearance along with
1804-14]
National Debt.—The Funds.—Public works. 119
disasters in
the field. In 1812 there was a deficit of 95,000,000 francs: in 1813 one of
175,000,000 francs.
But, if the
interest on the National Debt rose in 1814 to 63,000,000 francs per annum, in
the shape of Perpetual Annuities, it was principally in order to complete the
liquidation of the arrears which had accrued prior to the Consulate. Never
under the Empire or under the Consulate was recourse had to loans properly
so-called. “ That method,” declared Napoleon in the interesting preamble to the
edict of December 29,1810, establishing the tobacco monopoly, “is both immoral
and disastrous...It insensibly undermines the edifice of state, and exposes one
generation to the curses of the next.”
In other
respects the Empire carried on those traditions of order and method which it
had inherited from the Consulate. The price of stock had risen from 60 to 70
francs by the year 1806, and afterwards remained stationary at about 80. The
maximum price of 93'40 was reached on August 27, 1807, and the minimum of 45 on
March 29, 1814. Even this low figure compares favourably with those which
prevailed shortly before and after 18 Brumaire. Thus, if facts were neglected
which did not appear on the surface, the financial position appeared highly
satisfactory. Not only were the means to carry on the ordinary affairs of
government always forthcoming, but supplies were found, in spite of almost
ceaseless war, to provide for the expenditure and the public works initiated
under the Consulate, though these appeared, by their very nature, suited rather
to a time of peace.
Under the
Empire, public works were vigorously pushed on. Between 1804 and 1813 more than
a milliard was spent; and the programme of works under construction in 1813
involved a further expenditure of 500 millions, without counting the expenses
incurred under the Consulate. The repairs of the roads had become a matter of
urgency. A distinction was drawn between local and departmental roads (kept up
at the expense of the local authorities) and imperial high-roads (kept up by
the State). The admirable system of high-roads, dating from early monarchical
times, underwent a complete renovation and was carried beyond the boundaries of
Old France. The Decree of November 16, 1811, enumerated 229 imperial
high-roads, the most important of which, 30 in number, radiated from Paris as
their centre to the most distant extremities of the Empire and indeed of
Europe. The Mont-Cenis road, completed in 1805, brought Paris into touch with
Turin; that of the Simplon, completed in 1807, connected Paris with Milan,
Rome, and Naples. Numerous bridges were also built. The network of canals and
waterways rendered available for navigation was hardly even outlined in
pre-revolutionary France. The works undertaken during the Consulate and
partially completed at the close of the Empire were planned on a scale so vast
and, at the same time, with few exceptions, on such practical lines, that they
constitute to-day by far the most important
120 Imperial palaces. Museums. The Capital, [isoi-u
portion of
the internal navigation of France. The Spanish prisoners of war, organised in
“working companies,” provided manual labour at next to no expense. Prony, the
Director of the School of Bridges and Highways, who, either on the spot or from
a distance, was the guiding spirit in all these undertakings, was an engineer
of the first rank. Marshes were drained, dykes strengthened, sand-dunes
hindered from spreading along the coast. The principal sea-ports, both naval
and commercial, and particularly the ports of Cherbourg and Antwerp, were
enlarged and fortified. On the other hand, only a few inland places were
fortified, and these only beyond the boundaries of Old France—so unlikely did a
foreign invasion seem to be.
The Imperial
palaces in the environs of Paris (Saint-Cloud, Fontainebleau, Compiegne,
Versailles, Trianon, and Rambouillet) and those situated in the more remote
departments, were restored and enlarged. In Paris the completion of the Louvre
and the clearing of the Tuileries formed part of a general scheme which aimed
at making the French capital the metropolis of Europe. The most famous works of
art, the fruits of victory, poured in to enrich the Musee NcvpoUon at the
Louvre. The Vatican archives, those of Simancas, and those of the Holy Roman
Empire, came from Rome, Spain, and Vienna to be mingled with the Imperial
archives, as though the present aspired to enslave the past. The capital grew
rapidly. Numbering 600,000 inhabitants towards the close of the eighteenth
century, it only registered 547,736 at the census of 1801; but by the end of
the Empire its population had reached 700,000. Napoleon had expended more than
100,000,000 francs upon Paris, and
150,000,000
francs upon the chief towns of the departments. In the west, two towns, viz.
Napoleon-Vendee (La Roche-sur-Yon), and Napoleonville (Pontivy) were, so to
speak, created by him, in order to keep a closer watch upon that royalist
district.
The Emperor
threw himself into public works with the greater keenness in that he had a
genuine desire to round off his military glory with the arts of peace, and
because he considered it his duty as head of the State to contribute actively
towards the material well-being of the country. When he rose to power, he knew
little or nothing of economics. But by dint of discussion in the Council of
State, of talk with Mollien, and of observation, he taught himself a great
deal. In 1801 he had taken up a definite attitude. “That great and ordered
system,” he exclaimed to Mollien, “ which governs the whole world, must also
govern each part of it. Government plays the part of the sun in the social
system, whose various bodies should revolve round this central luminary, each keeping
strictly to its own orbit. Government should therefore so rule the destinies of
each society that all should vie with one another in seeking to preserve the
harmony of the whole.”
These ideas
gave birth to legislation of a new type. Under both the Consulate and the
Empire, the State often intervened in the sphere of
I801-12] Economic policy of Napoleon.
121
economics,
and restored to their pristine vigour institutions which the Revolution had
suppressed. A manifest return towards the guild-system of the old r&gvme
was visible in the creation of commercial exchanges with brokers and jobbers
appointed by the Government (1801), in the reconstruction of the Chambers of
Commerce (1802), in the formation of Advisory Boards in connexion with
manufactures, factories, arts and crafts (1803), in the useful institution of
conseUs de prud^hommes (1806), and in the regulation of certain liberal
professions.
Even while
proclaiming the principle of the liberty of labour, the Revolution had made
certain reservations in connexion with the food- supply. To Napoleon this
question was one of primary importance. “ He feared,” he said, “ popular
insurrections due to economic causes, though he was not afraid of political
risings.” Thinking to provide a remedy for economic crises in the exercise of
state control, he kept a watchful eye on all that concerned the food-supply,
especially in Paris. A copious series of laws, Consular decisions, Imperial
decrees, and regulations issued by the Prefect of Police, revived in some measure
the minute supervision exercised by the police in former times over the
markets, the public granaries, and all the trades connected with the supply of
food and drink; so much so that in Paris, at the close of the Empire, almost
all these trades had again become veritable corporations. The same process was
beginning in the larger provincial towns.
On the other
hand, Napoleon was opposed to the restoration of the guild-system in other
professions. While upholding in principle the liberty of labour, he instituted
a system of strict supervision which placed the workman under the control of
the police and in a position of inferiority towards his employer. It was with
this end in view that the law of April 12, 1803, obliged the workman to provide
himself with a form supplied by the local police, on which were inscribed his
successive engagements. Without this form or without a passport, a workman was
treated as a vagabond; and no employer might engage him. In Paris the Prefect
of Police, and in certain provincial towns the local police, were to be found
descending to the most trumpery details in the regulation of labour. The law of
April 12, 1803, also recognised a systematised copyright in trade-marks or
designs.
“ While
preserving,” said Napoleon, “ those useful innovations which it was the object
of the Revolution to introduce, I intend to restore any institutions of value
which it mistakenly destroyed ”—a general principle which was applied in a new
fashion to weights and measures and the coinage. The Bill of December 10, 1799,
upheld the decimal-metric system; but its general adoption was long delayed by
the Order of November 4, 1800, and the Decree of February 12, 1812, which
authorised the simultaneous use of both the old and the new measures.
Similarly, with regard to the currency, the law of March 28, 1803, ordained as
the unit a weight of five grammes of silver, 90 per cent.
122
Customs. The Continental System. [1803-7
being of pure
metal, under the name of “ franc.” Gold was reckoned at 15^ times the value of
silver. These regulations sufficed to ensure in the France of that day a sound
and stable monetary regime; and the Revolutionary reforms were maintained and
developed. But the Senatus Consultum of 22 Fructidor, year XI (September 9,
1803) reintroduced the Gregorian Calendar, which was to come into operation
from 11 Nivose, year XIV (January 1, 1806).
It was,
however, Napoleon’s general policy which, more even than his legislation,
affected the material development of the country. The view which regarded state
intervention as all-powerful in economic matters, the protectionist leanings of
the French producers, on whose side the Emperor ranged himself, above all, the
incidents of the struggle with Great Britain, brought about a commercial
situation almost unprecedented in history, the consequences of which not only
reacted upon French agriculture and French trade, but on the trade of Europe
and the general commerce of the world. It does not fall within the scope of
this chapter to enter into a full explanation of Napoleon’s commercial system.
We must content ourselves with outlining that portion of it which concerns the
internal conditions of bygone France.
In the course
of every year from 1802 to 1807, a law relating to the Customs was passed by
command of Napoleon. Of these laws, the two most important were those of 1803
and 1806, which contained Customs Tariffs. The protectionist character of the
Tariff for 1803 was one of the causes which led to the rupture of the Peace of
Amiens. The Tariff of 1806 was drawn up in the same spirit, but it was fuller,
so much so that it served as a basis for all the Customs Tariffs in France
during the greater part of the nineteenth century, France thus became frankly
protectionist.
The various
Decrees which established what is generally known as the Continental System,
together with the Orders in Council by which the British Government retaliated
on Napoleon, will be described at length in a later chapter, and therefore need
not be discussed here. But some account of the economic effects of this system
is requisite in a description of France under the Empire. During the middle
period of the Empire, the Continental System occupied a position of paramount
importance; and it is not without reason that some have seen in it the pivot of
Napoleon’s policy; for, if it were to be made effective, it was essential that,
as he no longer had a navy, he should have the whole of Europe either under his
sway or in his alliance. But, owing to the force of circumstances, Great
Britain was economically indispensable to Europe. Thanks to the lead which she
had gained in matters industrial, she alone was in a position to provide
certain manufactured goods, and more especially cotton fabrics. Owing to her
maritime supremacy, she alone could import colonial food-stuffs into Europe.
British goods and colonial produce became therefore the
1806-iq] Imports and smuggling.
123
centre of an
active system of smuggling, less widespread in France, it is true, than in the
countries newly incorporated with the Empire, such as Germany, Italy, and
Spain. The smugglers brought in the prohibited merchandise at a premium
representing approximately half its real value. Napoleon compromised. He
granted temporary licenses, giving certain French shippers the right to bring
in prohibited goods or articles of British origin on payment of a duty of 40
per cent. The law of January 12, 1806, regularised the license system ; but
cloths, muslins, cotton materials, and hosiery remained absolutely prohibited.
Napoleon hoped by this means to direct the illicit trade to his own advantage,
and to become, so to speak, his own smuggler.
With regard
to food-stuffs and cotton, he had vainly tried to import them overland from the
Levant, by a system of transport across the Balkan Peninsula. But he was not
living in the Middle Ages; and it was not in his power, omnipotent sis he was,
to revive the overland trade-routes which the progress of maritime navigation
had superseded. Napoleon, therefore, compromised once more. The Trianon Decree
enhanced the existing duties on colonial produce. Here again the exciseman took
the place of the smuggler.
Having thus
regulated to his own advantage the importation of merchandise and food-stuffs
which found their way into the Empire in spite of him, Napoleon, by a Decree
issued October 18,1810, established certain Tribunaux ordinaires de douane
(Customs Tribunals) to try cases of first instance ; above which the Cours
prevotales de douane, presided over by Grand Provosts, pronounced final
judgments in cases of appeal. All the smuggling cases were referred to these
special tribunals. The penalties for fraudulent declaration and smuggling were
very severe. Such smuggled goods as came within the category of prohibited merchandise
were to be confiscated and burnt, or included in the list of dutiable articles
to be sold for the benefit of the State. Burnings were particularly frequent
outside the old boundaries of France, where smuggling most abounded. In France
itself the Decree of October 18,
1810, was received with enthusiasm because it
maintained protection for French industries against British competition, and
opened up to French trade those countries which had hitherto provided for their
needs by means of smuggled British goods.
There were,
therefore, two stages in the Continental System. In 1806 the exclusion of
British trade was absolute, but tempered in practice by smuggling; in 1810 the
prohibition was to a certain extent tempered by the Government, which, per
contra, attempted to put down smuggling altogether. In both cases the European,
and especially the French, markets were almost hermetically sealed to the
products of British invention and to colonial produce. That the injury to trade
and the sufferings of the consumer were acute, especially beyond the old
boundaries of France, it is scarcely necessary to say. In 1800 the
124 Foreign trade.—Growth of industry. [isoo-14
foreign trade
of France reached an approximate total of 595,000,000 francs (imports
323,000,000, exports 272,000,000); in 1802, thanks to the peace, it touched
790,000,000 (imports 465,000,000, and exports
325.000.000); and it reached its maximum height in 1806
with
933.000.000 (imports 477,000,000, exports
456,000,000); but thenceforward it steadily diminished, falling in 1814 to 585,000,000
(imports
239.000.000, exports 346,000,000). Obviously these
figures are only of secondary significance, owing to the extent of the illicit
trade. The fact also ought to be taken into account, that neither the imports
nor exports of gold and silver are included in the above figures. Between 1799
and 1814 France imported cash to the value of 838,000,000 francs, and only
exported 21,000,000. Generally speaking, however, the oscillation of the “
curve ” remained fairly characteristic. Finally, it is to be observed that the
balance of trade showed an excess of imports in 1800 and an excess of exports
in 1814. The two lines intersected one another immediately after the
establishment of the Continental System.
Various
circumstances, wholly unconnected with the Continental System, contributed
powerfully to advance French industry. At the time of the rupture of the Peace
of Amiens, the “ industrial revolution,” which had so radically transformed the
conditions of production in England, was beginning to be felt in France. The
application of machinery to manufactures, which had begun before the
establishment of the Continental System, continued to develop under the new
regime, simultaneously hindered and fostered by it—hindered because all
relations with the original home of mechanical invention had been broken off,
fostered because France had now to produce herself the goods she could no
longer buy from Great Britain. On the other hand, there now came into being for
the first time a happy and fruitful alliance between the manufacturers and the
men of science. “The Society for the Encouragement of National Industries
grouped together, under the presidency of Chaptal, all those who were
interested in mechanics, chemistry, and economics, in agriculture and commerce;
and by its propaganda, its experiments, its loans, and its prizes contributed
largely to the scientific progress of industry. In fact, it created in France
the “ applied sciences.” Napoleon himself was active in the same direction.
Technical schools, prizes, loans and subventions, industrial exhibitions,
government institutions designed to help on industrial development— all played
their part in bringing about the progress achieved.
Agriculture
profited by the introduction of improved systems of crop rotation, both Flemish
and English. The spread of these was, to be sure, slow enough; but still a
beginning had been made. The Continental System, by prohibiting the importation
of foreign dyes, gave a great impetus to the culture of dye-producing plants,
such as madder, woad, and saffron. Chicory was grown as a substitute for
coffee. To take the place of sugar, various preparations were tried.
The consumer
was just getting used to a kind of treacle extracted from the grape, when,
after many experiments, French manufacturers, reviving a process discovered in
Prussia in the preceding century, succeeded in manufacturing sugar out of
beetroot (1809-10). The Government fostered the new industry, which in 1812 was
in full course of development; but the abandonment of the Continental System
two pears later dealt it a blow from which it took long to recover.
Flax and hemp
were cultivated, and worked up by home industry. Napoleon offered in 1810 a
prize of a million francs to the inventor of the best flax-spinning machine. A
good machine was made by Philippe de Girard; but the prize was not awarded to
him. His invention was taken up in Great Britain, whence it afterwards returned
to France. The manufacture of woollen goods was greatly improved. The old and
famous silk industry of Lyons had suffered greatly through the Revolution.
Napoleon did all in his power to revive the fashion for Lyons silks. Jacquard
invented the loom bearing his name, which executed by purely mechanical means
even the most intricate designs in the richest materials. The progress of the
cotton industry in France under Napoleon is astonishing, when one thinks of the
difficulty of obtaining the raw material from America, of bringing the
Levantine cotton overland, of the inadequacy of the supply from Naples and
Sicily, and of the failure of the attempt to cultivate it in Corsica or the
valley of the Rhone. Nevertheless Oberkampf and Richard, with his partner
Lenoir, succeeded in establishing important cotton-spinning factories with the
machinery of the English spinning-jenny.
The important
law of April 21, 1810, laid down once for all the principles which were to
govern mining operations in France. As a matter of fact, neither mining
operations nor metallurgic industries made much progress. On the other hand,
industrial chemistry made great advances. The Decree issued on October 15,1810,
on “ Factories and workshops which emit unhealthy or offensive smells,” laid
the foundation of the system of state regulation still in force in France.
Already it could enumerate—as subject to authorisation or to inspection —nearly
seventy different chemical industries. Philippe Lebon invented the system of
gas-lighting. Nicholas Leblanc, having invented a process for manufacturing
soda, published his method from patriotic motives, and committed suicide, a
ruined man. Lebon’s invention remained practically unknown; that of Leblanc,
while it relieved France from the necessity of importing foreign natural sodas,
gave it in exchange a superior product at a tenth of the price.
It is
difficult to form a general opinion on the development of wealth in France
under the Consulate and the Empire. We shall see later that Napoleon’s downfall
was preceded by an economic crisis of peculiar gravity, the causes of which, it
is true, were partly of political origin. But it seems clear that, while luxury
prevailed at the Court and among
126
Wealth and poverty.—Public instruction. [1802-14
the new
nobility, so also material well-being and comfort were spreading among the
general population and the peasantry. In the case of the latter the evidence is
almost unanimous; but the improvement in their condition was less the work of
Napoleon than of the Revolution itself. With regard to artisans, the frequent
calls to arms made manual labour scarcer and therefore dearer. Nevertheless,
certain local disturbances warned far-seeing men of the difficulties which
industry on the grand scale and the growth of machineiy were bound to entail.
Never perhaps
was France more wretchedly armed against poverty. The old charitable
institutions of the Church had disappeared during the Revolution; and the
reorganisation of asylums, hospitals, refuges, outdoor relief centres,
foundling hospitals, monts de piete, etc., devolved upon the municipalities. In
Paris, Frochot, who as Prefect of the Seine performed the duties of mayor (for
political reasons, the capital had, as regards municipal government, been
placed in a category of its own), took an active part in the business of
chanty, as did the prefects and mayors in the departments. The communal and
municipal revenues (including Paris) amounted in 1812 to 128,000,000 francs,
more than half of which (51 per cent.) was contributed by the octroi-duties,
which were specially assigned to meet the requirements of charitable
institutions. The incomes derived from municipal property (i.e. 16 per cent.)
were partially devoted to the same purpose. The Government strove to suppress
vagrancy. In the list of public works executed by order of the State in the
departments the construction of vagrant wards and prisons figured at the head.
Public
instruction, like public charity, was in the hands of the Church under the old
regime; but now the State claimed to be the Church’s heir. The law of 11
Floreal, year X (May 1, 1802), divided both instruction and schools into four
classes as follows—(1) Primary Schools, supported by the local authorities,
communal and municipal acting under the control of the prefects and
sub-prefects; (2) Secondary Schools, providing instruction in French, Latin,
and elementary science, and supported by the communes or by private enterprise,
but subject to government authorisation and prefectorial inspection; (3)
Lycees, providing a thorough education in literature and science, of which
there was to be at least one in each Appeal Court district. The lycees were
state institutions: inspectors, governors, and teachers were appointed and paid
by the State. (4) itcoles Speciales, constituting, according to the law, “ the
final stage in public instruction.” They were divided into (a) Scales puhMques
superieures, devoted to “the full and thorough study, as well as to the
advancement of the useful arts and sciences”; and (6) ecoles d'application des
services publics, designed to provide the State with enlightened public servants.
The Act contemplated a general remodelling of the Higher Schools. As a matter
of fact, the Government
contented
itself with completing and organising, in Paris and the departments,' the
schools of law, medicine, and design; with maintaining the institutions which
the Revolution had protected, created, or restored in Paris; and, lastly, with
the establishment of a few new schools, such as a special military school for
officers at Saint-Cyr, schools of pharmacy, and technical schools. In fact the
law was responsible for only one wholly new creation, viz. the lycees. In these
it undertook to found 6400 exhibitions (bourses), 2400 of which were to be
reserved for the sons of military men and government officials, and 4000 for
the best pupils in the secondary schools. Nevertheless, in 1806, there were
only 29 lycees in existence, as compared with 370 secondary schools kept up at
the expense of the communes, and 377 founded by private persons.
With these
results Napoleon was by no means satisfied. “The essential thing,” he wrote on
February l6, 1805, “ is a teaching body ” organised on hierarchical lines, “
like that of the Jesuits of old.” This body should have a definite aim, for
there can be no stability in political conditions without a teaching body actuated
by fixed principles. “Unless men are taught from childhood, as they should be,
to be republicans or monarchists, Catholics or infidels, and so forth, the
State will never make a nation : it will rest upon shifting and insecure
foundations, and will be for ever exposed to disturbance and change.” An
enquiry was ordered. Fourcroy, Councillor of State and Director-General of
Public Instruction at the Ministry of the Interior, drew up a scheme which he
was obliged to remodel more than twenty times; the Emperor was never satisfied
with it. On May 10, 1806, the Legislative Body approved provisionally the
principle of the desired reform. “There shall be established, under the name of
the Imperial University, a body exclusively charged with the work of teaching
and public instruction throughout the Empire.” In bringing in the bill,
Fourcroy explained that it aimed, in a sense, at a reconstruction, only on a
vaster scale and embracing the whole Empire, of the ancient University of
Paris.
Eventually
the Decree of March 17, 1808, gave a working constitution to the Imperial
University. Henceforth no one might open a school nor teach in public without
being a member of the Imperial University, and a graduate of one of its
Faculties. These Faculties were five in number, viz. theology, law, imedicine,
science, literature. After the Faculties came the lycees; then the colleges or
secondary schools maintained by the municipalities; next those kept by private
persons; then the private boarding-schools; and, lastly, the primary schools.
The degrees attached to the Faculties were those of Bachelor, Licentiate, and
Doctor. No one could be promoted to a higher post unless he had previously held
those below it. All the schools of the Imperial University were to take as the basis
of their teaching the principles of the Catholic religion, loyalty to the
Emperor, and obedience to the statutes of the teaching body. These statutes
laid down a special
system of
discipline, and a series of regulations which, in the case of certain posts,
went so far as to impose the common life and celibacy. The recruiting-ground
for the teaching-staff was provided in the Normal School, organised in Paris in
1810, by the restoration of the Normal School founded by the Convention in
1795.
The University
was divided into as many Academies as there were Appeal Court areas. At the
head of each Academy was a Rector, assisted by a conseil academique and by
academic inspectors. A Grand Master, in Paris, appointed and dismissed by the
Emperor, governed the Imperial University. He appointed and promoted its
officers, maintained discipline, superintended the curriculum, and presided
over the University Council. The University had its own budget. An abundant
crop of regulations subsequently grew up. In this connexion the Decree of
November 15,
1811, is highly characteristic: it shows clearly that
Napoleon was anxious to reduce more and more the competition of these private
schools with the government institutions, if not, indeed, to suppress them
altogether. And yet, at the final collapse of the Empire, there existed within
the old boundaries of France only 36 lycees with 9000 pup 5, and 368 colleges
with 28,000 pupils, as against 1255 voluntary institutes and boarding- schools
with nearly 40,000 pupils.
The Imperial
University had, therefore, as clientele less than half the pupils actually
acquiring a secondary education. Moreover, it will be observed that it was
incomplete both at the top and at the bottom. The Faculties of Law and Medicine
had, it is true, 6300 students in 1815; but all the locales Speciales included
in the design of the Act of 1802 were to be found outside the University
organisation. Primary education was left to private initiative, to the
communes, or to the Freres des Scales Chretiennes, who were authorised and
encouraged by the Grand Master, according to the decree of 1808.
These
shortcomings did not prevent the University from being the sole Imperial
creation which has survived to our own day, though it has become almost
unrecognisable both in its organisation and in its guiding spirit. In
Napoleon’s conception, it was to be a self-governing corporation, but a state
institution. The pupils and the masters were subjected to a discipline derived
partly from a monastic, partly from a military model. As in the hierarchical
society created in all its details by the Emperor, academical energies were to
be stimulated by the spirit of emulation and the desire of promotion. Confined
practically as it was to the spheres of secondary and higher education, the
Imperial University appealed only to the sons of the upper and middle classes.
It was in no sense democratic. Lastly, it aimed at the preservation of the
social and monarchical system; and, so long as the Church could not produce
schools of its own to compete with it, it frankly claimed, although recruited
from lay sources, to take the Church’s place. Its first Grand Master, Fontanes,
was one of the leaders of what we may call the clerical party
under the
Empire; and its first Chancellor, appointed by the Decree of March 17, 1808,
was “ le Sieur Villaret, Bishop of Casal.”
Above the
itcoles SpiciaJes and the Faculties came the Institute, established in 1795. By
its publications, its reports, its correspondence with learned and foreign
societies, the higher standard it set for study and research, and above all to
the authority it derived from the inclusion of the most illustrious names in
branches of learning, the Institute was intended to be the permanent, living,
and active representative of literature, science, and art. It comprised three
“classes,” physical science and mathematics, moral and political science,
literature and the fine arts. The second class was disliked by Bonaparte, for
it contained all the most notorious ideologues. By the consular order of
January 23, 1803, it was suppressed ; and its members were distributed among
the other branches, which were henceforward to be four in number, resembling
in their attributes the Academies of former times. The class of physical and
mathematical science carried on the old Academy of Science; that of French
language and literature, the French Academy; that of ancient history and
literature, the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles- Lettres; that of Fine Arts,
the old Aciademies of painting, sculpture, and architecture.
It would seem
to have been Napoleon’s wish that the Institute should take an active part in
the work of government. “ The Institute cannot refuse what is asked of it,” he
wrote in a famous note, dated April 19* 1807; “ it is bound by the terms of its
constitution to respond to any demands made upon it by the Ministry of the
Interior.” Nevertheless, the active participation of the Institute was actually
confined to the editing of general reports on the progress of literature,
science, and art, and to the distribution of prizes.
Thus, then,
the labours of the intellect, the work of education and criticism, and the
formal recognition of their results, were entrusted to organised bodies acting
by order of the Government. It followed inevitably that all expression of
opinion uttered outside these organised bodies was subject to rigorous
scrutiny; The two Censorships established on April 5,1800, at the Ministry of
the Interior for theatres, and at the Ministry of Police for the press,
discharged their duties uninterruptedly; and police supervision was naturally
extended to all printed publications. This however was not enough; and to
Napoleon’s eyes a fresh series of regulations appeared necessary. He began with
the theatres. The imperial note of February 25, 1806, and the Decrees of June
8, 1806, April 25, July 29, and November 1, 1807, established a truly extraordinary
system. In Paris there were to be only eight theatres, viz. four “ Grand
Theatres ” (the Opera, the Theatre Fran^ais, the Opera Comique, and the Odeon),
and four “ Secondary Theatres.” Every theatre was to have a special character
of its own, defined by the Minister of the Interior. All plays had to be
supervised by the police before production.
In the
departments, five towns were to be entitled to two permanent theatrical
companies each, fourteen other towns to one company each. The Empire was
divided into twenty-five theatrical areas, twelve of which were to be allowed
two strolling companies each, and thirteen one company eafchi The companies and
their repertories were placed under the supervision of the police and the
Ministry of the Interior, the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors.
But the
Decree of February 5, 1810, which organised the general censorship of printing
and publishing, was stricter still. The number of printers was limited: in
Paris it was not to exceed sixty. Printers had to take out licenses and to
swear an oath; and candidates for licenses might not take the oath “until they
had given proof of their capacity, moral character, and attachment to their
country and their sovereign.” Bookseller^. also were to be licensed and sworn,
but their number was not restricted. Before being printed, every work had to be
submitted to the General Censorship, and, in case of appeal, to the Minister of
the Interior; but, even after permission given, the general police and the
prefects could suspend publication. The severity shown by the General
Censorship and the police in dealing with intellectual activity was almost
incredible.
Down to 1810,
newspapers had remained subject to the regime established under the Consulate';
but the supervision of the police tended always towards greater rigour.,
Censors and official editors were forced upon the principal journals. After
1810 the control of the press became still more severe. Outside Paris the
number of newspapers was reduced to one for each department; and this was
placed under the control of the prefect by the Decree of August 3,1810. After
October, 1811, there were only four newspapers left in Paris—the Moniteur, the
official organ; the Journal des Dibats, now called Journal de VKmpire; the
Journal de Paris, which dealt chiefly in gossip; and the old Gazette de Frarwe,
which gave special prominence to religious news. Going one step further still,
the Decree of February 18,1811, appropriated the Journal de VEmpire, without
giving any compensation to the brothers Bertin, its proprietors. Finally, the
Decree of September 17, 1811, confiscated all the other Paris newspapers. From
that moment the Press may be said to have ceased to exist. Political news was
only published at rare intervals and only with the Government’s consent; and
such news was often false.
Is it
astonishing if a regime such as that we have just described hampered the free
expression of ideas ? It was no mere coincidence that Chateaubriand and Madame
de Stael, the two most distinguished writers of the Napoleonic era, belonged to
the Opposition.
In 1801
Chateaubriand, a former emigre, had published Atala, an episode detached from
Le Gbiie du Christianisme, which first saw the light in 1802, about the time of
the promulgation of the Concordat; his demonstration of the poetic beauty and
civilising power of the
Catholic
religion therefore appeared at the right psychological moment. Chateaubriand
then entered the diplomatic service, but resigned after the murder,of the Due
d’Enghien. He now published Rent, another •’ragment of Le Genie; and, having
formed the project of writing Les Martyrs, a kind of romantic prose epic
depicting the antagonism between the Christian and pagan worlds, he set out for
the Holy Land. This was in 1806. Returning to Paris in 1807, he published, in
1809, Les Martyrs, and in 1811 his travelling impressions under the title of
Itvn&raire de Paris d Jerusalem. His dislike for Napoleon had become
invincible; but, though he took little pains to d isgrise it, he was not
subjected to any persecution, for, being in no sense a man of action, he was
politically harmless. Moreover, his pride kept him aloof from affairs. But,
just because all he wrote reflected his own personal views, and because he had
a marvellous gift for reproducing,, with the precision of a painter and the
sensibility of an artist, his impressions of nature and of history, be
succeeded, at least to a large extent, in stamping his mode of thought and
feeling upon his contemporaries. The effect of his work did not reach its
height imtil the next generation; but during the Napoleonic era he stood for
reaction against what he called the narrow scepticism of the eighteenth
century. He rediscovered, so to speak—.possibly, indeed, in a manner savou'i
ing more of literature than of genuine religious belief— the living God of the
Christian, and substituted Him for the Supreme Being of the philosophers and
for the obsolete mythologies of the men of letters. He shook himself free from
the outworn forms of the classicists. History was to him only the past restored
to life; and this past he made others see as he himself saw landscape, colour,
smilight. Lastly, whatever he did was steeped in his personality, his
aloofness, his disillusionment. French Romanticism springs from Chateaubriand.
Madame de
Stael was also a romanticist. Banished from Paris under the Consulate, she made
her home at Coppet, whence she travelled in Germany, Italy, even in France. She
had published her treatise, De la Litterature consideree dans les rapports avec
les Constitutions Sociales in 1800, and two novels, Delphine in 1802, and
Cormne in 1807. In 1810, having finished her book on Germany, she ventured to
return to France, and settled near Blois, where immediately her friends flocked
round her, as of old at Coppet. Solitude was distasteful to her ; she needed
conversation and the stir of life. It was for this reason that Napoleon dealt
more severely with her than with Chateaubriand. The General Censorship was on
the point of authorising the publication of De TAUemagne, when the police, at
the Emperor’s instigation, interposed its veto (1810). Madame de Stael was
forced to return to Coppet, where ahe was kept under strict surveillance; and
Madame Recamier was banished from Paris (1811) for having gone to see her
friend. In 1812 Madame de Stael escaped, travelling through various countries
to England, where she published De TAllemagne in 1813.
132 Madame de Stael. Criticism and philosophy,
[lsoi-u
■ What
a strange spectacle was the struggle between the all-powerful Emperor and this
woman! To the whole of Europe Madame de Stael personified opposition to the
despot. In Prance, since all political activity had become impossible, she
played another part. Supremely intelligent, drawing her intellectual
nourishment from the talk of the most distinguished men of her day,
■& Parisian by choice, a traveller by necessity, Madame de Stael
developed into a French-speaking cosmopolitan. Perceiving that the classical
rules which tradition had forced upon literary expression in France were not
absolute, and that each people, each generation, has its own individuality, she
distinguished between the mental attitude of the Latin and that of the Teuton,
she revealed Germany to France, and made the Homanticism of the North (she was
the first to use the word in its modern sense) acceptable to the classical
taste of the Latin races. Like the philosophers of the eighteenth century, she
believed in the boundless progress of humanity; and to her the march of
European literature was an harmonious concert, to which each people contributed
its peculiar note. She broke down barriers^ she opened out horizons. She Sowed
the seeds of new ideas, and she believed in their force. She could not conceive
of politics divorced from morals, or of morals divorced from religion. She was
at once a liberal and a believer; In the noblest sense of the word she was an
ideologue.
But, for the
present, literature still dragged on in the rut of time- honoured formulae. Its
revolution only came after the fall of Napoleon. Most of the poets of the time
are forgotten to-day. Some signs there were, perhaps, which spoke of a revival
of lyric poetry, in the work of Chenedolle, Millevoye, and even Fontanes; but
Ducis, who (after Voltaire) made Shakespeare known in France, aind ^couchard
Lebrun, “the French Pindar,” had almost ceased to write: Official poetry was
rampant; The birth of the King of Rome inspired 170 pieces, written for the
occasion, which brought in 88,400 francs in fees to their authors.
Professional
literary criticism* whether it clung to or diverged from the Voltairean
tradition, was absorbed in the contemplation of the past. Ginguene devoted
himself to the study of Italian literature; Sismondi, a friend of Madame de
Stael, to the history of the Italian Republics. But, though literature sounded
the praises of Charlemagne and his Paladins, of Henri Quatre and other memories
of the past, there does not exist a single national historical work of that
time worthy of mention.
As for
philosophy, the sensualistic school of the eighteenth century, which claimed to
explain everything by sensation, was represented by ideologues like Volney,
Garat, Saint-Lambert, Laromiguiere, Pinel, de G^rando, by Cabanis and Destutt
de Tracy, whose Idiologie, or Science of Ideas, appeared in 1801. The
ideologues were free-thinkers in religion and liberals in politics. “A band of
imbeciles,” Napoleon called them, “who sigh from the bottom of their souls for
liberty of the press and of speech, and believe in the omnipotence of public
opinion.”
A new
doctrine, reactionary both in politics and religion, was formulated by de
Bonald and Joseph de Maistre. A mystic tendency showed itself in the works of
Saint-Martin, Ballanche, and Aza'is. The psychological analysis of Maine de
Biran and the spiritualism of Royer-Collard introduced a philosophy which
found a warm welcome at the University, and was long to remain the official
doctrine. Lastly, Saint-Simon and Fourier, whose first publications, be it
said, attracted no attention whatever, enunciated certain ideas upon social
organisation which placed them among the pioneers of socialism.
The movement
of ideas under Napoleon was, therefore, both interesting and varied; and we
can often discern the beginnings of things for which the future was to be the
richer. The scientific movement brilliantly maintained the progress of the
eighteenth century, In mathematics, both pure and applied, astronomy, algebra,
geometry, topography, physics, the generation which comprised men like; Lalande
(bom in 1733), Lagrange, Mechain, Mouge Cassini, Delarobre, Laplace, Legendre,
and Carnot, together with that of Lacroix, Biot, Malus, Poinsot, Poisson, and
Arago (bom in 1786), could boast a brilliant constellation of stars of the
first magnitude. The chemists, from Guyton de Morveau (bom in 1737),
Bertholletj Fourcroy, Chaptal, Ducret the younger, Vauquelin,
Bouillon-Lagrange, Thenard, Gay-Lussac, down to Chevreul (who was bom in 1786,
and died in 1889), combined laboratory experiments and scientific research with
practical application of their results.
Natural
science too advanced with rapid strides, thanks to the work of Cuvier in the
field of comparative anatomy and palaeontology, of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and
Lacepede in zoology, of Lamarck, who was the first to formulate the doctrine of
evolution (1809), of Haiiy in mineralogy, of Jussieu and the two Genevese,'
Candolle and Saussure, in botany. Among the physicians, Bichat, whose
anatomical treatise was epoch-making, and who died prematurely in 1802 at the
age of 31, alone gained scientific distinction. The rest were little more than
practitioners.
Turning to
the Fine Arts, we find two theories dividing their holders into opposite camps.
Quatremere de Quincy, whose Essay on the Ideal appeared in 1805, maintained a
doctrine of ideal aesthetics. According to him, there exists an ideal beauty,
absolute, heroic, and final. This beauty the ancients had succeeded in
expressing; it was the duty of the modems to rediscover it. The artist was
bound to study things as they are, but only in the spiri' of idealism, or in
the light of an aesthetic law to which he must subordinate his own individual
tastes and temperament. The naturalistic or liberal school had for its leader
dimeric David, whose Disquisition on the Art of Sculpture appeared in 1805. It
aimed at reconciling the realisation of classic “beauty” with personal
inspiration, with truth of expression and sincerity of observation. The public
became interested in the controversy, but it
134
Architecture. The “Empire style.” [1804-14
was not'
converted, to the “ ideal.” The Government also possessed immense influence in
this respect. Napoleon was indifferent to art in all its forms; but he thought
it advisable to encourage it, in order to add splendour to his reign. The
official art preferences of Denon, Director-General of Galleries and Museums,
coincided with those of the Fine Art class of the Institute and of the itcole
des Beaux Arts.
Thus it came
about that out of the conflict of doctrines, the tastes of the public, and the
influence of , the Government, there was bom an artistic style sufficiently
original and definite to give to the reign of Napoleon that distinction which
it lacked in literature. Like the Imperial! regime itself, it was stiff and
formal, solemn and sumptuous, declamatory, pompous and—fleeting! It only
required a little romantic imagination or a little realistic truth to sweep it
into oblivion. Nevertheless it had a beauty of its own, and it left its stamp
on everything— on an official discourse by Fontanes as well as on the shape of
a card- table, on an overture by Mehul as well as on a'picture by David.
Theoretically it belonged to the “ ideal ” school, modified in practice by the
“liberal” doctrine. In so far as it followed antique models, it may be said to
be “ ideal ”; in so far as circumstances forced it to adapt those models to
modem needs, it was “liberal”; and it displayed original beauty in proportion
as this adaptation was complete.
For this
reason the sculpture of the period does not count. Houdon (bom in 1741) and
Roland (born in 1749) belong to another generation. The architecture of the
time exaggerated more and more the tendency of the preceding period to
reproduce the monuments of antiquity; its best work was in the restoration and
completion of existing monuments. It was in no sense 0 .'igina’. It built a
Greek temple and called it the Exchar ge; it copied Trajan’s column to glorify
the Grand Army; nothing could have been easier. Nevertheless there was a keen
sense of decorative effect and a grandiose, harmonious ensemble, especially in
the work of Napoleon’s favourite architects, Percier and Fontaine. It was the
same thing with the decorative arts. Furniture was stiff, uncomfortable, and
pompous to the point of absurdity. But it is not in its place in the mean
houses of the middle class. To judge it aright, we must picture it in its
proper sphere, in the imperial palaces, surrounded by all the accessories
which Fontaine and his fellow-workers were able to group in such imposing
fashion. We must summon up before the eye of imagination the Court fetes and
the stately ceremonial. We must observe the uniforms and official costumes of
the men, and the dress of the women, so original in its combination of modem
elegance with classic design. In all this there is an artistic note, the note
of the “Empire style,” which belongs to the Empire alone, and is marvellously
suited to the Roman features of Napoleon.
In painting,
Louis David (1748-1825) stood high above his contemporaries by right of
genius, knowledge, and personal influence. He
was one of
the protago:._sts of the idealistic school; but, whether he willed it or not,
in his hands the orthodox doctrine unbent from its attitude of uncompromising
rigidity. The aged Vien, bom in 1716, to whom belonged the glory of having been
David’s master; Vincent, worthy but frigid; Regnault, through whose correctly
classical work there still showed occasionally something of eighteenth century
charm; and Lethiere—all these were temperate idealists. Greuze and Fragonard,
who lived till 1805 and 1809 respectively, were only the survivors of a bygone
age: the day of that charming, iridescent, dainty, but superficial eighteenth
century art was over.
The
generation of painters which followed belonged entirely to the classical
school. The work of Isabey (bom 1767) was attractive and brilliant. Girodet was
a classicist and at the same time a man of genuine imagination—two elements
which he never fully succeeded in reconciling. Gerard specialised in
portraiture, as did Madame Vigee-Lebrun and Robert Lefevre. Guerin, Regnault’s
pupil, Gericault’s master, and a confirmed “ Davidian ” to boot, was perhaps the
most typical painter of the classical school. Gros (bom in 1771) was the
Emperor’s favourite artist. He was a colourist, a realist, full of animation
and a sense of the dramatic ; full too of a sense of life and effect, even if
occas mally somewhat theatrically expressed. Among the younger men, Ingres
(born in 1780) and Horace Vemet (bom in 1789) were already at the height of
their powers, if not of their reputation. Lastly, in the Salons of 1812 and
1813, a quite young painter, Gericault by name (bom
in 1790), exhibited epoch-making pictures: all romantic art is in
them—thrilling, passionate, already triumphant. Thus in painting, as in
literature, the First Empire saw the dawn of Romanticism, but with this
difference, that in literature the classical school was definitely moribund and
sterile even before the Revolution, while in art its most glorious period is
that of Napoleon.
It is
interesting to find music developing vigorously side by side with painting.
Napoleon’s tastes lay rather in the direction of Italian music. He favoured men
like Spontini, Cherubini, Salieri, Paer, Paisiello, and Della-Maria. But the
French school was brilliant; and the works of Catel, Berton, Lesueur, and
particularly of Mehul, with the comic operas of Dalayrac, Gaveau, Nicolo (whose
real name was Isoard), and Boieldieu, illustrated the best qualities of French
music.
To complete
the picture of France under the First Empire nothing now remains but to group
together in their chronological order the principal events in her internal
history. In this respect the only noteworthy incident of the first years of
Napoleon’s reign was the financial and economic crisis, to which, as we have
seen, Napoleon speedily put an end on his return to France after the victory of
Austerlitz. From January to September, 1806, the Emperor resided either in
Paris or at one of the suburban palaces; and it was during this time that he
planned the
two most important institutions of the new regime—the new nobility and the
University. Then he set off to conduct the campaign in Prussia and Poland. He
was absent from September, 1806, until July, 1807. He continued to govern the
country from afar; and, in his correspondence, letters dealing with home
affairs alternate with military orders and matters relating to the conduct and
organisation of the campaign. The Berlin Decree put the finishing touch to the
new regime so far as internal affairs were concerned. The nobility, the
University, the Continental System, and the Church transformed into the
handmaid of the State—these were the four basic columns on which the fabric of
the Empire reposed. '
In spite of
the master’s absence, France was tranquil* We have only to note a few royalist
movements of no real importance. At Bordeaux and in the west a royalist band
was formed, with the.:aid of subsidies from Great Britain; La Rochejacquelein
was its principal leader. But the police made short work of this disturbance.
One obscure accomplice was shot (September 18, 1805); and La Rochejacquelein,
in order to save his property from confiscation, went over to the Empire. In
Britanny, Guillemot the Chotum, a former companion of Georges Cadoudal, was
taken prisoner and shot (January 4, 1805); La Haye Saint-Hilaire suffered the
same fate on October 7,1806. In Normandy d’Ach i and Le Chevalier endeavoured
to effect a rising; and the poor old Marquise de Combray even went so far as to
prepare a bedroom for His Majesty in her chateau at Tournebut. But the
conspiracy ended in an act of highway-robbery; the law had no difficulty in dealing
with royalists reduced to robbing a stage-coach.
The material
condition of the country was one of prosperity. On Napoleon’s return, after
Jena, Eylau, and Tilsit, he was welcomed with genuine enthusiasm. Everybody,
perhaps even Napoleon himself, believed that the war which was just over was to
be the last. The national fite on the occasion of the Emperor’s birthday
(August 15) was celebrated in 1807 with unwonted splendour. Speaking in the
name of the Legislative Body, Fontanes, in the address which he presented to
Napoleon, acclaimed “far less the conqueror than the peace-maker of Europe.”
Practical as ever, the Emperor took advantage of his renewed popularity to
suppress the Tribunate. He made, besides, several changes in the personnel of
his government. Talleyrand was appointed ViceGrand Elector, Berthier
VicerConstable; Champagny became Foreign Minister, and Clarke Minister for War.
Cretet replaced Champagny at the Ministry of the Interior; and Bigot de
Preameneu succeeded the deceased Portalis as Minister of Public Worship. These
selections were not all the happiest imaginable; Clarke could not compare with
Berthier. Talleyrand was not exactly disgraced; but his elevation to the title
of a Grand Dignitary, specially created for him, removed him to a certain
extent from close contact with affairs, and his inexhaustible subtlety no
1807-8]
Demaillot's plot.—Anaciety about Spain.
137
longer
tempered his master’s rough diplomacy. The promotions of 1807 usher in a second
generation of Napoleon’s servants.
Soon after
his return from a short journey in Italy (December, 1807), the Emperor put the
finishing touches to the two institutions which were to consolidate his
work—the nobility and the University (March, 1808). Then he set out for
Bordeaux and Bayonne. We know the business he had in view; we know too the
disastrous consequences which his intervention in Spain held in store for him.
He was away from April to August, 1808. His absence was marked in Paris by a
characteristic episode. An old Jacobin, Eve Demaillot, had gathered round him a
band of republicans, including General Claude-Fran^ois de Malet, an officer who
had been cashiered for his republican opinions. The conspirators, flattering
themselves that they had the support of the ideologue group in the Senate, drew
up a Senatus Consultum proclaiming the dethronement of Napoleon, reestablishing
the Republic, and calling the people together in their electoral colleges. A
provisional government, in which La Fayette, Moreau, Malet, and other
republicans were to take part, was to preserve order, make peace with foreign
Powers, and emancipate the conquered countries. A proclamation to the army was
drafted. What was the precise extent of the plot it is impossible to say. Malet
seems to have belonged to a secret society known as les philadelphes, who
carried on republican traditions. Fouche was a freemason. Did the conspirators
really think they could count on his support ? One thing is certain: it was
Dubois, not Fouche, who discovered the plot (June 8, 1808). Dubois arrested
the conspirators and informed the Emperor of the affair; this time he had real
hopes of ousting his rival at the Ministry of Police. But Fouche, more
fortunate than in 1802, succeeded in persuading Napoleon that the plot was of
no importance; the prisoners were not tried, and the affair was hushed up.
The Emperor
returned to Paris through the departments of the west, but started again
immediately, only allowing himself time to celebrate the 15th of August, and to
raise a fresh levy of troops, now for the first time calling up two classes in
advance. Already the consequences of the Spanish policy were plainly visible.
In close succession the tidings of the capitulation of Baylen and the
convention of Cintra burst on the French people. Could it be possible that
victory no longer attended the eagles of France P “ Public opinion,” wrote
Fievee, one of Napoleon’s secret agents, “is sick with anxiety”; and he added
these significant words: “ If one were asked to describe the moral condition of
France, one would have to say that the only dupes left are those who still base
their calculations on popular credulity.” Shortly afterwards Napoleon hurried
to the Congress of Erfurt (September 22) where he seemed to be in very truth
the master of Europe. On his return to Paris he opened the session of the
Legislative Body (October 25). One phrase in the address presented by Fontanes
in answer to the speech from
138 Schemes
of Talleyrand and FoucM. [18O8-9
the
throne deserves to be remembered. “ Alreadv you are on the point of leaving
Prance once more—France which during so many years has seen you for so few
days. You are setting out; a vague fear, bom of love and tempered by hope,
troubles all our hearts.” Beneath the cautious circumlocution of the President
of the Legislative Body the general uneasiness was plainly visible. On October
29 Napoleon left Paris for Spain. Never had his life been marked by such
feverish activity. The year 1808 was to be the turning point of the Empire. •
To all,
those, not blinded by servile devotion, who had the true interests of France at
heart and some power of divining the future, two facts made themselves more and
more apparent: Napoleon’s policy was becoming extremely dangerous; and no
provision had been made for the contingency that the one man on whom everything
depended might cf .o- appear from the scene. Talleyrand and Fouche had the
courage to look the matter in the face. Their motives could hardly be
disinterested. In their thought of the morrow their first instinct was
doubtless to retain the high positions to which Napoleon had raised them; but,
if they kept their private fortunes in view in case anything should happen to
Napoleon, they thought at the same time of the fortunes of France. There was no
love lost between the two men; but they met and talked things over. They agreed
to ignore Joseph, Louis, and Jerome, who were neither capable nor popular, and
came to an understanding, it seems, to prefer Murat to Bemadotte. The Emperor
got wind of these confabulations, and his anger knew no bounds. He returned at
full speed, his campaign scarcely over. On January 28 he attacked Talleyrand in
public with unprecedented violence. Though removed from the position of Grand
Chamberlain,1 Talleyrand continued to go to Court; but he never
forgave, and, if a secret, he was henceforth an implacable enemy. As for
Fouche, whether out of prudence or contempt, Napoleon spared him yet once more.
Before four
months were over, the Emperor set off again for the front; no one in France
knew why. By an administrative order, drawn up at the moment of his departure
(April 13, 1809), Napoleon had, as usual, appointed Cambaceres as his deputy.
Ministers were to correspond with the Emperor direct, but to meet once a week
under the presidency of the Arch-Chancellor. It so happened that Cr^tet,
Minister of the Interior, fell ill from overwork; Napoleon put Fouche in his
place (June 29). Thus it came about that the two most important ministerial
offices were united under the same chief; and for the first time in the history
of the reign there was a chief, if not a Prime Minister.
The royalists
had not yet lost all hope. Louis XVIII, at this time a refugee in England,
never ceased to look for the active support of the British Government. But
royalist emissaries in France continued to be seized and shot; the Jersey
agency, which had been at work since 1793, disappeared. Fouche’s energy and
skill had enabled him to suppress,
once for all,
the royalist endeavours; and this was the chief reason why Napoleon had
continued to trust him. Fouche made the most of the situation. The
long-expected English landing actually took place, but at Walcheren (July 29,
1809), not in Britanny. Flushing was invested (August 6), Antwerp threatened.
While the other ministers hesitated, Fouche ordered a levy of the National
Guard in the north-eastern departments and in Paris, and afterwards in the
south, on the pretext that another English landing was possible at Marseilles;
he also issued orders for the reinforcement of the National Guard in Paris.
These
measures were obviously out of all proportion to defensive needs. Let but an
accident happen to Napoleon, and Fouche was master of France. As a matter of
fact, on October 12, the youth Staps Attempted to assassinate Napoleon at Schonbrunn.
When the alarm was over, Napoleon, who at the outset had supported Fouche (he
had made him Duke of Otranto on August 15), intervened in his turn. He
disbanded the National Guards, and sent Montalivet to the Interior (October 1),
but he did not disgrace Fouche. He preferred to bide his time.
On October
20,1809, Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau. When, some hours later, the
Empress Josephine rejoined her husband, she found the door of communication
between her room and that of the Emperor walled up. Napoleon had decided upon a
divorce. For a long time he had been possessed by the idea, for upon him, too,
lay like a dead weight the terrible question of the future. What did it profit
to have founded an hereditary Empire if he could not ensure the succession? If
we are to trust Masson, Napoleon had for a long time believed himself incapable
of having issue. At first he seems to have intended to settle the question of
the succession by means of adoption. . It was with this idea that on January
22, 1806, he adopted Prince Eugene, who henceforth called himself
Eugene-Napoleon, as his successor on the throne of Italy. At that time, the
heir-presumptive to the throne of France was, to all appearance,
Napoleon-Charles, the son of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense. But Napoleon-Charles
died on June 5, 1807, when scarcely five years old. Now, on December 13, 1806,
one of Napoleon’s mistresses gave birth to a son, Leon, whose imperial origin
it was impossible to doubt. Napoleon therefore gave up the idea of adoption in
favour of the natural succession from father to son. But from that moment
divorce became a necessity. Fouche, who guessed what was in his master’s mind,
had been spreading abroad the rumour of an approaching divorce since July,
1807, and even had the assurance to speak of it to Josephine herself. Napoleon
silenced him, but the idea had been launched; and now the hour had struck for
its execution.
The days that
followed were a veritable torture for the unhappy Josephine. Up to the very end
she had to play the part of Empress; and just at that precise moment there were
great festivities afoot in
140
Marriage with Marie-Louise.—Fouche dismissed. [1809-10
honour of the
Peace of Vienna. Napoleon suffered also. He was full of tenderness and pity for
Josephine; he was moved by the memories of long years spent in common. A
heartrending scene took place between husband and wife on November 30, 1809;
but Napoleon did not reverse his decision. He dispensed with the formalities
laid down by the Civil Code and went to work in a different fashion. On
December 16, 1809, after a family council held the evening before, the Senate
passed a Senatus Consultum announcing the civil divorce; and the religious
separation was pronounced shortly afterwards by authority of the Metropolitan
(January 12, 1810). Josephine retired to Malmaison. Her beauty, her winning
charm,- her wit, her gentleness, her tact and goodness of heart, had long ago
obliterated the memory of her old frivolity of character and conduct. She had
not proved herself unworthy of her amazing destiny. She was moreover genuinely
popular; and Napoleon’s popularity, already somewhat diminished, suffered
through this event.
The marriage
with Marie-Louise, which had been mooted in January,
1810, and settled in February, took place at Vienna,
by proxy, on March 11. The civil ceremony was repeated at Saint-Cloud on April
1 ,■ the religious, on the 12th, in the chapel of the Tuileries. Napoleon
was happy and hopeful, and passed his time in a whirl oif festivities. He never
doubted that he would have a son. So early as February 17,1810, a Senatus
Consultum proclaimed the incorporation of the Roman States with the French
Empire and announced that “the Prince Imperial was to bear the title and
honours of the King of Rome.”
On June 3,
1810, Napoleon proceeded to perform an act of execution. “I know,” he wrote to
Fouche, “all the many services you
have
rendered me nevertheless it is
impossible for1 me, without loss of
self-respect,
to leave you in possession of’ your portfolio.” By means of his agent, Fagan,
formerly an English prisoner of war, and of Ouvrard the speculator, Fouche had
kept up surreptitiously the intercourse with the British Cabinet which had
possibly already begun at the time of the Walcheren affair. Napoleon did not know
all this, and therefore still preserved a certain regard for Fouche’s
susceptibilities. He was to be punished for his overbearing attitude in 1809.
The letter of June 3 was couched in moderate language; and Fouche obtained by
way of compensation the Governorship of Rome and the title of Minister of
State (June 4). But, when a subsequent enquiry revealed the Minister’s
performances in detail, the Emperor flew into a violent rage. Fouche fled,
taking refuge first in Italy, and even contemplating a further flight to
America; later, on his return to France, he received orders to retire to Aix in
his own senatorial district (August 27), where he sought and found oblivion.
His disgrace was absolute. After Talleyrand, Josephine; after Josephine,
Fouche. Of these three ruptures the last was undoubtedly the most serious.
Madelin, Fouche’s latest biographer, has constituted himself his apologist; and
the view he holds is by no means wholly
exaggerated.
Fouche was, in regal’d to internal politics* by far the most important
personage in the reign of Napoleon; and, if his fidelity, in spite of all his
services, never rang quite true, the reason may have been that he was never
wholly subservient. It must be admitted that no one could have contrived with
more astonishing cleverness to throw an air of moderation over the work of his
formidable office. He never abused his discretionary powers, and he placed
under obligations men of all groups. It is not the least of the paradoxes of
that time, so rich in contrasts, that the downfall of the former terrorist and
atheist caused genuine regrets even in the reactionary and clerical salons of
the Faubourg Saint-Germain.
Fouche’s
successor was General Savary, that man of passive obedience of whom report has
it that Napoleon said, “ I like him; he would kill his own father if I bade
him.” The story is not authentic, but its circulation throws a terrible light
on Savary’s character. Henceforth, clearly, Napoleon intended everyone to bow
to his will in all things. Dubois, who had so long hoped for Fouche’s place,
met, soon after, with the same fate as his rival. Napoleon replaced him
(October 14) by Pasquier, formerly Councillor in the Parliament of Paris,
afterwards a member of the Council of State—an appointment no less characteristic
than that of Savary. Pasquier came of an old royalist family. The young
officials who were now entering the public service often came of the same
stock. Full of pride at being the husband of an archduchess, Napoleon was glad
to recruit his staff from the old nobility; and he never troubled himself as to
whether these erstwhile royalists were sincere ^converts or not. The tone of
the salons became reactionary, anti-revolutionary, clerical. When, finally, the
aged General Pommereul had succeeded the younger Portalis in the General
Censorship (January 11, 1811), when, in a last administrative shuffle, Napoleon
had sent the docile Maret to the Foreign Office, while Daru took his place as
Secretary of State, and Champagny fell from the exalted post of Foreign Minister
into that vacated by Daru, the evolution was complete. It may be summed up in
two phrases, obedience even more absolute than in the past to the Imperial
authority; reaction, both aristocratic and monarchical.
This
transformation was the more noteworthy in that it coincided with a vigorous
renewal of the Emperor’s organising and administrative activity. It was high
time : the Empire had become enormous in extent. In 1805 the annexation of
Genoa had enlarged it from 626,000 square kilometres and 108 departments, to
640,000 square kilometres and 110 departments; thal of Parma, Piacenza, and
Tuscany (1808) to 668,000 square kilometres and 115 departments; that of
Holland, the States of the Church, and Valais (1810) to 750,000 square
kilometres and 131 departments. The population was estimated by Montalivet at
42,700,000 in 1812, of which total 28,700,000 were ascribed to the original
France.
It will be
noted that not a single Imperial institution dates from the year 1809. This is
not owing to chance. There were two periods in
Napoleon’s
internal policy, separated from one another by a veritable gulf. From 1804 to
1808 he devoted himself to welding together and strengthening the Imperial
system; after 1809 he reorganised! the method of government, but he added
nothing to the existing Constitution. If we consider the establishment of the
license-system (January 12, 1810), of the domaine extraordinaire (January 30),
of the book-censorship (February 5), of state prisons (March 3), and all the
later measures, can we not sum them all up in the one word Absolutism? The
State was omnipotent: its interests overrode all private interests, all civil
rights, just as long ago it had suppressed all political rights. For the first
time since the establishment-of the Empire, Napoleon had some leisure. From
1809 to 1812 he resided* in Paris, or in one or
other of his suburban palaces, Saint-Cloud, Fontainebleau, Compiegne, or
Trianon But he was no longer as active as he had been. He began to put on
flesh, and to develope a liking, for good food; he dozed constantly., His pride
became oyer weening; and, absorbed in himself he no longer saw men or things as
they were. Yet he allowed no one to do anything but himself.
The birth of
the King of Rome, on March 20, 1811, raised the mental intoxication of Napoleon
to a climax. The dream of his life was realised. Since November 25,1810, a
MaisOn des Enfants de France had been in existence, its title copied textually
from the ceremonial of the old French monarchy. The Jetes in honour of his
birth were confined to the exclusive Court circlis, and had no connexion with
the public festivities arranged for the people of Paris. There was no trace of
popular enthusiasm; no one cared for either Marie-Louise or the King of Rome.
To make his isolation complete, Napoleon, after his divorce,, quarrelled with
every member of his family in turn, even with the sagacious l^lise, who was not
allowed to come to Paris for the christening. But this state of things was by
no means distasteful to the Emperor of Austria’s son-in-law, the father of the
King of Rome.
In reality,
the posi tion was growing more and more disquieting. To speak only of France
proper, the population was suffering sorely from the effects of the Continental
System and the continued war. ■ Commercial activity was falling off.
Industry was entering upon a critical phase; and the manufacture of articles of
luxury, in Paris and Lj ons, was the first branch to feel the strain. The
harvest of 1811 was bad. Napoleon came to the rescue in his characteristic
fashion. A new Ministry of Manufactures and Trade was created in June, 1811,
though it had no head until January, 1812, when Collin de Sussy was appointed
to the post. A Food Commission was secretly organised, with a view to ensuring
an adequate food-supply for Paris (August 20,1811). Loans were made to
manufacturers, amounting to 18,000,000 francs in 1812, scarcely half of which
had been repaid at the dose of the Emp;re. The Food Commission
purchased com with a view to restocking the public granaries. Wheat rose from
72 francs (a price already above the average) to 80 francs the
I812]
Decay of
industry.—Maid's plot. 143
sack (equal
to about 8 bushels); Frightened by the rise* the Commission resold,
surreptitiously, at 75 francs. On this leaking out, belief in an imminent
famine became general; and prices rose still further, until they reached 140
francs per sack in 1812. The Decrees of March 12, May 4 and 8, 1812, aimed at
remedying this state of things, by limiting the use of grain in the distilleries,
by keeping a watch over circulation and sale, and finally by fixing the maximum
price at 33 francs per hectolitre, i.e. about 95 francs per sack. Napoleion was
thus obliged to revert to the old device of a maximum fixed by law. The year
1812 was a year of scarcity. In Paris more than 20,000 workmen (cabinetmakers,
goldsmiths, etc.) were out of employment. Nor were the other industrial centres
much better off. :
The economic
crisis had already become acute when Napoleon set forth on the invasion of Russia
(May 9, 1812). News of the expedition was as scanty as it was false, a
circumstance of which Malet determined to take advantage. After being in prison
for 18 months he had obtained leave to move to the “ home ” kept by Dr
Dubuisson, at the further end of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. There he had made
acquaintance with several other political prisoners, to whom the same privilege
of living under the doctor’s surveillance had been granted. Almost all of them
were royalists or clericals; among them were the two Polignacs, who had
conspired with Cadoudal, and the Abbe Lafon, who had been arrested for
papistical intrigues., A new plot was formed with the aid of certain young men
who visited the prisoners while under the doctor’s roof.
Malet
remodelled the documents which had been framed in 1808— the fictitious Senatus
Consultum, the list of the provisional government (to which he added the names
of Montmorency, Frochot and others), and the appeal to the army. He no longer
proposed to proclaim the Republic, but to grant permission, to all emigres to
return to France, and to send a deputation to the Popt begf ing him to pardon
the insults to which he had been subjected, and to pass through Paris on his
way back to Rome —was this for the purpose of anointing Louis XVIII ? The
scheme of 1808 had, in fact, undergone so many changes that it became a
question whether Malet had not turned royalist. The truth was that, for the
time being, royalists and republicans had agreed to combine their efforts so
far as the summoning of the Electoral Assemblies, which, Napoleon once
overthrown, were to decide authoritatively, either for the reestablishment of
the Republic or the restoration of Louis XVIII. Malet laid his plans with
extreme care. He drew up beforehand a number of forged summonses, to which he
succeeded in giving an appearance of perfect authenticity. He even arranged for
a detachment to be sent to Saint-Cloud for the protection of Marie-Louise. Why
then did he not succeed ? Was success more improbable than the very existence
of the plot ?
When all was
ready, Malet escaped under cover of night from
144
Failure of Malet's plot. Its meaning. [1812
Dubuisson’s
home, went to a friend’s house to put on his uniform once more, and then
without any other companions save two youths, presented himself at one of the
barracks occupied by the National Guard (October 23, 1812).' He roused the old
Commandant Soulier, informed him that Napoleon had died before Moscow, and
ordered him to hand over his men. Soulier obeyed. Malet took command of the
troop and marched straight to La Force in order to set at liberty two generals
imprisoned there, viz. La Horie, an ex-chief of staff under Moreau, and Guidal*
whose intimacy with both the royalists and the English in the south had aroused
suspicion. Malet recited his fairy-tale for their benefit; and they, too,
obeyed in their turn. La Horie and Guidal went to the Ministry of Police,
arrested Savary arid put him under lock and key; after which La Horie went to
the Prefecture of Police to secure the person of Pasquier, while Guidal seized
Clarke at the War Office. At the Hotel de Ville Frochot was busy getting ready
a hall for the reception of the provisional government. All1 seemed
to be going perfectly when Malet himself spoilt the: game. He had
chosen as his own task the arrest of Hulin, commander of the Paris garrison.
Hulin resisted: Malet laid him low with a pistol-shot. A tumult ensued. Two
officers, suspecting the imposture, threw themselves upon Malet, recognised and
denounced him. At 11 A.m. all was over. The punishment of the conspirators was
vindictive. Twelve unfortunate accomplices^ or rather dupes, were shot with
Malet'(October 29), among them Soulier, La Horie, and Guidal. It was not
without some show of reason that, at the court-martial, when asked by Dejean,
the president, who were his accomplices, Malet proudly replied, “ You,
yourself, Sir, and all France— if I had succeeded !”
This curious
episode was not without its bearing upon Napoleon’s decision secretly to desert
the Grand Army in its disorderly retreat from Russia, and to return to Paris,
where he arrived 011 the evening of December 18. His reply to the address of
the conservative Senate (December 20), showed that he had grasped the true
meaning of the Malet conspiracy. So long as the story of Napoleon’s death was
believed, Malet had no difficulty in making himself obeyed; and no one had
fancied for one single instant that, if Napoleon were dead, the King of Rome
would, as a matter of course, succeed. One moment had sufficed to reveal the
vanity of all the precautions taken by the Emperor to place his system on an
enduring basis. Without him the whole structure would collapse. “ Our fathers,”
he said to the Senate, “ had for their rallying cry, ‘The King is dead. Long live
the King!’ In these words the principal advantages of monarchy are summed up.”
But the real truth was that the people hiad no love for either Marie-Louise or
the King of Rome. They were ignored; and it was this fact which lent to the
Malet affair so grave a significance.
Still
possessed by his dynastic ideas, Napoleon attempted to remedy
this state of
things. He showed no severity towards anyone. The utmost he did was to replace
Frochot by Chabrol. Instead of keeping Marie-Louise hidden behind a hedge of Court
etiquette, he went abroad in her company, seizing every opportunity during the
Winter of 1812-3 of showing her to the Parisians, who could not fail to be
charmed by her grace and simplicity. He conceived the idea of having his son
crowned by the Pope in anticipation. By a Senatus Consultum, dated February 5,
1813, he established an Imperial Regency. By letters- patent in the event of
the Emperor’s enforced absence from home, by prescriptive right in the event of
his premature death, the Empress- mother was to combine the care of her son
during his minority with the Regency of the Empire, assisted by a Council of
Regency composed of the Princes of the Blood, the Grand Dignitaries of the
Empire, and other members appointed by the Emperor either by letters-patent or
in his will. Thus vanished the ordre de service in use since the Consulate,
which, in the Emperor’s absence, delegated the presidency to Cambaceres. The
letters-patent of March 30, 1813, actually conferred the Regency upon
Marie-Louise, with Cambaceres as her secret adviser.
Napoleon was
absent from April 14 to November 9,1813. France shuddered, less from grief over
her defeats, than from moral and physical exhaustion, after so many years of
oppression. Nevertheless, a still further effort was expected of her. It was
felt that only some performance quite out of the common could rouse public
opinion. The session of the Legislative Body, due in 1812, was not held till
February and March, 1813; and it was as completely insignificant as its
predecessors. By way of contrast, Napoleon determined to give great
magnificence to the session of 1813. By the Senatus Consultum of November
15,1813, he announced that the Senate and Council of State would take part
collectively in the Imperial conferences of the Legislative Body. The idea of
the three bodies meeting together, in a sort of national convention, to listen
to the words of its sovereign, was not without a certain grandeur; and it was
legitimate to hope that the spectacle would make a profound impression not only
upon France but upon Europe.
It is true
that, by the same Senatus Consultum, the Emperor arrogated to himself the
right to choose the President of the Legislative Body, thus withdrawing from
the deputies their right of presentment. Regnier was selected for the
presidency, though he was not a deputy but a Grand Judge. Thence resulted a
general change in the Ministry— the last of the reign. Mole succeeded Regnier
at the Ministry of Justice; Maret went back to the Secretaryship of State; Daru
replaced Lacuee (himself the successor of Dejean) at the Ministry of Military
Affairs; and Caulaincourt was installed at the Foreign Office. It was a sort of
ministerial shuffle, similar to those of 1807 and 1811. Ministerial stability,
which was the rule under the Consulate and during the first years of the
Empire, had now become the exception.
146 The
Imperial session. Laine's report. [1813-4
The Imperial
session took place on December 19,1813. “ Everything has turned against us,”
the Emperor confessed. “ No obstacle will be offered by me to the restoration
of peace....It is with regret that I ask fresh sacrifices at the hands of my
generous people.” By way of still more closely uniting Emperor and nation,
Napoleon announced that all the original documents, now lying at the Foreign
Office, relative to the recent negotiations with the Powers, would be laid
before the Senate. The Decree of December 20 ordered the Senate and the
Legislative Body to elect from their own ranks two commissions of five members
each, to examine, with the aid of the two Presidents, the documents furnished
by the Government.
In the Senate
everything passed off as Napoleon hoped. The report of the Commission was
approved at the sitting of December 27; and the Senate repaired in a body to the
Emperor to express its gratitude and devotion. But in the Legislative Body
matters turned out differently. The Commissioners, who were all southerners,
naturally profited by the chance offered them to express their views. When
Regnier accused one of them of making an unconstitutional remark, the deputy
retorted: “ I can conceive of nothing more unconstitutional than you are
yourself —you who, in contempt of the law, come here to preside over the
people’s representatives without even possessing the right to sit amongst
them.” Here was novel language indeed! But it was even less surprising than
Laine’s report. In this document the Emperor was invited, in very respectful
terms, to declare that he would continue the war only “in order to preserve the
independence of the French people and the integrity of French territory.” If,
however, the Coalition persisted in maintaining the offensive, France would not
be found wanting. “ Nevertheless,” he continued, “this is not enough in itself
to revive the national spirit”; and His Majesty is “ implored to see to the
constant and effectual execution of those laws by which liberty, personal
security, and the rights of private property are assured to every Frenchman,
and to the nation at large the unfettered exercise of its political rights.”
Laine’s report, put to the vote on the 29th, was carried by 223 votes to 81.
The division is all the more interesting from the fact that, at that time at
any rate, there was no trace of opposition to the dynasty in the Legislative Body,
and because the actual terms of the report had been drawn up with the
assistance of the Government. The deputies, in fact, still remained loyal
subjects of the Empire; they had merely put into words the passionate longing
of the whole Empire for liberty and peace.
Nevertheless
the report threw Napoleon into a violent passion. In spite of the counsels of
moderation urged by Cambaceres, he suppressed the publication of Laine’s
report; on December 31 he adjourned the Legislative Body; and at the official
new year’s reception on January 1,1814, he welcomed the deputies present with a
violent outburst. “You might have done me so much good, and yet
1814]
Napoleon's address to the Legislative Body. 147
you have only
done me harm! Do you represent the people ? I am its representative. Four times
have I been summoned by the nation; four times have I received the votes of
five millions of citizens. I have a right to speak, and you have none. You are
merely delegates of the departments.... Your report is drawn up with an
astuteness, a perfidy of intention which you do not yourselves realise. The
loss of two battles in Champagne would have done less harm... .Do you think by
such complaints to raise the prestige of the throne ? After all, what is the
throne P Nothing but four pieces of gilded wood, covered with a scrap of
velvet! The true throne rests on the nation’s will; and you cannot separate me
from the nation without doing it harm, for the nation has greater need of me
than I have of the nation....With the enemy at your very doors, you ask for
institutions! As if we had no institutions already ! Perhaps you Want to copy
the Constituent Assembly and start a revolution ! You would find no
resemblance whatever between me and the then king. I should abdicate at once, for
I would infinitely rather take my place among the Sovereign People than remain
a royal slave!... Go back to your departments.” One can feel the anger that
vibrated through this passionate eloquence. In truth Napoleon was a great
orator, just as, judged by the evidence of certain of his letters and by his
despatches, he was a great writer. His imagination was full of romanticism; and
his literary style went straight to the point without the meaningless embellishments
of the classical school. But on this particular occasion his speech was even
more impolitic than eloquent. The deputies went back to their departments, but
in quite as angry a mood as that evinced by the Emperor. The speech of January
1, 1814, marked, in fact, the rupture between Napoleon and the French
middle-class.
Before
returning to the front, Napoleon planned, even more carefully than the year
before, the line of action to be followed in his absence. Twenty-two Senators
or Councillors of State were sent, in the capacity of extraordinary commissioners,
to the military districts which had not yet been invaded by the enemy, to
hasten on the conscription and the organisation of the National Guard (December
26, 1813). In Paris the National Guard was mobilised (January 8, 1814). The
regency was again vested in Marie-Louise, assisted by Cambaceres and King
Joseph. On January 25, 1814, Napoleon left Paris; and henceforth the history of
his reign is merely the record of war and invasion.
THE CODES.
The
codification of French law, if it was probably the most durable, was certainly
not the most surprising manifestation pf Napoleon’s energy. It was the
fulfilment of an aspiration, as old at least as the fifteenth centuiy, and
partially realised by the ordinances of kings and the textbooks of jurists—an
aspiration for the legal unity of France, for “ one weight, one measure, one
law.” To this ideal the Revolution imparted a fresh and powerful impulse. The
birth of the new nation, the triumph of the new civic enthusiasm, the victory
of philosophic reason, seemed to demand a code of uniform laws suitable to an
enlightened people. At the same time, all those social obstacles which had
hitherto stood in the path of legal unity were swept away—provincialism and
feudalism, caste and corporation, the wealth and influence of the Church, the
power and prestige of the Crown. The whole law of property and of persons was
remodelled by the Revolutionary Assemblies under the stress of a democratic
theory as coherent as it was imperious.
The land was
liberated from feudal dues and tithes ; and its freedom was secured by the
prohibition of all perpetual and irredeemable rents. The corporate property of
the Church and of the rural communities passed almost entirely into the. hands
of the State, and was thrown piecemeal into the market. Again, as the land was
freed to guard against tyranny, so it was divided to promote equality. The
Roman law of succession, which was favourable to testamentary freedom and
therefore to inequality, was set aside; and the egalitarian tendencies of the
Custuinals were developed and sharpened. Wills were almost entirely forbidden;
the distinction between moveables, acquisitions, and patrimonial property was
abolished; and the inheritance, considered as a uniform mass of property, was to
be divided equally among the heirs. Still further to promote territorial
equality, representation was declared to be infinite in the direct line;
donations were to be returned to the donor; natural children were recognised,
and gifts to the rich prohibited. Thus, while the law fortified the proprietor
during his lifetime, it weakened his influence after death.
Equally
sweeping were the changes which came over the law of persons. Under the
monarchy, sex and nationality, social status and professional calling, had
created legal inequalities between French subjects. In virtue of the droit
cTaubaine, a foreigner could not inherit a legacy or execute a will, or
transmit his property save to children bom in France. The division of persons
into three orders—clergy, nobility, and tiers etat—carried with it fiscal and
political inequalities and also some differences of civil status. The monk was
dead to civil life; and in the mountains of the Jura there lingered a last
remnant of serfdom. In several Custumals, the rule of inheritance differed
according as the person concerned was noble or roturier. Religion, which gave
privileges to the Catholic, brought penalties to the Protestant and the Jew.
The civil disabilities of women were many. But all these intricate, manifold,
and unreasonable distinctions were swept away by the Revolutionary Assemblies.
The droit d'aubaine was suppressed; the division between the three orders was
effaced; and monks were restored to civil life. Religious toleration took the
place of the intolerant privilege of the Catholic religion. The clergy were
permitted to marry; and marriage itself, being declared a civil contract,
passed into the domain of state control. Divorce and adoption were introduced,
to the scandal of the Catholic world; and the care of the registers of births,
marriages, and deaths was transferred from the Church to lay officials. A
secular State based upon a large peasant proprietary, a civil law emancipated
from religious influences, a system of land-tenure devised to secure the
maximum of equality, a law of persons, which proclaimed that all men had equal
rights—such were the main results of a period of legislation unprecedented in
history for its volume, its violence, its idealism, its splendid achievements,
and its deplorable mistakes.
An atmosphere
of great legislative fertility, of high passions and quick changes, is
unfavourable to codification ; and the draft codes of the Convention and the
Directory received so little attention from the preoccupied Assemblies to which
they were successively submitted, that the revolution of Brumaire found France
still waiting for that body of simple and clear laws which had been promised in
the Constitution of 1791. Yet no one could doubt but that a code would
eventually be enacted, even if three successive drafts had been consigned to
limbo. Every Assembly had regarded the task as a solemn charge upon its
energies; and every sensible man felt—no one more than Cambaceres, the chief
draftsman of the Convention—that in the Revolutionary legislation there was
much to revise, to coordinate, and to secure. At the first calm moment the task
could be completed. Indeed, immediately after the revolution of Brumaire, a
committee was appointed to consider the reform of the Code and to report to the
Legislative Commission.
There is
perhaps no single document more significant of the temper of France upon the
morrow of Brumaire than the speech made by
Jacqueminot
in submitting his draft to the Commission. The reporter fully acknowledged that
the work of his committee had been hasty and imperfect, but urged in
extenuation that it was necessary to put an end to the scandal of the
Revolutionary divorce laws, to restore to parental power its lawful authority,
and to widen the liberty of testamentary bequest. So instantaneous was the
reversion from Revolutionary excesses to the old and pertinacious tradition of
French jurisprudence! The draft of Jacqueminot was in itself of no consequence.
Composed in the brief and unsettled interlude between the fall of the Councils
and the establishment of the Consulate, and far inferior in elaboration and
technique to the earlier work of Cambaceres, it was not even discussed for five
minutes. The Legislative Commission was confronted with larger and more
pressing problems; but it is well to remember that, before their task had been
completed, and while the lineaments of the Consular Constitution were still
under discussion, the spirit which was destined to inform the Code NapoMon had
spoken and revealed itself. The laws of France, as they had been left by the
Revolutionary Assemblies, were to be coordinated and reduced to system; but
philosophical idealism was to be corrected by juristic tradition, and the
political extravagance of the passing hour utterly effaced. Law was to be the
expression of settled national character, not of every passionate and casual
mood.
The Civil Code.
The desired
moment of calm came after the battle of Marengo had secured the frontier of
France, established the prestige of the Consulate, opened the avenue to an
honourable peace, a,nd liberated the energies of Bonaparte for the civil
organisation of the State. On August 12,1800, a committee of four lawyers,
Tronchet, Portalis, Bigot de Preameneu, and Maleville, was appointed to draw up
a project of a Civil Code, with instructions to bring the work to a conclusion
in the following November. Every committee has a head and a tail. Though
Maleville was a capable lawyer .and afterwards distinguished as the first of a
long line of commentators on the Code, and though Bigot’s adroitness and
pliancy were destined to be proved in more fields than one, the driving power
in this committee lay with Tronchet and Portalis. Of these two men, Tronchet,
the venerable president of the Caur de Cassation, stood for massive learning,
sound judgment, and conservative caution; while Portalis, if less eminent in
knowledge than “the Nestor of the aristocracy,” was specially distinguished in
the art of legal and philosophical exposition. “ He would,have been,” said
Napoleon, “ the most eloquent orator in the Council if he had known when to
stop ”; but, save for its fluency, the chastened eloquence of the great
Proven9al jurist had little in common with the exaggerated rhetoric of the
Clubs. Portalis was a thinker, a Catholic, and a conservative. A true
parliamentarian,
in the French
sense of the term, he had opposed legal unification in 1789 on the ground that
a code would be the precursor of despotism; and ten years later, when the
Directory was tottering to its fall, he expressed to a friend his earnest
desire that a liberator might be found to free France from the toils of
Revolutionary legislation. It was certain that he viewed divorce with aversion,
and that his will would be cast into the scale of moderate reaction towards the
past. While Portalis and Maleville represented the legal traditions of the land
of written law, Tronchet and Bigot had been trained in the Parlement and the
Customs of Paris; and the Civil Code, which was the result of their labours,
exhibits many traces of compromise between northern Teutonism and the Latin
inheritance of the south.
The draft of
the Civil Code was completed in four months and printed on January 1,1801. It
was then, by order of Bonaparte, sent to the law-courts, which were invited to submit
their criticisms and observations in the course of the next three months. In
the light of this commentary the draft Code was then examined and revised by
the legislative section of the Council of State, composed of Boulay, Berlier,
Emmery, Portalis, Real, and Thibaudeau; and, when this process was completed,
it was submitted title by title to the whole body of the Council. It was at
this stage that the provisions of the Code first came under the notice of
Bonaparte.
Eyewitnesses
have described the vivid and animated drama which was enacted whenever
Bonaparte came down to preside over the Council- chamber in the Tuileries. A
clink of arms, a roll of the drum under the arcades* and then, as the door
opens, and the usher calls, and the councillors rise in salutation, the master
steps briskly up to his green table on the dais, nods to Cambaceres on his
right, to Lebrun on his left, signs to his Council to be seated, and with his “
Allans, Messieurs, commenfons,” sets the debate aflame. Under the Consulate,
these discussions were free, vivacious, and unembarrassed; and, when the First
Consul presided in person—and he presided over thirty-five of the eighty-seven
sittings devoted to the Civil Code—they were generally prolonged till a late
hour in the evening. His too was the most quickening spirit in debate. With
little legal learning, save what he had gathered from snatches of reading or
from the talk of Tronchet and Portalis, and devoid of the scholarly temper of
the professional draftsman, he possessed so luxuriant an intellectual nature,
so lively a power of concrete vision, so keen an instinct for the large issues
of politics, that his contributions to the discussion were a series of splendid
surprises, occasionally appropriate and decisive, occasionally involved in the
gleaming tissues of a dream, but always stamped with the mark of genius and
glowing with the impulses of a fresh and impetuous temperament. Lanfrey has
indeed urged that the official report of the proceedings drawn up by Locre, the
clerk of the Council, has imparted a correctness
to
Bonaparte’s language which did not belong to it, and has effaced the
eccentricities which would have betrayed the novice in legislation. This is
true. Bonaparte often talked at random, and some of his warmest admirers in the
Council complained that he fatigued the attention of his audience by the
confused abundance and the unexpected turns of his thought. On the other hand,
it is equally true to say that the grave and chilly language of the official
reporter has robbed the First Consul of all his peculiar verve and most of his
originality.
“ He spoke,’’
says Thibaudeau, “ without embarrassment and without pretension. He was never
inferior to any member of the Council; he often equalled the ablest of them by
the ease with which he seized the point of a question, by the justice of his
ideas and the force of his reasoning; he often surpassed them by the turn of
his phrases and the originality of his expression.” At one moment he would
embark upon the most adventurous of intellectual cruises ; at the next he would
propound some prim legal definition. Here would be a flash of anger ; here a
string of anecdotes; here a friendly passage of badinage punctuated by
snuff-taking; here a flight of gaudy rhetoric. But the prevailing impression
left on the reader of these debates is the union in the mind of the chief
debater of hard-headed common sense with imaginative vision. He thinks, not in
legal rules but in concrete cases, keeping always in sight the gain and loss to
the whole State, the political advantages and disadvantages to France. “ You
act as law-makers,” he cried once, “ not as statesmen. It is by speaking to the
soul that men are electrified.” He was in fact the amateur of genius, learning
as he went along, throwing off opinions as sparks fly from the anvil, shaking
himself free from the views of yesterday if they embarrassed him or were
plainly overpowered, but always capable of making a contribution to the
discussion by his sheer power of seeing principles as they would work
themselves out in the life of the individual or the State. “I first thought,”
he confessed, “ that it would be possible to reduce laws to simple geometrical
demonstrations, so that whoever could read and tie two ideas together would be
capable of pronouncing on them; but I almost immediately convinced myself that
this was an absurd idea”; and in one of the last sittings of the Council he
pronounced what legal opinion has felt to be the true criticism on the Code
itself. “I often perceived that over-simplicity in legislation was the enemy of
precision. It is impossible to make laws extremely simple without cutting the
knot oftener than you untie it, and without leaving much to incertitude and
arbitrariness.” Yet Bonaparte’s appreciation of the complexity of the task was
only equalled by his impatience to despatch it without delay.
As each Title
of the Code passed the Council, it was submitted successively to the Tribunate
and the Legislative. The spirit of these two assemblies was in the early days
of the Consulate tolerably independent ; and the debates of the Tribunate were
often distinguished by
eloquence and
courage. As the Tribunes had been provided with copies of the first draft, they
had ample leisure to mature their objections; and it was expected that they
would assail the Code for its lack of originality, its deference to tradition,
and its departure from some of the Revolutionary innovations. To disarm
criticism of this kiiyd, Portalis pointed out that the Prussian Code had
respected historic forces and even local custom; that moderation was a quality
essential to the legislator; and that the temporary laws of the Revolution were
like piles wavering in a stormy sea. Nevertheless, the Tribunes proceeded to
level a volley of well-aimed criticism against the first two “ Titles,” or
laws, which were presented to them. It was objected against the First—which
dealt with the publication, the effects, and the application of laws in
general—that its scope was too wide; that its character, consisting largely of
moral and legal maxims, was inappropriate; and that the arrangement of the
clauses was incoherent. These objections were so strongly felt that the law was
thrown out by a majority of sixty-five to thirteen in the Tribunate, and by a
hundred and fifty-two to a hundred and thirty-nine in the legislative. The
Second Title, on the enjoyment and loss of civil rights, shared the same fate;
and the Council was obliged to withdraw both laws. The First Consul was deeply
chagrined. “ When I see a man like Simdon,” he said, “ doubting if persons bom
in the colonies are Frenchmen, I ask myself whether my head has turned ”; and,
announcing that the time had not yet come when one could “import into these
great discussions the calm and unity of intention which they demanded,” he
decreed (April 1, 1802) a revision of procedure. An end was put to open debate
in the full House. The Titles of the Code were henceforward to be submitted to
the legislative section of the Tribunate, which was invited to tender its comments
to the section of the Council responsible for that portion of the draft. In
case of non-agreement, a conference was held under the presidency, of
Cambaceres; and, when the clauses had been there settled, they were referred
back to the whole body of the Council, discussed anew, and then in their final
shape expounded to the silent legislature by three selected Councillors. Under
the new arrangement the work proceeded swiftly; and on March 21, 1804, the
Civil Code in its entirety passed into law.
It has been
often said that the spirit displayed by the Tribunate in these legal debates
was captious and unsteady, and that it was well for France that the
rhetoricians were silenced. This view is untenable. The speeches of Andrieux
and Simeon, who took the lead in opposition, are serious and weighty; and
nearly all the criticisms of the Tribunes were well-founded. One speaker
protested against the droit d’aubaine, another against civil death, a third
against confiscation. All three have the verdict of posterity on their side.
When Simeon, the brother-in-law of Portalis, urged that there was no pressing
hurry, and that every effort should be made to bring the Code to perfection, he
was only talking
common sense.
But Bonaparte was impatient of delay; and, through no fault of its own, the
action of the Tribunate was bound to wear the aspect of obstruction. By an
inept clause of the Constitution, that body was debarred from proposing
amendments to the laws which were submitted to it. If, then, the Tribunes were
to give practical effect to their criticism of an article, they were forced to
throw out the whole Title of which that article formed perhaps only an
inconsiderable part. The alternative was one which no self-respecting public
men could accept; and, refusing to accept it, the Tribunate was deprived of the
power of publicly debating the Civil Code.
The First
Book of the Civil Code treats of “ Persons,” the Second of “Goods and the
various kinds of Property,” the Third of “The various modes in which Property
is acquired.”
The French
Revolution was justly charged with having disturbed the foundations of family
life. In order to stimulate the subdivision of property, it had, by its
encouragement of adoption and its recognition of natural children, introduced
new members into the family, while, with the same clear intention, it had
restricted the testamentary powers of the father, equalised the sexes in
marriage, and facilitated divorce. In the strong reaction which had set in
against these ideas Bonaparte fully participated. He held that the legislator,
far from encouraging . T:he indefinite subdivision of property, should aim at
securing a nation I of
moderate fortunes. He was a keen advocate of the subjection of . women. He
thought that it was the function of law to chasten loose morals, to exhibit the
solemnity and sanctity of marriage, to strengthen the authority of the father,
and to maintain the cohesion of the family V group. All these views—and they
were by no means the exclusive property of Bonaparte—are reflected in the
provisions of the Code.; If adoption was retained, the institution was
accompanied by so many precautions that it could no longer be regarded as a
deterrent to matrimony or a menace to family life. The adopter must be
childless and over fifty years of age; and the adopted is not to sever the ties
which bind him to his natural family. Nor can adoption take place so long as
the adopted is a minor. Again, a clear line of separation was traced between
the lawful and the natural child. “ Natural children are not heirs. The law
only accords them a claim upon the goods of their deceased father and mother
when they have been legally recognised.” Even so their share is reduced to a
thirds a half, or three-fourths of what it would have been had they been born
in wedlock; a third if the father and mother have left lawful descendants ; a
half, if they have only left ascendants, brothers or sisters; and three-fourths
where there are neither descendants nor ascendants, to claim the inheritance.
In vain Cambaceres pleaded that in certain cases the parent should be compelled
to recognise the child. “Society,” replied Bonaparte, “has no interest in the
recognition of bastards ”; and he set his face against facilitating
investigations
into questions of paternity. Save in one eventuality, la recherche de la
patemite is forbidden in the Civil Code.
In one of
those large moral precepts, which are plentifully sown about the Code, it is
laid down that the “ child at every age owes honour and respect to his father
and mother.” The power of the father was restored, and the despotism of the
State repeated in the structure of the family. While the mother has no voice in
the control of her children, the father is absolute. He can imprison his child,
if under sixteen years of age, for a period not exceeding one month; if between
sixteen and twenty-one, for a period not exceeding six months. In neither case
is any writing or judicial formality required. The president of the Court of
the arrondissement is bound to grant the order for detention. The father is not
even required to state his motives. It is merely demanded of him that he shall
sign an undertaking to pay all the expenses, and to furnish a suitable support
to the prisoner. There is no more significant tribute to the continuity of
French jurisprudence than this curious revival of the lettres de cachet, which,
in the later half, at any rate, of the eighteenth century, were almost
exclusively used to protect family honour by enabling a parent to incarcerate
his troublesome offspring, without any disagreeable process of washing dirty
family linen in open court. In the south of France, no doubt, where the Roman
law had always been a living force, the paternal power was the corner-stone of
society; but all over the country, partly owing to the pride of the
aristocracy, partly owing to a delicate sensitiveness which is a feature of the
national temperament, and partly owing to the general dislike of the royal
tribunals as intrusive novelties, the strongest prejudice existed against dragging
family affairs into court. Indeed it is a singular fact that many of the
cahiers of 1789, while denouncing the lettres de cachet, express a hope that
some less objectionable provision may be made for maintaining domestic
discipline. To this aspiration the Code responds.
Nor are these
the only stones, in the edifice of domestic monarchy. A marriage may not be
contracted without consent of the parents by a son who has not reached his
twenty-sixth year, or by a daughter who has not reached her twenty-first. The
parents have the usufruct of their children’s property until they have entered
upon their nineteenth year. They have the right to choose a guardian without
the intervention of the relations or of a magistrate; and, if the father may
not disinherit his son, he is given a larger power of devising his property by
will. “ Even in the most absolute governments,” said Bonaparte, “ despotism
stops short at the threshold of the home. It weighs upon the head of the
household; and, as the head of the family is absolutely at the disposition of
the Government, so is the family absolutely at the disposition of its head.” ,
In accordance
with these principles, the civil status of woman was carefully depressed. A
woman cannot be accepted as a witness to the
acts of the
Civil State, nor can she act as guardian or form part of the family council
unless she is the mother or one of the ascendants. As a wife she is subject to
her husband, and has no voice in the administration of their common property.
She cannot give, sell, or mortgage; she cannot acquire by sale or gift without
the husband’s written consent. Only if she is carrying on a separate trade can
she make a contract without her husband’s authority. The woman of the Civil
Code is -Regarded as a fickle, defenceless, mindless being; and her lapses from
virtue are punished more severely than those of a man. “ A husband,” jTsaid
Napoleon, “ ought to have the right to say to his wife: you shall I not go out,
you shall not go to the play, you shall not see such and such La person.” When
a Councillor asked whether wifely obedience had been prescribed in the old laws
of France, the First Consul turned upon him sharply. ee What a
question ! ” he cried. “ Do you not know that the angel told Eve to obey her
husband ?...Morality has written this article in all languages, A fortiori
should it be written in French in our Codte.” A law of September, 1792, had
abolished judicial separation and admitted divorce, not only by mutual consent,
but also for incompatibility of temper upon the allegation of one of the
parties. That a contract should be abolished at the will of one of the parties
was in itself an anomaly ; and in this instance it was clearly subversive not
only of religious tradition but of the most elementary principles of social
order. Some of the law-courts, when consulted upon the first draft of the Code,
declared against divorce altogether, and asserted that, as a matter of fact, no
recourse had been made to it in the provinces. With the single exception of the
Tribunal of Paris, eveiy Court in France rejected divorce for incompatibility;
and the Tribunal of Paris stipulated that incompatibility should be proved in
court. It was a vquestion upon which Bonaparte himself was profoundly
interested. On the one hand, with his strong views as to the subjection of the
weaker sex and the value of family cohesion, he was averse from any provision
which might encourage the levity or augment the liberty of woman ; and so
powerful was this feeling in him that he subsequently prohibited divorce for
members of the imperial family. On the other hand, he recognised that divorce
might serve his own turn, and that within certain .prescribed bounds it was
necessary to society. As he said at St Helena, “to make marriage indissoluble
is to provoke ennui, and to put the village cur& above the law.” The
Council too was substantially agreed upon the necessity of admitting the
principle of divorce, though it was willing to yield to Catholic
susceptibilities so far as to restore judicial separation (omitted in the first
draft) as an alternative. Nor was there any doubt that, while divorce for grave
specific causes should be admitted, divorce for incompatibility at the demand
of one of the parties should be eliminated fromthe Code. ^The main contest
raged over divorce by mutual consent; I and, but for the strong advocacy of the
First Consul,
this
would not have been received into the Code. Bonaparte’s contention was that
divorce for specific causes would not be sufficient. The offences contemplated were
not only difficult to prove, but, in the attempt to prove them, the wronged and
the wrong-doer were alike dragged into publicity. “ Few men are so lost to
shame as to procL m the turpitude of their wives. It would be scandalous and
against the honour of the nation to reveal what passes in some households;” ,
Practical and political considerations therefore concurred in suggesting that
this form of dissolving the marriage union should be supplemented by an
alternative expedient which should be at once more private, more honourable,
and more popular. Bonaparte was willing to concede that; unions should not be
dissolved after they had endured ten years ; he was! willing to prevent the
same person from divorcing twice; he urged that' the law should forbid divorced
persons from remarrying within five years. . But, hedged round by these
safeguards, divorce by mutual consent for! incompatibility of temper was in his
view essential to marital happiness, j Girls married young; and, though he had
succeeded in raising the age from thirteen to fifteen, he had not raised it as
high as he wished. In most cases, a young girl fresh from school or convent
could not know whether her husband would prove congenial; in most cases a
marriage was an affair of convenience. It was well that, when mistakes had been
made, they should be capable of being corrected without noise or scandal.
Accordingly he proposed that the affair should be brought before a family
council presided over by a magistrate; that the relations on both sides should
be unanimous; and that with their consent the Court should pronounce the
divorce without examination. “ I do nothing against the married persons,” he
said, “ since I require mutual consent. I do nothing against marriage, since I
demand the adhesion of the relations.” Judicial separation was in his view a
bad expedient, for it involved publicity and favoured immoral conduct. At St
Helena he added, with penetration, that it was “ a mezzo termme which could
only be applied to the upper classes.” All things then conspired to commend the
adoption of some provision for divorce by mutual consent. After long debate the
First” Consul prevailed; and, surrounded with a large number of restrictions,
divorce by mutual consent passed into law. *■
No less
jealous was the attitude of the Council towards divorce for “ specified
motives.” The possible causes were reduced from seven to three—adultery,
cruelty, and the conviction of one of the parties for a grave criminal offence;
and the investigation into the facts was transferred from the family council to
the law-court. It is a curious fact in human nature that the experiment of
entrusting these delicate enquiries to the family council broke down, not so
much by reason of the incompetence of its members as because of their sheer
indifference to an issue in which their sentiments should have been most
closely involved.
The sentiment
of equality* which had shaped the family law of the
LRevolution,
had also moulded its conception of civic rights. The Constituent Assembly, in
a fit of cosmopolitan generosity, had unconditionally abolished the droit
d’aubaine, and the droit de detraction, a ten per cent, succession duty levied
by the Treasury upon the property of foreigners.
-^But the
clouds of war had obscured the clear sky of philanthropy; and the draft Code
proposed a return to the earlier system of reciprocity, which secured to the
alien in France just such treatment as was accorded to the Frenchman in the
alien’s country. Though sharply attacked in the Tribunate, this clause passed
into the Code. In favour of the change it was argued that the generous policy
of the Constituent Assembly had failed to induce other countries to relax
their alien laws, and that, by retaining something to give away in return for
concessions, France could secure better terms for her emigrants. Animated by
the same spirit of traditional nationalism, the framers of the draft Code had
proposed to accord civil rights to such persons only as were bom in France and
were the children of French parents. This proposition "seemed to Bonaparte
far too narrow. On political and on military grounds, he held that the
privileges and duties of French citizenship should be as widely diffused as
possible. He insisted that civil rights should be granted to the children of an
alien father if they were bom in • France, and to the children of a French
father bom abroad. So too he ; urged that the child bom abroad of a French
father who had renounced his nationality should always be able to recover his
French citizenship.
" “ As
for me,” he said long afterwards when recalling his share in this debate, “I
desired that a Frenchman by origin should find himself a Frenchman again even
if his family had been for ten generations abroad. If he should appear on the
further bank of the Rhine, saying, £ I wish to be a Frenchman,’ I
desired that the barrier should fall before him and that he should return
triumphant to the bosom of the common mother.” lit is also due to the First
Consul that special dispositions were inserted fin the Code to facilitate the
registration of births, marriages, and deaths j occurring in the French army while it was serving beyond the
frontiers. [ Oil est le drapemt, la
est la Frame.
The
fundamental principles of the Revolutionary law of property were too clearly
based on sound economic principles to be shaken by the lawyers of the
Consulate. Nobody dreamed of restoring feudalism or the dead hand of the great
corporations. A proposal to revive the rentes fonderes, a contract resembling
the Roman emphyteusis by which a proprietor may let out waste land at a
perpetual and irredeemable charge, was indeed discussed, but only to be
rejected. The First Consul saw no advantage in it; and Portalis urged that,
however useful it might have been in days when there was much waste to be
reclaimed, such a contract would now create “inextricable embarrassment.” But,
while the law of tenure underwent no sensible modification, the law which
I804] Contracts.
Interest. Mortgages.
159
regulated the
transfer of property was modified in several important | particulars. A sale of
immoveable property could be rescinded pour cause de Usion, if the seller had
been defrauded of more than seven- twelfths of the price; and that, too, even
if he had expressly renounced his right to take action for the rescission of
the contract. Such a provision implies that there is a just price, the result
of common opinion; and f that,
if property is sold for less than t is worth, the State should step! in to protect
the ignorant vendor. The doctrine had been repudiatea by the Coi^entionj_ which
had abolished the action for rescission in 1795; but it was hotly
championecL£y..ihe...First Consul, whose hatred of the Stock Exchange and of
army contractors led him to welcome any expedient for repudiating a contract.
With a
similar aim of defeating the machinations of financiers, it was intimated in
the Code that the rate of, interest would be fixed by
law.
“Interest,” so runs the text, “is legal or contractual...................................... Lfegal
interest is
fixed by law. Contractual interest may exceed legal interest whenever the law
does not prohibit.” It was urged in defence of the principle of regulation
that, ever since the Convention had declared money to be merchandise, it had
been loaned out at usurious rates. Nevertheless, it was not until September,
1807, that the rate was :,ctually fixed—by a law which, as Napoleon remarked to
Mollien, did not belong “ to the system of your ideologues."
Two questions
arose with regard to liens and mortgages. Should the law require them to be
publicly registered ? Should the law require them to be specially attached to a
particular piece of immoveable property ? The Convention, which desired to
facilitate land-transfer to the furthest extent possible, decided on 11
Brumaire, year VII (Nov. 1, 1798) both for the principle of publicity and for
that of specialty. But these rules seemed too violent a departure from previous
custom. It is true that in the Low Countries mortgages had long been publicly
inscribed and specially allocated; but. in France the secretiveness• of an
embarrassed aristocracy had resisted so obvious a method of facilitating
credit. Of thirty Courts of Appeal consulted upon the point, only nine were in
favour of maintaining the Law of Brumaire. The legislative section of the
Council was divided, and two plans were submitted. It was alleged that the Law
of Brumaire violated family secrets, destroyed credit, and injured the
circulation of wealth; that inscription was costly and ineffectual ; that the
principle of specialty was inconsistent with the rights of property, because
the debtor was bound to fulfil his engagements upon all his property and not
upon some special part of it. But the most valid practical objection to the
law, as it stood, was the injury which might, be inflicted upon wives and
minors who had not taken the step of inscribing their legal claims upon the
property of their respective husbands or tutors. The division of opinion
pointed to a compromise ; and, while the publicity and specialty of liens and
mortgages
were
recognised, a particular exception was made in favour of women and minors who
had omitted the formality of' registration.
Curious as
was the debate upon mortgages, as revealing unsuspected depths of timid conservatism,
it was far less important than the discussion provoked by the law of
inheritance. (Jhe theory of the French Revolution had been that the State,
having conferred testamentary rights upon the individual, could abridge or
expand them at will; and that in the interests of social equality it was
necessary to abridge them. Consequently entails (substitutions) were
forbidden; the devisable portion was limited to a tenth; and equality of
division was prescribed. 'She Code exhibits a sensible but cautious modification
(of this extreme position. |The devisable portion was augmented, rising to a
half if the testator had (but one child, and never falling below a fourth. The
father may bequeath all or any of this portion to one of his natural heirs, or
give it to a relation in trust for children who may be yet unborn. Entails,
owing to the vigorous advocacy of Bonaparte, are permitted to one degree. The
arguments used in debate were both economic and moral. On economic grounds,
urged Maleville, it was undesirable that property should be excessively
divided, especially in the poorer departments where com and moveable wealth
were scarce. On moral grounds, urged Portalis, it was well that the father
should be placed in a position in which he “ could punish and recompense his
children, redress inequalities between them, and satisfy obligations of
gratitude towards strangers.” While Bonaparte was fully in accord with the
spirit of these contentions, he proposed, as an alternative plan for giving
effect to them, that the devisable portion should be graduated according to the
amount of the heritable property rather than according to the number of the
children, in such a way that, the wealthier the testator, the less should be
the ratio which the devisable portion should bear to the sum total of his
property. This suggestion, however, was overruled, as entailing expensive and
inquisitorial researches; and the First Consul acquiesced in his defeat. The
concession could be afforded; for, though the Code favours the subdivision of
property, it is far more lenient to inequality than was the Convention, whose
doctrine still numbered some vigorous exponents in the Council of State.
Napoleon once
said at St Helena that his glory consisted, not in having won forty battles,
but in the Civil Code and in the deliberations of his Council of State. ,
Judged by external tests, the fortunes of the Civil Code have indeed been
brilliant, and its influence has been wide. Yet it has been subjected to much
severe criticism. Savigny, the founder of the historical school of European
jurists, and Austin, the chief exponent of the analytical school in England,
attacked it with vigour and knowledge. The Civil Code, said Savigny, was
drafted at an unfavourable epoch, at a time of uncertainty and conflict, when
the ideas of the Revolution were fast passing away and the'ideas of the Empire
were secretly growing; and this uncertainty is reflected in its
provisions.
To take one instance—the system of entails, rejected in 1803 was restored in
1806, and included in the Code in 1807. The Council of State had no part in the
technical discussion of the Code, which was left to the fourdraftsmen, who were
ignorapdt-of- Roman Jaw. The judicial literature of France, consisting almost
entirely of Pothier, from whose treatise three-fourths of the Code were
extracted, was pitiable; £gd the selection of subjects was not determined
by.experience and practical knowledge, but by the Institutes of Justinian. 3The
Code was incomplete; it had to be supplemented by external authority, and, far
from being an organic product, was but a mechanical mixture of the results of
the Revolution and the old regime of Roman law and the customs. Austin, too,
condemned the haste and ignorance of the draftsmen, the absence of definitions
of technical terms and of any provision for amendment. The Council of State, he
pointed out, often devoted great attention to points of no importancg^while
neglecting many vital questions of arrangement and expression. (The Code must
not be regarded as a body of law7forming a substantive wholejjjut as an
indexTto an immense body or jurisprudence existing outside itself.
The Civil
Code has also been criticised, upon economic grounds, as too favourable to the
subdivision of property. From this cause some have deduced the lack of
commercial enterprise, the fondness for safe investments, and the stationary
census returns which they regard as characteristic of France. Thus Le Play
contended that, before the reign of Louis XIV, the French peasantry made use of
their testamentary freedom to keep their properties together; and that these
habits resulted in an admirable social organisation and great agrarian
prosperity. By degrees, however, the old traditions of work and economy
declined; and it was found more difficult to make pecuniary endowments for the
younger children. The habit of territorial subdivision acquired strength; and
it was intensified by the legislation of the Revolution and the Consulate. It
may be sufficient here to point out that the economic criticism is more
properly directed against the Revolutionary law of succession than against the
Civil Code, which travelled as far back on the road to testamentary freedom as
public opinion would then allow.
The
criticisms of the jurists are no doubt largely true ; but some of them would be
equally applicable to any code framed at any time. The most elaborate system of
legal casuistry is poor beside the inexhaustible power of life to produce new
combinations; and no code can be more than a legal alphabet. It is doubtful
whether the Civil Code has reduced the bulk of French case-law, or materially
lightened the labours of French judges. On the other hand, it has diffused the
knowledge"! of law, and made it comparatively easy for the ordinary
Frenchman to become acquainted with the leading principles which govern the law
of.i his own country. Again, its simplicity and elegance of form have made it a
convenient article of exportation; and these qualities have perhaps-"
helped to
secure for it a wider acceptance outside the frontiers of France than upon its
intrinsic merits it deserves. In France, the Code has perhaps commanded an
excessive deference and stood in the way of useful legislative changes. There
the gJajBQm:.jKhi^^ta^bgs^tojt is.due not only to the circumstances of its
production, to the fact that it is at once the summary and the correction-of
.the French Revolution, as well as the legal formula of the fmoat. daggling
perjod of French nffjfimd.hiafrny, but also and more especially to the
circumstance that it is the abiding symbol of thaL.uriity.jQf_law which wag
,first made possible by the meeting of the States General in 1789... So long as
law was'unified, it did not so much matter whether the text was scrupulous or
clumsy, whether the principles were collected in a code or left to be inferred
from legislative acts, custom, and judicial decisions. The Civil Code was a
hasty piece of work; and the First Consul imported a strong gust of passion and
of politics into the laboratory of legal science. Civil death—a superannuated,
unjust, and immoral fiction—confiscation, and the position of women, are bad
blots upon the page. Could anything be more monstrous than that a widow should
not be allowed to succeed to her husband, until all his relations, even his
natural children, have taken their share ? There is also much disproportion and
omission. There are instances of a subject being discussed in the Council, then
forgotten and allowed to lapse. The law of contract is taken almost bodily from
Domat and Pothier. But, when all deductions have been made for haste,
negligence, and political perversion, it remains a great achievement. It was a
single code for the whole of France, substantially based Upon the broad
historic instincts of the race, while preserving the most valuable social
conquests of the Revolution. It is vain to say that the moment was
unfavourable. Ideally favourable it certainly was not, but it was the one
moment which had never occurred before and would never occur again. A few years
earlii^iJtieCode wouldjhave been jtfigpgjljn Revolutionary extravagance t a few
years kter^it.would have home J^e hard imprint of despotism. Fortunately for
France, the Code was composed at the only time since the Revolution when the
government of the country had been both glorious and even-handed. And to the
strictures of the chair it is at least some reply, that the Code has proved
adequate to the needs and congenial to the temper of France.
The share
taken by Bonaparte himself in the construction of this famous monument has been
variously estimated according to the political prepossessions of historians.
Lanfrey believed that, if the First Consul advocated divorce and adoption, this
was because he was thinking of his own possible requirements; and that his
interference with the legal discussions of the Council, being dictated in the
main either by strictly political or by strictly private considerations, was a
positive disservice to French law. Such a view is a great exaggeration. It is
perfectly true that the quidnuncs of Paris were speculating upon a possible
divorce of
Josephine so
early as July, 1802; and perhaps Bonaparte even then regarded the divorce as a
conceivable and odious contingency. But his attitude upon the question is quite
explicable without reference to any dishonourable hypothesis; and the
safeguards with which he proposed to surround adoption clearly show that in
that matter at least he was not thinking of his own case. Again, it would be a
wild paradox to assert that the Code gained nothing by Bonaparte’s slashing
intrusions. That he hadJittle interest in the technical side of law; that he
had none of that patient and trained sagacity^Tch^IowIy ^worries out the heart
of an intricate subject; that he was often grossly irrelevant; that he took no
part whatever in the composition of the Second Book of the Code and only an
intermittent part in the composition of the Third; that he was ipainly
interested in .the.iarger social.and~ political aspects of every legal problem
which came before his notice—all this may be admitted. Nor can any fair
apologist deny that Bonaparte was directly responsible for some of the worst
features of the Code; that he admitted without a word of censure other features
which were hardly less objectionable; and that, if he had always had his way,
some provisions would have been inserted which every sound lawyer and statesman
would have deplored. He was solely responsible for the...admission of
confiscation; he was largely responsible for jhe..gr.ossJ®eqHality of treatment
meted out to ih«wo sexes. If Kis will had prevailed, all emigres would have
been declared civilly dead, and their marriages regarded as null and void by
the law.
vAJ!i»..t^-.SPtTOths±anding,-±he
Ovi]^Code_ owes much to Bonaparte. Without his driving power; it would certainly
not have come into existence so soon, and it might not have come into
existence at all. To his glowing imagination and fertile intelligence are due
several small changes of a humanitarian character and some technical
improvements. “Would you allow a father to drive a daughter of fifteen from his
house or to thrust out his heir into misery ? A well-to-do father always owes
maintenance to his children,” he cried; and this eloquent protest against the
doctrine that alimony was not due to majors was embodied in the Code. In
another passage he argued that the deaf and dumb should be permitted to marry.
“He has known through his father and mother the marriage union. He can declare
his will to live like them. Why then aggravate his misfortune ? ” And here again
the argument went home. He suggested several improvements in the law of
absence; he framed the definition of “ domicile ” which has found its way into
the Code; he advocated, in the interests of the race, that the age at which
marriage could be legally contracted should be more advanced than that
sanctioned by the old French law. But, over and above these specific
contributions, the presiding intelligence of Bonaparte gave scope and dignity
to the work. ProfessionaTlawyers may easily lose sight of the wider
implications ^of’their professional studies; though perhaps this was not the
greatest danger in a Council where men like Berlier and Treilhard championed
at every turn
the large political faith of the Revolution. Yet it was a dangerand to
Bonaparte’s presence we may ascribe the fact that the civil law of France was
codified, not only with more scrupulosity than other portions of French law,
but also with a livelier sense of the general interests of the State. What
those interests were, Bonaparte knew. They were civil equality, healthy family
life, secure bulwarks to property, religious toleration, a government raised
above the howls of faction. This is the policy which he stamped upon the Civil
Code.
The Code of Civil Procedure.
By turn
feudal and ecclesiastical, royal and democratic, civil procedure in France has
earned, in its successive phases, the bad opinion of laymen. The venality of
judges, the costliness, the delays, and the cumbrous forms of the law have been
denounced or satirised by a long succession of writers, from Theodulf of
Orleans to Rabelais, Montaigne, Moliere, and Saint-Pierre. In its feudal stage,
procedure was public and oral; its proofs were characterised by extreme
rigidity and formalism, and also by the barbarous method of the combat. But, in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Church began to extend her influence
over the whole realm of legal forms, softening the rigour of the old Germanic
codes, introducing written proofs and secret enquiry, and appealing to reason
rather than to force. In the thirteenth century, the usage of secret inquest,
diffused specially through the medium of the Inquisition, found its way into
the “ Olim ” and the official registers of the Parlement of Paris; and the
influence of St Louis, who in 1260 suppressed judicial combat in the royal
domain, was exerted to promote this tendency.
The triumph
of the Canon Law invested the civil procedure of France with a higher degree of
unity than existed in the department of Civil Law. The Custumals, at any rate in
their later stages, generally contained no rules relating to forms; and,
although each Parlement had its own “style of procedure,” there was a large
measure of uniformity through France, always excepting those provinces which
had lately been conquered. When, therefore, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and
seventeenth centuries, the Kings of France undertook the task of correcting the
vices which had crept into the administration of justice, they were able with
comparatively little trouble to secure general acceptance for their ordinances.
Several important partial reforms were effected in the sixteenth century, as
for instance by the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets in 1539, which prescribed
the use of the French language in legal documents, simplified procedure in
cases of default, and restrained the number of dilatory exceptions; and by the
Ordinance of Orleans (1561), which introduced into lay Courts the canonical
distinction between ordinary and summary affairs. But all these ordinances were
welded together in the Grand Ordinance of 1667, which aimed at establishing a
uniform
“style” in
all the Courts of the kingdom, public, feudal, and ecclesiastical. ‘
Supplemented by local usages, this elaborate code—for code it was—ruled France
till the Revolution. It abolished some abuses; but, since its object was rather
to codify existing rules than to introduce reforms, it was often subjected to
sharp criticism. The eighteenth century was filled with complaints of the
delays, the costs, and the technicalities of justice; but, unfortunately for
legal progress, the aversion from formalism characteristic of the age was
unaccompanied by an accurate knowledge of forms. With the exception of
d’Aguesseau’s two Ordinances of 1737 and 1738, no definite ameliorations were
proposed. The works of Lange and Bomier, who had commented upon the Ordinance
of 1667 in the reign of Louis XIV, were reprinted; and the reform of French
judicial procedure failed to attract a single mind of high quality. Indeed, it
is well to note that the eminent Pothier, whose lectures had so large an
influence on the Civil Code, left only one unimportant treatise upon the
subject of civil procedure, and that composed only in extreme old age. Thus,
when the Revolution broke out, the lawyers, whose gaze was restricted within
the four comers of seventeenth century formalism, were confronted with a public
that wished all formalism at the bottom of the sea. The public said in effect,
“ Let justice be speedy, unprofessional, governed by natural laws, divested of
technicalities, affording large facilities for arbitration”; and what the
fashionable theory proclaimed the Revolutionary Assemblies enacted. The
Constituent Assembly promised a code, organised the procedure to be followed
before the newly created juges de paix, and curtailed some judicial expenses.
In the Constitution of 1793 it was decreed that public arbitrators were to
decide upon verbal pleadings without formality or expense; and this principle
was translated into practice by a law passed in October of that year, which
suppressed attorneys, and enjoined that procedure should be simple and
inexpensive, “ founded upon a verbal defence or on a simple memoir read to the
Court by one of the judges.”
The attempt
to infuse simplicity and sentiment into transactions which are necessarily
complicated and dry is unlikely to command success. Treilhard said that justice
was never so costly as during the temporary eclipse of the legal profession,
when every litigant was making large and irregular payments for underhand and
unauthorised advice. Nor was this the only vessel in the fleet of amiable
intentions which suffered shipwreck. While theory proclaimed the juge de paioc
as “arbiter,” “father,” and “angel of conciliation,” practice too often
exhibited him as a venal, violent, and ignorant politician. The conciliatory
procedure, from which Voltaire had hoped so much, failed for a reason which a
man of letters could not have been expected to foresee.
If it was a
means of averting litigation in tranquil country districts, it broke down in
the exciting atmosphere of the towns; and, so early as 1800, it was clear that
the belief in trained legal intelligence and settled
formality had
experienced a revival. The attorney was reestablished by law; the old procedure
was restored pending the preparation of a new code; and men of weight held
conciliation to be a thing of proved futility and a specious source of delay
and expense.
While the
Council of State was elaborating the Civil Code, a Commission was at work upon
civil procedure. Nominated on March 24, 1802, this Commission was composed of
Treilhard, President of the Court of Appeal of Paris; Try, substitute of the
Commissioner of the Republic in the same Court; Berthereau, President of the
Court of First Instance of the Seine; Seguier, government Commissioner in the
same Court; and Pigeaii, formerly a practitioner in the Court ■ of the
Chatelet and a recognised expert upon procedure. The work of the Commission was
published in 1804, submitted to the Courts of Appeal and the Cour de Cassation
for their observations, amended by the Commission, examined by the legislative
section of the Council of State, and then, after a discussion in full Council,
communicated privately to a section of the Tribunate, and finally voted on in the
Legislative Body (April 14-29, 1806). In the case of the Civil Code, far the
most interesting stage in the proceedings had been the debate in full Council;
but this cannot be predicated of the Code of Civil Procedure. Most of the
Councillors were unversed in minute technicalities; and the Commission,
composed as it was of practising judges and lawyers with little sense of
philosophical or literary finish, presented their work in a somewhat abstruse
and forbidding shape. Once only, on February 22,1806, was Napoleon present;
and his personal influence was restricted to obtaining the insertion of two
clauses which modified the law relating to the inscription of mortgages in the
interests of the Treasury. So languid, indeed, was the interest of the Council,
that a code containing no less than 1042 articles was despatched in
twenty-three sittings (April 20,1805, to March 29,1806).
The
Commission decided to exclude from its purview all questions affecting judicial
competence. It did not attempt to settle the procedure of the commercial
Courts, for this would properly belong to the framers of the Commercial Code;
nor that of the Cour de Cassation, which still substantially follows, in civil
cases, the regulation issued by the Conseil des Parties in 1738. It was also
determined to leave the settlement of a tariff' of judicial costs to
subsequent regulation, rather than to include it in the Code. Nevertheless, the
task of Treilhard and his colit tgues was sufficiently arduous. They had to
bring the civil procedure of the ordinary Courts into harmony with the Civil
Code, to simplify and amend the ancient forms, and to review the Revolutionary
legislation as to the juges de paix, conciliation proceedings, and the various
processes of distraint. Yet, when all allowance has been made for the
difficulty of the task, it must be confessed that the arrangement of topics is
singularly illogical and disorderly. The first part is entitled “ Procedure
before the Courts,” and the second “ Diverse Procedures.”
The former is
by no means a model of systematic treatment; while the latter, as its title
implies, comprises a miscellaneous assortment of regulations dealing with such
varied subjects as offers of payment by a debtor, judicial separation, and the
procedure incidental to arbitrations or the opening of a succession.
Yet, however
faulty its arrangement, the Code of Civil Procedure contains some useful
innovations upon the law as d’Aguesseau left it. The provisions in the First
Book as to the procedure to be followed before the juge de paix are
substantially based upon the law of 1790, but comprise a few marked
improvements in detail, such as a simplification of procedure on appeal, and
the prohibition of viva voce objections to witnesses after evidence given. It
was decided to take over from the Revolution the principle that access should
not be given to the law- courts until all attempts at conciliation had been
exhausted; but the exceptions to the general rule of obligatory conciliation
were multiplied. The law of 1790 had decided that affairs which interested the
State, the communes, and public order need not in. the first instance be
brought before the juge de paix for conciliation. The Code extends the
privilege—exemption from nugatory proceedings is nothing else— to minors, to
commercial affairs which admit of no delay, to actions incidental to pending
suits, and to actions directed against two persons. Even these concessions
have been regarded as insufficient. The Commission on the revision of the Code
of Civil Procedure in 1893 revealed the presence of considerable
dissatisfaction with compulsory conciliation. It was described as a formality “
useless in three-fourths of the cases which arise, and always long and
burdensome.” It was pointed out that the number of cases settled by
conciliation was only 23 per cent, of those brought before the juge
conciliateur; that ten or twelve days were consumed by the process; and that,
where conciliation had failed, the record of the proceedings was often
prejudicial to the interests of bona jide litigants in the Court to which the
case was subsequently removed. It would, however, have been folly in 1806 to
reject a promising experiment simply because it had broken down under the
stress of abnormal circumstances. The Commission rightly held that conciliation
proceedings had never had a fair trial; and that the conditions in regard to
the temper of the country and the qualifications of the Bench were so far
changed as to admit of these proceedings being continued with a good prospcct
of success.
This was the
boundary beyond which the influence of the French Revolution was not permitted
to pass. The rest of the Code is founded on the rules of the anden regime,
though some useful additions were made with a view to curtailing expenses,
reducing formality, and abridging delay. The Court was given power to disallow
the right of a party to conduct his case in person, whenever it had reason to
believe that the course of justice would suffer from the passion, the
inexperience,
or the
obscurity of the pleader. In order to defeat fraudulent attempts to win a
judgment by default by intercepting the summons, it was laid down that
execution could not be taken save “ after an act necessarily known to the
defaulting party.” Some excellent provisions were added concerning the
examination of experts; but, save for two slight changes, the whole procedure
to be followed when the genuineness of a document was questioned in a civil
trial (faux incident civil) was taken from d’Aguesseau’s Grand Ordinance of
1737. Indeed the First Book of the Code of Civil Procedure may be roughly
described as a reissue of the Ordinances of 1667 and 1737 with some
improvements and such additions as were rendered necessary by the institution
of conciliation and other proceedings before thejuge de paix. Like the Civil
Code, the Code of Civil Procedure was a synthesis of old and new law; but the
old law was here the dominating factor. The rules relating to the examination
of witnesses direct that they shall be examined in camera, but in the presence
of the parties to the suit. The secrecy of 1667 is substantially preserved. The
witnesses are not examined in each other’s presence; nor is the public admitted
to hear the examination. But the presence of the parties is a guarantee that the
judge will not tamper with the depositions. In the compilation of the Second
Book, the Commission found less guidance in the great code of the seventeenth
century; and recourse was had to the “ edicts and declarations of kings, to
local statutes1, and case-law.” Here some considerable changes were
effected, partly in order to bring the procedure into harmony with the Civil
Code, and partly to correct some suspected tendencies of Revolutionary legislation.
Whether these changes were always wise is a matter of grave doubt; and it has
been alleged that the Code, by too sharply reacting igainst the easy
Revolutionary law of distraint (November 1, 1798), has damaged credit and
rendered property almost impregnable.
In the main,
then, the Code is an almost literal reproduction of the ancient ordinances and
of the practice of the Chatelet. Even the most conservative lawyers criticise
the luxury of precautions, the profusion of documents, the extreme slowness and
costliness which it enjoins or entails. It may be regarded as a blemish that it
reverts to imprisonment for debt, though, in view of the fact that the
contrainte par corps en matiere civile et commerciale was not abolished till
1867, ,this step was clearly in accordance with opinion and manners. That a
bolder and more drastic treatment was not applied to civil procedure is a
matter for regret, but readily admits of explanation. The writers of the
eighteenth century were either too vague or else too satirical to afford any
practical guide to the reformer. There was no French Jeremy Bentham, nor had
the Revolutionary Assemblies produced a draft code of civil procedure which
might serve as a corrective to the Grand Ordinance of 1667; and a reversion to
the cautious formalism of that and other legal monuments of the cmcien regime
seemed especially imperative to
1539-1789]
History of criminal procedure.
169
men just
escaped from a period of turbulence and corruption, when judges were ignorant
and venal, and justice was frequently perverted to political ends. Personal
influence may have contributed its quota; something may have been due to the
absence of Napoleon and to the activity of Pigeau—a conservative Chatelet
lawyer whose Court had been abolished by the Revolution, and who now took a
modest revenge by importing the practice of the Chatelet into the Code. But
though public and lawyers alike have grumbled over the Code of Civil Procedure,
though the Academy has offered prizes for the best suggestions for reforming
it, though two commissions have reconstructed it on paper, and nine statutes
have amended it in detail, the course of business in a French civil Court is
still substantially determined by the work of Napoleon’s commission.
Criminal Procedure and Penal Law.
As in civil,
so in criminal procedure, the jurists of the Consulate and the Empire were
presented with two sharply contrasted systems, the one the product of the
monarchy, and the other of revolution. The salient features of the older
criminal procedure, as first tabulated in 1539 by the Ordinance of
Villers-Cotterets and afterwards incorporated in the Grand Ordinance of 1670,
were, first, that the procureur of the King or the lord is a party to every
criminal proceeding; next, that the case is divided into two parts of unequal
length, the instruction, a long secret enquiry before a single judge, and the
Jugement, given in secret by the whole Court upon the written evidence
submitted to it; thirdly, that the accused is not permitted to be represented
by counsel or to see the charges brought against him; and lastly, that he is on
oath to answer all questions truly. In other words, the procedure was secret,
inquisitorial, and highly unfavourable to the accused; and many flagrant
violations of justice drew attention to its obvious defects. Towards the end of
the eighteenth century, the movement in favour of a reform of criminal
procedure spread through the whole educated class in France. It had been
preached by Beccaria, Voltaire, and Dupaty; it was encouraged by Louis XVI, who
carried through some elementary but precious reforms, such as the abolition of
torture; and it led to some remarkable and comprehensive changes during the
Revolution.
The lines
upon which these changes were effected were English rather than French. All the
legal reformers were loud in praise of the English system—the English jury, the
English public trial, the English practice of allowing the prisoner to employ
counsel, the English principle that no prisoner is to be examined on oath. The
Constituent Assembly therefore addressed itself to the task of a radical
reform of criminal procedure upon English lines. Two juries were introduced—the
jury (Taccusatkm,
corresponding
to the English grand jury, and the jury de jugement, corresponding to the
English petty jury. The secret preliminary instruction, which had been the
longest and most important part of the proceedings under the amcien regime, was
whittled down to a summary examination by the police-officer, to the possible
hearing of witnesses by the jury d?accusation, and to the interrogation of the
accused by the director of the jury, who was always one of the judges of the
district Court. Further, although the instruction was held with closed doors,
the public were now represented by the accusing jury, which examined the
documents submitted to it by the juge de paix, and decided whether to bring in
or to throw out the bill. Greater facilities were given to private persons to
initiate criminal proceedings; there was more oral examination and less
writing. An important change also comes over the second stage of the
proceedings, the trial proper. The procedure is oral and public instead of
written and private. The accused has the assistance of counsel; the judge reads
out the charge to him ; he is put upon oath only if he wishes to advance
charges against the witnesses. He is condemned or acquitted by the verdict of a
jury of twelve men, but he is given a practically unlimited right of rejecting
jurymen. The criminal prosecutions are no longer exclusively initiated by the
Government; and no prosecution proceeds to the second stage unless the accusing
jury sees fit to draw up an acte d’accusation. In a word, the system of the
Constituent Assembly was as favourable to the defence as the Ordinance of 1670
had been favourable to the prosecution.
During the
Revolution these rules proved unworkable. At the best, a system so alien to
French tradition, and making such large drafts upon the judicial temper of the
populace, could only have succeeded in quiet times. As it was, the jury was
introduced into the country during the one decade of its history in which it
was almost certain to be valueless. The excesses of Revolutionary law-courts
and the prevalence of crimes of violence exhibited the weakness of the new
procedure; and Merlin’s Code of Delicts and Penalties (October 25, 1795),
heightening the importance of the written instruction, marks an early stage in
reaction.
The rise of
Bonaparte sharply closed the epoch of generous excursions and airy latitude.
Anarchy, rife in many departments, supplied pretexts congenial to a soldier’s
temperament. An article of the Constitution of 1799 decreed that the public
prosecutor was to be the agent and the nominee of the executive power. A law,
of January 21, 1801, provided for the appointment of government prosecutors in
every arrondissement, gave them power to imprison pending the report of the
accusing jury, restored the secret examination of witnesses in the absence of
the prisoner, and substituted written for oral procedure before the jury
d'accusation. On Jan. 7, 1801, in spite of the terms of the Constitution which
guaranteed trial by jury for all crimes, special criminal tribunals were
established exempt from the restraint of jury or appeal. The
orators of
the Tribunate were loud in their indignation. These new Courts, they said, were
only the Cours prevdtales of 1670 revived; it was vain to urge that they were
limited as to function, space, or time. In a short time all France would be
covered with these tribunals ; and what kind of tribunals were they ? They
denied the prisoner time and Opportunity to prepare his defence; they deprived
him of the right of being heard on questions of importance, of objecting to his
judges, of being released on bail. Since the Bench was relieved of the
necessity of explaining the grounds of its judgment, there was no guarantee
that the judgment would be reached by any competent intellectual process at
all; and, since the law denied the right to appeal, there was no redress if the
procedure should be tainted by informality or injustice. To these criticisms
the government orators replied that the disorder of the country demanded
exceptional measures; that the Courts were to be abolished two years after the
conclusion of peace ; that the procedure was to be public and oral; that the
prisoner was to have the benefit of counsel and to be acquainted with the act
of accusation; that it was impossible to obtain a verdict of guilty in the west
or the south, where the jury had become the “ safeguard of brigands ”; that
military tribunals bad been established to deal with brigandage under tbe
Convention and the Directory; that exceptional Courts were generally demanded
by the prefects; and that the Constitution itself had sanctioned the suspension
of the jury in case of armed revolt. The measure was carried in the Tribunate
by 49 votes to 44, and in the Legislative by 292 to 88.
Meanwhile
(May 28,1801) a Commission had been appointed to draw up a criminal code. Their
labours resulted in a draft comprising both penal law and criminal procedure
(Code criminel correctionnel et de police), which preserved the jiuy and was
still prevailingly English in character. But no sooner was this draft submitted
to the law-courts than it became clear that Anglomania was falling out of
fashion. Of the seventy-five Courts whose observations were published, only
twenty-six pronounced in favour of the retention of the jury; twenty-three did
not refer to the subject; while twenty-six, mainly from the south of France,
were adverse. Of the Courts of Appeal, twelve were adverse, and seven
favourable. The problem of the jury became a burning question.
The Criminal
Code first came before the Council of State on May 22, 1804. The Emperor, in
order to clear the ground, ordered the legislative section of the Council to
prepare and print a list of fundamental questions relating to criminal law and
procedure which might be debated before the articles of the draft Code came to
be discussed in detail. Accordingly, on June 5, fourteen questions were
submitted. Should the jury be preserved ? Should there be a jury of accusation
and a jury of judgment ? How should the jury be constituted ? On what grounds
should objection be taken to a juror ? Should the instruction be purely oral,
or par tly oral and partly written ? Should several questions be
put to the
jury of judgment, or one bnly—“Guilty or not guilty?” Should the verdict be
given by unanimity or majority ? Should there be criminal circuits? Should the
penalty of death be preserved? Should there be life penalties ? Should
confiscation be admitted in certain cases ? Should the judges have a certain
latitude in the application of penalties ? Should condemned persons who have
finished their term of punishment be placed under supervision? Should condemned
persons of subsequent good conduct be rehabilitated ?
The debate
extended over three days, and was characterised by great ability and acuteness.
Capital punishment and imprisonment for life were passed without discussion.
Confiscation was contested, but advocated by Napoleon and carried through. The
main debate centred round the Jury; and here Napoleon, after listening to a
number of speeches, most of them adverse to the retention of the institution,
unfolded his views with characteristic decision. A tyrannical government, as
the experience of the Revolution showed, could influence a jury more easily
than it could influence a judge; and, given public trial and counsel for the
defence, the jury was a superfluous guarantee. Besides, a jury would always
acquit a man who could aflbrd an advocate, and always condone an offence
against the gendarmerie. Still, if it were well composed, and provided that
counsel should not be permitted to address it, a jury might be allowed; but
exceptional Courts would always be needed to chastise organised crime. If,
however, a jury were allowed, the verdict should be given by a majority vote,
for so the chance of escape would be diminished. In these views the Council
only partially concurred. The retention of both Juries—that of Accusation and
that of Judgment—was voted in principle ; but it was decided that they should
be named by the prefect from the Electoral Colleges, and that the verdict
should go by an absolute majority. If injustice were done, it might be remedied
by the right of pardon.
With these
large principles determined, the Council, under the presidency of Cambaceres,
settled down to discuss the draft Code. Twelve sessions were held; and the work
was proceeding fast, when it was disturbed by an intervention of the Emperor.
In the great June debate, Napoleon had argued for the establishment of large
Courts like the old Parlements in order to give greater authority to the
magistrature. “ Did one not,” he said, “ see judges, even of the Cour de
Cassation, dine with advocates, and contract habits of familiarity with them
which destroyed the moral independence and prestige of their office ? ” But his
idea found no favour with the Council. On October 80, however, the legislative
section was presented with a draft law on the amalgamation of civil and
criminal justice which was to give effect to Napoleon’s intention. The Council
of State was again summoned to Saint-Cloud ; and five days were devoted to the
discussion of the Emperor’s plan in his presence. “ It is necessary,” urged
Napoleon, “to form great corporations,
strong in the
reputation conferred by a knowledge of civil law, strong in numbers, above
private fears and considerations, in order that they may cause the guilty to
turn pale and may communicate their energy to the prosecution. It is necessary,
in fact, to organise the prosecution of crime. At present there is no such
thing.” It was argued on the other side that it had been difficult enough to
gather the departmental juries, and that under the proposed plan of wider
judicial areas the Jury would be impossible. Napoleon replied that his Court
might send judges on issize; but this did not satisfy the Council, whose view
was shared and supported by the magistrates then present in Paris for the
Imperial coronation. They reported that the proposed change would extinguish
the Jury, and that the Jury was working better every day. At this Cambaceres
confessed his surprise; and Napoleon tacitly withdrew his plan. After December
20 the work of the Commission was mysteriously intermitted. Twenty-five
sittings of the Council had been held, over eleven of which Napoleon had
presided; hut opinion was not yet ripe for the changes which he had in mind,
and he was content that opinion should ripen. Thus all the questions relating
to criminal law and procedure which had engaged the public, the law-courts, the
Institute, and the Council, were allowed to fall into oblivion for three years.
It was not
till January 23, 1808, that the legislative section of the Council of State was
commanded to resume its labours on criminal procedure. Their recollection of
past proceedings was confused and unrefteshed ; and the great questions which
had excited so much controversy in 1804 were debated anew as if they had never
arisen. A close and crushing criticism from Napoleon settled the fate of the
Jury of Accusation; but the Jury of Judgment successfully weathered the storm.
Napoleon himself advanced arguments in its favour, provided that it were
properly constituted. “ The real interest of the accused,” he said, “ is to be
judged by enlightened and not by ignorant men ”; and this object would be
obtained if the jurors were drawn from the Judges of First Instance and the
Electoral Colleges. There remained the great question of the amalgamation of
civil and criminal justice; and into this Napoleon threw himself with
passionate energy. He had to vanquish an old prejudice against itinerant
judges, and a suspicion that the scheme might revive the Parlements of the
widen regime in a new shape. Never did he wield the rapier of controversy with
a more persuasive brilliance. He touched on the need of curtailing the powers
of the prefect, already excessive ; on his desire for a vigorous local life,
for more decentralisation; on the respect due to the magistrature, which was
now to receive greater dignity; on the sheer necessity of coercing crime; on
the humanising influence which a turn at civil business would exert upon the
temperament of a criminal judge. Nor was Napoleon rich in principles only; he
drew from his pocket two draft laws for consideration, and presided day after
day till the scheme passed through.
The system of
Assize Courts once safely secured, Napoleon could afford to admit the Jury, and
to allow the Code of Criminal Procedure to proceed quietly on its way. In
thirty-seven sittings (Jan. SO to Oct. 30, 1808), the Council cut the Gordian
knots over which they had fumbled in 1804.
In the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Code (FInstruction criminelle) the jury of accusation is
suppressed. The depositions of witnesses are taken secretly in the presence of
the juge d'instruction and his clerk, and in the absence of the prisoner ; and
all the guarantees of 1789 disappear. The defence cannot contest the choice of
an expert made by a judge; the juge d'instruction is not compelled to hear the
witnesses for the defence; and, during the whole of the instruction, the
prisoner may remain in complete ignorance of the steps which are being taken
against him. The regulations as to bail are so illiberal as to be almost
prohibitive; and they were contested in the Council. And yet, with this
exception, this portion of the Code, utterly subversive though it was of the
Revolutionary law, was passed almost without discussion. So great a change had
been wrought by the advancing palsy of despotism.
But while the
Code of Criminal Procedure borrows from the Ordinances of 1670 almost all its
rules of preparatory instruction, the rules for the trial in court were based
upon the legislation of the Revolution. The accused was to be tried in public;
he was allowed to produce witnesses, to be assisted by counsel, and to be heard
in his own defence. A jury of well-to-do persons was permitted to return a
verdict by a majority vote. The Code however maintained the special Courts
which were authorised to decide without recourse to a jury upon cases of
rebellion, false coinage, assassination if committed by armed bands, and armed
smuggling; nor was any resistance offered in the Council of State to the
permanent incorporation within the judicial system of France of these tyrannous
and autocratic tribunals.
It cannot be
denied that the apparatus set up in the Code for performing the preliminary
business of penal judicature was, though complicated, highly effective as an
instrument of exploration. Whereas in England no judicial functionary was then
obliged to attend to any evidence except such as was voluntarily offered to
him, in France the power of the State was at once put in motion to search out
everything that could illuminate the case. On the other hand, the rule which
required every question to the witnesses to be put through the medium of the
presiding judge sacrificed much of the extractive force of the English
cross-examination. The questions framed by the judge for the jury admitted a
more delicate consideration of circumstances than the mere alternative “ guilty
” or “ not guilty.” But the Code of Criminal Procedure, though on the whole
well adapted for the detection of crime and for the speedy trials of prisoners,
presented hardly any barrier against the arbitrary use of executive authority.
There was no adequate machinery to correspond to the English proceedings upon a
writ of
1808-iq]
Estimate of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 175
habeas carpus; the juries were nominated by the prefects; the prefect
might act as a juge d'mstruction; and, in the secrecy of the preliminary
instruction, a case might be prepared for the jury which the innocent prisoner
would find it difficult to rebut.
The Penal Code.
, The Code of
Criminal Procedure could not be put into force until the completion of a Penal
Code; and on October 4, 1808, this task was taken in hand. Some fundamental
questions had already been decided in the June debate four years earlier. It
had been settled that there should be capital punishment and imprisonment for
life; that discharged convicts might be placed under police supervision; that a
convict might be rehabilitated; that a minimum and a maximum penalty should be
fixed for each crime, with latitude of choice within the boundary. It remained
to revise the Code of 1791 in detail under the influences of the moral climate
of 1808. The work was accomplished in forty-one sittings; and the Penal Code
was decreed on February % 1810. On the single occasion upon which Napoleon
presided, he expressed his desire for short laws, which left a large discretion
to the judges and the Government, on the pretext that “men had bowels and the
law had not”; but his general views of penal law did not err on the side of
clemency. In 1801 he had advocated with enthusiasm the penalty of branding,
especially for forgery. “ The forger is generally rich,” he remarked. “ If only
condemned to irons, he returns to society, keeps a fine salon, and people dine
with him. This would not happen if he were branded by the hand of the
executioner.” And his defence of confiscation was equally characteristic; it
would, he said, tempt the relatives of a conspirator to betrayal.
“Punishment,”
said Target, “is certainly not vengeance....It is not the object of law that a
guilty man should suffer, but that crimes should be prevented.” This theory of
punishment had recently been made famous in Bentham’s Treatise on Legislation
which was once alluded to in the course of the discussion. It is not however
probable, considering the prevailing Anglophobia of the time, that the
influence of Bentham upon the Commission was great; and such influence would
never have been acknowledged. The memory of the crimes of the Revolution and
the administrative needs of a strong despotism were far more potent influences.
The Penal Code is severe, suspicious, and in places barbarous. The penalty of
confiscation, which had been condemned by Montesquieu and excluded from the
Code of 1791, was restored. The Legislative Section agreed almost unanimously
to restore the penalty of branding, on the ground of “political reason and the
general interest.” The parricide was to lose his hand before undergoing the
penalty of death. Men condemned to forced labour were to be employed upon the
most
painful
tasks. “They shall drag a ball at their feet, and shall be tied two and two
with a chain when the nature of the work on which they are employed shall
permit.” The penalty of death was to be inflicted for murder and arson, for
theft and brigandage endangering life and personal security, for corruption and
false witness in cases which imperil the life of the innocent. Penal servitude
for life was meted out to those who organise and command associations of
malefactors against persons or property, even where no actual crime has been
committed; against unprovoked acts of violence which were of a nature to cause
death; and against rebellion, armed gatherings, and “grave crimes.” Deportation
for life was assigned to “ state crimes due to false political ideas, the
spirit of party, or an ill-understood ambition,” as well as to grave cases of
forgery and peculation. So great was the suspicion of political meetings that
it was provided that “no association of more than twenty persons, whose aim is
to unite every day or on certain fixed days to occupy itself with religious,
literary, political, or other objects, can be formed, except with the consent
of the Government or under such conditions as public authority may impose.”
The Penal
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure bear very strongly the imprint of the
times in which they were composed. Unlike the Civil Code, they belong to the
later epoch of the Empire, when despotism had assumed its harsher forms, and
the ideals of the Revolution had ceased to be serious factors in political
life. Napoleon intervened only in the most crucial questions; but his attitude
was understood, and his purposes were fulfilled. No despotism could have wished
for a more powerful or terrible instrument than the combination of these two
branches of penal law. It has been truly said of the compilers of the Penal
Code that “ they were far less concerned with devising means of repression
sufficient for public safety, than with compensating the horror of crime by the
horror of punishment.” And, .while the Penal Code displays its long catalogue
of terrible penalties for offences against public order or the political
principles of the Empire, the Code of Criminal Procedure furnishes the
Government with the most ample means for the exploration of criminal charges
and for the packing of the juries by whom these charges are to be tried.
The Commercial Code.
A Commercial
Code crowns the ordered structure of Napoleonic law. This was in the national
tradition; for, ever since the days of L’Hopital, France had possessed separate
commercial Courts established “for the public good and the shortening of all
suits and differences between merchants.” Two great Ordinances, due to the
initiative of Colbert, had fixed the outlines of French commercial law—the
Edict of 1673 touching inland, and the Ordinance of 1681 touching marine
commerce. So
excellent was the Ordinance of 1681 that it became the common maritime law of
Europe.
A commission
was sitting in 1789 to investigate the commercial law of France. Commerce had
grown; new wants were urgent; and the two great edicts of the seventeenth
century, variously interpreted and overspread with a luxuriance of local
custom, needed pruning and adaptation. Bonaparte commanded the suspended task
to be resumed; and on April 3, 1801, a committee of six was appointed to
prepare a Code. Their draft was submitted not only to the law-courts but also
to the commercial councils and tribunals, and duly revised in the light of
their comments. By some mistake, however, this revised Code was handed in, not
to the legislative section of the Council of State, but to the section of the
Interior, where it slumbered peacefully in its pigeonhole for several years. A
curious incident served to disinter it. In the autumn of 1806, while the
Emperor was camp! ,igr ing in Germany, Paris was startled by a scandalous and
signal case of fraudulent bankruptcy. The firm of Recamier had failed. A
rescript came from the camp demanding a severe law; and an answer went back
that such a law would properly form part of the Commercial Code. The Code then,
replied Napoleon, must be instantly pushed forward. Accordingly, the draft was
produced, and submitted to all the processes employed in the case of the other
Codes. The discussion began on November 4, 1806, occupied sixty-eight sessions,
and ended on August 29, 1807. The Emperor was absent during the greater part of
this period; but, on his return, he demanded a general account of the
proceedings, and held four sessions at Saint-Cloud (July 28, 29, August 1, 8,
1807) which began at 7 a.m. and
lasted till the evening.
Two points
riveted his attention; and on these he poured Out his rich and effervescent
eloquence. The first concerned the question whether the commercial Courts
should take cognisance of all cases arising out of promissory notes, where the
signatories had declared their intention of being bound by the law of commerce.
Napoleon argued strenuously that no one, save a merchant, should be liable to
imprisonment for failing to meet an obligation contracted by a promissory note.
The obligations of private individuals were not so precise as those of
merchants; for the former, credit was a misfortune and a lure to dissipation.
For his part, he was unwilling to see bills of exchange or other negotiable
instruments used by those who were not in business. Suoh a practice would lead
to the mobilisation of fortunes, and spread alarm among the fathers of
families. “ A courtesan who had extorted a promissory note from a young man
might drag him before the commercial Court and get him sent to prison.” This vehement
advocacy, inspired by a hatred of speculation and of the free transfer of land,
produced its due effect upon the Code; and, by Clauses 636 and 637,
uncommercial persons and uncommercial transactions were exempted from the
severe
178
The Bankruptcy Law.—Defects of Commercial Code. [1807
penalties
by which the commercial Courts were empowered to enforce the payment of
negotiable instruments. ■ • ■
The
second point which specially interested Napoleon was bankruptcy. The old law
had assumed misfortune until fraud was proved; and in other respects it was
characterised by objectionable laxity. The Council proposed, in the first
instance, to expropriate the bankrupt and to vest the administration of his
property in the hands of provisional syndics; then, to subject his conduct to
strict examination; after which he might be brought before a correctional or a
criminal Court according as his offence was one of negligence or fraud. In any
case, action was to be taken by the public prosecutor and. not by the creditors.
These proposals were severe, but they were not severe enough for Napoleon. “
Bankruptcies,” he said, “take away men’s fortunes without destroying their
honour; and that is what it is important to destroy.” He argued in favour of
incarceration in order to prevent the bankrupt flaunting his triumph of
indifference. The creditors could not be trusted to humiliate the bankrupt, for
their sole interest was to recover their debts as soon as possible. But prison
would do it, even if it were but for an hour. It was also desirable that in
every case the woman should share the misfortune of her husband. It was pointed
out by more than one member of the Council that the proposals were too severe;
and that to suppose every failure to be the result of fraud until the contrary
had been established would injure credit, and bear harshly upon merchants and
traders in the country districts. The clauses in the Code represent a somewhat
softened version of Napoleon’s views., The administration of the debtor’s
affairs is entrusted first to agents named by the Court of Commerce, and then
to syndics named by the creditors; and the magistrate must be kept fully
informed of the proceedings, so that on any indication of misconduct or fraud
he may send the bankrupt before the correctional or the criminal Court.: i
. Pardessus
has complained that the Code of. Commerce was more carelessly drafted than any
of the other Codes; and yet it was the Code for which there existed the most
abundant materials. In the First Book, entitled . Du Commerce General, the whole question of purchase and sale is disposed
of in a single unimportant clause. There is not a word concerning price,
promise of sale, or earnest money; nothing upon the conditions of weights,
measures, and assay; nothing on patents or copyrights,, on contracts of
apprenticeship, or contracts between workmen and manufacturers or shopkeepers,
on bank commissions or on the various kinds of loans which are used in
commerce. The Second Book, Du Commerce Maritime, being copied from the
Ordinance of 1681 with little alteration save what was derived from later
experience or later laws, is pronounced to be the best Book of the Code, though
here again several topics are omitted, for instance, quays and ports,
shipwrecks, and fishing. The Third Book, on bankruptcy, is
179
said by
Pardessus to contain some excellent dispositions, with others so full of
objectionable matter that it is difficult to believe they could have passed
uncorrected; and this verdict is confirmed by Locre, who shows how the Law of
Bankruptcy broke down. The Fourth Book, on the competence and procedure of the
commercial Courts, is far from being either clear or precise, and is
distinguished by the curious omission of any clause dealing with imprisonment
for debt. No part of the Napoleonic legislation has required or received more
amendment.
The Five
Codes—a Sixth, the Code Rural, was drafted but never passed—represent a great
idea, the unity and comprehensiveness of French law. When it is remembered that
a task demanding the most massive learning, the calmest and most scrupulous
enquiry, was accomplished in the 'midst of unparalleled excitement and strain;
that it was begun in the reverberation of a great war, when all the organs of
government were being simultaneously re-created; and that . it was continued
and brought to a close while the country was involved in a series of gigantic
and perilous foreign enterprises—we need not wonder tliat the expert has
detected signs of perfunctory work and political passion. The print of
despotism is stamped harsh and deep on the Penal Codie, the subjection of woman
on the Civil Law. It was left for future generations to make adequate provision
for the needs of ah industrial society, to regulate labour contracts, to
protect the interests of the working classes against the tyranny of capital,
and to expand the sphere of company law, so jealously contracted by the
middle-class individualism of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, the Codes preserve
the essential conquests of the revolutionary spirit—civil equality, religious
toleration, the emancipation of land, public trial, the jury of judgment.
Original they were not, but rather a hasty amalgamation of royal and
revolutionary legislation, governed by the genius of Napoleon, divining,
traversing, and penetrating all complications in order to make law subservient
to his rule.' But, if in France herself the Codes were a symbol of a strict but
enlightened despotism, in Germany and Italy they stood for liberty. Here they
were the earliest message, as well as the most mature embodiment, of the new
spirit. In a clear and compact shape, they presented to Europe the main rules
which should govern a civilised society.
THE
CONCORDATS.
When, on March 18, 1800, Cardinal Chiaramonti became
Pope Pius VII, he could hardly have expected permanent agreement with the
French Republic. The outlook in France seemed dark indeed. Persecuted by the
Directory, the clergy had little to hope from a Government created by an army
whose leaders were among the most noted opponents of the Church. The past
history of the more prominent civilian officials, Talleyrand and Fouche, gave
no promise of goodwill to the Roman Catholic cause. The First Consul himself,
while in Egypt, had openly professed his sympathy with Islam, and could
scarcely be expected to restore the old religion of France. Even if any
recognition of the Christian faith took place, the favour of the State was more
likely to be extended to the pliant constitutional clergy than to the
non-juring Church, which, led by bishops who were mostly absent from France,
was intriguing in the provinces on behalf of the Bourbons. On the other hand, a
keen observer might have noted certain signs which pointed to a cessation of
the active hostility of the Republic to the Papacy. The anti-religious tendency
of the Revolution had never been more than superficial in the provinces, while,
even in Paris, the humbler classes had preserved much of their respect for the
Church. The clergy, too, began to experience a respite from their persecutions,
and after 18 Brumaire were secretly returning to France. The Government
declared itself satisfied with a promise from parish priests of fidelity to the
Constitution, and no longer insisted on the obnoxious oath of fidelity to the
Republic. Though a large number of clergy refused to form any connexion with
the usurper, the less enthusiastic members of the order, including some of the
bishops, began to comply with the more moderate demands of the Consular
Government. Moreover, the other Church, called constitutional, had by its
servility to the Republic forfeited popular respect, while the persecution of
the orthodox clergy had revived the sympathy of the people with that section,
and contributed in no small degree to the unpopularity of the Directory. The
avowed mission of the Consular Government was to retrieve the errors
of the
Jacobins and save the Republic. It was imperative that the religious question
should be settled; and, if an understanding with the orthodox clergy could be
reached, the resulting union of the nation would greatly strengthen the
position of the Government.
Nevertheless,
it was natural that Pius VII should feel the utmost uneasiness as to his
position, for the apathy of the Austrian Government seemed to leave him without
any important friend. His delight, therefore, was great when he heard that not
only had the First Consul told the Milanese clergy that the French people were
of the same religion as they, but had also attended a Te Deurn after the battle
of Marengo. Better still, Bonaparte had told Cardinal Martiniana that he was
willing to treat with the Pope. His terms were that the Roman Catholic faith
should be “dominant” in France; and that all the bishops, whether refractory or
constitutional, should resign their sees, so that the First Consul might map
out a reduced number of dioceses, to which, in accordance with the Concordat of
1516, he would nominate, and the Pope institute, bishops loyal to the new
polity. This measure, he added, would secure to the bishops a salary of 15,000
francs apiece, to indemnify them for the loss of the Church lands.
After a delay
of some three months, due on the French side to the negotiations with Austria,
and on the Roman to uncertainty as to Bonaparte’s good faith, Pius VII decided
to give the French Government a signal proof of his goodwill. On September 21,
1800, Mgr. Spina, Archbishop of Corinth, set out for Vercelli, accompanied by
Father Caselli, a learned Servite. But the French Government transferred the
negotiations from Vercelli to Paris; and the Pope could not but acquiesce. He
therefore ordered Spina to Paris, but instructed him to discuss only the points
raised at Vercelli, and strictly forbade him to sign any document whatever.
Seeing that there was a prospect of an agreement between the Pope and the
Republic, the royalist party now made a desperate effort to stop the
negotiations. Through the agency of Cardinal Mauiy, Louis XVIII had done what
he could to keep alive Pius VII’s distrust of Bonaparte; and, when he heard
that the Pope had not only issued a brief to the non-juring clergy expressing
hopes of a settlement, but had also sent a mission to Paris, Louis tried to
interest his host, the Tsar, on his behalf. But the victory of Hohenlinden began,
and Bonaparte’s offer of Malta completed, the conversion of Paul to friendship
with the Republic. Louis could only protest.
Spina arrived
at Paris on November 5, and found that, with the exception of Lebrun, Bonaparte
was the only official in favour of a religious settlement. Talleyrand secretly,
Fouche openly, opposed the new policy; but Bonaparte was not a man to be
intimidated by his subordinates. Since his return from Italy, he had attended
mass with some regularity, not from any religious convictions, but in order to
emphasise his desire for an understanding with the Church. A Deist,
but
not a Christian, he admired the centralised Roman Catholic form of Chr;
tianicy above all others; what he aimed at was the stability of his government.
He calculated that, should the strife in the Church be ended, the Pope would
become his ally. Consequently he was extremely anxious that negotiations should
be rapidly pursued; and, as soon as Spina arrived, they began. Gregoire, whom
the First Consul had previously approached, proved too hostile to the Roman
Court for Bonaparte’s purposes; and Bernier, a refractory priest—once a leader
of the Chouans, now a government agent—was appointed to conduct the
negotiations. An agreement was all but arrived at in the first three weeks.
Bonaparte having offered to recognise the Roman Catholic religion, the Pope was
prepared to acquiesce in the confiscation of the Church lands. Spina raised
objections to the compulsory ejection of bishops from their sees by the Pope,
as such a measure was ultra vires. The Gallican Bernier acquiesced in this
objection, and proposed that the Pope, after a ‘f general exhortation*” should
suspend the disobedient, whereupon the Government would appoint diocesan
administrators cum jure successionis. Spina had virtually suggested this; but
Bernier’s apparent wavering induced Spina to raise his demands. He refused to
agree to a promisr of fidelity to the Government, and thereby destroyed all
chance of an immediate agreement. ’
The
negotiations were intricate and prolonged. Bonaparte, as rusi in diplomacy as
on the field of battle, at one moment pressed one point and withdrew another,
then withdrew both and emphasised a third. By January, 1801, however, he had
put Spina in possession of what may be considered as his definite intentions.
Spina must have bitterly repented his imprudent refu»al of the French proposals
when, between November and February, Bonaparte formulated his demands with
greater precision and in more exacting terms. The phrase “dominant religion”
was withdrawn in favour of a bald recognition by the Consuls that the Roman
Catholic. religion was that of the majority of Frenchmen; the sees of bishops who
refused to obey the Pope’s request, or command, to resign were to be declared
ipso facto vacant; the Church lands, even if unsold, were not to be restored to
the Church; the clergy must take an oath of fidelity to the Constitution or to
the Government; and the married constitutional clergj were to be recognised as
laymen in communion with the Catholic Church. Meanwhile, the Pope’s demands
had also been rising. In January and February he ordered Spina to press for the
annulment of the sale of the Church landc, while the precariousness of the
Temporal Power thrust the spiritual needs of the Church into the background. So
the Archbishop of Corinth was told not to forget to claim the Legations, and to
demand a compensation for the loss of Avignon. But these instructions led to
nothing, for they reached Paris too late. In spite of Talleyrand’s attempts to
intimidate Spina into signing the draft convention, the Archbishop had
succeeded in
i80i]
Cacault sent to Rome. Bonaparte's terms. 183
transferring
the negotiations to Rome, and so virtually relieved himself of all direct
responsibility.
Simultaneously
the First Consul, dissatisfied at the dilatoriness of the negotiations and
suspicious of Spina’s good faith, appointed as minister in Rome a man whom he
knew to be favourable to his policy. Cacault was ordered to combine assurances
as to the Temporal Power with demands for an unreserved acceptance of the terms
as they stood; but, at the same time, Bonaparte carefully enjoined respect for
the Pope. “Behave towards the Pope,” he told Cacault in his last interview,
“as though he were in command of 200,000 men.” Cacault obeyed his master’s
commands in all respects; but Pius VII, in accordance witii his usual polity,
submitted the French project to two Congregations; and the arts of
procrastination were so successfully practised that no answer was given till
May 12. It took the form of a counterproject, based on an alternative scheme
which Bernier had sent along with Bonaparte’s terms. Any suggestion entailing
recognition of the constitutional clergy was met with a direct non possumus; to
allow the confiscation of the Church lands would be to sanction the teaching of
heretics such as Arnold of Brescia and Wyclif; but the Pope was ready to give a
dispensation to the present occupiers. Although the Pope had previously
expressed the opinion that, if the phrase “dominant religion ” were not used, “
the whole fabric would collapse,” the Roman theologians offered to sacrifice
it, provided the Roman confession were established as the religion of the
State. It was urged that, if the First Consul was to have the right of
nominating to vacant sees, this proviso was imperative, in order to avoid
offending the Tsar of Russia and the Kings of England and Prussia, to whom
Benedict XIV had refused a similar right on the ground that these sovereigns
were not Catholics. An excuse for meeting the First Consul in another matter
was furnished by historical research. It was discovered that, to end the
Donatist schism, all the African bishops had resigned their sees; and, as the
French bishops had wished to resign in 1791, advantage might now be taken of
that offer. Refusal would entail the sin of “detestable irreverence,” which
would justify the deprivation of the offender. Finally, the question of the
oath afforded a good opportunity for asserting the superiority of the Pope to
General Councils; for, though the Fourth Lateran Council had forbidden the
clergy to take oaths, the Pope was willing to sanction an oath of fidelity to
the Government.
The Curia,
therefore, conscious of its inability to resist, and anxious for a settlement,
was willing to agree to the French proposals. But, before its offer reached
Paris, the negotiations entered on a new phase. The long delay had irritated
the First Consul; and his vexation at the failure of his diplomatic schemes was
vented on the comparatively innocent Pope. The constitutional clergy were now
allowed to hold a national council, while Talleyrand despatched an ultimatum to
Rome.
184 Consalvi in Paris. The Concordat signed. [isoi
The effect of
these measures was to bring Cardinal Consalvi, the papal Secretary of State, to
Paris. He arrived on June 20,1801; and, after a dramatic reception by Bonaparte
on June 21, the negotiations were resumed. The solution of the problem was
aided, on the one side, by the absence of Talleyrand, and, on the other side,
by the meeting, on July 3, of the council of constitutional clergy, which
appeared to Consalvi to be a potential realisation of the First Consul’s
threats of a national religion.
Although
Bonaparte refused to abate the demands he had made in January, the Cardinal
drafted a counter-project (July 11) which Bemier declared to be consistent with
Gallican liberties. Accordingly Joseph Bonaparte^ Cretet, and Bemier were named
as French plenipotentiaries; and on July 13 they met the papal envoys. The
project submitted to the meeting differed materially from Consalvi’s,
especially in some words (now heard for the first time) about police
restrictions on the liberty of worship. The Cardinal offered a strenuous
opposition to the new proposals, and at last succeeded in getting rid of the
objectionable amendments. The new convention was brought to the First Consul in
the afternoon of July 14. He tore it up, and exclaimed at dinner to Consalv '
that, if Henry VIII, who had not one-half of his power, could break with the
Pope* the First Consul would be well able to manage without him. Eventually,
however, Bonaparte allowed himself to be persuaded by the Austrian minister,
Philip Cobenzl, to renew the conferences; and, on July 15, the Concordat was
signed by the plenipotentiaries and accepted by the First Consul.
The preamble
of this famous convention defines the nature of the faith professed by the
French nation and the Consuls. The seventeen articles which follow may be
divided into three classes. Five articles define the rights of the Church—its
freedom to exercise public worship (Art. 1), the prayers to be said at the end
of divine service (8), the establishment of cathedral chapters (11), the grant
of salaries to the beneficed clergy (14), the permission to Catholics to make
pious foundations (15). Five others deal with the question of nomination to
benefices. In the case of bishoprics, the arrangement of the Concordat of 1516 is
revived (4, 5); the patronage of the parish livings, taken away from the
landlords in 1790, is now given to the bishops (10); the oath to be taken by
the clergy is defined (6, 7). Other articles are dictated by the circumstances
of 1801, and deal with the formation of new dioceses and parishes (2, 9), the
resignation of the bishops then bolding diocesan titles (3), the restoration of
the churches and the alienation of lands (12, 13), the grant to the Republic of
the privileges enjoyed at Rome by the Kings of France (16). Art. 17 provided
for a new Concordat, should any future First Consul not be a Catholic.
\ As signs of
haste are apparent in the irregular arrangement of the clauses, so also does
theii phraseology betray a lack of deliberation.
There was a
want of precision, and there were many strange omissions. No number was fixed
for the new dioceses. Not a word was said as to whether the Pope could refuse
to institute a nominee of the Government. After a long struggle about the
manner of making pious foundations,1 the Government had suddenly
dropped its contention, but only when it put forward its claim to making police
regulations for the execution of the Concordat; and these regulations were
subject to no limitation but the will of the French Government. Nevertheless,
vague as the terms occasionally were, they were precise enough to show that
Bonaparte had attained the main objects for which he had been striving. The
revolutionary settlement of the Church lands was maintained; liberty of
conscience was recognised in Art. 17. The Pope’s consent to deprive the bishops
of their sees, if they refused to resign, permitted Bonaparte to map out the
new dioceses; while the recovery of the power of nominating bishops, and the
provisions for the appointment to smaller benefices, gave the Government
control over the ecclesiastical and political complexion of the clergy. Any
deficiency in this respect could be made good by the police restrictions on
liberty of worship referred to in Art. 1.
On the other
hand, if the Pope surrendered positions which he had once considered vital, his
retreat was covered by the phraseology of the Concordat. The Government refused
to recognise the Catholic religion as “dominant”; but the Consuls had been
persuaded to make a public profession of that creed. Though the bishops were to
resign their sees under penalty of deprivation, this clause was so worded that
compulsion was veiled under an expression of confidence that the bishops would
obey the Pope’s exhortation. The vexed question of the oath of fidelity had
been solved by substituting the oath taken by the clergy under the ancien
regime, a compromise which could hardly be offensive to either party. The
abandonment of the Church lands was represented, not as a matter of principle,
but merely as a measure of circumstance; and this loss was more than
counterbalanced by the guaranteed salaries of the clergy, the restoration of
cathedral chapters, and the apparent abandonment of the Government’s claim to
regulate the manner of making pious foundations. Politically, too, the alliance
of France with the Papacy gave the latter a friend among the Great Powers, and
reconciled it with the first military State in Europe. Still, while Pius VII
might congratulate himself on having improved the position of the Church in
matters spiritual and temporal, he can scarcely have doubted which side gained
most by the agreement.
The next step
was to obtain the ratification of the Concordat. The complete success of the
measure depended on the goodwill of no less than four parties—the Pope, the
French Republic, the constitutional clergy, and the legitimate bishops. On
August 16,1801, the National Council was dissolved by order of the First
Consul. A show of
186 The Constitutional Church.—The “Petite ]£glise.”
[isoi
resistance
was made; and Le Coz, the President of the Council, with Griegoire and a few
other bishops, protested against the reduction of the sees, demanded the
restoration of capitular elections, accepted papal institution only as a
temporary device* and declared that bulls from Rome should be supervised by the
French metropolitans. But no more was heard of these objections; and, when the
constitutional bishops were requested to resign, only two refused. Although
signs of trouble appeared at Rome, the. attempt to resist the Concordat came to
nothing. It was prompted; by jealousy of Consalvi, on whose return the Pope
departed from his usual custom of following the advice of the Sacred College.
With some vacillation, he despatched two ratifications of the convention-^the
one absolute, the other conditional. With the brief on the married clergy, he
also sent two bulls concerning the resignation of the bishops, the one
addressed to Spina and through him to the constitutional bishops, the other
addressed directly to the latter. Spina was left to choose which documents he
should present; and he wisely sent in the absolute ratification and the “
indirect ” bull. Talleyrand’s attempts to procrastinate were roughly defeated
by Bonaparte, who, on September 8, 1801, ratified the Concordat on behalf of
the Republic, reserving to himself the right of “providing by regulations
against the more serious inconveniences that might arise from a literal
execution of the Concordat.” What this meant the next few months were to show.
Thus far, the
process of ratification had been carried out with remarkably little friction.
Nineteen French bishops, however, met in London, and refused to resign their
sees. Encouraged by Louis XVIII, who saw a new chance of wrecking the hateful
Concordat, twenty-six of their brethren in Germany followed their example.
Later, some of these gave way; but there still remained thirty-five bishops to
form a non-juring body called the “petite iglise,’’ which survived till 1893.
The majority of the legitimate bishops deserted the cause of Louis, and, by
obeying the Pope* rallied to the Republic. Forty-four prelate; resigned; and,
after a final exhortation to the recalcitrant bishops, Pius VII issued the bull
for the delimitation of the new dioceses. The resistance of the legitimate
bishops caused considerable delay in the issue of this bull; and the legate
appointed to execute the Concordat had to leave Rome without it. Bonaparte, on
the advice of Cobenzl, had requested that Cardinal Caprara might be appointed
to this post. He was a;pious and amiable ecclesiastic, devoid of insight into
motives or character, easily intimidated and cajoled, and, as nuncio at Vienna,
had given much dissatisfaction to the Roman Court. The Pope, unable to refuse
Bonaparte’s request, attempted ■ to tie Caprara’s hands by instructing
him to refuse institution to the constitutional clergy, and, harking back to
the Temporal Power, to demand the restoration of the Legations and compensation
for Avignon. The Legate was received by Bonaparte with great honour; but the
delay in the issue of the bull
isoi-2] The Concordat ratified.^—The Organic
Articles. 187
roused his
ire, and he complained of being tricked by the Curia. In December, however, the
bull arrived; and it was at length possible to submit the treaty to the
legislative bodies for their acceptance as a law of the State. It was here that
Bonaparte had reason to anticipate serious opposition. When, on August 6, 1801,
the Concordat was read before the Council of State, not a word was said in its
favour; even the Senate did not disguise its dissatisfaction. But, by a strain
on the Constitution, the opposition of the Tribunate was surmounted; the
promised, police regulations, which appeared under the title of Articles
Organiques, somewhat gilded the p-iU for the legislature; and, with remarkable
celerity, the law, comprising both the Concordat and the Organic Articles, was
passed, after a show of discussion, in three days (April 8, 1802).
The Organic
Articles had been expressly kept back by Bonaparte until the bulls connected
with the Concordat had been issued. Had these articles been known to Pius VII,
he would certainly have broken off the negotiations—a fact which explains
Bonaparte’s eagerness that the Pope should immediately perform his part of the
bargain. Of the hundred and twenty-one articles, seventy-seven deal with the
Roman Church; and here Bonaparte was able to enact those provisions which he
had been forced to omit from the Concordat. The supremacy of the State over the
Church was asserted by provisions that no bulls, briefs, or legates from Rome,
no decrees of General Councils or National Synods, could enter France without
permission from the Government; the system of appel ccmime (Tabus was revived;
while other articles dealt with the more trivial questions , of the ringing of
church bells, the position, salary, qualifications, dress, and titles of the
clergy.' One liturgy and one catechism only were to be used throughout the
Republic. Civil marriage was always to precede the ecclesiastical rite. Though
obviously intended to restore the Gallicanism of the ancien regime, the
preceding articles would not have excited opposition by themselves. What galled
the Court of Rome was a clause which showed a disposition to go back to the worst
days of Louis XIV, by ordering seminarists to be taught the four Gallican
articles of 1682; while the arrangement of the articles, by combining
regulations for Catholics and Protestants, placed all religions on a level, and
maintained the obnoxious principle of liberty of conscience.
All the
formalities having been completed, the First Consul nominated the new bishops.
On March 30, Caprara, who had received authority to institute the First
Consul’s nominees, learnt that Bonaparte intended to nominate ten
constitutional bishops. He was deeply mortified, for, though on his arrival in
Paris he heard that the number would be fifteen, and though, on March 15, he
had been asked if he would tccept constitutional nominees, he had, during the
negotiations at Amiens, been lulled into the belief that no constitutional
bishops would
be nominated.
On April 9 he was received by Bonaparte in a solemn audience. Although he had
been promised an exemption from the oath usually exacted from papal legates^ he
read a Latin declaration, promising to respect the Gallican liberties. Next day
the Moniteur announced that he had signed the declaration. He protested, but
was told that the matter was of no consequence; and there, with characteristic
weakness, he let it rest. But he insisted that, if the constitutional bishops
were to receive institution, they must retract their errors. Their refusal was
unanimous; but they consented to sign a letter drawn up by Bernier and Portalis
by which they renounced the civil constitution. Caprara was induced to accept
this; but he required that it should be publicly announced that the
constitutional nominees had been reconciled to the Holy See after explicitly
confessing their late errors before Bernier and Pancemont. These two men, on
the morrow of their consecration as Bishops of Orleans and Vannes, informed the
Cardinal that these conditions had been fulfilled. Caprara thereupon (April
17) instituted the constitutional bishops, who next day denied the truth of the
statement.
The
publication of the Concordat took place on Easter Day (April 18, 1802).
Bonaparte’s victory was complete. He had triumphed over the Jacobins by forcing
the generals to come to church; by the Organic Articles he had apparently
reduced the clergy to the condition of an obedient department of the State; by
the convention with the Pope he had made an alliance with the most powerful
moral force in Europe, had removed all religious reasons for opposition to the
Republic, and had established his own position more firmly than ever. Nor can
it be doubted that to the mass of the French people the achievement was most
acceptable. What opposition there was had arisen among the remnants of the old
revolutionists; but the loyalty of the bulk of the younger generation to the
Catholic Church was shown by the enthusiasm which hailed Chateaubriand’s Genie
du Christianisme. In so far, then, as the policy of the Concordat agreed with
the wishes of the French nation, there is nothing to be said against it. But
experience was to show that in some ways its effect was the reverse of what
Bonaparte intended. He had hoped that the clergy would revive its old loyalty
to the Government, and resist all encroachments of the papal power. He did not
see that, by putting the parish priests absolutely into the hands of the
bishops, he gave the latter an army which might some day be used against him;
and that, by depriving the bishops of their lands, he deprived them, now that
they had lost their self-taxing powers, of the moderating influence they had been
able to exercise over the Government of the anden regime, and reduced them, in
case of Conflict with the civil power, to rely for support on their ancient
rival, the Pope. The decay of Gallicanism and the rise of Ultramontanism in
France during the nineteenth century is to be attributed in no small degree to
the Revolution and to the Concordat of 1801.
At present,
however, the First Consul had every reason for satisfaction. Such was not the
case with the Pope. When he heard of the Organic Articles, he delivered an
allocution, which was the first of a series of papal protests against them; and
he considered Caprara’s weakness in the matter of the oath tantamount to
treason. Caprara, too, had said that Bonaparte would communicate at Easter; and
here again the Pope had been disappointed. In short, the effect at Rome of the
news of recent events in Paris was disastrous : but, as the Pope did not wish
to break with the Power which alone could restore to him his territories, he
pretended to be satisfied with the explanation that the Articles were necessary
police regulations. Meanwhile, in Paris, Caprara was busy raining his master’s
interests. In May the nomination to the smaller dioceses began. Bonaparte
desired that the constitutional clergy should be left undisturbed so far as
possible, and treated the legitimate clergy with some harshness. Caprara, on
his side, insisted on obtaining a retractation from the constitutional clergy.
On hearing this, Bonaparte tried to intimidate the Legate by a threat to convert
the French to Protestantism. Even Caprara saw through this; so Pancemont,
Talleyrand, the Archbishop of Aix, and Bernier in turn bombarded the
unfortunate Cardinal with notes declaring that his obstinacy was ruining the
new settlement. Their efforts, combined with a judicious offer by Bonaparte of
the archbishopric of Milan, and an unbounded confidence in the piety and good
faith of the First Consul, induced Caprara to give way. The Pope also yielded
on this point, as he was not in a position to make trouble; for, by restoring
Pesaro and Ancona, and by representing to the King of Naples that Benevento and
Ponte Corvo belonged to the Church, the French Government had laid the Curia
under a considerable obligation.
The First
Consul’s wishes, therefore, thanks to Caprara, had now been met by the Pope in,
every respect; and relations between the two Powers became cordial. But it was
not to be expected that this ill- assorted pair would long remain on friendly
terms. The compliance of the Pope led Bonaparte to make further demands. He
required, in violation of the privileges of the other Catholic Powers, that the
five vacant places in the College of Cardinals should be filled by Frenchmen.
If the Pope would not create five French Cardinals, he would allow none at all,
and would hold no communication with the Sacred College. Here again the Pope
had to give way.
Matters
followed a similar course when Bonaparte wished to negotiate for an Italian
Concordat; the Pope was unwilling to grant it, but mable to resist. In 1803 a
convention between the Pope and the Italian Republic was formed, on the same
lines as that with France; but its terms were generally more favourable to the
Church. The religion of the Italian Republic continued to be that of Rome; two
bishoprics were suppressed and only three archbishoprics allowed; cathedral
chapters
190
The Italian Concordat,—The press.—The Orders. [1802-6
were to be
endowed; and education was put under the control of the bishops. A clause was
added, exempting the clergy from any obligation to marry persons suffering
from' a canonical impediment. But in February, 1804* Melzi, the Vice-President,
issued a decree analogous to the Organic Articles. The Pope protested that
Bonaparte, as President, by allowing this decree, had violated the Concordat.
The first article of the decree maintained certain laws which iJie Concordat
had implicitly repealed; by another the President claimed certain rights
formerly assumed by the Emperor, but never recognised by the Pope, and forming
no part of the privileges of the Duke of Milan, to which alone the President
was entitled by the Concordat; thirdly, by adding the word “definitely” to the
clause enacting that no foundations might be suppressed save by consent of the
Holy See, the decree claimed the right of “ provisional ” suppression; and
lastly, the attempt to exercise government control over the number of novices
and ordinands was a clear violation of one of the conditions of the treaty. To
these protests, however, Bonaparte turned a deaf ear.
Within the
limits of France the polity of Bonaparte required subtler methods. We have seen
how in May, 1802, he had insisted on the parishes being filled to a great
extent by constitutional clergy. Exactly the opposite policy was followed with
regard to the bishops. These were drawn for the most pai t from the
clergy of the ancien regime, who, as converts to the Revolution and deserters
from the old cause, might be relied on to give firmer support to Napoleon’s
government than those who had never wavered in their allegiance to the new
order. But, to ensure the submission of the clergy, the prefects were ordered,
on May 31, 1802, to exercise a censorship over all the pastoral letters of the
bishops. When these protested, the regulation was interpreted as an order that
the letters should be handed in to the prefect and printed at the press of the
prefecture.1 Any attempts at independence on the part of the
clerical as of the secular press were soon crushed; and in 1806 all the
clerical papers were united into one, the Journal des Cures, issued under the
strict supervision of the Government.
If Bonaparte
hoped that the secular clergy of France would support him in the event of a
quarrel with the Pope, and would use their influence for the purposes of
facilitating conscription—and in the latter case his confidence was not
misplaced—he Saw clearly that the regular clergy might prove less amenable.
Taking advantage of the peace proclaimed by the Concordat, many of the old
religious Orders had returned to France and resumed their educational work. In
June, 1802, Bonaparte suppressed all such communities in the German territories
recently annexed to France; and in January, 1803, he issued an order to the
prefects to prevent the revival of these Orders. In June, 1804, he decreed the
suppression of all unauthorised congregations, and especially of the “ Peres de
la Foi,” who disguised under this name the old Society
1803-6]
Liturgy and catechism.—Fesch sent to Rome. 191
of Jesus; but
this sweeping decree was not rigorously carried out. Charitable communities
were not molested; and Napoleon put under the high protection of his mother
five communities of sisters engaged in works of mercy.
The Organic
Articles had provided for the use of one liturgy and one catechism throughout
France. Save for the observance of the festival of St Napoleon on August 15,
better known as the feast of the Assumption, the single liturgy seems to have
been an unrealised ideal; but the catechism was ready in 1803, and made no
small stir. It was based on that of Bossuet. But the First Consul delayed its
publication until his proclamation as Emperor; and in September, 1805, Consalvi
heard of it. He ordered Caprara to prevent its appearance, on the ground that
the publication of a catechism by command of the Emperor would be an
infringement of the rights of the Church. In February, 1806, Caprara sanctioned
the catechism; and the Vatican had to content itself with reprimanding its
Legate. But the catechism did not satisfy the bishops; and Cardinal Fesch discovered
the reason. It did not contain the doctrine extra eccledam nulla solus. Anxious
that a catechism which damned those who dared resist the Emperor should be well
received, Napoleon, contrary to the spirit of the Organic Articles, inserted
the doctrine. Loud applause greeted the appearance of the catechism; the
bishops concealed their objections till 1814.
The
proclamation of Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul for Life in August, 1802,
marks a further: step in the development of his policy towards the Holy See.
During the negotiations for the Concordat, La Fayette had remarked, “ Ctioyen
Consul, avouez que vous voulez vous faire briser la Jiole sur la tete ”; and
Bonaparte had not denied it. Now that he was in power for life, all his
relations with the Pope are seen to lead up to a coronation in Paris by the
Pope. In order to persuade Pius VII to comply, he held out hopes of still
further concessions to the Holy See; but he hinted that disaster,would follow
if the Pope refused. Cacault, who showed himself too sympathetic with the
Curia, was recalled; and the First Consul appointed as ambassador at Rome his
own uncle, Cardinal Fesch, who proved as bad a diplomatist as he was,
subsequently, a good bishop.
In March,
1804, Fesch demanded the extradition of an emigre who was supposed to be
implicated in the plots, but, as a naturalised Russian subject, was in no way
amenable to the French courts. The Pope would have resisted this demand, had he
not been cowed by the news of the murder of the Due d’Enghien; once more he
submitted. On May 16, 1804, Napoleon was declared Emperor. A week earlier he
had consulted Caprara on the subject of the coronation. The pliant Legate
advised the Pope to , accede to Napoleon’s wishes; but Pius VII received the
French advances coldly. The blood of the Due d’Enghien was still fresh on
Napoleon’s hands. From motives of courtesy nothing
was said
about this; but other excuses were put forward. The demand was unprecedented;
and Paris was far from Borne. Some religious reason must be alleged for such a
request, compliance with which would probably offend the Court of Vienna. The
coronation oath must not contain any allusions to the Organic Articles, or to
liberty of worship; some attention must be paid to the protests against Melzi’s
decrees; the constitutional bishops must retract their errors before the Pope
in person. Caprara, who seems to have, assured Napoleon that no difficulties
would arise, was covered with confusion on receiving this despatch; and, on
hearing its import, Napoleon roughly refused to receive the Legate. The Pope,
however, was master of the situation; and Napoleon’s diplomatic efforts show
that he was aware of this. Blandishments proving vain* the Emperor declared
that, if his demands were not granted, the blame of overthrowing the Church
settlement would fall on the Pope. Insult succeeded where threats and flattery
had failed. Napoleon suggested that Pius VII had written to Vienna for advice.
Stung to the quick, the Pope decided to go to Paris in order to prove his good faith.
Fesch gave assurances that the Pope’s religious scruples would be respected;
but, to the latter’s disgust, the formal letter of invitation contained no
mention of the interests of religion. As it was too late to decline, the Pope
started, doubting whether he had not been tricked uga i, and leaving, it is
said, an act of abdication against the event of his being detained in France
against his will.
The Pope was
received by the common people with enthusiasm and devotion; but by the
officials generally, the “ Dominies universalis,n though treated
with respect, was made to feel his inferiority to the Emperor of the French.
The only advantages that he was able to gain from his journey were the
ecclesiastical marriage of Napoleon and Josephine the night before the
coronation, and the omission of any mention in the Moniteur of the Emperor’s
self-coronation. That he could insist on the ecclesiastical marriage shows how
advantageous a position Pius VII held before the coronation; while his failure
to obtain the retrocession of the Legations, the restoration of the Church to a
“ dominant ” position, or the abolition of divorce, is strong evidence of his
humility or his lack of firmness. After the coronation, the Pope’s demands were
met by polite reminders of the Emperor’s services to the Church, and by
assurances of Napoleon’s desire for its welfare; and in March, 1805, Pius VII
left Paris on his return to Bome.
Pius VII had
now reached the nadir of his career. The spiritual gains won for the Church had
not been obtained without sacrifice of principle, while the territorial
advantage derived from his Gallophil policy had not been equal to his
expectations. His compliance with Napoleon’s demands had led to personal
humiliation. Now, however,, the tuming-poiiit was reached. The Emperor’s
arrogance rapidly increased; and the Pope determined to make no more
concessions. The
Emperor
became a persecutor, the Pope a martyr. But, though there were spiritual
questions at issue in the quarrel, the clash was caused by temporal
considerations. Napoleon’s continental policy was incompatible with the
territorial sovereignty of the Pope. The differences, however, were at first of
another kind. In June, 1805, the Code NapoMon was extended to Italy. As it
permitted divorce, the Pope protested against this fresh violation of the
Italian Concordat. As usual, the Emperor recalled his services to religion, but
authorised Fesch to promise modifications. The promise was not fulfilled, and
it was forgotten in the more serious trouble that arose over the marriage of
Jerome. The light-hearted sailor had, at the age of nineteen and without his
mother’s leave, married a Miss Paterson, of Baltimore. When the Empire was
proclaimed, Jerome brought his wife back to Europe. The Emperor, who could not
brook this misalliance and had other matrimonial projects for Jerome, asked the
Pope to quash the marriage, which, according to the decrees of the Council of
Trent, was nullified by its secrecy. But the Pope replied that, as the decrees
of Trent had never been published at Baltimore, he could not annul the union.
Napoleon declared, perhaps with truth, that the Pope’s refusal was a piece of
spite because the Legations had not been restored to the Church; and, finding
there was no means of overcoming the Pope’s resistance, he dispensed with his
services and quashed Jerome’s marriage by an Imperial edict.
If Napoleon
had succeeded in keeping this dispute secret, his next step revealed to the
whole world the delicate nature of his relations; with the Pope. From this time
forward, Napoleon gradually increased his hold over the Papal States, and
entered on the policy which was finally to lead to their annexation and thus to
complete the breach between him and Pius VII. When, in 1805, war between
Austria and France was impending, the Court of Naples offered its neutrality,
if the French Emperor would withdraw Gouvion Saint-Cyr from Otranto. Anxious to
concentrate his forces, Napoleon, who was rather overweighted by his
combinations, agreed to pay the price. He therefore ordered Saint-Cyr to join
Massena on the Adige; but instructed him, while on the way, to occupy Ancona.
For a time
the Pope made no sign. Austria, with whom he was on bad terms, so far
misunderstood the situation as to protest against the Pope’s flagrant breach of
neutrality in allowing the passage of the French troops; and indeed it was
generally believed that the French occupied Ancona with the connivance of the
Pontifical Government. But, after hearing of Ulm and Trafalgar, the Pope sent a
protest to Napoleon. It reached him in the anxious days before Austerlitz, and
seemed to be a deliberate attempt to add to his difficulties. In his reply,
written after the victory, Napoleon made no secret of his feelings. He told the
Pope that Ancona had been occupied to protect the Holy See; and, in a violent
letter to Fesch, he threatened that, if the Pope continued his
194 Napoleon’s demands.—Seizure of Civita Vecchia.
[1805-6
unreasonable
behaviour, he would be reduced to the condition of Bishop of Rome. To justify
his conduct, the Pope . asserted that his protest was made to remove the'
impression that he was in collusion with the French, and once more claimed the
Legations and the repayment of moneys advanced to the French troops. But
Napoleon now had further designs. The Continental Blockade must be enforced,
the British minister, Jackson, expelled, and the Papal ports closed to the
British, the Russians, and the Swedes. This exorbitant request was put forward
by Napoleon as successor of Charlemagne, Emperor of Rome. Seeing the storm
coming, Jackson withdrew; but the other demands had to be met. In accordance
with the advice of the Sacred College, the Pope refused to close his ports, as
he had no grudge against the nations concerned; and he pointed out that, in
calling himself Emperor of Rome, his Imperial Majesty was talking nonsense.
Had not the
quarrel been so bitter, the recall of Fesch might have improved the situation.
The Cardinal was no longer on speaking terms with the Pope. He had groundlessly
accused the Papal Government of complicity in the murder of a French trader, of
making the tax levied for the maintenance of the French garrisons as vexatious
as possible, and of forming bands of men for the murder of isolated French
soldiers. . The inconvenience of the situation gave Napoleon an opportunity of
iannoying the Papal Court by substituting a layman for a churchman; but, by
obtaining an ambassador with whom the Pope was on speaking terms, the Quirinal
escaped from a difficulty. So long as Fesch was at Rome, the only channel of
communication between the Quirinal and the Tuileries was Caprara, who was now
worse than useless to the Pope, for the Emperor had paid his debts.
Before his
departure from Rome, Fesch notified the Pontifical Government of the accession
of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples. In reply, Consalvi reminded him of the
ancient suzerainty of the Pope over that kingdom, and put in a claim for
homage. To this proud but injudicious answer Napoleon replied by advancing
still further into the Papal States. If the Pope refused to close his ports,
they must be closed for him; the Continental Blockade was not to be nullified
by the obstinacy of an insignificant Power. Joseph therefore was empowered to
seize Civitk Vecchia; and the .protest against this step furnished an excellent
excuse for completing the occupation of the Papal ports by the seizure of
Ostia; while Benevento and Ponte Corvo were granted as principalities to
Talleyrand and Bernadotte.
But the
dismemberment of the Papal States did not shake the Pope’s determination,
though he accepted Consalvi’s resignation, which had been offered as a
conciliatory measure. On July 1, 1806, Napoleon, in a violent interview with
Caprara, threatened to occupy the whole of the Pope’s territory. Seeing the
approach of war with Prussia, Napoleon was anxious that the Pope should be
terrified into yielding before the
18O6-7] Rejection of Napoleon's terms.
195
crisis became
acute. The troops at Ancona and Civitk Vecchia were therefore ordered to seize
the Papal revenues and incorporate the Papal troops in the French army; and, on
July 8, the new envoy, Alquier, a former member of the Convention, presented an
ultimatum, bidding the Pope choose between surrender and annexation. But,
although Caprara and Spina implored the Pope to yield, Pius VII would not give
way; and events in the north for a time averted the threatened blow. After
Jena, Napoleon tried to induce the Pope to capitulate by negotiating through
the nuncio at Dresden. But the Emperor’s difficulties were the Pope’s
opportunity. In October, 1806, he refused to institute Napoleon’s nominees to
bishoprics in the newly annexed Venetian territory, on the ground that the
Italian Concordat did not apply to those lands. Checked at Eylau, and busy with
his combinations against Russia, Napoleon could only complain to Eugene of the
tracasseries of the nigauds composing the Roman Court.
But the
tables were turned when the Treaty of Tilsit left Napoleon free. The Emperor’s
tone became unbearably arrogant; and the retirement of Talleyrand from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed the skilful pen which had softened down so
many harsh demands. As the Papal ports were in Napoleon’s hands, it is not
surprising that an offer made by Pius VII in October, 1807, to close his ports
and meet the Emperor’s wishes in any matter not entailing war, should have been
considered insufficient. In spite, however, of Lemarois’ assumption of the
style of governor of the occupied Papal provinces, and in spite of his
imprisonment of the officials who protested against the usurpation, the Pope
hesitated to complete the rupture. Very little more was needed, for the Pope
had revoked Caprara’s powers and ordered Cardinal de Bayane, the Papal
plenipotentiary, to prepare to leave Paris.
Napoleon,
however, seems to have decided to give the Pope an opportunity of making peace.
A draft treaty was submitted, under the terms of which the Pope, in return for
the Emperor’s protection, would close his ports to infidels, Barbary pirates,
and the British; make common cause with France; surrender Ancona, Civita
Vecchia, and Ostia; recognise the new dynasties; abandon his claims against
Naples; and extend the Italian Concordat to Venetia. Further, one-third of the
Sacred College was to be French; and a new Concordat was to be made for the
Confederation of the Rhine. To these stipulations were added, in the original
draft, two clauses, directing that no protests should be made against the
Gallican liberties, and that the treaty should be accepted without reserve.
These clauses Fesch had succeeded in removing; but Champagny refused to
promise that they would not be reinserted. The Sacred College, to whom these
preposterous proposals were submitted, emphatically rejected them. Napoleon
thereupon ordered General Miollis to occupy the Castle of Sant’ Angelo, in
order “to protect the rear of the Neapolitan army,” and “to clear
196 Papal States annexed.—Captivity of the Pope,
[isos-9
Rome of
brigands.” Alquier was ordered to control the press and to crush any action
against French interests; while Napoleon announced his resolve that, should the
Pope issue any bull against him, he would annex the Papal States.
When,
therefore, on February 2, 1808, Miollis carried out the Emperor’s commands, the
Papal States became French in everything but in name. The Papal army was
absorbed in the French; and, by the expulsion of the Neapolitan cardinals, the
disorganisation of the Pontifical Government was rendered complete. As soon as
any Secretary of State appeared to be gaining influence over the Pope, he was
driven from the capital; and only the personal intervention of Pius VII saved
the last Secretary, Cardinal Pacca, from a similar fate. Less eminent
personages were summarily thrown into prison. At last, on May 17,
1809, Napoleon issued from Schonbrunn an Imperial
decree recalling the “ donation of Charlemagne, our august predecessor,” and
annexing Rome to the Empire. On June 10 the tricolour replaced the Papal banner
over the Castle of Sant’ Angelo. “ Consummatum est,” exclaimed Pius VII, with
the glib profanity of an Italian; and the next day there was affixed to the
doors of the three chief basilicas, a bull, “ Cum memoranda,” which, after
asserting the supremacy of the Pope over all temporal sovereigns in language
worthy of Boniface VIII, excommunicated the despoilers of the Church. The reply
to the bull was not long delayed. On July 6 the Pope and Cardinal Pacca were
carried off. At Grenoble they were separated; the Pope was taken to Avignon,
and thence to Savona; Pacca was imprisoned at Fenestrella.
This act of
violence was done by Napoleon’s orders; of this his letters to Murat furnish
conclusive proof. If he thought that the Pope’s stubbornness would be bent by
such methods, he was grievously mistaken Now that he was really deprived of his
freedom, and so cut off from his friends that he was compelled to make a
secretary of his valet, Pius VII became infinitely more powerful than before.
His policy was simple; he refused to perform any pontifical acts, knowing that,
sooner or later, Napoleon would be put to serious inconvenience. Napoleon, on
his part, tried, by an expedient which seemed perilously allied to certain
Protestant ideals, to substitute the Gallican Church for the Pope. No doubt
this had been the logical conclusion of the claims of the French bishops under
the amden regime; but never had the Church of France been in such danger of a
supremacy of the Tudor type as during the later years of the First Empire.
Confronted by the Pope’s opposition, Napoleon summoned in November, 1809, an
Ecclesiastical Commission, with Fesch, Maury, and Emery as its most prominent
members, for the purpose of advising the Government upon the questions' at
issue. Proceeding to the enquiries submitted to it, the Commission denied the
arbitrary power of the Pope in Church affairs, and sharply distinguished the
spiritual from the temporal power of the Papacy.
Therefore, as
the Concordat was a “synallagmatic contract” between Napoleon and Pius VII, the
latter was bound to observe it; and it was implicitly argued that the
annexation of Rome—a matter which did not touch the Concordat—was not
sufficient to justify the Pope in refusing to institute the new bishops. So
far, the report of the Commission was in Napoleon’s favour; but, on the other hand,
a preamble was affixed, demanding the liberty of the Pope, while protests were
raised against certain of the Organic Articles. Further, a National Council was
declared incompetent to deal with questions which concerned the whole of
Christendom; what was needed was a General Council, which could only be held
under the presidency of the Pope. Finally, although Napoleon had not “
essentially ” violated the Concordat, the separation of the Pope from his
cardinals was a serious matter of complaint, “ the force and justice of which
His Majesty would readily perceive.”
These
uncertain sounds in no way satisfied the Emperor; and in January, 1810, the
Commission was suppressed. Meanwhile French sees were falling vacant; and
dissatisfaction at the Emperor’s policy had been rapidly growing. In spite of
orders to the newspapers against any mention of the Pope, the bull of
excommunication and the imprisonment of Pius VII had become known. The former
was secretly circulated throughout France by an association called the
Congregation of Paris, to which many of the nobility belonged. It had been
founded in 1801 by an ex-Jesuit, as a purely charitable institution; but, its
methods now becoming political, Napoleon arrested Alexis de Noailles and five
other members. The Congregation pretended to dissolve, and thus anticipated the
decree which suppressed all such bodies (October 1, 1809). On the failure of
the Commission, the Emperor regulated the doctrine of the Church by Senatus
Consulta. It was by this means that the coping-stone was set upon the scheme of
religious persecution on February 17, 1810. On that'day the Senate passed a
decree which, while annexing Rome as a free Imperial city, granting palaces to
the Pope at Paris, Rome, and elsewhere, and guaranteeing him an income of
2,000,000 francs, declared that spiritual authority could not be exercised by a
foreign Power within the Empire, and provided that future Popes, at their
enthronement, should swear not to contravene the Gallican Articles of 1682,
which were hereby declared common to all the Churches of the Empire. The result
was that, in Italy, bishops and priests refused to adhere to these articles,
and were transported in hundreds to Corsica, where they remained in strict
seclusion until the fall of Napoleon.
The next
victims of the Emperor’s rage were the cardinals. Unable to obtain from the
Pope a decree nullifying the union with Josephine and a faculty for marrying
Marie-Louise, Napoleon created a chancery for the Archbishop of Paris, which
granted his demands. Consalvi and twelve of the cardinals who had been brought
to Paris refused to attend the ecclesiastical ceremony. They were driven from
the wedding reception
198 The Black Cardinals.—The National Council,
[lsio-u
with every
contumely, Transported to various provincial towns, they were reduced by the
confiscation of their property to dependence on charity; and, being forbidden
to wear the emblems of their rank, they received the name of the “ Black
Cardinals.”
The question
of the vacant sees of France and Italy continually grew more serious. On the
advice of Cardinal Maury, who had deserted Louis XVIII, recourse was had to an
expedient employed by Louis XIV in similar circumstances. The Emperor’s nominee
was to be appointed by the Chapter as provisional adnr listrator of the
diocese. But, unlike Louis XIV, Napoleon could not count on the support of the
Chapters. The Congregation secretly distributed briefs from Savona, forbidding
the Chapters to obey the Government’s orders. Some Chapters resisted; that of Paris
refused to accept Maury as archbishop. “Anxious to protect his subjects from
the rage and fury of this ignorant and peevish old man,” Napoleon deprived the
Pope of all writing materials, and even of the Fisherman’s ring. But, in spite
of this disgraceful treatment, Pius VII showed as yet no signs of yielding,
although in 1810 Napoleon had made several efforts to induce him to come to
terms. Lebzeltem (the Austrian diplomatist), then Spina and Caselli, tried to
persuade the Pope to give way; but he absolutely refused, except under physical
compulsion, to live anywhere but at Rome or Savona. He continued to demand
liberty as a preliminary to all negotiation.
A new
Commission was therefore appointed in January, 1811. Like its predecessor, this
body demanded the liberation of the Pope. It declared the diocesan bishops
capable of granting dispensations, and suggested that, if the Pope gave no
reasons for his refusal to institute bishops, a return might be made, after due
preparation of public opinion, to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438. But it shrank
from the responsibility of actually recommending such a step, and reported in
favour of the convocation of a National Council. Summoning the Commission
before him, Napoleon denounced the policy of Pius VII, and, entering upon a
discussion on the authority of the Pope, was completely routed by Emery. He now
decided to summon the National Council, but, at the moment of its assembly, he
made one final effort to obtain the Pope’s adhesion to the Senatus Consultum of
February 17,
1810. One Italian and three French bishops were
despatched for this purpose. After ten days’ negotiation (May 10-20), they
succeeded in extracting an unsigned paper by which the Pope agreed that a
provision should be inserted in the Concordats that, if he did not within six
months give institution to the Emperor’s nominee, the right was to lapse to the
Metropolitan. No sooner were the bishops gone than Pius VII repented. But it
was too late; Napoleon- had won the move.
The National
Council met on June 17, in a spirit of utmost devotion to Pius VII. An oath of
fidelity to the Pope was immediately taken;
i8ii]
The Council dissolved. Resistance of the Pope. 199
and long
debates ensued on the vexed question of the relation of the Pope to the
Council. Napoleon desired that the Papal assent should follow the decisions of
the Council; but the opposition to this was very strong. On July 5 the Council
declared that nothing could be done unless the Pope had given his assent to its
convocation ; and they appointed a commission to learn his intentions.
Napoleon’s anger passed all bounds. Exaggerating the recent concession, he sent
a message announcing that the Pope had been pleased to agree to the Emperor’s
demands. Though shaken at first by this news, the Council on the following day
became convinced of its falsity, and reaffirmed the decree of July 5. The
Emperor forthwith dissolved the Council, and imprisoned three of its leaders at
Vincennes.
Once more
Cardinal Maury came to the Emperor’s help, and remarked that wine which is bad
in cask is often good in bottle. Applying this parable, Napoleon summoned
individually those members of the Council who had remained in Paris. As these
prelates viewed the Emperor’s policy with some favour, the task of converting them
was not difficult. In a fortnight the persuasive arguments of the Minister of
Public Worship, backed up by the sinister presence of the Minister of Police,
bore fruit; and when, on August 5, the mutilated Council met once more, it
decreed by a great majority that sees could not be vacant for more than a year,
and that, if the Pope did not give institution within six months, the right was
to lapse to the Metropolitan.
The Imperial
supremacy seemed now to be complete. By the decree annexing Rome, the Temporal
Power was abolished and the Pope deprived of his necessary liberty; the
legislature, in the Senatus Consultum of February 17, 1810, had defined the
doctrine of the national Church; and now, by a decree of the National Council,
the clergy had shaken themselves free of the spiritual supremacy of the Pope.
But there was a fatal flaw in this conclusion. The decree of the National
Council was expressly reserved for the approval of the Pope, without which it
was null. Pius VII was not likely to sign away his spiritual supremacy; but
Napoleon set himself to persuade him to do so. He sent some Italian cardinals
to Savona to act as the Pope’s advisers, and he carefully regulated the
behaviour of the commission of the Council which brought the decree.. The Pope,
on the advice of the treacherous card' lals, yielded and on September 20 signed
the brief “ Ex quowhich not only ratified the Conciliar decree, but contained
its very words. To the general surprise, Napoleou refused to accept the brief.
Its language savoured of “ the Gregorys and Bonifaces ”; and it did not
explicitly extend the French method of appointing bishops to the late Papal
States. But, though Napoleon tried to obtain a brief which, merely accepted the
decree sans phrase, Pius VII refused to issue another. He repeated his demand
for liberty : Napoleon replied by asking for his resignation. It was clear that
a real settlement was further off than ever; Pius VII
200
The Pope in France. Concordat of Fontainebleau. [1812-3
was reduced
to the straitened captivity which he had undergone before the negotiations
began; and Napoleon busied himself, amid his preparations against Russia, with
a persecution of the clergy who seemed to be disaffected to his rule.
In May, 1812,
to prevent the British carrying off the Pope, and under the pretence of doing a
favour to the Emperor of Austria who was interceding for him, Napoleon ordered
Pius VII to be brought to Fontainebleau. Pius VII arrived safely on June 19,
although he nearly died on the way; and there he lived, in strict seclusion,
during the Russian campaign. That disaster changed the whole situation. It was
now the Pope who held the Emperor in his hand; and on December 29, 1812,
Napoleon made advances for a settlement of the dispute. His demands were more
exorbitant than ever; he knew that the Pope would refuse them, but thought that
a compromise would probably represent his real desires. On January 18, 1813, he
suddenly descended upon Fontainebleau, and was apparently reconciled to the
Pope. The two shut themselves up together for several days, and discussed the
treaty. The result was that, on January 25, the Emperor and the Pope signed the
preliminaries known as the Concordat of Fontainebleau. The former renounced
his pretensions to the Catholicity of the Gallican Articles, his claim that the
Catholic sovereigns should nominate two-thirds of the Sacred College, and his
demand that the Pope should condemn the conduct of the Black Cardinals and
exclude di Pietro and Pacca from the amnesty. On his side, the Pope yielded
only by confirming the Conciliar decree on institution to bishoprics, but he
obtained the restoration of the suburban sees and the exclusive right of
appointment to those posts; the ejected bishops of the Papal States were to be
named bishops in partibus, until sees could be found for them in France and
Italy, where the Pope would have the right of providing directly to ten
bishoprics in each country. The Propaganda and the Penitentiary were restored,
and were to follow the Pope, wherever he might choose to live; and he was to
enjoy a revenue of two millions.
The Pope,
however, was not satisfied with the document, and this soon became clear. When
the amnesty restored to him the Black Cardinals, he began to betray his
intentions. Napoleon, on February 13, made the Senate declare the new Concordat
a law of the State. On March 24 the Pope, at the instance of the cardinals,
protested against the publication of preliminaries as if they were a definite
treaty, and sent a retractation to the Emperor, saying that he had been “led
into error.” Next day Napoleon retorted by declaring the Concordat obligatory
on all bishops and chapters, and enacting that infractions would render the
culprit amenable to the Imperial courts, not, as leretofore, to the Council of
State. Finally, as the Pope had abrogated the Concordat, Napoleon imprisoned
again di Pietro and many of the clergy who had been released by its amnesty
clause. But the Emperor’s
absence in
Germany enabled the clergy to disobey him; and the Pope had no difficulty in
making his wishes known.
After the
crushing defeat of Leipzig, Napoleon became a suppliant; and the Pope took full
advantage. Knowing that the Allies were fighting his battle, Pius VII turned a
deaf ear to Napoleon’s entreaties. At last, when, in January, 1814, the Allies
crossed the Rhine, Napoleon offered the restoration of the Papal States. The
offer was rejected; such a restoration was an act of justice, and could not be
the subject of a treaty. On January 24 the Austrians entered Burgundy; and the
Pope was again carried off to Savona. When the Allies at Chatillon demanded his
liberation, Napoleon ordered him to be conducted to the Austrian outposts; and
on March 19 he left Savona on his return to Bome. His captivity had lasted
nearly five years.
The year 1808
saw another dispute between the Emperor and the Pope reach a critical point.
The negotiations for a Concordat with the Confederation of the Rhine were
finally broken off. The condition of the German Church was little less than
chaotic. During the last decade of the eighteenth century, Josephism had spread
widely through the German Courts; and there were many cries for Church reform.
In 1803 an attempt was made to satisfy the clamour. On February 25 the Diet
pronounced the decree of secularisation. By that famous Act not only was the
suzerainty of the ecclesiastical Princes of the Empire extinguished, but the
landed property of the Church was handed over to the civil power. As in France,
compensation was offered to the clergy in the form of a state salary, which of
itself was sufficient evidence of their dependence on the State. That the
Governments were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity is evident from
the general suppression of monasteries in consequence of the Recess.
Here, indeed,
they were merely following the example of the second Catholic State in Germany.
So early as 1800, Bavaria had begun, under Montgelas, a general reform of the
Church on Josephist lines. Not only was an attack made upon the Mendicant
Orders, but the supremacy of the State over the Church was uncompromisingly
asserted by this Catholic monarchy. A “ spiritual ” council, consisting of
three Protestants and two Catholics, was formed for the regulation of Church
affairs. Not unnaturally, the Pope remonstrated; and the objectionable council
was dissolved.
Other German
Governments, by virtue of a right long inherent in Protestant States at least,
entrusted the Church to the supervision of a single minister. The most
prominent of such were Benedict Werkmeister in Wiirtemberg, Philip Joseph
Brunner in Baden, John Lewis von Koch in Nassau, and John Henry Schmedding in
Prussia, where, in 1815, an attempt was to be made to put the Catholic Church
under the rule of the Lutheran consistory. The aim of these ministers was
at first not
so much to separate the Church from Rome as to make the dioceses of their
countries conterminous with the boundaries of the State. A rearrangement of the
German sees was indeed imperative. The growth of the German States and the
disappearance of the Empire took away all excuse for the confusion of diocese
and state which prevailed throughout Germany; and the loss of the left bank of
the Rhine had transferred some of the most important sees in Germany to France.
There is no greater symptom of the change in the German Church than the fall of
Mainz. That great church, the metropolitan see of all Germany, was reduced to
the rank of a suffragan of Malines. The Archbishop, the sole remaining
spiritual member of the Electoral College, was transferred to Ratisbon, where a
small ecclesiastical State maintained a precarious and anomalous existence in
the new Germany.
But,
at the end of the Napoleonic era, the ministers of the German States, taking
advantage, doubtless, of, the position of the Pope, took a further step; and
definite attempts were made to rid the Church of extraneous jurisdiction. In
1811 Prussia tried to unite her Catholic dioceses under one Prussian Catholic
Patriarch. More significant still, in 1812, the' King of Wurtemberg appointed a
Vicar-General at Ellwangen. This officer, unable to obtain institution from the
Pope at Fontainebleau, was ordered by his Government to take possession at
once, but only obtained canonical institution from Dalberg, the Primate of the
Confederation, after having been three months at his post. The Curia, while it
disliked these changes, was not in a position to quarrel with any individual
State, except in the case of Bavaria, with whom relations were broken off in
1808. The Government of Bavaria claimed the right of landlords to the advowson
of the churches on their property. This led to friction with the Tyrolese
bishops, who appealed to Rome with success. But the Government stood firm; the
bishops of Chur and Trent were deported from their dioceses; and the
negotiations for a Bavarian Concordat came to an end. , , ,.
The idea of a
Bavarian Concordat Kad beeii mooted so early as 1802. For . this purpose, the
Court of Munich had, in that year, opened relations with the Vatican; and the
First Consul, anxious to increase his influence in Germany, accepted with
alacrity the proffered post of mediator. But Rome, displeased with Montgelas’
suppression of the Mendicant Orders, and unwilling to> make concessions in
Germany, determined to deal with the Empire as a whole, and rejected the mediation
of France. Dalberg, however, was anxious for the. conclusion of a Concordat
with the whole Empire; for by this means, and by Napoleon’s favour, he hoped to
become Patriarch of Germany. In this he was at variance with the Bavarian
policy, but was supported by the decree of secularisation. Bavaria again
appealed to the First Consul, who instructed Fesch to support its claims. A
triangular dispute, which ensued between the Diet, the Pope, and Bavaria,
remained indecisive; for the
1802-8] Dalberg’s scheme.—The French
Protestants. 203
situation was
changed by the quarrel about Ancona, and by the formation of the Confederation
of the Rhine. The position of Dalberg as Primate, and that of Napoleon as
Protector, of the Confederation filled the Roman Court with apprehensions of
the realisation of Josephist ideals under their influence. The Vatican at once
reversed its policy; rather than strengthen the Confederation, it would
negotiate with the individual Courts. Napoleon also changed his plans: he
deserted Bavaria, demanded from the Pope a Concordat for the Confederation, and
accused the Holy See of ruining the Church in Germany. But the rupture with
Bavaria did not serve Napoleon, for the Papacy continued to discuss the Concordat
with the Confederation with more than usual dilatoriness. Dalberg drew up a
scheme which satisfied his own ambitions, and which made him almost a German
Pope. But Caprara, for once, did his master a service. Knowing the jealousy
entertained by the Princes towards Dalberg, he adroitly proposed that they
should send plenipotentiaries to the conference on the Concordat, and thereby
blasted the prospects of the Primate’s ambitions. No more was heard of the
Concordat, for in December, 1808, Pius VII formally broke off negotiations ;
and, although Napoleon had vigorously upbraided the Pope for neglecting the “
perishing Church ” of Germany, not a word was said about it in the Concordat of
Fontainebleau. It was reserved for the Germany of the Congress of Vienna to
define and settle the tangled relations between Church and State.
It now
remains to say a few words on the relations of Napoleon with the non-Roman and
the non-Christian bodies under his rule. The Protestants of France were to
Napoleon an unknown quantity. He imagined Protestantism to be a many-headed
hydra, difficult to control. When he was drawing up the Organic Articles in
1802, a report was presented to him, recommending that, although the Government
had declared the Catholic religion to be that of the majority of Frenchmen, it
should none the less protect the Protestants, and give them the enjoyment of
the same privileges as Catholics except as to the payment of their ministers.
This distinction was based on the ground that the Concordat, by allowing the
intervention of the State in Church affairs, gave compensation for the loss
incurred in paying the bishops and priests. A further report on the
Protestants, dated March 12, 1802, dealt with their civil rights and with
police regulations for their worship; but, as nothing was said in it about the
manner of nomination and about the oath of the ministers at their installation,
Bonaparte disapproved of it.
Eventually
the question was settled in the Organic Articles themselves. Forty-four of
these deal with the Protestants. They were divided into two Churches, the
Lutheran, for the inhabitants of the German departments, and the Reformed, for
the French Huguenots.
These
articles were strictly framed to prevent any foreign influences filtering into France
through the Protestants; and much importance was attached to the education of
ministers. Two seminaries for the Lutherans, and one at Geneva for the
Huguenots, were to be set up under the control of teachers appointed by the
Government. Ministers were to be chosen by the local consistory, and their
names submitted to the Government for approval. Before a minister could enter
on his duties he had to take the oath imposed on the Roman clergy
The Reformed
or Huguenot churches were divided into local consistories, five of which
formed the arrondissement of a synod. There was to be one consistory for every
6000 Huguenots ; and each consistory was to contain not less than six and not
more than twelve lay members. The synod, composed of a pastor and a layman from
each church, was to be held in the presence of the prefect or sub-prefect, and
was to last not more than six days. The Lutheran churches differed in having
superintendencies and general consistories above the local consistories. Every
group of five local consistories was placed under the supervision of a
superintendent and two laymen, whose appointment was subject to the
confirmation of the First Consul, and who were not to discharge their duties
without the permission of the Government. The general consistories were to be
three in number, at Strassburg, Mainz, and Cologne. They were to be composed of
a lay president, two ecclesiastical inspectors, and a deputy from each
“inspection.” The president was to take the oath of allegiance; and the consistory
was not to meet without leave from the Government or to sit for more than six
days.
The
Protestant articles were received with great enthusiasm by the Churches
concerned. But, in the case of the Huguenots, Bonaparte had drawn the teeth of
their organisation. Formerly they had been governed by a General Assembly and
Provincial Assemblies, which regulated their discipline. Bonaparte destroyed
the General Assembly and substituted a number of synods, whose authority was
derived from the civil power. In short he erastianised the Presbyterian system
with still greater success than did James VI in Scotland. He ordered the
anniversaries of his birthday and his coronation to be observed as festivals in
Protestant churches.
The
Protestants were alone in finding no cause of complaint under Napoleon. No
doubt, the smallness of their numbers was a protection to them. It was
otherwise with the Jews. On returning from Austerlitz, Napoleon heard of the
extortionate interest (75 per cent.) demanded by the Jews in Alsace ; and his
anger was kindled by reports that they evaded conscription. On May 30, 1806, he
suspended for a year all contracts entered into between agriculturists and Jews
in the eastern departments; and he decided to reform the “ locusts that were
ravaging France.” In order to fuse the Jews with the French nation, he decided
to summon a “ Jewish States-General.” He first convoked an Assembly
of Jewish
Notables. One hundred and eleven deputies met as Notables from France and
Italy; and,, later, seventy-one members formed the Grand Sanhedrin, composed of
rabbis and laymen in proportion of two to one. This Sanhedrin was supposed to
be a revival of the Jewish tribunal at Jerusalem; its functions were to turn
the decrees of the Assembly of Notables into doctrinal laws.
The questions
addressed to the Assembly of Notables on behalf of the Emperor show what his
intentions were. They fall into three groups. The first group deals with the
relations of Jews to their neighbours and the country they live in. Are they
polygamous? do they allow intermarriage with Christians? do they allow divorce
without recourse to the civil power? are the French in their eyes brethren or
strangers ? The second group relates to the authority and position of the
rabbis. The third contained the significant questions, “ Is usury lawful ? ”
and “ Are there any professions which the Jews are forbidden to exercise? ”
Napoleon, who had intimated that the Notables must decide in his favour,
received the answer he desired in all cases. Polygamy was forbidden; divorce
was allowed only before the civil Courts; intermarriage with Christians was,
after discussion, permitted, as the old law only forbade marriage with the
Canaanites and polytheistic races. But such marriages, though entailing no
infamy, could no more be performed before rabbis than before a Christian
minister. It was further decided that French Christians were the brethren of
the French Jews, that France was their country, that the rabbis had no
authority, that no profession was forbidden, that usury was contrary to the
Mosaic Law. The Sanhedrin turned these decisions into doctrinal laws, and, to
please Napoleon, expressly allowed the profession of arms. Carried away by
their benevolent feelings, they even thanked the Papacy for the protection
afforded to their race since the time of St Gregory.
But, while
the Grand Sanhedrin might have been useful in furthering Napoleon’s object of
reconciling the Jews to his control, and in assisting conscription, it was
useless in districts outside France, where the Jews refused to recognise its
authority. The high-water mark of Imperial favour, however, had been reached;
and on March 17, 1808, Napoleon issued a decree regulating Jewish worship.
These Organic Articles provided that a synagogue should be erected in each
department or group of departments where there were 2000 Jews, with a
consistory to preserve order in the synagogues and facilitate conscription. A
demand for salaries for the rabbis was refused; and, in order to check usury,
it was enacted that loans to minors, women, soldiers, and domestic servants
should be null and void, as also all loans raised on instruments of labour. “
Fraudulent and usurious credit ” was annulled ; the Jews were to trade
honestly; no more Jews were to enter Alsace, nor were they permitted to enter
other departments except as agriculturists; every Jew was to serve in the army,
and substitutes were not to be allowed; lastly, no
206 Political effects of Napoleon's church policy,
[isoo-u
Jew was to
engage in trade without permission from the prefects This decree caused a
strong revulsion of feeling among the Jews. Though its duration was limited to
ten years, its terms were insulting; and, though Napoleon, by 1811, had
exempted twenty-two departments from its operation, the Jews turned to the
secret societies, which, in 1809, had declared against the Emperor.
Napoleon’s
relations with the Churches illustrate what has been called the paradox of his
career. He begins by exciting enthusiasm among his subjects as the friend and champion
of religion ; he ends as a persecutor, and a violator of his best promises. At
the end of his reign, the religious opinion of his subjects had almost
Universally turned against him. He was hated by the Catholics for his barbarous
treatment of the Pope; he was hated by the Jews for his broken promises and
his insulting suspicions ; he was hated by the secret societies for his
despotism and his violation of Liberal principles.
Of these
bodies the Catholics were by far the most important. Composing as they did the
majority of the populations of Prance, Spain, Italy, and southern Germany, they
were not to be lightly regarded by a ruler who aspired to universal dominion.
No one was more conscious of this than the First Consul; yet, as Emperor, he
did his best to wound their most tender feelings. It may be that in reality
Napoleon was aiming throughout at one object. He knew that, if his government
was to be secure, he must obtain the goodwill of the Pcpe. But Napoleon’s idea
of goodwill grew to be passive obedience. Remembering the importance that he
attached to friendship with Rome, he tried to obtain it by force, and found
that he had missed the cardinal aim of his policy. The Church turned against
him, and undermined the basis of popular support on which he had placed his
throne.
In France,
the secret activity of the Congregation did much to excite that smouldering
resentment against Napoleon which existed during the later years of the Empire
; while the clergy, having nothing to hope for either from Napoleon or from a
Republic, worked for the return of the Bourbons, whose head was, in deed as
well as in name, “the Most Christian King.” But the Pope’s imprisonment had
effects beyond France. The resistance of the Spaniards was stiffened by the
thought that they were fighting not only to satisfy their wounded national
pride, but were also crusading against the infidel; and in 1814 the release of
the Pope was a prominent aim of the Allies.
Nor was
forgetfulness of his early ideals the only mistake which Napoleon made. He
mistook entirely the character of the Pope’s resistance. He imagined that, just
as he had beaten down the great continental Powers, so he could bend the puny
force of the Papacy to his will. But he found that in spite of the extinction
of the Temporal Power, the resistance of the Pope raised up an opposition which
was as
I800-14] The Papacy as a bulwark of
liberty. 207
intangible as
the pressure of the Continental Blockade, and against which the mightiest army
was powerless. Force succeeded against the Pope so far that, when worn out by
captivity and harassed by perfidious advice, Pius VII was induced to sign the
Treaty of Fontainebleau. But a Concordat of this kind, even if it had not been
denounced by the Pope immediately after its signature, would have been useless.
The Papacy wanted freedom if its confidence was to be given with a whole heart;
fettered by an agreement which was such only in name, it aimed constantly at
recovering its independence; and the antagonism between Church and State could
not cease until that end had been gained.
After all, it
may well be doubted whether a permanent agreement between Napoleon and the
Papacy was possible. The former aimed at securing his own interest and
satisfying his own ambition for universal dominion; the latter hoped by
agreement with France to obtain not only peace for the Church, but the recovery
of her lost possessions. Here indeed lies the severest criticism that can be
levelled at the policy of Pius VII. It can be plausibly urged that, in the
early years of his Pontificate, while negotiating on the spiritual welfare of
his flock, his anxiety as to the Temporal Power weakened his defence; and
further, that the diplomatic ability of the Papacy was not always equal to its
reputation. On more than one occasion the Pope had the advantage; had he
pressed it with greater energy, he might have obtained a greater measure of
success. Finally, the impressionable character of Pius VII led him to commit
acts which were hasty, if not rash; while his denunciation of the Concordat of
Fontainebleau may possibly deserve a harsher epithet. But, on the other hand,
his conduct in adversity was indisputably admirable. Except at one moment, he
never forgot the high traditions of his office. By his firm stand he raised the
Papacy from the depths of contempt into which it had fallen during the
eighteenth century, and he showed that the Holy See was a power to be reckoned
with in Europe; while the patience with which he bore his sufferings in a
captivity far straiter than that which his persecutor was to undergo, and the
spectacle of the helpless old man, dragged across Europe at the risk of his
life because he would not grant the demands of an overweening tyrant, aroused
at once the pity, the anger, and the enthusiasm of the world. In France, Pius
VII will be remembered, not only as the Pope of the Concordat, but also as the
chief cause of the revival of a healthy activity of public opinion, dormant
since the early days of the Directory. In Europe, the Pope, the Spaniards, and
the sailors who maintained the Continental Blockade, will be associated
together as the primary examples which stirred the nations to the rising that
eventually liberated them from the despotism of Napoleon.
THE COMMAND
OF THE SEA.
The chief causes
which led to the renewal of war between Great Britain and France in 1803 have
been described in a previous chapter. Various occurrences which preceded the
actual outbreak of hostilities appeared to indicate a design on the part of the
French Government to invade England. In December, 1802, instructions sent by
the First Consul to his so-called commercial agents in the British ports had
been intercepted, and were found to point to such an intention. On February 18,
1803, in an interview with Lord Whitworth, he assumed a threatening attitude,
and declared that, in case of war, he would risk his life and reputation in an
attempt to invade England, though he did not underrate the danger of such an
adventure. “He acknowledged ” (said Lord Whitworth) “ that there were a
hundred chances to one against him,” but he went on to state that he could find
army after army for the enterprise.
This violent
talk alarmed the British Government, the more so as, according to Lord
Whitworth’s despatches, it was accompanied by naval preparations. Several
French sail of the line had embarked troops in the Mediterranean; there was a
considerable movement of French troops in Belgium towards Havre and Dunkirk; in
the Batavian Republic* then under French control, a small naval expedition was
fitting out. The British ministry saw in these things indications that some
treacherous attack was intended, and at once made counter-preparations. A royal
message to Parliament (March 8) stated that the military preparations of France
rendered it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution ; bounties
were offered to seamen for enlistment in the fleet; there was a “hot press” in
London for likely men; all seamen and officers in foreign employment were
recalled; and the militia were embodied. The number of men voted for the navy
by the estimates had been only 50,000; 10,000 more were voted on March 14, and
40,000 in addition when war became certain.
In reality,
the British Government seems to have been misinformed as to the French
armaments. The French archives do not reveal any
threatening
movements either by land or sea, which is the more surprising, as it was not
Bonaparte’s habit to use threats without force to back them. The probable
explanation is that he expected a long period of diplomatic correspondence to
elapse before the outbreak of hostilities—a conjecture which receives support
from the fact that, on March 6, General Decaen was permitted to sail for the
French East Indies with a small force, with instructions drawn up in such a
manner as to make it clear that war was not anticipated till about September,
1804. If Bonaparte had thought that hostilities were imminent, he would
scarcely have risked the loss of this detachment. His irritation was great
when, on March 11, he learnt that the British Government had taken his threats
seriously, and, instead of giving way, was arming. On the same day he wrote a
large number of orders and letters, all having war in view, and constituted two
“national flotillas,” with head-quarters at Dunkirk and Cherbourg. Two days
later occurred the famous scene with Lord Whitworth, with its demand of “ Malta
or war,” indicating that a conflict was inevitable. Yet, after this threat,
Bonaparte once more drew back, perhaps to gain time for armaments and to permit
Decaen to reach India. War, however, was declared by Great Britain on May 18,
1803. Bonaparte’s first measure of retaliation was to seize and imprison every
British subject within his reach.
At the
outbreak of war the French navy consisted of 23 ships of the line ready for
service or in commission, 25 frigates,, and 107 corvettes* or smaller vessels,
with 167 small craft belonging to the invasion flotilla of 1800. The best part
of the fleet was in the West Indies, where twelve battleships, eight frigates,
and 28 smaller vessels were covering the operations against San Domingo. In the
home ports or in European waters only five ships of the line and ten frigates
were actually ready for sea; but this force, after two months’ delay, could be
raised to nine ships of the line and thirteen frigates, and in six months to 21
battleships (including those from the West Indies) and 19 frigates; while 45
sail of the line were under construction in the French ports. There was the
same want of seamen as in the previous war; and timber and naval stores were
again lacking. Of the Batavian fleet, comprising fifteen sail of the line, all
small, only six were in commission. Five others were new and in good condition;
while four stood in need of extensive repairs. The storehouses were empty, and
money scarce.
The personnel
of the French navy was still disorganised and insufficient. It had not
recovered from the demoralisation caused by the Revolution and by the terrible
defeat of the Nile. The admirals were too old, and, according to Bonaparte,
lacked energy and decision. They were unduly depressed by the prospects of a
naval conflict, and seem to have feared Nelson with an almost superstitious
dread. Service with the fleet was unpopular and inglorious; the best men went
into the army rather than into the navy. The Dutch navy was in no better
plight,
and was more
than ever ill-disposed to France, the Batavian Government being suspected of
intriguing with England. Bonaparte was credited with the intern.on of gradually
creating a French navy of 130 sail of the line, to be supported by 60 Spanish,
20 Dutch, and 15 Genoese ships; but the execution of these vast plans demanded
time, and could not have been completed in less than ten years. The alliance of
Spain was guaranteed to France by treaty, but was of so little value that,
though Bonaparte demanded of the Spanish Government the twelve sail of the line
and the 24,000 men with whom it was bound to support France, he accepted, in
lieu of this, an annual subsidy of £2,880,000.
Against the
numerically weak and badly manned squadrons of France, England could place on
the high seas a powerful force commanded by the men who had made their names
famous in the war of 1793-1801. The fleet in commission in January, 1803, numbered
34 sail of the line with 86 50-gun ships and frigates, and numerous small
craft. Besides the ships in commission, there were in reserve 77 ships of the
line and 49 50-gun ships and frigates.- In numbers the British navy was
superior to any combination of two or even three Powers. Fresh ships were
rapidly commissioned, as the tension between England and France increased; the
sail of the line in service rose in May to 52, and in June to 60, with
corresponding additions to the force of frigates. Excellent officers were
appointed by Lord St Vincent, then at the head of the Admiralty. For the
Mediterranean, Nelson was chosen, as this was the post of the greatest danger,
and would make the highest demands upon a commander’s activity. In the North
Sea and the Straits of Dover Lord Keith was stationed with a small fleet. The
main force in waters near home was the squadron off Brest, which was to
maintain a close blockade of that port; it was commanded by Cornwallis, who was
probably, after Nelson, the ablest of British admirals.
The strategic
position of England in the Mediterranean had been improved, as compared with
that during the revolutionary war, by the acquisition of Malta. But, for the
purpose of watching Toulon, Malta was of little importance; and it was scarcely
used by Nelson, who would have preferred the island of Minorca in exchange. In
the later stages of the war, during the operations in the Adriatic and the
Levant, Malta proved of greater service. The main object of the British
commanders was to interpose a superior force between the French fleets at
Toulon and Brest; and Malta lay out of the direct course between these ports.
Until the battle of Trafalgar, the British forces in the Mediterranean made
Gibraltar their chief base, and used the harbours in the north of Sardinia as a
“flying base” for action against Toulon.
Throughout
the war the British fleets acted on interior lines, blockading the different
French detachments in the various ports and preventing their junction—a
strategic plan which was comparatively simple in days when the movements of
ships depended on conditions
I803-4] Blockade of the French ports.
211
of wind and
weather, and could never be calculated with exactitude beforehand. For this
reason the French fleets were seldom able to combine effectively. But the
difficulty of blockading both Brest and Toulon was great. Toulon, in
particular, was so remote that any British force watching it was entirely out
of touch with the Channel; and the blockaded squadron, if it escaped, could not
be pursued immediately, since there was always doubt as to whether it would
sail east or west; and this had to be ascertained before the British could move
to the Channel. Bonaparte’s Egyptian schemes were well-known, and had been
emphasised by Sebastiani’s report. When Spain ceased to be neutral in 1804, the
difficulties of the British admirals were much augmented, as Cadiz and
Cartagena both contained fleets and had to be masked or blockaded. But it was
not necessary, as it had been when Spain joined France in the previous war,
that the British navy should evacuate the Mediterranean.
The Italian
ports, with the exception of Naples and Sicily, were under French influence or
in the hands of the French, while the coastline under French domination in the
north of Europe extended beyond the limits of France proper as far as Hamburg
and Bremen, which were more or less subject to French influence, through the
French occupation of Hanover in 1803. As the war proceeded, practically the
whole northern littoral of the Mediterranean became French, while in northern
Europe French influence penetrated to the Baltic; so that, from the Niemen to
Corfu, French bayonets repelled the British flag.
Since the
British navy was far better trained and prepared for war in 1803 than in 1793,
the strategy adopted was bolder and mere determined. On the outbreak of war,
the British fleets moved up to the hostile ports in the Atlantic and the
Channel, and closely blockaded them. A force was at once directed against the
French in San Domingo, whence the French Admiralty had already recalled most of
their ships of the line. The British forces sufficed to defeat the French on
the island, weakened as they were by disease and pressed on all sides by the
negroes; and a naval blockade of the ports soon reduced them to starvation.
The first
hostile movement in European waters was made by Cornwallis, who on May 17, the
day before the declaration of war, put to sea with ten sail of the line, and
moved towards Brest. Next day, acting under an Order in Council of May 16,
directing reprisals to be made against France, one of his cruisers captured a
French vessel. The situation of the French fleet at this moment was critical,
as nine sail of the line were on their way to France from San Domingo; of these
one was captured in the West Indies; the remainder were expected by the British
to sail for the Mediterranean, and preparations were made to meet them off Cape
St Vincent. Contrary to expectation, they steered for the Bay of Biscay; two
reached Rochefort; five more entered the Spanish harbour of Corunna; and the
other stole into Cadiz. The
British
squadron detailed to attack them had received too precise instructions; and
thus the war opened with a strategic check instead of with a naval victory. One
reason for the British failure was the want of frigates, which throughout the
campaign of 1803-5, as in that of 1798, hampered the British admirals at every
turn. So many vessels were required for the protection of commerce that the
fighting fleets were deprived of their necessary scouts; and Cornwallis was at
times compelled to employ battleships in doing frigates’ work.
The
distribution of the French forces, before the return of the San Domingo fleet,
was as follows. At Brest there were three ships of the line ready for sea, and
fifteen approach ng completion. At Lorient and Rochefort there were six ships
completing. At Toulon there were three ready, and six nearing comnlet’ in. Thus
the French battleships were so much scattered that a great fleet action at the
outset was impossible; and the blockade imposed by the British had to be
accepted, until the squadrons could be reinforced. At Brest, Truguet was placed
in command, to be succeeded later by G-anteaume, who at the outset commanded at
Toulon. At an early date orders were issued by Bonaparte, directing his
admirals constantly to weigh and anchor, so as to train the crews, or, if the
enemy vanished, to put out for short cruises.
The real
offensive against England was to be directed by a flotilla of small craft,
capable of conveying an invading force across the Channel in a single night.
There were several stages in the development of the flotilla project. According
to the first plan, a comparatively simple one, 310 armed Craft of small size
and light draft were to escort across the Straits of Dover a fleet of
fishing-boats, carrying 100,000 men, the central idea being that small vessels
could be rowed across in winter fogs or calms, when the sailing ships of the
period were useless. This plan, however, was open to so many difficulties and
dangers that good authorities have believed Bonaparte to have intended it
merely as a demonstration. Against this view, which is based ultimately on the
theory that he never made mistakes, many facts may be brought forward. The most
convincing of these is the lavish expenditure not only on the flotilla but also
on the construction of harbours of refuge along the northern coast of France.
Excavations, basins, moles, and sluices were begun at Ambleteuse, Boulogne,
Staples, and Wimereux; and millions of francs were lavished upon them at a time
when the French treasury was embarrassed for funds. Secondly, the French people
looked anxiously to Bonaparte to end the war as speedily as possible, for,
while it lasted, everything that had been won by the Bevolution was at stake.
Now the war could be rapidly ended only by an invasion of England, Thirdly, an
invasion of England had frequently been contemplated before. That Bonaparte
soon perceived some of the dangers of his flotilla project is perfectly clear;
but, while he modified, he did
not abandon
his plans. He began to think out the means by which he could obtain temporary
command of the straits.
The idea of a
transport flotilla of unarmed fishing craft, accompanied by a few small armed
vessels, was given up almost at once; and the number of armed vessels was
steadily increased. In May, 1803, there were to be, as we have seen, only 310
fighting craft; in July the number rose to 1410, in August to 2008. It was
anticipated that the flotilla might be ready by November, and that the armed
vessels would be able to clear a way for it by driving off the British fleet.
These anticipations were not fulfilled. When Bonaparte visited Boulogne in
July, only fourteen vessels of the flotilla were ready at that place. Numerous
skirmishes with the British frigates and small craft went on along the coast,
the British showing persistent energy, and attacking the French boats whenever
they ventured beyond the shelter of their coast batteries. In these encounters,
the British almost always had the upper hand, thus revealing the grave military
weakness of the flotilla. The French soldiers complained bitterly of the
timidity and hesitation of their seamen; they did not see that the whole
project was absurd, and that to ask men in boats to attack well-armed and
skilfully handled ships was to demand impossibilities.
In June, in a
note to Deeres, his Minister of Marine, Bonaparte insisted on the necessity of
having twenty battleships ready at Brest by November, and gave instructions for
a large number of additional ships to be taken in hand. But he altogether
overestimated his forces; in November only eight vessels were actually ready,
so that Cornwallis had not the slightest difficulty in maintaining a close blockade
at Brest, while other detachments watched Ferrol, whither the French vessels
from Corunna and the West Indies had moved, and the Biscayan ports. It would
appear from Bonaparte’s order that, so early as June, 1803, he intended his
fleet to act in close concert with the flotilla, which was to be ready before
the winter for the attempt on England. The fleet was not to be actually present
in the Straits of Dover; it was to divert the attention of the British admirals
by raids in other directions.
In September,
1803, Bonaparte saw that the flotilla could not be counted upon by November,
and postponed the date of action to January, 1804. At the same time he ordered
Ganteaume at Toulon to be ready to put to sea with ten battleships, though as a
matter of fact only seven were complete. In December Ganteaume was asked to
give his opinion on the flotilla. It was extremely unfavourable ; but he suggested
that it might be possible for a handy, swift-sailing fleet to lead the enemy
astray by feints, and then, by suddenly appearing in the Channel, to secure the
command of the sea for two days, and so clear the way for the flotilla. The
enterprise would be extremely bold and very hazardous; and the best way of
accomplishing it would be either to sail round the north of Great Britain or
run up the Channel past Brest,
and appear in
the Downs. Here we have the germ of the strategy subsequently pursued in the
Trafalgar campaign. Six days later, in a letter to the admiral, Bonaparte
disclosed his projects, giving a choice of three plans, all of which in
substance involved a feint by the Toulon squadron in the direction of Egypt to
mislead Nelson, and a gradual concentration of the French squadrons at Ferrol
and Rochefort, to be effected by the Toulon fleet moving out of the
Mediterranean and successively setting them free. The whole force thus
concentrated was finally to appear off Boulogne, while the Brest fleet was to
make feints at Ireland, so as to occupy Cornwallis’ attention. But, as
Ganteaume shrewdly pointed out, the element of surprise would probably be
wanting in so complicated a plan ; and for the French to move into the Channel
with anything larger than a flying squadron of a few fast ships would be to
court disaster. The British could detach in pursuit forces “quadruple or
quintuple” the strength of the French squadron.
As its
Construction proceeded, the flotilla proved more and more untrustworthy and
expensive. In November, 1803, Bonaparte went in person to Boulogne and made
some unwelcome discoveries. If the plan of a surprise invasion was to be
carried out, it was essential that the boats should be able to put to sea at
the very shortest notice. But this involved keeping them outside the basin at
Boulogne, since at the most only 100 boats could pass from the basin in any one
tide. Outside the basin they were exposed to the British attacks and to injury
by weather. Under the eyes of the First Consul five boats were wrecked by a
storm; and the records prove that, for nearly six months, from November, 1803,
to May, 1804, the flotilla only went out of the basin thrice and remained
outside ten days in all. It had become a mere incumbrance, and had even ceased
to cause the British admirals any serious alarm, so long as it was unsupported
by a fleet of large ships. In April, 1804, the Boulogne flotilla was caught by
a storm when outside the basin, and forty vessels were driven to Staples.
Experience proved that at least six days would be required to get all the boats
out of harbour, so that for that period it would be necessary to command the
waters of the Channel; but, all through 1803-4, there was no period of six
days’ continued fine weather. Thus the original idea of a surprise passage of
the straits proved impracticable. Yet the outlay on the small craft and on the
harbours continued; and Bonaparte refused to abandon his project, though he
inclined more and more to the employment of the flotilla in conjunction with a
squadron of large ships. His army in 1804 was concentrated between Brest and
the Texel, waiting for the opportunity to embark; his fleets at Brest and
Toulon were steadily increasing.
Though the
British Government did not seriously believe in the possibility of invasion,
it neglected no precaution. In March, 1803, it had 250,000 men under arms oh
land, of whom 110,000 were regulars. The volunteer movement developed rapidly,
though there was considerable
1803—4] Further development of the invasion plan.
215
doubt as to
the military value of the forces which it produced; and in December, 1803,
there were 463,000 men available in the three kingdoms belonging to this
branch alone. Making heavy deductions, the Government could dispose of about
500,000 troops of all sorts during the period of danger, and could rapidly
concentrate 100,000 of them against an invader disembarking on the south-east
coast. Thus, even had the fleet been drawn off, as Bonaparte had originally
contemplated, the position of Great Britain would have been tolerably secure.
In the spring
of 1804, fresh instructions were sent to Latouche- Treville, who had succeeded
Ganteaume at Toulon, to put to sea. He was to elude Nelson by feinting at
Egypt, to pick up the French ship of the line which was blockaded at Cadiz,
then to make for Rochefort and set free the French ships in that port; after which
he was to sail far out into the Atlantic, finally making a dash up the Channel
past Cornwallis, as soon as the winds were favourable, and putting into
Cherbourg. Ferrol and Brest were to be left blockaded. This plan contains all
the characteristics of Napoleonic strategy: unexpected concentration of
superior force at the point where that force could be used to the greatest
advantage; feints to distract the enemy’s attention from that point; disregard
of minor considerations. Its defects were that it made insufficient allowance
for the energy of the British admirals, and that it assumed a degree of
training and seamanship in the French navy which that force did not possess.
Bonaparte counted confidently on the mismanagement of the British Admiralty, of
which he had a very poor opinion, and he underestimated the military genius of
Nelson.
The date at
which the French army of invasion was to cross was fixed by the First Consul
for September, 1804. Feints would no longer be necessary, if a French
battle-fleet could reach the Downs; but it was important to have good weather
and long days for the operation. All through the spring and summer' of 1804 the
concentration of the flotilla in the neighbourhood of Boulogne was going
painfully forward, under the guns of the British cruisers, which watched every
movement of the French with lynx-eyed vigilance. But the sections of the
flotilla which had been constructed on the littoral of the Bay of Biscay found
the British fleet off Brest a fatal obstacle to their passage, and never
succeeded in effecting their junction with the Channel division. Of 231 small
craft, only 35 reached the Channel from the Atlantic coast. In July, 1804,
Bonaparte again visited Boulogne and inspected the flotilla. For a second time
a storm occurred in his presence; the flotilla was scattered and thirteen
vessels were lost; while, of forty boats at Staples, nine had to be run ashore
and several others were carried by the storm to various ports. The flotilla,
even in summer, was the sport of the winds and waves.
On the night
of October 2,1804, an attack was made by the British forces upon the flotilla
in the Boulogne roads. Fire-ships and “catamarans,” a primitive kind of
torpedo, were employed. Their explosion
216
French inactivity,—Nelson off Toulon. [1803-4
caused
confusion in the French flotilla, but the loss of life was insignificant; and
on the whole the French were rather encouraged than alarmed by this affair.
From this point onwards the flotilla played but an unimportant part; and,
though large sums were still devoted to it, it became more and more a mere
subsidiary to the French fleet.
The complete
inactivity of the French fleets during 1803 and the earlier months of 1804 must
in part be explained by the want of seamen and the lack of stores in the naval
ports. Even when the ships were ready, it was impossible to send them to sea.
The flotilla made heavy demands for funds and men; and thus its equipment
militated against the efficiency of the fleet, a fact which Bonaparte never
seems to have perceived. In May, 1804, complaining bitterly that Truguet
remained immoveable at Brest, and allowed himself to be shut in by a small
British force, he removed this officer and replaced him by Ganteaume. When
Ganteaume took over the command at Brest in June, 1804, twenty ships were ready
for sea, but only seven were fully manned; and, to fill up the gaps, it was
necessary to put out of commission a large number of boats belonging to the
western section of the flotilla. In September, 1804, Ganteaume was directed to
report on the possibility of getting to sea in November, and carrying a force
of 16,000 men to Ireland; but the coronation of Bonaparte as Emperor
interrupted the project, and no answer from Ganteaume is recorded. As there
were accidents whenever his vessels weighed anchor, his reply is not likely to
have been favourable, ■hough his force had now risen to twenty-one ships
of the line.
