

THE
HISTORY OF THE POPES

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

DRAWN FROM THE SECRET ARCHIVES OF THE VATICAN AND OTHER
ORIGINAL SOURCES

FROM THE GERMAN OF THE LATE

LUDWIG, FREIHERR VON PASTOR

TRANSLATED BY
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VOLUME XXXVIII
CLEMENT XIV. (1769-1774)

LONDON
ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAN PAUL, LTD.
BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.
1951

Owing to production delays
 this book was not published
 until 1952

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CHAPTER I.

THE CONCLAVE OF 1769.

(1)

EVEN while Clement XIII. was still alive, the secular Powers had devoted more frequent and earnest attention to the next Papal election than was usual when a conclave was thought to be approaching. This was caused by the Pope's frequent illnesses, and the keenness of the envoys and Ministers was especially sharpened by the fear of another Cardinal of Jesuit leanings ascending the throne of St. Peter.

As soon as Clement XIII. knew himself to be in serious danger of death, in August 1765, Azpuru, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, asked his Minister, Grimaldi, for instructions for the next conclave.¹ As a basis for the requested instructions, Grimaldi called for reports on the various Cardinals from the ambassador himself and from Tanucci.² Whereas Tanucci included several Cardinals friendly to the Jesuits among those he mentioned with approval and for further details referred Grimaldi to the ex-ambassador, Roda, as being better informed,³ in Azpuru's report the attitude of the various Cardinals towards the Society of Jesus was of decisive importance in his appreciation of them.⁴ Similarly, in a contemporary "Plan for the Conclave", which very probably originated with the Spanish agent Azara⁵ and

¹ *On August 22, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4973.

² *To Azpuru, September 10, 1765, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 45; *to Tanucci, September 10, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6017.

³ *To Grimaldi, October 1, 1765, *ibid.*, 5994. Cf. *Tanucci to Grimaldi, November 12 and December 24, 1765, *ibid.*, 6097 and 6099.

⁴ **Ibid.*, 5012, and Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 104.

⁵ *Azara to Grimaldi, September 11, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012; *Tanucci to Centomani, June 7, 1766, *ibid.*, 5997.

contained descriptions of nineteen *Papabili*, it was stated in every instance whether or not the Cardinal in question was a supporter of the Jesuits.¹

On the French side, the secretary to the embassy, De la Houze, had transmitted as early as February 24th, 1764, a list of the Cardinals showing those to be favoured.² The same thing was done by the French envoy, Aubeterre, in August 1765, after the Pope had again fallen ill.³ According to Aubeterre, Cardinals Rezzonico, Castelli, De Rossi, Antonelli, and Bonaccorsi were definitely to be excluded, whereas Galli, Conti, Durini, and Ganganelli were worth considering, from France's point of view.⁴ Some weeks later, Aubeterre⁵ and the Neapolitan envoy Orsini deemed it advisable, to create the necessary impression, to have a common plan of action and to make an open declaration to the conclave. In this way, they thought, they could gather a number of Cardinals around themselves and influence the voting. Aubeterre's suggestion was that there was to be no talk of the Jesuits in this declaration and that it was to contain an assurance that the Powers were concerned only with the good of the Church. They had no intention of forcing a Pope on the Church; all they wanted was that a Pope should not be set up without reference to them. The joint action of the three Bourbon Powers and the strictest secrecy in which their dealings were to be wrapped had been agreed upon in advance at a meeting of the ambassadors.

Rumours of plans being formed by the Zealots caused them considerable agitation. To ensure one of their men obtaining

¹ *Piano per il Conclave, October 14, 1765, State Archives, Naples, Carte Farnesiane, 1554. It is said here of Cardinal Ferroni: "Trasportato per li Gesuiti non potra esser accetto alle corone." Cardinal Stoppani is characterized thus: "Non è affezionato nè contrario ai Gesuiti." "Sommamente è attaccato ai Gesuiti" is the accusation levelled against Cardinal Serbelloni.

² THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 167 seq.

³ To Praslin, August 28, 1765, *ibid.*, 169 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ To Praslin, September 18, 1765, *ibid.*, 170.

the triple crown, the rumour ran, they intended to bring about an election in the conclave before the arrival of the foreign Cardinals. Aubeterre apprised Orsini of the rumour and wanted to lodge a protest with the conclave, signed by all the Bourbon envoys, to the effect that neither France nor Spain would recognize a Pope elected before the arrival of their Cardinals. Orsini's way of thinking was less severe ; the mere promise, he thought, to await the coming of the foreign electors would be enough, at any rate for the moment ; this had satisfied Rochechouart when Benedict XIV. had died. But Aubeterre was not to be appeased so easily. It mattered little, he explained, if the person chosen was friendly to the Jesuits so long as he did not, like Clement XIII., value the Jesuit interest higher than that of the Courts. He did not want to make the Pope ; all that was needed was to form a party strong enough to exclude every Pope that was not agreeable to them. A hint of the possibility of financial loss would discourage several members of the opposite party, such as the younger Albani, who held an abbey in Sicily bringing him an income of 1,000 sequins.¹

Madrid, too, was disturbed by the supposed danger. Grimaldi instructed Azpuru to make every effort, in conjunction with Orsini and Aubeterre, to prevent a decision being taken before the arrival of the foreign Cardinals and to hold up the election of a member of the Rezzonico party, namely a defender of the fullest Papal powers in temporal as well as spiritual matters.² The Spanish ambassadors in Vienna³ and

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, December 20, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012. Tanucci ascribed this plan to the Jesuits (*to Orsini, December 28, 1765, *ibid.*, 5995).

² *To Azpuru, January 21, 1766, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 46 ; *to Orsini, January 21, 1766, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1035 ; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 6, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012 ; *Orsini to Grimaldi, February 6, 1766, State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*

³ *Grimaldi to Mahony, January 19, 1766, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3915.

Paris¹ were instructed to apprise the Governments there of the danger that was threatening. Tanucci also was informed by Grimaldi that his king desired a Pope who was independent of the Rezzonico party and was able to govern on his own, free from the direction of those who in their obstinacy and with their doctrines of the supremacy of Rome in temporal as well as spiritual matters were sowing discord between the visible head of the Church and the most pious and conscientious princes.² Tanucci, who had always encouraged the idea of the Bourbon Courts taking joint action,³ now ordered the Neapolitan envoy, in conjunction with the Spanish and French representatives, to work for the election of a candidate who was not an adherent of the Jesuit party.⁴

Choiseul, in Paris, took a definitely calmer view of the situation than the statesmen in Madrid and Naples. On February 12th, 1766, Aubeterre had written to tell him of his plan to prevent a precipitate election on the death of Clement XIII. by lodging a protest with the Camerlengo and with the heads of the three orders of Cardinals; if this proved inadequate, a formal protest would have to be made, which would be published in Rome as well as elsewhere.⁵ On the previous day, however, Choiseul had written to the Spanish envoy Magallon that he considered that the fear of a precipitate election before the arrival of the foreign Cardinals was groundless, since any attempt to bring this about would be defeated by the objections that would be made by the opposing party. To issue a formal declaration against such an election would be to threaten the Church with schism, and neither the French

¹ *Grimaldi to Magallon, January 20, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4563.

² *Grimaldi to Tanucci, January 22, 1766, *ibid.*, 6099.

³ *To Centomani, August 24 and December 27, 1765, January 4 and 18, 1766, *ibid.*, 5994, 5995, 5996; *to Orsini, September 7 and 14, 1765, and January 4, 1766, *ibid.*; *to Charles III., December 24, 1765, *ibid.*, 5995.

⁴ *To Orsini, February 8 and 15, 1766, *ibid.*, 5996.

⁵ Aubeterre to Choiseul, February 12, 1766, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 173, *seq.*

nor the Spanish king could desire that. France would favour whatever candidate was thought to be most worthy by Charles III.¹ A letter of similar purport was sent by Choiseul to Aubeterre,² and on the latter attempting to raise further objections³ he repeated his former instruction, that on no account was any protest to be made without the king's assent.⁴

In his letter to Magallon Choiseul had declared his readiness to win over the Viennese Cabinet to the league of the Bourbon princes,⁵ which, in view of Austria's prestige in the Catholic world and its influence in the College of Cardinals,⁶ would thus have been greatly strengthened. Steps towards this end were accordingly taken by the French representatives in Vienna.⁷ Grimaldi, acting through Mahony, had already made representations of a similar purport at the Imperial Court. There was no fear in Vienna of a precipitate election,⁸ nevertheless it was not averse from joining forces with the Bourbon Courts, for the disharmony between Versailles and Vienna at the previous conclave had resulted in an undesirable candidate ascending the Papal throne.⁹ Torrigiani above all was to be excluded, not only from the Papacy but also from the Secretaryship of State. Doubts arose as to who was to be Austria's confidential agent in the conclave. Choiseul suggested Alessandro Albani,¹⁰ but Tanucci and Aubeterre as well as the

¹ *To Magallon, February 11, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4563; *to Ossun, January 14, 1766, *ibid.*, 4686.

² On March 4, 1766, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 174 *seq.*

³ To Choiseul, March 19, 1766, *ibid.*, 176.

⁴ To Aubeterre, April 8, 1766, *ibid.*, 177.

⁵ See n. 1.

⁶ *Grimaldi to Magallon, January 20, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4563.

⁷ Choiseul to Aubeterre, March 4, 1766, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 176.

⁸ *Mahony to Grimaldi, February 22, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6502.

⁹ **Idem* to *idem*, February 26, 1766, *ibid.*, 5012.

¹⁰ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 176; *Choiseul to Ossun, March 4, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

Spanish Court were strongly prejudiced against him. Cardinal Rodt or Cardinal Migazzi would have been more welcome.¹

During Clement XIII.'s illness in 1765 the question of bringing influence to bear on the next Papal election was frequently discussed. It was thought that a sufficient number of votes to exclude an undesirable Cardinal would be obtainable.² To "make the Pope", however, to ensure the success of a desirable personality, a skilful and energetic member of the conclave was needed, and a person of this character was wanting.³ On the other hand, the opposing party was in a similar plight, for Carlo Rezzonico was no natural leader, while the Maggiordomo had had too little experience and did not enjoy the reputation of irreproachable morals.⁴ Cardinal Bernis had strongly disapproved of employing the unpopular method of formal exclusion, though Tanucci and the Spanish agent Azara warmly recommended it. Moreover, argued Azara, it was inexpedient to restrict exclusion to cases of extreme urgency, since a standing right of the Crowns ought not to be allowed to fall into disuse, and by its use the Cardinals could be kept in subjection. Cardinal Cavalchini, for example, had been particularly well disposed towards France since his exclusion by that Power in the last conclave. They must agree among themselves as to which Cardinals were to be excluded; according to Aubeterre's intimations, Antonelli, Castelli, and De Rossi were particularly undesirable in French eyes.⁵ To prevent an undesired election, Azara proposed another measure, which was approved by Tanucci⁶ and Grimaldi⁷: the Crown Cardinals were to lodge the objection

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 177; *Grimaldi to Mahony, April 21, 1766, *ibid.*; *Mahony to Grimaldi, April 21, 1766, *ibid.*; *Mahony to Grimaldi, May 21, 1766, *ibid.*, 6502.

² Cf. *Piano per il Conclave (see above, p. 2, n. 1).

³ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, July 22, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6099.

⁴ *Azara to Grimaldi, September 11, 1766, *ibid.*, 5012.

⁵ *Azara to Grimaldi, June 5, 1766, *ibid.*

⁶ *To Orsini, January 18, 1766, *ibid.*, 5996.

⁷ *Grimaldi to Azara, September 30, 1766, *ibid.*, 5012.

that before an election took place the moneys taken from the treasure of Sixtus V. at the time of the famine in 1764 must be restored.¹

All these deliberations were without immediate importance, since the Pope recovered his health. To satisfy Grimaldi² Azara subsequently reported from Rome on every incident, occasion for suspicion, and topic of conversation; in so doing he gave the freest expression to his distrust, which smelt out hidden Jesuit supporters everywhere, even in the person of Aubeterre himself.³ Full reports on the Cardinals created in 1766 were rendered by Azara and Centomani, with notes on each Cardinal's attitude towards the Jesuits.⁴ To Tanucci Grimaldi wrote⁵ that the future Papal election was not of importance for Spain, but that it certainly was for Naples and Parma. His king, therefore, would do all he could to ensure that the choice fell on a friendly Cardinal, who was hardly likely to be found in the Rezzonico party. The envoy in Paris, Fuentes, was instructed by Grimaldi to urge Choiseul to press for the speedy appointment of Crown Cardinals, so as to ensure the success in the conclave of the righteous projects of the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Madrid.⁶

When, on the death of Clement XIII., the conclave became

¹ *Azara to Grimaldi, September 11, 1766, *ibid.* Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI, 175. In a *list drawn up by Azara at this time the Cardinals, with their ages, are sorted into classes: very good, good, bad, very bad, negative, doubtful. The only one to be marked "very good" was Sersale of Naples; Ganganelli appears among the "good" ones (Cardinales actuales, undated, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 781). Azara's *report and Grimaldi's *letter to Roda, September 30, 1766, *ibid.*

² *To Azara, July 29, 1766, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Corresp. Azara-Grimaldi", 1766.

³ *To Grimaldi, October 2 and December 4, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4981, 5012.

⁴ *Informazioni sopra i 13 cardinali promossi li 26 Sett., State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1410.

