



THE
HISTORY OF THE POPES

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

DRAWN FROM THE SECRET ARCHIVES OF THE VATICAN AND OTHER
ORIGINAL SOURCES

FROM THE GERMAN OF THE LATE

LUDWIG, FREIHERR VON PASTOR

TRANSLATED BY

E. F. PEELER

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CHAPTER I.

HONTHEIM'S RECANTATION—THE ERECTION OF A NUNCIATURE IN MUNICH.

(1)

“ You are accepting in the name of Christ the mission of guarding and taking under your protection, on the Rhine, the faith and the authority of the Apostolic *Cathedra* of St. Peter, whence derives the priestly dignity of all Bishops.” These words were spoken by Pius VI. in St. Peter's on September 24th, 1775, when he had consecrated Carlo Bellisomi Bishop and had dispatched him as nuncio to Cologne.¹ Clearly a Pope who granted commissions in this decisive fashion intended to deal differently from his predecessor with the ecclesiastical movements in Western Germany.

Pius VI.'s principal aim was to win over Klemens Wenzeslaus, Elector of Trier, and through him to induce the author of the *Febronius*, whose identity had long since ceased to be unknown, to recant his dangerous doctrines. It was with this idea in mind that the Pope spoke in his allocution of the special ecclesiastical and political conditions that prevailed in the Rhenish dioceses, alluding thereby in an unmistakable way to the composition and distribution of anti-clerical books, even by high-ranking Catholic dignitaries. The sharpness of the words he used in referring to these facts indicate the personal feeling with which he observed the growth of the evil.

Bellisomi arrived in Cologne on January 4th, 1776. In early June of that year he paid his visit to the Archbishop of Trier

¹ The address was quickly published in printed form by the Apostolic Camera. Reproduced in LEBRET, *Magazin*, V., 351 *seqq.*, and in *Bull. Cont.*, VI., I, 158 *seqq.* The passage quoted will be found there under § 2, p. 159.—This section on Febronius is based partly on preliminary work done by Professor Vierneisel of Heidelberg.

at Coblenz, where he stayed five days.¹ He took the opportunity of speaking with the Archbishop perfectly openly about the *Febronius*, whose author resided in his territory and who, with all his scholarship, was endangering the rights of the Roman See to such an extent that the Pope had given him, the nuncio, a definite commission in the matter.

These representations of the nuncio, which could have had no other object than to pave the way for negotiations, fell on ground that was not entirely unprepared. Since the Alsatian Franz Heinrich Beck had come within the inner circle of the Archbishop's acquaintances, in 1773, things had not been the same in Trier as in the days when the Elector had given his suffragan Bishop protection and security without hesitation. Beck,² who had had the advantage of being trained in Strasbourg, had worked as a member of the Society of Jesus in Alsace, and then in Württemberg. For some time now he had been exerting a considerable influence on the Electoral Court of Trier, and in an anti-Febronian direction.

It may have been at Beck's instigation that in 1775 Klemens Wenzeslaus asked the Archbishop of Paris to obtain the opinion of the French assembly of the clergy on the *Febronius*, the principles of the French Church being Hontheim's great authority. The opinion sent from Paris³ turned out unfavourably for Hontheim; it rejected Febronius's attack on the Papacy, brought out sharply its divergences from the Gallican conception, and reprehended its inaccuracy in questions of the highest importance. The Elector now wanted the work to be censored by the Sorbonne, and the basis for this was to be a thorough examination of Febronius's volumes. The most suitable person for the task seemed to be the Roman

¹ MEJER, 276.

² *Ibid.*, 101 *seqq.*, 283 *seqq.* For Beck, see J. GASS, in the *Revue catholique d'Alsace*, XXXIX. (1924), 2 *seqq.*; *cf. id.*, *La disgrâce de l'abbé F. H. Beck*, *ibid.*, 615 *seqq.*

³ *Coup d'œil sur le congrès d'Ems* (Düsseldorf, 1787), 101 *seqq.* Klemens Wenzeslaus attached the opinion to his *letter to Bellisomi of July 14, 1776 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, Papal Secret Archives).

Dominican Thomas Maria Mamachi,¹ a distinguished scholar and archæologist from Chios, who in the years that followed was to prove to be a notable literary opponent of Febronianism. In the form of letters, the first volumes of which appeared in 1776 and 1777,² he assembled very skilfully the logical and factual weaknesses of the Febronian system.

Bellisomi expressed his agreement with the Elector's intentions, especially as his zeal had been commended to him by the Cardinal Secretary of State; all that he wanted now was that the Pope should be informed.³ Klemens Wenzeslaus agreed to this, provided that his intentions were kept secret. Meanwhile he was eagerly awaiting Mamachi's opinion.⁴

In Rome, however, this manner of procedure seemed to offer no definite solution.⁵ Pius VI. was convinced that Febronius's system could only be rendered harmless by inducing its author

¹ Cf. **ibid.*; KÜNTZIGER, 100 *seqq.*

² "Fr. Thomae Mariae Mamachi Ord. Praed. Theologi Casanatensis Epistolarum ad Iustinum Febronium ICtum de ratione regendae Christianae Reipublicae deque legitima Romani Pontificis potestate liber primus," Romae, 1776 (liber secundus 1777). As a reward Mamachi was appointed Secretary to the Congregation of the Index. Cf. also *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi on August 23, 1776 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*). Mamachi's work was not permitted in Vienna (*Pallavicini to Garampi, September 22 and October 26, 1776; Nunziat. di Germania, 667, *loc. cit.*). Cf. GENDRY, I., 191.

³ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, July 27, 1776 (Nunziat. di Germania, *loc. cit.*). In the *Cifra to Bellisomi of February 22, 1776 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, *ibid.*) the Elector is commended for his efforts to have the *Febronius* banned by the Sorbonne.

⁴ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, November 20, 1776 (*ibid.*).

⁵ *Cifra to Bellisomi, November 2, 1776 (*ibid.*); *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, December 2, 1776 (*ibid.*, 772). In this letter the Archbishop asked for information about the decrees of the Index against Febronius and for a summary of all the episcopal prohibitions. Bellisomi sent him a list of the latter *on January 2, 1777, but the information about the Index was sent to the nuncio in confidence only, under date *March 1, 1777 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*; cf. *ibid.* 772).

to make a formal recantation. Besides, the Archbishop of Paris considered that a censure by the Sorbonne would be impracticable, as Hontheim's work had been banned by Bishops only, at the Papal desire, not expressly by the Pope himself.¹ Klemens Wenzeslaus regretted the failure of his plan and signified his readiness to pave the way for the course proposed by Rome.

Bishop Hontheim, however, thought that his position was as unassailable as ever. Certainly his superior had given him a clear sign of his displeasure by nominating as Coadjutor the Strasbourg Regens, Herbain,² with whose *processus informativus* Garampi, the nuncio to Vienna, had been charged,³ but Hontheim was so little disturbed by this that in the summer of 1777 he was bold enough to publish a shortened edition of his work, which had finally become unwieldy. This *Febro-nianus abbreviatus*,⁴ which was adapted even more than the previous editions to the widest possible circulation and already contained an answer to the first volume of Mamachi's letters,

¹ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, Munich, January 28, 1777 (*ibid.*, 189A); cf. *Cifra to Doria, the nuncio to France, of April 3, 1776 (Nunziat. di Francia, 461A, fo. 109, *loc. cit.*).

² Hontheim had suggested other names, but they were not considered. The proposal to appoint Herbain was *reported by Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi on March 31, 1777 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *ibid.*). Cf. MARX, *Geschichte des Erzstiftes Trier*, V., 118.

³ *Cifra to Garampi of June 28, 1777 (Nunziat. di Germania, 667, *loc. cit.*). For the difficulties encountered in the *processus informativus*, cf. *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi on June 2, 1777 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*); cf. *Cifra to Bellisomi of July 16, 1777 (*ibid.* 772). Herbain was consecrated Bishop on May 31, 1778.

⁴ "Iustinus Febro-nianus abbreviatus et emendatus, id est de statu Ecclesiae Tractatus, ex Sacra Scriptura, Traditione et melioris notae Catholicis Scriptoribus adornatus, ab Auctore ipso in hoc Compendium redactus," Coloniae et Francofurti, 1777. Cf. ZILICH, 36. Klemens Wenzeslaus *wrote on August 14, 1777, that he was trying to procure a copy (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*).

announced itself on the very title-page as the production of the same author who had compiled the larger work.

As early as March of this year Rome apparently had thought that it would not be long before Hontheim would resign his office,¹ but the appearance of the shortened *Febronius* called for fresh measures.² The nuncio Bellisomi was asked to try and persuade all the Bishops to ban the book, though in so doing he was to take every precaution.³ However, the steps taken by Bellisomi were not successful. Bishop von der Asseburg, of Paderborn, replied⁴ that it was better to treat such books with contempt than to ban them, while the Bishop of Hildesheim, Friedrich Wilhelm von Westfalen, feared that a fresh censoring would do serious harm to his diocese.⁵ Würzburg⁶ and Fulda⁷ were willing to ban the book, but only when the necessity to do so was evident, whereas Liége preferred to let it die a natural death by saying nothing whatever about it.⁸ Even Von Limburg-Stirum, the Bishop of Speyer, said that he was more than willing to proceed against the book but that they must not forget that a poor impression would be made if only some of the German Bishops raised their voice against it.⁹

A second visit of Bellisomi's to Klemens Wenzeslaus, in August 1777, at his hunting lodge, Cärlich, did not advance

¹ The Pope's hope that the news of Hontheim's resignation would be verified was mentioned in the **Cifra* to Bellisomi of March 8, 1777 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772).

² The Cardinal Secretary of State had already received a copy in September (**Cifra* to Garampi, September 27, 1777; Nunziat. di Germania, 667, *loc. cit.*) and he sent it on to Mamachi to be refuted (**Cifra* to Garampi of December 6, 1777, *ibid.*).

³ **Cifra* to Bellisomi, November 8, 1777 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ *Under date December 14, 1777 (*ibid.* 189A).

⁵ *Under date December 15, 1777 (*ibid.*).

⁶ *Under date January 5, 1778 (*ibid.*).

⁷ *Under date January 7, 1778 (*ibid.*).

⁸ *Under date December 24, 1777 (*ibid.*).

⁹ *Letter from Bruchsal under date January 7, 1778 (*ibid.*).

the matter to any appreciable extent.¹ It was only through the movement originating soon afterwards in another literary event and through the chance implication in it of the suffragan Bishop of Trier, that the ball was set rolling again.

Johann Lorenz Isenbiehl,² one-time chaplain to the students at Göttingen, since 1773 professor of Oriental languages and exegesis in the university of Mainz, had contested in his lectures that the passage from the prophet Isaias (vii, 14) referred to the Messiah and his virginal conception and birth. The Elector of Mainz, Emmerich Joseph, did no more than reprimand Isenbiehl, but when the new Archbishop, Friedrich Karl Joseph von Erthal, removed him from his post, Isenbiehl employed his enforced leisure in elaborating his opinion in a written work, which appeared in 1777 under the title *Ein neuer Versuch über die Weissagung vom Emanuel* ("A fresh attempt to explain the foretelling of Emmanuel"). The author's name was given, but not the place of publication, which was Coblenz. The ecclesiastical authorities at Mainz now dealt with him more severely,³ and on the strength of an opinion given by the theological faculty they suspended him from the exercise of his priestly faculties and committed him to the vicariate prison. Although six of the Canons offered to go bail for him, the conditions of his confinement were only slightly alleviated and after an unsuccessful attempt at escape they were reimposed in their former strictness.

Meanwhile Mainz had obtained the opinions of various other

¹ According to Krufft (MEJER, 228) the Elector had by this time already decided against Hontheim. On August 24, 1777, Bellisomi *reported from Cärlich to the Pope (Nunziat. di Colonia, 187, *loc. cit.*) that he had found the Archbishop entirely submissive towards Rome.

² Fully dealt with in WALCH, *Religionsgeschichte*, VIII. (1781), 7 *seqq.* Cf. also ERSCH-GRUBER, *Allg. Enzykl.*, 2. Sektion, 23./24. Teil (1844), 339 *seqq.*; *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, XIV., 618 *seqq.*; *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, VI², 860 *seqq.*; KÜNTZIGER, 105 *seqq.*

³ The severe treatment of Isenbiehl by the Mainz authorities was noted with approval in the **Cifra* to Bellisomi of May 23, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, *loc. cit.*).

theological faculties.¹ The suggestion that Rome should ban the book seems first to have come from Bishop Von Limburg-Stirum,² who through his agent speeded up the leisurely process with which Rome was dealing with the matter.³ Finally the Bishop wrote himself to the Pope, enclosing a number of judgments. Under Pius VI.'s personal presidency a formal prohibition of the book was issued, on account of its "assertions which either favoured heresy or were heretical in themselves".⁴ Isenbiehl submitted without demur at the

¹ The first condemnation of the book, even before it had appeared in print, had already taken place in 1775, at the hands of the Viennese censorship, although Rautenstrauch, the director of the theological faculty in Vienna, had written to Isenbiehl on April 19, 1775, that he had found nothing unorthodox in the book (LEBRET, VIII., 22 *seq.*). The most severe judgment from the personal point of view was that of Heidelberg, of March 17, 1778; that of Strasbourg (April 5, 1778) was merciless, too, objectively; the most lenient judgment was that of Salzburg (April 21, 1778), though it was afterwards made more stringent (WALCH, *loc. cit.* 56 *seq.*). On August 1 the Sorbonne denounced the book as being rash, pernicious, scandalous, and erroneous.

² J. RÖSSLER, *Die kirchliche Aufklärung unter dem Speierer Fürstbischof August v. Limburg-Stirum*, Würzburg, 1914, 21 *seqq.*; *cf.* *Cifra to Bellisomi of June 13, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772) and *Cifra to Garampi (Stirum commended) of June 23, 1778 (Nunziat. di Germania 667, Papal Secret Archives).

³ There the book had first to be translated into Latin (RÖSSLER, 27). For its investigation by the Inquisition *v.* *Cifra to Bellisomi of October 17, 1778 (*loc. cit.*); *cf.* also *Cifra to Garampi of August 29, 1778 (*ibid.*).

⁴ "Continentem doctrinam et propositiones respectue falsas, temerarias, scandalosas, perniciosas, erroneas, haeresi faventes et haeticas." The observation that the book had been printed without approbation was erroneous. Bull of September 20, 1779, and the Mainz formula of publication in SCHLÖZER, *Briefwechsel*, 6. Teil (1780), 364 *seqq.*; *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 1, 621; *cf.* REUSCH, *Index*, 998 *seq.*; *Cifra to Caleppi of September 22, 1779 (Nunziat. di Germania, 667, *loc. cit.*). The course of the investigation of Isenbiehl's book was described in detail by the Pope in his two

end of December, 1779.¹ Later the Archbishop conferred upon him a valuable canonry, while in all his subsequent publications Isenbiehl upheld the authority of the Church's doctrinal decisions without qualification.

The Isenbiehl case was connected with a turning-point in Hontheim's career. The Mainz scholar had sent the Suffragan the proofs of his *Fresh Attempt* in order to have his opinion on it and also probably to use it to his advantage. After some time Hontheim gave him a favourable opinion: he could not agree with the main thesis of the book, but he could see no real reason why the learned and industrious work should conflict with faith and why it should not be printed, if only to stimulate other scholars.²

Unfortunately for Hontheim, this rashly given verdict of his seems to have been made public immediately, and it lost him his Archbishop's good opinion of him. In a letter of April 4th, 1778, Klemens Wenzeslaus rebuked him in vigorous language, censuring not only his rashness and ignorance but also the implacable hostility towards the Church that was patent in his letter.³ Hontheim, though he could have cited the opinions of reputable theologians who had gone even further than he had,⁴ declared that he was ready to do anything his superior

*Briefs of September 25, 1779, to the Archbishop of Mainz and the Bishop of Speyer (*Epist.*, V., 87, 93; Papal Secret Archives).

¹ Isenbiehl signed his submission on Christmas Day, 1779. REUSCH, *loc. cit.*

² Hontheim's letter to Isenbiehl written from Trier on November 6, 1777, in reply to one of September 4, 1777 (LEBRET, VIII., 24 *seq.*). This view was taken by the two theologians who were officially asked for their opinions: the regular Trier censor, Philipp Cordier, on November 4, 1777, and subsequently the exegetist Johann Gertz on February 1, 1778 (*ibid.*, 24, 30 *seqq.*). Cf. *Cifra to Bellisomi, July 18, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772; Papal Secret Archives).

³ Klemens Wenzeslaus *wrote to Bellisomi on June 12, 1778, that as soon as he had heard of Hontheim's approval of Isenbiehl's book he had tried to make him withdraw it (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A; *loc. cit.*).

⁴ E.g. the Suffragan Bishop of Speyer, Seelmann (under date

might ask of him. He could not bear, he said, such disfavour any longer and he assured the Archbishop of his readiness to give his life for the Catholic Church, great as was the distinction he had to draw between the Roman Church and the overweening demands of the Roman Court.¹

This qualification touched on one of the main ideas contained in the *Febronius* and gave the Archbishop an excuse for making some representations to his Suffragan about the book.² As Hontheim, he wrote, had shown a conciliatory spirit towards his Archbishop in the Isenbiehl affair, he might do the same in the case of *Febronius*. He had no desire to start an academic dispute, but it was his duty to establish the harmfulness of those dangerous doctrines and to remove the scandal from his archdiocese. In earnestly advising him to retract the January 16, 1778), and the opinion obtained by Dalberg, the representative of the Electorate of Mainz, from the Würzburg theologian Oberthür (of December 22, 1777). LEBRET, VIII., 25 seq. ; RÖSSLER, 23.

¹ Letter from Hontheim of April 9, in LEBRET, VII., 3 seq. ; STÜMPER, 159.

² To Hontheim, April 21, 1778, in *Briefwechsel zwischen Klemens Wenzeslaus und Niklas von Hontheim*, Frankfurt a.M., 1813, 5 seqq. The editor of this booklet, which consists only of the Archbishop's letters with enclosures, signs the preface with the letter "V". This stands for Niklas Vogt, as he tells us himself in his *Rheinische Geschichten und Sagen*, IV. (1836), 225. Cf. also the *Cifra to Garampi of May 30, 1778: "Se nel giustificarsi l'Hontheim col signor elettore di Treviri sulla sconsigliata approvazione del libro del sacerdote Isenbiehl non ha saputo dissimulare il suo mal talento contro i sommi pontefici, come risulta da uno dei fogli annessi alla Cifra di V. S. Ill^{ma} dei 7 spirante, parmi che molto meno sia sperabile la ritrattazione insinuatagli dal ridetto zelante arcivescovo, la di cui sensata del pari ed affettuosa lettera, quando anche non giungesse ad eccitare alcun rimorso nell' autore del Febronio, servirà nondimeno a reprimere la folle di lui presunzione, ed a fargli vieppiù comprendere in quale orribile combustione abbia egli tentato di porre il cattolicismo e la chiesa col da lui mal' inteso progetto della riunione degli eterodossi al grembo dell' antica lor madre . . ." Nunziat. di Germania, 667, fo.368, loc. cit.

Febronius he was prompted by his own conviction, not by the exhortations of others. If the Suffragan agreed to recant, he would gladly restore him to his full confidence and join him in clearing the ground of all the weeds.

The promptness and the wholeheartedness with which Hontheim agreed to fulfil the Archbishop's request must have surprised the latter. Hontheim expressed his willingness to write immediately to Rome a letter of apology and retractation. Klemens Wenzeslaus congratulated him most joyfully on this splendid victory over himself¹ and readily agreed to his taking a month or two to prepare his letter to Rome. A summary, compiled by a Frenchman, of the objectionable propositions in the *Febronius* contained sixteen of them, to the astonishment of the Elector, who admitted,² when forwarding the summary to Hontheim, that this was the first time he was aware that such propositions were to be found in the *Febronius*. On receiving Hontheim's draft of the proposed missive to Rome, in mid-June, 1778, the Elector was "profoundly comforted and was even moved to tears of joy".³ Nevertheless, lest he might be too hasty, he deemed it necessary to have

¹ To Hontheim, May 8, 1778, *Briefwechsel*, 12 seqq. MARX (V., 119) ascribes the compilation of the objectionable propositions to the French theologian Bergier, whereas Krufft thought it was Canon Pey of Notre Dame, Paris (MEKER, 228 seq.).

² To Hontheim on May 29, 1778 (*Briefwechsel*, 15 seqq.), in reply to his letter of May 10. Hontheim now held back the manuscript, which he had just completed and was about to be sent to the printer, of his confutation of Mamachi's second book of letters. Krufft pressed very hard for the publication of this *Epistola ad Th. Mamachium*, but it did not take place; the manuscript, however, came into the Pope's hands in 1782 through the agency of Klemens Wenzeslaus. The text of this manuscript (Cod. Vat. 11824 of the Vatican Library) was published by LEO JUST in the *Quellen und Forschungen aus ital. Archiven*, XXII. (1930), 256-288.

³ Hontheim's *missive of June 14, 1778, was *acknowledged by the Elector on the 23rd (both documents in Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, Papal Secret Archives). The latter is dated the 22nd in the *Briefwechsel* (19 seq.).

the draft examined carefully, again by a Frenchman. The fact was that in the meantime slight suspicions of Hontheim's sincerity had been aroused in the Elector's mind by a further letter of June 25th, in which the Suffragan had quoted fresh authorities and view-points in defence of the *Febronius* and in refutation of the opinion that had been sent to him. Klemens Wenzeslaus, understandably enough, wrote a sharp reply to this letter¹ and asked Hontheim "to consider everything without prejudice, together with God and his conscience". The result he would gladly forward to Rome.

From this point onward one event followed another in rapid succession. On August 2nd Klemens Wenzeslaus sent on Hontheim's draft, which was couched in the form of a dogmatic confession, to Bellisomi, the nuncio to Cologne, expressing the hope that the Pope would be satisfied with it.² Bellisomi forwarded it a few days later to the Cardinal Secretary of State.³ So soon after as August 22nd Pius VI. was writing a commendatory Brief to the Elector of Trier, signifying in the strongest way his joy and gratitude for what had been effected.⁴ Something, he added, had been found in the document which was of no great importance in itself but which might provide the enemy with an opportunity for contradiction. Having promised his complete submission, Hontheim would doubtless make the necessary adjustments in these small matters. Instead of threats, the Pope made the most attractive promises : if Hontheim did what was asked, he would not only forgive him but he would bestow upon him, along with the reconciliation, his entire affection and paternal

¹ On July 16, 1778 (*Briefwechsel*, 21 *seqq.*). Hontheim's letter was accompanied by a detailed refutation in Latin of the sixteen points set out in the French opinion. (MEJER, 303 *seqq.*).

² *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, August 2, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*, together with the original of Hontheim's retraction).

³ Hontheim's letter, with the Elector's *covering letter of August 2, was *forwarded by Bellisomi to Rome under date August 5 (*ibid.*).

⁴ *Briefwechsel*, 27 *seqq.*, also in Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*

love. Finally it was the Pope's desire that in the future the learned Suffragan should use his erudition to repair the scandal that had been spread throughout the whole Church.

On September 17th Klemens Wenzeslaus passed this Brief¹ on to his Suffragan, with the note that presumably there was nothing to hinder the fulfilment of the Papal wishes.² He also spoke for the first time—and this surprised Hontheim more than anything—of making the recantation public. On the same day as he received this letter the Suffragan wrote back³ that he would readily fulfil the wishes of Rome but that he had the greatest misgivings about a public recantation. If he acknowledged his authorship, which hitherto he had never openly admitted but on the contrary had consistently denied, all that he had built up so laboriously during his thirty years' work in the archdiocese would be brought down in ruins. A more suitable procedure, in his opinion, would be for him to publish under his own name a work that would confute all the Febronian ideas and would contain the main points of the recantation. The Elector, however, would have none of these objections and in a letter of October 4th⁴ insisted that it was precisely the acknowledged learning of the author that would make a recantation more effective than a confutation. On this point, as on others, it was best to submit entirely to the will of the Holy Father.

The Suffragan, who in the meantime had retired to his

¹ *Briefwechsel*, 25 seq. Krufft (MEJER, 231, 294 seq.) attaches particular importance to the Elector's stay of a few days in Trier at the beginning of September, but there is no evidence of this in the other documents nor any question of intimidation.

² *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, September 9, 1778 (promising to carry out the Pope's commands and assuring him of Hontheim's willingness). (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*).

³ On September 17, 1778 (CARDAUNS, *Ehrengabe für Joh. Georg von Sachsen*, 739 seq.). The nuncio informed Rome of these doubts and difficulties in his *report of October 15, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ *Briefwechsel*, 31 seq.; cf. Bellisomi's *report to Rome of October 15, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*).

country residence, while yielding to the Pope's desire, made one last attempt to avoid the pain of self-exposure.¹ But Klemens Wenzeslaus would not relax his stringency and demanded the disregard of all human considerations.² At the same time he forwarded another Papal Brief, of September 12th, requiring Hontheim to declare in his recantation that he had written it because of his own sincere convictions and not at anyone's command. He would find enclosed the alterations and improvements desired by Rome.³

Making no further objection, the Suffragan submitted his recantation to his superior on November 1st, 1778, and it was forwarded by the latter to Bellisomi on the 15th.⁴ Only one brief phrase had been omitted, that which acknowledged the monarchical constitution of the Church,⁵ for which omission Klemens Wenzeslaus accepted personal responsibility.⁶ In all other respects the Papal wishes had been met. The Elector, in a covering letter,⁷ briefly surveyed the whole affair, including his own attitude towards it, and begged the Papal pardon for his Suffragan Bishop, who had now cast aside all false pride and was willing to acknowledge himself openly as the author,

¹ Hontheim to Klemens Wenzeslaus, from Montquintin, October 14, 1778 (CARDAUNS, *loc. cit.*, 740 seq.).

² To Hontheim, October 17, 1778 (*Briefwechsel*, 33 seq.). On October 6 Klemens Wenzeslaus had *thanked the nuncio Bellisomi for the Brief he had transmitted and expressed the fear that Hontheim was unlikely to make a public acknowledgment of his authorship of the *Febronius*. Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*

³ *Brief to Klemens Wenzeslaus of September 12, 1778 (*ibid.*); *Briefwechsel*, 35 seq.; REUSCH, 942 seq. Zaccaria was credited with the chief responsibility for the improvements desired by Rome (borne out by Krufft, in MEJER 296).

⁴ The Elector's covering letter to the nuncio in *Briefwechsel*, 40 seq.; cf. STÜMPER, 160.

⁵ "ut proinde merito monarchicum Ecclesiae regimen a catholicis Doctoribus appelletur."

⁶ To Hontheim, November 15, 1778 (*Briefwechsel*, 38).

⁷ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Pius VI., from Ehrenbreitstein, November 15, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*; published with the consistorial acts mentioned below).

which was the best possible proof of the sincerity of his repentance.¹

Hontheim's recantation² was an important document, for, with the improvements considered necessary by the Pope, it included all the essential features of the Church's doctrine on the primacy.

In the introduction Hontheim acknowledges himself to be the author of the *Febronius* and of the works written in its defence, and he regrets the insult thereby offered to the Holy See and the errors arising from an ill-considered zeal. "The authority of Your Holiness, which I recognize as that of Jesus Christ, has freed me from error, and I hereby lay my real views³ on the constitution of the Church and the supreme rights of St. Peter as the Prince of the Apostles at the feet of his successor. It is in this belief that I wish to live and die." Citing the authoritative sources of the Church's teaching and confuting the erroneous opinions put forward in the *Febronius*, Hontheim proceeds to make his declarations about the Church and the primacy, the succession from St. Peter and the right of the Bishops, and finally about the relation between the Church and the State.

He perceives and confesses that the keys of the Church have been given to Peter alone, who as its supreme member next to Christ and as its director and leader under Christ is the representative of the whole body. At the same time, however, the keys have been given to the unity of the universal Church, to the other Apostles and the Bishops, in dependence on and in submission to Peter, who has received the keys for himself alone, to use them in common with the others. As is known by the teaching of the Fathers, by this appointment of one supreme head of the Church the possibility of disunion has been precluded. "*Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia.*"

The successor of St. Peter is by divine right the Bishop of

¹ Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, November 18, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*).

² *Original *ibid.*

³ "genuinos animi mei sensus."

Rome, who has complete power over the universal Church, with authority, jurisdiction, and the power to punish, in particular the right of excommunication. The Bishops who adhere to their supreme head cannot possibly stray from the path of truth, since the Church at one with its head, whether scattered over the surface of the globe or assembled in council,¹ cannot err in decisions affecting faith and morals nor separate itself from the cathedra of the Prince of the Apostles. The faithful have to abide by these decisions, not only in respectful silence but with inward assent. Similar obedience must be given to the Constitution *Unigenitus*, which is a dogmatic decree of the Holy See.

Doubts about the constitution of the Church are also to be brought before the Head of the Church. It is his right, too, to summon General Councils, to direct them, and confirm their findings; it is only through his co-operation that they acquire validity and infallibility. Very rightly the Council of Trent has reserved to the Pope the right to take disciplinary action against the Bishops, also the decision in particularly difficult cases and exceptional dispensations from conciliar decisions. Likewise, the Pope's right to ordain, translate, or depose Bishops is incontestable.

Then come the recognition and declaration of the powers of the Holy See in regard to canonizations, appeals, and reservations, and the State is requested to observe concordats with the greatest care, for the Pope would not think of infringing them. The annates, too, were of great use, until the Holy See had devised some other means of meeting its needs, also the exemption of the Regulars, which could not be abolished by the secular power or by a particular synod. Abuses had been guarded against by the Council of Trent.

The Bishops are installed, not by the body of the faithful, but by the Holy Ghost, to direct the flocks entrusted to them, under the control of the Bishop of Rome, and only within

¹ "in quibus Episcopi iure proprio ac iudiciaria potestate sibi ex institutione Christi cohaerente una cum Summo Pontifice definiunt."

their dioceses, not outside them. Their rights, in so far as they have been circumscribed by canon law in the course of time, are not to be extended on the strength of private authority.

“ In everything that concerns the faith, the sacraments, and ecclesiastical discipline, the Church makes its decisions entirely by its own right (*pleno iure*) without the co-operation of the civil authority.” In the mutual protective relation between the Church and State the desire and the right of the Church are to be respected, and every effort should be made to avoid a conflict.

With these unequivocal statements the rights of the Papacy were recognized. In conclusion the writer expressed his sincere willingness to do anything further that the Pope might require of him in the matter. In begging pardon for his errors he professed his adherence to the Church of Rome as the Mother of all Christians in the clear language of St. Bernard and St. Jerome, without pretence or deception.

The great importance attached by Rome to the Febronius affair¹ was shown by the very solemn way in which the Pope himself undertook the publication of the retractation. After the Mass of Christmas Day he assembled the Senate of the Church in a secret consistory at the tomb of St. Leo, where he imparted to them the joyful news. The session² was opened

¹ The Pope also expressed his satisfaction in a **Cifra* to Bellisomi of December 5, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772; Papal Secret Archives).

² “ Acta in consistorio secreto habito a SS. D. N. Pio div. prov. Papa sexto feria VI Dec. MDCCLXXVIII solemnī dominicæ nativitatis die statim post missam pontificalem in basilica Vaticana prope B.M.V. de Columna et S. Leonis Magni altaria, qui locus nunc pro sacrario est, nondum novo quod construitur absoluto.” They were printed in the press of the Apostolic Camera and reprinted several times. Cf. *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 529-541 (the date given here, 529, is December 19, but in 541, § 9, it is quite clearly the 25th). The course of the consistorial proceedings was also *reported by Cardinal Albani to the imperial chancery in Vienna on December 26, 1778 (Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican; cf. WOKER, 27 seqq.; GENDRY, I., 192 seqq.).

by Pius VI. with an allocution in which he recalled the evil effects of the *Febronius*, formally named its real author for the first time, and gave prominence to the services of the Archbishop of Trier in settling the matter. Then the Secretary of the Briefs, Benedetto Stay, read the Elector's covering letter and Hontheim's complete retractation. In a further allocution the Pope laid stress on the obvious sincerity of the withdrawal, which had been made without any compulsion and was due solely to the recognition of the truth. He ended by granting Hontheim full pardon and by receiving him back with affection into the Apostolic peace.

Some days before, on December 19th, 1778, two Briefs had been made out,¹ informing the two prelates of Trier that the reconciliation had been completed and calling on Hontheim to compose an anti-Febronian work, which alone could add more weight to his recantation. Klemens Wenzeslaus knew nothing of the Christmas consistory when he forwarded the Brief to his Suffragan on January 11th and congratulated him on the successful struggle with himself.² Hontheim, he thought, having won the most splendid battle with himself, had more right than anyone to sing a song of victory, and for this reason too he himself could tell the world of the reconciliation that had been completed. He also encouraged him to undertake the new work.

A few days later the Elector received the news about the Christmas consistory, and in another letter to his Suffragan

¹ *Parchment originals in Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A (*loc. cit.*). There too are several *congratulatory letters to Pius VI. In a *Brief of July 24, 1779 (Epist. A° V, fo. 50, *ibid.*) the Pope thanked Duke Ludwig Eugen of Württemberg for his letter of congratulation of January 22, 1779. In another letter, of January 6, 1779, the Cardinal Secretary of State congratulated Klemens Wenzeslaus and praised his services (MEJER, 140 *seq.*).

² *Briefwechsel*, 43 *seqq.* Klemens Wenzeslaus *reported on this to Bellisomi under date January 12, 1779 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*). The Elector did not want to announce the recantation ("one might think that I wanted to trumpet the victory"). *Briefwechsel*, 45.

he pointed out that the Pope's gentle method of procedure was evidence of his great paternal joy at the settlement of the trouble. This should make it all the easier for the Suffragan to inform his diocese also of his change of opinion. The Elector offered to have the proceedings of the consistory printed at his own expense, while Hontheim should announce in a foreword to them, in a pastoral letter, the motives of his recantation, his sorrow for his lapse, a promise to produce shortly an anti-Febronian work, and the prohibition of the writings he had recanted.¹ Hontheim signified his assent, but in the draft of his pastoral letter he tried to obtain some alleviations for himself, so that it did not entirely satisfy the Elector, who had to make some alterations in it.² The Elector also did his best to remove Hontheim's dissatisfaction with the publication made by Rome.³

On January 24th, 1779, the Suffragan wrote to the Pope ⁴

¹ *Briefwechsel*, 46 seq. Klemens Wenzeslaus *reported this to Bellisomi on January 15, 1779 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*) and *Bellisomi to Rome on January 21 (189A, *ibid.*).

² Klemens Wenzeslaus to Hontheim on February 1, 1779 (*Briefwechsel*, 52 seq., with enclosure, *ibid.* 62 seqq.). Hontheim thought that he had written the letter in such a way as to satisfy his supporters in Vienna as well as Rome (*cf.* his letter to Krufft of February 4, 1779, in MEJER, 149, n. 1). Except for a few characteristic variations he finally adopted the desired phrasings almost word for word.

³ Hontheim's letter of January 21 was answered by Klemens Wenzeslaus on the 24th (*Briefwechsel*, 49 seqq.). The Elector too was rather put out by the Roman style (*v.* his letter of February 15, 1779; *ibid.*, 56). Hontheim's dissatisfaction was evinced in a letter to Krufft of February 4, 1779 (MEJER, 149, n. 1, and "Treveris", 1835, No. 3). On January 21 the Elector had sent his Suffragan a copy of another Papal Brief, of January 2, in which the Pope had given a full account of the consistory and had again spoken very favourably about Hontheim (reprinted in Hontheim's *Commentarius*, 1294 seqq.; the Elector's covering letter in *Briefwechsel*, 48).

⁴ *Hontheim to Pius VI. January 24, 1779: "Omnia haec (the Briefs, etc.) spirant tantum non incredibilem in Ste V^a animi mag-

to thank him for the pardon that had been granted him, also to inform him that he was working at the pastoral letter. This communication and the Elector's accompanying note of February 1st was answered by the Pope in a further Brief of February 17th.¹ Meanwhile Klemens Wenzeslaus had reported to Rome—where the news naturally was received with much pleasure—the appearance of the pastoral letter along with the consistorial proceedings.² Half-way through the month a copy of the publication was sent by Beck to the nuncio in Cologne.³

More trouble arose when the printing of this pastoral letter

nitudinem, caritatem et benevolentiam in me, ea minime dignum, infinitum cuius meritum extollere non est meum. Offers mihi, Pater optime, tuam clementiam, praesidium atque tutelam adversus eos, qui mihi forte propter Febronii systematis obiectionem graves esse possent." This makes me doubly beholden to you. "Superest ut iuxta tuum, S. Pater, desiderium imposterum calamum stringam ad vindicanda summae sedis iura et praerogativas alias a Febronio temere impugnatas. Sed quid hac in parte expectabis a viro octogenario continuis laboribus fracto? Conabor tamen . . ." Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, Papal Secret Archives. Klemens Wenzeslaus transmitted the *original letter to Bellisomi on February 1, 1779, along with Hontheim's *letter to the Elector of January 31 (*ibid.*).

¹ How pleased the Pope was to hear of Hontheim's good will was indicated in the **Cifra* to Garampi of February 13, 1779 (Nunziat. di Germania, 667, fo. 424, *loc. cit.*): "Per commissione del signor elettore di Treveri fu già prevenuto il Santo Padre da monsignor Bellisomi dell' arrivo del pontificio Breve alle mani di monsignor d'Hontheim; della divota rassegnazione con cui era stato accolto, e della rispettosa deferenza che mostrava alle insinuazioni di S. B^{ne} sulla suggerita confutazione dell' opera, benchè egli dubiti di poterla condurre a fine, attesa la di lui cadente età e il lungo tempo, che occorrerebbe almeno di due anni per compirla. Convengo però anch' io nel sentimento di V. S. Ill^{ma} di non doversi da noi molto insistere su questo lavoro . . ."

² *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Pius VI. on February 8, 1779 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*), similarly *to Bellisomi on February 9 (*ibid.*).

³ *From Ehrenbreitstein, February 15, 1779 (*ibid.*).

of February 3rd and the Roman documents was prohibited in Austria,¹ and preference was still given to Febronian principles by the Austrian professors.² Even the Elector of Mainz refused to grant a printing licence.³ Of the foreign Powers the

¹ The Abbot of Gleink, for instance, was fined for having the documents printed, and both his edition and that of a printer in Prague were confiscated. The *Acta* were not formally incorporated in the government list of forbidden books (MEJER, 156 *seqq.*; GOYAU, *L'Allemagne relig.*, I., 17 *seq.*). Another glimpse into Austrian conditions is afforded by a letter from the Bishop of Seckau (WYTTENBACH-MÜLLER, *Gesta Trevirorum*, III., 57). The necessary imperial *placet* for the publication of Hontheim's work was also refused for those parts of the archdiocese that lay in Luxembourg (*cf. Briefwechsel*, 51, 53, 54 *seq.*). Even Maria Theresa commented unfavourably on the recantation (MEJER, 160). The Pope's complaints about this in the **Cifra* to Garampi of January 20, 1779 (Nunziat. di Germania, 667, Papal Secret Archives). *Cf. KÜNTZIGER*, 121 *seqq.*; KIRSCH-VEIT, *Kirchengesch.*, IV., 1, 304.

² According to the **Cifra* to Garampi of February 27, 1779 (Nunziat. di Germania, 667, fo. 426, *loc. cit.*), the Viennese Febronians should be made to read Hontheim's pastoral letter, which had given so much pleasure to the Pope: "Per dissipare poi e confondere il fermento e i sofismi di cotesti letterati politici allarmati contro la ritrattazione, contribuirà senza meno il proemio dello stesso monsignor Hontheim premesso alla ristampa degli *Atti concistoriali* pubblicati d'ordine del signor elettore di Treveri, essendo per così dire una più succinta e sugosa ratifica della ritrattazione medesima. Il Santo Padre, a cui dal signor elettore ne è stato trasmesso un esemplare, l'ha molto commendato e gradito, ed è uniforme il giudizio di chiunque l'ha letto, che basti da sè a prevenire e confutare i cavilli e le sinistre interpretazioni de' maligni censori . . ." Mamachi's letters against Febronius also fell foul of the Viennese censor; *cf. *Cifra* to Caleppi of September 4 and 29, 1779 (*ibid.*).

³ He wanted in fact to come to an arrangement with Prince Kaunitz about a concerted action, but the proposal did not succeed; *v. Kaunitz's* letter of March 4, 1779, in WYTTENBACH-MÜLLER, *loc. cit.*, 56 *seq.* According to the document belonging to the imperial legation in Coblenz, Cologne and Salzburg had also

Council of Castile eventually decreed the prohibition and the suppression of the recantation and the consistorial proceedings.¹ In Germany, on the other hand, the attitude of the Electoral Court of the Palatinate at Mannheim was particularly friendly towards Rome.²

At this point Hontheim himself provided grounds for doubting his sincerity. A letter of his to his relative Krufft,³ who did not keep the matter to himself, gave rise to the rumour in Vienna that Hontheim's recantation had been extracted from him by force. Further, when replying to Cardinal forbidden the pastoral letter to be printed (*Briefwechsel* 73 seq.). In a *Cifra of May 1, 1778 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, *loc. cit.*) Bellisomi had been ordered to find out if the printing of the letter really had been forbidden in Mainz.

¹ Notification from Madrid, of February 24, 1779 (WYTTEBACH-MÜLLER, III., 55 seq.).

² Cf. *Cifra to Bellisomi of February 20, 1779 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*).

³ Of January 17, 1779 (MEJER, II4, n. 2). Krufft's publication of the letter did not have the desired effect everywhere (*v.* the letter from Prince Kaunitz to Krufft of January 26, 1779, in BRUNNER, *Humor*, II., 170). An unofficial statement of Hontheim's, of the same purport, which appeared in the *Hamburger Zeitung* of August 18, 1781, in a report from Frankfurt, may have been made about the same time. MEJER (155, n. 2) quotes an equally remarkable statement made to one of his relatives in Cologne. So far as is known, not one of Hontheim's statements contains a criticism of his position from the religious and ecclesiastical standpoint, but very often the curious argument that even though they had been retracted, the propositions of Febronius would carry all before them in the world. In a confidential *letter to Bellisomi of May 14, 1779, Klemens Wenzeslaus made the following observations: "M. de Hontheim excédé par les reproches que ses amis de Vienne lui ont faits, d'être devenu tout-à-coup ultramontain, a eu la faiblesse de dire et d'écrire que, s'il n'eût pas été intimidé par le S. Père, il ne fût jamais allé si loin dans sa retractation. Les prétendues menaces doivent se trouver dans ces paroles du bref que le S. Père a adressé à S.A.E. le 12. Septembre 1778: Quod si nihil . . . praeclusum?" Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*

Migazzi of Vienna, who had congratulated him on his recantation,¹ the Suffragan spoke of the "excellent canonists" of Vienna, who in fact were all Febronianists at heart. And finally Krufft gave further publicity to this question of a forced recantation by means of the Press,² whereupon the foreign papers, the Protestant ones in particular,³ seized upon the matter with evident satisfaction. Trier was at a loss how to counter these moves of the Febronianists, and the Elector thought of threatening to publish the whole story of the recantation based on the correspondence.⁴ The Roman ciphers also spoke of the enormous damage done by these reports.⁵

The Elector, however, succeeded in obtaining from his Suffragan a promise not to speak to him again of attempts to intimidate him, and he offered to send the Empress Maria Theresa all the material relating to the events that had led up to the recantation, for publication if necessary.⁶ Finally, however, Hontheim himself wrote him a letter on April 22nd,⁷ stating most definitely that all the Press reports were false and

¹ WOLFSGRUBER, 391 *seq.* Hontheim had answered a congratulatory letter from Abbot Martin Gerbert of St. Blasien in a more fitting manner (MEJER, 151, n. 1).

² MEJER, 156; KÜNTZIGER, 136, 139 *seqq.*

³ **Cifra* to Caleppi of June 9, 1779 (Nunziat. di Germania, 667; Papal Secret Archives).

⁴ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, May 14, 1779 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*).

⁵ **Cifra* to Bellisomi, June 22, 1778 (*ibid.* 772); **Cifra* to Caleppi of August 11, 1779 (Nunziat. di Germania, 667; *loc. cit.*). In the **Cifra* to Caleppi of July 7, 1779 (*ibid.*) it was emphasized that Rome's victory consisted solely in the voluntary recantation.

⁶ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi on May 14, 1779 (*loc. cit.*), warning him that Hontheim had an excitable disposition and that it might be dangerous to drive him to extremes.

⁷ The letter to the Elector of April 22, 1779, in MEJER, 169 *seqq.* The Elector *sent on the letter to Bellisomi on May 14, 1779 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A; *loc. cit.*). The letter was never published, although the matter was resurrected in the Press (*Briefwechsel*, 59 *seqq.*).

denying that he was in any way responsible for their appearance. On receiving from the Papal Secretary of State a protest against the falsity of such representations, the Elector wrote in a similar vein to the Empress, describing the true sequence of events.¹

At about this time the Elector, acceding to the wish of his aged Suffragan, agreed to his retiring from office. Hontheim was relieved of all business, without having to suffer any appreciable reduction of revenue.² As Dean of the Trier chapter of St. Simeon he was succeeded by a relative of the same name. By Rome too Hontheim was treated with the utmost consideration. The prohibition issued by the Secretary of State against the printing of Mamachi's third volume of letters to Febronius was too late to take effect,³ but the appearance of the fourth volume, which had been projected, was prevented.⁴ Nevertheless the rumour of the forced recantation still went on. Finally Klemens Wenzeslaus urged

¹ Klemens Wenzeslaus *wrote to Bellisomi on July 7, 1779, that he had done so a month previously (*loc. cit.*).

² MEJER, 172 *seqq.*

³ It had already appeared in the summer of 1778. Klemens Wenzeslaus had himself suggested that it be prohibited (*v. *Cifra to Caleppi on June 2, 1779, Nunziat. di Germania, 667, loc. cit.*).

⁴ **Cifra to Caleppi of June 2, 1779 (ibid.)*. The authorities were anxious not to make things more difficult for Hontheim, who was being pressed hard enough by his supporters. *Cf. the *Cifra to Garampi of April 3, 1779 (ibid.)*: "Sugli effetti perniciosi che possono produrre nell' animo di monsignor Hontheim tanto gli acerbi rimproveri dei di lui antichi partigiani, quanto gli encomi mal ponderati di alcuni troppo zelanti cattolici, mi uniforme anch' io al di lei sentimento, anzi a dir vero fu sempre tale a costante il mio giudizio sin dal primo momento che emanò la di lui ritrattazione. Ben però comprende V. S. Ill^{ma} quanti sia difficile di trattenerne in certi casi le lingue e le penne di chi le impiega senza consultarci. Da noi non si è risparmiato industria e diligenza per frenare questo inconsiderato prorito; e per non esacerbare inopportunamente il suffraganeo di Treveri, si è fatto sospendere al padre Mamachi il lavoro della confutazione di Giustino Febronio."

Hontheim to deny it publicly,¹ which he did in a satisfactory manner.² The Grand Duke of Tuscany was sent a copy of the statement so that he could use it against the reports appearing in the Florentine journals,³ and the Papal Secretary of State communicated the text to various European nunciatures. Krufft, of course, represented this statement too as having been made under pressure.⁴

Meanwhile Hontheim was working at the commentary on his recantation.⁵ Krufft tried to dissuade him from publishing it,⁶ but he was not successful, and after two years' work, which Hontheim had foreseen would be necessary, the commentary was published in 1781 by the same house that had published his *Febronius*.⁷ The author's name did not appear, but the book contained the proceedings of the Christmas consistory

¹ Klemens Wenzeslaus to Hontheim, March 30 and 31, 1780 (WYTTENBACH-MÜLLER, III., 57 seq.).

² *Ibid.* 59. In making the denial on April 2, Hontheim gave permission for it to be published in all the newspapers. *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi on April 4, 1780 (Nunziat. di Colonia 189A, *loc. cit.*). Cf. *Katholik*, 1891, II., 26 (dated April 7). For Rome's satisfaction with the denial, cf. the *Cifra to Bellisomi of April 29, 1780 (Nunziat. di Colonia, *loc. cit.*).

³ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, April 10, 1780 (*ibid.*). In Florence the notice had appeared in the *Gazzetta universale* at the beginning of 1780. Cf. Brunati's *reports to Vienna of February 26 and March 5, 1780 (State Archives, Vienna; cf. MEJER, 178, n. 2). Klemens Wenzeslaus wanted to write an article against the Press reports himself, but afterwards entrusted the task to Hontheim (*v.* his *letter to Bellisomi of March 29, 1780; Nunziat. di Colonia, 189A, *loc. cit.*). The *Cifra to Bellisomi of April 6, 1780, expressed the same wish to Klemens Wenzeslaus (*ibid.*).

⁴ MEJER, 181 seq.

⁵ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, November 10, 1780 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ MEJER, 182, n. 2; KÜNTZIGER, 143 seqq.

⁷ *Iustini Febronii IC^{ti} commentarius in suam retractationem Pio VI. Pont. Max. Kalend. Novembr. a. 1778 submissam*. Frankfurt, Esslinger, 1781.

and the pastoral letter that had been printed at the time, also an assurance that the recantation was voluntary and sincere. The Elector had watched the preparation of the book with an anxious eye and would have liked to prevent its publication.¹ He had very much wanted the text to be examined before publication² but the work appeared without the ecclesiastical permission. This was all the more surprising as Bellisomi had had definite instructions from Rome to urge the Elector to keep a careful watch on Hontheim and to see that the manuscript was checked in Trier and Rome.³ But this latter request came too late, the manuscript having been sent to the printer three weeks before.⁴ Beck tried to obtain for the nuncio a collection of the doubtful passages in the text,⁵ while Klemens Wenzeslaus wanted to obtain the opinions of various theological faculties. Sometimes Hontheim seemed to agree, at other times he made as if he had no concern with the book.⁶ The Archbishop advised him to state in a note that the book had not been submitted to ecclesiastical censorship and that the

¹ MEJER, 193 *seq.*; *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, November 10, 1780, *loc. cit.* In his *letter to Bellisomi of March 3, 1781, Klemens Wenzeslaus expressed his pleasure at the Pope's approval of his exertions, which approval was reiterated in the **Cifra* of April 4, 1781. Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, *loc. cit.*

² *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, November 10, 1780 (*ibid.*).

³ *The Pope asked the Elector "di non perder di vista l'autore e di sempre meglio assicurarsi, affinché non venga da lui comunicato ad altro o publicato colle stampe verun scritto se non sia prima visto ed esaminato da N. S. e da S. A. Elettore a tenore della positiva sicurezza datane per lettera dallo stesso suffraganeo al prefato S.E." *Cifra* to Bellisomi of October 8, 1780, Nunziat. di Colonia 189A, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. **Cifra* of October 18, 1780 (*ibid.* 772).

⁴ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Bellisomi, December 14, 1780 (*ibid.* 189A).

⁵ *Beck to Bellisomi, January 19, 1781 (*ibid.*).

⁶ **Id.* to *id.*, February 11, 1781 (*ibid.*). On other occasions he was angry with his superior for submitting the commentary to the universities (**id.* to *id.*, January 27 and February 6, 1781, *ibid.*).

author was solely responsible for any errors it might contain and that he submitted himself fully and completely to the decision of the Pope.¹

Hontheim sent his work to the Pope with a letter from himself.² Whether he really hoped that with this step he would completely recover his good name, we have no means of knowing, but the contents of the book could hardly have been conducive to such an end.³ He certainly tried to justify the thirty-eight propositions of his recantation,⁴ but his standpoint was that of the Gallican Church, even the Gallican propositions of 1682 and Bossuet's *Defensio*.⁵ There was no longer any appearance of supporting the Protestant cause, but every argument ended in favour of the claims of the State.

At this time, however, public interest was centred on the Josephist reforms, the practical effects of which must have seemed to be far more disturbing than Hontheim's learned disquisitions. Nevertheless, as Hontheim had held out a prospect of amending his work in accordance with the Papal wishes Pius VI. asked the learned Gerdil to give his opinion on Hontheim's latest publication. After devoting several months to the subject, Gerdil produced a wholly admirable criticism of all the thirty-eight propositions.⁶ Though it was not put to

¹ The Elector's *letter to Hontheim of March 19, 1781, containing this suggestion, was *sent by Beck to Bellisomi on March 20, expressing the fear that the letter would arrive too late, as the book might already be printed (*ibid.*).

² Undated (MEJER, 317 *seq.*). The apprehension with which the book was awaited in Rome is seen in the **Cifra* to Bellisomi of March 21, 1781 (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, *loc. cit.*). The arrival of the book was reported in the **Cifra* of April 18, 1781 (*ibid.*).

³ A letter from Rome dated December 26, 1781, informed Hontheim that the commentary was not satisfactory. The same information was conveyed in a letter of December 2, 1782 (*v. MARX*, III., 127; *Katholik*, 1891, II., 27).

⁴ Cf. *Coup d'œil sur le congrès d'Ems*, 119.

⁵ For other subjects too most of the authorities cited were Gallican and Josephist canonists.

⁶ *Animadversiones in Commentarium a J. Febronio in suam*

any public use,¹ the Pope approved of it, and in a very detailed Brief to the Archbishop he condemned the mixture of falsity and truth in Hontheim's work. He cited numerous examples of this, and instructed the Archbishop to administer a reprimand to Hontheim.² In reply, however, the Archbishop advised that Hontheim be dealt with as gently as possible, as his Suffragan was incapable of undoing the scandal that had been given.³

Hontheim now ceased to play an active part in public life, but for a long time yet he held fast to his opinion on the inviolable rights of the State in its relations with the Church.⁴ After Beck had left the Elector's service in 1782 the latter came under the influence of another cleric—of the same name, Ludwig Joseph Beck, but of the Febronian way of thinking—and reverted to his old courses, which were formulated at the Congress of Ems. In November, 1786, Hontheim was made privy to the records of the transactions by his Archbishop and he even contributed to them a historical article on the annates.

In the years that followed Hontheim seems to have turned his attention to graver matters. It was apparently a letter from Abbot Martin Gerbert of St. Blasien,⁵ who had always *Retractionem editum*, 1792. Also in GERDIL, *Opere*, XIII (1808).

¹ In the *Monitum* that preceded the edition of 1792, Gerdil informed his readers that an unforeseen circumstance had made it desirable to postpone the printing until a more favourable time (MEJER, 196, n. 1).

² *Brief to Klemens Wenzeslaus, of October 13, 1781 (*Epist.* A° VII., fo. 63b, Papal Secret Archives).

³ He thought it dangerous to inform Hontheim of the reprimand. See his *letters to Pius VI. of November 11, 1781, and to Bellisomi of the same day (Nunziat. di Colonia 189A, Papal Secret Archives; reprinted in *Coup d'œil*, 121 seqq., 128 seqq., and dated the 17th). In these letters too Klemens Wenzeslaus did his best to excuse Hontheim's ambiguous behaviour since his retraction.

⁴ MEJER, 203.

⁵ Of February 10, 1788 (WYTTENBACH-MÜLLER, III., Appendix 60; cf. MEJER, 212 seq.).

had a high opinion of him as a man as well as a scholar, that moved him to make a frank confession of his faith. At any rate he made the solemn deposition that though in this world he had been noted for various writings that had given rise to many hard words, nevertheless, as a Bishop, it was incumbent on him to leave behind a testimony of his faith. Accordingly he desired that after his death the abbot's letter be published as this testimony.¹

Resigned to his lot, the unhappy Suffragan departed this life on September 2nd, 1790.² He had composed his own epitaph: "*Tandem liber, tandem tutus, tandem æternus.*"³ The opinion of one who lived during this period and beyond it was that "no one shook the ancient hierarchic structure erected on the Rhine by the Roman Curia so violently as Hontheim".⁴ In the end this shaking helped to bury the old Rhenish hierarchy for good and all.

(2)

The close connexion between the Febronian-episcopal movements in the Austrian hereditary lands and the reforming intentions of enlightened despotism was due above all to such men as Gerhard van Swieten. But that the two currents were not necessarily intermingled is shown by the course of events in the second largest Catholic State in the German Empire—Bavaria.

Since the death of Max III. Joseph in 1777 the Wittelsbach possessions had been in the hands of the Elector Karl Theodor, of the Pfalz-Sulzbach line. Already under the previous government⁵ the ecclesiastico-political principles then current

¹ WYTTEBACH-MÜLLER, *loc. cit.*

² MEJER, 208 *seqq.*

³ On paper at any rate, Krufft had composed for him a more magniloquent epitaph, which was censured by Gerdil in his *Animadversiones* (MEJER, 216).

⁴ NIKLAS VOGT, *Rhein. Geschichten*, IV., 215. Cf. *Coup d'œil*, 115 *seq.*, 120 note a; MÖHLER, *Kirchengeschichte*, III., 295; GOYAU, *L'Allemagne religieuse*, I., 8.

⁵ For the various measures and plans, see PFEILSCHIFTER-BAUMEISTER, *Salzburger Kongress, passim.*

had been applied to Bavarian conditions, notably by the director of the Spiritual Council, Peter von Osterwald. In a widely circulated pamphlet¹ Osterwald, writing under the pseudonym "Veremund von Lochstein", had tried to show that ecclesiastical immunity was an unjustified impertinence, while a series of so-called "reform decrees" issued in 1768-70 encroached on the inner life of the Church.² The protests raised against them by the Bishops of the country at the Congress of Salzburg³ went practically unheard. The new Elector began his regime with several reactionary measures, but in the ecclesiastico-political sphere he kept to the course which was already set. An exception was made in the case of the "Illuminati", a secret society of the "enlightened" founded at Ingolstadt by Adam Weishaupt. As a result of the action he took against it, its collapse was as rapid as its growth.⁴

¹ *Veremunds von Lochstein Gründe sowohl für als wider die Geistliche Immunität in zeitlichen Dingen, herausgegeben und mit Anmerkungen begleitet von F. L. W.* The work was condemned in Rome on June 26, 1767 (REUSCH, 946; cf. I. GEBELE, *Peter von Osterwald*, Munich, 1891).

² KIRSCH, *Kirchengeschichte*, IV., I, 270 seqq., according to Pfeilschifter-Baumeister; DOBERL, *Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns*, II., 254 seq.

³ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVIII., 416.

⁴ Cf. MÄNNER, *Bayern vor und in der Französischen Revolution*, 69 seqq., especially 119 seqq.; also LE FORESTIER, *Les Illuminés de Bavière et la Franc-Maçonnerie allemande*, Paris, 1915; DÖBERL, *loc. cit.*, II., 320 seq. When the Archbishop of Trier, who was also Bishop of Augsburg, wanted to purge the Augsburg cathedral chapter of the Illuminati, the Pope readily gave his approval, in a *Brief of October 14, 1797, this sect, like the Freemasons, to whom it belonged, being already excommunicated. *Epist. A° XXIII.*, fo. 170 seqq., Papal Secret Archives; *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CXXVII. (1901), 94 seqq., CLVIII. (1916), 711 seqq., CLXVII. (1921), 677 seqq. That Karl Theodor, in spite of his ecclesiastical policy, wanted to maintain friendly relations with the Curia is shown by his behaviour on the occasion of Pius VI.'s visit to Munich (see our account, Vol. XXXIX., 460), and of the Elector's journey to Italy (cf. our account, Vol. XXXIX.,

Like Joseph II. in Austria, the Bavarian rulers wanted the ecclesiastical areas of administration to coincide with the civil ones and thus to do away with the spiritual jurisdiction of foreign Bishops over Bavarian subjects.¹ In the Palatine and Bavarian territories, which had been united in 1777, and to which were added Jülich and Berg on the Lower Rhine, there were no less than eighteen Bishops and Archbishops taking part in the pastoral administration, and not one of them resided in the territories.² Frequent attempts³ had been made in previous centuries to disentangle these conditions, even so far back as the concordat of 1583, and later Ferdinand Maria and Max Emanuel wanted to erect a separate bishopric for the country.⁴ At the end of the eighteenth century the situation was more irksome than ever for, whereas formerly many of these sees had been domestic bishoprics of the Wittelsbachs by long-established custom, which in some cases had been going on for centuries, since 1763 not a single member of the dynasty had been honoured with the episcopal dignity.⁴

Karl Theodor's first endeavour was to have the foreign Bishops set up vicariates general in the areas belonging to the Bavarian Electorate. Those concerned, however, managed to frustrate both this plan and the next one formed by the

104). Cf. Antici's reports to Seinsheim of May 21 (arrival in Rome, honourable reception), June 14 (reception by the King of Naples), and July 5, 1783 (the homeward journey), State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 498/16. In 1789 the Pope sent his bust (by Gerardi) to the Elector, and in return the Elector had his bust made by the same sculptor (*v.* BRUNNER, *Humor*, I., 311).

¹ FRITZ ENDRES, *Errichtung der Münchener Nuntiatur*, 4 seqq.

² *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CLXIV., 533 seq.

³ ENDRES, 5 seq.

⁴ The following sees had been occupied by Wittelsbachs: Liège, 1581-1723; Cologne, 1583-1761; Freising, 1566-1763; Regensburg, 1579-1763. Cf. *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CLXIV., 532; H. E. FEINE, *Die Besetzung der Reichsbistümer vom Westfälischen Frieden bis Säkularisation 1648-1803* (Stutz' Kirchenrechtl. Abhandl. 97/98), Stuttgart, 1921, 319-326.

Elector, namely to set up new bishoprics in the country.¹ Consequently other measures were tried. The versatile Vice-President of the Spiritual Council, Kasimir Häffelin, who for many years after was to play several important rôles in Bavarian ecclesiastical politics, wanted the post of Apostolic commissary to be created in Munich for himself,² but the Elector finally adopted another plan, which had already been discussed in the past and now became a reality: the erection of a Papal nunciature in Munich, which was to be of equal rank with Vienna and Cologne and whose authority was to extend over the whole Bavarian territory.

Negotiations on this project of a Bavarian nunciature were undertaken at the beginning of 1784 by the Bavarian agent to the Curia, the Marchese Tommaso Antici, who was also *chargé d'affaires* for the Archbishop of Cologne. His preliminary inquiries promising eventual success, on April 11th he wrote a long memorandum to his sovereign, setting out the advantages of the plan.³ For the Holy See to have a special representative in Munich, he wrote, was fully in accord with the Elector's power and grandeur, whereas under actual conditions the transaction of affairs was considerably delayed. The cost of maintaining the nuncio would be borne by Bavaria, it was true, but the tithes could be used for the purpose, and part of them in any case had gone to the Bishops.

After this the matter was pursued with such vigour in Rome that Pius VI. had no choice but to give way, unless he was to offend the mighty Elector. On June 7th, 1784, after lengthy negotiations, the Pope assented to the establishment of a new nunciature at the Court of the Bavarian Elector.⁴ A further interval elapsed before a decision was reached regarding the person of the new nuncio and an opportunity of making the official announcement was provided by the consistory for the

¹ *Documents and an opinion on the subject in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten blau 425/8, I., No. 2. Cf. MÄNNER, *loc. cit.*, 113 seq.

² ENDRES, 8.

³ *Memorandum in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 275/9. Cf. ENDRES, 12 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

next cardinalitial promotion. Finally this long-awaited consistory took place on February 14th, 1785, and Monsignore Cesare Zoglio, Archbishop of Athens, was nominated as the Papal representative in Munich. Some months were to pass, however, before he set out for Bavaria.

Though this solution could not satisfy all the wishes of the Wittelsbach Elector, he had at least gained one important point: the spiritual jurisdiction over all his subjects now had a centre, and a certain counterpoise against the influence of the foreign Bishops seemed to have been secured. The Curia too in the end was not wholly loath to agree to the compromise, especially as the friendship of so important a secular prince might be of use to it, the more the other sovereigns, such as those of Austria and the Latin countries, showed themselves to be favourable to the episcopal movement.¹ A serious breach had been made in the ranks of those members of the imperial college of the German princes who aimed at the establishment of national churches.

As was only to be expected, this innovation had the effect of a beacon-fire on the Febronian party in the German episcopate and roused them to retaliation. To the Rhenish archbishoprics the jurisdiction of the nunciature tribunals had long been a stumbling-block, and its removal had been one of the *Desiderata* put forward at the Congress of Coblenz in 1769.² At that time the Electors failed to receive the support from Joseph II. that they had expected, he having to consider the wishes of his mother, Maria Theresa. Consequently the plans of the German episcopalists had to remain in abeyance for a time,³ but now this fresh "curialistic pretension" gave them the excuse for further action.

¹ Cf. SCHOTTE, *Zur Geschichte des Emser Kongresses*, in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXXV. (1914), 91.

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVIII., 413, and JAKOB WILLE, *August Graf von Limburg-Stirum, Fürstbischof von Speyer* (Neujahrsblätter der bad. hist. Kommission), Heidelberg, 1913. For the exertions made by Mainz until 1772, cf. HÖHLER, 42 *seqq.*

³ For their fruitless exertions, v. NOTTARP in *Theologie und Glaube*, VII. (1915), 271 *seq.*

The recalcitrants were headed by the Elector of Mainz, Archbishop Friedrich Karl Joseph von Erthal,¹ who had originally been elected by a conservative group, but with his worldly-wise character and "enlightened" principles he soon changed his course for one of increasing friendliness towards Prussia. He was loyally supported by his Suffragan Heimes,² who, on account of his ambitious designs, was as much disliked by his fellow-Bishops as by the Imperial Court. In the controversies that now ensued the staunchest ally of these two prelates was the Metropolitan whose power was most restricted by the newly-founded nunciature, Hieronymus, Count von Colloredo, Archbishop of Salzburg,³ a friend of "enlightenment" who was most skilful in advancing his Josephist ideas.

On March 3rd, 1785, Colloredo suggested to his Mainz colleague a coalition of all the prelates affected by the newly erected nunciature.⁴ The reply this evoked from Erthal, who was also in charge of the diocese of Worms, which extended into the Palatinate, was remarkable. If the nuncio expected in Munich was only a diplomatic representative of the Holy Father, there could be no objection to the appointment; but if he came furnished with spiritual faculties it would conflict with the irreducible and inalienable rights of the episcopal authority instituted by Christ, and it would have to be resisted. While they were agreeing on the course to be pursued,⁵ the two prelates sought for associates among their

¹ Cf. *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CLXII. (1921), 677 seqq.; ENDRES, 29 seqq.; *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, VII., 552 seqq.

² *Ibid.*, XI., 330 seq.

³ He was the son of the Imperial Vice-Chancellor (*ibid.*, IV., 416); J. MACK, *Die Reform- u. Aufklärungsbestrebungen im Erzstift Salzburg unter Erzbischof Hieronymus v. Colloredo*, Munich, 1912. Colloredo was described by the nuncio Della Genga as haughty and distant; cf. his report of February 16, 1802, in the *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CLIII. (1914), 194, 203.

⁴ ENDRES, 32.

⁵ Mainz's envoy to the Diet was instructed to get into touch with the Bishops whose dioceses lay in Bavaria, through their *chargés d'affaires* there, with the object of making a joint

Suffragans, but they were not immediately successful. Baron Ludwig Joseph von Welden, Bishop of Freising, whose competence extended to the Bavarian capital, was almost alone in wholeheartedly supporting the proposed plan of action. Eichstätt's reply might also be considered satisfactory, but the Bishops of Chiemsee, Regensburg, and Passau, and the Archbishops of Cologne and Trier were unwilling to commit themselves.¹ On the other hand, from now onwards all the measures taken by the episcopalists, together with their obstructive propaganda, were accompanied by a loud voice of uncompromising contradiction, that of the Bishop of Speyer, Count von Limburg-Stirum,² whose opposition to the Mainz Metropolitan was well known and who upheld the free, unrestricted exercise of the Papal jurisdiction in the cases reserved to it.

In the first days of May, 1785, the Courts of Mainz, Salzburg, and Freising sent an inquiry, through their agents, to the Curia, regarding the capacity in which the chosen representative of the Holy See was coming to Munich, and they drew attention in their memoranda to the serious misgivings that would be caused if the representation were armed with jurisdictional faculties. In a few days they received the terse reply that the nuncio to Munich would be invested with the same rights and powers as those exercised by the nuncio to Cologne.³

representation to the Elector. Cf. *Lerchenfeld to Karl Theodor, August 13, 1785 (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz. 393/1).

¹ ENDRES, 33 *seqq.* Klemens Wenzeslaus had written to Karl Theodor on June 27, 1785, asking how much truth there was in the rumours about the new nunciature. On July 12, the Elector had given him the required information in a polite but terse manner. Both *letters, *loc. cit.*, Kasten schwarz 393/1.

² Cf. above, p. 7.

³ ENDRES, 37 *seqq.* Texts of the inquiries from Salzburg and Freising and the Papal replies in *Pragmatische u. aktenmässige Geschichte der zu München neu errichteten Nuntiatur*, Frankfurt & Leipzig, 1787, Anhang 2-8. On August 13, 1785, the Bavarian

The brevity with which it dealt with this inquiry showed that Rome was not by any means inclined to take instructions from others on how to appoint its legates ; nevertheless, the three prelates were not deterred by this initial rebuff. The agents for Mainz and Salzburg were told to draw up and present further memoranda in far sterner language, while the Archbishop of Mainz again invited his Suffragans to co-operate. Of the other German prelates the Bishops of Bamberg and Würzburg and of Eichstätt agreed to make inquiries couched in similar language, as did also the Elector Klemens Wenzeslaus, the Ordinary of Augsburg and Trier, a man of notoriously weak and vacillating character.¹

The memorials from Salzburg and Freising arrived in Rome at the beginning of August 1785 and were not deemed worthy of a reply by Pius VI. On July 11th, however, he had sent another brief and firm response to the Elector of Mainz, strongly denying the accusations that the spiritual jurisdiction of the nuncios was presumptuous, that it infringed the concordats and that it was prejudicial to the Bishops.² At the same time Garampi, the nuncio to Vienna, was asked to use his influence with the Suffragans of the refractory Metropolitans and make them more friendly towards Rome.³

Minister Vieregg *complained about this (*loc. cit.*, Kasten schwarz 393/1) to Antici, who on May 11, 1785, had *sent Karl Theodor the three letters of complaint together with the Papal reply and a letter from the Pro-Secretary of State (*ibid.*, 393/9).

¹ ENDRES, 39 *seq.* Later the nuncio Della Genga also said that the Elector was easily influenced ; *v.* his report of February 16, 1802, in the *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CLIII. (1914), 191 *seq.*, 200.

² ENDRES, 45 *seq.*

³ Garampi's successes, *ibid.* 53 *seq.* As early as April 16, 1785, Garampi had *written to Bishop Zeil of Chiemsee, at Salzburg, that the new nunciature was really no innovation at all, but only a continuation of the one at Graz, so that, if anyone had cause for complaint, it was not the Bishops but the other nuncios, and they had not complained. In spite of several other *letters from Garampi on the subject (for the good relations that existed between the two, *v.* ENDRES, 53 *seq.*) Bishop Zeil afterwards informed his Metropolitan Colloredo of Salzburg of his entry into

The measures adopted by the German prelates having thus apparently been rendered abortive from the very start by the unshakable principles of Christ's vicar, they had to resort to another expedient: to enlist the aid of the German emperor as their mediator and spokesman in Rome. For this they relied chiefly on the co-operation of the Archbishop of Cologne, Maximilian Franz Joseph, Archduke of Austria.¹ He was the youngest brother of the emperor and fully agreed with his views on the Church.

Maximilian Franz, having had some friction with Bellisomi, the nuncio to Cologne, was ill-disposed towards the Curia and now pressed for the abolition of all the nunciature tribunals in Germany. On March 11th, 1785, he had made a written complaint to the Pope about the improper delay of the nunciature in dealing with appeals and he had asked for Papally approved *Judices in partibus*, a request that had already been made by German Bishops on several previous occasions.² Bellisomi viewed the application as an attack on his office and entered into negotiations to settle the affair. The Roman Curia also showed an accommodating attitude by agreeing to certain cases of appeal being entrusted directly by Rome or through the nuncio to high-ranking clerics in the archdiocese. But it definitely refused to grant a general mandate for all cases, as was desired. Finally, when at an audience granted to the agent Antici, Pius VI. refused to make

the group of the four Archbishops (*letters to Colloredo of September 15, 1786, January 25 and March 9, 1787; State Archives, Munich, Salzburg Erzstift, 263). In his *letter of August 27, 1785, to Caprara, Garampi's successor as nuncio to Vienna, the Secretary of State Boncompagni spoke of the Pope's joy and his hope that he would continue to work for the same object, faithful to the "informazioni" of his predecessor. *Nunziat. di Germania*, 683, Papal Secret Archives.

¹ *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, XXI., 56 seqq.; cf. also M. BRAUBACH, *Das Domkapitel zu Münster und die Koadjutorwahl des Erzherzogs Maximilian 1780 in Historische Aufsätze, Festschrift für Alois Schulte*, 1927, 239 seqq.

² ENDRES, 56.

any further concessions, Maximilian Franz, suppressing all his previous scruples, cast in his lot entirely with the party led by the Elector of Mainz, a step which induced his cousin, the Archbishop of Trier, to work for a still stronger coalition.¹

Their group thus strengthened, the four Metropolitans could enter the next stage of the controversy about the German nunciature with greater assurance. This second stage was brought about by their appeal to the Imperial Court. Mainz and Salzburg wrote officially to Vienna on September 22nd and October 4th, 1785, while Maximilian Franz went there in person to present to his imperial brother his own petition and that of the Elector of Trier.² Erthal's memorial³ began with a protest against the resolution of the Roman Curia to set up a new nunciature in Munich, without the previous knowledge of the emperor, the empire, or the episcopate. There had never been any suspicion of it and it was causing universal disquiet. He proceeded to relate the repeated but fruitless efforts he had made in Rome, marshalled all the reasons of a legal, theoretical, and practical nature against the "unconstitutional proceedings of the nunciature tribunals", and finally besought the emperor as the "supreme patron and protector of the German Church" to oppose in Rome the mission of the new legate or at least to demand the restriction of his powers to purely diplomatic duties.

Joseph II. did not agree to the request of the German Metropolitans with the readiness they probably expected, and which, indeed, considering the almost complete unanimity of their views would have been quite understandable. There were, however, a number of misgivings which may have caused him to hold his hand. Firstly, he could hardly support a movement whose leader, the Elector of Mainz, was about to join the anti-imperial Prussian league of princes. Secondly, the Metropolitans had on this occasion acted without their

¹ *Ibid.*, 57 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 63.

³ Printed in HÖHLER, *Arnoldis Tagebuch*, 275 *seqq.*, and *Pragmatische Geschichte*, etc., *loc. cit.*, 8 *seqq.*

Suffragans in order to preserve the appearance of a general movement, but to co-operate with the Metropolitans alone might estrange the rest of the German Bishops and seriously endanger the success of the Josephist reforms. Lastly, Joseph II. may possibly have been unwilling to add to the material for conflict that already existed between himself and the Curia.

It is true, however, that the reply sent to Mainz on October 12th, 1785, in the form of an imperial rescript,¹ was in the principles it expressed, entirely in agreement with the petitioners. The emperor, it said, would work for the preservation and restoration of the original rights of the Bishops and would also present the case to Rome. "I therefore recognize the Papal nuncios only as Papal emissaries competent to deal with political matters and those with which the Pope is directly concerned as supreme head of the Church. I cannot, however, allow these nuncios to exercise jurisdiction in spiritual affairs nor allow them a judicature which is not within the competence of, and cannot be conceded to, the Papal nuncio in Cologne, nor the one here in Vienna, nor any other that may come in the future into the territory of the German empire." Up to this point, in the main, the petitioners had reason to be satisfied with the document,² but in the last part of it the emperor, probably not without intention, touched on a delicate spot. That the rights they claimed might be preserved, he urged the Metropolitans to come to an understanding with their Suffragans and the exempt Bishops and to collect their grievances against Rome. The first of these conditions may have served the Archbishops as a legitimation of the Congress of Ems, but the failure to obtain the agreement of all the Bishops brought the whole dispute about the nunciature to an inglorious end.

¹ HÖHLER, *loc. cit.*, 277 *seqq.*; STIGLOHER, 263 *seqq.*; *Pragmatische Geschichte*, *loc. cit.*, 13 *seqq.*

² Some additions made to the text resulted in internal contradictions, noted by ENDRES (66). It is difficult to reconcile the abolition of the nunciatures with the guaranteeing of the ecclesiastical organization that had been "observed for centuries".

The imperial rescript, which was to figure very prominently in the coming negotiations and in the copious publications of the time,¹ was hailed with the greatest joy by the Court of Mainz. The Suffragan Heimes urged that the favourable opportunity be seized to press on with further action. At this juncture the resistance of the other Suffragans was not foreseen. On October 30th the Elector Friedrich Karl von Erthal sent a circular letter to the Bishops of his province, asking them to inform him of any cases of interference or impropriety on the part of the Curia.² The Metropolitan authorities of Salzburg, who took a more sober view of the situation, also asked the subordinate dioceses for similar information and tried to justify the peculiar coalition of the four Archbishops. The same steps were then taken by Cologne and Trier. At the same time the four Metropolitans forbade any recourse to the existing German nunciatures or, following the example of Mainz, made it a condition that it should first be given the archiepiscopal assent.³

But, contrary to expectation, many of the Bishops declined to co-operate. As before, it was the Bishop of Freising who showed the greatest ardour in espousing the cause of the quadruple alliance, and again it was Speyer that headed the opposing party.

Pius VI. was deeply concerned when Cardinal Herzan, on November 7th, had to inform him of the imperial rescript and its decree abolishing the tribunals of the German nunciatures. The Pope⁴ defended the erection of the nunciature at Munich as being solely an adjustment in respect of personnel and locality within the bounds of the existing law, though he made no effort to conceal the grief that the step would cost him. Knowing that no one's right had been infringed, he insisted as

¹ The Bavarian envoy to the Diet at Regensburg regularly sent the Elector all the pamphlets he could get hold of. They are now to hand as enclosures in his reports in the State Archives, Munich.

² ENDRES, 68 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 69 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 77.

firmly as before that he could not make any more concessions. He followed this up by again requesting the nuncios to do their best to see that the rights of the Holy See in Germany were understood and appreciated. The Pope could still rely on the German princes, especially Bavaria, and it was doubtful whether the imperial rescript, which had not been ratified by the diet, was merely an expression of opinion or was actually a law. In a letter to the Prince Bishop of Freising¹ Pius VI. referred to this uncertainty and pointed out that even if it was a law, every Catholic, and still more every Bishop, would have to oppose it and value more highly the ecclesiastical regulations on the subject, for here was a case of a secular power deciding illegally on an ecclesiastical question.

In the days that followed, Karl Theodor's composure must have increased the confidence of the Holy Father.² Disregarding the rescript, the Bavarian government insisted on Zoglio's coming to Munich as soon as possible. His departure, however, was still delayed, to his regret, by unfavourable weather, financial difficulties, and ill health.³ The Munich Minister of State, von Vieregg, wrote that on the nuncio's

¹ On October 18, 1786, before the Punctuation of Ems had been announced (text in STIGLOHER, 292 *seqq.*; *copy in the State Archives in Munich, Kasten schwarz 393/9; *Epist.*, A° XII., fos. 144, 152, Papal Secret Archives; translation in P. P. WOLF, *Geschichte der röm.-kath. Kirche*, IV., 208-223). The *Pragmatische und aktenmässige Geschichte* reproduces the Latin text of the Brief (appendix, pp. 19 *seqq.*) and examines it sentence by sentence in the endeavour to prove that it is spurious (pp. 26 *seqq.*). To show that there was no reason to doubt the legal force of the imperial rescript, the author argues that it was not a question of a new law, but an announcement of the imperial will for the stricter enforcement of old laws (pp. 74 *seq.*). The canonistic authority for this argument, as so often in the controversial literature of the time, was Febronius.

² Cf. the Pope's commendation of the Elector in WOLF, *loc. cit.*, 219.

³ Boncompagni *reported to Caprara on October 12, 1785, that Zoglio had been asked to hasten his preparations for departure (Nunziat. di Germania, 684-685, Papal Secret Archives).

arrival everything else would fall into place and the nuncio would be able to exercise complete jurisdiction in the usual manner.¹ At the end of the year these representations had to be renewed, and then there was a further delay of some few months before they were finally put into effect.² Zoglio arrived in Munich on May 20th, 1786,³ and after he had presented his Brief of recommendation⁴ to the Elector, the Government, on May 26th, announced the erection of the nunciature to all Bavarian subjects and commended them to bring before it all matters which had hitherto been dealt with by the nuncios to Cologne, Vienna, or Lucerne.⁵ By most of the Bishops in his new jurisdictional area Zoglio was acknowledged only with far-reaching reservations, reference being made even to the imperial rescript. This attitude of theirs was censured by Pius VI. in unmistakable language.⁶

In Cologne too, about this time, there was a change of nuncios that aroused unusual interest. Bellisomi having been called to Lisbon, a suitable successor had to be found for this unenviable post. After some difficulty Pius VI. finally appointed Bartolommeo Pacca nuncio to Cologne on May 27th,

¹ ENDRES, 78.

² *Antici wrote to Vieregg on January 14, 1786, that Zoglio was hurrying to Munich, and *on February 4, 1786, that he had been gone for over a month but had sent no word of himself. (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 105/17).

³ *Vieregg to Antici on May 27, 1786 (*ibid.*), where also there is a reference to the audience of May 22. Cf. ENDRES, 80 *seq.*, 83. A **dispaccio* for Zoglio, dated from Rome, June 3, 1786, brought news of the Pope's joy and generous praise for the Elector (copy *loc. cit.*, Kasten schwarz 507/2).

⁴ *Of December 10, 1785. Original *ibid.* 393/1. Printed in *Pragmatische Geschichte*, *loc. cit.* 17; STIGLOHER, 265. Karl Theodor's *letter of thanks to the Pope, of May 23, 1786, in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 393/1. Further relevant documents, *ibid.*, 507/16.

⁵ Copy of the decree issued by the Electoral Ecclesiastical Chancery *ibid.*, Staatsverwaltung, 3221, No. 74.

⁶ Cf. the above-mentioned Brief to Freising of October 18, 1786, and ENDRES, 87 *seq.*

1785. Pacca was a young man, only twenty-eight years old, but he was competent and careful, and his way of life was irreproachable.¹ For various reasons his departure had to be postponed,² so that nearly a year passed before he finally set out, on May 6th, 1786. After a journey delayed by bouts of sickness, he reached Bonn on June 9th.³ His reception here was far from cordial. The Archbishop refused to recognize him unless he renounced his jurisdiction. Pacca could not think of doing this and chose rather to ignore him, Archbishop and brother of the emperor though he was. Meanwhile the nuncio's relations with the other prelates in his area gradually became tolerable.⁴

¹ For Pacca and his family, v. A. PROFESSIONE, *Antonio Felice Zondadari e Bartolommeo Pacca*, Milano, 1899, 40.

² ENDRES, 81 seq. Pacca relates the story of his appointment as nuncio in his *Memorie storiche . . . sul di lui soggiorno in Germania . . .*, Roma, 1832, 9-10.

³ For his indisposition, journey, and arrival in Germany, v. his *Memorie*, 13 seqq., 23 seqq.; PROFESSIONE, *loc. cit.*, 41.

⁴ ENDRES, 90 seq.; PACCA, *loc. cit.*, 23 seqq.; PROFESSIONE, *loc. cit.*, 42, and Pacca's *"Lettere al padre" of June 22 and 29 and October 19, 1786, in the Archiepiscopal Archives at Benevento.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONGRESS OF EMS AND ITS AFTERMATH—DISTURBANCES IN THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS—DEATH OF JOSEPH II. —HIS SUCCESSORS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHURCH.

(1)

IN pursuance of the imperial rescript and in continuation of the Congress of Coblenz, of 1769, the Rhenish Electors had agreed among themselves to hold another meeting of their representatives, in which the Archbishop of Salzburg was also to take part.¹ Hieronymus von Colloredo had in any case intended to travel to the Netherlands and he would thus be able to hold his Court in the vicinity of the selected meeting-place in the Rhineland and by rapid communication with his representative there follow the course of the negotiations. Mainz and Salzburg on the one hand, and Cologne and Trier on the other, then got ready their proposals for the congress, which were to be only of a provisional nature until the four prelates had been joined by the rest of the German episcopate. There was some difficulty in choosing a suitable meeting-place, especially as this had to be done without prejudice to any of the participants and attention had to be paid to the best postal connexions with the archiepiscopal residences. Mainz proposed Frankfurt or Worms, while Cologne and Trier were more in favour of Coblenz. After some deliberation the list of possible places was reduced to Limburg and Ems. At Heimes' suggestion the latter, in view of its character of a health-resort, was finally selected as most likely to conceal the purpose of the meeting, which for the time being was to be kept secret.²

In Vienna these preparations were observed with mixed feelings. As the conference might prove to be of extreme importance for the future of the German Church, the imperial

¹ HÖHLER, 49 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 55 ; ENDRES, 91 *seqq.*

government found it necessary to obtain betimes, in spite of the inevitable wearisome negotiations it entailed, solemn promises from Cologne, Trier, and Salzburg that nothing detrimental to the imperial name and its rights would be discussed or determined. Vienna's distrust of the ambitious policy of Mainz proved to be not entirely unjustified.¹

The four Metropolitans having spent rather more than the first half of the year 1786 in preparatory negotiations, their representatives met at last at the "Darmstädter Hof" at Ems on the evening of July 24th. Mainz was represented by the Suffragan Bishop Heimes in person,² an indication of the importance attributed to the conference by this dignitary, who had long since wrested from his Archbishop the administration of ecclesiastico-political affairs in the diocese. The oldest member of the group was Tautphoeus, the deputy for Cologne, former Vicar General of Münster. He was seventy years old and hard of hearing. The Salzburg representative, Consistorial Councillor Bönicke, was of more consequence, though his vacillating attitude soon lost him the confidence of Heimes. Trier was represented by Vicar General Ludwig Joseph Beck, to whom his superior had hitherto entrusted the conduct of all business connected with the nunciature dispute.

In certain respects the instructions given to these negotiators had been drawn up with considerable circumspection. Thus the representative of Trier had been strictly enjoined³ not to agree to anything that might mean a privilege for Mainz or might impair the respect due to the Pope. He was to be scrupulously careful to uphold the hierarchic system and to avoid giving the other Bishops any reasonable cause for complaint. Above all, no alliance against other Powers was to be entered into nor were complaints to be voiced against the

¹ Cf. SCHOTTE in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXXV. (1914), 102. Endres gives a full account of the assurances desired by Vienna.

² Cf. Arnoldi's character-sketch in his report of July 24, 1786 (HÖHLER, 63 *seqq.*); plans and views of the "Darmstädter Hof" *ibid.*

³ Printed version of his instruction of July 21, 1786, *ibid.* 59 *seqq.*; his credentials, in Latin and German, *ibid.*, 61 *seq.*

emperor or other sovereigns. But with all this, the object of the congress as defined in Beck's authority, which was made out at the same time, was entirely episcopalist in its purport : " to restore the original rights of the Archbishops and Bishops, after previous consultation, and to have them put into practice." The other Courts also carried out the necessary preliminary work by means of long-winded discussions and memoranda, in which, along with the actual dispute about the nunciature, the Coblenz *Desiderata* of 1769 played the most prominent part.

As the proceedings at Ems were to be regarded as secret, no official protocol was to be taken and, in particular, any differences that might arise were not to be committed to writing ; only the resolutions that were arrived at were put down in due form day by day. The Trier Secretary Arnoldi, however, was instructed to make a secret record of the proceedings in a room adjoining that of the conference.¹

Having agreed on their programme on July 25th, the next day the delegates began discussions on complaints against the Papal Curia. In many cases the *gravamina* of 1769 served as a basis for these talks, which covered all the episcopal rights which Rome was alleged to have impaired. It was agreed to reject all cases of Papal reservation, all Papal dispensations, all nuncios and Papal notaries, all unilateral resolutions of Congregations, and all *processus informativi* carried out by nuncios. The annates and *pallium* moneys were to be reduced in accordance with long-standing promises, and every diocese was to have its own courts of appeal. Other points discussed were resignations and the accumulation of benefices resulting from Roman presentations. Working speedily, the delegates dealt with all the subject-matter of the *gravamina* by July 28th. The various demands they proposed were submitted for

¹ His account of the proceedings has been edited by HÖHLER (67 *seqq.*), who had before him the original from the episcopal archives at Limburg. The sources given by Höhler were used by A. COULIN in his article " Der Emser Kongress des Jahres 1786 " in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht*, vol. 47 (vol. 25 in the 3rd series), 1917, 1 *seqq.*

approval to their Courts, which made several alterations in them.

In addition, the four Archbishops wanted to use this opportunity to pave the way for an internal reform of ecclesiastical life according to modern notions, to be carried out by a uniform procedure in all four archdioceses. For these questions of discipline, as for the first part of the talks, Beck, the delegate from Trier, had to provide the preliminary drafts as material for debate.¹ It is significant that the circular letter written to his Bishops by the Grand Duke of Tuscany was also taken into consideration.² Beck's proposals were accepted in the main and were collected together in a reforming decree.³ These agreements were not to be brought to the knowledge of the public but were to serve the other Bishops as a model of pastoral organization in harmony with the times. According to the agreed decree, all exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction were abolished and new regulations were made for the training and employment of the parochial clergy. Other articles provided for the cleansing of divine service from all "superstitious objects and abuses", such as benedictions, confraternities, processions, and the decoration of churches and altars. A further set of articles regulated in detail the whole of religious life, including the daily regime of abbeys, nunneries, and convents.

From August 8th to 16th the congress was suspended while some of the representatives returned to their seats of government to deliberate on the punctations laid down during the first part of the negotiations. A difference of opinion between Mainz and Cologne on the questions of celibacy and abstinence had hindered the work⁴ and almost threatened to wreck the

¹ Beck used for the purpose some notes in Latin that he had made before the congress opened (published by HÖHLER, 281 *seqq.*).

² Arnoldi's diary for July 31, *ibid.*, 109 *seq.*

³ Text, *ibid.*, 92-106.

⁴ Cf. especially Beck's letter to Klemens Wenzeslaus, of August 5, 1786 (*ibid.*, 134 *seq.*); SCHOTTE in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXXV., 97 *seq.*

whole undertaking. Back in Trier Beck wrote to his secretary at Ems¹ "The end of the congress will be ignominy as a reward for us and a triumph for the Romans." In Trier too there was an unpleasant incident. When the proposal made at Ems that overworked priests should be dispensed from saying the breviary was submitted to Klemens Wenzeslaus he rejected it with scorn remarking that no doubt the object of it was "to enable the reverend gentlemen to have an extra hour a day for bibbing and gaming". Beck, deeming that his own honour and that of all the clergy of Trier had been impugned, felt it his duty to relinquish his appointment as representative at the Congress of Ems unless his Archbishop expressed to him a better opinion of the diocesan clergy. He accordingly tendered his resignation to the Elector on August 12th,² as the result of which Klemens Wenzeslaus wrote him a personal letter in which he withdrew the insulting references and did his best to mollify his indignant Vicar General.³

The last of the archiepiscopal governments to deliver its finding on the Ems proposals was that of Cologne, which had been awaited with anxiety. It accepted the punctation on the restoration of episcopal rights while rejecting the proposed reform of ecclesiastical discipline. The discussions at Ems could therefore be resumed and this was done on August 18th. The main task now was to pay regard to the alterations suggested by the different Courts and to the observations they had made and to reconcile them one with the other. This had to be done with all possible speed as the emperor wanted to be apprised of the Ems resolutions by the beginning of the following month at the latest.

After a series of discussions, many of which were very lively, an agreement was finally arrived at. Between September 3rd and 8th four letters, all of similar import, were addressed to Joseph II. by the Powers taking part in the

¹ On August 11, 1785 (HÖHLER, 140).

² Text of the letter, *ibid.*, 141 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 144.

congress.¹ They were accompanied by the punctation agreed upon at Ems in pursuance of the imperial commission, and the wish was expressed that the emperor, as the advocate of the German Church, should support the demands in Rome or, if no satisfaction was obtained there by amicable methods, that he should summon a German national council "to free the German nation at long last from all forms of oppression". If this course too proved ineffectual, the petitioners were prepared to bring the questions before the German Diet and to solve them satisfactorily in a lawful way.

Every word of the Ems Punctation² betrayed its close connexion with the principles of Febronianism³ and Josephism. All the demands, whether based on traditional *gravamina* or on recent developments, were assembled in a clear and concise manner, the episcopal authority being referred to as the only one to have any lawful existence within the diocese.

In the introduction the punctators cited the imperial request contained in the rescript of October 12th, 1785, and their sense of responsibility to the German Church, but at the same time they declared their readiness to uphold the primacy of the Pope, even in the matter of jurisdiction, though they felt themselves obliged to draw a definite distinction between the essential rights of the Pope and those he had allegedly usurped. The latter, having originated in the spurious decretals of pseudo-Isidore, were henceforth to be abolished.

¹ Dated from Salzburg on September 3, 1786, Brühl on the 7th, Schönbornslust and Aschaffenburg on the 8th (*ibid.*, 168 *seq.* and STIGLOHER, 278 *seqq.*). According to ENDRES (III, n. 1) the 8th should be corrected to the 10th, but the first date is found in the imperial reply (Stigloher, 290; Höhler, 190).