The strength
of the Toulon squadron steadily rose; it numbered nine ships early in 1804; ten
in the middle of that year; and eleven towards its dose. On July 8, 1803,
Nelson had arrived off Toulon, and had taken charge of the blockade of the port
with a total force of nine ships, of which, however, four were frequently on
detached duty. Only seven ships of the line were at first available for the
blockade; and these were not in good condition, while their crews were weak,
and, it would seem, in some cases of inferior quality. Reinforcements
subsequently reached Nelson, raising the Mediterranean fleet to thirteen ships of
the line; but he could rarely collect more than six off Toulon, and was always
short of frigates. Owing to the inadequacy of this force, the blockade was not
a close one. From time to time Nelson withdrew altogether to fill up his ships
with water and provisions in Maddalena Bay, which was his real base. On these
occasions he generally left two frigates to watch the French. His battleships
were so few that it was unsafe for him to divide his squadron, while this
method of blockade gave the French a chance of coming out; and it was his one
wish to get them out and defeat them. The plan aroused great misgivings among
British officers, because it unquestionably afforded openings for the escape of
the French and a possible concentration of their forces in the Atlantic. But it
was the best adaptation of the available means to the end; moreover, the escape
1803-4] Blockade
of Brest.—Anglo-Spanish relations. 217
of the French
squadron from Toulon could not be so dangerous to British interests as the
escape of the far larger and more formidable squadron in Brest. This last force
was kept hermetically shut in by the closest possible blockade; but, had it
been thoroughly trained and efficient, it might have found opportunities for
escape. For, as Collingwood said— and subsequent experience confirmed his
judgment—ships are not like sentinels standing at the door; there must be
occasions when the greatest vigilance may fail in preventing a sortie.
In the
Mediterranean, the French made no move during 1803 and the early part of 1804.
Nelson was now convinced that the French intended some fresh stroke against
Egypt; Bonaparte’s skilfully-devised false information had put him off the true
scent. The British Admiralty were receiving accurate information from their
agents in France as to French intentions, but they do not appear to have
communicated their intelligence to Nelson. St Vincent had been replaced as
First Lord by Lord Melville; and Admiral Gambier was now First Sea-Lord.
Gambier was an officer of inferior capacity and poor judgment; timid to excess,
he prevented Cornwallis from carrying out a daring plan, which had been matured
by Captain Puget, for an attack with fire-ships on the French fleet at Brest.
Melville was a good administrator and understood the general outline of
Bonaparte’s plan. He thought that a move against the West Indies was probable.
In the autumn
of 1804, relations between England and Spain became more than ever strained.
The blockade of the French force at Ferrol was carried on by Cochrane with scant
respect for Spain’s rights as a neutral. His haughty conduct was due to the
hostile attitude of the Spaniards, who had given constant assistance to French
privateers, and were reported to be fitting out a large number of ships in
their dockyards, while they had permitted French gunners to be sent from
France to the squadron blockaded at Ferrol. It was known that Napoleon was
drawing a large subsidy from Spain, exempting her in return from the fulfilment
of the other conditions of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, because he thought that
French interests would on the whole be better served by such an attitude of
benevolent neutrality on the part of the Spanish Government. This state of
affairs the British ministry had hitherto tolerated; but Spain was warned that
any serious armaments on her part would lead to war, and that without further
negotiations or notice. As Spanish hostility always diminished when the
treasure-ships from South America were drawing near to Europe, and increased
after their safe arrival, and as the British agents, in September, 1804,
reported great activity in the Spanish dockyards, the British Government
issued instructions to seize four of these ships which were due at Cadiz. The
British commander off Ferrol was also ordered to prevent Spanish vessels
leaving or entering that port and to communicate his instructions to the
Spanish authorities. On October 5 the treasure-
218
War with Spain. Napoleon's plans changed. [i804
ships were
encountered off Cadiz by four British frigates. The Spanish commander was
summoned to surrender, and disregarded the summons, the forces being equal on
either side, though he was quite unprepared to resist. A short but furious
action followed, in which one of the Spanish vessels, with a number of
non-combatants on board, blew up; the other three were captured, with treasure
valued at £1,000,000. The act was deuounced as one of piracy, but, in the
circumstances and in view of the plain warning given to Spain, it was
justifiable, the only mistake being that an inadequate force was employed.
War was
reluctantly declared by Spain on December 12, under pressure from Napoleon. In
the same month a Spanish official return gave the Spanish force available as
fifteen ships of the line at Cadiz, eight at Cartagena, and nine at Ferrol; but
two months would be required to get all these ships ready for sea. The arsenals
were empty; at Cadiz the plague was raging; and there was a dire want of funds.
The alliance
with Spain modified the strategic position, and led Napoleon to make important
changes in his plans. In September, 1804, he had appointed Villeneuve to the
command of the Toulon squadron, and had detailed 7,000 men under General
Lauriston to embark on board the fleet. To Deeres he sent instructions and
plans for several expeditions. In the first place, the Rochefort squadron was
to sail to the West Indies, in order to reinforce the French garrisons there
and seize Dominica and Santa Lucia. The bulk of the Toulon fleet was
simultaneously to seize Surinam, and afterwards to join the Rochefort squadron.
The whole force, thus concentrated, was then to appear off San Domingo, attack
Jamaica, return to Ferrol, and liberate the squadron in that port, finally
putting in to Rochefort with twenty sail of the line. Lastly, the Brest fleet
was to sail with 18,000 men for Ireland, and, after landing them, to move by
either the northern or the southern route to the Texel or Boulogne. These
plans, however, appear to have been intercepted by British agents, since they
disappeared for several days and eventually turned up in a damaged envelope,
with the postmark “ Boulogne.” It has been suggested that Napoleon purposely
allowed them to fall into British hands in order to divert British attention to
Ireland; but this supposition is improbable, as the plans embodied many
features of the combination which Villeneuve afterwards attempted to execute.
On learning what had happened to his instructions, Napoleon ordered the Brest
ships not to embark any troops, but to remain in readiness for sea.
At the dose
of the year 1804 the French fleets were at last ready to act, though they still
lacked trained seamen. The strain of continual watching was becoming very
serious for England; and only young and active officers could have supported
the hourly anxieties of such a blockade as was maintained. The strategy adopted
was simple, yet well-adapted to the requirements of the situation. Every effort
was
1804-s]
British and Allied forces. Villeneuve at Toulon. 219
concentrated
upon the command of home waters. If the French fleets escaped, the British
blockading squadrons were to follow them and bring them to action, or to fall
back on the main force at the entrance to the Channel, thus securing England
against invasion. Unfortunately, however, it was not found possible to secure
an overwhelming preponderance in force in European waters; the British fleet
was scattered, and a large number of ships of the line were on distant
stations. The Allied force at the close of 1804 consisted of eleven ships ready
at Toulon, five at Cartagena, ten nearly ready at Cadiz, five French and four
Spanish at Ferrol, five at Bochefort, twenty-one at Brest, and three at the
Texel. These were faced by twelve British battleships in the Mediterranean,
thirty-seven under Cornwallis off Brest and in the Bay of Biscay, nine in the
North Sea, and five in British ports. On foreign or distant service were twelve
ships of the line. Thus the total battleship force of England was seventy-five
; that of the Allies was sixty-four.
In European waters
the British preponderance was extremely slight; and the question arises whether
it was a wise disposition which placed seven ships of the line in the East
Indies and five in the West Indies, when, if used in Europe, they might have
prevented the escape of the French. The economic importance of the East and
West Indies was, however, very great at this period—a fact which explains both
Napoleon’s anxiety to conquer San Domingo, and the maintenance of so large a
British force in distant waters. The Mediterranean fleet was the weakest of all
the important British squadrons; and Nelson was hampered in his work by the
appointment of an influential but inefficient senior officer, Orde, to command
off Cadiz. Orde impeded Nelson in various ways, and appropriated his cruisers
whenever they came within reach, which prevented Nelson from keeping a ship on
the look-out at Gibraltar.
In December,
1804, fresh instructions were sent by Napoleon to Missiessy, his admiral
commanding at Bochefort, and to Villeneuve at Toulon. Both were to evade the
British and immediately put to sea, the first standing for Martinique and the
second for Cayenne. After forming a junction and doing as much harm as possible
to the British possessions in the West Indies, they were to return to Ferrol,
proceeding thence to Bochefort. The ultimate intention was that this
concentrated force, in conjunction with the Spanish fleet and the Brest fleet,
should cover the invasion of England. On January 18, 1805, Villeneuve, with
eleven ships of the line and nine smaller craft, put to sea. His vessels were
so crowded with troops and so deeply laden with stores that he expressed grave
fear as to their stability and the safety of their masts. Nelson had retired to
Maddalena to water his fleet, and had only left two frigates on the look-out;
so the way was open to the French. But, when Villeneuve had made one day’s sail
to the south, he was caught by a severe storm; two of his battleships and two
of the smaller craft lost masts or yards; and three frigates were accidentally
separated from the fleet.
Villeneuve,
recognising that a long voyage with damaged ships was out of the question,
decided to return to port and effect repairs. On his way back, he captured a
small craft carrying despatches for Nelson from England. If, as is probable,
the despatches (contained the secret information as to the true intentions of
Napoleon which we know to have been reaching the British Admiralty, Nelson must
have been left in the dark as to the ulterior purpose of the French at the most
critical moment of the whole campaign. In March, 1805, he complained that he
had had no news from England of later date than November 2,1804.
As soon as he
learnt that the enemy had put to sea, Nelson sailed from Maddalena Bay and
cleared for battle, with the fixed resolve to bring them instantly to action.
Learning from his cruisers that the French had been seen off Ajaccio, steering
south, he concluded that they must be making for Egypt, as the wind was strong
from the west, which would prevent their rapid movement through the Straits of
Gibraltar. He hurried to Alexandria, heard nothing of them, and returned, overwhelmed
with anxiety and fear, to discover that Villeneuve had been driven back to port
by bad weather. Nelson’s letters show that, then and afterwards, he considered
the various possible destinations of the French, and was determined to follow
them without further orders, whether to the West or the East Indies. The danger
to be apprehended from the arrival of a strong French force in the West Indies
was in his judgment very great. “ If St Lucia, Grenada, St Vincent, Antigua,
and St Kitts... fall,” he had written, “ in that case England would be so
clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves”; and this statement
explains his subsequent action.
On his return
from Egypt, Nelson proceeded to the Gulf of Palma and provisioned there.
Meanwhile Villeneuve put to sea again on March 30. Again the French squadron
was followed and watched for some distance by the British cruisers; but again
it disappeared from view. Villeneuve learnt from a neutral vessel where Nelson
was, and avoiding him ran in to Cartagena, in order to join forces with the
Spaniards. The Spanish admiral, however, had received no orders to put to sea
with the French fleet, and declined to move till orders arrived. Unwilling to
wait, Villeneuve hastened to the Straits of Gibraltar, and on April 9 passed
through them, to the roar of the alarm-guns from the Bock. Nelson did not hear
of his escape till April 4. He then deployed his fleet between Sardinia and the
Algerian coast, in order to prevent any eastward movement on the part of the
French, and to cover Egypt and Naples, and waited for information before
sailing west or east.
The greatest
of Napoleon’s projects was now in train of execution. The complicated plans had
been further modified. Two squadrons were to escape from port, and open the
French movement. The proceedings of Villeneuve’s force have been described down
to the second sortie in March. Missiessy’s detachment, consisting of five ships
of the line and
five small
craft, put to sea from Rochefort on January 11, 1805, heavily laden with troops
and stores, and proceeded to the Antilles. On the way across, it suffered the
usual mishaps which befell French vessels whenever they moved ; in three weeks
the ships of his squadron lost nine masts or important spars. On February 20
Missiessy reached Martinique, and at once attacked the British island of
Dominica; but, though he took the British by surprise, he could not reduce the
island. He seized or destroyed thirty-three British merchantmen, levied
contributions upon the islets of St Kitts, Nevis, and Montserrat, and then
returned to Martinique, where, according to his original instructions, he was
to await Villeneuve. But, when Villeneuve was driven back after his first
sortie, fresh orders were sent from France, which directed Missiessy not to
expect help from Villeneuve, but to carry out his special mission
independently; in other words, he was to convey some reinforcements to San
Domingo and then return to Europe.
It was
Missiessy’s anxiety to obey these orders that prevented him from receiving a
third despatch directing him, after all, to wait for Villeneuve.
Villaret-Joyeuse, who commanded at Martinique, was desirous that Missiessy
should assist him in the reduction of the Diamond Rock, an islet off the
Martinique coast, where the British had a small post which annoyed passing
French ships ; and the delay which such an operation would have involved would
have given time for the arrival of the third despatch. But Missiessy was
anxious to get away; he feared that superior British forces were following in
his wake; he thought, from the tone of his earlier orders, that his return to
France was urgently required; and he pointed out that he had already stayed in
the West Indies longer than had been intended. Accordingly he sailed off to San
Domingo, where he landed a few men and some stores, and then returned to
Rochefort, making a very slow passage and reaching that port on May 20. He had
been five months at sea and, for all practical purposes, had done nothing
beyond causing great alarm in England and the British West Indies, and
obtaining some £60,000 by the sale of prizes and by contributions levied on the
British.
Through the
latter half of 1804 and the first weeks of 1805 embarrassments had' been
accumulating about Napoleon’s path. The attitude of Austria was becoming more
and more threatening, as the general feeling in that country was that any
failure of the French to invade England would bring about a war on the
Continent by way of diversion. Relations between France and Russia were already
broken off in consequence of the execution of the Due d’Enghien; and a
personal appeal which the French Emperor addressed to George III, with the
probable object of strengthening the hands of the British Opposition, was
answered by a curt refusal to discuss terms of peace without consulting Russia
and the Continental Powers. Under these menacing conditions, Napoleon, early in
January, 1805, appears for a moment to have abandoned the
invasion
project. Orders were sent recalling Missiessy; and instructions were despatched
to Villeneuve to undertake a movement against India. But, just after these
despatches had been forwarded, the situation changed once more. A letter from
the Austrian Emperor which arrived at Paris at the end of January reassured
Napoleon, and led him to resume the “immense project”—his own term for the
complicated plan of invasion. The orders to Missiessy were revoked; but the
counterorder, as we have seen, reached the West Indies too late.
A fresh
series of orders, dated March 2, 1805, directed Ganteaume to put to sea with
twenty-one battleships as speedily as possible, to sail to Ferrol and open that
port, capturing eight British vessels which were watching it, and to form a
junction with the ten or eleven French and Spanish ships now ready in the
harbour. He was then to stand away for Martinique, where the Rochefort and
Toulon fleets would be found; and then, instantly returning to Europe with at
least forty sail of the line, to beat the British fleet off Ushant and move up
to Boulogne, there to cover the passage of Napoleon’s army. On the same day
further instructions were sent to Villeneuve; and these are of great importance,
being the last he received before putting to sea for the second time on March
30. They directed him to move from Toulon, pick up the Spaniards at Cadiz, and
proceed to Martinique, there to meet Ganteaume and Missiessy. If Villeneuve
arrived before Ganteaume, he was to remain at Martinique, ready to put to sea
at a signal; after waiting forty days, in case Ganteaume had not appeared, he
was to move by San Domingo to the Canaries, to cruise off the Canaries twenty
days, and then to return to Cadiz, in the event of nothing having been seen of
Ganteaume. Though every precaution was taken to keep these orders secret, they
were known to the agents of England and the Bourbons even before they had
reached their destination. “ The fleets,” wrote the mysterious “Jih d'ami"
of d’Antraigues, on March 1, “are to move against the West Indies and to attack
Jamaica.. .England will know in eight days the exact facts which I tell
you....She places entire faith in these sources of information at Paris; she
has found them too trustworthy in the past not to show such faith.” Thus there
is good contemporary evidence that the British secret service was fully
informed as to Napoleon’s intentions. But these facts do not appear to have
been communicated at once to the British admirals, perhaps because of the
confusion at the Admiralty at this juncture, owing to the attack on Lord
Melville, which culminated in the vote of censure of April 8.
Napoleon had
hitherto based all his plans on evading the British naval forces. His fleets
were ordered to leave port without fighting; but this, in the case of the Brest
force, was out of the question, so closely did the large British fleet watch
that place. Yet, at times, the blockading fleet fell much below the strength of
the blockaded; and, had they been allowed to fight, the French had
opportunities, which in consequence of
Napoleon’s
orders they were unable to use. On March 24 Ganteaume I'elegraphed to Napoleon
that he was ready to sail with twenty-one ships, and that there were only fifteen
British ships outside; there must be a battle if he went out, but his success
was certain. Napoleon replied, directing him to go out but forbidding him to
fight a battle. This reluctance to run an insignificant risk at one of the most
critical moments tied the Brest fleet thereafter to harbour. The lost
opportunity never recurred, though at a later date Ganteaume was ordered not to
shrink from fighting his way out. Dispirited by the threatening attitude of the
British admiral, who a few days later received large reinforcements, Ganteaume
on March 29 retired from Bertheaume Bay to the interior of Brest harbour; and,
when inside, received too late the news that Villeneuve was at sea, with
pressing orders for himself to go out.
Meanwhile
Villeneuve, after passing the Straits of Gibraltar, appeared on April 9 off
Cadiz. There he was joined on the same day by one French ship of the line and
by six Spanish ships under Admiral Gravina, raising his total force to eighteen
vessels of the line. He was anxious to put as great a distance as possible
between his ships and Nelson’s, “ as the enemy’s squadron in the Mediterranean
must be in pursuit of me, and may be able to effect a junction with that which
has been blockading Cadiz.” As a matter of fact Orde’s squadron, consisting of
four ships of the line, narrowly escaped capture, and fled north without
keeping touch with the Allies or sending information to Nelson, thus rendering
that officer’s task harder than ever, since he was left to grope in the dark
for the destination of the French. On April 11 Villeneuve was well on his way
to the West Indies, but with only one of the Spanish ships in company. The
Spaniards sailed wretchedly; and, if there had been any British pursuit, they
must have been captured one by one. Napoleon was filled with satisfaction at
the news that the junction with the Spaniards had been effected, and sent off
pressing orders for Admiral Magon to start with two ships of the line from
Rochefort and join Villeneuve at Martinique. He added further instructions
which ordered Villeneuve to spend thirty-five days, after Magon’s arrival, in
the West Indies, to employ the time in attacking the British islands, and after
that interval to return to Ferrol if Ganteaume did not appear. From Ferrol he
was to go to Brest and there join Ganteaume, even at the risk of battle.
Villeneuve reached Martinique on May 14, having occupied more than a month on
the passage, and in conformity with his original orders— Magon had not yet
joined him—took in water and made ready to put to sea as soon as Ganteaume
should appear.
The alarm was
great in London at this juncture. The Admiralty was distracted by the political
attack which, at this moment, the Opposition were making upon the purity of
its financial management. The First Lord, Melville, had resigned on April 9;
and further complication followed, when, with utter disregard of national
interests, Lord Sidmouth
224 British measures. Nelson sails for the West
Indies. [i805
claimed the
office for one of his supporters in the Ministry, and strongly opposed Pitt’s
appointment of Admiral Sir Charles Middleton (Lord Barham). Fortunately, Pitt
stood firm; and his judgment was vindicated by events. The precautionary
measures taken by Barham were as follows. Cochrane, with six battleships, had
left in March for the West Indies, where four British battleships were already
stationed, in order to deal with Missiessy; and on April 27 a. secret order was
issued by the Admiralty to Gardner, then in temporary command off Brest, to
detach Admiral Collingwood with five ships to Madeira. If Nelson with his fleet
had not passed that point going west, he was to move to the West Indies and
effect a junction with Cochrane, which would raise the force in the West Indies
to fifteen battleships. If Nelson had passed, Colling M'ood was to rejoin the
Channel fleet. At the same time orders were sent to the ports to expedite the
fitting out of all available ships. A few days later, Orde was removed from his
command; and Collingwood was directed to make at once with eight sail for
Barbados. But, before he could leave, the news that Nelson was moving in
pursuit of the French led to counter-orders.
That admiral
had been searching the Mediterranean for Villeneuve; nor was it till April 18
that he heard that the enemy had passed through the Straits, steering west and
picking up the Spanish ships at Cadiz. The fact that the Spaniards, of whose
incapacity at sea Nelson was fully aware, were in Villeneuve’s company, seemed
to point to a move towards Ferrol and Brest and Ireland; and he at once decided
to make for the Scilly Isles, from which point he could cover the Channel. He
was detained for several days by unfavourable winds and by the necessity of
convoying 5000 British troops on their way from England to the Mediterranean;
but he used the delay to fill up with provisions and water. On May 10 he at
last received from Admiral Campbell, a British officer in the Portuguese
service, information which convinced him that the French were bound for the
West Indies. Sending in all directions the information that he was following
Villeneuve, he started with ten sail of the line “ to save the West Indies.” So
far was he from being “ decoyed ” away, that the mere news that he was on his
passage caused a feeling of immense relief in England.
Notwithstanding
the foul condition of his ships, so swiftly did Nelson make the passage that on
June 4 he was at Barbados, where he picked up two battleships, raising his
force to twelve. His arrival was speedily reported to Villeneuve, who in
obedience to his orders had waited at Martinique, utilising his stay to effect
the capture of the Diamond Rock. Receiving, however, from Magon Napoleon’s
later instructions to drive the British from the Antilles, he set sail for
Barbados, intending to attack that island. On June 8 Villeneuve captured a
British convoy, and learnt from prisoners that Nelson was in the neighbourhood
with a force represented at from twelve to fourteen ships. This intelligence
filled
him with
something approaching panic; and, after a conference with Gravina, he decided
to return forthwith to Ferrol. The Spanish crews were daily diminishing through
sickness and desertion; and a prolonged stay might have forced him to abandon
some of the Spanish ships. He sent back, in frigates, the troops embarked at
Martinique and Guadeloupe, and hurried off to Europe with twenty sail of the
line. He was fortunate in not being molested on his passage; but this he owed
to the fact that Nelson was led by false information to make a move to Trinidad.
On June 12, however, Nelson heard that the French had disappeared, and, with
the judgment of a consummate commander, at once divined their course of
action—if indeed definite information did not reach him from the British
secret-service agents at Martinique, where Villaret appears to have been
dangerously talkative. He sent off a fast vessel with news for the Admiralty,
and himself followed with his squadron. His fast ship sighted the Allies on her
passage, and was thus able to carry to London exact information of the enemy’s
movements.
Nelson was
off the Spanish coast on July 18, steering for Gibraltar, and, after
provisioning his ships and conferring with Collingwood, who had moved up to
Cadiz, sailed slowly northwards to the entrance of the Channel with his fleet,
being much delayed by unfavourable winds, so chat be did not form his junction
with Cornwallis till August 15. His return to Europe had a disconcerting effect
on Napoleon, who at first flatly refused to credit it or to believe that the start
gained by Villeneuve had been absolutely lost. Meanwhile the British Admiralty*
having, received Nelson’s information as to the French movements, issued orders
to Cornwallis to reinforce the British fleet off Ferrol, under Calder, by
adding to it the squadron blockading Rochefort, after which Calder wa& to
move to the west of Ferrol with fifteen battleships, so as, if possible, to
intercept the allied fleet. It was a fresh complication and source of danger to
the British that Allemand, who had replaced Missiessy, put to sea from
Rochefort on July 17, as soon as the blockaders vanished, just missing orders
which were sent him from Paris at the last moment to sail direct for Ferrol,
and acting on earlier instructions, which ordered him to cruise on the parallel
of Ferrol from July 29 to August 3, and after this for ten days in the Bay of
Biscay, when he was to put into Vigo. It was unfortunate for the French that he
sailed without knowing that Villeneuve was expected back forthwith at Ferrol;
and so it happened that he cruised at no great distance from Calder, without
being near enough to be present at the battle of Finisterre.
On July 22,
in foggy weather, Calder sighted the allied fleet. He had but fifteen ships to
their twenty, though he-had been given to understand that they would not have
more than sixteen, and he had good reason to fear that the Rochefort ships
might at any moment appear and form a junction with the enemy. He was a
mediocre commander, incapable of bold or decided action, and unequal to the
strain of so perilous a position.
He joined
battle, however, forming his fleet in a line in close order, while the enemy
also slowly formed a line. A confused, scrambling action resulted, ship
fighting ship in a thick fog that rendered unity of control impossible. As
darkness fell, two Spanish ships in the allied rear struck and were taken
possession of by the British, whose losses in killed and wounded amounted to
199, while the Allies lost 476. Thus, though the issue was not decisive, the
Allies had the worst of the battle. At daylight on the 23rd the two fleets were
still in sight of each other; but neither admiral would attack—Calder because
he wanted to cover and secure his prizes; Villeneuve, because, if his excuses
are to be believed, he thought he could not reach the British before nightfall,
and did not care to risk a night action. Thereupon, imagining that the British
would receive reinforcements, he decided to shape his course to Ferrol. Thus
the two fleets parted without decisive results, though the allied ships
received such injuries that they were compelled forthwith to make for a port.
Villeneuve asserted that Calder had fled before him; and this report, being
credited in England, led to a bitter outcry against the latter. Yet Calder had fought
fairly against considerable odds; his position was one of great anxiety; and,
if his success was not in the same class with Nelson’s victories, it was at
least worthy of comparison with Lord Howe’s victory of June 1 and Hotham’s
Mediterranean actions. He was subsequently court-martialled and severely
censured for his behaviour—such an effect had Nelson’s tactics produced on
public opinion.
After the
action, Calder proceeded to blockade Ferrol, but was perplexed by finding no
sign of Villeneuve there on July 29. The French admiral had sailed to Vigo, to
disembark his numerous sick and take on board food and water. Leaving behind
him three of his worst ships, he put to sea on July 31 with fifteen sail; and,
as Calder had been blown off the sta 'on by a storm, he managed to slip into
Corunna without a battle and form a junction with the fleet inside, now
fourteen strong. On August 9 Calder discovered that the French were inside
Corunna in great force; and, holding himself too weak to keep them in, he fell
back upon the Channel fleet, which, with Calder’s and Nelson’s ships, now
reached a total of thirty-seven sail of the line. Cornwallis, however, after
all his brilliant work in the blockade, committed at this point a blunder which
might have proved fatal against any antagonist but Villeneuve and the
disorganised Franco-Spanish fleet. He divided his force into two squadrons:
one, consisting of twenty ships, he sent to Ferrol to meet Villeneuve, who was
reported to be twenty-eight sail strong; the other, of seventeen ships, he kept
with his flag off Brest. Had Villeneuve put to sea and appeared off Brest with
the thirty-four effective sail which, including Allemand’s squadron, he could
have collected, Cornwallis, caught between this force and Ganteaume’s twenty-one
sail inside the port, must have been compelled to retire or have sustained a
great defeat.
But
Villeneuve did not proceed to Brest; nor did he even effect a junction with
Allemand, for a cruiser sent off with instructions to the latter’s rendezvous
was snapped up by the British almost in sight of both the French fleets.
Allemand wandered aimlessly about the Bay of Biscay, out of touch with his
colleagues, and performing no useful service. Villeneuve had been forbidden by
Napoleon to go into Ferrol, and had some difficulty in getting his ships out of
Corunna; both he andGravina now despaired of success. He complained that he had
“ bad masts, bad sails, bad officers, and bad seamen...obsolete naval tactics ;
we only know one manoeuvre, to form line, and that is just what the enemy wants
us to do.” When he started to move out of Corunna, his ships collided with each
other, and fresh trouble ensued. It took him five days, from August 8 to 13, to
get the fleets at Ferrol and Corunna to sea.
On his moving
westward, with a total force of twenty-nine sail of the line, fortune once more
played the French a cruel trick; on August 14 several of Allemand’s squadron
were sighted to the north, and were mistaken for British ships; at the same
time Allemand mistook Villeneuve for his enemy. But for this mutual
misunderstanding, the two would have met; the French fleet would have risen to
thirty-four sail of the line; and the despondency of Villeneuve might have been
removed by a real success. As it was, feeling that he had no chance of carrying
out <s the immense project,” and finding that the wind was dead
against him, Villeneuve on the 15th turned south to Cadiz, in obedience to the
express orders of Napoleon, bearing date July 16, which directed him, in the
event of unforeseen circumstances, or if the position of the fleet did not
permit him to attain the main object, to concentrate an imposing force at
Cadiz. These orders had been subsequently cancelled; but news of the fact had
not reached Villeneuve. He was short of supplies, short of everything; and
mishap succeeded mishap in the Spanish contingent. On August 20 he drove off
Collingwood and entered Cadiz, where his force rose to thirty-five, counting
the six Spanish ships already inside that harbour. A few hours later, with
stupefying audacity, the imperturbable Collingwood once more closed in on the
harbour, though his total force was only three sail of the line; and Villeneuve
accepted this truly remarkable blockade. Powerful reinforcements for
Collingwood were hurried south; and Nelson, after a brief visit to England, was
despatched to Cadiz to take command in what was to be the last and greatest
battle of his glorious life.
For Napoleon
the summer of 1805 had been a period of great suspense, as he was obliged to
face at once towards Austria and England. On August 3 he arrived at Boulogne;
five days later he learnt of the battle of Finisterre, and at first expressed
satisfaction at Villeneuve having effected a junction with the Ferrol fleet. On
second thoughts, he despatched a letter to Villeneuve, blaming him for his weak
conduct; and on the 13th, supposing the admiral to be at Ferrol, ordered
228
Napoleon orders Villeneuve to fight.
[1805
him to attack
the British, provided the Allies could oppose twenty- eight ships to the
British twenty-three or fewer. For the first time since he devised “ the
immense project,” he contemplated a great naval battle. The explanation of this
sudden change in his designs is probably that he saw the extreme danger of
risking an invasion of England without the command of the sea, now that Nelson
was back and Austria was preparing for war. A naval engagement must be won
before he could cross the Channel; while, if the battle were lost, it would
justify his abandonment of the flotilla scheme without any loss of reputation,
since the blame of the disaster would naturally be laid on the unsuccessful
admiral. Subsequent orders, dated August 13 and 14, directed Villeneuve to
attack the enemy, who were supposed to have but twenty-four ships, and then to
move up to the Channel, where “ we are ready everywhere ; his appearance for
twenty-four hours will suffice.”
Napoleon had
imagined a picture of the British dispositions which was far from the truth.
Nelson and Collingwood were in the Mediterranean ; a large British force was
in the West Indies; there could be nothing in Villeneuve’s way. But these
messages and orders did not reach the French admiral at Corunna; it was not
till he was at Cadiz that he knew he was expected to fight. Meanwhile Ganteaume
was directed to move his ships out of Brest and to be ready for a battle when
Villeneuve drew near. On August 22 a message was sent by semaphore, to be given
to Villeneuve when he appeared at Brest, urging him to come up Channel at once,
the army being embarked and England at his mercy. Napoleon directed that* if
Villeneuve, in obedience to the earlier orders, should have fallen back to
Cadiz, he was immediately to leave that port, with the Spanish ships there and,
if possible, with the ships at Cartagena, and sail for the Channel. Deeres,
however, filled with misgivings as to the invasion project, adjured the Emperor
not to bring the combined fleet north at that season of the year, but to regard
its arrival at Cadiz as “ the decree of destiny, which reserves the fleet for
other purposes.” Written on August 22, this letter appears to have decided
Napoleon. Though he still wished to wait fifteen days before moving against
Austria, his cavalry began on the 24th to march off to the Rhine, and was followed
on the 26th and 28th by other portions of the army. On the 30th the flotilla
was ordered to be concentrated in the Liane—a fact which indicated the
postponement of the invasion ; on September 1 letters were sent to Villeneuve
criticising his conduct and directing him to take on board six months’
provisions, to “ dominate the coasts of Andalusia,” and to attack the enemy, if
of inferior force. On September 8 a letter in Napoleon’s correspondence
contains, for the first time, the allegation that Villeneuve’s movement to
Cadiz had defeated the project of invasion. It is sufficient comment to point
out that on August 28, before he knew of Villeneuve’s move southward to Cadiz,
Napoleon had written that the “ army is in full march ” against Austria.
In reality,
it was Nelson’s swift movements, the Austrian diversion in Napoleon’s rear, and
the hopeless unseaworthiness of the flotilla, that dictated the abandonment of
the “immense project.”
The final act
in the great drama was yet to be played. On September 28 Nelson in the Victory
joined the fleet off Cadiz. He at once convened his captains and laid before
them his arrangement for the battle. Such enthusiasm did his plans excite, so
extraordinary was his influence, that some of his audience were moved to tears.
The whole fleet was filled with exultation at the fact that he commanded it; a
thrill of enthusiasm ran through the crews; and, as a small token of their
regard for him, the captains painted their ships the colour he preferred. With
true generalship, though he judged his force adequate for victory, Nelson
sought to obtain a fleet which would secure “not victory but annihilation.”
And, just as Napoleon at the opening of his Italian campaign strove to attract
to himself all available force, so Nelson begged his Government to send him
ships, more ships, so that he might have the largest fleet possible at the
vital point in contact with the enemy. “It is only numbers that can
annihilate,” he wrote to Lady Hamilton. Various detachments, however, among
others the despatch of a division to take in water and provisions at Gibraltar,
reduced his force, in mid-October, to twenty-seven sail of the line.
The attack
which he meditated, and the details of which he had communicated to his
officers, was a double cutting of the enemy’s line and concentration upon its
centre and rear, leaving the van out of the fight. If reinforcements joined him
in time, he intended to attack in three separate columns and to effect a treble
severance; but, as the reinforcements had not reached him, he formed his fleet
in two divisions, the second led by Collingwood, who had full authority to
manage his own part of the battle. The central idea was that, having lured the
enemy out of Cadiz, he should pass through them with one division of his fleet
in line abreast, covered by the other in line ahead, get to leeward, and cut
them off from that port—a manoeuvre which would make a decisive engagement
certain. In order to mislead the Allies as to his strength, Nelson kept only a
small force close to the port; the bulk of his fleet cruised far away in the
offing, out of sight of the coast, linked to the squadron inshore by a chain of
cruisers and battleships.
On October 19
Villeneuve, having heard that Rosily had been sent to supersede him, determined
to obey the orders of Napoleon and issue forth, his intention being to form a
junction with the ships at Cartagena. His force comprised thirty-three sail of
the line; but the crews of the French ships were short of their establishment
by 2200 men, and the Spanish vessels were in even worse plight. Provisions were
so scarce, in consequence of the strict blockade, that his crews were on the
verge of starvation. Nelson made no premature attack when he learnt that the
Allies were moving. He fell back, trusting to his cruisers
to keep good
touch, and headed for the Straits of Gibraltar to cut his enemy off from the
Mediterranean. On the 20th he was in sight of Gibraltar; and there the last
conferences were held on board the Victory.
At noon on
that day the allied fleet turned and steered south. Nelson watched them closely
all that afternoon and night; the 21st he had selected for the battle, as a day
glorious in the annals of his family. At 6.30 a.m.
on the 21st he made the signal to form line of battle in two divisions,
the left or windward division under his own personal command, eleven ships
strong; the right or leeward one under Colling- wood, fifteen strong, while one
ship was far off to the north. A little later came the order to prepare for
battle, followed by another to “ bear up east ” towards the Franco-Spanish
fleet. The British fleet mustered twenty-seven sail of the line, with a
broadside of 29,000 lbs.; the allied fleet thirty-three ships, with a broadside
of 30,000 lbs. The morning was grey and cloudy; a light wind blew from the
north-west; and a great swell rolled booming in upon the cliffs of Cape
Trafalgar, which showed to the eastward out of the mists of morning.
As the
British drew nearer, Villeneuve, who had been heading southward, changed his
course and stood north, seeing that a battle was inevitable, and wisely
deciding to fight with a friendly port under his lee. His ships formed a long
line, bent at an obtuse angle, the ends inclining inwards to the approaching
British fleet. At the head of each British column sailed its admiral, Nelson to
the left in the Victory; Collingwood to the right in the Royal Sovereign. Under
Nelson’s leadership the spirit of the fleet had risen to a degree of exaltation
which was in itself the presage of victory. Nelson, as he went to battle,
declared to a friend that he looked for twenty prizes; the captains jested with
each other as to the ships which they should capture. The approach was slow and
tedious to excited nerves; while it proceeded, Nelson prepared the final
codicil to his will and wrote his last prayer, in which he asked for a great
and glorious victory, with no misconduct in his fleet. His final orders to the
frigates accompanying him show the sternness of his spirit and its remorseless
insistence upon gathering in the full fruits of victory. These lighter vessels
were not to save ships or men; they were to complete the enemy’s annihilation ;
“ capture was but a secondary object.”
As the fleets
drew nearer, Nelson was entreated by his personal friends to cover the orders
which he wore on his coat, since in naval actions of that date the leader was
exposed to the enemy’s fire at close quarters, and his decorations would
attract the aim of their marksmen. He refused to comply with this request or to
move to a light ship where the danger would be less, giving as his reason the
importance of a great example in the leader. About 11 o’clock, perceiving that
stormy weather was to be expected, he signalled to prepare to anchor, and soon
afterwards made the last great appeal of his life to those he led, in the
famous signal
“ England
expects that every man will do his duty.” Originally he had intended a
different and perhaps warmer appeal, cast in a form which expressed not
expectation but certainty—“Nelson confides that every man will do his duty.”
But, even in its altered form, the signal evoked a zeal and spirit like his
own; “ it seemed like inspiration to most of them.” The last and invariable
order of the Nelson battle, “Engage more closely,” followed just before the
firing began. These, with the possible exception of an intimation to
Collingwood that he meant to feint against the allied van, were all the
important signals of that morning, illustrating the perfect forethought of the
admiral, the complete preparation for all contingencies.
The bands
played in the British ships as they went down to battle, in irregular lines,
with little precision of formation. Just before closing, Collingwood, whose
column, owing to the enemy’s formation, was now nearly parallel with the allied
rear, gave the signal to bear up together, i.e. to turn to the right and attack
as nearly simultaneously as possible. Nelson’s column was still in line ahead,
slightly converging on that of Collingwood. The first gun was fired by accident
in a British ship; the next shots were fired by the Allies about midday at the
Royal Sovereign, as she approached in advance of her line. A dense cloud of
smoke gathered round their line as it moved north; Collingwood reserving his
fire, headed for the twelfth ship from their rear, but at the last moment
swerved and made for the thirteenth, which was larger. The Allies were in the
closest possible order; but Collingwood was not to be denied. He drove straight
ahead, ready to carry away the bowsprit of the French vessel astern of his
quarry; and the Frenchman gave way before his unflinching tenacity.
From the
Victory the Royal Sovereign was seen to vanish amidst a tempest of firing in
the thick cloud of smoke; then her tall masts showed on the further side of the
line, and it was known that Collingwood had gloriously performed his task. Some
minutes followed before support reached her; but Nelson’s confidence in his
subordinate was justified. The Royal Sovereign's fire was deadly; it tore down
the stem of the Santa Ana, and caused great execution in the press of hostile
ships gathering round her. Her friends followed eagerly to her aid; there was
no hanging back in the line; and as* one by one, the other ships judiciously
brought their broadsides to bear, the battle in the rear began to go decisively
in favour of the British.
On the left,
Nelson watched with intense admiration Collingwood’s fierce onset, as the
Victory slowly covered the space between the fleets. He feinted towards the
French van, as he came within range, probably with the object of holding it
inactive, and then turned sharply to the right and, after passing some distance
down the enemy’s line, turned left and broke through, driving his flagship
through the smoke and flame, and suffering heavy loss as the French guns raked
him. He passed under
232
Tactics of Nelson and Villeneuve,
[l805
the stem of
the tenth ship in the allied line, the Bucentaure, pouring into her a raking
fire, which brought clouds of dust and splinters from her hull. Then, after
penetrating the allied line, he turned to starboard again and dropped on board
a French 74, the Redoutable. It was about 12.20 p.m.
when the Victory broke the French line.
When the
leaders had struck the enemy’s line and passed through it without disabling
loss, the battle might be considered won. Of necessity, in such a scheme of
action, the heads of the British columns would suffer most heavily in the
approach; and this is doubtless the reason why Nelson led himself with
Collingwood, on whose iron nerve he could absolutely rely. But, when the line
was penetrated, generalship ceased for the moment; the rest was the work of the
captains, to whom full initiative had been conceded. The logs prove that they
too showed judgment and energy worthy of their leaders, breaking boldly through
the hostile line wherever they thought their efforts would tell most, or moving
without further orders to meet the enemy’s van, when it at last began to
threaten the British ships in the centre of the fight. The battle of Trafalgar
is the most perfect example of initiative among subordinates, as it is of the
leader’s scientific use of his weapons, that is to be found in the whole naval
war. Though the details of the attack have been much disputed, especially in
regard to the question whether the method indicated in Nelson’s previous
instructions was precisely followed or not, there is no doubt that its greatest
merit—what he himself called “the Nelson touch’’—consisted in the concentration
of an overpowering force upon the rear half of the enemy’s fleet, the bold
occupation of the enemy’s van with a force numerically inferior (under his
immediate command) so as to leave his lee column free to do its work, and the
handling of both columns in such a way as to prevent the enemy, till the last
moment, from knowing how the attack was to be made.
Villeneuve’s
tactics, on the other hand, were of the simplest description. He intermingled
the French and Spanish ships, to prevent misconduct on the part of the latter,
and then adopted a passive attitude, dictated, no doubt, by his officers’ want
of skill and practice in manoeuvring. As he had said at an earlier date, there
was but one evolution of which they were capable, and this was forming line.
But, if the leadership throughout the fleet was indifferent or bad, there was
no want of individual courage. The French and Spanish seamen displayed the
greatest bravery, and suffered terrible losses before they could be induced to
strike.
The first
French ship struck about 1 p.m., soon
after the engagement had become general; it fell to Collingwood. From this hour
onward, the frigates watching the battle saw a steady succession of surrenders;
one two-decker at 1.35; two ships to the Victory and Temeraire at 1.50; “
several ” at 2 o’clock. With each surrender the demoralisation of the allied
fleet and the confidence of the British increased. But these results were not
won without great loss to the British, both in officers
and men. A
few minutes before the resistance of his antagonist in the French line was
overcome, Nelson, while walking the Victory's quarterdeck, was struck by a
bullet from the Redoutable's top and mortally wounded. He fell with the words “
They have done for me at last,” and was borne below. His intellect remained
unclouded for two hours, during which, again and again, he urged his
flag-captain to give the order to anchor. About three he was told that a great
and decisive battle had been gained; that fifteen of the enemy had been taken,
and that no British ship had struck. The ruling spirit was strong even in
death, and he cried that he had looked for twenty prizes. A little later
consciousness ebbed from him ; and with the last words “ God and my country,”
this great servant of England passed away.
His presence
was sorely needed in the last stage of the battle, to complete the victory
which his genius had gained. The French van, five ships strong, turned and
attacked the confused mass of British ships struggling with the allied centre.
A large part of the British fleet was still intact, and might have been used to
crush this detachment. But Collingwood, though incomparable as a subordinate,
did not possess the force and decision of Nelson, and let the opportunity slip.
Again, when the shattered French and Spanish ships in the centre and rear fled
towards Cadiz, no general pursuit was ordered or attempted. Had Nelson been
alive, it is doubtful if one of them would have been permitted to escape. The
logs show continued signals at the end of the battle to the British ships,
which, acting on their own initiative, were attempting pursuit, to “ close
round the admiral ”; and, as night came down, Collingwood committed a final
blunder in refusing to anchor his prizes.
The serious
fighting ended with the repulse of the French van about three. Spasmodic firing
continued till five, when the French ship Achille blew up with a terrific
report. Of the allied fleet, thirty-three ships of the line strong, one French
ship blew up after she had struck, eight French ships and nine Spanish were
taken. Four French vessels escaped to the north; eleven, French and Spanish,
ran eastwards to Cadiz. After the battle a violent storm set in, in consequence
of which three of the prizes, with insufficient crews on board and in a
shattered condition, were either recaptured by their own men or handed over by
the British prize-crews, as the only way to keep them afloat and save the lives
of all, while ten were wrecked or destroyed by their captors; so that
ultimately only four ships remained in the hands of the victors. The British
loss was 449 killed, and 1241 wounded; while that of the Allies, though never
exactly ascertained, is stated to have reached the enormous figure of 5860; and
this estimate may probably be accepted, in view of the fact that, out of a crew
of 645 men, the Redoutdble lost 522 in killed and wounded.
The losses of
the Allies did not, however, end with the day of the great battle. On October
23, Commodore de Cosmao Kerjulien put to sea from Cadiz with five battleships
and five frigates, in the hope of
retaking some
of the British prizes. His movements contributed to the recapture of two of the
vessds already mentioned. But his force was caught by a storm, and three of its
five ships were wrecked, so that there remained in Cadiz only nine sail of the line,
including the recovered ships. On November 4, four of the ships which had
escaped from the French van at Trafalgar, under Rear-Admiral Dumanoir le
Pelley, were overtaken after a long chase and brought to action by a British
squadron of five ships of the line and four frigates, then cruising off Ferrol
under the orders of Captain Sir Richard Strachan, and after a prolonged
resistance were taken and carried into Plymouth. Strachan was looking for
Allemand’s squadron, which however eluded the British fleets and returned
safely to Rochefort, having done great damage to British commerce.
Brilliant as
was the victory of Trafalgar—the climax of the prolonged naval struggle with
France, and the last pitched battle of the war fought at sea between large fleets—it
caused at the moment little jubilation in England. So closely had Nelson
identified himself with the glory of the navy, so much had he endeared himself
to his countrymen, that his loss seemed to them to outweigh the virtual
annihilation of the enemy’s fleet. The news of Trafalgar brought sorrow rather
than rejoicing; and the British triumph seemed to be balanced by the French
victories at Ulm and Austerlitz. No immediate effect was perceptible, yet from
the close of 1805 the French navy ceased to cause serious anxiety in England ;
and, though more than once Napoleon attempted to repeat the combinations which
had ended thus Jisastrously, British predominance upon the seas was
henceforward beyond dispute.
Before the
battle of Trafalgar, but after his army had moved from Boulogne, Napoleon
issued orders to Rear-Admirals Willaumez and Leissegues, both of whom held
commands in the Brest fleet, to put to sea, the one with six ships of the line
and the other with five, and to wage relentless war on British commerce. Both
squadrons managed to escape on December 13, and soon parted company. But their
exit was observed; and two powerful squadrons, under Sir John Warren and Sir
Richard Strachan, were sent in pursuit. Willaumez sailed to the Cape, after a
narrow escape from Admiral Sir John Duckworth, who saw him but, though almost
equal in force, showed no anxiety to attack him. As the Cape was in British
hands, the French admiral proceeded to Brazil and Martinique, off which island
he had another narrow escape from a British squadron under Rear-Admiral
Cochrane. While he was waiting at sea to catch a British convoy, storms
scattered his fleet; and he was compelled with only one ship to make for
Havana. He reached that port in safety, and returned to France early in 1807.
The results of the expedition were miserable—seventeen merchantmen taken at the
cost of two French ships of the line. Leissegues was even more unfortunate. His
five sail of the line were caught at anchor in San Domingo roads, on
February
6,1806, by Duckworth with eight sail of the line, and sustained a crushing
defeat. Three of his ships of the line were taken and two destroyed; only the
small craft with him managed to escape.
In January,
1806, Cape Colony was attacked by a small British expedition under Commodore
Sir Home Popham, and captured with but little difficulty. The results of this
conquest, and the subsequent failures of Popham and Whitelocke in their
attempts upon Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, will be described in a later chapter
of this volume.
In 1807, two
important operations were undertaken by the British navy in European waters.
The first was against the Sultan, who had been induced by Napoleon to declare
war on Russia, with which Great Britain was still in alliance. A squadron of
eight ships of the line was assembled off the Dardanelles under Duckworth, with
orders to compel the Sultan, by a threat of bombardment, to surrender his
fleet. Duckworth viewed the project with something verging on alarm; but,
instead of either resigning his command or acting with celerity, though he knew
that the works commanding the Straits were being strengthened daily, he wasted
time. While he was waiting, one of his ships was accidentally burned with heavy
loss of life. At last, on February 19,1807, he forced his way past the forts in
the Dardanelles, destroying a small Turkish squadron on his progress and
suffering trivial loss. But, though he now had Constantinople at his mercy, his
indecision reasserted itself; and, instead of taking instant action, he spent
days in consultations with the British minister at Constantinople, while the
Turks recovered from their alarm and prepared to meet him. He was more than
ever uneasy when he found that vague threats had no effect on the Porte; and oh
March 2, after showing himself off Constantinople, he returned to the
Dardanelles and repassed the Straits next day, suffering considerable loss and
damage in the transit. The whole expedition was mismanaged; and Duckworth was
fortunate in escaping a court-martial. An attempt on Egypt was equally
unsuccessful. The British took Alexandria, but were defeated at Rosetta, and in
September agreed to evacuate the country. The Russian Admiral Seniavin, who was
in the Mediterranean with ten sail, defeated the Turkish fleet in July; but, on
hearing that peace had been made at Tilsit, he concluded an armistice with the
Sultan and hurried back towards the Baltic. He succeeded in reaching the Tagus,
but was blockaded by a British squadron, and ultimately, in August, 1808, after
Wellesley’s landing in Portugal, was obliged to hand over his ships to the
British Government.
The second
expedition of 1807 was the direct consequence of the Peace of Tilsit.
Information reached the British ministry that a secret article in this treaty
stipulated that Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal should be compelled by France and
Russia to close their ports to British ships and join in the war against Great
Britain. This would add to the naval force at Napoleon’s disposal twenty
Danish, eleven Swedish.
and nine Portuguese
sail of the line, and would more than repair the losses of Trafalgar. It was of
the utmost importance that Napoleon should be forestalled; and Canning, then
Foreign Minister, had sufficient daring to act at once. The weapon was ready to
hand, as a large force had recently been mobilised for service on the
Continent.
On July 19,
eleven days after the signing of the secret articles, the resolution to seize
the Danish fleet was formed ; and on July 26 Admiral Gambier sailed from
Yarmouth with seventeen sail of the line, subsequently raised to twenty-five,
and a large flotilla of gunboats and transports, carrying 27,000 troops under
Lord Cathcart. Though the Danes could not offer any serious resistance, when,
on August 3, Gambier appeared off Elsinore, they refused to surrender their
ships. The blockade of Zealand was therefore enforced by the British navy,
while the army disembarked and drew its lines round Copenhagen. On September 2
the bombardment of the town began. It was continued till the 5th with terrible
effect, when negotiations followed; and on the 7th the Danish Government
decided to surrender the fleet. Eighteen Danish ships of the line, ten
frigates, and forty-two smaller vessels were seized and most of them removed,
the others being destroyed. The operations were well planned and skilfully
carried out; and an ample force was wisely employed. That the attack was
necessary no one will now deny. England was fighting for her existence; and,
however disagreeable was the task of striking a weak neutral, she risked her
own safety if she left in Napoleon’s hand a fleet of such proportions. In Count
Vandal’s words, she “ merely broke, before he had seized it, the weapon which
Napoleon had determined to make his own.” During the operations against Copenhagen,
Heligoland was occupied; it was used thenceforward as a depot for trade with
the Continent. The island of Anholt was seized in 1809, and held till the close
of the war.
The natural
result of the seizure of the Danish fleet was that Denmark declared formal war,
and joined France against Great Britain. A British fleet and a small
expeditionary force were despatched to the Baltic early in 1808; and thus it
came to pass that, when the Spanish troops whom Napoleon had virtually interned
in Fiinen, under the Marquis of Romana, heard of the dethronement of their
sovereign and showed signs of disaffection, a British fleet was able to take
off the greater portion and to convey them back to Spain. During the later
months of 1808 the British blockaded the Russian fleet, which showed little
inclination to cause trouble. This blockade continued without intermission
until 1812. From 1810 to 1812 Sweden was an unwilling enemy; but the British
and Swedish admirals mutually arranged not to attack each other. As for the
Portuguese fleet, Napoleon was not able to seize it, since it withdrew to
Brazil. At the same time the island of Madeira was temporarily handed over to
British custody. In the autumn of 1812, on the approach of the French army,
Alexander I
of Russia
decided to send his fleet to England for the winter, fearing that otherwise it
might fall into the hands of the French. Seventeen Russian sail of the line
accordingly withdrew to England.
On his return
from Tilsit, Napoleon gave instructions for the flotilla at Boulogne to be kept
in readiness, and pressed forward the work of shipbuilding with greater energy
than ever. A powerful expedition was organised at Toulon to attack Sicily. In
January, 1808, Allemand put to sea from Rochefort, evaded a British squadron which
was watching him, entered the Mediterranean unseen, and with five of his ships
reached Toulon. Ganteaume, who had been transferred to Toulon from Brest, was
ready to put to sea, with instructions to attack Sicily, or, if this were
impossible, to revictual Corfu. He sailed on February 7 with ten battleships,
including Allemand’s force, and a number of smaller craft and transports, but
was caught by a storm in which one of his ships lost two topmasts, and four
others parted company, only rejoining him in the Adriatic. He reached Corfu
unmolested, and having thrown reinforcements and provisions into it, returned
to Toulon on April 10, again without opposition. The inferiority of Collingwood
to Nelson as a commander and a strategist was shown by his conduct of these
operations; with thirty sail of the line and fifty smaller ships, he failed to
cut off the French fleet which had ventured into the Adriatic. The blockade of
Toulon had been virtually abandoned, and the French were permitted to come and
go much as they liked. Collingwood’s failure at this juncture appears to have
preyed upon his mind; he was old, ill, worn out by long years of devoted
service, and would willingly have relinquished the command to a younger man;
but, entreated by his Government to remain at his post, he obeyed, to die in
harness in 1809.
In May, 1808,
Napoleon formulated another “immense project,” from the execution of which he
was only diverted by the outbreak of the Spanish insurrection. It embodied most
of the features of the old plans formed before the battle of Trafalgar. Great
expeditions were to be made ready at Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Ferrol, Nantes,
and Toulon, in order to menace England on every side; while large forces were
to encamp close to the squadrons, and to embark if the British fleets relaxed
their vigilance. Egypt, the West Indies, and Ireland were to be perpetually
threatened, with the purpose of wearing out England by incessant alarms.
Napoleon calculated that by midsummer, 1808, he would have 42 battleships available,
and a year later, 77; which, added to 54 ships belonging to his various allies,
would give an effective fleet of 131 sail of the line. But all these hopes and
anticipations were shattered when it became clear that a national war had to be
faced in Spain, and that, instead of adding the Spanish forces to his own, he
would have to count them as hostile to him. In June, 1808, he directed Deeres
to delay his naval armaments and to diminish the purchase of stores and
supplies for the navy. Practically, this meant that the project
238
Effect of the Spanish rising.—A ttack upon Brest. [18O8-9
of invading
England was again abandoned. In the same month, five French sail of the line,
the last remnant of Villeneuve’s fleet, which had been in Cadiz harbour since
Trafalgar, were captured by the Spanish insurgents; and a French ship at Vigo
shared their fate. As squadrons were no longer needed off Cadiz, Ferrol, and
Cartagena, large British forces were set free to watch Toulon and other French
ports. The Spanish insurrection therefore greatly diminished the pressure on
Great Britain, and, from the naval as well as the military point of view, had
an important influence on the course of the war.
In February,
1809, the British fleet blockading Brest was driven off the port by a storm;
and Willaumez, who commanded the French forces inside, put to sea with eight
sail of the line. Had he shown energy, he might have captured in succession the
small British detachments watching Lorient and Rochefort, in each of which ports
lay three French ships. His orders were to pick up these squadrons and then
proceed to Martinique. On February 24 he anchored in Basque Roads with eleven
ships of the line, three of which were in no condition to put to sea; and, as
he was at once blockaded by the British and feared an attack, he moved into Aix
Roads, where defence was easier. In this operation one of his ships went ashore
and became a total wreck. Napoleon thereupon removed him from his command, and
replaced him by Allemand. The British Admiralty prepared fire-ships for an
attack on the French; and Lord Cochrane, a bold and enterprising officer, was
selected for the conduct of the operations, under Admiral Lord Gambier, who
viewed the project with no enthusiasm. The attack was delivered on April 11;
and, with the smallest energy on Gambier’s part, the whole French fleet must
have been taken or destroyed. The British fire-ships, it is true, did little
damage, but they created a panic in the French fleet, so that the vessels cut
their cables and, drifting in the strong tides, collided with each other or ran
aground. At daybreak on the 12th, all the French ships but two were ashore. All
that was required to complete the disaster was an attack by the heavy ships of
the British fleet. But Gambier did not move; and Cochrane was left to effect
what he could with his light ships and frigates. The result was that five of
the eight stranded French vessels eventually escaped, and only three of
Allemand’s fleet were destroyed. But so low had the professional standard of
the British navy fallen since the loss of its great leaders, that Gambier was
regarded as having deserved well of the nation. Notwithstanding bitter protests
from Cochrane, he was “most honourably” acquitted by a packed court-martial,
and was even thanked by Parliament.
In the
disastrous Walcheren expedition, however, there was little fault to find with
the navy. This expedition was originally planned in March, 1809, to effect a
diversion in favour of Austria; and, had the plan been carried out immediately
after the defeat of Napoleon at
1809-14] Walcheren eocpedition-Mediterranean
operations. 239
Essling, it
might have brought about the fall of the Empire. But there was great delay in
completing the preparations; and the French had time to win the battle of
Wagram before the fleet and transports sailed (July 28). The naval force
consisted of 37 sail of the line and 600 other craft, under Sir R. Strachan.
The army was 39,219 strong, and was under Lieutenant-General Lord Chatham,
whose chief recommendation for command appears to have been that he was of
high rank, and had been seen “ in person exercising eight or ten thousand men
much to his credit.” The unfortunate results of this expedition will be described
in another chapter of this volume. It must suffice to say here that the failure
was due to friction between the army and navy, the selection of an incompetent
general, and the despatch of the force at the wrong season of the year.
The only
other naval event in Europe of any importance in the year
1809 was the destruction of two French battleships
and a convoy in the Gulf of Lyons (October 26—-November 1) by ships from
Collingwood’s fleet. The French were under the orders of Rear-Admiral Baudoin,
who was conveying supplies from Toulon to the French army in Spain. Though
Ganteaume had eighteen French and Russian ships in Toulon, he made no attempt
to support his subordinate. He was soon afterwards replaced by Allemand, who
was subsequently sent to Lorient. Thence, in March, 1812, Allemand managed to
put to sea, but he went no further than Brest.
In the
Adriatic the British navy slowly asserted its superiority. In October, 1809,
the Ionian Islands, with the exception of Corfu, were reduced by small conjoint
expeditions, which gave the navy a base in those distant waters. This was
followed by a victory gained by Captain Hoste off Lissa (March, 1811) over a
strong French squadron of frigates, and by the capture of a French battleship,
the RivoU, in 1812.
From the date
of the first despatch of a British expeditionary force to Spain, the British
navy was called upon to protect the passage of transports and storeships, and
to cooperate in the military operations. The best work in this quarter was
achieved by Cochrane, who late in 1808 harried Duhesme in Catalonia. There were
many complaints of the navy when Wellington was commanding in Spain. He blamed
it in 1813 for insufficient support in the siege of San Sebastian, but not, it
would appear, with good reason. He asked impossibilities, and, in the words of
the First Lord of the Admiralty, appeared to consider “a large ship within a
few yards of the shore...as safe in its position and as immoveable by the winds
or waves as one of the Pyrenean mountains.”
Throughout
the later years of the war the main French squadrons remained inactive; and
this though their numbers were steadily growing, and though, from 1812 onwards,
Great Britain was at war with the United States. As a general feature of the
war from 1803 to 1814, it
240
Colonial captures.—The Continental Blockade. [1803-11
may be said
that the French fleets never deliberately attacked; they only accepted battle
when it was forced upon them.
Outside
Europe, the reduction of the French possessions continued steadily all through
the war, though it was not effected with the rapidity which might have been
expected after the British navy had asserted its command of the sea. Numerous
examples, and, in particular, the cruises of Missiessy, showed how easy it was,
down to 1805, for French squadrons to put to sea, and to throw reinforcements
into the French colonies. In the West Indies, Santa Lucia, Tobago, and Demerara
were reduced in 1803; Surinam in 1804; the Dutch island of Cura^oa in 1807;
Marie Galante and Desirade in 1808; Martinique and Cayenne in 1809; and in 1810
Guadeloupe, the last of the French West Indian possessions, and the Dutch
islands of St Martin, St Eustatius, and Saba. In the East the British were
equally successful; Pondicherry and the other French colonies in India had not
been evacuated by the British troops when war broke out, and were retained;
Amboyna and Banda Neira, in the Dutch East Indies, were captured in 1810; in
the same year Bourbon and Mauritius, the head-quarters of the French privateers
in the Indian Ocean, were reduced; and in 1811 the valuable island of Java was
taken from the Dutch. In Africa, the French colony of Senegal succumbed in
1809. Reference has already been made to the occupation of Cape Colony in 1806.
Thus France and her allies were stripped of all their colonial possessions. Yet
the loss of these bases did not render attacks upon British commerce altogether
impracticable. At that date there were many weak neutrals, on whose coasts it
was possible for cruisers to refit and obtain provisions.
After the
failure of his project of invading England, Napoleon determined to prohibit
British trade on the Continent. As an answer to his efforts, a blockade of the
French coast from Brest to the Elbe, with certain reservations, was proclaimed
by the British Government in May, 1806. Napoleon’s replies to this measure,
embodied in the Berlin, Milan, and other decrees, which jointly established
what is known as the Continental System * are described elsewhere in this
volume. The political effects of these measures fall outside the province of
this chapter. As to their economic effects, though practically the entire coast
of Europe was under Napoleon’s control from the opening of 1808 to the close of
1811, and though British trade at sea was attacked by numerous French
privateers and cruisers, the results were far less disastrous than might have
been anticipated. The measures directed by Napoleon against neutrals
contributed to the success of British shipping, by providing it with freight.
Probably it would have been a wiser proceeding on his part, had he given all
possible encouragement to American shipping, and sought to reduce British
exports by a heavy differential tariff. The following figures, giving the
clearances of British and foreign shipping engaged in the foreign trade of
Great Britain (exclusive of
Ireland),
will illustrate the effect of Napoleon’s Decrees and the British Orders in
Council:
Clearances
outwards, in thousands of tons, for years ending January 5.
1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811
1812
1814
British,
1626 1453 1463 1495 1486 1424 1372 1531 1624 1507 1665 1875
Foreign,
461 574 587 605 568 631 282 699 1138 696 550 571
The records
of 1813 have been destroyed. The remaining figures prove that, while British
shipping slightly decreased in the earlier period of the war, and neutral
shipping distinctly increased, from 1808 onwards British shipping gained
ground, though the heavy demand for transports during the Peninsular War must
be taken into account after 1808. The sudden increase of neutral shipping in
the nominal year 1810, really in 1809, was due to the repeal of the American
embargo, to the expansion of the Baltic trade when Napoleon’s attention was
concentrated upon crushing Austria, and to the fact that he intimated that he
would permit the entry of neutral shipping, even if laden with British goods;
while, in their anxiety to obtain markets for unsaleable produce, the British
authorities were even more tolerant towards neutral shipping. But, when the
neutral vessels put into French ports, their cargoes were seized and sold or
destroyed by the French authorities.
There is a
tendency to regard the Continental System as a disastrous failure; but the
economic history of England suggests that it inflicted upon her industrial
population fearful suffering and loss, and came perilously near to effecting
its object. The attempt of Napoleon to cut off the supply of raw material from
the British manufacturers was so far successful that in England wool, silk,
timber, and hemp rose enormously in price—silk, for example, from 30s. per lb.
to 112s., and most other materials in proportion. The control of the Baltic by
Napoleon, especially in 1810-11, shook England to her foundations. In 1812 the
British people were face to face with actual famine, owing to the demands of
the French army for wheat and corn, the export duty levied at Danzig, and a
general bad harvest. Wheat, in places, rose from 10,?. a bushel to 25s.; and
the foreign sources of supply failed. The trade was virtually free, but the
cost of licences, freight, and insurance was prohibitive. According to- Tooke,
these charges, on a vessel of 100 tons burden, occasionally amounted to
=£*50,000 for the voyage to Calais from London and back.
It has been
calculated (by Captain Mahan) that the average annual loss to British shipping
by capture was 524 vessels, or an average of about 2J per cent, on the annual
number of British vessels entering and clearing from ports in the United
Kingdom. Such insurance figures as are obtainable suggest that the percentage of
pecuniary loss was much greater, since, even when neutrals were included, the
average rate of insurance during the war was more than 5 per cent. To the
Mediterranean, during the third quarter of the year 1805, the risk varied from
242 Insurance rates. French and British losses.
[1802-14
6 to 25
guineas, the lower figure being probably that paid for neutral ships. In 1811
the average rate out to the Baltic was J?18, and home from that sea, £22.
Outside European waters, however, the risk steadily diminished during the war,
with the reduction of the French colonies and the capture of French cruisers
and privateers. The voyage to the West Indies was insured at 13^ guineas in
1805, while Villeneuve was at sea; the rate in
1810 was £9. To the East Indies the rate was about
16 guineas in 1805, and £8 in 1810. Freight rose in a ratio corresponding with
the advance in insurance. According to Tooke, the freight and insurance on hemp
rose luring 1809-12 to twelve times the cost of the same items in 1837, a
normal year; on tallow it was nearly fourteen times the normal; on wheat eleven
times, and on timber ten times—all being cargoes from the Baltic. In 1809 as
much as £30 was occasionally paid for the freight of a ton of hemp alone. The
value of a ton in time of peace was only from £20 to £30; that price was now
quadrupled.
Except in the
Mediterranean, where throughout the war France retained a certain amount of
coasting trade, French shipping was annihilated. After their brief recovery
during the Peace of Amiens, the French Channel ports reverted to the lamentable
condition in which the earlier war had plunged them; and at Havre a large
number of houses were uninhabited. Mettemich, in 1810, speaks of the French
people as “ruined by the entire destruction of their commerce”; but this was an
exaggeration, as France enjoyed internal prosperity and a considerable export
trade by land. Between 1802 (a year of peace) and 1811, when the Continental
System was at its height, French exports increased slightly, while British exports
declined. On the other hand, the allies of France suffered lamentably; the
strain upon their population was severer than had been the strain on France in
1796-1800; and they had no compensation for their losses. Their growing
exasperation led eventually to the great explosion of national hatred which
overthrew Napoleon.
The following
figures, given by Captain Norman, indicate the intensity of the French attack
upon British commerce, showing as they do the British merchantmen captured year
after year by the French, and the French privateers taken annually by the
British:
1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812
1813 1814
Briteke?iP1
222 387 607 619 669 469 671 619 470 476 371 146
French pn- * 33
63 39 33 33 49 28 67 37 34 18 16 vateers taken )
The evidence
of the insurance rates would seem to show that the peril was greatest in 1805,
when two strong French fleets were at large on the Atlantic. In the closing
years of the war with France, the simultaneous conflict with the United States,
described in a previous volume, complicates the calculations.
1803-is]
End of the war. Services of the navy. 243
The losses of
the French and their allies in the war were enormous. While the British navy
did not lose a single vessel of the line in action or by capture, thirty-one
French ships of the line were captured or destroyed by the British, while six
more were captured by the Spanish insurgents; Spain lost twelve sail of the
line, Holland three, Denmark nineteen, and Russia one. But the British losses
from storms and shipwrecks were numerous throughout the war, as was to be
expected in a fleet which was constantly forced to keep at sea.
The renewal
of war in 1815 led to a fresh blockade of the French coast; and, when the news
reached the British authorities that Napoleon would probably endeavour to
escape to America, the British cruisers in the Bay of Biscay were ordered to
show the utmost vigilance. Napoleon, however, speedily gave up the attempt as
hopeless, and surrendered himself to Captain Maitland of the Bellerophon on
July 15. It was not inappropriate that the navy, which had frustrated two of
the Emperor’s greatest projects—the intended invasion of England and the
attempted conquest of Spain—should also receive his final surrender. At the
close of the war, the navy had reached a point of strength which has never
before or since been surpassed or even equalled. In 1814 it counted 240 ships
of the line, 317 frigates, and 611 small craft, a total of 1168 pennants; and,
though all of these ships were not fit for sea, they represented a force which
was more than equivalent to the navies of all the other European Powers
combined.
The service
which the British navy rendered in this Titanic conflict both to England and to
Europe can scarcely be overestimated. It saved England from invasion, and
perhaps from conquest; it enabled her to continue her efforts unceasingly, and
thus, after she had, in Pitt’s famous words, “saved herself by her exertions,”
to “save Europe by her example.” British successes at sea proved to the world
that the great conqueror was not invincible, and this at a time when his
prestige on land was undimmed by failure. Consequently, throughout the
struggle, Great Britain remained the one centre of hope and encouragement to
the Continental Powers; her endurance and success bred in them something of
her own dauntless and indomitable spirit; and Trafalgar was the really decisive
battle of the Napoleonic War.
THE THIRD
COALITION. I.
On January 2,
1805, a month after his coronation as Emperor, Napoleon wrote to George III
proposing peace, as neither nation had anything to gain by war. There was a
marked change in his tone from that of 1803, when he declared that Great
Britain was no match for France, and that, if the English were the first to
draw the sword, he would be the last to sheathe it. Whether he had brought
about the rupture of the Peace of Amiens of set purpose, or had built overmuch
on Andreossy’s assurances of the pacific temper of the British ministry and
people, he had little reason to be satisfied with the result. Europe was too
narrow a field for his activity; and his mind was incessantly revolving
schemes of conquest and colonial expansion in east or west, to which England
was the great obstacle; but the renewal of war with her had not furthered them.
French trade had been driven off the sea; the French fleets were blockaded in
their ports. Santa Lucia and other West Indian islands had again passed into
British hands; San Domingo, for the reconquest of which such great efforts had
been made, had secured its independence; and Louisiana, the new acquisition
from which so much was hoped, had been sold to the United States.
England had
kept her hold of Malta, and had become a focus of conspiracies against
Napoleon’s government and person. French troops had, indeed, occupied Hanover;
but that was an affront to George III and an embarrassment to Prussia, rather
than a blow to Great Britain. A superb army had been assembled round Boulogne,
with wings at Brest and Texel, for the invasion of England and Ireland. This
army numbered
170,000 men;
and there were 280,000 men elsewhere (in France, Holland, Hanover, and Italy)
to be provided for. The public expenditure of France rose to thirty millions
sterling; and it became necessary to supplement direct by indirect taxes. The
outbreak of war had caused a financial crisis; and public credit was so low
that deficits could not be met by loans. The burden of taxation and
conscription provoked much discontent in France; and Napoleon tried to shift
this burden, so far as possible, on Italy, Switzerland and the Rhine lands. He
had gained a reluctant ally in Spain, which, as we have already seen, declared
war against
England on December 12, 1804. But Spain was already paying an annual subsidy to
Prance, and was making naval preparations under orders from Paris; so it was an
advantage to Great Britain to be able to treat her as an enemy. In England
trade was prosperous and credit good. Supplies of more than £53,000,000 were
voted in 1804; yet at the end of the session the Speaker could say: “ We have
now the proud satisfaction to see that the permanent debt of the nation is
rapidly diminishing, at the same time that the growing prosperity of the
country has strengthened and multiplied all its resources.” Pitt, “ the pilot
that weathered the storm,” had been recalled to the helm, and had begun to form
the Third Coalition.
Napoleon had
good reason for desiring peace; but, as usual, he desired it on his own terms.
These, as stated to the Legislative Body by Cham- pagny on Jan. 1, 1805, were
such as justified the British Government in regarding his overtures as a mere
repetition of his manoeuvre of five years before, designed to exhibit Pitt as
the obstacle to peace, the irreconcilable enemy of the French people and of
the institutions they had chosen, and to strengthen the hands of Fox and his
associates The reply to Napoleon’s overtures was that the King must communicate
with the Continental Powers, to whom he was united in the most confidential
manner, and particularly with the Emperor of Russia, before he could give a
specific answer. It was suggested to the Tsar (January 21) that he should send
an envoy to Paris to state on behalf of both Governments the indispensable
conditions of peace. At the same time Pitt included in his budget a sum of five
millions for foreign subsidies.
Alexander had
been mortified at the secondary part he had played in the settlement of the
affairs of Germany after the Treaty of Lune- ville. His wishes, and even the
promises made to him, had been disregarded by Napoleon; and he had recalled
his ambassador, Markoff. The despatch of a French division to Taranto made him
uneasy; for, while ostensibly a counter-stroke to the British retention of
Malta, it was a step towards the annexation of southern Italy and the
prosecution of Napoleon’s cherished designs in the East. In October, 1803, the
Austrian Government was invited to make arrangements for joint action with
Russia; but it shrank from the prospect of war. At length, in November, 1804,
it consented to sign a declaration—the word “treaty” was studiously avoided—by
which the two Powers bound themselves to help one another in resisting any
further French aggressions in Italy or Germany, or upon the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire.
Alexander was
a compound of sentiment and self-seeking. Charm of manner and lofty aspirations
veiled a steady pursuit of his own ends. The execution of the Due d’Enghien
(March 20, 1804) “ fired a mine already loaded”; the Tsar put his Court into
mourning, and sent an ndi paant protest to Paris and to the German Diet. The
French answer was that the First Consul did not interfere with the internal
affairs of
Russia, and
would permit no Government to meddle with the internal affairs of Prance; and
there was a significant reference to the assassination of the Emperor Paul. A
complete rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries followed.
The Russian
Government had made overtures to Great Britain, as well as to Austria, in the
autumn of 1803, with reference to French designs on Turkey; and the conditions
of cooperation were discussed more actively after Pitt’s return to office and
the breach between Russia and France. Pitt was ready to find money for the
Continental Powers, but not for mere measures of self-defence. He desired a
league, not against future aggressions on the part of France, but for the
restoration of the status quo ante belhim, and for the erection of solid
barriers. In November, 1804, Count Novossilzoff was sent to London to negotiate
an alliance on such a basis. But the Russian Government had other things in
view. Prince Adam Czartoryski, whom Alexander had lately made his Foreign
Minister, was an ardent young Pole, who hoped to bring about the reunion of his
country under the kingship of the Tsar, compensating Austria and Prussia on
their western borders for the loss of their Polish provinces. He maintained
that, if occasion should arise for dealing with the Turkish possessions in
Europe, Moldavia and Constantinople should fall to Russia, while the rest
might be formed into separate States under a Russian protectorate. On the other
hand, England must amend her maritime code, and must hand over Malta to Russia;
France might be compensated for her surrenders in Europe by an enlargement of
her East Indian colonies; and in case of war, the promised British subsidy
ought to be increased.
It is not
surprising that, when such ideas as these prevailed at St Petersburg, the
negotiation of an alliance proved difficult. A treaty was at length signed
there on April 11, 1805, by which the two Powers agreed to form an European
league for the restoration of peace and the balance of power. North Germany,
Holland, Switzerland, and Italy were to be liberated from French control.
Piedmont was to be restored to the King of Sardinia, and enlarged. Holland,
Switzerland, and Prussia were also to receive additional territory, with the
object of presenting a solid barrier against future French usurpations. The
Allies disclaimed any intention of dictating the form of government in France.
Great Britain, besides employing her own forces by land and sea, engaged to pay
an annual subsidy of £1,250,000 for every 100,000 men employed by the
Continental Powers against France, provided that the total number should not be
less than 400,000. Of these Russia was to furnish 115,000, besides reserve
corps on her own frontiers. It was agreed that England should restore the
colonies and settlements in the East and West Indies which she had taken during
the war; but Pitt resisted the Russian demands respecting Malta and the
maritime code, and this delayed the ratification of the treaty for more than
three months.
Napoleon
clinched the Coalition when it seemed not unlikely to fall through. He had
determined that the Italian (formerly Cisalpine) Republic should follow the
example of the French Republic, and become a monarchy. Napoleon destined the
crown for his brother Joseph, and so informed foreign Powers; but Joseph
declined to renounce his right of succession to the throne of France for a
nominal kingship. Louis also declined; whereupon Napoleon decided to assume the
crown himself. He announced his decision to the French Senate on March 17,
1805, adding that the arrangement was provisional, and that the crowns would be
separated on the advent of peace. By this concession he hoped to soothe not
only Italy but Austria. He placed the iron crown of Lombardy on his own head at
Milan on May 26, and chose his stepson, Eugene Beauhamais, as Viceroy.
An envoy from
the Court of Naples demurred to the new title “King of Italy,” and drew from
Napoleon one of his customary outbursts, in which he threatened to drive Queen
Maria Carolina out of the peninsula. On June 4 he received a deputation from
the Ligurian Republic, asking to be annexed to France. He granted the prayer
which he had himself prompted, and so added to his naval resources the port of
Genoa, and some thousands of excellent sailors. Lucca was turned into a
principality for his sister l^lise; and Parma and Piacenza were annexed shortly
afterwards. By these steps, all Italy west of the Adige and north of Tuscany
was brought under the direct rule of Napoleon; and little doubt was felt at
Vienna that he would soon demand Venetia.
Austria had
not recovered from the state of exhaustion to which she had been reduced by the
wars of the Revolution. Her debt had risen to fifty millions sterling, while
her annual revenue was under ten millions; and she had been driven to an
inconvertible paper currency. The loss of Venetia would be a heavy blow to her
financially, and would shut the door on her hopes of recovering lost ground in
Italy. The Emperor Francis had at first shared the view of Archduke Charles
that peace, retrenchment, and reform were the only way of salvation for the
monarchy. He had made the Archduke War Minister in December, 1801, and had
narrowed the functions of the Aulic Council for War. But the changes brought
about by Charles did not find favour in high circles at Vienna; and there grew
up a strong opposition to him. Champagny, the French Minister, wrote on July
26, 1802: “ Archduke Charles, honoured by his own people, valued by all
Germany, esteemed throughout Europe, is not loved in his own family: he is too
big for them.” The Emperor was conservative by instinct, mistrustful of
himself, but not inclined to delegate power. He sought wisdom in a multitude of
counsellors, and preferred the old system of government by boards to the new
system of ministers meeting in conference, which the Archduke had persuaded him
to adopt.
Charles was
deeply impressed with the defects of the army, and
248
Vacillation of Austria. Archduke Charles; [1804-5
wanted time
to carry out his reforms. Both from a military and from a national point of
view he was in favour of peace at almost any price. He pointed out (in a memoir
dated March 3, 1804) that France could draw upon a population of 40,000,000 for
her armies, while Austria had only 25,000,000, and could not apply conscription
to more than half of them. Her finances were unequal even to a peace
establishment. War would mean bankruptcy, for the British subsidies would not
cover more than a quarter of the expenditure. Past experience showed how little
the Russians were to be depended on as allies; and, even if Russia furnished
150,000 men, this would not make Austria a match for France. Prussia would be
neutral or perhaps hostile; no help could be looked for from the secondary
German States; and Great Britain would employ such troops as she could spare
from home in enterprises against French and Dutch colonies. Instead of war, he
urged alliance with France, which, being based on solid advantages for both
sides, would be durable.
Cobenzl had
made an attempt in this direction in 1801, when he succeeded Thugut as Foreign
Minister; but it met with no success. Napoleon leaned to Prussia and Bavaria;
and each year had brought changes to the disadvantage of Austria. His
endeavours, as soon as he became Emperor, to represent himself as the successor
of Charlemagne, roused the fear that the House of Habsburg would lose the
titular headship of Germany, and led Francis to adopt a new title for himself,
“ Roman Emperor Elect, Hereditary Emperor of Austria ” (August 11, 1804). Both
he and his minister gradually drifted towards the war party, made up of the
Archduke’s opponents. They came to the conclusion that war with the help of
allies would be a less evil than peace with isolation. If they feared Napoleon,
they also feared Alexander; and they were above all things anxious that Russia
should not come to an understanding with France unless Austria were a party to
it.
Charles was
perhaps too prone to play the part of Jeremiah. A man prepared to prophesy
smooth things was found in General Mack. He was a fluent talker who had risen
from the ranks, and had been chief of Coburg’s staff in the campaigns of
1793-4. He had unbounded confidence in himself; and not only the Emperor
Francis, but British officers and the British Government, took him at his own
valuation, though Napoleon spoke of him as a charlatan. He had commanded the
Neapolitan army in 1798, and had been forced to capitulate; but the blame was
laid on his troops. In spite of the strongest opposition on the part of the
Archduke, Mack was made Quartermaster-General in the spring of 1805, and had the
chief voice in the preparations for war. The Aulic Council of War was restored
to its old predominance, on the plea that the Archduke could not act as War
Minister while commanding in the field.
Novossilzoff
was waiting at Berlin for passports to proceed to Paris
as the bearer
of the reply of England and Russia to the peace proposals made by Napoleon at
the beginning of the year, when Alexander received news of the annexation of
Genoa. The Tsar at once recalled his envoy, considering the annexation a gross
insult at such a moment, and pressed the Austrian Government to decide whether
it would join the Coalition. If it consented, he was ready to increase his own
contingent to 180,000 men. If it refused, it must not look to him in future for
support against France. On July 7, 1805, the Austrian Government sent an
affirmative reply, and acceded formally at St Petersburg on August 9. It
undertook to furnish 315,000 men; but its army fell far short of that number.
Sweden also joined the Coalition, and promised 12,000 field troops. Prussia
declined to join, and asked Austria to unite with her in an attempt to mediate.
The French
occupation of Hanover had given Prussia ample cause of quarrel. It was an
infringement of the Treaty of Basel; it brought French troops into the midst of
the Prussian dominions; and it was a severe blow to Prussian commerce,, for it
led the British to blockade the mouth of the Elbe. Napoleon was deaf to
remonstrances on this subject, and he rejected the proposal that Prussia should
guarantee the neutrality of Germany; that, as he told Lucchesini (November 27,
1803), would close the road from Strassburg to Vienna, which he should have to
take if he went to war with Austria. Nothing short of an alliance would satisfy
hi"Q. At the Court of Berlin the general sentiment was strongly
anti-French, but there was the old jealousy and distrust of Austria; and the
arguments for keeping on good terms with France were pressed by men like
Haugwitz and the Cabinet-Secretary Lombard, who had the ear of the King. Others
were against taking either side, and maintained that as much might be won by
wise and skilful diplomacy as by war, with less risk, and without any sacrifice
of men or money.
This course
commended itself to Frederick William III, who was diffident, irresolute, and
parsimonious. He declared that he would have no war unless he was himself
attacked. Early in 1804 he appealed to the Tsar to know if he might count on
him in case of need; and on May 24 declarations were exchanged at Berlin,
providing for joint resistance to any fresh aggressions by France east of the
Weser. The seizure of Sir George Rumbold, the British envoy at Hamburg (October
24, 1804), was a flagrant act of this description; and Hsrdenberg, who was by
this time associated with Haugwitz as Foreign Minister, persuaded the King to
send a remonstrance to Paris. Its terms were milder than Hardenberg wished; and
Frederick William wrote at the same time to Haugwitz, asking how the matter
might be settled without war if Napoleon iisregarded it. The Emperor had
wanted Rumbold’s papers rather than his person, and he made a merit of
releasing him at the request of the King of Prussia; but he said privately that
he had had a bad quarter of an hour which he hoped to pay back with interest.
250
Prussia and Sweden.-The Allies' plan of campaign. [1804-5
There was
great exultation in Berlin at the unexpected efficacy of the King’s
intervention; and the relations of the two Powers seemed to be on a better
footing than before. Napoleon was acknowledged without delay as Emperor of the
French, and later as King of Italy; and Black Eagles were sent to Paris in
exchange for the Golden Eagles of the newly-founded Legion of Honour. This
brought friction with Gustavus IV of Sweden, the Quixote of legitimism, who
returned his own Black Eagle to Berlin that he might not be on the same roll
with Bonaparte. He received a warning from the Prussian Government that troops
would be marched into Swedish Pomerania if any steps were taken there which
might affect the neutrality of northern Germany; but he signed treaties with
Great Britain and Russia, and the Tsar sent a counter-threat to Berlin.
Swedish
Pomerania was one of the border-lands which Prussian statesmen coveted, to
round off their own fragmentaiy territory. But they hankered much more after
Hanover; and Napoleon was convinced (as he told the Austrian ambassador in May,
1803) that he could at any time secure Prussia by giving her a bone to gnaw. He
had several intimations, especially after Hardenberg (who was himself a
Hanoverian) became minister, that Prussia would like to occupy Hanover, if only
as temporary custodian. Towards the end of 1804, the Prussian Government
sounded the Tsar on this point; but he strongly disapproved of an arrangement
which would release 25,000 French troops for use elsewhere.
In the summer
of 1805 General Winzingerode paid a fruitless visit to Berlin, and then went to
Vienna as the Tsar’s military representative. He had conferences there with
Mack and other Austrian officers, which ended in a protocol drawn up on July
16. The plan of operations was based upon the memoir already referred to,
prepared by Archduke Charles in March, 1804, which (as Lord Mulgrave remarked)
“ presents rather the laboured detail of obstacles to any attempt at opening a
campaign against the power of France, than a system of action and vigorous
operations.” The conclusion of the Archduke was that Austria, if successful,
could hope to gain territory only in Italy; while, on the other hand, it was by
way of Italy that the enemy could most easily reach Vienna. On that side,
therefore, the Austrians should take the offensive in force; in the valley of
the Danube they should occupy the line of the Iller, and wait for the Russians
to join them.
In accordance
with this general conception, it was settled at the end of August that the army
of Italy should number 94,000 men, and be commanded by Archduke Charles; there
should be 34,000 men in Tyrol and Vorarlberg; and 58,000 men should form the
army of Germany, commanded nominally by the Emperor, or by the young Archduke
Ferdinand of Modena in his absence, with Mack as chief of the staff. A Russian
army of 55,000 men, under Kutusoff, was to cross the Galician frontier in the
middle of August, and reach the Inn
1804-5]
Napoleon and Austria.-Hanover offered to Prussia. 251
by the middle
of October, twenty days (as it was reckoned) before the French army could
arrive there from Boulogne. It was to be followed by two others under Bennigsen
and Buxhowden. A Russian force was also to be sent to Stralsund, to form part
of an army of 50,000 men under Gustavus, made up of Swedes, Danes, Hanoverians,
and English, which was to recover Hanover and invade Holland; while an Anglo-
Russian corps of 30,000 men, with 20,000 Neapolitans, was to drive the French
out of southern Italy.
The utmost
secrecy was observed about the negotiations and the preparations for war, lest
the Austrians should be crushed before the Russians could join them. But
Napoleon was on the alert, and took note of the gradual increase of Austrian
troops in Italy and Tyrol. He warned the Court of Vienna, in June, 1804, that
his attention was not absorbed by his preparations against England; and his
tone became threatening when the recognition of his Imperial title was delayed.
At the beginning of 1805 he demanded and received pacific assurances; at the
same time he reinforced his army in Italy. He thought it unlikely that Austria
would compromise herself when she had “ nothing to hope for, and everything to
lose ”; and in any case he reckoned that she must show her hand three months
before she would be ready for war.
In the
meantime he hoped to carry out his project for the invasion of England, to
which he clung with characteristic tenacity. The variations in this scheme and
the events which hindered its execution have already been described. When, on
July 28, Villeneuve, after his indecisive action with Calder, put into Vigo
for repairs, Napoleon was beginning to change his mind about the intentions of
Austria. On August 13 he told Talleyrand that he must know within a fortnight
whether Austria meant peace or war, as the season was far advanced for a
campaign. Late as it was, however, the Emperor Francis should understand that,
if he elected for war, he would not spend Christmas in Vienna. The time had
come to give Prussia her bone and to secure her help, in order either to
paralyse the Coalition while Napoleon crossed the Channel, or to overpower it,
if war should break out on the Continent. On August 8 the French ambassador at
Berlin made a definite offer of Hanover, with a guarantee that the cession of
it should be an essential condition of peace between France and Great Britain.
Frederick William had scruples; he hesitated, but seemed inclined to negotiate;
and to hasten the negotiation and settle details of cooperation Napoleon sent
Duroc to Berlin at the end of August.
The invasion
of England had been given up some days before. Some authorities have held that
Napoleon never entertained, or had long abandoned, the hope of crossing the
Channel. The Prussian ambassador, Lucchesini, and Archduke Charles, suspected
at the time that the scheme was an excuse for keeping a large army on foot for
use on the Continent; but the enormous expenditure incurred for the expedition,
and the
incompleteness
of the preparations for a Continental war, militate against this conclusion.
Napoleon, however, was not the man to dwell exclusively on a single scheme. It
was his custom, as he said, “faire to/ujawrs son theme en deux fa$ons.y> The many disappointments
he had met with, and the remonstrances of his naval officers, could hardly fail
to cause him some misgivings about his project; and he had foreseen for some
months that the action of Austria and Russia might oblige him to postpone it.
No doubt it was with a sense of relief that he now turned his back on the sea,
and entered upon land operations against troops which he had so often beaten.
At any rate he could afford to wait no longer. He directed Talleyrand to
prepare a circular showing how Austria had forced him into war; and on August
26 his army began its march from the Channel coast to the valley of the Danube.
The “ Grand
Army,” as it now became, consisted of seven army-corps, six divisions of heavy
cavalry or dragoons, and a division of the Imperial guard, numbering altogether
190,000 men. The 1st corps, under Bemadotte, was in Hanover; the 2nd, under
Marmont, in Holland; and the 7th, under Augereau, at Brest. The 3rd, 4th, 5th,
and 6th corps, commanded respectively by Davout, Soult, Lannes, and Ney, were
in the neighbourhood of Boulogne. Murat acted as the Emperor’s lieutenant, and
had general command of the cavalry. It was the best army that Napoleon ever
led. Nearly half the men had seen some war service; and a quarter of them had
served throughout the wars of the Revolution. Four years of continental peace
and the prolonged encampment at Boulogne had given opportunity to make good
all defects ; and the officers of corps and divisions had learnt to work
together. The generals, while rich in experience, were in their prime, on an
average barely over forty years of age. But the captains and subalterns were
not much younger; and, though they knew their business, most of them had lost
the spring of youth, and were confirmed grumblers.
Owing to the
sudden change of plan, there was a great deficiency of supplies and transport;
and this was aggravated by the rapidity with which the army moved. Cloaks and
shoes were ordered at the last moment; and some of the dragoons were without
horses. The proportion of field-guns was small—less than two to a thousand
men. Magazines were formed at Strassburg and Mainz, and subsequently at Ulm and
Wurzburg; but the army practically lived upon the country as soon as it left
France. “ Pillage became authorised,” says the Due de Fezensac, “and the
districts through which we passed suffered cruelly; yet we were none the less
famished throughout the campaign.” This developed the habit of marauding and
relaxed discipline.
To gain time,
Napoleon told Talleyrand to change his tone: “ il ne faut plus d'audace, il
faut de la pusillanimite.” But it was too late. On September 3 the Court of
Vienna rejected the French ultimatum; and, on the 8th, the Austrian troops
crossed the Inn. The Elector of
isos J Bavaria joins France.—The march on the
Danube. 253
Bavaria was
called upon to unite his forces with those of Austria, but he had already
thrown in his lot with France. Leaving Munich, he retired northward with his
troops (27,000 men) to Wurzburg and Bamberg, to await the arrival of the
French. Apart from hereditary antagonism to the House of Habsburg, the personal
sympathies of Maximilian Joseph were with France, as were those of his
minister, Montgelas. By the act of mediatisation which followed on the Peace of
Luneville, Bavaria had gained a quarter of a million in population, with a
richer and more compact territory; and the Elector hoped for further gains. He
would have preferred neutrality, but Napoleon would not hear of it; and on
August 24 he signed a treaty of alliance with France. Hope and fear led other
South-German States—Wiirtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt —to take the same
course. The German people, to whom revolutionary France had brought more
benefit than injury, made no protest.
The Austrian
army advanced to the Bier; and by the end of September there were about 60,000
men between the Lech, the Danube, and the Lake of Constance. This forward
position had been recommended by Archduke Charles, in order to cover Tyrol and
watch the defiles through the Black Forest; but he now supported Archduke
Ferdinand, who urged that Napoleon would be at Munich with 150,000 men before
the Russians reached the Inn, and that only flying columns should be sent into
Bavaria. Mack, however, persuaded the Emperor that it was impossible for
Napoleon to bring more than 70,000 men across the Rhine.
On September
23 Napoleon explained to the Senate his reasons for war, and obtained an
unconstitutional vote authorising him to call out all the conscripts of 1806 as
well as the reserve conscripts of previous years. This yielded him 180,000 men,
of whom three-fourths were actually under arms before the end of the year. On
the 26th he arrived at Strassburg; and Murat crossed the Rhine there with the
cavalry and Lannes’ corps. This confirmed Mack in his belief that the French
would approach the Danube, as in former wars, either through the Black Forest,
or by skirting its southern border. But Napoleon intended to reach the Inn
before the Russians, and to thrust himself between them and the Austrians; and
this could only be done from the north.
On the 27th
Ney passed the Rhine near Carlsruhe and pushed on to Stuttgart, where he was
joined by Lannes and Murat, when their demonstration had served its purpose.
Soult and Davout crossed lower down, at Speier and Mannheim, and took up the
line of the Neckar to the north of Ney. Bemadotte marched from Gottingen to
Wurzburg, where he found part of the Bavarian army, and was joined on the 30th
by Marmont. By the beginning of October more than 200,000 French and Bavarians
were assembled on the Neckar and the Main. Augereau’s corps, 14,000 strong, was
on its way from Britanny; and contingents amounting to 16,000 men were being
drawn from Baden, Wiirtemberg,
and
Hesse-Darmstadt. In the north of Italy Massena had nearly 50,000 men, while
Saint-Cyr had 20,000 in the south.
Taking a
south-easterly course and moving with a wide front, the Grand Army reached the
Danube on October 6. It crossed at various points near Donauworth and
Ingolstadt, driving before it the weak corps of Kienmayer, the only Austrian
troops east of the Lech. Ney was left to the north of the Danube, to bar the
roads leading from Ulm towards Bohemia. Bemadotte marched on Munich with his
own corps and the Bavarians, while the rest of the army converged upon
Augsburg, which was occupied by Oct. 10. The troops had marched two hundred
miles in a fortnight, in terrible weather and with scanty food. Napoleon had
effected his object, but for some days he was not aware of the full measure of
his success. He thought it probable that the Austrian army, whose strength he
put at 80,000 or perhaps 100,000 men, had retreated southward into Tyrol, or
had escaped eastward by skirting the base of the Alps. Assuming that only a
small garrison would be left in Ulm, he ordered Ney to take it. Dupont’s
division thereupon advanced; but at Haslach, four miles north of Ulm, it
encountered superior forces (October 11), and was obliged to retreat, leaving
the northern roads open to the enemy.
If what has
been aptly called “ the fog of war ” led Napoleon astray, much more was this
the case with his antagonist. Archduke Ferdinand received instructions that, in
case of any difference of opinion, he was to be guided by Mack, on whom rests,
therefore, the whole responsibility. Mack was concentrating his troops at Ulm,
when he learned that the French were on the Danube, fifty miles or more to the
east of him. He began a movement on Augsburg; but his leading division came
across Lannes’ corps at Wertingen, and was nearly destroyed (October 8).
Checked in this direction, and refusing to retreat on Tyrol, he determined to
strike northward, and cut the French communications. This plan was soon
dropped, and then again taken up; and on the 13th one corps (Wemeck’s) advanced
halfway to Nordlingen. But by this time Napoleon had fully grasped the
situation ; Soult, Marmont, and Lannes were hastening to envelop Ulm on the
southern side. When the heads of their columns were approaching the Iller, a
report reached Mack that British troops had landed at Boulogne, and that there
was a revolution in France. He jumped to the conclusion that the French army
was in full retreat, cancelled his previous instructions, and issued orders for
pursuit. His dream, as he afterwards called it, was soon dispelled. By the 15th
the investment of Ulm was complete. The Archduke had ridden northward with a
few squadrons; but Mack remained at Ulm with 25,000 men. It was not a place
that could be defended against a serious attack, and it was short of supplies. \
On October 17
Mack agreed to capitulate, unless he should be relieved within eight days. Two
days afterwards he consented to an alteration
of the terms;
the surrender should take effect immediately, but the corps of Ney should
remain at Ulm till the 25th. The point about which Mack showed most concern was
that Napoleon should not think ill of his generalship. Meanwhile Murat was in
hot pursuit of the Austrians who had gone northward. Werneck’s corps was
overtaken and surrendered; but the Archduke, with about 2000 cavalry, escaped
into Bohemia. The corps of Jellachich, which had been sent to reinforce Mack,
made its way back to Vorarlberg much reduced. The total number of prisoners
secured by the French was about 50,000.
Napoleon
waited to see the troops at Ulm lay down their arms. On October 21, the day on
which his naval power was shattered at Trafalgar, he left Ulm for Augsburg,
after inviting his soldiers to deal with the Russians as they had dealt with
the Austrians, and to settle the question whether the French infantry was the
second or the first in Europe. He had still no easy task before him. Kutusoff
had reached Braunau with 40,000 Russians, and was joined there by 25,000
Austrians. In a few weeks another Russian army would come up; and Archduke
Charles might bring his troops from Italy to help in barring the road to
Vienna, or might descend on the flank or rear of the French army as it moved
down the valley of the Danube.
Prussia, too,
had changed her attitude. Hardenberg had been in favour of accepting Hanover
with the conditions attached to the transfer. He disliked the system of
neutrality which had been so long adhered to, and believed that a more spirited
and less drifting policy was better for Prussia. Her enlargement and
consolidation were his persistent aim, and he saw more prospect of effecting
them by an alliance with France than by union with the eastern Powers. He was
supported by the Duke of Brunswick; but Haugwitz advocated an armed
neutrality. That was the course which the King decided on; and Duroc (who
arrived shortly afterwards) could not move him. He would give no facilities for
the movement of French troops across neutral German States. Duroc reported,
however, that the Prussian army was quite unready to take the field; and
Napoleon, while beriming to feel some distrust of the Prussian Government,
felt more contempt for it. He blamed Bemadotte for deviating from the direct
route from Gottingen to Wurzburg on account of scruples about neutral
territory, and told him to pass through Ansbach on his further march to
Ingolstadt.
The news of
this affront reached Frederick William at a critical moment. The Tsar had been
pressing him to join the Coalition, or at any rate to allow the Russian troops
to cross Silesia. He had refused, and, when he was told that the Russians would
force their way, he had put his army on a war establishment. Alexander was
unwilling to carry out his threat; and the march of the Russians was delayed
for some weeks. He sent Dolgorouki to Berlin with a fresh appeal; but
on October 6
the King reaffirmed his unalterable resolution to declare against any Power
which should violate his territory. He learned immediately afterwards that the
French had passed through Ansbach three days before. His indignation was
extreme, and was shared by his army and people, which had long felt sore at the
mean part which Prussia had come to play in Europe. The desired permission was
at once given to the Russian troops. On October 25 Alexander was cordially
received at Potsdam; the sovereigns renewed the friendship which they had
formed at Memel in 1802, and swore before the tomb of Frederick the Great to be
faithful to each other. A convention was signed on November 3, by which Prussia
undertook to present to Napoleon conditions of peace substantially the same as
those laid down in the Anglo-Russian treaty, except as regards Piedmont and the
Netherlands. The King promised^ if these proposals were rejected, to put
180,000 men into the field in order to enforce them; and a plan of yperalions
was settled. Four weeks were to be allowed for negotiation with France, to give
time for military preparations.
Prussia was
to obtain a better frontier, either by new acquisitions or by exchange; and the
Tsar promised his good offices to bring about the cession of Hanover. He sent
Oubril to London with this object; but Pitt, while willing to pay a subsidy,
declared that, “ as for the exchange of Hanover, no minister would be imprudent
enough to make such a proposal to the King, and great care will be taken always
to conceal it from him.” The British Government had been urging for some time
past that' the influence of France over Prussia should be met “ by uniting
temptation with menace, and by acting at the same time upon the fears and upon
the cupidity of the Prussian Government.” They proposed to extend its
possessions west of the Rhine up to a line drawn from Maastricht to Luxemburg,
so that it might form part of the French barrier. This proposal was now renewed
as an alternative to the cession of Hanover; but it was less attractive to
Prussia, and was not regarded favourably by Austria or Russia. It was an offer,
too, of part of the bear’s skin before the bear was dead.
The affair of
Ansbach is an example of that recklessness on Napoleon’s part which made Simon
Woronzoff say of him: “ Avec toutes les quaMtes d'un vrai scilerat qu'il
possede en ■perfection, il Jinwa mal,Jmite de ion sens.” But, if he
wantonly added new enemies to old, no one ever knew better how to deal with
them in succession, and to make up for opposing odds by celerity and precision
of stroke. By a rapid advance on Vienna he hoped to defeat Kutusoff before he
was reinforced, and to force Francis to make peace, as he had done in 1800. He
sent Ney with the Bavarians into Tyrol, and ordered Augereau to follow with his
corps as soon as it arrived. He directed Bemadotte and Marmont on Salzburg,
where they would cover his own flank, and would be able to turn the left of
Kutusoff if he should try
isos] Napoleon at Vienna.—Archduke Charles in Italy.
257
to hold the
line of the Inn. But Kutusoff made no such attempt. In spite of Austrian
remonstrances, he fell back from one line to another as the French approached,
and fought only rear-guard actions.
On November 5
Napoleon was at Linz. There he received proposals for an armistice from
Francis; but, while ready to treat for peace, he refused to stop the march of
his columns. Archduke Ferdinand had gathered about 9000 men in Bohemia, and a
Russian force was rumoured to be there also; so Napoleon formed a new corps under
Mortier, made up of divisions from other corps, which was to march down the
left bank of the Danube and push out reconnaissances. This made Kutusoff
uneasy, for he thought the object was to cut him off from the army which was
crossing Silesia. Parting company with the Austrians, he crossed the Danube at
Mautem, fell upon the leading division of Mortier’s corps, and nearly destroyed
it. He then marched towards Olmutz, followed by Bemadotte. The Austrian corps
which had been cooperating with him turned southward into the mountains, to
keep the road over the Semmering open for the army of Italy, but was so roughly
handled by Davout and Marmont, that only fragments of it found their way to
Pressburg.
Napoleon
entered Vienna, which was undefended, on November 13, and took up his residence
at Schonbrunn. He at once organised an administration of the archduchy, and
imposed a war contribution of four millions sterling. By a ruse de guerre,
possession was gained of the bridge over the Danube, which was to prove a
formidable obstacle in 1809. Murat was sent on with the cavalry and with the
corps of Lannes and Soult to intercept Kutusoff. He ought to have succeeded,
but he allowed himself to be tricked in turn by the Russian general, who
professed that he was authorised to treat for the retirement of the Russian
armies into Poland, and so gained time to reach Znaym. Bagration’s corps had to
be left behind in presence of the French; but it succeeded in rejoining the
army, after losing a third of its men in a fight against great odds at
Hollabrunn. By November 19 Kutusoff had effected his junction with Buxhowden’s
army between Briinn and Olmutz.
While the
Austrian defence in the valley of the Danube had so completely collapsed, the
vigorous offensive, which, according to the plan of campaign, was to be taken
in Italy, had come to nothing. When Archduke Charles took command of the army
of Italy on September 20, he found his divisions under strength and short of
equipment and transport. He was soon called upon to send assistance to the army
of Germany. He was a man of more ability than energy, cautious rather than
enterprising, and subject to nervous convulsions. His disapproval of the war
and foreboding of disaster perhaps quenched his activity. At any rate he accepted
the proposal of Massena that six days’ notice should.be given before
hostilities began; and under this convention the
258 The war in Italy.—Napoleon’s dangerous position.
[i805
two armies
remained passive till the middle of October. By that time the Archduke had
90,000 men under his command, including 15,000 men in southern Tyrol. Massena
had only 58,000, but Saint-Cyr was bringing 10,000 from southern Italy. By dint
of threats, Napoleon had forced a treaty of neutrality upon the Neapolitan
Government, which was ratified on October 8.
In spite of
his inferiority in numbers, Massena denounced the convention and took the
offensive. On November 19 he gained possession of the Castel Vecchio bridge at
Verona, which enabled him to pass the Adige. On the 29th he attacked the
Austrian army in its intrenched position behind Caldiero. Three days’ obstinate
fighting ended in the repulse of the French; but the Archduke did not follow up
his success. He had heard of the disaster at Ulm, and had already suggested that
the Austrian forces should evacuate Italy and Tyrol. He had sent off some of
his guns and stores, and now seized the opportunity to begin his retreat.
Massena followed and harassed his rear-guard, but did not seriously interfere
with him.
On November 8
the Archduke reached the Tagliamento, and halted there some days to give his
brother John time to bring away the troops in Tyrol. Some of the corps there
were cut off; Jellachich surrendered to Augereau; and Rohan, after an
adventurous march which brought him almost to Venice, surrendered to Saint-Cyr.
With the remainder, John made his way by Villach to Marburg, where he was
joined on the 26th by the army of Italy. Knowing that Napoleon had gone to meet
the Russians in Moravia, Charles had thoughts of forcing the Semmering and
recovering Vienna. The task should not have been too much for
80,000 men. He decided, however, to march round
by Hungary, where he would meet with no opposition; and he had reac’ ad Kormond
when he heard, on December 6, of the battle of Austerlitz.
Napoleon had
joined Murat at Brunn on November 20. He had hoped to dictate peace at Vienna ;
but Francis, though he continued to negotiate, could not be brought to cede
Venetia and Tyrol. In spite of his successes, or rather by reason of them, Napoleon’s
position grew critical. He was five hundred miles from the French frontier.
Winter was approaching, and his soldiers were longing to get home. The conscription
was causing great discontent in France; there were plots and a financial crisis
in Paris. The corps of the Grand Army were scattered, forming a huge horse-shoe
round Vienna. Bemadotte was at Iglau, watching the Archduke Ferdinand; Davout
had his head-quarters at Pressburg, to hold Hungary in check; Marmont was
guarding the passes of Styria; Ney, having done his work in Tyrol, had moved on
into Carinthia; while Augereau had been sent north into Swabia. Mortier’s
divisions garrisoned Vienna. Massena, who was expected to be at Gratz, had
halted at the Venetian frontier. Napoleon had only about 40,000 men with him at
Brunn; while at Olmiitz nearly 90,000
isos] Resultless negotiations.—Russian advance. 259
Russians and
Austrians were assembled towards the end of the month, with the two Emperors at
their head. If he attacked them, he could only hope to win a costly and barren
victory, a prelude to a winter campaign. In a few days they would be reinforced
by another Russian corps, that of Essen. By the middle of December their
numbers would be more than doubled by the arrival of Bennigsen’s army and that
of Archduke Charles, while the Prussians would also come into the field. The
British ministers were reckoning that more than three-quarters of a million of
men would be available for the next campaign.
While giving
his troops a few days of much-needed rest, Napoleon tried to break up the
Coalition by means of diplomacy. Talleyrand urged him to make a friend of
Austria, and to compensate her at the expense of Turkey for the sacrifices he
required of her in Germany and Italy. As a powerful Danubian State, she would
be a buffer against Russian encroachments; and her interests would be bound up
with those of France. But Napoleon hankered after an understanding with the
Tsar. The news of Trafalgar had lately reached him; and, in the indirect war
against England to which he was now reduced, the war of blockade, he looked
upon Russia as his best ally. Stadion and Gyulai, who came to his head-quarters
to reopen negotiations on behalf of the Emperor Francis, were sent on to
Vienna, to be kept in play by Talleyrand Haugwitz, the bearer of the Prussian
ultimatum disguised as an offer of mediation, was detained two days at Iglau
that he might not meet Stadion. Haugwitz had a short interview with Napoleon,
in which he was careful not to commit himself; and he, too, was sent on to
Vienna. There he was profuse in his assurances to Talleyrand that the King was
bound to nothing more than the tender of his good offices. Meanwhile Napoleon
wrote to the Tsar, proposing a personal interview. Alexander declined, but sent
his aide-de-camp, Dolgorouki, who was met by Napoleon at the French outposts on
November 30. In reply to a suggestion that Russia should annex Moldavia instead
of quarrelling with France, Dolgorouki said that the Tsar’s policy was quite
disinterested, and he stated the conditions which the Allies insisted on. These
(as Napoleon wrote that day to Talleyrand) included the withdrawal of the
French from Belgium, which was to be united to Holland. “ What, Brussels too !
” said Napoleon, “ not even if you were on the heights of Montmartre.”
By this time,
however, another way of escape from his embarrassments was opening for
Napoleon. The allied army began to advance on Briinn. Czartoryski advised
Alexander to leave the army to Kutusoff, whose command was only nominal while
the two sovereigns were with him. But Alexander had cooled towards his
favourite, who was anti-Prussian, and had powerful enemies in the Old-Russian
party. He lent a willing ear to courtiers like Dolgorouki, who assured him that
his presence and control would secure victory for his troops and glory for
himself, He had chosen an Ausfrii n, Colonel Weyrother, a man of the Mack type,
as chief of
the staff, and was persuaded by him that Napoleon’s unwonted inactivity showed
he felt himself no match for the Russians, and that he might be cut off from
Vienna. A move in some direction was imperative, as supplies were running short
at Olmiitz; so it was decided to advance.
On November
28 the French outposts at Wischau were driven in. Napoleon at once penetrated
the design of the Allies, and did his best to encourage them in its
prosecution. He drew his troops back, and chose a position between Briinn and
Austerlitz, which seemed to lend itself to that turning movement at which
Weyrother was aiming. He determined that this should be no ordinary battle, but
should finish the war with a clap of thunder. The plateau of Pratzen offered
such strong ground that the enemy might be deterred from attacking him there;
so he left it to them, and concealed his troops, so far as possible, in the
hollows behind it. He intrenched a hill on the Olmiitz road, and seemed to be
making preparations for a rear-guard action to cover his retreat. He called up
Bemadotte from Iglau, and one of Davout’s divisions from the Danube, so that by
the day of battle he had 65,000 men at his disposal. The leisurely movements of
the Allies gave him ample time.
The French
position extended about seven miles along the Goldbach, from the Olmiitz road
southward to Tellnitz. The southern half of it was occupied by a single
division (Legrand’s) of Soult’s corps ; but a few miles to the west lay
Friant’s division of Davout’s corps, which reached Raigem Abbey on the evening
of December 1, after marcl Jng seventy miles in forty-four hours. In the
northern half of the position, Lannes’ corps was astride of the Olmiitz road;
Murat’s cavalry was on his right; and to the right of Murat were Bemadotte’s
corps and two divisions of Soult’s corps. The Imperial Guard and Oudinot’s
grenadiers were in reserve behind Bemadotte. Napoleon massed his troops here
for a counter-stroke against the enemy’s centre, when their left should be
engaged in turning the French right. His confidence was such that, on the eve
of the battle, he told his soldiers what would happen.
Early on the
morning of December 2—the first anniversary of Napoleon’s coronation—three
columns of Russians under Buxhowden, with an advanced guard of Austrians, more
than 30,000 men in all, descended from the plateau of Pratzen upon Tellnitz and
Sokolnitz. They expected to meet with little resistance there, and wheeling
northward they were to join hands with a fourth column of 16,000 men, under
Kolowrat, which was directed upon the centre of the French position. On the
right, the corps of Bagration and some 10,000 cavalry under Liechtenstein
advanced against Lannes and Murat, mainly as a demonstration. The Russian
Guards remained in reserve.
Napoleon did
not wait for these attacks to develop. As soon as “the sun of Austerlitz,”
breaking through the mists, showed him that the plateau of Pratzen was
comparatively bare of troops, he ordered his left and centre to advance.
Soult’s divisions (Saint-Hilaire and Vandamme)
encountered
Kolowrat’s column at the village of Pratzen, drove it back, and reached the
plateau, cutting the allied army in two. Bema- dotte and Lannes also drove back
the enemy in their front. There were some brilliant cavalry charges, which
ended to the advantage of the French; and, after four or five hours’ hard
fighting, the battle was won. The Austro-Russian right and centre retreated in
disorder on Austerlitz, the two Emperors with them. Meanwhile Buxhowden’s
columns had been making slow progress against the obstinate resistance of
Legrand and Friant. Before they realised what had taken place on the plateau,
their direct line of retreat was cut off. Their only way of escape was by the
dyke which separated the lakes of Monitz and Satschan; and on this the French
guns concentrated their fire. Many were drowned in trying to cross the thin ice
of the lakes. It is uncertain how large a deduction should be made from the
20,000 of the Thirtieth Bulletin, or even from the 2000 of Thiers; but, at all
events, 30 guns were afterwards recovered from Lake Satschan. Most of
Buxhowden’s force laid down their arms. The total loss of the Allies was about
26,000 men and 180 guns; that of the French was
about 7000.
But the
losses were no adequate measure of the victory. It was Napoleon’s chef
d’oeuvre, the battle of which he was most proud; and it completely demoralised the
beaten army. “ There were no longer regiments or army corps,” says
Czartoryski, “there were only disorderly bands of marauders.” Austrians and
Russians blamed one another for their defeat. They retreated in a
south-easterly direction to Goding, where they crossed the March into Hungary.
They were not closely pursued, for Murat by mistake took the road to Olmiitz.
Alexander was deeply depressed, and listened to those who told him he had done
enough for others, and must now think of himself. With his concurrence Francis
asked for an interview with Napoleon, which took place on the 4th. An armistice
was granted, on condition that the Russians should evacuate Austrian territory
within a month, and that no other foreign army (i.e. the Prussian) should enter
it. Napoleon is said to have offered to leave Austria intact, if Russia would
join in a treaty of peace excluding British trade from the Continent. Alexander
would not consent, but he told Francis not to reckon any longer on the Russian
army; and he sent word to the King of Prussia that he hoped he would find means
of coming to an arrangement with France. At the same time he placed the corps
of Tolstoy and Bennigsen, which Were in northern Germany, at the disposal of
Frederick William.
Negotiations
for peace between France and Austria were begun at Nikolsburg, and completed at
Pressburg (December 26). No representatives of other Powers, except Bavaria,
were allowed to take part in them. Austria recognised all the changes already
made by France in Italy, and ceded Venetia (including Lstria and Dalmatia, but
not Trieste) to the King of Italy, subject to the promise already made by
Napoleon
that the
crowns of France and Italy should be separated at the general peace. The
Emperor Francis renounced all feudal rights over Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and
Baden. He ceded Tyrol and Vorarlberg with several smaller districts to Bavaria,
while his possessions in Swabia were divided between Baden and Wurtemberg. The
Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg were recognised as kings; and so, by the
irony of fate, Napoleon bestowed a crown on the daughter of George III. Bavaria
was authorised to annex the free cfty of Augsburg, and Austria to annex
Salzburg, the ex-Gfaiid-Duke of Tuscany receiving Wurzburg in exChafige for it.
On the whole, the EmpCror Francis lost nearly three millions of subjects and
one-sixth of his revenue. He agreed to pay forty millions of francs in lieu of
the unpaid portion of the war contribution imposed on his hereditary States. On
the advice of Archduke Charles, he replaced Cobenzl by Stadion, in order to
appestse Napoleon. The Archduke had an interview with Napoleon on December' 27,
but was unable to obtain any mitigation of the terms. The treaty was ratified
on January 1, 1806.
The Austrian
negotiators had been1 placed at great disadvantage by the signature
of a treaty between France and Prussia a few days before. Haugwitz had held
back his ultimatum till he could learn the result of the battle which was
imminent; atid after Austerlitz he suppressed it. Talleyrand wrote on that day,
“ He seems to have come to await events rather than with any other object.” On
December 14 he was received by the Emperor at Schonbrunn. NajJoleon had no
exact knowledge of the Potsdam agreement’, but he had learnt something of it, especially
from Dolgorouki, and he poured out threats and reproaches. Later in the day he
sent for Haugwitz again, and told him that Austria was ready to become his ally
and was asking for Hanover for one <3f the Archdukes, but he would prefer
alliance with Priissia. Haugwitz suggested a triple alliance, to include
Russia. Napoleon said he asked for nothing better, but that would be a work of
time, and he could not wait. “Napoleon’s art of diplomacy,” says Seeley, “was
very similar to his fashion of1 making war. It was a singular
mixture of cunning and audacity, made more effective by extreme rapidity.” It
prevailed with Haugwitz, who, on December 15, signed at Vienna the treaty
dictated to him. The terms of this treaty were that there should be an alliance,
offensive and defensive, between France and Prussia. The latter should cede
Cleves to a Prince of the Empire, to be designated by Napoleon (it was to be
Murat), NeucMtel to France, and Ansbach to Bavaria, receiving in exchange
Hanover and a rectification of the Baireuth boundary. Prussia was to guarantee
the changes made in Germany and Italy.
Having
disposed of his principal antagonists, Napoleon turned his attention to the
minor operations in the north and south, which he had hitherto disregarded.
Augereau was sent northward; and Massena was directed to march on Naples with
40,000 men, accompanied by Joseph as the Emperor’s representative. Napoleon had
refused to admit any stipulations on behalf of the Neapolitan Bourbons into
the Treaty of Pressburg;
and, on the
very day on which that treaty was signed, he declared his intention to “hurl
from the throne that criminal woman who has so shamelessly violated everything
that is sacred among men ” (Bulletin 37). The Court of Naples had delivered
itself into his hand. It had no sooner ratified its treaty of neutrality with
France than it assured the Russian minister that this convention, extorted by
force, was not binding, and called on the Allies to furnish the assistance
they had promised. Towards the end of November, 1805, 13,000 Russians from
Corfu and 7000 British troops from Malta disembarked in the Bay of Naples. They
were joined by a few thousand Neapolitans, and by the middle of December they
reached the northern frontier of the kingdom. When news came that the Allies
had been defeated at Austerlitz, and that a strong French army was marching on
Naples, it was at first decided to retreat into Calabria; but the Russian
general Lacy, who was in chief command, received orders from the Tsar to bring
his troops away; and, in spite of the bitter reproaches of the Queen, they
reembarked for Corfu in the middle of January, while the British forces sailed
for Messina. The King and his consort retired to Palermo.
The army
which was to recover Hanover and invade Holland, under the leadership of the
King of Sweden, proved equally ineffectual. About
20.000 Russians and Swedes assembled at
Stralsund in October, and after some delay (owing to differences between
Gustavus and the Prussian Government) marched into Hanover. There they were to
be joined by
30.000 British and Hanoverian troops under Lord
Cathcart; but some of the British ships were delayed by adverse winds till the
end of 1 )ecember. The Allies had done nothing but sit down before Hameln,
where there was a small French garrison, when the victory of Austerlitz and the
changed attitude of Prussia caused the army to break up. The British force
reembarked at Bremen in February, 1806; and the Swedes and Russians retired to
Stralsund.
Lord Harrowby
had gone to Berlin in the middle of November, 1805, to settle the terms of
alliance between Great Britain and Prussia. He was authorised to promise
subsidies for 250,000 men; and, if Prussia hesitated to accede to the
Anglo-Russian alliance, he might agree to some more limited engagement, such as
the deliverance of Holland and north Germany. On Dec. 22 Hardenberg told him
that, owing to the turn events had taken, the treaty must lie by for the
present, but asked for a loan of <£1,000,000. He also stated that, to
prevent a fresh occupation of Hanover by the French, Prussia intended to occupy
it. The Russian troops there had been placed at the disposal of the King of
Prussia; and he proposed that the British and Swedish troops should receive
orders to retire behind the Prussians, but support them if they were attacked.
This proposal, to which Pitt was not indisposed to agree, aggravated the bad
faith which acceptance of the Treaty of Vienna would involve. The terms of that
treaty were not known at Berlin till Haugwitz arrived
264
Prussia occupies Hanover.—Death of Pitt. [1805-6
there on the
25th; and, even then, they were not disclosed to the British and Russian
ministers. A State Council was held on January 3,1806, to consider the terms.
Hardenberg opposed the ratification of the treaty; Beyme was in favour of it;
Haugwitz and the Duke of Brunswick recommended that it should be ratified with
certain modifications. This last was the course which the King adopted. He had
repented, even before Austerlitz, of having committed himself to the Coalition,
and is said to have given Haugwitz private instructions to prevent a breach
with France in any circumstances. The modifications made were as follows. The
alliance must be defensive only; Hanover should not be annexed, but occupied
provisionally; Hamburg and Bremen should be included in the transfer to
Prussia; but Ansbach, the patrimony of the House of Hohenzollem, should not be
given up. Laforest, the French Minister, exchanged ratifications of the treaty
as modified, but subject to the Emperor’s approval; and on January 14 Haugwitz
set out for Paris to obtain it.
Harrowby had
left Berlin a few days before, as the Anglo-Prussian treaty had fallen through.
At his farewell audience, the King told him that he was endeavouring to make an
arrangement by which he hoped to preserve the tranquillity of north Germany
until a definitive peace, and trusted he should be supported in the event of
failure. Of the details Harrowby learnt nothing. His return was anxiously
looked for by Pitt, who was then on his death-bed. He died on January 23; and
the Coalition, already dismembered, lost its soul. The events of December hastened
Pitt’s end; but the “Austerlitz look” was already in his face before that
battle was fought, when he could still say, “England has saved herself by her
exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example.” An impracticable
sovereign and a virulent Opposition had overtaxed a constitution never robust.
It added to the European significance of his death that none of his colleagues
could take his place; in the new ministry which was formed Fox was the
principal figure.
Macaulay has
described Pitt as a good peace minister, but “ unequal to surprising and
terrible emergencies,” and has contrasted him with Chatham. But the difference
in their performance as war ministers was in the circumstances rather than in
the men. The father had the good fortune to have Frederick as ally; the son had
Napoleon as antagonist. Pitt’s spirit was as lofty and steadfast as Chatham’s;
and, if he was less inspiring, he was a better administrator, far more
competent to deal with the financial problems on which the continuance of the
struggle depended. Pitt suffers most by comparison in his excessive deference
to the King, who was jealous of ministerial interference in military matters.
But it should be remembered that, while Chatham reaped the benefit of the
Oreach between George II and the Duke of Cumberland, caused by the Convention
of Klosterzeven, Pitt’s hands were tied by the state of George Ill’s health,
and by the character of the war, a war of established authority against
revolution.
THE THIRD
COALITION. II.
On his way to Paris from Vienna, Napoleon stopped at
Munich for the wedding of his step-son, Eugene Beauhamais, with the Princess
Augusta, daughter of King Maximilian I of Bavaria (Jan. 14, 1806). The
Hereditary Prince Charles of Baden, who was to have married this princess,
became the husband of Josephine’s niece, Stephanie. Napoleon had extorted a
reluctant consent to these marriages from the south- German Princes, as he
wished to bind them more closely to him; and he did not hesitate to remind them
that it was not for their own sakes, but as part of the French system, that
they had received new lands and titles. A marriage was also arranged between
his youngest brother, Jerome, and the only daughter of Frederick, King of
Wurtemberg. But Jerome was already married; the Pope had scruples about
granting a divorce; and the marriage was deferred for eighteen months.
Haugwitz arrived
at Paris a few days after Napoleon, to obtain his assent to the Berlin revision
of the Treaty of Vienna. The moment was ill chosen. The change of ministry in
England had opened fresh prospects to the Emperor, and he was glad that the
Prussian Court—“ very false and very stupid,” as he described it to Joseph—had
not ratified the treaty as it stood. He wrote to Talleyrand (February 4): “ If
Mr Fox is really at the Foreign Office, we cannot cede Hanover to Prussia,
except as part of a general arrangement which will secure us against the fear
of a continuation of hostilities.” Talleyrand was to take care, therefore, in
dealing with Haugwitz, to leave Napoleon free either to make peace with
England, or to conclude a new treaty with Prussia on a broader basis. No
immediate overtures came from Fox; so the latter course was chosen. The
concessions asked for by the Prussian Government were brushed aside. When
Haugwitz urged that Ansbach was the cradle of the Hohenzollems, he was told
that there is no need of a cradle when one is grown up. A new treaty was signed
at Paris on February 15,1806, in substitution for the Treaty of Vienna. Prussia
was to mtipt and occupy Hanover at once, and to dose the Elbe, the Weser, and
the Ems to British commerce. The alliance between Prussia and France was no
longer
266 The Franco-Prussian alliance. Attitude of
Russia. [i806
described as
“offensive,” but they guaranteed each other’s territory; and the Prussian
guarantee extended to the changes which might be made at Naples, to the newly-formed
States of Germany, and to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The two Powers
were to make common cause in any war which would affect these guarantees. In
other respects the Vienna stipulations were renewed, except that the
rectification of the Baireuth boundary was cancelled.
The new
treaty was more onerous and more distasteful to Frederick William than the old
one, but it was accepted and ratified at Berlin on February 24. A few smooth
words from Talleyrand, while Napoleon was at Munich, had made the Prussian
Government so sanguine of his assent to the changes which it desired, that the
greater part of the army had been placed on a peace footing at the end of
January. On the French side everything was ready for war, and there was
practically no alternative to acceptance. Hanover was already occupied by
Prussian troops; and at the end of March it was formally annexed, and its
harbours were closed to British vessels. “It is the lowest of all degradations,”
said Heinrich von Biilow, “to steal at another man’s bidding.” Fox denounced
the conduct of Prussia as “ a compound of everything that is contemptible in
servility with everything that is odious in rapacity.” The British Minister was
recalled from Berlin; the Prussian harbours were blockaded; and some hundreds
of Prussian ships were seized. The King of Sweden joined in the work of
blockade, and held Lauenburg on behalf of George III. His troops were driven
out, but the Prussians forbore to press him hard because of the Tsar.
What
Alexander would say to the new treaty was the question which most disturbed
Frederick William. He had sent the Duke of Brunswick to St Petersburg in
January to explain his occupation of Hanover, and to give assurances that he
would not help France against Russia in any war on the Eastern Question. He had
no sooner ratified the Treaty of Paris, which bound him to do so, than he made
a fresh appeal to the Tsar, who had no wish to drive Prussia into the arms of
France, and lent a friendly ear to the explanations offered. Alexander proposed
an exchange of secret declarations; Prussia should bind herself not to take
part in any attack on Russia, and to obtain the evacuation of Germany by the
French troops within three months; while Russia undertook to come to the aid of
Prussia if France should attack her. The King jumped at this proposal; and a
secret declaration was drawn up by Hardenberg and sent to St Petersburg.
A dual
ministry was the appropriate instrument of the double-faced policy of Prussia
at this time. Hardenberg had been denounced in the Moniteur as a traitor in
English pay; and the French envoy, Laforest, was forbidden to have any dealings
with him. In April it was found advisable that he should ostensibly hand over
the charge of foreign iftairs to Haugwitz, and retire to his estates. But,
while Haugwitz
transacted
all business with France, Hardenberg continued to act as the King’s adviser in
the secret dealings with Russia, communicating with him through the Queen.
Queen Louisa, already beloved for her charm and goodness, now began to display
the patriotism and courage which have made her memorable She used her influence
on the side of the growing party which was indignant at Prussian subservience
to France, and at the head of which was Prince Louis Ferdinand, “the Prussian
Alcibiades,” a nephew of the great Frederick.
Meanwhile
Napoleon was building up his system. In southern Italy the French troops met
with little resistance. They entered Naples on February 15, 1806, and Joseph
Bonaparte organised an administration. At the end of March he was declared King
of the Two Sicilies, without forfeiture of his rights in France. Gaeta held
out, and the peasants of Calabria rose in insurrection on behalf of Ferdinand;
but the rest of the country submitted. Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia were
annexed to the kingdom of Italy, which was required to make some small cessions
for the benefit of Napoleon’s sisters, ^lise and Pauline. Two months afterwards
he made his brother Louis King of Holland (June 5). He had paved the way for
this subversion of a republican government more than two centuries old by
appointing a Grand Pensionary, Schimmelpenninck, in March, 1805. All power had
been concentrated in the hands of this official, who came to be regarded by the
Dutch as a French prefect, charged to extort money from them. The change,
therefore, was not unwelcome in Holland. Caroline Bonaparte and her husband,
Murat, were established in the grand-duchy of Berg, formed out of the duchy of
that name ceded by Bavaria in exchange for Ansbach and the eastern part of the
duchy of Cleves.
While
providing for the members of his family, Napoleon reckoned on making use of
them as instruments of his policy. “ I recognise no relatives but those who
serve me,” he said; and he discarded the recalcitrant Lucien. The other
brothers, though more submissive, were not content with the status of
satellites, and did not perceive the width of the interval between Napoleon and
themselves. On his part harsh language went along with much indulgence. It was
his habit to snub and scold. In May, 1807, he wrote to Joseph, “ I am not ill
pleased with Louis ”; yet, a few weeks before, he had been telling Louis that
he should regard him as his inveterate enemy if he did not cancel a decree
reestablishing nobility in Holland. Louis was a conscientious man, with bad
health and low spirits. He identified himself with his subjects, and tried to
protect them from his brother’s rapacity. The differences began almost at once,
which ended in his abdication in 1810.
Napoleon
proceeded to reward his principal officers in such a way as to bind up their
fortunes with his. He was well aware (as Pasquier says) that nothing isolated
lasts long, and sought props for his throne from old and new France alike. He
made Berthier Prince of Neuchatel. He
created
titular duchies in the newly acquired countries—twelve in Venetia, four in
Naples, four in Lucca, Parma, and Piacenza—and conferred them on marshals and
ministers. The new dukes were not allowed to interfere in administration, but
they received one-fifteenth of the revenue of their duchies for their personal
use. Benevento and Ponte Corvo, papal enclaves in the kingdom of Naples, were
bestowed as principalities on Talleyrand and Bemadotte. Counts and barons of
the new Empire were also to be created; and, to provide funds for endowing
them, Napoleon appropriated domain-land in Italy to the value of 34,000,000
francs, and imposed a fixed charge on the public revenues. Jacobins might shake
their heads, but he knew that a few years of equality had not eradicated the
love of honours and distinctions, and he hoped to rally the old aristocracy to
the new Empire.
In the spring
of 1806 Napoleon addressed himself to the reconstitution of Germany, which had
been long in his mind, but had been only partially accomplished after
Luneville. The territory which Austria had been obliged to cede had been
assigned to other German Princes and to the kingdom of Italy; it had not been
added to France. Her profit was to be found in the realisation of the aims of Richelieu
and Mazarin, the destruction of Germany as an unit. Napoleon’s plan was to
dissolve the Empire, and to form a Confederation of the Rhine, from which the
two great Powers, Austria and Prussia, should be excluded. The principal
States in this new Confederation owed much to him, and would be obliged to lean
on him for support. The smaller Princes, who had habitually looked to Austria,
were to be swept away with some few exceptions. The treaty constituting the
Confederation was drawn up by Talleyrand, and was ratified at Saint-Cloud on
July 19.
The affairs
of the Confederation were to be managed by a Diet at Frankfort, consisting of a
College of Kings and a College of Princes. The former was composed of the Kings
of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, with the Grand Dukes of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and
Berg. Its president was Dalberg, formerly Archbishop of Mainz, now of Ratisbon,
and Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, who was established with a suzerainty of his
own at Frankfort, and received the title of Prince Primate. A well-meaning but
weak man, he dreamed of a western Germany, the ally but not the vassal of the
Emperor of the West. As Archbishop of Mainz he had been useful in the
secularisations of 1802, and was the only ecclesiastical elector who survived
them; and he now again proved himself a serviceable tool. The minor members of
the Confederation, nine in number, formed the College of Princes under the
presidency of the Duke of Nassau. Rectifications of frontier were arranged
between the several members, and they renounced all claims to one another’s
territory. The secularisations of 1803 were followed up by wholesale
mediatisation. The dukes, counts, and knights who were not admitted to
membership lost their sovereign rights, and were
absorbed in
the States recognised; but they retained their other feudal rights and their
patrimonies. Ratisbon and the free city of Niimberg fell to Bavaria, as
Augsburg had fallen already. Provision was made for the adhesion of other
German Princes outside the boundaries of the Confederation. Napoleon was
declared Protector; and an alliance was made between the Confederation and the
French Empire, binding each to help the other in any Continental war. The
contingents of the several States were fixed, the total amounting to 63,000 men,
about eight per thousand of their population.
On August
1,1806, the representatives of the several States announced at Ratisbon their
separation from the German Empire; and the French envoy declared that Napoleon
no longer recognised its existence. Five days afterwards Francis II resigned
the Imperial dignity, and became Francis I, Emperor of Austria. Thus, after an
existence of more than a thousand years, the Holy Roman Empire came to an
unlamented end.
Napoleon had
thought it well to keep his army in Germany till these changes were accepted,
and he had been furnished with a pretext for so doing. The harbour of Cattaro
was ceded to him as part of Dalmatia; and he attached particular value to it as
an inlet to the Balkan peninsula. He meant to get possession of Montenegro,
come to an understanding with Ali Pasha of Janina, and so gain influence over
the Sultan and counteract the policy of Russia. The Russians and Montenegrins
were alarmed at the prospect of French troops at Cattaro; and, before their arrival,
the Austrian officer who was in command there was persuaded to hand over the
place to a Russian force from Corfu. The French army was on the point of
evacuating Austria when this news reached Napoleon. He sent orders at once that
the troops should halt, and that Brauuau should be reoccupied. He informed the
Court of Vienna that hostilities would be resumed if it failed to put him in
possession of Cattaro; if the Russians refused to give it up, Austrian troops
must join with French troops in besieging it. Francis appealed to the Tsar, but
Cattaro was not given up; and Napoleon had to content himself with seizing
Ragusa. The Grand Army remained in Germany, living in cantonments at the
expense of the country, and distributed from Frankfort to the river Inn.
Reinforcements had raised it to 170,000 men, and it could be readily assembled
for a march either on Vienna or Berlin.
Shortly after
Fox’s accession to office, a Frenchman came to him with a scheme for the
assassination of Napoleon. Fox caused the man to be detained, and sent
information of the design to Talleyrand. Napoleon accepted this as the overture
which he had been looking for. Talleyrand sent a courteous acknowledgment, and,
in a separate letter of the same date (March 5), called attention to the
Emperor’s recent declaration to the Legislative Body, that he was ready to
negotiate with England on the basis of the Treaty of Amiens. Fox replied that
the King was equally desirous of a durable peace, but could only treat in
concert with
Russia. It
was Napoleon’s rule to deal with his adversaries one at a time, and he would
have nothing to do with joint negotiations. Neither side would give way; and
there was a deadlock for some months. The Russian Government was loyally
informed of what had taken place, but it had some misgivings. Its ambassador in
London, Simon Woronzoff, wrote on March 31, “Fox wishes for peace at any price,
and would abandon all his allies to obtain it.” Oubril was sent to Paris,
nominally to make arrangements about prisoners, but really to discuss the
question of Cattaro, and to look after Russian interests generally.
Some British
subjects who had been detained in France since the rupture of the Peace of
Amiens were released about this time; and among them was Lord Yarmouth
(afterwards Marquis of Hertford), a personal friend of Fox. Talleyrand
persuaded him, in June, to be the bearer of fresh propositions to England.
“Hanover should make no difficulty ”; and on other points Napoleon, as Yarmouth
understood, was ready to negotiate on the basis of uti possidetis. England
might keep what she had—Malta, the Cape, even Sicily. Holland and Switzerland
should be independent, if the Emperor were met on other points. As for Russia,
Talleyrand said that she was disposed to treat directly with France. Yarmouth
brought back a letter from Fox, consenting to a preliminary discussion, while
still maintaining that Russia must be a party to any treaty. By that time
Talleyrand had changed his ground, and insisted on the surrender of Sicily as a
sine qua non ; and Yarmouth was told not to produce his powers till that demand
was withdrawn (June 26).
To become
master of the Mediterranean was the chief aim of Napoleon’s policy, as he told
Joseph; and he pressed him to get possession of Sicily without delay. He was
confident that 9000 French troops could force a landing and expel the English
from the island (June 6). But the course of things in Italy did not bear out
this view. A British force from Sicily, under Sir John Stuart, landed on the
coast of Calabria; and on July 4 it defeated a French division under Reynier at
Maida, the numbers on each side being about 5000. As Paul Louis Courier (then
serving as an artillery officer in southern Italy) wrote:— “ With our good
troops, and with equal numbers, to be defeated and broken up in a few
minutes—such a thing has not been seen since the Revolution.” The victory
stimulated the Calabrian insurgents, but it was not followed up; and the
surrender of Gaeta (July 18) made it necessary for the British to return to Sicily.
Oubril
reached Paris on July 6. Napoleon had caused him to be delayed on the road in
the hope of coming to terms with England before his arrival. This hope was
disappointed, and the British and Russian envoys took counsel together; but
Talleyrand soon found that Oubril was willing to keep secrets from his
colleague, and was more yielding. Oubril was told that the retention of Cattaro
would bring war upon Austria; and he knew that Alexander was personally anxious
to prevent
such a
result, and was desirous of peace. By July 20 he was induced to sign a treaty,
with which he at once set out for St Petersburg. Russia was to hand over
Cattaro, and recognise Dalmatia as part of the kingdom of Italy; France would
recognise the independence of Ragusa and of the Ionian Islands, and would
withdraw her troops from Germany within three months. The two Powers guaranteed
the independence and in- teg ’ity of the Turkish Empire; they were to bring
about peace between Prussia and Sweden, and to induce the King of Spain to cede
the Balearic Islands to Ferdinand’s eldest son. On that condition the Tsar
would recognise Joseph as King of the Two Sicilies. He would also use his good
offices to bring about a maritime peace.
Napoleon had
carried his point as to separate negotiations, and he hoped now to be able to
force the hand of the British envoy. If the second treaty were signed, he could
count on the ratification of both. Yarmouth was persuaded to produce his
powers, and to discuss matters orally with Clarke, the French plenipotentiary.
He “ carefully forbore giving any written paper, or admitting even the
possibility of any other basis than that of uti possidetis”; but he ascertained
the French demands, and transmitted a draft treaty to London (printed in the
Correspandance de Napoteon I). Oubril’s treaty, however, had leaked out, and
had caused indignation there, both by its terms and by the manner in which it
had been brought about. To fall in with Russian wishes, Fox had, it is true,
entertained the idea that Sicily might be exchanged for Dalmatia, Istria, and
part of Venetia, but not for the Balearic Islands; and such exchange was not to
be forced upon Ferdinand. The Government thought Yarmouth had gone rather too
fast; they associated Lord Lauderdale with him as joint negotiator in August,
and soon afterwards recalled him. Lauderdale at once took his stand on the uti
possidetis, except as regards Hanover; while Clarke declared it could never
have entered the Emperor’s mind to take that principle as a basis. Even Fox had
come by this time to despair of peace. He wrote to his nephew, Lord Holland, “
It is not Sicily, but the shuffling, insincere way in which they act, that
shows me they are playing a false game.” But Fox was too ill to pay much
attention to affairs; he died on September 13. His successor at the Foreign
Office was Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey). The negotiations dragged on for
two months, each side hoping that the course of events would turn to its
advantage, and changing its tone accordingly; but there was no approach to
agreement.
The draft
treaty prepared at the end of July had included provisions for the restoration
of Hanover to George III, and for the indemnification of Prussia for her
cession of Cleves, Ansbach, and Neuchatel by other lands (Anhalt, Fulda, etc.)
with an equivalent population. The Prussian eagle had turned vulture, Napoleon
once said; and he thought little of making her disgorge her prey. Yarmouth had
let Lucchesini know that Hanover had been offered to England; and the news
reached Berlin
272 Murder of Palm. Indignation in Prussia. [i806
on August 6,
when Napoleon was claiming credit there for refusing to rob Prussia in order to
make peace with England. The indignation which it caused was heightened by
other circumstances. Murat had lately jostled the Prussians out of the
districts of Essen, Werden, and Elten, which he claimed as part of the duchy of
Cleves. There were rumours of other claims, and of the transfer of the Polish
provinces to Russia, and of Pomerania to Sweden. When the treaty creating the
Confederation of the Rhine was communicated to the Court of Berlin, the King of
Prussia was invited to form a Northern Confederation and to style himself
Emperor. He made proposals to Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Mecklenburg, and the Hanse
Towns; but the answers were unfavourable, and it was soon found that they were
prompted from Paris. As there were no signs of organised opposition to the
Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon resolved to discourage that of the North.
All these things convinced Frederick William that the Emperor meant to force
war on him, or to render him incapable of resistance. He appealed to the Tsar,
and decided (August 9) to mobilise part of his army, not with the intention of
declaring war, but to guard Prussian interests. It was important to gain time;
and, as Lucchesini had incurred Napoleon’s displeasure, a new ambassador,
Knobelsdorff, replaced him at Paris.
Towards the
end of August an incident occurred which stirred all Germans. A pamphlet had
been circulated, entitled “ Germany in her deep humiliation (Deutschland in
seiner tiefen Erniedrigung').'" It was a forcible yet moderate appeal to
Saxony and Prussia to save the German Empire on the brink of the abyss. It is
said to have been written by an Ansbach official, but it bore no name of author
or publisher. Palm, a bookseller of Niimberg, had helped to circulate it; and,
by Napoleon’s direction, he was tried by a military Court and shot (August 25).
At Berlin the popular excitement became uncontrollable. A remonstrance was
presented to the King early in September, calling upon him to dismiss Haugwitz
and the Cabinet Secretaries, Beyme and Lombard, who were distrusted both at
home and abroad. It was signed by Louis Ferdinand and other princes, by two
generals and by Stein. The King refused, but he and his ministers were carried
away by the war party, now strengthened by the news that Alexander had refused
to ratify Oubril’s treaty.
There had
been a change of ministry at St Petersburg. Czartoryski had resigned on June
17, and was succeeded by Baron Budberg, a Livonian, whose sympathies were with
Prussia. Oubril was declared to have gone beyond his powers, and was disgraced.
The Russian Government demanded that France should give up Dalmatia, guarantee
Sicily to Ferdinand, and find some compensation for the King of Sardinia; and
the British Government joined in these demands. Napoleon learnt the Tsar’s
refusal on September 3. He had hitherto looked upon the stir in Prussia as mere
effervescence, which might be left to subside. It now
became more
serious; and on the 5th he sent Berthier instructions to make arrangements for
concentrating the army near Bamberg, if necessary, and to reconnoitre the
roads to Berlin. He wrote to Frederick William inviting him to discontinue his
military preparations (September 12). The French envoys at Berlin, Dresden,
and Cassel were directed to intimate that neither Saxony nor Hesse must arm,
and that the entry of Prussian troops into Saxony would be regarded as a
declaration of war. But Prussian troops from Silesia had already entered
Saxony; on the 10th they crossed the Elbe near Dresden, and the Saxon troops
were mobilised to join them. The Elector of Hesse temporised, and eventually
declared himself neutral.
Convinced
that war was inevitable, the King left Berlin on the 21st for the head-quarters
of his army at Naumburg; and on the 26th he sent an ultimatum to Paris,
demanding the immediate withdrawal of the French armies beyond the Rhine, and
the Emperor’s acquiescence in a Confederation of the North, to include all the
States which did not belong to the Confederation of the Rhine. Napoleon had
left Paris the day before; and the ultimatum was delivered to him at Bamberg on
October 7, when the term allowed for reply to it had almost run out, and when
the French troops were in fact passing the frontier of Baireuth. It was
accompanied by a letter from Frederick William to Napoleon, which the latter
described as “a sorry pamphlet,” showing how Prussia had cringed to France, and
how ill she was requited.
The total
number of men on which the Prussian Government reckoned was a quarter of a
million, including Saxons and Hessians; but not half that number was actually
available to meet the French. The Duke of Brunswick was named
commander-in-chief; but his command was only nominal, as the King was present.
Prussian tradition made this necessary, though Frederick William hated war and
recognised that he had no gifts for it. Brunswick had distinguished himself in
the Seven Years’ War under his uncle Ferdinand, and had been described by
Frederick the Great as “ce Mros dont Tesprit unit des sa jeunesse le solide au
brillant, Vardeur d la sagesse.” He had many fine qualities, but he was more
than seventy years of age, and wanting in decision. He was anxious about his
duchy, and held Napoleon in awe. A French officer who had been sent to Dresden
reported at the end of September: “ The Duke of Brunswick does not wish for
war; he is afraid of compromising his reputation; he is timid, slow, and
irresolute.”
The Prussian
officers generally were far from sharing the apprehensions of their commander
They believed that the French were, after all, “ the men of Rossbach,” and were
no match for Prussian troops in open countiy. They were justly proud of the
drill and discipline of their men, and had full confidence in the linear
tactics with which Frederick had won his victories. These tactics, combined
with a proper use of light infantry, afterwards served Wellington well enough
in the Peninsula
274 The Prussian army.—Napoleon's plans. [isoe
and at
Waterloo. But the Prussian army was at a disadvantage in many ways. It had seen
no war service for ten years. It was the King’s army, not the army of the
nation, and had no reserves behind it. It had always been a heavy burden on the
country, and of late years this burden had been less patiently borne; civil
interests had prevailed, and military reforms had been rejected if they
involved much expenditure. The muskets, says Clausewitz, were highly polished,
but they were the worst in Europe. The officers were old; and cliques and
jealousies were rife among them. Some believed in Prince Hohenlohe, others in
Ruchel, both of whom possessed abundant self-confidence, and were comparatively
young, Hohenlohe being sixty and Ruchel fifty-two.
Brunswick had
proposed that the available forces should be assembled at Naumburg to form one
army under his command. But he was overruled. It was decided that, on the left
of the main army, there should be another army under Hohenlohe to cover
Dresden, and on the right a separate corps under Ruchel to protect Cassel. The
greater part of Hohenlohe’s army was afterwards brought over to the west of the
Saale, to take part in an advance through the Thuringian Forest, by which it
was hoped to surprise the French army in its cantonments and to cut it in two.
But this offensive movement had to wait for the expiration of the term named in
the Prussian ultimatum, and before that date (October 8) it was abandoned. The
Prussian armies lay between Eisenach and Jena, with a few thousand men east of
the Saale, guarding the points where that river was crossed by the roads to
Leipzig and Dresden. The initiative was left to the French.
It was the
intention of Napoleon to march straight on Berlin from the river Main, while
threatening attack from the lower Rhine by way of Munster. He expected that the
Prussians would remain on the defensive behind the Elbe waiting for the
Russians, and was surprised to find them advancing to meet him. This gave him
an opportunity of repeating the manoeuvre of Ulm. His plan, as he explained it
to his brother Louis at the end of September, was to mass all his forces on his
extreme right, leaving the country between Bamberg and the Rhine bare of
troops. If the enemy should try to turn his left and cut his communications, he
would throw them back upon the Rhine, which was guarded by a corps under
Mortier at Mainz, and by Dutch troops under Louis at Wesel. If he were himself
defeated, he should fall back on the Danube; but he had not much fear of defeat.
The deployment of his forces would be so imposing and so rapid that the
Prussians would probably hurry back to defend their capital.
By the
evening of October 7 the Grand Army, numbering 160,000 men, was assembled on
three main roads leading northward, with a front of about thirty miles. The 4th
corps (Soult) was at Baireuth on the right, with the 6th corps (Ney) a day’s
march behind it. The 1st corps (Bemadotte) and the bulk of the reserve cavalry
under Murat were
in the
centre, about Kronach, with the 3rd corps (Davout) and the Guard behind them.
On the left was the 5th corps (Lannes), a few miles south of Coburg, with the
7th (Augereau) in its rear. The south-German States had been called on for
contingents, which amounted to 30,000 men; but they were left at first to guard
the communications and to watch Austria, about whose course of action Napoleon
was uneasy. He had been reassured to some extent by Archduke Ferdinand at
Wiirz- bursr: and he told his ambassador at Vienna to throw out hints of his
o
' _
inclination
towards an Austrian alliance.
The general
advance of the French army began on the 8th; and the Prussian detachments on
the upper Saale fell back before it. On the 9th Bemadotte’s leading troops
overtook Tauenzien’s division at Schleiz, and drove it in disorder to
Mittel-Pollnitz, where there was another division of Hohenlohe’s army. To
support these outlying troops Hohenlohe gave orders that the rest of his army
should cross the Saale; but it was too late, and he was obliged to bring the
two divisions over to the left bank of the Saale, leaving the roads to Dresden
and Berlin open. In consequence of Hohenlohe’s first orders, Prince Louis, who
commanded his advanced guard, marched to Saalfeld, and there encountered the
head of Lannes’ corps (October 10). He was killed in a cavalry engagement, in
which six French squadrons proved more than a match for eight Prussian
squadrons; and his division was routed.
Having
satisfied himself that there was no large body of the enemy in his front or on his
right, Napoleon drew the heads of his columns together and turned them towards
the west. By the evening of the 12th the leading troops of three corps were on
the Saale—Davout at Naum- burg, Lannes at Jena, Augereau at Kahla. “ If the
enemy is at Erfurt,” the Emperor wrote next morning, “my plan is to march my
army on Weimar, and attack on the 16th.” He wished to give time for his heavy
cavalry to come up, but the enemy must not be allowed to escape; and the battle
planned for the 16th was fought on the 14th.
There was
much perturbation at the Prussian head-quarters when it became known that the
French were at Naumburg, between the King and his capital, and in possession of
the Prussian magazines. Scham- horst, afterwards the reorganiser of the
Prussian military system, was Brunswick’s chief of the staff. He urged that
they should hold to their plan, and, if not attacked themselves, cross the
Saale and fall upon the enemy’s flank and rear. Brunswick thought it better to
retreat northward, to meet the reinforcements which were on their way from
Magdeburg under Duke Eugene of Wiirtemberg; and his opinion prevailed. The King
with the main army, 50,000 men, marched to Auerstadt on the 13th. Riichel’s
corps (15,000) was to follow. Hohenlohe, who had about
40,000 men, was to remain in his position near
Jena for a day or two to cover the retreat, but was to act strictly on the
defensive. Detachments amounting to more than 12,000 men had been sent through
the
Thuringian
Forest to strike at the French communications, and were too far off to be
recalled in time.
The Saale was
fordable at several points near Jena; but the high and steep banks made it a
difficult river to force. Open and level ground, however, was best suited to
Prussian tactics; and Hohenlohe, instead of attempting to defend the town, drew
back his left (Tauenzien’s division) to the highest part of the plateau north
of it. On the afternoon of the 13th Lamies’ corps not only occupied Jena, but
established itself on the Landgrafenberg, a corner of the plateau; and Napoleon
himself bivouacked there that night with the Guard. Hohenlohe was restrained by
bis instructions from attacking the French, crowded as they were in a narrow
space, with steep slopes behind them. He supposed that Napoleon had gone
northward to Naumburg with the greater part of the French army, and did not
expect to be seriously attacked himself on the 14th. Napoleon, on the other
hand, believed himself to be in presence of the main strength of the Prussians,
and was not aware that Brunswick’s army had retreated. He had 55,000 men
available on the morning of the 14th, and 95,000 by midday; and he had sent
orders that Davout should march from Naumburg, and Bemadotte from Domburg, to
fall upon the left ilank of the Prussians in the course of the afternoon.
With such
odds against him, the utmost Hohenlohe could do was to hold his ground for a
few hours and then follow the main army. For this it was essential that he
should have his troops well in hand; but the Prussian divisions, including Riichel’s,
were scattered over twelve miles of country, and were beaten in succession. A
thick mist hampered movements on both sides for some hours, but served
Napoleon’s purpose, as it gave time for the troops in the rear to come up. By
10 a.m., when it cleared off, the
French had gained possession of Vierzehnheiligen, the key of the plateau.
Hohenlohe tried to recover it, but his tactics were not those of Frederick, who
made use of columns for storming a village. Twenty Prussian battalions in two
lines advanced en echelon-, but, instead of pushing home their attack, they
halted and engaged in musketry fire against the better-sheltered French
skirmishers. Their endurance was at length exhausted, and they were falling
back in confusion, when Riichel’s corps tardily arrived from Weimar. In
half-an-hour it was also put to flight; and by 6 p.m. Murat was in Weimar.
Napoleon’s
victory at Jena was supplemented, and, as a tactical achievement, surpassed, by
Davout’s victory at Auerstadt. Following his instructions, Davout set out for
Apolda at 4 a.m. ; and, on
reaching Hassenhausen, his leading division met the advanced guard of
Brunswick’s army on its way to Freiburg, where it was to pass the Unstrut.
Having gained possession of Hassenhausen, Davout formed his troops to right and
left of it as they came up. He had only 26,000 men; in infantry he was
outnumbered by three to two, in cavalry by six to one, in guns by five to one.
Yet he held his ground for five hours against repeated
isos] Battle of Auerstadt. The Prussian retreat. 277
attacks, in
one of which Brunswick was mortally wounded. Soon after midday the French found
themselves able to take the offensive; and by half-past two Frederick William
decided to retreat on Weimar and rejoin Hohenlohe. This decision turned a
repulse into a rout. The retreating troops had to change direction in order to
avoid French corps, and they soon learned what had happened at Jena. With the
exception of a few battalions, the whole Prussian army dissolved, many of the
men throwing away their arms.
The battle of
Auerstadt showed how largely the French successes were due to the fighting
qualities of the officers and men, apart from the leadership of the Emperor.
Napoleon was incredulous when he received Davout’s report. “Your Marshal sees
double,” he said roughly to the aide-de-camp who brought it; and though he gave
much praise afterwards to the Marshal and his corps, he took care that the
battle should figure in his bulletin as a mere episode of the battle of Jena.
If great credit was due to Davout, blame might seem to attach to the strategy
which left him to fight against such odds. This caused Napoleon to be the more
severe on Bemadotte, who was at Naumburg on the night of the 13th, and might
have accompanied Davout. In the orders for the 14th, which reached Davout at 3 a.m., it was stated: “ If Marshal Bemadotte
should be with you, you might march together; but the Emperor hopes that he
will be in the position which he has indicated to him at Domburg.” Bemadotte,
on being shown these orders, decided to march to Domburg, and cross the Saale
there, though he knew there was a difficult defile. He heard heavy firing to
south and to north of him, but he held on his way, and reached Apolda at 4 p.m., having played no part in either
battle.
The streams
of Prussian fugitives from Jena and Auerstadt flowed westward. Some of them
made for Erfurt, where 10,000 men capitulated on the following night, including
Marshal Mollendorf and the Prince of Orange. The main body turned towards the
Harz country, to reach Magdeburg by a circuit. The King gave the chief command
to Hohenlohe, and hurried on to Kiistrin, where he was joined by the Queen,
who had been with the army, but had fortunately left on the eve of the battles.
By the 20th the wreck of the army was at Magdeburg; but Hohenlohe saw no hope
of making a stand behind the Elbe, and decided to retire to Stettin. Soult’s
corps, which had been marching sixteen miles a day for a fortnight, was a day’s
march behind him; and Ney was following Soult. Fifty miles to the west was the
Duke of Weimar, with the force which had been sent against the French
communications.
While the
Prussians and the corps pursuing them were describing an arc, Napoleon moved by
the chord upon Berlin with the rest of his army. Bemadotte was sent towards
Halle to intercept any defeated troops drifting in that direction; on October
17 he fell upon the corps commanded by Duke Eugene of Wiirtemberg, which was
encamped there,
278 Annexation of Prussian and other territories.
[i806
and drove it
in disorder across the Elbe. On the 20th Davout secured the bridge at
Wittenberg; and on the 25th his corps marched through Berlin, as a reward for
its behaviour at Auerstadt. Lannes had occupied Potsdam, and frightened the
governor of Spandau citadel into surrender.
During these
movements of the troops, Napoleon found time to deal with many other things. He
had written a letter to the King of Prussia, proposing peace, two days before
the battle of Jena, probably with the object of gaining time for his own
combinations. To this letter the King replied from his first halting-place
after the battle, asking for an armistice to allow of negotiations. The
armistice was refused; but the King was invited to make propositions.
Lucchesini had an interview with Duroc on the 22nd near Wittenberg, but he
found Napoleon’s conditions too hard for acceptance. Prussia was to cede all
her possessions west of the Elbe, except Magdeburg, to renounce her plans of
federation with other German States, to renew her pledge of alliance against
Russia, and to pay an indemnity of 100,000,000 francs.
The Emperor
did not wish for a settlement while the tide of his success was in full flow.
He went to Weimar the day after the battle of Jena, and was received by the
Duchess. It suited him to express admiration for her spirit, and to overlook
the part played by her husband, who was related to the Tsar. At the same time
he was dictating bulletins which likened the Queen of Prussia to Armida, Helen,
and Lady Hamilton. “ In politics magnanimity is the mark of a simpleton,” he
once said; but the pettiness of his conduct towards Queen Louisa, which drew
remonstrances from Josephine, only served to endear her to the German people.
The Duke of Brunswick, blinded at Auerstadt, was driven from his capital, to
die at Altona a few weeks afterwards. He and the Prince of Orange were deprived
of their duchies by a decree issued at Wittenberg on October 23, which also
directed that possession should be taken of all Prussian territory between the
Rhine and the Elbe.
The Elector
of Hesse was the next victim. He had declared himself neutral, but he had
mobilised 20,000 men, and his eldest son had been at the Prussian
head-quarters. Napoleon wanted his land for the kingdom of Westphalia, which he
was already planning; and he was resolved to get rid of a prince who had
hitherto played off France against Prussia, and had tried “ to fish from both
banks.” Mortier was ordered to march on Cassel from Frankfort, and Louis from
Wesel. On October 81, when Mortier was within a day’s march, the Elector was
called upon to disarm, and to hand over his fortresses and war-material. He
fled to Denmark, and tried to negotiate; but on November 4 his deposition was
announced, much to the satisfaction of his people.
Very different
was the treatment accorded to another Elector, Frederick Augustus of Saxony.
Not only had he mobilised his troops, but they had fought side by side with the
Prussians at Jena. They
1806]
Saxony neutralised. Berlin and Stettin occupied. 279
had, however,
been unwilling allies, and were dissatisfied with their treatment. Saxony stood
to Prussia much as Bavaria to Austria, and might equally be made to serve
Napoleon’s purposes. He had issued a proclamation to the Saxon people on
October 10, announcing that he had come to deliver them from Prussian
domination. At Weimar he made a similar address to the Saxon officers who had
been taken prisoners, and allowed them and their men to go home, on taking an
oath never to bear arms against him in future. This led the Saxon division to
separate itself from the Prussians. It marched into Saxon territory, and asked
for an armistice, which was granted on condition that the Elector recalled his
troops and remained at Dresden. To this he acceded on the 19th The King of Prussia,
who was treating for peace without any regard to his ally, could not complain
if that ally took the same course.
Saxony,
however, did not escape all the penalties of her partnership with Prussia.
Dresden was occupied by Bavarian troops, which, with other south-German
contingents had been formed into a corps under Jerome, and had followed the
Grand Army. The Saxon war-material and cavalry horses were appropriated to
French use; and the country was temporarily placed under French administration.
War contributions amounting to 160,000,000 francs had been imposed on the
several States of northern Germany on the day after Jena; and of this total
25,000,000 fell on Saxony. On December 11 a treaty was signed at Posen by which
Saxony joined the Confederation of the Rhine, and was bound to furnish a
contingent of 20,000 men, though only 6000 were exacted for the campaign then
in progress. The Elector received the title of King. Weimar and the other small
Saxon States were admitted to the Confederation two days afterwards.
On October
25, when the French entered Berlin, Hohenlohe was at Ruppin, forty miles N.W.
of it; and his rear-guard, under Bliicher, was a day’s march behind him.
Napoleon sent Murat northward, followed by the corps of Lannes and Bemadotte,
to intercept Hohenlohe. They forestalled him at Zehdenick; but, by sidling to
his left, he succeeded in reaching Prenzlau on the 28th before Murat, and might
have reached Stettin. Through the fatuity of his chief staff officer,
Massenbach, who had been a bad adviser to him throughout, Hohenlohe was led to
oel:' ire that he was surrounded by overwhelming forces. The troops with him at
Prenzlau, numbering 10,000 men, laid down their arms; and other surrenders soon
followed. Stettin capitulated on the 29th. It was a respectable fortress with a
garrison of 5000 men, but its governor was over eighty years of age; and the
prevailing demoralisation made him yield to the summons of Lasalle, who had
ridden forward with a brigade of Hussars to reconnoitre it.
Bliicher, on
learning of Hohenlohe’s surrender, turned round, and marched westward by
Strelitz. He had about 10,000 men, a number
which was
doubled on the 30th by junction with the corps hitherto commanded by the Duke
of Weimar. The Duke had given up the command on receiving the King’s assent to
his retirement from the Prussian service, which Napoleon had made the condition
of his retaining his duchy. Bliicher, closely followed by Bernadotte and Soult,
and by Murat, found himself unable to cross the Elbe, and was driven to take
refuge in the free city of Liibeck. He was refused permission to cross the
Danish frontier, so that he could retreat no further. The French attacked his
positions on November 6, drove his troops back into the town, entered it along
with them, and sacked it. Bliicher had no alternative but to surrender next
day. On the 8th Magdeburg capitulated to Ney. It had 24,000 men within its
walls, including nineteen generals whose ages averaged 68 years, while Ney had
only 16,000 men,
Bliicher had
hoped that, by drawing nearly 50,000 French troops a week’s march to the west,
he would enable preparations to be made for defending the line of the Oder; but
in this he was disappointed. There were not 20,000 men available behind that
river. Kiistrin followed the example of Stettin. It surrendered to Davout at
the first threat of bombardment (November 1), though it was well armed and
garrisoned and abundantly provisioned. The garrison sent boats to bring in the
French troops, as the bridge had been burnt. The King and Queen had left it a
week before, and had gone to Graudenz on the Vistula. In the middle of November
they felt themselves unsafe even there, and retired towards Konigsberg.
Napoleon had
told Louis (September 15) that the struggle with Prussia would not last long,
and that success was certain, though he foresaw that it was perhaps the
beginning of a new Coalition. Within a week of the outbreak of war the Prussian
armies were in full flight; and by the end of the month they were practically
annihilated. The world was astonished at such a catastrophe to a State which
had been a military model for half a century; but clear-sighted admirers had
predicted it. Mirabeau had said: “ The Prussian monarchy is so constituted
that it could not bear up under any calamity, not even under that which must
come sooner or later, an incompetent government.” Catharine II had described it
as built upon the sand; and Guibert had said that the Prussian military system
must fall to pieces under a weak king. A succession of able and masterful
rulers had raised the country to a rank to which its real strength did not
entitle it; and only such men could maintain it there. In alliance with other
Powers it could have done much; it might have turned the scale in 1805. It
chose isolation, and found itself driven to fight single-handed against a Power
for which it was no match.
Alexander had
assured Frederick William that he would do his utmost to help him; and the King
had asked (in September) for 60,000 men. Neither of them had supposed that the
help would be so quickly
needed, and
that the Russians would become principals instead of auxiliaries. Two months
had been allowed for them to come into the field. The Tsar had let himself be
drawn by the adroit diplomacy of Sebastiani into a quarrel with Turkey; and on
October 16 a Russian army of 80,000 men had been ordered to occupy the Danubian
principalities. Napoleon was bound to take advantage of such an opportunity.
He could not afford to give his enemies a respite of several months, and to
forfeit the resources he might draw from Poland, though it was a terrible
country for a winter campaign. The roads were not metalled, and turned to
sloughs in bad weather; and the whole country became a swamp. There was nothing
to arrest his advance to the Vistula; but he was in some doubt about the
movements of the Russians, and wished to bring his army together again before
he encountered them. Davout was told to advance cautiously to Posen, and thence
towards Warsaw. He was to treat the Poles with great consideration, and
encourage them to rise, but not to commit himself in writing. He was supported
on his right by the south-German contingents under Jerome, which had moved on
from Saxony into Silesia, and were employed in the reduction of Glogau, Breslau,
and other fortresses, which made but a poor defence. Lannes was directed from
Stettin upon Thom; and Augereau followed in support of him. The Emperor himself
remained at Berlin.
He had
entered it in state on October 27, after spending two days at Potsdam, where he
had visited the tomb of Frederick the Great, and despoiled it of his sword and
other memorials for the benefit of the Invalides. The fragments of the column
which commemorated Rossbach had already been sent off to Paris. “ I always
admired Frederick II,” he afterwards said, “ but I admire him twice as much
since I have seen what kind of men they were with which he resisted Austrians,
French, and Russians.” The population of Berlin received Napoleon, if not with
enthusiasm (as the journals declared), at any rate with curiosity and apparent
friendliness. The night before, at the opera (as is stated in Baron Percy’s
Journal) “no one seemed to be thinking about his country, or pitying the Court,
or troubling himself about the future; they were applauding the singing of
Iphigenia, and still more the ballets, which were charming.” Prince Hatzfeldt,
the acting governor of Berlin, had forbidden the removal of arms from the
arsenal, and the destruction of bridges, lest the city should suffer for it; yet,
on account of a letter written before the French arrived, Napoleon threatened
to bring him before a court-martial and have him shot as a spy. He eventually
spared the Prince at the entreaties of his wife, and took credit for clemency
in so doing.
Negotiations
for peace were resumed at Berlin. Frederick William sent General Zastrow as
Lucchesini’s colleague; but no abatement of the French terms could be obtained.
On November 6 the King held a council at Graudenz, and decided to accept the
terms. But the stream of disaster which brought Prussia to this decision had
already made
Napoleon
repent of them. Magdeburg was now in his hands, and he meant to keep it. The
collapse of Prussia, and the want of spirit shown in every quarter, made him
hold her cheap, whether as an ally or as an enemy. The alliance which he really
desired, now as in 1805, was with Russia; and, if he continued at war with
Prussia, he might use her as a lever to bring this about. He refused to grant
an armistice, except on condition that his troops should occupy the country
between the Oder and the Vistula; that Thom, Graudenz, and Danzig, fortresses
on the latter river, together with other places, should be handed over to him;
and that the Russian troops should be sent home. Even to these terms the
Prussian envoys agreed; and a convention was signed at Charlottenburg on
November 16. The King, however, refused to ratify it. A despatch from St
Petersburg had informed him that, if he stood fast to the alliance, the Tsar
would recall his troops from Turkey and come to his assistance with 140,000
men; but, if he made peace, Alexander would take his own course without regard
to him. This led the King to follow the advice of Stein at a council held at
Osterode (Nov. 21), and to reject that of Haugwitz and others, who were in
favour of ratification. Haugwitz retired; and the portfolio of Foreign Affairs
was offered to Stein. He declined it, and suggested Hardenberg; but the King
would not shut the door on peace by choosing a man so distasteful to Napoleon,
and he appointed Zastrow. Lombard had been disgraced, but the other
Cabinet-Councillor, Beyme, still held his post; and Stein once more urged, with
the support of Riichel and Hardenberg, that the Cabinet system should be
abandoned. The King, though he remodelled the system, would not consent to its
abolition; and Stein retired for a time from the Prussian service.
Frederick
William had made overtures to Great Britain as soon as war with France was
imminent. The Prussian ports were opened to British vessels; the British
blockade was raised; and ministers were sent on each side to negotiate an
alliance. Lord Morpeth reached the Prussian head-quarters at Weimar two days
before the battle of Jena, but he was not given an opportunity of discussing
the questions at issue. After the battle he made his way to Hamburg, and taking
the view that his instructions were practically cancelled by the course of
events, he returned to England at the end of the month. The Prussian minister,
Jacobi, who arrived in London on October 10, was authorised to promise that
Hanover should be restored at a general peace; but this fell short of what the
British Government felt bound to demand; and the preparations for sending an
expedition to Hanover, to cooperate with the Prussians, were stopped. According
to Gentz, even Stein thought that Prussia should keep Hanover, though he
disapproved the manner in which it had been acquired.
While the
question was still unsettled, Mortier marched into Hanover, and, in the middle
of November, took possession of Hamburg and the
other Hanse
Towns. Having given up all hope of making peace with England, Napoleon
determined to wage vigorous war. Those who excluded him from the ocean should
be excluded from the Continent, and he would dominate the sea by the land. He
would hold on to his.continental conquests till England restored her colonial
conquests: “It is with my land armies,” he told Louis, “that I mean to recover
the Cape and Surinam.” On November 21 he issued his Berlin Decree, which
declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade, and prohibited all
commerce or correspondence with them. British goods were to be confiscated
wherever they were found, and British' subjects imprisoned. “ I have every
reason to hope,” he wrote, “ that this measure will deal a deadly blow to
England.” Spain, Naples, Holland, and all his other allies were required to
conform.
The Poles had
long looked to French aid for the recovery of their independence; and the
approach of the French armies filled them with hopes. These hopes Napoleon took
care to encourage. He wrote to Fouche to send him Kosciuszko; and, when that
high-minded patriot refused to head an insurrection without definite pledges
from the Emperor, forged proclamations were issued in his name. Napoleon knew
that to commit himself to the restoration of the Polish republic would not only
hinder that alliance with the Tsar which he was aiming at, but would link the
interests of Austria to those of Russia and Prussia, He was by no means easy
about the intentions of Austria. The Corsican refugee, Pozzo di Borgo, the
persistent enemy of the Corsican Emperor, was at Vienna on a mission from the
Tsar, to bring about a fresh combination. A large army was gathering in Bohemia
under Archduke Charles. Galicia at that time extended northward to the Bug, and
came within a few miles of Warsaw. Napoleon sent assurances that he would not
meddle with it, offering at the same time to give part of Silesia in exchange
for it; but the offer was not accepted. Lannes and Davout warned him not to
trust the Poles, who were divided by jealousies and party passions as of old.
There was no doubt, however, that admirable fighting material was to be found
among them; and the line taken by Napoleon was to declare that he should not proclaim
the independence of the country until the Poles convinced him of their
resolution and ability to maintain it, by putting at least 30,000 men in the
field, organised and headed by the nobility. To meet the wastage of a winter
campaign, he called for a fresh levy of 80,000 conscripts from France; and he
demanded 14,000 men from Spain to form a corps of observation in Hanover.
The Russian
forces available against the French consisted of 60,000 men under Bennigsen,
and about 40,000 under Buxhowden. Bennigsen’s army arrived on the Vistula in
the middle of November, and occupied Warsaw; but Buxhowden’s could not join it
for another month. The Prussians could only contribute a corps of about 15,000
men, commanded
284
Napoleon's advance. The Russian retreat. [18O6-7
by L’Estocq,
who was placed under Bennigsen’s orders. On November 25 Napoleon left Berlin
for Posen; and on the same day French and Russians came in contact thirty miles
west of Warsaw. Bennigsen was not strong enough to stand his ground; he recrossed
the Vistula and retreated up the river Narew to Ostrolenka. Murat entered
Warsaw on November 28, to the delight of its inhabitants. The Vistula was
encumbered with floating ice; and a fortnight elapsed before the bridges at
Warsaw and Thom could be restored. Napoleon remained at Posen till December 15,
doubtful whether he should join his right wing at Warsaw, or his left, which
was to Cross at Thom. News that the Russians were in retreat led him to decide
on the former; and he arrived at Warsaw on the 18th.
By that time
the two Russian armies had united, and had advanced again; they were encamped
behind the Wkra and the Narew, with head-quarters at Pultusk. Bennigsen was a
Hanoverian, and Buxhowden a Livonian, and they were not on good terms; so Marshal
Kamenskoi, a veteran of the Turkish wars, and a genuine Russian, was appointed
to command the whole, though he could neither ride nor see. Having thrown
Davout’s corps across the Narew, Napoleon drove the Russians out of Czamovo
(Dec. 23), thereby turning their positions on the Wkra. A general advance of
the French army followed. Ney and Bemadotte, who had passed the Vistula at
Thom, moved eastward, threatening the enemy’s right; Lannes, Davout, and
Augereau moved northward from the lower part of the Narew; while Soult,
crossing near Plock, formed a link between the right wing and the left. The
whole army numbered about 120,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry. The Russians
drew back slowly as the French approached. Kamenskoi, having lost his head,
ordered a retreat to the Russian frontier, and hurried on to Lomza.
On December
26 Lannes had a very severe action with Bennigsen’s troops at Pultusk, while
Davout and Augereau were engaged at Golymin. At Pultusk the French were largely
outnumbered; at Golymin the advantage of numbers was on their side; but in
neither case could they claim much success. The Russians, however, continued
their retreat up the Narew to Novogrod. Napoleon had hoped to cut them off, but
the weather and the state of the roads made turning movements impossible. The
men sank to their knees, and the guns stuck fast; hardly any food was to be
found in the deserted villages, and none could be transported. Napoleon had to
be content with having driven the enemy dalfway to Grodno, and taken a large
number of cannon which they had left behind. He returned to Warsaw at the
beginning of 1807, and the army was placed in cantonments Lannes on the Bug,
Davout on the Narew, Soult north of Davout, and Augereau on the Vistula formed
a semicircle covering Warsaw. Bemadotte’s corps was sent into East Pmssia, to
cover the investment of Danzig and Graudenz, and to threaten Konigsberg; and
Ney was to be at Mlava, to support either Bemadotte or Soult in case of need.
1806-7]
Napoleon at Warsaw. The winter campaign. 285
Napoleon
reckoned on three months’ repose for his army, and hoped to make good its
numbers and equipment before he took the field again in the spring. By that
time he expected to have possession of all the fortresses west of the Vistula,
and he ordered intrenchments to be thrown up to form bridge-heads on the
Vistula and the Narew. He believed that the Russians stood in more need of rest
than his own men; and he and his officers enjoyed themselves at Warsaw, feted
and caressed by the Polish ladies, “ the most agreeable in Europe.” Napoleon wrote to Joseph, “ Ma sante rCa jamais ete si bonne, tellement
que je suis devenu plus galant que par le passe."" But
before the end of January he was obliged to assemble his troops. Ney, on his
own initiative, had followed L’Estocq’s corps to within thirty miles of
Konigsberg, leaving a wide gap between his own corps and that of Soult. He was
sharply reprimanded, and drew back his troops to their assigned position just
in time to escape disaster.
Frederick
William had urged the Russian commanders to take up a position which would
protect East Prussia; and they had consented to do so. Alarmed by Ney’s
approach* the King left Konigsberg for Memel (Jan. 6), and renewed his appeal.
Bennigsen, who was chosen to replace Kamenskoi as commander-in-chief, collected
his army at Biala on January 15, and set it in motion towards the lower
Vistula. His object was, in the first place, to cover Konigsberg and drive back
the French troops threatening it, and then to raise the blockade of Danzig, and
secure good winter quarters. Brushing the rear of Ney’s corps as it fell back
southward, the Russian columns were in the midst of Bemadotte’s cantonments
before he had time to get his men together. He engaged their leading troops at
Mohnmgen on the 25th, and repulsed them; but he was obliged to raise the
blockade of Graudenz, and to retreat to the southern border of East Prussia.
When Napoleon
found that the Russian army was west of the Alle, he saw an opportunity of
repeating the Jena manoeuvre. By a rapid advance northward from Warsaw he might
place himself across the Russian line of communications. He marched with 75,000
men, and sent orders to Ney and Bemadotte, who had 34,000 men, to draw eastward
and join him. The 5th corps remained behind to guard his rear, and to make head
against the three divisions which Bennigsen had left to cover the Russian
frontier, between the Bug and the Narew. Some instructions to Bemadotte, sent
from Willenberg on January 31, fell into Bennigsen’s hands, and disclosed
Napoleon’s plan. Be.inigsen had been giving his men three days’ rest, and had
just written to the King of Prussia that he believed the French would have to
retire behind the Vistula. He immediately ordered his army to concentrate on
Allenstein, but found Soult and Murat in possession there. He made a succession
of night marches, hoping to cross the Alle further north; but the French kept
level with him, and also hung upon his rear. At
length, on
February 7, he chose a position at Preussisch-Eylau, and offered battle. His
army was becoming demoralised by forced marches in retreat, but he could count
on his men’s stubbornness in fight; and a halt would enable L’Estocq’s corps,
which Ney was trying to cut off, to rejoin the main body.
The country was
open and undulating. It abounds in lakes, but they were frozen so hard that
cavalry could manoeuvre over them; and everything was covered with snow. The
Russian position was on high ground, strong against frontal attack but not well
secured on the flanks. It was less than three miles in extent, and was held by
75,000 men. The town of Eylau lies in a hollow about half-a-mile to the front;
and the French gained possession of it on the evening of the 7th. The French
forces in front of the Russian position on the morning of the 8th did not
exceed 50,000 men. Augereau’s corps formed the centre, with one of Soult’s
divisions on his right, and the other two on his left* The Guard and the heavy
cavalry were in reserve. Davout was approaching the left flank of the Russians
from Bartenstein with 17,000 men; and Ney’s corps was expected to come up on
the other flank. Bemadotte was two days’ march behind, owing to the miscarriage
of the orders sent him on January 31.
Napoleon
wished to divert the enemy’s attention from Davout. He began the battle by the
seizure of a mill near the Russian right, and then ordered Augereau’s corps
forward. It advanced in a blinding snowstorm, and the leading brigades
deployed; but, shattered by the fire of the Russian guns, and charged by
cavalry, it was driven back in disorder with a loss of nearly half its
strength. The Russians followed up their success by a counter-attack, which
almost reached the churchyard where Napoleon had placed himself before it was
repulsed by the heavy cavalry. Meanwhile Davout was making progress, aided by
Saint-Hilaire’s division of Soult’s corps. He stormed the Kreegeberge, on which
the Russian left rested, and pushed on in rear of the position across the
Friedland road. But his progress was arrested by the arrival of part of
L’Estocq’s corps early in the afternoon. He was forced to give up half the
ground he had won; and his exhausted troops would probably have been
overwhelmed at nightfall, had not the approach of one of Ney’s brigades on the
Russian right checked Bennigsen’s preparations.
Napoleon had
failed for the first time in a pitched battle. The Russians had borne out what
the historian of the Seven Years’ War said of them, “ They cannot be defeated,
they must be killed.” They had lost more than a third of their number, but the
French loss was still greater. Napoleon wrote to Duroc in the course of that
night that he might find it necessary to recross the Vistula. Next morning he
learnt to his great relief that the Russians had retreated, and that he could
claim a victory. Bennigsen fell back on Konigsberg, partly because his
troops were
in want of food and ammunition, partly from an erroneous belief that
Bernadotte’s corps had come up; but he was much blamed by his own officers. The
Emperor remained for a week near Eylau, to make good his daim to victory and
allow of the removal of his wounded. He then drew back his troops into
cantonments, not, as before, in Poland, but across East Prussia, behind the
Passarge and the upper part of the Alle. Thom became the base of the army; the
head-quarters were at Osterode. The corps of Augereau had suffered so severely
that it was broken up, and its units were transferred to other corps. Great
pains were taken, then and afterwards, to minimise the French losses; and
Napoleon professed to have exaggerated them in his bulletin, where he gave them
as 1900 killed and 5700 wounded.
His
experience at Eylau lowered his tone. A few days after the battle, he sent
General Bertrand to Memel to persuade Frederick William to make a separate
peace. He was willing to restore all Prussian territory east of the Elbe, and
he would not require Prussia to help him in a war with Russia. As for the
Poles, he said, he attached no importance to them now that he knew them better.
Zastrow favoured a separate peace, if the Tsar would consent; but Hardenberg,
when consulted by the King, maintained that Napoleon was not to be trusted and
that Prussia should hold fast to her ally; and his counsel prevailed. The
Emperor then proposed an armistice for joint negotiations; but Alexander saw
in this proposal evidence of the critical condition in which Napoleon found
himself.
At the
beginning of April, the Tsar went to Memel to stiffen the King’s purpose; and,
by his influence, Zastrow was replaced by Hardenberg as Foreign Minister. By
the end of the month Hardenberg was charged with the conduct of internal as
well as external affairs, in order that there might be the unity of direction
which was essential for vigorous prosecution of the war. The Cabinet system
came for a time to an end. The two sovereigns went together to the
head-quarters of the allied army at Bartenstein; and the Convention which
afterwards bore that name was signed (at Schippenbeil) on April 26. The two
Powers bound themselves to do their utmost to drive the French out of Germany,
and to create a German Confederation with a good military frontier. Neither
Power was to make conquests on its own account; Prussia was to regain her old
possessions or receive compensation for them. Offers were to be made to
Austria, Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark, in order to secure their
assistance. The Italian Question was reserved for future settlement; but the
crown of Italy was in any case to be separated from that of France; and
something was to be done for the Kings of Sardinia and Naples and the Prince of
Orange. Napoleon’s overtures were met by the proposal of a congress at
Copenhagen.
Alexander
recognised by this time that Russia, with all her powers of resistance, had not
the offensive strength required for driving the French
back to the
Rhine. Prussia was powerless; and the mixture of promises and threats which had
been applied to her in 1805 was now applied to Austria. Napoleon, on his side,
was assiduous in his offers: he would fall in with the wishes of Austria about
Turkey, or he would let her have part of Silesia. Proposals of alliance were
coupled with hints of the alternative, an alliance between France and Russia;
and this was a danger to which they were fully alive in Vienna. Stadion agreed
with Archduke Charles in holding that war must be avoided, but he wished to
have a voice in the final settlement, lest Austrian interests should be
sacrificed. His policy was to hold out hopes to both sides, to find excuses for
delay, and to offer mediation. This suited Napoleon, whose great object was to
gain time. He assented in principle to the Austrian proposal of a congress at
Prague, but claimed that Turkey should be admitted. Russia, Prussia, and Great
Britain did not reject it, but desired to know, as a preliminary, on what basis
the French Emperor was prepared to negotiate; and the correspondence was
prolonged until events made it superfluous.
The strain
upon Napoleon’s resources in the spring of 1807 was such as only he could have
borne. To retire behind the Vistula would be a confession of failure which
would strengthen his enemies; but to remain east of it was hardly possible. The
country was exhausted; and he was short of transport and supplies. We find him
pressing Talleyrand to send biscuits and brandy from Warsaw, and adding, “this
matter is more important than all the negotiations in the world” (March 12).
The French soldier, reduced to meat and potatoes, is described as lean, sad,
and dreamy, filthy in his person, and cursing his fate. Many thousands of
marauders were wandering in search of food. The cavalry, with half-starved
horses, could do little to check the raids of the Cossacks, who cut off convoys
and caused a general scare. The corps which had been left on the Narew held its
own with difficulty.
The long line
of communication across Germany was at many points open to attack by partisan
corps, or by troops landed on the northern coast; and few men could be spared
to guard it. Mortier had invested Stralsund at the end of January, but he was
called away to besiege Kolberg; and the small force which he left behind was
driven across the Peene by the Swedes at the beginning of April. Alarm spread
to Stettin and Berlin; but Mortier marched back to Stralsund and succeeded in
bringing the Swedes to an armistice. Napoleon’s instructions were to treat them
well, and to distinguish between the Swedish people and their king. The
Prussian Government had proposed that a British force should be sent to
Stralsund, to cooperate with Swedes and Prussians. It might have done much both
to hamper the French and to encourage the Allies; but the Grenville Ministry
was not disposed to furnish either auxiliaries or subsidies. Lord Hutchinson,
who had been sent to the Prussian head-quarters at the beginning of the year,
wrote and spoke in
a strain of “
mingled despair and contempt ” about the allied armies and their prospects. He
signed a treaty of peace with Prussia (January 28); but it was not ratified for
some months. The resources of Great Britain were devoted to expeditions to
Egypt and South America, in pursuit of purely British interests, to the great
discontent of the Continental Powers.
The change of
ministry (March 25) Which brought Cannitig to the Foreign Office led to a
change of tone; and the substitution of Hardenberg for Zastrow made relations
more cordial. Ratifications of the treaty of peace were exchanged on April 30;
and, on June 27, Great Britain acceded to the Convention of Bartenstein,
undertaking to pay a subsidy of £1,000,000 to Prussia in the course of the
year. She had promised a few days before to subsidise 16,000 Swedes, and to
send
20,000 British and Hanoverian troops to
Stralsund, to be under the orders of Gustavus, but removable for employment
elsewhere. But the change had come too late. Neither men nor transports were
available when the Tories came into office; and Lord Cathcart arrived at Riigen
with 8,000 Hanoverians, the first instalment of the expedition, on July 16, a
week after peace had been signed at Tilsit.
Danzig, even
more than Stralsund, threatened Napoleon’s security on the Vistula; and he
resolved to make himself master of it before concluding any armistice based on
the status quo. Accessible from the sea and along the coast, and so well
covered by inundations that it could only be attacked from the west, it was not
an easy place to take. It had a garrison of 14,000 men; and the siege-corps,
which consisted mainly of Germans and Poles under the command of Lefebvre, was
at no time more than 25,000. The place was partially invested on March 11, but
the French batteries did not open fire till April 24; and it held out for
another month. The defence compared favourably with that of other Prussian
fortresses; and the governor, Kalckreuth, reaped laurels from it, though personally
he showed little skill or vigour.
At the
beginning of April Napoleon shifted his head-quarters to Finkenstein, to be
nearer to Thom and Danzig. There he received the ambassadors of the Shah and
the Sultan, and formed schemes for attacking Russia from the south. The Turks
were to be joined by Marmont with his Dalmatian corps, and were to march into
Podolia, where Massena, who was now commanding the 5th corps on the Narew,
would meet them. But the Porte did not relish plans which would bring French troops
into Ottoman territory; and the Turkish ambassador pleaded want of
instructions. The treaty with Persia was signed on May 4; and French officers
were sent to Teheran to instruct the Persians in the art of war.
At the same
time Napoleon was drawing troops from all quarters to strengthen his own army.
Provisional regiments of conscripts were hurried across Germany; and a new levy
of 80,000 men (or boys) was ordered in France. It was the third levy within
twelve months, and was
made a year
and a half before the legal date. He was warned that he was cutting his com
before' it was ripe; but he replied that young men of eighteen were perfectly
fit for home defence, and he made a promise (which was not kept) that they
should not be sent out of France. Early in June he had 210,000 men in first
line* on the Vistula and the Narew, and 100,000 in second line, including
garrisons The Allies had also been reinforced, but could not muster more than
130,000 men.
The capture
of Danzig had given Napoleon a new base, and had famished timely supplies of
com, wine, and money. Being no longer tethered by a siege, he planned a general
advance for June 10. To his surprise and satisfaction, Bennigsen anticipated
him. The Russian general had been passive throughout the siege of Danzig, with
the exception of an ineffectual “ promenade,”' meant to assist a force sent
from Konigsberg to relieve that fortress. He now took the offensive when there
was least reason for it, and tried to cut off Ney’s corps, which was quartered
near Guttstadt, in advance of the general line. Ney, however, extricated his
troops and fell back to the Passarge; and Bennigsen, finding that the whole
French army was approaching, retreated to Heils- berg, where he had intrenched
positions on both sides of the Alle. The positions on the left bank were
attacked on June 10, but the Russians held them with their usual tenacity. The
French lost heavily, and made no permanent impression. Napoleon did not renew
the action next morning. He waited for all his troops to come up, and moved
them round the Russian right, barring the road to Konigsberg, and interposing
himself between the Russian army and L’Estocq’s coips.
On the night
of the 11th Bennigsen withdrew from his position, and retreated down the right
bank of the Alle. At Friedland, on the morning of the 14th, he found himself
in presence of a single French corps, a new coips which had been formed for
Lannes, who had given up his old one (the 5th) on account of ill-health.
Napoleon had directed Murat on Konigsberg, with the corps of Soult and Davout,
and was at Eylau with the rest of the army. B&inigseii had fought Lannes at
Pultusk six months before,- and had repulsed him, but had not made the most of
his success. He now saw an opportunity of overwhelming him, and brought nearly
the whole of his army across the river. But Lannes, favoured by woods, and
reinforced from time to time, held his ground. By 5 p.m. the Emperor had brought up the corps of Ney, Mortier,
and Victor (vice Bemadotte), and had nearly 90,000 men on the field, while the
Russians were under 50,000. The Russian left, under Bagration, was separated
from the right by a ravine, and the ground behind it was cramped between this
ravine and the Alle. Leaving Mortier to hold the right in check, Napoleon launched
the rest of his troops against Bagration and drove him back through this narrow
belt, where the French artillery made havoc of the Russian masses, and across
the river. The town was set on fire and the bridges were burnt. The right wing,
retreating too
late, escaped
with difficulty by fords lower down. The Russians lost more than 15,000 men,
killed and wounded, the French about half as many.
It was a
decisive victory, worthy: of the anniversary of Marengo. The pursuit was not
close, and the Russian army soon found shelter behind the Pregel; but it was in
such a state that Bennigsen wrote to the Tsar begging him to treat for peace,
in order to gain time for its reorganisation. Believing himself unable to hold
the line of the Pregel, Bennigsen continued his retreat, ordering L’Estocq’s
corps to join him. It left Konigsberg, which it was preparing to defend, and
succeeded in overtaking the main force, after a narrow escape from being cut
off. By the 19th the combined army had crossed the Niemen at Tilsit; but it
left many thousands of stragglers behind.
Alexander was
at Olitta, inspecting a fresh corps brought up by Prince Lobanoff, when he
received Bennigsen’s report. Frederick William had gone to Memel with
Hardenberg; and the Tsar had assured the latter, when they parted on the 13th,
that he did not mean to yield to the cry for peace which had been growing for
some time past at the Russian head-quarters. But he was overborne by the
emergent^, and without waiting to consult his ally he authorised Bennigsen to
ask for an armistice. Lobanoff was sent to act as envoy. He presented himself
at the French outposts on June 18, a day destined to win other associations
eight years afterwards. Napoleon demanded the surrender of Graudenz and of
Kolberg, where Gneisenau had been showing an activity and resource which made
its defence memorable. The Grand Duke Constantine, who brought Napoleon’s terms
to Alexander, urged him to accept them on account of the temper of the army,
and even reminded him of his father’s fate. The Tsar could not dispose of
Prussian fortresses, or issue orders for their surrender; but this point was
waived, and on the 21st an armistice was agreed upon between the French and
Russians. Four or five days were granted to the Prussians to allow of their
accession to it.
On the same
day Alexander and Frederick William met again at Schawli. “Saw Budberg and
found the political system completely changed,” was Hardenberg’s entry in his
diary. Alexander had decided, not only to make peace, but to ally himself with
France. This volte-face was caused, as Budberg explained, by the conduct of the
Austrian and British Governments, which had left him to bear the whole burden
of the war. He had been greatly irritated by the refusal of the Grenville
Ministry to guarantee a Russian loan of six millions, and by the ground given
for it, that if the two countries fell out Russia might not keep faith as to
payments. He had repeatedly asked, but to no purpose, that a British expedition
should be sent to the north coast of Germany; and he knew that England was
altogether opposed to his designs upon Turkey. He had nothing to gain by the
war, and he was told that he was sacrificing his country for Prussia. For the
Prussians his officers
entertained
even greater contempt than the}’ had felt for the Austrians in 1805. Frederick
William was bitterly aggrieved at the Tsar’s desertion of him, but he could
only submit; and his own past conduct gave him small right to complain.
Alexander
made rapid progress on his new tack. He sent Lobanoff to Tilsit to propose a
personal interview, which Napoleon conceded with some affectation of
indifference. It took place on June 25, on a raft moored in the Niemen. The two
Emperors discussed their future relations tete-a-tite for three hours, while
the King of Prussia waited in the rain on the river bank to learn his fate. As
a concession to Alexander, Napoleon granted an armistice to Prussia without
surrender of the fortresses; and it was signed on that day. Nothing else is
positively known of what took place. There was another meeting next day at
which Frederick William was present. Napoleon treated him with marked neglect,
and described him as “im homme entierement borne, sans caractere, et sans
moyens
The bases
having been settled by the two monarchs, the details of the negotiations were
left to the diplomatists; but Napoleon would not let Hardenberg take any part
in them, and Prussia was represented by Goltz and Kalckreuth. At the instance
of the latter, Queen Louisa was induced to come from Meinel to Tilsit. Napoleon
wished to meet her, and, after Eylau, had expressed his regret by Bertrand for
“ the manner in which she had been spoken of.” She was led to hope that, by
passing over her own wrongs, she might win back Magdeburg for her country; but,
though Napoleon admired her, he yielded nothing to her.
The treaty of
peace between France and Prussia was signed at Tilsit on July 9. Prussia was
deprived of all her territory West of the Elbe, of the Polish provinces which
she had annexed in 1793, and even of the southern part of West Prussia,
acquired in 1772. Kottbus was assigned to Saxony, of which it was an enclave.
Danzig, with a radius of ten miles round it, was made a free city under the
joint protectorate of Prussia and Saxony. By these surrenders Prussia lost
nearly half her area and population, the latter being reduced to less than five
millions. She was required to recognise Napoleon’s new creations, and to take
common action w'th France and Russia against England. The treaty was supplemented
by a convention (signed at Konigsberg, July 12) respecting the withdrawal of
the French troops from what remained of Prussia. This was to be completed by
October 1, with some exceptions, but only upon payment of What was due to
France for outstanding war contributions. The amount was not specified, and was
not settled till long afterwards. Napoleon was well aware that the money, or
security for it, could not be found; and that this condition would enable him
to keep 100,000 men in Prussia at her expense so long as he wished.
The treaty of
peace between France and Russia had already been signed (July 7). It made
mention of the several cessions of Prussian
territory,
and put on record that it was only out of regard for the Tsar that Frederick
William received back part of his country. Napoleon had, in fact, thrown out
the suggestion that Prussia should be expunged, and that the Vistula should be
the dividing line between the two Empires. The treaty also stated Napoleon’s
intentions as to the disposal of the ceded territory. The provinces west of the
Elbe were to be included, with Hesse, in a new kingdom of Westphalia, for his
brother Jerome. The Polish provinces were to form the duchy of Warsaw, under
the rule of the King of Saxony, except the district of Bialystok, which was
given to Russia. Alexander recognised these arrangements, as well as those,
which Napoleon had made previously in Germany and Italy. He gave up Cattaro and
the Ionian Islands, and promised to recognise Joseph as King of Sicily, if Ferdinand
were indemnified by the Balearic Islands or Crete. He accepted Napoleon’s
mediation for peace between Russia and Turkey, while Napoleon accepted him as
mediator between France and Great Britain.
The treaty of
peace was supplemented by a secret treaty of alliance signed on the same day.
It provided that France and Russia should help one another with all their
forces, or with so much as might be agreed upon, in any war against an European
Power, and should not make peace separately. If England ’ should reject the
mediation of Russia, or not make peace by November 1, recognising the equality
of all flags on the seas, and restoring, in exchange for Hanover, all conquests
made by her since 1805, the Emperor of Russia should give her one month’s
notice of his intention to make common cause with France. In that case,
Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria would be summoned to make war upon
England; and if Sweden refused, Denmark would be called on to join in
hostilities against her. If Turkey should decline French mediation, or if peace
were not made within three months, France would make common cause with Russia
against the Porte; and the two Powers would come to an understanding for the
liberation of all the European provinces from the Ottoman yoke, with the exception
of Roumelia and Constantinople. The deposition and death of the Sultan Selim,
which occurred on May 29, 1807, did something to cover the shamelessness of
this abandonment of the Turks.
Ratifications
were exchanged on July 9; and the two Emperors parted well pleased with
themselves and with each other. Alexander had discovered at their first meeting
that “Bonaparte, with all his genius, had his weak side!—vanity.” He played
upon it so successfully that he himself won some of the praise which he bestowed.
Each sovereign believed himself to have secured an instrument to serve his own
purposes. y
THE
NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT.
One of the most marked characteristics of great men
of action is their refusal to rest, even when they seem to haye gained a
surfeit of glory and to have climbed to almost incredible heights of power. But
of all those whom history depicts as spurred on by insatiable activity the most
remarkable was Napoleon. To him a great victory was but an opportunity for,
pushing on a relentless pursuit. It enabled him, by exhausting his enemy’s
resources, to force terms upon the vanquished at the sword’s point; and the
resulting treaty inaugurated no period of rest and recuperation, but a
political campaign that promised to overawe his remaining enemies and to
strengthen the fabric of his own authority. Such a peace was the Peace of
Tilsit. While diplomatists and soldiers hailed it as the beginning of an era of
quiet enjoyment, the victor looked on his diplomatic triumph as the beginning
of a new time of activity, in which the forces of the Continent were to be used
for the humbling of Great Britain, and in due course for the prosecution of new
schemes in the East.
So complex
and many-sided were the undertakings of the French Emperor in this period of
his ascendancy that it has been found advisable to treat them separately, and
to postpone to later chapters the consideration of his Continental System, and
of. his relations to Austria, Spain, and the Church of Rome. The present chapter,
then,, deals, first, with the events in Denmark, Portugal, the Baltic States,
and Finland, which sprang directly from the policy agreed on at Tilsit;
secondly, with the international relations which led up to the Congress of
Erfurt; thirdly, with the very important work of national revival which went on
in the kingdom of Prussia; and lastly, with the establishment of the kingdom of
Westphalia and the duchy of Warsaw.
The mental
preoccupation of the French Emperor during his return from Tilsit to Paris was
noticed by Madame Reinhard at Dresden. In her letters she alludes to his utter
lack of interest in the art treasures of that city. When conducted by the King
of Saxony to the Museum, he
hurried past
pictures and statues at a pace which obviously caused no less inconvenience
than annoyance to his host. This haste and preoccupation were natural.
Napoleon was at the turning-point of his career. His thoughts were doubtless
intent on the complex plans sketched in outline at Tilsit with his new ally,
Alexander I, which have been described in the previous chapter. The chief of
them was that which bound the Allies to summon the Courts of Copenhagen,
Stockholm, and Lisbon to close their ports to British commerce, and declare war
against England. A refusal on their part would bring on them the hostility of
the two Imperial Courts; and, if Sweden failed to comply, Denmark would be
compelled to declare war on her. A postponement of decisive action was clearly
contrary to Napoleon’s wishes; and it is known that, on his way back to France,
he made his plans with a view to the speedy coercion of Denmark as well as of
Portugal.
There was
every reason why he should at once turn his attention to the former of these
Powers. Denmark, holding the keys of the Baltic, had it in her power to prevent
the arrival of reinforcements to a British expedition then off the shores of
Swedish Pomerania. That expedition was a belated effort to comply with the
requests for help urgently pressed by the Tsar during the spring. It had set
sail from England at the end of June, and reached Elsinore on July 4-5, 1807;
its aim was to help the King of Sweden in the campaign which he sought to renew
against the French in the north of Germany. The land forces, numbering about
10,000 men, were under the command of Lord Cath- cart; they consisted mainly of
Hanoverians who had been embodied in the King’s German Legion. Had the force
set sail two months earlier, it might have effected a most welcome diversion
against Napoleon’s flank or rear. As it was, the British entered the Baltic and
arrived off Riigen just when peace was signed at Tilsit.
The action of
Gustavus IV Adolphus of Sweden in denouncing the armistice which he had signed
with the French general Brune on June 4 was equally inopportune. Strengthened
by the signing of a convention for subsidies at Stralsund (June 27), and
relying apparently on the arrival of a larger force than Cathcart actually
brought, the Swedish monarch renewed the war after the interval of one month,
at the very time when the course of negotiations at Tilsit set free large
numbers of French troops for service against the Swedes and their allies. It is
unnecessary to follow the fortunes of this expedition. The chances of success
for the defenders of Stralsund were greatly lessened by the withdrawal of the
British force, owing to events soon to be described. In truth the Anglo-
Swedish expedition scarcely claims notice on its own account. Its importance
lies in the fact that it precipitated vigorous action both on the part of the British
Government and of the French Emperor.
The presence
of a British expedition off Riigen furnished an additional reason why Napoleon
should press Denmark to side with him and
endanger the
communications of Cathcart. On July 81! the French Emperor wrote to Talleyrand,
who had not yet definitely given up the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, directing
him to express through the French Minister at Copenhagen his annoyance at the
continuance of correspondence between that Court and the British Government,
in spite of the promise already made to the contrary, and to demand that all
communications should cease. The despatch ordered the French envoy to state
further to the Danish Minister: “ That, whatever my desire to treat Denmark
well, I cannot prevent his [the Prince Royal’s] suffering from the violation of
the Baltic Sea which he has permitted; that, if England refuses the mediation
of Russia, he must choosa either to make war on England or on me; and that the
friendship which the Prince Royal has testified for me, as well as the
interests of Denmark, cause me to hope that he will not hesitate in his
choice.” This letter is of importance as showing that the Prince Royal of
Denmark had given Napoleon some ground for hoping he would take the French
side; and the phrase quoted above concerning the “violation of the Baltic Sea,”
i.e., by Ca,thcart’s expedition, also bears witness to the Emperor’s
expectation that Denmark would keep the Baltic shut against a British fleet. He
expressed the same desire to the diplomatic circle on August 2. Stopping before
the Danish Minister, he remarked, “So you have allowed the Baltic to be
violated. We laid down the principle that you were to be its guardians.” After
a long statement by the envoy, he closed the discussion with the words, “ The
matter will, I hope, be arranged.”
The
friendliness displayed by Denmark towards France had long been known to the
Powers leagued together in the Third Coalition. In his official Memoire of
April 7, 1807, Hardenberg proposed, among other things, that Russia, G^eat
Britain, and Prussia should take steps to make Denmark move. The same proposal
took more stringent form in the Russo-Prussian Convention of Baitenstein (April
26, 1807), the ninth article of which specified that Russia and Prussia, together
with Austria, Great Britain, and Sweden—in case of the accession of these
Powers to the new compact—would endeavour to persuade the Court of Denmark to
join the Coalition. Great Britain became a party to this convention; but no
steps were taken immediately to force the hand of the Danish Government.
Garlike, the British Minister at Copenhagen, reported various small matters in
which Denmark showed undue deference tp Napoleon. The position of Denmark was,
in truth, extremely difficult. Threatened by the naval superiority of the
Coalition on the one side, she saw, on the other, the duchy of Holstein menaced
by a force of French and Spanish troops under Marshal Bemadotte at Hamburg. The
Peace of Tilsit, for from lessening her cares, redoubled them. In fact
Copenhagen became for a few weeks the central point in vast combinations of
policy, those of the Sea Power and those of the Land Power.
The general
situation was not unlike that of the years 1800-1, when
1807] Napoleon's designs revealed to the British
Government. 297
the First
Consul and the Tsar Paul drew Prussia and Denmark into their schemes for the
humbling of England’s naval power. As at the time of the Second Armed
Neutrality, so now Napoleon looked on the help of Denmark as essential to the success
of his schemes; and on August 16 he ordered a demand to be sent to the Danish
Government for the cooperation of its fleet with that of France, and for the
exclusion of British goods from Danish ports. On the other hand, George III and
his Ministers were equally resolved to paralyse the new hostile coalition at
the outset by measures which, though Jess unfriendly in intention than those of
1801, proved in the sequel far more disastrous to the Danes.
We must now
advert to the interesting but obscure question, how the British Ministry had
been able to fathom their adversaries’ designs. On July 16 Canning received
important despatches which warned him that dangers were ahead. One of these was
from an officer, probably a Russian, dated Memel, June 26, 1807, describing the
losses at the battle of Friedland and the friendly bearing of the two Emperors
on the occasion of their interview on the raft at Tilsit. The second was from
Garlike, giving bad news that had come through General Clinton, who had been at
Memel and on his return had called at Stralsund. The despatch also stated that
the Danes now feared a military occupation of their mainland territories by the
French, a danger which ought to be guarded against. The third despatch was from
Mackenzie, a British agent who had dined with General Bennigsen at Tilsit on
June 22, and heard news as to the Tsar’s ratification of the armistice and the
general wish for peace. These tidings, coupled with the notorious partiality of
the Danish Prince Royal for the French cause, caused Canning to take a step of
great importance. On that same day, July 16, he appointed Brooke Taylor British
Minister at Copenhagen in the room of Gaxlike, and instructed the new envoy to
inform the Danish Government that a large British fleet would at once be sent
to the Sound, in order to cooperate with the King of Sweden for the security of
his dominions, to protect any British reinforcements that might be sent to
Stralsund, and to safeguard British commerce in those waters. Brooke Taylor was
to announce that the naval preparations of Denmark and the “avowed designs of
Bonaparte ’’ had conduced to the formation of this decision; and that the
presence of a large British fleet was necessary in order to counterbalance that
of the French forces on the borders of Holstein.
As yet,
however, Canning seems to have entertained no thought of employing forcible
measures against Denmark. That drastic resolution was apparently formed on or
shortly before July 22, when he had news “ directly from Tilsit,” that the two
Emperors, at an interview held on June 24 or 25, proposed to form a maritime
league against Great Britain, “the accession of Denmark to which was
represented by Bonaparte to be as certain as it was essential.” The Emperor of
Russia is described as having “neither accepted nor refused this proposed.” The
source of
this news is
unknown. A British agent, Mackenzie, and Dr Wylie were probably the only
Englishmen at Tilsit at the time of the interview; and Mackenzie did not arrive
in London until July 23, when he brought despatches from Lord Granville
Leveson-Gower at Memel. Seeing, however, that the role attributed to the Tsar
in the sentence quoted above contrasts honourably with that assigned to
Napoleon, we may with some approach to certainty infer that the news which
reached Canning on July 21 must have come from a Russian. The gossips of Paris
and London afterwards pointed to Talleyrand as having betrayed his master; but
this rumour seems to be discredited by the details contained in the British
archives and summarised above. Still more certain is it that the news of July
21 came “directly from Tilsit,” and that the decisive information did not come
from Lisbon, as some writers have averred.
In any case,
the information was incorrect in several important particulars. In the first
place, the news as to the naval preparations going on at Copenhagen was
afterwards discovered to be wholly unfounded, the Danish sail of the line
being for the most part quite unfit to put to sea. It would appear also that
Canning misconceived the plans agreed on at Tilsit. The details of the
conversation of the two Emperors at their first interview on the raft are still
but dimly known; it is, however, improbable that Napoleon succeeded at once in
his effort to entice the Tsar into the formation of a league actively hostile
to Great Britain. At the close of the interviews, when he had strengthened his
hold over Alexander by setting forth alluring plans respecting Turkey and
Finland, he was unable to induce him to do more than offer his mediation for a
peace between France and Great Britain in a sense favourable to the former. If
the latter rejected the Franco- Russian terms, then, but then only, should
Denmark be coerced into joining the new league. In short, the plan of coercion
was conditional.
Canning, on
the other hand, believed it to be absolute and immediate. He had no knowledge
of the secret treaty of alliance signed at Tilsit, such as he would probably
have had if Talleyrand had betrayed Napoleon’s secrets. On August 4i the
British Foreign Secretary instructed Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, British
Minister at the Russian Court, “ that, in the event of there not appearing any
article on the face of the Treaty which affects the rights and interests of
this country, your Excellency should further demand the communication of any
secret articles to that effect or a formal disclaimer of their existence.” Next
day Canning informed LeVeson-Gower that news had come of Bemadotte’s arrival in
Holstein; and he added these significant words: “The project of occupying the
ports of Holstein and of employing the Danish fleet as part of a combined
armament to cover the invasion of Scotland and Ireland was undoubtedly
conceived by Bonaparte some time before any intercourse had taken place between
him and the Emperor of Russia.... The causes of this expedition [the British]
are to be found in the more
I807]
Seizure of the Danish fleet, and its results. 299
immediate and
pressing dangers which existed independently of any Baltic League, though their
probability and their magnitude would no doubt be infinitely augmented by such
a confederacy.”
Thus the
British Ministry based their action on evidence which was merely of a
circumstantial character, and which we now know to have been incorrect in
important details. Whatever was the truth as to the project of using the Danish
fleet against Scotland or Ireland, that project in point of fact was
subordinated to the policy agreed on at Tilsit, which aimed at massing
overwhelming political forces in order to compel Great Britain to accept the
terms there formulated. Whether the British Ministry would have accepted those
terms, had they been presented in their entirety, is of course only matter for
conjecture. But such acceptance was by no means impossible. Talleyrand, in his
letter to Napoleon of June 20,1807, had expressed surprise at finding the tone
of the British despatches far more favourable to peace than that of the
Prussian notes. The Portland Cabinet, however, in its alarm at the news which thereafter
came from Tilsit and Holstein, decided on a step which subjected the Danes to
harsh and high-handed usage.
On July 28,
1807, Canning instructed Francis Jackson to proceed with the utmost speed to
Kiel, and to demand from the Danish Prince Royal, then at that place, an
explicit declaration of policy. Jackson was charged to present a treaty of
alliance with England* one condition of which was the deposit of the Danish
fleet in pledge. As is well known, the offer met with an immediate refusal; the
Prince set out for Copenhagen; and hostilities at once began between Great
Britain and Denmark. The British operations in Zeeland and the capture of the
Danish fleet having been described in a previous chapter of this volume, it is
unnecessary to relate them here. The political results of those actions,
however, claim attention in proportion to their importance. First, Great
Britain suffered a loss of moral reputation which partly outweighed the gain
brought by the accession of material strength to her navy and the added sense
of security. The peoples of the Continent, unaware of the reasons that prompted
the action of Great Britain, regarded it as little better than piratical. Only
by degrees did this bad impression fade away, and then because it was overshadowed
by Napoleon’s conduct in Spain. For the present, the French Emperor had public
sentiment on his side, a matter of great importance when so complex and
unpopular a regime as that of the Continental System was being imposed on
peoples previously hostile. This adverse trend of opinion was destined also to
increase the difficulty of England in finding allies among the old Governments
of the Continent, which contrasted the tardiness of the Grenville Ministry in
helping their friends with the energy shown by their successors in attacking
neutrals. Further, fanning failed to accomplish his ulterior aim in sending
this expedition, namely, that of forming an Anglo-Scandinavian league as a
counterpoise to that
of Prance and
Russia. This aim he set forth in a memorandum which is contained in the British
archives. He therein stated that his action was prompted, not by hostility to
Denmark, but rather by the wish to compel her by the display of irresistible
naval force to choose the British alliance, and assure the freedom of the
Baltic Sea and the safety of Sweden. This hope failed in consequence of the
natural resentment of the Danish Prince Royal, who spurned all the British
proposals for a friendly understanding and ordered the continuation of
hostilities after the British forces evacuated Zeeland (October 20).
Sweden also
gpined nothing by England’s conduct towards Denmark. In fact, the position of
Gustavus Adolphus at Stralsund was sensibly weakened by the withdrawal of
Cathcart’s force in order to support the attack on Copenhagen—a result which
goes far to explain the sudden resolve of the Swedish monarch to sue for an
armistice and to abandon the mainland of Swedish Pomerania. On August 20 he
evacuated Stralsund ; and, under the pressure of Brune’s operations against
Riigen, found himself constrained to hand over that island to the French commander
by a convention dated September 7. In a state of illness which was largely
traceable to his misfortunes he retired to Sweden. There again he was soon to
be beset, on the east by the preparations of the Tsar for a campaign against
Finland, and on the west by the hostility of the Danes. At the close of the
month of October, Denmark concluded an alliance with France, which empowered
Marshal Bemadotte to cross the Belt and occupy Zeeland. There can be little
doubt that Napoleon had expected to gain an easy victory over the Swedes in
Pomerania, and hoped that this further triumph would place the resources of
Denmark at his disposal. A phrase in his letter of September 7 to Champagny,
the new Minister of Foreign Affairs—“If England succeeded, the great 2st loss
would be the Danish vessels that she would destroy ”—shows that Napoleon never
ceased to look on Denmark as potentially the ally of France, and her navy as
forming the right wing in the naval operations eventually to be carried out
against the mistress of the seas. Phrases such as these, and the details
contained in the British archives, serve largely to justify Canning’s policy,
which on the surface appears unjustifiable. It rested on an induction the
premisses of which were insecure, but which was based on a sound estimate of
Napoleon’s character and of his probable action. The Emperor’s subsequent
conduct added a further proof that, when he wrote the letter of September 7, he
believed that Great Britain had failed at Copenhagen. When he heard the truth,
his rage knew no bounds. The compiler of the Fouche Memoirs states that, since
the arrival of the news of the murder of the Tsar Paul, he had never seen
Napoleon in such transports of anger. This is easily to be accounted for. The
accession of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of France, Rucsia,
Holland, Spain, northern Italy, and probably Portugal, might have turned the
balance against Great Britain and secured either
her
submission to the conqueror’s terms or her utter overthrow on her own element.
In order to
secure this great result, Napoleon had also been maturing his plans for the
coercion of Portugal. So far back as July 19, he charged Talleyrand immediately
after his return to Paris to warn the Portuguese ambassador that the harbours
of Portugal must be closed to British commerce by September 1, and British
goods confiscated; in default of such action, hostilities would be begun by
France. Spain also was urged to put pressure on her western neighbour, and, in
case of recalcitrance on the part of the Court of Lisbon, to join France in
effecting the conquest of Portugal. The latter proposal seemed, on the surface,
to be merely the renewal of a plan for the partition of that kingdom discussed
between Napoleon and the Spanish Minister, Godoy, early in the previous year;
it now met with a ready assent from the latter, all the more so as it appeared
to indicate Napoleon’s forgiveness for the threatening declaration issued by
the Prince of the Peace shortly before Jena. The alarm Caused at Lisbon by the
French demands was proportionate to the satisfaction felt at Madrid. Those
demands took threatening form at the diplomatic reception of August 2, when the
Emperor addressed an imperious summons to the Portuguese Minister. The Court of
Lisbon was now in despair. Any hope that it might have entertained eighteen
months earlier of resisting the power of France and Spain had now vanished.
Prussia was overthrown; the Tsar had made common cause with Napoleon; the naval
resources of Great Britain seemed hardly sufficient to ward off defeat; and a
strong French corps was mustering at Bayonne. The Queen of Portugal being at
that time insane, the government was in the hands of her son, the Prince
Regent, a man scarcely fitted to cope with the crisis.
The
despatches of Viscount Strangford, British ambassador at Lisbon, show that that
Court, laying aside all thought of resistance to Napoleon, sought by all
possible means to induce the British Government to meet Napoleon’s demands. On
finding that the Portland Ministry had no thought of accepting his terms, the
Lisbon Cabinet begged the British Government to put up with the appearance of a
rupture between the two countries, and promised that in no case would the
property of British merchants in Portugal be subjected to confiscation. The
replies of the Prince Regent of Portugal to the French mandate were of the same
tenour. While giving an all but complete assent, he stated that honour forbade
his confiscating the property of British merchants who had settled under his
protection. Bribes were also secretly sent to Paris with the view of
influencing the Emperor’s counsellors.
All was in
vain. Napoleon’s mind had recurred with irresistible strength to the earlier
plan of partitioning Portugal. While the appeals of the Portuguese Government
were still coming in, he instructed Duroc to confer with Izquierdo, the agent
who managed Godoy’s private
302 Napoleon's policy. Convention with Spain. [i807
concerns at
the French Court, and to accede to the plans of the Prince concerning Portugal.
In his instructions to Duroc, dated Fontainebleau, September 25, he suggested
the advisability of making the. King of Spain suzerain over Portugal, and of.
apportioning part of that kingdom to Godoy and to the Queen of Etruria (a
daughter of the House of Spain) and her-son. The. following sentence is
noteworthy : “As to the affairs of Etruria, you will make him [Izquierdo]
understand that it is very difficult for a branch of the House of Spain to
continue to be established in the middle of Italy; that this offers great
difficulties, now that the whole of Italy belongs to me, in respect of
religious, affairs, the monks, and the commerce of Leghorn, and by reason of
the absolute incapacity for self-government from which that country suffers.”
The whole letter shows how in Napoleon’s fertile brain diverse strands of
thought were by degrees worked up into a firm and definite policy. The coercion
of Portugal formed an essential part of his great fiscal design for the ruin of
England; but the hesitation of the Portuguese Prince to comply with his demand
for the confiscation of all British produce furnished an excuse for recurring
to his former design of partitioning Portugal. This expansion of the Emperor’s
Iberian policy, it will be observed, had an intimate relation to his plans for
securing complete domination in Italy in matters commercial, religious, and
political. In order to ensure free play in that peninsula for the working of
the Napoleonic system, Portugal was to be partitioned between the Queen of
Etruria, Godoy, and France. In fact, Portugal was now, like the Venetian
Republic in the year 1797, to provide means for satisfying the demands of its
more powerful neighbours and for extending the operations of Napoleon’s
statecraft.
The Spanish
Court, unaware of the dangers which attended Napoleon’s gifts, eagerly entered
into his views; and, as a, result, a secret convention was signed at
Fontainebleau on October 27. It specified that the young King of Etruria,
grandson of Charles IV of Spain, should cede that kingdom to Napoleon,
receiving in return the province of Entre Minho e Douro, with the title of King
of Northern Lusitania. A larger territory, namely, Algarve and Alemtejo, was
awarded to Godoy. The intermediate districts were not to be definitely disposed
of until the general peace; the King of Spain received the title of Protector
of the province Entre Minho e Douro. Napoleon guaranteed to him the possession of
all his Spanish lands south of the Pyrenees, and awarded to him eventually the
title of Emperor of the two Americas. A military convention of the same date
arranged for the entry into Spain of
28.000 French troops to be marched against
Lisbon, an enterprise in which they would receive the help of 11,000 Spanish
troops; while
16.000 other Spaniards were to invade the north
and south of Portugal. Another French corps of 40,000 men was to meet at
Bayonne, to be held in readiness to support the first corps if the British
threatened to attack
it;
but its entrance into Spain was made conditional on the consent of the two
contracting Powers. -
The signature
of these conventions marks a third stage in the development of Napoleon’s
Iberian policy; and those who are acquainted with the methods of his statecraft
cannot fail to notice in them the emergence of ideas which portended ruin to
the House of Spain. The removal of 27,000 Spanish regulars into Portugal, added
to that of
15,000 who were already serving under Bernadotte
in Holstein, robbed Spain of the greater part of her trained forces, and that
too at the very time when Napoleon gained the right of sending first 28,000
French troops, and eventually 40,000 more, into the Peninsula. With the fate of
Spain, however, we are here concerned only in so far as it originated in, and
was developed from, the policy agreed on at Tilsit. Enough has been said to
show that the Emperor’s Spanish policy did not spring Minerva-like from his
brain, but that it had three well-marked stages corresponding to the
opportunities furnished by the course of events.
Even before
the signature of the two conventions at Fontainebleau, Junot, the commander of
the corps at Bayonne, received imperative orders to start at once, “ in order
to forestall the English.” He therefore crossed the Bidassoa on October 19.
Despite the irregularity of his entrance into Spain, he and his men received a
warm welcome from the Spaniards, whose goodwill enabled them to march at a
rapid rate towards the Portuguese frontier. In the gorges of the border
districts beyond Almeida the corps suffered terribly from want of food, the
torrential rains of the autumn, and the badness of the mountain tracks. The
Spanish troops who accompanied them soon lost 1700 men from hunger and
sickness, or by drowning in the torrents. Still Junot struggled on, under the
stimulus of reiterated commands from Napoleon. The Emperor’s correspondence
bears witness to his eagerness on this head. It was naught to him that Portugal
had dismissed the British ambassador and declared her adhesion to the
Continental System. Junot (so Napoleon wrote on October 17, and again on the
31st) must be at Lisbon by December 1, either as a friend or an enemy to that
Court; for “ Lisbon is everything.” The letter of October 28 to General Clarke,
Minister of War, explains the ground of Napoleon’s anxiety. After stating that,
however accommodating the conduct of the Prince Regent of Portugal might be,
Junot must hurry on to the capital and make no promises, the Emperor adds: “I
wish my troops to reach Lisbon at the earliest time possible in order to
sequestrate all the English merchandise. I wish them to arrive there, if
possible as friends, in order to seize the Portuguese fleet.”
Despite the
subtlety of Napoleon and the utmost efforts of Junot’s corps, the prize
escaped. Under the pressure of urgent remonstrances from Sir Sidney Smith, then
in command of a British naval force in the Tagus, and from the British
ambassador, who had taken refuge on his
flag-ship,
the Prince Regent decided, thcragh with the utmost reluctance, to leave
Portugal and set sail for Brazil. Taking with him the archives of the State,
the treasure, the chief Ministers, courtiers, and all who specially feared the
advent of the French, he entrusted himself to the protection of Sir Sidney
Smith’s squadron (November 29). Eight Portuguese sail of the line, four
frigates, four sloops, and twenty merchantmen weighed anchor opposite the
historic quay of Belem. Thence Vasco da Gama and Cabral had set sail in happier
times on their memorable quests; but now the royal family and its most
cherished supporters made for the New World amidst signs of universal grief.
The lamentation proved to be prophetic; for this event was the precursor of
many others which finally led to the separation of Brazil from the mother-land.
Portugal, in truth, had forfeited nearly every claim to respect, except that
which is accorded to the weakness of old age. She had made no effort to
preserve her independence. When, on November 30, Junot’s van-guard neared
Lisbon, almost in time to see the Portuguese sails at the mouth of the estuary,
it was found to consist of barely 1500 foot-sore and half-famished men. Yet the
capital struck no blow to save its honour. The weakness that had crept over all
the old Governments in turn seemed to have paralysed the once hardy and
adventurous men of Estremadura. Even so* however, the escape of the Portuguese
fleet and the departure of the royal family caused Napoleon the greatest
annoyance. He had persuaded himself that the Prince Regent would not take this
desperate step, and had urged Junot to do all in his power to induce the Prince
and all those who had claims on the throne to repair to Bayonne. He also hoped
that the Russian squadron commanded by Admiral Seniavin, which was on its way
back from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, would put in at Lisbon and prevent
the escape of any Portuguese and British ships. Seniavin did arrive there; but
his squadron was overawed by that of Sir Sidney Smith, who once more stepped in
to mar the Emperor’s plans. After escorting the Portuguese fleet to sea, Smith
returned and blocked the Russian ships in the Tagus.
The
deliberations of the British Cabinet at this time are unknown ; but we may
reasonably conjecture that the capture of the Danish fleet and the prospect of
saving the Portuguese men-of-war from Napoleon’s grasp helped to strengthen
their resolve to brave the risks of open war rather than meet the uncertainties
and humiliations of a peace with Napoleon. Nevertheless, towards Russia the
British Government maintained a friendly attitude, doubtless with the hope of
dissolving the Franco-Russian alliance. It sent a conciliatory reply to the
Tsar’s offer of mediation, which was couched in terms agreed on at Tilsit. Canning
stated that his Government was willing to treat on equitable terms for so
desirable an object as a general peace, and required in turn a communication of
the secret articles signed at Tilsit as a sign of the goodwill of the Tsar’s
Government in its present proposal. In order to smooth matters,
Canning had
despatched to Leveson-Gower on August 25 full powers for the signing of a
commercial treaty with Russia, on terms favourable to that Power. This was of
no avail. The Russian Chancellor, Count Budberg, returned an evasive answer on
the subject of the secret articles signed at Tilsit. On September 1, indeed, he
admitted in an interview with Leveson-Gower that there were such articles, but
he pledged his word that they did not stipulate the closing of Russian ports to
British ships and merchandise. He added the following significant words : “ the
Continental peace cannot be of long duration; any peace with France must be
considered as a momentary respite, and by no means as affording any prospect of
permanent tranquillity; neither the French Government nor the French people is
ripe for peace; they retain too much of their revolutionary restlessness. We
must employ this moment of repose in preparing the means of resistance against
another attack.”
This was the
general opinion in Russian society. It was even more prevalent in the
mercantile classes, where the prospect of the exclusion of British commerce
caused general alarm. The policy agreed on at Tilsit was openly disapproved by
the Empress Dowager, the nobles* the clergy, and the trading classes; and
Savary, who came on a special mission to St Petersburg, soon reported that the
“ English ” party had the upper hand. The news of the bombardment of Copenhagen
caused no general resentment, being regarded as an act of timely vigour. The
Tsar, however, on September 11 entered a sharp protest against that action; and
the statement that he at the same time privately expressed his approval of it
must be dismissed as a calumny, originating in some discontented clique. He had
just dismissed the lethargic and rather Anglophil Minister Count Budberg, and
now entrusted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to Count Romanzoff, the chief
partisan of the French alliance and a firm believer in Russia’s mission to
effect the overthrow of Turkey. The new Chancellor quickened his master’s
resentment against England; but motives of policy served to postpone an open
rupture. In the first place Alexander waited to hear news that his
Mediterranean squadron, about to return to the Baltic, had reached the French
ports on the Bay of Biscay, where it would be safe from capture by the English.
There were other reasons why he should move warily in so complex a situation
and in dealing with an ally whom he secretly dreaded. By holding back part of
what Napoleon required, he would give weight to the demands of Russia. The “
English ” party at St Petersburg, however, made a false move which probably
precipitated the rupture with Great Britain. Sir Robert Wilson, an astute
intriguer, had been stirring up the old hatred felt by the Russian nobility for
France; but he was imprudent enough to introduce an English pamphlet on the
policy of Tilsit which spoke with slight respect of the Tsar. Savary was able
to present a copy of this brochure to Alexander, who at once gave orders for
the expulsion of Wilson and the removal of
Novossilzoff,
Strogonoff, and others of the English party from the capital. Doubtless, as
Lord Granville Leveson-Gower stated in his despatches, the demand of Napoleon
for a Russian declaration of war against Great Britain had also a place in
Alexander’s calculations. On November 8, when the approach of winter promised
immunity from British attacks by sea, he broke off all relations with the Court
of St James.
Next in
importance to the relations of Alexander with Great Britain were his plans with
regard to the Ottoman Empire. As has been already stated, Alexander’s desire
for conquests in Turkey had been whetted by Napoleon at Tilsit; and it was the
keystone of RomanzofFs policy to render the French alliance less unpopular by
turning Russian energies away from the campaigns in central Europe, barren
alike of glory and material reward, to those enterprises against the Turk which
had rarely failed to win glory, treasure, and broad dominions for the Muscovite
nobility. Yet, while directing the gaze of his ally toward the Balkans,
Napoleon had taken care to stipulate in the public treaty of Tilsit that
hostilities between Russia and the Sultan should cease, the troops of the
former evacuating the Danubian Provinces, which they then held, though the
Sultan was not to occupy those lands until the signature of a peace with
Russia. For the conclusion of this peace Napoleon offered his mediation, and
thus gained the right to act as arbiter in the complex disputes arising out of
the Eastern Question. By the secret articles signed at Tilsit, Alexander had
ceded to him the Seven (Ionian) Islands and the Cattaro district on the
mainland; and the occupation of these places, together with Dalmatia and Ragusa,
placed the French in possession of points of vantage on the Turkish frontier
fully equal to those which Russia held on the banks of the Dniester.
Furthermore, an article of the secret treaty of alliance specified that, if
Turkey did not accept the mediation of France, or if she failed within three
months to give effect to her promises after her peace with Russia, then France
would make common cause with Russia against the Sultan, “ in order to withdraw
from the yoke and the vexations of the Turks all the provinces of the Ottoman
Empire, except the town of Constantinople and the province of Roumelia.” It was
well known that this last clause met with opposition from Alexander at Tilsit;
for it withdrew from the sphere of Russia’s future activity the province and
city that formed the goal of her most ardent ambitions.
The Tsar
showed his ill-humour by postponing the evacuation of the Danubian Provinces.
For this conduct he had a plausible excuse. Article 4 of the public treaty of
Tilsit enjoined unconditionally the evacuation of Prussian fortresses and
districts by the French troops; but there was no sign of its approaching
fulfilment. In fact, Napoleon’s procedure in the case of Prussia betokened a
determination to keep that State wholly under his control. Alike in the
negotiations and in the Treaty of Tilsit, the case of Prussia was set over
against that of Turkey.
Napoleon
wished to partition Prussia, just as Alexander wished to annex a large part of
Turkey; and the French Emperor waived his views of aggrandisement at the time,
in consideration of similar restraint being shown by his ally and rival in the
case of Turkey. But it was not in Napoleon’s character to let Prussia escape
until he had drained away her strength. An opportunity came which promised not
only to give free play to these vampire-like methods, but also indefinitely to
prolong the French occupation.
Marshal
Kalckreuth, when negotiating the terms of the Convention of Konigsberg (July
12), for the restitution by France of the Prussian lands that she had conquered
on the east of the Elbe, was guilty of a strange inadvertence. He allowed
the'insertion of an article stipulating the restitution of these districts to
the Prussian authorities when the contributions and exactions imposed by order
of Napoleon should have been completely discharged; but he failed to secure the
insertion of a clause specifying the maximum charge. This omission gave
Napoleon the opportunity of subjecting towns and districts to exactions beyond
their powers, and thereby indefinitely postponing the time of liberation. The
Emperor’s letters leave no doubt that he was personally responsible for this
ingenious cruelty. On July 18, 1807, he wrote to General Clarke that he did not
intend to evacuate Prussia until the money should be paid; he then estimated
the amount due from Brandenburg at
80.000.000 francs. On July 22 he again wrote to Clarke
respecting the sums due from Brandenburg and Silesia, which he reckoned at more
than
120.000.000 francs. He added, “ make the provinces pay
all they can.... If we can raise this sum to 200,000,000 francs, so much the
better.” This was from a land whose revenue in 1805-6 was about 27,000,000
thalers (101,250,000 francs). With her domestic industries suffering from the
French occupation, her foreign commerce ruined by the naval war with England
consequent on the adoption of the Continental System, the mutilated Prussia of
1807 was utterly unable to meet the exactions now imposed. The same device at
once sapped her strength and cut off all hope of future deliverance, except by
a step that involved political annihilation, namely, inclusion in the
Confederation of the Rhine ; and there is every reason to believe that Napoleon
had determined to drive her to this last step. Ultimately, in March, 1808, the
sum claimed from Prussia was fixed at 112,000,000 francs; but the French
intendcmt, Daru, placed all possible difficulties in the way of the icceptance
of the sureties demanded for this sum. Even a personal appeal, which Prince
William of Prussia made to Napoleon at Paris in the spring of the year 1808,
failed to move him from his purpose. He finally replied that the evacuation of
Prussia depended solely on the other political combinations which he had in
view.
The
instructions issued on November 12, 1807, to Caulaincourt, French ambassador
designate at the Russian Court, reveal the advantages
which
Napoleon hoped to reap from his very lucrative occupation of Prussia. Seeing
that the Tsar desired to keep Moldavia and Wallachia, the French Emperor directed
Caulaincourt to offer no opposition to that plan, provided that France should
gain a part of Prussia fully equal in population and resources to those States.
If the Treaty of Tilsit were to be modified, the change must be equally to the
advantage of both the contracting Powers. If, however, the Russian Government
hinted at a partition of Turkey, with the acquisition of Bosnia and Albania by
France, Caulaincourt was to repel any such suggestion. The fall of the Ottoman
Empire was inevitable; but it was to the interest of France and Russia to
postpone its fall to a time when they could most profitably share its “ vast
d6bris,n and
when a hostile Power could not seize “ Egypt and the islands, the richest
spoils.” In any case the two contracting Powers must march at the same speed.
Napoleon declared that he would not evacuate Prussia until Alexander avowed his
intention of restoring Wallachia and Moldavia to the Sultanor he would evacuate
Prussia partially when arrangements referring to a new order of things had been
agreed on between the two Powers. A secret convention might be signed, “
interpreting ” the Treaty of Tilsit, whereby the two Powers would retain the
parts of Prussia and Turkey agreed on between them. Caulaincourt was also
charged to hold out the prospect of a joint Franco-Russian expedition against
India through Asia Minor and Persia—a topic on which instructions had been
forwarded to the French ambassador lately sent to Teheran. Russia must also be
urged to invade the Swedish dominions on the side of Finland, while a Franco-
Danish force was preparing to enter them from the west.
Such were the
instructions issued to Caulaincourt. Though Alexander, on December 20,
received that envoy with the graciousness due to his diplomatic position and to
his own estimable qualities, he did not hide his chagrin at seeing the
acquisition of the Danubian lands restricted by a condition which deeply
touched his honour. At Potsdam and Bartenstein he had taken up the role of
protector to Frederick William and Queen Louisa. Even at Tilsit he had saved
for them the province of Silesia. How could he, the chivalrous admirer of the
Prussian Queen, gain Turkish lands by a step which would entail the sacrifice,
once again, of half her dominions ? His pride revolted at so humiliating a
bargain, every suggestion of which he waved aside. In point of fact, he had
been prepared for such a proposal by the despatches of Count Tolstoi, Russian
ambassador at Paris, who on October 26 and November 22 wrote to warn the
Russian Government that Napoleon was about to compass the entire ruin of
Prussia by assigning Silesia to the duchy of Warsaw and the whole of
Brandenburg to Jerome Bonaparte’s kingdom of Westphalia. The latter statement
was probably incorrect, though there are grounds for thinking that the Emperor
had held out to his brother the prospect of reigning at Berlin.
But, whether
correct or not, Tolstoi’s despatches awakened in Alexander those suspicions of
Napoleon which he had with difficulty suppressed even at Tilsit. A time of
doubt and dexterous poising ensued on both sides. Napoleon, on finding that
Alexander was at once firmer, more astute, and more ambitious than he had at
first believed, sought to adjourn every important question to a time that would
be more favourable for France. In a postscript which he added on January 18,
1808, to a despatch for Caulaincourt, he informed him
that the present state of things suited his (Napoleon’s) wishes, and that the
question of the partition of Turkey must be deferred.
A new
situation, however, was brought about by the action of the British Government.
George III, in his speech at the opening of Parliament on January 21, announced
the firm resolution of the King and his trust in the support of the people
during the present terrible struggle. The tone cf the debates in the two Houses
was equally determined. Napoleon replied by a Note in the Moniteur, on February
% that peace would return some day, but only after events that would have
deprived England of her distant possessions, “prmcipale source de sa
richesse." This hint as to an Oriental expedition served at the same time
to threaten Great Britain with the direst losses and to hold out once more to
the Tsar the visions conjured up at Tilsit. The certainty that the war would be
fought out to the bitter end served to quicken the march of events both at
Paris and St Petersburg. It even promised to bring Austria into the
Franco-Russian coalition. Already that Power had settled the outstanding claim
of France in the convention which Mettemich, Austrian ambassador at the French
Court, signed with Champagny at Fontainebleau on October 11,1807. For the
Habsburgs that compact was little else than a series of surrenders. The
delimitation of the Austrian frontier on the south was wholly in favour of the
kingdom of Italy, the line of the river Isonzo being adjudged as the boundary
between the two States; Trieste was saved with difficulty. The Habsburgs gained
no compensations; and Mettemich suggestively remarked to Stadion that the sole
advantage conferred by that compact was that it left no question open with
Napoleon. The French, however, now evacuated Braunau on the Bavarian frontier;
and friendliness seemed to be the order of the day in Franco-Austrian
relations. Below the surface there lurked the old suspicion and fear of
Napoleon, as is seen in Mettemich’s correspondence. Nevertheless Austria
undertook to mediate with a view to peace between France and England; but,
largely owing to the opposition of Canning, her offer was firmly declined. Accordingly,
the Austrian ambassador, Count Starhemberg, left London on January 20, 1808;
and Adair closed his mission to Vienna on March 1. On February 28, 1808,
Austria adopted the Continental System.
Napoleon at
once sought to complete the isolation of Great Britain by a scheme which would
bring Austria wholly into his political system.
He sketched
the outlines of the new plan at an interview which he accorded on January
22,1808, to Mettemich. The Austrian ambassador having presented a letter
announcing the marriage of his master with the Grand Duchess Maria Ludovica
d’Este—it was his third marriage— Napoleon began to dilate upon the fatal
obstinacy of the British Cabinet, which, he said, had brought him reluctantly
to the determination to ensure the peace of the world by a step that must bring
ruin to England, namely, an Eastern expedition and the partition of the Ottoman
Empire. That event would benefit Russia more than France, who needed only “
Egypt and some colonies ”; but Austria could not stand by and see the partition
of Turkey among other Powers. The dictates of sound policy required her to
unite very closely with France in order to share the spoils. Mettemich received
the offer very guardedly, and suggested that Francis II would almost certainly
disapprove of so revolutionary a proposal, for his only desire was to maintain
peace and the status quo. Napoleon, however, believed that he could force his
hand, as Frederick II and Catharine II had forced that of Maria Theresa in the
case of Poland. That he entered eagerly into the new scheme may be seen from
two letters which he wrote to the Tsar and Caulaincourt on February 2. To his
ambassador he stated that he would gladly see Alexander conquer Sweden and take
even Stockholm itself, so as to make St Petersburg the geographical centre of
his empire. He also instructed Caulaincourt not to press for the evacuation of
the Danubian Principalities by Russia, it being understood that the French
would not leave Prussia. Above all he was to hold out the plan of an Eastern
expedition, in which from 20,000 to 25,000 Russians, from 8,000 to 10,000
Austrians, and from 35,000 to 40,000 French troops would march through Asia to
India; “nothing is so easy as this operation.” That enterprise, of course,
implied a partition of the Turkish Empire ; and, in order to arrange details,
he (Napoleon) wished to have an interview with Alexander. If the Russian
Emperor could come to Paris, it would cause him the greatest pleasure; if this
were impossible, and he could come only halfway, Caulaincourt must take his
compasses and find the middle distance. Such is the first emergence in
Napoleon’s correspondence of the plan which was to lead up to the Erfurt
interview.
Napoleon
expressed the same wishes, but more vaguely and grandiloquently k
in a letter of the same date to Alexander; he laid no stress on the help that
Austria might give, but stated that, in the space of a month after they had
come to an agreement, the French and Russian troops could be on the Bosphorus;
that by May 1 the combined armies would be campaigning in Asia, and the
Russians might be in possession of Stockholm. This letter has its theatrical
side; but there is ground for thinking that the final refusal of Great Britain
to consider Austria’s offer of mediation, together with the challenge conveyed
by the King’s speech to Parliament, now sufficed to overcome Napoleon’s
isos] Napoleon prepares for an Eastern expedition.
311
former
reluctance to an immediate partition of Turkey, and induced him to press it on
his ally with all the seductiveness that he had displayed at Tilsit. He saw in
the enterprise an opportunity, similar to that which Frederick the Great and
Catharine II had discerned in the partition of Poland, of composing the mutual
jealousies of France, Russia, and Austria. It was true that France was not so
well placed for the partition of Turkey as were Russia and Austria. But the
defects of position might be made good by a vigorous policy, even during a time
of war with Great Britain. Moreover it was clear that, if the Russians were
deeply involved in the conquest of Finland and Sweden, they could scarcely have
the upper hand in the partition of Turkey, especially if Napoleon secured the
armed help of Austria in resisting their undue preponderance in the Balkan
peninsula.
Swift as was
the transition of the Emperor’s plans, yet his correspondence during the
months of February—May, 1808, yields proof that it was decisive. He now bent
all his energies to the task of consolidating his power in the territories
which dominated the Mediterranean, namely, Corfu, Sicily, and Spain. On
February 7-8 he wrote several letters showing the importance that he attached
to Corfu and the rock of Scylla. An attack by British cruisers on Corfu would
be serious (so he wrote to King Joseph); and the loss of that island would be
the most fatal blow to his plans. At the same time he warned his brother that
the rock of Scylla, where the Bourbon garrison stoutly opposed every effort of
Joseph’s troops, was “ the most important point in the world.” It was the key
to Sicily; and the capture of Sicily (so he wrote to Deeres) would change the
face of the Mediterranean. At the same time he pressed on the occupation of
Spain by the French; and his letters of May 16-19, when he believed that affair
to be at an end, show that he valued Spain’s possessions largely because her
naval resources were now quite at his disposal “ for the common cause.” He
ordered Dupont to march straight to Cadiz in order to secure that arsenal for
France. In all the ports of France and of her vassal States, from Amsterdam to
Ancona, there reigned the greatest activity; and it is clear from Napoleon’s
letter of May 17 to Deeres that he wished to prepare for an expedition against
India at the dose of the year.