⁵ *On September 30, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6099.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4976.

a matter of the most immediate concern, the representatives of the three Bourbon Powers met the very next evening and agreed to act in the closest concert pending the arrival of instructions from their Governments. Azpuru and Aubeterre were to visit the Cardinals to frighten them off the idea of holding the election before the arrival of the foreign Cardinals ; if it did come to that, the ambassadors would be forced to leave Rome. They also agreed not to make any definite pronouncement against an election which had been carried through, for in this way the Courts could make their recognition dependent on concessions.¹

In reporting these proposals to Choiseul, Aubeterre advised ² the exclusion from the pontificate of Cardinals Rezzonico, Torrigiani, Castelli, and Boschi as being representatives of the governmental principles of Clement XIII., Chigi and Bufalini on account of their relations with the Jesuits, and perhaps Fantuzzi also. One could not be quite certain of the other Cardinals either, as it was very difficult to discover their true opinion of the Society ; besides, once a Cardinal had become Pope he could change his way of thinking. Tanucci should send a strongly worded note to the Neapolitan Cardinals, and threats might be used against Lante, as he drew some revenue from France. To strengthen the party of the Courts, as many French Cardinals as possible should be sent to the conclave ; a precipitate election could then be prevented and perhaps a capitulation could be imposed on the candidate elected. The

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, February 3, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473. The dates mentioned in the rest of this chapter refer to the year 1769, unless otherwise stated.

² On February 6, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012 ; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 179 *seqq.* ; DANVILA Y COLLADA, III., 291 *seq.* Cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi [February 4], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Cartas confidentiales del Confesor del Rey ", 1769 ; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 6, Archives of Simancas, *loc. cit.* ; *Orsini to Grimaldi, February 6, *ibid.* ; *Orsini to Tanucci, February 7, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1769.

only condition necessary would be the suppression of the Jesuits; all other points could easily be added.

Aubeterre and Azpuru then visited all the Cardinals except the four who had been excluded. All declared their willingness to wait for the foreigners, some, in fact, stating that in the circumstances it was their duty to do so.¹ The Jesuit General Ricci also visited the Cardinals. According to Aubeterre's report he begged them with tears and sighs to hasten the election so as to secure a Pope favourable to the Jesuits.² Choiseul, however, remarked in his reply that Ricci's action had been kept within such bounds as to deserve neither complaint nor blame. Besides, since Clement's death the prestige of the Jesuits was no longer so important.³ Nevertheless, the ambassadors' fear of the Jesuits was so great that as soon as the Pope was dead they strengthened the guards at the embassies.⁴ The Roman people, on the other hand, remained much calmer during this interregnum than was usual on such occasions.⁵

(2)

On the afternoon of February 15th twenty-eight Cardinals went into conclave in the Vatican.⁶ Among them were Neri

¹ Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 9, DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 292 *seq.*; *Orsini to Tanucci, February 10, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473; *Erizzo to the Doge of Venice, February 11, State Archives, Venice, *Ambasciatore Roma*, 288; *Brunati to Colloredo, February 11, State Archives, Vienna.

² Aubeterre to Choiseul, February 15, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 183 *seq.*

³ To Aubeterre, March 14, CARAYON, XVII., 146.

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, February 3, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473; **idem* to *idem*, February 14, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, 1216; *Vettori to Sigismondo, February 9, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1473.

⁵ *Brunati to Colloredo, February 11, State Archives, Vienna.

⁶ Buonanici, the agent for Lucca, estimated the cost of the installation of the conclave and the nine-days' obsequies at 70,000 scudi, the daily outlay for the conclave at more than 20,000 scudi. *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX. (1897), 291.

Corsini and Stoppani, who despite their eighty-four and seventy-four years, wanted to play their parts in preventing the Jesuit party carrying through too speedy an election.¹ The rest of the Italian electors appeared during the next few weeks. The three German Cardinals had excused themselves from participating in the election on the score of old age or indisposition²; according to a report of the Spanish envoy in Vienna, Migazzi's indisposition was due to the appointment of Pozzobonelli instead of himself as the Austrian Government's confidential representative in the conclave.³

The promise to await the foreign Cardinals was to involve the conclave in severe trials. Only two of the six French Cardinals arrived, namely Bernis and De Luynes. On February 15th the banker Laborde had remitted Bernis two letters of credit for 130,000 *livres* to defray the cost of the journey,⁴ but five weeks went by before Bernis arrived in Rome and finally entered the conclave on March 25th.⁵ A far longer time was to pass before the Spaniards appeared.

Azpuru had announced⁶ their arrival for the end of March

¹ *Brunati to Colloredo, February 15, State Archives, Vienna.

² *Mahony to Grimaldi, March 22, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6505.

³ The empress did not credit Migazzi with the necessary prudence and the indifference towards the Jesuits which he had promised to display (THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 186 *seq.*). The whole "secret" which the confidential agent was supposed to keep consisted in the general instruction that a pious, learned, non-party man was to be elected (*Mahony to Grimaldi, March 22, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6505).

⁴ *Laborde to Bernis, February 15, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

⁵ *Centomani to Tanucci, March 24, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

⁶ To Almada, March 25, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Corresp. Almada-Azpuru", 1760-9; *Centomani to Tanucci, March 31, State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.* Aubeterre asserted even then that the two Cardinals were not to be expected before the latter half of April (*to Orsini, March 11, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{29}{1038}$).

or the beginning of April, but March went by without his even receiving word of their setting out. The courier bearing the news of Clement XIII.'s death had not reached Madrid till February 19th, and it was not till the 21st that Grimaldi informed Tanucci and Azpuru that the king deemed it expedient for the Spanish Cardinals to take part in the conclave. They were three in number, all of the bluest blood but of little talent or learning. One of them, the Archbishop of Toledo, was so decrepit that he could not be expected to live much longer, but the other two, the Patriarch of the Indies, La Cerda, and Solis, the Archbishop of Seville, could at any rate cast their votes in the balance.¹ On February 23rd Charles III. sent word to the two prelates to take the shorter route, by sea. Solis accordingly set off from Seville on March 1st and reached the port of Alicante on the 15th, where he embarked with his colleague on the 18th.² But alarmed by the storms that were blowing they turned back, preferring to travel to Rome by the less perilous route by land, which choice received the king's assent.³

Meanwhile, the conclavists were growing highly impatient,⁴ and when on April 13th there came, instead of the Cardinals themselves, the news that on March 30th they had resumed their journey by land, some of the electors were determined not to wait any longer. The French, however, declared that they would have to apply the exclusion to every candidate

¹ *To Tanucci, February 21, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102; **idem* to Azpuru, February 23, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 293 *seq.*

² *Solis to Grimaldi, March 1, 15, 18, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

³ *Solis and La Cerda to Grimaldi, March 23; *Grimaldi to Solis, March 25, *ibid.*

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 13, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Bernis to Choiseul, March 30, and to Aubeterre, April 13, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f.

who was chosen before the arrival of the Spaniards.¹ An assurance being given by the Spanish ambassador that the absentees would be present on May 1st or 2nd at the latest,² it was decided to wait still longer. La Cerda did, in fact, reach Rome on April 25th and entered the conclave on the afternoon of the 27th, to be followed on the 30th by Solis, who had arrived two days later.³

While the Spaniards were performing their journey the conclavists were consumed with boredom and impatience. More thought was applied to the problem of killing time, wrote Azpuru on February 25th, than to the election of a Pope, which was necessarily postponed indefinitely.⁴ It fell hard on the aged electors, wrote Bernis on April 19th,⁵ and perhaps even harder on the younger ones, to be cooped up so long in enforced idleness. The heat was beginning to make itself felt and it would be difficult to postpone the election for yet another month. Even if that did happen and an unlimited number of candidates were excluded, many of those friendly to the Governments might finally go over to the opposite party from sheer fatigue and set up a Pope who might be very unwelcome to the Courts. There had been conclaves which had lasted a half or a whole year, but then the parties were incessantly struggling for victory, whereas now they found themselves

¹ Buonamici, April 15, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX. (1897), 309: "On s'y est rendu sans beaucoup de murmure. Cette docilité prouve combien le sacré Collège craint de se compromettre avec les Couronnes." *Bernis to Choiseul, April 26, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*

² Buonamici, April 19, *loc. cit.*, 309.

³ *La Cerda and Solis to Grimaldi, April 27 and 30, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013; *Azpuru to the same, April 27, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108; **idem* to Tanucci, April 28, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 400/1145; *Pozzobonelli to Colloredo, April 29, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ *To Almada, February 25, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, "Corresp. Almada-Azpuru," 1760-9.

⁵ *To Choiseul, April 19, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

condemned to inactivity and on top of all the other troubles there was the tedium of idleness. There was general apprehension that the Courts wanted to restrict the freedom of the conclave too much, but this freedom was prized very jealously. The Spanish ambassador oscillated constantly between hope and fear.¹ On March 18th he thought that the news of the Spanish Cardinals' departure had banished all danger of an unforeseen election²; a month later his confidence was sadly diminished.³ In spite of all their difficulties, however, Bernis, Orsini, and Pozzobonelli came to an agreement on April 19th, by which the Lombard Cardinals were to be informed, through Alessandro Albani, that on no account was an election to take place before the arrival of the Spaniards.⁴ In the conclave, too, especially at its outset, there was a lively fear lest the Zealots might exclude the participation of the foreign Cardinals by a precipitate election. The Neapolitan representative, Orsini, who had been entrusted also with the representation of Spain and France pending the arrival of the foreigners,⁵ declared that there was no need to fear anything of the kind,⁶ and Azpuru considered that there was a sufficient number of

¹ *To Grimaldi, February 23 and March 2, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

² *To Mahony, March 18, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3903; *Montealegre, March 18, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5765. "Quedó acordado por todo el colegio esperarlos: más dócil para esto nunca se habrá visto el conclave, ni nunca con más miedo" (Azara to Roda, March 30, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 249).

³ *To Grimaldi, April 20, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

⁴ *Bernis to Aubeterre, April 19, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f.

⁵ *Brunati to Colloredo, February 18, State Archives, Vienna; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 9, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

⁶ *To Azpuru, February 21, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012; to Tanucci, February 21, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{200}{1035}$; *to Almada, February 25, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1504.

votes to frustrate any such attempt, which indeed might involve the whole Church in unforeseeable consequences. Nevertheless, until the middle of May complaints continued to be made that through their friends in the conclave the Jesuits were preparing a surprise.

To create a favourable atmosphere for Spain Orsini was empowered to inform the Sacred College that the Spanish king had suggested to Naples the postponement of the threatened occupation of Castro and Ronciglione and that the Cardinals and the future Pope were expected to appreciate this step and to meet the king's wishes by giving satisfaction to Parma and by suppressing the Jesuit Order.¹ Nor was there an absence of threats. Spain and France let it be understood that no election without the participation of the foreign Cardinals would be recognized by them, and if such an election were carried through the ambassadors would have to leave Rome.² The postponement of the election would also give them time to learn the attitudes of the various Cardinals.

(3)

The monotony and inactivity to which the Sacred College found itself condemned was broken by an event which Rome had not experienced for two and a half centuries. On the morning of March 15th, 1769, the Emperor Joseph II. made an unexpected entry into the city³ and was thus the first

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, February 21, Archives of the Spanish in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49; *Tanucci to Orsini, March 11, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{291}{1038}$.

² *Fuentes to Grimaldi, February 17, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4570; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, March 6, *ibid.*; **idem* to Tanucci, February 28, *ibid.*, Estado, 6102; *Aubeterre to Orsini, March 8, State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. "Instrumentum de introitu in Conclave", in THEINER, *Epistolae*, 340 *seqq.*; CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 123; CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *Clément XIV.*, 216 *seqq.*; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 203 *seqq.*; [BOERO] *Osservazioni*, II., 236; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 267 *seqq.*; MASSON, *Bernis*, 92; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 307 *seqq.*;

German Emperor to visit Rome since Charles V. He took up his quarters in the Villa Medici, where his brother, Leopold of Tuscany, had been residing since March 6th.¹ In spite of his incognito, the monarch, who travelled as the Count of Falkenstein and wore only the simple uniform of an officer with no decorations to indicate his exalted rank, was recognized immediately, and wherever he showed himself was acclaimed with rousing cheers by the populace. Accompanied by his brother, he visited the churches and chief sights in the city of the Apostles, showed a keen interest in the monuments of art, and gave generous alms to charitable institutions, the organization of which he had explained to him in detail.² His reverent attitude at divine service aroused the admiration of the Romans, especially when on Maundy Thursday he received Easter Communion in S. Lorenzo in Lucina, the parish church of his residence, along with the common people.³ The prince not only edified the people with his piety and condescension but delighted the great ones and those in superior positions with his refined amiability. The races and sumptuous entertainments organized by the Roman aristocracy and the ambassadors in honour of the royal guests, the illumination of St. Peter's at Eastertide, the Girandola,

ROUSSEAU, I., 281 *seqq.*; DEL PINTO, in *Rivista d'Italia*, XII., 2, Roma, 1909, 911 *seqq.*; DENGEL, in *Jahrbuch der österr. Leo-Gesellschaft*, 1926, 36 *seqq.*; C. MARIANI, *Il viaggio di Giuseppe II. a Roma*, Lanciani, 1908; *Ragguaglio o sia giornale della venuta e permanenza in Roma della S. M. Cesareo Giuseppe II. nel mese di marzo 1769*, Roma, 1769; *Per l'arrivo felicissimo in Roma di due principi illustri. Componimenti poetici* [Roma, 1769]; O. HARNACK, *Kunstleben*, 4.

¹ *Brunati to Colloredo, March 8, State Archives, Vienna.