² Text, *ibid.*, 171-183; STIGLOHER, 266-278; WOLF, *loc. cit.*, 178 *seqq.* COULIN (*loc. cit.*, 17 *seqq.*) examines the contents article by article, giving especial attention to the steps of the development of each and to the alterations made by the Courts of the ecclesiastical principalities.

³ Cf. also *Archiv für kath. Kirchenrecht*, LXXXIII., 647 *seq.*

There followed, in twenty-two articles, the various demands that were held to arise from the episcopal authority: the subordination of all residents in the diocese to the Bishop; the abolition of all direct appeals to Rome and of all exemptions; the severance of the bond with foreign Generals of religious Orders; the extension of the episcopal authority of dispensation to all injunctions of abstinence, matrimonial impediments, and religious vows; the right to alter pious foundations; removal of the quinquennial faculties; the invalidity of all Papal Briefs and unilateral resolutions of Congregations lacking episcopal ratification; the abolition of the nunciature tribunals and notariates apostolic. The serious accusation was made that in questions of dispensation connected with the accumulation of benefices Rome had "violated in various ways" the concordat of Bâle. Wherefore the right of presentation to benefices was vested in the Bishop alone, unrestricted by Papal reservations or coadjutorships or resignations in favour of others. In the conferment of benefices special consideration was to be given to the age and worthiness of the recipients. The same absence of restriction was to apply in cases of appointment to the higher offices in cathedral and collegiate churches.

Other articles of the Ems resolutions were directed against delay in ordination after the conferment of benefices, against the presentation of foreigners to German benefices, and against the so-called "Papal months". In future the *processus informativus* was to be carried out by the Ordinaries or neighbouring Bishops, with the relaxation for suffragan Bishops of the necessary conditions, the abolition of the customary Papal provisos, and the alteration of the old form of oath, which lowered the Bishops to the rank of vassals. Within two years the annates and pallium moneys were to be reduced by a national council or the imperial Diet. In future, as a court of third instance over the diocesan and metropolitan courts, there should be only national *judices in partibus*, or, better still, new courts attached to provincial synods.

In the final paragraph of the document it was stated that

the Bishops could only guarantee a reform of ecclesiastical life and discipline after the restoration of all these "rights which were due to them". The emperor was asked to see to it that the council that had already been promised in the interim concordat of Aschaffenburg was brought into existence, on a national basis, within two years.

Naturally much depended on what the emperor thought of these demands. At first sight it looked as if they were in complete conformity with the principles of the Austrian variety of Josephism and would therefore be sure of having the imperial protection, but a closer inspection revealed an important difference. In the opinion of the Josephist experts on ecclesiastico-political jurisdiction, almost all the rights in the punctations claimed by the Bishops for themselves on divine authority belonged to the omnipotent State, as inalienable rights, as it was also the duty of the State to take in hand the pastoral care of its subjects. It was only in the negation and rejection of the alleged usurpations of power by the Papacy that the two movements were in accord. But the proposed extension of episcopal authority was not to be borne by so absolutist a monarch as Joseph II.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the emperor's reply, though containing an abundance of assurances couched in general terms, was, on the whole, guarded and evasive. Chancellor Kaunitz seems to have pointed out to him the serious issues of principle involved and to have convinced him of the plausibility of such misgivings. The emperor also agreed to another of Kaunitz's suggestions, that the petitioners be asked to come to a general agreement with the rest of the German hierarchy, a request which seemed impossible of fulfilment. Some time previously, as it happened, the Bishop of Speyer, having learnt of the Ems punctations through an indiscretion of the "Hamburger Journal", had sent a sharply-worded protest to the imperial court against the presumably intentional exclusion of the German Bishops from deliberations of such vital importance, and in so doing he had given expression to the dissatisfaction felt by several Suffragans at the prospect of the metropolitan authority increasing its power

without reference to others.¹ Actually the imperial reply of November 16th, 1786,² expressed the extreme desirability of extending the Austrian measures of reform to the whole of Germany and promised the four Metropolitans every assistance as soon as "the necessary closer agreement had been taken in hand by means of confidential negotiations" with the Suffragans and exempt Bishops on the one hand and the competent secular rulers on the other.

This request was complied with by the Archbishops, who now acquainted their Suffragans with the Ems negotiations and invited their support. The most wholehearted approval of the episcopalist aims came from the prelates of the Salzburg province, though some of them expressed doubts about the practicability of the punctation.³ The only answers that were entirely negative were those of Speyer and Liège,⁴ while a number of other Bishops preferred to wait on events.

The indecision of some of the prelates is exemplified by the behaviour of the Bishop of Constance. Both Speyer and Mainz had written him long letters in November and December, 1785, urging him to join their respective parties,⁵ as the result of which he wrote to his Vicar General, "We waver between two camps, neither of which we want to offend."⁶ He then made inquiries of Würzburg and Hildesheim, as to

¹ Dated from Bruchsal, November 2, 1786; text in HÖHLER, 187 *seq.* *Copy of the imperial reply of November 16, 1786, in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 393/9.

² HÖHLER, 190 *seq.* Endres' date, the 26th, may be a misprint, as his source too has the 16th (STIGLOHER, 204 *cf.* 290 *seq.*).

³ The attitude of each one is outlined by SCHOTTE in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXXV., 105, n. 1. *Cf.* HÖHLER, 202 *seqq.*

⁴ SCHOTTE, *ibid.*, 106 *seq.*

⁵ Bishop Stirum to the Bishop of Constance on November 15, 1786 (records of the diocese of Constance, "Papal Nunciatures," in the Archives of the Archdiocese of Freiburg i. Br.). *Cf.* "Conclusum des Geistl. Rats zu Konstanz," of November 9, 1786 (*ibid.*); *Erthal to the Bishop of Constance, December 11, 1786 (*ibid.*).

⁶ *November 25, 1786 (*ibid.*).

their attitude,¹ and even sent a special representative to Würzburg to reconnoitre the situation.² In the course of the next few years the letters written to Constance by the two party-leaders, Erthal and Stirum, were more and more urgent, and they were now joined by Salzburg.³ It was not till October, 1788, when Würzburg informed Constance⁴ that it hoped to come to terms with Rome—Würzburg refraining from negotiations at the Diet and Rome refraining from exercising the jurisdiction of the nunciature—that the careful Swabian prelate decided to follow suit and wrote to Mainz on these lines.⁵ His petition to Rome in the matter, asking for considerate treatment, evoked a friendly response from the Pope, though it contained a definite reference to the excessive demands of the four Metropolitans.⁶

With these differences of opinion, it soon became evident that there was no possibility of complete agreement; some were in favour of a national council, others would have none of it.⁷ Finally the Ems punctators came to the conclusion that

¹ *Letters of December 23, 1786 (*ibid.*).

² *The Bishop of Constance to the Bishop of Würzburg, June 24, 1787 (*ibid.*).

³ *Erthal to the Bishop of Constance, April 23, 1787 (*ibid.*); *Stirum to the same, May 19, 1787 (*ibid.*); *Salzburg Consistory to the same, August 29, 1788 (attacking the tithe Bull; *ibid.*); *Erthal to the same, September 25, 1788 (urging him to decide on co-operation), and October 8, 1788 (asking for his agreement at the Diet; *ibid.*).

⁴ Letter of October 9, 1788 (*ibid.*); *letter of thanks from the Bishop of Constance to the Bishop of Würzburg, November 8, 1788 (*ibid.*).

⁵ *To Erthal, November 8, 1788, also on October 31, 1789 (*ibid.*). In a *letter of February 1, 1790, Erthal asked him once again for his definite support at the Diet (*ibid.*).

⁶ *Brief of January 3, 1789 (Papal Secret Archives, Epist. A° XIV., fo. 137).

⁷ Salzburg, for instance, was in favour of it, Cologne against it. Cf. the letter from Minister Clauspruch to Heimes on January 4, 1787 (in HÖHLER, 197 *seqq.*), in which Cologne's misgivings were fully expressed.

the only course that offered any hope of success was to put their resolutions into practice within their own dioceses, thus giving them some sort of validity, and to invite those Suffragans who had shown a co-operative spirit to do likewise. The procedure for dealing with appeals and dispensations in their four archdioceses were accordingly altered so as to leave out the nunciatures; some synodal courts were set up; and advocates and procurators were forbidden to have any official intercourse with the nuncios.¹

This illegal and arbitrary procedure naturally met with opposition on the part of the Roman Curia and its representatives in Germany.² The nuncios were immediately instructed to keep a most careful watch for any violation of Papal reservations and to issue appropriate warnings. But protests were of no avail.³ Rome being less disposed than ever to retreat, the nunciature tribunals exercised their jurisdiction as before.⁴ In Cologne, where Bellisomi's successor, Pacca, had granted a matrimonial dispensation to Prince Hohenlohe-Bartenstein, there were serious clashes. In response to a complaint about the matter lodged with the Papal Secretary of State, the Archbishop received a letter which, carefully worded though it was, was in essence an unmistakable rebuke.⁵ The affair

¹ SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 320 *seq.* Cf. the Cologne pastoral letter of February 4, 1787, with its dispensation from fasting issued on its own authority (in STIGLOHER, 307 *seqq.*).

² How badly Rome was informed about the happenings at Ems is shown by Boncompagni's *letters to Caprara of August 12 and 26 and September 7, 1786 (Nunziat. di Germania, 684-5, Papal Secret Archives). *On October 11, 1786, the nuncio was instructed to procure the letter written by the Ems punctators to the emperor, *on November 18, 1786, to find out the emperor's opinion (*ibid.*).

³ SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 321.

⁴ This was done by Zoglio, for instance, in the matter of indulgences and dispensations; cf. for example, his letters of August 12 and October 4, 1786 (*Pragm. Geschichte . . . appendix, 31-35*).

⁵ Cardinal Secretary of State Boncompagni to the Elector Max Franz on December 20, 1786 (*ibid.*, 807 *seq.*), and to Pacca on

became more complicated in November, 1786, when Pacca went so far as to send a circular letter to the Vicars General and all the clergy of the ecclesiastical provinces of the Rhine, declaring the dispensations granted directly by the archiepiscopal diocesan courts to be invalid, for this drew into the dispute not only the higher but also the lower ranks of the clergy.¹ The Archbishops were still further incensed, and it was not until the Elector of Cologne had received a temperately worded letter from the Pope, of January 20th, 1787, that the excitement was somewhat allayed.²

Meanwhile a measure taken by the Munich nunciature provided the Rhenish Archbishops with fresh grounds for complaint. With the agreement of the Government, Zoglio appointed special sub-delegates for the outlying districts of the Bavarian electorate, his purpose being the more expeditious handling and dispatch of official business. The person appointed for Düsseldorf was Baron Roberz, who was Provost there, for Heidelberg the administrative councillor Philipp von Hertling.³ This step reawakened the suspicions of the Ordinaries

December 26, 1786 (*ibid.*, 322, n. 1). His letter of complaint to Pacca, of November 27, 1786, *ibid.*, appendix 35 *seq.* The *copy in the State Archives in Munich, Kasten schwarz 393/9, is dated November 29, 1786; *ibid.* also Pacca's answer, pointing out that he was granting the dispensation as nuncio, not as titular archbishop. Max Franz had complained "que ce serait donner lieu à des confusions perpétuelles, si des évêques étrangers vouloient exercer une juridiction dans le diocèse d'un autre et s'ingérer dans l'administration de ses fonctions episcopales" (*ibid.*). He had not even recognized Pacca as nuncio. Cf. PACCA, *Memorie storiche*, 57 *seqq.*

¹ Encyclical of November 30, 1786, printed in the appendix to the *Responsio* (Leodii, 1790), 430 *seqq.*, mentioned on p. 61, n. 1 (STIGLOHER, 281 *seqq.*); PACCA, *Memorie storiche*, 63 *seqq.*; *Pragmat. Geschichte*, appendix, 37 *seqq.* *Ibid.*, 42-9, the letters of protest from Mainz, Trier, and Cologne.

² SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 323 *seq.*

³ The State Archives in Munich (Kasten schwarz 507/2; the "570" in ENDRES, 86, n. 4 is a misprint) have copies of the nuncio's request for the nomination of two candidates (undated) and the

affected, despite the reassuring declarations of the Bavarian Government. Numerous complaints made to the emperor by the three ecclesiastical Electors had little success. Finally, however, a rescript issued by the Imperial Court Council on February 27th, 1787, while recognizing all the other rights of the nunciature, ordered the Bavarian Elector to prevent the erection of a commissionership in Düsseldorf.¹ Karl Theodor very firmly refused to submit to any such attack on his sovereign rights and finally made use of the opportunity to make a full explanation of his attitude towards the whole of the nunciature dispute.² A rather tortuous counter-statement made by the imperial court read very like an apology.³

electoral nomination of Roberz (November 5, 1786), with Zoglio's letter of October 11, 1786. *Ibid.*, Kasten schwarz 507/16b, the *papers dealing with the difficulties connected with Zoglio's recognition on the Lower Rhine and Roberz's administration.

¹ *Original of the imperial rescript, *ibid.*, Kasten schwarz 507/16b. Cf. SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 325. The Bavarian envoy in Vienna, Karl Theodor von Hallberg, had only just received instructions from the Elector (dated February 16, 1787) to find out the substance and result of the discussions that were presumably going on in the Court Council, when, on March 3, he had to send off the rescript. On his making further inquiries he was told that the sharp wording of the rescript was in accordance with the imperial policy of totally abolishing the nunciatures and that later, step by step, stricter measures would be taken in the matter. See his *report of May 30, 1787 (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 623/66).

² *Karl Theodor to Joseph II., April 4, 1787 (*ibid.*, Kasten schwarz, 507/2). Simultaneous *instructions to Baron von Hallberg, *ibid.*, Kasten schwarz 507/16b. *Ibid.* another *instruction to Hallberg, of May 30, 1787, with a full memorandum setting out the reasons for the Elector's attitude, to be used in future negotiations.

³ Hallberg's *report of August 22, 1787, on the deep impression made on the Court Council by the Elector's reply (the nuncio would probably be tolerated: *ibid.*, Kasten schwarz 623/66); *report of November 28, 1787: the Imperial Court Councillor was seeking a compromise, but he would rather recognize a native

In the course of time ever wider circles were caught up in the discussion about the Ems punctuation, and finally the general public. One of the first to enter the fray was Bishop von Limburg-Stirum himself, who published a spirited pamphlet full of objections to the Ems demands. This led to a fruitless correspondence with Salzburg and a violent public controversy in print with Cologne, in which other circles were involved.¹ The number of polemical works and written opinions on the German nunciature dispute was so enormous that even now the collection of them is still far from complete.²

There then took place an incident of an ecclesiastico-political nature that proved to be the turning-point in the history of the Ems punctuation. The Elector of Mainz fell so seriously ill as to necessitate the election of a coadjutor, and in this appointment Prussia, in pursuance of its policy of the League of Princes, was particularly deeply interested.³ It was agreed that the most suitable person for the post was Canon

Bishop than a foreign nuncio (*ibid.*); *report of December 12, 1787: the Court Council's decision had been dispatched, but Hallberg was still ignorant of its content; in any case the Protestant members had adopted the attitude of the Curia and had outvoted the Catholic members (*ibid.*). On September 30, 1788, the Imperial Vice-Chancellor Colloredo *wrote that the emperor intended to treat the Elector with the greatest consideration and would gladly assist "in the establishment of a permanent ecclesiastical system" (*ibid.*).

¹ HÖHLER, 208 *seqq.*

² When competing for a prize offered by the theological faculty of the university of Munich, in 1930-31, Habenschaden had collected and edited about 140 publications from the Munich archives and libraries alone. I saw his work in manuscript form.

³ Cf. HÖHLER, 225 *seqq.*, and SCHOTTE'S complete presentation of the matter (*loc. cit.*, 330 *seqq.*) based on Vatican records. IMMICH, using the documents published by LEHMANN (*Preussen und die kath. Kirche*, VI. and VII. [1893-4]), has dealt with Prussia's participation in the affair in his article "Preussens Vermittlung im Nuntiaturstreit 1787-89" in the *Forschungen zur brandenburg. u. preuss. Gesch.*, VIII. (1895), 143 *seqq.* Cf. also the account in PACCA, *Memorie stor.*, 73 *seqq.*

Karl Theodor von Dalberg, Baron of the Empire. After some difficulties, by no means slight, had been overcome in the Chapter itself, the Roman Curia's assent to Dalberg's appointment had to be obtained, and further trouble was anticipated in this quarter, as Dalberg's views were notoriously similar to those of Archbishop Erthal. To remove these obstructions the parties interested were prepared to make concessions in the matter of the Ems punctation. To effect an arrangement on this basis, the Marchese Lucchesini, a diplomat of some experience, was sent to Rome by the Prussian Court.¹ Lucchesini's mission was successful, and on May 2nd, 1787, an agreement was reached between Rome and Mainz, by which the desired election was sanctioned on condition that the ecclesiastico-political *status quo* that existed before the Congress of Ems was retained. Mainz had been moved to make this concession by the far from friendly attitude shown towards the Ems demands by Austria, Bavaria, and Prussia, and the Ems coalition was thereby breached in a vital spot. This conclusion of at least an outward peace with Mainz had another effect which was not unwelcome to Rome: the increasing friendliness towards the Curia evinced by Prussia, which might be valuable in connexion with the nunciature dispute and the Josephist reforms.² Henceforth, out of gratitude for this benevolent neutrality, Pius VI., when addressing the Prussian sovereign, did not demur to use the royal title, which Rome had hitherto refused to recognize.³

¹ IMMICH, *loc. cit.*, 145. Dienseim, the president of the chamber, was first selected, then Dalberg, whose Brief of eligibility was made out on April 18 (*ibid.*, 147).

² Pacca, the nuncio, was instructed to seek an audience of the Prussian king and to convey to him the Pope's thanks. This he did at Wesel on June 15. His address was published by SCHOTTE (*loc. cit.*, 816 seq.). Cf. IMMICH, *loc. cit.*, 157, and Pacca's own account (*Memorie stor.*, 87 seqq.).

³ SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 328. That this courtesy could have been no juridical recognition in accordance with canon law has been shown in *Archiv für Kirchenrecht*, CIII. (1924), 136 seq. Cf. KURT RHEINDORF, *Die Anerkennung des preuss. Königtitels*

Even in these circumstances the questions raised by the Congress of Ems were not allowed to rest. In issuing a Bull of taxation to the Bavarian Elector,¹ a transaction of little importance in itself, which would not normally have attracted attention, Pius VI. was deemed by the Ems punctators to have exceeded his legitimate powers. On this occasion the objectors were headed by Salzburg and Trier, but they soon realized they would make no impression on the Bavarian Government, which stood its ground, and there being no prospect of either Rome or Munich agreeing to a compromise, the Metropolitans entertained the idea in the course of 1788 of initiating negotiations with Rome, but their efforts were not rewarded with any immediate tangible success.

These attempts having failed, there was still another course of action available to the exponents of the Ems resolutions: they could try to secure the co-operation of the German Diet. It had already been pointed out in a decree of the Imperial Court Council of November, 1787,² replying to a complaint by Salzburg about Zoglio's jurisdiction, that the final decision on the whole question of the German nunciatures rested with the Diet in full session. The project was eventually approved by the Courts concerned, and on August 9th, 1788, the matter was accordingly referred to the Diet by Joseph II.³ The Elector of Mainz then sent the Imperial Estates a detailed memorandum of the Ems demands, culminating in a clamorous appeal for the preservation of freedom for the German Church.⁴

durch die Kurie, in the *Zeitschr. der Savigny-Stiftung*, XLII., Kan. Abt. XI. (1921), 442-6. The Papal Brief of April 5, 1788, and Friedrich Wilhelm II.'s letter of thanks of June 23, 1788, are to be found in PACCA, *Memorie stor.*, 88 *seqq.*, 96 *seqq.*

¹ SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 338. Cf. the relative *acts in the State Archives, Munich, Acta comit., Kasten schwarz 214/7.

² This decree ran clean contrary to Joseph II.'s ecclesiastico-political ideas, and consequently was suppressed by him. Cf. SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 781 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 786. Printed copy in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten blau 416/9.

⁴ For the twofold version, cf. SCHOTTE, 786, n. 2. Count

Being urged more and more insistently to deal with the matter quickly, most of the Protestant and some of the ecclesiastical Estates gave their support to the motion,¹ and it only remained to overcome the obstructions offered by several members of the Prussian League of Princes.²

As time went on, these discussions tended more and more to concentrate on the original point at issue: the Papal nunciatures and their faculties. Memoranda were sent in all directions, the matter was discussed by every publicist,³ and it soon looked as if the leisurely tempo of the negotiations associated with the Diet would bring about its gradual demise before any result could be obtained. The Munich Government declared its readiness in principle to come to a friendly understanding, but insisted that the decision of the question rested with the sovereign of the country and not with the Diet, and it threatened to set up bishoprics of its own if the Diet passed a resolution in another sense.⁴ Even the Archbishops now be-

Lerchenfeld sent along with his *report to the Elector of May 16, 1789, a copy of the Mainz letter to the Margrave of Ansbach and a copy of the printed circular letter to the Catholic Estates (*loc. cit.*, Kasten schwarz 214/7, II.).

¹ Some of the Estates are listed by SCHOTTE (798, n. 1).

² Prussia had strong objections against the matter being dealt with by the Diet principally because it had no desire to fall out with Rome. Finally, however, Friedrich Wilhelm II. voted against the nunciatures, in accordance with the demands of the Empire, after further attempts had been made to effect a compromise. Cf. IMMICH, *loc. cit.*, 166.

³ Cf. A. PROFESSIONE, *Antonio Felice Zondadari e Bartol. Pacca*, Milano, 1899, 49 *seq.*

⁴ Instructions from the Elector to Count Lerchenfeld, of August 27 and October 8, 1788, and December 3, 1789 (*loc. cit.*, Kasten schwarz 393/2, 214/7 II., 393/4). Lerchenfeld communicated the first of these instructions to the Courts friendly to Bavaria, tactfully omitting several passages (cf. his *report to Karl Theodor of September, 5, 1788, *ibid.*, 393/2) and added full memoranda in the same sense to his *reports to the Elector of September 12, 1788, and December 2, 1789 (*ibid.*, 393/2 and 4). On the other hand, Lerchenfeld was able to send his sovereign,

sought the Pope to settle the matter on a friendly basis rather than expose it to the publicity of the Diet.¹ Cardinal Herzan, on instructions from the emperor, tried to move the Pope in this direction, but Pius would not give way, while earnestly professing his readiness to remove any genuine abuses.²

With the passage of time even those most nearly concerned lost interest in the matter. Trier, after supporting the action in the Diet in a half-hearted fashion, soon followed the example of Mainz and made a separate peace with the Curia. Klemens Wenzeslaus came to Rome to obtain the quinquennial faculties and forbade any attitude towards the Ems Punctuation to be taken in the schools of his diocese.³ Likewise the peace party in the cathedral chapter of Cologne, which also sought for reconciliation with the Pope, was on the increase. With the lapse of time and the general exhaustion the storm had died down.⁴

The movement reached its logical conclusion in the long-awaited pronouncement of its attitude by the Papal Court, which in fullness and clarity of exposition left nothing to be

on April 19, 1789, a copy of the Brunswick instruction (*ibid.*, 393/3). According to the first instruction from the Bavarian Electorate the emperor was to be asked by the Diet to initiate mediatory negotiations with the Pope.

¹ Cf., for example, the letters to Pius VI. from Klemens Wenzeslaus on November 18 and from Colloredo on November 24, 1788 (*copies in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 393/9); *Max Franz to Pius VI. on November 28, 1788 (*ibid.*, 507/4).

² Under date February 4, 1789, *Zoglio sent a copy of the report on this audience to the Bavarian Government (*ibid.* 507/5). Erthal had asked Joseph II. to mediate, and the emperor had agreed to do so. Cf. *Erthal to Joseph II. on November 17, 1788, and *Joseph II. to Erthal on December 6, 1788 (*ibid.*, 507/4). Cf. also the report on the audience in *Cifra to Caprara on January 21, 1789 (Nunziat. di Germania, 684-5, Papal Secret Archives).

³ SCHOTTE, *loc. cit.*, 803.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 804.

desired. A special Congregation consisting of the Secretary of State Zelada, and Cardinals Albani, Antonelli, Gerdil, and Campanelli, had been appointed by Pius VI. in the autumn of 1789 to inquire into the Punctuation of Ems and the other complaints that had been raised. The Congregation concerned with the Synod of Pistoia met at the same time. The fruit of the discussions appeared in a detailed memorandum covering several hundred pages and entitled *Sanctissimi Domini Nostri Pii papae Sexti Responsio ad Metropolitanos Moguntinum, Trevirenses, Coloniensem et Salisburgensem super Nunciaturis Apostolicis*. It had been composed, on the Pope's instruction, by Campanelli. On November 14th, 1789, the pronouncement was sent as an enclosure in a Papal Brief to the four punctators.¹

Pius VI. began his Brief by referring to the Archbishops' letter of December, 1788, and expressing the hope that the accompanying "*Responsio*" would bring home to them the absurdity of their demands. The length of the memorandum was not due to the difficulty of the subject but to the vast

¹ A *MS. copy sent from Rome is in the State Archives, Munich (Kasten schwarz 393/7). An exact contemporaneous copy appeared "juxta exemplar Romae, Leodii 1790", with various documents in an appendix. This copy contains on pp. 465 *seqq.* corrigenda for an obviously tendentious edition purporting to be published in Florence; actually it was published in Mainz. On p. 467 is a note (*a*) referring to Klemens Wenzeslaus: "Hunc ex catalogo tuo expunge. Is enim sanio rem mentem induit," and on p. 473 is another (*b*) referring to the other three: "Speramus meliora. Imitabuntur procul dubio Collegam Trevirenses, qui errorem deposuit." The dispatch of the *Responsio* to the addressees, after lengthy studies, was reported, for example, to Venice by *the agent Pietro Donado on November 21, 1789 (State Archives, Venice, Roma 302), and its appearance in print to Genoa by the *agent Serafino Figari on February 6, 1790 (State Archives, Genoa, 2405). Cf. GENDRY, II., 25 *seqq.* The Pope had the work sent to the emperor so that he might see how much he was relying on him in these matters (**Cifra* to Caprara, November 14, 1789, Nunziat. di Germania 684-5, Papal Secret Archives).

amount of literature that had to be considered ; there was hardly a courier that came to Rome from Germany that failed to bring with him a mass of pamphlets on the nunciature dispute, so the Holy City now had a superabundance of German publications. The long delay in the preparation of the memorandum had been caused by the Church's occupation with other pressing cares. The Brief ended with an urgent appeal to each of the recipients to recognize the nunciature tribunals then existing in Germany and to defend them against all contestants. "Get rid of all innovations," it went on to say, "into which You have been seduced against Your will by the wickedness of others. Bring everything back to the state in which it was before and show by Your actions the love for Your Mother that You claim for Yourself. And lastly acknowledge the right that has been joined inseparably to the primacy as such by divine institution, a right which We can never renounce and which no decision of a Diet, which has no competence in the matter, can abolish." At the same time the Pope stated that he was more than ready to take action against any abuses that had crept in, if they were brought to his attention.

Thus the accompanying Brief. The extensive memorandum itself, which soon appeared in print,¹ began with an enumeration and criticism of all the personalities involved in the dispute. This was followed by six chapters in which the various grievances were treated : the erection of the Munich nunciature, the appointment by this nunciature of commissaries in Heidelberg and Düsseldorf, Pacca's letter to the Suffragans and the clergy of the archdioceses, the rejection of Cologne's request for the sanctioning of a general mandate for the new synodal courts and Cologne's assertion that the Papal sanction for the independent erection of this tribunal was unnecessary, and finally the tithe Bull granted to Bavaria. The seventh chapter took up almost all the second half of the memorandum and offered positive proofs of the unrestricted

¹ Summary of the contents in WOLF, *Geschichte der röm.-kath. Kirche*, IV., 301 seqq.

rights of the Papacy. Eight sections were devoted to demonstrating the uncontested right to appoint extraordinary legates in extraordinary conditions, which certainly existed in the German dioceses, and the right to appoint ordinary nuncios with permanent jurisdiction. In three more sections historical evidence of the existence of this right was adduced, first from the earliest times till the ninth century, then from the ninth to the fifteenth century, and lastly from the fifteenth century till the present day. This was followed by evidence from conciliar decisions, mostly those taken by the four German Metropolitans, and from resolutions of the Diet and imperial ordinances, in the issue of which even the Protestant Estates had participated. In a final brief chapter various specific objections were rebutted.

The Brief and memorandum were transmitted to the German Archbishops by the nuncio Pacca. Both documents made a deep impression. For Klemens Wenzeslaus in particular they provided the final impetus that decided him to make his peace with Rome.¹ In February, 1790, he informed his former comrades-in-arms that he was no longer of their company.²

On the same day, February 20th, 1790, there took place another event of great moment for the German Church: the death of Joseph II.³ The nunciature dispute was now nearing its end. The nunciature at Munich remained in existence.⁴

¹ HÖHLER, 229 *seq.*, 237.

² Letters to the three Archbishops, to the Vicar General at Trier, and the Official at Coblenz, all of February 20, 1790 (*ibid.*, 238 *seqq.*).

³ On February 16, 1790, Reinach, a member of the cathedral chapter, *wrote from Würzburg to the Bishop of Constance that the death of the emperor would bring about a change in the whole situation (Archives of the Archdiocese of Freiburg im Breisgau, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ Subsequently Karl Theodor succeeded in setting up the office of a Grand Almoner and an exempt Court Bishopric. Cf. Vieregg's *report, of February 13, 1790, to Antici on the grand solemnization of the foundation on February 9 (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 508/1).

Zoglio was recalled in February, 1794, and died a year later.¹ On learning that the internuncio to Turin, Conte Ziucci, had been chosen to succeed him,² Karl Theodor brought it to the Pope's knowledge³ how pleased he would be to have at his Court, if only for a time, Annibale della Genga (the future Pope Leo XII.), who had succeeded Pacca as nuncio to Cologne in 1794 and was residing in Augsburg.⁴ Pius VI. acceded to his wish, and Della Genga was internuncio in Munich from May, 1795, till April, 1796.⁵ His place was taken by Ziucci until 1800, and then ensued a long interval in which the nunciature was left unoccupied.⁶

A hard lot was in store for the German Metropolitans. Their territories were invaded by the victorious armies of the French

¹ *Communication to the Elector on April 21, 1795 (*ibid.*, 393/4).

² *Cardinal Antici to Karl Theodor, April 25, 1795 (*ibid.*).

³ The Elector *wrote to Antici on May 9, 1795 (*ibid.*), that Antici was to tell the Pope "che io gradisco la destinazione della persona del conte Ziucci in nunzio alla mia corte, e che gli sono anzi gratissimo per avere a tal effetto scelta persona che mi lusingo sia per giustificare la sua elezione ed esser di mia piena soddisfazione". At the same time, however, he repeated his request for Della Genga, at least in the interim. " *Dopo la morte di Mgr. Zollio l'elettore Carlo Teodoro aveva fatto premura presso la S. Sede per avere in qualità di nunzio Mgr. Annibale della Genga arcivescovo di Tiro (nel 1823 Leone XII.), il quale si trovava in Augusta nunzio accreditato presso gli elettori ecclesiastici al Reno e che aveva seguito l'elettore di Treviri in Augusta. Pero la S. Sede aveva già destinato presso la corte elettorale di Baviera Mgr. Anidio dei conti Ziucci di Ascoli. " Serie dei nunzii accreditati presso la corte di Baviera " (Archives of the Apostolic Nunciature in Munich, now in Rome).

⁴ For Pacca's recall and the transference of the nunciature to Augsburg, v. his *Memorie storiche*, 166 *seqq.*

⁵ *Brief of Pius VI.'s to Karl Theodor, of May 3, 1795, and Zelada's *letter to the same, of May 16, 1795 (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 393/4; the Elector's *letters of thanks to the two writers, dated June 20, *ibid.*

⁶ " *Serie dei nunzii accreditati " (*loc. cit.*).

Revolution, and in 1792 Archbishop Erthal had to take to flight; two years later the same expedient was forced upon the Electors of Trier and Cologne, and finally also upon the Metropolitan of Salzburg.¹ In 1803, at the behest of France, a harsh decree was passed by the Deputation of the Empire, depriving them of their landed property for ever.

(2)

Joseph II. also had to suffer opposition, which in this case was of the most bitter nature, to his well-intentioned but ill-considered reforms, even in his lifetime. In the Austrian Netherlands this resistance led to bloody clashes and finally to a complete break with the House of Habsburg-Lorraine.

Through the death of his mother, Joseph II. had become the sovereign ruler of the Netherlands, and in 1781 he pledged himself, through the oath taken in the presence of the Belgian Primate, Cardinal Frankenberg of Malines,² by his deputy and brother-in-law, the newly-appointed Stadholder Albert of Sachsen-Teschen, to uphold the traditional rights and privileges (" *Joyeuse Entrée* ").³ During his stay in the country, which he made at this time, Joseph observed with what old-fashioned cumbersomeness and meticulousness official business was transacted and justice administered, and this was enough inducement for him, with his reforming zeal and love of thrift, to intervene here too with the object, as he conceived it, of effecting an improvement. The very least he could do

¹ HÖHLER, 243 *seq.*; GENDRY, II., 29.

² For Frankenberg, v. A. THEINER, *Der Kardinal Johann Heinrich Graf von Frankenberg, Erzbischof von Mecheln, Primas von Belgien, und sein Kampf für die Freiheit der Kirche und der bischöfl. Seminarien unter Kaiser Joseph II.*, Freiburg i. Br., 1850; ARTHUR VERHAEGEN, *Le cardinal de Franckenberg, archevêque de Malines (1726-1804, Bruges-Lille [1890].)*

³ SCHLITTER, *Josephs II. Regierung in den Niederlanden*, I., II; GENDRY, II., 30. Cf. also LAINEN, *Joseph II. en zijn regeering in de Nederlanden*, Anvers, 1908; L. DELAPLACE, S.J., *Joseph II. et la révolution brabançonne*, Bruges, 1890.

was to introduce into this country too the measures he had had carried out in the other hereditary lands.

While he was still in the Netherlands, therefore, he gave instructions that the ground should be prepared for a universal toleration, which, despite Cardinal Frankenberg's remonstrances, was introduced shortly afterwards by letters patent of October 13th, 1781.¹ Considerable indignation was aroused among the Bishops and Estates both by this and another measure, the abolition of all exemptions enjoyed by the regular clergy, which was carried out in defiance of a reasoned memorial presented by the Privy Council in Brussels. Bad blood was also inevitably created in the highest ecclesiastical circles by the ordinance authorizing the Bishops to use their right of dispensation without reference to the Pope and by the ever increasing suppression of religious houses that had been in progress since 1782.²

The general discontent was brought to a head in October, 1786, by the publication of another decree, providing for the suppression of the episcopal seminaries and their replacement by two others, controlled by the State, at Louvain and Luxemburg.³ Again the earnest remonstrances of the Cardinal and the Bishops were ignored.

As, however, a certain measure of supervision was conceded to the Bishops, the theological students assembled in their new schools in accordance with instructions. At Louvain, on December 1st, when the lectures began, the students complained that they were being taught heretical doctrines, violent disturbances ensued, and in a few days, though the Rector did his best to allay them, they developed into open revolt. So much damage was done to the building that the Rector was forced to retreat to Brussels, where he sought the help of the Government.⁴ Further attempts to quell the

¹ VERHAEGEN, 97 *seqq.*; SCHLITZER, 20 *seqq.*; PIRENNE, V., 391 *seqq.*

² SCHLITZER, 23-6.

³ *Ibid.*, 30; GENDRY, II., 31 *seqq.*; VERHAEGEN, 154 *seqq.*, 157 *seqq.*; PIRENNE, V., 407 *seqq.*

⁴ SCHLITZER, 55 *seqq.*

rebellion failed, the military were called in, and the Government appointed a commission to investigate the matter. But this did not break the spirit of the rebels. Finally, at the beginning of the new year the Government gave them the choice of submission or dismissal, whereupon most of the students chose to return to their dioceses.¹

Meanwhile the Government, whose clumsy handling of the incident incurred the censure of the emperor, had tracked down the students whom they considered to be chiefly responsible for the disorders and locked them up.² What was more serious, Zondadari,³ the Papal nuncio in Brussels, was accused of having incited them. Actually his only misdemeanour had been to have some copies printed, without the Stadholder's knowledge, of the Papal Brief against Eybel's pamphlet "What is the Pope?". He averred⁴ that they were intended primarily for the missions, but they had found their way into the seminary at Louvain, where, it was alleged, they had played an important part in the disorders. The theologians there had in fact found fault with their professors for teaching the same Febronian heresies as had been condemned in the Pope's Brief against Eybel.

The Stadholder's office was now thinking of forbidding the nuncio to appear again at Court, but Vienna thought that this was not sufficiently drastic. Prince Kaunitz suggested to the emperor that a nunciature at Brussels was unnecessary and asked for Zondadari's expulsion from Austrian territory. Joseph II. was remarkably quick in accepting this proposal, and the nuncio was given the definite order, dated February 14th, 1787, to depart from Brussels and the Netherlands

¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

² GENDRY, II., 32.

³ For Zondadari, cf. MORONI, CIII., 480; A. PROFESSIONE, *Zondadari e Pacca*, 7 seqq.; *ibid.*, II-14 his journey and arrival in Brussels. His journal dealing with these events in HUBERT, *Les papiers du nonce Zondadari*, in the *Bulletin de la Commission Royale (belgique) d'histoire*, LXXXIV. (1920), 178.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 126, 192. Incidentally Rome, not Brussels, was given as the place of publication.

within a few days. In future, the representative of the Holy See in Vienna would be responsible for the Netherlands as well.¹

Outwardly the Pope sustained this fresh attack with perfect calm and patience, but actually it had come as a great shock to the Curia.² On March 3rd Cardinal Herzan reported on an interview he had had with the Secretary of State, Boncompagni, who had admitted that the nuncio was somewhat to blame, inasmuch as he had not been authorized to have the Brief printed, but he defended him from the charge of having deliberately incited the students to rebellion. In any case, the Brief had already been made public long before, by a Luxemburg journal, so that the imperial decision could only be regarded as an unwarranted humiliation of the Pope. Pius VI.

¹ SCHLITTER, 60; PROFESSIONE, 24; HUBERT, 135 *seq.* With the approval of the Cardinal Secretary of State, Zondadari retired to the Abbey of Saint-Trond in Holland (HUBERT, 144, 193); *v. ibid.*, 201, the Secretary of State to Zondadari on March 7, 1787. *Cf.* “*Memorie relat. alla partenza del nunzio cacciato di Bruxelles, 1785,” Cod. Vat. 8652 of the Vatican Library.

² The Secretary of State gave vent to his indignation in a *letter to the nuncio Caprara, of February 21, 1787: “Quanto al breve di Eybel, il buon Zondadari non ha preso pensiero di pubblicarlo; ma non so, come osservatore e filosofo, riconciliare con sè stessi i metodi di S.M., e se avessi l'onore d'accostarlo, conterei tanto sopra la sua equità e ragione, che non avrei difficoltà di dirlo a lui stesso. Deve esser permesso ad Eybel di denigrare, estenuare, ridurre al niente il papa, e non deve esser permesso al papa di riprovare e confutare Eybel? Dov'è la libertà che tanto si vanta, dove l'indifferenza cui tante cose si sacrificano? e la libertà della stampa sarà solo pe' libri contro la religione, che sarà sempre vietato di difendere sino al capo stesso della religione cattolica? Saremo ridotti a dimandare al primo sovrano della nostra comunione almeno la neutralità, e neppur questa otterremo?” *Nunziat. di Germania*, 684-5, fo. 162, Papal Secret Archives. Boncompagni to Zondadari, undated, in HUBERT, 200. *Cf.* **Cifre* al Caprara, February 28, March 3 and 14, 1787 (*Nunziat. di Germania, loc. cit.*).

had, in fact, as Herzan learnt from another source, been extremely hurt by the step that had been taken.¹ It was also viewed with disapproval by many of the secular Courts of Europe.² A significant feature of the situation was the fear that the Prussian king, who at that time was anxious to secure the friendship of the Pope, would offer the rejected nuncio a refuge in his country, from where he could care for the interests of the other areas in his charge, namely Holland and England.³

At an audience he granted to the Austrian Cardinal Minister at the beginning of April, Pius VI. spoke with great self-restraint of the grave humiliation inflicted on him by Joseph II.'s action in the Netherlands.⁴ Nevertheless, at the same interview, Herzan tried to persuade the Pope to close the nunciature in Brussels, on the plea that the nuncio in Vienna could easily deal with the affairs of Brussels as well as his own.⁵ The Pope, of course, would listen to no such proposal.

The Cardinal of Malines⁶ being thought to be the prime leader of the clergy's opposition to the imperial measures of reform, the emperor sought to render him harmless by summoning him immediately to Vienna, to give an account of the disturbances in the Netherlands. In Vienna the Cardinal made proposals in writing to the emperor with a view to mediation, but Joseph rejected them outright and gave him the choice of altering his views on the imperial aims or of resigning his office. Rome had hoped that the emperor would see things in a different light after listening to Frankenberg,⁷ but not only was the emperor impervious to the Cardinal's

¹ BRUNNER, *Theol. Dienerschaft*, 152 seq.; HUBERT, 149 seq.

² Herzan's report of March 24, 1787, in BRUNNER, 159 seq.

³ HUBERT, 150.

⁴ Herzan's report of April 4, 1787, in BRUNNER, 161 seq. Cf. HUBERT, 149, 155.

⁵ SCHLITTER, 61 seq.

⁶ Zondadari wrote about him in his report (ch. 4), in HUBERT, 183 seq.

⁷ **Cifre al Caprara*, of March 17 and 24 and June 25, 1787 (*loc. cit.*).

exposition of the situation ; the Cardinal himself was not uninfluenced by the arguments put forward by Government circles in Vienna.¹

Meanwhile the students' revolt in Louvain was not by any means over and forgotten. From time to time the smouldering embers burst into flames. The indignation aroused among the theological members of the clergy was only the prelude to far more widespread disturbances which, by degrees, affected ever larger sections of the whole population and finally led to a general rebellion against the imperial system of reform, which was ruthlessly suppressing long-established privileges, not only in the ecclesiastical sphere but also in the civil administration and the judicature. Meanwhile, through making temporary concessions, the imperial Stadtholder, Prince Francis, found his position growing more difficult every day, and he was finally recalled by the emperor and replaced by General Murray, who was made responsible for the military government of the province.² Murray, too, in spite of the stringent instruction he had received, had hopes at first of averting the threatening catastrophe by an amicable agreement,³ but he too only brought upon himself the distrust and displeasure of his master. Joseph II., hoping to stifle any question of rebellion by a rigid policy of the utmost severity, failed to perceive how thoroughly bad the situation was until the Netherlandish volunteers and the Government troops were engaged in an open civil war.

Murray was now replaced by General Trautmansdorff,⁴ who, when all forcible measures had failed,⁵ followed the example of his predecessors and tried to settle the dispute about the general seminaries by friendly means, thinking that this would be the quickest way of bringing the whole popular movement to an end. He accordingly proposed to the emperor that a compromise be sought by allowing the theologians to be

¹ SCHLITTER, 62 *seqq.* Cf. GENDRY, II., 33 ; PIRENNE, V., 435.

² O. LORENZ, *Joseph II. und die belg. Niederlande*, 21.

³ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁴ GENDRY, II., 35 *seqq.*

⁵ LORENZ, 49-58 ; PIRENNE, V., 438.

trained in Vienna and then to occupy their posts in the Netherlands¹; alternatively, some concessions might be made to the Bishops on matters of secondary importance.² Later he proposed that the students should undergo only two years' training in the State seminary, the first three years to be spent in the episcopal establishments.³

But none of these proposals led to a settlement of the dispute. When it also seemed useless to try to stave off the disaster by prolonging the negotiations,⁴ Trautmansdorff published an edict, dated August 14th, 1789, whereby the episcopal seminaries were to have the same recognition and legal validity as the State ones,⁵ since the people, in their unfounded suspicion of the Government, feared that the new system was intended to open the way for new and erroneous doctrines. But Joseph II. was very angry at this announcement being made at what was thought to be an inappropriate moment, also at the failure to carry out some important restrictions that he wished to be imposed upon the theologians belonging to the regular clergy.⁶

In any case the conciliatory attitude now shown by the imperial government had come too late to have the desired effect of pacifying the population. It was also unfortunate that just at this time Cardinal Frankenberg, whose translation to Prague or Vienna was being considered by the Court, took to flight to ensure his personal safety,⁷ whereupon the Brussels

¹ Letter to Joseph II., of May 13, 1788, in SCHLITTER, *Geh. Korrespondenz Josephs II. mit Trautmansdorff*, 91 seq.

² Letter to Joseph II. of June 10, 1788 (*ibid.*, 101).

³ Letter to Joseph II. of May 25, 1789 (*ibid.*, 260).

⁴ Letters to Joseph II. of July 24 and August 6, 1789 (*ibid.*, 316 seq., 336).

⁵ VERHAEGEN, *Franckenberg*, 256 seqq. Cf. Trautmansdorff's letter to Joseph II. of August 14, 1789, in SCHLITTER, *Geh. Korrespondenz*, 351.

⁶ Joseph II. to Trautmansdorff on August 22 and 25, 1789 (*ibid.*, 360, 363).

⁷ Reports to Joseph II., of November 8 and 11, 1789 (*ibid.*, 470, 473). Cf. Joseph II. to Trautmansdorff on September 28,

government confiscated his property.¹ On it becoming known that he had been on the point of being arrested by Trautmansdorff, the Habsburg Government lost what little goodwill it had still enjoyed, and Rome too was deeply embittered.² Simultaneously the insurgents were capturing one town after another in their victorious advance. At the eleventh hour Trautmansdorff made them the most far-reaching concessions and gave them his word that they would be carried out,³ but even this was no longer of any avail. Finally, after even the Government troops had deserted him and copious supplies had fallen into the hands of the rebels, he was forced to quit the capital almost as a fugitive. "The accursed revolution has actually come about," he reported to his emperor in Vienna on December 15th.⁴ Joseph II. was so ashamed and enraged by this unexpected disaster that he would gladly have put himself at the head of his troops and quelled the insurrection at the point of the sword,⁵ but he no longer had the physical strength for any such undertaking; his frame was weak and sickly and was already in the grip of a mortal disease.

Driven well-nigh desperate by this emergency, the emperor, who had been so self-willed in the past, now sent out a cry for help to the Power against which he had formerly waged so unremitting a warfare—the Holy See. He must have fought and won a bitter struggle with his pride before he could have asked the Pope—whose representative he had driven out of the country that had risen up against him—to come to his assistance in winning that country back again.

Grievously though it must have irked him, Chancellor Kaunitz had to ask the Pope, through Cardinal Herzan in

1789 (*ibid.*, 406 *seq.*); Trautmansdorff's report to Joseph II. of November 12, 1789, in SCHLITZER, *Geh. Korrespondenz*, 477.

¹ GENDRY, II., 38 *seq.*

² **Cifra al Caprara*, of November 26, 1789 (Nunziat. di Germania, 684-5, *loc. cit.*).

³ Proclamation of November 26, 1789 (GENDRY, II., 41).

⁴ SCHLITZER, *Geh. Korrespondenz*, 531 *seqq.*

⁵ GENDRY, II., 42.

Rome,¹ so to prevail upon the Belgian Bishops that the Netherlands would remain an apanage of the imperial crown. In return for this assistance the emperor promised to revoke completely all the reforming laws, whether civil or ecclesiastical, he had introduced into the province, and to grant an unconditional amnesty to all the rebels. It was possible, too, that the emperor would be willing to take similar measures in the rest of his hereditary lands.²

Pius VI., only too willing to return good for evil, declared his readiness to take a hand in the affair as quickly as possible.³ One thing only he asked, that the emperor should now make reparation for all the injuries he had done the Church and the disasters he had brought upon it.⁴ Then, after some very careful preliminary work, a Brief was written to the Belgian Bishops,⁵ dated January 23rd, 1790, to be conveyed to them by the nuncio Zondadari, who was then resident in Liège. Zondadari too had been approached, by an imperial general, for the purpose of obtaining his good offices in the regaining of the province,⁶ so radically and rapidly had the situation altered.

The Brief to the hierarchy of the Austrian Netherlands was

¹ *Ibid.*, 43.

² Cf. Herzan's reports of January 13-30, 1790, in BRUNNER, *Theol. Dienerschaft*, 191-9. Cf. the *report of the agent Pietro Donado to Venice on January 9, 1790 (State Archives, Venice, Esteri-Roma 302).

³ For Herzan's audience, v. **Cifra al Caprara* of January 9, 1790 (Nunziat. di Germania, *loc. cit.*). Cf. **Cifre* to the same, January 13, 16, 23, 1790 (*ibid.*).

⁴ Pius VI.'s desire was that the emperor *" dia qualche riparo per i danni e disastri che o per sorpresa o per altrui seduzioni o anche per errore d'intelletto egli ha cagionati e inferiti alla religione, alla chiesa e ai di lei ministri ". There followed a list of his complaints. *Cifra al Caprara*, February 24, 1790 (*ibid.*).

⁵ Translated in P. PH. WOLF, *Gesch. der Kirche unter Pius VI.*, III., 628 *seqq.* Cf. VERHAEGEN, 276.

⁶ BRUNNER, *loc. cit.*, 193. During his term of exile Zondadari travelled through the parts of the Rhineland and of Holland that were still under his jurisdiction (PROFESSIONE, 34 *seq.*).

the result of mature deliberation and was characteristic of the Pope's prudent manner of procedure. It began by giving generous praise to the Bishops and the Estates for their defence of the Church's rights and for their loyal attitude towards the civil authority at the time of the insurrection. They had very rightly raised a vigorous protest against the numerous innovations which had been prescribed in the emperor's name but apparently against his will, and which contravened their country's constitution. But the object of their desires had now been attained : they were to hear from the Pope's own lips the definite pronouncement of the emperor's that guaranteed the Bishops the full and unrestricted exercise of their pastoral office, and the Estates the restoration of their ancient constitutional rights. In conclusion the Pope asked the Bishops to hold out the hand of peace and to use their united strength to bring about a reconciliation between the people and the emperor.

These words of the Pope satisfied the imperial party but they came too late for the Bishops to act upon them. Only a short time before, the Estates of Belgium, assembled under the presidency of the Cardinal of Malines, had proclaimed their sovereignty and the freedom and independence of their country.¹ Consequently the Bishops were no longer able to satisfy the Pope's desire, as they considered it their duty to recognize the new political constitution that had just been inaugurated. In their reply to Pius VI. of March 8th, 1790, they defended their position² by referring to the numerous attempts at pacification that had been made to no purpose, and by describing the unjust oppression of the subjects which had found expression in the closing of churches and religious houses and in the ruthless violation of all the basic national agreements. No wonder that the people had lost all confidence in the emperor's word and that the Bishops no longer had the power to recall them to the desired obedience. " We cannot but be convinced that all that has happened had to be done

¹ GENDRY, II., 44 ; VERHAEGEN, 264 *seq.*

² WOLF, *loc. cit.*, 634 *seqq.* ; VERHAEGEN, 276 *seq.*

by the nation, and rightfully so. Your Holiness would be as fully convinced as we are, were You to see the courage and military efficiency, the institutions and constitutional laws that the nation has already been able to give to the new State." It was therefore more than ever their duty to confine themselves to things spiritual and moral. "Allow us, Most Holy Father, to have no other concern than to drive off the wolf from the fold and to keep at bay a pestilence that already threatens to infect us."

Thus it was that in the last weeks of his life, after years of restless reforming activity, Joseph II. had to witness at least the partial collapse of the structure he had built so optimistically. Exactly a month after the Belgian proclamation of independence, and after he had had to withdraw a series of reforming laws he had devised for Hungary, on January 28th, 1790, the last hour also struck for his own life on earth.

There was one last brief sequel to the Austrian supremacy in Belgium. After the victorious advance of the Austrian General Bender¹ the Estates, in their fear of the French Revolution, created Emperor Leopold II. Duke of Brabant on May 30th, 1791.² After Leopold's early death, however, his successor, Francis II., was unable to prevent the country being occupied by the armies of the Revolution. After the battles of 1794 Belgium was annexed to the French Republic,³ and the union was confirmed by the treaties of Campo Florio and Luneville.

(3)

The Diet of the German Electors which met in 1790 and which was to raise to the imperial throne Joseph II.'s brother, Leopold of Tuscany, had to direct its attention, above everything else, to the threat of a war that would involve the whole of Europe. The Papal Secretary of State, in his letter to the Catholic Electors, also stressed the importance of the forth-

¹ VERHAEGEN, 295 *seqq.*

² GENDRY, II., 50. *Cf.* PIRENNE, V., 488 *seqq.*

³ VERHAEGEN, 334 *seqq.*

coming election, not only for the stability of the Church but also for the peace of Europe.¹

On this occasion, as on previous ones, an ancient Papal right of sending a legate to the Diet was exercised. Caprara, the nuncio to Vienna, was instructed to go to Frankfurt in this capacity,² and the Bavarian Elector in particular was asked to lend him his support.³ Pacca, the nuncio to Cologne, who was instructed by the Pope to act as a silent observer of the negotiations and proceedings in the imperial city, relates in his memoirs how unimportant the Holy Father's representative was made to appear, despite all the honours that were paid him in public and all the display he made on his own account.⁴

The impotence of the Papal legate was more than ever regrettable on this occasion, since it was feared that the aim of the Ems punctators to have the German nunciatures done away with altogether might be brought up for discussion by the electoral college. Karl Theodor of Bavaria in particular must have been perturbed lest the nunciature that had been set up in Munich after so much trouble should be argued about in the assembly. As soon, therefore, as he heard from Zoglio of Caprara's appointment as legate to Frankfurt, he instructed the Bavarian envoys to the Diet to keep in close touch with the Papal representative, "to second him and support him in whatever business he may have in hand by every possible and practical means", and to see that he was received and treated in a worthy manner.⁵ The most important of the Bavarian

¹ *The Papal Secretary of State to Karl Theodor, also to the three Rhenish Electors (Nunziat. di Germania, 686, *loc. cit.*). Cf. JOSEPH MÜLLER, *Das Friedenswerk der Kirche in den letzten drei Jahrhunderten*, I., Berlin, 1927, 247 *seq.*

² **Cifra al Caprara*, June 1, 1790 (*loc. cit.*).

³ *Brief to Karl Theodor, May 29, 1790 (original in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 393/4). *Ibid.* also Caprara's *letter to the Elector of August 29, and his *reply of September 17, 1790, also the Elector's *letter of thanks to Pius VI. and Zelada, of the same day.

⁴ PACCA, *Memorie storiche*, 130-5.

⁵ *Karl Theodor to the delegates to the Diet, Oberndorff and

instructions for the Diet was that in the conference on the imperial capitulation no addition detrimental to the organization of the Papal nunciatures was to be tolerated.¹

The Diet, convened for July 1st, was finally opened at the beginning of August, after the lengthy preliminary ceremonies had been performed.² But even before this the talks on current ecclesiastico-political questions had reached a certain stage of development. In the course of the visits and return-visits of the various electoral envoys the representatives of the Rhenish Archbishops had hinted that on the question of the nunciature they were not intending to maintain their former obstructive attitude; on the contrary, if their ordinary, unrestricted jurisdiction and the proposed synodal courts were recognized, they were quite prepared to drop all their other *desiderata*.³ The Bavarian representative was asked to bring this pacific attitude to the knowledge of the Papal legate. Karl Theodor's ambassadors lost no time⁴ in coming to an understanding with Caprara, who had arrived on July 28th,⁵ and the latter was soon in direct negotiation with the envoys from Cologne and Mainz.⁶ Cologne, however, declined to acquaint the nuncio with its *desiderata*, which as yet were only provisional, and feared that a continuation of these confidential talks would arouse the suspicion of the other Courts.⁷

These first attempts to come to an arrangement having failed the Bavarian embassy was again asked at the beginning of August by the representatives of the three ecclesiastical Electors to smooth the way, in conjunction with the secular

Hertling, March 12, 1790 (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 138/12).

¹ *Instruction to the delegates to the Diet, May 12, 1790 (*ibid.*).

² Information on this, among other matters, in the **Diarium* of the Bavarian envoys (*ibid.*, 138/6).

³ **Diarium* for July 24 and 26, 1790.

⁴ **Ibid.*, for July 31, 1790.

⁵ **Ibid.*, for July 28, 1790.

⁶ **Ibid.*, for August 1 and 2, 1790.

⁷ **Ibid.*, for August 2, 1790.

Electors, for a mediation and settlement of "the differences that have existed for several years between the Roman Curia and the said three Archbishops". Further inquiries, however, showed that Prussia had objections to Bavaria, an interested party, being the arbitrator in the case. The apprehension felt by the envoys from Munich lest a Protestant Power should act as intermediary in a purely Catholic matter¹ was allayed by Karl Theodor, who proposed that the whole electoral college or at least the three Electorates concerned should vote for the mediator of their choice.²

Unfortunately the negotiations soon came to a standstill. Mainz even refused at first to accept from the hands of the Papal legate the Brief accrediting him to the Diet, and it only consented to do so at the earnest plea of Bavaria.³ When the Brief was read out afterwards at one of the sessions the Mainz delegate did not omit to emphasize that this did not mean that the legate's competency was recognized in any way.⁴ Nor did a visit paid by Caprara to the Court of the Mainz electorate at Aschaffenburg, where he was paid every kind of honour,⁵ seem to ease the situation.

On August 11th the electoral delegations entered the Römer in solemn procession, and the conference was opened. After the usual formalities, such as the verification of powers, the compilation of standing orders, and the promulgation of the edict of emigration, the delegates proceeded to discuss the imperial capitulation, taking as a basis the form adopted in 1764.

The sessions of the electoral college, twenty-four in all, were

¹ *Both envoys to Karl Theodor, August 2, 1790 (*loc. cit.*, 138/12). Prussia suggested Brunswick instead.

² *Karl Theodor to the envoys on August 28, 1790 (*ibid.*). But in any case, he stipulated in this letter, the nuncio must approve of whatever arrangement was made, and the recipients of the letter must consult him in advance.

³ **Diarium* for August 6 and 7, 1790.

⁴ There was question of the meaning of the word *munus* in the Brief. Cf. *election protocol for August 18, 1790 (*ibid.*, 138/11).

⁵ **Diarium* for August 11 and 12, 1790.

held thrice weekly and lasted from August 11th to October 4th, 1790.¹ More time was taken up with the amendments of the capitulation proposed by the Electoral States than with any other topic, article 14 on the ecclesiastical constitution and relations with the Curia being discussed at length. Similar motions were proposed by Cologne and Mainz for all five paragraphs.

In the first place the retention and execution of the concordat with Eugene IV. was demanded, whereby, at the request of the Bohemian crown, the ecclesiastical treaty with Nicholas V. was included. When various grievances were specified, especially those concerned with benefices, Bavaria voted for the retention of the existing text, whereupon Saxony referred to the forthcoming discussion of these points at the Diet of Ratisbon. Brunswick giving its assent at a later sitting, with the reservation of all its sovereign rights, the proposal was adopted, though only in the last place. The other questions were discussed more expeditiously. Thus an adjustment of the ecclesiastical *processus* was adopted, in so far as territorial rights were not affected, Bavaria laying stress on this. Further, the emperor was to see that the Diet's resolutions on the nunciature affair were carried out swiftly. It was unanimously agreed to prohibit appeals to an ecclesiastical tribunal in civil cases and to make a clear distinction between ecclesiastical and civil cases of a criminal nature; the former were to be judged only by the Bishop, Archbishop, or synodal court and were not to be taken further to a foreign court of appeal. The Bavarian representative, however, asked that these new courts should not be allowed to function without the co-operation of the sovereign.²

Thus the opportunity of settling the old conflict once for all was neglected³; worse still, some notably stringent injunc-

¹ Cf. the detailed *election protocols of the Bavarian delegates.

² For all this *v.* the *election protocol for September 3-7, 1790.

³ The feeling prevalent in Rome is described in the *report made to Venice by the agent Pietro Donado on October 9, 1790: "Gli resultati della dieta di Franfort rispetto alle vertenti controversie sulle giurisdizioni dei Nunzi Apostolici sono stati assai

tions were inserted into the capitulation, against which Caprara could do no more than protest in the Pope's name, which he did, rather belatedly, on October 13th, 1790.¹ After his solemn election on September 30th, Leopold II. confirmed these agreements on oath.²

On October 10th the Pope received notice that the Grand Duke of Tuscany had been elected emperor, and on November 7th Prince Schwarzenberg, the emperor's envoy extraordinary, arrived in Rome and was granted the customary audience.³ That the assumption of power by this new protector of the Church was viewed by the Pope with mixed feelings at so critical a time is apparent from his allocution to the Cardinals in the consistory of November 29th. After announcing the election he expressed the wish that Leopold might follow the example of Charles VI., who as emperor had revoked all his previous anti-clerical edicts.⁴ It was not yet known whether Joseph II.'s successor, whose unfriendly attitude towards Rome had long been notorious, would continue to encourage Josephist ideas.

At first it seemed that Leopold intended to take a different line. His attention being drawn by Cardinal Migazzi to the unsatisfactory state of ecclesiastical life⁵ he invited the *meno sfortunati di quello che qui si temeva*. Intanto furono registrati i brevi pontifici ed ammesso, benchè senza distinzioni, il Nunzio Mgr. Caprara a differenza della precedente occasione in cui non ebbero luogo nè gli uni nè l'altro, ed essendosi stabilito che le cause ecclesiastiche, le quali solevano essere appellate inanzi, alla Nunziatura, saranno in avvenire decise da un tribunale, ch' eletto verrà soggetto all'approvazione del S. Pontefice, sonosi remesse tutte l'altre vertenze alla dieta di Ratisbona." State Archives, Venice.

¹ The most important part of his protest in RICARD, *Correspondance du cardinal Maury*, I., 43, n. 1. The *text and the relative *material in the Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Germania 686, Affari dell' art. XIV. e delle appellazioni.

² *Diarium for October 4, 1790 (*loc. cit.*).

³ GENDRY, II., 46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 46 seq.

⁵ WOLFSGRUBER, *Migazzi*, 743 seqq.

Bishops so soon as April 9th, 1790, to set down their chief grievances within two months—an invitation eagerly accepted by Migazzi¹ and most of the episcopate. But of the many hopes that were raised very few were realized. On November 8th the memorials he had received were handed over by the emperor, with a request for its opinion, to the same Ecclesiastical Court Commission that during the previous decade had originated the measures that had been so hotly contested. There could be little doubt, therefore, about the final decision. In the judgment of the commission the episcopal proposers were guilty as a body of interference with, and encroachment on, the rights of the sovereign and of aiming to increase their revenues. This opinion was evidently approved by the emperor, for when his imperial resolution finally appeared on March 17th, 1791,² it was substantially a confirmation of Joseph II.'s ecclesiastical legislation. Migazzi's further protests were without effect.³

Leopold II. had therefore been determined from the start to follow his brother's policy. Of a quieter and more careful disposition than his predecessor, he was more inclined to make concessions in the political field,⁴ but on Church matters he had no intention of giving way. The only concession he did make was forced upon him in consequence of material mishaps and dubious financial agreements. This was the closing of the State-controlled general seminaries, which he announced on May 20th, 1790, to take effect at the end of the current scholastic year.⁵ Thenceforward the episcopal and monastic schools—the latter only with important restrictions—were

¹ He performed the task more thoroughly than any of the others (*ibid.*, 745 *seqq.*).

² *Ibid.*, 755.

³ *Ibid.*, 756 *seqq.*

⁴ Delineation of his character in RANKE, *Die deutschen Mächte und der Fürstenbund* (*Werke*, 31/32), 409 *seq.* A surprising confession of constitutionalism is to be found in so early a letter as that of January 25, 1792 (*Leopold II. und Marie Christine. Ihr Briefwechsel*, 83-86).

⁵ WOLFSGRUBER, *loc. cit.*, 759 *seqq.*

allowed to function again, but Migazzi's vigorous remonstrances against the other regulations regarding the syllabus laid down by Joseph II. had not the slightest effect. The spirit that reigned in the University of Vienna may be gauged by some of the theses propounded there: on the primacy of the Pope, against the celibacy of the clergy, and in favour of the extension of the royal *placet* to dogmatic questions.¹

However, Leopold II.'s reign was very short. On March 1st, 1792, Francis, his son and future successor, had to inform the electoral diet that his imperial father had passed away after only two days' illness.² A few days later invitations to another imperial election in Frankfurt were issued.³ This was destined to be the last election, for the empire that had endured for over a thousand years was nearing its end.

The political situation having seriously deteriorated since 1790, the princely electors agreed to have the imperial throne reoccupied as quickly as possible. At their unanimous request, the electoral congress, which had been appointed for July 3rd, was put forward a whole month. It was also agreed to make no alteration in the previous capitulation, but to take it over as it stood.⁴

Pius VI. sent as his legate to the Diet the valiant opponent of the French Revolution, the Abbé Maury,⁵ conferring on him as his envoy the dignity of Archbishop of Nicæ. The Catholic Electors, Karl Theodor in particular, were again asked for their support. The Bavarian ambassador to the Diet received instructions in conformity with this request.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, 778 *seq.*

² The letter *to Karl Theodor, for example, is in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 127/9.

³ *On March 12, 1792 (*ibid.*, 138/1).

⁴ *Cf.* the *Elector of Mainz to Karl Theodor, April 24, 1792, and the *instruction to the Bavarian delegacy (*ibid.*).

⁵ For Maury, see below, p. 118; GENDRY, II., 206; PACCA, *Memorie storiche*, 147.

⁶ *Brief to Karl Theodor of May 17, 1792, *his letter of thanks to the Pope, of June 2, and *letter to the delegacy, of June 4, 1792 (*loc. cit.*, Kasten schwarz. 138/1).

Maury, having been secretly instructed to work against the anti-ecclesiastical movements in the Rhenish archbishoprics when on his way to Frankfurt, utilized the opportunity to call on the three Metropolitans. It was also his intention to press for the cancellation of the additions to article 14 of the capitulation of 1790. He sent a long report to Rome¹ on the friendly reception accorded him by the Mainz Elector, who attached great importance to the discrediting of the Congress of Ems, but evaded discussion of any other of the outstanding questions. As for amending the capitulation, the critical situation, which threatened the Rhenish territories in particular, precluded any question of it. At the Court of Trier no conversation of any importance took place.² The Archbishop of Cologne, on the other hand, was against altering the capitulation for the reasons already stated and even entered into a defence of the Gallican principles; he was prudent enough, however, to appear to be willing to listen to reason when the nuncio, although himself a Frenchman, showed him the danger of nationalizing the ecclesiastical organization on the French model.³ In any case, Maury was certain that he would not be able to carry through his commission in Frankfurt,⁴ even if Cologne did try to come to an arrangement there with the nuncio on the other questions.⁵

The electoral conferences finally began in the imperial city on June 18th, and this time only ten sessions were necessary.⁶ It was agreed at once that the election should take place on July 5th,⁷ which left hardly any time to discuss the

¹ Report of June 22, 1792, from Frankfurt, in RICARD, *loc. cit.*, 29 *seqq.* Cf. *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CVIII. (1891), 838 *seqq.*

² RICARD, *loc. cit.*, 36.

³ *Ibid.*, 36 *seqq.*

⁴ For his difficulties in the matter of etiquette, *v. ibid.*, 44 *seqq.*, 47 *seqq.*; for the edict of emigration, 51 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 58 *seqq.*

⁶ For particulars, *v. the *Diarium and the *protocols of the Bavarian delegacy (loc. cit.).*

⁷ *Protocol for June 20, 1792 (*ibid.*).

capitulation. Some amendments (not to article 14) proposed by Brunswick were rejected and, at the request of the Bavarian Elector, the text of 1790 was retained unaltered.¹

When the electoral ambassadors met for their final conference on July 16th after Francis II. had been duly elected and crowned,² they were informed by the president that Maury, the Papal legate, had handed to the principal Mainz delegate a formal protest against the additions made in 1790 to article 14³ and to article 1 regarding the maintenance of the principles of the Peace of Westphalia.⁴ The archiepiscopal ambassador, however, had returned the document unopened to the legate.⁵ Maury's protest was merely a repetition of a statement made by Caprara after the Diet of 1790,⁶ and he hit on a very courteous way of making it known: at an evening reception given by the emperor he distributed to the ambassadors and guests what purported to be copies of his

¹ *Protocols for June 22 and 25, 1792 (*ibid.*).

² Cf. the *reports of the Bavarian delegates for July 6 and 16, 1790 (*ibid.*). The election was on July 5, the coronation on July 14. For the audience given to the nuncio, *v.* his report of July 16, 1792, in RICARD, I., 69 *seqq.*

³ See above, p. 79.

⁴ The reference is presumably to the Prussian motion in the session of August 16, 1780 (restriction of the episcopal and archiepiscopal jurisdiction) and that of Brunswick, of August 18 (territorial rights of the sovereign in religious affairs). Cf. the *protocols for these days in the State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 138/11 and 620/376.

⁵ *Protocol for July 16, 1792 (*loc. cit.*, Kasten schwarz, 138/1).

⁶ "Maury . . . , Protestatio et reservatio in comitiis electoralibus pro electione novi Romanorum regis et imperatoris congregatis exhibita," of July 9, 1790 (Bibl. Vallicelliana, Rome, Mon. stor. Z. 126-133; GENDRY, II., 206, n. 3); also as enclosure in the *report sent to Venice by Pietro Donado on August 4, 1792 (State Archives, Venice). Maury had the text ready for printing on July 9 (*cf.* RICARD, I., 67).

latest work.¹ Previously, when the nuncio had approached the Archbishop of Mainz on the possibility of altering the text he was told that it was too late then for anything to be done in that Diet.²

The Pope, after receiving notification of the election, announced it to a consistory on September 24th and expressed his confidence that in view of the gravity of the situation the new emperor would use his great authority for the honour of God and the protection of the Church.³ The traditional celebrations in thanksgiving for the election took place in due form, this being the last time St. Peter's and the Papal palaces were illuminated in honour of a German emperor.⁴

Pius VI.'s confident statement was not at first belied, so far as Francis II.'s relations with Rome were concerned. Migazzi never tired of pointing out to the emperor the root of the evil that had been establishing itself for a decade, and he criticized severely the Josephist reforms. In the summer of 1794 he condemned them in the strongest possible terms in the endeavour to bring the young emperor to a decision.⁵ But Francis, like his predecessors, left these matters largely in the hands of officials who favoured Josephist ideas,⁶ and so, as before, the authority of the Austrian Bishops, when not actually slighted, was ignored. Migazzi's incessant protests had no real success. As before, the State ruled within the Church and conceded few alleviations. Among the latter may be reckoned the permission to celebrate a jubilee year in the archdiocese of Vienna in 1795, and the introduction of the Forty Hours' Prayer and other pious practices. Finally even retreats and missions, with certain restrictions, received the sanction of the State, which was still considered indispensable.⁷

¹ Maury's report of July 20, 1792 (RICARD, I., 75 seq.).

² Maury's report of July 6, 1792 (*ibid.*, 63 seqq.).

³ Allocution in BRUNNER, *Theolog. Dienerschaft*, 238 seqq.; GENDRY, II., 207.

⁴ Particulars in BRUNNER, 236 seq.

⁵ WOLFSGRUBER, 783.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 786.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 860 seq., 868 seqq.

Joseph II.'s ecclesiastico-political system was thus maintained under his two successors, though the first fury of the attack had somewhat abated. In the Austrian hereditary lands, even after the dissolution of the German Empire, the principles of Erastianism were carried over into the next century and even flourished anew.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHURCH IN FRANCE AT THE END OF THE *Ancien Régime*— THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION—THE ABOLITION OF ECCLESIASTICAL PRIVILEGES.

VIEWED externally, the French Church on the eve of the Revolution was perhaps the most brilliant and most powerful in the world. Italy excepted, probably no other country possessed so many glorious churches filled with works of art and treasures of every kind. In every province there were numerous abbeys and monasteries, and religious confraternities flourished in the cities. Religious ceremonies were performed with great pomp and splendour, especially processions, the most impressive being that of Corpus Christi.¹

The Huguenots having been forbidden to celebrate their services in public since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, by Louis XIV., and as the edict of toleration issued at the end of 1787 had granted them only civic rights, withholding official recognition of their religion, the Catholic Church was still the only legitimate one, as it alone possessed the right to hold its services in public.²

¹ For what follows, *cf.* P. DE LA GORCE, *Hist. religieuse*, I., 2 *seqq.*, and the full account given by SICARD, *L'ancien clergé de France*, I.: *Les évêques avant la Révolution*, Paris, 1890, 4th ed., *ibid.*, 1905, 5th ed., *ibid.*, 1913. Our quotations are taken from the 4th edition.

² Louis XVI.'s edict of toleration granted legal validity to the birth, marriage, and death certificates furnished by the Huguenot clergy. Their form of worship was not expressly allowed, nor was it forbidden; what was forbidden was to molest them on the plea of religion. The edict, therefore, was "an immense advance and a great benefit to the Protestants" (*v.* SCHOTT in the *Hist. Zeitschr.*, LXI., 490). Although the only religion to be expressly recognized in the edict was the Catholic one, the edict also contained the first limitation of the Catholic Church's absolute

Its Bishops, many with highly aristocratic titles, were of great social and political importance. They were next in rank to the king. Special privileges were enjoyed by the clergy in respect of their legal competence, also considerable alleviations from taxation, though these had long ceased to be so great as to render them completely tax-free.¹ In the latter half of the eighteenth century some of their other privileges had also been diminished in various ways through the influence of the unbelieving philosophers and the pressure of public opinion, but the Church was still sufficiently rich and powerful to retain its brilliant position till the eve of the Revolution.

The Church's wealth, though nowhere near so vast as was estimated by many contemporary and later writers,² was certainly very considerable. Many of the historical sources being unreliable, an accurate valuation is far from easy. In 1791 the Marquis de Montesquiou, who is largely to be trusted,

authority (*cf.* E. CHAMPION in the *Révolution Française*, 1903, Juillet). At first there was some opposition to the edict, and then it was accepted by the Parlements and the clergy, though the latter's spokesman did express to the king its dismay that such a law should have been made without reference to the clergy or the Pope (*cf.* SCHOTT, *loc. cit.*, 421 *seq.*; WAHL, *Vorgeschichte der französ. Revolution*, II., 200). When the matter was mentioned by the Pope to Cardinal Bernis, the French ambassador, he was given the reassuring reply "que la chose est juste et nécessaire, qu'elle ne nuit en rien à la Religion dominante, et qu'on a écarté jusqu'aux apparences du culte public" (*v.* MASSON, *Bernis*, 451). In France the edict was received with no hostility, but also with scant approval; *v.* L. MAZOYER, in *Bull. de la Soc. de l'hist. du protestantisme français*, LXXX. (1930), 41-73.

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 3 *seqq.*

² BARBIER (*Journal*, III., 208) maintains that at the time of Louis XV. a third of the country was in the hands of the Church; BOURGEOIS (*Die französ. Revolution*, Stuttgart, 1922, 34) says only a fourth; but both exaggerate. Actually only one-tenth at the very most was owned by the Church (*v.* *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CXXX., 137; WAHL, *loc. cit.*, I., 97; F. WOLTERS, *Studien über die Agrarzustände in Frankreich*, in *Schmollers Staatswiss. Forschungen*, XXII., 5, Leipzig, 1905).

assessed the Church's property in real estate, farms, forests, and buildings, at about three thousand million francs, the forests alone being valued at 392 millions. If the profits from the forests are calculated at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, the value of the non-productive buildings at 100 millions, and the profit from the rest of the property at 3 per cent, the total revenues amount to 85 millions. In addition, the tithes may be reckoned at 80 millions, and the revenues of certain bishoprics and abbeys at 15 millions. This gives a total annual income of 180 million francs.¹

But attached to this wealth of the Church there were manifold commitments. Firstly at the great decennial assemblies of the clergy free-will offerings (*dons gratuits*) were voted to the State, amounting to about 10 million francs a year. Then there were other large sums that were frequently lent by the clergy to the State, on which the said 10 millions were often the "interest", so that it was said with just cause that the Church had often lent the monarchy money *à fonds perdu*.² There were still other ways in which the Church's property (to which every class of the population had contributed) was liberally expended to the best advantage of the community. There being as yet no budget for education, the cost of maintaining the primary and secondary schools was largely borne by the Church. The Bishops of the eighteenth century were no less zealous in this respect than their predecessors, especially when the expulsion of the Jesuits had put many of the schools out of action. In spite of every willingness to make sacrifices, however, they found it impossible to repair completely the grievous harm caused by the sudden closing of over a hundred colleges, for many of the other Orders were unable to supply the necessary staff. Nevertheless, in 1789, thanks to the Bishops, there were 562 grammar schools in France, with over 72,000 pupils, 40,000 of whom were receiving their education either wholly or partially free of charge. Of these schools 178 were conducted by the regular clergy, the remainder by seculars. Montesquieu, who had a first-rate knowledge of the

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 10 *seqq.*, 12.

² *Ibid.*, 6 *seq.*

situation, relates that the Revolution deprived the grammar schools of revenues amounting to 30 million francs, so great was the sum spent on education by the Church, with no assistance from the State. In addition the Bishops had to maintain their seminaries, of which in 1789 there were 165.¹

Far greater still were the disbursements made by the Church for charitable objects. At the time in question it was the only charitable institution in the country, and it had been engaged in this work for centuries on the most generous scale and in every conceivable manner. In the eighteenth century the majority of the Bishops were still active in this direction. Abundant evidence of this is supplied by the various diocesan histories. The poor and needy were generously supported, not only by such wealthy Bishops as Christophe de Beaumont and De Juigné of Paris and De Durfort of Besançon, but also by those with more modest incomes, such as De Pressy of Boulogne. The death, in 1790, of Bishop de Fumel of Lodève was much lamented by the people, to whom he had been a true father for forty years.² The historian of the diocese of Béziers found it impossible to enumerate all the works of charity performed by Bishop Claudius de Nicolai during his twenty years of office. To relieve the distress of the population of Albi at the time of the floods and later, during the severe winter of 1766, Cardinal Bernis gave away everything he had and incurred in addition a debt of 150,000 francs. Similar self-sacrifice was displayed at Amiens by Bishops De la Motte and De Machault, at Verdun by Des Nos, at Tulle by De Saint-Sauveur, at Montauban by De Breteuil. The inhabitants of Orange still retain an affectionate remembrance of Bishop Du Tillet, who visited the hospital and the prison at the beginning of every month and performed many other works of

¹ SICARD, *Les évêques*, I., 427 seq., 441 seq., where there is a long list of special works on the subject. See also SICARD, *L'éducation morale et civique avant la Révolution*, Paris, 1884; *id.*, *Les Études classiques avant la Révolution*, *ibid.*, 1887.

² SICARD, *Évêques*, I., 385 seq. For Beaumont, see the monograph by E. RÉGNAULT, Paris, 1882, and DUPLESSY, *Paris religieux*, 421.

mercy. Of a similar character were De Rosset de Rocoze de Fleury, Bishop of Chartres, his brother Henri-Bernardin, who graced successively the sees of Tours and Cambrai, Amédée de Broglie, Bishop of Angoulême, De Besons, Bishop of Carcassonne, De la Tour-du-Pin of Nancy, and Louis-Marie de Nicolai of Cahors. Many noble and moving deeds are related of Cardinal De la Rochefoucauld, Archbishop of Rouen, and of De Becdelièvre, Bishop of Nîmes. Almost everywhere the Bishops took the lead when help was wanted. Often it was they who founded fire insurances, loan societies, and, above all, lying-in and other hospitals. In the terrible winter of 1788-89 they did their utmost to lessen the sufferings of the people, especially their hunger.¹

Unhappily, however, this bright picture was marred by only too many blemishes, which were largely due to the social and political position of the Bishops. In consequence of the Government's abuse of the concordat of 1516, the higher positions in the Church had become more and more the exclusive property of the nobles. Under Louis XIV. bishoprics were still being given to clerics of the middle class, but under Louis XV. and Louis XVI. the nomination of aristocrats had become a regular system.² Massillon's dictum that the Church was not in need of great names but of great virtues had been quite forgotten. The Court thought only of providing for its favourites. The nobility, now in a critical situation, regarded the higher ecclesiastical posts as so much booty. Certain bishoprics, abbacies, and canonries became the heirlooms of great families. The appointment of a bourgeois to the little see of Senes in 1774 was so exceptional that it created quite a stir. At the outbreak of the Revolution there was not a bourgeois left among the 130 Bishops of France.³ This was

¹ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 385 *seq.*, 395 *seqq.*, 409 *seq.*, 416 *seq.* Cf. GUGLIA, *Konservative Elemente*, 92 *seq.*; DE LA GORCE, I., 74. For the charitable activity of the Archbishop of Aix, Boisgelin de Cicé, see his biography by E. LAVAQUERY, 2 vols., Paris, 1921.

² SICARD, *loc. cit.*, I., 5 *seqq.*, 10 *seqq.*, 16 *seqq.*

³ We have not included the four bishoprics of the Comtat Venaissin and the five bishoprics of Corsica.

particularly regrettable in view of the rise of the middle classes in the eighteenth century in all other spheres, only the way to ecclesiastical honours being barred to them. The *Almanach Royal* for 1788 shows that almost every great family was represented among the Bishops: a Montmorency was at Metz, a Rohan at Cambrai and at Strasbourg, a Clermont-Tonnerre at Châlons-sur-Marne, a De la Tour-du-Pin at Auch and Nancy, a La Rochefoucauld at Saintes, Rouen, and Beauvais. The see of Rheims had been held since 1777 by Alexandre Angélique de Talleyrand, and in 1788 one of the most gifted but most unworthy members of this old and noble family, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, was presented by Louis XVI. to the see of Autun.

For a long time now the French episcopate of the *Ancien Régime* had been judged by such unworthy dignitaries as Rohan, Loménie de Brienne, and Talleyrand, who were all nominees of Louis XVI. Recent research has exposed the injustice of this view. Of the 130 French Bishops only a dozen can be named whose unspiritual behaviour was a cause of scandal.¹ There were others who set a splendid example, not only in the matter of public charity but in other respects too; some in fact were really ideal characters.² The majority belonged to neither of these groups. Of mediocre character,

¹ SICARD, in *La France chrétienne*, Paris, 1895, 477 *seqq.* DE LA GORCE (I., 47) mentions a dozen prelates as unworthy of their position, SICARD ten. For Loménie, *cf.* PERRIN, *Le cardinal Loménie de Brienne*, Paris, 1896; C. CIPOLLA, *Il viaggio letterario del card. de Brienne in Italia, 1789-1790*, in the *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, LXXXVII. (1912), 129-163. For Rohan, see the Papal *letters in Epist. 181, pp. 229 *seq.*; 182, pp. 26, 102, 110; 185, pp. 70, 169 (Papal Secret Archives).

² SICARD (*loc. cit.*) picks out the following as worthy of distinction, besides those we have already mentioned on p. 90: Durfort of Besançon, Reboul de Lambert of Saint-Paul-Trois-Châteaux, Balore of Alais and Nîmes, Saint-Luc of Quimper, Hercé of Dol, Neufville of Dax, Bonal of Clermont-Ferrand, Royère of Castres, Charterac of Alet. *Cf.* also GUGLIA, *Konservative Elemente*, 90 *seqq.*

often of a worldly disposition, with no liking for things purely spiritual, they took their pastoral duties too lightly.¹ As things were, it could hardly have been otherwise, for these sons of noble parentage were destined by their parents for the Church while they were still mere boys, there being no question of their choosing their own careers. They were hardly subdeacons before they were allotted the revenues of an abbey, and as soon as they were priests their relatives were seeing to their promotion to the rank of vicar-general. The holders of this office were so numerous that the individual had little to do.² Family connexions and the favour of the Court finally secured for them the desired bishopric, which they abandoned for a more profitable one as soon as the occasion offered.³ Of such pastors the strict fulfilment of their task was not to be expected. The duty most frequently neglected was that of residence, despite the ordinances of the Council of Trent, compliance with which had been prevented by the Crown.⁴ Nevertheless, even in the eighteenth century, there were still

¹ " On peut faire deux parts : les évêques exemplaires, assez clairsemés, mais trois ou quatre fois plus nombreux que les indignes ; puis les autres qui forment la masse et sont de moeurs correctes, de piété très-décente, de vertu moyenne, quoiqu'un peu court pour qui doit montrer au peuple les voies de Dieu " (P. DE LA GORCE, I., 47). Burke was of this opinion, according to SICARD (*L'ancien clergé*, II., 99) : " Lorsque j'étais en France, je suis certain que le nombre des prélats répréhensibles n'était pas considérable." Cf. also Taine's opinion, in the same place.

² SICARD (I., 314 *seq.*) entitles his description of the situation : " Légions de grands vicaires."

³ Rouen, Bayeux, Beauvais, Albi, Auch, and Toulouse were rich bishoprics, with annual revenues of 100,000 *livres*. The archbishopric of Narbonne brought in 160,000 *livres* a year, the bishopric of Cambrai 200,000, Strasbourg 400,000. A dozen other bishoprics had only 10-15,000 *livres* a year, the others a mere 7000 *livres*. See DE LA GORCE, I., 42. Cf. SICARD, I., 104, 275 *seq.*

⁴ MARTIN (*Gallicanisme*, X.) considers the opposition of the Crown to the reforming decrees of Trent to be one of the chief causes of the Revolution.

many Bishops who stayed faithfully with their flocks.¹ It has been estimated that this was true of about half of the episcopate. The other half² fell victim to the spell that Paris and Versailles had cast upon the cultured Frenchman since the time of Louis XIV. There all the life and splendour of the kingdom was gathered round the throne³; there only was it possible to procure the rich benefices which, in accordance with the concordat, were at the disposal of the Government.⁴ Even such prelates as had a genuine vocation to the ecclesiastical state considered themselves entitled to spend at least part of the year in the capital, if only to maintain connexion with their relatives and to transact diocesan affairs,⁵ and once there, owing to the love of social life innate in every Frenchman, they were always tempted to prolong their visit indefinitely. To many of them, once they had tasted of this magic potion, their diocese appeared as a land of "exile", from which they strove to escape as soon as possible back to the interesting capital. Meanwhile they consoled themselves with keeping up a lively correspondence with their friends in Paris. Even the most trivial news was received with gratitude, for all their thoughts were in Paris, not in their diocese. Another reason why the residential obligation was neglected was that many Bishops were so involved in temporal affairs that a visit to the seat of government was indispensable. Thus it was that even such worthy prelates as Louis de la Tour-du-Pin, of Nancy, failed in this respect. What little regard was paid to this obligation is shown by the fact that several

¹ Examples are given by SICARD (I., 289 *seq.*).

² DE LA GORCE, I., 43.

³ Even Fénelon had said of Paris, "cette ville est devenue tout le royaume."

⁴ One who knew the situation said of the Pompadour's influence in the distribution of benefices, "Il est vrai que c'est M^{me} de Pompadour qui donne tout aujourd'hui." *Correspondant*, XCIII. (1921), 1015.

⁵ At times, such as in 1764, a fourth of the Bishops were living in Paris. In 1784, Louis XVI. forbade all the Bishops to leave their dioceses without the royal permission. SICARD, I., 305.

Bishops delayed taking possession of their sees for as long as two years ; some, indeed, postponed it so long that before they could perform this function they were translated to another see.¹

In 1789 there were no longer any Jansenist Bishops, and there were very few outward signs that Jansenism still existed. As a theological and heretical sect it had been extinguished, but its spirit still lived on, especially in the political world. Paying no regard to the laws of Church or State, the Parlements were doing their utmost to put into effect, in the ecclesiastico-political field, the logical conclusions to be drawn from Jansenism, which were making headway also in other Catholic countries. Mightily emboldened by their victory over the Jesuits, they now found powerful allies in their fight against Papal and royal authority in the unbelieving philosophers, whose influence had been facilitated by the rebellion of the Jansenists against the Holy See and their puritanical ideas about the reception of the sacraments.²

As has already been indicated, the overburdening of many Bishops with purely temporal affairs was closely connected with their social and political position, but instead of withdrawing themselves as far as possible from such ties they devoted themselves to them with such wholeheartedness that it was said of one of them that he would have made a better governor of a province than a spiritual leader. The advantage accruing to the provinces and towns from the active interest taken by the Bishops in the promotion of industry and the construction of roads and canals was dearly paid for by the neglect of spiritual duties, which received but little attention from a prelate playing the rôle of a Turgot or a Necker. The

¹ SICARD (I., 276, 295 *seqq.*), who reminds us that Cardinal Polignac died in 1741, without having ever visited his archdiocese, to which he had been nominated fifteen years previously.

² SCHILL, *Konstitution "Unigenitus"*, 299 *seq.* For the spread of Jansenism in Italy, Austria, and Portugal, see our account, Vol. XXXV., 375 *seqq.*, 381 *seqq.*, XXXVI., 278 *seqq.*, 289 *seqq.*, XXXVIII., 130 *seqq.*

Archbishop of Vienne, Georges le Franc de Pompignan, pointed this out very frankly in a letter to the Bishop of Nantes, Frétat de Sarra. He lamented with justification the worldliness of the episcopacy, described the new type of administrator-bishop, which was becoming more and more prevalent,¹ and rebutted all the excuses that were being made for not fulfilling the obligation of residence. Much harsher language was used in the "Private Correspondence on the Present State of Religion and the Clergy", which appeared in 1781 and 1783. The prelates' passionate desire to play the statesman was castigated with biting sarcasm. This kind of administrator-bishop, they said, was a sort of half-caste, half clerical, half lay. Dressed up as an ecclesiastic, he indulged in a philosophic apostolate that consisted in clearing France of all the Government's mistakes. This mania, which was taking possession of the best intellects and was steadily increasing, degraded the sanctuary to the level of an office where industrial, commercial, and financial business was transacted. The victims of this mania sat in their boudoirs in their country seats and gave no thought to anything else. They could manage everything successfully except their proper business. There were not many of the old-style Bishops left, who had more faith in the Gospels than in accounts and who had no desire to be anything but spiritual pastors. The new administrator-bishops, on the other hand, as it was said in a pamphlet of 1788, all wanted to be Sugers, Richelieu, and Mazarins.² Thus the French episcopate was divided by these two currents of thought into two separate parties, each of which was convinced that its policy was in the best interests of the Church and the country. The one, distrusting any kind of innovation, confined itself to spiritual matters, the other, which was in the majority, devoted all its energy to advancing the cause of economic and political progress.³

¹ *Œuvres de Lefranc de Pompignan*, II., 181 seqq., 235 seq., 263 seq.

² SICARD, I., 170 seqq.

³ *Ibid.*, 177.

Far more serious than these divergent aims of the Bishops was the deep cleavage between the higher and lower clergy, caused by the very unequal distribution of material and social benefits.

Like the Bishops, the canons, of whom there was an abundance in many of the cities, were very rich. The yearly revenues of the chapter of Arras amounted to 150,000 *livres*, of Laon to 163,000, of Soissons to 166,000, of Besançon to 130,000; those of Le Mans, Amiens, and Béziers to over 100,000 each.¹ Vast revenues, especially in the northern districts, were also enjoyed by the abbeys, of which there were more than a thousand in France.² The list was headed by Saint-Vaast at Arras, whose estimated yearly income was 500,000 *livres*; next came Saint-Bertin, with 150,000 *livres*, Saint-Eloi with 130,000, and Saint-Médard at Soissons with over 60,000.³ The revenues of many other abbeys were not public knowledge, but the magnificence of their buildings and the extent of their properties were evidence enough. Inevitably, therefore, it was more and more widely believed that the monks had entirely abandoned their ideal of poverty. Worse still, as a result of the commendatory system, the wealth of these numerous abbeys had been wholly diverted from its original purpose into the hands of men who did not belong to the Order concerned or, worse still, were not even clerics of any kind. There was no question of abolishing the system, although it had become a veritable curse, since even those who might have been inclined to do so were themselves too deeply involved in the practice, for it was with these benefices *in commendam* that the Crown rewarded its numerous favourites. Now and then the philosophers wrote about the situation in scathing terms,

¹ Evidence in DE LA GORCE, I., 38.

² 755 for men, 253 for women; v. HESSELN, *Dict. de la France* (1771), I., 3. There were about 25,000 male religious, and 35,000 female; v. MADELIN, *La Révolution*, 5, who estimates the seculars at 60-70,000. This gives a grand total of 120-130,000.

³ DERAMECOURT, *Le clergé du diocèse d'Arras, Boulogne et Saint-Omer pendant la Révolution*, I., 327, 329, 332; MASSON, *Bernis*, 5.

but probably not with any serious intent, since many of the beneficiaries were their friends and protégés. The worst feature of the whole situation was the apparent inability of the Holy See to remedy the evil. It feared that any step it took would be answered by reprisals on the part of the secular power and that it would meet with the opposition of the higher clergy. Moreover, it was itself implicated in the system in so far as it tolerated the transference of rich benefices to Cardinals. Thus Cardinal Stuart held the abbeys of Anchin and Saint-Amand, Cardinal Zelada the abbey of Marsillac, and Cardinal Doria the wealthy abbey of Gorze, near Metz.¹

In general there was no definite immorality in the French abbeys, but rather a dangerous falling away from strict discipline and a laxity in complying with the obligations of holding services and reciting prayers which had been accepted along with the various donations. The commendatory system was one of the worst, but by no means the only evil. What was possibly more pernicious was the infiltration of a worldly spirit into the men's religious houses, where a real joy in their vocation, especially among those who regarded it merely as a livelihood, was often wanting.² This was partly the reason why the houses were so thinly populated. In 1789, of the two hundred Cistercian monasteries only five had more than forty inmates, another five more than twenty, and six more than fifteen. In sixty-nine communities the membership had shrunk to only three or even only one. We also know from archival records that at the outbreak of the Revolution the average membership of an abbey was barely more than seven or eight.³ The sinking of the monastic population was also due to the restrictions and obstructions attached to the reception of novices by the Government in 1767. Several houses were simply closed down, without reference to the Pope, by the royal commission, whose moving spirit was the utterly worldly

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 19, 32.