Alexander at first
responded to the appeals and projects set forth in Napoleon’s letter of
February 2. On reading it he exclaimed fervently to Caulaincourt, “ Voila le
gramd homme...c‘est le langage de Tilsit.'" He declared that he would
gladly go to Paris, did not circumstances forbid such a step. At some place,
about halfway, such as Weimar or Erfurt, he would gladly meet his ally so as to
arrange the details of the new scheme. He, however, expressed a wish to have
some preliminary understanding as to the partition of Turkey; and amidst the
discussion of details the first raptures speedily vanished. It could not escape
the notice of Alexander and Romanzoff that the gains of Russia in the south
were vague
and prospective; while Napoleon’s proposal to keep his hold on Prussia seemed
to foreshadow the annexation of that State, and possibly the reconstruction of
Poland on a larger scale by the addition of Silesian and East Prussian lands.
The partition of Turkey, however, was the question on which Caulaincourt and
Romanzoff entered into the most eager discussions. The Russian Minister
conceded to Napoleon Albania, Thessaly, Epirus, the Morea, the JEgern
Archipelago, Egypt, the chief seaports of Asia Minor—“les echelles du
Levant'"—and, perhaps, part of Syria. The French ambassador also agreed
that Russia should have Moldavia, Wallachia, part of Bulgaria, and a
considerable territory around Trebizond; but, when Romanzoff claimed Servia,
Roumelia, and Constantinople, their debates became keen, almost acrimonious.
Caulaincourt remarked that Servia lay beyond Russia’s natural sphere of
influence, and that it ought to go to Austria, or to some German prince who
might marry a Russian grand-duchess. Above all, he demurred to handing over to
Russia both Constantinople and the Dardanelles, with all the districts north of
them. Russia’s interests, retorted Romanzoff, demanded that she should hold
both the keys of the Black Sea, and not one only. In short, he claimed all the
lands east of the river Maritza. He further pointed out that the proposed joint
expedition to India would be all to the advantage of Napoleon. This drew from
Caulaincourt the question whether Russia was not at war with England; and he
asserted that the other gains of France in the East could not be securely held
unless she possessed the Dardanelles with an eastern frontier running from
Rodosto to Adrianople. To this Romanzoff replied that their interests would
then be brought frequently into opposition. It would be far preferable, he
urged, that Austria should be a buffer-state between the new dominions of
France and Russia. The views of the Tsar were now found to have widened,
probably under the influence of Romanzoff. He cared little for Trebizond; but
his mind was firmly set on the acquisition of Constantinople and the
Dardanelles. When Caulaincourt appealed to him in favour of his first proposal
respecting
Constantinople—that of making it an independent free city______
Alexander at
once replied that the plan of sending a great army to India altered matters,
and that Russia must consult her own interests before she put forth such an
effort.
In these
discussions, it is observable that French policy relegated Austria to a quite
secondary position. Part of Bosnia and Turkish Croatia, together with some
control over Servia and the north of Macedonia, would, Caulaincourt assumed,
amply satisfy her. Alexander assigned to her the coast-line west of the
Maritza, inclusive of Salonika, but only because he disliked having Napoleon as
a neighbour. The same motive also dictated RomanzofTs references to the
continued occupation of Prussia by Napoleon’s troops. Alexander clearly felt
uneasy while a large force of French troops remained near his own borders.
isos] Russian invasion of Finland.—Trouble in Spain.
318
The first
week of March, 1808, wore on amidst these discussions, which left Caulaincourt,
and through him Napoleon, with the conviction that Alexander would not move his
army towards the East until the French troops evacuated Prussia, and
Constantinople and the Dardanelles were allotted to Russia. Such was the
substance of Caulaincourt’s despatch to Napoleon of March 16. Alexander’s
letter of that date to Napoleon was of the same tenour. Two projects of
partition were drawn up, the one French, the other Russian. The acceptance of
the Russian scheme was made the condition of the Tsar’s acceptance of
Napoleon’s invitation to the interview.
If this was
the tone of Russian diplomacy when Napoleon’s Spanish enterprise seemed to be
prospering, it was certain to harden when, a few weeks later, difficulties
began to crowd upon the Emperor in the Iberian peninsula. There, the first
rumblings of popular wrath, which portended the mighty outbreak that was
shortly to follow, already made themselves heard; and, while Napoleon betook
himself to Bayonne to set the crown to his new policy, Alexander could look
with satisfaction on the progress of his arms in Finland. The Swedish King
having refused to abandon the British alliance in deference to the Russian note
of February 10, Alexander’s troops promptly invaded Finland, overcame the few
Swedish battalions encamped there, and early in March brought the fortress of
Sveaborg to capitulate. On March 26 the Tsar issued a proclamation to the
Powers, in which he spoke of Finland as a province conquered by his arms. The
phrase has a twofold interest, first, because it explains the firm and decided
tone which Russian policy then assumed towards Napoleon on the Eastern
Question; and, secondly, because it has ever since been appealed to by the
advocates of the Panslavonic programme in Finnish affairs, as justifying
subsequent measures for the abrogation of the ancient rights of the Grand
Duchy.
It may be
well to advert briefly to this question, especially as the changes that came
over the situation in Finland to some extent influenced Alexander’s relations
with Napoleon. Just as the French Emperor felt the need of modifying his plans
under the stress of events in Spain, so too Russian policy, being under the
control of a more sensitive personality, registered the changes that took
place in the campaign in Finland. There, as in Spain, the resistance did not
become serious until the regular troops were beaten back or dispersed. The
defence of the Swedish forces was tame in the extreme; but Alexander’s
reference to Finland as a conquered province cut the pride of that patriotic
people to the quick; they prepared for a national resistance, and early in the
summer inflicted several checks on the invaders. In tha.t land of forests,
lakes, and swamps, the efforts of partisan bands were no less effective than
in Spain; and Alexander soon perceived that the real conquest was still to be
effected. Prudence, therefore, as well as his own leaning towards liberalism
prescribed a more generous treatment of the Finns.
He had all along
wavered between the advice of his military men, headed by Arakcheieff, Minister
for War, and those who favoured an approach towards western democracy. The
latter party now gained his ear, and urged him to end a troublesome strife by
offering to the Finns a generous measure of autonomy. There was the more reason
for taking such a step, seeing that Napoleon had not sent the expedition
against Sweden from the west on which the Tsar had counted. In fact, a recently
published letter of Napoleon to Caulaincourt (April 26, 1808) shows that he had
enjoined on Bemadotte conditions as to the crossing of the Sound by 40,000 men
at one time, which he must have known to be impracticable. Possibly Alexander
suspected that his ally was holding back the promised help. In any case, his
attitude towards the Finnish question underwent a change. Giving up the role of
conqueror, he adopted that of conciliator; and, on June 17, 1808, issued a
declaration which promised to the Finns the enjoyment of their ancient
privileges, and the convocation of the Diet of the Grand Duchy.
The sequel is
well known, and can be only briefly described here. The resistance of the Finns
slackened; and in November, 1808, a deputation of their chief men proceeded to
St Petersburg to set forth to, the Tsar the wishes of their people. In the same
month a truce was concluded, whereby Sweden recognised the occupation of the
province of Uleaborg by the Russians. The Russian officials who administered
the Grand Duchy, Sprengtporten and Speranskii, cordially worked on behalf of
the interests of the people; and on February 1, 1809, Alexander issued an order
convoking the four Estates of the Grand Duchy at the town of Borgo. On the
opening day, March 27, he issued an Act of Guarantee in which, after stating that
the will of God had placed him in possession of the Grand Duchy, he confirmed
and sanctioned its religion and “ the fundamental laws of the country, as well
as the rights and privileges which each Order in particular, in the said Grand
Duchy, and all its inhabitants in general, both great and small, have hitherto
enjoyed by virtue of the Constitutions. We promise to maintain all these
advantages and laws in full vigour without alteration or change.” Thus did
Finland gain its first charter of freedom under the aegis of the Tsars, who
became, in a constitutional sense, Grand Dukes of Finland. Thus, also, did
Alexander avert the troubles that had threatened at the beginning of the
previous summer to weaken his position in the complex international questions
then pending.
Very
different at that time was the situation of Napoleon. While Alexander saw his
proclamation of June 17,1808, bring forth the fruits of confidence and
goodwill, the policy of Bayonne speedily produced an immeasurable harvest of
hatred and strife. The change thus brought about in Napoleon’s position is
instructively mirrored, in his correspondence. On April 29 he had told
Alexander that the revolutionary symptoms in Spain embarrassed him somewhat,
but that he would soon be
ready to
arrange “ the great affair,” that is, the partition of Turkey, with the Tsar.
On May 31 he wrote to Caulaincourt that Spanish affairs were “ entirely
finished ”; that the Spaniards were quiet and even devoted to him; and that at
any time after June 20 he would be free for the proposed interview, but it must
be without any preliminary conditions attached to it. As for Spain, his views
of that country down to the first days of June were, in the main, those of an
admiral counting up the additions which he could make to his naval resources
with a view to the great operations proposed for the following autumn and
winter. On June 3, however, he heard disquieting news from Santander,
Saragossa, and elsewhere, which caused him to announce to Alexander the postponement
of his departure from Bayonne 'for a month; though he added that after that
time he would be free for the interview. In a letter to Caulaincourt, dated
June 15, he fixed the month of September for the interview. It was not until
July 7 that he expressed to Deeres his fears that he must postpone the great
naval efforts on which he had been counting. This implied the abandonment of
all plans for the partition of Turkey and the conquest of Egypt and India. It
is significant that the news of the capitulation of Dupont at Baylen, which
reached him at Bordeaux after his return to Paris, turned his thoughts at once
to the complex international situation. In a letter to his brother Joseph he
writes: “L’Allemagne, la Pohgne, Vltalie, etc.—tout se lie.” Three days later
he sent Caulaincourt a letter, subsequently antedated July 31, stating that, as
Alexander had obliged him by recognising Joseph as King of Spain, he (Napoleon)
had given orders to close matters with Prussia, that is, to evacuate her
provinces. In another despatch of the same date he even informed Caulaincourt
that he might withdraw his troops from the duchy of Warsaw and Danzig, and
canton his army on the left bank of the Rhine. A comparison of these intentions
of Napoleon (which afterwards were modified by circumstances) with his former
designs on Prussia will serve to reveal the enormous influence which the
Spanish rising exerted on the affairs of Europe. It is not too much to say that
it saved Prussia from virtual extinction and the Turkish Empire from partition.
There was
another reason why Napoleon should now seek to conciliate Alexander by every
means in his power. The fate of the Spanish Bourbons had struck terror into the
Habsburgs. This might have been expected. The mental equipment of Francis II was
inadequate. His narrow, pedantic outlook on international affairs left him a
prey to forceful adventurers, like Thugut, or subtle trimmers such as Cobenzl.
Between their diverse lines of policy he had wavered for many years. But in one
respect his character displayed some firmness; he inherited the family pride of
the Habsburgs and their veneration for ancient dynasties. These fundamental
feelings were cut to the quick by Napoleon’s treatment of the Houses of
Braganza and Bourbon. On all sides Francis saw with bewilderment the old
landmarks vanishing—
Etruria
absorbed in the French Empire (January, 1808), and the Papal Legations annexed
to the kingdom of Italy (April, 1808). Nor were his fears laid to rest by the
invitations that came from Paris to share in the approaching partition of the
Turkish Empire. While Napoleon’s legions held Silesia, the duchy of Warsaw, and
Dalmatia, Austria could expect but scant consideration either at his hands or
at those of the Tsar, whom she had neglected to help in the spring of 1807.
Having broken with England, the Habsburgs saw themselves utterly isolated. One
source of hope alone remained—to trust the loyalty and devotion of their still
numerous subjects, thoroughly to reform the administration, and to arm against
all contingencies.
This was the
advice of Stadion, the bold and enlightened minister who then held the
portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The result was the decree of June 9, 1808,
ordering the incorporation in a national Landwehr of all able-bodied men from
eighteen to twenty-five years of age who were not serving in the regular army.
The decree aroused an amount of enthusiasm almost unparalleled in the history
of the Habsburg States. In truth the people were weary of surrenders to
Napoleon, and chafed under the burdens imposed by the Continental System. They
therefore gladly answered the summons; and their zest for military service was
heightened by the news of the French disaster at Baylen.
Napoleon was
at first perplexed by Austria’s action. With his usual proncncss to exaggerate
the importance of material gains, he failed to see why the plan of a joint
partition of Turkey should not bring the Habsburg Power wholly to his side.
Thereafter he decided quite correctly that its armaments were due solely to
fear. Yet he did nothing to allay Austrian alarms. On August 15, at the first
reception of the diplomatic circle held after his return from Bayonne, he
reproached Mettemich with Austria’s armaments, asserting that they must be set
on foot either to attack or to intimidate France; that he (Napoleon) would
retort by arming the Confederation of the Rhine and beginning a war which would
be war to the death. The present conduct of Austria would induce the Emperor of
Russia to declare that those armaments must cease; and, he added, if Russia
became the arbiter in this matter, “I will no longer admit you to the future
settlement of many questions in which you are interested.” This reference to
the Eastern Question, uttered in presence of the Turkish ambassador, alarmed
everyone and reacted unfavourably on the Bourse. The bad impression thus caused
was not removed even by a friendly explanation which he privately accorded to
Mettemich ten days later. The tirade of August 15 was remembered as a notorious
instance of Napoleon’s ineradicable bias in favour of physical compulsion. This
mental characteristic of his was well described by Tolstoi, Russian ambassador
at Paris, in his despatch of August 7 to his master • “ It is only conduct that
is simple and open but firm and resolute* and that rests on
adequate
military force, which has any effect on this sovereign. Every concession begets
in him the desire for further concessions.” The Court of Vienna had discerned
the same truth. Indeed, under the pressure of Napoleon’s supremacy, the
statesmen of St Petersburg now saw the need of safeguarding the interests of
the only State that stood between them and the conqueror of the West. The
policy of balance maintained by Alexander with so much skill at Erfurt was but
the expression of a truth the importance of which had already been recognised
by every intelligent diplomatist on the Continent. The utmost length to which
the Tsar would go in the way of coercing Austria was a suggestion which he made
in a despatch of September 5 to Kurakin, his ambassador at that Court, as to
the advisability of her remaining a passive spectator of the war in Spain;
otherwise Napoleon might decide to fall upon the Habsburgs before entering on
the Peninsular War. “ There will always be time,” he added, “to adopt
afterwards the course that circumstances will then suggest. By following this
line of conduct, Austria would save me the painful necessity, of taking sides
against her, for I am bound to that course only when she shall attack.” It
would be difficult to judge from this language whether Alexander was an ally of
Napoleon or of Francis II.
In vain,
also, did Caulaincourt press on the Tsar the need of speaking firmly to Austria
about her armaments, if he wished to see Napoleon evacuate Prussia. That wish
lay near to Alexander’s heart; but he came to believe that the evacuation would
take place owing to the urgent needs of the Spanish campaign. While, therefore,
he warmly approved Napoleon’s offer to free large parts of Prussia from the
crushing burdens of the military occupation, he now did little to press for its
fulfilment. He preferred to wait upon the logic of events. This passivity
seemed about to be justified. As has been stated, the news of the French
surrender at Baylen induced Napoleon to offer to arrange matters with Frederick
William. Accordingly, negotiations began with a view to the evacuation of part
at least of Prussian territory. They failed owing to an untimely incident, the
capture of a letter written by Stein on August 15, in which that statesman
imprudently referred to a war between France and Austria as inevitable, and
cited the events in Spain as proofs of what a courageous nation could do. The
influence of this letter on the fortunes of Stein and of the German national
movement will be referred to later in this chapter. Here we must notice that
its effect on the negotiations between Napoleon and Prussia was equally
disastrous. It enabled the conqueror to tighten his grip on Prussia and to
raise his pecuniary demands. In the month of March, 1808, as has been stated
above, he fixed 112,000,000 francs as the price of evacuation; now, after his
army had lived on the country six more months, he raised the sum to 154,000,000
francs. After vigorous protests from Prince William of Prussia this was reduced
to
318 Napoleon’s general position impaired. [isos
140,000,000
francs by a convention signed at Paris on September 8, which stipulated that
Glogau, Kustrin, and Stettin should be handed over to the Prussian troops on
the discharge of that sum. The convention, besides limiting the Prussian army
to 42,000 men, imposed other humiliating conditions, the result being that the
King sent Prince William to the conferences at Erfurt in the hope of securing
some alleviation of the trials of Prussia. The hope was a vain one. Napoleon’s
irritation at the close of his interviews with the Tsar led to further
tergiversations. The three fortresses were not evacuated, and more exactions
and insults were heaped upon Prussia.
In the month
of September, 1808, the arrangements foi the interview at Erfurt neared
completion. So far back as the third week of May, Alexander had announced to
Caulaincourt that he accepted Napoleon’s invitation without insisting on any
preliminary understanding on the Eastern Question. Events proved that this
concession on his part was premature, but at that time the campaign, in Finland
was beginning to take a sinister turn; and the shadow of the Spanish troubles
had not as yet dimmed the lustre of Napoleon’s glory. To the Erfurt interview,
then, both monarchs came untrammelled by conditions, a fact which greatly
favoured Napoleon’s diplomacy; but, while the French Emperor had gained in
regard to diplomatic procedure, he had lost in the sphere of practical
politics. The Spanish difficulty clogged his efforts at every turn, and still
more so when, after the middle of September, the news of the Convention of
Cintra filtered through to the chanceries of central Europe. After this second
blow he could no longer dictate his terms as to Constantinople, the
Dardanelles, Prussia, and Austria; he came almost as a suppliant for the good
services of the Tsar. Not that he adopted the role of a suppliant. Such a part
consorted ill with his temperament, and still worse with his diplomatic
methods; but the word expresses his position amidst the complex play of
world-forces. He no longer controlled them; he seemed on the point of being
whirled into their vortex. Affairs in Spain called for his undivided attention;
yet Austria’s armaments held fast no small part of his available forces in
central Europe; and no one but the Tsar could end this exasperating situation.
The role of arbiter which Napoleon had so triumphantly played at Tilsit passed
to Alexander at Erfurt; and both men knew it.
Everything
turned, then, on the ability of Napoleon to fascinate his rival by the display
of that personal and political witchery which had been so effective on the
banks of the Niemen. External circumstances promised to favour him. The old
Thuringian city itself appealed to the historic imagination of the Tsar. The
sight of the crowds of vassal Princes and nobles of Germany side by side with
the diplomatists of Europe compelled admiration for the genius and power of the
modern Charlemagne. Erfurt had passed into his hands after the battle of
isos] Congress of Erfurt. The Eastern Question. 319
Jena; the
choicest of the French regiments now formed the garrison under the command of
Oudinot. Architects had been called in to beautify the chief buildings of the
city in accordance with the pseudo- classical fashion of the time; and the
handsomest if not the ablest artistes of the Theatre Frangais came in the
conqueror’s train in order to represent appropriate dramas before the two
Emperors and a parterre of Kings. The arrival of the chief potentates on
September 27 was the signal for a series of receptions and spectacles of
unequalled brilliance. The charms of intellectual converse were not wanting. In
a brief visit to Weimar, in the middle of the conferences, the two Emperors saw
Goethe and Wieland. Napoleon discussed literary topics with the former, and
urged him to fix his abode at Paris, where he would find an adequate sphere for
his powers. With Wieland the Emperor engaged in brilliant sallies, depreciating
the genius of Tacitus and decrying his judgments on the Roman Emperors.
All this was
but the scenic setting designed to dazzle Alexander, and to beget in him that
acquiescent mood so needful for the success of Napoleon’s designs. The task
proved to be unexpectedly difficult. The splendour of the reception could not
blind Alexander to the fact that the divergence of French and Russian policy
was all but irreconcilable. The Tsar came to Erfurt with the hope that the
embarrassments of France would enable him to press on a solution of the Eastern
Question entirely favourable to Russia. Napoleon, on the other hand, had
recurred to his previous resolve to postpone that question until Spain and
Sicily became naval bases that would assure to him the complete command of the
Mediterranean. Their views were no less sharply opposed with regard to the
armaments of Austria and the continued occupation of the fortresses of the Oder
by Napoleon’s troops. Diplomatic skirmishing on these questions preluded
serious and prolonged struggles, all of which served to convince Napoleon that
the Tsar was no longer in that frame of mind which had rendered him so open to
fascination at Tilsit. In vain did he now seek to bend him in compliance with
his aims. Alexander replied but briefly to the disquisitions of his host, and
maintained his position with a quiet obstinacy against which arguments,
seductive offers, flights of imaginative statecraft, and threats were equally
futile.
Their
discussions respecting the Eastern Question are not fully known. It is dear,
however, that Alexander agreed, or seemed to agree, to a postponement of the
scheme in its larger issues. Napoleon had placed his finger on the central
point of the whole problem in the conduding words of his letter of May 31 to
Caulaincourt: “ The fundamental part of the great question is always this—Who
shall have Constantinople ? ” That question remained unsolved by the interviews
at Erfurt. The arguments of Romanzoff, who was most eager to show his
countrymen some tangible gain from the French alliance, barely availed to
secure
320
Napoleon, Alexander and Austria.
Napoleon’s
reluctant consent to the acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russia; and
even this was to be deferred, lest, in the present uncertain situation at
Constantinople, the Sultan should decide to throw himself into the arms of
England. If the Sultan made war on Russia, France was not to take part in it.
France and Russia also agreed to maintain the remaining possessions of the
Sultan. If Austria attacked France, Russia was to make common cause with the
latter. Finland was definitely assigned to Russia. Clauses to this effect were
included in the convention signed at Erfurt on October 12, whereby the Emperors
renewed the alliance concerted at Tilsit.
Disappointed
in his hopes of acquiring Constantinople and the Dardanelles, Alexander felt
the less inclination to support Napoleon in any j reposal to coerce or
humiliate Austria, Thanks to the Spanish rising, and to Mettemich’s astute
diplomacy at Paris, which had the tacit support of Tolstoi, Talleyrand, and
Fouche, the Erfurt interview had no terrors for the Habsburgs. Talleyrand
strongly advised that the Emperor Francis should present himself at Erfurt to
defend in person the interests of his realm. Fearing, perhaps, to compromise
his dignity at the congtess, that monarch despatched a special envoy, Baron
Vincent, as bearer of a conciliatory letter to Napoleon. The French Emperor
received it coldly (September 28). His distrust of Austria redoubled after
reading a despatch of Andreossy, French ambassador at Vienna, describing the
conduct of that Court in the most hostile terms. “ I understand now,” exclaimed
Napoleon, “ why the Emperor did not come; it is difficult for a sovereign to
lie to my face; he has devolved that task on M. de Vincent.” A joint
Franco-Russian note to Austria seemed now to be imperatively needed. But on
that day Talleyrand (whose presence at Erfurt must be pronounced a strange
blunder on Napoleon’s part) had seen the Tsar and pointed out the need of
supporting the European system, of which Austria was the pivot. The advice
entirely coincided with that of Tolstoi and, indeed, with Alexander’s inmost
convictions. In vain, then, did Napoleon point out to the Tsar in successive
interviews that the disarmament of Austria could alone guarantee central Europe
against war and quench the hopes of cementing a future coalition that still
were cherished at London. Alexander saw the need of supporting the
buffer-state, and firmly declined to participate in any summons for its
disarmament. Repulsed on this side, Napoleon refused to listen to Alexander’s
pleadings on behalf of Prussia. How could France evacuate the valley of the
Oder, he exclaimed, if Austria were to be free to continue her preparations ?
If Alexander insisted on the evacuation, he (Napoleon) would at once fight out
his quarrel with Austria before sending more of his troops into Spain. This
threat sufficed to bring about compromise. Napoleon promised to evacuate the
fortresses of the Oder, while Alexander definitely undertook to help France if
Austria should throw down the gauntlet.
The final
proceeding at Erfurt was the despatch by the two Emperors of a letter, dated
October 12, to George III, in which they begged him to accord peace to the
world and “to guarantee all the Powers then existing ”; they also warned him
that in the contrary case still greater :hanges would take place, all of them
opposed to the interests of . Great Britain. An accompanying despatch contained
the offer to treat on the basis of uti possidetis, and of reciprocity and
equality. These vague expressions must be interpreted in the light of the then
secret Franco- Russian convention of October 12, which, as noted before,
stipulated that Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia should count as already
belonging to Russia. Though unaware of the exact meaning of the phrase cited
above, Canning replied on October 28 that Great Britain had always striven for
a general peace on equitable terms, but that no such terms had yet been
offered; that his Britannic Majesty was now united by treaty with the Crown of
Portugal and with his Sicilian Majesty; that with the Spanish nation he had
engagements which were no less sacred than those resulting from the most solemn
treaties; and that these engagements must be respected in any ensuing
negotiations. On November 28 Romanzoff replied that Russia would recognise the
envoys of the Kings, but could not admit those of the Spanist insurgents. On
the same day Champagny refused to admit the Spanish insurgents to the
negotiations, or the envoys of “ the King who reigns in Brazil, the King who
reigns in Sicily, or the King who reigns in Sweden.” This brought a reply from
Canning to Champagny, dated December 9, stating that the refusal to admit the
Government acting on behalf of Ferdinand VII of Spain must be regarded as
ending the negotiations for peace.
The chief
practical results, then, of the Erfurt interview were the continuance of the
Franco-Russian alliance, though on somewhat strained terms; Napoleon’s
reluctant concession of the Danubian Principalities to Russia; the prolongation
of the time of immunity for Austria; and the assurance of Russia’s triumph over
Sweden.
It will be
well briefly to review here the course of Swedish affairs from the beginning of
the war of the Third Coalition down to the deposition of Gustavus IV and the
choice of Marshal Bemadotte as Prince Royal, No monarch had striven so
zealously and persistently against the French Republic and Empire as Gustavus
IV. Hereditary instincts and the events of his early life conspired to make him
a champion of legitimacy. During the period following the Peace of Amiens he
spent many months in Germany, seeking, in concert with other sovereigns and
with Drake at Munich, to form a new league against France. After the execution
of the Due d’Enghien, the young monarch felt for the author of that crime a
hatred as intense as that which his father had nursed against the Revolution.
His advisers saw with concern the growth of the same characteristics that had
brought Gustavus III to his doom—a quixotic generosity unbalanced by prudence
or kingly
regard for the vital interests of his own people, undue haste in arriving at
decisions and extreme obstinacy in adhering to them, proneness to contradict
or thwart his advisers, and slowness in healing the wounds that his vanity or
heedlessness inflicted. At a critical time in the formation of the Third
Coalition he impeded the negotiations by demanding an exorbitant subsidy from
Great Britain in return for a small contingent, and by sending back to Berlin
the decoration of the Order of the Black Eagle, because Frederick William had
conferred it on Napoleon. With such a sovereign accord was difficult and
friction inevitable.
The
ignominious end of his Pomeranian expedition in 1807 caused great discontent
among his people. Nevertheless, the attack made by Russia on Finland in the
following spring kindled anew their martial ardour. They gladly responded to
the appeals of their monarch and furnished considerable forces. Had Gustavus
put himself at their head and won credit, if not victory, in the field, the
loss of the Grand Duchy would have been less keenly felt; but he remained at
Stockholm and drew up an ineffective plan of campaign, which left the Swedes in
small bodies to be crushed in detail. Little use was made of the patriotic
ardour of the Finns; and, by the close of the year, the Swedes had virtually
lost their hold on the country. In making preparation to withstand the Danish
and Franco-Spanish forces that then threatened his western and southern
borders, Gustavus revealed his incompetence as a commander and his captiousness
as a man. On the arrival of General Moore at Goteborg with a British force of
10,000 men, the King insisted on the adoption of offensive measures which were
quite incompatible with the orders of the British Government. When Moore
represented this in the course of interviews at Stockholm, the King heaped
reproaches on him, and for a time placed him under arrest (May—June). Moore,
however, managed to escape and sailed away with his whole force. Nevertheless
the sequel showed that Sweden had little to fear on this side. Bernadotte had a
force of French, Spaniards, and Dutch, about 35,000 strong, in Jutland and the
Danish islands; but Napoleon, as has been stated above, had no longer any
interest in pressing Sweden hard, and sent orders which practically tied his
Marshal’s hand. Romana’s corps of 14,000 Spaniards also became increasingly
restive as the news from Spain began to filter through; and their wish to
escape from the grip of the conqueror became a fixed resolve when the British
authorities succeeded in sending a priest in disguise to inform them of the
successful rising of their countrymen. They determined to flee as soon as ships
could be sent by the British admiral, Keats. Meeting the guile of Bayonne by
guile of his own, Romana duped Bernadotte and finally succeeded in escaping
from the archipelago with some 9000 men on British ships; the rest of the
Spaniards were disarmed by Bernadotte or by the Danes (August).
Nevertheless,
Gustavus failed to stem the tide of Russian conquest on the east. During the
winter of 1807-8 the Muscovites made good their
hold on
Finland, and finally by a daring march over the ice succeeded in seizing the
Aland Isles. The Swedes were now at the end of their resources. A malignant
fever had raged among the crews of their fleet during an expedition to the
Livonian coast; and few ships cr men remained for the defence of Stockholm. The
deep-seated discontent of the nobles had now spread to the army and the trading
classes; and, when Gustavus persisted in warlike efforts that transcended his
abilities, the movement that aimed at his dethronement assumed national proportions.
At length General Adlersparre, commander of the Swedish army of the west,
marched to Stockholm and compelled the King to abdicate (March 29, 1809). On
May 10 the Estates of Sweden confirmed this action, and called to the throne
the Duke of Sudermania, with the title of Charles XIII. A change soon took
place in the constitution, the Estates regaining the control which they had
lost in 1789, and declaring their right to meet every five years, even if the
monarch did not summon them. Charles XIII being advanced in years and having no
son, the Estates recognised, as his heir and successor, Prince Christian
Augustus of Augustenburg, a connexion of the Danish House. These events
facilitated the signature of peace. On September 17 Charles XIII came to terms
with Russia in the Treaty of Frederikshamn, whereby he ceded Finland to that
Power. In December, 1809, the Treaty of Jonkoping closed the war with Denmark;
and on January 6, 1810, the Swedish envoy signed at Paris a treaty with France,
recognising the adoption of the Continental System by his Government, and the
exclusion of British ships and merchandise, with a reservation in favour of the
unrestricted importation of salt. In return Napoleon restored to Sweden her
province of Pomerania and the island of Riigen.
A
fatal accident to Prince Christian during a fit of apoplexy (May 28) once more
raised the question of the succession to the throne, and that in a threatening
manner. Count Fersen, who was unjustly suspected of complicity in the accident,
met his death at the hands of the populace in Stockholm. In these untoward
circumstances, the Swedish Diet looked round for a man of firm yet conciliatory
character who would guarantee Sweden against troubles within and war from
without. Charles XIII, in his perplexity, wrote to Napoleon, who urged the
claims of the King of Denmark to the Swedish crown. That monarch was, however,
known to be unpopular in Sweden; and nothing came of the suggestion. Charles
XIII wished for the nomination of the younger brother of the deceased Prince
Royal; but he declined the honour. In truth, the majority of the nobles and of
the people wished for a man of wider influence and greater governing powers.
Who could reconcile the claims of peace, order, and national prestige so well
as one of Napoleon’s marshals? It so happened that, in the transactions which Swedish
envoys had had with the French forces in Denmark and Holstein during the late
war and the overtures for an armistice at its close, they had ch. xi. 21—2
324 Bemadotte Prince Royal of Sweden. [isos-io
been greatly
impressed by the personality of Bemadotte. His tall frame and martial bearing,
the combination of vigour and courtesy in his speech and demeanour, and the
fairness that had marked his dealings with the people of Hamburg and Holstein,
alike served to inspire respect and esteem. His reputation spread across the
Sound; and a few influential men called for him in preference to one of the
less known of Napoleon’s paladins. Finally Charles XIII and the Diet convoked
at Orebro decided to recognise Bemadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, as heir to the
Swedish throne (August 18, 1810).
Bemadotte
signified his willingness to accept the honour if Napoleon accorded his
permission. The request surprised the Emperor and placed him in a difficult
position. Bemadotte was related to Joseph Bonaparte by marriage, having wedded
his sister-in-law; but Napoleon always manifested a dislike for the tall
Gascon. In 1803 he had sought to remove him to the United States as ambassador;
after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena he unjustly accused him of slackness
in the handling of his corps; and now he was on the point of sending him away
to Rome as governor of that city, when the unexpected request came from
Stockholm. To the Princess of Ponte Corvo he wrote on September 6 in cordial
terms; but four days later he sent to the Prince a curt note (which has been
greatly altered in the official Correspondance) signifying that letters-patent
were being drawn up to enable him to become a Swede, with a restriction
superadded binding him never to bear arms against France. As in duty bound, the
Prince Royal declined to fetter his future action or that of his prospective
subjects, and resigned his claims on the principality of Ponte Corvo, receiving
12,000 francs income in lieu of it. In this grudging fashion did Napoleon
recognise the installation of a new royal family in Sweden.
The
ignominious collapse of the old royal House of Sweden afforded one more proof
of the weakness of the traditional monarchies of Europe. In nearly every case
their rulers showed signs of mental instability or even of actual aberration, a
sure proof of the exhaustion of the stock or at least of its incapacity to
withstand the strain of the new environment. Only in one State did the monarch
take to heart the teachings of adversity, and allow his ablest advisers to
mould the national polity in accordance with the manifest needs of the age.
That State was the one which underwent the completest overthrow, but in the
depths of its humiliation found the means of winning its way back to more than
all its former glory. In truth, the regeneration of Prussia was due, not so
much to the monarch whose mistaken policy brought her to that dire pass, but to
certain of the leading men of Germany, whose instincts prompted them to offer
their mental and administrative gifts on behalf of the one polity that could be
called a national German State.
Never was
there a sharper contrast between the actual and the potential in any
commonwealth than in the Prussia of 1808-10. The
efforts of
the Tsar at Erfurt had failed to secure the removal of the French garrisons
from the three chief fortresses of the Oder; the utmost that he could wring
from his ally was a slight reduction in the French indemnity. As a set-off to
this, heavier terms were imposed for the provisioning of the French garrisons
in these fortresses; and certain claims, urged by the duchy of Warsaw in regard
to frontier questions and the confiscation of the property of Prussians in that
duchy, were driven home by the French authorities and the King of Saxony with a
perfidy and brutality almost past belief. The total of the contributions
exacted by the French from Prussia itself has been reckoned at
601,227,000 francs; Duncker estimates it at not less
than a milliard. The bonds of the Continental System were drawn tighter every
year, to the practical extinction of Prussia’s maritime trade.
But, while
Napoleon and his satraps were ruthlessly endeavouring to complete the ruin of
Prussia, the mind of Germany earnestly bent itself to the work of endowing her
with fresh vitality. Foremost among those who pointed the way to new sources of
hope and strength was the philosopher Fichte. As the seer of the new national
movement, Fichte deserves as much attention as is usually bestowed on agents of
destruction. Bom in a village of Upper Lusatia, in 1762, he received University
training at Jena; thereafter he lived for some time at Zurich; but he found the
chief inspiration of his life, as was the case with so many other thinkers, in
Kant’s philosophy and in the stem ideal of duty which it set forth. He became
professor of philosophy at Jena, but vacating his chair in 1799, owing to a
charge of heterodoxy, he settled at Berlin. After a time of absence from that
capital, mainly due to the political troubles of the subsequent years, he
returned thither and expounded to the citizens of the ruined State the ideal
of civic duty which he owed ultimately to the teaching of Kant. Rejecting the
unpractical cosmopolitanism of his earlier years, he now pleaded for a revival
of patriotism of an intelligent but enthusiastic type.
Fichte began
his course of lectures, entitled Reden an die deutsche Nation, at the close of
the year 1807, when the French troops garrisoned the capital. In the earlier
Addresses he pleaded for an enlightened system of education, which, lifting its
pupils above the selfish pursuit of petty interests, should inspire them with a
noble zeal for the common welfare. Selfishness and particularism, he claimed,
had ruirfed Germany; only the adoption of a national system of education could
cure these deep-seated evils and inspire the people, irrespective of class and
creed, with a love for the whole German race. In the Ninth Address he pointed
to Pestalozzi’s methods as affording practical means of instituting a fresh and
vitalising education, and expressed the hope that the State would apply it to
the training of the young of all classes. Next, referring to the idea of the
nation, he claimed that it must take precedence over that of the State; it must
lead the patriot to devote himself and all his powers and
326
Effects of Fichte?s appeal. Prussian education. [1807-9
belongings to
the public weal, and to offer up his life, if necessary, so that the nation,
the one enduring entity here below, may live on. In other Addresses he pointed
out what Germans had achieved in time past under the stimulus of patriotism,
and besought the people to prepare to show themselves worthy of their sires.
The language
of the Addresses was too academic to produce any wide impression at the time.
Even so, considering Napoleon’s dread of the principle of German nationality,
it is strange that he did not accord to Fichte the doom meted out to Palm for a
much slighter offence. However we may explain this riddle, certain it is that
the appeal struck home, when, shortly after the delivery of the Addresses, the
Spaniards showed what a people in arms could effect. The events at Saragossa
and Baylen seemed to bring Fichte’s plea within the range of practicality;
while, on the other hand, its connexion with religion, ethics, and history gave
an intellectual basis to the national movement in Germany which was utterly
wanting in that of Spain. The contrast between the sudden instinctive outburst
of passion and outraged pride in the Iberian peninsula and the methodical and
intellectual preparation now adopted by the German patriots goes far to
explain, on the one hand, the barrenness of the Spanish movement, and, on the
other, the harvest of mental and civic results with which modem Germany has
enriched the life of central Europe.
In one
direction Fichte’s appeals had a speedy and noteworthy effect. The leading men
of Prussia had been impressed by the mental apathy which followed the collapse
at Jena-Auerstadt. When fortresses surrendered to small bodies of cavalry,
something was clearly wrong with the moral of the people; and, in the days of
despair that followed, every thinking man saw the need of building up the
nation’s life from the very foundations. As a system of national education
promised to quicken the torpid circulation of Prussia, men were appointed to
study the question. Some of them visited Pestalozzi’s school at Yverdun, and
brought back a report favourable in the main. Zeller, an enthusiastic disciple
of the Swiss reformer, started a Normal School in Konigsberg on Pestalozzian
lines, which ultimately gained the approval of the King. German method
subsequently improved on the somewhat fantastic ideas and crude procedure of
the seer, so that eventually his system became fruitful of good in primary
education. Equally important and more immediately effective was the reform of
the gymnasia or higher schools. The teaching hitherto had been for the most
part lax, one-sided, and unpractical. But when, early in 1809, Wilhelm von
Humboldt was appointed to the Ministry of Public Instruction, the whole system
speedily felt the influence of his learning, enthusiasm, and organising power.
Not that the subjects of education were greatly altered; in the gymnasia of
Prussia, as in the lycees of Napoleon, the classics still held the first place.
The influence of Wolf and Niebuhr forbade the extensive
intrusion of
“ modem ” and “ practical ” subjects; but the change in spirit and in
thoroughness of work was profound.
Most
important of all, perhaps, was the establishment of the Universities of Berlin
and Breslau. This new development, which for the first time brought culture
into close touch with public life, resulted from the political changes of the
year 1807. Until that time, Prussia possessed three Universities, Konigsberg,
Frankfort on the Oder, and Halle, besides two smaller ones; but the terms of
the Treaty of Tilsit robbed her of Halle. Two of the Halle professors went at
once to Memel and begged the King to establish a Hochschule in Berlin. An order
of the Cabinet appeared in September, 1807, declaring the need of founding an
institution which should take the place formerly held by Halle. Konigsberg was
too remote, and Frankfort on the Oder too poor, to provide the means of culture
for the central parts of the monarchy. Circumstances therefore pointed to
Berlin; but action was delayed, at first, because Stein was reluctant to expose
a large number of students to the moral temptations of the capital, and
subsequently because Humboldt feared the benumbing influence of the governing
circles and the military caste at Berlin. As the work of national regeneration
proceeded, the advantages of Berlin were seen to outweigh these objections,
Humboldt himself finally declaring that the contact between learned men and the
official and military classes must prove “intellectually refreshing, thought-
awakening, and naturally elevating ” to the latter. Humboldt’s report,
conceived in this spirit, was published in May, 1809; and three months later
appeared an Order of Cabinet assigning to the proposed University the palace of
Prince Henry of Prussia at Berlin and a state subvention of 150,000 thalers
(<£*27,500) per annum. Fichte expressed the general feeling in his statement
that this action was “ the highest example of a practical respect for science
and thought ever afforded by a State; for it was given during a time of the
direst oppression, and under the greatest financial difficulties. It was not an
occasion of display or elegance that was sought for, but an instrument for
giving new health and vigour to the nation.” Steffens, professor of physics at
Breslau, also wrote that such liberality would never have been shown in the old
days, had any request been made to remedy the miserable condition of the
University of Halle. Despite the poverty of the young institution, illustrious
men gave their services from the outset—Fichte for philosophy, Schmalz (first
Rector) and Savigny for jurisprudence, Schleiermacher for theology, Wolf and
Buttmann for classics and antiquity, Niebuhr for history, and many others. In
the opening year 1810-11 as many as 458 students matriculated; and a proof of
the patriotic spirit kindled and sustained by the new seat of learning was to
be seen in the ardour with which professors and students rushed to arms in
1813.
The University
of Breslau took its present form in the year 1811, when the old University of
Frankfort on the Oder was incorporated with
328
The University of Breslau.—The Tugendbund. [18O8-11
the Roman
Catholic College established by the Emperor Leopold I at Breslau in 1702. The
new institution attracted less attention and fewer students than that of
Berlin; but it served to further the work of permeating the mass of the people
with the higher ideals of culture and civic duty which Fichte set forth in his
inspiring phrase, “ The blossoming of the eternal and the divine in the
world.” On all sides the conviction spread that, if Prussia was to rise from
her prostration, it must be accomplished (in the words of Steffens) “ not by
physical but by moral force.” A conviction of this truth appealed to the ideal
element then so powerful in the thought of Germany, and drew able men from the
west to aid in the regeneration of the one national State left amidst the ruins
of the old political system. It is noteworthy that among the men who helped to
raise Prussia from her ruins very few were bom in that realm. Stein was a
Rhinelander, educated in Hanover; Hardenberg and Schamhorst were Hanoverians;
Niebuhr was partly of Danish, partly of Hanoverian descent; Bliicher came from
Mecklenburg; Arndt from Riigen; Gneisenau and Fichte were Saxons; but the new
national instinct of Germany bound the feelings of all of them indissolubly to
Prussia in the time of her overthrow.
The same
instinct, itself an outcome of German idealism, also led to the formation at
Konigsberg of the Moral and Scientific Union, popularly known as the Tugendbund
(June, 1808). Among its founders were Professors Krug, Bardeleben, and Barsch.
The King, during his long residence at Konigsberg, came to have more sympathy
with the cultured classes, among whom the influence of Kant was still powerful
for good; and probably this explains the carefully guarded approval which he
bestowed on this society for “the revival of morality, religion, serious taste,
and public spirit,” so long as it did not interfere in the domain of politics
and administration. Most public men, however, Stein included, refused to enrol
themselves in its ranks, regarding its aims as unpractical and visionary. Apart
from its praiseworthy efforts in the direction of moral revival, the Tugendbund
probably had. far less direct influence on the course of events than has
generally been claimed for it; it was declared illegal in 1809, but continued
to work through secret agencies. Stein compared the anti-Gallic fuiy of its
members to “the rage of dreaming sheep.” It is, however, one of the weaknesses
of practical statesmen that they are apt to undervalue influences which cannot
be weighed in political scales; and it is improbable that that great class of
quiet people, who before 1808 knew and cared nothing about public affairs,
would have dared and achieved the mighty tasks of the year 1813, had they been
merely passive material moulded by the efforts of legislators and organisers.
Only by the infusion of moral enthusiasm into a new and skilfully devised
polity could Prussia have acquired the strength and the tenacity of purpose
displayed in the War of Liberation.
The first
place among the men to whom Prussia owes the revival of
«
1757-1807]
Marly life of Stein. His rise to power. 329
her powers
must be accorded to Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Freiherr vom und zum Stein
(1757-1831). The scion of an old family of Imperial Knights in the valley of
the Lahn, he early showed signs of a strong practical capacity far in excess of
the average of his class. At the University of Gottingen he learnt to
appreciate the merits of British institutions; and probably it was the study of
them, as well as the sternly positive bent of his nature, that intensified his
distaste for the pedantries of the Imperial Courts, amidst which his lot was
subsequently cast. In 1780 the’ fame of Frederick the Great induced him to
enter the Prussian service; and for some years he served in the administration
of mines and manufactures in the King’s Westphalian lands. A diplomatic mission
to Mainz in 1785 and travels in England in 1786-7 extended his knowledge of men
and affairs; but it was not until the year 1804 that he held office at Berlin
as Minister of State for Trade. In this position he firmly withstood the
degrading foreign policy of Haugwitz, but found all struggles against it
thwarted by the Cabinet. After the disaster at Jena, when Haugwitz was
suffering from a sharp attack of gout, the King offered to Stein the portfolio
of Foreign Affairs; but Stein declined on the ground of his incompetence for
the position and his desire to see a change of system. In reality he wished to
see the appointment of Hardenberg, the most outspoken opponent of France, and
the complete abolition of the irresponsible Cabinet. In vain did the King
propose a compromise on the latter point and persist in his exclusion of
Hardenberg. Stein was equally obstinate and somewhat overstepped the bounds of
etiquette in his letters to the King. Finally Frederick William, shortly before
the hurried retreat of the royal family from Konigsberg to Memel, dismissed
him, adding that he was “ a refractory, insolent, obstinate, and disobedient
official, who, proud of his genius and talents, far from regarding the good of
the State, guided partly by caprice, acts from passion and from personal hatred
and rancour” (January 3, 1807). For a time Stein passed into retirement. In the
month of April, 1807, Frederick William was constrained to entrust to
Hardenberg the ministry of Foreign Affairs, with powers which foreshadowed
those of a chief of a responsible Cabinet. When the negotiations at Tilsit
began, Napoleon refused to negotiate through Hardenberg, on the ground that he
was a Hanoverian and very English in sympathy; he also named Stein among the
three men whom he would gladly see in the Prussian Ministry. Some time elapsed
before Frederick William brought himself to offer to Stein the ministry of Home
Affairs; but, thanks to friendly mediation, the baron resumed office with
extensive powers on October 4, 1807.
The foregoing
summary will have shown the masterful nature of the man who now held in his
hands the internal affairs of Prussia, and the seeming fatality of the events
which placed him in power. Frederick William, after nine months of direst
calamity, resulting from his own
330 Political,
economic and social reforms. [1807-8
wavering
policy, could not but give a wide liberty to the one able man whom Napoleon
allowed him to choose as Minister ; and the logic of events pointed with irresistible
force to a complete reversal of the old system. The King recognised the fact by
entrusting to Stein the control of all the civil affairs of the State, and the
right of sharing in the deliberations of the Military Commission (October 4,
1807). Hardenberg had wielded considerable powers over all departments of the
public service; but it was Stein’s dictatorship in civil affairs that put an
end to the disastrous dual system, under which power was divided, in varying
and indefinite proportions, between the King’s Ministers and the Cabinet,
consisting of the King’s private advisers. In place of the latter body, there
was now to be a Cabinetsministerium, consisting of the chief Ministers, who
wielded full powers both as regards collective advice offered to the King and
the administration of their several departments. This administrative reform
was completed by the Edict of November 24, 1808, which established, first, a
Council of State, including the royal Princes, all the Ministers, and certain
Privy Councillors ; and secondly a smaller Cabinet of Ministers alone. The more
important affairs were to come before the Council of State. The ministerial
departments also underwent a remodelling which removed the division of powers
and crossing of functions that often paralysed the old governing machine.
Still more
important in its bearing on the life of the nation was the Edict of
Emancipation, issued at Memel on October 9, 1807, which abolished serfdom, with
its tangle of personal obligations, throughout the Prussian monarchy. These
great changes were to take effect on October 8, 1810. The serfs on the royal
domains were also freed by a decree of October 28,1807. But this was not all. A
conviction had long been growing that the wealth of the country would never
develop until the medieval restrictions on the holding of land were abolished
or profoundly modified. As the minister Schon phrased it, “ he who has an
estate has no capital, and he who has capital is not allowed to have an
estate.” In other words, the old families were as a rule too poor to cultivate
the soil properly, and were not allowed by law to sell “noble” land {Rittergut
or adeliges Gut) to the burgher class. Similar limitations attended the holding
of peasants’ land (Bauergut). The transfer of land from members of one class to
those of another could only be legalised by the express permission of the King.
Stein now decided to enforce the principle of free trade in land, abolishing
the restrictions derived from old feudal customs, and imposing only such
safeguards as would prevent the serious diminution of peasant holdings. But the
Edict of Emancipation went even further than this. It swept away the laws and
ordinances which prevented the noble from taking up occupations previously
confined to the burgher class; as also those which marked off the callings of
the latter class from those of the peasantry. In short, it swept away the caste
system in regard to
occupations,
and facilitated the rise of a peasant to the citizen class and even to that of the
nobles.
The framing
of this edict was not, to any appreciable extent, due to Stein. The “ Immediate
Commission ” recently appointed by the King had reported on the topics named
above in a sense practically identical with the terms of the Edict of Emancipation,
even before the accession of Stein to office. It is to the King, who had long
been desirous of abolishing serfdom, and to enlightened advisers like Schon,
rather than to Stein, that the chief credit for originating the reform belongs;
Stein, however, bore the official responsibility for the promulgation and
carrying out of the edict, which aroused sharp opposition from the feudal
nobles. After Stein’s withdrawal from Prussia, Hardenberg carried through this
measure and others abolishing certain monopolies in trades, to their logical
conclusion, by the drastic decree of September 14, 1811. Farmers and peasants
on feudal lands now gained complete possession of their farms or holdings, on
condition that the lord received one-third of the land in lieu of his former
agrarian rights and claims for personal service. This decree again met with
strenuous opposition from the privileged classes; but, in spite of their
protests in the Chambers of Notables, which Hardenberg successively convoked,
he carried it through by royal authority. Thus the change from feudal tenure to
freehold, which in France formed the chief practical outcome of the Revolution,
was in Prussia distinctly due to the King’s will and prerogative. The Cabinet
rescript (first made public in 1875) which Frederick William sent to Hardenberg
on September 6, 1811, leaves no doubt that the impulse towards this thorough
agrarian reform came in a large measure from the King himself. That he and his
Minister succeeded in carrying it through, in spite of the bitter protests of a
large part of the nobility, was also indirectly due to Napoleon, who at the
very same time was known to be planning the utter ruin of Prussia. Here,
therefore, as in the reforms of Stein and Schamhorst, we may discern one of the
epoch-making results of the Napoleonic supremacy. Legislation, which would have
been utterly impossible before Jena, was imperatively called for, if the
crippled State was to gain strength enough to cope with revolutionary and
Napoleonic France. Frederick William deserves greater credit than has usually
been bestowed for discerning this important truth. Limited as were his views on
foreign policy, he actively furthered the reforms which laid anew the basis of
the Prussian State. In his adoption of this course, so different from that of
Louis XVI before the Revolution, lies the chief cause of the startling
divergence in the fortunes of the Houses of Hohenzollem and Bourbon.
Side by side
with the legislation which renovated the social and commercial life of Prussia,
there arose a new military system that was destined profoundly to influence the
fortunes of the kingdom, and ultimately of all Continental States. Here, again,
the demand for
332
Military reforms. Rise of Scharnhorst. [1755-1807
reform
originated largely with the King. Frederick William had never shared the
superstitious reverence felt by most of the officers for every detail of the
military organisation of the great Frederick. Long before the collapse of Jena,
he had privately indicated many of its weak points; and his doubts as to the
efficiency of the army probably explain in part the pitiable shifts of his
policy in the years 1804-6. On July 25, 1807, that is, sixteen days after the
signature of peace with Napoleon, the King appointed a Commission for Military
Reorganisation, with Scharnhorst as president, and Gneisenau and Grolmann among
its members. Boyen joined the Commission in 1808. Subsequently the King set
down in writing nineteen suggestions with regard to reform; among them were the
dismissal of incapable officers, the improvement of the system of promotion for
deserving officers, extension of the facilities for the promotion of
non-nobles, diminution of the number of exemptions from military service,
abolition of the custom of recruiting among foreigners, the formation of larger
reserve districts (Ersatzbezirke), formation of divisions and corps, the
drilling and use of cavalry and artillery in far larger units than before,
together with various improvements in weapons, uniforms, drill, and tactics,
so as to modernise the army and its dispositions on the field of battle.
Similar ideas had occurred to Altenstein, Hardenberg, and others; and few
intelligent officers (York was an exception) felt any doubts as to the need of
drastic military reforms.
Frederick
William here laid his finger on the weak points of the old system ; and he gave
a general though not unvarying support to the men who were determined to
construct a truly national army from the ruins of the old organisation, which
placed a premium on noble birth and seniority among the officers, and relied
almost solely on overdrilled serfs and foreigners in the ranks. First among the
officers who now pressed for a thorough change was Gerhard Johann David
Scharnhorst (1755-1813). Bom of humble parentage in a village of Hanover, he
early received a training in the military school at Wilhelmstein. Thereafter he
served with great credit in the Hanoverian army in the campaigns of 1793-6, and
wrote some essays that displayed thought and originality. In 1801 he entered
the Prussian service as first-lieutenant of artillery, and soon gave an impulse
to the whole service by founding the mMitarische GeseUschaft at Berlin. In
April, 1806, he showed his zeal for reform by advocating the formation of a national
militia. Having further displayed his warlike prowess at Auerstadt, Liibeck,
and Eylau, he was able to live down the scoffs levelled at him as a mere
theorist; and he enjoyed the confidence of all who looked for searching and
practical reforms. With him was Gneisenau (1760-1829), whose staunch defence of
Colberg also proved that study of the principles of the art of war was by no
means incompatible with personal bravery and an inspiring influence. It is
impossible here to do more than enumerate the chief features of the
system
inaugurated by the Military Commission. It began by asserting the duty of every
man to share in the work of national defence. Schamhorst, in his memoir of July
81, 1807, pointed out the need of having a small standing army of about 65,000
men, which could speedily be reinforced from a national militia; he further
sketched a plan for passing a certain proportion of men quickly through the
ranks and thence into a reserve. A month later he suggested that all men
between the ages of eighteen and thirty should equip themselves at their own
expense so as to form a national militia or reserve army. For various reasons,
Frederick William decided to reorganise the existing army before venturing on
any novel experiments. Accordingly the officers who had been guilty of cowardly
surrenders were severely punished; many more were cashiered ; while merit
received due recognition, and men in the ranks (thenceforth only Prussians)
were treated as befitted citizens of a free State. While these practical
reforms were taking shape, Napoleon formulated a demand, in a secret article of
the Franco-Prussian Convention of September 8, 1808, that Prussia should limit
her army to 42,000 men for at least ten years, and should not form a militia or
civic guard. Owing to this action of the French Emperor, the reformers at
Berlin devised the famous “shrinkage-system ” (Kriimpersystem), so called
because the cad/res at stated intervals were filled with recruits and depleted
by their passing into a reserve. The working of the system was kept as secret
as possible. Nominally the total of the army was kept at 42,000 men; but by the
year 1812 Prussia had as many as 150,000 men trained to the service of arms.
The organisation of the Lcmdwehr belongs to the year 1813, and will be
described later. Even when driven from power by Napoleon in the year 1810,
Schamhorst continued unofficially to further the extension of the system which
began to make the Prussian army, in the words of the Military Commission, “the
union of all the moral and physical energies of the nation.” Herein lies the
true grandeur of Schamhorst and his colleagues. They placed their trust not so
much in an improved organisation as in the growth of a new civic patriotism.
Closely
connected, therefore, with the subject of army reform is that of local
self-government in Prussia. In order to understand the importance of the
municipal reform of November 19, 1808, which laid the foundation of local
self-government, the older method of control must be briefly outlined. Since
the establishment of the Prussian War and Domains Chambers in 1723, the
administration of the towns had fallen more and more under the control of the
Crown. Under the plea of supervising affairs of finance and cognate matters,
the central Government frequently appointed retired officers to the posts of
burgomaster, treasurer, or councillor, in order to lighten the demands on the
army chest. The right of co-optation was allowed in certain towns; but, lest
this privilege should lead to civic freedom, the municipal authorities
were
subjected to the supervision of a tax administrator, whose will was law for the
whole of his district. Stein had long seen the need of breathing into the towns
of Prussia the civic life which had characterised the Free Cities in earlier
days; and the reform promulgated in the Grand Duchy of Berg in October, 1807,
made some analogous measure peculiarly necessary if Prussia was to retain her
place in the Germanic system. Accordingly Stein, with the help of Schrotter, Minister
for Prussia proper, drafted a scheme which received the King’s sanction on
November >19, 1808. The State still retained a general control over towns,
especially in respect of the supervision of accounts and the ratification of
new by-laws ; but it now entrusted large powers to the citizens, and swept away
the rights of lords of manors over towns and over villages with more than 800
inhabitants. Citizens were now required to take their due share in all civic
duties, and, if elected, to serve as appointed under pain of a fine. The
elected governing body was thereafter to consist of a paid burgomaster, paid
councillors, and unpaid councillors, those only being paid who gave all their
time to public work. In large towns the chief burgomaster was to be chosen by
the King from a list of three men nominated by the representatives of the
citizens. Police magistrates might be appointed directly by the State; or it
might charge the locally elected magistrates to supervise affairs of police.
Such, in very
brief outline, was the statute which granted or restored local self-government
to the towns of Prussia. Inaugurated by royal decree and through the action of
a Minister who was soon to be chased from office by Napoleon, it stands in the
sharpest contrast to the French departmental system of 1789-90, that precocious
child of fervid democratic beliefs. The more cautious procedure of the
legislators of the north was destined to be abundantly justified. The memory of
ancient civic rights, dimly surviving in some towns, and the new patriotism
begotten by the teachings of the leaders of thought, helped to nerve the
citizens of Prussia with a dogged resolve and a zealous earnestness better
suited to the working of free institutions than were the ecstatic hopes and
effusive demonstrations of the year 1790 in France. The leaven of civic freedom
was quietly introduced into the torpid mass of old Prussian life; and its
working, though slow, was thorough. Assuredly, among the many influences that
helped the down-trodden men of Berlin to accord a joyous welcome to their King
and Queen on their memorable return (December, 1809), must be reckoned the new
sense of civic dignity which the capital now enjoyed. Dutiful subjects of the
House of Hohenzollern the Berliners had ever been; now the tax-paying burghers
of the past held up their heads as responsible citizens in a reformed
commonwealth.
Stein was
unable to carry out his statesmanlike plan of extending to the country
districts the principles of self-government which he had accorded to the towns.
Already the seizure of one of his letters by a
French
official showed the ultimate aim of these reforms to be that of a national
revival which should in due course lead to the expulsion of the foreigner. At
first the Emperor was inclined to dismiss these designs scornfully. “ These
Prussians are poor, miserable people,” he wrote on September 4,1808, to Soult,
who was then holding down Prussia. But six days later he wrote to his marshal
in more threatening terms: “ I have demanded that he [Stein] should be chased
from the [Prussian] Ministry; otherwise the King of Prussia will not return
home.” Napoleon also sequestrated Stein’s property in Westphalia. Still
Frederick William delayed complying with the Imperial mandate, until, in
November, Davout and other French officers assured the Prussian authorities
that the French would not evacuate their country so long as Stein remained in
the Ministiy. At last the blow fell, from Madrid. An Imperial decree of
December 16, 1808 (omitted from the official Correspondance) declared “ le
nomme Stem" an enemy of France and of the Confederation of the Bhine,
sequestrated all his goods, and ordered his seizure wherever he could be taken
by French or allied troops. A letter to Champagny of the same date (recently
published by Lecestre) concluded with the order that, if Stein were captured,
he must be shot. Napoleon’s procedure was well enough known in such cases not
to need the clearer interpretation given to Champagny. Stein heard the news of
his danger on Januaiy 5, 1809, and at once set out by night for the Bohemian
frontier, which he reached in safety. After more than three years of
retirement, he was to take service with the Tsar and help in the westward march
of victory that set in at the close of the year 1812. Meanwhile his place at
Berlin was filled by Hardenberg (June, 1810), a man equally hostile to Napoleon
but more able to bend before the autocrat than the adamantine Stein.
Among the
many influences that served to build up the new national spirit in Germany,
that of literature must take a high place. Davout well remarked that only by
means of their literature were the Germans a nation; and the perception of the
same truth explains the efforts which Napoleon made to bring Goethe and Wieland
over to his side at the time of the Erfurt interview. He succeeded in
fascinating them by his powers of conversation, by the tactful eulogiums that
he passed on their works, and by bestowing on them the Cross of the Legion of
Honour. The historian Johann von Muller also yielded to Napoleon’s allurements,
and accepted a ministerial post in the kingdom of Westphalia. But these
conquests, if such they can be called, had little effect. The younger men of
letters clave more and more closely to Prussia in the time of her misfortunes;
and daring but hopeless efforts like those of Schill and the Duke of
Brunswick-Oels in 1809 awakened passionate longings for national freedom
throughout large parts of Germany. Arndt, Kleist, Komer, Riickert, and others
expressed the national feeling long before it found free vent in the rising of
1813.
336
Queen Louisa of Prussia-Kingdom, of Westphalia. [18O6-10
Why German
sentiment should have dung so staunchly to Prussia is a question that eludes
philosophic research, as all questions of sentiment must do. There was,
however, one truly inspiring personality in the Prussia of that period; and
those who seek to analyse the inscrutable instincts that sway great masses of
men may well question whether the single figure of Queen Louisa of Prussia did
not count for more than all the promises of good government held out to Germans
by Napoleon. Her grace and beauty, the radiant happiness of her life in its
early phases, the gladness and purity which she diffused in the Court circles
of Berlin, the queenly serenity with which she bore the misfortunes and insults
of the months succeeding Jena, her patriotic efforts at Tilsit to awaken some
generous impulse in the man who had slandered her, and anally the deepening
gloom of her later years, all conspired to thrill every German heart with
admiration and pity. Her return to Berlin amidst the enthusiastic homage of its
citizens lifted for a brief space the clouds that gathered over her; but the
trials of the past and the hopelessness of the situation in the year 1810,
when Napoleon threatened to seize Silesia, told too deeply on that sympathetic
and sensitive nature. Little by little her spirit sank under the burdens heaped
upon her people by the conqueror; and in the month of July of that year death
came to end her sufferings of mind and body.
In comparison
with the stem life-struggle of Prussia, the fortunes of artificial States like
the kingdom of Westphalia and the duchy of Warsaw possess only a slight and
passing interest. They owed their existence to the fact that Napoleon, unable,
for the diplomatic reasons stated above, to annex Prussia to the Confederation
of the Rhine, was determined to dominate her on the west and on the east by the
erection of two considerable States subject to his control. Of these new
creations, the kingdom of Westphalia comprised the Prussian lands to the west
of the Elbe, Brunswick, Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel), and other smaller
districts. In the most westerly of the districts tom from Prussia the rule of
the Hohenzollerris had not yet taken deep root. Despite the dull and niggardly
rule of the former Elector, the Hessians resented the connexion with France;
while in Brunswick the mild sovereignty of the Duke was everywhere regretted.
Nevertheless Napoleon hoped to win over the inhabitants by the reforms which
are described in other chapters of this volume. The new Constitution of
Westphalia was not unsuited to the needs of the people; but everything depended
on the monarch. Here Napoleon was unfortunate. In vain did he inform the King,
Jerome Bonaparte (November 15, 1807), that the sight of just laws and good
administration in Westphalia would do more than the greatest victories to
consolidate the Napoleonic system in Germany. In vain did he seek to inspire
him with the ambition to do great things and the persistence that overcomes
obstacles. Jerome had neither ambition nor persistence, except in the direction
of display and luxury.
1807-9] Jerome in WestphaUa.-Grand
Duchy of Warsaw. 337
The scanty
revenues of the kingdom were wasted on worthless favourites. The pay of the
troops was in arrears; and in the spring of 1809 a serious mutiny broke out.
The inability of the King to stop the progress, first of Schill, and afterwards
of the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, made a profound impression. Immermann has
recorded his own youthful feeling of patriotism at these events, and the
determined belief of the people at Magdeburg that Schill was not killed at
Stralsund but would come back to cast off the French yoke. These incidents cut
Napoleon to the quick. He overwhelmed his brother with reproaches (April 29,
1809). “ Your kingdom (he wrote) has no police, no finances, and no
organisation. It is not with display that the foundations of monarchies are
laid. What is happening to you now I fully expected. I hope it will teach you a
lesson. Adopt ways and habits suited to those of the country which you govern.”
Similar evidence might be quoted from several quarters to show that the failure
of Napoleon’s efforts to denationalise central Germany resulted largely from
the follies of his brother Jerome. It was, however, also due to the exigencies
of Napoleon’s statecraft. His Continental System hindered commerce, and imposed
vexatious burdens on the trading classes; the conscription aroused increasing detestation,
as larger and larger bodies were raised to fight the Emperor’s battles; and the
trend of public opinion set steadily away from Paris, and towards Berlin.
The other
State whose erection was due to Napoleon’s desire to complete the isolation and
subjection of Prussia was the duchy of Warsaw, not officially styled a Grand
Duchy till 1808. It consisted of the Polish lands which Prussia had seized in
the three partitions, with the exception of the Bialystok district, which went
to Russia, and the city of Danzig, constituted by the Treaty of Tilsit a free
city under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony. Frederick
Augustus, King of Saxony, received the new duchy for himself and his heirs. It
contained upwards of 2,300,000 inhabitants, nearly entirely Poles. Oginski
states in his memoirs that the small extent of the new State, and especially
the severance of the Bialystok district, struck Polish patriots- with despair.
Czartoryski, however, asserts that many of his countrymen looked on the establishment
of the duchy as betokening the future restoration of Poland. In this hope they
were disappointed. Napoleon had promised Alexander at Tilsit that the name
Poland should never be revived; and after 1809 his desire not to offend the
Habsburgs gave efficacy to this promise. Not until the Peace of Schonbrunn, by
which the Grand Duchy acquired the Polish lands of Austria south-east of
Warsaw, did it gain defensible frontiers; on the other hand from the outset,
the connexion with Saxony, the right of sending troops and stores across
Silesia, and other concessions wrung from Prussia, to some extent diminished
its military weakness.
The
Constitution of 1807 borrowed some of the forms of that of
1791, but
little of its spirit. It was based in part on a draft presented to the Emperor
by Polish magnates at Dresden in July, 1807; but in its final form it only
partly met their wishes; In regard to religious worship it ensured fuller
toleration and freedom. The King, however, now wielded a power far greater than
that accorded in 1791. He nominated the eighteen members of the Senate—six
Bishops, six Palatines, and six Castellans. Furthermore, he and his senatorial
nominees could override the advice of the popular Chamber, the Chamber of
Nuncios; and he alone could dissolve it. The Diet, consisting of these two
Chambers, was requ/red to meet every two years, on convocation by the King; but
it had no right of initiating laws; this lay with the King and his Council of
State, consisting of five Ministers and a Secretary of State. The members of
the popular Chamber were chosen by electoral colleges or dietines, those of the
nobles sending up sixty members and those of the commons forty. The Napoleonic
departmental system was introduced, along with the Code Napoleon. But the
essence of the new Constitution lay in the stipulation, laid down by Napoleon
himself at Dresden, that France alone should have a resident or envoy at
Warsaw. This obviously deprived the King-Duke of all functions in regard to
foreign policy; and, when it further appeared that Frederick Augustus could not
name a viceroy to act at Warsaw on his behalf, this further limitation clearly
placed the autocratic powers of the new Constitution in the hands of the French
resident, that is, in those of Napoleon himself; As in the case of Danzig,
where the joint protectorate of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony was a
diplomatic fiction in face of the control vested in the French military
governor, so also the political machinery of the new duchy served merely to disguise
the indisputable fact that the mainspring of government was the will of
Napoleon. It is therefore difficult to credit de Pradt’s story that Napoleon
once accused himself of two capital errors in his dealings with the duchy—that
of sending a priest (de Pradt) thither as ambassador, and that of not having
made himself King.
The
application of the principles of the French Revolution to the duchy of Warsaw
naturally proved to be somewhat half-hearted and artificial. Serfdom was
abolished in theory, but, as no land was forthcoming for the freedmen, they
remained virtually in their old position. Civic equality in the eye of the law
likewise proved to be scarcely compatible with the deep-seated prejudices of
Poland. Nor was it insisted on, when the aims of Davout’s government clearly
were to make the duchy the eastern bastion of the Napoleonic system. Military
affairs alone received much attention. The forces were to be raised to the
total of 30,000 men; and the generosity of four Poles sufficed to equip six regiments
within a short space. This enthusiasm, however, was partial and shortlived.
Even at the outset, many patriots shared the distrust with which Kosciuszko had
always regarded Napoleon’s Polish policy. He now refused to serve the Emperor
until he declared in favour
of the
restoration of Poland. That declaration never came. On the contrary, the
Emperor took care to chill Polish aspirations: witness his instructions of
March 81, 1808, to Davout at Warsaw. “Maintain harmony with the Russians as
much as possible, and hold in check your Poles, who are hot-headed.” The
Emperor consented to relieve the financial burdens of the Grand Duchy by taking
into his pay 8000 Polish troops destined for Spain. Some 5000 were already
serving under the French eagles. Despite this slight alleviation of its
burdens, the new State felt the financial strain severely. Ravaged by war and
subsequently burdened by the support of French troops, it was in no condition
to bear the restraints of the Continental System, which greatly hampered, even
when it did not cut off, the export of grain and timber to England. Another
grievance, slighter in reality but more galling, was the apportionment of
twenty-seven Polish domains to Napoleon’s marshals and generals. Some of these
were of great extent. Davout received the principality of Lowicz with a rental
of 4,831,238 francs; Lannes that of Sievre with 2,674,280 francs; in all,
rentals to the value of 26,582,652 francs were bestowed on the paladins of the
Empire. The Peace of Schonbrunn (October, 1809) detached from Austria and
annexed to the Grand Duchy an additional territory of about 900 square leagues
and some 1,500,000 inhabitants. The army was, however, increased to 60,000 men,
and by the year 1812 to 85,000 men. The financial situation became worse than
ever, the deficit for the year 1811 amounting to 21,000,000 francs.
Nevertheless,
Napoleon possessed in the Grand Duchy a political asset of the highest value,
such as his German policy never presented to him. In spite of all his melodramatic
appeals to the memory of Charlemagne, he failed to enthral the Teutonic
imagination; and, if we inquire why so consummate a political artist achieved
only a mediocre success among that home-loving, sentimental, and politically
backward people, the answer would seem to be that he never touched the deepest
well-springs of hope. For his reforms, so far as they really served their
needs, the Germans were thankful. But his efforts in this direction were soon
at an end; and the people of the Rhenish Confederation, after experiencing the
benefits of the Code Napolion and of his administration, had little to look
forward to but an increase of taxes, a severer conscription, and the loss of
the comforts of life under the operation of his commercial decrees. In their
minds, the name of Napoleon called up no vision of national greatness and glory
in the future. With the Poles it was different. Their imagination turned to the
sphere of politics with an eagerness sharpened by the humiliations of recent
times and by the memory of their former greatness. The appeal to the example of
Stanislas was an appeal to no dim simulacrum such as the name of Charlemagne
conjured up. It called forth visions of a real and realisable polity. Their
temperament and their misfortunes therefore alike
disposed them
to see in Napoleon the Messiah of their race; and, having marked the clear-cut
logicality of his plans and the grandeur of his ambition, they refused to
believe that the anomalous situation which he created at Warsaw could be anything
more than a temporary shift in his progress towards a consummation worthy of
his powers, the reestablishment of the kingdom of Poland in its ancient
splendour. In that hope, ever baffled but never crushed, lay the secret of
Napoleon’s power in eastern Europe.
A survey of
the period of the Napoleonic supremacy reveals the fact that, despite the
seemingly complete overthrow of the European system at Tilsit, affairs tended
speedily to revert to a state of equipoise. It is true that Canning’s wider plans
for an alliance with all the Scandinavian States ended in comparative failure;
Denmark ranged herself on Napoleon’s side; and, as the pressure of events
sundered Sweden from Great Britain, Napoleon and Alexander became supreme in
the Baltic lands. It is also indisputable that Napoleon by masterful diplomacy
held Prussia at his feet and kept the French and allied forces echelonned from
the Elbe to the Niemen. But the very magnitude of the means thus amassed for
the commercial strangulation of Great Britain led both Austria and Russia to
adopt precautionary measures in which lay the seeds of future wars with
Napoleon. Central and eastern Europe was, as it were, rolled in on itself, and
began to find new means of resistance to the conqueror. Moreover, the eagerness
with which he extended his political system over the south of Europe made an
irreconcilable foe of the Vatican, and led to the Spanish rising with its
immense consequences—the postponement of the plans for the partition of the
Ottoman Empire, the preservation of Prussia, the encouragement of the new
national movement in central Europe, and the Austrian challenge of the year
1809. For the complete success of his designs against
England, Napoleon needed not only peace on the Continent, but the acquiescence
of governments and peoples in his supremacy. Thenceforth this became
impossible; and it remained to be seen whether, with the feelings of fear and
hatred now working against him in Court and cottage, even the Emperor could
succeed with his vast and complex experiment, the Continental System.
THE WAR OF
1809.
The war between Austria and Napoleon in the year 1809
was no mere fortuitous conflict. It arose almost spontaneously, as a historical
necessity, out of the three hundred years’ contest between France and Austria
for European supremacy. In the eighteenth century the struggle against the
supremacy of Louis XIV culminated in the war of the Spanish Succession. A
century later, in the war of 1809, the House of Habsburg once more gathered its
forces in order to break down the tyranny of Napoleon, which weighed so heavily
on central Europe. But the war of 1809 has a character of its own; it was the
first time since 1792 that in any continental State the whole force of a nation
was united for military ends. Bearing in mind the almost simultaneous national
risings in Spain, Tyrol, and northern Germany, we may regard the years 1808 and
1809 as the starting-point of the popular reaction against the despotism of
Napoleon.
The Spanish
rising in 1808 gave Austria the decisive signal to take up arms, a year later,
against the French Emperor. The signal came from abroad; it found the ground
prepared at home. The domestic reasons for the step taken by Austria date back
to the Peace of Pressburg (December 27,1805). That treaty, notwithstanding its
stringent conditions, left Austria, though shorn of the prestige of a German
Emperor, a great position in the concert of the Powers. It was, in the first
place, the overthrow of Prussia, but, above all, the alliance between Napoleon
and the Tsar, completed at the Congress of Erfurt, which doomed Austria to
political isolation, and thereby exposed her to the danger of annihilation by
Napoleon whenever it should suit him to attack her. The first who fully grasped
this danger was Count Stadion, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, a man
of large views and conspicuous political ability, and an ardent patriot, who
combined with great energy of character a detestation of the narrow-minded
Austrian bureaucracy. It was he who, with the active support of the courageous
Empress, Marie Louise Beatrix, and of Count Clemens Metternich, then Austrian
ambassador in Paris, finally succeeded in urging his Imperial master to
the point of
war. Metternich believed that the French people were tired of war, and unlikely
to support Napoleon much longer; so that, in the event of a conflict, there was
reason to expect a popular revolt against the Napoleonic regime. Strange to
say, Metternich found some support in Talleyrand, who, behind the scenes, was
indirectly encouraging Austria to fight. The decision, apart from military and
financial considerations, was not an easy one for Austria, seeing that the
general attitude of Europe offered no certain prospect of her finding allies in
the ensuing conflict. Before, however, we describe the struggle, we must
briefly consider the general political situation; for war is simply “ the
carrying-out of diplomacy by forcible means.”
In the spring
of 1808, Napoleon’s violent and despotic interference in the internal affairs
of Spain, at that time his ally, confirmed the opinion prevalent in the Court
of Vienna, that the French Emperor’s lust of conquest was insatiable, and that,
after the overthrow of Spain, it would be Austria’s turn. Napoleon had not been
backward with unfriendly acts, and even with open threats, against that
country; nor had it escaped his notice that preparations for war had been going
on for some time on the Danube. According to Count Stadion’s views, it was
simply a question of gaining sufficient time for the completion of military
preparations, and, if possible, for a fresh coalition against France. Archduke
Charles, who was superintending the reorganisation of the army, was of the same
opinion, at least in principle. The memorial addressed by him to the Emperor
Francis on April 14,1808, is specially interesting. He therein solemnly adjured
his Imperial brother, Jbove all things, to introduce into the public
administration a more harmonious system. Such a change, unfortunately, did not
take place; but something was done to facilitate the preparations for war.
Among other measures, the formation of a Lamdwehr was ordered by the Imperial
edict of June 9, 1808. In this force were enrolled all male subjects, from
eighteen to twenty-five years of age, who were capable of bearing arms, and not
already serving in the standing army. The edict called forth from Napoleon a
more than ordinary burst of anger. On August 15, in Paris, at the reception of
the diplomatic corps, there was a violent scene between him and Metternich. The
Emperor tried to represent Austria as a disturber of the peace, and threatened
a war of extermination if her preparations were not instantly stopped. He also
referred to England as the “ invisible hand ” which was pushing forward this
war. As a matter of fact, since the death of Pitt, there had been no intimate
relations between London and Vienna.
In a second
interview with Metternich, Napoleon endeavoured to efface the impression of his
menaces by more amicable phrases ; but Metternich was too experienced a
diplomatist to be misled in such a way. He knew perfectly well that, between
the two interviews, bad news had arrived from Portugal, where, in consequence
of the landing of British troops,
the French
under Junot were hard pressed. On the strength of this news, he sent word to
Vienna that, in view of the development of affairs in the Iberian peninsula,
Napoleon could certainly not be meditating any immediate attack on Austria.
The Congress
of Erfurt, which followed on these events, helped to throw the Austrian
difficulty into the background in Napoleon’s mind. Count Stadion, on the other
hand, did his utmost to force the Emperor Francis to an energetic decision. He
met, it is true, with opposition from most of the other ministers; and even
Archduke Charles used all his influence to secure delay, urging that it was
better to put off the war a little longer, until the military and internal
affairs of the State should be on a more settled footing. The war party, on the
other hand, could count on the support of the nation. Indeed, throughout purely
Catholic Austria, recent events—the occupation of Rome by the French, the
seizure of the Pope, and his appeal for help to Catholic Christendom—all served
to increase the general detestation of Napoleon.
Early in
December, 1808, councils were held in the Hofburg in which Mettemich’s
representations turned the scale in favour of war. These representations
(contained in three memorials, two of a political nature, the third headed Armee
fran^aise: guerre d'Espagne), starting from the assumption that Napoleon’s
supremacy was a permanent danger to the existence of Austria, led up to the
conclusion that, in view of recent events in the Iberian peninsula, now or
never was the moment for Austria to strike. A deep impression was made by
Metternich’s calculation that, in a wax with Austria, Napoleon would not have
more than 206,000 men at his disposal. Stadion had arrived at similar results;
he, indeed, placed the number as low as 197,000. These calculations, it may
here be observed, proved later to be incorrect; the number had been
underestimated. Archduke Charles considered the views of Stadion and Metternich
too sanguine. He reiterated his protest against an early declaration of war,
and suggested the end of March as the earliest possible date for the
commencement of hostilities, if war should eventually be declared.
It was the
object of the Court of Vienna, in the interval that remained, to seek the
support of those Powers whose interests might presumably incline them to the
side of Austria. But the prospect of forming a new Coalition was far from
favourable. Among possible allies, the first was Great Britain, the traditional
friend of Austria and the most implacable enemy of the Napoleonic system. But,
as has already been stated, no close relations existed at that time between the
Governments of the two countries; and even in Vienna it was admitted that, in
the most favourable circumstances, the utmost that could be counted on from
Great Britain was a subsidy. That she would also intervene by means of a
military diversion on land (as she afterwards did at Walcheren) could not at
that time be foreseen. It was after the outbreak
344
Austria without allies. She resolves on war. [1809
of the war
that Count Starhemberg was despatched to England by the Viennese Cabinet, to
conduct negotiations which had hitherto been carried on through the Hanoverian
Ministry.
There was
some room for hope that Prussia would be won over. The so-called “ Reformers,” who
after the catastrophe of 1806 had been bent on the political, military, and
social regeneration of Prussia, such men as Stein, Schamhorst, Gneisenau and
others, backed as they were by the profound hatred of Napoleon felt by the
population of northern Germany, were ardently in favour of the Austrian
alliance. At the outset it seemed likely enough that Prussia would be drawn to
Austria’s side. Even after Stein’s resignation, the war party in Berlin refused
to acknowledge its defeat; and in January, 1809, a convention was actually
concluded in Vienna by Major von der Goltz, in which it was agreed that Prussia
should place 80,000 men in the field. But it did not accord with the cautious
character of King Frederick William III, any more than with those formal
pledges by which he had bound himself to Napoleon in the convention of
September 8, 1808, to form so bold a resolution—a resolution made more
difficult, it is true, by the Franco- Russian alliance. During his stay in St
Petersburg in the beginning of January, 1809, he was strengthened in his
tendency to remain neutral; and, in the end, he rejected all binding
arrangements with the phrase- “Without Russia I cannot join you.”
That Russia
should join must, to any dispassionate judge of the situation, have appeared
out of the question. Her friendship with France had gained for her Finland and
the reversion of the Danubian Principalities. All the same, various diplomatic
attempts were made to lure the Emperor Alexander from Napoleon’s side. But in
vain. On March 2, 1809, the Tsar drily informed Count Schwarzenberg, the
Austrian ambassador, that he would fulfil his obligations to France ; that is
to say, he would despatch an auxiliary force to help her against Austria.
Nevertheless there was still some ground for the hope that Russia would not
carry military coercion too far. As for the minor Powers, Denmark was on the
side of France; Sweden was occupied by the war with Russia; and the smaller
German States had, through the Confederation of the Rhine, become the vassals
of Napoleon and the adversaries of their former Emperor.
Thus, when on
February 8, 1809, war was finally decided upon by an Imperial Council under the
presidency of the Emperor, Austria found herself alone, without an ally, pitted
against the most powerful State and the greatest military genius of the time.
She was still alone, when on March 2 Metternich declared in the Council that
the movements of the French troops in Germany, and the mobilising of the
Rheinbund contingent, had compelled the Emperor Francis to place his own army
on a war footing. Formal declaration of war there was none. Its place was taken
by a lengthy official report, issued by the Court of Vienna and
widely
circulated, and by a stirring proclamation, addressed to the army and the
nation.
France, from
a military point of view, was then in the zenith of her power. By force of
numbers, military capacity, admirable organisation, and masterly leadership,
the French army was in the hands of Napoleon a terrific engine of war. In the
winter of 1808-9, by means of a conscription relentlessly carried out, the
nominal strength of this army (never actually reached) attained the number of
800,000 men. This included field-forces about 300,000 strong in Spain, 100,000
in the interior of France, 200,000 drawn entirely from the Rhenish territory on
the right bank of the Rhine, and about 60,000 in Italy.
At the same
time, one fact must be clearly borne in mind: that the French army of 1809, as
regards both its internal cohesion and its military discipline, was not the
equal of the Grand Army of 1805, which Napoleon himself described as “ the best
army he ever commanded.” The causes of this falling-off were various. In
accordance with his widening schemes of supremacy, the Emperor was possessed by
a sort of rage de nombre; and the army, both officers and men, thus lost in
quality what it gained in quantity. The financial resources of France were also
so severely strained by incessant wars that the clothing, equipment, and
provisioning of the troops left much to be desired; and pay was frequently in
arrears. Moreover, many officers in the higher ranks of the service were
beginning to be tired of war, and longed to enjoy their hard-won honours and
positions in peace and quietness. Napoleon therefore was driven to economise in
the once lavish items of rewards, so that his paladins might have something
left to fight for.
But these
defects were of but slight importance compared with the brilliant military
qualities of the French army. Looking back on the overwhelming victories of the
last ten years, it might well regard itself as invincible, so long as Napoleon
was at its head. For pure fighting quality the infantry stood indisputably in
the front rank. We shall see later what marvellous deeds were done, especially
at Aspem and Essling, by the French infantry (including the German auxiliaries
there engaged). In any case, the mass of the French infantry must be regarded
as superior to the Austrian, and the tactical skill of its leading was most
decidedly greater. The French cavalry was brave, numerous, and well- mounted;
and it was commanded by a large staff of distinguished officers. Its weakness
lay in the rider’s lack of care for his horse, which led to large numbers of
animals dying on the march. But, as was proved by its brilliant charges at the
battle of Aspem, the cavalry, when it came into action, was extremely
efficient. The artillery had attained a prominent place in the French army; and
Napoleon, who had himself risen from this branch of the service, knew how to
handle it in a masterly fashion. In the war of 1809, the “ grand battery ” of
Wagram became the classic instance of successful handling of large masses of
field artillery.
The military
resources of Austria, with a population only half as large as that of France,
were very inferior to the French. According to official calculations, there
were available, in the spring of 1809, 283,000 troops of the line and 310,000
of the reserve. But these numbers were never reached. The actual strength of
the field army, at the outbreak of war, amounted to no more than 265,000 men,
including 15,000 militia. It is true that the army had been in every respect
reorganised since the catastrophe of 1805. Archduke Charles had then taken upon
himself the functions of Minister of War; and to his circumspection and
practical energy was mainly due the improvement in organisation and tactics
that now became apparent. : New service7regulations were intro-,
duced; equipment and arms were perfected. But the end chiefly aimed at was to
rouse the spirit of the troops. Such words as “People,” “ Freedom,” “
Fatherland,” were heard for the first time in the army— words which, however,
before long were again to be excluded from the language of Austrian policy. In
1809 a lofty sentiment of patriotism permeated the army, especially the German
portion of it; and it was this universal enthusiasm for the fatherland which
inspired its heroic conduct in the battles of Aspem and Wagram.
Among the
various branches of the service, ancient tradition had allotted a leading place
to the thirty-five regiments of the Imperial cavalry, which (except at Marengo)
had invariably distinguished itself in war. The infantry, numbering 78
regiments and nine Jager battalions, was somewhat clumsy in action, but admirable
in discipline; and its grenadiers formed a picked body of troops, which
remained unconquered at Aspern and Wagram. The field artillery, consisting of
four regiments, was well trained, and during the campaign of 1809 superior to
the French in the number of its guns.
The
mobilisation of the Austrian army commenced in January, 1809. On February 25,
1809, the strategical concentration began. The plan of operations was to attack
the French troops under the command of Davout in central Germany, together with
the Rheinbund troops (in all about 230,000 strong), and to defeat them before
Napoleon could bring up his reinforcements. The Austrian army in Germany was
under the command of Archduke Charles, who was appointed commander-in-chief.
The “army of Inner Austria,” under Archduke John, was to proceed
simultaneously against the French forces in Italy and Dalmatia; while a third
army, under Archduke Ferdinand, was to invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In
accordance with this plan of operations, Archduke Charles assembled, towards
the end of March, six army corps in western Bohemia. This position was opposite
to the centre of the enemy’s radius of concentration and close to northern
Germany, in which a rising was expected. Two army-corps were also concentrated in
Upper Austria in order to invade Bavaria on both banks of the Danube. Archduke
John had orders to invade north-eastern Italy from
I809]
Austrian plan. Distribution of French forces. 347
Willach-Laibach
with two army-corps, and to despatch a column to Tyrol, to form a nucleus for
the expected rising in that country, which bore unwillingly the Bavarian yoke.
A detachment was to advance into Dalmatia and cover the rear of Archduke John’s
army. Archduke Ferdinand’s army-corps was to move from Cracow and to occupy
Warsaw so as to reach, from thence, the Elbe above Breslau. Clearly, this plan
of operations did not fail on the side of comprehensiveness.
On the French
side, the situation did not admit of plans so definite in their aim, not only
because the French army was at first strictly limited to the defensive, but
because, scattered as it was over a wide extent of country, it could only
proceed to the seat of war by sections. Napoleon had, it is true, completed his
military preparations by the middle of January, 1809. While still in Spain, he
sent orders to the princes of the Rheinbund to place their contingents on a war
footing. Troops were sent from France; and the Imperial Guard was despatched
from Spain to Germany. The French troops under Davout, then dispersed over
northern Germany, received orders to march into Bavaria. But these orders were
insufficient to secure to the Emperor at the outbreak of war those two most
important factors of success—numerical superiority and initiative. At the
beginning of April, the entire force which he could dispose of at the various
seats of war (exclusive of Spain) amounted to only 165,000 men (French and
Rheinbund troops) in Bavaria; 18,050 (Poles) in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw;
20,000 in Saxony; 57,000 in Italy north of the Po; and 10,000 in Dalmatia. In
Bavaria the French army was not only inferior in numbers to the army of
Archduke Charles, and far weaker in artillery, but it was also seriously
dislocated. And in Bavaria lay the crux of the whole war.
Archduke
Charles’ original plan of operations had to be altered even before its
execution began. The Archduke had meant to take the field at the end of March.
But, as all the troops had not yet arrived on the scene of action, and as news
had come that the French army of the Rhine was approaching Ratisbon, the
commencement of operations was put off till the second week in April, while the
main army advanced from Bohemia to the Braunau-Passau line. Here, on the
evening of April 9, were finally marshalled 116,000 men, forming a front
scarcely twenty-eight miles in length. Besides these, 50,000 men under General
Bellegarde were at Tachau, and 10,000 under General Jellachich at Salzburg. In
all, 176,000 men crossed the Bavarian frontier on April 10. The Austrian
offensive found the French army of the Rhine not yet assembled. Davout was
engaged in carrying out the directions sent by the Emperor from Paris to
Berthier, who was then at Strassburg and was temporarily entrusted with the
conduct of operations. These directions ordered a concentration upon
Donauworth. At the same date the various divisions of the French axmy,
numbering 89,000 men, distributed in five groups, were drawn up
348 Opening movements. Slowness of the Austrians.
[i809
on the line
Munich-Ratisbon-Wiirzburg (a line 112 miles in length), behind which 76,000 men
lay between Augsburg and Donauworth.
Archduke
Charles had meant by rapid marches to reach the Isar in the direction of
Landshut, while Bellcgarde was to march upon Ratisbon, and Jellachich upon
Munich. It would have been quite possible for the Austrian main army to reach
the Isar by April 14. Instead of this, owing to the defective arrangements of
the commissariat, it advanced very slowly, and accomplished only half a normal
march daily. Herein lay one of the principal causes of the later Austrian
reverses. In war the most valuable of all commodities is time; and the French
generals knew how to handle it so economically that by April 13 the various
divisions of their army were already drawn closer together in the direction of
Donauworth. Then, all of a sudden, Berthier interfered disastrously in the
course of operations, with a view to effecting a concentration at Ratisbon. A
change of orders became necessary, proving the truth of the adage:
“Order—counter-order—disorder.” To be sure, Berthier might have said he was
only acting in obedience to Napoleon’s commands; but Napoleon did not leave
Paris till April 13 ; and even he, at such a distance, was not in a position to
make arrangements in accordance with the actual condition of things.
Consequently,
when the Emperor entered Donauworth early on April 17, he found the situation
far from favourable, since the dislocation of the French forces made it
possible for Archduke Charles to attack and defeat the scattered units one by
one. But the Archduke, whose advanced forces had won several unimportant
successes between the 11th and the 15th, had in the meanwhile become “ sicklied
o’er with the pale cast of thought.” Although, on the 16th, he had driven the
Bavarians out of Landshut, and thus possessed himself of the line of the Isar,
he abandoned his design of breaking through the enemy’s front, and decided on
the 18th to attack the French left wing under Davout at Ratisbon, maintaining
the defensive against the Bavarians on the right.
With the
personal intervention of Napoleon the course of operations underwent a complete
change. In the end, his energy succeeded in rectifying the strategic blunders
of Berthier. But even here, as in the Marengo campaign, Napoleon’s merit has
been much overrated. But for the remarkable tactical achievements of his
marshals and the blunders of Archduke Charles, the “Ratisbon campaign” (as the
military movements of April 19-23 are called) would have had a different issue.
It was, above all, a serious mistake on Napoleon’s part that he miscalculated
the date when hostilities were likely to commence. He did not expect them to
begin till a fortnight later, and he ought to have been much earlier on the
spot.
The Emperor
had originally intended to concentrate his forces on the left bank of the
Danube, at a point further to the west, between Augsburg and Ingolstadt; but,
having reconnoitred the enemy’s position,
1809]
The “Ratisbon campaign." Abensberg andEckmuhl. 349
he decided,
on April 17, to effect his junction on the left bank in the neighbourhood of
Abensberg. The orders relating to this movement were conceived, it is true, in
masterly fashion; but, as ought to have been foreseen, they became
impracticable, in the most important details, when on the 19th the Austrian
commander carried out his intention of making a determined attack, with all his
available forces, on the French left wing. This wing consisted of four
divisions under Davout, whom Napoleon had directed to approach the main army by
marching to Neustadt in a southerly direction. Such a march, with the Danube in
the rear and a vastly superior enemy in front, could only be carried out as a
flank movement, one of the most difficult of all military operations. Napoleon
himself would have been the first to condemn any other commander for attempting
a movement so contrary to all the rules of war. Moreover, recent researches
have shown that Napoleon gave this order without knowing how Davout was
situated; it was, therefore, an order based on false assumptions. Davout, by
means of magnificent generalship, succeeded, after a fierce battle at Haussen
on April 19, in escaping the overthrow that threatened him ; but this was
chiefly if not entirely owing to the fact that, at the last moment, Archduke
Charles failed to bring his entire force (which was far superior to Davout’s)
energetically into the field. Thus the Marshal succeeded in joining Lefebvre’s
corps, which on the 19th had also fought with equal success at Abensberg
against isolated detachments of the Austrian army. If the events of the 19th
meant no decided victory for the French, they had great influence on the whole
future course of the campaign, seeing that, from this point onwards, Napoleon
altered his tactics, acting solely on the offensive, while Archduke Charles
confined himself to the defensive. Now, as Moltke said, “the offensive alone is
real generalship”; and this was proved by the later incidents of the campaign
of 1809.
On April 20,
Ratisbon, where only one French regiment was posted, fell into the hands of
Count Bellegarde, who formed with his two army- corps the extreme right wing of
the Austrian army, and had till now been operating by himself on the left bank
of the Danube. But the jossession of Ratisbon had no further influence on the
course of the operations, for on the 20th Napoleon with his united forces fell
upon the Austrian left wing, and in the battle of Abensberg inflicted on it a
decisive defeat. The following day Napoleon pursued the battle against the
Austrian left as it was retiring upon Landshut, and cut it off from the main
army. Davout advanced simultaneously upon the right wing and forced it to
retreat. But the decisive blow against that part of the Austrian army which was
under the direct command of Archduke Charles was not struck till the battle of
Eckmuhl (April 22). Here, in spite of a stubborn resistance, the Austrians were
beaten; and a general retirement along the whole line of front became
inevitable. This, however, could take place only by the separation of the army
into two bodies.
The left
wing, under Hiller, disappeared in a south-easterly direction towards the Isar;
while the main army under Archduke Charles, going north, attempted to gain the
left bank of the Danube. This it succeeded in reaching on the 23rd by way of
Ratisbon, which the French, after an obstinate defence on the part of the
Austrian rear-guard, stormed on the evening of the same day.
Thus ended
the five days’ campaign of Ratisbon, in which the Austrians lost nearly 40,000
men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Austrian army was broken up. Its
condition after the defeat was such that the French Emperor had no further
opposition to fear in his march on Vienna. On the morning of April 23 Archduke
Charles himself wrote to his Imperial brother: “Napoleon’s position grows
steadily stronger; and I shall be very lucky if, after yesterday’s defeat, I
succeed in bringing the army with honour across the Danube. I have given your
Majesty an accurate account of my position ; and I must add that against such
an enemy nothing more can be expected from what is left of this army.”
As a
commander-in-chief Napoleon remains to this day unequalled in the relentless
following-up of victory. Ceaselessly pursuing Hiller’s division of the Austrian
army, the French Emperor appeared before Vienna on May 10. Three days later he
rode into the Imperial city, which had offered only a feeble show of
resistance. Meanwhile, Archduke Charles, who had reassembled his army,
approached the Danube from Budweis in the direction of Vienna, and about the
middle of May took up his position in threatening proximity on the left bank.
His intention was to cross to the right bank, and so threaten, if possible, the
French communications. This plan, however, was frustrated by Napoleon, who was
firmly determined to win a decisive victory by a vigorous offensive. The battle
was to be fought on the Marchfeld, where the Archduke had effected a junction
with the troops under Hiller—that historic field where Rudolf of Habsburg
conquered the Bohemian king Ottokar, and thereby founded the power of his
House.
Napoleon’s
plan of attacking Archduke Charles on the Marchfeld was bold in the extreme,
because he would first have to cross the Danube, and then to fight with the
river in his rear. On May 18 he had gathered together 70,000 men south-east of
Vienna. Having planted himself firmly on the left bank of the Danube at Aspem
and Essling, he commenced operations by transporting his army by means of four
military bridges to Lobau, an island formed by one of the numerous arms of the
Danube. From Bisamberg, a hill commanding a view of the wide plain of the
Marchfeld, Archduke Charles had watched the movements of the French. He
quickly brought his troops into order of battle, and determined to fall with
his full strength upon the feeble forces which Napoleon, who did not believe
the Archduke to be so near him, had transported to the left bank of the river.
These troops
did not amount to more than 17,000 infantry, with 5000 horse and 52 guns, under
Marshal Bessieres. Against these, about noon on Monday in Whitsun week (May
21), 80,000 infantry, 15,000 horse, and 300 guns, formed in three columns,
advanced to the attack. But, in spite of all their courage, the Austrians
failed to take Aspem and Essling, the two points d’appui of the French. Aspem
was defended by Massena with Molitor’s division, Essling by Marshal Lannes with
that of Bonnet. Repeated attacks were made on these positions, only to be
repulsed in every case by the indomitable defenders. On the other hand, the
attempt made by Napoleon to break through the centre of the enemy’s line by a
great cavalry charge failed signally, owing to the steadiness of the Austrian
infantry. Equally unsuccessful was a second attack of the combined French
cavalry, made about eight o’clock in the evening upon the Austrian horse. When
it grew dusk, Aspem was only partially in possession of the Austrians, while
they had been altogether unable to force an entry into Essling. Nevertheless,
the Austrian army held the French (as Massena, the defender of Aspern,
expresses it in his memoirs) “ closely hemmed in by a ring of fire and steel ”;
and during the night the battle repeatedly flared up afresh.
At 3 a.m. on the 22nd Massena recommenced the
bloody work with a vigorous and unexpected attack on the Austrians in Aspem,
and drove them from this fiercely contested position. Further fighting took
place at Essling, which finally remained in the hands of the French. At seven
o’clock Napoleon began to deploy the forces massed between Aspern and Essling
for a combined attack. During the night fresh bodies of troops, the 2nd corps,
under Lannes, the grenadier corps, under Oudinot, and the Imperial Guard, had
crossed the Danube; so that in all about 55,000 men, with 8000 horse, pressed
forward against the Austrian lines. Before the tremendous onset of the French,
who advanced in close order with the regularity of men on parade, some of the
Austrian battalions began to waver, when Archduke Charles, seizing the banner
of the Zach regiment, flung himself into the fray. His heroic example inspired
his troops; and the advance of the French infantry was checked. Similarly the
French regiments of horse, after overthrowing the enemy’s cavalry in a
magnificent charge, finally retired before the advance of the Austrian
grenadiers. In the centre the battle came to a standstill.
At nine
o’clock the news reached Napoleon that the enemy had set on fire and destroyed
the largest of the military bridges. This was disastrous news. It might mean
the annihilation of the French army, if the Austrians succeeded in taking Aspem
and Essling; for in this case the French retreat across the Danube would be
seriously imperilled. A furious conflict therefore again broke out round the
two villages, whose position was now marked only by heaps of smouldering ruins.
The struggle for Aspem and Essling is one of the most memorable and
also the most
sanguinary combats in military history. At 8 p.m.
the French won back Essling, which they had lost; and they held it till the
end of the battle. Aspern, on the other hand, fell finally into the hands of
the Austrians later in the day. But their strength also was exhausted. They
were no longer able to hamper the retreat of the enemy, who, the same evening
and during the following night, crossed over to the island of Lobau, after
having with immense labour succeeded in restoring the bridges. The losses on
both sides were enormous. The Austrians had lost from 25,000 to 26,000 men; the
French from 18,000 to 20,000, the gallant Marshal Lannes being among those who
perished.
The battle of
Aspern made a powerful impression on both friend and foe. For the first time,
the prize of victory had escaped the hitherto invincible Emperor. This fact
remained unaltered by the boastful bulletin issued by Napoleon on May 23, in
which he estimated the French losses at 4000, and declared that on May 22 he
“remained master of the battlefield.” On the other hand, there is some ground
for the reproach brought against Archduke Charles of having let slip the
opportunity offered him by the critical position of the French army, which was
forced to wait several days on the island of Lobau without food or ammunition.
There is justice in this accusation as regards the afternoon of the 23rd; but
afterwards there appear to have been political reasons for the delay. At the
end of May the Prince of Orange made his appearance at the Archduke’s
head-quarters, as confidential envoy of the Prussian Court, with the promise
of help from Prussia. In the beginning of June it seemed likely enough that
King Frederick William III, under the pressure of the war party, would actually
decide on taking part in the war. But when, at Konigsberg, on June 18, the
Austrian ambassador, Baron Steigentesch, delivered letters to the King, both
from the Emperor Francis and Archduke Charles, and endeavoured to obtain a
definite engagement, the King deferred his decision in the hope that things
might become clearer in the future. Steigentesch returned with his mission
unaccomplished.
Between the
armies a seven weeks’ armistice was arranged, which was used by both to obtain
reinforcements. In the beginning of July an army of 165,000 men—partly French,
partly troops of the Rhine Confederation, and including 25,000 horse—was
marshalled on the island of Lobau, ready to repeat the attempt of the previous
May. The French now had a numerical superiority, for Archduke Charles had but
135,000 men, including 15,000 horse, though he certainly held a strong position
behind the Russbach with the Marchfeld before him. His artillery was slightly
superior in numbers to the French.
In the night
of July 4-5, amid thunder and lightning and in torrents of rain, the French
columns began to cross the Danube on the four bridges. On July 5, at midday,
their approach completed, they advanced in close columns from Gross-Enzersdorf
against the Austrians, who at
seven in the
evening repulsed with heavy loss an assault upon the heights of Wagram. But the
real attack did not take place till the following day. Napoleon had determined
to direct it against the enemy’s left wing, while the Austrian centre was to be
broken simultaneously by a charge of densely-packed masses of cavalry and
infantry. Archduke Charles had also decided to take the offensive, directing
his main attack upon the French left, which was to be surprised at early dawn.
But the order reached his generals too late; and the Archduke was obliged to
change his plan. At 6 a.m. he
pushed forward his centre, and fell upon the French in the village of Aderklau.
The struggle for the possession of this place was bitter and prolonged,
resembling that for Aspem two months before. Fortune alternated; in the end the
village remained in the hands of the Austrian grenadiers under the heroic
General d’Aspre. On their right wing also the Austrian columns pressed forward
victoriously by Siissenbrunn and Breitenlee to the banks of the Danube. At this
moment matters looked critical for the French ; but the Emperor, hastening to
the centre of the fight, ordered 100 guns, the historic “ grand battery,” to be
massed at Siissenbrunn to check the Austrian advances. Soon afterwards he
launched against the enemy a solid column, consisting of 30,000 infantry and
6000 horse, moving in one compact mass under Macdonald’s command. Though the French
eventually succeeded, with heavy loss, in attaining their object, it was not at
Ibis point that the issue was decided. This took place in another part of the
field, near Markgrafen-Neusiedel, where Marshal Davout beat the enemy’s
enfeebled left wing under Prince Rosenberg, rolled it up, and so tore a breach
in the Austrian front. Their right wing was also forced back by Massena at
Aspem. Everywhere limited to the defensive, with no prospect of the
long-expected help from, Archduke John (who was to have advanced from Pressburg
and fallen on the enemy’s right flank), Archduke Charles reluctantly gave, at
two o’clock, the order to retreat.
Though a
defeat for Austria, the battle of Wagram was one of the most brilliant feats of
arms in Austrian history. The Austrian losses, in the two days’ fighting,
amounted to 24,000, killed and wounded. Those of the French were estimated at
18,000. On the following day Archduke Charles drew off his army in good order
in the direction of Znaym and Iglau, pursued, though but feebly, by the French.
There was some more fighting at Znaym on July 10 and 11; but an armistice on
the 12th put an end to further hostilities. The Emperor Francis at first
refused to sanction this; but on the 17th, at Komom, he reluctantly consented
to the ratification.
We must now
turn to review the course of the war elsewhere. At the outset of the straggle,
Austria was compelled to reckon on a conflict not only with the Grand Duchy of
Warsaw, but also with Russia, since
both these
States were allied with France. Consequently, in March, 1809, a force of 25
battalions, 44 squadrons of cavalry, and 76 guns (30,000 men in all) were
concentrated, as a 7th army-corps, in western Galicia,' and placed under the
command of Archduke Ferdinand. On April 15, the Archduke, from his base at
Nowe-Miasto, commenced operations, aiming in the first place at the capture of
Warsaw. This enterprise was open to the strategic objection that it exposed the
right flank to a Russian force stationed on the Pruth; but it was not expected
that this force would push forward with speed or decision. In addition to
40,000 Russians under Prince Galitzin, the Austrians had to face 17,000 Poles
and 2,000 Saxons, whom Prince Poniatovski had assembled near Raszyn, a day’s
march south of Warsaw.
Archduke
Ferdinand advanced rapidly, beat Poniatovski at Raszyn (April 19), and occupied
Warsaw (April 22); the tete-du-pont at Praga —a suburb of Warsaw on the right
bank of the Vistula—remained, however, in the hands of the Poles. Early in May
Poniatovski took the offensive, and on the 5th, after a successful combat,
occupied Gora, at which point the Austrians had intended to cross the Vistula.
The Archduke, finding himself unable to advance further against the main
Polish army, determined to make a demonstration in the direction of Thom, in
order to divert the attention of the enemy from Galicia. The plan failed,
however; for Poniatovski led his troops up the Vistula, occupied Lublin (May
14) and Sandomir (May 18), and on the 20th stormed Zamosz. At the same time the
Russians advanced towards Lemberg, while a strong Polish force approached
Warsaw. Thus threatened on all sides, the Archduke was forced, on June 3, to
evacuate the city, and to withdraw to Opatoff, in the upper valley of the
Vistula. Although the Austrians made some successful raids from this point, the
further advance of the Russians from Lemberg, and the presence of 25,000 Poles,
strongly posted near Radom, made the Archduke’s position untenable. Early in
July he fell back upon the line Viniary-Zamoviez, but soon afterwards received
orders to retire upon Olmutz by way of Cracow. On July 16 the news of the
armistice of Znaym put an end to hostilities in this quarter. The Austrian
Government has been blamed, with some justice, for undertaking the Polish
campaign at all. The decision of the war lay, in any case, with the main army
under Archduke Charles; and Poland was so far distant that events in that
country could have no serious influence on the issue. On the other hand, the
30,000 men, who fought bravely but uselessly under Archduke Ferdinand, might
well have turned the scale at Aspem or Wagram.
Nor was this
the only deficiency which stood in the way of Austrian success. It has been
mentioned above that, on the afternoon of July 5, Archduke John was vainly
expected on the battle-field. Till that time he had been independently
conducting the operations of the army of Inner Austria, consisting of 48,000
men, 5000 horse, and 150
guns, which
had crossed the Italian frontier at Tarvis on April 9. On April 16, at Sacile,
he came upon a Franco-Italian army of 36,000 men, led by Eugene de Beauhamais,
Viceroy of Italy, and inflicted on it a decisive defeat. He followed up this
blow by another at Caldiero on the 29th. But the bad news from Germany obliged
the Archduke to retire to Willach early in May. After a series of collisions,
the issue of which was unfavourable to the Austrians, he had to abandon
Carinthia to the Viceroy (who in the meanwhile had received considerable
reinforcements), and to withdraw into Hungary. On June 7 he arrived before the
fortress of Raab, followed by Eugene, who was now attempting to cover the
movements of the main French army towards Hungary. In Croatia and Dalmatia also
there had been fighting with Marshal Marmont’s corps, ending in the retreat of
the Austrians.
On June 14
the Archduke again challenged the fortune of arms at Raab, but was beaten and
obliged to retreat by way of Komom to Pressburg, whence he was summoned to take
part in the battle of Wagram. It was his own fault that he arrived too late for
effectual interference. In any case, it is doubtful whether Archduke John, who
could bring no more than 13,000 men into the field, would have been able to
turn the tide of war at Wagram.
At the
beginning of the campaign, Archduke John was also commissioned to deliver
Tyrol from Bavarian rule, under which it had fallen by the Peace of Pressburg.
He despatched General Chasteler with
10,000 men, who were to push forward up the
valley of the Drave by way of Brixen towards the Brenner and form the nucleus
of an army to assist the general rising of the loyal Tyrolese. Popular levies
speedily rallied on all sides round their self-constituted leaders, attacked
the feeble Bavarian garrisons, and drove them, in some cases after obstinate
fighting, to leave the country. In four days the whole of northern Tyrol was
freed; and the Imperial flag waved once more in Innsbruck. General Chasteler
now advanced to Trient and even as far as the Lake of Garda. He was, however,
compelled to hasten back again to northern Tyrol, the recovery of which had
been undertaken by the Bavarian General Wrede, who invaded the country with
strong forces from the north and east about the beginning of May. In spite of
the heroic efforts of the Tyrolese, who in their mountain valleys fought the
detested enemy with rifles, scythes, and rocks, the Bavarians made progress and
occupied Innsbruck on May £2.
General Wrede
now despatched part of his forces to join the French main army; but he had no
sooner done so, than the tocsin sounded again the call to arms. On May 29,
20,000 Tyrolese under Andreas Hofer, the innkeeper of Passeyer, and such
popular leaders as Speckbacher and Peter Hasper, appeared before Innsbruck,
which, after a fierce battle on the Iselberg, fell the same day into their
hands. For the second time the Bavarians were compelled to evacuate Tyrol. But
as the Tyrolese
refused to
recognise the terms of the armistice of Znaytaj the full weight of the French
Emperor’s fury was turned against the little country, which, in its courageous
loyalty, believed itself strong enough to defy even a Napoleon. From all
directions strong columns pushed into the Tyrolese valleys. But everywhere they
met with so obstinate a resistance that they were forced to draw back; and on
August 15, after a sanguinary conflict on the Iselberg, the Tyrolese for the
third time marched victoriously into Innsbruck. As “commander-in-chief in
Tyrol,” Hofer now undertook not only the military but also the political
direction of affairs. Europe beheld with amazement the triumphant resistance of
the Tyrolese, who in very deed had proved the truth of Schiller’s words:
“Unworthy is
that people,
Which on its
honour dares not stake its all.”
Yet this
heroic struggle was in the end to be crushed by sheer brute force, through the
enemy’s numerical superiority. Napoleon, furious at the repeated failure of his
arms, gave orders to the Viceroy of Italy to invade the country from the south,
while the Bavarians poured into it from the north and east. The conflict raged
with alternating fortunes in the hard-tried land, for even after the Peace of
Schonbrunn (October 15) the Tyrolese did not abandon the struggle. But, when
Hofer, after the so-called fourth battle on the Iselberg (November 1 and 2),
was compelled to retreat, he himself bade his fellow-countrymen give up the
unequal contest. Nevertheless he countermanded the order, and once more sent
forth the call to arms. But to alter the fate of his country was beyond his
power, although the sanguinary strife was prolonged till December, incessantly
renewed, like the battles in the Peninsula, with extreme bitterness on either
side. At length Andreas Hofer was betrayed into the hands of the French; and,
after a trial by martial law, he was shot at Mantua, on February 21, 1810. He
maintained his heroic demeanour to the last, and himself gave his executioners
the word to fire. The revolt of the Tyrolese, their heroic fight for their
Emperor and for the deliverance of their country, will remain for all time one
of the noblest pages in modem German history.
The rising of
Austria against Napoleon gave the signal for several efforts in Germany to
shake off the French yoke. At the end of April, 1809, in Hesse, which had
suffered heavily through the bad government of King Jerome, there was a general
rising under the leadership of Baron von Domberg, a cavalry captain. It was,
however, suppressed with much bloodshed. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt
of some officers, formerly in the Prussian service, to surprise the fortress of
Magdeburg.
More
importance attaches to the enterprise of the Prussian major, Frederick von
Schill, who already in the campaign of 1806-7 had won a
I809]
Attempts of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick. 357
reputation
for gallantry. On April 28, 1809, he left Berlin at the head of his regiment of
Hussars, and crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, in order to carry the insurrection
into Hesse and Westphalia. On May 5 he beat the French troops who had been
despatched against him from Magdeburg; on the 15th he captured the small
fortress of Domitz in Mecklenburg on the lower Elbe, meaning to move thence to
Stralsund, where he intended to await the arrival of English ships. On the
march thither, having meanwhile received reinforcements, including four guns,
he fell (May 27) upon a body of Mecklenburg troops, which he put to flight,
taking many prisoners, four standards, and two guns. On the following day
Stralsund, after a brief resistance, fell into Schill’s hands. But on May 31
some Danish and Dutch troops appeared before Stralsund and stormed it, after a
fierce fight in which most of Schill’s volunteers were killed or wounded. In
the melee Schill himself met with a soldier’s honourable death; and on
September 16, eleven officers of his corps, who had been taken prisoners, were
tried by martial law and shot, by Napoleon’s orders, on the ramparts of Wessel.
Although this attempt was doomed to failure, it at least served to rouse the
spirit of patriotism throughout the length and breadth of northern Germany, and
to kindle hatred against the alien rule of the French. Round Schill and his
brave band poetry and legend soon wove a web of popular glamour, which deepened
the feeling of common nationality throughout Germany.
The same may
be said of the heroic campaign of Duke Frederick William of Brunswick-Oels. At
the outbreak of the war, he had formed a volunteer corps in Bohemia; and at its
head, together with some Austrian troops, he invaded Saxony. On June 11 they
occupied Dresden, and after several successful combats, forced the Saxon and
Westphalian troops under King Jerome to retreat. After the armistice of Znaym,
the Duke conceived the bold plan of fighting his way to the mouth of the Weser
and there taking ship to England. On July 20 he started from Greiz with 2000 men,
and, repeatedly beating back the French troops, won his way to Brunswick, which
he entered on July 30. On the following day he and his “ Black Troop ” (so
called from their dark uniforms) again defeated the enemy, who had pressed in
hot pursuit to the very gates of his capital. Surrounded on all sides, the Duke
was forced to leave Brunswick, whence he reached the lower Weser, and embarked
with his men on board British ships at Elsfleth. His little troop became the
nucleus of the “ King’s German Legion,” which subsequently fought with much
honour under Wellington in Spain.
If it was
only indirectly that England thus did a service to the “ good cause,” she had
in the meanwhile, independently of events in Spain and Portugal, taken direct
action in the war by the expedition to the island of Walcheren. In April, 1809,
Count Starhemberg had been hastily sent to London as ambassador from the
Austrian Court, to persuade the British Cabinet, not only to grant a subsidy,
but to
undertake a
military diversion oil the German coast. After lengthy negotiations, Canning
granted a monthly subsidy of £150,000. On the other hand the British Ministry
declined the plan suggested by the Austrian Government for a landing at the
mouth of the Weser with a view to raising an insurrection in northern Germany.
They determined instead on an expedition to the Scheldt. From a military point
of view this plan was certainly not a happy one; it was chiefly dictated by
political and commercial considerations. The chief point with Great Britain was
to render Antwerp innocuous.
The
expedition did not leave the English harbours till July 28. It was in five
divisions. A fleet of 38 ships of the line, 36 frigates, and a large number of
gunboats, under Sir Richard Strachan, escorted the land-forces, which numbered
nearly 40,000 men, under Lord Chatham, who was commander-in-chief. On July 30
the army landed on the island of Walcheren; on the 31st Middelburg, Vere, and
Zierickzee capitulated. On August 1 General Fraser captured Fort Haake. The
French squadron retired up the Scheldt to Antwerp, and found safety under the
shelter of its guns. The British troops now advanced to the siege of Flushing,
the most important point on Walcheren, defended by General Mounet with 5000
men. On August 2 General Hope occupied the island of South Beveland; but the
attack upon Cadzand, opposite Flushing, failed. Flushing was by this time not
only besieged from the land side, but bombarded by the British fleet from the
sea.
Meanwhile the
French had recovered from their first shock of surprise caused by the landing
on Walcheren; and troops were rapidly despatched from all directions for the
defence of Antwerp and the Scheldt. Marshal Bemadotte took over the supreme
command. On August 16, however, Flushing was forced to capitulate. The British
forces now attempted to press on up the Scheldt; but the river was so well
guarded by its forts that they could make but little way. Meanwhile the French
fleet had been carried up the river beyond Antwerp, where it was out of reach; the
French fortifications had, by dint of great energy, been placed in a fair
condition for defence; and a large body of troops stood ready for action in the
open field. The naval and military commanders on the British side were unable
to agree as to the further course of operations; and the troops suffered
terribly from the malarial climate of Walcheren and South Beveland. On
September 2 the British ships made another attempt to sail up the Scheldt, but
without success; and on September 4 South Beveland was evacuated, after a
council of war (August 26) had decided that the expeditionary force under Sir
Eyre Coote should concentrate on Walcheren. On Sept. 14 Lord Chatham returned
to England.
The French
took no offensive measures, but left the destruction of the enemy to the
climate and to sickness. Walcheren fever, as it was called, made terrible
ravages among the British troops, so that at the end of December hardly half of
this fine force (the largest that had
ever yet
sailed from English harbours) were able to bear arms. On December 23 the
remainder, after destroying the fortifications of Flushing, left Walcheren, and
returned home. In England there was universal indignation over the result of
this expedition, which had sent so many brave soldiers to a useless death, and
swallowed up a large sum of money. In Parliament fierce attacks were made upon
the Government; but the commission of enquiry failed to come to any conclusion,
except that there had been a want of unanimity among the commanders. Eventually
the discussion led, not only to a rupture, but to a duel between Canning and
Castlereagh, in consequence of which Canning resigned office.
During many
months the peace negotiations, which had been begun at the outset of the
armistice, made no progress. More than once they were on the point of being
broken off; and a renewal of the war, for which the Empress Marie Louise
Beatrix, Archduke John, and Count Stadion were very anxious, was expected. But
presently Stadion’s influence began to pale before that of Mettemich, the
result being a disastrous dualism in the conduct of affairs, inasmuch as, since
Wagram, Mettemich had gone over to the peace party, and had ended by becoming a
keen supporter of the Napoleonic system. He was upheld by Archduke Charles,
who, immediately after the unfortunate issue of the Ratisbon campaign, had
urged the conclusion of peace. But, after the armistice, serious differences of
opinion arose between the Archduke and his Imperial brother, in consequence of
which the former resigned the supreme command and retired into private life—an
irreparable loss to Austria and her army.
In the last
week of July the pourparlers for the peace negotiations began. These were
opened at Altenburg on August 15 between Mettemich, Nugent, and Champagny. But their
course was anything but smooth. It was found impossible to accept in toto (on
this point the Emperor Francis stood firm) the conditions of Napoleon, who demanded,
in the first place, the abdication of the Emperor Francis, as well as large
concessions of territory. In the middle of September it looked as if the
Emperor of Austria had determined to continue the war, especially as a secret
Prussian envoy, Colonel von dem Knesebeck, had declared the willingness of his
sovereign to join Austria under certain conditions. Eventually, however, the
arguments in favour of peace prevailed; and on September 25 the Emperor Francis
despatched Prince Liechtenstein with Count Bubna to Napoleon’s head-quarters in
Vienna, there to conclude peace. Peace was signed at Schonbrunn on October 15.
The Peace of
Schonbrunn laid very severe conditions upon Austria. She ceded large districts
in Upper Austria, Camiola, Carinthia, and Graubiinden to Bavaria and France;
the whole of western Galicia
and part of
eastern Galicia to Russia and Saxony. Moreover, she was no longer to maintain
an army of more than 150,000 men. This treaty relegated Austria to a place
among the Powers of the second rank. Her attempt to shatter Napoleon’s
supremacy on the Continent had disastrously failed. Mettemich henceforward took
into his hands the conduct of affairs. With Stadion’s retirement Austria lost a
statesman of the first class, a man whose views were in harmony with the
spirit of his time, who would have guided, not only the foreign, but also the
domestic policy of the Austrian Empire into happier paths. The system which
Mettemich established was very different. So early as the autumn of 1809, he
was already spinning the first threads of the intrigue which led to the
marriage of the Archduchess Marie-Louise with Napoleon; and down to the year
1813 he steadily pursued a policy, in regard to foreign affairs, of
acquiescence in the supremacy of Prance; while, in regard to domestic
government, he from the outset displayed the reactionary tendencies which were
in the end to prove disastrous to Austria.
The war of
1809, unfortunate as was its immediate issue, had one notable result. It
destroyed, in the eyes of Europe, the halo of invincibility that had encircled
the head of Napoleon. It marked the beginning of the national awakening, the
first step towards the overthrow of Napoleon’s power.
THE
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM.
The promulgation of the Berlin Decree against British
commerce was one of those dramatic strokes by which Napoleon sought to double
the effect of his actions. The popular imagination was awed by the suddenness
with which the conqueror turned aside from the task of completing the ruin of
Prussia in order to launch his thunderbolt against the hitherto unassailable
islanders, and to launch it, too, from the capital of Frederick the Great. In
Napoleon’s career the element of the melodramatic frequently obtrudes itself;
but those who have observed the workings of his statecraft over a long term of
years know that the stage thunder is but the climax in a carefully prepared
situation, when the minds of all observers are in a state of tense expectancy.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Berlin Decree of November, 1806, was the
climax towards which Napoleon’s policy had long been working on one of its
best-marked lines. His power as a statesman lay in his skill in adapting to
present needs the most practical among the ideas and theories woven by the
brains of the former generation ; and the events already described enabled him
now to apply them to a large part of the Continent of Europe. The Berlin
Decree constitutes, perhaps, the highest example of a union of the practical
and theatrical in statecraft. Overwhelmed by the suddenness of the blow,
contemporaries could not see that it was but the outcome of thoughts and
efforts, whose beginnings had long been observable. Briefly stated, the idea
which took form in the Berlin Decree was to subject Great Britain to complete
commercial isolation from the Continent in order to compel her to surrender at
discretion. But this idea was by no means new. It had its beginning in the
Mercantilist theory of commerce, in the teachings of Rousseau on national
solidarity, and in the speculations of the Physiocrats.
It is
impossible here to trace in detail the development of these ideas from the time
of their inception down to the revolutionary era, when some, at least, became
political actualities. Some general remarks only can be made. French statesmen
who thought about the wider interests of commerce belonged with scarcely an
exception to the
362
Influence of the Mercantilists and Rousseau. [i660-i793
Mercantilist
school. From the time of Colbert to that of Vergennes, the greatest statesman
was he who could increase the internal resources of France, and set her free
from all dependence on the foreigner. Turgot alone swerved aside of set purpose
in the direction of freer trade with foreigners ; and his action was speedily
reversed. In concluding a treaty of commerce with Great Britain in 1786,
Calonne and Vergennes were probably influenced solely by the belief that
moderate duties would bring in a larger revenue than the prohibitive duties
formerly imposed; and that treaty cannot be looked on as a triumph of Free
Trade principles in France. The rebound towards the older fiscal methods in and
after 1792 was overpoweringly strong; and, after the outbreak of war in
February, 1793, public men of all shades of thought were ready to adopt any
conceivable means in order to ruin British commerce.
The political
theories of the age previous to the Revolution also served to convince the
thinkers of France that the struggle with Great Britain would be easily won.
The perfect State, according to Rousseau, was one that sufficed for all its
needs and could do without foreign trade. The ideal commonwealth was “ that
which can subsist without other nations, and without which every other nation
can subsist." Subsequent events emphasised the contrast here implied
between the life of a self-sufficing agricultural community and that of a
commercial State such as Britain or Holland. The agrarian reforms of the French
Revolution tended to make France more self-sufficing, while Great Britain,
under Pitt’s able guidance, was fast becoming the purveyor of the world.
The lesson
taught by Rousseau in regard to ethics and legislation had also been set forth
by the Physiocrats in the sphere of economic theory. The teachings of Quesnay
and of his followers rested on the assumption that the only true source of
national wealth was the land, and that States would prosper in proportion as
they developed agriculture and raw materials. Manufactures might be productive
of refinement and utility, but could not add to the stock of national wealth,
inasmuch as they did but change the form of existing material. Agriculture
alone, therefore, was capable of producing a clear gain to the community;
manufactures could not yield it, for they were “ sterile.” These views had no
small influence on the leaders of thought in France before the Revolution.
As a result
of these three diverse influences, there was a general tendency in 1789-93 to
exalt agriculture and depreciate commerce. It was helped on by the cult of
Lycurgus, to which Saint-Just gave so much vogue. It was probably the appeals
to the legendary life of Sparta that were most effective among the militant
Jacobins who came to power in 1793; but the speeches of members of the
Convention contain many passages which show that England was not only hated as
the abode of corrupting commerce, but also despised on the ground of economic
and political unsoundness. Some even of the Girondins
took this
view. Thus, on January 18, 1793, Kersaint, in presenting the official report of
the Committee of Defence, used these words :— “ The credit of England rests
upon fictitious wealth; the real riches
of
that people are scattered everywhere Asia,
Portugal, and Spain
are the most
advantageous markets for the productions of English industry; we should shut
those markets to the English by opening them to all the world. We must attack
Lisbon and the Brazils, and carry an auxiliary army to Tippoo Sultan. The
Republics of Italy offer you maritime prizes, the loss of which will fall on
English commerce.” In pursuance of this policy, the Convention, on September
21, 1793, excluded from French ports all goods that were not brought by French
ships or the ships of neutrals; and on October 9 and 10 all merchandise
produced in Great Britain or her colonies was proscribed throughout the French
Republic. At the same time Clootz declared that the possession of the mouths of
the Rhine was essential to the success of France in her new enterprise.
The Decree of
October 31, 1796, carried the policy of commercial war to still greater
lengths. The preamble stated that it was the duty of French legislators to
encourage French industry, and to exclude every product manufactured by the
enemy. The Act carried this into effect, and further declared that any ship
laden either in whole or in part with British goods might be seized in any
French port. A large number of goods were to be considered as British, namely,
cotton, woollen, and muslin stuffs, “ English ” carpets, buttons, cutlery,
hardware, saddlery, tanned leather, refined sugar, pottery, etc. None of these
might be exposed for sale, under pain of seizure. The same prohibition applied
to the products of India unless accompanied by certificates of the Dutch and
Danish companies, duly vises by the French consuls.
Thus, the
beginnings of the Continental System are clearly traceable in the thought and
politics of France long before the advent of Bonaparte to power. He was in turn
the pupil, the agent, and the master of the men who had long cried, in impotent
wrath, “ Delenda est Carthago ”; and no small part of his political influence
resulted from his ability to give effect to their views. At the close of his
early campaigns, he scanned the horizon for further means of carrying out the
grandiose designs sketched in outline to the Convention on the threshold of the
war. On February 23, 1798, he reported to the Directory that four courses were
possible in the war against Britain—first, to attempt an invasion; secondly, to
seize Hanover and Hamburg ; thirdly, to make an expedition to the Levant;
lastly, failing all of these, to make peace. In that year he attempted the
third of these schemes. Its failure served only to popularise the methods of
commercial war; and, according to his future minister, Mollien, the mania for
the prohibition of English trade was never greater than at the beginning of the
Consulate.
The Peace of
Amiens brought about no resumption of friendly
trading
relations. On the renewal of war in 1803 the First Consul seized Hanover, and
sought to control Hamburg. After the failure of his schemes for the invasion of
England and his triumph over Austria at Austerlitz, he recurred to the plan of
controlling northern Germany. By skilfully offering Hanover to the Court of
Berlin, he sought to range Prussia under what he now termed his “
coast-system.” The experiment of bribing Prussia to take his side having
failed, he used force against her in order to ensure the same result. As a
victor he launched from Berlin the famous Decree soon to be described in
detail. The reappearance of Russia in the field afforded him still wider
opportunities; and the Peace of Tilsit gave him the prospect of arraying
against the mistress of the seas forces vaster by far than had ever entered
into the conceptions of the men of 1793. Yet, in reality, the Continental
System existed in embryo in the minds of the Anglophobes of the Convention; and
the Napoleonic Empire of the years 1810-12 was, in a sense, only an index of
the strength of the ideas which have been briefly set forth.
The political
and military events of the years 1805-6, which led up to the Berlin Decree, having
been already described in previous chapters of this volume, it is needful only
to glance at a few of the accompanying incidents which show the trend of
Napoleon’s policy. The importance which he attached to the coasts of the North
Sea is seen in his determination to control Holland at all costs, in the speed
with which, after the outbreak of war, he overran Hanover, and in the means
that he adopted for the coercion of the Hanse Towns. On every occasion when
Prussia put in a claim for those cities during the bargainings of the years
1805-6, it was set aside. The conditions which he attached to his offer of
Hanover to that Power at the time of the discussions at Schonbrunn (December,
1805) point in the same direction. He insisted that, if Prussia acquired that
electorate, she must exclude British commerce from all her lands. In vain did
Frederick William III seek to escape from the cruel alternative of war with
Napoleon or war with England. On April 1,1806, he reluctantly issued an
ordinance which excluded British ships from the ports of Prussia and Hanover.
In point of
fact this, rather than the Berlin Decree, was the event which definitely
inaugurated the Continental System. It is true that Napoleon had already
compelled neutral States to exclude British commerce—for instance, in the
Treaty of Florence with the kingdom of Naples (March 28, 1801); but the present
was the first occasion on which a great Power bent beneath the pressure of his
commercial policy. The consequences were immediate and far-reaching. The
Grenville-Fox Ministry at once placed an embargo on some 400 Prussian ships
then in British harbours, declared the coasts from the Elbe to the Ems to be in
a state of blockade (April 8,1806), and thirteen days later launched a
declaration
of war against Prussia. An Order in Council of May 16, however, declared that
the ports of the north-west of Germany and of Holland would not be closed to
neutral ships, provided that they had not come from, or were not sailing to,
one of the enemy’s ports, and carried none of his goods and no contraband of
war. Only on the coast between Ostend and the mouth of the Seine would the
blockade be strictly enforced. On May 21 the British Government further
declared that it would stop no ship in the Baltic Sea; and on September 25 it
threw open the navigation between the Ems and the Elbe. Evidently it was the
intention of the British Government, while upholding its rights, to subject
neutrals to as little inconvenience as possible. The causes of friction between
the United States and Prance and England having been discussed in a previous
volume of this work, they need not be further referred to here.
Such was the
state of’ affairs when, on November 21, 1806, Napoleon launched his Berlin
Decree. The preamble stated that, whereas Great Britain did not recognise
International Law as observed by civilised nations, but extended her
hostilities to ships engaged in commerce, to peaceful individuals, and to their
property on board merchant ships, and declared coasts to be blockaded on which
she had not a single war-ship— measures which aimed at ruining the world’s
commerce to the advantage of her own—therefore Napoleon had resolved to apply
against her the measures of her own maritime code. Accordingly he declared the
British Isles to be in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce and
correspondence with them. All British subjects found in any country occupied by
French or allied troops were liable to imprisonment, their merchandise and
property being also considered lawful prize. Half the proceeds of such acts of
confiscation were to be used to indemnify merchants for losses sustained
through captures made by British cruisers. The Decree further declared that no
ship coming from Great Britain or her colonies would be received in French or
allied ports, and ordered the confiscation of ship and cargo whenever false
statements were made on this head. The Decree was communicated at once to the
Governments of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria, and its adoption was
expected as a sign of friendship to Napoleon; while every Government that made
peace with him was thenceforth expected to comply with this and the later
enactments of his Continental System.
The British
Government, seeing in this Decree a deliberate attempt to cut off British trade
with the Continent, retaliated by the Order in Council of January 7, 1807. The
preamble stated that, whereas the French Government, in violation of the usages
of war, sought to prohibit the commerce of all neutral nations with Great
Britain and the acceptance of her merchandise by them, His Majesty would be
justified in enforcing a similar prohibition of all commerce with France. He
would, however, restrict the retaliation, and accordingly ordered that no
vessel
366
The Warsaw Decree. British Orders in Council. [1807
should be
permitted to trade between two ports whence British ships were excluded; any
ship so trading would be warned to discontinue her voyage, and, if she
persisted, would be captured and become lawful prize. Napoleon replied to this
Order in Council by a Decree, dated Warsaw, January 25, 1807, which ordered the
confiscation of all British merchandise and British colonial products seized
in the Hanseatic cities—an action which led to the renewal of the British
blockade of the coast between the mouths of the Elbe and the Ems.
The
provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7,1807) having brought Prussia,
Russia, and Denmark into collision with Great Britain, the King’s Government
adopted severer measures against the States that were included in the hostile
league. An Order in Council of November 11,
1807, declared that, whereas the Order in Council of
January 7,1807, had not had the desired effect of compelling the enemy to
withdraw the decrees against British trade or of inducing neutral nations to
interpose to procure their withdrawal, but they were being enforced with
increased rigour, His Majesty therefore ordered that, with certain exceptions,
all ports whence British ships and goods were excluded should thenceforth be
subject to the same restrictions in regard to trade and navigation as if they
were actually blockaded by a British naval force. That is to say, the Order
reasserted the legal validity of a blockade which in most cases would be merely
fictitious. All trade in articles produced by countries excluding British ships
and goods, or by their colonies, was to be considered unlawful; and all ships
trading to or from the said countries or their colonies, together with all
merchandise and produce belonging thereto, were thenceforth to be lawful prize.
Neutral ships that, prior to receiving notice of the present Order, had set
sail from any port excluding British goods, and were destined for another port
hostile to Great Britain, were to be warned by His Majesty’s ships or privateers
to discontinue such voyage and to proceed to a British port; if they
disregarded such warning, they might be seized and confiscated. The same Order
in Council granted certain exceptions in favour of neutral ships; but, in a
later clause, it threatened the penalty of confiscation against any ship on
which were found French “certificates of origin,” that is, whose papers
declared the cargo to be non-British. This clause must be pronounced harsh and
overbearing*
A second
Order in Council, also of November 11, 1807, held out certain inducements to
neutral ships to trade with Great Britain. It relaxed the stringency of the old
Navigation Acts in a way that had been foreshadowed by the statute 43 George
III, “for permitting certain goods imported into Great Britain to be secured in
warehouses without payment of duty ”; it also allowed (but did not compel)
neutral ships, which, owing to the operation of the foregoing Order in Council,
had been obliged to put in at a British harbour, to discharge goods from an enemy’s
country on the usual conditions, so far as concerned duties and
“ drawbacks.”
Merchandise thus imported might also be bonded and thereafter re-exported on
the receipt of an official certificate. A third Order in Council of the same
date declared the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral to be null and
void at law. Orders in Council of November 25,1807, extended trading facilities
to neutral ships plying between British ports and hostile ports in the West
Indies or America, also between the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man,
Gibraltar, or Malta, and any hostile port not actually blockaded by British
ships. It was further decreed on the same date that the ships of Prussia,
Liibeck, and Portugal, which had been captured or were liable to capture, owing
to their compliance with French demands, should be released or held to be not
subject to detention or seizure.
An
examination of the text of these Orders in Council, which differ widely from
the travesties of fact too often presented in histories, suffices to show that
the British Government, while pressing severely on all States which freely
placed their resources at the disposal of Napoleon, yet sought to lessen the
hardships of those on which the Continental System was imposed by force. The
facilities granted to neutrals were clearly of such a kind as to disprove the
charge that George Ill’s Government deliberately sought to ruin neutral
commerce. On the contrary, it sought to attract neutral ships to British
harbours, but only on conditions which contravened Napoleon’s decrees. The aim
clearly was not to ruin neutral commerce, but to make the Continental System
odious to neutrals.
Information
touching the Orders in Council of November 11, 1807, reached Napoleon at Milan
on December 16. During his tour in Italy he had received news of the triumphant
entry of his troops into Lisbon, the arrival of the Russian squadron in the
Tagus, Alexander’s declaration of war against Great Britain, and the departure
of the greater part of the British force from Sicily. His letters and his
actions of December 7-17 show that he expected the speedy collapse of England’s
power. The second Milan Decree, that of December 17 (the first is unimportant),
must be read in the light of this belief. The preamble stated that the British
Order in Council of November 11 subjected all neutral ships, not only to the
right of search exercised by British cruisers, but also to a forced stay in a
British port and a compulsory impost on the cargo; and that such conduct would
“denationalise” the ships of every neutral Power and cover with infamy every
nation that allowed it. Napoleon therefore decreed that every ship undergoing
such search or compulsory voyage to a British port was thereby denationalised,
and would be considered lawful prize if captured by French or allied vessels;
any ship, of whatever nation, sailing from any British port or from countries
occupied by British troops, would count as good prize if taken by a French
war-sh*p or privateer. The Decree asserted that these measures, being designed
as a just retaliation for the barbarous code adopted in London, would not apply
to nations that caused their flags to be
respected* at
sea, but would otherwise be valid until England returned to the principles of
International Law. Napoleon’s reference to the first Order in Council of
November 11 can only be described as a deliberate misrepresentation. That Order
did not seek to compel all neutral ships to put in at British ports and pay a
tonnage duty. The clause now travestied by the Emperor merely declared that
neutral ships which, at the time of setting sail, had not received notice of
that Order in Council, should be warned not to continue their voyage to a port
hostile to Great Britain, but to proceed to some British port. Obviously this
could apply only to a few ships, and for a limited time. The second Order in
Council of that date, however, granted facilities to neutrals trading with
England; and it is clear that this proceeding annoyed Napoleon. An earlier
letter shows his anxiety on this head. On October 13 he wrote to Gaudin, his
Finance Minister, stating that the British had just raised the blockade of the
Elbe and the Weser, evidently because they were using neutral ships for their
export trade and wished to avail themselves of that coast. He charged Gaudin to
take advice as. to the adoption of measures to “prevent this contraband in the
Elbe, which is so advantageous to the English.” The result was seen in the
French Decree of November 13, ordering the seizure on that coast of any ship
that had touched at a British port.
The Milan
Decree of December 17, 1807, was an extension of this policy. of putting an end
to the export of British produce on neutral vessels; and it was the events of
November and December which encouraged Napoleon to couch his orders in the
arrogant language of that edict. In view of the aggrandisement of his power,
which then extended over all harbours from Memel to Ragusa, the Decree was by
no means a piece of schoolboy declamation, as Lanfrey has termed it. The year
1807 had seen the balance turn decidedly in favour of Napoleon. The only
successes of importance gained by England were the capture of Curafoa and
Heligoland (January and September), and the withdrawal of the Danish and
Portuguese fleets from Napoleon’s sphere of control. On the other hand, the
British expeditions to the Dardanelles, Alexandria, Montevideo, and Stralsund
had all failed. The Spanish rising was not then foreseen; and Napoleon might
well imagine that the pressure exerted by the Milan Decree on the harbours of
nearly the whole Continent must be fatal to the power of England.
Apart from
the Order in Council of April 26, 1809, which restricted the limits of the
British blockade to Holland, France, aud Italy, the belligerents did little to
alter their rules in the years 1808 and 1809. They bent themselves to the task
of extending, or secretly modifying, the operation of the existing decrees. As
has been stated above, Napoleon had forced Austria to accede to the Continental
System (February 28, 1808), had annexed Etruria and the Papal Legations
(January and April), and had occupied a large part of Spain with
French
troops. The colonial conquests achieved by Great Britain served in part to
redress the balance between the Land Power and the Sea Power; but the latter
was in great danger until the Spanish rising of 1808 opened the way for an
alliance with Spain.
That great
event also served to consolidate public opinion in Great Britain. Latterly it
had begun to incline towards peace, as appeared in the petitions from Leeds,
Bolton, and other manufacturing towns, where the distress was very great. Such
petitions ceased when the alliance with the Spanish patriots revived the
national hopes. The struggle now became a struggle on behalf of the national freedom
of the Spaniards; it also promised to open up markets that had hitherto been
closed, for it concerned not Spain alone but also her colonies. Every victory
of the patriots and of Wellesley widened the area within which British goods
were accepted in the Peninsula; and the news of these successes soon decided
the Governments of central and southern America to open their ports to British
trade. Unfortunately the Spanish Regency and Cortes, or the governors whom they
sent out* sought to impose the old restraints on foreign trade; and this
embittered the disputes and civil strifes which arose. For a time, however, the
opening of the ports of central and southern America enabled British merchants
to withstand the otherwise unendurable strain caused by Napoleon’s policy.
Those markets were, however, glutted with British goods in the course of the
year 1810; and many firms that had counted on a continuance of the South
American trade were ruined. “ Speculative exports to South America are the rock
upon which these houses have split.” Such is the gist of the commercial report
of August, 1810, describing the cause and the growth of the grave financial
crisis of that year. The value even of Bank of England notes fell sharply; and
the loss on exchange with foreign countries, averaged 30 per cent.
Several
causes conspired to bring about this result. The disgraceful failure of the
Walcheren expedition in the previous year, Napoleon’s triumph over Austria, and
his marriage with Marie-Louise of Austria in April, 1810, the seeming inability
of Wellesley and the Spanish patriots to make head against the French in the
Peninsula, and finally the annexation of Holland, served to produce a general
feeling of despondency.
It had always
been a fundamental axiom of Napoleon’s political belief that French influence
must be paramount in Holland. Every accession to his power was marked by some
change in Franco-Dutch relations more and more prejudicial to the freedom of
the little State. The Franco-Dutch treaty of May 24, 1806, guaranteed to
Holland (then assigned to Louis Bonaparte) its independence and integrity; yet
the hand of the Emperor soon pressed heavily upon it. In theory the monarchy
was constitutional, but the attribution of all executive power to the King
made it practically absolute. Louis however
resolved to
rule in the interests of the Dutch. By his, care of the dykes, the canals, and
the commercial interests of his people, and by his mitigation of the
conscription, he succeeded in earning the gratitude of his subjects and the
rebukes of the Emperor. His chief difficulty lay in the finances, the public
expenditure being three times as great as the revenue ; and his appeals to
Napoleon for financial relief met with ironical replies or recommendations to
effect a reduction of the state debt.
But the chief
cause of friction lay in the application of the Continental System to an
essentially maritime State. Louis had to bear many bitter reproaches for his
failure to seal up the Dutch coasts against British merchandise. “ You attach
too high a price to popularity in Holland,” wrote Napoleon on December 3, 1806.
“ Before being kind, you must be the master. You have seen by my message to the
Senate and by my Decree that I mean to conquer the sea by the land. You must
follow this system.” During his sojourn at Erfurt in October,
1808, the Emperor threatened to close the mouths of
the Rhine and the Scheldt unless Louis put an end to all trade with England; at
present, wrote Napoleon, a hundred ships a month left the Dutch shores for
those of the enemy.
By the end of
the campaign of 1809 Napoleon had resolved, to annex the kingdom outright; and
in November of that year he wrote to Champagny to that effect. In his
declaration of policy to the Legislative Body, he stated that Holland was
crushed between France and England, and that she formed a necessary outlet to
one of the great arteries of the Empire. On December 21, 1809, Louis (then at
Paris) received an acrid communication (omitted from the official
Correspondance) to the effect that he might retain his crown if he would
prohibit British commerce, maintain a fleet of fourteen sail of the line and
seven frigates, and an army of 25,000 men. The letter warned him, however, of
the probability of the annexation of Holland as the most fatal blow that could
be dealt to England. In order to double the force of this threat, Napoleon on
January 3,1810, annexed the island of Walcheren, ordered his troops to invade
Holland, and forcibly occupied Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. The Dutch prepared to
resist; but Louis, prostrate with illness, bent before his brother’s demands,
thus staving off for a moment the inevitable blow.
Meanwhile
Napoleon, being desirous of using his hold on Holland in order to browbeat the
British Government, urged Louis to set on foot negotiations through the medium
of a Dutch banker, Labouchere, son- in-law of the banker Baring, with a view to
intimidating England by the prospect of the entire annexation of Holland. Louis
returned to his kingdom on April 11, 1810; and the negotiations began.
Labouchere had some interviews with the Marquis Wellesley, Canning’s successor,
who saw through the design. Nevertheless he allowed the negotiation to proceed,
even though Labouchere had no official credentials. The affair was rendered memorable
by the intrigue secretly carried on by Fouche,
the French
Minister of Police, who sent over an agent named Fagan, and afterwards sought,
through the medium of a financier, Ouvrard, to sound the British Ministry on
the subject of a possible accommodation. Napoleon was enraged when, at the end
of May, he discovered the unparalleled effrontery of his Minister. He
disgraced him and ordered him to live in retirement in his sbiatorerie of
Provence.
These
negotiations delayed but did not avert the doom of Louis and of his kingdom.
Even while they were still on foot, Napoleon insisted on the cession of the
lands south of the Rhine, the observance of a more stringent fiscal decree,
which had been promulgated on May 13, and the confiscation of several American
ships which Louis had allowed to enter his harbours. Under these provocations,
the patience of Louis and of his subjects gave way. Disturbances took place, in
the course of which an insult was offered to the coachman of the French
ambassador in Amsterdam. At once Napoleon withdrew his ambassador, instructed
the charge d'affaires who remained to “ keep the quarrel open,” and sent his
troops into Holland. For a brief space Louis thought of calling his people to
arms; but, on his counsellors pointing out the hopelessness of such an effort,
he resolved to abdicate. After drawing up the deed of abdication in favour of
his son (the elder brother of the future Napoleon III) and writing a touching
farewell to his counsellors, he set out secretly on the night of July 1, and
fled to Toplitz in Bohemia. An Imperial edict of July 9, 1810, decreed the
annexation of Holland to the French Empire. The French commercial decrees were
at once put in force, and colonial produce was confiscated.
The
annexation of Holland and the consequent cessation of Anglo- Dutch commerce
added to the depression everywhere felt in Great Britain. To increase the
trials of the people, the harvest of the year 1810 was a nearly total failure;
that of 1809 having been deficient, there were no reserves of com; and in
August, the price of wheat averaged 116 shillings the quarter. Most
fortunately, Napoleon did not adopt the device of stopping the export of grain.
As is shown by his letters of February 8, July 16, and August 6, 1810, he suspended
its exportation from his States only when he feared the approach of dearth ;
when reassured on this point, he sought to increase his revenue by allowing the
export of com, subject to a considerable duty, even to England. He confined his
hostility almost entirely to the exports from England. Ships that received his
licenses to export French, Polish, or Italian com or other produce were not
allowed to bring back goods from England, except such as were needed for the
French and allied navies.
As a result
of these curious arrangements, England survived the time of dearth, which might
otherwise have become actual famine. Owing to the onesidedness of Napoleon’s
commercial system, the command of tropical lands which Great Britain enjoyed,
and the policy embodied in the Order in Council of November 11, 1807, vast
stores of goods
accumulated
in bonded warehouses at her ports. Ultimately this circumstance was destined
to tell favourably on the nation’s industries, but for the present it
embarrassed the mercantile interest. The official report, dated March 7, 1811,
of the parliamentary committee appointed to enquire into the distress of the
autumn and winter of 1810-1, traced it partly to the excessive amount of goods
thus imported, which had helped to bring about a sharp fall in prices, ranging
from 40 to 50 per cent, in Lancashire goods. It further stated that the opening
of new docks and the granting of facilities for placing goods in bond had
attracted neutral commerce to an unexampled extent; and that the produce of San
Domingo and of the newly conquered colonies came almost wholly to British
harbours. “ From Europe the importations from places from which the British
flag is excluded have been immense.”
The tone of
the report is clearly optimistic. It sought to minimise the present distress,
and omitted to state that in November, 1810, the number of bankruptcies had
been 273, nearly three times the average number. Nevertheless, in the main, its
contentions were justified by events. The facts which it adduced as to the
increase in the value of the exports of cotton goods (from £9,846,889 in 1808
to £18,616,723 in 1810) showed that this industry was successfully grappling
with the strange conditions of the time, and had found in the new colonial
markets a recompense for the partial loss of those of Europe. Indeed all clearsighted
observers could see that the stores of colonial and tropical merchandise
brought to British harbours would enable manufacturers, with the recent
inventions of Watt, Crompton, and Cartwright at their disposal, to produce
goods whose abundance, excellence, and cheapness would more than counteract the
effect of the Napoleonic Decrees.
Napoleon
failed to notice the operation of these wider causes that made for the triumph
of England in the commercial war; he saw only her present difficulties. In the
English newspapers he read of the misery and discontent of a large part of her
operatives, the spread of insolvency, and the rapid growth of taxation and of
the National Debt. Mollien, Minister of the French Treasury, states that nearly
all the Emperor’s advisers pointed jubilantly to the fact that British
merchants lost 30 per cent, on exchange in their trade with the Continent, as a
sure sign of the forthcoming collapse of that Power. This consideration probably
furnished Napoleon with another inducement in favour of allowing com and some
other products to enter her ports. His great aim was to deplete the stores of
bullion in London, lower the rate of exchange, and in every way undermine
British credit. Finally, the old Jacobin illusion as to the inherent
artificiality of England’s position induced him, in the latter half of the year
1810, to adopt in succession three measures, which, it appeared, must humble
his rival in the dust. These were the Trianon Tariff of August 5, the
Fontainebleau Decrees of October 18 and 25, and the annexation of the
north-west coast of Germany at the close of 1810.
1810]
Trianon Tariff. Seizure of British ships.
373
The first of
these devices arose, apparently, from a growing conviction that, despite his
efforts to keep neutrals from trading with his enemy, all colonial products
brought to Europe came from British colonies, being fraudulently sent by
British merchants under cover of neutral flags. In his curious letter of August
20 to Lebrun, Napoleon states that in reality there are no neutral ships, for
they all “ pay ransom ” to the English and transgress his rules. He also
admits, in a letter of September 2, to Davout, that the “certificates of
origin” mean nothing; they are all forgeries. Accordingly, he determined to tax
all colonial imports. On the annexation of Holland and the confiscation of
British goods, he hfid allowed Dutch merchants to send their colonial products
into France on payment of a duty of 50 per cent, ad valorem; and they availed
themselves of these terms. This seems to have convinced him that that class of
goods could everywhere bear the same high duty, and that its imposition would
serve to check smuggling on the coasts and frontiers, benefit the revenue, and
equalise prices. Therefore, while staying at the Trianon, he devised the tariff
of August 5; but its existence was kept secret and for a short time disavowed.
It subjected every kilogramme of these articles to the following
duties—American cotton 8 frs.; Levant cotton 4 frs. if imported by sea, and 2
frs. if imported by land; other cottons 6 frs.; cane-sugar 3 frs.; refined
sugar 4 frs.; China tea 9 frs.; green tea 6 frs.; other teas 1 fr. 50 c.;
coffee 4 frs.; indigo 9 frs.; etc. The average duty was about 50 per cent, ad
valorem. In order to impose this tariff on his subject States, he sent secret
agents to watch the chief trading centres of Germany and Poland, and to prepare
for the seizure of illicit goods. He also sought to induce Prussia and Russia
to adopt the same tariff, urging the great benefits that must accrue to their
treasuries, solely at the expense of British merchants and smugglers. Frederick
William obeyed his behest; but the Tsar refused to go beyond the terms agreed
on at Tilsit. Napoleon further announced that all depots containing such wares
and situated within four days’ distance of the frontiers of the Empire were
liable to seizure; and he accordingly confiscated great stores of merchandise
at Stuttgart, Frankfort, Bern, and elsewhere.
Fortune
placed a great prize in his power during the autumn. A large convoy of ships,
which were nominally neutral but were laden with British goods, had sailed for
the Baltic, in the hope of gaining the admission to Russian, Swedish, and Prussian
ports that was still usually accorded. A long spell of easterly winds and the
political uncertainties of the time kept them for some weeks near the Sound;
whereupon Napoleon urged the Baltic Powers to confiscate the ships and cargoes.
On October 19 he threatened to march against Prussia if she did not comply; and
four days later he wrote to the Tsar in terms almost equally urgent, stating
that England was in extremities, that her 600 merchantmen, now wandering about
the Baltic, had been refused admission by Prussia, and that similar action on
the part of Russia would help to end
374
Fontainebleau Decrees.—Fresh annexations. [isio
the war.
Alexander yielded to the insistance of his ally, and confiscated many of the
ships; Prussia and Sweden acted in the same way. A memorial sent by British
merchants to the Tsar, and dated May 8, 1816, states that the cargoes then
confiscated in Russia were valued at £1,500,000, and that this was the first
occasion on which commerce between the two States had suffered serious loss.
On October 18
and 25, 1810, Napoleon issued the famous Fontainebleau Decrees. The first
ordered that all British manufactured goods found in the Napoleonic States
should be seized and publicly burnt; the second established forty-one tribunals
for the trial of persons guilty of introducing illicit wares and for the reward
of informers and others who helped in their seizure. These Decrees provoked
great discontent. At Frankfort the French garrison held the chief points of the
city while the seizure and burning of goods went on ; and everywhere men
prepared to do without colonial goods rather than pay the exorbitant prices
which the harassed dealers were compelled to charge. Hitherto the Continental
System had not brought actual privations to the trading classes and their
patrons. Indeed, some towns near the coast of the North Sea had even benefited
from the contraband trade in British goods. Stiive, an eminent citizen of
Osnabriick in the kingdom of Westphalia, states in his memoirs that in the years
1808-9 long trains of waggons used to bring these wares from the coast through
that city on their way into central Europe and France, and that King Jerome
himself connived at this profitable contraband trade. But the seizures and
burnings of British produce in the autumn of 1810 ushered in an era of
terrorism and want, which reached its climax for all true patriots when the
north-west of that kingdom was annexed to the French Empire, along with the
whole of the north-west coast of Germany, including the free city of Liibeck
(Dec. 10, 1810).
This event,
together with the absorption of the Bepublic of Valais, resulted from
Napoleon’s determination absolutely to control the trade centres of northern
Germany and the Simplon road into Italy. He found from the reports of Davout at
Hamburg that British and colonial merchandise came in from Heligoland and other
small islands; while the coast of Oldenburg was a favourite resort of
smugglers. The Emperor now pushed the policy of “ Thorough ” against Great
Britain to its logical conclusion, in the manner described. The official
statement accompanying the decree of annexation averred that that measure was
“commanded by circumstances. The immense stores at Heligoland threatened ever
to flow into the Continent, if a single point remained open to English trade on
the coasts of the North Sea, and if the mouths of the Jahde, Weser, and Elbe
were not closed against it for ever.” None of the Emperor’s acts caused more
alarm than this. By the same reasoning, any coast-line of Europe where British
goods were smuggled in could be annexed forthwith. Prussia was in no position
to offer a protest; but the Tsar soon manifested his annoyance at the summary
dethronement
of his brother-in-law, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. As will appear later, the
Oldenburg affair, coming at a time when Alexander was beset by the complaints
of his mercantile classes at the stoppage of all trade with England, paved the
way for the war of 1812.
The growth
and completion of the Continental System having been traced, it remains to
advert, as fully as limits of space will permit, to the relaxations of their
fiscal and maritime codes which both combatants permitted themselves to make
under the guise of licenses. These were first granted by the British Government,
which in the year 1806 began to allow neutrals to trade in a manner ostensibly
forbidden by the Orders in Council. The practice being found to be convenient
for the export of British merchandise, as many as 2606 licenses were granted in
the year 1807; in the year 1809 the number exceeded 15,000, and in the
following year, 18,000. The greater number were allotted to neutrals or merely
nominal enemies, as Sweden, Prussia, and Russia, which were thereby freed from
search and detention by British cruisers at sea. On arriving at their
destination, the masters could produce their other papers, which freed ship and
cargo from confiscation under Napoleon’s edicts. This soon led to the practice
of having two complete sets of papers, those only being produced which procured
immunity from confiscation whether at sea or in harbour. A judge in the British
Court of Admiralty stated in 1809 that the whole carrying trade of the world
was being carried on under licenses, chiefly in hostile bottoms. The protests
of British shipowners against this system and the capture of nearly 600
fraudulent neutrals in the Baltic in the autumn of 1810 led to its decline
after that time. Justice Phillimore, a severe critic of the system, blamed it
as being contrary to the British Navigation Laws and unjust to honest neutrals,
especially the United States, and as tending to foster bad faith and to place
dangerously wide powers in the hands of officials. He states that licenses were
often sold by British importers to their clients abroad, as much as 700
rix-dollars being paid for one by a merchant at Amsterdam. The merchants of
Hull, in a memorial to Parliament (1812), also complained that licenses granted
to our enemies had been the means of transferring to them a great part of the
trade of that port. The only defence for the practice was that the Orders in
Council could not be carried out rigidly, and that licenses facilitated British
trade with the Continent, though at the cost of severe loss to British
shipowners.
Napoleon
adopted somewhat analogous expedients in the years 1809-10; but his licenses
were granted mainly for the export of French, Italian, German, or Prussian
merchandise on ships of those countries. In August, 1810, at the time of the
Trianon Tariff, he extended the system, allowing the importation of sugar,
coffee, etc., into French harbours, on condition that French manufactures of at
least equal value were exported. Thenceforth he and his officials strove to
stimulate trade
by these
means; large bribes were given by merchants for the grant of licenses on
favourable terms, and the silk trade derived some benefit from these
expedients; but the whole system speedily became a synonym for misplaced
activity, favouritism, and corruption.
The warping
influence exerted by the license system of the two combatants on their maritime
and fiscal policy makes it difficult to come to any clear judgment on the
efficacy of that policy in either case. The facts as to the internal economy of
the French Empire at the crisis of the struggle (1810-1) are even more
difficult of interpretation. The working of the Fiscal Decrees varied greatly
at different times and places, according to the deviations allowed by the
Emperor and the corruptibility of officials. The official statistics
respecting commerce and industry are also open to suspicion. Freedom of the
press did not exist; and few persons ventured openly to complain, or to
petition against grievances.
There is
another disturbing factor that makes it difficult to form a conclusion as to
the causes of French prosperity in the years 1806-10. In a land where the
absurdities of the old agrarian system and the iniquities of taxation had
crippled the working classes at every turn, prosperity was certain to increase
as soon as the revolutionary legislation had time to take effect. For various
reasons this did not take place until the time of the Consulate. The Napoleonic
Empire therefore garnered the harvest sown by the men of 1789. The vastness of
the area now thrown open to the operations of commerce, contrasting strongly
with the restricted provincial areas existing before 1789, was another
condition highly favourable to national prosperity; but it might be argued that
the remarkable vitality of France during the Empire was due not so much to the
Emperor as to the members of the Constituent Assembly, who struck the shackles
from agriculture, industry, and commerce. In and after the year 1806 Napoleon
imposed unheard-of restraints on foreign commerce, even on the operations of
the com trade, the supervision of which he held to be “the most important and
the most delicate ” duty for a ruler. The whole fabric of the Continental
System rested on his conviction that, in the words of his Minister, Chaptal, he
could make commerce “manoeuvre like a regiment.” The history of modem nations
tends to show that such a policy is harmful in the main, however much it may
stimulate particular industries.
The impact of
Napoleon’s forceful intelligence upon the industries of his 45,000,000 subjects
led unquestionably to some beneficial results. When his Decrees practically
excluded colonial wares, he sought to make the Empire entirely independent of
them. Most characteristic and memorable was his action in regard to sugar. When
it seemed that sugar must become an expensive luxury (it sold at six francs the
pound in Paris in 1810) he charged his chemists to devise a substitute. The
result is well known. A slight success was achieved in the making of
grape-sugar by the chemist Proust; but the experiments of Barruel,
Isnard,
Delessert, Chaptal, and others led to a noteworthy triumph in the perfecting of
the somewhat defective processes of manufacturing sugar from beetroot already
attempted by Achard in Germany. As soon as the new methods were known to be
practically successful, Napoleon issued a decree (March 25, 1811), whereby
32,000 hectares (about
80,000 acres) were to be planted with beetroot
for this purpose, six experimental schools bt’ng also founded for the
instruction of scholars in the details of culture and manufacture. The most
suggestive clause of the decree, however, is that in which he ordained the
entire prohibition of cane-sugar coming from “the two Indies” on and after
January 1, 1813, because it might be assumed to be of British origin. Similar
success having attended the production of a kind of indigo from woad, the same
decree ordered the cultivation of woad on a large scale, the founding of four
experimental schools in connexion with that industry, and the entire exclusion
of the indigo of the two Indies after the above-mentioned date. Other efforts,
more or less successful, were made to thrust upon manufacturers throughout the
whole of the Empire the use of certain Italian products.
Some
districts benefited by these Procrustean methods; and their gratitude was loudly
proclaimed through the official press. The attempt, however, to force the
produce of the Mediterranean by way of the Alpine passes to Mainz and Frankfort
and thence throughout central Europe was clearly foredoomed to failure. A
German, Eilers, who travelled down the Rhine in 1812, describes the stagnation
of trade owing to the irritating trade regulations that prevailed; and from
other sources it appears that the districts which now form the Rhine Province
persisted in clinging to trade with Germany and reaped little benefit from the
opening up of commerce with the French Empire. Baron Pasquier well sums up the
result of Napoleon’s experiment in the statement that genius, even in its
vagaries, produces memorable results; and that French industry and perseverance,
supported by a million bayonets and an auxiliary force of douaniers, and thanks
to the relief now and again afforded by the Imperial licenses, succeeded in
meeting the needs of an enormous consumption.
The success
of the Continental System and with it the fortunes of Napoleon depended,
however, not so much on France as on her subject lands and allies. Unless every
one of them consented to endure the hardships which it imposed until Great
Britain surrendered, the whole experiment was doomed to failure. Napoleon, with
his usual discernment, had always assigned the first importance to a complete
control of the coasts of the North Sea, and secondly to those of the Baltic, a
fact which determined the general trend of his diplomacy after the renewal of war
with England. Even down to the close of the campaign of 1813 he clung
tenaciously to Hamburg, as being the natural inlet for British goods into
central Europe. It will be well, then, briefly to review
the condition
of that free city while under his control. At first the trade of Hamburg
suffered little from the French occupation, which began in 1806. The French
Minister, Bourrienne, was found to be open to bribes; and the compilers of the
memoirs bearing his name assert that he did good service to his countrymen
campaigning in Poland in
1807, by granting permission to German merchants
secretly to procure
50,000 cloaks from England. He is said to have
received altogether the sum of 558,000 francs from the city, besides a million
more from merchants for immunities and licenses granted by him. Moreover, the
proximity of the Danish port of Altona presented facilities for the smuggling
of goods into Hamburg; and the sympathy of the whole population with the
smugglers rendered the Berlin and Milan Decrees almost inoperative down to the
year 1810. Lloyd, a British resident, states that most of the imports came in
from Altona and other parts of the coast in waggons. Women also smuggled silks,
lace, and coffee.
The advent of
Davout as commander of the French army in that part of Germany, and the
Napoleonic Decrees of the summer and autumn of the year 1810, subjected the
city to the severest hardships. In the following year more than 300 ships lay
dismantled in the harbour; out of 428 sugar refineries only one remained at
work; and all the cotton- printing works were closed. The more rapacious of the
French officials seized goods which seemed to be of English make, even when
satisfactory certificates of origin were forthcoming. Where all honest means of
livelihood languished, informers plied a brisk trade. Employees, in order to
spite their masters, were known to mix British goods with others in order to
procure the condemnation of all. In short, all the conditions that clog the
operations of trade reigned supreme in Hamburg. The extortions of the
conquerors completed its misery. French officials seized the Treasury bonds,
and confiscated a fund containing the savings of the old and the poor. The fate
of the great free city was one of unequalled severity; but everywhere
throughout Germany the Continental System produced feelings of exasperation and
fear, which had no small share in bringing about the War of Liberation.
The northern
States naturally suffered most from the exclusion of colonial goods. Italy and
France could supply several of the articles prohibited by Napoleon’s Decrees;
but the north Germans, Swedes, and Russians found no palatable substitutes for
tobacco, coffee, and sugar. The influence of this fact on the formation of
political opinion may readily be imagined. The resentment of those peoples was
directed, not against the British merchants, whose sl ips or smuggling sloops
occasionally hovered off the coasts, but against the Emperor who forbade the
importation of the comforts of life or placed them beyond the reach of all but
the most wealthy. Further, it must be noted that the export trade of those
lands had consisted mainly of bulky articles such as timber, pitch, hemp, iron,
com, etc., sent to England. These were not adapted
to contraband
trade, as were the silks and muslins of southern climes. Consequently the
export trade all but vanished, except when Napoleon, for revenue purposes,
allowed occasional shipments from Danzig.
Several
circumstances served to make Sweden the centre of important political questions
resulting from these economic facts. As has been already mentioned, Marshal
Bemadotte became Prince Royal of Sweden and heir-apparent to the throne in
August, 1810. The illness of the King speedily assured to him the chief place
in the Government. It soon became clear that he was indisposed to support the
policy of the Continental System, which had been forced on Sweden in the spring
of that year. War ensued between England and Sweden in November; but in both
countries there was no desire to resort to hostilities which were to the
interest of Napoleon alone. Thanks to the combined tact and firmness shown by
Sir James Saumarez, the British commander in the Baltic, little harm was done
to Swedish commerce; and the way was left open for reconciliation. Napoleon, on
the other hand, frequently showed his distrust of the Swedish Government,
probably because Bemadotte was already aiming at the conquest of Norway from
Denmark. The Emperor warned the King of Denmark of overtures in this connexion,
and pressed his commercial decrees rigidly on Sweden. On March 25, 1811 (a date
which marked the adoption of the harshest measures towards all the Baltic
States), he asserted that, if a single cargo of colonial goods were landed in
Swedish Pomerania, French troops would march in and establish the Imperial
douanes.
Meanwhile
Alexander I had offended Napoleon by issuing the ukase of December 81, 1810,
which virtually allowed the entry of colonial goods into Russia and prohibited
the import of certain articles of luxury. When Napoleon upbraided his ally with
this breach of the Treaty of Tilsit and sent troops eastwards, Russia and
Sweden naturally drew closer together and laid the basis of that agreement
which took definite form in the alliance of 1812. During the year 1811 the Tsar
gradually abandoned the system prohibiting the entry of British goods: and the
conclusion of peace between England and Russia in July, 1812 (as also between
England and Sweden), virtually put an end to the Continental System. Already
the British Government had repealed the Orders in Council, but too late to
avert war with the United States. Commerce, however, began to follow its normal
course in Europe, the downfall of the Continental System being assured by the
campaigns of 1812 and 1813. The great commercial experiment broke down where
failure might have been expected, namely, in Russia, Sweden, and northern
Germany.
If we may
judge from the spoken and written utterances of Napoleon, he could never bring
himself even to consider the possibility of failure. With his love of control
and his passion for the handling of vast masses of details, he faced the
problem of rearranging the commerce and industries of Europe as hopefully as he
confronted its stupendous
corollary,
the expedition to Moscow. Very characteristic was his reply, on March 24, 1811,
to a deputation from the General Councils of Commerce and Manufactures in
France, on the occasion of the birth of the King of Rome. After twitting the
deputation with its lugubrious opinions, he proceeded to j’istify the
Continental System and stated that in about six months his sword would pierce
England to the heart. As for his tariff, it would remain unchanged, for it did
the utmost harm to British trade. The French Empire would soon produce enough
sugar, indigo, and, perhaps, cotton, to do without imports of those articles;
and Europe would no longer need trade with England and the colonies. Then,
turning to the manufacturers, he blamed them for making too many goods and at
too high a price. They had France, Italy, Germany, and a part of Spain open to
them ; that ought to satisfy their wants if they paid attention to the demand.
As for England, she would soon be bankrupt. Austria was actually insolvent, and
Russia was following her in that path. France alone had stores of bullion in
the Bank. The whole address illustrates his proneness to illusions on the
subject of commerce. That wise counsellor, Mollien, often noted that his master
had failed to grasp some of its essential facts; and the Emperor’s letters
yield proof that he believed the extreme dearness of colonial wares in Europe
to be more harmful to the English vendor than to the continental consumer—a
notion as mistaken as his suggestion that the confiscation of those products
would be a good way of replenishing the coffers of Prussia, Westphalia, and
Naples.
The course of
events was to prove that nothing could shake his belief in the efficacy of
these suicidal devices. State after State was flung into the crucible of his
mighty experiment; yet the looked-for result never came. Finally, in his
constant straining after the one final expedient that must assure the ruin of
England, he came to the death- grapple with Russia. It is difficult to believe
that this was the man who, in other domains of thought, sneered at ideologues.
He himself was the chief ideologue, the supreme dupe, of the age. As he looked
round on the Europe of his day, he took no count of the mighty forces of the
industrial revolution that then were girding England with the strength of youth
and were connecting all parts of the world by indissoluble ties; what he
beheld was a mirage conjured up by his vivid fancy and boundless egotism.
Having
reviewed the causes that determined the final hostility of the peoples of the
north and centre of Europe to Napoleon’s policy, we may now glance briefly at
the influence exerted by the combatants on certain points on the fringe of the
Napoleonic system. While the French Emperor had the advantage of the central
position in his commercial warfare with England, her efforts were necessarily
confined to the seaboard and to certain outlying parts of Europe. She acted
from
Heligoland, from one or two of the Danish and Frisian islets, the Channel
Isles, Lisbon, Gibraltar, Sicily, Malta, Corfu, and certain parts of the
Turkish Empire. These were, so to speak, sword-points constantly held out
against the central mass ; and, according to the laws of supply and demand,
their power to wound increased automatically as the master of the Continent
strengthened the barriers separating it from the outer world. The occupation by
the Sea Power of these points of vantage produced, in most cases, few if any
noteworthy results of a political character. But the peoples of Sicily and
Turkey were affected by the great conflict in several ways. This chapter will
therefore conclude with a brief notice of their history during this period.
The British
occupation of Sicily was destined to exercise on the Italian people a far more
abiding influence than that resulting from the long-continued presence of our
forces in the Iberian peninsula. For this fact the two following reasons may be
assigned. The Sicilians felt towards their royal House, that of the Spanish
Bourbons, none of the sentiments which the Spaniards and Portuguese felt for their
respective dynasties; and the political instincts of the townsfolk of Palermo
and Messina were more akin to those of the British people than to the
traditional policy of Ferdinand IV of Naples and his spirited Queen, Maria
Carolina. The characters and careers of that ill-matched pair having been
already described in a previous volume, it is needless to describe again the
causes which dulled the affections of their subjects. Like other islanders, the
Sicilians had always been remarkable for their clinging to ancient liberties.
The preservation of their Parliament was to them far more precious than that of
the dynasty. The Queen naively expressed the contrast between Naples and
Palermo in a letter from the latter place to her daughter: “ This is a different
country; people are constitutional; the King has not a sou without the consent
of Parliament; everything, including justice, is under dissimilar regulations
and stands on a totally different footing; but we must put up with it.” The
Parliament, it is true, was of a feudal rather than a democratic type. It
consisted of three Chambers, barons, clergy, and tenants of the Crown, the
last-named to some extent representing the chief towns. The Chambers met and
voted separately; in the House of Peers the greater barons had several votes
apiece. Parliament had the right of assembling at least once every four years;
and during the vacations a committee of three from each Chamber supervised
national expenditure and the carrying out of laws.
Such was the
framework of government in which Ferdinand IV and Maria Carolina found
themselves placed by the events of the year 1806, which deprived them of the
mainland. The efforts which Joseph Bonaparte put forth to gain Sicily would
doubtless have been crowned with success, but for the presence of British
forces at and near Messina. The danger to the Bourbon cause increased when
Joachim Murat came
to the throne
in place of Joseph Bonaparte. The “ beau sabreur ” signalised his accession by
a vigorous effort to retake Capri; with superior forces he succeeded in
overpowering Colonel Hudson Lowe’s small garrison and compelling it to
surrender (October, 1808). This and other adverse events failed to damp the
ardour of the Queen for the recovery of the mainland. The volcanic passions of
her earlier years had now sunk into a dully glowing hatred, the outcome of
opium, of her many disappointments, and of her resentment at the clownish
indifference of the King. She spent large sums in stirring up revolts in
Calabria; she maintained a small army of spies to watch every event on the
mainland; she secretly helped to equip the privateers that preyed on Neapolitan
merchantmen, and was subsequently proved to have had no small interest in the
spoils. In her growing rage at her impotence, she sent a brigand chief with 800
galley slaves to overthrow a sovereign who had Napoleon’s legions at his back;
and there are grounds for suspecting her of complicity in attempts at political
assassination at Naples. Above all she fumed ceaselessly at the prudence that
held back Sir John Stuart, commander of the British force in Sicily, from
supporting these mad enterprises. Variable in all else, she showed unvarying
dislike to the British commanders who succeeded Sir Sidney Smith on that
station; in fact, hostility to England on points of detail tended to become as
strong a motive at the Bourbon Court as hatred to Napoleon had been on the
ground of principle. The efforts of an Anglo-Sicilian expedition against the
Neapolitan coast in the year 1809 having ended in failure, the Queen was
reported to have set on foot intrigues with Murat’s agents with a view to the
eventual restoration of the mainland to Ferdinand IV, Murat receiving
compensation elsewhere.
The truth on
this matter will perhaps never be cleared up. That either Napoleon or Murat and
his consort seriously entertained the thought of restoring Naples to the
Spanish Bourbons is incredible. The Emperor’s correspondence shows that he
never lost sight of the need of conquering Sicily; and, if King Joachim ever
entertained the overtures of Maria Carolina, it was assuredly only with the aim
of weakening the Anglo-Sicilian alliance. That Queen, however, with her usual
proneness to self-delusion and intrigue, kept up secret communications with
Naples and the Court of Vienna through the years 1810-1, in a way that aroused
the gravest suspicions of the British Government. The United Kingdom had
acquired the right to some measure of control over the policy of the Court of
Palermo, firstly by providing the naval and military support which alone
enabled that Court to exist, and secondly by the terms of the treaty of
alliance signed at Palermo on March 80,
1808. These prescribed the furnishing of all possible
means of mutual support by both parties in the present war, the maintenance by
Great Britain of a force of not less than 10,000 men in Sicily, and the payment
of a yearly sum of £800,000 to its Court, as well as the conclusion at
i8io-i] Parliamentary difficulties. Bentinck and the
Queen. 383
an early date
of a treaty of commerce on conditions favourable to British trade. The Sicilian
Government also promised not to make a separate peace with Napoleon; while
Great Britain covenanted not to come to terms with him unless the interests of
His Sicilian Majesty were safeguarded. Obviously the protecting Power had the
right to insist on the due observance of this treaty; and, when the Queen was
believed to be intriguing with her nominal enemies, when further her privateers
captured a British merchantman and great difficulty was experienced in
obtaining its release, friction between the parties was inevitable.
Despite the
increase of the British subsidy to i?400,000 in answer to the unceasing appeals
of the Queen, her extravagance was such as to provoke a serious conflict with
the Sicilian Parliament. That body met at Palermo on January 25, 1810; and
Ferdinand, the mouthpiece of the Queen’s desires, proposed that it should
increase the subsidy to the Crown from 250,000 ounces to 300,000 ounces (the
ounce was then equal to 13s. 4d.), besides making further donations to the
Queen and to the infant daughter of the Crown Prince. To these demands the
Parliament, especially the Chamber of Barons, demurred; they had long been
incensed by the favour shown to Neapolitan courtiers and by the exclusion of
Sicilians from the Government, and now evinced their annoyance at the many
abuses of the State by granting only one-half of the required sum. Like Charles
1 of England in similar circumstances, Ferdinand dissolved Parliament, only to
find its successor still more refractory. Thereupon the Queen urged him to
adopt various illegal expedients, including even the sale of monastic lands
through the medium of lottery tickets. To these measures Parliament opposed an
unswerving resistance, with the result that on July 19, 1811, Ferdinand
arrested five of the baronial leaders, including the able and determined Prince
of Belmonte. A deadlock now ensued, fatal to industry and commerce, and
jeopardising the very existence of the State.
It was in these
circumstances that the British ambassador, Lord Amherst, retired in favour of
Lord William Bentinck, who was to combine with his diplomatic duties those of
commander of the British troops. The urgency of the crisis called for some such
concentration of power in the hands of a strong man. Great skill and tact,
however, were needed to disabuse the Queen of the notion that the English were
about to seize Sicily and either keep it themselves or use it as a piece in
some diplomatic game of exchange. Unfortunately Bentinck lacked the qualities
of charm and graciousness that were needed to win over the Queen to a true view
of the situation. Stiff and unsympathetic in manner, he offended Maria Carolina
from the outset, as later he offended her subjects. Meeting with firm
resistance at Court, he sailed for London, and came back in December, 1811,
armed with yet wider powers, which enabled him to stop the British subsidy
until the terms of the treaty of 1808 were sincerely carried out. Financial
needs and a
threat that
Palermo would be occupied by British troops finally induced the King and Queen
to capitulate, Ferdinand agreeing, on the pretext of illness, to hand over the
government to his son, whom he named his alter ego (January 16, 1812). The
Crown Prince at once restored the barons to favour, repealed the illegal taxes,
and appointed more popular Ministers. Yet Bentinck’s suspicions of the Queen
remained unabated; and when, in the month of March, he acquired further proofs
of her correspondence with the French, he insisted on her removal into the
interior of the island.
Meanwhile
Castlereagh, who had succeeded Wellesley as Foreign Minister in Downing Street,
deemed the time to be ripe for the application of British institutions to
Sicily as an antidote to the Napoleonic reforms which were beginning to take
root in the Peninsula. Reluctant as the Crown Prince was to introduce a foreign
Constitution, yet his desire for cordial relations with England, in order to
attempt the conquest of Naples while Murat was absent in Russia, brought him to
acquiesce in Bentinck’s suggestions. Accordingly the Parliament which met at
Palermo in June, 1812, proceeded to discuss and finally to adopt a Constitution
which was modelled closely on that of Great Britain.
Had this
Constitution been promulgated under more favourable conditions, it would
probably have taken firm root; but this was impossible amidst the disputes and
miseries of the year 1812. The abolition of feudal privileges annoyed many of
the leading families; and their discontent enabled the Queen to make one more
bid for power. She spurred on the King to give up the amusements of his
country-seat and to resume his authority. Ferdinand obeyed. On March 9, 1813,
he suddenly appeared at the palace at Palermo, and announced that, having
recovered his health, he intended to resume the government. Again Bentinck
intervened, and threatened that, unless the Constitution were respected, the
British alliance would cease forthwith. The Prince of Belmonte and Ruggiero
Settimo also resigned their offices. Under severe pressure from both sides,
Ferdinand listened to the advice of his son-in-law, the Duke of Orleans, and
promised to withdraw to the country. Bentinck, however, now insisted on the
departure of the Queen from the island, an expedient which had already been
more than once discussed. After long and painful disputes, she left Sicily with
her son and a few attendants, proceeding to Constantinople, Odessa, and finally
to Vienna. Even there fate frowned upon this unhappy woman, great only in her
misfortunes. As she was about to return to Palermo and triumph at the fall of
her many enemies, the hand of death intervened and laid her low at the castle
of Hetzendorf (September 7,1814).
In the
meantime the overthrow of Napoleon led to the resumption by Ferdinand of his
old governing powers (July 6, 1814). There being now no reason for the former
strict control of Sicilian affairs, Bentinck was unable to prevent the
ultra-loyalists from working havoc in the
Constitution
of 1812. It soon became little more than a memory. But, as the tide of reaction
rolled over Italy, that memory was held dear; and, when the Sicilians in 1848
lit the torch of revolution that was rapidly to be passed on from capital to
capital, their veteran leader, Ruggiero Settimo, summed up their experience of
the past and their hopes for the future in the cry “ Separation from Naples, or
our English Constitution of 1812.”
The mighty
forces of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, which shattered some of the
greatest States of Europe, led to strange shifts of fortune in the Ottoman
Empire. That corner of the Continent formed as it were a great side-eddy which
changed according to the volume and direction of the main current of events.
The survival of Turkish rule in Europe never seemed more hopeless than in the
years 1789-91 and 1798-1801, and again in the period after the Treaty of
Tilsit. Yet Turkey emerged from this cataclysmic epoch almost unchanged,
perhaps even stronger than at its beginning.
The accession
to power of Selim III in 1789 occurred at a time of unequalled calamity,
brought on by the persistent attacks of Catharine II of Russia and Joseph II of
Austria. In vain did the young Sultan set an example of austerity and vigour,
and call his whole people to arms against the infidels. The Moslems were
several times defeated by Suvoroff and Laudon. Only the death of Joseph II
(1790) and the conclusion of a timely Prusso-Turkish alliance saved Turkey from
overwhelming disaster. The new Habsburg ruler, Leopold II, came to equitable
terms with her at Sistova (1791); but Catharine II insisted on heavy sacrifices
in the Treaty of Jassy (1792), namely, the cession of all the Turkish lands
east of the river Dniester, the Sultan also virtually acknowledging the
suzerainty of Russia over Georgia, Imeritia, and Mingrelia. Even this success
seemed to the ambitious Tsarina merely a stepping-stone to the longed-for
conquest of Constantinople ; but the crises in the affairs of Poland and
France drew off her attention towards central Europe almost down to the time of
her death in 1796. Her son, Paul I, at first adopted a peaceful policy, thus
affording to Selim a time of respite for the many reforms which were most
urgently called for.
It is
difficult to conceive the disorder of the Sultan’s dominions at that time. His
authority over the Moslem States of northern Africa was of the slightest. The
rise of the Mameluke power in Egypt left only the shadow of authority in the
hands of the Turkish Pacha at Cairo. The Wahabites were masters of nearly the
whole of Arabia. The Druses and other tribes of the Lebanon district were
virtually independent; at Acre the savage Gezzar put to death the Sultan’s
messengers with impunity ; and taxes were generally withheld by the Pachas of
Bagdad, Trebizond, and Akhalzik. In Europe the Pacha of Widdin long defied
the Sultan’s
authority; and the notorious Ali Pacha had made good his independence in
Albania. The Suliotes and Greeks felt the pressure of their pacha’s rule, but
rarely that of the Sultan. Worst of all, Russia accorded her protection to the
hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia; and the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774)
had given her the right to champion the claims of all the Christian subjects of
the Porte. As the custom of farming out the taxes placed immense powers in the
hands of the local pachas, beys, and agas, as well as of the money-lenders whom
they employed, the Sultan’s authority was liable to be thwarted in every
conceivable way. The armed forces of Turkey, paid and unpaid, were a source of
weakness rather than strength. By far the most important among them was the
privileged Order of the Janissaries, comprising some
150,000 members, though many of these were not
liable to service in the field. They considered their membership as hereditary,
generally appeared in the ranks only on pay-days, and exercised authority in
the towns where they were settled. They had long possessed valuable trading
rights, and, in fact, claimed to represent and enjoy the rights of the old
Moslem conquerors, especially against the Christian rayahs.
Braving the
opposition which the Janissaries were certain to offer, Selim now began to
reorganise his armed forces on the European model, and introduced some
uniformity in regard to arms, drill, and discipline. The opening of closer
diplomatic relations with France in 1796, when, for the first time, the Porte
despatched an ambassador to reside at Paris, enabled the French ambassador,
Aubert Dubayet, to take with him to Constantinople several officers, together
with well-mounted pieces of artillery. But little progress was made. The
Janissaries refused to make any change in their traditional methods; and the
rupture with France, brought about in 1798 by Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition,
stopped all progress, except in the organisation of the Turkish artillery.
Greater success attended Selim’s efforts to improve the civil administration.
By curtailing the powers of the Grand Vizier and the pachas who governed
provinces, he somewhat strengthened the fabric of government and the
productiveness of the revenue; but his efforts to abolish the farming of taxes
led to no general result. He established regular embassies not only at Paris,
but also at London, Vienna, and Berlin.
Despite
Selim’s efforts, Turkey was wholly unprepared to meet the iangers resulting
from Bonaparte’s expedition ; and without the aid of Nelson she would probably
have lost both Egypt and Syria. Scarcely freed from that danger, she was on the
verge of others equally serious at the beginning of the year 1801, when
Bonaparte and the Tsar Paul prepared for an invasion of Asia Minor preparatory
to the conquest of India. Once again, however, the restoration of the balance
of power in Europe served to avert the projected partition of the Ottoman
realm. Peace was concluded with France at Amiens (March 25, 1802), when the
1802-7]
Selim?s military reforms.—Revolt of Seroia. 387
Republic
recognised the integrity of the Turkish Empire, procured the renewal of the
former “capitulations” between the two Powers, and gained the right of sending
French ships into the Black Sea. In one quarter the war had not been
unfavourable to the Sultan’s power. The fall of the Mamelukes (an event
furthered by the perfidious massacre of several of their chiefs by the Turks)
paved the way for the gradual advancement of Turkish authority in Egypt. The
death of Gezzar Pacha at Acre in 1804 also had a similar effect on Syrian
affairs. On the other hand, the successes of the Wahabites in Arabia and their
capture of Mecca and Medina in 1804 spread abroad the belief that the
innovations of the Sultan were displeasing to Allah. Nevertheless Selim
proceeded with his military reforms. In the year 1804 he organised the
artillery, and placed it on a footing of privilege superior to that of the
Janissaries; and in March, 1805, he decreed that the finest youth of the Empire
should be taken, even from the Janissaries themselves, and enrolled among the
Nizams or regular infantry. The privileged corps flatly refused to obey this
decree, and in some cases killed those who strove to put it in force.
Selim’s
difficulties at this time were increased by a formidable rising of the
Servians. Galled by the oppressions of the Janissaries and encouraged by
promises of help from Russia, the distressed rayahs rose under the lead of Kara
George and Milosch Obrenovitch, foiled a plot of the Janissaries for a general
massacre, and captured some of the strongholds of Turkish tyranny in their
land. Their revolt was directed firstly against the turbulent Janissaries of
Belgrade; and they sought to prove that it tended to strengthen the Sultan’s
authority in the province. Selim, however, could not side with Christians
against the faithful; he arrested their deputies, and ordered Afiz, the Pacha
of Nissa, to disarm the whole population. The Christians scorned all thoughts
of surrender, now that the Sultan was threatened by hostilities from Russia and
by a general mutiny of the Janissaries. Kara George defeated the pacha; and in
the campaigns of 1806-7 the Servians not only drove back other Turkish forces
but finally succeeded in capturing Belgrade and the remaining Turkish
strongholds. At the close of this War of Liberation, military and governing
powers were allotted to military chiefs, or voivodes, among whom Kara George
enjoyed a preeminence corresponding to his prowess and masterful will. A
Skupshtina, or General Assembly of warriors, formed the ultimate source of
authority; it deputed administrative and legislative powers to a Senate of
twelve members; and by degrees a civil magistracy was established for each
district. The suddenness with which a formerly down-trodden people cast off its
yoke and established its own institutions stands in marked contrast to the
helplessness of the Sultan’s Government and the brutish opposition of his
privileged classes to all reform.
In the midst
of these troubles, the subtle French diplomatist, General
388
Murder of SeUm. Accession of Mahmoud II. [18O6-9
Sebastiani,
arrived at Constantinople (August 9, 1806). Napoleon’s instructions (dated June
20, 1806) directed the envoy to form a Franco- Perso-Turkish alliance against
Russia, and to urge the Sultan to keep a firm grasp on Moldavia and Wallachia.
Sebastiani soon succeeded in touching Turkish pride on the latter question;
and, despite the threats and protests of the Russian and British envoys, Selim
deposed the hospodars of these provinces (August 24). This amounted to a
declaration of war against the Tsar, who speedily sent an army across the Pruth
and reduced Bucharest (December 27). In February, 1807, a British fleet under
Admiral Duckworth forced the passage of the Dardanelles but failed before
Constantinople. Equally unfortunate results attended a British expedition to
Egypt. Meanwhile the campaign in the valley of the Danube languished. The main
forces of the Russians were always directed against Napoleon ; and Selim’s
efforts were thwarted at the outset by the selfish obstinacy of the
Janissaries, who intercepted and routed a force of Nizams. Elated at this
success, the reactionaries determined to rid themselves of the reforming
Sultan. With the help of a fawning traitor, the Kaimakam Mousa Pacha, the
Janissaries of the capital marched to the seraglio, which was undefended,
deposed their master, and placed on the throne Mustapha IV, the son of Abdul
Hamid I (May 29,1807). His tenure of power was short. A truce with the Russians
in August having set free the forces of Bairactar, the Pacha of Rustchuk, that
officer marched to the capital with the intention of restoring Selim, only to
be foiled at the last moment by the murder of the deposed ruler at the hand of
Mustapha’s eunuchs. After wreaking vengeance for this crime, Bairactar raised
to power Selim’s young cousin, Mahmoud II (July 28, 1808), whose firmness and
ability enabled him ultimately to carry out many of Selim’s reforms.
His
difficulties seemed overwhelming at the outset. The news of Selim’s deposition,
which arrived during the conferences at Tilsit, furnished Napoleon with an
excuse for a complete change of front; the Franco-Russian compact aimed at the
spoliation of the Turkish Empire. Motives of policy alone led Napoleon to defer
this undertaking to a time when France should be firmly established on the
Albanian coast, in Sicily, and in Spain. As has been already shown, the
Emperor’s aim of using the naval resources of Spain for the furtherance of his
Eastern schemes set in motion the great events of the Spanish rising, which
brought salvation to Turkey. The Emperor’s policy at the Congress of Erfurt
also served to prolong the time of respite ; while, on the other hand, the
Tsar’s growing fear of his western rival held him back from the prosecution of
vigorous measures against the Turks. Great Britain, also, after coming into
collision with Russia, had no interest in pressing hostilities against the
Turks, and, thanks partly to the friendly services of Austria, came to terms
with the Porte in the Peace of the Dardanelles (January, 1809).
While,
however, the diplomatic situation underwent an almost miraculous change in
favour of the new Sultan, he failed to cope with the internal disorders. Sir
Robert Adair, British Minister at Constantinople, reported the utter
disorganisation of the government, of the finances, and of the armed forces,
whose fierce brawls were not stayed even in presence of the enemy. At the close
of the war with Austria, Alexander sent larger forces to the Danube; and the
end of the campaign of 1809-10 saw him master of the strongholds on that river.
In the following year the prospect of war with Napoleon imposed prudence on the
Russians; but no considerations of patriotism put an end to the feuds of rival
pachas and the exasperating pretensions of the Janissaries. On both sides,
therefore, there was a readiness to come to terms; and, after lengthy
negotiations, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed (May 28,1812). The Sultan
thereby ceded to Russia the Moldavian lands to the east of the Pruth, and
promised to grant an amnesty to the Servians. He insisted, however, that the
Servian fortresses should once more be garrisoned by Turkish troops; and to
this the Tsar consented. The Servians, who had put forth great efforts on
behalf of their co-religionists, thus saw one great result of their War of
Liberation bargained away by their avowed champion.
Thus, by a
singular concurrence of events, Turkey more than once during this period
escaped a doom which seemed inevitable. Alone among the great Powers of the
Continent, she escaped the grinding pressure of events which compelled them to
reorganise their governments, their armies, and even their polities. Whether,
in the like case, she would have been driven to employ the same healing
process, is very questionable. What is certain is that she alone of the great
States drew no new sources of strength from the strains and calamities of the
time. Even the peculiarities of the Continental System, which might have given
a great impulse to the trade of Turkey, as the only neutral State in Europe,
led to no noteworthy result. The passage of stores of contraband goods through
Salonica and the Albanian ports into central Europe served to invigorate the
maritime instincts of the Greeks and Albanians; it breathed no new life into
the torpid frame of Turkish industry. Above all, the Ottomans themselves felt
none of those longings for reform which were implanted by the events of the
Napoleonic era among the peoples of Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and
were destined to triumph over the reactionary forces of the succeeding age.
Barren in regard to legislative achievements, the life of Turkey was barren
also of those popular impulses, which, under wise guidance, strengthen the
fabric of the State and invigorate the whole nation.
THE FRENCH
DEPENDENCIES, AND SWITZERLAND.
Napoleon told Roederer in August, 1800, that
it was his policy to govern men as the majority wished to be governed. “ It
is,” he said, “ by turning Catholic that I finished the war in the Vendee; by
turning Mussulman that I established myself in Egypt; by turning Ultramontane
that I won the Italian mind. If I governed a people of Jews I would rebuild the
temple of Solomon. So, too, I would speak of liberty in the free part of San
Domingo, while I would confirm slavery in the tie de Bourbon and in that part
of San Domingo where slavery now exists.” Such flexibility was undoubtedly a
safer recipe for empire than the rigid propaganda of the Revolution.
Administration must be adapted to men’s needs; and these in turn are shaped by
climate, locality, and historic forces. A good administration does not expect
the surface of humanity to be regular; it expects it to be irregular, and
gently fits itself into the indentations, trusting to time and some patient
process of friction to plane down uncomfortable angles. It has fixed
principles, but it applies them with charitable modifications. It is
well-instructed, just, pure-handed. It has its professional code of honour, of
which it is proud. Checks and counter-checks do not obstruct its celerity. It
has the courage of its opinions and strikes hard at waste, inefficiency, and
old abuses. It is served by every variety of trained and technical experience.
It is neither radical, nor conservative, but knows when to be the one, and when
the other. To build up an ideal bureaucracy capable of governing foreign
peoples, both European and coloured, in such a way as to command their
confidence and respect, is no easy task. It argues a high standard of public
morals, a passion for public improvement, a copious equipment of tact, an
easy-going good-humour coupled with strict attention to detail, an instinct
which may be called propagandist on the part of the governing nation, and a
readiness to learn and be guided on the part of the governed. Such a
coincidence of happy qualities is necessarily the result of complex forces, and
cannot be contrived by any one mind.
The French
Empire at its zenith stretched from Liibeck to the Ebro md from Brest to Rome.
It was divided into 130 departments, 46
of which were
alien to France in race, language, and temperament. Dutchmen and Belgians,
Germans and Italians, Croatians and Spaniards were swallowed up in the great
machine; and over and above these alien departments of the Empire there were
the vassal principalities and kingdoms, all of which were ultimately controlled
from Paris and made to contribute to the military and financial strength of
France. It may well be asked how a country which had managed its own affairs so
badly as to experience ten years of hideous disorder could accomplish such a
task as the civil government of these miscellaneous regions.
The Frcnch
administration under Napoleon had behind it the momentum of a creed, and the
momentum of a person. It believed in what England contemptuously called “French
principles,” not with a passive traditional acceptance but with the zeal of a
convert who with infinite struggle has refashioned his inner life. The best of
Napoleon’s servants regarded themselves as missionaries of some higher
civilisation which it was their duty to diffuse through the world; and to this
momentum was added the force of Napoleon’s character and genius. Discursive in
council, in action he sped straight to his end; he was a sure judge of men ;
and when he had picked his team he drove it hard. His eye was everywhere. His
appetite and memory for detail were such that slovenly work rarely escaped him,
aud he knew how to inspire and to encourage as well as how to frighten and to
coerce. Nor was this all. Connected with the momentum which acted on the will,
there was a great illumination of the intelligence. Almost every question
relating to the fabric of society or the government of man had come up for
discussion during the French Revolution. Daring experiments had been made,
great disasters endured; and a rich experience was crowded in a narrow space of
time. The new generation was more sober, more practical, more critical of vague
ideals, and yet fully capable of being excited by the large horizons which
Napoleon unfolded to France.
Another
factor was, that the French Government, having a coherent body of principles to
administer, found in almost every part of central Europe a state of opinion
either favourable or not violently unfavourable to their acceptance. This was
not only or mainly due to the fact that French principles could easily be
explained and bore a self-evident and superior air of rationality about them.
It was largely due to the long historic preparation which Europe had received
for the acceptance of French ascendancy; to the general diffusion of the French
language which prevailed in all the large towns in Holland, Germany, and Italy;
and to the continuance of the feeling that France was the mistress of the arts
and sciences, and the centre of European intelligence. There were other reasons
of equal weight, among which may be mentioned indifference to the displaced
rulers, fatigue consequent upon foreign war and civil turmoil, and the
overwhelm ng ascendancy of the French arms.
On the other
hand, the Napoleonic system laboured under several grave disadvantages. The
Revolution, while increasing the material comfort of France, had spread. great
demoralisation through political life; and, although this was to a considerable
extent corrected by the return to orderly government under Napoleon, it was far
from eradicated, and did much to discredit French rule abroad. Towns were pillaged
of their art treasures; soldiers and civilians made fortunes by blackmail;
bribes were accepted even by men in the highest places. Another great
disadvantage was due to the war, and to the peculiar policy which the war
forced Napoleon to adopt. On every new department and on every new dependency
the war imposed a heavy tribute of men and money; and, in order to ease the
French taxpayer, the dependencies, in addition to the expense of their own
levies, were forced to contribute to the support of the French army. Thus,
while higher and more expensive standards of civil government were being introduced,
the budgets of the vassal States were burdened by a military expenditure out of
all proportion to the other items of the account. It is true that improved
financial methods, the abolition of privilege in taxation, and the confiscation
of monastic wealth, enabled larger revenues to be raised with less loss to the
taxpayer. But it must be remembered that the decline of the volume of commerce
due to the Continental Blockade diminished indirect sources of revenue; and
that in every dependency a considerable portion of the state domain was
reserved for the benefit of French generals' and other servants of the Empire.
The object of these dotations was to give to the military and official class a
strong pecuniary interest in the maintenance of the French conquests, and to
create in every vassal State a group of families attached to the Imperial
connexion. The result was to cause embarrassment to the local exchequer, and
to aggravate the impression that the dependency was being exploited for ends
which were not its own. The Continental Blockade was another and most harassing
consequence of the war, leading as it did not only to great material losses,
but also to the irritating intrusion of French custom-house officers. If the
dependencies had been thoroughly incorporated in the French fiscal system,
freedom of trade with the great French market might have offered some compensation.
But they experienced all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of a
fiscal connexion with the Empire. They were not allowed to compete with the
French manufacturer, and they were compelled to lower or demolish their
barriers against French wares.
There was
another drawback incidental to the national temperament. Frenchmen of the best
kind did not readily go abroad except in pursuit of military glory, and when
abroad were generally anxious to come home again. Nor were they apt at picking
up the colloquial use of a foreign language, partly because they regarded any
foreign language as an inferior kind of patois, and partly because they
expected foreigners
to talk to
them in French. Napoleon was well aware of these drawbacks, and hoped to create
in the auditeurs attached to his Council of State a body of young, intelligent,
enterprising civilians, drawn from eveiy part of the Empire, versed in affairs,
sufficiently wealthy to be above pecuniary temptation, and ready to go anywhere
and do anything at a moment’s notice. Had the Empire lasted ten years longer,
the Council of State, with its brilliant nimbus of disciples, would probably
have become a great seminary of public virtue.
Napoleon, who
created so many States, institutions, armies, and careers, was, despite his
high administrative gifts, a frequent source of disorder, distrust, and even
despair to the men who worked under him. He was very restless, constantly
altering the boundaries of States, and rearranging the map of Europe. He was
very inquisitive, employing hundreds of spies and police agents, and receiving
secret reports even as to the conduct of his own brothers. He was often very
harsh and unfeeling, and always brutally direct both in his written and spoken
words. He therefore contrived, though perhaps only in the last four years of
his Empire, to convey the impression that none of his political creations would
be enduring, that he suspected his own agents, and that pity and benevolence
had no place in the conduct of affairs.
The Italian
Republic, whose formation and early history down to 180S has already been
described, made a beginning which impressed one person at least as unpromising
and ill-omened. Count Melzi, the Vice-President of the Republic, was not a man
of sanguine temperament ; and some deductions must be made by readers of his
querulous correspondence. It would appear, however, that the blessings of selfgovernment
were inadequately appreciated by those for whom they were intended, and that,
while the Electoral Colleges regarded the franchise as a burden, the College of
the Dotti resented the connexion with France. The legislators preferred the
cafe to the council-room, and, through their factious and careless conduct, had
greatly fallen in public esteem. Good prefects and good clerks were difficult
to discover. The “passive animosity” against France was almost universal. With
these complaints directed against his countrymen, Melzi combined criticisms of
the Napoleonic system. In January, 1804, he pointed out that the Republic was
paying a third of its revenues to France, that the department of Olona alone
sent to Paris one-ninth more revenue than had been raised by Austria from Milan
and Mantua together, and that local expenses were augmented in the same
proportion. Out of a budget of 90,000,000 francs, 4,000,000 were spent upon
fortifications,
85,500,000 upon the French army, and 22,500,000 upon the
Italian army. Moreover, while Melzi desired economic freedom, Napoleon refused
to lower his own tariff in favour of the Italian Republic.
Nevertheless
some progress was made towards the organisation of
the State.
The ministers were hard-working and capable, and carefully drawn from the
different provinces; and the government, if not popular, was free from the
taint of peculation. A Veronese prefect was sent to Bologna, a Novarese to
Modena; and this principle of selection, based on the desire to obliterate
local divisions, was universally acted upon by the French in Italy. A
gendarmerie, organised on the French model, proved to be a most efficient
instrument for the suppression of brigandage and other forms of crime. The
conscription was introduced ; and a native army was rapidly formed, in which
the Romagnols proved to be the most vigorous element, leaving a strong imprint
of their dialect upon the new and common language of the camp. In September,
1803, 6000 Italians were ordered up to the coast of the English Channel. In the
following July the Republic was inspired to make a voluntary gift of 1,200,000
francs towards the war.
Still
Bonaparte was dissatisfied. In 1804 he became Emperor of the French; and that
the head of an Empire should also be president of a Republic seemed to him
anomalous. He was not entirely pleased with Melzi, and doubtless reflected that
a French prince in Milan would have more authority than an Italian nobleman,
especially in military affairs. It may perhaps also have occurred to him that a
kingdom of Italy would evoke historic memories and national hopes, and
therefore enlist a larger stock of active assent from the Lombard people than
they were willing to give to the Republic. He determined therefore to revive
the old Lombard monarchy, and to offer the crown to his eldest brother. The
plan would fall in with other parts of a great scheme which was now shaping
itself in his mind—the scheme of a number of allied and tributary kingdoms
governed by members of the Bonaparte family. But Joseph and Louis both
preferred their chances of succession in France to an Italian crown; so
Napoleon took the crown himself. On March 17, 1805, a Constitutional Statute was
issued, which called the Emperor of the French to the throne of Italy. But the
kingdom was to be kept distinct from the Empire ; and upon the conclusion of
peace Napoleon promised to resign it to his natural or adopted son. To a
deputation of the Republic he promised that he would make the new kingdom free
and himself go to Milan to take the Iron Crown.
Napoleon’s
visit to northern Italy in 1805 was like the passing of a hailstorm over
parched land. Wherever he went he poured out ideas, schemes, improvements. He
was crowned King with great pomp in Milan Cathedral, and then nominated his
step-son Eugene Bcauhamais to act as viceroy. He told the Italian legislature
(June 7) that good and splendid results always proceeded from a uniform and
simple system, and that to this end he had simplified the administration. The
Code had been given to Italy; and the Council had been asked to prepare a
judicial system which should secure to the Italian people all the advantages of
strong judicial benches, public procedure, and fair trial.
The jury,
however, would not be admitted. To enhance the credit of the country, the
public debt was to bear the name of “Monte Napoleone.” Public instruction was
no longer to be departmental, but based on a uniform policy for the whole kingdom.
Departmental expenses were to be equalised, the richer departments being forced
to contribute to the needs of the poorer. “ My people of Italy,” he continued,
“ is of all the peoples of Europe the least heavily taxed ”; and he assured his
hearers that no new charge would be laid upon them. Measures had been taken to
provide the clergy with a suitable endowment; and, though some monastic
establishments had been amalgamated, it was his intention to protect those
which were of public utility, or which supplied the place of the secular
clergy. “ The Italians should remember that arms are the principal support of a
State. It is time that the youth who live in idleness in the great towns should
cease to fear the fatigues and dangers of war.” Eugene was reminded that he
must study to please the Italians. “ Cultivate their language; let them be your
principal companions; distinguish them in a particular manner at festivals;
approve what they
approve,
love what they love Your grand interest
is to treat the nation
well, to know
them all, their names, their families.” He was rarely to preside over the
Council of State, to speak little, to work twice a week with his ministers, to
distrust spies, to write every day to the Emperor, to surround himself with
young Italians, to study the history of all the towns in the kingdom, to be
inflexible with dishonest officials, to visit the fortresses, and every week to
report on the force of each corps—how many were on the sick list, how many on
the active list, where they were quartered, how went the conscription. An
experienced French publicist, Mejean, was deputed to guide his footsteps.
Every one in
Milan liked Eugene. He was not clever or experienced, but he was frank and
manly, loyal and laborious, with a gift for the right word; a keen professional
soldier rather than a statesman, but even as a statesman above the average of
Italian rulers. He served Napoleon well, and was well served by his subjects.
Indeed it was said in after-times, when the Austrians ruled in Milan, that if
you met a dever-looking man in the streets, or heard of any one as a
book-lover, as subscribing for instance to the collected edition of Alfieri, he
was sure to be an ex-civil servant of the Viceroy. The bureaucracy was so
strenuous, there was such a thrilling air of improvement and economy, of
adventure and high politics, in the kingdom, that the whole tone of society was
braced up. It was observed, for instance, that the Milanese aristocracy became
more economical and flung away less money in carriages and theatres, and that
in spite of heavy taxation they were richer at the end of the reign than at the
beginning. It was observed that house-building proceeded rapidly, though the
taxes rose from 82,000,000 francs in 1805 to 144,000,000 in 1812. The public
works carried out by the Government, the canals and roads, the ornamental
396
Improvements under the Viceroy Eugene. [1805-8
boulevards
and gardens, constituted in themselves a kind of education. The Po was cleared
of floating brushwood, so that it became navigable by night; the cathedral of
Milan was finished; every important town received some embellishment. The
prison and sanitary legislation was far in advance of earlier standards.
Agriculture was encouraged by schools, mendicity diminished, public order
enforced by a stricter police. The comparative immunity of northern Italy from
crime during the later portion of Eugene’s rule, and the subsequent
recrudescence of acts of violence, have been noted by Sir Samuel Romilly.
It is true
that the government was a despotism. The legislature, which was somewhat
obscurantist, was suppressed for criticising the first budget of the kingdom;
and afterwards (March, 1808) a Senate was formed upon the French model to take
its place. Being mainly composed of government officials, and merely qualified
to register the acts of the sovereign and the Council of State, this body was
both servile and useless. Nor was there any outside criticism. The press was
kept down with a firm hand; and the faintest attempt at political comment was
severely punished. Lattanzi, the editor of a fashionable Milanese weekly, was
put into a madhouse for hinting at the annexation of Etruria.
Yet the play
of higher upon lower minds, if discouraged in the sphere of politics, was
fortified in other directions. The great vice of Italian education had long
been the sacrifice of solid learning to frivolous accomplishments. The French
rule gave a more serious and practical bent to the Italian intellect. Special
schools were instituted for music, agriculture, engineering. I/ycees in the
French style were planned in every department; at Milan, Bologna, and Venice,
academies of art were created which were to elect a commission delV ornato,
charged with the duty of embellishing cities; military education became quite
as serious, and far more scientific than it had been elsewhere, even in
Prussia; and the study of military history experienced a renascence. The effect
of the army upon the country was profound and far-reaching. It helped to
obliterate provincial and social distinctions; it provided a career for talent;
it roused the rich from their lethargy, and formed an admirable school for
patriotism; it restored to the Italians their self-respect. At the Boulogne
manoeuvres, in the Austerlitz campaign, at the sieges of Kolberg and Stralsund,
in the difficult fighting in Catalonia, at the battle of the Raab, and in the
Moscow campaign, the Italian troops proved themselves inferior to none.
Officers returning from the wars believed in the union of Italy.
The kingdom
of Italy was successively increased by the addition of Venice in 1806, of the
Marches in 1808, and of Italian Tyrol in 1810. Dalmatia, which was ceded to
Napoleon together with Venice, was in the first instance placed under the
control of Eugene, but afterwards (August, 1806) transferred to Marmont; and,
when three years later Austria was stripped of her remaining Illyrian
provinces, these were
added to the
command of the Governor-General of Dalmatia. Whatever may have been Napoleon’s
original intention when he appointed Eugene, when he arranged for his marriage,
and when he adopted him as a son, he showed clearly by his subsequent conduct
that he did not intend a Beauhamais to rule over a united Italy. For not only
did he establish a French monarchy in Naples, but side by side with these two
kingdoms he built up “ a French Italy,” an Italy annexed to the Empire, which
seemed likely to swallow up the whole peninsula. Indeed, in 1810 he frankly
told Eugene that, if he did not show zeal in the Continental Blockade, his
kingdom would be annexed to France.
Of these
Franco-Italian provinces, Piedmont was the earliest specimen. It was, as
Bonaparte explained, a tite-du-pont necessary for France; and its hardy
subalpine population, trained to the barrack and the camp, afforded an
additional inducement to annex it. Accordingly, from 1802 to 1814, Piedmont,
divided into six departments, was administered as a French province by French
laws. The French tongue, which had formerly been fashionable, was now official;
and a bilingual newspaper, the Courier de Turin, was provided by the
Government, to educate the shopkeepers and the rustics in the language of their
conquerors. The Piedmontese debt was taken over by France; tithes and feudal
dues were suppressed; and the French fiscal system was introduced by Gaudin in
all its vigorous completeness in 1805. But here, as in Lombardy, the First
Consul was determined that the anti-clerical democrats, who had triumphed at
the fall of the Sardinian House, should triumph no longer. General Menou, who
governed the Piedmontese departments from 1803 to 1808, was, though married to
an illiterate Egyptian, himself well-born, and assiduously angled for the
graces of the Piedmontese nobility. With all his ostentation, his debts, and his
amours, Menou rendered some substantial services to the province, organising as
he did a much-needed system of poor-relief, and completely stamping out
brigandage. Napoleon, too, visited Piedmont in 1805, and was prolific in
policies. Bread was to be cheapened; rivers were to be bridged; fortifications
were to be demolished; and Turin, under the new administration, was to assume
“the popular and paternal physiognomy of a French town.” Three years later,
wishing to console the Piedmontese for the loss of a Court, he created the post
of “ Governor-General of the departments beyond the Alps,” and appointed his
brother-in-law Camille Borghese to hold it. Borghese was a young, good-looking
Boman, without intellect or parts, and would have been unequal to serious
responsibilities. But as a gaudy fly thrown to attract the nobility of Piedmont
and Liguria (for the Genoese departments were placed within his sphere),
Borghese could serve the Emperor’s turn. He was instructed to speak French, to
hold levies and give banquets, to write to the Emperor every day, and to take
his orders from the ministers in Paris.
Piedmont had
always been noted for certain peculiarities. It was
398
Piedmont, Parma, Etruria,
etc.
[1800-14
very
monarchical; it was very clerical; it was very military; and it was very
un-Italian. If the Sardinian House was to be exiled, annexation to France was
as acceptable a destiny as any other, though there was a party who favoured a
connexion with the Italian kingdom. Being military in their tastes, the
Piedmontese were not averse, as were other Italians, from the conscription; and
the name of Napoleon was revered by many a veteran long after the Empire had
passed away. Though many noble families still secretly hoped for a Sardinian
restoration, many accepted office and title from the French. Eight Piedmontese
entered the Senate of the Empire; nine at least sat in the Legislative Body;
two were in Napoleon’s Council of State. Wider careers flattered the
professional class; popular festivals and military reviews amused the people.
Though the taxes were heavy, though the use of the French tongue was a source
of hardship in the country districts, though the anti-clerical policy of the
later Empire went against popular sentiment, and many parts of the Code were
contrary to tradition, there was no serious opposition to French rule.
The
boundaries of French Italy were eventually expanded by the annexation of Parma
and Piacenza, of Tuscany, and of the remaining portions of the Roman State. In
1800 Moreau de Saint-Mery was sent as resident to Duke Ferdinand of Parma; and,
after the Duke’s death in October, 1802, he was named as administrator of
Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. Moreau abolished torture, improved the judicial
system, and prepared the way for annexation, which was formally proclaimed on
Sept. 23,1805. In 1806, after a peasant revolt had been crushed by Junot and
the public debt liquidated by Gaudin, the duchies received the designation of “
the department of the Taro,” and were placed under the general government of
Piedmont and Liguria.
The kingdom
of Etruria, annexed three years later, was a more important addition to the
Empire. Founded in 1801 for Louis, the weakly and superstitious son of Duke
Ferdinand of Parma, Etruria had experienced nothing but humiliations and
disasters. The policy of the Court of Florence was controlled by Napoleon, who
quartered his troops in the country, abstracted the Venus de’ Medici,
prescribed the acceptance of his Code, and insisted upon the closure of Livorno
to English vessels. The kingdom was overrun with French soldiery; and the Queen
Regent, whose husband had died in 1802, was overawed by the French resident.
But, though powerless to oppose French schemes, Marie-Louise was not the woman
to support them. She had all the inertia, all the stupidity, all the abject
superstition of the Spanish Bourbons. While Napoleon was plunging deeper and
deeper into his struggle with the Papacy, the Queen Regent of Etruria was the
patroness of monks and the plaything of favourites; and her rule appeared all
the more lifeless and dark, when compared with the active proceedings of
lEillise Bonaparte in the neighbouring principality of Lucca. Herself able and
laborious, an
admirable
ruler of her tiny State, Uillise both envied and despised, annoyed and
depreciated her Spanish rival. Her strictures and aspirations were no secret to
Napoleon, who, having created the kingdom of Etruria to obtain colonial
concessions from Spain, now came to view it as “a deformity in the Italian
peninsula.”
On October
27, 1807, a secret treaty was signed with Spain at Fontainebleau, in virtue of
which the heir of Marie-Louise was to surrender Tuscany for a principality in
Portugal. When all had been settled, the Queen Regent was informed that she had
ceased to reign, that she must pack up her goods and spend the rest of her life
as a pensioner and an exile. On May 30, 1808, Tuscany was united to France,
receiving three places in the Senate and twelve in the Legislative Body. In the
meantime an Extraordinary Junta had been appointed to organise the country. It
was headed by General Menou, and contained among its numbers Chaban, the
experienced prefect of Brussels, d’Auchy, the financier, de Gerando, soldier,
philosopher, administrator, and philanthropist, and a young Piedmontese named
Cesare Balbo, who was destined to make a mark in the annals of Italy. It was
explained that the object of the annexation was to extend the French coasts, to
aid naval recruiting, and to enable a military port upon the scale of Toulon to
be constructed at Spezia.
Seven months
and eighteen octavo volumes of ordinances sufficed to convert “the mother of
modem civilisation” into a little French frontier town. A French prefect was
sent to Florence; the country was carved into three departments, Amo, Ombrone,
Mediterranee; the Leopoldine system of justice and administration was swept
away. The Italian language was however admitted into official acts and
documents —a wise concession duly appreciated; and in time many prominent
Tuscans rallied to the new government. In March, 1809, “ a General Government
of the Departments of Tuscany” was created upon the model of that which had
been established in Turin. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany, as it was now called,
was given to lillise Bonaparte; and it was hoped that the festivities of a
grand-ducal Court would bring consolation to Florence for the extinction of the
Medici and the expulsion of the Bourbons. The powers of the Grand Duchess were
limited to transmitting the orders received from the ministers in Paris to the
intendaut of her Treasury, the director of her police, the chief of her staff,
and a general of division (her own husband), all of whom were named by the
Emperor. When lillise attempted to neglect or amend the instruction of a
minister, she was reminded that as a French subject she was liable to arrest.
Of all the
Italian States, Tuscany had least to gain and most to lose by the imposition of
the French system. Her judicial system had been excellent, her penal law mild
and humane in comparison with that which she was now compelled to receive. She
had already grown out of
feudalism and
reformed her monasteries; and, though her administration was complex and still
bore evidence of the historic dualism between Florence and Siena, it was the
product of an intelligent race versed in the arts of management. The French
improved the law of mortgage, encouraged the cultivation of cotton, helped the
woollen manufacturers, flattered the universities; and, by abolishing religious
congregations, enabled the debt to be liquidated. But the most civilised
peasantry in Europe loathed the crude barbarity of the conscription; and all
the benefits of French rule could not efface the resentment which the military
policy of Napoleon aroused in the Tuscan mind.
The temporal
power of the Papacy had long appeared to Napoleon to be anomalous and
inconvenient; and in his first Italian campaign he had enforced the cession of
the Legations to the Cisalpine Republic. The March of Ancona, stretching along
the eastern coast of Italy and connecting the Italian with the Neapolitan
kingdom, formed the next object of attack. On August 5, 1807, Napoleon
expounded to Eugene the advisability of annexing this portion of Italy; and on
October 8 General Lemarrois was ordered to fix his head-quarters at Ancona, to
sequester the revenue, to take command of the papal troops in the district, and
to establish a provisional administration. In the spring of 1808 the last
pretence of reserve was thrown away. The March of Ancona and the duchies of
Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino were incorporated in the Italian kingdom,
divided into three departments (Metauro, Musone, Tronto), and subjected to the
Italian Concordat. Prina was despatched to liquidate the debt and arrange the
budget. The port of Ancona was to be cleared; the city was to be fortified;
and, while the coasts were to be carefully surveyed, a regiment was to be
formed out of the papal troops. But, while the northern provinces fell to the
Italian kingdom, the most precious and distinctive portion of the State, includ
"g the capital, was annexed to the French Empire.
Of all the
events which occurred dining this crowded period of Italian history, none, not
even the partition of Venetia, cut so deep to the Italian heart. Religious
scepticism was common enough in Italy; Gallican principles were widely held,
men of intelligence readily acknowledged that priestly government meant
stagnation and inefficiency. But the Papacy was a possession common to all
Italians; and Rome was the sacred city of the race. An Italian might serve the
French in Piedmont, or even in Tuscany, and feel no searchings of heart; but to
gallicise Rome, to arrest the head of the Catholic religion, was quintessential
impiety and treason to the deeper instincts. The pretexts for the annexation
and the circumstances which attended it made collusion peculiarly ignominious.
It was asserted that Charlemagne had wished the Pope to be a vassal of the
Empire; that Pius VII had allied himself with Protestants; and that, if the
Papal States were not annexed, Rome would become the “ refuge of brigands
raised or vomited by the
enemies of
his Majesty in the territory of Naples.” The plain facts were that the Pope had
declined to join in an offensive alliance against England; that he had contested
the extension of the French Concordat to Piedmont and Liguria, and the
extension of the Italian Concordat to Venetia; that he had refused to sanction
the divorce of Jerome; and that he asserted the old papal claim to suzerainty
over Naples. In other words, he had fought for the traditions of his office,
for the spiritual and temporal independence of his See.
To chastise
such insolence, General Miollis was commanded (January, 1808) to quarter his
troops in Rome, to seize the Castle of Sant’ Angelo, and to arrest every
English resident and Neapolitan refugee. The Pope was then subjected to every
humiliation. He was forced to dismiss one secretary after another; his guard
was dissolved; a Roman newspaper was launched against the temporal power. On May
17, 1809, a few days before the battle of Aspem, a decree was issued annexing
the Papal States to the French Empire; and a Consulta was appointed to carry on
the government. The Pope responded with the Bull Quant Memoranda, directed
against all who should take part in the spoliation of the Church; and for this
offence he was made prisoner, hurried out of the capital, and transported to
Savona. The act was concerted between Murat and Miollis, and transgressed the
measure of Napoleon’s instructions. But, once done, it could not be undone; and
it proved the signal for a revelation of fortitude in an unexpected quarter.
The Roman clergy did not stand high in the public esteem; and no section of
Italian society seemed less likely to furnish a pattern of manly independence.
Yet, when an oath of obedience and fealty to the Emperor was proposed to them,
and though it was well understood that not only preferment, but liberty and a
livelihood depended upon their answer, the majority of them declined to swear.
Arrest, imprisonment, exile made no impression. “ I began to suspect,” wrote
Balbo, the secretary of the Roman Consulta, “ that these despised priests were
the strongest men, perhaps the only strong men in Italy.” Out of 3106 monks,.
1868 declined to accept pensions from the French Government.
Consistently
with the proscription of the non-jurors, the transition was to be effected as
painlessly as possible. The Consulta was told that it was Napoleon’s intention
to diminish rather than increase the taxes. A Senate of sixty members, chosen
from the highest ranks of Roman society, was to conduct the affairs and flatter
the pride of the city. Though feudal dues were to be suppressed, the nobility
might preserve their titles and liveries. Two Romans were to sit in the Imperial
Senate, and two in the Council of State. On August 22, 1809, it was announced
that a palace, a country-house, and a civil list of a million francs were to be
allotted to a grand dignitary of the Empire thereafter to be named. Meanwhile
the city was to lose its distinctively
ecclesiastical
aspect. It was the first duty of the Consulta to suppress the Inquisition. The
wearing of the clerical habit was restricted to ecclesiastics; the monasteries
were dissolved; and a great reduction was effected in the number of dioceses
and parishes.
The conduct
of the Consulta was marked by the zeal, the energy, and the consideration
characteristic of the best French officials. The taxes were fairly assessed;
and the liquidation of the debt was here, as elsewhere, provided for by
confiscated monastic wealth. The medieval traditions which impeded judicial
efficiency—torture, the right of asylum, the exclusive use of Latin in the
Courts—were now abolished; while the brigand bands which infested the Campagna
were at last broken up. The government took in hand the draining of the Pontine
Marshes, the regulation of the Tiber, the restoration of the Appian Way, the
improvement of agriculture and the industrial arts. Prizes were offered for the
best compositions in Italian prose and verse; a rational system of poor relief
was instituted; a university was founded at Perugia ; a plan was devised for
the restoration of the ancient monuments of Rome, and enthusiastically received
by Napoleon. When the Consulta finished its work in January, 1810, the
departments of Rome and Trasimene were fully organised. The papal troops had
been drafted into the Neapolitan army; the Codes were being administered in the
Roman Courts; and bishops, canons, and priests were drawing exiguous stipends from
the French exchequer.
Nevertheless
the city was not satisfied. Murat represented that the population had shrunk by
forty thousand owing to the loss of the papal Court; and, as the taxes were
doubled and the conscription was introduced, while the subordinate fiscal
officials abused their power, the populace looked back with regret to the soft
and indolent rule of the Pope. But meanwhile Napoleon was expecting the birth
of an heir; and his expectations were blended with new schemes and ambitions.
On February 17,1810, a Senatus Consultum was issued, which declared Rome to be
the second city in the Empire. The Prince Imperial was to assume the title of
King of Rome, to hold an imperial Court there, and to renew the splendour of
the arts; and, in order that the analogy with the old Empire might be more
complete, it was added that the Emperors of France were to be crowned in St
Peter’s before the tenth year of their reign. The independence of the Papal See
was at an end. The Pope was to swear to the Gallican Articles, to accept a
civil list of 2,000,000 francs, and to have a palace in Paris as well as in
Rome. The expenses of the Sacred College and the Propaganda were declared
imperial. “Rome will stand higher than she has stood since the last of the
Caesars. She will be the sister of the cherished city of Napoleon.” The
“capital of a small State” was henceforward to become “one of the capitals of a
great empire.” In time the old papal feeling would die out. By throwing Church
lands to the value of 200,000,000 francs
into the
market, Napoleon intended to form a proprietary, whose interests would be bound
up with the continuance of French rule.
In no quarter
of Italy was there a more crying need for energetic reform than in the kingdom
of Naples. Here was a people still plunged in medieval barbarism, ignorant,
poor, lazy, superstitious, degraded not only by inherent faults of character
but by long centuries of oppression and neglect. A rich and privileged absentee
landlord class extorted, through the medium of its rapacious agents, every form
of due or service which the unfettered tyranny of the noble caste had been able
to devise. The burden of the State taxes fell almost entirely on the poor. The
course of justice was habitually interfered with by the King; and the judges
not only bought their places, but received presents from the litigants who
pleaded before them. Torture indeed was abolished, but starvation and chains
remained, and all the horrors of the dark and pestilential Neapolitan dungeons.
Trials were still held in secret, and verdicts prescribed by authority. That
the galleys might be filled more rapidly, prisoners were often tried in a batch
and condemned without a pretence of justice; on the other hand, men were
sometimes immured for twenty years or more without being brought to trial. In
the country districts brigandage was chronic, and was the only career which a
young man of spirit could adopt. Agriculture was almost entirely neglected ; it
was strangled by fourteen hundred different kinds of feudal dues, by a vicious
system of taxation, and by the free rights of grazing possessed by the
nobility. Monks and priests, beggars and bandits, formed the staple of the
country population; while in the capital, 150,000 half-starving and half-naked
lazzaroni constituted a real danger to personal security. The fiscal system
combined the maximum of harm to the people with the minimum of benefit to the
State. More than a hundred direct imposts were levied by the municipalities,
which paid a fixed proportion to the government, and the remainder to the
feudal lord. Almost every article of food was taxed; and the duties so raised,
the airrendaimenti, were contracted out to a farmer. A heavy tax on salt,
rendered additionally oppressive by compulsory purchase, was specially
burdensome to the poor. The law was a chaos of precedents and customs,
municipal statutes and royal decrees; but its obscurity was almost immaterial,
for it was constantly supplemented or transgressed by the exceptional action of
the Crown.
In 1806 Ferdinand
IV was compelled to make way for Joseph Bonaparte; and there were some grounds
for hoping that the second French occupation of Naples would be more permanent
than the first. The Bourbons, after all, were intruders, half-French,
half-Spanish; and the bloodthirsty revenge which they had taken on their
antagonists in 1799 had made them many enemies. Joseph was an Italian, who
could speak the language and appreciate the characteristics of his subjects;
and he came to Naples backed by the reputation of the Empire and
aided by the
sword of Massena and R^gnier. Though no soldier and destitute of any
conspicuous talent for action, Joseph had a good fund of common sense, and some
genuine popular sympathies. That he was entirely subjugated by the will of his
brother, and that he was over- fond of display is true enough. But he was
disinterested, laborious, anxious to improve the lot of his subjects; and it
would be an insult to compare him to the degraded and worthless creature whom
he displaced.
The situation
was one of exceptional difficulty. The Queen of Napl es had emptied the bank
and absconded with the fleet; and the whole coast was exposed to British
cruisers. The Pope declined to recognise the new King, and the Archbishop of
Naples refused to consecrate him—a serious flaw in the eyes of a superstitious
people. As the Court had taken the precaution of levying part of the year’s
revenue in advance, and commerce was intercepted by the naval war, the Government
found itself from the first in grave financial embarrassment. A protracted
campaign of a peculiarly harassing kind added to its perplexities. Gaeta,
gallantly defended by the Prince of Hesse-Philipstadt, held out for five months
against all the efforts of Massena’s army; and this, combined with Sir John
Stuart’s victory over Regnier at Maida, stirred up all Calabria to revolt. It
was a war of ambuscades and skirmishes, of midnight assassinations and the
firing of villages; and, while untold atrocities were perpetrated in the South,
a British fleet landed a garrison at Capri within sight of Naples itself. There
were other difficulties more insidious still. “ You have to do,” wrote
Napoleon, “ with a woman who is crime personified ”; and more than one
conspiracy was unmasked which traced its origin to Maria Carolina.
Napoleon’s
own views as to the prospects and functions of the new government were unfolded
to his brother with the brutal directness characteristic of all his
correspondence. If the lazzaroni gave trouble they were to be shot; and three
or four batteries might be erected which could throw bombs into different parts
of Naples if the capital should prove restive. A few big villages should be
burnt to edify the Calabrians; and a war contribution of 30,000,000 francs
should be levied to meet immediate expenses. The King was to impose a severe
and equal system of taxation which should bring in a revenue of 100,000,000
francs from the mainland alone, to create a number of big fiefs for French
officers, and to introduce the Civil Code; so that, while the French laws of
inheritance would tend to subdivide Neapolitan fortunes, the establishment of
a system of entails for a certain number of selected fiefs would strengthen and
perpetuate the power of the French connexion. If, however, the institution of
divorce should offend clerical prejudice, Joseph was at liberty to drop it, and
to leave the registration of births, marriages, and deaths in the hands of the
priests. Above all he was warned aga» 1st optimism. The utmost caution was
required in raising
1806-8] Joseph's problems and
instructions. 405
a Neapolitan
force. In every act Joseph was to ask himself, “How would this be if the French
were beaten back to Alessandria?”
As a
precaution against ill-fortune, Napoleon recommended the construction of a strong
fortress, a sort of Strassburg, in which the French might defend themselves for
a year or two in the event of disasters to the eagles in central Europe.
Meanwhile the chief duties of the Neapolitan King were to stamp out the
Calabrian revolt, to conquer Sicily, to create a good army corps and a
squadron, and to aid Napoleon to become master of the Mediterranean, “the
principal and constant aim of my policy.” He must not expect to receive
financial aid from France; on the contrary, he must pay for the French army of
occupation, and permit the establishment of six imperial fiefs, to be increased
to nine in the event of the annexation of Sicily, as well as a reserved domain
producing a million francs per annum, to be distributed to French generals and officers.
His ties to France were still imperiously emphasised. He was a Grand Elector of
the Empire, the heir-apparent to the throne, subject in all matters foreign and
domestic to his brother’s will. But it was provided in the statute which
conferred the Neapolitan crown, that it was never to be held with the crown of
France.
An
extraordinary situation requires extraordinary measures; and Joseph was
compelled to raise a special tax of 5,000,000 francs from Naples and to
negotiate a loan in Holland. Even so, his revenue was not adequate to his
expenditure, three-fifths of which was accounted for by the army and navy. But
by the end of his reign, thanks to the skill of Roederer, Neapolitan finance
had been put upon a sound basis. The admirable French system of audit and
control was introduced; the duties on commodities (arrendamenti) were taken out
of the hands of the farmers, and henceforward collected by the State. In place
of the old direct taxes, 104 in number, a single tax was substituted
(fondiaria) upon all incomes, lay, ecclesiastical, noble, and non-noble, which
were derived from land. The incredible complication of the Neapolitan octroi
duties was done away with; the customs tariff was revised. On November 27,
1807, Roederer was able to report that a tenth of the national debt had already
been liquidated by the sale of national domain, and that measures had been
taken for extinguishing three-quarters of the remainder by the confiscation of
monastic lands. In the two years of Joseph’s rule the revenue was doubled and
the debt halved; and the only blots upon an otherwise excellent system were the
retention by the State of exclusive and compulsory powers to sell salt, and a
civil list which absorbed one-fifth of the revenue.
These were
not the only reforms. Every commune was endowed with a free school, every
province with a college. Communal and provincial councils were established,
with consultative functions; and, though little could be expected of them at
first, they might with experience develop into useful bodies. The abolition of
feudalism was
decreed, and
the whole land-system was revolutionised by the division of communal property,
the abolition of primogeniture and entails, the conversion of the mtalizi or
rents of younger sons into freehold property, and the confiscation of the vast
estates belonging to the Orders of St Bernard and St Benedict. While these
changes increased the number of proprietors and promoted the agricultural
energy of the population, measures were taken to abridge the grazing rights on
the tavoliere of Apulia, and to bring a larger acreage under tillage. Prison
reform and law reform were other subjects which occupied the attention of the
government; and, though the moment was not favourable to experiments in
clemency, the prisons were placed for the first time under humane regulations,
and the country introduced to the benefits of public trial. In view of the
Calabrian revolt, four extraordinary and semi-military Courts were created to
despatch summary justice; they were not abolished till 1808. The jury system
was never introduced into any part of Italy; but, with these qualifications,
and others belonging to the nature of the Codes themselves, the judicial system
introduced by the French forms a favourable contrast to the system which it
displaced.
Joseph had
reigned barely two years when, on March 10, 1808, he was commanded to exchange
his kingdom for the throne of Spain. From Bayonne he issued a constitution to
his former subjects, the main feature of which was a parliament of a hundred
members, eighty of whom were to be named by the King and twenty by the
electoral colleges. But even this limited concession to the parliamentary
system was regarded as untimely, both by the Government and by the Neapolitans
themselves; and, though orders were issued in 1810 for the convocation of
departmental councils, there was so general a reluctance to serve upon them
that further progress in the direction of political liberty was arrested.
French rule in Naples resulted in a liberal despotism, untrammelled by
constitutional forms or privileged corporations.
Joachim
Murat, being offered his choice, wisely determined to reign in Naples rather
than in Portugal. His spectacular appearance, his brilliant military record,
his affable manners, made him at once a favourite with the idle and
impressionable Neapolitan populace; and his wife Caroline, the sister of the
Emperor, a handsome and capable woman, added to his prestige and popularity.
Primarily a soldier, “ Jacino ” devoted his main attention to military affairs.
The Neapolitan army was steadily increased, until in 1814 its numbers stood at
80,000. A bold attack upon Capri resulted in the expulsion of its Corsican and
Maltese garrison. This greatly impressed the Neapolitans; and, though the
attempted invasion of Sicily in 1809 was less successful and led to a
formidable recrudescence of brigandage, Calabria was ultimately pacified by the
systematic severities of General Manhes. In the meantime the reforms of the
previous reign, many of which existed only on paper, were carried into
execution. A Feudal Commission, presided over by Giuseppe Zurlo, the Minister
of the Interior, dealt with all the questions
1808—n]
Murat in Naples.—French influence in Germany. 407
which arose
out of the new land-laws, distributed domain-lands, settled scales of
compensation, and completed its arduous task by 1810. Through careful finance
the revenue rose steadily, and showed a surplus in 1810 and 1811. Agricultural
societies were founded in every province; and real energy was thrown into
educational reform.
If the
continuance of the French rule in Naples had depended on a plebiscite of
liberal and intelligent Neapolitan opinion, King Joachim would have been
secure. But, as time went on, the real divergence between the interests of the
Neapolitan kingdom and the exigencies of Imperial policy became more and more
apparent. The correspondence between Murat and his master is filled with
complaints on the one hand, with reproof and recrimination on the other.
Burdens (says Murat) are thrown upon the Neapolitan exchequer which do not
properly belong to it and which it can ill afford to bear. Native industry is
damaged and * the revenue diminished by the exemption of French imports from
duty. Despite licenses, the merchants are ruined by the Continental Blockade.
The King petitions that he may be allowed to send home at least 15,000 of the
French troops quartered upon his country; or that he may recall his own troops
from Spain, where they are serving at the charges of the Neapolitan exchequer.
It was all in vain. With regard to the blockade, finances, and military
preparation, Napoleon was inexorable. In 1811 he threatened Murat with
deposition. Yet there were already over
76,000 men on the naval and military
establishment, a strain which bade fair to compromise the success of all the
French reforms.
Great as was
Napoleon’s influence south of the Alps, it was no less far-reaching in Germany.
The secularisation of the ecclesiastical principalities, the mediatisation of
the Imperial Knights, the elimination of Austria, the extinction of the Holy
Roman Empire, the additions made to the dignity and power of the south-German
Princes, the simplification of the political geography of the country—these
achievements entitle Napoleon to be called one of the makers of modem Germany.
Yet, while this was the ultimate result, it was far from being the immediate
intention. In a letter to Louis, Napoleon said that it was the principal end of
his policy to denationalise (depayser) the German mind.
The German
mind, so far as it was expressed by the captains of literature, readily lent
itself to the process. It was sufficiently cool and cosmopolitan to appreciate
the fine points of French civilisation, and sufficiently intelligent to condemn
the absurdities of the medieval German policy. Thus, while the Holy Roman
Empire perished in an atmosphere of home-made ridicule, the new Rhine
Confederation carried with it no distinct idea of historic sacrilege. The
south-German Princes, enriched and dignified by Napoleon, had been enabled to
pay off their old scores against Austria; and the south-German population was
generally content to follow where its Princes led.
The influence
of Prance upon the internal polity of the States of the Confederation was none
the less marked for being indirect. It made at once for autocracy and central
ation, for civil equality and political subservience. The object of Napoleon
being to extract military assistance from his German allies, every
constitutional check upon the will of the sovereign was an obstacle which ought
to be removed; and the Princes who were his confederates were ready enough to
take the hint, and to purchase autocracy at home at the price of subservience
in their foreign relations. But there were other parte of Germany where French
influence was more directly exerted, parts which were ruled by French prefects
or by German prefects obeying a French master. This French Germany, or German
France, as it may be called, was made up of a series of accretions. The process
began with the conquest of the Rhenish electorates in 1792; it ended with the
annexation of the Hanseatic towns and the duchy of Oldenburg in 1811. It did
not follow any preordained plan, but was governed by the circumstances of the
moment; and the component parts of the new territory were frequently altered,
both as to their boundaries, and as to their organisation. Hanover, for
instance, was subjected to military occupation in 1803; then part of it was
taken away and incorporated in the kingdom of Westphalia (1806); then the
remaining portion was given to Westphalia (1810); a few months afterwards, the
whole of the original portion ceded in 1806 and most of the additional portion
ceded in 1810 formed part of the French Empire. Some districts, such as Erfurt,
never received regular civil organisation, but were simply charged with the
support of French troops; others, like Fulda and Hanau, after a period of
military government, were fused into a State on the French pattern.
This
inequality in the duration of methodised French rule must be taken into account
in considering the history of French Germany. Ultimately the four Rhenish
departments and the two departments formed out of the Hanseatic lands were
administered on the same plan; but this outward similarity conceals the most
divergent conditions. The four Rhenish departments had long lost all semblance
of interest in their old masters, in the motley host of archbishops and
bishops, princes and counts, Imperial towns and Imperial knights, who had borne
sway over the land. They had never been in the full current of German life;
they had no great university; their peasantry had greatly profited by the fall
of the sovereigns and the land-sales of the Revolution, and were content enough
with French rule, as soon as it put off Jacobinical excesses. Until 1814 the
departements rfamis suffered little from war. Nowhere was the Imperial
government more intelligent, more zealous, more anxious to make the “ new
Frenchmen ” at home in France. The French language was encouraged, but not to
the exclusion of German; the French market was opened to Rhenish trade.
It was far
otherwise with the Hanseatic departments. The govern-
I8O6-13]
Hanseatic departments.—Grand Duchy of Berg. 409
ments of
Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck had been such as to enlist a large amount of
active municipal patriotism. The burghers of these city-States were proud of
their polities and jealous of their independence. They had been forced to lend
money on doubtful security to the French government of Hanover; and ever since
1806 they had been pillaged by French soldiery, and molested by French
policemen. They lived for commerce, and their commerce was destroyed by the
blockade; and in the loss of their liberties they saw little else than the
desire of Napoleon to sweep more sailors into his navy, to burn more English
wares, and to plague their lives by more effectual requisitions and more
searching domiciliary visits. Whereas the Rhine departments had been the
earliest among the conquests of the Revolution, the Hanseatic departments were
among the latest annexations of the Empire. The Rhine province had been
conquered in obedience to one of the oldest historical impulses of the French
race; its conservation was a point of national pride, and the contentment of its
habitants an imperious charge upon national activity. The mouths of the Ems,
the Weser, and the Elbe lay outside the proper sphere of French ambition. The
occupation of these was a military measure; and, though good men were sent to
survey and organise the new departments, few believed that the French control
of this region would be permanent.