² **Idem* to *idem*, March 11 and 15, *ibid.*; *Orsini to Tanucci, March 15, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

³ *Centomani to Tanucci, March 24, *ibid.*; *Foglio di nuove*, March 24, 1769, *ibid.*; *Albani to Colloredo, March 25, State Archives, Vienna; Buonamici, on March 25, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, *loc. cit.*, 300; Joseph II. to Maria Theresa, March 25, 1769, in ARNETH, *Korrespondenz*, I., 248.

and so forth, engaged the attention of the Romans to such an extent that even their interest in the Papal election receded completely into the background.¹

On the day after his arrival the emperor, attended by his brother, visited the conclave, where he was received by all the Cardinals present. When, on entering, he was about to lay aside his sword, Stoppani invited him to retain it in his capacity of the Church's protector. Conducted by some of the prelates, the two brothers visited the Pauline and Sistine Chapels and made close inquiries into the electoral procedure and the manner of proclaiming the new Pope.² In the conversation that ensued Joseph II. treated the Cardinals with exquisite politeness and asked how long they expected to remain in conclave. On being told that the previous one had lasted two months and the one before that six months, he remarked that if another Benedict XIV. were elected, even a year would not be too long. On being asked by some of the Cardinals if he would take the Church and its future Head under his protection he replied, "You can see to that better than I, by choosing a man who understands the saying '*Ne quid nimis*' and doesn't carry things to extremes." The Pope, who in the spiritual sphere was infallible and wielded absolute power, was not to strive after its extension into the temporary sphere of other States; especially when dealing

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, March 24, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504. A pen-and-ink drawing in the Galleria Doria in Rome shows the courtyard of the Palazzo Doria converted into a ballroom by the architect Nicoletto in Joseph II.'s honour. The Pope had a copy made of Batoni's portrait of the two princes (*Kaunitz to Colloredo, July 14, 1769, State Archives, Vienna).

² "Instrumentum", in THEINER, *Epist.*, 340 *seqq.*; *Orsini to Tanucci, March 17, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 204 *seq.*; *Foglio di nuove*, March 17, *loc. cit.*; *Brunati to Colloredo, March 18, State Archives, Vienna; *Albani to Colloredo, March 15 and 18, *ibid.*; Buonamici, March 18, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 298.

with princes ought he to use it with due consideration and in a befitting manner.¹

Of far greater moment was the conversation between Joseph II. and the French ambassador Aubeterre. The chief topics dealt with were the alliance with France, and Rome and the Jesuits. Regarding the Jesuits, the monarch said that his mother was very pious and would consequently take no step to bring about their suppression but would leave everything to the decision of the Church ; on the other hand, she would do nothing to oppose it, rather would she greet it with joy. He himself had no other thoughts on the matter. Of the treasonable activities of these Religious, especially in Spain, he seemed to be fully convinced.² Aubeterre claimed to have heard from the emperor himself that when visiting the church " al Gesù " he put the question to Ricci, " When will you lay aside this dress ? " To which the General, clearly confused, replied that the times were bad indeed but that he trusted in God's mercy and—he is said to have added—in the infallibility of the Pope, who, if the Society were destroyed, would be destroyed along with it—an allusion to the ratifications which the Institute had received from so many Popes. When viewing the statue of St. Ignatius, which was of solid silver and adorned with precious stones, the Emperor spoke regretfully of its cost, whereupon Ricci remarked that they had good friends to thank for it. " You mean the profits from the Indies," suggested the emperor.³

¹ Orsini to Tanucci, March 17, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 205 ; Azara to Roda, March 23, 1769, *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 242 *seqq.*

² The emperor's opinion of the Jesuits as expressed to Count Papini and Mgr Garampi make it unlikely that he spoke about them in this way. Cf. DENGEL, *loc. cit.*, 43, 77 *seq.*

³ Aubeterre to Choiseul, March 31, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 206 *seqq.* Aubeterre's report to Bernis, of March 28 [1769], in CARAYON, XVII., 147, is shorter and less coloured. The emperor's conversation with Aubeterre is reproduced by the Spanish agent Azara in a similar fashion, but there is no mention of the story of the silver statue (*Azara to Grimaldi, March 30, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Cartas confid. del

In a conversation with the Spanish ambassador Azpuru, Joseph II. expressed his contempt for the Cardinals in conclave. There was so little to choose between them that the election might just as well be made by drawing lots. A reference being made to the suppression of the Jesuits, Azpuru, speaking of them as the "Blacks", defended the action of his Court, whereupon the emperor assured him that doubtless the king had good reason for the expulsion and he indulged in praises of his honesty and piety. From the two conversations Azpuru gained the conviction that the emperor would welcome the suppression, although the Jesuits set high hopes on him and his mother.¹

One of the persons who saw and heard what happened at the Gesù was Giulio Cordara. According to his report, which, it is true, was composed many years after the event, the Jesuit General, when the altar of St. Ignatius was being inspected, earnestly begged the monarch for his protection of the Society, so that it might be saved from the destruction with which it was being threatened on every side. The monarch is said to have answered half-ironically, half-accusingly, "There is no need for your request. See to it yourselves that a Pope is chosen who is well disposed towards you and all will be well. On the other hand, if one is elected who is ill-disposed towards you, and intends to destroy you, what can I do to stop it? Don't you teach and preach to all

Confessor del Rey"; Azara to Roda, March 30, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 247 *seqq.*). Cf. DENGEL, *loc. cit.*, 65. According to hearsay, Zambeccari reported from Bologna to Madrid that in Rome the emperor's support had been enlisted on behalf of the Jesuits, who, to win his favour, had given him two million sequins (!) and his brother Leopold another large sum of money. According to the same report the emperor told Count Papini that as the Jesuits in Germany were decent people they were not thinking of any reform. *Zambeccari to Grimaldi, March 25, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4734.

¹ Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 30, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

the world that the Pope is infallible and wields the highest power on earth? ”¹

When revisiting St. Peter's on Easter Monday, March 27th, the emperor expressed the wish to see some of the Cardinals who had just arrived, especially Bernis and Sersale. The former he complimented as the author of the happy alliance between Austria and France.² To the latter, of whom he had already spoken favourably in Bologna,³ he is said to have remarked, with reference to his intended election, that he thought he saw in his face a ray of grace from the Holy Spirit.⁴ According to another version he expressed himself far more prosaically: “ I am now going to Naples, where I shall bring the news that Your Eminence will not be returning there.”⁵

An indication of the young monarch's attitude towards the situation is the statement he made to his confessor on taking leave of him before setting out for Italy—that the new Pope would dissolve the Society of Jesus and that he himself was neutral in the matter.⁶ The nuncio Visconti had already reported to the Cardinal Secretary of State on January 2nd, 1769, that the emperor seemed not too well disposed towards the Jesuits and that he had given the following advice to the Jesuit Parhamer: “ It would be far better, Father, if you

¹ *I. C. Cordaræ di profectioe Pii VII. ad aulam Vindobonensem eiusque causis atque exitu*, ed. Boero (1855). The passage is also reprinted in [BOERO], *Osservazioni*, II.², 236 seq.

² *Bernis to Choiseul, March 30 (draft), in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

³ *Zambeccari to Grimaldi, March 18, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4734.

⁴ “. . . a Sersale, con gracia le decia, que veia en su semblante un no sé qué de gracia del Espíritu Santo.” Azara to Roda, March 30, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 249.

⁵ Buonamici on March 29, *loc. cit.*, 303. “ *Al Card. Sersale augurò di non dover tornare in Napoli ” (Orsini to Tanucci, March 28, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504).

⁶ ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, IX., 38; *Silva to Garampi, March 27, Nunziat. di Germania, 389, Papal Secret Archives.

Jesuits were to consider the dissolution of your Order yourselves in good time, for you will certainly not survive the next conclave and you will be forced to take this step, which you could now anticipate in a manner profitable and honourable to yourselves." ¹

Highly gratified by the honourable reception which had been given to her sons in Rome, Maria Theresa expressed her thanks to the Cardinals through the nuncio,² and afterwards renewed them in a letter from herself to the conclave.³

(4)

While the delayed arrival of the Spanish Cardinals was making it impossible for the conclave to elect a Pope, the Bourbon Courts exerted themselves all the more eagerly to obtain one that suited their demands. In this matter France abstained from any policy of its own. Choiseul was bent on preserving and strengthening the alliance with Spain, and joint action with Charles III. in the matter of the Jesuits seemed likely to draw the bonds still closer.⁴ On February 21st, 1769, Choiseul empowered his envoy in Madrid to make the appropriate statements that the instruction had been sent to Luynes and Bernis in Rome to act in complete conformity with the Spanish and Neapolitan prelates so as to procure the tiara for the candidate considered most worthy by the Catholic king.⁵ There could be no doubt about the attitude Tanucci

¹ *Visconti to Torrigiani, January 2, Cifra, *ibid.*, 392.

² *Visconti to Garampi, March 25, *ibid.*, 389.

³ THEINER, *Epistolae*, 342 *seq.*; *Mahony to Grimaldi, April 12, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6505.

⁴ MASSON, 81.

⁵ *To Ossun, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49. " *Aunque considero sumamente importante el encargo que S.M.C. hace a sus dos Cardenales que pueden asistir al Conclave, me parece aun más importante y sin duda más apreciable el que a su Embajador y Cardenales los someta tan absolutamente a la voluntad de nuestro Rey" (Osma to Grimaldi, March 7, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012).

would adopt¹; the Neapolitan envoy in Rome, Cardinal Orsini, was instructed to co-operate with Azpuru and the Bourbon ambassadors.²

Once again the Bourbons laid great weight on Austria's entry into their league.³ As for the burning question of the Jesuits, Maria Theresa and Joseph II. had stated more than once that they had no grounds for complaint against them.⁴ In a memorandum of March 1768 the young emperor had observed that in Austria there was no cause for desiring their suppression nor any reason for championing their preservation.⁵ On the other hand, the view was often held in Governmental circles in Vienna that Aranda's sole purpose in driving out the Jesuits was to free the State from ecclesiastical oppression,⁶ and the curtailment of ecclesiastical power was desirable.⁷ In addition, the empress considered herself to be under an obligation to the Bourbons. Her second son, Leopold of Tuscany, had married a daughter of Charles III., her daughters Maria Karoline and Maria Amalia were betrothed to the young King of Naples and the Duke of Parma in 1768 and 1769, and it was hoped to open negotiations for the betrothal of her

*Choiseul to Fuentes, March 4, *ibid.*, 4570; to the same, March 14, in CARAYON, XVII., 144; *to Ossun, March 21, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

¹ *Order to Orsini, of March 7, to follow the instructions of the Spanish king; Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6008; to *Castromonte, March 11, *ibid.*

² *Tanucci to Grimaldi, February 14, *ibid.*, 6007; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 294.

³ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 297.

⁴ *Report by Cardinal Borromeo, of May 9, Nunziat. di Germania, Papal Secret Archives; *Visconti to Torrigiani, January 21 and March 3, 1768, and January 2, 1769, Cifre, *ibid.*

⁵ ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, IX., 28.

⁶ *Silva to Garampi, April 20, Nunziat. di Germania, 389, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Tanucci to Grimaldi, April 4, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102. Cf. DUHR, in the *Stimmen der Zeit*, CX. (1925), 213, n. 4.

youngest daughter, Maria Antonia (Marie Antoinette), with the French Dauphin.

The ground was thus prepared in Vienna for the fulfilment of the Bourbon desires. On February 23rd Mahony, the Spanish envoy in Vienna, had to inform the Government there that Charles III. desired as Pope a man with a veneration of piety and learning but no inclination to extend the power of the Curia at the expense of the legitimate powers of princes. Above all, the person in question was not to allow himself to be ruled by the Jesuits but to deal justly and impartially with the monarchs who had driven them away. It was to be assumed, he added, that the Austrian Court had the same desires, either for the sake of pleasing the other Courts or because of its indifference towards the Jesuits. Accordingly, it was the king's desire that each Court should forthwith send as many Cardinals as possible to the conclave to ensure a majority there. Further, corresponding instructions should be sent to the envoys in Rome to prevent an over-hasty election and to give the Church a pacific Pope.¹

The Court of Vienna replied through its ambassadors in Madrid and Paris that it had no particular person in view as the future Pope. Its only desire was that he should be a man of "good principles" and not an immunist. Regarding the Jesuits, their Majesties were indifferent. None of the three German Cardinals would be going to Rome.² Pallavicini had been selected as envoy to the conclave, but he was soon replaced by the Neapolitan ambassador, Ernst von Kaunitz-Rittberg, the eldest son of the chancellor.³ Azpuru had

¹ *Grimaldi to Mahony, February 23, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

² *Grimaldi to Azpuru, March 14, *ibid.* *Fuentes to Grimaldi, March 17, *ibid.*; *Du Tillot to Azara, in March, Exped. "Parma", *ibid.*; *Tanucci to Centomani, March 14, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1736.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 30, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; ARNETH, *Korrespondenz*, I., 245. Documents and letters from this embassy in the Fürstl. Metternichsches Familienarchiv in Pless, III., 4, fascicule

received instructions to sound the envoy on his attitude to the Jesuits and then to treat him with confidence or caution as the case required.¹ A letter of Mahony's to Grimaldi provides further information about the neutrality of the Viennese Court in the Jesuit affair. There were good grounds, he writes, for supposing that the suppression would be welcomed by the emperor and his Ministers, but that the empress had not yet entirely rid herself of her hereditary attachment to the Order. For some months, however, she had been firmly convinced that the Catholic Courts had not ejected these Religious without weighty reasons. The policy of neutrality towards them had its advantages: if Rome refused to suppress them, one spared oneself the mortification of a rejected request; if they were suppressed, one reaped the fruits of the labour of others without exerting oneself.² The empress's opinion of Clement XIII. was that with all his piety he had been too rigid and scrupulous. Out of consideration for the Bourbon Courts she would like a Pope who had not been taken from the Jesuit party, who had a knowledge of the world, and was conversant with conditions outside Italy. However, they would make no conditions in advance for the election but would urge their just claims after the event.³

In accordance with these declarations of the Court of Vienna its confidential representative at the conclave, Cardinal Pozzobonelli,⁴ and Kaunitz,⁵ its envoy, received only a general instruction not to recommend anyone's election and not to

22, No. 95. *Relazione delle udienze pubbliche che le mattine de' 27 e 30 d'Aprile 1769 ebbe dal s. Collegio in conclave S. E. il Sign. C. del S. R. I. Ernesto de Kaunitz-Rittberg*, Roma, 1769.