² SICARD, *Le clergé de France pendant la Révolution*, I. *L'effondrement*, nouv. édit., Paris, 1912, 278.

³ DE LA GORCE, 34.

Archbishop of Toulouse, Loménie de Brienne. The losses caused by the expulsion of the Jesuits had not been made good by the other Orders, and yet it was sought to reduce the numbers! ¹ In all this gloom the only cheerful spectacle was provided by the congregations of religious women. Of their 35,000 members 3,000 belonged to abbeys or special foundations, of the others 32,000 devoted themselves with admirable zeal either to prayer and contemplation or—and among these the Ursulines were most conspicuous—teaching and other good works. ²

The wealth enjoyed by the bishops, canons, and commendatory abbots must have made a very bad impression on the less exalted clerics, since they had only too often to struggle with grinding poverty. Whereas any number of prelates were drawing an income of 100,000–400,000 *livres* a year and could never spend enough on costly buildings and the like ³—there were some indeed, like Rohan, the Bishop of Strasbourg, who simply threw the money away in a display of luxury—the average income of a parish priest was no more than 800–1,500 francs. Those who were dependent on tithes were far worse off, for when they were not paid, which was frequently the case, they were on the verge of starvation. Then again, these parish priests, who were mostly of peasant stock, had not only to bear the whole burden of the cure of souls, but also had various civil duties to perform, such as keeping the civil register, superintending the village schools, announcing public notices, and even serving summonses. ⁴

Certain areas excepted, such as the dioceses of Le Mans and Viviers and, in particular, the Franche-Comté, ⁵ the conduct

¹ *Ibid.*, 75 *seqq.*

² DE LA GORCE, I., 74 *seqq.*

³ SICARD, *Évêques*, I., 80 *seqq.*

⁴ DE LA GORCE, I., 23 *seq.*, 28; *cf.* SICARD in the *Correspondant*, 1890, in the *Compte rendu du congrès scientifique international des catholiques*, section 5, Paris, 1891, 254 *seq.*, and *Clergé*, I., 209. For the living conditions of the lower clergy before the Revolution and the efforts to improve them, *cf.* PRÉCLIN, 379 *seqq.*

⁵ DE LA GORCE, I., 23 *seq.*, and for the Franche-Comté,

of these lowly country-priests, whether as individuals or in the performance of their duties, was good; in some parts, Lorraine, for example, it was excellent.¹ In fact, the French clergy as a whole was far better than is generally supposed.² Much harm was done by the lack of uniformity in the appointment to parochial offices. The right of presentation was shared promiscuously by the king, the bishops, cathedral chapters, hospital boards, and the gentry. In only a few places was it vested in the diocesan bishop; in the large diocese of Besançon only a tenth of the 1,500 livings were at the Ordinary's disposal.³

As most of the diocesan funds were in the hands of those who took part in the appointment to offices, the village priests had no hope of having their meagre pittance increased. With what feelings they regarded their far better situated colleagues in the towns and cathedral chapters, the inmates of the rich abbeys near their own villages, and the luxury-loving Bishops, it is easy to imagine.

Since nobody in France could avoid the influence of the new ideas, it was not surprising that they spread apace among the poor country-priests.⁴ For them the temptation to embrace

J. FAIVRE in the *Annales révolut. janv.-févr.*, 194. W. MICHAEL, however, observes quite rightly in the *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CXII., 676, that Faivre's reference in a general way to complaints and pleadings is not entirely convincing.

¹ F. D. MATHIEU, *L'ancien régime dans la province de Lorraine et Barrois* ³, Paris, 1907.

² This was brought out by DE TOCQUEVILLE (*L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, Paris, 1856, 169), who preceded, and by Taine, who followed, Sicard. See also GUGLIA, 95 *seqq.* The town clergy was also quite good in several places. H. LUDWIG bears witness to this in the case of Strasbourg in his *Strassburg vor hundert Jahren* (Stuttgart, 1888). On pp. 93 *seq.* he says that the clergy "even in its lowest ranks possessed some gifted and scholarly men who, with their solid training, combined in the exercise of their vocation as much honesty and conscientiousness as a genuinely Christian benevolence".

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 21 *seq.*, with much detailed evidence.

⁴ GUGLIA, *Konserv. Elemente*, 260 *seq.*

them was particularly strong, for not only had they to suffer severely themselves under the unjust social conditions, they also heard the continual complaints that were made by the peasants about their situation.¹ The great wealth and the inordinate extravagance of the privileged classes must have provoked even the best-intentioned of these priests to rebel against a social order that sanctioned these extremes. Naturally they listened to proposals that promised an improvement.² Through the *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques* ideas detrimental to the Papal authority were disseminated among the clergy, and at the same time the parish priests were stirred up against the Bishops. In 1775 this journal was saying that since the Council of Trent the Bishops had conspired among themselves to suppress the rights of the ordinary priests, and the assertion that the office of the parish priests had been instituted by God Himself and that they were entitled to decide on matters of faith,³ must have enhanced their opinion of their own worth as compared with that of the Bishops.

Among the clergy in the towns the new ideas had spread far more widely still. Like most of the Bishops, they devoted too much attention to terrestrial affairs. The scholars among

¹ Taine's description of the wretched conditions of the peasants (*L'Ancien Régime*, Paris, 1876, 429 *seqq.*) has been corrected in several important respects by WAHL (*Vorgeschichte*, I., 85 *seqq.*), though even his more favourable opinion is open to strong misgivings, as is shown by H. LUDWIG in the *Hist. Zeitschrift* (XCVI., 85 *seq.*), where he aptly remarks that in a question of this kind the peasants' opinion of their condition was more important than the condition itself. For their feelings the recently published *Cahiers* are certainly valuable evidence, but they are not to be taken as a basis for a description of the economic and social conditions of the provinces without being very carefully scrutinized. See MÜSEBECK in the *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CIV., 171 *seq.* Cf. DENYS-BIURETTE, *La question religieuse dans les Cahiers de 1789*, Paris, 1919. The *Cahiers* have been published in the *Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire économique de la Révolution française*.

² DE LA GORCE, I., 94 *seqq.*

³ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIX., 362.

them studied for preference subjects that had no connexion with their calling, such as the diseases of the vine, potato-growing, and magnetism. Highly enlightened on such matters as these, they were wholly blind to the approaching catastrophe. Like everyone else, they read the works of the new philosophers with relish. The effect this had upon them showed itself most noticeably in their sermons. In many places, instead of preaching the solemn truths of the Gospel, they uttered moral platitudes culled from any and every religion, and expounded a vague moral philosophy embroidered with humanitarian maxims.¹ In the course of the eighteenth century, freemasonry, in spite of the prohibitions of Popes Clement XII. and Benedict XIV.,² had been on the increase in every large town in France,³ not only among the upper classes and the philosophic circles but also among the bourgeois. In several dioceses, even the clergy, attracted by its mask of humanitarianism, had sought and obtained admission to its lodges. At Besançon not only several canons but even Benedictines, Bernardines, and a Carmelite had been initiated.⁴ The following incident shows the disastrous lack of

¹ MAURY, *Essai sur l'éloquence de la Chaire*, 80 seqq.; DE LA GORCE, I., 61 seq., 64 seq. GUGLIA (*loc. cit.*, 94 seq.) reminds us that here too there were exceptions, among them the excellent Jacques Bridaine (d. 1767), whose sermons on eternity and on the unworthy reception of Communion moved his hearers very deeply. Cf. the examples given by MAURY, *loc. cit.*, 56 seqq., 461. For Maury, v. *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, II², 1384.

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIV., 411, XXXV., 371.

³ Cf. FINDEL, *Gesch. der Freimaurerei* (1900), 180 seqq.; *Staatslex.* II⁵, 226 seqq.; *Stimmen der Zeit*, XCIII. (1917), 251 seq., XCIV. (1918), 29 seq.; G. BORD, *La Franc-Maçonnerie en France*, I., 152 seq.; DESCHAMPS-JANNET, *Les sociétés secrètes et la société*⁵, 2 vols., Paris, 1883. In many cases, it must be said, the particulars given are not accurate enough. Bord (*loc. cit.*, I., 236) says of Louis XV.'s attitude towards freemasonry: "Il est très probable que Louis XV. ne fut jamais initié, mais on peut croire qu'il accepta le titre de protecteur insigne de l'Ordre."

⁴ SAUZAY, *Hist. de la persécution relig. dans le département du Doubs de 1789 à 1801*, I., 12. In Arras too an Oratorian was

uniform moral standards prevailing among the upper clergy. When, in 1778, the Bishop of Quimper, Cotun de Saint-Luc, censured a Franciscan for belonging to a masonic lodge, De Conzié, Archbishop of Tours, a highly "enlightened" prelate, considered his attitude ridiculous.¹

Not all the Bishops were so blind as this. Time and again a note of warning was struck at the general assemblies of the clergy by men of clearer vision. In 1762 the Archbishop of Narbonne, De la Roche-Aymon, deplored the decay of faith and the libertinage of writers. Similar alarms were sounded in 1775 and 1778; in the latter year the Bishops demanded that steps be taken to protect religion and morality against the excesses of the Press. At the same time they protested against the banning of provincial councils and the suppression of certain religious Orders. In 1782 the Archbishop of Arles, Dulau, drew the Government's attention to the unrestricted distribution of the works of Voltaire and Rousseau and to the fact that immoral booklets had even been thrown into nunneries during the night. He demanded the revision of the law of 1757 relating to the Press and remarked that a new dogma was now being propounded, that of independence of any authority.²

Unfortunately there was no Bishop of sufficiently outstanding character to take the lead. Consequently there was no joint action, only individual prohibitions of the works of the philosophers and inadequate attempts to stem the flood of irreligious and immoral writings by the circulation of good books.³ Apparently the hopelessness of the struggle was realized by the upper clergy themselves, since in 1786 they decided to suspend the grants they had made to learned churchmen for

a member of a lodge (*v.* DERAMECOURT, *Le clergé du diocèse d'Arras*, I., 284), and there were priests who had joined lodges at Le Mans and Béthune (*v.* D. PIOLIN, *Hist. du diocèse du Mans pendant la Révolution*, I., 6, and BEGHIN, *Béthune pendant la Révolution*, 46).

¹ GÉRIN, *La Commission des Réguliers*, in the *Revue des quest. hist.*, 1875, juillet, 113. *Cf.* our account, Vol. XXXVII., 386 *seq.*

² DE LA GORCE, I., 67.

³ *Ibid.*, 68.

the defence of religion.¹ The pastorals warning the faithful against agnostic literature could have no lasting effect, as they were mostly confined to remonstrances and admonitions of a general nature, and as the Revolution approached they showed no signs of increasing vigour or frequency. In 1775 an observer far from hostile to the Church said of one such pastoral that it was so colourless that it might just as well have been addressed to Turks as to Christians.² The Sorbonne also took up the fight against "philosophy", Voltaire and Helvetius in particular, but with no success; in any case its influence was waning.³ In point of energy and vigour the defence was no match for the attack. On the one side an unlimited mass of destructive literature was unloaded on to the nation; on the other, especially after the expulsion of the Jesuits, was a paucity of talent capable of rebutting it.⁴ The

¹ ROCQUAIN, *L'esprit révolut.*, 427.

² *Ibid.*, 338; GUGLIA, 86.

³ FERET, *La Faculté de théologie de Paris et ses doctrines*, vols. VI-VII., Paris, 1910.

⁴ The most prominent of the writers who tried to refute the views of the "enlightened", Voltaire especially, in a popular fashion, are discussed by GUGLIA (234 *seq.*), whose opinion is that though they were not so insignificant and contemptible as opponents represented them to be, they were far from being highly talented and were certainly no match for a man like Voltaire. (256) GUGLIA (259 *seqq.*) also describes the campaign waged against the philosophy of enlightenment by the Jesuits in the famous *Journal de Trévoux*, especially under the editorship of Fr. Berthier (1745-62). For the *Courrier d'Avignon*, which was a serious rival of the *Gazette de France*, v. HATIN, *Hist. de la Presse*, III., 310. However much the Jansenistic *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques* denounced sensualist and atheistic writings to the authorities (GUGLIA, 260), the mordant ridicule with which it censured the luxuriousness and aristocratic prejudices of the clergy most effectively prepared the lower clergy for the reception of the new subversive ideas (DE LA GORCE, I., 49). It was seen only too clearly at the outbreak of the Revolution that Jansenistic ideas were still alive in these circles as well as in the Parlements. See SICARD, *Évêques*, I., 481.

unbelieving writers, who made a point of calling themselves "philosophers", did not leave unused the huge breach that was being made in the conservative elements of the nation. Their undermining operations met with little resistance from the privileged classes, the frivolous aristocracy and the worldly prelates, and their work was made still easier by the Government's failure to take any serious counter-measures. The following incident was typical. One of the chief means of spreading unbelief was the encyclopædia that had been edited since 1750 by Diderot and D'Alembert. On the appearance of the last ten volumes of this massive work in 1765 the general assembly of the clergy renewed its condemnation of it. The Government, however, prohibited the publication of this judgment because it included a defence of the Jesuits. The publisher of the encyclopædia, Le Breton, was made to supply a list of subscribers and was confined in the Bastille for a week, but the order that was issued at the same time, that all the copies that had been delivered were to be called in, was rendered nugatory by the king, Louis XV., who ordered a copy because he wanted to know about the composition of gunpowder, while the Pompadour was interested in the preparation of cosmetics and the manufacture of silk stockings. The encyclopædia being the best source of information on these subjects, the confiscated copies were released and no further objections were made to the production of the work.¹

In these circumstances what was the use of the Parlement continuing to hand over to the executioner the works of the unbelieving philosophers? ² The influence wielded by these writers had to be acknowledged by the Advocate General Séguier in 1770, when proposing that action be taken against a number of their more dangerous publications. "The philosophers," he said, "have set themselves up as the teachers of the human race. 'Freedom of thought' is their watchword, and we hear it repeated all over the world. With

¹ BAUMGARTNER, V., 470 *seq.*; *cf.* our account, Vol. XXXV., 369 *seqq.*, XXXVII., 366.

² GUGLIA, 57.

one hand they have tried to shake the throne, with the other to overthrow the altars. Their object has been to bring about a radical change in the public conception of our civil and religious institutions. And this revolution has actually come about. Kingdoms feel their old foundations being shaken, and the peoples, seeing the destruction of all traditional principles, are asking themselves in bewilderment by what mysterious fate they have become so unlike their former selves. . . . But the most deadly blows of these innovators have been aimed against religion. Through innumerable writings they have spread the poison of unbelief. Oratory, poetry, history, romance, even dictionaries, are full of it. Hardly had their writings become known in the capital when the provinces were flooded with them. This contagious pestilence has even seeped into the workshops of the artisans and the hovels of the poor.”¹

Of the clergy the most seriously infected by the new subversive ideas were those who had only donned the soutane for the sake of the revenues and benefices that went along with it. The latter they consumed without fulfilling in any way the conditions attached thereto. This host of parasites, calling themselves *abbés* whether or not they were priests, swarmed in Paris particularly. Here they lived like men of fashion and were prominent habitués of the salons. Contemporary memoirs have much to say about their immorality and unbelief. It was these men more than any others who brought the clerical calling into disrepute and caused their fellow-countrymen to hate it. The Church, then, still retained its outward show of splendour, but its foundations were undermined.² The clergy, riddled with worldliness and consequently weak and disunited, was in no shape to withstand the coming crisis.

¹ ROCQUAIN, 278.

² As the result of his studies, DE LA GORCE (I., 50) comes to this conclusion: “Une façade superbe, puis derrière cette façade des bâtisses minées de toutes parts, telle était au déclin de l’ancien régime l’image de l’Église de France.” SICARD’s judgment was similar (*Évêques*, I., 2). Cf. C. DEJOB, *Les abbés et les abbesses de la comédie française et italienne du 18^e siècle* (1898).

The body politic was in an even worse condition. The old institutions were still nominally in force, but the foundations had decayed, everything was breaking up, and the whole structure threatened to collapse.

The fundamental disease from which the monarchy was suffering was the absolutism of the State. Its foundations had been laid by Richelieu and Mazarin, and Louis XIV. had carried it to extremes. His will was the source of every right ; taxes were levied, new laws made, and old ones altered, according to his personal pleasure. He had even called for an opinion as to whether, like the Mohammedan despots of the East, he was the owner of every piece of ground in the kingdom.¹ All that the " Roi Soleil " had done to advance the material prosperity of his country had been wrecked by his foreign policy and his endless wars of aggression. On his death in 1715 the national exchequer was hopelessly in debt in spite of the heaviest possible taxation, and the people were reduced to beggary ; in some places the only food available was leaves and grass.² Even worse conditions were endured in the regency of the dissolute Duke Philippe of Orleans (1715-23), whose debauchery and irreligion did as much harm to the royal prestige as John Law's over-issuing of paper money did to the French finances. Louis XV.'s misgovernment, which was particularly harmful after the death of the prudent Cardinal Fleury in 1741, the baneful influence of the royal mistresses, and the king's extravagance deprived the throne of what little respect it still enjoyed, and France's military and political importance also continued to decline. The bad example set by the Court corrupted the whole of Society. When Louis XV.'s immoral life came to an end on May 10th, 1774, a year after the most influential of the religious Orders had fallen victim to the Bourbons, and a great impetus had been given to revolutionary ideas, Count Mercy-Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador, wrote an impressive account of the last four years of the reign, culminating in the following verdict : " Morality and decency are no more. There are no

¹ SYBEL, I⁴, 5.

² Cf. below, p. 115.

principles now ; everything is left to chance. The burden of shame that has been weighing down the nation has brought about a universal despondency." ¹

Louis XVI., Louis XV.'s grandson, came to the throne at the age of twenty years, untouched by the corruption of the Court and full of good intentions, but completely uninstructed in political affairs. Unfortunately this young monarch, though exceptionally benevolent, did not possess what was supremely necessary at such a time of universal ferment : a firm and decisive character and a true understanding of the situation. The most urgent task, in his opinion, was the restoration of the crippled finances, but any permanent improvement in this direction was most unwelcome to the Parlements, which would thereby have lost their most convenient opportunities of sharing in the government and legislation.²

The long-standing feud between Louis XV. and the Paris Parlement had resulted at the close of 1770 in the self-suspension of this haughty corporation, which hoped that the Government would be forced to give way by the high court of justice ceasing to function, for this brought all legal business in France to a standstill. The attempt to repair the situation by constituting a new high court, the so-called Parlement Maupeou, came to naught, for after Beaumarchais had accused it of venality it failed to command respect. Thus it was that at the very beginning of his reign Louis XVI. was faced with the difficult problem of deciding in favour of one or other of these two Parlements. In 1774, in spite of every warning, he

¹ *Corresp. entre Marie-Thérèse et le Comte de Mercy-Argenteau*, p.p. ARNETH ET GEFFROY, II., 231.

² WAHL, *Vorgeschichte*, I., 185, 190, 233. There was also some questionable complaisance on the part of the Church. In this same year, 1784, there took place the death of Diderot, after Voltaire the most active and influential of the Encyclopedists. Although he had received his parish priest several times during his illness, his friends maintained that he had persisted in his unbelief to the last. He certainly never recanted. Nevertheless he was buried with the rites of the Church. See BAUMGARTNER, V., 474 *seq.*

ordained the restoration of the old order. This initial mistake was fraught with far-reaching consequences.¹ In 1776 the fall of Turgot, who had tried to set the administration of the revenue to rights by means of vast reforms, led to the complete supremacy of the Parlement, which was bound to result in revolution.² The attitude of the Parlement during the Jansenist controversies had already been an indication of the coming catastrophe. When Jansenism ceased to exist as a sect, it fell back on the Gallican theories: on March 31st, 1753, every professor of theology was obliged by the Paris Parlement to subscribe to the four articles of 1682.³ An even greater impetus was given to the revolutionary movement by the destructive doctrines of the philosophers, especially their new theories about the function of the State. The attitude of the Government, at first inconsistent and finally constantly yielding, also contributed to the gradual lowering of the royal authority. While giving every encouragement to reform, it had not the strength to bring about the universal amelioration of conditions that was necessary to save the situation.⁴ As opposed to the apophthegm attributed to Louis XIV. and generally accepted as the epitome of his regime—*L'État c'est moi!*—the cry that now arose with ever growing violence from the meetings of the Parlements and the writings of the *littérateurs* was "The people are the State", "The legislative authority by its very nature rests with the nation, or with the majority of it."⁵ Now on the verge of open bankruptcy and crippled by the ever more reckless opposition of the privileged

¹ WAHL calls this measure "the most momentous event in the reign of Louis XVI." (*loc. cit.*, I., 195, 232, 253).

² *Ibid.*, 260, 323. The reports of the Spanish ambassador, cited by A. SCHEIBE in *Die französische Revolution* (Gotha, 1909), and other sources tend to show that Queen Marie Antoinette also had a hand in Turgot's dismissal. See SÉGUR, *Au couchant de la Monarchie*, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 févr., 15 oct. 1909.

³ SICARD, *Évêques*, I., 453.

⁴ Cf. the numerous documents cited by WAHL and enumerated in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXIX., 377 seq.

⁵ WAHL, II., 298 seq., 178, 174, 176, 179, 303, 54.

classes, the Government also finally decided to appeal to "the good people", as being the majority of the nation, to help it fight against the two superior Estates. With the glaring contrast between the life of the poor and that of the rich, the doctrine that the Third Estate, which had hitherto been nothing, was to seize all power into its own hands—the most assiduous exponent of which was the Abbé Sieyès¹—fell on very fruitful ground. This doctrine was one of the chief motive forces of the Revolution, which was essentially a struggle for political power, first the Parlement, then the privileged classes, and finally the Third Estate striving for supremacy in place of the absolute monarchy.² In ordering the Third Estate to send to the assembly of the *Etats Généraux* twice as many deputies as the other two Estates the Government in its blindness was actually encouraging its aims. But whether the States-General, which had not been convoked since 1614, were to assemble separately, in three chambers, as before, or all together in one, was left undecided. The crowning piece of folly committed by the Government was to order the States-General to assemble at Versailles, in the vicinity of the seething capital, though it must have known that with no money and no reliable troops it was in no position to defend its existence.³

When the deputies of the States-General met on May 4th, 1789, its proceedings were followed by the whole nation with intense excitement. Once more the ancient feudal State appeared in all its glory, but this time the leading rôle was played not by the clergy and nobility but by the Third Estate, the representatives of the bourgeois and the farmers.

Among the deputies of the clerical Estate a deep cleavage between the upper and the lower clergy was evident from the

¹ For Sieyès, *cf.* the monograph by NÉTON, Paris, 1900.

² Besides Wahl's arguments in Vols. I. and II., *cf.* MADELIN'S opinion in *La Révolution*, 19.

³ For the demoralization of the army, *v.* SYBEL, I.⁴, 44 *seqq.* "Le Roi n'a pas la force de tête et la force des bayonnettes lui manque," wrote one of the deputies on July 8, 1789; *v.* MADELIN, 22.

start. The majority of the 208 parish priests were anxious to improve their sorry lot and hoped to attain this object by means of political changes. After the Third Estate, which was numerically superior to the other two, had formed itself into a National Assembly on June 17th, appropriating the principle of *L'État c'est moi!* and claiming the sole right of representing the French nation, some of the nobility and clergy went over to it.¹ This victory was soon followed by another, when the three Estates, which had hitherto held their meetings apart, deliberated together. On June 23rd, 1789, Louis XVI. had prohibited the union, but four days later, on the 27th, he ordered it himself. With this the supreme authority passed to the National Assembly; the ancient and sacred monarchy of St. Denis and Rheims, the monarchy of the oriflamme and the holy ampulla had passed away.² From this point onwards the course of events was quickened. Necker's dismissal led to riots in Paris, where a national guard was formed. The fall of the Bastille on July 14th, 1789, was the signal for a general rising throughout the country. The peasants set fire to the nobles' châteaux and even wrecked some abbeys; in the towns the mob took to plundering.

It was under the pressure of these events that there took place the famous all-night sitting of August 4th. The young Vicomte de Noailles, who, like his brother-in-law Lafayette, had fought in America, moved that all feudal rights be redeemed by the communes, either in money or on a moderate valuation, and that the *corvées*, the rights of mortmain, and other personal obligations should cease in future without

¹ Of the 296 clerical deputies 47 were Bishops, 12 Canons, 6 Vicars General, 23 Abbés or other unattached priests, and 208 parish priests. The last had the great advantage of being supported by the Archbishops of Bordeaux and Vienne (Cicé and Lefranc de Pompignan) and the Bishops of Chartres (Lubersac), Rodez (Seignelay-Colbert), Orange (Du Tillet), and Coutances (Talaru de Chalmazel). An interesting feature of the situation is that the wily Talleyrand was still keeping himself in the background. See SICARD, *Clergé*, I., 19, 46 *seq.*

² GUGLIA, *loc. cit.*, 45; GENDRY, II., 107.

indemnity. Another *grand seigneur*, the Duc d'Aiguillon, spoke in a similar sense, whereupon the assembly was seized with a veritable frenzy. Everyone wanted to outdo his neighbour in generosity; no one wanted "to perish alone". Even the clergy was infected by the general excitement. The Bishop of Nancy, with some of his colleagues, including the Archbishop of Aix, denounced the feudal system. So many motions were proposed with such rapidity that the secretaries were hard put to it to take them down in time. Some of the parish priests renounced their livings, and a delegate from the clergy of Lorraine demanded the abolition of the annates. The Duc de Liancourt proposed that a medal be struck to commemorate "the self-denial of all the individuals for the good of the community", the Archbishop of Paris, De Juigné, that a *Te Deum* be sung, the Marquis Lally-Tollendal that the title "restorer of French freedom" be conferred upon the king. Day was breaking when the president ordered the reading of the main titles of the various resolutions, the full drafting to be left for subsequent sessions.¹

But afterwards the assembly refused to listen to any talk about redeeming the tithes, which were the chief source of income for the lower clergy. When the eloquent Mirabeau moved that they be abolished without compensation and contended that the clergy, being nothing more than "*officiers de police et d'instruction*", be paid by the State, there was a loud murmur of dissent from the clerical benches. Mirabeau defended his proposal by exclaiming, "I know of only three ways of existing in society: by begging, thieving, or receiving wages." At the evening session the Abbé Sieyès, who had been largely responsible for raising the storm with his attacks on the nobility and clergy and his glorification of the Third Estate, failed to move his hearers when he spoke in favour of redeeming the clerical tithes. When he complained about the turn the Revolution was taking, Mirabeau rejoined, "My dear Abbé, you have let the bull loose, and now you complain

¹ BOUCHEZ ET ROUX, *Hist. parlementaire*, II., 224 seq., 229 seqq.; DE LA GORCE, I., 127; SICARD, *Clergé*, I., 183 seq.

when it runs at you with its horns." ¹ Finally the clergy preferred to give way completely. At the session of August 11th, after several parish priests had renounced their tithes, the Archbishop of Paris rose to make the statement, "In the name of all the clergy we surrender all the tithes hitherto possessed by the Church into the hands of a just and generous nation. But let the Gospel be preached among us as before, let public services be celebrated with dignity and propriety, let the churches be served by virtuous and zealous priests, and let the poor be assisted as before! This was the object of our tithes. But we trust ourselves to the National Assembly and do not doubt that it will make it possible for us to continue to fulfil such honourable and sacred duties." ² Thereupon a decree was passed, abolishing the tithes unconditionally, and this was followed by the prohibition of the payment of annates and other Church dues to the Holy See, which was an open breach of the concordat. ³ All these measures were applauded, for as a result of its shameful abuse by the Crown the concordat was detested by many members of the lower clergy as much as were the money payments to Rome. This being the state of things, the Bishops held their peace. ⁴

The last remnant of the clerical privileges was abolished on August 26th, when, after a long and heated debate, the

¹ É. DUMONT, *Souvenirs*, 147. "Le peuple a appris à connaître ses forces," we read in a letter from a parish priest in Normandy, who vigorously defended the tithes (*La Révolution française*, 1906, janvier, 48 *seqq.*).

² Cardinal Bernis disapproved of the Archbishop of Paris's conduct almost as strongly as he did that of Talleyrand later on. "On n'aurait jamais cru, que l'enthousiasme patriotique pût porter un grand prélat à offrir au nom du clergé la suppression de la dîme, et encore moins qu'un autre évêque proposât de dépouiller l'Église de tous ses biens; nous ne sommes que les usufruitiers des nos bénéfices." MASSON, *Bernis*, 466, n. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, 461 *seqq.* SYBEL (I.⁴, 70) points out that a previous violation of the concordat was no justification of the measure.

⁴ CHAMPION, *La Séparation*, 58; CH.-L. CHASSIN, *Les Cahiers des curés*, Paris, 1882; MAQUIEZ, 26 *seq.*

assembly adopted the declaration of the rights of man and citizen, the tenth article of which declared that " No one is to be molested on account of his opinions, even when they affect religion, except when their manifestation disturbs the public, lawfully established, order ". On the following day, in the course of the discussions on the new constitution, the motion proposed by the Abbé Eymar, that the Catholic religion be that of the State, was rejected.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL LEGISLATION OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN 1789 and 1790—THE SECULARIZATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE RELIGIOUS HOUSES—THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY—THE ATTITUDES ADOPTED BY LOUIS XVI., PIUS VI., AND THE FRENCH HIERARCHY.

THE abrogation of the feudal rights that had been held for centuries by numerous dioceses, abbeys, and cathedral chapters, the cancellation of the financial privileges of the clergy, and finally the abolition of the tithes, without any compensation, were only the prelude to still more drastic measures: the secularization of Church property and the suppression of the religious houses. Here too the preliminary work of upheaval had been done by the absolutist State. As far back as 1749 a decree had prohibited the increase of estates in mortmain,¹ and in May, 1766, after the expulsion of the Jesuits, a royal commission had been appointed whose ostensible purpose was the removal of existing abuses. It ordained the suppression of numerous religious houses, and this was followed by restrictions placed on the reception of novices.² It had been maintained by Louis XIV. that kings had the absolute right to dispose of ecclesiastical as well as lay property for the good of the state,³ and the idea that Church goods were State property had been gaining ground since the middle of the eighteenth century. In 1770, acting on this principle, the errant Abbé Raynal, a friend of the Encyclopedists, worked out a thorough-going plan for

¹ ISAMBERT, *Anciennes lois françaises*, XXII., 226.

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVII., 386 seq.

³ "Les rois," we read in the *Mémoires de Louis XIV.*, "sont seigneurs absolus de tous les biens tant des séculiers que des ecclésiastiques, pour en user comme sages économes, c'est à dire selon les besoins de l'État." Cf. MADELIN, *La Révolution*, 118.

secularization.¹ In the instructions of the electors, the so-called *Cahiers* of 1789, the idea that Church property belonged to the nation was obviously taken for granted as being a necessary condition for any demand for reform. The only point on which opinions differed was whether the administration of clerical property should be altered or whether the property should be confiscated altogether.²

These aims, which were furthered by the gross exaggerations of the value and extent of the Church's possessions,³ were taken up by the National Assembly. Their exponents, being fully aware how deeply the Catholic Church was rooted in the people, in spite of all the subversive activity that had been going on, decided to approach their objective slowly and carefully, step by step.

The cant phrase, "The Church's property belongs to the nation," was first uttered in the National Assembly at the beginning of August, 1789. In view of the embarrassing financial situation as described by the Finance Minister Necker, the hierarchy expressed its readiness to mortgage its property in order to provide the nation with ready money. This offer, however, was declined by the Assembly, which decided instead to raise a loan, being firmly convinced that it would not have long to wait before the Church's property was confiscated altogether.⁴ On September 26th, 1789, one of the noble deputies proposed that the increasing financial stress be relieved by the sale of church plate. Archbishop Juigné of Paris, speaking both for himself and for many of his colleagues, promptly offered to place at the State's disposal all the plate that was not needed for divine service. The nature of the applause that greeted this offer showed that much more was expected.⁵ The favourable moment for

¹ According to LUDWIG in the *Hist. Zeitschrift*, XCVI. (1906), 96, and F. WOLTERS, *Agrarzustände*, 345.

² Besides WOLTERS (382 *seqq.*), *cf.* especially CH. GOMEL, *Hist. financière de l'Assemblée Constituante*, Paris, 1896, 138 *seq.*

³ *Cf.* above, p. 88.

⁴ DE LA GORCE, I., 135 *seqq.* *Cf.* SICARD, *Clergé*, I., 192 *seqq.*

⁵ DE LA GORCE, I., 139.

obtaining it came when the Assembly moved to Paris and was exposed to the threats of the rough and ignorant mob that was being stirred up by professional agitators. The situation grew so oppressive that very soon, by the middle of October, nearly a hundred deputies had left the assembly.¹ This was a serious mistake, for it left the radical elements in the majority. Then, more than ever, when the storm was blowing up, it was their duty to remain at their posts.

The most grievous wounds the Church has had to suffer have always been inflicted on her by her own unnatural sons, not by her enemies outside the fold. At the meeting of the National Assembly on October 10th, when it was still at Versailles, it was not one of the many unbelieving and anti-clerical lawyers, but a cleric, and a Bishop at that, who took the initiative in robbing his own Estate. Talleyrand, who had entered the Church without having any genuine vocation² and who, in spite of his frivolous way of living, had been presented by the king to the see of Autun in 1788,³ brought forward a motion whose careful wording most skilfully concealed its true purpose. After referring to the parlous state of the public finances he proceeded to represent the covering of the deficit by means of ecclesiastical property as something inevitable and too obvious for words. The whole of this property belonged to the nation, but it should see that the clerics received a stipend and that religious bequests were duly fulfilled. Prominent among the speakers who developed this attack was the eloquent Mirabeau. Ostensibly solicitous for the lower clergy, but really to estrange them from their superiors, he too, like the Bishop of Autun, pleaded that the *curé* should not receive less than 1,200 francs a year. Taking his cue from Talleyrand, he openly demanded that every

¹ *Ibid.*, 140.

² "Mes parents s'étaient déterminés, selon ce qu'ils regardaient comme un intérêt de famille, à me conduire à un état pour lequel je ne montrais aucune disposition." TALLEYRAND, *Mémoires p.p. le Duc de Broglie*, I., Paris, 1891, 16.

³ BLENNERHASSET, *Talleyrand* (1904) ; DE LACOMBE, *Talleyrand évêque*, Paris, 1903.

possession of the Church be declared the property of the nation. Barnave, an ambitious and embittered Protestant, only 29 years old, even denied the existence of ecclesiastical property.¹

The Church's rights were defended by Boisgelin, the much-respected Archbishop of Aix, Camus, the Jansenist advocate of Paris, and the Abbés Eymar and Maury. Maury maliciously reminded the assembly that as an *abbé* in Périgord the Bishop of Autun had once defended the sacredness of the Church's right to property against the government of Savoy. Sharp language was used again by Maury at the session of October 10th, when he denounced the contemplated robbery and Sieyès' statement that the clergy was not an owner as other owners were. "There is only one kind of ownership", he protested, "and it is as sacred to us as it is to you. Our ownership is a guarantee of yours. If we are robbed, your turn will come too." He stressed the difficulty of putting the proposed measures into practice and the disappointment that would be caused by the difference between the estimated and the actual profit. Great riches had been expected when the Jesuits were suppressed, but their property had barely sufficed to provide them with miserable pensions. In passing through the hands of the State officials the money had run away to nothing. "You want to be free!" he cried. "Good! But remember that where there is no property there is no freedom!"²

The rest of the clergy did not adopt so firm an attitude, and disclosed their intention of sacrificing some of their goods in order to save the remainder. The Archbishop of Aix, who had once been the leader of that section of the clergy that had wanted to unite with the Third Estate, made every effort to strike a bargain. With his offer of October 31st to come to the rescue of the community, as the clergy always had done in an emergency, in this case by lending the Government 400 million francs, he deprived the opposition of its chief argument, the

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 140 *seqq.*

² POUJOLAT, *Maury*, 90 *seq.*; HERGENRÖTHER, *Maury*, 23 *seqq.*

necessity of meeting the deficit with the Church estates.¹ It looked, indeed, as if the attack had been repelled, when the advocate Le Chapelier commented that if the clergy continued as proprietors they would also continue to be a separate Estate. This new line of thought was again adroitly supported by Mirabeau, who proposed that Thouret's formula, "The clergy's property belongs to the nation", be amended to "The clergy's property is at the nation's disposal". Many of the clergy thought that they might give their approval to this less peremptory wording, if only because of the simultaneous admission of the obligation to provide in a fitting manner for the cost of religious services, the maintenance of the Church's functionaries, and the relief of the poor, also to allot to every parish priest a salary of at least 1,200 francs a year, besides a house and garden. Accordingly, the motion was carried on November 2nd, 1789, by 568 votes to 346, and became law. Forty deputies had abstained from voting; 300, almost all belonging to the right, were absent.² Even then the real object of the revolutionaries was so cleverly concealed that there were many who still indulged in idle hopes. It did, indeed, seem very possible that the threat would not be carried out. A message to this effect was conveyed by the Government to its ambassador in Rome, Cardinal Bernis,³ and even Boisgelin thought that the actual committing of the robbery would meet with serious difficulties, especially in Flanders, and that probably only monastic property would be taken.⁴

But the Revolution was not content with half-measures, nor did it stop to take breath. The nation having failed to strike it down when it first raised its head, it steadily pursued its course of destruction. The most complete embodiment of the

¹ "Il eût mieux valu accepter, la nation allait faire une mauvaise affaire." This was MADELIN'S opinion (*France et Rome*, 310). Cf. below, p. 129, n. 4.

² DE LA GORCE, I., 149 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 151 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. his letter to the Countess Gramont, of November 3, 1789, in MATHIEZ, *Rome et le clergé*, 85.

spirit of negation, it devoted all its energy to destroying the existing order. When it had finally enthroned itself upon the ruins it ruled the people with the bloody sceptre of brute force and terror.¹

Having gained this first success the leaders of the movement still continued to conceal their general plan. While gradually increasing the intensity of the attack they slowly but steadily advanced. Once the principle had been admitted, the consequences followed automatically. On November 7th, 1789, the National Assembly placed all ecclesiastical property under the control of administrative officials and municipalities. Six days later benefice-holders and all superiors of religious houses and institutes were ordered to produce within two months a full account of all the movable and immovable property of their establishments. But it was not till December 19th, when it was clear to all that the patriotic free-will offerings had failed to meet the situation, and Necker had described the financial crisis in the blackest colours to the National Assembly, that it was resolved to meet the deficit by selling the royal domains and church goods to the value of 400 million francs. *Assignats* to this amount, bearing interest at 5 per cent, were to be issued by the Government.²

This attack on the property of the Church was accompanied by another one, which was far more serious. On August 20th, 1789, in the course of the debate on the so-called "Rights of Man", the National Assembly had appointed a *Comité Ecclésiastique*, consisting of five clerics and ten laymen, to deliberate on Church affairs. In this committee Bishops Bonal of Clermont and Mercy of Luçon could count on the votes of six or seven other members, and were thus able to hold in check the Jansenist Martineau and the Erastians and parliamentary Gallicans, La Perche Treilhard and Durand de Maillane.³

¹ MÜNZENBERGER, *Kirchengesetzgebung*, 5.

² DE LA GORCE, I., 153 *seq.*

³ KIEFER, 13. For Martineau's Jansenism, *v.* De Bonneval's letter to Zelada, in *Études*, 1907, Avril, 263, 267. As opposed to Mathiez, *cf.* MOURRET's remarks on pp. 87, 102.

The situation changed, however, when on February 7th, 1790, the Paris lawyer Treilhard succeeded in having the membership of the committee doubled. The Left, now in the majority,¹ advocated reforms of so subversive a nature that the Bishops of Clermont and Luçon, the Abbé Montesquiou, and six others of similar views refused to take any further part in the discussions² lest their remaining on the committee be represented by ill-wishers as co-operation in the revolutionaries' plans.³ Their action is further explained by the fact that three of the newly-joined clerical members of the committee were among those who were on the point of openly leaving the Church, a step they eventually took. On February 11th, 1790, Treilhard brought forward a motion which had been under preparation for the previous two months: that a religious should be allowed to leave his house whenever he wished. The civil law, he argued, recognized only voluntary decisions. That he was not concerned with the protection of personal liberty, however, or the removal of abuses was revealed in the second part of his proposal. This, in glaring contrast to the first, prohibited the taking of vows, which was tantamount to condemning all religious houses to a slow death. The Bishops of Clermont and Nancy fought the motion with reasoned arguments, but two days later it was passed and became law. Only educational or charitable institutions were exempt. The measure had only temporary validity but the permanent destruction of the religious houses was only a question of time.⁴ On February 19th the pension to be paid to ex-religious was settled. An unexpected result of the debate was the raising of the ex-Jesuits' pension from the miserable sum of 400 *livres* to 900.⁵

On March 17th, 1790, the National Assembly turned its attention again to the question of Church property. Treilhard,

¹ PISANI, I., 153.

² DURAND DE MAILLANE, *Hist. apol.*, 38.

³ KIEFER, 14.

⁴ DE LA GORCE, I., 155 *seqq.*; SICARD, *Clergé*, I., 284; MOURRET, 99 *seq.*

⁵ SICARD, I., 285.

who had been elected chairman of the *Comité Ecclésiastique*, moved that each commune be invited to acquire a portion of the ecclesiastical estates at a fixed price and afterwards to sell it to private persons. The communes were to be allowed to make a profit over the transaction, which was later fixed at a sixteenth of the purchase price.¹ This proposal had a double object: to make the purchase an attractive proposition for the communes and to salve the conscience of private purchasers who might fight shy of acquiring Church property at first hand. On March 17th Treillard's motion was made law by decree. Three days later another decree ordered the religious houses to draw up inventories within a week and to supply personal particulars. Also, each inmate was to be asked whether he wished to remain in the establishment or not.² This action against the religious houses constituted "a serious invasion of the individual's liberty of conscience", which in every other sphere the Revolution wanted to protect. "From now on it was certain that reconciliation with the Catholic Church was out of the question and that hostilities were inevitable."³

In their boundless optimism many clerics still hoped that the Assembly would rest content with its resolution to sell the ecclesiastical property to the amount of 400 millions, and that later on the clergy would be able to buy it back. All such hopes were soon to be dispelled. On April 9th Chasset declared that the decree of November 2nd was useless, so long as the clergy were not expropriated.⁴ On the same day he moved that the administration of nearly all the Church estates be transferred to the district authorities and that uniform payment of the clergy be regulated in detail by law. To avert this blow the Bishop of Nancy and the Archbishop of Aix spoke with all the eloquence at their command, but to no purpose. The latter's renewal of the clergy's offer to guarantee a loan of 400 millions

¹ Decree of May 14, 1790; *v. DE LA GORCE*, I., 156.

² *Ibid.*, 157.

³ BERGER, *Der religiöse Kult*, 25.

⁴ MATHIEZ, 86.

made no impression. But some harsh words were used about the *Comité Ecclésiastique*, even by the Church's opponents. When the direct charge of hostility to religion was brought against it, it was defended by a deputy from the Auvergne, a Carthusian of the name of Dom Gerle, who, religionist though he was, had been led by his hazy notions and his enthusiasm to join the "Club of the Friends of the Constitution", which afterwards became the club of the Jacobins. He asserted that the *Comité Ecclésiastique* was not biased, and that to say that the National Assembly wanted no religion was a slander. To reassure those who had misgivings on this score, it should be decreed that the Roman, Catholic, and Apostolic religion was now and always would be the religion of the nation, and that only its form of worship would be recognized.

No proposal could have been more welcome to the clergy. With a prudent moderation it declared its agreement also with the amendment, that its acceptance was not to prejudice the rights of the non-Catholics. At first the Left was seriously put out by this blow that had come from their own camp, but it quickly recovered and succeeded in having the vote on the motion postponed until the next session.¹

During the night both parties were very active. The Left put it about that the fanatics wanted to restore the old intolerance. This induced the poor Dom Gerle to promise to withdraw his motion. The clergy and many of the nobles met in the Capuchin convent in the Rue St-Honoré, where they decided to insist on the acceptance of Gerle's motion and in the event of its rejection to lodge a protest. They also decided to approach the king in solemn procession and to submit a protest to him. They would then inform the people of the danger that threatened religion. A message, however, was sent to them by the Keeper of the Great Seal that the king was unable to receive them or accept their address.

On the morning of April 13th hundreds of colporteurs were

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 157-160. For Dom Gerle, v. F. MÈGE in the *Mém. de l'Acad. de Clermont-Ferrand*, 1865, 444 *seqq.*, and AULARD, *La Société des Jacobins*, I., 59.

distributing leaflets purporting to tell the people about the plot that had been hatched at the Capuchins.¹ Agitators also appeared in the National Assembly ; but not only were the deputies subjected to intimidation ; attempts were also made to persuade the credulous and the shallow-minded, who were only too numerous. It was with this object that the Baron de Menou, who nine years later was to become a Mohammedan in Egypt, came forward as the spokesman of Catholicism. " I will begin," he said, " with my confession of faith. I respect the Catholic and Apostolic religion. I hold it to be the only true one and I submit to it with my head and my heart. But can my belief in this religion, my way of worshipping God, be brought about by the resolution of an assembly, or by a law ? No, assuredly not. My conscience and my opinion belong to me alone. I have to answer for them only to the God I worship. And why should I make this religion, which I respect and for which I would give my life, the religion of the State ? If all of us have equal rights, if convictions and all that goes with them are not subjected to any law, who am I to abrogate to myself the superior right of forcing my views, my form of worship, on others ? Could not everyone make this reply to me : ' My religion is a better one. *This* is the one that must be supreme ' ? Did not God Himself say that His religion would grow and grow, until it embraced the whole world, and that the powers of hell would not overcome it ? And you with your resolution want to confirm this great pronouncement of the Lord's ! If you are convinced of the truth of your religion what fear can you have that it will perish ? Can you believe that the laws and the will of Providence need the help of your decree ? " ²

Beguiled by these fine words, Dom Gerle withdrew his motion, but the Right intended to insist on it, although their spokesman Cazalès was refused leave to speak. At this point the Duc de la Rochefoucauld rose to introduce the following

¹ " Assemblée des Aristocrates aux Capucins ; nouveau complot découvert." See DE LA GORCE, I., 161.

² WEISS, *Weltgesch.*, XV., 78.

order of the day: "In view of the fact that the National Assembly has no power to exercise over consciences and religious opinions, and that the deep respect due to religion does not allow of its being a subject of discussion; further, seeing that there can be no doubt about the attachment of the National Assembly to the Roman, Catholic, Apostolic faith at a moment when it is about to place this form of worship alone in the first class of recipients of public funds, and when by an unanimous movement it has given expression to its respect in the only way conformable with the dignity of religion and the character of the Assembly, it has decided that it cannot and may not discuss the proposed motion and that it will resume discussion on the order of the day, namely the church tithes."¹ While the Left were applauding a cry rang out from the Right: "When the Jews crucified Jesus they called out, 'Hail, King of the Jews!'" At this, a general uproar ensued and several members of the Right, including Maury, left the chamber. Outside they were threatened by the mob. Those that stayed behind adopted Rochefoucauld's order of the day.²

On April 14th the National Assembly again discussed the fate of the Church's possessions, and elated by the recent victory it adopted Chasset's motion. That evening a cleric who was not far off apostasy wrote to his electors, "The last blow has been struck against the clergy."³ And so it was. Gerle's motion having been rejected, the Right decided to appeal to the people in the provinces by means of a proclamation. But it was signed by only 297 deputies, whereas on November 2nd 346 had voted against the sale of the ecclesiastical estates. The strength of the Conservative party in the National Assembly had rapidly decreased, not one of the least causes being the attitude of the lower clergy.⁴

¹ SICARD, I., 486.

² DE LA GORCE, I., 162 *seq.*

³ "Messieurs, le dernier coup vient d'être porté au clergé." LINDET, *Correspondance*, 132, in DE LA GORCE, I., 163.

⁴ SICARD (*Clergé*, I., 487) observes: "Ce qui était grave, c'est que la majorité des curés avait refusé de s'associer à la protestation. Sur environ trois cents ecclésiastiques députés, cent quarante

With the exception of Talleyrand and the titular Bishop Gobel all the Bishops in the National Assembly had signed the protest. But with this they rested content. A few of them, indeed, including Bishop Bausset of Alais, were weak enough to lull the righteous anger of the people.¹ A contemporary judged correctly that the chief charge to be brought against the minority was its failure to protest with sufficient vigour.² This lack of resistance encouraged the Assembly to go still further ahead. A decree of May 14th contained instructions regarding the sale of the ecclesiastical estates. In perpetrating this robbery the Assembly quite forgot that the "rights of man" that had been so solemnly proclaimed contained the principle that property was inviolable and sacred. The sale of the Church's property did not stop short at the 400 million mark; two further laws, of July and October, 1790, decreed the sale of all of it. Only a few estates were excepted, those of the charitable institutions and the forests, which the State reserved for itself.³

The suppression of the religious houses had begun in the spring with the taking of the inventories and personal particulars. This was followed by the questioning of the inmates, as to whether they wished to remain. It was seen then to what extent the monastic spirit had died away in the male orders. In some, it is true, especially the poorer and the stricter ones, such as the Capuchins, the Carthusians, and the Trappists, there was not a single case of desertion. The grand spirit of the past was also shown by the Benedictine abbeys of the North, where most religious houses had escaped the scourge of the commendatory system. In the country as a

seulement consentaient à l'appuyer. Ainsi les curés qui avaient provoqué la suppression des deux premiers ordres par leur réunion au tiers, qui avaient abandonné les dîmes, défendu très mollement les biens du clergé, fait échouer le veto royal, continuaient à aider la marche de la Révolution, en refusant leur vote à une proposition tendant à maintenir au catholicisme le privilège de religion d'État et de seul culte public."

¹ MATHIEZ, 182 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 185.

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 164.

whole, however, most of the inmates showed no definite desire either to stay or to leave; what troubled them all was the uncertainty of their future.¹

The women's convents presented a very different picture. In this emergency the weaker sex proved to be the stronger. With very few exceptions these brave women displayed an admirable resolution. They took no thought for themselves but only for those entrusted to their care. Their whole desire was to keep faith with their vocation, come what might. One cannot but be moved by their declarations that they would rather suffer death than be unfaithful to their vows. They had taken their vows in absolute freedom, and they asked to be allowed to die in peace, keeping their rule. From the Carmelite nuns in Paris the National Assembly had to accept the reproof that the persons whom Catholic France was intending to exterminate were suffered to exist in Canada by Protestant England. When the corporation of Lyons tried to soften the decree of the National Assembly by a reference to the possibility of a pension, it received the reply from the Poor Clares that their vow of poverty forbade them to accept remuneration. The nuns drew attention to the valuable services they were rendering with their charitable and educational work, but their remonstrances had no effect on the civil authorities. Similarly useless were the efforts made by some of them to save themselves by declaring their readiness to work for the community. The National Assembly insisted on doing away with them all.²

In certain towns and villages the preservation of the religious houses was demanded by the inhabitants, but it was only in a few places that they were sufficiently determined to offer any resistance.³ Except in Alsace,⁴ the population showed

¹ See the details taken from the *Papiers du Comité ecclésiastique* (Archives nationales in Paris), *ibid.*, 170 seq., and the full account given by SICARD (I., 287-377).

² DE LA GORCE, I., 174 seq., and especially SICARD, I., 412-496.

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 179 seq.

⁴ GRAF SOLMS-RÖDELHEIM, *Der Nationalgüterverkauf im Distrikt Strassburg 1791 bis 1811*, Strassburg, 1904 (no account of Marion has been taken in this work).

no particular aversion to the purchase of ecclesiastical property. Rather the contrary was the case. Owing to the practice of diverting ecclesiastical revenues from their proper purposes, the Church's property was no longer regarded as sacred, and the removal of the occasion for so many abuses was viewed with satisfaction.¹ Besides, the National Assembly had promised to defray the cost of public worship and to provide for the clergy and the poor. Any scruples about buying Church property were allayed by the law of March 17th, according to which it was not being bought from the Church direct but from the commune. Most of it was bought by the bourgeoisie. It is certain that the farmers also took a lively interest in the sales²; the nobility and even the clergy did not hold themselves aloof from the transactions, since everybody else was taking part and there was no actual prohibition against it. The *curés*, who stood to benefit from the new system of remuneration, had no cause to lament the passing of the old regime. The hardest hit were the wealthy members of the upper clergy; nevertheless, the episcopate acquiesced in the new situation with dignity and resignation. From no section of the clergy was there any resistance, and this passivity greatly facilitated the proceedings.³ Encouraged by the

¹ Such views were expressed as soon as the decree of November 2, 1789, was made known (v. E. FLEURY, *Le clergé du département de l'Aisne pendant la Révolution*, I., 1853, 82 seq.).

² LEGEAY, *Documents hist. sur la vente des biens nationaux dans le département de la Sarthe* (1885-7), 3 vols.; F. ROUVIÈRE, *L'aliénation des biens nationaux dans le Gard* (1900); LECARPENTIER, *La vente des biens nationaux dans la Seine-Inférieure*, in the *Rev. hist.*, September-December, 1901; LEMONTIER, *La vente des biens nationaux dans la Charente-Inférieure*, in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, January, 1906; SAGNAC, in the *Rev. d'hist. mod. et contemp.*, July, 1906; M. MARION, *La vente des biens nationaux pendant la Révolution avec étude spéciale des ventes dans les départements de la Gironde et du Cher*, Paris, 1908; A. VIALLAY, *La vente des biens nationaux pendant la Révolution*, Paris, 1908. Additional monographs in SICARD, *Clergé*, I., 246 seqq.

³ *Ibid.*, 249 seq., 253.

triumphant reports on the successful progress of the operation the National Assembly decided to proceed still further with the robbery, which attached all who participated in it to the Revolution.¹ All the exceptions that had been made in 1790 were cancelled in rapid succession. In 1792 the religious orders of knighthood, the Bishops' residences, the property belonging to the church factories, and the houses of the female orders were also declared to be national property. In 1793 the same fate befell the schools, the hospitals, and other charitable institutions.² But as the market value of the *assignats* rapidly and irresistibly depreciated, the Church properties, which had been bought at a good price, were sold at such a bad one that this huge sale proved to be an utter financial failure.³ Nor did the division of the estates improve the condition of the poor to the extent that has often been asserted. It has been established beyond all doubt that in the Paris district, for example, the only persons to derive any profit from the sale of the national property were those who were already property owners.⁴

Even before the financial operations had proved unsuccessful the Church, which had already been despoiled, firstly of all its privileges then of all its property and its Orders, had

¹ *Ibid.*, 205 seq.

² MARION, *loc. cit.*, 13 seqq. ; SICARD, I., 247 seq.

³ MARION (*loc. cit.*), supported by DARMSTAEDTER in the *Hist. Zeitschrift*, CIV., 173. Marion estimates the total value of the goods taken from the Church at 3,000 millions. For the deleterious effects and the injustice of the measure, cf. TAINE, I., 211 seqq., 222 seq., and MOURRET, 95 ; PISANI, I., 138. SYBEL (I.⁴, 113, 127 seqq.) condemns the seizure and sale of the Church goods as outrageous. In another passage (I., 191) he refers to the measure not only as a great injustice but also as a financial speculation. Cf. 222 seqq.

⁴ This is demonstrated with ample evidence extracted from various archives by B. MINZES in his article *Die Nationalgüter-Veräußerung während der französischen Revolution, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Departements Seine und Oise* (*Staatswissenschaft. Studien*, ed. L. Elster, IV., 2, Jena, 1892).

sustained another and still more deadly attack at the hands of the National Assembly. The project of it originated in the *Comité Ecclésiastique*, in which as far back as November 23rd, 1789, the Gallican Durand de Maillane, the author of a work on the liberties of the French Church, had recommended, along with some good, some very dangerous proposals for reform, such as the eligibility of laymen for the episcopal office,¹ and their nomination without reference to the Pope. After the radical elements in the committee had gained the upper hand in February, 1790, a plan to introduce devastating "reforms" had secured a firm footing there. It aimed at nothing less than the transformation of the whole ecclesiastical constitution, and was largely interspersed with Jansenistic ideas.²

One of the watchwords of this sect was that the only possibility of reform was to return to the simplicity of the early Church. It was a favourite doctrine of the Jansenists that even simple priests were entitled to participate in the government of the Church and in the settlement of questions of faith. In future, as if in revenge for the restriction of the episcopal authority, which the *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques*, the organ of the Jansenists, stigmatized as "despotism", the Bishops of France were to take possession of their sees without first obtaining Papal confirmation, as was already the custom in the schismatic Church of Utrecht.³

¹ Since "the Spirit breatheth where he will". St. Ambrose was only a layman, but became Bishop of Milan. Cf. MATHIEZ (93), who nevertheless did not find Durand de Maillane's proposals (95) "très-hardies".

² For what follows, cf. the article on the Jansenists during the French Revolution in the *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CXXIV., 124 seqq., KIEFER, 15 seq., and our account, Vol. XXXIX., 361. For Martineau's Jansenism, see above, p. 120, n. 3. For lack of evidence it is not possible to ascertain what part was played by the Freemasons in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy or in the French Revolution as a whole. On this point DUDON (*Études*, April 20, 1907, 263) and MATHIEZ (81) are in agreement.

³ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIX., 361 seq.

Among the members of the *Comité Ecclésiastique* the Paris advocate Martineau was swayed by Jansenist and Gallican ideas. His colleagues, too, imbued with the principles of the old Parlements, were amenable to Jansenistic views, for they fitted in not only with their whole course of education but also with the old traditions of their families, in which the memory of their fathers' battles against the Papal condemnation of Jansenism was still alive.¹

Now that the Church had been stripped of all its financial resources provision had to be made for the maintenance of the clergy. This was an opportunity to reshape the constitution of the Church under the guise of removing abuses. By means of the so-called "Civil Constitution of the Clergy" it, too, was to be made to conform to the completely new conditions.²

¹ KIEFER (15) points out that it was the Jansenists who were principally responsible for the elaboration of the Civil Constitution, and that it was they, and Camus in particular, who were its most ardent supporters. Kiefer also very aptly refers to the marked approval with which the work of the *Comité Ecclésiastique* was received in Jansenistic circles, even abroad, citing in evidence (16 *seqq.*) the correspondence of Bishop Ricci of Pistoia and Prato, whose Jansenistic and Gallican leanings were notorious. The following passage from a letter written to Ricci by Gianni on January 8, 1791, shows how these circles recognized their own system in the decrees of the Civil Constitution: "With these new reforms I should not be surprised if the whole of the Gallican Church went the way of the Jansenist Church of Utrecht. What a blow this would be for Babylon!" ("Babylon", of course, was Rome). KIEFER, 17; NICCOLÒ RODOLICO, *Gli amici e i tempi di Scipione dei Ricci*, 140.

² KIEFER (12 *seq.*), who rightly rejects the view taken by SCIOUT (*Histoire de la Constitution civile*, I., 31), that the authors of the Civil Constitution intended with their new law to create a deistic Church or a purely rationalistic religion. MATHIEZ goes to the other extreme in taking at their face value the pious phrases uttered by the speakers in the National Assembly and in believing that these "chrétiens sincères" were really concerned with the welfare of the Catholic Church. Even he, however, admits (78) that the authors of the Constitution had the intention "de libérer

This invasion of the purely ecclesiastical domain was to be undertaken in a completely arbitrary fashion and, above all, without reference to the Pope, who was to be excluded from any influence in France. The most that he would be allowed to do was to sanction the projected upheaval. After their liberation from the "yoke of Rome" the clergy were to be so completely subjugated to the civil power as to make Voltaire's ideal a reality: that France should be blessed with a clergy as submissive as that in Russia.¹ The Civil Constitution of the Clergy, the joint work of the Voltairians, the Jansenists, and the Gallican lawyers in the Parlement, was one gigantic swindle. Its very name was misleading; it was not a civil but an ecclesiastical code, that overturned the Church's constitution and invaded the domain of dogma.²

Rumours of what was afoot had already reached the public in March, 1790,³ but the situation was not entirely clear until April 21st, 1790, when Martineau, representing the *Comité Ecclésiastique*, laid before the National Assembly a scheme for the reordering of ecclesiastical conditions. The greater the necessity for the Catholic religion, it was stated in the preamble, the greater the need to ensure its purity. Experience had shown, it proceeded, that in general, and especially in regard to the Church, abuses began with divergence from the original foundation. To remove them, all that was necessary was to return to the state of things that preceded the divergence. "Must not the primitive discipline—the work of the Apostles,

l'Église de France de la sujétion romaine d'une part, nationaliser cette Église de l'autre". Similarly, FERN. MOURRET, *Histoire générale de l'Église*, Paris, 1913, 100.

¹ "Il n'y a que votre illustre souveraine qui ait raison; elle paie les prêtres; elle leur ouvre la bouche et la ferme: ils sont à ses ordres, et tout est tranquille" (Voltaire to Schuwalof, December 3, 1768; *Œuvres*, LX., 580). The whole passage is given an entirely different meaning in Beuchot's edition (*Œuvres*, 1833; LXV., 250).

² PISANI, I., 160 *seq.*, and especially 165.

³ For the counteraction taken by certain Bishops and its ill-success, *cf.* DE LA GORCE, I., 207 *seq.*, and MATHIEZ, 186 *seq.*

the fruit of the instructions they had received from the lips of their divine master—be most in conformity with the spirit of the Gospel, the one most favourable for the preservation and propagation of religion ? ” The *Comité Ecclésiastique* had accordingly taken as the basis of its proposals “ the maxims of the old discipline ”. To recover the simplicity of the early Church, the State, on its own authority, without consulting any other body, was to abolish the cathedral chapters, all other canonries, all abbeys, priories, and benefices. The 130 bishoprics were to be reduced to eighty-three, to correspond with the number of the newly-created *Départements*. Of the archbishops, who in future were to be called metropolitan bishops, only ten were to survive, and towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants were to have only one *curé*. It was also proposed to change all the parishes and fix new boundaries for them. An immeasurably more radical proposal was the appointment of the parish priest by the electors of each district, and of the Bishop by the electors of the *Département*. The only electoral qualification was attendance at a Mass ; whoever agreed to this could cast his vote, even though he be a Jew or a declared unbeliever. The *curé* was to obtain his canonical institution from his Bishop, the Bishop from his Metropolitan. The Bishops were expressly forbidden to seek the confirmation of their appointment from the “ Bishop of Rome ”, as the Pope was called for preference ; they might bring their election to his notice as the visible head of the universal Church “ solely in testimony of the unity of faith ”.¹ Another general regulation aimed at the Pope was that no French cleric might appeal to a foreign Metropolitan or his representative. Every act of episcopal jurisdiction was to have the assent of a council consisting of twelve or sixteen vicars. All clerics were classed as public officials and servants of the State, which fixed their

¹ In the text of the law the title “ Pope ” was substituted for that of “ Bishop of Rome ” (“ une appellation dégagée jusqu’à l’impertinence ” ; DE LA GORCE, I., 235), and at the request of the Abbé Grégoire the “ unité de foi et communion qui sera entretenue avec le chef de l’Église universelle ” was repeated not in one but in two articles.

salaries. The Bishop of Paris was granted an income of 50,000 *livres*, the other "Metropolitan Bishops" 20,000 *livres*; the rest of the hierarchy had to be satisfied with 12,000. Eight classes of salaries were fixed for the *curés* and other clerics; the *curés* of Paris were in the highest class, with 6,000 *livres*, the parishes with less than 1,000 souls in the lowest, with 1,200 *livres*. To gain the support of the country clergy, special advantages were promised them. The final item of the proposal was that the king be asked to take all the measures necessary to give force to the law.¹

The general debate on this motion in the National Assembly began on May 29th and was continued by a special debate on June 1st.

At first most of the French Bishops² had eagerly participated in the work of reordering the conditions of the country, and they had subsequently borne with dignity the loss of their exalted status and their goods. Now they had no choice but to resist the outrageous arrogance and arbitrariness of the

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 209-211. With reference to the interpretation of the final item, MADELIN (*Révolution*, 181) remarks: "Voilà, dit M. Mathiez, la pensée du Comité ecclésiastique et cela, paraît-il, autorisait une négociation du roi avec Rome. Mais d'une part l'Assemblée repoussa l'article et d'autre part, la formule était pour le moins obscure." In his work *France et Rome* (324 *seq.*) Madelin aptly comments on Mathiez's opinion as follows: "Camus fit repousser l'article et il est vraiment paradoxal d'admettre, comme la preuve d'un réel esprit de conciliation, la motion Gobel du 21 Juin qui, pour assurer la paix aux consciences timorées, indiquait très vaguement la possibilité de confier au Roi le soin de faire accepter la loi à Rome . . . Si l'Assemblée voulait entrer en pourparlers avec Rome, elle n'avait qu'à le dire. Il y a quelque ironie à dire que la Constituante se montrait conciliante parce que quelques-uns de ses membres n'eussent peut-être pas trouvé mauvais que 'l'évêque de Rome' saisi par le Roi, en vertu de sa 'primauté', accordât son consentement que d'ailleurs on tenait pour parfaitement inutile, sans délai d'ailleurs et sans réserve, à la loi qui bouleversait sans lui et contre lui toute une partie de l'Église romaine."

² MATHIEZ (114 *seqq.*) has listed the exceptions.

National Assembly, which laughed to scorn all their conceptions of right and law.¹ Their spokesman was Archbishop Boisgelin of Aix, the chairman of the episcopal committee in the National Assembly.² He opened the debates with a great speech delivered with his usual restraint and dignity.³

While agreeing that ecclesiastical conditions were in need of reform, he would not acknowledge the right of the Assembly to issue regulations in this connexion on its own account. The divine founder of the Church had committed the promulgation of His teaching to the Apostles alone, and they, to their successors, the Bishops. He had not entrusted it to officials or to kings, all of whom were subject to the Church. Bishops could be deposed only by those who had installed them; no one had the right to restrict the jurisdictional area of the Bishops, and in removing the present abuses they must adhere to the canonical prescriptions. For the Church's collaboration in the general reform of the constitution the Archbishop suggested certain ways and means: provincial synods could decide on separate decrees; more important matters must be referred without question to a national council or to the Pope. The penultimate course was most strongly recommended by the speaker as he appealed to the king and the nation to agree to his proposal.⁴

As expected, the reply to Boisgelin was made by the lawyer Treilhard. With his description of the abuses in the Church he sought to prove the necessity of the projected innovations, which, according to him, the assembly had the right to introduce. He represented the episcopal authority as universal, and not restricted to particular dioceses; the delimitation of the dioceses was the State's affair and always had been. Although this argument was not borne out by history, it was warmly applauded by the majority of the Assembly, as was also Treilhard's subsequent assertion: "If the demarcation

¹ KIEFER's opinion (p. 20).

² Cf. *ibid.*, 23.

³ For the Archbishop's character, cf. LAVAGNER, *Le cardinal de Boisgelin 1732-1804*, Paris, 1921, 2 vols.

⁴ KIEFER, 24 *seq.*

of the dioceses has nothing to do with faith and morals and is the business of the State, similarly the election of the Church's ministers has nothing to do with dogma and is the affair of the people." Treilhard then reminded the assembly that in 1764 the king had suppressed the Jesuits without the authorization of the Church. "Is not the nation to have the same right?" he demanded.

Camus, the spokesman for the Jansenists, made so bold as to say: "We are the national assembly and we possess the full power to change even religion. But we do not wish to do so. We want to keep the Catholic religion. We want Bishops and *curés*. But we want eighty-three *Départements* and only one Bishop for each. This is a matter for us laymen to decide." The efforts made by Camus and his friends by means of proposed amendments to obtain for the clergy the power to influence the election of the Bishops and *curés* were soon to be frustrated by Robespierre and Barnave. Nevertheless, there were some ambitious clerics who, while protesting their love of the Church, spoke in favour of the project, hoping that it would help them to rise to episcopal rank.¹ No fresh arguments were produced by these misguided men, but merely because they were clerics they exerted a considerable influence on the Assembly's decisions. The speech made by Robespierre, who at the time was busily active in the clubs, should have opened their eyes. This ardent admirer of Rousseau held that the proposals of the *Comité Ecclésiastique* were not sufficiently far-reaching—"philosophic" was the term he used—and he demanded in addition the abolition of the Archbishops and Cardinals. But when he began to recommend the abolition of celibacy the dissent was so vociferous that he was unable to proceed. At the opening of the special debate on June 1st Bishop Bonal of Clermont pointed out again the incompetence of the Assembly to decide on purely ecclesiastical questions, and he renewed the demand for the summoning of

¹ Among them, besides Gobel, who afterwards became Constitutional Bishop of Paris, were Gouttes, Massieu, Dumouchel, and Jallet; of these, only the last-named refused to become a schismatic Bishop. DE LA GORCE, I, 225 *seq.*

a national council. But the majority, misled by Camus's sophistries, rejected any agreement.¹

Acting in accordance with the declaration of the Bishop of Clermont, the Bishops refused to take any further part in the deliberations on a law which was so serious an incursion into the life of the Church. The defence was now left to a few *curés*, who tried in vain to blunt the sharpest edges of the new law.

On June 17th and 18th there were lively debates on the payment of the clergy.² The evening session on the 19th was remarkable for the appearance of Baron Anacharsis Clotz, an ardent advocate of the abolition of the monarchy and Christianity. He came attended by one or two Orientals and several Frenchmen; the latter, having procured the appropriate costumes from theatrical wardrobes, had attired themselves as Swedes, Spaniards, Moroccans, Greeks, Mongols, and Chinamen. This "Embassy of the Human Race", as it called itself, presented to the authors of the rights of man an address of homage. Its bombastic declamations against the "tyrants" were received with thunderous applause.³ The sequel to this prank was the abolition of the hereditary nobility, as being contrary to reason and true liberty. When this resolution was announced, amid the frantic plaudits of the democrats, there were only a few nobles present. The absence of the Bishops and other clerics from the sessions in which the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was discussed also had to be paid for dearly. There was no Catholic party among the lay members of the National Assembly; those who supported the Church were distributed among the various groups of the Right and Centre. The clergy was split into an upper and a lower class. There was no great personage capable of organizing and leading the divided forces in defence of the Church. The Bishops had formed themselves into a committee, but here, too, there was a palpable lack of any

¹ MOURRET, 106 *seq.*

² DE LA GORCE, I., 230 *seq.*

³ LE BLANC, *Histoire de la révolution française*, IV., Paris, 1881, ch. 15; SYBEL, I.⁴, 204.

dominant leader, and the want of courage and determination was disastrous. Neither the Archbishops of Aix and Arles, Boisgelin and Du Lau, nor Bishop Bonal of Clermont were capable of dealing with the difficult situation. The Gallican spirit, with which nearly all the French Bishops were imbued at this critical juncture, had a crippling effect and, what was of supreme importance, it precluded a resolute defence of the rights of the Holy See. Of the 208 *curés* in the National Assembly a number were loyal and were excellent speakers, but their relations with the episcopate were too distant. Even worse, a considerable proportion of the *curés* who were discontented with their lot showed that they were not averse to innovations. In consequence, there was no solid and tenacious resistance; the sallies made by individuals were ineffectual.¹ A comparison of the June debates with those of April shows a marked decrease in vigour. None of the many speeches were worthy of the momentous subject under discussion; most of them failed to rise above the level of mediocrity.² The discussions were repeatedly interrupted by the broaching of other matters, and the longer they were protracted the less interest was taken in them. The tedious disquisitions of the Jansenist Camus, who was consistently at pains to show that the proposed new law was in harmony with the New Testament and the earliest Church Councils, thoroughly bored the Left, but they relieved it of the necessity of launching more vigorous attacks. Nothing more was required of it than to await developments.³ The news of the religious conflicts that had

¹ DE LA GORCE (I., 216 *seqq.*, 218 *seq.*), who observes on p. 249: "On put détruire la primauté romaine en affectant de la respecter, sans qu'aucune voix maîtresse répêât le mot de Bossuet au siècle précédent: 'O Église romaine, que ma langue s'attache a mon palais, si jamais je t'oublie.'" Cf. MATHIEZ, *Révolution*, 150; Zelada's laments, *ibid.*, 199.

² JOLY, *Le schisme de l'Église de France pendant la Révolution*, in the *Revue d'hist. et de litt. relig.*, III. (1898), 165 *seqq.*

³ SYBEL, I.⁴, 194; *Rev. d'hist. de l'Église de France*, IV. (1913), 346. The importance of Camus's activity has already been brought out by THIERS in his *Histoire de la Révolution*, I., 229.

already broken out in the south, notably in Nîmes, were not taken as a warning, as they were thought to be connected with disturbances which had been engineered.¹ On July 12th, 1790, after the desires of certain cities which refused to surrender their claims to episcopal sees had been met, the proposed law was passed in its entirety.² On the 9th, to no purpose, Bishop Bonal of Clermont had made an exceptional appearance in the Assembly to warn it with all possible earnestness against the imprudent step it was about to take. He solemnly renewed the civic oath he had taken on February 4th, "to be faithful to the nation, the law, and the king, and to uphold the constitution," but he made it clear that this oath applied only to civil, political, and secular affairs, not to purely ecclesiastical ones. He omitted these expressly, "since, Gentlemen, while I remember what I owe to Cæsar, I have not forgotten what I owe to God."³

The object of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was to tear the Church in France away from the great unity of Catholicism, and by overthrowing its constitution so to reduce it to the status of a Government police institution as to cripple its entire effectiveness. The State erected and suppressed the dioceses; it decided who might be elected Bishop or parish priest, and authorized the communes to elect these functionaries as though the Church's right to do so had never existed. It regarded the Church's goods as its own, administered them as it liked, fixed the clergy's salaries as though they were its officials, and withheld payment if they did not submit to the new regulations regarding residence, which made it impossible for the Bishops to travel to Rome.⁴ The State had the right to reform religion, according to the

¹ SYBEL, *loc. cit.*, 192 *seq.*; DE LA GORCE, I., 232 *seq.*, 251 *seq.*, who gives a full description of the fighting in Nîmes.

² Some supplementary decrees were adopted on July 24 (DE LA GORCE, I., 253).

³ SICARD, *Évêques*, II., 308.

⁴ MÜNZENBERGER, 27. Cf. the arguments put forward by SCIOUT, *Constitution civile* (1887), 63 *seqq.*; DE LA GORCE, I., 255 *seqq.*; MADELIN, *Révolution*, 150.

Jansenist Camus ; the State, shouted the Voltairian Treillard, had the right to allow or prohibit a religion.¹ The State was everything, the Church nothing. For the Jansenists, the parliamentary lawyers, the Gallicans, and the Calvinists the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was an act of revenge on the Holy See ; for the Voltairians the decatholicization of France, which was Mirabeau's final objective, was only a stage on the way to complete dechristianization.²

¹ MADELIN (*Révolution*, 150) reminds us that even Napoleon did not make such claims as these.

² KIEFER, 21 ; MADELIN, *loc. cit.*, 146. MATHIEZ objects (on p. 7) to Sorel's description of the *Constitution civile* as "une Église d'État instituée par des incroyables". Sorel certainly goes too far, but CHAMPION (*La Séparation de l'Église et de l'État en 1794*, Paris, 1903) is equally at fault in endeavouring to persuade his readers that the great majority of the constituent national assembly, which passed the law, consisted of "catholiques sincères", who, far from wanting to attack religion, wanted to strengthen it by means of the new organization. Mathiez, who simply accepted at its face value the fine-sounding assurance of the authors and promoters of the Civil Constitution, was opposed by Wahl as soon as the Frenchman published his work in the *Révolution française*. WAHL rightly takes Mathiez to task for not having really studied the policy of the French Bishops or the German literature on the subject (*Hist. Zeitschrift*, IXC., 216) and, in spite of his prolixity, for not having digested or exhausted his material (*ibid.*, C, 450). Nevertheless, in the new edition of his essays which came out in 1911 Mathiez completely ignored the valuable work done by Kiefer (1903). He accepted Champion's view and defended it very vigorously. But as opposed to this it should be noted that although there were vague and short-sighted Catholics of the type of Dom Gerle (*cf. above*, p. 123), who allowed themselves to be deluded by the debate on the law, and although discontented members of the lower clergy voted for it (*cf. KIEFER*, 21 *seqq.*, and SICARD, I., 421), they were not the authors of the law nor its real promoters. These consisted of the Jansenists (whose share in the work is simply denied by Mathiez), the Parliamentary advocates, the Calvinists, and the philosophers. The "orthodoxy" of the philosophers had already been championed by Mathiez in his *Contributions à l'histoire de la*

Since hitherto the National Assembly had had everything its own way, no punitive measures against offenders had been included in the new law. The last paragraph in the original draft—that the king be asked to take such measures as were necessary for the execution of the law—had been struck out as being superfluous. Clearly the Assembly thought that the king and the nation would acquiesce in this new decree as they had done in previous resolutions; it was quite unconscious of committing one of its greatest blunders—if not the greatest and most disastrous—in making a law which was bound to be regarded by “millions of believing Catholics as an infamous attack on the sanctuary of their conscience”. It had been able to destroy the clergy as the First Estate of the feudal constitution without the opposition’s showing anything but the powerlessness of the conquered. But no sooner did it set its hand on the clergy as the repository of a faith rooted in

Révolution (Paris, 1910). Though they may not all have been “adversaires de l'idée religieuse”, their declaration of orthodoxy cannot be taken seriously. Mathiez himself feels this to be the case and consequently qualifies his judgment: “Si tous ne sont pas des croyants pratiquants, la plupart au moins sont des fidèles respectueux”—as “respectful”, no doubt, as the Baron de Menou, who afterwards went over to Islam. The rest of them have been accurately portrayed by DE LA GORCE: “Quelques-uns déplorait en secret les usurpations sur le domaine ecclésiastique, mais par mollesse de croyance ou crainte du ridicule, se garderaient bien de se compromettre pour des prêtres. Plusieurs étaient tellement pénétrés des scandales de l'ancien régime que, de confiance et sans examen, ils suivraient quiconque se proclamerait réformateur. D'autres enfin affichaient un grand respect pour Dieu, pour l'Évangile; quand ils avaient parlé de la sorte avec une piété voisine de l'édification, ils se ravisaient et prenaient grand soin qu'on séparât leur cause de celle des ‘fanatiques’. Qu'on les pressât un peu, et on reculait effrayé; car ces mêmes hommes englobaient sous le nom de ‘fanatisme’ presque tout ce que la tradition des peuples avait jusque-là proclamé sacré” (I., 216). PISANI's arguments (I., 138 *seqq.*) also run counter to Mathiez's. There is a very good article on the Constitution in the *Dict. de théol. cath.*, III., 1537 *seqq.*

the people than a fratricidal war broke out all over the kingdom. It was then discovered that as opposed to the enlightened orators of the clubs and the godless mob in the capital, half the country was occupied by a farming population that held fast to the church of its fathers with unshakable tenacity and a readiness to fight for it.¹

This attempt to found a schismatic national church not only drove believers into civil war but also inevitably changed the attitude of the king, who in spite of all the signs of danger, hoped, so limited was his intelligence, to be able to rule in partnership with an assembly² which was determined to rule alone. Two days after the passing of the resolution on the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, at the great festival of the federation held in the Champ-de-Mars to commemorate the

¹ SYBEL'S opinion (*loc. cit.*, 191 seq., 194; cf. also 128, 203, 205), which is corroborated by respected historians of the most diverse persuasions: SOREL (*L'Europe et la Révolution*, II.⁷, 115); HASE (*Rosenvorlesungen* [1880], 158 seqq.); RANKE (III., 145); BROSCHE (II., 176); DEBIDOUR (*L'Église et l'état de 1789 à 1870*, 68); ROBIDOU (*Hist. du clergé*, I. [1889], 415); EICHORN (*Gesch.*, III., 821); MOURRET (121); KIEFER (20); MADELIN (*Révolution*, 147); *id.* (*France et Rome*, 315); BLIARD (in *Études*, CLXX. [1922], 21 seq.). In more recent times the Civil Constitution has found very few defenders. The only German one is MAX LENZ, whose article in the periodical *Kosmopolis* (1896, 561 seqq.) has been so thoroughly refuted by KIEFER (17 seqq.) that nothing more need be said. Independently of Lenz, three Frenchmen have defended the Constitution. It is not surprising that GAZIER, the last of the Jansenists, should have upheld the work of his sect in his *Études sur l'hist. religieuse de la Révolution* (1887, 23 seqq.). CHAMPION (cf. above, p. 140) and MATHIEZ do so as supporters of the anti-clerical campaign in France opened in 1903 by the Left Republican party. Though they do not go so far as Lenz, their ignorance of the nature and constitution of the Catholic Church is equally complete.

² In SYBEL'S opinion (I.⁴, 240, 245) the changed attitude of the king, who was finally driven by the persecution of the Church to enter into a foreign alliance, was the worst injury suffered by the Revolution as the result of the Civil Constitution.

storming of the Bastille, Louis XVI., his hand stretched out towards the altar in the antique style on which Talleyrand had offered Mass, took a solemn oath to uphold the new constitution. The cheers with which he was greeted on this occasion made the weak-willed monarch more than ever disposed to maintain good relations with the National Assembly.¹ Was he to endanger them by opposing the new law? On the other hand, the voice of conscience told him that in sanctioning such a violation of the most sacred rights as was contained in the Civil Constitution he was breaking his royal word, by which he had pledged himself to protect the Catholic religion. Thus troubled in his conscience, the unhappy Louis turned to the two esteemed prelates who were members of his council. One of them, the Keeper of the Great Seal, Champion de Cicé, Archbishop of Bordeaux,² who had always occupied himself more with secular than with spiritual matters, thought it better to come to terms with the National Assembly than to provoke it with a veto. This opinion was supported by the other prelate, the worthy Archbishop of Vienne, Le Franc de Pompignan, who had once been a doughty opponent of Rousseauism³ but was now weakened by old age and disease and was appalled by the prospect of schism.⁴ Thus the plan was formed to promise to sanction the law but not to publish the fact until negotiations with the Holy See had been completed. This escape from the dilemma, which shifted the whole responsibility on to the Pope, was typical of the pusillanimous king and of his counsellors. They would gladly have resisted, but dared not. Instead, they deceived themselves with the hope of extricating themselves from an awkward situation by inducing the Holy See to give way.⁵ To

¹ DE LA GORCE (I., 284) has rightly drawn attention to this.

² Cf. Zelada's praise in his letter to the *chargé d'affaires* Pieracchi on March 10, 1790 (Nunziat. di Francia, 463, Papal Secret Archives).

³ CL. BOUVIER, *Lefranc de Pompignan*, Paris, 1903.

⁴ Cf. Pompignan's letter to Pius VI., of July 29, 1790, in THEINER, *Documents*, I., 283.

⁵ DE LA GORCE (I., 286) has written an excellent study of the course of action chosen by Louis XVI.

a superficial observer such a hope may not have seemed unjustified.

The events in France had not caused Pius VI. to abandon his customary benevolence. Like many of his contemporaries he failed at first to appreciate the full significance of the trend of affairs, which developed with extraordinary rapidity. As in his dealings with Catherine II., Joseph II., and Leopold of Tuscany, he decided at first to wait on events, in which attitude the great confidence he placed in Louis XVI.'s Catholicism played an important part. Although the prohibition issued by the National Assembly against the payment of dues to the Holy See¹ threatened the existence of the concordat, he did all in his power to avoid a rupture. He ordered prayers to be said for the intentions of the Church, and on September 13th, 1789, he sent a confidential letter to the king in which, with fatherly solicitude but in general terms, he exhorted him to protect the Church.² The king's reply, written in a very mournful tone, contained assurances of his steadfast devotion to the Church,³ but it could not satisfy the Pope, in view of the bad news that was coming from France. The revolutionary movement had penetrated even Avignon,⁴ and the National Assembly was preparing to seize the Church goods there.

¹ Cf. above, p. 133.

² MATHIEZ, *Rome et le clergé*, 38 seq.; here also are particulars about the settlement of the question of the annates.

³ Text of the letter in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, I., 234, where it is dated October 8. GENDRY (III., 111 seq.) reproduces it from the "Carte sciolte" of the Papal Secret Archives, with the date October 1. MASSON (*Bernis*, 465) saw a copy in the *Archives des affaires étrangères* which was dated October 20.

⁴ Cf. PASSERI'S *Mémoires sur la Révolution d'Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin*, Rome, 1793, which is valuable for the documents reproduced from the Papal Secret Archives, and MATHIEZ (53 seq.), who uses the documents in the *Archives des affaires étrangères* in Paris but ignores the information obtained from the Papal Secret Archives and published by GENDRY (II., 166 seq.) in 1907. Cf. also J. F. ANDRÉ, *Histoire de la Révolution avignon.*, 2 vols., Paris, 1844, and CLÉMENT SAINT-JUST, *Esquisse hist. de la*

Nevertheless, isolated as he was and unable to rely on any European power, the Pope found it imperative to hold his hand yet longer. This decision was supported by the French ambassador, Cardinal Bernis, who had received an official intimation from his crafty minister in Paris, De Montmorin, that the last word in the matter of the Church goods had not yet been spoken.¹ Moreover, the Pope was in no doubt about the piety of Louis XVI. and the ecclesiastical zeal of his Minister, the Archbishop Pompignan.

In these circumstances the greatest possible restraint was recommended also by the aged Cardinal Zelada, who had been Secretary of State since October, 1789, and who was genuinely well-disposed towards France. But at the beginning of March, 1790, news arrived in Rome of the action taken against the Orders. Surely a protest must be made now? Many of the Cardinals were in favour of it, also the first of the *émigrés*, many of whom had arrived in Rome during the winter.² Pius VI. had apparently made up his mind to appeal to France and the rest of Catholic Europe by means of a circular letter, when Cardinal Bernis intervened. In an audience lasting two hours he threw his rank, his age, and his experience into the balance. He described at length the excitement that prevailed in France and argued from this the necessity of avoiding precipitate measures. "I feel the weight of your arguments," replied the Pope in deep distress, "but I must uphold my honour and obey the voice of my conscience by protesting against the violation of the Church's laws and the rights of the Holy See." "In that case," pleaded Bernis, "I beg Your Holiness to speak only in general terms and to make no special reference to France. Our enemies want a rupture; therefore we must avoid it." The Pope, who had listened to Bernis with great attention and his customary benevolence, still took no

Révolution d'Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin et de leur réunion à la France, Paris, 1890.

¹ Cf. p. 146.

² MASSON, *Bernis*, 469 seq.; DE LA GORCE, I., 273 seq.; MATHIEZ, 142 seq.

decision. On dismissing Bernis, however, he assured him that his attitude would be based on his love for the king and his solicitude for France.¹

As the result of Bernis' urgent remonstrances it was decided not to issue a circular letter. Instead, at a secret consistory on March 29th, 1790, the Pope delivered an allocution to the Cardinals, denouncing in strong language all the transgressions hitherto committed by the National Assembly. This speech, however, was kept from the public.² Similarly, to Bernis' satisfaction, the permission to dispense from monastic vows, granted to the French Bishops on March 31st, 1790, at the request of Cardinal Rochefoucauld, contained only a message of consolation framed in general terms.³ Nevertheless, in spite of these successes, the Cardinal thought that the Pope's patience ought not to be tried by any more attacks on the Church. "I too," he wrote, "ought not to be expected to be more than human in matters affecting one's honour, conscience, and duty."⁴ His assertion that a public statement, even if carefully worded and of a general nature, would only make the situation worse, again succeeded in restraining the Pope from taking definite action.

Meanwhile the Foreign Minister, the Comte de Montmorin, a mystic filled with hatred of the Holy See, and probably a freemason,⁵ who had compared the Pope to the Sultan, wrapped himself in studied silence so far as Bernis and the nuncio Dugnani were concerned.⁶ Nevertheless, news of a highly disquieting nature made its way to Rome. In April the nuncio reported that a poisonous pamphlet against the Pope

¹ Cardinal Bernis' report to M. de Montmorin, dated Rome, March 16, 1790, in the *Archives des affaires étrangères* in Paris, used by MASSON (*loc. cit.*, 477) and DE LA GORCE (I., 275).

² Text of the allocution in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, I., 1-4. Cf. GUILLEAUME, I., 1 *seqq.*; MASSON, 478.

³ Text in THEINER, I., 4 *seq.*, and GUILLEAUME, I., 7 *seqq.*

⁴ DE LA GORCE, I., 277.

⁵ MATHIEZ, I 4 *seq.*, 19, 133.

⁶ DE LA GORCE, I., 277 *seqq.*

had been allowed to circulate.¹ Far more disturbing were the messages he sent about the regulations contained in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which, in the opinion of one who saw things as they were, evinced an unbelievable hostility towards the Holy See.²

Moved by ever greater anxiety, Pius VI. ordered public prayers to be said in Rome at Whitsun for the protection of the Church. When the French Government expressed its misgivings about the extension of these prayers to France the Pope could not refrain from remarking to Bernis: "God grant that His Most Christian Majesty is threatened by no worse danger than our prayers!" To avoid giving the enemies of the Holy See in the National Assembly any cause for complaint no reference to France was made in the announcement of the prayers, and they were confined to the city of Rome.³ But the restraint shown by the Holy See only seemed to make its enemies bolder. With extreme ruthlessness they continued in their discussions on the Civil Constitution of the Clergy to treat the Church as a civil institution which was simply subject to the ordering of the State and had only as much right as was vouchsafed to it by the National Assembly. By June there could be hardly any doubt that the new law would go through.

Cardinal Bernis learnt of all this only through the newspapers. Although these reports, he wrote to Paris in slight reproval of the Government, offered no guarantee of their authenticity, he would be guilty of a serious neglect of duty if he failed to point out the evil consequences of deciding such controversial and momentous matters in a precipitate and arbitrary fashion. An attempt was being made to bring about a complete revolution in the discipline and constitution of the Catholic Church, which had been laid down by the canons and

¹ Report of April 19, 1790 (*v.* GENDRY, II., 117). For the pamphlet, entitled "La Journée du Vatican ou le Mariage du Pape", *v.* MASSON, 479, n. 1. This trashy composition was performed at the Théâtre Louvois in September, 1793.

² Report of May 10, 1790 (GENDRY, II., 121).

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 279; MATHIEZ, 238.

the councils. The suppression of the present bishoprics and the erection of new ones, the election and canonical institution of the Bishops, were essentially ecclesiastical matters. In issuing regulations concerning them the National Assembly was exceeding its competence. But as it was not a sovereign body, its law was a dead letter so long as it was not sanctioned by the king. So all was not yet lost. Perhaps in the course of time an agreement could be reached, though it was certainly difficult to negotiate between two parties of which one refused to give way in any direction and the other was unable to waive rules and regulations that had been laid down dogmatically. However, as it was still in the king's power to prevent the threatened schism he must make use of his right. To sanction ordinances which were inherently schismatic would be a burden on His Most Christian Majesty's conscience.¹

Shortly after this warning of the French ambassador and Cardinal had been received in Paris three Briefs arrived there : one for the king, the other two for his counsellors, the Archbishops of Vienne and Bordeaux. All three missives were dated July 10th, 1790. In the Brief to the king the Pope openly expressed his solicitude about the course of events in France and touched finally on the insurrection of Avignon and the offer made by the revolutionaries there to attach themselves to France. But the main purport of the letter was ecclesiastical. Pius VI. made it clear that he was in no doubt about the king's devotion to the Roman Catholic Church, but as the Vicar of Christ and the guardian of the treasure of the faith he was obliged not so much to enlighten him on his duties to God and his peoples—for he held him incapable of acting against his conscience and of surrendering himself to the delusions of a false policy—as to declare to him with firmness and fatherly love that he would lead his whole nation into error and plunge his kingdom into schism, and possibly into a terrible war of religion, were he to confirm the National Assembly's decisions about the clergy. Hitherto he, the Pope, had scrupulously

¹ This important letter from Bernis to Montmorin, of June 30, 1790, was first published by MASSON (*loc. cit.*, 479).

avoided every kind of conflict by using only the innocent weapons of prayer, but if the danger to religion continued he would have to raise his voice as head of the Church without, however, ignoring the precepts of charity. His Majesty was not to believe that a political body could alter the teaching and general organization of the Church and order the election of Bishops and the suppression of episcopal sees—in other words, shatter and mutilate the whole structure of the Catholic Church, precisely as it pleased. The king could renounce the rights of his crown, but he certainly could not dispose of what belonged to the Church, of which he was the eldest son. In any case, before deciding on so weighty a matter Louis should consult the two Archbishops on his council and the rest of the episcopate.¹ It was, of course, at their suggestion that the plan had been formed to sanction the Civil Constitution but not to publish the fact until the negotiations with Rome had been completed. But this Papal Brief put an end to any hope of success by this method. Moreover, the two Archbishops were sternly admonished in the Briefs of July 10th to restrain the king from sanctioning the Civil Constitution, since this would mean his participation in a schism.²

By the time these Briefs arrived in Paris the decision had been taken. On July 22nd Louis XVI., accepting the opinion of all his counsellors tendered to him on the 20th, informed the National Assembly that he would sanction the Civil Constitution, but that he was withholding the publication of this decision in order to take the necessary measures for the execution of the new law.³ What he had in mind was the negotiations with Rome. But after the arrival of the Briefs of July 10th this way of escape seemed to be blocked. Nevertheless, the king, Cicé, and Pompignan went on hoping that they would be rescued from their predicament, or at least that

¹ THEINER, I., 5-7; GUILLEAUME, I., 10 *seqq.*

² THEINER, I., 7-10; GUILLEAUME, I., 14 *seqq.*, 18 *seqq.*

³ MATHIEZ (265 *seq.*), to whom is due the credit of having been the first to give a clear account of these events.

they would gain time by the Pope's provisional acceptance of the Civil Constitution or a large part of it, for after all, as the result of the revolution of Avignon, the Pope was dependent on the good graces of the French Government. In this opinion they were supported by Boisgelin and Bonal, who were also in favour of this expedient.¹ Bonal assured the nuncio Dugnani that this was the view not only of the Bishops in the National Assembly but also of their other colleagues. The nuncio thought this not improbable; he knew how widely Gallican ideas were spread among the French Bishops and he feared that if an understanding with Rome was not reached quickly a third of the French episcopate would conform to the regulations of the Civil Constitution.²

If Paris really did desire an understanding with the Holy See the worst possible method was chosen to arrive at this result. The fundamental error in the Civil Constitution was the completely arbitrary procedure of the National Assembly in interfering with what were pre-eminently ecclesiastical affairs. Adherence to this principle inevitably rendered negotiations for an agreement extremely difficult. The ill-advised king, writing from Saint-Cloud on July 28th, in reply to the Brief of the 10th, announced quite bluntly that in accordance with the public statement he had made to the National Assembly on the 22nd he would take steps to carry out the Civil Constitution. He was ready to receive the Pope's comments on this law with due respect, but he asked him to consider the condition of the French Church, since the chief object of religion now was the avoidance of a schism.³

The king thus placed the head of the Church in the dilemma of either bending beneath the Caudine Forks of the National

¹ *Ibid.*, 259 *seq.*

² Dugnani's report of July 14, 1790 (French translation in MATHIEZ, 261).