Among the
Napoleonic States carved out of German soil the Grand Duchy of Berg was the
earliest, and it presents some features of special interest. It was never actually
annexed to the French Empire, and yet from 1808 to 1813 it was practically
governed from Paris. It was never given a paper constitution, yet it received
the French Codes (with some modifications adjusted to local conditions), the
French municipal system, the French taxes, coins, weights and measures. It
contained within its borders the most important industrial region in Germany,
and was therefore peculiarly injured by the Continental Blockade; yet its manufactures
were shut out of the French and Dutch markets by a tariff wall. Desiring
annexation in order to escape industrial ruin, it was kept at arm’s length by
the country which fixed its budgets, consumed its soldiers, and dictated the
forms of its administration.
Formed in
March, 1806, out of the Prussian duchy of Cleves and the Bavarian appanage of
Berg, this little State was intended to serve as a convenient military outpost
on the lower Rhine. It was a French “march” against Brandenburg, just as
Brandenburg in old days had been a German “ march ” against the Wends ; and,
since it was framed for a military purpose, it was appropriately entrusted to
the government of a soldier, Prince Joachim Murat, brother-in-law to the
Emperor and the finest leader of horse in the French army. From the first, Murat
complained of narrow boundaries and exiguous revenues; and, when the terms of
the Confederation of the Rhine were settled in June, 1806, the Grand Duchy of
Berg, while bound to contribute 3000 men to the army
of the
Confederation, was practically doubled by the addition of parts of Nassau and
Dillenburg. The humiliation of Prussia in the following autumn paved the way
for further increments; and, after some months of acrimonious negotiation, a
treaty was struck (January 20, 1808) by which the Grand Duchy received the
Prussian countships of Mark and Tecklenburg, the Prussian portion of the
principality of Munster, and the countship of Lingen, in return for which it
was compelled to cede the important Rhine fortress of Wesel to Prance. It now
contained some 900,000 inhabitants; but, though its area was modest, its social
structure was diverse and composite. While Munster was Catholic and
aristocratic, Nassau was humble and Calvinist. While in the county of Mark
there was great industrial activity, Bavarian rule had done nothing to correct
the ignorance and inertia of Berg.
The French
administrators soon learnt to respect the work of their Prussian predecessors;
but they had nothing but contempt for the confused and feeble practices of the
old Government at Diisseldorf. Under the rule of Murat the French principles of
equality were introduced into the financial system; and a Prussian enactment
which forbade burghers to acquire noble land in Cleves was abolished. An end
was made of municipal autonomy; and, as in France, so in Berg, the budgets of
the towns were now to be decreed by the central executive. A supreme court of
appeal was erected at Diisseldorf; and a legal commission was appointed to
confer with lawyers drawn from the different provinces of the duchy as to the
introduction of the Codes. Many other important and beneficial schemes were
planned or partially executed; but in February, 1808, the Grand Duke was
summoned to Bayonne, and shortly afterwards invested with the crown of Naples.
He had only paid two flying visits to his humble German principality.
Count
Beugnot, who had helped to introduce French rule in Westphalia, was now
appointed to act as Imperial Commissioner in the duchy of Berg; and, not long
afterwards, the grand-ducal title was bestowed upon Napoleon Louis, Prince
Royal of Holland, a child of four-and-a-half years. Beugnot was a good and
zealous administrator, careful of the best interests of the people, and prompt
to represent their grievances at head-quarters. He was assisted by a German
minister of the interior, and a German minister of justice; and, as he was
himself conservative in temperament, the Government at Diisseldorf could not be
accused of precipitancy or iconoclasm. In a brief and tempestuous visit (1811),
which has been immortalised in Heine’s poetic prose, Napoleon attempted to
quicken the process of change. A university, a lycee, a bishopric, and a
seminary were prescribed for Diisseldorf. The principles of the Concordat were
to be extended to the duchy; and, while no boy was to be educated save in a
French or grand-ducal school, some selected youths were to be despatched to
Saint-Cyr or Saint-Germain to receive such military education as would entitle
them to hold commissions.
Beugnot, in
his memoirs, congratulates himself upon the excellent results achieved by his
government; and the archives of Diisseldorf and Paris testify to the honest and
enlightened zeal of the local administration. But here, as elsewhere, good
intentions were wrecked by impossible conditions. Napoleon claimed half the
domains, levied a war- contribution on the Prussian provinces added in 1808,
and steadily raised his demand for conscripts. The taxes were tripled; but,
since one-half of the revenue was employed for military purposes, religion,
education, and justice were equally starved. Yet some permanent benefit was
derived from the French occupation—the abolition of caste, the establishment of
free trade in land, the disappearance of internal customs dues, the growth of a
spirit of cooperation between contiguous districts which had hitherto lived
self-centred lives, the break-up of the guilds, the foundation of a small
proprietary, a better penal law, a more active, intelligent, and tasteful
direction of the public works.
If the
kingdom of Westphalia was the second of the Franco-German States in point of
time, it was easily first in point of importance. It contained a population of
2,000,000 and extended over some of the most classic soil in Germany. But, like
all the Napoleonic States, it was devoid of marked boundaries or any
pre-existing principle of inner union. Its main constituents were the
electorates of Hesse-Cassel, the duchy of Brunswick, the Westphalian provinces
of Prussia, and the southern portion of Hanover. Its capital, Cassel, was
Hessian; of its three principal universities, Gottingen was Hanoverian, Halle
was Prussian, Marburg was Hessian. Its chief fortress, Magdeburg, was Prussian.
The Hessians, who formed the nucleus of the population, were rugged Calvinists,
imbued with strong military tastes and a touching loyalty for the harsh and
selfish dynasty which had governed them so ill. The Brunswickers, who had lived
under a more humane and politer rule, were better educated and more
enlightened; and it is a curious fact that, having more cause to regret the
past, they were at once more willing and better trained to accept the present.
Various as were its elements, and shaken though it was by five small risings
and conspiracies, the kingdom of Westphalia attained a reasonable degree ot
consistency. The best talents rallied round the Crown; nobles and gentry took
part in the administration. Prussians and Brunswickers, Hessians and
Hanoverians, all cooperated to carry on the work of the State.
The person
nominated to rule the Westphalian kingdom was Jerome, the youngest and
favourite brother of the Emperor, who had gleaned a little military reputation
in the Silesian campaign. Jerome was full of amiable intentions, agreeable in
manner, quick in counsel, and by no means destitute of sympathy. But he was
untrained, impetuous, and self-willed; and he consistently sacrificed the
material interests of his subjects to his own vulgar and prodigal pleasures.
The Constitution, which was framed in Paris, laid down the conditions upon
which the
412 Westphalia under Jerome Bonaparte. [18O8-12
Crown was to
be held, and fixed the principles upon which the government was to be
conducted. As a member of the Rhenish Confederation, the new kingdom was
compelled to furnish a contingent of 25,000 men to the French Empire; and
one-half of the allodial domains of the expropriated Princes was to be reserved
for the Emperor to serve as dotations to French officers. The King of
Westphalia was to remain a French prince; and, in case of the expiration of his
lawful line, his kingdom was to devolve upon the Emperor. The Civil List was
fixed at the enormous figure of 5,000,000 frs. The Code NapoUon was to form the
civil law of the kingdom. Procedure was to be public; trial by jury was
introduced in criminal cases; while conscription was declared a fundamental
law of the kingdom. The French monetary system and the French system of weights
and measures were to be established. Corporations previously existing were
doomed to extinction; and serfage and the exclusive privileges of the
aristocracy were to suffer the same fate. The Estates of the realm were to be
composed of a hundred members, named, after the Italian plan, by electoral
colleges, but were denied the right of initiative or public discussion.
Departments and prefects, districts and sub-prefects, cantons and justices of
the peace, municipalities and mayors, were prescribed and accepted.
It was not a
liberal constitution, but it was an advance upon anything which had been
experienced in these provinces; and the Westphalians determined to make the
best of it. The French system of justice won the approval of many competent
lawyers, as alike more speedy, simple, and efficient than the law or the
procedure to which they had been accustomed. The Jews, who everywhere save in
Brunswick had been liable to the most onerous disabilities, now found
themselves free and full citizens of the State; and, if the aristocracy
suffered from the loss of feudal dues, this was in a measure compensated by
places at Court and public offices. Military life was no novelty in Hesse; and
the Westphalian army proved attractive as a profession. The German prefects
threw themselves with zeal into the business of administration; and, as the
department of the interior was manned by German clerks, and presided over by an
old minister of the Duke of Brunswick, French principles were applied with due
consideration of German proclivities. The difficulty of language never became
acute, for, though French was exclusively spoken at Court and in the Council,
and the portfolios of war and justice were held by Frenchmen, German was never
proscribed. It was the language of the law-courts, of the Codes (specially
translated for Westphalian use), and of many of the public offices. It was
still taught in the schools, though French was made obligatory in addition; and
the official organ of the government, the Moniteur Westphalien, was bilingual.
It is true that the machine of administration and of justice had been set going
by French officials, and that the highest posts in the Westphalian army were
reserved to Frenchmen. But the French element in the
1805-14]
Misfortunes of Westphalia.—Frankfort. 413
Government
was not preponderant, or more than was sufficient to secure an intelligent and
appreciative execution of the principles upon which the business of the State
was to be conducted. The all-important ministry of finance was held in
succession by two Germans.
Yet, in spite
of many elements of promise, the kingdom of Westphalia ended in shame and
bankruptcy. The territories out of which it was made up were poor and backward;
and, before Jerome set foot in his kingdom they had been exhausted by a year of
French military requisitions. Every consideration of policy should have
prompted Napoleon to ease the financial situation of the government which was
to display to all Germany the benefits of the French method. But, if the
kingdom of Westphalia had been a deadly and treacherous foe, it could hardly
have been handled with greater harshness. Every penny which Napoleon could
wring out of Westphalia for the French Treasury he was determined to exact. He
claimed the debts due to the ex-Elector; he claimed half the domains; he
refused to pay the charges which had been incurred during the French military
occupation of 1809; he exacted an immense war-contribution; he required the
kingdom to maintain a force of 25,000 armed men, half of whom were in the first
instance to be French; and, as soon as he was assured of their loyalty, he
prompted his brother to raise more and more Westphalian troops. The Westphalian
financiers found themselves confronted by a deficit, in the first year, of
40,000,000 frs. But all entreaty and expostulation were in vain. Napoleon would
not listen to Jerome; and Jerome, with his wild and lavish courses, was not in
a position to remonstrate with effect. In 1812 the Government repudiated
two-thirds of its inherited debt, fixed the land-tax at 25 per cent, of the net
revenue, and decreed a forced loan of 5,000,000 frs.
If
enlightened finance ended in desperate extortion and bankruptcy, the greater
part of the blame rests with Napoleon. He set an extravagant and untried youth
to govern a new kingdom; he gave him too large an income; and he imposed
financial and military obligations upon his subjects which they were quite
unable to bear. A share in the disaster is also attributable to Jerome. He knew
how the Westphalian peasantry were suffering from the taxes and requisitions,
how commerce was paralysed and houses were allowed to fall out of repair; and he
was capable of describing to Napoleon the miseries of his subjects in tones of
genuine compassion. But, though there were good and prudent heads in his
ministry, he never checked for an instant the flow of his senseless
prodigality, and never surrendered a pleasure or a vice.
A third
variety of political experiment was exhibited on the banks of the Main. In 1805
Napoleon had spoken of the free city of Frankfort as a centre of English
conspiracy and contraband; and, when the Prussian war broke out, a heavy hand
was laid upon the purses and liberties of the Frankforters. They were compelled
to pay a war-tax of 4,000,000 frs. and to lose their cherished autonomy. The
city of Frankfort was now
included in
the small principality composed of Aschaffenburg and Ratisbon, which in 1803
had been created for Carl von Dalberg, the Prince-Primate of the Rhenish
Confederation, and the last surviving representative of the great
ecclesiastical Princes of Germany. Dalberg was humane and enlightened; and his
great reputation as a patriot, a reformer, a man of letters, and a churchman,
rendered him a useful ally to Napoleon. As he was unbounded in his enthusiasm
for the Emperor, he could be trusted with a territory of some strategical
importance. But he was known to be elderly, weak, and amiable; and, while his
policy was strictly watched by the French resident in Frankfort, Napoleon made
no scruple in quartering French troops upon his territory.
Dalberg
addressed himself to the task of alleviating the disabilities of the Frankfort
Jews, and began a faint assault upon the exclusive privileges of the Lutheran
Senate. But it was difficult for any of Napoleon’s agents to obtain immunity
from interruption. In 1810 the Dalbergian principality was entirely remodelled.
The Prince-Primate was forced to cede Ratisbon to Bavaria and to accept in
exchange the county of Hanau and the bishopric of Fulda, both of which
provinces had been utterly exhausted by four years of French military
occupation. His State was now christened the Grand Duchy of Frankfort, and
bound to contribute a quota of 4200 men to the Confederation of the Rhine, to
provide endowments for two marshals, to reserve an income for the Emperor, and
to introduce the French legal and administrative system at the earliest
opportunity. Upon the decease of the reigning Grand Duke, tbe principality was
to lapse to the Viceroy of Italy.
The
tragicomedy of the situation which ensued may be imagined. On the one hand
there is the mild old German prelate, issuing a constitution drafted on the
Westphalian model, summoning his Estates to Hanau, carving his little
principality into four departments, scheming a university here and a law-school
there, naming departmental councils and inviting their opinions; now sanguine
and exuberant, now cowed and depressed, but meeting with an unexpected amount
of intelligent German support, as well as a good deal of tough opposition from
the oligarchy of Frankfort. On the other hand there is the French agent,
d’Hedouville or Bacher, corresponding with the Foreign Office in Paris and
calling the tune. He inspects every act and proclamation before it is published
in the official gazette, and, in defiance of the Constitution, promulgates acts
which have never received the assent of the Estates; he suppresses political
newspapers, carries out domiciliary visits, goads the Prince-Primate if he is
remiss, checks him if he is hasty; while on the financial side he is assisted
by “ the Director of Domains in the service of France,” who arranges the budget
and introduces the searching and unpopular methods of the French Treasury.
Meanwhile English wares are burnt in the towns; and a continual procession of
French troops passes to and fro through the country, which is burdened with the
cost of their
support.
Outwardly the Grand Duchy is a little German State, governed on a
constitutional system by an elderly German philanthropist. In reality it is a
French military tyranny which ends by alienating every heart. Yet,
notwithstanding, in the reaction which followed the downfall of Napoleon, the
judicial system introduced into these regions by the French was substantially
preserved.
In the
catalogue of squandered opportunities the history of the Belgian departments
should take a high place. At the outbreak of the French Revolution there seemed
to be every reason for expecting a permanent and wholesome coalescence between
the French and Belgian populations. The inhabitants of the Austrian Netherlands
had no history which could be called national, nor were they divided from the
French by the barrier of language. Belgians had frequently taken service in the
French army; and, in the revolt against the iconoclastic policy of Joseph II,
the Belgian Liberals rested on the support and sympathy of France. It is true
that in Luxemburg there was a genuine devotion to Austria, and that many
wealthy Belgians had placed their savings in the bank of Vienna. It is true
that a considerable trade was done with England. Yet such obstacles as these
might easily have been overcome by just and considerate government.
There were,
however, two circumstances which made the problem of Belgian incorporation
exceptionally delicate: The population of the Netherlands was both devout and
unmilitaiy. Nowhere, save perhaps in Spf in, had the Catholic Church so complete
and unqualified a dominion. It had neither been discredited by a Jansenist
schism, nor shaken by the clarifying blasts of French philosophy. The doctors
of Louvain persevered in their rejection of the Gallican Articles, and
instilled into their disciples an abhorrence of Erastianism which had been
deepened by the injudicious measures of Joseph II. During the Revolution and
more particularly under the Directory, everything had been done to lacerate the
conscience and to impair the well-being of these unfortunate provinces. They
were pillaged by ignorant and brutal commissioners ; they were subjected to the
conscription; their taxes were increased; their Church was persecuted. With an
inconceivable lack of statesmanship, the French Government applied to the
Belgian departments all the religious legislation which had torn asunder the
Church in France ; and the consequence was that they raised a Belgian Vendee.
Consequently, at the establishment of the Consulate, the nine departments, far
from having acquired an attachment to their new masters, were angry, miserable,
and impotent. Population had dwindled ; roads were broken and neglected;
banditti swarmed over the country; and the hero of every parish was its
non-juring and persecuted priest.
The policy of
the Consulate was well calculated to heal the breach which had grown up between
France and her new subjects. Capable
416
Religion and conscription in Belgium.—Holland, [1800-14
French
prefects were sent to govern the departments, and ruled them with honesty,
energy, and good sense. Canals and roads were made ; prisons were reformed;
brigandage was stamped out; order was introduced into municipal and village
finance; a cadastral survey was pushed forward towards completion; and while
the material havoc was thus skilfully repaired, the Concordat brought peace to
the Church, especially as the government wisely refrained from appointing “
Constitutional ” bishops to the Belgian sees. Papalist to the backbone, the
Belgian clergy did not go behind the decision of the Pope. .
Still, the
profound Erastianism of the Napoleonic system was sure, sooner or later, to
cause trouble in this quarter. An able pamphleteering priest, Alfred Stevens,
took up his pen against the Organic Articles, and poured satire on the new Imperial
festivals and the new Imperial catechism. A great mistake was made when the
Emperor insisted that the professors in the seminaries should subscribe to the
Gallican Articles and teach them to their pupils; and the uews of the formation
of the University of France and of the inclusion of the Belgian departments
within the sphere of its control was received in a spirit of angry distrust.
The conscription had been peculiarly unpopular from the first; and the clergy
keenly resented the obligation to promote it from the pulpit. In 1808 there was
already widespread disaffection, which every fresh turn in Napoleon’s quarrel
with the Papacy served to intensify. Their commerce injured by the blockade,
their privacy violated by the police, their homes emptied by the conscription,
their deepest religious sensibilities outraged by the religious policy of the
Emperor, the population of the nine departments was in no humour to appreciate
the splendid work of men like Chaban at Brussels, or Micoud d’Unions at Liege.
Indeed, the closing years of the Imperial administration were disfigured by an
ignominious persecution of priests and seminarists.
It was
comparatively late in the reign of Napoleon that the United tTovinces, long a
subordinate republic or kingdom, became a part of the French Empire. Napoleon’s
early dealings with the Batavian Republic, the conversion of the republic into
a kingdom in favour of Louis Bonaparte (1806), and the events which brought
about the resignation of Louis and the annexation of his kingdom (1810), have
been described in previous chapters of this volume. It only remains here to
consider the condition of the Dutch provinces during the brief period in which
they were directly under Napoleon’s rule. The decree of annexation laid down
that Amsterdam was to rank after Paris and Rome as the third city of the Empire
; that Holland was to contribute six members to the Senate, three to the
Council of State, and twenty-five to the Legislative Body, not to speak of two
judges to the Court of Cassation, three auditeurs, and three masters of
requests. Lebrun, Duke of Piacenza, and Arch-Treasurer of the Empire, was
appointed
Lieutenant-General
in Holland and instructed to introduce the French system. “ I am about to open
the Continent to your industry,” said Napoleon to the Dutch deputies who were
summoned to Paris to assist in the task of incorporation. “ My intention,” he
wrote to Lebrun, his urbane and dignified lieutenant, “ is to govern the
country myself.”
The
consequences of the expulsion of “ good King Louis ” were rapidly made evident.
The interest on the public debt was reduced by two-thirds; a tax of 50 per
cent, was levied on colonial merchandise found in Dutch warehouses; a revenue
of 60,000,000 florins was extorted from a population of 2,000,000; and, while
the blockade was now for the first time strictly enforced, the conscription was
introduced with all its rigours. With a singular refinement of stringency two
Belgian prefects were appointed to rule the important departments of Zuider See
(capital Amsterdam) and the Bouches de Meuse (capital Rotterdam); and the
cruelty and rigour with which de Celles and de Stassart enforced the
conscription left an indelible impression on the country. The domiciliary
visits of the French police, the necessity of obtaining a police pass for the
smallest journey, and the inquisitorial methods necessitated by the new excise
duties, increased the general discontent. It seemed to be the French policy to
obliterate all the national memories. The names of the old provinces were
abolished, and the country was divided into seven departments. It was enacted
that French should be taught in all the primary schools, and that after the
lapse of a year no person should be received as a master who should not be
capable of teaching the rudiments. Every book had to satisfy the censor at
Amsterdam or at Paris. All public acts had to be accompanied by a French
translation; and, while no department was allowed more than one political
newspaper, that newspaper had to be bilingual. That the country might be still
farther denationalised, a third of the officers in the Dutch army must be
French, while it was a principle to employ, as far as possible, Dutch officers
and generals outside their own country. The universities of Leyden and
Groningen were converted into academies of the University of France, while
lycees of the usual French pattern were set up in Groningen, Leyden, and
Utrecht. It is true, as Mollien remarks, that the revenue derived from the
Dutch departments, at a rate per head almost double that imposed upon France,
was exclusively spent in the departments themselves; but it was spent upon
objects with which the population had no sympathy, dockyards and ships, forts
and soldiers. The best French administrators acknowledged that the Dutch had
little to learn from them in economy, exactitude, and business method.
Among the
European dependencies of the Empire none were more miscellaneous, more remote,
or more calculated to test the flexibility of the French system than the Illyrian
provinces, a tract of coast-land
extending
from the Tyrolese mountains to the Paschalik of Scutari, and containing a
sparse population of some two million inhabitants. Of this large Adriatic
domain two portions, the Venetian province of Dalmatia and the tiny republic of
Ragusa, had been absorbed into the French system in 1806 ; the remainder,
including the ports of Trieste and Fiume, was stripped from Austria three years
later. A lengthy decree, issued on April 15, 1811, and published in the Moniteur
for May 12, placed the new dependency under three officials, a
governor-general, a general m- tendant of finance, and a commissioner of
justice; divided it into one military and six civil provinces (military
Croatia, civil Croatia, Camiola, Carinthia, Istria, Dalmatia, Ragusa); ordered
the erection of lycees at Laibach and Ragusa; and, while defining the outlines
of the judicial and administrative system, commanded the introduction of the
French Codes at the opening of the ensuing year.
Several
currents of Imperial policy, some clear and steady, others hidden and
intermittent, are reflected in the acquisition of the Illyrian provinces, which
provided a strong bulwark against Austria, a military base against Turkey, and
distant endowments for the French marshals. It was worth while to acquire a
string of harbours in which a fleet might be built, and whence an expedition
might start for the recovery of Egypt; worth while to win a new strip of coast
for the Continental Blockade, and to divert the overland consignments of
Eastern cotton from the German route to Imperial territory. The Illyrian
provinces were valuable, whether they were considered as a military march, or
as a pawn in the game of diplomatic exchanges. The climate was delicious, the
scenery romantic; and in the olive gardens and vineyards of the coast the
French were reminded of their beloved Provence. Yet Illyria was for the most
part in a half-barbarous condition, without roads, without schools, without
posts, plagued with brigands, and neglectful of the arts of agriculture and
forestry. The woods which formerly clothed the Dalmatian mountains had been
wilfully destroyed by the inhabitants, in order that they might escape the
burden of supplying timber to the Venetian navy; and the upland population,
though splendid in physique and valorous in temper, was poor, superstitious,
and paralysed into economic inertia by the raids of Turkish and Albanian
brigands. There was more prosperity among the Italian shippers and
fruit-growers of the coast; and the republic of Ragusa was specially notable
for its polite and exclusive aristocracy, its prosperous middle class of
retired sea- captains and merchants, and its well-to-do and laborious
peasantry. But Dalmatia had always cost Venice more than it brought in. A cadastral
survey was unknown; taxes were largely paid in kind. In the interior there were
still traces of archaic communism; justice and administration were alike venal;
and, but for the active ministrations of the. Franciscan missionaries, the
rural population would have been left in outer darkness. In the seaports a few
forward spirits had caught some fragments of
democratic
phraseology; but otherwise the intellectual preparation for French rule was
singularly wanting. The popular sympathies were Venetian, Hungarian, Austrian.
The task of winning them over to France was entrusted to Marmont, the first
governor-general, and the finest political intelligence in the Imperial army.
Marmont built
the great coast-road which leads from Zara to Spalatro. “ The Austrians ” (so
went a Dalmatian saying) “ discussed plans for eight years; Marmont mounted his
horse, and when he got off the road was made.” He broke up the robber bands,
equipped the country with primary, secondary, and technical schools, and,
divesting himself of the stereotyped anticlericalism of the army, assumed the
protectorship of the Franciscan Order in Dalmatia. The foible of uniformity,
dear to the logical mind, was not one of Marmont’s failings. His administrative
areas varied according to the locality, small where communications were
difficult, large where they were easy. He was not afraid to sanction communal
and feudal institutions, as for instance in military Croatia, where he
successfully justified the arrangements of the Austrian Government to the
critics in Paris. That he did not obtain financial equilibrium was due to the
exigencies of the Emperor and the maritime war, rather than to any lack of
administrative dexterity on his own part or on that of d’Auchy, the financial
intendant. The fiscal history of the Illyrian provinces is one of desperate
expedients and growing deficits. Thus, while the vigour and effectiveness of
the French Government procured permanent benefits to the dependency, these
advantages were purchased at the expense of much temporary suffering. A report
upon the Illyrian provinces, drawn up in July, 1813, for the instruction of the
Duke of Otranto when he came to take up the governorship, speaks of the ruin of
commerce, the ruthless exaction of taxes, the unsatisfactory personnel of the
judicature, the scanty and unpunctual remuneration of the clergy, the failure
to appreciate the Civil Code, the oppression of every class in the community.
This is a dark picture to be set beside the brilliant canvas of Marmont’s
memoirs. Yet in the archives of Paris there is ample testimony to the zeal and
intelligence of the officials who were sent to explore Illyrian men and manners
and to advise upon the institutions adapted to the country.
The project
of restoring the French colonial empire in the West belongs specifically to the
period of the Consulate. Then it was that Louisiana was purchased from Spain,
and that a great army was despatched to San Domingo to revive the influence of
France in the richest of her colonies. It was then also that the Spanish
government was pressed to part with the Floridas in exchange for Parma. The
loss of Egypt and the postponement of designs upon the further East would in
this way be balanced by the formation of a new empire in and round the Gulf of
Mexico, stretching from French Guiana northwards to the
420
French colonial policy. Toussaint UOuverture. [1794-1800
St John’s
River and the lower waters of the Mississippi. Its central point would be San
Domingo. In one direction it might be made to extend as far north as Lake
Superior and the St Lawrence.
The colonial
policy of the ancien regime had reposed upon three principles—the preservation
of an aristocratic planter society, served by slave-labour, the restriction of
colonial commerce in the interests of the mother-country, and the exercise of
direct political control by the central government. With all these principles
Napoleon was in sympathy. He believed in the natural inferiority of the black;
he supported slavery; he was in favour of commercial monopoly and jealous of
the least symptom of colonial independence. Yet, when he began to turn his
attention to colonial problems, he found that the greatest colony of Prance was
governed by a negro, who had drilled a black army, promulgated a constitution,
and opened the ports of San Domingo to British and American traders. Everything
which was most odious to Napoleon, black ascendancy, free trade, colonial
autonomy, seemed to be concentrated in this island of the Antilles. He told his
Council that he did not know the slaves of America, but that he had seen the
slaves of Egypt and Darfour, and found them no better than brute beasts. “ In
the interests of civilisation ” hie determined to destroy “ the new Algiers
which was being organised in the middle of America”; and no intelligence could
have been more grateful than this to the exiled planters of the Club de
Massiac, whose fortunes had been crippled by the “ romance of the revolution,”
and who had long besieged the Government with clamours for restitution and revenge.
The negro
ruler of San Domingo styled himself Toussaint L’Ouver- ture. He was a man of
rare endowments, so abstemious that a glass of water and two bananas would
often suffice for a day’s nourishment, so hardy and laborious that he rarely
slept more than two hours in the twenty-four. To the unctuous piety of a
convert he added the zeal of a revolutionary, the courage of a soldier, and the
reserve of a statesman. His ascendancy over his fellow-negroes was complete,
for he understood their natures, formulated their ambitions, and could speak in
vivid and homely parables to their understanding. But he saw that the fortress
of civilisation was not to be captured by sudden violence, and that discipline
is the master-key to progress. In the summer of 1794, at the darkest hour in
the history of the French colony, when the mulattoes were freely raging in the
south, and the western and northern strongholds had passed into the hands of
the English or the Spaniards, Toussaint marched 4000 blacks to the rescue of
the last French garrison in the island. His assistance was decisive. By May,
1800, the whole of the French colony, save Les Cayes, which still held out for
Rigaud, the mulatto chief, had passed into the power of Toussaint.
It had been
stipulated by the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1795 that the Spanish or eastern
half of the island should be handed over to Fiance
on the
conclusion of a general peace. Toussaint resolved to anticipate the event. He
was aware that Napoleon had risen to supreme power in France; and emulation or
precaution prompted him to acquire the mastery of the whole island before the
First Consul had time to intervene. Compelling the French commissioner at Le
Cap to authorise the expedition, Toussaint marched his black army into the
Spanish colony and carried all before him. On January 26, 1801, San Domingo,
the capital, was in his hands; and the sleepy Spanish Government had come to an
end.
It is
improbable that Toussaint intended to make himself independent of the French
Republic. Himself a convert of French missionaries, he had sent his two sons to
be educated in France, and had refused an English offer to recognise him as
king of the island. It is true that, in the constitution which had been drafted
by a small knot of white and yellow admirers, Toussaint had been appointed
governor for life and given the power to name his successor. But, as throughout
his career he had been careful to obtain the shelter of French authority, so
now (July, 1801) he sent Colonel Vincent to Paris to lay the constitution
before Napoleon. His idea was to found an autonomous government under French
suzerainty, defended by black battalions, but assisted by the skill of white
civilians and mechanics. Vincent reported that he was the only man who could
rescue the colony from anarchy and keep it faithful to France. But there were
letters from the West which spoke of him as full of treacherous designs.
Toussaint was
fond of saying that the liberty of the blacks could only be consolidated by the
prosperity of agriculture, and he set his face against agrarian revolution. Not
only were the white planters urged to return to the island, but Toussaint
forced negro labour back to the plantations and dragooned his compatriots to
revert to their old tasks. He would not even allow the blacks to acquire small
plots of land, holding that a peasant proprietary would be idle and
undisciplined. His finance was excellent; his policy of free imports from
America was essential not only to the well-being but even to the sustenance of
the colony; and there had always been a party among the planters favourable to
some scheme of colonial autonomy. On the whole, it would have been wise to
leave him undisturbed, until he had shown clear proof of disloyalty to the
French connexion.
The command
of the French expedition was given to General Leclerc, the first husband of
Pauline Bonaparte; and from his secret instructions the character of Napoleon’s
colonial policy may be judged. Leclerc was named captain of the whole island,
but was instructed to maintain a strict separation between the French and
Spanish areas. The blacks were to be disarmed everywhere; but, whereas in the
French colony they were to be free, in the Spanish colony they were to remain
in a condition of servitude. The French colony was to be divided into departments
and municipalities, the Spanish into dioceses and jurisdictions;
“administration,
commerce, justice, everything must be different.” Tous- saint and his principal
generals were in the first instance to be flattered and confirmed in their
commands, and then to be kidnapped and deported to France. When the black power
had been broken—for it was likely that there would be some guerilla fighting in
the mountains—the French government would show its hand. All the principal
agents, whether white or black, lay or clerical, of Toussaint’s government,
would then be deported to France. The exiled proprietors would be restored to
their plantations; and the donations made by the black government would be
annulled. The creoles would be compelled to send their children to France for
education, and no public instruction of any kind would be permitted in the
island. The foreign trade, as in old days, would be reserved for France.
Napoleon said
at St Helena that the expedition to San Domingo was the greatest act of folly
in his life. Short-sighted and disastrous it certainly proved to be, though
Toussaint was successfully deported to die in prison among the rigours of the
Jura. The yellow fever decimated the French army; the blacks fought bravely in
the western mountains; and the resumption of the war with England closed the
sea-ways to France and broke the project of a western empire. The fleet which
was to have brought French organisation into Louisiana never crossed the
Atlantic; the tricolour never waved over Florida. Yet, even apart from
circumstances connected with the general war, Napoleon’s colonial policy was
neither honest nor wise. Toussaint is an enigma; but, whatever view may be
taken of his intentions, he was treated with cruelty and guile. It was
short-sighted to suppose that the systems of slavery and freedom could coexist
in the same or in adjoining islands. Such a policy would lead the free negroes
to revolt from suspicion, and the slaves to revolt from envy. Nor was it wise
to revive the old system of preferential trade, which sacrificed the material
interests of the colony to those of the mother-country. More might be said for
the autocratic type of colonial government, for the substitution of nominated
Chambers of Commerce with advisory powers for the old free planters’
assemblies. Measures were taken to strengthen the connexion between the
mother-country and the colonies. A section of the Council of State was
entrusted with colonial affairs; a representative from every colonial Chamber
of Commerce was forced to be resident in Paris, and a liberal allowance of
places in the French prytaneum was allotted to colonial students. That the
coalescence of the white and dark races might be promoted, Napoleon, according
to his own account, contemplated legalising polygamy. Such was his colonial
policy, full of noble aims and unwise expedients, and scorning every accepted
canon of conventional morality.
The Act of
Mediation (1803) brought Switzerland completely under the control of Bonaparte.
For the year 1803 he appointed, as
Landammawn of the Swiss Federation, Louis d’Affry of Fribourg. The choice
was significant. D’Affry belonged to an old patrician family, which had
supplied officers and ambassadors to France; and he himself had served in the
Swiss guard under Louis XVI. He was, in fact, one of those courtiers of the old
regime of whom Bonaparte had said, “ It is only the nobles who understand
service.” Of attractive manners, polished and courteous, quick-witted and
moderate in his views, he became a valuable servant to Bonaparte. The First
Consul, moreover, in order to secure his services, paid over to d’Aft'ry, on
the day on which he took office, a sum of 31,000 francs from the secret service
money at the disposal of the police, revived in his favour an extinct royal
pension, and wrote him a letter in which he said, “ I shall seize every
opportunity of showing you favour.” In similar fashion Bonaparte strove to gain
over other members of the Swiss aristocracy, to whom, in his own words, he offered
“ power, honour, and wealth ”; but in these attempts at corruption he was less
successful.
On July
4,1803, the first meeting of the Diet was held at Fribourg. It was presided
over by d’Affry, who opened the assembly with an eloquent speech, in which he
set forth the advantages of the Act of Mediation, and urged on his
fellow-citizens the expediency of union, moderation, and attachment to France.
General Ney, the French ambassador, then announced that France was prepared to
conclude with Switzerland a defensive alliance and a military convention. This
treaty, which marked a further stage in the dependence of Switzerland on
France, produced a painful impression on the patriots. Bonaparte, in point of
fact, called upon the Federation to furnish four regiments of 4000 men each;
Switzerland, in return, had the right to send twenty young Swiss to the £cole
Polytechnique-, and Swiss officers were made eligible to all commands and
dignities in France. The Diet, after a somewhat heated discussion, accepted the
inevitable.
These Swiss
regiments in the French service were never at their full strength. The soldiers
were volunteers and were recruited with difficulty. In 1810 Bonaparte declared
his intention of establishing compulsory service. The Diet protested against a
measure contrary to the terms of the convention, and implored Bonaparte to
agree to a fresh arrangement which should relieve Switzerland from her crushing
military burden. Curiously enough, Bonaparte acceded to this on the eve of his
Russian campaign. On March 28, 1812, a fresh convention reduced the strength of
each regiment to three battalions of 1000 men apiece. During the wars of the
Empire the Swiss soldiers maintained their old reputation for bravery. “The
Swiss,” Napoleon wrote, “are the only foreign soldiers who are brave and
trustworthy.” In Russia the Swiss regiments were heavily engaged. Most of them
were left on the battlefield, but they lost neither eagle nor flag.
Napoleon’s
protection did the Swiss more harm than good, for the
military convention
of 1808 was cited by the Allies in 1814 as their excuse for violating the
neutrality of Switzerland. It is only fair, however, to acknowledge that until
1814 Switzerland was preserved from the evils of war. In 1804 Bonaparte
withdrew his troops; and this measure, which in other times would have been
followed by disturbances, did not affect the tranquillity of the country.
There was, indeed, an insurrection in the spring of 1804, but it was purely
local in character. Some peasants of Zurich were dissatisfied because their
Grand Council had fixed a higher rate for the redemption of their tithes than
that paid by the other cantons, and they rose in revolt. It became necessary to
call in the Federal troops, and they had some difficulty in reducing the
insurgents to submission.
This rising
called the attention of the Diet to the need of a better organisation of the
Federal forces; and in 1804 the Diet asked Bonaparte for his permission to
create a permanent staff, which should be the nucleus of a militia. Bonaparte
flatly refused to accede to their wishes; and his refusal elicited from the
Landammann, de Watteville, the following letter—“The chief aim of France is
clearly to weaken Switzerland by depriving her of the military organisation
which she might and should have, and so to tie her down. This affords matter
for the most discouraging reflexions; and there can be no doubt that, if France
persists in her unjust refusal, doubt and distrust will soon replace the
genuine feeling of attachment which, after the Act of Mediation, the conduct of
the French Government inspired.”
It needed
some courage on the part of a Landammann of Switzerland to write this letter,
for Bonaparte had now become the Emperor Napoleon, and no longer concealed his
design of annexing to the Empire those countries which were dependent on
France. So early as 1805 it was believed in Switzerland that the last hour of
the Federation had struck. The Emperor, when he broke up his camp at Boulogne,
desired to know if Switzerland was in a position to compel respect for her
neutrality. Fortunately the Diet, on the resumption of hostilities, had decided
to mobilise the Federal forces. This did not satisfy Napoleon, who was clearly
seeking for a pretext to violate the neutrality of Switzerland if the war
approached her frontier. Such was, however, not the case; and Swiss neutrality
was preserved.
It may be
said that, so long as the Empire lasted, the threat of annexation hung over
Switzerland. In 1809, on the outbreak of the Austrian war, Napoleon said to the
envoy Reinhard: “ If I have need to march into Switzerland, I shall do it. I
can always find a pretext; the most insignificant pamphlet aimed at me will
serve my purpose.” In 1810 certain events happened which seemed to forebode
actual annexation: the formal absorption of Valais, which had hitherto remained
an independent republic; and the occupation of Ticino by troops sent from
Italy, on the pretence of putting down the smuggling of English goods.
Johann von
Muller, in his letters written at the time, bewailed the fate of the old
Federation; and it was commonly reported that Napoleon proposed to convert the
ancient republic into a kingdom for one of his brothers or for his protege,
Berthier, who was already Prince of Neu- chatel. What is certain is that in
1811 the question of creating a kingdom of Helvetia for the Elector Charles of
Baden, the husband of Stephanie de Beauhamais, Napoleon’s adopted daughter, was
seriously considered. But this project was never carried out.
Switzerland
suffered much from the Continental Blockade. Ever since the middle of the
eighteenth century she had possessed certain flourishing industries which had
already gained a reputation abroad—the manufacture of cotton goods in St
Gallen, Zurich, and Glarus, of linens and embroideries in St Gallen, of silk
stuffs in Zurich and Basel, and of clocks and watches in Geneva and the Jura.
In addition to these, an important manufacture of machinery had been
established at Zurich at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Act of
Mediation had created hopes that a fresh impulse would be given to the
industrial movement, and new markets created abroad. Napoleon had promised the
Swiss an addition to the convention of 1803 or a treaty of commerce ; but
neither the promised additional clauses nor the treaty ever saw the light Worse
than this, although the convention had stipulated that the Swiss should be
placed on the footing of the most favoured nation, an enormous prohibitory tax
was laid on their cotton goods. The Swiss Government protested against an
arrangement which was ruining one of their most flourishing industries; but
Napoleon would not listen. On the contrary, he doubled the tariff in 1805; and
in 1806 he forbade altogether the importation of Swiss cottons into France.
In
Switzerland the Continental System was applied with extreme 1 rigour. The
inhabitants were ordered to exclude all British merchandise, with the exception
of cotton yarn, a raw material indispensable to the cotton industry.
Prohibitive duties were imposed on all colonial products, and all manufactured
products of British origin discovered in the country were confiscated. When he
saw that, in spite of his precautions, British goods were smuggled in, Napoleon
forced the Swiss to establish on all their frontiers a network of custom-houses
under French supervision. This involved the ruin of a great number of Swiss
industries. At the close of 1810 more than 10,000 families were out of work. In
1812 the distress had become so great that the Diet decided to address a
petition to Napoleon, beseeching him to put an end to their calamities. This
appeal was unheard amid the din of the preparations for the Russian campaign.
But it was the Russian campaign which brought deliverance to the Swiss* Hardly
had the news of the retreat of the Grande Armee arrived in Switzerland than
there was a general relaxation in the Continental Blockade; and in the
following year, after Leipzig, the
Diet, in an
extraordinary session held at Zurich on November 15, declared formally that the
Continental System was at an end.
During these
years of subjection the Diet could hardly effect much, but it showed an anxiety
to do something towards improving the future of the country. Among the first
tasks of the new Government were the liquidation of the debt of the Helvetic
Republic, and the settlement of questions relating to the national funds and
the management of the public estates. A committee, appointed in 1803 to deal
with these matters, rejected all claims to indemnity in respect of
confiscations suffered during the Revolution, whether such claims were made by
civil or religious corporations or by private individuals, and determined the
share of each of the cantons in the national funds. The Diet would have been
well pleased could it have secured the money for the central authority; for the
latter, however insignificant were its powers, had certain expenses to meet. In
the absence of a central fund, these expenses had to be paid out of the yearly
sums contributed by the cantons towards the maintenance of the Federal forces.
The Diet,
too, would have been glad to create a uniform system of weights, measures,
money, and customs duties throughout the various cantons. Proposals to this end
were made by certain deputies who had suffered from the existing confusion, so
prejudicial to the trade and the general prosperity of the country; but, as
most of these reforms would have been contrary to the Act of Mediation, it was
impossible to adopt them. The cantons, on the other hand, did not hesitate to
infringe certain provisions of the Act. Thus, in spite of the declaration that
all religious beliefs were free, and that any Swiss might reside in any canton,
some of the cantonal governments, mostly those in Old Switzerland, forbade the
settlement of Protestants in their territories. Liberty of thought was,
moreover, reduced to the narrowest limits; and the press was subject to a
censorship not less rigorous than that which existed in France.
A
confederation which possessed neither authority nor revenue was incapable of
carrying through any great work of public utility. All matters such as the
repair of roads, the creation and maintenance of canals, the straightening and
embankment of rivers, and the replanting of mountain-sides, were left to the cantons;
and they, in the absence of funds, did nothing. Fortunately, the spirit of
initiative, always strongly developed in the Swiss nature, made good the
insufficiency of state resources. Many important works were, during this
period, undertaken by private individuals. In 1804, Escher, a celebrated
geologist of Zurich, undertook, at the instigation of the Diet and with the
help of some fellow-countrymen, to drain the marshes which reached from the
lake of Wallenstadt to the lake of Zurich, a distance of four leagues; he cut a
canal through them and so brought a wide extent of barren and unhealthy land
into cultivation.
To turn to
the sphere of moral activity, the Swiss Society of Public Utility, which has
produced and still produces important results, was founded at Zurich in 1810 by
certain philanthropists. Other institutions of an educational character date
from this period, such as the schools of Pestalozzi at Burgdorf and Yverdon,
and the agricultural school and general institute of the Bernese Fellenberg at
Hofwyl. There was at the same time no slackening of intellectual activity.
While living in Germany, Johann von Muller continued and completed his history
of the Swiss Confederation. At Zurich, Pestalozzi wrote his educational books,
Martin Usteri and Ulrich Hegner their popular tales. In Aargau, Heinrich
Zschokke published his novels and his historical works. French Switzerland was
adorned by the brilliant society which Madame de Stael assembled at Coppet, and
which included Benjamin Constant, the publicist of Lausanne, Sismondi, the
Genevese historian, Bonstetten, the Bernese philosopher, and August Wilhelm
Schlegel, the German critic. Geneva, although at that time actually part of
France, remained the intellectual centre of French Switzerland. The Genevese
were not inclined to allow their national spirit to be absorbed by France. Ever
since the Reformation, there had been a continual exchange of ideas between
Great Britain and the city of Calvin; and all the publicists of the Genevese
school, Burlamaqui, Delolme, and J. J. Rousseau, were strongly influenced by
English writers. “Geneva,” said Sismondi in 1803, “ is a city where men speak
and write in French, but where men read and think in English.” To meet their
taste for what was English, Marc-Auguste Pictet, Professor of Physics at
Calvin’s ancient Academy, where he was the worthy successor of Horace-Benedicte
de Saussure, founded in conjunction with his brother, Pictet de Rochemont, the
BibMotheqite britannique. This review rapidly took an important place in Europe
as an international organ. In this publication the Genevese ventured, at a time
when to speak favourably of things English was looked upon as treason, to keep
the Continent informed of all that was passing in England. Its influence is shown
by the remark of Talleyrand, who, at the Congress of Vienna, observed to Pictet
de Rochemont, “Your review has behind it such a weight of public opinion that
its suppression would have amounted to a coup d'etat.”
THE
PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-14.
In
dealing with the political schemes of Napoleon it is not always easy to
discover what is end and what is means: whether a particular project is carried
out merely for its own sake, or is also intended as a step towards some further
goal. This is preeminently the case with the invasion of Portugal, described in
a previous chapter. It has often been maintained that when the Emperor launched
Junot’s corps against Lisbon he was thinking of nothing more than bringing
Portugal into line with his other vassal-states in the matter of the
Continental System. A careful study of his manoeuvres, however, would seem to
make it certain that he was also using the whole affair as a cover for a long-
projected attack on Spain.
So far back
as 1805 he had muttered to a confidant, “ Un Bourbon mr le trone d'Espagne,
c'est un voisin trap danger mac ”; and with far better justification, after he
had received Godoy’s bellicose proclamation on the battlefield of Jena, he had
vowed to take his revenge in due season on the presumptuous favourite and his
imbecile master. “ Jejurai des lors qu'ils me le paieraient, queje les
mettrais hors d'etat de me nuire.” No one could have blamed him
if, after signing the Treaty of Tilsit, he had turned sharply on Spain and
demanded the dismissal of Godoy, or even declared war on Charles IV. Ten years
later, at St Helena, he acknowledged that this would have been the most
expedient as well as the most honest course to take. In place of it he adopted
the tortuous and Machiavellian policy of which the first step was seen in the
Treaty of Fontainebleau. Godoy, instead of receiving condign chastisement, was
promised a kingdom for himself in southern Portugal, on condition that he
should allow a French army a free passage to Lisbon, and lend his aid for the
expulsion of the House of Braganza. It is impossible to believe for a moment
that the Emperor ever intended to call into real existence Godoy’s
“principality of the \lgarves.” When he offered a crown and a realm to one who
had deserved so ill at his hands, it was clearly with the object of cajoling
him into admitting French troops into the Peninsula, and with no
intention of
carrying out his promise. After Junot had obtained possession of Portugal, no
steps were taken to establish the “ principality of the Algarves.”
Meanwhile,
before Junot had reached Lisbon, the domestic troubles of the Court of Spain
had at last reached explosion point. On October 27,
1807, Charles IV arrested his son Ferdinand, accusing
him of having plotted to dethrone him and to murder his mother and her
favourite Godoy. The Prince of the Asturias had undoubtedly been intriguing
behind his father’s back; he had written to Napoleon to beg his protection,
and to ask for the hand of a princess of the House of Bonaparte. He had been
organising a party of malcontents, who hated the “ Prince of the Peace”—such
was Godoy’s title—as much as he did himself. But his schemes were vague and
futile; the most he did was to write obsequious letters to Paris, and to take
precautions against Godoy’s hardly-disguised intention to exclude him from the
succession. The only compromising documents found in his possession were two
drafts of a manifesto denouncing the favourite’s designs, and an undated commission
appointing the Duke of Infantado (one of his personal camarilla) military
governor of Madrid and New Castile. He declared, probably with truth, that this
last paper was intended to be used only in the case of his father’s death or
permanent disablement.
But the best
proof of Ferdinand’s innocence of the grave accusations brought against him is
his character. He was very obstinate and a good hater, but he was also cautious
in the extreme, and so destitute of courage and proper pride that, though he
could resent, he could never revenge an insult, if the least risk was involved.
When arrested at the Escorial, he gave up the names of his confederates in the
most craven fashion, and sent to his parents two letters couched in the most
disgusting terms of self-abasement. The King had already written to Napoleon
stating that his son had been discovered in a plot against his mother’s life;
he had also published in the Madrid Gazette a manifesto to the effect that the
Prince had been detected in treasonable plots, and that the conspirators were
to be tried and punished. But whether it was that the old man shrank from
bloodshed, or that Godoy thought that he had done enough in discrediting
Ferdinand in the eyes of the nation, matters were pushed no further. The Prince
was pardoned by a magniloquent and turgid royal proclamation; and his
partisans, Infantado, the Canon Escoiquiz, and certain others, were allowed to
be acquitted after a formal trial. Nothing could have suited Napoleon’s plans
better than the publication of this scandalous domestic quarrel; it was indifferent
to him whether public opinion regarded Charles IV as an unnatural father or
Ferdinand as an unnatural son. In either case the prestige of the Spanish royal
family was diminished, and interference in its affairs became more easy.
Meanwhile he
was proceeding with his plans for introducing, more
French troops
into Spain. The Treaty of Fontainebleau had provided that, if the English sent
an army to Portugal, the Emperor might reinforce Junot’s expeditionary corps,
after giving due notice to the King of Spain. With this excuse, an army-corps
of 25,000 men under General Dupont had been collected at Bayonne. On November
22 Dupont received orders to cross the Bidassoa, though no English force had
been heard of. No intimation of this movement was sent to the Spanish
Government; and Charles IV and Godoy were as much alarmed as they were
surprised by the news that the troops of their ally had cantoned themselves in
the valley of the Ebro. On January 8, 1808, they were still further startled by
the appearance of a third army-corps under Marshal Moncey, which occupied
Biscay and Navarre; whereupon Dupont pushed forward to Burgos and Valladolid.
Nor was this all. On February 10 a division of 14,000 men, half French, half
Italian, under General Duhesme, began to pour into Catalonia and made its way
to Barcelona. As Catalonia is not on the way to Portugal, there was no excuse
whatever for the appearance of this fourth army in the north-eastern comer of
the Peninsula.
On February
16 the Emperor finally threw off the mask and began a series of frankly hostile
acts towards his unfortunate ally. On that day the French troops quartered in
Pampeluna occupied the citadel of that fortress by a treacherous coup de main.
On the 29th Duhesme seized the citadel and chief forts of Barcelona. On March 5
the weak- kneed governor of San Sebastian allowed himself to be scared out of
that rocky stronghold by threats of force. Finally, on March 18, Figueras, the
border fortress of northern Catalonia, was surprised by a French detachment,
supposed to be passing peacefully through the town.
The Spanish
Court was plunged into wild alarm by the news of the seizure of Pampeluna and
Barcelona. Godoy hesitated for a moment whether he should declare war on his
treacherous ally, or follow the example of the Prince Royal of Portugal, and
bid the King and Queen fly to Cadiz and embark for America. He seems to have
thought that there was little use in attempting resistance: a fifth French
army- corps under Bessieres had now commenced to cross the Bidassoa, so that
more than 100,000 French soldiers were already south of the Pyrenees. Moreover
the headstrong Murat had appeared at Burgos on March 13 with a commission as “
lieutenant for the Emperor in Spain.” At last Godoy resolved to advise instant
flight, without any attempt to defend Madrid or central Spain.
But the
Spanish people now intervened. The King and Queen had left Madrid for Aranjuez;
and their departure for Andalusia had been announced for March 18. On the
preceding night a fierce riot broke out in the little town, which was crowded
with hangers-on of the Court. Every Spaniard now understood that Godoy had
ruined the realm by handing it over to Napoleon, and that his cowardly and
obsequious
policy had
led to far deeper humiliation than could have been caused by the most
unfortunate of open wars. He had to pay for nearly twenty years of corrupt and
selfish rule, which had led Spain to her ruin; and the explosion of wrath
against him was all the more fierce for its long suppression. A raging mob of
soldiers, peasants, and citizens sacked his palace, but sought for him in vain.
The crowd then gathered under the King’s windows, calling aloud for the
favourite’s head, and cheering for the Prince of the Asturias. Charles IV was
terrified; the Queen besought her son to parley with the mob, and disperse them
on any terms. Ferdinand therefore was able to announce that Godoy had been
dismissed from office and banished from the Court. But next day the favourite
was detected as he was slinking away; the royal guards rescued him from his
first captors in a very battered state, and dragged him into the palace. This
brought the multitude once more around its gates; and it seemed as if some
bloody scene from the French Revolution was about to be reenacted. Then came
the hour of Prince Ferdinand’s opportunity. He told his parents that their
personal safety and the life of their favourite could only be secured by an
abdication. Without delay the old King wrote a brief statement, in which he
announced that his age and infirmities compelled him to resign the crown to his
very dear son and heir, the Prince of the Asturias. Armed with this, Ferdinand
faced the mob, promised them that Godoy should be imprisoned and brought to
trial, and begged them to disperse without further violence. He was hailed as
King amid universal rejoicings ; the troops took the oath to him as sovereign;
and Godoy was sent a prisoner to Villaviciosa (March 19, 1808).
All over
Spain, the fall of Godoy was received with feelings of intense relief; and much
was hoped from the young King, as if it were likely that the son of Charles IV
and Maria Luisa of Parma would prove a hero and a statesman. Ferdinand’s first
acts proved his unwisdom and timidity; instead of retiring to Andalusia and
concentrating what was left of the Spanish army, he went to Madrid (March 24),
though Murat had arrived there on the previous day at the head of Moncey’s
army-corps. Having taken possession of the royal palace, he wrote a grovelling
letter to Napoleon, assuring him of his adherence to the French alliance, and
renewing his request for a bride from the Imperial house. It was evident, from
the first, that he had taken a false step. The French ambassador refused to
acknowledge him as King; while Murat behaved to him in the most discourteous
fashion, and, what was more ominous, sent a French escort to guard the person
of the former King and Queen.
Meanwhile
Napoleon had been forced to face the new problems created by the revolution of
Aranjuez. Down to this moment he had apparently hoped to scare Charles IV, his
Queen, and their favourite out of Spain, and then to present himself to the
nation as their saviour
from the
tyranny of Godoy. This was no longer possible when a young and popular King had
mounted the throne. It would have been wise to accept the situation, and
receive the homage of the new sovereign, whose protestations of obsequious
respect to his patron were all that could be desired. But Napoleon resolved to
push on his iniquitous plan in spite of the new political situation that had
been created by Ferdinand’s accession. The pretext was ready at hand, for
Charles IV had no sooner recovered from his first terror, than he drew up a
secret protest in which he declared that his abdication had been extorted from
him by threats of bloodshed. Long before this document had reached Paris,
Napoleon had written to his brother Louis, King of Holland, offering him the
Spanish crown; it is therefore clear that he had been intending in any case to
refuse to recognise Ferdinand, and that the protest of Charles IV had nothing
to do with his decision. It was, however, welcomed as a useful card in the
game; and Murat was directed not only to send the old King to Bayonne, but to
forward Godoy in his aiaiter’s train.
Meanwhile the
Emperor declared his intention of visiting Madrid in person. He sent before him
his aide-de-camp, General Savary, who visited the young King, and, as all the
Spanish witnesses unite in declaring, informed him that his master intended to
take him into favour, and to bestow upon him the hand of the Bonaparte princess
whom he had craved as his consort. Unless he had received some such assurance,
the cautious Ferdinand would most certainly have refrained from putting
himself in the Emperor’s power. But on April 10 he was persuaded into setting
out to meet his mighty guest, and was finally induced to cross the Bidassoa
into French territory. When he reached Bayonne (April 20) he was put under
guard, and informed that Napoleon had resolved to depose him; but that if he
would sign an instant resignation of the Spanish crown, he should receive in
compensation the kingdom of Etruria.
The King,
craven though he was, plucked up courage to refuse this monstrous proposal.
Thereupon the Emperor produced Charles IV and his Queen, whose arrival at
Bayonne had been timed so as to follow that of their son by a few days. He
confronted Ferdinand with his parents; and a lamentable scene followed in his
presence. On being told that his father was still the lawful King, and that he
himself was a rebel who had been guilty of high treason, Ferdinand preserved a
sullen silence. When he refused to sign a document declaring that he withdrew
his claim to the crown, his father tried to strike him with his cane, and his
mother burst in with a string of abuse worthy of a fishwife. The Emperor put an
end to the altercation by thrusting Ferdinand out of the room. He then offered
to abdicate if he were allowed to return to Madrid, summon the Cortes of the
realm, and execute his renunciation in due form. But this would not have suited
Napoleon’s scheme; and the
isos] Abdication of Ferdinand. The Dos Mayo. 433
offer was
refused. Two days later there arrived at Bayonne the news of the bloody Dos
Mayo, the great insurrection at Madrid (May 2). Thereupon the Emperor told
Ferdinand that if he did not abdicate within twelve hours he should be tried
for high treason. Terrified by this threat, the young King executed, on May 6,
an instrument restoring the throne to his father. Then appeared the second half
of Napoleon’s scheme; he produced a treaty, signed on the previous day, by
which Charles IV “resigned all his rights to the throne of Spain and the Indies
to the Emperor of the French, the only person who in the present state of
affairs can reestablish order.” The old King and his wife knew that they could
never return to Madrid, and out of revengeful spite had lent themselves to a
scheme for disinheriting their son. They received in return certain revenues
and estates in France, and retired into obscurity in company with Godoy. The
miserable trio spent the greater part of their remaining time in Rome, the
objects of universal contempt. Ferdinand’s enforced abdication could not buy
him similar liberty; he was interned in Talleyrand’s manor of Valen^ay, and spent
six years there under strict military guard. He spoilt his status as martyr by
adulatory letters to Napoleon; in one, he even congratulated him on his
victories in Spain.
We must turn
back eight days from Ferdinand’s final abdication, to explain the outbreak at
Madrid which had caused Napoleon to apply the last turn of the screw to his
captive. Within a short time of the first, arrest of the young King at Bayonne,
it had become known in the Spanish capital that treachery was on foot. The-
effete or cowardly ministers took no action; but the news got abroad in Madrid,
and premonitory signs of trouble began to be seen. They were brought to a head
by an order from the Emperor to Murat, bidding him arrest and send over the
frontier all the remaining members of the royal House.
On May 2,
when the French escort was preparing to move from the palace the young prince
Francis, the last of the sons of Charles IV, an unarmed or half-armed mob fell
upon them, broke up the coach, and attacked the soldiers with stones and
stilettos. Murat had been warned by his master to be ready for outbreaks, and
to treat the canaille to a whiff of grape-shot if they should rise. He
dispersed the rioters by a couple of volleys from his guard. But this was only
the beginning of the trouble: the whole populace of Madrid turned out at the
sound of the musketry, and flung themselves upon the French with such weapons
as they could procure. The battalions in the city were almost swept away by the
furious assault, which was far more formidable than Murat had expected; more
than thirty French officers and several hundred soldiers were killed or
wounded. But within an hour the brigades of Moncey’s corps came marching down
from their camps outside the walls, and cleared the streets with much slaughtex-.
The Spanish garrison of Madrid took no part in the struggle. Only two
officers,
named Daoiz and Velarde, with a handful of artillerymen, joined the rioters and
perished with them.
For a few
days after the Dos Mayo, Murat at Madrid, and his master at Bayonne, lived in a
sort of fool’s paradise, imagining that they had made an end of all open
resistance to their will. Murat assumed the presidency of a “Junta of Regency,”
chosen from among the most pliant of the old officials who had been corrupted
by twenty years of Godoy’s rule. On May 13 he announced to this body that the
Emperor desired them to ask for a new King, and suggested that the person
designated should be Joseph Bonaparte, who for the last two years had been the
ruler of Naples. The contemptible Junta did as they were ordered, and duly
petitioned the Emperor that his brother might be granted them as a King. In
order that some semblance of national consent might be displayed, Napoleon drew
up a list of some 150 magnates, who were directed to present themselves at
Bayonne and sue in person for Joseph’s acceptance of the throne. Of this body
no less than 91 were base and weak enough to obey the mandate. On June 15 the
deputation met the Emperor at Bayonne and acccpted Joseph as their ruler, receiving
many promises of liberal reforms and wise governance from that well-intentioned
prince, who little understood the unenviable task that his brother had imposed
upon him.
But, long ere
Joseph Napoleon I had been proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies, the whole
country had flared up into insurrection. It took some time for the news of the
treachery at Bayonne, followed by that of the Dos Mayo, to penetrate to the
remoter comers of the Peninsula. But, when the nation began to comprehend the
situation, a wild outbreak of patriotic rage followed. It was not led by the
lawful and constituted authorities, who for the most part disgraced themselves
by a cowardly torpidity. The effervescence came from below; and the leaders
were non-official persons, local magnates, street-demagogues, and sometimes
clerics. The movement was spontaneous, unselfish, and reckless; in its wounded
pride, the nation challenged Napoleon to combat, without any thought of the
consequences, without counting up its own resources or those of its enemy.
Every province, in many cases every town, acted for itself. But, though there
was no union or organisation, the same spirit animated every region; and all,
without exception, rose in arms between May 24 and June 10. It was an unhappy
feature of the insurrection that in many places it was stained with massacre.
The populace was incensed against its late rulers almost as much as against the
French. Old proteges of Godoy, colonels who refused to lead their regiments
against Napoleon, officials who had shown zeal in carrying out Murat’s orders,
were assassinated on all sides. In Valencia a priest led out a band of ruffians
who murdered the whole of the French merchants resident in that great seaport.
It took some
weeks for even the rudiments of a Government to be
formed out of
the turbulent and patriotic chaos which prevailed. In every province local “
Juntas ” then emerged, and began to call out the strength of the region for the
holy war against the treacherous Emperor, the enemy of Church and King. It was
unfortunate, but inevitable, that the Juntas were largely composed of furious
but incapable zealots, ambitious demagogues, and self-seeking intriguers. There
was an absolute want of statesmanship and organising ability; and fierce
parochial patriotism could not supply their place. No central Government whatever
was established for some months; and each province fought for itself without
much regard for the fate of its neighbours.
The military
position at the end of May stood somewhat as follows. The French troops whom
Napoleon had pushed down into the Peninsula during the last six months held a
narrow triangular wedge of territory, piercing into the heart of New Castile.
Toledo and Madrid formed its apex, a line drawn from San Sebastian to Pampeluna
was its base. In addition to this there were two outlying French forces, that
of Junot, mainly concentrated at Lisbon, and that of Duhesme, which lay at
Barcelona. The central army, formed of the troops of Moncey, Dupont and
Bessieres, was about 75,000 strong: Junot had about 28,000 in Portugal, Duhesme
some 14,000 in Catalonia. But the latter two generals were completely cut off
from communication with Madrid.
On the
Spanish side, the Juntas found about 100,000 regulars and militia at their
disposal; but these were scattered about in provincial garrisons, badly
provided, and wholly unfit to take the field immediately. The main force lay in
Galicia and Andalusia, where large detachments had always been kept for the
purpose of protecting the seaports from English descents. In each of these
provinces there were about 30,000 men available. Of the rest, there were a few
battalions in Estremadura, Valencia, and Catalonia, but in mid-Spain hardly a
man. Thus the forces of the insurgents formed a sort of semicircle, extending
around the French wedge which ran into the heart of the land. New levies were
being hastily prepared on every side, but arms and equipment were hard to find,
owing to the depleted state in which Godoy had left the arsenals; while the
stores of Madrid, Barcelona, Pampeluna, Figueras, and San Sebastian were in the
hands of the enemy. When the fighting began, the remains of the old standing
army were the only serious belligerent force on which Spain could count; the
rest of the Spanish force consisted of undrilled and ununiformed peasants,
officered by untrained and often incompetent civilians.
It was
fortunate for the Spaniards that Napoleon at first misconceived the problem
that lay before him. He had always nourished the greatest contempt for the
fighting power of Spain, and was under the impression that the armies which he
had already pushed south of the Pyrenees were amply sufficient to hold down the
country. But these armies were, as a matter of fact, very imperfect instruments
of conquest. When
the Emperor
organised the forces which worked their way to Madrid, Lisbon, and Barcelona
during the winter of 1807-8, he had, not drawn upon the veteran corps which lay
in Germany. Junot’s corps, indeed, was of good material, being composed of old
battalions picked from the garrisons of western France. But the corps of
Moncey, Dupont, and Bessieres were a hap-hazard assembly of second-rate troops
and newly-organised provisional units. They included only about 5000 men of old
French regiments; but round this nucleus were gathered some
15,000 Swiss, German, and other auxiliaries, and
no less than 60,000 conscripts of 1807, hastily organised in “provisional
regiments,” “legions of reserve,” and bataillons de ma/rche.
The Emperor
had collected a very raw and ill-compacted army; he next proceeded to dispose
of it on mistaken lines. He had made up his mind that the Spanish insurrection
was a mere flash in the pan, the work of monks and banditti. The suppression of
it would be a mere matter of police; he imagined that a few flying columns
would be able to scour the insurgent districts and take possession of the chief
strategical points without much difficulty. His orders read as if some isolated
emeutes, rather than a national rising, had to be suppressed. While Bessieres
and his corps were to keep open the road from Burgos to Madrid, and to detach a
force to subdue the province of Aragon, two expeditions were to be sent out
from the capital, the one to reduce Seville and Cadiz, the other to conquer
Valencia. The first of these columns, 13,000 strong, was to be led by Dupont;
the second, 7000 strong, was given to Moncey. Both were composed entirely of
conscript battalions and Swiss auxiliaries, without any stiffening of veteran
troops.
The despatch
of the two expeditions from Madrid took place on May 24 and June 4
respectively, and was the last executive order carried out by Murat at his
master’s behest. He fell ill of a fever a few days later, and returned to
France; his place was taken by Savary, the betrayer of King Ferdinand, an
officer wholly incompetent to face the threatening situation that was gradually
developing itself.
Moncey passed
the mountains of Cuenca without opposition, and met with no resistance till he
had reached the borders of the kingdom of Valencia. There he was twice opposed,
in the defiles that led down to the shore-plain, by an irregular mass of new
levies, which he thrust aside with ease. When he reached the city of Valencia,
he found it packed with many thousands of combatants, including some regular
troops, and roughly fortified with many batteries and earthworks. He risked two
attempts to storm the place (June 28), lost 1000 men, and saw that it could not
be taken without a battering train and a regular siege. By a rapid retreat he
eluded his adversaries, and drew back to the vicinity of Madrid (July 15).
Very
different was the fate of Dupont. He too, like Moncey, met with little
opposition during the first days of his march. The defiles
of the Sierra
Morena were not defended against him; and his troops did not fire a shot till
they reached the bridge of Alcolea, in front of Cordova, where they dispersed a
horde of 10,000 or 12,000 peasants who tried to cover that ancient city.
Cordova made no resistance; nevertheless it was sacked the same evening (June
7). Here Dupont’s advance came to an end; he found that between him and Seville
lay the Spanish army of Andalusia, nearly 30,000 regular troops commanded by
General Castanos. The peasantry of the mountains had risen behind him and cut
his communication with Madrid; his conscripts were suffering dreadfully from
the summer heat and malaria. He wisely refused to advance further, and, when
Castanos began to move slowly towards him, evacuated Cordova and fell back to
Andujar, the point of junction where the routes from the Sierra Morena come
down into the valley of the Guadalquivir. He wrote to Madrid for
reinforcements, which Savary did not refuse; two fresh divisions of conscripts
were sent him, which brought up his force to some 22,000 men. Thus strengthened,
he might have defended the passes of the Sierra Morena, though he could not
have conquered Andalusia. But instead of retiring to the passes and assuming
the defensive, he lingered in the plain at Andujar. He lacked the moral courage
to confess to his master that the offensive campaign he had undertaken was
hopeless.
At last, a
false rumour that the Spaniards were detaching troops to close the passes
behind his back led him to commit the fatal blunder of dividing his small army
into two nearly equal halves, and sending off his lieutenant, Vedel, with
10,000 men to secure the Despena Perros. Castanos then thrust two divisions
under General Reding into the gap, and seized the town of Baylen, halfway
between Vedel and Dupont. This was a risky move, as the intervening force might
have been crushed if the two French generals had acted in unison. Dupont at
once evacuated Andujar, and marched with 11,000 men to clear the road, while
Castanos’ main body followed him at a leisurely pace. At Baylen Dupont found
the road blocked by Reding with 17,000 men. He fought till noon, with much
courage but little skill, endeavouring to pierce the Spanish line. But Reding
held firm, and beat off five partial and successive attacks. When the French
were thoroughly exhausted and demoralised, Castanos appeared in their rear and
enclosed them. Dupont then offered to capitulate, if his army were granted a
free return to France. Terms were being discussed when, late in the afternoon,
General Vedel, with the other half of the French army, came up in Reding’s rear
and began to develop an attack upon it. Vedel had shown criminal negligence and
torpidity in delaying his appearance; he had refused to hurry, though he knew
that Dupont was engaged, and though a distant cannonade had been audible all
the morning. When informed that his chief was proposing to surrender, Vedel
wheeled off and retired towards the passes. But Dupont nevertheless
made a
convention with Castanos, whereby he stipulated that not only his division, but
that of his lieutenant, should capitulate and be sent back to France. This was
unjustifiable conduct; but still more unjustifiable was that of Vedel, who
tamely came back and laid down his arms, when he might easily have marched off
to Madrid (June 23). In all, 18,000 unwounded men surrendered; more than 3000
had been lost in the fighting. When the French were secured, the Junta of
Seville J"tained them all, and never allowed them to return to France.
This
disaster, the worst check that the French arms had suffered since Menou
capitulated in Egypt nine years before, had immense effect not only in Spain,
but all over Europe. The responsibility for it must be divided between the
Emperor himself, Dupont, and Vedel. Napoleon, under a false idea of the Spanish
strength, had sent out an army too small and too raw to accomplish such a task
as the conquest of Andalusia; Dupont had shown both incapacity and want of
moral courage; Vedel’s torpidity and lack of initiative had doubled the
disaster. The Emperor accused them both of cowardice and treason, and had them
tried before a military commission, which found them guilty of criminal
negligence and of “ signing a capitulation containing shameful conditions,” but
of nothing more. Dupont was imprisoned till 1814; Vedel was pardoned after a
few years and again employed.
The first
result of Baylen was that King Joseph and Savary, considering their forces
insufficient to max tain such an advanced position as the capital, hastily
evacuated Madrid (August 1), and did not halt till they had recrossed the Ebro.
Meanwhile four other series of operations had been in progress. The Spanish
army of Galicia under General Blake had descended from its mountains into the
plains of Old Castile, with the intention of cutting the communications between
Madrid and Burgos. Marshal Bessieres, whose corps had been told off by Napoleon
to protect that line, met him at Medina de Rio Seco on July 14, and inflicted a
complete defeat upon the Galicians, though they mustered
22,000 men to his 13,000. This victory, however,
had no further effect than to secure for King Joseph a safe retreat from
Madrid; Dupont’s disaster deprived Bessieres of the power of following up his
success.
The second
independent campaign raging at this moment was that which centred at Saragossa:
it was the most creditable to the Spaniards of all the operations of the summer
of 1808. The kingdom of Aragon was almost destitute of regular troops; only
about 1000 trained men were available when the revolution broke out. But Joseph
Palafox, a young and ambitious adventurer, who had led the rising and been
saluted as captain-general, collected a considerable body of half-armed
peasants and townsfolk at Saragossa, and with them made head against the 15,000
men under Generals Verdier and Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who were detached to
subdue Aragon. His defence of Saragossa (June 15— August 13) was an
extraordinary feat. The French having broken
isos] First siege of Saragossa.—Junot in Portugal.
439
through the
flimsy medieval walls of the city, Palafox, instead of capitulating, threw up
barricades across the streets, defended house after house, beat back many
assaults, and was still fighting fiercely inside the town, when the news of the
fate of Dupont and the evacuation of Madrid compelled Verdier to retire. The
story of Palafox’ answer to the French summons, when the enceinte had been
pierced, “ No surrender, and war to the last party-wall ” (hasta la ultima
tapia), seems well authenticated; and the obstinate courage displayed by his
Aragonese in the street fighting contrasted strongly with the helplessness of
similar levies when forced to give battle in the open.
While Verdier
was being held at bay in Saragossa, Duhesme, commanding the French army in
Catalonia, was also brought to a standstill. His troops, concentrated at
Barcelona, found their communications with France cut off by the general
rising of the province. To open them again, Duhesme delivered two attacks on
the fortress of Gerona, which blocked the road to Perpignan. Both were beaten
off (June 20-21, and July 22—August 16); and the French general was compelled
to shut himself up in Barcelona, where he was blockaded for nearly four months
by the insurgents, and reduced to great straits.
The fourth
local campaign in which Napoleon’s expeditionary forces were involved during
the summer of 1808 was that of Junot in Portugal. The Spanish rising had
isolated the 28,000 French who lay in and about Lisbon; but Junot resolved to
defend his conquest without taking any heed of what was going on elsewhere.
Fortunately for him, Portugal was completely disarmed; the old army had been
disbanded or sent across the Pyrenees; and all the arseuals were in the hands
of the French. The efforts of the people, who rose on all sides between June 6
and June 16, were of necessity weak, for there was no nucleus of trained men,
and arms were hard to get. Junot’s flying columns scoured the whole country and
held down central Portugal with success. He was still in good hopes of
maintaining his position, when, on August 3, he received the news that on the
preceding day a British expeditionary force had landed in Mondego Bay.
The arrival
of this army marks a new stage in the history not only of the Peninsular War
but of Europe at large. The British Government was about to turn aside from
that system of sending out small forces to inflict pin-pricks on non-vital
spots in Napoleon’s empire, which Sheridan wittily called “ its policy of
filching sugar-islands.” Urged on by Castlereagh, who already had in the winter
of 1805-6 advocated an interference on the Continent on a large scale, and had
hoped much from the expedition to Hanover, and by Canning, who, following
Pitt’s forecast, was fascinated with the idea of a really national and popular
rising against Napoleon, the Portland Cabinet had resolved to strike hard. Even
the Whig Opposition could not cavil at the proposal to aid a people so basely
betrayed as the Spaniards, or make any attempt to
defend the
morality of Napoleon’s late doings. On the arrival in London, on June 4, of
deputies from the Asturias asking for help, followed soon after by similar
missions from the other Juntas, the Government promised speedy and ample
assistance. In all some 30,000 men were directed to move, and more were to
follow.
Lord
Castlereagh had intended to place at the head of the whole the young
lieutenant-general who commanded the force which sailed from Cork, Sir Arthur
Wellesley, the brother of the great Viceroy of India, already known for his
victories of Assaye and Argaum. But the Duke of York and the War Office were
against the scheme; and there were members of the Cabinet who disliked the
Wellesleys. After the first troops had actually set sail, the Government
resolved to place over Sir Arthur’s head two senior officers of no special distinction
or ability, Sir Hew Dalrymple, governor of Gibraltar, and Sir Harry Burrard.
Sir John Moore also, who was ordered up from the Baltic, would outrank
Wellesley, who was thus placed fourth instead of first in command.
Before he was
aware that he was superseded, Wellesley had sailed; he landed his 9000 men in
Mondego Bay on August 1-2, 1808. The Portuguese welcomed him; but he found that
their levies were little more than a useless mob, and that he must depend on
his own resources. Four days later he was joined by another British division,
and set out to march on Lisbon with some 13,000 men. On August 17 he met at
Roli^a a small force which Junot had despatched to delay his advance, and drove
it out of a strong position by a vigorous attack. This roused the viceroy of
Portugal, who sallied out of Lisbon with his field-army. Having garrisoned
Elvas and Almeida, and left a whole division to overawe the discontented
populace of the capital, Junot only brought
13,000 men to the front. Wellesley, having been joined
by two more brigades from England, had over 16,000 British troops in hand,
besides some 2000 Portuguese insurgents.
The invading
army was encamped at Vimiero, with its back to the sea, when on August 21 it
was fiercely attacked by the French. Wellesley had chosen an admirable position
on a line of rolling hills, and showed in this, his first European victory,
that masterly power of handling troops on the defensive which was to make his
reputation. Junot’s vigorous but ill-combined assaults were driven back with
awful slaughter; and the victor was about to let loose his reserves upon the
broken masses of the enemy when his hand was suddenly paralysed. Sir Harry
Burrard had landed at this untoward moment, asserted his authority, and forbade
a pursuit. Thus Junot was able to gather his routed battalion together and to
cover the road to Lisbon. Next morning (August 22) Burrard was superseded by
Dalrymple, who was much surprised to receive on that same day proposals from
Junot that he should be allowed to evacuate Portugal under a convention. The
French jeneral was expecting every moment to hear of a revolt in Lisbon; his
isos] The Convention of Cintra.—French
reinforcements. 441
troops were
not inclined to face another general action; and he saw no better way “ pour
nous tirer de la souriciere.'n
Dalrymple,
overjoyed at finding himself dictating terms ere he had been two days ashore,
eagerly accepted the idea of a convention. He was justified in accepting
Junot’s offer; time was of importance; and the French might, if driven to
despair, have ruined Lisbon and made a long and desperate defence. Bat Sir Hew
weakly conceded every demand that was made by the French negotiators, including
several that were most offensive to the Portuguese; e.g. he allowed the French
to depart laden in the most shameless fashion with the plunder of palaces,
museums, and churches, and guaranteed immunity to native traitors. On August 30
this famous Convention of Cintra—falsely so called, for it was neither
discussed nor signed in that pleasant spot— was executed. Before the next month
was out, 25,000 French troops had been shipped out of Portugal; and the whole
kingdom was delivered. It was now possible to think of bringing aid to Spain.
But neither
Dalrymple nor Burrard was destined to lead the victors of Vimiero into the
uplands of Castile. When the news of the Convention was received in England,
universal indignation was expressed. It was thought that Dalrymple had let off
the French too easily, and that he might have forced them to unconditional
surrender. Letters from officers who complained of the way in which the pursuit
at Vimiero had been checked, and complaints from the Portuguese provisional
government, added fuel to the flames. All three British generals were recalled,
and sent before a Court of enquiry. This body reported that, in its opinion,
they had all acted according to the best of their judgment and shown proper
zeal, and that no further proceedings should be taken. But, while the two
senior generals were never despatched on active service again, Wellesley,
whose conduct had contrasted so splendidly with that of his superiors, was sent
back to Portugal as commander-in-chief in the ensuing spring.
Much had
happened before Sir Arthur resumed his place at the head of a British army.
King Joseph and Savary had evacuated Madrid, recrossed the Ebro, and fallen
back to the foot of the Pyrenees. This long retreat caused almost as much
indignation in Napoleon’s breast as Dupont’s surrender. He had at first
directed Joseph to hold on to Madrid at all costs, then to stay his retreat at
Aranda and Valladolid. But both his despatches arrived too late; and, by August
15, the remains of the army of Spain, still nearly 70,000 strong, were concentrated
between Miranda and Milagro on the Ebro. The Emperor, on hearing the news of
Baylen, had ordered three veteran corps of the army of Germany, those of
Victor, Mortier, and Ney, to march for Spain, and had drawn together other
reinforcements from various comers of the Empire. He had hoped that Joseph and
Savary would hold out in some advanced position till those succours arrived.
But all such hopes were
442 The “ Central Junta’' Its mistaken strategy,
[isos
now at an
end; and the conquest of the Peninsula had to be begun de novo. It was not till
the end of October that the heads of the columns from Germany began to cross
the passes. While they were marching across France, the Emperor went off to
Erfurt.
Thus, from
the day of Baylen to the opening of the new campaign, the Spanish insurgents had
three full months in which to organise their forces. Unfortunately, they did
not turn the time to good account. The provincial Juntas showed no desire to
relinquish their local sovereignty in favour of a new national executive. When
they were at last induced to create a supreme authority, it was not a compact
egency of a few members but a “Central Junta” of no less than thirty-five
delegates. This body was only got together on September 25; and, when it met,
it proceeded, like a debating society, to discuss constitutional reforms,
instead of turning all its energies to making ready for Napoleon’s advance. The
most fatal fault was that it refused to appoint a single commander-in-chief for
its armies, and tried to direct independently the movements of half-a-dozen
captains-general of the provincial armies. These officers became personal
rivals, intrigued with the Junta, and refused to cooperate with each other.
Hence came military chaos and lamentable waste of time. By the end of October,
only about 110,000 men had been pushed up to the line of the Ebro to face the
French, though about 60,000 more were being drilled and equipped far to the
rear. Indeed, the only important addition made to the army at the front after
Baylen was that of 9000 of La Romana’s troops from Denmark, who landed at
Santander.
The Spanish
strategy at this moment was hopelessly bad. The Junta had allowed their two
main armies to drift apart; Blake, with
40,000 men of the Galician army, had advanced
into Biscay, with the intention of turning the French right; while Castanos and
Palafox, with the armies of Andalusia and Aragon, some 60,000 strong, were
executing a similar movement far to the east on the side of Pampeluna. To
connect these two armies there was nothing but the army of Estremadura, 12,000
strong, which was concentrating at Burgos. Thus the Spanish array had two
powerful wings but practically no centre.
To aid the
Estremadurans at Burgos, it was intended that the British army from Portugal
should be brought up. After the departure of Dalrymple, the command of this
force had devolved on Sir John Moore (October 6). He had received orders to
march into Spain and join our allies; but he found much difficulty in starting
his troops, owing to his want of transport and his absolute ignorance of the
relative practicability of the various inland roads of Portugal. Receiving
false intelligence from the native engineers that it was impossible to move
guns over the Serra da Estrella, by the straight road from Lisbon to Almeida
and Salamanca, he took the unfortunate step of sending nearly the whole of his
cavalry and artillery on a vast detour, by Elvas,
Talavera, and
the Escorial, while he marched with his infantry columns direct over mountain
roads by way of Coimbra and Guarda. The consequence was that, while 16,000
infantry reached Salamanca in detachments between November 13 and November 23,
they could not move till, on December 3, the guns came in from their long turn
to the south. Moore’s little army at Salamanca was not the only British force
which had been sent to aid Spain; a separate division under Baird,
13,000 strong, had been landed at Corunna in the
middle of October, and directed to push inland and join Moore in Old Castile.
But, much hampered by want of transport, Baird only reached Astorga on November
22. He was still far from his junction with Moore when news arrived that the
Spanish armies on the Ebro had received a series of appalling defeats, and were
retiring in disorder before the French.
Napoleon held
back his army in Navarre till the great reinforcements from Germany had
arrived, and 200,000 men were under his hand. He then struck with the swiftness
and shattering power of a thunderbolt at the weak centre of the Spanish line,
and opened for himself the road to Madrid. The first battle was fought at
Zomosa, in Biscay, on October 29, when Blake’s army of Galicia, still bent on
its turning movement, was thrust back by Marshal Lefebvre, and had to retire
westward. The Galicians were making off, pursued by two French corps, when
Napoleon led his main body over the Ebro, and on November 10 dashed to pieces
the little army of Estremadura at the combat of Gamonal in front of Burgos.
Next day (November 11) Blake’s retreating army, overtaken by Victor at Espinosa
in the Cantabrian mountains, received an equally disastrous beating, and was
forced to disperse into the hills with the loss of the whole of its artillery.
A full month passed before its wrecks, 20,000 strong, were rallied at Leon by
the Marquis of La Romana. There remained intact, of all the Spanish armies,
only the combined host of Andalusia and Aragon under Castanos and Palafox. On
November 23 this force shared the fate of its fellows; its main body,
4<5,000 strong, was defeated at Tudela by Lannes. Quarrels between Castanos
and Palafox were largely responsible for this disaster; their plans were so
badly arranged that one-third of the Spanish army did not fire a shot, while
the other two-thirds were being routed and dispersed. Palafox’ divisions now
drew back to defend Saragossa, while Castanos and the Andalusians made off for
Madrid by way of Calatayud. They narrowly escaped falling into the hands of
Ney, who had been sent to intercept them, and escaped in wretched plight over
the mountains.
Such was the
depressing news which Moore and Baird, still far from effecting a junction with
each other, received in the last days of November. It seemed that there was no
Spanish army left with which the British could cooperate; and Moore despaired
of being even able to meet Baird in safety. Judging himself far too weak to
confront Napoleon’s main oody, he issued orders for a retreat on Lisbon, and
directed Baird to fall
back on
Corunna (November 28). He believed that Spain was ruined and that Portugal was
indefensible, and he was prepared to evacuate even Lisbon if the French should
push their invasion home.
Meanwhile the
Emperor, as soon as the news of Tudela reached him, struck straight at Madrid.
He was only vaguely aware of Moore’s position on his flank, and paid no
attention to him. The Junta had made a hasty attempt to cover the two defiles
which lead to Madrid, having drawn to Segovia and the Guadarrama pass the
wrecks of the Estremaduran army, and thrown into the Somosierra pass a force
composed of new levies and a few belated battalions of the army of Andalusia.
The Emperor, leaving Segovia alone, advanced in a single column against the
Somosierra, and forced it after a short combat on November 30. On December 2 he
appeared in force in front of Madrid. The Spanish capital was an open town
devoid of any regular defences, and had no garrison save some of the .fugitives
from the Somosierra. But the populace were in a paroxysm of patriotic frenzy,
and had sworn to make a second Saragossa of their home. They held out for one
day behind extemporised batteries and earthworks; but, when the French stormed
the Buen Retiro heights, which command the whole place, and forced their way
into the Prado, the enthusiasm died down and the town surrendered (December 3).
From Dec. 4s
to Dec. 22 Napoleon remained in the neighbourhood of Madrid, laying down laws
and drafting projects for the reorganisation of Spain, and giving his troops a
short rest before they should be called upon to march on Lisbon and Cadiz. His
reserves and outlying columns were beginning to come in; and he had, in and
about Madrid, some
75,000 men.
Meanwhile Lannes, with the army which had won the fight of Tudela, was directed
to besiege Saragossa and make an end of Palafox; while Marshal Soult, whose
corps lay in Old Castile, covering the Emperor’s flank and rear, was directed
to invade Leon and disperse the wrecks of Blake’s old army. The Emperor’s next
move would have been to march on Lisbon, whither he assumed that Sir John Moore
would have withdrawn when he heard of the fall of Madrid.
But matters
had gone otherwise in the north-west of the Peninsula. Moore had ordered a
retreat on Lisbon on November 28; but on December 5 he changed his mind, mainly
because he had heard exaggerated reports of the desperation with which Madrid
was defending itself, but partly also because he had been at last (December 3)
rejoined by his long-lost artillery and cavalry, and had discovered that there
was nothing to prevent Baird from joining him. In these circumstances, honour
required that he should not retire without striking a blow in behalf of Spain.
Accordingly he resolved to execute a diversion in Old Castile, and to make a
raid on Valladolid or even on Burgos, with the object of disturbing the
Emperor’s line of communication. In this plan he persisted, even when, on
December 9, he received news
of the
surrender of Madrid. He knew that his move was a dangerous one, and wrote to
Baird that “ both you and me, though we may look big, and determine to get
everything forward, yet we must never lose sight of this, that at any moment
affairs may take the turn that renders it necessary to retreat.” They must
advance “ bridle in hand ” and ever ready to swerve off to the rear. Moore
marched from Salamanca on December 11; two days later, he learnt from a
captured despatch that the Emperor was unaware of his presence, and that Soult
was lying in an isolated position on the Carrion river, with less than 20,000
men. He thereupon resolved to change his direction, and to endeavour to
surprise and defeat Soult before he could be reinforced. Turning north, he was
joined by Baird on December 20, which raised his force to about
27,000 men. He drove in the French cavalry in
several successful combats, and on December 23 lay at Sahagun close in front of
Soult. The Marquis of La Romana, Blake’s successor, was slowly bringing up the
disorganised wrecks of the army of Galicia to his aid.
A battle
would have followed next day, had not Moore received from a Spanish source, on
the afternoon of the 23rd, the news that Napoleon had at last heard of his
whereabouts, and had started from Madrid in pursuit of him with the main body
of his army. Without a moment’s hesitation, the British general faced his
columns to the rear, and slipped off westward on the road to Benavente and
Astorga. He had thrown up his base in Portugal, and was intending to retreat to
Vigo and Corunna. He did not start a minute too soon. Napoleon, on receiving
tardy but certain news of the advance of the English army against Soult, had at
once given orders (December 19-20) that the greater part of the troops at
Madrid, not less than 42,000 sabres and bayonets, should hasten by forced
marches to throw themselves upon Moore’s rear, and cut him off from his retreat
on Portugal or Galicia. The sight of the red-coats in the distance had at once
drawn him off from all his other plans; and the idea of capturing a whole
British army excited him to almost frenzied exertions. He drove his troops
across the snow of the Guadarrama pass in the midst of a blizzard which smote
down horse and man, and urged them across the plains of Old Castile at a
breakneck pace. But Moore was too quick for him. When the cavalry of the
Emperor’s van-guard reached the line of the Esla on December 28, the British
were safely across the river and out of danger. As the French pressed on, Lord
Paget turned back with his hussars, and cut to pieces the chasseurs a cheval of
the Imperial Guard at Benavente (December 29), capturing Lefebvre-Desnouettes,
their commander, and many of his men.
The Emperor
urged on the pursuit for two days more, but threw it up in disgust at Astorga
on January 1, 1809. it is usually said that he turned back because of news
received concerning the threatening attitude of Austria. This was the official
view; but it seems probable that reports of intrigues at Paris, in which
Fouche, Talleyrand, and
Murat were
all concerned, had more to do with the Emperor’s return. The pursuit was handed
over to the corps of Ney and Soult. About
45,000 men were ordered to follow Moore and La Bomana,
whose famishing army had fallen back on Astorga just as the British arrived.
The rest of the force that had taken part in the Emperor’s movement was sent
back to Madrid or cantoned in the kingdom of Leon.
The retreat
of the British from Astorga to Corunna occupied only twelve days; but an
immense amount of misery was compressed into that short space of time. Moore
believed that his best policy was to withdraw with such rapidity as to leave
the enemy far behind. He had calculated that the pursuers would probably follow
him no further than Villafranca, so that he would have a quiet and undisturbed
embarcation at the end of his retreat. Accordingly he made very long marches,
not unfrequently by night; the army covered on the average seventeen miles a day,
in a rugged mountain country covered with snow and cut up by torrents and
defiles. The troops, profoundly disgusted at not being allowed to fight, and
wearied out by perpetual marching, got out of hand. Many regiments left
multitudes of stragglers behind, and plundered the villages by the road.
Drunken marauders and footsore stragglers fell by hundreds into the hands of
the pursuing French cavalry. But the rear-guard under Paget held together
staunchly, and roughly repulsed the enemy when any attempt was made to drive
them in. Yet, the French stuck to the heels of the retreating army, and could
not, as Moore had hoped, be shaken off. On January 11 the British reached
Corunna, in a very dilapidated condition, only to find that the transport-fleet
had not arrived. It came up two days later, and the embarcation began. But
Soult had also appeared; and, to secure a quiet departure, Moore had to fight
the battle of Corunna (January 16). Four days’ rest and the advent of the
long-denied opportunity for fighting,had pulled the army together; and, when
Soult assailed the British infantry—the cavalry and guns were already on
board—he suffered a bloody repulse. Moore was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball
in the thick of the battle, or he would probably have attacked in his turn and
driven the French into the river Mero, which lay at their backs. But his
successor, General Hope, was content with having repulsed Soult, and embarked
his troops at leisure next day.
Thus ended
Sir John Moore’s celebrated campaign, which undoubtedly saved Spain and
Portugal for the moment, by distracting the Emperor from his southward advance,
and by drawing his field army, which might have marched on Lisbon and Cadiz,
into a remote and rugged corner of the Peninsula. “As a diversion it has succeeded;
I brought the whole of the disposable force of the French against this army,”
wrote Moore in his last despatch; and this was absolutely true. The conception
was so fine, and the result so satisfactory, that it seems ungracious to
criticise the details of the operations. But we may agree
with
Wellington that “Sir John Moore’s error was that he did not know what his men
could do,” and allow that he drove them too fast in the march from Astorga to
Corunna, with great resulting loss. Of 6000 men lost by the way, some no doubt
perished owing to their own indiscipline, but more because they were wearied
beyond the limits of human endurance. But this was a cheap price to pay for
wrecking Napoleon’s original plan for the conquest of the Peninsula, just when
he himself was on the spot and able to combine the movements of all the French
corps in a way that was never again possible.
After
abandoning the pursuit of Moore to Soult and Ney, the Emperor returned to
France. His great coup de theatre, the capture of the British army, had failed,
and the projected invasion of Portugal and Andalusia had been postponed; but,
in the main, he was not discontented with the results of his campaign. The
spirit of the Spaniards—so he fancied—was completely broken. “ Les affaires
(PEspagne sont a peu pres terminie'ihe wrote to one of his ministers; and he
returned to suppress intrigues in Paris and to watch Austria. Moore’s diversion
had, however, allowed time for the Spaniards to rally, and had stopped the
French advance for two months. By that time the shattered Spanish armies were
once more reorganised, and able to resume their stubborn if too often
unsuccessful resistance. The Spanish affair was far from being “nearly at an
end,” as Napoleon supposed. He had yet to discover that to defeat a Spanish
army was easy, but to destroy it difficult. The routed force dispersed, took to
the hills, and reassembled again to give further trouble. Spain was not the
country to be subdued by a single Jena or Austerlitz. The loss of Madrid counted
for little or nothing; every province continued to fight for its own hand; and
no region could be considered conquered that was not held down by a French
garrison planted at every cross-road.
During the
midwinter of 1808-9, Moore’s diversion had caused the suspension of the French
operations in all quarters save two, Aragon and Catalonia, the two regions from
which no troops had been withdrawn for the race to Corunna. Lannes had been
sent with two corps to take Saragossa, into which Palafox had withdrawn his
part of the army that had been routed at Tudela. The siege began on December
20,
1808, and lasted for exactly two months. Palafox was
no strategist and made numerous blunders of detail, but he was obstinate and
enthusiastic; and his position was far stronger than it had been in the
preceding July and August. He had nearly 40,000 more or less organised fighting
men; and the flimsy walls of his city had been strengthened by earthworks and
batteries since the first siege. The Aragonese fought with their usual
obstinacy; and it was not till January 27, 1809, that the French succeeded in
breaking through the outer enceinte of Saragossa. Three weeks of deadly
street-fighting still remained before them. Lannes only won his way by blowing
up house after house, and storming street after
448 Fall of Saragossa.—Other Spanish defeats,
[isos-9
street. When
the place surrendered, it was because fire and sword, pestilence and famine,
had destroyed the garrison. Over 20,000 fighting men, with some 30,000 of the
populace, had perished. Desperate but ill-organised patriotism had failed when
pitted against military science. But it was clear that the people who could
make such a stand were not likely to become the passive subjects of the French
Emperor.
In Catalonia
matters went no less badly for the Spaniards. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, whom the
Emperor had sent to relieve Duhesme and his beleaguered army, commenced his
operative action by taking Rosas (December 5), and then pushed through the
mountains to succour Barcelona. He routed Reding, the victor of Baylen, at
Cardadeu on December 16, and cut his way through to join Duhesme. Their united
forces then sallied out and beat the army of Catalonia at Molins de Rey
(December 21) just outside Barcelona. Even then Reding’s spirit was not broken.
Rallying his troops, he took the offensive, but he was defeated by Saint-Cyr
for a third time at Vails (February 25, 1809). In this last fight Reding was
mortally wounded; his broken host shut itself up in Tarragona or took to the
hills, leaving Saint-Cyr free to commence the siege of Gerona, the great
fortress commanding the road from the French frontier to Barcelona.
Meanwhile the
Spanish line of defence was being reconstructed. The wrecks of Castanos’ old
army had gathered in La Mancha, and took their post at the foot of the passes
of the Sierra Morena, under General Cartaojal. The still more dilapidated
divisions vanquished at Gamonal and the Somosierra rallied behind the Tagus.
They were in a fearful1 state of indiscipline, and had murdered
their general San Juan on a wild charge of treason; but their new commander,
Cuesta, a morose and incapable but courageous veteran, reduced them to order by
a series of military executions. Blake’s old army of Galicia, now under La
Romana, after parting from Moore’s retreating force at Astorga, had retired
into the mountains and was reorganising at Orense. Blake himself had been sent
to Valencia, and was busy in getting together a fresh army in that fertile and
well-peopled province. Including other levies in the Asturias and Andalusia,
the Supreme Junta, which had now established its seat at Seville, could place
some 100,000 men in the field in March, 1809.
But more
important, in the end, than the survival of any Spanish army was the fact that
9000 British troops still remained in Portugal. These were the battalions that
had been left in Lisbon when Moore marched to Salamanca in the preceding
autumn. Their very cautious general, Sir John Cradock, kept them close to the
Portuguese capital, ready to embark if the French should advance in force.
Fortunately for Portugal, for Great Britain, and for Europe, the British
Government had resolved to continue the struggle in the Peninsula at all costs.
In February General Beresford was sent out to reorganise the Portuguese army,
with some scores of British officers to help him, and a great
store of new
arms and equipment. On April 2 a far more important announcement was made. Sir
Arthur Wellesley, the victor of Vimiero, was named commander of the British
forces in Portugal, and ordered to sail for Lisbon at short notice. This
appointment was due to Lord Castlereagh, who showed a steady confidence in
Wellesley, and always employed him as his chief military adviser. The general
had stated that, if granted a British army of 20,000 or 30,000 men and the
control of the native forces, he would undertake to hold Portugal against any
French army not exceeding 100,000 men. This was contrary to Sir John Moore’s
dictum that Portugal was untenable; but the Government, urged on by
Castlereagh, resolved to take the risk. Reinforcements began to be sent out;
Wellesley himself reached Lisbon and superseded Cradock on April 22, 1809.
Ere he
landed, the campaign of 1809 had begun. Before quitting Spain, Napoleon had
laid down the general lines that were to be followed by his marshals. Soult,
leaving Ney behind him to hold down Galicia, was to march with his own corps
from Corunna on Portugal, and to take first Oporto, and then Lisbon. So
sanguine was Napoleon that he hoped that the Portuguese capital might fall
before February 15. On the other side, Victor, with his corps and certain
reinforcements, was to cross the Tagus, crush Cuesta’s army of Estre’ .ladura,
take Badajoz, and then march on Seville. Sebastiani’s corps was to deal with
the other Spanish army in the south—that of La Mancha under Cartaojal; but
Victor’s was to be the decisive blow. Catalonia and Aragon were side- issues of
comparatively little importance.
The French
columns duly advanced, in obedience to the Emperor’s orders; but inevitable
hindrances—bad roads, bad weather, and difficulty of supplies—caused them to
start far later than he had intended. Soult left Corunna with 23,000 men, after
turning over the charge of Galicia, to Ney. On March 9 he crossed the Portuguese
border near Chaves; La Romana, with the wrecks of the Spanish army of Galicia,
had retired northward, wisely refusing battle. Soult’s invasion of Portugal was
an unbroken series of combats with a half-armed peasantry, backed by a few
battalions of disorganised line-troops. They did their best, but were utterly
unable to stand before the French veterans. At last, on March 27,. the Marshal
forced his way to Oporto, and found in front of the city a line' of hastily
constructed earthworks manned by 30,000 insurgents, headed by their bishop and
uncontrolled by any proper military organisation. He stormed the lines two days
later, and made a horrible slaughter of the Portuguese, several thousands of
whom were driven into the river.
But here
Soult’s initiative came to an end; he was unable to carry out the Emperor’s
instructions by advancing against Lisbon. He was cut off from all communication
with other French armies by insurgents in his rear. The remains of the
Portuguese forces that he had beaten were hanging in a great mass on his left
flank; if he left a competent
garrison in
Oporto, he would not have enough troops for the final advance; and he now knew
that there was a British force awaiting him somewhere near Lisbon. Accordingly
he halted, sent out flying columns to open his communication with Galicia, and
wrote to the Emperor for more troops. Meanwhile he amused himself by assuming
quasi-regal state at Oporto, and seems to have dreamed of becoming “King of
northern Lusitania.”
The other
French advance had come to a similar standstill at about the same moment. Two
Spanish armies, it will be remembered, had been collected for the defence of
Andalusia—that of Cartaojal covering the eastern passes, that of Cuesta behind
the line of the Tagus. On March 27 Sebastiani beat Cartaojal at Ciudad Real,
and forced him to take shelter in the Sierra Morena. But the French general had
received orders not to press his victory; it was Victor who was to deliver the
great blow. On March 15, that marshal crossed the Tagus high up, thus turning
the position which Cuesta had taken behind the central course of the river at
Almaraz. He had about 22,000 men, a force slightly exceeding that of the
Spaniards, who drew back when their flank was turned, and retired across the
mountains into the valley of the Guadiana. Here Cuesta was reinforced by a
division drawn from Cartaojal’s army and offered battle, for he was as rash as
he was unskilful in the field. He took in hand no less a scheme than to
surround the French in the open plain near Medellin, and advanced in a line
four miles long and only four men deep. The natural result followed; the French
cavalry broke his left-centre by a furious charge, and then rolled up his
isolated wings in detail. The slaughter was awful, for there was no friendly
mountain or ravine to shelter the routed troops; more than 7000 were cut down,
and nearly 2000 made prisoners (March 28). Nevertheless Victor’s offensive was
exhausted at Medellin, just as that of Soult had been at Oporto. Insurrection
had burst out in his rear; his army was enfeebled by detachments, and suffering
from want of food. He could hear nothing of Soult, whose advance on Lisbon was
to synchronise with his own on Seville. He declared that he was not strong
enough to besiege Badajoz, much less to invade Andalusia, and halted in the
valley of the Guadiana, clamouring for reinforcements, which King Joseph at
Madrid was too weak to send him.
Such was the
condition of affairs when Wellesley landed at Lisbon. The French invasion had
come to a standstill. Soult would not move without reinforcements from Ney, nor
Victor without reinforcements from Madrid. Wellesley at once grasped the
situation; he had at his disposal, counting the newly-arrived regiments from
England, some
25,000 British and 16,000 Portuguese troops.
This was enough to enable him to deal a crushing blow at either Soult or
Victor, while leaving a detached force to “ contain ” the other. Without a
moment’s hesitation, he resolved to deal with Soult first, and, leaving 12,000
men
at Abrantes
to watch Victor, marched with the rest on Oporto. If successful in the north,
he intended to rush back to Estremadura and deal with the second French army.
Everything
favoured Wellesley’s enterprise. Soult had dispersed his army to hunt down the
Portuguese insurgents, and was attacked before he could concentrate. At the
moment when the blow fell, he was more intent on suppressing a republican
conspiracy among his own officers than on watching for any advance on the part
of the British. On May 12 Wellesley was in front of Oporto, while Soult was
hurriedly assembling his troops and preparing to retreat. Noting the confusion
in the French ranks, Wellesley carried out at midday his astounding passage of
the Douro, throwing his advanced guard across a broad river edged with
precipitous cliffs, when he noted that the enemy had neglected to guard all the
passages. The move was completely successful, and Soult was hunted out of
Oporto and driven eastward, in search of the divisions of his army which had not
yet been able to join him. But Wellesley had thrown a Portuguese force under
Beresford across the line of retreat by which the enemy could retire up the
Douro into Spain. Thus intercepted, Soult rallied his missing columns, but
found that he was shut in between Wellesley, Beresford, and the inhospitable
and roadless mountains of the Serra de Santa Catalina. Burning his baggage and
destroying all his artillery, he escaped by goat-tracks over the hills towards
Galicia. Hotly pursued by Wellesley, and harassed by the peasantry, he finally
got off with the loss of 5000 men, and led his corps in a disorganised mass to
Orense. He found that Galicia was no safe harbourage for him; the whole
province was up in arms, and the detachments of Ney’s corps were fighting for
existence against La Romana’s army and the local guerillas. With some
difficulty Soult and Ney ultimately concentrated at Lugo, and resolved to
devote themselves to crushing the Galician insurrection.
As they were
thus engaged, Wellesley had ample time for a blow at Victor in Estremadura.
But, while he was hurrying his victorious troops from Oporto to Abrantes for a
rapid stroke at the 1st corps, the French army of the south was enduring such
dire starvation that Victor at last resolved to retire towards Madrid, before
the whole force should become ineffective from sheer exhaustion. He evacuated
Estremadura about the middle of June, and retired to the valley of the Tagus,
fixing his head-quarters at Talavera. Thus he abandoned all that he had won at
Medellin. This rearward movement of the 1st corps compelled Wellesley to revise
his plans, since Victor was no longer isolated, but had fallen back to a
position where he was in close touch both with Madrid and with Sebastiani in La
Mancha. After taking counsel with Cuesta and the Junta at Seville, Wellesley
consented to embark in the first and only campaign which he ever undertook in
company with a Spanish colleague and without supreme control over
the whole
conduct of affairs. The scheme was ambitious, yet not unpromising if the
details had been properly carried out. The Junta undertook that Venegas, now in
command of its army of La Mancha, should distract the attention of Sebastiani
and King Joseph by a cautious demonstration against Madrid. Meanwhile Wellesley
was to march up the Tagus, unite his forces with those of Cuesta, and endeavour
to catch and crush Victor’s corps while still isolated. He did not fear
interruption from the other French armies, believing Ney and Soult to be
occupied with the Galician insurrection.
On July 18
the British troops, just 20,000 strong, joined Cuesta’s Estremaduran army,
which had been raised to a strength of 35,000 men, near Almaraz; and the two
bodies marched in company against Victor. The Marshal drew back before them,
evacuated Talavera, and retired towards Madrid. Matters looked fairly well,
though Cuesta had proved a very perplexing colleague. It was, however, not he,
but Venegas, who ruined the campaign. That officer, instead of detaining
Sebastiani in his front, remained inactive, and allowed the enemy to march away
unperceived. Thus Victor, Sebastiani, and King Joseph, who had brought up the
last reserves from Madrid, were able on July 26 to mass nearly 50,000 men in
front of Wellesley and Cuesta, ignoring completely the army of La Mancha.
There
followed the bloody battle of Talavera, extending over the two days (July
27-28). Wellesley and Cuesta had taken up a position extending from the Tagus
to a bare hill three miles north of it. The Spaniards held the right in the
town of Talavera and its suburbs and olive-groves, the British the left, partly
in the plain, partly on the isolated hill which marked the end of the line.
Victor, overruling King Joseph and Jourdan, who were theoretically in chief
command, delivered three desperate attacks on the British position, leaving
only a few thousand cavalry to contain the Spaniards. He had never before met
the British, and, looking on the thin line opposed to him, exclaimed, “ si on
rierf once pas fa, ilfaudrait renoncer afaire la guerre.” Practically the whole
of the French infantry threw themselves upon Wellesley’s half of the line, with
a superiority in numbers of nearly two to one. The fighting was desperate, and
at one moment the British left-centre was broken. But Wellesley saved the day
with his single reserve brigade; and the French drew back, leaving 17 guns and
7200 killed and wounded upon the field. The British had suffered even more
heavily in proportion, losing 5300 men out of 20,000 present. The Spaniards
were but slightly engaged, and their casualties were trifling.
Both armies
were exhausted; and when, during the night, the French retired from the field,
Wellesley was unable to pursue them. King Joseph’s position was now a dangerous
one, for Venegas and the army of La Mancha had at last come up, and were
beginning to threaten Madrid in his rear. But an interruption from a new
quarter suddenly
1809]
Soulfs advance. Wellesley's retreat.
453
changed the
whole face of the campaign. On July 30 the news came in that Soult with a
considerable force—how great no one yet knew— was marching from Salamanca on
Plasencia and the middle Tagus, so as to cut the British communications with
Portugal.
A few words
are necessary to explain the appearance of this army upon the scene. When Soult
had been driven back into Galicia in May, and had there met Ney, the two
Marshals had agreed to cooperate ; Ney was to clear the coast-land, Soult to
sweep the interior. But they were jealous and suspicious of each other’s
loyalty; and the joint movement was a failure. Ney was checked by the
insurgents at the estuary of the Oitaben; Soult, disregarding his colleague’s
difficulties, made off to the south-east, and ultimately descended into the
plains of Leon. Therefore Ney, declaring that he had been betrayed and
abandoned, suddenly evacuated Galicia, withdrew all his garrisons, and returned
into the plains by another route. Thus, by June 30, Galicia was delivered from
the French; but, on the other hand, two corps, 35,000 strong, which had been locked
up in this remote corner of Spain, had returned to the valley of the Douro, and
were now available for the main central operations of the summer campaign of
1809.
It was this
fact that ruined Wellesley’s plans for the recovery of Madrid. On hearing of the
advance of the British and Estremaduran armies along the Tagus, Soult had
written to King Joseph (July 19), asking for leave to fall upon the rear of the
Allies, while the troops of Victor and Sebastiani were detaining them in the
front. He had been given permission so to do, and had received, in addition to
the two corps lately arrived from Galicia, a third, that of Mortier, which had
recently been drawn back from Aragon into Old Castile. With this large body of
troops, about 50,000 strong, he marched from Salamanca on July 27, the first
day of the battle of Talavera.
On July 30
Wellesley was warned that French troops were descending upon Plasencia and
threatening his communications with Portugal. On August 2 he started off to
fight them, believing that Soult was raiding in his rear with no more than a
few divisions. But, on the following day, an intercepted despatch revealed to
Wellesley and Cuesta the real strength of the approaching enemy. They at once
saw the danger of their position, and retreated behind the Tagus by the bridge
of Arzo- bispo, abandoning at Talavera 4000 wounded, for whom no transport
could be procured. There was still some danger that Soult might anticipate them
at Almaraz, the main passage of the Tagus; but Wellesley seized this important
strategical point by a forced march (August 7), and the situation became
comparatively safe. The Anglo- Spanish armies had now a broad river in front of
them, and a fair line of retreat behind; and the French could no longer hope to
surround them. On August 8 Soult forced the passage of the Tagus at Arzo-
bispo, driving off the Spanish division which tried to defend the bridge;
but this was
his last forward move. The only remaining incident of the campaign was that on
August 11 Venegas gave battle to the King and Sebastiani at Almonacid near
Toledo. He was beaten and forced back into La Mancha, with a loss of 5000 men.
It is difficult to say whether he was more to blame for his culpable slowness
at the commencement of the campaign, when he failed to detain the 4th corps in
his front, or for his culpable rashness at the end of it, when he courted and
suffered a wholly unnecessary defeat. No further active operations occurred in
central Spain till the autumn. The French army dispersed in order to get food;
and Wellesley, in equal danger of starvation at Almaraz, retired on August 20
to the valley of the Guadiana, where he remained quiescent for several months
recruiting his army. Thoroughly disgusted by his experience of cooperation with
Cuesta, he refused to lend himself to any of the plans for offensive action in
company with the Spanish armies which the Junta proposed.
While the
Talavera campaign was in progress, there had been sharp fighting in Aragon and
Catalonia, regions in which the war always took a course wholly unaffected by
the main struggle in Castile and Portugal. General Blake, having raised a new
army in Valencia, had advanced in May with the object of recovering Saragossa.
He was attacked (May 23) by Suchet, the new commander of the French army of
Aragon, but repulsed him in a sharp fight at Alcaniz. Continuing his advance,
Blake pursued Suchet and brought him to action again at Maria just outside the
gates of Saragossa. But on this occasion the Spanish army was beaten (June 15);
and, after suffering a second and more decisive defeat at Belchite (June 18),
the Valencians dispersed in disorder, leaving Suchet master of the plains of
Aragon.
Meanwhile, in
Catalonia, Saint-Cyr had been occupied during the whole summer and autumn in
the siege of the fortress of Gerona, a place of very moderate strength, but
held by a gallant and resourceful governor, General Mariano Alvarez, and a
garrison whose courage and endurance surpassed even the level that had been
attained by the defenders of Saragossa. From May 6 to December 10, 1809, the
French lay before its ramparts, keeping up an incessant bombardment and making
assault after assault upon the breaches. They won the outworks, but could not
penetrate into the town, till sheer starvation and incessant fighting had
practically annihilated the garrison. Blake came up from Valencia with the
wreck of his army to disturb the siege, but was too weak to drive off
Saint-Cyr, and only succeeded in prolonging the agony of Gerona by throwing in
a few convoys and some trifling reinforcements. On December 10 the place
surrendered, the governor and nearly the whole of the surviving defenders being
prostrate in the hospitals. From first to last the siege had cost the French
20,000 men. This was undoubtedly the most brilliant piece of service performed
by the Spaniards during the whole Peninsular War.
Long before
Gerona fell, the lull in the main operations in Castile, which followed upon
the battle of Talavera, had come to an end. Seeing the French passive, the
Spanish Junta resolved to take the offensive again in October. They asked, but
asked in vain, for the cooperation of Wellesley (now Viscount Wellington), who
warned them that if their armies tried to fight general actions they would be
beaten, and besought them to confine their efforts to the defence of Andalusia.
Nevertheless the Junta ordered a new advance on Madrid. Two forces were to take
part in this scheme, starting from two remote bases. The larger consisted of
the old army of La Mancha, formerly commanded by Venegas, to which had been
added the greater part of the army of Estremadura. Cuesta had been invalided in
August; Venegas had been disgraced after his defeat at Almonacid; and the
united force was entrusted to General Areizaga, an officer more rash and decidedly
more incapable than either of his predecessors. He was ordered to march on
Madrid with some 50,000 men and to bear down all opposition. At the same time,
del Parque, with La Romana’s old army of Galicia, now counting over 20,000
bayonets, was ordered to advance into Leon, and to move on Salamanca and
ultimately on Madrid.
Del Parque
started first, pushed boldly forward, and met the French ' 6th corps, commanded
by General Marchand in the absence of Ney, at Tamames near Salamanca. Taking a
strong position, he awaited the attack of the enemy, and beat them off, the
assailants losing an eagle and 1500 men (October 18). Marchand was forced to
evacuate Salamanca, which the Spaniards occupied. After a pause, del Parque
advanced again, but found that the enemy had received reinforcements, which
made him too strong to be faced. The Spanish general began to fall back, but
was surprised and beaten at Alba de Tormes (November 28). His army fell back,
with a loss of 3000 men, partly on Galicia, partly on Ciudad Rodrigo.
The fate of
Areizaga in the south was far worse. Starting from the passes of the Sierra
Morena on November 3, he made a sudden dash for Madrid, driving before him at
first the small French detachments which occupied La Mancha. But, having
reached Ocana near Aranjuez, only three marches from the capital, he found
heavy forces gathering in his front, was stricken with sudden irresolution and
indecision, and waited to be attacked by the enemy. King Joseph, having
collected the corps of Mortier and Sebastiani and the Madrid reserves, fell
upon him with
30,000 men on November 19, and inflicted on him
a defeat less bloody, indeed, than that of Medellin, but even more disastrous.
The French made no less than 18,000 prisoners; some 4000 Spaniards were 1 .Led or
wounded. It took five weeks to collect the wrecks of the army in the Sierra
Morena; and, even then, only 25,000 out of the 50,000 men with whom Areizaga
had started could be rallied.
The rout of
Ocana sealed the fate of southern Spain. Napoleon
was now free
from the Austrian troubles which had absorbed his attention during the summer
of 1809, and was at liberty to turn his whole attention to the Peninsula. He
sent up huge reinforcements, and ordered a general advance, before the enemy
should have recovered from the effects of Alba de Tormes and Ocana. It was in
his power to throw the great mass of his troops either on Seville or on Lisbon;
in other words, to break the centre of the Spanish line of defence and occupy
the fertile Andalusia, or to overwhelm Wellesley and drive the British out of
Portugal. Fortunately for Great Britain and for Europe, the Emperor chose the
easier enterprise, and ordered Soult, with the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and
Mortier, to force the Sierra Morena, occupy Andalusia, and drive the Spanish
army of the south into the sea. The conquest of Portugal was to be postponed
till the next year. Accordingly Soult led out some 70,000 men at midwinter,
threw himself upon Andalusia, and in less than a fortnight overran the whole
kingdom. On January 20, 1810, the passes of the Sierra Morena were forced at
three points; Seville fell on January 31; and by February 4 the French
advance-guard was in front of Cadiz, the only town that had not been submerged
by the flood of invasion. The demoralised troops of Areizaga had dispersed or
fled into Murcia; and Cadiz itself was only saved by the Duke of Albuquerque,
who threw himself into the town with 10,000 men from Estremadura just before
Victor arrived.
The loss of
Andalusia appeared the crowning disaster of the whole war; and many observers,
both French and English, thought that the end was at hand. But it was really a
blessing in disguise; the whole Imperial field-army available for offensive
operations was absorbed by the tasks of garrisoning the newly conquered kingdom
and of besieging Cadiz. No surplus troops remained for an attack on Portugal;
and meanwhile Wellington was preparing the defence of that realm with a
thoroughness which no one suspected. He had completed its regular army, drilled
and armed some scores of thousands of militia, and got well to work on the
famous lines of Torres Vedras, against which the advancing wave of French
invasion was to surge in vain during the ensuing year. In short, the seven
additional months of preparation which were granted for the organisation of the
defence of Portugal were all-important.
There was a
long gap in the offensive operations of the French between the conquest of
Andalusia and the commencement of the invasion of Portugal. The former
enterprise had been completed in February, 1810; the latter did not begin till
August. The reason of this delay was that the Emperor waited till the spring
before sending across the Pyrenees the reinforcements from Germany, which were
to form the bulk of the army destined for the march on Lisbon. Nearly 100,000
troops were ultimately poured into the Peninsula for this purpose, including
two new corps, the 8th and 9th, under Junot and Drouet,
20,000 men of the Imperial Guard, and many other
smaller units. For
i8io] Massena takes the command.—Siege of Cadiz. 457
the command
of the whole, Marshal Massena, lately created Prince of Essling for his
services on the Danube, had been selected. The Emperor’s choice was good, for
despite his personal faults—he was selfish, greedy, and quarrelsome—Massena was
more capable of conducting a great campaign at the head of 100,000 men than any
other of the marshals. He took up his command at Valladolid on May 15, 1810.
Meanwhile
Soult, in the far south, was busy with the siege of Cadiz. It was an
unpromising enterprise; for the town, situated at the point of a peninsula
projecting far into the sea, and separated from the mainland by a broad creek,
is almost impregnable without the assistance of a fleet, it was to little
purpose that the French bombarded the outlying defences at long range. Cadiz
was “observed” rather than besieged; and Victor’s corps had always to be left
in front of it. That of Sebastiani lay at Granada and Malaga, charged with the
duty of keeping down the insurgents of the Sierras and watching the Spanish
army of Murcia. For further offensive operations Soult could only count on
Mortier’s corps; the Emperor had directed that he was to use it, when Massena
was ready to start the main attack on Portugal, for the reduction of Badajoz
and Elvas, and finally for an invasion of the Alemtejo which would take Lisbon
in the rear. But Massena was long in moving; and Soult waited for the signal
without impatience, being well content to devote himself to organising the
civil government of Andalusia—a profitable viceroyalty for one who loved money
and was an indefatigable and unscrupulous collector of works of art.
In the
eastern parts of the Peninsula the war during the spring of 1810 did not stand
still, as in the south; but it was inconclusive in its results. Suchet, having
reduced the plains of Aragon to obedience, risked an advance against Valencia
with a column of 12,000 men, a force too small for the enterprise. He was
repulsed (March 5-10) and forced by the news of fresh revolts in Aragon to
retire to Saragossa. Warned by this check that he must not go too far afield
till he had made all safe in his rear, Suchet now turned his attention to the
reduction of the fortresses on the borders of Aragon and Catalonia, and
speedily captured Lerida (May 14) and Mequinenza (June 8). He had now won his
way far down the Ebro valley; and one further push would take him to the sea,
and enable him to cut the communications between Valencia and Catalonia.
Meanwhile Augereau, who had replaced Saint-Cyr in Catalonia in time to receive
the surrender of Gerona in December, 1809, fared far worse in the new year. His
only success was the capture of the petty mountain fortress of Hostalrich (May,
1810), while his failures were many; for the Catalans were obstinate and
enterprising, and their general, O’Donnell, was a man of resource. So many of
Augereau’s outlying detachments were cut off, and so many of his enterprises
proved fruitless, that early in the summer the Emperor recalled him to France
in disgrace, sending Macdonald, Due de Taranto, to supersede him.
But events in
Aragon and Catalonia were unimportant compared with the great invasion of
Portugal, which was just about to commence. At no period of the struggle did
matters look so hopeful for the French as at this moment. Massena had under him
180,000 men, of whom three corps (the 2nd, 6th, and 8th), over 70,000 strong,
were to form the actual field-army; while the 9th corps and other troops
guarded the plains of Leon in his rear, and the Imperial Guard came up to
occupy Navarre and Old Castile. This seemed an overwhelming force to turn
against Wellington, who had less than 30,000 British bayonets and sabres, about
the same force of Portuguese regulars, and a mass of native militia useless in
the field and only fit for raids and bickerings in the mountains. Moreover, the
British general had always to guard against the chance of a separate invasion
of the Alemtejo by Soult, far in his rear. To aid him there were two weak
Spanish armies, the remnants of del Parque’s old force—one in Galicia, the
other in Estremadura near Badajoz; together these forces did not muster 25,000
men, and they were much demoralised by their late defeats. Neither gave any
profitable assistance during the campaign in Portugal.
When Massena
began his advance, the two Castiles, with Aragon and Andalusia, were quiet. The
guerilla bands which afterwards troubled them had not yet developed their
strength; and the French garrisons were so strong that no comer of central
Spain was left unguarded. In this summer there were no less than 370,000 French
troops in the Peninsula—a larger number than was ever seen before or after.
Everywhere, save in Catalonia, the Spaniards seemed discouraged; and it
appeared probable that one further effort would drive them to despair and
surrender. The Supreme Junta, which had hitherto conducted the war, had become
so unpopular that it resigned its powers to a Begency of five members on
February 2. But the new Government, if not so arrogant and unteachable as the
old, inspired little confidence. Had the invasion of Portugal proved
successful, there would have been no power of resistance left in Galicia, in
Cadiz, in Valencia, or even in Catalonia; and the war would have ere long
flickered out.
Massena had
resolved not to start on his great enterprise till all the troops from Germany
were nearing the front; and some of them, especially the 9th corps, were still
far in the rear. He had also resolved to secure his base of operations in Leon,
by capturing the fortresses of north-western Spain, before he crossed the
frontier of Portugal. Astorga, the outer bulwark of Galicia, had fallen on
April 22, after an honourable defence. The greater stronghold of Ciudad Rodrigo
made an even more creditable resistance, its governor, Herrasti, holding out
from April 25 till July 10 against all the efforts of Ney. His laudable
tenacity caused the invasion of Portugal to be postponed till August, to the
satisfaction of Wellington, who needed every moment that he could gain for the
organisation of his defence. He had refused to risk
i8io] Massina invades Portugal. Lines of Torres
Vedras. 459
a battle for
the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, though pressed to do so both by the Spaniards and
by some of his own officers; his forces were not yet strong enough to face the
French in the plains, and lay distributed along the hills of the Portuguese
frontier, observing the enemy from a distance.
It was not
till August 24 that Massena crossed the Coa at the head of the main body of his
army. He then laid siege to Almeida, the fortress which protects north-eastern
Portugal against attacks from the side of Spain. It was defended by a good
native garrison under an English governor, Colonel Cox; and Wellington had
expected it to delay the enemy as long as Ciudad Rodrigo. But on the third day
of the siege a shell exploded the main powder-magazine; nearly the whole town
was destroyed; and Cox was forced to surrender next day (August 27). Having
mastered Almeida with such unexpected ease, Massena called up all his columns,
63,000 strong, collected his stores and provisions, and advanced into Portugal
on September 15.
On plunging
into the interior of Portugal, Massena was surprised to find the whole
country-side, and even the larger towns, completely deserted by their
inhabitants. This was the first intimation that he received of Wellesley’s new
and original scheme of defence. He had obtained from the Portuguese Regency
permission to order all the people of the invaded districts to retire from
their homes after destroying all their food-stuffs. The wealthier classes were
to make their way to Lisbon or Oporto; the rest to take refuge in the
mountains, or in regions to which the French columns could not easily
penetrate. Knowing that Napoleon’s armies relied chiefly on local requisitions,
he rightly supposed that such a device would soon reduce the invader to great
distress. Meanwhile he had prepared a secure refuge for his own army, by
constructing across the neck of the peninsula on which Lisbon stands the celebrated
lines of Torres Vedras. These were not mere field entrenchments, but solid
closed works connected by ditches and palisades, and furnished with ample
provision of heavy guns from the Lisbon arsenal. Skilled engineers, aided by
the whole of the ablebodied peasantry of Estremadura, had been at work on them
for more than half a year; and they were now perfectly complete. The first line
was 29, the second 22 miles long from sea to sea; they included 126 closed
redoubts, defended by 427 pieces of artillery. The ground in front of them had
been cleared of all cover, and on the more exposed points the slopes had been
scarped away. Finally, to provide against the possible but unlikely contingency
of the lines being pierced, a third series of fortifications had been built at
the mouth of the Tagus, to allow the army to embark in safety in the event of
disaster. A very large force would be required to man so long a front.
Wellington had arranged that the whole British army, nearly 30,000 strong,
five-sixths of the Portuguese regulars (a force of about the same strength),
and some 20,000 Lisbon and Estremaduran militia should hold the lines.
460 Devastation of Portugal. Wellingtons retreat.
[i8io
He even
borrowed during the autumn 7000 Spanish troops from the army of La Romana,
which lay at Badajoz, so that, in the end, he could count on nearly 100,000 men
for the defence, though a large proportion of them were of inferior material.
But this was
not the whole of Wellington’s plan. The militia of northern and central
Portugal were not taken inside the lines, but were ordered to wait till the
French army should have passed on into the interior, and then to cut its
communications, harass its rear, and enclose it in a net of mobile columns.
They were directed to avoid all serious fighting with large forces, but to
destroy stragglers and detachments, cut off convoys, and prevent the enemy from
foraging far afield. If Massena dropped small garrisons to guard the more
important points on his line of advance, they would be cut off and destroyed.
If he kept his whole army in a mass, he would move on in a sort of perpetual
blockade, with an active but intangible enemy hemming him in on all sides. When
he reached the lines of Torres Vedras and was forced to stop, he would find himself
the besieged rather than the besieger. The main difficulty in Wellington’s plan
was the dreadful sacrifice imposed on the peasantry of central Portugal, who
were asked to quit their houses and destroy their provisions in the face of
approaching winter. But a combination of patriotism and wholesome fear of the
marauding propensities of the French sufficed to cause the orders of the
Regency and the commander-in-chief to be carried out.
Massena was
entirely unprepared for the tactics used against him. He imagined that he had
but to win a battle somewhere in front of Lisbon, and so to compel the British
to embark; the capital and the whole kingdom of Portugal would then be his own.
He advanced through northern Beira for ten days, while the army of Wellington
retired before him, refusing to commit itself to a fight. The route which he
had taken, to the north of the Mondego, by way of Vizeu, at last brought him in
front of the position of Busaco, where the main road to Coimbra and Lisbon
crosses a range of precipitous heights. On this commanding ridge, which
overlooks all the upland of central Portugal on one side, and the plain of
Coimbra on the other, Wellington stood at bay; he did not intend to make a
permanent defence of the position, well knowing that it could be turned on the
left, but merely to check the French if they should venture on a direct attack.
His troops were eager for a fight, and he was anxious to indulge them if it
could be done without risk. It would be useful too, from the political point of
view, to retire to the lines of Torres Vedras only after having won a victory
which should impress public opinion.
Massena acted
much as Wellington had hoped. He had never before seen a British army in
battle, and thought that this might be driven, by a vigorous attack in column,
even from such ground as that which lay in front of the convent of Busaco. He
had a distinct superiority in
i8io] Battle of Busaco. Capture of Coimbra. 461
numbers—about
59,000 men to 50,000—and knew that half his opponent’s army was composed of
Portuguese, for whom he had a supreme contempt. Accordingly, on September 27,
he launched Ney’s corps against Wellington’s left-centre, and Reynier’s against
his right-centre, keeping Junot’s in reserve to clench the victory. The two great
columns of assault were directed against the least precipitous parts of the
English position; but even here the slope was steep; and, when the French had
toiled to the summit under heavy musketry fire, their order was broken and
their impetus spent. Charged vigorously by Craufurd’s light division on the
left, and by Picton’s 3rd division on the right, they were rolled down the hill
in fearful disorder and with great loss. The actual clash of battle hardly
lasted an hour, but the French lost five generals and 4400 men killed and
wounded. Wellington’s casualties were less than 1300; and only a third part of
his army had been engaged. It was a matter of immense relief and encouragement
that the Portuguese line regiments had stood perfectly steady and had contributed
their fair share to the victory. After this Wellington knew that he could
safely trust them in line of battle—a piece of knowledge which well-nigh
doubled his fighting power.
Having
suffered this well-earned punishment for trying to “rush11 a British
army securely posted in a good position, Massena took the obvious step of
turning Wellington’s left wing by the circuitous road through Boialva. His
opponent had expected this move, and promptly resumed his retreat, evacuated
Coimbra, and fell back towards the lines. The Marshal occupied the deserted
town, where he found food-stuffs, that had not been properly destroyed, in
quantity sufficient to enable him to resume his advance (October 1). Now that
he had reached this point, prudence seemed to demand that he should establish a
new base at Coimbra, and leave a division to guard it and to care for the 5000
sick and wounded who now encumbered his march. But Massena felt that he would
require eveiy available man for the battle in front of Lisbon which he believed
to be impending. Accordingly he took the rash step of leaving all his sick and
wounded at Coimbra under the guard of half a battalion, and with the remainder
of his army hurried on in pursuit of the British (October 4). The nemesis for
this blunder was not long in coming. On October 7 Colonel Trant, the commander
of the nearest militia brigade, learning of the smallness of the force at
Coimbra, surprised the place at dawn, and captured both the garrison and the
men in hospital, 5000 in all.
Wellington’s
army passed within the lines on October 11, escorting the whole population of
northern Estremadura, which moved down to take refuge in and about Lisbon. On
the following morning Massena’s columns came up; the Marshal had only heard of
the existence of the lines five days before, and was even now unaware of their
strength. But when he had surveyed them with his own eyes, and had made one or
462
Massena at Torres Vedras and Santarem. [1810-1
two tentative
attacks on some of the outlying positions, he recognised the hopelessness of
his situation. He had now not much over 50,000 men left, and saw that it would
be insane to risk an attack with such a force. His provisions were running out,
and the Beira militia had closed in upon his rear, so that he commanded no more
ground than that on which his three army-corps were encamped. His
communications with Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo had long been cut; and he had
not the least idea what was going on in Leon, or whether his reserves were on
their way to join him. Nevertheless he remained for a month in front of the
lines, hoping against hope for some chance to make a successful assault, and
then retired to Santarem, thirty miles up the Tagus. He despatched, meanwhile,
letters to the Emperor begging for instant aid, lest all the results of his
campaign should be lost.
In and about
Santarem the French army abode from November 15, 1810, to March 5, 1811,
obstinately refusing to retire, though by the end of that time it was suffering
from sheer starvation. When the resources of the region had been eaten up, the
army had to live by pushing marauding columns into the surrounding
districts—columns which were always opposed and often destroyed by the
Portuguese militia. Wellington refrained from attack; for hunger was doing the
work of the sword, and the invading army dwindled day by day.
Massena had
hoped for more effective assistance from Soult, who, according to the Emperor’s
orders, was to cooperate in the attack on Lisbon by advancing into the
Alemtejo, and threatening the Portuguese capital from the south. But Soult’s,
movements were begun too late; he had no love for Massena, and refused to
hurry. He came up with a single corps, the 5th under Mortier, into Estremadura,
and prepared to capture Badajoz as a preliminary to the advance into Portugal.
On February 19 he destroyed the Spanish army of Estremadura at the battle of
the Gebora, and then began to press the siege of Badajoz. The place made a weak
defence, and was surrendered by its cowardly or treacherous governor Imas on
March 10.
Five days
earlier Massena had in despair abandoned Santarem and started on his weary
retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo across the mountains of central Beira. The army of
Portugal would have perished if it had remained a fortnight longer in its advanced
position. It was now in a desperate plight; nearly all the horses were dead;
the men, demoralised by long privations, left the colours in thousands and
hunted the Portuguese peasantry in the mountains in the search for food. The
atrocities which they committed on these marauding tours surpass description,
and brought about horrible retaliation on all French parties surprised by the
natives. Prisoners on either side who were merely shot were thought to have got
off lightly.
On hearing of
Massena’s departure, Wellington started off in pursuit with five divisions,
giving two others to Beresford, with orders to march
through the
Alemtejo into Spanish Estremadura, and, if possible, to relieve Badajoz.
Beresford’s march, however, was made fruitless by the surrender of Badajoz two
days before the army of succour could reach its vicinity. Massena’s retreat
from Santarem to Ciudad Rodrigo occupied just a month (March 5—April 4), and
was conducted with great skill. Ney, who took charge of the rear-guard, fought
a long series of partial actions to detain the British van, but nearly always
drew off just in time to escape serious loss. The only occasion on which the
French were severely punished was at Sabugal (April 3), where the British light
division surprised the 2nd corps in a fog, and killed or wounded more than 1000
men.
The French
army had entered Portugal on September 15, 1810, with some 63,000 sabres and
bayonets, and had received some 6000 or 7000 men in reinforcements while at
Santarem. When it recrossed the frontier on April 5, it mustered only 45,000
men. Massena therefore had lost some 25,000 men during the seven months of his
campaign— far more by sickness and starvation than by the sword, for he had
fought only one general action, that of Busaco, and a dozen combats, in none of
which (save Sabugal) the casualty list was heavy. He had been dislodged from
Portugal, not by force but by Wellesley’s use of the terrible weapon of hunger.
The price that the Allies had paid for their success was no insignificant one;
a broad strip of central Portugal had been reduced to a desert, and many
thousands of its inhabitants had perished. But thereby the rest of the realm
had been saved; and the end was well worth the sacrifice. For the moral effect
of Massena’s defeat was enormous; the Emperor had sent forth his lieutenant,
with much pomp and circumstance of war, to “ drive the leopards into the sea.”
The whole of Europe had been summoned, as it were, to look upon the spectacle
of the punishment of the English for their rash attempt to defend a section of
the Continent against the invincible French arms. For many months the fall of
Lisbon had been prophesied; and Massena’s checks and miseries had been
carefully concealed. When the wrecks of the army of Portugal fell back on
Ciudad Rodrigo, the facts could no longer be kept secret. The offensive power
of the French hosts in Spain was spent; and it may be said that the retreat
which began at Santarem only ceased at Toulouse.
During the
six months which Massena spent in Portugal, the course of the war in the other
regions of the Peninsula was on the whole favourable to the French. The
successful operations of Soult, described above, were carried out in spite of a
strong diversion which the Allies conducted on the side of Cadiz. That place
was full of troops, including an Anglo-Portuguese division of nearly 5000 men
under General Graham. The Spanish Government was anxious to make what use it
could of this accumulation of forces. Power at Cadiz was no longer in the hands
of the Regency which had been appointed in
February,
1810: a Cortes, or national parliament, had been summoned to meet on September
24. It was not a very representative body, since many provinces were in the
hands of the French, and the delegates who sat for these regions had not really
been chosen by the people. But it was energetic and vigorous, if too much given
to ill-timed discussions. The Spanish Liberals had a predominance in it; and
the “ serviles ” or partisans of absolute monarchy were in a decided minority.
When the news
of the departure of Soult and the 5th corps for the siege of Badajoz became
known at Cadiz, the Spaniards were eager that something should be done to
disturb the small army under Victor which was blockading the city. Accordingly,
in February, 1811, a Spanish force of 9000 men under General La Pena,
accompanied by 4000 British under Graham, was sent down the coast to Tarifa on
shipboard, and put ashore with the object of attacking the French lines from
the flank and rear. The exped;tion was not quite large enough for
the end in view; for Victor had nearly 20,000 men dispersed along his front,
and, without entirely evacuating his redoubts and batteries, could gather a
force sufficient to turn back La Pena and Graham. The Anglo-Spanish army
marched for three days along the coast, and on March 5 reached the heights of
Barrosa, overhanging the southern extremity of the French lines. Here Victor,
aware of their approach, had gathered all the available troops of the 1st
corps. He sent one of his three incomplete divisions to demonstrate against the
Spaniards, who formed the head of the Allies’ long column of march, and fell
with the other two upon the British, who formed its rear. La Pena allowed
himself to be overawed by the few thousand men on his flank, and sent no aid to
Graham, who had to fight a battle of his own, with about 4500 men opposed to
7000. Nothing daunted, the British general turned about, and fell upon the
advancing columns with desperate resolution, though he had to attack uphill.
Once more the line proved too strong for the column; and Graham’s musketry
shattered and drove off the French with a loss of 2000 men, six guns, and an
eagle, his own casualties amounting to 1100 killed and wounded. La Pena, in
spite of his colleague’s urgent entreaties, refused to send him cavalry or
reinforcements, or even to take up the pursuit of the routed force. Indignant
at this desertion, Graham led his troops back to Cadiz. La Pena followed two
days later. The two generals entered on a campaign of wrangling; and the
expedition, which might have wrecked half the French lines, came to an
ignominious end. No more was attempted on the side of Cadiz for some months.
Meanwhile, in
eastern Spain, Suchet was cooperating with Macdonald, who had superseded
Augereau in command of the army of Catalonia. Their main object was to capture
Tortosa, and So to block the communications between Catalonia and Valencia, and
cut the Spanish defence in two. In December, 1810, Macdonald, though much
harassed by the indomitable Catalans, succeeded in pushing southward, and
placed
i8io-i] Gallant resistance of Catalonia.
465
himself in a
position from which he could cover the siege of lortosa, while the actual
attack was confided to Suchet and the army of Aragon. The operations were
conducted with Suchet’s usual decision and activity; the defence was so feeble
as to cause not unnatural suspicions of treachery; and Tortosa fell on January
1,1811, after holding out for less than three weeks. This was a serious blow to
the patriotic cause; Catalonia was henceforward isolated, and only kept in
touch with the other unsubdued Spanish provinces by means of the British ships
ever hovering about its coast. Yet it showed no signs of weakening in its
defence; indeed, the most daring exploit of the Catalans during the whole war
was carried out in the spring following the fall of Tortosa.
On April 9
the bands of its northern border took by surprise the great fortress of
Figueras, which commands the road from France to Gerona and Barcelona. Macdonald
had at once to depart with the larger half of his army to attempt the recovery
of this important place. Meanwhile the Emperor ordered Suchet to take charge of
the conquest of southern Catalonia, and assigned to him the remainder of
Macdonald’s troops. Thus strengthened, he was ordered to lay siege to
Tarragona, the one great seaport of that region still in Spanish hands, and the
rallying-point and arsenal of the Catalan army. Suchet, leaving Macdonald to
shift for himself in front of Figueras, concentrated every man for this
enterprise, and sat down before Tarragona on May 4. Contreras, the governor,
made an honourable defence; but the place was stormed on June 28, and sacked
from cellar to garret, with much unnecessary bloodshed among the civil population.
The loss to Spain was great; and the surviving Catalan divisions had to take to
the hills since the last of their seaports was gone. Yet still they held out,
and the province remained unsubdued.
We must now
return to the operations of Massena and Wellington. When the Prince of Essling
recoiled across the Spanish frontier on April 5, the only fruits remaining to
him from his nine months’ campaign were the two fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo
and Almeida. While the French army was refitting in the neighbourhood of
Salamanca, Wellington laid siege to Almeida. The Marshal had to make his choice
between allowing it to fall unsuccoured, or leading forward his exhausted army
once more in the hope of raising the siege. As might have been expected from
his indomitable temper, he chose the latter alternative. But, seeing that his
cavalry was almost destroyed, and that he could not horse half his guns, he
made a desperate appeal to his colleague Bessieres, the commander of the army
of the north, to aid him with all his artillery, and as many squadrons as he
could concentrate. The younger marshal showed no great zeal for the enterprise,
but brought 1500 horse and a single battery to Ciudad Rodrigo on May 1. With
this small auxiliary force, and the whole surviving strength of the army of
Portugal, some 39,000 sabres and bayonets, Massena marched on Almeida.
466 Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro. Fall of Almeida,
[isii
On May 3 he
found Wellington’s army, about 34,000 strong, arrayed across his path on the
heights of Fuentes d’Onoro. On the first day of battle Massena endeavoured to
force back the British line by a frontal attack ; he failed, and after waiting
a day despatched half of his troops to turn Wellington’s right flank by a
ditour to the south. On May 5 the struggle was resumed; again the assault on
the British front was repelled, but the turning column forced back the extreme
southern wing of the allied army, and compelled its general to throw back part
of his line on to new ground. Here he stood to receive a third attack; but
Massena dared not deliver it. His ammunition had run short; his troops were
exhausted; and his colleague Bessieres and his corps-commanders were unwilling
to persevere with the attempt to relieve Almeida. He was forced to abandon the
place to its own resources, and drew off on May 8. In the two fights he had
lost nearly 3000 men, Wellington not more than 1800. Brennier, the commandant
of Almeida, on hearing of the result of the battle, blew up the walls of his
fortress and sallied out at midnight (May 11) with his garrison, to cut his way
through the lines of the besiegers. His courage was rewarded by success, and he
escaped with two-thirds of his force to Massena’s outposts. But Almeida, the
last hold of the French in Portugal, was lost; and Massena had fought to save
the place, not the garrison.
The Marshal’s
career had now come to an end. Napoleon, dissatisfied with his conduct of the
campaign of Portugal, observed that “Massena had grown old,” and superseded him
by the young and ambitious Marmont, who had still his spurs to win as the
commander of a large army. The new chief arrived at the front on May 6, and
took over the charge of the army of Portugal on the 12th. His first action was
to disperse his exhausted divisions into cantonments in the province of
Salamanca, where they began to repair the losses they had suffered during the
late campaign.
The state of
the French army was not concealed from Wellington, who resolved to utilise the
enemy’s enforced leisure for a raid into Estremadura, and an attempt to capture
Badajoz. Leaving four divisions on the Portuguese frontier opposite Marmont’s
army (May 15), he marched with two to join Marshal Beresford and the force
which had been detached against Soult at the moment of Masscna’s retreat from Santarem.
But, before he could arrive, matters had come to a head in this quarter, and a
battle had been fought. Beresford had marched from Lisbon into Estremadura at
the end of March. His operations were dilatory; and it was not till May 5 that
he succeeded in driving off the 5th corps, which Soult had left on the
Gnadiana, and in investing Badajoz. The remains of the Spanish army which had
been crushed at the Gebora, and other troops sent from Cadiz, now came to his
aid, under Castanos and Blake.
On May 10, after
receiving news of the investment of Badajoz, Soult
marched from
Seville with the reserves of the army of Andalusia, and on May 15 presented
himself with 23,000 men in front of the position of Albuera, where the allied
army stood prepared to dispute his passage. Beresford had drawn off his army
from the trenches three days before, and had concentrated nearly 32,000 men;
but of these less than 8000 were British. Nor was his fighting-ground
well-chosen; his front was covered only by a brook everywhere fordable; and
dense woods on the further bank prevented him from discerning the enemy’s
movements.
At dawn on
May 16 Soult delivered his attack against the flank and not the front of the
Allies. Crossing the stream high up, under the cover of the woods, he fell
unexpectedly upon Beresford’s right wing, which was composed entirely of
Spanish troops. While endeavouring to change their front, Blake’s regiments
gave way; but Beresford came up with the British 2nd division, and attacked the
head of the French column. At the moment when the troops were closing, a
furious rainstorm swept over the hill-side; and, under cover of it, a brigade
of French light cavalry charged in upon the flank and rear of the British and
absolutely annihilated the three leading battalions. The surviving seven
battalions of the 2nd division maintained for a long time a desperate
musketry-battle with the 5th corps, in which neither side gained an inch.
Soult’s rear brigades were coming up, and Beresford flinched and thought of
retreat; but he was persuaded by Colonel Hardinge to throw into the fight his
last troops, three British and three Portuguese regiments of the 4th division.
Myers’ fusiliers thrust aside Soult’s reserve, and falling upon the flank of
the 5th corps drove it off the field. This struggle was the most bloody
incident of the whole Peninsular War; on both sides the infantry had maintained
the battle at close quarters, and had fallen by companies and battalions as
they stood. Over 6000 French were killed or wounded; but their proportion of
casualties was as nothing to that of the British, who lost 4100 men out of less
than 8000 present. The Portuguese had about 400 killed and wounded, the
Spaniards 1000, so that the total casualties among the Allies were not much
less than those of the enemy. They had also lost a gun, five standards, and 500
prisoners. But the object of the battle had been achieved, in spite of
Beresford’s unskilful management; after lingering for another day in front of
his adversary’s position, Soult retreated towards Andalusia, leaving 1000 of
his severely wounded to the mercy of the Allies. The victors therefore were
able to resume the siege of Badajoz on May 20.
When
Wellington arrived from the north and assumed command in Estremadura, he
resolved to press the siege with vigour. But his engineers were unskilful; his
Portuguese battering train was both small and weak; and two assaults were
beaten oft' with loss. On June 12 he was obliged to retire from before the
well-defended fortress, for Marmont had united his whole army and marched
southward to join Soult. The British
divisions
left near Almeida had executed a march parallel to that of the French army of
Portugal; but, even when they had been united to the force in Estremadura,
Wellington had not the numbers to face the two Marshals combined in the open
field. He therefore retired to the Portuguese frontier, and took up a position
behind the Caya river, which he strengthened with field-works; here he waited
with 50,000 men in line, inviting an attack. Soult and Marmont had brought
62,000 men to relieve Badajoz, but only by stripping Leon and Andalusia of
their garrisons, and leaving their rear exposed to the incursions of the
Spaniards. From June 22 till July 4 the two Marshals lay in front of the Caya,
threatening an attack. These twelve days were the most critical period of the
campaign, for hardly ever again were the French in a position to assail
Wellington with superior numbers and force him to fight for the safety of
Portugal. But they held back, and on July 4 Soult marched away to save Seville
from an attack by Blake. Marmont, too weak to fight without his colleague’s
assistance, drew off to the valley of the Tagus; and the crisis in Estremadura
came to an end.
Seeing no
immediate hope of resuming the siege of Badajoz, for a movement against it
would have brought back both Soult and Marmont to the Guadiana, Wellington
resolved to transfer his main force back to the north, and to threaten Ciudad
Rodrigo. On Aug. 1 he set out for Almeida and Sabugal with six divisions,
leaving two in Estremadura. Beresford was not again trusted with the command of
this independent corps; and the detachment placed to observe Soult was
committed for the future to the charge of a cautious and steady general, Sir
Rowland Hill. On arriving near Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington began preparations
for the siege; but the battering train, which was to come from Oporto, was
still far off, and for some weeks he could do no more than blockade the
fortress from a distance. This demonstration, however, was enough to call
Marmont out of his cantonments; assembling his whole army, he left the valley
of the Tagus and called to his aid Dorsenne, who had lately succeeded Bessieres
in the command of the army of the north. More zealous than his predecessor had
been at the time of Fuentes d’Onoro, Dorsenne came up with four strong
divisions; and, when the two armies joined near Salamanca on Sept. 21, they
mustered 60,000 sabres and bayonets. Against such a force Wellington could do
nothing, as he was inferior in numbers by nearly a third. Without firing a
shot, he allowed Ciudad Rodrigo to be relieved (Sept. 25), and retired into the
Portuguese mountains.
The enemy
followed hard upon his steps; and he was forced to cover his retreat by two
rear-guard actions, at El Bodon (Sept. 25) and Aldea de Ponte (Sept. 27). On
the 28th Wellington had concentrated his army in a strong position in front of
Sabugal, where the ground was so much in his favour that he dared to offer
battle. Marmont and Dorsenne, being without the provisions and transport which
would have
i8ii] Stubborn
Spanish resistance. Its results. 469
justified
them in commencing a serious invasion of Portugal, refused to attack. They
retired after revictualling Ciudad Rodrigo, and dispersed their armies into
winter quarters. Wellington at once came down again from the heights and
resumed the blockade of the fortress. But he was not in a position to press it
closely so long as the roads and the weather were favourable to the
reconcentration of the enemy; he lay for two months awaiting the moment when a
coup de main would be practicable.
Thus the main
series of operations in Spain came to an end in October. The French offensive
was spent; neither north nor south of the Tagus had their commanders dared to resume
the invasion of Portugal, even when they had collected an imposing force and
greatly outnumbered Wellington’s field-army. To concentrate such masses for a
serious campaign, they were forced to strip the provinces in their rear; and,
when those regions were left ungarrisoned, they lapsed at once into
insurrection. Soult could not quit Andalusia, nor Marmont Leon and the Tagus
valley, for more than a few weeks, under pain of seeing the country behind them
aflame. Enormous as was the force— over 300,000 men—which the Emperor had
thrown into Spain, it was still not strong enough to hold down the conquered
provinces and at the same time to attack Portugal. For this fact the Spaniards
must receive due credit; it was their indomitable spirit of resistance which
enabled Wellington, with his small Anglo-Portuguese army, to keep the field
against such largely superior numbers. No sooner had the French concentrated,
and abandoned a district, than there sprang up in it a local Junta and a ragged
apology for an army. Even where the invaders lay thickest, along the route from
Bayonne to Madrid, guerilla bands maintained themselves in the mountains, cut
off couriers and escorts, and often isolated one French army from another for
weeks at a time. The greater partisan chiefs, such as Mina in Navarre, Julian
Sanchez in Leon, and Porlier in the Cantabrian hills, kept whole brigades of
the French in constant employment. Often beaten, they were never destroyed, and
always reappeared to strike some daring blow at the point where they were least
expected. Half the French army was always employed in the fruitless task of
guerilla-hunting. This was the secret which explains the fact that, with
300,000 men under arms, the invaders could never concentrate more than 70,000
to deal with Wellington.
There is
little that needs description in the operations in eastern and southern Spain
during the latter months of 1811. On August 9 Soult defeated an attempt of the
army of Murcia to invade the kingdom of Granada, but was unable to push his
advantage, having to keep a watchinl eye on Cadiz and Badajoz. His only
offensive movement in the winter was an attempt to take the small fortress of
Tarifa, near the Straits of Gibraltar, which was handsomely repulsed by the
British garrison of the place (Dec. 1811). Macdonald in Catalonia was occupied
by the long siege of Figueras till September had almost arrived; and,
even when it
had fallen, he accomplished little against the indomitable Somatenes of the
mountains.
Further
south, however, matters went differently. After capturing Tarragona, Suchet had
resolved to leave Catalonian affairs to his colleague Macdonald, and to strike
at Valencia, the largest and wealthiest city in the whole realm which still
remained in the hands of the patriots. In September he led the greater part of
the army of Aragon down into the Valencian coast-land, and laid siege to the
rock-fortress of Sagunto, which forms the chief bulwark of the fertile Huerta.
It was well defended by General Andriani; and, when it had beaten off two
assaults, Blake came to raise the siege with the whole of the armies of Murcia
and Valencia. Suchet turned to meet him, and on the plain south of Sagunto was
fought (October 25) the last pitched battle of the war in which a Spanish army,
unaided by British troops, attempted to face the French. Blake, though he
attacked vigorously, was defeated with a loss of 5000 men. But his disasters
did not end here. Sagunto surrendered next day; and Suchet then pushed on
against Valencia itself. He had obtained leave from the Emperor to draw on the
army of the north for reinforcements; and, when he had been joined by Reille
and two divisions from Navarre, he advanced on a broad front, sweeping Blake’s
army before him. On December 26 he fought a long, running fight with the
Spaniards, and drove two-thirds of them, with their commander-in-chief, into
the city of Valencia; the remainder escaped towards Murcia. Blake had not
intended to be shut up in this fashion; the place had no regular modem
fortifications, nor had it been properly provisioned. He made two futile
attempts to break out, and was forced on Jan. 9,1812, to surrender at
discretion. This was the last and not the least of the disasters of the Spanish
armies; 16,000 men laid down their arms, and only a remnant was left in the
field to maintain the struggle in Murcia. Suchet was now at the height of his
fortunes; he had been made a marshal for capturing Tarragona, and was now
created Duke of Albnfera and given viceregal power over all eastern Spain. But
the capture of Blake’s force was to be the last, as well as the most striking,
of his exploits.
Even before
Valencia fell, the fortune of war was beginning to turn on the more important
theatre of war, along the Portuguese frontier. Wellington had been watching his
opportunity for a renewed attack on Ciudad Rodrigo, and found it at midwinter,
when the armies of Portugal and the north were dispersed in distant
cantonments. He calculated that he might count on three weeks before they could
concentrate in such force as to drive him off. Hence he was forced to work in
haste, under pain of seeing his scheme fail if the place had not fallen within
that time. But all went well; on January 8 he invested Ciudad Rodrigo and
brought up his battering train. On the 13th he had begun to breach the walls;
on the 19th the 3rd and light divisions
stormed the
place. This was sharp work, for, by the strict rules of siege-craft, the attack
should have been held back some days longer, till the fire of the defence had
been subdued and the breach had been made more practicable. But speed was
necessary, and Wellington’s happy audacity was justified by the result. The
splendour of the success was somewhat tarnished by the misconduct of the
victorious troops, who sacked the town in the most scandalous fashion.
Marmont had
called out his army from its cantonments on receiving the news that Wellington
had invested Ciudad Rodrigo; but bad roads and worse weather prevented him from
concentrating at Salamanca before January 25; and by that time he had received
news that the place had fallen. Seeing no profit in a winter campaign, he sent
back his divisions to their old quarters. Wellington, thus left undisturbed,
proceeded at once to carry out the second half of his great plan. As soon as he
was certain that Marmont’s army had dispersed, he marched with six divisions on
Estremadura, there to join the detached corps of Hill. Starting on March 6, he
reached the gates of Badajoz on the 16th. The moment was even more favourable
than he could have expected for a great offensive movement; Napoleon had now
the Russian war looming clearly before him, and had begun, for the first time
since the war began, to draw troops from Spain. In February he had recalled
13,000 men of the Imperial Guard from the army of the north, and had directed
Soult and Suchet to send him their two Polish divisions; he had also ordered
off some German troops; so that, as a net result, the army of Spain was
30,000 men weaker than it had been in the autumn
of 1811. This diminution was most important, as it was now far more difficult
for the enemy to concentrate superior numbers against the Anglo-Portuguese,
either in the valley of the Guadiana or in that of the Douro.
Badajoz, like
Ciudad Rodrigo, had to be besieged “ against time ”; for it was clear that
Soult and Marmont might unite to relieve it, as in June, 1811, if the siege
were long protracted. Accordingly, Wellington pushed matters as fast as he
could. On the twentieth day after the investment had begun, he ordered the
place to be stormed, though his preparations were still incomplete and the
defence was still strong. Badajoz was taken, though at the cost of dreadful
bloodshed : nearly 5000 men were killed or wounded, and the main assault on the
breaches failed. But Picton and Leith, with the 3rd and 5th divisions,
penetrated into the town by escalade; and the French were forced to surrender.
Excesses far worse than those committed at Ciudad Rodrigo disgraced the storm;
the troops got entirely out of hand, and fell to plunder, rape, and arson, in
the most desperate fashion. It was three days before they could be restored to
discipline.
Soult arrived
in Estremadura with the bulk of his army a few days after Badajoz fell; he
refused to fight when he heard that the place was lost, and retired to Seville.
Marmont, instead of marching straight to
the Guadiana,
had taken the unwise step of trying to draw off Wellington by a foray into
central Portugal. But the British general disregarded this diversion, believing
himself quite capable of dealing with the Marshal when Badajoz should have
fallen. He was justified in his belief; for, on hearing of the disaster,
Marmont hastily withdrew from Portugal and fell back to the middle Douro.
On learning
that Marmont had retreated, the British general determined to pursue him, and
to push matters to a decisive issue in Leon. But, before marching on Salamanca,
he resolved to strike a blow which should make the united action of the armies
of Portugal and Andalusia even more difficult than it had recently been. Their
sole line of communication was by the boat-bridge of Almaraz on the central
Tagus: if this were destroyed, they had no way of keeping touch with each other
save the circuitous route through Madrid. Accordingly Hill was directed to send
a lightly-equipped expedition through the mountains and to break the bridge.
This feat he accomplished on May 19, surprising and storming the two forts
which guarded the structure, and burning its pontoons. Having thus secured
himself from the danger that Soult might come up in time to succour the army of
Portugal, Wellington challenged Marmont to battle by marching straight on his
head-quarters at Salamanca, and laying siege to the forts which dominated the
town (June 17). The Marshal, having concentrated the greater part of his
divisions, appeared three days later in front of the British army; but he found
that he was somewhat outnumbered by the allied forces, and instead of
attacking, retired behind the Douro (July 2). The Salamanca forts fell ere he
had completed his retreat.
The campaign
then stood still for a fortnight, while Marmont was waiting for reinforcements.
He called in the French garrison of the Asturias, and besought aid from the
army of the north, in command of which Caffarelli had now superseded Dorsenne,
and from King Joseph at Madrid. Both promised him help, but both were tardy in
carrying out their promise; and Marmont was impatient. When he had been joined
by the Asturian division alone, he recrossed the Douro and assumed the
offensive. Wellington fell back before him, till he had reached the immediate
vicinity of Salamanca, and then drew up his army on the heights to the south of
the town (July 22). The contending forces were very nearly equal in numbers,
each having about 42,000 men in line; but Wellington was handicapped by the
fact that more than a third of his army was composed of Spanish and Portuguese
troops. Over-eager to press his adversary, and to cut him off from the direct
road to Portugal, Marmont took the dangerous step of pushing his left wing
forward to turn Wellington’s right, and extended his forces on a much longer
front than was safe. While he was executing his flank- march across the front
of the British position, Wellington came down upon him with the speed and fury
of a thunderbolt. The isolated
French left
wing was suddenly assailed in front by Wellington’s right, which descended from
the heights, while the 3rd division under Pakenham, which had been concealed in
woods and had escaped Mar- mont’s notice, fell upon its flank and rear. Three
French divisions were routed and dispersed in half-an-hour, and t
Marmont himself was grievously wounded by a round-shot as he was hastening to
repair his fault. The remainder of the army of Portugal, the centre and right
of its line, massed themselves in a defensive position, and fought hard to save
the day; but they were gradually pushed off the field by a concentric attack
from front and flank. They lost 8000 killed and wounded, 7000 prisoners, two
eagles and 12 guns; and Clausel, who had succeeded to the command, was unable
to rally the wrecks of the army for many days. The disaster would have been
still greater, if a Spanish force which Wellington had placed to block the ford
of Alba de Tormes, over which the routed host retreated, had not left its post
without orders before the battle.
The victory
of Salamanca shook the French domination in Spain to its very foundations ; and
its results were felt to the remotest corners of the Peninsula. King Joseph and
his army of the centre had started from Madrid on the day before the battle,
and would have joined Marmont, had he only waited three more days before
fighting. As it was, the King and his 15,000 men had to retreat in haste, as
soon as it was known that Wellington was moving on Madrid. The victor had sent
one division and his Spanish auxiliaries to pursue Clausel, while with the rest
he marched upon the capital. Joseph was forced to fly, with his Court, his
officials, and the Spaniards who had sold themselves to his cause, a mixed
multitude of 10,000 souls. Fearing that, if he retired towards France, he would
be taken in flank by the British, the King ordered a retreat on Valencia, where
he could take refuge with the victorious army of Suchet. On August 12
Wellington entered Madrid in triumph, and next day compelled a garrison of 1200
men, which Joseph had left in the Buen Retiro forts above the city, to lay down
their arms. Leon and both the Castiles were thus delivered from the power of
the enemy. Nor was this all; Soult in Andalusia now found himself cut off from
all the other French armies, and saw that he could no longer maintain his
position in the far south. Evacuating with bitter regret the splendid provinces
where he had reigned as Viceroy for three years, he concentrated his whole army,
some 55,000 sabres and bayonets, and marched to join Suchet at Valencia. The
Spanish troops thereupon emerged from the long-blockaded Cadiz and reoccupied
Andalusia; while Hill, left with no enemy before him in Estremadura, moved up
the Tagus to Madrid.
The very
completeness of Wellington’s success had led to a dangerous concentration of
the French armies, which, giving up the attempt to hold down the provinces of
the south and centre, had gathered in two
threatening
masses. Soult, Suchet, and the King had nearly 90,000 men at Valencia; the army
of Portugal had fallen back to join the army of the north; and 40,000 men were
assembled about Burgos and on the upper Ebro. It was clear that Wellington,
with some 60,000 men concentrated at Madrid, could not face these overwhelming
numbers if they acted in unison. But he hoped to keep them apart, and he had
just received from the Cortes the chief command of all the native forces of
Spain, which gave him the power of ordering diversions from many quarters
against the enemy. Unfortunately, the Spanish generals were dilatory and even
disobedient; and comparatively little profit accrued to Wellington during the
autumn of 1812 from this quarter. Only the Galician army, some 11,000 men, was
at this moment actively engaged in his support. The forces which had come out
of Cadiz made little attempt to distract Soult; and the Murcians and Valencians
were completely cowed by Suchet. A British, force of 6000 men from Sicily
landed at Alicante on August 7, but was far too weak to have any effect on the
general course of operations on the eastern coast.
Trusting,
however, that the great accumulation of French troops at Valencia might not be
immediately dangerous, Wellington left Madrid on September 1 with four
divisions, and joined the troops whom he had left in the Douro valley, with the
intention of pushing back the French force in the north. Hill, with three
divisions, remained at Madrid to guard against any movement on the part of
Soult and the King. On September 19 the British main army appeared in front of
Burgos; and Clausel retired before it to the Ebro, after having thrown a
garrison into the forts above the city. Wellington was of opinion that Burgos
must be reduced before he could venture to pursue the French into Alava or
Navarre; he therefore invested its citadel. The siege lasted just a month
(September 19—October 19). It was the most unfortunate operation which he ever
conducted. The place, though small; was strong; and the material provided for
the attack was lamentably insufficient, only eight heavy guns being available.
For want of transport, a sufficient train was never brought to the front; and
Wellington was foiled. Though the outer works were captured, four successive
attempts to storm the castle failed; and a whole month was wasted.
This respite
enabled the French to combine and arrange for a general forward movement
against the allied armies. Souham, who had succeeded Clausel in command, led
the armies of Portugal and the north to relieve Burgos; while Soult and the
King, leaving Suchet to hold down Valencia, marched upon Madrid with 60,000
men. Wellington would probably have fought Souham if he had not been aware that
even a victory in this part of the field could not save Hill from being crushed
by the superior numbers that were moving up against Madrid. He was compelled
to fall back in order to unite the two halves of his army, and, while retiring
slowly from Burgos along the valley of the Douro, sent
Hill orders
to abandon New Castile and join him at Salamanca. The two retreats were carried
out with complete success; and the whole allied army was concentrated on the
Tormes by November 3. But the two armies of Soult and Souham had also combined;
and nearly 100,000 men were facing Wellington on his old battlefield south of
Salamanca; during the whole war the French had never before gathered so large a
force upon a single line. The British general had hoped that the dearth of
provisions and the miserable autumn weather would arrest the further progress
of the enemy. But Soult pressed on, always turning the right of the allied
army; and Wellington was forced to fall back for three marches more till he had
reached Ciudad Rodrigo (November 18). This last stage of the retreat was made
in drenching rain over roads that had become almost impassable, and cost the
retreating host several thousand men in sick and stragglers, who were left
behind to perish or fall into the hands of the enemy. But the French also were
in a desperate state of exhaustion, and at last desisted from the pursuit.
In spite of
the failure at Burgos and the losses in the subsequent retreat, the net results
of the campaign of 1812 had been most satisfactory. Though the French had
reoccupied Madrid and Toledo, they had been compelled to evacuate all southern
Spain. Estremadura, Andalusia, and La Mancha had been completely freed from the
invaders; and the casualties of the Imperial armies had exceeded 40,000 men.
They were now thrown upon the defensive, and had lost confidence in their
ultimate success. But this was not the worst of their misfortunes. At midwinter
arrived the news of the Emperor’s awful disasters in the retreat from Moscow;
and shortly afterwards he began to requisition troops from Spain to
reconstitute the Grand Army. Soult was summoned off to Germany, and with him
many other generals, a number of complete regiments, and a still greater
proportion of cadres composed of picked officers and non-commissioned officers,
who were to train the mass of conscripts which was being levied for the next
campaign. Yet so enormous were Napoleon’s resources that, after deducting men
in hospital or detached, there were still nearly 200,000 French troops left in
the Peninsula in the spring of 1813.
Of these,
63,000 men were under Suchet in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; the
remainder—the armies of Portugal, the south, the centre, and the north—were
still facing Wellington. Yet the British general was able to commence the
operations of the new year with a greater prospect of success than he had ever
before enjoyed. He had about
75,000 fighting men of the best sort in his own
Anglo-Portuguese army; and with these the main blow would have to be delivered.
But he was also in a position to utilise all the scattered Spanish forces as he
had never done before. Ballasteros and some other generals who had disobeyed
orders in 1812 had been removed in disgrace; and in 1813 Wellington could rely
upon obedience. There were about 60,000 Spanish regular
476
Improvement in Anglo-Spanish prospects. [1813
troops
available in Galicia, Estremadura, and La Mancha ; but quite as important were
the gueriUems who had been stimulated to redoubled activity by the successes of
the previous year. Indeed, it may be said that these bands were of greater
profit to the cause of Spain in 1813 than were her armies; for their'daring and
ceaseless raids dining the spring diverted the attention of the French from the
early operations of Wellington, and caused them to spread their divisions far
and wide in regions remote from the real point of danger. So harassed were the
French that Marshal Jourdan, who directed King Joseph’s armies since the
departure of Soult, determined to make a desperate attempt to hunt down the
main bands before concentrating in face of Wellington. This fatal error was
committed in March, when the whole army of the north and four divisions of the
army of Portugal were drawn up into the northern mountains, and devoted to the
sole task of exterminating the guerilleros. Dispersed in numerous columns, and
cut off from each other by the active insurgents, these 40,000 men were no
longer available for the main operations upon the Douro.
While Clause!
and Foy were hunting Mina and his compeers to little effect, the line of battle
from Salamanca to Toledo was too thin for safety. The French armies were
dispersed over an immense front; and, to draw together in any strength, they
would be forced to fall back far to the rear and to abandon vast tracts of
territory. Meanwhile the campaigning season had arrived; and Wellington saw his
advantage. It was clear that the French would expect his main attack to be
delivered from the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, as in previous
years. Their defensive position had been taken up to guard against this
eventuality. But, instead of repeating his old move, Wellington secretly passed
up five British divisions to the north of the Douro into the Portuguese
province of the Tras-os-Montes. Braganza, not Ciudad Rodrigo, was to be his
real base; and the larger half of his forces was thus placed in a position from
which it overlapped the extreme French right wing, and could turn its flank
whenever it attempted to make a stand. Jourdan had forgotten to guard against
this possibility, since this north-eastern extremity of Portugal was so rugged
and so badly furnished with roads that it had never before been used as the
starting- point of a large army. Graham, the victor of Barrosa, was placed in
command of this corps; while Wellington remained in person at Ciudad Rodrigo,
with three divisions, lest the news that he had gone northward should arouse
the suspicions of the enemy.
It was not
till May 16 that Graham had struggled through the defiles of the
Tras-os-Montes, and commenced his descent into the plains of Leon behind the
French flank. Wellington himself therefore only set out on the 22nd; but, when
once the advance was begun, the results were startling. The enemy’s van-guard
retired from Salamanca without offering resistance, for Jourdan proposed to
concentrate and fight in
Old Castile.
But, every time that he thought that he might stand to resist Wellington,, he
discovered that Graham had marched onward and was behind his right wing. The
British attack had been directed so far to the north that the French could not
concentrate within any reasonable space of time. Orders had to be sent to
evacuate Madrid and Toledo in hot haste, and to direct every available man on
Burgos. The isolated divisions engaged in guerilla-hunting in Navarre and
Biscay were also called in to join the main army. But Wellington gave the
retreating army no leisure; and, when he had reached the ground in front of
Burgos, the enemy had only 50,000 men collected. Joseph and Jourdan saw that to
offer battle with such inferior numbers would be ruinous, and reluctantly fell
back beyond the Ebro, after blowing up the citadel of Burgos (June 12-13). The
King had vainly hoped to defend the line of the Ebro; but, instead of attacking
him in front, Wellington once again pushed forward Graham and his left wing,
which crossed the river far to the west of the French headquarters. Once more
Joseph had to draw back, till he reached a strong position in front of
Vittoria, where he was covered both in front and in flank by the stream of the
Zadorra. Here at last he stood to fight, having collected some
65,000 men. But Wellington had nearly 80,000 men
in line; with such a numerical superiority, he naturally attacked at once.
The essential
part of Wellington’s tactics in the battle of June 21 was to push forward, once
more, his left wing under Graham, so as to turn the French right, and cut them
off from their line of retreat, the great high road to San Sebastian and
Bayonne. This was accomplished early in the day; but the enemy, drawing back
his exposed wing behind the Zadorra, kept Graham for many hours from advancing
further. Yet the loss of the power to retreat on Bayonne was fatal. For
Wellington, attacking vigorously with his centre and right, crossed the lower
course of the Zadorra at several points, and drove in the main body of the
French towards the town of Vittoria. If the road behind them had been open,
Joseph and Jourdan might have retired without any ruinous losses. But Graham
was blocking the way; and the defeated host had to retreat by the only route
left to them, a rough mountain track to Salvatierra and Pampeluna, unsuited for
the passage of an army encumbered with heavy impedimenta. The King had with him
not only a vast train of artillery, but a great convoy of Spanish refugees— his
partisans from Madrid—and countless carriages and waggons laden with treasure,
pictures, state archives, and valuable property of all sorts, the accumulated
spoil of six years of conquest. The whole of this heterogeneous mass of
vehicles was thrown upon the narrow Pampeluna road, and hopelessly jammed
within a few miles of its starting-point. The defeated army abandoned
everything, and fled over the hill-sides. In actual casualties it had not lost
heavily—some 6000 killed and wounded, and 1000 prisoners; while the Allies had
5000 men hors de
combat. But the French had saved nothing but their persons; the whole
equipment of the army of Spain was captured by the victors, 143 guns, 500
caissons, nearly £1,000,000 sterling in the militaiy chest, besides several
thousand carriages laden with valuables. Seldom has an army shared such plunder
as fell to the Allies that night.
The
vanquished host reached Pampeluna in complete disorder; and Jourdan, after
strengthening the garrison of that place, ordered the retreat to be continued
beyond the Pyrenees. On June 26 the whole force re-entered France, and only
halted at Bayonne, where desperate measures were taken to rally the regiments,
and to refit the army with artillery drawn from the arsenal of that fortress
and from the depots at Toulouse and Bordeaux. The pursuit had not been
vigorous, for Wellington had turned aside the greater part of his army to hunt
the columns of Foy and Clausel, which had not succeeded in joining Joseph in
time for the battle. Both were hard pressed, but ultimately escaped to France
by devious roads. When he found that they had eluded him, the British general
told off his Spanish auxiliaries to invest Pampeluna, and two of his own
divisions to besiege San Sebastian. With the rest of his army he advanced to
the frontier, but refused to cross the Bidassoa till the two great fortresses
had fallen. Their leaguers began simultaneously on July 1, 1813. Thus ended
this brilliant and skilful campaign,, which had lasted only forty days (May
22—July 1), and had cleared all northern Spain of the enemy. If the four French
armies of Portugal, the centre, the south, and the north, could have been
concentrated on a single position, they would have outnumbered the allied
forces. But Wellington never allowed them to gather, hurried matters to a
crisis with unswerving determination, and finally drove the enemy over the
Pyrenees, at a cost to himself of not more than 6000 men in the whole series of
operations.
The campaign
of Vittoria is separated by a gap of some three weeks from the second campaign
of 1813, that of the Pyrenees. During this space, Napoleon had time to send
Soult from Dresden, to reorganise the army of Spain. Joseph and Jourdan were
recalled to the interior of France in disgrace; and the Emperor expressed his
opinion that, with a change in leadership, his hosts would be able to resume
the offensive and deliver Pampeluna and San Sebastian. Though four divisions of
cavalry left for Germany, the French still counted more than 100,000 men. Some
3000 were in Pampeluna, about the same number in San Sebastian, 1500 in
Santona. After deducting a garrison for Bayonne, Soult had some 85,000 with
which to take the field.
Before
proceeding to relate the campaign of the Pyrenees, it is necessary to cast a
glance at eastern Spain. So long as King Joseph held Madrid and Toledo, Suchet
had been able to retain Valencia He even assumed the offensive, and on April 11
beat Elio’s Murcians at Yecla and Villena. Two days later he attacked the
Anglo-Sicilians on
the heights
of Castalla, and was beaten off with loss. But Sir John Murray, the officer who
commanded this force, made no attempt to profit by his victory, and remained
passive throughout May. On the last day of that month, acting under orders from
Wellington, Murray put his troops and a Spanish division on board ship at Alicante,
and sailed for Catalonia. He was directed to join the Spanish array in that
province and to lay siege to Tarragona. The purpose of this move was to give
Suchet full occupation during the campaign in Old Castile. When the news of the
landing arrived, the Marshal hurried north with part of his troops, and,
joining Decaen, the officer left in command at Barcelona, marched against
Murray. That general fled with unseemly haste on hearing of the approach of the
French, abandoning his siege artillery while he hurriedly embarked his troops
(June 12). He was superseded five days later by Lord William Bentinck, and
afterwards tried for cowardice and disobedience to instructions. The
court-martial ended in an acquittal, though he was censured for gross errors of
judgment.
On July 5
Suchet received the news of Vittoria, which compelled him to evacuate Valencia,
since the garrison of that province would have been in a perilous position when
New Castile and Aragon had fallen into the hands of Wellington. He retired
beyond the Ebro, and a little later abandoned Tarragona, after blowing up its
fortifications (August 17). The Anglo-Sicilian army, with the Spaniards of the
Murcian force, advanced along the coast and took up positions whence they could
observe Barcelona from a distance. On September 12, Suchet, thinking that they
were pressing him too close, advanced against them, and routed Bentinck’s
van-guard at the combat of Ordal. But, as he did not use his advantage, the
Allies continued to hold Tarragona, and to push the siege of the garrisons
which Suchet had left behind him at Tortosa, Lerida, Monzon, and other places.
The Marshal would have done far better to have evacuated them ; for he lost the
services of 10,000 good troops, whom he was never in a position to succour. The
Emperor began to withdraw troops from his army for use in Germany during the
autumn; and, as Suchet’s main body grew feebler, it became increasingly clear
that he would never be able to relieve his outlying garrisons. In the winter of
1813-4, the struggle in Catalonia dwindled down into a mere war of
demonstrations and affairs of outposts.
Far otherwise
had matters gone on the shores of the Bay of Biscay. On July 23, Soult, in
accordance with his master’s orders, resumed the offensive. The allied army was
now ranged on a long line upon the Franco-Spauish frontier, so as to cover the
sieges of San Sebastian and Pampeluna. Soult’s opportunity lay in the fact that
the hills impeded the lateral communications between the British divisions. He
secretly moved 60,000 men far inland to his extreme left, and fell upon the
troops under Picton and Hill who were guarding the passes of Ron- cesvalles and
Maya. He hoped to overwhelm them, by a twofold
superiority
of numbers, before Wellington could bring to their aid the corps cantoned
nearer to the sea. He would then push on, relieve Pampeluna, and force the
allied army to quit the frontier by a general attack on their flank and rear.
This ingenious plan miscarried, partly owing to fog and rain, which delayed the
French advance, but more because of the long and vigorous resistance of the
British outlying brigades. Maya and Roncesvalles were both forced in the end
(July 25-26); but their defence gave Wellington time to concentrate in front of
Pampeluna a force which, though much smaller than that of Soult, was yet strong
enough to hold him at bay. At the battle of Sauroren (July 27-28) the Marshal
strove in vain to storm the heights held by the allied troops. Reinforcements
were hurrying up from the west to join Wellington; and the Marshal had no
alternative save to fall back on France. This series of fights, generally
called the battles of the Pyrenees, had cost him 10,000 men.
Wellington
now pressed the sieges of San Sebastian and Pampeluna, hoping to secure both
places in time to allow him to advance into France before the winter came. But
his efforts were not at first successful. British siege-craft was seldom
efficient in these years; and San Sebastian beat off two assaults. The town was
finally stormed on August 81, and the castle surrendered nine days later: but
the success cost 2500 men. Soult, on the very day of the storm, made a last
attempt to raise the siege, but was heavily repulsed at the combat of San
Marcial by the covering force, consisting mainly of Freyre’s and Longa’s
Spaniards. Pampeluna fell on October 31, by starvation, not by assault. Thus
Wellington’s entry into France was delayed for four months.
But, on
October 7, the British general had already begun his preparations for advance
by fqrcing the lines of the Bidassoa, which Soult had strengthened by a long
chain of redoubts. Fording the broad river at low tide, the British divisions
swept all before them and captured all the enemy’s works. The French then fell
back on a second and stronger line behind the river Nivelle. This series of
positions was carried on November 10, after a series of desperate assaults on
almost inaccessible peaks and defiles, where the storming columns had to crawl
and climb up the cliffs of the Rhune and other lofty mountains. A third line of
positions now faced the British, formed by the river Nive and the fortress of
Bayonne behind it. A month of heavy rain and cold delayed the attack on this
new line of defence; but, with the return of fine weather, Wellington forced
the passage of the Nive (December 9) and advanced close to the outworks of
Bayonne. His army was now divided into two halves by the Nive, a feet of which
the indomitable Soult tried to take advantage. He first massed his whole
field-force against Wellington’s left, and strove to crush it before it could
be succoured by his right, which had to cross the river by a single distant
bridge. After severe fighting, this attack failed (December 10); whereupon the
Marshal
shifted his main army to the east bank of the Nive, and repeated his experiment
against the British right. At the battle of Saint-Pierre (December 13), the
entire French army was repelled by one British and one Portuguese division
under Sir Rowland Hill; and Soult was already foiled, when the appearance of
the reserves from beyond the river forced him to beat a precipitate retreat.
The battles of the Nive had cost the Marshal some 6000 or 7000 men, and would
have sufficed by themselves- to discourage him from making any further attempts
to assume the offensive. But his position was rendered utterly hopeless when,
shortly after, he received orders from the Emperor directing him to send two
divisions (10,000 men) to aid in the defence of the eastern frontier. His army
was now reduced to less than 50,000 men, little more than half the strength
which Wellington could put into the field. If he lingered much longer at
Bayonne, he ran a chance of being shut up.
When,
therefore, Wellington manifested an intention of surrounding Bayonne, by
casting a great bridge of boats across the Adour below the city, and
transporting several divisions to its northern bank, Soult was. driven to
retire into the interior and to leave the stronghold to its fate (Feb. 26,
1814). He retreated, not directly northward along the road to Bordeaux, as
might perhaps have been expected, but eastward in the direction of Toulouse, so
as to place himself upon the flank of the allied army. This move made matters
more difficult for Wellington, who could not push forward and leave Soult in his
rear, but was constrained to turn aside and pursue him along the roots of the
Pyrenees, moving every day further from the sea, from which alone he could
receive supplies and reinforcements. He was forced also to leave 30,000 men to
besiege Bayonne.
The first
stage of Soult’s retreat was marked by the battle of Orthez (February 27).
Knowing that the British army had been enfeebled by the large force left before
Bayonne, the Marshal offered a defensive battle on the heights above the town,
but was driven out of his position after a hard day’s fighting, and forced to
resume his retrograde movement to the east. After the battle, Wellington
detached two divisions under Beresford to march on Bordeaux, where the
partisans of the Bourbons, had promised to hoist the white flag as soon as
British aid came in sight. Beresford’s detachment reached Bordeaux on March 12;
and the royalists were as good as their word, opening the gates to him and
proclaiming the Due d’Angouleme, who had come out in the wake of the British army,
as Prince Regent. This movement was not without its inconveniences, for, if the
allied sovereigns had made peace at Chatillon, as was quite possible, the
Bordelais would have been left exposed to terrible punishment at the hands of
the Emperor. Wellington had given them fair warning of this, but they
nevertheless carried out their agreement. All the neighbouring departments were
practically on the same side; and the invading army was readily supplied with
information and provisions
482 Battle of Toulouse.—Results of the war. [i8i4
______________________ i
by the
peasantry. Soult’s attempts to raise a partisan warfare in the rear of the
Allies met with no success. Still less fruitful was Napoleon’s last desperate
device. On March 13 he released Ferdinand VII from Valen^ay, having made him
sign a treaty of peace, which the Spanish Cortes very properly ignored.
Soult’s
retreat did not end till he had fallen back under the walls of Toulouse (March
24), where he once more stood at bay in lines which he had caused to be thrown
up outside the city. He had some
39,000 men left. Wellington, owing to the
detachments at Bayonne and Bordeaux, was not greatly superior in force, having
only six Anglo- Portuguese divisions and a Spanish corps, less than 50,000
sabres and bayonets. In spite of the strength of Soult’s entrenchments, he
resolved to attack (April 10). The business turned out more formidable than had
been expected. The assault of Freyre’s Spaniards upon the French centre failed;
and it was only after desperate efforts that the 4th and 6th divisions
succeeded in storming the lines upon Soult’s left, and driving the enemy back
into the town, which was commanded by the captured heights. The victors lost
4600 men, far more than the vanquished, who, protected by their entrenchments,
suffered only 3200 casualties. But the result of the battle was sufficiently
clear, when Soult on April 12 evacuated the town, and retired still further
east* to join Suchet, who was coming up to his aid with the small remnant of
the army of Catalonia. Toulouse, if the combatants had but known it, was an
unnecessary battle; for Paris had capitulated to the Allies on March 30, and
Napoleon had abdicated on April 6. Unnecessary also was the bloodshed before
Bayonne on April 14, when the French garrison made a sortie, which cost each
side 800 casualties.
So ended the
great struggle which sapped Napoleon’s strength, though it was not the direct
cause of his fall. He called it himself “ the running sore”; and such indeed it
was, considered from his point of view. For it was the constant drain of men
and money to the Peninsula which rendered him too weak to fight the Powers of
central Europe. What might not have happened in Saxony in 1813, if the Emperor
had been able to dispose of the 200,000 veterans locked up behind the Pyrenees
P If, with the raw army that he actually commanded, he almost achieved success,
the experienced troops of Soult and Suchet must certainly have turned the
balance in his favour, and have enabled him to impose on the Allies a peace
that would have left his Empire intact, even if his prestige had lost some of
its ancient splendour. He paid in 1813 the price for his iniquitous doings at
Bayonne in 1808. The never-failing, if often ill-directed, patriotism of the
Spaniards, and the skill and firmness of the much-enduring Wellington, had
detained for six years in the Peninsula the army with which he might have
dictated peace to Europe.
RUSSIA AND
THE INVASION OF 1812.
The circumstances in which Alexander I, at the age of
twenty-three, succeeded to the throne of Russia, have already been described.
His tutor, the Swiss La Harpe, had imbued him with' the idealistic spirit of
the humanitarian philosophy of the eighteenth century; and this tendency
endured throughout his life. On the other hand, in his father’s circle at
Gatchina, Alexander had acquired a leaning towards a pretentious militarism,
and established friendly relations with Alexei Arakcheieff, the chief
representative of this new military school. Base and vulgar in spirit,
inhumanly hard and cruel, devoid of courage, but an absolutely trustworthy
servant, Arakcheieff was destined to be the curse of Alexander’s reign.
The reforms
which the new monarch introduced affected only the organisation of the central
government, and left the fundamental evils of the Empire untouched. The
arbitrary power of a corrupt administration, under an absolute ruler, and the
servile condition of the peasants, remained as before. Alexander’s first
counsellors were the friends of his youth, Count Kochubei, Count Stroganoff,
Prince Czartoryski, and Novossiltzoff, who, like him, lived in a world of
ideals, the political ideals of western Europe. The last three were called the
Triumvirate. La Harpe’s restraining influence must also be taken into account.
Alexander’s discussions with his friends, in what was called “a non-official
committee,” embraced the entire policy of the Empire, and showed traces of
English and Polish influences. This committee formed a plan for presenting
Russia, on the coronation day, with a Bill of Rights based on the English
Habeas Corpus Act; but this scheme was never carried out. The only change made
was in 1802, when the Government Boards were replaced by eight Ministries. The
Emperor’s theoretical liberalism was accompanied by a deep-rooted and obstinate
adherence to autocracy. The powerful bureaucracy of St Petersburg soon recognised
that the new Tsar was by no means inclined to allow it more than a superficial
share in his unlimited power. Those who understood his character regarded
without alarm the plans which Alexander was then
484)
Character of Alexander I. Michael Speranskii. [1801-12
revolving for
the liberation of the serfs. The Emperor loved the forms of freedom as people
love a play. He was pleased that his government should wear the appearance of
liberty; but more than the appearance he would not allow.
In June,
1807, began the period of Napoleonic influence, which was extremely unpopular
in Russia. The Russian nobility, for all its French culture, was inwardly
disaffected towards Napoleon. Alexander, however, admired in him not only the
commander of genius but also the great organiser. He at once perceived the
immense advantage which the ~mo3ern French absolutism had over the old
traditional absolutism of Russia; it was the advantage of system over caprice,
of organisation over anarchy. The Tsar determined to concentrate power in his
own person, but at the same time to transform the obsolete autocracy into a
modern monarchy, by combining with it some sort of popular representation. In
January, 1808, he appointed Arakcheieff Minister of War, that he might have at
his side an awe-inspiring figure of enormous energy, who would take off his
shoulders the detestable responsibilities of despotism. On the other hand,
towards the end of the same year, he gave the ablest of his state secretaries,
Michael Speranskii, supreme authority in initiating legislation. The son of a
poor country parson, but a man of great talents, Speranskii rose from the
position of pupil to that of teacher in the ecclesiastical seminary of St
Petersburg. By his capacity for work and his exten ;ve knowledge, he
had already proved of great assistance to many courtiers, high officials, and
ministers, men like Kurakin, Troschinskii, and Kochubei. In Speranskii the
Emperor found a keen and logical intellect, fertile in political ideas, a man
who knew Russia, and was familiar with modern French statecraft.
During the
years 1809-12, Speranskii, collaborating as Secretary of State with the
Emperor, came to occupy a unique position in Russia, one in fact superior to
that of the ministers themselves. Yet he never abused this enormous influence
by turning it to his personal advantage. The model for Speranskii’s project of
a Constitution (1809) was the French Constitution of the year VIII (1799). He
strove to accommodate its principles to Russian conditions, so as to form, out
of the free owners of land and houses, a system of local self-government and a
Central representation of the people—the so-called Gosudarstvennaia Duma or
Supreme Diet. The initiative in legislation was to come from the Emperor; but
no law was to take effect until it had been drafted and sanctioned by the Diet
and subsequently approved by the Council of State and the Emperor. Laws and institutions
were of more importance than personalities in the eyes of the reformer. Of all
Speranskii’s schemes, however, the only one that was carried into effect was
the organisation of the bureaucratic Council of State (Jan. 1810). To the end
of his life, Alexander nourished these plans of reform; for his inability to
carry them out he blamed the unfavourable conditions of
1807-12]
Russian foreign policy. The war with Turkey. ( 485;
the day and
the immaturity of the nation. But, when the first excitement of his reform
projects had passed off, his real interest and ambition were diverted to
foreign politics.
It was
Alexander’s favourite, Prince Czartoryski, who first gave utterance to the
Panslavonic idea in regard to the East. He made the federation of all the
Slavonic nations his final aim, hoping thereby to ensure the resurrection of
Poland. At Tilsit the deliverance of the Turkish provinces in Europe from the
Sultan’s yoke had been regarded as an eventual object of policy. In the
following years the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and even the
partition of the Ottoman Empire, were the main subjects of discussion between
France and Russia. Early in 1808 Caulaincourt was commissioned to treat with
the Emperor Alexander and Count Rumiantzeff at St Petersburg concerning an
expedition to India, to be preceded by a partition of Turkey. Russia was
simultaneously invited to occupy Stockholm. Rumiantzeff brought forward
Russia’s claim to Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. For this,
even Egypt and Syria seemed to France an insufficient equivalent. Caulaincourt
demanded at least the Dardanelles or the Asiatic side of that strait,
suggesting, as an alternative, the conversion of Constantinople into an
independent State under a French prince. Amid such divergences, no agreement
was possible. The scheme of partition was wrecked on Napoleon’s jealousy of the
aggrandisement which the possession of Constantinople would confer on Russia.
Thus the first rift was made in the Russo-French alliance.
Meanwhile
Alexander had been carrying on, since 1806, a war with Turkey, which at the
outset had been promoted by the intrigues of French diplomacy. Finally the Tsar
resolved, in case of victory, to annex Moldavia and Wallachia. At first, the
Russian commanders, Mikhelson and Prozorovskii, had but little success; it was
only under Prince Bagration in 1809, and the young Count Nikolai Kamenskoi in
1810, that the Russians captured the fortresses of Brailoff, Ismail, Silistria,
and Rustchuk, and gained two i .nportant victories. When, in 1811, the veteran
general Kutusoff took over the command, the war was quickly brought to an end.
The new commander-in-chief allowed the Turkish vizier to cross over to the
northern bank of the Danube, surrounded him in his camp at Slobodzeia, and
compelled the Turkish army to surrender. The Peace of Bucharest (May 28, 1812),
was the result. Under pressure of the impending war with Napoleon, Russia had
to content herself with the acquisition of Bessarabia, by which the river Pruth
and the Kilia mouth of the Danube became the frontier.
At Tilsit,
where the foundation of the Russo-French alliance was laid, the Polish question
had also been taken up. Since the latter part of the eighteenth century, Polish
patriots, in the hope of reviving their political existence, had looked to
France and Russia. After Tilsit, however, they made no effort to conceal their
expectation of obtaining
486
The Polish Question.—Friction with Napoleon, [isot-ii
from Napoleon
what Russia could not grant without reservations. For Napoleon, Poland was only
one more piece on the politico-military chess-board. Alexander, unwilling to
enrich himself at the expense of Prussia, conceived the idea of creating a
grand-duchy of Warsaw; and Napoleon adopted this suggestion. The results of
this agreement have already been described. What the Russian Emperor feared was
that, in the event of a re-establishment of the Polish kingdom, he would be
forced to cede to it the provinces which had once formed part of Poland. He therefore
regarded with a jealous eye Napoleon’s friendly attitude towards the
grand-duchy of Warsaw. The Peace of Vienna (1809) added to the grand-duchy
1,500,000 inhabitants in eastern Galicia; while Russia gained, as compensation,
only about
500,000 in the district of Tamopol. The Tsar’s
anxiety led to the drafting, in January, 1810, of a convention with France,
directed against the aspirations of Poland. The kingdom of Poland was never to
be re-established ; even the names “ Poland ” and “ Pole ” were never to be
applied to the former divisions and inhabitants of that kingdom.
Though this
convention was not yet ratified, the friendship between Napoleon and Alexander
appeared for a time to have taken a new lease of life. The French monarch even
became a suitor for the hand of the Grand Duchess Anna, sister of the Tsar. The
wooing was, however, wrecked by the hatred which the Empress Dowager, Maria
Feodorovna, cherished for the Corsican usurper. At the first sign of hesitation
on the Russian side, Napoleon resolved to anticipate a refusal by betrothing
himself to a Habsburg princess, This union was the signal for a radical change
in his foreign relations. He refused now to ratify the convention about Poland;
and the Russo-French alliance rapidly cooled. In order to win the Poles to his
side, Alexander, at the beginning of 1811, offered through Czartoryski to
revive the kingdom of Poland, on the understanding that the Tsar should bear
the title of Polish King; the rivers Dwina, Berezina, and Dnieper were to be the
boundaries between the two States. At the same time he discussed with Oginskii
a plan for constituting a grand-duchy of Lithuania out of the eight governments
of western Russia, in order to pave the way for a revival of the Polish
kingdom, which was to be linked to Russia by a personal union. In this contest
for the favour of Poland, Russia was once more worsted. Alexander’s designs
upon the grand-duchy of Warsaw were no secret for his adversary, who began,
early in 1811, to prepare for war.
Napoleon
conceived that a war with Alexander, like his former friendship, would enable
him to give the coup de gr&ce to British trade and influence. In order to
bring his war with England to a speedy and glorious end, Napoleon strove to
increase the rigour of the Continental Blockade, especially in the Baltic
ports. In pursuance of this policy, the duchy of Oldenburg was incorporated
with France in January, 1811; and an uncle of the Tsar was thus dethroned. The
Continental Blockade had
1810-2]
Preparations for war.—Fall of Speranskii. 487
already been
very detrimental to Russian trade with England. The exports of raw material
fell off; the balance of trade turned against Russia; the value of her paper
currency was greatly diminished. To counteract these misfortunes, neutral ships
were allowed to participate in Russian colonial trade; and an attempt was made,
in the tariff of December 31,1810, to check the import of French luxuries.
Mutual
recriminations took place, each sovereign reproaching the other with preparing
for war. In his negotiations with Tchemitcheff, early in 1812, Napoleon
insisted that Russia should combine with France in severe repressive measures
against British and American trade. Alexander replied by demanding that the
French should evacuate Prussia and withdraw beyond the Oder. Napoleon now
regarded war as inevitable. On May 9 he left Paris and went to Dresden, where
many German Princes, headed by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia,
paid court to him. He had counted on a simultaneous attack on Russia by Sweden
and Turkey, but was disappointed by Sweden’s rapprochement to Russia, and still
more by the Peace of Bucharest. War with Sweden had lasted for a year and a
half; but the Peace of Frederiks- hamn (1809), which ceded Finland to Russia,
had left no lasting soreness between the two Powers. By his occupation of
Swedish Pomerania in January, 1812, Napoleon drove the Swedes into the arms of
the Tsar. The result was a rapprochement between the Crown Prince, formerly
Marshal Bemadotte, now Regent in Sweden, and Alexander I. Early in April they
concluded a treaty, under which Sweden was to be compensated for the loss of
Finland by the prospect of obtaining Norway. In July Russia also concluded an
agreement with England and Spain. Her whole strength thus became available for
the decisive struggle.
If Alexander
was to undertake a war against Napoleon, he required a victim on whom to shift
the responsibility for the French alliance, in order to win back to his side
the patriotic feeling of his subjects. A treatise “ On the old a/nd the new
Russia,” written by the cultivated historian Karamsin, emphatically stated that
the Tsar’s reforms were the cause of the general dissatisfaction, in that they
tended to weaken and destroy autocratic government. A pretext was thus supplied.
Alexander determined to sacrifice Speranskii in order to satisfy the
Conservatives, and, in particular, the Old-Russian party, and to stimulate the
warlike enthusiasm of the country. A coalition formed by the enemies of the
unlucky reformer was joined by Arakcheieff, Count Rostopchin, Balashoff,
Minister of Police, and the Swedish Baron Armfeldt. But all these were only
tools of the Tsar, who used them to entangle Speranskii in the toils of a
pretended plot, in order to accumulate on his head the guilt of the detested
reforms, and of the Francophil policy of the last five years.
The 29th of
March, 1812, the day on which Speranskii fell and was banished to
Nijnii-Novgorod, marks a turning-point in Alexander’s
career, for
he now entered deliberately upon a life-and-death contest. Vice-Admiral
Shishkoff, the narrow-minded representative of Old-Russian tendencies in
language and literature, was appointed Secretary; of the Council of State in
Speranskii’s place, and entrusted with the task of issuing manifestoes designed
to bring together the Tsar and his people. -About this time, Alexander’s mental
and spiritual development began to take a turn towards faith in the Bible and a
pious mysticism, which added strength to his resolve. The French Emperor
appeared in his eyes the embodied principle of evil; and it seemed to him that
he might be the instrument of Providence destined for Napoleon’s overthrow.
Napoleon had
been pushing forward his preparations since the beginning of 1811; and thus it
was possible for him to bring into the field such an army as modern Europe had
never before seen. The total strength of the Grand Army, with its baggage
trains, amounted to about
680,000 men, including 500,000 infantry and about
100,000 cavalry. Of this force, the French composed rather less than half; the
rest was made up of the troops of the allied States, the Italian, Illyrian,
Polish, and Rhenish contingents, and Austrian and Prussian auxiliaries. These
troops, exclusive of the Imperial Guard, and of the Austrians under Prince
Schwarzenberg, formed eleven army-corps and four divisions of cavalry. The
French troops consisted chiefly of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Marshals
Lefebvre, Mortier, and Bessieres; the first four army-corps, under Marshals
Davout, Oudinot, Ney, and Eugene, Viceroy of Italy; and the first three corps
of cavalry reserves, under Murat, King of Naples. Poles, Bavarians, Saxons, and
Westphalians, under Poniatovski, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Reynier, and Vandamme
(whose place was afterwards taken by Junot), formed the next four arraj -corps.
The fourth corps of the cavalry reserve was composed of Poles, Saxons, and
Westphalians, under Latour-Maubourg. To the tenth army-corps, under Macdonald,
belonged also the Prussian auxiliaries. These were the troops destined for
immediate service at the opening of the campaign. Their total strength, at the
passage of the Niemen, amounted to 450,000 men. The ninth army-corps, under
Marshal Victor, at first remained behind in Prussia ; a considerable body was
afterwards separated from this corps, and, with the Neapolitans, who came up
later, was placed under the command of Augereau, as an eleventh army-corps. The
reinforcements brought up in the course of the campaign amounted to at least
140,000 men ; to these must be added the troops with the siege-park and baggage
trains. In all, nearly 610,000 men, with 1242 field-pieces and 130 siege-guns,
crossed the Russian frontier in the year 1812, besides officials, servants, and
drivers.
Owing to the
large number of horses, the opening of the campaign was postponed till it was
possible to find grass. Napoleon had perceived that the provisioning of such an
enormous body of troops would constitute the chief difficulty, and had made
special regulations
18X2] French deficiencies.—The Russian forces. 489
accordingly.
But, as the commissariat authorities were by no means equal to their task, the
troops, during their march to Moscow, had to fall back on the system of
requisitions, a system which acted very detrimentally on discipline. Moreover,
the measures taken for replacing losses were inadequate; while, owing to the
size of the army and the large area covered by the operations, Napoleon could
not make his personal influence everywhere felt. His lieutenants were but poor
substitutes. On principle, he had trained his generals to habits of dependence,
and even the highest of these, such as Murat, and Berthier, Chief of the Staff,
were by no means born commanders; moreover, the Marshals declined to obey
anyone but the Emperor. Napoleon himself was no longer, either physically or
mentally, the man he had been. Corpulent and in poor health, he was less
capable of action and endurance than before. Mentally, also, he had suffered a
great change. Having hitherto succeeded in all his enterprises, he had lost all
sense of the attainable. In his determination to be at once Emperor,
Generalissimo, Chief of the Staff, and Minister of War, he had taken upon
himself a burden too great even for his capacity. All these things considered,
it is clear that the Grand Army bore within itself the seeds of dissolution.
Although
Russia had also been arming since the beginning of 1811, she was unable, at the
outset, to oppose equal forces to Napoleon. The available troops were formed
into three armies of very unequal strength. The first army of the west, under
the command of Barclay de Tolly, Minister of War, contained over 100,000 men;
the second, under Prince Bagration, was only about a third of that number. The
third, or reserve army, under General Tormassoff, was about 40,000 strong. Thus
the total strength of the first line was 175,000 men, with 938 guns; to which
may be added 18,000 Cossacks. On the other hand, the Russians could reckon on
considerable reinforcements. In the first place, there was the army of the
Danube, under Admiral Tchitchagoff, now set free by the Treaty of Bucharest,
and numbering over 50,000 men. There were also the troops from Finland, and two
reserve-corps on the Dwina and the Pripet. Thus, the troops in the second line
numbered, in all, rather more than 100,000. In the third line have to be
reckoned the recruits, the militia, and the Cossacks. Yet the total strength of
all the forces which were gradually brought up to repel the French attack,
amounted in the end to little more than 400,000 men.
The Russian
army was not only considerably inferior to the French in respect of numbers,
but it possessed no commander in any wise comparable with Napoleon. Kutusoff
and Bennigsen had already been defeated by him. Kutusoff, now physically a
wreck, had recently fallen into disfavour with the Tsar for having acted
contrary to his wishes in delaying the peace with Turkey. Bennigsen, who was
given to intrigue, was, as a German and one of the murderers of Paul, very
unpopular
with the national party. Alexander was therefore obliged to take over the
supreme command himself. Requiring military advice, he unfortunately selected a
theorist, General von Phull, whose plans fell to pieces at the first trial.
When, in July, 1812, Alexander left the army, Barclay de Tolly, as Minister of
War, assumed the supreme command. An honourable man and a capable general, but
without conspicuous talent, and a foreigner to boot, Barclay was hardly equal
to his task; nor was his strategy, though correct in the circumstances,
understood by his subordinates.
Alexander,
from fear of his great opponent, was inclined to adopt the purely defensive
plans of his counsellor, General von Phull. On the assumption that Napoleon
would cross the Niemen at Grodno, whence he could advance upon either Vilna or
Minsk, an army was to be opposed to him in both these directions. The first
army was afterwards to retire upon the entrenched camp at Drissa; the other was
to operate against the enemy’s flanks and rear, or else to withdraw 'to
Bobruisk. Phull’s plan was approved by the Emperor; orders were therefore sent
from Vilna, which Alexander entered on April 26, to prepare the camp at Drissa.
The first army of the west, under Barclay, was already concentrated about
Vilna; the second, under Bagration, gathered soon afterwards at Voikovisk;
Tormassoff, with the reserve army, remained at Lutsk in Volynia.
Meanwhile it
became clear that the enemy would cross the Niemen at Kovno. Napoleon had
prepared no detailed plan of campaign; he had merely drawn the outlines,
leaving the details to the decision of the moment. His intention, at the
outset, was essentially as follows :— to break through the enemy’s right wing
with his reinforced left; then to fall upon the communications of the enemy’s
left and centre, so as to separate Barclay and Bagration. After Napoleon had
himself reconnoitred the Niemen on June 23, several bridges were thrown across
the river, a little above the town of Kovno, after dark. In the small hours of
the 24th the army began to cross; next day the passage of the main column was
practically completed, and the advance upon Vilna begun. Orders were sent to
King Jerome to march towards Grodno and follow hard upon the heels of
Bagration.
On the 26th
the Tsar left Vilna. As Barclay at this moment had only two infantry corps at
his disposal, and his advance-guard could no longer join him, he also began (on
the 28th) his retirement on Sventziany and Drissa. On the same day Vilna was
taken by the French. The advance of the French army was designed to separate
the two Russian armies of the west. To carry out this plan, Davout advanced
upon Minsk, there to lie in wait for Bagration, whom Jerome was to drive in his
direction. The plan, however, miscarried, owing to Jerome’s failure to pursue
Bagration closely. There were excuses for Jerome; but Napoleon was so angry
with his brother that he placed him under
the command
of Marshal Davout. Deeply hurt, Jerome left the army and returned to Cassel.
Meanwhile Davout had continued his march, and thus compelled Bagration to turn
aside towards Bobruisk.
Napoleon
himself ‘had remained stationary with the centre at Vilna. He utilised his
residence in the capital of Lithuania to set up a provisional government
there, and turn its military resources to account. In his regulation of Polish
affairs he committed a fatal error. At the end of June the Polish Diet had met
at Warsaw; it had declared itself representative of confederated Poland,
proclaimed the restoration of that kingdom, and set about uniting Poland and
Lithuania. Napoleon, however, was anxious not to offend Austria and Prussia, or
to make peace with Russia impossible; he therefore refused to approve
definitely the decisions of the Diet, thereby damping the ardour of the Poles.
It was some
time before Napoleon grasped the failure of his plans against Bagration; when
at length it became clear to him, he decided to send forward to the Dwina those
divisions of the centre which had hitherto been detained at Vilna. On the right
wing, Davout, who had now the command of Jerome’s army, received orders to
proceed towards MogilefF. Napoleon himself left Vilna in the night of July
16-17. By his inactivity at that place the Emperor had lost much valuable time;
and his operations, so far, had produced no satisfactory result. In spite of
great sacrifices, he had only succeeded in hindering Barclay’s junction with
Bagration. And this was, after all, a doubtful advantage ; for it was to
Napoleon’s interest that the two generals should combine and do battle with him
as soon as possible.
Meanwhile the
first army of the west had effected its retreat to the camp at Drissa.
Alexander, trusting to Phull’s counsels, had at first intended to make his
stand against the French army at this point; but he was soon apprised of the
strategic disadvantages of this position and the defective fortification of the
camp. The hollowness of Phull’s counsels was now revealed to the Tsar. Alive to
the probability of his left wing being surrounded, Alexander now determined on
continuing the retreat as far as Vitebsk, and there effecting a union with the
second army of the west. Bagration was ordered to march to Vitebsk by MogilefF,
there to join forces with Barclay. After the first army of the west had
returned to the right bank of the Dwina, leaving behind it Wittgenstein’s
corps, now raised to 25,000 men, it was only about
82,000 strong. The march from Drissa to Vitebsk
by way of Polotsk began on July 16. Wittgenstein’s corps remained behind
between Druia and Drissa to guard the St Petersburg road. The course of events
having shaken the confidence of the Tsar, he now (July 18) decided to follow
the advice of his intimates, and to betake himself to Moscow, where, in the
centre of the kingdom, he might superintend the conduct of the national
defence. From Moscow was issued the order to the northern and central provinces
for a general levy. The Tsar’s
declaration
that the war was a national war, and his avowed intention to conclude no peace
so long as one hostile soldier remained on Russian soil, kindled great
enthusiasm throughout the Empire.
On July 20
Davout had taken Mogileff with but slight opposition. The Marshal was convinced
of the necessity of barring Bagration’s way, in spite of his superiority, and
for this purpose concentrated his forces at the village of Saltanovka, south of
Mogileff. On the 23rd Raievskii, at Bagration’s orders, attacked him in this
position, but without success; nor did Bagration venture to renew the attack.
On the contrary, he withdrew across the Dnieper and marched on Smolensk, which
he reached on August 2. Napoleon had meanwhile begun his advance by Glubokoie
upon Vitebsk, and thus frustrated Barclay’s intention of marching from Vitebsk
by way of Orsha to join the second army. At Ostrovno, on July 25, there was a
smart encounter between Osterman and the French van-guard under Murat, who
forced the Russians to retire. The news of Bagration’s failure at Mogileff now
forced Barclay to decide on retreat, an operation which was successfully
carried out. On August 1 the first army of the west reached Smolensk, where, on
the next day, the junction with Bagration was effected. Napoleon now gave up
the pursuit, and returned with the Guards to Vitebsk.
Here he
decided to give the army two weeks’ rest, in order to rally the stragglers and
establish magazines. Though comparatively few of his troops had come within
sight of the enemy, the Grand Army had already lost more than 100,000 men.
Nevertheless Napoleon was firmly determined to continue his reckless advance. He
did not yet perceive that the limitless expanses of Russia were unsuited to his
strategy; and this mistake was the chief cause of his enormous losses. The idea
of postponing the completion of the campaign till the next year had some
attractions; but many considerations made against it. Not only the supremacy of
France in Europe, but Napoleon’s own position in the eyes of the French nation,
depended on his advance. The Emperor needed before all things a conspicuous
success in order to justify himself, and to maintain his prestige. His whole
plan of campaign was therefore founded on a brilliant offensive, rather than on
regular methods of warfare, in which defensive action would take a certain
part. Besides, the means at his disposal were such that he might well hope to
bring the war to a rapid conclusion with one crushing blow. Napoleon therefore
decided to continue his advance by way of Smolensk to Moscow, following the
line taken by the Russians in their retreat.
The two
Russian armies now united at Smolensk numbered 113,000 men, with 8000 Cossacks.
The first army, under Barclay, was posted on the right bank of the Dnieper; the
second, under Bagration, on the left. Both the Tsar and the army, and
particularly Bagration, von Toll, and Grand Duke Constantine, were now very
anxious to take the offensive. Early in August, Barclay attempted forward
movements against the
I812]
Capture of Smolensk. Russian retreat continued. 493
French centre
at Rudnia, and upon Poretchie; but his action was undecided, and the Russian
offensive came to nothing. Napoleon now determined to advance (August 13). His
plan was to march on Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper, and, by
capturing that place, to embarrass the Russian retreat upon Moscow. On the 14th
the whole army set out in one great column.
The news of
its advance compelled both Barclay and Bagration to march as quickly as
possible on August 16 to the aid of Raievskii, who was holding Smolensk with
about 13,000 men. Murat and Ney reached that place early on the 16th; Napoleon
arrived about 9 a.m. ; and Davout
was approaching. An energetic attack was imperative, if the French were to take
the place before the arrival of the Russian army. Napoleon, however, decided to
await the rest of his forces, and limited his efforts that day to a useless
cannonade. This delay gave the two Russian commanders time to come up. But the
expected battle did not take place; 20,000 men, under Dokhturoff, were left to
hold Smolensk; the rest of his army Barclay intended to withdraw as soon as Bagration
had secured the road to Moscow.
Napoleon,
expecting the Russians to make a sally from Smolensk, let the early hours of
the 17th slip by; it was 3 p.m. before
the attack began. Poniatovski, Ney, and Davout advanced almost simultaneously.
After about three hours’ fighting, the French succeeded in taking the suburbs,
but were unable to penetrate further; their guns failed to effect a breach in
the walls. A violent conflict raged till nightfall. Barclay, knowing that the
way to Moscow was now secure, believed himself justified in evacuating the
town; for, if the French should cross the river above Smolensk, the Russian
army might be in a very dangerous position. But Napoleon, who had intended to
renew the attack on the 18th, did nothing that day but concentrate his army and
prepare for the passage of the Dnieper. His behaviour before Smolensk indicated
a great diminution of mental energy.
The bridges
having been restored early on the 19th, Ney at once crossed over to the right
bank of the Dnieper, and was followed in the course of the day by Murat,
Davout, and Junot. The French pressed hard on the retreating enemy, and there
were fierce engagements at Valutina-Gora and Lubina; but, as Napoleon returned
to Smolensk and Junot did not attack, Murat and Ney were unable to prevent the
Russians from effecting their retreat. Had Napoleon remained at Smolensk, he
would have been able to continue the campaign in the following spring with good
prospects. The hope of winning a decisive battle and of making peace at Moscow
induced him to press forward; but in extending his advance beyond Smolensk he
committed perhaps the gravest error of the whole war. The means at his disposal
were no longer adequate to such a task. To provide for the advance it became
necessary to establish a strong reserve at Smolensk. The force under Victor was
therefore
summoned up; it crossed the Niemen at Kovno on September 4, and arrived at
Smolensk on the 27th, over 25,000 strong. Napoleon himself did not leave the
town till August 25. Robbing and burning as it went, the French army marched
forwards across Old Russia.
The feeling
in the Russian army and the difficulty of his own position had now convinced
Barclay of the necessity of a battle. He intended to bring on a decisive
engagement at Tzarevo-Zaimische, where the Russian army had arrived on August
29. But in the meantime his retention of command had become impossible.
National pride, irritated by recent events, demanded loudly that he should give
way to a Russian. Yielding to this demand, Alexander appointed General Kutusoff
(recently raised to the rank of Prince) commander-in-chief of the Russian
forces. Neither personal inclination nor confidence on the part of the Tsar had
anything to do with Kutusoff’s appointment; it was a political necessity.
Kutusoff was
sixty-seven years old. Physically weakened by age, he lacked the mental energy
required for contending with Napoleon, but he had talent enough to play a
Fabian part. His chief merit was that he could see when conditions were turning
in his favour, and knew that, if the worst came to the worst, the winter would
help him to expel the French. Endowed with much native cunning, he felt
confidence in his ability to conquer the great man, by guile if not by battle.
Barclay had saved the army in spite of itself. The enemy’s numerical
superiority, which, at the outset, had stood in the ratio of three to one, now
stood only at that of five to four. Kutusoff knew how to turn this service of
his predecessor to good account. The new commander-in-chief joined the army on
August 29. He had to fight a battle, since that was the object of his
appointment. But, as the position chosen by Barclay at Tzarevo- Zaimische was
open to criticism, the retreat was continued on the 31st as far as Borodino,
where the army arrived on September 3.
In the
expectation that the new Russian commander would accept battle, Napoleon gave
his army two days of repose (September 2, 3) at Gjatsk. On the 4th the advance
was continued. A strong redoubt had been constructed near the village of
Shevardino, in front of the Russian left. On September 5, Napoleon launched his
advance-guard against this redoubt, which was defended by Prince Gortchakoff;
Davout also took part in the attack. Later, Poniatovski, on the extreme right
of the French, succeeded in turning the enemy’s left, whereupon the Russians
abandoned the redoubt and retired after nightfall upon their main position.
Even after the losses of the last few days, the two Russian arniirs still
numbered 103,800 men, with 640 guns, exclusive of the Cossacks and the militia.
The French army was between 120,000 to 130,000 strong, with 587 guns. The
Russian position formed a shallow convex curve. On the right, the line followed
the bank of the Kalotcha, a tributary of the Moskva; in the centre, near the
village of Borodino, it fell back a little from the former, and then bent round
by
Semenovskoie
to Utitza on the old Smolensk road. While the fight wing was unassailable, the
left, being without natural protection, was a weak point in the position; yet
the first army, forming the bulk of the Russian force, was drawn up on the
right, while the weaker second army was posted on the left. The latter
position, not being covered by the Kalotcha, was defended by trenches.
Raievskii’s battery was posted to the right of this position, on the high
ground between Borodino and Semenovskoie; on its left, between Semenovskoie and
Utitza, three small entrenchments had been thrown up. Napoleon had not been
able to obtain clear information as to the ground, and supposed that
Raievskii’s battery and Bagration’s entrenchments stood on the same ridge. The
Emperor decided on a frontal attack ; Poniatovski alone, with his weak corps,
was to turn the Russian left.
The battle of
Borodino, or of the Moskva, began at 6 a.m.
on September 7. On the French left, the Viceroy advanced first and took
the village of Borodino; lost it, and took it again; then crossed the Kalotcha
with the greater part of his troops, and deployed against Raievskii’s battery.
About 10.30 a.m. this position was
taken ; but the Russians, reinforced by General Yermoloff, soon succeeded in
recapturing the entrenched battery, and in repulsing the enemy with great loss.
Meanwhile Davout, with the divisions of Dessaix and Compans, had advanced at 6
a.m. against Bagration’s
entrenchments. Round these there raged for hours a fierce struggle, with
varying 'esults. On Davout’s left, Ney’s corps and Friand’s division took part;
Junot filled up the space between Davout and Poniatovski. About 11.30 a.m. the French succeeded in finally
capturing the entrenchments, already thrice won and lost, and in driving back
the second army with great loss over the depression of Semenovskoie, where part
of the reserves came to its aid. It had lost nearly all its senior officers,
Bagration himself being mortally wounded. Kutusoff remained inactive the whole
time at Gorki, far behind the line of battle, leaving Barclay, Bagration, and
Yermoloff to their own devices.
An attack by
Murat’s cavalry failed; and it was past midday when Friand succeeded in taking
Semenovskoie—a success which forced the Russians in this part of the field back
to the edge of the forest. But Murat, Davout, and Ney believed themselves
unable to advance further without reinforcements; and these Napoleon refused to
send. The Emperor was suffering from a severe chill, and stayed for the most
part far in the rear by the Shevardino redoubt. About midday, PlatofFs Cossacks
and Uvaroff’s cavalry vainly attempted, by outflanking the French left, to
divert the enemy’s attention from the Russian centre. The Raievskii battery was
captured by the French soon after the loss of Semenovskoie; and the whole
Russian centre fell back behind the depression of Goritzkii. About 4 p.m. the battle gradually died out, in
consequence of the complete exhaustion of the troops on both sides. Only on
the French right Poniatovski continued fighting till nearly 6 p.m.
The losses on
both sides were enormous. The French lost over
28.000 men, the Russians half of their troops of
the line. Napoleon had himself to thank for the fact that the result of the
battle did not justify these sacrifices. If he had called up his Guards, who
were still
20.000 strong, he might have annihilated the
Russian army. Kutusoff had intended to continue the battle the next day; but,
in view of his losses, he abandoned this intention, and on September 8, before
daybreak, began his retreat. Napoleon having withdrawn his advanced troops
after the battle was over, the Russians were able to feel that they were not
defeated; the commander-in-chief even claimed a victory.
The French
Emperor remained at Mojaisk till September 12; Kutusoff meanwhile continued his
retreat as far as the village of Fili. At a council of war, held on the 13th,
Bennigsen wished to renew the offensive, but Barclay was of the opposite
opinion. His advice was adopted by Kutusoff; and the retreat was resumed in the
direction of Riazan. The army retired through Moscow, and was followed by
nearly the whole population of the capital. Out of 250,000 inhabitants only
about 15,000 remained behind; among them many strangers, especially French, and
the dregs of the population, besides thousands of wounded Russians. To cover
the retreat, Miloradovitch remained behind with the rear-guard. Murat and
Sebastiani being very anxious to occupy Moscow intact, he demanded and obtained
an armistice of some hours, which enabled him to withdraw undisturbed (Sept.
14). With him went the military governor of the city, Count Rostopchin. During
the afternoon of the same day, Napoleon, who had vainly waited for a deputation
from the authorities, made his entry into the forsaken capital.
The
abandonment of the city produced a strange and disquieting effect on the French
army. Several fires broke out on the evening of the 14th, in different quarters
of the city; but these were attributed to accident. On the following evening a
great part of the city was in flames; a few days more, and three-fourths of the
houses were in ashes. Napoleon, who had established himself in the Kremlin on the
morning of September 15, was on the following day obliged to make his escape
through the burning buildings; he took up his quarters outside the city in the
Petrovskii palace. Not until the 18th, when the fire had abated, did Napoleon
return through the smoking ruins to the Kremlin. Moscow was burnt neither by
Napoleon nor by Count Rostopchin. Probably, the fire was in part accidental,
and due to plunderers, both Russian and French; in part the deliberate work of
patriotically-minded inhabitants. It began in the shops and corn- magazines,
along the outer wall of the Kremlin, and around the Krasnaia, a public square
hard by. On the 16th the fire was at its height. The noise of the flames
resembled the roaring of the sea; the sky glowed; and it was possible to read
by night within three or four leagues of Moscow. Robbery went hand in hand with
fire.
It was not so
much the French themselves as their allies, the Rhenish troops and the Poles,
who displayed the most brutality and greed. Every comer was ransacked, under
the pretext of saving something from the flames. The victors turned the
churches into stables for their horses, chopped up for firewood the panels
adorned with ikons, and used the altars for dinner-tables. A slaughter-house
was set up in the Petrovskii convent; and the conventual church was turned into
a butcher’s shop. The gold plate of the Cathedral of the Assumption and other
churches was melted down. The relics of St Philip were scattered on the
church-floor.
But neither
fire nor plunder could bring the enemy to terms; and the approach of winter
warned Napoleon to abandon the capital for a more secure position. Retreat,
however, meant a confession of failure; and this he was anxious to avoid. He
therefore remained in Moscow so long as there appeared any hope of peace. But
Alexander was firmly resolved to make no peace so long as a single hostile
soldier remained on Russian soil; he would rather let his beard grow and eat
potatoes with the serfs. Kutusoff, feeling that the unfavourable impression produced
by the Russian retirement must be effaced, adopted the advice of Toll, and
resolved to change the direction of the retreat from Riazan to Tula or Kaluga.
The main army, therefore, returning to the right bank of the Moskva, marched on
September 17 by way of Podolsk to the old Kaluga road, and on the 21st took up
a position on the right bank of the Pakhra, near Krasnaia-Pakhra.
Napoleon had
ordered Murat to pursue the enemy on the road to Riazan with a strong
advance-guard; but that general, in spite of his strength in cavalry, had
completely lost touch with the Russians. About Sept. 21 Napoleon heard that the
Russian army was posted on the road to Tula, and that the Cossacks were
threatening the French line of retreat on Mojaisk. He therefore despatched
Poniatovski and Bessieres, one after the other, in the direction of Podolsk and
Kaluga, to meet the enemy. In the Russian head-quarters a general attack was
feared, in consequence of which it was decided, on the 26th, to continue the
retreat as far as Tarutino, beyond the river Nara. There the army remained for
three weeks, receiving reinforcements which raised the number of regular troops
to 97,000 men. An advance-guard, under Miloradovitch, was now formed; while
Tormassoff, who arrived on October 20, took over the command of the main army.
Meanwhile
guerrilla warfare began to assume serious proportions. Early in September,
Denis Davydoff, a lieutenant-colonel of hussars, began to organise the partisan
forces. Before long, uhlans, dragoons* and Cossacks, under Davydoff, Dorokhoff,
Figner, and Seslavin, swarmed round the hostile army, seized its provision
convoys, destroyed or captured French detachments in the real1, and
drove the French garrisons from the towns. The peasants flew to arms, formed
bands, and seized
the French
spies, marauders, and stragglers, whom they slaughtered without mercy.
Napoleon had
let September pass in complete inactivity. His position was growing worse every
day; and he felt that, in order to enforce peace, something must be done, and
that quickly. Early in October he formed a plan for a demonstration in force
against St Petersburg; but, finding his generals were against it, he let it
drop. As Alexander did not beg for peace, Napoleon was forced to take the first
step himself. On October 5 he sent General Lauriston to the Russian
head-quarters, to open negotiations ; but, in so doing, he only betrayed the
untenability of his own position, without getting any nearer to peace. In the
end, therefore, he decided on retreat. It is true that, apart from fodder,
which had run low, there was still, in spite of reckless waste, a large
quantity of provisions in Moscow. The difficulty of provisioning the army was
chiefly felt in regard to the troops outside the city, especially those of the
advance-guard. As to numbers, the army, in spite of reinforcements, was, on the
evacuation of Moscow, reduced to 108,000 men and 569 guns. Napoleon, at the
outset, did not intend to retreat beyond Smolensk. The natural line of retreat
was by way of Volokolamsk, Zubtzoff, and Beloi to Vitebsk; it passed through a
poor country, but one unravaged by war. But to choose this route would have
implied a confession of fear. It was in accordance with Napoleon’s character
that he decided upon the route by Kaluga to Smolensk.
On the
morning of October 18 Murat suffered a repulse at Vinkovo, opposite the Russian
camp at Tarutino. Though the Russian success was of slight importance, Napoleon
at once gave orders for the retreat. The same evening the greater part of the army
bivouacked on the old road to Kaluga. A strong detachment under Mortier was
temporarily left behind in Moscow, for Napoleon wished to make it appear that
his return .to the capital was still possible. The cavalry horses were in very
bad case; but the most serious symptom was the falling-off in discipline. The
French host resembled a horde of nomads rather than an army; men, horses, and
waggons were loaded with booty. The arrangements for the ammunition and for the
clothing and provisioning of the troops were utterly inadequate.
Napoleon had
selected for his line of retreat the new road to Kaluga by Fominskoie, on
which, by hastening his pace, he might hope to get past the Russian army at
Tarutino; but he had actually struck into the old road which goes through
Tarutino itself, in order to anticipate a possible attack on the part of
Kutusoff. The latter, however, did not advance further; so, on October 20, the
French army turned to the right to Fominskoie. On the night of October 22-23
Mortier also evacuated Moscow. He had been directed by Napoleon to destroy the
Kremlin and all the public buildings except the Foundling Hospital; but he
carried out the order in a very superficial way.
1812] Napoleon's
choice of. route.—Approach of winter. 499
The Russian generals
were very badly informed as to the enemy’s movements. It was not till the night
of October 22-23 that they had definite news of the flank march of the French
army from the old to the new Kaluga road; whereupon it was decided to head off
the enemy at Malo-Yaroslavetz. On the 24th, at 5 a.m., Dokhturoff reached that
place, and finding the French in occupation, at once attacked. After some hours
of indecisive fighting, the Viceroy Eugene arrived with the rest of his troops,
who were followed by the Guards and Davout’s corps. A little later the Russian
main army also came up, Raievskii first, and then Kutusoff himself. The
struggle for the burning town lasted till 11 p.m. ; eventually the French
succeeded in driving the Russians out of the place. Kutusoff fell back a little
during the night; but he had attained his end, and barred the road to Kaluga
against his opponents. Napoleon had either to force his way through, or to
retreat to Mojaisk and thence to Smolensk through an exhausted and desert
country.
After long
vacillation, and much reconnoitring and consultation, the Emperor, on October
26, formed the momentous decision to retreat upon Mojaisk—a course which meant
nothing short of destruction for his army. On the same day, Kutusoff,
perceiving, as he thought, in all the movements of the French army an offensive
directed against Kaluga, also gave orders to retreat. Toll and the British
commissioner, General Wilson, in vain urged the commander-in-chief to fight a
decisive battle. Kutusoff hoped that the Grand Army would melt away of its own
accord, and preferred to build a golden bridge for his opponent. Moreover, he
was by no means persuaded that the complete destruction of Napoleon and his
army would really be a benefit for the world; he feared that the heritage of
the French Emperor might fall, not to Russia, but to Great Britain.
Consequently, at the last moment, Napoleon found the hindrance to his retreat
by way of Medyn removed. But his power of decision was already impaired by
consciousness of failure. He fell back upon a compromise, and drew off his
troops on the road by Borovsk, thus taking a circuitous course, with all the
disadvantages incident to such a route, which he might have avoided by marching
straight on Mojaisk.
Winter, which
this year had been slow in coming, now set in. By the end of October the men
were shivering by the bivouac fires at Velichevo, with nine degrees of frost.
Provisions were coming to an end; the ranks were thinning, the men fatigued;
the Cossacks became bolder in their attacks. Serious news reached Napoleon at
Viazma : Tchitchagoff had driven Schwarzenberg back to Brest; Saint-Cyr had
evacuated Polotsk; and Victor had hurried from Smolensk to his relief. The
Grand Army itself was in peril. Napoleon alone, with the Guards and the
Westphalian troops, had outstripped his pursuers. The main Russian army was
close to Ney at Viazma. Miloradovitch clung to the flanks of Eugene,
Poniatovski, and Davout; Platoff and his
Cossacks
pressed on their rear. On November 3 Miloradovitch had advanced from the south
towards the main road; his cavalry encountered the head of Davout’s column,
already hard pressed by Platoff. Eugene and Poniatovski were obliged to turn
back to his assistance; but the former vainly tried to beat off the Russian
infantry approaching from the south. Thereupon the French generals determined
to continue the retreat toward Viazma ; it was carried out amid incessant
attacks. The French troops passed through Viazma in disorder; Ney was the last
to leave the neighbourhood of the burning town.
For the next
few days the march to Smolensk went on without a halt. Want and disintegration
now reached a terrible pitch. Horseflesh had long composed the almost
exclusive diet of the troops; the Guards alone received a small ration of meal.
On November 4 it began to snow; two days later the ground was covered, and the
roads became slippery with ice ; the thermometer fell to 5° Fahrenheit. The
soldiers were attacked with a strange sickness. A man would suddenly look as if
he were drunk, stagger, fall down in the snow, and die. On November 7 fifty men
of Ney’s corps perished in this way.
On November 9
Napoleon arrived at Smolensk. There he heard that Vitebsk was taken by the
Russians, and that Eugene’s corps had been attacked by Platoff while crossing
the Vop, and had lost heavily in retreating to Smolensk. In Smolensk efforts
were made to provide the different corps with the necessaries of life; but, as
the distribution was made without respect to circumstances, many of the troops,
particularly the stragglers, were neglected, and through sheer hunger committed
violent excesses. In spite of all this the Emperor succeeded in bringing his
effective force up to 49,000 men ; and he still hoped to be able to get the
army into winter quarters on the Dwina and the Dnieper. With this intention he
ordered the Poles, the Westphalians under Junot, and the Legion -of the
Vistula, with the trophies of war, to go ahead of him, on the high road to
Krasnoi; he himself left Smolensk in his carriage, on November 14, with the
Guards and the cavalry.
The Russian
main army still numbered over 50,000 men. Kutusoff might very well have
appeared at Krasnoi by November 15. Instead of this, he kept back his troops
for a day’s rest; and it was not till the afternoon of that day that he sent
forward Miloradovitch with the advance-guard to the main road; while Napoleon
concentrated the Guards, the Legion of the Vistula, and Junot’s troops at
Krasnoi. From some prisoners the Emperor learnt (November 16) that Kutusoff,
with his whole army, was in the neighbourhood, and boldly resolved to wait for
the Viceroy, Davout, and Ney, at Krasnoi. Intimidated by the presence of
Napoleon, Kutusoff, in spite of his overwhelming superiority, advanced but
slowly. It was late in the afternoon of the 16th before there was any fighting,
when the Viceroy approached with his slender force from Korytnia. Thanks to
Miloradovitch’s excessive caution, the
1812] Kutusoff's
pursuit. Grave situation of the French. 501
Viceroy was
able to stop the fight at nightfall, and to reach Krasnoi by passing round the
enemy’s position. On the 17th Napoleon determined to advance in person to
attack the Russian main army, with what forces he still had, in order to free
the road for Davout and Ney. Davout was thus able to march past Miloradovitch,
who confined himself to artillery fire, and to join Napoleon, who was engaged
in a smart encounter with the feeble Russian centre. The Emperor, considering
it hazardous to wait any longer for Ney, now gave orders to retreat. The
consequence was that Ney, instead of meeting Napoleon on the 18th at Krasnoi,
came unexpectedly upon the Russians under Miloradovitch in the afternoon of
that day, and was obliged to retreat with enormous loss. He turned northwards
to the Dnieper, crossed it by night near Syrokorenie, leaving behind all his
waggons and guns on the left bank, and joined the Viceroy with only about 900
men.
Kutusoff,
having let the French escape, left Miloradovitch to pursue them with the
advance-guard alone, while with the main army he took the direction of Lower
Berezino, in the hope of barring the enemy’s path again at that place. It was
intended that Wittgenstein should follow close on the tracks of Oudinot and
Victor, while Tchitchagoff was to hold the narrow defile at Zembin. It was now
Napoleon’s intention to join Schwarzenberg by way of Minsk; and with this
object his movements were directed towards Borissoff. He hoped it would still
be possible to take up winter quarters behind the Berezina. But on the 16th
Minsk was taken by the Russians. Orders were therefore sent to Dombrovski to
hold the bridge-head at Borissoff with his Poles; Oudinot was despatched in
that direction; and the French main army crossed the Dnieper on the 19th at
Orsha.
Meanwhile, on
Napoleon’s right, severe fighting on the Dwina (July—October) had ended in
Wittgenstein’s advance to Chashniki and Vitebsk and Victor’s retirement towards
Senno; while, to the south, Tprmassoff had successfully withstood the Austrian
onset. On the ratification of the Peace of Bucharest, Tchitchagoff brought up
the army of the Danube, and, taking TormassofFs place at the head of the
combined forces, marched towards the Berezina. The situation in the rear of the
French main army, at the moment when its shattered remnants approached the
Berezina, was thus very grave. Wittgenstein, with more than 30,000 men, stood
ready at Chashniki to advance against Oudinot and Victor, who were posted with
22,000 men at Chereia and Krasnogura; while Tchitchagoff, with more than
30,000, was marching upon Borissoff, in order to drive Dombrovski from this
important point.
Napoleon,
believing himself to be in possession of the passage over the Berezina at
Borissoff, ordered the destruction of the pontoon trains, with their carriages,
which had been provided at Orsha; but General Eble had fortunately preserved
some waggons with coal, instruments, and iron material for building bridges.
Meanwhile the situation of the French
army became
more and more perilous. It was pursued by an enemy flushed by victory, and now,
thanks to reinforcements, far superior in numbers. Miloradovitch disposed of
more than 25,000 men ; the main army, under Kutusoff and Tormassoff, added
40,000 more. By November 21 the bridge-head of Borissoff was lost to the
French. Next day Tchitchagoff crossed the Berezina at that point, and pushed
his advance- guard towards Loshnitza, but was driven back again by Oudinot to
the right bank. Napoleon was now convinced that the passage' of the Berezina
below Borissoff was barred by KutusofTs approach as completely as that by the
town itself was stopped by Tchitchagoff. His only course, therefore, was to
force his way by Zembin to Vilna between Tchitchagoff and Wittgenstein. On Nov.
23 he directed Oudinot to throw bridges across the Berezina at Vesselovo, where
the road to Zembin passes that river, and ordered Victor to stop Wittgenstein’s
advance against Oudinot. Victor, however, in the end, fell back on Loshnitza.
Through the junction with Victor and Oudinot, the strength of the French main
army again rose to between 37,000 and 40,000 men, not counting many thousands
of stragglers. It was with this army that Napoleon was to attempt the passage
of the Berezina, in the face of an enemy three times stronger, and surrounding
him on all sides.
Both
Wittgenstein and Tchitchagoff believed that Napoleon would cross south of
Borissoff. Wittgenstein therefore advanced but slowly, although Victor, by his
retreat upon Loshnitza, had left the way open; and he did not reach Studianka,
near the crossing-place, till November 27. Thus, left to his own resources,
Tchitchagoff failed at the decisive moment to bar the way. Conceiving that
Napoleon would make his way to Minsk below Borissoff, where Oudinot was making
a feint of preparations, Tchitchagoff with his main force marched southward on
the 25th, leaving behind him, opposite Borissoff, only Langeron’s feeble corps,
and at Brili, opposite Studianka, a detachment under Chaplitz. On the 26th,
Chaplitz also was ordered back to Borissoff; and there remained only a small
detachment, under Komiloff, opposite Studianka.
Preparations
for throwing the bridges across at this place were begun on the 25th. In order
to prevent the enemy from opposing the passage, Oudinot’s whole artillery,
numbering forty guns, was mounted on the heights of Studianka. On November 26,
to the astonishment of the French, the further (right) bank of the river
appeared almost free from the enemy. There was, in fact, nothing there but
KomilofTs detachment, which was soon driven off by a small body of cavalry and
sharpshooters who crossed the river on horseback or on rafts. Meanwhile two
trestle-bridges were begun, a larger one for carriages and cavalry, and a
smaller one above it for the infantry. The river being swollen and full of ice,
the work was unusually hard; but, early in the afternoon, the smaller bridge
was completed. Oudinot at once crossed by it, sent a detachment to secure the
Zembin defile, and then advanced southward
with his main
forces. Three hours later the artillery followed by the larger bridge. The
passage of Ney’s corps was delayed by the breakdown of the larger bridge
during the night of November 26-27.
About midday
on the 27th Napoleon himself crossed with the Guards, and took up his
head-quarters in the village of Zanivki. On the left bank there still remained
the corps of Victor, Davout, and Eugene, with the great mass of the unattached
troops, and, mixed up with them, the whole of the baggage train. It was on this
day that the Russians first appeared in the neighbourhood of the crossing. On
the right bank of the river, Komiloff and Chaplitz failed to make any
impression on Oudinot; while Tchitchagoff, who had now returned, declined to
order a general attack. On the left bank, Victor took up his position at
Studianka to cover the crossing against Wittgenstein. Instead, however, of
attacking Victor, Wittgenstein continued his march to Borissoff, and falling
upon Partouneaux’s division, which had been left behind at Stary-Borissoff and
had lost its way, he surrounded it and forced it to surrender. Further delay
was caused by a third break-down of the larger bridge; but, during the night of
November 27-28, other bodies of troops passed over.
On November
28, Wittgenstein and Tchitchagoff, reinforced by Yermoloff and Platoff, made,
for the first time, a combined attack on the French army on both sides of the
river. The conflict was severe, and lasted all day. On the right bank, where
the country was covered with woods, the Russians on the Borissoff-Zembin road were
unable to deploy, and were repulsed by Oudinot and Ney with great loss. On the
left bank, Victor’s corps, posted on high ground, stoutly withstood
Wittgenstein’s attack and checked the Russian offensive. During the night
Victor crossed the river, leaving only his rear-guard behind. Meanwhile, the
unattached troops and the carriages had been passing over without intermission.
Those who stumbled were trampled under foot; many fell into the water. Many
families, women, and children, who had followed the army from Moscow, here
found a miserable end. On November 29, about 9 a.m.,
the bridges were set on fire.
The French
losses were frightful. They amounted to at least half of the regular army, that
is to say, from 20,000 to 25,000 men. On the other hand, Napoleon’s reputation
was saved. The passage of the Berezina should not be regarded merely as a
dismal catastrophe, but as the greatest achievement in the retreat of 1812. The
Emperor owed his deliverance, above all, to the magic of his name and the
prestige of his arms. Wittgenstein and Tchitchagoff were both afraid of him;
neither was anxious to come to dose quarters. Besides, Kutusoff believed that
he could attain his end without a pitched battle.
With the
passage of the Berezina, the Grand Army of 1812 was extinct. Hunger, cold (—13°
Fahr.), and the Cossacks, finished the work of destruction. The remnants fled
in wild haste to the Niemen.
On December
2, three days after the passage of the Berezina, the ordered nucleus of the
main army numbered only 8800 men, rank and file; on the 10th, only 4300. On the
Russian side, the light troops, who were entrusted with the pursuit, sufficed
to complete the annihilation of the French army; the main body followed slowly
behind. In the face of his terrible losses, Napoleon gave up all hope of
checking the flight. The thought of abandoning the army, which he had conceived
on hearing of Malet’s conspiracy, had now ripened into a resolution. The 29th
bulletin, dated from Molodetchno, December 3, was meant to prepare the world for
his return. He confessed the ruin of his army, but laid the blame on the early
commencement of the Russian winter. At Smorgoni, on December 5, he announced to
his generals his intention of departing for Paris, in order to raise another
army. He entrusted the supreme command to Murat, and left Berthier with him.
Accompanied only by a few of his intimates and a scanty escort, he set out the
same day, and, travelling by Vilna, Warsaw, Dresden, and Mainz, reached Paris
in safety at midnight, December 18-19.
As head of
the State, Napoleon was at this moment more indispensable in the capital than
on the field. But Murat, the dashing leader of an advance-guard, was by no
means the right man to rescue the remnants of the army. Under him the last
trace of discipline vanished. Only a few thousand men of the Guards still held
together; all the rest disbanded. Some reinforcements, Loison’s division,
Wrede’s corps, came up; but they were speedily lost in the general wreck. On
December 8 Murat reached Vilna; but the appearance of some Russian cavalry
sufficed to make him retreat hastily on Kovno in the night of December 9-10.
Near the hill of Ponarskaia, where there was a steep rise in the ice-covered
road, Ney, with what was left of Wrede’s and Loison’s force, sought to check
the Cossacks; but the attempt ended in the complete destruction of his troops.