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, March 14, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

² *On March 22, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6505; DUHR, in the *Zeitschr. f. kath. Theologie*, XXII. (1898), 443.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 187.

⁴ *Azara to Grimaldi, April 6, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4977.

⁵ *Tanucci to Orsini, April 4, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

exclude anyone openly but to co-operate throughout with the Bourbon party. Choiseul and Fuentes had already forwarded the imperial envoy their list of candidates for the tiara.¹

Sardinia also adopted a neutral attitude in the Jesuit question, which information was conveyed by the Abbate Montagnini, the Sardinian *chargé d'affaires* in Vienna, to the nuncio there.²

There could be no doubt about Portugal's attitude in the matter.³ When the courier Uslenghi reached Lisbon with the news of the death of Clement XIII. he was kept in Pombal's palace for two days without being allowed to speak to anyone; the reason for this, it was explained to him, was that the king, who happened to be away in the country, had to be the first to announce the news.⁴ In a letter of condolence to the conclave Joseph I. spoke of his longing to see St. Peter's chair occupied by one who with his piety would put an end to the troubles which had been apparent for some years past and which were sorely grieving his royal heart.⁵ An explanation of these indefinite phrases may be found in a letter from the Portuguese queen, Mariana Victoria, to her brother, Charles III. of Spain, who had informed her of the Pope's death and had added his views on the conclave. The sister replied ⁶ that the court of Lisbon shared his wish that the choice should not

¹ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, March 17. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 188.

³ Cf. Aubeterre to Bernis, April 9, in CARAYON, XVII., 153.

⁴ Buonamici's report in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 307. Saldanha excused his absence on health grounds.

⁵ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 302 *seq.* *Orsini to Almada, April 8, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

⁶ *On March 5: "Y yo tonta y ignorantemente digo, que me acuso, que no la consiento en nadie, si no se diere palabra de extinguir la Compañía, porque sin eso puede parecer que no es jesuita o fingirlo, y después serlo y quedamos como antes." Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 303. Cf. the queen's *letters to Charles III., of February 20 and 26 and March 14, 23, and 28. Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7297.

fall on a " Jesuit " ; if it did, as he rightly observed, all was lost. Under a Jesuit Pope the arrogance and ferocity of the Order would grow so great that the Church would suffer grievous injury and no prince's life would be safe. The *esclusiva* was hardly a safeguard against this danger, since in the last conclave Cavalchini had been excluded and in his stead Rezzonico had been kept, who was a creature of the Jesuits and a professed member of their Order. Her husband had had a secret instruction drawn up for all his envoys, so as to acquaint them with the spirit of the Roman Court. She enclosed a copy of it, asking him not to let it leave his hands. In the opinion of the Spanish king a war with one of the great European Powers would be less harmful than a Papal election that would bring an open or secret Jesuit to the throne of St. Peter. As it was desired that this interest of the three Courts should become the common cause of all the Catholic Powers, Almada was to leave Venice for Rome, where he was to occupy himself with the election in conjunction with the Bourbon envoys. She herself would not bestow her approval on any candidate who would not pledge his word to abolish the Society of Jesus. Without this promise a secret Jesuit might come to power and then the Catholic Powers would be in the same situation as before.¹

The secret instruction of which the queen speaks betrays clearly in its twenty points the hand of Pombal. After bombastic declamations against the corruption of the Jesuits, which had existed from the start, and against the pride and boundless tyranny of the Roman Court, the demand was made that the future Pope was not to be taken from the College of Cardinals, as this was largely composed of Jesuit tertiaries. The first condition to be imposed upon him was the suppression of the Society of Jesus. The Portuguese envoy brought the gist of this instruction to the knowledge of Tanucci, but

¹ " *Instrução sobre la morte do Papa Clemente XIII. que se deve participar a todos os ministros de S. M. Fidelissima nas Cortes de Europa," March [5], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49. Cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi on May 4, *ibid.*, Registro 108.

received only the reply that Naples would co-operate with the other two Bourbon Courts.¹

In the strictest confidence Grimaldi forwarded the secret instruction and the queen's letter to Azpuru, with the observation that the extravagant proposals might be turned to profit if something of them was quietly brought to the knowledge of the Cardinals, so as to intimidate them.

After the break between Lisbon and Rome, Almada, the Portuguese ambassador to Rome, had finally come to rest in Venice. He now made inquiries of Orsini if he could come to Rome,² for without definite instructions from his Court he dared not leave Venice.³ It was intimated to him that for this purpose he needed a letter of credence.⁴ The ambassadors were clearly apprehensive lest the turbulent behaviour of this unruly character might involve them in fresh complications,⁵ but finally the prospect of having him as an ally gained the day.⁶ On April 30th, 1769, he arrived in Rome and presented his credentials to Cardinal Corsini. His instructions were to take his cue from the Spanish and French ambassadors and to work with them to obtain satisfaction for Parma and the suppression of the Jesuits.⁷ Aubeterre expected little help from him.⁸

¹ *Tanucci to Charles III., March 14, *ibid.*, Reales Ordenes, 49.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 23, *ibid.*, Registro, 108.

³ *Almada to Azpuru, February 25, Exped. "Corresp. Almada-Azpuru" 1760-9, *ibid.*

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 23, *ibid.*, Registro, 108.

⁵ " *Almada non è soggetto da conciliarsi l'altrui stima." Erizzo to the Doge of Venice, August 19, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288.

⁶ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 30, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

⁷ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, April 24, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4570; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 4, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108; *Azpuru to Solis, May 5, Exped. "Conclave 1769", *ibid.*

⁸ In CARAYON, XVII., 182.

(5)

For the Bourbon Powers the coming election was not primarily a question of personalities. What was desired was not the election of this or that Cardinal but a complete change in the policy of the Holy See, no matter who was chosen. "It would be a danger to religion and the centre of unity," wrote Choiseul to Bernis on April 10th, 1769,¹ "if the throne of St. Peter was occupied by a Pope with the principles of Clement XIII. and with a Minister such as Torrigiani. It is not everyone who thinks as I do on this matter, and the fanatical opponents of the Roman Curia, who in my opinion are as much to be feared as the Jesuits, regret Torrigiani's departure and would have liked Clement XIII. to have reigned another ten years, for, had this happened, a schism or even the destruction of the temporal supremacy of the Pope would have been more than likely. There is no question but that the Pope must be a man who understands the spirit of the Courts and of our age, which is entirely different from that of last century. He must be a man who while maintaining the dignity and the appearance of power tries to adapt himself to circumstances. . . . One is entitled to expect that the rule of the next Pope will inaugurate a memorable epoch in Catholicism. But if he follows the old Roman principles there is no hope for it."

The task in hand, therefore, was to find a man of the requisite pliability, but this was not so easy. The statement made in a broadsheet of the time that every one of the Cardinals was either openly or secretly smeared with Jesuit blacking² may have been an exaggeration, but it was true that the Society of Jesus had many ardent admirers and very few enemies in the Sacred College.³ "There is hardly a single wearer of the purple who is not attached to them, if not actually dependent on them," was the opinion of the former

¹ MASSON, 96.

² **Foglio di nuove*, March 21, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 153.

ambassador Roda.¹ Bernis wrote, a week after he had entered the conclave, "It is easy to foresee the difficulties of our negotiations on a stage where three-quarters of the players are not on our side."² Of the forty-three Cardinals sitting in conclave on April 25th, Aubeterre designated twenty-five who either openly or circuitously would have to be excluded on account of their excessive liking for the Jesuits.³

The Governments' awareness of these difficulties is to be seen from the instructions they sent to their Roman envoys on how to influence the conclave. Paris thought it best to allow Spain to take the lead in this matter, as was expressly stated by Choiseul through his envoy in Madrid.⁴ In the instruction sent to Cardinals Luynes and Bernis they were told to adhere firmly to the former standpoint regarding Parma; France's immediate concern was to secure its possession of Avignon and Venaissin. For the coming election the guiding principle was: on no account another Clement XIII., wherefore Torrigiani, Boschi, Bonaccorsi, and Castelli were to be excluded. The bark of Peter must have a steersman who was enlightened enough to see that he must proceed in complete agreement with the Catholic princes, wise enough to avoid unpremeditated actions arising from imprudent zeal, and intelligent enough to regulate his conduct by the principles of moderation, prudence, and benignity. As Spain wanted as Pope the Archbishop of Naples, Sersale, the King of France also desired to use all his prestige for the fulfilment of this aim, and the Cardinals were to exert themselves to the utmost to see that this election took place.⁵

Everything therefore depended on Spain. In his instruction

¹ *To Grimaldi, February 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

² RAVIGNAN, I., 240.

³ *Ibid.* " *Me dicen que se han descubierto en el Conclave 33 Cardenales jesuitas: si es así, è por qual milagro escaparemos a que sea uno de ellos Papa? " Du Tillot to Azara, April 15, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Parma ".

⁴ *Choiseul to Ossun, February 21, *ibid.*, Reales Ordenes, 49.

⁵ RAVIGNAN, II., 363 *seqq.*

of March 7th, 1769, Grimaldi renewed the demand for satisfaction for Parma, which, however, might be moderated now that Clement XIII. was dead, and the further demand for the suppression of the Jesuits, which must be insisted on at all costs. It might be advisable for the conclave to pass a resolution binding the future Pope to grant these two demands, but in view of the strength of the opposing party, it was left to the envoys of the three Powers to decide as to the expediency of such a proposal.¹

That the proposal was to be adopted only in favourable conditions was stressed by Choiseul on March 21st, when he forwarded the Spanish instruction to Aubeterre as a guide for the French Cardinals. He was principally concerned with Avignon and Venaissin.² Grimaldi also wrote to Tanucci that his royal master would be pleased if the suppression of the Society of Jesus were to come from the conclave, but he was not blind to the difficulty of such an undertaking, as all Rome was flooded with creatures of the Jesuits. Conditions could be made after the formation of a party sufficiently strong to use the *esclusiva*, but this was just where the difficulty lay. Apart from this, Charles III. was definitely resolved to treat about the suppression only and to drop the Parma affair for the moment, as it was impossible to press both matters simultaneously with the necessary vigour. To supplement his former instruction Grimaldi informed Azpuru also of the royal command.³

Further correspondence of the Spanish statesmen throws more light on their instructions. The demand for the suppression of the Jesuits, wrote Grimaldi on February 23rd, was

¹ *To Azpuru, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 23, *ibid.*, Registro, 108; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 217 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 304 *seq.*

² *To Aubeterre, March 21, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 219; *Choiseul to Ossun, March 21, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

³ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, March 14, *ibid.*, Reales Ordenes, 49.

rightly timed for the last days of Clement XIII. The new Pope would find that the matter had already been broached, so that he would have to attend to it at once.¹ A memorandum from Roda recommended Sersale as the future Pope, but admitted that his attitude of indifference towards the Jesuits and the far from friendly feelings towards Rome that he had displayed on certain occasions rendered him unsuitable to the majority. What they wanted, he said, was a Pope who would protect the alleged rights and the unlimited power of the Roman Court and simultaneously, of course, the Society of Jesus. Ganganelli was ranked third by Roda.² No less than ten Cardinals were named by him to be excluded.³ In his view the only enlightened Pope of recent times was Benedict XIV.

Roda wanted the future Pope to be "learned, prudent, moderate, experienced in affairs, and non-party", while Grimaldi demanded one who possessed "equanimity, learning, prudence, and virtue".⁴ Similar expressions are to be found in all the edicts issued by the Courts at this period, it being always understood that a Pope possessing these qualities would be ready to fall in with the wishes of the Governments.

The possibility of rumours about the Governments' plans leaking out beyond the circles of the initiated had to be taken into account. Orsini wrote to Aubeterre on February 19th that his answer to all questions on this topic was that the princes did not want to make the Pope but that he was not to be made without them or in spite of them. On the subject of Sersale (whose candidature, according to hearsay, was eagerly promoted by Orsini himself) he answered all inquiries with a laugh, without further explanation. He would speak

¹ *To Fuentes, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4570 ; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 296 *seq.*

² Reprinted in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 297.

³ Lante, Serbelloni, De Rossi, Torrigiani, Colonna, Bufalini, Castelli, Bonaccorsi, Chigi, Boschi.