³ THEINER, I., 264 *seq.* No mention was made by Louis XVI. of the revolution in Avignon, to which reference had been made in the Brief of July 10. Moreover, a special memorandum on the subject, with a direct appeal to the king, had been handed in on July 20 (in PASSERI, II., App.).

Assembly or of provoking a schism.¹ To make this unreasonable request acceptable to the Pope, Cardinal Bernis was instructed on August 1st to point out that the danger of the situation demanded a rapid decision. Unlike the National Assembly, the king had not wanted to ignore the Pope or even to call a national council. In his piety and filial devotion he was appealing directly to the Holy Father. He did not conceal from himself the difficulties that stood in the way of the fulfilment of his wishes, consequently he did not request a final but only a provisional sanction of the most important regulations contained in the Civil Constitution, namely the new diocesan divisions, the suppression of the chapters, and the election of the Bishops by the people.

The instruction not only prescribed the substance of the reply that was to be made by the Pope but also demanded that it be made immediately, not to the Bishops but direct to the king. Finally the Cardinal was reminded of the necessity of a quick decision, which was all the more remarkable as the king had not hurried himself with his reply.²

The courier who left on August 1st with the instruction and the king's letter had been told to travel with all haste and to return without delay.³ This haste, which left the Pope hardly any time in which to consider so important a matter, was as unreasonable as the demands that were put to him. Cardinal Bernis, as ambassador, was saddled with the unpleasant task of representing a policy which demanded the impossible.⁴ He accordingly drafted another memorandum, which put the requests of his Government in a different light and made it possible, as he hoped, for the Pope to agree to them. The Cardinal knew only too well that if he presented himself to the Pope with the direct request for the recognition of the Civil

¹ MASSON, *Bernis*, 482.

² Bernis' instruction was first published by MASSON (264 *seq.*).

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 291 *seq.*

⁴ The policy of the French Government, says DE LA GORCE (I., 288), "prétendait bouleverser l'Église avec le consentement de l'Église elle-même."

Constitution he would only receive a complete refusal. Instead, therefore, of making so hopeless an attempt, which could only embitter the Pope, he shifted the basis of the negotiations by proposing a revision of the law, so as to make it acceptable.¹ His Holiness might agree to this, but whether the National Assembly would be willing to revise its law was quite another question. On August 13th the Cardinal had a long audience with Pius VI. Taking care not to present his Government's demands in the crude form in which they had been transmitted to him he spoke about a provisional arrangement and described the risks involved in delaying a decision. The Pope, who had known two days earlier that the king had decided to give his sanction, did not conceal his surprise and pain at this behaviour. "The sanction," he said, "deprives me of many expedients I might have used," but he refrained from using any harsh words about the unhappy monarch. At the same time he firmly refused to take any precipitate decision. Though he had little hope of coming to any agreement he expressed his willingness to call a Congregation of Cardinals without delay to consider the French demands.²

With this reply the courier set out on his return journey on August 18th. He took with him also a letter from the Pope to the king, informing him that a Congregation of Cardinals was being set up to consider Bernis' proposals and emphasizing once again quite definitely that a purely political assembly had no right to make laws on ecclesiastical matters.³

The authors of the Civil Constitution were burning with

¹ Bernis' memorandum in THEINER, I., 265-281, excellently summarized in KIEFER, 34 *seq.* Cf. also MATHIEZ, 283 *seqq.* Mathiez unjustly condemns Bernis' action and, in opposition to Masson, does his best to depreciate the Cardinal's worth on many other scores, though he admits that a final verdict is impossible so long as the Cardinal's private correspondence is withheld from the public.

² Bernis' report to Montmorin, of August 18, 1790 (*loc. cit.*), used by DE LA GORCE, I., 293 *seq.*

³ Text of the letter, written in French and dated August 17, 1790, in THEINER, I., 15 *seq.*

impatience to bring their work to completion, and regarded with annoyance the king's appeal to Rome. The real object of their law was to exclude the Supreme Pontiff from any influence in France. In the course of the discussions the Jansenist Camus had directly denied the Papal supremacy. "What is the Pope?" he had asked. "A Bishop, a servant of Christ like the others, whose powers are confined to the diocese of Rome. The time has come for the French Church, which has always jealously guarded its freedom, to be freed from this slavery." Lanjuinais and others also spoke of Pius VI. merely as Bishop of Rome.¹ With what anxiety then the authors of the Civil Constitution must have listened for news about the king's negotiations with the Pope! All who had hoped that the Pope would be induced to give his provisional approval of the law now at last began to grow impatient. On August 16th the deputy Bouche demanded the publication of the sanction, and on the following day the same demand was made by the *Comité Ecclésiastique*. The feeble Cicé asked for another week's grace. On the 20th Bouche declared in the National Assembly that this was too long. The nuncio, reporting on August 23rd on the agitation that was being worked up against the Holy See, wrote that a rumour was being spread that the Pope was urging the cabinets of Europe to send troops against France.² On the 24th, the feast of St. Louis, the period of grace expired. In offering his congratulations to the king on his name-day, Dupont, the president of the National Assembly, recalled the sainted king Louis, representing him as a Gallican and a steadfast opponent of the Roman Curia. Louis XVI. saw the point of the allusion and abandoned all resistance. Pompignan lay on a sick-bed from which he was not to rise again and took no part in the last act. Cicé, however, as Keeper of the Great Seal, had no scruples in setting his hand and his seal to the decree by which Louis XVI. gave his definite approval to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The king had not waited for the Pope's reply,

¹ MADELIN, *Révolution*, 147, 151.

² Dugnani's report of August 23, 1790 (*loc. cit.*).

which could not have arrived in Paris before August 26th.¹ One can understand how it took Louis twelve days to reply to the Pope's letter when it did come, and his embarrassment can be seen in his reply. He made no attempt to justify himself. Pleading the force of circumstances, he confined himself to notifying the Pope that he had published the Civil Constitution but that he had not yet brought it to the knowledge of the interested parties in due form.²

It is characteristic of Pius VI.'s gentleness and forbearance that in his reply of September 22nd, while deeply regretting the step taken by the king, he administered only the lightest of reproofs. He seems almost to be excusing himself in saying that evidently it was still not clear to His Majesty that the reformers were using his royal name to shield themselves while attaining their rash projects of revolution. The Pope would withhold the explicit and definitive condemnation of the Civil Constitution until the Congregation of Cardinals had met on September 24th and had once more given the matter their careful attention. The Pope then made the highly important announcement that he would exhort the French Bishops to turn in confidence to Rome for help. The king was asked to support this appeal, for this was the only way of finding ways and means of restoring ecclesiastical order; the imparting of provisional powers would cause the most grievous harm.³

These last words were a reference to the expedient suggested on behalf of the suffragan Bishops of his province by the Archbishop of Auch, De la Tour-du-Pin, on August 7th, that the Pope should provisionally agree to the Civil Constitution by dint of Papal dispensations and concessions or with certain alterations.⁴

¹ MASSON, *Bernis*, 486; SICARD, *Clergé*, II., 399 *seqq.*; MATHIEZ, 302, 306 *seq.* The journey from Rome to Paris still took 12-14 days.

² Louis XVI.'s letter of September 6, 1790 (*Arch. des affaires étrang.*), used by MASSON (485) and DE LA GORCE (I., 297), and reproduced by MATHIEZ (314 *seq.*).

³ THEINER, I., 18 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 284-296. Cf. SCIOUT, I., 280; KIEFER, 43 *seq.*

The Cardinals appointed to the Congregation took the same viewpoint as the Pope.¹ They assembled on September 24th and one can easily understand how their deliberations lasted till October 27th. Their decision was bound to be fraught with the gravest consequences. Now that the king had definitely sanctioned the Civil Constitution, only two courses seemed to be open to them: either to accept the law in its entirety or wholly to reject it. The former course, quite apart from the danger of other States introducing similar laws,² was impossible to reconcile with the Catholic religion. On the other hand, the total condemnation of the law was equally repugnant to them, in view of the incalculable consequences that would ensue.

The Pope, too, was still reluctant to use extreme measures. Though provoked by abusive writings that were being disseminated in Paris,³ he maintained complete composure and a conciliatory spirit. He was ready for any sacrifice that did not conflict with the unity and constitution of the Church. When he received Cardinal Bernis in audience on October 22nd he had on his desk in front of him the opinions of the Cardinals and several letters from the French Bishops, including one from Boisgelin, whose talent and prudence he highly esteemed. The Cardinals of the Congregation, said the Holy Father several times, were of the unanimous opinion that the Civil Constitution, in its present form, could not be approved without dealing the Church a mortal blow.⁴ Emphasis was

¹ MATHIEZ (324, n. 1) gives the names of the members of the Congregation as reported by Bernis on September 22, 1790.

² SOREL, *L'Europe et la Révol. franç.*, II. (1899), 124 seq.

³ MASSON, 479.

⁴ "Ceux-ci sont unanimes à juger qu'on ne peut, sans porter un coup mortel au catholicisme, approuver tels qu'ils sont les décrets sur le clergé." In his book *Rome et le clergé français*, which abounds in insinuations and suppositions, MATHIEZ (Professeur au lycée Voltaire, Président de la société des études robespierristes) is at pains to show that it was not the National Assembly, with the Civil Constitution, that made the fatal mistake that brought so much suffering on France, but Pius VI., through not accepting this law, and that the chief motive for his attitude was his anxiety

laid on the words, "in its present form," which were further explained by the statement: "It is easier to destroy than to restore, but for the latter We must be given time." Pius VI. couched his decision, which accorded with the Cardinals' opinion, in the following form: "It must be explained to the king in writing that many of the regulations of the Civil Constitution are of such a nature that We cannot approve of them without contravening Our most sacred duties. At the same time, however, We shall instruct the French Bishops to make Us proposals as to how the most objectionable directions of the new law may be brought into harmony with the principles of the Catholic and Gallican Church."¹

Pius VI., who had not been sufficiently informed either by Bernis or the nuncio Dugnani of the importance of the events in France,² wanted even at this stage to avoid a rupture and

about the revolution in Avignon (Mathiez, 62, 300). MOURRET (112) has very rightly protested against this imputation of a "calcul d'une égoïste et basse politique". In the *Annales révolutionnaires* of July–August, 1921, Mathiez proceeded to advance the view that with a little good-will Pius VI. could have accepted the Civil Constitution. But, as BLIARD has shown in *Études* (1922; CLXX, 13–28), this theory rests on a complete ignorance of the principles of the Catholic Church. Mathiez again betrays an entirely wrong conception of the facts and of Pius VI.'s standpoint when he asserts, with an allusion to Joseph II, "Ce qui était permis ou tolérable chez un souverain légitime, devenait un attentat sans excuse chez des sujets révoltés" (*Rome*, 79). In the same breath he observes quite rightly that the basic object of the Civil Constitution was "libérer l'Église de France de la sujétion romaine d'une part, nationaliser cette Église de l'autre" (p. 78; cf. above, p. 131, n. 2). It is almost ludicrous when, in the further course of his arguments, the apologist of Robespierre delivers to the Pope a solemn lecture on his pastoral duty (245, 298), which consisted simply in sanctioning such a law.

¹ Cardinal Bernis' report to Montmorin, of October 27, 1790 (*loc. cit.*), used by MASSON (486) and evidently also by DE LA GORCE (I., 300).

² As for Bernis, who was purposely kept in ignorance by his Government of what was happening (see above, p. 146), MOURRET

to come to an understanding, but the National Assembly, which considered itself to be the competent authority in all matters, ecclesiastical included, made this impossible by undertaking the execution of the law without reference to the Pope or the French episcopate.

The possibility of its meeting with energetic resistance seems at first hardly to have entered into the Assembly's calculations. It thought that there was nothing to fear from the peasants and the inhabitants of the smaller towns and not much from the *bourgeois*. Many of the educated had been infected with the spirit of the age and despised or hated the clergy. The full significance of the reforms, which left the religious services untouched, was realized at first by very few.¹

Of those who were favourably inclined towards the Church, including even the clergy, the majority had participated in the work of reform with such enthusiasm as to leave no room for restrictions or precautions. The lower clergy had given the

(115) says quite rightly that his diplomatic position did not allow him to tell the Pope everything. As for the supply of information by the nunciature, PISANI says (I., 167 *seq.*) that in the dispatches to the Secretary of State the facts were accurately reported, but that there was no appreciation of the forces at work. Dugnani's competence is also unfavourably judged by GENDRY (II., 119, 122), who says in the latter passage: "Les évêques, alarmés, à juste titre, de la situation présente se retournent vers le nonce, mais Dugnani n'ose assumer les graves responsabilités qu'on réclame de lui. Ce prélat est-il bien à la hauteur de sa lourde charge? . . . Toute sa politique semble consister à donner des informations à la secrétairerie d'État et à en attendre les ordres. Dans aucune circonstance urgente, il n'osera ni prendre une décision, ni même l'insinuer à sa cour." MATHIEZ thinks this judgment too severe (123), but he admits that the nuncio took too optimistic a view of the situation (197). MASSON says (432) that in the matter of the Civil Constitution the nuncio went as far as he possibly could to keep the peace. A conclusive judgment on Dugnani's performance of his duty can only be formed after the publication of the work which has been prepared by the Abbé Sevestre for the *Société d'histoire contemporaine*.

¹ SICARD, *Évêques*, II., 349 *seq.*

reform so warm a welcome that any opposition on their part was most improbable. Many of them had been actuated by material distress, and now at last they were assured of a decent existence. Any lasting resistance in this quarter, therefore, was almost out of the question, though there were individuals who were already beginning to see the truth.¹

Thus, all the hopes of the Church were centred on the Bishops. In Paris it was thought that since they had acquiesced in the loss of their privileges and their goods and had not put up an effective opposition when the matter was deliberated in the National Assembly, they would adapt themselves to the new order once it had become law. Expectations of this kind were not unjustified, since the Bishops' attitude towards the Civil Constitution had been neither uniform nor forceful. They had objected at the very beginning, but when their protest died away they had withdrawn themselves from the debates and had failed to make a determined stand. After the law had been accepted by the National Assembly and had been sanctioned by the king, many of them, including those who were most respected, indulged too long in vain hopes of its provisional approval by the Pope. Only a few of them made an immediate protest² or issued sharply-worded pastorals against the Civil Constitution; among the latter were the Archbishops of Vienne and Amiens.³

The Pope's long delay in reaching a decision was due not only to the fact that it was still possible to revise the law. If

¹ "Ils commencent à s'apercevoir qu'ils ont été dupes," wrote the Archbishop of Embrun to Bernis on October 30, 1790 (THEINER, I., 297 seq.).

² The Bishop of Laon, however, had protested against the Civil Constitution in a letter to the Pope of June 18, 1790; and the Bishop of Quimper did likewise on July 18 (TRESVAUX DU FRAVAL, *Histoire de la persécution révol. en Bretagne*, Saint-Brieuc, 1892, I., 97 seqq.). Cf. Dugnani's report of August 23, 1790 (*loc. cit.*).

³ For these pastoral letters, which were issued at the end of August, v. MATHIEZ, 318.

this hope failed and a condemnation became imperative, there was still another factor to be weighed: he was not by any means certain that the majority of the French Bishops would support him. The steady demand for a national council filled him with misgivings about the Gallican tendencies of the episcopate.

By rejecting this demand for a national council the National Assembly had played into the Pope's hands to some extent, for now there was no other authority to give a decision.¹ Basing its calculations on the accommodating attitude of so many of the Bishops, the Assembly was counting on the Pope's provisional approval of the law, and hoped that its attitude towards the revolution in Avignon would exert a decisive pressure on Rome.² But by the middle of September, when the Pope was still withholding his decision, the Government grew tired of waiting and ordered the law to be put into effect. Now, however, it encountered an opposition that was far more extensive than it had expected. In any case, the method of procedure it adopted was enough to provoke the most peaceable persons to resistance. The *Département* authorities were baldly instructed to call on the Bishops to accept a law that did away with all their rights. The chapters received notice that they had ceased to exist. By the end of September this had been done in Nantes and Nîmes, and by the beginning of October in Lyons, Bourges, and Digne.³ The chapters now followed the example of the Bishops in offering resistance; in many cases they yielded only to force. In many places, such as Mirepoix, Verdun, Soissons, and La Rochelle, their protests were quickly supported by the Bishops.⁴

The arrogance of the Assembly in proposing on its own authority to deprive time-honoured sees of their importance or to suppress them altogether, aroused bitter opposition on several occasions. The Bishop of Senes had already declared

¹ Even MATHIEZ (240) admits this.

² *Ibid.*, 226 *seq.*, 231 *seq.*, 234, 299 *seq.*, 317.

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 301.

⁴ See the instances quoted by MATHIEZ (327 *seq.*, 329 *seq.*).

on August 13th, 1790, that he did not propose to resign his lawful see.¹ On September 2nd, 1790, Archbishop Dillon of Narbonne wrote a firm letter to the king, complaining that an attempt was being made to reduce him to the rank of a suffragan. It was intended, he observed, to introduce into France Presbyterianism, the sect most hostile to the monarchy.² Under the terms of the Civil Constitution the diocese of St-Pol de Léon was suppressed; on receiving notice of this, addressed to himself as the "former" Bishop, the incumbent sent it back as "undeliverable".³ Although he was himself a member of the National Assembly, the Bishop of Beauvais, exercising his old right, filled a parochial vacancy in spite of the fact that the order had gone forth to give effect to the Civil Constitution.⁴ Had not death prevented him the universally respected Bishop of Quimper would have put his name to a solemn protest.⁵ In a pastoral letter to the diocese of Grasse the severance of communication with the Pope was condemned as schismatic.⁶ The Bishops of Strasbourg and Verdun claimed their privileges as Princes of the German Empire.⁷ The occupants of the sees of Lisieux and Nantes declared that they could take no part in the execution of the new law until the Pope had spoken.⁸ The clergy of Soissons were forbidden by their aged leader to participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the execution of the Civil Constitution. The Bishop also appealed to his colleagues, forty-five of whom expressed their agreement.⁹ But there were also those who in their weak-willed complaisance assisted in the execution of the measures stipulated by the Civil Constitution. Among

¹ BARRUEL, *Collection ecclésiast.*, I., 396 seq.

² THEINER, I., 296 seq.

³ BARRUEL, *loc. cit.*, I., 412 seq.

⁴ KIEFER, 53 seqq.

⁵ DE LA GORCE, I., 304 seq.

⁶ MATHIEZ, 335.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 334.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 330, 337 seq.; KIEFER, 54.

⁹ FLEURY, *Le clergé de l'Aisne pendant la Révolution*, Paris, 1853, 145 seq.

them were the Bishops of Tarbes, Vannes, and Perpignan.¹ Uniformity in the attitude of the hierarchy was first brought about by the statement issued on October 30th by the Bishops in the National Assembly, who, as the highest ecclesiastical representatives of the nation, were best qualified to take this step. This document, entitled *Exposition des Principes sur la Constitution Civile du Clergé*,² was drawn up by Boisgelin and was signed by all the Bishops in the National Assembly except Talleyrand and Gobel. It began with the statement that the National Assembly had issued the decrees on the Civil Constitution in the form of absolute laws of a sovereign power which considered itself to be completely independent of the authority of the Church, and consequently found it unnecessary to observe the canonical forms. In the face of this it was their duty to declare that any such procedure was contrary to all the principles of the Catholic Church. The regulations laid down in the new law were then subjected in turn to a searching but entirely unemotional examination, not by any means all of them being rejected. On the contrary, so conciliatory were the Bishops that they suggested certain alterations and concessions that really would bring the law into harmony with the precepts of the early Church—the object desired by the National Assembly. But for this, they held, co-operation between the spiritual and the lay authority was indispensable. This was why they had suggested the convocation of a national council and the suspension of the execution of the decrees in the various *Départements* until the Church had spoken through the voice of its visible head, or other means had been found of making good the disuse of the canonical forms. In conclusion they announced that they were still resolved to await the decision of the successor of St. Peter, the sole interpreter and mouthpiece of the whole Church.

Accordingly on November 9th this statement of the Bishops was sent through Boisgelin to Cardinal Bernis for trans-

¹ MATHIEZ, 335 *seqq.*

² BARRUEL, I., 151–283. For a summary of the contents and an appreciation of the manifesto, *v.* KIEFER, 44 *seq.*

mission to the Pope. Pius VI., it was said in the accompanying letter, had in his Brief to the king of September 22nd expressed the desire that the Bishops should state their attitude. This desire they were now fulfilling.¹ Boisgelin explained that he had drawn up the declaration on behalf of his colleagues in the National Assembly and that it was a literal exposition of their views. It was true, continued Boisgelin, that their proposals for a settlement were on many points largely in accord with the provisions of the Civil Constitution, but they were not entirely in agreement with them. As they were not in conflict with the principles of the Church, he hoped that they would meet with the Pope's approval. There were, he said, some grounds for this hope, as the Bishops were not simply repeating their request for the provisional acceptance of the decrees without any important alterations and restrictions, as in the proposals made in August; they were proposing really important alterations in the articles that were to be permanently accepted, especially those concerned with episcopal elections; moreover, even in these cases they left it to the Pope's judgment to grant only a provisional approval.²

This was the Bishops' last attempt at mediation between the Holy See and the National Assembly. It was to be frustrated, as Boisgelin had feared, through the definite refusal of the majority of the deputies to make any alteration in the Civil Constitution.

¹ THEINER, I., 298 *seqq.*

² KIEFER, 49 *seqq.*

CHAPTER V.

THE FATE OF THE NON-JURING CLERGY IN FRANCE—THE REIGN OF TERROR.

THE declaration made by the Bishops in the National Assembly on October 30th, 1790, was agreed to by all the other members of the hierarchy except three.¹ In order to ensure a united course of action the Bishop-deputies lost no time in sending to their colleagues twenty-eight articles, in which they recommended that for the time being they should confine themselves to passive resistance.² Many thought that the attitude of the hierarchy erred on the side of moderation.³ The majority in the National Assembly was proportionately inflexible; what it wanted was not a compromise but the complete submission of the Bishops and the Pope. In the hope of obtaining this it had delayed for a time the execution of the law and had thus afforded the episcopacy time to collect its forces.⁴ When it saw that its expectation was not to be fulfilled and that the passive resistance of the Bishops was everywhere in evidence⁵ the majority in the Assembly shut its eyes more tightly than

¹ The first, Loménie de Brienne, Cardinal Archbishop of Sens, whose mode of life was scandalous, put his dissentient opinion before the Pope on November 25, 1790 (THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 300-4). His intention was to confront the Holy See with an accomplished fact, as is admitted by his admirer MATHIEZ (355). The second was the thoroughly immoral Bishop Jarente of Orleans. The third, Savine of Viviers, is noted on p. 172, n. 2. The declaration was signed by ninety-eight clerical deputies.

² DE LA GORCE, I., 306 *seq.*; MATHIEZ, 345 *seq.*

³ MATHIEZ, 347.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 317. The first Constitutional Bishop to be elected was the Abbé Expilly of Quimper, on October 31, 1790.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 357 *seq.* How high hopes ran in Paris is seen from a letter from Montmorin to Bernis, of October 26, 1790, in which he says: "Le plus grand nombre des ecclésiastiques cédera sans murmurer," *ibid.*, 368.

ever to the mistake it had made in invading a domain in which the decision rested with a higher power. As before, it refused to treat with Rome, being loath, as Pétion put it, to expose itself to an ultramontane veto.¹ It was thus that it resolved to beat down the dutiful resistance of the clergy by brute force, to muzzle it, in Mirabeau's words.² On November 5th, 1790, his friend Duquesnoy angrily complained in the National Assembly that certain "functionaries" were still using the title of Archbishop, and he demanded that the *Comité Ecclésiastique* should report within a fortnight on the execution of the Civil Constitution. Lanjuinais replied that the committee was attending to the matter and that in Quimper on October 31st an episcopal election had already taken place in conformity with the regulations of the new law.³ This announcement, however, failed to satisfy the Left. On November 6th Merlin and Lavie demanded that forcible measures be taken against the "rebellious functionaries"; as disturbers of the peace they must forfeit their salaries. Demands of this kind were supported by the Jacobin newspapers; in one article it was suggested that if two or three of these gentlemen were summarily punished the others would submit. On November 22nd the *Département* authorities of Var ordained that within the next two weeks all priests must promise on oath to observe the Civil Constitution.⁴

¹ MADELIN, *France et Rome*, 327.

² "museler le clergé."

³ The Bishop of Quimper, Cotun de Saint-Luc, having died on September 30, the Abbé Expilly, deputy in the National Assembly and president of the *Comité ecclésiastique*, was elected Bishop by 400 electors, despite the protest of the cathedral chapter. Expilly accepted the election on November 5 "avec le respect qu'on doit à la voix du peuple" (TRESVAUX DU FRAVEL, *loc. cit.*, I., 140 *seq.*), but he tried, through the Government, to have it confirmed by Rome (*v.* MATHIEZ, 373 *seq.*). There being no hope of Expilly being consecrated by the Bishop of Rennes, the Government tried to solve the problem by issuing a special decree on November 15 (*ibid.*, 379 *seq.*).

⁴ DE LA GORCE, I., 320.

This was the course pursued by the majority in the National Assembly. On June 20th the patriots in Avignon declared for union with France, and on November 20th the Assembly decided to send troops there, ostensibly for the maintenance of order, in reality to exert pressure on the Pope.¹ At the evening session on November 26th the Jacobin Voidel made a speech in which sentiment alternated with sarcasm. He began by praising the primitive Church, then stigmatized the ecclesiastical abuses which had taken place in the old regal period and glorified the Civil Constitution, to the observance of which all clerics in the public service were to bind themselves by oath within a week. Whoever failed to take the oath was to be removed from his post, and if he persisted in performing clerical functions he was to be prosecuted as a disturber of the peace.

Speaking on behalf of the Right, Cazalès asked for the deferment of the motion, but the Calvinist Barnave insisted on an immediate discussion. So great was the excitement in the Assembly that Archbishop Bonal of Clermont, who again proposed the summoning of a national council, had difficulty in making himself heard. On the other hand the majority listened all the more readily to Mirabeau's violent attacks on the Bishops and the harsh language in which he condemned their appeal to the Pope. The fact was that the Left had no desire for any understanding with the Holy See, nor with the Bishops, but simply for submission to its decrees. Mirabeau, however, being at the time in the pay of the Court, was inveighing against the clergy in order to mislead the Left about the real purpose of his counter-proposal. In this, on some points, he was even more ruthless than Voidel, demanding

¹ The deputies of the Left and their newspapers not only described this resolution as the "prelude de la réunion", i.e. the annexation of Avignon, but imagined that it would force the Pope to submit to the Civil Constitution or, as Legendre, the deputy for Brest, put it, "que le Pape expédie une bulle propre à désarmer le fanatisme du ci-devant clergé" (i.e. the clergy that were true to Rome). See the periodical *La Révolution française*, XI., 48; MATHIEZ, 415 seq.

that "all Bishops who appealed to the Pope should incur suspension"; but as he omitted to mention any time-limit for the oath, his motion amounted to a postponement of the final decision. Voidel's and Mirabeau's vilifications were replied to on the same evening by the Abbé Montesquiou and on the following day by the Abbé Maury, who, amid the plaudits of the Right and the ridicule and laughter of the Left, laid great stress on the fact that in defending the rights of the Church the clergy was advancing the cause of freedom for all, whereas the majority was drifting towards Byzantinism: in Constantinople the Sultan was master of both bodies and souls, and just as in the past the Cæsars had made dogmas and laws, the National Assembly now wanted to be both king and Pope. Montesquiou and Maury both proposed that Voidel's motion be held over until the arrival of the Pope's decision, but the majority sided with the Jansenist Camus, who denied the Bishop of Rome any jurisdictional authority over the French Church. Camus succeeded in having Voidel's motion given priority over Mirabeau's. Before the votes were cast the Bishops and the deputies of the Right withdrew. Maury's warning against "making martyrs" was completely disregarded; Voidel's motion was passed unaltered.¹

The Voltairians were jubilant, for if the clergy took the oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution, they could only be doing so to save their incomes, and that would be the end of their prestige. If, on the other hand, they refused to swear, they would lose their power to function, and once again their influence would be gone.

Blinded with hatred and drunk with power the majority refused to realize that ultimately the new law was the denial of a principle that had been decreed by the National Assembly only a short while since, and had been ardently advocated by

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 320 *seq.*; MATHIEZ, 386 *seq.*; KIEFER, 55 *seq.*; MADELIN, 329 *seq.*, where Mirabeau's procedure is well explained. MICHELET'S assertion (*Hist. de la Révolution française*, II., 107) that the new oath did not apply to the Civil Constitution has been refuted by SYBEL (I.⁴, 245, n. 1).

the philosophers : the principle of religious toleration.¹ It also failed to foresee that the attempt to suppress by force the Catholic religion in France was bound to kindle the flames of civil war and drive the king into a foreign alliance.² Louis XVI. was again on the horns of a fearful dilemma : if he sanctioned the civil oath he was burdening his conscience with the persecution of the non-juring priests and was breaking with the Church ; if he made use of his right of veto, which was still left to him, he would have to face open rebellion and his deposition. In this terrible predicament he turned to Boisgelin, the author of the proposal for mediation published on October 30th. But after the resolution of the National Assembly, the Archbishop had lost all courage. In two memoranda of December 1st he represented to the king that Rome was harbouring a delusion if it thought that the clergy would offer a unanimous resistance ; the great majority of the 44,000 *curés* would give way to fear. Nor had Boisgelin any hope now of the people rising in defence of their religion ; in fact, he seemed to fear any such disturbance. The prelate being in this state of utter pessimism it is not surprising that the advice he offered to the king was that he should propose to the Pope that he should give his definite and no longer provisional approval to the majority of the articles in the Constitution.³

In a letter of December 3rd, composed for him by Boisgelin, the king implored the Pope, in the interests of religion and to avoid a schism, to give the speediest and the most favourable reply possible to these proposals.⁴

On December 3rd a special courier was dispatched with

¹ SOREL, II., 216.

² SYBEL'S opinion (*loc. cit.*, 245 *seq.*) was that : " The persecution of the Church by the National Assembly—and no historical event is more certain—drove Louis XVI. into a foreign alliance, as it drove the Vendée into civil war."

³ See Boisgelin's first memorandum in SICARD, *Évêques*, II., 298, n. 3, and the second, already utilized by DE LA GORCE (I., 321 *seq.*), in MATHIEZ, 425 *seq.*

⁴ MASSON, 489 ; MATHIEZ, 424 *seqq.*

these documents to Rome. A reply could not be expected back in Paris before the end of the month at the very earliest.

The National Assembly was greatly concerned to force the king to sanction the civil oath before the arrival of the Pope's reply¹ and thus to bring its work, as it thought, to a successful conclusion.

On December 14th Louis XVI. made a vain attempt to pacify the Assembly, which was still simmering with excitement, by assuring it of his adherence to the Constitution. The Jacobin Press replied with attacks on the king's entourage and even on the Assembly itself.² The latter, adopting the proposal of the Jansenist Camus on December 23rd, resolved to send the king a categorical demand for the immediate publication of the sanction. Louis asked for a little more time, as the Pope's reply had not yet arrived. When the king's answer was announced by the President at the evening session, Camus immediately rose to deny that the Pope had any right to influence the French Church. His proposal, that a second and final peremptory demand for the sanction be sent to the king, was adopted.³

Thus Louis XVI. was faced with only two alternatives: open resistance or complete submission. In his vain hope for peace and his fear for the safety of the queen, around whose apartments in the Tuileries a hostile mob was raging, the weak-willed monarch found in the counsels of Boisgelin and those of Saint-Priest and Duport-Dutertre an excuse for giving way again. On December 26th he capitulated to the pressure put upon him by the National Assembly.⁴ "I would rather be King of Metz than King of France in these conditions," he is said to have exclaimed, "but this, too, will soon come to

¹ KIEFER, 62; MATHIEZ, 451 *seq.*

² MATHIEZ, 454 *seq.* For an appraisal of Louis XVI.'s attitude, see MADELIN, *La Révolution*, 156.

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 341 *seq.*; MATHIEZ, 456 *seq.*

⁴ DE LA GORCE, I., 343 *seq.*; MATHIEZ, 459 *seq.* Boisgelin's advice amounted to this, that the king could sanction the law "à condition que cette acceptation parût être forcée".

an end.”¹ On the 26th he wrote to the King of Spain that he was only yielding to force and that he was asking for armed assistance to be sent to him with all haste.² The royal message announcing the sanctioning of the Civil Constitution was received by the Left wing of the National Assembly with a storm of applause that lasted ten minutes. Like everyone else who could not see very far ahead, it was now hoping for a final victory. To preclude the possibility of organized resistance, the oath was to be taken almost immediately. As a further precaution a beginning was to be made with the taking of the oath by the Bishops and clerics ; they were to do this publicly, in the presence of the Assembly, which represented the whole nation. The first to perform this act, on December 27th, 1790, was Grégoire, the parish priest of Emberménil, who tried to fortify those who were still hesitant and timorous by assuring them that with this new law the National Assembly had no intention of prejudicing the Church’s dogma or hierarchy or the Papal jurisdiction. After Grégoire had taken the oath sixty-two clerics, including fifty-one *curés*, followed suit. The majority was more elated still on January 2nd, 1791, when the oath was taken by two Bishops, Talleyrand and Gobel.³ Bishop Bonal of Clermont, on the other hand, declared that his conscience forbade him to do so. He wanted to propose a formula which excluded ecclesiastical affairs and could consequently be pronounced by all ecclesiastics. But this last attempt to go to the uttermost limit of conciliation was indignantly rejected by the majority. “We demand a straightforward, unconditional oath,” shouted Treilhard. Cazalès, in a very restrained speech

¹ *Souvenirs du Marquis de Bouillé*, I., 185.

² *La révolution française*, III., 567. SYBEL (*loc. cit.*, 249, n. 1) considers that the much-quoted letter from Louis XVI. to the King of Prussia, of December 3, 1790, asking him to summon a congress of all the Powers, for the purpose of intervening in France, was actually written in 1791.

³ Gobel, Bishop *in partibus* of Lydda, was the coadjutor of the Bishop of Bâle for the French part of the diocese.

made on January 3rd, warned the Assembly against precipitancy and asked that the matter be deferred until the Pope's reply had arrived,¹ but the Left, who rejected any compromise and were fearful lest the Civil Constitution be revised, insisted on hurrying. On the motion of the Calvinist Barnave, it was resolved that the oath must be taken before one o'clock on the following day. Barnave was a member of the *Club des Jacobins*, and this was now the master of France.²

Every means of intimidating the clergy was used in order to produce a favourable result on January 4th. Public opinion was worked upon by the written and spoken word. In pamphlets, news-sheets, and posters the non-jurors were represented as disturbers of the peace, and even as traitors. The men from the Clubs and other ruffians were sent on to the public platforms to intimidate the unwilling and to applaud the weak.

At the opening of the session Grégoire made another attempt to seduce his "reverend brethren the *curés* and his respected superiors the Bishops" by means of a sophistical explanation of the oath. Barnave insisted on action. "We have had enough of words," he shouted. "What we want is deeds!" Thereupon the president decided to make a beginning by calling on each individual by name, while the mob outside bawled out: "To the lamp-posts with the rebels! . . . With all who refuse to swear!" The Bishop of Agen, the first to be called, declared that he regretted that he could not take the oath. He was joined by a *curé* from his diocese, then by another, who said: "You say you want to restore the primitive Church. Good, I shall follow my Bishop, as Lawrence did!" When another *curé* began his reply with the words: "I am a child of the Catholic Church," the Assembly's patience was at an end. Alarmed by the entirely unexpected resistance and by the paucity of those who indicated their compliance, it decided to drop the procedure of naming members and to

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 351 *seqq.*

² Salamon's report to Zelada, of January 3, 1791, in the *Mélanges d'archéol.*, XVIII. (1898), 423.

attain its object by other means. The president now addressed a general summons to the clergy. At first only one *curé* responded, to be joined later by a few others ; the majority stood firm ; they had been shown the way of fidelity by the Bishop of Poitiers, who made a simple confession of faith : " I am seventy years old," he said, " and for thirty-five of them I have been a Bishop, doing as much good as was in my power. Bowed by the weight of years and toil, I shall not defame my old age by taking an oath against my conscience. I prefer to live in poverty and I shall bear my lot in the spirit of penance."

In the course of the session Cazalès had repeatedly demanded that the assurances that had been given again and again that there was no intention to invade the spiritual sphere should be definitely decreed and that the formula proposed by the Bishop of Clermont be adopted. But Cazalès' motion was not put to the vote. Maury was unable to get a hearing. By this time it was five o'clock. " For the last time," announced the president, " I call on those who wish to take the oath." No one came forward, notwithstanding the fact that Barnave's motion, which had been adopted as a resolution, meant that all recusants would be removed from office in accordance with the decree of November 27th.¹

Thus it was that January 4th, 1791, turned out to be a day of glory for the French clergy, the Bishops in particular.² Of the forty-four Bishops in the National Assembly, all but

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 357 *seqq.*

² MASSON, 491 : " Nul jour n'est plus mémorable pour le clergé de France, qui, individuellement, puis en masse, refusa d'apostasier. Nul jour n'est plus honorable pour la conscience humaine, car l'ignominie du parjure est partout semblable. L'un après l'autre, les grands et les petits, les évêques et les curés, les riches et les pauvres, les nobles et les manants vinrent confesser leur foi et réclamer leur Dieu. Point de transaction honteuse, point de basse compromission ! A ceux qui refusent, la misère, la persécution, l'exil, la guillotine ; ils le savent et ils refusent, et ils proclament leur refus en face de l'Assemblée irritée et des tribunes hurlantes. Cela fut grand ! "

two had stood fast. Of the other clerics, many of whom failed to perceive the underlying reason and the real nature of the Civil Constitution, 107 had taken the oath, but within the next few days twenty of these realized their rashness and retracted, so that finally barely a third of the clerics in the National Assembly submitted to the schismatic law.¹ In the *Départements*, too, the number of those who gave way was far less than had been prophesied by Boisgelin and other pessimists. Of the whole hierarchy the only members who joined the deputies Talleyrand and Gobel were the three who had refused to subscribe to the declaration of October 30th, 1790, namely Loménie de Brienne, Jarente, and Savine, and their personalities were such that the French Church was strengthened rather than weakened by their desertion.²

The town clergy, on the whole, acquitted itself nobly. Even in Paris, where it was subjected to the threats of the mob and an unbridled Press, the result was so unsatisfactory from the Government's point of view that it had to present a false account of it. All the same, of fifty *curés* twenty-three took the oath.³ In the other large towns, Orleans, Nantes, and Lyons excepted, the result was far more favourable to the Church.

In Strasbourg and in Bordeaux only three *curés* took the oath, in Rennes only two, in Nîmes and Arras only one; in Aix it was taken by only one vicar, in Montpellier by not a single *curé* or vicar.⁴ To the lower clergy in the rural districts the Revolution had brought high hopes; materially the new law could only be of benefit to them. But with all their

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 362.

² *Ibid.*, 387. To these three must be added two Bishops *in partibus*, Dubourg-Miroadot, Bishop of Babylon, and Martial de Brienne, coadjutor of his uncle in Sens. For Martial de Brienne and Jarente, see SCIOUT, 115 *seqq.*, for the extravagant Savine, see the account in GENDRY, II., 133 *seq.*; also, S. BRUGAL, *Le schisme constitutionnel dans l'Ardèche, La Font de Savine*, Toulouse, 1889.

³ PISANI, *L'Église de Paris*, I., 190 *seqq.*; DE LA GORCE, I., 363 *seqq.*

⁴ DE LA GORCE, I., 387 *seq.*

hostility to the old monarchic rule, most of them wanted to remain good Catholic priests. They tried to escape from the dilemma by making reservations in the taking of the oath. Many took it, but refused to enter into relations with the new Constitutional Bishops. Exact figures cannot be given because the statistics are untrustworthy and incomplete. It is certain, however, that those who took the oath within the first six months after the promulgation of the law were in the minority, which was further reduced very appreciably after Pius VI.'s final condemnation of the Civil Constitution.¹

The National Assembly's hope of subjugating the whole of the clergy by using every possible means of intimidation was frustrated by the majority's loyalty to the Church. In spite of this failure, which was felt very sorely, the Assembly set about founding, with a minority of the clerics, a new State Church, for which room was to be made by dismissing and persecuting the majority. The difficulties that hindered this undertaking from its inception were so great that the imposition of the oath was regretted.² But there was to be no retreat; the Assembly was too dazzled with success even to contemplate it. Mirabeau, however, saw the situation in its true light. "If the National Assembly," he declared, "imagines that the dismissal of 20,000 priests is an easy matter, it is taking a curious view of the situation."³ Not only the dismissal but

¹ PISANI, I., 184 *seq.*; DE LA GORCE, I., 372-399; MATHIEZ, 165 *seqq.* The information given by SAGNAC in the *Rev. d'hist. moderne* (VIII., 97 *seq.*), where a map is attached, is not entirely accurate. Among the parish priests who took the oath was the future Bishop of Aix-la-Chapelle, Berdolet, who was to suffer under Robespierre; see A. KROENER, *M. A. Berdolet, évêque constitutionnel du Haut-Rhin*, Rixheim, 1898.

² "L'embarras que donne à l'Assemblée le décret sur le serment des ecclésiastiques fonctionnaires publics est cependant très évident," wrote La Mank to Mercy-Argenteau as early as January 26, 1791. "On voudrait bien n'avoir pas ordonné ce serment, que ceux-là qui le prêtent, regardent comme inutile." *Correspondance de Mirabeau avec La Mank*, III., 25.

³ DE LA GORCE, I., 409.

also the replacement of the priests proved difficult, since in many *Départements* no priest could be found to serve the new Church¹; in many cases it was necessary to appoint fugitive and suspended priests from Germany and Holland. Further, the National Assembly found itself compelled to make alterations in the Civil Constitution in order to render it practicable. As in this respect it passed decrees in the manner of a Church Council, the chairman of the *Comité Ecclésiastique*, Treilhard, decreed a detailed instruction on the consecration and canonical institution of the new Constitutional Bishops, as though he were a Cardinal of a Roman Congregation.² Further difficulties were raised by those of the Constitutional Bishops who were conservative. Loménie de Brienne, Jarente, and Savine refused to perform the rite of consecration. The first to consent to do so was Talleyrand,³ and this was nothing but a mockery of the Assembly's professed aim of restoring the conditions of apostolic times. The ambitious Gobel, on taking possession of Notre-Dame on March 17th, 1791, four days after he had been elected by twenty-one priests and 664 laymen as successor to the *émigré* Archbishop of Paris, De Juigné, held a showy procession through the capital, accompanied by the band of

¹ MATHIEZ, 468.

² *Ibid.*, 470 *seq.*

³ The first episcopal consecration was imparted on February 24, 1791, by Talleyrand, under the protection of the National Guard and assisted by the Bishops *in partibus* Gobel and Miroadot. The recipients were the parish priests Expilly and Marolles, who were to be installed in the sees of Quimper and Soissons. The rite was performed in accordance with the *Pontificale Romanum*, except for the oath of loyalty to the Pope and the reading of the Papal Bulls (there being none to read). See [GOSSELIN], *Vie de M. Emery*, I., Paris, 1861, 255 *seq.* Cf. J. M. PILVEN, *Le premier évêque constitutionnel, Expilly, évêque de Finistère, 1790-1794*, Quimper, 1912. After committing this sacrilege, of which the nuncio Dugnani was supplied with a reliable account from an eye-witness, Talleyrand laid aside his ecclesiastical dress for good. In 1791 he resigned his see and lived henceforth as a layman. When the concordat was concluded he obtained a Brief of secularization from Pius VII.

the National Guard.¹ The assumption of office by the Constitutional Bishops was carried out in a similarly worldly manner in the provinces.² The moving spirit of the Constitutional Church was Grégoire, who was elected Bishop of Loir-et-Cher. Filled with Gallican prejudices against the Holy See, he was very active, but later even he was forced to protest against the anti-Christian tendencies of the Revolution.³ It was not long, too, before Gobel had to expiate his apostasy by a tragic death. These examples alone show that the Constitutional Bishops are not to be condemned wholesale as men devoid of faith and morals. There were some whose conduct was a public scandal, but they were in the minority; the others were either simply misguided or were enthusiastic adherents of the schismatic cause.⁴ The lawful Bishops denounced their constitutional successors as intruders, schismatics, and usurpers of episcopal jurisdiction, and declared all their official acts to be null and void, but in every case they were ejected from their sees, often by force.⁵ Though there were many places where the people submitted to the new regime, there were thousands of others where it offered resistance. This was particularly true of the strictly religious population in the whole of north-western France, in Flanders, and Alsace. Following the example of the king, the loyalists here refused to accept the sacraments from the priests who had taken the oath. And so the whole country was soon split into two hostile religious camps, consisting of the adherents of the "State" priests who had been sworn in (*assermentés*) and of the supporters of the non-jurors (*insermentés*), namely the loyal Catholics who clung fast to the lawful clergy.⁶

¹ PISANI, *Repert. biogr. de l'épiscopat constitutionnel*, Paris, 1906, 53 seq. Cf. PISANI, *loc. cit.*, I., 205 seq.; G. GAUTHEROT, *Gobel*, Paris, 1911.

² DE LA GORCE, I., 460 seq.

³ MOURRET, 141.

⁴ PISANI, I., 25, 70 seq., 377 seq.; MOURRET, 142 seq.

⁵ KIEFER, 74.

⁶ DE LA GORCE, I., 415 seq.; MOURRET, 144 seq. For Normandy

In view of the ecclesiastical confusion into which the National Assembly had thrown the whole of France, the Pope, too, broke his long silence at last. As in his dealings with Joseph II., Leopold of Tuscany, and Catherine II., the Pope, in this crisis, too, had shown his desire to avoid a rupture. Unfortunately, however, he had set his hopes too long on Louis XVI.'s resistance. He also feared that little attention would be paid to him by the many Bishops who were anxious for a settlement and by the clerics who were ignorant of the real situation.¹ The position he finally took up was based on very sound reasons : firstly, those of principle, then regard for the other Catholic States, which were to be given no opportunity of following the French example. A further consideration was the persistent adherence of the French Bishops to the Gallican liberties, which made it very dangerous to relax the connexion with Rome and to concede the French Church a special and unparalleled position.² It was these reasons, not the events in Avignon,³ which underlay the cautious and hesitant policy of Pius VI. Immediately after the arrival of the last far-reaching proposals sent to Rome on December 3rd, the Pope, citing the verdict of the Inquisition, had informed the ambassador, Bernis, that a definite approval of the most important clauses of the Civil Constitution could not be given.⁴ Equally clear language was used in the Papal communications made to a number of French Bishops.⁵ An additional reason

there is a full description (1,148 quarto pages) in E. SEVESTRE, *Les problèmes religieux de la Révolution et de l'Empire en Normandie. II. La constitution civile du clergé 1791-1795*. Paris, 1924.

¹ MOURRET, 124.

² This is very well brought out by KIEFER (77 seq.). Cf. BERGER, 30.

³ As MATHIEZ exerts himself to prove (478 seq.).

⁴ MASSON, *Bernis*, 490 ; MATHIEZ, 476.

⁵ Brief to the Bishop of Bâle concerning the erection of a new see for the *Département* of the Upper Rhine, of December 11, 1790, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 23 seq. ; Zelada's letter to the Bishop of Rennes, of December 15, 1790, in BOURGIN, *France et Rome*, 5 ; Brief to the Archbishop of Avignon, of December 22, 1790, *ibid.*

for postponing the reply to the declaration of October 30th made by the whole French episcopate was the presumption, based on its previous behaviour, that it would not come to any definite decision without the Papal assent¹; with all their Gallicanism, the Bishops were on the whole loyal to the Church. This favourable opinion of the Pope's was not belied: on January 4th not only the Bishops but also a large number of other clerics showed that they did not dare, without the Pope's assent, to swear allegiance to the Civil Constitution, with its deep encroachment on the discipline and constitution of the Church.

On the same day as this decisive event took place in France Pius VI., who hitherto had been alone in opposing the dangerous aspirations of the French Government, was assured by the Spanish ambassador, Azara, that he could rely on Spain's support.² This decided him to publish his condemnation of the Civil Constitution,³ but with his customary circumspection he took his time about it. While he was revising his reply to the French hierarchy⁴ he sent out some more letters to individual Bishops, exhorting them to stand firm against the new law.⁵ On February 23rd Loménie was threatened with the loss of his cardinalitial rank, failing the immediate retractation of his oath of allegiance to the Civil Constitution.⁶ After these incidents, no one of any foresight could have been surprised by the answer made, after careful

¹ KIEFER, 78.

² THEINER, I., 313 *seqq.*

³ Bernis' report of January 5, 1791, in MATHIEZ, 489.

⁴ Bernis' report of February 8, 1791, *ibid.*

⁵ Brief to the Vicar-General of Dol, of February 2, 1791, and another to the Bishop of Toulon, of February 9, 1791, in THEINER, I., 25 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 28 *seq.* Loménie informed the Pope of his resignation of the cardinalate in a letter of March 26, 1791, trying at the same time to conceal his real attitude in a cloak of sophistries (GUILLEAUME, I., 73 *seq.*). Pius VI. made his reply in a lengthy speech addressed to the Consistory of September 26. See THEINER, I., 105 *seq.*

consultation with the deputizing Cardinals, on March 10th, 1791, to Cardinal Rochefoucauld, Bishop Boisgelin, and the other signatories of the declaration of October 30th.

The Brief in question, betraying traces of repeated emendation, was unusually long.¹ It was, in fact, a treatise in which not merely the Civil Constitution but all the errors and encroachments of the National Assembly—"by which expression We mean in every case the dominant party only", care was taken to add—were subjected to severe criticism and a detailed rebuttal. It condemned the breach of the concordat, the seizure of the church goods and the suppression of the religious orders, also the definitions issued in connexion with the rights of man regarding the unlimited liberty of belief and the Press and human equality, for they contradicted the principles of the Church.² The liberty and equality so highly vaunted by the Assembly, said the Brief, were used as means of destroying the Catholic Church.

Before proceeding to elucidate in greater detail the Civil Constitution the Pope declared that a secular assembly had no right to make laws affecting spiritual matters. He went on to show that these laws dealt not merely with disciplinary regulations but with regulations that touched too nearly on unalterable dogma.³ In any case, ecclesiastical discipline was not to be altered arbitrarily by the secular power, since discipline and dogma were intimately related.

As for the various regulations laid down in the Civil Constitution, the Pope protested against them in the first place

¹ THEINER, I., 32-71.

² "Eo quippe concilio decernitur, in iure positum esse, ut homo in societate constitutus omnimoda gaudeat libertate, ut turbari scilicet circa religionem non debeat, in eiusque arbitrio sit de ipsius religionis argumento, quidquid velit, opinari, loqui, scribere, ac typis etiam evulgare. Quae sane monstra ab illa hominum inter se aequalitate, naturaeque libertate derivari ac emanare declaravit."

³ "Verum inter decreta ipsa non solum disciplinaria, sed et alia non pauca in eversionem puri immutabilisque dogmatis congeruntur, ut hactenus demonstravimus."

on the ground that they were aimed at the abolition of the primacy and jurisdiction of the Pope. As for the diocesan rearrangement, it was not just a question of a few sees being affected; it meant the overthrow of almost every see in the realm. Such a rearrangement could not be approved by the Pope without previous inquiry of the various Bishops and the parishes. The regulations regarding the election of Bishops not only amounted to a breach of the concordat but were a revival of the doctrines of Luther and Calvin. The episcopal council destroyed the Ordinary's power; the payment of the Bishops by the State was likely to undermine their authority. As for the reduction of the number of parishes, the Bishops had already said what was necessary in their declaration.

There followed an exposure of the hostile spirit shown by the National Assembly towards the Catholic Church. The latter had been despoiled of all its goods while the Protestants had been left with theirs, although their title was based on forcible appropriation, not on legitimate bequests. "With the National Assembly," the Brief continued, "the treaties made with the Protestants held good, but not the canonical regulations and the concordat made between Francis I. and the Holy See." Another manifestation of hostility towards the Catholic Church was the suppression of the chapters and, worst of all, the Orders. The decree of February 13th, 1790, prohibiting the taking of vows, not only condemned the religious houses to death but was also an attack on Papal rights. The savage persecution of the nuns recalled the exploits of Luther. The Pope marvelled at the steadfastness of these women and urged the Bishops to give them every support.

"To return to the subject of the Civil Constitution," the Brief continued, "much more might be said about this law, for from beginning to end it contains nothing that ought not to be censured, and all its regulations are so intertwined that hardly one could be approved of."¹ To a law of this kind,

¹ "Siquidem a principio usque ad illius exitum nihil fere in eo est, quod non sit cavendum, ac reprehendendum, omnesque eius sensus inter se adeo nexi, consentientesque sunt, ut vix ulla pars sit ab erroris suspicione libera."

which was based on the principles of notorious errors, the Bishop of Autun, according to the newspapers, had bound himself by oath, which action was condemned in the severest terms. The illicit oath demanded by the National Assembly was compared with those that had been demanded by Henry VI. and Henry VIII. of England. "Just as Henry VIII. pretended that the form of oath that he proposed for the Bishops amounted to nothing but civil and secular loyalty, whereas it really contained the destruction of Papal authority, similarly the assembly that dominates France has actually denied the supreme head of the Church all power through the Civil Constitution, seeing that it ordered the Bishops to have no communication with Us except to let Us know what had already been done and completed without Us."

The behaviour of the Bishop of Autun was then very effectively contrasted with that of the other Bishops. The latter received the praise they deserved; keeping the law of the Lord with unspotted souls, they were showing loyalty as strong as iron, retaining the dogmas and doctrine of their predecessors, adhering to the see of Peter, exercising and defending their rights, resisting the innovations while waiting for the Papal answer, which they would accept as the basis of their conduct. They all spoke with one voice, they all had one confession; there was only one faith, one tradition, and one discipline.¹ Bossuet, who enjoyed so great a reputation in France and was anything but suspect, had drawn a similar comparison between Thomas of Canterbury and Thomas Cranmer.

As the Bishop of Autun had not relented, despite his chapter's protest, the Pope threatened to excommunicate him and all who followed him in the way of perjury. Finally, he

¹ "Ibi quidem immaculate ambulantes in lege Domini, magnam praetulerunt animi constantiam in servando dogmate doctrinaque suorum praedecessorum, in inhaerendo primae Petri cathedrae, in suis exercendis tuendisque iuribus, in adversando novitatibus, in nostrum exspectando responsum, unde quid agendum sibi esset agnoscerent. Una eorum omnium vox fuit, una confessio, sicut una fides est unaque traditio et disciplina."

appealed to the loyal Bishops as his beloved and respected brethren. Although their previous conduct had shown that he had no need to urge them on, nevertheless, in view of the disastrous confusion of the times, he desired to warn them to preserve their unity so as to be able to defend as one body the Catholic religion against the snares and foolish enterprises of the new law-givers. "Be, therefore, of strong and unshakable courage, do not allow yourselves to be frightened by dangers or threats from the path on which you have set your feet, and be mindful of the fearless reply made by David to the giant, by the Maccabees to Antiochus, by Basil to Valens, by Hilary to Constantius, by Ivo of Chartres to King Philip." The Pope then recounted once again what he had done to avert the present disaster from the French Church, but his complaisance had been rewarded with ingratitude, one instance of which had been the support given to the revolution in Avignon. Hitherto he had refrained from excommunicating the authors of the Civil Constitution, making every effort by means of gentleness and patience to avoid a schism and to restore peace to France. For this reason he asked them to let him know what more they thought he ought to do to bring about unity of thought. They were in a better position to advise him on this point, as he was so far from the scene of action. But such proposals as they might make him were not to offend in the slightest degree against Catholic dogmas and the universal discipline. This last proviso shows that there was no question, as has often been supposed, of the Pope's inviting further proposals similar to those already made by the Bishops.¹ In any case, such a request was ruled out by the

¹ KIEFER (79 *seq.*) views the request as a clear indication that the Bishops' Gallican principles were being considered. But the whole passage is merely an expression of courtesy: if there was still any way of restoring unity without offending in the slightest degree against Catholic doctrine and discipline, they might bring it to his attention. Similarly, in the Brief of April 13, 1791: "Hortati sumus episcopos ut ii, quorum oculis res ipsae observantur, Nobis desuper agendi rationem quandam exhiberent, si inveniri

utter condemnation, both in the Brief and in the simultaneous letter to the king,¹ of the Civil Constitution, as being in conflict with the dogma and the constitution of the Church and as conducive to schism and the destruction of the Catholic religion.

In any case, suggestions for coming to terms were irreconcilable with the oath demanded by the National Assembly, which scouted any kind of agreement. Nevertheless, the Bishop-deputies still hoped against hope that a settlement would be reached; consequently the Papal Brief was most unwelcome to them, in spite of its high praises of the French clergy,² as its whole tenor ruled out any sort of compromise. Regarding themselves as representative of the whole of the French hierarchy, these Bishops, much to the dissatisfaction of that section of the clergy that held closely to its faith,³ refrained from publishing the Brief, whereby they were guided also by the Gallican principle that they were entitled

fortasse poterit, a catholico dogmate disciplinaque universali minime dissentaneam, in nostram deliberationem atque examen adducendam." THEINER, I., 80. It is clear that Pius VI. thought that no such solution was possible.

¹ In the Brief of March 10, 1791 (not cited by THEINER) it was stated that the Civil Constitution contained many false doctrines and introduced a new doctrine, a new hierarchy, and a new ecclesiastical discipline. Wherefore the king's over-hasty sanctioning of this law without waiting for the Pope's reply was sharply condemned. The only way the king could repair this serious blunder was to protect the loyal Bishops. A private letter, in French, dated March 11, 1791, from Pius VI. to Louis XVI., was attached to the Latin Brief, but it has not yet been located. MASSON, 494.

² That Pius VI. intended from the outset to treat the Bishop-deputies with kindness is shown by the highly complimentary expressions he used with regard to Boisgelin, the most influential of them, when writing to him through Zelada on December 21, 1790. See MATHIEZ, 477, n. 2, who notes correctly that GENDRY (II., 137) is wrong in attributing this letter to the year 1791.

³ RICHEMONT, *Correspondance*, 483.

to examine Papal documents before making them public.¹ This attitude of the Bishops suited the policy of the Government, which also kept the Brief a secret and was determined to make another attempt in Rome to induce the Pope to approve of the Civil Constitution. This task was entrusted to Count Philippe de Ségur, Cardinal Bernis having been recalled in March, 1791. On February 22nd the Cardinal had written a dignified and decisive letter, refusing to pledge himself unconditionally to the Constitution, it being his wish to live and die in the bosom of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church.² It appears from Ségur's instruction that the French Government hoped that Pius VI. would be impelled to give way by the threat to Avignon.³ But this hope proved to be valueless. On April 13th, without waiting for a reply from the French hierarchy, the Pope addressed a Brief to the whole of the French clergy and laity, repeating his absolute condemnation of the Constitution, as being built on a heretical foundation, and threatening with the direst penalties all clerics who complied with it. Whoever took the civil oath and did not retract it within forty days would be suspended. The elections of the Constitutional Bishops were declared to be null and void, their consecration and official acts illicit and sacrilegious; all who took part in them, and the parish priests installed by the Constitutional Bishops, likewise incurred suspension; if they remained obdurate, they would be excommunicated. The Pope concluded by urging the clergy most earnestly to resist schism with firmness and he exhorted all the Catholics of France to remain true to the religion of their forefathers, to pay no heed to the deadly doctrines of contemporary philosophers, to have no dealings with the intruders, no matter whether they called themselves archbishops, bishops, or parish

¹ KIEFER, 80. The Venetian ambassador in Paris also reported on the Bishops' Gallican convictions on March 28, 1790. See KOVALEWSKY, *I dispacci degli ambasciatori Veneti alla corte di Francia durante la Rivoluzione*, I., Torino, 1895, 238.

² MASSON, 494; MATHIEZ, 494.

³ MATHIEZ, 495 *seq.*

priests, to follow only their lawful pastors, and to remain in communion with the visible head of the Church.¹ Further Briefs condemning in similar terms the oath of loyalty to the Constitution were sent in the next few days to Cardinal Rohan of Strasbourg and the Archbishop of Avignon.²

After this decisive step the situation developed with great rapidity. On May 2nd, 1791, the nuncio transmitted the Brief of April 13th to the Foreign Minister Montmorin and informed him at the same time that the Pope could not recognize Ségur as the representative of France, since he had taken the civil oath unreservedly. Montmorin, on some pretext or other, refused to accept the Brief and retorted that if the Pope persisted in withholding his recognition of Ségur the King of France would be forced, in defence of the nation's honour and his own, to break off diplomatic relations with the Holy See and to withdraw his toleration of the latter's representative in Paris.³

After the arrival of the second Brief the Bishop-deputies could no longer keep the first a secret and had to frame a reply to it. In a document dated May 3rd they tried in every possible way to defend their political as well as their ecclesiastical conduct in the National Assembly and their proposals for a settlement. In so doing they again revealed quite unmistakably their haziness on fundamental questions raised by the principles of unlimited liberty and equality that had been proclaimed in France, also their Gallican convictions. Their

¹ THEINER, I., 75-88. *Ibid.*, 90, the accompanying Brief to Louis XVI. and (91) the Brief to Cardinal Rochefoucauld and the rest of the hierarchy. Cf. *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 3, 2325 seq.

² THEINER, I., 94 seq.

³ MASSON, 508; MATHIEZ, 511. In the Brief sent by Pius VI. to Louis XVI. on April 13, 1791, on the subject of Bernis' recall, he made it clear that he would have to reject anyone who had sworn loyalty to the Civil Constitution (THEINER, I., 89); *ibid.*, 345 seq., the official memorandum on the reasons for Ségur's rejection. On May 14, 1791, the Governor of Civitavecchia received orders to restrain Ségur from travelling to Rome. See BOURGIN, *La France et Rome*, IV., 75. Cf. GENDRY, II., 155 seq.

response to the Pope's request for a last attempt to pacify men's minds was an offer to resign *en bloc* if this step would avert a schism and restore peace.¹

The Gallican spirit of the Bishop-deputies was also shown in the objections they raised (much to the regret of Zelada, the Cardinal Secretary of State, and of the Pope himself)² to that passage in the Brief of April 13th, 1791, which dealt with the penalties to be imposed on apostate Bishops. As opposed to this they put forward the Gallican standpoint that no Frenchman might be judged in Rome without a previous trial, which was to be held in France by French commissaries delegated by the Pope. Consequently, they would only accept the Brief if a proviso was added.³ A large part of the rest of the episcopate, however, which did not belong to the National Assembly, was for accepting the Brief as it stood.⁴ This proposal was so objectionable to the Jacobins that they put into circulation a spurious document purporting to ratify the Civil Constitution.⁵ The trick failed, however, for those who were true to the Church distributed the genuine Brief, and this made such an impression that everywhere recantations were made by clerics who had taken the oath from fear or through ignorance.⁶ This development was so unwelcome to the National Assembly that on June 17th, 1791, it prohibited, on pain of the heaviest penalties, the publication of any Papal edict that had not been previously examined and confirmed by the Assembly and published by the king.⁷ Previous to this

¹ *Macédoine littéraire*, III., 95-158. Cf. KIEFER, 81 seq.

² Zelada's letter to Salamon, of November 2, 1791, in RICHEMONT, *Correspondance secrète de l'abbé Salamon avec le card. Zelada*, Paris, 1898, 91.

³ *Ibid.*, 81 seq.; KIEFER, 84 seq.

⁴ KIEFER, 86, where it is noted that Salamon and Bonnard overestimated the number of these Bishops.

⁵ GENDRY, II., 159.

⁶ Mgr. de Cressac's report to Zelada, dated Paris, June 7, 1791, in THEINER, I., 327; *ibid.*, the letter from Bishop Grimaldi of Noyon, May 30, 1791.

⁷ PRESSENSÉ, *L'Église et la Révolut. franç.*, Paris, 1889, 201.

the Paris patriots had utilized a fine May day to ridicule the Pope outrageously, the police making no attempt to intervene. An effigy was made of Pius VI., holding in one hand the Brief against the Civil Constitution, in the other a dagger. A band round the forehead bore the label "Fanaticism", and on another round the breast was written "Civil War". This caricature was burned, amid the plaudits of the mob, in the Passage Radziwill.¹ The nuncio Dugnani, who for a long time past had had to look on helplessly while the rights of the Holy See and the Church were constantly attacked, made repeated requests that this insult to his sovereign should be redressed. His efforts, however, were of no avail, and when the head of a policeman, which had been hacked off his body, was thrown into his carriage as he was driving through the streets of Paris, he left the capital on May 31st, after making another vain attempt to obtain satisfaction by appealing to international law.² The auditor Giulio Quarantotti remained behind in the nunciature and endeavoured to maintain diplomatic relations more by following his own ideas than the instructions of the Secretary of State, Zelada, who had to give him the order twice before he finally asked for his passports on August 2nd. The Foreign Minister, Montmorin, protested against this step,³ but without any justification, since he himself had stated that the Pope would not be allowed to retain a representative in Paris if Ségur was not recognized in Rome.⁴

Pius VI. could hardly be blamed for refusing to retain in Paris an official representative who had to witness the daily

¹ MASSON, 509. Cf. the contemporary engraving entitled "Manichino di Pio VI. bruciato al palazzo reale di Parigi 4 Maggio 1791".

² The last *dispatch was dated May 30, 1791 (Nunziat. di Francia, 575, Papal Secret Archives), not May 16, as given by GENDRY (II., 160) and DE LA GORCE (I., 437). Cf. BRIDIER, *Salamon*, 3 (English translation, London, 1911), where the departure is made to occur quite wrongly at the end of 1790, and *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CXXIII. (1899), 788 seqq., 853 seqq.

³ RICHEMONT, *loc. cit.*, 181.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 184.

insults offered to the Holy See and the Church. Nevertheless, it was highly important and necessary for the Curia to have in Paris a confidential agent who could be relied upon to render an account of what was happening and to transmit Papal instructions to the French episcopate and clergy. Fortunately, Pius VI. had such a person at his disposal : the Abbé Salamon. Salamon was a native of Carpentras, in the Comtat Venaissin, and was thus a Papal subject by birth. Since 1784 he had been a councillor in the Paris Parlement, and after the suspension of the parlements he became a member of the *Chambre des Vacances*. He had been in correspondence with Cardinal Zelada since 1786.¹ On May 25th, 1791, the Cardinal had written to him : " You see that very soon we shall have no accredited agent there,² in which case you will be more and more useful and necessary to us. The Pope is convinced that in such an eventuality you will not fail to redouble your zeal and your activity, so as to keep us exactly informed of what is happening from day to day and to give us accurate and precise information on everything which might be of value to us and which we ought to know, so that we may see clearly what steps to take in these unhappy times. It is at the express command of His Holiness that I am communicating his desires to you. I am thoroughly convinced that this will suffice for you to justify his confidence in full."³ Salamon's memoirs show that Pius VI. wrote him a letter in his own hand, six pages long, in which he praised him in glowing terms for the services he had rendered hitherto, and imparted to him instructions for the immediate future.⁴ Quarantotti received with his letter of recall the order to hand over to Salamon the documents belonging to the nunciature which he was not taking away with him. Salamon was asked to send to Rome all the newspapers,

¹ BRIDIER, *loc. cit.*, xiv, 325 *seq.* ; RICHEMONT, *loc. cit.*, xv ; GENDRY, II., 102 *seq.*

² "Aucune personne avouée."

³ RICHEMONT, xvi.

⁴ BRIDIER, 4. Richeumont (xvi, n. 2) was unable to find the letter.

brochures, and periodicals which had hitherto been sent by the nunciature.¹

After these preparations had been made Salamon was able to take over his post as private agent of the Holy See on Quarantotti's departure.² His desire was that at least the French Bishops should be informed of his confidential position *vis à vis* the Holy See, as then they would give more consideration to his representations. Zelada, however, would not fall in with this view. He thought it better that Salamon's real position should not be known, or at any rate that those concerned should appear not to know it. Salamon could then act quite freely and could communicate his views to the Pope without being influenced in any direction.

From now on Salamon sent a full report every week to the Papal Secretary of State, always enclosing everything in the way of periodicals, brochures, and even caricatures, which might be of special interest to the Curia.

It can easily be understood how useful it was for the Holy See to have a reliable and devoted reporter in France, where the Church's situation grew more critical every day. Salamon's zeal was so great that from time to time he had to be restrained by the more level-headed Secretary of State and the Pope. This was shown in the question of taking steps against the Constitutional intruders. The Brief of April 13th, 1791, had threatened them with excommunication, and this extreme measure was demanded in various quarters.³ Salamon was all

¹ RICHEMONT, xvii.

² RICHEMONT (*ibid.*) thinks that the nearest description of Salamon's peculiar position is "chargé des affaires" (as Salamon describes himself in one of his letters), presumably as distinct from "chargé d'affaires", an official position which was not held by Salamon. BELLESHEIM (*Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CXXI. [1817]; 801) describes him more accurately as "private chargé d'affaires of the Holy See", but this, too, would indicate an official position. For this reason I suggest "private agent". Bridier is certainly wrong in using the title "Internonce" in his edition of Salamon's *Mémoires*.

³ The " *Lettere dell' ab. Salamon " to Zelada, from August 29,

in favour of it, whereas Boisgelin deemed it premature and dangerous. Most of the Bishops sided with the Archbishop of Aix. On November 2nd, 1791, Zelada wrote to Salamon that the Pope was also of their opinion, as otherwise the king would have to be included in the ban, since he had sanctioned the fatal Constitution. On November 16th he repeated this statement of opinion, stressing once again that in such cases the Holy Father weighed the pros and cons with the greatest care before fulfilling his duty.¹

The little freedom still left to the loyal Catholics was almost everywhere disputed by the clubs and the Constitutional clergy.² Although the National Assembly had decided that the non-juring clergy could not be forbidden to celebrate Mass in the parish churches³ the mob in Paris tried to stop this happening on Ascension Day, 1791. Similar incidents occurred in nearly all the provinces. The Constitutional clergy, whose services were shunned by the people, who flocked to those held by the loyal priests, were successful in obtaining the

1791, to May 21, 1792, and *Zelada's instructions from January 5, 1791, to June 5, 1793, have been preserved in the Papal Secret Archives. See RICHEMONT, *loc. cit.*, supplemented in the *Mélanges d'archéol.*, XVIII. (1898), 420 *seqq.*

¹ RICHEMONT, *loc. cit.*, 91, 129; *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CXXIII. (1899), 859; the faculties granted to the French Bishops on May 4, 1791, in THEINER, I., 97 *seq.*; *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 1, 2341.

² RICHEMONT, 81, 96, 128 *seq.* In the summer of 1791 the Bishop of Langres, De la Luzerne, made a proposal regarding the measures to be taken by non-juring clerics when conducting baptisms, weddings, and funerals, but it failed to meet with universal acceptance and was allowed to drop. See RICHEMONT, 81 *seq.*, 91, 483; KIEFER, 86 *seq.* Finally Pius VI. issued an instruction on the matter to the French Bishops on September 28, 1791, but as it was opposed at first by the Bishop-deputies it was not published till the beginning of December. See KIEFER, 91; GENDRY, II., 162 *seq.*

³ Law of May 7, 1791, which also allowed loyal Catholics to hire churches, with the threat, however, that if attacks were made on the Civil Constitution they would be closed immediately. DE LA GORCE, I., 432 *seq.*; SCIOUT, 167 *seq.*

support of the clubs. Together with them they made common cause against the non-juring priests, whose position grew more and more untenable.¹

The direction in which the situation was developing was shown by the transference on July 11th, 1791, with much pomp, of Voltaire's body to the church of Ste-Geneviève, which had been converted into a heathen Pantheon. The majority in the National Assembly had given its permission with enthusiasm for the apotheosis of a man who had staked his talent and his honour on the destruction of Christianity.² One of the last resolutions taken by the Assembly, on September 14th, 1791, had been to approve of the union of Avignon and the Venaissin with the French realm.³ As soon as Pius VI. received news of the rape of this possession, which had lawfully belonged to the Holy See for five centuries, he raised a solemn protest and communicated it to the ambassadors of all the Powers.⁴ The bandits who, dubbing themselves patriots, had taken possession of the Papal palace at Avignon, murdered sixty-one persons there on October 16th and stowed their corpses away in one of the palace dungeons, known as the ice-cellar. It is significant that these murderers were supported on every side by the French democrats: the bandits of Avignon were as useful to them in the revolution as the Parisian pikes and National Guards.⁵

¹ DE LA GORCE, I., 438, 457 *seq.*, 467 *seq.*, 483 *seq.*; SCIOUT 183 *seq.*

² Cf. W. KREITEN, *Voltaire*, Freiburg, 1878, 378.

³ The Abbé Salamon had made heroic efforts to nullify the resolution, even calling on Barnave (RICHEMONT, 39). He received instructions to present to the king and queen of France the protest which had been addressed to all the European powers on October 26, 1791. RICHEMONT, 78; *ibid.*, 151 and 160, the carrying out of this instruction.

⁴ GENDRY, II., 177 *seq.*

⁵ SYBEL's opinion (I.⁴, 353). In March, 1792, the National Assembly decided to grant an amnesty for all crimes committed in Avignon and the Venaissin before November 8, 1791. For the vandalism at Avignon see A. HALLAYS, *Avignon*, Paris, 1909, 99

The situation of the Catholics took another turn for the worse on October 1st, 1791, when the Constituent Assembly was followed by the Legislative Assembly. Most of the 750 members were not more than thirty years of age and were so impecunious as to give rise to the joke among the Parisians that their total baggage consisted of no more than an umbrella and a pair of galoshes. But the gentlemen made up for this by their loquacity. The fate of France was to be decided by 450 advocates and twenty-six State clerics, ten of whom had been rewarded with bishoprics. This majority, in which blood-thirsty Jacobins such as Robespierre, Danton, and Marat were prominent, were for a republic and the growth of free thought. The last rights that still remained to the Catholics were now taken away from them. Already on October 7th, 1791, a deputy was complaining about the non-juring priests, who were drawing large congregations, while the Constitutional ones were avoided or even assaulted. Two days later the Assembly was presented with a report by Gensonné on the opposition that was being offered to the Constitutional priests by the loyally Catholic population in the Vendée. So bitter was it, it was stated, that it was to be feared that if the two Churches were allowed to exist together it would come to a civil war.¹

The National Assembly began its deliberations on the matter on October 21st, 1791. So great was its perplexity and confusion that no fewer than twenty-one different motions were put forward. Only a few drew attention to the mistake made by the Assembly in imposing the oath on the priests. Erastian ideas had taken so firm a hold of the Assembly that it occurred to only a few isolated members that the confusion and the threat of civil war might be dispelled by putting into practice the principle of the Constitution which promised freedom of religious worship. The deputy Lejosne roundly

seq.; STEINMANN, *Die Zerstörung der Grabdenkmäler der Päpste in Avignon*, in the *Monatsheften für Kunstwiss.*, XI. (1918). Cf. DUHAMEL, *Documents sur la réunion d'Avignon et du Vénéaisin à la France*, Paris, 1891-3.

¹ DE LA GORCE, II., 9 *seqq.*

accused the loyal priests of being either charlatans or fanatics and disturbers of the peace. The most extravagant language was used by Fauchet, the Constitutional Bishop of Calvados, who went so far as to say that, compared with the non-juring priests, atheists were angels. Fauchet, who two years later was guillotined by these ungrateful "angels", finally moved that all disobedient clerics be deprived of their stipends and that those who provoked disturbances be sent to the galleys for five years. The warning uttered by another Constitutional Bishop, Torné, against the punishment of opinions and the crippling of toleration, went unheeded. Fauchet insisted that to tolerate poison was to be guilty of the greatest sin of intolerance against society. Even Gensonné reminded the Assembly that after the Constitution had granted men the right to elect their own parish priests, it was hardly fitting to force them to accept clerics they detested. But his words had no effect. The Girondin Isnard, who had made a fortune by the sale of perfumes, declared that everything must be subjected to the will of the nation: tiaras, diadems, and censers must bow before the sceptre of the law. The safest weapon to use against the priests who disturbed the peace under the cloak of religion was banishment.¹

The result of this debate was a fresh law of proscription, passed on November 29th, 1791, by which priests who had refused the oath and had already been deposed were to be deprived of their pensions if they did not take the oath within a week. Further, they were to be placed under special supervision as being suspected of rebellion and, if disturbances broke out on account of the religious question, they would be expelled from their place of residence. If they refused to obey they would be liable to a year's imprisonment. Clerics convicted of inciting others to rebel against the law or constitutional authority would be punished by two years'

¹ SCIOUT, 231 *seqq.*; DE LA GORCE, II., 17 *seqq.*, 24 *seqq.* Fauchet's speech is in BUCHEZ ET ROUX, *Hist. parlem.*, XII., 97 *seqq.*; Gensonné's, *ibid.*, 104 *seq.*, Torné's, 123 *seq.*, Isnard's, 133 *seq.*

imprisonment. This was followed by two regulations which in effect were tantamount to the proscription of the Church, the priests, and all believers. One forbade non-juring priests to conduct services in parish churches, the other deprived Catholics of the right to hire or buy churches unless they took the civil oath.¹ The term "civil oath" was purposely chosen to give the impression that it was an oath of allegiance to the order of things that had been fixed by law for the public safety, whereas, in fact, it included the Civil Constitution.² The Abbé Salamon perceived at once the perfidious nature of the regulation and the danger that many would be deceived and be induced both by the deceptive wording and the harsh penalties for refusal to come to the decision that if needs must they could take the oath. Accordingly, he did all he could to have the matter clarified and to prevent the clergy acquiescing. He discussed the question with the Bishops and with theologians and got the Sorbonne to consider it. Both the Sorbonne and the committee of Bishop-deputies declared quite definitely that in this form, too, the oath could not be taken. It was then, also at Salamon's instigation, that several vicars-general sent circular letters to the clergy, warning them against the taking of the oath.³ Further, he had great hopes of the king's refusing to sanction this new law, which made Catholic worship quite impossible. This time Louis XVI. did not belie the hopes that had been placed in him; he declined to give his sanction to the fatal resolution. But although the suspensive veto was still allowed him by the new constitution of September, 1791, it was now most violently contested by the Jacobins, likewise the declaration of the members of the administration of the Paris *Département*, who still had enough good sense to address a memorial to the king, protesting in the name of freedom against the new law.⁴ The Jacobins

¹ BUCHEZ ET ROUX, XII., 150 *seqq.*; *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CXXIII., 858 *seq.*

² SCIOUT, 241.

³ RICHEMONT, 163 *seq.*, 171 *seqq.*

⁴ BUCHEZ ET ROUX, XII., 233 *seqq.*

declared this to be high treason.¹ Their battle-cry was the suppression of all who thought differently from themselves, the overthrow of the throne, the subjugation of the Catholics within the realm, and war outside it. The National Assembly acted entirely on these lines. On April 6th, 1792, a Good Friday, on which there were performances at the Paris theatres—a thing unheard of—the National Assembly, on the motion of the Constitutional Bishop Torné, forbade the wearing of religious dress or emblems. The Constitutional Bishop Fauchet of Calvados, with instant obedience, put his *calotte* in his pocket, and his colleague, Gay-Vernon, Bishop of Haute-Vienne, laid his gold cross on the table of the house.²

On the same day Salamon, as private agent of the Holy See, received two Briefs, dated March 19th, 1792, which had been composed by the Pope himself. The first, after commending the loyal Bishops, gave a final warning to the Constitutional clergy and threatened them with excommunication if they did not repent within 120 days.³ The second Brief imparted extraordinary powers to the lawful Bishops for the spiritual affairs of their dioceses.⁴ As the Government kept a sharp watch on all dispatches from Rome, Zelada, the Secretary of State, had taken special precautions, which had been agreed on with Salamon. Only a few copies of the Briefs were sent to Salamon direct; a larger number, including the decrees destined for the Bishops, which were in a separate parcel with an address supplied by Salamon, were sent to Girard, the Papal agent in Lyons, who was to forward them to a certain

¹ SCIOUT, 244.

² DE LA GORCE, II., 141.

³ THEINER, I., 125 *seqq.* The Brief was decided on in a Congregation of Cardinal deputies on January 19, 1792. MASSON, 524.

⁴ RICHEMONT, 331; THEINER, I., 139. *Ibid.*, 142 *seqq.*, the accompanying Brief; 149 *seq.*, the extension of the faculties on June 13, 1792; 168, the prolongation of the faculties on December 10, 1792; 213, their further prolongation on December 15, 1794. *Cf. Bull. Cont.*, VI., 3, 2476, 2479, 2529, 2568, 2740, 2897 (prolongation of the faculties on December 10, 1795).

De Blignièrès in Paris, a loyal deputy from the Ardennes. A parcel addressed to a deputy was delivered without question, and Salamon thus received everything safely. He took immediate steps to have the first Brief printed and distributed. No little risk was attached to this, for by a decree of the National Assembly every printer, colporteur, or distributor of Papal Briefs was threatened with severe penalties. Within twenty-four hours a large number of copies were printed and by Easter Monday Salamon could report with great satisfaction to Cardinal Zelada that already more than 20,000 copies had been distributed in the capital and that everyone wanted to have one.¹ The Brief was distributed in the provinces too, though not by the timid Bishop-deputies, as Salamon reported with regret. Their committee was still in Paris, and was again making difficulties, in anticipation of which the consignment of Briefs had been sent to Salamon.²

On May 5th, 1792, the Calvinist François Nantes reported to the National Assembly that the number of non-juring priests was between 15,000 and 20,000 and that the clergy still existed as a separate Estate, with one foot in the Vatican and the other on a great throne. The coercive measures employed hitherto were inadequate; to restore domestic peace to the people the refractory clerics must be interned. This proposal seemed too lenient to the "Mountain" and the Girondists; they demanded deportation. Accordingly on May 27th a law was passed by which all non-juring priests were to be expelled if denounced by twenty citizens and the expulsion was requested by the district authorities concerned; any priest returning to the country after expulsion would be punished by ten years' imprisonment. This then was the penalty incurred by any priest who still dared to conduct a Catholic service.³ The king made use of his right of veto for the second time.

¹ Reports of April 9 and 16, 1792, in RICHEMONT, 382 *seqq.*, 393 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 422 *seq.*, 456; KIEFER, 92 *seq.*

³ SCIOUT, 268 *seqq.*; DE LA GORCE, II., 146 *seq.*; the decree in BUCHEZ ET ROUX, XIV., 248.

Although his life had been threatened by the mob that had forced its way into the Tuileries on June 20th, 1792, he displayed a courageous firmness on this occasion.¹ But no more regard was paid to his right of veto than in the previous year. In the all-prevailing anarchy the persecution of the loyal clergy could pursue its course unhindered.²

Not only the altar but the throne, too, was subjected to attack. Its enemies tried every means of completely demolishing the monarchy, which had already been gravely humiliated. On July 3rd Vergniaud made a great speech in the National Assembly; with masterly ingenuity he represented the king as an enemy of the country and spoke for the first time of his deposition. Two days later Torné, the Constitutional Bishop of Cher, made a formal request to this effect. After that not a day passed without an attack being made on the crown.³ In the latter half of July non-juring priests in several places, such as Limoges, Clairac, Marseilles, and Bordeaux, were murdered.⁴ The insurrection of August 10th, 1792, resulted in the arrest of Louis XVI. and his family. Having obtained this success the Jacobins and Girondins renewed their attack on the Church more furiously than ever. The revolutionary communal authorities in Paris led the way,⁵ and the National Assembly obediently followed. The female orders, which had hitherto been spared, were condemned to a speedy end by the decree of August 17th, which ordered them to vacate their institutions before October 1st. In the name of the free State, which could not tolerate any corporation within its boundaries, a decree of August 18th ordered the dissolution of all teaching and nursing Congregations. The work of persecution was crowned by the law of August 26th, by which time there was no need to fear a veto, as the king was a prisoner in the Temple. This new law

¹ DE LA GORCE, II., 191 *seq.*, 196 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 202 *seqq.*; SCIOUT, 277 *seq.*

³ SCIOUT, 276 *seq.*; WEISS, *Weltgesch.*, XV.⁴⁻⁵, Graz, 1900, 589 *seq.*

⁴ SCIOUT, 279 *seq.*; DE LA GORCE, II., 221 *seq.*

⁵ F. BRAESCH, *La Commune du dix août 1792*, Paris, 1911.

decreed that all priests who had not yet taken the oath in accordance with the laws of November 27th, 1790, and April 15th, 1791, or who, after having sworn, had recanted and persisted in their refractoriness, were to leave their *Départements* within a week and French soil within a fortnight. Those who would not obey would be taken to the penal colony of Guiana in South America and if they returned to France they would be imprisoned for ten years. This law could also be applied to any other priest in the country who stirred up trouble or if a request for its application was made by the citizens of a *Département*. Those who were too old or sick to be deported were to be interned together in one house.¹

The implementation of this new proscriptive law, the object of which was to preclude any kind of Catholic service, was forestalled by one of the most horrible events in French history—the September massacres.

The main object for which they were carried out was to influence the elections for the National Convention; the allegation that the country was threatened with a foreign war was a mere blind. It is equally certain that plans for the slaughter, including even the preparation of the victims' graves, had been laid by scoundrels in the pay of the communal council and by the minister of justice, Danton. The butchery began at three o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, September 2nd, and lasted till the 7th.² The accounts of the atrocities left us by contemporaries make horrible reading; the Englishman Moore, who was living in Paris at the time, wrote that these fearful deeds were worse than anything that

¹ DE LA GORCE, II., 236 seq., 239 seq., 241 seq.; MATHIEZ, *Les conséquences religieuses de la journée de 10 août 1792 : La déportation des prêtres et la sécularisation de l'état civil*, Paris, 1911. SCIOUT (288) calls attention to the inclusion of the clerics who had taken the "serment de liberté et égalité" which had been decreed on August 14, 1792. Cf. below, p. 203.

² GRANIER DE CASSAGNAC, *Hist. des Girondins et des massacres de Septembre*, vol. II.; MORTIMER-TERNAUX, *Hist. de la Terreur*, III.; SYBEL, I., 515 seq.; WEISS, *loc. cit.*, XVI., 126 seq., 138 seq.; SCIOUT, 290 seq.; DE LA GORCE, II., 275 seqq.

had been recorded in the history of crime.¹ The number of the victims was at least 1,400, of whom 225 were priests, apart from those who were executed in the former Benedictine abbey of St-Germain-des-Prés; their number can no longer be established.² Not one of the priests would save his life by taking the oath; as one of the executioners exclaimed in amazement, they went to their death as happily and joyfully as though it were a wedding. At the Carmelite convent, where the clerics destined for deportation had been interned, there were put to death Louis XVI.'s confessor, Hébert, the learned Jesuit Gagnières, the Superior of the Eudists, Lefranc, the Bishops of Saintes and Beauvais, François-Joseph de la Rochefoucauld and his brother Pierre-Louis, and the eighty-seven-year-old Archbishop of Arles, Jean-Marie Dulau.³

Among the few who escaped the butchery were the director of the deaf and dumb institute, the Abbé Sicard, who had to

¹ *A Journal during a Residence in France* (1793).

² DE LA GORCE, II., 285, 296. LENÔTRE (*Massacres de Septembre*, Paris, 1907) estimates the number of the victims at 1,600; WEBSTER (*The French Revolution*, London, 1919, 330) gives a total of 1368 (43 nobles and officers, 245 priests, 1,080 ordinary people).

³ They were beatified on October 17, 1926. A. CORTAGGINI, *I beati Martiri del Settembre 1792 a Parigi*, Isola del Liri, 1926; J. DEHAUT, *Prêtres victimes de la Révol. dans le dioc. de Cambrai 1792*, Cambrai, 1909; WELSCHINGER, *Les Martyrs de Septembre*, Paris, 1919; SOREL, *Le couvent des Carmes pendant la Terreur*, 125-145, 371 seq.; MOURRET, VII., 160; LECLERCQ, *Les Martyrs*, XI., 40 seq.; SABATIÉ, *Les massacres de Septembre, les martyrs du clergé*, Paris, 1912; J. B. ROVOLT, *Les martyrs eudistes massacrés au Carmes et à St-Firmin 2 et 3 Septembre 1792*, Paris, 1927; FOUQUERAY, *Un groupe de martyrs de Septembre 1792, 23 anciens jésuites*, Paris, 1927. On the question of the oath that was demanded of the victims—a matter of importance so far as their beatification was concerned—see (as opposed to MISERMONT, *Le serment à la Constitution civile du clergé*, Paris, 1917) PISANI's observations in *Polybiblion*, LXXXIX. (1917), 264 seq., and L. AUDIAT, *Deux victimes des septembreurs* (the two Rochefoucaulds), Paris, 1927.

watch the murders in the abbey for two whole days,¹ and the Pope's confidential agent, the Abbé Salamon, who has described his ordeal in his memoirs. At two o'clock in the morning of August 27th there was knocking at the door of his house and five commissaries of his Section entered, followed by twenty armed men. As they approached the Abbé's bed, where he lay ill with a fever, he told them that he was sick and asked them their business. "We don't want to disturb you," they replied, "but we know that you are the Pope's Minister. Hand us over your correspondence." "Since you know I am the Pope's Minister, you should also be aware that my person is inviolate. You will have to look for my correspondence yourselves." They then tried to force him to sign a statement that they had been unable to find the correspondence. When he refused to do this he was taken to the Hôtel de Ville and brought before the Watch Committee. "You're just a criminal ripe for the guillotine," one of the councillors shouted at him. "Is that the language of a people that's supposed to be free?" retorted Salamon, and he refused to answer the questions put to him. He was then taken to the Mairie to be kept in provisional custody, and on September 1st, at eleven o'clock at night, he was transferred with some other prisoners to the abbey. On September 2nd the warder rushed in shouting: "Look lively, the people are breaking into the prisons and have already begun to slaughter the prisoners!" Distant sounds of the raging mob could be heard in the prison, and the captives prepared for death by making their confessions. At about half-past eleven at night there was a violent hammering on the door. Something had to be done quickly. The prisoners, Salamon among them, jumped out of the window into the yard fourteen feet below. But the mob was already there, and an interrogation of the prisoners began at once. The aged parish priest of Saint-Jean-en-Grève was the first to be examined. "Have you taken the oath of obedience to the Civil Constitution?" "No, I have not." Hardly had he answered when the stroke of a sword brought him to the

¹ BUCHEZ ET ROUX, XVIII., 72 *seqq.*

ground. With a few further strokes the gruesome deed was done. Salamon had to stand by while his fellow-priests were pitilessly slaughtered one after another. In silent prayer he prepared himself for death. When his turn came dawn was breaking. Summoning up his courage, he stood in front of the deputy President, whom he knew already, and said to him: "Before I am handed over to these misguided people allow me to speak." "Well, who are you?" "I was spiritual counsellor to the Paris Parlement and I am a lawyer." "How did you get here?" Salamon gave him an explanation that was partly true, partly invented. He had been arrested in the street, he said, and taken from one prison to the other, but this was the first time he had been questioned. Taking pity on him, the President said: "You see, gentlemen, how carelessly citizens are arrested in the other Sections. If we had taken this man prisoner he would have been examined and released long ago." On hearing this, Salamon was bold enough to exclaim: "I appeal to the National Assembly!" Whereupon the murderers exclaimed: "Oh, the deputies of the National Assembly! We've got a list of their names and we'll strangle them along with the others!" Salamon was quick-witted enough to reply: "Yes, but I mean the patriots—Hérault, Torné, Rovère." "Bravo, bravo!" they all applauded. At the President's suggestion Salamon was taken back to the prisoners' cell. In the evening he was brought before a tribunal of five members, to which he related the true story of his arrest. The President said he was willing to release him, but that the killing was still going on, so that it would be safer for him to spend the night in the prison. The next day, therefore, he was able to leave, but before doing so he saw from the window a member of the communal council, wearing a tricoloured sash, dealing out money to the murderers. In the hope of getting better paid, they were disputing among themselves as to who had waded deepest in the blood.¹

Outside France the view that was taken of the September murders may be judged from the reception that was given to

¹ BRIDIER, *Salamon*, 9-122.

the clerics who escaped the massacre. As the deportation of the priests began at the same time, all who crossed the frontier were looked on as saved.