Everything that the French had hitherto dragged with them—guns, baggage, and
trophies—was here lost. On the same day Vilna was occupied by the Russians. The
misery in the town was indescribable. Nearly all the houses were filled with
sick and wounded, the courtyards with the dead, and the streets with stragglers
clothed in rags. Beyond Vilna the pursuit was carried out only by Platoff’s
Cossacks and the cavalry of the advance-guard. These were sufficient to scare
the French back over the Niemen. An attempt made by Ney to hold the bridges at
Kovno and the town itself failed, as the Niemen and the Viliia were frozen
hard. On December 14 Kovno also was taken by the Russians.
Here, on the
Niemen, which at that time formed the western limit of the Russian Empire, the
pursuit ended. The Grand Army had disappeared. Only about 1000 men of the
Guards remained in order; the rest roamed over the country, singly or in small
bands, mostly unarmed and in rags. The only available troops were the two
wings, under
1812-3]
French and Russian losses. Causes of the disaster. 505
Schwarzenberg
and Macdonald, which together amounted to over 60,000 men. These, with the
Poles, who had crossed the Niemen at Olita, and the stragglers, altogether
about 100,000 men, were all that was left of the Grand Army. More than 500,000
men were lost, over
150,000 army horses, and about 1000 guns. The
prisoners numbered upwards of 100,000; many others had deserted, or filled the
hospitals; the great mass, about a quarter of a million of men, had found their
graves in Russia. The Russian losses were estimated at 200,000.
Kutusoff was
inclined to be satisfied with driving the invaders across the frontier; but Alexander
was firmly resolved to proceed from defence to attack. The prospects of a
general rising of Europe were favourable. On December 30, 1812, General York,
the commander of the Prussian auxiliaries, concluded with the Russians the
Convention of Tauroggen, by which, of his own authority, he broke with the
French and declared his corps, for the time being, neutral. On January 13,1813,
Alexander’s main army crossed the Niemen.
The Napoleon
of 1812 was, for the world, no longer the republican general of 1796. United by
marriage with the Imperial House of Habsburg, he stood nearer to the ancien
regime than to the Revolution. He no longer appeared as the deliverer of the
nations, but as their conqueror and oppressor. For the restoration of Poland or
the abolition of serfdom he displayed little genuine zeal. The part which
destiny had assigned him in history was played out. He worked no longer in the
interests of humanity, but for the selfish ends of his personal or dynastic
ambition. He had no serious idea, in Russia, any more than in Spain, of
furthering the revolt of the people against an obsolete social and political
system; all he did, therefore, was to turn the national rising against himself
as a foreign conqueror. When the “Patriotic War” was over, his defeat gave to
the victorious national- conservative party complete supremacy in Russia. If
Poland was to be restored, its restoration would be due to the Russian Emperor
alone.
To turn to
the causes of Napoleon’s overthrow—it was neither the Russian frost, nor the
national rising, but his own strategic blunders that brought it about. He
desired, in one year, to bring to a victorious end a campaign which, at the
very least, required two. It has been considered his capital error that he
continued his march on Moscow beyond Smolensk. Even supposing that, during the
first year, it was feasible to beat the Russian army at Moscow and occupy the
city for a short time, nothing can excuse the folly of driving half a million
of men by forced marches into the heart of Russia in order to reach Moscow with
only 100,000. It is clear that, not only from a social and political, but from
a strategic point of view, Napoleon, towards the end of his career, gradually
degenerated. But, as his creative genius became exhausted, his vast schemes
only grew vaster still.
THE WAR OF
LIBERATION (1813-4).
The weight of the
Napoleonic despotism lay heavy upon Europe, crushing alike her kings and her
peoples. Besides England, which controlled the sea, Russia was the only remaining
independent State. The British power was to be broken by the Continental
Blockade; and in the spring of 1812 huge columns of armed men marched eastward
to the subjection of Russia. Napoleon penetrated victoriously into that
country, and made his way to Moscow. It looked as if the whole continent of
Europe was to become French. For some time nothing was heard of the Grand Army.
Then, on December 12, news reached Berlin that Napoleon had been forced to
leave Moscow, and was in full retreat. Louder and louder grew the rumour of a
terrible tragedy. But rumour fell far short of the reality. During the first
weeks of 1813, broken masses of men, for the most part sick or wounded, crossed
the Prussian frontier, begging and plundering as they went—soldiers, officers,
even generals of the highest rank, wrapt in rags, frostbitten, hollow-eyed and
wasted. This was all that was left of half-a-million of soldiers, all that was
left of the Grand Army. At sight of such a disaster the mind of Germany was
deeply moved; men felt that a new era was about to dawn; now was the time for
action—now or never.
It was
natural to expect assistance from four directions—from England, Sweden,
Austria, and Russia, England was the implacable enemy of Napoleon. Allied with
Spain, she had defeated his armies, advanced victoriously into France, and
drawn off part of the French forces against herself. But, though her wealth
gave her the means to help—a means subsequently used to effect in the Treaty of
Reichenbach (June, 1813)— she could not herself carry on war in Germany.
Sweden, long dragged at the heels of France, was now, under the guidance of
Bemadotte, aiming at the acquisition of Norway, hitherto in the possession of
Denmark. When Napoleon refused his consent to this act of robbery, Sweden went
over to his enemies. At the end of 1812 the French ambassador received his
passports; on March 13, 1813, a treaty was
concluded
with Great Britain; and, soon afterwards, 12,000 men landed in Swedish
Pomerania, without, however, pushing further inland.
More
important than Sweden was Austria. She was, it is true, in alliance with
Napoleon, but she was longing to throw off his yoke, and was therefore merely
keeping up an appearance of hostilities against Russia. At the end of January,
1813, Austria concluded a secret agreement with that country to cease
hostilities, in consequence of which she withdrew her forces, without, however,
any immediate rupture with Napoleon. She left Russia and Prussia to bear the
first brunt of the new conflict, while she formed an army of more than 150,000
men, with which she proposed to play the part of peacemaker at the right time.
By the middle of April Austria ceased to be an ally of France, and had begun to
mediate as an independent Power. Her leading statesman, Count Metternich,
endeavoured to strengthen his position through the Princes of the Rhine
Confederation, proposing to Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg a kind of neutral
league, which should aim at a peace ensuring the independence of Germany. But
he only succeeded in winning over the King of Saxony for a short time; that
monarch, dismayed by Napoleon’s threats, instantly collapsed, and submitted to
him once more.
None of these
three Powers, then, contemplated taking immediate action in Germany. Even
victorious Russia played her own game. There were two parties in that country,
one of which desired to terminate the war at the Prussian frontier, the other
to carry it further. The champion of the former policy was the
commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Count Kutusoff; the latter was headed
by the Tsar Alexander, who was strongly influenced by his German entourage and
by the prospect of acting as deliverer of Europe. Alone, Alexander could hardly
have carried his country with him; but be found Prussia on his side. With
Prussia the decision really rested; and that country, as we shall see,
pronounced in favour of war.
Even after
the Russian disaster, Napoleon’s situation was by no means unfavourable.
Besides France, he had with him Italy, Illyria, the Netherlands, and all
Germany with the exception of Prussia. Against him were Russia and Prussia
alone; the former weakened by war, ponderous in movement, unprepared for a
struggle beyond her frontiers; the latter financially ruined, with her
government in disorder and her military strength reduced. France, it is true,
was almost depopulated by her many wars; her prosperity was injured by the
Continental Blockade; a profound and passionate longing for peace was dominant
among her people. The subject or allied nations, which had once welcomed the
French with jubilation, now groaned under the foreign rule; even Italy, her
racial ally, was in part hostile. But fear ruled them all; they murmured, but
they obeyed. It was therefore probable that in the coming war Napoleon would be
able to muster the larger force, while he
also enjoyed
the advantages of single command and of a military genius unequalled in
history. No wonder if at first the King of Prussia was alarmed, and hesitated
until his people almost forced him into this apparently hopeless war, by the
side of an ally who had once before, at Tilsit, left him in the lurch. But,
since Tilsit, the conditions were completely changed. It was no longer the
Cabinets that waged war, but the nationalities revolting against the universal
dominion of Prance.
When, on
December 18,1812, Napoleon entered Paris, his Mi” sters were agreed in advising
the peace for which France, they asserted, was loudly clamouring. Napoleon made
proposals for an armistice, but was unable to communicate with Alexander; and
Austria’s mediation was of no effect. Nevertheless, in February, 1813,
negotiations were actually begun, and continued without any formal rupture till
June 4, when an armistice was concluded at Plaswitz. This fact is important.
Time was required for the setting on foot of another Grand Army. While on the
march to Russia, Napoleon had created certain cohorts, as they were called, for
the defence of the Empire, numbering about 80,000 men. In November, 1812, he
sent orders from Moscow for a new conscription for 1813; the levy (of 137,000
men) took place in the following January. Further levies raised the total
demand to the enormous figure of 650,000 men; but this number was never
attained; and there was great difficulty in providing a complement of trained
officers, especially for the cavalry.
The result of
Napoleon’s energy, grasp of detail, and unscrupulousness, was that by the end
of April, 226,000 men, including the German and Italian troops, with 457 guns,
were with the colours on the banks of the Elbe and the Weser; that the
fortresses on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe were strongly garrisoned; and
that reinforcements were pouring in along all the roads from France. The
infantry was, on the whole, of first-rate quality; the artillery was good; the
cavalry alone was inadequate, both in men and horses. Napoleon had desired to
make it specially strong, but at first it numbered only 15,000 men. Such were
the forces employed in the spring campaign. Things were different in the
following autumn, when it became evident that the military resources of France
had been overstrained. There was an army, numerous indeed, but an army of the
most heterogeneous description, flung together at haphazard, raw youths along
with men over age, lacking in physique and discipline; while the corps of
officers left, in the lower grades, much to be desired. Moreover, the troops
never had their heart in the conflict, and were only kept together by a sense
of military honour. In the higher commands there were grave defects. The
marshals were, glutted with glory and honours; they longed for rest and
enjoyment; they feared defeat. Good tacticians there were among them, but no
good strategists, except perhaps Davout. Napoleon himself was no longer what he
had been. True, his genius remained; but his will, his decision,
his
self-confidence, even his health, had suffered. His life had been too full, and
even his Titanic strength, mental and physical, had been affected by the
efforts and the catastrophes of the Russian campaign.
Of Napoleon’s
opponents the foremost was Russia. Her field-army numbered only about 110,000
men, including 80,000 cavalry. A ukase of February 5 commanded the formation of
a strong reserve army ; but this force was so slow in getting into shape that by
the end of July only
68,000 infantry, 14,000 cavalry, and five
batteries were available for reserves and reinforcements; and of these a third
was lost on the way. This was not enough to keep the numbers at the front even
up to their own low level during the spring campaign. The army was composed of
tried soldiers; but, as they were thrown together at random, the tie of
comradeship was lacking.
Prussia had
been brought to the verge of ruin by the Peace of Tilsit. Her territory was
reduced to four provinces, her population to 4,500,000 souls; she was burdened
with a war-debt of 120 millions; her army was limited to 42,000 men. But her
very misfortunes helped her to revive. Under Scharnhorst’s direction a new, a
national army was created. Then came the war of 1812. Prussia was obliged to
supply an auxiliary corps to Napoleon; the leaders of the reorganisation were
dissatisfied and resigned their posts; everything fell into stagnation and
disorder. The jonsequence was that in 1813 Prussia was unable to raise her
forces to a war footing as quickly as had been expected. Difficulties arose
from the fact that part of the country was occupied by the Russians (with whom
as yet there was no treaty), another part by the French; still more from the
terrible want of money; finally, from the character of the King, and from that
large section of the bureaucracy which expected all salvation to come from
above.
This time,
however, it was a question, not of kings and officials, but of the soul of a
people. The Prussian nation had endured too much under the pitiless hand of the
conqueror of Jena, and in the grim school of suffering had acquired a moral
force which now revealed itself in its elemental power. The people were
resolved to win back their highest possessions, their rights as men and
citizens, by desperate combat if there were no other way. The enthusiasm for
freedom and fatherland swept through the country like a pent-up mountain
torrent. All classes, all ages, flew to arms; mere lads and grey-haired
patriarchs, even young girls, entered the ranks. Those who could not offer
their own lives on the altar of their country gave what they had. In a few
weeks the country, impoverished as it was, contributed in free gifts the value
of half-a-million of thalers (£75,000), and thus lightened—one may even say,
made possible—the heavy task of the Government.
In the face
of all this, King Frederick William maintained an attitude of shy detachment.
He was conscientious and painstaking, but slow and hard to move, and
pusillanimous in his decisions. He dreaded the
510 King Frederick William. Arming of Prussia. [i8i3
revolutionary
tendencies of a popular movement. The conviction that a terrible end was
preferable to unending terrorism could not be expected in the representative of
an hereditary dynasty. Many even of the best men, like Scharnhorst, at first
found this popular violence but little to their taste; they regarded it as
futile sentimentalism. But the popular pressure was too strong, and in the end
it carried away both bureaucracy and Court. Scharnhorst was recalled to office;
Gneisenau came to his aid; and in the Chancellor Hardenberg Prussia found the
man who could steer her straight in her time of need.
A series of
orders was issued, calling the troops under arms. The want of officers was met,
so far as possible, by promoting cadets and non-commissioned officers. Though
sorely hindered by want of money, of uniforms, and of equipment, the
mobilisation of the field-army was almost completed by the end of March; but
that of the reserve battalions, especially those of the Lamdwehr, was much in
arrear. The Landwehr had been embodied by a royal order of March 17; but not a
single corps took part in the spring campaign. A preliminary order for raising
the Landsturm was issued on April 21; but it was impossible to carry it out.
One unique feature of the war was to be found in the “Free Corps”—divisions of
patriotic volunteers, who, not being Prussians, could not serve in the Prussian
line. The best known was that of Liitzow, raised by officers of Schill’s former
corps. In this band Theodor Komer, the foremost singer of the War of
Liberation, fought and fell. Altogether, the strength of the Prussian army,
after complete mobilisation, was estimated at 250,000 men; but, at the
beginning of the campaign, not more than 80,000 combatants could be mustered.
Typhus had already made great gaps in the ranks. But with each stage of the
advance the military enthusiasm of the people grew, and with it the military
resources of the State. This explains the fact that, throughout the spring
campaign, the fighting troops were steadily reinforced; and that, during the
armistice, the strength of the whole army was considerably increased. Although
in numbers and discipline the Russian army at first appeared the stronger, the
Prussian troops, in spite of their inferior numbers and the large proportion of
young soldiers, soon proved themselves the more formidable. This was attested
by Napoleon himsel£
What at the
outset seemed so dishonourable—the presence of Prussian auxiliaries in the
Russian campaign—had in the end the happiest result. The Prussian corps had
operated on the left wing of the Grand Army, in the Baltic Provinces. It thus
escaped the destruction that befell the main body, and was enabled to form a
firm nucleus for the national force. The commander, General von York, was not
on good terms with his superior, Marshal Macdonald. The King had privately
expressed a wish that fighting with the Russians should be avoided so far as
possible; while they on their part made similar proposals to the Prussians.
Negotiations became more lively after the retreat of Napoleon. The
King had, in
August, directed York to break off from the French if they should be driven
across the Prussian frontier, informing him further that he contemplated
abandoning the French alliance, as soon as circumstances would permit.
Thereupon, on December 30, 1812, York came to an arrangement with the Russian
general, Diebitch, under which the Prussian corps was to remain neutral until
orders arrived from the King, and the Russians were to be allowed to march
freely over the Prussian frontier-roads. This purely military convention
induced the Russians to continue the offensive, and, indirectly, led to the
great popular rising in Prussia. York betook himself to the neighbourhood of
Tilsit, Macdonald to Konigsberg, whence, on the appearance of the Russians, he
removed to Danzig.
On January
11, 1813, Murat, King of Naples, the commander-in- chief of the Grand Army, now
practically annihilated, transferred his head-quarters to Posen, where, six
days later, he was replaced by the Viceroy Eugene. The military situation at
this time was as follows. The extreme left of the French position rested on
Danzig, a fortress garrisoned by 30,000 men, of whom a third part were sick or
convalescent. The right wing consisted of the Austrian auxiliary corps under
Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps (Saxons and French) under Reynier, in all about
40,000 men, who retired upon Warsaw. In the centre lay the fortress of Thom,
with a garrison of 4000 men. The French thus practically held the line of the
Vistula. Behind it lay Eugene with a field-army of 16,000 men, mostly unfit for
service. Behind the Oder stood Lagrange who, with 10,000 men, had to guard the
Mark of Brandenburg and the fortresses on the Oder. Grenier’s division, about
18,000 strong, was hastening from Italy towards Berlin.
Against these
insufficient and widely-scattered forces the Russians could mass about 110,000
men. Their army, on crossing the Niemen, broke up into four divisions.
Wittgenstein, with 30,000 men, pursued the fragments of the Grand Army towards
Konigsberg and Elbing; on January 13 he crossed the Vistula, despatched a
portion of his troops to operate against Danzig, and marched with the rest to
Stargard in Pomerania; here he halted in order to effect a junction with the
second corps, 20,000 strong, which, under command of Tchitchagoff, was
approaching slowly by way of Thom. Further south Kutusoff, with
30.000 men, was marching from Lyk upon Plock;
while Miloradovitch, with about 30,000 men, followed Schwarzenberg and Reynier.
Eugene
employed the time allowed him by the slowness of the Russian movements in
strengthening and reorganising his army. He could do nothing with the troops
which had just come from Russia, except to use them as garrisons for the
Prussian fortresses; with the rest, about
12.000 men, he stood fast at Posen.
Schwarzenberg, however, evacuated Warsaw without a struggle, and marched, not
eastwards to Kalisch, but southwards to Cracow under the pretext of covering
Galicia. Eugene
512 French retirement.—The King leaves Berlin. fi8i3
received no
help from the Prussians, whose secret understanding with the Russians became
more and more apparent. Consequently, though Grenier’s division reached Berlin,
where it was combined with that of Lagrange to form a new corps (the 11th),
under Gouvion Saint-Cyr, the growing disaffection of the inhabitants was such
that this corps dared not abandon the Mark. When, therefore, Tchitchagoff
reached Bromberg, when Wittgenstein’s light troops began to raid the country
far in Eugene’s rear, and the French troops had suffered two reverses, the
Viceroy’s position became untenable; and on February 12 he was forced to
evacuate Posen. On the 18th he reached the Oder at Frankfort, where his
position was rendered more secure by the neighbourhood of Saint-Cyr. Shortly
before that date, on the 13th, Reynier had been surprised by the Russians and
so severely handled that he reached the fortress of Glogau with only 9000 men.
Thus the French line of defence was pushed back to the Oder.
The action of
York was highly embarrassing for the King of Prussia. Ostensibly he was
Napoleon’s ally; and the French occupied his country, as we have seen, up to
the Vistula. No one could be more anxious than Frederick William to shake off
the oppressive French yoke; but he dared not move in any direction, such was
his fear of Napoleon, and his dread lest failure should endanger the very
existence of his State. His hopes, for the present, were limited to an
acceptable peace; and with this view he turned to Vienna. Not until he
perceived that nothing was to be hoped for in that quarter did he begin to look
eastward to Russia. In order not to break with France, he informed the French
ambassador that York’s action had aroused his surprise and indignation, and
followed this up by sending a special envoy to Paris with instructions to
pacify Napoleon; he even ordered York’s dismissal. But the officer who informed
Murat of this order travelled on to the Emperor Alexander and proposed an
alliance.
A double game
of this sort was the natural resource of the weak; and Hardenberg played it
veiy skilfully. He managed to explain away every proceeding on the grounds of
necessity and the repellent attitude of France; and he was fortunately able to
convince Saint-Marsan, the French ambassador at Berlin, who involuntarily
played the part of a friendly reporter. It was, however, clearly necessary to
get the King away from Berlin, where he was in constant danger from the French
garrison. A report was therefore spread that he was going to Breslau, there to
raise a new contingent for Napoleon. In Berlin a High Commission of Regency
was established to represent the sovereign in case of sudden need. On Feb. 22 Frederick
William left Potsdam unmolested, and reached Breslau on the 25th. He was now
free to act, and firmly determined to risk everything for the rehabilitation of
his kingdom. As Austria hung back, he was forced to join with Russia, in the
hope that events would bring Austria into line. But the utmost caution was
required. The
object was to put Napoleon in the wrong, and to give the King an appearance of
being forced to side with Russia against his will. Accordingly the Prussian
ambassador in Paris, after setting forth the difficulties of Frederick
William’s position, made sundry demands which it was certain the Emperor would
refuse; while General Knesebeck was sent to the Tsar with full powers to
conclude an alliance.
For some time
the negotiation made little progress; on the one hand, because Russia demanded
a large slice of Polish (formerly Prussian) territory; on the other, because
Frederick William still shrank from decisive action. Eventually these
hindrances were overcome—a result to which Napoleon’s continued ill-treatment
of Prussia contributed; and on February 26 an offensive and defensive alliance
was concluded at Kalisch. Russia undertook to furnish 150,000 men and Prussia
80,000; while the Tsar pledged himself, in a secret article, to restore Prussia
to the political and financial position which she held previous to 1806. It was
agreed that Prussia should be enlarged by acquisitions in northern Germany. The
treaty was not published till March 13, when Prussia declared war against
France.
Even more
important than the Russian alliance was the strengthening of the national
forces, a process which had been pushed forward by all possible means since the
King’s arrival in Breslau. The volunteer Jager divisions were quickly formed;
and all exemptions from military service were abolished. The country was
divided into four military departments, with a military and a civil governor
over each. The recreation of the Prussian army was, for the time being,
concluded by the issue of regulations for the organisation of the Lcmdwehr,
Meanwhile
important events were happening elsewhere. York had transferred his
head-quarters from Tilsit to Konigsberg, where he took over the functions of
Governor-General of East and West Prussia, and raised his weakened corps to the
effective footing of 20,000 men. Those provinces being occupied by the Russians
as officially hostile territory, they deputed as their representative Baron vom
Stein, who, as a former Prussian minister and now adviser of the Tsar, was
admirably fitted to watch over the interests of both States. He ordered a
meeting of the General Diet of the Prussian Estates, which, under York’s
influence, decided on the establishment of a militia force of 20,000 men, a
reserve of 13,000, and a general levy (Landsturm), in which all men from
eighteen to forty-five were to serve. Then York, in agreement with
Wittgenstein, transferred his troops to the left bank of the Vistula. The
conclusion of the alliance with Russia, though it was not yet made public,
hastened their movements. During the advance the Russians remained in front;
for until March 13 the Prussians were not to engage in overt hostilities
against the French, and even then to avoid them so far as possible.
On February
18, as we have seen, the Viceroy Eugene had reached
Frankfort on
the Oder with 12,000 men, and had effected a junction with Saint-Cyr’s force of
18,000. The fortresses on the Oder—Stettin, Kiistrin, and Glogau—as well as
that of Spandau near Berlin, were strongly garrisoned. Russian scouts, under Tchemitcheff
and Tettenborn, had already crossed the Oder; and on the 20th the latter had
even pushed his way into Berlin, where fighting went on in the open streets.
But, as the capital could not be held with cavalry alone, the Russians
retreated northwards, carefully watching all roads leading to Berlin. These
events in his rear made a very sensible impression upon Eugene. He left his
van-guard on the Oder, and betook himself and his main army to Berlin and the
neighbourhood, entering the capital on February 22. Thus he practically
abandoned the line of the Oder, and that without any necessity; for
Wittgenstein had not as yet approached the river; Kutusoff, with the main army,
was a long way off at Kalisch; and Sacken remained in Poland with about 20,000
men. As yet the Prussians had not declared war. In these circumstances Eugene
ought to have continued to hold the line of the Oder. He was able to mass on
that river 40,000 men and 122 guns; while in Magdeburg a new corps was being
formed, which by March 1 amounted to 23,000 men. But general uncertainty and
fear of a popular rising drove him to retreat. Meanwhile Wittgenstein had come
up; and his van-guard, having crossed the Oder on March 1 and 2, pressed on to
Berlin. Eugene did not wait for him, but in the night of March 3-4 fell back
upon Wittenberg towards the Elbe. He and his 30,000 men had retreated before
about 12,000 Russian light troops, and abandoned without a struggle the capital
of Prussia.
Meanwhile the
Prussian forces in Silesia, drawn from various parts of the kingdom, had been
raised to 25,000 men. The command was given to Bliicher, whose courage and
energy inspired unbounded trust. But he was essentially a practical soldier,
not given to wide-reaching plans and strategy; therefore the two most talented
officers in the Prussian service were associated with him—Schamhorst as chief
of the staff, and Gneisenau as quarter-master-guner&l.
Things were
now so far advanced that the Russo-Prussian alliance could be carried into
effect. Kutusoff took command of the combined armies. Wittgenstein, with York
and Billow, led the right wing; it numbered 50,000 men, and was to march upon
Magdeburg by way of Berlin. The left wing was under Bliicher’s command. It
included Winzingerode’s Russian corps and the Prussian corps, in all 40,000
men. Dresden was its objective. Kutusoff took a middle route with the reserve,
the so-called main army, numbering hardly 40,000 men.
Early in
March the Viceroy completely abandoned the line of the Oder and fell back on
that of the Elbe, where he soon received reinforcements. His main body he
transferred to Magdeburg and Dresden. Distance also obliged him (March 12) to
abandon Hamburg, which was
1813] Defeat of Morand.—Eugene fails to retake
Berlin. 515
entered by
Tettenbom and his Cossacks amid the jubilations of the inhabitants. Napoleon,
disapproving of many of Eugene’s measures, ordered him to collect 80,000 men
before Magdeburg, making that point a centre from which to defend the line of
the Elbe. This led to the withdrawal of most of the French troops from Saxony.
An energetic
offensive was obviously the right strategy for the Allies. This was what the
Prussians desired, but the advance was stayed because the van-guard was too
weak, and Kutusoff, contrary to agreement, remained at Kalisch. Wittgenstein
and Bliicher, however, approached the Elbe. Through the massing of the French
forces at Magdeburg their position at Dresden was so far weakened that they
were compelled to evacuate the Saxon capital, which was occupied by Bliicher.
Soon afterwards York’s van-guard appeared east of Magdeburg; and the lower Elbe
was crossed by light troops. Napoleon, well knowing the importance of the lower
Elbe, appointed Davout governor of that district, and gave the command in
Bremen to Vandamme. On April 1 General Morand, having crossed the Weser,
occupied Liineburg with 2800 men and nine guns. Here he was surprised by
Dorenberg’s and TchemitchefTs light troops, and his force was annihilated. It
was but a small affair, but its moral effects were far-reaching. It was the
first real victory won on German soil; and the news was received with general
rejoicing. Unfortunately, on the very next day, Davout appeared with a superior
force, and drove Dorenberg and Tchemitcheff back across the Elbe.
There was
brisk fighting at Magdeburg also. Here, on April 2, Eugene crossed the Elbe
with about 45,000 men, forced Borstell to retire, and took up a position with
his centre at Nedlitz. Wittgenstein determined to attack him on the 5th with
20,000 men. In three places the advanced French forces were engaged, and were
everywhere defeated. Eugene lost in killed and wounded 700 men, besides 1000
prisoners. The next night he began to retreat. His attempt to recover Berlin
and scatter the forces of the Allies was feebly executed, and altogether
miscarried. Biilow and Borstell followed his retreat, with the object of
watching Magdeburg. York, with the Russians, marched up the Elbe to Roslau and
Dessau, where a bridge was built over the river. The further plan of campaign was
that Wittgenstein should operate in conjunction with Bliicher to the west of
the Elbe; but, as the enemy had over 50,000 men in Magdeburg, Bliicher dared
not lose touch with Biilow. York reached Kothen on April 10, while Eugene
occupied the left bank of the Saale, and approached the Harz mountains with his
main army. Meanwhile Bliicher had reached Leipzig and the Mulde, where he was
compelled to halt, as the French were said to be gathering in force about Hof
and Erfurt. All he could do was to make himself master of the territory between
the Elbe and the Saale, and to keep in close touch with Wittgenstein.
Not till
March 7 did the Russian main army begin its march from
Kalisch into
Saxony. It numbered only 32,000 men, and could not expect to be reinforced by
more than 30,000 reserves before the end of May. On March 18 it reached Bunzlau
in Silesia, where Kutusoff soon afterwards died. Bliicher thus found himself
crippled as before, the more so since, in spite of all the efforts of his
scouts, the enemy’s designs remained obscure. Wittgenstein was in a similar
situation. It was known that Napoleon had gathered a powerful army on the
middle Rhine, and that it had begun to march eastward. When Wittgenstein
received more certain intelligence of the movements of the enemy’s main army
towards Erfurt, he began (March 20) to draw nearer to Bliicher on his left. The
latter also concentrated his forces in order to effect a junction with the rest
of the Allies.
As the news
from the west grew more and more threatening, Schamhorst proposed to abandon
the defensive, and to attack at once. It was however determined that the main
army should cross the Elbe and accept battle on the left bank, presumably
between Leipzig and Altenburg. Wittgenstein proposed, in this case, to fall
suddenly on one of the hostile columns during their approach. Schamhorst looked
forward gloomily to the future; he thought that they would all be too late.
It cannot be
denied that the Allies showed themselves incapable of using the favourable
moment when the main French army was still distant. Bliicher’s and
Wittgenstein’s united forces amounted to 65,000 men, a strength amply
sufficient to engage Eugene, drive him from Magdeburg, and fight him in the
open field. The opportunity had now passed; their front was, it is true,
strengthened by the Russian main army, but this reinforcement could not compare
with the masses which Napoleon brought into the field. Previously they would
have had to deal with an opponent by no- means eager for the fight; now they had
to contend against the genius and invincible resolution of the Emperor.
As for
Napoleon, while with indefatigable zeal he was gathering together an immense
army in France, he kept his eye all the time on Germany. About the middle of
March he was thinking of crossing the Elbe, and relieving Danzig. This was a
survival of his Russian schemes, and had little prospect of success. The
situation of the French in Germany was growing steadily worse; consequently
Napoleon found himself compelled to meet the enemy on the Elbe and to protect
Saxony. He therefore concentrated two armies, a main army under the command of
Marshal Ney on the lower Main, and another not far from Magdeburg mder Eugene,
which served to secure the middle Elbe and could also advance south-eastward
into Saxony. The two armies might effect a junction behind the Saale. On April
15 the army of the Main began its march, while an Italian corps approached from
the south. On the 16th Napoleon left Paris. He stayed in Mainz till the 24th,
in order to overcome the various difficulties which obstructed the raising of
the new army. His plan was as follows. The army of the Elbe, about
60.000 strong, was to take up a defensive
position, guarding the Thuringian Forest; the army of the Main, comprising over
105,000 men, was to concentrate at Erfurt under Napoleon’s command; while the
Italians and Bavarians, 40,000 strong, approached from the south by way of
Coburg. Napoleon had thus a force of more than 200,000 men, with which he hoped
to engage and defeat the far weaker enemy in the neighbourhood of Leipzig. From
three directions the troops pressed forwards towards the lower course of the
Saale, between Halle and Jena. On April 25 Napoleon joined the main army at
Erfurt, which five days later appeared on the banks of the Saale; while the
Allies took up a position behind the Elster and the Pleisse, extending from
Leipzig to Altenburg on the east. The Emperor had at his disposal
145.000 men, including 10,000 cavalry and 400 guns.
The Allies at the most could only muster 80,000 men. A swift and decisive
victory was required by Napoleon if he was to recover his reputation ; and this
victory seemed secure. All he had to do was to press forward.
On May 1 he
crossed the Saale, and marched straight on Leipzig. As Napoleon had no precise
information about the enemy’s position, he hoped, by marching in this
direction, to turn their right wing, drive it in upon the centre, and crush it
by a series of heavy blows. He therefore kept bis main force in a central
position near Kaja and Liitzen. At 5 a.m.
on May 3 the movement began. Napoleon succeeded in pressing back the
Allies on the left and occupying Leipzig. Further south, his centre advanced
towards the Elster with its front to the east. As none of the enemy’s forces
were to be found here, Napoleon betook himself to Leipzig. Suddenly a violent
cannonade was heard on his right flank from the direction of Gorschen. The
Emperor at once took in the situation, and, while holding Leipzig, turned his
whole force against the enemy. The Allies had taken up a position somewhat
south of Leipzig, supposing that Napoleon would approach by way of Zeitz. When
it became known that he was advancing by Liitzen, and, it was supposed, in
extended columns, Wittgenstein determined to attack him in the flank, while
Kleist was to make an attempt on Leipzig. The army began its march during the
night; but it was 11 a.m. before
it reached a point south of Gross-Gorschen, where it formed three lines, with
Bliicher in the front and the Russian Guard in the rear. The troops were so fatigued
that they had to rest an hour. At midday Bliicher advanced upon Gross-Gorschen,
surprised the French at that point, and routed them; but behind the village he
encountered a stubborn resistance. At one o’clock the whole line was engaged,
from Klein-Gorschen to Steinsiedel. At first the Allies had a numerical
superiority, but French reinforcements kept coming up. At 2.30 p.m. Napoleon, with the Guard, appeared
behind Kaja. The fighting was extremely severe, especially round Gross-Gorschen
and Kaja; but the superior forces of the French steadily gained the upper hand,
and at
6 p.m. Napoleon ordered a general advance.
In spite of desperate resistance, the Allies were forced at 7 p.m. to retire in a direction southward
of Gross-Gorschen. In the centre the battle was lost.
Under cover
of night the defeated army pulled itself together. The Russian Guard, 11,000
strong, had taken no part in the struggle; and a large Russian corps, that of
Miloradovitch, remained inactive at Zeitz. Wounded as he was, Bliicher hurled
eleven squadrons upon the enemy during the night, but they were repulsed.
Before dawn the Allies withdrew in perfect order, and crossed the Elbe at
Dresden and Meissen. The French lost 18,000 men, the Allies only 10,000,
exclusive of the slightly wounded. During the pursuit many more fell out, so
that eventually Napoleon, on reaching the Elbe, had 35,000 men less than when
he crossed the Saale—a proof of the bad moral of his army.
Early on May
4 Napoleon pressed on with the main army to Dresden, while Ney with an
auxiliary force operated on the left. The pursuit, however, was not effective;
it was not till a week later that the French occupied Dresden-Neustadt.
Meanwhile Ney pushed back the Prussians under Biilow; and, at Napoleon's
bidding, the Saxon fortress of Torgau surrendered. The Allies were in bad case.
Each laid the blame of their defeat on the other. The Prussians were for
pressing northwards to guard Berlin; the Russians for marching eastwards to
Breslau, in order to remain near to Russia and Austria. The armies were about
to separate, when Frederick William, knowing this would be fatal, gave in.
Leaving the defence of Berlin to Billow’s weak corps, the combined forces
slowly moved to Bautzen, and took up a position on the heights behind that
town, where they were joined by Barclay with 13,000 men. Napoleon remained in
Dresden till the 17th to strengthen and organise his army. His main force
amounted finally to 120,000, Ney’s army to 85,000; the army of the lower Elbe
under Davout numbered 30,000. Against these forces the Allies, with Billow’s
corps, could only muster 110,000 men.
Napoleon, on
being informed of the movements of the Allies, determined to attack and defeat
them in conjunction with Ney. His troops advanced cautiously towards Bautzen,
until it became dear that the Allies intended to accept battle there. On May 19
the French main army deployed west and north-west of Bautzen, with the Spree in
their front. Ney was on the march with two corps, his object being to turn the
Allied right. Wittgenstein, unaware that Ney had more than one corps, planned
to attack him unexpectedly with the forces under Barclay and York. Soon after 1
p.m. the fight began. During its
course, Barclay committed the blunder of first ordering York to abandon his
position, and then bidding him resume it This second advance led to a fierce
struggle, which lasted, with varying fortunes, till 11 p.m. The attempted surprise had failed; and during the night
the Russians and Prussians fell back on the main body.
The position
of the Allies was now as follows. In front of them flowed the Spree, as yet a
shallow stream, its banks crowned in the centre by the town of Bautzen. Their
main force rested on the heights above the town, while their advanced posts
reached to the Spree. They numbered 92,000 men, including 30,000 Prussians.
GortchakofTs Russians were on the left, Blucher in the centre, and Barclay on
the right wing; the Russian Guard formed the reserve. The position was a strong
one, but too extensive, and it was broken up into three ill- connected portions
; moreover the ground was unfavourable for cavalry. The weakest point was on
the right, which was incompletely covered This was the very point that was
threatened by Ney.
At noon on
May 20 Napoleon crossed the Spree and attacked the Allies’ advanced posts, in
order to prevent them from withdrawing on the approach of Ney. He shrewdly
aimed at deferring the decision until the next day, when his second army would
come into action. By nightfall Bautzen and the ground in front of it were won
from the Allies. The Russian left wing appeared to be seriously threatened;
whereupon 4000 men of the reserve were sent to its relief. Napoleon’s plan for
the 21st was admirably conceived. At daybreak a fierce attack was made on GortchakofTs
division; and Ney speedily followed suit on the right. Supposing that the issue
would be decided on the left, Alexander sent thither another 5000 of the Guard,
thus reducing the reserve at the very outset to 6000 men. Napoleon’s tactics
were entirely successful on the Allied left, where the Russians were fully
occupied till evening. He was equally triumphant on the right. Here the
Russians had to meet the enveloping attack of Ney’s superior force; they
received no reinforcements, and were pushed back in spite of a fierce
resistance. Finally Blucher was forced to intervene in order to wrest the
important position of Preititz from the French. It was now midday. Napoleon’s
centre began to move. The Prussians made a desperate but ineffectual defence;
their right was turned. Meanwhile Ney’s force had increased to 45,000 men. In
full strength he hurled himself upon Preititz, took it, and, attacking Blucher
in front and flank, forced him to retire. Had Ney continued his advance against
the Prussians, they would have been destroyed; but he failed to grasp the
situation. Part of the centre still held its ground firmly; and thus Blucher
gained time to extricate himself from his perilous position. The French,
however, again made a general advance, and the Allies withdrew from the field.
They retreated in good order, without losing a single gun. The losses during
the three days amounted to about 20,000 on both sides. A second time Napoleon
had conquered, but again the victory was indecisive.
Still
fighting, the Allies slowly retired, protected by their powerful cavalry.
Almost daily there was fierce rear-guard fighting. It was evident that from a
military point of view the Allies were still strong; on the other hand, in the
field of diplomacy they showed a deplorable lack of
520
Indecisive fighting. Armistice of Plaswitz. [1813
unanimity.
Wittgenstein was now replaced by Barclay, who was disinclined to risk another
battle and advised the abandonment of Silesia, if necessary, and a retreat to
Poland. The Prussians, on the other hand, were for defending Silesia and
remaining in the neighbourhood of the Austrian army. Alexander was won over to
this plan. The army swung round to the north-east, and on the 30th took its
stand on the heights of 1 Isen, not far from Schweidnitz. The northern provinces
of Prussia were thus abandoned to the enemy.
Elsewhere the
successes of the French were slight. Generals and troops were dispirited by the
unbroken strain and fruitless fighting with an enemy ready at any moment to
fall upon them with its superior cavalry. Ney, in a fit of ill-temper, actually
sent in his resignation. The French advanced but slowly ; and so firmly did the
Allies maintain their ground that Bertrand and Macdonald even fell back.
Napoleon despatched one division to Breslau and another, under Oudinot, to
Berlin. Biilow had mustered 30,000 men, including a large body of militia, for
the defence of the capital. Supposing that he had a small force to deal with,
he attacked Oudinot on the 28th, but was repulsed. Victor also now turned
northwards. If Oudinot had made an energetic advance, it would have gone hardly
with the Prussians; but his slowness allowed Biilow to take up a strong
position at Luckau, where he repulsed Oudinot with the loss of 2000 men.
The French
had better luck on the lower Elbe under the cautious Davout. That district was
to have been defended by the Russian general Wallmoden; but he was inadequately
supported, and, finding the Danish forces on the enemy’s side, he abandoned
Hamburg, which the French reoccupied on May 30. But risings in the rear of the
French constantly imperilled their communications; Prussian and Russian
partisans scoured the country beyond Halberstadt; and on June 7 a body of 6000
men actually penetrated into Leipzig.
On the other hand,
Napoleon, whose main army now extended over a front some 28 miles long,
threatened the allied line of retreat with his left wing. The position of the
Allies was bad; they were in danger of being forced back upon Austrian
territory. But suddenly there came a complete change. So early as May 18
Napoleon had despatched General Caulaincourt to Alexander to treat for peace.
On June 1 it was agreed, through Austria’s mediation, to suspend operations on
the morrow for thirty-six hours. Finally, on June 4, at Plaswitz, the Powers
consented to an armistice to last till July 20, a period afterwards prolonged
for another month.
The question
arises: What were the causes that led to the armistice? Napoleon has indicated
two—his want of cavalry and the doubtful attitude of Austria. Evidently he
overestimated the strength of Austria, or did not realise the deplorable
condition of the allied forces. His own troops had proved insufficiently
trained; though he had won two
victories, he
had lost 25.000 men more than his opponents, and he had 30,000 men in hospital.
His ammunition was exhausted, his commissariat inadequate; guerrilla bands
harassed his communications; and, worst of all, his marshals desired peace. An
armistice, Napoleon hoped, would give him time to complete and reorganise his
army, to win back Austria, and possibly to divide Russia and Prussia.
But the
Allies were in still worse case. Their numbers had sunk very low; they suffered
all manner of want; the Russian and Prussian commanders were always at odds.
The long retreat, the incessant fighting, and the want of supplies, had
weakened the discipline of the troops; they had been driven back almost to the
frontier; the hopes of defeating a Napoleon were almost at an end. There could
be no question that rest was far more necessary for the Allies than for the
French, who, with one supreme effort, might possibly have touched their goal.
If, nevertheless, Napoleon concluded an armistice, this proves that he.was no
longer the general he had been, that he no longer possessed that confidence and
iron will which had riveted victory to his banners. The Armistice of Plaswitz
was one of the gravest errors of his life; its acceptance sealed the
preliminary conditions of his fall.
The armistice
was not the prelude of peace, but a season of preparation for the decisive
campaign. On both sides the work was carried forward with the greatest zeal.
The Allies succeeded in winning over Sweden and the Crown Prince with the
promise that his army should be reinforced by strong Russian and Prussian
contingents. To arrange with England was more difficult, for Anglo-Prussian
relations were traversed by Guelph interests in Hanover; nevertheless British
subsidies were sent. The most important Power to gain was Austria. Metternich
had kept up relations both with the Allies and with France. He was aware of
Napoleon’s pretensions, but was not anxious to see Russia’s position made too
strong; it was to the advantage of Austria that both Powers should be confined
within their natural limits. This end he tried to gain by intervention, with a
view to ending the war. On June 7 he proposed certain definite bases of peace,
to which the Treaty of Reichenbach, made during the armistice, added the
important undertaking that, if the conditions therein laid down were not
accepted by July 20, Austria would declare war on France.
The proposal?
made by Austria were that the grand-duchy of Warsaw and the Confederation of
the Rhine should be abolished; that the Illyrian provinces should be restored
to Austria; that the Hanse Towns and other portions of northern Germany annexed
in 1810 should be restored; and that Prussia should be replaced in a position
as good as that which she had in 1805. These terms were by no means
unfavourable to Napoleon; but he could not bring himself to renounce his dream
of universal sovereignty. Even the disastrous defeat of Vittoria (June, 1813),
522
Austria joins the alliance. Allied forces and plans. [1813
while it
encouraged the Allies, could not break down his obstinacy. Mettemich finally
sent an ultimatum, fixing August 10 as the limit of time for Napoleon’s reply.
On the 12th Austria declared war. It was well for Europe that Napoleon’s
ambition allowed no change of conditions at the crucial moment. At the head of
a powerful army he still hoped to defeat a loose coalition.
Nobody was
more pleased with the turn of events than the Prussian and German patriots,
inspired as they were by a profound and passionate resolve. Speaking of this
time, at St Helena, Napoleon said, “I saw the decisive hour drawing near; my
star waned; and I felt the reins slipping from my hands.” Military preparations
were pressed forward. On the renewal of war, the whole force of Prussia
amounted to 271,000 men; and that number was raised to 300,000 in the course of
the year. It was indeed a nation in arms.
She Russian
field-army now numbered 184,123 men and 639 guns; the Prussian 161,764 men and
362 guns; the Austrian 127,345 men and 290 guns; the Swedes, the Anglo-Germans,
and the Mecklenburgers, 38,871 men, and 90 guns—in all 512,103 men and 1381
guns. If to these are added the reserves and the available Austrian troops in
Italy, amounting to 350,000 men, we have a total of 860,000 combatants. But
Napoleon, on his side, had summoned the strength of France and the Rheinbund to
his camps in Saxony, Silesia, and the Mark, to the number of nearly 700,000
men—a large part, it is true, being unserviceable recruits. Both armies
presented a strange mixture of nationalities, but Napoleon’s troops were all
drilled on the French system; they -were armed alike; and, excepting the
Rheinbumd troops, were mostly commanded by French officers. The French had the
advantage in the military experience of their senior officers; their artillery
also was superior, but their cavalry was inferior to that of the Allies.
Lastly, the French were guided by one sole will, while the Allies were crippled
by divided command and divergence of interests.
Various plans
of operations were discussed by the Allies. Eventually a scheme, the so-called Reichenbach
plan, was accepted by Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, and subsequently by Austria.
Its purport was that three armies should be formed, the largest, known as the
main army, in Bohemia, under Austrian command; the second, about 120,000 men,
in the Mark, under the Crown Prince Bemadotte; and a third, of 50,000 men,
under Prussian command, in Silesia. They were only to accept battle if their
superiority were undoubted. If the enemy en masse should attack one of the
armies, it was to retreat while the other two advanced quickly, with a view to
pressing hard upon his flanks and communications. The whole plan proved that
the Allies did not dare to close with so great a strategist as their opponent.
Napoleon was
expected to begin the attack in Bohemia. He deferred the formation of a plan
till the last moment. Then he determined to
adopt the
line of the Elbe and its fortresses as his base; to retain
300.000 men, facing east and south, to watch the
enemy’s movements in Saxony and Silesia; and to despatch 110,000 to attack
Berlin and the Swedish Crown Prince. Napoleon thus abandoned all idea of a
rapid offensive, and allowed himself to be seduced, apparently by hatred of his
late marshal and of the Prussian capital, into a side movement which could lead
to nothing decisive. The youthful conqueror of Marengo would have acted very
differently.
The Russian
and Prussian troops succeeded in joining the Austrians before the termination
of the armistice, thus bringing up the army in Bohemia to a total of 254,000 men
with 692 guns. The chief command was given to Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg.
The three sovereigns were at his head-quarters; and, as he acted with their
consent, he possessed a certain authority over both the other armies.
Schwarzenberg was a man of honour and devoted to duty, but he had neither
self-confidence nor talent for supreme command; and his generalship was
over-cautious, dilatory, and uncertain. This led the self-satisfied Alexander
to interfere not unfrequently in an arbitrary manner; and many others put in
their word. It was under these conditions that a Council of War was held on
August 17, by which it was determined to advance with three columns upon
Leipzig. But as Dresden, not Leipzig, was the decisive point, this meant losing
touch with the army of Silesia, and giving the enemy a chance to invade
Bohemia.
On August 22
Schwarzenberg crossed the frontier of Saxony and occupied the Erzgebirge, then
turned towards Dresden. To his astonishment he met with no serious resistance,
for Napoleon, with the Guards, had marched off to attack Bliicher. Dresden was
covered only by Saint-Cyr’s corps; and, if Schwarzenberg had pushed on with
speed and resolution, the Saxon capital must have fallen. But he was
half-hearted; and it was not until the afternoon of the 25th that the Allies,
to the number of 80,000, stood before the gates of Dresden. Even then they did
not attack at once, thinking they had plenty of time; and yet the defenders
could already see the camp-fires of the approaching French. The favourable
moment had passed. Napoleon was at first badly informed as to the movements of
his opponents, and supposed their main forces to be in Silesia. He hesitated
for a time, but finally decided to advance into Silesia with 180,000 men, to
beat the Silesian army, and to return to Dresden in time to prevent its fall.
After the
departure of the Russian and Prussian divisions, the forces which remained in
Silesia, near Breslau, consisted of a Prussian corps of
38.000 men under York, and three Russian corps
numbering 66,500, about 105,000 men in all, with 339 guns. They were commanded
by Bliicher, a very different man from Schwarzenberg. A good tactician, but
ignorant of strategy, he passionately hated Napoleon, and was probably the only
general who did not fear him. Schamhorst having
524 Campaign in Silesia. Battle of the Katzbach.
[i8is
died from the
effects of a wound, his place as Bliicher’s adviser was taken by Gneisenau, a
far-seeing, courageous, and talented man, who, by much study of Napoleon’s
campaigns, established the principles of the modem art of war. The higher
Russian officers, especially Langeron, were mostly lukewarm; Sacken, though
brave and impetuous, was inclined to insubordination. Unfortunately, too, the
self-willed, egotistical York was on bad terms both with Bliicher and with
Gneisenau. It was only the common purpose and the firm and prudent conduct of
Bliicher that kept together these conflicting forces.
The struggle
in Silesia was severe. On August 18 Macdonald was forced to abandon the line of
the Katzbach; and the French army of the Bober, though numerically superior,
was pressed back. Three days later Napoleon arrived, at once took the
offensive, and repulsed the Allies with the loss of 2000 men. Bliicher
instantly perceived whom he had to deal with, and therefore retreated,
according to the general plan of campaign, but so as to keep close to the
enemy. By the 23rd the French onset grew weaker; and Bliicher supposed they had
given up the pursuit. As a matter of fact, they were advancing all along the
line; they repulsed the Allies in three successive fights, and continued their
forward movement on the following day.
The situation
of the Silesian army was now very serious. Provisions, equipment, and clothing
were insufficient; the troops were tired out; in spite of great sacrifices they
were unable to hold their ground. Bliicher feared that his army would be
destroyed piecemeal, and determined to try the desperate remedy of a pitched
battle. On August 23 Napoleon had hurried back to Dresden with a portion of his
army, handing over the command of the remaining troops to Macdonald. The
Marshal despatched 34,000 men in a side direction, and crossed the Katzbach and
the Neisse with 67,000 men, intending to fall upon Bliicher’s flank. As the Prussians
also advanced, the two armies came unexpectedly into collision. In consequence
of the heavy rain the river Neisse was running bank-high. The French crossed
the swollen torrent, and climbed up the steep right bank. Falling into
disorder, they were attacked by York’s corps at close quarters before they
could gain a foothold on the plateau. A fierce fight ensued; the Prussian
cavalry were forced to give way, but the Russian squadrons broke through the
French flank and rear and decided the battle. The French cavalry were flung
back upon their own infantry; and the whole force was driven in confusion down
the hollow lanes and precipitous slopes. Prussian batteries placed on the edge
of the plateau fired into the disorganised masses hemmed in by the torrent below.
Darkness alone put an end to the work of destruction.
The French
were beaten, but it was only their centre that had been engaged on the high
ground; their left wing had not come up. It was the pursuit which turned the
partial into a decisive defeat. The French were hampered in their retirement by
the rivers; their retreat became a
I813] Silesia
freed.—Bernadotteand the army of the north. 525
rout. The
Prussians also suffered terribly owing to the weather; hunger and want of
clothing and ammunition hindered the pursuit. On the 29th Macdonald crossed the
Bober; finally, after another fierce fight at Bunzlau, the river Queiss
separated the two armies.
Bliicher now
received the news of Napoleon’s victory at Dresden (August 26-27). Fearing that
the Emperor would hasten to relieve the army of the Bober, the Prussian general
left his main army on the Queiss, and with his van-guard only pressed on
Macdonald, who at last succeeded in concentrating his army at Gorlitz. On
September 1 Bliicher was able to report that Silesia was free, and that 103
guns, 250 ammunition waggons, and 18,000 prisoners had been taken. If Prussian
generalship had not yet attained its full perfection, it had already
demonstrated its cardinal principles—reckless employment of all forces, cooperation
of all branches of the service, energetic use of cavalry, and strenuous
pursuit.
We turn now
to the army of the north, which consisted of 119,000 Prussians, Russians, and
Swedes, under the command of Bernadotte, together with Tauenzien’s 4th Prussian
corps, which, after deducting the garrison troops, comprised 33,000 men for
action in the field. Tauenzien was independent, but he was directed to keep in
touch with the Crown Prince, whose main forces consisted of Biilow’s Prussian
corps of 38,000 men. Napoleon had appointed three divisions of his army to act
against the army of the north—the Berlin army under Oudinot, with 63,000 men;
Girard’s intermediate corps, with 13,500; and the army of the lower Elbe, about
35,000 men, under Davout.
The Crown
Prince of Sweden had his political as well as his military ends; he was
cunning, reserved, and untrustworthy; as a soldier, he was a mixture of
capacity and incapacity; moreover, fear of Napoleon, his former master in
warfare, made him downright cowardly. Of his generals, Bulow, a clear-headed,
enterprising commander, though self-willed and difficult to manage, was by far
the most notable. The conflicting views of the Crown Prince and the Prussian
generals were apparent from the first. Bernadotte certainly wished to cover
Berlin; but he preferred retiring behind the shelter of the Havel and the Spree
to being beaten by Napoleon. For the Prussians the defence of Berlin was the
main point. They desired, therefore, if it must be, to leave their bones to
bleach before and not behind the capital. But, as there seemed no serious risk
in delay* the Crown Prince also remained in the south, until he received news
on August 17 that the army of Oudinot, then in process of concentration, was
all he had in front of him.
Napoleon was
busy with Bliicher and Schwarzenberg; but, as he stood in need of a moral
success, he ordered Oudinot to break through the combined army of the north and
occupy Berlin. On August 21 the Marshal began to advance, and after two days’
fighting succeeded in passing the defiles and marshes of the Nuthe. The chief
difficulty was
overcome; and
Oudinot, believing that he would meet with no serious resistance till he
reached Berlin, continued his march in three divided columns. But things fell
out otherwise. Bemadotte resolved to attack him with his whole army, while
Tauenzien engaged the French right wing. Oudinot’s right therefore came into
collision with the Prussians at Blankenfeld, and was repulsed. In the centre
Reynier was victorious at Gross-Beeren, after which he imprudently bivouacked.
Hardly were his troops encamped when Prussian shells burst suddenly in their
midst. Biilow had heard the sound of fighting. He first advanced his guns, the
infantry taking up a position behind them. The village of Gross- Beeren and the
windmill hill were stormed. A French counter-attack failed. Reynier was forced
to give way; the support of the left French column came too late; and Oudinot
was forced to retire with the loss of 3000 men. Berlin was saved.
Unfortunately
the pursuit was weak, partly through Bemadotte’s fault, partly through
Billow’s. The Crown Prince was hampered by his fear both of a renewed attack by
Napoleon on his front and of a flank attack from a corps on his right. This was
not, as Bemadotte supposed, Davout’s army, but Girard’s division, which on the
27th was encamped, about 9000 strong, at Hagelsberg, not far from Belzig.
Against it the Crown Prince despatched the Prussian general Hirschfeld, with
12,000 men, all militia. He succeeded in surprising Girard, and all but
annihilated his division. Only six battalions got away.
Meanwhile the
main army of the Allies was drawn up before the Saxon capital, garrisoned by
Saint-Cyr with only three divisions. Napoleon was approaching to its relief. Had
the Allies made a comprehensive and energetic attack, they might have taken the
place. Fighting actually began early on August 26, but was carried on in so
slack and disconnected a fashion that Saint-Cyr was able to hold out till the
arrival of reinforcements. Napoleon had beer n Dresden since 9 a.m. He halted by the bridge over the
Elbe and directed the reinforcements to their places as they came up. By 5 p.m. all his infantry had reached the
left bank. He had despatched General Van damme with a strong corps to Pima,
there to cross the Elbe and embarrass the retreat of the Allies. Meanwhile it
was decided at head-quarters to cease fighting; but, as Schwarzenberg gave no
orders to that effect, the battle blazed out afresh about 4 p.m. The defeat of the Allies was a
foregone conclusion. Their front was nearly two miles long; and there was on
their side no unity of generalship, no connected movement, no clear aim. On the
other side there was sound generalship, masterly use of the ground, the
capacity to seize the decisive moment. When the Allies were worn out, the
French began to attack. By nightfall the Allies had gained nothing, but,
rather, had lost ground; while Napoleon, on the other hand, had deployed all
his forces and prepared for a steady advance.
The Allies
were still 140,000 strong, and the next day were reinforced
by 20,000,
while Napoleon had only 120,000 men. But this numerical superiority was more
than cancelled by the moral depression of the one side and the exaltation of
the other. The Council of War, chiefly influenced by the King of, Prussia,
decided to stand firm the next day. Napoleon planned a comprehensive attack on
both of the enemy’s wings, in order to drive Schwarzenberg into the difficult
mountain country. This operation was facilitated by the fact that the left
wing,
24.000 strong, was divided from the main army by
the valley of Plauen. Meanwhile Vandamme had arrived at Pima. At 7 a.m. on the 27th the French began to
advance; and before long a fierce fight was raging. At 3 p.m. the allied left was completely
beaten. Till then Schwarzenberg had held his ground, but now the defeat of his
left wing began to telL Schwarzenberg announced that want of the barest
necessities compelled the Austrian army to retreat into Bohemia—a resolution which
decided the fate of his allies. The retreat was to be made in three columns,
the easterly consisting of the Russian and Prussian divisions, which were to
move by Dohna to Teplitz; the other two of Austrian troops. Accordingly, as
circumstances permitted, the troops left the field. The losses of the Allies on
the 27th amounted to
10.000 men killed and wounded and 15,000 taken
prisoners, mostly Austrians, besides from 5000 to 6000 lost in the retreat.
On a
pitch-dark night, amid torrents of rain, over rough and obstructed roads,
marched the dense masses of the main army, fatigued, starving, and dejected.
Under a hot pursuit their destruction would have been certain, especially that
of the eastern column, which had been ordered to take the Pima road, already,
in all likelihood, occupied by Vandamme. When Napoleon heard next day of the
retreat, he determined on an energetic pursuit. His first idea was to get
ahead of the enemy with a strong force on the Pima road; subsequently he transferred
his main strength westward, where Murat was to fall upon the Austrians in flank
and rear. Vandamme was to continue his march upon Teplitz. On the 28th, his
advanced troops came up with the Russian rear-guard at Peterswald; the latter,
however, held their ground till the whole column set out for Nollendorf. Fierce
rear-guard actions were fought, first at Nollendorf, and later at Kulm, which
enabled the French to debouch from the hill country.
At this point
the Russian general Ostermann received a letter from the King of Prussia,
describing the perilous position of the main army with the Emperor Alexander,
and requesting him to hold back the enemy. Seizing the last sheltered position,
Ostermann risked the unequal combat. Meanwhile the King sent his adjutants in
all directions to gather troops for the relief of the main army; and Alexander
adopted a similar course. They hoped to collect by the next day (August 30) a
force sufficient to check Vandamme’s impetuous advance. In the interval,
Ostermann, with his 15,000 men, was thrown on his own resources. In
front of the
Russians was the village of Priesten. The battle, which began about 10 a.m., grew hotter as the French forces
increased. Three times Priesten was taken and lost. When, late in the
afternoon, Vandamme advanced to the decisive attack, Duke Eugene of Wiirtem-
berg hurled the cavalry against his flank. The French advance was checked, but
they hoped to renew it next day with large reinforcements, for Vandamme
believed that either Saint-Cyr or Mortier was ready to support him. More than
6000 Russians had fallen, but they had gloriously discharged their task. Strong
reinforcements poured in, until the Allies could muster 50,000 men. A
counter-attack was planned for the following day. Grave anxiety was felt for
Kleist’s Prussian corps, which was still entangled in the hill country behind.
But this very circumstance might be turned to advantage. Kleist was ordered so
to direct his movement as to fall on Vandamme’s rear. In compliance with these
instructions, and also because his own retreat was cut off1, Kleist
turned eastwards and took the same road by which the enemy had advanced before
him.
Vandamme now
stood before Kulm across the road, with his right wing resting on the high
ground. The Allies resolved to throw their superior forces on his left and
drive him up against the hills. If Kleist came up in time from Nollendorf in
Vandamme’s rear, he would be surrounded on three sides. The battle began early
on August 80. In spite of a stubborn resistance the Austrians were already
succeeding in their aim when the sound of Kleist’s guns was heard. Having
reached the heights of Nollendorf, he fell upon a French detachment between
that place and Kulm, and brought his artillery into play. Recognising the
dangerous nature of his position, Vandamme at once determined to unite all his
forces at Kulm, and, if possible, break through the Prussian lines. But now the
Russians and Austrians pressed forward. Before long all was in confusion, and
at Kulm two French divisions laid down their arms. Meanwhile the main French
force hurled itself upon the Prussians, and with the fury of despair swept
three brigades out of their path; but, rushing forward in confusion, they
encountered a fourth Prussian brigade, which completed their destruction.
Vandamme’s
division was almost wiped out; 10,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the
Allies, including Vandamme himself. The fact is that Napoleon had left him in
the lurch. He had mistaken the direction taken by the enemy, and, when he
ascertained the truth, he had delayed to send speedy help. The battle of Kulm
marks a turning-point in the campaign ; it cancelled Napoleon’s victory at
Dresden and completed the effects of the reverses at Gross-Beeren and the
Katzbach, to which indeed that of Kulm was partly due. At Kulm, for the first
time, the combined efforts of the three allied nations had won a victory. Even
the despondent Schwarzenberg began to hope; and Metternich finally broke off
his secret relations with Napoleon.
Napoleon
himself began to hesitate. He abandoned the Napoleonic method, which consisted
in dealing rapid and crushing blows. He had, by his delay, forfeited the
overwhelming success which a relentless pursuit of the allied army would have
attained; now he thought of advancing again upon Berlin, but, as he dared not
move so far from Dresden, he sent Ney instead. He himself meant to take up a
central position near Hoyerswerda, which would enable him to fall upon
Bliicher’s right flank, to support Ney, and to cover Dresden. On September 8 he
received news of the disaster that had befallen Macdonald, whereupon he
advanced against Bliicher; but the latter again withdrew beyond his reach. At
the same time the Emperor received news that the army of Bohemia was again on
the march, while his own troops were in extremity from hunger and want. He
therefore abandoned his pursuit of Bliicher and hurried back to Dresden, which
he entered on the 6th. Meanwhile Saint-Cyr had yielded slowly to superior
numbers. Napoleon reached the front on the 8th, and attacked and repulsed the
enemy. The situation seemed to be improving, when news arrived of fresh
disaster, the defeat of Ney at Dennewitz. Napoleon appeared to take it calmly,
but he sent secret instructions to the Minister of War in Paris to take
measures for the defence of the French frontiers.
Ney had had
orders to move towards Jiiterbog on September 4, so as to attack Berlin in
conjunction with the Emperor on the 9th or 10th. He found the French army,
about 58,000 strong, on the right bank of the Elbe, in evil case; and he had no
precise information as to the enemy. In obedience to his orders he set out on
the 5th, and drove the Prussians under Tauenzien back upon Jiiterbog. Biilow
was further west; but in the night he moved eastward, and, unknown to the enemy,
encamped within two miles of him. Early on the 6th, Tauenzien marched to join
Biilow with 9000 men, when he observed the French approaching, and took up a
position on the high ground north of Dennewitz. Ney, not expecting any serious
combat that day, had made no reconnaissances. His three corps set out at
different times, and consequently arrived at long intervals on the battlefield.
The country
near Dennewitz is a lofty table-land, intersected from west to east by the
Ahebach, whose marshy banks could only be crossed by bridges at Dennewitz and
Rohrbach The rivulet thus cut across the French line of advance and divided the
battlefield into two parts. When Bertrand had got past Dennewitz, he attacked
Tauenzien, and after an hour’s fighting compelled him to give way. A cavalry
charge temporarily relieved the pressure, and gave Biilow time to throw himself
on the French right. Biilow’s first advance was repulsed, but, as fresh
reinforcements appeared, he succeeded in gaining possession of the monument
hill, an important point, and occupied it with 34 guns. The French line of
battle was thus forced in a westerly direction, so> that its centre now
rested on the village of Dennewitz. The Prussian
left now
advanced, and after a fierce conflict drove Bertrand to retreat. Meanwhile
Reynier’s corps came into action on the French left between Dennewitz and
Gohlsdorf; Oudinot came up later, and faced Borstell’s division, which had
joined the Prussian line on the other side of Gohlsdorf. The French were now in
overwhelming superiority; they recovered Gohlsdorf; and, as the Crown Prince
was still two miles away, the battle was apparently won.
Ney, however,
threw away his chance. Failing to perceive that the decisive point was to the
south, he ordered Oudinot to reinforce the troops on the northern bank of the
stream. Oudinot obeyed, and withdrew his men from the front. At this moment the
Prussians threw themselves in force upon Gohlsdorf, took it after a desperate
struggfej and captured also the commanding position of the windmill hill'.
Reynier and Bertrand were now forced to abandon their positions; and Ney failed
in a desperate attempt to break through the enemy’s lines. The arrival of
reinforcements from the Crown Prince crushed the last efforts at resistance.
Darkness and exhaustion put an end to the pursuit. The Prussian losses amounted
to more than 10,000 men; the French lost
22.000 men and 53 guns.
The defeat at
Dennewitz prevented the French army of the north from prosecuting the attack on
Berlin, while it placed the Crown Prince in a position to molest the Emperor’s
combinations—an opportunity which he neglected to use. It was Bliicher’s flank
march to the middle Elbe which brought about a turn of the tide. Further north,
the course of the campaign was influenced by the reverses at Gross-Beeren and
Dennewitz. In that quarter Davout commanded an army neither numerically
formidable nor otherwise trustworthy, Napoleon had intended that Oudinot and
Davout should simultaneously advance upon Berlin, the former from the south,
the latter from the north. But the course of events had condemned Davout to
comparative inactivity; and Oudinot’s defeat had forced him to withdraw further
from Hamburg. Wallmoden was therefore able to cross the Elbe, and, defeating a
French division on the Gohrde, to overrun Hanover. Hamburg became an isolated
outpost.
We left
Napoleon in the Erzgebirge, where tidings reached him of Ney’s defeat. He
determined at first to continue his advance towards Bohemia, but subsequently,
fearing to move too far from Dresden, he returned thither, directing Saint-Cyr
to hold the crest of the Erzgebirge. Since the recommencement of hostilities,
the Emperor had lost nearly
150.000 men, 300 guns, and an immense quantity of
war materials. His communications were constantly disturbed by roving bands. It
was almost impossible to provision his army; the hospitals were full to
overflowing; the courage and efficiency of his troops diminished daily. The
Emperor no longer attempted great enterprises; he restricted himself to taking
advantages of the enemy’s mistakes, while he himself
committed the
grave blunder of clinging obstinately to Dresden, though his position there had
become untenable.
The army of
Bohemia was equally inactive. For some time no important movements took place.
After the defeat at Dresden, it was considered desirable to withdraw Bliicher
from Silesia to Bohemia; and on September 11 orders were actually sent him to
that effect. Fortunately, however, he remained in Silesia; and, with
Saint-Cyr’s retreat to the crest of the Erzgebirge, the situation changed.
Nevertheless, in spite of their numerical superiority, the Allies were still
unwilling to come to close quarters, and attempted only minor operations. Hope
lay rather with Bliicher and the army of the north. Eventually the Prussian
general succeeded in urging the Crown Prince, and finally the main army, to
more energetic measures.
Napoleon
found himself half surrounded by superior forces, which, with the army of
Poland, amounted to 450,000 men. His position becoming increasingly critical,
he finally abandoned the right bank of the Elbe, and drew up his army in a bent
line, facing east along the river from Meissen to Konigstein, and south from
the Erzgebirge to Freiberg. Hearing that the army of Bohemia was at last
marching to the north-west, towards Chemnitz and Leipzig—a plan which had more
than once been taken up previously and dropped—he was in hopes that he would
now be able to attack it, when news came that part of the army of Silesia was
on the march. He expected an attack on Dresden, and discovered too late that
Bliicher had crossed the Elbe.
On September
3, Napoleon, abandoning his advance against Bohemia, had turned against
Bliicher, whose main force was at Gorlitz. Bliicher received early information
of the danger, and retired during the night. The Emperor reached Gorlitz, but
returned to Dresden. Bliicher now again advanced, and drove back Macdonald
beyond Bautzen, but, with Napoleon so near him, did not feel equal to an
energetic attack. He decided to await Bennigsen’s arrival, and then to push
forward rapidly, and cross the Elbe between Torgau and Wittenberg. Bennigsen,
with the army of Poland, at length reached Bohemia unobserved. The numerical
superiority of the Allies was now such that a decisive battle became
inevitable; but, as Schwarzenberg and the Crown Prince still hesitated,
Bliicher decided to force their hand. Leaving one corps to cover Silesia, he
marched westward on the 26th. The Crown Prince declared himself ready to cross
the Elbe with him, and restored the bridge over that river near the village of
Elster. On hearing of this, Ney despatched Bertrand to Wartenburg, a town on
the left bank of the Elbe opposite to Elster. Bertrand here assembled his whole
corps, about 14,000 men, with 32 guns, in a position rendered almost
impregnable by the surrounding marshes and water. An attack was only possible
on the extreme right by the village of Bleddin. Bertrand, unaware that he had
the army of Silesia in front of him, garrisoned this
place with
only 1500 men and six guns. With great difficulty the Allies succeeded in
breaking through at this point, while the main French force was held fast at
Wartenburg. The Prussians suffered fearful losses; one battalion was reduced to
sixty men. Bleddin taken, Bliicher gave orders to attack Wartenburg from this
point. The Prussian divisions forced their way through water and morass into
the French positions. Other divisions now advanced from different sides; and
Bertrand was forced to beat a hasty retreat with heavy loss. The passage of the
Elbe was accomplished. From the strategical point of view it was the most
eventfiil action of the campaign.
The situation
was completely changed by the simultaneous advance of two allied armies upon
Leipzig, one from the north, the other from the south. Their object was to
combine, Napoleon’s to frustrate their combination by defeating them singly. He
had still 267,000 men ; but he was obliged to divide his forces, employing the
larger half for the attack, the smaller for the defence. In spite of this
division, his offensive force was still a match for either of the hostile
armies. He determined to hold Dresden and its environs with Saint-Cyr’s corps
alone, and himself to advance with 160,000 men against Bliicher and the Crown Prince,
while the King of Naples was to hold up the slowly advancing army of Bohemia.
After defeating the armies of the north, the Emperor intended to join Murat by
way of Leipzig, and to crush Schwarzenberg.
On October 5
Napoleon set out against Bliicher. He advanced to the district between the
Mulde and the Elbe, while the Crown Prince crossed the Elbe near Dessau and
marched cautiously for a short distance along the left bank of the Mulde. On
the 9th, near Duben, Napoleon almost caught the army of Silesia, which hardly
succeeded in evading the attack of his immensely superior forces by falling
back on the Crown Prince. Napoleon found himself in painfrd perplexity; he knew
nothing of the enemy’s designs; he received bad news from Murat and Saint-Cyr.
On the other side Bliicher and the Crown Prince were at variance. Bernadotte
was anxious to avoid fighting, and preferred to take shelter behind the Saale;
Bliicher, on the other hand, wished to approach the army of Bohetnia, to march
on Leipzig, and, in combination with the Crown Prince, to risk a battle.
Eventually, nothing was left for Bliicher but to cross the Saale at Halle. In
his new position he confronted the French, with the Crown Prince behind him.
Meanwhile a
French detachment crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, dispersed the Prussians
besieging that place, and took Dessau. The Emperor hoped that this movement
would force the Crown Prince to withdraw to the right bank of the Elbe, leaving
him free to fell upon the army of Bohemia with 200,000 men. But, learning that
Bliicher was still at Halle, and that the retreat of the Ci'own Prince was
doubtful, he made up his mind that the time had come to concentrate his forces
at Leipzig. The troops which had crossed the Elbe were therefore
ordered to
seize the bridges over that river, and then to march upon Leipzig, whither the
French divisions on the left bank of the Elbe had already begun to move. The
French occupation of Dessau had a depressing effect on the Crown Prince.
Blucher begged him to march straight upon Leipzig; but he preferred a junction
at Halle. Finally, on October 15, in accordance with orders received from
head-quarters, the army of Silesia set out alone, following the right bank of
the Elster in the direction of Leipzig.
Napoleon had
hoped, by1 taking advantage of the inner lines, to beat the allied
armies singly before they could effect a combination. But his design had
failed; it was he who in the end was compelled to fall back on Leipzig, while
the Allies pressed forward against it from the north and south. We left the
army of Bohemia on the borders of Saxony. When joined by the army of Poland it
numbered 240,000 men. But Schwarzenberg was incapable of an energetic
offensive. Leaving Bennigsen and Colloredo to guard Bohemia, he commenced his
northwesterly march on September 26; but his measures were so undecided and
dilatory that he did not reach Altenburg till October 14. Nothing went right.
Though the cavalry were exceptionally strong, they were not sent forward, but
kept in the rear; the divisions continually fell into disorder; above all,
Schwarzenberg dreaded an encounter with Napoleon, and endeavoured rather to
manoeuvre the enemy out of Saxony. Such a scheme was foiedoomed to failure. In
spite of his great numerical superiority, he failed to tear asunder the veil
which Napoleon had drawn over his operations against the northern army, and did
nothing to hinder its eventual defeat. It was entirely owing to Blucher that,
on October 14, the three allied armies were near enough together to be able to
plan a combined attack for the 16th. Murat commanded the forces operating
against the main army, but had only three weak corps at his disposal. Nothing
but his own boldness and the enemy’s indecision enabled him to hold
Schwarzenberg in check, and thus give the Emperor time to engage Blucher and
Bemadotte.
On the 13th
news was received at head-quarters of the conclusion of a treaty with Bavaria,
also a despatch from Blucher saying that he was at Halle, with the Crown Prince
in his neighbourhood. The despatch ended with these words: “ The three armies
are now so close together that a simultaneous attack, on the point where the
enemy has concentrated his forces, might be undertaken.” Blucher proved
himself, now as ever, the propelling power. Schwarzenberg, however, could not
make up his mind to any comprehensive movement against Leipzig, but persisted
in his endeavour to avoid an encounter with Napoleon, with which aim he pushed
his army a little to the left—a movement which would either have enabled the enemy,
with superior numbers, to attack the allied forces separately, or to withdraw
ii* time before being surrounded. At this point Russian influence intervened,
and effected a
combined
movement upon Leipzig. Unfortunately it was carried out in three sections, on
the right of the Pleisse, between the Fleisse and the Elster, and on the left
of the Elster. Wittgenstein was to make a reconnaissance in force; and this
led, on the 14th, to an engagement at Liebertwolkwitz, the greatest cavalry
fight of the campaign.
Murat had at
his disposal about 32,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 156 guns. These he
posted on hilly ground south of Leipzig, his left resting on Liebertwolkwitz,
his centre on Wachau, and his right on Markkleeberg. The range commanded the
country stretching south, its highest point being the Galgenberg, between
Liebertwolkwitz and Wachau. It thus formed a position well protected against an
enemy approaching from the south. The Allies began the battle with inadequate
forces. Attacks and counter-attacks were made and failed; a turning movement
was vainly essayed by Murat; a general advance of the French cavalry was
repelled. Meanwhile the Austrian infantry had jucceeded, after a hard struggle,
in occupying the greater part of Liebertwolkwitz; but the French artillery
prevented them from advancing further. At Wachau the fighting was indecisive.
The cavalry attacks having failed all along the line, Murat pushed forward his
infantry: but it was too late. The Allies were reinforced; and the French abandoned
their attempt. Round Liebertwolkwitz the conflict raged till evening, when the
Austrians evacuated the village. In the end, both armies retained their
positions. Murat still held the heights, and thus secured for Napoleon an
advantageous' ground for the decisive battle; but his cavalry was severely
shaken.
At the allied
head-quarters it was decided to employ the next day in preparing for a great
battle on the 16th. Bliicher received orders to march upon Leipzig, and to
effect a junction with an Austrian division at Markranstadt. On the 15th the
main army took up the positions which had been assigned as the starting-point
for the operations of the 16th. On the 14th Napoleon had arrived at Leipzig.
There were many reasons against his venturing on a decisive battle. His troops
had suffered greatly, particularly the cavalry; the Rhembund troops were
disaffected and meditated desertion; the .generals were sick of fighting. If,
nevertheless, the Emperor stood firm, he did it trusting to his genius and his
star. He hoped to annihilate Schwarzenberg before the army of the north could
arrive. With Bliicher in the field this was a rash hope; it failed, and the
mistake proved fatal.
Napoleon
still had 190,000 men with 734 guns, a force amply sufficient for victory, seeing
that it was under single control; whereas, on the side of the Allies, a
multiplicity of leaders destroyed the requisite unity of command. The allied
armies numbered over 300,000 men, with 1335 guns. But, on the first day of
battle, the Allies were short of 100,000 men, while only 18,000 were missing on
the French side. On the other hand, the moral of the allied troops was
decidedly
superior. At
last they were face to face with the arch-enemy, and could repay him with
interest for the suffering he had inflicted on them. Less confidence was felt
at head-quarters; Schwarzenberg, as usual, appeared to dread an encounter with
the greatest of living commanders.
Napoleon
directed General Bertrand to take up a position at Lindenau, west of Leipzig,
with 10,000 men. A force numbering 50,000 was to cover Leipzig on the north;
but, as the enemy was supposed to be still distant on this side, this force was
to cooperate, if possible, with the main army. The latter, amounting to about
110,000 men, was drawn up in the form of a crescent south of the dty, in much
the same position as that already held by Murat, stretching from the banks of
the Pleisse to Holz- hausen. Against this position the Allies advanced in a
wide semicircle. There was a wide divergence in the views of their commanders.
Schwarzenberg was for attacking from the west, so as to crumple up the
Emperor’s line and bar his retreat; but, in order to carry out this plan, they
would have had to cross the Pleisse, between which and the Elster lay marshy
impassable flats, where a few thousand men could have sufficed for the defence.
This plan was therefore given up; and, by Alexander’s advice, the Russians and
Prussians remained on the right bank of the Pleisse, while only the larger
portion of the Austrian force crossed that river. The result was that the
Allies had only 84,000 men on the main battlefield, which left them
numerically inferior to the French; and that three separate engagements took
place, at Lindenau, at Connewitz, and on the right bank of the Pleisse. As
Schwarzenberg led the Austrian contingent, the supreme command in a manner
devolved upon the Russian general Barclay. The monarchs of Russia and Prussia
stationed themselves on the Wachtberg; Napoleon was at Wachau. The 16th of
October dawned dull and cold; rain and mist partly hid the operations.
The Allies
advanced in four columns. The attack was opened about 8.30 a.m. by Kleist’s Prussians, who after an
hour’s fierce combat wrested Markkleeberg from the French. Meanwhile the second
column, under Duke Eugene, advanced against Napoleon’s centre at Wachau. This
village also fell; and the whole French line seemed to waver. Suddenly
everything was changed. Napoleon appeared on the field, and at once took
advantage of the scattered formation of the Allies. Sending 177 guns to the
front at Wachau, he opened an overwhelming cannonade, under cover of which
dense masses of infantry moved forward. After an obstinate resistance the
Russians were forced back into the plain, where, having no cover, they were mown
down by thousands. Meanwhile, on the east, Markkleeberg was several times lost
and won; on the west the Austrians under Klenau captured Liebertwolkwitz, but
had to surrender it again. The allied line began slowly to give way.
Napoleon now
determined to break through the weakest part of the enemy’s line at Wachau,
despatching Macdonald to turn their right. The sovereigns, recognising their
danger, requested Schwarzenberg to
transfer the
Austrian reserves to the threatened quarter, and called up from the rear the
Guards and grenadiers; but much time was lost before these orders were carried
out. Between 12 and 1 o’clock the French advance began. Under cover of a
murderous fire from 150 guns, 10,000 cavalry under Murat galloped forward. They
divided into two parts, the smaller advancing against Kleist, the larger
against Eugene. Behind the cavalry the Emperor massed his infantry, while
Macdonald advanced on the French left. At first all went well. Murat’s powerful
column rode down two battalions of infantry, took 26 Russian guns, dispersed a
division of Russian cavalry of the Guard, and stormed on to within a few
hundred paces of the Wachtberg, where the Emperor Alexander ,tood. If the
infantxy had followed up the charge, the battle would have been won. But at
this point the cavalry, already in some disorder, were checked by a marsh
between two lakes ; the defenders hurried up from all sides; and the French
advance was stayed. Unsupported by reserves, one regiment after another turned
round; the huge force streamed back, while the French guns fired
indiscriminately upon friend and foe. The attack on the allied left shared the
same fate; here, too, a fatal blow was all but dealt, when the Austrian
reserves came up and checked the charge. It was doubtless owing to Napoleon’s
absence that the infantry had failed to come up at the right moment; and now
the retreating squadrons prevented the foot from deploying. All. they could do
was to form square and repel the counter-attack. Sanguinary collisions occurred
at various places; and at 6 p.m. the
battle in this part of the field ended in a furious cannonade.
Meanwhile the
main Austrian force had been losing heavily and to no purpose among the swamps
and thickets on the left bank of the Pleisse. Schwarzenberg at last recognised
his error, and sent a detachment to the chief scene of action, whither he
himself followed. On the extreme left, at Lindenau, the Austrians, in spite of
their superiority, had no success. Thus, on the whole, the French had won the
day, for they had repulsed the attack of the army of Bohemia; but they had
gained no decisive victory, and this was all-important. Such a victory would
have been theirs if Ney and Marmont had joined in the main battle. Napoleon
called them up, but Marmont was engaged with Bliicher; and Ney, who was already
on the march, was forced to go to his colleague’s assistance. He arrived on the
field too late, having dragged his corps—which might have decided the issue on
the north, as on the south—backwards and forwards to no purpose.
Just as the
cavalry charge at Wachau was at its height, a dull rumble was heard from the
north. Berthier took it for a distant thunderstorm; but Napoleon’s practised
ear recognised the sound of guns, and knew what it meant. He turned his horse
round, and rode full speed to Mockern; hence his absence from Wachau at the
decisive moment of the fight. Bliicher had started early, and his steps were
hastened by the
1813]
Bliicher at Mockern. A day's pause. 537
sound of
heavy firing at Wachau; but, as the Crown Prince gave him inadequate support,
he was compelled to advance with great caution. He arrived when Marmont was on
the point of starting; and the latter at once saw that everything depended on
keeping him back. With this view he took up a strong position between Mockem
and Eutritsch, posting forty guns behind the former village. Bliicher, for his
part, knew that the army of Bohemia must be relieved, and that therefore he
must go forward without counting the cost. Six times did the Prussians under
York attempt to storm Mockem, which was stubbornly defended by the French. A
savage hand-to-hand struggle raged in the narrow village streets. House after
house was taken; but the French artillery prevented a complete occupation, and
even enabled their infantry to recover the larger part of the village. An
attack on the heights behind Mockern was repelled with heavy loss; and the
battle seemed lost. In this extremity, York hurled his cavalry upon the enemy;
the charge was successful, and the French gave way. The infantry instantly
followed up the attack; and Marmont’s forces fell back upon Leipzig in
disorder.
The straggle
for the possession of Mockem was the bloodiest episode of the whole war. The
Prussian losses were estimated at between 5500 and 7000 men; those of Marmont
were about the same. The total losses of the two armies cannot be exactly
reckoned; approximately they were, on the side of the Allies, 38,000 killed and
wounded, besides 2000 prisoners; on that of the French, the numbers were 23,000
and 2500 respectively. The “Battle of the Nations” had thus cost over
60,000 men. After the battle of Borodino, it was
the most sanguinaiy in modem history.
On the
morning of the 17th the allied armies stood ready to renew the struggle; but,
as Napoleon did not attack, they put off the combat till the following day,
when the arrival of the Crown Prince and Bennigsen would give them a crushing
superiority. The only movement was made by Bliicher, who drove the French
further back upon Gohlis; but, as quiet reigned to the south of Leipzig, he too
paused.
Napoleon’s
position was clear enough. He had been mistaken about Bliicher, and had gained
no real victory at Wachau. Two courses alone were open to him, either to beat a
speedy retreat, in order to extricate himself from the toils; or to resume the
battle instantly, in order to make the most of his advantage over
Schwarzenberg. He did neither, but gloomy and undecided, sat brooding over the
prospect. Finally he despatched to his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria,
the offer of an armistice; but no answer was vouchsafed. While he hoped and
waited, time went by; and his doom implacably approached.
In the
evening of the 17th he decided to continue the battle on the morrow; but he
despatched Bertrand to cover a possible retreat by securing the passages of the
Saale. Mortier had orders to guard the paaa of Lindenau; and the whole army was
concentrated round Leipzig.
The French
line formed a sweeping semicircle on the south, west, and north sides of
Leipzig, resting to the southward on the Pleisse at Losnig, to the northward on
the Elster at Gohlis. The centre of this position, at Paunsdorf, was left weak,
because Napoleon believed that the army of the north would not take part in the
battle. The comparative strength of the forces had changed very much to his
disadvantage. The French army numbered only about 135,000 men, of whom 5000
Saxons and Wiirtembergers subsequently deserted. The Allies were twice as
strong; they were able in the course of the day to bring up about
268,000 men, of whom over 100,000 were fresh
troops. Nevertheless, Napoleon, unaware of this fact, still hoped for victory.
Schwarzenberg
had kept only a weak Austrian detachment on the left bank of the Pleisse. The
main army was to the south of Leipzig, Bliicher to the north. The space between
was to be filled on the left by Bennigsen, when he arrived, on the right by the
Crown Prince. But the latter was unwilling to expose himself unless Bliicher
made over to him Langeron’s corps and Saint-Priest’s division; that is to say,
half the army of Silesia. It was an audacious demand; but the Field-marshal,
with praiseworthy self-abnegation, was ready to grant anything, in order that
the army of the north should go forward.
Schwarzenberg
formed the main army in three columns. The first, under the Prince of
Hesse-Homburg, was to drive the French from the Pleisse; the second, under
Barclay, was to advance by way of Wachau ; the third, under Bennigsen, to the
right of that position, was to push forward by way of Holzhausen and
Stotteritz. The three attacks were to be made simultaneously at 7 a.m. ; but Bennigsen did not arrive till
2 p.m., nor the Crown Prince till
4 p.m. ; while, in spite of the
large number of troops available, the reserves were not brought into play. These
circumstances, combined with a grievous lack of generalship at head-quarters,
enabled Napoleon for some time to hold his own.
The
Austrians, on the extreme left, began by capturing several villages, and won
their way to Connewitz; but here they were again driven back by the Young Guard
and the Poles, until the arrival of reinforcements enabled them to make another
stand. It was a serious disadvantage to the Austrians that Barclay, their
neighbour on the right, did not make a simultaneous advance. He found Wachau
and Liebertwolkwitz unoccupied, but was met at Probstheida by a heavy fire. The
Prussians and Russians forced their way into the village, and, though
repeatedly driven out, had occupied the greater part of it, when the fire of
150 guns brought them to a halt. Shaken by this cannonade, they were attacked
by the Old and the Young Guard with some line regiments, and driven from the
village. The slaughter was so terrible that Schwarzenberg withdrew his troops,
and left Probstheida to the French.
The cause of
Barclay’s delay was his desire to await Bennigsen’s intervention. When the
latter at length came up, he led a vastly
superior
force against Macdonald. The French made a desperate defence, especially at
Holzhausen; tut numbers eventually told. All the neighbouring villages fell
into the hands of the Allies; still they could make no further advance. To the
left of Macdonald stood Reynier with the Saxons and Wiirtembergers. Both,
especially the Saxons, had long been disaffected; but the King had not dared to
desert Napoleon. These troops now took the matter into their own hands, and the
majority went over to the Allies. The rank and file received them with cries of
joy, the generals with coldness. The King of Prussia curtly remarked, “ These
gentlemen from Saxony are a little late; they could have saved us many men.”
Reynier, left with only 4000 men, defended Paunsdorf obstinately, and till 4 p.m. kept the enemy at bay.
At this point
the northern army struck in, the Prussians under Biilow in front. They stormed
the burning village, but a further advance was repelled with loss; and
Napoleon, coming up with the Young and the Old Guard, recaptured Paunsdorf. It
was only for a time; the Allies were reinforced, and the place became
untenable. The French retired; but, till night fell, they held their ground in
the village of Stiinz. The next village to Stiinz was Schonefeld, which formed
the key of the French position on the left bank of the Parthe, north of
Leipzig. Here stood Marmont with his weakened corps. Langeron attacked him at 3
p.m. ; and a conflict ensued,
which, if possible, exceeded all the rest in violence. Finally Langeron ei
gaged his entire corps,' but not till nightfall did the French evacuate the
village, in which there lay 10,000 killed and wounded men. Here, too, Billow’s
advance finally told. On the extreme right Sacken led the attack, while York
had charge of the reserves. The Russians, after some preliminary success, were
driven back beyond Gohlis, so that the Prussians had to come to their relief
and to storm the village again. Pfaffendorf fell after severe fighting. The
French were at length forced back to their entrenchments before the Hallc-gate
of Leipzig.
The sun went
down in thick wreaths of smoke amid the thunder of 1500 guns. Each side had
lost about 25,000 men, the French rather less, the Allies rather more. Even now
the battle, as a whole, was undecided. The French had repulsed every attack on
their right wing; on their left and centre they had lost a number of villages;
but it was only in front of Bliicher that they were driven back upon Leipzig.
Their line of retreat by Lindenau stiU remained open. The Allies could not
claim a victory; rather they expected a renewal of the fight next day.
Schwarzenberg gave orders accordingly. Bliicher judged the situation more
correctly, his opinion being that the essential thing was to block the enemy’s
retreat. He made little impression on Schwarzenberg, hut Frederick William
agreed that York should hasten on to Merseburg. York’s cavalry reached Halle by
the following morning.
On a low
stool by the watch-fire sat the Emperor of the French.
He recognised
that his position was untenable, and gave orders for the retreat. Then, utterly
exhausted, he fell asleep. The directions which he appears to have given to
construct bridges were not obeyed; and the army had to wind its way through the
narrow streets of Leipzig, to pass out by a single gate, and to cross the river
Pleisse at Lindenau by a single bridge. The operation necessarily took a long
time. The retreat began at night, part of the troops being left to defend the
outposts of the city as long as possible. The confusion was terrible; all order
was lost; Napoleon himself was carried away in the stream of fugitives.
At daybreak
on October 19 the Allies perceived that the field was empty and the battle won.
They marched in from all sides towards Leipzig, singing and rejoicing; but the
possession of the city was disputed for hours, and the struggle was continued
in the streets. On the Ranstadt bridge there was a fearful crush, It was
already threatened by Sacken’s Russians, when suddenly it was blown into the
air. This cut off the retreat of the troops who were still on the further side
of the Pleisse, The Italian and Rhembund troops laid down their arms, or turned
them against their former comrades. The Poles and French, who acted as a
rear-guard, made a desperate defence; when all was over, they flung themselves
into the river. Many were drowned, among them the brave Marshal Poniatovski.
Whole regiments and many generals, including Reynier, Lauristpn, Bertrand, and
Macdonald, were taken prisoners. But the victory was dearly bought. It was
calculated that during the four days’ battle 120,000 men were killed or
wounded. The losses of the Allies were even heavier than those of the French;
and
20,000 sick lay in the hospitals of Leipzig.
Napoleon’s
position was critical, all but hopeless. His line of retreat, or rather flight,
passed across the left wing of the Allies; and almost the whole of Germany had to
be traversed before a halt could be made. It was obvious that an energetic
pursuit and an intelligent use of the resources offered by a hostile country
were all that was needed to complete his annihilation. But neither was
attempted. The Coalition was incapable of such swift and purposeful action. One
Austrian detachment approached Napoleon’s flank obliquely, but effected
nothing. York alone showed himself dangerous, by seizing the passages of the
Saale and compelling the Emperor to take the route through the Thiiringer Wald
by Erfurt. At Eisenach a detachment of Bliicher’s force vainly tried to stop
his march, Instead of being allowed to press the pursuit, Blucher now received
orders to march upon Giessen and Wetzlar, so as to oppose a possible passage of
the Rhine at Coblenz; but Napoleon hurried straight on to Mainz. Near Hanau his
further progress was hindered by the Bavarian general Wrede with some 40,000
men. The Bavarians fought obstinately, but after a three days’ combat (October
29-31) they were thrust aside. The French continued their march, and on
November 2 crossed the Rhine at Mainz. Lack of
unanimity and
feeble generalship on the part of the Allies had saved Napoleon’s army. But he
had suffered serious additional losses on the way, and brought back to France
only about 70,000 men, of whom
30,000 soon afterwards fell victims to typhus,
and many others wasted away. Within little more than a year, two French armies,
amounting together to nearly a million of men, had perished.
The autumn
campaign of 1813 was by no means a .nasterpiece of Napoleonic strategy. The
Emperor met the Allies with an army of almost equal strength; his generals were
the most experienced in Europe, while two of the hostile armies were led by men
of inferior ability; and yet he was completely defeated. The main causes of his
defeats were in the man himself. His old genius still glowed within him, but he
had left behind him in Russia his energy and his magic certainty of victory.
Formerly his armies possessed both mobility and staying power; now he was tied
and bound by the connexion with Dresden. Dresden offered many advantages; with
it he held Saxony in his hand; but it lay too near the Erzgebirge, and too far
from the enemy’s vulnerable points; and it was an unfortified town. Magdeburg,
with its fortifications, would have made a better base of operations. Had it
been occupied, the pusillanimous Schwarzenberg would have had to come out into
the open field; Berlin would have baen within attainable distance; and the
Emperor could have left the defence of the city to its own ramparts and its own
guns. He would thus have been to a certain extent free, whereas now he was
crippled in every movement.
Moreover, he
was always evolving new plans, but executed none of them with energy, independence,
and completeness. Instead of using to the full the advantages of inner lines,
by first annihilating one opponent and then atls eking the next, he kept making
partial advances and strokes in the air, which fatigued his troops and finally
led him to Leipzig. He even allowed his victory over the main army to be turned
into the defeat of Kulm. It must, however, be allowed that in the conduct of
single battles he displayed far greater energy than in the strategic handling
of his armies as a whole. A French officer, who was taken prisoner, said of the
Emperor that his present strategy was strikingly different from the past; he
had lost his old activity; he betrayed a great craving for comfort, especially
for sleep; he was irritable and morose. In short, he resembled a sick Titan,
suffering from some secret hurt; and his achievements were no longer
proportionate to his renown.
Germany was
now free to the Rhine; her territorial Princes returned to their capitals; only
a few fortresses still remained in the hands of the enemy. It might have been
expected that the Allies would have at once ittvaded France; on the fcontrary,
there ensued a long pause in the military operations. Military and political
reasons, the very nature of
the
Coalition, brought about a kind of armistice, a relaxation after the strain.
The allied armies occupied the line of the Rhine; and the sovereigns of the
Great Powers assembled at Frankfort, where their conflicting aims and wishes at
once asserted themselves.
Austria had,
in the meanwhile, fought victoriously in Italy, and fairly recovered her
earlier position. The loss of her former Belgian possessions might now be
counterbalanced south of the Alps. Thus she had no interest in the complete
overthrow of Napoleon. On the contrary, to continue the war implied further
sacrifices of men and money; and its result could not be foreseen. If it ended
favourably, it would advance the prospects of Russia and Prussia more than
those of Austria. The Crown Prince of Sweden, who commanded the northern army,
was opposed to the invasion of France. He could not forget that he had once
been a French, Marshal, and he had his eye on the French throne; but his
influence was rendered comparatively ineffective by the fact that he aimed at
the conquest of Norway, which involved war with Denmark. The array of Silesia,
on the other hand, demanded an energetic offensive; but Bliicher and Gneisenau
were only generals, and Frederick William was anything but warlike. Timid and
unenterprising, he chiefly aimed at preserving his army, his only defence among
disaffected rivals. In the Russian head-quarters opinions were divided. Here
many generals and diplomatists held that to continue fighting at an ever-
increasing distance from their own frontier would bring little profit to
Russia. The Tsar, on the other hand, was eager to press forward; he longed to
counter Napoleon’s entry into Moscow by his own entry into Paris. Besides, the
more strongly he figured as the tamer of the Revolution incarnate in Napoleon,
the more would his voice weigh in the final settlement, when he meant to assert
extensive claims to Polish territory. On this point Austrian and Prussian
interests were naturally opposed to those of Russia. On the other hand, his
warlike mood chimed in with that of Bliicher, and of the Tory party now in
power in England. For years her army had fought victoriously against Napoleon
in the Peninsula; and Wellington had now crossed the Pyrenees with some 80,000
men, and occupied a firm position in the south of France.
The clash of
so many opposing views might well have brought about an agreement with
Napoleon; and Europe actually beheld the incredible spectacle of the four
Powers making overtures to their vanquished enemy and offering him the “
natural ” boundaries of France. Early in November a French envoy had two
interviews with Mettemich at Frankfort. The terms proposed by the Allies were
that France should retire behind the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees,
resigning her conquests in Germany, Italy, and Spain. This offer meant,
practically, a return to the limits of 1797; it left Belgium, the left bank of
the Rhine, Savoy and Nice, in the hands of France. But Napoleon could not
abandon the dream of universal empire; he returned (Nov. 16) an evasive answer,
suggesting a
European
Congress. A fortnight later, Caulaincourt practically accepted the terms, but
it was now too late; the Allies had virtually withdrawn their offer, It may be
doubted whether they had ever really agreed in making it. England was
determined not to leave Antwerp in Napoleon’s hands; Prussian statesmen dreaded
the presence of his armies on the Rhine; the Tsar meant to dictate peace at
Paris. The policy of Austria was, as usual, doubtful; but Mettemich himself
does not appear to have expected that Napoleon would yield. It was therefore
with feelings of relief that most members of the Coalition heard the news of a
decision which implied a fresh recourse to arms.
There were,
however, military grounds which hindered an immediate continuance of active
operations. The armies of the three eastern Powers were in bad case; those of
the Rhembund Princes who had come over had to be incorporated; and it was
necessary to determine the further conduct of the war. Various plans of
campaign were projected, the boldest being that of Gneisenau, which aimed at
Paris as the final goal. The scheme proposed by the Emperor Alexander was
eventually adopted in its essential features.
The allied
forces were now distributed as follows: on the right, the army of the Crown
Prince, 102,000 men and 316 guns, and the army of Silesia, under Bliicher,
82,000 men and 312 guns; in the centre, the main army, under Schwarzenberg,
200,000 men and 682 guns; on the left, the Austro-Italian army, about 55,000
men, and that of Wellington, about 80,000 men. To these must be added about
100,000 men, not yet concentrated, who were to besiege the German fortresses
still held by the French, making a total of about 620,000 men.
The forces at
Napoleon’s disposal were numerically far inferior. Of the 400,000 men with whom
he had begun the campaign, only about
70,000 had recrossed the Rhine. His position was
far worse than it had been a year before. He had lost Germany, and with it the
Rhdnbund troops; and he could no longer carry on war in the enemy’s country,
France, moreover, was becoming exhausted, while the strength of the Allies, now
joined by Bavaria, Saxony, etc., was proportionately increased. A new army had
to be created by means of reckless conscription. But the French people were
tired of war; the men came in slowly; and in December only about 53,000 troops
were available for the defence of the Rhine, a line upwards of 300 miles in
length. The Emperor’s embarrassments were increased by want of arms,
ammunition, and horses, by the untrustworthiness of his marshals, and finally
by a superfluity of fortresses in Holland and Belgium and on the frontier. His
gravest fear was for Belgium, on account of the large factories of arms
situated in that country; he therefore concentrated his chief force in that
direction and on the lower Rhine. The upper Rhine and the Swiss frontier were
insufficiently protected. Macdonald commanded the northern section of the
frontier as far as Cologne, and Marmont the southern.
Napoleon
secretly hoped that the Allies would leave him in peace till the spring, but he
was disappointed. Austria, not without an eye to the war in northern Italy,
proposed the plateau of Langres as their first destination and the most
important scene of operations. According to the plan finally adopted, half of
Bemadotte’s army was to march into Holland by Diisseldorf and Cologne; while
Bliicher with the army of Silesia was to cross the middle Rhine and occupy the
enemy till the main army should have penetrated into France from the direction
of Basel and Schaffhausen. The latter was then to press upon Napoleon’s right,
and effect a junction with Wellington’s army and that of Italy.
On December
22 the Bavarians, under Wrede, crossed the Rhine and laid siege to Hiiningen.
Bliicher transferred the main part of his force to the left bank on New Year’s
Eve at Caub, the rest crossing at Lahnstein and Mannheim. The Crown Prince
contented himself with besieging Hamburg, which was held by Davout, and
despatched but a weak division to the conquest of the Netherlands under the
Prussian general von Billow. Bliicher pressed vigorously forward, took Coblenz,
and laid siege to Mainz. An attempt to entrap Marmont at Kaiserslautern
miscarried; but on January 10 and 11,1814, Bliicher crossed the Saar, and
Marmont was forced to retire hastily upon Metz, before whose walls York’s
van-guard appeared on the 18th.
Meanwhile the
main army had moved forward on an extended front to Colmar. The forces opposed
were very small, and it would have been easy to reach Langres; but it was humoured
that Napoleon was assembling
80,000 men, and caution rendered progress slow.
Since, however, no serious resistance was encountered, the army advanced on
January 14 to the neighbourhood of Langres, where it awaited the enemy. Three
days later an officer was sent to demand the surrender of the fortress, which,
to his amazement, he found empty. Mortier had left it unobserved, and retired
beyond Chaumont. Further operations were deferred, in order to allow the rest
of the army time to come up.
The French
abandoned the line of the Moselle to the army of Silesia without a blow; and
Bliicher, leaving York before Metz, turned towards the Meuse. He had vainly
tried to persuade the commander-in-chief to initiate a general movement on
Paris. Gneisenau wrote to the Austrian chief of the staff: “ We only need a
single battle to make us complete victots. For this purpose the main army
should advance to the middle Seine, and the reserves which are to cover its
flank and rear should be posted, not on the Rhine, but at CMlons-sur-Marne. All
we have to do is to press on towards Paris without delay.” But the advice was
unheeded; and the weakened army of Silesia was thus thrown on its own
resources. It pushed on, however, and on the 22nd captured the line of the
Meuse with little difficulty. Continuing the pursuit, Bliicher defeated the
French at Ligny, and pressed on to the Marne, which Sacken’s vanguard crossed
at Joinville on the 23rd. In nine days, in spite of floods,
1814]
Napoleon attacks Bliicher. Battle of La Rothiere. 545
frozen roads,
and the resistance of the enemy, the army of Silesia had marched seventy-five
miles, crossed three rivers, and joined hands with the main army.
Schwarzenberg
had not yet left the commanding position of the plateau of Langres, partly
owing to military, but still more to political considerations. Caulaincourt,
Foreign Minister at Paris, had suggested negotiation—a proposal agreeable to
Mettemich, but not to the Tsar. It was eventually settled that a congress of
plenipotentiaries should meet. Meanwhile the army slowly groped its way
forward. On January 24, the van-guard encountered Mortier at Bar-sur-Aube.
There was a sanguinary but indecisive battle, after which Mortier evacuated his
position by night as skilfully and secretly as at Langres. He retired on
Troyes, feebly pursued by the Allies.
Bliicher,
having reached Brienne, and come into touch with Schwarzenberg, now urged the
commander-in-chief to advance directly on Paris. His resolution was not
disturbed by an attack upon his rear-guard at St Dizier, so fully did he rely
on the cooperation of the main army in this operation. But Schwarzenberg
declined to move, merely ordering the two nearest corps to go to Bliicher’s
assistance if he were hard- pressed. With a general so minded, disaster was to
be expected. The attack upon St Dizier was the beginning of Napoleon’s
offensive.
Domestic
politics, the new conscription, and other causes, possibly even indecision, had
hitherto detained Napoleon in Paris. He left the capital on January 25, and
reached the camp at Chalons on the following day. Here, among his troops, he
was once more possessed by the old warlike spirit. He had about 42,000 men near
St Dizier; Macdonald was coming up with 10,000; and Mortier with 20,000 was in
the neighbourhood of Troyes. Without delay Napoleon attacked the nearest
division of the enemy at St Dizier, repulsed it, and thus separated York and
Bliicher. He then turned on the latter, and, in order to prevent his junction
with the main army, attacked him at Brienne (January 29). Bliicher was not
unprepared; but the fighting went so much against him that in the night he
abandoned the field, and fell back on Schwarzenberg, making a further stand
between La Rothiere and Trannes.
At this
moment the forces under Blucher’s command happened to consist almost entirely
of Russians. As Napoleon did not advance, Bliicher pressed forward. At 1 p.m.
on February 1 he fell upon La Rothiere. The roads were impassable; and it was
snowing heavily, with a strong wind. After some hours’ fighting, Wrede decided
the action by repulsing the enemy’s left wing. The Wiirtembergers joined him;
and at nightfall La Rothiere was taken by the Russians. A fresh advance on the
part of the French was only repelled with the aid of reinforcements. The battle
was now won; but lack of reserves and a terrible snowstorm
prevented
Bliicher from following up his victory, which, even so, cost Napoleon 6000 men
and about 70 guns.
Down to this
point the conduct of the campaign leaves the impression that Napoleon was not
himself; now he shook off his lethargy and rose to the greatness of his task.
For the victorious Allies there began a series of defeats. They believed that
Napoleon’s power was shattered, that the way to Paris lay open, and that all
they had to do was to follow up their advantage in leisurely fashion until the
peace negotiations should bring matters to a definite conclusion. With this
object, Bliicher was again to separate from Schwarzenberg, and, keeping to the
right of the main army, to march on Paris by way of Chalons, while the main
army kept on in the direction of Troyes. On February 7 this place was occupied.
On the 9th it was reported that Napoleon,- far xom being crushed, was advancing
against Bliicher. Next day Bliicher sent word that he was attacked by a
superior force, and begged Schwarzenberg to assist him by falling upon the
enemy’s rear. Under pressure from the Emperor Alexander a half-hearted movement
was made; but Schwarzenberg’s lack of energy and insight, and the divergence
of Russian and Austrian diplomacy, spoilt everything, and the irmy of Silesia
was left in the lurch.
The political
causes of this disastrous error must now be briefly explained. In view of the
prevailing want of harmony among the Allies, the British Government sent out
Lord Castlereagh, then Foreign Minister, to take part in the pending
negotiations. On his arrival at head-quarters, about the middle of January, he
found the Coalition in imminent risk of break ig-up through the mutual
jealousies, suspicions, and selfishness of its component parts. The great thing
was to bring Austria into line; and this Castlereagh succeeded in doing by
allaying Mettemich’s fears about Poland and Saxony, and persuading him that
France must be reduced to her old boundaries to secure the safety of Europe. On
the other hand, Alexander had to be cajoled into entering upon aiiy negotiation
at all; and this was only effected by a threat oh the part of Austria to
withdraw from the Coalition. The Conference opened at Chatillon-sur-Seine on
February 5. Caulaincourt represented France. On the 7th the Allies stated their
terms, which went far beyond those of Frankfort. France was now to give up
Belgium, the Left Bank, Savoy, and Nice; she was to retire within the
boundaries of 1791; England would restore some colonies by way of compensation.
The news of these demands reached the Emperor at Nogent at a moment when his
fortunes seemed almost desperate. Caulaincourt had been instructed to make
peace on the basis which had been offered and refused two months before; but
Napoleon was not yet beaten so low as to accept the new demands without a
further effort. He •shut himself up for a day and a night; by the morning of
the 8th he had resolved not to accept the terms, but to annihilate Bliicher and
I814]
Napoleon breaks up the army of Silesia. 547
then
to. drive back Schwarzenberg. The first part of his plan all but succeeded. ,
Blucher had
marched forward sure of victory; and York, believing Napoleon to be held fast
by the main army near Troyes, drove Marmont out of Chalons; the Russian cavalry
pursued Macdonald. Thus the separate divisions drew far apart. Finally York
pressed on down the Marne against Chateau-Thierry; Sacken advanced in the
centre; Karpow. formed the left wing at Sezanne; the other divisions of the
army were still further in the rear. As most of the cavalry were operating
against Macdonald, there was a lack of troops for reconnoitring. On the 8th
there was a skirmish on the left at Sezanne. This caused some alarm at
head-quarters, but nobody believed that there was any serious danger. York
occupied Chateau-Thierry, and proceeded slowly down the river; Sacken engaged
the enemy at La Ferte, and met with a stout resistance. The news from the left
wing became more threatening; it was reported that Napoleon with some 35,000
men was at Sezanne. Thereupon Blucher ordered up York, Sacken, and Kleist, and
summoned Wittgenstein, whose force formed part of the main army. But, before
these movements could be executed, the storm broke.
Napoleon, with
the greater part of his troops, had abandoned his insecure position at Troyes
in order to fall upon Blucher, and, holding the inner line, was able, by
rapidity of movement, to attack the enemy before he could collect his forces.
On February 10 he repulsed the Russians at Braye and turned their flank at
Champaubert. It was only by furious fighting with the bayonet that 2000 men
with 15 guns were able to break through and reach Chatillon-sur-Mame. On the
11th York and Sacken attempted to effect their junction at Montmirail. Napoleon
hastened thither, and at once attacked Sacken, who had arrived first. Had
Sacken been reinforced by York at the right moment, it would have gone hard
with the French; but the Prussian commander deliberated too long, and sent only
two brigades to the support of his Russian colleague. Sacken’s 14,000 men were
defeated by superior forces, the enemy breaking through between the Russians
and the Prussians on their left. As the Allies had the Marne in their rear,
their retreat was extremely difficult; that they succeeded in effecting it, was
due to the courage of a Prussian brigade, which lost heavily in covering the
retirement. Next day, at Chateau-Thierry, where two bridges had been hastily
constructed, the Allies were again attacked, and had to fight a severe
rear-guard action before they could place the Marne between themselves and
their pursuers. Thence they directed their march on Soissons.
Meanwhile,
Blucher, with 15,000 Prussians and Russians, had remained stationary on the road
leading westwards from Montmirail, in complete ignorance of what was passing.
It was not till the evening of the 12th that he received the news of York’s
retreat. In order to relieve York, he advanced towards Stages on the 13th,
repulsed the French division
548
Causes of the defeat of Bliicher. He recovers himself. [I814
there, and
pushed forward until he stumbled on Napoleon. The Emperor had left only a small
force to pursue Sacken and York; with the chief part of his army he turned
towards Montmirail, and behind Vauchamp succeeded in massing 50,000 men.
Bliicher’s van-guard had advanced too far; it was driven out of Vauchamp and
retired in disorder on the main body. When Bliicher recognised the strength of
the enemy and discovered with whom he had to do, he at once retreated. It was
almost too late. The French cavalry pressed hard upon him; and continuous
rear-guard fighting inflicted on the Prussians a loss of 4000 men, half of
their force, while the Russians lost 2000; the French loss was not over 600.
The army of Silesia was thus defeated in detail, and completely broken up. The
total loss amounted to 16,000 men.
The causes of
this disaster may be briefly stated. It had been intended to march upon Paris
in concentric formation; but this plan was gradually abandoned. The main army
shogged more and more towards the left, and moreover delayed its advance; the
troops which should have linked it up with the army of Silesia were diverted
from this purpose; consequently Bliicher’s left flank was left uncovered
without his knowledge, and the danger came upon him unawares. Carelessness,
mistaken orders, want of unity, and various mishaps did the rest. Had Napoleon
been able to follow up the army of Silesia, it would have been annihilated; but
threatening news from the Seine recalled the Emperor to the defence of his
capital. Thus Bliicher gained time to reassemble and reorganise his scattered
divisions at Chalons. Reinforcements were already on the way; and Biilow was
expected from the Netherlands. Bliicher therefore remained in Chalons till the
18th, when he again set out to join the main army. “ We acted,” said Gneisenau,
“ as if we had not been beaten. Five days after the defeat we tgain took the
offensive.”
Schwarzenberg
had been slowly advancing. His cavalry already ranged as far as Melun and
Fontainebleau. But the news of Bliicher’s inisfortunes caused him to halt; he
lost heart, and even began to draw back. The French in front of him recovered
courage and gained some small successes. Napoleon himself now appeared. Leaving
Marmont behind after the fight at Vauchamp, he had, on the 14th, turned against
Schwarzenberg. Having only 56,000 men at his disposal, he summoned even the
veterans to join him in the field. Maison was ordered to detain Biilow in
Holland; Augereau was to attack the Austrians in southern France and threaten
their left flank. Having himself defeated two advanced bodies of the enemy,
Napoleon took measures to secure all the passages across the Seine from Nogent
to Montereau.
Meanwhile the
conferences at CMtillon had been suspended for a week (February 9-17), owing
partly to a mandate from Alexander, partly to Napoleon’s anxiety to defeat
Bliicher. They were only renewed when Metternich repeated his threat to
withdraw the Austrian forces.
1814J Schwarzenberg's retreat. Bliicher acts
independently. 549
The Allies
were willing to make peace on terms which would have left France the limits of
1791, provided that Napoleon would renounce all claim to influence beyond them.
Caulaincourt was ready to accept these conditions; his master, encouraged by
his recent success, was more ambitious. He was resolved not to cede Belgium and
the left bank of the Rhine, and he instructed his envoy accordingly. So
depressed were the Allies that, at Schwarzenberg’s suggestion, they asked for
an armistice; but Napoleon refused to parley except on the basis of the
“natural frontiers” of France. In these circumstances, Schwarzenberg conceived
his only hope of safety to lie in a general retreat. His decision was hastened
by a fresh reverse. In order to cover the withdrawal, he intended to hold the
outlying position of Montereau till the evening of the 19th. But on the 18th
the Crown Prince of Wiirtemberg, who commanded there, was attacked by Napoleon,
and, after a stout resistance, driven out of the town with the loss of 5000
men.
Schwarzenberg,
believing his own strength to be insufficient, now called on Bliicher to join
him, on the understanding that, if the latter could reach Mery-sur-Seine by the
21st it might then be possible to renew the advance. Bliicher replied that he
would be on the spot. There seemed to be every prospect of a decisive battle;
and on the 20th Gneisenau and Grolman went to head-quarters to discuss a plan
of action. But again a change occurred. Schwarzenberg had received news that
Augereau was pressing up the Saone from the south, and that other hostile
forces were marching towards Geneva. Instead of effecting his junction with
Bliicher and then attacking Napoleon with a superior force, he became anxious about
his flank and rear.
On February
22 a council of war was held at Troyes, at which Schwarzenberg’s proposal to
retreat prevailed. He informed Bliicher that for the present he dared not risk
a battle, and directed him accordingly to retire northwards towards the Marne,
to join Winzingerode and Biilow (whose corps were to be at his disposal), and,
having effected his junction, to divert the attention of Napoleon from the main
army. This meant yet another separation of the two armies; but it did not at once
relieve Schwarzenberg, for Napoleon gave him no rest. Pushing on, he stormed
Troyes; and the main army retired beyond Bar-sur-Aube. On the 25th, at a
council of war held at that place, it was decided that the main army should
continue its retreat by way of Chaumont to Langres, and that Bliicher should
act independently. The Field-marshal had already set about executing his part
of the plan, furious at Schwaxzenberg’s retirement, but overjoyed at recovering
his independence, together with a large accession of strength. After some
fighting at Mery, he attacked Marmont at Sezanne, in order to draw off
Napoleon’s forces. Marmont was defeated; and Napoleon now became seriously
anxious about Paris. Leaving his position in front of Schwarzenberg, he marched
northwards with a large part of his army on the 27th.
On his
approach Bliicher skilfully withdrew, and crossed the Marne. The object of the
Prussian commander was thus attained.
Hitherto, the
conferences at Chatillon had produced no result. But, within the Coalition
itself, mutual relations had improved; and this was even more important than
immediate successes in the field. On February 21 Napoleon had written to his
father-in-law, urging him not to sacrifice the interests of Austria to those of
his allies, but to accept peace on the basis offered at Frankfort. Received a
little earlier, this proposal might have broken up the Coalition; while, on the
other hand, Alexander and Frederick William were seriously considering whether
they should not abandon the connexion with Austria and prosecute the war
alone. What prevented so disastrous an issue was Napoleon’s obsti racy and the
very successes which he had recently obtained. His refusal of an armistice
disgusted the Emperov Francis, who, on the 27th, returned an unfavourable
answer to his son-in-law. Under pressure of misfortune and alarm the alliance
was now compacted into a closer bond, which took shape in the Treaty of
Chaumont. By this important treaty the Four Powers bound themselves not to
negotiate separately with Napoleon, but to continue the war till France should
be reduced to her pre-revolutionary limits. The forces that each was to
maintain were defined; Great Britain promised large subsidies; the League was
to be defensive or offensive as might be requisite. Napoleon was given till
March 11 to accept the terms mentioned above.
Even while
the Treaty of Chaumont was in the making—it was dated March 1, though not
actually signed till the 9th—its effects, combined with those of Bliicher’s
movement, began to be felt. After Napoleon’s departure from Troyes, only a few
troops under Oudinot, Macdonald, and Milhaud remained in front of the main
army; and on February 27 Schwarzenberg was again able to order a general
advance. This proved the turning-point of the campaign. After a brave
resistance, Oudinot was utterly defeated at Bar-sur-Aube. The Allies took
heart; Troyes was retaken; and the whole French force was driven back beyond
the Seine. On March 7 Schwarzenberg drew up a memorandum designating Paris as
the goal of all operations. On the same day Bliicher fought the first of the
final series of his battles.
The French
had been forced to abandon Holland almost without a struggle. On December 2,
1813, the Prince of Orange had made his entry into the Hague. Biilow occupied
the country with his Prussian corps and some Russian detachments under
Winzingerode; and the French were slowly driven out of Belgium. Before this
operation was complete, Winzingerode and Biilow received orders from Bliicher.
The troops that remained behind were under the Duke of Weimar, who failed to
drive the French altogether from the Netherlands. In the south Wellington
defeated Soult at Orthez (February 27), and following up his success occupied
Bordeaux (March 12).
While
awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from the north, Bliicher was
hard-pressed, first by Marmont and Mortier, then by Ney, finally by Napoleon.
His only course was to go to meet his supports. He therefore crossed the Aisne,
and, taking advantage of the surrender of Soissons on March 3, effected his
junction the same day. Bliicher’s army now numbered 100,000 men, a force so
superior to that of his opponent as to enable him again to take the offensive.
That the advance did not immediately take place was due to Various reasons. Excessive
strain and excitement had laid the veteran Field-marshal on a sick-bed;
Gneisenau and Muffling also fell ill; and, in consequence, unity and energy of
command were wanting. Political considerations also came in. It was felt that
all the work was being thrown on the Prussian army; its numbers were dwindling;
and yet this army was all that secured to Prussia a place among the Great
Powers. It was therefore determined to proceed to Laon, a strong position on
high ground, surrounded by open country which would give full advantage to the
superior strength of the Allies. On Napoleon’s approach, Bliicher occupied the
plateau of Craonne with a force of 25,000 Russians. These troops were attacked,
on March 7, by 40,000 French, against whom they held out for a whole day,
inflicting on the enemy very heavy losses. It was only with difficulty that the
army of Silesia effected its concentration at Laon; but that operation was
practically completed by March 8.
The position
at Laon was extremely favourable to the Allies. Facing south, it sloped steeply
upwards to the flat summit on which stands the town; and on the south-eastern
side it was protected by a marsh. On March 9 Napoleon advanced to the attack. A
thick mist in the early morning enabled the French columns to deploy unseen;
the Guard, under Ney, formed the centre. At 9 a.m. began a struggle, with
varying fortunes, around two villages at the foot of the hill. When the mist
dispersed, the weakness of Napoleon’s force became apparent; but the Prussians
still remained on the defensive. In the afternoon Victor’s corps arrived. Once
more the battle flickered up and continued until dark, but without result.
While Napoleon was fighting in the south, Marmont, on the other side of the
marsh, attacked from the east, but, in the face of superior numbers strongly
posted, had even less success than the Emperor. After nightfall York made a
counter-attack on Marmont. The French were taken completely unawares, and
Marmont’s corps was put to flight with a loss of 4000 men. An energetic pursuit
combined with a turning movement would have destroyed Napoleon. But at this
moment Bliicher was incapacitated by illness; and Gneisenau, who took over the
command, dared not risk a decisive battle in the face of the reluctance of his
generals.
In spite of
the defeat of his right wing, Napoleon remained in position; and on March 10
there was some more fierce but ineffectual fighting. The Allies ran no risks;
and the Emperor perceived that victory
552
The Conference closed. Napoleon’s manoeuvres. [i8i4
was out of
the question. He therefore withdrew early on the 11th, and crossed the Aisne
almost unpursued. Even now the Allies failed to make use of their victory;
Napoleon, on the other hand, displayed marvellous energy, although his position
was really desperate. On the 14th he wrote to his Minister of Police, “ I am
still the man I was at Wagram and Austerlitz.” He surprised the Russian
general, Saint-Priest, at Rheims, and captured the town. Prom Rheims he
dictated on March 17 his last proposals for peace. The limit of time allowed by
the Allies had expired on March 11; but a further prolongation was granted, at
Caulaincourt’s request, in order that he might still persuade his master to
listen to reason. But not even the failure at Laon could abate Napoleon’s
pride. He now demanded that the Allies should evacuate French territory,
offering, when that was done, to recognise the independence of Holland, to
hand over Belgium to a French prince, and to give up the control of countries
beyond the borders. But he said nothing definite about the Left Bank, and he
claimed the restoration of all colonies. These terms could only have been
justified by such a victory as it was no longer in Napoleon’s power to gain.
They were not even discussed. Before the envoy reached Chatillon, the
conference was closed. Its only result had been to strengthen the cohesion of
the Allies.
When Napoleon
recognised Bliicher’s strength, he left Marmont and Mortier to watch him, in
order to fling himself upon the main army. The latter, instead of advancing,
had meanwhile been moving aimlessly hither and thither. On March 18 Cossack
patrols announced the Emperor’s approach on the right flank. Schwarzenberg,
rightly assuming that Napoleonr meant to cross the river at
Arcis-sur-Aube, took his measures accordingly; and there the battle was fought.
Napoleon was unable to bring as many troops together as he wanted, because
Bliicher had again begun to advance and had defeated Marmont. On the other
hand, he did not come upon the six corps of the main army, but only on the
Bavarian corps under Wrede, whom, after a hard fight, he compelled to fall
back. On the following day Schwarzenberg succeeded in concentrating his
forces. The moment had come for destroying Napoleon; but for this Schwarzenberg
lacked determination. He delayed the attack, whereupon Napoleon led his troops
boldly against him. The enterprise would have been his last, had he not
perceived the enemy’s strength in time and beaten a hasty retreat. Only the
French rear-guard was caught by the Allies and driven from Arcis-sur-Aube. Thus
the Emperor had fallen back before Schwarzenberg as before Bliicher. It was to
no purpose that he brought together on the same day 45,000 men ; the number was
insufficient.
Recognising
the facts, Napoleon now endeavoured to gain by skilful manoeuvres what he could
not achieve by fighting. He retired, not westwards upon Paris, but eastwards
towards St Dizier, hoping to check the allied advance by an attack upon their
communications. But the plan
1814]
The march on Paris. Fighting outside the city. 553
miscarried.
The allied commanders decided to join Bliicher and march on Paris. Bliicher’s
illness hampered the movements of his army; but, when Marmont and Mortier
disappeared from its front, and the sound of fighting was heard from
Arcis-sur-Aube, it marched in that direction. The junction was to be effected
on the 28th at Meaux. On the way thither, the main army came unexpectedly upon
Marmont and Mortier. Had it been in closer formation, the two marshals could
hardly have escaped; as it was, they fared badly. The Crown Prince of
Wurtemberg engaged Marmont at Sainte Croix and drove him over the Somme, where
he took up a position with Mortier. There was a hot fight, in which the French,
after a brave resistance, were worsted, losing many men and guns. The remainder
were attacked at Lafert^-Gaucher by York; but he could only reach them with his
van-guard, and the French beat off the attack. Bliicher was more fortunate; he
fell in with a detachment of 6000 men, and drove it back upon
Lafere-Champenoise, where it encountered the main army and was annihilated.
The march on
Paris now began in earnest. The Emperor’s plans having been discovered through
an intercepted letter, the Allies left
10,000 cavalry to watch his movements, and,
turning their backs upon him, marched down the valley of the Marne with 180,000
men. Paris has two natural bulwarks—to the north Montmartre, to the north-east
the thickly populated plateau on whose northern edge stand Romain- ville,
Pantin, and Belleville. There the French drew up all their available forces for
the defence of the capital, Mortier at the foot of Montmartre forming the left
wing, and Marmont the right. Here, on March 30, the last battle was fought. The
result was a foregone conclusion. The main army opened the fight by attacking
Romainville, first with insufficient forces. The French made a courageous
defence, so that the Allies advanced but slowly and with heavy losses. At 2 p.m., however, a vigorous advance drove
Marmont back to the extreme edge of the plateau, whereupon he despatched an
officer to negotiate. Meanwhile the army of Silesia had engaged Mortier. The
latter had repulsed the Prussians at La Villette, but was unable to withstand
the onset of Prince William of Prussia and an attack on the barriers of the
city. On the right flank Bliicher deployed his forces against Montmartre. Other
divisions occupied Vincennes, and pressed on towards Charenton.
On the
preceding day the Empress had fled from Paris. King Joseph and his brother
Jerome watched the battle from the heights of Montmartre. When they saw that
all was over, they mounted their horses and rode away, directing the marshals
to treat with the enemy, and then proceed to the Loire. The negotiations
resulted in an armistice, by the terms of which the capital was to be
evacuated. In the evening the A Hips bivouacked on the slopes in full view of
the city they had so ardently desired. But as yet they had not settled with the
Emperor; and they prepared for a renewal of the combat.
554 Napoleon at Fontainebleau. Surrender of Paris.
[isu
Napoleon had
meanwhile wasted his energies in futile plans of rescue and undecided movements
against a force consisting of a few mobile squadrons of horse. Surrounded by a
gaping void, cut off from all connexion with the diplomacy of Europe, he saw
all the cords broken out of which he might have woven a ladder of escape. At
Vitry he received the tidings of the fate that threatened his capital. He
hurried towards Paris, and, accompanied by a few loyal adherents, reached
Fontainebleau far in advance of his army. Here, on March 30, he was joined by
Marmont’s cavalry. He was pressing on towards the capital, when he heard that
it had capitulated; and in despair he returned to Fontainebleau. On the
following day more troops came up; he took heart again, and dreamed of hurling
himself boldly upon Paris at their head. The idea was madness. His marshals
refused to follow him, and implored him to throw up the game. He still clung to
the belief that something might be saved by Mplomacy. But it was too late; the
overthrow was complete. On April 11 Napoleon signed his abdication.
Already, on
March 31, the victors had made their entry into Paris. At noon the monarchs,
with their guards, reached the Porte St Martin, then turned to the right
towards the Champs Elysees. They entered in full military pomp, trumpets
blowing,, drums beating, bayonets jhiningj banners waving, and uniforms of all
colours glittering in the sun. The people of Paris cried, “ Vive le roi! vive
Louis XVIII! ” The glory of the Bourbons rose from its ashes; that of the
Empire seemed for ever departed. Yet it was only in seeming; the wings of the
Imperial eagle were not yet finally clipped.
During the
brief campaign of 1814, Napoleon had displayed all the greatness of his
inexhaustible military genius, but at the same time the aberrations of an
overwrought brain. He had lost all sense of reality; like a desperate gamester
he tried to win back what had long been lost. Instead of continuing the war
with the sole object of obtaining by negotiation durable and rational results,
he betrayed in his diplomacy an inordinate ambition, which he could not realise
by victory in the field. The material resources and the military strength of
France were at length exhausted; and she succumbed to half Europe in arms.
THE FIRST
RESTORATION (1814-5).
At 10 o’clock
on the morning of March 31,1814, the rulers of Russia and Prussia rode into
Pans. From early dawn a vast crowd had posted itself along the route from the
Faubourg St Martin to the gardens of the Tuileries, and watched in sad and
anxious silence the long procession of foreign troops. A few shouts saluted the
noble presence of the Tsar, as he advanced along the Boulevards; but it was not
till he reached the Boulevard des Italiens that he was made aware of the
existence of a Bourbon party in Paris. Here loud cries of “ Vivent les Bourbons
” rent the air; and a party of some forty young nobles atoned by their noisy demonstration
for the sullen tranquillity of the mob. Elsewhere there was hardly a token of
royalist sympathy, or a clue to the real feelings of the capital. Yet a
royalist emissary, Baron de Vitrolles, had assured the Tsar that Paris would
declare in no uncertain tones for the Restoration.
In
the absence of the Emperor of Austria, it lay with Alexander to determine the
future government of France. It was a problem which he had for some time past
been anxiously considering, yet without reaching ' a positive solution. He was clear that Napoleon was
impossible; but
his views as
to the succession were still fluid and uncertain. Bemadotte and Eugene were
thought of for a moment and waived aside. A wisely organised republic—so it was
hinted to a royalist agent—might best accord with the French spirit; but, if
the French did not care for a republic, there was the alternative of the
Bourbons. Upon the qualities of the Bourbon cause the Tsar had pondered much,
and he found them dubious. The princes would return embittered by misfortune;
and, even if they could master their own resentments, the animosities of the
imigres would prove less amenable to discipline. The army, the Protestants, the
spirit of the new generation, would be opposed to them; and it was doubtful whether
they could rely upon any substantial measure of support. It was true that
royalism was making head in some regions of the south, and that the Due
d’Angouleme had been received with acclamations in Bordeaux. But Alexander and
Mettemich were both impressed by
the fact that
in the wide area covered by the eastern campaign they had been unable to
discern the faintest traces of a Bourbon party. Still, if France should declare
for the old monarchy, Alexander was not prepared to oppose her choice. There
was a statesman in Paris who had laid a plan for fixing the wavering purpose of
the Tsar. Talleyrand, whose special gift it was to shine “ in a crisis or at a
congress,” had determined to have a direct and personal share in the political
settlement. When the official world fled by command to Blois, he contrived to
be turned back at the barrier, and thus to be left the sole person of
importance in the capital. He had gauged Alexander, knew that he had impressed
him once, and was confident that he would be able to impress him again. In an
interview with Nesselrode he invited the Tsar to be his guest.
The Tsar
accepted the proposal. “M. de Talleyrand,” he said, “ I have determined to stay
in your house because you have my confidence and that of my allies. We do not wish
to determine anything before we have heard you. You know France, its needs and
desires. Say what we ought to do, and we will do it.” Talleyrand replied, “We
can do everything with a principle. I propose to accept the principle of
legitimacy, which recalls to the throne the Princes of the House of Bourbon.”
The Tsar enumerated his doubts. Could France be detached from the chief for
whose cause she had just fought with such desperate heroism ? Would she accept
princes for whom she had manifested the most bitter hatred during a period of
twenty years ? Would the old monarchy receive any constitutional support from
councils created by Napoleon and manned by his creatures ? To these objections
Talleyrand replied—and his assurances were confirmed by Dalberg, Louis, and de
Pradt, who had been summoned to the conference—that, if once it were made clear
that no peace or truce would be made with Bonaparte, the Legislative Councils
would themselves invite the Bourbons. Alexander was deeply impressed. He walked
up and down the room enlarging with emotion upon the horrors of war and the
crimes of Napoleon, and then, turning to the King of Prussia and Prince
Schwarzenberg, invited them to consent to a proclamation, which should pledge
the Powers not to treat with Napoleon or any member of his family. Two hours
afterwards the proclamation was posted; and a regency under Marie- Louise was
thus formally excluded from the sphere of possible solutions. On April 1 a
Provisional Government was named, including, in the person of Montesquiou, at
least one confidential friend of the banished King. Next day, the Senate, as
pliant under Talleyrand as under Napoleon, decreed the deposition of the
Emperor. The Legislature ratified and the law-courts acclaimed the decision.
Sensible men saw that enough had been done for chivalry, and that only thus
could France obtain liberty and peace.
Forty miles
away, in the palace of Fontainebleau, sat Napoleon. It is true that the force
around him did not exceed 86,000 men; but
what might
not desperate courage and skilful leadership effect? At a council held on the
morning of March 81, the Marshals advised a retreat to the south; but Napoleon,
choosing as ever the more dangerous and attractive alternative, decided to
manoeuvre before Paris and to oblige the enemy to give him battle. He ordered
the corps of Marmont and Mortier, which had just evacuated the capital, to stop
at Essonnes, where they would form his advance-guard in an aggressive movement.
The allied generals, with a fickle population of 700,000 souls to watch, looked
forward with anxiety to a reopening of the strife.
Alexander had
often told his French friends that the army was the nation, and that nothing
solid could be done unless the army were gained over. A few generals had sent
in their adhesions to the Provisional Government; and Dupont and Dessoles had
accepted posts—the one as Minister of War, the other as Commandant of the
National Guard; but the defection of individual generals was a matter of slight
moment, so long as the army remained faithful to Napoleon. It was therefore
determined to invite Marmont to put his troops at the disposition of the
Government, and to march them into Normandy, where they might serve as the
nucleus of a constitutional army. Marmont owed everything to Napoleon, and had
fought with brilliant skill and courage during the last campaign; but he
complained that he had been constantly placed in the most difficult and
hazardous positions, and that he had been rebuked and insulted after the defeat
of Laon. He knew that his surrender of Paris had spoilt Napoleon’s
calculations; he was disillusioned and weary of war, and perhaps also desirous
of playing a great role in history. Salving his conscience by the command of
the Senate, and making an express stipulation that the personal safety and
liberty of Napoleon should be respected, should he fall into the hands of the
Allies, he promised to move his troops from Essonnes to Versailles in the night
of April 4-5.
But meanwhile
events were occurring at Fontainebleau, which threatened to put a new
complexion upon affairs. On the morning of April 4, as Napoleon was preparing
to strike his final blow, news came that the Senate had decreed his deposition.
The general order was that headquarters were to be transferred to Ponthierry;
and, after the midday parade, Napoleon retired to his room to make his last
preparations for the march. But the discontent of the Marshals and the officers
of their respective staffs had now reached a crisis. The army was destitute,
and was melting away by desertion. The loss of the capital, the news of its
altered political attitude, not to speak of sheer weariness, affected the
judgment of the senior officers. They were stripped of illusions, sated with
achievements, and unprepared to face civil strife. They marched into Napoleon’s
room and represented the situation. A letter from Beumonville was read out.
“Very good, gentlemen,” replied the Emperor with unexpected compliance, “ since
it must be so, I abdicate ”; and then, as all present accepted his proposals
for a regency in the
name of the
King of Rome, he drew up the Act of Abdication and appointed commissioners to
treat for a suspension of arms. Suddenly, swept away by a revulsion of feeling,
he threw himself on a sofa, struck his thigh, and cried,' “ Nonsense,
gentlemen; let us leave that and march to-morrow ! We shall beat them.” An
impassioned argument followed; but the Marshals were in earnest and bore him
down. He wrote and signed with his own hand an abdication in favour of his son.
Caulaincourt, Ney, and Macdonald were sent to lay the document before
Alexander. On their way through Essonnes they induced Marmont to go with them.
The Tsar had
formally proclaimed his intention of never treating with Napoleon or any other
member df his family; he had thus already decided against the proposal of a
regency. But what if a regency were the only plan which the army would accept,
the only plan which would avert further bloodshed ? The members of the
Provisional Government waited anxiously in Alexander’s salon while the envoys
expounded their cause in an inner chamber. Then, dismissing the envoys,
Alexander called in the Government, and explained with animation the advantages
which would accrue from the acceptance of Napoleon’s propositions—a Government
served by able and experienced men, enjoying the sympathy and support of
Austria, respecting the habits and the new interests of France, and finally
commanding, as no other Government could, the entire allegiance of the army.
Talleyrand, Dalberg, and Dessoles replied that, if a regency were established,
Napoleon would be back again at the end of a year; that many members of his
family were too ambitious to be content with a subordinate station; and that
the claims of the Bourbons had now been so far revived that it was impossible
to discard them without injustice and injury. The Tsar listened attentively,
and admitted the envoys to a second audience. Again the envoys were dismissed,
the members of the Government admitted, and the arguments of the army warmly
pressed and energetically combated. It was 2 a.m.
before this singular and crucial debate came to a close.
Count Pozzo
di Borgo got up on April 5 to look at the sunrise. As he was standing at the
window a hand was laid upon his shoulder; and the Tsar apprised him of the
joyful ridings that Marmont’s corps had arrived at Versailles. “You see,” he
said, “it is Providence who wills it; she manifests and declares herself. No
more doubt, no more hesitation.” General Souham had in fact taken the decisive step
without waiting for Marmont’s orders, having learnt that Napoleon was about to
be informed of the intended desertion of the corps. Alexander’s way was now
cleared. The army was divided against itself. The envoys were instructed that
the abdication must include the whole family of Napoleon.
On the
morning of April 13, after many painful hesitations, Napoleon ratified the
Treaty of Fontainebleau, which banished him to the island of Elba and settled
the rank, title, and revenue to be enjoyed by himself and the various members
of his family. The terms of the treaty were
1814J Treaty of Fontainebleau.—The Restoration.
559
on the whole
liberal—an annual revenue of two million francs for himself, with reversion of
one million to the Empress; a revenue of two millions and a half to be
distributed among the members of his family ; a capital sum of two millions to
be expended in gratifications to his followers; the full sovereignty over the
duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla for the Empress, with succession to
her son and descendants; and lastly the island of Elba for himself in full
sovereignty. The place of exile was chosen by himself, as preferable to either
Corsica or Corfu— alternatives which had been offered by the Tsar. Yet at times
the transaction appeared intolerably humiliating to his proud and sensitive
nature. “ Why should they make a treaty with a vanquished man ? ” he asked; and
over and over again, catching at straws of hope, he demanded the return of the
Act of Abdication. On the 12th he refused ratification and talked coldly with
Maret of suicide. In the night he took a poison or an opiate which he had
carried on his person all through the Russian campaign; but his recovery seemed
to him to indicate that he was still destined for high things, and on the 13th
he signed the Act. A week later he took leave of his Old Guard, embraced the
eagle, and left Fontainebleau.
Thus was the
way prepared for the Bourbons. It was, as Guizot truly says, a trait of
Napoleon’s genius that he never forgot them and knew them to be his only rivals
for the throne of France. They were not exactly restored by tbe foreign armies;
they were not restored by the voice of France; they owed nothing to their own
merits or exertions. They came back because France was tired and dumb,
disinclined to found a republic, or to embark upon a sea of experiment. To the
Napoleonic men, such as Talleyrand, who interpreted France to the foreign
conqueror, a constitutional monarchy was the only solution. It would enlist a
long array of glorious memories; it would preserve the heritage of the
Revolution; it would make the least possible disturbance in the administration.
The white and the red spectre would alike be exorcised by a monarchy restored
on constitutional conditions.
But there was
a fundamental difficulty in the scheme. It was of the essence of the old
monarchy that it was absolute and unconditional, and that its title was based
not upon the will of the people but upon hereditary right. If, then, the
Bourbons were restored, and if their restoration were not only made to depend
explicitly upon the grant of the French people, but were also accompanied by
conditions settled beforehand by the popular voice, what became of the
principle of legitimacy or the old monarchical tradition ? The head of the
Bourbon House had always claimed that he had never ceased to be King of France.
How could he then loyally accept terms which implied that this claim was futile
? And yet, if no terms were settled, if it were not made clear that the basis
of the monarchy had been changed, all the conquests of the Revolution might be
lost, all the evils of the ancien regime might be
560 Stipulations of the Senate.—Return of Monsieur.
[i8i4
restored. The
Constitutional Charter—the phrase came from Talleyrand —which was adopted by
the Senate on April 6, frankly departed from the old principles. It summoned “
freely to the throne Louis-Stanilas- Xavier of Prance, brother to the late
King,” scrupulously eschewing any mention of an official title. It provided
that the Charter should be submitted to a plebiscite, and that
Louis-Stanilas-Xavier could only be proclaimed King of France after he had
signed and sworn to adhere to the constitutional and practical provisions
contained in the document. These were such as met the general needs of the
situation— the King, master of the executive power; the legislative power
divided between King, Senate, and Elective Chamber; responsibility of
ministers; taxation by consent; the jury system ; the irrevocability of the
sale of Church lands; the continuance of military pensions and ranks; the
recognition of the new as well as of the old nobility. The influence of
Montesquiou obtained the unreserved attribution of the executive power to the
King, the royal right of nomination to the Senate, and the admissibility of
ministers to the two Chambers. But the greed of the senators threw a dark shade
of discredit upon the Act. A provision was inserted to the effect that all the
existing members of the Senate were to form part of the new Second Chamber, and
that the senatorial endowments were to be equally divided among them. The
leaders of liberal opinion argued that this transparent exhibition of cupidity
had been permitted by Talleyrand in order to favour the establishment of
autocracy; and so brisk was the shower of opprobrious pamphlets that the
Provisional Government recurred to the censorship of the press. It was a grave
misfortune for France that so solemn a transaction as the establishment of a
limited monarchy should have been discredited from the first by the selfishness
of some of its principal promoters.
Louis was in
England, prostrate with gout; but Monsieur (the Comte d’Artois) was at Nancy;
and Vitrolles persuaded Talleyrand that it would be well to receive him in the
capital as his brother’s lieutenant. There was brilliant sunshine on April 12,
the day of the solemn entry. As the Prince, attired in the uniform of the
National Guard, rode down the Boulevards, the enthusiasm was indescribable. His
few utterances were felicitous; and one, which was invented for him afterwards
by Count Beugnot—“ Nothing is changed save that there is one Frenchman the
more”—went round France like wildfire. Tears were in every eye as the “ Domine,
salvum fac regem ” was chanted by ten thousand voices. At the end of the
ceremony, the old servants of the Prince, who had wept his absence for
five-and-twenty years, embraced his knees; and he raised them with a touching
grace. When he reached the Tuileries, he dismounted from his horse, addressed
the National Guard in some appropriate words, and, shaking hands with several
officers and soldiers, bade them remember the day, protesting that he would
never forget it. “ How can I be fatigued?” he said in the evening to Beugnot,
“ it is the
only day of happiness which I have tasted for thirty years.” “ Do you
understand such enthusiasm, such exultation ? ” said Ney, turning to Vitrolles
during the service at Notre Dame. “Who could have believed it?” Cowardice and
loyalty, sentimentality and reason, repentance and hope, were all combined in
the intoxication of that day.
As yet
nothing had been done to settle the title and constitutional position of the
Prince, who was somewhat loosely described by Talleyrand as the “ Chief of the
Government.” His royalist advisers wished him to assume the title of
Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, arguing that his brother was already
sovereign of France and competent to delegate his authority. Such a claim was
however in clear contradiction to the spirit and the terms of the Charter. The
Senate declined to acknowledge powers delegated by a sovereign whose title it
had not admitted, and was unwilling itself to confer them without limiting
conditions. As the contest threatened to become acute, Alexander intervened;
and a prudent compromise was arrived at. On the one hand, the Senate conferred
the provisional government of France upon the Comte d1 Artois with
the title of Lieutenant-Governor of the kingdom; while, on the other hand,
Monsieur replied that he was acquainted with the constitutional act which
recalled his brother to the throne, and that, while he had no authority to
accept the Constitution, yet, knowing his brother’s sentiments and principles,
he could assure them in the King’s name that he would admit the fundamental
conditions, which he then proceeded to state. The Senate and the Legislature
were delighted with the adroitness of an address which seemed to promise so
fairly for constitutional rule. But to his principal confidant, Vitrolles, the
Prince spoke words of evil omen, “Yes, the engagement is taken. We must keep to
it frankly; and, if after some years it appears that things cannot go on, we
shall have to try something else.” The experiment was made in 1830.
Fat and
gouty, indolent and clever, with a caustic turn of phrase and the nonchalant
and playful temper of the dilettante student, Louis XVIII was watching the
course of events from his exile at Hartwell. Sixty years of life had ripened
his wit and enlarged his knowledge of the Latin classics without bringing him
ideas or passions, or schooling him to the management of affairs. His unwieldy
bulk, completely prohibitive of horse exercise, disqualified him from playing
the role of popular hero, despite the countervailing advantages of a finely cut
countenance, a sonorous and agreeable voice, and flashing eyes. He had been so
long absent from France that he was ignorant of her new men and her new ways;
and, coming at an advanced age out of the shadow of a studious retirement, he
was unfitted for strenuous action in glare and heat. Yet, despite all this, he
had some qualifications for the part which he was now suddenly called upon to
play. His bearing was dignified and gracious, his language felicitous; and in
all the smaller concerns of life he possessed an exquisite tact. A kind of
fatalism, half religious, half
epicurean, if
it conduced to the neglect of business, supplied him with a stock of passive
courage, which was occasionally impressive. His natural moderation and
sweetness of disposition, his absence of religious animosity, his wise
abstention from the intrigues and exaggerations of the emigres, his power of
alert and sensible criticism, were all clear advantages. “ He is," said
the Duke of Wellington, “ the most cautious man I ever saw, and the best
sovereign for this country.” Nor was his past record unpromising. In the
Assembly of Notables he had supported liberal measures, and during the early
months of the Revolution he was generally understood to be in favour of a
limited monarchy. It is true that he subsequently proclaimed his complete
attachment to the system of the anden rkgme, describing it as the “Ark of the
Covenant”; but in later years he had publicly receded from so desperate a
position. In a declaration published at Mittau on December 4, 1804, he had
promised to forget the past, to recognise liberty and equality, and to secure
existing interests if he were recalled to the throne. He was prepared, in fact,
to accept the position of a constitutional king—a situation, as his friend the
Prince Regent may have taught him, by no means incompatible with the pursuit of
pleasure.
An acceptance
of the senatorial Constitution was accordingly penned, when advices from Paris
supervened and prompted a higher flight. Learning that his brother had been
received without promise or oath, that the Senate was decried and its Charter
without authority, Louis determined to assume the royal title, and to ignore
the pretension of a discredited body to confer a crown or to impose conditions
on its wearer. At St Ouen, before the gates of Paris, he issued a declaration
which promised constitutional rule, while it safeguarded the legitimist
principle. The document declared that the plan of the Senate, though good in
its essential particulars, was hastily composed and would require modification.
Accordingly Senate and Legislature were summoned for June 10, with a pledge
that the terms of a liberal Constitution would be submitted to them. With this
profession, as distasteful to the extreme royalists as it was disgusting to the
liberals, Louis XVIII entered Paris.
His entry
took place on May 3, under a stainless sky; but “it was not,” says Beugnot, “
like the entry of Monsieur. The heart did not speak so loud.” Sullen silence
was mingled with vociferous enthusiasm, cries for the King with acclamations of
the Imperial Guard, which contributed two companies to the escort. Yet, even if
Chateaubriand, the greatest living master of French sentiment, had not
proclaimed them, the calamities of the House, long fallen and now restored,
would have struck the common heart. In the evening a vast crowd filled the
Carrousel and the gardens of the Tuileries, calling again and again for the
King and his niece the Duchesse d’Angouleme. A pamphlet from the pen of Lally-
Tollendal ran through the town, celebrating the virtues and the sorrows of that
simple, narrow, and austere lady. But, with her morose features,
masculine
fibre, and stem royalist creed, she was not destined to capture the heart of
France. Her life had been fatally blighted in the Temple prison. In the male
members of her House there was little of romance, of tragedy, or of heroism.
The two first
tasks of the new Government were to draw up a Constitution and to sign a
peace. A select number of senators and deputies was appointed to confer with
three royal commissioners under the presidency of Dambray, the new Chancellor,
and to prepare a Charter for the acceptance of the Chambers. The institution of
a House of hereditary Peers, named by the King, unlimited in number,
deliberating in secret, and invested with the power to try cases of high
treason, was passed with the understanding that the senators should preserve
their endowments. A Chamber of Deputies, to be composed for the present of the
existing legislators, but in the future to be elected on a higher franchise,
was to initiate all money-bills. It was in accordance with French tradition
that the head of the Government should have power to make rules and ordinances
“ necessary for the execution of laws and the security of the State”; and no
danger was anticipated from this branch of the prerogative. The right of
initiative and legislation was accorded to the Crown; but the Chambers were
given the power to suggest the principles and even the details of bills. The
expedient of a Civil List voted for life was one for which the French mind was
long prepared. The system of the rota, by which the Chamber of Deputies was to
be renewed by a fifth every year, had been tried under the Directory; and,
though perhaps unfavourable to the establishment of strong party government, it
seemed likely to diminish the intensity of electoral crises. Freedom of worship
was readily accorded to all the creeds; and only four voices were raised
against declaring the Catholic faith to be the state religion. After a heated
discussion, the maintenance of the revolutionary land- settlement was
unconditionally guaranteed; and wise provisions were added to secure the
abolition of confiscation, the retention of the jury, and the independence of
the judicial bench. But, while the liberty of the press was formally permitted,
it was distinctly stated that laws would be passed to chastise its abuse. Such
were the main outlines of the Charter. Extreme royalists resented its
concessions; and ‘Bonapartists were outraged by the closing words “ Given at
Paris in the year of grace 1814 and in the nineteenth year of our reign.” The
word “Charter” itself, and the ancient prelude, “Nous accordons, nous faisons
concession et octroishowed clearly enough that the contractual theory of sovereignty
had been cast to the winds. Still the bulk of the nation was satisfied. The
Charter embodied the highest political wisdom which had been extracted from
twenty-five years of democracy and despotism.
Even more
important than the Charter was the Treaty of Peace between France and Europe,
signed on April 30, and published on June 4. The situation was such that, while
peace was a most imperious
necessity for
France, no glorious or honourable peace could be concluded. It was necessary to
withdraw the French garrisons beyond the Rhine in order to purchase the removal
of the foreign armies from the soil of France; it was necessary to accept the
proposal of Mettemich that all specifically French concerns should be there and
then settled in Paris, while questions affecting the balance of power in Europe
should be reserved for a congress in Vienna. It would have been too dangerous
to defer the conclusion of the peace, in the hope of extracting advantages for
France from the dissensions which were sure to arise in Vienna. Indeed, the
Allies were masters of the situation, and could dictate their terms. They were
fully alive to the necessity of treating France with generosity, and of
connecting the advent of the new dynasty with a popular peace. When France
declined to pay a war-indemnity to Prussia, Russia, England, and Austria
acquiesced in her refusal; and the demand was withdrawn. The art-galleries of
Paris were permitted to retain the spoils with which Napoleon had enriched
them. The provisions with reference to the ships in Dutch waters were liberal.
But it was a settled principle that neither in Europe nor in the colonies must
France ever again be permitted to exert a dangerous preponderance. Belgium, the
Left Bank of the Rhine, the conquered lands in Holland, Germany, Switzerland,
and Italy were to be ceded by France. The frontier of the fallen monarchy
(1792) was to be the frontier of the monarchy restored, with an addition of
territory ^comprising Montbeliard and Avignon, Chambery and Annecy. The lie de
France, Tobago, and Santa Lucia were retained by England, which had acquired
them during the war. The country, which had nourished many illusions, and the
Court, which had tried to obtain Luxemburg and a line of strong Belgian
fortresses, were bitterly disappointed at so meagre a salvage; and it was not
the least of the undeserved misfortunes of the Bourbons that their restoration
was associated with the national humiliation of a contracted frontier and
abandoned colonies.
In spite of
the temporary enthusiasm which the return of the Bourbons had evoked, the
condition of public opinion in France was disquieting. The army was for the
most part disaffected to the white cockade, and to such extent depleted by
desertion that in April scarcely
90,000 men remained under arms. The three or
four million possessors of national lands trembled for their property, which
had become enormously depreciated by reason of the prevailing insecurity. The
peasantry half expected the reimposition of tithes and feudal dues. In many
places the villagers, indignant at the maintenance of the droits reunis, drove
out the tax-collectors and burnt their registers. The Bretons and Vendeans went
still further, and refused even to pay direct taxes. “We have fought for the
King,” they said; “we ought not to pay any taxes at all.” In some places the
old quarrel between those who had accepted and those who had resisted the
Concordat broke out
anew; and the
members of the Petite £glise, returning from a twelve years’ exile, loudly
claimed to exercise their old functions, and openly agitated for the
restitution of Church property. “The country districts,” wrote Dupont, “ and a
large number of the towns are opposed to the friends of the King.” This
opposition was, however, scattered and disorganised; and a large part of it
might reasonably be expected to melt away under a strong administration, all
the more so since the world of politics and finance, literature and law was,
with few exceptions, on the side of the monarchy. The vast body of the middle
class, the manufacturers, the merchants, the indifferents, were heartily glad
of peace and willing to support the new regime. The general staff of the army
had put on the white cockade; and Ney, Augereau, Macdonald, and ten other
generals drawn from different branches of the service, joined the King’s
Council of War. Men of such diverse antecedents as Carnot and Fontanes, Fouche
and Rouget de L’Isle, accepted the situation. There was likely to be plenty of
quiet support if the monarchy managed well, and plenty of criticism however
well it managed.
The ministry
of Louis XVIII contained many able and well-meaning men, but it was neither
strong, discreet, nor properly organised. The three most prominent members,
Talleyrand, Montesquiou, and de Blacas, were none of them well-suited to deal
with a situation of exceptional difficulty. Talleyrand had no taste for regular
work, no parliamentary gifts, and little interest in the problems of domestic
administration; consequently, when he went to Vienna to represent the interests
of France at the Congress, he left no gap behind him. Montesquiou, Minister of
the Interior, was honourable and disinterested, and a fluent and clever speaker
in the Chambers; but his temperament was light and inconsequent; and, being a
strict royalist by conviction, he had accepted the Constitution with little
faith in its virtues and much suspicion of its vices. De Blacas remained at the
Tuileries what he had been at Hartwell, a favourite and an emigre, devoted and
laborious, a counsellor of moderation, out of fear that his master might be
compromised by excess, but a stranger to France, and absolutely devoid of the
knowledge of a statesman. Of the other ministers, Ferrand, Director-General of
the Posts, the Chancellor Dambray, and Dupont, Minister of War, were
unfortunate selections. The dark shadow of the Capitulation of Baylen still
clung to the name of Dupont, and made him unpopular with the army; while the
other two belonged to the familiar type which had for a quarter of a century
learnt nothing. There was no Prime Minister, no collective responsibility; and
the business of the Cabinet was transacted in a series of secret conferences
held between the King, de Blacas, and the Ministers in turn. If the King had
been a strenuous man with a coherent policy, this “government by departments”
might not have been detrimental; but Louis detested work, was slow in signing
his name, and liked his mind to be made up by others. “What is the good of
making
reports to
him?” said Baron Louis to Beugnot. “You might as well make them to a saint in a
niche. I just simply give him ordinances to sign, and he signs.”
The wits
aptly described the system of government as “paternal anarchy ”; and Wellington
said truly that there was no Ministry, only Ministers. Every view, from the
strict constitutionalism of Baron Louis to the reactionary royalism of Dambray
and Ferrand, was represented among the Ministers. Side by side with them sat
the Princes—Monsieur, the chieftain of the intractable royalists, who kept his
own court, his own cabinet, his own police, and made no secret of his loathing
for the Charter; Angouleme, narrow, ignorant, silent, and awkward, but with
some grains of good sense; and lastly Berry, passionate, spontaneous, and
injudicious, a good fellow with a bad temper, who loved women and horses, and
would interrupt serious counsels with the language of the barrack or the
stable.
Seldom has
any Government been confronted with a less enviable situation. There was a
financial deficit of from five to six hundred millions of francs; there was an
immense diminution in the taxable area, owing to the loss of the Napoleonic
conquests; and there was a sensible though temporary impoverishment of France
herself. It was certain therefore that large reductions would have to be made
in the naval and military establishments; and it was equally certain that such
reductions could not be effected without occasioning widespread dissatisfaction
and distress. Nor was it possible, with due regard to the economic situation of
the country, to make any material remission of taxation, in spite of the
general expectation that with peace the most obnoxious imposts would
instantaneously disappear. Under such conditions, a Government of angels and
sages could not have failed to make enemies and to disappoint hopes. Yet the
measure of unpopularity would depend upon the wisdom with which affairs were
administered, and the loyalty with which the Charter was observed. In both
respects the Government fell short of the standard which the country had a
right to expect.
There was
something vigorous and heroic about the finance of Baron Louis. He made provision
for the liquidation of a debt amounting to 759,000,000 francs, and successfully
resisted a dishonourable proposal, emanating from the extreme royalists of the
Chamber, that the State should repudiate one-fourth of the debt contracted
under Napoleon. He maintained the unpopular taxes of 1813 and 1814, though
Monsieur and Angouleme had been profuse in promises of remission. In one year
he diminished the naval, military, and civil expenditure to a third of its
former amount, reducing the army from a war footing of 600,000 to a peace
footing of 201,140, and discharging ten or twelve thousand officers on
half-pay, with the right, however, to succeed in order of seniority to
two-thirds of the commissions as they became vacant. It was part of his design
to make the Legislature an accomplice in his parsimony.
By a
revolution in French financial methods he proposed the budget of revenue at the
same time as the budget of expenses, and promised that the taxes should be
assigned to the purposes voted by the Chambers. The policy was perhaps
over-strict, over-parsimonious. It might have been wiser to extend the process
of reduction over a longer period of years and to raise more money upon loan;
for the goodwill of the army was worth the price. But no one will deny to Baron
Louis the qualities of courage, skill, perseverance, and honesty; and the
movement of the funds, which rose ten points upon the introduction, and three
more upon the passing, of the budget, was an indication of his services towards
the restoration of French credit.
The situation
was, however, needlessly aggravated by several pieces of gratuitous folly.
Before the arrival of the King, and despite the strong representations of
Talleyrand, it had been decided to substitute the white cockade for the tricolour,
and thus to discard the colours which in the mind of every French soldier were
intimately associated with his own personal achievements and with all the
military triumphs of the Empire. By the bad advice of the Princes, the
Government consented to revive the old Household Corps, which had existed from
the days of Louis XIV down to the eve of the French Revolution. The plan
burdened the budget with the cost, exceeding 20,000,000 frs., of a small army
of 6000 officers highly paid and expensively equipped; but expense was far from
being the most objectionable feature in the new luxury. The establishment of
the Household Corps was an intimation that the Imperial Guard could not be
trusted to defend the throne. The starving half-pay officer—and the embarrassed
Treasury could not always pay even the half-pay—contrasted his sorry lot with
the affluent career thus opened to the young noble who had never smelt powder,
and to the old Emigre whose sword had rusted in its scabbard for twenty years.
The whole army realised that some of the money lavished on the favoured corps
might have kept deserving officers upon the active list, or repaired the
battered uniforms of the men. It might have been expected that the Government
would have disbanded the seven foreign regiments which had formed part of the
Imperial army; on the contrary, an eighth was added to the number. It would
have been easy to exclude from the army Emigres who had fought against their
country; but they were readmitted in large numbers, and in many cases promoted;
and, when we remember that for every emigre who was foisted on a regiment, one
old officer was discharged on half-pay and another disappointed of promotion,
we may imagine the jealousies aroused. Napoleon had advised the King to trust
the Imperial Guard or to disband it. Louis did neither. It is true that the pay
of the Guard was maintained, and that it was placed under the command of Ney
and Oudinot; but the Royal Grenadiers of France, as they were now called, were
removed from Paris and supplanted by the new Household troops. “ You are
about,”
said Pasquier
to Dupont, “to place at the head of the army a most formidable centre of
discontent.”
The sacred
ark of the Napoleonic army was the Legion of Honour; and the Government had the
good sense to preserve it. But the prodigality with which the decoration was
distributed to civilians seemed to indicate a desire to depreciate its value;
and an insertion in the ministerial papers that the Order of St Louis would
henceforth be the sole military Order caused deep resentment. To calm these
suspicions, the King issued an ordinance on July 19, approving and confirming
the Order. But the salaries were reduced and the decorations changed. The face
of Henry IV was substituted for that of Napoleon, the three lilies for the
eagle; and an archbishop—the Abbe de Pradt—was named Chancellor of the Order.
The intended suppression of certain schools for the daughters of legionaries
with a view to effect an economy of
40,000 francs, the dismissal of 2500 veterans
from the public institutions which had been burdened with their support, the
suppression of the military schools of St Cyr and St Germain, the intended
establishment of a royal military school “ in order that the nobility of -the
kingdom may enjoy the advantages accorded by the edict of 1751,” and the
changing of the numbers of almost all the regiments—all this added to the
indignation of the soldiers. Stories too were circulated, telling how the Due
de Berry had struck a soldier on parade, tom off his epaulettes, and spoken of
the wars of the Empire as “ Five-and-twenty years of brigandage”; how the Due
d’Angouleme had entered Paris in an English uniform; how Monsieur had replied
to General Letort of the dragoons of the Guard, who had offered the services of
his brave men, “ Peace is made; we have no need of brave men.” The Marshals had
received high commands and good pensions from the monarchy; but they, and still
more keenly their wives, were made to feel the difference which divided the
parvenu from the noble. “ Je ne connais pas cette femme-lasaid a great lady of
the old regime; “ e'est une marSchale.”
For the army,
then, the new dynasty was associated with a humiliating peace, a miserly
economy, and diminished opportunities of promotion. Ragged, barefooted, without
regular pay, the veterans of Napoleon watched with anger the distribution of
the Legion of Honour to obscure civilians, the formation of the Household
Brigade from foreigners, Chouans, and bnigris, and the ordinance of May 12
which reserved two-thirds of the vacant promotions to the officers on half-pay
and the remaining one-third to the King’s nominees. The army had ceased to be a
democratic profession, for no non-commissioned officer could ever now expect to
be a sub-lieutenant. It is no wonder that the troops, especially the returned
prisoners, cherished the memory of the great exile who had made them, as Pozzo
said, “ a nation apart,” that they kept the tricolour as a sacred relic, mixed
the ashes of their burnt eagles in wine and drank them down to save them from
dishonour,
disturbed
many a review by their seditious cries, and diffused the spirit of discontent
through the villages of France.
It might have
been expected that the Church, which had been so submissive to Napoleon, would
not have received special favours from the new monarch. But the Comte d’Artois
and the King, habituated to the English Sunday, put pressure upon the director
of police to remedy the lax notions which prevailed in France. Without
consulting the Council or any of the ministers save Dambray, Beugnot signed an
ordinance (June 7) prohibiting under severe penalties all work and trade on
Sundays and festivals, and two days afterwards issued a decree enforcing
respect to the processions of the Fete-Dim. The first ordinance was universally
blamed, “ because it was too severe, because it deranged the habits of an
infinite number of people, and because it menaced those who broke it with a
heavy money fine, and was in fact a penal law which the King had no right to
promulgate without the consent of the Chambers.” The second was regarded as an
infringement of the religious toleration granted by the Charter, as well as a
violation of an as yet unrepealed law prohibiting out-of-door religious
processions. Both together were taken as an indication that the Court was
willing to violate the Charter in order to promote the predominance of the
Roman Catholic Church. So general was the indignation that the Government was
compelled to withdraw the two measures.
In the course
of the summer, party feeling defined itself more clearly in Paris. A monarchy
which accepted a bicameral Constitution, allowed Bonapartists and Jacobins to
sit in the Legislature and even in the Ministry, retained the prefects and
judges of the Empire, paid life- pensions to the senators, received the
Marshals’ wives at Court, and declined to restore the loyalists to their old
homes, was not the kind of monarchy of which the exiles had dreamed. Men who
had suffered years of banishment in the cause of the old France wished to see
the old France once more—provinces instead of departments, parlements instead
of law-courts, autocracy in place of constitutionalism, the old Orders instead
of the Legion of Honour. The more extreme cried for the deportation of the
regicides and the repudiation of the Napoleonic debt; and their organ, La
Quotidienne, raved against a monarch who did everything for his enemies and
nothing for his friends.
While this
knot of men, “more royalist than the King,” were assailing the Government under
the leadership of Monsieur, there was growing up on the other hand a
constitutional party of opposition, formed of the most intelligent politicians
in Paris. The Egeria of the movement was Madame de Stael; its literary organ
was Le Censeur, a grave and moderate journal edited by two young lawyers, Comte
and Dunoyer; its greatest reputation was La Fayette; its principal pamphleteer
was Benjamin Constant, no longer the Tribune of the Consulate, still less the
Jacobin of the Directory, but a mystic in religion and a constitutional
570 Discussions on the Charter.—Favours to iWigr^s.
[i8i4
legitimist in
politics. Constant still gambled at night, and was the slave of women; but his
excitable and vain temperament was compatible with considerable intellectual
nobility and a real grip of constitutional principles. In no small measure
France owes her first lessons in the principles and practice of a
constitutional monarchy to his mercurial pen.
The great
topic of debate and source of ferment was the loyalty of the Government to the
Charter. It arose in connexion with the press, in connexion with the land, in
connexion with the Church, one might almost say in connexion with every branch
of public policy. When the Government brought in a scheme for the censorship of
the press, it was bitterly attacked as a distinct violation of the Charter.
Talleyrand criticised the measure in the salons; Comte thundered in the
Censeur; a prominent Bourbon organ, the Journal des Debats, went into
opposition ; and, though the Government accepted important amendments, the
licensing commission only passed the Peers by one vote. The effect of the
agitation on the Press Law—and it must be remembered that the question was
before the Chambers for a period of three months— was profound and critical.
“France,” says Pasquier, “was inundated with satirical pamphlets, which
represented the men in power as bent upon recalling the days of ignorance and
darkness. The success of these writings was great; and public opinion
henceforth shared their fears and their angers.”
Another
heated discussion arose over a Bill to restore to the emigres such of their
lands as had not yet been sold by the State. The measure was just, and might
have passed without friction but for the injudicious speech of Ferrand, the
Minister who introduced it to the Chambers.
“
The emigres have followed the right line the
King regrets that he
cannot give
to this measure all the latitude which in his heart of hearts he desires
”—phrases such as these seemed to indicate that more was to be done for the
emigres hereafter, and that the clause in the Charter which decreed the
inviolability of all property was not safe from attack. The expose des motifs
was unanimously condemned; and a refutation was prepared, filling four columns
of the Moniteur. But, though the debate raged angrily for eight sittings, the
law, with some amendments, was passed by a large majority. The liberal
opposition in the Chambers kept within the bounds of moderation; but, in the
country at large, Ferrand’s indiscretion was read in the light of the
publications of two lawyers, Dard and Falconnet, contending that sales of
national property were legally invalid; and the inference was generally drawn
that the Bourbons were about to embark upon a colossal scheme of eviction with
a view to restoring the land to its former owners. The promotion of Ferrand to
the dignity of Count, a few days after his speech, confirmed the worst
suspicions; and, when the Parliamentary session closed on December 30, 1814,
the Government, despite many concessions and explanations, had fallen greatly
in public esteem.
In order to
bring strength to the Ministry, Louis, at the end of November, transferred the
portfolio of war from Dupont to Soult. The new Minister was one of the most
illustrious of the Marshals, a skilful general and a resolute administrator;
and his appointment was at first received with satisfaction. But he had risen
to favour with the Court by opening a subscription for the men who had fallen
at Quiberon; and it was soon discovered that, in his desire to please his new
master, he was insensible to considerations of delicacy and tact. He began by
ordering all half-pay officers out of Paris to their birthplaces, and adopted,
if he did not suggest, the idea of giving pensions to the officers and soldiers
of the royalist army of the west who had been wounded in defence of the throne.
He sent a commission into Normandy and Britanny, one of whose members, a noted
Chouan, was said to have committed the foulest crimes in the civil war. He
recommended the Comte de Bruges, a royalist nobody, to be Grand Chancellor of
the Legion of Honour. But perhaps no circumstance contributed to cast so much
odium upon his administration and upon the Government as the affair of General
Excelmans.
During the
last week of November, a certain Andral, physician to the Court of Naples, was
arrested at Nemours by order of the prefect of police. Among his papers was
found a letter from General Excelmans addressed to the King of Naples, and
containing an assurance that, if things had not taken a favourable turn at
Vienna, “ a thousand brave officers instructed in the school and under the eyes
of your Majesty” would have rushed to assist the Neapolitan throne. The letter
did not pass the bounds of indiscretion; and Dupont contented himself with a
mild reproof. Soult, however, determined to treat the matter seriously, put
Excelmans on half-pay, and ordered him at once to leave Paris for his
birthplace. The general first pleaded delay, and then determined to resist.
Upon the question of legal right Excelmans was clearly in error; for, though on
half-pay, he was still in the service of the Crown and amenable to military
discipline. But Soult and his agents contrived by their violence to make a hero
out of a melodramatic and insolent soldier. All Prance learnt how the house of
Excelmans had been broken into by night; how the general had bared his breast
and cried, “ I know that you have come to assassinate me. Make an end of it! I
am ready”; how he had tried to blow out his brains; how he had escaped by the
garden ; how his wife had fainted five times; how the cordon would not permit
her doctor to enter. In a moment Excelmans became the hero of the army, of the
liberals, of all France. Madame de Stael wrote to him ; Lanjuinais called twice
a day; La Fayette offered him the asylum of his country residence. When, on
January 25, 1815, he was acquitted at Lille, enthusiasm knew no bounds.
The state of
tension in Paris and outside steadily increased during the months of January
and February, 1815. The King had decided
that on
January 21 the ashes of Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, and Madame Elizabeth
should be borne to St Denis, and that on the same day the first stone should be
laid of two monuments to commemorate the royal martyrs. Funeral services were
to be celebrated in all the cathedrals and churches of the kingdom; and the day
was to be further solemnised by the closing of the law-courts and the theatres.
The desire was natural and pious; and no exception could reasonably be taken to
the ceremonial devised for the occasion. But, when the nerves of a
highly-strung people are strained, the least event may give rise to suspicion
or panic. A dark rumour spread through the capital that the celebration of
January 21 was to be marked by the massacre of all the Terrorists; that lists
of proscription had been drawn up; that the Princes, and especially the
Duchesse d’Angouleme, were backing the conspirators; that the King, who was
opposed to it, had been induced to visit Trianon; and that it was to execute
this nefarious project that all the chiefs of the Vendeans had collected in
Paris. An incident connected with the burial of a famous actress, Mademoiselle
Raucourt, whose corpse, as that of an excommunicate, was refused admission to
the Church of St Koch, until the crowd, with shouts of “ les pretres a la
lanternebroke open the door, still further exasperated the public mind. Nor was
this nervousness entirely without foundation. There were undoubtedly desperate
men and plotters among the royalists, whose press, in denying that an amnesty
had ever been promised to crimes, pointedly encouraged a campaign of vengeance.
The extent of the alarm may be gauged by the fact that Carnot sat up during the
night of January 21 with his weapons handy.
Plots were
met by counter-plots. At the end of October, 1814, about thirty half-pay
officers had been arrested on suspicion of plotting the assassination of the
King and the Princes. The excitement over the Excelmans case, the affair of St
Roch, and the celebration of January 21, seemed to show that Paris would rise
if it could find anyone to give the lead. The brothers Lallemand, commanding
respectively the department of the Aisne and the artillery of La Fere, and
Drouet, the head of the 16th military division at Lille, were confident that
they could march upon Paris, raise the faubourgs, and overthrow the monarchy.
They sounded Davout, who had been proscribed by the Bourbons, and entered into
communications with Lavalette, Bassano, and Fouche. The soul of the conspiracy
was Fouche, whose hopes of advancement under the monarchy had been dashed to
the ground by the recent ministerial appointments, and who was clever enough to
see that the fabric was unstable. But the conspirators, though agreed upon the
necessity of overthrowing the Bourbons by an assault on the Tuileries, were
divided as to their future course. The vehement Bonapartists wished simply to
proclaim the exiled Emperor; but this course was repugnant to the regicides and
to those whom Bonaparte had alienated at the close of his
career. The
Duke of Orleans, the son of a regicide and himself once a soldier in the armies
of the Revolution, “ the only Bourbon who understood France,” as both
Alexander and La Fayette thought, seemed to offer better guarantees. He would unite
the revolutionists and the moderate liberals, and realise the hopes of the men
who wished for a constitutional monarchy. The Duke was discreetly approached by
Talleyrand, but would have nothing to say to him.
Fouche,
however, determined to proceed with the conspiracy. But La Fayette and the
editors of the Censeur preferred to trust to the constitutional action of the
new Chamber of Deputies, which was to meet in May; and in the middle of
February, when all was ready, Davout, the military chieftain of the intended
insurrection, declared that he would have none of it, alleging ignorance of
Napoleon’s wishes, in reality moved by distrust of Fouche. Meanwhile Fouche had
entered into correspondence with Mettemich, who was glad to communicate with so
sensitive a barometer of the political weather. Since the regency of
Marie-Louise was a possible outcome of the plot, it was necessary to secure the
consent of the Powers whose representatives were then assembled at Vienna. But
how could the Powers tolerate a regency for Marie-Louise, if her terrible
husband were to remain within two days’ sail of the French coast ? If Napoleon
could be put to death or banished to a distant isle in the Atlantic, then
indeed the idea might become a practical policy. Fouche wished it to be
practical. One of his men suggested assassination to Louis XVIII, but the King
rejected the proposal. It was necessary therefore to work for the deportation
of Napoleon—a safe task, since the scheme was as agreeable to the Bourbons as
to their secret foes. Herein Fouche agreed with Talleyrand.
But the
signal for revolt did not come from Vienna. On Sunday, March 5, at 1 p.m., it was announced to Louis that
Bonaparte had landed on the coast of France. Some hours afterwards Fouche
learnt the news, and determined to precipitate the revolt. If his men marched
on Paris they could overturn Louis, establish a Provisional Government, and
resist or side with Napoleon according as the opinion of the country declared
itself. But all miscarried. A handful under Lefebvre Desnouettes marched as far
as Compiegne, and then, finding the outlook cold and cheerless, returned to
their duty. Such was the sole outcome of all the plotting under the First
Restoration.
Napoleon was
not brought. over from Elba by plot or conspiracy. He came because he had
correctly divined the situation in France. His march to the capital is one of
the miracles of history. He fought no battle; he shed no blood; he was greeted
by the peasantry all along the route as a saviour and a friend; not a soldier
would fire on him; his name was a talisman which drew all the valour of the
kingdom to itself. He often rode before his troops unattended; yet no one
offered him violence. He promised liberal reforms—not that liberal reforms
mattered
to peasant or
soldier, but to make his return sound pleasantly in the ears of the lawyers and
politicians of Paris. Never had his instinct for action been more faultless,
his demeanour more enchanting in its direct and spontaneous ease. “ Roule ta
boule, roi cotillon, Rends ta couronne d Napoleon,” blithely sang men, women,
and children along his triumphal way. “ Le pere Violette ” had come to teach
the cure and the emigre a lesson, and to make secure every peasant-holding in
Prance. On March 10 he was at Lyons, on the 17th at Auxerre, on the morning of
the 20th at Fontainebleau. On the 14th he was joined by Ney, who had boasted
that he would bring him back to Paris in an iron cage.
Louis had
always said, in his easy way, that the clouds would pass over and all would soon
be well. He knew that he had given France peace and liberty, that he had no
intention of violating the Charter, that he had not been stiff with the
Chambers, that his Government had respected the material interests of the
nation. Given time, the good sense of the nation would rally round him; fears
would be quieted, suspicions allayed. The countiy might grumble, mock,
criticise, but it could never be so mad as to upset his throne. But he had not
calculated on Bonaparte. Though he had been warned in November that there was
something stirring in Elba, he took no heed; and, even after the news of the
landing, he was full of confidence that the Princes would be able to stop “ the
escapade.” But on the night of March 9-10 news came that Lyons was untenable; and
the assurance of the Court oozed away. The wildest courses were suggested. De
Blacas thought that the King should go in an open carriage, accompanied by the
Chambers, to meet Napoleon; Monsieur, that he should summon Fouche to the
Council; Marmont, that he should fortify the Tuileries and the Louvre, and
prepare to stand a siege of two months, while Monsieur and his sons raised the
provinces. Bourrienne advised a retirement to Lille; and Vitrolles proposed
that the Chambers should be summoned to Rochelle, and that the King should
throw himself on the loyalty of the Bretons. With true perspicacity,
Montesquiou objected that the King of La Vendee would never be the King of
France.
Soult was
suspected of treason and dismissed; Bourrienne was made prefect of police.
Montesquiou advised large concessions to liberal opinion, and carried the King
with him. From the 9th to the 16th of March a series of announcements appeared
in the Moniteur, destined to satisfy the constitutionalists and to appease the
resentments of the people. Half-pay officers were to be recalled to service and
full pay. Arrears due to the Legion of Honour were to be paid; privileged corps
were to be formed of the old Imperial Guard; the utmost loyalty to the Charter
was protested. On March 16 the King drove to the Palais Bourbon, wearing for
the first time the rosette of the Legion of Honour. “ How,” he said to the
assembled deputies and peers, “ can I at sixty years better terminate my career
than by dying in defence of my
country ? ” A
crowd of deputies rose at his words, and stretching forth their arms swore to
die for the King and the Charter. Even Monsieur protested on oath his fidelity
to constitutional principles.
But on March
17 it was known that Marshal Ney had deserted to the enemy; and the Court made
up its mind to flee. Very secretly, on the evening of Sunday, March 19, the
King drove out of Paris; nor was it till the next morning that his ministers
became aware of his flight. Then for the first time all was known—the desertion
of Ney, the flight of the King, the arrival of Napoleon at Fontainebleau.
Crowds collected in the squares and gardens awaiting the event; generals and
officers drove out along the Essonnes road to proffer their services. At 2 p.m.
the tricolour was hoisted on the Tuileries; but still he did not come. The
night closed in; a fine rain began to fall, and the streets emptied. Then a
carriage galloped into the town, with the torches of the Polish Lancers of the
Guard on either side. It was Napoleon. Instantly a crowd surged round the
Tuileries, and he was borne through the press, a light smile upon his lips, his
face deadly pale, up the great staircase to the throne- room, where a hundred
lustres shed their brilliance upon a gay crowd of men and women. But he was not
deceived by the splendour of his reception. “ Mon cher,” he said to Mollien, “
the time for compliments is passed; they have let me come, as they have let
those people go.”
So fell a
Government of which Madame de Stael could say that it was guilty of no single
act of arbitrary authority; a Government which respected public and private
liberty and secured possibilities of quiet and comfortable living to its
subjects. According to its own lights, it honestly served the interests of
France both at home and abroad. It was not disloyal to the Charter, though it
had no faith in it; and, thanks to the courage and adroitness of Talleyrand, it
regained for France a place in the counsels of Europe. Many as were its errors,
it was nearly as good a Government as the circumstances permitted. But Paris,
always remorseless in its ridicule and captious in its criticism, could make
no allowance for the pygmy who had been called upon to fill the giant’s throne.
The grievances of the army were partly inevitable and partly trifling. The
suspicions of the provinces were based, not upon injuries received, but upon
fears entertained. A strong king, enthusiastic for the Constitution, might have
allayed these tremors, kept the emigres in check, and soothed the
susceptibilities of the army. But still he would not have been safe. To a race
which had drunk so deeply of military and civil glory, his rule must have meant
the beginning of the humdrum age.
THE CONGRESS
OF VIENNA. I.
On May 30,1814,
the treaties known collectively as the First Peace of Paris were signed by
Talleyrand on behalf of the Most Christian King, and by the representatives of
Austria, Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia. This Peace fixed the frontiers of
France as they had stood on November 1, 1792, granting, however, certain
augmentations of territory on the northern and eastern frontiers of France in
return for her renunciation of any pretensions to sovereignty or control
beyond them. On the middle Rhine the Thalweg (or mid-stream line) of the river
was fixed as the boundary; while, to the south-east, the department of Mont
Blanc was increased by the acquisition of Chambery and Annecy. Moreover, France
was guaranteed the retention of all the enclaves within her territories of
1792—Avignon, Montbeliard and a number of other districts. She thus gained
territory comprising 150 square (geographical) miles, with 450,000 inhabitants,
although Holland, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and the island of Malta
now remained wholly detached from her rule or influence. Of the French
colonies, Tobago, Santa Lucia, and tie de France with its dependencies, were by
the Peace of Paris ceded to Great Britain; and the Spanish portion of San
Domingo was restored to Spain. On the other hand, Portugal gave French Guiana
back to France.
It would be
superfluous here to enter further into the provisions of the First Peace of
Paris; for, in the treaties made by France with the other Great Powers, the
thirty-second Article stipulated that a congress, to be held at Vienna by the Powers
which had taken part in the recent war, should determine the arrangements for
completing these provisions. This, of course, referred primarily to the changes
made or to be made in the political map of Europe; and, in one of the secret
articles of the Peace, France promised to recognise whatever distribution the
Allied Powers should make of conquered or ceded territories. Another secret
article, already agreed upon at Chaumont, which directed the signatory Powers
to make provision for the independence of the German States,
and for their
union by means of a federal bond, was also inserted in the Peace of Paris. With
these topics the ensuing summary of the proceedings at the Congress of Vienna
itself will be principally concerned.
It should be
observed that the first Article in each of the Paris Treaties declared the
intention of the High Contracting Powers to use every endeavour for
maintaining, not only among themselves, but among all the States of Europe, the
good accord and understanding necessary for her peace. Thus the Powers which at
Paris agreed to address themselves to the task of definitely ordering the
conditions of the pacification of Europe deliberately purposed by their present
and future common action to secure permanency for the results of their
endeavours. Herein they were only adhering to a system of procedure on which
they had previously agreed among themselves. On March 1, 1814, Mettemich,
Nesselrode, Castlereagh, and Hardenberg, had, as representatives of their
respective Governments, signed the Treaty of Chaumont. The Allied Powers, it
must be remembered, had entered into the decisive struggle against Napoleon
each at its own time and under the conditions which seemed best to suit its own
interests, and during its course had incurred no obligations with regard to
their future policy except by means of separate treaties with one another, and
of the declaration issued by them on December 1, 1813, when on the point of
invading France. But at Chaumont they agreed to an offensive and defensive
alliance, of far wider scope than any of these previous agreements. Not only
did they undertake, in the event of the terms of peace being refused by France,
to unite their endeavours so as to secure for Europe a general peace, but they
further agreed that, in order to assure the continuance of a good understanding
between them, meetings should periodically be held between the allied
sovereigns in person or their representatives. Thus was founded the new system
of congresses convened and conducted by the Great Powers, and implying, as
Wellington said at Vienna, the exercise by these Powers of a right of
protection over the peace of Europe. Among these congresses of the new model,
that which met at Vienna in 1814 was not only the earliest, but by far the most
important.
Europe was
full of hopes in the summer months which preceded the meeting of this assembly.
It seemed as if the States composing the European family, free once more to
take counsel together on terms of independence, were also free to determine
their own destinies. The pacifications of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic days
had been concluded only in order to be strained and broken; the diplomatic
hagglings dignified by the name of congresses in this period—Rastatt, Prague,
Chatillon—had amounted to little more than pretences, even in the eyes of those
who took part in them. The time of the despised ideologues seemed to have come
at last. Gorres, whose journal, the Rhemische Merkur, records some of the
noblest aspirations of this romantic age,
wrote in
August, 1814, to his friends, the brothers Grimm: “ It is wonderful how deep a
root all our efforts, hitherto more or less suspended in the air, have now
taken in all our hearts.”
Moreover,
public expectation was enhanced by a widespread impression, that the Allied
Powers had already agreed on the principal territorial arrangements which the
Congress would be invited to approve and guarantee. It was confidently expected
that the distribution of the large mass of territories reconquered from France,
and the resettlement of the political map of Europe, would* proceed on
principles ensuring a real and permanent equilibrium among its States, such as
had not been established either at the close of the Thirty Years’ War or of
that of the Spanish Succession. But more than this. In many quarters the lope
was cherished that, after promptly solving this part of its task, the great
assembly would without loss of time enter upon an ulterior range of labours,
equally important and, from a cosmopolitan point of view, more inspiring. It
would assuredly safeguard the settlement of the political system of Europe by
the institution of an effective and enduring international tribunal. Further,
by way of attesting its sincere desire of putting an end to the constant recurrence
of war, the Congress would at least attempt to apply the remedy of a
systematic, though at first inevitably partial, disarmament. It would encourage
the growth of representative institutions, by which Napoleon himself had
endeavoured to appease resistance or to conciliate support. It would obey the
dictates of humanity, already followed by Great Britain, by extinguishing the
African slave-trade, while with the aid of the same Power it would sweep piracy
out of the Mediterranean. To the transatlantic colonies of Spain the Congress
might perhaps succeed in opening a future of independent life; and,
conceivably, freedom of traffic might be secured on the ocean itself, though,
to be sure, Great Britain, then still at war with the United States on behalf
of her navigation laws, was not likely to modify them in favour of neutrals.
Such
expectations and visions as these the Congress was not destined to fulfil
within the nine months—strictly speaking, they were barely more than eight—of
its existence; but, even if the return of Napoleon had not unexpectedly
abridged its course, the leading minds of the assembly at no time shared this
widespread conception of the scope of its activity. Indeed, at a comparatively
early date in the course of its deliberations, Gentz contrived, through his
journalistic friend Pilat, to make public a list of the subjects to be treated
at the Congress, which, with the solitary exception of the measures against the
Barbary pirates, consisted entirely of such as had been mentioned in the Paris
treaties or in the supplements to them.
The primary
task of the Congress, the redistribution of territories, was to be carried out
in accordance with arrangements concerted by the Allied Powers without
consulting France, and explicitly recited in
I813-4] Previous separate compacts.
Convention of Kalisch. 579
certain
articles of the Paris treaties, likewise kept secret, at Talleyrand’s request,
in order to spare the susceptibilities of the French nation. The most important
of these arrangements concerned Upper Italy, the Netherlands, the territories
on the left bank of the Rhine, and the Swiss Federal Constitution. These
provisions, dating in part from secret articles in the Treaty of Chaumont, or
from earlier compacts between particular Powers, were unlikely to create
serious difficulties for the Congress, having been settled in principle between
the four Great Allied Powers, and accepted by France. The case was, however,
altogether different with some other agreements concluded between certain of the
Great Powers but unconfirmed by the rest—above all, with the Convention of
Kalisch (February 28, 1813) between Russia and Prussia.
This
Convention, while putting into the form of a concrete bargain the accord which
even in the darkest days had never ceased to exist between these two Courts,
clearly defined their relation to the general problem of the permanent
reconstitution of Europe. Prussia surrendered to Russia a large part of her own
Polish claims, in return for a guarantee of compensations in Germany which
(excluding Hanover) would restore to her an extent of territory equal to that
held by her before the war of 1806. The Treaty of Alliance between Austria,
Russia, and Prussia, concluded at Reichenbach (June 27, 1813), stipulated that
the grand- duchy of Warsaw should be partitioned between these three Powers ;
and a secret article of the Treaty of Teplitz (September 9), which rendered
definitive the promised alliance between the three Eastern Powers, provided
for an amicable settlement between them as to the future of this territory. But
the spirit of the Kalisch Convention had not been quieted by this seeming
revision of the Russian side of the bargain; as to the other, it was becoming
more and more apparent that the compensation promised to Prussia would be
sought in the annexation of Saxony.
Here then was
a stumbling-block thrusting itself, as it were, across the very threshold of
the Congress. Nor should the important fact be overlooked, that, at the time of
the arrival of the plenipotentiaries at Vienna, the Allies remained in joint
occupation of France, and severally held, or were on the point of holding,
military control over those territories in the final settlement of whose future
they respectively took a special interest. In the Low Countries the British
forces predominated, while the armies of Austria were in command of the whole
of Italy, with the exception of the Two Sicilies. Poland on the other hand was
entirely under Russian occupation; and the control of Saxony was soon to be
handed over to the Prussian authorities by the Russian Governor, Prince Repnin,
who at present held sway there on behalf of the central administration of the
Allies.
The beginning
of the month of August had been originally fi-red for the opening of the
Congress at Vienna. But the event was postponed for two months, first, in
order to enable Castlereagh to see out
the session
of Parliament; then, to allow the Tsar and the King of Prussia a brief sojourn
at home after their visit to England. By the middle of September several of the
leading statesmen of Europe, Castle- reagh, Hardenberg, and Nesselrode among
them, had found their way to the Austrian capital, where, on September 17, they
were joined by Mettemich and Gentz from the neighbouring watering-place of Baden.
On the 23rd the French plenipotentiaries put in an appearance; and on the 25th,
amidst what Gentz half contemptuously calls a “tumult,” the sovereigns of
Russia and Prussia made their entry. Four days afterwards the plenipotentiaries
held a conference, with which the business of the Congress may be said to have
opened, and which was to prove the first coup manque in its proceedings.
According to
the Moniteur, the sovereigns present at the Congress familiarly discussed
among themselves every day, before dinner, the principal subjects that were
occupying their plenipotentiaries, and arrived at their conclusions like
private persons conducting a friendly bargain. No doubt some of the
difficulties of the Congress were eased in this informal way, by means of a
diplomacy whose manner then seemed new because it dispensed as far as possible
with precedent and etiquette, and which made full use of the social
opportunities celebrated in the Prince de Ligne’s famous mot, “ Le congres
dcmse, mais il ne marche pas.” But, though at critical moments appeal was made
to the influence of great personages, above all to that of the Emperor
Alexander, yet the substance of the work of the Congress was carried on by a
select group of political experts. Whether Gagem’s statement—that this group
was composed of Wessenberg, Clancarty, Dalberg, Humboldt, Gentz, and La
Besnardiere—is exhaustive or not, the historian of the Congress will not err in
attributing to the labours of these men, and perhaps of a few others, most of
what was constructive in its achievements.
Among the
sovereigns present in person at the Congress, the Emperor Francis I of Austria
played the part of host in one sense magnificently enough, if we are to believe
that he lavished more than thirty millions of florins upon the entertainment of
his guests, at a time when his Government had the greatest difficulty in
meeting even its ordinary expenditure. The personality of the first Austrian
Emperor corresponded very imperfectly to the demands of so great an occasion;
but the long- established traditions as well as the actual interests of his
dynasty were safe in his keeping, and his good-natured instincts and obedience
to narrow conceptions of duty are caricatured when he is represented as moved
alternately by simple docility and low cunning. A nature like his could have
little in common with the gentle intellectual tastes of his reigning (third)
consort, the Empress Ludovica, a princess of Modena, nor regard without
jealousy and suspicion the militaiy laurels of the elder of his brothers,
Archduke Charles, and the popular sympathies of the younger, Archduke John. The
persistent refusal of the Emperor’s
daughter,
Marie-Louise, to play any part of her own in politics, made it all the easier
for her father to uphold her interests.
Among the
Imperial and royal guests lodged at the Hofburg, the most conspicuous figure
was beyond all doubt that of the Emperor Alexander I of Russia. The part played
by Russia and her armies in the overthrow of Napoleon, and the autocratic
conditions of Alexander’s own authority, must in any case have secured to him a
wholly exceptional influence; and this was enhanced by his ambition to
intervene, wherever he could, as a sort of universal Providence, and by his
irresistible desire to please. During the period of the Congress he kept up an
intimate personal intercourse with Prince Adam Czartoryski, to whose
inspiration his Polish policy was directly due. The remembrance of La Harpe’s
teaching animated the Tsar’s interest in the democratic development of Swiss
institutions; Stein’s lofty schemes for securing a national future to Germany
found in him a willing listener; even the refugee Prince Ypsilanti’s dreams of
the emancipation of Greece were not waived aside as undeserving of attention.
But he had around him other less singleminded counsellors; and the continuous
tendencies of Russian Imperial expansion imposed their perennial conditions
upon him. The political action of Russia in the immediate future hinged upon
the revival of dose cooperation between her and Prussia, to whose dynasty
Alexander had long been attached by close personal ties; while the
apprehensions of Austrian and British opposition were intensified by his
personal grudge against Mettemich, and perhaps by a feeling towards Great Britain
made up of political jealousy and personal disenchantment. At Vienna the
Emperor Alexander was met by his neglected Empress, Elizabeth—who was chiefly
interested in the future of the grand-duchy of Baden, of which she was a
princess. Thither too came the Tsar’s eldest brother, Grand Duke Constantine,
quite ready to become Viceroy of Poland pending the foundation of the new
Byzantine Empire; and his sisters the Grand Duchesses Mary and Catharine, of
whom the latter was soon to marry the Crown Prince of Wurtemberg, a prince
whose intelligence and high-mindedness, well matched with her own, exercised a
strong attraction upon Alexander.
Quite unlike
his brilliant ally, King Frederick William III of Prussia had, whether in
prosperity or in adversity, habitually abstained from adopting an independent
course of action except when slowly forced to it by an imperative sense of
duty. In 1813 he had yielded to the strong current of national feeling, mindful
of the humiliations undergone by himself and his late beloved consort Queen
Louisa, whom his subjects adored as a martyr of patriotism; but, while he had
taken care to safeguard the interests of his monarchy by the compact with
Russia, he had but little sympathy with the projects of minds more or less
dimly conscious of Prussia’s future national task. At the Congress the solitary
though to all appearance not unconsolable King shrank, according to
582
[18U-5
his wont,
from prominence; but, notwithstanding his natural obstinacy, his statesmen in
general found him willing to fall in with the compromises which they were so
often obliged to adopt.
Among the
minor crowned heads, King Frederick VI of Denmark appeared in person, with the
purpose of bettering, so far as he could, the conditions of the Peace of Kiel
(January 14, 1814), under which he had joined the coalition against his former
ally, Napoleon. Although his indefatigable efforts were almost wholly
unsuccessful, yet, but for them, his unfortunate kingdom might have fared even worse
than it did in the general pacification. On the other hand, the Crown Prince of
Sweden (Bemadotte) took no personal part in the proceedings at Vienna, possibly
because he had no wish to betray how greatly he had been disenchanted by the
turn which events had taken in France.
Among the
purely Napoleonic royalties, King Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria and King
Frederick I of Wiirtemberg headed the list of members of the Confederation of
the Rhine, whom something besides the zeal of converts had brought to the
Congress. The latter potentate, a tme but by no means an impotent exemplar of
what Stein termed Napoleonic Sultanism, was at Vienna mainly intent upon
affronting the patriotic hopes of his own stedfast Swabians, which, together
with their constitutional traditions, had a warm friend in his son and heir,
the Crown Prince William. King Max Joseph was accompanied to the Hofburg by his
Queen and the Crown Prince Lewis, whose own aspirations, patriotic and other,
so readily soared, out of reach; for himself, the Bavarian sovereign adhered to
the policy of his able minister Montgelas, which consistently subordinated all
other claims to the dynastic ambition of the House of Wittelsbach. Frederick
Augustus I of Saxony, whose calculations at the eleventh hour had, unluckily
for him, lagged behind those of his two fellow Kings, was as a matter of course
excluded from the Congress, where however his brother, Prince (afterwards King)
Anton, seems to have put in an appearance. The King of Saxony, in danger of
remaining landless for ever, was still detained in custody at Friedrichsfelde
near Berlin; nor was it till the beginning of March, 1815, that he reached
Pressburg, whence communication with Vienna was comparatively easy.
Many other
German Princes had been attracted to the Austrian capital—heads or members of
sovereign families, or belonging to Houses that still claimed to be such or
hoped to recover their sovereignty. The Grand Duke Charles of Baden had
arrived, fearful of having to forfeit part at least of the territorial gains
bestowed upon him by Napoleon. Here were also the Elector William of Hesse,
whose seven years of exile from the delights of Cassel had at last come to an
end, and the Hereditary Grand Duke George of Hesse-Darmstadt, whose Austrian
military uniform attested the traditions of his line. Here were the heads of
the elder branch of the House of Brunswick, and those
1814-5] Metternich. Wessenberg.
Gentz.
583
of both the
German branches of the House of Nassau; and among the Princes of the elder Saxon
branch, the Duke of Weimar, Karl August, still fresh in body as well as in
mind, though a little ageing; and Duke Ernest of Coburg-Saalfeld, with his
brothers Prince Ferdinand (another Austrian general) and Leopold (the future
King of the Belgians). Lastly, a peculiar position was occupied among the
royalties by Eugene Beauharnais, Josephine’s son, formerly Viceroy of Italy.
Married to a Bavarian princess, he had still hopes of a provision in Germany.
At the
Congress of Vienna no single plenipotentiary exercised an ascendancy such as at
some other Congresses before or since has been possessed by individual
statesmen. Yet there can be no doubt that Prince Metternich, the Emperor of
Austria’s Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs and his first plenipotentiary
at the Congress, was from first to last its right hand, and its president in
fact as well as in name. However cautious an attitude Metternich might have
observed towards Napoleon in 1810-3, and subsequently towards the Coalition, at
the Congress he was resolutely intent upon a definite system of policy from
which in his judgment Austria ought not to swerve. Hence his collisions with
the incalculable policy of Alexander, whose bitter dislike the loyal support of
Francis enabled Metternich to meet with firmness as well as with tact. The low
view of his intellectual capacity, set on foot by Talleyrand’s malice, will not
bear examination; nor can it be denied that Metternich well understood the
first condition of ministerial success—that of placing trust in worthy
subordinates. The second Austrian plenipotentiary, Baron John von Wessenberg,
was an admirable pragmatical diplomatist; and his labours proved of the highest
importance to the general success of the Cougress, of which he has been
described as the “ working bee.” The Austrian Foreign Office at this time had
many capable agents at command; Baron Binder was called in from Stuttgart to
serve on the Sardinia-Genoa Committee; Count Radetzky, whose reputation as a
general had risen high at Leipzig, attended as military adviser; and Pilat
instructed public opinion as editor of the Oesterreichische Beobachter. But
Metternich’s second political self was Gentz, who, as he blandly informed
Rahel, knew everything, and who stirred Europe by appeals which were masterpieces
of force and point. Metternich had treated Gentz with confidence at the
abortive Congress of Prague; but it was not till early in 1814, when Gentz
definitely settled down at Vienna, that the minister actually took counsel of
the publicist in questions of high policy. After constant intercourse with him
at Baden, Metternich obtained the assent of Castlereagh, Nesselrode, and the
Prussians to the appointment of Gentz as Secretary of the Congress. Under him
Privy-Councillors Watken and Martens acted as Second General Secretary and as
Secretary of the German Committee respectively; and no official seems to have
more fully enjoyed his confidence than State-Councillor Hudelist,
584
Labrador. Talleyrand. Castlereagh. [1814-5
Spain, which,
as it proved, had nothing of substance to gain or lose from the deliberations
of the Congress, was represented by a single plenipotentiary. Don Pedro Gomez
Labrador exhibited from first to last a stiffness which, when the Powers
offered him a chance, became recalcitrance. As a rule he, like the Sicilian
plenipotentiary, joined with Talleyrand in the advocacy of Bourbon interests,
especially in Italy; he was also commissioned by Marie-Louise, Queen Dowager of
the extinct kingdom of Etruria. “Labrador,” wrote Castlereagh to Wellington,
“is a true Spaniard; he burlesques Talleyrand’s incongruities.”
The
plenipotentiaries of Portugal, and with it of Brazil, were the Counts de
Palmella and de Saldanha de Gama, with the Chevalier Lobo de Silveira.
The Prince de
Talleyrand, who had got rid of his Italian principality of Benevento, soon to
be suppressed by the Congress, appeared as Foreign Minister and first
plenipotentiary of the King of France. As such, he not only advanced very lofty
pretensions on behalf both of France and of “legitimate” royalty, but was
extraordinarily successful in quickly impressing these upon an assembly at
first disposed to treat him and his colleagues with the utmost coldness. The
influence which he had thus established he increased by daring intrigue, and
maintained in some measure to the last, in circumstances which would have
depressed any intellectual energy inferior to his own. Thus he did brilliant
service to the country which he represented as well as to the sovereign whom he
served; nor was France again temporarily excluded from the supreme council of
Europe till after his fall. The secret of his success probably lay as much in
his clearness of aim as in his calm audacity of action. With him came the Due
de Dalberg (whose kinship with the Prince Primate and share in the negotiations
for Napoleon’s second marriage do not seem to have interfered with his success
as a hardworking and capable diplomatist), and the young Counts de La Tour du
Pin and Alexis de Noailles. The Secretary of the Embassy, La Besnardiere, an
experienced official and a man of singular reserve, was accounted one of the
most indefatigable and effective among the working statesmen of the Congress.
Only the
wilful blindness of prejudice could describe the diplomatic action of Great Britain
at the Congress of Vienna as isolated, and out of touch with the main currents
of European politics. Nevertheless, the efforts of her plenipotentiaries were,
on this as on other occasions, unduly affected by apprehensions of
parliamentary comment at home, while the choice of these agents themselves was
not altogether determined by their diplomatic fitness. Castlereagh remained
first plenipotentiary till it became necessary for him to return home, in
order, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (February 15,1815), to explain
and defend by his unimpassioned and unadorned oratory the ministerial policy; a
fortnight earlier his successor had arrived in the person of the Duke
of
Wellington, who continued at Vienna till March 26. Castlereagh’s defects were
no secret abroad, though they were not exaggerated there as they were
afterwards at home; but at the Congress his tenacity of purpose, though derided
by Talleyrand as founded in ignorance, was by no means immovable. Where his
action was wanting in consistency, this may in general be ascribed to the
absence of clear instructions; to his capacity not only Mettemich, by whose
will his own was largely dominated, but so candid an observer as Gagem, bears
very distinct testimony. The return of Napoleon from Elba soon called away
Wellington from the Congress to his last and most famous campaign; but in the
share which he took at Vienna both in the immediate measures necessitated by
that return and in other matters, such as the settlement of the Netherlands, he
displayed his habitual clearness and promptitude of decision. The other British
plenipotentiaries were the Earl of Clancarty, also a member of the Cabinet, a
judicious and painstaking statesman; Earl Cathcart, British Minister at St
Petersburg, a good man of business as well as a military officer of commanding
presence; and Castlereagh’s elder brother, Lord Stewart (afterwards Marquis of
Londonderry), whose recent appointment to the Vienna embassy Talleyrand
regarded as significant of a wish to support Prussia against France. Stratford
Canning, British Minister at Bern, was called in to assist in the Swiss
Committee.
The first
Prussian plenipotentiary, Prince von Hardenberg, Chancellor of State, had for
his colleague Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, who was also accredited as Minister
at Vienna; indeed, by reason of Harden- berg’s deafness, Humboldt’s presence
could rarely be dispensed with. Although the differences between these two
eminent statesmen interfered with the success of their endeavours at the
Congress, yet each of them was pre-eminent there by distinctive qualities of
his own. Hardenberg’s wide culture and unrivalled experience were combined with
a singular elasticity of mind. Yet, even if we discount the severe judgment of
Stein, with whose fame his own is so inseparably linked, we must allow that, at
this critical moment, he betrayed an unfortunate indefiniteness of purpose.
Curiously enough, Humboldt, whom French critics spitefully called le sophisme
incarne, and to whom politics, like all other subjects, formed part of a
never-ending process of self-education, at times showed a notable readiness for
compromise. The labours of the Prussian plenipotentiaries were materially
forwarded by the services of Hardenberg’s trusted advisers, more especially the
high-minded Stagemann, Jordan, and the celebrated statistician Hoffmann. Among
the diplomatists called in to their assistance were Baron von Jacobi-Kloest,
for many years Prussian Minister in London, and Kiister, who was accredited to
the Courts of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg. General von dem Knesebeck, well known by
his mission to St Petersburg in 1812, was in attendance upon the King at
Vienna; but his influence has probably been much
586
Stein. Nesselrode. Consalvi. Beinhard. [1814-5
overestimated.
That of Stein, by which Prussian statesmanship could not fail to be specially
impressed, was in part exerted indirectly through the potent intervention of
the Tsar.
The
personality of the Russian autocrat would in any event have overshadowed the
activity of his statesmen, whose importance in the work of the Congress was not
always proportionate to their respective official rank. The first Russian
plenipotentiary was Prince Andreas Rasumofekii, whose diplomatic career had
begun in the capricious days of Catharine II. The second was Count Stackelberg,
the Russian Minister at Vienna; but a more prominent figure was that of the
third, Count Nesselrode, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Fortunately
for the progress of business, Mettemich had long personally trusted Nesselrode;
and at Paris, when Alexander was still opposed to the restoration of the
Bourbons, he found both this statesman and Pozzo di Borgo favourable to his
support of that family. This relentless adversary of Napoleon was, much to the
satisfaction of Louis XVIII, summoned to Vienna by Alexander in October, 1814.
Another recent addition to the important personal influences surrounding the
Tsar was the liberalising but mature counsel of Count Capodistrias, who from
1813 onwards had been chief of the diplomatic department at the Russian
head-quarters, and at Vienna represented Russia in the Committee for Swiss
affairs. During the later sittings of the Statistical Committee the Russian
representative was Baron Anstett. Prince Repnin came to Vienna on the termination
of his Saxon Governorship.
Finally,
Sweden, and after the declaration of the Union in November, 1814, Norway, were
represented by the Minister at Vienna, Count Loewenhielm ; but his attendance,
like that of his Spanish and Portuguese colleagues, was, except in special
cases of rare occurrence, purely formal. It may be added that Denmark was, as a
matter of course, represented by two Bemstorffs (Counts Christian Gunther and
Joachim Frederick); and the sovereign Prince of the Netherlands (the Prince of
Orange) by Baron van Spaen, van Voorstonden and Baron Hans von Gagem, whose “
share in European politics,” detailed with so much complacent sincerity by
himself, had begun after Rastatt with his mission to Paris as envoy for all the
Nassau lines. The representatives of Italian Powers, governments, and
municipalities may be passed by, with the exception of Cardinal Ercole
Consalvi, who during nearly a quarter of a century conducted, as Secretary of
State, the diplomatic affairs of the Papacy through a series of critical
phases, and contrived to infuse a tincture of liberalism much reprobated by the
Zelanti into a singleminded devotion to the interests of the Curia. At Vienna,
Consalvi was charged by Pope Pius VII with the interests of his temporal sovereignty
as well as those of the Catholic Church at large. The Swiss representation was
naturally numerous, the Diet of the Confederation sending three deputies,
headed by the Lmidammann Hans von Reinhard, a patriotic
statesman of
high intelligence and integrity, although not always holding the balance quite
evenly between opposing cantonal interests. Nearly all the cantons sent one or
more deputies. The active and successful efforts of La Harpe, who represented
Tessin and Vaud, were effectively supported by his compatriot General Jomini.
Among the
German Governments, the Bavarian sent to the Congress Field-Marshal von Wrede,
who remained there till called away on April 24, 1815, to take part in the
imminent war. At Vienna he made the most of his military laurels; but the
influence he acquired through his negotiation of the Treaty of Ried (October 8,
1813) on terms highly favourable to Austria was not increased by his arrogance.
The Wiirtemberg plenipotentiaries, on the other hand, had little or no liberty
of action left to them by their despotic master. It was only towards the end of
the Congress that the King of Saxony could be formally represented at the
conferences of its German Committee. His interests had previously been watched
by Count Friedrich Albrecht von der Schulenburg, and by his subsequent
plenipotentiary Globig; and a considerable influence was exercised at Vienna by
General von Langenau, who, when a Saxon officer, had actively exerted himself
for an alliance with Austria, and was now in her service. The electorate or, as
it soon became, kingdom of Hanover was, as already stated, represented at
Vienna by Count Munster, with whom was associated Count von Harden- berg, who
had for several years previously filled the difficult post of Hanoverian Minister
there; they had the services, as an expert in public law, of the elder Martens,
formerly professor at Gottingen. Although Miinster had, at Castlereagh’s
request, directly represented the British Government at Paris, and still
continued to possess the full confidence of the Prince Regent, his Ministers
entertained a strong desire, in which Wellington concurred, to keep the
interests of Great Britain quite distinct from those of Hanover; and, as a
matter of fact, the Hanoverian policy proper was in several respects far from
congenial to British statesmanship or public opinion. The Prince Primate
(Dalberg), who had recently resigned his government of the Napoleonic grand-
duchy of Frankfort, was represented in his ecclesiastical capacity by the
younger Wessenberg (Heniy), Vicar-General of the see of Constance under
Dalberg, and odious to Rome on account of his championship of the rights or
claims of “ The German Church.” The remaining German States all made a point of
sending plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order either to assert the sovereignty
still retained by their dynasties, or, if possible, to recover the territorial
control which, after the dissolution of the Bheinbimd, they had refused to make
over to the “Central Administration of reconquered territories” established by
the Allied Powers. This administration, presided over by Stein, accordingly had
under it, besides the kingdom of Saxony, only the former grand-duchies of Frankfort
and of Berg, and the territory of the Prince of Isenburg. The
588
Other interests.—Committee of the Four Powers. [1814-5
plenipotentiaries
of these German States included Baron von Plessen (Mecklenburg-Schwerin), whose
personal wieight at the Congress is said to have surpassed that of the
plenipotentiaries of some of the eight Powers, and Senator Smidt (Bremen), an
acknowledged authority on questions of economy and trade. In addition to these,
a large number of the German Princes and Counts formerly “immediate” were
individually represented at the Congress, while their collective interests were
in charge of Privy-Councillor von Gaertner. The four corporations of the
Knights of the Empire (those of Swabia, Franconia, the Wetterau, and the left
bank of the Rhine) also each sent a deputy.
The above
enumeration is very far from exhausting the list of interests personally
represented at Vienna, which included those of former sovereigns, of pretenders
to various thrones and dignities, of spiritual and temporal corporations, of
countries, districts and towns, of commissions, associations, and bodies of
men of many different sorts, and of private individuals. The Catholic Church of
Germany was represented, not only by Henry von Wessenberg, but also by three
oratores, reinforced by twenty-five members of ecclesiastical and secularised
foundations; the Catholics of Frankfort sent a deputation of their own, as did
the Jews of Frankfort, Bremen, Strassburg, and Liibeck, trusting perhaps also
to the influence exercised by the great Jewish financiers established in the
Austrian capital. Even the interests of publishers and authors were effectively
advocated, in particular by the great Augsburg publisher Cotta.
The first
week of October passed without any indication of the expected opening of the
Congress beyond reviews, manoeuvres, balls, redoutes, promenades in the Prater
and popular festivals in the Augarten. As a matter of fact, however, the first
plenipotentiaries of the Four Great Allied Powers met from September 16
onwards; and on the 22nd they agreed upon the general method of procedure at
the Congress. A committee consisting of representatives of the Four Powers,
and of France and Spain, was to charge itself with the preparatory work
connected with any matters of general European interest; while that concerning
the proposed Germanic federal constitution was to be left to a committee of the
five principal German States, Saxony being of course excluded. The non-German
Great Powers had, at Stein’s instigation, declared their intention to abstain
from intervening. On the same date, however, the plenipotentiaries of the Four
Allied Powers signed a protocol to the effect that they intended to settle
among themselves the distribution of the Polish, German, and Italian
territories placed at their disposal by the Peace of Paris; and that, until
this had been done, they would not confer on this head with the representatives
of France and Spain, or listen to any objections put forward by them. On the
28rd Castlereagh made a separate declaration, reserving to himself the right of
communicating arrangements adopted by the Four Powers to others.
1814]
France admitted.—“ Committee of the Eight” 589
Talleyrand,
who arrived at Vienna with his colleagues on the 24th, and was on the following
day admitted, with the faithful Labrador, to a sitting of the European
Committee, at once took his stand. As to the distribution of the reconquered
territories, he simply disputed the assumption that, since the conclusion of
peace, there still existed any alliance against Prance, or that she could be
excluded from a concert of European Powers. He had no objection to the plan of
a committee for the preparatory treatment of general European affairs (in those
specifically German he disclaimed any desire of intervening), and agreed that
it would appropriately consist of plenipotentiaries of the Powers which had
signed the Peace of Paris, viz. France, Great Britain, Russia, Austria,
Prussia, with Sweden, Spain, and Portugal. But this committee, he argued, ought
to be appointed by the Congress in pleno. Pertz is clearly justified in saying
that this contention inverted the system of procedure established at Chaumont;
moreover, it involved obvious risks, and was naturally enough regarded as
deeply insidious. After it had been rejected, the only practical question for
the plenipotentiaries was the actual constitution of the Directing European
Committee; and this was discussed at their meeting on September 30, which
ended in a set battle of two hours’ duration and a scene which, as Gentz wrote,
would never be effaced from his memory. Portugal and Sweden having hereupon
claimed admission to the Directing Committee, two further stormy sittings
ensued on October 5 and 8; and at the latter the plenipotentiaries of the Eight
Powers formally constituted themselves the Preliminary Committee of the
Congress—to be generally known as the “ Committee of the Eight.” The
declaration published by them on October 12 forms the first official
manifestation issued on behalf of the Congress, though still only in the name
of the Powers that had signed the Peace of Paris. It postponed the formal
opening of the Congress to November 1, by which time it was hoped that the
questions at issue might by free and confidential discussion have matured in
harmony with the principles of “ public law,” the provisions of the recent
Peace, and the expectations of the age. Though Talleyrand was said to have
called this declaration “ du mauvais papier? it was condescendingly approved by
the Paris Moniteur (October 22). In Germany, where the first anniversary of the
battle of Leipzig had been just celebrated amidst much popular excitement,
Arndt’s and other popular expostulations displayed a less contented temper. •
No formal opening of the Congress, however, took place either on the appointed
or on any subsequent day. The Committee of the Eight issued on November 1 a
declaration to the effect that a Committee of three, appointed by them for the
verification of the powers of the plenipotentiaries of the several States,
would enter upon its labours on November 3; and that, after the completion of
these, the Committee of the Eight would formulate proposals for the regulation
of the further progress of the Congress. Thus it may be said, in Gentz’
paradoxical
phrase, that
the Congress, as such, only came into existence by means of its Final Act; and
even this was only the act of the Eight Powers, to which the rest were invited
to adhere.
The working
organ, then, which had assumed the responsibilities of the general body, was
the Committee of the Eight, although on certain occasions the plenipotentiaries
of the Five Great Powers took it upon themselves to meet without the rest. But
even the Committee of the Eight, which on October 30 unanimously elected
Mettemich as President and Gentz as Secretary, of the Congress, held only infrequent
meetings, especially in the earlier months of the session, its principal task
being to formulate and place on record the decisions arrived at by the special
Committees appointed by it. The Committee for the settlement of the Germanic
Constitution had, as has been seen, been separately constituted from the
outset; and its broken course will be most conveniently summarised apart,,
while the composition of some of the other Committees will be noticed in
connexion with their proceedings.
Throughout
the earlier period of the Congress, the statesmen assembled there were, in the
main, though not as we shall see entirely, engaged on the permanent
rearrangement of the political map of Europe. This task, as well as the work of
the Congress in general, depended for its successful accomplishment on the
removal of certain difficulties which had from the outset obstructed its
labours; and among these difficulties, as will speedily appear, two, so closely
interwoven with one another as in reality to form a single problem, dominated,
and for a brief critical period seemed destined to swallow up, all the rest.
In the matter
of the restitutions, compensations, and satisfactions to be arranged, it was of
course necessary in the first instance to consider the interests of the Great
Allied Powers; the smaller members of the recent Coalition came next. France
stood in a position of isolation; though Talleyrand might continue to maintain
at Vienna the pretension which he had set up at Paris, and to act as if the
legitimate Government of France, having taken part with the Allies in
overthrowing the usurper, had a just claim to share in the decision of any
proposal as to the territorial reconstruction of Europe. But the question of
the French frontier had been settled at Paris, so far as its main issues were
concerned ; nor could there be any thought of reopening it now. France could
not at Vienna seek to obtain more than certain small rectifications of
frontier; on the other hand, she ran no present danger of a renewal of the proposal
which Austria had brought forward in December, 1813, of restoring Alsace to
Germany. As to the other Four Great Powers, nothing seemed simpler to the
Emperor Alexander than that Russia should find her compensation in Poland, and
Austria and Prussia theirs in Italy and northern Germany. This division implied
that, in the Tsar’s opinion, Great Britain would find her account, or rather
had
already found
it, in retaining most of her conquests beyond the seas, together with the
important positions held by her in the Mediterranean. In regard to these
conquests, she had at Paris shown a moderation which now stood her in good
stead. For the Dutch, at whose expense the most considerable of her colonial
acquisitions had been made, she exerted herself to obtain a compensation at
home; but her own gains were not submitted to the approval of the Congress,
which showed no disposition to touch her tenure of Malta, or to hand over the
Ionian Islands to any of the claimants who would have anticipated the
subsequent establishment of her protectorate. To Napoleon’s characteristic
remark, that the British Government was to blame for neglecting its
opportunities at Vienna, it may be replied that the moderation shown by Great
Britain enhanced her influence in respect of territorial settlements in which
she had no direct interest.
Austria
advanced no new claims except in Italy. By the Treaty of Reichenbach (June,
1813) she had secured the recovery of her dominions on the eastern shore of the
Adriatic, and by that of Ried (October, 1813) the retrocession of most of her
former losses to Bavaria; she looked for a still more favourable adjustment of
her claims in southern Germany, and also aimed at aggrandisement in Poland. On
the other hand, she was rid for ever of those Austrian Netherlands which Thugut
had described as a millstone hanging round her neck, and she could not expect
in the long run to retain those Swabian possessions which had ceased to be of
value to the House of Habsburg. But the rulers of Austria had firmly resolved
on permanently re-establishing her sway over all the Italian territories which
she had forfeited in a long series of disastrous pacifications (1797-1809), and
on extending that sway over the whole of Lombardy and Venetia.
Russia
entered the Congress in a position of great strength. Her recent successes in
the war with Turkey had placed her in an advantageous position towards Austria,
whose foreign policy had of late years shown want of decision in this
direction; while, in the north, Sweden, so long Russia’s bitterest foe, had, by
renouncing Finland in order to acquire Norway, become a close ally. No
opportunity, as it seemed, could have been more propitious for the
accomplishment of Russia’s design of appropriating the whole grand-duchy of
Warsaw, and thus, by a material advance of her western frontier, becoming at
last, as one of her statesmen phrased it to Talleyrand at Vienna, a European
Power. Now, although even before the collapse of Napoleon’s Russian expedition
Alexander had become possessed with the idea of a restoration of Poland under
Russian supremacy, he could not expect that Austria would give up Galicia, as
at one time she might perhaps have done in order to bring about the
establishment of an independent Poland; and after Reichenbach (June, 1813) he
had agreed that the grand-duchy of Warsaw, which must form the nucleus of the
intended dependent kingdom, should
592
[l814
be divided
among the three partitioning Powers. As a matter of course, he meant to secure
the lion’s share; and the question of Russia’s Polish satisfaction thus came
more and more to turn upon the compensation to be assigned to Prussia. The
counsels of Stein and Gneisenau were mingled in Alexander’s mind with the
promptings of Czartoryski; and, as it became patent that Prussia would seek her
compensation in Saxony, the Kalisch compact lay like an incubus upon the
deliberations of the Congress, where the Russo-Polish and Prusso-Saxon
questions were soon inextricably interlaced.
The position
of Prussia herself at the Congress was beset by many peculiar difficulties. In
order that she should secure in the future the position as a Great Power which
she had so rapidly reached and so precipitately forfeited, it was not enough
for the Prussian monarchy to be restored to a territorial dominion equalling
that possessed by it before the catastrophe of 1806. Moreover, in the
distribution of the German territory recovered from France or taken over from
her allies, Prussia was entitled to a recognition of the leading part she had
played in the liberation of Germany. The negotiations on this head were
complicated by many considerations. No great difficulty attended the transfer
to Prussia of a stretch of territory on the left bank of the Rhine, with
considerable accessions in Westphalia and on the right bank of the river,
including the grand-duchy of Berg and some of the German dominions of the House
of Nassau. On the other hand, Prussia could not hope to recover her hold on any
part of the electorate of Hanover, towards which she had proved so unkind a
neighbour from the Peace of Basel (1795) onward to the second French occupation
of the electorate after Jena (1806). The claims of Hanover, after its many
tribulations, were further commended by its dynastic connexion with Great
Britain. Prussia could not expect successfully to resist the Hanoverian claim
for the restoration of East Frisia, which implied the loss to her of an
important coast-line; and she could not even carry Hardenberg’s modest plan of
a Gottingen “isthmus,” to connect the western and eastern moieties of her
dominions. In lieu of the lost North Sea province, she contrived, by means of a
complicated series of transactions, to add Swedish Pomerania (Vorpommern) to
her possessions on the Baltic coast. At the same time, she had to negotiate
with a number of German States as to cessions, compensations, and exchanges
necessitated by her requirements or imposed on her by considerations of all
kinds.
In the south,
Bavaria remained in possession of the Franconian duchies formerly owned by the
House of Brandenburg. But she was in search of further compensation than she
had already secured for her retrocessions to Austria; and Stein and those who
thought with him were on the alert to anticipate Bavarian attempts to
appropriate Mainz, the key of Germany’s western frontier. The fact that the
area of a reconstructed Prussia was thus practically limited to northern
Germany whetted
the desire of
her statesmen to annex Saxony. That the kingdom of Frederick Augustus I was
both technically, and as a matter of fact, entirely at their disposal, was not
to be disputed, although his culpability consisted not in having supported
Napoleon, but in having adhered to him too long. His kingdom had been
conquered; and he was himself in fact a prisoner of war. But his real danger
lay in the palpable gain which the annexation of his kingdom would bring to
Prussia from every point of view—economical, military, and political; and in
the further fact, that the traditions of Prussia’s rise to the position of a
Great Power coincided with aspirations as to the future awaiting her in
northern Germany.
Had it been
left to the Four Allied Powers to settle the Polish-Saxon difficulty among
themselves, they might very probably have arrived at an early agreement. At the
outset of the Congress, Austria, remembering what important interests of her
own were at stake, made no sign of being prepared to carry out Mettemich’s
earlier threat: that she would perish rather than allow the establishment of a
Russian Poland. The secret correspondence carried on by Castlereagh with the
Tsar in the early part of October shows that the former had already abandoned
any attempt at carrying out the first idea of the British Government—that of
re-establishing Polish independence—and merely insisted on a partition of the
grand-duchy of Warsaw which should leave to Austria and Prussia their military
frontiers. Thus there seemed every prospect that this part of the problem would
resolve itself into a question of boundaries, as to which Alexander appeared
quite prepared to listen to reason.
Again, in the
earliest weeks of the Congress it seemed as if the absorption of Saxony in the
Prussian monarchy would be accomplished without serious hindrance. The ecMamce
of the rule of King Frederick Augustus and his dynasty had not indeed as yet
been pronounced; but in two memoranda addressed to the Russian and Prussian
sovereigns by Prince Repnin, the Governor of Saxony, the proposed annexation
was treated as a settled affair. Before taking the preliminary step of transferring
the administration of the kingdom to Prussia, it was thought desirable to
obtain the concurrence of Great Britain and Austria. That of the former Power
was readily signified by Castlereagh (October 11), who informed Hardenberg that
Great Britain was prepared to acquiesce in the incorporation of the whole of
Saxony in the Prussian monarchy, provided that it was not intended thereby to
indemnify her for sacrifices which would make her dependent upon Russia. Mettemich
gave no assent, but implied (October 22) that this might be forthcoming, and
that even to a permanent annexation of Saxony Austria might, under certain
conditions, be found willing to agree. Thus no arguments either of principle or
of policy seemed likely to prevail in favour of the unfortunate King Frederick
Augustus. On November 8 Prince Repnin handed over the supreme administration of
Saxony to the Prussians; proclaiming (on his own authority) the King of Prussia
as the future
sovereign of
Saxony; and Alexander promised his support to Stein’s proposal, that Prince
William of Prussia should be sent to Dresden as Governor of Saxony. It was not
only Frederick William’s natural repugnance to ungenerous haste which rendered
this proposal abortive; a new element had been introduced into the situation.
This was the
influence of France. No sooner had Talleyrand made his way into the European
Committee, than, as represented by him, the France of Louis XVIII once more
began to pose before the smaller States of Europe, and those of Germany in
particular, as the natural protectress of their interests. It would in any case
have been in the regular order of things that France should espouse the cause
of the King of Saxony, whose House, though he had lately been the faithful ally
of Napoleon, had of old been so closely connected with the Bourbons. But his
cause was also the cause of legitimacy, of whose rights, which conquest could
not invalidate and no punitive process could extinguish, the first
plenipotentiary of Bourbon France now stood forth as the consistent champion.
King Frederick Augustus’ privy purse accounts relating to this critical period
were afterwards judiciously destroyed; but Talleyrand needed no incentive to
stir up a conflict which might have results advantageous to France.
At first his
manoeuvres had no effect but that of impelling Stein, the real author of the
annexation project, to pursue it with increased determination; and Alexander
proposed the removal of the King of Saxony from his libera custodia at
Friedrichsfelde to the safe distance of Riga. But it soon became apparent that
one of those vehement outbursts of popular sentiment had been evoked, with
which, however mixed their origin, it is always necessary to reckon. On
November 4 the King of Saxony issued, from Friedrichsfelde, a formal protest
against the Prussian occupation of his kingdom, in which he declared that never
and under no conditions would he consent either to renounce the dominions
inherited by him or to accept an equivalent in their stead. In Saxony itself, a
few of the nobility and higher officials had so far supported the temporary
administration; and there was a small pro-Russian faction among the well-to-do
members of the higher middle class. But among the Saxon population at large,
notwithstanding the many tribulations through which it had passed under the
House of Wettin, there was still much loyal attachment to the dynasty and no
desire whatever for annexation to Prussia, while the bulk of the nobility and
of the officials were bitterly anti-Prussian. The sympathies of the German
Governments which had escaped the fate of Saxony—the Bavarian in
particular—were assured to her from the outset; and, among the Saxon Princes of
the Ernestine line who rallied round the head of the Albertine, even Karl
August of Weimar at first upheld the claims of his unfortunate kinsman against
the interests of his Prussian ally. With the aid of a free expenditure of
money, every exertion was
used to
influence public opinion in Saxony, in Germany, and elsewhere. Devoted
officialism found a mouthpiece in Kohlschiitter; historic indignation in
Sartorius; Bavarian envy in Aretin. On the other side an artillery of great
guns and small—Niebuhr, Eichhorn, Arndt, J. G. Hoffmann, Karl Muller—discharged
itself in support of the Prussian policy; while Gorres in the Rheinische
MerJeur denounced the interference of France in an essentially German question.
In Saxony the feeling of alarm and indignation soon became intense, and
communicated itself to the Saxon troops serving in the Rhinelands. These
manifestations soon began to exercise an effect upon public opinion both in
France and in England; strong journalistic comments made their appearance;
Ministers were pressed on the subject in the British Parliament; the Prince
Regent was known to be personally anxious to serve the interests of King
Frederick Augustus. So far, however, as can be discovered, Castlereagh’s change
of attitude in the Saxon question was due to the failure of his endeavours,
which had at one time seemed promising, to mediate in regard to the Polish
branch of the problem.
When
Castlereagh agreed to the transfer of the Saxon administration to Prussian
hands, he intended (as he afterwards explained to Wellington) by satisfying
Prussia to unite her with Austria in moderating Russian demands in Poland. The
British mediation, which continued during all the latter part of October and
far into November, was designed to induce the Tsar, instead of falling back
upon his cherished scheme of reviving a kingdom of Poland under Russian
supremacy, to consent to a partition of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, which would
leave both Austria and Prussia in possession of a frontier and of frontier-
fortresses, necessary to their security and to that of Germany as the central
Power of Europe. The success of this scheme was thwarted by Alexander’s
pronounced dislike of Metternich, and by the close attachment between the
Russian and the Prussian sovereigns. Nor was Castlereagh possessed of the tact
needed in circumstances so exceptional. In reply to his memorandum of October
12, the Tsar, on October 80, insisted on the equity of the Russian
requirements, which with a frontier- line running from Thom to Cracow and
including both fortresses, amounted to nearly three-quarters of the grand-duchy
(reckoned by population) and two-thirds of its revenues. The struggle now
became more acute. Early in November Metternich made an attempt to induce
Prussian diplomacy to unite with him at all events in pressing upon Russia the
line of the Vistula. But on the 6th of the month an end was put to
Castlereagh’s mediation, and to the endeavour to confront Russia with united
action on the part of the Three Powers. In an interview with Frederick William
and Hardenberg, Alexander revealed or proposed to reveal to them an offer of
concessions in Poland, which he declared to have been made to him by
Metternich, on condition that he would in return cooperate in keeping Prussia
out of Saxony. Frederick
William
thereupon indignantly bade Hardenberg cease from any further negotiations with
the Austrian and British plenipotentiaries.
Mettemich
lost no time in denying the charge; nor is there any evidence that it was he
who had in this instance swerved from the truth. But the Tsar was now virtually
certain of his ally, and in consequence more determined to persist in his
demands. In this spirit he sent a final note to Castlereagh (November 21). For
a time, indeed, Hardenberg behaved as if the task of inducing Alexander to
concede more satisfactory terms had passed from Castlereagh to himself. On
November 27 he obtained from the Tsar a declaration expressing his willingness
to consent to the two fortified cities of Cracow and Thom, with a certain
district around each, being declared independent and neutral. But this
concession was to be conditional on the annexation of the whole of Saxony to
Prussia, and on the garrison of Mainz, whose future had become a burning
question between the German Powers, being furnished conjointly by Prussia and
Austria. Hardenberg passed on these proposals to Mettemich on December 2,
adding a suggestion that King Frederick Augustus should be compensated with a
desirable little territory in Catholic Westphalia, and pathetically entreating
the Austrian statesman to save Prussia from her present position. He was well
aware that the design of incorporating Saxony in the Prussian monarchy was in
the most serious danger. Metternich’s answer (December 10), while making direct
reference to the opposition offered by France to the annexation of the whole of
Saxony, suggested that Prussia should annex a small portion of it, without
coming into contact with the Austrian frontier; as to Poland, he declared
himself ready to fall in with the last Russian proposals, provided, however,
that Thom and Cracow passed to Prussia and Austria respectively. The only
result of this note was to draw the Kalisch allies still more closely together;
and when Mettemich, who at this point seems to have overreached himself, sought
to sow discord between them by further manoeuvres, the Tsar declined any
further personal transaction with him, and requested Hardenberg to draw up a
final memorandum as the basis of direct discussion with the Emperor Francis.
This memorandum (dated December 15) argued strenuously against the
dismemberment of Saxony, and proposed that, since no other satisfaction but the
whole of that kingdom could be found for Prussia, King Frederick Augustus
should be compensated for the loss of it by territories, with a population of
nearly 700,000, on the left bank of the Rhine.
While this
unedifying wrangle was in progress at Vienna, the news arrived that Grand Duke
Constantine, who had been sent to Warsaw to organise a Polish army, had on
December 11 issued a proclamation calling upon the Poles to unite for the
defence of their common country and for the preservation of their political
independence. This manifesto not being disavowed by the Tsar, he was judged to
have taken his final
1814-5] Imminence of war. Defensive Triple Alliance.
597
stand in the
Polish question. A movement of Austrian troops towards the Galician frontier
and a partial mobilisation of the French army ensued. Both Mettemich and
Castlereagh—the latter probably stimulated by parliamentary intelligence from
home—became more and more disposed to listen to the Saxon plea. Talleyrand now
came to the front. In two rhetorical notes of December 19 and 26, he insisted
on the restoration of Frederick Augustus; a cession of part of his dominions
might be a politic act, but the principle of legitimacy must be upheld. He also
nearly succeeded in uniting the whole body of representatives of the minor
German States in a collective note against the absorption of Saxony by Prussia,
whose administrative amenities were exercising their usual effect.
When,
therefore, on December 29, a last attempt was made to lay down the basis of an
understanding in a special conference between representatives of the Four
Allied Powers, Mettemich at once proposed the admission of Talleyrand to the
discussion ; and, taking a leaf out of his book, urged that no final decision
as to Saxony could be taken without the approval of its legitimate King.
Castlereagh supported the proposal; but nothing came of it. The conference met
again on January 3, when Mettemich appeared to be well disposed towards the
Russian basis of agreement drafted by Nesselrode. But in the midst of these
amicable proceedings the rupture took place; and for a week, or thereabouts,
Europe was in imminent peril of a general war. Mettemich had, not unnaturally,
been irritated by the personal insults of the Tsar; while it would seem as if a
menacing phrase of Hardenberg’s, ordinarily very little disposed to dwell in
extremes, had provoked Castlereagh, who with all his shortcomings had the peace
of Europe at heart. Thus the wiles of Talleyrand, encouraged by the bluster of
Wrede and the buzz of the smaller folk, prevailed; and, in a moment of what
might almost be called infatuation, the Defensive Triple Alliance of January 3,
1815, was concluded between Great Britain, Austria, and France. It bound the
three Powers to mutual support in the event of any one of them being attacked
on account of the proposals on which they had jointly agreed for the completion
of the arrangements of the Peace of Paris—Austria and France each providing an
army of 150,000 men, while Great Britain (which on December 27 had concluded
peace with the United States at Ghent) was to furnish equivalent aid either by
subsidies or by mercenary troops. An attack upon Hanover or the Netherlands was
to be treated as one upon Great Britain. The accession to the treaty of the
sovereigns of these two countries, and of Bavaria, was to be invited; Sardinia
and Hesse-Darmstadt also afterwards acceded. A military commission was
appointed to draw up a plan of operations, in the event of an advance of the
Russian armies in the direction of Vienna. To the treaty itself a special
article was added, providing for absolute secrecy; and this was rigorously
observed,
though Stein seems to have had a shrewd notion of what was in progress. It was
only by accident that, during the Hundred Days, Louis XVIirs copy of the treaty
fell into the hands of Napoleon, by whom it was made known to Alexander before
he left Vienna.
To whatever
speculations and hopes this secret treaty might give rise, and however
brilliant a diplomatic stroke its conclusion might seem on the part of
Talleyrand, none of the Powers that were parties to it could on reflexion fail
to perceive its precipitancy. At Paris the Ministry of War could not undertake
to place more than half the promised French force in the field within six
weeks. Austria was unwilling to withdraw troops from Italy, where Murat needed
careful watching. Europe in general was exhausted in men and money; the British
Parliament could not be depended upon for an endless flow of subsidies; and a
European war could not be waged by means of undertakings on paper. And, if war
actually broke out, nothing had been done to prevent the Emperor in Elba from
having a hand in it.
In a word, no
sooner was the controversy on the point of becoming an open quarrel than both
sides began to recede in order to avoid such a catastrophe. Fortunately, as has
been seen, the negotiations had never been broken off; on January 9, 1815, the
plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers resolved that their decision should be
binding upon the King of Saxony; and on the 11th Talleyrand was admitted to
their conference. The supreme tribunal of the Four Powers was thus incidentally
changed into that of the Five; and henceforth nothing further was heard from
the astute representative of France about an appeal to the Congress at large.
For a time the prospects of peace remained clouded; and Alexander’s wrath
against Metternich seemed to wax hotter than ever. But, after a slight effort
on the part of Castlereagh, Metternich, in the conference of January 28, at
last took a decisive step towards conciliation. He made it clear that Austria
was prepared both to concur with Prussia in accepting an unsatisfactory
military frontier in Poland, and, on condition that the greater portion of
Saxony should be left to its King, to consent to the annexation of the rest of
it by Prussia. Hardenberg’s reception of these offers showed that Prussia was
willing to compromise; and Castlereagh, whose presence was required at home,
wished if possible to return with the credit of success. Bargaining began; and,
after at least one stormy passage, a settlement was reached which, on February
8, a sub-committee was appointed to reduce to the form of a preliminary
convention.
Austria
recovered all her Polish possessions; but Cracow was declared a free city. The
Prussian share covered the larger part of her former Polish dominions, and
comprised the fortress of Thom, which Alexander at the last moment consented to
yield. In return, Prussia contented herself with rather less than two-fifths of
Saxony, including the fortress of Torgau, but not the important city of
Leipzig. On February 11 these
arrangements
were approved by the Committee of the Five Powers; and, so far as they were
concerned, the Polish-Saxon difficulty was at an end. The aspirations of
Alexander, and the hopes cherished by his Polish counsellor, were curtailed;
and the three Powers, between whom Poland, with the exception of the fragment
called the Republic of Cracow, had been as it were once more partitioned, were
left to deal each on its1 own account with the national claims of
its Polish subjects. On the other hand, the King of Saxony, who had so
strenuously exerted himself against the absorption of the whole of his kingdom
by Prussia, still had to be persuaded to accept the compromise by which he was
left in possession of a part of it. In order to bring him for this purpose
within easier reach of the Congress, he was invited to take up his residence at
Pressburg, where he arrived on March 4, 1815. Here, a few days afterwards, he
was waited on by a deputation from the Committee of the Five Powers,
consisting of Mettemich, Talleyrand, and Wellington, Castlereagh’s successor.
.The King refused to accept the conditions offered, and proposed to open a
negotiation with them on his own account under the mediation of Austria. The
deputation having returned to Vienna, the Committee on March 12 retorted by
empowering the Prussian Government to take immediate permanent possession of
the part of Saxony assigned to it, while continuing provisionally to occupy the
remainder. In the House of Commons, on March 20, Castlereagh resolutely upheld
the agreement of the Powers; and on April 6 King Frederick Augustus at last
gave a preliminaiy assent to the cession imposed upon him. But it was not till
May 18 that Saxony signed the definitive treaty.
This delay
apart, the reaction which had ensued upon the crisis into which jealousy,
suspicion, and design had precipitated the Great Powers had resulted in an
amicable settlement before the tidings of Napoleon’s return warned the Congress
to hasten its deliberations. But in other directions, too, not a little had
been accomplished by the early part of February, 1815; and the Final
Declaration drafted about this time by Gentz, probably at the instigation of
the British Government, was not wholly unwarranted in its tone of
self-satisfaction.
The first
actual decision arrived at on behalf of the Congress was the incorporation of
Genoa and her territory in the kingdom of Sardinia, on which the Committee of
the Eight agreed on November 18 and 17. In April, 1814, Lord William Bentinck
had sanctioned the establishment of a Provisional Government under British
protection. But Austria, mindful of her own dominion over Venice, well disposed
towards King Victor Emmanuel, and possibly not unwilling to augment what might
ultimately prove an Austrian inheritance, would not listen to the proposal of
restoring Genoese autonomy. France and Spain raised a feeble protest against
the annexation; and the efforts of the plenipotentiaiy of the Provisional
Government of Genoa at Vienna, Marquis de Brignole,
found an echo
in both Houses of the British Parliament. But the good fortune of the House of
Savoy prevailed; and the fate of the proud and wealthy city was sealed.
The Swiss
question, complicated in itself and envenomed by ancient antipathies and
jealousies, as well as by mischievous foreign intrigue, was likewise carried to
a conclusion within the earlier period of the Congress, though nothing short of
the apprehensions of immediate war excited by Napoleon’s return could have
brought it to so speedy an issue. After the overthrow of the “Mediator of
Switzerland”, her future had depended upon the preservation of her neutrality,
and upon her adherence in principle to the provisions of the Act of Mediation
(1803), which had united an augmented number of cantons under a real though far
from stringent Federal Constitution. But although, under the influence of La
Harpe, Alexander was prepared to respect Swiss neutrality, Austria insisted on
her troops entering the territory of the Confederation; and Bern, instigated by
the same Power, summoned Vaud and Aargau to acknowledge their relation of
dependence towards herself. Fortunately, Zurich was at the time the directing
canton (Vorori); and the Landammann, Hans von Reinhard, was a statesman who
combined patriotic feeling with diplomatic sagacity. The extraordinary Diet
(Tagsatzung) summoned by him at Zurich, where it sat from December 1813 to
August 1815, began by declaring the Act of Mediation abolished; but on the same
day (December 29) the deputies of the old cantons (except Bern) laid the
foundations of a fresh federal union, recognising the existence of the new
cantons, and excluding dependent or subject territories from the Confederation.