⁴ *To Fuentes, February 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4570 ; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 296 *seq.*

out in his own time, he said, if a candidate was nominated to whom he could give his assent.¹

(6)

The assurance that they had no desire to make the Pope was continually recurring in the statements of the Governments and ambassadors of this epoch. How much was meant by it may be discovered in the lists in which they voiced their opinions of the various Cardinals. One such list, of a provisional nature, was sent to Paris by Grimaldi on February 23rd²; an amended version, based on more recent reports, was sent to Fuentes and the allied Courts on February 27th,³ and to Azpuru on the 28th,⁴ reaching his hands on March 15th. The Cardinals were divided into four classes, Azpuru's list having five. The first of these five divisions contained eleven "good" Cardinals, headed by the "very good" Sersale. The second and third divisions were composed of six "very bad" and fifteen "bad"; the very bad, namely Torrigiani, Castelli, Bonaccorsi, Chigi, Boschi, and Rezzonico, were to be disposed of, if necessary, by the open as well as the silent *esclusiva*, the bad ones by the silent *esclusiva* only. The fourth class contained three "doubtful" Cardinals, the fifth eight "negative" or "indifferent" ones. Three of the eleven good ones were withdrawn by Tanucci, who described Caracciolo and Pirelli as bad, while Ganganelli, he said, had been described in several letters as a Jesuit. On February 28th Grimaldi sent together with his list six forms for the exclusion of the "very bad", on April 4th he sent three more for Fantuzzi, Bufalini,

¹ CARAYON, XVII., 143 *seq.*; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 190; *Orsini to Azpuru, February 21, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

² *To Fuentes, *ibid.*, Estado, 4570; *to Azpuru, February 23, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

³ *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012. Vienna also received the list. *Fuentes to Grimaldi, March 17, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

⁴ *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013. Text of the list, *ibid.*, 5012; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

and Paracciani, and on May 9th another one for Stoppani. On April 11th he had forwarded some blank forms for all whom the Bourbon representatives wanted to exclude.¹

Choiseul had several observations to make on Grimaldi's list.² Of the eleven names in the first class he deleted the three Cardinals who were over eighty years old—Cavalchini, Neri Corsini, and Conti—and those whom he considered to be too young—Negroni, Andrea Corsini, and Caracciolo—although he designated the last-mentioned as very good, apart from his age. Branciforte also would have had his approval, but he had no prospects. To Durini objections were raised by France. Of the eleven names, therefore, only three were left: Sersale, Ganganelli, noted by Choiseul as "very good", and Pirelli, noted as "good". And as the Cardinals in the conclave refused to have Sersale or Pirelli, the only possible candidate left was Ganganelli. In the third class of "doubtfuls" Choiseul noted against the names of Stoppani and Serbelloni that if either of them became Pope he would have to have Pallavicini as his Secretary of State. In the fourth class Choiseul gave Cardinal Perelli the note "good", whereas Tanucci had described him as "bad".

In his correspondence with the ambassadors Choiseul expressed still more of his opinion on some of the Cardinals. Ganganelli, he wrote to Fuentes, was neither a Jesuit, as he had been called, nor a friend of the Jesuits; French opinion was firmly convinced on this point. Tanucci had designated all the Neapolitan Cardinals with the exception of Sersale as "bad", but in France there were other views on the subject.³ To Aubeterre also Choiseul⁴ expressed his disagreement with Tanucci's judgment on Ganganelli and Caracciolo. Of all the

¹ *To Azpuru, February 28 and April 4, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *to Azpuru, May 9, *ibid.*, Reales Ordenes, 49; on April 11, *ibid.*

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 210.

³ CARAYON, XVII., 144; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 200 *seq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 209 *seq.*

⁴ On March 14, CARAYON, XVII., 145 *seq.*; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 201 *seq.*

members of the Sacred College Ganganelli was the least favourably inclined towards the Jesuits and during the last pontificate had had to endure what amounted to a series of persecutions. Even now he was opposed by a very strong party, and the Jesuits would certainly make great efforts to thwart his election if ever there was any question of it.

Not only Choiseul but also the French and Spanish representatives in Rome raised objections to Grimaldi's list. The number of "good" Cardinals was too small; after those who stood no chance on practical grounds had been removed there were only two or three left; it was suggested that Perelli, Pozzobonelli, Malvezzi, and Stoppani be added to them. They did not agree with the objection to Ganganelli and Caracciolo. Apart from Chigi there was little danger of any of the six excluded Cardinals being elected; but Bufalini, Paracciani, and Fantuzzi ought to be added to them. Moreover, after the arrival of the foreign Cardinals there would be no need to use the open *esclusiva*, but if it was necessary there should be no shrinking from using it repeatedly. If in spite of this one of the excluded candidates was elected or if an elevation to the Papacy took place before the arrival of the foreign Cardinals, the ambassadors would leave Rome without acknowledging the chosen candidate.¹ Before entering the conclave Bernis had had a talk with Orsini, in the course of which he too had said that the number of eligible candidates in Grimaldi's list was too small.² Tanucci was of the same opinion.³

As a result of these representations a fresh instruction was issued by Madrid on the attitude to be adopted by the Spanish envoy in the matter of the election. The ambassadors'

¹ *Aubeterre to Choiseul, March 15, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 16 and 23, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108; *Azpuru to Orsini, March 18, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

² The only "soggetti riuscibili" left were Ganganelli, Perelli, Sersale, Canale, Pozzobonelli, Stoppani, and Serbelloni.

³ *To Grimaldi, May 2, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102.

proposals regarding the list of Cardinals were accepted ; after mutual agreement they might even transfer other Cardinals to the " good " class, especially if there was any prospect of their pledging themselves to bring about the suppression of the Jesuits and were ready to grant the other demands of the Courts. The king left it to the ambassadors to select Cardinals for the Secretaryship of State and the other important posts, on condition that they were " good " or " indifferent " and that the pro-Jesuits were avoided as far as possible. France was wholly in agreement with the Spanish policy, but wanted to retain Avignon in return for a monetary compensation. Similarly, Benevento and Pontecorvo were to pass to Naples in accordance with the king's wish, but with no compensation. It had not yet been decided whether all three conditions were to be presented simultaneously or whether the suppression of the Jesuits was first to be demanded separately ; in the former case satisfaction for Parma was to be added as a fourth condition.¹

The drawing up of a final list on the basis of this instruction gave rise to a lively exchange of opinions among the envoys. A list transmitted by Aubeterre to Azpuru on April 19th² contained twenty-one *Papabili*. At a meeting at the French ambassador's on April 22nd, attended by Centomani as the representative of Naples, another list was agreed on and this was forwarded as the definitive one by Aubeterre to the French Cardinals on the following day. In this only eleven Cardinals were named as *Papabili* and they included the six who had formerly been marked as too old or too young ; the others were Sersale, Malvezzi, Ganganelli, Perelli, and Branciforte, of whom the first and the last mentioned had formerly been considered to have had no prospects. As a reserve for the eleven Stoppani was awarded twelfth place. If none of

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 4, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Conclave 1769 ".

² *Azpuru to Aubeterre, April 20, *ibid.* The list itself, *ibid.* The copy at Simancas (5013) does not contain the remarks added subsequently.

the *Papabili* won through, recourse was to be had to the second class of five "indifferents". The third division contained fifteen Cardinals whose election was to be prevented by adverse voting. If the number of votes necessary for this purpose proved to be unobtainable, the envoys were to resort to the expedient of stating that the monarchs would not recognize a Pope who was elected against their will and that they (the envoys) would leave Rome. If necessary, the open *esclusiva* also was to be used against those in the fourth division of the list.¹ In effect, therefore, no less than twenty-six Cardinals were excluded from the Papacy, and Aubeterre had some difficulty in including Malvezzi and Stoppani in the first class against the wishes of Azpuru.²

In the draft of a letter to Aubeterre, Bernis gave expression to his misgivings about the list. After the arrival of the Spaniards, he wrote, the conclave would have forty-six members, and twenty-three of these would have to be excluded if the combined lists of France and Spain were taken into account. Of the remainder, Cavalchini, Neri Corsini, Lante, two Spaniards, two Frenchmen, and Orsini were also to be deleted as non-*Papabili*. In these circumstances, how was a Pope to be found? Azpuru's reply would be that there was still Sersale. But Sersale was not wanted in Rome, nor Stoppani, and Malvezzi had been regarded with horror since he had spoken in favour of the Courts. On account of their youth there would be few votes for the Neapolitans Perelli and Pirelli. Ganganelli was feared and little respected. Azpuru's probable answer to all this, Bernis continued, was that fatigue would finally compel the electors to fall back on Sersale. But fatigue, combined with rumours about the tyranny of the Courts, would end in destroying the system of the *esclusiva* which had hitherto been liked well enough. Votes would be lost, and a Pope would be chosen in opposition

¹ *Aubeterre to Luynes, April 23, *loc. cit.*; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 224 *seq.*

² *Aubeterre to Bernis, April 22 and 23, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, g.

to the Courts. If, contrary to expectation, a Pope was chosen from among the doubtfuls or indifferent, was he to be given the *esclusiva* in the Chapel of the Scrutiny? The idea of making such a scene as this now seemed to be viewed with no apprehension, but afterwards it would cause dissatisfaction. Besides, it had never been the intention of the Courts to make the Pope by excluding more than half the Sacred College; it was unprecedented. He himself was not lacking in courage or patience, but one had to be reasonable and not force the Cardinals in conclave to break off their deliberations as a protest against oppression. It was impossible to base a plan of action on an *esclusiva* which left barely four or five Cardinals, of which some again were too young. What was there to fasten on to, if the "doubtfuls" and "indifferent" were to be treated the same as the "bads"? In these conditions, the Pope would have to be elected in the Ministries of the three Courts, for, so far as he could see, it was doubtful what any of the Cardinals would do, once they were Pope.¹

Bernis stopped short at dispatching this communication,² but on receiving the final list of candidates he wrote to Aubeterre in similar terms.³ Aubeterre excused himself by ascribing the responsibility to the will of his Government. He had succeeded with some difficulty in having Malvezzi transferred to the "good" class, but his efforts on behalf of Stoppani and De Rossi had been ineffectual. De Rossi allowed himself to be governed solely by motives of self-interest.⁴ Bernis retorted that Spain was too far away from the conclave to give an accurate opinion on the Cardinals. Many of those who had been banned were better than some of the chosen;

¹ *Bernis to Aubeterre, April 22, *ibid.*; partly in CARAYON, XVII., 164 *seq.*

² The draft is marked "Ce billet n'a pas été envoyé".

³ *Bernis to Aubeterre, April 24 [1769], in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f; partly in CARAYON, XVII., 165 *seq.*

⁴ *Aubeterre to Bernis, April 25, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*; CARAYON, XVII., 166 *seq.*

Spanish stringency might have unpleasant consequences.¹ He expressed the same misgivings to Choiseul,² and Orsini also raised objections.³ Azpuru dropped the demand that the ambassadors should leave Rome in the event of an unfavourable election.⁴

A considerable proportion of the ambassadors' deliberations was devoted to the fate of the Society of Jesus. What was by this time the conviction of wide ecclesiastical circles, the fear of many Jesuits, and the hope of the Spanish Court, was expressed by the Spanish agent Zambeccari when he wrote from Bologna to Grimaldi on February 18th, 1769, that with the death of Clement XIII. the Jesuits had received Extreme Unction.⁵ A Pope was wanted, he thought, who was a friend of the Courts, for preference the Cardinal Archbishop Malvezzi, who was free from the prejudices of the Roman Curia, for now all were agreed that the abolition of the Order would be carried out.⁶ A written work of the period tried to show that the Pope was bound in conscience to yield to the majority of the Catholic princes of Europe and to suppress the Society of Jesus without legal process or the adjudgment of evidence, solely on account of the evil repute into which it had fallen as the result of its perverse doctrines, its commercial dealings,

¹ *To Aubeterre, April 26, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*

² *On April 26, *ibid.*, d. On May 10 Bernis *wrote to Choiseul : " On ne veut . . . ni des vieillards, ni des jeunes gens, ni des ministres des Couronnes ; on s'oppose, a Stoppani et a Malvezzi, il ne reste aucun sujet véritablement capable. La proscription a esté trop forte. . . . On s'arrêtera sur un partisan secret des jesuites, ou sur un homme faible, à qui les amis de la Société, dominans dans le S. Collège, fairont peur . . . "

³ *To Azpuru [April 26], State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

⁴ *Azpuru to Orsini, April 28, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Conclave 1769 "; *cf.* *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 27, *ibid.*, Registro, 108.

⁵ " Muerto el Papa, los Jesuitas han recibido la Extrema Uncion." Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4734.

⁶ *Zambeccari to Grimaldi, February 11, *ibid.*

its boundless ambition, and its infamous attacks on the lives of princes and the public safety. The work was originally addressed to Clement XIII., after whose death there was added a section appealing to the Cardinals in conclave.¹ At Centomani's suggestion Tanucci had it printed secretly in Naples and saw to its distribution among the Cardinals.²

(7)

Immediately after the death of Clement XIII. the ambassadors of the Bourbon Powers agreed that in the restoration of peace with the Pope all other complaints were to be put on one side and that the suppression of the Jesuit Order was to be their only demand, but that this was to be insisted on with vigour.³ In this connection Choiseul advised caution, for too hasty a step might jeopardize the honour of the Crowns.

¹ **Parere di un illustre Ecclesiastico sulla necessità di abolirsi la Compagnia detta di Gesù* (in the *Inquietudini de' Gesuiti*, IV., [Naples], 1769, [31 pages]); *Brunati to Colloredo, April 1, State Archives, Vienna. The work was written by Mgr. Bortolo, assisted by Marefoschi, Conti, and Carafa di Columbrano, in the convent near the Chiesa Nuova (Ricci, *Espulsione dalla Spagna*, n. 162).