The chief object of the September murders, the securing of votes for the National Convention, was attained. Over the corpses of the victims this most dreadful of all the National Assemblies proclaimed the Republic on September 21st, 1792. Even in the Convention, of the 749 deputies forty-eight were State priests, seventeen of them calling themselves Bishops. It was their votes that turned the scale ¹ in favour of the death sentence pronounced on January 20th, 1793, on Hugues Capet, as Louis XVI. was now called. The sentence was carried out the next day, amid the joyful shouts of "Long live the Republic!" The noblest of the Bourbons mounted the scaffold with a firm step and openly proclaimed that he was innocent and that he forgave his enemies. Louis XVI. died as a Catholic Christian, proving what he had asserted in his last testament, that he wished to leave this world in communion with the one true Church. He had never striven after unrestricted power, but revenge for the absolutism founded by Richelieu was taken on him. The unhappy French people now fell victim to the most terrible of all tyrannies, that of the Revolution; and to all the other calamities there was added that of war, and not only the war with the Emperor and the King of Prussia that had been going on since April, 1792, but also war with England, Holland, and Spain. But this did not hinder the continuation of the persecution of the Catholics.

In spite of the deportation law a number of clerics had stayed on in France; in addition, there were those who, as non-functionaries, were excepted from the oath. Further, in some of the *Départements* remote from Paris, especially in Alsace, there were many parishes that refused to part with their lawful pastors. Thus it was that the Catholic form of worship still persisted, though under the constant threat of extermination.² With its decrees of March 18th and April 23rd,

¹ SCIOUT, *Hist. de la Constit. civile*, 310 seq.

² DE LA GORCE, II., 321 seqq.

1793, the Convention determined to put an end to this state of things. Every priest condemned to deportation who still showed himself in the country was to be put to death within twenty-four hours of his conviction. Almost the same penalty was to be paid by clerics who were non-functionaries.¹ These laws were carried out with inexorable strictness and, indeed, with cruelty.² Not content with raging against human beings, the Jacobins also attacked ecclesiastical buildings with incredible vandalism ; numerous works of art thus perished at their hands.³

Christianity had not been subjected to such merciless persecution since the time of Diocletian. When finally there was armed and organized resistance against this intolerable tyranny it was supported by only isolated districts, the Vendée and parts of Brittany, where in the spring of 1793 the people rose in defence of God and the monarchy. But as this rising, like the resistance shown against the Revolution in other parts of France, was only of a local nature, it was found possible to quell it by the end of 1793, in spite of the heroic efforts of the Vendéans.⁴ The insurgents, in their desperation, may have tarnished their good cause by many an atrocity, but the vengeance of the victors was quite inhuman. The sheer delight in murdering defenceless persons taken by the "hellish columns" of General Turreau and the Convention's commissary, Carrier, recalls the deeds of the Huns and the Mongols. The massacres perpetrated by Carrier at Nantes are an ineffaceable stain on the history of the Revolution ; in four months he had 16,000 prisoners put on board ship, bound together, and by the opening of a trap-door he let them drown in the Loire. The first of these *noyades*, on November 7th,

¹ *Ibid.*, 324 *seq.* Cf. SCIOUT, III., 378.

² MOURRET, VII., 194.

³ *Ibid.* ; G. GAUTHEROT, *Le vandalisme jacobin*, Paris, 1914.

⁴ General descriptions by DE LA GORCE, II., 328-527, III., 114-264. Cf. also WEISS, *loc. cit.*, XVII., 96-118, 534-583 ; DENIAU, *Hist. de la guerre de Vendée*, 3 vols., Angers, 1906-8 ; E. GABORY, *La Révolution et la Vendée*, I. (1789-1793), Paris, 1925.

1793, caused the deaths of ninety priests, who had been imprisoned since 1792 and preferred to endure anything rather than take the oath. At the second *noyade*, on December 10th, the same fate befell fifty-eight priests who had been condemned to deportation to Cayenne. These atrocities having been committed against the priests without reproof, they were soon afterwards committed against a countless number of laymen. At the same time shooting and guillotining went on steadily.¹ In Paris, too, the *rasoir national* (the "national razor") was in constant use. On October 16th, 1793, it cut short the life of Marie Antoinette, the widow of Louis XVI., aunt of the last Emperor of the Germans and sister of two other emperors. On October 31st thirty-two Girondins had to mount the scaffold. Conforming priests were also among the victims. "The Moor had done his duty and could go."

The illusions of the Constitutional clergy had already begun to fade away in 1792. Some of the Bishops showed signs of an uneasy conscience, but only one, Charrier de la Roche, the Metropolitan of Rouen, had the courage to resign the see he had usurped. There were others, however, who realized with horror that they had walked into a trap.² A year later it was already possible to discern an intellectual cleavage: some threw in their lot completely with the Revolution, others were still trying to maintain Catholic regulations. The conflict of the latter with the Convention began when it came forward as the promoter of the marriage of the clergy. After several Constitutional clerics had married at the end of 1791 and the beginning of the following year,³ this step was taken by a Bishop, Thomas Lindet, in November, 1792.⁴ In 1793 the number of Constitutional clerics who married steadily increased. In Lyons, in March of that year, one of these clerics married his sister, to the disgust of the whole town. For this crime, it is true, he

¹ SCIOUT, 441 *seq.*; A. LALLIÉ, *Les Noyades de Nantes*,² Nantes, 1879; SYBEL, II.⁴, 429 *seq.*; WEISS, XVII., 589; CARLYLE, *French Revolution*, II., 292, 298.

² DE LA GORCE, III., 14 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 44 *seq.*; BERGER, *Religiöse Kulte*, 40.

⁴ DE LA GORCE, III., 47.

was arrested.¹ In general, however, the marriage of priests was encouraged. The easiest way to win the favour of the Jacobins was to get married. On July 19th, 1793, the Convention ruled that any Bishop who opposed the marriage of the clergy was to be deported or deposed. On September 22nd Pontard, the Bishop of the Department of the Dordogne, presented his future wife to the Convention, which extended its energetic protection to the now numerous clerics who were entering into marriage.²

As many Catholic customs, especially the celebration of Sundays and saints' days, were still being practised, the Convention passed resolutions on October 6th and November 24th to introduce a republican calendar in place of the Christian one. Not only the whole constellation of the saints but even the Lord's Day appointed by the Apostles were swept away.³ The official abolition of Christianity—dechristianization as it was called—had already taken place in certain parishes in the autumn of 1793. It began in such small places as Ris-Orangis, in the Ile de France, where a school-teacher had induced the peasants to replace the statue of St. Blaise in the church by one of Brutus, and to change the name of the place to Bourg-Brutus. Similarly, the inhabitants of Mennecy added "Marat" to the name of their village, after they had dismissed their priest and had discarded the statues of Saints Peter and Dionysius in their church in favour of those of Marat and Lepeletier.⁴ After that, to demonstrate their abhorrence of superstition, they sent a deputation dressed, as a joke, in choir dress, to the Convention, which on November 6th declared that all citizens were entitled to adopt whatever religious cult they pleased and to do away with the ceremonies of which they disapproved.⁵ On the same day a

¹ BERGER, 46.

² DE LA GORCE, III., 49 seq. ; AULARD, *Le culte de la Raison et de l'Être Suprême*, Paris, 1892, 21 seq. ; BERGER, 46 seq.

³ DE LA GORCE, III., 59 seq. ; WEISS, XVIII., 705 seq. ; BERGER, 49 seq. ; WALLON, *La Terreur*, II.², Paris, 1881, 183.

⁴ AULARD, *loc. cit.*, 36 ; BERGER, 51 seq.

⁵ DE LA GORCE, III., 84 seq. ; BERGER, 52.

number of deputies prevailed upon the weakly Constitutional Bishop of Paris, Gobel, whose debts had put him entirely in the hands of the Jacobins, to resign his office. On November 7th Gobel, with seven of his vicars, made a statement to this effect in the presence of the Convention. The radical deputy Chaumette promptly took advantage of the occasion to propose that the day on which the declaration had been made should be called the Day of Reason. This was joyfully adopted by the Convention. Gobel, laying aside his cross and ring and putting on the red bonnet of the Revolution, was congratulated by the President on having climbed to the heights of philosophy, and amid the cheers of the assembly received from him the kiss of brotherhood.¹ The deputies were now seized by as great a frenzy of enthusiasm as on the night in August, 1789.

Gobel's example was followed by all the deputies who had taken Orders, including, of course, Thomas Lindet. The Constitutional Bishop of Limoges, who had been one of the men chiefly instrumental in bringing about the execution of the king, said that he was glad to be a simple citizen and that he had done with every kind of divine service. Another of these mock Bishops declared that he would hold only the dogmas that were in the great book of Nature and reason. The Calvinist preacher Julien of Toulouse, not wanting to be outdone, praised philosophy and reminded his hearers that he had always preached that the consistently virtuous man was equally blessed, no matter whether he prayed to the God of Geneva or the God of Rome, to the God of Mahomet or that of Confucius. Grégoire, the learned and strictly moral Bishop of Blois, was alone unmoved. The final words of his speech were: "I shall remain a Bishop and appeal to the freedom of worship."² But no one imitated his courageous stand.

As the Constitutional Church now began to break up, a

¹ DE LA GORCE, III., 86 *seqq.*; 88 *seqq.*; BERGER, 53 *seq.* For J.-B. Gobel, who was guillotined on April 13, 1794, see WEISS, XVIII., 93, and STEINHUBER, II., 230 *seqq.*

² WEISS, XVIII., 93 *seqq.*; PISANI, II., 65 *seq.*

republican, revolutionary religion—the cult of reason—was set up as a substitute for Christianity. In this movement, naturally, a leading part was taken by the radical communal council of Paris. In the nave of the venerable cathedral of Notre Dame a little “ Temple of Philosophy ” was erected, with a decorated bust of Voltaire. Here, on the morning of November 10th, 1793, a beautiful actress took up her position and was revered by Republicans of both sexes. She represented Liberty, as was expressly indicated in the hymn composed for the occasion: “ Sacred Liberty, dwell in this temple and be the goddess of the French.” In the afternoon those who had taken part in this pageant appeared in the National Assembly, which immediately adopted the proposal of the ex-Capuchin Chabot that the metropolitan church be henceforward regarded as the Temple of Reason. Half of the Assembly then repaired to this new temple, where the blasphemous ceremony of the morning was repeated.¹

In the days that followed Paris was like a madhouse in which all the demons of hell had been let loose. One after another Constitutional priests made their way into the Assembly to lay down their office, and men dressed up in ecclesiastical vestments made blasphemous declarations. Deputies of the Paris sections offered up church utensils on the altar of the fatherland. The Jews and Protestants also delivered up their sacred vessels.²

Really horrible scenes were enacted in the churches in which the cult of Reason was practised. In this the three main currents of French ‘enlightened’ thought, especially the pantheistic one, were prominent, particular attention

¹ AULARD, *loc. cit.*, 50 *seq.*; BUCHEZ ET ROUX, XXX., 196 *seq.*; DE LA GORCE, III., 95 *seqq.* PISANI (II., 70) shows that the usually accepted story of the actress being placed half-naked on the altar is an exaggeration. Cf. also BRUNOT, *Culte cath. en français*, in the *Annales de la Révolut. franç.*, II. (1925), 209 *seq.*; HASHAGEN, *Kultus der Vernunft*, in the *Neue kirchl. Zeitschrift* (1905), 383 *seqq.*, 428 *seqq.*

² DE LA GORCE, III., 103 *seqq.*; BERGER, 58 *seq.*

being paid to the ridicule of the Catholic religion.¹ In the words of a member of the Convention: "In most cases the tabernacle of the high altar was used as a footstool for the throne of Reason. It was ministered to by artillerymen with pipes in their mouths. The confused shouts of thousands of people, the beating of drums, the shrill blasts of trumpets, the thundering of organs, gave the onlookers the impression of being among the bacchanals on the mountains of Thrace. The people, suddenly torn away from the bonds of the State and religion, had become a raving mob. Screaming the 'Carmagnole', they danced before the altars practically breechless, their necks and breasts bare, their stockings fallen down. With their rapid twisting and turning they were like whirlwinds, the harbingers of the storm that was to bring destruction and terror everywhere. The wife of the bookseller Momoro, a ranting Cordelier, the *chanteuse* Maillard, the actress Candelle, these were the deities of Reason; they were borne round in triumph and were given almost divine honours, to which they offered no objection. Great hangings had been fixed in front of the side-chapels in the nave, not without an ulterior motive, for sounds issued from these murky chambers which attracted the inquisitive, and when they raised the side of the curtain most indecent scenes were revealed to the passers-by."² The church of St. Eustache was converted into a common tavern, where shameless people caroused. St. Gervais was taken over by the women of the Halles; at nightfall public prostitutes held a ball in the Lady Chapel.³

In the streets of Paris bands of Jacobins, "drunk with wine and blood, on their way back from viewing the executions," formed processions, shouting "guillotine" and "*rasoir national*". In the Place du Carrousel a kind of pyramid was erected in honour of Marat, with busts equalling in number the heads he intended to strike off.⁴

¹ BERGER, 61 *seq.*; DE LA GORCE, III., 110 *seq.*

² L. S. MERCIER, *Le nouveau Paris*, IV., Paris, 1798, 139 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 145 *seqq.*

The example set by the capital was followed by many other towns, where the new cult was welcomed by both the educated and the ignorant.¹ An English Protestant lady who was living in France at the time gives us the following account : “ When the festival of Reason is to be celebrated in a *Département* a delegate arrives some days in advance, accompanied by a goddess (if the town itself cannot supply a suitable one). She is attired in a Roman tunic of white satin, usually taken from a theatrical wardrobe, and wears a red cap trimmed with oak leaves. Her left arm rests on a plough, in her right hand she holds a lance. Her foot is on a globe and around her are mutilated symbols of feudalism. In this pose the goddess, with all her paraphernalia, is borne along by four sansculottes in red caps, and is escorted by the National Guard, the mayor, the judges, and other officials, who, whether enraptured or enraged, have to present an appearance of respect. The whole retinue having arrived, the goddess is installed on an altar especially erected for the purpose. From this position she addresses the people, who in return pay her homage and sing the ‘ Carmagnole ’ and other songs of the kind. The procession then enters the principal church, where the same ceremonies are re-enacted in the choir. Wherever possible a priest is procured to abjure his faith in public and to declare that Christianity is nothing but a fraud. The festival ends with a bonfire in which prayer-books, saints’ images, confessionals, and other pieces of church furniture are burnt. Most of those present stand looking on in silence, struck dumb with horror and amazement ; others, either drunk or paid for playing these infamous antics, dance round the flames as though they were half-crazy or with a savage delight.”² It was in this fashion that the glorious cathedrals of Chartres, Rheims, Metz, and Strasbourg were desecrated. At Laon and Abbeville the goddess of Reason was a harlot.³

On the whole, the witches’ sabbath in the provinces was

¹ BERGER, 64 *seqq.*

² *Un séjour en France de 1793 à 1795*, Paris, 1872, 161.

³ DE LA GORCE, III., 321 *seq.*

even worse than in Paris. Though the greater part of the population, especially in the Vendée, Lorraine, and Alsace, was still true to the religion of its forefathers, it had to stand by and watch how everything reminiscent of the religion of Christ, even names, was stamped out. Naturally, the first things to go were the crucifixes and statues of Our Lady. The churches and chapels were cleared out to the very last corner, and in spite of repeated prohibitions all the works of art produced by a great past were destroyed. The empty churches were then befouled outrageously¹ or were converted into temples of Reason. In some places, such as Rochefort, Grenoble, and Tours, the new cult took on an atheistic character.² One example will suffice to show the manner in which the representatives of the people reported on their activities. Le Carpentier wrote from St-Malo: "An obstinate priest has just left here—head foremost—to join the others who were dispatched (*expédiés*) before him. The guillotine has been set up permanently for the conspirators, the prisons are full of people under suspicion, and Liberty smiles on the patriots."³ Voltaire's ideal, the throttling of the *Infâme*, seems to have been fulfilled as well as the dream of the Jansenists: the return to the age of the primitive church, the time of the catacombs. But the church created by the Civil Constitution was also at an end when the pseudo-bishops who did not belong to the Convention followed the example of their colleagues and resigned their office. A number of them, including Torné and Jarente, married, and most of the Constitutional parish priests did likewise. Whoever failed to do so were kept under strict watch⁴. One of the chief originators of the Civil Constitution, the Calvinist Barnave, was sentenced to death on November 28th, 1793.

The enemies of the Church and Christianity were by no means united. A formidable opponent of the new religion of Reason arose in the person of Robespierre, who realizing the

¹ *Ibid.*, 324 *seqq.*; BERGER, 64 *seq.*

² BERGER, 69.

³ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁴ SCIOUT, 373 *seq.*; BERGER, 69.

dangers, both internal and external, to which the Republic was exposed by the disgraceful outrages that were being committed, now suddenly objected to the destruction of Christianity. An ardent follower of Rousseau, Robespierre was enthusiastically in favour of a "natural religion", and his dislike of the cult of reason and the atheism advocated by Hébert, Chaumette, and Anacharsis Clootz was increased by the fact that these individuals were his personal enemies. On November 21st, 1793, in the club of the Jacobins, he condemned atheism as being aristocratic and repeated Voltaire's dictum: "If God did not exist, he would have to be invented." On May 7th, 1794, after he had succeeded in expelling Clootz from the Jacobin club and in bringing Hébert and his adherents to the scaffold, he introduced his new State religion. He expounded it in an endless speech in which he effectively defended the belief in God and the immortality of the soul, but denied that he had any dealings with fanatical priests. At the same session the Convention passed the law proposed by Robespierre, which acknowledged the immortality of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being, who was to be honoured with thirty-six festivals in the year, beginning with the 20th Prairial. A ceremony of this nature was held accordingly on June 8th, 1794, in the Champ de Mars and, in spite of its flimsy theatricality and hollowness, it delighted the Parisians.¹

Four days later the cowardly Convention passed the horrible law which had been carefully worked out by Robespierre and formed the climax of the Reign of Terror. The frenzy of the Tribunal of the Revolution which began now and lasted till the fall of Robespierre was indescribable. When the head of this strange founder of a new religion fell under the guillotine on July 28th, 1794, the cult of the Supreme Being, which many had been unable to distinguish from the cult of Reason, also disappeared.² Robespierre had been the

¹ BERGER, 80 *seqq.*; DE LA GORCE, III., 333 *seq.* Robespierre's motives are well described also by SYBEL (II.⁴, 440).

² BERGER, 89.

moving spirit of the Reign of Terror, but the reaction was slow to develop.¹ The number of loyal Catholics who had to mount the scaffold under his fearful regime was so great that they were called "an army of martyrs". Almost every town supplied its contingent, those from Arras, Orange, and Bordeaux being particularly numerous.² In many cases it is difficult to determine the part played by political hatred, but there is no doubt that many of the victims, especially priests and nuns, shed their blood for the Faith.

The historian of the Popes has also to commemorate these heroes, since they died for the Holy See. To name but a few, the parish priest Noël Pinot, after secretly bringing spiritual comfort to the faithful for a year, was seized on February 21st, 1794, just as he was about to say Mass and, still wearing his vestments, was beheaded in the public square at Angers.³ Two months later the Vincentine nun Marguerite Rutan had to mount the scaffold at Dax for refusing to take the oath of loyalty to the Constitution.⁴ The four nursing sisters of Arras, who were guillotined at Cambrai, were also martyrs.⁵ The female orders, which had been dissolved and broken up, were especially prominent in the number of their members who gave their lives for the Faith. Eleven Ursulines were executed at Valenciennes,⁶ and thirty-two nuns at Orange in

¹ WEISS, *loc. cit.*, 568.

² DE LA GORCE, III., 514; L. DE CHÉRANCÉ, *Nos martyrs 1789-1799*, Paris, 1908; AUDARD, *Actes des martyrs et des confesseurs de la foi pendant la Révolution*, 2 vols., Tours, 1921.

³ DE SÉGUR ET C. SAUVÉ, *Un admirable martyr sous la Terreur*, Paris, 1904; LECLERCQ, *Les Martyrs*, XII., 1 *seqq.*; UZUREAU, *Noël Pinot*, Angers, 1912; CORTAGGINI, *Vita del b. Natale Pinot*, Milano, 1926.

⁴ P. COSTE, *Une victime de la Révolution, Sœur M. Rutan*, Paris, 1904; *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, I., 702.

⁵ MISERMONT, *Les vén. Filles de la Charité d'Arras, dernières victimes de J. Lebon à Cambrai*, Paris, 1914; LECLERCQ, *loc. cit.*, XI., 491 *seqq.*; A. LOVAT, *The Sisters of Charity martyred at Arras in 1794*, London, 1921.

⁶ *Le beate quindici Vergini-martiri Figlie della carità ed Orsoline*

July, 1794 (most of the latter were either Ursulines or members of the Congregation of the Perpetual Adoration). The manner of their deaths was so heroic that the onlookers declared that only religion could be the source of such fortitude and confidence.¹ In the same month sixteen Carmelite nuns from the convent at Compiègne went to the scaffold in Paris, singing hymns. The Superior begged, as a favour, to be the last to die.²

messe a morte nella dioc. di Cambrai, Giugno-Ottobre 1794, Roma, 1920.

¹ REDON, *Les 32 religieuses guillotonnées à Orange en 1794*, Avignon, 1904, 105; LORIDAN, *Les bienheureuses Ursulines de Valenciennes*, Paris, 1920.

² A. SOREL, *Les Carmélites de Compiègne*, Avignon, 1878; V. PIERRE, *Les bienheureuses Carmélites de Compiègne*, Paris, 1906; *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, III., 23; P. MARIE-AMAND DE ST. JOSEPH, *Carmes et Carmélites martyrs de la Révolution*, Paris, 1925; LECLERCQ, *loc. cit.*, XII., 129 seq. Of those cited the martyrs of Compiègne were beatified on May 27, 1906; those of Valenciennes and Arras on June 13, 1920; those of Orange on May 10, 1925; and Pinot on October 31, 1926.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PENETRATION OF REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS AND MOVEMENTS INTO THE STATES OF THE CHURCH.

IN the war waged by the French revolutionaries against the Catholic religion the Pope had very soon become an object of attack, not only as the supreme head of the Church but also as a temporal ruler. In the latter capacity Pius VI. was in a far more dangerous situation than in the former, for notwithstanding his Government's well-intentioned efforts at reform the financial and military weakness of the Papal States was by now deplorable.¹ There was no question, therefore, of the Pope's direct participation in the military undertakings of other Powers against the Revolution; the most that he could hope for was to prevent the infiltration of subversive ideas into his own dominions. For this purpose, precautionary measures had been taken at the beginning of 1790, when French newspapers were already prophesying that a revolution like that of Paris would soon break out in Rome.² The downfall of Pius VI. had also been foretold by the freemason and reformer Cagliostro³ after his arrival in Rome at the end of May, 1789. This adventurer, who tried in Rome as in other capitals to exploit the credulity and the love of the mysterious that were rife at this period, was arrested during the night of December 27th-28th, 1789, and was prosecuted by the

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIX., 42 *seqq.*, and below, pp. 225, n. 5, 227, 246, n. 4.

² Serafino Figari's *report from Rome, of January 23, 1790 (State Archives, Genoa).

³ Pietro Donado's *report of June 6, 1789. He adds that those who have seen Cagliostro are surprised that so much fuss is made about him in Paris (State Archives, Venice). Bernis had the same impression (see *Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 375).

Inquisition.¹ Simultaneously with his arrest the police discovered that the students of the French Academy at Trinità de' Monti had set up a masonic lodge in the house of the painter Belle. Freemasonry having been forbidden in Rome under pain of the heaviest penalties by Bulls of Clement XII. and Benedict XIV., severe measures were taken. Belle, the most deeply involved of the offenders, deemed it prudent to disappear.² Among Cagliostro's papers, it was said, was found a prophecy that Pius VI. would lose his throne and be the last of the Popes. The perturbation caused by these incidents may be gathered from Cardinal Bernis' letters. He relates that the students at the French academy of art having been infected by masonic ideas, Ménageot, their director, had the greatest difficulty in keeping them to their studies and in restraining them from reading free-thinking and irreligious works. The people of Rome, added Bernis, had not yet been affected by the false ideas, but they had spread among the artists and the middle class, and were beginning to penetrate into higher circles.³ How anxious were the authorities to forestall any occasion for disturbances may be seen from some of the measures taken in February, 1790. On the 5th of this month the Moccioni festival, which was usually held on the last day of the Carnival, and of which Goethe gives so attractive a description, was banned.⁴ Of recent years it had deteriorated into an orgy. On the feast of St. Peter's Chair, February 22nd,* Frenchmen were not allowed to attend the Papal Mass in St. Peter's in the space reserved for distinguished strangers, owing to the most disrespectful conduct there of several of

¹ Reports in *Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 275, 277 seq. Cf. Donado's *report of January 2 and 30 and February 6, 1790 ("La prigionia del Cagliostro può dirsi l'epoca di una insolita vigilanza"), *loc. cit.*, and *Figari's of March 13, 1790 (*loc. cit.*).

² *Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 374.

³ *Ibid.*, 377 seq.

⁴ Figari's *reports of January 23, February 6 and 20, 1790 (*loc. cit.*); also *Donado's of February 6, to which is attached the edict of February 5, 1790 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. also the police report in *Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 396 seq.

their countrymen during the Christmas celebrations. Before the month was out an ordinance was issued against the sale of tricolour cockades.¹ Further incidents gave cause for exercising even greater watchfulness. In March the legate of Bologna had to take steps against the diffusion of revolutionary announcements.² In May a man was carried along the Rione Regola in Rome, dressed up as the Pope and accepting appeals and lampoons; this resulted in some arrests.³ In June the mob at Rignano, near Rome, opened the prisons; at Viterbo a tax edict was torn down⁴; and in July there were disturbances at Ferrara on account of the taxes.⁵

On June 18th, 1790, the subversive tragedies of Alfieri, who was living in Paris, were banned in Rome.⁶ Toward the end of the month Bernis was reporting that the people of Rome were beginning to eye the French residents with suspicion, as being potential disturbers of the peace.⁷ In July considerable alarm was caused by the news from Paris that Mirabeau had made a speech, which was being publicized by means of provocative manifestoes, to the effect that the French revolution would spread to every country in Europe. As this coincided with the discovery of French emissaries in the States of the Church, certain suspicious individuals were expelled.⁸ At the end of

¹ Figari's *reports of January 23 and February 13, 1790 (*loc. cit.*).

² Figari's *report of March 20, 1790 (*ibid.*).

³ Figari's *report of May 29, 1790 (*ibid.*).

⁴ Figari's *report of June 26, 1790 (*ibid.*). On October 17 and 24, 1789, *Donado reported an attempt made by the criminals to seize the fortress of Sinigaglia (*loc. cit.*).

⁵ Figari's *report of July 10, 1790 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ Donado on June 19, 1790 (State Archives, Venice): “*Ieri si sono proibite come sediziose le tragedie del conte Alfieri accresciute di numero dopo la prima edizione e ristampate a Parigi con alcune dediche assai sfrenate.” Cf. BAUMGARTNER, *Ital. Literatur*, 592 *seqq.*

⁷ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 429.

⁸ Donado's *report of July 31, 1790, with the observation (*loc. cit.*): “Una società che s'unisce espressamente per rovesciar tutta Europa, una nazione che la genera, l'alimenta e l'incoraggisce

September Bernis reported that the police were keeping a strict watch on foreigners. The young artists especially were under suspicion as they were nearly all freemasons. Three Frenchmen regarded as suspicious characters had been expelled. "Every sovereign," he observed, "is master in his own house, and it is only natural that he should refuse to tolerate those who stir up others against the government or who despise religion."¹ In January, 1791, the authorities in Rome were on the track of fresh emissaries of the National Assembly.² Another effect of the French Revolution was that the Dataria and Penitentiary ceased to derive any money from France; this, in view of the precarious financial situation, was a serious loss.³

The Inquisition's prosecution of Cagliostro ended in April, 1791, with his being condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted by Pius VI. into lifelong imprisonment in the fortress of S. Leone. The penalties imposed on the others implicated in the case, of whom one was a Capuchin, were also mitigated. The charlatan's masonic writings were burnt in the Campo di Fiori.⁴

nel proprio seno come necessario ai suoi interessi sono oggetti che da sè solo possono occupare i pensieri d'ogni governo nello studio d'allontanare le insidie esterne e togliere nell'interno l'occasioni favorevoli allo sviluppo dei sensi venefici gettati dall'esempio e ricaldati da discorsi detti scritti. Qui si continua un costante esercizio di vigilanza." For the fortifications at the end of July, 1790, *cf. Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 438. On September 25, 1790, Donado *reported on the prohibition of the importation of "figure equivoche" from France (*loc. cit.*).

¹ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 457.

² " *Non mancano anche in Roma d'emissari della sudetta assemblea," Brunati reported to Colloredo on January 22, 1791 (State Archives, Vienna).

³ Brunati's *report to Colloredo on February 12, 1791, *ibid.* On January 31, 1791, Brunati *reported that the Christmas gifts to the court prelates were getting smaller and smaller, owing to the shortage of money (*ibid.*).

⁴ Brunati's *reports of April 9, 1791 (*ibid.*), and of April 9 and 13, 1792 (where he dismisses Cagliostro as a mere charlatan),

After dismissing Cardinal Bernis, its representative in Rome, in March 1791, for having refused to take an unconditional oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution, the French Government tried to force the Pope to accept as his successor Count Ségur, who had taken the oath. The Pope, however, firmly refused to agree to this proposal, whereupon the nuncio Dugnani had to leave Paris on May 31st, leaving behind him only his secretary Quarantotti. Similarly in Rome, Bernard, Cardinal Bernis' former secretary, continued to function as an unofficial *chargé d'affaires*.¹

When a coalition of the Great Powers was formed against France in support of Louis XVI., Pius VI. showed no inclination to join it.² He was evidently waiting to see how it succeeded.³ The Republic of Venice also remained neutral, and possibly the Pope was of the same opinion as its representative in Rome, that the new order of things in France, being founded on false principles, would be overthrown by a counter-revolution within the country itself.⁴ These hopes were heightened by the news that Louis had succeeded in escaping from Paris, and great was the dismay when the rumour proved to be ill-founded.⁵ It was, however, a con-

*Donado's of April 9 and 16, 1791 (*loc. cit.*); *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 18 seq., 23.

¹ Brunati's *report to Colloredo of June 4, 1791 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. above, p. 186.

² " *Gli affari di Roma con Francia sempre più peggiorano tanto nelle cose ecclesiastiche sicchè nelle politiche," wrote Capello on May 21, 1791, in reporting the burning of the Pope's effigy (see above, p. 186). State Archives, Venice.

³ Capello's *report of June 4, 1791 (*ibid.*).

⁴ Capello's *report of June 25, 1791 (*ibid.*).

⁵ Capello's *report of July 9, 1791 (*ibid.*). The news of Louis XVI.'s successful escape, which spread from Turin through the whole of Italy, misled Pius VI. into sending the king a message of congratulation, dated July 6, 1791. It was described by Capello in his *report of July 16 as a " capolavoro della latinità Romana " (*ibid.*; it is reproduced in VICCHI, Appx., 5 seqq.). Pacca, the nuncio to Cologne, was to present it, as a " Nunzio straordinario ", to the king at Metz.

solution to the Pope to know that the majority of the French clergy were proving loyal to the Church¹ and that national feeling in England was turning in favour of the Catholics.² In Rome, where in May 1791 there were further expulsions of suspicious Frenchmen,³ the anti-French feeling of the people against supporters of the revolution was reaching a pitch unparalleled since the Sicilian Vespers.⁴ When Frenchmen were stoned in the streets⁵ the governor of the city, Rinuccini, immediately expressed his regret to Bernard that the rabble should have committed these excesses, and he promised to take steps to prevent their recurrence.⁶ Other ugly incidents occurred in other places in the Papal States. At Macerata, at the end of June, thirty-one criminals broke out of prison and after joining forces with Neapolitan fugitives they took to highway-robbery.⁷ Far more serious was the mutiny that broke out at Civitavecchia on August 1st. Prisoners rowing the Papal galleys rose in revolt, shouting "Long live liberty! Long live the French National Assembly!" It was not till the commandant of the fortress threatened to shoot them down that order was restored.⁸ In the same month there was

¹ Figari's *report of July 16, 1791 (State Archives, Genoa); Brunati's *reports of July 7 and 13, 1791 (State Archives, Vienna); Capello's *report of July 16, 1791 (State Archives, Venice).

² Capello's *report of July 2, 1791 (*ibid.*).

³ Capello's *report of May 7, 1791 (*ibid.*).

⁴ " *Per quanto i Francesi sino dalla famosa epoca del vespro Siciliano, siano in visi alla nazione italiana, non mai più che attualmente in specie ai Romani." (Brunati to Colloredo, May 23, 1791, *loc. cit.*)

⁵ Cf. *Capello on July 16, 1791 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 35.

⁷ Capello's *report of July 2, 1791 (*loc. cit.*). On June 16, 1792 (*ibid.*), Capello *reported another plot to plunder Macerata, which was frustrated at the last minute; the report was used by BROSCII (II., 157).

⁸ This incident, which was not mentioned by GUGLIEMOTTI in his *Gli ultimi fatti della squadra Romana* (Roma, 1884), was reported by Capello in his *dispatch of August 6, 1791 (*loc. cit.*),

another mutiny in the Castel S. Angelo,¹ and disturbances occurred at Velletri and Fano, at the latter place on account of the bad bread.²

At the beginning of August, 1791, after the attacks on the Church and the person of the Pope had increased in Paris, Quarantotti, the auditor to the nunciature, also had to leave his post. On September 14th the National Assembly decided to unite Avignon with France.³ Further, Bernard, France's unofficial representative, who was still in Rome, was ordered to refrain from any dealings with the Papal government.⁴ Some of the Cardinals proposed that an immediate and solemn protest be made against the seizure of Avignon,⁵ but it was not till October 26th that the Pope addressed a sharply-worded communication to all the Powers.⁶

On November 19th, 1791, Antonio Capello, the Venetian ambassador, wrote that in all the preceding centuries the Holy See had never been in so critical a situation as it was then. France had attacked it in both the ecclesiastical and political spheres, and there was a danger of other sovereigns following suit. Consequently, the formation of the coalition was viewed

and by *Cardinal Herzan in his letter to Colloredo on August 3, 1791. According to the latter's *report of August 14, 1791, another mutiny had to be put down in Civitavecchia. State Archives, Vienna.

¹ Brunati's *reports of August 17 and 20, 1791 (*ibid.*).

² Brunati's *report of August 14, 1791 (*ibid.*), and *Capello's of September 17, 1791 (*loc. cit.*). The latter describes how the disturbances at Fano were composed by the moderation shown by the Bishop there, which had the approval of the Pope.

³ Cf. above, p. 190.

⁴ Cf. *Capello on October 8, 1791 (*loc. cit.*).

⁵ Capello's *report of October 15, 1791 (*ibid.*).

⁶ The Secretary of State's *letter and Azara's *letter of October 26, 1791 (Archives of Simancas), are attached to Capello's *report of October 29, 1791 (State Archives, Vienna). A "chirografo" of Pius VI.'s of November 5, 1791, "ammette e approva la protesta del commissario della Camera contro l'usurpazione d'Avignone" (contemporary print).

with satisfaction in Rome, but it seemed that this hope, too, was to be frustrated.¹ The replies from most of the Powers to the protest against the seizure of Avignon were depressing, for they were really nothing more than pious hopes.² As the result of the strain he had undergone the Pope had already fallen ill with a fever at the end of August, 1791,³ and in December he was ill again. His distorted mouth gave rise to talk about an apoplectic stroke, especially as this was hereditary in his family.⁴ He refused to spare himself, however; his father, he said, had had the same trouble, and he had lived for another eighteen years. He applied himself to all his duties as before. On December 16th, 1791, he granted the Abbé Maury, who had arrived in Rome a short time before, an audience of three

¹ Capello's *report of November 19, 1791 (State Archives, Venice).

² The Emperor regretted that he had not 100,000 men at his disposal; the King of Naples referred to his allies; the King of Sardinia's reply was " *polita quanto ai modi, consona quanto alla sostanza. Tutto viene non essendo che parole senza nemmeno promessa di una interposizione . . . di buoni offizi " (Capello on December 3, 1791, *ibid.*). The Spanish reply was contained in Floridablanca's *instruction to Azara, dated November 15, 1791: " que en quanto esté de parte de S.M. y le permitan las circunstancias se interesará mui de rexar las satisfacciones de S.S." (Archives of Simancas). No help could be expected from Aranda, who succeeded Floridablanca on February 28, 1792, since he was a Voltairian who had always been a firm supporter of a Franco-Spanish alliance (BAUMGARTNER, *Gesch. Spaniens*, 365 *seq.*).

³ Brunati's *reports of August 31, 1791 (*loc. cit.*), and *Capello's of September 3, 1791 (*loc. cit.*). The latter *reported on September 10 (*ibid.*) that the Pope had regained his health, but on September 28 Brunati *reported (*loc. cit.*) that he looked very ill, that he was dragging one of his feet, that his thigh was swollen, and that he could hardly stand.

⁴ Capello's *report of December 10, 1791, where he gives his opinion that " è una paralisia che una volta o l'altra può farsi apoplessia " (State Archives, Venice); Brunati's *reports of December 10 and 12, 1791 (State Archives, Vienna).

and a half hours. This was reported by the Venetian ambassador Capello, who again expressed the view that a counter-revolution would come about in France of its own accord.¹

The Pope, who went through all the exhausting ecclesiastical ceremonies of Christmas,² must have been still more hopeful of an anti-French coalition when he heard of the good progress that was being made in the negotiations for an Austro-Prussian defensive alliance, which was concluded on February 7th, 1792.³ The sudden death of the Emperor Leopold II. on March 1st caused as much dismay in Rome as in Vienna, though it was soon learnt that Francis II. would adhere to his father's policy. It was also good to hear that Francis insisted on the return of Avignon to the Pope.⁴

The news of the assassination of King Gustavus III. of Sweden, which arrived in Rome at the end of April, 1792,

¹ Capello's *reports of December 4 and 17, 1791 (*loc. cit.*).

² Capello's *report of December 31, 1791 (*ibid.*; the Pope was restored to health, "diminuto anco di molto il difetto della bocca").

³ Capello's *reports of January 7 and 21, 1792 (*ibid.*). On January 28 (*ibid.*) he *reported Catherine II.'s reply on the subject of Avignon: "supera in pienezze quelle di tutte le altre corti." The letter of thanks to Catherine II. (PIERLING, V., 170 *seq.*) was criticized by many of the Cardinals, among other reasons for its tone (the Czarina was described as "eroina del secolo"). See Capello's *report of March 3, 1792 (*ibid.*). In her reply the Queen of Portugal promised to make representations through her envoy in Paris (Capello's *report of February 4, 1792, *ibid.*). On March 17, 1792, Capello *reported that the queen had lost her reason (*ibid.*): "E veramente par che la colera di Dio siasi lanciata contro i sovrani."

⁴ Capello's *reports of March 10, April 21, and May 12, 1792 (*ibid.*). Maury had come to Rome on December 6, 1791, and had been nominated by the Pope Pronotary Apostolic and Archbishop of Nicæa on April 17, 1792 (see RICHEMONT, *Corresp. de Salamon*, 159, 381). For his mission to Frankfurt, *cf.* above, p. 182. POULOUAT, *Le card. Maury* (Paris, 1855), 230; RANCEBOURRAY, *Maury e Zelada en 1791* (Paris, 1898), 17, 42 *seq.*; HERGENRÖTHER, *Maury*, 54 *seqq.*

greatly distressed the Pope,¹ as Gustavus had been friendly to the Catholics and an avowed enemy of the French Revolution, for the overthrow of which he had been forming great plans. As for the successful issue of the first war of the Coalition, the Venetian ambassador had only very modest hopes from the outset. He did not close his eyes to the probability that a struggle with so mighty a nation would be long and hard, nor to the dangers inherent in every coalition of different nations. He was also aware that England was pursuing a selfish policy and that there was no immediate prospect of Spain, Portugal, or Sweden joining the Coalition. Finally, he pointed out that the Polish crisis to which Russia was devoting its attention threatened to separate Austria from Prussia.²

The Pope at this time was fully occupied with ensuring the safety of the Papal States. He had discovered that the disturbances that had taken place in Fano in August, 1791, had been instigated by emissaries from the French National Assembly,³ and a club on the French model had been brought to light at Ferrara.⁴ In consequence he ordered the expulsion of further suspicious characters and had the control of passports made stricter still.⁵ Reports of the warlike preparations of the French in Toulon gave rise to the fear that Civitavecchia would be attacked. The further counter-measures ordered to be taken for the protection of the coast, under the direction of the Tesoriere Ruffo, revealed straightaway the incapacity of

¹ Capello's *report of April 28, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

² Capello's *report of May 12 and 26, 1792 (*ibid.*). The ambassador had already passed the following judgment on England on September 17, 1791: "L'Inghilterra, la sola potenza cui giovi la rovina della Francia assai più che la cosa comune, mira il proprio interesse." The downfall of France, he alleged, would greatly further England's trade. For Spain's attitude see BAUMGARTEN, 391.

³ Cf. *Capello on February 4, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Capello's report of February 18, 1792, in BROSCII, II., 193.

⁵ Capello's *report of April 14, 1792 (State Archives, Venice; *Corresp. des Direct.*, XV., 76, 88).

the Papal States to adopt any sort of military precautions.¹ In July, 1792, the entry of Frenchmen into Papal territory was made more difficult still, and a strict edict was issued about the policing of foreigners, on the supposed discovery of a French plot to assassinate the Pope (who had now fully recovered his health).² Pius VI., who hitherto had refused to have any precautions taken for his personal safety, now gave instructions for them to be put into effect.³ In August prayers were offered and processions held for the security of the throne and altar in France.⁴

In Rome as elsewhere the news of the fall of the French monarchy and the September massacre caused widespread indignation and dismay. It coincided with the arrival at Civitavecchia of the first of the nuns expelled from France.⁵ In view of the persistent and extreme hostility of the people

¹ Capello's *reports of June 2 and 9 and July 28, 1792. He states in his report of June 9: " Questa corte continua in alcune disposizioni di difesa più d'apparenza che di realtà e senza altro effetto che di una spesa inutile." He wrote on June 23: " tutte queste precauzioni o sono insufficienti dato che vengano i Francesi o se non vengono sono gettate " (*loc. cit.*). See also *Figari on June 9, 1792 (State Archives, Genoa) and *Brunati on June 23 and July 7, 1792 (State Archives, Vienna). Full accounts of Ruffo's military measures are contained in Azara's *letters of June 13 and July 4, 1792. He says here that " Rufo goza del mas decidido ascendiente sobre su [the Pope's] anima " (Archives of Simancas).

² See Capello's *report of July 9, 1792 (*loc. cit.*) and Azara's *letter of June 13, 1792 (Archives of Simancas), where he writes that the Pope went through the Corpus Christi procession " no obstante el valor y fatiga que debió sufrir en una funcion tan larga no ha tenido ninguna mala resulta ".

³ Capello's reports of July 14 and 21, 1792, and that of July 28, referring to the policing of foreigners, in BROSCHE, II., 184.

⁴ Capello's *reports of August 11 and 18, 1792 (State Archives, Venice), and *Figari's of August 11 and 25, 1792 (State Archives, Genoa).

⁵ Capello's *reports of August 25 and September 22, 1792 (*loc. cit.*), and Figari's *letters of September 1 and 22 (*loc. cit.*).

towards the French¹ the Papal Government was at pains to prevent any possible outrage. When the Swiss Guard, in revenge for the murder of three of their countrymen, were about to attack the French academy of art in the Palazzo Mancini, on the Corso, they were restrained by the Cardinal Secretary of State.² Rome's anxiety not to compromise itself was shown by its attitude towards Piedmont's appeal for help against the threatened attack of the French. Pius VI. was well aware of the Piedmontese Government's unreliability³; nevertheless, the question of affording it support was seriously considered. In response to an appeal from King Vittorio Amadeo, brought by special courier, the Pope summoned an extraordinary Congregation of Cardinals at the beginning of October. It was resolved to invite all the Italian powers to support Savoy, but it was declared impossible to render any financial assistance.⁴

So soon as October 8th news arrived that without declaring war the French had marched into Savoy and had taken Nice. The Savoyard envoy now demanded that Papal vessels be sent immediately to protect the island of Sardinia⁵—in other words, that the Pope should openly join in the war against the French Republic. This was a strange request in any case, and was stranger still considering that the reverses, especially the

¹ The Romans' hatred of the French was indescribable, according to *Brunati, who made this comment as early as May 5, 1792 (State Archives, Vienna).

² Figari's *report of September 15, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

³ Capello had *written on May 19, 1792: "La corte di Torino teme la guerra più che la desidera." Savoy, he said, had no money (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Pius VI.'s *letter to the King of Sardinia, of October 2, 1792 (Cod. Vat. 9718, Vatican Library), and Azara's *report of October 3, 1792 (*loc. cit.*). The Cardinals refused to touch the Sixtine treasure (see Capello's report of October 6, 1792, in BROSCHE, II., 181).

⁵ Figari's *report of October 6, 1792 (*loc. cit.*) and *Azara's of October 10, 1792 (*loc. cit.*). The latter observes that the Congregation consisted of Cardinals "di ordine e palatino".

loss of Nice, were principally due to the cowardice of the Savoyard troops. This aspect of the matter was given prominence also at the Congregation of Cardinals, together with the view that the Papal States had nothing to fear from the French either by land or sea. The only danger that threatened, it was held, came from within, not without; the infiltration of new ideas demanded most imperiously that Rome should see to the safety of its own house.¹ The representatives of this view could point to the French newspapers and pamphlets that were eagerly read in Rome,² to the spreading of revolutionary ideas by the students at the French academy of art,³ and to the disturbing incidents that had occurred at Bologna and other places in the Papal States.⁴

Besides this widespread disaffection and the utter inadequacy of Ruffo's defence measures⁵ the critical state of

¹ Full *report by Azara on October 17, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

² This had already been reported by *Brunati on July 7, 1792 (State Archives, Vienna).

³ The Belle case (see above, p. 214) seems to have been followed by an interval of calm, but on August 25, 1790, the Director, Ménageot, was complaining of the "esprit de liberté et égalité" of his students (see *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 441). On March 21, 1792, Bernard reported that the behaviour of some of the students was so unrestrained that they were likely to be expelled (*ibid.*, XVI., 73 *seq.*). This penalty was subsequently suffered by the prophetess Labrousse (*Mél. d'arch.*, XVII., 311 *seq.*). On March 28 a similar report was made by Ménageot, who added that the students had been warned to be more careful (*Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 75 *seq.*). This brought him into conflict with the students, who were filled with the new ideas, and at the end of October, 1792, the director, who was old and in bad health, asked to be pensioned off (*ibid.*, 119 *seq.*).

⁴ Brunati's *report of September 5, 1792 (*loc. cit.*) and *Capello's of September 8, 1792 (*loc. cit.*). According to the latter, the reports of the disturbances in Bologna had been exaggerated.

⁵ According to Brunati, *reporting on September 15, 1792, the garrison of the Castel S. Angelo, 400 strong, consisted of the most part of deserters and bad characters, and that in addition

the finances caused the gravest anxiety. The increase of paper money, to which the Papal Government had already had recourse before 1789,¹ could only worsen the situation. By 1790 the notes, which had never before been issued for sums less than 10 *scudi*, were representing half that amount. There was no question of exchanging this paper money for hard cash, as the Papal coins soon went out of circulation, having been transferred to Milan, Genoa, Florence, and Naples. The evils arising from this continual issuing of paper money were vividly described by the Venetian ambassador Capello, who found this method of raising money convenient but very dangerous.²

The less the Papal States were able to rely on their own strength, in spite of their costly mobilization,³ the more anxiously the eyes of Rome were turned towards the war of the Coalition. From the very beginning the stout resistance of the French and the unreliable attitude of the allies had aroused serious misgivings.⁴ For two months hopes of the Coalition's success alternated with fear of the French; their fleet, under Admiral La Touche-Tréville, had been sent against Naples, and it was feared that it would capture Civitavecchia.⁵ At the

there were 200 sentenced to hard labour (*loc. cit.*). This sounds incredible, but it has been confirmed by others. A similar situation prevailed elsewhere. Cf. Brunati's *report of Dec. 15.

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIV, 481.

² Capello's *reports of September 11 and October 30, 1792 (State Archives, Venice).

³ Figari's *report of November 3, 1792 (State Archives, Genoa). On December 15 he reported that it was proposed to increase the strength of the troops to 60,000, which would cost 5,760,000 *scudi* a year (*ibid.*).

⁴ Capello's *report of September 8, 1792 (*loc. cit.*). In a *Brief of September 12, 1792, Pius VI. asked for assistance from the Emperor Francis (*Epist.*, 189, Papal Secret Archives).

⁵ *Letter to the nuncio in Madrid, October 10, 1792 (Nunziat. di Spagna, 439, fo. 111 *seq.*; *ibid.*): "Animati da questi progressi [i Francesi] minacciano ancora, secondo le notizie che abbiamo, la Sardegna e tutta l'Italia, e il carattere ardito della nazione, i principj che l'hanno pervertita, la forza della squadra navale di facinorosi di essa nazione, tutto ispira il più fondato timore. Ma se

beginning of November came the shattering news that the supreme commander of the Coalition forces, Karl Ferdinand of Brunswick, had abandoned French soil.¹ In spite of the daily deliberations of the Congregation of Cardinals² it was terrifyingly clear that the States of the Church were defenceless.³ "We have neither troops nor ships," wrote Pius VI. to the Czarina on November 3rd, 1792, in the endeavour to persuade her to send her vessels to the Mediterranean.⁴ Making war was not the business of priests, was the judgment of the Venetian ambassador; much money was being spent on a defence that was more show than reality. In Civitavecchia, he continued, confusion reigned; the best protection for the Papal States was the south-west wind (*libeccio*), which made a landing impossible at that time of year.⁵

tutti i principi d'Italia debbono temere la loro audacia, la Santa Sede si vede ancor più esposta al pericolo di esserne assalita, correndo voce che nutrano il disegno di tentate qualche sbarco nel littorale pontificio nel Mediterraneo, e specialmente di portarsi a Civitavecchia con isperanza di rendersene facilmente padroni."

¹ Capello's *report of November 3, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

² Capello's *report of October 23, 1792 (*ibid.*).

³ On November 24, 1792, Brunati sent Colloredo a list showing the distribution of all the Papal troops. Their total strength, excluding recruits, was 8,860. As Brunati pointed out on December 5, 1792, they were badly trained and undisciplined. *Report of November 28, 1792 (State Archives, Vienna).

⁴ *Brief to "Catharina imperatrix Russiæ" (*Epist.*, 189, fo. 187, Papal Secret Archives).

⁵ *The defence measures were being taken "in fretta e senza chi sappia dirigerli, la tattica militare non essendo la scienza de' preti, onde spendesi molto denaro in una difesa più apparente che reale. Tutto essendo confusione a Civitavecchia, la maggior difesa dello stato pontificio è il libeccio" (Capello, on November 3, 1792, *loc. cit.*). Cf. Brunati's opinion in his *letter of November 14, 1792 (*loc. cit.*); also Azara's *report of October 24, 1792 Archives of Simancas): "En esta semana ha prevalecido [?] el parecer de los que quieren establecer un armamento y poner el estado en un pie militar para lo que se dan todas aquellas disposiciones que puede producir un pais que no sabe lo que es guerra, a quien falta

Prayers were ordered to be said in Rome,¹ but the panic was so great that many were preparing for flight.² Cardinal Herzan and Brunati were among those who were thinking of departure.³ Amid the cares with which he was encompassed the Pope retained unshaken his pious confidence in Providence.⁴ When asked what he would do if the French came to Rome he gave the reply: "My post is at the door of St. Peter's."⁵ It was not so much the depressing news of the victories of the Republican armies on the Rhine and in Belgium, which reached him in November, as the recognition by Naples of the French Republic, that forced even him to change his attitude.⁶ It was firmly impressed upon him by his entourage, whose influence grew as his age advanced,⁷ that the purely temporizing attitude he had hitherto maintained towards the French Government could not be persisted in without running the gravest danger.⁸ Accordingly, he gave way. When Mackau, the French envoy in Naples, protested to Cardinal Zelada

todo absolutamente y que ha puesto la direccion de esta empresa en manos de uno que por su estado y por otras mil circunstancias ignora hasta los primeros elementos de lo que hace."

¹ Figari's *reports of November 3 and 10, 1792 (State Archives, Genoa).

² Azara's *report of November 7, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

³ Brunati's *report of November 10, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ An *instruction of October 31, 1792, to the nuncio to Spain contains the following passage: "In somma siamo circondati da ogni parte di afflizioni; ma dobbiamo adorare le disposizioni divine e confidare nella sua bontà e misericordia" (Nunziat. di Spagna, 439, fo. 115, *loc. cit.*).

⁵ Capello *wrote on November 10, 1792: "Il S. Padre più d'ogni altro si diporta con tranquillità e saviezza." On the 17th he *wrote: "Interrogato il S. Padre cosa farà se i Francesi vengono a Roma, rispose con animo robusto e sereno che il suo posto sarà sulla porta della chiesa di S. Pietro" (State Archives, Venice). Cf. *Brunati on November 17, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ Cf. *Brunati on November 24, 1792 (*ibid.*).

⁷ This had already been stated by Brunati in his *report of February 8, 1792 (*ibid.*).

⁸ Brunati's *report of December 4, 1792 (*ibid.*).

against the arrest on September 22nd of two French artists, the sculptor Chinard and the painter Ratter, both being charged with wearing the tricolour cockade and making a statue of Liberty overpowering Fanaticism,¹ the two men were released.² Another step of an accommodating nature was the issue of an instruction to the commanders of the ports in the Papal States to supply the French vessels with victuals on payment.³

Meanwhile, Mackau's secretary, Hugon de Bassville, had come to Rome, ostensibly to view the sights of the Eternal City and to render thanks for the release of the two artists, actually, as was soon suspected, on a very different errand.⁴ Some thought that through him the Republic intended to open diplomatic relations with the Pope⁵; others correctly regarded him as a spy who had come to reconnoitre the situation in the States of the Church.⁶ Bassville lodged in the Via dell'Impresa, with the French banker Morette. The Pope gave orders that he was to be treated courteously but that his movements were to be watched.⁷ Although he had no right to do so, Bassville immediately behaved as an accredited representative and he entered into close relations with the Spanish ambassador, Azara, whom he complimented on being the only diplomat in Rome who "had risen almost to the

¹ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 105, 106 seq., 120, 122 seq., 124 seq., 127 seq. That the Republicans' accounts of the treatment of the two artists were exaggerated was confirmed by Bernard in his report of November 8, 1792. His words were: "L'affaire de ces artistes se trouve en justice réglée" (*ibid.*, 132).

² *Ibid.*, 128 seq., 132 seq.

³ Figari's *report of November 24, 1794 (State Archives, Genoa).

⁴ Capello's *report of December 1, 1792. Bassville, he said, was "certamente non innocente". He gave "elemosine quasi sempre in oro", which was suspicious. State Archives, Venice.

⁵ Brunati's *report of November 14, 1792 (State Archives, Vienna).

⁶ SFORZA, *L'assassinio di Bassville*, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series (1889), 264 n.

⁷ Brunati's *report of November 17, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

heights of our revolution". "He is," he added, "a philosopher and a friend of the arts, with none of the prejudices that might reasonably be excused in a Spanish diplomat of twenty-six years' standing."¹ The friendliness with which he was received² emboldened Bassville to ask for the release of suspicious Frenchmen, which request, owing to the fear of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, was accorded him without demur.³ Nervousness in Rome increased on the discovery of signs of a revolutionary conspiracy. Suspicion fell on the Jews, weapons having been found in their ghetto. In early December arrests were made almost daily.⁴ Meanwhile, General Caprara, summoned for the purpose by the Pope, began his inspection of the defence establishments in the Papal States.⁵ At the end of November, to relieve the financial strain, the Pope had decided to draw on the treasure in the Castel S. Angelo, which had hitherto been anxiously guarded, though it had already been seriously depleted.⁶ To calm the Romans an announcement was made by Cardinal Zelada on December 4th, 1792, to the following effect. The Pope's intention was to remain at peace with foreign powers and to preserve tranquillity within his own realm. For this purpose he had taken precautionary

¹ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 153.

² Bassville's report (*ibid.*, 144 seq.; cf. 152 seq., 171 seq., 178 seq.).

³ *Ibid.*, 148 seq., 169 seq., 171 seq., 178 seq., 184.

⁴ Capello's *report of December 1, 1792 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. VICCHI, lxxxvii.

⁵ Azara's *report of November 22, 1792 (Archives of Simancas), and *Capello's of November 24, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ The Pope's decision was reported by Azara to Aranda in his *letter of November 28, 1792 (*loc. cit.*). The withdrawal of 500,000 *scudi* was made with the prescribed formalities at the beginning of December (see THEINER, *Docum.*, I., 165 seq.; Azara's *report of December 4, 1792, *loc. cit.*). According to Brunati's *letter of October 10, 1792, a well-informed Cardinal had stated that there were not more than 800,000 *scudi* left in the reserve fund established by Sixtus V. Cf. *Brunati on December 12, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

measures for the protection of the coast and harbours and had levied troops for the maintenance of public order. He was making this announcement so that it might be generally known that his intentions were directed solely towards the preservation of the peace and security of the Papal States. The idea of his attacking anyone was quite absurd.¹

In Paris other views prevailed. On October 24th, 1792, Arena had written to his friend Brissot, the head of the diplomatic committee in the Convention, that Rome was a far more dangerous enemy to the Republic than Prussia or Austria, and that the opportunity must be taken of installing another bishop in Rome and of starting a general revolt, for "we are the masters of the Mediterranean".² It was soon made clear that such views would continue to be held, notwithstanding the Pope's accommodating attitude towards Bassville. On December 7th the French fleet, under Admiral de la Touche-Tréville, entered the harbour of Naples, with the object of enforcing the demands of the Executive Committee in Paris; if they were not complied with the town would be reduced to a heap of ruins.³ On December 12th Bernard, who had tendered his resignation as unofficial *chargé d'affaires* as far back as the autumn of 1791, received a letter from the Executive Committee of the French Republic, addressed to "The Foreign Minister in Rome". Bernard transmitted it immediately through his son to the Cardinal Secretary of State. It struck a threatening note: if the two artists (who, it was supposed, were still under arrest) were not immediately given their liberty, the Republic would take the law into its own hands and proceed against the States of the Church with fire and sword.⁴

¹ Azara's *letter to Aranda of December 5, 1792, to which was attached a printed copy of the "Notificazione" (*loc. cit.*).

² MORTIMER-TERNAUX, *Hist. de la Terreur*, V., 80 seq.

³ A. SIMIONI in the *Arch. stor. Napol.*, XXXVII., 90 seqq., 125 seqq.

⁴ Azara's *report of December 12, 1792 (*loc. cit.*), and *Capello's of December 15, 1792 (Archives of Simancas); *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 174 seq.; VICCHI, II seqq.

Enclosed in the letter to Zelada was another one, dated November 23rd and directed to the Pope. It had been composed by the Minister Roland's emotional wife, who was particularly proud of this piece of work.¹ The very address, "To the Prince Bishop of Rome," which had been chosen by the Executive Committee, was insulting. The contents were far more outrageous. Firstly, in a torrent of phrases, a protest was raised against the arrest of the two artists, whose only crime had been their respect for the rights of man and their patriotism. "The tottering power of the Inquisition," it continued, "will come to an end as soon as it dares to give vent to its rage, and the successor of St. Peter will lose his power directly he allows this. Everywhere reason has lifted its mighty voice, it has broken the sceptre of tyranny and the talisman of monarchy. Now that 'Liberty!' has become the general battle-cry, the thrones of princes are tottering; they, too, must salute Liberty if they want to avoid a violent fall. The Republic, not content with the destruction of tyranny in Europe, has the duty of preventing its activity everywhere and of raising its protests in the name of justice, the arts, reason, and the nation, which is breathing revenge." Further on the Pope was thus apostrophized: "Pontiff of the Roman Church, still ruler of a State that threatens to slip from your hands, you can only preserve the State and the Church by a disinterested profession of the evangelical principles, which breathe the purest democracy, the tenderest humanity, the most complete equality—principles of which the successors of Christ availed themselves to increase their power, which to-day is collapsing through senile decay. The centuries of ignorance are over, men can now be ruled only by conviction, led by truth and bound together by their own good." After some bombastic declamations about "the principles of the Republic" the letter ended with the threat of reprisals if the peaceful remonstrations were unsuccessful.²

¹ MADAME DE ROLAND, *Mémoires* Paris, 1820); *idem*, éd. H. A. Perroud, 2 vols. (Paris, 1905).

² *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 160-2; VICCHI, II *seqq.*

Even Azara admitted that such a message had never been sent to a sovereign before.¹ Nevertheless, the Cardinal Secretary of State, Zelada, replied politely but firmly that such a letter could not be delivered to the Pope.² The general opinion was that with this outrageous insult the French Government intended to bring about an open breach with the Pope, as the two artists had already been set at liberty and had taken their departure and the threatening letter had been published in the French Press before it had been dispatched.³ To relieve the situation Zelada agreed to send Bernard a note, dated December 19th, justifying in a calm and factual manner the Pope's treatment of the two artists.⁴ Bassville, too, in spite of his suspicious behaviour,⁵ was treated, as before, with the utmost consideration and his demands were met as far as possible.⁶ But the tension lasted till December 20th, 1792, when news came that the French fleet lying off Naples had been scattered by a storm.⁷ Bassville, however, and his intriguing and ambitious taskmaster, Mackau, paid no attention to the altered situation; they came forward with further demands.

Bassville, who had been joined in Rome in December, 1792,

¹ " *Dos cartas las mas extraordinarias que jamas se han escrito a ningun soberano " (Azara's letter of December 12, 1792; *loc. cit.*).

² Bernard's report of December 12, 1792 (*Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 184 *seq.*).

³ Capello's report of December 15, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ French translation in *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 189 *seq.*

⁵ This had already attracted notice in late November, 1792 (Brunati's report of the 28th). On December 29, Brunati gave it as his opinion that Bassville was trying to pick a quarrel, which the Papal Government was anxious to avoid. State Archives, Vienna.

⁶ VICCHI, Appx., 13 *seq.*; *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 194; Brunati's report of December 19, 1792 (*loc. cit.*).

⁷ Figari's report of December 15, 1792 (State Archives, Genoa). As reported by Brunati on December 29, 1792 (*loc. cit.*), the Pope, with evident pleasure, imparted the news to his entourage in the chapel, on the Thursday.

by his wife and little son, was on such intimate terms with the revolutionary-minded students of the art academy, whose patriotism, he reported to Roland, was as great as their talent, that he was taken to task for neglecting the other Frenchmen. He attempted to excuse himself by pointing out that he had habitually invited all the French without distinction to his republican *Déjeuners*, namely, to "a cup of tea".¹

Azara, who was on intimate terms with Bassville, had already reported to Madrid on December 12th, 1792, that it was intended to replace the royal lilies on the art academy and the French post office by the cognizance of the new republic, the figure of Liberty with the Phrygian cap—a gesture that would cause more annoyance to the Papal Government than it had done to the Neapolitan one.² The idea arose with Mackau, who was accredited only to the Neapolitan Court and had no more of a mission in Rome than Bassville. The Minister of Marine had ordered him to have the royal arms replaced by the Republican ones at the consulates in Rome, Civitavecchia, and Ancona, if no opposition was offered there.³ Mackau and Bassville paid no heed to this proviso, but simply ordered the French postmaster in Rome, Digne by name, to change the arms. During the night of January 1st–2nd, 1793, Digne removed the royal arms and those of the Pope, but the erection of the Republican emblem was prevented by Papal soldiers both at the post office and the art academy.⁴ Zelada had brought this surprising demand to the consideration of the Congregation of Cardinals; of its seven members two had replied in the affirmative, five in the negative.⁵ The Pope and public opinion in Rome were also for refusing. The reply of the Cardinal Secretary of State, Zelada, was sent to Digne and

¹ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 172, 203.

² *Azara to Aranda, December 12, 1792 (Archives of Simancas).

³ GENDRY, II., 224 *seq.*

⁴ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 205; Capello's *report of January 3, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. BROSCHE, II., 188.

⁵ Capello's *report of January 5, 1793 (*ibid.*), and *Figari's in SFORZA, *L'assassinio di Bassville*, 265 n.

Bassville on January 8th, and was communicated to all the envoys. It referred to the excited state of popular feeling in Rome and set forth the reasons why the Pope did not allow the arms of the French Republic to be displayed. As the head of the Catholic Church he could not, without violating his most sacred obligations, recognize a Government that was exerting all its power to detach France from the Holy See. As the ruler of the States of the Church he must first demand reparation for the wrong that had been done him, for the burning of his portrait, the rape of Avignon and Venaissin, the destruction of the Papal arms on the residence of the Papal consul in Marseilles. Respect for armorial bearings was a universally recognized obligation of honour, which the French Government had been the first to violate. After the destruction of the Papal arms in Marseilles it was impossible for him to allow the Republican ones to be set up in Rome. Moreover, in December the residence of the Papal consul in Marseilles had been searched, and although the release of the two French artists had already taken place it had been demanded in an improper, threatening letter, which had been brought to public knowledge in the newspapers. In everyone's opinion, all these affronts justified the Pope in his refusal to allow the display under his very eyes in his own capital of the arms of a Republic which refused to allow the Papal arms to be shown in France.¹

Bassville, who now realized that the Papal Government had hitherto restrained itself only from fear of the French fleet in the Mediterranean,² was apparently not unaffected by the weight of these arguments, as he sent a courier to Paris to ask

¹ VICCHI, Appx., 18 seq.; *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 208 seq. Capello enclosed the note when *reporting to his Government on January 12, 1793. He was not wholly in agreement with it and presumed that its decisiveness was due to the courage which the Pope had derived from the declarations made by the English. If England, he concluded, dispatched its fleet in the spring, the Pope had nothing to fear, but if it did not, "potrebbe forse pagar caro un passo troppo affrettato ch'era meglio temporeggiare." State Archives, Venice.

² *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 207.

for fresh instructions. Meanwhile, however, he did all he could to increase the excitement that was taking hold of the Romans. At a banquet he gave for some influential Romans he toasted the French Republic, and at the same moment a cake shaped like a Phrygian cap was brought in ; this contained tricolour cockades, which Bassville distributed among the guests.¹ This incident naturally incensed the people, who were loyal to the Pope, and mordant satires were written by way of retort.² Thereupon Bassville's friends had a sonnet posted up in various places in the city, calling on the Romans to follow the example of Brutus.³ A contemporary tells us that Bassville was behaving as though Rome had already become another Paris.⁴ Though he had no official status he corresponded with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the manner of an ambassador and proposed to it on January 9th, 1793, that the "beatified martyr", as he called Pius VI., be brought to submission by a severe castigation.⁵

Bassville, who was disappointed to find that Rome was not a suitable place for his designs,⁶ was outdone in audacity by Mackau. On January 10th, 1793, he sent to Rome a naval officer, of the name of La Flotte, with letters for the Secretary of State and the consul Digne.⁷ Digne was instructed to display the Republican coat of arms without delay. He, however, objected quite rightly that Mackau had no authority to issue orders outside his own sphere of action, which was

¹ SFORZA, *L'assassinio di Bassville*, 264 ; SILVAGNI, I., 431.

² *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 212 ; VICCHI, 17 *seq.*

³ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 214.

⁴ SFORZA, *loc. cit.*, 264.

⁵ He suggested that : " On pourrait même le mener à Paris pour le jour des Rameaux, ce qui sans doute ferait rire l'ami Prudhomme." The letter, cited by DE LA GORCE (IV., 354), is in the *Archives des affaires étrangères* in Paris.

⁶ " *Bassville si mostra malcontento di non vedere secondati in Roma i suoi disegni." Figari's report of January 12, 1793 ; State Archives, Genoa.

⁷ Text in MASSON, *Les diplomates de la Révolution* (Paris, 1882), 70 *seqq.* Cf. VICCHI, Appx., 19 *seq.*

Naples, and that in any case the order was in contradiction to that of the Minister of Marine, which said that only a protest was to be made if the display of the Republican arms was disallowed. Mackau, he added, was unaware of the danger to which he was exposing all his countrymen by provoking still further popular feeling in a city in which the people clung to their religious traditions, and in any case hated the French. In these circumstances Digne thought it safer to wait until the special courier brought back a reply from the Executive Committee in Paris. But the hot-headed La Flotte refused to hear of this. Disregarding all the warnings that had been given him, he insisted that the national honour must be respected, the Secretary of State intimidated by drastic action, and the Pope compelled to withdraw his statement of March 8th.¹ Bassville having been won over to this way of thinking, they both repaired to the Secretary of State, to whom they gained admittance all the more easily as they assured him that they wanted to express their gratitude for the release of the two artists.² The gratitude consisted in their giving the Papal Government twenty-four hours in which to allow the display of the Republican arms. If the Pope withheld his assent the Republic would obtain satisfaction by sheer force. Zelada replied by referring them to the unfavourable statement of January 8th, but he undertook to draw the Pope's attention to the matter for the second time and to give them a reply on January 14th.³

The French threats became known immediately in Rome, and it was also learnt that La Flotte, as well as Bassville, was on the most friendly terms with the students of the French academy. The latter, in their revolutionary ardour, burned the statue of Louis XIV., the founder of the academy, in the basement, and put up a statue of Brutus in the dining hall. They also applied themselves with enthusiasm to the making of a Republican coat of arms which was to be displayed

¹ Mérimée's report in *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 237; cf. 219.

² *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 221.

³ *Ibid.*, 221.

in defiance of the Papal prohibition.¹ All these things must have increased the fury of the Romans to such a point that it was almost beyond control. In view of the excited state of popular feeling, the Pope had already given orders at Christmas to the military to take certain precautions, which had proved to be effective.² In consequence of the provocative behaviour of the French academy and the threats of La Flotte and Bassville he ordered special measures for the maintenance of order to be taken on Sunday, January 13th³; they failed, however, to prevent the disaster resulting from Bassville's allowing himself to be persuaded by La Flotte to participate in another blatant act of provocation.⁴

¹ LAPAUZE, *Hist. de l'Académie de France*, I., 447. Lapauze points out quite rightly (p. 446) that the conflict was provoked by Bassville and La Flotte.

² Figari *reported on December 29, 1792 (*loc. cit.*), that there was no disturbance on Christmas night, that "la città era ben guardata da soldatesche ripartite in più luoghi per impedir ogni disordine", and that theatrical performances, even in private houses, and masks were forbidden during the carnival.

³ Reports in SFORZA (*loc. cit.*, 266). Cf. Figari's *letters of January 5 and 12, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). In the latter he wrote: "Le pattuglie non cessano di girare giorno e notte per tutta la città" to prevent any disorder "che l'astuzia francese potrebbe suscitare".

⁴ For many years French historians have been led astray by the legendary account of Bassville's murder published by the *Moniteur*, which bristles with lies. Perfectly clear accounts are given by MASSON (*loc. cit.*). Cf. also SFORZA (*loc. cit.*) and VICCHI, lxxxvii *seqq.* The latter, in his Appx. (pp. 25 *seq.*), gives two contemporary accounts and (pp. 27-9) Zelada's account, dated January 16, 1793, which is also in *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 220-6; the last-mentioned volume contains also Digne's report (218 *seq.*). The account given by P. Vincenzo Fortini di Serravezza, who was well informed, is in SFORZA (263-9). See also Capello's *report of January 14, 1793 (*loc. cit.*), and *Figari's of January 19 (*loc. cit.*). For Vincenzo Monti's poem on the death of Bassville, see VICCHI, *V. Monti, Le lettere e la politica in Italia dal 1791 al 1793*, Paris, 1893; *id.*, *Les Français*, 88 *seq.*, 104 *seq.*, 106 *seq.*; AL. SCHREIBER, *Friedrich Weinbrenner, Denkwürdigkeiten aus seinem Leben* (Heidelberg, 1929), 97 *seqq.*

On this Sunday afternoon, accompanied by his wife, his little son, La Flotte, a French friend called Amaury Duval, and two servants, Bassville drove in an open carriage along the Corso, which was crowded at this time of day, as though he were heading a triumphal procession.¹ All the occupants of the carriage wore large tricolour cockades in their hats, and one of them waved a tricolour silk flag. The crowd took offence, an urchin threw a stone into the carriage,² it was soon followed by others, and on all sides there were shouts of "Take off those cockades!" An altercation then ensued, La Flotte and Bassville refusing to remove their Republican badges and returning the Romans' insults with interest. The excitement was increased by the firing of a shot, though no one was hit. Threatened with the sticks and stones of the mob, the party, on reaching the Piazza Colonna, finally realized its peril. At the Palazzo Chigi the driver was told to drive through the Vicolo dello Sdrucchiolo to the neighbouring Palazzo Palombara, the residence of the French banker Morette. The carriage, however, was followed by the yelling mob, a part of which forced its way into the palace. Here a scuffle took place and Bassville was seriously wounded by a knife-thrust in the belly.³ Had it not been for the police, who hurried to the scene and

¹ " *Come in aria di trionfo passeggiarono in carrozza per il Corso " (Capello, *loc. cit.*).

² Cf. the "Relazione" of January 19, 1793, published by R. PASTE in the *Arch. d. Soc. Vercellese di storia e d'arte*, I. (1909), 133.

³ Capello *reported on January 14, 1793, that after leaving his carriage " Bassville venne alle mani e ferì uno del popolo " (State Archives, Venice). Zelada's official account also says " il voulut se défendre avec un fer à la main et dans la mêlée il blessa quoique légèrement quelqu'un " (*Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 223 *seq.*), which was denied by the other side. Bassville himself told Dr. Flajani that he tried to take La Flotte's pistol away from him (VICCHI, Appx., 61). The report of January 16, 1793 (in VICCHI, 29), also says that La Flotte wanted to defend himself and that Bassville hindered him, which the assailants took to be a defence. The attempts made to find the man who struck the blow met with no success. *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 225 *seq.*

took him to their guard-room in the Via Frattina, he would have been done to death on the spot. As it was, he received further injuries from stones that were thrown at him as he was being carried away. In the guard-room he was attended to by Dr. Bussan and later by the Pope's physician, Flajani, who had been sent at once by the Pope himself. But two days later, in spite of every medical attention, Bassville succumbed to his injuries.¹ He had asked for the Last Sacraments, which were administered to him by the parish priest of San Lorenzo in Lucina, after his recantation of the oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution. He told Flajani that he owed his death to La Flotte, since had he not appeared on the scene nothing would have happened.² A fitting burial for Bassville was provided by the Pope at San Lorenzo in Lucina.³ La Flotte had left his friend in the lurch and seen to the safety of his own person by escaping through a window into a neighbouring house. He, with Bassville's wife and son, owed his life to the Pope, who had a carriage and an escort of sixty men waiting outside the gate. It was by this means that they got safely away to Naples.⁴

The infuriated populace had attacked not only the Palazzo

¹ Dr. Bussan's report of January 25, 1793, in VICCHI, Appx., 46 *seq.*, which also contains the "Relazione" of Dr. Giuseppe Flajani (pp. 61 *seq.*) and Bussan's reply, dated Florence, April 1, 1793 (pp. 75 *seq.*). The two doctors disputed with each other as to whose unskilful treatment was the cause of the death. In any case the Pope was not responsible, as he did all he could to save Bassville's life. The doctor said in his report: The Pope "mi ordinò di prestargli tutta la assistenza, di visitarlo spesso e di ordinare a suo nome tutto ciò che credevo necessario e che potea contribuire alla sua guarigione". In confining himself to Bussan's report and saying nothing about the dispatch of the Papal physician, BROSCHE (II., 189) was giving a purely partisan account.

² VICCHI, Appx., 61 *seq.* Bassville had to recant because he was a secularized deacon (*ibid.*, 26 *seq.*); GENDRY, II., 184, n. 2.

³ GENDRY (II., 232), who reproduces the entry in the registry of deaths kept at S. Lorenzo in Lucina.

⁴ Figari's *report of January 19, 1793 (State Archives, Genoa); *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 225. In his *report of the same date

Palombara but also the French post office, the academy of art, where they set fire to the front door, and the houses occupied by such Francophiles as the banker Torlonia. In every case the windows were smashed and attempts were made to set fire to the houses, but these acts of vengeance were averted by the personal intervention of Senator Rezzonico and General Caprara. During the night the whole city was astir; in every street there were cries of "Long live the Catholic religion! Long live the Pope!" All carriages were stopped and their occupants were made to join in the cheering.¹ "The revolution that was to be started in Rome has misfired," wrote the Venetian ambassador Capello at the end of his report of January 14th, 1793. "There were no supporters of it anywhere."²

The next day the anger of the people, the Trasteverini in particular, turned against the Jews. For months past there had been talk in Rome about these detested aliens supplying the French with money, making tricolour cockades for them, and being in league with them for the purpose of bringing about a revolution. What was far more serious and, for the Jews, more dangerous, was the resentment of the traders, who saw that their interests were being gravely injured by the Jews' disregard for the commercial laws.³ Accordingly, a plot was hatched to take a fearful vengeance on them. Fortunately, however, the ghetto, which the mob, including some elements intent on booty, proposed to set on fire, was protected by Papal troops.⁴

Herzan stresses that La Flotte owed his escape to the Popes' magnanimity (State Archives, Vienna).

¹ Capello's *report of January 14, 1793 (*loc. cit.*), and *Figari's of January 19, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

² "La rivoluzione che vedevasi di operar in Roma è affatto mancata senza che siasi manifestato alcun partito per essa" (Figari's report, *ibid.*). Herzan also emphasized in his *report of January 19, 1793, that the riot was due not to insubordination but to loyalty to the ruler and respect for religion (*loc. cit.*).

³ Letter in SFORZA (*loc. cit.*, 268).

⁴ Figari's *report of January 19, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

In other directions, too, the authorities succeeded in preventing further disorders. Most of the French had already fled from Rome, and those that remained were afforded protection at the Pope's command. The parish priests were asked to pacify the people, the excesses already committed were condemned in an edict of January 16th, and by another edict of the 17th the Jews were placed under the same restrictions as those ordained by the Bull of Paul IV.¹

By January 15th order had been restored in Rome,² and the city gradually resumed its former tenor. Vigilance, however, had still to be exercised, as the people's anger had not yet entirely subsided.³ Further precautionary measures were taken by the Pope, including some for the protection of his own person.⁴ By a full and calmly-worded report issued on January 16th and communicated to all the envoys,⁵ he hoped to forestall a distorted account of the regrettable events. Mackau's forceful method of procedure had been disapproved of not only by Digne but also by Bernard and even by some of the students at the art academy.⁶ Nor did it conform with the plans of the Executive Committee in Paris, where Madame Roland no longer set the tone. Not yet informed of the riot of

¹ **Ibid.* and Capello's *report of the same day (*loc. cit.*). There is nothing here about the ghetto being "stormed and partially plundered", as stated by BROSCHE (II., 189), who was evidently repeating the words used by the contemporary writer A. VERRI in his *Vicende memorabili del 1789-1802* (Milano, 1858), I., 133 *seqq.*: "Dicdero un fiero assalto al Ghetto." Digne took care to say in his report that the ghetto was protected by the troops (*Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 219). Cf. the account in VICCHI, Appx., 42 *seq.*

² Digne's report (*loc. cit.*, 220).

³ " *In somma vi è quel mare grosso che resta dopo la burrasca," wrote Capello in January 26, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. Figari's report of the same day (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Capello's *report of January 26, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

⁵ Capello's *report of January 19, 1793 (*ibid.*), and Herzan's *letter of the same day (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 227, 228, 238.

January 13th, Lebrun, on the 23rd, had written to Bassville, strongly disapproving of his action in the matter of the coat of arms. Custom and prudence demanded, he wrote, that Bassville should first have come to an understanding with the College of Cardinals, so as not to jeopardize the dignity of the nation and the safety of the French in Rome. To the Pope, who had not formally recognized the Republic, it must have seemed an extraordinary procedure to replace the royal arms by the Republican ones in that abrupt manner. Bassville was ordered to return to Naples, and someone else would be appointed to conduct diplomatic relations.¹

This task had already been entrusted by the Executive Committee on January 19th to Cacault, secretary to Baron Talleyrand in Naples, and on the 30th he received the definite instruction to inform the Cardinal Secretary of State that the Executive Committee disapproved of all the steps taken on their own authority by Bassville and Digne as being unseemly and improper, and it asked that these steps and all their consequences should be forgotten.²

But before Cacault could undertake his new appointment in Rome³ a sudden *volte-face* took place in Paris. The living Bassville had been completely disavowed; but now that he was dead he was declared to be without question a martyr of the Republic. The conspiracy of the king's priests must be avenged by the destruction of Rome; the time had come for this city to disappear from the face of the world, which it had oppressed so long.⁴ On February 2nd, 1793, on the strength of wholly partisan reports, the National Convention passed the following resolution. Whereas the fearful crimes committed against the person of Bassville and the destruction and burning

¹ *Ibid.*, 236. Cf. VICCHI, cxxci seq., who states: "Le Ministère jugea que le pape avait raison en droit aussi bien qu'en fait."

² VICCHI, Appx., 49 seqq. Cf. *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 248; GENDRY, II., 233; VICCHI, *loc. cit.*

³ He did not leave Paris till February 7, 1793. Had he taken up his post immediately, says VICCHI (*loc. cit.*), it would have meant a victory for the Pope.

⁴ VICCHI, Appx., 28 seq.

of the art academy and French consulate constituted an affront to the national sovereignty and a flagrant violation of international law, the Executive Committee was to decide on the measures necessary for the taking of a resounding vengeance. Bassville's son was to be brought up at the Republic's expense and his widow was to be granted a pension.¹ Four days later Cacault, who shortly before had been commissioned to disapprove of Bassville's behaviour, was given instructions by the Committee of Public Safety to present the following demands to the Cardinal Secretary of State: (1) The dispatch of a nuncio to Paris to apologize for the murderous attack. (2) The withdrawal of the prohibition against the erection of the Republican arms on the French consulate. (3) The banishment of all *émigrés* from the States of the Church, in particular the Abbé Maury. (4) The punishment of the instigators of the riots of January 12th and 13th. (5) The indemnification of the Frenchmen and Romans affected by these disturbances. (6) The restoration of the art academy to its former condition.²

Naturally, Pius VI. refused to buy peace with the Republic on such humiliating terms. Cacault was not allowed to appear in Rome and had to stay in Florence, where he tried to be of use by caring for the Frenchmen who had fled from Rome or who were still remaining there. But the Republic was not in a position to take steps against the States of the Church. It had enough to do to protect itself against its enemies, both within and without its frontiers. Consequently the Bassville affair had to be allowed to lapse.³

The calm that had settled over Rome since the middle of January, 1793, was not to last long. The news of the execution of Louis XVI. on January 21st shocked the whole civilized world, England as much as the Continental states; in Italy, especially Rome, where the people were definitely hostile to

¹ *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 253 seq. The consulate was only slightly damaged (GENDRY, II., 233).

² *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 258 seq.

³ VICCHI, cxxvi seq.

the French Revolution, a particularly deep impression was made. During the king's trial the world had become inured to the thought of a sanguinary issue; nevertheless, when the horrid deed had actually been done it had the effect of an utterly unexpected and unbelievable crime. The whole population of Rome was seized with sorrow and disgust. The Pope wept for grief and passed a sleepless night.¹

The indignation of the Romans was now turned with renewed fury against the Frenchmen who were still in the city and their friends, especially the Jews. On February 11th and 12th acts of violence were again committed in Rome and the people demanded the expulsion of every Frenchman. The Government did all it could to protect those who were threatened, if they had not already taken to flight, or to remove them from the city. At the Government's request pacificatory sermons were preached and agitators were arrested. This last measure had a salutary effect, and an edict of February 17th, condemning the excesses, also helped in the same direction.²

When England joined in the war against France and it seemed likely that the Coalition would be further enlarged by the inclusion of Spain and Portugal, the Pope could face the threats of the French Republic with comparative composure.³ The Venetian ambassador, writing on February 23rd, said that they no longer had any effect and that France would be defeated by the British sea-power.⁴ This atmosphere of

¹ Figari's *report of February 9, 1793 (State Archives, Genoa), and *Capello's of the same day (State Archives, Venice). Cf. the poems in VICCHI, Appx., 63.

² See the reports in VICCHI, Appx., 58 seq., 60 seq., *Cardinal Herzan's to Colloredo, of February 13, 1793 (State Archives, Vienna), *Figari's of February 9, 16, and 28, 1793 (*loc. cit.*), and *Capello's of February 16 and 23, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). The edict of February 17, 1793, is in VICCHI, Appx., 59 seq. According to Figari's report of February 16 there were attacks on the French and Jews in Albano also.

³ Capello's *reports of February 2 and 9, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Capello's *report of February 23, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

confidence increased in March, when it was heard that the French expedition against Sardinia had failed miserably.¹ Shortly afterwards, it was learnt that war had broken out between Spain and France.² Tuscany, the only state in Italy that still maintained relations with the French Republic, offered to mediate for Pius VI., but this proposal he rejected.³ On the other hand, having no illusions about the military strength of the Papal States,⁴ the Pope was by no means inclined to give his unconditional support to the Royalists and thus give the appearance of interfering in France's domestic affairs—a standpoint which was also adopted by Austria, England, and Prussia. In spite of Azara's efforts to persuade him the Pope declared that he could not recognize Louis XVIII., Count of Provence, as a sovereign until the other Great Powers had done so. The most that he did in this direction was to send a confidential Brief, in French, in reply to the letters he had received from the Count, one of which purported to accredit Cardinal Bernis as ambassador. In this Brief he expressed the lively hope that after the impediments had been removed he would be able to recognize the Count as a sovereign.⁵

Rome received with joy the news that the Republican

¹ Capello's *report of March 9, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

² Capello's *report of March 16, 1793 (*ibid.*).

³ Capello's *reports of March 2 and 23, 1793 (*ibid.*).

⁴ In spite of all the defensive measures that had been taken, Figari considered them inadequate (*report of March 23, 1793, *loc. cit.*), and Capello wrote in his report of March 9 (*loc. cit.*): “* È piu da sperare in quello che non possono fare i Francesi che in quello che possono fare i Romani.” In his *report of June 8, 1793 (*loc. cit.*), Figari complained of the lack of discipline among the troops, and in his *report of the 27th (*ibid.*) he referred to clashes between the soldiers and “sbirri”. How little the Papal troops were to be trusted is shown by the discovery of a plot that had been hatched on a Papal galley in Civitavecchia, where 155 galley-slaves revolted. Troops had to be called in to quell them and fifty prisoners were taken to Rome. “Viaggiatori e corrieri in paura”; *reported Capello on August 10, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

⁵ MASSON, *Bernis*, 535 *seq.*

troops had been defeated in Belgium by the Imperial army and that Royalist revolts had blazed up in the Vendée and Brittany.¹ "Pius VI.," wrote the Venetian ambassador Capello on April 20th, 1793, "is now free of all danger and apprehension. He is on friendly terms with all the monarchs, even the non-Catholic ones. Sweden wants to accredit an ambassador to Rome; negotiations are pending with England concerning closer relations; the Emperor promises the recovery of Avignon; and Spain and Portugal offer to protect the Papal States with their fleets."² The same assurance soon came from England, too.³ Thus, the Revolution, as Capello observed in another report, was forcing the non-Catholic States to adopt a more friendly attitude towards the Holy See.⁴ So great was the Romans' admiration of the Pope that they wanted to erect a bronze statue of him on the Capitol, but to this he would not assent.⁵ He had had processions held to implore from God a happier state of world affairs,⁶ but he had so little confidence in the improvement that had taken place in April that he had prohibited the Girandola that was customary at Easter and the illumination of the dome of St. Peter's, lest they might be regarded as a manifestation of joy at the French defeat.⁷ But when the risings in Northern France persisted⁸ and the Republican

¹ Capello's *reports of March 23 and 30, and April 6 and 20, 1793 (*loc. cit.*), and *Figari's of April 6, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

² " *Questa corte era affatto esente da pericoli e da timori, ha motivo di gloriarsi della sua condotta politica, amica di tutti i potentati anche non cattolici " (*loc. cit.*).

³ Capello's *report of April 14, 1793 (*ibid.*).

⁴ Capello's *report of May 25, 1793 (*ibid.*).

⁵ Capello's *report of April 16, 1793 (*ibid.*), and *Figari's of April 20, 1793 (State Archives, Genoa; *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 294; TAVANTI, II., 206).

⁶ Figari's *reports of March 2, 9, 23, and 30, 1793 (*ibid.*).

⁷ Figari's *report of April 3, 1793 (*ibid.*).

⁸ After fuller reports had reached Rome, Capello *wrote on June 1, 1793, that he had prophesied in 1789 that there would be civil war in France; the country would go bankrupt (*loc. cit.*).

armies suffered further reverses at the hands of the Allies,¹ he was sure at last that there was nothing more to fear, and on June 17th, at a secret Consistory, he spoke his mind about the murder of the French king. He deplored the mighty fall of France, that once had been the model for the whole of Christendom and a rampart for the Catholic faith, and he did not hesitate to describe Louis XVI. as a martyr, observing also that even Queen Elizabeth had granted Mary Stuart, who also had died for the Catholic faith, a decent burial.² On July 12th, 1793, England, which had already concluded an alliance with Savoy on April 25th, won over Naples, too, for the war against France.³

The spreading of the revolt in Brittany, in connexion with which similar movements afterwards started in the south, the anarchical conditions in the new Republic, the successful prosecution of the war by the Allies, and the taking of Mainz by the Prussians, all made a very deep impression in Rome.⁴ It was hoped that the Revolution would be completely overthrown, and in September it was decided to have the allocution of June 17th printed and published and to send copies of it to all the envoys.⁵ On September 23rd a requiem for Louis XVI. was celebrated by Cardinal Bernis in the Cappella Paolina, in the Quirinal, where the Pope resided in the summer. The

¹ " *Continuano le vittorie degli alleati," are the opening words of Capello's report of June 15, 1793 (*ibid.*), in which he gives further news of the rebellion in France.

² Capello's *report of June 22, 1793 (*ibid.*), and *Figari's of the same date (*loc. cit.*). The speech is in THEINER, *Docum.*, I., 177 *seqq.*, and VICCHI, 91 *seq.*; *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 3, 2627-2637.

³ COPPI, 275 *seq.*, 277 *seq.*; LEO, V., 823 *seq.*

⁴ Capello's *reports of July 6, 13, and 20, August 10, 17, and 24, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). In the last-mentioned report he says, " ma l'anarchia non è governo durevole."

⁵ Figari's *reports of September 18 and 21, 1793 (*loc. cit.*), and Capello's of September 21, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). Attached to the last one was a printed copy of the allocution. Capello noted that the epithet " martyr " and the reference to Mary Stuart had been criticized.

funeral oration delivered by Paolo Leardi moved many of his listeners to tears.¹ On November 12th a memorial service arranged by Cardinal Bernis in honour of his murdered king was held in the national church of S. Luigi, again with all the pomp of the old France.² Shortly before, the news had arrived in Rome of the execution of Queen Marie Antoinette. The Pope's grief was shared by the whole city. As this fresh outrage was likely to occasion further assaults on the French and their friends, the Government took extensive precautions, which this time were entirely adequate.³

The Pope had been taken ill in September and he had been unwell the whole of October.⁴ On resuming residence in the Vatican in November he decided to stay there permanently, as year after year he had been ill in the Quirinal.⁵ He was now seventy-five years old, and it was not surprising that his health had been affected, for the year 1793 had brought him many anxieties. He had witnessed the collapse of a great Catholic empire, not only in the west⁶ but also in the east of Europe,

¹ Figari's *report of September 28, 1793 (*loc. cit.*); GENDRY (II., 239), who wrongly gives September 28 as the date of the ceremony. Leardi's "Oratio in funere Ludovici XVI." is attached, in its original printed version, to Capello's *report of November 16, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). It is reprinted in VECCHI, Appx., 109 *seq.*; an Italian translation by G. B. Carlieri appeared at Foligno in 1794.