In March, 1814, Bern retorted by convoking a “legitimate Diet” of the old
cantons, among whom, following her example, first Solothum and Freiburg, then
Zug, Uri, and Unterwalden, and finally (by means of a cowp (Titat) Luzern,
restored their old Constitutions. After Napoleon’s first abdication,
disturbances broke out in many parts of Switzerland, which had in some
instances to be suppressed by force of arms; and so late as February, 1815,
Bern, together with Freiburg and Solothum, was arming in order to force back
Vaud and Aargau into their former condition of dependency.
Thus the task
of the special Committee appointed at Vienna for dealing with Swiss affairs was
a thorny one—the more so that at the Congress not only the plenipotentiaries of
the Zurich Diet, headed by Reinhard, made their appearance, but every one of
the nineteen cantons, old and new, was likewise represented. While La Harpe,
through the Tsar, exercised a continuous influence upon Capodistrias, the
ordinary Russian member of the Committee, Zurleder, the able deputy of the
aggrieved “city and republic” of Bern, was strenuously supported by Stratford
Canning. Numerous other claims were urged for restorations and reunions; and
much time was spent on the conditions under which
Geneva, whose
deputy Pictet displayed great activity, should be included in the Confederation
so as to strengthen it against France. Ultimately, King Victor Emmanuel of
Sardinia was by divers concessions induced to give up the requisite territory.
It was further resolved to erect into cantons Wallis (Valais), recently a
French department, and Neuchatel, which the King of Prussia had recovered out
of the hands of Marshal Berthier, and which was thus placed in a peculiar
political condition. The Russian proposal to include in the Confederation the
Valtelline, formerly incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic in order to provide
France with an easy entrance into Germany, was approved by the Committee. But
the Valtelline deputies having pressed for reunion with Lombardy, this valuable
territory, at all times coveted by the possessor of the Milanese, was after
some skilful management finally secured by Austria.
Dalberg
having been admitted on November 30, 1814, to the sittings of the Swiss
Committee as French plenipotentiary, the influence of France was generally
thrown with that of Austria on the side of Bern and the a/nden regime against
that of Russia, on whose behalf Stein and Capodistrias advocated liberal views.
Thus it gradually became possible for Great Britain to hold the balance between
the other Powers with more success than in the Saxo-Polish controversy. In the
crucial question of the independence of Vaud and Aargau, Bern was not allowed
to reverse the provisions of the Act of Mediation, but was compensated for her
losses by the greater part of the bishopric of Basel, with the town and
district of Biel. Nevertheless, the general issue of the Committee’s labours
was not a vigorous federal State, but a loose union between twenty-two more or
less sovereign cantons. The directorate was to rotate in biennial periods
between Bern, Zurich, and Luzern. When, on March 29, the proposed settlement
was approved by the Committee of the Eight, it was still resisted in principle
by certain of the cantons (Schwyz, Unterwalden, Appenzell), while others
(including Bern) were still completing the reconstruction of their cantonal
constitutions. Two months intervened before the Declaration recognising the
twenty-two cantons was accepted by the Diet at Zurich; and more than two
further months passed before the new constitution became law. But the guarantee
of Swiss neutrality, which was accorded by the Five Great Powers on November
20, 1815, had been practically assured by the result of their preliminary
deliberations. That such a result, incomplete and defective as it was, had
been reached, was obviously due to the fact that, though each of the Powers was
desirous of shaping the new Swiss Confederation in accordance with its own
preferences, none of them in this instance sought any direct advantage for
itself.
The case was
very different with regard to Italy. Here it was understood that Austria was to
find her main satisfaction; and her interests therefore dominated all
territorial arrangements. The question
of an Italian
Confederation was not so much as raised at the Congress of Vienna; and
Labrador’s proposal, on November 15, to appoint a committee for the affairs of
Italy in general, was successfully opposed by Mettemich, who urged that each
Italian question should be dealt with separately. A beginning was, as we have
seen, made with Genoa. Next, a small committee (consisting of Wessenberg and
Labrador, with Noailles, Nesselrode, and Clancarty) was charged with the affairs
of Tuscany and those of Parma and the sister-duchies; but it does not seem to
have been regularly summoned, and had to deal with accomplished facts. In
Tuscany, the Grand Duke Ferdinand III, who was also an Austrian Archduke, and
whose rights rested on the Treaty of Vienna (1735), had been recognised by the
Allied Powers ; but against him Labrador urged the claims of the Bourbon
Charles-Louis, son of the Prince of Parma and Marie-Louise, who as “King” and
“Queen of Etruria ” had misgoverned the country till, in 1807, it was
incorporated in the French Empire. In putting forward the claims of the Infante
Charles-Louis, and basing them on the Treaty of Madrid between France and Spain
(1801), which had been undone by that of Fontainebleau (1807), the plenipotentiary
of the Spanish Bourbons took up an untenable position, which his intemperate
advocacy failed to improve. Mettemich having brusquely refused negotiation,
Labrador, by Talleyrand’s advice, desisted from any further challenge of
Ferdinand’s rights.
Parma had
probably been the real object of Labrador’s efforts ; but at this point the “
Don Quixote ” of Bourbon diplomacy was in conflict with the personal sentiments
of the Emperor Francis I as well as with the policy of Austria. By the Treaty
of Fontainebleau of April 11,
1814, the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla
were assigned to the Empress Marie-Louise, with remainder to her son. Her claim
was opposed by Labrador on behalf of the Infante Charles-Louis; but, though his
title was good in itself, Talleyrand used his influence in favour of a
compromise which would at once diminish the number of small Italian
principalities and keep the son of Napoleon out of the peninsula. While the
three duchies were to be allotted to the Bourbon claimant or to his mother, the
Queen of Etruria, and Lucca with part of Elba to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the
Empress Marie-Louise was to be compensated by a pension on the revenues of the
grand-duchy, and by certain “Bohemian fiefs ” now owned by the Grand Duke, of
which Reichstadt, in the Circle of Buntzlau, was one. The Emperor Francis I
hereupon declared his willingness to consent to the abandonment by his daughter
of her lawful daims, in return for fit compensation. But Mettemich seems to
have made it clear that Austria would insist on retaining a hold on Piacenza,
the military importance of which was considerable; and Labrador lost his
opportunity by demanding the three duchies or an Italian equivalent. Such an
equivalent was only to be found in Lucca and the Legations; and of the latter
the Queen’s conscience forbade her to despoil the Holy
See. Such was
the situation when the return of Napoleon made it necessary for Austria to hold
fast to the duchies, but to exclude his son from the succession. Lucca remained
the only possible compensation for the Queen of Etruria; and the conflict of
money claims between the Lucchese and their former “ Semiramis,” lElise
Bacciochi, had to stand over.
The duchies
of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola were claimed by Duke Francis IV, the son of
Archduke Ferdinand and the grandson of Ercole III, the last Duke of the House
of Este, from whom they had been wrested with more than the usual effrontery.
His rights were assured of acceptance by the Powers, and in return he proved a
faithful adherent of the Austrian regime. The duchy of Massa, with the principality
of Carrara and certain Imperial fiefs in the Lunigiana, were not reunited with
Modena till after the death (in 1829) of Duke Francis’ mother, Archduchess
Marie-Beatrix of Este, to whom the Congress had assigned them in her own right.
So early as
August, 1814, Cardinal Ercole Consalvi had called upon France, Great Britain,
and Austria to reinstate the Holy See in its dominions, though the Legations
(Ferrara, Bologna, and Ravenna) were actually occupied by Austrian troops. At
the Congress, Consalvi was instructed to demand the restitution of all
territories in possession of the Holy See before 1791, when the National
Assembly had decreed the incorporation of Avignon and the Venaissin.
Accordingly, in the note which in October he addressed to the Committee of the
Eight, he contended that the Treaty of Tolentino (1797), in which the Pope had
ceded these territories to France, was null and void. Having not the slightest
intention of relinquishing Avignon and the Venaissin, France could afford to
favour the restoration of the Legations to the Holy See. Such a restoration had
been deprecated by Metternich just before the conclusion of the Peace of
Paris. The balance of opinion at the Congress was in favour of treating the
Legations as conquered territory and therefore at the disposal of the Powers;
and at one time they were thought of as a suitable compensation for the King of
Saxony. In the end, however, Consalvi’s exertions proved so far successful that
the Legations (excepting the Ferrarese districts on the left bank of the Po)
were recovered by the Pope.
Finally, the
affairs of the Two Sicilies were, when the Congress opened, in a condition full
of difficulty for the Powers in general, and specially embarrassing for
Austria. At Naples King Joachim Napoleon (Murat), although his rule had never
taken root in popular feeling, still maintained himself upon the throne.
Notwithstanding that he had actually, been a combatant at Leipzig, the Allies
might even after that date have condoned his past, had he entirely severed his
fortunes from those of Napoleon; indeed, towards the end of 1813 they might
possibly even have put him in possession of Sicily. As it was, Metternich made
the
mistake of
concluding with Murat, on January 11,1814, a treaty of peace and alliance,
which guaranteed to him the throne of Naples, in return for Murat’s guarantee
of that of Sicily to Ferdinand IV. This treaty, with certain modifications
suggested by Castlereagh, had received the approval of Russia, Prussia, and
Great Britain; so that, at the opening of the Congress, most of the Allied
Powers were pledged to leave Murat in possession of Naples, and find a
compensation elsewhere for the legitimate claimant. In September, 1814, Queen
Maria Carolina had died at Schonbrunn; but her efforts were, with considerable
prospect of success, continued by King Ferdinand’s plenipotentiaries, who were
warmly supported by both Spain and France. Indeed, Talleyrand used his best
endeavours to make this question a second touchstone of his dogma of
legitimacy; and this time the Tsar seemed to lend a willing ear. But the
obligations incurred by Austria could not be ignored; and Castlereagh finally
agreed with Mettemich that the settlement of the Neapolitan question should be
deferred to the close of the Congress. Intentionally or otherwise, they thus
(as will be presently seen) enabled Murat to ruin his own chances.
The Order of
St John of Jerusalem (the Order of Malta), while wholly or in part despoiled of
its estates and revenues in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, had in 1788 been
driven from Malta itself. Though the Peace of Amiens had stipulated for its
restoration to the Order, the island had by the Peace of Paris, without so much
as the suggestion of an indemnity, been assigned to its actual ruler, Great
Britain. In consequence of the refusal of Pope Pius VII, in deference to the
wishes of Napoleon, to confirm the last election of Grand Master, this office
was at present held vicariously; but the organisation of the Order, which had
temporarily established itself at Catania in Sicily, remained intact. Its
plenipotentiaries at the Congress, Bailiff Miari and Commander Berlinghieri,
both of the Italian “ language,” were duly recognised by the Committee for the
verification of powers; but they demurred to the association with them of a
deputy representing the “language” of France. Several of the Great Powers were
favourably disposed towards the Order, though the Emperor of Austria was thought
to have designs upon its estates in Lombardy in the interests of the Order of
Maria Theresa. Louis XVIII was under a special obligation to the Order of St
John, dating from the calamitous days of his elder brother, and had instructed
his plenipotentiary to ask for Corfu as a compensation to it for the loss of
Malta. Great Britain, though she had no intention of relinquishing Malta, could
not in principle have opposed the grant of a compensation; but, as to this, the
agents of the Order appear to have been without definite instructions, and
their plea for an indemnity came in any case too late (February 24,1815). The
renewed outbreak of war entailed fresh services on the part of Great Britain,
of so much importance to the interests of Europe, that, instead
of Corfu
being assigned to the Order of Malta, or to any other claimant or expectant,
the Ionian Islands were ultimately placed under British protection.
Spain,
notwithstanding the unreasonable self-confidence of her Court and Government,
due to the facile accomplishment of their restoration in the midst of a people
exhausted by its self-sacrificing efforts, had in the earlier months of the
Congress accomplished very little by her advocacy of Bourbon pretensions in
Italy. Where her own immediate interests were concerned, Spain showed the
utmost reserve, not only in all matters of colonial policy but, as will be
seen, in that of the slave- trade in particular. In a minor question affecting
her relations with Portugal she obeyed the dictates of a perennial jealousy and
ill-will. After the attack which France had compelled Spain to make upon
Portugal, the Peace of Badajoz (June 6, 1801) had conceded to Spain the
fortress of 01iven<ja with the surrounding district, and certain strongholds
on the Guadiana. The Prince Regent of Portugal (Don John of Brazil) now
demanded its retrocession. This had been already pressed upon King Ferdinand;
and the Powers were agreed in regarding it as equitable. Portugal however,
still rather a dependency than mistress of her great American colony and
confiding in the goodwill of Great Britain, showed herself unwilling to restore
French Guiana to France, from which her arms had acquired it in 1809;
consequently Spain, trusting to her entente with France, continued to resist
the demand.
Among the
territorial settlements forwarded by the Congress in its earlier months, one of
the most important was that of the Netherlands. After December 2 the Prince of
Orange had held his entry into Amsterdam as Sovereign Prince of the
Netherlands. The southern (formerly Austrian) Provinces had speedily followed
the example of the northern; and the plan of a political reunion of the entire
Netherlands, which had already been considered at Chaumont (Februaiy, 1814),
and of which the preliminaries had been arranged during the visit of the allied
sovereigns to London (June), seemed now likely to be carried into execution.
Undoubtedly, it accorded with British interests; while its success would, after
a fashion, compensate Holland for her colonial losses to Great Britain, as
recently settled by treaty (August 13). Moreover, to many vigorous political
thinkers nothing seemed in itself more likely to assure the peace of Europe
than the creation of a strong State between northern Germany and France. The
racial difference between the northern and southern Provinces seemed no
insuperable obstacle; the difference in religion might be constitutionally met.
The union between a mainly mercantile or maritime, and a mainly industrial or
agricultural population, depending respectively on English and on French
markets, ought in the end to redound to advantage; and the opening of the
Scheldt, to which Holland would be obliged to assent, would remove one of the
chief hardships hitherto inflicted upon the
606
The new Netherlands State.—Scandinavia. (_i8i3-5
southern
Provinces for the benefit of the northern. By the Peace of Paris the House of
Orange had been assured a considerable increase of territory; but its nature
and extent had not been fixed. Castlereagh, therefore, in a memorandum
transmitted to the Committee of the Five Powers on January 28, 1815, recalled
the Chaumont stipulation, that the boundary of the new State should be carried
at least as far as the line of the Meuse; while the extent of further additions
on the left bank of the Rhine was to be determined by the interests of both the
Netherlands and Germany. The line of the Meuse was steadily upheld by the
British plenipotentiaries throughout the negotiations. They kept a consistent
middle course between Gagem, who as representing the House of Orange asked too
much, and Munster, who in the interests of Hanover sought to reduce the Dutch
demands; while Mettemich and Stein also showed themselves jealous of an
excessive extension of the Netherlands frontier in the direction of Cologne.
Towards the end of January, 1815, the Netherlands problem was approaching
solution. The new State was to include, with the duchy of Limburg and the
wealthy and industrious dominions of the Prince-Bishop of Liege, whose former
subjects desired this incorporation, the duchy (henceforth to be called the
grand-duchy) of Luxemburg in exchange for certain German possessions of the
House of Nassau. To the provision that the capital should become a federal
fortress of the Germanic Confederation, the Sovereign Prince was only with
difficulty induced to assent through the exertions of Lord Clancarty.
A separate
committee or sub-committee was appointed to dispose of the sovereignty over so
much of the duchy of Bouillon as had in the Peace of Paris not been transferred
to France. Gagem, as representing Great Britain, worked hard to obtain the
annexation of the sovereignty over Bouillon to that over Luxemburg.
The
relatively slight attention paid by the Congress to the affairs of the
Scandinavian North was primarily due to the fact that Russia had definitively
become the chief Baltic Power, and that neither Sweden nor Denmark could any
longer aspire to play a prominent part in the politics of Europe. When King
Frederick VI of Denmark, towards the end of 1813, joined the Allies, he made
his peace with Great Britain by relinquishing Heligoland, and at the same time
accommodated himself to the understanding between Sweden and Russia by
consenting to cede to the former the kingdom of Norway, tied as it was to
Denmark by historical association, by community of language, and by enduring
fidelity. In return he looked for a fulfilment of the promises held out to him
in the Peace of Kiel (January 14,1814), and confirmed by the so-called “Family
Peace” of Berlin (August 25, 1814). His compensations were to be Swedish
Pomerania and Riigen, with perhaps a further indemnity. Although the brief
insurrection, by which, under the leadership of the Danish Prince Christian,
the Norwegians had
attested
their repugnance to the personal union with Sweden, and in the repression of
which British and Russian ships had cooperated, was ended on August 14 by the
Convention of Moss, it was not till November 4 that King Charles XIII of
Sweden, after accepting the new democratic constitution of Norway, was duly
elected to its throne by the Storthing. These delays provided the Crown Prince
Bemadotte with a pretext for declining to hand over Western Pomerania (Fbr-
pommem) to Sweden’s hereditary foe. When the Danish plenipotentiaries at Vienna,
on November 19, 1814, presented a note calling upon the Powers to secure to
King Frederick VI the promised indemnity for Norway, they were not invited to
specify the quarter whence it was to be derived; nor was it till after
Napoleon’s return that a final arrangement, very unsatisfactory to Denmark, was
made.
Sweden had
chosen her part in the European political system by successively sacrificing
Finland and Vorpommern in return for Norway. She had thus, while entering into
a union of scant intrinsic value, which brought with it no promise of a future
headship of the Scandinavian North, deliberately excluded herself from the
political life of central Europe. This change was readily accepted by the
Powers, whom the military prowess of the House of Vasa had so often forced to
reckon with Sweden as a dominant factor in European affairs; and the protest
addressed to the Congress in November, 1814, by the ex-King Gustavus IV on
behalf of the rights of his son, which he asserted to be unimpaired by his own
forced abdication in 1809, fell upon deaf ears.
The Powers
charged by the Peace of Paris with the responsibility of completing the
territorial resettlement of Europe had, as has been seen, specially undertaken
to establish a permanent system of constitutional relations among the States
which had formed part of the Germanic Empire before its dissolution. The
recognition of this responsibility is, at all events primarily, not
attributable to the widespread demand for constitutional charters, which
Napoleon’s own action in Poland, as well as that of his brother Joseph in Spain
and that of the protecting British Power in Sicily, had helped to excite, and
to which the Charter granted to France by her Bourbon King and the democratic
Constitution by which Bemadotte purchased the submission of the Norwegians,
alike bore testimony. In several of the principal German States, notably in
Prussia and in the two kingdoms of the south-west, this demand was not to be
left without a response; and the promise of a Constitution to each State
included in the Confederation was inserted in its Fundamental Act. But the sole
point of view from which the Congress, or its leading Powers, could take up the
problem of the future constitutional system of the Germanic body, as a whole, was
the security to be derived from such a system for Europe at large. On the
delegation of this subject to a German committee, it speedily
became
manifest that neither the two great German Powers, nor the rest of the German
Governments, nor anything that deserved to be called public opinion or national
feeling, had as yet resolved upon even the leading principles of a settlement.
Thus the saying on which Frederick William IV of Prussia ventured in 1850, that
the time had come for Germany to be as free from the control of Europe as were
Great Britain or France, would in 1814-5 have seemed strangely premature to
Germany herself.
For many
years during the course of the Revolutionary Wars, and more especially since
the ill-omened Peace of Basel (1795), jealousy and distrust had prevailed
between the two great German Powers; while the political conduct of the other
German States, either openly dependent upon a foreign protector or retaining
the pretence of a sovereignty of their own, had been dictated by the instinct
of self-preservation or by the cognate impulse towards self-aggrandisement.
When, after the collapse of the Russian expedition, Frederick William Ill’s
proclamation (March, 1813) called the Prussian people to arms, it was but
gradually that the resolve to liberate Germany at large from the dominion of
the alien overspread the whole of “the German’s Fatherland”; and still more
slowly that attention began to be given to the constitutional methods and forms
that were to regulate the national life of emancipated Germany. As was
inevitable, the first ideas on this subject were vague and indefinite; nor
could it in any case be expected that hopes and aspirations for a new era of
the national life should move in the same plane as the claims and designs of
the chief German Governments and dynasties. In the negotiations which combined
Austria and Prussia against the falling conqueror, those Powers publicly
guaranteed to each other their restoration to a territorial dominion such as
they had possessed before the wars of 1805 and 1806 respectively. But the two
Governments made no attempt to discuss, in the interests of the nation as a
whole, either the future constitutional settlement of Germany or the particular
question of headship; and, instead of asserting themselves as the natural
guardians of those interests, they merely concurred in the undertaking as to
independence and federation, agreed upon at Chaumont and inserted in the Peace
of Paris.
Thus,
whatever Germany might think or say on the subject, the political axiom had
been laid down that the future bond between the German States must be a federal
bond; and, having accepted this conclusion, each of the two great German Powers
was intent upon safeguarding itself against any attempt on the part of the
other to establish an ascendancy which might develop into a hegemony over the
Confederation. At the same time both had resolved to defeat any attempt on the
part of the other German States to form by combination a third Power capable of
holding the balance between the two great Powers; and thus the claim of Austria
and Prussia to represent Germany
as a whole
was about to be definitely asserted in the eyes of Europe. The earliest draft
of a Germanic Constitution, submitted by Stein to Alexander, Hardenberg, and
Munster on March 10,1814, and probably in its composition largely due to
Humboldt, who had induced Stein to relinquish for the present his dream of
reviving the Empire, proposed a Confederation under the joint directorship of
Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Hanover. In July, however, Stein and Hardenberg
prepared at Frankfort a second draft, which on September 13 was, apparently
with some modifications, communicated by the latter to Mettemich. From this
document, consisting of forty-one articles, the deliberations of the Congress
took their start. It proposed that Austria and Prussia should enter into the
new Confederation in respect to part of their dominions only; but that the
directorship was to belong to the two Powers in common, the presidency over the
Diet being assigned to Austria. This Diet was to consist of the Directory, the
Council of the Heads of the Circles (with eleven votes distributed among the
two great Powers and the secondary States), and the Council of the Princes and
Estates (comprising the remaining Governments). Of representative assemblies
in the several States, or of a popular representation at the Diet, the draft
made no mention.
The Allied
Powers addressed themselves with unmistakable goodwill to the task imposed upon
them. The Tsar had with the aid of Capo- distrias familiarised himself with the
ideas of Stein, and was as a rule prepared to follow his advice as to the
internal affairs of Germany; while on this head the British Government
implicitly trusted Munster, whose Germanic patriotism was as sincere as
Stein’s, however much they might differ as to the part to be played in Germany
by Prussia. Both Powers at once assented to the sensible proposal that the
preliminary discussions on German affairs at the Congress should be carried on
by the plenipotentiaries of German States only—a concession which effectually
deprived France of any opportunity of intervening. The Committee formed for the
preparation of a Germanic Federal Constitution consisted of representatives of
the two great Powers—Mettemich and Wessenberg for Austria, Hardenberg and
Humboldt for Prussia; while Wrede sat for Bavaria, Winzingerode and Linden for
Wurtemberg, and Munster for Hanover. Saxony remained unrepresented. Baron
Martens acted as secretary to the Committee, which held its first sitting on
October 14. At the second, held on the 16th, Mettemich submitted as the basis
of discussion twelve articles, as to which the Austrian, Prussian, and
Hanoverian Governments had arrived at a preliminary agreement, and which, with
certain modifications, reproduced the proposals of Harden- berg’s draft.
Bavaria, however, seconded by Wurtemberg, not only took exception to the
proposed distribution of voting power among the Heads of Circles, as securing a
preponderance to Austria and Prussia, but raised a fundamental objection to the
subordination of sovereign Princes
to a federal
authority. The Bavarian protest stood in sharp contrast with the ready
acceptance of the principle of the draft by Hanover, notwithstanding her
intimate connexion with Great Britain; albeit at the fourth sitting of the
Committee (October 24) Wrede stated that Bavaria, though she might have with
slighter sacrifices secured the same advantages by allying herself with other
Powers of her own choosing, was on the whole inclined to enter the proposed
Germanic Confederation.
Thus the
discussion proceeded during a series of sittings (from October 26 to November
11) in which Austria and Prussia, supported by Hanover, adhered to the
substance of their original proposals, but sought to amend them in respect of
rights of peace and war, alliances, diplomatic representation, federal
legislation, and judicial procedure. It was sought to advance the work of the
Committee by appointing a separate Military Committee consisting of experts,
with the patriotic Crown Prince of Wurtemberg at their head, who it was hoped
would make definite recommendations, inter alia, as to the future federal
fortress of Mainz. On November 11 a secret Russian note, drawn up by
Nesselrode, but no doubt inspired by Stein, expressed the Tsar’s approval of
the Twelve Articles, in favour of which he declared himself if necessary
prepared to intervene. But even this stimulus failed materially to advance the
work of the German Committee, hampered and discouraged as it was by the
Saxo-Polish embroglio and by the more or less obstructive attitude of
Wurtemberg and Bavaria.
In the
meantime a feeling had gained ground among the smaller Princes and the free
cities, alike unrepresented on the Committee, that their rights, though
guaranteed to them by the Allied Powers, were in imminent peril. Gagem, who had
been mistrustful from the first, took the initiative by assembling in his place
of residence at Vienna the plenipotentiaries of nineteen petty States. The movement
was gradually joined by all the Governments unrepresented on the German
Committee as first constituted, including the Grand Duke of Baden and the Grand
Duke of Hesse. The associated minor potentates agreed to confine themselves to
seeking admission for their body, which soon grew to a total of thirty-one
members. The joint manifesto of the minor States, which was brought before the
German Committee on November 16, after asserting that as recognised sovereign
Governments they were entitled to take part in discussing the future
institutions of the nation, proceeded to declare that a federal head with
executive authority was needed to give coherence to these institutions; and
that the establishment of an effective judicial authority for the whole Confederation
and of representative Constitutions in its several States was likewise
indispensable.
This
manifesto, which revealed the inspiration of Stein, reached the Committee at an
unpropitious moment. For at the same sitting of November 16 the Wiirtembergers
presented a note, declaring the inability of their Government, with its
present information, to cooperate
further in
the task of elaborating a Germanic Constitution; and on the same day a protest
was read from the Grand Duke of Baden, reserving to himself the rights of full
sovereignty. He was very speedily, in a note drafted by Munster, answered
according to his deserts; and, on November 22, Metternich, after previous
consultation with the Prussian Government, reminded the Wiirtembergers that it
was preposterous for a single, State to controvert the principle of a Germanic
federal union laid down in the name of Europe. Wiirtemberg, however, remained
obdurate; and the effects of her recalcitrance were only too palpable. The
sittings of the German Committee were suspended (November 24) for more than
five months; and, just when the general prospects as to the success of the
Congress were darkening, the first series of systematic efforts towards the
drafting of a Germanic Constitution was superseded by a series of
projects more or less irresponsible and visionary.
Stein’s
original scheme of uniting Germany under the supremacy of a single
Power—whether this were Austria or Prussia, he declared to be indifferent to
him—had long since vanished into limbo. But even the dualistic scheme worked
out in the Stein-Hardenberg draft, which in the reduced and modified form
approved by Metternich and Munster had served as the basis of the deliberations
of the German Committee, and which accorded a direct share in the control of
the proposed seven Circles of the Empire to the three kingdoms of Hanover,
Bavaria, and Wiirtemberg, had been opposed by the two latter Governments as
going far beyond the one legitimate object in view, viz., combination for
external defence. In the meantime, as has been seen, the Governments not
included in the “ Pentarchy ” had shown themselves prepared for a considerable
restriction of their respective sovereign rights, and inclined to listen
favourably to proposals for resuscitating the worn-out machinery of the Empire.
They were in their turn influenced, on the one hand, by fears of absorption by
the larger States, and on the other by the action of the Standesherren, who had
already lost their sovereignty and are usually, though not correctly, called
the “ Mediatised.”
These Princes
and Counts regarding the interests of the petty potentates as adverse to their
own, had in fact been first in the field, and so early as October 22, in an
audience granted to their deputies by the Emperor Francis I, had besought him
to resume the German Imperial dignity. On December 16 they attempted to
safeguard their rights, as against the Wiirtemberg and Baden notes of November
16, by an appeal, in which, while declaring that they represented the claims of
a million of former subjects, they claimed a restoration of their sovereign
authority. When Munster, on whose support the petty Governments had reckoned,
sought to disabuse them of the belief that there was any alternative to a
federation, they retorted that the German nation, having the right to determine
its own Constitution, was entitled to decide as to the headship over it.
Stein, doubtless gratified by this revival of his own ideas,
had probably
begun to hope that the declared headship* which Austria was loath to resume,
might devolve on Prussia. But at the Congress very few shared this hope; there
is no sign that it was cherished by Humboldt; and, while no plans based upon it
had been formed by King, Court, or Government at Berlin, it had not even become
familiar as a speculation or aspiration either to the Prussians in particular
or to the German nation at large. The solution could hardly lie in ingenious
compromises—such as that Austria should hold the Imperial dignity for renewable
terms of five years, while to Prussia should be assigned a hereditary vicariate
in northern Germany; that the King of Prussia should be Imperial
commander-in-chief under an Austrian Emperor; or that Francis should be crowned
Emperor, and Frederick William King of Germany. It was also proposed, in order
that the ambition of Bavaria might not be denied its chance, that a couple of
vicariates should be set up, of which that on the Danube should be held by the
“Prussia of the south.” The impracticable idea of a very little Germany found embodiment
in the suggestion of the Gottingen historian Sartorius, that a Confederation
should be formed from which both Austria and Prussia were excluded. We pass by
other schemes and fantasies. A more practical instinct led Arndt and those who
shared his views, without demanding the restoration of the Empire, to insist on
the annual convocation of an Assembly, freely elected by the nation at large,
side by side with a permanent Diet of representatives of the Governments, as
well as on the establishment of a national judicial tribunal and foreign
office^ and the creation of a national army. This, it may be remarked, is
practically the present Constitution of the German Empire. Unhappily all this
planning and scheming was pervaded by diffidence and mutual suspicion. Jacob
Grimm, writing from Vienna to Gorres, lamented a state of things in which
little hope of patriotic action remained, and Heaven alone could unite Germany
and avert the consequences of weakness and treachery in the counsels of her
Governments.
Thus, during
the gloom of December, when the two chief German Powers were becoming involved
in serious antagonism on other subjects, the question of the Germanic
Constitution, which could not be settled without an agreement between them,
seemed breaking up into a chaos of conflicting schemes. As a matter of fact,
however* the working members of the German Committee were far from idle. Before
the year had ended or the Saxo-Polish difficulty reached its height, Wessenberg
prepared a draft entrusting the conduct of German affairs to a Federal Council
or Diet, at which Austria was to preside and all the other Governments were to
have either individual or collective votes. This draft, ultimately adopted as
the main basis of the deliberations which led to the passing of the Federal
Act, at first served no purpose but that of marking time. Early in February,
1815, when the Saxo-Polish crisis
I814-5J
Deliberations resumed.-The Statistical Committee. 613
had passed,
Austria and Prussia took serious counsel with one another as to the resumption
of the constitutional task. Mettemich agreed with Hardenberg and Humboldt to
admit to the renewed deliberations on the Germanic Constitution all the “
Princes and Estates ” of Germany; and on February 10 two new and in the main identical'
drafts, professedly tentative, were laid before him by the Prussian
plenipotentiaries, which represent the furthest advance proposed at the
Congress. These drafts insisted on the necessity of securing to Germany a
strong military power and an effective judicial tribunal, with guaranteed
Constitutions for the several States, and for all Germans a definite measure of
fundamental rights (Grundrechte). They also proposed two distinct Councils—the
smaller and executive to be composed of representatives of the five larger
States, the other, with purely legislative functions, to include
representatives of all the Governments. In the draft preferred by Humboldt, the
division into Circles, as an intermediary link between the centra) power and
the particular States, was retained. So matters stood until, when Napoleon’s
return had made a prompt solution indispensable, Mettemich was, as will be
seen, at last moved to action.
Among the
miscellaneous subjects assigned for treatment to separate Committees was the
business of the so-called Statistical Committee, composed of representatives of
the Five Great Powers. France, if Talleyrand is to be believed, had been
admitted to a share in its deliberations only after a threat that, if excluded,
she would withdraw altogether from the Congress. Its task, which it carried
through in six sittings, extending from December 24, 1814, to January 19, 1815,
was merely preparatory to the final adjustment of the territorial restorations,
acquisitions, cessions, and exchanges. Instead of calculating, by area and by
wealth as well as by population, the statistical value of each of the
territories concerned, the Committee applied the last-named standard only,
which from the military point of view was no doubt the most important. The
total of “souls” at the d'sposal of the Congress, as representing the
population of the territories, exclusive of France itself, reconquered from
Napoleon and his allies, amounted to nearly thirty-two millions. I"t is
stated that the only serious difference as to the calculation occurred in the
case of the grand-duchy of Warsaw; and that this was settled by the Committee
taking the mean between two estimates differing from one another to the extent
of about half-a-million.
Of a very
different nature was the work of the Committee on the abolition of the
slave-trade. Fox’s famous resolution (June, 1806), followed by the Act of 1807,
which Denmark had anticipated in 1803, had extinguished the slave-trade in all
the British dominions. The ixample of Great Britain had been followed in the
next year by the United States of North America; and, stimulated by Canning,
the British navy had lost no time in operating against the slave-trade,
to which the
very imminence of its abolition had imparted an unprecedented activity.
Previously to 1803, as Castlereagh afterwards declared, Spain had been without
any slave-trade of her own; and only a small proportion of the negroes imported
by her after this date were intended for use in her own colonies. In the course
of the war, during which Great Britain had become the mistress of the seas, the
slave-trade had almost dwindled into a hazardous smuggling traffic from the
Portuguese settlements; but the approach of peace threatened to revive it. Its
entire extinction had, however, now become a matter in which the honour and
conscience of Great Britain seemed alike engaged; and in the First Peace of
Paris she persuaded France to promise to unite with her at the coming Congress
in securing the abolition of the trade by all the European Powers, and to put a
stop to it in her own dominions within the next five years. The pressure
exerted by Wilber- force and his friends was not relaxed; and there was no
object which the British plenipotentiaries, and Castlereagh in particular, pushed
with so persevering a determination.
On December
10, 1814, Talleyrand proposed the appointment of a committee of
plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers, to prepare the final abolition. Since
this object commended itself to the humanitarian aspirations of the Tsar, while
Austria and Prussia could have no conceivable reason for resistance, British
efforts seemed to be assured of success. Unfortunately, Spain and Portugal,
unwilling to pledge themselves to immediate action in a matter directly
affecting their own colonies in the New World, proposed that the committee
should be limited to representatives of the colonial Powers, viz., Great
Britain, Prance, and themselves; and, on Castlereagh’s retorting that the
subject was one of interest to humanity at large, Labrador declared that at
least eight years would be required before Spain could join in putting an end
to the obnoxious trade. Finally, on Castlereagh’s suggestion, it was agreed
that, instead of a special committee being appointed on this subject, special
sittings should be held of plenipotentiaries named for the purpose, one for
each of the Powers represented on the Committee of the Eight. Five such
sittings having been held, that committee was enabled on February 8, before
Castlereagh’s departure, to adopt a Declaration which, without prejudice to the
date at which each Power might judge it most convenient to declare for itself
the definitive abolition of the slave-trade, united all the Powers in the full
moral responsibility of its condemnation, and thus practically assured its
eventual extinction.
The Committee
on the Navigation of Rivers, which was appointed by the Committee of the Eight
on December 14, 1814, and held twelve sittings from February 2 to March 27,
1815, was designed for carrying out the provisions of the Peace of Paris as to
the free navigation of the Rhine and the Scheldt, and for applying the same
treatment to the
1814-s] Rivers.—Precedence.—Results to February,
1815. 615
navigable
portions of other rivers bounding or intersecting European States. The historic
importance of the Rhine as a trade-route, and the difficulties which previously
to 1792 had obstructed the opening of the Scheldt, stimulated the exertions of
this Committee, which, composed of representatives of Great Britain, Prance,
Prussia, and Austria, admitted to its deliberations representatives of other
States, as well as of important commercial towns. The very complicated business
was managed with much address; and the report of the Committee, besides
proposing an elaborate code for the navigation of the Rhine and briefer
regulations for that of the Main, Neckar, Moselle, Meuse, and Scheldt,
suggested a series of provisions for river navigation in general, which made an
important advance towards its ultimate enfranchisement.
We can but
briefly refer to the labours of the Committee appointed on December 10 for
settling the rank or order of precedence, with the various consequences
dependent thereon, among the European Powers. At some previous European
Congresses no subject had been discussed at greater length or with more
vehemence; but at Vienna the presence of so many sovereigns and members of
sovereign families contributed to repress the self-assertion of
plenipotentiaries; and Mettemich, like his master, was careless of formality
for its own sake. In practice, the order of signatures to the various protocols
was decided partly by the alphabetical sequence of the names of States, and
partly by accident; and henceforth there was to be a precise distinction
between three classes of diplomatic agents, within which there was to be no
precedence in the signature of treaties except one determined by lot.
Thus, by the
end of February, 1815, or thereabouts, considerable progress had been made with
the business of the Congress. Russia had reduced her Polish pretensions; the
new dominion of Prussia (including her share of Saxony) had been settled;
Austria was established in the control of northern Italy; Great Britain had
virtually secured satisfactory boundaries for the Netherlands, while those of
Hanover had likewise been enlarged; a broad basis for the Swiss Confederation
had been preserved; the kingdom of Sardinia had been materially strengthened;
and the final abolition of the slave-trade had been brought within sight. When,
on January 4, Castlereagh had requested that, as a matter of convenience, his
recall to England might be postponed a little longer, he had expressed the
opinion that “ in the course of four or five weeks he would be enabled to bring
all the territorial arrangements of Europe to a close.” But on March 4 the news
arrived at Vienna that Napoleon had quitted Elba on February 25; and on March 8
he landed at Cannes. His first words on landing—so it was afterwards said—were
“Le Congres est dissousJ"
THE HUNDRED
DAYS (1815).
On the very
night of his arrival at the Tuileries, Napoleon found himself able to
reconstruct the official machinery of the Imperial regime. Most of his former
ministers hastened to place themselves at his disposal, Maret took up again
the post of Secretary of State; Deeres returned to the ministry of Marine;
Gaudin to the ministry of Finance. Cambaceres was put in temporary charge of
the department of Justice; Caulaincourt, with some show of reluctance,
consented to become once more Minister for Foreign Affairs. There were,
however, two new appointments of first-rate importance. Davout was placed at
the War Office, where it was hoped that the talent for organisation which he
had shown during his proconsulate at Hamburg would display itself once more.
Carnot became Minister of the Interior; Napoleon had not forgotten the
patriotism which the old republican had evinced in 1814, and saw that it would
help him to rally the Liberals to his side, if he could once more exhibit their
strongest man taking service under the Empire because France was in danger.
Carnot in office was a surprise; but it was still more surprising to see Fouche
once more Minister of Police. He had presented himself, with his usual cynical
impudence, at the reception held at the Tuileries on March 20; and, ignoring
his former disgrace, had offered himself as the only man capable of
satisfactorily filling the post from which he had been degraded in 1810.
Remembering how inadequately Savary had worked the machine after the removal
of the Duke of Otranto, Napoleon gave the old intriguer the place, though he
had no confidence in his honesty or his good intentions.
The Emperor
had reconstituted his government before he had been two days in Paris; it only
remained that he should force France to recognise it. Except in the south, no
serious opposition was made to the restoration of the Empire; the whole of
northern, eastern, and central France adhered to the new regime. But things
went otherwise on the banks of the Rhone and the Gironde. In those districts
the royalist party was in a clear majority among the civil population; and,
though the regular troops were known to be disaffected, the partisans
of the
Bourbons hoped to hold their own. At Toulouse the prefect, the Baron de
Vitrolles, kept the white flag flying till April 4, when he was seized and
imprisoned by General Delaborde, his levies refusing, at the critical moment,
to fire upon the troops of the line. At Bordeaux the Duchesse d’Angouleme and
Lynch, the mayor who had opened the gates to Beresford in 1814, gathered
several thousand men and defended the passage of the Dordogne against General
Clausel (March 29). Civil war would have begun, had not the garrison of the
city declared, in unmistakable terms, that it would join Clausel and attack the
volunteers if matters went further. The Duchess rode from barrack to barrack,
making desperate appeals to the linesmen; they received her with sullen
silence, and their officers besought her to fly while there was yet time. Convinced
that it was hopeless to resist, she bade her army disband, and sailed for
England (April 2).
Only on the
Rhone was there any serious fighting. Provence was wholly royalist in feeling;
and the Due d'Angouleme had gathered more than 10,000 volunteers and National
Guards at Nimes, a force which overawed the few regular battalions which
remained in the district. Having boldly resolved to march on Lyons, he beat two
small forces of imperialists at Montelimar and Loriol (April 1, 2), and reached
Valence; but here his expedition came to an inglorious close. He found General
Grouchy in front of him, while news reached him that the regular troops, whom
he had left behind, had proclaimed the Emperor at Avignon, Montpellier, and
Nimes. His men began to melt away; and on April 8 he signed the Convention of
La Palud, by which he and his officers were granted a free departure, and his
volunteers were to be pardoned on laying down their arms. Thus ended, for the
moment, the resistance of the royalists to the restoration of the Empire. The
Vendee remained quiet for a while, though the old leaders were doing their best
to stir up the peasantry; and the Ministers at Paris deluded themselves with
the idea that the west, no less than the south, was pacified. It was not till
May 15 that the Vendean insurrection broke out in force.
But, though
Napoleon seemed master of all France on April 10, it was not in France but at
Vienna that his fate was to be settled. On the news of his landing, the
plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers had signed a declaration, by which they
bound themselves to aid Louis XVIII with all their strength, and announced that
Bonaparte, having broken the convention signed by him on April 1, 1814, had
placed himself in the position of an outlaw, and, “as the enemy and disturber
of the peace of the world,” was given up to the vengeance of Europe (March 13).
Four days later, a practical turn was given to this rather turgid piece of
declamation, by a treaty in which Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia bound
themselves each to put 150,000 men in the field, and to keep them under arms
“till Bonaparte should have been rendered
absolutely
incapable of stirring up further troubles,” By a supplementary clause, the
British Ministry engaged to place ■£’5,000,000 at the disposal of her
Continental allies, in order to aid them in the rapid mobilisation of their
armies.
The Emperor
had some hope that these warlike intentions would be affected by his having
recovered possession of France with such rapidity and ease. His first care,
therefore, was to address pacific overtures to Austria and Great Britain, the
two Powers which he had some hopes of detaching from the Coalition. He declared
that he adhered to the terms of the Treaty of Paris, wished for nothing but
peace, and was anxious to give every guarantee of his good intentions. But
Metternich dismissed his agent Montrond with a blank refusal; and the Prince
Regent sent back unopened a letter addressed to him in Napoleon’s own illegible
handwriting. The temper of Great Britain was shown by the fact that, when
Whitbread and other leading Whigs raised a protest against war in the House of
Commons, only 72 votes were given in favour of their resolution, while 273 were
against it.
Before April
was out, Napoleon had to acknowledge to himself that war against united Europe
was the only course open to him. Even while he was sending out the olive-branch
to Vienna and London, he had been hurrying forward his military preparations.
He was quite aware that he could not face his enemies with an army such as that
which had won Austerlitz and Jena, still less with a force so great as that
which had invaded Russia in 1812, or defended Saxony in 1813. He was shorn of
the numerous auxiliary corps which had been wont to double the strength of his
hosts. Was it possible to raise, within the boundaries of France alone, men
enough to withstand the victors of 1814? Napoleon could count on the aid of a
mass of veterans who had been shut up in the prisons of England and Russia
during his last two campaigns, and had not witnessed the disaster of Leipzig or
the fall of Paris. But, of the levies of 1813 and 1814, an enormous proportion
had perished during the campaigns in Saxony and France; and those who remained
had little cause for zeal. The actual army which Napoleon took over from Louis
XVIII numbered not more than 200,000 men under arms. Of the 114 infantry
regiments, some were reduced to one, most to two battalions, and all were weak.
Officers to train new units could be found in plenty, among the thousands of
veterans on half-pay who were offering themselves; but time to collect, embody,
and arm the men would be wanting, if the Allies struck quickly. Moreover—and
this shows how the position of Napoleon in 1815 differed from that which he had
enjoyed in earlier years—the Emperor hesitated long before he dared let fall
the odious word conscription ; the one popular act of the restored monarchy
had been its abolition. In April and May the veterans and the men on leave were
called back to their standards, but no call for conscripts was made.
It was only a
few days before fighting actually commenced that the Emperor ventured to take
the step of calling out the class of 1815. This is the reason why, in spite of
all his efforts for three months, the regular troops, who had numbered 200,000
in March, had only risen to 284,000 in June. It was the finest army that
Napoleon had commanded since Friedland, for it was purely French, and was
composed almost entirely of veterans; but it was too small for its purpose.
The Emperor
was well aware of this, and endeavoured to supplement it by auxiliary troops of
a different kind. The organisation of the National Guard existed all over
France; and, theoretically, all citizens from twenty to sixty years of age were
liable to service in it. By a series of decrees, issued in April, it was
directed that 326 battalions of this levy should be mobilised and sent to the
frontier fortresses. But it was only in the east and the centre of France that
the Emperor could carry out this plan; in the north and west the men refused to
come forward. The decrees had contemplated the placing in the field of 234,000
National Guards: on June 15 only 135,000 had been collected. In many
departments, the prefects reported that an attempt to enforce the levy would
lead to open insurrection. Napoleon had formed some other units of secondary
value, by embodying, as battalions for land service, the greater part of the
men of his navy, by enrolling 26,000 gendarmes and douamiers, and by arming, under
the name of federes, some thousands of the workmen of Paris and Lyons. But in
June the total of his auxiliary forces did not exceed 250,000 men; and very few
of the corps could have been relied upon for efficient service.
The whole
army indeed, line and National Guard, was not numerous enough for the task of
resisting the united hosts of Europe. Napoleon calculated that, if he had been
left alone till October, he might have raised 600,000 or even 800,000 men. But
he was well aware that this leisure would not be granted him. It was useless to
demonstrate that in October, by the aid of conscription, the regular army might
have shown 400,000 men under arms, and the force of the National Guard might
have been doubled. Time was everything; and of this his enemies were as well
aware as himself.
But military
problems formed only part of the cloud of cares which beset Napoleon in April
and May, 1815. He saw that, if he was to obtain solid support from France, he
must abandon his old autocratic methods and pose as a liberal sovereign, ready
to consult his people and to meet their desires. Even Louis XVIII had granted
the country a Charter and a Constitution. The warmth with which the Emperor had
been at first received cooled down unmistakably when it became known that his
return meant war with all Europe. He saw that he must put forth some programme
which would rouse enthusiasm; and he determined with small hesitation that this
programme must take the form of an appeal to the Liberal section of the nation.
He must try to rouse the
old Jacobin
zeal for the rights of man and the liberty of France, to raise the cry of “ the
country in danger,” to present himself as a dictator elected to save the
republic, no longer as the successor of Charlemagne or the anointed of the Pope.
Hence the genesis of the Acte additionel, a supplement to the former Imperial
Constitution, which gave Prance a Parliament of two Houses—a nominated Chamber
of Peers and an elected Chamber of representatives. It also proclaimed the
liberty of the press, and announced that the Ministers would, in some degree at
least, be responsible to the Chambers. The Rerj resentatives were not to be
chosen directly by the people, but by small boards of electors previously
nominated by the constituencies.
The Acte additionel
was laid before the people for acceptance by means of a plebiscite. Registers
were opened in every commune; but only 1,500,000 citizens took the trouble to
record their suffrages. The number of votes was less than half of those
received when the project for the Life Consulate was laid before the nation in
1802. Such as they were, however, they sufficed; and on J tine 1 the new
Constitution was proclaimed, at a ceremony which the Emperor designated as the
Champ de Mai, a term borrowed from Merovingian phraseology. It was a gorgeous,
interminable, and hollow affair. The Emperor swore to obey the Constitution ;
the newly-elected Chambers and the army vowed fidelity to the Emperor. To one
of his confidants Napoleon (at a later date) confessed that his intention had
been to abolish the House of Representatives as soon as this could safely be
done.
Meanwhile he
found himself, to his disgust, saddled with a Lower House of the temper which
he least desired. Among 629 deputies there were some 40 Republicans, 80 pure
Bonapartists, ready to revive, autocracy when the favourable time should come,
and about 500 Liberals of all sorts, whose main desire was to prevent that time
from arriving. At the first sitting of the new legislature, two days after the
Champ de Mai, Lucien Bonaparte was suggested for election as President of the
Chamber; but the representatives ignored the official hint, and chose by an
enormous majority Lanjuinais, one of the deputies for the Seine, a convinced
Liberal. The constitutionalists were dearly determined that the old
administrative regime should never be restored.
But domestic
politics were not the worst problem in June, 1815. It was necessary to beat
back the approaching armies of Europe, if the Constitution was to have even a
chance of trial. Every man in France who looked at the military situation with
unbiassed judgment felt himself constrained to doubt whether the
breathing-space would be obtained. This was not the view of the soldiery; the
rank and file started for the frontier in a state of fierce enthusiasm, such as
had not been seen since the days of the Republic. It was the same with the
lower ranks of the officers; the thousands who had been eating the bitter bread
of half-pay during the reign of Louis XVIII had hastened back
to their
regiments with a firm determination that they would never again be reduced to
such a life. The memory of the slights and the poverty which they had endured
made them fanatical adherents of their old master. No army that the Emperor had
ever led fought with such truculent fury as that of 1815. But the spirit of the
marshals and generals was very different; they knew enough of the strength of
the Coalition to make them down-hearted as to the result of the coming
campaign. They had thrown in their lot with Napoleon, but doubted their own
wisdom, when they saw old comrades like Macdonald and Victor adhering to the
Bourbons, and even Berthier refusing to return to France to join the master
whose chief of the staff he had been for so many glorious years. Many took the
field with a presentiment of disaster; a few who, like Ney, had fatally
compromised themselves with the Bourbons, went forth like men possessed, with
the vision of the hangman’s rope before them in the event of defeat. Such a
prospect might render them capable of acts of desperate courage, but did not
strengthen their judgment.
The weakest
point in Napoleon’s situation was that he found himself—what he had never been
before, save in 1814—destitute of allies. When he returned from Elba, he had possessed
one single supporter— his brother-in-law of Naples. King Joachim felt sure that
he would be evicted from his realm before the Congress of Vienna concluded its
sessions, and had resolved to link his fortunes with those of the Emperor. By
good service in 1815 he might wipe out the memory of his treachery in the
preceding year. His plan was to throw himself into the Emilia and Lombardy,
hoping to rouse to arms the numerous partisans of the Imperial regime, who
detested the restoration of Francis Joseph and Pius VII to their former
dominions. Murat took no counsel with his brother-in-law, but rushed forward
with mad haste, and commenced the war while Napoleon was still hoping to lure
Austria and Great Britain out of the league of the Continental Powers. The
reorganisation of the French army had hardly begun, when news reached Paris
that Joachim had issued a proclamation calling the Italians to revolt, and had
invaded the Papal States at the head of 80,000 men. He occupied Rome,
Florence, and Bologna, before the Austrians had collected an army to drive him
back; and he was able to push on to the line of the Po. But on April 10 serious
fighting began, The Austrians were far inferior in numbers, but Murat’s troops
were worthless. Their old sovereign, King Ferdinand, once observed of the
Neapolitan army, “ You may dress it in blue, or in green, or in red; but,
whichever you do, it will run.” Checked at a series of combats in the Emilia,
the invaders were pressed back to Tolentino, where Joachim was forced to deliver
a pitched battle. The result was that he lost all his artillery and 4000
prisoners ; the rest of his army dispersed (May 3). He could not rally even
10,000 men to defend Naples; and, when the Austrians pressed forward, he was
forced to throw up the game and fly in disguise by sea (May 19). A few days
afterwards he
arrived at Toulon, a penniless refugee. Napoleon refused to see him; he was
enraged at the levity with which his brother-in-law had precipitated the war
without asking his advice. He even believed (but wrongly) that, if Murat had
restrained himself^ Francis II might have remained neutral; under this
impression he repeatedly declared that the Italian campaign had been one of the
main causes of his ruin.
Since,
therefore, there could be no subsidiary operations in northern Italy, Napoleon
had to cast his eyes along the long eastern frontier of France, from Dunkirk to
the Var, with a full knowledge that the enemy might break in at any point;
there was no neutral border for a single mile, for even Switzerland had
declared its adhesion to the Grand Alliance. Nor could Spain be forgotten;
Ferdinand VII was tardily collecting corps of observation behind the Bidassoa
and the Muga. It was fortunate for the Emperor that, except on one very short
front of forty miles about Saarbriicken and Trier, France was surrounded by
States of inferior rank—the kingdom of the Netherlands, Bavaria, Baden,
Switzerland, and Sardinia. None of these could deliver an immediate attack with
its own unaided resources; and the main hostile armies had to be brought from
afar, from Hungary and Bohemia, from Brandenburg and Silesia, from the distant
depths of Russia.
There were
only two bodies of troops belonging to any of the Great Powers which lay in the
immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier. In Belgium, at the moment of
the Emperor’s return from Elba, there was a British force of some 10,000
men—the regiments which had served under Graham in Holland during the preceding
year. In their company were two or three Hanoverian brigades. Out of this
nucleus the British Government proposed to construct an army of 100,000 men.
They ordered Wellington to Brussels, where he arrived on April 5, and began
sending to him in twos and threes every corps on the home establishment that could
be equipped for service. Unfortunately, the larger part of the old Peninsular
army had been shipped to America; and, though the Peace of Ghent had been
signed, these troops were still beyond the Atlantic. Very few battalions of the
veterans of Spain could be put at Wellington’s disposition. But, week by week,
his British force was growing; by the irr Idle of June it reached 30,000 men.
In addition, a quantity of Hanoverian Lamdwehr had marched up to the Meuse and
the Scheldt. The rest of Wellington’s miscellaneous host was composed of the
contingents of Brunswick and Nassau, whose sovereigns, from jealousy of
Prussia, had placed their little armies at the disposal of Great Britain, and
of the levies of the Netherlands. The Government of the new kingdom which had
been created for the Prince of Orange had been surprised by the return of
Napoleon at a moment when its army was still in the making. Its whole regular
force amounted on March 1 to only 10,000 men. Since then it had raised and
equipped
20,000 more, mostly militia of the rawest sort.
The Dutch-Belgian
troops were
the weakest element in Wellington’s army; all the old soldiers were men who had
served as conscripts under Napoleon; the rest were untrained recruits. There
had always been a considerable French party in Belgium; and most of the
Flemings and Walloons disliked their enforced union with Holland. The officers
of the Nether- land army were loyal; but too many of the rank and file, partly
cowed by the reputation of their former master, partly attracted towards him by
old memories, could not be trusted to give a good account of themselves.
British, Germans, and Dutch included, Wellington had 105,000 men under him in
June ; but, of these, 20,000 were detached to form the garrisons of Antwerp,
Ostend, and other Belgian fortresses.
The other
army at hand was a Prussian force under General Kleist, quartered partly in the
newly-formed Rhine Province, which the Congress of Vienna had given to
Frederick William III, partly in eastern Belgium, about Namur and Luxemburg. It
numbered only some 30,000 men in March; but the Berlin Government, acting with
zeal and rapidity, had sent up three more army-corps from the east in April and
May, and given the command to the indomitable Bliicher. Early in June, Bliicher
had 117,000 men in line, four-sevenths of whom were line troops, the remainder
Lamdwehr battalions. The weak part of this army consisted in the newly-raised
regiments of Westphalia, Berg, and Rhineland men, who had formerly served
either Napoleon or his brother Jerome as conscripts. But the preponderance of
the old Prussian regiments in the whole force gave it a homogeneity which
Wellington’s host was far from possessing.
It was on the
Prussian and Anglo-Dutch armies in Belgium that Napoleon concentrated his main
attention; they were close at hand, while the Austrians had far to come, and
the Russians had hardly yet crossed their own frontier. Reasoning correctly
from the characters of the two generals opposed to him, he concluded that, if
he waited much longer, they would attack him. His information from Belgian
sympathisers, however, was to the effect that their mobilisation was not yet
complete, and that both were awaiting reinforcements. Meanwhile their troops
were scattered, the line of their advanced posts covering the whole frontier
from the Scheldt to the Moselle. The Prussian cantonments extended from Liege
to Charleroi, the Anglo-Dutch from Mons to Ghent. It would probably take three
days for either army to mass on the common centre, the line Mons-Charleroi;
while six would be required to concentrate them, if the British right or the
Prussian left were the point selected for attack.
The Emperor’s
whole plan of campaign was based on these facts. He resolved to collect every
available man, and to throw himself upon the junction-point of the two hostile
armies before they were expecting his approach. Secrecy was all-important,
since with three days’ notice the enemy would have time to draw together. But,
if only
they failed
to get wind of his approach, or to discover the exact line of his advance, he
might hope to catch them in the midst of their process of concentration, and to
deal with each separately. To meet them united would be almost certainly fatal,
for they outnumbered his own available force almost in the proportion of two to
one. It was a risky game; but in the Emperor’s present situation eveiy move was
hazardous, and this was the only one which promised great results. If the
British and Prussians were crushed, he could hasten down to the Rhine to meet
the Austrians and assail them before the Russians began to arrive. If he could
but protract the game till September, his new levies would give him 400,000
more men; and with such a force anything might be possible. A crushing defeat
administered to Wellington might cause the fall of the British Ministry; a
second Ulm might break the spirit of Francis II and cause him to make peace.
Prussia would be irreconcilable, but she might be destroyed. Looking forward,
the Emperor did not wholly despair; but he knew that he was staking his crown
on the chance of gaining the three days that he required.
The total
force which the Emperor could employ against Belgium was about 125,000 men. It
was 10,000 men weaker than he had intended, for, at the last moment, he had
been forced to despatch against the Vendee, which had broken out in open
insurrection on May 15, two divisions with a brigade of the Imperial Guard. The
Vendeans were beaten; and their general, La Rochejaquelein, was killed at the
combat of St Gilles, near Nantes, on June 4. But it was impossible to recall
the missing divisions in time to take part in the invasion of Belgium. The
whole force which the Emperor had collected under his own hand was composed of
veterans of the regular army. For the defence of the eastern and southern
frontiers he had told off comparatively small forces of the line, backed by
masses of the National Guard. Only Rapp, who was sent to command the army of
the Rhine, had a solid corps of 20,000 regulars and but few of the new levies.
In the other divisions—those of the Alps under Suchet, of the eastern Pyrenees
under Decaen, of the western Pyrenees under Clausel, of the Var under Brune, of
the Jura under Lecourbe—the National Guards formed half, or more than half, of
the total force under arms. All these six armies together numbered only 75,000
men. Of the rest of the Emperor’s available troops, about 130,000, mostly
National Guards, had been thrown into the fortresses of the east and north.
Napoleon
started for the front on June 12. His first and in some ways most important
move was carried out with complete success. The five army-corps which were to
form the bulk of his army were drawn in from their scattered cantonments,
extending from Valenciennes to Thionville, without alarming the enemy. On June
14 the whole force was concentrated on a front of not more than thirty-five
miles, just where the French frontier (as it then was) projected most deeply
into Belgium.
Meanwhile
nothing save the vaguest rumours had reached Wellington and Blucher. On June 13
the former wrote to his friend Graham: “ We have reports of Buonaparte joining
the army and attacking us. But I judge from his speech to his Legislature that
his departure is not likely to be immediate, and I think we are now too strong
for him here.” When the Duke was writing these words, the Emperor’s 'ar <age
was driving furiously forward from Laon to Avesnes; that night he slept within
ten miles of the Belgian frontier. Blucher was of much the same opinion as
Wellington; he was busily engaged in drawing out his plans for an advance into
France, when the enemy burst across the frontier.
The Emperor
had thus secured the three days’ start over the Allies in the matter of
concentration which was the necessary preliminary to a successful campaign in
Belgium. He had his 125,000 men massed for the stroke, while their 210,000 were
strung out on a front of a hundred miles. It remained to be seen how he would
utilise this tremendous advantage. His five corps were commanded by d’Erlon and
Reille— veterans of the army of Spain—Vandamme, Gerard, and Lobau. Of the
marshals, only three were with the army. Soult acted as chief of the staff, a
post which he had never before filled, and in which he showed himself, from
lack of experience, markedly inferior to Berthier. Ney, who owing to his
conduct in March had been kept in a sort of half-disgrace during the last three
months, had been called up at the last moment and placed in command of the left
wing—the corps of Reille and d’Erlon. Grouchy, whose reputation had been won as
a leader of horse, took charge of the great cavalry reserve.
At dawn on
the morning of June 15 the French army passed the frontier and threw itself
upon the outposts of the Allies. The blow was delivered on the extreme right of
the Prussian army, in and about Charleroi, and just failed to touch
Wellington’s extreme left at Mons. On the first day, only the corps of Ziethen
was engaged on the side of the Allies; and this force, caught before it could
concentrate, and assailed by superior numbers, was driven northward and
eastward with considerable loss. By nightfall the Emperor was in possession of
Charleroi and the bridges of the Sambre; and Ziethen had fallen back behind
Fleurus. Blucher, on hearing of this first assault, had set his whole army on
the march westward. At noon on June 16 Ziethen was joined by Pirch’s corps from
Namur, and Thielmann’s from Dinant and Huy; Blucher had thus 90,000 men in
hand. His fourth corps, that of Biilow, had not arrived. It had lain at Liege,
forty miles from Charleroi, and was still a day’s march from the main army.
Blucher, however, had made up his mind to fight without waiting for Biilow, and
drew up his host on the hill-sides behind Ligny and St Amand, looking down into
the valley where Fleurus lies.
If the
position of Blucher was not quite satisfactory at this moment, that of
Wellington was much less so. The Duke had received definite
626
Wellington's position. His tardy concentration. [1815
details of
the enemy’s movements many hours later than ought to have been the case.
Ziethen had sent him news that his outposts were attacked early on the 15th,
before anything decisive had happened. After this, engrossed in the details of
fighting, the Prussian general forgot to keep the British head-quarters
informed of the developments of the French advance. It was only about 4 p.m. that Wellington received
intelligence from several quarters which showed that the attack in the
direction of Charleroi was being made by several army-corps, and was evidently
part of a general advance. The Duke immediately ordered all his divisions to
concentrate at their head-quarters and to be ready to march at a moment’s
notice. But he was still uncertain whether the movement on Charleroi was being
carried out by the whole of the Emperor’s army, or whether a second column
might not be advancing on the other high-road which leads to Brussels by way of
Mons. His ignorance was due to the negligence of Domberg, the officer commanding
the British cavalry-screen on the line Mons-Toumay, who failed to send any
report as to matters in his front till night. The Duke had been of opinion that
the Mons road presented advantages for the enemy which the Charleroi road did
not, and refused to commit himself to a concentration on his extreme left till
he was sure that his left-centre was safe. Hence it was only late in the
evening that, reassured on this point, he directed his scattered divisions to
concentrate on Nivelles, Braine-le-Comte, and Hal. As they could not move till
daybreak on the 16th, he was in the unfortunate position of having no troops on
the Brussels-Charleroi road next morning save one Dutch and one Nassau brigade,
at Quatre-Bras and Nivelles; while within supporting distance there were only
the reserve from Brussels—some 26,000 British, Hanoverian, and Brunswick
troops—and one or two brigades at Enghien and Braine-le-Comte. The Duke clearly
underrated the rapidity with which Napoleon would push forward when his crown
was at stake. That m’ght Wellington remained at Brussels, and attended the
Duchess of Richmond’s famous ball. At daybreak he rode out to visit his outposts,
and then to confer with Bliicher.
Actual
contact between the British and French outposts had been established late in
the afternoon of the 15th, when the cavalry at the head of the Emperor’s left
columns struck the pickets of the Nassau brigade under Prince Bernard of
Saxe-Weimar at Frasnes, and drove them back to Quatre-Bras, where the Prince
showed fight. Ney, who was in command of this part of the French army, reported
the fact to the Emperor, and encamped opposite Quatre-Bras, waiting for his
infantry to come up. There were only 4000 men in front of him; and it would be
many hours before the Brussels troops, which only started at daybreak on the
16th, could arrive to support Prince Bernard. But of this the Marshal was
necessarily ignorant; he could only report that he was in touch with the enemy,
who seemed inclined to stand.
Thus, on the
morning of the second day of the campaign, the position of the French army was
excellent. Bliicher had not collected even three-fourths of his army at Ligny
till noon; Wellington would not, till twelve hours were passed, be able to
concentrate more than a third of his at Quatre-Bras. The Emperor, however,
seems to have overrated his advantage, great as it was. His orders for the 16th
directed Ney to drive away whatever lay in front of him at Quatre-Bras, and
then to fall upon the flank of the Prussian force at Ligny. This force
Napoleon, in his earliest despatches, seems to have estimated at a single corps
only. But, as the day wore on, he discovered it to be much stronger than he had
supposed, and deferred his attack till his whole right wing had come up. Ney,
with less justification, behaved in a similar fashion in front of Quatre-Bras,
and, before assailing Prince Bernard’s brigade, waited till he had the whole of
the infantry of Reille’s corps under his hand. Thus nothing happened on either
field of battle till noon was well passed. Wellington, after visiting his force
at Quatre-Bras, rode over to Ligny, interviewed Bliicher, and told him that he
would bring him aid if he was not himself attacked and detained by the French
left. The promise was conditional, and could never be carried out, as Ney found
full occupation for all the British divisions, as they successively reached
Quatre-Bras during the afternoon. The Duke then returned to his own
advance-guard, just in time to meet Ney’s ittack, which was delivered a few minutes
before his arrival.
Between 2 and
3 p.m. on June 16 the Emperor, having massed in front of the Prussian position
the Guard, the corps of Vandamme and Gerard, and all his reserve cavalry,
thought himself strong enough to begin. As a matter of fact, he had 20,000 men
less than Bliicher on the field, and, even when Lobau’s corps came up late in
the afternoon, was still in a grave numerical inferiority. But, not fully aware
of this, he commenced a vigorous attack upon the line of villages which covered
the right and centre of the Prussian position; their left wing he merely
“contained” with the numerous cavalry of Grouchy. This was the commencement of
a long and obstinate struggle. The French repeatedly stormed Ligny and the
three villages of St Amand; Bliicher, perpetually feeding his fighting-line
from his reserve, always won them back again. But the Prussians suffered more
heavily than their opponents, because their troops were exposed to the
preponderating artillery fire of the French, whenever they descended the bare
slopes above the villages in their counter-attacks. This was not the sort of
battle that the Emperor desired; he had been for some time expecting Ney to
appear, in accordance with his orders, behind the Prussian right wing. But no
French troops showed in this direction, the Marshal being engaged in a bitter
struggle with Wellington at Quatre-Bras, and finding himself unable to spare a
man for the turning movement.
The Emperor,
however, cared little for the subsidiary action far to
his left; he
sent orders directly to d’Erlon, the commander of the 1st corps, which formed
Ney’s reserve and was just approaching Quatre- Bras at the moment, bidding him
draw off eastward and march towards Ligny, so as to fall upon the Prussian
flank and rear. D’Erlon obeyed, but, by a slight misdirection in his march,
headed for Fleurus rather than ligny, and therefore came upon Napoleon’s
battlefield in such a way as to join the Emperor’s left, rather than to
circumvent the Prussian right. Napoleon was for a moment puzzled by the
appearance of troops in this direction, and slackened in his attacks on St
Amand and Ligny. But, learning that the new-comers were his own missing corps,
he recommenced the assault on Bliicher’s line. This final attack, however,
obtained no support from d’Erlon, who at this juncture received pressing orders
from Ney, bidding him return and save him from Wellington’s overpowering
numbers. Though he was now in a position to manoeuvre with splendid effect
against the Prussian right, d’Erlon turned back and started for Quatre-Bras.
Thus Napoleon
had to fight out his battle with no aid from the west. He brought it, however,
to a successful conclusion, by dashing the Imperial Guard against the Prussian
centre just as night fell. Bliicher had used up his reserves, and was unable to
withstand the tremendous impact of this mass of veteran troops. He himself
charged at the head of his last remaining cavalry brigades, but was repulsed,
thrown from his horse, and nearly taken prisoner. He was dragged off the field
almost insensible from his fall; and his army at the same moment abandoned all
its positions, and rolled back to the villages two miles in the rear of its
original position. Bliicher had lost more than
20,000 men, including many stragglers from the
Berg and Westphalian Landwehr, who ran away and did not stop till they reached
Aix-la- Chapelle. The Emperor had also suffered heavily; his losses must have
amounted to about 11,000 men, and he had taken few prisoners and only
twenty-one guns. Thus Napoleon had won a victory, but not a decisive one. The
Prussians shook themselves together at dawn, and retired unmolested in the
direction of Wavre, the point at which they could most easily put themselves in
connexion with Wellington’s army. This was quite contrary to the suppositions
of the Emperor, who imagined the Prussians to be far more disorganised than
they were, and thought it probable that they had retired due east, towards
their own base at Li^ge, while really they had marched north. This false hypothesis
had results fatal to its framer on the next day but one.
Ligny,
however, in spite of d’Erlon’s mistake, was distinctly a victory; at
Quatre-Bras neither party could claim so well-marked a success. Ney, as we have
already mentioned, delivered his attack on Wellington’s advance-guard at about
2 p.m., with the whole corps of
Reille. The line of the Allies was at once crumpled up; but, just as it gave
way there arrived on the field Picton’s British division, the first of the
Brussels
reserves to reach the front, and, shortly after, the Duke of Brunswick and his
corps. At the same moment Wellington himself rode up. He had just time to
deploy his fresh troops, when the French attack pressed up against them. After
a fierce struggle, in which the Duke of Brunswick fell, it was beaten off. Soon
afterwards both sides received reinforcements, Kellermann’s cuirassiers joining
Ney, while the Duke was strengthened by Alten’s British division from
Braine-le-Comte. Ney resumed the attack, dashing his cavalry fiercely against
the allied centre. More than one British battalion was broken; and the
cuirassiers penetrated as far as the houses of Quatre-Bras. But they were
finally driven off, and the allied line reformed itself. Ney, who had now
learnt that his master had called off the corps of d’Erlon, his sole reserve,
was in a state of desperate fury. Napoleon, by stripping him of half his
infantry force, had condemned him to defeat; in his rage, Ney sent to recall
d’Erlon, despite the Imperial orders, and so ruined Napoleon’s plan for making
Ligny a decisive battle. But the missing corps was too late in its return to
Quatre-Bras to save the day in that direction. Long ere its arrival, Wellington
assumed the offensive; he had just received Cooke’s division, the British Guards,
and with the aid of this reinforcement attacked the French along the whole
line. His superiority in numbers was now very marked; he had 32,000 men in hand
to Ney’s 22,000, and could not be held back. The enemy, still fighting
fiercely, had been forced to return to their original positions when darkness
brought the battle to an end. The losses were equally distributed; each side
had suffered about 4200 or 4300 casualties.
Looked at
from the tactical point of view, Quatre-Bras was a severe check to Ney. But
from the strategical point of view the action had served Napoleon’s purpose
fairly well, since the Marshal had prevented Wellington from sending a single
man to Bliicher’s aid. Ligny would have had very different results, if the Duke
had been able to crush the containing corps in front of him early in the day,
and had then marched for St Amand. The reason why he failed to do so was the
lateness of his concentration; he had to fight Ney with the Brussels reserves
almost unaided. If his troops from Ghent, Oudenarde, and Ath had started twelve
hours earlier, Ney must have been destroyed. Du: ng the night, the belated
divisions poured in, till nearly the whole army was concentrated on the
morning of the 17th. But it was now too late. The news of Ligny had arrived;
and the Duke saw that the Emperor would infallibly join Ney before the day was
out. He resolved to draw back at once from his advanced position, and to seek a
junction with Bliicher before he again gave battle. Early in the morning he
sent word to the Prussian head-quarters that he would stand on the position of
Mont St Jean, if he were promised the help of one of Bliicher’s army-corps.
Napoleon was
slow to move during the morning of June 17. He was fatigued by the long running
fight on the Thursday and by the battle
on the
Friday; but this fact does not wholly account for the strange lethargy that
seems to have seized him on this day. He spent the morning in talking politics
with his generals, in driving round the battlefield of the previous day, and
in reviewing his victorious troops. Every moment was of importance to him, yet
he squandered seven precious hours before he made a move. Not till about noon
did he issue the orders which were to govern the rest of the campaign. He
directed Grouchy to take charge of the corps of Vandamme and Gerard and half
the reserve cavalry—some 33,000 men, when the losses of Ligny were deducted—and
to follow the Prussians in whatever direction they had retreated. He was to
keep in touch with them at all costs, and to discover whether they were
retiring towards their base, or showing any signs of moving towards Wellington.
Napoleon himself intended to join Ney with the Imperial Guard, the rest of the
reserve cavalry, and the corps of Lobau. Owing to the late hour at which the
orders were given, neither of the columns got away till 2 or 3 p.m.
Meanwhile,
owing to the Emperor’s tardy start, the whole Prussian army had slipped away
unmolested; and the French cavaliy had not even discovered the route which it
had taken. Much time was lost in seek ing for Bliicher on the road to Namur. At
nightfall, Grouchy knew that some of the Prussians must be moving on Wavre,
which would bring them in the direction of the British, but was still uncertain
whether their main body was or was not retreating eastward in the direction of
Liege. For this he cannot be seriously blamed; the responsibility lies partly
with the Emperor for losing time in the morning, partly with the two cavalry
generals, Pajol and Excelmam who had shown gross carelessness in letting the
enemy slip away and failing to find him again. Delayed by heavy rain, which
fell all through the afternoon and evening, Grouchy’s infantry did not reach
Gembloux till nightfall. They had covered less than ten miles in the day; the
Prussians had covered twenty, and were safely concentrated at Wavre, where they
were joined by Biilow’s intact corps, which had at last got up from Liege to
the front.
In this part
of the field Napoleon had practically lost twenty-four hours—one of the three
precious days which he had gained by his rapid concentration and his vigorous
advance. Things went almost as badly for him in its western portion. Wellington
had begun to withdraw his army from Quatre-Bras at 10 a.m. on June 17. Owing to his late start from Ligny,
Napoleon came on the ground only when the last of Wellington’s infantry was far
advanced on the route to Mont St Jean; a mere cavalry screen under Lord
Uxbridge remained in his front. Recovering his energy when it was too late, the
Emperor drove in the British cavalry, and pursued it fiercely throughout the
late afternoon. But he could neither catch it nor do it any serious harm; at
the defile of Genappe, indeed, Uxbridge turned back and broke the leading
brigade of the Imperial horsemen by a downhill charge of the Life Guards.
After this he
was not so severely pressed; the same heavy thunderstorm which had delayed
Grouchy did much to check the Emperor’s pursuit. It was nearly 7 p.m. on the 17th before the head of the
French army reached the front of the position of Mont St Jean, where Wellington
had been arranging his army as it came up. A reconnaissance in the rain showed
the Emperor that his enemy was standing ready to receive him; and he halted to
allow the rest of his troops to arrive. So long was his column that much of the
infantry did not reach the front till after midnight, and at least one division
only on the following morning. The troops were much fatigued by their long
tramp in the rain, and had outmarched their commissariat; there was no proper
distribution of rations either that night or the next day. They bivouacked in
the mud of the fields, drenched through, fireless, and half-starved.
Wellington’s
position on that night was an anxious one, in spite of the fact that he had
carried out his retreat without loss or disorder. All now depended on the
Prussians; he had sent them, early in the morning, his offer to fight on the
battle-ground he had chosen, if he were promised the aid of a single
army-corps. If they replied that this was impossible, he would have to retire
again, and to sacrifice Brussels, which lay some eleven miles to his rear. It
was only after midnight that he received the all-important answer to his
proposal. Bliicher had been hors de combat on the 17th, owing to the contusions
he had suffered at Ligny; and the details of the Prussian movements during that
day had been regulated by Gneisenau, his chief of the staff. But at night the
indomitable old man had recovered sufficiently to resume command; it was he who
received the Duke’s offer, and he promptly accepted it. Certain objections were
made by Gneisenau and other generals, who thought that a flank march so near
the enemy was full of dangers, and that it was wrong to throw up the safe line
of retreat on Maestricht which the army now possessed. This was true enough;
but the chance of catching Napoleon in flank and overwhelming him with superior
numbers was too good to be lost. Bliicher wrote that he would despatch Billow’s
corps to join the English at daybreak, and send after it that of Pirch. His
other two corps should follow if not prevented. He knew Grouchy’s exact
position, and thought it might be necessary to detach Thielmann and Ziethen to
hold him back. Bliicher had risen to the full height of the situation; and
these orders, once given, decided the fate of the campaign. If they had been
carried out with exactitude, they would have ended it with far less expenditure
of blood than was actually incurred on June 18. The execution, however, was not
equal to the conception; the plan worked, but it worked over-slowly and
over-late.
Reassured as
to the cooperation of the Prussians, Wellington drew up his army on the
hill-side of Mont St Jean, across the two high-roads Nivelles-Brussels and
Charleroi-Brussels, which there meet. The position does not at the first sight
appear very strong; the slopes are gentle, and
do not rise
more than 120 or 150 feet above the level of the valley which divides them from
the French lines. There was no cover in front, save at three isolated points.
Before the British right lay the farm, orchard, and copse of Hougoumont,
surrounded with hedges and walls; in front of the exact centre, on the
Charleroi high-road, is the smaller farm of La Haye Sainte; far away on the
extreme left lie two other farms, close together, Papelotte and La Haye. All
these were occupied: Hougoumont by a brigade of the British Guards; La Haye
Sainte by a picked detachment of the German Legion; the other two by Bernard of
Saxe-Weimar’s Nassau brigade. The enemy would have to storm them, before he
could make any solid lodgement in the British position. But the feature which
Wellington regarded as most advantageous in his field of battle was that behind
his fighting line the ground stretched away in a broad plateau falling slightly
toward the north. Here he could array his reserves completely out of sight of
the enemy, and bring them to the front without exposing them to view till the
crest was reached. It was the exact converse of the Ligny position, where all
the Prussian reserves had been exposed to Napoleon’s eye, and many of them to
his artillery, before they were brought into action. Wellington had 67,000 men
on the ground. Of these, 24,000 were British; 5800 belonged to the King’s
German Legion, of Peninsular fame; 11,000 were Hanoverians. There was the
Brunswick corps, reduced to 5500 men by its losses at Quatre-Bras; two Nassau
brigades (Kruse and Saxe-Weimar) over 6000 strong; and finally 14,000 Dutch-
Belgians. These last were the weak1 point in the line; horse and
foot had behaved feebly at Quatre-Bras, and did not redeem their reputation at
Waterloo. It was a motley array at best, but, with Blucher due before noon, all
seemed safe; the Duke knew it would be more than a mere morning’s work to wear
down his stubborn British and German infantry. It was probably in reliance on
the early arrival of his ally that Wellington had left, far out on his right, a
day’s march from Mont St Jean, a force consisting of a strong Dutch-Belgian
division, with one British and one Hanoverian brigade, under General Colville
and Prince Frederick of Orange. They lay at Hal, on the Mons-Brussels road,
nearly 14,000 strong, intended apparently to guard against a turning movement
of the French. But it had long been ascertained that Napoleon had no detached
corps to the west; it was a mistake not to call Colville in.
On the low
ridge opposite Mont St Jean, Napoleon had arrayed some 7%000 veteran troops, on
each side of the farm of La Belle Alliance and the high-road from Charleroi to
Brussels. He showed no hurry to beg n the battle on the morning of that
eventful Sunday, June 18,
1815. Indeed, the rear of his infantry only reached
the field after daybreak, and required some hours of rest. Wellington lay
quietly in his front, inviting attack: Blucher, so Napoleon supposed, was out
of
the game. He
had news from Grouchy, dated from Gembloux at 10 p.m. on the 17th, to the effect that one Prussian corps had
retired on Wavre, but that the rest of the troops defeated at Ligny were heading
for Perwez, on the road to Liege, i.e. were falling back towards their base,
and leaving Wellington to his fate. The Marshal added that he intended to
follow the force that had moved on Wavre, in order to head it off from Brussels
and separate it from the British army. This information seemed to guarantee the
Emperor against any interference on the part of the Prussians. Grouchy, it is
true, learnt more of the facts of the situation on the following morning, and
wrote at 6 a.m. to inform his
master that the bulk of Bliicher’s men had gone to Wavre, not to Perwez. But
this despatch did not reach La Belle Alliance till after Napoleon had made his
arrangements; and, even if it had arrived earlier, it contained no hint that
the Prussians were moving on Mont St Jean.
Napoleon,
therefore, gave his weary army a long rest after daybreak, and put off the hour
of attack, so that the sodden ground might grow drier and permit of the free
movement of his artillery across the fields. It was only about 11 a.m. that his forces were deployed for
action. Their array was very simple, as simple as the Emperor’s own plan of
battle, which contemplated nothing more nor less than the smashing in of the
British centre by a tremendous frontal attack. His army was formed in three lines;
in front were Reille’s corps on the left, d’Erlon’s on the right, each with
cavalry on the outer wing. The second line was formed of Lobau’s incomplete
infantry corps (only 7000 men), with the reserve cavalry, no less than six
divisions, deployed on its wings. Last of all came the Imperial Guard, 20,000
strong, the infantry in column on the high-road, the cavalry in line to right
and left. It was a magnificent array, and every man was visible from the
British position. The Emperor, on the other hand, could not make out much of
Wellington’s arrangements. There were visible to him only the four isolated
farms on the slope, and above them a line of infantry and guns along the crest;
the reserves were out of sight. The Duke had formed a front line of twelve
infantry brigades, six British, four Hanoverian, one Nassau, and one Dutch,
with two British cavalry brigades on his extreme left, in the direction from
which the Prussians were expected to appear. In second line, behind his centre,
was the rest of his horse, British and Dutch. The infantry reserve was massed
for the most part behind the right wing, because the Prussian aid was expected
on the left. Bliicher, according to the arrangements made on the preceding
night, would form the true reserve of the Duke’s left wing.
Never, in any
of his earlier fights, had Napoleon massed such numbers on so short a front;
the whole French line was less than three miles long, including the cavaliy on
its extreme wings. In the tactical disposition the infantry was used in heavy
columns of unprecedented solidity. They were to push their way through the
British line by
mere force of
impact. This arrangement did not please those of the Emperor’s lieutenants who
had seen the wars of Spain, and remembered the poor exhibition that
column-tactics had always made against the English two-deep formation. Soult
urged caution; but Napoleon replied in an insulting outburst, “You were beaten
by Wellington, and so you think he is a great general. But I tell you that
Wellington is a bad general, and the English are bad troops; they will merely
be a breakfast for us! ” A little later, Reille was asked his opinion of the
British infantry; he replied that he thought that, in a good defensive
position, •hey could repel any frontal attack. He hoped that his master would
manoeuvre and try flank movements; front-to-front action would be costly and
unsuccessful. The Emperor paid no attention; he was determined to try the
effect of assaults by massive columns upon the long red line that crowned the opposite
hill-side.
About 11.30 a.m. the French army was at last on the
move. After some cannonading, a division of Reille’s infantry pressed in upon
the farm of Hougoumont. After some fighting, the copse and orchard were
carried; but in the farm-buildings and the garden two battalions of the British
Guards held their own, and beat off regiment after regiment as it surged in
upon them. This, however, was but a side-issue; the Emperor’s real attack was
to be delivered on the other side of the highroad, half a mile further to the
east. Here, under cover of the fire of a long row of batteries, eighty pieces
in all, d’Erlon’s corps was waiting the order to attack the British
left-centre. It was formed in four great columns, each a species of phalanx
containing eight battalions, ranged one behind another. This order of battle
was extremely unwieldy; but, in many a fight, Continental troops had broken up
in panic at the mere approach of such a moving multitude. Just as Napoleon was
about to order d’Erlon to attack, he received an unpleasant surprise. It was
pointed out to him that masses of troops were coming into sight far to the
north-east, on the heights of Chapelle St Lambert, some six miles away. A few
hours earlier, the Emperor would have been puzzled to guess what this force
could be; but he had received, some little time back, Grouchy’s despatch of the
early morning, informing him that Bliicher, far from retiring towards Liege,
was massed at Wavre. The force in the distance must, then, be some fraction of
the Prussian army. Soon afterwards a prisoner was brought in, a hussar of
Billow’s corps, who, when questioned, divulged the fact that his general was
marching to join Wellington. The Emperor reflected for a moment; then he gave
d’Erlon orders to proceed with his attack. Biilow was still far away; Grouchy
was probably in pursuit of him; the battle might be won before the Prussians
could intervene.
Accordingly,
at about 1.30 p.m., the four vast
columns forming the 1st corps crossed the little valley that separated them
from the British position, and began to climb the opposite hill. One brigade
diverged
to storm the
farm of La Haye Sainte; the rest advanced straight against Wellington’s
left-centre. At the head of the slope they came under a hot musketry fire, but
continued to press forward. The first troops that they encountered were
Bylandt’s Dutch-Belgian brigade, which fled to the rear in disorder. A moment
later they came upon Picton’s two British brigades, reduced to little more than
half their strength by the losses of Quatre-Bras, but steady as ever. A furious
musketry engagement began; the French were five times more numerous, but, owing
to their vicious formation, could bring no more muskets to bear than could
their opponents. While both sides were blazing into each other at close
quarters, and the smoke lay thick around them, there was a sudden rush from the
rear; and two brigades of British heavy cavalry—Somerset’s Horse Guards and
Life Guards, and Ponsonby’s Union Brigade—charged into the thick of the French
columns. D’Erlon’s men were caught unprepared, while closely engaged with
Picton’s infantry. The unwieldy masses were riven to pieces, hurled down the
slope, and chased back to their old position with the loss of two eagles, 3000
prisoners, and several thousands more of killed and wounded. Unfortunately,
the British horse, drunk with the exhilaration of success, failed to check
their career, and rode straight into the French lines, sabring the fugitives,
till Napoleon flung upon them cavalry from right and left, and swept them home
again with fearful loss. Of the 2500 who had charged, a full thousand were left
behind dead or disabled. Ponsonby, the commander of the Union Brigade, was
killed in cold blood after he had been made prisoner. Picton, too, had fallen
in the very moment of victory.
Prudence
would now have counselled Napoleon to break off the battle. Biilow had become
visible in the nearer distance, advancing slowly towards the French right
flank. Lobau’s small 6th corps and two brigades of reserve cavalry had to be
detached to the east to intercept him. This reduced by 10,000 men the number
available for the attack on Wellington. Moreover, a new despatch was received
from Grouchy, alarming because it showed that at 11 a.m. he was still far from- Wavre and had no conception of
Biilow’s having marched to join Wellington. But Napoleon had no idea of
ordering a retreat; he knew that he was ruined if he failed to beat Wellington
that afternoon. The British must be crushed at all costs before the Prussians
came up in force.
Accordingly,
at 3.30 p.m. the Emperor directed
Ney to take charge of his front line and resume the attack. The least injured
regiments of d’Erlon’s corps marched against La Haye Sainte; a fresh brigade of
Reille’s corps went forward to reinforce the baffled assailants of Hougou-
mont. Little or no progress was made at either point; and the Marshal resolved
to have recourse to a new expedient—a great cavalry charge against the front of
the British line between the two farms. At about
4 p.m.
Ney ordered Milhaud’s two divisions of cuirassiers to charge:
they moved
up, supported by the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, forming in all a mass
of 5000 veteran horsemen. At the sight of their approach, the fifteen British
and Hanoverian battalions forming Wellington’s right-centre fell into squares,
and prepared to withstand the shock. The tremendous episode which filled the
next two hours was the part of the battle of Waterloo which impressed itself
most strongly on the memory of the survivors on the British side. Never, in all
the Napoleonic wars, was there so prolonged a whirlwind of cavalry charges as
those which filled the later hours of that afternoon. Milhaud’s first onslaught
was only the beginning; he breasted the slope, drove the allied gunners from
their batteries, and then dashed at the squares. They did not flinch, and their
fire blew the squadrons to pieces; then Wellington ordered his own cavalry
reserves to advance, and drove the enemy down the slope. But the attacks were
renewed again and again; and, in the intervals, the French artillery played
upon the British squares with deadly effect. It was their round-shot, and not
the swords of the cuirassiers, which made such havoc among the battalions of
Wellington’s centre.
When Milhaud
had failed to break a single British square, and his corps was hopelessly
disorganised, Ney called up the rest of the reserve cavalry from the second
line, Kellermann’s two divisions of cuirassiers; they were followed by the
heavy squadrons of the Guard. This splendid veteran cavalry, 5000 strong, fell
upon the crippled squares; Milhaud’s scattered brigades reformed themselves,
and fell in as supports to the new attacking force. There followed an hour of
confused melee; the horsemen rode through the line of squares and even to the
very rear of the British position, charging every face of the dwindling blocks
of British and German infantry, but always failing to break in. Yet the stress
was so great that Wellington used up all his cavalry, save those of the extreme
left wing, in the struggle, and gradually pushed forward into the fighting line
the whole of his infantry reserve, save one Dutch-Belgian division, which
showed such unequivocal signs of demoralisation that the Duke dared not risk it
in the front. The shrinkage in the ranks of the squares was fearful; they were
dreadfully mauled by the French artillery during the intervals of the charges,
and harassed by the fire of tirailleurs, who crept up close to them and could
not be driven off, for to open out into line would have meant utter destruction
at the hands of the cavalry. One battalion of the German Legion, ordered by the
Prince of Orange to deploy, was absolutely exterminated by the cuirassiers
before it could resume its formation.
What, meanwhile,
were the Prussians doing? Wellington had expected to be succoured before noon,
and had only consented to fight on that understanding. Yet six o’clock had
arrived, and no relief due to the Prussian operations was yet perceptible. It
is impossible to explain the delay, as has often been done, by the bad state of
the roads alone.
The roads
were much cut up, it is true; but Wavre is only thirteen miles from Mont St
Jean, and it does not take from dawn (3.30 a.m.
at that season of the year) till 4 p.m.
to cover such a distance. The fact was that there had been bad
staff-work and also a certain amount of hesitation at the Prussian
head-quarters. If Bliicher had ordered his nearest corps, that of Thielmann, to
march for the French flank at dawn, it would have been in contact with the
enemy at 10 or 11 a.m. What
Napoleon would have done in this case it is idle to guess; he had not at that
time committed himself to the battle with Wellington. But Billow’s corps, which
had two miles further to march than the others, was chosen to lead the column,
because it had not suffered at Ligny. It did not start till 6 a.m., was stopped in the streets of
Wavre —which it ought not to have passed through—by an accidental fire, and
then crossed the march of Pirch’s corps. Both columns were blocked; and it was
1.30 p.m. before Biilow’s leading
division finally reached Chapelle St Lambert, where, as we have already seen,
it at once attracted Napoleon’s attention. It was 4 p.m. before it got into actual contact with the French. This
amazing delay, of nearly ten hours, was due not to Bliicher, but to Gneisenau,
his chief of the staff, who feared that Wellington might retreat, after
committing the Prussian army to the dangerous flank march. So late as 10.30 a.m., Gneisenau wrote to Muffling, the
Prussian attacM at the British head-quarters, adjuring him to find out if the
Duke really intended to fight; and it was not, in fact, till the cannonade of
Waterloo was making itself heard all over Brabant, that the Prussian advance
was urged on with genuine energy. Then, at last, Bliicher had reached the
front; and he rode up and down the line of march, calling to his men that “
they must not make him break his word,” and encouraging the infantry to help in
dragging the embogged cannon across the miry meadows along the Lasne.
It was only
about 4 p.m., just as the great
French cavalry charges were beginning, that Billow’s corps reached the wood of
Paris, some two miles from Napoleon’s right flank, and began to interchange
shots with the French vedettes. The Emperor, as we have seen, had told off
Lobau to “contain” them, which he did in the most skilful fashion. Drawing out
his troops at right angles to the main French line, he established himself in a
good position, with the village of Planchenoit covering his right, and there
fought fiercely for two hours against threefold numbers, for Biilow had over
30,000 men. At last, despite all his efforts, Planchenoit was lost; but the
Emperor, who had now turned his attention for a space to this comer of the
field, sent the four regiments of the Young Guard to retake it. These fresh
troops, coming up with a sudden rush, completely cleared the village. It was
now 6 o’clock; Biilow’s last reserves had been used up; and it could not be
said that he had turned the fate of the battle. The only positive difference
that his presence had made was that it had compelled the Emperor to divert
638
Ney s attack. La Haye Sainte taken.
[l815
against him,
first and last, some 14,000 men of his reserves, who might otherwise have been
used against Wellington. This was far from the support that the Duke had
exptcted when he offered battle. Fortunately, however, at this moment, more
Prussian troops drew near. The corps of Ziethen and Pirch, which had started
later and moved even more slowly than Biilow, were at last at hand.
But, long
before their arrival began to produce effect, Napoleon’s last offensive moves
had been made. Seeing that the cavalry attacks had achieved no definite
success, and that the British line was still unbroken, Ney made a final
attempt to force it with his infantry. While the wrecks of d’Erlon’s corps made
one more assault on La Haye Sainte, the infantry of the left-centre—the
divisions of Foy and Bachelu, belonging to Reille’s corps—pushed forward, to
the east of Hougoumont, to assail the much-tried brigades which had just beaten
off the cavalry. .Though these divisions were fresh troops, engaging battalions
wasted by three hours;’ desperate fighting, they were repulsed; once more the
column withered away before the deadly discharge of the two-deep line. “
CPetait utie grele de marts” wrote Foy in his diary a few days later. But. a
little further to the right, the French achieved at this moment the first real
success that they had won against Wellington that day. D’Erlon’s men carried La
Haye Sainte at about 6.30 p.m. The buildings had been well-nigh pounded to
pieces by the French guns; the gallant battalion of the German Legion which
held them had exhausted all its cartridges; and the enemy at last burst in.
This was the most dangerous moment of the battle for the allied army. A breach
had been made in its front line; and the troops on each side of the gap were
utterly exhausted and unable to fill it up. Fortunately for Wellington,
d’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps were also at the end of their strength; they were
unable to push forward. Ney begged the Emperor to send more infantry; but the
moment was not propitious for such a request. Napoleon had nothing left in
reserve save the fifteen battalions of his Old and Middle Guard; and he grudged
spending them. Moreover he was watching a new and dangerous attack of the
Prussians on Planchenoit which was just impending. “ You want more infantry !”
he exclaimed, “Oil voulez-vous quefen premie? Voulez-vous quefen fosse?™ And
for a critical forty minutes he refused to succour Ney. The only movement that
he made was to send two of his precious battalions of the Old Guard to feed the
defence of Planchenoit, where Biilow, now supported by Pirch’s corps, had made
a third irruption into the village. Like the previous assaults, it was
defeated; the Old Guard swept the street and the churchyard free once more.
But, during
this short moment of hesitation on the Emperor’s part, Wellington had found
means to repair the damage in the neighbourhood of La Haye Sainte. Ziethen’s
corps had at length arrived, and had come into touch with his extreme left. He
drew from that quarter his
last two
brigades of British cavalry, those of Vivian and Vandeleur, and ranged them in
the rear of his depleted centre. The much-tried brigades between La Haye Sainte
and Hougoumont were drawn in together, and strengthened by other regiments
called up from the right. A solid front was once more displayed to the enemy.
It was at
this moment that the Emperor made up his mind to deliver his last blow, and to
throw the Guard into the thick of the battle. The alternative of retreat was
still open to him; and there were good military reasons for accepting it. But
the political reasons against taking this line were too cogent to be resisted.
As one of his own generals wrote a few days later, “The Emperor might have refrained
from making his last attack, and could have gone off in good order, without
leaving a gun behind. But then he must have repassed the Sambre, after having
lost 30,000 of the men with whom he had crossed it two days before. How could
he have hoped to take up the campaign against the Russians, the Austrians, and
the rest of the Allies, after having been forced to retire with loss from
before the English army alone ? In spite of the fearful result I cannot blame
Napoleon.” Though a retreat might save the army for a few days, it could only
mean ultimate disaster. The Emperor, then, was right to attack; his mistake was
that he did not send the Guard to the front en masse, the moment that La Haye
Sainte fell.
It was past
seven when Ney led out from the French position the last column of assault. It
was composed of six battalions of the Middle Guard, arrayed in hollow squares—a
curious formation for attack, dictated probably by the fear that Wellington
might have cavalry waiting to receive them. Two battalions of the Old Guard
followed some distance behind, to act as supports. The remaining five were
still held back in reserve near or behind La Belle Alliance. The attack was
delivered not directly up the high-road towards La Haye Sainte, but half a mile
further west and near to Hougoumont. By chance or design the battalions took a
formation en echelon, with the right in advance and the left somewhat refused.
The leading square, that furthest to the east, came up the slope opposite
Halkett’s British brigade; the others were mak> tig for the ground held by
Maitland’s brigade of the Guards. The moment that they began to ascend the
heights, all came under a heavy fire of artillery, for Wellington’s gunners,
though often driven from their pieces by the cavalry charges, were still
holding their positions. The smoke was dense; and the different units seem to
have lost sight of each other and to have fought each its own battle.
The shock was
short and decisive. The right-hand echelon first reached the crest, engaged in
a close and murderous musketry fight with Halkett’s brigade, and then recoiled.
A little later the central force, apparently three battalions, came up against
Maitland’s Guards and the British battery beside them. When they were seen
looming through the smoke,
Wellington,
who was present himself at this point, bade the Guards rise to their feet—they
had been lying down to escape the fire of the French artillery—and give one
volley, after which they were to advance firing. Now, as so often in Peninsular
battles, the first point-blank discharge of a well-formed British line was
irresistible. The heads of the French squares went down in one weltering mass;
then, when their enemy marched on them, still pouring in deliberate volleys,
the survivors broke and fled downhill. The advance of Maitland’s brigade was
only checked by the appearance of the last French Echelon, two battalions
strong, somewhat on their flank. But, while the Guards were reforming to meet
this new attack, another force came on the scene. Colonel Colbome of the 52nd,
whose corps belonged to Adam’s brigade, the unit next to the right of Maitland,
had wheeled his battalion out of the main line, so as to place it at right
angles to the advancing French and parallel to their flank. His fire tore away
the whole left flank of these two battalions, which broke in helpless disorder
and rolled down the slope after their beaten comrades. Their retreat carried
with it the two battalions of the Old Guard which were crossing the valley in
their support, as well as the half-formed and depleted masses of Reille’s corps
which were lingering under the lee of Hougoumont.
The cry, “la
Garde recule,” was already running along the whole French line, when Wellington
let loose upon the wavering masses below him his last British reserves, the two
cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur. They crashed down the hill-side east
of Hougoumont, across the debris of the fight, and fell upon the retreating
Imperial Guard and the exhausted and disordered remnants of Kellermann’s and
Milhaud’s cavalry. All gave way, almost without resistance; and the French
centre was transformed in a minute into a panic-stricken crowd. Wellington had
bidden his whole front line to advance in support of the cavalry, but it found
no enemy to fight; after ascending to the crest of the French position it
halted, and left the pursuit to the Prussians. There was no strength to march
left in the remnants of the shattered battalions which had borne the burden and
heat of the day.
At the moment
when Napoleon’s last attack was repulsed by Maitland and Colbome, Ziethen’s
Prussian corps had broken in between d’Erlon’s and Lobau’s troops at the
north-eastern point of the French front. The right angle formed by the enemy’s
line gave way inwards, and the Prussian cavalry arrived near La Belle Alliance,
driving their immediate opponents before them, at the same moment that the
brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur reached the same point from the other side.
The last
resistance made to the Allies was offered by three squares of the Old Guard
near the high-road; they held out for some time, in order to protect the
retreat of the Emperor, who had lingered with them while there was any hope of
rallying his centre. Charged without success by both British and Prussian
cavalry, these veterans at last
retired, and
mingled with the flying masses in their rear. The Young Guard in Planchenoit
held out almost as long; had. they given way earlier, the Prussians would have
reached the high-road south of the French position, and cut off the whole army.
But this was prevented by the admirable obstinacy of Lobau’s men, who held
their own till night fell, and the main battle had long been lost.
The Emperor’s
army, now no more than a helpless horde of fugitives, was chased all night by
the Prussian cavalry, and never allowed a moment to rally. After being driven
out of seven successive bivouacs, which it had attempted to form, it fled over
the Sambre next morning, and crossed the frontier in isolated bands. In the
last great battle it had lost all its artillery, more than 250 guns, and about
30,000 men in killed and wounded alone. The prisoners were comparatively few,
probably not more than 6000 or 7000; but, in many units of the Imperial army,
the actual casualties exceeded 50 per cent, of the men present. Wellington’s
army had lost over 13,000 men, of whom 7000 were British. The Prussians
reported a loss of over 6000.
It has often
been endeavoured to fix the responsibility for the loss of Waterloo upon
Grouchy; Napoleon himself, and countless later writers on the French side, have
alleged that he had it in his power to intervene effectively in the battle and
failed to do so. The answer to this accusation is that the Marshal, like
Napoleon himself, had not toreseen Bliicher’s bold flank march to join
Wellington, and acted in strict accordance with his master’s orders. In the
first despatch that he received on the 18th, written from the field of Mont St
Jean at 10 a.m., the Emperor told him to march on Wavre, pushing before him the
Prussians in his front, and at the same time to keep up his communications with
the main army and send frequent reports. This was exactly what Grouchy, long
before he received the despatch, had determined to do. His troops were already
on the march for Wavre, when the opening guns of Waterloo were heard. Some of
his officers urged him to march toward the cannonade: but he refused, saying
that his duty was to look after the Prussians. As soon as his advanced cavalry
reported the enemy in strength beyond the river Dyle—it was Thielmann’s corps,
left behind to detain him—he made preparations to attack them. When the
Emperor’s despatch reached him, he congratulated himself on having foreseen and
carried out his master’s orders. The critical hours of Waterloo passed while
Grouchy was forcing the fords and bridges of the Dyle, slowly driving back
Thielmann, who fought desperately to gain time for his commander-in-chief to reach
Wellington. Not till
5 p.m. did the Marshal receive Napoleon’s
last despatch, telling him that Biilow had been sighted on the heights of
Chapelle St Lambert, and ordering him to turn westward and crush this Prussian
corps, which he would catch “ en flagranti delit.” It was far too late for
Grouchy to do anything of the kind; at that hour Biilow was attacking
Planchenoit;
and, even if
the Marshal had at 5 o’clock despatched towards the field of Mont St Jean such
of his troops as were not already engaged at Wavre, they would not have reached
it till long after the fate of the battle had been decided. By 8 p.m. the main struggle was over; and
there was much more than a three hours’ march (as the Prussians proved) between
the Dyle and Planchenoit. Had Grouchy detached troops in that direction, they
would have found the Emperor already routed.
Grouchy
fought his way across the Dyle on the 18th, but received no news of the great
battle that night. He therefore renewed his assault on Thielmann next morning, beat
him by sheer force of numbers, and was about to pursue him northward, when he
at last heard of the results of Waterloo. Promptly perceiving the danger that
Bliicher might cut him off, Grouchy ordered an instant retreat. He executed it
in very skilful style, reached Namur just in time to avoid being intercepted,
defended that town by a rear-guard action till his main body had got clean
away, and escaped to Prance up the valley of the Meuse. He returned with his
33,000 men intact, thinking that he had deserved well of his country, but found
that he was to be made the Emperor’s scapegoat and to have the loss of Waterloo
imputed to his stupidity or treason. It was a hard fate; his only crime was
that, like Napoleon, he had failed to foresee Bliicher’s great fiank march.
Napoleon,
after ordering the wrecks of his army to rally at Laon, set out for Paris at
once, and arrived there in a state of great mental and bodily prostration on
June 21. The news of his disaster had reached the capital on the preceding night,
and was not generally known till a few hours before his arrival. He did not at
first grasp the completeness of his own ruin, and spoke to his Ministers of his
intention to continue the war, -ai;ie a levee en masse, and defend Paris. He
had to be reminded that he was no longer the autocrat that he had been when he
returned from Moscow or from Leipzig; and that he would have to reckon not only
with the enemy in the field, but with the Chambers at home. The Houses had
allowed him to appeal to the arbitrament of the sword; but, after his disaster,
it was unlikely that they would continue the struggle against united Europe,
merely in order to keep him on the throne. The Allies had proclaimed that they
were attacking not France but the Emperor; peace, then, might be secured by his
abdication. Napoleon had no intention of throwing up the game; and, for a
moment, he contemplated dissolving the Chambers and rWlnring himself absolute.
Deceived apparently by treacherous assurances from Fouche, to the effect that the
spirit of the deputies was not so hostile as he supposed, he took no decisive
measure on the morning of his arrival. In a few hours it was too late for him
to act. The Chambers no sooner met than, at the suggestion of La Fayette, they
declared themselves in permanent session, and voted that anyone who attempted
to dissolve them would be guilty of high treason. To defend
themselves,
they called out the National Guards, on whose loyalty they could rely. This
move struck the Emperor’s counsellors with terror. JLucien Bonaparte alone
dared to advise his brother to collect the few regular troops which were in
Paris, appeal to the faubourgs, and disperse the Chambers. But Napoleon’s
spirit was broken. He declared that he “would never lead a Jacquerie”; the idea
of conducting a civil var at the head of the rabble was hateful to him. That
night he made up his mind to abdicate; and when, on June 22, the Chambers sent
him word that his choice lay between resignation and deposition, he bowed
before the storm, and signed a declaration by which he abdicated in favour of
his son. On June 25 he retired to Malmaison.
The Chambers
believed that it was now in their power to decree a new Constitution for
France, though they were much divided as to its form. They appointed a Provisional
Government, of which Fouche and Carnot were the leading members. But already it
had been practically settled that the Bourbons should be restored. Immediately
after Waterloo, Wellington wrote to Louis XVIII at Ghent, advising him to cross
the frontier in the wake of the allied armies. The old King saw the wisdom of
this counsel, and, on entering French soil at Cateau Cambresis (June 25),
published a proclamation in which he announced that he came to resume his
rights, that he should adhere to the Constitution of 1814, repair the horrors
of war, reward his faithful subjects, and punish the guilty in accordance with
the forms of law. Next day he made a triumphal entry into Cambrai, which, after
a feeble resistance, had been stormed by the British on the 24th. Within the
next few days, all the towns north of the Somme which were not held down by
regular troops hoisted the white flag; and a “ royal army ” of 5000 or 6000
irregulars assembled at Arras. The movement spread to Normandy, where the
Imperialists were forced to shut themselves up in the larger towns; and the
whole country rose to hem them in. When Louis XVIII had been recognised as
legitimate King by the greater part of northern France, it was too late for the
Chambers to debate on what form of government they would inaugurate, too late
also for the Allies to take into consideration any other plan for dealing with
France than that of restoring the status quo of 1814. Several of the Powers
were not too well pleased. Prussia, in particular, had intended to extort many
things before allowing the King to be restored; and her Ministers were
indignant with Wellington for having permitted or rather encouraged Louis to
take possession of his kingdom again.
Meanwhile the
British and Prussian armies were advancing against Paris with all speed* Their
leaders had agreed that the enemy must not be allowed time to rally. On their
approach, the wrecks of Napoleon’s army at Laon, and Grouchy’s coips also,
retired into Paris. On June 29 the heads of the Prussian columns appeared on
the heights to the north of the capital; Wellington’s army was about a day
further
off, but
within good supporting distance. The Provisional Government sent messenger
after messenger to the Allies, requesting them to grant an armistice and stay
their advance, now that Napoleon had abdicated. Bliicher and Wellington wisely
refused; there was no knowing what might happen if the enemy were allowed to
rally, and to bring up reserves from the south. Napoleon, from his retreat at
Malmaison, was already offering to take command of the army in Paris; and,
though this was the last thing that Fouche and his colleagues desired, they
were well aware that many regiments would have gone over to their old master if
he had invited them to follow him against the Allies. The four days, June
25-29, which Napoleon spent at Malmaison were full of possibilities of danger.
The Provisional Government, however, at last succeeded in inducing him to
depart; had he stayed a day longer, they would have had either to arrest him or
to suffer him to fall into the hands of the Prussians. Bliicher had sent off a
flying column with orders to seize him, dead or alive, and had expressed bis
intention of shooting him offhand, as an outlaw, if he were captured. The
Prussian cavalry reached Malmaison only a few hours after Napoleon had driven
off on the road to the south. His last idea had been to quit Europe and betake
himself to the United States; the Provisional Government had eagerly fallen in
with the idea, and promised him the use of two frigates then lying at
Rochefort. On June 29, therefore, Napoleon disappeared; and several days passed
before the Allies ascertained his whereabouts. It was only discovered on July
10, when he sent % message to Captain Maitland, commanding the blockading
squadron off Rochefort, in which he asked whether he would be allowed to put to
sea and sail for America.
Meanwhile,
after Napoleon’s departure from Malmaison, the Provisional Government was left
face to face with Wellington and Bliicher; and no suspension of hostilities had
yet been arranged. Indeed, there was sharp fighting in front of Paris on July
1. The allied generals, after reconnoitring the strong line of fortifications
along the northern front of the city, had determined to cross the Seine, with
the object of presenting themselves before its undefended southern side. The
brigade of cavalry which formed Bliicher’s advance-guard was routed near
Versailles by a superior force of French horse; but this did not prevent the
Prince from taking up his position on the heights which command Paris on the
south. At the same time Wellington occupied positions observing the northern
front of the city.
The
Provisional Government had now to make its choice whether it would fight or
capitulate. There were some 70,000 men of the regular troops within the city,
besides the National Guards. Bliicher’s and Wellington’s armies united did not
much exceed 120,000 sabres and bayonets. But the British and Prussians were
only the van of the advancing hosts; it was known in Paris that the Austrians
had crossed
the eastern
frontier on June 23, had beaten Rapp and his small army of the Rhine on June
28, and had shut him up in Strassburg. Their columns were already advancing
across Lorraine unopposed. At the same time, the Austro-Sardinian army of Italy
had crossed the Alps and attacked Suchet, who, on hearing the news of Waterloo,
asked for and obtained an armistice (June 28). If there had been any great
national cause to defend, if any appeal to loyalty could have been made, it
might have been worth while to fight. But no one knew whether the Chambers and
the Provisional Government intended to acknowledge Napoleon II, to proclaim a
Republic, to recall Louis XVIII, or to choose some new ruler—for example, the
Duke of Orleans. The only persons who knew their own mind were Fouche and a few
others, who had determined that the best thing for France and for themselves
was to make a prompt submission to Louis XVIII. Further resistance would be
useless; it would only irritate the Allies, and lead to the dismemberment of
the realm. It was by arguments of this kind that Fouche won over Davout, who
combined the functions of Minister of War and commander of the army in Paris,
to face the unpalatable prospect of concluding a capitulation and admitting the
King. The two acts must be done simultaneously; for, if the city surrendered
before the King was recognised, it would be treated as a conquered place.
Blucher was for some time inclined to press matters to extremity, and to offer
the Provisional Government nothing save the alternatives of unconditional
surrender and a storm; but he was induced by Wellington to accept a
capitulation. The French army was to retire beyond the Loire; the allied troops
were to enter the city, but to respect all private and public property, except
military stores and the works of art which Napoleon had plundered from Italy,
Germany, and Spain. The allied generals undertook to make no attempt to arrest
or punish any French subject for having borne arms under Napoleon (July 3).
Fouche and
Davout had considerable difficulty in inducing the army and the Chambers to
accept these terms. But all the military authorities agreed that Paris was
indefensible on the southern side, and that the army was too disorganised to
make a successful resistance. In face of such statements it was necessary to
yield; and on July 5-6 the French troops marched for the Loire. On July 7 the
Allies made a triumphal entiy; and on the 8th Louis XVIII returned to the
Tuileries. Fouche and Davout had already settled with him the terms on which he
was to be received. As soon as the army had left Paris, the Provisional
Government recognised Louis as King, and the Chambers dissolved themselves. New
Houses, duly summoned by royal writ, were to meet within two months. They
actually commenced their session before August was out, and showed themselves “
more royalist than the King.”
THE CONGRESS
OF VIENNA. H.
When Napoleon was meditating his return to France, he
had been well served by the agents whom he maintained at Vienna, but not
supremely well. Before the middle of February the moment had passed away when
his advent would have found his adversaries on the brink of a conflict with one
another. As it was, the news of his departure from Elba did not for some days
give rise to any overt sign of apprehension on the part of the sovereigns and
statesmen assembled at the Congress. Metternich, however, showed promptitude of
action as well as presence of mind; and, within an hour after the receipt of
the news, the Four Allied Powers had resolved on ordering their troops back
upon France, while the necessary dispositions were at once made for the
movements of the Austrian forces. During their journey to Pressburg, Metternich
and his companions discussed the terms of the Declaration to be addressed to
the French nation and army. On their return, the news having arrived of
Napoleon’s landing at Cannes, it was agreed at a meeting of the Committee of
the Eight Powers, on the proposal of Metternich, to issue in their name the
Declaration which was actually promulgated on the following day (March
13,1815). Gagem’s suggestion that the Declaration should be issued by the
entire Congress had been waived aside; but, after an almost continuous series
of political and military conferences, a further step, the expediency of which
had from the first been urged by Wellington, was on March 25 taken by the Four
Powers, in the conclusion of a solemn treaty of alliance. This treaty expressly
applied to the new situation the principles of the Treaty of Chaumont, and
invited the adherence of all the Governments of Europe. The King of France was
specially invited to join the alliance, and to specify the succour required by
him in accordance with its provisions. In notifying its acceptance of the
treaty, the Government of Great Britain, of whose loyalty towards the Alliance
her new and ample subsidies furnished the most convincing proof, refused to
bind itself to continue the war with the intent of obliging France to adopt any
particular form of government; and the Tsar was at this time by no means
favourable to
the elder
branch of the Bourbons. The tact and skill with which, in these circumstances,
Talleyrand maintained his position and that of his Government at Vienna certainly
call for admiration. The smaller States of Europe, almost without exception,
gave in their adhesion to the treaty. The German States, in acceding on April
27, agreed that all their efforts should be directed towards maintaining the
provisions of the First Peace of Paris; Gagem’s refusal to sign seems to have
been due to his dissatisfaction with the frontier assigned to the Netherlands.
His Dutch colleague signed, but Munster also held back; and the adhesion of the
King of Denmark, who it must be allowed had reason enough for delay, did not
come in till all was over (August). Spain and Sweden persisted in their
refusal; but their abstention, caused in the former case by sullen pride, and
in the latter by the withholding of a British subsidy, counted for very little.
At Vienna,
though all eyes were turned towards the theatre of the impending struggle,
there was at the same time a general wish to prevent the threads of the
diplomatic transactions from being scattered while it was still possible to
gather them up; and the settlement by the sword for which Europe was once more
waiting might be hastened by removing all doubt as to conclusions already
settled in principle. Thus, on April 7, the Emperor of Austria proclaimed the
union of the Italian States now subjected to his rule, under the designation of
the Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom. A few days earlier (April 2) he had
provisionally taken over from his daughter the administration of the duchies of
Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. The affairs of the Helvetic Confederation were
hastened by the Declaration adopted by the Eight Powers on March 20, which was
solemnly accepted by the Diet on May 27 following. The arrangements as to
Poland were rapidly formulated in two treaties, concluded on May 3 between
Austria and Russia, and between Russia and Prussia, respectively; and on the
same day the plenipotentiaries of the three Eastern Powers signed a further
treaty as to the Republic of Cracow. This scanty remnant received, as if by way
of compensation for the incorporation in Prussia of the free city of Danzig, a
guarantee of its independence and neutrality, together with a Constitution. To
the Poles who were subjects of any one of the Three Powers the treaties
promised the grant, at such time as might seem expedient to each Government, of
institutions preservative of their nationality; and, before the Tsar quitted
Vienna, he proclaimed the bases of the Constitution intended by him for his
kingdom of Poland, which were immediately to regulate its provisional administration,
and included an indissoluble union with the Russian Empire. The Saxon
difficulty ended with the conclusion of a treaty of peace on May 18 between
Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and King Frederick Augustus, who had at last been
made to see the wisdom of yielding to necessity.
Only two
problems of first-rate importance still remained unsolved.
These were
the two questions which, as has been seen; Castlereagh had before his departure
from Vienna specified to Liverpool—viz. the Neapolitan, and that concerning the
future Germanic Constitution. The former necessarily entered into a new phase
with Napoleon’s return, though already Murat’s action had been influenced by
the hopes which he founded on that event. By acting blindly on the assumption
that Austria was in complete accord with those who sought his ruin, Murat
relieved her from the difficulties in which she had involved herself by
guaranteeing Naples to him in the treaty of January 11, 1814. He now called
upon Italy to arm on behalf of her independence; whereupon, on April 18, the
Austrian Government published a manifesto which, while exposing the duplicity
of Murat’s conduct, declared him to be (as de facto he had been for weeks) at
war with Austria. A British declaration of war against him speedily followed.
Early in May the Austrian Government signed a treaty of alliance with King
Ferdinand IV; and on the 23rd of the month the Austrian troops entered Naples.
Yet no overt act of the Congress or of any of the Powers had declared King
“Joachim Napoleon” to have forfeited his throne; and in the British Parliament
Castlereagh had to argue that their engagements towards him lapsed with his
attack upon Austria. Even now, had he shaped his conduct with more
circumspection, some compensation Plight have been allotted him. His end is
told elsewhere; his consort Queen Caroiiae, whom a revolt of the lazzaroni had
forced to make terms for herself, was treated very considerately by the Emperor
of Austria.
After the
collapse of the endeavours of the “Pentaxchy,”the question of the future
Germanic Constitution had, it will be remembered, been kept alive by the
efforts of the minor States and by the imperturbable assiduity of Humboldt. On
Napoleon’s return, it became clear that the choice lay between two courses.
Either the whole subject must be deferred till a more favourable season—and, as
a matter of fact, Harden- berg would have been content with the merest laying
of foundations till the war was over—or, if the Congress was to offer something
.beyond this to the German nation, then what had to be done must be done
quickly, even though inadequately. After two further drafts had been brought
forward by the Prussian plenipotentiaries, Metternich at last, early in May,
took action by laying before them, in a slightly revised form, Wessenberg’s
draft of the previous December. In a series of conferences, at which this
draft served as basis, he and Hardenberg evolved a final draft—the ninth of the
series—which Metternich in the name of both the Austrian and the Prussian
Governments submitted to those of all the German States.
This draft
proposed a Federal Diet, in which out of fifteen votes Austria and Prussia
should have but one each, the former Power holding the presidency, but without
a casting vote. There was to be no smaller council, committee, or other
executive body; and the members of the
1815J
Final conferences on the Federal Act.
649
Confederation
were to be possessed of equal rights. They were prohibited from entering into
any alliance with foreign Governments against the Confederation or against any
members of it. The provision of a judicial tribunal, which should in accordance
with the laws of the Confederation determine differences between it and them,
or between any of them, was reserved for the Diet. Nothing could have been
briefer than the article declaring that in every German State a Constitution of
Estates (Landstande) should be set up; and the enumeration of the fundamental
rights of German citizenship was indisputably meagre. On the other hand, the
article as to the rights of the so-called “ Mediatised” was long and
elaborate. It is to the credit of Wessenberg, the author of the draft, no doubt
inspired on this head by his brother Henry, who at this time (April, 1815)
published anonymously some notable proposals on the subject, that it contained
a stipulation for the grant of a Constitution to the entire Catholic Church in
Germany, safeguarding its natural rights as well as providing for its needs.
The
conferences which out of this draft elaborated the Federal Act were eleven a
number, and lasted from May 23 to June 10. In the first two the associated
minor States were represented by five ministers only; nor was it till the third
sitting that the entire body of plenipotentiaries found admission. Wurtemberg
took no part in any of these conferences; and Baden withdrew at the sixth
sitting. For the rest, Mettemich, in his opening remarks on May 23, while
pointing out that the Congress could not be ended until the bases of the
Germanic Confederation had been laid down, stated that the development of these
in detail must be left to the Diet. The statesmen whom Mettemich thus
instructed took him at his word, and frankly declined to address themselves to
their task in any such thoroughgoing spirit as that, for instance, which
animated the Frankfort Parliament in 1848. Accordingly the Federal Act commits
to the Diet the drawing-up of the fundamental laws of the Confederation, and of
the organic institutions concerned with its foreign, military, and internal
affairs.
After, at the
sitting of May 26, much time was wasted on vexatious questions of precedence,
the discussion turned on the distribution of votes at the Diet, and a proposal
was made to reserve one “ curial11 (or combined) vote for the “
Mediatised.” On the other hand little opposition was now offered to the
prohibition of the conclusion of separate alliances by members of the
Confederation. Hardenberg and Humboldt, whether reasonably or not, were so much
discouraged by the slow progress made that about this time they urged
Mettemich to join in a kind of ultimatum, refusing any further amendments to
the draft. As a matter of fact, no addition of importance was made to it except
that besides the ordinary body of the Diet, now extended to seventeen votes, rliere
was instituted for the discussion of organic changes in its fundamental laws
and Constituent Act, and for other questions affecting the
entire
Confederation, a larger assembly or plenum with sixty-nine votes,
proportionately distributed among the States, but so as to give at least one
vote to each (June 3). The final discussions produced one other important
change. Already on May 26 Bavaria, on the plea that its Government had already
resolved on granting a Constitution, had carried a proposal for a significant
change in the text of the much-vexed article as to such grants. On May 22 King
Frederick William had signed the ordinance promising representative
institutions in the whole of the Prussian monarchy; and the article now ran
that, in each State, Constitutions “will be granted,” instead of “shall be
granted.”
At the
sitting on June 5, Mettemich (who was just about to quit Vienna) announced that
before the close of the Congress the German Federal Act must be placed under
the protection of the European Powers; and, while proposing; that the twenty
articles, which had been pushed through committee, should be accepted as the
requisite foundations for the Germanic Federal Constitution, he declared that
they were so accepted by the Emperor of Austria. At the same time he disclaimed
all intention of putting pressure upon any Government, thus exhibiting a
characteristic deference to the pretensions of the minor States, instead of
adopting the Prussian way of offering them the proposed Federal Constitution as
a thing to be taken or left, or Munster’s contention that Europe had a right to
insist on all the German Governments entering the new Confederation, whether
they liked it or not. Hereupon the Federal Act of twenty articles was
unreservedly accepted by Prussia and Hanover (on the ground that it seemed
better to agree upon an imperfect Confederation than upon none at all), by
Holstein (Denmark), and with certain reservations by several of the minor
States; Luxemburg (Netherlands) assented only on condition that all the other
German States became members of the Confederation. For the present, the Saxon
and Bavarian plenipotentiaries declared themselves obliged to await sufficient
instructions; but on June 8 Mettemich met the remaining Bavarian objections by
carrying certain modifications of the Act.
The most
important of these substituted for the Federal judicial tribunal, as the means
of settling disputes between members of the Confederation, the obsolete
Austrdgalmstanz—i.e., the appointment of special Courts nominated ad hoc by
particular States. Bavaria, too, now obtained the omission (proposed by Austria
already on June 1) of Wessenberg’s article promising a common Constitution to
the Catholic Church in Germany, which at first Cardinal Consalvi had in his tentative
way seemed disposed to favour. The claims of the Jews had been actively urged
at the Congress by the agents of the Jewish communities of Frankfort and of
the three Hanseatic free cities, and strongly supported by the Viennese banking
interest; but notwithstanding the goodwill of the Austrian, Prussian, and
Hanoverian Governments, they were unable to secure the insertion in the Federal
Act of more
than a guarantee of the rights already possessed by them in particular States
of the Confederation, For the Diet was also reserved the drawing-up of uniform
regulations concerning the liberty of the press, and the protection of authors
and publishers against piracy.
Thus, then,
concession carried to an extreme had made it possible for the Federal Act in
its entirety to be signed and sealed (June 8, 1815) by the plenipotentiaries of
thirty-six German Governments. The signatures of Wurtemberg and Baden were
still wanting, an offer on the part of the plenipotentiaries of the former to
sign the first eleven articles only of the Act having been declined. They did
not come into the Confederation till July 26 and September 1 respectively.
Landgrave Frederick VI of Hesse-Homburg, whose military services and connexion
with the royal family of Great Britain secured him special consideration, was,
by a protocol drawn up during the conferences on the Second Peace of Paris,
included in the Confederation as a sovereign prince.
After the
Federal Act had been signed, there was just time enough for inserting its first
eleven articles in the Final Act of the Congress, and adding a further clause
giving to the remaining articles the same force as if they had likewise found a
place there. Thus, the Germanic Constitution was—like the Helvetic and that of
the Republic of Cracow —to be placed under a European guarantee; per contra, an
inevitably complicated, manifestly artificial, and avowedly imperfect
constitutional fabric depended for its endurance upon the interested goodwill
or the indifference of the Powers at large. In any case, as Mettemich had
himself in the first instance hinted, the vitality of the constitutional
settlement depended upon the endurance of the territorial changes which had so
materially altered the size and power of the several German States and their
mutual relations; while each of the two Great Powers on whose cooperation the
whole structure hinged was placed in a position towards the other which,
without constant loyalty and prudence on both sides, could not fail to end in
jealous rivalry.
On the day
after that on which the German Federal Act at last passed through committee,
the Final Act of the Congress itself was formally adopted. So early as March
12, at the sitting of the Committee of the Eight which had agreed upon the
Joint Declaration against Napoleon as the disturber of the peace of Europe, a
Special Committee, composed of one plenipotentiary of each of these Powers and
of three secretaries, had been appointed to draft in a definitive form a
General Act of the Congress, summarising its results. Before the labours of
this Committee were completed, the Tsar, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor
of Austria left Vienna. On June 9 the plenipotentiaries of seven out of the
eight Powers signed the Final Act, the Swedish plenipotentiary alone recording
certain reservations, as to no indemnity having been provided for the deprived
“ Grand Duchess of
652
Provisions of the Final Act. Its primary end. [isis
Tuscany ”
(Napoleon's sister lise), or for the Crown Prince (Bemadotte) in consideration
of the restoration of his former principality of Ponte- Corvo to the Holy See.
Spain refused altogether to sign, Labrador recurring to the complaint by which
he had answered a previous invitation to agree to the settlement about Parma
and the restoration of Oliven^a to Portugal. Only a small proportion of the
subjects dealt with in the Final Act had, he urged, been reported in the
sittings of the Committee of the Eight; and a fraction of these Powers ought
not to be permitted to settle the affairs of all Europe, merely summoning the
rest to accord or refuse their signature. The Spanish protest was at bottom
much the same as that of Gagem, who, when dissatisfied with the conditions of
the Netherlands settlement and informed by Wellington that it had been made by
the Great Powers, “very much as was the case with the Treaty of Chaumont,”
retorted that of this newly-invented term “ the Great Powers ” he knew neither
the precise import nor the intention. The Congress of Vienna by its procedure
set the seal upon the principle that the settlement of the affairs of Europe
appertained to the Great Powers, and that the other States had merely to decide
whether they would accede to such settlement or not.
Whether we
review the provisions of the Final Act of the Congress in detail, or as a whole,
it is not easy to keep asunder the two questions as to what it actually
accomplished and as to what it left undone. First and foremost, the Congress
had sought to secure to the political system of Europe a stability which it had
not enjoyed since the First Partition of Poland. The fulfilment of this purpose
was not easily reconcilable with the “ satisfaction ” of those Powers who were
desirous either of recovering or extending their former limits, or of
sacrificing as few as possible of their recent gains; nor again could it
consistently be combined with deference to the principle of legitimacy, as
cherished by many of the sovereigns and statesmen assembled at Vienna, and put
forward, by the Bourbon interest in general and by the sagacity of Talleyrand
in particular, as of paramount importance for the Governments of Europe. In
seeking to restore the balance which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era had
upset, the Congress of Vienna was not content, like that of Westphalia, with
more or less localising the range of its efforts, or, like that of Utrecht,
with directing them entirely against the danger of the preponderance of a
single Power. France, while recovering the greater part of her colonial
possessions, had been virtually restricted to her boundaries of 1792; and by
means of new territorial dispositions along her eastern borders securities had
been provided against a new infraction of the peace of Europe. But the Congress
had at the same time shown itself sensitive to an excessive increase of the territorial
strength of Russia, whose partnership Napoleon had formerly been prepared to
accept in his vastest schemes of dominion. To the question of the balance of
maritime power the
Congress shut
its eyes; for Great Britain, from the first the mainstay of the defensive
alliance of Europe, was still its paymaster.
With regard,
then, to France, the Final Act added nothing of moment to the provisions of the
First Peace of Paris. Talleyrand’s attempts to obtain for France at least those
portions of the Belgic lands which were comprised in the grand-duchy of
Luxemburg and the see of Liege, as well as Geneva and Savoy, had ended only in
the confirmation of certain extensions in the latter quarter already settled in
that Peace. Belgium, as Louis-Philippe said a quarter of a century afterwards,
was, to the Galliphobe statesmen at Vienna, “ the stumbling-block of Europe.”
Of the colonial restorations not effected before the opening of the Congress,
the Final Act specifies only that by Portugal of French Guiana, whose climatic
conditions were afterwards pronounced unfit even for a continuance of the penal
settlement into which it had shrunk. Both Guadeloupe and Martinique were
restored to France by Great Britain before the adoption of the Act, as the last
remnants of a dominion which France had administered with so conspicuous a
success.
The
moderation exhibited by the Allied Powers in their treatment of France was the
result partly of a recognition of her services to civilisation, partly of
deliberate judgment. At Paris and Vienna it was not held to be in the interest
of Europe to leave France in a condition of weakness which would be a source of
disquiet to herself and therefore to her neighbours. The return of Napoleon,
however, once more revived the thought of securing a better western frontier
for Germany. This was recognised in England as opportune; and Stein,
Hardenberg, and Metternich agreed in June that France ought to be deprived of
Alsace and Lorraine as well as of French Flanders. But even then it was held certain
that the Tsar would intervene in favour of France. Castlereagh and Wellington
were opposed to any serious diminution of her territory; and the German demand
was not formulated so as to allow of its being pressed in the subsequent
negotiations for peace. As it was, France had preserved at Vienna what
constituted her chief source of strength, iiamely, the compactness and unity of
her territory; indeed, she was in this respect stronger than she had been in
1792, inasmuch as all the enclaves which had at that time remained within the
boundaries of France were now incorporated in it; nor were any of these except
certain German districts taken back at the Second Peace of Paris. As for the
government of France, her throne was at the time of the dissolution of the
Congress of Vienna left in the nominal possession of the House of Bourbon; and
the plenipotentiaries of King Louis XVIII were among those who signed the Final
Act. There was nothing to cause apprehension in the disclaimer by Great Britain
of any intention to impose any particular form of government upon the French
nation; for Louis XVIII had himself acknowledged that to the British Government
he above all owed his restoration. The aversion of Alexander I
from the
Bourbons was very soon to give way to reactionaiy influences. The Austrian
Emperor’s goodwill to Napoleon was an audacious fiction. Nothing would prevent
a second recovery of the throne of Prance by the Bourbons but a manifestation,
such as now seemed wholly improbable, of the national will; and nothing was
likely again to cut short their tenure of that throne but disloyalty to their
own promises, or a fetal want of common-sense in themselves.
While the
Final Act thus avoids much direct reference to France, it accords even slighter
mention to the Power on the rock of whose resistance the wave of her disturbing
action had broken. Great Britain’s maritime supremacy was tacitly allowed by
the European Concert; nor did the Congress so much as consider the propriety of
subjecting to international discussion the practices and claims which that
supremacy involved. Her colonial conquests in part were retained and in part
renounced, according to her own decisions. Of her own free choice she returned
portions of her conquests to France, which in 1810 had been left without a
single colony. To the Dutch, whose entire East Indian possessions had been in
her grasp before the close of the war, she now returned them all except Ceylon;
on the other hand, she retained Demerara and Cape Colony. No notice was taken in
the Act of the final cession to Great Britain by Denmark of the island of
Heligoland, the occupation of which had proved highly profitable during the
War. The influence of Great Britain was, naturally enough, thought traceable in
the considerable increase of territory granted at the Congress to the new
kingdom of Hanover, and in the exclusion, by the restoration of East Frisia to
that State, of Prussia from the coast-line of the German Ocean. Nothing had
come of the feeble attempt to amend the provision of the Peace of Paris which
had finally established British rule in Malta. The return of Napoleon
frustrated any scheme for providing the Order of St John with an indemnity in
Corfu, or elsewhere. Elba was now transferred to the Grand Duke of Tuscany; while
Corfu (where Bavaria would have liked to settle Eugene Beauhamais) was with the
other Ionian Islands soon afterwards placed under the British protectorate.
Ypsilanti and his fellow Hotspurs, incessantly scheming to engage the
sympathies of the Tsar on behalf of the liberation of Hellas, were checked by
the unwillingness of the other Great Powers to open the Eastern Question, of
which the Greek problem formed an integral part; and the Tsar himself had no
wish again to revive a jealousy like that provoked by his attitude of
friendship to Poland.
Great Britain
had throughout taken the most active interest in the negotiations concerning
the newly-established kingdom of the Netherlands. The treaty which placed
Belgium and Luxemburg under the Prince of Orange, now King of the Netherlands,
was not concluded between him and the Four Allied Powers till May 81, 1815; but
his acceptance of the sovereignty of the Belgic Provinces had been signified
by him, in
accordance with the invitation of those Powers, so far back as July 21, 1814.
The question had therefore become one of boundaries ; and the article of the
Final Act incorporating Belgium with Holland, the hereditary sovereignty of
which was vested in the House of Orange, was accordingly a long and elaborate
one. Luxemburg, while included as a grand-duchy in the Germanic Confederation,
was assigned to the King of the Netherlands in compensation for the German
principalities formerly belonging to him as head of the Orange-Dietz branch of
the House of Nassau, and now ceded by him to Prussia. The city of Luxemburg,
occupying a position which nature rendered all but impregnable, became a
German federal fortress. With the grand-duchy was united the portion of the
contested duchy of Bouillon not joined to France by the Peace of Paris.
Thus was
introduced into the European family of States a Power of considerable strength,
though of secondary rank, deliberately intended to serve as a barrier against
France, in the interests more especially of the Low Countries themselves, of
Germany and of Great Britain. Holland was at the same time compensated for
important colonial losses by a great augmentation of its importance as a
European State. No serious doubts as to the endurance of the reunion seem to
have suggested themselves to its authors and abettors. Yet nowhere were the
reasons for such doubts more manifold and deep-seated, and more abundantly
illustrated by the history of the past.
The first
fourteen articles of the Final Act were concerned with the Polish question, and
the following nine with the Saxon, which together had so occupied the attention
of the Congress during its earlier period. In accordance with the treaties of
May 8, 1814, between the three Eastern Powers, the greater part of the
grand-duchy of Warsaw was secured to Russia under the title of the kingdom of
Poland, to be perpetually bound to the Russian Empire. Like the portions of
Poland assigned to Prussia and Austria, the kingdom was to receive such
representative national institutions as the Russian Government might determine.
Before leaving Vienna, the Tsar carried out his promise by solemnly laying down
on May 81, 1815, the bases of its future Constitution; and this was actually
proclaimed on November 27. Prussia’s share of the grand-duchy of Warsaw included,
together with her Polish acquisitions of 1770, the fortress of Thom with the
surrounding district, and portions of what had hitherto been the departments of
Posen and Kalisch. Austria remained in possession of the parts of Eastern
Galicia assigned to her at the Peace of Vienna (1806), together with the salt
mines of Wiliczka and their vicinity. Cracow was declared a free city, with a
Constitution and an episcopal see of its own, whose independence and neutrality
were placed under the joint protection of the three partitioning Powers.
The Polish
question had thus, though within a more limited range
and at the
cost of considerable concessions to the two other partitioning Powers, been
settled on the lines to which Russia had from the first adhered; and the alternative
of an independent Poland, after being momentarily entertained at Vienna and
London, with the certainty of its finding favour at Paris, had been finally
shelved. A reasonable limit had been set to the advance of Russia's western
frontier ; and, since she had already established her predominance in the
northern Baltic, the natural process of expansion would henceforth have to take
other directions. Meanwhile, the agreement of the three Eastern Powers,
effected at Vienna in the face of difficulties for which they were ji’iginally
alike responsible, once more helped to establish an enduring community of
interests between them.
The other
partner in the Kalisch compact was likewise obliged to content himself with a
partial satisfaction of his expectations. The Treaty of May 18 and the articles
of the Final Act founded upon it, which transferred to Prussia, under the title
of the duchy of Saxony, a portion of the former Saxon kingdom, represented a
solution full of hazard. Whatever importance might attach to the feeling of
historical right which had survived the changeful experiences of the German
nation under the Holy Roman Empire and since its extinction, there can be no
doubt that, in the eyes of a large proportion of that nation (to say nothing of
foreign peoples % Prussia, whose conduct towards Hanover in the Revolutionary
period was unforgotten, was morally discredited by this annexation. On the
other hand, while what remained of the kingdom of Saxony could not suffice as a
barrier in the case of a conflict between the two Great Powers of Germany, a
State had been preserved of sufficient importance to add considerably at a
critical moment to the balance against Prussia. Austria renounced the Bohemian
rights of overlordship over the portions of the two Lusatias now ceded to
Prussia, except in case of the extinction of the House of Brandenburg.
Passing over
the treaties by which Prussia regulated her territorial arrangements with other
Governments, we come to her treaties of June 4 and 7 with Denmark and Sweden
respectively, by which the former ceded to Prussia Swedish Pomerania and the
island of Riigen (acquired by the Treaty of Kiel) in return for part of the
duchy of Lauenburg (previously ;nded to Prussia by Hanover) and a sum of two
million dollars.
The general
provisions of the Final Act as to the reconstituted and expanded Prussian
monarchy were contained in three articles, of which the first enumerated the
territories recovered by it, viz., those which had been formerly under Polish
sovereignty, including the city of Danzig and its district; the circle of
Cottbus (retroceded by Saxony) and the Old Mark (formerly part of the kingdom
of Westphalia); all the former Prussian dominions between Elbe, Weser, and
Rhine, but not the former Brandenburg principalities of Ansbach and Baireuth;
the portion of the duchy of Oleves on the left bank of the Rhine, and Neuchatel
and
Valengin. The
second of these articles recounted the new acquisitions of Prussia east of the
Rhine, comprising, besides the duchy of Saxony and part of Lauenburg, part of
the Westphalian department of Fulda, including the former abbacy of Corvey; the
free town of Wetzlar, the seat of the Reichskammergericht; the grand-duchy of
Berg, including the city of Dortmund and parts of the former dominions of the
Archbishop of Cologne; the duchy of Westphalia, as assigned at Luneville to
the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt; a large number of principalities,
countships and lordships formerly “ immediate ” and belonging to the
Westphalian Circle; and those portions of the former dominions of the
Nassau-Dietz line, ceded to Prussia by the King of the Netherlands, which she
had not again exchanged with the Duke of Nassau. Finally, a third article
defined the districts assigned to Prussia on the left bank of the Rhine, which
followed a long line beginning at Bingen, including nearly the whole of the
former electorate of Trier and so much of the electorate of Cologne as had lain
on the left bank, and terminated by the old Dutch frontier between Rhine and
Meuse.
As a result
of all these acquisitions and exchanges, the Prussian monarchy gained in
population not more than half a million of inhabitants, while, as compared
with her extent in 1805, she suffered an actual loss in area. More
disappointing, however, to Prussian statesmanship was its failure to secure to
the monarchy the territorial continuity and cohesion for which two military
roads connecting its halves afforded no equivalent; nor did the rights of trade
and navigation that Prussia had reserved to herself on the Ems make up for her
being cut off by Hanover from the North Sea. Prussia’s greatest gain, as has
been truly pointed out, lay in the fact that the reconstitution of her
territories had not only made the German element in her population more
decidedly preponderant than it had been in 1805, but had brought her into
cooperation or contact with almost every German interest, and had marked her
out as henceforth the principal guardian of the national security on the Rhine.
Loyal attachment towards the Prussian throne was certain to be a plant of slow
growth in the Catholic Rhine-valley and in ultra-conservative Westphalia; but
all these difficulties must in the end be overcome by Prussia, if her statesmen
were resolved to achieve what Austria dared not contemplate.
Among the
remaining German States a material increase of strength had been gained, with a
rise in dignity, by the new kingdom of Hanover,- thanks perhaps partly to her
close connexion with Great Britain and partly to the remembrance of the
exceptional severity of her recent experiences, but chiefly to the sagacity and
vigilance of her representative, Count Munster, and to the peculiar influence
which he had so long enjoyed with some of the chief princes and statesmen of
Europe. Besides recovering her former province of East Frisia, Hanover acquired
658 Bavaria.—Hesse-Darmstadt.—Frankfort. [i8is
the
principality of Hildesheim, with the ancient Imperial city of Goslar, and
several other additions.
Few
transactions at the Congress had given more trouble than the arrangement of the
compensations which the Treaty of Ried (October 8, 1813) and the supplementary
treaty concluded at Paris (June 3, 1814) between the two Governments promised
to Bavaria in return for her cessions to Austria. Bavaria was strongly
suspected of an ambition to play the part of a Great Power; and, while distrust
of Montgelas combined with dislike of Wrede and his bluster to thwart such
schemes, a strong current of patriotic jealousy opposed the scheme of placing
Mainz, the key of western Germany, in the hands of a Power so long an eager
ally of France. Mettemich had, however, very skilfully succeeded in changing
the traditional hostility of! Bavaria to Austria into an attitude of
expectant friendliness. Before the opening of the Congress the two States had
advanced a large part of the way towards a settlement by taking possession,
Austria of Tyrol and Vorarlberg, and Bavaria of Wurzburg and Aschaffenburg. On
April 23, 1815, a treaty was concluded between them, and approved by Russia,
Prussia, and Great Britain, which, in return for the cession to Austria of the
Hausruck and pait of the Inn Quarter (old divisions of Upper Austria), with the
bulk of the former archiepiscopal territory of Salzburg, assigned to Bavaria an
ample series of cessions and reversions which would have secured to her an
acceptable frontier. But this treaty, which would have necessitated further
exchanges, remained unratified; and the Final Act secured no acquisition to
Bavaria beyond that of Wurzburg and Aschaffenburg. At Paris, on November 3, a
supplementary treaty approved by the Allied Powers secured an exchange to
Bavaria by which she received districts in the former French departments of
Donnersberg, the Lower Rhine, and the Laar, including the sovereignty of the
federal fortress of Landau, with a total population of not far from
half-a-million, besides the reversion of the Baden share of the Palatinate; and
to this Bavaria at last assented in the Treaty of Munich (April 17,1816).
The Grand
Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt was compensated for the duchy of Westphalia and for
some minor cessions by a considerable territory on the left bank of the Rhine,
which had been included in the French department of Donnersberg, and by a
smaller territory on the right bank, formerly under the sovereignty of the
Prince of Isenburg. The remaining lands on the left bank at the disposal of the
Powers were ultimately distributed among several minor German potentates.
The
grand-duchy of Frankfort had in December, 1813, been broken up by the Allies,
who had at the same time restored to the city of Frankfort its ancient status
as a free Imperial city. This recognition of its historic past, as well as of
its future political distinction, found full expression in the Final Act, where,
in tacit commemoration of
Dalburg's
enlightened tolerance, an equality of rights for the several Christian
confessions was declared to be established in the city, the care of whose
Constitution was committed to the Germanic Diet.
The Germanic
Confederation established by the Federal Act, comprised thirty-eight States,
among which a total population of between twenty-nine and thirty millions was
distributed with the utmost unevenness. Austria and Prussia joined for those
only of their provinces which had formerly belonged organically to the German
Empire, Denmark for Holstein and Lauenburg, and the kingdom of the Netherlands
for Luxemburg only. Though the Federal Act had confessedly been concluded in
haste, its imperfections were not due to any declared fundamental dissension
as to its provisions between the two great German Powers; and its failure, if
such was to ensue, would only declare itself gradually. To the claims of the
Princes and Counts formerly “immediate” to the Empire, the Emperor of Austria
had listened benignly, and the Prussian Government, in the royal ordinance of
June 21, 1815, had shown much consideration; but their example was not followed
by Bavaria and Wiirtemberg, and by some of the minor States. It must be allowed
that, while some of these former petty potentates had entered into compromising
relations with the French Empire, others had, without any fault of their own,
lost not only their rights of sovereignty, but in some instances rights of
property likewise, besides suffering personal ill-treatment. The provisions of
the Federal Act secured to the “ mediatised ” Princes and in a modified measure
to former members of the “ immediate ” nobility of the Empire, the maintenance
of former family compacts, exemption for themselves and their families from
amenability to any but superior judicial tribunals and from military service,
and the exercise of criminal jurisdiction at certain definite stages. Their
demand of a curial (collective) share in the voting of the plenum, of the Diet was
reserved for decision by the Diet; so that the protest in which the “
Mediatised ” placed on record the maximum of their claims, had received
distinct encouragement. In the end, however, it proved futile.
Notwithstanding
the labours of the special Military Committee, no provision of a satisfactory
military frontier for Germany had been introduced into the Federal Act; and the
deficiency was only partially supplied in the Final. Though, in the latter,
Luxemburg was named as a federal fortress, no such mention was made of Mainz,
notwithstanding the pressure put upon Austria and Prussia first by some of the
minor German States, and then by Russia, no doubt instigated by Stein. Of the
other intended federal fortresses some had been presciently demolished by the
French; the reconstruction of Ehrenbreitstein was committed to Prussia. On
November 3, at Paris, the plenipotentiaries of the Four Allied Powers drew up a
final agreement, constituting Luxemburg, Landau, and Mainz federal
fortresses—the last-named to be garrisoned,
as hitherto,
by Austrian and Prussian troops conjointly, with an Austrian governor and a
Prussian commander.
If Austria,
in the negotiations concerning the Germanic Constitution, displayed a
persistent reluctance to assume Imperial responsibilities towards the nation at
large, this was not due to any waning of dynastic ambition in the House of
Habsburg. Indeed, at the Congress, the power of that House was raised to a
height which it had not reached since the age of the Counter-reformation.
Adhering to a policy which she had long pursued, Austria had declined to
reunite the former “Austrian Netherlands” with her dominions; and any lands
recovered or acquired by her on the left bank of the Rhine she merely meant to
utilise for later arrangements; but she made up for this self-denial in other
quarters. Throughout, she kept a firm hold on the portions of Upper Austria and
Salzburg, which Bavaria had consented to give up in addition to Tyrol and
Vorarlberg. The Final Act set the seal upon her recovery of all the losses to
which a succession of disastrous treaties had subjected her in Italy, and upon
the union of all her Italian dominions under the name of the Lombardo-Venetian
kingdom, proclaimed by her two months earlier. The Valtelline, with Chiavenna
and Bormio, which had been reunited with Italy by France, formed part of
Austria’s new Italian kingdom; she regained Trent, Aquileia, and Trieste.
Carinthia, Camiola, and Trieste (Istria), were likewise recovered, and
henceforth named the kingdom of Illyria. Dalmatia fell back to her, and,
enlarged by the territory of the former Republic of Ragusa, and by the
Montenegrin seaport of Cattaro, was henceforth also designated a kingdom.
Though the reckoning is not easily cast up, it has been estimated that Austria
issued from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with an increase in
population amounting to between four and five millions over that of the
Habsburg dominions in 1792; she had, moreover, by the large extension of her
Adriatic coast-line, become a maritime Power of considerable importance.
Austria might
perhaps have been inclined to retain a permanent hold of the Legations; these,
however, had been restored to the Holy See with the exception of certain
Ferrarese districts on the left bank of the Po, Austria also obtaining the
right of garrisoning the fortresses of Ferrara and Comacchio. The duchies of
Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla were definitively assigned to the “Empress”
Marie-Louise, but for her own life only; the succession to be determined by the
Five Powers and Spain in common, subject to the reversionary rights of the King
of Sardinia. The Final Act defined the enlarged , limits of the Sardinian
kingdom, and confirmed its possession of Genoa; to the north it made certain
cessions to the canton of Geneva; and the Sardinian provinces of Chablais and
Faucigny were admitted to a participation in the Swiss neutrality. The Act
confirmed Grand Duke (Archduke) Ferdinand in his possession of Tuscany, to
which the Stati degli
Presidi and part of Elba were added, the rights of Prince Ludovisi
Buoncampagni being however reserved both in that island and in the principality
of Piombino. Lucca was assigned as a duchy to the Infanta Marie-Louise (late
Queen of Etruria), with an increase of income payable by the Emperor of Austria
and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to whom the duchy was to revert in the event of
the demise of the Duchess and her son Don Carlos, or of their succession
elsewhere. Finally, King Ferdinand IV was recognised by the Powers as King of
the Two Sicilies.
The above,
together with the stipulations already noticed concerning the Helvetic
Constitution, make up the main provisions contained in the Final Act as to the
territorial limits of the several European States, and the internal institutions
of some of them. With the exception of a reference to the restoration of
Oliven^a as a desirable act of justice to Portugal, the Act was, for the best
of reasons, quite silent as to Spain; and it also contained nothing respecting
Scandinavian affairs proper. The Swedish plenipotentiary, Count Lowenhielm,
had, in the Committee of the Eight, played a more or less passive part,
reflecting both the disappointment of Bernadotte’s ulterior ambitions and his
desire to adhere to his bargain with Russia, to whose power in the Baltic that
of Sweden was now altogether inferior. The King of Denmark’s hopes of a
compensation for the cession of Norway had been grievously disappointed;
Denmark had to content herself with Lauenburg and the sum of two million dollars,
while another sum of three and a half million was paid by Prussia to Sweden.
These arrangements, made by treaty on June 4 and 7, found, however, no
expression in the Final Act; and indeed Denmark hung back from joining the
coalition against Napoleon on his return till some time after the dissolution
of the Congress (August, 1815). Denmark had to pay a severe penalty for her
ill-luck; and this may help to explain the fact, otherwise surprising, that no
protest was raised by the Powers against her retention of the very profitable
right of levying the Sound Dues on European commerce.
A vast number
of other claims were left unsatisfied in the final settlement adopted by the
Congress—from the persistent prayer of the Greeks for liberation from the
Turkish rule and the demand of the Papacy for the restoration of Avignon, down
to the grievances of the French militaiy recipients of Napoleonic dotations in
Germany and in Italy, where a special fund had been reserved at Milan for the
purpose.
If the
Congress lacked time for completing those territorial changes and adjustments
which formed its primary purpose, it necessarily failed to satisfy expectations
as to the settlement of ulterior questions of European interest. With regard to
river navigation, the Final Act recited certain bases of agreement settled by
the Committee appointed on the subject, providing for the nomination of another
Commission to be charged with elaborating these in the form of regulations.
Absolute freedom of navigation, in the case of rivers traversing several States
or
dividing them
from one another, was declared, on a uniform system, subject to special
regulations in each case; and moderate dues, not variable unless with the
consent of all the States concerned, were prescribed* The distinct advantage
hereby secured for continental commerce was of the highest importance at a
time when rivers still afforded the principal means for the transport of heavy
goods; and it was not unnaturally regretted that the Congress should not have
proceeded further, and essayed the more difficult task of facilitating on
similar lines the commercial intercourse between States on the coasts of the
internal seas of Europe, especially the Mediterranean and the Baltic.
The
Declaration of February 8,1815, concerning the African slave- trade, had
announced the intention of the Eight Powers to carry out its universal
abolition as promptly and efficaciously as possible by all the means at their
disposal But, as this Declaration left to each Power the choice of the date which
it might consider most suitable for carrying out the definitive abolition in
its own case, the universal accomplishment of the great reform remained a
matter of negotiation among the Powers. The document was printed among the
annexes to the Final Act, the text of which contained no reference to the
subject. An important step forward was taken when Napoleon, anxious to
conciliate British public opinion on his return from Elba, decreed the
immediate abolition of the slave-trade throughout the French Empire; and, Louis
XVIII having been prevailed upon by British diplomacy to follow the usurper’s
example, Talleyrand could on July 30 inform the representatives of the Allied
Powers that, so far as France was concerned, the slave-trade was for ever at an
end. The reproach deliberately cast upon Great Britain in one of the sittings
of the Slave-trade Committee (January 30) was afterwards repeated by Cardinal
Consalvi—that, while so ardent in her condemnation of the African slave-trade,
she had displayed culpable indifference as to the acts of violence committed
against the personal liberty of Christians by the Barbary pirates. The subject
had been brought and kept before the Congress by the exuberant energy of Sir
Sidney Smith; but, although Great Britain seemed more than ever called upon to
set it at rest since she had taken possession of Malta, whose knights had been
the appointed protectors of Mediterranean Christendom, it was only by the
Algiers expedition of 1816 that she effectually met this responsibility.
The last of
the annexes to the Final Act 6f the Congress was that which, as already
mentioned, classified the diplomatic agents of the several Powers. These
regulations expressly abstained from introducing any change as to the legates
and nuncii of the Pope, who as a matter of course were ranked in the first
class with ambassadors. But the official wrath of the Vatican at much that the
Congress had done, or neglected to do, was not thus to be appeased. On June 14
Consalvi addressed to the Signatory Powers of the Peace of Paris, with an
accompanying
note, a protest which once more adopted the attitude observed by the Papacy at
Munster and at Nymegen. But, in an allocution addressed not long afterwards to
the Secret Consistory, Pius VII adopted a more conciliatory tone; and in truth,
while his complaint as to the incomplete restoration of his temporal dominions
was inevitable, his lament over the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire was
little more than a rhetorical flourish. The really important facts for the
Church of Rome, though not of a nature to be dealt with either in protests or
in allocutions, were that, while the rule of Protestant princes had been newly
established over large bodies of Catholic subjects—notably so in Prussia and
the Netherlands—the greater part of Poland, whose ecclesiastical allegiance was
likewise due to Rome, had been permanently subjected to the dominion of Russia,
the representative Power of Eastern Christianity. For Rome and her agents new
methods of policy had once more become necessary; and a new period in the
history of the Western Church began.
With the
exception of the Papacy and Spain, all the Governments of Europe successively
sent in their adhesion to the Final Act and joined in the ratification which
involved a general, complete, and reciprocal guarantee of all its articles. The
large majority of the provisions contained in the Act and elaborated in its
annexes, in so far as they had not been already carried out before the close of
the Congress, were executed immediately afterwards. Thus the perpetual
neutrality of the Swiss Confederation and the inviolability of its territory
were solemnly recognised by the Four Allied Powers and by France at Paris on
November 20, 1815. After the conclusion of a series of conventions between the
several German Governments, and the promise, in one form or another, of
representative Constitutions to their respective subjects by all of them except
Austria, the Diet of the Germanic Confederation was opened on November 5, 1816.
When the Hundred
Days were over, and Paris was once more occupied by the Allies, it became
necessary to negotiate another peace with France. The protests of Louis XVIII,
who had adhered to the coalition against Napoleon, and had now returned to
Paris (July 8), were quite logical; but the Great Powers were unanimous in
concluding that a rupture had once more taken place between France and Europe,
and that the closing of it must be marked by a general pacification. To the
negotiations concerning this it was determined by the Four Powers on August 10
not to admit representatives of the other Governments till after the main
issues had been decided. In the previous conferences, held from the middle of
July onwards between the leading ministers of the Four Powers, a disagreement
had already manifested itself as to the securities to be taken against another
disturbance of the peace of Europe. On July 22 Hardenberg laid before the
Committee of the Four Powers the Prussian
proposals,
which included the strengthening of the Belgian frontier by the cession of a
series of French fortresses, and of the German by the cession of Alsace, whose
fortresses were to be garrisoned by Austria, and by the transfer to Prussia of
those on the Saar and Upper Moselle; while some of the strong places in the
Jura were to be included within the Swiss frontier, and Piedmont was to be
placed in possession of the whole of Savoy. It was well known that these views
were shared by several of the smaller German Governments, and enthusiastically
advocated by the Crown Princes of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg. During the
discussions which ensued, Mettemich appears to have argued that a territorial
cession might fairly be demanded from France, together with a permanent
guarantee consisting in the surrender of the outermost of her three lines of
fortresses; and Humboldt finally insisted on much the same minimum. Had Austria
and Prussia, before entering upon the new war, agreed upon the demands which
they would make on its termination, they might possibly have succeeded in
carrying their proposals; but it is open to doubt whether it would have suited
Metter- nich, as it assuredly would have been repugnant to Gentz, the confidant
of his policy at the Congress of Vienna, to make any radical alteration in its
conclusions. The problem was decided by the unwillingness of Great Britain
materially to modify, and of Russia to disturb at all, the arrangements of the
First Peace of Par s as elaborated at Vienna. Wellington, though unwilling to
impose important cessions upon France— a policy which Castlereagh upheld with
remarkable resolution—allowed that this First Peace had left her in a position
of relatively excessive strength; while Capodistrias argued that, since the war
had been undertaken to maintain the conditions then settled, no alteration of
them could be expected at its close.
The
controversy ended by a rearrangement which cannot be called a compromise. A new
line of demarcation was drawn in the north-east, separating from France the
whole of the duchy of Bouillon and a portion of the department of the Ardennes;
the fortresses of Saarlouis and Landau were transferred to Germany, and Fort
Joux to the Swiss Confederation, while the fortifications of Huningen were to
be rased. Part of the heavy pecuniary indemnity to be imposed on France was
meant to enable her neighbours to complete their defensive system against her.
This ultimatum having been communicated to the French ministry by the plenipotentiaries
of the Four Powers in the conference held on September 20, Talleyrand resisted
it with so much vehemence and bitterness, and with so inopportune a reference
to first principles, as to convey the impression that in his own opinion the
situation would best be saved by his making himself impossible. His speedy
resignation of his ministerial office, in which he was succeeded by the Duke of
Richelieu, facilitated the conclusion of peace. Thanks to the efforts of the
Tsar, easier terms were granted to France, so far as the pecuniary indemnity
was concerned.
On September
26, 1815, the Emperors of Russia and Austria and
the King of
Prussia signed the manifesto known as the Holy Alliance, which proclaimed that,
alike in the government of their own monarchies and in their political
relations with other States, their conduct would be absolutely regulated by the
principles of the Christian religion, and invited the adhesion to this
declaration of all the Christian sovereigns and Powers of Europe, including the
Most Christian King. This document, which had been reluctantly signed by the
Emperor Francis and King Frederick William without being communicated to their
Cabinets, though Mettemich had seen and disliked it and suggested certain
changes of wording, was not of a nature to be fitted into the peace
negotiations ; but the Tsar, the author of this “ diplomatic apocalypse,” was
unmistakably anxious that the Peace concluded under his predominant influence
should be accounted its first-fruits. Nor would it be difficult to show that,
though the Holy Alliance had no direct or formal connexion with the Second
Peace of Paris, the train of ideas which led Alexander to conceive the one
strongly influenced his policy with regard to the other, more especially as to
the treatment of France. Under the guidance of Richelieu, the friend of Madame de
Kriidener, France would, the Tsar hoped, support him in the execution of his
Eastern designs, counterbalancing Great Britain, as his faithful ally Prussia
would counterbalance Austria. Yet he did not resist the establishment of the
Protectorate of Great Britain over the “United States” of the seven Ionian
Islands, which was recognised by the Four Allied Powers on November 5, 1815,
though it implied the practical recognition of British naval supremacy in the
Mediterranean.
The treaties
known collectively as the Second Peace of Paris were concluded on November 20,
1815, the bases of these agreements, afterwards elaborated by Wessenberg,
Capodistrias, and Humboldt, and put into their final shape by La Besnardiere
and Gentz, having been settled some weeks previously by the representatives of
the Great Powers. These treaties provided that the frontiers of France should
be those of 1790, with the modifications already indicated, and a few others,
including the bipartition between France and Baden of the bridge between
Strassburg and Kehl: while certain further contractions of the French frontier,
both towards Switzerland and Savoy and towards the Netherlands, were successfully
opposed by Richelieu. No other changes of significance were made in the
permanent provisions of the First Peace of Paris and of the Vienna Final Act;
and it was stipulated that, in all cases where these provisions were not
expressly altered by the present treaty, they were to be regarded as confirmed
and maintained by it. The Second Peace of Paris made no attempt to supplement
the Final Act where (as in the case of the Bavarian compensation) the Vienna
settlement had remained incomplete. Mettemich was therefore very near the mark
in observing that the only difference between the First and the Second Peace of
Paris, apart from the transfer of a few frontier-places, and the provisions as
to the
war indemnity
payable by France and the occupation of her soil by the Allies, lay in the
wholly justifiable restitution of the artistic spoils brought to Paris by
Napoleon.
The
stimulations, intrinsically more important, as to the continued occupation of
French soil by the allied troops were devised with studied moderation. The
total of troops distributed among the northern and eastern fortresses of the kingdom
was not to exceed 150,000 men; and the duration of: their presence was not to
extend beyond five years. The indemnity payable by France was fixed at
700,000,000 francs, to be handed over within five years; and exchequer bonds to
the amount of 140,000,000 more were issued, to cover the debts due from France
to other countries, which in reality reached a much larger total.
On the same
day as that on which this Peace was signed (November 20) the Four Allied Powers
agreed to a joint guarantee for its maintenance, thus caxrying out the treaties
of alliance concluded at Vienna on March 25, 1815, and at Chaumont on March 1,
1814. In this convention, while maintaining the exclusion of Napoleon and his
family from the French throne, and renewing their mutual promise to unite if
necessary in common measures of war, they undertook to renew at stated
intervals meetings between the sovereigns and their plenipotentiaries on
subjects of common interest, and for the discussion of measures conducive to
the tranquillity and prosperity of their peoples, and to the preservation of
the peace of Europe. Thus, while the Holy Alliance was distinctly regarded by
the statesmanship of Europe as a declaration of principle leading to no dircct
results, the agreement between the Four Powers based upon the Treaty of
Chaumont meant not only the renewal of an offensive and defensive Quadruple
Alliance of the utmost moment, but also the actual beginning of the
congressional epoch of European politics. It was left to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle
(1818) to complete the system of the Five Powers acting in conference by the
admission of France into what it declared to be a union animated by the
fraternal principles of the Holy Alliance. Certain territorial questions left
open at Vienna were here set at rest; others (including those of the Bavarian
compensation and the garrisoning of Mainz) were settled by a Committee of
representatives of the Four Allied Powers at Frankfort (July, 1819).
The Congress
of Vienna was in its earlier days accused by critics, judging near at hand like
the Prince de Ligne, or at a distance like Goethe, of wasting time. But the
assembly which in June, 1815, hurriedly brought its labours to a conclusion was
not justly chargeable with slackness. Its task had been, not to make peace in
Europe—for, where this had not been accomplished before the meeting of the
Congress it had no commission to bring it about—bat to elaborate out of the
conditions laid down by the First Peace of Paris a political system which
should ensure to Europe an endurance of peaceful relations among her States.
Within the nine months during which the Congress remained
assembled, it
was called upon to repair the consequences of a quarter of a century of
upheaval. It was therefore incumbent upon the Congress, after safeguarding
Europe against a recurrence of the same peril from the same quarter by
strengthening the frontier against France from the Low Countries to Italy, to
redistribute the territories which had been directly or indirectly subject to French
rule. This had to be done with a regard to the security and balance of Europe
on the one hand, and on the other to just and reasonable claims of former
possession. The Congress accomplished its twofold task by reducing France
within limits virtually the same as those which had bounded her territory
before the Revolutionary Wars, including all her acquisitions under Louis XIV;
by constructing on her north-eastern boundary an important secondary State, the
Netherlands; by reconstructing Prussia as a Great Power, materially
strengthened on the Middle and Lower Rhine, and by the transfer to her of part
of Saxony ; by establishing in the centre of Europe the Germanic Confederation
as a permanent political organisation, and restoring, likewise under European
guarantee, the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons ; by reapportioning Poland
among the three Eastern Powers in such a way as to increase the Russian share;
and by enlarging the conservative Austrian Empire, while at the same time
balancing its control over northern Italy through the re-establishment of the
throne of Sardinia (with increased territorial power) and of the Bourbon throne
of the Two Sicilies.
Among the
criticisms to which these results were open, the most obvious was that of their
incompleteness, as measured not only by the expectations of the European
public, but also by the designs of those who took a prominent part in its
labours. The scheme cherished, according to Talleyrand, by himself,
Castlereagh, and others—that of establishing, in lieu of mere temporary
alliances, a permanent system of general and reciprocal guarantee and
international adjustment—was broken off by the return of Napoleon. There was
some question of deferring the conclusion of the Congress until it should have
been completed on these broader lines; and Talleyrand took credit for having
perceived the necessity of pressing on the Final Act without waiting for such a
consummation. The scheme, had it been carried out, must have amounted to the
substitution of a body representing all the European Governments for the
self-appointed Committee of the Four Powers which took action at Chaumont and
Paris, and into which France was not admitted till 1818.
There is,
however, no reason for concluding that the establishment of the former kind of
tribunal seriously entered into the conceptions of the leading statesmen of the
Congress. The adherence to the Final Act of all the European Governments, its
express confirmation by the Second Peace of Paris, and the assumption by the
Four Allied Powers of the task of watching over the peace of Europe on the
basis thus
agreed upon,
might fairly be regarded as together offering as complete a security as in the
existing condition of things could be obtained. At the same time, it cannot be
said that in its territorial arrangements the Congress consistently followed
either the principle of legitimacy or any other single principle; indeed, as
was more or less inevitable, it largely followed Napoleonic precedent. This
applies to the establishment of secondary States on the borders of States of
the first class (“ buffer-states ” in more recent phraseology), as in the
instances of the Netherlands and of Sardinia; and to the extinction, where
possible, of republican Governments (though, paradoxically, Neuchatel was
forced into the Swiss Confederation), as well as of aristocratic political
coiporations. Nor did the Congress, though it might shrink from ruthless
disregard of historic usage or tradition, show itself at bottom more readily
moved than Napoleon had really been by considerations of nationality. The great
historic wrong done to that principle by the partition of Poland was not undone
at Vienna. Austria was allowed to consolidate her sway over a large part of
Italy; Finland was left under the Russian dominion; Norway was severed from
Denmark, to which it was bound by ties of language as well as by other
associations. Historic antagonisms and antipathies were treated with as scant
regard as were differences of nationality; Catholic Belgium was united with
Protestant Holland; Genoa was subjected to her ancient foe the House of Savoy;
and Sicily which, when in reluctant union with Naples, had possessed a separate
Constitution, was now once more joined to her under a single despotic
Government. But on the whole, a business-like spirit predominated in the
territorial dispositions of the Congress; violent transfers of sovereign
authority were avoided so far as possible; and there was little of that
juggling with thrones and principalities which had been habitual with Napoleon.
There was, however, a good deal of favouritism in the distribution to the
advantage of petty potentates whom the great sovereigns, for reasons of state
or of family, desired to oblige; and little appreciation of the claims of
nationalities.
The Eastern
Question in its various branches—among which the future of Greece, of the
Danubian Principalities, and of Egypt had already become prominent—was, with
the common consent of the Great Powers, passed by. From want of foresight,
probably, rather than of courage, British statesmanship lost an admirable
opportunity of impressing upon the Porte the necessity of reforming its
internal administration, and adhering to treaty engagements with the European
Powers; and the indecision which had hitherto characterised Mettemich’s
Oriental policy likewise operated in favour of inaction. But this was not the
only important political question, sooner or later certain to become one of
burning interest, which the Congress left untouched. The future of Spanish
America likewise remained undiscussed, although British statesmen, and
Castlereagh in particular, were fully aware that the old regime,
which had
been restored in the Pyrenean peninsula, could not be revived in the Spanish
and Portuguese colonies; and although it was manifest that an independent
Spanish America would supply Great Britain, whose own colonial possessions had
been so largely augmented, with a market such as had never before been opened
to her in the New World. The repressive policy of the Spanish Government was
sure to hasten a crisis; as for Portugal, the incorporation with it of Brazil
into a single country had been announced, but the Prince Regent prudently
remained at Rio. None of the Great Powers besides Great Britain cared to meddle
with the Spanish American colonies, Russia wishing to play the part of trusted
counsellor at Madrid in Great Britain’s place, and France espousing the
interests of the Spanish Bourbons.
Of special
methods ensuring the peace and tranquillity of the European family of States,
or the good government on which the general peace so largely depended, the
Congress was not regardless; but it lacked the time and preparation for
profitable discussion. Kant's Project of a Perpetual Peace had been just nine
years before the world; but it had not yet won the deference which the
principles recited in it, rather than the accompanying proposals for their
application, deserved; and the London Peace Society was not founded till 1816.
The expedient agreed upon at Chaumont and reaffirmed on the conclusion of the
Second Peace of Paris had to suffice—namely that of periodical meetings of
representatives of the chief European Powers, to whose decisions the other
States were to be invited to accede. No proposal for instituting a permanent
tribunal of arbitration, or any similar authority for the settling of disputes
between the States of Europe, could at present be expected to find serious
support; the principles of the public Law of Nations, as interpreted by a
preponderance of learning, had in the last resort to be enforced by the joint
action of what Metternich called “ moral Pentarchy,” approved and supported by
the remaining Governments. When the Congress assembled, there were no doubt
many hopes that the dawn of a long if not perpetual era of peace might itself
be heralded by a general disarmament. The Congress gave no sign of the
willingness of the European Governments, or of the Great Powers in particular,
to entertain any such proposal. But a reduction of the military forces of the
individual Powers had been actually begun on a considerable scale when the
return of Napoleon put a stop to the process. It was something that a
beginning, however abortive, should have been made; and the negotiations for
the termination of the second occupation of France probably benefited by the
precedent. The conception of a permanent armed camp in each of the European
States was foreign to the generation which had undergone the experience of a
vast military tyranny.
The belief,
in the main sincere, that the good government of the several States of Europe,
and consequently its general peace, would
be greatly
assured by the grant of popular representative Constitutions, was encouraged by
many influences. Among these were the enthusiastic receptivity of the Emperor
Alexander for the liberal ideals presented to him by some of his chosen
associates, a widespread conviction of the excellence of the British
Constitution, and the extraordinary prestige that had accrued to the
constitutional form of government from the
©
stability of
the British State and its policy. Yet the process was repugnant to nearly all
phases of continental conservatism, and most of all to the dynasty and
statesmen of the Austrian Empire. Even Austria, however, made no objection to
Constitutions outside her own dominions; and, in more cases than one, the
statesmanship of the Congress, like that of Napoleon, was prepared to treat the
grant of Constitutions as much less hazardous than their growth. The Final Act
itself guaranteed the Germanic Constitution, which in one of its clauses
announced that representative Constitutions would be granted in each of the
States of the Confederation. It also declared the participation of the Belgic
Provinces of the Netherlands in the constitutional rights of the Dutch ; while
it protected the national institutions of the Poles who had become subjects of
the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Governments respectively, conferred a
Constitution on the republic of Cracow, and secured representative rights to Genoa
on its annexation to Sardinia. Elsewhere^ in Norway, in Spain, and in France
itself, the Great Powers were understood to approve the grants of Constitutions
which they and the Congress were not bound to guarantee.
That the
Congress of Vienna was chargeable with shortcomings, omissions, mistakes, and
failures; that some of its creations, like the union of Belgium and Holland,
proved of very brief endurance, while others, like the Germanic Confederation,
were more and more loudly decried; that the aspirations which its settlement
failed to satisfy found vent in conflicts, in conspiracies, in insurrections
from which no part of the period ending with the revolutionary outbreak of 1848
remained wholly free—all this is as true as it was inevitable. But to make the
Congress of Vienna the scapegoat of the troubles which marred the general peace
and prosperity of the next thirty years is to overlook several considerations.
In the first place, the task of the Congress was limited by the terms of its
commission, while it must in candour be allowed to have rendered substantial
services to the extension of intercourse between European States and to the
progress of human civilisation. Secondly, if the commission of the Congress was
restricted, so was its real power. Amid the clash of divergent interests,
compromise was the only alternative to coercion or war; and this was clearly
seen by the representatives of the Great Powers who virtually controlled the
situation. It was indeed no secret; Spain openly defied the Great Powers, of
whom she would have fain been accounted one, to deprive her of Oliven^a; Aargau
at one time declared that force alone
should
compel her to return to subjection under Bern. How near the Great Powers came
to an armed conflict among themselves has been seen from the brief account
given above of the Saxo-Polish difficulty. The results actually attained by the
Congress, or the Committee of the Great Powers which acted on its behalf, could
only have been accomplished by means of patient argument, resourceful
diplomacy, and a judicious display of flrmness. Thus, while much of its success
was due to the toil of the Humboldts and the Wessenbergs and of their
indefatigable subordinates, some of the credit should in equity also be given
to the magnanimous impulses of Alexander, the fairmindedness of the British
plenipotentiaries, and above all to the tact of Mettemich and his confidential
adviser Gentz. •
What the
Congress, within such limits and restrictions, actually did achieve, was not
only to restore a number of princes to the dominions formerly held by
themselves or their dynasties, and to revive the independent existence of a
number of States which had been subjected to an alien rule; to furnish fresh
securities for the reorganised political system of Europe by instituting a
federal union of the States of Germany, strengthening that of the cantons of
Switzerland, and opening a prospect of constitutional life for a number of
European peoples; to rescue a large and unfortunate section of humanity from
the indefinite endurance of a cruel and wicked abuse; and to add not a few
further provisions favourable to the principle of tolerance and to that of
freer and more frequent intercourse between the nations. The Congress did more
than this. It built up for Europe a territorial system, which had some doubtful
points and some unmistakable defects, and for which permanency could not be
hoped any more than for any other set of human devices. But the system itself
was neither accidental in its main principles, nor altogether transitory in its
main conditions. It re-established a real balance of power in Europe, if this
expression be understood to mean that every security was provided against the
violent disturbance of the peace of Europe by any one Power, or by any actually
existing or probable combination of Powers. An augmented Austrian Empire, a
stronger and more thoroughly German Prussia, and a Germanic Confederation whose
conditions showed in some respects an unmistakable advance on those of the old
Empire, furnished guarantees for the security of continental Europe against
Bussia as well as against Prance. The results achieved by the Congress may
fairly be described as a settlement which, though open to many criticisms, and
in many respects inadequate, on the whole fairly met both the commission that
it had received, and the demands that could reasonably be made upon its
efforts. The method which it exemplified in dealing with the affairs of Europe,
though likewise full of imperfections, yet deserved to be called the best and
most expeditious hitherto devised by her statesmen in the common interest of
her peace.
GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND (1792-1815).
The year 1792
forms the dividing line between the earlier and later periods of Pitt’s career.
That France was in convulsions and Europe in commotion seemed to Pitt no reason
why he should cease adding to the edifice of financial reform and commercial
prosperity at which he had toiled uninterruptedly for the last decade. In
introducing the Budget he found himself able to assist the Sinking Fund and to
diminish taxation; and, in the conviction that fifteen years of peace might be
reasonably expected, he reduced the vote for seamen, and allowed the subsidy
treaty with Hesse-Cassel to expire. That his composure was undisturbed was
further shown by his warm support of the Libel Bill. Erskine’s plea that the
jury had to determine the question of libel no less than the fact of
publication had been adopted by Kenyon in 1789; and in 1791 Fox proposed to make
this principle part of the law of the land. Considerable opposition was offered
by Thurlow; but in 1792 the measure again passed the House of Commons
unopposed, and was accepted by the Lords. Events in France had nevertheless
begun to modify the grouping of parties. Many who were ready enough to suggest
or support measures of political or religious emancipation in ordinary times
deemed it unwise, in Windham’s phrase, to repair their house in the hurricane
season; while in other quarters the Revolution was interpreted as a warning of
the perils that attended the delay of reform. Early in 1792 the more liberal
element in the Opposition formed the Society of the Friends of the People, from
which Fox, who cared little for parliamentary reform, stood aloof, though it
was joined by his chief lieutenants. Grey was deputed to introduce the question
of reform in the following year; but, when he gave notice of his intention,
Pitt rose to express his belief that such an attempt could not safely be made
at the present time. This declaration, uttered on the last day of April, 1792,
may be taken to mark the transition from the remedial to the repressive period
of Pitt’s ministerial career.
The ultimate
cause of this change was the Revolution in France;
but its
proximate cause was the rapid growth of Radical opinion at home. The
Corresponding Society, founded at the end of 1791, was enrolling large numbers
of artisans; and the immense circulation of Paine’s Rights of Man caused the
gravest apprehension. Pitt made himself the interpreter of the growing anxiety
by a royal proclamation on May 21, 1792, against “ divers wicked and seditious
writings.” The proclamation was supported by Windham and some less prominent
Whigs in the Lower House, and by the Prince of Wales, Portland, and Spencer in
the Upper; and so strong was the feeling of alarm that in neither House did its
opponents hazard a division. The debate on the proclamation revealed to the
world the differences of the Whigs. Lord Malmesbury, arriving in England at
this moment from service abroad, at once set to work to consolidate the
position of the section which disagreed with Fox; and the conferences that took
place almost daily throughout June and July are described with incomparable
vividness in the pages of his Diary. The moving spirits were Loughborough,
Fitzwilliam, Portland, Windham, and Gilbert Elliot; while Burke, who alone had
openly quarrelled with Fox, strove by tongue and pen to encourage the
dissentients. The situation developed when, on June 15, Thurlow was dismissed
by Pitt in consequence of repeated acts of ministerial insubordination. Dundas
called on Loughborough, and on behalf of Pitt offered the Chancellorship and
three seats in the Cabinet as the price of a coalition. Fox had no belief in
Pitt’s sincerity, and declared that the union must not be a mere accession of
members to the existing Ministry, but a fair and equal division of power and
patronage. Portland refused to join without Fox, and declared for a neutral
Premier such as the Duke of Leeds. Malmesbury and Loughborough, on the other
hand, felt that Pitt ought not to be asked to surrender the Treasury. The
publication of the memoranda of the Duke of Leeds has made it clear that Pitt
was not at this time really anxious for a coalition; and it soon became obvious
that the disintegration of the Whig party had not proceeded far enough to admit
of such a step.
The fall of
the French monarchy, the September massacres, and the offer of aid to insurgent
peoples increased the alarm of the country to fever point. Part of the militia
was called out by proclamation on December 1, though such a step was only legal
when insurrection could be alleged. Parliament met on December IS; and the
King’s Speech pointed to designs to subvert the Constitution and social order.
Fox replied that the duty of the Government was to redress grievances. His
proposal to acknowledge the French Republic led to the renewal of the
negotiations which had been broken off in the summer, though there was no
longer any thought of including him in the coalition. The dissentient Whigs
looked to Portland as their leader, because of his high rank, his wealth, and
his long political career. But Portland was among the least efficient
politicians of his age. He undertook to
repudiate
Fox; but, when Lansdowne and Lauderdale gave utterance to the opinions which he
abhorred, he remained silent. Malmesbury, who sat by him, urged him repeatedly
to speak. “He said he really could not; Loughborough had said all that could be
said. I pressed him to say these very words and nothing more, but without
effect.” This astonishing scene was afterwards attributed by Portland himself—a
man who had been Prime Minister—to “ want of habit in speaking in public.” Its
real explanation was that Fox’s influence was still powerful, and that Portland
was at the mercy of the last visitor at Burlington House. After a few more
meetings the task was abandoned as hopeless; and Loughborough accepted the
Chancellorship.
Fearing that
the advent of royalist refugees might, if Paris fell, be followed by an inroad
of Jacobin fugitives, Pitt introduced an Alien Bill (Jan. 1793) providing that
foreigners must state the object of their visit, register their names, and
procure passports. The Traitorous Correspondence Bill quickly followed (March),
extending the law of treason to the supply of arms or military and naval stores
to the enemy, and to the purchase of lands in France; and intercourse with
France was forbidden except by special license under the Great Seal. When Grey
brought forward the motion of which he had given notice in the previous
session, he presented a striking report on the abuses and anomalies of
parliamentary representation. , But, though he only begged for a commission,
not more than forty members supported him; and the Opposition remained
approximately at this strength till the resignation of Pitt. A year later, on
July 11, 1794, a coalition with the dissentient Whigs was formally announced.
Portland accepted the Home Office, Fitzwilliam became Lord President, Windham Secretary
for War, and Spencer Privy Seal, which office he quickly exchanged for the
Admiralty. A peerage was offered to Burke, but the death of his son led him to
refuse it; and the heartbroken old man retired from Parliament and public life
at the moment when the concentration of which he was the prime author was
accomplished. When the Speaker asked Pitt if he did not fear being outvoted in
his own Cabinet, he replied that he placed much dependence on his new
colleagues, and still more on himself. While Pitt’s dictatorship was in no way
impaired, the brilliant oratory of Windham, the admirable administrative work
of Spencer, and the great social influence of Portland immensely strengthened
the Ministry.
The position
of the Foxite Whigs was now a lonely one. All who aspired to a title or to
promotion in the Church or the Law found it wise to profess Tory opinions. The
country gentlemen were Tory almost to a man; and the moneyed classes had
rallied to Pitt long before the outbreak of the Revolution. The Liberalism
which advocated a moderate measure of parliamentary reform and opposed coercion
was involved in a common condemnation with the Radicalism which demanded
universal
1795]
Marriage of the Prince of Wales.—Treason Bill. 675
suffrage and
annual parliaments. Yet the little band, though powerless in the division lobby
and unregarded by the country, kept alive the spirit of freedom, and preserved
the nucleus of a party to which men could rally when the war and the panic
should be over.
In the spring
of 1795 the affairs of the Prince of Wales were once more forced on the
attention of the country. He was again deeply in debt, and had no choice but to
extract money from Parliament by a promise to marry. The Duke of York, while
campaigning, had met his cousin Caroline, the daughter of the Duke of
Brunswick, and spoke highly of her to his brother. The King approved the
suggestion, and despatched Malmesbury to the Court of Brunswick to ask her
hand. Malmesbury reported that the Princess was spoiled by a bad education and
bad examples, though with a good husband he believed she might turn out well.
When the Prince met his future wife, he was unable to conceal his distaste for
her. The mutual dislike of the royal couple was fostered by Lady Jersey, whom
the Prince, with singular bad-taste, appointed to be lady-in-waiting to his
wife; and, after the birth of a daughter in the following year, a formal
separation was effected.
By the autumn
of 1795 the burdens imposed by the war and the operations of the press-gang
began to be keenly felt. The enormous open-air meetings organised by the
Corresponding Society so alarmed Pitt that he remarked to Wilberforce that, if
he were to resign, his head would be off in six months. The King, on his way to
open Parliament, was greeted with cries of “Bread! No War ! No Famine ! ” and a
pebble, or a bullet from an air-gun, broke the glass of his carriage. Pitt
replied to the challenge by rendering illegal almost every form of agitation. A
Treason Bill was introduced, imposing penalties on attacks intending bodily
harm to the King; while to excite hatred of the King or the Constitution by
writing or speaking was made punishable on a second conviction by
transportation for seven years. A second measure, known as the Sedition Bill,
forbade meetings of more than fifty persons without notice to a magistrate, who
was ordered to apprehend the speakers if the Government or the Constitution
were brought into contempt. Every public meeting was to be advertised by a
paper signed by resident householders ; and a license was made necessary for
houses, rooms, and fields where money was taken to hear lectures or speeches.
Fox justly observed that this Parliament had taken more from the liberties and
added more to the burdens of the people than any of its predecessors.
The currency
question gave rise to much anxiety throughout the war. The rapid advance of
prosperity had led to the issue of notes far beyond the gold reserves ; and a
crisis began shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation was
rendered worse by the action of the Bank of England, which, in the expectation
of being required to supply a quantity of bullion for the expenses of the war,
restricted its note issues. Pitt knew the country to be solvent, and authorised
the
issue of
Exchequer Bills for five millions to merchants against securities or goods
(1793). The advances were quickly repaid, and the panic ceased. But the causes
which produced the shortage of bullion, among them the practice of advancing
cash to the Ministry in payment of Bills of Exchange, continued to operate.
When, in December, 1796, the French fleet reached Ireland, a panic ensued; and
deposits were withdrawn from country banks, which in turn withdrew their
deposits from the Bank of England. In February, 1797, the alarmed Directors
applied for advice to Pitt, who promptly issued an Order in Council forbidding
the Bank to pay in cash till Parliament could be consulted. The merchants of
London agreed to accept and to tender bank-notes; and the Bank Restriction Act
forbade the resumption of cash payments exceeding £1 until six months after the
conclusion of peace. Suspension was on the whole a wise policy. It aided the
raising of the great loans, and assisted commercial credit by enabling the Bank
to increase the circulation without regard to the demands of Government. The
Opposition foretold for the inconvertible paper the fate of assignats; but the
Directors of the Bank acted with caution, and the difference between the value
of gold and that of notes in the early years of suspension was slight.
If the
currency crisis and the Mutiny of the Nore rendered the year 1797 one of
unusual anxiety, the parliamentary difficulties of the Ministry were lightened
by the secession of the leading members of the Opposition. A Reform Bill was
introduced by Grey; but its supporters were aware that the measure had no
chance of passing, and announced that they would cease to take an active part
in Parliament. The secession of Fox was for some years almost complete. He had
lost the thirst for office, and was never so happy as at St Ann’s Hill,
surrounded by his flowers and his books. The writers of Greece, Italy, France,
and Spain were his daily companions, and his letters to Gilbert Wakefield and
to his adored nephew, Lord Holland, reveal his intense delight in literature.
Grey’s northern home was equally attractive, and his secession was scarcely
less complete. Erskine gladly seized the opportunity of retirement from an
arena where he added nothing to his fame. These withdrawals left the stage free
for the minor actors; and Tierney, whose financial ability rendered him a
formidable opponent of Pitt, became the working head of the Opposition. The
secession of the leaders was a tactical blunder, due chiefly to Grey, in which,
according to Lord Holland, Fox acquiesced rather from indolence than judgment.
The step was condemned by Lansdowne, Sheridan, and other influential Whigs; and
its effect was neutralised by its incompleteness.
After the
failure of Pitt’s negotiations with the Directory in 1797, the question of ways
and means became acute. He had so confidently expected a speedy pacification
that he met the expenses of the early years almost entirely with loans. It was
only slowly that he perceived that he had entered on a long struggle, demanding
not only loans but
heavy war
taxation. During his first ministry the National Debt was increased by
£334,000,000. Of this sum he only received about £200,000,000 in cash, as he
borrowed in a low stock. He has been sharply blamed for not raising his loans
in stock of a higher denomination; but he was most eager to do so, and his
failure was due to the absence of public competition. The burden was reduced
during the same period by more than £40,000,000 through the operation of the
Sinking Fund. Pitt’s scheme of war taxation has been less censured; and in it
his desire to spare the poor may be clearly traced. In 1796 he introduced a
graduated Legacy Duty, incorporating the proposal in two Bills, one relating to
personal, the other to real property. The former passed without difficulty; but
the latter incurred so much hostility that it was deferred, the anomaly
remaining till 1853. The Budget of 1797 tripled the assessed taxes, a few
abatements being made for the poorer classes. A suggestion by Addington that
wealthy men should be invited to make voluntary contributions was next adopted,
and brought in .£2,000,000 within the year. In the following year the triple
assessment and the voluntary subscriptions were superseded by the Income Tax.
Pitt estimated the taxable income of the country at £100,000,000, and proposed
a levy of 10 per cent. Incomes under £65 a year were to escape, and those under
£200 to pay at a graduated rate. Pitt reckoned the yield at about £7,500,000;
but the tax brought in scarcely more than £6,000,000. His other taxes are too
numerous to be mentioned here. They extended to every kind of food and drink,
to the necessaries not less than to the luxuries of daily life, to every item
of property and every operation of trade and business. But, despite the
suffering they involved, exports and imports steadily increased throughout the
war, while English shipping gained the place which it has never lost.
The penal
code received its coping-stone in 1799. The political societies were not quite
lifeless; and the Irish rebellion impelled Pitt to frame the Corresponding
Societies Bill. The Corresponding Society was suppressed by name; and all
associations were declared unlawful whose members were required to take an oath
not recognised by law, or which included members or committees not known to the
whole society. Unlicensed debating clubs and reading-rooms were to be regarded
as disorderly houses; printing-presses and type-foundries were to be
registered; and the printer’s name was to appear on every publication.
Thenceforth the democratic movement ceased for a number of years.
The passing
of the Union scarcely ruffled the surface of English politics; but Pitt had
more than one ground for uneasiness in the summer of 1800. When Napoleon became
First Consul, Pitt believed that another effort for peace should be made,
though wide differences of opinion existed within the Cabinet. He was even more
concerned at the economic condition of the country, declaring that the problem
of peace or war was not half so serious as that of the scarcity. There
678 Catholic Emancipation.—Pitt resigns. [isoo-i
was a third
question, the complications of which Pitt did not at the time fully realise. He
had always favoured far-reaching concessions to the Irish Catholics; and, though
he was dissuaded by Clare from incorporating these concessions in the Act of
Union, he was resolved that they should immediately follow it. Cornwallis had
been empowered to invite Catholic support for the Union; and it was with
confidence that Pitt summoned his colleagues to a Cabinet meeting. He informed
Loughborough, who was at Weymouth with the King, that he desired to discuss the
general state of the Catholics, tithes, and a provision for the Catholic and
dissenting clergy. 1 Loughborough showed the King Pitt’s letter, and
learned his strong objection to the proposals. At the meeting of the Cabinet on
Sept. 30,1800, when Pitt advocated the substitution of a political for a
sacramental test for office, and the commutation of tithes, Loughborough caused
general surprise by declaring that he was opposed to the admission of Catholics
to Parliament or office, though he approved the settlement of the tithe
question. Pitt had no choice but to adjourn the discussion. The plot now
matured rapidly. At the time of the Fitzwilliam episode, the King had asked the
opinion of Chief Justice Kenyon and the Attorney-General, Sir John Scott, as to
whether his assent to the admission of Catholics to Parliament would be
contrary to his Coronation Oath, and had received a reply in the negative. He
had then applied to Loughborough, who returned an ambiguous answer; and the
King’s own feelings were strengthened by a document drawn up by Lord Clare
asserting that the Coronation Oath was a bar to any such measure. The Archbishop
of Canterbury was now invited to write a strong letter to the King; and a
similar communication arrived from the Primate of Ireland.
Pitt was
entirely unaware of the conspiracy, but he knew that his proposal had opponents
besides the Chancellor. Portland, Westmoreland, Liverpool, and Chatham were
hostile; but Grenville, Dundas, Camden, Windham, and Spencer supported the
plan. Pitt made up his mind to go forward, and in January, 1801, wrote to
Castlereagh that he was firm. The King was equally determined, and on January
28 he remarked to Dundas at the levee, “What is it this young Lord
(Castlereagh) has brought over which they are going to throw at my head? The
most Jacobinical thing I ever heard of!” Next day he requested Addington to see
Pitt and “prevent him ever speaking on a subject on which he could scarcely
keep his temper.” Pitt wrote to the King, explaining the proposal and begging
leave to resign if he was not allowed to bring it forward. The King suggested
that neither should recur to the subject. Pitt answered that he could not
remain on those terms; and on February 5 his resignation was accepted. Thus the
King and his Minister parted without an interview.
It is easy to
understand the King’s indignation that a measure of such importance had been discussed
by his ministers for months without
i80i] The
Kings illness.—Addington Prime Minister. 679
any official
intimation to him; but the motive that led Pitt to withhold such intimation is
clear. If he had informed the King of his intention to discuss the Catholic
Question with his colleagues, the project might have been nipped in the bud by
a peremptory veto. On the other hand the waiting course incurred two very grave
dangers. There was nothing but Cabinet loyalty—in those days a broken reed—to
prevent his colleagues from informing the King of what was going on; and,
secondly, it was inevitable that the King should hotly resent being left
without information. Pitt afterwards expressed regret that he had not informed
the Eng at an earlier stage; but his original judgment is not necessarily
invalidated by one formed subsequently at a period of painful agitation. Both
courses were beset with difficulties. That which he pursued failed; but it is
not clear that the other would have succeeded.
On the
approach of the crisis, the King’s thoughts had at once turned to Addington;
and, when Pitt resigned, the Speaker was invited to form an administration.
Addington’s^ reply depended on the attitude of Pitt; but, having promised the
King his support, he could not decline his invitation. Addington used in later
life to declare that his resolution was taken when Pitt declared that
hesitation meant ruin. Though the most pressing matter was thus easily settled,
the excitement was too much for the King. After reading the Coronation Oath to
his family, he remarked, “If I violate it I am no longer sovereign of this
country, but it falls to the House of Savoy.” By the middle of February he was
thoroughly ill. No business could be transacted during the King’s madness. Pitt
had resigned, but was still in control. Addington had been appointed, but had
not received the seals of office. The anomalous situation was only saved from
danger by the affectionate relations between the actual and the prospective
Minister.
When the King
regained his senses, his thoughts still ran on the Catholic Question. He sent a
message to Pitt through the doctor, “Tell him I am now quite recovered; but
what has he not to answer for who is the cause of my having been ill at all ? ”
Pitt was so affected that he immediately replied that he would never again
bring forward the question during the King’s lifetime. This momentous communication
set all men asking why he had resigned; and Pitt himself had begun to doubt
whether he had acted rightly. On the evening of his Budget speech, February 16,
he had talked for three hours with his friend Rose, Secretary to the Treasury,
who relates that there were painful workings in his mind, and most of the time
tears in his eyes. The dangerous illness of the King agitated him still more;
and, when the reproachful message reached him, his resolution was taken. Some
of his intimate friends had already urged him to resume office, and their
efforts were now redoubled. Pitt favoured the idea, but refused to take the
first step. Dundas begged the Duke of York to urge the King to restore Pitt;
and, when the Duke, though sympathising with the project,
refused,
Portland offered to approach Addington. Pitt forbade the mission; but his
friends were determined, and urged Addington to retire. Addington replied that
they might speak to the King, but they ought first to ask the doctors if such
an interview was likely to be dangerous. At this point Pitt definitely declared
his intention of supporting Addington, and on March 14,1801, surrendered
office.
The sudden
resignation of Pitt gave rise to the belief that it was not exclusively due to
the Catholic difficulty. There was in truth no ground for the suspicion that
the chief or even a contributing cause of the resignation was a desire to escape
the responsibility of making peace. The fear lest it should necessitate a
reconstruction of his Cabinet might have influenced a weaker man; but Pitt’s
confidence in himself was boundless. The subject of the peace was never
mentioned in the long and confidential discussions held between Pitt and his
intimate friends during the crisis; and, when the charge was made, it was
indignantly and repeatedly repudiated by him. Nor is there any reference to it
in the letters of Lord Grenville to his brother. Secondly, Pitt was willing,
and indeed eager, to return to office a few days after his resignation, and was
only prevented from doing so by Addington’s refusal to withdraw. In the next
place, he aided Addington to negotiate the peace, discussed and approved every
article with him, and defended it in public and in private. Again, why should
it be supposed that the French would prove more accommodating in dealing with a
weak than with a strong Cabinet ? It is true that Malmesbury records a
conversation in which Dundas spoke strongly in favour of Pitt’s return, and
added that, if it were not feasible, the fact that the new Ministers would make
peace would only smooth the way for his recall. But this was obviously an
after-thought, not an efficient cause of what had taken place.
Peace having
been made (March, 1802), Pitt continued to give Addington a sincere and
disinterested support on the tacit understanding r,hat the latter
would not depart from his policy. The statements that Addington declared
himself to be merely a locum tenens for Pitt, and that Pitt gave his successor
a solemn pledge of support unredeemable by any lapse of time, rest on no
first-hand authority and are inherently improbable. The Minister’s second
pillar of support was the throne. He had long been a favourite at Court; and
the King once paid him what was intended to be a compliment by saying, “When I
converse with you I think aloud.” As Pitt had gone to the extreme of ministerial
independence, so Addington went to the extreme of ministerial subserviency. He
consulted his master’s wishes in every detail, and was rewarded by letters of
almost ecstatic satisfaction at his arrangements. Of all the Ministers who
served George III, Addington was the one most completely fashioned to the royal
mind. The King was perfectly contented, and at the first levee after the change
he drew Pitt and Addington aside and said, “ If we three do but keep together,
all will
I802] The
Peace.—Proposals for Pitt's return. 681
go well.”
Having such powerful allies, Addington could dispense with a strong Ministry.
The King had made use of Loughborough’s intrigues; but he had read his
character, and replaced him in the Chancellorship by Eldon. Chatham, Portland,
and Westmoreland remained in the Cabinet; Hawkesbury went to the Foreign
Office, Lord St Vincent to the Admiralty; and Perceval became
Solicitor-General. The first business of the new Ministry was the case of Home
Tooke, the veteran agitator, who had been returned for Old Sarum. Tooke
declared that he had thrown off all clerical functions and had undergone a
quarantine of thirty years; but Addington, who felt that the law was uncertain,
proposed and carried a measure definitely forbidding the clergy to enter
Parliament. The main business of the new Ministry, however, was the peace. The
signature of the preliminaries in October was the signal for a great outburst
of popular enthusiasm, but was received in higher circles with mixed feelings.
The King called it experimental but unavoidable. Fox applauded it as ending a
war which he had consistently opposed. Sheridan defined it as a peace of which
all men were glad and none were proud. The only pronounced opposition came from
the small section which followed Grenville, Spencer, and Windham.
Pitt's
support of the Prime Minister was disapproved by almost all his friends; and,
when he paid a visit to the Bishop of Lincoln shortly before Christmas, his old
tutor openly remonstrated with him. This interview was soon followed by a
definite cause of offence. When Tierney accused Pitt of holding back charges
which fell on his successor, Addington contented himself with a single sentence
in denial. Pitt was pained at his friend’s silence, but professed himself
satisfied with Addington’s explanations; and the Budget, repealing the Income Tax,
was framed with his full approval. The late Minister’s fame indeed had many
champions. Burdett moved for an enquiry into the conduct of the late
Government, “ in order that punishment should follow guilt.” This unprovoked
attack was met by an expression of the thanks of the House to Pitt “for his
great and important services to his country”—a tribute without parallel; and a
few days later Canning’s magnificent ode, “The Pilot that weathered the Storm,”
was recited at a crowded banquet to celebrate Pitt’s birthday. The speech from
the throne closing the session in June was approved by Pitt, who shortly
afterwards pressed Castlereagh to accept the offer of a seat in the Cabinet.
These
pleasant relations were, however, soon disturbed by the renewed importunity of
Pitt’s friends. After a sharp attack of illness in September, 1802, Pitt was
ordered to Bath. Malmesbury reported that he had spoken during the summer to
many leading men, who recognised the necessity of Pitt’s resumption of power.
Canning, ever the most forward of the band, formed a plan for an address to
Addington, urging him to replace the government in the hands of Pitt; and at
his wish Malmesbury saw the Duke of York, who suggested that Addington
should be
approached through a friend or colleague. A memorandum was accordingly drawn up
and presented to Eldon. At the same time Canning pursued his plan of collecting
signatures for an address to Addington; but, on hearing what was on foot, Pitt
immediately forbade it. The agitation had not been wholly fruitless, for Pitt
undertook to give the Government no further advice.
When
Parliament met at the end of November, 1802, the return of Pitt was for the
first time openly demanded. Grenville declared that he was the only possible
helmsman; and Canning contended that, as France was made powerful by Napoleon,
there was need of “ one commanding spirit ” to cope with him. On leaving Bath,
Pitt went to spend Christmas with Rose. They studied the Budget together, and
found a grave miscalculation. On December 30 Pitt wrote to Addington, who had
asked him for an interview, that he feared there were many points to which he
could not help looking forward with regret and anxiety. When the two men met in
January, 1803, Addington hinted in an embarrassed manner at Pitt’s return; Pitt
merely replied that he would consider the matter. Addington then discussed with
Dundas, whom he had lately created Lord Melville, the plan of a coalition.
Addington and Pitt were to be Secretaries of State under the nominal headship
of Lord Chatham, and Melville was to replace St Vincent at the Admiralty.
Melville entered warmly into the project j and set off for Walmer. Pitt replied
that he would only come forward as the undisputed head of the Administration.
Addington was pained and surprised, but said that he hoped Pitt would not
insist on Grenville and his friends receiving places. Pitt replied that he
could not bind himself, and proposed an arrangement by which Addington should
become Speaker of the House of Lords. Addington, after consulting his
colleagues, refused. Pitt replied that the negotiation was “ finally and
absolutely closed”; and the letters of the old friends became stiff and formal.
The renewal
of war in May, 1803, impelled Pitt to return to Westminster, where he at once
delivered one of his greatest speeches, supporting the war but ignoring the
Ministers. The militia were reembodied; and a reserve army of 50,000 men,
raised by ballot for four years, was voted. The Military Service Bill provided
for the enrolment of Volunteers; and before the end of the summer 300,000
responded to the call. Pitt entered with enthusiasm into the movement, and, as
Warden of the Cinque Ports, raised 3000 Volunteers. But the issue of arms was
slow; and no adequate response was made to local offers of help. The storm that
had threatened during the session broke out after its close. A paper war began
with a pamphlet written from materials provided by Bragge, brother-in-law of
the Prime Minister, though without the knowledge of the latter. Pitt was deeply
indignant, and supplied the facts for a reply. Other pamphlets followed, and
both parties steadily grew more embittered. In January, 1804, Pitt refused
an invitation
of Grenville to join the regular OppoF’~.ion; but he vigorously attacked naval
mismanagement. By the end of March he had made up his mind to suggest to the
King the formation of a broad Administration. When the Government majority fell
to 21, Addington wrote to ask Pitt for his views. On Pitt’s reply that he would
only communicate them to the King or someone selected by him, Addington asked
permission to authorise Eldon to meet him. On April 25, after an attack by Pitt
on the whole system of defence, Addington determined to resign; and Eldon
informed Pitt that the King would be glad to have a written plan of a new
Administration. Addington’s1 greatness had been thrust upon him; and
he had played his part as well as anyone had a right to expect. But everyone
except the Minister himself recognised the truth of Canning’s merciless epigram,
“ Pitt is to Addington as London to Paddington.” He was vain and mediocre; but
his conduct is free from any personal imputation.
Pitt’s reply
to the King’s invitation was to frame a Ministry drawn from all parties except
the immediate followers of Addington. A sharp letter expressed the royal
indignation at the inclusion of the names of Fox and Grenville. Pitt again
explained the need for a national Ministry, and begged for an audience. The
King agreed to accept Grenville and any friends of Fox, but not Fox himself.
Fox magnanimously urged Grenville to accept office, adding that he was too old
to care about it; but his friends refused to enter the Ministry without him.
Pitt made no complaint of the conduct of the Foxites; but he was deeply hurt at
the refusal of his cousin, who in the previous year had urged upon him the
formation of a cabinet in which Fox would have no post. He has been severely
blamed for acquiescing in the exclusion of Fox; but he was apprehensive of
another outbreak of madness. Thus nearly all Addington’s colleagues remained.
Pitt rapidly regained his usual buoyancy of spirits; but his health inspired
grave apprehensions among his friends. He had never been really strong since
1797; and, though the Bath waters and his open-air life at Walmer had done him
good, he had lost his former elasticity. The King was polite, but not cordial.
Pitt stood alone, and the burden proved too heavy for him.
His first
task was to strengthen the national defences. At no time dining the war was it
an easy task to obtain soldiers; for the privates were subject to savage
punishments; and their comfort and well-being were shamefully neglected. To
procure a more regular supply, Pitt introduced his Additional Force Bill. Each
parish was assessed at so many men, the fines for deficiency being used for the
recruiting fund. As the Bill introduced an element of compulsion, it was
violently attacked and narrowly escaped defeat. The debates revealed Pitt’s
weakness; and in the autumn .Add igton was invited to enter the Cabinet. When
the two men met, they at once yielded to the force of old memories. “I am sure
you are glad to learn Addington and I are
684 Fall
of Melville.—Pitt's last speech. [1804-5
at one
again,” said Pitt to Wilberforce. “ And then he added, with a sweetness of
manner I shall never forget, ‘ I think they are a little hard on us in finding
fault with our making it up again, when we have been friends from our childhood
and our fathers were so before us.’ ” Addington accepted a peerage as Lord
Sidmouth, and became President of the Council. Sidmouth’s accession
strengthened the Ministry in voting power alone; and he proved a troublesome
colleague.
In the
session of 1805 an event occurred which darkened the close of Pitt’s life.
Though Dundas, now Lord Melville, had undertaken the ill-conceived mission to
Walmer, Pitt retained something of his old affection for him and had sent him
to the Admiralty. Among St Vincent’s measures, when at the Admiralty, had been
the appointment of a Commission of Naval Enquiry. The first nine reports were
technical; but the tenth related to Melville’s conduct as Treasurer of the Navy
in Pitt’s previous Ministry. Wilberforce was with Pitt when the report was
brought to him, and could never forget how eagerly he looked into the leaves
without waiting to cut them open. The report showed that Trotter, who had been
made Paymaster by Melville, had paid national money in to his own account; and
that a large sum, which Melville declared to have been used for secret service,
was not accounted for. Pitt was only dissuaded from defending his friend at all
costs by a threat of resignation from Sidmouth. When Whitbread’s resolutions
were introduced, Wilberforce supported the censure and won over the
independent members. The voting resulted in a tie, on which the Speaker gave
his casting vote against Melville. Pitt put on the little cocked hat that he
was in the habit of wearing when dressed for the evening, and jammed it deeply
over his forehead to conceal the tears trickling down his cheeks. The same day
Melville resigned his office, which was given to an admiral. Sidmouth had urged
the appointment of one of the Ministers, with a view to creating a post for an
adherent of his own. He now resigned, but Pitt could not afford to lose him;
and it was arranged that, in regard to Melville’s case, Sidmouth’s friends
should vote as they pleased. Hiley Addington, however, and other followers of
Sidmouth joined so hotly in the attack that Pitt declared they had rendered
themselves ineligible for office. Sidmouth once more resigned, and his
resignation was this time accepted. But the loss was so serious that Pitt again
implored the King to allow him to strengthen the Ministry. On the King’s
refusal, he determined to introduce Canning into the Cabinet.
Pitt once
more stood alone, and he knew that his strength was ebbing. When on November
9—a fortnight after Trafalgar—the Lord Mayor gave the toast of “ the saviour of
Europe,” Pitt rose and said, “ Europe is not to be saved by any single man.
England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, I trust, save Europe by
her example.” It was his last speech. A month later he went to Bath to prepare
himself for the session; but the news of Austerlitz (December 2) drove the gout
to the
vital parts,
and he left for Putney a dying man. He had paid little attention to religions
observances, but he derived comfort from reflecting on the innocency of his
life. On January 22, 1806, he died.
Pitt’s
instincts were for finance, for the peaceful development of national resources,
for pushing forward the frontiers of political and religious liberty; but the
period of his life surveyed in this chapter was one of almost unbroken failure.
That he accomplished little which he regarded as necessary was due partly to
the character of the King, partly to the French Revolution, but partly also to
himself. No Minister has possessed greater self-confidence ; but Pitt lacked
persistence in domestic affairs. He deliberately put aside parliamentary reform
; but he permitted his colleagues and supporters to maintain the slave-trade,
and he allowed his wise intention of combining Catholic relief with the Union
to be overridden. Of his foreign policy this is not the place to speak. His
repressive measures were the offspring of panic, and created more danger than
they averted. As a financier he stands beside Walpole, Peel, and Gladstone. As
a leader of the House of Commons he has perhaps been equalled by Peel alone. As
an orator he excelled in polished and lofty declamation, though rarely rising to
impassioned eloquence and lacking variety. Inferior to his father in dramatic
power, to Fox in warmth and passion, to Sheridan and Canning in sparkling
brilliance, he rivalled them all in logical statement and purity of diction.
His private character was singularly attractive. Reserved and unbending in
public, in congenial society he was sunny, buoyant, and companionable. He was
loved like a father by his niece, Hester Stanhope, to whom he gave a home; and
the passionate devotion of Canning is unique in the history of political
friendships.
On Pitt’s
death the Ministry resigned; and the King sent for Grenville. On his saying
that he should first consult Fox, the King, who saw that there was no
alternative, replied, “ I thought so, and I meant it so.” Fox became Foreign
Secretary, Spencer and Windham Secretaries for the Home Department and for War
respectively; Grey went to the Admiralty; Lord Henry Petty commenced his long
official career as Chancellor of the Exchequer; Erskine became Lord Chancellor,
and Romilly Solicitor-General, Fitzwilliam, Moira, and Sir Gilbert Elliot
received subordinate places. Sheridan, whose habitual excess in drinking
prevented his inclusion in the Cabinet, was made Treasurer of the Navy.
Sidmouth became Privy Seal, and insisted on the admission of a friend. Lord
Ellenborough, the Chief Justice, was accordingly admitted to the Cabinet,
criticism being met by reference to the precedent of Mansfield, and by the
theory (followed under Lord North) that each member of the Cabinet is responsible
only for his own department.
The new
Ministry first directed their attention to the slave-trade. Fox had always felt
strongly on the subject, and, after slight opposition, he pledged the House to
take measures for its prohibition. In the
Lords the
resistance was so slight that he determined on a Bill to forbid the traffic in
slaves after January 1, 1808, declaring that, if he had done nothing else in
his forty years of public service, he would be content. The Bill was brought in
by Grey and carried in the following year (March, 1807); but Fox did not live
to see his measure become law.. His health was bad when he entered office; and
its fatigues told heavily on him. Dropsy appeared, and he died after a short
illness in September, 1806. The King had yielded to the spell of his winning
personality, and remarked that he had never thought he should live to regret Mr
Fox. He had been debarred from office in his earlier years partly by his own
errors, and in later years by the French Bevolution. He lives as the greatest
of debaters, the undaunted champion of liberty in an age of reaction, the most
lovable of English statesmen.
On the
formation of the Ministry, the Catholic Question had not been mentioned by the
King or Grenville; but it was thought possible to remove one glaring anomaly.
The Irish law of 1793 had opened to Catholics all posts in the army up to and
including the rank of colonel; but, though the Union made the armies one,
officers in Irish regiments could not hold rank when their regiments came to
England. The King consented to the removal of this injustice, while declaring
he would go no further. At this point the question was raised whether the
existing restrictions as to rank were to remain in English regiments. The
Cabinet decided that they should be removed; and Grey believed himself to have
obtained the royal approval. But Portland wrote offering to form a Ministry;
and on the day after the second reading the King informed the Cabinet that he
could not accept the Bill. Ministers acquiesced, but drew up a Cabinet minute
reserving the right of offering whatever advice relating to Ireland they might
regard as necessary. The King replied by demanding a written declaration that
they would never again recommend concessions to the Catholics. The demand was
refused; and the “ Ministry of All the Talents ” was dismissed. Its lack of
homogeneity is vividly portrayed in Lord Holland’s memoirs; but its fall was
due to two tactical errors. It was courting disaster to extend the Catholic
measure without gaining the King’s express consent ; and the Cabinet minute
could serve no useful purpose. Grenville was a man of high character and
ability, of wide culture, and great experience; but he was lacking in tact, and
his fall was unregretted.
After a
year’s exclusion, the Tories returned to office (March, 1807), nominally under
the Duke of Portland, really under Perceval, and entered on a spell of power
which lasted twenty-three years. Throughout this period there were two schools
of Tory thought. The one, led by Canning, drew its inspiration from Pitt,
championed the Catholic claims, and was willing to consider any change except
parliamentary reform; the other, which exerted the dominant influence, was
represented if not founded by Eldon, whose philosophy was summarised by Sydney
Smith
in Noodle's
Oration, and disappeared with the Reform Bill. The prolonged exclusion of the
Whigs was due to a variety of causes. In the first place, they suffered from
the lack of a leader. Their titular chief, Lord Grenville, preferred the
gardens and library of Dropmore to the anxieties of Westminster. Nor was there
any one in the Commons to whom they could look for guidance. When, in 1807,
Grey went to the Upper House, George Ponsonby, who had played a leading part in
Ireland, was chosen as leader, merely because he divided the party the least.
Whitbread was distrusted by the pure Whigs. Brougham entered Parliament in
1810, and at once became the most formidable opponent of the Government; but
his character inspired no confidence. The second main cause of the impotence of
the Opposition was that it was sharply divided into two sections; one, led by
Grenville and Grey, representing the great families; the other, following
Whitbread and Burdett, speaking for the middle and commercial classes, and
pledged to a more advanced programme. The latter fought hotly against abuses
and privilege, disapproved of the war, and led the onslaught on the Duke of
York; and, when the Regent deserted his old associates, they retaliated by
championing the cause of the Princess of Wales. Scarcely less detrimental to
the party were the personal jealousies which divided the leaders. The
publication of the Creevey Papers has gone far to explain why so many able men
formed so feeble an Opposition.
While the
Whigs were almost powerless in Parliament, their ideas steadily gained ground
beyond its walls. In Holland House the men who cherished the memory of Fox
found a rallying-point. But the most powerful factor in the revival of liberal
ideas was the Edinburgh Review. During the long reign of reaction, Scotland had
lain prostrate at the feet of Dundas. Freedom of thought survived in the
Universities alone; and it was among the Edinburgh students that the flag of
rebellion was raised. The idea of a Review occurred to Sydney Smith during a
residence in the northern capital, and was discussed by him with a number of
young Whigs who met in the rooms of Francis Jeffrey in the spring of 1802.
Smith was just over thirty; Jeffrey, who edited the Review till 1829, was a few
months younger; Homer, the economist of the group, was twenty-four; and
Brougham only twenty-three. The first number appeared in the autumn of 1802;
and its effect was described by Lord Cockbum as electrical. Scott and other
Tories contributed articles on non-political topics; but an article written on
the Spanish War by Jeffrey in 1808 disgusted this section of its supporters.
The idea of a rival organ had been suggested by John Murray to Canning in 1807
and was discussed by him with Scott in 1808. On the publication of the Spanish
article in the Edinburgh, the plan was carried into execution by Canning,
George Ellis, Southey, Frere, and other Tories, an editor being found in
Gifford and a publisher in Murray; and the first number of the Quarterly Review
appeared in 1809.
Bagehot has
aptly characterised the first thirty years of the last century as a species of
duel between the Edinburgh Review and Lord Eldon. But, in the assault on an
effete Toryism, the Whig champions received valuable aid from two groups of men
whose opinions by no means coincided with their own. Bentham had come to
believe that the legal and other reforms which he advocated were only to be
accomplished by an altogether different kind of Legislature; and in 1809 he
wrote a Catechism of Parliamentary Reform demanding annual parliaments, the
ballot, and universal suffrage. Though the influence of the Benthamites was
confined to a comparatively small circle, their ability and their far- reaching
proposals made them formidable opponents of the reigning philosophy. The second
group consisted chiefly of the survivors of the Radical movement which Pitt had
for a time suppressed. Though it was represented in Parliament by Burdett and
Cochrane, its main work was carried on outside by Major Cartwright, Place,
Henry Hunt, and other democrats. But its real leader was Cobbett, whose
Political Register obtained an influence over the lower middle classes
rivalling that of the Edinburgh Review in more cultivated circles.
On the fall
of Grenville, Pitt’s old followers returned to office. Portland was from the
first a shadow in his own Cabinet, which was dominated by Perceval and Canning.
The former had made his mark under Addington and Pitt as a powerful debater and
a man of great parliamentary capacity. In private life he was genial and
affectionate; but he was ignorant and acrimonious, and shared Eldon’s belief
that every change was a step towards revolution. Canning possessed the
qualities which Perceval lacked; he had wit, fancy, scholarship, genius; but he
declared that his political allegiance was buried in the grave of Pitt; and he
was never trusted by the orthodox Tories. The chief episode in the domestic
history of the Portland Cabinet was a royal scandal. The Duke of York was the
King’s favourite son, and warmly returned his father’s affection. In January,
1809, a colonel of militia, named Wardle, informed the House that commissions
in the army were being sold by Mrs Clarke, the Duke’s mistress, and avowed his
belief that the Com* mander-in-Chief shared the money. When the evidence had
been taken, the Duke wrote to the Speaker regretting his connexion with Mrs
Clarke, but maintaining his ignorance of her practices. A motion was carried
declaring him ignorant of the traffic; but, before an address to the Crown for
his dismissal could be moved, the Duke resigned. Parliament refused to decree
his permanent exclusion from office; and he returned to his post in 1811.
The inorganic
character of the Cabinet was soon illustrated by the Walcheren expedition
(1809), which was arranged by Castlereagh. Canning, as Foreign Minister,
declared that he could not share in the responsibility, and would resign if
Castlereagh remained in the Cabinet. When the preparations became generally
known, he repeated his demand.
1808-iq]
Portland resigns.-Finance-Sir Francis Burdett. 689
The King
implored him not to resign; and Portland told him the change would be made. On
the failure of the expedition, Canning at once left the Cabinet. Castlereagh,
whose position had been unJermined by charges of corruption, and had till now
known nothing of the agitation for his removal, also resigned. When Portland
wisely followed their example, Wellesley was summoned from Spain to fill the
post of Canning; Liverpool succeeded Castlereagh at the War Office; and
Perceval became Premier.
The condition
of the currency again claimed attention. Towards the close of 1808 the price of
gold had risen to more than 15 per cent, above the Mint price; and the rates of
exchange with Hamburg and Paris fell heavily. Ricardo called attention to the
matter in a masterly pamphlet; but the Bank denied depreciation, declaring that
gold had risen in value owing to the subsidies, the needs of the armies, and
the disposition to hoard. A committee appointed at the instance of Horner
reported that there had been an over-issue of notes, and urged that the Bank
should resume cash payments within two years. But, when Homer and Huskisson
asked for legislation, the House voted that bank-notes were equivalent to gold,
though ,£100 of paper were only worth £86. 10tf. 6d., and declared the refusal
to accept notes at their face value a misdemeanour. The paper currency
therefore remained; and cash payments were not resumed until 1819.
A large share
of public attention in 1810 was claimed by the contest between Sir Francis
Burdett and the House of Commons. The exclusion of strangers from the House in
the Walcheren enquiry was chosen as the topic of discussion in a debating
society; and placards announcing the debate and denouncing the proposal were
placed on the walls. Thereupon the House declared the chairman of the society
guilty of a breach of the privileges of Parliament, and ordered him to Newgate.
The sentence was challenged by Burdett, who had been absent owing to illness.
Finding only twelve supporters, he published a “ Letter to his constituents
denying the right of the House of Commons to imprison the people of England.”
The House declared the letter a scandalous libel, and committed its author to
the Tower. Burdett replied by barricading his house in Piccadilly, in front of
which a huge mob assembled. When the house was forced, Burdett was discovered
explaining Magna 'Jarta to his little son, and was removed to the Tower. The
affair ended with the prorogation of Parliament; but the vast crowds gathered
to celebrate Burdett’s release were grievously disappointed on learning that
their hero had returned home by water; and Burdett’s reputation as a champion
of the people never entirely recovered the fiasco.
The old
King’s Jubilee (October, 1810) had scarcely been celebrated when the clouds
finally gathered round him. The exposure of the Duke of York, the failure of
the Walcheren expedition, and the fatal illness of his fondly-loved daughter
Amelia combined to overthrow his sanity; and
690 The Regency.-Perceval's death.-Liverpool
Premier, [isio-4
Perceval
carried resolutions in December establishing a Regency for a year on the model
of that of 1788. The Prince chafed at the limitations, and asked Grenville and
Grey to suggest a reply to the forthcoming address (Januaiy, 1811) requesting
him to assume the Regency. The Prince sharply criticised their suggestions, and
summoned Sheridan, the only Whig with whom he had remained intimate, to draw up
another reply. The Whig Lords were indignant; and the breach rapidly widened.
The doctors foretold the King’s speedy restoration; and the Queen asserted that
his recovery would be jeopardised if he found new Ministers in office. Yielding
to the pressure, the Prince announced that he should make no change; but at the
end of the year he determined to strengthen the Government. Grenville and Grey
replied with the inadmissible stipulation that they should be allowed to grant
Catholic emancipation to Ireland. At this moment Wellesley resigned in disgust
at the lack of support for the Peninsular War, and was succeeded by
Castlereagh; and Sidmouth before long re-entered the Cabinet. Perceval had
hardly time to congratulate himself on his retention of office when he was
assassinated by a lunatic. Negotiations were at once resumed. Wellesley and
Canning refused to serve with Castlereagh, and failed to arrange terms with
Grenville and Grey. The Whig Lords then attempted to form a Ministry, but
alienated Moira, the friend and counsellor of the Prince, by claiming entire
control of the Household appointments. In face of these difficulties, the
Regent retained the Ministry and appointed Liverpool Prime Minister. He had had
long official experience and possessed considerable tact; but he was chosen
merely because he seemed least likely to divide the party; and the real head of
the Cabinet was Castlereagh, who led the House of Commons. The Catholic
Question was expressly left open ; but, though Peter Plymley’s Letters had set
the country thinking, they had made but few converts at Westminster.
The Regent
disliked business, and intervened little in purely political affairs; but his
unpopularity was great, and he was denounced as a libertine by Leigh Hunt and
lashed in Moore’s stinging lampoons. His elevation to the Regency brought into
greater prominence the quarrel with his wife. When the King became insane she
lost her only protector ; and her intercourse with her daughter was still more
narrowly restricted. The Regent was not kinder to his daughter than to his
wife; and when, in 1814, the Princess Charlotte broke off her engagement to the
Prince of Orange, her household was dismissed, and she became a virtual
prisoner in a lodge in Windsor Forest. The royal visits of 1814 made the
exclusion of the Princess of Wales still more painful; and in the autumn she
went abroad. Her daughter was soon to find escape in a marriage of brief
happiness.
The economic
condition of thb working-dasses throughout the great war gave rise to the most
anxious reflections. There was an almost unbroken succession of bad harvests
from 1789 till the Peace of Amiens.
1795-1802]
Poor relief.—Enclosures.—Factory
Act. 691
The attack on
the King in 1795 made Pitt aware of the urgency of the problem, and led him to
appoint a committee of enquiry. The report did not satisfy Whitbread, who
proposed to revive the old practice of settling wages at Quarter Sessions. Pitt
opposed the demand, but undertook to introduce a comprehensive measure. His
Bill advocated Schools of Industry for the destitute poor—the materials to be
bought, the products to be sold, and the wages to be fixed by the local
authorities. Land was to be bought or hired; and commons might be enclosed.
Persons having more than two children were entitled to relief; and money for
the purchase of a cow or some other animal might be advanced in deserving
cases. The Bill was so sharply criticised in Parliament and subjected to so
ruthless an analysis by Bentham that it was withdrawn. But the measures
actually adopted were no less crude. In 1795 the Berkshire Justices met at
Speenhamland, and granted allowances from the rates according to the price of
com to supplement wages. Though this step was taken only in order to meet a
local and temporary crisis, the allowance system was widely adopted. It largely
contributed to reckless marriages, the raising of the rates, and the fall of
wages. A second potent cause of suffering was the rapid increase of enclosures.
Bakewell had improved the breeding of stock; but there was a great want of
cereals. The problem of the food-supply became urgent with the expansion of
population and the interruption of foreign trade. To develop the food-supply of
England was the life-work of Arthur Young, and the object of the Agricultural
Board of which he was the chief founder. A General Enclosure Act was passed in
1801; and over five million acres were added to the cultivated area of England
and Wales during the war. But, though the change was economically profitable,
it brought with it considerable hardships. The small farmers disappeared;
pasture-rights were lost; and the labourer became entirely dependent on his
wage. Village industries were gradually extinguished by the industrial
revolution; and the high price of com benefited the landlord and the farmer
rather than the labourer.
The
sufferings of the towns were still graver. The new conditions created by the
industrial revolution, the rapid growth of population, heavy taxation, the
closing of foreign markets, currency difficulties, fluctuations of trade, and
the decreased purchasing power of the community, led to wide-spread distress.
In the belief that sedition might lurk behind labour meetings, and in
consequence of the rapid growth of unions among the textile workers of
Yorkshire and Lancashire, a severe Combination Act was passed in 1799. Though
the law equally prohibited combinations of employers, its infringement on that
side went unpunished; and it was used to stifle the interests of labour in
every possible way. In only one direction did the Legislature recognise the
duty of protecting labour. The first Factory Act was passed in 1802 at the
instance of the elder Sir Robert Peel, for the protection of ch. xxii. 44—2
692
Generaldistress.-Luddites.-Education.-Debtors. [1798-1813
apprentices
in cotton and other factories. But no adequate machinery was provided for its
enforcement; and the Act is only important as the first step in the modem
system of industrial regulation. If improvements were made, they were due to
humane employers such as Robert Owen at New Lanark. The working-classes
clamoured for protection against employers; but opinion in Parliament ran
strongly in the contrary direction, and no alleviating measures were
introduced.
Distress
reached its climax in 1811-2, when the harvest failed all over Europe. The
sufferings of the workers in certain trades were intensified by the
introduction of machinery. In 1811 the hosiers of Nottingham were enabled to
discharge a large number of workmen. An attack on the factories followed; and
new machinery was destroyed before it reached the town. The frame-breakers were
called Luddites, after an imbecile who had formerly broken some
stocking-frames. A law was hurried through Parliament, rendering the
destruction of machinery a capital offence; but the movement spread rapidly
through the Midlands. The most glorious period of British arms abroad was the
time of the greatest misery at home.
The only way
in which effective aid was rendered to the people during the reaction was in
regard to education. In 1798 a young Quaker named Lancaster began to teach a
few poor boys in a shed in south London. He soon had so many pupils that he
adopted a system which had been applied by Dr Bell in Madras, by which children
were set to teach one another. He formed a plan for covering England with
schools; and in 1810 his friends and supporters, including James Mill,
Brougham, Place, Rogers, and several Nonconformists, created the Royal
Lancastrian Association, which in 1813 became the British and Foreign School
Society. The movement, which was unsectarian, grew so rapidly that in 1811 a
number of Churchmen, under the leadership of Joshua Watson, formed the National
Society for the education of the poor in the principles of the Established
Church. By these rival organisations elementary education in England was
carried on till the introduction of a national system in 1870.
In one other
direction there was progress to be recorded. The criminal law was condemned by
nearly all English opinion. Compassionate juries acquitted prisoners; and
extreme sentences were rarely carried out. But Eldon and Ellenborough saw
nothing to change; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Romilly secured a
reduction in the number of capital offences. Of greater importance was the
abolition of imprisonment for debt. The noble efforts of the Thatched House
Society had succeeded in buying out thousands of victims; but it was not till
the evils were fully exposed in a report drawn up by Grey that action was
determined on. The distinction between poverty and crime was at last recognised
by the Act of 1813, which discharged debtors on rendering a true account of
their debts and property, and
1789-91] Ireland. Religious grievances.
693
placed them
under the jurisdiction of a Court. It was in the same year that Elizabeth Fry
resolved to continue Howard’s work, and paid her first visit to Newgate.
We turn now
to the affairs of Ireland, with which, for the sake of clearness, it has been
thought better to deal separately. The Regency question had thrown Irish
politics into confusion; but, with the recovery of the King in February, 1789,
the Administration regained its power. Fitzgibbon, the Attorney-General, who
had borne the brunt of the struggle, received a peerage, and shortly after
succeeded to the Chancellorship. Pitt hoped that the termination of the
dispute and the withdrawal of Buckingham would lead to quieter times; but,
within a few days of the Viceroy’s departure, the Whig Club was founded to
maintain the principles enunciated in the Regency debates. Among its members
were Charlemont, the Duke of Leinster, Grattan, Parsons, and George and William
Ponsonby. Though not a few were individually in favour of parliamentary reform
and Catholic emancipation, the club in its corporate capacity was a defensive
rather than aggressive organisation, demanding nothing more revolutionary than
Place and Pension Bills and the reduction of sinecures. The crying needs of
Ireland found no place in its programme; and it was to those needs that the
more advanced members called attention when, in January, 1790, the new Viceroy,
Lord Westmoreland, arrived, and Parliament assembled.
The interest
in political discussion that had been kindled by the Regency debates was
further stimulated by the events that were taking place in France. Religious
disabilities and the tithe system—the two most acutely-felt grievances under
which Irish Catholics laboured—were mitigated by the first breath of the
Revolution; and the revolt of a people against misgovemment was viewed by the
Presbyterians with the same approval that they had extended to the uprising of
the American colonies. The Volunteers were urged to refill their ranks; and
resolutions were passed eulogising the measures of the French reformers. When
Parliament met in January, 1791, everyone was conscious that opinion was
changing; but motions for enquiry were defeated, and a short session terminated
without additions to the statute-book. The obvious futility of direct
parliamentary attack set earnest reformers searching for other modes of
influencing the Government. The Volunteer movement had been purely and even
militantly Protestant; but the steady decline of religious bigotry among the
educated classes, reflected in men so eminent as the Bishop of Derry, Hely
Hutchinson, and Kirwan, facilitated cooperation. In July the Belfast
celebration of the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille was signalised by
the demand for emancipation as well as reform. The acknowledgment by some
Catholic bodies of a resolution in favour of the abolition of religious
disabilities marks the first overt step towards the union of Presbyterians and
Catholics.
The idea of
cooperation that was stirring in many minds was set forth with consummate force
in an anonymous pamphlet which appeared in September, Its author, who called
himself a Northern Whig, was Wolfe Tone, a young Protestant lawyer already
known to a wide circle of friends as a man of advanced views and unusual
ability. The reforming Whigs desired to extend and purify the existing
Constitution; Tone boldly brushed aside the whole system of 1782. Three-fourths
of the people were without political rights. The paralysing influence of
English dictation could only be removed by the efforts of a united nation ;
for, so long as the sects were at war, the Administration could defy them both.
The pamphlet circulated by thousands; and within a month the Society of United
Irishmen was founded in Belfast to carry its ideas into practice.
Communications were opened with the Catholic Committee; and a branch was
speedily formed in the capital. Members of the United Irish Societies pledged
themselves to nothing more than Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform;
but the ultimate programme of some at least of the leaders indicated a
standpoint that was new in Irish politics. In a letter written in the summer of
1791 Tone declared his opinion that separation from England would be the
regeneration of Ireland; and the attitude of the Society as a whole towards
England was from the beginning one of indifference verging on disaffection. In
the second place, the United Irishmen frankly rejected the Whig philosophy.
While Grattan declared an Upper Chamber indispensable and believed that a
democratic franchise would lead to an attack on property, Tone pleaded for
equal electoral districts, manhood suffrage, and annual parliaments. Finally,
while Grattan was resolutely opposed to the use of force, Tone was prepared to
employ whatever means were necessary to nationalise the government of Ireland.
While the
Presbyterians and the advanced Protestant reformers were championing Catholic
claims for their own purposes, the Catholics themselves were awakening from
their slumbers. The Catholic Committee carried so little weight that in 1790
they could not induce any member of Parliament to present a petition. But the
partial removal of restrictions had led to the growth of a prosperous middle
class ; and in John Keogh, a wealthy Dublin tradesman, the advocates of a more
active policy found a leader. Frightened by schemes for political union with
the Dissenters, the conservative or country section, led by Lords Kenmare and
Fingal, seceded. The control of the Committee passed into the hands of Keogh;
and addresses from most of the towns approved the policy of the first plebeian
leader of Irish Catholicism. In October, 1791, the Committee issued a
strongly-worded demand for the abolition of the penal code, invited Richard
Burke to be their agent, and determined to send a deputation to England.
Pitt and his
principal colleagues were without the slightest taint of religious bigotry, and
were convinced that the Catholics might be made
1791-3]
Catholic Relief Bill.—Growing disaffection. 695
one of the
most effective bulwarks against, the onrush of the revolutionary flood—a
conviction set forth with matchless power by Burke in his Letter to Sir
Hercules Lamgrishe. Before the deputation reached London, the Cabinet had
occupied itself with the matter; and in December, 1791, Westmoreland was
informed that far-reaching concession was considered indispensable. The Viceroy
replied angrily that his advisers were unanimously opposed to such a departure,
since the connexion of England with Ireland rested on the unimpaired
maintenance of the Protestant ascendancy. Pitt consented to postpone his larger
schemes, but informed the Viceroy that they were not abandoned. The introduction
of a modest Relief Bill in the session of 1792 gave rise to little direct
opposition. The measure opened to Catholics the lower branches of the legal
profession, repealed the laws limiting the number of apprentices and relating
to marriage with Protestants, and removed the obsolete prohibition against
educating their children abroad.
The Viceroy
informed the Cabinet that the Catholics were grateful and satisfied, and that
the country was tranquil; but the events that occurred during the recess
pointed to a less sanguine conclusion. The Volunteers of Belfast sent an
address to the French nation on the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. In
Dublin, a military association, modelled on the National Guards, adopted as
their emblem the harp without a crown, surmounted by the cap of liberty. This
overt manifestation of republicanism was followed by the spread of French
fashions; and Charlemont lamented that the Volunteers had long ceased to ask
his advice. The Catholic Committee replaced Richard Burke by Tone, who at once
issued invitations to every priest to elect delegates to a Catholic Convention.
In December, 1792, the Dublin United Irishmen invited the Volunteers to resume
their arms and resolved that a deputation should be sent to the forthcoming
Convention. So threatening was the outlook that Grattan formed a society called
the Friends of the Constitution, with the dual purpose of working for reforms
which the Whig clubs would not officially recommend, and resisting republican
tendencies. There was however at present little real disaffection among the
Catholics outside Dublin. The prelates, the priests, the gentry, and the
peasantry were almost untouched; and, when the Catholic Convention met in
December, even the Viceroy admitted the loyalty and moderation of its conduct.
A petition to the King for the removal of Catholic disabilities was drawn up;
and Keogh and four of his colleagues were deputed to present it. Pitt and
Dundas at this point informed the Viceroy that the concessions which they had
postponed must now be granted. The deputation were graciously received at
Court; and in the King’s Speech at the opening of the Irish Parliament in
January, 1793, the condition of “ His Majesty’s Catholic subjects,” no longer
“Papists,” was commended to the attention of members. .
The Executive
was the mouthpiece of the English Cabinet; and the
Chief
Secretary introduced and carried a Relief Bill which the Irish Government had
in the previous year assured Pitt would have no chance of passing. It gave the
franchise to Catholics on exactly the same terms as to Protestants, swept away
the remaining disabilities relating to property, admitted them to grand juries,
allowed them to become magistrates, threw open to them degrees in Dublin
University, permitted them, subject to a property qualification, to carry arms,
and rendered them eligible to receive commissions in the army and navy, and to
hold, with a few exceptions, any civil office. Grattan vehemently urged the
Government to complete their work by admitting Catholics to Parliament,
pointing out that to give power to the peasantry and withhold political
influence from the gentry was to risk detaching the people from their natural
leaders, whose loyalty was above suspicion; but Pitt had no mind to renew his
struggle with the Irish Executive. Even without this addition, the Catholics
gained a position superior to that occupied by them or by Protestant
Nonconformists in England. It has been estimated that the number of electors
in Ireland was tripled; and Catholic voters obtained a clear majority of votes
in the rural constituencies outside Ulster and in many of the open towns. On
the other hand, the private borough system was unaffected; and the Protestant
ascendancy remained impregnably entrenched behind the nomination members, who
formed a majority of the House of Commons.
During the
same session the Government accepted a Place Bill, excluding revenue officers
and holders of offices created after the passing of the Bill from fitting in
Parliament, and made re-election necessary in the case of members accepting
places of profit already in existence. The English Libel Act was adopted; an
Appropriation Bill on the English model became law; and the East India trade
was thrown open to Ireland. The Volunteers were suppressed in March; and a
Convention Act was passed to check the practice which had grown up of summoning
large assemblies independent of Parliament; for, thbugh the Catholic Convention
had dissolved itself on the passage of the Relief Bill, the United Irishmen
were planning a similar gathering. The longest, most eventful, and most
profitable session since 1782 closed in August, 1793.
Outside
Parliament, however, the horizon was overcast. Grattan’s Support of the war
completed the breach between the Whigs and the radical reformers. The annual
Synod of Ulster Presbyterians expressed its approval of the Relief Bill and its
dislike of the war. Equally threatening was the attitude of the Catholic
peasantry in certain districts. The quarrels of the Peep-of-Day Boys and the
Defenders had originated about 1785 in Armagh, where the poorer Presbyterians
wrecked the houses and chapels of Catholics. In 1791-2 the disturbances became
so general that early in 1793 a Committee of the House of Lords was appointed
to investigate the matter. The report showed that the Defenders had become a
secret organisation, whose Chief object was
1794] Parliamentary
reform.—Fitzwilliam Viceroy. 697
the abolition
of tithes; and that through this channel many of the Catholic peasantry were
passing into the ranks of disaffection.
The chief
feature of the session of 1794 was a Reform Bill, introduced by George Ponsonby
and supported by Grattan. Each county, and the cities of Dublin and Cork, were
to have a third member; and large tracts of the surrounding country were to be
thrown into the small borough constituencies, the franchise being extended to
ten pound freeholders. But the measure aroused little interest, and was
rejected by a majority of three to one. Parliament was prorogued in March; and
the attention of the Government was at once called to the United Irishmen. An
Anglican clergyman of low character, named Jackson, who had long resided in
Paris, was sent by the French Government to discover what support the English
democrats were likely to render in case of an invasion. Finding ho
encouragement in England, Jackson crossed to Dublin, taking with him an
acquaintance who secretly reported his doings to the Government. At Jackson’s
request, Tone drew up a paper on the state of Ireland; but the document which
was destined for Paris found its way to the Castle. Jackson was imprisoned; and
the United Irishmen were in Consternation. Tone was allowed to go into exile in
the United States, but was compelled to leave behind him an account of his
relations with Jackson, which would serve to convict him of treason if he
returned. The Dublin Society of United Irish was broken up, and its papers were
seized.
The junction
of the dissentient Whigs with Pitt in 1794 ushered in one of the most important
episodes in Irish history. The Whigs understood that Portland, the Home
Secretary, was to have the chief direction of Irish affairs; and the
viceroyalty was offered to and accepted by Fitzwilliam, on the understanding
that the appointment should not take effect till Westmoreland received some
other post. Fitzwilliam at once began to make arrangements for taking office,
and told Grattan that he looked to him and the Ponsonbys for counsel and
support. The appointment, and the change of policy that it appeared to
foreshadow, soon became known in Ireland. Pitt and Grenville, on learning from
their Irish friends that there was open talk of a change in men and measures,
were deeply annoyed; and, when Portland urged that Fitzwilliam’s appointment
should take effect, the relations between Pitt and his Whig colleagues became
seriously strained. Pitt repeated that nothing could be done till a place had
been found for Westmoreland, and that the removal of Fitzgibbon, which was demanded
by Grattan, was not to be entertained. It would be best, he wrote in a
memorandum, that Fitzwilliam should not go to Ireland; but, in any case, his
appointment must be on the understanding that all idea of a change of system
should be given up, and that no supporters of the Government should be
displaced.