² *Centomani to Tanucci, February 10, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{471}{1218}$; *Tanucci to Centomani, February 21, *ibid.*, $\frac{290}{1035}$. On February 28 Tanucci sent *two copies to Charles III (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102) and twelve copies to Orsini (State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*), on March 7 twenty more (*ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1504), and on April 12 twenty-five more (*Tanucci to Centomani, *ibid.*; *Tanucci to Orsini, *ibid.*). Azpuru (*to Grimaldi, March 2, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036) and Grimaldi (*to Azpuru, March 21, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49) considered the work to be conclusive, others thought it weak (*Orsini to Tanucci, March 10 and 14, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504 and 1473). According to Kaunitz, the work was not left unanswered (*to Colloredo, April 26, State Archives, Vienna).

³ Aubeterre to Choiseul, February 6, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012, CARAYON, XVII., 141.

He himself did not ascribe so much importance to the suppression as did Aubeterre. By adopting a rigid attitude in this affair they might close the door against further negotiations.¹

Madrid, on the other hand, agreed with Aubeterre's view that the suppression was the first and only condition of peace. This was the sole matter for negotiation, wrote Charles III. to Tanucci on February 28th, 1769,² and instructions in this sense were sent to Azpuru.³ The only differences of opinion were about the methods of attaining this object. A Monsignore d'Angiò proposed to Tanucci that a layman of determined presence should be sent to Rome, where, after consulting Centomani and the ambassadors, he was to get all the Cardinals to sign a written promise to fulfil all the lawful wishes of the king.⁴ Aubeterre thought that a verbal promise given by the candidates for the Papacy would be enough, while Orsini condemned this proposal too as dishonourable and unworthy of a man of rank and culture,⁵ and even Tanucci could not reconcile himself to it.⁶ His view was that the matter would certainly have to be thrashed out during the conclave, for while the election was still in progress the candidate would be anxious to attain his object as quickly as possible. After his elevation, however, he would not be so eager to handle this thorny problem, and then they would have to foot the bill at the cost of the true and genuine principles of sovereignty; they might even have to return Avignon and Benevento. While the conclave was on, however, the matter was to be handled with propriety and dignity. They should distribute the written opinion which held that the Pope could and must

¹ To Aubeterre, CARAYON, XVII., 142; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 185.

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 298.

³ *Grimaldi on March 14, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

⁴ *G. G. d'Angiò to Tanucci, February 3, *loc. cit.*, C. Farnes., 1473.

⁵ *To Tanucci, February 7, 14, and 21, *ibid.*,

⁶ *Ibid.*

order the suppression without any proceedings, and in conversation with the Cardinals they must ascertain their views and take steps accordingly.¹

Both Aubeterre and Tanucci became more and more convinced that the suppression of the Jesuits was impossible of attainment by means of negotiations with the Sacred College as a whole.² Orsini and the French Cardinals, Aubeterre wrote to Paris, would not hear of the matter being discussed in the conclave. Consequently, he thought that they ought to try to obtain from the candidate, before his final election, a written promise, or, failing that, an oral one made before witnesses.³ Spain, he said, was adamant on this point; King Charles and his confessor insisted on it unconditionally, also Portugal, which would only seek a *rapprochement* with Rome on this condition.⁴ Azpuru urged Orsini to adopt the same attitude.⁵ He was to consult the French Cardinals as to whether and how the question of the suppression was to be raised in the conclave itself, or whether at any rate the three

¹ A written promise " aborrisce e ripugna il cardinale Orsini per coscienza, per onore e per le conseguenze inquiete [inique ?] che ne avverrebbono quando la cosa si scoprisse e finalmente perchè fatte le riflessioni sulli cardinali papabili niuno per temperamento, per massime e per costume apparisce capace di condiscendere a far tal biglietto. Stimo, che nel tempo del conclave si deva preparar la cosa con onestà ". For " un Papa già fatto senza tal preparazione . . . non avrà gran premura di trattar un affare spinoso ". *Tanucci to Charles III., February 21, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102; **Id.* to Azara, February 14, *ibid.*, 6007; Azara to Roda, February 16, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 222; *Orsini to Tanucci, February 23, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

² *Tanucci to Grimaldi, April 4, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 30, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

³ To Bernis, April 8, partly in CARAYON, XVII., 153.

⁴ Aubeterre to Bernis, April 9, *ibid.*

⁵ *On April 9, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Conclave 1769 ".

or four Cardinals who had the best prospects of success were each to be urged to give an assurance that the suppression would be carried out.

The deliberations with the French prelates resulted in their firm rejection of the proposals ; a formal promise of suppression, made with the object of obtaining the tiara, would, they held, be nothing but simony. Orsini's reply to Azpuru was that they could do no more than elect a Cardinal whom the princes might confidently expect to fulfil their demand. The conclave had no authority to discuss any other matter but the election. To solve the difficulty by treating with each of the Cardinals in turn seemed equally impracticable. The outcome of the voting was quite uncertain and both Colonna and Serbelloni would rather forego the tiara than make such a promise. And if the Courts with their request were rebuffed, the envoys would emerge with nothing but disgrace.¹ To Bernis Orsini wrote, " I stand fast by our previous agreements. You are an archbishop, I a priest. We cannot abet the election of a simoniacal Pope. I have no doubt that Cardinal De Luynes, who is also an archbishop, is of the same opinion." ²

But Aubeterre would not yet admit defeat. So far as the Italian Cardinals were concerned, he wrote, not one would be troubled in his conscience about making the required promise.³ He himself saw nothing unlawful in it ; the point at issue was the secularization of an Order whose continued existence would undeniably perpetuate the cleavage and confusion in the Church. He asked Bernis to open his mind in confidence to Cardinal Ganganelli, one of the most celebrated theologians in the country, who had never been in disrepute as a lax moralist. His view must closely approach his own. It was not a temporal but a spiritual matter that was in question, and nothing was more uncertain than what a Pope

¹ *Orsini to Azpuru, April 10, *ibid.*, Registro 108 ; *Azpuru to Orsini, April 20, *ibid.*, Exped. " Conclave 1769 " ; *Tanucci to Grimaldi, April 11 and 18, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102.

² [April 10 ?] CARAYON, XVII., 173.

³ *Ibid.*, 153 *seq.*

would do after his election, if he had not been bound down in advance.¹ To Choiseul Aubeterre wrote in the same strain.

To protect his rear, Bernis also wrote to the Minister. One had only to read the electoral Bulls, he wrote, to whose observance every Cardinal bound himself by oath, to know that the Cardinals in conclave had no authority whatever even to discuss such matters as had been proposed. To demand from a Papal candidate a promise to suppress an Order was to violate all the canonical laws and to expose the honour of the Crowns to an obvious danger. A Cardinal capable of taking such a step would also be capable of breaking his word. The conclave could do no more than bring about the election of an enlightened Pope who felt the necessity of making due satisfaction to the Courts and of living in harmony with them. The three Courts had demanded the suppression of the Jesuits in a memorial addressed to Clement XIII. It now lay with them to pursue with tenacity the path on which they had set out. The Court of Vienna was putting no obstacle in their way, and the whole world was of the opinion that the Church and its well-being must take precedence over consideration for a religious Order.²

But the controversy between the Bourbon Cardinals and the ambassadors still went on. Aubeterre disputed the simoniacal character of the proposed bargain,³ but Orsini⁴ and the French Cardinals⁵ would not agree with his arguments. Bernis summed up his objections in a letter of April 19th. The Bourbon Cardinals agreed, he added, that the secularization of the Jesuits was of great advantage—nay, of necessity—for the tranquillity of the Catholic States and the Holy See; policy demanded, in fact, that the tree which up till then had

¹ MASSON, 99.

² MASSON, 100; CARAYON, XVI., 152 *seq.* (partly).

³ *To Orsini, April 15, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma,

²⁹¹
1036.

⁴ *To Aubeterre, April 17, *ibid.*

⁵ Bernis to Aubeterre, April 14 and 18, in CARAYON, XVII., 155, 161, 170.

only had its branches lopped, should be pulled up by the roots. The only trouble was to find a Pope strong enough to deal the blow and bold enough to destroy an Order which was especially devoted to the Holy See. In enumerating the Cardinals most talked of, he observed, "There are many indications that lead me to believe that Ganganelli has intelligence, knowledge, and even a resolute character, but he is frightened of his own shadow. He fears the slightest suspicion of any alliance with the French and keeps to himself in his cell. This may have been successful in his convent, but since his elevation to the purple he should have behaved differently, for he gives cause for thinking that he is more ambitious than he probably is. On the whole, he is more feared than loved."¹

In Versailles Bernis' representations met with complete success. Choiseul brought Aubeterre's efforts to an end by stating on May 2nd that neither France nor Spain wished to have any unprofitable dealings with the College of Cardinals likely to jeopardize the dignity of the three monarchs. It would be precisely the worthiest of the Cardinals who would refuse the tiara when asked to comply with the required condition.²

Even before this decision arrived in Rome Aubeterre had told Bernis³ that he regarded the matter of the required promise as closed but that the opinion of one of the most reputable Roman theologians (which he attached to this letter) might show that his view was not so unreasonable after all. Bernis replied⁴ that the opinion was based on the principle that the suppression of the Society of Jesus was the greatest possible benefit to the Church. This principle, however, was contested by at least half the clergy and by numerous Cardinals, Bishops, and laymen of every nationality and rank. It was

¹ To Choiseul, partly in CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *Clément XIV.*, 234 *seq.*; CARAYON, XVII., 162; MASSON, 100 *seq.*

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 223 *seq.*; MASSON, 101. Carayon gives April 25 as the date of the letter.

³ On April 25, in CARAYON, XVII., 166 *seq.*

⁴ On April 26, *ibid.*, 168.

therefore an unfounded assumption. The envoy retorted ¹ that complete unanimity was an unattainable ideal. No one who studied the matter dispassionately could deny that the continued existence of the Jesuit Order would provoke confusion and dissension and would result in losses being suffered by the Holy See.

Azpuru's arguments ² had no more success with Orsini than Aubeterre's with the French Cardinals. Orsini's reply ³ was that according even to the Spanish lists twenty of the forty-six Cardinals held opposing views and three were doubtful, so that there was no prospect of certain success, as Azpuru had assumed.

In spite of the opposition of the Bourbon Cardinals, Charles III. kept returning to his old demand that the candidate for the Papacy must not be an immunist and must bind himself to decree the suppression of the Jesuits. The French and Neapolitan Cardinals were to make the proposal while the conclave was still in progress and whenever the opportunity offered. If that proved impracticable, the request which had already been put to the late Pope must be put again to the future one.⁴

On April 20th the Cardinals of the three Crowns agreed on certain guiding principles for their conduct in the conclave. Their intention was to win votes, not for the advancement of

¹ On April 27, *ibid.*, 169.

² *Azpuru to Orsini, April 20, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 20, *ibid.*, Registro, 108. Undated *discussion (Inc. : Il Papa Capo visibile . . .), *ibid.*, Exped. "Sobre la supresion de la Comp. de Jesus 1767-1774", *ibid.*; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 13 and 20, *ibid.*; *Azpuru to Orsini, April 20, *ibid.*; Buonamici in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th Series, XX., 309 seq.

³ *To Azpuru, April 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 27, *ibid.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 25, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769". Grimaldi too refused to see anything simoniacal in such a bargain; *ibid.*, Reales Ordenes, 49.

particular candidates but only for their exclusion. Nor did they intend to make any detailed announcement about the Cardinals who were not *personae gratae* with the Courts. They were to have recourse to the formal exclusion only in a case of extreme necessity, when more lenient methods had failed. If there was a danger of losing votes they were to take part in the voting for less suitable persons, provided that they could nominate a Secretary of State of their own choice.¹ This line of action, Bernis maintained,² would not be altered in any way either by Azpuru or an instruction from the Spanish Court, for in Madrid and elsewhere quite faulty notions were held about what was practicable or impracticable in the conclave. If the Spanish instructions were followed blindly, the conclave would end in an uproar.

(8)

Just as Bernis was in constant correspondence with Aubeterre, Azpuru, and Choiseul, Orsini also sent the envoys and Ministers reports on the most secret incidents in the conclave and on the daily results of the voting.³ Azpuru, to avoid suspicion, never came to the door of the conclave⁴ and he assured Orsini⁵ that he showed his letters to no one except the French ambassador. Nevertheless, he received daily news about the voting from Orsini⁶ and forwarded his letters to the Spanish Cabinet.⁷ There being but scanty evidence extant of

¹ *V. infra.*

² *To Aubeterre, April 22, *to Choiseul, April 26, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f.

³ *To Tanucci, February 21, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473; *to Azpuru, February 21, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012. C. Farnes. (1504) contains the cipher-key to the conclave correspondence and the election results, from February 21 to May 19 inclusive.

⁴ *Azpuru to Orsini, March 8, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁵ **Ibid.*

⁶ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 23, *ibid.*

⁷ **Idem* to *idem*, March 9, *ibid.*, Registro, 108.

the opposing side's opinion, the historian is at the disadvantage of being entirely dependent on the one-sided reports of the Bourbon party.

As the regulations regarding the secrecy of the conclave and its isolation from the outer world were not observed by Bernis and Orsini, the Governments had no difficulty in ascertaining and influencing the casting of the votes. In the first few weeks of the conclave this was of little importance, as no final election was practicable before the arrival of the Spaniards at the end of April. Until then the Cardinals had to content themselves with pretended voting in order to discover the prospects of the various candidates. This preliminary work begun before the arrival of the Spaniards could be completed afterwards.