² VICCHI, Appx., 116 *seq.*; *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 347; MASSON, *Bernis*, 358 *seq.* Bernis, whose influence in Rome had almost gone, died on November 3, 1794. His body was taken to Nîmes and was buried in the church of St. Castor; his heart was kept in Rome and placed in the first chapel on the left in the church of S. Luigi, where a monument was erected to his memory in 1805, at his family's expense. *Ibid.*, 547 *seq.*

³ Capello's *report of November 9, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Capello's *reports of September 7 and October 19 and 26, 1793 (*ibid.*). The Pope's restoration to health was *reported by Capello on November 2, 1793 (*ibid.*). See also Figari's *letter of October 19, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

⁵ Capello's *report of November 23, 1793 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ Capello's *report of December 7, 1793 (*ibid.*): "Il S. Padre è percosso di dolore mentre ora si comincia a realizzare in Francia

namely Poland.¹ In addition to all his other troubles he had to deal with another matter that threatened to disrupt the French Catholics, already so sorely persecuted. On September 3rd, 1792, the Legislative Assembly had imposed a fresh oath on every citizen, by which they were to swear to uphold the liberty, equality, and security of persons and property, and if necessary to die for the observance of the law. A heavy penalty was to be exacted in cases of refusal, and the question arose whether the clergy could take this oath. Some of them took it at once, others held it to be illicit.²

In Rome this new, so-called "little" oath (*serment de la liberté et de l'égalité*) was attacked by Maury with all the passion and decisiveness of a Provençal. The Secretary of State, Zelada, before whom the matter had been placed for his consideration, replied in March, 1793, that if it was merely a question of a civil oath, it could be taken. On May 18th he disavowed Maury, who had asserted that the Pope disapproved of the new oath.³

With his usual caution Pius VI. had referred the matter to a special Congregation of Cardinals. Inquiries were made and the French Bishops were consulted. On May 28th, 1793, the Pope reminded those concerned that he had not yet come to

il processo di abolire il cristianesimo persino alle sue traccie e di sostituire un culto secondo le idee del gentilesimo."

¹ " *La S. Sede col perdere i due regni di Francia e Polonia perde più della metà del cattolicesimo " (Capello, on April 19, 1794, *ibid.*). Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIX., 162 *seqq.*

² For what follows, see the excellent articles by E. MANGENOT (*L'intervention de Pie VI. au sujet du serment de la liberté et de l'égalité*) in the *Rev. pratique d'Apologétique*, XXIV. (1917), 257 *seqq.*, 342 *seqq.*, 414 *seqq.*, 539 *seqq.*, 726 *seqq.*, XXV. (1917), 355 *seqq.* He corrects the particulars about the works of the Abbé Misermont in the *Rev. d'étud. hist.*, 1910, and in *Le serment de Liberté-Égalité et quelques documents inédits des Arch. Vat.*, Paris, 1914, also the assertions made by MATHIEZ in *Les divisions du clergé réfractaire* in the *Révol. franç.*, XXXIX. (1900), 44 *seq.*, 97 *seqq.*

³ MANGENOT (*loc. cit.*, 351).

a definite decision and that meanwhile no canonical penalties should be imposed on clerics who had taken the new oath ; on the other hand, in doubtful cases neither clerics nor laymen were allowed to take it.¹

A final judgment on the new oath was never passed by Pius VI. His personal opinion was that it should not be taken, but he did not confirm the condemnatory verdict passed by Maury, the French Bishops, and the Congregation of Cardinals. In this question of the "little oath" the Pope, who had absolutely forbidden the taking of the oath of loyalty to the schismatic and heretical Civil Constitution, showed a moderation that equalled his prudence and foresight.²

The hopes that had been entertained of the French Republic's downfall were destined to remain unrealized. By the end of 1793 the rising of the Royalists in the Vendée had been crushed and the Coalition was in a most unfavourable situation : defeats, instead of the hoped-for victories, were being sustained on all sides, Prussia's further participation in the war was doubtful, and Austria and Spain were weary and exhausted.³ Cardinal Bernis' opinion was that if the next campaign went the same way, it would end in complete exhaustion and the Republicans would emerge the victors.⁴ Such being the situation it was obviously inadvisable to offer any provocation to the French Republic, and Pius VI. was seriously perturbed by the Romans' desire to celebrate the anniversary of Bassville's death with a general illumination. It was prevented by an edict of January 11th, 1794, and at the same time

¹ THEINER, *Docum.*, I., 173. MANGENOT (XXIV., 259) points out quite rightly that the oath demanded in 1793 during the establishment of the Département of Mont-Blanc, was an entirely different one, which was rightly forbidden by the Pope (*ibid.*, XXV., 356) because it expressly comprised allegiance to the Civil Constitution. For the oath demanded at Nice in 1795, which was also forbidden by Pius VI., see *ibid.*, 365 *seq.*

² MANGENOT, XXV., 367 *seq.*

³ BAUMGARTEN, *Gesch. Spaniens*, 501 *seq.*

⁴ MASSON, *Bernis*, 543.

the clergy were instructed to preach sermons that would help to calm the people's feelings.¹

The real cause of the allies' ill-success, as the Venetian ambassador Capello rightly emphasized at the beginning of 1794, was that each of them was striving to attain its own particular aims at the expense of the interests common to them all.² They were waging not so much a war against the Revolution as a war of conquest for themselves. Each of the belligerent powers wanted to be compensated for its military expenses by the acquisition of a French frontier-fortress or some other territory. Unity was completely lacking.³ In Belgium and on the Rhine disagreement among the allies hindered the winning of victories which would have been fatal to the Revolution.

Pius VI.'s chief hope in 1794 was set on England,⁴ which as announced in the speech from the throne on January 21st, was firmly determined to continue the struggle on which depended the preservation of the constitution and the safety of the whole of civil society. By sending Erskine to London in August, 1793, the Pope had entered into direct negotiations with the British Government,⁵ and among the beneficial effects of this step was the alleviation of the deplorable situation of the Catholics in England.⁶

¹ Capello's *report of January 18, 1794 (State Archives, Venice).

² Capello argued to this effect in his *reports of March 29 and April 5, 1794 (*ibid.*).

³ Capello's *report of February 15, 1794 (*ibid.*); Azara's *report to the Duke of Alcadia, of April 2, 1794 (Archives of Simancas).

⁴ Azara's *report to the Duke of Alcadia, of January 15, 1794, enclosing the edict of the 11th (*ibid.*). The edict is reprinted in VICCHI, Appx., 130 seq. Cf. *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 362.

⁵ Erskine's mission, which was primarily of a commercial nature, was *reported by Capello and Figari on August 31, 1793, as about to take place in the near future (*loc. cit.*). In his *report of March 15, 1794 (*loc. cit.*), Capello observed that to have relations with Protestant England was against the "Roman maxims" that had been followed hitherto.

⁶ It had an effect, among other directions, in Santo Domingo

After England, Pius VI.'s next great hope was in the Imperial army,¹ but after the battle of Fleurus (June 26th, 1794) the Austrian, English, and Dutch troops had to abandon Belgium, which was consequently plundered by the French, the churches suffering especially severely.² On the Austrian General Clairfait's retirement before Jourdan's advance after the battle of Jülich (October 2nd), the same fate was undergone by the towns on the Lower Rhine. It was especially those that were the residences of ecclesiastical princes that provided excellent material for the predatory and destructive activity of the Revolution, which was in glaring contrast to the trees of liberty it had planted and which soon disillusioned the dissatisfied elements that had placed their trust in the initial promises. It is significant that "holy Cologne", that up to the time of the Revolution had 118 churches, was now left with only twenty-two.³

and all the British colonies. See *Azara to Alcadia on September 24, 1794 (*loc. cit.*). On September 13, 1794, Capello *reported that England was now showing a more favourable attitude towards the Catholics and that Erskine, in spite of his being an Auditor, was staying in London "con occulto carattere" (*loc. cit.*). Cf. his *report of November 1, 1794 (*ibid.*). For Erskine's efforts to effect a commercial treaty, see Azara's *letter of June 11th, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

¹ Capello's *report of March 15, 1794 (*loc. cit.*), with the observation: "Questo ministro di Spagna [Azara] che non ha più l'influsso di primo, non rappresenterà ciò alla sua corte con parola indifferente."

² WEISS (*loc. cit.*), XVIII., 391; PIRENNE, VI., 55 *seqq.*

³ Cf. H. CARDAUNS, *Köln in der Franzosenzeit 1789-1802* (Bonn, 1923); J. BAYER, *Die Franzosen in Köln, 1794-1814* (Köln, 1925). For the robbery of the cathedral treasures, see *Domblatt*, 1852, No. 93; ENNEN, *Die Stadt Köln und die französ. Republik*, in the *Belletrist. Beilage zur Köln. Volkszeitung* (May 16 and June 6, 1869). For the French occupation of other places, cf. ARMEL D'ÉTEL, *Les Capucins d'Alsace pendant la Révolution* (Strasbourg, 1923); M. SPRINGER, *Die Franzosenherrschaft in der Pfalz 1792-1814* (Stuttgart, 1927); M. SALM, *Die lothring. Ahnengruft des österr. Kaiserhauses*, in the *Hist.-pol. Blätter*,

In Rome, where the course of the war of the Coalition had been followed with intense interest, the news of all these events was all the more shattering because of the high hopes that had been entertained. In April 1794, the Venetian ambassador Capello observed that the sky was growing ever darker. He noted in alarm that revolutionary ideas were creeping into Italy too: in Genoa even the nobility had been infected.¹ Things were much the same in Naples, where since Tanucci's time the Government had been systematically wearing away respect for the Church, writers such as Genovesi and Filangieri had been spreading revolutionary ideas, and the freemasons' lodges had undermined the ground. When in March 1794, the Government finally took action against the masonic intriguers, it was too late.²

To Pius VI., a prey to feverish attacks in April,³ the battles in Belgium were a cause of great anxiety. In May and June he ordered public prayers to be said and joined in them fervently himself.⁴ Meanwhile the financial distress in the Papal States, which the Tesoriere Generale, Ruffo, tried in vain to control,⁵

CLXIX. (1922; especially p. 653, where its destruction in 1793 is described).

¹ *Letter of April 19, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

² LEO, V., 381; Capello's *report of April 5, 1794 (*loc. cit.*). In his *report of April 26, 1794, he stated that the conspiracies in Naples and Genoa had been the work of the French (*ibid.*). For F. S. Salvi, a priest who had become a freemason and who fled to Genoa, see his biography by C. NARDI (Genoa, 1925).

³ Capello's *reports of March 29 and April 19, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Capello's *report of May 24, 1794 (*ibid.*), and *Figari's of June 7 and 14, 1794 (State Archives, Genoa). See also Azara's *letter of June 11, 1794 (Archives of Simancas).

⁵ As Capello reported on February 1, 1794 (*loc. cit.*), the measures introduced by the Tesoriere Generale, Ruffo, had made him disliked " *senza rendersi utile alla camera ". He had, in fact, become so unpopular that Pius VI. decided to relieve him of his post. Accordingly, on February 21, 1794, a nomination of Cardinals suddenly took place and Ruffo was raised to the purple along with A. Dugnani, Ippol. Ant. Vinc. Mareri, Maury, G. Batt. Bussi, Fr. M. Pignatelli, F. Lancellotti, Aurelio Roverello, and

reached such a pitch that desperate measures were adopted, one example being the sale of the timber in the arsenal of Civitavecchia.¹ The Government was at its wits' end to know what to do. The measures taken by Ruffo had been deeply resented and had proved useless. The expenditure, which in view of the political situation could not be reduced, was still exceeding the receipts. No loan could be effected, nor was it possible to impose fresh taxes, increase the paper money, or debase the coinage, for these measures would have raised the price of the barest necessities and have caused more riots.²

Giov. Rinuccini. Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIX., 348. The most divergent opinions were passed on Ruffo's promotion, but—as observed by *Capello on February 22, 1794 (*loc. cit.*)—the Pope “ poco cura le censure e le satire. Però dei nuovi ingiuriosi cartelli sono stati jeri affissi contro il card. Ruffo, il quale nell'uscire dalla casa Braschi fu anche urlato dal popolo mentre il card. Maury fu guardato con qualche stupore, ma però in silenzio ”. The promotions of Roverella and Dugnani met with approval. Cf. Azara's *report of February 5, 1794, which also announced forthcoming alterations in the nunciatures (*loc. cit.*).

¹ Capello's *report of July 14, 1793 (*loc. cit.*). On March 22, 1793, he had *reported that as the charge for purchasing gold and silver with notes already amounted to 5 per cent, the “ Congregazione di stato ” was against the increase of paper money (*ibid.*).

² *Capello on March 29, 1794 (*ibid.*): “ Le finanze pontificie sono in maggior disordine di primo malgrado l'apparente severa amministrazione dell'ultimo tesoriere generale che ha fatto gridare tutti senza alcun frutto per la camera. In conseguenza le spese superano di molto le rendite et le prime non possono diminuirsi sino a che durano questi tempi calamitosi e difficili. Non si può fare un imprestito perchè ora non si sa da chi, non imposizioni maggiori perchè troppo pesanti ed impercettibili, non una aumentazione della carta perchè caderebbe sempre più in discredito e nemmeno con alterazione della moneta sia col diminuirne il valore intrinseco sia coll'alzarne il valore estrinseco poichè questa operazione oltre molti altri disordini trascinando naturalmente con se l'accrescimento del prezzo di tutti i generi e massime di quelli di prima necessità, farebbe gridare il popolo e

In May certain persons with leanings towards Jacobinism were arrested in Rome,¹ but the State was defenceless ; in July an expert observed that the costly fortifications in Civitavecchia were useless.² The only hope now was that the French Republic would continue to be preoccupied with its enemies within and without its frontiers. Of the latter, the English fleet seemed to be the most formidable, for which reason its officers were received and assisted in the most friendly manner possible.³

For a time there was hope of stemming the advances of the French in Piedmont,⁴ but it proved to be illusory. The abandonment by the Piedmontese of their position at Loano on July 3rd left the French a clear road to Lombardy. In addition, the news from Belgium was more and more disheartening. In July the report was current in Rome that the loss of Ypres and Charleroi⁵ had been followed by that of Brussels. This, of course, caused great alarm.⁶ For a time the rumour was not substantiated, but there could be no doubt that the situation in Belgium was becoming more critical every day.⁷ On August 9th Capello wrote that there was no

sarebbe imprudente e pericolosa nei momenti presenti. Questo stato non ha alcuna risorsa nemmeno nel patriotismo Romano, siccome l'esperienza dell'anno passato lo ha fatto conoscere."

¹ On May 17, 1794, Capello *reported the arrests in Rome of two "impudenti Giacobini", namely Angelucci ("il più bravo chirurgo di Roma") "ed un certo Corona parente del medico di tal cognome". Suspicious papers and money had been found on them. Arrests had also been made in other places besides Rome, such as Terracina. State Archives, Venice.

² Capello's *report of July 14, 1794 (*ibid.*).

³ Capello's *reports of May 31 and July 7, 1794 (*ibid.*).

⁴ Capello's *report of June 28, 1794 (*ibid.*): "Tutti i tentativi francesi con l'Italia fortunatamente abortirono. Respinti anche dalle parti dell'Alpi cessa ogni motivo di timore. Roma è tranquilla."

⁵ Capello's *reports of July 12 and 18, 1794 (*ibid.*), and Azara's *letter of July 16, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ Capello's *report of July 26, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

⁷ Capello's *report of August 2, 1794 (*ibid.*).

prospect of the French Republic being defeated by its foreign enemies.¹

In the middle of August the Pope, who was maintaining his physical and moral energy wonderfully well,² ordered more prayers to be said in public,³ and it seemed that they had been heard, for though there was no longer any hope of success in Belgium the news that a counter-revolution had broken out in Paris made it possible to view the future more cheerfully.⁴ But so soon afterwards as August 23rd Capello had to report that there had been no counter-revolution but only internal dissensions. He had to console himself with the teaching of history that a democratic republic could never take root in so great an empire as France.⁵ On September 20th, shortly before he was recalled, and with Robespierre's downfall still fresh in his mind, he wrote as follows: "As I approach the end of my diplomatic career I must repeat for the last time that it is only the French themselves that can overcome the Revolution in their own country; the Allies will collapse of their own accord."⁶

¹ Capello's *report of August 9, 1794 (*ibid.*).

² Azara's *letter of July 16, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

³ Figari's *report of August 16, 1794 (State Archives, Genoa; VICCHI, 138).

⁴ Capello's *report of August 16, 1794 (*loc. cit.*): "Tanto ne fu più grande l'allegrezza in Roma quanto fu inaspettata e la speranza di sentirsi in breve. . . Re Luigi XVII. tiene in agitazione gli spiriti." The news of Robespierre's execution had reached Rome on August 13, 1794; see Azara's *letter of this date, with the remark: "Parece que Barrère es ahora el que reina." Archives of Simancas.

⁵ Capello's *report of August 23, 1794 (*loc. cit.*): "La storia del mondo insegna che una Republica democratica non può consolidarsi in un imperio così grande come la Francia."

⁶ Capello's *report of September 20, 1794 (*ibid.*): "Vicino al termine della mia carriera dipl. ripeterò per l'ultima volta che se la controrivoluzione in Francia non nasce da sè al di dentro, siccome un giorno e l'altro dovrebbe succedere, le potenze coalizzate non finiranno che col rovinare se stesse, e ch'è cosa

Conditions in the Papal States caused the Pope continual anxiety. In autumn there was serious discontent among the lower classes in Rome and in the garrison of the Castel S. Angelo.¹ The financial situation continued to deteriorate² and as a result of the bad harvest the bread in Rome was of a poor quality and it became impossible to supply the English with grain.³ In spite of all this, however, the Pope preserved his outward calm, though in view of the internal condition of the Papal States and the depressing news from Belgium it was doubted that he was inwardly so calm as he appeared to be.⁴

At the beginning of November it was learnt in Rome that the French had entered Cologne and that the nuncio there, Pacca, had had to leave the city. On November 22nd there was further news of the rapid progress made by the French. It could be seen already that the Allies would have to make peace.⁵

At this juncture there were signs that popular feeling in *superba per essa, ma vera, che non vi sono che i Francesi che possano in casa loro soggiogare i Francesi.*"

¹ Capello's *report of September 27, 1794 (*ibid.*), and *Figari's of September 26, 1794 (*loc. cit.*). According to a *letter of Azara's of October 2, 1794 (*loc. cit.*), the lack of discipline among the Papal troops had grown worse since Caprara's death, wherefore the Pope had asked the Emperor for another general.

² Capello's *report of September 27, 1794 (*loc. cit.*): "Qui l'affare della moneta . . . sempre più serio, parte la speculazione, parte la paura facendo esportar fuori il poco nummario." On October 4, 1794, he *wrote: "La perdita della cedole nel cambiarle in denaro cresce sempre più" (*ibid.*). And on November 8 he *reported that "monete plateole" were being minted on account of the "discredito delle cedole". Cf. Figari's *report of November 29, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

³ Figari's *reports of October 11 and November 22 and 29, 1794 (*ibid.*), and *Capello's of November 15, 1794 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Capello's *reports of October 4, 11, and 28, 1794 (*ibid.*).

⁵ Capello's *reports of November 1 and 22, 1794 (*ibid.*), and *Figari's of December 27, 1794 (*loc. cit.*). Pacca's arrival in Rome was *reported by Figari on January 10, 1795 (*ibid.*).

Rome, affected by all these misfortunes, was beginning to change. Hitherto it had been distinctly Francophobe, but now the cost of living and the numerous arrests were causing discontent. It was chiefly directed against the Papal nephew, Duke Braschi, who was accused of dishonest speculations in grain, and who was undoubtedly so anxious to enrich himself that he allowed no scruples to stand in his way. Whenever he showed himself there were demonstrations against him. On one occasion the glass windows of his carriage were smashed and his footmen were roughly handled. At the end of November it was discovered that a plot had been formed to blow up his palace. The conspiracy was detected in time to prevent the perpetration of the crime,¹ but in spite of all the investigations and arrests the guilty persons remained undiscovered, and the rumour spread that it had been intended to set the whole of Rome ablaze.²

In the autumn of 1794 a plot to overthrow the Papal Government was brought to light in Bologna. It was to be carried out by thirty youths, mostly students at the university, led by a Bolognese of the name of Lodovico Zamboni, who was in touch with French emissaries. The attempt was frustrated by the desertion of all Zamboni's companions except one. Zamboni tried to escape into Tuscany but was arrested and he and his confederates were brought to trial. He hanged himself in prison. Of his confederates, the one found most guilty was hanged, the others were condemned to the galleys or to confinement in a fortress. It was on the occasion of this conspiracy that the Italian tricolour made its first appearance. Zamboni and his friends had added the colour green, signifying hope, to the white and red of Bologna

¹ Capello's report of November 22, 1794 (*ibid.*), most of it reproduced by Brosch (II., 191).

² " *Senza alcuna speranza di invenire i rei, quest'avvenimento non fa che tenere sempre più viva l'inquietudine." (Capello's report of November 22, 1794, *loc. cit.*) On the 29th he *reported that a notice had been found calling on the people to burn down the whole of Rome.

and had had cockades made up of the three colours.¹ Some writers explain the choice of these colours as being connected with freemasonry.²

¹ Citations in BROSCHE (II., 194).

² CUSANI, *Storia di Milano*, V. (Milano, 1861), 70 seq. The tricolour was adopted as the symbol of the new State on the proposal of Giuseppe Compagnoni di Lugo at the session of the "Congresso Cispadano di Reggio Emilia" on January 7, 1797 (see L. RAVA, *G. Compagnoni di Lugo, inventore del tricolore*, Roma, 1926).

CHAPTER VII.

THE FRENCH CLERGY IN EXILE—DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHURCH IN FRANCE.

(1)

THE critical situation of the States of the Church resulting from the French Revolution—a situation which grew worse as time went on—did not preclude Pius VI. from following the example of his predecessors in extending generous hospitality to all who sought his help. The number of the victims who were driven from their country by a political convulsion of unprecedented dimensions and who were entirely at the mercy of fate, amounted to several thousands. Among the numerous Frenchmen who made their way into Italy, mostly into the States of the Church, after 1790, principally in the years that immediately followed, were not only suspicious emissaries of subversive mentality, against whose undermining activities the Papal Government could not take too many precautions, but also many who were deserving of every sympathy, having been forced to seek shelter and safety abroad by reason of their loyalty to the royal family and the Church.

How nearly ecclesiastical circles in Rome, pre-eminently the Pope himself, were concerned in the welfare of these exiles was shown in the spring of 1791, when members of the French royal family sought refuge in the south. They were the two daughters of Louis XV., Marie Adelaide and Victoire Marie, who, to avoid acknowledging the constitutional schism, left the capital at the beginning of February and crossed the Savoyard frontier incognito.¹ Almost immediately it was known in Rome that they intended to come to the Holy City Cardinal Bernis sent them a cordial letter of welcome and offered them his palace as a permanent residence. The Pope

¹ GENDRY, II., 150 *seqq.*

sent a special courier, Bartolommeo Radavero, to meet the royal fugitives, and gave orders through the Secretary of State's office that all the officials on the route should show the greatest possible attention to the two princesses. After a short stay in Loreto, they arrived in Rome on April 16th.¹ Here they were met by Bernis and Azara² and by so large a crowd that their carriage could only proceed at a walking pace. The Pope sent his Maestro di Camera, Pignatelli, to welcome them, and the Cardinal Secretary of State, Zelada, and other members of the highest ranks of society waited on them in person. On the following evening they were received by the Holy Father in an audience lasting half an hour. The next afternoon their visit was returned by Pius VI. in person, a most unusual gesture, contrary to all previous etiquette.³ At the Mass he celebrated in their presence at the tomb of the Apostles he gave them Communion with his own hands. The general rejoicing in the city and the air of festivity among the upper classes was increased by the presence of the King and Queen of Naples, who had just returned from attending the marriage in Vienna of their daughter Maria Theresa to Emperor Francis II.

The cordial welcome given to the two royal fugitives was to set the tone for the reception of all the other *émigrés* who now flocked into Italy in very large numbers.

The many clerics among them, of all ranks, from the highest to the lowest, were of particular importance, for it was on

¹ An account of the reception is in the letter of April 20, 1791, *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 19 *seqq.*

² Donado's *report of April 16, 1791 (State Archives, Venice).

³ " *Oggi doppo pranzo S.Stà è stato a restituire loro [the King and Queen of Naples] la visita, cerimonia non praticata d'alcun altro pontefice e che s'è introdotta per la prima volta lunedì verso le principesse di Francia " (report made by the agent Donado on April 23, 1791, *loc. cit.*). Cf. GENDRY, II., 153, and Brunati's *report to Colloredo on April 19, 1791 (State Archives, Vienna). A picture of the reception in VICCHI, clv. In his *Journal d'émigration* (ed. C. d'Hautecoeur, 76) D'Espinchal speaks of *émigrées* of the highest degree having arrived in Rome as early as January, 1790.

them that the decree of banishment in its severer form had been pronounced by the new popular Government. " Good God ! What tolerance is that which subjects, first to forgetfulness, then to contempt, and finally to the most cruel destruction a religion that once changed the face of the earth so advantageously and placed human society on the foundation of sacred laws ! " These words were spoken by Edmund Burke, though he was not a Catholic, in the English Parliament, against one who had spoken in praise of the revolution and its freedom of conscience.¹

After the introduction of the Civil Constitution the fate of all who refused to take the oath of loyalty to it was definitely sealed by the deportation decree of August 26th, 1792, unless they very quickly left the country.² In consequence, the roads leading to the frontiers of France were filled with exiled clerics, and as they crossed them many were stripped of their last possessions and left in the direst poverty. Later, the priests who failed to take the " oath of liberty and equality " were also banished,³ and even those who did take it were not sure of their safety, for if six citizens denounced them as suspect they incurred the severest penalties.⁴ Thus, what was left of the French Church was very soon to lose all its pastors, the last and strongest support left to the faithful after the confiscation of the Church's goods, the enforcement of the Civil Constitution, and the prohibition of public worship.

Conditions were so uncertain and the spirit of the times so hostile to the Church that the Papal States were practically the only political organism in Europe in whose Government the *émigrés* could place their trust. And so it was here especially

¹ J. BLÖTZER, *Die katholische Emanzipation in Grossbritannien und England* (Freiburg, 1905, 53).

² GENDRY, II., 195 (*cf.* above, p. 196). *Cf.* in particular H. FORNERON, *Hist. générale des émigrés pendant la Révolution française* (2 vols., Paris, 1884).

³ SCIOUT, III., 376.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 377 ; FR. OLMO, *La rivoluzione francese nelle relazioni diplomatiche d'un ministro piemontese a Roma* (Milano, 1915, 120).

that large bodies of fugitives sought safety. Their numbers were considerably increased in the autumn of 1792, when the French revolutionary army occupied Savoy and with the support of a Jacobin party which was established there demanded its union with the Republic.¹ In October the dethronement of the king was proclaimed at Chambéry by a National Convention of Savoyards, which sent a delegation to Paris to affirm its loyalty. An immediate result of this upheaval was the introduction of the Civil Constitution and the deportation laws into the new Department of Montblanc, whereupon the exiled clerics staying there resumed their flight, this time into the States of the Church.

Most of the other States of Italy refusing to receive the *émigrés*,² the number of those within the area governed by the Pope gradually increased to such an extent that their accommodation had to be systematically controlled. At the first count, in 1792, there were 200 French clerics in the Papal States, but by the summer of the following year there were ten times as many, and by the autumn of 1794 they totalled no less than 5,000.³ It is hardly possible to describe in detail the privations and sufferings to which this army of refugees was exposed on its journey to safety. Stories were exchanged of the strangest circumstances in which high dignitaries re-encountered each other on the high-roads.⁴ All the splendour of an absolutist Court, including its ecclesiastical elements, was here reduced to utter beggary. The last treasures that had been saved had to be parted with to purchase the

¹ SCIOUT, III., 394 *seq.* Cf. in general, MOURRET, VII., 183 *seq.*

² SICARD, *Clergé*, III., 128.

³ *Ibid.*, 106. Lists of names of the *émigrés* in the States of the Church and particulars of their treatment in SURREL DE ST-JULIEN, *Le clergé français émigré dans les États de l'Église pendant la Révolution*, in *La Semaine de Rome*, II. (1909), Nos. I, 4, 8, 12, etc.

⁴ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 108 *seq.* Several individual instances are given on pp. 108-III. Other anecdotes in COLOMB, *Quelques épisodes de l'émigration française à Rome pendant la grande révolution*, in *La Semaine de Rome*, I. (1908), 4 *seqq.*

barest necessities of life. Church dignitaries cast off all their insignia, even their pectoral crosses,¹ and clean contrary to their former practice sent humble petitions to Rome.² The rich collection of memoirs written at the time provide an interesting and often touching insight into their beggarly conditions.³ Thus, we are told by a contemporary: "An extraordinary sight was presented by these droves of priests, of all ages and ranks, trudging through the mountains and almost inaccessible districts, where it was difficult to find even the crudest nourishment and where they were often compelled to sleep on straw or in stables. I can, however, assert that during the whole journey I never heard the slightest complaint."⁴

In Rome Cardinal Bernis continued to show the same generosity towards other fugitives as he had towards the French princesses. Every day he had thirty of them as his guests. Even at his death, in November, 1794, this work of charity did not cease, for it was continued by Cardinal Maury.⁵

It was not long before the Pope, too, realized that the unceasing influx of persons seeking assistance would have to be controlled by systematic and legalized arrangements. The first step taken was to accommodate the ecclesiastical *émigrés* in various ecclesiastical establishments in Rome, the Pope himself seeing to their clothing out of his own resources.⁶ The Bishops were allotted to the more wealthy convents, so that

¹ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 112.

² Individual instances, *ibid.*, 114-19.

³ Cf. the evidence, *ibid.*, 9, n. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 119 *seq.*; SCIOUT, III., 279. Cf. MASSON, *Bernis*, 537 *seq.* For the colony of *émigrés* supported by Maury at Montefiascone, see RICARD, *Corresp. du card. Maury*, I., 163-170, including two poems written by *émigrés* in praise of his generosity (168 *seq.*, 170).

⁶ *Brunati to Colloredo, December 31, 1791 (State Archives, Vienna); report of April 11, 1792 (*Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 77).

their maintenance was not a charge on the public exchequer.¹ As time went on, however, the available accommodation proved to be insufficient, especially as it was feared that fresh batches would arrive when, as was generally expected, all non-juring priests were deported by the French Government into the States of the Church, as had happened in the case of the Jesuits.²

Accordingly a special institution for the care of the *émigrés*, called the *Opera pia della ospitalità francese*, was set up by Pius VI. Its chief administrator, working under the superintendence of the Pope and the Secretary of State, was Monsignor Caleppi. By September, 1792, the organization was complete, and in the next few weeks it was possible to begin the work of assistance on a large scale.³ The Bishops in most cases were first invited to Rome by the Pope,⁴ and there many of them were given fresh appointments in the States of the Church; the rest of the clergy were forbidden to enter Rome without the express permission of the Secretary of State.⁵ They were instructed to have their papers made out by the nuncios in Turin or Florence, whence they were allotted evenly to the various districts.⁶ So as to know where suitable

¹ " *Questi vescovi sono qui considerati sul piede degli antichi confessori della Chiesa." (Brunati to Colloredo, December 21, 1791, *loc. cit.*)

² *Brunati to Colloredo, June 9, 1792 (*ibid.*). For the great apprehension that prevailed in Rome, *cf.* Capello's *reports of October 23, November 3, 10, and 17, 1792 (State Archives, Venice), and above, p. 233.

³ GENDRY, II., 198 *seq.*; THEINER, *Docum.*, II., x (this second volume is devoted entirely to the documents referring to the relief work). The Pope's circular letters and instructions regarding the *émigrés* in the Papal States were edited by BOURGIN (*La France et Rome*, 201-22); the number of collections of extracts from the Secretary of State's dispatches contained in this work (nearly 2,000) gives us an idea of the vast volume of correspondence dealing with the *émigrés*, apart from the relief work.

⁴ SCIOUT, III., 279.

⁵ SICARD, *Clergé*, III., 106.

⁶ THEINER, *loc. cit.*

accommodation was available several circular letters were sent by the Pope in October to the various dioceses, convents, and ecclesiastical establishments in the States of the Church, inviting them to express their willingness to receive the exiled clerics and to indicate the extent to which they were able to support them.¹ Four agencies were established outside Rome and its immediate environs, at Bologna, Ferrara, Perugia, and Viterbo ; the areas with which they had to deal were carefully defined and were placed under the superintendence of the various Bishops.² Both here and in the headquarters in Rome lists of the *émigrés* in the States of the Church were to be kept up to date. Soon there was not a place that was not taking its share in this great work of charity. To finance it, it was found necessary to draw again on Sixtus V.'s treasure, this time to the amount of 500,000 Roman thalers.³

The legal and economic position of the ecclesiastical *émigrés* was broadly defined in a circular letter of December 1st, 1792,⁴ and with full details in a further decree of January 26th, 1793.⁵ In twenty-four points it regulated the duty of residence in the allotted place, the fulfilment of sacerdotal obligations, and—where necessary—the participation in the canonical life in community ; also mutual relations and the receipt of mass stipends. Every cleric in receipt of assistance was required to take an anti-Jansenistic oath, and if he had sworn allegiance to the Civil Constitution in France, to make a formal recantation and to publish it in his home parish. It was also necessary to see that an equable distinction was drawn between the really needy and those whose circumstances had already improved. Though inevitably several oversights occurred it was usually possible to satisfy every legitimate demand. To obviate excessive hardship the Pope granted exemption from

¹ E.g. on October 10, 20, and 31, 1792, in GENDRY, II., 199 ; THEINER, *loc. cit.*, xi *seq.* ; BOURGIN, 201 *seqq.*

² THEINER, *loc. cit.*, xiv *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, xvi.

⁴ BOURGIN, 205 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 207-212 ; THEINER, *loc. cit.*, xvi *seq.*, in a French translation. Cf. GENDRY, II., 200 *seqq.*

certain regulations now and then. The revenues from properties situated in the Papal States but belonging to the French Church were also utilized ; in this connexion Cardinal Bernis was authorized to carry out a special visitation in December, 1792.¹

In the summer of 1793, when rendering a full report on the Papal work of assistance,² Caleppi, basing his calculations on a complete list of names, reckoned that of the round 2,000 clerics whose particulars had been taken only about 100 were able to maintain themselves from their own resources ; for the remainder an annual outlay of roughly 100,000 thalers was necessary. The opening, therefore, of a public fund for the assistance of the *émigrés* was most opportune ; the task of collection was undertaken by Prince Filippo Colonna, and some handsome contributions were made by the Pope from his privy purse.³ At the same time, organized by Cardinal Gerdil, a number of the exiles, possessing suitable qualifications, began the task of compiling voluminous works on the contemporary history of the revolution.

To obtain an idea of the average support rendered to the refugees by the cities of Italy we may take the example of Urbino.⁴ In response to an inquiry made by the Archbishop of Ferrara, Cardinal Mattei, the competent authority, the convents at Urbino offered to lodge and maintain indefinitely twelve *émigrés*. As a result, in November, 1792, they were allotted fifteen ; economic conditions being what they were the available resources would have to be reapportioned. Shortly afterwards Mattei summoned the superiors of the

¹ GENDRY, II., 203 *seq.*

² A translation of the text in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, xxi *seq.*

³ Cf. the *report by the agent Figari on December 15, 1792 (State Archives, Genoa). A list of the 101 most famous emigrant clerics in Rome is in VICCHI, 149.

⁴ What follows is taken from the essay " Sacerdoti francesi ospitati in Urbino all'epoca della rivoluzione 1792-1797 " (*Bollettino diocesano di Urbino*, VII., Urbino, 1920, 29 *seqq.*, 64 *seqq.*, 92 *seqq.*), based on documents in the archiepiscopal archives at Urbino.

convents and the priest-refugees to a conference, at which he praised the generosity of the former in suitable terms and exhorted the latter to show their gratitude by their subordination. When, in the spring of 1794, after the occupation of Savoy and Nice, further embarrassment was caused by the necessity of sheltering another large number of refugees, Urbino, at Mattei's request, undertook the reception of two more clerics. Furthermore, there is evidence that in the years that followed more than one French cleric was given hospitality at Urbino. During their long sojourn the exiles and the native clergy were always on the best of terms, except for one brief estrangement caused by the failure of the *émigrés* to participate in the ceremonies of Maundy Thursday. The "good French priests" ("*buoni preti francesi*") became proverbial. At times, it is true, these good relations were interrupted, such as after the outbreak of the war between France and the States of the Church, when the anti-French feelings of the people sometimes showed signs of venting themselves even on the innocent victims of the Revolution. The matter was put right, however, by the timely steps taken by the Cardinal Secretary of State.

For most of the fugitives the period of exile lasted till the Napoleonic concordat of 1801.¹ The complete lack of unobjectionable pastors in France weighed heavily on the minds of these exiles, and by 1795 there were one or two who attempted a premature return to their fatherland. They were forced, however, to retreat again before a fresh outbreak of the terror that took place shortly afterwards. In consequence, in 1796, an ordinance was issued by the Cardinal Secretary of State,² whereby anyone who decided to return home then definitely waived his claim to be received back at a later date. Some

¹ The subject as a whole is dealt with by SURREL (see p. 264, n. 3) and in two works by a contemporary: HESMIVY D'AURIBEAU, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la persécution française, recueillis par les ordres de Pie VI.*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1794-5); *Bienfaits de Pie VI. et de ses États envers les Français émigrés* (Rome, 1796).

² On January 13 (*Bollett. dioces. di Urbino*, VII., 94).

such ruling was necessary because at this time many other *émigrés*, mostly those who had been driven from their former place of exile into other countries, were applying for admission into the States of the Church, although several applications by high-ranking ecclesiastics who preferred the Papal States as a place of refuge to anywhere else, had to be refused. Thus, the Bishop of Lyons, who applied for the admission of his diocesan clergy who had been driven from their refuge in Belgium by the Revolutionary armies, received the reply that this was impossible as the States of the Church were already providing for 185 clerics from the same diocese.¹

The good example set by the Italian Bishops in making personal sacrifices deserves honourable mention. Cardinal Mattei, at Ferrara, continuously supported no less than 300 priests at his own expense and kept in his palace a large store of clothing and other articles that were urgently needed.² And his was no isolated case.

The Pope's solicitude for the French refugees was naturally not confined to the clerics but embraced also the laity, though the latter's need of assistance was not so great, either in point of numbers or in extent. Nevertheless, several thousand of them had been counted by 1794, so that regulations had to be made for their accommodation, too.³ After reporting to the Governatore and taking an anti-revolutionary oath, they were divided into those who could provide for themselves, workers, and the completely destitute; they were then distributed in the proportion of about two *émigrés* to every hundred inhabitants, due regard being paid to the degree of their necessity and the nature of their occupation. They, too, were confined to their place of residence and were obliged to report to an official every two months. Whenever possible, their spiritual needs were to be administered to by the clergy of their own nation.

Even in these days we are impressed by the magnitude of

¹ *Brief of January 18, 1794 (*Epist.*, A° XIX., fo. 131, Papal Secret Archives). Cf. GENDRY, II., 214.

² SCIOUT, III., 279.

³ Under date May 4, 1794, in THEINER, *Docum.*, II., xxv *seqq.*

the work done under the direction of the Pope in support of the victims of the French Revolution when we see the collected records of the organization. They are comprised in no less than sixty large folio volumes, which were incorporated in the Papal Secret Archives in 1805.¹ They bear the unassuming inscription, *De caritate sanctæ sedis erga Gallos 1792-1803*. This great work of Christian charity is also commemorated by the Papal medal struck in 1795.² But the people and the clergy of the States of the Church also deserve the gratitude of posterity for the unflagging generosity they displayed for nearly a decade. Their solicitude for the exiles is an indication of the scanty desire they had for the blessings of the French Revolution; its dubious value was revealed to them day after day by the inhumanly cruel lot suffered by so many outcasts.

The loyalty to the Church and the Papacy that was manifested everywhere by the people on the occasion of Pius VI.'s journey to Vienna in 1782, bore rich fruit ten years later, when innumerable acts of self-sacrifice, both large and small, were performed in the name of human charity. These, too, must be taken into consideration in forming a judgment of the period.³

Of the 30,000-40,000 clerics who emigrated from France⁴ only a portion, 5,000-6,000, made their way into the Papal States, for these States, too, being small and helpless in the military sense, might sooner or later fall a prey to the Revolutionary armies.

¹ In his *Docum.*, vols. I. and II., THEINER made use of about 500 documents from this source. Cf. *ibid.*, II., xxxii *seqq.* A special catalogue was begun in 1911.

² The inscription runs: "Clero Gallia pulso hospit. et alim. praestita." *Ibid.*, II., xxix, and GENDRY, II., 219. The medal is illustrated in VICCHI, pl. viii, p. 80.

³ An interesting diary kept by an *émigré* who described each of the colonies of his countrymen in Rome, Northern Italy, Switzerland, and Western Germany, was edited by C. D'HAUTE-CŒUR, *Journal d'émigration du comte d'Espinchal* (Paris, 1912).

⁴ SICARD (*Clergé*, III., 130 *seq.*) arrives at the total number in this way: England 10,000, Spain 6,000-8,000, Italy 6,000, Switzerland 5,000, and several thousand in Germany and Holland.

The reception accorded to the *émigrés* by the Papal States was rivalled by that of England. Fortunately, it was in 1791 that the law was passed there which abolished the heavy penalties formerly inflicted on the "Papists".¹ In Parliament, where shortly before speeches full of hatred of the Catholic Church had been delivered, Burke was able to include in the speech already mentioned a cordial welcome to all the French outcasts. "Come over to us!" he said. "There is not a moment to lose if you want to avoid the martyrdom that awaits you in your own country." To the female orders also he held out the prospect of complete toleration on English soil.²

At the time of the September massacre the clergy of Northern France fled almost in a body to the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, where Catholic life was organized by the Bishop of Tréguier.³ When the war spread to the islands, which happened soon afterwards, the priests continued their flight to England, where, contrary to their expectation, they received so friendly a welcome that their numbers were rapidly swollen. In a few weeks as many as 6,000 were counted there; this number quickly rose to 8,000, and by the end of 1793 to 10,000. In the capital alone shelter was found for 4,000-5,000, coming from a hundred French dioceses. Most of them arrived, after severe sufferings and privations, without any belongings whatever; of the thirty Bishops stopping in London twenty-five were entirely dependent on charity.⁴

In this secluded island kingdom the fugitives felt far more secure than anywhere on the Continent,⁵ and they were treated

¹ BLÖTZER, *loc. cit.*, 37 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 53.

³ *Ibid.*, 54. Cf. A. LEMASSON, *Les paroisses et le clergé du diocèse actuel de Saint-Brieuc. Manuel pour l'étude de la persécution religieuse dans les Côtes-du-Nord durant la Révolution française* (vol. I., 1789-1795, Rennes, 1926).

⁴ BLÖTZER, 55. Cf. the account given on September 26, 1793, by the Abbé Barruel, an *émigré* himself (THEINER, *Docum.*, I., 366 *seqq.*).

⁵ SICARD, *Clergé*, III., 10 *seq.*

by the English people of all classes with a truly noble charity. In view of this, the numerically insignificant party that supported the Revolution soon ceased to taunt the *émigrés*.¹

Bishop De la Marche, of St-Pol-de-Léon, quickly came to the fore as the most trusted of the upper French clergy, and with the support of leading British circles he set about the task of organizing help for his fellow refugees.² As the result of private donations £40,000 were soon at his disposal, King George III. leading the way with a gift of £1,000.³ It was thus possible to pay each of the exiled priests 50 francs a month, and the Bishops 250 francs, while many of the clergy earned their living by giving lessons, working in commercial concerns, and even performing the simplest manual labour.⁴ Winchester Castle, which remained at the disposal of the refugees until 1793, accommodated 700 of them; here they came under the devoted care of the family of Lord Buckingham and lived as a religious community with a former superior of a French seminary at their head. Much intellectual work of no little value was accomplished, and eventually the castle became the centre of a regular home industry.⁵ The University of Oxford contributed to the good work by printing a number of Biblical texts based on the Vulgate and distributing them to the French clergy.⁶

Although it had been administered with as little expense as possible the fund established for the assistance of the *émigrés* was exhausted by the spring of 1793. The king accordingly

¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

² BLÖTZER, 55; SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 14; GENDRY, II., 197; L. KERBIRIOU, *Jean-François de la Marche évêque-comte de Léon. Étude sur son diocèse breton et sur l'émigration* (Quimper, 1924). He was known as the "Vincent de Paul de l'émigration". Cf. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXII., 151. The great confidence he inspired can be seen from Burke's letter to the Archbishop of Aix, written in July, 1791 (THEINER, *loc. cit.*, I., 332).

³ SCIOUT, III., 282.

⁴ BLÖTZER, 56; SICARD, 16, 19 *seq.*

⁵ BLÖTZER, 60; SICARD, 20 *seq.*; SCIOUT, III., 283.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 282.

ordered that August 18th be observed as a day of general prayer and sacrifice, and on this day the Anglican clergy made door-to-door collections in person. The generous response enabled the fund to function again for a time,¹ and even the outbreak of war between England and France had no adverse effect on these benevolent arrangements, but as time passed the fund sank to a low ebb again, whereupon the Government agreed to grant the French clergy a subsidy for as long as their exile lasted. This subsidy continued until 1801.²

For a long time past Catholic life had been almost unknown in England, so far as the public was concerned, and now a sudden transformation occurred. More daily Masses were celebrated in London than in most of the other European capitals, with the possible exception of Rome.³ To facilitate ecclesiastical life the Vicar-Apostolic of the London District, John Douglass, permitted the *émigré* Bishops to exercise their powers without restriction when dealing with their own clergy, so long as they were in England.⁴

The strict sense of duty shown by the *émigré* clergy and their blameless conduct won for them at once the esteem of the English people. The age-old prejudices held by the Anglicans were thereby removed and the banishment of so many priests brought a moral advantage to the Catholic Church in England. It is said, possibly with justice, that a movement in England friendly to the Catholics and still appreciable in our own days, may be traced back to those times.⁵ English Catholicism itself, numerically weak, was directly affected to an extraordinary degree. Catholic institutes of studies and seminaries, which formerly had been forbidden and had therefore been transferred to France, were opened again in England and rendered great services for the education of Catholic youth and the coming generation of native clergy. A Catholic library was founded, also a home for aged priests and a hospital, and even

¹ BLÖTZER, 56.

² *Ibid.*, 58.

³ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 58 *seq.*

⁵ SICARD, *Clergé*, III., 31 ; BLÖTZER, 61.

the spiritual welfare of prisoners was not neglected.¹ Most significant of all perhaps was the establishment at Stonyhurst, after a few setbacks, of a branch of the Society of Jesus.² The most conspicuous manifestation of the renewal of the Church's life was the consecration in 1797 by Archbishop Boisgelin of the first large Catholic church in London to be opened since the Reformation. The ceremony was attended by sixteen Bishops and many members of the French nobility.³

The many acts of kindness done by the English people to the outcasts of "*la grande nation*" were warmly applauded by the Catholic world at large. Pius VI. was not niggardly in giving praise and thanks to the benefactors of his loyal adherents. In September 1793, he took the opportunity offered by Erskine's journey to England to send the king, the heir apparent, and Burke long letters of thanks for the great charity they had shown the *émigrés* and the English Catholics.⁴ A few weeks later, on November 2nd, he wrote to Bishop De la Marche of the great consolation he had derived from the hospitality shown by the English people and leading personalities—a hospitality in which the king himself had taken a most remarkable part.⁵

¹ SCIOUT, III., 283 *seq.* For Erskine's mission (*cf.* p. 252, n. 5) and other relations between Rome and England, *cf.* GASQUET, *Great Britain and the Holy See 1792-1806* (Rome, 1919); *Memoirs of Cardinal Erskine, Papal Envoy to George III.* (London, 1890); and, in general, A. LEBON, *L'Angleterre et l'émigration française de 1794 à 1801* (Paris, 1882); MOURRET, VII., 175 *seqq.*

² BLÖTZER, 62-5.

³ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 26.

⁴ Brief to King George of September 7, 1793. The "1792" in *Epist.*, A° XIX., p. 70^b, Papal Secret Archives, is undoubtedly an error, as the Brief definitely refers to a letter of Zelada's of November 10, 1792. THEINER has wrongly attributed the Brief to the year 1792 and has pre-dated Zelada's letter by a year (*Docum.*, I., 159 *seq.*). See also the Briefs to Prince Augustus of September 2 and 7, 1793 (*ibid.*, 197, 198), and to Burke of September 7, 1793 (*ibid.*, 199).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 194 *seqq.*

The astonishment of the Catholic world at England's magnanimity was certainly well-founded, for no one had imagined that a nation which had recently been persecuting the Catholic Church and which represented a schism that had been made the State religion would come so nobly to the support of the outcast clergy of the country that had been so proud of its Catholic traditions and had been so recently under the sceptre of the "Most Christian King". Complete toleration was also assured the fugitives in the Constitution of the United States of America, which had lately won their independence. This enabled the Catholic Church in North America, still in its youth, to be reorganized, largely through the activity of the Sulpicians.¹

The Pope's solicitude was also engaged by the *émigrés* who had sought refuge in the countries adjoining France on the north-east. In many cases their stay there could only be a brief one, as the Belgian Netherlands and parts of the Rhineland were soon overrun by the French armies. Whoever decided to stay on in spite of them was quickly taken off and deported.²

Both Flemings and Walloons showed their readiness to help the fugitives and distributed them among different families. A large number of *émigré* priests settled down in Maastricht.³ After the battle of Fleurus a huge stream of fugitives poured into the German Rhineland and the rest of Germany, where they met with widely varying receptions.⁴ Towns such as Cologne and Düsseldorf distinguished themselves by their magnanimity.⁵ One of the chief collecting-

¹ MOURRET, VII., 185 *seq.*

² Cf. *Brief to Cardinal Frankenberg of November 8, 1794 (*Epist.*, A° XX., fo. 148^b, Papal Secret Archives).

³ SICARD, *Clergé*, III., 51 *seqq.* Cf. *Rev. des quest. hist.*, LXXVIII. (1905), 553 *seqq.*; F. MAGNETTE, *Les émigrés français aus Pays-Bas* (Bruxelles, 1907).

⁴ D'Espinchal writes of a constant coming and going of *émigrés* in Coblenz (HAUTECEUR, *Journal d'émigration*, 276 *seqq.*).

⁵ *Correspondence between the Rhenish Electors and some *émigrés* and the nuncio Della Genga in Papal Secret Archives

points of the refugees was Münster, where the prince-bishop was a brother of Marie Antoinette. It was not long before two Cardinals, two Archbishops, and twelve Bishops had taken up their quarters there.¹ Cardinal La Rochefoucauld resided here until his death in 1794. Many others were given generous support at Ettenheim, the residence of the Bishop of Strasbourg, who had retired to the German portion of his diocese on the outbreak of the Revolution.²

Those who sought help from the Emperor Francis II. were directed to the city of Constance, on the lake of that name, which soon became a centre of relief work for the *émigrés*.³ Particularly good service was rendered here by Juigné, the Archbishop of Paris, who displayed great energy in collecting money, even from very distant places. Thus, £200,000 came from the Empress of Russia. A common table was provided for sixty priests, and a hundred needy priests received sums of money every month. Acting on the suggestion made by Juigné and some other Bishops, Pius VI. sent a circular letter in November 1792, to the German Bishops, Abbots, and chapters, invoking their charity. At the same time he praised the Bishop of Constance for his benefactions and encouraged the exiles.⁴

(Principi, 267). Cf. *La révolution franç. et les électorales du Rhin*, in the *Annales de St-Louis des Franç.* (III., 25 seqq.).

¹ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 55 seq., 62. For the *émigrés* in Germany, see especially the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, LXIII. (1898), 148 seqq. There are, for instance, *documents on the support of *émigré* priests in the "Landesarchiv" at Salzburg (Wiener Akten Litt. C. 89).

² SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 61 seq.; HAUTECŒUR, *Journal d'émigration*, 225 seqq. A typical example of the hard lot undergone by the *émigrés* is described by a parish priest of Harskirchen, near Saarunion (see GASS, *Studien zur elsäss. Kirchengeschichte*, II., Strassburg, 1926, 151-236).

³ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 57 seqq.; GENDRY, II., 199 seq.

⁴ The circular letter of November 21 is in THEINER, *Docum.*, I., 162 seqq., and *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 3, 2560; and a printed copy was enclosed in Herzan's *letter to Colloredo of November 29, 1792,

In other German States many French priests were accommodated individually. The Catholic line of the royal house of Saxony was particularly hospitable, as were also certain towns in Bavaria and especially the Franciscan and Capuchin convents.¹ Unfortunately, under the influence of the Illuminati, the largest states, such as Prussia and Austria, and even Bavaria at first, closed their doors to the *émigrés*. But some of the country priests and the ordinary folk paid little attention to such prohibitions.² The Elector Karl Theodor did at least instruct the monasteries and convents in his territory to extend their hospitality to the outcasts, for which he was duly thanked by the Pope.³

The hardest lot experienced by the *émigrés* was undoubtedly in Switzerland. The economic poverty of the country must have made it seem impossible to receive a body of 6,000 fugitive priests; nevertheless, it was the neediest folk, the peasants, who showed the greatest willingness to make sacrifices. They vied among themselves to befriend the foreign priests. Even Calvinist Geneva, defying the French threats of military reprisals, issued an official proclamation, assuring the fugitives of shelter and security. It did, in fact, receive 700 of them, and a public collection made on their behalf brought in a goodly sum.⁴ Naturally, the Catholic cantons were the most sought after. Six *émigré* Bishops lived in Fribourg itself, and at one time there were as many as eighty priests accommodated in the surrounding villages. It was only right, therefore, that this district should receive a special message from the Pope, dated April 20th, 1793, in which he expressed his complete

in which the matter was discussed (State Archives, Vienna). Cf. Capello's *report of December 1, 1792 (State Archives, Venice), and the letter to Juigné of November 21, 1792 (*Epist.*, A° XVIII., fo. 199^b *seqq.* (Papal Secret Archives; in THEINER, *Docum.*, I., 160 *seq.*).

¹ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 67, 69 *seqq.* Cf. MOURRET, VII., 181.

² SICARD, 68 *seq.*

³ *Brief to Karl Theodor of April 12, 1794 (*Epist.*, A° XX., fo. 38^b, Papal Secret Archives).

⁴ SICARD, 34. Cf. MOURRET, VII., 173 *seq.*

satisfaction with its behaviour.¹ A few months later he sent a similar message to the Canton of Valais, which had rendered equally good service.² It must be said the accommodation offered to the priests was often of a very humble description. Their food for the most part consisted only of bread, milk, cheese, and vegetables, and in return they had to do hard work as field-labourers, carters, and the like. Others took to bootmaking, set up laundries, traded in tobacco, or obtained employment in printing-offices and workshops. Some even occupied themselves in such feminine occupations as knitting and embroidery. Many of them were authorized by their Bishops to go on begging-missions on behalf of those who stayed behind. Their wanderings, in which they suffered many privations, took them to the Tyrol and Austria, and even as far as Russia and Scandinavia.³

More *émigrés* went to Spain than to Switzerland; their number is estimated at 6,000–8,000. They came from all parts of France, particularly the south, so that at the time of the main emigration the roads across the Pyrenees experienced a veritable wandering of the nations. There were many others who went by sea.⁴ Manifold privations and sufferings, together with the necessity of supporting themselves by manual labour, embittered the lot of these exiled priests. On the other hand, the cordiality with which they were welcomed by the Spanish people and clergy left nothing to be desired. A good example was set by the upper clergy. Thus, at times, as many as 200 priests were lodged and boarded in his palace by the Bishop of Valencia, and over 100 received similar hospitality from the

¹ Brief of April 20, 1793, in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 169 *seq.*

² Brief of August 31, 1793, *ibid.*, 193 *seq.*

³ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 35–40. Note 1 on p. 42 refers to their descriptions of their travels. Letters from the Bishops staying in Switzerland are in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, II., 8 *seqq.*, 11 *seq.*, 219 *seqq.*, 221 *seq.*, 223, 243 *seqq.*, 246 *seqq.*, 249 *seq.*, 277–285, 371–7.

⁴ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 89 *seq.*; GENDRY, II., 195. *Ibid.*, 196, the hospitality of the Spanish noble, L. d'Entraigues. Cf. also J. CONTRASTY, *Le clergé français exilé en Espagne* (Toulouse, 1910); *Études*, LIV., 5 *seqq.*

Bishop of Sigüenza. The Bishop of León provided food and clothing for 100 priests, while 500 more were supported by the Cardinal of Toledo, one of the wealthiest of the Spanish prelates.¹ Bishop Quevedo of Orense, in Galicia, placed the whole of his palace at the disposal of the refugees and announced that every door in his diocese stood open to them. He welcomed them not as strangers but as brothers in Christ. "You French priests who have kept faith with God and have deserved so well of the whole Church, are now the pride of Spain. Its clergy regard you as a reinforcement and an embellishment; its Bishops receive you and treat you not as guests or strangers but as fellow-citizens of the saints, as servants and children in the house of God, as loyal auxiliaries, as brothers and dearly beloved sons."² Many of the Bishops asked for the *émigrés* to be sent to them. A number of the exiles made their way into Portugal, where they were taken care of by the Bishops of Coimbra and Braga.³

Charles IV. agreed to the exiles being in his country and gave them generous support, but he imposed several legal restrictions on them. They were forbidden to stay in the principal cities or near the frontier, to preach, hear confessions, or to teach, either publicly or privately, and those in convents were compelled to live the life of the community. Later, owing to Spain's political relations with France there were some isolated cases of expulsion and deportation.⁴

But these were exceptions. While in France the Church was hated and persecuted, the rest of Western Europe, irrespective of denomination, took part in one vast work of Christian charity, in which the greatest vigour and self-sacrifice were shown by the see and patrimony of St. Peter, and this at a time of dire distress.

¹ BARRUEL, *Le clergé français*, II., 101; SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 99 seq.

² SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 102. Cf. his spirited circular letter on their welcome in THEINER, *Docum.*, II., 1 seqq.

³ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 104.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 92, 95. Cf. the story of a parish priest from Brittany: G. DE GRANDMAISON, *Un curé d'autrefois, L'Abbé de Talhouet* (Paris, 1894).

(2)

The Christianity of France, so firmly rooted in the faith of the people and the loyalty of its priests, survived even the worst persecutions. After the events of the 9th Thermidor and the execution of Robespierre the principle of toleration slowly gained ground, even in the National Convention, while ecclesiastical life, in spite of every kind of threat and prophecy, emerged with rettempered strength from the catacomb-like existence it had been forced to lead during the Reign of Terror, although the iniquitous treatment of the priests still persisted for a time.

It was the Republic's financial difficulties that first gave rise to the whole discussion about the Church's recovery of its freedom. According to the assurances of the Civil Constitution the State had undertaken the payment of the Constitutional clergy's stipends and pensions. These sums had been repeatedly reduced, and had finally been cancelled altogether. After the downfall of Robespierre the claims of the pensioners had been satisfied by the payment of the arrears, but the Treasury was incapable of any further disbursements.¹

On September 18th, 1794, Cambon proposed a radical alteration in the law, the basis of which was that the priests should be maintained by their congregations. His opinion was that the French Republic ought not to pay either the expenses or the salaries of any religious denomination. This proposal, which was accepted with enthusiasm, was tantamount to the abandonment by the Republic of all its former projects of establishing a national church and was the first step towards the separation of the Church and State, which at first was wholly to the advantage of the latter.²

This measure, originally intended as one of economy only, inevitably led in time to consequences involving matters of principle. If the State abandoned all obligations towards religious bodies, how could it have the right to pronounce

¹ AULARD, *Polit. Gesch. der französ. Revolution*, I., 437 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 438; DE LA GORCE, IV., 13 seq.; BERGER, *Kulte*, 92 seq.; DELARC, *L'Église de Paris*, III., 307.

judgment on and control the exercise of ecclesiastical functions or, in fact, as it had done hitherto, to forbid it ?

The Constitutional Bishop Grégoire, who had prudently retired into the background during the Reign of Terror, was the first to come out into the open and put forward the corresponding demands. Mounting the tribune of the Convention on December 21st, he delivered a speech which was to become famous ; after a carefully worded preamble, full of the best Republican sentiments, he demanded unrestricted freedom for religious denominations. But he met with nothing but opposition and his motion was rejected.¹

Nevertheless, the fight went on, chiefly in the Press. The demand for the liberation and separation of the Church from the State was made with ever greater insistence, and in certain dioceses it was put into effect without further ado.² Here and there old or infirm priests who had stayed behind in spite of the deportation laws were practically forced to hold religious services in public. When in February, 1795, the Vendean rebels agreed to make peace they only did so on condition that they were allowed to practise their religion without hindrance.³ It was clearly only a question of time before the concessions were granted to the whole of France.

Only a few days after this peace of La Jaunaie the Convention was to hear from Boissy d'Anglas a friendly word of warning⁴ : it would be foolish, he said, to go on making martyrs ; the scaffold only increased religious fervour. In consequence a resolution was passed protecting religious services from disturbance ; but the services were not to be held in public or in the churches that had been sequestered, and it was still forbidden to invite people to attend them by the ringing of bells or by symbolic signs affixed to the meeting-

¹ DE LA GORCE, IV., 21 *seqq.* ; DELARC, *loc. cit.*, 311 *seqq.*

² AULARD, *loc. cit.*, I., 440.

³ DE LA GORCE, IV., 45 *seqq.* ; PISANI, *L'Église de Paris*, II., 162 *seqq.*

⁴ BERGER, *Kulte*, 91 *seq.* ; DELARC, *loc. cit.*, 315.

places. And the State also refused to render any financial assistance to any form of worship.¹

But the popular movement, once started, was not to be diverted by the granting of freedom in so questionable a form and proceeded firmly on its former course.² Almost overnight the religious life was resumed in every quarter of the capital, and on the Sundays in Lent and, still more, during the Easter festivities, the joy of the faithful was evident to an unexpected degree. The legislators, taken by surprise, made vain attempts to discourage it and check it in their public speeches and writings. For a long time, however, the complete satisfaction of religious needs was seriously hampered by the continuing lack of priests.

This rebirth of Christianity in France, gratifying though it was, was overclouded by the deep cleavage in the clergy, which now became even wider than before, principally because the adherents of the constitutional schism imagined that as their existence was guaranteed by the Government the religious future of the country lay in their hands. This national church, now on the verge of collapse owing to its lack of popular support, was rescued by its champion Grégoire, who gathered round him all the Bishops of his party and in their name issued a programme in the form of a pastoral letter. After May, 1795, the movement had its own organ, *Les Annales de la Religion*, while Grégoire went on with the organization of his Gallican Church, as he called it.³

The scarcity of priests and other restrictions on their freedom told more heavily on those members of the French

¹ Law of 3rd Ventôse, III. (February 21, 1795); BERGER, 92 seq.; AULARD, I., 440 seq.; DE LA GORCE, IV., 49; SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 407; PISANI, II., 173 seqq.

² SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 407, 416; PISANI, II., 181 seqq.; DELARC, III., 316.

³ DE LA GORCE, IV., 52 seq.; DELARC, III., 329 seqq., 337 seq.; AULARD, I., 442; MOURRET, VII., 230 seqq.; PISANI, I., 192 seqq. For the life of the Constitutional Church cf. PISANI, III., 39 seqq.; *ibid.*, 143 seq., and MOURRET, VII., 237 seqq., for its National Council.

Church who had kept faith with Rome. Several *émigrés*, it is true, considered it their duty to return to their orphaned parishes, in view of the toleration that was promised and although the severe laws of banishment had not yet been repealed, but the increase in the number of non-juring priests was very slow.

The greatest obstacle that impeded both the loyal Catholics and the Constitutional clergy was the lack of suitable churches; the chapels and oratories available scarcely sufficed for the needs of the former, and the schismatics were also in need of churches. Consequently, both parties strove, above all, to recover the confiscated buildings. A proposal to this effect was put to the Convention by Lanjuinais, who pointed out that it would be far easier to keep a watch on the services performed in public places of worship than in private and concealed ones and it would also be easier to put a stop to any developments dangerous to the State. It was further proposed by the Constitutionals that an oath of loyalty to the new State be imposed on all who wished to hold religious services in the churches that were to be handed back.¹ When this proposed law was approved the latter clause aroused many misgivings among the clergy loyal to Rome, while the opposing party imagined that in this respect they had gained an advantage. It was a grievous disappointment, therefore, when in its interpretation of these new demands, the legislative committee declared that the promise asked for had no connexion with the former oaths, and that on the contrary the Civil Constitution, which indeed was the basis of the Constitutional schism, was no longer to be regarded as a law of the Republic.²

With this last fundamental concession the new State had to acknowledge the victory and the survival of the old Church in France. It also meant the abandonment of the politico-religious aims of the former leaders of the Revolution. The recovery of the long suppressed Church could now make further

¹ Lanjuinais made his speech on May 30, 1795. Cf. DE LA GORCE, IV., 63 *seq.*; AULARD, I., 443; SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 416 *seqq.*; SCIOUT, IV., 387 *seqq.*

² DE LA GORCE, IV., 64 *seq.*

progress. Evidence of this was the considerably increased numbers of returning *émigrés*.¹ Once again the frontier roads and districts were traversed by priests, who this time were moving in a homeward direction, under various disguises and at the cost of manifold privations.² But a long time was yet to pass before the Church regained the measure of liberty it needed. When in September, 1795, a new law was promulgated regulating the whole conduct of religion, it proclaimed the principle of the separation of the Church and State and the freedom of the former, but attached to it was an ordinance which was unacceptable to the Catholics, namely the prohibition of the publication of writings composed by foreign adherents of a religious faith.³ This measure went well beyond the demands made in the former royal *placet*.

The reawakening of religious life that had been welcomed so joyfully by both people and clergy was further impeded by the opposition offered by a minority of Jacobin persuasion that deemed it its duty to suppress the alleged Royalism of a section of the clergy. Goaded on by this minority, the Convention remembered that the old deportation laws were still formally valid and resolved on a decree by which their regulations were to be put into effect again within twenty-four hours.⁴ Other regulations governing the practice of religion were made more stringent, and in other directions, too, in this last stage of its existence, the Convention relapsed into outbursts of terrorism. Thus, another oath of loyalty to the State was imposed on the clergy, who had to testify to the sovereignty of the people and to pledge their resistance to any attempt to restore the monarchy.⁵ It is true that at the time there was much talk in Rome, too, of an imminent counter-revolution in France for the purpose of restoring the Bourbons.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

² SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 422 *seqq.*, 427 *seq.*

³ AULARD, I., 444; BERGER, *Kulte*, 94 *seq.*

⁴ Law of September 6, 1795 (DE LA GORCE, IV., 75; AULARD, I., 445).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Capello's *report from Rome of August 16, 1794 (State

At the same time the principle of the separation of the Church and State and the latter's indifference to all forms of worship was consistently upheld and played its part in the constitutional work of the Convention, namely the so-called Constitution of the year III. This was the foundation of the liberalistic attitude of the bourgeois Republic, in ecclesiastical as well as other spheres.¹

When the National Convention dissolved itself and its place was taken by the new constitutional bodies, namely the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents*, the *Conseil des Anciens*, and the Directory, of five members, the opposition between the popular movement for religious freedom and the reaction of a Jacobin minority became more and more acute, especially as the latter's firmest supporters were among the directors of the State. Many of them impelled by hatred not only of the Church but of everything Christian,² the Directors wanted to restore the Reign of Terror and paved the way for it by a series of measures the true purpose of which was purposely concealed. Popular resistance, however, increased in proportion, and finally the provincial and district authorities were courageous enough to refrain from giving effect to the Government's anti-clerical regulations. Nevertheless, many of the *émigrés* who had returned to France fell victims to the Directory's fresh campaign of persecution.³

During the two succeeding years also, 1796 and 1797, in spite of every obstacle, the reawakened life of the Church continued to gather strength. Here and there, in spite of the

Archives, Venice). He was persuaded that democracy could not last in France (see above, p. 257, n. 5). For the sad fate of the Dauphin, who died in 1795 as the result of ill-treatment, see A. DE BEAUMONT, *Louis XVII., sa vie, son agonie, sa mort* (13 Paris, 1884).

¹ SICARD, *Clergé*, III., 410; AULARD, II., 534; DELARC, III., 333 *seqq.*; BERGER, *Kulte*, 93 *seq.*

² A. GIOBBIO, *La Chiesa e lo Stato in Francia durante la Rivoluzione 1789 sino 1799* (Roma, 1905, 256). Cf. SCIOUT, IV., 438 *seqq.*

³ DE LA GORCE, IV., 91-100.

prohibition, the church bells called the faithful to divine service; religious houses, confessional schools, and even nunneries opened their doors in increasing numbers¹; and many priests who had sworn allegiance to the Civil Constitution recanted and sought readmission to the old communion.² The number of returning *émigrés* also increased, though only one Bishop dared to join them.³ Once again Paris was at the head of the movement.⁴

It was only the Directory that maintained the Jacobin opinion and thought of anti-clerical measures. It persisted on this course even when the elections to the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* in 1797 resulted in the overwhelming success of the anti-Jacobins and there were numerous requests from all parts of the country for the complete freedom of the Church.⁵ The words of exhortation uttered in Parliament in June of this year by a young deputy from Lyons, Camille Jordan, gave expression to the nation's satiety with revolution and its religious fervour: "Make civil peace by means of religious peace and liberty of conscience for everyone!"⁶ In other ways, too, the demand for the "Faith of Our Fathers" grew ever more insistent.

Several fresh alleviations were in fact obtained, and finally after a few weeks the new Chamber decided to repeal the laws of banishment and the recent oath of loyalty to the State.⁷ This blow against the revolutionary policy towards the Church, which was carried out only as the result of a narrow majority,

¹ *Ibid.*, 128 *seqq.*, 145 *seqq.*, 204 *seqq.*

² BLIARD, *La première rétractation solennelle d'un évêque intrus*, févr. 1796 [F. Panisset], in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, LI. (1923), 115 *seq.* Other cases in DELARC, III., 327 *seq.*, 372 *seqq.*

³ The Bishop of Vienne, who had already shown outstanding courage. DE LA GORCE, IV., 207 *seq.*

⁴ SICARD, *loc. cit.*, 432 *seqq.*

⁵ DE LA GORCE, IV., 166-172; AULARD, II., 546; SCIOUT, IV., 547 *seqq.*

⁶ DE LA GORCE, IV., 174-8; SCIOUT, IV., 557 *seqq.*

⁷ The repeal of the deportation laws was proposed by Dubruel on June 26, 1797. DE LA GORCE, IV., 183-8.

provoked the Jacobin opposition to resort to extreme measures. Now or never was the time for them to rescue the heritage of the atheists. From now on the leading members of the party and the Directory, which for the most part was favourably inclined towards it, never ceased to hatch those perilous plots ¹ that finally led to the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor and caused a serious setback to religious life in the Republic.

¹ *Ibid.*, 197 *seqq.*

CHAPTER VIII.

BONAPARTE AND THE FRENCH IN THE PAPAL STATES—THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC AND THE EXPULSION OF THE POPE.

THE period that began with the fall of Robespierre and ended with the second victory of the Republicans through the *coup d'état* of 18th Fructidor VI. (September 4th, 1797)¹ was for France a renewal of its religious life, but for the head of the Church and the Papal States it was the beginning of a deep humiliation.

Though the Pope, as head of the Church, had been compelled to adopt a disapproving attitude towards the French Republic on account of the persecution of the Catholics, as ruler of the Papal States he took care not to take any active part in the war of the Coalition. In this war against the anti-religious Republic he had, it is true, his hopes and desires, but he preserved the neutrality of the Papal States and gave no armed or financial assistance to the Allies. At the end of 1794 all the Cardinals were in favour of maintaining this neutrality.²

The ruler of the Papal States had, however, to suffer for the Republicans' hatred of the head of the Church, as was seen at the end of 1792 and the beginning of 1793, when there was a dispute about the national emblem ; and it was shown by

¹ Even as early as August 12, 1797, a *Brief to Cardinal Rochefoucauld referred to the Pope's joy at the change of tone in France: "Haec unica multoque laetissima Nobis erit summi diuturnique quo hactenus obruebamur, doloris compensatio." *Epist.*, A° XXII./XXIII., fo. 166^b, Papal Secret Archives.

² A. Capello *reported on November 13, 1794, that when the Emperor asked Albani, who was going to Vienna, for troops and money, almost all the Cardinals were against it not only because, as they said, there was no money available but also because they objected to "uscire dalla neutralità" (State Archives, Venice).

Bassville's behaviour. Further, though the religious change that began in Paris in 1794 seemed to promise a certain improvement in relations,¹ it had little effect so far as Rome was concerned, principally because the majority of the Directory was openly hostile to the Church.

The Pope's hopes for the Coalition's success in the war were sadly diminished in 1795, owing to the falling away, one by one, of France's enemies. Prussia made separate peace with the Republic at Bâle by ceding the left bank of the Rhine. In September, when Azara privately informed the Secretary of State—emphasizing the unofficial nature of his communication—that peace had also been made between France and Spain several weeks before,² the Pope made known his regret, not merely on account of the politico-ecclesiastical situation but because of the whole political system which he perceived to be at work here. He was only partly consoled by the assurance that Spain was undertaking the rôle of intermediary between the Holy See and the Republic.³

In other directions, too, the political friends of the Papal States were none too many. During these critical years the Pope was distressed and pained by the attitude of the

¹ Capello *reported on September 8, 1794, that in Paris the system of "moderazione" had superseded tyranny, and on November 29, 1794, that the moderates had overcome the Jacobins (*ibid.*).

² *Pesaro to the Doge, August 8, 1795 (State Archives, Venice). On August 12, 1795, *Azara asked his Government for precise instructions as to his attitude in the French affair (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

³ " *El Papa personalmente desapruewa nuestra paz no tanto por motivo de religion quanto por su falso sistema politico . . . Lo demas de Roma se ha alegrado ne nuestra paz. Los emigrados franceses que hai aqui la abominan como es natural. Venecia la celebra. Toscana la aplaude pero Napoles la detesta hasta con indecencia contra España, al mismo tiempo que por ahi la desea y solicita, pero su tratado impendente con Inglaterra sera siempre un poderoso estorbo para conseguirla." (Azara to De la Paz, September 30, 1795; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.) Cf. *Azara to the same, October 7, 1795 (*ibid.*).

Neapolitan Government.¹ All the attempts made in 1794 to settle the politico-ecclesiastical differences came to naught. In the summer the former Spanish envoy to Paris, Fernán Nuñez, accompanied by Evangelisti, was sent by the Pope to Naples to effect a settlement,² but after a few weeks the private conversations³ were broken off and Nuñez came back without accomplishing anything.⁴ The Pope found himself compelled to take an uncompromising attitude in the matter of episcopal nominations.⁵ Towards the end of the year further friction resulted from the enfeoffment of Cardinal Ruffo by the King of Naples, with the abbey of S. Sofia, at Benevento.⁶

Finally, Pius VI. was left with Austria as his strongest ally, but the Austrian armies in Northern Italy were soon confronted with a general of extraordinary ability, the Corsican Bonaparte, who had won his spurs at Toulon, had been put in command of the army in France in October, 1795, and in March, 1796, had been entrusted with the direction of the campaign in Northern Italy.⁷

The Papal States were incapable of repelling an invasion by the Revolutionary troops, and their internal conditions were far from sound. In the winter and spring of 1795 there were

¹ *Capello to the Doge, June 21, 1794 (State Archives, Venice).

² *Capello on August 16, 1794 (*ibid.*).

³ **Id.*, August 23, 1794 (*ibid.*).

⁴ **Id.*, September 16, 1794 (*ibid.*).

⁵ Capello *reported on this on August 30, 1794 (*ibid.*).

⁶ **Id.*, December 6, 1794 (*ibid.*). Ruffo made it out to be a good sign, but Pius VI. refused to be misled and answered him very sharply in a *Brief of November 28, 1794, remarking that the Cardinal knew very well where it was his duty to reside as long as the Pope had no need of him elsewhere; the Abbey of S. Sofia had always been presented by the Holy See; it was not an "inaspettabile felicità" but a "sacrilega percezione de' redditi ecclesiastici"; he ought to emulate his great-uncle Cardinal Tommaso Ruffo in his contempt for material gain. (*Epist.*, A° XXI, fo. 48; Papal Secret Archives).

⁷ KUHLE, *Bonapartes erster Feldzug 1796*, Berlin, 1902, 77 seqq., 135. He assumed the chief command at Nice on March 27. FÉLIX BOUVIER, *Bonaparte en Italie 1796*, Paris, 1899, 1.

riots about the bad bread both in Rome itself and in places outside,¹ so that the Pope had to make provision for the time that was still to pass before the harvest.² Then the coinage had been debased more than once,³ and to improve it silver was taken from the churches.⁴ Nevertheless, there were more bread riots in the following winter and paper money was issued for one *scudo* and for a half *scudo*.⁵ In the autumn of 1795 Azara foretold that the effects of the financial crisis would be most damaging to the State.⁶ And, indeed, it was not long before the fate that had long been hanging over the Papal States actually came to pass.

When, in February, 1793, the National Convention communicated the terms on which it would accept satisfaction for

¹ *Figari's reports of January 17, February 7 and 14 (Rome), February 28 (Albano), April 25 (at Termo), 1795 (State Archives, Genoa).

² *Figari, June 13, 1795 (*ibid.*).

³ As the Pope was proceeding to the Quirinal in July the people called out to him: "Pane buono e moneta!" (*Figari, July 18, 1795; *ibid.*). Cf. **id.*, August 22, September 5 and 12, 1795 (*ibid.*).

⁴ **Id.*, September 19, 1795 ("Nondimeno il sistema monetario è sempre incerto e fluttuante"), and November 28, 1795 (*ibid.*). For the financial edict of August 29 and its consequences, cf. *Pesaro to the Doge, August 22, September 5, 12, 19, 26, October 3 and 10, 1795 (State Archives, Venice).

⁵ *Figari, October 31, November 7 and 14, 1795, January 2, April 2 and 23, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). The economy reforms in the army were *reported by him on March 12, 1796 (*ibid.*).

⁶ Azara to De la Paz, September 30, 1794 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome): "*La falta de moneda efectiva, en que se halla Roma, ha llegado a tal exceso que va a producir las consecuencias mas funestas para el estado y por lo punto ya produce un movimiento tal en el pueblo que yo no sé que nombre darle." There follow copious and interesting details. Cf. also Pesaro's *reports to the Doge, from January 10, 1795, onwards (*loc. cit.*), the subject-matter of which was continually used by ANNA RUBINO without giving exact references in *La Vita Italiana*, XIV. (1926), 131 *seqq.*, 158 *seqq.*, XV. (1927), 37 *seqq.*, 109 *seqq.* Cf. especially XIV., 132 *seqq.*, 147 *seqq.*

the murder of Bassville, they were considered by Rome to be too unjust and humiliating to be fulfilled, even at the cost of the war that the Republic was already threatening to let loose.¹ At the time, however, France was too heavily committed in other theatres of war to carry out the threat. When the Directory came to power the situation had changed. One of its principal aims was the destruction of the Papal authority, both spiritual and temporal. Harking back to the threat of war, it decided that Bonaparte, who during the past few weeks had won its complete confidence was, with his energy and ambition, the man best suited to carry out the project. In a communication dated February 3rd, 1796, he was invited to consider the idea of destroying Rome as a scourge in the hands of fanaticism; it was not a definite instruction and was only to be acted on if opportunity offered.² As expected, the young general, thirsting for glory, eagerly embraced the project, the execution of which would establish him as a world-famous figure for ever. Accordingly, during the next few weeks, while the Austrians were retiring from the Adda to the Mincio, he decided to act boldly.

At the beginning of May the Secretary of State received word from the Cardinal Legates at Ferrara and Bologna that the plain of Piacenza had been invaded by a French army 10,000 strong.³ A few days later Milan was taken, and on May 21st Bonaparte issued from there a proclamation regarding his intended march on Rome. "We are the friends of every nation," he declared, "especially the descendants of Brutus and the Scipios. Our intention is to restore the Capitol, to set up there in their honour the statues of the men who won renown, and to free the Roman people from their long slavery. This will be the fruit of your victories."⁴

Thus, war was declared on the States of the Church without

¹ Cf. above, p. 244.

² MOURRET, VII., 251.

³ *Ibid.*, 252. GENDRY, II., 244. The Pope, who was in the Pontine Marshes at the time, hurried back to Rome. (*Figari's report of May 14, 1796; State Archives, Genoa.)

⁴ BOUVIER, *Bonaparte en Italie 1796*, 634 seq.

regard for international law, and the French troops, eager for plunder, overran the legations of Ravenna, Ferrara, and Bologna.¹ The economic and military situation of the Patrimony of St. Peter was so bad ² that there was no question of any serious resistance. The only course left to Rome was to negotiate for a speedy truce and by making concessions to save the Eternal City and the Holy See from complete disaster. Neapolitan support could only plunge it into fresh perils. The requests made by the King of Naples to be allowed to conduct his troops through the Papal States to Lombardy and there to resist the French were, it is true, acceded to on principle by the Pope, but at the same time he tried to dissuade him from the project, which would have imperilled the Papal States as well as the kingdom of Naples.³

As Rome was not disposed to acknowledge, even tacitly, the revolutionary Government of France by entering into direct negotiations with it,⁴ it sought in its distress the mediation of Spain, in accordance with their agreement. It

¹ For the French advance, see *Figari's reports of June 11 and 25, 1795 (*loc. cit.*); DU TEIL, *Rome, Naples et le Directoire*, 132 *seqq.* For the entry into Bologna: A. AGLEBERT, *I primi martiri della libertà italiana: congiura e morte di Luigi Zamboni e G.B. de Rolandis in Bologna*, no place of publication, 1862, 157 *seq.* On June 30, 1799, when Bologna was retaken by the Austrians, the ashes of these revolutionary conspirators were scattered to the winds (*ibid.*, 171).

² On September 30, 1795, Azara, *reporting to De la Paz, gave a very full and interesting account of the financial plight of Rome (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). For the relative ordinances, *cf.* *Mendizabal to De la Paz, June 1, 1796 (*ibid.*).

³ *Azara to De la Paz, May 18, 1796: The King of Naples is exhorting the Pope to follow his example and decide on war against the French. **Id.*, May 26, 1796: a chilly reception was given in Naples to the news that the Pope was not going to make war but would rely on Spain's mediation (*ibid.*).

⁴ The Pope would rather suffer the consequences than complain to the French representative (*Pesaro to the Doge, April 2, 1796; State Archives, Venice).

was also moved to take this step by the consideration that Azara, the Spanish envoy to the Vatican, had acquired an adequate knowledge of the Papal States in the thirty years he had held the post. The envoy was accordingly recalled to Rome from his rural retreat in the Campagna by an urgent note from the Secretary of State.¹ The Pope in his turn hurried back from Terracina, where he had arrived the day before and where he had intended to spend the rest of the month.² In Rome Zelada informed the envoy of the Pope's desire to send him to Bonaparte as the representative of the Holy See. The Pope, never very forceful and suffering from poor health at the time, had previously given way to his nephew Braschi's request that the Roman banker Botoni be sent as a negotiator, and the latter was already on his way. It was only when he was assured that Botoni would be recalled and when other misgivings had been dispelled that Azara agreed to undertake the mission, in which he was to be accompanied by the Marchese Gundi. In his absence the affairs of the embassy were to be conducted by his secretary Mendizabal.

Wide circles of those most competent to judge and the general public were vastly pleased to hear of Botoni's recall, though it was feared that in his discomfiture he would set going spiteful intrigues. Azara's journey was not accomplished without a hitch. The rumour spread in Rome that he had been murdered in the neighbourhood of Lodi. This proved to be false, but he had fallen into the hands of robbers and had to pay them money to spare his life and release him.³

When Azara's mission and, shortly afterwards, the desire of the Neapolitan Government to conclude a treaty of neutrality

¹ Azara *reported fully on subsequent events to De la Paz on May 18, 1796, attention being given to all points of view (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

² *Pesaro to the Doge, May 14, 1796. He also reported on Azara's long audience on the previous evening (State Archives, Venice).

³ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, June 1, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), and June 8, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, *Les origines du concordat*, I., 178).

with France became known to the Roman people, they received the news with relief.¹ Similarly the Pope's letter of June 12th, in which he informed the Spanish Court of Azara's mission and promised a present for the king, was one of confident hope.²

Meanwhile Bonaparte went on with his military operations.³ At Ferrara there was a cannonade lasting half a day and then the troops moved against Bologna, where a delegation of several officers and forty cavalrymen gave the Legate the choice of undergoing a siege by 8,000 French or capitulating with full honours. Actually the revolutionary troops entered with little delay, and the Bolognese Senate recalled its *chargé d'affaires* from Rome, to the sorrow of the Pope and his Secretary of State. Nevertheless, the Cardinal Legate of Bologna was instructed to exhort the inhabitants to be perfectly calm and orderly, so that the French should meet with no resistance.⁴

Meanwhile, after some initial difficulties, Azara's efforts were rewarded.⁵ Bonaparte refused at first to regard him as anything more than the representative of Spain,⁶ and he then demanded as a basic condition the conveyance to himself of all the rights that would fall to him as master of the Capitol. This led to heated altercations between the two politicians, who were usually so unemotional, but they did not deter the experienced Spaniard from waiting for a more favourable moment.⁷ For a time his hopes were lowered by the defection of some Papal territories in the Romagna and by the traitorous intrigues of revolutionary circles in Rome; finally, however,

¹ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, June 15, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome); *Pesaro to the Doge, May 21 and June 18, 1796 (State Archives, Venice).

² SÉCHÉ, *loc. cit.*, I., 181 *seq.*

³ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, June 22, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Details in RICHEMONT, *La première rencontre du Pape et de la République Française*, in *Le Correspondant*, CLXXXVIII. (1897), 803 *seqq.*

⁶ DU TEIL, *loc. cit.*, 147.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 148.

on June 23rd, 1796, an armistice was signed in Bologna which did not include all the overweening demands of the Corsican.

The signing of this agreement was attributed by many to Azara's skilful inflexibility, by others to Bonaparte's consideration for the Spanish Court in its rôle of mediator. Both views were only partly correct, for Bonaparte had no intention of signing an honourable truce as a step towards the conclusion of peace on the terms he had exacted ; his sole object was to gain time for the execution of his tasks in northern Italy before advancing into the heart of the peninsula.¹ In writing, therefore, to Madrid ² that in spite of the hard terms of the agreement the Spanish representative had saved the Pope, religion, and Rome from ineluctable disaster, Mendizabal, in the first flush of joy at Azara's success, was overstating the case. Azara, however, does deserve the credit of having calmed the Roman population for the moment and of having given it some grounds for hope.³ Unfortunately, the authoritative members of the Curia were not active enough to turn the moment to account ; the Pope, as nearly always, was seriously unwell, and Zelada was too old. Consequently the predominating influence was wielded by the fiscal Barberi.⁴

The terms of the armistice of Bologna ⁵ were so harsh that at best they produced only a short-lived feeling of relief that by then Rome had been preserved from an even worse fate. They had been agreed to only from fear of losing everything. The Pope undertook to send a plenipotentiary to Paris without delay, to conclude a formal peace, and he also promised to apologize for the murder of Bassville and to free all political

¹ GENDRY, II., 245 *seq.*

² On June 28, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 183).

³ The Pope ordered a Triduum in thanksgiving (*Figari, July 2, 1796 ; State Archives, Genoa).

⁴ " *Mgr. Barberi fiscal que es el omnipotente." (Mendizabal to De la Paz, June 29, 1796 ; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁵ GENDRY, II., 246. *Pesaro to the Doge, June 26 and July 2, 1796 (State Archives, Venice).

prisoners. His sovereignty over the States of the Church were severely curtailed ; all the harbours were to remain open at all times for French vessels but were to be closed to those of France's enemies. The French were to evacuate the legation of Ravenna but were to remain in possession of Bologna and Ferrara and could occupy Ancona also within a week ; merely on giving notice they could cross Papal territory at any time they chose. The hardest provisions of all were those that laid down the tribute to be paid : 21,000,000 *scudi* were to be paid in three instalments within three months, and 100 objects of art and 500 manuscripts had to be surrendered, the details to be fixed by a commission of French experts.

" In fine, we are still alive," was the comment on the armistice made by Pius VI. when asking Mendizabal to convey his thanks to the Spanish Government for their ambassador's mediation.¹ Honest attempts were made by Rome to satisfy the French demands. To pay the first instalment of the tribute 700,000 *scudi* were drawn from the Sixtine treasure,² and on July 6th a Papal circular letter was addressed to the Bishops of the Papal States informing them of the decree of the " Congregazione di Stato ", whereby all church valuables except those that were absolutely indispensable were to be collected and surrendered for the preservation of the Papal States.³ Even ordinary citizens were urged to send in lists of their valuables and hold themselves in readiness to part with them.⁴ These measures, in Rome especially, occasioned further indignation, which was a fertile soil for every kind of revolutionary movement. It was known that various conspiracies had been hatched during the preceding months, and now the

¹ Mendizabal to De la Paz, July 6, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 186).

² The Pope's *consistorial address on the subject, delivered on June 27, 1796, in *Epist.*, A° XXII./XXIII., fo. 43 ; Papal Secret Archives. Cf. TAVANTI, III., 181, and *Pesaro to the Doge, July 2, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

³ GENDRY, II., 247. *Figari's report of July 9, 1796 (*loc. cit.*) ; *Pesaro to the Doge, July 23, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ MOURRET, VII., 254.

authorities were apprehensive of many more ; some were actually exposed and the culprits were severely punished.¹ There were outbursts of discontent among the people, generally under cover of darkness ; in the morning posters and writings were found on the walls. From time to time the manifestations had to be quelled by force of arms. The molestation of the French and their households increased to an alarming degree.² It was then that Bonaparte sent a blunt message to Rome that if the Government did not see to the maintenance of law and order he would come and take it in hand himself.³

In curious contrast to these revolutionary symptoms was the storm of applause with which Azara was welcomed back as the saviour of the city. In his report on the occasion he remarked with pride : " I believe there was more noise than if a storm had swept over the city." ⁴ For his successful efforts he received the due meed of praise and thanks from his Government.⁵

How little this unimaginative " enlightener " had at heart the salvation and honour of the Holy See and the Patrimony of St. Peter may be seen from the unconcealed contempt with which he wrote of the pious belief and religious reverence of the people,⁶ the manifestations of which were an essential feature of the Roman scene at this critical juncture. In Azara's judgment these pious fanatics were far more dangerous than the open adherents of the Revolution who were plotting to overthrow and plunder the city on their own account.⁷

¹ GENDRY, II., 248 *seq.*, 252.

² Azara to De la Paz, August 10, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 195 *seqq.* ; MOURRET, VII., 254).

³ *Id.* to *id.*, August 24, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 198 *seq.*).

⁴ *Id.* to *id.*, July 21, 1796, from Rome (not on the 20th, as given by SÉCHÉ, I., 189), *ibid.*

⁵ Thus, De la Paz in his letter to Azara of June 14, 1796. *Cf.* his report of July 3, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 187).

⁶ *To De la Paz, August 17, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). *Cf.* later reports, e.g. of February 3, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 266).

⁷ *To De la Paz, July 21, 1796 (see above, n. 4).

Actually at this time a large part of the population of the Eternal City were borne along by a great wave of religious fervour that expressed itself in numerous processions and other ecclesiastical ceremonies. The whole of Italy was full of the reports of the extraordinary happenings in the churches of Rome, most notably with regard to the images of the Madonna, whose eyes were said to have moved.¹ An amazing number of people streamed into the churches. In July the Pope ordered mission sermons to be preached and expiatory prayers to be recited, accompanied by Benediction, in the six largest squares in the city, with important indulgences for those who attended.² The streets were full of pious pilgrims, many barefoot and saying the rosary. As the days passed the supernatural incidents increased in every part of the city. Mendizabal, who was no free-thinker like his superior Azara, reported to Madrid that now there were not many who denied what they saw with their own eyes.³ He also reported that the preachers had a calming effect on the excited populace and were trying to remove the hatred felt for the French.⁴

It was soon evident that Bonaparte had no intention of supplementing and completing the terms of the armistice by concluding a speedy peace. At the beginning of July Azara reported to his Government from Florence that the General was interpreting the agreement in his own way, namely with his customary brutality. He was occupying the whole of the

¹ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, July 13, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome); *Figari, July 23, 1796 (State Archives, Genoa). Cf. RICHEMONT in *Le Correspondant*, CLXXXVIII. (1897), 815 *seqq.*

² “*Invito sagro per le sante missioni” issued by the Vicar-General, Cardinal G. M. della Somaglia, of July 9, 1796, with an account of the miracles and an announcement of the indulgences, the six piazze, and the preachers (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

³ “*Pocos son los que niegan lo que han visto con sus propios ojos” (Mendizabal, July 13, 1796; *ibid.*).

⁴ *Ibid.*, a full description. Nevertheless, Azara afterwards made them out to be popular agitators.