After some
weeks of severe strain, Fitzwilliam was formally appointed.
The powers of
the new Viceroy were not defined in writing; but, shortly before his departure,
Pitt and Grenville met Portland, Spencer, Windham, and Fitzwilliam. No notes of
the meeting were made at the time; but in March, 1795, after the quarrel had
taken place, a memorandum was drawn up, probably by Grenville, and approved by
the other Ministers present with the exception of Fitzwilliam. According to
this, the new Viceroy said that he desired to admit the Ponsonbys to places in
the Government, and that he intended to reduce the Revenue Board, Pitt acceded
to the former request; but, with respect to the latter, Fitzwilliam was to consult
him before any step was taken. Beresford’s name, according to the memorandum,
was not mentioned. As regards emancipation, which was only briefly discussed,
it was arranged that Fitzwilliam should endeavour to prevent its agitation;
but, if it were strongly pressed, he was not to oppose it, though he was not to
commit the Government without further instructions. It is thus clear that
Fitzwilliam left England bound by definite though unwritten instructions.
The Viceroy
landed in Dublin on January 4, 1795, and two days later dismissed several
members of the Administration with pensions. The most notable, John Beresford,
though holding the subordinate office of Commissioner of the Revenue, possessed
enormous borough influence, and occupied a position second only to that rf
Fitzgibbon, being often spoken of as the King of Ireland. Fitzwilliam
afterwards stated that he had distinctly told Pitt that he might find it
necessary to remove Beresford, and that the Premier had acquiesced by his
silence. Pitt replied that he had no recollection of such an incident. In any
case, a man of such importance should not have been removed without
communicating with the Home Government; and Pitt was justified in declaring the
step to be an open breach of a solemn engagement.
The Viceroy’s
attention had also been claimed by the Catholic Question from the moment of his
arrival. Four days after landing, he informed Portland that it would be
exceedingly impolitic and even dangerous not to grant cheerfully what the
Catholics demanded, and that nothing could prevent the matter being brought
before Parliament. On January 15 he wrote that he was endeavouring not to
commit the Government, but that, if he received no orders to the contrary, he
should acquiesce in the demand for the admission of Catholics to Parliament.
The session of 1795 opened on January 22; and Fitzwilliam informed Portland of
the unanimity of the Catholics and the readiness of the Protestants. No mention
of concessions was made in the King's Speech; but the Viceroy acquiesced in
Grattan’s giving notice of an emancipating measure. Despite the pressing
communications of Fitzwilliam, Portland made no reference to the matter till
February 9, when he urged the Viceroy not to commit himself. On the following
day Pitt wrote censuring the removal of Beresford, but without mentioning the
Catholic Question. Fitzwilliam replied that Pitt must choose between him and
1795] Recall
of FitzwMiam. Its causes and effect. 699
Beresford;
and to Portland he wrote that he would not risk a rebellion by deferring the
measure. These letters crossed two from Portland, opposing the whole policy of
emancipation. Without waiting for a reply, Portland wrote on February 18 in
peremptory terms that Grattan’s measure must go no further; and on February 19
the Cabinet agreed to Fitzwilliam’s recall.
In the
letters to Lord Carlisle, in which Fitzwilliam defended his conduct, he
asserted that the cause of his removal was not the Catholic Question but the
dismissal of Beresford and the intrigues of Beresford’s friends in England. In
this opinion Grattan, Burke, and other friends of the Viceroy concurred.
Westmoreland and Buckingham were indignant at the reversal of their policy;
and Auckland, who was primed by Beresford, led Pitt to believe that the whole patronage
of the Irish Government was passing into the hands of the Ponsonbys. That
Fitzwilliam’s dismissals were a contravention of the understanding on which his
appointment rested is beyond doubt. On the other hand, the Home Government were
not less to blame for their conduct in regard to the Catholic Question than was
Fitzwilliam in respect of the dismissals. The silence of Pitt may be explained
by the assumption that Portland did not show him the Irish despatches; but
Portland’s reticence was utterly inexcusable. The most probable explanation
seems to be that the Home Secretary, to whom all decisions were odious, had not
made up his mind and allowed matters to drift. Meanwhile the King learned
Fitzgibbon’s view that the admission of Catholics to Parliament would involve a
violation of his Coronation Oath, and drew up a memorandum, dated February 6,
vetoing emancipation. The Cabinet met next day, apparently for the first time
since Fitzwilliam’s arrival in Dublin, and determined to censure and disavow the
Viceroy. Portland received his cue, and wrote the letters to which reference
has been made. Fitzwilliam was a warm-hearted and generous man, who saw clearly
that the system of Irish government was a thoroughly vicious one; and that, if
a policy of conciliation and reform was to be undertaken, it could not be
carried out by men who were opposed to it. It would therefore have been best if
he had refused to undertake the viceroyalty on the conditions imposed by Pitt;
but, having accepted the terms, he ought to have observed them. The fact that
his Whig friends and colleagues, Portland, Spencer, and Windham, approved his
recall is conclusive evidence that he broke the agreement. It is possible,
however, to blame Fitzwilliam’s conduct, and yet to believe that his policy was
sound. Pitt was in favour of admitting Catholics to Parliament; but the strong
protests that reached him from Ireland determined him to defer emancipation
till a Union had been accomplished. His conduct is intelligible; but his
vacillation is more responsible for the tragic occurrences of the succeeding
years than is the generous rashness of Fitzwilliam.
The news of
Fitzwilliam’s recall was received at Dublin Castle with
delight and
elsewhere with consternation. It was taken as a definite rejection of the
Catholic claims; and large numbers of men henceforward despaired of achieving
reform by peaceable means. The United Irish Society was already to a large
extent a treasonable body; and the recall of Fitzwilliam gave an impetus to
violent counsels and attracted many recruits. Fitzwilliam’s recall was not the
cause of the rebellion of 1798; but it intensified the bitterness and despair
which were the principal factors in that event. The new Viceroy, Camden, son of
the great judge, reached Ireland at the end of March, 1795. The promotion of
Fitzgibbon to the earldom of Clare and the establishment of Maynooth College
for the education of priests revealed the dual tendency of his policy. But
Camden was a colourless personality; and Irish politics quiekly relapsed into
their chronic condition of confliqt and repression. The Defenders became
increasingly aggressive; and in September a sharp conflict occurred at the
village of the Diamond in Armagh. Though the Catholics had the larger force,
and were on this occasion the aggressors, they were defeated with considerable
loss. The following day the first Orange Society was founded. For a time the
new organisation was nothing more than a league of defence, almost confined to
the Protestant peasantry of Ulster. But the Peep-of-Day Boys rapidly became
merged in the Orangemen, and a terrible persecution followed. Houses and
chapels were burned or wrecked; and hundreds of Ulster Catholics fled destitute
into Connaught. The revival of fierce sectarian passions struck right athwart
the scheme of the United Irishmen. Though it furthered their plans in so far as
it frightened multitudes of the Catholic peasantry into their ranks, it put an
end to their dream of a rebellion in which the two religions would fight side by
side.
The session
of 1796 was short and uneventful save for the passage of the Insurrection Act,
inflicting crushing penalties on the taking of a seditious oath, authorising
the search for arms, and empowering Justices to send men to the fleet without
trial. The United Irishmen replied by forming a military organisation and
ordering their members to procure arms. Arthur O’Connor, an able man of high
birth, Thomas Emmet, a lawyer, and William James MacNeven, a physician, and a
cultivated Catholic, joined the Society in the autumn; and the control of its
policy passed into their hands. In December a French fleet sailed into Bantry
Bay; but Munster was far from Dublin, and its loyalty had not been affected. In
March, 1797, General Lake, by order of the Viceroy, issued a proclamation which
came near to a declaration of martial law in Ulster; and the search for arms
led to horrible outrages by the yeomanry. A final attempt at conciliation was
made by Grattan, who proposed a far-reaching Reform Bill, admitting Catholics
to Parliament and the great offices of state, and introducing household
franchise; but only thirty members supported him. Inside and outside the House
his influence was gone. Together with George Ponsonby, Curran, and a
few others,
he retired from Parliament. He disapproved both the conduct of the United
Irishmen and that of the Government, and refused to encourage the one by
attacking the other.
Sir Ralph
Abercromby arrived in Ireland as Commander-in-Chief in December, 1797. Strongly
disapproving the system of pure repression, he issued a General Order rebuking
the licence of the troops, and forbidding them to act, unless attacked, without
the orders of a civil magistrate. The proclamation was a direct censure of the
Government; and Abercromby was compelled to resign. Vain attempts to impose a
check on military violence were made, by Parsons, Bushe, and Plunket, the last
of whom was at this time brought into Parliament by Charlemont. The United
Irish movement was weakened by the confiscation of arms, and by its want of
skill, discipline, and unity. But the Executive believed that they had half a
million members, and could count on 280,000 men to appear in the field. The
insurrection, however, was deprived of much of its danger by the hetrayal of its
leaders. Arthur O’Connor was seized at Margate on his way to France on February
28, 1798. The Leinster Committee were secured in Bond’s house in Dublin on
March 12; and Emmet and MacNeven were captured in other parts of the city. On
March 30 martial law and free quarters were proclaimed; and the following weeks
witnessed scenes of ferocity and horror. The revolt was to be headed by Lord
Edward Fitzgerald, who had served in the American War and had been expelled
from the army for attending a dinner given in Paris in 1792 to celebrate French
victories. He had subsequently thrown himself frankly into the revolutionary
movement, his noble birth and winning nature rendering him a formidable popular
leader. Clare was anxious that he should leave the country, but he refused to
go; and on May 19 he was betrayed and seized after a desperate resistance, in
which he received wounds of which he died. Two days later Henry and John
Sheares, who had assumed the direction after the arrest of the Leinster
Committee, were captured.
The rebels
were as sheep without a shepherd; but, since there were not more than 15,000
British troops in the island, they were not without hope. The mails on the
roads round Dublin were stopped on the night of May 23; and next day the
peasants gathered in arms in the counties of Kildare, Dublin, and Meath, the
revolt spreading rapidly into Carlow and Queen’s County. The rising in the
north was speedily quelled; but it flamed out in the south of Leinster, where
it was not expected. In Wexford the rebels found leaders in Father Murphy,
Father Roche, and Holt. After some successful skirmishes, Murphy entered
Wexford with a force of 16,000 men, which rapidly swelled to 50,000. The rebels
elected a Protestant, Bagenal Harvey, to command “ the Army of the People,” and
with Wexford as a base began to march north. But reinforcements were reaching
the Government; and Lake took the rebel
encampment on
Vinegar Hill, and entered Wexford. The rebellion failed because there was no
real harmony of aim between the Protestant and Catholic malcontents. The
Protestants realised that, if it succeeded, they would become an inconsiderable
minority in a Catholic and independent Ireland; and the excesses of the rebels
gave the rising the character of a religious war. Thus the greater part of
Ulster stood aloof. Connaught and Munster remained tranquil; and the priests,
with some notable exceptions, took no share in the rebellion.
On the
outbreak of the revolt, Cornwallis was induced to accept the viceroyalty,
combined with military control. When he landed on June 20, the rebellion was
almost over, but passion was running high. His letters lament the ferocity of
the troops; and he describes the conversation at his table as turning on
hanging, shooting, and burning. He stood out boldly for clemency, and succeeded
in some degree in stemming the tide of vengeance. A few of the rebels were
executed and a few transported; but the majority were allowed to return to
their homes. The Sheares were defended by Curran, but were hanged on July 14.
Thomas Emmet, Arthur O’Connor, and MacNeven consented to give information as to
the movement, on condition of being allowed to go into exile. Scarcely was the
insurrection over when Humbert, with a French force, landed in Killala; but he
soon surrendered to overwhelming forces. A larger French expedition started in
October, which also failed. Tone, who had accompanied it, was taken prisoner
and condemned by court-martial, but committed suicide in prison. Till the
founder of the United Irishmen, the ablest foe of the English connexion, was
dead, the danger could not be said to be past.
The rebellion
and the invasions turned men’s thoughts once more to the idea of a Union The
legislatures had been combined by Cromwell; and a Union was demanded by both
Irish Houses under Queen Anne. Adam Smith advocated it in conjunction with free
trade; and Montesquieu expressed to Charlemont his approval of the idea. Every
living ex-Viceroy except Fitzwilliam had long wished for it. On the other hand,
the growth of national sentiment had changed the opinion of Irishmen. Arthur
Young found the project highly unpopular; and the debates on the commercial
propositions and the Regency proved that the Parliament was jealous of the
slightest infringement of the settlement of 1782. It was not till the Relief
Bill of 1793 that the idea began to find support with the champions of the
English connexion. The dispute with Fitzwilliam strengthened Pitt’s
inclination for a Union; but it was not till after the rebellion that he came to
regard it as essential to the preservation of the Empire. So early as June,
1798, he was studying the Scottish Act of Union with Grenville; and Auckland’s
advice was asked in regard to the commercial and financial settlement.
Cornwallis approved the proposal; and Castlereagh, who had lately been
appointed Chief Secretary, became its strongest advocate.
1798-9]
Project of Union. Adverse views.
703
It is not
difficult to understand the considerations that appealed with varying force to
different sections of Irish opinion. The Protestants were alarmed for their
lives, their property, and their Church, and may well have felt the need of
closer connexion with England. Even many who were animated by friendly
sentiments towards the Catholics believed that to open Parliament to them would
endanger the Protestant ascendancy; while to retain the disqualifying laws
seemed to ensure the permanence of discontent. On the other hand, the lawyers
perceived that their professional opportunities would be diminished; the official
classes foresaw the loss of their posts; and the borough-owners feared the
disappearance of their political influence. There was also a class, weak in
numbers but strong in character and ability, to whom the maintenance of a
separate national life outweighed in importance any dangers which the
continuance of the Irish Legislature might involve. The Catholics were less
divided; and Cornwallis pertinently remarked that they considered any change
better than the present system. If emancipation had been included, Catholic
Ireland would have enthusiastically supported the scheme. The opposition of
the capital may be largely explained on commercial grounds.
In the autumn
of 1798 the Government employed Cooke, the Undersecretary, to state the
arguments for a Union. He dwelt on the benefits of the Union with Scotland and
the dangerous preponderance of France in Europe, and held out hope of a
provision for the priests. With the appearance of Cooke’s pamphlet the great
debate fairly commenced. Meetings of the Dublin bar, the Dublin corporation,
and the bankers and merchants condemned the plan, the speakers dwelling on the
certain increase of absenteeism, and the probable merging of the National
Debts, and dismissing the Scottish analogy on the ground that Scotland had been
poor and Ireland was flourishing. But the Government was not to be deterred
from its course. Parnell was dismissed from the Exchequer; anti-Unionist
officials were replaced by Unionists. When Parliament met in January, 1799, the
project was attacked by Ponsonby, Parsons, Parnell, Jonah Barrington, Bushe,
and Plunket, Castlereagh standing almost alone in its support. An amendment to
the Address condemning a Union was only defeated by one vote; and a second
amendment to expunge the paragraphs of the Address relating to a Union was
carried by five; but, when Ponsonby tried to pledge the House against future
consideration of a Union, several anti-Unionists protested, and the motion was
withdrawn. In the Lords the Address was ca: ,'ied by 52 to 17. A speech
delivered by Pitt was at this stage widely distributed by the Government. He
declared that a Union would give Ireland security and wealth, and he promised
to keep the debts separate and to resist the increase of taxation. The problems
that confronted Ireland (he said) could only be settled by a Legislature free
from local prejudices; a voluntary association of the two countries was not
subjection but
704
Methods of'persuasion.-Last Irish Parliament. [1799-isoo
partnership.
The Irish Opposition retorted by framing a Regency Bill to obviate the
repetition of the crisis of 1789; but Castlereagh pointed out that it did not
provide for such dangers as the refusal of supplies for war or the imposition
of commercial restrictions on English goods. In this debate, the Speaker,
Foster, delivered a speech which contains the most powerful presentation of the
case of the anti-Unionists. He had supported the Government in its opposition
to the Catholics and its struggle with anarchy; and he was considered the greatest
living authority on Irish commerce and finance. He asserted that taxation would
increase, and that the material progress of the last two decades would be
jeopardised; he reviewed the circumstances and probable fortunes of the leading
industries, and pointed out that the Irish members would be a powerless
minority in an ignorant and indifferent Parliament.
The matter,
however, was not to be settled by argument. The work of the recess is portrayed
in the letters of the highminded Viceroy. “ My occupation is most unpleasant,
negotiating and jobbing with the most corrupt people under heaven. How I long
to kick those whom my public, duty obliges me to court! ” Nearly all the great
borough-owners were willing to consent to a Union if they received compensation
for the loss of their influence. Pitt had adopted this principle in his Reform
Bill of 1785; and even the United Irishmen included compensation of
borough-owners in their scheme. Eighty boroughs, about a third of which
belonged to opponents of the Union, were bought at the market price of £15,000
apiece; and the sum was added to the National Debt. In the case of boroughs
which were to send one member to the joint Parliament, no compensation was
given for the suppression of a second seat. In some cases, where a
borough-owner was doubtful, the promise of a peerage was employed to turn the
scale. During the recess sixty- three seats were vacated. A few of the
vacancies were caused by the dismissal of officials who opposed the Union, but
the greater number by the resignation of nominees. Finally, government
patronage was steadily exerted in the same direction. One hundred and seventy
members who held places or pensions knew that their promotion and even their
tenure depended on their support of the Union. Direct money bribes were almost
unknown, for they were scarcely needed. On the other hand, there can be no
doubt that during the later months of 1799 the notion of a Union gained ground
independently of corruption. A general idea of the measure projected was given
to leading men; and Cornwallis declared that outside Dublin the feeling of the
masses was indifferent. The active opposition was almost confined to Ulster, to
those who were interested in maintaining the existing system, and to the little
band of Nationalists who followed Grattan.
The Irish
Parliament met for the last time in January, 1800. Dublin was as hostile as
ever, and the Orange lodges sent numerous resolutions against the project; but
the parliamentary majority was now secured,
and
Castlereagh explained the details of the proposal. The debts and taxation were
to remain separate; and Ireland was to pay two-seventeenths to Imperial
expenditure. The commercial clauses were modelled on those of 1785. Though
nothing was promised, the Chief Secretary hinted that an arrangement for both
Catholic and dissenting clergy was under consideration. Two hundred seats were
to be extinguished, and Ireland was to be represented by one hundred
members—the counties to return sixty-four, Dublin and Cork two each, thirty-one
other towns and Dublin University one each; while four spiritual peers were to
sit in rotation, and twenty-eight representative peers to be elected for life.
Foster delivered another powerful speech, demonstrating that, in offering the
Union as an alternative to bankruptcy, Castlereagh was guilty of gross
exaggeration, the financial distress being due to specific causes. Grattan, who
had lately sought re-election, took higher ground. He predicted that the Union
would be one of parliaments, not of peoples. To destroy the Parliament was to
destroy an organ of national intelligence, a source and symbol of healthy
national life. Ireland would become subordinate without ceasing to be separate.
The
fundamental weakness of the settlement of 1782 was that the Irish
Administration was responsible not to the Irish but to the English Parliament.
Friction between the Legislature and the Executive was thus almost inevitable,
and was likely to increase with the growth of a vigorous national
consciousness. The opponents of the Union pointed to the loyal record of
Parliament, but did not deny that it was within its power to thwart the policy
of England. The second weakness of the settlement was that Parliament
represented only one of the three religious bodies into which Ireland was
divided; and that a genuine representation might overthrow the Protestant
ascendancy and thereby endanger the connexion with England. Whether national
sentiment would have proved strong enough to overcome sectarian animosities and
to weld the Churches and the races into a loyal and homogeneous community, is
a question which can never be answered with certainty. Grattan believed there
would not be a Catholic majority, and that in anv case the loyalty of the
Catholics was secure; but he underestimated the risk to the Protestant
ascendancy, of which he was a professed supporter. Thus the Union cannot be
judged as a separate event. It was brought about by a number of circumstances,
some of which were inherent in the Irish problem, while others were due to the
Selfishness and vacillation of the English and Irish Governments. Its defence
must rest on the dual ground that, at least after 1798, the continuance of the
Irish Legislature seemed likely to prove a source of weakness to Great Britain
in her deadly struggle with France, and that it was the necessary preliminary
to complete Catholic emancipation. If these grounds are accepted as conclusive,
they must be borne in mind in judging of the means by which the Union was
accomplished. If a Union was necessary,.
those means
were necessary; for in no other way could it have been achieved. But it was a
settlement by compulsion, not by consent; and the penalty of such methods is
that the instrument possesses no moral validity for those who do not accept the
grounds on which it was adopted. Pitt had hoped that Ireland would become a
partner in the Empire; but she found herself a dependency, her true position
being concealed by the presence of a hundred members at St Stephen’s. It was
also Pitt’s intention that the Union should be followed by concessions to the
Catholics. Their most pressing needs were the commutation of tithes, the endowment
of the priests, and the admission of Catholics to Parliament. The first and
second were approved by many who resisted the third; but with the fall of Pitt
the opportunity was lost. Emancipation arid the commutation of tithes had to
wait till their concession exerted no healing influence, and the endowment of
the clergy had become impossible. The Union, as Pitt designed it, might have
proved a blessing for Ireland; as it was accomplished, it merely added to the
store of bitter memories which constitutes the Irish problem.
The Union
once carried, Ireland became quiet and almost indifferent. The brilliant
society of the capital broke up; and the country sank back into the lethargy
and provincialism from which Flood and the Volunteers had aroused it. But the
fall of Pitt, bringing with it the resignation of Cornwallis and Castlereagh,
was a bitter disappointment to the Catholics. The new Viceroy, Hardwicke, the
Chief Secretary, Abbot, and Redesdale, who succeeded Clare as Chancellor in
1802, were openly anti-Catholic. On the other hand, the Administration was mild
and honest. Catholic chapels which had been burned or wrecked were rebuilt at
public expense. Che Peace of Amiens extinguished the hope of French aid; and a
reaction followed the excitement of the Union. The harvest of 1802 was good;
and increased expenditure was concealed by loans.
In the summer
of 1802 Redesdale wrote to Addington that the satisfaction he had previously
expressed had been premature, and that nothing but the fear of consequences
prevented a rebellion. The chief danger was to be apprehended from the
survivors of the United Irishmen, who found a leader in Robert Emmet, younger
brother of Thomas Addis Emmet, and a comrade and fellow-student of Thomas Moore
at Trinity College. Robert Emmet left Ireland in 1801 for Paris, where he met
his brother and Russell, the friend and colleague of Tone; but Napoleon gave
him so little encouragement that he returned to Ireland next year. The elder
brother remained as the accredited agent of the executive, and his diary shows
that French aid was still expected; but Robert, contrary to the advice of
Arthur O’Connor and other exiles, determined not to wait for help which might
never come. Arms were accumulated in Dublin; Russell was sent to organise a
revolt of Ulster; and Emmet found a capable and daring colleague in Miles
Byrne. But treachery was at work; and the Government received frequent reports
as to the
I803-5]
Failure and death of Emmet.—Daniel O’Connell. 707
progress of
the plot. On July 16,1803, the city was startled by an explosion of gunpowder
in Emmet’s depot; but the Viceroy thought it best to take no action. A week
later, at ten o’clock in the evening, a rocket gave the signal; and a few
hundred men hurried to head-quarters. Pikes were handed out, and Emmet found
himself at the head of an undisciplined rabble. But his followers, though he
beckoned them to the Castle, lacked determination. While they hesitated, the
carriage -if Lord Kil warden, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, approached.
The horses were stopped; Kilwarden and his nephew were pierced by pikes; and
his daughter, escaping in the confusion, carried the news to the Castle. Emmet
had been powerless to stop the slaughter; and the appearance of a body of
troops quickly scattered the crowd. Next day the insurrection broke out in
Ulster; but it was at once suppressed, and Russell was captured and hanged.
Emmet took refuge in the Wicklow Hills and might have escaped to France; but he
wished, before he fled, to see Sarah Curran, the great advocate’s daughter, to
whom he was attached. He visited Dublin, was betrayed, arrested, and hanged.
The rising caused the greatest alarm. The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, and
martial law was proclaimed. Suspects were arrested and kept in prison without
trial. The system of coercion thus introduced continued, except during the
short interval of the Grenville Ministry, throughout the war.
On the news
of Emmet’s rising, Lord Fingal armed his tenantry and placed them at the
disposal of the Government. As a mark of recognition he was appointed a
magistrate; but the Chancellor, in transmitting the warrant, took occasion to
accuse Catholics of want of loyalty. His letter aroused great indignation, and
it was determined to petition Parliament. Accordingly, when Pitt returned to
office, Fingal and other prominent Catholics pressed their claims. Pitt
regretfully replied that he could do nothing during the lifetime of the King.
The matter was debated in 1805, when Grattan made the first and perhaps the
greatest of his few speeches in the Imperial Parliament. On the death of Pitt,
the Duke of Bedford became Lord-Lieutenant; and the suspects of the Emmet
rising were liberated. For a brief interval Ireland was governed by the
ordinary law of the land; but, on the fall of the Whigs, the Duke of Richmond,
a man of unconcealed Orange sympathies, became Lord-Lieutenant; and Lord Manners,
an equally strong anti-Catholic, began his twenty years’ chancellorship.
Saurin, an able lawyer of high character but narrow views, became
Attorney-General, and virtually governed Ireland till the arrival of Peel.
The Catholic
Committee gave scarcely a sign of life for some years after the Union; but in
1805 an energetic protest against its ethargy was made by a lawyer well known
in the Courts though as yet unknown beyond them. Bom in 1775, and educated in
France, Daniel O’Connell
708
Grattan and Repeal.—Economic conditions. [1805-15
had derived
from the horrors of the Revolution an abiding attachment to monarchy and a
hatred of violence. He was one of the few Catholics who openly denounced the
Union; but he did not speak again on political matters till 1805, when he
persuaded the Committee to petition. He continued to urge greater activity, and
in 1810 he was unanimously elected chairman. Henceforward the history of the
Catholic movement in Ireland, to be described in a subsequent volume, is the
history of O’Connell.
O’Connell had
never concealed his opinion that the repeal of the Union was essential to the
restoration of the national life. Plunket, Saurin, Bushe, and other opponents
of the Union had come to accept it. Grattan announced in 1810 that he would
only work for repeal if the country unmistakably desired it; and he afterwards
declared that, as the marriage had taken place, it was his duty to make it
fruitful. But in 1808 there had been symptoms of discontent among the merchants
of Dublin; and in 1810 a meeting was held in the Exchange* at which resolutions
in favour of repeal were carried. O’Connell declared that Ireland was governed
by foreigners; but the Catholics had nothing to hope from repeal, and their
attitude was one of indifference. In Ulster anti-Union sentiment had almost
disappeared by 1815. The Regium Donum had been increased; Orange lodges had
multiplied; anti-Catholic sentiment had revived. The linen trade, almost alone
among the industries of Ireland, improved; and Belfast was growing into a
prosperous port. On the other hand, the economic condition of the Catholic
peasantry was not improved by the Union. The Irish Com Laws of 1784 had led to
a great increase of tillage; and bounties on the export of com and the growing
English demand led to excessive subdivision of farms. Rents rose with the
competition for land, and wages fell. Discontent spread; and Threshers and
Ribbonmen appeared in protest against tithes and high rents. Taxation was
nearly doubled, and Ireland was compelled to borrow. By the end of the war her
debt had risen from ,£28,000,000 to d£l 12,000,000; and the time contemplated
by Pitt and ^astlereagi1 When the debts and contributions of the two
countries should be in the same ratio had arrived. In 1815 a Committee of the
House of Commons was appointed to consider the financial relations, and
reported in favour of the consolidation of the Exchequers.
Though the
closing years of the great struggle with France were not marked by the terrible
distress which threw a dark shadow over England, the outlook for Catholic
Ireland was exceedingly gloomy. In England it was possible, beneath the thick
crust of Tory rule, to detect the germs of a new life. In Ireland it seemed as
if the soul of the people was dead. There have been periods of far greater
conscious suffering and material hardship; but at no time since the Union has
there been witnessed such apathy, such hopelessness, such spiritual
degradation.
THE BRITISH
EMPIRE.
I.—INDIA AND
CEYLON (1785-1815).
When Warren Hastings sailed from Calcutta on February
8,1785, he left behind him established authority and ideals of government and
policy such as no British representative before him had set forth in India. He
had made it impossible for England to be content with a trading interest, to
hold herself apart from the intricacies and passions of native politics, or to
disdain a knowledge of Oriental literature and philosophy, and the geographical
and historical conditions of Eastern life. For good or ill, England, in the
guise of the East India Company, had become a partner in the development of the
vast Indian peninsula. Would she remain content with a merely transitory
concern in the struggles of dynasties and adventurers, and in the welfare or
distress of millions of rural cultivators; or would her agents, by ambition or
by the sheer force of circumstances, be led to fight for supremacy, diplomatic,
political, and eventually territorial? The next twenty years were to give a
final answer to this question.
A year of lassitude
succeeded in the British administration the vigorous rule of Hastings. John
Macpherson, as senior in the Council, succeeded to the post of
Governor-General. Though he had only since 1781 been prominent in Calcutta, he
had long been concerned in Indian affairs. But his connexion with the financial
transactions of the Nawdb of Arcot (or the Carnatic) had not been free from
suspicion ; and there was little confidence in his capacity as a statesman. In
the hope of holding his high position for a term of years, he began by an
attempt at revenue reform; but in this his successor could not find that he had
achieved any success. Macpherson’s government, wrote Lord Cornwallis in the
next year, for the private information of Dundas and Pitt, “ had no authority,
and the grossest frauds were daily committed before their faces; their whole
conduct, and all their pretensions to economy, except in the reduction of
salaries, were a scene of delusion.”
In the
familiar business of the Nawdb of Arcot’s debts, Macpherson
710
Indian conditions. Appointment of Cornwallis. [1785-8
inherited the
difficulties of Hastings and the troublesome assistance of Lord Macgrtney, the
Governor of Madras. This vigorous and independent official had pursued a
policy of his own at Madras, which was, perhaps too hastily, terminated by his
resignation, on the news of the appointment of John Hollond as his successor;
but he visited Calcutta in the summer of 1785 in order to impress his views on
Macpherson; and he was not without hope of returning to India as
Governor-General
It was a
period when popular interest in Indian affairs had for the first time been
aroused, when the excitement caused by the India Bills had not yet subsided,
and when Great Britain first showed a sense of her growing responsibilities in
the East. But there was no agreement among either statesmen at home, or those
in India, as to the right course to be adopted in that country. The
difficulties were appreciated by Pitt and Dundas; and they determined to
inaugurate a new system by sending out to India a statesman of distinction,
unfettered by past experience or local ties. Lord Macartney seemed to them
inadmissible, not only because of his close association with Anglo-Indian party
feeling, but because he insisted upon receiving an English peerage as a
preliminary to his appointment as Governor-General. In 1782 Lord Shelburne had
offered the post to Charles, Earl Cornwallis, to whom Junius had referred as a
young man whose spirited conduct might atone for the deficiencies of his
understanding, but whose military abilities were somewhat discredited by his
surrender at Yorktown in 1781. In 1785 the offer was repeated by Pitt; and, now
that the East India Act had largely increased the power of the office, it was
accepted. A Supplementary Act (1786) conferred still greater powers upon the
Governor-General and the Governors of the different Presidencies; and in 1788
the Declaratory Act gave the Board of Control power to send troops to India
without having regard to the wishes of the Directors.
Cornwallis
sailed for India on May 5, 1786. He touched at Madras on August 24, and reached
Calcutta on September 12. From the moment of his arrival he found himself beset
with difficulties, which the easygoing incompetence of Macpherson had rendered
acute. The most serious of these was the entanglement proceeding from the war
of 1785, waged by Tipu, the Sultdn of Mysore, against the Mar&thas and the
Nizdm. Ndna Famavis, the guardian and minister of the sixth Mardtha Peshwa, had
applied to Bombay for assistance, and, referred to Calcutta, had been informed
by Macpherson that the Treaty of Silbdi (1782) stipulated, not that the friends
and enemies of the two States should be common, but that neither party should
afford assistance to the enemies of the other, while the Treaty of Mangalore
forbade the English to assist the enemies of Tipu. Ndna then applied to the
Portuguese. Macpherson scented a new danger, and sent Charles Warre Malet as
resident to Poona; and an offer of troops from Bombay was authorised.
Cornwallis immediately repudiated the transaction as contrary
1785-93]
Legal and other reforms of Cornwallis. 711
to treaty.
But the difficulties were even more pressing in internal than in external
affairs; and it was as a reformer of British administration that the new
Governor-General was chiefly to be famed. A man of sensitive honour and devoted
to duty, he had taken office only on the grant of full powers in both civil and
military matters; and, empowered as he was by the Supplementary Act of 1786 to
act on occasion even against the votes of the majority of his Council, he
regarded the authority placed in his hands as the only chance of “saving this
country.” “ Mr Fox’s plan,” said he, “ would have ruined all.” He proceeded to
act with decisive vigour in regard to the scandalous abuses which still clung
to the British administration.
Macpherson
had spoken of “the relaxed habits” of the public service in India. This meant
the system of small salaries and large perquisites, and the immense number of
half-recognised methods of obtaining money to which British officials had
resort—monopolies, offices at native Courts, jobbing agencies, sinecures of
many different kinds; to which must be added the abuse of the Directors’
patronage, and of the influence of powerful persons at home, among whom the
Prince of Wales was conspicuous. For three years Cornwallis devoted himself to
the suppression of such abuses; and his determination, dignity, and untarnished
personal honour enabled him to succeed. He persuaded the Court of Directors to
augment salaries, on the principle that good pay is the parent of good work;
and he left behind him a purified and energetic public service.
No less
vitally did his work affect the nature of British rule in India when he took in
hand the reform of the police system and the revenue settlement of Bengal.
Hitherto the Company’s collectors had enjoyed certain powers of civil
jurisdiction, while the criminal law had been administered by the Nawdb Nazim
and his native assistant; from these there was appeal to the Sadr Diw&ni
Ad&lat (supreme civil Court) and the Nizamat AddJat (supreme criminal
Court) respectively. This system resulted in both uncertainty of jurisdiction
and diversity of practice; punishments were irrationally severe or absurdly
lax. Over all the districts of the Bengal territory Cornwallis placed British
judges and magistrates; and above these he established Provincial Courts of
Appeal at Calcutta, Patna, Dacca, and Murshiddb&d. Under the magistrates
were placed daroghas, or heads of police, who had authority to arrest and to
take bail. The Mohammadan Code was followed in criminal cases, the barbarity of
its punishments being mitigated, and its rules of evidence revised, in
accordance with English principles. In civil cases Hindu or Mohammadan
assessors assisted the British magistrate to deal with the intricacies of
religious and social custom. The changes introduced by Cornwallis marked an era
in the British occupation; they defined jurisdiction and created procedure; and
the Regulations of 1793 practically formed a new Code, which has been the basis
of all subsequent legislation. They bear the marks of an anxious regard for
civil and
religious
feeling among different classes and creeds, and of a clear and orderly method,
which replaced the inconsistent and arbitrary arrangement of the earlier days
of British occupation. It was their great aim to replace the privilege of the
conquerors by a full recognition of general rights. Government, in its own
words, “ divested itself of the power of infringing in its executive capacity
on the rights and privileges ” which it had conferred upon the landholders. The
judicial reforms were, indeed, intimately connected with the central fact of
Cornwallis’ administration, the Permanent Settlement of Bengal (1793).
The
difficulties connected with the land revenue demanded the attention of the
Governor-General from the moment of his arrival in India. Hastings had dealt
with them by way of enquiry and of tentative endeavour to reach a standard rate
of assessment; but his determined rival, Philip Francis, had espoused the view
that the zemindars, who were the farmers of the revenue and collected it from
the raiyats, had indefeasible, if restricted, proprietary rights; and the
Directors had concluded that it was with them that a permanent settlement must
be made. They condemned the frequent changes of system, the failure of all
attempts to increase the revenue, and the accumulating arrears; and they had
assumed that there was already sufficient information in the possession of the
Government in India to justify a coherent and permanent reform. They regarded
the settlement of the revenue as part of the reorganisation of the Government
at Calcutta, which they directed in a letter from the Court at the end of 1785.
The Bengal Government was to consist of four branches—a Board of Council, a
Military Board, a Board of Revenue, and a Board of Trade, each with definite
duties. The Revenue Board was to order an assessment of the revenue, to last
for ten years, and then, if satisfactory, to become permanent. The plan of the
Directors was made; Cornwallis was to carry it out.
The
Governor-General was thus in no sense the originator of the Permanent
Settlement; nor was he personally responsible for any theory of Indian
ownerships which assimilated their position to that of English landlords.
Though he came with instructions, he came with an open mind; and he was soon
convinced that there was not as yet enough information to justify a permanent
arrangement. He entrusted to John Shore the preparation of an exhaustive paper
on the proposed settlement. The point of most critical importance was the
position of the Bengal zamvndars—were they merely the government agents for the
collection of taxes, or were they the hereditary owners of the land, subject
only to the tax due to the Government? Shore held that the proprietary right
belonged to the zemindars: the position of the talukdars, or intermediate
owners, was left more vague; and there were many other classes whom it was
difficult to bring into a consistent scheme. Shore’s view, however, was clear;
he summed it up in an
ancient
saying, that “ the land belonged to the zamindars and the rent to the King ”;
and this view was on the whole accepted.
At the end of
1789 plans were matured for the settlement of the revenue; and these plans
involved the substitution of uniform statutory titles among the landholders for
uncertain and fluctuating customary rights. While these legal rights were given
to a large class of landlords, the position of the cultivators was to be
secured by a universal system of declaratory leases. Herein, as it proved, lay
the weak point of the jettlement. The settlement with the zamindars was
unavoidable; but the rights of the cultivators were not sufficiently secured.
The zamindars were recognised as the owners of the soil on the payment of a
fixed land-tax:, which was not to be increased; the rents of the independent
cultivator were not to be raised; registers of tenures were to be kept; and the
cultivators were to receive leases (pattas), and to have the remedy of civil
action if these were infringed.
Was this
settlement, which was designed at first to be for ten years, to be made
permanent ? Cornwallis wished this; but Shore, with fuller knowledge of local
conditions, deprecated it. The Directors at home deliberated for two years,
having before them elaborate arguments on both sides; but at last they accepted
the view of Cornwallis. On March 22, 1793, the Governor-General declared the
settlement to be permanent. This act, the most important that had affected
native society under British government, had undoubtedly the effect of creating
a feeling of security in the native mind with regard to British rule. It showed
that the Company intended to be honest, and to be just. But it caused very
grave evils. Defective statistics of area and value led to unforeseen
hardships. It was impossible to create a uniform system by a stroke of the pen;
and an agrarian and social revolution was the result, in which the old landed
class of Bengal was broken up. A strain of punctuality, legality, exactness,
was placed upon the ancient rajas, which they were unable to boar; and a large
part of Bengal changed hands. Middlemen ousted the old families and oppressed
the cultivators. A new class of zamindars was soon called into existence, who
managed their estates on purely business principles. The cultivators were the
sufferers; the legal protections proved nugatory; and twenty years later a
Governor-General found their position “desperate.” It was not till 1859 that
they were legally secured in the right of which it had never been intended to
deprive them.
Though
Cornwallis was not the originator of the Permanent Settlement, it is with his
name that the act is indelibly associated. He was the statesman who carried it
through; he brought together divergent opinions, worked out a coherent policy,
and embodied it in a permanent memorial. British authority showed itself
content with much less than the ancient conquerors of Bengal had exacted,
willing to make sacrifices for the benefit of its subjects, and desirous of
building a fabric
Relations with Oudh and Haidarabdd. [1786-93
of good
government on the security and happiness of the people. It may be that the
results were not equal to the expectations; but the principles embodied in the
Settlement were of the first importance in the history of a great
experiment—that1 of governing a vast Eastern territory by the
methods and morals of the West.
In the
external relations of the East India Company within the Indian peninsula
Cornwallis did important work, but nothing which takes rank with the police or
the revenue reforms. He was decided, but not bigoted, in his view of the wisdom
of non-intervention; but events were too strong for him. His action may be
briefly summarised. The long-standing difficulty with Oudh became for a moment
acute. The maintenance of two brigades of British trained troops caused a heavy
drain; and the other pecuniary burdens were no less oppressive. Discontent
■ grew dangerous. Cornwallis believed Oudh to be in need of military
defence. British fame at the moment, he thought, did not stand high; Colonel
Baillie’s defeat at Perambakam (1780) was known all over India; Sindhia and the
Sikhs were growing in power; the British troops could not be reduced. But
Cornwallis diminished the demand on the treasure of the Naw&b Wazir from 84
to 50 lacs, and he drove from the oppressed country as many of the pilfering
European adventurers, agents, and jobbers, as he could. In southern India the
British position was hampered by the projects, feared often without reason, of
the French. Before the Revolution, isolated adventurers were believed to
receive support from Versailles; a little later the East became prominent in
the vast schemes of Bonaparte. In 1793 Pondicherry and all the French
settlements were easily taken; but the danger came from Europe.
In 1788
British relations with the Niz&m reached one of the recurrent crises which
disturbed the politics of the Madras Presidency. The Niz&m, placed between
the Peshwa of Poona, and Tipu Sultdn of Mysore, intrigued and shuffled; only on
the proposal of a matrimonial alliance from the latter did he turn towards the
English. Cornwallis found himself in a difficulty which the framers of the
Regulating Act (1773) ought to have foreseen. Danger from Tipu was evidently
growing; alliance with native Princes without leave from home was forbidden;
but time pressed. The Governor-General kept the Act in letter but broke it in
spirit by writing a letter to the Niz&m, which he declared to be of force
as binding as a treaty. He promised to supply the troops which the Niz&m
declared to be essential to his safety; he stipulated that they were not to be
used against the allies of the British; and, when he enumerated those allies,
he omitted the name of Tipu. A mass of recrimination clusters in the documents
of the day round this somewhat shifty action of a high-principled man. Tipu
intended war; and it is doubtful whether Cornwallis accelerated it.
On December
29, 1789, Tipu attacked Travancore. Cornwallis,
who had
previously instructed Hollond, the Governor of Madras, to promise assistance—an
ins.traction which had not been carried out— determined to defend the R&ja.
He made a triple league with the Mar&thas (June 1) and the Niz&m (June
4, 1790); and three campaigns against Mysore followed. Into the details of
these campaigns it is unnecessary to enter; but they presented features which
give them special importance. The Governor-General himself took command in
1791; there was a pomp and magnificence in the proceedings which impressed on
the people the fact that British rule was Imperial, like the rule of the
Moghuls before it. But, on the other hand, the inadequacy of British
preparations was soon evident. Supplies were insufficient; the country was
almost unknown; native allies proved of little assistance. British officers
themselves were forced to admit the failure of their equipments; and
Cornwallis’ first campaign ended in retreat. At the end of February, 1792,
however, peace was won at the gates of Seringa- patam. One-third of Tipu’s
dominions was surrendered to the allies ; and an indemnity of ,£3,000,000 was
exacted. The gallant little State of Coorg, long oppressed by Tipu, was freed
from his grasp; and in despatches it was plainly hinted that, if the Mohammadan
Prince proved refractory, the old Hindu dynasty might be restored in Mysore
itself.
Whatever may
be thought of the wisdom of Cornwallis’ action as regards Mysore, it can hardly
be doubted that in the Carnatic his action was disastrous. He undertook the
management of the country for a time in such a way as to destroy all chance of
an efficient native administration. The treaties of 1787 and 1792, the latter
of which placed the Carnatic under the administration of Madras, were
ineffective and inadequate solutions of a difficulty which demanded a decisive
solution. In October, 1793, Cornwallis sailed for England. He left behind him
the reputation of a just and honourable administrator; and his creative work
was the most enduring that Englishmen had, so far, accomplished in India.
Still greater
interest was aroused by the impeachment of Warren Hastings. While caricaturists
were representing the Governor on his return as welcomed to St James’ for his
ill-earned wealth, Burke was denouncing him as the plunderer of Bengal and the
murderer of Nuncomar. On April 26,1786, the charges were preferred; on February
13, 1738, the trial began in Westminster Hall. As a ceremonial display, it was
equal to anything that London had seen in the century; and in eloquence
Sheridan and Burke had never been surpassed. Court interest and party passion
were alike aroused; politics and fashion combined to make the trial of the
great man who had saved the British possessions in India a scene of excitement
and emotion unsurpassed even in that historic place. Of the charges it is here
enough to say that hardly a single act of Hastings’ administration was left
untouched; but, while they dealt with details, it soon became plain enough that
the true reasons for the
impeachment
were, first, the private animosity of Philip Francis, and, secondly, the public
policy of the party of Fox. These were blended by the fiery genius of Burke,
who took up the cause as for the punishment of a great malefactor, when
unprejudiced study might have led him rather to champion a great ruler who was
the victim of ignorance and passipn. The charges, in the end, centred round the
execution of Nuncomar, the treatment of Chait Singh, and the pecuniary exactions
from the Begams of Oudh; to Burke these were “ the damned and damnable
proceedings of a judge in hell; and such a judge was Warren Hastings.” But
within two years, while the slpw course of the trial dragged on, illuminated
only by the flashes of Burke's gorgeous invective, the public interest in the
whole question, declined. That Hastings was not selfish, cruel, or
unprincipled, was becoming apparent to all who could judge; and, what was more
important, the policy of Fox’s party in regard to Bengal was losing interest as
compared with their attitude towards the French Revolution. Tragic events in
France, in England the King’s illness, the Regency Bill, and the Reflections of
Burke, absorbed public attention. Days and weeks passed into years; yet the
trial seemed no nearer a conclusion. If a temporary excitement was aroused when
Cornwallis came forward to give evidence on behalf of his great predecessor,
the proceedings were for the most part carried on with laborious prolixity and
followed with unconcealed weariness. Before the trial was over, of the hundred
and seventy peers who had sat on the opening day sixty were no longer living;
and, when at last the decision was called for, only twenty-nine recorded a
vote. On April 23, 1795, the judgment was delivered; and by a large majority
Hastings was honourably acquitted.
The trial of
Hastings belongs chiefly to the history of English parties. In India few knew
or cared much about it; the magnificent services of the great ruler were fully
recognised in the lands he had governed, and it was regarded as inconceivable
that his merits should not be known in his own country. But the trial, and the
mass of literature and caricature which gathered about it, afforded decisive
evidence that the affairs of the East India Company had become a national
concern. From time to time the public interest flickered; but henceforward it
was never doubtful that the British Government and the British people regarded
the settlements in India as a national possession in which the honour as well
as the profit of the nation was involved. The East India Company was no longer
a semi-independent association of commercial gentlemen, but a vigorous offshoot
of the British power. Dundas, who was President of the Board of Control,
became, largely through his Indian connexion, a personage of great political
importance; and it was a significant mark of the progress of public opinion
that in February, 1791, he carried, in the House of Commons, without a
division, resolutions asserting that Tipu had broken
his treaty
with the English by the attack on Travancore, and that Cornwallis deserved
approbation for his action in meeting it.
When the
privileges of the Company expired in 1793, British interest was too deeply
concerned in European affairs to enter fully into the important economic
questions involved. Questions of free trade, restriction, monopoly, were argued
perfunctorily; hut it was something that they were raised. Dundas, however, was
practically omnipotent; and petitions from many important trading centres were
disregarded. For once, the Company did not appear before Parliament in forma
pauperis: Cornwallis’ revenue reforms had made financial matters, for the
moment, smooth. The Act of 1784 was therefore renewed, practically without
alteration; and the Company’s privileges were continued for twenty years. One
slight concession to free trade was made—the Company were to allot annually not
less than three hundred tons of shipping for the trade of private persons.
In September,
1792, Pitt and Dundas pressed upon Sir John Shore, who had become a baronet in
that year, and was now residing in England in rural privacy, the succession to
the Govemor-Generalship of India. He accepted it with great reluctance; that it
was offered him was largely due to the influence of the noble character and
wide Indian experience of his friend, Charles Grant, who for thirty years
exercised in England an influence on Indian affairs as beneficial as it was
powerful. Burke protested that he was concerned in the crimes of Hastings; but
the Court of Directors replied that their inducement for selecting him was that
he had proved one of their ablest and most upright servants in India.
Sir John
Shore held the post of Governor-General till the beginning of 1798, when he
received an Irish peerage as Lord Teignmouth and returned to England. The five
years of his rule were not, as regards action on the part of the British power,
eventful; hut the development of native politics during the period brought
affairs to a crisis, which became acute immediately after he left the country.
The chief factors in Indian politics, whose action extended over a vast area,
were the Great Moghul himself, Shah Alam, who had been nominally restored by
the Mardthas in 1771 and had since then been in the power of Sindhia ; the
Nizdm of Haidar&b&d, whose power, between the Marathas and Tipu, was
becoming almost a negligible quantity, but who possessed a French- trained
force which might prove dangerous to the British; the Mardthas, that is the Poona
regency, Sindhia, Holkar, and Bhonsla; and Tipu, the usurping Mohammadan Sultdn
of Mysore. The French in the peninsula were rendered practically impotent by
the Revolution at home; the Dutch were almost equally affected by domestic
politics, and their hold on Ceylon was far from secure. The Portuguese at Goa
had endeavoured to keep out of native politics, for fear of endangering the
traditional British alliance. They had been asked in
1786 to join
the Mardthas in military action, but had refused. Against Tipu they nourished a
strong resentment, due to his forcible circumcision of thirty thousand native
Catholics, of whom they were the natural protectors. In 1791 they had rounded
off their own territories by the capture of Rachol and Piro, after an
arrangement with the Rdja of Sunda, by which he had given them all his rights
in the territories of Ponda, Zambolim, and Panchamal. With these several
Powers, during the administration of Sir John Shore, British interests were in
the main concerned It may be added, as evidence of the extension of Oriental
relations, that in 1792-4 Lord Macartney undertook a special embassy to China,
which was productive only of a somewhat better acquaintance between the two
Powers, and an increased knowledge on the part of British sailors of the
navigation of Chinese waters; that a commercial treaty was made in 1792 with
the Gurkhas, the Hindu race which had ruled Nepdl for some fifteen years; and
that, on their request for aid against the Chinese, Colonel Kirkpatrick was
sent on a special mission to Nepdl.
The domestic
politics of India during the eventful period which synchronised with the
administration of Cornwallis and Shore may best be grouped round the remarkable
personality of Madhoji Rdo Sindhia. In 1785 this able and adventurous chieftain
was the most important personage in central India. He had seized Agra, secured
the person of the Moghul, and forced him to declare the Peshwa, the nominal
ruler of the Mardthas (though strictly he too was but a deputy of the Rdja of
Sdtdra), his vicegerent for his whole empire. But it was Sindhia who ruled the
vicegerent himself, the Poona regency, and Ndna Farnavis, the guardian and
minister of the Peshwa, whose authority was now practically confined to the
district immediately round Poona. Thus it came about that, in the words of a •
contemporary observer, all the legal sovereignty of India was consolidated in
the hands of the Mardthas. Sindhia’s military power was built up by Benoit de
Boigne, a clever French officer, who had served also in the British and the
Russian armies, and a Scotsman named Sangster. By their assistance a powerful
army was organised, drilled, and armed on European models. A large train of
artillery was provided; and regular infantry, unknown before to the Mardtha
system, was introduced. Of the immediate success of these changes there could
be no question; but it was doubted, even at the time, whether the accompanying
neglect of cavalry was not a fatal error. The Mardtha was, above all, a
predatory horseman ; swiftness was his. strength; “his fortune was on the
saddle of his horse.” When the other Mardtha States followed the example of
Sindhia, and developed the artillery and infantry arms at the expense of the
horsemen, the decay of their military power began. They could not stand against
European foot, and they threw away the advantages which celerity and knowledge
of the country
conferred.
The greatest British general of the age, after full experience of Indian
warfare, expressed his view that the changes introduced by Sindhia were a great
mistake, and that the Mar&thas would have “ been more formidable if they
had never had a European or an infantry ioldier in their service.” The opinion
has been criticised, but the facts of the next few years prove its truth.
At the end of
1785 Sindhia was supreme in Hindustan. Not only were the Peshwa and his adviser
impotent, and the dynasty of NAgpur inactive, but Tukaji Holkar, the military
comrade of Madhoji Sindhia, was content to follow his progress to power with
acquiescence. But within a year his authority was gravely threatened. The
Mohammadan levies of the Moghul, which had heen under Sindhia’s control,
refused to disband: they were joined hy the Rajput chieftains, Raja Partab
Singh of Jaipur, the R&na of Udaipur, and Mahar&ja Bijai Singh of
Jodhpur; and in May, 1787, Sindhia was defeated at Ldlsot, about forty miles
south of Jaipur. In vain did he appeal for aid to N&na Famavis. Gbul&m
Kadir, an hereditary official at Delhi, overawed the Moghul, and joined the
forces which were endeavouring to wrest Agra from Sindhia. But the forces of
Mohammadan and Hindu opposition were disunited; they pursued their own
interests; and Sindhia, with unbroken spirit, preserved his position in spite
of constant defeats.
On June 18,
1788, he vanquished the Musalm&n leader, Ism&il Beg, on the site of the
famous city of Akbar, Fatehpur-Sikri, already deserted and now a magnificent
ruin. But the victory was not followed up. The defeated Mohammadans marched to
Delhi; Ghul&m K&dir and Ismd.il Beg made themselves masters of the
city, plundered the palaces, and blinded the Moghul Emperor, Shah Alam. The
horrors of this PatMn occupation, in which no indignity was spared the imperial
family, and dire privation was experienced by the whole city, brought inevitable
retribution. Ism&il Beg joined the Rajputs, and both determined to rescue
the Moghul; the Poona regency gave the command of its troops to Tukaji Holkar;
GhuMm K&dir was captured at Meerut md put to death; and Sindhia entered
Delhi in triumph as the saviour of the rightful sovereign.
In 1790 the
authority of Sindhia, as effective ruler of the strongest native power in
India, seemed consolidated. He was still in theory only the deputy of a
deputy’s deputy; but the Peshwa, with whom, as the head of the Mardthas, the
English always negotiated, was far inferior to him in power. Assumed humility
only veiled Sindhia’s ambition. In 1790 and 1791 he crushed the Rajputs of
Jaipur and Jodhpur and the restless Ism Ail Beg, who were hoping for help from
the Afghans of K&bul. In June, 1792, he marched to Poona, and paid a
ceremonial visit to the Peshwa, acting with an exaggerated affectation of
subservience which deceived no one. This was the culmination of his career. Sir
John Malcolm records it as a common saying in India that “Madhoji
720
Death of Sindhia. Confusion in Maratha affairs. [1792-6
Sindhia made
himself the sovereign of an empire by calling himself the headman of a
village.’'’ In spite of resistance from Holkar and Nina Famavis, there can be
little doubt that Sindhia, had he lived, would have established his power over
the Mar&thas and throughout Hindustan, and either by alliance with Tipu or
after his fall, would have become the most formidable rival of the English in
the new movement of advance at the end of the eighteenth century. But on
February 12,1794, he died at Poona, not without suspicion of foul play. The
city was famous for its tragedies, and this was not the last, though it may
have been but the tragedy of inopportune conclusion. Daulat R&o Sindhia, a
boy of fifteen, could not maintain the great position of his dead uncle; and,
after a few years of strangely confused intrigue, the English found that they
had no more serious rival in all India than the Mohammadan ruler of Mysore.
The death of
Madhoji R£o left the Mar&thas with no soldier- statesman to combine their
forces or their interests. Yet it seemed for the moment as if union had come. A
war with the Niz&m, on the unending subject of chauth (tribute of
one-fourth), found all their forces lighting together under the leadership of
the Peshwa. But it was for the last time. From this war, which began in 1795,
the English, under the cautious direction of Sir John Shore, held aloof. The
Governor- General obeyed the Act of Parliament so scrupulously as to refuse
assistance to the Nizdm when he was attacked by the Mardtha host, and left it
to the French corps of Raymond to oppose the only solid resistance to the
allied armies, among whom the corps of Perron, lieutenant and successor to de
Boigne, was conspicuous. On March 11, 1795, the Moghuls—as they were still
fancifully called—were routed at Kurdla by the Mardthas. The treaty which
followed marked the highest point of the power of the Brahman oligarchy at
Poona directed by Ndna Famavis. Within a few months it proved intolerable to
the unhappy young Peshwa. He committed suicide on October 27,1795; and
Mar&tha affairs were again thrown into confusion. Intrigues and
complications ensued; and it was long doubtful whether any coherent power would
emerge. Daulat R&o Sindhia and the N&na played fast and loose with each
other. The N&na at last recovered control by an arrangement with the Nizdm
(Treaty of Mahr, October, 1796); and at the end of the year, by the influence
of Sindhia, B&ji Rdo, son of the quondam Bombay candidate R&ghoba, was
accepted as Peshwa. But a little later the Nana was reduced to impotence; and
at the same time Tukaji Holkar died. B&ji was practically the nominee of
Sindhia; and, if Madhoji had been still alive, the State of Gwalior might have
again ruled the Mardthas.
From all
these conflicts Sir John Shore had stood apart. The Company’s interests seemed
to be again restricted to commercial concerns, justly and honourably
administered. While Tipu’s power remained
untouched,
that of the Niz&m, under his astute and unscrupulous minister the
Azim-ul-Umard, and with a French force established under Raymond at
Haidar&b&d, seemed to be re-established on a firm basis. In Oudh Sir
John Shore established a new Wazir, Saddat Ali, and bound him, under dread of
invasion from Afgh&nist&n, to pay seventy-six lacs of rupees a year for
the support of 13,000 British troops—an act of somewhat unusual firmness on the
part of the Governor-General, for which he was threatened with impeachment. In
the Carnatic, affairs were going from bad to worse. The growth of the
Naw&b’s debts placed him and his country in the hands of unprincipled
European moneylenders. Lord Hobart, Governor of Madras, proposed to interfere
by assuming control of the administration; but little came of the proposal
beyond disagreement with the Governor-General. After the utmost allowance has
been made for the difficulties of Sir John Shore’s position, enmeshed as he was
by Acts of Parliament, a Board of Control, and a Court of Directors, no very great
praise can be bestowed upon his conduct of affairs. When his term of office
came to an end, the East India Company occupied in India a position hardly
higher than whep the Regulating Act first manifested England’s supreme concern
in her Eastern settlements.
On April
26,1798, Shore was succeeded by a man of very different temper, the imperious,
dignified, energetic, and determined Earl of Mornington, an Irish peer, the
friend of Pitt and Wilberforce, of Grattan and Canning. Richard Colley
Wellesley, before whom lay a great career, but one not so great as his
brilliant qualities seemed to promise, was a figure at once commanding and
picturesque in the society of the day. He was a distinguished classical
scholar, a writer of impressive if somewhat magniloquent English, a singularly
keen judge of political tendencies, a statesman unfettered by partisan or
family prejudice. No man of equal ability, except Hastings, had upheld British
rule in India; and Pitt, like his father, had a genius for the choice of great
men to fill great posts. Before Wellesley arrived in India, he had shown how
deeply he had studied the problems with which he would be confronted, and how
trenchantly he was prepared to deal with them. Speaker Addington had said to
him some while before, “You want a wider sphere; you are dying of the cramp.”
The sphere was now open; and Wellesley determined that his powers should be
cramped no more.
A paper
written by the Duke of Wellington some years afterwards explains the situation
with which his brother had to deal on his arrival in India. The French interest
seemed to^ be paramount at the Courts of Tipu and the Niz&m. A body of
Frenchmen had already landed at Mangalore. Tipu was engaged in negotiations
with France, had sent envoys to the Mauritius, and was said to have
ridiculously affected Republicanism and called himself “citizen Tipu.” Now his-
more ambitious designs were ripe for execution. A strong French
force was
established at Haidardb&d. The civil administration of the Carnatic had
collapsed; and the revenue, even in time of peace, was inadequate to the
demands upon it. The R&ja of Berar was hostile; Poona was at the mercy of
Sindhia; and Oudh was agitated and insecure. Cornwallis had aimed at securing a
balance of power in the Deccan; and his method had consisted chiefly in doing
nothing. This policy had been continued by Sir John Shore, with the result of
reducing the power of the Peshwa almost to vanishing point. There was pressing
danger from Mysore; and hardly less serious was that from HaicLardMd.
Lord
Momington dealt first with the Nizdm. “A French State in the peninsula,” to use
Wellington’s phrase, was growing up in the territories of Haidardbdd; and it
was the Govemor-General’s first aim to destroy it. The Nizdm’s minister, the
Azim-ul-Umard, was favourable to a British alliance, as a counterpoise to the
Mar&tha power. In September, 1798, a treaty was drawn up, largely through
his influence, by which the Niz&m was to receive a British-officered force
of Sepoys and to dismiss his French officers, disbanding their troops; further,
the British Government was to mediate between the Niz&m and the Peshwa,
that is practically to protect the former against the Mar&thas. Mornington
had able agents. One was a very clever young officer, John Malcolm; another was
the British resident, Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick; a third was Colonel
Roberts, who led the British troops to Haidar&bdd. Raymond was dead, his
successor, General Perron, was unable to resist; and the disarmament of the
French troops took place without a blow. Well might Dundas write that the
policy and its execution were alike masterly and effectual. In October, 1800, a
defensive alliance guaranteed the territories of the Niz&m, and gave him'
the support of 10,000 of the Company’s troops. The alliance with the Niz&m
marked an important stage in the settlement of southern India. Lord Mornington
had no idea of leaving the direction of policy to the local authorities; he
made it clear that the direction of policy in Madras and Bombay, as well as in
Bengal, was his peculiar province; and he reduced the Presidencies of the west
and south to submission to his will. But the most important step in the
settlement of the south was the conquest of Mysore.
In Tipu
Momington saw the chief danger to the peace of India. Mysore seemed a centre of
anti-British intrigue which might culminate in alliances from Cape Comorin to
Afghanistan. The public announcement of Tipu’s overtures to the French in
Mauritius and the alliance offered by General Malartie determined the
Governor-General to act at once. He sketched with masterly precision a course
of action which should reduce the ruler of Mysore to impotence; and, when he
heard of Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition, he prepared for immediate war. The
British alliance with the Sultan of Turkey did not affect this bigoted
Mohammadan; he counted on the French, and felt confident of success. On
February 22,1799, Momington, who had himself come to Madras to direct
operations, issued a declaration setting forth the occasions of
1799—i80i]
Defeat and death of Tipu. Settlement of Mysore. 723
the war; and
the troops, under General Harris, were set in motion. The circumstances were
very different from those of Cornwallis’ campaigns. British officers now knew
the ground; the commissariat was admirably organised; the alliance of the
Niz&m and the Peshwa was secured; and the object of the war was “ single,
distinct, and definite.”
On March 5
the British troops entered Mysore; and after a series of defeats, Tipu was
unable to prevent the investment of Seringapatam. On April 4 the town was
carried by assault; and Tipu fell in the thick of the fight. When the Sultdn
was killed, the French troops fired a few volleys but made no further
resistance. The British success was complete; and the subsequent settlement of
the country was just and effective. By the Muslims Tipu was regarded as a hero
and a martyr. It had been his delight to enforce on his subjects and his
vanquished foes “ the honour of Islam ”; and he had at first appealed to Selim
III, as the head of the Muslim world, to protect him. But he was a stem and
savage ruler; and the subject Hindus rejoiced at their deliverance from
Mohammadan tyranny. No action of Momington’s was more politic than the
restoration of the race of the Hindu R&jas from whom Haidar had withdrawn
even the appearance of power. The State was restricted but compact; and
prosperity rapidly returned. “The country is becoming a garden,” said Arthur
Wellesley in 1801; and the Government, over which the British retained a light
but effective control, remained a firm ally of the East India Company. Part of
the territory previously ruled by Tipu was offered to the Mar&thas; on
their refusal, the annexed provinces were divided between the English and the
Nizdm. The Company secured an uninterrupted frontier from the east to the west
of the peninsula, as well as the sea-coast and the forts commanding the passes
over the hills into the Mysore kingdom. As a military, financial, and
pacificatory settlement, the conquest of Mysore was the most brilliant success
of the British power since the days of Clive. It left no serious opponent of
British influence in the whole peninsula save the scattered and disunited
confederacy of the Mardthas.
The
Government at home recognised the greatness of the achievement. Honours were
distributed with unusual liberality; but Lord Momington was not pleased to find
that he was himself only to be a marquess in the peerage of Ireland as Marquess
Wellesley; he called the distinction a “double-gilt potato.” But his annoyance
led to no relaxation of his vigorous activity. He tinned at once to review the
whole course of Indian politics. The States already tributary were first dealt
with, then the external powers. The most pressing questions were those
connected with the Carnatic. The system established there, to adopt the
language of Wellington in 1806, “not only tended to the oppression of the
inhabitants of the country, to the impoverishment of the Nawdb, and to the
destruction of the revenues of the Carnatic, but was carried into execution by
the Company’s civil and military servants, ch.
xxxii. 46 2
and by
British subjects.” By a series of treaties, the Nawdb, while left free in his
internal government, had been placed under control in his external relations;
he was shackled by guaranteed debts to the Company and unrecognised loans from
private persons; his whole position was insecure, discreditable, and dishonest.
At Seringapatam were discovered letters to Haidar Ali and Tipu, which proved
that the Nawdbs had been eager to extinguish their liabilities by joining with
Mysore in shaking off the British yoke; and a careful enquiry established the
fact of this connexion. The death of the Nawdb, Mohammad Ali, proved convenient
for a new settlement. On July 81, 1801, Azim-ud- daulah was set up as Nawdb
with an income of one-fifth of the net revenues; the debts were provided for;
and the administration, civil and military, was handed over to the Company’s
officers.
Similar
arrangements were made in Surat and Tanjore. Surat was at the time one of the
greatest ports in India, exceeding Bombay in importance. The British community
in Surat was struggling, as usual, for privileges or rights; and the native
officials strove to retain the power of unlimited exaction. Wellesley stepped
in on a vacancy in the sovereign power, and executed with the new ruler an
arrangement like that with the Carnatic. British interests were thus secured
from Gujardt to Goa. In the south, the State of Tanjore came into a similar connexion
with the Company. Its Rdja, Sarboji, who had been educated by the famous Danish
missionary, Schwarz, was glad to yield, in confidence and honour, the entire
civil and military administration of his country to the Company’s officers. ‘
In Oudh a similar
arrangement put an end to other difficulties. There was the perpetual danger of
the Do&b frontier, of Rohilkhand, of encroaching Mardthas, Sikhs, and
Afghdns. Even while he was planning the war against Tipu, Wellesley was dealing
with Oudh. On this occasion he received support from home. Dundas was alarmed
by the prospect of an invasion by the Afghdn leader, Zamdn Shah, and urged
alliance with Sikhs and Rajputs, and even with Mardthas, in order to protect
Oudh and Bengal. Wellesley saw that Oudh, in its present state, was
indefensible. The Nawdb Wazir’s troops were no better than an armed rabble; and
the administration, infected by corrupt officials and European money-lenders,
was hopelessly inept. Wellesley determined to exclude every European except
the Company’s officials, and to disband the native force. The Nawdb threatened
to resign; he was advised to surrender the administration to the Company, but
refused. In 1801 the Governor-General sent his brother, Henry Wellesley (afterwards
Lord Cowley) to Lucknow, and was prepared to follow himself,, when the Nawdb
ceded, in perpetuity and in full sovereignty, a large frontier district,
sufficient to protect his territory and to defray the expense of maintaining a
guard of British troops. The treaty of 1801 was severely criticised at home as
unauthorised and unjust; and the
1801-2] Treaty with Oudh.—The Mardtha
confederacy. 725
appointment
of Henry Wellesley to preside over a provisional government of the ceded
district was attacked as a flagrant “job.” The Directors were alienated from
their Governor-General by this apparent infringement of their right of
patronage as well as by his “forward policy.” To later students the wonder is
that, when Wellesley annexed part of Oudh, he did not annex the whole.
The policy of
“ subsidiary ” alliances (that is, alliances involving the support of British
troops paid for by the receiver of such support), culminated in Wellesley’s
dealings with the Mardthas. The decadence of that disorderly confederacy
offered an opportunity and a justification for intervention. He determined to
act boldly and decisively. His action was bold, but it was not decisive.
Perhaps he plucked the fruit too soon; more probably it was the home
authorities who prevented the satisfactory completion of a policy which could
only succeed if pressed to a conclusion. The factors in the problem were the
Peshwa, the aged Ndna Famavfs, now again chief minister at Poona, the families
of Sindhia, Bhonsla, and Holkar. Among their constantly changing relations Wellesley
moved with confidence if not with security. He turned first to the Peshwa, BAji
Rdo; and, as he turned, the Nana, who had ever regarded the English with
jealousy and alarm, expired. An opponent was gone; but the Mardtha Government
was left without a rudder. “With him,” wrote the British resident, “has
departed all the wisdom and moderation of their Government.”
Baji now
became a mere shuttlecock between the two great houses of Sindhia and Holkar.
Daulat Rdo Sindhia was busy fighting with his father’s widows; Jaswant Rdo
Holkar, with his brothers. At last, on October 25, 1802, Holkar defeated the
Peshwa and Sindhia under the walls of Poona, and set up a pretender in the
Peshwa’s place. In December, Bdji, in safety at Bassein, close to Bombay, agreed
to make no treaties save with British consent, and to receive a large British
force, for which he assigned districts to provide the payment. The Treaty of
Bassein made the Peshwa, hitherto regarded by the Company as the head of the
Mardtha confederacy, little better than a servant in their hands. The
arrangement was severely criticised at home. Castlereagh, now President of the
Board of Control, thought it was certain to involve us in further
complications; the Directors deprecated all action which could lead to war.
Wellesley, in defending his policy, surveyed the whole of the Company’s
relations. The first danger he foresaw was from France. Perron had, with
Sindhia’s aid, established a great territorial dominion, embracing the Panjdb,
Agra, Delhi, and a large portion of the Dodb, nearly from the left bank of the
Indus to the Jumna and the Ganges. It was the most vulnerable part of our
north-west frontier; and the name of the unhappy Moghul, Shah Alam, could
always be used to rally forces against us. So long as the Peshwa was bound to
make war and peace
only by the
Company’s advice, there was some security for peace in India—such was the view
of Arthur Wellesley, the able soldier who had already distinguished himself in
Mysore. But the real question was of the excellence of the “ subsidiary ”
system itself; in truth it could not be permanent, and must end in withdrawal
or annexation.
On May 13,
1803, Bdji R£o re-entered Poona as Peshwa, with General Arthur Wellesley as his
guard. On August 3 war broke out with Sindhia; he had not been long in seeing
that his independence would be threatened next. The greatest of Lord
Wellesley’s struggles began. He planned at once to destroy the French force, to
conquer the whole of the land between the Ganges and the Jumna, to seize Delhi
and Agra, and to extend his control from Katak to Bharoch. At the outset,
British arms were successful over a large part of the field. In 1799 Bdji had
given a lease of all the Peshwa’s rights in Gujar&t to Govind R&o; but
K&nhoji Gaekw&r, supported by his Arab guard, had held the capital,
Baroda. Wellesley saw the importance of securing this commercial and military
post; and the British troops took it by storm. In April, 1805, a treaty
established a satisfactory settlement. Katak was still more easily secured. In
Hindustan and the Deccan the work was much more serious.
In the Deccan
Arthur Wellesley was in command. He had to meet both Sindhia and Bhonsla. He
took Ahmadnagar and Aurang&bdd, and on September 23,1803, fought the famous
battle of Assaye. An infantry attack was followed by a cavalry charge; and
Sindhia’s French troops, as well as his own newly-organised infantry, were put
to flight. Two months later Bhonsla was defeated at Argdon; and on December 14*
the capture of Gawilgarh practically ended the war with the Rdja of Berar.
Bhonsla on December 17, 1803, signed the Treaty of Deogaon, agreeing to dismiss
all foreigners whose countries were at war with England, to receive a resident,
and to give up Katak. In Hindustan General Lake gained some brilliant
successes. Perron gave up his post with Sindhia; Bourquin was defeated outside
Delhi; and the aged Shah Alam was raised again to semi-independent power. Agra
was taken; and Sindhia’s army, after hard fighting, was scattered to the winds at
Lasw&ri. The Treaty of Surji Aijang&on took from Sindhia all the land
between the Jumna and the Ganges, and all north of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Gohad.
A difficult
point was the rock fortress of Gwalior, which Hastings had long ago called the
key of Hindustan, and which had been seized by Sindhia from the Rlja of Gohad.
Sindhia was anxious to retain it; but Lord Wellesley demanded its surrender, in
order that the Company might restore it to their faithful ally, the R&ja of
Gohad. Arthur Wellesley said he would sacrifice it and every other frontier
town ten times over “to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith”; and
John Malcolm supported him strongly. But Lord Wellesley replied,
1802-5] War with Holkar. Defeat of
Monson. 727
“Major
Malcolm’s business is to obey my orders and enforce my instructions; I will
look after the public interest ”; and Gwalior was surrendered. Soon afterwards
Sindhia accepted a modified “ subsidiary ” treaty; but in 1805 he regained the
territory of Gohad and the fort of Gwalior. Three out of the four chief
Mar&tha States were now subdued; and there was no French centre of
influence left in India. But there was still a power to reckon with, more
dangerous and astute than any other.
Jaswant R6o
Holkar had emerged from a confused series of battles and intrigues as the
strongest member of the family of Tukaji, of whom he was an illegitimate son;
and he soon made himself the ruler of the territory which had been so wisely
administered by his father and by the great Ahalya B6i. He and Sindhia in turn
sacked each other’s capitals; and it was the capture of Poona by his troops in
1802 which led to the epoch-making Treaty of Bassein. During the recent war he
had stood aloof; now he seemed suddenly to perceive his danger, and prepared
for war. Illusory negotiations were for a time carried on ; but on April 16,
1804, the Governor-General gave orders to Lake, the
commander-in-chief, and to Major-General Arthur Wellesley, to commence hostile
operations. Lake was to move from Delhi; Colonel Murray, starting from
Gujar&t, was to reduce Holkar’s possessions in Malwa. Rdmpura was taken on
May 16; but an advance by Colonel Monson into M&lwa met with utter
disaster. He had hoped to meet Murray, but the latter had turned back; and,
when Monson, misled by the treacherous advice of Sindhia’s general, nominally
his ally, moved down the Mukandwdra pass into the open country towards the
Chambal river, he heard that Murray could not join him. He therefore determined
to retreat, leaving Lucan with the cavalry to protect his rear. Lucan was
surprised, and his force cut to pieces, by Holkar, who thereupon pursued
Monson, and attacked him on all sides. The retreat became a disorderly flight;
and Zdlim Singh, Regent of Kota, refused to allow the British forces to find
shelter within his city. A demoralised rabble, the only remains of the five
battalions of infantry, 4000 horse, and artillery, which had formed the force
at the outset, eventually found refuge within the fort of Agra.
The defeat of
Monson was a blow in northern India which recalled the disasters of Baillie and
Braithwaite in the south. Native ballad- mongers made the most of it; and
native Princes again took courage to resist the mighty foreigner. Holkar
gathered a large army, and entered Hindustan as a conqueror; but he remained
there only seven months. Murray seized his capital, Indore. Laying siege to
Delhi, Holkar was kept at bay by a mere handful of men, and eventually withdrew
southward, contenting himself with ravaging the Do&b. Of the horrors of
native raids contemporary observers have left vivid pictures. One is that of
Colonel James Tod, British representative among the Rajputs, who says, “
wherever the Mar&thas encamped, annihilation was ensured; and twenty-four
hours sufficed to give to the most flourishing spot the
728 Reforms in judicature, civil service,
andfinance, [ras-isos
aspect of a
desert.” He spoke from his own observation; and Holkar was the most savage
freebooter of his time. But his career was cut short by General Frazer, who won
a brilliant victory at Dig on Nov. 12, 1804; and Holkar’s cavalry was cut up
three days later by Lake at Farrukhdbdd. On December 24 Dig, in the Bharatpur
country, fell before the British arms; and the Rdja of Bharatpur, after keeping
Lake at bay for many months, at last consented to a treaty.
It was at
this point, when success was within his grasp, that Wellesley’s government came
to an end. For this abrupt conclusion there were other causes besides Monson’s
defeat. The Directors had viewed with increasing alarm the expansion of their
territory under the forward policy of their brilliant Governor-General. They
were quite unprepared to undertake Imperial responsibilities. Lord Wellesley
saw that some one government must weld the different nations and races of the
vast peninsula into a single whole; the Directors, of whom Charles Grant was an
able spokesman, regarded the idea as a scheme of ambition and aggrandisement,
contrary to the Act of 1784, and in principle wholly unjustifiable. But it was
not only the rapid advance of empire, involving what seemed like an attempt to
rival in India the aggressions of Napoleon in Europe, against which the
Directors protested. At every point of administration Wellesley had matured
plans for improvement. Some of them he had carried into effect; others waited
for sanction; and the sanction was refused. He reconstituted the chief civil
and criminal Courts, the Sadr Diwdni Addlat and the Nizdmat Adalat, no longer
retaining for the Governor-General in Council those judicial duties which it
was impossible for him, in the pressure of other business, adequately to
perform. He planned a reorganisation of the whole system of government. The
scheme exists in manuscript, but it never approached acceptance. The
Governor-General proposed that there should in future be only two divisions of
British India—Bengal, and Madras with Bombay and Ceylon. The Governor-General
was to be over both, with a Council and a Vice-President for each. Li view of
the Company’s growing responsibilities, it was not surprising that such a
scheme failed to obtain consideration.
Closer to the
Govemor-General’s heart was the training of the Company’s civil servants. The
ignorance of the local officials led too often, said Wellesley, to sloth,
indolence, and low debauchery. The young men who were sent out had no previous
training; and the training they received in India was inadequate to enable them
successfully to act as judges, financiers, administrators, and rulers.
Wellesley determined to supply the training by a college to be erected at Fort
William, for which he planned the government, discipline, and course of study.
His foundation received the warm approval of Warren Hastings, who had had a
similar scheme in mind thirty-five years before ; but the Directors took alarm,
and the college speedily disappeared.
1799-1805]
Question of free trade.—Wellesley retires. 729
In finance
Wellesley made great advances; the commercial classes acquired new confidence
from his firm rule; and public credit became much more secure. In regard to the
inevitable breakdown of the Company’s monopoly, Wellesley was prepared to make
advances towards free trade, and Dundas at home was ready to support his
action; but the Directors raised shrill cries of alarm. Not only would their
trade be destroyed, but England would be depopulated. “Free trade,” they
asserted, “cannot be permitted without being followed by a general intercourse,
nor that without hazard to our political power in the East.” Wellesley, like
his friend Pitt, knew The Wealth of Nations too well to take such a view. He
suggested the employment of ships built in India, and a considerable increase
of freedom for private trade. In a letter to the Court of Directors, dated
September 30,1800, he foretold a vast expansion of trade. This trade (he said)
must, if possible, be kept in British hands; and this could best be done by
giving liberty to British merchants to provide their own tonnage as they needed
it, hiring ships under regulations framed by the Company. In this attempt to introduce
free trade, Wellesley was warmly supported not only by the mercantile interest
in England, but by Castlereagh and Dundas; the Company’s opposition was,
however, determined. Charles Grant observed that the Govemor-General’s letter,
advocating the enlargement of private trade, arrived when his educational
scheme was being considered; and this coincidence wrecked them both. “It would
lead,” said Grant, “to the supersession of the Company, the opening of trade,
and ultimately the endangering of our Indian Empire.” Grant’s opposition was
particularly unfortunate for Lord Wellesley, as in May, 1804, he was made
Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, and next year Chairman; he became,
said those who knew, not merely a Director but the Direction.
There was,
unfortunately, another bone of contention between the Governor-General and his
masters. As Sir John Macpherson admitted, “merit and capacity to serve” were
the only qualifications which he considered in the appointments he made; but
the Directors wished to have more than a finger in the pie, and cancelled the
appointments of eminent men with something like personal resentment. The
records of the India Office are full of denunciations and criticisms. Wellesley
had long felt the irksomeness of his position; and it was only by repeated
requests from the Government that he was induced to remain. When, early in
1805, the Court censured his appointments, his
expenditure, his disobedience to their orders, he resolved to abandon his
post; and on August 15 he sailed for England, with his work still incomplete,
but having accomplished more than any of his predecessors, and established
throughout India the ascendancy of the British power.
The one
superior power left in India was such only in name ; but it had been an
important part of Wellesley’s policy to preserve and utilise this nominal
superiority. The Moghul, Shah Alam, by an agreement
made early in
1805, was established at Delhi under British protection, with a considerable
payment and provision for his dignity. The object of this was as little
understood in England as Wellesley’s general policy of “ subsidiary” alliances.
Even Pitt is reported by Castlereagh to have said that the Governor-General had
acted most imprudently and illegally; and it was on this understanding, and
with the object of reversing all that could be reversed, that Lord Cornwallis
again accepted the Govemor-Generalship. He entered on his duties on July
30,1805. He immediately began negotiations with Holkar with the view of
concluding peace. His view was that the line of the Jumna should be taken as a
military frontier, that all the countiy west of that line should be given up;
and that the territories south and west of Delhi should be granted to the
smaller RAjas, who were to be pledged to relinquish all claims to British aid.
Either they would unite against Sindhia, or he would have enough to do to
reduce them. The British rule was to depend, not on its own power, but on the
internecine strife of its rivals. So much was clearly sketched ; and something,
in spite of the bitter opposition of Lord Lake, was accomplished, when
Cornwallis died on October 5, having held office little more than two months.
Sir George
Hilaro Barlow, a civil servant of the Company, senior member of the Council, succeeded
provisionally to the post, and was immediately confirmed in it by the Court of
Directors. A conscientious and strong-minded man, Sir George Barlow felt
himself bound to carry out the known wishes of the Directors, and to endure the
obloquy which was sure to fall upon him for repudiation of honourable
obligations. The treaty made with Sindhia meant the abandoning of many allies,
and the practical submission of the Rajput chieftains to his attacks. Holkar
was pursued by Lord Lake across the Sutlej into the territory of the great Sikh
ruler Ranjit Singh. The attitude of the Sikhs was long undecided; but early in
1806 Ranjit Singh came over decidedly to the British side. A series of treaties
left a number of minor chieftains to the vengeance of Holkar, and allowed him
to recover the greater part of his lost dominions. Misled perhaps by the fears
disseminated by returned civil and military servants, who told them that he was
now the only strong power in India, and that they must court his friendship, the
Board of Control sanctioned a treaty by which Holkar, who had taken refuge in
the Panj&b in his disorderly flight before the British army, was permitted
to return to his dominions, and was established in a greater position than he
had ever held before. Moreover, in April, 1809, a treaty was made with Banjit
Singh by which the Sikh power was restricted to the north of the Sutlej. But
Jaipur was abandoned; and the Sikhs were left free to subdue the districts of
Multdn, Kashmir, Pesh&war, and the Derajdt.
The
administration of Sir George Barlow marked the practical abandonment of central
India to rapine and anarchy. Udaipur was
1808-iq]
Lord Minto in office.—Mutiny at Vellore. 731
the prey of
savage pretenders to the hand of its R&ja’s daughter, who was at last
driven to suicide to save her father from entire subjugation. The peace which
it was hoped the British power could uphold was lost; and the influence of the
Company was maintained only at the Courts of Haidar&bdd and Poona. Anxious
to please the Directors, Sir George Barlow failed to satisfy the British
Government. Consequently, although he had been practically promised the
Govemor-Generalship, he was superseded by the Crown under the power given by
the Act of 1784; and Lord Minto, who had for some time held office at the Board
of Control, was appointed in his place. Lord Minto assumed the government at
Calcutta on July 3, 1807. The disagreement between the Company and public
feeling was evident also in the fact that, while the Court of Proprietors in 1806
strongly condemned Lord Wellesley’s policy, the attempts to impeach or to
censure him in Parliament were decisively rejected.
The condition
of India when Lord Minto arrived was highly disturbed, not only through the
disastrous policy of leaving the native States to devour one another, and the
disorder in Bundelkhand, but also by a new and most alarming symptom of the
insecurity of the British power. This was the mutiny of the Madras sepoys at
Vellore, in which a large number of British officers and men were slain. The
cause was mainly national, or racial; and the sons of Tipu Sultdn were at least
nominally its leaders. Recent military regulations, utterly unsuited to native
troops, had caused bitter resentment among the soldiers; and by some it was
supposed that there was an intention to convert them to Christianity, a
suspicion which the ostentatious disregard of that religion by the officials at
Madras might have served to discredit. Lord William Bentinck, the Governor, who
was in no way to blame, was removed from his office, and was replaced by Sir
George Barlow, one of whose first duties was to deal with a serious mutiny
among the European officers in the Madras army. Efforts to reduce expenditure
had led to the cutting off of several unsatisfactory methods of raising money;
and investigations, courts-martial, orders of suspension and dismissal, led to
an open outburst against the Government, which threatened civil war. In these
difficult circumstances, Sir George Barlow showed that he possessed distinguished
courage and determination. Aware that a large proportion of the Company’s
troops in the south were banded together to secure the redress of grievances,
he suppressed the mutiny by calling the sepoys to the aid of the Government. At
Seringapatam this actually led to a conflict between the King’s troops and the
Company’s; but eventually peace was secured by concessions which accompanied
the restoration of authority.
Lord Minto’s
term of office was marked by the temporary occupation of Goa, by an abortive
expedition to Macao in 1809—a consequence of Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal—by
the capture in 1810 of the lie
732
Missions to Afghanistan andPersia-Gurkha War. [1807-I6
de Bourbon
and the He de France (Mauritius), and by the occupation of Java in 1811, by
which time every position held by France or her dependencies in the East, had
passed into English hands. During this period we should also note the
beginning, or at least the extension, of a policy, of which slight indications
had been given both by Warren Hastings and by Wellesley, of entering into
friendly relations with the great States outside the limits of direct British
influence. Mountstuart Elphinstone led a mission to the Amir of Afghanistan,
who promised to prevent any attack on India through his territory; but the
Amir, Shah Sujah, was himself dethroned immediately afterwards, so that nothing
came of the mission. Sir John Malcolm, who so early as 1803 had been called
“Lord Wellesley’s factotum and the greatest man in Calcutta,” and whom Wellesley
had sent in 1799 to Teheran, went in 1807 on a mission to the Persian Gulf, and
in 1810 again visited the Persian sovereign and obtained an assurance of
friendship. In 1809 Charles Metcalfe negotiated an alliance with Ranjit Singh,
which brought British power to the banks of the Sutlej. Each of these three distinguished
public servants had been trained in the school of Wellesley; and, if the
results of their embassies were not great, they served at least to emphasise
the wide interests of the British power. The treaty with Persia, which was not
definitely completed till 1814, is notable as showing that the British
Government was already apprehensive of Russian influence in the East, the
security of Persia being guaranteed against any attack from that quarter.
The
Govemor-Generals who succeeded Wellesley possessed none of his fire, even if
they had his opportunities; and the work of Lord Minto was rather one of
consolidation than of fresh advance. Legal changes, some attempts to redress
the errors of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, and to reform the rural
system of the Madras Presidency (a great public service for ever associated
with the name of Sir Thomas Munro), and a vigorous effort to organise a police
force and local criminal judicature, marked the period which ended in 1813. In
1814 a new advance was made by the Earl of Moira (afterwards Marquis of
Hastings), whom the Prince Regent, his personal friend, sent out to replace
Lord Minto. The most important work of Hastings and his successor belongs to a
later time; it was concerned mainly with the destruction of the Pinddris, the
armed freebooters of central India, and with the final suppression of the
Mardtha power at Poona. Of earlier date, and significant as marking the
direction in which British enterprise was advancing, was the war against the
Gurkhas of Nepdl (1814-6). This expedition was at first unsuccessful, largely
through the unpopularity and rigour of the officers, whom the troops refused to
follow. Things went better when the command was taken over by Ochterlony, who
captured many hill forts, advanced into the valley of Khdtmdndu, and from
Makwdnpur might have pressed on to
the capital
itself. But Hastings was content with a treaty which restricted the Gurkhas in
their power over Sikkim, and, after a renewal of the war in 1816, compelled
them to cede a large tract of territory along the outer ranges of the
Himalayas.
In 1813,
after prolonged debate, the Charter of the Company was renewed for twenty
years. Castlereagh, who introduced the Bill into the Commons, proposed to
establish free trade, both import and export, for all British ships not above
four hundred tons. This liberal approach towards complete freedom was hotly
contested. The Company brought up some of its most distinguished servants to
plead for its privileges. Warren Hastings, the Marquess Wellesley, Lorn
Teignmouth (Shore), Sir John Malcolm, Charles Grant, spoke, but spoke in vain.
The renewal of the Charter in 1813 was, in fact, a decisive mark of the
extended interest which England as a whole was beginning to assert in Indian
affairs. A vast number of pamphlets, papers, reports, protestations of every
kind, manifest the public concern. The settlement of the trade question was
complicated by a passionate religious controversy. A number of timid traders,
and at least as many persons of narrow political views, displayed great alarm
as to the prospects of Christian missions in India. Wilberforce, who powerfully
supported the attempt to win freedom for Englishmen to teach their own religion,
declared definitely “ that the missionaries should be clearly understood to be
armed with no authority, furnished with no commission, from the governing power
of the country.” The distinction was emphasised by Lord Wellesley, who had
definitely asserted the Christianity of the Government when he was in India,
and strongly favoured the increase of the Church establishment; while able
civil servants like Malcolm warmly urged a considerable extension of the
educational work of the Company. Several missions had already been started;
some progress had been made, and further advance was retarded only by the
hesitation of the Government to permit the appointment of a bishop.
Somewhat
apart from the general progress of the British power during the period under
survey stands the history of Ceylon. At the beginning of 1795 the island, long
held by the Dutch, was seized by an expedition from Madras; and on February 16
the Dutch Government surrendered its authority to Colonel Stuart and Captain
Gardner, R.N. The end of the severe and unsympathetic Dutch rule was
universally welcomed in Ceylon. In spite of the most careful regulations for
preserving the rights of the Dutch religious establishment, it soon
disappeared; and no other influence, except in the region of law, remained to
testify to their long occupation. During 1797 there were proposals for the
retrocession of Ceylon to the Batavian Republic; and some injudicious action on
the part of the representative of the Madras Presidency, under which the island
was placed, led to a revolt, which caused Pitt to see the wisdom of placing it
directly under the
Crown. In
October, 1798, Frederick North became first Governor. Lord Wellesley regarded
Ceylon as an important part of the Indian Empire, essential to its defence; and
he proposed that it should be definitely placed under the control of the
Governor-General. While the English held the coast, the mountain kingdom of
Kandy remained independent; and with its ruler North engaged in negotiations
which bore the appearance of a discreditable intrigue. In 1803 British troops
took possession of Kandy, but the bulk of the force was soon withdrawn,
whereupon the remainder were massacred by the natives. It was not till 18l5
that satisfaction for this act was obtained. The King of Kandy for twelve years
ruled without interference as a successful and savage tyrant. At length an
outrage committed on British subjects led to a declaration of war on January
16, 1815. The Governor, General Brownrigg, acted against the advice of his Council,
but was completely successful; and on March 2, 1816, the tyrant was deposed. In
1817 an insurrection broke out, but it was speedily suppressed; and the island
has since then remained tranquil under the British Crown.
The echoes of
the great European conflict were heard in India only like the sound of distant
thunder. But there was one occasion on which the East sent its aid to repel in
a far distant land the encroachments of the West. At the end of December, 1800,
an expedition started from Bombay to intervene in the Egyptian campaign. It
consisted of 6400 British and native troops, commanded by Sir David Baird. The
force landed at Kosseir on June 8, 1801, whence, after a march of 140 miles
across the desert, it reached Cairo on August 10. From Cairo it marched with
the rest of the British army to Alexandria; and three weeks later the French
capitulated.
This
expedition, insignificant as were its immediate results, is remarkable as
illustrating the position which British rule in India had, through the
struggles of the years 1785-1815, definitely attained. The innumerable diaries,
memoirs, letters of travellers, and state papers, in which the inner social
history of this period may laboriously be read, leave an impression of narrow
commercial views, of personal interests selfishly pursued, of a lack of
sympathy with other races, of difficulties of education and environment
awkwardly surmounted, of petty aims and trivial incidents. But to conclude that
this was all would be to take a very superficial view. The Governors who from
time to time guided the policy of the Company in India, much though they
differed in width of view, in knowledge, in statesmanship, were yet, everv one
of them, inspired with an earnest desire for righteousness and justice in their
rule. The experiment of governing millions of Asiatics in accordance with the
dictates of Western ideas was being tried, amid many difficulties, but with
unflinching determination. The greatest of the Governors felt the stupendous
nature of their task. They did not undertake it lightly, whether it was
Cornwallis in his revenue and police
reforms, or
Wellesley in his alliances and his wars. It was an ideal not of conquest but of
empire which they set forth; and from that ideal the deep thought of moral responsibility
was never absent. They had their reward in the permanence of their work. It is
this that makes the growth of British power in the East during the thirty years
that followed the rule of Warren Hastings a unique phenomenon in the history of
the Napoleonic age.
II.—THE
COLONIES (1783-1815).
Although the
French War, which closed with the Battle of Waterloo, was the last episode in
the long contest for colonial and commercial pre-eminence, its colonial
character was less apparent than in the case of earlier wars. The British
colonial empire of the time was of a singularly amorphous structure—in the
East, vast and wealthy territories under the ill-defined authority of a trading
company, moving, under irresistible impulses, in a direction from which its
natural instinct recoiled; in the West, a conquered French possession, some
island colonies hitherto unprogressive, and a wilderness sparsely peopled by
“United Empire Loyalists.” A convict colony in the southern seas could not
arouse enthusiasm ; and the West Indian Islands alone seemed to realise the
idea of the old colonial system. But, such as they were, the colonies and the
nascent Indian Empire were alike protected by the dominant sea-power of Great
Britain. Thus it came about that, though the French Revolution and the
personality of Napoleon dominate the general history of the period, there were
distant regions, of great future importance, which scarcely felt their
influence.
In Australia
and in Canada the seed, sown in dishonour or in carelessness, of a
self-governing colonial empire was struggling into life. That this empire was
due to no conscious aims of British statesmen is manifest. The declaration of
American independence cast its shadow over the years which followed. When, in
1793, Great Britain was involved in war with France, colonies became pawns in
the game; but even then there was no deliberate aim to secure colonial
ascendancy by means of sea-power. The conquered West Indian Islands were, with
the exception of Trinidad, readily restored at the Peace of Amiens. The
ultimate decision to retain Cape Colony and Mauritius was based on military,
not colonial, considerations. At the final peace British statesmen felt no
heartburnings in restoring to Holland that “other India,” Java; and, in justifying
the action of the Government with regard to the French colonies, Lord
Castlereagh deliberately maintained that it was not the interest of England to
make France a mere military, instead of a commercial, nation. The final outcome
of the great war
was the
colonial ascendancy of Great Britain; but such was not the conscious aim of
those who carried through the struggle.
It would be
easy to imagine that the foundation of New South Wales, almost immediately
after the loss of the American colonies, was intended to call a new colonial
empire into existence to take the place of the old; but, in point of fact, the
first movers in the matter were careful to explain that they intended no
repetition of the past. In view of the general disapproval of emigration, they
laboured to refute the notion that their project would in any way depopulate
the parent State. The settlers of New South Wales (they asserted) would
principally be collected from the Friendly Islands and China; and only a few
skilled workmen, with the ships’ crews, would be required from England. James
Maria Matra, who was, next to Sir Joseph Banks, chief author of the proposal,
while advocating the colony as an asylum for the American loyalists, still held
that the bulk of the immigrants might come from China. Part of New South Wales
lay in the same latitude as the Spice Islands; and spices and other tropical or
semi-tropical products would be the main wealth of the colony. The whole
expense to the British Government need not exceed £3,000. Lord Sydney, the
Home Secretary, whose department had at the time the control of colonial
affairs, saw no visions of a Greater Britain in the southern seas; but he was
seriously exercised over the question how to dispose of the convicts who were
crowding the English prisons, and he recognised in the proposal a way of
escape. From the time of George I, a regular system of transportation to the
American colonies had been in force; and it was necessary to find a substitute
for this outlet. In 1784 an Act of Parliament was therefore passed enabling the
Government, by an Order in Council, to' indicate places to which convicts might
be transported; and in 1786 “the eastern coast of New South Wales” was declared
to be such a place.
The new
colony extended, on paper, from Cape York, 10° 37' south latitude, to South
Cape, 43° 39' south latitude, and inland as far as 135° east longitude. It
included all the islands adjacent in the Pacific Ocean within the aforesaid
latitudes. These spacious limits were doubtless fixed to forestall occupation
by other Powers. The Governor’s commission might follow the sonorous precedents
of more hopeful times; but there is no reason to suppose that the Government
had in view more than a mere convict colony. Even so, it was started with
amazing recklessness. The coast of New South Wales was practically unknown. The
projectors were ignorant of the physical conditions, which subsequently proved
so great a hindrance to agriculture. The system under which transportation to
the American colonies had taken place had secured the efficiency of convict
labour; but it was a wholly different matter in Australia, where no attempt was
made to select those convicts who were most suitable for agriculture, and
skilled overseers were
1787-92] Captain Phillip. Early struggles of the
colony. 737
not provided.
The wonder is, not that the colonists suffered hardships and want for several
years, but that New South Wales ever successfully emerged from its period of
beginnings.
For this
result the credit is mainly due to its first governor, Captain Phillip. His
appointment evoked surprise from Lord Howe, First Lord of the Admiralty; but he
proved himself eminently the right man for the place. The arrangements made for
the voyage were by no means adequate, but they would have been far more
defective without Phillip’s ceaseless exertions. The first fleet, with 756
convicts on board, started on May 13, 1787, and arrived at Botany Bay on
January 18, 1788. Finding Botany Bay unsuitable for settlement, Phillip
proceeded to examine Port Jackson, where he found “the finest harbour in the
world”; and he selected Sydney as the site of the new colony. Owing to the size
of the trees, the labour of clearing the ground proved almost too severe for
undisciplined convict labour. In this state of things, Phillip recognised the
necessity of a regular supply of provisions for four or five years. The home
authorities took little interest in the emigrants; and, when to this difficulty
was added the loss of ships with stores, famine itself came perilously close.
Other troubles beset the sorely-tried Governor. Major Ross, who commanded the
Marines, was a continual thorn in his side. The dignity of the service forbade
that officers should hold any intercourse with the convicts when not directly
compelled. A further cause of anxiety arose from the disproportion of the sexes
in the colony. The first intention had been that the convicts should receive
wives from the South Sea Islands; and, even when this idea was abandoned, the
proportion of women to men sent out in the years during which the system of
transportation prevailed was seldom higher than one in three, and often much
lower. The first settlement might well have consisted only of able-bodied men
who might have received wives after carrying out the preliminary work; in the
course actually adopted there was neither method nor convenience.
Nevertheless,
through all his trials, Phillip maintained his faith in the future of the
country. He never wavered in the belief that the colony would “ prove the most
valuable acquisition Great Britain ever made,” although he recognised that no
country offered less assistance to the first settlers, or “ could be more
disadvantageously placed with, respect to support from the mother-country, on
which for a few years we must entirely depend.” Before starting he had written:
“as I would not wish convicts to lay the foundation of an Empire, I think they
should ever remain separated from the garrison and other settlers that, may
come from Europe.” Experience now proved that fifty farmers sent out with their
families would do more in one year to render the colony self-dependent than a
thousand convicts. The “assignment” system, under which alone convict labour
could be made economically profitable, was suggested by Phillip. Free emigrants
should have the
labour of a
certain number of convicts for two or three years, after which they should be
able to support themselves, and pay, in return for convict labour, the cost of
the passage out of such convicts. The first free settlers arrived in New South
Wales in 1793, after Phillip had left the colony; but their arrival was due to
his despatches. The work committed to Phillip was in some ways squalid;
nevertheless, he has rightly taken rank among “the builders of Greater Britain.”
The success
or failure of one-man government will always depend upon the efficiency of the
directing mind. So regardless, however, were the home authorities of this
elementary truth, that a considerable interval took place between the departure
of Phillip and the arrival of his successor. Phillip left Sydney in December,
1792; Hunter did not reach that place till September, 1795. This interregnum
proved calamitous to the colony. The military Acting-Governor superseded the
civil Courts; the restrictions against the supply of spirits to convicts were
relaxed; and, when Hunter at last arrived, he proved unable to abate the evils
which had arisen. In 1799 he was recalled. While the colony was suffering evil
days, a discovery was made, which, more than anything else, rendered possible a
different and happier Australia. Phillip had reported that sheep would not
thrive in New South Wales; but in 1794 Captain MacArthur, who had gone out as
an officer in the New South Wales Corps, began his efforts in the direction of
producing fine wool; and two years later he obtained some sheep of the pure
merino breed from the Cape. It was from these beginnings that the great
pastoral industry of Australia took its rise.
The
appointment of Hunter’s successor, King, was made, though late, on the advice
of Phillip, who had recommended him for the post. The task which awaited the
new Governor was very difficult. The unrestricted importation of spirits had
proved the curse of the colony; and to check this evil was to come in conflict with
vested interests and to incur unpopularity. Nevertheless, the landing of
spirits without a written permit for the specific quantity was forbidden; and
in no circumstances was drink recognised as an object of traffic. We are told
that nearly 70,000 gallons of spirits and over 31,000 gallons of wine were
refused a landing during King’s government. Moreover, the fixing of reasonable
prices made the trade less tempting. The improvement in the morals of the
colony during King’s period of government was attested by those best able to
pronounce an opinion.
In 1802 a
considerable flutter was caused in the little community by the appearance of
two French vessels under Captain Baudin. The avowed object of the expedition
was scientific; and it received a friendly welcome, even before the
announcement of the Peace of Amiens. It was rumoured, however, that the real
object was to found French colonies in the southern seas. In any case, without
the command of the sea, such colonies must have succumbed to the English. After
the death of the gallant
18O6-21]
Bligh and Macquarie. Progress of the colony. 739
Baudin, the
French authorities at Mauritius, having captured and imprisoned the explorer
Flinders on his passage to England, attempted, by the use of his papers, to appropriate
for their ships the credit of his discoveries along the south coast of
Australia.
King’s
successor, Bligh, arrived in Sydney in August, 1806; and a change at once took
place in the aspect of affairs. In putting down the liquor-traffic, he acted
with such violence and illegality that Major Johnston, who commanded the forces
at Sydney, took the strong step of deposing and imprisoning the Governor. That
such an event could occur, shows a startling state of things; but it is
doubtful whether, in the circumstances, the action of Major Johnston and his
associates was not justified. The impotent conclusion of Johnston’s
court-martial in England, which, while finding him guilty, contented itself
with cashiering him, virtually admitted the provocation under which the colony
laboured. “ My will is the law ” was Bligh’s motto; and it is easy to see how,
on such principles, the Governor’s power might be abused.
Of the form
of government which prevailed throughout this period it is difficult to form a
dear notion. The first three Governors were sailors, accustomed to the
discipline of a man-of-war. No nail, King explained, was issued without the
written order of the Governor. The settlers and free labourers were compelled
to attend at stated musters. Strict regulations enforced the observance of
Sunday; and all persons found strolling about the towns of Sydney and Paramatta
during the time of divine service were summarily locked up. A paternal
government fixed the rate at which all articles could be sold. Written
promissory notes were forbidden. The quality of flour was rigidly prescribed.
No cow, ewe, or breeding sow might be killed; and weekly returns had to be
furnished of all slaughtered stock. Meanwhile the colony was slowly developing.
Eighteen years after its foundation there were between six and seven hundred
landholders, of whom about four hundred were ex-convicts. About 20,000 acres
were under cultivation, and over 144,000 under pasture.
The military
situation seemed to demand a military Governor as Bligh’s successor; and
Major-General Nightingale was intended for the post. The 73rd Regiment under
Colonel Macquarie was detached for service in the colony; and Macquarie was to
act as Lieutenant-Governor during the absence of the Governor. Nightingale, however,
never took up the appointment; and Macquarie was made Governor. The long period
of his government, which lasted till 1821, embodied in crude exaggeration the
theory which was to yield to new influences. Macquarie believed in Australia as
a countiy for convicts and emancipists, and resented the presence in their
midst of free settlers. These, he thought, as unwelcome intruders, had no cause
for complaint if he refused to treat them as freemen. Macquarie placed on
record his deliberate opinion that he was justified in flogging “profligate
men, though at
740 Settlements in Australia.—State of Canada.
[i789-i8i6
the time
free, without any trial or examination before a Court.” This flogging occurred
in 1816, and the justification was written four years afterwards. How from such
beginnings Australia gradually developed, until now it is perhaps the most
democratic community upon the face of the earth, will be told later.
In spite of
the wide terms of his commission, New South Wales, as known to Phillip, included
only the present county of Cumberland; it stretched from Broken Bay in the
north to Botany Bay in the south. The exploration of the Hawkesbury and Nepean
rivers in 1789 opened up a large stretch of fertile country on their banks; and
the crossing of the Blue Mountains in 1813 enabled the rich district of
Bathurst to be thrown open to settlement. In 1797 the mouth of the Hunter river
was discovered; and a branch depot for convicts was afterwards started there.
So little was known of the coast of Australia that it was not till 1798 that
Bass, sailing in an open boat, proved Van Diemen’s Land to be a separate
island. In 1801-3 Flinders first made a survey of the coast of southern
Australia. Port Phillip was discovered in January, 1802; and it was decided to
form a settlement there as well as in Van Diemen’s Land. But the
Lieutenant-Governor, Collins, who arrived in October, 1803, formed a most
unfavourable opinion of the site, and he was allowed to remove to Van Diemen’s
Land, where he founded the settlement of Hobart. A settlement was also started
at Port Dalrymple on the north coast of the island.
If the early
history of New South Wales crudely illustrates the temper of the times with
regard to colonisation, in Canada a very different problem was exercising the
minds of British statesmen and Governors. The history of Canada down to the
British conquest has been described in a previous volume. At first the new
province was placed under military rule; but the disposition of the British
Government, both at home and in Canada, was very conciliatory, and the system
was well adapted to the simple character of the population. There was distress,
owing to the delay of the French Government in admitting liability on the
paper-money; but, upon the whole, the people seemed fairly content with their
new rulers. The problem how to recognise the position of the Roman Catholic
Church, while preventing it from becoming a nucleus for French intrigue, was
solved by tacitly allowing claims which could not be openly admitted.
It was the
singular good fortune of Great Britain that, when war broke out with France in
1793, it came in such a fashion as to alienate the natural sympathies of the
Canadian people. The British Governors were under no illusion as to their
temper; there was acquiescence in British rule, but the patriotism and
prejudices of generations could not be uprooted in a day. The British officers,
to whom the care of the new colony was entrusted, regarded with special favour
the simple and
i763-i8oo] French population of Canada.-First
Governors. 741
pious
inhabitants, and drew comparisons between them and the cantankerous and
meddlesome “sutlers and traders,” as they called the New England commercial
immigrants. Nevertheless the British rulers, in their efforts to conciliate
their new subjects, had no easy task. The deep-rooted British prejudice against
Roman Catholicism proved a serious hindrance. The royal instructions, which
forbade holy orders being conferred “without a licence first had and obtained
from the Crown,” were, however, quietly ignored; and, in spite of occasional
friction, the relations between the authorities and the Roman Catholic
hierarchy were on the whole friendly. The feudal system, which had survived in
Canada, was a very different thing from that swept away by the Revolution in
France. “ By degrees,” the Lieutenant-Governor, Milnes, wrote in 1800, “the
Canadian gentry have become nearly extinct; and few of them, on their own
territory, have the means of living in a more affluent and imposing style than
the simple habitants, who feel themselves in every respect as independent as
the seigneur himself, with whom they have no further connexion than the obligation
of having their com ground at his mill, paying their toll of a fourteenth
bushel, which they consider more as a burdensome tax than as a return to him
for the land conceded by his family to their ancestors for ever, upon no harder
condition than the obligation above mentioned, a trifling rent, and that of
paying a twelfth to the seigneur upon any transfer of the lands.”
In this state
of things it was obvious that the seed of social revolution would fall on
stony ground, though reports of French republican designs on Canada fill a
large part of the state-papers of the time. The habitants, it is true,
displayed great reluctance to serve in the militia, and, on the first day they
were called out, “broke into a mob and refused to be balloted for.” But this
was attributed to long disuse of military service rather than to active
disloyalty. Here and there a French patriot might lament that Canada had not
been “ re-demanded ” at the Peace of Amiens; but, on the other hand, French
Canadians, especially the religious institutions and the clergy, contributed
substantial sums to the cost of the war. In any case, the risk of attack from
France was never serious. Napoleon, who, conscious of his lack of sea-power,
abandoned Louisiana to the United States, was never in a position to invade
Canada with success.
If political
conditions thus favoured the beginnings of British Canada, she was also
fortunate in her early rulers. Compared with the average of mediocre
place-hunters who had presided over the destinies of the American colonies, the
first Governors of Canada stand out conspicuously. Murray (1763-6) was an
upright soldier, and a persona grata to the Canadian population; Haldimand
(1778-85) was a hardworking and conscientious Swiss, whose reputation has been
vindicated from the aspersions of earlier writers by the publication of the
records in
the Canadian
archives. But above all, one name must always be associated with the making oi
British Canada—that of Sir Guy Carleton. As Lieutenant-Governor or Governor of
Quebec from 1766 to 1778, and again, from 1786 to 1796, as Governor of Quebec
and subsequently Governor-General of the British North American possessions
after the passing of the Constitutional Act, he had unrivalled means of ji
dging of the character of the new colony; and no one could have used his
knowledge to better purpose.
Even Carleton,
however, was unable to check one of the worst abuses of the old British
colonial system. In indignant language he called attention to the abuses of the
system of fees and perquisites to judges, officials, and others. He denounced a
system “which alienates every servant of the Crown from whoever administers the
King’s government. This policy I consider as coeval with His Majesty’s
governments in North America, and the cause of their destruction. As its object
was not public but private advantage, so this principle has been pursued with
diligence, extending itself unnoticed, till all authority and influence of
government on this continent was overcome, and the Governor reduced almost to a
mere corresponding agent, unable to resist the pecuniary speculations of
gentlemen in office, or to convict their connections and associates of any
enormity whatever. It was not therefore surprising that this phantom of an
executive power should be swept away at the first outset of a political
storm....Whatever tends to enfeeble the executive power on this continent
tends to sever it for ever from the Crown of Great Britain.” It was in fact the
weakness rather than the tyranny of the executive which was the chief evil of
the old system of government; and it is this weakness for which responsible
government has provided the remedy. But in Carleton’s time responsible
government was far distant; and a dreary waste had to be passed, wherein the
weakness of the executive, the private interests of the Council, and the
irresponsible clamour of the Assembly were destined gradually to bring about
the final impasse, relief from which was found in a peaceful revolution.
Under the
proclamation of October 7, 1763, regular Courts to administer English law were
to be erected; and the promise of a General Assembly was held out. The
situation had been complicated by the arrival of some two hundred immigrants
from the American colonies. These regarded with dislike and contempt the
ignorant population which surrounded them, and resented strongly the delay in
granting a popular Assembly, in which they alone, as Protestants, would have
taken part. To such the rule of a Protestant minority over Roman Catholics
seemed in the nature of things. The English settlers were mostly traders or
disbanded soldiers; and the Justices of the Peace were largely recruited from
the ranks of those who had failed in business. Such men “sought to repair their
broken fortunes at the expense of the people.” Grave scandals occurred in the
administration of the law. In
consequence,
an ordinance was passed in 1770 limiting the power of the Justices. At the same
time more drastic measures were recognised to be necessary. In the special
circumstances of the colony, a popular Assembly seemed impossible; but there
was no reason why a French people should not enjoy the benefit of French
customs and laws.
These views
were embodied in the Quebec Act, 1774. Under it, a Council, to consist of not
more than twenty-three nor less than seventeen members, was created. The power
conferred on it to pass ordinances did not include the right to levy general
taxes or duties. The French Canadian law was to prevail in questions “relative
to property or civil rights"; but the English criminal law was to remain
in force on the ground of its “certainty and lenity.” The wisdom of the Quebec
Act was within a short time justified, when the Canadians, generally speaking,
declined to join the rebellious American colonies; but there was no good reason
for retaining within the limits of the Roman Catholic colony the territory to
the west of the Alleghany Mountains, which was the natural heritage of the
American provinces. While, however, the policy of conciliation towards the
inhabitants of French extraction was wise in its day—and it is idle to imagine
that the French nationality could have been peacefully destroyed—the
consequences of the American War of Independence greatly altered the situation.
Many American
settlers, refusing to make terms with the new Republic, sought a new home in
Nova Scotia and the western districts of Quebec, where they became known as
“United Empire Loyalists.’’ The presence of this new element rendered necessary
some modification of the Quebec Act. That the Constitutional Act of 1791 was
not proposed without anxious forethought is clear to every student of the
records. Sir Guy Carleton, while at home on leave, had assisted in framing the
Quebec Act. In 1786 he became Governor-General, with the title of Lord
Dorchester. The following year we find him confessing himself at “ a loss for a
plan.” He recognised the objection to separate assemblies, and hankered after a
“ more general government ” than was provided by the mere existence of a “
Governor-General.” In the same spirit, Chief Justice Smith, an American
loyalist, speaking with the bitterness of past experience, protested against
the establishment of democracy implied by the creation of separate petty
legislatures. There was, however, much force in Grenville’s objection that the
presence in the same assembly of representatives of rival nations, with rival
interests, who had served no apprenticeship in the give and take of political
life, would be a dangerous experiment. Dorchester deprecated haste. He
considered that economic reforms were more urgent than political, that socage tenure
should be introduced in new grants of land, and that the amount of a single
grant should be limited to 1000 acres. Still it was clearly desirable that
English freemen should enjoy popular government; and loyalty to their pledged
word forbade that the British Government
should refuse
to the French of Lower Canada what they were granting to the English in Upper
Canada.
Under the
Constitutional Act, 1791, the province was divided; and separate legislatures
were established in the two new provinces. French laws and customs could thus
be retained in Lower Canada, while the English population of Upper Canada
obtained the benefit of English law. The English inhabitants of Quebec were the
chief sufferers under the Act. Under the electoral arrangements made by the
acting- govemor, Sir Alured Clarke, the proportion of representatives in the
Assembly was fixed according to the existing population of the different
districts. At this time, the agricultural population was almost entirely
comprised in the French seigneuries; and, the number of members of the Assembly
remaining the same, the English townships, as they developed, did not receive
adequate representation. Looking back, we may regret that no attempt was made
to strengthen the government by adding to the efficiency of the Executive
Council. There was in it no division into departments, no individual
responsibility, and no individual superintendence. The claim of Dorchester to
select councillors to form an inner cabinet was not approved by the home
authorities; and the Executive Council was a mere Privy Council, wherein men of
wholly different views might sit side by side. Dorchester’s successor,
Prescott, who arrived at Quebec in 1796, became involved, from the outset, in a
hopeless struggle with his Council over the question of land grants, and, while
continuing to receive his salary as Governor, spent most of his term of office
in England. His successor in the government, Milnes, also found himself
thwarted and opposed by Chief Justice Osgoode. It need not have passed the wit
of man to find a remedy for this unfortunate state of things.
With regard
to the Legislative Council, one provision of the Act has excited much derision.
Pitt proposed that power should be given to the Crown to give hereditary titles
to the members of the Canadian Upper House. Colonial conditions were hardly
such as to render advisable the creation of such titles; nevertheless, the
object of the Government in proposing it was undoubtedly wise. In Grenville’s
words it was, “To give to the upper branch of the Legislature a greater degree
of weight and consequence than was possessed by the councils in the old
colonial governments, and to establish in the province a body of men having
that motive of attachment to the existing form of government which arises from
the possession of personal or hereditaiy distinction.” In Canada, no less than
in the old American colonies, the root of political difficulties lay in the
fact that a democratic Legislature was confronted with a Governor autocratic in
theory, aristocratic by traditions and associations. We are familiar with the
various forms of “ influence ” which, in England, bridged the gulf between the
old system of government and the new. The want of a genuine aristocracy had
been one
cause of the American Revolution; and British statesmen were certainly not
wrong in aiming at supplementing this defect in Canada. It was, however, easier
to will than to accomplish. Dorchester, from the first, advised that the
seigneurs should be attached in every possible way to the British Government.
Unfortunately they were, for the most part, poor; and the feudal system of
tenure, without the military obligations connected with it, afforded few points
of contact between the lords and the censitaires, who to all intents and
purposes resembled English copyhold tenants. A real source of grievance to the
Canadians was the purchase of these estates by Englishmen, and the more rigid
enforcement of legal rights. The sudden disbandment of the Canadian regiment,
raised for the Indian war in 1764, left behind it a feeling of bitterness,
which the well-meant efforts of the British Government were not able altogether
to remove. Moreover, considerable grants of land to the impoverished seigneurs
would have been necessary to make them any real check to the progress of
democracy.
In this state
of things the Assembly fell more and more under the domination of professional
men, who had sprung from the class of habitants. Although the general level of
elementary education was lamentably low, opportunities were not wanting for the
more clever members of a family to receive an advanced education. Such an one
inspired a blind belief in his kinsfolk and neighbours, who themselves might
not be able to read or write. The qualification of electors had been left to
the Canadian authorities; and, though the suffrage might appear extensive
according to English standards, any restriction of it would probably have kept
out the habitants, whom it was the object of the Act to enfranchise. But,
though the result may have been inevitable, it was none the less unpleasant to
the British Governors. One after another, they record the same experience. So
early as 1800, some years before the publication of a French newspaper (which
is sometimes spoken of as the date from which troubles began for the British
Government), we find the Lieutenant-Governor, Milnes, writing “Very few of the
seigneurs have sufficient interest to ensure their own election or the
election
of anyone to whom they give their support and
the
uneducated
habitant has even a better chance of being nominated than the first officer
under the Crown.” On the whole, however, the relations between the Governor and
the Assembly were satisfactory until the time of Craig. In 1810, according to
that official, the Assembly consisted of six petty shopkeepers, a blacksmith, a
miller, fifteen ignorant peasants, a doctor or apothecary, and twelve Canadian
avocats and notaries, besides “ four so far respectable people that at least
they do not keep shops.” Ten Englishmen completed the list. “There is not one
person coming under the description of a Canadian gentleman among them.”
Nor was it
only in Lower Canada that indignant Governors espied the
cloven hoof
of democracy. Upper Canada had been peopled by British soldiers and American
loyalists, a race that might have been expected to stand by the mixed system of
government to which they were accustomed. Yet from Upper Canada the active
Lieutenant-Governor, Simcoe, reported that the general spirit of the country was
against the election to the Assembly of half-pay officers, and in favour of men
who dined in common with their servants. The rulers of the Assembly were active
and zealous for particular measures which were soon shown to be “improper or
futile.”
Dorchester
resigned in 1795 on the ground that he did not agree with the policy of the
Government “to divide and subdivide and to corm independent governments instead
of consolidating, as is done in the United States.” Separate governments had
been carved out of Nova Scotia for New Brunswick and for Cape Breton in 1784;
and Prince Edward Island also had a separate Lieutenant-Governor. Dorchester
resented the practice of the home authorities in holding direct communications
with Simcoe. No subsequent Governor could speak with the authority of
Dorchester; and henceforth the affairs of the two provinces ran in recognised
separate channels. In Lower Canada the difficulties in the way of government
came to a head during Sir James Craig’s term of office, which lasted from 1807
to 1811. Craig was an honest but obstinate soldier, slowly sinking under an
incurable malady. No man was less fitted to the role of constitutional
governor. He sought to cut the knot which he was powerless to untie. George
Ryland was sent on a secret mission to England to obtain, if possible, the
abolition of the Assembly. Ryland not unnaturally found the English ministers,
Liverpool and Peel, “weak, very weak,” and failed in his main object; though he
obtained more sympathy for his proposal to curb the independence of the Roman
Catholic Church. To long-suffering English politicians Craig’s demand for a
distinct enunciation of the principle that Canada was not to be governed by the
House of Assembly seemed very indiscreet. Moreover, the imminence at this time
of war with the United States dictated a policy of conciliation with regard to
the Canadians. The new Governor (1811), Sir George Prevost, was in every way
the opposite of Craig; and the manner in which the Canadians contributed their
share to the defence of the Empire in the American War caused a temporary
improvement in the relations between the Government and the people. One cause
of future friction between the Assembly and the British Government was
fortunately as yet lacking. It was not until 1818 that the offer of the
Canadian Assembly to undertake the full discharge of the civil service was
accepted. Down to that time, the revenue from the fixed customs duties and the
sale of the public lands had been largely supplemented by grants from the Imperial
exchequer. This dependence on the mother-country was no doubt a source of
security to the British
1763-1815]
Canadian development. General despondency. 747
authorities.
It was clear that the right of regulation and control would necessarily follow upon
adequate self-taxation.
Throughout
this period a continual cause of evil was the reckless and wasteful alienation
of the public lands. Land speculators obtained vast tracts, but made no attempt
to promote settlement. Well-meant efforts to benefit individuals, such as the
grants made to the children of United Empire Loyalists, failed in their object,
through the land being, in most cases, resold for a trifling price; and the
rules framed against the excessive size of land grants were in practice successfully
evaded. The existence of great blocks of “ clergy reserves ” was a further
hindrance to cultivation.
Nevertheless,
in spite of economic failure and the wrangling of politicians, the material
development of both provinces went slowly on. The population of Lower Canada,
about 65,000 at the date of the conquest, had increased to about 250,000 in
1810, of whom some 25,000 to 80,000 were British or American. This British
population was, for the most part, confined to the towns of Quebec and
Montreal, and even in these remained a minority of about one to three. Upper
Canada, which was practically uninhabited by Europeans before the American War,
had in 1810 a population of some 70,000. The need for extensive emigration from
England had not yet arisen ; but in 1803 some Roman Catholics from the Scottish
Highlands emigrated to Upper Canada. The attempt of Lord Selkirk, in 1812, to
establish settlements in the Red River valley should be noted as the first
invasion of the closed reserves of the great trading companies. The Hudson Bay
Company and the North-West Company were actively carrying on the fur trade, but
they only held isolated posts. In Lower Canada, Governor Haldimand started the
modest beginnings of the system of canals which was to play a great part in
Canadian development.
The period
was, however, emphatically the day of small things. Throughout we observe the
note of despondency. Carleton saw that North America required a population
fifty times as large as it then possessed; but that he expected little
development seems clear from the view he expressed in 1767 with regard to
Quebec. The severe climate (he wrote) and the poverty of the country
discouraged all but the natives; and any new stock transplanted would be
totally hid and imperceptible amongst them except in the towns of Quebec and
Montreal. The view current in England is probably expressed in a paper written
some years after the close of this period by “ A Military Man.” “ The
possession of this dreary comer of the world is productive of nothing
to
Great Britain but expense Nevertheless,
it pleases the people
of England to
keep it, much for the same reason that it pleases a mastiff or a bull-dog to
keep possession of a bare and marrowless bone, towards which he sees the eye of
another dog directed. And a fruitful bone of contention has it proved and will
it prove betwixt Great Britain and
the
United'States before Canada is merged in one of the divisions of that Empire—an
event, however, which will not happen until blood and treasure have been profusely
lavished in the attempt to defend what is indefensible and to retain what is
not worth having.” The affairs of Canada were to pass through many and evil
days before it found political safety under responsible government and economic
safety in the development of its enormous natural resources.
Throughout
the whole period in question, Canada was, for practical purposes, confined to
what was now its eastern portions. The task of providing a population for
Ontario and adding to that of the eastern provinces was enough, without
attempting the untrodden regions of the west. Great Britain, however,
maintained a lien upon the promise of the future; and when, in 1790, Spain
claimed, by right of previous discovery, the northern Pacific coast up to the
Russian possessions, and seized British ships trading on this coast, the demand
was promptly repudiated. Happily, the action of the French Assembly in refusing
to support Spanish pretensions averted war; and the voyage of Vancouver
(1790-5) served to call further attention to future possibilities. In 1802 Sir
Alexander Mackenzie, who had crossed the continent from the east in 1793,
proposed, on behalf of the North-West Company (founded in 1784), to form a
supreme civil and military establishment on the island of Nootka at King
George’s Sound, with two subordinate posts on the river Columbia and in Sea
Otter Harbour. A trading settlement had been founded at Nootka Sound in 1788;
and there were scattered settlements north of the Columbia belonging to the
Hudson Bay Company; but the time for regular colonisation was not yet.
Mackenzie might reasonably protest against the claim of the Hudson Bay Company
to bar the way to the opening of the West; but it was not till much later that
the grievance became serious.
While continents
in the west and in the southern seas were reluctantly travailing with the
birth-throes of new English nations, the page of history was occupied by events
of a more stormy character. On February 1,1793, the French Republic declared
war against Great Britain; and thenceforth the colonial possessions of the
rival Powers became the prize of whoever should obtain the mastery at sea. The
West Indian Islands have always possessed strategic importance; but at this
time the sugar colonies were valued mainly for their commerce, and as being
among the chief sources of maritime power and national wealth within the
Empire. The old historian of the West Indies compared with pride the extent of
the West Indian and the East Indian trade, and showed that the capital employed
in the former exceeded by almost four to one the capital employed in the
latter, and that the duties paid to the Government stood in the proportion of
over two to one. Tobago, which the peace of 1783 had restored to France, was
captured
in 1793, as
well as the French islands of St Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland. In the
following year Martinique was taken without the loss of a single life. The
possession of the best harbour in the eastern Caribbean Sea rendered this
island a position of special importance. St Lucia and Guadeloupe also
surrendered in 1794. The attempt, however, to combine with these undertakings
the complete occupation of Hayti led to the loss of both the former islands. A
French expedition under Victor Hugues recaptured Guadeloupe at the close of
1794, and St Lucia in the following June. Insurrections were at the same time
stirred up in the British islands of Dominica, St Vincent, and Grenada, which,
in the case of the two latter, were not quelled till the arrival of a British
force under Sir Ralph Abercromby. St Lucia surrendered on May 26, 1796, after
hard fighting, the result being mainly due to the energy and capacity of
Brigadier-General Moore.
Meanwhile the
absorption of Holland by the French Republic had given new hostages to fortune
and the British fleet. The Batavian Republic, established in 1795, was in fact
a mere appendage of France; and the Dutch colonial empire became open to
English attack. Cape Colony was of importance as the halfway house to the East
Indies; and an expedition was despatched under Admiral Elphinstone and General
Craig “ to protect the colony against an invasion of the French.” The Dutch
Governor was in a difficult position. The Prince of Orange, the hereditary
Stadholder, wrote from England bidding him to submit to the English; but there
were no signs of a French invasion, and he preferred to remain faithful to the
de facto government in Holland. Nevertheless, the resistance was not very
formidable; and, on the arrival of British reinforcements under Sir Alured
Clarke, terms of capitulation were arranged on September 16,1795. At the time
of this conquest, there were already in existence the outlying districts of
Stellenbosch, Swellendam, and Graaff-Reinet. These districts had been occupied
in spite of the general policy of the Dutch East India Company; and their
existence rendered more difficult the task of the British authorities. At first
they seemed inclined not to acquiesce in the surrender; but Stellenbosch and
Swellendam soon accepted the British terms; and the Boers of Graaff- Reinet
submitted after an abortive attempt at resistance.
At first
great stress was laid on the temporary nature of the occupation ; but,
whatever the ulterior designs of the British Government, the appointment of
Lord Macartney, who arrived at the Cape as Governor in 1797, and the system of
government introduced, suggested a permanent retention of the colony. Lord
Macartney’s rule, though according to later notions despotic, was just and
honest. The economic condition of the people was improved by the English
occupation; and the “free trade ” promised to the colonists, though very
different from free trade as we now understand it, was certainly an improvement
upon the rigid monopoly of the Dutch East India Company. The main difficulty in
the way of
the British authorities was the same in Cape Colony as in America. An intensely
aristocratic social system found itself confronted with a community which,
whatever had been its political condition, was intensely democratic. Englishmen
of the type of the governing classes of the eighteenth century found it
difficult to associate with the tradesmen and farmers of Cape Colony, although
feminine tact might sometimes bridge the chasm1. Macartney’s stay in
the colony was brief; and unhappily Sir George Yonge, who succeeded him at the
end of 1799, after General Dundas had acted as Lieutenant-Governor for about a
year, laid himself open to grave charges of corruption. Upon investigation at
home, he was acquitted of personal bribery; but the state of things revealed at
the enquiry was discreditable to his government.
The story of
the reduction of the Dutch possessions in India and of Ceylon is dealt with
elsewhere. In the further East, Malacca was taken in 1795, and Amboyna and the
Banda Islands in the following year. The year 1796 also witnessed the reduction
in South America of Deme- rara, Essequibo, and Berbice; Surinam and the island
of Cura^oa were not taken till three or four years later. The alliance of Spain
with France cost the former country in 1797 the island of Trinidad, the accidental
burning of the Spanish fleet preventing any resistance. In Hayti alone the
British attempts met with failure; and they were abandoned in 1798. Subsequent
events in the island, and the fate of its able negro ruler, Toussaint
L’Ouverture, have been described in a previous chapter. Sweden and Denmark lost
their West Indian Islands in 1801. The French alliance proved a costly
connexion for countries with over-sea possessions.
In the West
Indies throughout this period there existed a variety of forms of government.
So long as the negro was deemed a mere chattel, so- called popular government
was possible in these islands in a degree which has become impossible in later
times. Thus we find Lord Castlereagh writing in 1809 of Jamaica, “The
pretension of the Assembly to all the rights and privileges of the House of
Commons is quite absurd; they have no other privileges than those naturally
arising out of and connected with the colonial and limited purposes for which,
by the act of the Crown, they have been created. The control of the army does
not belong to them.” Side by side with the constitutional regimes of Jamaica
and Barbados were the purely military governments of the islands conquered
during the war. Thomas Moore was the governor of St Lucia before its
restitution to the French, and Thomas Picton of Trinidad. The case of Picton in
Trinidad is especially noteworthy. His instructions were, for the present, to
administer Spanish law in both civil and criminal cases. Under the Spanish law
torture was permissible; and it was proved that in the case of a Spanish girl a
slight form of torture had been employed. Public opinion in England was lashed
into a frenzy against the “ bloodstained tyrant”; and Picton became the
subject of a criminal indictment.
He was at
first found guilty on the charge of applying torture illegally, the counsel for
the prosecution having misrepresented the Spanish law; but upon a new trial he
was acquitted, while his character was at the same time vindicated by the
result of a minute enquiry before the Privy Council. There can be no question
as to the honesty and uprightness of Picton, and he proved both an efficient
and a popular governor; the fault really lay with the framers of his
instructions.
Brief mention
may be made of the colony established by the Sierra Leone Company in 1792, with
the philanthropic object of introducing civilisation into the West Coast of
Africa, and thereby striking a blow at the slave-trade. Negroes introduced from
Nova Scotia proved a turbulent addition to the colony. It must be confessed
that Sierra Leone failed to realise the hopes of its founders. “Many of the
settlers,” we are told, “and even some of those who went out in the Company’s
employment, embarked in the service of the slave factories or commenced the
trade upon their own account.” The new movement, which recognised the
brotherhood of man, found more active expression than in the foundation of
Sierra Leone. The Act for the Abolition of the Slave-trade, passed in 1807,
should be noted as closely connected with colonial history. The slave-trade had
been regarded as one of the bulwarks of the old colonial system; and many
believed that its abolition would prove fatal to the colonial interests of Great
Britain. This view was vigorously expressed by Lord St Vincent in the House of
Lords; but, though the measure was, from an economic point of view, “a leap in
the dark,” the conscience of the nation could no longer endure the existence of
this plague-spot in its midst.
It was due to
the sea-power of Great Britain that Napoleon, who fully recognised the
importance of colonial empire, found his best-laid plans working for the
aggrandisement of his chief adversary. In 1798 it seemed as though the splendid
vision of an Eastern Empire might be realised. The retirement of the British
fleet from the Mediterranean left to the French its temporary control. Under
the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797) the Ionian Islands had become a French
possession; and Malta was seized by Napoleon in June, 1798, on his way to
Egypt. Nelson’s pursuit of the French fleet and its destruction in Aboukir Bay
are described in a previous volume; but the Battle of the Nile marks a
turning-point in colonial history, because among its results is to be placed
the permanent British occupation of Malta, which, according to Moore, was in
1800, even after years of neglect, “ the strongest place in Europe.” The
Maltese rose against the French in August, 1798, the garrison taking refuge in
the fortress of La Valetta. After a two years’ blockade by land and sea, they
finally surrendered in September, 1800. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Amiens
stipulated that Malta should be restored to the Knights of St John; and in the
same yielding spirit
Great Britain
restored to France and her allies all conquests except Trinidad and the Dutch
possessions in Ceylon. The retention of Trinidad was perhaps due more to
Napoleon’s anger with Spain than to the persistence of English statesmen. It
was abundantly manifest that Great Britain had not waged war with the view of
enlarging her colonial empire.
The Peace of
Amiens was a mere truce; and, had not Napoleon’s retention of Holland and the
breakdown of the settlement with regard to Malta given cause, some other reason
would have been found for a renewal of hostilities. The provisions with regard
to Malta proved incapable of execution; and the publication of General
Sebastiani’s report on his tour of observation in Egypt and the Levant
justified the contention of those who recognised the importance of Malta as the
key to Egypt and the East. In 1803 war was resumed. St Lucia, Tobago, Demerara,
Essequibo, and Berbice were quickly retaken; and in the following year Surinam
surrendered. Cura^oa and the Danish islands of St Thomas and St Croix were
taken in 1807. In 1809 Martinique was captured, and finally Guadeloupe in the
following year became British; so that no European flag except the English and
the Spanish waved in the West Indies.
Under the
Peace of Amiens the Cape of Good Hope had been restored to the Batavian
Republic; the right being reserved for British ships to use Cape Town for the
purchase of supplies without the payment of duties beyond those payable by
Dutch ships. The new system of government was very different from that of the
East India Company. A council of four members was to assist the Governor. The
judicial authority was made independent of the executive and the legislative.
Moderate custom duties replaced the monopoly of the old Company. The
Commissioner, de Mist, and the Governor, General Janssens, proved worthy
exponents of the new system. Unhappily their ideas of com* prehension and
toleration were beyond the understanding of the Dutch farmers with whom they
were brought in contact. The Dutch government was hardly established when
Great Britain and France were again at war; and in 1805 an expedition was
despatched under Admiral Popham and General Baird against Cape Colony. It
arrived at Cape Town in January, 1806; and, after a gallant attempt at
resistance, General Janssens was obliged to yield to superior numbers.
Before
following the fortunes of Cape Colony, brief mention should be made of a
somewhat shameful passage in British history. The home Government had for some
time cherished vague schemes of obtaining in South America a position
favourable to British trade, through cooperation with the Spanish colonial
insurgents. These schemes had, however, been abandoned out of deference to
Russia. Nevertheless, early in 1806, Sir Home Popham, without orders, and on
the strength of exaggerated rumours of disaffection in La Plata, left Cape
Colony,.
and sailed
against Buenos Ayres. That place surrendered on June 27,
1806, to a small body of troops under General
Beresford. The capture, however, had been in the nature of a surprise; and in
August the British garrison were in turn compelled to surrender to a joint
force of Spanish troops from Montevideo and natives of Buenos Ayres. The
British fleet blockaded the river; and reinforcements from the Cape were encamped
on the sea-coast. Meanwhile the British Government had not the resolution to
abandon a conquest of which it had disapproved. Before the news of the loss of
Buenos Ayres had reached them, an expedition under Admiral Murray and General
Craufurd was arranged for the reduction of Chili. British rule was to be
substituted for Spanish; but, on the crucial question whether Great Britain
would stand by the interests of the inhabitants in the event of peace, all that
the Ministry could express was “an anxious wish...so to regulate the conditions
of any future peace as to leave them no cause for apprehension.” In this state
of things it was perhaps fortunate that the loss of Buenos Ayres compelled the
expedition to be diverted to its reduction. General Whitelocke was despatched
from England, with additional forces, to assume the supreme command. In spite
of a partial success gained by Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the attack upon Buenos
Ayres ended in failure; and in return for the liberation of English prisoners,
General Whitelocke retired from La Plata. Tried by court-martial, he was found
guilty and cashiered; but in fact other things, besides the reputation of an
incompetent general, were on their trial in these proceedings.
After the
second conquest of Cape Colony, British rule was restored on the old lines.
Throughout the period the government was in form a despotism, though the
Governors Lord Caledon (1807-11) and Sir John Cradock (1811-4) were well
disposed towards the Dutch colonists; and the government was carried on, so far
as possible, through Dutch instruments. A cloud, however, soon arose on the
horizon, which was to cast a shadow over the future relations of the Dutch with
the British authorities. The London Missionary Society was founded in 1794, and
a few years later began its work in Cape Colony. It is impossible in a brief
summary to enter into the disputes which arose between the missionaries and the
Dutch colonists upon the question of the treatment of the natives. Doubtless
there were faults on both sides. If the Dutch were often brutal in this
respect, as men who live on the borders of civilisation are wont to be, the
missionaries were not always gifted with common sense. The full results of
these misunderstandings belong to a later date; but, so early as 1812, we find
the interference of the home authorities at the bidding of the missionaries
causing the so-called “black circuit,” which, according to Dutch sympathisers,
left behind it a rankling sense of wrong. At the close of the great war,
Holland recognised the permanence of the British occupation of Cape Colony, as
well as that of Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo, receiving
754
Bourbon and Mauritius. Baffles in Java. [1807-18
in return
various payments amounting to the sum of <£6,000,000; but whether that occupation
would in fact be permanent still remained in doubt. British emigration to Cape
Colony did not begin till 1818; and for many years political symptoms portended
storms. But for the men of that generation the task of confronting Napoleon was
a sufficient burden; the problem of combining authority with freedom in a
colonial empire had to wait for its solution till a later day.
In the Far
East, the renewal of Napoleon’s schemes of aggrandisement rendered necessary
the reduction by the English of Bourbon, the lie de France (Mauritius), and
Java. The two former were taken in 1810; and in Java the Dutch general Janssens
surrendered on September 18 of the following year, after an ineffectual
resistance. The British occupation, though it continued only five years, was
memorable for the reforms initiated by the Governor, Stamford Raffles. The
original intention of the East India Company had been that the island when
taken should be handed over to its native inhabitants. The Governor- General of
India, Lord Minto, who accompanied the expedition, at once saw the
impossibility of this course; and an interim British government was set on
foot. That, in this provisional state of things and with so little time in
which to work, much of Raffles’ system of reform remained on paper, is not
surprising; the wonder is that so much was earned out.
The Dutch
East India Company had come to an end in 1798; but the substitution of the
Batavian Republic for the Company led to no real change of system. The
appointment of Daendel as Governor in 1807 was followed by a reorganisation of
the system of government; but the lot of the natives, weighed down by the
payment of “contingents” and by forced labour, was in no way improved. To them
the substitution of a rigorous and militant central authority for the
malversation of petty officials meant merely an increase of burdens; and
Daendel’s successor, Janssens, again and again reported the extreme
unpopularity of the government. Raffles set himself to remove the causes of
this unpopularity. It is true that the ideas to which he sought to give
practical embodiment were not in themselves new. A Dutch ex-official, Dirk van
Hogendorp, had some years earlier proposed the abolition of all forced services
and the transference of the land to the common people, along with the
introduction of a general tax in kind on the land, and a poll- tax on persons.
The difficulty lay in the application of these theories. In his own words
Raffles proposed: “1st. The entire abolition of all forced delivery of produce
at inadequate rates, and of all feudal services, with the establishment of a
perfect freedom in cultivation and trade. 2nd. The assumption, on the part of
the Government, of the immediate superintendence of the lands, with the
revenues and rents thereof, without the intervention of the regents whose
office shall in future be confined to public duties. 3rd. The renting out of
the lands so assumed in large
or small
estates, according to local circumstances, on leases for a moderate term.”
After a
tentative employment of the agency of intermediate lessees, it was finally
decided that the Government should enter into direct contact with individual
peasant proprietors. In the nature of things it was impossible that Raffles’
system should at once come into full working order. It required, as a condition
for success, a survey of the native lands and a body of trained European civil
servants. Moreover, financial exigencies forbade the immediate abolition of all
forced deliveries; and the same cause prevented the native regents from
receiving such allowances as alone would have rendered possible a complete
change of system. The truth with regard to Raffles’ reforms is by no means easy
to arrive at; for, while his sanguine temperament was apt to confuse intention with
accomplishment, the Dutch officials, after the restoration of the 'slsnd, would
naturally be inclined to depreciate the work of the daring English innovator.
Granting that his work must be measured rather by its promise than by its
actual fulfilment, we shall admit that enough was effected to establish
Raffles’ title to rank among the greatest of English colonial governors. In the
prevailing temper of the time regarding colonies it was not without an ironic
appropriateness that such a man’s labours should have been expended on a colony
destined not to remain British.
By the first
Treaty of Paris (May, 1814) Malta was recognised as British; but all the French
colonies conquered by England were restored, with the exception of Tobago, St
Lucia, and Mauritius, with its dependencies Rodrigues and Seychelles. By the
London Convention of August, 1814, Great Britain agreed to restore all the
Dutch colonies except the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice.
The islands of Banda were given up to the Dutch in exchange for Ooch i and its
dependencies on the coast of Malabar. The result of the great war was not so
much to add to the size of the British Empire, though the gain of Cape Colony
led in time to a great extension of territory, as, by the assertion of
sea-power, to secure to the scattered portions of that Empire their peaceful
development under British supremacy.
ST HELENA.
The abdication of Napoleon, his retirement from Paris
to Malmaison, and his flight to Rochefort, have been related in a previous
chapter. When Napoleon arrived at that port (July 3,1815), he found the coast
narrowly watched by British sail, and hazard upon every side. For ten days he
waited to balance chances, conscious of a certain loss of elasticity in himself,
listening to the counsels of others, himself indifferent. A clandestine escape,
an ignominious capture in the ballast of a Danish sloop or in an open row-boat,
would have been inconsistent with an impressive close; and, after some
hesitation, he rejected all desperate expedients and determined to throw
himself on the generosity of the English people. On July 13 he wrote to the
Prince Regent that he had terminated his political career, and that he came,
like Themistocles, to seat himself at the hearth of the British nation and to
claim the protection of her laws. Two days later he gave himself into the
charge of Captain Maitland of the Bellerophon. He knew well that he could
expect little mercy from the restored Government of France, and that the
Prussians would shoot him like a dog. But England was the refuge of the
homeless and the asylum of the exile. She had sheltered Paoli, the friend of
his youth; she had sheltered the Bourbons, the rivals of his manhood. Out of
magnanimity she might shelter him.
But the man
whose ambition had wrought such disasters could not expect to be treated with
leniency; and the British Government determined that Napoleon was no guest, but
a prisoner of war. It was a case of policy, not of precedents; and, even if
Lord Liverpool’s Cabinet had been accessible to quixotic impulses, it would
have been their plain duty to suppress them in the interests of European peace.
The Congress of Vienna had declared Napoleon to be an outlaw, and, in virtue of
a Convention struck on August 2, 1815, the four Great Powers agreed to regard
him as their common prisoner. The turn of events had devolved upon Great
Britain the ungracious office of the gaoler; but Austria, Russia, and Prussia
were consenting parties; and all four Powers promised to name commissioners to
assure themselves
of Napoleon’s
presence in the place of his captivity. Meanwhile, on July 28, the British
Government had decided to send their captive to St Helena. In that lonely
island of the Atlantic, with its precipitous coast, its scanty harbourage, its
sparse population, the great prisoner of state might be securely guarded, the
more so as the East India Company, to whom the island belonged, had recently
erected upon it a complete system of semaphores. The climate was reported to be
salubrious; and in St Helena Napoleon might enjoy a larger measure of liberty
than any government would then have been prepared to concede to him in Europe.
It was a hard fate, but brighter than an Austrian fortress, and gentler than
the doom of Murat and of Ney.
On August 7
he was removed to H.M.S. Northumberland, which, under the command of Admiral
Sir George Cockbum, was instructed to convey him to his destination. His suite
consisted of twenty-five persons, including Count Montholon and General Gourgaud,
who had served as adjutants in the last campaign ; General Bertrand, who had
controlled his household in Elba; Count de Las Cases, once a royal emigri, now
one of the most attached of his.adherents; and Dr Barry O’Meara, the surgeon of
the Bellerophon, who, at Napoleon’s request and with the consent of the British
Government, was allowed to act as his medical attendant. Montholon and Bertrand
were accompanied by their wives, Las Cases by his son. On October 17, at the
hour of eight in the evening, after a passage of ninety-five days, Napoleon
landed at Jamestown. As the house destined for his reception was not yet ready,
he took up his residence at the Briars, a villa belonging to a merchant named
Bale- combe, where he spent some weeks in pleasant and familiar intercourse
with the family of his host. In December the exiles moved into Long- wood, a
low wooden building on the wind-swept plateau, far above the prying curiosity
of the port. It was here that the last scene in Napoleon’s life-drama was
enacted.
For the
general history of Europe the captivity at St Helena possesses a double
interest. Not only did it invest the career of the fallpn hero with an
atmosphere of martyrdom and pathos which gave to it a new and distinct appeal,
but it enabled him to arrange a pose before the mirror of histoiy, to soften
away all that had been ungracious and hard and violent, and to draw in firm and
authoritative outline a picture of his splendid achievements and liberal
designs. The Napoleonic legend has been a force in the politics of Europe; and
the legend owes much to the artifice of the exiles. The great captain, hero of
adventures wondrous as the Arabian Nights, passes over the mysterious ocean to
his lonely island and emerges transfigured as in some ennobling mirage: He
shares the agonies of Prometheus, benefactor of humanity, chained to his
solitary rock; his spirit is with Marcus Aurelius, moving in the serene orbit
of humane and beneficent wisdom. The seed sown from St Helena fell upon
fruitful soil and was tended by devout hands.
Carrel, the
great liberal journalist of the July monarchy, claims Napoloon, on the ground
of the Longwood conversations, as the friend of the Republic which he
overturned. Quinet sings of him as of some vague and romantic embodiment of the
democratic spirit:
“fai couronnt U peuple en France, eri Altemagne;
Je Vai /ait gentilhomme aidant que Charlemagne;
J’ai donn4 dee ateuar A la fouls sang norri;
Des nations partout fai grav£ le blason.”
The heir of
the Napoleonic House, Louis Bonaparte, son of the ex-King of Holland, knew well
how to exploit the democratic elements in his uncle’s career. In 1831 he was
secretly negotiating with Republican leaders in Paris; in 1832 he published a
statement in his Revet its politiques that his principles were “ entirely
republican.” In 1839 a slender volume came from the same pen, entitled Idees
Na/poUou- iennes, which contained the whole essence of the exilic literature
and the whole programme of the liberal Empire. The Siecle, a Bonapartist organ,
spoke in 1840 of “ the sublime agony of St Helena, longer than the agony of
Christ, and no less resigned”; and in the haze of sentiment men lost sight of
the elementary facts of Napoleon’s career. “The thought of Napoleon at St
Helena,” say the editors of the official Correspondance (vol. xxix), “ is a
thought of emancipation for humanity, of democratic progress, of the
application of the great principles of the Revolution”; and this was the
pretext and apology for the Second Empire, the Government which, beginning with
a cannonade in the Boulevards, ended with the capitulation of Sedan and the
loss of Alsace and Lorraine.
Exile is in
itself a form of martyrdom ; and the exiles of Longwood ate their bread in
genuine sorrow. As Las Cases remarked, “ The details of St Helena are
unimportant; to be there at all is the great grievance.” A little company of
French gentlemen and ladies, accustomed to the stirring life of a brilliant
capital, found itself pitched on a desolate island, far from friends and home
and all the great movement of the world. The attendants of Napoleon were not
cast in the stoical mould; and, even if considerations of policy had not been
involved, temperament would have inclined them to exaggerate minor discomforts,
to strain against the restrictions of the governor, to shudder at the rocks and
ravines, to condemn the rain when it was rainy, the sun when it was sunny, arid
the wind when it was windy, to compare the sparse gum-trees of the Longwood
plateau with the ample shades of Marly and St Cloud, and the rough
accommodation of the Longwood house with the comforts of a well-appointed
Parisian hotel To a man like Napoleon, whose whole soul was in politics,
seclusion was a kind of torture. He had no administrative occupations to absorb
his energy's as had been the case in Elba; and “ time,” to quote his own bitter
phrase, was now “ his only
superfluity.”
To quicken all the leaden hours was a task too heavy even for his busy genius.
He learnt a little English, he dictated memoirs, he played chess, he read books
and newspapers, he set Gourgaud mathematical problems, and in the later half
of 1819 and the earlier half of 1820 he found some solace in gardening. In the
first two years of his captivity his spirits were sometimes high and even
exuberant; and in the exercise of his splendid intellect he must have found
some genuine enjoyment. But at heart he was miserable, spiting himself like a
cross child, and allowing petty insults to fester within him. Now he was calm,
proud, and grand, now irritable and wayward. Even the approach of death could
not purge his soul of its evil humours, and he left a legacy to Cantillon as a
reward for attempting to assassinate the Duke of Wellington.
The colony of
Longwood had a political object in magnifying the hardships of its position;
and it has left a large literature of complaint. “ Our situation here,” said
Napoleon, as reported by Las Cases, “ may even have its attractions. The
universe is looking at us. We remain the martyrs of an immortal cause. Millions
of men weep for us; our country sighs; and glory is in mourning. Adversity was
wanting to my career. If I had died on the throne amid the clouds of my
omnipotence I should have remained a problem to many men; to-day, thanks to my
misfortune, they can judge of me naked as I am.” Nor was this the only
advantage that might be reaped from the policy of complaint. Compassionate
Whigs in England, learning the tale of hardships, the bad food, the damp house,
the intercepted letters,the ostentatious cordon of sentinels, would rise and
denounce the Government in Parliament. At the voice of Lord Holland the heart
of the country would be stirred; and Napoleon would be summoned back to Europe
on the crest of the Whig reaction. Even if this hope failed, still it would be
wise to disparage the good name of England. The Bourbons owed everything to
Great Britain, but the rivalry between France and England was older than the
Bourbons; and the story of petty indignities heaped upon her greatest captain
by a British Government would be accepted in France as a token that he too had
suffered for the old cause, and that his dynasty would never forget it.
Holding the
general conviction that Napoleon was far too dangerous to be allowed abroad,
and having some reason to believe that plots were on foot to effect his rescue,
Lord Liveipool’s Cabinet properly determined to keep a close watch on St
Helena. Their precautions may have been excessive—and excessive the Duke of
Wellington thought them—their suspicions over-done, their regulations too minute
and harassing. Obtuse the Government undoubtedly was, but it was as humane and
considerate as its sense of duty would permit. The prisoner received a yearly
allowance of £8,000, subsequently raised to £12,000, inhabited the second-best
house in the island, was permitted to retain a numerous suite and to move
freely without an escort within a radius of twelve miles. He might
760
Precautions against escape. Sir Hudson Lowe. [18I6-21
gratify his
taste for books and newspapers and music, and he might ride or walk outside the
radius with a British officer in attendance.
These are not
the provisions of an inhuman Government; and the man who was sent out to
administer them was not inhuman. Sir Hudson Lowe, who assumed sole charge of
the island on April 14, 1816, was an officer with a respectable record, though
not one which would be likely to commend him to Napoleon. He had led a regiment
of Corsican rangers, participated in the siege of Toulon, and brought the news
of Napoleon’s abdication to London. In five stormy interviews, all held within
the first four months of Lowe’s arrival, Napoleon poured out the vials of his
wrath upon the luckless governor, whose chief crimes consisted in his refusal
to extend the twelve miles’ limit or to forward a letter of complaint to the
Prince Regent save through the ordinary ministerial channels. After this,
Napoleon never suffered the “ Sicilian thief-taker ” to approach him, or
attempted to revise his first and hasty estimate. It may be conceded that Lowe
was a martinet, that he was deficient in graciousness and tact, and that he
ultimately came to suffer from a mania of suspicion. To be a good regimental
officer is one thing, to discharge a delicate political mission is another.
Lowe was full of loyal punctilio. The home Government, with almost incredible
pedantry, had insisted that Napoleon should be refused the Imperial title and
known only by the designation of General Bonaparte. A wise governor would have
taken good care to minimise the effect of so stupid a regulation as soon as he
had ascertained that it was violently objected to. Lowe on the other hand
administered the rule with military exactitude. He intercepted a book from
Europe because it was directed to “the Emperor,” and recommended the officers
of the 20th regiment to decline a copy of Coxe’s Life of Marlborough presented
to them by Napoleon during his last illness because it contained the Imperial
name on the title-page. So wondrous an exhibition of obtuse literalism has
rarely been afforded. But there was no inhumanity in Lowe. He was genuinely
solicitous for the creature comforts of the exiles.
It was,
however, part of the policy of Longwood to court martyrdom and to advertise
woes. When Napoleon failed to obtain a relaxation of the twelve miles’ limit,
he declared that he would not ride out at all; when he was reminded of the need
of economy, he ordered his plate to be broken up, as if the wicked gaoler had
driven him to starvation’s brink. On October 9, 1816, some new and more
stringent regulations arrived from England, which had probably been suggested
by intelligence received in London in the previous August, to the effect that
three hundred men had set sail from Baltimore to attempt a rescue. The limit
was contracted to eight miles, and the sentinels were drawn in close to the
house at sunset, so that the exiles were deprived of the full enjoyment of the
coolest and most delicious hours of the day. The new restrictions (which were
subsequently relaxed) were certainly
.unpleasant;
and it is not surprising that they should have provoked a protest.
In 1817 a
thin volume was published in London entitled Letters Jrom the Ca/pe of Good
Hope in reply to Mr Warden. The letters, which purported to be written by an
Englishman, were in reality translated from the French; and the original draft
was secretly dictated by Napoleon to Las Cases. They were designed to impress
the British public with the sufferings of the exiles, and to furnish a defence
for those episodes in Napoleon’s career which had proved most repugnant to British
opinion—the execution of the Due d’Enghien, the death of Captain Wright, the
treatment of the Spanish Bourbons, and the return from Elba. It was represented
that the new code of rules was worthy of Botany Bay; that Napoleon could not go
out into his garden without being spied on by a red-coat; that he was not
allowed even to exchange a word with a native; that the climate of St Helena
was fatal to health, and the food mediocre; that for many months Napoleon had
not left his four ill-built, unwholesome little rooms; and that the British
Government was incurring a cost of £20,000 a year to keep a prisoner within
four walls under a tropical sun. It was a skilful demonstration, but the Tory
garrison showed no sign of distress, and the Quarterly blew its loudest note of
defiance. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (November 31,1818) the
representatives of Russia, Austria, and Prussia formally testified their
approval of the new regulations.
The Emperor’s
autobiography had been commenced at the Tuileries and St Cloud, where he had
dictated accounts of several of his Italian battles to General Bertrand and
given orders that plans and maps should be drawn to illustrate his Italian and
Egyptian campaigns. The work was resumed at St Helena with such materials as the
Emperor was able to gather round him; and the story of Brumaire and the
Provisional Consulate, of the early exploits in Italy, Egypt, and Syria, of the
return from Elba and the Hundred Days, was written in a connected form at
Napoleon’s dictation, together with a critical account of the Hohenlinden and
Waterloo campaigns. Chapters were added upon the rights of neutrals, the battle
of Copenhagen, and the assassination of Paul I. Four notes were dictated on
Lacroix’s Memoires pour servir d Thistoire de Saint Domingue, and six notes on
de Pradt’s Les Quatres Concordats; but, with the single exception of Waterloo,
no unlucky campaign was recorded, and the account of Waterloo was not a record
but an apology. For a moment, in 1817, Napoleon seems to have contemplated a
narrative of the Russian expedition; but the plan was soon dropped for lack of
materials, and a projected history of the Revolutionary Convention shared the
same fate. The choice of episodes was not fortuitous. The Memoires were
designed to exhibit Napoleou as the soldier of the Republic, and to clear his
military reputation from the stain of his last resounding defeat.
Sainte-Beuve,
the finest of critics, has recognised the literary quality of the St Helena
writings, the prompt imperious brevity, the exquime clearness, the occasional
beauties of sentiment and eloquence. It is natural to compare the record of the
Egyptian and Syrian campaigns, where Napoleon depicts himself at once as
soldier, statesman, and discoverer, with another splendid fragment of military
autobiography, the Commentaries of the Gallic War. The two stories have the
same lucidity, the same gift of perspective, the same command of professional
technique, the same wide scope of observation, the same close adherence to
detail. Caesar has more formal eloquence; Napoleon has more romance, more
passion, more vibration. But, while each wrote to defend his policy and his
military reputation, Caesar had no interest in concealing or confusing the
truth.
Yet the
formal memoirs, however strongly conceived and carefully executed, are the
least interesting portion of the St Helena retrospect. Napoleon was a voluble
talker; and, when the long tension of his political career was relaxed, his
restless mind poured itself out upon all the incidents of his wonderful life.
It is true that he desired a certain reading of his career to be accepted, and
that he more than once prompted his faithful followers to record his remarks;
but he was far too mobile to maintain a steady pose. He was not a chilly man
sitting down to falsify a dull life, but a child of nature, frank, passionate,
impetuous, full of sudden turns and ruses which carried him far beyond the
boundaries of his set apology. The schemer’s mind, constant to its old habit,
schemes for the past, as it had formerly schemed for the future; and we cannot
tell whether the plans which he attributes to himself had actually been in his
mind. A man of such a temperament could talk neither sober autobiography nor
sustained deceit. And so, side by side with the official legend, the Moniteur
of exile, deferential to a moral judgment whose power it uneasily apprehends
but never understands, we have the fragments of spontaneous talk, sometimes
shrewd and lively, sometimes grand and eloquent, sometimes brutal, sometimes
kindly, always and through eveiy mood vivid and unmistakable.
Napoleon
shrewdly saw that the forces of reaction were spreading over Europe, and that
the yoke of the Bourbons would soon become intolerable to France. Some day the
King of Rome would have his chance. In the sombre gloom of clericalism and
privilege and military impotence, men would point back to the bright vision of
a Liberal Empire, which had been based on social equality and religious
tolerance, which had made France the arbitress of Europe, and Paris the centre
of European civilisation. Then France would turn to her great, calm, and
beneficent Prome theus, would gather his lightest words and descry his true
intentions. She would learn that he alone had understood and adored her; that
he loved peace, but was driven by wicked foreigners into ceaseless war; that,
although he had showered golden gifts upon her, his
cornucopia
was still full of the manifold blessings of prosperity and constitutional rule
which he intended to bestow upon Europe after the conclusion of a general
peace. She would read his own authentic accounts of campaigns which he had
fought as the soldier of the Republic, and, perusing his story of Waterloo,
would recover faith in his supreme mastery of war.
“ The system
of government,” said Napoleon once to O’Meara, “ must be adapted to the
national temperament and to circumstances. In the first place France required a
strong government. While I was at the head of it, I may say that France was in
the same condition as Rome when a dictator was declared necessary for the
salvation of the Republic. A series of coalitions against her existence was
formed by your gold amongst all the powerful nations of Europe. To resist
successfully, it was necessary that all the energies of the country should be
at the disposal of the chief. I never conquered unless in my own defence.
Europe never ceased to make wax upon France and her principles. We had to
strike down others or to be ourselves struck down. Between the parties that so
long agitated France I was like a rider seated on an unruly horse, who always
wanted to swerve either to the right or to the left; and to make him keep a
straight course I was obliged to let him feel the bridle occasionally. In
quieter times my dictature would have finished, and I should have commenced my
constitutional reign. Even as it was, with a coalition always opposing me,
either secret or public, avowed or denied, there was more equality in France
than in any other country in Europe. One of my grand objects was to render
education accessible to everybody. I caused eveiy institution to be formed upon
a plan which offered instruction to the public either gratis or at a rate so
moderate as not to be beyond the means of the peasant. The museums were thrown
open to the canaille. My canaille would have become the best educated of the
world. All my exertions were directed to illuminating the mass of the
nation
instead of brutalising them by ignorance and superstition______________
There never
was a king who was more the sovereign of the people than I was. I always prided
myself upon being the man of the people....Those English who are lovers of
liberty will one day lament with tears having gained the battle of Waterloo. It
was as fatal to the liberties of Europe as that of Philippi was to those of
Rome.”
Such was the
general scheme of apology. The conquests were forced upon him, but they made
for the wefl-being of the conquered; and the whole foreign policy was part of
the great battle for light against darkness, which had been waged by Voltaire
and continued by the men of the Revolution. The “ grand objects ” were to
re-establish the kingdom of Poland as a barrier against “ the barbarians of the
north,” and to endow Spain with a constitution, which would have crushed
privilege and superstition and opened a full career to talent. He admits that
the Spanish War destroyed him; but the “ Peninsula could not have been left to
the
machinations
of the English, to the intrigues, the hopes, the pretexts of the Bourbons.” The
interview of Bayonne was not an ambush but “ an immense coup d'etat.” He had.
never mingled in the intrigues of the Spanish Court, had never broken
engagements with the Spanish princes, and had used no duplicity to draw them to
Bayonne. “ When I saw them at my feet and could judge by myself of their
incapacity, I pitied the lot of a great people, and seized the unique occasion
which fortune presented me to regenerate Spain, to rescue her from England, and
to unite her entirely to France.” Again, if he had been successful in crossing
the Channel, he would have founded independent republics in England and
Ireland. “I would have dethroned the House of Hanover, abolished the nobility,
proclaimed liberty, fraternity, equality.. ..Your canaille would have been on
my side, knowing that I am a man of the people and that I spring from the
people myself.” His designs in Italy were equally liberal. “ I purposed, when I
had a second son, as I had reason to hope, to make him King of Italy, with Rome
for his capital, uniting all Italy, Naples, and Sicily into one kingdom.” The
three great obstacles to Italian unity had been the foreign dynasties, the
spirit of locality, and the residence of the Pope at Rome. In the short span of
fifteen years all had been removed, “broken by the great movement of the French
Empire.” The Pope was at Fontainebleau; and, but for the Russian campaign, the
head-quarters of the Catholic religion would have been permanently transferred
to Paris. All had been prepared for the proclamation of Italian independence
upon the birth of the second son. It was settled that Prince Eugene should act
as Viceroy during the minority.
It was true
that mistakes had been made in Germany. The King of Prussia should have been
deprived of his kingdom after Jena. “ After Friedland I should have taken
Silesia and given it to Saxony. Had I done this, given a free constitution, and
delivered the peasants from feudal anarchy, they would have been contented.” He
thought that he should have declared Hungary independent, that he should have
subdivided Austria, that he should at least have “ devoured ” Prussia before
starting on his Moscow campaign. Still, the Confederation of the Rhine and the
kingdom of Westphalia, the grand-duchy of Warsaw and the crippled state of the
Hohenzollerns, were sufficient evidence of French predominance beyond the
Rhine.
The problems
of the Balkan Peninsula, of Asia, Africa, and America had not been solved; and
here it was necessary to acknowledge some failures and errors of judgment. The
idea of the policy, however, was large, magnificent, and liberal. Egypt was the
key to the East; and France, once mistress of Egypt, would have been able to
unlock the treasures of India. She would have pierced the Isthmus of Suez, and,
in alliance with Russia, Persia, and the Mahrattas, broken the British power in
the East. “ Egypt once in possession of the French, farewell
India to the
English.” The possession of Egypt was also designed to secure a further
advantage. The Ottoman Empire was corrupt to the core; and though, on its
inevitable dissolution, part of the spoil would go to Russia, the remainder
would fall to France, the mistress of Egypt. During the negotiations subsequent
to the Peace of Tilsit, the partition of Turkey had been frequently discussed
between Napoleon and Alexander. But, though at first Napoleon was pleased with
the Russian proposals because he thought “ it would enlighten the world to
drive those brutes the Turks out of Europe,” mature reflexion convinced him
that the plan would endanger the equilibrium and the peace of Europe. “ I
considered that the barbarians of the North were already too strong, and
probably in the course of time would overwhelm all Europe, as I now think they
will.” Accordingly it became his object to bridle the Muscovite barbarians in
the interests of European civilisation. On the one hand, he would lure them far
into the East; on the other hand he would erect strong bulwarks in the west and
south, a national kingdom of Poland, a group of German States under French
suzerainty, a French Italy, a French Egypt, possibly also a French
Constantinople. Thus he would have accomplished a work analogous to that of Leo
I and Charles Martel, of Charlemagne and Otto I, who saved the fabric of Greek
and Latin civilisation from destruction at barbarian hands.
The great
design had failed, and Europe would live to regret it; but the failure had been
the result of the incapacity of subordinates, of incalculable accident, of the
perverse policy of England, and was in no way inherent in the design itself. An
admiral’s error had lost the battle of the Nile; the chance stroke of an
assassin had destroyed the general who could have preserved Egypt for France.
And what benefits might not fifty years of French rule have secured to Egypt! A
thousand dykes would have distributed the waters of the Nile; sugar and cotton,
rice and indigo, would have been cultivated; and the commerce of the Indies
would have resumed its ancient route. “ After fifty years of possession,
civilisation would have spread into the interior of Africa by the Sennaar,
Abyssinia, Darfour, and the Fezzan; several great nations would be called to
enjoy the benefits of the arts, the sciences, the religion of the true God, for
it is from Egypt that the people of central Africa must receive light and
happiness.” An elaborate argument was designed to show that the French army
could have maintained itself in the country without help from home.
In the West
Indies Napoleon had to confess to the miscarriage of his plans. He told O’Meara
that he should have declared San Domingo free, and that he should have
acknowledged the black government; for, if this had been done, England would
have lost her West Indian colonies. However, in the notes appended to Lacroix’s
memoirs, he takes a precisely opposite line and defends the policy of the
expedition, ascribing its failure to the mistakes of Le Clerc, the intrigues of
the English, and the
ravages of
yellow fever. He had found it necessary to permit the slave- trade and to
maintain the institution of slavery in Martinique and the lie de France, but
these decisions had not disturbed the course of events in San Domingo. Slavery
was founded upon antipathy of colour; and antipathy of colour could only be
overcome by polygamy. He had therefore held several consultations with
theologians with the view of preparing a measure to authorise polygamy in the
French colonies, “ restraining the number of wives to two, one white, one
black.” This was the solution which the legislator would be bound to adopt,
whenever it should be thought desirable to enfranchise the blacks in the French
colonies. The experiment was never made, for the naval war stripped Prance of
her islands; yet in the Continental System a compensation was provided, which
in time would have made Europe independent of colonial imports. In two or three
years beetroot-sugar would have been sold as cheaply in the French market as
the cane-sugar of the tropics.
Nor was this
the only compensation for the temporary hardships of war. Napoleon had made
France the centre of a federal empire; and it was his intention that Paris
should be the capital of Europe, “unique, incomparable,” adorned with all the
treasures df art and science, the seat of the Papacy and of the College of
Cardinals, the centre of the foreign missions, the home of the University of
France, the seminary of all the ideas and thoughts which were to sway the
course of European civilisation. In order “ to facilitate the fusion and
uniformity of the federal parts of the Empire ” he had designed, in the Institute
of Meudon, a school in which all the princes of the Imperial House would have
received a common education. Each prince would bring with him “ ten or twelve
children more or less of his own age and belonging to the first families of his
country,” with results which might easily be predicted French principles would
take root in all the dependencies; Italy, Spain, Germany, and Holland would
attach themselves more closely to the French connexion; foreign sovereigns
would clamour for the admission of their sons; and, looking back upon the
friendships of early youth, the rulers of Europe would be more likely to keep
the peace.
Great as had
been his ambition, his course was untarnished by crime or corruption, Surveying
the past from St Helena he declares that he is astounded at his moderation.
After one or two preliminary volleys, he ordered the guns of Vendemiaire to be
charged with blank cartridge. Nothing would have been easier for him than to
have procured the death of the French and Spanish Bourbons; yet the temptation
was rejected. He would probably have pardoned the Due d’Enghien, if Talleyrand
had not intercepted a letter in which the Duke offered his services to the new
Government of France. “ My secret thought,” he said on one occasion, “ was to
give him the Constable’s sword so as to be quit of the emigres? He had never
taken a bribe ; he had never bought a vote or a party by
promise of
place or power; he had found great dilapidations; he had left administrative
purity. Council of State, Tribunate, Senate, all were pure and irreproachable.
As for himself he had never cared to amass wealth. “ J'avais le goat de la Jbndation et non celui de la propriete. Ma
propriete a men etait dans la gloire et la celebrite.'"
As to the
solidity of his great social experiment, the creation of the nobility, he was
under no illusions. In a singularly penetrating way he explained one day to Las
Cases that the French Revolution had destroyed the social charms of the home,
and the ease, luxury, and wealth which form the basis of cultivated enjoyment.
In consequence of this, society took its pleasure in public entertainments. The
throne had also ceased to be a lordship, a seigneurie, and had become an office
; and the whole tone of a modem Court differed from that of the Courts of the
amcien regime. The modem Court had less social influence, for the influence of
Courts can only penetrate the nation through the medium of an aristocracy. He
had to be cautious about introducing men of the ancien regime to the Court; “
for every time I touched this cord there was a trembling of spirit, as with a
horse when the reins are pulled in too tight. I have made princes and dukes,
but I could not make real nobles.” In twenty years, however, all would have
been well, for he had intended to intermarry the new blood with the old.
He recurred
to this subject at St Helena, saying that the creation of the nobility was one
of his greatest, his most complete, his most happy ideas. He had three objects
in view, all of which would in time have been attained—to reconcile France with
Europe, to amalgamate the new France with the old, and to annihilate the feudal
nobility. He claimed that his national titles would have re-established that
equality which the feudal nobility had proscribed: “for parchments I substituted
fine actions,” forgetting apparently that fine actions are not transmitted from
father to son. It was clear, however, that he had not succeeded in winning the
Faubourg St Germain. “ J'ai fait trop, ou trop peu,” he said one day to Las
Cases—enough to discontent the democrats and not enough to attract the
royalists. “ If on the return of tht emigres I had attached them to myself, the
aristocracy would readily have adored me.” He goes on to speculate upon all
that he would have done to bind the ancierme noblesse to his throne. His first
thought, “his true inclination,” when seeking for a second wife, was to marry a
daughter of one of the old French Houses. He would have adopted the daughters
of the Mont- morencys, the Nesles, the Clissons, and married them to foreign
sovereigns. “ For the good and the magic of aristocracy consist in antiquity
and in time, the sole things which I was unable to create.” Talleyrand, his
usual scapegoat, prevented advances to the emigres, and his councillors persuaded
him to the Austrian marriage; so the Faubourg St Germain was never conciliated.
We must remember that on this occasion he was talking to a royalist.
The
Imperial system might be accused of having stifled liberty and injured
education. To such allegations Napoleon replies that his work was a torso, not
a statue. The extreme centralisation of the prefectoral system was essentially
transitional, “a weapon of war,” and would in time have given way to “our peace
establishment, our local institutions”; and here he sketches out a system of
local government by unpaid magistrates somewhat after the English plan. Again,
the conscription, far from harming education, was designed to benefit it.
“Conscription is the eternal root of a nation; it purifies morality and trains
habits”; and the virtues engendered by the military life would in time have
been fortified by the instruction given in the regimental schools which the
Emperor had planned in order that the conscripts might continue their studies.
He had also devised a scheme for the improvement of clerical education. The
elements of agriculture, medicine, and law were to be added to the theological
course provided for those intending to take Orders. Dogma and controversy would
insensibly have become rarer in the pulpit; and, while the cure would preach
“pure morality” in church, he would be in a position to give useful counsels to
his parishioners on practical affairs.
'
He denied
that the Senate was servile; he asserted that the Tribunate was useless and
expensive, and that its suppression was sanctioned by the public voice. “ iTai tmijours marche avec Vopmion de cvnq ou six millions (Pho-mmes.” There
could be no doubt as to the solidity and excellence of his finance. “ Never,”
he said to Gourgaud, “ has anyone brought more order and more light into
financial accounts than I. In part my good measures are due to my knowledge of
mathematics, to my clear ideas on everything.” At another time he spoke of his
Code as the “arch of salvation,” as his “ title to the benedictions of
posterity.” These were legitimate vaunts; and the noblest monument to his
memory, as he once told Montholon, would not be a catalogue of the exploits of
“ the most audacious soldier in the history of war,” but a collection of the
thoughts which he uttered in the Council of State, and the instructions which
he issued to his ministers, and a list of the public works which were
undertaken during the period of his rule.
There were
moments in which bravado and apology were cast aside, and he saw himself and
the world truly. “ None but myself ever did me any harm,” he said once to
O’Meara, “I was my only enemy”; and again to Montholon, “I stretched the cord
too much. I could not wait to finish the Spanish business before I crossed the
Niemen.” But of contrition for bloodshed and treasure spent and lives broken
there is no trace. He broods over his failure and tries to explain how he
should have averted it, now saying that he should have shot Fouchd after
Waterloo and sent twenty deputies to the scaffold, now that with a man like
Turenne to help him he would have made himself master of the world. In
unguarded moods he shows how little he cared for the principles
of the
Liberal Empire. Had he conquered at Waterloo, he would have sent' the Chambers
packing. If he were back again in France, he would close the University and
entrust the education of the country to the priests. “ I too have suffered from
the mania for propagating the sciences, but my experience has corrected it. We
want cultivators, workmen, manufacturers, not philosophers.”
But a
reconciliation of his inconsistencies is not to be attempted. As the mood
seized him he could be brutal, cynical, obscurantist; and who can keep the
chart of his moods and thoughts ? There is not a noble sentiment which he will
not pitch overboard when the scowling storm is on him ; there is hardly a
proposition which stands unrefuted in the confused effulgence of his
contradictory apologies. At one moment he loudly proclaims his beneficence, and
then suddenly the notes of the edifying anthem are stopped, and we hear the
chagrined cry of the baffled schemer laying the blame of failure on his
confederates. On the whole he bore his hour of trial with a certain noble
courage, cheering his despondent and irritable companions, and himself setting
an example of resolute work. But, as hope after hope went out and disease
gained on his constitution, his giant energy flagged. At the opening of 1821 it
was clear that he had not long to live; and after the end of March he scarcely
rose save to change his bed. The disease which slew him was the same which had
slain his father, cancer in the stomach ; but he bore the pain with patient
fortitude and full knowledge. When Bertrand asked him what conduct his friends
should pursue and what end they should aim at, he answered with fine
magnanimity, “The interests of France and the glory of the Fatherland. I can
see no other end.” The last faint sounds caught from his lips as he expired on
May 5, 1821, are said to have been, “ France, armee, tete d’armie, Josephine'”
•, and so in the midst of the great hurricane he passed out of life, charging
at the head of his ghostly legions. De Todqueville has written his epitaph— “
He was as great as a man can be without virtue.”
Men of a
conservative temper who were spectators of the downfall of the Empire were apt
to see little in Napoleon’s career but a superb and maleficent explosion of
human energy, the devastations of which it would be the duty of subsequent
generations to repair. To them he was merely the last and the greatest of the
Jacobins, the upstart captain of the revolutionary and militant democracy which
had overturned the settled institutions of France and thrown its insolent
challenge at the old order of Europe. Others, taking longer views of history,
have been principally concerned with the fact that Napoleon was a powerful
dissolvent of medieval barbarism. They think of the wars of the Empire, not
merely as a great effusion of Frankish chivalry, inexhaustible, as the Crusades
themselves, in audacious and pathetic extravagance, but also as one of the
decisive episodes in the secular duel between the Latin and the
Teutonic
nations. For the conquests of France involved the acceptance of the political
system which had been fashioned in the fires of revolution; the obliteration of
outworn boundaries; the destruction of the social groupings of the feudal age,
noble caste, trade guild, religious order; the extension of a system of private
law, as hostile to the Teutonic principle of free association as it was
favourable to the Roman principle of State omnipotence. To others, again, the
true significance of Napoleon lies in the fact that he made possible the
national movements of the nineteenth century. He is the herald of Italian
unity; and, alike by reason of the things which he destroyed and by reason of
the efforts which he provoked, he takes rank as one of the makers of Germany.
For the old aristocratic federalism of the Dutch he substituted the principles
which govern the modem kingdom of Holland. It was one of his many policies to
excite the national and inextinguishable aspirations of the Poles; and quivers
of hope spread even to Serbs, Roumans, and Greeks, communicated by the mighty
movements of so many men, and the sudden catastrophe of such ancient things. If
South-American democracies value their independence, statues of the man who
destroyed the prestige of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies might be
raised, without an excessive strain on historical propriety, in the squares of
Valparaiso or Buenos Ayres.
This,
however, is not the aspect which chiefly impressed Englishmen. That dauntless
and dogged generation, who never cried craven and never drew breath, viewed
Napoleon, not with complete justification, but also not without justification,
as the tyrant who respected no pledge, stopped short of no ambition, and
flinched before no crime. They thought of him not as the creator of
nationalities (for he created none in his lifetime), but as the destroyer of
peoples and the enemy of constitutional freedom all over the world. As the men
of the fifth century regarded Attila the Hun, so, with few exceptions, did the
contemporaries of Pitt and Liverpool regard Napoleon. The thunders of the storm
have now long died away; and we see that some precious seeds were bome upon the
hurricane. Nor did they fall upon the continent of Europe alone. The maritime
and colonial power of England was fortified by a war which gave us Ceylon and
the Cape of Good Hope, promoted the occupation of Australia, and led to the
destruction of the Mahratta power in India. The sea-power of France, broken by
the disorders of the Revolution, was finally shattered by the wars of the
Empire. So impressive was the aggrandisement of England beyond the seas that
some writers have regarded the augmentation of the British Empire as the most
important result of Napoleon’s career.
What was his
legacy to France ? To the extravagance of his later projects France owes the
loss of the Rhine frontier, which had been the earliest conquest of the revolutionary
arms, and the immemorial ambition of French diplomacy. That he terminated the
romance of the Revolution, that he founded a government above party, that he
healed the schism in
the Church,
and conciliated the principles of social equality and political order—all this
is acknowledged even by his enemies. To his resolute energy France owes the
rapid completion and the wide reputation of her Codes; nor has any great modem
community of men received so much from a single human mind. His economic
legislation is open to criticism, even granting his own assumptions. Was it
wise for a government resting upon the support of the peasantry to promote the
growth of towns by giving high protection to manufactures ? Was it statesmanlike
to exclude the manufactures of Italy and Germany from the French market ? Was
it not chimerical to suppose that Europe could be made independent of tropical
produce ? Socialism had been the peril which, in the eyes of the middle
classes, had justified the Consulate; and socialists can find little comfort in
the Civil Code. Napoleon believed in the magic of private property; and it was
left for the Second Empire to legalise trade-unions. His religious policy had
issues widely different from those which he intended; for a Church, pinched,
policed, and bullied by the State, was inevitably thrown back upon the support
of the Papacy. If the Revolution, by confiscating the Church lands, destroyed
the Gallicanism beloved by St Louis and Bossuet, Napoleon promoted that modem
form of Ultramontanism which wages a truceless war against the very foundations
of the democratic State. The Revolution broke with religion and sowed the seeds
of martyrdom. Napoleon exploited it, and promoted at once clerical opportunism
and Ultramontane zeal. The idea of a vast community, organised on a rigid plan
and trained to a definite end, will always continue to fascinate minds
impatient of the free and miscellaneous movements of human activity. In
attempting to control all the sources of spiritual and intellectual influence
in France, Napoleon essayed a task beyond the compass of any man or any
government. The frontiers of liberty and authority must necessarily shift from
age to age and from occasion to occasion. When Napoleon grasped the helm of
State, France needed a spell of strong government. This he gave her, and more
besides. He gave her a scheme of education framed to meet the needs of a
military despotism. He restored the administrative centralisation of the
anczen regime, with those improvements which the Revolution had rendered
possible—a centralisation scientific, uniform, all-pervasive, untrammelled by
the spirit of locality, caste, or corporation ; and men trained in the
Napoleonic school have worked the machine of French government ever since.
A selected
list of such works as will be found generally useful with regard to the
subject-matter of two or more chapters in this volume.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Briere, G., Caron, P., and Maistre, H. Repertoire methodique de
l’histoire moderne et contemporaine de la France. Paris. 1898- (one vol.
yearly). Catalogue de l’Histoire de France. 15 vols. (Published
catalogue of works on French History in the Bibliotheque nationale, Paris.)
Dahlmann, E. C. and Waitz, G. Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte. 6th
edn., by E. Steindorff. Gottingen. 1894. (7th edn. in progress.)
Gardiner, S.
R., and Mullinger, J. B. Introduction to English History. 3rd edn.
London. 1894.
Kircheisen,
F. Bibliography of Napoleon. London. 1902.
Lumbroso, A.
Saggio di una Bibliografia ragionata dell’ Epoca Napoleonica.
Modena, Rome,
and Paris. 1894-. (In progress.)
Subject-Index
of the Modem Works added to the Library of the British Museum in the years
1881-1900. Edited by G. K. Fortescue. 3 vols. London. 1903. (See vol. n, under
France: History: Napoleon.)
See also
under Europe, General (Lavisse, Rose, Weber); Military History (Pohler, etc.);
Napoleon (Fournier); Great Britain (Cunningham); Italy (Johnston); Germany
(Fisher); Sweden, etc. (Bain).
EUROPE.
General History.
Alison, Sir
A. History of Europe, 1789-1815. 10 vols.
Edinburgh. 1833-42. Bredow, G. G. Chronik des xixten Jahrhunderts. 2 vols. Altona. 1801. Continued by C. Venturini. 20 vols. Altona.
1809-28.
Capefigue, B. H. R. L’Europe pendant le consulat et 1’empire de
Napoleon. 10
vols. Paris. 1839-41.
Fyffe, C. A.
A History of Modern Europe. 3 vols. London.
1880. (Vol. i, 1792-1814.)
Heeren, A. H. L. Handbuch der Geschichte des enropaischen Staatensystems
und seiner Colonieen. 3rd edn. Gottingen. 1819. English transl. London. 1873.
Lavisse, E., and Rambaud, A. Histoire gene'rale du ivmo siecle a nos
jours.
12 vols. Paris.
1893-1901. (Vol. ix, 1800-15. Bibliography.)
Mahan, A. T.
The influence of sea-power upon the French Revolution and Empire. 2 vols. London. 1893.
Niebuhr, B. G. Geschichte des Zeitalters der Revolution. Hamburg. 1845.
Oncken, W. Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs, und der Befreiungs-
kriege. 2 vols. Berlin. 1884-7.
Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, edited by. Napoleon I. Revolution und Kaiserreich.
Das Erwachen der Volker. 2 vols. Berlin. 1900-1.
Posselt, E. L. Europaische Annalen. Tubingen.
1795-1820.
Rose, J. H.
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, 1789-1816. 2nd edn. Cambridge. 1895. (Bibliography.)
Schlosser, F. C. Geschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts und des
neunzehnten his zum Sturze des franzdsischen Kaiserreichs. 7 vols. Heidelberg.
1836-48. English translation. 8 vols. London. 1843-52.
Sorel, A. L’Europe et la Revolution fran£aise (1789-1815). 8 vols. Paris.
18851904.
Stephens, H. M. Europe, 1789-1815. London. 1893.
Wachsmuth, W. Das Zeitalter der Revolution. 4 vols. Leipzig. 1846-7.
Weber, G. Allgemeine Geschichte. 2nd edn. 15 vols. Leipzig. 1882-9. (Vol.
xiv, 1797-1830. Bibliography.)
Weiss, J. B. von. Weltgeschichte. (Vols. xix-xxii,
1796-1815.) Leipzig. 1896-8.
Biography and Genealogy.
George, H. B.
Genealogical Tables illustrative of Modem History. Oxford. 1875.
Grote, H.
Stammtafeln (Genealogies of reigning families). Leipzig. 1877.
Nouvelle
Biographic Generale. 46 vols. New edn. Paris. 1855-77.
Collections op Theaties.
Martens, G. F. de. Recueil de traites d’alliance, de ti-eve, de
neutrality, de commerce, etc., depuis 1761 jusqu’a present. 7 vols. Gottingen.
1791-1801. (Vol. vii contains the period 1797-1801.)
Supplement au Recueil des principaux traites,
etc., depuis 1761 jusqu’a
present. 4
vols. Gottingen. 1802-8. (Vols. n-iv contain the period 17991807. Vol. iv
contains a chronological and alphabetical Table of the Treaties etc. in this
and the above work.)
The second
and more useful edition of the above (Recueil and Supplement) was issued by G.
F. and C. de Martens in 8 vols., of which vols. v-vm contain the period
1790-1808. Gottingen. 1817-35.
and C. de. Nouveau recueil de traites
d’alliance, etc., depuis 1808 jusqu’a
present.
(Vols. i-iv, 1808-19; vol. v, 1808-22.) This collection was continued by
Saalfeld and Murhard. 16 vols. Gottingen. 1817-42.
Martens, F. de, and Cussy, F. de. Recueil manuel des traites. 7 vols.
Leipzig. 1846-57.
Murhard, F. Nouveaux supplements au Recueil de traites depuis 1761
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Recueil, et Nouveaux Supplements. Gottingen. 1839-42.
Clercq, A. de, and J. de. Recueil des traites de la France. Paris.
1864. New edn. 1880-. (In progress.) Vols. i, n
(1713-1815); vol. xv, Supplement (1713-1886); vol. xvi, tables (1713-1885).
Martens, T. T. Recueil de traites et conventions conclus par la Russie
avec les puissances etrangeres. 14 vols. St Petersburg. 1875- . (In progress.)
Vol. xiv (1905) contains 1807-20.
Neumann, L. Recueil des traites et conventions conclus par l’Autriche
avec les puissances etrangeres, depuis 1763 jusqu’a nos jours. 6 vols. Leipzig.
1855-9.
Diplomatic History and International Law.
Dufraisse, M. Histoire du droit de guerre et de paix (1789-1815). Paris.
1867. Garden, Comte G. de. Histoire generale des traites de paix depuis la paix
de Westphalie (to 1813). 14 vols. Paris. 1848-59. Leipzig. 1848-87.
Koch, C. G. de, and Schoell, M. S. F. Histoire abregee des traites de
paix. 2nd
edn. 15 vols. Paris. 1816-18. New edn., continued to 1815. 4 vols. Brussels. 1837-8.
Lefebvre, A. Histoire des cabinets de l’Europe pendant le consulat et
1’empire.
3 vols. Paris.
1845-7.
Military History.
Bleibtreu, K. Geschicbte und Geist der europaischen Kriege unter Friedrich
dem Grossen und Napoleon. Leipzig. 1893.
Clausewitz, K. von. Hinterlassene Werke. (Vols. v, vi, campaigns of 1799;
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those of 1812-14; vol. vm, that of 1815.) 2nd edn.
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Kausler, F. von, and Woerl, J E. Die Kriege von 1792 bis 1815...mit 136
Karten und Planen. Karlsrube. 1841.
Schiitz, F. W. von. Gescbicbte der Kriege in Europa seit 1792. 15
parts. Leipzig. 1827-53.
On military
history consult also
Bibliotheque du depot de la guerre : Catalogue. 9 vols. Paris. 1883-96. Pohler, J Bibliotheca historico-militaris.
Systematische Uebersicht...bis zum Schluss des Jahres 1880. 3 vols. Cdssel.
1887-95.
Repertorium der neueren Kriegsgeschichte. Oldenburg. 1902.
Historical Geography and Maps.
Droysen, G. Allgemeiner historischer Handatlas. Bielefeld and
Leipzig. 1886. Freeman, E. A. The Historical Geography of Europe. 3rd edn. by
J. B. Bury.
2 vols.
London. 1903. (Vol. n contains maps.)
Poole, R. L.,
edited by. Historical Atlas of Modern Europe. Oxford. 1896. Rothert, E. Karten und Skizzen aus der vaterlandischen
Geschichte der letzten 100 Jahre. 9th edn. Diisseldorf. n. d.
Schrader, F. Atlas de Geographic historique. Paris. 1896.
Spruner, K. Hand-Atlas zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der neueren
Zeit.
3rd edn. by
T. Menke. Gotha. 1880.
Vidal-Lablache,
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NAPOLEON.
Correspondence, etc.
Fournier, A. Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons I. (Archiv fur
osterr.
Gesch. Vol. 93.) Vienna.
Napoleon I, Correspondance de; suivie des oeuvres de N. a Sainte-Helene.
32 vols.
1858-70. Supplement. Edited by A. du Casse. Paris. 1887.
Lettres inedites de (1799-1815). Edited
by L. Lecestre. 2 vols. Paris. 1897.
Lettres inedites de. Edited by L. de Brotonne.
Paris. 1898.
Demieres lettres inedites de. Edited by same.
Paris. 1903.
Correspondance inedite, officielle et
confidentielle, avec les cours etrangeres,
les princes, les ministres et les generaux fran^ais et e'trangers, etc.
Edited by Gen. Beauvais. 7 vols. Paris. 1819-20.
Correspondance militaire, extraite de la
correspondance generale, et publie'e
par ordre du Ministre de la Guerre. 10 vols. Paris. 1875-7.
Contemporary Memoirs, eto.
Bourrienne, L. A. Fauvelet de. Memoires sur Napoleon (1795-1814).
Arranged by C. M. de Villemarest. 10 vols. Paris. 1828-30. (Cf. Boulay de la
Meurthe, Comte A. J. C. B. Bourrienne et ses erreurs. 2 vols. Paris. 1830.)
Bourrienne, M. de. Vie de Napoleon. 3 vols. Paris. 1831.
Chaptal, J. A. C. Mes souvenirs sur Napoleon. Paris. 1893.
Constant (L. Constant Very, dit.). Memoires sur la vie privde de
Napoldon, sa famille, et sa cour. 6 vols. Paris. 1830-1. [To be
used with caution.] [Jomini, A. H. de.] Vie politique
et militaire de Napoleon. 4 vols. Paris. 1827.
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Norvins, J. M. de Montbreton de. Histoire de Napoleon. 4 vols. Paris. 1827-8.
21st edn. Paris. 1868,
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Coquelle, P.
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Napoleon intime. Paris. 1893.
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1896.
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Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I. Munich. 1899.
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Life of Napoleon I. 2 vols. London. 1902.
Napoleonic Studies. London. 1904.
Seeley, J. R.
A short history of Napoleon I. London. 1886.
Sloane, W. M.
Life of Napoleon. 4 vols. New York. 1896.
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Vandal, A.
Napoleon et Alexandre I. 3 vols. Paris.
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L’avcnement de Bonaparte. Paris. 1902-. (In progress.)
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Cobbett, W.
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Proces-verbal des stances du Tribunat, de l'an viii a l’an xn. 59 vols. Paris,
n. d. See also Note by M. Chas. Schmidt (Manuscript Sources) below.
Moniteur, Le. (Official organ after 1799.) Paris. 1799-1815.
Nouvelles politiques (formerly Gazette de Leyde); after Oct. 1804
entitled Journal Politique.
Contemporary Memoirs and Correspondence.
For military
Memoirs etc., see above, under Napoleon ; for Memoirs etc. of civilians, see
Bibliography to Chapters I, V.
General Works.
Aulard, F. A. Histoire politique de la Revolution fran^aise, 1798-1804.
Paris. 1901. .
Etudes et le£ons sur la Resolution fran^aise.
4 vols. Paris. 1893-1904.
Beauverger, E. de. Les institutions civiles de la France. Paris. 1864.
Bignon, L. P. E., Baron. Histoire de France depuis le 18 brumaire. 6
vols. Paris.
1829-30. Continuation to 1815. 8 vols. Paris. 1838-50.
Bourgeois, E. Manuel historique de politique etrangere. Vol. n
(1789-1830). Paris. 1900.
Correard, F. La France sous le Consulat. Paris. 1899.
Duvergier de Hauranne, P. Histoire du gouvemement parlementaire en
France.
10 vols.
Paris. 1857-72. (See vols. i, n.)
Hamel, E. Histoire de France (1789-1830). 6 vols. Paris. 1872-88.
Lacretelle, C. Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire. 6 vols. Paris.
1846-8. Lacroix, P. Directoire, Consulat, et Empire. Paris. 1883.
Martin, H. Histoire de France depuis 1789 jusqu’a nos jours. 2nd edn. 8
vols.
Paris. 1878-85. (Vols. in, IV, 1798-1831.)
Michelet, J. Histoire du xix siecle. Vol. m (1799-1815). Paris. 1875.
Taine, H. A. Les origines de la France contemporaine. Le regime modeme.
2 vols. Paris. 1891-4.
Thibaudeau, A. C., Comte. Le Consulat et l’Empire. 10 vols. Paris. 1835.
Thiers, A. Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire. 20 vols. and atlas. Paris.
1845-62. (Cf. Bami, J. Napoleon et son historien, M. Thiers. Paris, 1869.
Martel, Comte de. Les historiens fantaisistes: M. Thiers. 3
vols. Paris. 1883-7.)
See also
under Russia (Tratchevski).
Biographical Works.
Cambac£res,
J. J. R. de, Due de Parme, Life of. By A. A[ubriet]. Paris. 1824. Carnot, L. N. M., Comte, d’apres les archives nationaux etc. By E.
Bonnel. Paris. 1888.
Chateaubriand et son groupe litt£raire sous l’Empire. By
C. A. Sainte-Beuve.
2 vols. Paris.
1860.
Fesch,
Cardinal. By A. Ricard. Paris. 1893.
Fouche, Jos., Due d’Otrante. By L. Madelin. 2 vols. Paris. 1901.
Frochot, Prefet de la Seine. Histoire administrative
(1789-1815). By L. Passy. Paris. 1867.
Louis XVIII, Vie de. By A. de Beauchamp. 3rd edn. 2 vols. Paris.
1825. Stael, Mme de. A study of her life and times. By A. Stevens. 2
vols. London. 1881.
Talleyrand-Perigord,
C. M., due de, Souvenirs intimes sur. By A. Pichot. Paris. 1870.
Military History.
[Beauvais, C. T.] Victoires, conquetes, desastres, revere des Francais
de 1792 a 18X5. 27 vols. and atlas. Paris. 1817-22.
Bulletins officiels de la Grande Armee, dictes par 1’Empereur Napoleon,
et recueillis par A. Goujon. (Campaigns of 1805-14.) 2 vols.
Paris. 1824. [Should he used with caution.]
Vallaux, C.
Les campagnes des Armees francaises (1792-1815). Paris.
1899.
Various.
Barral, G. Histoire des sciences sous Napoleon I. Paris. 1889.
Chaptal de Chanteloup, J. A. C., Comte. De 1’industrie francaise. 2
vols. Paris.
1819.
Chevalier, E. Histoire de la marine francaise sous le consulat et
1’empire. Paris. 1886. .
Gaudin, M. C. Notice historique sur les finances de France, 1800-14.
Paris. 1818. Merlet, G. Tableau de la litterature francaise, 1800-15. 3 vols.
Paris. 1877-84. Monnet, E. Histoire de l’administration provinciale,
departmentale, et communale en France. Paris. 1885.
Bei-qian Departments.
Delplace, L. La Belgique sous la domination francaise. 2 vols. Louvain.
1896. Lanzac de Laborie, L. de. La domination francaise en Belgique. 2 vols.
Paris. 1895.
See also Bibliography to Chapter XIV.
HOLLAND.
Bonaparte, Louis. Documents historiques et reflexions sur le gouvemement
de la Hollande. (Published under the name of Comte de St Leu.)' 3
vols. London.
1820.
Bosch-Kemper, de. Staatkundig;e Geschiedenis van Nederland, 1795-1814. Amsterdam.
1867.
Gazette de Leyde (see above, under France: Documents).
Hogendorp, G. K. van. Brieven und Gedenkschriften. 4 vols. The Hague.
1866-87.
Hogendorp, General D. van. Memoires. The Hague.
1887.
Legrand, L. La Revolution francaise en Hollande: la Republique batave. Paris. 1894.
Wagenaar, J. Geschiedenis van Nederland, 1789-1806. Amsterdam. 1799-1811.
Wreede, G. W. Geschiedenis der diplomatic van der bataafsche republiek. 3
vols. Utrecht. 1863.
See also
under Napoleon (Napoleon and his family) and Bibliography to Chapter XIV.
SWITZERLAND.
Documents.
Amtliche Sammlung der Acten aus der Zeit der helvetischen Republic. Edited
by J. Strickler. 9 vols. Bern. 1895-1903.
OfBzielle Sammlung der das schweizerische Staatsrecht betreffenden
Actenstiicke. Zurich. 1820.
Repertorium der Abschiede der eidg. Tagsatzungen aus den Jahren 1803-13.
General Works.
Dandliker, K. Geschichte der Schweiz. 4th edn. 3
vols. Zurich. 1900-4. Muller, J. von, and Monnard, J. Histoire de la
Confederation suisse. (Translated from the German.) 18 vols. Paris and Geneva. 1837-59.
Muyden, B. van. Histoire de la Nation suisse. 3 vols. Lausanne. 1896-1900. Oechsli, W. Geschichte der Schweiz im xixten
Jahrhundert. Vol. i (1798-1813).
Leipzig. 1904. (In progress.)
Schweizer, P. Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitat. 2 vols.
Frauenfeld. 1893-5.
Tillier, A. Geschichte der helvetischen Republik, 1798-1803. 3 vols. Bern.
1843.
Geschichte der Eidgenossenschaft wahrend der
Vermittclungsakte, 1803-13
2 vols. Zurich. 1845.
Vuillemin, L. Histoire de la Confederation suisse. 2
vols. Lausanne. 1875-6.
See also
Bibliography to Chapters HI, IV.
ITALY.
Azeglio,
Massimo di. I miei ricordi. Florence. 1867.
Bianchi, N.
Storia della politica austriaca rispetto ai sovrani ed ai govemi italiani dall’
anno 1791 al maggio 1857. Savona. 1857.
Bonnefons, A. Marie-Caroline, Reine de Naples. Paris. 1905.
Botta, C. G. G. Storia d’ Italia, 1789-1814. 4 vols.
Paris. 1824. Revised edn. Paris. 1832.
Castro, G. de. Storia d’ Italia dal 1797 al 1814 Milan. 1881.
Helfert, Freiherr von. Konigin Karolina von Neapel und Sicilien, im Kampfe
gegen die franzosische Herrschaft, 1790-1814. Vienna. 1878.
Johnston, R.
M. The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy. 2 vols.
London.
1904. (Bibliography.)
Ramondiui, E. L’ Italia durante la dominazione francese. Naples. 1882.
Ranke, L. von. Cardinal Consalvi und seine Staatsverwaltung unter...Pius
VII. Leipzig. 1878.
Rnth, E. Geschichte des italienischen Volkes unter der napoleonischen
Herrschaft. Leipzig. 1859.
Sclopis de. Salerno, F. La domination francaise en Italie (1800-14).
Paris. 1861. (Seances et travaux de l’academie des Sciences morales et
politiques. Vols.
LVI, LVII.)
Tivaroni, C. L’ Italia prima della rivoluzione francese (1789-1815).
Turin. 1889. Vimercati, C. Histoire d’ltalie de 1789 a 1863. Paris. 1864.
See also Bibliography to Chapters XIII, XIV.
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.
Memoirs.
Godoy, Manuel. Cuenta dada de la vida politica de M. G., princ. de la
Paz, o sean memorias...par la historia del reinado del sefior don Carlos IV. 6
vols. Madrid. 1836-42. Engl, translation. 5 vols. London.
1836-8.
General Works.
Baumgarten, H. Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der franzosischen
Revolution.
Vol. i.
Leipzig. 1865.
Costada,
Juau. Historia de Portugal hasta 1839. Barcelona. 1844.
Dunham, S. A.
History of Spain and Portugal (to 1814). London. 1833.
Latino
Coelho, J. M. Historia politics e militar de Portugal, desde os fins do 18
seculo ate 1814. 3 vols. Lisbon. 1874-91,
Oliveira
Martins. Historia de Portugal. 2 vols. Lisbon. 1802.
See also
Bibliography to Chapter XV.
GERMANY,
INCLUDING PRUSSIA.
Contemporary Memoirs, Correspondence, etc.
Bailleu, P. Preussen und Frankreich, 1795-1807. Diplomatische
Correspondenzen.
2 vols.
Leipzig. 1881-7.
Briefwechael Konig Friedrich Wilhelm’s III und der Konigin Luise mit Kaiser
Alexander I. Edited by P. Bailleu. Leipzig. 1900.
Eylert, R. F. Charakterzuge und historische Fragments aus dem Leben des
Konigs von Preussen Friedrich Wilhelm III. 4 vols. Magdeburg. 1843-6. Gagem,
Freiherr H. C. E. von. Mein Antheil an der Politik, unter Napoleon’s
Herrschaft. Stuttgart. 1823.
Gentz, F. von. Tagebiicher. Ed. Vamhagen von Ense. 4 vols. Leipzig. 1861.
Me'moires et lettres inedites. Ed. G. Schlesier. Stuttgart. 1841.
Hardenberg, Denkwurdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fursten von. Edited
by L. von Ranke. 5 vols. Leipzig. 1877.
Montgelas, Graf Max. von. Denkwurdigkeiten, 1799-1817.
Stuttgart. 1887. Briefe. Regensburg. 1853.
Ompteda, L. von. Politischer Nachlass aus den Jahren 1804-13. 3 vols. Jena.
1869. Stein, H. F. K. Freiherr vom. Lebenserinnerungen. Hagen. 1901.
Stem, A. Abhandlungen und Akteustucke aus der preussischen Reformzeit, 180715.
Leipzig. 1885.
Vamhagen von Ense, C. A. Denkwurdigkeiten und vermischte Schriften. 6 vols.
Mannheim. 1837-42. English translation. London. 1847.
General Works.
Bornhak, C. Geschichte des preuss. Verwaltungsrechts. 3 vols. Berlin. 1884-92. Denis, E. L’Allemagne, 1789-1810. Paris. 1896.
L’Allemagne, 1810-52. Paris. 1898.
Duncker, M. Preussen wahrend der franzosischen Okknpation. Berlin.
1872. Fisher, H. A. L. Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany. Oxford. 1903. (Bibliography.)
Hassd, J. P. Geschichte der preussischen Politik, 1807-15. Leipzig. 1881.
Hausser, L. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Griind-
ung des deutichen Bundes. 4th edn. 4 vols. Berlin. 1869.
Menzel, K. A. Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen von der Reformation bis zur
Bundes-Acte. 12 vols. Breslau. 1826-48.
Zwanzig Jahre preussischer Geschichte,
1786-1806. Berlin. 1849.
Perthes, C. T. Politische Zustande und Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit der
franzosischen Herrschaft. 2 vols. Gotha. 1862.
Philippson, M. Geschichte des preussischen Staatswesens (1786-1813). 2
vols.
Leipzig. 1880-2.
Rambaud, A. Les Franijais sur le Rhin (1792-1804). Paris. 1873.
L’Allemagne sous Napoleon I (1804-11). Paris.
1874.
Servieres, G. L’Allemagne franijaise sous Napole'on I. Paris. 1904.
Treitschke, H. von. Deutsche Geschichte im x:xten Jahrhundert. Vol.
i. Leipzig. 1879.
Biographical Works.
Allgemeine dentsche Biographie. 50 vols. published. Leipzig. 1878-1905.
Bliicher, seine Zeit und sein Leben. By J. Scherr. 3 vols. Leipzig.
1862-3.
2nd edn.
1865.
Life. By
C. Blasendorff. Berlin. 1887.
Gneisenau, Lehen des Feldmarschalls Grafen N. von. By G. H.
Pertz and
H. Delbriick. 6 vols. Berlin. 1864-81. 2nd edn. 1894.
Hardenberg und die Geschichte des preussischen Staates, 1793-1813. By
L. von Ranke. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1880-1.
Life. By
C. L. Kiose. Halle. 1861.
Luise, Konigin von Preussen. By the Grafin von Berg. Berlin. 1814.
By F.
Adami. 11th edn. Giitersloh. 1888.
Life and
Times of. By E. H. Hudson. 2 vols. London. 1874.
Montgelas,
Graf von. Life. By Count du Moulin Eckhart. Munich. 1894. Schamhorst, Leben des Generals G. J. D. von. By
G. H. Klippel. 3 vols.
Leipzig.
1869-71 Life. By Max Lehmann. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1886-7.
Stein, Leben des Ministers Freiherrn vom. By G. H.
Pertz. 6 vols. Berlin. 1850-5.
Life and Timas of. By J. R. Seeley. 3 vols.
Cambridge. 1878.
Life. By M. Lehmann. Leipzig. 1902-3.
Yorck von Wartenburg, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen. By
J. G. Droysen.
3 vols. Berlin. 1851-2. 2nd edn. 1884.
For other
works (General, Biographical, etc.) on the French domination in Germany, see
Bibliography to Chapters XI, XIII.
AUSTRIA.
Contemporary Memoirs, etc.
Karl, Erzherzog, von Oesterreich. Ausgewahlte Schriften. 6 vols. Vienna.
1893-5. Metternich-Winneburg, C.W.N.L., Prince. Nachgelassene Papiere. Edited
by his son. 8 vols. Vienna. 1880-4. Memoires, documents, et ecrits divers. 8
vols. Paris. 1880-4. English translation. 5 vols. London. 1880-2. (Cf. P.
Bailleu, in Hist. Zeitschrift. Vol. 44.)
Schwarzenberg, Denkwiirdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Feldmarschalls Fiirsten
K. von. Edited
by A. Prokesch, Ritter von Osten.
General and Bioqraphical Works.
Angely, M., Edler von. Erzherzog Karl von Oesterreich als Feldherr und
Heeres- organisator. 5 vols. Vienna and Leipzig. 1896-7.
Beer, A. Zehn Jahre osterreichischer Politik (1801-10). Leipzig. 1877.
Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs zeit
1774. Prague and Leipzig. 1888.
Binder, W. von. Fiirst Clemens Mettemich und sein Zeitalter. 3rd edn. 1845.
Fournier, A. Gentz und Cobenzl. Geschichte der osterreichischen Diplomatie,
1801-6. Vienna. 1880.
Krones, F., Ritter von. Zur Geschichte Oesterreichs im Zeitalter der
franzosisclien Kriege, 1792-1816. Gotha. 1886.
Meynert, H. Kaiser Franz I. Zur Geschichte seiner Regierung und seiner
Zeit.
2 vols.
Vienna. 1872.
Oncken, W. Oesterreich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege. Vienna. 1822.
2 vols.
Berlin. 1876-9.
Schmidt-Weissenfels, E. Fiirst Metternich: Geschichte seines Lebens und
seiner Zeit 2 vols. Prague. 1860.
Wertheimer, E. Geschichte Oesterreichs und Ungarns im ersten Jahrzehnt des
xixten Jahrhunderts. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1884-90.
Zeissberg, M., Edler von. Erzherzog Carl von Oesterreich. 2
parts. Vienna. 1895.
See also
under Italy (Bianchi), and Bibliography to Chapter XII.
RUSSIA.
Memoirs and Correspondence.
Alexandre I et le prince Czartoryski. Correspondance particuliere et
conversations, 1801-23. Edited by Prince L. Czartoryski.
Paris. 1865.
Czartoryski,
Prince Adam. Memoires et correspondance avec Alexandre I. Edited by C. Mazade. 2 vols. Paris. 1887. English transl. 2 vols. London. 1888. Nesselrode,
K. R., Comte de. Lettres et Papiers (Autobiography, etc.). Paris. 1904. Toll, R., Graf von. Denkwiirdigkeiten.
Edited by T. von Bernhardi. 2nd edn.
4 vols.
Leipzig. 1865-6.
Woronzoff
Archives. 40 vols. St Petersburg. 18/0-95.
General and Biographical Works.
Bernhardi, T. von. Geschichte Russlands nnd der europaischen Politik im
xixten Jahrhundert. 4 vols. Leipzig. 1863-77.
Bogdanovitch,
M. History of the reign of Alexander I and of the Russia of his time. (In
Russian.) 6 vols. St Petersburg. 1869-71.
Golovine, J.
Histoire d'Alexandre I. Leipzig. 1859.
Joyneville,
C. Life and Times of Alexander I. 3 vols. London. 1876.
Rambaud, A. Histoire de la Russie. 5th edn.
Paris. 1900. English translation.
2 vols.
London. 1879.
Schiemann, T. Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. Vol. i. Kaiser
Alexander und die Erlebnisse seiner Lebensarbeit. Berlin. 1904.
■Schilder,
N. K. The Emperor Alexander I, his Life and Reign. (In Russian.)
4 vols. St
Petersburg. 1897-8.
Speranski,
Count. Life, by Baron Korff. (In Russian.) 2 vols. St Petersburg. 1861.
TVatchevski,
A. Diplomatic relations of Russia with France in the time of Napoleon I. (In
Russian.) Archives of the Imp. Russian Hist. Society. St Petersburg. 1890-3.
See also
under Napoleon (Tatischeff, Vandal) for Alexander I and Napoleon.
Poland.
Lelewel, J. Histoire de Pologne. 2 vols. Paris. 1844.
Oginski, M. Memoires sur la Pologne et les Polonais depuis 1788 jusqu’a
la fin de 1815. 4 vols. Paris. 1826-7.
SWEDEN, DENMARK AND NORWAY.
Documents.
Recueil des Lettres, Discours, et Proclamations de Charles XIV Jean, Roi
de Suede. Stockholm.
1858.
General and Biographical Works.
Bain, R. N. A
Political History of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 1513 to 1900. Cambridge.
1905. (Bibliography.)
Boyesen, H.
H. A History of Norway from the earliest times. (Story of the Nations.) London.
1900.
Dunham, S. A.
History of Sweden to 1814. 3 vols. London. 1839-40.
Fryxell, A.
History of Sweden. English translation. 2 vols. London. 1844.
Geijer, E. G.
Konung Carls XIV Johann Historia. Stockholm. 1844. German translation by U. W.
Dietrich. Ibid. 1844.
Holm, E.
Danmark-Norges udenrigske Historie under den franske Revolution og Napoleons
Krige. 2 vols. Copenhagen. 1875.
Pingaud, L.
Bemadotte, Napoleon, et les Bourbons. Paris.
1901.
rhorso.ee, A. Den danske Statspolitiske Historie (1800-64). Copenhagen. 1874.
Touchard-Lafosse, G. Histoire de Charles XIV Jean (Bemadotte), Roi de
Suede et de Nprvege. 3 vols. Paris. 1838,
Wergeland, H.
Nprges Historie. 2 vols. Christiania. 1834.
TURKEY,
GREECE, AND THE LEVANT.
Creasy, E. S.
History of the Ottoman Turks. 2 vols. London. 1856.
Driault, E. La Question d’Orient. Paris. 1898.
Emerson, J.
[Sir J. Emerson Tennent]. History of Modem Greece to the present time. 2 vols.
London. 1830.
Finlay, G.
History of Greece under Othoman and Venetian domination (1453-1821).
London. 1856.
Revised edn. By H. F. Tozer. 7 vols. Oxford. 1877.
Jucbereau de St Denys, Baron A. de. Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman, 1792-1844.
4 vols. Paris. 1844.
Maurer, G. L. von. Das griechische
Volk. 3 vols. Heidelberg. 1835. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, K. Geschichte
Griechenlands. (Staatengeschichte der neuesten Zeit.) 2 vols. I-eipzig. 1870-4.
Zinkeisen, J. W. Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa. (Europaische
Staatengeschichte.) 7 vols. Hamburg. 1840-63.
See also
Bibliography to Chapter XIII.
lhe documents
of most importance for the domestic history of the Consulate and the Empire are
preserved at the Archives Nationales, where they may be inspected on request
addressed to M. le Directeur des Archives Nationales, Paris, m, 60 rue des
Francs-Bourgeois.
This is not
the place to indicate all the series in which documents bearing on the period
may be found: one can only refer the student to the publications which, under
each category, give sufficient information as to the documents it contains. The
first place must be given to the ihtat-sommaire par series des documents
conserves aux Archives Nationales (Paris, Delagrave, 1891, 1 vol.). See
especially the series B (elections and votes), C (Proces^verbaum of the
Assemblies, and documents annexed), CC (the Conservative Senate and the
Imperial Chambre des Pairs), F (general administration), N (plans and maps), O2
(Maison de YEmpereur), BB (judicial papers), AD (an important collection of
printed matter), AFIV (the State Secretariat). The fitat-sommaire
should be supplemented by the &tat des inventaires des Archives Nationales
(Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1902; not published, but to be found in the
larger libraries), a work due to M. G. Servois, former Director of the
Archives.
For' the
Consulate and the Empire, the most important series is that marked AFIV,
in which are preserved the papers of the office of the Imperial Secretary of
State. Here are to be found, in particular, the ministerial reports, and the minutes
(often corrected by Napoleon) of the decrees passed from the year vm (1799) to
1815. The series AF17, in which are also some important diplomatic
documents, represents, in fact, what is essential in the administrative
activity of the period; the Secretariat of State is the central organ on which
depended and in which was completed all public business of first-rate
importance.
The following
publications, by M. Chas. Schmidt, may also be consulted. (1) La Nouvelle Salle
de travail auoc Archives nationales (published, Mar. 14, 1904, in La Revolution
francaise) describes the facilities offered to students visiting the Archives,
and indicates the inventories open to them. (2) Les Sources de FSistoire cCun
dtpartement aunc Archives nationales (published, Mar. 14, 1902, in La
Revolution francaise) contains an estimate of the importance, for students of
contemporary history, of the papers contained in series F (general
administration). (3) Une source de I’ Histoire contemporaine: le fonds
de la Police generale aux Archives nationales (published in the JRevue d’Hist.
mod. et contemp. 1902-’3) should be consulted for the purpose of
researches in the abundant papers of the Ministry of Police (series F T,
affaires politiques, Emigration, &c.).
788
(2) Archives
du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres.
Documents
anterior to 1830 are communicated on application to M. le Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres, Paris. There are two principal series: (1) Correspondance politique
(despatches of ambassadors, and correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs with French agents abroad, classified by countries, and in each country
by chronological order); (2) Mdmoires et Documents (divided into two groups,
France and foreign countries): am inventairesommaire has been issued; since the
publication of Les Archives de VHistoire de France, by MM. Langlois and Stein,
vol. i of the Correspondance politique (Germany, England, Argentine Republic,
Austria) has appeared (Paris, 1903). ,
(3) Archives
du Mmistere de la Guerre.
Documents anterior to 1830 are communicated on application to M. le
Ministre de la Guerre, Paris. There are two principal series,
forming in reality two distinct collections of Archives, for access to each of
which special authorisation is required. These are: (1) Les Archives
historiques, where one may consult, in particular, the Correspondance des
Armies, a primary source for military history ; (2) Les Archives
administratives, where are kept the personal records (dossiers) of military
officers.
(4) Archives
du Ministere des Colonies.
In these
archives, which, though of much importance, are still imperfectly known, the
documents are arranged in three principal series: (1) personnel des Colonies;
(2) correspondance generate; (3) papiers judiciaires. They are open to
inspection on application to M. le Ministre des Colonies, Paris.
(5) Archives du Ministere de la Marine.
Since 1899
the papers of this Ministry anterior to the Revolution, and a portion of those
of later date, have been deposited at the Archives Nationales. For the period
of the Consulate and the Empire, one should consult the decisions, the
correspondance gSntrale (classified under ports), the campagnes, the armements.
Special authorisation from the Ministry of Marine is required in order to
consult these documents.
The documents
preserved in the great libraries are of so varied a character that it is
impossible to give even a summary account of them. In the National library (new
acquisitions of the fonds frarqais) are to be found interesting mss. ; a
catalogue of which is in preparation. Others will be found in the Library of
the Arsenal (inventory by H. Martin), and in the Library of the Institute
(catalogue by F. Bournon), and other libraries. But what is essential for the
domestic history of France is to be found in the different Archives.
For further
details—except for such modifications as have been made since 1891— the student
should consult the book by MM. Ch.-V. Langlois and
H. Stein, entitled Les Archives dc VHistoire de France (Paris, Picardj 1891). He
will find there, in particular, indications respecting Archives at present
hardly explored, such as the Archives des Oultes, etc., also respecting such as
have been destroyed, e.g. those of the Conseil d’etat and of the Ministere des
Finances, which were burnt in 1871. Many private families have preserved
documents relative to the Napoleonic period, but access to these is generally
difficult.
FRANCE
UNDER THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE.
I. LAWS, REGULATIONS,
ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, ETC.
Almanach
national (puis imperial), published by Testu. Paris.
One vol. yearly.
Buchez, P. J. B. and Roux, P. C. Histoire parlementaire de la Revolution
franchise (1789-1816). Vols. xxxviii—xl.
Paris. 1838.
Bulletin des
Lois. Third series (an vm-an xn. 9 vols., and supplement). Fourth series (an
xii-1814. 20 vols.). Index by Rondonneau (1780-1814). 4 vols. Paris. 1816.
Duvergier, J. B. Collection complete des lois, decrets, ordonnances,
etc. (from 1788). Vols. xii-xiv (Consulat),
xv-xix (Empire). Paris. 1826-7. Index (1788-1830). 2 vols. Paris. 1834-8.
Gazette nationale ou Moniteur universel, “ seul journal official ” (from
7 nivose, an vni, Dec. 28, 1799). Paris. 2 vols. yearly. Index, 1799-1814. 2
vols. in
1 vol. Paris. 1820.
(Lallement, G. N., de Metz.) Choix de rapports, opinions, et discours
(17891816). Vols. xvii-xx. Paris.
1821-2. General Index, 1825.
Mavidal, J. and Laurent, E. Archives parlementaires. Second series.
Vols. i-xii (an vm-1814). Paris.
1862-8.
Aulard, F. A. Registre des deliberations du Consulat provisoire. Paris.
1894. (Soci£t£ de l’histoire de la Revolution franyaise.)
L’fitat de la France en l’an vm et en l’an ix,
Paris. 1897. (Society de
l’histoire de la Revolution franfaise.)
Chaptal, J. A., Comte de Chanteloup. Analyse des proces-verbaux des
conseils generaux de dcpartement. 2 vols. Paris. 1801-2.
Jullien, M. A. Entretiens politiques sur la situation actuelle de la
France et sur les plans du nouveau gouvernement. Paris. An vm.
Montalivet, J. P. Bachasson, Comte de. Expose de la situation de
l’Empire presente au Corps legislatif le 26 fevrier 1813, avec 75 tableaux
statistiques. Paris. 18] 3.
Peuchet, J. Essai d’une statistique generate de la France. Paris. 1802.
Statistique generale et particuliere de la
France. 7 vols. and atlas. Paris.
1803.
Statistique elementaire de la France. Paris.
1805.
Rocquain, F. L’Etat de la France au 18 brumaire. Paris.
1874.
II. GENERAL WORKS.
For works on
the general history of France during this period (by Aulard, Correard,
Duvergier de Hauranne, Lacroix, Taine, Thibaudeau, Thiers, etc.), and for works
on Napoleon (by Fournier, Lanfrey, Peyre, Rose, Seeley, Vandal, etc.) see
General Bibliography.
III. MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
1. Of French
Origin.
(a) Of primary authority.
[No
thoroughly critical study of Memoirs belonging to the history of this period
has yet been made; and many of those mentioned in the present section ought
perhaps to find a place in the next group.]
A brantes, Laure Junot, nee Pennon, Duchesse de. Memoires ou Souvenirs
historiques. 18 vols. Paris. 1831-4. Engl, transl. 8 vols. London. 183d.
3 vols. London. 1883.
Histoire des Salons de Paris. 6 vols. Paris.
1837-8.
Andigne, L. M. A. F., Comte de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1900-1.
Arnault, A. V. Souvenirs d’un sexagenaire. Vols. ii-iv. Paris. 1833.
Barante, A. G. P. Brugiere, Baron de. Souvenirs. Vols. i, ii. Paris. 1896-1901. Barras, P. F. J.
N., Vicomte de. Memoires. Arranged by Alex. Rousselin Corbeau de Saint-Albin. 4
vols. Paris. 1895-6. Engl, transl. London. 1896. Bausset, L. F. J., Baron de.
Memoires anecdotiques. 2 vols. Paris. 1827.
4 vols. Paris. 1828. Engl,
transl. Philadelphia. 1828.
Besnard, F. Y. Souvenirs d’un nonagenaire. 2 vols. Paris
and Angers. 1880. Beugnot, J. C., Comte. Memoires. 2
vols. Paris. 1866. 3rd edn. 1 vol. 1889. Boulay de la Meurthe, A. J. C. J.,
Comte. Theorie constitutionnelle de Sieyes; extraits des Memoires. Paris. 1836.
Memoires. Privately printed. Paris. 1868.
Broglie, A. L. V., Due de. Souvenirs (1785-1870). 4 vols. Paris. 1886.
(Cavaignac, Madame.) Les Memoires d’une inconnue. Paris. 1894.
Champagny, J. B. Nompere de, Due de Cadore. Souvenirs. Paris. 1846.
Chaptal, J. A., Comte de Chanteloup. Mes souvenirs snr Napoleon. Paris.
1893. Chastenay, Madame de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1896.
Chateaubriand, F. R., Vicomte de. Memoires d’outre-tombe. 12 vols. (See
vols.
1-3.) Paris. 1849-50. 6 vols. Edited by E. Bire. Paris. 1898-1900. Desmarest, P. M. C. Temoignages historiques, ou Quinze
ans de haute police.
Paris. 1833.
Edited by Grasilier and Savine. Paris. 1900.
Durand, veuve du General. Mes souvenirs sur Napoleon. 2 vols. Paris.
1819.
New edition,
entitled Memoires. Paris. 1885. Engl, transl. London. 1886. iFauriel, C.
C.) Les derniers jours du Consulat. Ed. L. Lalanne. Paris. 1886. FWvee, J.
Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte. 3 vols. Paris. 1836. Fouche, J.,
Due d’Otrante. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1824.
Gaudin, M. M. C., Due de Gaete. Mdmoires, souvenirs, opinions et
e'crits. 3 vols. Paris. 1826-34.
Girardin, L. C. S. X., Comte de. Discours et opinions, journal et
souvenirs.
4 vols. Paris. 1828.
Hautpoul, Marquis Amand d\ Souvenirs sur la Revolution, l’Empire, et la
Restauration. Edited by Comte Fleury. Paris. 1904.
Hyde de Neuville, G., Baron. Memoires et Souvenirs. Vol. i. Paris. 1888.
Lavalette, A. M. J. Chamans, Comte de. Memoires et Souvenirs. 2 vols. Paris.
1881. Engl, transl. 2 vols. London.
1831 and 1895.
Meneval, C. F,, Baron de. Napoleon et Marie-Louise. Souvenirs
historlques.
3 vols. Paris. 1843-5. New edition,
entitled Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1894. Engl, transl. 3 vols. London. 1894,
1895.
Miot de
Melito, A. F., Comte. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1858. Engl, transl. New York.
1881.
Mollien, F.
N., Comte. Memoires. 4 vols. Paris. 1845. 3 vols. Paris. 1898.
Norvins, J. Marquet de Montbreton, Baron de. Memorial, Souvenirs. Vols. u, in.
Paris. 1896-7.
Ouvrard, G. J. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1826.
Pasquier, E. D., Due. Histoire de mon temps. Memoires (edited by
d’Audiffret- Pasquier). 6 vols. Paris. 1893-4. Engl, transl. London. 1893-4.
(Pelet, de la Lozere, J., Baron.) Opinions de Napoleon. Paris. 1833.
Engl.
transl. Edinburgh. (1837.)
Plancy, A. G. Godard d’Aucour, Comte de. Souvenirs. Paris. 1905.
Pontecoulant, L. G. Le Doulcet, Comte de. Souvenirs. Vol. i. Paris. 1861.
Rambuteau, C. P. Barthelot, Comte de. Memoires Paris. 1905.
Recamier, Madame. Souvenirs et correspondance. 2 vols. Paris. 1859.
Relations secretes des agents de Louis XVIII a Paris sous le Consulat. Edited
by Comte Remacle. Paris. 1899.
Remusat, C. E. J. Gravier de Vergennes, Comtesse de. Memoires. 3 vols.
Paris.
1879-80. Engl, transl. London. 1894.
Lettres. 2 vols. Paris. 1881.
Roederer, P. L, Comte. (Euvres. 8 vols.
Paris. 1853-9. (See especially vol. hi.) Cf. Sainte-Beuve. Caus. du Lundi, vol. viii.
Roustam, Mameluck de l’Empereur. Memoires. Revue retrospective. Paris.
1888. Savary, A. J. M. R., Due de Rovigo. Memoires. (Arranged by A. Bossange,
A. Bulos, etc.) 8 vols. Paris.
1828. Engl, transl. 4 vols. London. 1828. Segur, P. P., Comte de. Histoire et
Memoires. 8
vols. Paris. 1873-7. Abridged edition, by L de Segur. 3 vols. Paris. 1894-5. Engl, transl. London. 1895, 1896.
Stael, Madame de. Considerations. 3 vols. Paris. 1818. Engl, transl. 3
vols. London. 1818. Cf. Bailleul, J. C. Examen critique des Considerations.
2 vols. Paris. 1818
Dix annees d’exil. Paris. 1821.
Edited by P. Gautier. Paris. 1904.
Engl, transl. London. 1821.
Talleyrand-Perigord, C. M. de, Prince de Benevent. Memoires. Edited,
with preface, by the Due de Broglie. (Arranged by M. de Bacourt.) 5 vols.
Paris. 1891-2. Engl, transl. 5 vols. London. 1891-2. Correspondance diplomatique.
Ed. G. Pallain. 2 vols. Paris. 1889-91.
Lettres
inedites a Napoleon (1800-9). Ed. P. Bertrand. Paris. 1889.
(Thibaudeau,
A. C., Comte.) Memoires sur le Consulat. 2 vols. Paris.
1826. Thiebault, P. C., Baron. Memoires. 5 vols. Ed. F.
Calmettes. Paris. 1893-5. Verneilh-Puiraseau, J., Baron de. Mes souvenirs.
Paris. 1836.
Villemain, F. A. Souvenirs. Vol. i. Paris. 1853.
Vitrolles, E. F. A. d’Amaud, Baron de. Memoires et relations politiques.
Vol. i. Paris. 1884.
For the
Memoirs of Napoleon (by Bourrienne); the Memoirs and Correspondence of Jerome,
Joseph, and Lucien Bonaparte; the Letters of the Empress Josephine; and Memoirs
of Napoleon’s Marshals and Generals, see General Bibliography.
(b) Of
inferior authority.
[Among1
these, so called because they are not by the authors to whom they are
attributed, or because their authors were ill-informed or display bias, fancy,
or insincerity, the following may be mentioned.]
Avrillon, Mademoiselle. Memoires sur Josephine. (By C. M. de
Villemarest.)
2 vols. Paris. 1833.
Caulaincourt, A. A. L., Marquis de, Due de Vicence. Souvenirs. Ed.
Charlotte de Sor, Comtesse Eillaux, nee Desormeaux. 2 vols. Paris. 1837. Engl,
transl.
2 vols. London. 1838.
Cochelet, Mademoiselle. Memoires sur la reine Hortense et la famille
imperiale.
(Attributed
to F. Lacroix.) 4 vols. Paris. 1836-8.
Constant (L. C. Very, dit). Memoires. Edited by C. M. de
Villemarest and others. 6 vols. Paris. 1830-1.
(Doris, C.) Memoires secrets. 2 vols. Paris. 1814. Engl, transl. London.
1815. Various pamphlets by the same.
Fauche-Borel,
L. Memoires. Arranged by A. de Beauchamp. 4 vols.
Paris. 1828-9. Josephine, Empress. Memoires et Correspondance. Ed.
Regnault-Warin. Paris. 1819.
Mdmoires
historiques. Ed. Mademoiselle M. A. Lenormand. 2 vols.
Paris. 1820.
Engl, transl. Philadelphia. 1848. London. 1855. tlaret,
H. B., Due de Bassano, Souvenirs mtimes sur. Ed. Charlotte de Sor, Comtesse
Eillaux, nee Desormeaux. 2 vols. Paris. 1843. Cf. Baron A. A. Ernouf: Maret.
Paris. 1878.
Rapp, J., Comte. Memoires. Arranged by A. Bulos. Paris. 1823. Richard-Lenoir (F. Richard, dit). Memoires. Edited by F.
Herbinot de Mauchamp. Paris. 1837.
Saint-Elme, Ida. Me'moires d’une contemporaine. Arranged by A.
Malitourne, Ch. Nodier, A. Pichot, and C. M. de Villemarest. 8 vols. Paris.
1827-8. Saint-Hilaire, E. Marco Saint-Hilaire, dit de. Memoires d’un
page de la cour imperiale. 2 vols. Paris. 1830. Various works by the same.
2. Foreign
Narratives.
(Alison, Sir
Archibald, and Tytler, P. F.) Travels in France during the years 1814-5. 2
vols. London. 1815.
Berry, Miss
Mary. Journals and Correspondence. 3 vols. London. 1865. Birkbeck, M. Notes on
a Journey through France. London. 1815.
(Blagdon, F.
W.) Paris as it was and as it is. 2 vols. London. 1804.
Blayney,
Major-General, Lord. Narrative of a forced Journey through France.
3 vols. London. 1814-6.
Carr, Sir
John. The Stranger in France. London. 1803.
Cazenove d’Arlens, Madame de. Journal (1803). Paris. 1903.
(Society d’histoire contemporaine.)
Eyre, E. J.
Observations made at Paris. Bath. 1803.
(Faber, Th.) Notices sur l’interieur de la France. St
Petersburg. 1807. (Also in: Offrandes a Bonaparte par trois strangers. London.
1810.)
Forbes, J.
Letters from France (1803-4). 2 vols. London. 1806.
Goldsmith, L.
Secret history of the Cabinet of Bonaparte. London. 1810.
Hase, C. B.
Briefe. Leipzig. 1894.
Hastfer, Helmina von. Leben und Kunst in Paris. 2 vols.
Weimar. 1805-6. (Hobhouse, J. C.) The substance of some Letters. 2 vols.
London. 1816. Keatinge, M. Travels. 2 vols. London.
1816.
Kotzebue, A. von. Erinneruugen aus Paris im Jahre 1804. Berlin.
1804. Langton, R. Narrative of a captivity in France from 1809 to 1814. 2 vols.
London. 1836.
Lucchesini,
Jerome, Marquis de. Depeches. Edited by Bailleu. Preussen und Frankreich. Vol. ii. Leipzig. 1887. (Publikationen aus den preussischen Staatsarchiven.)
Maclean, C. An excursion in France. London. 1804.
Meyer, F. I.
L. Briefe. 2 vols. Tubingen. 1802.
Morrice, D. A
view of modem France. London. 1803.
Niemeyer, A. H. Beobachtungen (1807). Halle. 1824.
Paris zur Zeit der Kaiserkrdnung. Leipzig.
1805.
Peltier, J. G. Paris pendant les annees 1795 a 1802. London.
250 nos. forming 35 vols.
Pinkerton, J.
Recollections (1802-5). 2 vols. London. 1806.
Pinkney,
Lieut.-Col. Travels. London. 1809.
Plumptre,
Anne. A narrative. 3 vols. London. 1810.
Reichardt, I.
F. Vertraute Briefe. Hamburg. 1805. French translation by Laquiante. Paris.
1896. Cf. Voss, I. Beleuchtung der vertrauten Briefe. Berlin. 1804.
Reinbard, Madame. Lettres. Paris. 1901. (Societe d’histoire contemporaine.)
(Schlabrendorf.) Napoleon Bonaparte und das franzosische Volk. Germanien
[Hamburg]. 1814.
Scott, J. A
visit to Paris in 1814. London. 1815.
Shepherd, W.
Paris in 1802 and 1814. London. 1814.
Stewarton.
The Belgian Traveller. 4 vols. London. 1806.
Secret
history of the Court and Cabinet of Saint-Cloud. 3 vols. London.
1806.
Thornton,
Col. T. A Sporting Tour. 2 vols. London. 1806.
Trotter, J.
B. Memoirs of the later years of C. J. Fox. London. 1811. (Underwood, T. R.) A
narrative...being extracts from the Journal of a Detenu.
London. 1825,
1828.
Williams, T.
State of France (1802-6). 2 vols. London. 1807.
Worsley, J.
Account of the State of France. London. 1806.
Yorke, H. R.
Letters from France (1802). 2 vols. London. 1804.
Alger, J. G.
Napoleon’s British Visitors and Captives. London. 1904.
Babeau, A. Les Anglais en France apres la paix d’Amiens. Paris. 1898. Holzhausen, P. Der erste Konsul Bonaparte
und seine deutschen Besucber. Bonn. 1900.
IV. SPECIAL WORKS.
1. Napoleon’s
Family and Coort; Fkench Society.
Arjuzon, C. de. Hortense de Beauharnais; Madame Louis Bonaparte. 2 vols.
Paris. 1897-1901.
Aubenas, J. A. Histoire de l’imperatrice Josephine. 2 vols. Paris.
1858-9. Bingham, D. A. The Marriages of the Bonapartes. 2 vols. London. 1881. Fontaine, P. F. L. Description des ceremonies..
.pour le mariage de S. M. Napoleon I. Paris. 1810.
Guillois, A Napoleon, l’homme, le politique, l’orateur. 2 vols. Paris.
1889. Imbert de Saint-Amand, A. L., Baron. Les femmes des Tuileries. 21 vols. Paris.
1880-90.
Kleinschmidt, A. Die Eltem und Geschwister Napoleon’s I. Berlin. 1878. Lescure, M. F. A. de. Napoleon et sa famille. Paris. 1867- Levy,
Arthur. Napoleon intime. Paris. 1893. Engl, transl. 2 vols. London.
1894.
Masij E. Le due mogli di Napoleone 1. Bologra. 1888.
Masson, F. Napoleon chez lui. 2 vols. Paris. 1893.
(In progress.) Engl, translation. London. 1894.
Napoleon et les femmes: L’Amour. English
translation. London. 1894.
Josephine (3 vols.), Marie Louise. Paris. 1893-1902.
Napoleon et son fils. Paris. 1904.
Napoleon et sa famille. 7 vols. Paris. 1897-.
(In progress.)
Maze-Ser<iier, A. Les fournisseurs de Napoleon et des deux
imperatrices. Paris. 1893.
Turquan, J. Souveraines et grandes dames. 13 vols. Paris. 1895. (In progress.)
Welschinger, H. Le divorce de Napoleon. Paris. 1889.
Bardoux, A. La bourgeoisie fran^aise (1789-1848). Paris. 1886.
Madame de Custine. Paris. 1888.
Bondois, P. Napoleon et la societe de son temps. Paris. 1895.
Bouchot, H. Le luxe fran9ais, l’Empire. Paris. 1892.
Broc, Vicomte de. La vie en France sous le Premier Empire. Paris. 1895.
Dreyfus, Ferd. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt. Paris. 1903.
Stenger, Gilbert. La societe franfaise pendant le Consulat. 6 vols.
Paris. 1903-5. In progress.
Campardon, E. Liste des membres de la noblesse imperiale. Paris. 1889.
(Societe de l’histoire de la Revolution franfaise.)
Reverend, Vicomte A. Armorial general du Premier Empire. 4 vols. Paris.
1894^7.
Bonneville de Marsangy, L. La Legion d’honneur. Paris. 1904. Saint-Maurice,
C. R. E. de. Histoire de la Legion d’honneur. Paris. 1833. Soulajon, L. Les
cohortes de la Legion d’honneur (1802-9). Paris. 1889.
■ 2. Royalist and Republican Opposition and Plots.
Daudet, E. Histoire de 1’emigration. 3 vols. Paris. 1886-90 and 1904-5.
Fomeron, H. Histoire generale des Emigres. 3 vols. Paris. 1884-90. Madelin, L.
Fouche. 2 vols. Paris. 1901.
Pingaud, L. Un agent secret, le comte d’Antraigues. Paris. 1893.
Bemadotte, Napoleon et les Bourbons. Paris.
1901.
Cadoudal, G. de. Georges Cadoudal et la Chouannerie. Paris. 1887.
Chassin, C. L. Jsltudes sur la Vendee et la Chouannerie. 11 vols. Paris.
18921900. (Third series: les Pacifications de l’Ouest, t. in, 1796-1815.)
Daudet, E. La police et les Chouans sous le Consulat et 1’Empire. Paris.
1895. Fauchille, P. Une Chouannerie flamande (1813-4). Paris. 1905.
La Sicotiere, L. de. Louis de Frotte et les insurrections normandes. 3
vols. Paris. 1889.
Lendtre, G. La Chouannerie normande au temps de l’Empire. Paris. 1901.
Robiquet, P. Le general d’Hedouville. (Revue historique, 1902, t. 78.)
Caudrillier, G. Le complot de l’an xn. Revue historique. 1900, 1901.
Destrem, J. Les deportations du Consulat et de l’Empire. Paris. 1885.
Le dossier d’un deporte de 1804. Paris. 1904.
Fescourt. Histoire de la double conspiration de 1800. Paris. 1818.
Guillon, E. Les complots militaires sous le Consulat et l’Empire. Paris.
1894.
(Nodier, Ch.) Histoire des societes secretes dans l’armee et des
conspirations militaires. Paris. 1815.
Penanster, Huon de. Une conspiration en l’an xi et en I’an xn. Paris.
1896.
Picard, E. Bonaparte et Moreau. Paris. 1905. (In progress.)
Proces instruit contre Saint-Rejan et autres (2 vols.); contre
Demerville et autres (1 vol.). Paris, an ix. Proces instr. contre Georges, Pichegru,
Moreau, et autres (8 vols.). Paris. 1804.
Thierry, G. Augustin. Conspirateurs et gens de police; le complot des
libelles
(1802). Paris. 1903.
Boulay de la Meurthe, Alfred, Comte. Les dernieres annees du due
d’Enghien. Paris. 1886.
Correspondance du due d’Enghien (1801-4). Vol. I. (Scciete d’histoire
contem- poraine.) Paris. 1904. (In progress.)
Memoires historiques sur la catastrophe du due d’Enghien. Paris. 1824.
Nougarede de Fayet, A. Recherches historiques sur le proces et la condamnation
du due d’Enghien. 2 vols. Paris. 1844.
Welschinger, H. Le due d’Enghien. Paris. 1888.
Duruy, A. La conspiration du general Malet. (Revue des Deux Mondes, Feb.
1,
1879, and Etudes d’histoire
militaire, Paris, 1888.)
Hamel, E. Histoire des deux conspirations du gene'ral Malet. Paris.
1873.
Lafon, J. B. H. Histoire de la conjuration du general Malet Paris. 1814.
Le Barbier, L. Le general de La Horie. Paris. 1904.
3. Administration, Finance, Industry, Military Organisation.
Aucoc, L. Le Conseil
d’fitat avant et depuis 1789. Paris. 1876.
Darmstadter, P. Die Verwaltung des Unter-Elsass (Bas-Rhin) unter Napoleon
I.
(Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte des Oberrheins.) Heidelberg. 1903-4.
Dejean, E. Le premier mouvement prefecWal, en l’an vm. (Revue politique
et parlementaire, 1904, t. 41.)
Edmond-Blanc, A. Napoleon I”, ses institutions civiles et
administratives. Paris.