Even before the conclave had assembled, the Neapolitan agent Centomani thought that the choice might fall on Cardinal Flavio Chigi, who with the whole of his family was a "tertiary" of the Jesuits.¹ By the middle of February the rumour was rife that the Rezzonico party intended to push through his election before the arrival of the foreign Cardinals and that the people expected to see him Pope on the Saturday or Sunday, February 19th or 20th.² Chigi was a worthy prelate of exemplary conduct and of great charity towards the poor. In the last conclave he had not voted for Clement XIII. Less to his credit, however, was that a large number of his relatives belonged to the families of Sora, Albani, and Bracciano. The Bourbon party disliked him on the score that he was imbued with the principles of the Roman Curia and was strongly attached to the Jesuits. Orsini, too, thought that he was on intimate terms with the Order.³ Roda had marked him

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, February 7, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1216.

² *Erizzo to the Doge of Venice, February 18, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288.

³ *Aubeterre to Choiseul, February 6, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012; cf. THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 180; *Orsini to Grimaldi, February 6, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

as unsuitable,¹ and the French envoy was strongly prejudiced against him.² There could be no question, therefore, of his escaping the veto of the Court of Madrid. For a long time, however, the Bourbon party could not rid itself of the fear that a secret supporter of the Jesuits might be elected.³

A candidature far more serious than Chigi's was that of Gaetano Fantuzzi. He had been proposed by the Rezzonico party, but he also had supporters in the other camp,⁴ where the two Corsinis championed him on account of an old-standing friendship.⁵ In the plan of the conclave of 1765 he was commended for his private life and the unremitting diligence with which he had earned the highest respect as Auditor of the Rota. As Prefect of the Immunity Congregation, and as commissary in the monastic question in the duchy of Parma he had given no offence, he had shown no particular love for the Jesuits, and he had not approved of all of Clement XIII.'s measures.⁶ Even Roda accorded him recognition of a similar nature, opining that he would make a good Pope because he did not nurse the usual prejudices on the subject of ecclesiastical immunity.⁷ In Roda's list he is accordingly promoted to the "good" class.

In spite of all this, however, Fantuzzi encountered insuperable opposition. In a marginal note on Roda's list Grimaldi

¹ *To Grimaldi, February 23, *ibid.*

² *Cf.* n. 1.

³ *Azpuru to Almada, March 4, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Corresp. Almada-Azpuru, 1760-69; *Azpuru to Orsini, March 4, *ibid.* Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 4, *ibid.*; *Montealegre to Grimaldi, March 18, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5765.

⁴ Buonamici on February 18, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 294; **Notizie segretissime del Conclave*, February 20, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

⁵ *Bernis to Choiseul, March 30, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

⁶ **Piano per il Conclave* (see above, p. 2, n. 1).

⁷ *To Grimaldi, February 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

put him in the "bad" class.¹ The representatives of the Bourbon Courts agreed that in certain respects he was worthy of commendation and went so far as to say that he would have brought the negotiations with Parma to a favourable conclusion, had not Torrigiani ruined the whole affair. Besides, he was more of a foe than a friend of the Jesuits. On the other hand, they blamed him for acquiring a bad reputation through his behaviour in certain private matters, and he was a fanatical champion of immunity. Orsini deemed him to be pro-Jesuit and wondered whether he ought to be vetoed.² When questioned about him he replied evasively,³ then brought the movement in his favour to an end provisionally, by hinting that they ought to wait for the arrival of the Spanish Cardinals. After Bernis had entered the conclave he agreed with them that Fantuzzi was to be excluded at all costs.⁴

Meanwhile, the votes in his favour were increasing, so that Azpuru had to apply for his formal exclusion,⁵ which Grimaldi had already sent off on April 4th.⁶ When it reached his hands safely Bernis uttered a sigh of relief.⁷ Fantuzzi, who doubtless wanted to avoid being openly excluded,⁸ now asked Rezzonico to desist from having him elected, as he would not accept the honour.⁹ This renunciation, however, had the effect of

¹ See above, p. 31.

² *To Grimaldi, February 6, Archives of Simancas, *loc. cit.*

³ *To Tanucci, March 24, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, March 28, *ibid.*

⁵ *To Grimaldi, April 6, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

⁶ *To Azpuru, April 4, *ibid.* Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁷ *To Aubeterre, April 23, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

⁸ *Bernis to Aubeterre, *ibid.*; cf. CARAYON, XVII., 180.

⁹ *Garcia to Azpuru, May 7, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Solis to Azpuru, May 14 and 18, *ibid.*; *Kaunitz-Rittberg to Colloredo, May 13, State Archives, Vienna.

increasing the votes cast in his favour, so that in Rome his election was expected to take place on the evening of May 3rd.¹ At this point Luynes and Bernis threatened certain of the electors with the departure of the ambassadors and this brought about Fantuzzi's downfall.² Later, Bernis himself was seriously thinking of putting up Fantuzzi as a Bourbon candidate against Ganganelli, but by this time it was too late.³

Fantuzzi's success having been made impossible, the *Zelanti* thought of proposing the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, Marcantonio Colonna, who was only forty-five years old but was highly esteemed on account of his irreproachable morals and his sagacity. Orsini had no objection, as Colonna was a Neapolitan subject, his house was in favour with the Spanish king, and his brother, Cardinal Pamfili, had been universally liked as French nuncio. Although a pupil of the Jesuits, he had never shown them any preference but had striven to bring the seculars to the fore, and for the last eighteen months, under his, Orsini's, influence he had drawn further and further away from them.⁴

Although the votes for Colonna steadily increased,⁵ he had no real prospect of success. Roda had marked him as unsuitable,⁶ and all along his name had appeared in the lists among the "bad" men.⁷ Bernis judged him to be more

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, May 5, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

² *Bernis to Choiseul, May 10, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

³ **Idem to idem*, May 17, *ibid.*

⁴ *To Tanucci, February 28, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504; *Orsini to Aubeterre, March 3, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, 1036.

⁵ *Centomani to Tanucci, April 4, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1216; *Orsini to Tanucci, April 4, *ibid.*, 1504.

⁶ *To Grimaldi, February 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

⁷ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, February 27, *ibid.* Orsini had to work against Colonna against his will: *Orsini to Tanucci, April 7, C. Farnes., 1504, *loc. cit.*

suitable as the superior of a seminary than as Pope ¹ and did not believe that his candidature was intended seriously,² though he had to admit that it had been proposed.³ When asked about him by Pozzobonelli he said that he thought that his youth and his friendship with the Jesuits would stand in his way.⁴ The same two points were brought against him when he wrote to Choiseul. He and his friends would bring about his failure in the gentlest manner possible.⁵

Accordingly, on May 12th the Crown Cardinals met to decide on a reply which would not offend Colonna or his family. Attention was to be drawn to his youth and his inexperience in dealing with the Governments.⁶ But when this decision was made known to Rezzonico, the leader of the *Zelanti*, it provoked a brisk exchange of opinions. Rezzonico declared that in spite of the misgivings which had been expressed he would propose Colonna if there were a sufficient number of votes in his favour. It was not the Courts, he maintained, but the views of the Cardinals and his own conscience that had to be considered first in such a matter. On his refusal to transmit the decision to his partisans Bernis replied that he would inform the Dean and Sub-Dean of the Sacred College. Rezzonico's retort to this was that his followers were free to do as they wished and he as his conscience dictated.⁷ "A word to Gianfrancesco Albani, who in his heart was against Colonna's election, brought the whole plot to an end," Bernis boasted afterwards.⁸ The Cardinal

¹ *To Aubeterre, May 7, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f.

² *Solis to Azpuru and *Azpuru to Solis, May 12, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

³ *Bernis to Aubeterre, May 6, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Bernis to Aubeterre, May 6, *ibid.*

⁵ *To Choiseul, May 10, *ibid.*

⁶ *Garcia and Aguirre to Azpuru [May 12], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Solis to Azpuru, May 14, *ibid.*

⁷ Bernis to Aubeterre, May 13, in CARAYON, XVII., 183. Cf. *Azpuru to Solis, May 13, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

⁸ *To Choiseul, May 17, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

Vicar's prospect of becoming Pope was, in fact, destroyed therewith, but the number of votes he received up to the penultimate scrutiny¹ was tantamount to a protest against the improper interference of the Courts.

Further eloquent evidence of the ruthless pressure exerted on the conclave by the Bourbon envoys is furnished by the fate of the Milanese Archbishop Pozzobonelli. Illness prevented him from entering the conclave until April 15th,² but he had been preceded by a good reputation. In the plan for the conclave of 1765, he figured among the *Papabili*, and it was thought that he would make his mark in the coming conclave, as he had no reason to fear any objection on the part of the Powers.³ Roda placed him fifth among the *Papabili*, with the note that he was remarkable for his calm judgment, sagacity, and administrative ability.⁴ In the lists⁵ he began by being among the "indifferents", being scarcely known in Roman diplomatic circles, but as a result of the complaints about the restricted number of eligible candidates he was promoted to the "good" class.⁶ He was also well thought of by the *Zelanti*, having taken a firm stand against the prohibition of the Bull *In cæna Domini*. His name appeared in the list for scrutiny early on in the conclave, and remained there.⁷ Even Bernis took the view that he could be the head of the strongest and most respected party, as much could be done in Rome under the ægis of the

¹ " *L'affaire du card. Colonna est finie, quoiqu'il eût hier matin 13 et le soir 12 voix " (Bernis to Aubeterre, May 14, *ibid.*).

² *Albani to Colloredo, March 25, State Archives, Vienna ; *Bernis to Choiseul, April 19, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*

³ **Piano per il Conclave* (see above, p. 2, n. 1).

⁴ *To Grimaldi, February 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

⁵ See above, pp. 31 *seqq.*

⁶ Choiseul to Aubeterre, March 14, in CARAYON, XVII., 145 ; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 16, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

⁷ *Azpuru to Orsini, February 25, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{299}{1035}$; *Centomani to Tanucci, April 4, *ibid.*, $\frac{471}{1216}$.

Emperor¹; he contradicted himself, however, by saying that Pozzobonelli would collect a large number of votes for himself if only he were not the Viennese Cabinet's confidential representative in the conclave.²

Pozzobonelli had informed Bernis that he had received an instruction from Vienna to act in conjunction with the Bourbon envoys, but that he had acquainted Alessandro Albani with only a part of this instruction. Pozzobonelli may well have thought it his duty to apprise Austria's official representative with the view taken by the Court of Vienna, but his association with the two Albanis, who were distrusted in Vienna as well as in Paris, was to prove disastrous for him. Bernis and Aubeterre presumed that he was playing a double game. Aubeterre tried at first to defend him³ and sent him a warning through the Austrian envoy extraordinary, Kaunitz, against associating with the Albanis.⁴ Bernis, on the other hand, worked against him: he had, he said, the clumsy cunning of a Lombard country-priest; his attitude towards the Bull *In cæna Domini* was suspicious; and his behaviour in the conclave could only be explained by his stupidity and egotism.⁵ When, in addition, adverse reports came in from

¹ *To Choiseul, April 5 and 12, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*

² *To Aubeterre, April 16, *ibid.*

³ Cf. *Aubeterre to Orsini, April 16, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{291}{1036}$; Orsini to Aubeterre, April 18, *ibid.*, CARAYON, XVII., 162; ARNETH, *M. Theresia*, IX., 40. According to the assurance of the Viennese Court Councillors, Pozzobonelli afterwards helped to dissolve the Benedictine foundation of St. Peter's in Milan and the Cistercian convent of Morimondo "come agente e consenziente" and "come promotore della soppressione". *Visconti to Pallavicini, March 26 and July 23, 1772, Nunziat. di Germ., 390, fo. 87^v. 199^v, Papal Secret Archives; *Histor.-polit. Bl.*, CXLV. (1910), 39.

⁴ *Aubeterre to Bernis, April 21, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, g; *Kaunitz-Rittberg to Colloredo, April 26, State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ *Bernis to Aubeterre, April 23 and 24, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*, f.

the Neapolitan envoy, Centomani, Pozzobonelli's fate was sealed. Azpuru and Aubeterre condemned him to a silent exclusion¹ and held to this decision in face of the more favourable opinions which were now being passed on him by Bernis and Orsini.² Aubeterre declared that he would make even a worse Pope than the one who had just died.³

Nothing now remained to be done but to pacify the Court of Vienna regarding the treatment meted out to its confidential agent. Bernis' opinion was that the emperor himself had given Pozzobonelli the *esclusiva* by appointing him his agent, for according to the principles held by both the conclave and temporal rulers, it was not customary for such a man to be elected Pope. If Pozzobonelli had more sense he would withdraw of his own accord.⁴

Aubeterre acquainted the imperial envoys Rosenbergh and Kaunitz⁵ with this view, and added the threat that to stop the election he would, if necessary, leave Rome, as he considered Pozzobonelli to be a most dangerous scoundrel.⁶ In reply to this the imperial envoys declared that they had no interest in his election.⁷ The emperor wrote to say that when he was in Viterbo he had warned the Archbishop of Milan against the two Albani.⁸

¹ See above, p. 34.

² *Bernis to Aubeterre, April 25, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*; *Bernis to Choiseul, April 26, *ibid.*; *Orsini to Azpuru, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

³ *Aubeterre to Bernis, April 25, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*, g (cf. CARAYON, XVII., 167); *Azpuru to Grimaldi, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108.

⁴ *To Aubeterre, April 28 and 30, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*, f; *Solis to Azpuru, May 10, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

⁵ *Aubeterre to Bernis, April 29 and 30, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*, g.

⁶ **Idem* to *idem*, May 2, *ibid.*

⁷ *Aubeterre to Orsini, May 3, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 17037; *Tanucci to Orsini, May 9, *ibid.*; *Orsini to Tanucci, May 5, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1554. Cf. CARAYON, XVII., 175.

⁸ *Aubeterre to Bernis, May 8 and 10, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, g.