Romagna and was levying contributions from it; and any outbursts on the part of the oppressed inhabitants would be welcomed by him as occasions for further reprisals.¹ The Romagna was, in fact, laid waste with fire and sword, so that Azara thought that all his previous efforts would be wasted unless Napoleon was brought to heel by the French Directory. "Whether this happens or not," he wrote, "I foresee that all the States of the Church and Rome itself will be destroyed."² At the beginning of August, 1796, he referred to Bonaparte as a man who breathed only blood and fire.³

On July 21st, after the excitement in Rome had subsided to some extent,⁴ the French commissary Miot arrived in the city to execute the provisions of the armistice.⁵ Remembering Bassville's fate, he made no appearance in public except when accompanied by Azara.⁶ A revealing light is thrown on the Spanish ambassador who, still representing the Papal interests, sat on the opposite side of the table to the Frenchman during the negotiations, by the admission he made to his Government on August 3rd that at the moment he was the only person in Rome to support the French.⁷ Miot was soon replaced by Cacault, who had been commissioned to represent the Republic

¹ Azara to De la Paz, July 3, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 188 seq.).

² *Ibid.*, 187.

³ " *El general Bonaparte que no respira sino sangre y fuego " (Azara to De la Paz, August 3, 1796, from Rome (*loc. cit.*)).

⁴ The Pope himself assured Azara that there was no danger in the popular agitation, which Azara had described to him in the most lurid colours (Azara to De la Paz, July 21, 1796; SÉCHÉ, I., 191). Afterwards there was a moment when the commissaries were thinking of leaving, for fear of an attack on their lives. (Mendizabal to De la Paz, September 21, 1796; *ibid.*, 214.)

⁵ Azara to De la Paz, July 27, 1796 (*ibid.*, 193 seq.); DU TEIL, 320.

⁶ He also dined with Azara daily (see *Figari, July 30, 1796; State Archives, Genoa).

⁷ " * . . . contra estos Franceses y aun contra mi, que soi ahora el unico que los apoia aqui." (To De la Paz, August 3, 1796; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.)

in Rome in 1793 but had not been recognized by the Vatican.¹ Azara, who already knew of him through his diplomatic activities in Naples, distrusted his vivacious temperament, but after Cacault had moved from Florence to Rome he hoped to exert a calming influence on him.² By the middle of August the work of the art experts had advanced so far that Cacault was able to send to Paris a list of the hundred most valuable sculptures and paintings that were to be delivered.³

That the representatives of the French Republic were able to show themselves in public at this time of extraordinary popular excitement, without incurring any serious danger, was due principally to the measures taken by the Papal Government. On July 13th strict regulations were issued by Zelada for the protection of the commissaries.⁴ After being reminded that they should be thankful that the occupation of their city had been averted by the armistice and that there were hopes of a speedy and final peace, the inhabitants of Rome were commanded to show towards the stranger such principles of their religion as hospitality, the law of nations, trust in the public authority, respect for the arrangements agreed upon in treaties, regard for the mediation of Spain, and the attention of the individual citizen to the maintenance of public order. Wherefore the commissaries were to be respected and treated with courtesy by everyone. The slightest molestation of their persons or those of other members of their nation

¹ *Pesaro to the Doge, July 30, 1796 (State Archives, Venice). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XIV., 177. Figari's *reports of August 6 (State Archives, Genoa): GENDRY, II, 250.

² *To De la Paz, August 3, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

³ On August 5, 1796, he sent Azara a provisional list with fifty items (*Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 447 *seqq.*); on August 3 he had reported on the work done by the experts (*ibid.*, 447). The final list (*ibid.*, 461-7) was received by Delacroix on August 15. For the packing and the transport arrangements, *ibid.*, 467, 469, 471, 478.

⁴ Not, as TAVANTI (298) says, on July 18. The text was attached to Mendizabal's *report of July 13, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). Cf. *Figari's report of July 16, 1796 (State Archives, Genoa), and *Pesaro's to the Doge, of July 16, 1796 (State Archives, Venice).

would be regarded as hostility towards the fatherland and as rebellion and would be punished by death, the confiscation of the culprit's property, and the permanent loss of his good name. It was the duty of the authorities to exercise the most scrupulous control and of every individual to report without reserve any infringement of these regulations. Failure to obey this last regulation would be punished by ten years in the galleys, whereas for every information laid the informer would be rewarded by 500 *scudi* from the Apostolic Camera.

No time was lost in carrying out the first of the provisions laid down in the agreement : the appointment of an agent to go to Paris. The person selected for the duty was Pieracchi, the former auditor to the nunciature to France, whose ability was universally esteemed.¹ He travelled by the quickest route, calling at Florence to receive detailed directions from Azara.² With Evangelisti as his secretary he reached the capital on July 22nd. The time of his arrival was not inopportune, as religious life in Paris was reviving.

Printed copies, to the number of 2,000, of a Papal Brief of July 5th, the contents of which had been temporarily withheld in Rome, were sent after the Papal representative, who was to distribute them in Paris if circumstances permitted.³ This Brief had been suggested by Bonaparte in Bologna. It was an appeal by the Pope to the French Catholics to submit to the political authority, for it had the divine sanction. It spoke of the heavy but just punishments, both temporal and eternal, incurred by those who failed to observe the law, and it therefore urgently exhorted the Catholics to obey the Government with all possible zeal and willingness. They were thus to show

¹ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, June 29, 1796 (*loc. cit.*) ; DU TEIL, 195.

² DU TEIL, 206. On pp. 237 *seqq.* is an account of how the Brief originated.

³ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, July 13, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). For the Brief, *cf.* DU TEIL, 236 *seqq.* ; PISANI, III., 95 *seq.* ; *ibid.*, 109 *seq.*, the text. Du Teil (240) is doubtful if Pieracchi ever received the missive.

that the true faith had no intention of destroying civil laws—a fact of which the French Government had to be convinced.

No mention of this Brief was made by Pieracchi when presented to the French Foreign Minister Delacroix on July 25th,¹ possibly because he had not yet been informed of it, but by indirect means it soon came to the knowledge of the Minister and the general public.² Government circles were so surprised to find it contained a Papal recognition of the Republic that at first there was doubt about the authenticity of the document and Cacault was asked to confirm it.³ Some Catholics, too, were greatly taken aback and lively arguments ensued about the difference between the usurped and legitimate authority of the State and the duty of obeying it.⁴ Doubtless by making this concession the Pope had hoped to anticipate the demand of the French Government, which would surely have required its recognition as the very first condition of peace.

The talks between Pieracchi and Delacroix were not begun till August 13th, and after only a few days they came to a dead end. One of the first basic demands set out by Delacroix was the formal recantation of all Papal statements and documents relating to the French State since 1789.⁵ This would not only have compromised the Holy See's ecclesiastico-political position but would also have been an admission that it had followed the wrong course in the confusion of the Revolution. Had such concessions been made by the Pope they would have set at nought all the martyrdoms under the Reign of Terror and all the injustices taken on themselves by the exiles and prisoners. The solitary rock that had stood firm in a raging sea, when men were casting off the bonds of God and justice, would have been set tottering, and the principles of the Revolution

¹ GENDRY, II., 250 *seq.*

² In *Le Rédacteur* of September 4; DU TEIL, 240 *seq.*

³ SÉCHÉ, I., 23; PISANI, III., 100.

⁴ SÉCHÉ, I., 25 *seqq.*; PISANI, III., 99, 101 *seqq.* For the jubilation of the Constitutionals, *ibid.*, 106 *seqq.*

⁵ SÉCHÉ, I., 31; DE LA GORCE, V., 27 *seqq.*; SURREL, *Le card. Laurent Galeppi*, in *La Semaine de Rome*, II. (1909), 320 *seqq.*; DU TEIL, 219 *seqq.*

would have won the most resounding victory imaginable. No such retreat was possible for the Church. Pieracchi tried to discover some way of adjusting the dispute that might have been acceptable to Rome, but soon had to give up all hope of this, as he was not given the slightest encouragement by the other side. Finally, he asked if he might send a courier to the Pope with a message on the subject. This request afforded the Directory the welcome opportunity of breaking off the negotiations altogether.¹ The Foreign Minister expressed to the Papal representative his displeasure at Rome sending a plenipotentiary who had no real powers ; one was not disposed to treat with persons whose powers failed at the first point of discussion. Shortly afterwards the Directory issued an order of expulsion, dated August 14th, against Pieracchi, which was delivered to him on the 17th and with which he complied on the 20th. He withdrew at first to Switzerland.²

Pieracchi's mission and the attempt to initiate peace negotiations between Paris and Rome, as had been demanded at Bologna, were thus frustrated by the anti-clerical attitude of the Directory and its Foreign Minister. When a report on the break-down of the negotiations was rendered by Pius VI. to the College of Cardinals, every member, on being questioned, replied that so outrageous a demand could only be refused.³

Azara, seeing that the result of his diplomatic skill was threatened with ruin, tried to induce the Pope to view the matter in a less rigorous light. At first he tried his hand with philological subtleties about the meaning of the word " religion " in French ; he then suggested that there was no need for the Pope to withdraw the purport and the principles of his utterances regarding France, but only their proclamation, which could not injure either dogma or his personal

¹ GENDRY, II., 250 *seq.*

² Azara to De la Paz, August 31, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 201 *seq.*) ; *Pesaro to the Doge, September 3, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. A. RUBINO (*loc. cit.*), XIV., 180 *seq.* ; DE LA GORCE, V., 32.

³ SÉCHÉ, *loc. cit.*

reputation.¹ The Dominican General Quiñones agreeing that this solution was theologically unobjectionable, Azara propounded it to the Pope in a memorandum just before the decisive meeting of the Congregation of Cardinals. But Pius remained unmoved²; now that there was no longer any hope of avoiding the worst extremity, his courage and decisiveness increased. He was quite certain now that the rapacious Bonaparte would occupy Rome and the whole of the Papal States. When this took place, he averred, he would preferably face his destiny in Rome, but in response to all the entreaties that were made of him and for the sake of the Church, which would probably be threatened with a schism were he to die, he would allow himself to be persuaded, if the worst came to the worst, to take refuge in Spanish territory, along with his most faithful Cardinals. To this implied appeal for help, Azara gave an evasive answer. In effect it was a refusal, as the Pope knew very well. He now said that as Germany and Naples might also be invaded by the French he was thinking of Malta as a refuge.³

In August, 1796, when the attempts to effect a settlement with France had failed, the Cardinal Secretary of State Zelada took the opportunity of asking the Pope to relieve him of his duties. He was moved to take this step, he said, on account of his age—he was now eighty years old—and his physical enfeeblement. The Pope gave his consent and appointed in his place Cardinal Busca, formerly nuncio to Belgium and a friend of Azara's.⁴

¹ His letter to the Pope of August 27, 1796, in SÉCHÉ, I., 206 *seqq.* Cf. *ibid.*, 60 *seqq.*

² Azara reported the whole affair to De la Paz on August 31, 1796 (*ibid.*, 202 *seq.*).

³ *Ibid.*, 203 *seq.*

⁴ GENDRY, II., 251 *seq.* Busca assumed his duties with such independence that the members of the Congregazione di Stato considered themselves slighted ("L'attività, colla quale il nuovo Segretario di Stato si presta alle ispezioni del suo ufficio concentrando unicamente in sè solo e nella volontà del Papa la conoscenza e spedizione degli affari li più importanti, non riesce

Further negotiations took place in Florence, the French Government being represented by Garrau and Salicetti.¹ Any opportunity that offered a prospect of solving the crisis was gladly accepted by the Curia. Monsignore Caleppi, an experienced nuncio, was appointed by the Pope to represent him, and the Dominican Soldati was to accompany him as secretary.² Owing to their knowledge of the previous negotiations, Evangelisti and Azara were also of the party. The latter only consented after a show of reluctance due, as he said, to Rome's ingratitude towards him after the work he had done at Bologna. Actually he had long been waiting in silence for this invitation, and when it came he proudly informed his Government that the Pope had begged him with tears in his eyes to come to his assistance.³ On August 31st Pius VI. informed the Spanish king of Azara's new mission and asked him to continue his protection of the Church.⁴

On September 9th, the day following its arrival in the Tuscan capital, the Papal commission was handed a complete draft of the peace treaty by the French representatives, with the intimation that there were only two alternatives: complete acceptance or complete refusal.⁵ Thus, once again all hopes

di soddisfazione ai cardinali della Congregazione di Stato." They wanted to resign, but it was not long before the Congregation was dissolved. (Pesaro to the Doge, August 20, 1796; State Archives, Venice.)

¹ For these two, see SÉCHÉ, I., 50, n. 1.

² The *Briefs to the Grand Duke Ferdinand and the Grand Duchess, of September 3, 1796, announced Caleppi's delegation and asked for their support in so momentous an affair (*Epist.*, A° XXII./XXIII.; Papal Secret Archives). An account of the negotiations based on Caleppi's report was given by RICHEMONT in *Le Correspondant*, CLXXXVIII. (1897), 821 *seqq.*; cf. SURREL, *Galeppi, loc. cit.*, 323 *seqq.* Cf. *Lavaggi's report of September 3, 1796 (State Archives, Genoa). Figari's death was *reported by Lavaggi on November 5, 1797 (*ibid.*).

³ SÉCHÉ, I., 63, 201, 205; GENDRY, II., 259 *seq.*

⁴ SÉCHÉ, I., 208 *seqq.*

⁵ DU TEIL, 350; *Pesaro to the Doge, September 17, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, 182.

of discussion were excluded, and naturally Caleppi insisted on first consulting the Pope before replying. The short time he was given to consider his reply he utilized in journeying back to Rome. Rumours about the harsh and unacceptable conditions were already abroad there, but it was not until Caleppi's arrival on September 12th that the Pope could summon a General Congregation, in which about twenty Cardinals took part.¹

The Sacred College was unanimous in rejecting the French demands, for not only did they include for the second time the withdrawal of all the Papal edicts against the Revolution, but on several other counts the honour and the rights of the Church were impugned.² There were two other preposterous conditions: that the temporal power of the Pope should be restricted by the appointment of French officials and that the payment of tribute should continue as long as the French were at war, in other words there was to be no limit to it.³ Even Azara found these conditions unjust and acknowledged that they would mean the break-up of the Papal States.⁴

The Pope's written reply, which Caleppi subsequently presented in Florence⁵ and was countersigned by Azara after some misgiving,⁶ was couched throughout in a firm tone and showed

¹ *Pesaro (*loc. cit.*); GENDRY, II., 261; RICHEMONT, *loc. cit.*, 830 *seqq.*

² Mendizabal to De la Paz, September 23, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 220), and *Lavaggi on September 17, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). According to *Mendizabal's report of September 14 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome) eighteen or nineteen Cardinals took part in the Congregation, the result of which was kept secret at first in Rome, "aunque la creo negativa." For the attitudes adopted by the individual members, see RICHEMONT, *loc. cit.*, 831.

³ Extract from the terms in SÉCHÉ, I., 70, n. 1. The terms were enclosed in *Pesaro's report to the Doge, of September 17, 1796 (State Archives, Venice).

⁴ To De la Paz, September 23, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 217 *seqq.*).

⁵ The text of his letter of September 14, 1796, *ibid.*, 71 *seqq.*

⁶ Azara to De la Paz, September 23, 1796, from Florence, *ibid.*, 216 *seqq.* His signature was not at first recognized by the French. RICHEMONT, *loc. cit.*, 832.

how the Pope's courage and decisiveness increased the more closely he was pressed by the enemies of the Church. The document ended with a gloomy prophecy of what was to come: His Holiness would never be a party to such a defamation of the Church, even if his own life were in peril.¹

In the weeks that followed the utmost political excitement and tension prevailed in Rome. The arrogant demands of the French were published by the Pope and communicated to many of the European courts.² Indignation at Bonaparte's insatiability increased all over Italy, so that the prospect was very grave.³ The natural result of the French action was that the Pope declared the armistice to be broken and he suspended the stipulated payments. The statues that had been packed up were to be returned to their former situations.⁴ Among the many diplomatic negotiations that went on at this time, the most developed were those between Rome and Naples; in the course of time they showed signs of resulting in a defensive alliance, and this after an interval of eighteen years during which they had had no relations with each other.⁵ The question of military co-operation was discussed in Rome by the Marchese Vasto, representing Naples, while the other points of difference between the two states were put aside to be settled amicably within a given period.⁶ A discordant note, however, was suddenly introduced into the talks by the news that a treaty had been concluded between the Neapolitans and the French; this, to everyone's surprise, was hurriedly

¹ GENDRY, II., 262.

² *Ibid.*, 264. TAVANTI, 300 *seq.*, for Pius VI.'s appeals for help to the Princes and his ill-success.

³ The war fever in Rome was described by Mendizabal on September 28, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, 222). In his *report of September 14 he enclosed a satire on the subject which had been posted up in the Piazza Colonna (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁴ SÉCHÉ, I., 222 *seq.* Pesaro to the Doge, Sept. 24, 1796 (State Archives, Venice).

⁵ GENDRY, II., 266.

⁶ SÉCHÉ, I., 223, and Azara on October 7, 1796 (*ibid.*, 228); *Pesaro to the Doge, October 8, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

ratified in Naples.¹ Vasto complained that his position had been compromised by the game that had been played behind his back.² The negotiations were continued in spite of this sensational change in the situation, but they led to no tangible result.³ While they were going on the Auditor-General of the Camera, Monsignor Giuseppe Albani, sought to effect a close alliance with the Emperor by means of conversations in Vienna and to induce him to support the Pope with all the forces at his command.⁴ Much, too, was expected of England, which had sent Graves⁵ as a plenipotentiary.

The agitation within the State was even greater, culminating in the Government's feverish activity and the general mobilization of the country.⁶ The comprehensive defence of the State

¹ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, October 26, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome); *Lavaggi on October 29, 1796 (State Archives, Genoa); GENDRY, II., 269 *seq.* The origin of the treaty in DU TEIL, 258 *seqq.*, the signature of October 10, *ibid.*, 287; *ibid.*, 537, the text. The "internuncio" Salamon in Paris was apprised of it on the day of the signature (BRIDIER, *Mémoires*, 237 *seq.*). Cf. *Pesaro to the Doge, October 15, 22, 29, 1796 (*loc. cit.*); A. RUBINO, 41 *seqq.*

² *Mendizabal to De la Paz, December 14, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

³ *Id.* to *id.*, November 2, 1796, and January 11 and 18, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 231 *seq.*, 247 *seq.*, 253); *Pesaro to the Doge, October 29, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ " *Ahora aqui todos se muestran alegres y animosos porque cuentan que el Emperador entre en alianza con el papa." This opinion was based on Albani's reports of Imperial reinforcements. Mendizabal to De la Paz, January 4, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). Albani's mission to Vienna was announced in *Briefs of October 8, 1796, to the Emperor and to Thugut (*Epist.*, A° XXII., fos. 74, 78; Papal Secret Archives). Cf. Lavaggi's *report of October 22, 1796 (State Archives, Genoa), and *Pesaro to the Doge, October 8, 1796 (State Archives, Venice).

⁵ For his audience and for Albani's mission and departure, see *Mendizabal to De la Paz on October 5 and 12, 1796 (*loc. cit.*); *Pesaro to the Doge, December 31, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 52.

⁶ For the popular rejoicing at the prospect of war, see *Pesaro to the Doge on October 1, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

was organized and all able to bear arms were called to the colours. The municipal officials were given military powers and the payment of the troops was put in order. The most radical step was the setting up of a citizen army (*milizia civile*). This new organization was confirmed by a proclamation of September 28th,¹ its purpose being the maintenance of order and the strengthening of the regular troops. The "Senatore di Roma" was placed at its head, and volunteers were invited to report to the chiefs of the "rioni". The Pope, it was said in this proclamation, relied on the loyalty and the ardour of his subjects and on the world-famous patriotism of the Romans.² These auxiliary troops were to be respected and recognized as fully as the regular army. In a short time the enrolment of volunteers and the supply of equipment reached a gratifying level, the Roman nobility playing a prominent part.³ Almost inevitably these untrained and in many cases

¹ **Notificazione* of September 28, 1796, the third enclosure in Mendizabal's *report of the same day (*loc. cit.*). The report is in SÉCHÉ (I., 221 *seq.*), who was unable to discover the enclosures (*cf. ibid.*, 332). This order, which was signed by Busca, contains the organization of every two to three Rioni into five battalions of five to seven companies each, also the names of the officers. Further preparations and decrees were reported by *Pesaro to the Doge on October 8, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 40 *seq.*

² " *Conta principalmente il Santo Padre nella fedeltà e nello zelo de'suoi amatissimi sudditi e più particolarmente nel patriotismo, di cui tanto lodevolmente si pregia il popolo di Roma " (*loc. cit.*).

³ Cf. " *Nota delle offerte presentate al comando generale a tutto il dì 6 ottobre corrente," enclosed in Mendizabal's report of October 12, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). It contains, for example, the following items: "Contestabile Colonna: un regimento di fanteria di 12 compagnie di fucilieri e 2 di granatieri, vestito ed armato. — Marchese Luigi Ercolani: scudi 450 al mese durante l'armamento per soldo di uno compagnia di 100 teste. — Banchieri Torlonia: una compagnia di cavalleria di 80 teste, vestita, armata e fornita di cavalli: ed offre la sua persona e il ministero del suo banco gratis." There were twenty-four offers in all.—A few days later

undisciplined militiamen caused a great deal of trouble and disappointed many hopes, so that it was found necessary to introduce reforms.¹ At the end of November the new militia, under the command of their general, paraded in the atrium of St. Peter's before the Holy Father, who expressed his great satisfaction with it.² Similarly, the blessing of the colours of the various formations of both regular and auxiliary forces were made occasions of solemn ceremonial and the whole city was pervaded by a military atmosphere.³

Naturally, in these circumstances the position of the foreigners in Rome became increasingly uneasy. Before long, the Spaniards felt themselves as insecure as the French in the general confusion of the situation, and were at a loss as to what attitude to adopt.⁴ The popular excitement was further heightened by the rumour, which in spite of the desires of many persons in Vienna and Naples did not come true, that the Pope was about to declare a Holy War on Bonaparte and was already having Bulls and Briefs of excommunication printed.⁵ It was at this juncture that the French applied for

there appeared a "Nota seconda delle offerte" (see *Pesaro to the Doge on October 15, 1796; State Archives, Venice).

¹ Mendizabal to De la Paz, November 2, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 234), and *November 16, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

² **Id.* to *id.*, November 23, 1796 (*ibid.*).

³ "In hoc signo vinces" was the device on their standards (Mendizabal, January 21, 1797; SÉCHÉ, I., 246; similarly Azara on January 13, 1797, *ibid.*, 250); *Lavaggi on January 7, 1797 (State Archives, Genoa). For the swearing-in of the Colonna Regiment, *cf.* *Pesaro to the Doge on January 14, 1797 (State Archives, Venice). *Cf.* A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 110.

⁴ The predicament in which his compatriots were also placed was *reported by Mendizabal on September 14, 1796: "Los Españoles en Roma hoi dia estamos quasi en la misma categoria que los Franceses y nos llaman por no saber que decir Jacobins y fautores suyos" (*loc. cit.*). *Cf.* Azara on October 7, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 229).

⁵ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, October 5, 1796, and January 4, 1797 (*loc. cit.*). " *Molto sensato e giusto è stato il discorso

their passports to be got ready for departure, and soon afterwards they left Rome,¹ with the exception of Cacault, who stayed on for some time longer.²

The Papal army in the meantime had been considerably increased, and by January was 12,000 strong. Detachments were already being dispatched to defend the frontiers of the Papal States. From November onwards particular attention was paid to the defence of the Romagna.³ As the result of requests made by Albani, the services of General Colli, an officer in the Austrian army, were secured for the supreme command of the Papal forces. Landing at Ancona with several other officers,⁴ he went first to the headquarters at Imola,⁵ then to Rome, where he was given a jubilant reception and was paid the highest honours. He was fêted, reported

fattole dall' Imperatore relativamente alla guerra di religione, ma non è totalmente vero che non possa esservi più luogo a dichiararla, poiche se i Francesi venissero ad attaccare la Sede ed il centro della religione, non sarebbe mal fondata la determinazione di dichiarare ad essi per questo oggetto la guerra. Non siamo ancora a questo caso, ma non lascia di farmi sorpresa che ora si parli costà con tanta freddezza di una guerra che prima con tanto ardore si richiedeva." (Busca to the nuncio Albani, February 4, 1797; Nunziat. di Germania, 696, Papal Secret Archives.) Pesaro also *reported to the Doge on the Pope's misgivings about a war of religion on October 1, 1796, and on Vienna's insistence *on January 7, 1797 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 39, III.

¹ Mendizabal to De la Paz, September 28, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 224).

² " *La repugnancia de Cacault a partir de aqui sin que se le mande de una o de otra parte." (Mendizabal to De la Paz, October 5, 1796; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.)

³ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, November 16, 1796 (*ibid.*). On November 23 he *reported that there were 10,000 men there ready to retake Bologna and Ferrara (*ibid.*). *Lavaggi on November 26 and December 17, 1796 (*loc. cit.*); *Pesaro to the Doge, December 31, 1796, and January 7, 1797 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Mendizabal to De la Paz, December 28, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 245 *seq.*).

⁵ Azara to De la Paz, January 20, 1797 (*ibid.*, 255).

Mendizabal, as though he had already conquered the French.¹

While the Neapolitans and the English were doing their best to influence public opinion in Italy by the dissemination of war news of all kinds unfavourable to the French² Bonaparte made another attempt to achieve his purpose without the shedding of blood. This time he made use of Cardinal Mattei, who on Papal instructions had taken up his quarters at Ferrara as Vice-Legate and Governor, since according to the treaty the Romagna was to be handed back to the Papal States.³ Bonaparte held him hostage in Brescia, and now Mattei had to go to Rome on the French behalf to urge once more the acceptance of Bonaparte's conditions for peace.⁴ Probably Bonaparte hoped in this way to avoid being attacked simultaneously by the Papal States, Naples, and Austria, and possibly also England. Mattei's efforts failed, however, as the majority of the Sacred College had formed itself into a war party under the leadership of Cardinal Albani, and reckoned on strong support from the Emperor.⁵ Bonaparte also used Cacaull as an intermediary. He gave him full powers to treat with the Papal Government on the basis, it need hardly be

¹ The Cardinal Secretary of State went to meet him and conducted him to the Pope in the Vatican. (Mendizabal to De la Paz, January 25, 1797; *ibid.*, 256 *seq.*). In a *Brief of February 4, 1797, he was officially appointed supreme commander of all the Papal troops, subordinate only to the Pope and the Secretary of State. (*Epist.*, A° XXII., fo. 110 *seqq.*; Papal Secret Archives.) Cf. *Pesaro to the Doge, January 21, 1797 (State Archives, Venice).

² *Mendizabal to De la Paz, October 12, 19, 26, 1796 (*loc. cit.*).

³ Azara to De la Paz, August 24, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 199). Cf. *ibid.*, 58, and GENDRY, II., 256 *seq.*

⁴ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, November 9, 1796 (*loc. cit.*); *Lavaggi on October 29, 1796 (*loc. cit.*); *Pesaro to the Doge on October 29, 1796 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 46, GENDRY, II., 267 *seqq.*

⁵ Mendizabal to De la Paz, November 2 and 30, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I.; 232 *seq.*, 239); *Pesaro to the Doge, November 5, 1796 (State Archives, Venice); cf. RUBINO, XV., 47.

said, of the aforesaid peace conditions. Cacault accordingly put himself in touch with the Secretary of State, Busca,¹ and the Pope convened a Congregation which, before entering into any further negotiations, demanded fresh proposals from the French Directory. On this occasion, too, a stubborn opposition was offered by Albani's party, so that Cacault was made to wait several weeks for an answer.² Finally, on January 22nd, Bonaparte ordered him to leave Rome within six hours. Cacault, whose removal from Rome had long been urged by the Emperor, retired to Florence.³ Finally, even Azara, usually so self-confident, was at a loss as to which side to take.⁴

The war fever in Rome and the Papal States was increased by the continual news of victories won by the Imperial troops over Bonaparte, though most of these reports proved to be false. But the Roman people believed what they wanted to be true; even educated Romans were misled by reports that had been purposely falsified, whereas practically no attention was paid to the correct ones that told of Bonaparte's victorious advance.⁵ After various bodies of troops had set out with the

¹ *Mendizabal to the De la Paz, November 9, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

² **Id.* to *id.*, November 16 and 23 and December 21 (there had been no reply for forty days!), 1796 (*ibid.*), also on December 28, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 245); *Lavaggi on December 31, 1796 (State Archives, Genoa).

³ Mendizabal to De la Paz on January 11 and February 1, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 247, 262); Azara on January 20 and 27 and February 3, 1797 (*ibid.*, 255 *seq.*, 261 *seq.*, 267 *seq.*); *Pesaro to the Doge, January 7 and 28, 1797 (*loc. cit.*; cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., III, 113). In the latter dispatch was enclosed a *note from Cacault to Pesaro about his departure. Bonaparte's letter was published by RICHEMONT (*loc. cit.*, 839 *seq.*).

⁴ Azara to De la Paz, October 7, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 227).

⁵ For the remarkable difficulty experienced by the Romans in believing any report favourable to the French, see Mendizabal's *report of November 16, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome); similarly, his *report of November 23, 1796 (*ibid.*), for the treaty between Naples and Paris and Bonaparte's victories.

Pope's blessing, the first military encounters with the French took place at the beginning of 1797. On January 31st Bonaparte declared war on the Papal States by means of a proclamation.¹ After several victories had been gained over the Austrians² the fortunes of war continued to favour the Revolutionary army in the Papal States. After the first battle, on the Senio, it occupied Faenza³ and then Ancona, where Colli just managed to save himself by taking to flight. Here the

Cf. *Pesaro to the Doge on January 21, 1797 (*loc. cit.*), and Azara to De la Paz on November 2, 1796 ("les Romains ne voulaient nullement y croire"; SÉCHÉ, I., 230). *Cf. ibid.*, 233 (Mendizabal on November 2, 1796), 238 (on November 30, 1796), 261 (Azara on January 27, 1797), and 265 (Mendizabal on February 1, 1797).

¹ GENDRY, II., 271; A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 113. " *Questa invasione dello stato pontificio è stata eseguita dai Francesi senza darne antecedentemente alcun avviso; soltanto dopo aver già effettuata l'invasione della Romagna pubblicò il generale Bonaparte colle stampe una raccolta di scritture colle quali rende ragione delle sue mosse." This from a report, partly in cipher, from the Cardinal Secretary of State to the nuncio Litta on February 25, 1797. (Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A, Papal Secret Archives.)

² " *I Francesi hanno riportato una regolata vittoria dall'Armata Austriaca in Italia . . . Bonaparte ha già diviso la sua armata, come vedrà dall'annesso foglio scrittomi da Msgr. Nuncio in Venezia, ed una porzione è destinata per noi, nè credo che questa volta la cosa si riduca a sola minaccia, perche l'improvvisa partenza di M. Cadault da questa capitale è il lampo foriero del tuono." (Busca to Albani in Vienna, January 28, 1797; Nunziat. di Germania, 696, *ibid.*) For the further advance, see Busca's third *dispatch of February 4, 1797, to Albani (*ibid.*).

³ " *Al loro [the French] ingresso nello stato pontif. la nostra troppa trovavasi accostante (?) in Faenza, si battè bravamente con loro; ma soverchiata dal maggior numero e non assistita dalle masse de' paesani, dalle quali si aspettava soccorso, parte restò sbandata e parte prigioniera, o morta sul campo." (Busca to Litta, February 11, 1797; Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A; *loc. cit.*) *Cf.* GENDRY, II., 272.

Republic of Ancona was set up.¹ Then, at Loreto, what was left of the great pilgrimage treasure was plundered.² In most cases the inhabitants of the towns, mindful of the Corsican's threat to punish any armed resistance with fire and plunder, surrendered the keys of the town gates without striking a blow.³

In the first weeks of February the ill-tidings had to be taken seriously, even in Rome, where it was realized that the hopes that had been set on Vienna and Naples were not to be fulfilled⁴ and that the military situation was rapidly becoming hopeless. Even Colli despaired of saving the Romagna or of regaining it.⁵ Congregations of Cardinals followed one after the other, their deliberations for the most part being withheld from the public.⁶ Heated disputes took place between the war party, under Albani, and the peace party, under Antici, the former being in a slight majority.⁷ The news of the fall of Mantua

¹ Azara to De la Paz, February 18, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 275; cf. *ibid.*, 90).

² *Ibid.*, 276; GENDRY, II., 274; MOURRET, VII., 255.

³ G. GARAVANI, *Urbino e il suo territorio nel periodo francese 1794-1814*, Urbino, 1906, in particular I., 44 *seqq.*, though the author failed to make use here of important *documents in the Archiepiscopal Archives at Urbino. Cf. *Bollettino diocesano di Urbino*, IX. (1922), 34 *seqq.*, 55 *seqq.*, 75 *seqq.*

⁴ *Busca to the nuncio Albani in Vienna, third dispatch of February 4, 1797 (Nunziat. di Germania, 696, *loc. cit.*).

⁵ " *Il bravo generale Colli mettendo a profitto quel poco che è preparato dall'inattività ed ignoranza del passato comando militare, ha già date e darà dell disposizioni per salvarci. Ma ci salveremo? Il lo spero, ma ne temo." (Busca to Albani, January 28, 1797; Nunziat. di Germania, 696, *loc. cit.*)

⁶ The question of the Pope's saving himself by taking to flight was also discussed, the King of Naples having offered his capital as a place of refuge. (*Busca to Litta, February 11, 1797; Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A, *loc. cit.*)

⁷ Mendizabal to De la Paz, February 8, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 272). The report was accompanied by a " *Nota de los cardenales que asistieron a la congregacion general delante del papa y votaron por la paz y por la guerra " (Archives of the Spanish Embassy

caused great dismay, high hopes having been held of its resistance,¹ but the acme of consternation was reached when Colli reported that he could no longer rely on the loyalty of his troops, who would refuse to follow him any further.² At a decisive meeting of the Sacred College, held on the night of February 11th, it was resolved to empower General Colli to ask for an armistice and to convey the Pope to a place of safety, the place selected being Terracina, on the Neapolitan frontier.³ All preparations were made, and even the people were expecting the Pope's departure. Other highly placed persons, both clerical and lay, also made ready for flight. But Pius VI. stood firm and refused to listen to any such suggestion, just as he had done in September, 1796, when the Spaniards had placed a frigate at his disposal.⁴ In his acute distress his strong faith in God came to his support.⁵

On the following day the members of the Sacred College agreed among themselves to send a delegation to Bonaparte, consisting of Cardinal Mattei, Duke Braschi, Caleppi, and

in Rome): "Por esta fueron los siguientes: Albani, Duque de York, Carafa, Antonelli, Doria, Zelada, Somaglia, Altieri; Pignatelli, Roverella, Rinuccini: se duda del voto de estos: Gerdil: este dixo al dar su voto, que se creería hereje votando por la paz. Por la paz: Antici, Busca, Borgia, Caprara, Carandini, Livizzani, Mattei; Braschi: dudoso."

¹ SÉCHÉ, I., 273.

² Azara to De la Paz, February 18, 1797 (*ibid.*, 276).

³ *Ibid.*, 276 seq. Cf. *ibid.*, 92; GENDRY, II., 274 seq.

⁴ Mendizabal to De la Paz, September 7, 1796 (SÉCHÉ, I., 211), and on *September 14, 1796 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), with the following note from Busca: "D. Quirinal 9 Settembre 1796. Sua Santità ha comandato al card. Busca di significare al suo rev^{mo} sig. D. Stefano che resta in di Lei piena libertà il disporre del noto legno come li ordini del suo sovrano gli hanno prescritto non essendosi servizio di Sua Santità che lo possa impedire." Mendizabal remarked on this: "We have done all we could, therefore."

⁵ " *In mezzo a tante angustie l'animo del s. Padre si regge ed una ferma e santa fiducia lo sostiene." (Pesaro to the Doge, February 17, 1797; State Archives, Venice.)

Massimi.¹ Their departure was followed by the arrival of the preliminary conditions laid down by Bonaparte as the basis of any kind of negotiation. All the newly enlisted troops were to be disarmed, General Colli and all other Austrian officers were to be dismissed, and these steps were to be publicly announced. Five days were allowed in which to consider these conditions ; on their acceptance Bonaparte would be willing to receive the Papal representatives at Foligno.²

The situation was so desperate that there was no question of refusing to comply.³ In consequence Bonaparte invited the Papal representatives to take part in talks at Tolentino, where after a few days, on February 19th, terms of peace were signed.

The atmosphere of political tension in which the negotiations at Tolentino were carried on is described most vividly in Caleppi's reports.⁴ General Colli, on his return journey, met Caleppi, and in his despair urged to him to bring about a peace at any price. The Papal agents reached the Corsican's headquarters on February 16th. He received them the same evening with exquisite courtesy and immediately paid them a return visit in person. The Papal party consequently looked forward to the negotiations with every hope.

¹ Azara on February 18, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 278). The negotiations were initiated by a letter from Mattei to General Bonaparte.

² SÉCHÉ, *loc. cit.* ; *Busca to the nuncio Albani, February 13, 1797 (Nunziat. di Germania, 696 ; *loc. cit.*). He wrote that Vienna should not take it ill of the Pope to agree, as he was in the direst extremity. He would do all he could to retain Colli in spite of everything.

³ A *Brief of April 29, 1797, expressed the Pope's sincere regret at having to release the "locum tenente mareschallo Colli" (on February 4 he had been addressed as "pontif. copiarum supremo duci") and assured him of his lasting gratitude (*Epist.*, A° XXII., fo. 128 ; Papal Secret Archives). Colli's departure " *a Napoli per poi portarsi, come egli ha detto, ai bagni d'Ischia " was reported by Doria to the nuncio Albani on June 24, 1797 (Nunziat. di Germania, 696 ; *ibid.*).

⁴ They were used by RICHEMONT in *Le Correspondant*, CLXXXVIII. (1897), 842 *seqq.*

But in a few days these expectations were grievously disappointed. First, the general complained about the breach of the armistice that had been signed at Bologna, for which he held the Pope responsible. He refused to allow the objections that were made on this score, and as a basic condition for any further negotiation he demanded the complete fulfilment of the Bolognese agreements. The agents were given two hours in which to decide whether they would give in or break with France ; any discussion was ruled out. The first alternative was chosen, as may well be imagined, whereupon Caleppi was given the task of drawing up a draft treaty for the following day, Bonaparte insisting on bringing the matter to a speedy conclusion.

Cacault was included in the conversations that took place on February 18th, having been summoned from Florence for the purpose. Caleppi's proposals were rejected in their entirety as being too moderate and his draft was burnt. Bonaparte then drew up far more extensive demands, which included the banishment of Roman nobles and the confiscation of their property ; Rome was to be a free harbour for the French alone and, above all, the French were to have the right of the "*esclusiva*" in the conclave, even after the Papal election had been concluded.¹

As long as the French demands were of an economic or political nature the Papal representatives showed every desire to come to an agreement, but they could not suffer the slightest incursion into the ecclesiastical or religious sphere, and therefore opposed such demands with surprising energy. Though the General steadily increased his threats, they refused to surrender an inch of ground, with the result that unpleasant scenes occurred and the conversation was broken off. In the evening, however, it was resumed on separate points of the treaty and continued till midnight. Ecclesiastical questions were not touched on again.

When the negotiations were coming to a close Caleppi suddenly had misgivings about the advisability of making

¹ *Ibid.*, 844 *seq.*

peace with Bonaparte at such a time.¹ His colleagues, however, overruled his objections and so the treaty was signed on the morning of February 19th. The obligations thus incurred by the Papal States were hard to bear, but Rome and the Holy See had been saved once more and Bonaparte's attempted encroachment on the ecclesiastical domain had been frustrated by Caleppi's firmness.

The treaty, of twenty-six articles,² first required the complete fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the armistice of Bologna, in particular the delivery of the objects of art and manuscripts³; it then proceeded to demand very much more. Thus, in the treaty the Papal Government definitely revoked every agreement made in alliance against France, it undertook to discharge the military reinforcements it had recently enlisted, and granted the French Republic all the privileges formerly enjoyed in Rome by the Most Christian King. In the matter of territory the Pope formally renounced his claim to Avignon and the Venaissin, and to the three Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna; pending the conclusion of a Continental peace, Ancona and its environs were to remain in French hands. The financial obligations, including the sums already due, amounted to 46,000,000 *scudi*; in addition, there were considerable deliveries in kind to be made. France, for her part, undertook to evacuate all other territories she had occupied and to repatriate the prisoners of war.

A courier bringing news of the peace that had been made

¹ *Ibid.*, 846.

² Text in SÉCHÉ, I., 104, n. 1; DU TEIL, 545 *seqq.*; VICCHI, 164 *seq.*, with Busca's "Notificazione" of February 24, 1797, in *Bull. Cont.*, V., 3, 2988 *seq.* French caricatures in FUCHS, *Karikatur der europ. Völker*⁴, München, 1923, 151, 152. The *original minute, on separate sheets, with Bonaparte's signature, also a fine copy of the treaty with its ratification in brochure form are in the safe in the Papal Secret Archives.

³ Cf. *Corresp. des Direct.*, XVI., 498; list of art-treasures loaded on vehicles, of April 10, 1797, *ibid.*, 511 *seqq.* and 525 *seqq.*; G. A. SALA, *Diario di Roma*, III., 213 *seqq.*

arrived in Rome on the evening of February 20th.¹ The Roman delegates' state of mind may be judged from the letter from Duke Braschi to the Pope, which the courier also brought with him. "With God's help peace has been concluded. I cannot describe to Your Holiness what we had to contend with and endure in order to obtain it. Suffice it to know that more than once poor Cardinal Mattei threw himself at Bonaparte's feet, fighting for a long time against such terrible conditions for Rome."²

The next day the delegation itself arrived in the Holy City and the day after the Pope called a Congregation of Cardinals to ratify the agreement.³ There was satisfaction at the freedom of Rome and the Church being preserved once more, though at the cost of heavy sacrifices.⁴ Whether the Papal States in their exhausted condition were capable of fulfilling their obligations was open to doubt,⁵ but certainly France had profited very considerably with comparatively trifling sacrifices and very little effort. Once more, as at Bologna, Bonaparte

¹ Mendizabal to De la Paz, February 23, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 281 *seq.*).

² *Ibid.*, 282.

³ *Ibid.*, 282 *seqq.*; TAVANTI, III., 307; *Busca to Litta, February 25, 1797 (Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A; Papal Secret Archives); *Pesaro to the Doge, February 22 and 25, 1797 (State Archives, Venice).

⁴ " *La religione è stata quella che principalmente si è avuta in vista, poichè sarebbe stato incalcolabile il danno che ne avrebbe sofferto dalla invasione dell'intero stato pontificio e specialmente della capitale da cui sarebbe stato costretto il papa ad allontanarsi per metter in salvo la dua sacra persona " (*ibid.*).—On March 15, 1797, Duminique wrote from Dresden to the nuncio Della Genga : " Comme la nation française déclare dans toutes les occasions qu'elle est grande et généreuse, elle a donné par cette paix des preuves de ses sentiments sublimes et de sa modération en laissant au moins au St. Père le titre, les sept montagnes, les marais pontins, le Capitole et l'église de St Pierre." *Annal. de St.-Louis des Franç.*, III., 36 *seq.*

⁵ Even Azara expressed his doubts about it in his report of February 24, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 288).

had shown that he was more successful as a diplomat than the Directory, which had failed to come to terms with the Papal agents either in Paris or Florence.¹

At this juncture, too, Azara would have been welcome in Rome as an intermediary in the negotiations with the French,² but he stayed on in Florence, declaring that he could not return before Busca had been dismissed from the Secretaryship of State, as he and the Queen of Spain had deeply compromised him in letters that had become well known. It was true that Busca had questioned Azara's integrity in the armistice negotiations and had suggested to the Pope that he was only posing as a mediator and that his sole purpose was to provide the Duke of Parma, the Queen of Spain's brother, with portions of the Papal States. Such a suspicion, in Azara's judgment, could have been whispered into Roman ears by Naples alone.³ It was communicated by Busca in a letter to the nuncio Albani, in Vienna; the letter was intercepted by the French, who for their own purposes published it.⁴ Another and far more weighty accusation was brought against Busca, namely that he had worked for Rome's coalition with Naples and Vienna, which neither Spain nor France could view with indifference.

At first Pius VI. was incensed by Azara's presumption and refused to give way.⁵ This attitude he maintained when Busca, on March 9th, referring to Azara's request, asked to be relieved of his office, though definitely stating that he had

¹ "Bonaparte avait si habilement joué tour à tour le rôle du 'tragediante' qui fulmine et du 'comediante' qui caresse, que les hommes du pape étaient partis de Tolentino dépouillés et reconnaissants" (L. MADELIN, *La Révolution*, 462).

² Mendizabal reported on March 8, 1797, that the Pope had written to him to invite him back to Rome (SÉCHÉ, I., 297).

³ *Azara to De la Paz, April 27, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome); *Lavaggi on March 18, 1797 (State Archives, Genoa).

⁴ Mendizabal to De la Paz, March 23, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 112 *seqq.*).

⁵ The same report (*ibid.*, 301). Cf. Azara on March 25, 1797 (*ibid.*, 306).

never entertained thoughts of a foreign alliance without the Pope's knowledge.¹ Pius VI.'s reply on the following day was full of praise of Busca's fulfilment of his duties and his resignation was not accepted.² When Busca renewed his request in urgent terms on March 15th,³ the Pope gave way, giving expression equally to his regret and his esteem and intimating that Busca would be richly rewarded.⁴ His successor in office was Cardinal Doria Pamfili, Prince Doria's brother, who at this time especially was rendering important financial assistance to the Holy See.⁵

A month later Azara returned to Rome, where he was given a most cordial reception by the people and the Cardinal Secretary of State, to the disgust of an Anglo-Neapolitan party, which feared a revival of Spanish influence.⁶ The former understanding between the Holy See and the Spanish ambassador was restored at a Papal audience at the beginning of May, when all questions were discussed.⁷

In accordance with the peace treaty another Papal representative had to go to Paris to make satisfaction for Bassville's

¹ *Busca to the Pope on March 9, 1797, enclosed in Mendizabal's report of April 10, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

² The *Pope to Busca on March 10, 1797 (*ibid.*), with an allusion to the Bourbons' demand for Torrigiani's dismissal in Clement XIII.'s pontificate. Cf. *Mendizabal to De la Paz, March 11, 1797 (*ibid.*).

³ *Busca to the Pope, March 15, 1797 (*ibid.*).

⁴ The *Pope to Busca, March 16, 1797 (*ibid.*).

⁵ He put, for instance, 6,000,000 of his own funds in Genoa at the Pope's disposal (Mendizabal, on March 2, 1797, in SÉCHÉ, I., 291; and *on April 4, 1797, *loc. cit.*; *Pesaro to the Doge, March 11, 1797, State Archives, Venice). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 121. For his relations with Spain, cf. Azara, on April 25, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 307).

⁶ *Azara to De la Paz, April 27, 1797 ("Hace tres dias que estoi en Roma"), Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome; *Pesaro to the Doge, April 22, 1797 (*loc. cit.*).

⁷ The Pope was moved to tears, reported Azara on May 10, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 311).

murder. The Marchese Massimi was chosen for the purpose, and he stayed on in the French capital as *chargé d'affaires*.¹ To superintend the execution of the treaty, Cacault returned to Rome,² where he was given a very friendly welcome by the Pope and subsequently showed himself to be a lenient interpreter of the various agreements, in full accord with Bonaparte, who in contradistinction to the anti-clerical Directory, would gladly have come to terms with Rome on ecclesiastical matters. In August Cacault was replaced as ambassador extraordinary of the Republic to the Holy See by Joseph Bonaparte, the General's brother, formerly *chargé d'affaires* at Parma. At the end of the month he took up his residence in the Palazzo Corsini, in the Lungara, which subsequently became the centre of movements that were anything but pleasing to Rome.³

The Papal Court found it far from easy to raise the money demanded.⁴ The Pope sold the objects of value that were his personal property, and many of the Papal robes were stripped of their pearls and other ornaments.⁵ His example was followed

¹ The two *Briefs of authority for Massimi and his secretary, J. Gorirossi, of June 1, 1797, in *Epist.*, A° XXII/XXIII., fo. 132 *seq.* (Papal Secret Archives). The first begins: "Carissimis in Christo filiis nostris civibus Directorii executivi reipublicae Francorum"; the second ends: "... precamur et apost. benedictionem amantiss. impertimur." There was also the observation: "Tanto di questo che dell'antecedente breve ne furono fatti due altri senza l'Apost. Benedizione da presentarsi o gli uni o l'altri secondo venisse concertato a Parigi." Cf. *Doria to Gius. Albani in Vienna, June 3, 1797 (Nunziat. di Germania, 696; *loc. cit.*), and *Azara to De la Paz, May 1, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

² *Mendizabal to De la Paz, April 10, 1797 (*ibid.*); *Pesaro to the Doge, February 25, 1797 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 120.

³ *Doria to the nuncio Litta, September 9, 1797 (Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A, *loc. cit.*); GENDRY, II., 281.

⁴ Plans for raising money from church property, etc., were reported by *Pesaro to the Doge on February 25, 1797 (State Archives, Venice).

⁵ GENDRY, II., 280.

in a similar spirit of self-sacrifice by many Cardinals and Roman nobles, with the result that it was found possible to pay the required sums within the prescribed periods.¹ The Papal subjects had to play their part by surrendering their gold and silver in return for paper money.² Of the many legislative measures taken for the procurement of money those that exacted heavy taxes from the secular and regular clergy aroused particular attention.³ In spite of all this, the French were a long time in withdrawing from the provinces they had occupied, and their continued presence there only increased the general impoverishment and distress.⁴

In other ways, too, the occasions for popular discontent grew more numerous every day.⁵ Very soon after the conclusion of the treaty, when Cacault, on his departure from Rome, gave a dinner to the French officers and the diplomatic corps, serious disturbances took place and the French were

¹ *Azara to De la Paz, April 1, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome ; A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 120 *seq.*).

² Mendizabal to De la Paz, March 2, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 291).

³ Azara to De la Paz, August 25, 1797 (*ibid.*, 323). On September 10, 1797, Azara *reported on the gloomy economic conditions in Rome and the efforts made to improve them (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁴ *Pesaro to the Doge, March 18 and 25, 1797 (*loc. cit.*) ; **id.* on April 1, 1797 (they are leaving Umbria at last and are now only in Ancona and the Romagna), and *April 8 (great rejoicing in Umbria at the return of the Papal authorities), *ibid.* Cf. A. RUBINO, *loc. cit.*, XV., 122.

⁵ “ *La revolucion quasi completa de Italia se va . . . con una rapidez incredible ” (Azara to De la Paz, May 25, 1797 ; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). The Papal States, he continued, are surrounded by democratic republics ; no one can see how they can continue. “ Los que conocen el caracter italiano, la rivalidad de unos pueblos con otros, autorizada con la diversidad de gobiernos establecida desde tantos siglos, los intereses tan diversos de todas las ciudades, no conciben que este nuevo sistema pueda subsistir mas tiempo que el que lo sostenga la fuerza preponderante que acaba de formar y preveen una semilla de guerras civiles interminables.”

insulted in the streets.¹ Even the Papal civil guard was attacked and disarmed by gangs of ruffians, and plots against the State were discovered.² The most serious outbreak took place on the evening of August 1st, in the vicinity of the Quirinal, the Pope's residence.³ In April, owing to the insecurity of public order, he had abandoned the journey he usually made to Terracina to inspect the drainage works in the Pontine Marshes.⁴

It was at this time, too, that Pius VI.'s physical condition often gave cause for serious apprehension. In May, 1797, it was so disquieting⁵ that the possibility of a conclave in the immediate future began to be discussed in diplomatic circles and corresponding preparations were made.⁶ Soon, however, Azara was able to report that His Holiness's health had

¹ Mendizabal to De la Paz, March 2, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 292).

² *Id.* to *id.*, March 23, 1797 (*ibid.*, 302). On March 18, 1797, Pesaro *reported to the Doge the arrest of thirty revolutionaries (State Archives, Venice; GENDRY, II., 282).

³ Azara to De la Paz, August 10, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 320); *Doria to the nuncio Litta, August 5, 1797 (Nunziat. di Polonia 343 A; Papal Secret Archives).

⁴ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, April 10, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁵ "La salute del Papa comincia a dar soggetto d'inquietudine; attaccato da stranguria dovette in questi giorni più volte assoggettarsi alla operazione della siringa: gli fu due volte ripetuta l'emissione di sangue, e qualunque cosa ne dicano i suoi famigliari, la sua avanzata età e questo nuovo incomodo non lascia di cagionar qualche timore delle sue conseguenze." (*Pesaro to the Doge, May 6, 1797; State Archives, Venice.) "La salute del Papa ogni giorno va declinando e facendosi sempre maggiore l'infermità da cui è attaccato, non si abaglia a prevedere che vanno a gran passi avvicinandosi gli ultimi giorni della sua vita" (**id.* to *id.*, May 13, 1797; *ibid.*).

⁶ Azara asked for instructions and discussed them in his report of May 10, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 313). Cf. *Lavaggi on May 6, 10, 20, and 27, 1797 (*loc. cit.*), and *Doria, the Secretary of State, to Litta on May 6, 13, and 27 (Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A; *loc. cit.*).

improved,¹ though at the end of July an accident in the night brought on another temporary set-back.² A ruling of the Spanish Government issued at this time stated³ that in the event of a Papal election no German or Italian candidate was to be permitted and that a French one was quite out of the question. Azara was to press for the election of a Spaniard, namely the Archbishop of Toledo, Cardinal Lorenzana. On September 25th Azara signified his general compliance with this instruction and reported at the same time that the Pope's health had taken another turn for the worse; he had already received the Viaticum, had summoned the Sacred College to his side, and had given the necessary orders for the preservation of peace and order.⁴ Almost immediately, however, his health began to mend, and by October he was convalescing.⁵ Azara took this opportunity of explaining to his Government in a calm and objective manner that its attitude towards the question of a conclave was untenable, for according to a long-standing tradition, which in the present circumstances had more force than ever, it was only an Italian who was likely to be considered.⁶

Soon there were further differences between the Papal Government and Bonaparte. On an application being made in Vienna by Giuseppe Albani, General Provera was sent to the Pope to succeed Colli as the generalissimo of the Papal troops.⁷ Through his brother in Rome Bonaparte raised objections to such an appointment, but at first they failed to have the

¹ *Azara to De la Paz, July 1 and 10, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). A slight improvement had been *reported by Pesaro to the Doge on May 20 (*loc. cit.*).

² Azara's second report of July 25, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 317). On August 10 he reported him to be better again (*ibid.*, 320).

³ *De la Paz to Azara, from S. Ildefonso, August 28, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁴ *To De la Paz, September 25, 1797 (*ibid.*). Cf. *Doria to Litta, September 30, 1797 (Nunziat. di Polonia, *loc. cit.*).

⁵ Azara to De la Paz, October 10, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 326).

⁶ Azara's second report of October 10, 1797 (*ibid.*, 328).

⁷ Azara's first report of the same day (*ibid.*, 327).

desired effect.¹ Other awkward features of the situation were the difficulties raised by Rome about the recognition of the Cisalpine Republic² and the military preparations that Naples persisted in making on the frontier of the Papal States,³ which, in view of the unsettled conditions in northern Italy, were causing apprehension. The latter situation was eased at last by the peace that was signed at Udine on October 17th by Bonaparte and the Austrians, after lengthy negotiations.⁴ With the approach of winter the economic situation in Rome grew worse; the value of the paper money was barely sufficient to meet daily needs, commerce was on the point of collapse,⁵ and the legal measures that were found necessary were highly unpopular.⁶ Another misfortune was the loss of Ancona. By the treaty made with Austria it should have been returned to the Papal States; instead, it declared itself an independent republic.⁷

The numerous elements of discontent in Rome, which were not averse to a revolution, were centred in the Palazzo Corsini, the residence of the French ambassador, who was receiving instructions from the Directory to encourage republican aspirations in the States of the Church.⁸ Among the French

¹ *Azara to De la Paz, October 1, 1797 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). Bonaparte threatened to declare war unless Provera and the Austrian officers left the Papal States within twenty-four hours (*Azara to De la Paz, November 25, *ibid.*; GENDRY, II., 283).

² **Id.* to *id.*, November 25, 1797 (*ibid.*), and December 25, 1797 (SÉCHÉ, I., 329).

³ **Id.* to *id.*, September 10 and October 25, 1797 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ **Id.* to *id.*, November 25, 1797 (*ibid.*). For the sale of church property to relieve the distress, v. TAVANTI, III., 318. Cf. "Pensieri sulle circostanze economiche di stato pontif. dell'anno 1797" (Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome; Fondo Gesuitico, 195, pp. 78 *seqq.*). Cf. DUFOURCO, 13.

⁶ *Azara to De la Paz, December 10, 1797 (*loc. cit.*).

⁷ **Id.* to *id.*, June 10, November 10 and 25, 1797 (*ibid.*).

⁸ How carefully he carried out these instructions and systematically encouraged the revolution is shown in the

emissaries was a General Duphot, who was said to have supplied his followers with money and republican cockades.¹ On learning that revolutionary movements were under way the Papal Government strengthened its patrols in the city and on December 27th there were clashes between the Papal soldiers and the riotous mob, serious injuries being inflicted. Joseph Bonaparte, when offered the leadership of the popular insurrection, maintained a disapproving attitude towards it²; nevertheless, on the following day there were further mass meetings, at which there were shouts of: "Long live the Republic! Long live Liberty!" Two men were killed by the Papal patrol and the mob fled for help to the Palazzo Corsini. What precisely happened here has not been definitely established. The reports rendered by Joseph Bonaparte, Azara, and others are not entirely clear and do not agree.³ What is certain is that General Duphot, who, as the ambassador's future brother-in-law, was staying with him as his guest, appeared among the rioters with a drawn sword, more as an aggressor, therefore, than a mediator. The Papal party tried to disarm him but he made a serious show of resistance, and while making his way through the crowd fell down dead.⁴

**Relazione del card. Antonelli sull'avvenimento in Roma dal 1797 al 1799*, which, though it produces evidence, is strongly prejudiced against the French (Bibl. Vallicelliana, Rome; Filza Cappa, XII., 7, 25, pp. 7 seqq.; GENDRY, II., 284).

¹ Cf. G. BOULOT, *Le général Duphot 1769-1797* (Paris, 1908); **Relazione del card. Antonelli (loc. cit.)*; GENDRY, II., 285; SÉCHÉ, I., 166.

² BOULOT, *loc. cit.*, 153 seq., 157 seq.

³ Bonaparte's report (*ibid.*, 157 seqq.; cf. *ibid.*, 184 seqq.) and Azara's (SÉCHÉ, I., 169 seqq.). Full accounts in the letter written by *Doria, the Secretary of State, to the nuncio Litta on December 30, 1797 (Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A, Papal Secret Archives), and in the **Relazione del card. Antonelli (loc. cit.*, pp. 9 seqq.). Cf. DUFOURCQ, 73-7; G. A. SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 5 seq.; SCIOUT, *Le Directoire*, II., 3, 259 seqq.; VERRI, *Vicende memorabili*, 339 seqq.

⁴ The incidents are described in the detailed and well-informed *Memorie storiche sulle principali cagioni e circostanze della*

In the words of a French historian he was "the victim of his own imprudence and impetuosity".¹

This unfortunate incident was the start of all the ensuing calamity.² Its effect on the Directory in particular was like a spark in a barrel of gunpowder. Massimi, the Papal ambassador in Paris, was put in prison and his papers were seized.³ Joseph Bonaparte's behaviour was similarly directed towards an open breach with Rome, and in this he was assisted by the injudicious step taken by Doria, the Cardinal Secretary of State who, as soon as the accident occurred, hastened to

rivoluzione di Roma e di Napoli (1800; no place of publication), which were probably compiled by Valentinelli (*v.* DUFOURCO, 570): "Duphaut più temerario sprezza l'avviso, comanda alle truppe che depongano le armi, e non vendendosi obbedito, vuole aprire la strada ai ribelli fra l'armi. Si avvanza. Viene di nuovo a chiare note avvertito. Progredisce; e i soldati per necessaria difesa, e per non perdere la posizione fanno fuoco su i congiurati. Fu allora, che cadde a terra mortalmente colpito Duphaut, e che sull'ardita e minacciosa sua sciabola in vano tentò sostenersi. Accorre un prete per confessarlo; ma bruscamente è scacciato dall'agonizzante, che seguitando a pronunciare: fuoco, fuoco, senz'altro indugio rimane morto" (p. 177).

¹ DE LA GORCE, IV., 359. He was honourably buried in Rome on February 8 (*cf.* BOULOT, 258 *seqq.*; *ibid.*, 220 *seqq.*, the solemn conveyance of the corpse to the capitol).

² A Congregation that met on December 29 (DUFOURCO, p. 80, gives the date erroneously as the 26th) decided on an inquiry, which proceeded slowly. The unskilful letter sent to the Courts is mentioned in the **Relazione del card. Antonelli* (*loc. cit.*, pp. 13 *seq.*): "Il processo si fece, ma così lentamente che non fu compito se non verso la fin di gennaro. So formò del processo una relazione, ma così sfigurata e tronca, che non meritava che venisse da Roma pubblicata. Si scrisse pure a Parigi e altre Corti, ma si scrisse contanta circospezione e lenocinio, che noi sembravamo i rei bisognosi di giustificazione e di compatimento. Si cercò la protezione di Napoli, ma si passò oltre, e invece de'soliti uffici, vi furono spediti due Legati, il Card. Braschi e Mons^{te} Caleppi, con espressa commissione d'implorare le armi del Re e una dichiarazione di guerra contro i Francesi."

³ *Memorie storiche*, *loc. cit.*, 185; GENDRY, II., 289.

apologize, thereby acknowledging the guilt of the Papal party.¹ The ambassador thereupon asked for post-horses with which to make an immediate departure. All Doria's efforts to appease him failed, and even Azara's personal intercession had no effect. On the following morning the representative of the French Republic quitted the city. Azara was urged by Doria to go after him and persuade him to return, but this he omitted to do.²

From this point onwards one event followed another in rapid succession. On January 11th, 1798, a definite order was issued by the French Government to its troops to march on Rome and occupy it.³ The army accordingly moved southwards, under General Berthier, with orders from Bonaparte to expel the Pope and set up a republic in Rome. The Cardinals besought the Pope to take refuge in Naples, but this he refused to do and remained steadfastly at this post, prepared to endure whatever the future might have in store for him.⁴ On February 9th the French occupied Monte Mario and the Ponte Molle,⁵ and Berthier received visits from Azara, Duke Braschi, Doria, the Secretary of State, and other high-ranking diplomats.⁶ The next day Berthier made known his terms of

¹ GENDRY, II., 287. Nevertheless, Doria relied, too optimistically, on the French Directory's interpreting the situation in an understanding manner and on the intervention of the Catholic monarchs, which he invited. (*Doria to the nuncio Litta, January 6, 1798; Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A, Papal Secret Archives.)

² His excuse was "che egli era vietato di mischiarsi ulteriormente negli affari di Roma" (*Memorie storiche, loc. cit.*, 183). Cf. GENDRY, II., 288.

³ BOULOT, 203 *seqq.* Although the French were only 10,000-20,000 strong, the Papal States were no longer able to withstand them (**Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, pp. 14 *seq.*).

⁴ *Doria to Cardinal Antonelli, February 7, 1798: The Pope is determined to remain and desires the Cardinals to do likewise. *Relazione del Card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, p. 46.

⁵ SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 12.

⁶ GENDRY, II., 282; TAVANTI, III., 344.

capitulation.¹ The demands made for the atonement of the "attack" of December 28th far exceeded all previous ones, so far as payments of money and cession of territory were concerned, and they included the production of four Cardinals and four nobles as hostages and the imprisonment of high prelates and dignitaries.

Naturally the special confidence of the French general was enjoyed by Azara, with whom he discussed all the details of the action he intended to take in the next few days; his desire, he told him, was to occupy Rome without resistance and without bloodshed.² In a report rendered at this time Azara proudly relates how he prevailed on Berthier to allow the religious life of the city to continue without the slightest interruption, religious services to be held as before, as though there were no Frenchmen there at all, and the Pope to exercise his priestly functions with complete freedom and to retain his guards and palaces, his soldiers, and his police.³ He had been able to obtain these favours from Berthier without any great difficulty, as no one could be more humane than he.

The College of Cardinals decided to comply with Berthier's conditions. On February 10th the surrender of Rome to the French revolutionary army was signed and executed. An edict issued by the Secretary of State had already threatened with the death penalty anyone who molested the French.⁴ Everything possible was done to maintain public order. Azara, who now acknowledged that he was a friend of the French, exhorted the Spaniards in Rome to behave sensibly. In his reports to Madrid he was full of praise for Berthier's behaviour and referred sarcastically to the lethargy and pious helplessness of the Romans.⁵

¹ For what follows, see *Azara to De la Paz, February 10-12, 1798 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). The twenty-one articles of the capitulation are in GENDRY, II., 293 *seq.*

² *Memorie storiche, loc. cit.*, 190.

³ Cf. also *Azara to De la Paz, February 21, 1797 (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ Doria's edict of February 9, 1797, in *Memorie storiche, loc. cit.*, 196-8. Cf. GENDRY, II., 296.

⁵ On February 10-12 Azara *reported to De la Paz on the large-

Presumably Berthier purposely chose February 15th, the anniversary of the Pope's election, as the day on which to carry out the revolution, in accordance with his orders. Hitherto he had not said a single word about it.¹ After the ecclesiastical celebration of the anniversary the seven Cardinals who had taken part in it were kept under surveillance by a French officer in the Secretary of State's apartments, while the French troops entered the city, joined up with the revolutionary conspirators, and in the presence of a vast crowd erected a tree of liberty on the Capitol.² Here a document was read, announcing the deposition of the Pope as a temporal sovereign and the erection of a Roman republic. In the afternoon Berthier, with a military escort, made his entry into the city, where he was received by the people in silence.³ On the Capitol he made a speech in which he recognized, in the name of the French Republic, the new political order.⁴

Pius VI., who was again suffering from his physical ailments, received the first report of these events with calmness and composure. In the evening he was officially informed by the commandant of the city, General Cervoni, that the Roman people, disgusted with the abuse of political power, had decided to regain possession of its sovereignty and its freedom

scale demonstrations of the Romans' piety, which he interpreted as lethargy. This, for instance, was how he judged a procession of over 150,000 participants (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). For the processions, etc., that took place between January 16 and the beginning of February, see **Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, pp. 15 *seq.* Cf. DUFOURCQ, 81 *seq.*

¹ Some hesitant attempts at a revolution had been made on February 11. See **Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, p. 21.

² In the ensuing narrative use has been made of **Azara's* letter to De la Paz, of February 16, 1798 (*loc. cit.*), and especially the **Relazione* (pp. 22 *seqq.*) cited on p. 329, n. 8; also SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 28-32; BALDASSARI, *Gesch. der Wegführung und Gefangenschaft Pius' VI.*, ed. F. N. Steck, 166 *seqq.* Cf. DUFOURCQ, 99 *seqq.*

³ *Memorie storiche, loc. cit.*, 208.

⁴ BOULOT, 214 *seq.*

and had set up a government of its own. As the protectress of the freedom of all peoples, the French nation had not been able to oppose this urgent desire. The Pope's person was inviolable and he could continue to exercise his spiritual functions as the first Bishop of the Church. To these fine words Pius VI. replied that he respected the inscrutable designs of divine Providence.¹ Thereupon the Quirinal and Vatican were occupied, the archives and offices were taken over, and the Pope was declared to be in protective custody.²

Azara's report of February 16th speaks in solemn words of the "epoch in world history" initiated by the destruction of the temporal power of the Pope and the resurrection of the Roman republic.³ Azara had not been entirely free of responsibility for these events, but even he began to feel a little uneasy when the revolutionaries planted a tree of liberty outside his windows and proclaimed that they were fighting not only against the Pope but against all sovereigns.⁴ He had the guards outside his residence doubled and kept away from the anniversary celebrations in St. Peter's; he even tried to dissuade Cardinal Lorenzana from attending them, though it was his duty to do so. He comes to the conclusion in his report that the whole affair was nothing but a comedy played by the French Republicans, in which the harmless Roman

¹ GENDRY, II., 299; VERRI, *Vicende memorabili*, 351; *Memorie storiche*, loc. cit., 207; SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 32.

² " *Memorie di A. Galimberti dell'occupazione francese in Roma, 16 febr. 1798," fo. 12, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome, cod. 44-5.

³ " *Me determino a avisar a V.E. con extraordinario la gran crisis por la qual hubimos de pasar y el nuevo orden de cosas en que nos hallamos, que hará época en la historia del mundo, pues ayer fue destruido el imperio temporal de los Papas y resucitada la republica Romana aunque mui diferente de la antigua " (Azara to De la Paz, February 16, 1798; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁴ " *Algunos facciosos habian tenido la insolencia de plantar el arbol de la libertad delante di mi casa y predicán horrores no solo contra el papa sino contra todos los soberanos " (*ibid.*).

people took very little interest. He could not help paying tribute to the Pope's courage and resolution.¹

But the Pope had yet to undergo the heaviest blow: expulsion from the Vatican and the Eternal City. On February 17th he was informed that he would have to leave Rome within three days. Azara relates² how the commissary Haller put troops into the Papal palace and then presented himself to the Pope, whom he informed that he could go to Tuscany. Provision would be made for the journey and his maintenance. The Pope replied with astonishing composure that they could do what they liked with him, but he would neither leave Rome nor desert his Church.³ It was not till Haller and Cervoni threatened to use force that he gave way. His wish to be allowed to choose Naples as his place of exile had been refused.⁴ Although he was seriously ill he discussed his departure with Cardinals Doria, Gerdil, and Antonelli. He imparted all necessary powers to the members of the Sacred College who were staying behind, and at Antonelli's suggestion he nominated a special Congregation under the latter's presidency, consisting of two members of each of the three cardinalitial ranks.⁵

¹ " *Todo esto en el fondo no ha sido mas que una comedia, pues yo puedo asegurar a V.E. que este pueblo no ha hecho mas ni meno de lo que los Franceses le han dictado, baxo mano, los quales tenian por instruccion de democratizar a Roma sin comparecer que la democratizaban . . . El Papa ha tomado la cosa de una manera que se podria llamar valor en otra persona y circunstancias " (*ibid.*). The point was made in the *Memorie storiche* (*loc. cit.*, 204) that of the 190,000 inhabitants of Rome only 500 had taken part in the revolution.

² *To De la Paz, February 16 and 21, 1797 (*loc. cit.*). Cf. BALDASSARI, 184 *seqq.*

³ " *El Papa ha respondido con una gran presencia de animo que hagan d'el lo que quieran, que no se moverá de Roma ni abandonará su Iglesia " (Azara on February 16, 1797, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ **Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, pp. 23 *seqq.*; GENDRY, II., 303 *seq.*

⁵ *Azara to De la Paz, February 21, 1797 (*loc. cit.*); GENDRY, II., 304.

It was February 20th, 1798. Long before daybreak Pius VI. heard Mass and afterwards enclosed the Blessed Sacrament in a small case which he hung round his neck. Eighty years old, frail, and mortally sick, he entered the travelling carriage that awaited him in the Cortile di San Damaso. He was accompanied by two clerics, the Maestro di Camera Caracciolo and the ex-Jesuit Marotti, and his physician Tassi. An hour before sunrise the party left Rome unnoticed, attended only by some French officers in another carriage.¹ Tears came to his eyes as he saluted for the last time the church of St. Peter and the tomb of the Prince of the Apostles.² It was exactly a year and a day since the conclusion of the peace of Tolentino, which he had hoped in vain would spare his beloved Rome the worst indignity. Now he was to leave St. Peter's city as an exile, under cover of darkness, and leave it for ever.³ Siena was reached in five daily stages, and here he was at first accommodated in the convent of the Hermits of St. Augustine.⁴

Of the Cardinals, thirteen stayed on in Rome for a time, while as many others had either left already or did so now.⁵ Of the first-mentioned six were placed under arrest, together with other high dignitaries, in a former convent on March 8th,⁶

¹ See the **Relazione* cited on p. 329, n. 8, and **Memorie di A. Galimberti* for February 20, 1798 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 19); BALDASSARI, 197 *seqq.*; SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 46 *seq.*; GENDRY, II., 305 *seq.*; DE LA GORCE, IV., 359 *seq.*; MOURRET, VII., 258.

² RINIERI, *Il Caporale Trasteverino*, Roma, 1904, 406.

³ The last volume of the index to Pius VI.'s *Epist.*, A° XXII./XXIII., fo. 210 *seqq.*, closes with the numerous *Briefs of February 3, 1798, addressed to German princes, to whom he commended the cause of the Church at the Congress of Rastatt. The last *Brief to the nuncio Della Genga "facultatem tribuit ad publicas faciendas protestationes si necesse fuerint in congressu Radstadiensis" (*ibid.*, fo. 218; Papal Secret Archives).

⁴ Cf. below, p. 356.

⁵ GENDRY, II., 309.

⁶ Their subsequent vicissitudes were related by one of their number, Cardinal Antonelli, in his **Relazione* (pp. 27 *seqq.*, *loc. cit.*). Cf. *Memorie storiche* (*loc. cit.*, 250 *seq.*) and SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 90.

three more were expelled, and two lay sick. To the great distress of the Pope, Cardinals Altieri and Antici asked to be relieved of their high ecclesiastical offices. In a letter of March 7th, 1798, Antici gave as the grounds of his application his advanced age and utter physical debility and the desire to spend the evening of his life in peace and spiritual recollection.¹ Altieri, on March 12th, wrote to the Pope of the impossibility of fulfilling his cardinalial duties any longer. Shortly afterwards, on the insistence of the Roman consuls, he followed this up with a second letter in which his appeal for leave to resign was stated in more definite terms.² As the Pope was not at first inclined to accede to these requests he supported his appeal with two theological opinions, the soundness of which, however, was contested by Monsignore Spina.³ Antici, however, behaved as though he had already been relieved of his rank.⁴ Cardinal Antonelli, who interceded on behalf of his two colleagues, tried to allay the Pope's misgivings, which apart from the lack of canonical grounds were due to the fear that other members of the Sacred College would adopt this means of escaping persecution.⁵ Of the two appellants, he would have parted more readily with Antici, but both cases had to be treated alike. After months of resistance the Pope agreed to give way.⁶ In two Briefs of

¹ BALDASSARI, 246 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 248 *seq.*

³ Pius VI. to Antonelli, April 14, 1798, in E. CELANI, *loc. cit.*, 484.

⁴ " *Antici que vive ahora aqui como un simple privado." (Mendizabal to De la Paz, March 25, 1798; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome; MOURRET, VII., 274).

⁵ " *Sua Santità mi argomenta sempre contro con la mancanza della causa canonica a rinunciare e col cattivo esempio che si darebbe " (Spina to Antonelli, June 22, 1798, *Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, fo. 113). Cf. *ibid.*, fo. 66: *Archbishop Zondadari to Antonelli, April 15, 1798.

⁶ Spina *wrote to Antonelli on September 1, 1798, that Antici's Brief was ready and approved and that only the signature was needed. A similar Brief was being prepared for Altieri, and the

September 7th, 1798,¹ he acknowledged the validity of the grounds adduced and declared that the two Cardinals were no longer wearers of the red hat. At the same time he definitely denied them the right to attend the next conclave. Altieri died soon afterwards, but Antici, as soon as the political situation in Italy had been changed by the victory of the Austrians, entertained the notion of regaining his cardinalial rank and insignia and even of demanding admission to the conclave at Venice.²

The six Cardinals lying under arrest in Rome, after being urged without success to resign their rank of their own accord, were taken on the night of March 10th, under military escort, like malefactors, to the Dominican convent at Civitavecchia. Here they were allowed to move about in two corridors and the refectory, but not in the church or staircase. Later, the Prior obtained for them permission to say Mass. The colony was soon increased by the arrival of another party, which included Cardinals Consalvi and Barberi, who had been confined in the Castel S. Angelo. On March 23rd, however, they were all set at liberty, each having to choose a place of residence (to be reached by sea) outside the Roman Republic.³

In consonance with the talk in Paris of freeing the descendants of Brutus from the tyranny of fanaticism, Berthier's speech on the Capitol was full of turgid reminiscences of ancient times: "Manes of Cato, Brutus, and Cicero, accept the homage of free Frenchmen on the Capitol, where you so

affair would presumably be concluded in a few days (*ibid.*, fo. 125).

¹ *Both Briefs, addressed to all the Cardinals, are in the *Epist. ad princ.*, 194, fo. 64 *seqq.*, 67 *seqq.*, Papal Secret Archives. German translation in BALDASSARI, 484 *seqq.*

² BALDASSARI, 252.

³ Cf. for the whole affair, GENDRY, II., 312 *seq.*; SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 123 *seq.* In July, 1798, according to a statement in the Papal Secret Archives (*Epoca Napoleonica, Italia*, I, 1) ten Cardinals were resident in Naples, twenty-nine in other parts of Italy, and nine in other countries, including four French *émigrés* (*v. Archivio Romano*, XXXVI. [1913], 495).

often defended the rights of the people and celebrated the Roman Republic! These sons of the Gauls, with the olive branch of peace in their hands, will re-erect on this hallowed spot the altars of freedom that were set up of old by the first Brutus. And you, citizens of Rome, who are recovering your lawful rights, remember the blood that flows in your veins! Turn your eyes to the monuments of glory that surround you! Regain your ancient greatness and the virtues of your fathers!"¹

As in every revolution, these phrases were followed by a reality that in many respects was well up to the standard of the Reign of Terror.² The new government was based on military force. All suspicious persons were condemned to death and any French *émigrés* who had not already escaped were expelled.³ Day after day a fresh crop of ordinances and announcements was issued by the new Government.⁴ For the maintenance of public order a National Guard was formed. The mob flocked to the great popular festivals in the Piazza di S. Pietro, where it listened with enthusiasm to high-flown speeches about the golden age that had just begun.⁵ A month later there was a huge festival of brotherhood in the piazza, attended by representatives of every district of the new republic.⁶

But quite a time was to pass before the people was allowed to govern itself. The new constitution had little of the antique about it; it was modelled rather on the French pattern of the year III.⁷ The only indication of the promised revival of

¹ DUFOURCQ, 106 *seq.*

² MADELIN (*La révolution*, 507) calls the Roman Republic "Une exploitation désordonnée".

³ GENDRY, II., 301.

⁴ **Relazione del card. Antonelli (loc. cit., p. 23).*

⁵ GENDRY, II., 302; **Memorie di A. Galimberti*, for February 23, 1798 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, March 25, 1798 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). Illustration in MALAMANI, *Canova*, 63.

⁷ The comparison is developed by SCIOUT (*Le Directoire*, II., 3,

ancient Rome was some unimportant modifications, the most notable of which were some badly chosen official titles. Thus, at the head of the new State were five consuls, and the legislative power was vested in two chambers, the Tribunal, with seventy-two members over twenty-five years of age, and the Senate, with thirty-two members over thirty-five years.¹ Paying no attention to democracy, General Masséna, the successor of Berthier, who was recalled to Paris, appointed the consuls and most of the representatives of the people according to his own judgment.² Further, for the time being at least, the French generalissimo, who received direct instructions from Paris, was to control the consuls.³ The division into Departments⁴ and the revolutionary calendar were also introduced from France.

The French troops, not having received any pay for a long time, failed to live up to their rôle of popular benefactors and soon deteriorated into plunderers. The French showed themselves to be adept at systematically robbing Rome of its unique wealth of art treasures accumulated in the course of 2,000 years.⁵ Paris, the capital of the great Republic, was to be the artistic as well as the political centre of the West; Rome, therefore, had to surrender the treasures assembled there by emperors, Popes, and aristocrats.

The delivery of works of art and manuscripts had been demanded by Bonaparte at Bologna and Tolentino. The cities of northern Italy had already been despoiled. Correggio's works were moved to France from Parma; Modena, Ferrara, and Verona had to make their contributions; the works in silver from the churches in Milan were partly melted down, partly transferred to Paris; Bologna lost over 500 valuable

299 seqq.). Cf. G. GARAVANI, *La costituzione della repubblica romana* (Fermo, 1910, 39-59).

¹ DUFOURCO, 171.

² *Ibid.*, 109; SCIOUT, 304.

³ SCIOUT, *ibid.*

⁴ They are listed in SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 87.

⁵ For the systematic plundering of Rome by its "liberators" see DUFOURCO, 114-18, *Memorie storiche*, *loc. cit.*, 211 seqq.

manuscripts, and in Venice hands were laid on the treasury of St. Mark's.

And now it was the turn of Rome. In March–July 1798, the plundering was carried on with feverish activity. On one day alone a long procession of 500 horse-drawn vehicles, under a strong military guard, was seen leaving the city.¹ It contained an immense number of antique sculptures and Renaissance paintings that France was appropriating in accordance with the peace of Tolentino. They included the Laocoon group, the Belvedere Apollo, the Dying Gaul, Cupid and Psyche, Ariadne on Naxos, the Medici Venus, and the colossal figures of the Tiber and the Nile; tapestries and paintings by Raphael, including the Transfiguration, the Madonna di Foligno, and the Madonna della Sedia; Titian's Santa Conversazione; and many other works. It was not till several years after that these stolen treasures were exhibited in the Musée Napoléonien in the Louvre, which was opened in 1807. After Napoleon's downfall most of these works, together with other trophies of his, were returned to their former places.²

The losses in precious metals and stones were equally extensive; everything that could be carried was taken by the French to their own country. All the churches³ and palaces

¹ RINIERI, *Il Caporale Trasteverino*, 76 seq. Satirical *sonnet "Per il trasporto delle statue di Roma in Francia" in the Bibl. Comunale at Forlì (cf. MAZZATINTI, *Inventari*, I., 51).

² Cf. HAUTECOEUR, *Rome et la Renaissance*, 259–270.

³ They included the national churches of other countries, such as the Spaniards. Azara complained about it in his *reports to De la Paz on February 21, 1798. On March 10 he *reported that the French agreed to return him so little that he preferred to let them have it as a gift and as a mark of Spanish friendship. The efforts made to have the national churches excepted from the general taxation of churches was *reported by Mendizabal on April 10, 1798 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). Cf. SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 76, 83 seq., 92, 103, 242 seq. (St. Peter's, cf. 250), 257 seq., 135 (also in the provinces), 161 seqq. (the general result), II., 86 seq., 122, 125; for the sale of churches,

were stripped. On one day, under the direction of the Papal Captain Crispoldi, gold and silver bars to the value of 15,000,000 *scudi* were taken away in coffers. They had been abstracted from the Castel S. Angelo, the Monte, and the properties of the Cardinals and patricians. At the beginning of April pearls and precious stones valued at 4,000,000 *scudi* were taken off to France; they included 386 diamonds, 333 emeralds, 692 rubies, 208 sapphires, and many other stones. Most of them came from the famous tiaras of Popes Julius II., Paul III., Clement VIII., and Urban VIII. On July 8th 500 of the most valuable manuscripts were surrendered, at the loss of which Cardinal Borgia and Monsignori Marini and Caracciolo were said to have wept like children.¹ A week later a vast herd of 1,600 horses trotted out of Rome, destined for the French army in Italy.²

The Romans watched with silent grief the removal of the treasures that had been so proudly preserved,³ the wanton damage done in the gardens and collections of the Vatican and the great private libraries,⁴ the sale by auction at pitifully low prices of the treasures belonging to the Pope, the Cardinals, the Villa Albani,⁵ the Farnesina, and other houses; some of

ibid., II., 40, 45; for the German national church, the Anima, II., 92 *seq.* For the plundering of the Roman churches, *v.* the **Memorie di Ant. Galimberti* for March 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and October 29, 1798 (Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome, Cod. 44-5).

¹ RINIERI, 407. Coins were removed by the hundred (see F. GNECCHI, *Appunti di numismatica romana*, LXIV.: *I medagli exvaticani*, in *Riv. stor. di numismat.*, XVIII., 1905, 11 *seqq.*). For Canova's grief at the robbing of the Vatican Library and numismatic collection, *v.* O. MALAMANI, *Canova*, 63.

² RINIERI, 78 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 80 *seq.*

⁴ *Memorie storiche*, *loc. cit.*, 268 *seq.*; SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 156, 180; *ibid.*, 174, the Pope's private library.

⁵ *Memorie storiche*, 292; SALA, *loc. cit.*, 126 *seq.*; CABANIS in *Chronique médiévale*, I. (1907), 287 (Winckelmann's journey to Paris, and Christine of Sweden's to Montpellier). *Mendizabal to De la Paz, April 10, 1798 (*loc. cit.*).

them passed into Jewish hands in the ghetto.¹ It was even proposed to blow up the Castel S. Angelo, carry off the obelisks, and remove Raphael's frescoes from the Stanze.²

This vandalism on the part of a civilized nation is unique in history and is one of the blackest crimes committed by the French Republic.³ This colossal robbery, combined with the economic and financial oppression of the Roman people, which became more and more intolerable, aroused the greatest popular indignation, resulting in several outbreaks that had to be quelled by force of arms.⁴ To support and superintend the steps taken by General Masséna, the Directory set up a military commission of four members in Rome, and Masséna become nothing more than an executive instrument.⁵ The exploitation of the people, however, went on worse than ever.⁶ After a time Masséna was disliked by his own troops, and the commissioners had to devise means of checking a threatened

¹ The properties of the Santo Uffizio, for instance, were sold for 2,000,000 *scudi*, those of the Collegium Germanicum-Hungaricum for 260,000 (*Memorie storiche, loc. cit.*, 270), the rest of the collection of cameos belonging to Trinità de' Monti for 100 *scudi* (*ibid.*, 286). For the Jewish retail trade, see SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 155.

² *Memorie storiche, loc. cit.*, 269; RINIERI, 142.

³ SALA, *Diario di Roma*, I., 127 (March 27, 1797): "Un'invasione di Goti o di Unni e anco un saccheggio de' più solenni ci avrebbe recato minor danno, di quello che risentiamo dalla pacifica dimora di questi Eroi liberatori del genere umano."

⁴ Cf. *Memorie storiche, loc. cit.*, 236 seq. (Trastevere), 296, 298, 299 (at various other places), 300 (defeat at Terracina); SALA, *loc. cit.*, 187 seq., 192. The **Memorie di A. Galimberti* for February 27, 1798 (*loc. cit.*), tell of the shooting of twenty rebels in the Piazza del Popolo; cf. **ibid.*, for March 1, 1798 (return of the victorious troops from Albano and Velletri). Cf. **Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, p. 26; GENDRY, II., 298; MOURRET, VII., 276.

⁵ RINIERI, 469.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 480; *ibid.*, 488, various savage crimes committed by the French soldiers.

mutiny.¹ When both officers and soldiers refused to obey him Masséna fled from Rome, and the commissioners, having declared that they would have nothing more to do with him received fresh and more extensive powers from Paris.²

It soon became apparent that with the surrender of Rome insupportable obligations had been laid on a State which had already been severely weakened by the treaties of Bologna and Tolentino.³ Both private and public resources were exhausted and plundered to such an extent that even the commissioners reported on the financial incapacity of the Roman State. The paper money, which had long been the sole form of currency, was apparently about to share the fate of the French *assignats*.⁴ Domestic life was ruined, financially and otherwise, by the incessant quartering. Religious houses were converted into barracks and subjected to exorbitant taxes, and 200 of them were dissolved.⁵

For strangers, too, residence in Rome was anything but pleasant. Everyone, including the Auditors of the Rota and the Generals of religious orders, had to furnish the Government with personal particulars. The diplomatic representatives began to feel unsafe. Fuming with indignation at the continual infractions of international law, Azara, in March 1798, decided to leave Rome and retire to Florence.⁶ Almost as

¹ There were several mutinies against him. Details in DUFORCQ, 123 *seqq.*

² *Azara to De la Paz, March 10, 1798 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). The commissaries' announcement was reproduced by SCIOUT in the *Revue des quest. hist.*, XXXIX. (1886), 159 *seq.*

³ In addition there was the secret agreement on Rome's financial obligations made on 8th Germinal, VI. (SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 307 *seqq.*).

⁴ DUFORCQ, 193 *seqq.*

⁵ *Memorie storiche*, *loc. cit.*, 285. Cf. SALA, *loc. cit.*, 200, 208.

⁶ *Azara to De la Paz, March 10, 1798 (*loc. cit.*). He went off without instructions on March 13. Cf. *Mendizabal to De la Paz, March 25, 1798 (the MS. has, erroneously, 1797), *ibid.*

soon as he arrived there he was offered the post of Spanish ambassador in Paris, which he accepted.¹ While occupying this position, too, he remained a lifelong supporter of "Enlightenment".

In their bitter disillusionment the Romans turned for help to Naples.² In October 1798, King Ferdinand IV. did request the French to leave Rome but, of course, without result. In consequence, on November 14th, the Neapolitan Government issued a proclamation to the Roman people, but it failed to have the desired effect on the French. Thereupon General Mack, with Neapolitan troops, opened hostilities and advanced rapidly to the gates of Rome, where there were further popular disturbances.³ The French now retired from the city and the Neapolitans entered it on November 29th, to the great joy of the people.⁴ In a declaration of December 3rd the city was asked to put its complete confidence in the King of the Two Sicilies. But all this was only a brief interlude. After seventeen days the French, having obtained reinforcements, stormed Rome and pursued the South Italians to Naples, which fell to them on January 23rd, 1799.⁵ Hardly had they established a new republic there when a general insurrection blazed up in Italy, Rome taking its share.⁶ As in the Tyrol and Spain, the popular movement against the predatory French and their impious republic was of a strongly religious character. The Austrian declaration of war in March, 1799, impaired the situation of the French troops, who could no longer hold their

¹ *Mendizabal to De la Paz, April 10, 1798 (*ibid.*).

² For the origin of the Franco-Neapolitan war, *v.* DUFOURCQ, 338 *seqq.*

³ MOURRET, VII., 276.

⁴ De la Paz's *report of December 10, 1798 (*loc. cit.*); Lavaggi's *report of December 7, 1798 (State Archives, Genoa). SALA (II., 232) relates how, as soon as the French had withdrawn, the people shattered the monument to Duphot which had been erected on the Capitol.

⁵ MOURRET, VII., 277.

⁶ *Cf.* DUFOURCQ, 490 *seqq.*

ground. The rising was led by Naples, and the French soon had to quit Rome for the second time. But it was not till July, 1800, that the successor of St. Peter, now bearing the title Pius VII., could re-enter the Eternal City. In the meantime his predecessor had had to drink the chalice of exile to the last bitter drop.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RENEWAL OF THE PERSECUTION OF THE CLERGY IN FRANCE—PIUS VI.'S LAST JOURNEY AND HIS DEATH IN EXILE.

(1)

THE further sufferings and humiliations undergone by the head of the Church, already sorely tried, after his banishment from Rome, were connected with the change brought about in French politics by the *coup d'état* of 18th Fructidor. The years in which the ecclesiastical recovery was, if not actually encouraged, at least not impeded, were followed by another period of persecution, called by many French historians the "Second Terror".

The personal and political differences of opinion among the five members of the Directory had long been threatening to break out into an open rupture. The more lenient and conciliatory attitude, which extended to religious questions, held by Carnot and Barthélemy, was opposed by that of the three other directors, Barras, Larevellière, and Rewbell, who still adhered to the radical traditions of the Convention and the Terror.¹ A resolution passed by the Five Hundred on August 24th, 1797, revoking all the laws against non-jurors, decided them to take definite action.² Carnot, with his superior intelligence and the support he received from the broad masses of the people (for which he was envied by his colleagues in office), could perhaps have averted the change that threatened, but he hesitated too long and thus condemned the more moderate party in the Parliament to a waiting policy of inactivity.³

The radical party, on the other hand, provoked by Carnot's

¹ SCIOUT, *Constit. civ.*, IV., 576.

² AULARD, II., 546 *seq.*

³ SCIOUT, *Constit. civ.*, IV., 580 *seq.*

intransigence,¹ worked itself up into a feverish activity which caused public apprehension of imminent disturbances. The views of the three revolutionary Directors developed into a definite plan of campaign, which was finally decided on at a secret meeting with their supporters in the Ministries on September 3rd, 1797.² It was to be put into effect with the help of the military on the following day, the famous 18th Fructidor of the year V.

Bodies of troops marshalled together in the capital and placed at first under the command of General Augereau, occupied the headquarters of the most important civil authorities and corporations and the strategic points in the city.³ In the morning the astonished Parisians were informed of the alleged discovery of a royalist plot, in which even the highest Government circles were involved. This justified the military measures and the guarding of all the streets, and the opposition, which sensed immediately that these measures were aimed at them, found it impossible to organize themselves in any way or to offer any resistance.⁴ At the same time steps were taken to arrest the moderates. Carnot escaped his fate by taking to flight in good time, whereas Barthélemy fell into the hands of spies. Their party adherents in both Chambers were also arrested and interned in the Temple. To maintain public order threats of severe punishment were issued.⁵

The moderate party having been rendered harmless, the other representatives of the people, at the command of the three remaining members of the Directory, met in session, the Council of the Five Hundred in the Odéon, the Council of the Ancients in the School of Medicine. Under pressure of the Government, they approved of the action it had taken and

¹ DE LA GORCE, IV., 215.

² *Ibid.*, 217.