1880.
Monnet, E. Histoire de l’administration provinciale, departementale et
communale en France. Paris. 1885.
Saint-Yves, G., and Fournier, J. Le departement des Bouches du Rhone de
1800 a 1810. Paris. 1899.
Aulard, F. A. Paris sons le Consulat. T. i, n. Paris. 1903. (In
progress.)
(Collection de documents relatifs 4 l’histoire de Paris pendant la
Revolution.) Gilleuls, A. des. Histoire de l’administration parisienne au xix”
siecle. T. i (180015). Paris. 1900.
Lanzac de Laborie, L. de. Paris sous Napoleon. T. i, u. Consulat
provisoire, et consulat a temps. Paris. 1905. (In progress.)
Passy, L. Frochot, prefet de la Seine. Paris. 1867.
Simond, C. Paris de 1800 a 1900. T. l (1800-30). Paris. 1900.
Courtois, A., fils. Histoire de la banque de France. Paris. 1875. New
edition, entitled: Histoire des banques en France. Paris. 1881.
Gaudin, M. C., Due de Gaete. Notice historique sur les finances de la
France (1800-14). Paris. 1818.
La Rupelle, J. de. Les finances de guerre de 1796 a 1815. (Annales de
l’Ecole libre des Sciences politiques. 1892, 1893.)
Nicolas, C. Les budgets de la France depuis le commencement du xix8
siecle. Paris. 1882.
Ramel, J. Des finances de la Republique en l’an ix. Paris. 1801.
Stourm, R. Les finances du Consulat. Paris. 1902.
Viihrer, A. Histoire de la dette publique en France. T.
u. Paris and Nancy.
1886.
Am£, L. Etude sur les tarifs de Douanes et sur les traites de Commerce.
2 vols. Paris. 1876.
Chaptal, J. A., Comte de Chanteloup. De l’industrie fran^aise. 2 vols. Paris. 1819.
Darmstadter, P. Studien zur Napoleonischen Wirthschaftspolitik.
(Vierteljair- schrift fur Sozial- und Wirthschaftsgeschichte, 1904—5.)
Jaures, J. Histoire socialiste. Vol. vi: Consulat et Empire; by P.
Brousse and
H. Thurot. Paris. 1905.
Levasseur, E. Histoire des classes ouvrieres et de l’industrie en France
depuis 1789.
Paris. 1867.
New edition, corrected. Vol. i. Paris. 1903.
Vital-Roux. Rapport sur les jurandes et maitrises. Paris. 1805.
Belhomme, Lieut.-Col. D. Histoire de l’infanterie en France. Vol. iv
(1792-1815). Paris. 1899.
Blaze, E. La vie militaire sous l’Empire. 2 vols.
Paris. 1837. Abridged edition. Paris. 1902.
Canton, G. Napoleon antimilitariste. Paris. 1902.
Chapoutot, N. Livre d’or des officiers fra^ais de 1789 El 1815. Paris.
1904. Conard, P. Napoleon et les vocations militaires. Revue de Paris. 1902.
Fallou, L. La garde imperiale (1804-15). Paris. 1901.
Fieffe, E. Napoleon I"r et la Garde Imperiale. Paris.
1859.
Girod de l’Ain, Capt. M. Grands artilleurs. Paris and Nancy. 1894.
Historique des corps de troupe de l’armee franijaise (1569-1900). Paris and Nancy.
1900.
Lettow-Vorbeck, O. von. Die franzosische Conscription unter Napoleon I.
(Beibefte zum Militar-Wochenblatt.) Berlin. 1892.
Martinien, A. Tableau des officiers tues et blesses pendant les guerres
de l’Empire (1805-15). Paris. 1899.
Lvlasson, F. Cavaliers de Napoleon. Paris. 1895 and 1896.
Morvan, J. Le soldat imperial (1800-14). 2 vols. Paris. 1904-5.
Philip, Lieut.-Col. de. Le service d’Etat-major pendaut les guerres du
Premier Empire. Paris. 1900.
Picard, L. La cavalerie dans les guerres de la Re'volution et de
l’Empire. 2 vols. Saumur. 1895-6.
Romagny, C. Histoire generate de l’armee nationale. Paris and Nancy.
1893. Sauzey, Capt. Iconographie du costume militaire de la Revolution et de
l’Empire. Paris. 1901.
Thoumas, General C. Les grands cavaliers du Premier Empire. 2
vols. Paris and Nancy. 1890-2.
4. Education,
Censorship, Literature, Science, and Art.
Beauchamp, A. de. Recueil des lois et reglements sur l’enseignement
superieur.
T. i
(1789-1847). Paris. 1880. T. iv, Index. 1885.
Bourgeois, E. La liberte d’enseignement. Histoire et doctrine. Paris.
1902. Chabot, M., and Charlety, S. Histoire de l’enseignement secondaire dans
le Rhone (1789-1900). Paris and Lyons. 1902.
Chevalier, A. Les Freres des Ecoles chre'tiennes et l’enseignement
primaire (17971830). Paris. 1887.
(Fabry, J. B. G.) Le genie de la Revolution considere dans 1’dducation.
3 vols. Paris. 1817-8.
Greard, O. La legislation de l’instruction primaire, 1874. Second
edition. Vol. i.
(1789-1833.) Paris. 1890. Vol. vn, General Index. 1902.
Guizot, F. Essai sur 1‘histoire et l’etat actuel de l’instruction
publique. Paris.
1816.
Liard, L. L’enseignement superieur en France. 2 vols. Paris. 1888-94.
Rendu, A. Code universitaire. Paris. 1827.
Essai sur l’instruction publique et
particulierement sur l’instruction primaire.
3 vols. Paris. 1819. Cf. E.
Rendu: M. A. Rendu et l’Universite de France. Paris: 1861.
(Rendu, A.) Observations sur...l’instruction publique et 1’education.
Paris. 1816.
Four supplements. 1816.
Riancey, H. de. Histoire critique et legislative de l’instruction publique
et de la liberte de l’enseignement. 2 vols. Paris. 1844.
Schmidt, C. La reforme de 1’Universite imperiale en 1811. Paris. 1905.
Villemain, F. A. Rapport au roi sur l’instruction secondaire. Paris. 1843.
Aucoc, L. L’Institut de France (1635-1889). Paris. 1889.
Franqueville, Comte de. Le premier siecle de l’lnstitut de France
(1795-1896).
2 vols. Paris. 1895-6.
Germond de Lavigne, A. Les pamphlets de la fin de l’Empire. Paris. 1879.
Hatin, E. Histoire politique et litteraire de la presse en France. Vol. vn.
Paris.
1861.
Le Poittevin, G. La liberte de la presse depuis la Revolution
(1789-1815). Paris.
1901.
Locre, J. G. Discussions sur la liberte de la presse: la censure
(1808-11). Paris. 1819.
Schoor, C. van. La presse sous le Consulat et 1’Empire. Bruxelles. 1899.
Welschinger, H. La censure sous le Premier Empire. Paris. 1882.
Rapports sur les progres des sciences mathematiques depuis 1789, by J.
B. J. Delambre; des sciences physiques et naturelles, by G. L. C. F. D. Cuvier;
des lettres fran^aises, by M. J. de Che'nier; de l’histoire et de la
litterature anciennes, by B. J. Dacier; des beaux-arts, by J. Lebreton. 5 vols.
Paris. 1808, 1810.
Albert, M. La litterature franfaise sous la Revolution, l’Empire et la
llestauration. Paris. 1891.
Bertrand, L. La fin du classicisme et le retour a l’antique. Paris.
1897. Jeanroy-Felix, V. • Nouvelle histoire de la litterature franijaise
pendant la Revolution et le Premier Empire. Paris. 1887.
Jullien, M. B. Histoire de la poesie fran^aise a l’epoque imperiale.
Paris. 1844. Merlet, G. Tableau de la litterature fran^aise (1800-15). 3 vols. Paris. 1878-83.
Blennerhassett, Lady. Frau von Stael. 3 vols. Berlin. 1887-9. Engl, transl.
3 vols.
London. 1889.
—— Chateaubriand. Romantik und die Restaurationsepoche in Frankreich.
(Weltgeschichte in Karakterbildern.) Mainz and Munich. 1903.
Des Granges, C. M. Geoffroy et la critique dramatique (1800-14). Paris.
1897. Gautier, P. Madame de Stael et Napoleon. Paris. 1902.
Herriot, E. Madame Recamier et ses amis. 2 vols. Paris. 1904.
Picavet, F. Les Ideologues. Paris. 1891.
Sainte-Beuve, C. A. Chateaubriand et son groupe litteraire sous
l’Empire. 2
vols.
Paris. 1860.
Sorel, A.
Madame de Stael. Paris. 1890.
Stevens, A.
Madame de Stael, a study. 2 vols. London and New York. 1881. Lecomte, L. Henry. Napoleon et l’Empire racontes par le theatre. Paris.
1900. Muret, T. L’histoire par le theatre. 3 vols. Paris. 1864-5. Vol. i.
Barral, G. Histoire des sciences sous Napoleon Bonaparte. Paris. 1889.
Maindron, E. L’Academic des Sciences; Bonaparte membre de l’lnstitut. Paris.
1887.
Benoit, F. L’art franfais sous la Revolution et l’Empire. Paris. 1897.
Chesneau, E. La peinture fran^aise au xixe siecle, les chefs
d’ecole. Paris. 1862. Clement, C. Prudhon. Paris. 1872.
Delaborde, H. L’Academie des Beaux Arts depuis la fondation de
l’lnstitut de France. Paris. 1891.
Delecluzej E. J. Louis David. Paris. 1855.
David, J. Le peintre Louis David. Paris. 1880.
Fouche, M. Percier et Fontaine. Paris. 1904.
Rosenthal, L. Louis David. Paris. 1905.
Saunier, C. Les conquetes artistiques de la Revolution et de l’Empire.
Paris. 1902. Tripier Le Franc, J. Gros. 1880.
Coquard, A. De la musique en France depuis Rameau. Paris. 1891. Pougin,
A. Mehul. Paris. 1889.
Ashton, J.
English caricature and satire on Napoleon I. 2 vols. London. 1884. Bramsen, L.
Medaillier Napoleon le Grand. Vol. i, 1799-1809. Paris and Copenhagen. 1904.
(In progress.)
Dayot, A.
Napoleon raconte par l’image. Paris. 1894. Abridged
edition. 1895. Grand Carteret, J. Napoleon en images; estampes anglaises.
Paris. 1895. Millin, A. L. Histoire metallique de Napoleon Bonaparte. 2
vols. London and Paris. 1819-21.
Sect. I.—THE
BALTIC POWERS.
A. RUSSIA.
Doouments.
Archives du
Prince Woronzow. Vol. xi. Moscow. 1877.
Archives of
the Russian Historical Society. Vol. ix, 1872; vol. xxxi, 1880;
vol. Tixxxj
1890. St Petersburg.
Rousskaia
Starina. Vols. vii, vm. St
Petersburg. 1873.
Contemporary Authorities.
Engelhart, L.
Nikolayevitch. Zapiski, 1766-1836. Rousskavo Archeva. Moscow.
1868.
Golovkine, Comte F. La Cour et Ie Regne de Paul I. Portraits, Souvenirs
et Anecdotes. With
Introduction and Notes by S. Bonnet. Paris. 1905. [Masson, Major.] Memoires
secrets sur la Russie. 2 vols. Paris. 1800.
Tooke, W.
Life of Catherine II. 2 vols. London. 1798.
For the
Memoirs etc. of Prince Czartoryski, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Gachot, E.
Souvarow en Italie. Paris. 1903.
Lariviere, C. de. Catherine II et la Revolution fran^aise. Paris. 1895.
Kobeko, D. Tsarevitch Paul Petrovitch. 2nd edn. St Petersburg. 1883.
Schiemann, T. Die Ermordung Pauls. Berlin. 1902.
Schilder, N. Paul I intime. Paris. 1900.
Segur, A. de. Vie du Comte Rostopchin. Paris. 1872.
Waliszewski, K. Le Roman d’une Imperatrice, Catherine II de Russie. Paris.
1893.
For general
works on Russia by Bernhardi, Rambaud, and Schiemann, see General Bibliography.
B. SWEDEN, NORWAY AND DENMARK.
Bain, R. N.
Gustavus III and his Contemporaries, 1746-92. 2 vols. London. 1894. Brown, J.
Original Memoirs of Sweden and Denmark from 1766 to 1818. London.
1895.
For general
works on Scandinavian History, by Bain, Dunham, Fryxell, Holm, Thorsoee,
Wergeland, see General Bibliography.
C. ARMED NEUTRALITY.
Documents.
Collection of
Public Acts and Papers relating to the Principles of Armed Neutrality. London.
1801.
Malmesbury,
Lord. Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury. 4 vols. London. 1884.
Contemporary Authority.
Goertz, Comte de. Memoire ou Precis historique sur la Neutrality arme'e
et son Origine. Basel. 1801.
Later Works.
Bergbohm, C. Die bewaflhete Neutralitat, 1780-3. Berlin. 1884.
Martens, Baron C. de. Causes Celebres du Droit des
Gens. 2nd edn. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1859.
Nouvelles Causes Celebres du Droit des Gens. 2
vols. Leipzig. 1843.
For
Collections of Treaties by Garden and Martens, Koch and Schoell’s Abridged
History of Treaties, and Napoleon’s Correspondence, see General Bibliography.
Unpublished Material.
Public Record
Office, Admiralty, Secretary, “ In Letters ” :
Despatches
and Correspondence of Admirals commanding the Baltic Fleet. 1801.
Despatches of
Admirals commanding on Mediterranean station. 1800-1. Journal of Admiral Sir H.
Parker. 1801.
Journal of Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson. 1801.
Documents.
Desbriere, E. Projets et tentatives de de'barqnement aux lies
Britanniqnes.
(French Staff
History.) Vol. n. Paris. 1901.
Jackson,
Rear-Admiral T. S. Logs of the great Sea-Fights. Vol. n. (Navy Records
Society.) London. 1900. (Contains the important passages from the Journals of
Nelson and Parker.)
Laughton, J.
K. The Naval Miscellany. Vol. i. (Navy Records Society.) London. 1902.
Contemporary Authorities.
(Niebuhr, B. G.) Lehensnachrichten iiber B. G. Niebuhr, aus Briefen
desselben....
3 vols. Berlin. 1838-9.
Ross, Sir J.
Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord Saumarez. 2 vols. London. 1838.
With, J. P.
Danske og Norske S0-Heltes Bedrivter fra Aar 1797 til 1813. n.d.
Later Work.
Larsen, N. A.
Fra Krigens Tid: Bidrag til den Norske Marines Historic. Christiania. 1878.
See also the
general histories and works bearing on Nelson and Napoleon given in the
bibliography to Chapter VIII. For Dumas’ “Precis” (military), the Memoirs of
Jerome Bonaparte, and Holm’s General History of Denmark, see General
Bibliography. Most of the memoirs of the time touch on the invasion projects.
THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE. FRANCE AND HER
TRIBUTARIES.
I. FRANCE AND EUROPE.
Contemporary Authorities.
General.
Bailleu, P. Preussen und Frankreich 1795 bis 1807. Diplomatische
Correspond- enzen. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1881-7.
Huffer, H. Quellen zur Gesch. der franzosischen Revolution. 3 vols. Leipzig.
1900-1.
"
Tratchevski, A. Correspondance de la Russie avec la France. Societe
d’histoire de Russie. T. i.xx.
For the
National Archives of France, the Moniteur, and Collections of Treaties, by
Garden, Martens, etc., see General Bibliography.
Memoirs and
Correspondence.
Belliard, A.
D., Comte, General. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1842-3.
Bigarre, A., General. Memoires. Paris. 1893.
Bray, O. von. Denkwiirdigkeiten. Leipzig. 1901.
Courier, P. L. Correspondance. Paris. 1824.
Dohm, C. W. Denkwiirdigkeiten meiner Zeit (1778-1806). 6 vols. Hanover. 1814-9.
Maistre, J. de. Memoires politiques et correspondance diplomatique.
Publics par Alb. Blanc. 2 vols. Paris. 1860.
For the Memoirs and Correspondence of the Duchesse d’Abrantes,
d’Andignd, Barante, Beugnot, Broglie, Chaptal, Chateaubriand, Hyde de Neuville,
Meneval, Miot de Me'lito, Mollien, Norvins, Pasquier, Mad. de Re'musat,
Roederer, Savary, Segur, Talleyrand, Thibaudeau, 'Riiebault, see Bibliography
to Chapters I, V.
For the
Correspondence of Napoleon, the Memoirs and Correspondence of Beauharnais,
Joseph Bonaparte, Castlereagh, Fox, Gentz, Hardenberg, Malmesbury, Metternich,
Montgelas, Stein, Talleyrand; and the Memoirs and Lives of Davout* Gouvion St
Cyr, Macdonald, Marbot, Marmont, Murat, Oudinot, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
General.
For general
works by Bignon, Dufraisse, Lefebvre, Oncken, Sorel, Thiers, Martens’ Treaties,
etc., see General Bibliography.
Biographical.
Eckhart, du
Moulin, Count. Montgelas. Munich. 1894.
For
Biographies of Napoleon, also of Lucien Bonaparte, the Archduke Charles,
Berthier, Bessieres, Davout, Dessaix, Fouche, Lannes, Lecourbe, Lefehvre,
Moreau, Murat, Stein, see General Bibliography.
Special Works.
Austrian
politics.
Vivenot, A.
von. Thugut und sein politisches System. Archiv f. ost. Gesch.
Vol. XMII.
Vertrauliche Briefe von Thugut. 2 vols. Vienna.
1872.
For the
writings of Archduke Charles and the works of Beer and Wertheimer on Austria,
see General Bibliography.
Campaigns of
1800, and Peace of Luneville.
Berthier, General. Relation de la bataille de Marengo. Paris. 1806.
Boulay de la Meurthe, Alfred, Comte. Correspondance de Talleyrand avec
le Premier Consul pendant la campagne de Marengo. Revue d’hist. diplom. Paris.
1892.
Jommi, General. Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la
Revolution de 1792 a 1801. 6 vols. Paris. 1806.
Neipperg, Count. Aperiju militaire sur la bataille de Marengo et
1’armistice qui en fut la suite.
Cagliani. II passaggio di Bonaparte per il grande San Bernardo. Turin.
1892. Campana, Lieut. J. Marengo. Paris. 1900.
Carion-Nisas, M. H., Marquis de. La campagne des Fran^ais en Allemagne
en 1800.
(Memorial du depot de la guerre, v.) Paris.
Cugnac, Capt. de. Campagne de l’armee de reserve en 1800. Marengo.
(French Staff History.) 2 vols. Paris.
1900-1.
Du Casse, A. Histoire des negotiations de Luneville, etc. (see next page). Fournier, A. Die Mission des Grafen St
Julien im Jahre 1800. (Historische Studien und Skizzen.) Prague and Leipzig.
1885.
Gachot, E. La deuxieme campagne d’ltalie, 1800, Marengo. Paris. 1898.
Gruyer. Recit de la bataille de Marengo, par Grouchy. Carnet historique. 1898. Gunther, R. Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1800 in
Ober-Deutschland, der Schweiz und Ober-Italien. Frauenfeld. 1893.
Hermann, A. Marengo. Munster. 1903.
Hiiffer, H. Quellen zur Geschichte der Kriege von 1799 und 1800. Leipzig. 1901. Kellermann, F. E. Histoire de la campagne de 1800. Paris.
1864.
Mras, . Der
Feldzug von 1800. Oest. milit. Zeitschrift, 1822-3.
Petit, J. Marengo. Paris. 1800.
Picard, E. Bonaparte et Moreau. Paris. 1905.
Pittaluga, V. La battaglia di Marengo. 2 vols. Alessandria. 1900.
Richepanse, A. La bataille de Hohenlinden. (Spectateur
militaire.) 1836. Roberts, Miss L. M. The negociations preceding the Peace of
Luneville. (Transactions of the Royal Hist. Society.) Vol. xv. 1901.
Sargent, H.
H. Campaign of Marengo. London. 1897.
Schleifer, A. Die Schlacht bei Hohenlinden. Erding.
1885.
Tessier, J. La bataille de Hohenlinden et les premiers rapports de
Bonaparte avec le General Moreau. (Revue historique, ix.) Paris. 1879.
Vandal, A. L’effet de Marengo. (Revue des Deux Mondes, June 1.) .
1900.
On the battle
of Hohenlinden, see especially the Memoirs of Decaen (MS. in the Bibliotheque
de la ville, Caen); on that of Marengo, those of Marmont, Massena, and Victor
{GeneralBibliography) and Les Cahiers du Capitaine Coignet. Paris. 1883.
Peace of
Amiens, and the rupture.
Browning, O.
England and Napoleon in 1803. Despatches of Lord Whitworth. London. 1887-
Pellew, Dean. Life and Correspondence of Addington. London. 1847.
Potrel, J. La Russie et la rupture de la paix d’Amiens. Documents
anglais et russes inedits. (Annales de I’Ecole des sciences politiques.) 1897.
Auriol, C. La France, l’Angleterre, et Naples, 1803-6. Paris. 1905.
Bowman, H. M. Die englisch-franzosische Friedensverhandlung (Dec. 1799-Jan.
1800).
Leipzig. 1899.
Preliminary stages of the Peace of Amiens.
Toronto. 1900.
Buchholz. Die napoleonische Weltpolitik. (Preussische Jahrbucher,
June.) 1896.
Du Casse, A. Histoire des negociations diplomatiques relatives aux
traites de Morfontaine, de Luneville et d’Amiens. 3 vols.
Paris. 1855.
Ekedah, W.
The principal causes of the renewal of the war between England and France in
1803. (In Trans, of the Royal Historical Society. New ser. Vol. vm.)
Froidevaux, H. La politique coloniale de Napoleon I. (Revue des
questions historiques, vol. lxvih.) Paris.
1901.
Minto, Earl
of. Life and Letters. Vol. ii. London. 1874.
Noorden, C. von. Der Riicktritt des Ministeriums Pitt 1801. (Historische
Zeit- schrift. Vol. ix.) Munich.
Philippson, M. La paix d’Amiens et la politique gene'rale de Napoleon I.
(Revue historique. Vols. lxxv and
lxxvi.) Paris. 1901.
For the works
of Coqnelle and Lumbroso (Napoleon’s relations with England),
Roloff
(French colonial policy), lives of Pitt by Rosebery and Stanhope, and the
Memoirs, etc.
of Pitt and Fox, see General Bibliography.
II. ITALY.
For works of
a general nature by Bianchi, Botta, De Castro, Ramondini,
Ruth, Sclopis
de Salerno, Tivaroni, Vimercati, see General Bibliography.
Memoihs and Correspondence.
Arrivabene,
Count G. Memorie. Florence. 1886.
Cicognara, C. L. Memorie, tratte dai document! original!. Edited
by Malamani Venice. 1888.
Gallo, Duca
di. Memorie. (From Archivio storico per le Province Napoletane.
Ann. xiii. of
Part i.) Naples. 1888. (In progress.)
Melzi, F. d’
Eril. Memorie, documenti e lettere inedite di Napoleone I e Beauhamais. Ed.
Giov. Melzi. 2 vols. Milan. 1865.
Monti, V.
Lettere. Turin. 1894.
Zucchi, C.
Memorie. Milan. 1861.
See also the
Memoirs of E. de Beauhamais, Macdonald, Petiet (General Bibliography), and of
the D. de Broglie (Bibliography to Chapters I, V).
Special Works.
Benincasa, B.
Saggio sulla genealogia, natura ed interessi politici e sociali della
repubblica italiana. Milan. 1803.
Castro, G.
de. Milano durante la dominazione napoleonica. Milan.
1880.
Gioja, M.
Ragionamento su i destini della repubblica italiana. Milan. 1803. Mazzoni, G. Un commilitone di Ugo Foscolo, Ceroni. Venice. 1903.
Oriani, A. La lotta politica in Italia: Origini della lotta presente.
Rome. 1887.
Fasti e vicende dei popoli italiani dal 1801 al 1815, o Memorie d’ un
ufBziale per servire alia storia militare italiana. Florence. 1830.
Lissoni, A. Compendio della storia militare dal 1792 al 1815. Turin.
1844. Turotti, F. Storia delle armi italiane dal 1796 al 1814. 3 vols. Milan.
1855.
Dejob, C. L’instruction publiqueen France et en Italieau xix siecle.
Paris. 1892. Madame de Stael et l’ltalie. Paris. 1890.
Marchesi, V. Settant’ anni della storia di Venezia, 1798-1866. Turin. 1892.
III. HOLLAND.
Documents.
Brieven en negotiatien van L. L. van Spiegel. Amsterdam. 1803.
Brieven van prins Willem V aan baron van Lynden. La Haye. 1893.
Brieven von A. R. Falck (1795-1843). La Haye.
1857.
Gazette de Leyde.
Memoirs and Bioorapbies.
Hogendorp, G.
K. van. Brieven en Gedenkschriften. 4 vols. The Hague. 1866-87.
Mendels, H. W. Daendels. 2 vols. The Hague. 1890.
Pyman, G. J. Bijdragen tot de voornaamste gebeurtenissen van 1778 tot 1807.
Utrecht. 1826.
Schimmelpenninck, Count. Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck en eenige
gebeurtenissen van zijn tijd. Amsterdam. 1845.
Sillem, J. A.
Het leven van Johan Valclcenaer. Amsterdam. 1876.
Gogel. Amsterdam. 1864.
Dirk van Hogendorp. Amsterdam. 1890.
General Works.
Jonckbloet, W. J. Geschiedenis der nederlandsche Letterkunde. 2
vols. Groningen. 1873.
For other
works of a general nature by de Bosch-Kemper, Legrand, Wagenaar, Wreede, see
General Bibliography.
IV. GERMANY.
Documents.
Bailleu, P. Briefwechsel Konig Friedr. Wilhelms III und der Konigin Luise
mit Kaiser Alexander I. Leipzig. 1000.
Wreede, G. W. La Souabe apres la paix de Bale (recueil de documents). Utrecht.
1879.
For the
diaries of Gentz and the correspondence of Hardenberg, see General
Bibliography.
General Works.
Heigel, K. T. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur
Auflosung des alten Reichs. Stuttgart. 1899.
For other
works of a general nature, by Denis, Hausser, Stern, Treitschke, and the annals
of Bredow and Posselt, see General Bibliography.
Special Works.
Aegidi, L. K. Der Furstenrath nach dem Liineviller Frieden. Eine
reichsrecht- liche Abhandlung. Berlin. 1853.
Albert, P. Baden zwischen Neckar und Main in den Jahren 1803-6. Heidelberg.
1901
Alpen, H. S. van. Geschichte des frankischen Rheinufers. 2 vols. Cologne.
1803. Beanlieu-Marconnay, Karl von. Dalberg und seine Zeit. 2 vols. Weimar.
1879. Bockenheimer, K. G. Geschichte der Stadt Mainz (1798-1814). Mainz. 1890.
Drais, E. W. H. von. Geschichte der Regierung und Bildung von Baden unter Carl
Friedrich. 2 vols. Carlsruhe. 1819.
Du Moulin Eckhart, R., Graf. Bayern unter dem Ministerium Montgelas,
1799-1817.
Vol. i, 1799-1800. Munich. 1895.
Gaspari, A. C. Der Reichsdeputationshauptschluss. 2 vols., 1803. Hamburg.
1803. Hoff, K. E. von. Das deutsche Reich vor der fi-anzos. Revolution und nach
dem Frieden von Luneville. 2 vols. Gotha. 1801-5.
Huffer, H. Die Stadt Bonn unter franzdsischer Herrschaft. Bonn. 1873.
Oesterreich und Preussen gegeniiber der
franzosischen Revolution. Bonn.
1868.
Kleinschmidt, A. Die Sakularisation von 1803. Berlin. 1878.
Levy-Briihl, L. L’Allemagne depuis Leibnitz. Essai
sur le developpement de la conscience nationale en Allemagne (1700-1848).
Paris. 1890.
Massenbach, C. de. Memoire pour servir a l’histoire de la decadence
politique de la Pruese, depuis 1794. Amsterdam. 1804.
Rambaud, A. La domination fran9aise en Allemagne. I. Les Fran^ais sur le
Rhin;
ii. L’Allemagne
sous Napoleon I. 2 vols. Paris. 1873-4.
Servieres, G. L’Allemagne franijaise sous Napoleon I. Paris. 1904.
Weech, F. von. Badische Geschichte. Carlsruhe. 1900.
Baden unter den Grossherzogen Carl Friedrich
und Carl Ludwig. Freiburg
im Breisgau. 1863.
V. SWITZERLAND.
Documents.
Eidgenossische
Abschiede (in ms. ; preserved in the archives of Bern, Znrich, Fribourg, and
Lucerne, according to the place of the Vorort).
Amtliche Sammlung der Aden aus der Zeit der helvetischen Republik. Edited by J. Strickler. 9 vols. Bern. 1895-1903.
Dunant, E. Les relations diplomatiques de la France et de la Rdpublique
helve'tique, 1798-1803. (Recueil de document1! tires des archives de
Paris.) Basel. 1901. (Quellen zur schweiz. Geschichte, vol. xix.)
La reunion des Grisons a la Suisse. Correspondance diplomatique. Paris
and Geneva. 1899.
Offizielle Sammlung der das schweizerische Staatsrecht betreffenden
Actenstiicke. Zurich. 1820.
Repertorium der Abschiede der eidg. Tagsatzungen aus den Jahren 1803-13. Edited
by J. Kaiser. Bern. 1886.
For other
collections of documents, see General Bibliography (Switzerland). Memoirs and Correspondence.
Barth, H. Correspondance de Pierre Ochs. (Quellen zur schweiz. Geschichte, vol. xxiv.) Basel. 1905.
Brune, General. Correspondance publ. par Sturler. (Archiv fur schw. Geschichte, vols. xii-xv.)
Haug, E. Der Briefwechsel der Briider J. G. Muller und Joh. von Muller
(17891809). Frauenfeld. 1891.
Jahn, Alb. Bonaparte, Talleyrand et Stapfer. Recueil de d^peches de
Stapfer, 1801-3. Zurich. 1809.
Jenner, G. von. Denkwurdigkeiten meines Lebens. Bern. 1887.
Luginbuhl, R. Aus Philipp Albert Stapfer’s Briefwechsel. (Quellen zur
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Meyer von Knonau, L. Lebenserinnerungen. Frauenfeld.
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Monod, H. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1805.
Roverea, F. de. Memoires. 4 vols. Paris. 1848.
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Wickham, W.
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Godet, P. Histoire litteraire de la Suisse franchise. Paris. 1894.
Hilty, K. Die Bundesverfassungen der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft. Bern.
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Rossel, V. Histoire litteraire de la Suisse romande. 2 vols. Paris. 1889-91. Tillier, A. von. Geschichte der
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Viollet, P. Histoire du droit civil fran^ais. Paris. 1893.
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1343-4.)
For
Duvergier’s collection of laws, etc.; Edmond-Blanc’s civil and administrative
institutions of Napoleon; the Memoirs of Miot de Melito, and Thibaudeau’s
history of the Consulate and Empire, see Bibliography to Chapters I, V.
L THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH.
A. FRANCE AND ITALY.
Contemporary Authorities.
Unpublished
matter.
There is
unpublished material for the relations of Church and State in France in the
National Archives, Paris, in the following cartons:
F4
287-394.
F19*
3-6, 37-39, 104-112, 124.
F19
301-481®, 584-588, 613-695, 700-1785.
AFIV
1044-1048, 1317, 1414-1419, 1887-1932.
AF17*
380-382.
At the
Ambrosian Library, Milan, Mantovani’s Diario politico-ecclesiastico di Milano,
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Bodelschwingh, E. von. Leben des Ober-Prasidenten Freiherm von Vincke.
Berlin. 1863.
Guerber, J. Bruno Franz Leopold Liebermann. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1880.
Heckert, A. Handbuch der kirchlichen Gesetzgebuug Preussens. Berlin. 1846.
Hipler, F. Briefe und Tagebiicher des Furstbischoffs von Ermeland Joseph
[Wilhelm Friedrich] von Hohenzollem. Braunsberg. 1883.
Laspeyres, E. A. T. Geschichte und heutige Verfassung der katholischen
Kirche Preussens. Halle. 1840.
Lehmann, M. Preussen und die katholische Kirche seit 1640, nach den Acten
des geheimen Staatsarchives. (Publicationen aus den k. preussischen
Staatsai-chiven.) Leipzig. 1881.
Marx, J. Geschichte des Erzstifts Trier, d. h., der Stadt Trier und des
Trierer Landes, als Kurfurstentum und als Erzdiocese von den altesten Zeiten
bis zum Jahre 1816. Trier. 1858-64.
Rintel, C. G. N. Beleuchtung der Denkschrift des evangelischen Oberkirchen-
rathes betreffend die Vermehrung der Dotation der evangelischen Kirche in
Preussen. Regensburg. 1862.
South Germany.
Briick, H. Die oberrheinische Kirchenprovinz von ihrer Griindung bis zur
Gegeu- wart. Mainz. 1868.
Lieber, M. In Sachen der oberrheinischen Kirchenprovinz. Freiburg im
Breisgan.
1853.
Longner, I. von. Beitrage zur Geschichte der oberrheinischen
Kirchenprovinz. Tubingen. 1863.
Reininger, N. Die Weihbischofe von Wurzburg. Wurzburg. 1865.
Remling, F. X. Geschichte der Bischofe zu Speyer. Mainz. 1852.
Wiirttemberg.
Reyscher, A. L. Vollstandige, historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung
der wiirttembergischen Gesetze. Vol. x. Sammlung der katholischen Kirchen-
gesetze. Ed. Johann Jakob Lang. Tubingen. 1836.
C. SPAIN.
Briick, H. Die geheimen Gesellschaften in Spanien und ihre Stelluug zu
Kirche und Staat...bis zum Tode Ferdinands VII. Mainz.
1881.
La Fuente, D. Vicente de. Historia ecclesiastica de Espana. Vol.
vi. Madrid. 1875.
II. PROTESTANTS AND JEWS.
Deschamps, N. Les societes secretes et la society ou philosophie de
l’histoire con- temporaine. Avignon and Paris. 1881.
Fauchille, P. La question juive en France sous le premier Empire. Paris.
1884.
Felice, G. de. Histoire des protestants de France, depuis l’origi;ie de
la Re'forma- tion jusqu’au temps present. 4th edn. Paris. 1861.
Lemann, Abbe J. Napoleon I61 et les Israelites. La preponderance
juive: deuxieme partie—son organisation. Paris. 1894.
National Archives, Paris, F19, 1786-1849.
Reinach, T. Histoire des Israelites depuis la ruine de leur independauce
jusqu’a nos jours. 2nd edn. Paris. 1901.
I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL.
The Public
Record Office, London, contains an enormous mass of material, of which the
following items are of importance (for the most part catalogued in the Public
Record Office, Lists and Indexes, xvhi. List
of Admiralty Records. Vol. i. London. 1904).
Admiralty,
Secretary, “In Letters.”
Vols. 5-18.
Despatches of Admirals commanding on Baltic station.
121-159.
Despatches and Correspondence of Admirals commanding Channel Fleet.
172-188.
Despatches of Admirals commanding on East India station. 252-266. Despatches of
Admirals commanding on Jamaica station.
324-336.
Despatches of Admirals commanding on Leeward Islands station. 339-351.
Despatches of Admirals commanding on Lisbon station.
407-431.
Despatches of Admirals commanding on Mediterranean station. 495-509. Despatches
of Admirals commanding on North American station. 534r-576. Despatches of
Admirals commanding on North Sea station. 608-611. Correspondence of Admiral
commanding at Chatham.
735-752.
Correspondence of Admiral commanding at the Nore and Sheerness.
817-837.
Correspondence of Admiral commanding at Plymouth.
1051-1250.
Correspondence of Admiral commanding at Portsmouth. 3975-3981, 3986, 7.
Intelligence.
3992-3995.
Letters from Lloyds.
4189-4334,
4379. Letters from the Secretary of State.
4334-4340.
Letters from the War Office.
4353-4361.
Secret Letters to the Admiralty.
5126-5128.
Petitions.
5360-5449.
Proceedings of Courts-Martial.
Logs of
Ships, under the Ship’s name, year by year.
List Books,
1802-13. (Supplement from “Miscellanea.” Vols. 506-9.) Journals of Admirals.
(Alphabetical Catalogue under Admirals’ names in Record Office. Many vols.
missing.)
Minutes of
Navy Board. Vols. 2665-2682.
Admiralty,
Secretary, “Out Letters."
Vols.
143-166. Orders and Instructions.
„ 298-332.
Lords’ Letters.
„ 631-636.
Secretary’s Letters to Admirals and Public Offices.
Admiralty,
Secretary, “Minutes.” Vols. 146-184.
Miscellanea.
(Information as to convoys, passes, signals, licences ; also Board Room
Journals. 1802-16.)
In the
“Admiralty, Secretary, In Letters,” are also the letters of Captains and
lieutenants of Ships under the initials of the officer, year by year.
The War
Office Records contain Reports and Despatches covering the various expeditions.
In the
British Museum are the Papers and general Correspondence of Lord Nelson,
catalogued in the “Additional Manuscripts”:
Vols. 34,
919-34, 932. General Correspondence, 1803-6.
34, 936-6.
Official Correspondence—Letters to Lord Nelson from the Admiralty.
34, 948-51.
Secret Intelligence and Intercepted Letters.
34, 966-8.
Private Diary of Lord Nelson, 1803-6.
Other items
of interest are the signals used in the Trafalgar Campaign, and the Order-Books
of the “ Canopus” and “ Dreadnought ” in that campaign.
In the
Archives de la Marine at Paris is much material, including Ships’ Logs,
Admirals’ Despatches, Reports of Courts of Inquiry, Intelligence, Memoires et
Projets. The campaigns arc given year by year; thus Trafalgar will be found in
“Campagnes, 1806.”
In the
Archives de la Guerre at Paris is material bearing on the French projects- of
invasion.
Other
unpublished material in the Spanish and Dutch Archives.
II. DOCUMENTS.
Blanchard. C. F. Repertoire general des Lois...sur la Marine. 3 vols. Paris.
184P-59.
Bonapaites grosser Plan zur Eroherung von Grossbritannien. (Anon.)
London. 1804 Broining, O. England and Napoleon in 1803, being the Despatches of
Lord Whitworth. London. 1887.
Collingwood,
G. L. N. A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral
Lord Collingwood. London. 1828.
Corbett, J.
S. Fighting Instructions, 1630-1816. (Navy Records Society.) London 1906.
Hamilton,
Adm. Sir R. Vesey. Journals and Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Sir T. B.
Martin, 1773-1864. (Navy Records Society.) 3 vols. London.
1898-1902.
(Index in vol. i.)
Jackson,
Rear-Admiral T. S. Logs of the Great Sea Fights. 1794^1806. (Navy Records
Society.) 2 vols. London. 1899-1900.
Laughton, J.
K. Official Documents illustrating the Social Life and Internal Discipline of
the Navy in the 18th Century. (Navy Records Society.) London. (In preparation.)
Leyland, J.
Dispatches and Letters relating to the Blockade of Brest. 2 vols.
(Navy Records
Society.) London. 1899-1902.
Melville,
Lord. Speech...in the House of Peers...respecting the State of the Navy.
London. 1806.
Morrison, A
The Hamilton and Nelson Papers. 2 vols. London. 1893-4.
Privately
printed.
Naval
Chronicle, The. London. (Periodical.) 1803-18.
Nicolas, Sir
N. H. Dispatches and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson. 7 vols. London.
1844-6.
Papers
relative to the Discussion with Spain in 1802-4. London. 1806.
Pasley, C. W.
Essay on the Military Policy...of the British Empire. London. 1811.
Patton,
Admiral P. The Natural Defence of Insular Empire. Southampton. 1810. Recueil des Lois relatives a la Marine. 19 vols.
Paris. An v a 1812.
Remade, Comte. Relations secretes des agents de Louis XVIII...sous le
Consulat. Paris.
1899.
Reports of
the Commissioners of Inquiry into the Irregularities...in the several Naval
Departments. 16 parts. London. 1803-6.
Steel, David.
Steel’s Naval Chronologist of the War. London, n.d.
Steel’s
Original and Correct List of the Royal Navy. London. (Periodical.)
1813-15.
Summary
Account, a, of Leibnitz’s Memoir addressed to Louis XIV, recommending to that
monarch the conquest of Egypt etc. London. 1803.
Tabular
Statement of the Number of Seamen...from the year 1756 inclusive.
(Parliamentary
Return, 168.) London. 1860.
Vane, C. W.
Memoir...Correspondence, Despatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh.
12 vols. London. 1848-53.
For the
Moniteur and other periodicals, Cobhett’s Debates, Wellington’s Dispatches,
Napoleon’s Correspondence, and Coquelle, Napoleon et l’Angleterre, see General
Bibliography.
III. GENERAL WORKS (NAVAL).
Europe.
Chabaud-Arnault, C. Histoire des flottes militaires. Paris.
1889.
Colomb,
Admiral P. H. Naval Warfare. 2nd edn. London. 1895.
Dumas, Comte M. Prdcis des dvenements militaires. Vols.
8-19. Paris. 1819-26. Ekins, Admiral C. Naval Battles from 1744 to the Peace in
1814. London. 1824. Jurien-La Graviere, E. Guerres maritimes
sous la Republique et l’Empire.
2 vols. Paris, n.d.
Loir, M. Etudes d’histoire maritime. Paris. 1901.
Great Britain.
Brenton,
Captain E. P. The Naval History of Great Britain. 2 vols. London. 1837. Clowes,
Sir W. L. The Royal Navy. London. 1900. (Vol. v.)
(In progress.)
France.
Gudrin, L. Histoire maritime de la France. 6 vols. Paris. 1859-63.
Hugo, A. France Militaire. Ouvrage redige...d’apres...le Moniteur...les
Documents officiels. 5 vols. Paris. 1835-8.
Sicard, F. Histoire des Institutions militaires des Francais, suivie
d’un aperfu sur la Marine militaire. 4 vols. Paris. 1834.
Troude, O. Batailles navales de la France. 4 vols. Paris. 1867.
Victoires, Conquetes, Desastres...des Francais de 1792 k 1815. 27
vols. Paris. 1817-21.
For Mahan
(Sea Power), James (Naval History) and Chevalier (French Navy), see General
Bibliography.
Other Countries.
Couto, J. F.
de. Historia de la Marina Real Espanola. 2 vols. Madrid.
1854. Jonge, J. C. de. Geschiedenis van het
Nederlandsche Zeewezen. 6 vols. The Hague. 1833-48.
Navarrete, A. Historia Maritima Militar de Espana. Madrid. 1901.
(In progress.)
Randaccio, C.
Storia delle Marine militari Italiane del 1750 al 1860. Rome. 1886.
IV. BIOGRAPHICAL WORKS.
Contemporary Correspondence, etc.
Barrow, J.
Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir W. S. Smith. 2 vols. London. 1848.
Beatty, Sir
W. Authentic Narrative of the Death of Nelson. London. 1807. Bevan, A. B., and
Wolryche-Whitmore, H. B. A Sailor of King George. The Journals of Capt. F.
Hoffman, 1793-1814. London. 1901.
Brenton,
Captain E. P. Life and Correspondence of John, Earl of St Vincent, Admiral of
the Fleet. 2 vols. London. 1838.
Dundonald,
Earl of. The Autobiography of a Seaman. London. 1861.
Gardner,
Commander J. A. Reminiscences of, 1775-1806. Edited by Sir R. Vesev Hamilton.
(Navy Records Society.) London. (In preparation.)
Hoste, Lady
H. Memoirs and Letters of Captain Sir W. Hoste. 2 vols. London. 1833.
Lovell,
Vice-Admiral W. S. Personal Narrative of Events from 1799 to 1815.
2nd edn.
London. 1879.
Napier,
Major-Gen. E. Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir C. Napier. 2 vols. London.
1862.
Parsons,
Lieut. G. S. Nelsonian Reminiscences. London. 1843.
Ross, Captain
Sir J. Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord Saumarez.
2 vols. London. 1838.
Later Biographies. ,
Hennequin, J. F. G. Biographie maritime. 3 vols. Paris. 1835-7.
Lecene, P. Les Marins fran<pais. Arras. 1884.
Marshall,
Lieutenant J. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols. London. 1823-35. O’Byrne, W.
Naval Biographical Dictionary. London. 1849.
Ralfe, J.
Naval Biography of Great Britain. 4 vols. London. 1828.
Allardyce, A.
Memoir of the Hon. G. K. Elphinstone, K.B., Viscount Keith.
London.
1882. .
Allen, J.
Memoir of the Life and Services of Admiral Sir W. Hargood. Greenwich. 1841.
Bourchier, J.
B., Lady. Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir E. Codrington. 2 vols. London.
1873.
Brenton, Sir
L. C. P. Memoir of Vice-Admiral Sir J. Brenton. 2nd
edn.
London. 1835.
Chasseriau, F. Vie de l’Amii'al Duperre. Paris. 1848.
Chatterton,
Georgiana, Lady. Memorials Personal and Historical of Admiral Lord Gambier. 2
vols. London. 1861.
Clarke, J. S.
and Me Arthur, J. Life of Admiral Lord Nelson. 2nd
edn. 3 vols.
1840.
Fabre, E. Le Contre-Amiral Bouvet. Paris. 1887.
Jurien-La Graviere, E. Les Gloires maritimes de la France: L’Amiral
Baudin. Paris. 1888.
Les Gloires maritimes de la France: L’Amiral
Roussin. Paris.
Souvenirs d’un Amiral. 2 vols. Paris. 1860.
La Faye, J. de. Une Famille de Marins. Les
Dupetit-Thouars. Paris. 1893. Laughton, J. K. (Editor). From Howard to Nelson.
Twelve Sailors. London. 1899.
Mahan, Capt.
A. T. Types of Naval Officers (Jervis, Saumarez, Pellew).
London. 1902.
The Life
of Nelson. (2nd edn.) London. 1899.
(Markham,
Admiral John.) A Naval Career during the old War: being-...the life of Adm.
John Markham. London. 1883.
Murray, Capt.
A. Memoir of the Naval Life and Services of Admiral Sir P. Durham. London.
1846.
Oder, E. The
Life of Admiral Lord Exmouth. London. 1835.
Pettigrew, T.
J. Memoirs of the Life of Vice-Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. 2 vols. London.
1849.
Phillimore,
Rear-Admiral A. The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir W. Parker.
3 vols. London. 1876-80.
Proschko, F.
I. Em Admiral Napoleons (Villeneuve). Graz. 1866.
Randolph,
Rev. H. Life of Sir R. Wilson. 2 vols. London. 1892.
Smyth, Capt.
W. H. The Life and Services of Captain P. Beaver. London. 1829. Stanhope, Earl.
Life of the Hon. William Pitt. 4 vols. London. 1862.
Tucker, J. S.
Memoirs of Admiral the Rt. Hon. the Earl of St Vincent. 2 vols. London. 1844.
V. SPECIAL WORKS.
Invasion
Projects and Trafalgar Campaign. Public Record Office, Admiralty, “Various.” Vol. xv. (mss.)
Arteche, J. G. de. Reinado de Carlos IV. Madrid. 1893.
Baunigarten, H. Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der franzosischen
Revolution.
3 vols. Leipzig. 1865-71.
Clowes, Sir
W. L. Comhill Magazine. London. Oct. 1896.
Colomb,
Admiral P. United Service Magazine. Vol. xix.
London. 1899.
Couto, J. F. de. Historia del Combate Naval de Trafalgar. Madrid. 1851.
Desbriere, Capitaine E. Projets et tentatives de Debarquement aux lies Britan-
niques, 1793-1805. (French Staff History.) 5 vols. Paris. 1900-2. Desdevises du
Dezert, G. La Marine espagnole pendant la campagne de Trafalgar.
Toulouse. 1898.
Giclais, H. M. de la. Trafalgar. Paris. 1897.
Laughton, J.
K. The Story of Trafalgar. London. 1890.
Letuaire, H. Combat de Trafalgar. Hyeres. 1891.
Marliani, M. Combate de Trafalgar: Viudicacion de la Armada Espanola. Madrid. 1850.
Meyer, J. Die Franzosisch-Spanische Allianz in den Jahren 1796-1807. Linz.
1895.
Minutes
of...a Court-Martial...on Sir R. Calder. London. 1806.
Newholt, H. The
Year of Trafalgar. London. 1905.
P^ngaud, L. Un Agent Secret...Le Comte d’Antraigues. Paris.
1894.
Revue
d’Histoire, redigee 4 l’fitat-major fran^ais (for the year 1805). Paris. Aug.-Dee., 1901.
San Domingo and West Indies.
Ardouin, B. Etudes sur l’histoire d’Hai'ti. Paris. 1853-.
Boisrond-Tonnerre. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire d’Hai'ti. Paris.
1851. Boyer-Peyreleau, Col. Les Antilles Franfaisoi...j usqu’au 1 Novembre,
1815. 3
vols.
Paris.
1825. ,
Edwards, B.
The History, Civil and Ecclesiastical, of the British Colonies in the West
Indies. 5th edn. 6 vols. London. 1819.
Gragnon-Lacoste, T. P. Toussaint Louverture. Paris-Bordeaux. 1877.
Lacroix, P. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire de la Revolution de
Saint-Domingue.
2 vols. Paris. 1820.
Lanzac de Laborie, L. de. Memorial de J. de Norvins. 3 vols. Paris.
1897. Memoires du General Toussaint l’Ouverture, ecrits par lui-meme. Paris.
1853. Metral, A. Histoire de l’Expedition militaire...a Saint.Domingue. Paris.
1841. Poyen, H. de. Les Guerres des Antilles de 1793 a 1815. Paris. 1G96.
St Remy, J. Vie de Toussaint-Louverture. Paris. 1850.
Schoelcher, V. Vie de Toussaint-Louverture. Paris. 1889.
Continental System and French Colonies.
Considerations
on the Relative State of England in 1813. London. 1813.
Du Systeme Continental. Tableau de l’etat politique et moral de l’Empire
Fran- fais en 1813. (Anon.) Paris, n.d.
Eden, Sir F.
Address on the Maritime Rights of Great Britain. 2nd edn. London. 1808.
Hitzigrat, H. Hamburg und die Kontinentalsperre. Hamburg. 1900.
Iveraois, Sir F. de. Effets du Blocus Continental sur le commerce...des
lies Britanniques. 2nd edn. London. 1809.
Kiesselbach, W. Die Continentalsperre in ihrer okonomisch-politischen
Bedeutung.
Stuttgart. 1850.
Prentout, H. L’lle de France sous Decaen. Paris. 1901.
Quarterly
Review, The. London. May, 1811.
Rodocanachi, E. Bonaparte et les lies loniennes. Paris. 1899.
Roloff, G. Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons 1. Munich. 1899.
Rose, J. H.
English Historical Review. Vol. vm. London. 1893.
Sassenay, Marquis de. Napoleon 1 et la fondation de la Republique
Argentine. Paris.
1892.
Stephen, J.
War in Disguise, or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags. London. 1805. The Genius
and Disposition of French Government. Baltimore. 1810.
Of. also
Bibliography to Chapter XIII.
For Chaptal
(Souvenirs), see General Bibliography. For Pasquier’s Memoirs, see Bibliography
to Chapters I, V.
Copenhagen (1807).
frisenbeig, C. F. Fra Krigen, 1807-14. Copenhagen. 1894.
Raeder, J. von. Danmarks Krigs og Politiske Historie, 1807-9. 3 vols. Copenhagen.
1845-52.
Rubin, M. Studien til Danmarks Historie, 1807-14. Copenhagen. 1892.
Mediterranean.
Bianco, G. La Sicilia durante 1’ occupazione Inglese. Palermo.
1902.
Bunbury, Sir
H. A Narrative of Military Transactions in the Mediterranean, 1805-10. London.
1851.
Walcheren.
Papers
relating to the Expedition to the Scheldt. London. 1810;
[Public
Record Office.] Admiralty, “In Letters.” Vol.
3987.
Hook, S. van. Geschiedkundig verhaal van de Landing...der Engelschen in
Zeeland. Haarlem. 1810.
Pelet, J. J. G. Memoires sur la Guerre de 1809. 4 vols.
Paris. 1824.
For Lanzac de
Laborie (French in Belgium), Madelin (Fouche) and Rocquain (Napoleon and
Louis), see General Bibliography.
South America.
Authentic
Narrative of...the Expedition under Brig. Gen. Crawford...with an account of
the operations against Buenos Ayres. London. 1808.
Gillespie, A.
Gleanings...with an Account of the Expedition from England...under Sir D. Baird
and Sir H. Popham. Leeds. 1818.
Trial at
large of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke. London. 1808.
East Indies.
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Due B. de. Precis de la
Campagne de Java en 1811. The Hague. 1834.
Thorn, W.
Memoir of the Conquest of Java and Operations...in the Eastern Archipelago. London. 1815.
French Naval Ports.
Bertrand, P. J. B. Precis de l’Histoire de Boulogne. 2 vols. 1828-9.
Brun, V. Guerres maritimes de la France; Port de Toulon... 2 vols.
Paris. 1861. Lambert, G. Histoire de Toulon. 4 vols. Toulon. 1887-92.
Levot, P. Histoire de la ville de Brest sous le Directoire et Consulat.
Brest, n.d. Pons, M. Z. Memoires pour servir a l’Histoire de la ville de
Toulon. Paris.
1825.
Commerce and Shipping.
Bellairs, C.
The Naval Annual (Commerce and War). Portsmouth. 1904. Chalmers, G. An Estimate
of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain...continued to 1803. London.
1804.
Colquhoun, P.
Treatise of the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire. London.
1815.
Danson, F.
Our Next War...with some Account of the Premiums paid at Lloyds from 1805 to
1816. London. 1894.
Lindsay, W.
S. History of Merchant Shipping. 4 vols. London. 1874-6. McCtilloch, J. A
Dictionary of Commerce and Commercial Navigation. London. 1839.
Milbura, W.
Oriental Commerce. With much additional matter by J. Thornton.
London. 1825.
Norman, C. B.
The Corsairs of France. London. 1887.
Porter, G.
The Progress of the Nation. New edn. London. 1847.
Tooke, T. A
History of Prices. Vols. i and n. London. 1838.
Of. also
Bibliography to Chapter XIII.
Various.
British Minor
Expeditions, compiled in the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster’s Dept.
Loudon. 1884.
Dundonald,
Earl. Observations on Naval Affairs. London. 1847.
Gurney, W.
Minutes of a Court-Martial...on Lord Gamhier. London. 1809. Nautical Economy;
or Forecastle Recollections of Events during the last War...By a
Sailor...called...Jack Nasty-Face. London, n.d.
Nicolas,
Lieut. P. H. Historical Record of the Royal Marine Forces. 2 vols. London.
1846.
State of
certain Immoral Practices prevailing in H.M.’s Navy. London. 1822. Williams, G.
History of the Liverpool Privateers. London. 1897.
VI. NAVAL TECHNOLOGY.
A System of
Naval Tactics. (Anon.) London. 1797.
Chamock, J.
History of Marine Architecture. 3 vols. London. 1802.
Derrick, C.
Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy. London. 1806. Falconer, W.
An Universal Dictionary of the Marine. London. 1789.
Lever, D. The
Young Sea-Officer’s Sheet Anchor. London. 1808.
Smyth, W. H.,
Admiral. The Sailor’s Word-book...digest of nautical terms.
Revised by
Vice-Admiral Sir E. Belcher. London. 1867.
Steel, D. The
Ship-Master’s Assistant. London. 1799.
Willaumez, J. B. P. Dictionnaire de Marine. 3rd edn.
Paris. 1831.
CHAPTERS IX and X. THE THIRD COALITION.
I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL
British
Foreign Office Records:—
France, Nos. 72-74; Prussia, Nos. 67-75; Austria, Nos. 70-84; Russia,
Nos. 67-69; Sweden, Nos. 33-41.
Kriegsarchiv des grossen Generalstabes. Berlin.
Geheimes Staatsarchiv. Berlin.
Staatsarchiv, K. u. k. osterreichisches. Vienna.
For the
French Archives see General Bibliography (Manuscript Sources).
II. DOCUMENTS.
Beer, A. Osterreich und Russland in 1804-5. (Archiv fiir osterreichische
Geschichte. Vol. 63.)
Davout, Mai-echal. Rapport des operations du 3° corps, 1806-7- (Ed. General Davont.) Paris. 1896.
Friedrich I, Konig von Wurttemberg. Politische und militarische
Corresponded mit Kaiser Napoleon I. (Ed. Schlossberger.)
Stuttgart. 1889.
[Lombard, J. W.] Materiaux pour servir a l’histoire des annees 1805-7
Frankfort. 1808.
Paget, Sir Arthur. Correspondence, 1794-1807. (The Paget
Papers.) 2 vols. London. 1896.
dose, J. H.
(Ed.) Despatches relating to the third coalition, from the Foreign Office
correspondence. (Royal Historical Society.) 1904.
For
collections of treaties by De Clercq, Garden, and Martens; Napoleon’s Correspondence
(general, and with Louis Bonaparte); the Memoirs and Correspondence of
Beauhamais, Joseph Bonaparte, Castlereagh, Davout, Gentz, Murat, Hardenberg, »
Nesselrode, Talleyrand; the Diaries of Gentz; the Remains of Ompteda; the
Reflexions of Louis Bonaparte; Tratchevski’s Negotiations, and the Woronzoff
Archives (Russia); Alexander I and Napoleon (Tatischeff); France and Prussia
(Bailleu); Fred. William, Queen Louisa, and Alexander I (Bailleu), see General
Bibliography.
III. GENERAL WORKS.
Alomhert, P. C. et Colin, J. La Campagne de 1806 en Allemagne. (French
Staff History.) 4 vols. Paris. 1902.
Beck, K. Zur Verfassungsgeschichte des Rheinbundes. Mainz. 1890.
Beitrage zur Geschichte des Krieges von 1806 und 1807. (In Bennigsen’s interest.) Breslau. 1836.
Bonnal, E. La diplomatic prussienne depuis la paix de Presbourg. Paris.
1880. Bonnal, General H. L’esprit de la guerre moderne. La manoeuvre d’lena. Paris.
1904.
Bunhury, Sir
H. Military transactions in the Mediterranean, 1805-10. (Some passages in the
great war with France.) London. 1854.
Clausewitz, C. von. Nachrichten iiber Preussen in seiner grossen
Katastrophe.
(Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. Part 10.) Berlin. 1888.
Duncker, Max. Abhandlungen aus der neueren Geschichte. Leipzig. 1887. Foucart, P. Campagne de Prusse, 1806. 2 vols. Paris.
1887-90.
Campagne de Pologne, 1807. 2 vols. Paris.
1882.
Furse, Colonel G. A. Ulm, Trafalgar, Austerlitz. London. 1905.
Galli, H. 1806. L’armee francaise en Allemagne. Paris. 1889.
Goltz, C. von der. Rossbach nnd Jena. Berlin. 1883.
Hopfner, Alexander von. Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807. 5 vols. Berlin. 1850.
Lettow-Vorbeck, O. von. Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807. 4 vols. Berlin. 1899.
[Malo, C.] Precis de la Campagne de 1805 en Allemagne et en Italie. Brussels.
1886.
Mikhailovski-Danilevski, General. Relation de
la campagne de 1805 (trad, par L. Narischkine). Paris. 1846.
The
second war of the Emperor Alexander against Napoleon, in 1806-7
(Russian). St
Petersburg. 1846.
Morvan, J. Le
Soldat imperial. 2 vols. Paris. 1903-4.
[Petit, General G.] Histoire des Campagnes de l’Empereur Napoleon en
1805-7.
(Memorial du Depot general de la Guerre. Vol. vm.)
Paris. 1843.
Petre, F. L.
Napoleon’s Campaign in Poland. 1806-7. London.
1901.
Rustow, W. Der Krieg von 1805 in Deutschland und Italien. Frauenfeld. 1853.
Schonhals, K. Freiherr von. Der Krieg von 1805 in Deutschland. Vienna. 1873.
Ulmann, H. Russisch-preussische Politik unter Alexander I und Friedrich Wilhelm
III, bis 1806. Leipzig. 1899.
Wilson, Sir
R. T. Brief remarks on the character and composition of the Russian armies, and
a sketch of the Campaign in Poland. London. 1810.
For general
works on Europe by Alison, Lefebvre, Kausler, Oncken, Sorel; on France by
Beauvais, Bignon, Bourgeois, Thiers; on Germany by Fisher, Perthes, Rambaud,
Servieres, Treitschke; on Austria by Beer, Wertheimer; on Russia by Berahardi,
Schiemann; on Napoleon by Coquelle, Fournier, Jomini, Lanfrey, Rose, Vandal,
Yorck von Wartenburg, etc.; on Military History by Dumas, see General
Bibliography.
IV. BIOGRAPHICAL WORKS.
Contemporary Memoirs, etc.
August, Prinz, von Preussen. Kriegsgeschichtliche Nachlasse.
(Einzelschriften.
Part 2.) Berlin. 1883.
Boyen, H. von, Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Generals. (Ed. F. Nippold.)
3 vols. Leipzig. 1889-90.
Comeau, Baron. Souvenirs des guerres d’Allemagne. Paris. 1900.
Fezensac, Due de. Journal du camp de Montreuil et des campagnes
d’Allemagne jusqu’en 1807. Paris. 1858.
[Gagem, H. C. E. von.] Mein Antheil an der Politik. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1822-6. Massenbach, Colonel Christian von. Memoiren,
etc. Amsterdam. 1809.
Percy, Baron P.-F., chirurgien en chef de la Grande Arm£e. Journal
(1799-1809). Paris. 1904.
Plotho, C. von. Tagebuch wahrend des Krieges 1806-7. Berlin. 1811.
Reiche, General L. von. Memoiren. Leipzig. 1857.
Schladen, F. von. Preussen in den Jahren 1806 und 1807. Em
Tagebuch. Leipzig. 1865.
For the
Memoirs and Correspondence of Meneval, Mettemich, Miot de Melito, Pasquier,
Rapp, Savary, Talleyrand, see Bibliography to Chapters I, V. For the Memoirs,
etc., of Fox; Czartoryski, Marmont, Massena, Nesselrode, Toll (Russia);
Montgelas and Ompteda (Germany); the Reflexions of Louis Bonaparte (Holland);
and Jackson’s Diaries, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Beaulieu-Marconnay,
K. von. Dalberg und seine Zeit. 2 vols. Weimar. 1879. Bonnefons, A. Un allie de Napoleon: Frederic Auguste,
premier roi de Saxe. Paris. 1902.
Driault, E. Napoleon a Finkenstein. (Revue d’histoire diplomatique.
July.) 1899. Fitzmaurice,
Lord E. Charles, Duke of Brunswick. London. 1901.
Fournier, A
Gentz und Cobenzl. Vienna. 1880.
Grey,
General. Life and opinions of Charles, second Earl Grey. London. 1861. Hausing, K. Hardenberg und die dritte Koalition. Berlin.
1899.
Huffer, H. Die Kabinetsregierung in Preussen und J. W. Lombard. Leipzig. 1891. Marion, General. Memoire sur le general Baron A. de
Senarmont. Paris. 1846. Segur, P. de. Un aide-de-camp de Napoleon. Vol.
i. Paris. 1894. (English translation. London. 1895.)
Stanhope,
Earl. Miscellanies. London. 1863.
Wilson,
General Sir R. T. Life, from Journal etc. (Ed. Randolph.) 2 vols.
London. 1862.
Zapf.
Dalberg, Grossherzog von Frankfurt. 1810.
For lives of
Francis I (by Meynert), Louisa, Q. of Prussia (by Hudson), Maria Carolina, Q.
of Naples (by Bonnefons and Helfert), Archduke Charles (Angely), Gneisenau (by
Pertz and Delbriick), Scharnhorst (by Lehmann), Bliicher (by Scherr), Stein (by
Seeley), Pitt (by Stanhope), see Qeneral Bibliography.
V. SPECIAL WORKS.
Ambert,
Baron. Etudes tactiques...Austerlitz (with Atlas). Paris. 1865.
Angely, M., Edler von. Ulm und Austerlitz. Osterr. Milit. Zeitschrift. Vienna. 1878.
Auriol, C. La France, l’Angleterre et Naples: 1803-6. Vols.
i, ii. Paris. 1905. Beamish, N. L.
History of the King” s German Legion. 2 vols.
London. 1832-37. Dantzig, die Belagerung von (from Kalkreuth’s papers).
Leipzig. 1809.
Derode, M. Nouvelle relation de la bataille de Friedland. Paris. 1839.
Kohler, General G. Geschichte der Festung Dantzig. 2 vols. Breslau. 1893.
Mayerhoffer von Vedropolje. Der Krieg der dritten Koalition gegen Frankreich.
Vienna. 1905.
Montbe, A. von. Die kursachsischen Truppen im Feldzuge 1806. Dresden. 1860.
[Muffling, Baron C. von, Field-Marshal.] Operationsplan der
preussisch-sachsischen Armee im Jahre 1806. Weimar. 1807.
Schachtmeyer, F. von. Die Schlacht bei Preussisch-Eylau etc. Berlin. 1857.
Slovak, A. Die Schlacht bei Austerlitz. Briinn. 1898.
[Stutterheim, Baron K. de.] La bataille d’Austerlitz. (With Napoleon’s
annotations.) Hamburg. 1805.
Titeux, Lieut.-colonel E. Le marechal Bernadotte et la manoeuvre d’lena.
(Revue Napoleonienne, April—Sept. 1903.)
Treuenfeld, B. von. Auerstedt und Jena. 2 vols. Hannover.
1893.
I. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Unpublished Materials.
A small part
only of the diplomatic correspondence contained in the archives of the Great
Powers, relating to the period subsequent to the Treaty of Tilsit, has yet been
systematically published. The work of Herr Bailleu, “ Preussen und Frankreich,”
has not been carried on beyond the year 1807. The despatches of the French
Foreign Office du.ing the ministry of Champagny, due de Cadore, are not fully
known; but the gaps in our information have been to a large extent filled by
the work of M. Vandal, “Napoleon et Alexandre I” (1807-12), 3 vols., Paris,
1898. Light has also been thrown on Russian policy during this period by the
Czartoryski Correspondence, the Woronzoff Archives, and the works of MM.
Tatischeff and Tratchevski, which are founded on documentary evidence.
Similarly the Hardenberg Memoirs, edited by Leopold von Ranke, Lombard’s “
Materiaux pour servir a l’histoire des annees 1805, 1806, 1807,” Dr A. Stem’s “
Abhandlungen und Aktenstiicke zur Geschichte der preussischen Reformzeit,” and
collections of the reform-edicts, present fairly complete materials respecting
the foreign and domestic history of Prussia in this period. With Austrian
affairs this Chapter does not deal, except in relation to the policy which led
up to the interview at Erfurt. The Memoirs of Mettemich give some of the State
papers relating to this.
The British
Foreign Office Records for this period have been published only in the most
fragmentary manner. The following are the volumes that deal chiefly with the
events described in this Chapter: Denmark, No. 53; Portugal, No. 55; Prussia,
Nos. 74 et seq.; Russia, Nos. 69-74; Sweden, Nos. 8-67 (new series); Holland,
Nos. 62-72 (new series); Sicily, Nos. 27-68 (new series); Turkey, Nos. 10-85
(new series).
Collections of Documents.
For the
Woronzoff Archives, and for the Collection of Treaties by Clercq, Garden,
Martens, Neumann, see General Bibliography.
Memoirs and Correspondence.
For the
Correspondence of Napoleon; that of Fred. William and Queen Louisa with
Alexander I; that of Bemadotte with Napoleon; that of Alexander I with
Czartoryski; the Memoirs and Correspondence of Canning, Hardenberg, Malmesbury;
and the writings and diaries of Gentz and Jackson, see General Bibliography.
For the Memoirs of Caulaincourt (doubtful), Champagny, and Talleyrand, see
Bibliography to Chapters 7, V.
II. LATER WORKS.
General.
Driault, E. La Politique orientale de Napoleon (1806-8). Paris. 1904.
Froidevaux, H. La Politique coloniale de Napoleon 1“. (In Revue des Questions
historiques. Vol. lxviii.) Paris. 1901.
Pingaud, L. Les Fra^ais en Russie et les Russes en France. Paris.
1886. Pypine, A. The Movement of Ideas under Alexander I. (In Russian.) St
Petersburg. 1885.
Rose, J. H.
Napoleonic Studies. London. 1904.
For general
works on European History by Lefebvre, Oncken, and Sorel; on Austria (by Beer,
Wertheimer), Russia (Bernhardi, Tratchevski), Germany' (Fisher, Hausser,
Rambaud, Treitschke), Italy (Botta, Ruth), Spain (Baumgarten); on Napoleon and
his brothers (Du Casse, Masson); on Napoleon and Alexander (Tatischeff,
Vandal); on Alexander I (Bogdanovitch, Golovine, Joyneville); see General
Bibliography.
Biographical Works.
Barsof, N. J.
Le Chancelier Roumiantsoff. (In L'ancienne et la
nouvelle Russie.
Fischer, A. Goethe und Napoleon. 2nd ed. Frauenfeld. 1900.
Pingaud, L. Bemadotte, Napoleon, et les Bourbons. Paris. 1901.
Sklower, S. Entrevue de Napoleon Ier et de Goethe. 2nd ed.
Lille. 1853. Tessier, J. Le General Decaen aux Indes. (In Revue
historique. Vol. xv.) Paris.
1881.
For
biographical works or essays on Talleyrand (Pichot), Canning (Stapleton,
Temperley), Maret (Emouf), Hardenberg (Klose), see General Bibliography.
Special Works.
Bittard des Portes, B. Les preliminaires de l’Entrevue d’Erfurt. (In Revue
d’histoire diplomatique. Vol. iv.) Paris. 1890.
Driault, E. La question d’Orient en 1807. (In Revue d’histoire
diplomatique.
Vols. xiv, xv.) Paris. 1900-1.
Gardane, A. de (Comte). Mission du General C. M. Comte de Gardane en
Perse sous le premier Empire. Paris. 1865.
Marmottan, P. Bonaparte et la Repuhlique de Lucques: le Royaume
d’Etrurie. Paris. 1896.
Rodocanachi, E. Bonaparte et les lies loniennes (1797-1816). Paris.
1899.
III. THE REVIVAL OF PRUSSIA.
Contemporary Authorities.
Arndt, E. M.
Geist der Zeit. Vol. n. 4 vols. London. 1809.
Erinnerungen aus dem ausseren Leben. Leipzig.
1840.
Berg, Grafin von. Luise, Konigin von Preussen. Berlin. 1814.
Bernhardi, A. F. Uber die ersten Grundsatze der Disciplin in einem
Gymnasium. Berlin. 1810.
Bohlen, P. von. Autobiographie. Konigsberg. 1841.
Borcke, J. von. Kriegsleben. Berlin. 1888.
Boyen, H. von. Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls H. von
Boyen. Vol. t. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1889-90.
Chamisso, A. von. Leben und Briefe. 2 vols. Berlin. 1839.
Clausewitz, C. von. Nachrichten fiber Preussen in seiner grossen
Katastrophe. Berlin. 1889.
Die Manner des Volkes in der Zeit deutschen Elends, 1805-13. (Anon.)
Berlin. 1864.
Dolma, A. Graf von. Aus Schons Papieren. 5 vols. Halle and Berlin. 1875-82.
Fichte, J. G. Reden an die deutsche Nation (1807-8). Berlin. 1808.
Humboldt, W. von. Gesammelte Schriften, herausg. von der kon. preuss.
Akademie der Wiss. Vols. x, xi. (Politiscbe Denkschriften.) Berlin. 1903.
Immermann, K. Memorabilien. 3 vols. Hamburg. 1840-3.
Jacobs, F. Personalien. Leipzig. 1840.
Lombard, J. W. Materiaux pour servir a l’histoire des annees 1805, 1806
et 1807.
Frankfort and Leipzig. 1808.
Marwitz, F. A. von, Aus dem Nachlass von. 2 vols. Berlin. 1852.
Massenbach, C. von. Denkwurdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Verfalls des
prenssiscben Staates seit dem Jahre 1794. 2 vols. Leipzig aud Amsterdam. 1809.
Muffling, K. Freiherr von. Aus meinem Leben. 2 tom. in 1 vol. Berlin. 1851.
(Engl, translation. London. 1853.)
Muller, F. von. Erinnerungen aus den Kriegszeiten (1806-13). Brunswick.
1851. Niebuhr, B. G. Lebensnachrichten fiber. 3 vols. Hamburg. 1838-9.
Nostiz, K. von. Leben und Briefwechsel.
Raumer, F. von. Lebenserinnerungen und Briefwechsel. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1861.
Schlesier, G. Erinnerungen an W. von Humboldt. Vol. n. Stuttgart. 1845.
Schopenhauer, Johanna. Jugendleben und Wanderbilder. 2 vols. Brunswick. 1839.
Stael-Hol'-teLn, Mme de. L’AUemagne. 3 vols. Paris. 1810.
Steffens, H. Was ich erlebte. 10 vols. Breslau. 1840-4.
Voss, M. S. C. M. (Grafin von). Neunundsechzig Jahre am preussischen Hofe.
4th ed. Leipzig.
1876.
For the
Memoirs of Hardenberg and Varnhagen von Ense, see General Bibliography.
Later Wohks.
BSrsch, G. F. von Schills Zug und Tod. Leipzig. 1860.
Beitrage zur Geschichte des sogenannten
Tugendbunds. Hamburg. 1852.
Bassewitz, M. F. von. Die Kurmark Brandenburg im Zusammenhang mit dem
Schicksale des Gesammtstaates Preussens (1806-8). 2 vols. Leipzig. 1851-2.
Boyen, H. von. Beitrage zur Kenntniss des Generals Schamhorst. Berlin. 1833. Cavaignac, G. La formation de la Prusse contemporaine. Les
Grigines (1806-8). Paris. 1891.
Dilthey, W. Leben Schleiermachers. Berlin. 1870.
Dieterici, C. Zur Geschichte der Steuer-Reform in Preussen (1810-20).
Berlin.
1875.
Duncker, M. Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelms III.
Leipzig. 1876.
Preussen und die allgemeine Wehrpflicht im
Jahre 1809. (In Historische
Zeitschrift.) Berlin. 1861.
Ernouf, A. A. (Baron). Les Fran^ais en Prusse
(1806-8). Paris. 1873.
Fichte, J. H. J. G. Fichtes Leben. 2 vols. 2nd ed. Leipzig. 1862.
Firmery. Jean Paul Richter.
Fournier, A. Zur Geschichte des Tugendbundes. (In Historische Studien und
Skizzen.) Prague. 1885.
Gebhardt, B. W. von Humboldt als Staatsmann. Stuttgart. 1896.
Geiger, L. Geschichte des geistigen Lebens der preussischen Hauptstadt. 2
vols. Berlin. 1895.
Goette, R. Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhebung 1807-15. Gotha. 1391-2.
Goltz, C. Freiherr von der. Rossbach und Jena.
Goschen, G. J. (Viscount). G. J. Goschen. 2 vols. London. 1902.
Haken, J. C. L. F. von Schill. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1824.
Hassel, P. Geschichte der preussischen Politik (1807-15). Leipzig. 1881.
Haym, R. W. von Humboldt’s Lebensbild und Charakteristik. Berlin. 1856.
Hippel, T. G. von. Beitrage zur Charakteristik Friedrich Wilhelms III.
Bromberg.
1841.
Hfiffer, H. Lombard. (Allgemeine Deutsche Biographic. Vol. xix.) Leipzig.
1884. Kessler, G. W. Leben. Leipzig. 1853.
Knapp, G. F. Die Bauem-Befreiung in den alteren Theilen Preussens. 2 vols.
Leipzig. 1887.
Kopke, R, Die Grundung der kon. Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat zu Berlin.
Berlin. 1860.
Krug, W. T. Wesen und Wirken des Tugendbundes. Leipzig. 1816.
Lehmann, M. Knesebeck und Schon. Leipzig. 1875.
Lehmann, A. Der Tugendbund. Berlin. 1867.
Mamroth, K. Geschichte der preussischen Staats-Besteuerung im xix*™ Jahr-
hundert. Leipzig. 1890.
Meier, E. Die Reform der Verwaltungs-Organisation unter Stein und
Hardenberg. Leipzig. 1881.
Paulsen, F. Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen
und Universitaten. Leipzig. 1885.
Perthes, F.
C. Leben. 2 vols. Hamburg and Gotha. 1848. (Engl, translation (abridged). London. 1858.)
Reorganisation der preussischen Armee nach dem Tilsiter Frieden. (Anon.)
Vols. ii, in. (Beihefte zum
Militar-Wochenblatt.) Berlin. 1854-6.
Scherer, W. History of German Literature (1748-1832). Engl, translation.
Oxford. 1891.
Schleiermacher, S. Leben. 2nd edn. 1860.
Schmidt, W. A. Geschichte der deutschen Verfassnngsfrage wahrend der
Befrei- ungskriege und des Wiener Kongresses; herausgegeben aus dessen Nachlass
von A. Stem. Stuttgart. 1890.
Stettiner, P. Der Tugendbund. Konigsberg. 1904.
Sugenheim, S. Geschichte der Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft und Horigkeit in
Europa. St Petersburg. 1861.
Thiele, R. E. Arndt. Sein Leben und Arbeiten. Gutersloh. 1894.
Treitschke, H. von. Fichte und die nationale Idee. (Historische und
politische Aufsatze. Vol. vm.) Leipzig. 1886.
Voigt, J. Geschichte des sogenanuten Tugendbundes. Berlin. 1850.
For general works on Germany under French domination (Duncker and Perthes),
Prussian administration (Bornhak, Philippson); Lives of Bliicher (Blasendorff,
Scherr, Vamhagen von Ense), Gneisenau (Delbruck, Pertz), Queen Louisa (Hudson),
Schamhorst (Klippel, Lehmann), Stein (Pertz, Seeley, Stem), Yorck (Droysen),
see General Bibliography.
IV. THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES AND FINLAND.
Contemporary Authorities.
Armfeld, G.
M. Studier ur Armfeld’s efterlemnade Papper. 3 vols. Stockholm.
1887.
Gustavus IV
Adolphus. Historical Sketch of the last Years of the Reign of Gustavus IV,
Adolphus, late King of Sweden. Translated from the Swedish. London. 1812.
o
^
Key-Aberg, K.
V. De diplomatiska forbindelserna under Gustav Adolfs IV Krig emot Napoleon
intill Konventionen i Stralsund (7 Sept. 1807). Upsala. Macdonald, J. Travels through
Denmark and part of Sweden in 1809. 2 vols. London. 1809.
Maurice, Sir
J. F. The Diary of Sir John Moore. 2 vols. London. 1904. Monteith, W. Narrative
of the Conquest of Finland by the Russians in 1808-9.
(Engl, translation. London. 1854.)
Touchard-Lafosse, G. Souvenirs d’un demi-siecle (1789-1836). 6
vols. Brunswick. 1836-7.
For the
Correspondence of Bemadotte with Napoleon and his Proclamations, etc., see
General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Adlersparre,
C. A. 1809 ars Revolution och dess man. 2 vols. Stockholm.
1849. Ahnfeld, A. La Diplomatic russe a Stockholm en 1810. In Revue historique.
Vol. 37. Paris. 1888.
Boppe, P. Les Espagnols a la Grande Armee: le Corps de La Romana
(1807-8).
Paris and
Nancy. 1899.
Blomberg, A.
Marskalk Bemadotte. Stockholm. 1888.
Brissman.
Sveriges inre stryelse under Gustav IV Adolfs formyndare-regerinff Lund. 1888.
DanieJsson,
J. R. Finland’s Union with the Russian Empire. (Translated from the Swedish.)
Borga. 1891.
Engestrom, L.
von. Minnen och Anteckningar. Stockholm. 1876.
Finlande, La
Constitution du Grand-Duche de. Paris. 1900.
Fisher, J. R.
Finland and the Tsars 1809-99. London. 2nd ed.
1900. Koskinen, Y. Finnische Geschichte. (Translated
from the Finnish.) Leipzig. 1874. Raeder, J. von. Danmarks Krigs- og Politiske
Historic, 1807-9. 3 vols. Copenhagen.
1846-62.
Schefer, C. Bemadotte roi (1810-44). Paris. 1899.
Schinkel, B. von. Minnen ur Sveriges nyare Historia. Edited
by Bergmann. Stockholm. 1852.
Schybergson,
M. G. Geschichte Finnlands. (Translated from the Swedish by F. Arnheim.) Gotha.
1896.
Tegne'r, E.
G. M. Armfeld. 3 vols. Stockholm. 1883-7.
For general
works on the history of Scandinavian lands (Bain, Dunham, Fryxell Holm,
Thorsoee, Wergeland), for lives of Bemadotte (Geijer, and Touchard- Lafosse),
and for the life of Speranski (Korff), see General Bibliography.
V. THE GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW.
Doouments.
Laube, I. G. Gesetzsammlung des vormaligen Herzogthums Warschau, aus dem
Polnischen iibersetzt.
Lelewelj J. Analyse et parallele des trois Constitutions polonaises de
1791, 1807, et 1815; traduit du polonais par E. Kyakaczewski. Arras. 1833.
Contemporary Authorities.
Bignon, L. P. E. (Baron). Souvenirs d’un Diplomate. La Pologne
(1801-13). Paris. 1864.
Brandt, H. von. Aus dem Leben des Generals A. von Brandt. 2 vols. Berlin.
1869.
Kozmian, K. Memoirs (1788-1815). (In Polish.) Posen. 1858.
Potocka, Comtesse. Memoires (1794-1820). Paris. 1897.
Pradt, M. de. Histoire de l’Ambassade a Varsovie en 1822. Paris.
1815.
Staszyc, S.
Polish Statistics in 1807: Historical Sketch ot the Campaign of 1809.
(In Polish.)
1807-9.
Trembicka,
Madame. Memoires d’une Polonaise (1764-1830). 2 vols. Paris. 1841.
For the
Memoirs of Czartoryski and Oginski, and the Correspondence of Davout, see
General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Falkowski, I.
Scenes from the Life of the last Generations in Poland. (In Polish.)
5 vols. Posen.
1882-3.
Fournier, A. Zur Geschichte der polnischen Frage 1814-5. (In Mittheilungen
des Instituts fur osterreichische Geschichtsforschung.) Vol. xx. Innsbruck. 1899.
Gembaczewski, B. L’armee polonaise: le duchd de Varsovie (1802-14). (In
Polish.) Warsaw. 1905.
Kranskar, A. La societe varsovienne des amis des sciences (1800-32). (In
Polish.)
4 vols. Warsaw. 1900-3.
Ostrowski, A.
Life of T. Ostrowski, and the Events in Poland, 1795-1817. (In Polish.) Paris.
1836.
Skarbek, F.
History of the Duchy of Warsaw. (In Polish.) 3 vols. Posen.
1896.
Sulima, S. L.
The Poles in Spain, 1808-12. (In Polish.)
Warsaw. 1888. Zoltewski, S. Die Finanzen des Herzogthums Warschau (1806-15). 2
vols. Posen. 1890-2.
For
Bonnefons’ Frederick Augustus, see Bibliography to Chaps. IX and X. For
Lelewel’s History of Poland, see General Bibliography.
I. DOCUMENTS.
No systematic
and exhaustive publication of the documents relating to the political history
of the year 1809 has as yet been made. This statement holds good of all the
States concerned. Even Lefebvre’s comprehensive work, Histoire des cabinets de
I’Europe pendant le consulat et Vempire, is in this respect incomplete. The
Austrian archives have been used by Beer, so far as essentials are concerned,
in his Zehn Jahre oesterreichischer Politik, 1801-10, which treats very thoroughly
of the policy of the Minister Count Stadion. Wertheimer’s Geschichte Oesterreichs und Ungams im ersten Jahrssehnt des
19ten Jahrhunderts, vol. n, is based on documentary evidence.
The National
Archives of France still contain much unpublished material relating to 1809 ;
but the most important part has been published in the Correspondance de
NapolSon I, in the Memoires de Talleyrand, in the Lettres inedites a Napoleon,
and in the Souvenirs de Champagny. The same may be said of the English
archives, as the principal matter is to be found in “George Canning’s Official
Correspondence,” and the “Castlereagh Memoirs.”
As regards
the military events of 1809, the K. K. Kriegsarchiv in Vienna contains stores
of valuable material, which has been extensively used by Baron von
Binder-Kriegelstein, in his Regensburg, 1809, also in his Aspem, which is still
in process of publication. On the other hand, these archives contain many documents,
which, being “ secret,” may not be published; so that, as yet, we cannot be said
to possess an absolutely complete history of 1809, written from the Austrian
point of view, and based upon official reports.
The French
General Staff, on the other hand, is successfully engaged in utilising the
archives of the Dipot de la guerre, for the history of the War of 1809, in an
admirable work by Col. Saski, Campagne de 1809 en Allemagne et en Autriche, of
which three vols. have already appeared. It is based exclusively on documents.
There remain
the State archives of Dresden, Munich, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, and Darmstadt,
which contain various unpublished official reports relating to the part taken
in the war by the Confederation of the Rhine.
The documents
relating to the English Expedition to Walcheren have been published in
Expedition de TEscaut. Enqvete, pieces et documents relatifs aux affaires de
FEscaut, communiques aux deux Chambres du Parlement d’Angleterre. Paris.
1810.
II. CONTEMPORARY WORKS.
Memoirs, Correspondence, etc.
(a) Political.
For the
Memoirs and Correspondence of Napoleon, Canning, Castlereagh, Metternich,
Montgelas, and the Diaries of Gentz, see General Bibliography, for the Memoirs
of Champagny and Savary, see Bibliography 'to Chapters I, V.
(b) Military.
Bianchi, Freiherr von, k. k. Feldmarschallleutnant. Vienna. 1857.
Verteidigung des Briickenkopfes von Regensburg
1809. Prague. 1850.
Castellane, Journal du marechal. Paris. 1885.
Vol. i. English translation. London. 1892-3.
Heyde, von der. Der Feldzug des herzogl. braunschweigischen lvorps 1809.
Berlin. 1819.
Johann, Erzherzog von Oesterreich. Im Feldzuge 1809. Graz. 1892.
Karl, Erzherzog von Oesterreich. Relazion von der Schlacht von Aspem auf
dem Marchfelde. Vienna. 1809.
Larrey,
Baron. Memoirs (English). London. 1881. (Baron L. was Surgeon- General in the
French army.)
Lejeune, Memoires du general. Paris. 1895.
Lorences, Memoires du general. (Published in “Carnet historique et
litteraire du comte Fleury.”) Paris. 1900.
Pelet, J. J. G. Memoires de la guerre de 1809. 4 vols. Paris. 1824-6.
Pelleport, P., Vicomte de. Souvenirs
militaires et intimes. 2 vols. Paris. 1857. Wimpffen, Freiherr von. Eine
Denkschrift aus dem Jahre 1809. (Mitteilungen des k. k. Kriegs-Archivs.) Series
in, vol. m. Vienna. 1904.
For the
writings of Archduke Charles, and the Memoirs and Correspondence of Beauhamais,
Davout, Lannes, Macdonald, Marbot, Massena, Rapp, see General Bibliography.
III. LATER WORKS.
(o) General.
Fournier, A. Oesterreich nach dem Frieden von Wien. Vienna. 1882.
Hormayr, H. von. Kaiser Franz und Metternich. Leipzig. 1848.
Vandal, A. La France et la Russie pendant la campagne de 1809. (Annales
de l’ficole des Sciences politiques, 1892.)
For works on
European History, during this period, by Alison, Capefigue, Lefebvre, Oncken,
Rose; on France by Bignon, Taine, Thiers; on Austria by Beer, Wertheimer; on
Germany and Prussia by Pertz and Seeley; lives of Napoleon by Fournier,
Lanfrey, Rose; on Napoleon and Alexander, by Vandal; and collections of
Treaties by Garden, etc., see General Bibliography.
(b) Military.
Binder-Kriegelstein, Freiherr von. Regensburg (1809). Berlin. 1902.
Schill. Berlin. 1903.
Bremen, W. von. Die Tage von Regensburg. Berlin. 1891. Freytag-Loringhoven,
Freiherr von, Napoleonische Initiative, 1809 und 1814. Berlin. 1896.
Hellwald, F. von. Der Feldzug von 1809. Vienna. 1864. (Separatabdruck aus
der osterreichischen militarischen Zeitschrift, 1864.)
Hofler, E. Der Feldzug von 1809 in Deutschland und Tyrol. Augsburg. 1858.
Hormayr, H. von. Das Heer von Innerosterreich unter den Befehlen des Erz-
herzogs Johann im Kriege 1809. Leipzig. 1848.
Laborde, A L. J., Comte de. Precis historique de la guerre de 1809. Paris. 1893. Larisch, A. von. Das Kriegsjahr 1809.
Kotzschenbroda. 1899.
Mayerhoffer, von. Oesterreichs Krieg mit Napoleon I. Vienna. 1905.
Menge, A. Die Schlacht von Aspem am 21. und 22. Mai 1809. Berlin. 1900.
Moltke, Graf von. Militarische Werke. Vol. m, part 2. Berlin. 1899. Nicmever.
Heldenzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig 1809. Halle. 1859.
Saski, C. G.
L. Campagne de 1809. (French Staff History.) 3
vols. Paris.
1899-1902.
Schneidawind, F. J. A. La guerre de l’Autriche contre la France en 1809.
Leben des
Erzherzogs Johann von Oesterreich; mit besonderer Beriicksicbtig-
ung der Feldziige dieses Prinzen in 1800, ’5, ’9, und ’15. Schaffhausen.
1849. Smekal, G. Die Schlacht bei Aspem und Essling. Vienna. 1899.
Strobl, A. Aspern und Wagram. Vienna. 1897.
Stutterbeim, Baron von. Der Krieg von 1809. Vienna. 1891.
Welden, L. von. Der Krieg von 1809. Vienna. 1872.
Zwiedineck-Siidenhorst, H. von. Erzherzog Johann im Feldzuge 1809. Graz.
1892.
For the works
of Jomini and Yorck von Wartenburg on Napoleon as commander, and of Angely on
Archduke Charles, see General Bibliography.
I. EUROPE AND THE LARGER STATES.
Contemporary Authorities.
Collections qf Documents.
Blanchard, C. F. Repertoire general des Lois...sur la Marine. 3 vols. Paris. 1849-59.
Bormans, K. T. F., and Daniels, A. von. Handbuch der fur die konigl.
preuss. Rheinprovinzen verkiindigten Gesetze, Verordnungen und Regierungsbe-
schliisse aus der Zeit der Fremdherrschaft. 8 vols.
Cologne. 1834. Bulletin des Lois du Royaume de Westphalie.
Bulletin des Lois du Grand-duche de Varsovie.
Codice di Commercio dell’ Impero Francese adottato nel Regno di Napoli
per ordine di S. M. Naples. 1809.
Locre, J. G. Esprit du Code de Commerce, ou commentaire de chacun des
articles du Code. 10 vols. Paris. 1808.
Lois et Reglements des Douanes frani^aises. Paris. 1804-33.
London Gazette, The. London. 1807-12.
Memoire sur les Lois de la Neutrality maritime. Paris. 1812.
Naval
Chronicle, The. Vols. xx-xxn. 40 vols. London. 1798-1818.
Official
Documents relating to the United Provinces of Venezuela. London. 1812. Orders
in Council and Instructions for imposing the Restrictions of Blockade. London.
1808.
Orders in
Council. New System of Commercial Regulations. London. 1808. Recueil des Lois, Decrets, Arretes, et Ordonnances concernant les
Douanes, 1789 a
1876. 2 vols. Paris. 1876.
Savary, A. J. M. R, Due de Rovigo. Rapports
officiels a Napoleon ler. Published in the Archives of the Imperial
Russian Historical Society. 1892-5.
Statistical
Tables of the Commerce of the United States with European Countries.
1790-1890. Washington.
Tratado de Commercio e Naviga<;ao entre...o Principe Regente de
Portugal e el Rey do Reino Unido da Grande Bretanha e Irlanda (19 Feb. 1810).
For the
Annual Register; collections of treaties by G. F. de Martens (general), T. T.
Martens (Russia), Neumann (Austria); French decrees, etc. (Duvergier);
diplomatic relations of France and Russia (Tratchevslti); aud the proclamations
etc. of Bernadotte as Crown Prince of Sweden, see General Bibliography, for the
Moniteur, see Bibliography to Chaps. I, V.
General.
Bigland, J.
Letters on the Modem History of Enrope. London. 1804.
Bristed, J.
The Contest with France. London. 1809.
Letters from
Albion to a friend on the Continent in 1810-13. (Anon.) 2 vols. London. 1813.
Roscoe, W.
Considerations on the Causes, Objects, and Consequences of the present War.... London. 1812.
Memoirs and Correspondence.
Arndt, E. M. Erinnerungen aus dem ausseren Leben. 3rd ed.
Leipzig. 1842. Barrow, J. Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir W. Sidney
Smith. 2 vols. London. 1848.
Chamisso, A. von. Leben und Briefe. 2 vols. Berlin. 1839.
Croker, J. W.
Correspondence and Diaries, 1809-30. Edited by L. J. Jennings.
3 vols.
London. 1884.
Eilers, G. Meine Wanderungen durch’s Leben. 4 vols. Leipzig. 1856-60.
Immermann, K. Memorabilien. 3 vols. Hamburg. 1840-3.
Jacobs, F.
Personalien. Leipzig. 1840.
Martin, Sir
T. Byam, Admiral. Letters and Papers. (Navy Records Society.)
3 vols. London. 1898-1901.
Napoleon I,
Correspondance inedite de, avec Caulaincourt (1808-9), published by A. Vandal
in the Revue Bleue, 1895.
Pearce, C. F.
Memoirs and Correspondence of Marquess Wellesley. 3 vols. London. 1846.
Rose, Right
Hon. G. Diaries and Correspondence of. 2 vols. London. 1860. Ross, Sir J.
Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarcz. 2 vols. London. 1838.
Stael-Holstein,
Madame de. Dix Annees d’Exil. Paris. 1821. [New ed. from the original MS. Ed.
by P. Gautier. Paris. 1904.]
Steffens, H.
Was ich erlebte. 10 vols. Breslau. 1840-4.
For
Napoleon’s “Opinions’" (Pelet de la Lozere); Napoleon’s correspondence;
Memoirs, Correspondence etc., of Bemadotte, Castlereagh, Davout, Gentz, Malmesbury,
Oginski, Vamhagen von Ense, see General Bibliography. For Memoirs of
Bourrienne, Mollien, Ouvrard, Pasquier, see Bibliography to Chapters I, V.
For other contemporary
authorities see below, under “Special Works.”
Later Works.
General.
Muller, L. Aus sturmvoller Zeit. Marburg. 1892.
Rose, J. H.
Napoleonic Studies. London. 1904.
For general
works, on the history of Europe and the Colonies (Heeren, Posselt, Sorel),
England (Martineau), Germany (Rambaud), Prussia (Duncker), Russia (Bemhardi),
Belgium (Lanzac de Laborie), see General Bibliography. See also Revue
d’histoire diplomatique. Paris, v. d.
Biographical.
Allardyce, A.
Memoir of the Hon. G. K. Elphinstone, K.B., Viscount Keith. London. 1882.
Twiss, H. The
public and private Life of Lord Chancellor Eldon. 2 vols. 3rd ed. London. 1846.
For Lives of
Alexander I, Davout, Maret, see General Bibliography.
Special Wohks.
Contemporary
Travels.
Galt, J.
Voyages and Travels in 1809-11: with statistical, commercial, and miscellaneous
observations. London. 1812.
Green, G. A
Journey from London to St Petersburg by way of Sweden. London.
1813.
Macdonald, J.
Travels through Denmark and part of Sweden in 1809. 2 vols. London. 1809.
Schlegel, C. H. J. Reisen in mehrere russische Gouvernements in den Jahren
1801, 1807, und 1815. Meiningen. 1819-23.
Semple, R. A
journey through Spain and Italy to Naples and thence to Constantinople. 2
vols. London. 1808.
A second
Journey in Spain in the spring of 1809. London. 1812.
Steinkopff,
C. F. A. Letters relative to a Tour on the Continent in the year 1812. London.
1813.
Webb, D. C.
Observations and Remarks during four Excursions made to various parts of Great
Britain in 1810-11. London. 1812.
For Travels
in Naples and Sicily, and in Turkey, see below.
Industry and
Commerce.
Achard, F. C.
Traite complet sur le sucre europeen de betteraves (translated from the German
by D. Angar). Paris. 1812.
Ausziige aus dem Tagebuch von einer Geschaftsreise nach Russland im Jahr
1805. [Anon.]
1812.
Baines, E.
History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain. London. 1835. Beer, A. Geschichte des Welthandels im xix. Jahrhundert.
Vienna. 1884. Bischoif, J. A comprehensive History of the Woollen and Worsted
Manufactures. London. 1842.
Brougham,
Lord, Speech of, in House of Commons, June 16, 1812, on the present state of
Commerce and Manufactures. London. 1812.
Bruce, J.
Annals of the Honourable East India Company. London. 1810.
Busch, J. G. Grundriss einer Geschichte der merkwurdigsten Welthandel der
neuerer Zeit (1796-1810). 2 parts. Hamburg. 1810.
Chalmers, G.
An Estimate of the comparative strength of Great Britain. London.
1810.
Losses
in Trade. New ed. London. 1810.
Considerations on Commerce, Bullion and Coin,
etc. London. 1811.
Chaptal, J. A. C. La chimie appliquee aux arts. 4 vols. Paris. 1807.
Compte rendu a S. M. l’Empereur et Roi sur la
fabrication du sucre de
betterave. (Annuaire de l’agriculture fran^aise.) Vol. xxvm. Paris.
1811.
De l’industrie fransaise. 2 vols. Paris. 1819.
La chimie appliquee a l’agriculture. 2
vols. Paris. 1823.
Crump, J.
Plan for the better Protection of British Commerce. London. 1812. Gaskell, P.
The manufacturing Population of England. London. 1833.
Gensoul, F. Rapports de la Chambre de Commerce...a Turin. Turin. 1808.
Gouraud, C. Hist, de la Politique commerciale de la France. 2 vols. Paris.
1854. Gran Brettagna, la, considerata sotto 1’ aspetto fisico, economico, etc.
[Anon.]
2 vols. Milan. 1821.
Grassi, J. ' Aper^u sur le Commerce...du Piemont. Turin.
1811.
Inquiry into
the State of our Commercial Relations with the Northern Powers, etc. [Anon.] London. 1811.
Levasseur, E. Histoire des Classes ouvrieres et de l’lndustrie en France
de 1789 a nos jours. 2 vols. Paris. 1867. New edn. (corrected). Vol. I. Paris.
1903.
De l’esprit des Tarifs franyais. (In “Journal
des Economistes,” Vol. xxvi.)
Paris. 1860.
Lyne,
C. Letter on the North-American Export Trade. London. 1813. Viacpherson, D.
History of the European Commerce with India. London. 1812. Annals
of Commerce. 4 vols. London. 1805.
Macculloch,
J. R. A select Collection of scarce and valuable Tracts on Commerce. London.
1859.
Dictionary of Commerce and Commercial
Navigation. London. 1877.
Mac wade, C.
G. Commercial and Political Observations on the State of the Cotton Markets
(1801-12). London. 1812.
Magnien-Grandpre, N. Dictionnaire de la Legislation des Douanes. Paris.
1806.
Tarif des Droits de Douane. Paris. 1806, 1808,
1811, 1815.
and Den de Perthes, L. J. Dictionnaire des
productions de la nature et de
l’art, qui font l’objet du Commerce de la France...et des Droits
auxquels elles sont imposees. 2 vols. Paris. 1809.
Martin, F.
The History of Lloyd’s and of Marine Insurance in Great Britain.
London. 1876.
Mill, J.
Commerce defended. London. 1808.
Moreau de Jonnes, A. Le Commerce au xixe siecle. 2 vols.
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Moreau,
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Nuvollone, P.
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Porter, G. R.
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Rose, Right
Hon. G. A brief Examination into the Increase of the Revenue, Commerce and
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Spence, W.
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Tooke, T. A
History of Prices and of the State of Circulation from 1793 to 1837.
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Lumbroso,
Baron A. Napoleone I e 1’ Inghilterra. Rome. 1897. The supplementary volume
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Dormoy, E. Le
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Hitzigrath,
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Busch, J. G. Volkerseerecht. Hamburg and Altona. 1801.
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2 vols. London. 1898.
Thimme, F. W. Die inneren Zustande des Kurfiirstentums Hannover unter der
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Walton, W.
Present State of the Spanish Colonies, including a particular Account of
Hispaniola. 2 vols. London. 1810.
Zimmern, H.
The Hansa Towns. London. 1889.
For general
works on Germany under French domination, see General Bibliography.
II. HOLLAND.
The
enumeration of authorities relating to Holland in the Bibliography of Chapter
XI also applies to this Section. For King Louis’ Reflexions on the Government
of Holland, see General Bibliography.
Contemporary Authorities.
Delprat, D.
Journal (published in the Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het historisch
Genootschap x). Utrecht. 1892.
Description succincte du Royaume de Hollande (translated from the
Dutch).
[Anon.]
Amsterdam. 1808 [?].
Falck, A. R.
Brieven (1795-1843). The Hague. 1857.
Roell, W. F.
Verslag (Report of King Louis’ sojourn at Paris in 1809-10). Amsterdam. 1837.
Songe-Meyerz, De. Reflexions sur le Commerce de la ci-devant Hollande
depuis sa reunion a la France. Amsterdam. 1811.
For the
Memoirs and Letters of D. and G. K. van Hogendorp, see General Bibliography
(Holland).
Later Works.
Gamier, A. La cour de Hollande sous le regne de Louis Bonaparte. Paris and Amsterdam. 1823.
Jorissen, T. De Ondergang van het Koningrijk. Holland. 1871.
Mendels, M. H. W. Daendels (1762-1818). 2 vols. The
Hague. 1890.
Rdville, A. La Hollande et le Roi Louis. (In Rev. des Deux Mondes.) Paris.
1870. Schimmelpenninck, Count. Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck en eenige
gebeurtenissen van zijn tijd. Amsterdam. 1845.
Wichers, L. De Regeering van Koning Lodewijk Napoleon. Utrecht. 1892.
For the
political history of Bosch-Kemper, Coquelle’s “Napoleon et l’Angle- terre,”
Jorissen and Rocquain on the relations between Napoleon and King Louis, and du
Casse’s “Les Rois Freres,” see General Bibliography. For the Memoirs of Ouvrard
and Madelin’s Life of Fouche, see Bibliography to Chapters IV.
III. NAPLES AND SICILY.
Contemporary Authorities.
Blaquiere, E.
Letters from the Mediterranean, containing a civil and political Account of
Sicily, etc. 2 vols. London. 1813.
Cockburn, G.
(Lieut.-Gen.). Voyage to Cadiz, Gibraltar and a descriptive Tour in Sicily in
1810 and 1811. 2 vols. London. 1814.
Gallo, Duca
di. Memorie. (From Archivio storico per le Province Napoletane.
Ann. xni. of
Part i.) Naples. 1888. (In progress.)
Galt, J.
Voyages and Travels in Sardinia, Sicily, Turkey, etc. (with statistical
observations), 1809-11. Loudon. 1812.
Moore, Sir
John, Diary of. Edited by Sir F. Maurice. 2 vols.
London. 1904. Orloff, Count G. Memoires historiques, politiques et litteraires
sur le Royaume de Naples. 6 vols. Paris. 1821.
Pignatelli
Strongoli, F. Memorie intorno al Regno di Napoli dal 1805 al 1815. Naples.
1820.
Thompson, W.
H. Sicily and its Inhabitants in 1809 and 1810. London. 1813. Winspeare, D.
Storia degli abusi feudali. 2 vols. Naples. 1811.
For the
Memoirs of Lord Castlereagh, the Life and Correspondence of Murat, and the
Memoirs of Joseph Bonaparte, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Annesley, G.
(Viscount Valentia). Private Journal of the Affairs of Sicily. (In British
Museum; Additional MSS. 19426.)
Bianchini, L.
Storia delle Finanze del Regno di Napoli. 3rd ed. Naples. 1859. Bianco, G. La
Sicilia durante 1’ occupazione Inglese (1806-15). Palermo. 1902. Browning, O.
The Flight to Varennes and other historical Essays. (No. ix.) London. 1892.
Cantu, C.
Della Independenza Italiana. Cronistoria. 3 vols. Turin. 1875. Colletta, P.
Storia del Reame di Napoli. 2 vols. Capo Jago. 1838. Correspondence relating to
Sicilian Affairs (1814-16), presented to Parliament, 1849. Dumas, Davy de la Pailleterie, A. I Borboni di Napoli. 10 vols. Naples.
1862-3. Gagniere, G. M. La Reine Marie-Caroline de Naples d’apres des documeuts
nouveaux. Paris. 1889.
Hervey-Saint-Denis, Baron Leon de. Histoire de la Revolution dans les
Deux Siciles depuis 1793. Paris. 1856.
Jeaffreson,
J. C. The Queen of Naples and Lord Nelson. 2 vols. London. 1889. Johnston, R.
M. Lord William Bentinck and Murat. In English Historical Review, vol. xix.
London. 1904.
Minto,
Countess of. Memoir of the Right Hon. Hugh Elliot. Edinburgh. 1868. Palmieri,
N. Saggio storico e politico sulla costituzione del Regno di Sicilia infino al
1816. Lausanne. 1847.
Palumbo, R.
Maria Carolina, Regina delle Due Sicilie. Naples. 1877.
Pepe, G.
(General). Memorie intomo alia sua Vita, e ai recenti Casi d’ Italia. Paris. 1847. [Engl, translation. 3 vols. London. 1896.]
Reuchlin, H. Geschichte Neapels wahrend der letzten siebenzig Jahre,
dargestellt am Leben der Generale F. und W. Pepe. NSrdlingen.
1862.
Schipa, M. II
Regno di Napoli sotto i Borhoni. Naples. 1900.
Tivaronij C.
Storia del Risorgimento italiano. 3 vols.
Turin. 1889-90.
Weil, M. H. Le Prince Eugene et Murat: Operations militaires,
negociations diplomatiques. 5 vols. Paris. 1902.
For general
works on Italian history by Botta and de Castro, works on Qneen
Maria
Carolina (Bonnefons, Helfert), and on the Napoleonic Empire in S. Italy
(Johnston),
see General Bibliography.
IV. TURKEY
(1789-1812).
Contemporary Authorities.
Boppe, A. Documents inedits sur les relations de la Serbie avec
Napoleon. Belgrade.
1888.
Eton, W. A
Survey of the Turkish Empire. London. 1798.
A
concise Account of the Commerce and Navigation of the Black Sea. 1805.
A letter
to the Earl of D... on the political relations of Russia in regard to
Turkey, etc.
London. 1807.
Galt, J.
Letters from the Levant, etc. London. 1813.
Gardane, P. A. L. de. Journal d’un Voyage dans la Turquie d’Asie et la
Perse, fait en 1807 et 1808. 2 pts. Paris. 1809.
Hamilton, W.
Remarks on several Parts of Tnrkey. London. 1809.
Hammer-Purgstall, J. von. Des osmanischen Reiches Staatsverfassung und
Staats- verwaltung. 2 vols. Tubingen. 1816.
Holland, H.
Travels into the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly and Macedonia (1812-3). London. 1816.
[Masson, C. F. P.] Memoires secrets sur la Russie, et particulierement
sur la fin du regne de Catherine II et sur celui de Paul I. (Published anonymously.)
4 vols. Amsterdam (Paris). 1800-2.
Morier, J. A
Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor to Constantinople in 1808-9.
London. 1812.
Pouqueville,
F. C. H. L. Travels in the Morea, Albania and other parts of the Ottoman
Empire. (Translated from the French.) London. 1813.
Sacy, S. de.
Description du Pachalik de Bagdad. Paris. 1809.
Thornton, T.
Present State of Turkey. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London. 1809.
Tooke, W.
History of Russia in the Reign of Catharine II. 4th ed. 3 vols. London. 1800.
For the Memoirs
of Marmont, see General Bibliography.
Lathr Works.
Adair, Right
Hon. Sir R. The Negociations for the Peace of the Dardanelles in
1808-9. 2 vols. London. 1845.
Belloc, L. Bonaparte et les Grecs. Paris. 1826.
Coquelle, P. La Mission de Sebastiani a Constantinople en 1801. (In
Revue d’Histoire diplomatique.) July, 1903.
Cunibert, B. S. Essai historique sur les Revolutions et l’lndependance
de la Serbie depuis 1804 jusqu’41850. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1855.
Cuniberti, P. La Serbia e la dynastia degli Obre'novitch, 1804-93. Turin.
1893. Driault, E. La Politique orientale de Napoleon (1806-8). Paris. 1904.
Emerson, J.
[afterwards Sir J. Emerson Tennent]. History of Modem Greece to the present
Time. 2 vols. London. 1830.
Engelhardt, E. La Turquie et le Tanzimat, ou Histoire des reformes dans
l’empire ottoman. 2 vols. Paris. 1882-4.
Grosjean, G. La Mission de Semonville. Paris. 1887.
Herbette, M. Une ambassade turque sous le Directoire. Paris.
1902.
Hobhouse, J.
C. Journey through Albania and other Provinces of Turkey...in
1809-10. 2 vols. London. 1813.
Jiretchek, J. C. Geschichte der Bulgaren. Prague.
1876.
Juchereau de St Denys, Baron A. de. Revolutions de Constantinople en
1807 et 1808. 2
vols. Paris. 1819.
Mauroyanni,
G. History of the Ionian Isles (in Greek). 2 vols. Athens. 1889. Michel, —.
Milosch Obrenovitch (Prince of Servia). Paris. 1850.
Militchevitch,
M. Prince Milosch (in Servian). Belgrade. 1891.
Paton, A. A.
Servia, the youngest Member of the European Family. London. 1845.
Petrof, A. N.
The Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12 (in Russian). 3
vols. St Petersburg. 1885-7.
Pisani, P. La Dalmatie de 1795 a 1815. Paris. 1893.
L’Occupation des lies Ioniennes en 1797. (In
Rev. d’histoire diplomatique.)
Paris. 1888.
Popoff, A. N.
Russia and Servia (1806-56). (In Russian.) 2 vols.
Moscow. 1869. Pouqueville, F. C. H. L. Histoire de la Regeneration de la Grece
(1740-1824).
4 vols. Paris. 1824.
Vie d’Ali Pacha. Paris. 1822.
Voyage dans la Grece. 6 vols. Paris. 1826.
Ranke, L. von. The History of Servia. English translation. London. 1853. Reinach, J. La Serbie et le Montenegro. Paris. 1876.
Robert, C. Les Slavs de Turquie. 2 vols. Paris. 1844.
Le Monde slave. 2 pts. Paris. 1852.
Rodocanachi, E. Bonaparte et les lies Ioniennes (1797-1816). Paris. 1899.
St Rene-Taillandier, R. G. E. Kara-Georges et Milosch. Paris. 1875.
Schlechta-Wssehrd, O. Die Revolutionen in Constantinople (1807-8). Vienna. 1882.
Spalding, Lieut.-Col. Suvoroff. London. 1890.
Testa, Baron de. Recueil des Traites de la Porte ottomane. Paris.
1865. Waliszewski, K. The Romance of an Empress (Catharine II of Russia). 2
vols. London. 1894.
The
Story of a Throne (Catharine II of Russia). 2 vols. London. 1895.
Wurm, C. F. Diplomatische Geschichte der orientalischen Frage. Leipzig.
1858. Xenopol, A. D. Istoria Rominilor. 6 vols.
Jassy. 1888-93.
Etudes historiques sur le peuple roumain.
Jassy. 1888.
Zallones, M. P. Essai sur les Fanariotes, etc. Marseilles,
1824.
For general
works on the oriental policy of Austria (Beer), on the Eastern Question
(Driault), on the history of Turkey (Creasy, Juchereau de St Denys, Zinkeisen),
of Greece (Finlay, Maurer), and the Memoirs of Marmont, see General
Bibliography.
I. ITALY.
A. General Works.
Bianchi, N.
Storia documentata della Diplomazia Europea in Italia dal anno 1814.
8 vols. Turin. 1865.
Cantu, C. Corrispondenze de’ Diplomatici della Repubblica e del Regno d’
Italia
1796-1814.
Turin. 1884-8.
Cronistoria della independenza Italiana. Vol. i. Naples, Rome. 1872-7.
Monti, e 1’ eta che fu sua. Milan.
1879.
Coppi, A.
Annali d’ Italia dal 1750. 7 vols. Rome, Lucca. 1828-43.
Franchetti,
A. Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1799. Rome. 1881.
Gaffarel, P. Bonaparte et les republiques italiennes 1796-9. 2 vols.
Paris. 1895. Revue Napoleonienne. Ed. A. Lumbroso. Turin. 1901 etc.
Stendhal (Henri Beyle). Rome, Naples, et Florence. Paris. 1854.
For the
general histories of Botta and Sclopis, and the works of Masson and Du Casse on
Napoleon and his family, see General Bibliography.
B. The Italian Republic and the Italian
Kingdom.
Contemporary Memoirs, Documents, etc.
Arrivabene, G. Memorie della mia vita, 1795-1855. Florence. 1886.
Bullettino delle leggi della Repubblica Italiana da 31 die. 1802. Milan.
Cicognara, L. Memorie tratte dai documenti originale. Ed. Malamani. 2
vols. Venice. 1888.
Coraccini, F. (C. T. la Folie). Histoire de l’administration du royaume
pendant la domination fran^aise. Paris. 1823.
Derniere campagne de l’armee Franco-Italienne sous les ordres d’Eugene
Beauharnais en 1813 et 1814, suivie de memoires secrets par le Chevalier S.
J.*** temoin oculaire. Paris and Lugano. 1817.
Foglio
ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana. 3 vols. Milan. 1803, 4.
Foscolo, U.
L’ orazione a Bonaparte nel Congresso de Lione. Lugano. 1802. Giomale Italiano.
1 Jan. 1807—31 Dec. 1815. Milan.
Melzi d’
Eril, F. (Due de Lodi). Memorie e lettere. 2 vols. Milan. 1865. Monti, Vicenzo.
Lettere inedite e sparse. Turin. 1893.
Raccolta di
tutte le leggi, ossia di tutti i proclami, editti ed avvisi, stati pubblicati
dopo 1’ istallazione della Repubblica Cisalpina. 7
vols. Cremona. 1802 etc. Raccolta delle leggi e proclami della Repubblica
Cisalpina. 4
vols. Cremona, n. d.
For the
Memoirs of Eug. Beauharnais, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Casini, T.
Ministri, prefetti e diplomatici Italiani di Napoleone I. Revue Napoldon-
ienne. Dec. 1902, March 1903.
Cusani, F.
Storia di Milano. 3 vols. Milan. 1861.
De Castro, G.
Milano durante la dominazione Napoleonica. 1 vol. Milan. 1880. Mutinelli, F.
Annali delle provincie Venete dal anno 1801 al 1840. Venice. 1843. Pecchio, G.
Vita de Ugo Foscolo. Lugano. 1836.
Saggio
Storico sulla Amministrazione finanziera dell’ Ex-Regno d’ Italia dal
1802 al 1814. London. 1826.
Zanolini, A.
A. Aldini ed i suoi tempi. Florence. 1864.
C. Fhench Italy.
Contemporary
Memoirs, Documents, etc.
Azeglio, M.
di. By A. Ricci d’ Azeglio. 2 vols. Florence. 1867.
Balbo, Della vita e degli scritti del conte Cesare. Rimemhranza di E.
Ricotti.
(Contains Balbo’s Antobiografia.) Florence. 1856.
Borghese, Camillo. Lettres etc. mss. in Archives
Nationales. Paris.
Bran, Friederike. Briefe aus Rom, 1808-10. Dresden. 1820.
Chabrol de Volvie, G. T. G. de. Statistique des provinces de Savone,
d’Oneille, d’Acqui, et de partie de la province de Mondovi formant l’ancien
province de Montenotte. Paris. 1824.
Consalvi, Memoires du Cardinal. 2 vols. Paris. 1864.
Courrier, P. L. Lettres inedites, ecrites de France et d’ltalie (1789 a
1812). (Euvres.
Vol. in. Paris. 1877.
Courrier de Turin.
Gazzetta Romana, 1808-9; afterwards La Giomala del Campidoglio. 1810.
Gazzetta
Universale. 3 Jan. 1775—29 Jan. 1811. Florence.
Giornale del
dipartimento dell’ Arno 5 Feb. 1811—3 Feb. 1814. Florence.
Lettres du Gouverneur General de la 27me division militaire a
l’exterieur. 1808-14.
mss. in Archivio de Stato, Turin.
Marmottan, P. Lettres de Mme Laplace a Elisa Napoleon,
Princesse de Lucques et de Piombino. Paris. 1897.
Documents sur le royaume d’Etrurie 1801-7.
Paris. 1900.
For the
Memoirs of d’ Azeglio and Massena, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Artaud de Montor, A. F., chevalier. Histoire du pape Pie VII. 2 vols. Paris. 1836. Bianchi, N. Storia della monarchia
Piemontese. Vols. hi, iv. Rome.
1878. Brosch, M. Geschichte des Kirchenstaates. Gotha.
1880.
Carutti, D. Storia della corte di Savoia durante la rivoluzione e 1’
impero Francese. Turin. 1875.
Marmottan, P. Bonaparte et la Republique de Lucques. Paris. 1896.
Elisa Bonaparte. Paris. 1898.
Mazzarosa, A. Storia de Lucca. 2 vols. Lucca. 1833.
Mignet, F. A. M. Notice historique sur la vie et les travaux de M. de
Gerando.
(Memoires de 1’Academic des sciences morales et politiques. Vol. x.)
Reumont, A. von. Geschichte Toscana’s seit dem Eude des florentinisches
Frei- staats. Berlin. 1829 ff.
Bonapartische Erinnerungen in Toscana.
(Beitrage zur italienischen Geschichte, Vol. iv.) Berlin. 1853-7.
Rodocanachi, E. Elisa Napoleon en Italic. Paris. 1900.
Tournon, P. C. C., Comte de. Etudes statistiques sur Rome et la partie
occidentale des etats romains. 2 vols. Paris. 1831.
Zobi, A. Storm civile della Toscana dal 1737 al 1848. 5 vols. Florence.
1850.
D. Napubs.
Contemporary Memoirs, Documents, etc.
Bianchi, N. Storia delle finanze del regno di Napoli. Naples. 1859.
Bullettino delle ordinanze di commessarii ripartitori di domanii
ex-feudali e com- munali nelle provincie dei RR. DD. al di qua del Fano. 24
vols. Naples.
1858-67.
Bunbury, Sir
Henry. Narrative of some passages in the great war with France from
1799 to 1810. London. 1854.
Dedem, de Gelder, General. Memoires du 1774-1825. Paris. 1900.
Girardin; L. X. de. Discours, journal et souvenirs. 4 vols.
Paris. 1828.
Greco, L. M. Annali della citeriore Calabria, 1796-1811. 2 vols.
Cosenza. 1872. Miot de Melito, A. F., Comte. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1858.
Engl, transl. New York. 1881.
Rapport general sur la situation du royaume de
Naples pendant les annees
1806 et 1807, presente au roi en
son conseil d’etat par le ministre de 1’interieur. Naples. 1808.
Orloff, Comte Gregor. Memoires historiques, politiques et litteraires
sur le royaume de Naples. Edited by A. Duval. 5 vols. Paris.
1821.
Pepe, G.
Memorie intorno alia sua vita. 2 vols. Paris. 1847.
Pignatelli
Strongoli, F. Memorie intorno alia storia del regno di Napoli dell’ anna
1805 al 1815. Naples. 1820.
Rivarol, A. Notice historique sur la Calabre. Paris. 1817.
For the
Memoirs, etc., of Joseph Bonaparte and Murat, see General Bibliography.
Later Work*.
Archivio
Storico per le Provincie Napolitane.
Bucholtz, F. B. von. Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinando I, aus gedruckten
Quellen. 9
vols. Vienna. 1831-8.
Colletta, P.
Storia del reame di Napoli dal 1734 al 1825. 2 vols. Paris. 1835.
Engl,
translation. Edinburgh. 1858.
. Opere inedite e rare. Naples. 1861.
Giglioli,
Constance H. Naples in 1799. London. 1903. (Bibliography.) Johnston, R. M. The
Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy. 2 vols. London and New York. 1904.
(Bibliography.)
Schipa, M. II
regno di Napoli sotto i Borboni. Naples. 1900.
E. Benevento.
Nouvion, G. de. Talleyrand, Prince de Be'nevent (Revue historique. Vols.
LXX1II, LXXJV.)
Martin, T. P. P. Talleyrand et la Principaute de Bene'vent. (Revue des
questions historiques. Vol. lxi.)
II. THE ILLYRIAN PROVINCES.
Much
information may be gleaned from the Archives Nationales, F1* 61, and
A.F. iv. 1713, Paris. For the Memoirs of Marmont, see General Bibliography.
Boppe, P. L
H. Les regiments Croates a la Grande Armee. Paris. 1900.
Erber, T. Storia della Dalmazia dal 1797 al 1814. Zara. 1886-90.
Pisani, P. La Dalmatie de 1797 a 1815. Paris. 1893.
Raccolta di leggi, decreti e regolamenti ad uso delle provincie
Illiriche dell’ Impero. 14 vols. Paris. 1812.
III. THE IONIAN ISLES.
Rodocanaehi, E. Bonaparte et les lies Ioniennes 1797-1816. Paris. 1899.
(Cf. Revue Critique, Apr. 23, 1900.)
IV. GERMANY.
Much
unpublished material is to be found in the Archives Nationales in Paris
(especially for the Grand-duchy of Berg), in the Staatsarchiv of Berlin
(especially for the Kingdom of Westphalia) and in the archives of Hanover,
Diisseldorf, Marburg, and Wiesbaden.
General
Works.
For general
works on Europe (Sorel), on Germany (Fisher, Hausser, Perthes, Rambaud,
Treitschke), see General Bibliography.
A. Kingdom of
Westphalia.
Goecke, R. Das Konigreich Westphalen. Gottingen. 1888.
Kleinschmidt, A. Geschichte des Konigreichs Westfalen. (Gesch. d. enrop.
Staaten.) Gotha. 1893.
Moniteur Westphalien, le. Cassel. 1807-13.
Napoleon et le roi Jerome. Revue Historique. Vols. xvi-xxn.
Schlossberger, A. von. Briefwechsel der Konigin Katharina und des Konigs
Jerome von Westphalen mit dem Konig Friedrich von Wiirttemberg. 1886.
Strombeck, F. C. von. Darstellungen aus meinem Leben und aus meiner Zeit.
Brunswick. 1833-40.
Thimme, F. Die inneren Zustande des Kurfurstenthums Hannover unter der
franzosisch-westphalischen Herrschaft. 2 vols.
Hanover and Leipzig. 1893-5. Westphalie, le Royaume de, Jerome Buonaparte, sa
cour, ses favoris et ses ministres, par un temoin oculaire.. Paris.
1820.
For the
Memoirs of Jerome Bonaparte and Du Casse (Les rois freres) see General
Bibliography. For those of Beugnot, see Bibliography to Caps. I, V. Cf. also
Bibliography to Cap. XIII.
B. Grand Duchy op Berg.
Goecke, R. Das Grossherzogthum Berg. Gottingen. 1877.
Schmidt, C. Le Grand-duche de Berg (1806-13). Paris. 1905.
Scotti, J. J. Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen welche in den
ehemaligen Herzogthiimern Jiilich, Cleve und Berg, und im vormaligen
Grossherzogthum Berg ergangen sind. Diisseldorf. 1821-2.
For the
Memoirs of Beugnot and the works of Roederer, see Bibliography to Chapters I,
V.
C. The Rhine Provinces.
Alpen, H. S.
van. Geschichte des frankischen Rheinufers: was es war und was
es itzt ist. 2 vols. Cologne. 1802.
Bormans, K. T. F., und Daniels, A. von. Handbuch der fur
die konigl. preuss. Rheinprovinzen verkiindigten Gesetze, Verordnungen und
Regierungs- beschliisse aus der Zeit der Fremdherrschaft Cologne. 1834. '
Levy-Schneider, L. Les habitants de la rive gauche du Rhin. (Revolution Franchise. Feb., March, 1902.)
Neigebaur, J. D. F. Darstellung der provisorischen Verwaltung am Rhein von
1813 bis 1819. Cologne. 1821.
D. The Hanseatic Departments.
Klug, K. Geschichte Liibecks wahrend der Vereinigung mit dem franzosischen
Kaiserreiche 1811-3. Liibeck. 1856-7.
Servieres, G.
L’Allemagne franchise sous Napoleon I. Paris. 1904.
V. THE BELGIAN DEPARTMENTS.
For the works
of Delplace and Lanzac de Laborie, see General Bibliography.
VI. HOLLAND.
Contemporary Memoirs, Documents, etc.
De Koninklijke Courant. 1806-14.
Krayenhoff, C. R. T. Bijdragen tot de vaderL Gesch. van de belangrijke
Jaren 1809 en 1810.
Levensbijzinderheden van den lieutenant
General. Nimwegen. 1844.
Oorkunden betrekkelijk de oprigting van het Koniugrijk Holland in 1806.
Codex Diplomaticus Neerlandicus, uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap
gevestigd te Utrecht. Series ii,
vol. 2. Utrecht. 1856.
Roell, W. F. en W. Verslag van hetgeen ter gelegenheid van het verbliff des
Konings van Holland te Paris is voorgevallen. Amsterdam. 1837.
Roell, J. Historisch-staatsregtelijk onduzoek naar het algemeen en het
bijzonder bestuur van den Waterstaat in Nederland van 1795-1848.
For the
Reflections, etc., of Louis Bonaparte, and the Memoirs and Letters of D. and G.
K. van Hogendorp, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Gamier, L. La cour de Hollande sous le regne de Louis Bonaparte. Paris.
1828. Jorissen, T. T. H. De omwenteling van 1813. 2 vols. Groningen. 1867.
Lennep, J. Leven van C. en D. J. van Lennep. Amsterdam. 1861-2.
Loosjes, V. Louis Bonaparte de Koning van Holland. Amsterdam. 1888.
Wichers, L. De regeering van Koning Lodewijk Napoleon. 1806-10. Utrecht. 1892.
For the
general history of De Bosch-Kemper, Jorissen (Napoleon and King Louis) and Du
Casse (Les rois freres), see General Bibliography.
VII. THE COLONIES.
Adams, H.
Napoleon I" et Saint-Domingue. Revue
historique. vol. xxiv. Philippi, H. Geschichte des Freistaates von Sfc
Domingo. 3 vols. Dresden. 1827. Poyen, H. de. Les guerres des Antilles
de 1793 a 1815. Paris. 1896.
Prentout, H. L’lle de France sous Decaen. Paris. 1901.
Roloff, G. Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I. Munich. 1899.
Schoelcher, V. Vie de Toussaint l’Ouverture. Paris. 1889.
VIII. SWITZERLAND.
For the
authorities on Swiss history during this period, see Bibliography to Chapters
III, IV.
I. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
General.
Argiielles, Jos6 C. Observaciones sobre la historia de la Guerra de
Espana. London. 1829.
Estados de la organization e fuerza de los Ejercitos Espanoles. (Anon.)
Madrid. 1822.
Foy, General M. Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule, 1808. Paris.
1827. Jourdan, Marshal J. B. Memoires militaires sur la Guerre d’Espagne. Paris.
1899. Londonderry, Charles, Marquis of. Narrative of the Peninsular War,
1808-12. London. 1829.
Memoires sur la Guerre d’Espagne (ed. A. de Beauchamp). Four
vols. of short narratives by French and Spanish eye-witnesses: Baste,
Chemineau, Contreras, Duhesme, Vedel, Kolli, etc. Paris. 1823-5.
Napier,
General Sir William. History of the War in the Peninsula and the South of
France, 1807-14. London. 1828.
Pradt, de, Archbishop. Memoires historiques sur la Revolution d’Espagne.
Paris. 1816.
Schepeler, Colonel V. Geschichte der Revolution Spaniens und Portugals. Berlin.
1826.
Suchet, Marshal Louis Gabriel. Memoires sur ses Campagnea en Espagne,
1808-14. Paris.
1829.
Sonthey, R.
History of the Peninsular War. 3 vols. London. 1823-32.
Toreno, Conde de. Historia del Levantamiento, Guerra, et Revolution de
Espana. Paris.
1838.
For the
Correspondence of Napoleon and of Joseph Bonaparte, and the Dispatches of
Wellington, see General Bibliography.
Special.
Batty,
Captain R. Campaign in the Western Pyrenees and South of France. London. 1823.
Belmas, Major J. Joumaux des Sieges faits et soutenus par les Franfais
dans la Peninsule, 1808—14. Paris. 1820.
Caballero, Lieutenant-Colonel M. Les defenses de Saragosse; 1808 et
1809. Paris.
1815.
Cevallos,
Pedro. Usurpation of the Crown of Spain. London. 1808.
Choumara, T. Considerations sur les campagnes du Marechal Suchet, et la
bataille de Toulouse. Paris. 1840.
Cintra,
Convention of, Minutes of the Court of Enquiry on. London. 1808. Delagrave, Colonel A. La Campagne de Portugal, 1810-11. Paris.
1902.
Elliot,
Captain W. G. Treatise on the defence of Portugal. London. 1811. Gouvion St
Cyr, Marshal. Journal des operations de l’Arme'e de Catalogue, 1808-9. Paris.
1821.
Jones,
Colonel J. T. Journal of the sieges carried on in Spain, 1811-14. London.
1827. ‘
The lines of Torres Vedras. London. 1829.
Lafiaille, Colonel G. Memoires sur les Campagnes de Catalogue, 1808-14.
Paris.
1826.
Lamare, Colonel. Sieges et defenses de Badajoz etc. 1811-12. Paris.
1825. Lapene, Captain E. Conquete de l’Andalousie, 1810-11. Paris. 1823.
Campagne de 1813-14 sur l’Ebre, les Pyrenees,
et la Garonne. Paris. 1834.
Lenoble, P. M. Les operations militaires du Marechal Soult en 1809. Paris.
1821. Mayne, Major M. and Lillie, Captain C. Campaign of the Loyal Lusitanian
Legion. London. 1812.
Moore, James.
Narrative of the Campaign of Sir John Moore in Spain, 1808-9. London. 1809.
Stothert,
Captain W. Campaigns of 1809, ’10, ’11. London. 1812.
Vacani, Major
C. Storia delle Campagne degl’ Italiani in Spagna, 1808-14. Florence.
1827.
Memoirs, Journals, eto.
Barkhausen, G. H. Tagebuch eines Rheinbunds-Offiziers, 1808-14. Wiesbaden.
1900.
Blakeney,
Captain R. A boy in the Peninsular War, 1808-13. London. 1839. Brandt, H., Aus dem Leben des Generals. Edited
by H. von Brandt. (Autobiographical.) Berlin. 1870.
Bunbury,
Colonel C. Reminiscences of a Veteran. London. 1861.
Burgoyne,
Marshal Sir J., Life and Correspondence of. Edited by Hon. G.
Wrottesley. 2
rols. London. 1873.
Costello, E.
Adventures of a Soldier, 1810-15. London. 1841.
Fantin des
Odoards, General L. F. Journal, 1800-30. Paris. 1895.
Gleig, Rev.
G. R. The Subaltern. (Autobiographical.) Edinburgh. 1825. Gomm, Marshal Sir W.
M., Letters and Journals of, 1799-1815. London. 1881. Gonneville, Colonel A.
Souvenirs Militaires. Paris. 1875.
Grattan, W.
Adventures with the Connaught Rangers, 1809-14. London. 1902. Hawker, Col. T.
Journal of the Campaign of 1809. London. 1810.
Jacob, W.
Letters from the South of Spain, 1809-10. London. 1811.
Kincaid, Sir
J. Adventures in the Rifle Brigade. London. 1840.
Larpent, F.
Private Journal at Head Quarters, 1812-14. London. 1854.
Lejeune, General Baron. Memoires. Paris. 1896.
Lemonnier-Delafosse, Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Campagnes et Souvenirs,
1810-15.
Havre. 1850.
M'Grigor, Sir J. Autobiography. London. 1861.
Moore, Sir J.
Diary of. Edited by Sir J. F. Maurice. London. 1904.
Napier, Sir
G., Early military life of. (Autobiographical.) Edited by W. C. E.
Napier. London. 1884.
Naylies, Captain M. Memoires sur la Guerre d’Espagne, 1800-11. Paris.
1817. Parquin, Commandant D. Souvenirs et Campagnes. Paris. 1892.
Picton, Sir
T. Memoirs. Edited by H. B. Robinson. London. 1835.
Rocca, Captain M. Memoirs, 1808-12. Paris. 1814.
Roverea, Colonel F. de. Memoires ecrits par lui-meme. Berne.
1848.
St Chamans,
General A. Memoires. Paris. 1896.
Tomkinson,
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Diary of a Cavalry Officer, 1809—16- London.
1894.
For the
Memoirs, etc., of Godoy, Marbot, Massena, Murat, see General Bibliography. For
those of Miot de Melito, Savary, and Thi^bault, see Bibl. to Chaptert 1, V.
n. LATER
WORKS.
General.
Arteche y
Moro, General Jos£. Guerra de la Independencia. 13 vols. Madrid.
1868-1902.
Chalbrand, Colonel. Les Franyais en Espagne. Tours. 1884.
Clonard, Conde de. Historia Organica de las Armas de Infanteria y
Caballina Espanolas. Madrid. 1851.
Leith-Hay,
Major. Narrative of the Peninsular War. London. 1831.
Oman, C. W.
C. History of the Peninsular War. Vols. i, n. Oxford. 1902-4. Soriano, Simao
Jose da Luz. Historia da Guerra em Portugal. 19 vols. Lisbon.
1866-90.
Special.
Balagny, Commandant. Campagne de l’Empereur Napoleon en Espagne. (French
Sta£F History.) 3 vols. Paris. 1902-4.
Beamish, N.
L. History of the King’s German Legion. London.
1834-7.
Cabany, E. St. M. La Capitulation de Baylen. Paris. 1902.
Clerc, Lieutenant-Colonel. La Capitulation de Baylen. Paris. 1903.
Campagne du Marechal Soult dans les Pyrenees. Paris.
1894.
Cope, Sir W.
H. History of the Rifle Brigade. London. 1877.
Moorsom,
Captain W. S. Historical Record of the 52nd Regiment. London. 1860. Titeux, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Le General Dupont et la
Capitulation de Baylen: une erreur historique. 3 vols.
Puteaux-sur-Seine. 1903.
Biographical.
Craufurd,
General R. Craufurd and his Light Division, by A. Craufurd. London, n. d.
Douglas, Sir
Howard. Life by S. W. Fullom. London. 1863.
Foy, General, Vie militaire du. By Commandant M. Girod de l'Ain. (Based
on Fay’s Memoranda.) Paris. 1900.
Hill,
Rowland, Lord. Life by E. Sidney. London. 1845.
Murat, lieutenant de l’empereur en Espagne. By Comte A.
Murat. Paris. 1897. Seaton, Lord. Life, by G. C. Moore-Smith. London. 1903.
Vivian,
Richard Lord. Memoir, by C. Vivian. London. 1897.
Whittingham,
Sir S. F. Memoir, by F. Whittingham. London. 1868.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Liprandi.
Opyt Kataloga vsem otdelnym sochineniiam po 1872 god ob Otechestven- noi Voiny
1812 goda. Sobral I. P. liprandi. [An essay towards a catalogue of all
separately published works on the National War of 1812, down to the year 1872.]
(Chteniia v Imp. Obschestve Istorii i Drevnostei
Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete, 1874, kn. hi; 1875, kn. hi.)
K. Voenskii, Otechestvennaia Voina v Novohorisovskom sobranii I. Kh. Kolodeeva.
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1904. (Voennyi Sbornik, 1904, No. 2.)
See further
under the names of Bogdanovich, Dubrovin, Gadaruel, Labeaudoriere,
Skugarevskii.
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Documents.
Bumagi,
otnosiaschiiasia do Otechestvennoi Voiny 1812 goda, sobrannyia i izdan- nyia P.
I. Schukinym. (Documents relating to the National War of 1812, collected and
privately issued by P. J. Schukin.) Parts i-vii.
Moscow; 1897-1903.
Carte de la Russie europeenne, traduite et grave'e par ordre du
Gouvemement au D^pot General de la Guerre en 1812, 1813, et 1814, d’apres la
Carte Russe, en 104 feuilles. Paris. 1814.
Margueron, Commandant. Campagne de Russie, Premiere Partie:
Preliminaires de la Campagne de Russie, ses Causes, sa Preparation;
Organisation de l’armeei du 1 Janvier 1810 au 31 Janvier 1812. (French
Staff History.) Vols. i-m. Paris. 1898-1900.
Materialy
Voenno-Uchenago Arkhiva Glavnago Shtaba. (a) Otechestvennaia Voina
1812 goda. (Materials from the scientific War
Archives of the General Staff at St Petersburg, (a) The National War of 1812.)
Part i, Vols. i-iv. St Petersburg,
1900-3. Part n, Vol. i. Ibid. 1903.
Le Moniteur Universel (No. 303, Jeudi, 29 oct. 1812, et Grande Arm€e,
Bulletins i-xxix).
Memoirs, Correspondence, etc.
Bausset, L. F. J. de. Memoires anecdotiques sur l’interieur du Palais et
sur quel- ques evenemens de l’Empire depuis 1805 jusqu’au 1 mad 1814, pour
servir a l’histoire de Napoleon. By L. F. J. de Bausset, Ancien Prefet du Palais
Imperial. Vol. n. Paris. 1827.
Bignon, le Baron. Souvenirs d’un diplomate. La Pologne (1811-13).
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Valenciennes. 1856.
Memoires du Sergent Bourgogne. Edited by Paul
Cottin. Paris. 1898.
Bourgoing, Souvenirs militaires du Baron de, 1791-1815. Edited
by Baron Pierre de Bourgoing. Paris. 1897.
Castellane, Journal du marechal de, 1804-62. Vol. i, 1804-23. Paris.
1895. Dubrovin, N. Otechestvennaia Voina v pismakh sovremennikov (1812-15 g.g.).
(The
National War in contemporary correspondence.) (Vol. xun Zapisok Imp. Akademii Nauk.) St Petersburg. 1882. (Bibliography.)
Eugen von Wiirttemberg, Memoiren des Herzogs. Parts i-iii. Frankfort-on-Oder. 1862.
Fantin des Odoards, Journal du general. l&tapes d’un ofBcier de la
Grande Arm^e.
1800-30. Paris. 1895.
Kharkevich, V. 1812 god v dnevnikakh, zapiskakh i vospominaniiakh
sovremennikov. (The year 1812, in diaries, memoirs, and
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(Materialy Voenno-Uchenago Arkhiva Glavnago Shtaha). Vyp. ii. Vilna. 1903.
Langeron, L. A. A., Comte de. Memoires. Campagnes de 1812-1814. Ed.
L. G.
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Loszberg, General-Lieutenant von. Briefe in die Heimath geschrieben wahrend
des Feldzuges 1812 in Russland. Cassel. 1844.
Maringone, L. J. Vionnet de. Campagnes de Russie et de Saxe (1812-13).
Fragments de Memoires inedits. With preface by Rodolphe Vagnair. Paris. 1899.
Peyrusse, Memorial et Archives de M. le Baron, 1809-15. Carcassonne. 1869. Pion
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Edited by
Maurice Chipon and Leonce Pingaud. Paris. 1888.
Puihnsque, le vicomte de. Lettres sur la guerre de Russie en 1812, sur
la ville de St P£tei$boui'g, les moeurs et les usages des habitans de la Russie
et de la Pologne. Edited by le vicomte de P. Paris. 1816.
Roos, Ritter
H. U. L. von. Ein Jahr aus meinem Leben, oder Reise von den westlichen
Ufern der Donau an die Nara, siidlich von Moskva, und zuriick an die Beresina,
mit der grossen Armee Napoleons, im Jahre 1812. St
Petersburg. 1832.
Soltyk, comte Roman. Napoleon en 1812. Memoires historiques et militaires.
Paris. 1836.
Steinmuller, Joseph. Tagebuch iiher seine Teilnahme am russischen Feldzuge
1812. Edited
by K. Wild. Heidelberg. 1907.
Suckow, K. von. Aus meinem Soldatenleben. Stuttgart.
1862. French transl.
entitled,
D’lena a Moscou. Paris. 1901.
Surrugues, l’abbe'. Lettres sur l’incendie de Moscou, e'crites de cette
ville, au R. P. Bouvet, de la compagnie de Jesus, par l’abbe Surrugues, temoin
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Tchitchagoff, Memoires inedits de l’amiral. Campagnes de la Russie en 1812
contre la Turquie, l’Autriche, et la France. Berlin. 1855.
Thirion (de Metz), Auguste. Souvenirs militaires (1807-18). Paris. 1892.
Wolzogen, Memoiren des konigl. preuss. Generals
Ludwig Freiherrn von (1807-14 in russischen Diensten). Leipzig. 1851.
Zapiski A. P. Yermolova. (Memoirs of A. P. Yermolov.) Ch. i,
1801-12. Moscow. 1865.
For the
Correspondence of Napoleon (general, voL xxiv; military, vol. vm), the Memoirs,
etc., of Beauharnais, Jerome Bonaparte, Constant, Czartoryski, Davout, Dumas,
Fezensac, Gouvion St Cyr, Marbot, Oginski, Rapp, Toll, see General
Bibliography.
Narratives.
General.
Bertin, Georges. La Campagne de 1812, d’apr&s des temoins oculaires.
Faria.
1895.
Chambray, Marquis de. Histoire de l’Expedition de Russie. (Euvres, edn.
1, 1823; edn. 3. Vols. i-hi.
Paris. 1839.
Clausewitz, General K. von. Der Feldzug von 1812 in Russlaud.
(Hinterlassene Werke, edn. 2, Vol. vn.) Berlin. 1862.
Denniee, le Baron. Itineraire de l’Empereur Napoleon pendant la Campagne
de
1812. Paris. 1842.
Faher du Faur, eliem. wiirttemb. Artilleriemajor in der 3en
Armee (Marschal Ney). Napoleons Feldzug in Russland von
1812. Edited by Major von Kaussler. Leipzig. 1898.
Fain, le
Baron (secretaire-archiviste to Napoleon). Manuscrit de
Mil-Huit-Cent- Douze, contenant le precis des ev&iemens de cette annee.
Vols. i, n. Paris.
1827.
Segui'j comte de. Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee pendant
l’anuee
1812. Paris. 1824. 16th edn. 2 vols. Paris. 1852.
English translation. 2 vols. London. 1825.
Wilson, Sir
Robert (British Commissioner with the Russian army). Narrative of Events during
the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte and the Retreat of the French Army
in 1812. Edited by his nephew and son-in-law Herbert Randolph; 2nd edn. London. 1860.
Special.
A. F. de B...ch. (ancien officier au service de Russie). Histoire de la
destruction de Moscou en 1812. Traduit de l’allemand par M. Breton. Paris.
1829.
Chambray, Marquis de. Reponse de l’auteur de l’Histoire de l’Expedition
de Russie a la brochure de M. le Comte Rostopchin, intitule: La verite sur
l’incendie de Moscou. Paris. 1823.
Gadaruel, A. Relation du sejour des Francais a Moscou et de l’incendie
de cette ville en 1812 par un habitant de Moscou, suivie de divers documents
relatifs a cet evenement (Francois d’Ysarn, chevalier de St Louis?). Publie par
A. Gadaruel. Brussels. 1871. (Bibliography.)
G.L.D.L. temoin oculaire. [Laveau, Lecointe de.] Moscouavant et apres
l’incendie, ou Notice contenant une description...des evenements qui se
passerent pendant l’incendie et des malheurs...pendant la retraite de 1812.
Paris. 1814.
Jomini, General. Precis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812-14.
Extraits de ses souvenirs inedits, avec une notice biographique, etc. By F.
Lecomte. 2 vols. Lausanne. 1886.
Paixhans, H. J. Retraite de Moscon. Notes e'crites au quartier de
l’empereur. Metz. 1868.
Partouneaux, L. Explications de M. le Lieutenant-General Comte, sur le
chapitre vn du xi livre de l’Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee, par le
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Paris. 1826.
Pradt, M. de (ambassador at Warsaw). Histoire de l’ambassade dans le
Grand Duche de Varsovie en 1812. Paris. 1815.
Rostopchine, le comte. La verity sur l’incendie de Moscou. Paris. 1823.
Solignac, Armand de. La Be'rezina. Souvenir d’un soldat de la Grande
Armee. Limoges. _
Vaudoucourt, G. de. Relation impartiale du passage de la Berezina par
1’armee franfaise en 1812, par un te'moin oculaire. Paris. 1814.
III. LATER WORKS.
General.
Bogdanovitch,
M. Istoriia Otechestvennoi Voiny 1812 goda. (History of the National War of
1812.) Vols. i-iii. St Petersburg.
1859-60. (Bibliography.) German translation by G. Baumgarten. Leipzig. 1863.
George,
Hereford B. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. London. 1899.
Jensen, N. S.
Napoleons Felttog i Russland 1812. (Napoleon’s campaign in Russia.) Copenhagen.
1893.
Labeaudoriere, J. P. de. La Campagne de Russie de 1812. Paris. 1902. (Bibliography.)
Osten-Sacken, Freiherr von der. Der Feldzug von 1812. Berlin. 1901.
Wolseley, Viscount. The Decline and Fall of Napoleon.
London. 1894.
For general
works, on European history (by Sorel and Thiers), Russia (Bog- danovitch,
Schiemann), Napoleon and Alexander I (Tatischeff, Vandal), Alexander I
(Schilder), see General Bibliography.
Special.
Ditfhrth, Freiherr von. Die Schlacht bei Borodino am 7. September 1812. Marburg. 1887.
iVabry, G. Campagne de Russie (1812). (French Staff
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Kharkevich,
V. 1812 g. Berezina. Voenno-Istoricheskoe Izsledovanie. (A study in the
scientific history of war.) St Petersburg. 1893.
Kharkevich,
V. Voina 1812 goda ot Nemana do Smolenska. (The War of 1812 from the Niemen to
Smolensk.) Vilna. 1901.
Lindenau, von. Der Berezina Uebergang des Kaisers Napoleon unter besonderer
Berucksichtigung der Theilnahme der badischen Truppen. Ein Vortrag. Berlin.
1896.
Popoff, A. N. Moskva v 1812 godu. Frantzuzy v Moskve v 1812 godu. (Moscow
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Skarbek, F.
Dzieje Xienstwa Warszawskiego przez Fryderyka Skarbka. (History of the Duchy of
Warsaw.) Vols. i, n. Posen. 1896.
Skugarevskii.
1812-i God ot nachala voiny do Smolenska vkliuchitelno. (The year 1812, from
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Tzenoff, Ga-ntscLo. Wer hat Moskau im Jahre 1812 in Brand gesteckt? Berlin
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THE WAR OF LIBERATION, 1813-4.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Hirsch, P. Bibliographic der deutschen Regiments- und
Bataillons-Geschichten. Berlin. 1905.
Bibliographic der franzosischen
Truppengeschichten. Berlin. 1906.
Katalog der Bibliothek des kgl. preussischen grossen Generalstabs. Berlin.
1878.
Supplements. 1884, 1893.
Repertorium der neueren Kriegsgeschichte. Oldenburg. 1902.
For Pohler (Bibl. hist, milit., vol. n) see General Bibliography.
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Documents.
Fain, Baron A. J. F. Mannscrit de l’an 1813, contenant le precis des
evenements de cette annee, p. s. a l’histoire de l’empereur Napole'on. 2 vols.
Paris. 1824.
Manuscrit de 1814. Paris. 1823, 1830.
Recueil des ordres de mouvement, proclamations et bulletins de 8. A. R.
Charles Jean, Prince royal de Suede, commandant en chef de l’armde combinee du
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1838.
Seydlitz, A. F. von. Tagebuch des konigl. Preuss. Armee-Korps unter Befehl
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For Martens’
Treaties, Stem’s “Aktenstiicke,” see General Bibliography.
Memoirs, Correspondence, etc.
Barginet, A. Le grenadier de l’ile d’Elbe. Souvenirs de 1814 et 1815. 2
vols. Paris. 1830.
Borcke, T. von. Kriegerleben, 1806-15. Nach dessen Aufzeichnungen
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Colomb, E. von. Blucher in Briefen, 1813-5. Berlin. 1876.
Aus dem Tagehuche des Rittmeisters von Colomb.
Streifzuge 1813 und 1814.
Berlin. 1854.
Danilewsky, A. M. Denkwurdigkeiten aus dem Kriege 1813. Leipzig. 1837.
Dunker, Karl von, k. k. Oberst. Erinnerungen ernes osterreichischen
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Haussonville, Cte de. Ma jeunesse 1814-38.
Souvenirs. Paris. 1885.
Heller, F. von. Feldmarschall Graf Radetzky.
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Hellwaldj F. Heller von. Erinnerungen aus den Freiheitskriegen. Stuttgart.
1864. Henckel von Donnersmarck, Graf. Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben. Zerbst.
1846. Hofmann-Chappuis, A. von. Die nachgelassene Korrespondenz zwischen
Hei’zog Eugen von Wiirttemberg und dem Chef seines Stabes wahrend der
Kriegsjahre 1813 und 1814, dem damaligen Obersten von Hofmann. Cannstatt. 1883. Jomini, A. H. de. Correspondance entre le general J. et
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Keijserlingk, Graf. Erinnerung aus der Kriegszeit. 1. Ahteilung der
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Koch, J. B. F. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire de la campagne de 1814.
2 vols. Paris. 1819.
Langeron, Mdmoires de, g6a£ral d’inf.: campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814. Edited by G. F(abry). Paris. 1902.
Livlanders, Denkwiirdigkeiten eines. Herausgegeben von Friedr. von Smitt.
Leipzig and
Heidelberg. 1858.
Maceroni,
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Mebes, J. Briefe aus den Feldzugen 1813-14. (Jahrb. fur Armee und Marine.
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Muhl, G. Denkwiirdigkeiten des Freiherrn von Schaffer. Pforzheim. 1840.
Natzmer, G. E. von. Aus dem Leben des Generals Oldwig von Natzmer. Berlin.
1876.
Nippold, F. Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Feldmarschalls H. von Boyen.
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Nostiz, Das Tagebuch des Generals von. 2 vols. Berlin. 1834-5.
Radetzky, Graf, Denkschriften militar-politischen Inhalts aus dem
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Heilmann, J. Beitrage zur Geschichte des Feldzugs 1814. Munich. 1859.
Hiller, F. von. Geschichte des Feldzuges 1814 gegen Frankreich unter
besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Anteilnahme der konigl. Wiirttembergischen
Truppen. Stuttgart. 1893.
Houssaye, H. 1814. Paris. 1890.
Janson, A. von. Der Feldzug 1814 in Frankreich. 2 vols. Berlin. 1903-5.
Mirus, R. Das Treffen bei Wartenburg am 3. Oktober 1813. Berlin. 1863.
Oncken, W. Die Krisis der letzten Friedensverhandlungen mit Napoleon I,
Fehruar 1814. (Historisches Taschenbuch.) Leipzig. 1886.
Lord Castlereagh und die Ministerkonferenz zu
Langres am 22. Januar 1814.
(Ibid.) Leipzig. 1885.
Petzel, W. Die Operationen Napoleons von La Rothiere bis Bar sur Aube. (Beiheft zur Militar.-Wochenblatt.) 1900.
Pougiat, F. E. 1814^5. Invasion des armees etrangeres dans le
departement de 1’Aube. Troyes and Paris. 1833.
Roloff, G. Politik und Kriegfiihrung wahrend des Feldzuges von 1814.
Berlin. 1891.
Schels, J. B. Die Operazionen der verbiindeten Heere gegen Paris im Marz
1814. i, ii. Vienna. 1841.
Thielen, M. F. Der Feldzug der verbiindeten Heere Europas 1814 in
Frankreich. Vienna. 1856.
Die Schlacht von Bar-sur-Aube am 27. Februar
1814. Vienna. 1832.
Trapp, R. Kriegfiihrung und Diplomatie der Verbiindeten vom 1. Februar bis
zum 25. Marz 1814. Giessen. 1898.
Weil, M. H. La campagne de 1814 d’apres les documents des archives
imperiales et royales de la guerre de Vienne. La cavalerie des armees alliees
pendant la campagne de 1814. 4 vols. 1891-5.
Local.
Bemays, Guillaume. Schicksale des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt und seiner
Truppen. Berlin. 1882.
Chuquet, A. L’Alsace en 1814. Paris. 1900.
Jacobi, B. Hannovers Teilnahme an der deutschen Erhebung im Friihjahr 1813
mit. besonderer Beriicksichtigung auf die Truppenfomiationen an der Elbe.
Hanover. 1863.
Kriegsschauplatz, der, der Nord-Armee im Jahre 1813. (Beihefte zum
Militar.- Wochenblatt.) 1857.
Lachmann, General von. Die Eroberung von Kassel. Translated from the
Russian (Osterreich. mil. Zeitschrift.) 1838.
Pflugk-Harttung, J. von. Eine Fremdherrschaft (Hamburg, 1813-4). (Wester-
mann’s Monatshefte.) 1904.
Specht, F. A. C. von. Das Konigreich Westfalen und seine Armee 1813.
Kassel. 1848. Vamhagen von Ense, C. A. Geschichte der hamburgischen
Uegebenheiten wahrend des Friihjahrs 1813. London. 1813.
Voldemdorff und Waradein, Baron E. von. Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern unter
Konig Maximilian Joseph I. Munich. 1826.
Wallmoden-Gimbom, Der Feldzug des Korps Generals Grafen Ludwig von, an der
Niederelbe und in Belgien 1813-4. Altenburg. 1848.
[ ?] Der
Feldzug in Mecklenburg und Holstein im Jahre 1813. Berlin. 1817-
Weingarten, von. Geschichte des Armeekorps unter den Befehlen des Grafen
von Wallmoden-Gimbom an der Niederelbe und in den Niederlanden. (Osterreich-
ische Militarzeitschrift.) 1827.
Wellman, von. Aus dem Feldzuge des 3. preussischen Armeekorps am Nieder-
rhein, 1813-4. (Jahrb. fiir Armee und Marine.) Vol. lvii.
Zander, C. L. E. Geschichte des Krieges an der Niederelbe im Jahre 1813.
Boine- burg. 1839.
■Various.
Brauner, R. Geschichte der preussischen Landwehr. Historische Darstellung
und Beleuchtung ihrer Vorgeschiuhte, Errichtung, und spateren Organisation.
Berlin. 1863.
Darstellung der Ereignisse bei der schlesischen Armee im Jahre 1813, mit
besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Anteils der preussischen Truppen. Generalstab:
Kriegs- geschichtliche Abteilung. (Beihefte zum Militar.-Wochenblatt.) Berlin.
1843-5. fciiselen, J. F. G. Geschichte des Liitzowschen Freicorps. Halle. 1841.
Foucart, P. T. Une division de la cavalerie legere en 1813. Paris. 1891. Freiwillige-Jager-Detachements, Die
Formation der. (Beihefte zum Militar.- Wochenblatt.) Berlin. 1845-7.
Geschichte der Nord-Armee im Jahre 1813. (Beihefte zum
Militar.-Wochenblatt.)
1859-63.
llriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. Herausgegeben vom grossen
Generalstabe, Abteilung fiir Kriegsgeschichte. Hefte 2, 5 und 12. Berlin. 1883,1884,
1890. Militar.-Zeitschrift, Osterr. 1827. Geschichte des Armeekorps unter den
Befehlen des Generalleutnants Grafen von Wallmoden. Wien. 1827.
Nordarmee, Geschichte der. (Milit. Wochenblatt., Beihefte, 1859, 1863,
1865.) Petietj A. Journal historique de la division de cavallerie legere du 5.
corps 1814. Paris. 1821.
Pfister, A. Aus dem Lager des Rheinbundes 1812-3. Stuttgart and Leipzig.
1897. Quistorp, B. von. Geschichte der Nord-Armee im Jahre 1813. Vols. i, m.
Berlin. 1894.
Rothauscher. Das Wirken des Mensdorfischen Streifkorps. 1876.
Sachsen, Die Feldzuge der, in den Jahren 1812 und 1813. Dresden. 1821.
Schoning, K. W. von. Histor. biograph. Nachrichten zur Geschichte der brandenb.
preussischen Artillerie. Berlin. 1844^5.
Schuster,D., und Franke, F. A. Geschichte der sachsischen Armee. Leipzig.
1885. Siebert. Uber den Streifzug Thielmanns im Feldzug 1813. Vienna. 1895.
Stroth, F. A. Die konigl. preuss. reitende Artillerie vom Jahre 1759-1816.
Berlin. 1868.
Vogel, F. L. Teilnahme der konigl. preuss. Artillerie an dem Kampfe des
Befreiungskrieges. Berlin. 1846.
Weil, M. H. Campagne de 1813. La cavallerie des armdes alliees. Paris.
1886.
I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL.
A list of the
chief ms. authorities in the Archives Nationales, Archives des Affaires
Etrangeres and Archives de la Guerre is given in Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire
Generale, t. ix, p. 914, where will also he found a bibliograpny. See also the
Note on Manuscript Sources in the General Bibliography. The most complete modem
account is given by H. Houssaye, 1814. Paris. 1890.
II. DOCUMENTS.
Carnot, L. N. M. Memoire adresse au roi en juillet 1814. Brussels. 1814.
Chabannes, J B. M. F. de. Lettres a S. Excl. le Cte de Blacas.
London. 1815. Fidvee, J. Correspondance politique et administrative commences
au mois de mai
1814. Paris. 1815-6.
Mehee de la Touche, J. C. H. Denonciation au roi des actes et precedes
par lesquels les ministres de Sa Majeste ont viole la constitution. Paris.
1814.
For the
Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, see General Bibliography.
III. CONTEMPORARY MEMOIRS, ETC.
Ferrand, Memoires dn Comte. (Societe d'histoire contemporaine.) Paris.
1897. Fleury de Chaboulon, P. A. E. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire de la vie
privee, du retour et du regne de Napoleon en 1815. London. 1819-20.
Guizot, F. P. G. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire de mon temps. 8 vols.
Paris. 1858.
La Fayette, M. J. P. du Motier de. Memoires, correspondance et
manuscrits.
6 vols. Paris. 1837-8.
Rochechouart, Comte de. Souvenirs. Paris. 1889.
Une annee de la vie de l’Empereur Napoleon. By A. D. B. M*****,
lieutenant de Grenadiers. Paris. 1815.
Villele, J. B. Comte de. Memoires et correspondance. 5 vols. Paris.
1888.
For the Memoirs
etc. of Barante, Barras, Bausset, Broglie, Fouche, Gaudin, Hyde de Neuville,
Lavalette, Pasquier, Savary, Vitrolles, Mad. de Remusat, and the Duchesse
d’Abrantes, see Bibliography to Chapters I, V. For those of Macdonald and
Mettemich, see General Bibliography.
IV. LATER WORKS.
Duvergier de Hauranne, P. Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en
France, 1814-30. 10 vols. Paris. 1857-72.
For other
General Works, by Bignon, Hamel, etc., and the Life of Louis XVIII (Beauchamp),
see General Bibliography.
CHAPTERS XIX and XXL THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.
The main part
of the manuscript material for a history of the Congress of Vienna, and of the
First and the Second Peace of Paris, as well as for the general diplomatic
history of the year 1814, is to be found in the dispatches and other papers
deposited in the Archives of the various departments of the several European
Governments. Most of this material, but not as yet all, is accessible to the
student. The papers dating from this period in the Foreign Office at Paris,
which include the official correspondence of the French embassy at Vienna, are
open to students, on permission of a committee; those in the K. K. Staatsarchiv
at Vienna are open to applicants, and those in the K. K. Hofarchiv on
permission of the Minister of the Interior; those in the Geh. Staatsarchiv and
the K. Hausarchiv at Berlin on application to the Director; the State Records
at Brussels and at the Hague are freely opened; hut special permission is
required for the use of the papers of this period in the Imperial Archives at
St Petersburg and in our own Foreign Office. In addition, some of the smaller
Archives contain papers of interest, more especially the Royal Archives at
Dresden—as for instance the Memoir of December 26, 1814, with regard to the
management of the Saxon question at the Congress.
It would seem
as if no private correspondence remained unpublished which is likely to equal
in interest that which has already been given to the world; although important
Russian sources are only gradually being made accessible to Western readers.
For a
complete list of the plenipotentiaries at the Congress, see Kliiber, Acten etc.
Vol. vi, pp. 586 sqq. He cites as a (defective) contemporary list the “ Guide
des Strangers a Vienne pendant le Congres,” published at Vienna in Jan. 1815 by
“Jean Paggiam, coureur de S. A. R. le Due Albert de Saxe-Teschen.”
Short
bibliographies will be found in Vol. x of Lavisse and Rambaud’s “Histoire
Generale ” of Modern Europe and in A. Sorel’s work on the Second Peace of Paris
cited below. For German affairs see E. Steindorff’s edition (the 6th,
Gottingen, 1894) of Dahlmann-Waitz, “Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte.”
The bibliography of the Saxon question, which is very extensive and of
peculiar interest, is very exhaustively treated in Dr F. Troska, “Die
Publizistik der sachsischen Frage auf dem Wiener Kongress” (Hallesche AbhandL
zur neueren Gesch. xxvii), Halle,
1891.
I. TREATIES, AND ACTS OF THE CONGRESS.
Acte du Congres de Vienne, du 9 juin, 1815, avec ses Annexes. London.
1839.
[Printed for
the Foreign Office.]
Aretin, Baron C. M. von. Chronologisches Verzeichniss der bayerischen
Staats- vertrage, 1503-1819. [With documentary
Appendix.] Passau. 1838. [Flassan, G. de Raxis de] Histoire du Congres de
Vienne, par l’auteur de l’Histoire de la Diplomatie Franfaise. Vol.
m (containing the Final Act, with Annexes, and Supplementary Treaties,
including the Holy Alliance). Paris and London. 1829.
Hertslet, L.
A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions existing between Great
Britain and Foreign Powers, so far as they relate to Commerce, Slave Trade,
etc. 20 vols. London. 1827-95.
Map of
Europe by Treaty (1814-75). 3 vols. London. 1875-91. Vol. i.
1814-27.
Kliiber, J. L. Acten des Wiener Congresses in den Jahren 1814 und 1815. 2nd
edn. 8 vols., with 9th supplementary vol. Erlangen. 1817-35. [Both Vols. viii
and ix have Indices.]
Uebersicht der diplomatischen Verhandlungen des Wiener
Congresses iiber-
haupt, und insonderheit fiber wichtige Angelegenheiten des teutschen
Bundes. Frankfort.
1816. [With Index, and references to the author’s larger work.] For collections
and History of Treaties, by Garden, Martens (G. F. von, and T. T.), and
Murhard; and for the Abridged History by Koch and Schoell, see General
Bibliography. See also below, under II, III, IV, where Treaties are noted.
II. CONTEMPORARY STATE PAPERS, DESPATCHES,
LETTERS, DIARIES, PAMPHLETS, NEWSPAPERS, ETC.
General and Miscellaneous.
African
Institution, the. Reports 14-17. 2 vols. London. 1807-14. Special Report of
Directors, respecting allegations in Letter to Wilberforce, by R. Thorpe. London. 1815. _
Alexandre I et Mme de Stael. Correspondance. Revue de Paris. Jan. 1897. Arndt, E. M. Der Rhein Deutschlands Strom,
aber nicht Deutschlands Grenze. Leipzig. 1813.
British and
Foreign State Papers. 1812-14. London. 1841:—1814^15. Ib. 1839: -1815-16. Ib.
1838.
[Eichhom, J.
A. F. E.] Die Centralverwaltung der Verbiindeten unter dem
Freiherrn von Stein. “ Deutschland.” 1814. [According to
Sulzer, largely richauffe in the Rheinische Mercur.]
Francfort, la Gazette de. Frankfort. 1814-15.
Gentz, F. von. Briefe an Pilat. Edited by K.
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. Leipzig. 1867.
Herrmann, F.
tiber die Seerauber im Mittelmeer. Liibeck. 1815. [As to the Barbaresques and
Sir Sidney Smith.]
Holy
Alliance, the. Projet d’instruction gen£rale pour les missions de Sa
Majeste Imperials. (Vienna, May 13, 1815.) [Supposed to have been
drafted by Nesselrode from Alexander’s instructions.] Schilder, Alexander I,
vol. in, appendix xxv. (In Russian.)
Lieven,
Princess D. L. Letters to her brother, General A. Benckendorff, during her
residence in London, 1812-34. Edited by L. G. Robinson. London. 1902. Maistre,
Count J. de. Correspondance diplomatique, 1811-17. Edited by A. Blanc. 2 vols.
Paris. 1858.
Minister, E.
F. H. Count von. Die Depeschen fiber den Wiener Kongres”, edited by Count von
Miinster. In Politische Skizzen fiber die Lage Europas vom Wiener
Congress bis zur Gegenwart. Leipzig. 1867.
Oesterreichische Beobachter, der. Vienna. 1814-15. [Edited by Pilat.]
Pozzo di Borgo, Comte, ambassadenr de Russie en France, Correspondance
diplomatique du, et du Comte de Nesselrode, depuis la restauration des
Bourbons jusqu’au congres d’Aix-la-Chapelle (1814-18). Edited by
Count C. Pozzo di Borgo. Vol. i. Paris. 1890.
Talleyrand-Perigord,
C. M. de, Prince de Benevent. Memoires. (See Bibliography to Chapters I, V.)
[Contains T.’s correspondence with Louis XVIII, previously printed from the
French Foreign Office Archives by Pallain, with certain differences, and with
the addition of the letters addressed by the King’s ambassadors (by Comte de
Jancour in T.’s absence) to the Foreign Minister at Paris. Vol. in contains
some interesting matter concerning the negotiations for the Second Peace of
Paris.]
Correspondance inedite de T. et du roi Louis XVIII pendant le Congres de
Vienne.
Edited by G. Pallain. Paris. 1881. Engl, transl. 2 vols. London. 1881. German
transl. by P. Bailleu. Leipzig. 1881. [Contains, among other interesting
documents, T.’s report to Louis XVIII of June, 1815, as to the general conduct
of affairs at Vienna by the French embassy.]
Wiener
Congress-Chronik. Frankenthal and Worms. 1814-15. [Untrustworthy.] Wilberforce,
William. Correspondence. Edited by R. I. and S. Wilherforce. 2 vols. London.
1840.
For the
Dispatches etc. of Wellington and Castlereagh, the Diaries of Gentz and Jackson,
Stem’s Aktenstucke, the Correspondence etc. of Alexander I and Czar- toryski,
see General Bibliography.
The Saxon Question.
[Aretin, Baron C. M. von.] Sachsen und Preussen 1814. Swim
cuique. [Against the production of Gorres cited below. Suppressed, but twice reprinted. ] [Arndt, E. M.] Friedrich August, Konig
von Sachsen, und sein Volk im Jahr
1813. [Leipzig.] 1814. [An attack upon the King’s
policy and conduct.] [Eichhom, J. A. F. E.] An
die Widersacher der Vereinigung Sachsens mit Preussen. Frankfort and Leipzig.
1815.
[Gorres, J. J. von.] Sachsens Pflicht und Recht. In Rheinische Mercur, Nos.
90—94. Coblenz. July 21-29, 1814. [In favour of annexation.]
[Hoffmann, J. G.] Preussen und Sachsen. Berlin.
November, 1814. [Against the pamphlet of Aretin cited above.]
Niebuhr, B. G. Preussens Recht gegen den sachsischen Hof. Berlin. 1815.
Sachsische Aktenstucke aus der Dresdner geschriebenen Zeitung. 1815.
[A large proportion of these pieces, though not all, are forgeries. The
publication is a Parthian shot against Prussia, perhaps of Bavarian origin.] 1815.
[Sartorius, G. S., afterwards Baron von Waltershausen.] Uber die
Vereinigung Sachsens mit Preussen. Von einem preusf>!schen
Patrioten. 1814. [Against annexation.]
The German Constitution, eto.
Allemannia.
Munich. 1815. [Conducted, it is said, by Baron C. von Aretin and von Hormann,
in the Bavarian interest and under French inspiration.]
Arndt, E. M. Blick aus der Zeit auf die Zeit. “Germanien.”
[Berlin?] 1814.
[Pamphlet in
favour of dual rule of Austria and Prussia in Germany.]
Die Glocke der Stunde in Zfigen. Berlin. 1814.
Arndt, E. M. Die Regenten und die Regierten. Berlin. 1814.
[On the proceedings of the Congress.]
Schriften fiir und an seine lieben Deutschen. 3 parts.
Leipzig. 1845.
Der Geist der Zeit. Part in.
Berlin. 1813.
Gorres, Joh. Joseph von. Gesammelte Briefe. Heransgegeben von F.
Binder.
Vol. in. Munich. 1874 Kleinschmidt, A. Bayern und Hessen, 1799-1816. Berlin.
1900. [Contains despatches of General von Sulzer, Bavarian Minister at
Darmstadt, to King Max Joseph.]
Rheinische Mercur, der. Coblenz. Jahrg. 1814-16.
[Patriotic organ of German national aspirations, wrongly accused of interested
Prussian partisanship; written mainly by Gorres; with contributions by K.
Muller, Amdt etc. No. 357, the last number,
appeared January 10,1816.]
Stein, Freiherr vom. Ein Schreiben des Fr. vom Stein zur deutschen Frage.
Commun. by P. Bailleu. Histor. Zeitschr. No. 862. xlvi.
Tagebuch des Fr. vom Stein wahrend des Wiener
Kongresses, mitg. u. erl.
von M. Lehmann. Histor. Zeitschr. No. 862. xx.
Wachter, der. Cologne. 1815. [Founded and edited by Arndt.]
[Wessenberg, H. Baron von.] Die deutsche Kirche. Ein Vorschlag zu ihrer.
neuen Begriindung und Einrichtung. Im April 1815. s.l. [Directed against
the pretensions of Rome.]
III. CONTEMPORARY OR NEARLY CONTEMPORARY
HISTORIES, MEMOIRS, REMINISCENCES, ETC.
A. General and Miscellaneous.
Arndt, E. M. Erinnerungen aus dem ausseren Leben. 3rd edn. Leipzig. 1842.
Goethe und Oesterreich. Briefe mit Erlauterungen. Edited by A. Sauer.
(Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft, xvn.) Vol. ii. Weimar. 1902.
Guizot, F. P. G. Memoires. Vol. I. Paris. 1858.
Haussonville, J.-O.-B. de Cleron, Comte de. Souvenirs.
Paris. 1878. (Reproduction of a paper publ. in the Rev. des Deux Mondes, 1862,
for the first time publishing the essential matter of the correspondence
between Louis XVIII and Talleyrand.)
Hormayr, J. Baron von. Kaiser Franz und Mettemich. Leipzig. 1848.
[Fragment.]
Ernst Friedrich, Graf von Munster. Lebensbilder
aus der Befreiungskriege,
i 3 parts. Jena.
1841-4. [A rifadmento of Miinster’g Remains, in part documentary, violently
hostile to Mettemich.]
Memoires tires des papiers d’un homme d’etat. (Anon.) Vols.
xn and xm. Paris. 1837-8.
Wolzogen, Baron J. A. P. W. L. von (General). Memoiren.
Leipzig. 1851.
For the
Memoirs of Mettemich, and of Meneval (on Napoleon and Marie-Louise), see
General Bibliography. For those of Pasquier, Talleyrand, and Villemain, see
Bibliography to Chapters I, V.
For the
Second Peace of Paris see also B.
B. The Congress op Vienna.
Angeberg, Comte de. Le Congres de Vienne et les traites de 1815. Avec
une introduction historique par J.-B. Capefigue. 4 parts. Paris. 1864.
Capefigue, B. H. R. Histoire de la Restauration. 10 vols. Paris. 1831-3.
[Vol. n contains Talleyrand’s notes on the position of France at the Congress,
documents concerning the Polish question, etc.]
Capefigue, B. H. R. Le Congres de Vienne dans ses rapports avec la
circon- scription actuelle de l’Europe. Paris. 1847.
Nissan, G. de Raxis de.] Histoire du Congres de Vienne. (See under I.)
Gagem, Freiherr H. C. E. von. Mein Antheil an der Politik. Vol. n: Nach
Napoleon’s Fall.—Der Congress zu Wien. [The Appendix
contains many documents, official and journalistic.] Stuttgart and Tubingen. 1826. Vol. v: Der zweite Pariser Frieden. [With Appendix
of Documents.] Leipzig. 1845. Lagarde, Comte A. de. Fetes et
souvenirs du Congres de Vienne. 2 vols. Paris.
1843.
La Garde-Chambonas, Comte A. de. Souvenirs du Congres de Vienne. Edited
with introduction and notes by Comte Fleury. Paris. 1901.
Ligne,
Charles Joseph Prince de. Memoires et melanges
historiques et litteraires.
5 vols. 1827-9. Engl, selection and
translation by K. P. Wormeley, with introd. hy Sainte-Beuve. 2 vols. 1899.
Montet, Baronne de. Souvenirs (1785-1866). Paris. 1905. [Contains social
reminiscences of the Congress.]
Nostiz, K. von. Leben. Leipzig. 1848. [Contains social
reminiscences of the Congress.]
Pradt, D. D. de. Du Congres de Vienne. 2 vols. Paris. 1815.
Schaumann, A. F. H. Geschichte des zweiteu Pariser Friedens fiir
Deutschland. Aus
Aktenstucken. Gottingen. 1844. (From papers of Count von Wint- zingerode.)
For the
Memoirs of Vamhagen von Ense, and of Meneval (on Napoleon and Marie-Louise),
see General Bibliography, for Reminiscences of Caulaincourt, see Bibliography
to Chapters I, V.
IV. LATER WORKS.
General.
Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de 1’Europe. Vol. i. Paris. 1891.
[Dorow, W. von.] Denkschriften und Briefe zur Charakteristik der Welt und
Litteratur. 5 vols. Berlin. 1838-41.
Flathe, T. Geschichte von Sachsen. Vol. in. (Gesch. der europ. Staaten.)
Gotha. 1873.
Gervinus, G. G. Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts seit den Wiener Vertragen. Vol.
i. (Section ii: Der Wiener
Congress.) Leipzig. 1855. French translation by Minsen. Vol. i. 1864.
Houssaye, H. 1814 (1 vol.). 1815 (3 vols.). Paris. 1900-5.
Koniger, J. Der Krieg von 1815 und die Vertrage von Wien und Paris. Leipzig. 1865.
Malet, A. La Sainte-AIliance et le Congres. Chap. ii of Vol. x of
Lavisse and Rambaud’s Histoire general e du ivme siecle k nos jours.
Paris. 1898.
Munster, G. H., Graf zu. Politische Skizzen uber die Lage Europa’s,
1815-57. Leipzig. 1867.
Nettement, A. F. de. Histoire de la Restauration. Vols. i, ii. Paris. 1860. Ollivier, Emile. L’Empire liberal. Vol. i.
Paris. 1895.
Reumont, A. von. Geschichte von Toscana. Vol. ii. (Gesch. der europ.
Staaten.) Gotha. 1877.
Rochau, A. L. von. Geschichte Frankreichs vom Sturze Napoleons bis zur
Wieder- herstellung des Kaisei-thums. (Staatengeschichte der neuesten Zeit.)
Vol. i. Leipzig. 1858.
Roloff,G. Politik und Kriegfiihrung wahrend des Feldzugs von 1814. Berlin. 1891.
Seignobos, C. Histoire politique de 1’Europe contemporaine. Evolution
des partis et des formes politiques, 1814-96. Paris. 1897. [Foreign affairs
treated briefly.] Sorel, A. Les Allies et la Paix en 1813. Revue des Deux
Mondes, Paris. July— August, 1904.
Springer, A. Geschichte Oesterreichs seit den Wiener Frieden 1809. 2 vols.
Leipzig. 1863-5.
Stem, A. Geschichte Europas seit den Vertragen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter
Frieden von 1871. Vol. x. Berlin. 1894.
Viel-Castel, Baron L. de. Histoire de la Restauration. Vols.
i-ii. Paris. 1860.
For General
Works on Russia (Bemhardi, Schiemann), Spain (Baumgarten), Italy (Bianchi),
Germany (Hausser, Treitschke), Austria and Prussia (Oncken), Prussia (Stern’s
Aktenstucke), France (Thiers), Europe (Oncken), History of Treaties (Garden),
Historical Geography (Freeman) and Maps, see General Bibliography.
Biographical.
Allgemeine
deutsche Biographie. Articles (among others) on Gentz by A. Beer; on Mettemich
by P. Bailleu; on Munster by F. Frensdorff; on Stein by A. Stern; on H. von
Wessenberg by J. F. von Schulte; and on J. von Wessen- berg by A. von Arneth. Leipzig. 1878-97.
Ameth, A. von. Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg. Ein osterreich. Staatsmann
des 19. Jahrh. 2 vols. Vienna. 1898.
Broglie,
Alfred, Due de. Preface to the Memoirs of Talleyrand. Paris. 1891. Eynard, C. Vie de Madame de Krudener. 2 vols. Paris. 1849.
Gebhardt, B. Wilhelm von Humboldt als Staatsmann. 2 vols. Stuttgart.
1896-9. Gorres, Joseph von. Die Gegenwart. Vol. n. Leipzig. 1849.
Haym, R. Wilhelm von Humboldt. Lebensbild und Charakteristik. Berlin. 1866.
Heilmann, J. Feldmarschall Fiirst Wrede. Leipzig. 1880.
Lammers, A. Burgermeister Smidt. Preuss. Jahrbiicher. Vol. xlvii. December,
1873.
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, K. Friedrich von Gentz. Leipzig. 1867.
Graf Kapo-d’Istrias. Berlin. 1864.
Pallain, G. Preface a la Correspondance inedite de Talleyrand. Paris. 1881. Schmidt-Weissenfels, E. Friedrich Gentz.
Eine Biographie. Vol. n. Prague. 1869. Schulze, Hermann. Der Freiherr von Stein
und seine Bedeutung fiir Deutschland’s Wiedergeburt. Jena. 1850.
Sepp, J. Gorres und seine Zeitgenossen. Nordlingen. 1877.
Thurheim, Count A. (Field-Marshal). Carlo Joseph, Fiirst de Ligne, die
letzte Blume der Wallonen. Vienna. 1877.
Treitschke, H. von. Hans von Gagern. Historische und politische Aufsatze.
Vol. i. Berlin. 1866.
Ulmann, H. E. Graf zu Munster. Histor. Zeitschr. No. 862. xx.
Viel-Castel, Baron L. de. Lord Castlereagh et la
politique exterieure de l’Angle- terre de 1812 a 1822. Revue des Deux Mondes. June 1, 1854.
Wertheimer, E. Der Herzog von Reichstadt. Ein Lebensbild. Stuttgart and
Berlin. 1902. English translation. London. 1905.
Die Verbannten des ersten Kaiserreichs.
Leipzig. 1897. [ElisaBacciocchi, etc.]
[Zezschwitz, J. von.] Mittheilungen aus den Papieren eines sachsischen
Staats- manns. Camenz. 1859.
For
Biographical Works on Mettemich (Binder), Castlereagh (Lady Londonderry),
Wellington (Maxwell), Stein (Pertz, Seeley), Gneisenau (Pertz and Delbriick),
see General Bibliography.
Special.
Congress of Vienna.
Delbruck, H. Friedrich Wilhelm III und Hardenberg auf dem Wiener Kongress.
Historische Zeitschr. No. 862. lxiii.
Duncker, A. Der Freiherr vom Stein und die deutsche Frage auf dem Wiener
Kongresse. Hanau. 1873.
Fournier, A. Neue Quellen zur Gesch. des Wiener Kongresses. Oesterreichische Rundschau, i, 3. Vienna. 1905.
Haussonville, J. O. B. de C., Comte de. Le Congres de Vienne. Revue des
Deux Mondes. No. xxxix. Paris. 1862.
Schaumann, A. F. H. Geschichte der Bildung des deutschen Bundes auf dem
Wiener Congresse. Aus gedriickten und ungedr. Quellen. Raumer’s Histor.
Taschenbuch. 3rd Series. Jahrg. 1850. Leipzig. 1850.
Schmidt, A. Geschichte der deutschen Verfassungsfrage wahrend der
Befreiungs- kriege und des Wiener Kongresses 1812-15. Edited by A. Stern. Stuttgart. 1890.
Sorel, A. Essais d’histoire et de critique: Talleyrand au Congres de
Vienne; Mettemich. Paris. 1883, 1894.
Le Congres de Vienne. Chap. i of Vol. x of
Lavisse and Rambaud’s Histoire
generale du ivme siecle a nos jours. Paris. 1898.
See also
Berahardi, Hist, of Russia, vol. i (General Bibliography).
Various.
iEgidi, K. L. Der deutsche Bund. In Bluntschli’s Staatsworterbuch. Vol. hi. Duvergier de
Hauranne, P. Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France,
1814-48. Vol. ii. Paris. 1857.
Kaltenbora, K. von. Geschichte der deutschen Bundesverhaltnisse und Einheits-
bestrehungen, etc. Vol. i. Berlin. 1857.
Oncken, W. and P. Bailleu. Uber den Kalischer Vertrag 1813. Sybel’s Histor.
Zeitschrift. 1877.
Vehse, E. Geschichte des ostreichinchen Hofa und Adels und der
ostreichischen Diplomatie. Vols. ix and x. (Gesch. der deutschen Hofe.)
Hamburg. 1852.
I.
UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL.
Kriegsarchiv des grossen Generalstabs. Berlin.
Record
Office, London. Military dispatches, 1815.
Waterloo
Letters (Sibome’s collection) in British Musenm [contain many not published in
his book of 1891].
Wellington
Papers at Apsley House [contain many not published in Gurwood’s Wellington
Dispatches].
For the
French Archives, see General Bibliography.
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Documents.
Elchingen, Due de. Documents inedits sur la campagne de 1815. Paris.
1840. Gerard, General. Documents sur la bataille de Waterloo. Brussels.
1829.
For
Wellington’s Dispatches and Napoleon’s Correspondence, see General
Bibliography.
Memoirs, Narratives, eto.
Constant, Benj. Memoires sur les Cent Jours. Paris. 1820-22.
Fleury de Chaboulon, M. Napoleon en 1815. Paris. 1819.
Grouchy, Comte. Relation succincte de la campagne de 1815. Observation
sur la campagne de 1815. Fragments, etc. Paris. 1819-29.
Gourgaud, General. La campagne de 1815. Paris. 1818.
La Fayette, Marquis de. Memoires. Paris. 1837-8.
Mercer,
General C. Journal of the Waterloo Campaign. London. 1870. Muffling, General. Aus meinem Leben. Berlin. 1851.
Plotho, C. von. Krieg gegen Frankreich im Jahre 1815. Berlin. 1818.
Shaw-Kennedy, General. Notes on Waterloo. London. 1869.
Sibome, H. T.
Waterloo Letters. London. 1891.
For the
Memoirs of Chateaubriand, see Bibliography to Chapters 1, V. For those of
Metternich, see General Bibliography.
III. LATER WORKS.
General.
Capefigue, B.
H. R. Les Cent Jours. Paris. 1841.
Charras, Lieutenant-Colonel. Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Brussels.
1855.
Chesney,
Colonel C. Waterloo Lectures: a study of the campaign of 1815. London. 1868.
Clausewitz, General K. von. Der Feldzug von 1815. (Hinterlassene Werke,
vol. vni.) Berlin. 1835.
Couderc de St Chamant, H. Les dci-nieres armees de Napoleon. Paris. 1902. Damitz, C. von. Geschichte des Feldzuges von
1815. Berlin. 1837-8.
Houssaye, H. 1815. (1) La premiere Restauration. Les Cent Jours. (46th
edn.) (2)
Waterloo. (46th edn.) (3) La seconde Abdication de Napoleon. (20th edn.) 3
vols. Paris. 1905.
La Tour d’Auvergne, Col. E. Etudes sur la campagne de Waterloo. Paris. 1850. Lettow-Vorbeck, O. von. Napoleon’s Untergang, 1815. Berlin. 1904. Loben-Sels, E. van. Precis de
la campagne de 1815. The Hague. 1849.
Morris, W.
O’C. The Campaign of 1815. London. 1900.
Ollech, H.
von. Feldzug von 1815. Berlin. 1885.
Sibome, W.
History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815. London. 1848.
Biographical.
Girod de l’Ain, M. Vie militaire du General Foy. Paris. 1900.
Helfert, A. Murat und seine letzten Kampfe. Vienna. 1878.
For the
Memoirs or Lives of Napoleon, Wellington, Blucher, Gneisenau, Grouchy, Murat,
Ney, Soult, etc. see General Bibliography.
Special.
Beamish, N.
L. History of the King’s German Legion. 2 vols. London. 1832-7. Leeke, W. Lord
Seaton’s regiment at Waterloo. London. 1840.
Pflugk-Harttung, J. von. Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei La Belle Alliance.
Berlin. 1903.
Rose, J. H.
Napoleonic Studies. London. 1904.
GREAT
BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 1792-1815. I.—ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND.
CONTEMPORARY
AUTHORITIES.
General.
Cockbum,
Lord. Memorials of His Time. Edinburgh. 1856.
Edinburgh
Review. Edinburgh. 1802-1815.
Hazlitt, W.
The Spirit of the Age. London. 1894.
Protests of
the Lords. Edited by J. E. T. Rogers. Vol. n. Oxford. 1875. Quarterly Review.
London. 1809-1815.
Smith,
Sydney. Works. 3 vols. London. 1848.
State Trials.
Ed. Howell. Vols. xxii-xxxi. London.
1817-23.
Wolcot, John.
(Peter Pindar.) Works. 5 vols. London. 1812.
Wyvill, C.
Political Papers. Vols. v, vi. London. 1804.
For the
Annual Register, Cobbett’s Parliamentary History, Hansard’s Debates, Journals
of the Lords and Commons, see General Bibliography.
■
Special.
Clarkson, T.
History of the Abolition of the African Slave Trade. 2 vols.
London. 1808.
History of
the Two Acts (Anon.). London. 1796.
Proceedings
of the Society of Friends of the People. London. 1793.
Simond, L.
Journal of a Tour in Great Britain in 1810-11. 2 vols. Edinburgh.
1815.
Memoirs, Speeches, etc.
Auckland,
William, Lord. Journals and Correspondence. Vols. n-rv. London. 1861.
Brougham,
Henry, Lord. Life and Times, written by himself. Vols. i-ii. Edinburgh. 1871.
Buckingham,
Duke of. Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III. 4 vols. London.
1853-5.
Memoirs
of the Court of England during the Regency. 2 vols. London.
1856.
Burges,
Bland. Life and Correspondence. Ed. J. Hutton. London. 1883. Butler, Charles.
Reminiscences. 2 vols. London. 1824.
Colchester,
Charles Abbot, Lord. Diary and Correspondence. Vols. i-n. London. 1861.
Creevey
Papers, The. Edited by Sir H. Maxwell. Vol. i. London. 1903. D’Arblay, Madame.
Diary and Letters. Edited by Austin Dobson. 6 vols.
London.
1904-5.
Erskine, T.
Speeches. 4 vols. London. 1847.
Fortescue,
J., Manuscripts of. 3 vols. London. 1892-9.
Holcroft, T.
Memoirs. 3 vols. London. 1816.
Hunt, Henry.
Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 1820.
Huskisson, W.
Speeches. Vol. i. London. 1831.
Knight, Miss
C. Autobiography. 2 vols. London. 1861.
Leeds, Duke
of. Political Memoranda. Edited by O. Browning. London. 1884. Papendiek, Mrs.
Journals. 2 vols. London. 1887.
Place, F.
Additional mss. British Museum, 27789-27859.
Romilly, Sir
S. Memoirs. 3 vols. London. 1840.
Rose, G.
Diaries and Correspondence. 2 vols. London. 1860.
Sheridan, R.
B. Speeches. 5 vols. London. 1816.
Walpole, B.
C. Recollections of the Life of C. J. Fox. London. 1806. Wilberforce, W.
Correspondence. 2 vols. London. 1840.
Private
Papers. London. 1897.
Windham, W.
Diary. London. 1866.
Speeches. 3 vols. London. 1812.
Young,
Arthur. Autobiography. London. 1898.
For the
Memoirs, Correspondence, or Speeches of Burke, Canning, Fox, Pitt, Castlereagh,
and the Diaries etc. of Malmesbury, see General Bibliography.
LATER WORKS.
General.
Brosch, M. Geschichte von England. Vol. 9.
Gotba. 1896.
Craik, H. A
Century of Scottish History. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1901. Cunningham, W. Growth of
English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times.
Part II.
Cambridge. 1903.
Dorman, M.
History of the British Empire in the 19th Century. 2 vols. London. 1902-4.
Dowell, S.
History of Taxation and Taxes in England. Vols. ii-rv. London. 1888. Held, A. Zwei Bucher der sozialen Geschichte
Englands. Leipzig.
1881.
Lewis, Sir G.
Cornewall. Essays on the Administration of Great Britain, 1783
1830. London. 1864.
Mackintosh,
Sir J. History of Civilisation in Scotland. New edn. 4 vols.
Paisley.
1896.
Tooke, T.
History of Prices. Vol. i. London. 1838.
Traill, H. D.
Social England. Vol. v. London. 1896.
For the
General Histories of England by Adolphus, Lecky, Martineau, Massey, -and May’s
Constitutional History, see General Bibliography.
Special.
Amherst, W.
J. History of Catholic Emancipation. 2 vols. London. 1886. Fortescue, J. The
British Army, 1783-1802. London. 1905.
Fox-Bourne,
H. R. English Newspapers. Vol. i. London. 1887.
Harris W.
History of the Radical Party in Parliament. London. 1885. Jephson, H. The
Platform, its Rise and Progress. Vol. i. London. 1892. Kebbel, T. E. History of
Toryism. London. 1886.
Kent, C. The
English Radicals. London. 1899.
Newmarch, W.
On the Loans raised by Mr Pitt. London. 1855.
Overton, J.
H. The English Church in the 19th Century, 1800-33. London. 1894. Rose, J. H.
The Food Supply of England. Monthly Review. March. 1902. Sharpe, R. London and
the Kingdom. Vol. in. London. 1895.
Smith, E. The
English Jacobins. London. 1881.
Biographical.
Alger, J. G.
Englishmen in the French Revolution. London. 1889.
Napoleon’s English Visitors and Captives.
London. 1904.
Ashbourne,
Lord. Pitt: some Chapters of his Life and Times. London. 1898. Atkinson, C.
Bentham. London. 1905.
Bagehot, W.
Literary Studies. The First Edinburgh Reviewers. London. 1891.
Biographical Studies. William Pitt. London.
1889.
Bain, A.
James Mill. A Biography. London. 1882.
Bonar, J.
Malthus and his Work. London. 1885.
Bulwer, H.
Lytton. Historical Characters. 2 vols. London. 1867.
Campbell,
Lord. Lives of the Lord Chancellors. Vols. vn-x. London. 1857.
Lives of
the Chief Justices. Vol. iv. London. 1874.
Carlyle, E.
William Cobbett. London. 1904.
Cartwright,
E. Life and Correspondence of Major Cartwright. 2
vols. London. 1826. Chevrillon, A. Sydney Smith et la Renaissance des Idees
Liberates en Angleterre. Paris. 1894.
Churton, E.
Life of Joshua Watson. 2 vols. Oxford. 1861.
Cleveland,
Duchess of. Life of Lady Hester Stanhope. London. 1897.
Cockburn,
Lord. Life of Jeffrey. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1852.
Edinburgh
Review, October, 1888. Lord Grenville.
Fergusson, A.
Henry Erskine. Edinburgh. 1882.
Fitzmaurice,
Lord E. Life of Lord Shelburne. Vol. m. London. 1876.
Grey, C.
Early Life and Opinions of Charles, 2nd Earl Grey. London. 1861. Hammond, J. L.
Charles Fox, a political study. London. 1903.
Holland,
Lady. Memoirs of Sydney Smith, with a selection from his Letters.
2 vols.
London. 1853.
Homer, L.
Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner. 2 vols. London. 1843. Kenyon, G.
T. Life of the first Lord Kenyon. London. 1873.
Knutsford,
Lady. Life of Zachary Macaulay. London. 1900.
Le Marchant,
Sir D. Life of Lord Althorp. London. 1876.
Lockhart, J.
G. Life of Sir Walter Scott. 7 vols. Edinburgh. 1837-8. Macaulay, Lord. Essays
on William Pitt and Lord Holland, and Biography of William Pitt. Collected Works,
vols. vi, vn. London. 1866.
Mackintosh,
R. Life of Sir J. Mackintosh. 2 vols. London. 1835.
Marriott, J.
A. R. George Canning and his Times. London. 1903.
Minto, Lady.
Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot. 3 vols. London. 1874.
Omond, G. The
Lord Advocates of Scotland. Vol. ii. Edinburgh. 1883. Parkes, J., and Merivale,
H. Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis. 2 vols. London. 1867. Pellew, G. Life of
Viscount Sidmouth. 3 vols. London. 1847.
Phipps, E.
Memoirs of R. Plumer Ward. 2 vols. London. 1850.
Rae, W. F
Life of Sheridan. 2 vols. London. 1896.
Reid, S. J.
Life and Times of Sydney Smith. London. 1884.
Salisbury,
Lord. Biographical Essays. Castlereagh and Pitt London. 1905. Salmon, D. Joseph
Lancaster. London. 1904.
Smiles, S.
Memoir and Correspondence of John Murray. Vol. i. London. 1891. Smith, E.
William Cobbett, a Biography. 2 vols. London. 1879.
Stephens, A.
Memoirs of Horne Tooke. Vol. n. London. 1813.
Temperley, H.
W. V. George Canning. London. 1905.
Torrens, W.
M. Memoir of Lord Melbourne. London. 1890.
Twiss, H.
Life of Lord Eldon. Vols. i, n. London. 1844.
Wallas,
Graham. Life of Francis Place. London. 1898.
Walpole, S.
Life of Spencer Perceval. 2 vols. London. 1874.
Weigall, Lady
R. Brief Memoir of Princess Charlotte of Wales. London. 1874. Wilberforce, R.
and S. Life of William Wilberforce. Vols. i-iv. London. 1838. Wright, T. Works
of Gillray. London. 1874.
For
Biographical Works on Castlereagh (Alison, Londonderry), Pitt (Rosebery,
Stanhope), Canning (Stapleton), Fox (Russell), Brougham’s “ Statesmen,” and the
Dictionary of National Biography, see General Bibliography.
CONTEMPORARY
AUTHORITIES.
General.
Barrington,
Jonah. Historic Memoirs of Ireland. 2 vols. London. 1833.
Rise and
Fall of the Irish Nation. Paris. 1833.
Clarendon, R.
V. Revenue and Finances of Ireland. London. 1791.
Debates of
the Irish House of Commons. Vols. x-xvn (till 1797). Dublin.
Emmet, T. A.
Ireland under English Rule. Vol. n. Appendix, Diary of T. A. Emmet in Paris,
1803-4. New York. 1903.
Grattan, H.
Miscellaneous Works. London. 1822.
Knox, A.
Essays on the Political Circumstances of Ireland. London. 1799. Macneven, W. J.
Pieces of Irish History. New York. 1807.
Newenham, T.
A View of the Natural, Political, and Commercial Circumstances of Ireland.
London. 1804.
Plowden, F.
History of Ireland to the Union. Vol. n. London. 1809.
History
of Ireland, 1801-10. 3 vols. Dublin. 1811.
Seward, W.
Collectanea Hibernica. 3 vols. Dublin. 1812.
Wakefield, E.
Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political. 2 vols. London. 1810.
Special.
Cooke, E.
Arguments for and against a Union. Dublin. 1798.
Gordon, J. A
History of the Rebellion of 1798. Dublin.. 1801.
Hay, E.
History of the Insurrection in Wexford. Dublin. 1803.
Musgrave, R.
Rebellions in Ireland. Dublin. 1802.
Percy Society.
Vol. xxi. Songs illustrating the French Invasions of Ireland. London. 1847.
Reports of
the Secret Committees of the House of Commons and House of Lords. Dublin. 1798.
Stock, Bishop
J. A Narrative of what passed at Killala. Dublin. 1800.
Memoirs, Speeches, etc.
Barrington,
Jonah. Personal Sketches of His Own Times. 3 vols. London. 1827. Beresford, J.
Correspondence. Vol. n. London. 1854.
Byrne, Miles.
Memoirs. Vol. i. Paris. 1863.
Charlemont,
Earl of. Manuscripts and Correspondence. Vol. ii.
London. 1894. Cloncurry, Lord. Personal Recollections.
Dublin. 1849.
Cornwallis, Marquis. Correspondence. Vols. ii, m. London. 1859.
Curran, J. P.
Speeches. Dublin. 1845.
Edgeworth, R.
L. Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 1821.
Foster, J,
Speech on the Union. Dublin. 1799.
Grattan, H.
Speeches. Vols. ii-iv. London.
1822.
Holt, J.
Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 18S8.
Latocnaye, De. Un fran^ais en Irlande. Dublin. 1797.
Reynolds,
Thomas. Autobiography. 2 vols. London. 1839.
Rowan,
Hamilton. Autobiography. Dublin. 1840.
Sampson,
William. Memoirs. London. 1832.
Teeling, C.
H. Personal Narrative of the Irish Rebellion. Loudon. 1828.
Tone, T.
Wolfe. Autobiography. Ed. R. B. O’Brien. 2 vols. London. 1893.
For Memoirs
of Castlereagh, see General Bibliography, for Sir J. Moore’s Diary (Maurice),
see Bibliography to Ohap. XI.
LATER WORKS.
General.
Ball, J. T.
Irish Legislative Systems. Loudon. 1888.
Falkiner, C.
Litton. Studies in Irish History and Biography. London. 1902. Fitzpatrick, W.
J. Ireland before the Union. London. 1867.
Froude, J. A.
The English in Ireland. Vol. hi. London. 1874.
Guillon, E. La France et l’lrlande pendant la Revolution. Paris.
1888.
Ingram, T. D.
A Critical Examination of Irish History. Vol. n. London. 1900. Killen, W. D.
Ecclesiastical History of Ireland. Vol. n. London. 1876.
Lecky, W. E.
H. History of Ireland in the 18th Century. Vols. h-v. London.
1892.
Macdonagh, M.
A Viceroy’s Post-bag. London. 1905.
Morris, W.
O’Connor. Ireland, 1798-1898. London. 1898.
Ireland,
1494-1868. Cambridge. 1896.
Special.
Edinburgh
Review, Oct. 1903, The Emmet Insurrection.
Fitzpatrick,
W. J. Secret Service under Pitt. London. 1892.
The Sham
Squire, and the Informers of 1798. Dublin. 1866.
Ingram, T. D.
History of the Irish Union. London. 1887.
Macneill, J.
S. How the Union was carried. London. 1887.
Madden, R.
The United Irishmen. 7 vols. London. 1842-6.
Maxwell, W.
H. History of the Rebellion in 1798. London. 1848.
Murray, A. E.
Commercial Relations between England and Ireland. London. 1903. Wyse, T. The
Catholic Association of Ireland. 2 vols. London. 1829.
Biographical.
Dunfermline,
Lord. Sir Ralph Abercrombie. Edinburgh. 1861.
Dunlop, R.
Life of Henry Grattan. London. 1889.
Life of
Daniel O’Connell. London. 1900.
Grattan, H.
Life of Henry Grattan. Vols. m-v. London. 1841.
Guiney, L. I.
Robert Emmet. London. 1904.
Hardy, F.
Memoirs of the Earl of Charlemont. Vol. n. London. 1812. Lawless, E. Maria
Edgeworth. London. 1904.
Lecky, W. E.
H. Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland. 2 vols. London. 1903. O’Donoghue, D.
J. Life of Robert Emmet. Dublin. 1902.
O’Flanagan,
J. R. Lives of the Lord Chancellors of Ireland. Vol. n. London. 1870. Parker,
C. S. Sir Robert Peel. Vol. i. London. 1891.
Phillips, C.
Curran aud His Contemporaries. Edinburgh. 1850.
Pluuket, Lord
D. Life and Speeches of Lord Plunket. Vol. I. London. 1867. Taylor, Ida. Life
of Lord Edward Fitzgerald. London. 1904.
I.—India and Ceylon, 1785—1815.
UNPUBLISHED
MATERIAL.
Besides »
number of mss. belonging to
Protected States, there is a mass of documents, relating both to the affairs of
Native Territories and to those of the East India Company, in the offices of
the different Departments at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. Some of these have
been calendared (see below); some are in process of examination. Besides these
there is much in England in private as well as in public custody, notably—
Letters and
Diaries of Warren Hastings, belonging to Miss Winter, of Worton Hall, Steeple
Aston (now, or shortly to be, transferred to the Victoria Hall, Calcutta).
Letters and
Diaries of Sir George H. Barlow, in the possession of Major Sir H. W. W.
Barlow, Bart., R.A.
(1)
In the India
Office : .
The Court
Minutes of the East India Company, their Dispatches to India, and
the Replies.
24 vols. of Wellesley Papers. Fisher Papers, Miscellaneous Records, and other
collections, some only calendared in ms. ; vol. xix of the Miscellaneous
Records is especially noteworthy.
(2) In the British Museum:
A great mass
of documents relating to the administration of Wellesley, including accounts of
Secret Service money, private and official Correspondence, Minutes on the
Finances. A number of letters and papers on the period 1808-22.
CONTEMPORARY
AUTHORITIES.
General.
Bengal MS.
Records. A selected series of 14,136 letters in the Board of Revenue, Calcntta,
1782-1807. Edited by Sir W. W. Hunter. London. 4 vols. 1894. Forrest, G. W.
Selections from the Letters etc. in the Bombay Secretariat, Maratha Series.
Vol. i. Bombay. 1885.
Francklin, W.
A History of the Reign of Shah-Aulum. London. 1798.
Malcolm, Sir
J. The Political History of India from 1784 to 1823. 2 vols. London. 1826.
A Memoir
of Central India. 2 vols. London. 1823.
Scott, J.
Ferishta’s History of the Dekkan. 2 vols. London. 1794,
Tod,
Col. J. Annals and Antiquities of Rajast’han, or the Central and Western
Rajpoot States. London. 2 vols. 1829, 1832.
.
Wilks, Col.
Mark. Historical Sketches of the South of India. London. 1817-.
Special.
Macpherson.
Macartney,
Earl of. Some account of the public life and a selection from the unpublished
writings of the. By J. Barrow. 2 vols. London. 1807. Macpherson, Sir John,
Bart. Documents explanatory of the case of, as Governor General of Bengal.
London. (?1800.)
Copy of
a Letter to the Court of Directors, Aug. 10, 1786, printed by order
of the House
of Commons. London. 1786.
Cornwallis
and Shore.
Cornwallis,
Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis. Edited by C. Ross. 3 vols.
London. 2nd
edn. 1859.
Harington, J.
H. Analysis of the Bengal Regulations. 3 vols. Calcutta. 1814-15. Rennell,
Major J. The Marches of the British Army in the Peninsula of India...
transmitted
by Earl Cornwallis. London. 1792.
Rouse-Boughton,
C. W. Dissertation concerning the Landed Property of Bengal. London. 1791.
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Tipu Sultan,
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Trial of
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History of
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Cornwallis,
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Broughton, T.
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H. J. An account of the transactions of his Majesty’s Mission to the Court of
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Hastings.
Substance of
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Summary of
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East India
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and Proceedings in the Negociations for the renewal of the East India Company’s
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East India
Government and Commerce, the Present System of our, considered.
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East India
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Fifth Report
of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East
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are regulated. London. 1813.
Ceylon.
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[Fellowes,
R., D.D.] The History of Ceylon to 181o. London. 1817.
Narrative of
events which have recently occurred in the island of Ceylon, written by a
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Steuart, J.
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LATER WORKS.
General.
Hunter, Sir
W. W. Brief History of the Indian Peoples. 20th edn. Oxford.
1893.
Kaye, Sir J.
W. The Administration of the East India Company. London. 1853. Lyall, Sir A. C.
Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India. 3rd edn. London. 1894.
Mill, J. The
History of British India. Fifth edition, with notes and continuation, by Horace
Hayman Wilson. 9 vols. London. 1858.
Wilson,
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History of British India from 1805 to 1835. 3 vols. London. 1858.
Special,
Ali Shabamet.
The History of Bahawalpur. London. 1848.
Baden-Powell,
B. H. The Land Systems of British India. 3 vols. Oxford. 1892. Baines, J. A.
Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (Part 3). Vol. i. Part 1.
(History of
Gujarat.) Bombay. 1896.
Caldwell, Rt
Rev. R. A Political and General History of the district of Tinnevelly. Madras.
1881.
Compton, H. A
particular account of the European Military Adventures of Hindustan.
1784-1803. London. 1892.
Court, Major
H. History of the Sikhs. Translation of the Sikkhan de Raj Di Vikhia. Lahore.
1888.
Danvers, F.
C. Report...on the Portuguese Records relating to the East Indies, contained in
the Torre del Tombo and the public libraries at Lisbon and Evora. London. 1892.
The
Portuguese in India. 2 vols. London. 1894.
Hough, Major
W. A brief History of the Bhopal Principality. Calcutta. 1845. Hunter, Sir W.
W. The Annals of Rural Bengal. London. 1868.
Lyall, Sir A.
C. Asiatic Stndies. Vol. i (cap. 7, The Rajput States) London. 1899.
Seton Karr,
W. S. Selection from the Calcutta Gazettes. 5 vols. Calcutta. 1868. Malleson,
G. B.. Final French Struggles in India and on the Indian seas. London. 1878.
Surendra Nath
Roy. A History of the Native States of India. Vol. i. Gwalior.
Calcutta.
1888.
Tennent, Sir
J. E. Ceylon. 2 vols. London. 1859.
[Wright,
Daniel.] History of Nepal, translated from the Parbatiya. Cambridge.
1877.
Biographical.
Arbuthnot,
Sir A. J. Sir Thomas Munro; selections from his Minutes and other writings. 2
vols. London. 1881.
Bowring, L.
C. Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1893. Bradshaw, J.
Sir Thomas Munro. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1894.
Colebrooke,
Sir T. E. Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone. 2 vols. London. 1884. Cotton, J. S.
Mountstuart Elphinstone. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1892.
<»leig,
Rev. G. R. Life of Sir Thomas Munro, K.C.B. 2nd edn. 2 vols. London.
1831.
Griffin, Sir
Lepel. Ranjit Singh. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1893.
Hutton, W. H.
The Marquess Wellesley. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1893. Kaye, Sir J. W. Lives
of Indian Officers. 3 vols. London. 1883.
Life of
Sir John Malcolm. 2 vols. London. 1855-6.
Keene, H. G.
Madhava Rao Sindhia. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1891.
Minto,
Countess of. Lord Minto in India. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First
Earl of Minto, while Governor-General of India from 1807 to 1814. London. 1880.
Morris,
Henry. Life of Charles Grant. London. 1904.
Pearce, R. R.
Life of the Marquess Wellesley. 3 vols. London. 1846.
Ross of
Bladensburg, Major. The Marquess of Hastings. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1893.
Sleeman,
Major-General Sir W. H. Rambles and recollections of an Indian Official.
(New edition
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Trotter,
Capt, L. J. Warren Hastings. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1890.
GENERAL
WORKS.
Brougham, H.,
Lord. Colonial Policy of European Powers. 2 vols. Edinburgh.
1803.
Egerton, H.
E. Short History of British Colonial Policy. London. 1897.
The
Origin and Growth of the English Colonies, and of their system of
Government.
Oxford. 1903. Introductory vol. to Lucas, Hist. Geography (see helow).
Jose, A. W.
The Growth of the Empire. London. 1901.
Lucas, C. P.
Historical Geography of the British Colonies. 6 vols. Oxford. 1887-97.
Mahan, A. T.
Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire.
1793-1812. 2
vols. London. 1892.
Todd, Alph.
Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies. London. 1880. Winsor, J.
Narrative and Critical History of America. Vol. vm. Boston. 1889. Zimmermann,
A. Kolonialpolitik Grosshritannicus. 2 vols. Berlin. 1898.
For Lecky’s
History of England, and the Dictionary of National Biography, see General
Bibliography.
THE SEPARATE
COLONIES.
New Sodth Wales.
Unpublished
Material.
The Record
Office (Colonial Correspondence, New South Wales, Nos. 1-75) contains the mss.
dealing with the years 1786-1814. Many of the more important early documents
are set out in Barton, G. H. History of New South Wales from the records. Vol.
i. 1783-9. Sydney. 1889. (Not continued.)
Documents.
Bartrnm, J.
Proceedings of a General Court-Martial...of Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston.
London. 1811.
Bennett, Hon.
H. G., M.P. A letter to Viscount Sidmouth on the Transportation Laws. London.
1819.
A letter
to Earl Bathurst on the condition of the colonies in New South
Wales.
London. 1820.
Howe, J.
General standing orders, selected from the general orders issued by former
governors. 1791-1806. 2 vols. Sydney. 1802, 1806.
Parliamentary
Papers. The most important are “ Reports of the House of Committee on the
question of Transportation,” 1779, 1812; and “ Report of J. T. Bigge,
commissioner, to enquire into the affairs of New South Wales.” 1823.
Contemporary
Authorities.
Barrington,
G. A voyage to New South Wales. London. 1795.
Sequel
to above. London. 1800.
Collins, D.
An account of the English Colony in New South Wales. London. 1798.
An
account of N. S. Wales from its first settlement...to August 1801...and an
account of a
voyage pertormed by Captain Flinders and Mr Bass...abstracted from the Journal
of Mr Bass. London. 1802.
Hinders, M. A
voyage to Terra Australis...in the years 1801, 1802, and 1803. 2 vols. London.
1814.
Hunter, J. An
historical journal of the transactions at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island.
London. 1793. (The Supplement contains journals of the first period of
Lieutenant King’s government of Norfolk Island.)
La Perouse, J. F. G. de. Voyage autour du monde. Paris. 1798.
Pdron, M. F. Voyage de decouvertes aux terres australes. Paris.
1807.
Phillip, A.
The voyage to Botany Bay. London. 1789.
Extracts
from Letters to Lord Sydney. London. 1790.
Tench, W. A
narrative of the Expedition to Botany Bay. London. 1789.
Thompson, G.
Slavery and famine...an account of the miseries and starvation at Botany Bay.
London. 1794.
Tuckey, J. H.
An account of a voyage to establish a colony at Port Phillip in the years 1802,
1803, and 1804. London. 1805.
Turnbull, J.
A voyage round the world in the years 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803, and
1804. 3 vols. London. 1805.
Wentworth, W.
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Becke, L. and
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Bennett, G.
History of Australian discovery and colonisation. London. 1865.
Bischoff, J.
History of the Woollen and Worsted Manufactures. (Vol. i contains M°Arthur’s “
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Bon wick, J.
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Port
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Flanagan, R.
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Lahilliere,
J. R. Early History of Victoria. 2 vols. London. 1878.
Lang, J. D.
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Canada, etc.
Unpublished
Material.
The Haldimand
papers (1758-1785) are in ms. in the British Museum (Nos. 21,
661-21,892).
They were calendared by Brymner, Reports on the Canadian archives.
Ottawa.
1886-9.
The Record
Office. Colonial Correspondence—Canada (Quebec); Canada
(Lower);
Canada (Upper)—contains the mss. dealing with the years 1763-1815.
They are
calendared by Brymner, Reports (as above). 1890-1896.
The Papers
relating to Nova Scotia in the Record Office are calendared in
Brymner’s
Reports for 1894 and 1895. Those relating to Prince Edward Island,
New
Brunswick, and Cape Breton are calendared in the Report for 1895.
Documents.
Cavendish,
Sir H., Debate on Quebec Act...from notes of. London. 1839.
Christie, R.
A history of the late Province of Lower Canada (Vols. v and vi, containing
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Doucet, N. B.
Fundamental principles of the laws of Canada. (Text and literal translation of
the custom of Paris etc.) Montreal. 1843.
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collection of Commissions. London. 1772.
An
account of the proceedings of the inhabitants of Quebec. London. 1775.
Additional Papers. London. 1776.
Nickalls, J.
R. The Statutes of...Upper Canada. Kingston.
1831.
Regne Militaire en Canada, 1760-4. (Reprinted from Memoires et
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Gray, H.
Letters from Canada during 1806-8. London. 1809.
Heriot, G.
Travels through the Canadas. London. 1807.
Jackson, J.
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Lambert, J.
Travels through Canada and the United States in 1806, 1807, and 1808. 3 vols.
3rd edn. London. 1816.
La
Rochefoucault-Liancourt, Due de. Travels through the United States and Upper
Canada in 1795, 1796, and 1797) together with an authentic account of Lower
Canada. English translation. 4 vols. 2nd edn. London. 1800.
Laterriere,
P. de Sale. Memoires. Quebec. 1873.
Long, J.
Voyages and travels of an Indian interpreter. London. 1791. Mackenzie, Sir A.
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1789 and 1793. London. 1801.
Maseres, F.
The Canadian freeholder. 3 vols. London. 1777-79.
A review
of the government and grievances of the province of Quebec since
the conquest.
London. 1788.
Selkirk,
Lord. Sketch of the British fur trade in North America, with observations
relating to the North West Company of Montreal. London. 1816.
Smith, M.
Geographical View of the province of Upper Canada, and promiscuous remarks on
its government. London. 1813.
Vancouver, G.
Voyage of discovery to the North Pacific and round the world. 1790-95. London.
1798.
Later Works.
Atkinson, W.
C. A historical and statistical account of New Brunswick. Edinburgh.
1844.
Bibaud, M. Histoire du Canada sous la domination anglaise. Montreal.
1843-4. Bouchette, J. The British dominions in North America. 2 vols. London.
1831. Bourinot, Sir J. Canada under British rule, 1760-1900. Cambridge. 1900.
Manual
of the Constitutional History of Canada. Montreal. 1888.
Pari.
Procedure and Practice...in the Dominion of Canada. Montreal. 1892.
Bradshaw, F.
Self-government in Canada. London. 1903.
Bryce, G. A
short history of the Canadian People. London. 1887.
Manitoba. London. 1882.
History
of the Hudson’s Bay Company. London. 1900.
Campbell, D.
History of Prince Edward Island. Charlottetown. 1875.
Canniff, W.
History of the province of Ontario. Toronto. 1872.
Christie, R.
History of the Province of Lower Canada. 6 vols. Quebec. 1848-55. Dent, J. C.
The Canadian portrait gallery. 4 vols. Toronto. 1880-1.
Fleming, J.
Political Annals of Lower Canada under the Act 31 George III, Cap. 31.
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Garneau, F. X. Histoire du Canada. 3 vols.
Montreal. 1881-2.
Haliburton,
T. C. An historical and statistical account of Nova Scotia. 2 vols. Halifax.
1829.
Hatheway, C.
L. The history of New Brunswick from its first settlement. Fredericton. 1846.
Kingsford, W.
History of Canada. 10 vols. Toronto and London. 1887-98.
Masson, L. R, Les bourgeois de la Compagnie du Nord-Ouest. 2
vols. Quebec, 1889-90.
Munro, J. E.
C. The Constitution of Canada. Cambridge. 1889.
Murdoch, B. A
history of Nova Scotia. 3 vols. Halifax. 1866-7.
Prowse, D. W.
A history of Newfoundland. London. 1896.
Read, D. B.
Life of General Simcoe. Toronto. 1890.
Ridout, T.
Ten years of Upper Canada in peace and war (1806-16). Toronto. 1890.
Cape Colony.
Documents.
Keith, Sir G.
M. A voyage to South America and the Cape of Good Hope. (Appendix contains
official documents relating to conquest in 1806.) London. 1819. Records of the
Cape Colony, copied from ms. documents in the Record Office, by G. M. Theal.
Vols. x-ix (1793-1814). London. 1897-1901.
Contemporary
Authorities.
Barnard, Lady
A. South Africa a century ago. Letters written from the Cape,
1797-1801.
London. 1901.
Barrow, J.
Travels into the interior of South Africa. 2 vols. 2nd edn. London. 1806.
An
account of the public life and a selection from the unpublished writings of
the Earl of
Macartney. 2 vola. London. 1807.
A voyage
to Cochin China...to which is annexed an account of a journey
made in 1801
and 1802 to the residence of the chief of the Booshuana nation. London. 1806.
Autobiographical Memoirs. London. 1847.
Burchell, W.
J. Travels in the interior of South Africa. 2 vola. London. 1822-4. Percival,
R. An account of the Cape of Good Hope. London. 1804.
Later Works.
Cappon, J.
Britain’s title in South Africa. London. 1901.
Johnston, Sir
H. H. A history of the Colonisation of Africa. Revised edn.
Cambridge.
1905.
Hood, T. Life
of Sir D. Baird. 2 vols. London. 1832.
Lucas, C. P.
Historical Geography of the British Colonies. Vol. iv (South Africa). Oxford.
1897.
Theal,
G. M. History of South Africa. 5 vols. Vols. ii
and in. London. 1891. South Africa. (Story of the Nations.) London.
1894.
British Expeditions to Buenos Ayres.
Contemporary
Authorities.
Anon. Narrative
of the operations of a small British force under General Auchmuty. London.
1807.
Authentic narrative of the Expedition of
Brigadier-General Craufnrd. London.
1808.
Notes on
the viceroyalty of La Plata, with a history of the operations of the
British
troops in that country. London. 1808.
Smith, Sir H.
Autobiography. Vol. i. London. 1901.
Whitelocke,
General J., trial at large of, by Court Martial. London. 1808. Wilcocke, S. H.
History of the Vice-royalty of Buenos Ayres. London. 1807. For the Annual Register,
and Castlereagh’s Memoirs, see General Bibliography.
Later Works.
Andrews, J.
Journey from Buenos Ayres, in the years 1825-6. 2 vols. London. 1827. Parish,
Sir W. Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of Rio de la Plata. 2nd edn. London.
1852.
Paxson, F. L.
Independence of the South-American Republics. Philadelphia. 1903. Watson, R. G.
Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial period.
2 vols. London. 1884.
Winsor, J.
Narrative and critical history of America. Vol. vm. Boston. 1890.
West Indies.
Contemporary
Authorities.
An account of
Jamaica...by a gentleman long resident in the West Indies. (Anon.) London.
1808.
Edwards, B.
History of the British Colonies in the West Indies. 3 vols. 3rd edn.
London. 1801.
Moore, Sir J.
Diary. Vol. i. London. 1904.
Parliamentary
Papers. Report of House of Commons Committee on the state of the West Indies.
1807.
Picton, Sir
T. Memoirs. 2nd edn. London. 1836.
Pinckard, G.
Notes on the West Indies. London. 1806.
Renny, R.
History of Jamaica. London. 1887.
Turnhull, G.
Narrative of the revolt of the French inhabitants in the island of Grenada.
London. 1795.
Willyams, C.
An account of the Campaign in the West Indies in 1794 under Sir C. Grey and Sir
J. Jervis, with the reduction of Martinique. London. 1796.
Later Works.
Bridges, G.
Annals of Jamaica. 2 vols. London. 1827.
Southey, T.
Chronological History of the West Indies. 3 vols. London. 1827.
For Lucas
(vol. n), Mahan (Sea-power), and Winsor (vol. vih), see above, General Works.
For James’ Naval History, see General Bibliography.
British Occupation op Java.
Contemporary
Authorities.
Deventer, M.
L. van. Het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java en Onderhoorigheden
sedert 1811. Gravenhage. 1891.
S. van. Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het
Landelijk Stelsel op Java. Vol. i.
Zalt-Bommel. 1865-6.
Raffles, T.
S. Substance of a Minute. London. 1814. (The India Office Records contain
numerous despatches from Raffles.)
The
history of Java. 2nd edn. London. 1830.
Later Works.
Boulger, D.
Life of Sir S. Raffles. London. 1897.
Day, C. The
policy and administration of the Dutch in Java. New York. 1904. Deventer, M. L.
van. Daendels-Raffles. Trans, by G. Batten. 1897.
Egerton, H.
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Onderhoorigheden,
1811. Gravenhage. 1857.
Pierson, N. G. Koloniale Politiek. Amsterdam.
1877.
Raffles, S.
Memoir of the life and public services of Sir T. S. Raffles. London. 1830.
CONTEMPORARY
AUTHORITIES.
Unpublished Material.
The papers of
Sir Hudson Lowe are at the British Museum. The Colonial Office
papers
relating to St Helena are at the Record Office.
Memoirs, Narratives, etc.
Abell, L. A.
Recollections of the Emperor Napoleon during the first three years of his
captivity on the island of Saint-Helena. London. 1844.
Antommarchi,
F. Derniers moments de Napoleon. 2 vols. London. 1825.
Barnes, J. A
tour through the island of St Helena^ with some particulars respecting the
arrival and detention of Napoleon Bonaparte. London. 1817.
Bertrand, H.
G. Guerre d’Orient. Avant-propos. Paris. 1847.
Buonaparte’s
voyage to St Helena, comprising the diary of Adm. Sir G. Cockburn during his
passage from England to St Helena in 1815. Boston. 1833. Republished under the
title, Napoleon’s last voyage. London. 1888.
Firmin-Didot,
G. La captivity de Ste Helene d’apres les rapports ine'dits du
Marquis de Montchenu. Paris. 1C94.
Fremeaux, P. Napoleon prisonnier. Memoires d’un mcdecin de l’Empereur a
Sainte-Helene (John Stokoe). Paris. 1901.
Gourgaud, G. Saint-Helene: Journal inedit de 1815 a 1818. 2 vols. Paris.
1899.
Hall, Basil.
Narrative of a voyage...with accounts of an interview with Napoleon Buonaparte
at St Helena. London. 1840.
Hook, T. E.
Facts illustrative of the treatment of Napoleon Buonaparte in Saint Helena.
London. 1819.
Jackson,
Basil. Notes and reminiscences of a Staff Officer, chiefly relating to the
Waterloo campaign and to St Helena matters during the captivity of Napoleon. 1903.
Las Cases, E. P. D., Comte de. Memorial de Sainte-Helene. Journal de la
vie privee et des conversations de l’Empereur Napoleon a Sainte-Helene. 4 vols.
London and Paris. 1823.
Las Cases, M. J. E., Marquis de la Caussade, Memoires de. Brussels.
1818.
Maitland,
Capt. F. L. Narrative of the surrender of Buonaparte, and of his residence on
board H.M.S. Bellerophon. London. 1826.
Malcolm,
Lady. A Diary of Saint Helena. Ed. Sir A. Wilson. London. 1899.
Manuscrit venu de Sl Helene d’une maniere inconnue. 3rd edn.
London. 1817.
Melanges historiques, dicte's au Comte de Montholon. Vol. i. London.
1822.
Memoires pour servir a l’histoire de France sous Napoleon, Merits a
Saint-Helene sous la dict£e de l’Empereur par les Generaux qui out partage sa
captivite. London. 8 vols. 1823.
Montholon, Albene H., Comtesse de. Souvenirs de Sainte-Helcne. Edited
by Comte Fleury. Paris. 1901.
Montholon, C. J., Marquis de. R^cits de la captivity de l’Empereur
Napoleon a Sainte-Helene. 2 vols. Paris. 1847.
Napoleon 1,
Correspondance de. Vol. xxxi ff. Paris. 1870.
O’Meara, B.
E. Napoleon in exile ; or a voice from St Helena: being the opinions and
reflections of Napoleon, etc. 2 vols. London. 1822.
Santini, M.
An appeal to the British Nation on the treatment experienced by Napoleon
Buonaparte in the island of St Helena. London.
1817.
Stunner, B. Freiherr von. Berichte aus St Helena zur Zeit der dortigen
Intei- nierung Napoleon Bonapartes, 1816-18. Edited by H.
Schlitter. Vienna. 1886. Paris. 1888.
Warden, W.
Letters written on board H.M.S. Northumberland and at Saint Helena. London.
1816.
Wilks, M.
Colonel Wilks and Napoleon. Two Conversations held at St Helena in
1816. London. 1901.
LATER WORKS.
Articles in
Blackwood’s Magazine, Vols. xvn, lxxiv, olx; Quarterly Review, Oct. 1816, Jan.
1817, Dec. 1825; Edinburgh Review, Vol. xliv ; Frazer’s Magazine, Vol. xlviii ;
Revue Bleue, 8 May—12 June, 1897.
Forsyth, W.
History of the captivity of Napoleon at St Helena; from the letters and
journals of the late Lieut.-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe, etc. 3 vols. London. 1853.
Houssaye, H.
1815. 3 vols. Paris. 1905. (The best account of the events from the return of
Napoleon to Paris after Waterloo until his embarkation.)
Rose, J. H.
The Detention of Napoleon at Saint Helena. (Historical Essays by the members of
Owens College, Manchester.) London. 1902.
The
Funeral of Napoleon and his last papers. [English Historical Review.
April 1902.]
Rosebery,
Earl of. Napoleon; the last phase. London. 1900.
Scott, Sir
Walter. Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, Emperor of the French. 9 vols. Edinburgh.
1827. New edn. 8 vols. Loudon. 1869-71.
Seaton, R. C.
Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon. London. 1898.
Napoleon’s Captivity in relation to Sir Hudson
Lowe. London. 1903.
Silvestre, T.
De Waterloo a Sainte-Hdlene. Paris. 1904.
Ussher, Sir
T. Napoleon’s last voyages; Elba and St Helena. London. 1895.
OF THE
PRINCIPAL
EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.
1774 The
Quebec Act.
Treaty of
Kutchuk-Kainardji.
1780 First
Armed Neutrality.
1784
Separation of New Brunswick and Cape Breton from Nova Scotia.
Foundation of
the North-West Company.
1786
Supplementary [East India] Act.
1788 Foundation of a colony at Sydney (N.S.W.) by
Captain Phillip.
Trading
settlement formed on Nootka Souud.
Trial of
Warren Hastings opens.
1789 Accession of Selim III.
Exploration
of the Hawkesbury and Nepean rivers.
1790 Peace of Werela (Russia and Sweden).
1790-5 Voyage
of Vancouver.
1791 Austro-Turkish Treaty at Sistova.
The
Constitutional Act for Canada.
Treaty of
Drottningholm.
1792 Assassination of Gustavus III.
Foundation of
the Colony of Sierra Leone.
Russo-Turkish
Treaty of Jassy.
Sir John
Shore appointed Governor General of India.
1792-4
British embassy to China.
1793 Convention between Great Britain and Russia.
Settlement of
New South Wales.
The Permanent
Settlement of Bengal.
1795 Jan.-Feb. Earl Fitzwilliam Viceroy in Ireland.
February.
Surrender of Ceylon by the Dutch to Great Britain.
April.
Acquittal of Warren Hastings.
September.
First British occupation of Cape Colony.
The French
Institute established.
1796 November. Death of the Empress Catharine II
and accession of Paul I. British conquest of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice.
1797 February. Treaty of commerce between Great
Britain and Russia. October. Peace of Campo Formio (France and Austria).
1798 April. Earl of Mornington appointed Governor
General of India.
June.
Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt. Surrender of Malta to the French. Irish
Insurrection.
1798 August. Battle of the Nile. Landing of a
French force in Killala Bay. November. Capitulation of Ancona.
Bass explores
Van Diemen’s Land.
1799 April. Defeat and death of Tipu Sultan of
Mysore.
October.
Surrender of the Duke of York at Alkmaar.
November.
Overthrow of the Directory (18 Brumaire).
Nov.-Dec. The
Provisional Consulate.
December.
Constitution of the year vm. Bonaparte First Consul. Conquest of the Ionian
Islands by the Russians and Turks.
1800 March. Election of Pope Pius VII. '
May.
Bonaparte crosses the St Bernard.
June. Battle
of Marengo.
,, French
victory at Hochstadt.
August. Union
of England and Ireland.
September.
Surrender of Malta to England.
November.
Renewal of hostilities in Germany and Italy.
December.
Battle of Hohenlinden.
The Second
Armed Neutrality.
1800-1 Toussaint L’Ouverture
holds San Domingo.
1801 January. Annexations of Russia in Georgia.
February.
Treaty of Luneville (France, Austria, and Germany).
March. Resignation
of Pitt.
„ Murder of
Paul I. Accession of Alexander I.
„ Treaty of
Florence.
April. Battle
of Copenhagen.
May. The
Constitution of Malmaison.
June.
Maritime convention between Great Britain and Russia.
„ Treaty of
Badajoz.
„ Treaty of
St Petersburg between Russia and Great Britain.
July. The
Concordat signed.
August.
Battle of Alexandria. Cairo taken.
September.
Re-organisation of the Batavian Republic.
Bonaparte
forms his flotilla in the Channel.
Destutt de
Tracy’s Ideologic.
1801-2 Sept.-Jan. Organisation of the Cisalpine
Republic.
1802 March. The Peace of Amiens (Great Britain,
France, Spain, etc.).
April.
Promulgation of the Concordat. The Articles Organiques passed. May. Napoleon
Bonaparte Consul for Life.
,, Creation
of the Legion of Honour.
August.
Constitution of the year x.
September.
Incorporation of Piedmont, etc., with France.
October.
Treaty of Bassein (East India Company and the Peshwa).
First English Factory Act.
Chateaubriand’s Le Genie du Christianisme.
Mme de Stael’s Corinne.
Foundation of
the Edinburgh Review.
1803 February. The Act of Mediation (Switzerland).
May.
Declaration of war between Great Britain and France.
August.
Outbreak of the Maratha War.
The
Beichsdeputationshauptschluss in Germany.
The Italian
Concordat,
Emmet’s
Rebellion in Ireland.
The British
take Guiana, Santa Lucia, Tobago, and Demerara.
Sale
of Louisiana to the United States. .
1804 March. The French Civil Code.
„ Cadoudal’s
plot. Execution of the Due d’Enghien.
April. Pitt’s
return to office.
May. Franco-Dutch
Treaty.
„ Napoleon
becomes Emperor of the French.
December.
Spain declares war against Great Britain.
„ Coronation
of Napoleon.
Capture of
Mecca and Medina by the Wahabites.
Death of
Gezzar Pacha.
Defeat of
Colonel Monson in Northern India.
1805 April. Treaty of St Petersburg between Great
Britain and Russia.
May. Napoleon
becomes King of Italy.
June. Code
NapoUon extended to Italy.
July.
Accession of Austria to the Treaty between Great Britain and Russia.
„ Battle of
Cape Finisterre.
October., Battle
of Trafalgar. Capitulation of Ulm.
November.
Convention between Prussia and the Allies.
„ Napoleon occupies Vienna.
December.
Battle of Austerlitz.
,, Treaty of Vienna between France and
Prussia.
Chateaubriand’s
Rene.
French
annexation of Genoa.
1806 January. Second and final British occupation
of Cape Colony.
„ Peace of
JPressburg between France and Austria.
„ Deatlf'of
Pitt. FoSt becomes Prime Minister.
Februaiy. The
Treaty of Paris (France and Prussia).
March.
Formation of the Grand Duchy of Berg.
„ Joseph
Bonaparte becomes King of Naples and Sicily.
June. Louis
Bonaparte becomes King of Holland.
June-July.
The Confederation of the Rhine constituted.
July. Battle
of Maida.
August.
Francis II abdicates the Empire and becomes Francis I, Emperor of Austria. End
of the Holy Roman Empire.
September.
Death of Fox. Ministry of All the Talents.
October. War
between France and Prussia.
„ Battles of
Jena and Auerstadt.
„ French
annexation of Prussian and other territories November. Napoleon’s Berlin Decree.
December. War
between Russia and Turkey.
French
absorption of Dalmatia and Ragusa.
Venice added
to the Italian Kingdom.
British
expedition to Buenos Ayres.
Servian
revolt.
Treaty with
Ranjit Singh.
1807 Jan. and Nov. British ‘ Orders in Council.’
February.
Battle of Eylau.
„ British
expeditions to Turkey and Egypt.
March. The
Portland Ministry formed. Canning becomes Foreign Secretary. April. Convention
of Bartenstein between Russia, Prussia, and Sweden. May. Death of the Sultan
Selim III.
June. Great
Britain accedes to the Convention of Bartenstein.
„ Battle of
Friedland.
July. Lord
Minto Governor-General in India. Mutiny at Vellore.
,, Treaty of
Tilsit between France and Russia.
1807 July. Treaty of Tilsit between France and
Prussia. Formation of the Grand
Duchy of
Warsaw. Extension of the Confederation of the Rhine. September. British seizure
of Danish fleet at Copenhagen.
October.
Stein becomes Minister of Home Affairs in Prussia.
„ Prussian
Edict of Emancipation. Scharnhorst’s military reforms. „ Franco-Spanish Treaty
at Fontainebleau.
Oct.-Nov.
French invasion of Portugal. Flight of the Portngnese royal family. Russia
declares war on Great Britain.
December. The
Milan Decree.
„ Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation.
French
Commercial Code.
Abolition of
slavery in the British dominions.
Completion of
the Simplon road connecting France with Italy.
Sir John
Malcolm’s first mission to Persia.
1808 Jan.-Oct. French Code of Criminal Procedure.
February.
Seizure of Spanish fortresses by French troops.
Feb.-March.
Russian invasion of Finland. The Act of Guarantee secures the liberties of the
Grand Duchy.
March.
Constitution of the Imperial University of France.
„ Revolution
of Aranjuez. Abdication of Charles IV.
May. The Dos
Mayo at Madrid. Abdication of Ferdinand at Bayonne.
„ Tuscany
annexed to France.
„ Joseph
Bonaparte becomes King of Spain.
„ The
Tugendbund formed at Konigsberg.
May-June.
General insurrection in Spain.
July.
Accession of Mahmoud II.
,,
Capitulation of Dupont at Baylen.
August. Arrival
of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Spain. Battle of Vimiero-..
Convention of
Cintra.
September.
The Convention of Paris.
October.
Congress and Convention of Erfurt.
December.
Napoleon invades Spain and occupies Madrid.
The March of
Ancona and the Duchies of Urbino, Macerata and Camerino., incorporated in the
Italian Kingdom.
Joachim
JVIurat succeeds to the Kingdom of Naples.
Stein’s
municipal reforms.
1808-9
Sir John Moore’s campaign.
1809 January. Battle of Corunna. Death of Moore.
„ Treaty of
the Dardanelles (England and Turkey).
March. Revolt
in Tyrol. Outbreak of war between France and Austria. „ French invasion of
Portugal.
„ Battle of
Medellin.
„ Revolution
in Sweden and Abdication of Gustavus IV.
,, Accession
of Charles XIII.
April.
Battles of Abensberg and Eckmuhl.
May.
Annexation of the Papal States by Napoleon.
„ Napoleon
enters Vienna.
„ Battle of
Aspem.
July.
Wellesley expels Soult from Portugal. Battle of Talavera.
„ Battle of
Wagram.
Jtdy-Nov. The
Walcheren expedition.
September.
Treaty of Frederikshamn (Russia and Sweden).
October.
Peace of Schonbrunn (France and Austria).
November.
Battle of Ocana.
1809 December. Treaty of Jonkoping (Denmark and
Sweden).
Foundation of
the Quarterly Review.
Lamarck
formulates the doctrine of evolution.
1810 January. Treaty of Paris between France and
Sweden.
February.
French conquest of Andalusia. Hofer shot at Mantua.
,, Home
becomes the second city in the French Empire.
March.
Napoleon marries the Archduchess Marie-Louise.
July.
Annexation of Holland to the French Empire.
August.
Massena’s invasion of Portugal.
,, Trianon
Tariff.
September.
Battle of Busaco. Lines of Torres Vedras formed.
October.
Fontainebleau Decrees. Sweden declares war on England. December. French
annexation of the north-west coast of Germany. French Penal Code decreed.
Dalberg’s
principality becomes the Grand Duchy of Frankfort.
French
annexation of the Valais.
The Italian
Tyrol added to the Kingdom of Italy.
Opening of
Berlin University.
British
capture of the lie de France (Mauritius).
1811 March. Birth of the King of Rome.
March-April.
Massena’s retreat into Spain.
May. Battle
of Fuentes d’Onoro.
,, Battle of
Albuera.
October.
Battle of Sagunto.
Peasant
proprietorship created in Prussia.
University of
Breslau incorporated.
Failure of harvest
all over Europe.
1812 April. Secret alliance between Sweden and
Russia.
May. Peace of
Bucharest (Russia and Turkey).
June. War
between France and Russia. Napoleon’s march on Moscow. „ Sicilian Parliament at
Palermo adopts a Constitution modelled on that of Great Britain.
July. Peace
between England and Russia, and England and Sweden.
„ Battle of
Salamanca. Wellington enters Madrid, but retires. September. Battle of
Borodino. Napoleon enters Moscow.
,, The burning of Moscow.
October.
French evacuation of Moscow. The retreat begins.
,, Malet’s
plot in Paris.
November. The
crossing of the Berezina.
, December.
Napoleon reaches Paris.
War between
England and the United States.
Byron’s
Ohilde Harold.
Constitution
established in Spain.
1813 January. Concordat of Fontainebleau.
February.
Convention of Kalisch (Russia and Prussia).
Feb.-March.
The War of Liberation opens.
May. Battle
of Bautzen.
May-August.
Armistice in Germany.
June. Battles
of Vittoria and the Pyrenees.
,, Treaty of
Reichenbach (Russia, Prussia, and Austria).
August.
Battle of Dresden.
September.
Battle of Kulm. Treaty of Teplitz (Austria and Prussia). October. Battle of
Leipzig.
Oct.-Nov.
Wellington crosses the Pyrenees into France.
1813 Renewal of the Charter of the East India Company
for twenty years. Crossing of the Blue Mountains and opening up of Bathurst
(Australia).
1814 January. Peace of Kiel (the Allies and
Denmark).
,, Pius VII
returns to Rome.
February.
Conference of Chatillon-sur-Seine.
March. Treaty
of Chaumont. Battle of Laon.
„ The Allies
enter Paris and establish a Provisional Government. April. Abdication of
Napoleon. Louis XVIII returns to Paris.
,, Battle of
Toulouse. The French Constitutional Charter.
May. First
Peace of Paris.
August.
‘Family Peace’ of Berlin.
September.
The Congress of Vienna meets.
November.
Election of Charles XIII of Sweden to the throne of Norway. British treaty with
Persia. Opening of the trade with India.
1815 January. Defensive Triple Alliance of Great
Britain, Austria, and France. March. Declaration of the Congress of Vienna
against the Slave Trade.
,, Return of
Napoleon. Flight of Louis XVIII.
„ Treaties
between Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia against Bonaparte.
March-June.
The Hundred Days.
June.
Adoption of the Federal Act at the Congress of Vienna.
,, Adoption
of the Final Act by the Congress of Vienna.
„ Battles of
Ligny and Quatre Bras.
„ Battle of
Waterloo.
„ Second
abdication of Napoleon.
July. Second
French Restoration. Return of Louis XVIII.
October.
Napoleon lands on St Helena.
November.
Second Peace of Paris.
1821 May.
Death of Napoleon.