³ Documents on the part played by Augereau in PIERRE, 18 *Fructidor*, 72-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 217 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 219 *seq.* For the subsequent fate of the arrested men, see SCIOUT, *Le Directoire*, II., 3, 1 *seqq.*

appointed a commission of councillors to prepare the necessary legislative proposals.¹

At midnight on this eventful day the deputies assembled in a new plenary session and deliberated the whole night long on the proposed legislation. The ruthless measures they evolved² annulled the parliamentary elections of no less than forty-nine Departments, condemned to deportation the two Directors together with forty-two members of the Council of the Five Hundred and eleven of the Council of the Ancients, reintroduced all the laws of banishment affecting the clergy,³ and further enacted that every priest suspected of intrigues against the State was, after individual condemnation, to suffer the same penalty.

When these resolutions were laid before the Council of the Ancients in the early hours of the morning it tried to defer their ratification as long as possible, but in the afternoon a definite order came from the Directory to vote on them immediately. Fifteen members voted in favour of them, seven against. The way was now clear for the radical Directory to give vent to its arbitrary anti-clericalism.⁴

Another important measure was the imposition on the clergy of a fresh oath "against the monarchy and anarchy".⁵ Although the Pope expressed his disapproval of this renewal of political oppression of the French priests,⁶ many of them took the required oath, if not in such large numbers as in the autumn of 1795.⁷ But as in many cases the authorities presumed that the priests still in France had already taken the

¹ SCIOUT, *Constit. civ.*, II., 582 *seq.*; this session of the Council is described in PIERRE, *loc. cit.*, 47-58.

² AULARD, II., 550; SCIOUT, *Constit. civ.*, IV., 584 *seqq.*

³ Only one deputy, Laujeaq, representing Lot-et-Garonne, refused to be intimidated and spoke on behalf of the priests. DE LA GORCE, IV., 224.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 226.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 233; PISANI, *L'église de Paris*, III., 259.

⁶ Cf. BALDASSARI, 290 *seq.*, and 290, n. 2; PISANI, *loc. cit.*, 264.

⁷ AULARD, II., 551; PIERRE, *Déportation*, xxvi *seqq.*; PISANI, *loc. cit.*, 260 *seqq.*

former oaths of the Revolution, the new one was of practical importance only for the adherents of the constitutional schism.¹

More important in actual effect was the reintroduction of the deportation laws, which meant the arrest of all the priests who had been left at liberty on account of old age, illness, or other reasons, and the re-expulsion of all who had returned from exile. Once again, therefore, there was a stream of fugitive priests making their way into neighbouring states.²

In addition, penalties were enforced against priests alleged to be dangerous to the State, to an extent that was hardly realized at first. The arbitrary nature of the action taken against them³ was justified in individual cases on the grounds that they had refused to take the oath, that they had slighted Republican laws and institutions, and that they were "fire-brands of fanaticism". Any exercise of ecclesiastical functions or duties rendered them guilty of this last condemnation.⁴ Nor were the Constitutional clergy spared⁵; the only cults that had nothing to fear were atheistic or pantheistic ones, of a Rousseauesque tinge,⁶ especially philanthropy and the cult of the "Décade", which was now put into practice by the State.⁷ The inmost character of the French Revolution, with its ideological content, was thus unmasked.⁸ The practice of Christian beliefs was obstructed by the greatest difficulties and numerous harsh restrictions.⁹

Soon the Directory exceeded its own ordinances by taking collective measures as well as condemning individuals.¹⁰ Thus,

¹ SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 155.

² DE LA GORCE, IV., 233, 235 *seqq.*

³ SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 148.

⁴ PIERRE, *Déportation*, xxi *seqq.*

⁵ PIERRE, *Terreur*, 208 *seqq.*

⁶ DE LA GORCE, IV., 270 *seqq.*; MOURRET, VII., 272 *seq.*

⁷ SCIOUT, *Le Directoire*, II., 3, 179 *seqq.*; AULARD, II., 555 *seqq.*

⁸ SCIOUT, *Le Directoire*, II., 3, 149, 151.

⁹ Thus, several churches were closed again (*ibid.*, 176 *seqq.*).

¹⁰ In practice most of the individual sentences were made out according to a general formula, so far as the justification and

ninety-nine priests from Maine-et-Loire were sentenced to deportation on one order for arrest.¹ In many Departments action was taken only on direct instructions from the Directory, but in others, side by side with this activity, an equally radical persecution of the priests was carried on by the Departmental authorities, which, as was often the case in other parts of France also, formed the sole executive power.² One must study, therefore, the measures taken by both central and provincial authorities to obtain a complete picture of this arbitrary rule.³ It was only the southern regions of the realm that suffered little from this co-operation in comparison with the remainder of the country. Temporal and local variations in the execution of the deportation laws naturally followed from the uneven distribution of authority.⁴

On September 6th Larevellière, as President of the Directory, signed an order by which all persons condemned to deportation were to be conveyed to the penal colony of Cayenne, in South America.⁵ In consequence, four large ships brought a doleful burden of more than 250 priests to Cayenne, where most of them, owing to the inclement climate and the lack of the barest necessities, fell ill and succumbed to a miserable fate.⁶ The

actual sentence were concerned. PIERRE, *Déportation*, xi seq.; cf. *id.*, *Terreur*, 178 seqq.

¹ All the deportation sentences and similar ordinances of the Directory have been published by PIERRE (*Déportation*, 1-436); only eight of the persons sentenced were layfolk (six men and two women; *ibid.*, ix n.). Documents referring to the measures taken by the *Départements*, including Paris, in PIERRE, 18 *Fructidor*, 258-449. Cf. E. SOL, *Le clergé du Lot sous la Terreur fructidorienne*, Paris, 1922, based on documents.

² PIERRE, *Déportation*, 159 seqq.; *ibid.*, xi, a collection of instances of a similar nature.

³ *Ibid.*, xvii seqq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xiii seqq., xix seqq. Cf. also SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 169 seqq.

⁵ MOURRET, VII., 260.

⁶ DE LA GORCE, IV., 248 seqq.; MOURRET, VII., 260 seqq.; SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 194 seqq.; PIERRE, *Terreur*, 65 seqq.

majority of those condemned, however, owing to the fear of the English ships, were not taken to Cayenne; they were confined, first, for the most part, in the fortress on the isle of Ré, later also, in part, on the island of Oléron. On Ré there were nearly 1,000 priests, including a Bishop, and over 100 laymen; on Oléron, towards the end of 1799, there were 250 prisoners. Of the 1,388 persons held in captivity outside the Continent only 476 had been directly condemned by the Directory.¹ We must remember, too, the uncounted host of victims who during these years repopulated the prisons in France itself, and those who managed to escape a fearful fate by taking to flight in good time or by going into hiding. There was also a considerable number of heroes who as innocent victims in these months, too, testified to their faith and their loyalty to the Church in the face of the musket-barrels of the military commissions. Records show that in the course of a year at Besançon alone no less than twenty-five persons were executed for their faith. In all, about 250 such cases were recorded, but the actual total is certainly far greater.²

The religious persecution of the Second Terror soon spread to Belgium, which by this time had been entirely conquered. All non-juring priests were condemned *en masse*.³ By a general decree of the Directory issued on November 4th, 1798, about 8,000 of them were sentenced to deportation.⁴ The only Bishop still resident in Belgium, Cardinal Frankenberg, was

267-330, where their fate is related in detail; *ibid.*, 424-436, their names.

¹ DE LA GORCE, IV., 265 *seqq.*; MOURRET, VII., 263 *seqq.*; PIERRE, *Déportation*, xxxi *seq.*, and still more PIERRE, *Terreur*, 335-363 (*ibid.*, 437-458, the names).

² DE LA GORCE, II., 235 *seqq.*, where numerous individual instances are described. Similarly, SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 161 *seqq.*; MOURRET, VII., 259. Cf. LECLERQ, *Les Martyrs*, XIII., 14 *seqq.*, 20 *seqq.*, especially 24 *seqq.*, 34 *seqq.*

³ In Belgium the sentences were mostly collective (PIERRE, *Déportation*, xiii).

⁴ MOURRET, VII., 271; SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 185 *seqq.*; PIERRE, *Terreur*, 247 *seqq.*

to be sent to one of the islands, but on medical grounds he was finally allowed to retire to a retreat on the Rhine.¹ The suppression of the University of Louvain was due to the same inexorable hatred of the Church. In the autumn of 1798 a popular rising in Belgium in support of the Church was put down by armed force.² It was not till the dawn of the new century, when Bonaparte, as First Consul, was at the head of the Government, that a change took place in the politico-ecclesiastical conditions in France.

(2)

The Pope's expulsion from the city of St. Peter was intended by the enemies of the Church to represent the final triumph of the French Revolution over the Christianity of the West. It was significant that before informing Pius VI. of his imminent expulsion from Rome General Haller demanded from him, under threat of force, the two rings he was wearing. "I can give you one of them," the Pope replied, "because it is my own property. But the other will have to pass to my successor." This was the Fisherman's Ring.³ With this unswerving faith in the ultimate victory of the enslaved Church and with willing resignation to the will of God, Pius VI., enfeebled by age and barely recovered from a serious illness—in fact, he never really recovered—accepted the hardships of an exile that was to last a year and a half.

On his departure from Rome in February, under cover of darkness, he was escorted by a detachment of dragoons as far as the Ponte Molle,⁴ the bridge that through the victory of the Emperor Constantine had become so important in the history of the Papacy. In spite of the most unfavourable weather countless numbers of the faithful were kneeling at the sides of the road, in the rain, the cold, and the snow, waiting for the blessing of Christ's representative on earth.

¹ SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 183 seq.; VERHAEGEN, *Card. de Franckenberg*, 358 seq., 361 seqq.

² MOURRET, VII., 269 seqq.

³ TAVANTI, III., 352 seq.

⁴ BALDASSARI, *Gesch.*, 212 seq.

Even at the end of the first day's journey Pius VI. was so exhausted that he had to be lifted from his carriage by four sturdy servants and borne to the bed prepared for him in the abbey of Monterosi. The house was unable to provide him with even the most modest repast.¹ The next day the journey was continued through thickly falling snow to Viterbo, where again he was greeted by large crowds. They filled the streets and the squares of the town and even the steps and passages of the convent which had been allotted as his quarters. Those in power considered it necessary to call on the military to keep the people under control.² The latter gave vent to their anger and grief on the following morning, when the Pope, disregarding the fatigue it caused him, went to the church of the Franciscan nunnery and prayed in silence for a long while before the relics of the holy virgin Rosa, who was highly venerated in the locality.³ At Viterbo the party was joined by Duke Braschi. At Montefiascone the venerable exile was received with the pealing of bells and the cheers of people spread over the whole hillside. In response to solicitous questions about his health the Pope, nobly mastering his own emotions, said: "We are well, very well, but I must say to you, 'Be strong in faith'!"⁴ When the inhabitants of Bolsena saw the helpless, suffering old man, they were dangerously near venting their wrath on the Pope's escorts, the two French commissaries. After spending the night at the house of a landed proprietor at San Lorenzo Nuovo, the Pope crossed the frontier of his former States on February 23rd. At the frontier town the departure of the former sovereign was

¹ *Ibid.*, 214 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 216 seq.; SALA, *Diario di Roma*, III., 227 seq.; [P. LA FONTAINE], *Pio VI. e Viterbo durante il periodo della Rivoluzione*, Viterbo, 1899, 10 seqq.; report of an eye-witness in Viterbo in LUMBROSO, *Roma e lo Stato Romano dopo il 1789*, in the *Atti della r. società dei Lincei*, 5th series: *Rendiconti sc. mor.*, I. (1892), 212 seq. Two years later the same witness saw the Pope's corpse brought back to Rome.

³ BALDASSARI, 218.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 219.

announced by the ringing of bells, the windows and streets were decorated with carpets and flowers, and the Bishop accompanied the Pope to the frontier, where the departure was made unnecessarily humiliating by a vexatious customs' examination.¹

On Tuscan territory the Pope was given shelter for one night in the estate of Santa Quirizia, which belonged to the family of the Sienese Archbishop, afterwards Cardinal, Zondadari. The provisional end of the journey, the Augustinian convent at Siena, was reached on February 25th.² Certain members of the Florentine Government, fearful of damaging their good relations with France, had objected to the Pope's permanent residence in the capital, as had been planned at first. For the same reason all subjects were forbidden to pay the venerable exile public compliments.³ Nevertheless, the Sienese were hard put to it to restrain their joy and grief at the arrival of the distinguished party.⁴ The Apostolic nuncio to Florence, Archbishop Odescalchi, with Monsignore Spina, Duke Braschi, and the other members of the retinue who had hurried on in advance were at the convent entrance to welcome the Pope. Courtesy visits were paid by the Governatore of the town and the Maggiordomo Manfredini, representing the Grand Duke,⁵ who wrote a letter of welcome in his own hand.⁶ In spite of this, the Government expressed its disapproval of Archbishop Zondadari's having gone to meet the Pope.⁷

In a few days Siena seemed to become the capital of the

¹ *Ibid.*, 221 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 223 seq.

³ Cabinet secretary Rainaldi to the Luogotenente di Siena, February 21, 1798, in E. A. BRIGIDI, *Giacobini e Realisti o il Viva Maria, storia del 1799 in Toscana*, Siena, 1882, 102. Cf. PONCET, *Pie VI. à Valence*, 41.

⁴ BRIGIDI, 121 seq.

⁵ BALDASSARI, 226.

⁶ BRIGIDI, 126 seq.

⁷ Minister Seratti to the Governatore of Siena, February 24, 1798 (*ibid.*, 117).

grand duchy,¹ so numerous were the visits of foreign emissaries and *chargés d'affaires* and of lay and clerical dignitaries, though even the visits of Bishops to the Pope had to be sanctioned by the Government, while other strangers were given permits for a short stay only in most exceptional cases and on previous application.² From time to time Cardinals, Bishops, and *émigrés* assembled together for a few days. On Sundays regular processions of pilgrims from outside the town, especially the rural districts, came to visit the "Prisoner of Antichrist", as he was called, and to ask his blessing. Every day numerous priests and noblemen were received in audience in the convent library, although the two chamberlains posted in the anteroom rendered daily reports on the Pope's visitors to the Government in Florence.³ These visitors included many foreigners, especially Englishmen and Swiss. To compensate for this undesired ecclesiastical activity in the town a masonic lodge was founded at this time at the instigation of the French. In May 1798, however, the Government had to take decisive steps against it.⁴

During the Pope's three months' stay in Siena he divided his day between prayer, work, and recreation.⁵ As long as his health permitted him he celebrated Mass himself, especially on holidays; otherwise he always attended it. On his midday drives he was accompanied by Archbishop Zondadari and Monsignor Caracciolo, who paid him every attention in many other ways. Particular interest in the Pope's welfare was taken by Cardinal Lorenzana, who was accredited to the grand-ducal Court as the representative of Spain and paid frequent visits to Siena.⁶ Odescalchi, the nuncio to the same

¹ "Siena, patria di S. Caterina, prende l'aspetto di capitale" (*ibid.*, 133 *seq.*).

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 134-7, 145 *seq.*; "Roma è spapata, Siena è impapata" (*ibid.*, 147).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 165 *seq.*, 186 *seq.*

⁵ Martini, Luogotenente of Siena, reported fully on the subject to the Minister (*ibid.*, 144); *cf.* BALDASSARI, 227 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 229.

court, moved altogether to Siena during the Pope's stay there and acted as his Secretary of State, inasmuch as he maintained the correspondence with the foreign nunciatures and with the aid of the Sienese Archbishop and his vicar and chancellor prepared the Papal rescripts.¹ A number of foreign envoys to the Court of Florence, together with trustworthy merchants, saw to the conveyance of the letters and documents to foreign countries.²

The small sum of money the Pope had received from the revolutionary government in Rome at the time of his expulsion was soon spent, whereupon his household expenses were defrayed by means of alms, such as those from the cathedral chapter at Prague and in particular those from Archbishop Despuig, at Seville.³ It was at this time that the Pope confirmed the veneration of Blessed Andrea of Gallerani (d. 1251), which had long been practised at Siena. The necessary preliminary investigations had been conducted by an extraordinary Congregation presided over by Zondadari.⁴

Apart from the affair of Cardinals Antici and Altieri⁵ the Pope was chiefly concerned, as was only natural, with the continuance of the most important Curial offices, especially the Dataria and the Penitentiary. He discussed them with Cardinals Doria and Roverella when they visited him in Siena on April 12th and he had a great deal of correspondence on the subject with Cardinal Antonelli.⁶ Two other matters,

¹ " *Mgr. Nunzio è quello che porta i memoriali e le suppliche, e dipoi, unitamente a me, al mio vicario e cancelliere, facciamo i rescritti, per le formole dei quali ci serviamo di quelle che rinveniamo nell'archivio arcivescovile." (Archbishop Zondadari of Siena to Antonelli, April 15, 1798, *Relazione del card. Antonelli.*, Filza Cappa, XII., 7, Bibl. Vallicelliana, Rome, fo. 66^v.)

² BALDASSARI, 231.

³ *Ibid.*, 232.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 232 seq.; GENDRY, II., 319.

⁵ Cf. above, p. 338.

⁶ Pius VI. to Antonelli, April 14 and May 11, 1798, printed in E. CELANI, *I preliminari del conclave di Venezia*, in the *Archivio della R. Società Romana*, XXXVI. (1913), 483 seq., 488.

however, gave still greater cause for concern: the further vicissitudes that awaited the Pope and the preparation for another conclave, which obviously could not be far off.

As was only to be expected, the Pope in his distress turned for help to the Catholic Courts,¹ in the hope of obtaining through their mediation some alleviation of his deplorable situation, which was also so prejudicial to the welfare of the Church, especially as his stay in Siena was known to be only temporary. Together with the necessity of arranging for the next Papal election, the future of the Papal States and the fate of the Cardinals must have caused him great anxiety. Consequently, when writing to those Catholic princes from whom he expected assistance he went to great lengths in describing the urgency of his situation.² The replies he received consisted only of fine phrases ending in excuses: for political reasons nothing could be done at the moment, the French intentions being so unpredictable. The Portuguese Government went a little further, ordering prayers to be said for the Pope.³

Of particular importance, of course, was the lively correspondence, always in cipher, carried on with the Court of Vienna,⁴ through Monsignore Albani.⁵ In these letters the

¹ GENDRY, II., 316. Consalvi reported in his *letter to Mgr. Albani of August 20, 1798 (Nunziat. di Germania, 696 A, Papal Secret Archives), that Carafa and Doria were appealing through the nuncios to the Emperor and the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs on behalf of the Pope, and that Litta and Erskine had been given similar commissions.

² MOURRET, VII., 275.

³ GENDRY, II., 316; CELANI, *loc. cit.*, 486.

⁴ Austria and Spain seemed to offer the best prospects of assistance: “*Le corti di Vienna e di Madrid, che sole potrebbero dare qualche peso ai nostri affari, operano oppure mostrano di operare con un’ammirabil timidezza.” (The Archbishop of Siena to Antonelli, April 15, 1798; *Relazione del card. Antonelli. loc. cit.*, fo. 65.) Zondadari *wrote again to Antonelli on April 24: “Vienna e Madrid rispondono con i soliti ‘Mi dispiace’, attaccamento alla S. Sede, timori di scisma etc., ma dicono che le attuali circostanze non permettano il fare di più.” (*ibid.*, fo. 81^v.)

⁵ *Letters in cipher to Albani, till August 1798, Nunziat. di

Pope was assiduous in reminding the Emperor of his special duty as the principal protector of the Church. In a letter of March 17th Odescalchi expressed the definite expectation¹ that the Emperor would not fail to put forth his strong arm in support of the supreme head of the Church, who was in such a situation that he could not even speak with the strength and firmness that the critical times demanded. Albani's task was to arrange for the Pope, as soon as he was forbidden to stay any longer in Tuscany, to find a refuge in the Imperial dominions, in accordance with a friendly agreement between Vienna and Paris—a delicate task for Albani, in the performance of which Odescalchi advised him to be particularly cautious. But the reply sent from Vienna on March 31st dispelled all hopes: the Imperial Court considered it far from opportune to initiate negotiations with France on the subject and could not accede to the Pope's desire at the moment. The Pope, deeming it even more impossible to make representations in Paris himself, again requested Albani to urge the Emperor, if only to avoid a schism, to promise to secure some place in his states where the future conclave could assemble.² Odescalchi backed up this request by referring to the report that the German Bishops had asked the Emperor for permission to receive the Pope in their midst.³ In the ensuing correspondence the more Albani's zeal was praised by

Germania, 696 (*loc. cit.*); *also till December, 1798 (*ibid.*, 696 A); *drafts, mostly for ciphers 696, *ibid.*, 697; *reports from Vienna, 1799, *ibid.*, 698.

¹ *Odescalchi to Mgr. Albani, March 17, 1798 (*ibid.*, 696).

² **Id.* to *id.* from Siena, April 19, 1798 (*ibid.*): “. . . il s. padre con quanto gradimento e paterno affetto ha sentito le ottime disposizioni di S.M. Imp. verso la S. Sede e la sua s. persona, altrettanto dispiacere ha provato nel sentire che la M.S. Imp. non sia in grado di aderire alle sue istanze non credendo opportuno da mettere in trattativa coi Francesi l'affare di porre ne' suoi stati la s. persona di S. Stà . . . S.M. Imp. deve proteggere la chiesa, procurare di evitare lo scisma.”

³ “ *Si ha notizia che i vescovi della Germania abbiano fatto istanze a S.M. Ces. per avere fra di loro il S. Padre ” (*ibid.*).

Odescalchi the less prospect there was of any practical solution. Finally, we read that Albani was not to regard instructions of this nature as obligatory commissions but was merely to sound the ground for any possibility of success.¹ Albani then made two suggestions for attaining their object. One was to influence the French Directory through the Tuscan Government, but this the Pope considered to be quite unacceptable, as it would compromise the Grand Duke still further, to a dangerous degree, and might have the worst possible consequences both for himself and his country. The second proposal seemed to have a better prospect of success, namely to spur on the German Bishops to take further steps in petitioning the Emperor.²

There were also difficulties in choosing a suitable place for the conclave. It was doubtful if the Cardinals living in Neapolitan territory would be able to make their way into Northern Italy. There was some thought of entering into closer relations with the Catholic Courts in the hope of inducing them to allow the Cardinals to enter Imperial territory in the event of a Papal election. If the French were to hear of these negotiations they would be sure to do their utmost to prevent the Cardinals' departure. Nevertheless, it was considered important to obtain the Emperor's consent as soon as possible, since the vague words of consolation and encouragement that came from Madrid and Vienna were anything but satisfactory to the Papal entourage.³

On March 31st the Pope sent a letter signed with his own hand to the nuncio Litta in St. Petersburg,⁴ with the object of obtaining the Tsar Paul's mediation.⁵ After a detailed description of the French rule of force in Rome and the Papal States and of his own deplorable situation he informed Litta

¹ *Odescalchi to Albani, April 21, 1798 (*ibid.*).

² **Id.* to *id.*, May 4, 1798 (*ibid.*).

³ **Id.* to *id.*, May 25, 1798 (*ibid.*).

⁴ *Original in Nunziat. di Polonia, 343 A (*ibid.*).

⁵ *Brief to Tsar Paul, March 29, 1798 (*Epist. ad princ.*, 194, fo. 7 *seqq.*, *ibid.*).

that he had asked the Tsar, on the strength of their former personal acquaintance, to speak to the French *chargé d'affaires* at his Court and to write to the French Directory, pressing for the return of the possessions belonging to the Papal States, Avignon and Venaissin in particular. An agreement on this matter between Russia and the other northern powers was all the more important, inasmuch as the French actions were a danger to all sovereigns. The most recent oath with its hatred of the monarchy was evidence of this.¹ With this outspoken language, however, the Pope nearly brought fresh troubles on himself, for at the beginning of September a report was spreading in Florence that a French translation of the Brief was in public circulation.²

Litta's reply did, in fact, speak of the lively interest taken by the Tsar in the Pope's destiny,³ whereupon the latter wrote to the nuncio on September 2nd, thanking him and again condemning the behaviour of the French in detail and in unambiguous terms.⁴ The Tsar was to be asked to demand, through his representatives at the Congress of Rastatt, the restoration of the Papal States and all the stolen property. In an autograph letter of December 14th⁵ Tsar Paul I. expressed his sympathy with the Pope and promised him his support, in which he would endeavour to secure the co-operation of the powers allied with him. These friendly relations with the schismatic ruler came to an end, however, not long afterwards,

¹ This connexion between the protection of the Church and that of the State was also brought out by the Pope in his *Brief of April 24, 1798, "Ioanni principi Brasiliae": "Quoad Ecclesiae perniciem [*sic*] constituto quid a Regibus universis sit timendum aperte vides. Quare qua ratione potes in causam incumbe; non enim Ecclesiam solum tuebere, sed regnum etiam tuum tuebere, quod maximum in periculum vocari est necesse, si in eo statu, in quo nunc est, diutius maneat Ecclesia Summusque Regum ac Pastorum Pastor versetur." *Epist. ad princ.*, 194, fo. 43 (*ibid.*).

² *Cifra al Litta, September 8, 1798 (Nunziat. di Polonia, *ibid.*).

³ *Litta to Odescalchi, July 13 (24), 1798 (*ibid.*).

⁴ *Original, *ibid.*, 343 A.

⁵ *Tsar Paul to Pius VI., *ibid.*, 344.

when the Tsar accepted the direction of the Maltese Order, and in consequence the nuncio Litta was compelled to leave his court.¹

In the meantime the Pope had been forced to change his place of residence. The French authorities in Rome had long been seeking an opportunity of moving him still farther from the frontiers of the Roman Republic and they now found a welcome pretext in the disturbances that had broken out in Perugia and Città di Castello. First the clergy, then Duke Braschi, and finally the Pope himself were held responsible for them. The tyrants in Rome were not satisfied with the serious reduction in the number of the priests in the Papal States that had been brought about by arrests and expulsions, nor with the holding in confinement of the Duchess Braschi.² In a very firmly worded letter to Ferdinand III. of Tuscany General St-Cyr and the four French commissaries in Rome demanded the immediate extradition of the Pope, who was to be taken to Cagliari, in Sardinia.³ The Grand Duke, in a courteous reply, refused the request on the ground that negotiations were in

¹ For the departure on April 28 (May 9), 1799, and the causes of it, see Litta's *letters of May 31, 1799, from Bialystok, and September 7, 1799, from Vienna (*ibid.*). Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIX., 174-6.

² BALDASSARI, 233 *seqq.*

³ *Zondadari to Antonelli, May 22, 1798 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 97 *seq.*): "Intanto le imprudenti insurrezioni dei contadini di Città di Castello (or terminate all' arrivo dei Francesi con tanto danno e strage di quelli infelici) hanno dato moto a cento nuovi editti contro li Ecclesiastici ed all' arresto della Duchessa Braschi, al di cui marito si da la colpa dell' accaduto. Si passa pur troppo ancor più avanti e si desidera che ci slontaniamo, parlandosi dell' isola de Sardegna. Per altro si tien forte per la negativa ed il Marchese Mandredini, dopo aver spediti due canonici a Vienna e Parigi e di aver ricevuta una forte memoria su tale oggetto del sig^r Cardinale di Lorenzana, come ministro di Spagna, è partito per Roma. Ne attendiamo in conseguenza con estrema ansietà il ritorno e l'esito del suo operato." Cf. GENDRY, II., 317; CELANI, *loc. cit.*, 489; SCIOUT, *Directoire*, II., 3, 320 *seqq.*

progress between Paris and Madrid on the eventual transference of the Pope to Spain.¹ He also immediately dispatched couriers to Vienna and Paris. Manfredini, whom he sent to Rome,² was the bearer of several medical certificates showing the grave state of the Pope's health. It was clear from these that if the Pope, who had again been prostrated with weakness in the middle of April, were to undertake the projected sea voyage his life would be endangered. Another very energetic protest was sent to Rome by Cardinal Lorenzana, who also asked his Government and Azara, in Paris, to press strongly³ for at least a refuge to be provided for the Pope in Spain, which plan also seemed the best to Antonelli.⁴ The result of all these efforts was that the authorities in Rome announced their agreement to the temporary removal of the Papal Court to the Certosa, near Florence, pending the arrival of news from Paris about the final result of the negotiations with Spain.⁵

The Pope's departure from Siena was facilitated by a natural phenomenon. At about noon on May 26th, 1798, the Saturday

¹ *Odescalchi to Mgr. Albani, May 18, 1798 (Nunziat. di Germania, 696, *loc. cit.*).

² *Zondadari to Antonelli, June 2, 1798 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 99): 'Questo preteso torto [responsibility for the insurrection in Città di Castello] produsse poi una istanza dei quattro Commissari di Roma francesi e di quel Generale Saint-Cyr al Gran Duca, onde fosse loro consegnata la persona di S. Santità, per trasportarla sopra una galera nella città di Cagliari in Sardegna. La Corte ricusò di farlo, e fu avvalorata la di lei ripulsa da una forte rimostranza del sig^r Card. di Lorenzana, come ministro di Spagna. Furono spediti dei corrieri a Parigi, Madrid e Vienna ed il sig^r Marchese Manfredini a Roma.'

³ BALDASSARI, 237 *seq.*

⁴ *Antonelli to Emm. di Gregorio, July 5, 1798 (*Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, fo. 119 *seqq.*).

⁵ " *Non potè egli ottenere altro se non che, sino ai nuovi ordini di Parigi, il Papa si trasferisse alla Certosa, due miglia discosta da Firenze, ed il Duca Braschi escisse dallo Stato " (*ibid.*). Cf. *Cifra al Litta, June 16, 1798 (Nunziat. di Polonia, Papal Secret Archives).

before Whitsun, the town was shaken by very violent earthquakes which damaged almost all the buildings and churches.¹ Three persons were killed and many were injured. Pius VI. was at prayer in his room, the only one in the convent to escape damage, apart from some cracks in the walls. Caracciolo and other clerics hurried to his assistance and found him completely calm and unperturbed.² For safety's sake he was taken to the Villa Poggiarello, belonging to Venturi Gallerani, and on the next day, as the forces of nature showed no sign of abating, to the Torre Fiorentina, a country house outside the town belonging to Filippo Sergardi. A minute after the Pope had left the convent the vault of the sacristy of the chapel of the Blessed Sacrament fell in; the Archbishop of Siena was covered with fragments of the wall of his room and admitted that he had had a miraculous escape.³

As soon as the Grand Duke had heard what had happened in Siena he had Lorenzana tell the Pope that everything would be made ready for his reception in the Carthusian monastery near Florence. On the morning of July 1st, after five days in which there had been no less than fifteen violent

¹ BRIGIDI, 199 *seq.*; BALDASSARI, 240 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 241.

³ *Zondadari to Antonelli, June 2, 1798 (*loc. cit.*): "Il Papa non parti da Siena, ma bensì da una villa di Casa Sergardi poco discosta dalla città, ove egli era sino dalla scorsa domenica. A tanti mali politici e religiosi, si è qui adesso accresciuto il flagello dei terremoti. Fu il primo alle ore 1 ed un quarto dopo il mezzo giorno della vigilia di Pentecoste. Fu esso così violento che non vi è nella città chiesa o casa servibile. Tre persone son morte, vari sono i feriti, e tutto è lutto e spavento. Io son vivo per prodigio del cielo, giacchè ricevei addosso alcuni sassi della stanza nella quale stavo. Avevo di poco lasciato N^{ro} Signore, che unitamente a Mons^{re} Nunzio corsi subito a cercare. La camera, nella quale Egli diceva allora l'Ufficio, era l'unica intatta del suo appartamento. Lo trasportammo nel quartiere terreno del Cav^{re} Venturi Gallerani ed il giorno dipoi nella predetta Villa Sergardi, daddove è partito per Firenze." GENDRY, II., 318; BRIGIDI, 204 *seq.*, 212.

earth-tremors, causing half the population to flee from the town,¹ the Pope set out on his journey as bravely as ever and reached his destination in the afternoon.²

From the beginning his stay in the Certosa³ was only to be a temporary one, so from the first day here Pius VI. was oppressed with anxiety about his future and, above all, the fear that the projected removal to Sardinia might be realized after all.⁴ There were rumours, too, of other places to which the Directory were thinking of deporting him.⁵ Actually his stay here eventually lasted nearly nine months, although Azara's reports from Paris continually spoke of the Government's serious intention of sending him to Cagliari. The nuncio Casoni, in Madrid, on the other hand, was able to report⁶ that Azara was being instructed by the Spanish Government to press that the Pope be allowed to stay where he was, or failing that to continue his journey into Spanish territory, where the king was ready to receive him with full honours. While for week after week a final decision was awaited from France, the Pope's health grew worse, so that there was no longer any question of his attempting a sea voyage. At the end of June, when there were hopes of definite permission being given for the journey to Spain, fresh news came from Azara that the Directory was inexorably set on Sardinia.⁷ The effect of this was to throw the Papal entourage into another fit of despair and perplexity.

¹ BRIGIDI, 203, 207.

² *Ibid.*, 213 seq.; GENDRY, II., 319. The date given by CELANI (489), "June 3," is wrong.

³ The Pope is commemorated by several inscriptions here; the most notable one is reproduced by BALDASSARI (270, n. 1).

⁴ *Odescalchi to Albani, June 1, 1798 (*loc. cit.*).

⁵ To Portugal, Malta, and Brazil, among other places (DE LA GORCE, IV., 360).

⁶ Casoni's *report of June 4, 1798, enclosed in Odescalchi's *letter to Litta on June 23, 1798 (Nunziat. di Polonia, *loc. cit.*).

⁷ *Spina to Antonelli, June 22, 1798 (*loc. cit.*): "Nuovi rumori si fanno sentire ogni giorno di un trasporto a Cagliari. Scrive il Cav^{re} Azzarra da Parigi che il Direttore Baras è fermo nel proposito

Only a few days after his arrival at the Certosa the Pope received a visit, bare of any ceremony, from the Grand Duke, accompanied by Manfredini.¹ On the other hand, the Pope was deprived of the further presence of Duke Braschi, who had to quit Tuscan territory at the command of the Roman Government.² He was succeeded as intendant of the Papal household by Monsignore Spina, who had been made Bishop *in partibus* by the Pope shortly before his expulsion from Rome and who subsequently showed himself to be one of the Pope's most trustworthy servants.³ This fidelity he maintained until his master's death.

In his dealings with the outside world the Pope was now even more restricted than in Siena. The Florentines and all other strangers were forbidden to enter his apartments; instead, he had often to show himself at his window to the people waiting below and give them his blessing.⁴ He was also forced to give up his daily walk, the loss of which was probably the cause of a rapid decline in his physical strength. After a few months he was unable to hold himself erect. Odescalchi, who continued to perform the office of a Secretary of State and kept up the correspondence with the foreign nunciatures, came from Florence to the Certosa three times a week and had lengthy discussions with the Pope,⁵ the chief subjects being, as before, the future destiny of the Holy Father and the Sacred College and the preparations for the next conclave.

The brisk exchange of notes with Monsignore Albani in Vienna was thus maintained, the Papal Court having as its object the opening of negotiations with the French at the Congress of Rastatt on two points: an improvement in the Pope's position and the fixing of a suitable place for the

di non voler più permettere al St^o Padre il soggiorno in Italia.”

*Odescalchi to Mgr. Albani, June 26, 1798 (*loc. cit.*).

¹ TAVANTI, III., 357; BALDASSARI, 267 *seq.*

² GENDRY, II., 321.

³ BALDASSARI, 268.

⁴ TAVANTI, III., 355.

⁵ BALDASSARI, 271.

conclave.¹ Albani had had a personal audience with the Emperor at the end of May, when the latter had informed him that he had the greatest possible sympathy with the Pope in his present plight and held out hopes of providing the desired assistance.² The intervention at the Congress of Rastatt, which was in the hands of Count Kobenzl, together with the attempts at mediation made by Spain in Paris, had at least this success, that the Directory also declared itself in favour of allowing the existing conditions to continue for the nonce.³

Kobenzl's instructions proposed that the Pope and all the Cardinals, including those who had taken refuge in the kingdom of Naples,⁴ be allowed to travel to Venice. Finally, at the request of Austria, Pius VI. invited all the members of the Sacred College to repair to the territory that had just become an Imperial possession by the peace of Campo Formio.⁵ This invitation, however, met with little response, least of all from the Cardinals in Southern Italy, who included the Cardinal Dean, Giovanni Francesco Albani.⁶ That their object was the holding of the conclave in Naples was denied by the Dean; if possible, he said, the election should take place in the city of St. Peter, seeing that it was the Bishop of Rome who was in question.⁷ Albani hoped that Rome would shortly be liberated, and clearly felt more secure in Naples than anywhere else. How wrong he was in his reckoning was soon shown by the course of events: Naples was taken by the

¹ *Odescalchi to Mgr. Albani, June 8, 1798 (*loc. cit.*).

² **Id.* to *id.*, June 16, 1798 (*ibid.*).

³ **Id.* to *id.*, August 11, 1798 (*ibid.*).

⁴ Correspondence between the clerics in Siena and those in Naples was not too frequent; *v.* *Spina to Antonelli, June 22, 1798: "Io non sono in corrispondenza con alcuno di essi" (*loc. cit.*).

⁵ BALDASSARI, 274.

⁶ Maury's letter to Albani, of June 16, 1798, inviting him to come to Venice, in CELANI, *loc. cit.*, 493 *seq.*

⁷ BALDASSARI, 276 *seq.*

French and the Cardinals scattered in all directions ; most of them, however, soon reassembled in Venetia.¹

At the beginning of June Antonelli sent the Curia a lengthy memorandum containing various proposals.² The Archbishop of Siena replied on the 20th that they had been recommended by him to the Pope,³ and on the 22nd Spina wrote ⁴ that he had laid them before the Pope and had also recommended them, but only for the greatest part. This restriction referred to the project of re-erecting all the curial offices in the place of banishment. This, in Spina's view, was impossible ; for one thing there was no hope of maintaining them there, and secondly no prelate was allowed to stay more than two days at the Pope's place of residence. Antonelli's other proposals also did not meet with complete approval. Thus, the idea of issuing another Bull with further facilities for holding the next Papal election was objected to by the Pope on the score that the Bull of January 3rd, 1797,⁵ was quite sufficient, especially as it had been signed by most of the Cardinals. Antonelli also urged that the Sacred College, which now numbered only forty-eight members, be brought up to strength by new nominations. But in this, too, he was unsuccessful, the Pope objecting that in the circumstances it would be more difficult to convoke seventy electors than forty-eight. Besides, he did not know how he could endow the new members. Antonelli had more success in his efforts to obtain the acceptance of Antici's and Altieri's resignations.⁶

A discussion on the need for new regulations concerning the Papal election could not be rejected out of hand, however, as

¹ *Ibid.*, 277.

² *Antonelli to Spina, June 2, 1798 (*loc. cit.*, 101 *seqq.*). Cf. CELANI, 490 *seqq.*

³ *Zondadari to Antonelli, June 20, 1798 (*loc. cit.*, 109).

⁴ *Spina to Antonelli, June 22, 1798 (*Relazione del card. Antonelli, loc. cit.*, fo. III *seqq.*).

⁵ Text in SALA, *Diario di Roma*, III., 297 *seqq.* ; *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 3, 2976 *seqq.* ; GENDRY, II., 325. Cf. also the Brief of February 11, 1798, in GENDRY, 484.

⁶ See above, p. 338.

fresh and unexpected difficulties had arisen since the signing of the last Bull. At that time the choice of a suitable place of assembly had been left to the majority of the Cardinals, a regulation which now had little point. But the draft of the new text submitted by Antonelli met with no approval and was passed to Marotti and Spina to be worked over,¹ the Pope stating that the former Bull was fundamentally satisfactory and that all that was needed was a fuller explanatory text. Antonelli's opinion was that nothing more should be demanded than the canonical election and that the fixing of the place and time should be entrusted to the Dean and a few others. Another draft was composed by Monsignore di Pietro; this met with more approval and its advantages were recognized by Antonelli among others.²

Finally a new Bull was signed by Pius VI. on November 13th, 1798,³ and at the beginning of March it was sent to the senior Cardinal residing in Venetia. The facilities, it was stated therein, which had been granted in the Bull of the previous year concerning the Papal election were no longer adequate, in view of the fresh outrages that had been committed against the Church and its head. He was consequently granting new facilities so that in the event of his death his successor might be elected as speedily and conveniently as possible. The Dean and three or four of the most respected dignitaries were to settle the place and time of the election, which was to be held without any of the usual ceremonies and would result from a two-thirds majority. The Cardinals were permitted to discuss the circumstances, but not the personal aspect, of the future election. To avoid a schism, the right to vote was to belong to those Cardinals who were assembled in the greatest number in the territory of a Catholic ruler. Of their number the Dean or the next senior Cardinal was to fix the details. The Bull ended

¹ *Spina to Antonelli, September 1, 1798 (*loc. cit.*, 125 *seqq.*). Antonelli replied by means of a long *memorandum addressed to the Pope, dated September 17 (*ibid.*, 132-9).

² BALDASSARI, 278 *seq.*; *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 3, 3097 *seq.*

³ *Bull. Cont.*, VI., 3, 3097. Cf. GENDRY, II., 327 *seq.*; MOURRET, VII., 275; BALDASSARI, 280 *seq.*

with an impressive appeal to the electors to remember their responsibility and duty, more than ever at a time when the Church was so hard pressed.

Pius VI. and his trusty companions bore their distress and suffering with an admirable courage and confidence in the future welfare of the Church. In everything that happened they saw the will of God, who in His great mercy would direct all things for the good of the Faith.¹ The Pope also derived comfort and joy from the numerous letters that reached him from every part of the Church²; most of them contained not

¹ *[Spina] to Antonelli, October 12, 1798 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 156): "Vedo dunque nel tutto delle linee particolari di provvidenza, onde mi pare di dover sperare che il misericordiosissimo Iddio le dirigerà tutte alla conservazione della Chiesa e della nostra Santa Religione. Questo solo mi conforta; e piaccia a Iddio che le mie lusinghe non siano vane." Perhaps the best expression of these sentiments is to be found in the *Brief of July 24, 1798, to the Countess de Fernan-Nuñez, thanking her for her sympathy: "Verum cum promissum habeamus a Christo se usque ad consummationem saeculi nobiscum futurum; cumque sciamus Ecclesiam Dei semper in tribulationibus auctam esse et Martyrum sanguinem semen fuisse Christianorum, excitemus fidem nostram et in oratione et patientia promissam Nobis a Deo opem et optatam tranquillitatem praestolemur. Non enim semper dormiet Deus, sed expergefactus a somno imperabit ventis et mari ostendetque tantam hanc tempestatem, non ad Petri naviculam demergendam, sed ad eam altius extollendam ad Deique gloriam manifestandam esse excitatam" (Papal Secret Archives, *Epist. ad princ.*, 194, fo. 67). A similar Brief was sent *to the Archbishop of Compostela on November 1, 1798 (*ibid.*, fo. 110 *seq.*).

² " *Consolemur nos invicem," wrote the Pope, " Archiepiscopo Rhemensi aliisque Galliae ep.," in a Brief dated " Florentiae Non. Iuni 1798 " (*loc. cit.*, fo. 37). Similar *letters of thanks were sent to the same dignitaries on July 30, 1798 (*ibid.*, fo. 48); " Archiepiscopo Auscitano " on September 20, 1798 (*ibid.*, fo. 72); " Archiepiscopo Compostellano Cal. Nov. 1798 " (*ibid.*, fo. 92); " Episcopo Forlivino " on April 28, 1798 (*ibid.*, fo. 22); " Episcopo Alexandrino " on July 18, 1798 (*ibid.*, fo. 47); to the Archbishop-Elector of Trier on October 9, 1798 (*ibid.*, fo. 88);

only expressions of grief and sympathy but also promises of prayers and material support. The one that impressed him most deeply, perhaps, was from comrades in distress, namely the fourteen French Bishops in English exile.¹ He sent a touching letter in reply,² praising their self-sacrifice for the Church of God. The chief value of all their present distress, he wrote, was the separation of the true children of the Church from mere hypocrites. Of peculiar interest was his meeting with the King and Queen of Savoy, who had also been driven from their throne and country by the French in December, 1798, and were to be banished to Sardinia. Little is known of what was said by the three dethroned rulers in their half hour's conversation of January 19th, 1799, but the hard fate in store for all of them must have lent their words sincerity.³ But in view of his serious ill-health, he must have heard with pain the question put to him by a French officer of the name of Chipault: would he not care to accompany the royal couple to Cagliari, for the Directory's decision as to his destination was irrevocable? ⁴

During the winter the Pope's health became so bad that his life was in danger. As Chipault was constantly pressing for his

thanking him for 15,000 *scudi*); to the Archbishop of Salzburg on January 10, 1799 (*ibid.*, fo. 118). On November 20, 1798, the cathedral chapter of Augsburg *wrote to the chapter of Salzburg suggesting that its own example be followed in collecting money for the Pope. On December 12, 1798, the chapter *asked the Archbishop what was to be done. The latter *replied on December 22, 1798, advising against the suggestion, on the ground that the times were too bad (Landesarchiv, Salzburg, Wiener Akten, Litt. C 89).

¹ BALDASSARI, 295 *seq.*; TAVANTI, III., 370.

² *Brief " Archiepiscopis et episcopis Galliae pro Christo in Anglia exulantibus ", of November 10, 1798 (*Epist. ad princ.*, *loc. cit.*, fo. 97-111).

³ GENDRY, II., 375. Cf. *Odescalchi to Litta on January 19, 1799 (Nunziat. di Polonia, *loc. cit.*); TAVANTI, III., 356 (" January 28 " is wrong); DE LA GORCE, IV., 363; BALDASSARI, 304 *seqq.*

⁴ *Cifra al Litta, March 16, 1799 (Nunziat. di Polonia, *loc. cit.*).

transference to Sardinia, the best physicians in the capital were called in to report on the Pope's condition. Their testimony made it clear that the conveyance of the patient to Leghorn, not to speak of a sea voyage, was out of the question, as it would use up what little strength was left to him.¹ At

¹ *Copy of the medical attestation made on February 7, 1799, and forming the second enclosure in the "Cifra al Litta" of February 9, 1799 (*ibid.*): "Noi infrascritti Medici Fisici facciamo per la verità piena, ed indubitata fede, come essendosi trovati nella mattina di questo sudetto giorno adunati nel Monastero della Certosa presso Firenze per l'oggetto di essere informati dello stato fisico di S. S^{ta} Papa Pio VI., e quello personalmente riconoscere, siamo in primo luogo accertati la predetta S.S. essere stata per lungo tempo affetta di iscuria, ed aver più volte sofferte minacce indicatissime di malattie soporose, per le quali si è trovata in una permanente sospensione delle funzioni animali, e ci siamo di poi assicurati, ch'Egli è affetto di ernia, o sia entero-epiplocele sciolto, ed ha una grande, e permanente debolezza dell'estremità inferiori, avendo ancora la cute delle sue gambe da lunga mano molto alterata, nella tessitura della quale per ogni leggiera causa si rompe la continuità e si dispone a piegarsi e quindi ripetendo il principio de suoi attuali incomodi, ci siamo assicurati, come dal dì ventiquattro del p^o p^o Gennaro fù sorpreso da nuova affezione comatosa con febbre, per sollevarlo dalla quale le furono per sentimento dell'Ill^{mo} ed Ecc^{mo} Sig. Giuseppe Petri archiatro delle LL. AA. RR. applicati due vesicatori alle cosce, dai quali avendo ricevuto un sollievo in riguardo della detta affezione comatosa, ne vi portò all'incontro il disastro d'essersi il sinistro de medesimi vesicatori, cioè la piaga da questo prodotta, infiammata con principi di cangrena, ed in seguito d'essersi manifestata in capo a cinque giorni una vasta resipola estesa dal metatarso fino al capo della fibula della sinistra gamba. Abbiamo di più osservato, che dopo d'essersi limitata la suddetta resipola, si è alla S.S. aggravato il petto con respirazione laboriosa, tosse frequente, e principio di stertore, accompagnato da sputi vischiosi mischiati di sangue, aridità di lingua, e di labbra, e di orine cariche, in tempo che la coscia corrispondente alla stessa gamba resipolata si trova edematosa, e le piaghe dei vessicanti sono tuttora aperte et avendo avuto luogo di trattenersi nella camera ove Egli giace per esaminare tutto con diligenza, abbiamo

the end of January he had further attacks of cramp, was very feverish, and had difficulty in breathing, so that there were already thoughts of giving him Extreme Unction.¹ Two weeks later two French commissaries convinced themselves by a personal visit of his desperate condition ; he was more like a

riscontrato, che le necessarie benchè minime funzioni del suo corpo, come per esempio il bere, non si possono da Lui eseguire senza molto affannarsi e senza l'aiuto di più e varie persone che lo sollevino dalla grave prostrazione, in cui si trova, tanta è la depressione di forze, nella quale Egli è costituito.

Per lo che ben ponderati i motivi fin qui esposti abbiamo d'unanimo consentimento asserito, che prescindendo affatto dall'attuale malattia, che offende il petto della S.S., e che minaccia molto appresso la di Lui esistenza, e supponendo per la più vantaggiosa ipotesi, ch'Egli possa emergere dalla medesima, lo spossamento della sua machina esser tale, che attese tutte le circostanze, non può far altro, che aumentarsi oltre lo stato attuale, e che un uomo costituito in circostanze tali, se per qualsivoglia causa si determinasse a muoversi in qualunque si voglia immaginare anche commodissima forma, non potrebbe in niun viaggio considerabile, non esporsi all'evidente pericolo d'accelerare quel fine, che secondo l'ordine naturale non può credersi assai remoto per un'Individuo, che in mezzo a tante vicende, e carico di tanti fisici pregiudizi hà superato di molto i sedici Lustrì, ed in fede

Io Dott. Spirito Costanzo Marmajoni, uno dei dodici esaminatori del Collegio Medico Fiorentino, ed il primo dei medici addetti al servizio dei monaci della Certosa presso Firenze affermo quanto in questo si dice, e contiene, ed in fede mo.

ppa.

Io Dott. Attilio Zuccagni Medico ordinario del regio arcispedale di S. Maria Nuova, censore regio per la stampa, e prefetto dell'orto botanico del Museo Reale affermo quanto in questo si dice e contiene, ed in fede mo. ppa.

Io Dott. Pio Batista Betti Medico Fiorentino affermo quanto in questo si dice, e contiene, ed in fede mo. ppa.

Io Dott. Pio Batista Canovai Medico Fiorentino affermo quanto in questo si dice, e contiene, ed in fede mano ppa."

¹ GENDRY, II., 376 ; BALDASSARI, 308 seq. ; " *Cifra al Litta ", January 26, 1799 (*loc. cit.*).

corpse, they said, than a living person.¹ Shortly afterwards there was a slight improvement ; with extreme difficulty he was able to drag himself from bed and sit on a chair close by.² It was in this enfeebled condition, though so contented and lively in his mind, that he had little thought of imminent death, that he celebrated the opening of the twenty-fifth year of his pontificate,³ the end of which, however, he was not destined to see. On this day Spina had a portable altar brought near the sick-bed, so that the Holy Father could again after a long interval attend Mass and communicate. For this attention he was deeply grateful to the Monsignore, who had also obtained from Rome the liturgical instructions for such an occasion.⁴ The rareness of the Pope's communions at this

¹ CELANI, *loc. cit.*, 506 ; “ *Cifra al Litta,” February 9, 1799 (*loc. cit.*). A second *letter to Litta, of the same date, was written entirely “ in clear ”—a remarkable fact which was certainly not an oversight. In it the Pope thanked the Tsar for offering to come to his aid with an armed force, but firmly declined the offer. The letter was probably meant to be read ! *Ibid.*

² *Spina to Antonelli, February 8, 1799 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 237).

³ *Spina to Antonelli, February 15, 1799 (*ibid.*, fo. 239) : “ La più importante certamente è la salute preziosissima di S. St^a, il quale felicemente ha principiato in quest' hoggi l'anno XXV. del suo Pontificato. Pare che il Sig^r Iddio per sua infinita misericordia abbia esaudite le preghiere di tutti i buoni, già che, se bene S. St^a continui in uno stato di debolezza veramente grande e dal quale non sò se potrà risorgere, nel rimanente poi da due giorni particolarmente a questa parte si trova in uno stato da esserne ben contenti.”

⁴ “ *Questa mattina istessa hò colto un momento opportuno per pregarlo a permettermi di far erigere nella camera vicina al letto un altare portatile, acciò possa la mattina ascoltare la S. Messa con tutto il comodo, aggiungendogli che, se desiderava, non potendo celebrar la S. Messa, di far la comunione, mi ero già provveduto da Roma delle istruzioni necessarie per far tutto con decenza. Egli hà mostrato di gradire il mio pensiero ; onde spero che si principierà domenica a metterlo in esecuzione ” (*ibid.*) Cf. GENDRY, II., 379 ; CELANI, *loc. cit.*, 508 ; “ *Cifra al Litta,” February 16, 1799 (*loc. cit.*).

period was causing his companions some concern. On hearing of it Cardinal Antonelli made so bold, being the first of his creatures, as to write him a letter, dated March 3rd, 1799,¹ and beautifully composed, on the blessings of the holy sacrifice and communion. He was particularly desirous that he should celebrate Mass sitting, as had been done by Benedict XIV. The letter was read to the Pope by Spina,² but in his reply of March 9th,³ Pius declined to act on the suggestion, being unwilling to do what had once been refused to a highly respected Archbishop and would surely result in a series of similar petitions on the part of the episcopate in cases which were not as bad. Spina, however, was able to assure the anxious Cardinal that His Holiness would receive Communion again without fail on Holy Thursday.⁴

Even in these circumstances the French Directory showed itself to be incorrigible and continued to insist that the Pope's transference to Sardinia be carried out as soon as possible. On March 10th Chipault presented another of his Government's orders for departure, which was shown to be impracticable by further medical certificates and a declaration by the Pope himself.⁵ But this made no impression on the Directory; a week passed and then another courier arrived—the fourth within a short time—from Florence, with the information that the Directory was now making the Grand Duke personally responsible for the prompt execution of the order.⁶ Ferdinand III. assured the nuncio Odescalchi that he had no intention of pressing the Pope. Nevertheless, on March 18th, when the nuncio broached the matter to the Pope, Pius replied with unexpected composure and decisiveness that if the French were hoping to make it an excuse for occupying Tuscany they

¹ *Antonelli to the Pope, March 3, 1799 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 260 *seqq.*).

² *Spina to Antonelli, March 8, 1799 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 264).

³ Pius VI. to Antonelli, March 9, 1799, reproduced in CELANI, *loc. cit.*, 511 *seq.*

⁴ *Spina to Antonelli, March 16, 1799 (*loc. cit.*, fo. 268).

⁵ TAVANTI, III., 376 *seq.*; BALDASSARI, 310.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 315 *seq.*; GENDRY, II., 378.

were not to have it; he was absolutely ready to depart.¹ Odescalchi was about to journey in advance to Leghorn to make the necessary arrangements when at the last minute another message came that Reinhard, the French ambassador in Florence, insisted on the Pope remaining where he was and would take the responsibility for the consequences on himself.²

But the Directory had other intentions. It had already laid before the Council of the Five Hundred the proposal that war be declared against Austria and Tuscany, and the proposal was now accepted.³ The news of this reached Florence on March 21st. Three days later, on Easter Sunday, the Revolutionary troops entered the Grand Duchy, and on the 25th they were outside the gates of the capital. On the following morning a detachment of soldiers with two officers arrived at the Certosa and declared it to be under occupation though without questioning the security of the Pope.⁴ A day or two afterwards, while Ferdinand III. was being driven from his throne and country, Pius VI. received the order to leave for Parma immediately.⁵ There was no mention of any further destination, though in all probability it had already been decided to take him across the Alps.

"God's will be done!" With these words the Pope accepted the command and with resolution and willingness prepared himself for departure on the morning of March 28th, 1799.⁶ Both his legs and part of his body being paralysed, he was quite unable to move, and his rigid body, convulsed with pain, had to be lifted into the carriage by four of the strongest servants.⁷ The first day's journey was extremely tiring and

¹ BALDASSARI, 317.

² *Ibid.*, 318; *Odescalchi to Litta, March 18, 1799 (*loc. cit.*).

³ DE LA GORCE, IV., 364; BALDASSARI, 321.

⁴ BALDASSARI, 324 *seq.*; TAVANTI, III., 379; SALA, *Diario di Roma*, III., 229 *seq.*

⁵ Gaultier's order of March 29, 1799 (in the archives in Parma), in A. G. TONONI, *Il prigioniero apostolico Pio VI. nei ducati Parmensi* (April 1-18, 1799), Parma, 1896, 29 *seqq.* Cf. PONCET, 45.

⁶ BALDASSARI, 327.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 328.

when Maschera was reached in the evening the Pope's condition was so alarming that no one thought that the journey could be successfully completed.¹ Nevertheless, the snow-covered Apennines were crossed on the next day, during which Pius VI. lay in a delirium. At Bologna, the citadel of revolutionary life, the distinguished party was received with all the honours and attentions that befitted it. The military provided a guard for the Pope's quarters and even played him a serenade.²

From Bologna the journey was continued by way of Modena, where Cardinal Livizzani and the Bishop provided the best possible accommodation,³ and Reggio to Parma, where at the instigation of the duke the party was given shelter in the great monastery of St. John the Evangelist. In spite of the copious rain, the inhabitants along the route between Bologna and Parma turned out in large numbers to show their sympathy. At Parma, too, where the weather was still most unfavourable, immense crowds were in the streets to greet the Pope, who by now had not even the strength to raise his hand in blessing.⁴ On the day after his arrival personal visits were paid him by the duke, also by the duchess and her children and many of the most important inhabitants.⁵ For the next few days the invalid was allowed to rest.

On April 10th, however, a fresh order came from the French generalissimo that the Pope was to start out for Turin within two hours.⁶ When this news was imparted to the Pope his whole body was seized by a kind of paralysis, and his departure had to be postponed. The inhabitants' indignation at the French commander's heartlessness soon took threatening forms.⁷ Skilful physicians and diplomatic representatives

¹ *Ibid.*, 329.

² *Ibid.*, 330 *seq.*

³ At Modena the Pope was publicly insulted (BALDASSARI, 334 ; TONONI, 7).

⁴ TONONI, 8 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 9 *seq.* ; TAVANTI, III., 379 ; BALDASSARI, 340 *seq.*

⁶ BALDASSARI, 342 *seq.* ; TONONI, II *seq.*

⁷ BALDASSARI, 344 *seqq.*

prepared fresh memoranda on the dangerous state of the Pope's health,¹ but to no purpose. The French, fearing the victorious advance of the Austrians, insisted on the journey being continued without delay, unless the duke was willing to expose his country to immediate military occupation and a political revolution at the hands of the Republican army.² On hearing of this threat the Pope made up his mind, as he had done in Florence, to leave the town as soon as possible. On the morning of April 14th he was accompanied to the frontier by mounted Parmesans.³ Though hope was steadily receding, he made not the slightest complaint or gave any sign of indignation, but abandoned himself to what might yet befall him.

The next stopping-places after Parma were Borgo San Donnino, where Cardinal Gonzaga, who had taken refuge there, and the Bishop received the Pope in a befitting manner, and the missionary college of San Lazzaro, outside Piacenza, a foundation of Cardinal Alberoni's.⁴ When the journey was resumed a detour was made to avoid the town, whose gates had been closed to prevent the inhabitants streaming out to greet the Pope. Suddenly, however, the order came to turn back at once owing to the anticipated advance of the enemy's armies. This time the people of Piacenza were successful in having the Pope pass through their town, to the immense joy of the countless throngs of the faithful. The missionary college was only too glad to have the Holy Father back within its walls.⁵ On the same day, however, the order was given for the journey to be continued by another route. This, owing to the hardships that had just been endured and the extreme exhaustion of the Pope, was impracticable. The prelate's

¹ TONONI, 15 *seq.* ; BALDASSARI, 346 *seq.* The continuation of the journey was also impeded by natural forces, such as the "grosso torrente Taro" which was found impossible to cross.

² BALDASSARI, 349 ; PONCET, 49.

³ TONONI, 16.

⁴ TAVANTI, III., 380 *seq.* ; TONONI, 16 *seqq.* ; BALDASSARI, 353.

⁵ BALDASSARI, 355 *seqq.* ; TONONI, 19 *seqq.* ; GENDRY, II., 408.

refusal to move gave rise to altercations with the French officers,¹ who were anxious about the security of the hostages entrusted to their care ; the bridge across the Po had already been occupied by the military and it was said that the thunder of the enemy's guns had been heard in the town.²

The Papal party set out very early the next day and two laborious hours were spent in crossing the swollen Trebbia by means of a flying bridge, from which a coach and a horse fell into the floods, the latter having to be left to drown.³ At Castel San Giovanni the local officials, disregarding the annoyance of the French, paid the Pope all the honours due to his position and showed their grief at his pitiable plight. In the evening the people assembled in the church with their parish priest, to pray for the Holy Father, whom they had seen being carried like a lifeless corpse by two of his domestics into the quarters prepared for him. The party was joined here by the former Spanish ambassador, Pedro Labrador, who henceforward was to represent Cardinal Lorenzana in his dealings with the Pope but for a long time was unable to enter his presence.⁴ Here, as at Parma and Borgo San Donnino, the Pope's stay is recorded in inscriptions.⁵ The next day the frontier of the Duchy of Parma was left behind and the sick and aged man, utterly exhausted, was carried on to Voghera, Tortona, and Alessandria, where there was a day's rest, rendered still more welcome by the kindly hospitality offered by the Bishop. The party then proceeded via Casale di Monserrato and Crescentino to Turin. In all the smaller towns full honours were paid to their exalted guest, not only by the civil and military officials and the people, but also by the French commandant.⁶ To avoid demonstrations in the formerly royal city of Turin arrangements were made for the Pope's carriage to arrive there at night by unfrequented

¹ BALDASSARI, 358.

² TONONI, 21 *seq.*

³ BALDASSARI, 361 ; TONONI, 23.

⁴ BALDASSARI, 362 ; GENDRY, II., 408 *seq.* ; TONONI, 24 *seq.*

⁵ TONONI, 27.

⁶ BALDASSARI, 363 *seqq.*

routes.¹ Although the Pope was so worn out as hardly to be conscious, he was apprised of the order to set out again at dawn on the following day. But the preparations for the drive over the mountains were so meticulous and troublesome that no move could be made until it was nearly midnight.² At Susa the Pope and his companions learnt to the dismay of the latter than instead of Grenoble, as had been formerly intended, the far more cheerless Briançon had been fixed as their place of residence.³ From Susa onwards the Pope, having been made to abandon his carriage, was conveyed in a litter borne by four relays of four servants each, while the rest of the party had to be content with mules. The way led through steep walls of snow and precipitous rocky gorges, over brushwood and narrow, swaying bridges. At times the route had been rendered undistinguishable by masses of freshly fallen snow. In spite of the bitter cold not a word of complaint came from the sick old man; on the contrary, he encouraged his companions.⁴ When the frontier between Italy and France was crossed on April 30th the name of the village on the Italian side, Cesana, may well have awakened in his mind mournful memories of his distant birthplace, with its similarly sounding name, Cesena.

The track led through deep snow and slush and over slippery ice to the top of Mont-Genèvre,⁵ then down to Briançon, a lonely mountain hamlet with seven decayed forts. Here the party was accommodated in the commandant's house in extremely confined and uncomfortable quarters. Apart from a few hostile demonstrations the poor Alpine population showed a touching sympathy with the Pope in his misfortune.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, 369 *seqq.*; TAVANTI, III., 381.

² BALDASSARI, 372 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 375.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 377 *seqq.*; PONCET, 51; GENDRY, II., 410; TAVANTI, III., 382; the crossing is illustrated in REYNAUD, *Pie à Valence*, 10-11; *cf. ibid.*, 11.

⁵ BALDASSARI, 380.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 381, 383 *seqq.*; PONCET, 52 *seq.*; FRANCLIEU, *Pie VI.*

Life in Briançon was, indeed, monotonous and trying, especially as the Pope, henceforward referred to merely as "*citoyen pape*", was treated as the hostage of a State which had carried out the most terrible persecution of the clergy of modern times and whose final aim was the destruction of the Papacy. Only once did the noise of the outside world penetrate to this remote and lonely spot. After two weeks had been spent here the rumour arose that General Suvarov, with German and Russian troops, was on his way to Susa and the mountains for the purpose of freeing the Pope.¹ The local French commissary, Bérard, insisted on the party moving further into France, accusing the Pope and his companions of treacherous intrigues with the enemy. The Pope's condition showing no improvement, it was found impossible to move him, but his chief companions were taken away from him.² On June 8th, after bidding him an affecting farewell and receiving his blessing, they left for Grenoble, where they were treated as prisoners of State.³ The confessor Fantini and two valets stayed behind with the Pope at Briançon.

In less than three weeks the Pope, now almost a complete cripple, hardly able to stand,⁴ had to follow his companions to Grenoble, in spite of the physicians' energetic protests and a heavy fall of snow which persisted despite the advanced season of the year.⁵ The journey was made by carriage in the shortest possible stages, and everywhere the Pope was greeted and escorted not only by the curious but also—and these were far more numerous—by faithful adherents of the

dans les prisons du Dauphiné, Montreuil, 21892, 15 seq., 251 seq. Cf. the letter from an inhabitant of Briançon in LECLERCQ, Martyrs, XIII., 70' seq.

¹ BALDASSARI, 387, 391; GENDRY, II., 411; TAVANTI, III., 391 seq.

² LECLERCQ, *Martyrs*, XIII., 72.

³ BALDASSARI, 397-402 seqq.

⁴ PONCET, 55.

⁵ BALDASSARI, 408 seq. The cost of the stay in Briançon is set out in LECLERCQ, XIII., 76 seq.

Church.¹ He was pleasantly surprised on reaching Grenoble on July 6th to be offered accommodation in her château by a lady of distinction, the Marquise de Vaux.² A huge crowd outside the house kept on calling for the Pope's blessing until he was carried on to the balcony. When he appeared the square rang to the shouts of jubilation, among which were heard unmistakable imprecations against the French commissary.³ It was only after great difficulties that the Pope's companions who had preceded him were allowed to rejoin him. But as the time originally allotted for the Pope's stay in Grenoble had to be extended on medical instructions—the final destination had still not yet been reached—some of the prelates had again to go on in advance on July 9th. Among them were Spina, Caracciolo, Marotti, and Baldassari.⁴ The last-named entered in his notebooks all the details of the Pope's long journey into exile.⁵ Meanwhile the government of the Department of Drôme was also making all the necessary arrangements for the accommodation in Valence of the "former so-called Pope".

On July 10th Grenoble was left behind and the journey was again continued in short daily stages.⁶ According to report

¹ GENDRY, II., 412; LECLERCQ, 79 *seqq.*; TAVANTI, III., 393 *seq.*

² BALDASSARI, 413; PONCET, 57; FRANCLIEU, 97 *seqq.*

³ GENDRY, II., 416; TAVANTI, III., 395. Labrador wrote from here that this continual worrying of the aged Pope was more inhuman than killing him straight off (to the commissary Réal, July 5, 1799; in FRANCLIEU, 288 *seq.*).

⁴ GENDRY, II., 420 *seq.* Illustration of the entry into Grenoble in REYNAUD, 12-13. Cf. also FRANCLIEU for a complete account.

⁵ *Relazione delle avversità e patimenti del glorioso Papa Pio VI. negli ultimi tre anni del suo pontificato*, Roma, 1840,² Modena, 1840-3. The German translation, by Fr. X. Steck (Tübingen, 1844), which we have used, was based on the French edition by De Lacouture (Paris, 1839), which in its turn was based on the first publication of the work in the Modenese periodical *Memorie di religione, di morale e di letteratura*.

⁶ GENDRY, II., 416 *seq.*; BALDASSARI, 423. General Merck, whose book, *La captivité et la mort de Pie VI.* (Londres, 1814),

the people assembled to greet the Pope were most numerous at Romans. Girls dressed in white walked before him strewing flowers. When the shutters of his carriage were let down the people broke out into threats until they were again allowed to view his sacred person.¹ Arrived at his quarters he had again to be carried on to the balcony, where he blessed the crowd shouting out to see him.²

The long awaited travelling carriage finally reached Valence on the morning of July 14th and the dying Pope's last journey was at an end. He was declared to be an ordinary prisoner of the French Republic³ and was allotted as a dwelling the so-called *Hôtel du Gouvernement*, a three-storied building in the middle of the citadel, lying between the courtyard and the garden. According to the accounts of the Department commissary Curnier, the old building had been left unused and neglected for a long time before the arrival of the Pope.⁴ The furniture and even some of the doors had gone, the wallpaper was worn away, and the beds in the few rooms that could be locked were rotting with age. Through the kindness of the inhabitants, especially the local gentry, the house had quickly been rendered habitable, and now offered quite good quarters.⁵

was published by his widow, puts a good complexion on his actions both on this as on other occasions. His book makes no attempt at historical accuracy. Baldassari (viii) calls it pure fiction. For Spina's protest against Merck, *v. GENDRY, II., 414, n. 3.* REYNAUD (*II seq.*), however, accepts these fairy-stories in his jubilee publication.

¹ BALDASSARI, 425 *seq.*; TAVANTI, III., 396; FRANCLIEU, 145 *seq.*; PONCET, 84 *seq.*; *ibid.*, 86 *seq.*, an officer's report.

² BALDASSARI, 428 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 433 *seq.*

⁴ PONCET, 63. In 1874 the building was replaced by cavalry barracks (FRANCLIEU, 253).

⁵ BALDASSARI, 421 *seqq.* The Marquise de Veynes and Madame Championnet were especially prominent in this charitable work. *Cf. GENDRY, II., 414; LECLERCQ, XIII., 97 seqq.; REYNAUD, 13; PONCET, 66; TAVANTI, III., 397.* On July 15, 1799, the Pope sent a *Brief of thanks "Francisco archiep. Valentino" for his gifts, lamenting that "in dies gravius urgimur incommodo

From his bedroom the Pope could enjoy a view of the majestic course of the Rhône and the chains of hills that rose beyond it.¹

Ample precautions had been taken for the guarding of the Pope: the posts outside the Papal apartments were permanently manned by two officers and more than ten men, and the vicinity of the house was patrolled to prevent a crowd assembling.² Strangers were admitted only with the permission of the Government, and the domestic staff were provided with passes.³ The regulations for the accommodation of the exalted prisoner were drawn up with such meticulousness and thoroughness by the various officials⁴ that they contradicted themselves in many cases, and the officials themselves were at variance as to the limits of their powers. Boveron, a member of the Departmental administration, had the courage to protest on behalf of the Pope against the inhumanity of the rulings laid down by his colleagues, and he refused to put his hand to them.⁵

Although the prisoner of Valence was guarded with ever-increasing strictness and the sentries were inspected daily by the commandant⁶ many persons made their way into the

itineris longissimi in quo congesti fuimus " (Papal Secret Archives, *Epist. ad princ.*, 194, fo. 162). This volume containing the Briefs written in captivity is marked " *Exulante pontifice litterae quae hoc in volumine continentur non in forma brevis, ut moris est, sed privatim tantum scriptae atque expeditae fuerunt Josepho Marotti secretario* ".

¹ " Oh ! Che bella vista ! " exclaimed the Pope (GENDRY, II., 417).

² BALDASSARI, 435 ; REYNAUD, 14.

³ BALDASSARI, 436 ; PONCET, 73.

⁴ The Département officials, for example, produced an order with twenty articles (LECLERCQ, XIII., 100 *seqq.*) ; these and other regulations in PONCET, 59 *seqq.*, 67 *seqq.*

⁵ Similar protests were made by Curnier, who had been instructed by the Directory to keep a special watch on the Pope. GENDRY, II., 415 *seq.* ; LECLERCQ, XIII., 104 ; PONCET, 74-82 (Boveron's protest is dealt with on pp. 89-94).

⁶ PONCET, 107.

Pope's apartments and reached his presence without permission. It was evident that the appearance of every visitor gave him pleasure and he indicated by a slight movement of the hand that he was giving him his blessing.¹ Boveron came almost daily and whenever the Pope was strong enough conversed with him in Italian. Finally, however, even this Government representative was refused entry.²

For the first few days after the Pope's arrival in Valence his health had improved a little, probably as the result of the rest after the long journey.³ But soon his physical powers began to fail again. The physician paid him short visits twice daily. At Valence the Pope was no longer able to give his attention to the direction of the Church. The only exception he made was to deal with the far-reaching desires of the Spanish Government which the ambassador at last had the opportunity of putting before him. To some he gave his approval, others he rejected. He could not be persuaded, however, to be so complaisant towards Spain as to allow the Court of Madrid to shoulder almost alone the expense of maintaining the Papal household at Valence. He said with heroic firmness: "I cannot sell my soul in order to live a few days longer." But Labrador, too, was magnanimous enough to stay with the dying Pope and to see to his physical welfare and that of his entourage.⁴ Pius spent each day in prayer and a little reading; every morning he heard two Masses and during the day, if the weather was good, he was taken for a walk in the garden; in the evening he gathered all his companions around him for the saying of the Rosary.⁵

Soon, however, his condition became critical. He could hardly take any nourishment and he could no longer be taken into the open air.⁶ Nevertheless, on July 22nd, in the hottest part of the summer, the Directory in Paris was inhuman

¹ LECLERCQ, XIII., 106.

² BALDASSARI, 437; PONCET, 108 *seq.*

³ GENDRY, II., 418.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 439 *seqq.*

⁵ GENDRY, II., 418; PONCET, III.

⁶ PONCET, 113.

enough to order his removal to Dijon,¹ either because the enemy's forces were steadily approaching or because it was feared that riots in favour of the former sovereign might break out in the neighbouring Avignon. On the strength of a firm protest made by the physician, however,² counter-representations were made by the Departmental authorities and the departure was put off provisionally till August 12th. Preparations for the departure were begun but the Pope's condition was so serious that it was found impossible to carry out the order. The administrator and the commissaries satisfied themselves of the truth of this by viewing the patient themselves.³

Meanwhile, on the feast of the Assumption, a slight improvement took place. The Pope again assisted at two Masses and took Communion. As he was in surprisingly good spirits afterwards, mention was made of the projected move. He answered dolefully that he would have liked to spend his last few hours in Valence but that he resigned himself to the will of God.⁴ As it happened, on the next day he was worse again, a comatose stupor denoting that whatever little strength he had had was now completely exhausted.⁵

On August 18th, feeling a little better, he left his bed and tried to pray on an easy chair, but he could no longer collect his thoughts. In spite of this his improved condition continued for a while, but on the next night but one he was seized with fearful convulsions alternating with lethargy.⁶ Further medical attention was of no avail; blood was vomited painlessly, pointing to paralysis of the internal organs. And then, suddenly, the more his physical strength failed the more his mental faculties regained their former vigour.⁷ On August 27th

¹ GENDRY, II., 419; BALDASSARI, 441; LECLERCQ, XIII., 108; TAVANTI, III., 398 *seq.*; FRANCLIEU, 171.

² His attestation in LECLERCQ, XIII., III. Cf. PONCET, 120.

³ BALDASSARI, 449; PONCET, 124.

⁴ GENDRY, II., 420.

⁵ BALDASSARI, 442 *seq.*

⁶ GENDRY, II., 422; PONCET, 124.

⁷ BALDASSARI, 443 *seq.*

he expressed the firm desire of being clothed in his priestly vestments and of receiving the Body of the Lord. When Spina brought the Sacrament into the sick-room the Pope laid his hand on the Bible and in a clear voice made his solemn confession of faith. Then, together with Caracciolo, he recited the Confiteor and the responses.¹ On the same day he instructed Spina to draw up a new will, which he signed. In it he remembered all his loyal companions who had shared in his misfortune and rewarded them as well as his slender resources would permit. Spina was appointed executor.²

It was now only a question of hours. On the following day he left his bed again and later on Spina administered the holy oils to the dying Pope, who was completely clear in his mind and conscious of what was taking place.³ About midday a slight alleviation was observed—the last before the final dissolution. In the evening he again found it difficult to breathe. Summoning all his strength he pressed the hands of all the clerics present as if to thank them and to bid them farewell, and said in a loud voice, “Father, forgive them,” whereupon Fantini imparted the plenary indulgence to the dying. All then said the prayers for the dying. At twenty minutes past one Fantini suddenly stopped, for the Pope, making a final effort, was raising his right hand. With the crucifix he gave the triple blessing to those present and with them, too, the whole ungrateful world from which he was now departing. His arm dropped listlessly on to the bed and the crucifix slipped from his grasp. After a few minutes of grievous agony the face quivered slightly and the physician assured himself that death had taken place.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, 445; GENDRY, II., 422; PONCET, 125 *seqq.*

² Text in BALDASSARI, 447, and PONCET, 157 (with its shaky signature). Cf. LECLERCQ, XIII., 115 *seq.*, and FRANCLIEU, 213.

³ GENDRY, II., 423.

⁴ BALDASSARI, 450 *seqq.*; FRANCLIEU, 189; GENDRY, II., 424; LECLERCQ, XIII., 117; PONCET, 130 *seq.*; TAVANTI, III., 401 *seq.* Illustration in REYNAUD, 16–17. Cf. *Pedro Labrador to Azara on August 29, 1799, from Valence: “S.S. conservó el uso de su razón hasta el ultimo punto de su vida y si durante ella

It was daybreak on August 29th, 1799. A pontificate of twenty-four years, six months, and two weeks—the longest since that of St. Peter¹—had come to an end. In the sufferings of his last years Pius VI. had become an heroic follower of Christ with whom he kept faith unflinchingly and in whose footsteps he trod as few others had done. And the greatest and last action performed by this silent sufferer from whom, as he neared his end, all human frailties fell away like veiling draperies, was to forgive his enemies and bless the world which to a large extent had turned against him in revolt and hatred.

On hearing of the Pope's decease the civil officials of Valence appeared in their robes of office. In the afternoon the death certificate was made out,² and this was followed by an autopsy lasting four hours and the embalming of the corpse by Morelli³ in the presence of the higher officials and the Papal retinue. The latter operation was performed at Spina's request, that the mortal remains might be more conveniently conveyed to the Eternal City.⁴ This was the late Pope's last request, and Spina immediately applied to the Departmental authorities for permission to carry it out. The application was forwarded to Paris. Labrador also wrote to Paris for the same object.⁵ The Pope's belongings were laid under seal and listed.⁶ Caracciolo, as Pronotary, drew up an authenticated record of the Pope's death and its immediate circumstances,⁷ while Spina wrote a circular letter to the Cardinals, informing them

fue por su constancia sobrehumana un continuo motivo de admiracion, no se ha mostrado menos portentoso por la inalterable serenidad con que se ha acercado al sepulcro" (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

¹ PONCET, 133.

² BALDASSARI, 454 *seq.*; GENDRY, II., 425.

³ The result of the autopsy in PONCET, 139 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 144; BALDASSARI, 455.

⁵ GENDRY, II., 425 *seq.*, 492; BALDASSARI, 465. The text of Spina's petition in PONCET, 151 *seq.* (Labrador's letter on p. 153).

⁶ The list in LECLERCQ, XIII., 119 *seqq.*; PONCET, 175 *seqq.* The total value was about 13,000 francs.

⁷ Text in BALDASSARI, 519 *seqq.*, and PONCET, 147 *seqq.*

of the sad event.¹ Meanwhile the corpse had been clothed in ecclesiastical vestments and enclosed in a leaden coffin, which in its turn was placed in one of black walnut. The heart and entrails were put into a leaden urn.²

These mortal remains were taken to the simple chapel of the citadel, where the customary nine-days' exequies were begun on August 30th. The furniture consisted only of four candlesticks of poor quality and a few leaves of hyssop to serve as an aspergillum.³ All the more sincere, however, was the sympathy shown by the local inhabitants, who in spite of the prohibition and the obstacles placed in their way by the civil officials, managed to enter the chapel with no assistance from the clerics.⁴ After the days of mourning were over the coffin remained in a vaulted chamber immediately beneath the chapel. Shortly afterwards the lay servants were given their passports and were discharged, while the clerics stayed behind to see to the transference of the corpse to Rome.⁵

A long time passed before there was any prospect of fulfilling this desire. At the beginning of October General Bonaparte, when on his way back from the Egyptian expedition, touched at Valence and in the course of a drive inquired in the most friendly manner of Spina and his companions what were their intentions regarding themselves and the late Pope. On hearing their reply he promised to use his personal influence for them in Paris.⁶ In a few weeks permits to leave the country arrived for the clerics also, whereupon five of them left Valence on November 9th, Spina and Monsignore Malo remaining behind.⁷ Throughout the Catholic world solemn services were held in honour of the dead Pope.⁸

It was not until the Directory had been deprived of power

¹ GENDRY, II., 441 *seq.*; BALDASSARI, 465; PONCET, 147.

² GENDRY, II., 426. The inscription on the coffin in PONCET, 151.

³ BALDASSARI, 456.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 457; GENDRY, II., 428.

⁵ BALDASSARI, 458. In PONCET, 163, is the list of all the thirty-two members of the Papal household.

⁶ BALDASSARI, 466 *seqq.*; PONCET, 206 *seq.*

⁷ GENDRY, II., 430. ⁸ *Ibid.*, 443 *seq.*; BALDASSARI, 464.

by Bonaparte's *coup d'état* of that same November 9th, the 18th Brumaire, and he himself had been promoted to the leadership of the country as First Consul, that precise instructions were issued regarding the disposal of the Pope's body.¹ Spina's request, however, was not yet granted; instead, in December, an order came from the new Government that the coffin that had been laid aside in the citadel chapel was to be buried in Valence as soon as possible, with full military and public honours, and that a simple but befitting monument was to be erected to the Pope.² All the necessary measures were taken with great promptitude by the competent authorities. Spina was able to prevent a Constitutional Bishop conducting the funeral,³ but he had to refrain from taking a personal part in the ceremony so as not to give his silent consent to a deed that was directly contrary to his master's last wish.⁴

On the morning of the appointed day, January 30th, 1800, the town was aroused by the firing of cannon, and at nine o'clock the National Guard, in full equipment, paraded in the square outside the citadel. At ten o'clock the leading municipal, State, and military officials appeared in full dress with signs of mourning. After the seals had been inspected and the registration completed, the imposing procession, accompanying the coffin on a plain carriage, set out for the graveyard of St. Catherine, a little over a mile away.⁵ After military

¹ The French Ministry of the Interior feared that if the Pope's body was taken back to Italy Francophobe disturbances would break out there. Cf. *Labrador to Urquizo, Paris, October 27, 1799: (the Minister said) "que no hay otro reparo para permitir la translacion que el temor de que en los pueblos de Italia por donde pase, se aumente con este motivo la persecucion contra los que se mostraron afectos a la República francesa. Queda pues depositado en la capilla de la Ciudadela hasta que varíen las circunstancias" (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

² GENDRY, II., 431; PONCET, 208 *seq.*; FRANCLIEU, 221.

³ GENDRY, II., 433; BALDASSARI, 470 *seq.*

⁴ PONCET, 220 *seq.*

⁵ An illustration of the procession in REYNAUD, 18-19; an account, *ibid.*, 19 *seq.* The whole ceremony in PONCET, 214-18;

honours had been paid there the coffin and urn were placed in a vault while the military band played mournful airs. After further salutes from the guns the procession returned to the town.¹ There were no clergy present, no prayers were said, and no blessing was given.

Spina left the town the next day, but he knew no rest until the Pope's last wish had been fulfilled.² It was not till after Bonaparte had made peace with the Church by the concordat of 1801 that the requests put to him by Pius VII. were granted: the mighty Consul gave permission for the remains of Pius VI. to be transferred to the Eternal City.³ On the night of Christmas Eve, 1801, in accordance with Government instructions, the coffin and urn were removed from the vault in the presence of the local authorities of Valence and a guard of forty grenadiers. The task occupied nearly all the night; the record of the proceedings was signed in the early morning by Boveron, the acting mayor; the wording was objected to by the central authority as not conforming with the prescribed simplicity.⁴

When Spina arrived in Valence to fulfil his last duty towards his old master, the coffin and urn, which had been kept in a locked room in the prefecture, were delivered to him after the seals and record had been examined.⁵ Every formality having been settled, Spina left again on February 1st, 1802. The Pope's body had already left Valence on January 11th. It was taken by carriage to Marseilles, thence by ship to Genoa, and from there to Lericci.⁶ From Lericci it went by land

the record of the proceedings, *ibid.*, 231-5; *ibid.*, 235 *seq.*, the funeral expenses.

¹ BALDASSARI, 472 *seq.*

² GENDRY, II., 447.

³ PONCET, 241 *seqq.*

⁴ GENDRY, II., 448 *seq.* The text of the record in PONCET, 245-251; *ibid.*, 252-277, the discussions with the Prefecture, which eventually quashed the report.

⁵ PONCET, 270-3.

⁶ GENDRY, II., 450. Spina's letters to Consalvi about the conveyance of the corpse to Italy in FRANCLIEU, 360 *seq.*

via Pisa, Florence, and Siena, to Rome, the greatest respect being paid to it all along the route.¹ Rome was reached on February 17th, and here a solemn procession, including 400 torch-bearers, accompanied the hearse to St. Peter's, where Pope Pius VII. and his Cardinals were waiting to receive it.² On the following night the coffin and urn were opened, the body was clothed in new vestments, and a new inscription was affixed to the coffin.³ The next day the solemn exequies were performed in St. Peter's; the Requiem was celebrated by Cardinal Antonelli in the presence of the Pope, the panegyric was delivered by Gioacchino Tosi, and Pius VII. himself pronounced the absolution over the catafalque, around which 600 candles were burning. The coffin was then exposed in the customary fashion for the veneration of the faithful.⁴

The coffin was finally deposited in the Grotte Vaticane, but it was not till twenty years later, on November 26th, 1822, that an impressive statue of the sorrowful Pope, a masterpiece of Canova's, was erected opposite the Confessio of St. Peter.⁵ Pius VI. is portrayed kneeling with folded hands and bared head; his gaze, directed upwards, is full of devotion and sublimated suffering, of patience, and a trust in God so firmly rooted that the bitterest misfortune could not rob him of it.⁶

The leaden urn containing the Pope's internal organs was taken back to Southern France in fulfilment of the desire

¹ GENDRY, II., 451.

² *Ibid.*, 454 *seqq.*

³ BALDASSARI, 474, where also the inscription is reproduced. Cf. GENDRY, II., 457.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 458. For particulars about the funeral ceremonies see the Vatican Archives, "Prelati in carica," Sm., 7th document.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 459, and n. 1. Canova died a week before the dedication.

⁶ Illustrations in F. J. BAYER, *Papstbuch* (München, 1925), and MALAMANI, *Canova*, 278. Cf. ALBERIGO AGNOLETTI, *Canova e l'arte sacra*, Rome (n.d.), 10 *seq.*, 34 *seq.*; GREGOROVIVS, *Papstgräber*, 94; GENDRY, I. (frontispiece). Cf. also our account, Vol. XXXIX., 26 n.

expressed by the Bishop of Valence and backed by Spina.¹ Cacault, who was once again the French *chargé d'affaires* in Rome, acquired for the Bishop a bust of the Pope made in the studio of one of Canova's pupils, Laboureur.² It was Cacault, too, who arranged for the transference of the precious relics in the urn, after Pius VII. had acceded to Spina's request in November 1802.³ On December 29th they were taken with great solemnity from Rome to Civitavecchia⁴ and thence by sea to Toulon, which was reached in early January, 1803. Here they were fetched from the ship by the Archbishop of Aix in person, attended by the clergy, and were escorted by a vast procession through the town to the principal church, where for several days on end pontifical Masses and, in the evening, the office for the dead were celebrated.⁵ On March 21st, after the arrival of detailed instructions from the Government, the relics left Toulon for Marseilles, where, although the holding of religious services in public was still prohibited, the memory of the Pope was celebrated with full ceremony in the cathedral, under the leadership of the same Archbishop.⁶ On March 26th the urn was exposed all day in the cathedral at Avignon and on the 29th it reached Valence. Accompanied by a grand procession headed by the civil authorities it was conveyed to the cathedral, where it was taken over by the Bishop.⁷ In thanking those who had brought the relics from Rome he spoke some words that fittingly described the change that had taken place during the

¹ GENDRY, II., 459. Cf. Spina to Consalvi, November 6, 1802, in THEINER, *Docum.*, II., xxxviii seq.

² GENDRY, II., 461 seq.; PONCET, 285 seq.; illustration of the bust in REYNAUD, 22.

³ PONCET, 293 seq.

⁴ GENDRY, II., 460 seq.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 463. Cf. Archbishop Cicé's own account in THEINER, *Docum.*, II., xl seq.

⁶ Cicé's panegyric, delivered at Marseilles, *ibid.*, xli seqq.

⁷ *Ibid.*, xlix seqq., the Archbishop's full account of the journey, and xlix seqq., the official report of the ceremonies at Valence. Cf. GENDRY, II., 465 seqq.

last few years in the ecclesiastical situation—words which would have given the greatest joy to Pius VI. “On your return to Rome, let it be known that in France the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman faith is flourishing again, with the most promising signs for the future.”¹

On the following morning, after a solemn service, the urn was placed provisionally in a side-chapel. Finally, on October 19th, 1811, the execution of the monument to Pius VI. had proceeded sufficiently far² for the cathedral chapter to reopen and re-examine the urn, two days after which it was finally deposited in the monument.³ On October 25th the consecration of the monument was performed, amid a vast assembly of the faithful, by Spina, who meanwhile had become Archbishop of Genoa and a Cardinal of the Roman Church.⁴ This was the last mark of affection he could show the man with whom he had shared all the sufferings of exile with loyal devotion. They must have arisen in his memory with redoubled vividness on that day, twelve years after the great sufferer had passed away. For it had taken all that time for his mortal remains to find their final resting-place.

“The death of Pius VI. has, as it were, placed a seal on the glory of philosophy in modern times.” These words were used in a malignant obituary article on the great sufferer of Valence that appeared in a Paris newspaper.⁵ The times were such that it was thought possible to deliver funeral orations on the Papacy and to welcome with joy its permanent dissolution. The Church’s enemies were jubilant that the cockade was attached to the Papal tiara, that the banners of popular

¹ Detailed account in PONCET, 298–305.

² For the continual delays, *v.* GENDRY, II., 469 *seqq.*

³ PONCET, 306 *seqq.*

⁴ GENDRY, II., 471 (*ibid.*, 472, Gaetano Marini’s inscription on the monument); PONCET, 311. The cathedral was raised to the status of a basilica by Pius IX., who also conferred the pectoral cross on the chapter (*ibid.*, 313 *seq.*).

⁵ *Courrier universel*, of September 8, 1799. Cf. BALDASSARI, 459, 476.

government were waving over the Papal tombs, that the body of the exiled Pope had been buried in unconsecrated ground. The capital of Christendom had become the booty of the Revolution, the highest dignitaries of the Church had been scattered to the winds.

This then was the doleful end of the intellectual progress of the century of "enlightenment". Gallicanism and Jansenism, Febronianism and Josephism, still concealing their hostility to the Papacy with fine-sounding words, had gnawed at the Church's vitals from within, while the spirit of the Encyclopedists and "philosophers" threatened it from without. The extreme shortsightedness of many princes and diplomats facilitated rather than hindered the advent of the evil; they had no conception that the storm of hatred, once unleashed among the people, would engulf their thrones along with the altars, human authority along with the divine. After everything traditional had been destroyed in the flames of the Revolution it looked as if the last hour had struck for the Roman Papacy as well.

But the miraculous happened once again. The rock of Peter rides the storm of every century. The greatest and most mysterious feature of the history of the Church of Christ is that the periods of its deepest humiliation are also those of its greatest power and unconquerable strength. For the Church, death and the grave are symbols not of extinction but of resurrection. The catacombs of early times and the persecutions of the present day are but titles to fame. At the beginning of the modern era of Papal history the disturbances of the great schism and the secularization of thought brought forth the brilliant victory of the Catholic reformation and restoration. Between the exile of Avignon and that of Valence there was the rise and fall of 500 years. But this was not the end: even the humiliation of 1799 bore within itself the germ of another display of strength.

All great things are born in quietness and obscurity. As one stands on the Piazzetta in Venice and looks across the open lagoons the eye is held by the gloriously situated church of S. Giorgio Maggiore, the wonderful, fortress-like building of

Palladio. This island monastery was chosen by Providence to be the starting-point of a new era in the history of the Papacy. Here, welcomed with simple hospitality by the sons of St. Benedict, on December 1st of that year of misfortune, 1799, thirty-five Cardinals met for the election of a new representative of Christ. Their unobtrusive action was an important event in the history of the world.

On March 14th, 1800, Barnaba Chiaramonti, once a Benedictine of Monte Cassino, left the lonely island of S. Giorgio as the newly elected Pope Pius VII. He shared with his unfortunate predecessor not only the same Papal name and the same native town—for he, too, was born in Cesena—but also for long periods his bitter fate. Nevertheless, he succeeded in re-erecting the Holy See in Rome and in restoring and securing the ecclesiastical organization in France and Germany. The defenceless successor of the Galilean fisherman had won a lasting victory over the Terror of the Revolution and the tyranny of a world-conqueror. For Christ still walks with Peter on the waves, and for his successors the words still hold good: "*Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam, et portae inferi non praevallebunt adversus eam.*"