In spite of everything, however, the votes for Pozzobonelli increased to such an extent that the Crown Cardinals took precautionary steps to prevent the formation of a party in his support, the possibility of which filled them with alarm, for it would have included almost all the old and the new members of the College.¹ They went so far as to say that there was a danger of Pozzobonelli's election not being acknowledged by the envoys of the Courts.² After Luynes had remonstrated with the Milanese Archbishop, Bernis and Aubeterre, their fears allayed, were able to write to Paris about his candidature with a certain calm.³ But even in the penultimate counting of the votes twelve were cast in his favour.

A candidate who from the beginning of the conclave seemed to have an excellent chance of success was Gianfrancesco

¹ *Aguirre to Azpuru [on May 11], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769". An intrigue against Pozzobonelli is contained in the following letter (*Garcia to Azpuru, May 11, *ibid.*): "De resultas de haver conferenziado tres quartos de hora Pozzobonelli con el Emperador, parece que este Em. reveló a Albani haberle encargado S. M. no se diese parte de esta conferencia a la Reina de Ungheria. Parece que Albani se lo dixo a Bernis e este despachó un correo a Florenzia con una carta á su Embaxador de Francia pare que diese parte á S. M. Imperial de la falsedad que tuvo Pozzobonelli de confidenciar un secreto de esta naturaleza al encargado de los negocios de la Reina de Ungheria. Esta notizia trascenderá a la Corte de Viena, y por consiguiente el Emperador se malquistará con Pozzobonelli, y funda Bernis la esperanza de la exclusiva de este Cardinal en su desgracia con el Emperador".

² *Solis to Azpuru, May 15, *ibid.*; *Bernis to Aubeterre, May 15, in Jesuit possession, *De suppress.*, f. The steps taken against Pozzobonelli were approved by Charles III. in a dispatch which did not arrive till the conclave had closed. *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 16, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

³ Bernis to Choiseul, May 17, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 237 seq.; *Orsini to Azpuru, May 18, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013; *Aubeterre to Bernis, May 16, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, g.

Stoppani.¹ The *Zelanti* were on his side, also the French.² Bernis described him at the end of March as a man of recognized merit and the most competent person to fill the post of Secretary of State.³ In May he and Aubeterre were actively supporting his candidature, and in France his election was regarded in any case as tolerably certain.⁴ Less friendliness was felt towards him in Spain, where he was numbered among the "doubtfuls"⁵; notwithstanding the continual complaints about the paucity of the candidates, Azpuru's misgivings caused him to be ranked only as a reserve in the "good" class.⁶ Nevertheless, by the end of April his prospects had increased to such an extent that conjectures were already being made about his future Minister.⁷ "As for Stoppani himself," wrote Bernis, "I do not know whether he ever gives a thought to the Papal throne when in his cell. Men

¹ Buonamici in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 293.

² **Notizie segretissime venute dal Conclave*, February 20 and March 22, State Archives, Vienna; *Brunati to Colloredo, February 25, March 1 and 4, *ibid.*; *Orsini to Tanucci, March 3, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473; *Orsini to Aubeterre, March 3, and *Centomani to Tanucci, April 4, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, 1036²⁹¹ and 1216.

³ To Choiseul, March 30 and April 12, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

⁴ *Bernis to Choiseul, March 30 and April 12, *loc. cit.*; P. A. KIRSCH, in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXVI. (1905), 52, 59; **Piano per il Conclave* (see above, p. 2, n. 1); *Orsini to Tanucci, February 28, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. Cf. above, p. 32.

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi [on February 4], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, February 27, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

⁶ See above, p. 34.

⁷ Buonamici on April 26 and 29, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 310 *seq.*; **Foglio di nuove*, April 28, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504; *Kaunitz to Colloredo, April 29, State Archives, Vienna; *Erizzo to the Doge of Venice, April 29, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288. Cf. *Garcia to Azpuru, May 7, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Solis to Azpuru, May 2, *ibid.*

who have observed him for a long time agree with me that no one can see into the bottom of his heart. However, public opinion is all for him, it is only the Jesuit partisans who won't have him."

The question of the Jesuits was to decide his fate. For himself Stoppani was neither for them nor against them. The party of the princes took it as a good sign that he had excused himself from the meeting of the extraordinary Congregation on February 3rd, 1769, which was to decide on the request made by the Bourbon Powers for the suppression of the Jesuits. Moreover, he had not agreed with all of the other steps taken by Clement XIII. Grimaldi now informed Azpuru that the Spanish Cardinals could give him their votes if he engaged himself to suppress the Jesuits.¹ "I do not know," wrote Bernis, "whether he has enough courage for so bold an undertaking."² His prospects were so favourable, however, that after the Spanish Cardinals had entered the conclave, Azpuru advised Cardinal Solis to sound Stoppani on his attitude towards the required condition, adding, however, that if he refused to make the promise and there was no other Cardinal to take his place, and Stoppani's election was assured in any case, Solis too could give him his vote. But Azpuru still felt uncomfortable about Stoppani, and Grimaldi, writing to him on May 9th, found fault with him inasmuch as Stoppani had been ranked among the "good" Cardinals on the ambassador's recommendations, and now he was making him out to be a Jesuit partisan in disguise. If Orsini and the French considered him to be a suitable man to carry out the wishes of the Courts, it lay with Stoppani to prove this by engaging himself by a definite contract to bring about the suppression of the Jesuits.³

But Stoppani proving immovable on this point, Azpuru advised the Spaniards to withhold their votes from him for

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 11, *ibid.*

² *To Choiseul, April 19, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

³ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 9, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

the time being and not to pay him any attention until it was found impossible to effect the success of Sersale or Cavalchini. He personally had failed to rid Aubeterre and his Court of their like of Stoppani, whom they preferred to everyone except Sersale. The Cardinals might try now and see if they were more successful.¹

But Stoppani's day was nearly over. On May 13th Azpuru wrote to Solis that Aubeterre was now thinking of Ganganelli,² and after the news had spread that Stoppani was the only Cardinal who pleased the Courts, the *Zelanti* turned away from him.³ The Crown Cardinals' answer to this was that Stoppani did in fact suit them, but not he alone; if the choice of the College were to fall on him they too would give him their votes.⁴

To help Stoppani to succeed, the French now decided to support him as inconspicuously as possible for the time being,⁵ and at the next voting to put Ganganelli in the foreground.⁶ But the distrust of the *Zelanti* was not to be allayed,⁷ and to the Spaniards he was still an object of suspicion. After the middle of May he was not seriously thought of again.⁸

From the very beginning the real candidate of the Powers

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 11, *ibid.*, Registro, 108.

² **Ibid.*, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

³ *Aguirre to Azpuru, May 13 and 14, *ibid.*

⁴ *Solis to Azpuru, May 14, *ibid.*

⁵ *Bernis to Aubeterre, May 15, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f. Besides the Spanish Cardinals Rezzonico and the Venetians were against Stoppani. *Solis to Azpuru, May 15, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁶ *Solis to Azpuru, May 15, 16, and 17, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013; *Azpuru to Solis, May 16, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Concl. 1769"; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 18, *ibid.*, Registro, 108; *Orsini to Aubeterre, May 16, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1^o 2^o 3^o 7; *Orsini to Tanucci, May 16, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1473.

⁷ *Solis to Azpuru, May 18, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁸ *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May [17?], State Archives, Vienna.

was Antonio Sersale, Archbishop of Naples. His irreproachable morality, his good nature, and his ability to please all parties had earned him a good reputation.¹ The princes turned their attention to him more because on several occasions he had showed but little love for Rome and was no friend of the Jesuits. Clement XIII. had not valued him highly.² But, as Roda wrote, the very qualities which especially commended him to the Courts rendered him anything but attractive to the majority of the Cardinals. They, according to Roda,³ wanted a Pope who would defend with all possible vigour the imagined rights and the excessive authority of the Roman Court, and at the same time would protect and further the Society of Jesus.³

Moreover, Sersale's cause was not advanced by the excessive zeal with which it was championed by his well-wishers after his entry into the conclave on March 21st. Tanucci had advised silence,⁴ but the rumours that the Courts desired his elevation made themselves heard, and the Cardinals, seeing here a danger to their electoral freedom, took fright. Orsini tried to make light of the rumour,⁵ but with so little success that even by February 28th he had written to Tanucci that Sersale was finished already.⁶ In any case he was held in no

¹ **Piano per il Conclave* (see above, p. 2, n. 1.).

² ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, IX., 554.

³ “ *Su indiferencia y ninguna adhesion a los Jesuitas y el no haver deferido a favor de Roma en algunas causas, en que aquella Corte con poca razon se ha empeñado y enardecido le haran menos acepto a las ideas nada justas del maior numero de los votos del Conclave, cuia mira sera hacer un Papa, que defienda con teson los imaginarios derechos y excesiva autoridad de la Corte de Roma y que al mismo tiempo defienda y ensalze a la Compañia ”. Roda to Grimaldi, February 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

⁴ *To Charles III., February 21, *ibid.*, 6007.

⁵ To Aubeterre, February 19, in CARAYON, XVII., 143 *seq.*; *to Azpuru, February 21, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

⁶ State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473; *Centomani to Tanucci, March 3, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, 1216.

esteem in the conclave. The rumour that the Powers wanted only him to be considered for election,¹ Charles III.'s and Tanucci's support of him,² and Azpuru's continual recommendations of him³ were of no more effect in the conclave than the marks of favour shown him by the Emperor.⁴ Precisely because he was wanted by the Courts he was not wanted by the Cardinals.⁵ Bernis, who had written on March 30th that it was no secret in France that the three Bourbon Courts were making special efforts on Sersale's behalf, was saying on April 12th that the only way of ensuring his success was to persist in formally excluding the other Cardinals; then the Cardinals would probably fall back on Sersale through sheer fatigue. On 26th April, Bernis admitted that there had not yet been any serious question of his election. The Spanish Cardinals also gave him up as hopeless.⁶

After Sersale's the second name on the Spanish list was Cavalchini's. This Cardinal, now eighty-six years old, had

¹ " *Circa il card. Sersale, oltre il numero de' poveri parenti, e l'esclusiva de' Rezzonici mi ha spaventato il poco anzi niun credito che ha tra i cardinali e la voce sparsa che le* Corone vogliano coarctare l'elezione del detto Sersale " (Orsini to Tanucci, March 14, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1473); *Sonetto contro il card. Sersale in varii sonetti e composizioni uscite dopo la morte di Clemente XIII. e precisamente nel Conclave dell'anno 1769, p. 8, Pastor Library.

² Choiseul to Fuentes, March 14, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4570; CARAYON, XVII., 144; *Charles III. to Tanucci, April 4, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6060.

³ *To Grimaldi, March 23, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108; *to Orsini, April 7, State Archives, Naples, Exped. " Conclave 1769 ".

⁴ See above, p. 19.

⁵ *Tanucci to Orsini, March 21, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6008; *Tanucci to Losada, April 4, *ibid.*

⁶ *Azpuru to Tanucci, May 5, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{400}{1145}$; *Orsini to Tanucci, May 16, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1473; *Azpuru to Solis, May 16, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Conclave 1769 ". The *documents of March 30 to April 26 in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

come near to being elected Pope in the previous conclave.¹ On that occasion the French had given him the *esclusiva* on account of his alleged leaning towards the Jesuits. Subsequently, however, he had shown marked impartiality in the Congregations and had ardently supported the beatification of Palafox.² He was now once more in Charles III.'s favour,³ and France withdrew its *esclusiva*, a sign of grace which moved the old man to tears.⁴

Bernis, however, intended to use Cavalchini's candidature as a means of attaining other ends. It was hardly likely, he thought, that the Cardinals would elect a man of eighty-six suffering from a weak chest, but he might be the means of depriving the Rezzonico party of a few votes.⁵ The Spanish representatives thought differently. They seriously intended to procure the tiara for Cavalchini in the hope that he would fall in with their wishes when appointing a Secretary of State and new Cardinals.⁶ Solis's opinion was that he was still mentally active and capable of devising means whereby to restore peace to the Catholic countries. He could do more in one month than others in ten years.⁷ Nevertheless, all the efforts made on his behalf came to nothing. It had to be acknowledged that neither Sersale nor Cavalchini had any hopes of success.

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI, 152.

² *Roda to Grimaldi, February 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012. A satirical sonnet **Per la esclusiva data al card. Cavalchini dalla Francia 1769* in the Campello Archives at Campello. *Ibid.* **Sonetto contro li satirici del conclave 1769* and **Dies irae contro i Gesuiti 1769*.

³ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, February 23, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

⁴ CARAYON, XVII., 145; *Bernis to Aubeterre, April 13, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d. ⁵ *To Choiseul, April 12, *ibid.*

⁶ *Bernis to Aubeterre, May 6, *ibid.*; *Erizzo to the Doge, April 29, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288; *Garcia and Aguirre to Azpuru, May 7 and 8, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁷ *Solis to Azpuru, May 7, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *Bernis to Aubeterre, May 11 and 12, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f.

Finally, therefore, on Azpuru's advice, it was decided to back Ganganelli, and he it was who was ultimately successful.

Ganganelli had long been an object of study for those who were interested in the future Papal elections. In the survey of the Cardinals made in 1765, he was ranked only nineteenth among the *Papabili*, and was thought to have no hope of gaining the tiara.¹ The Jansenist Dufour painted him in the blackest colours, possibly because he had spoken against Mésenguy's Catechism.² The secretary to the French embassy, De la Houze, found that he trimmed his sails to the wind and that his chief endeavour was to please everybody; he always sided with whomever he happened to be speaking to. De la Houze admitted, however, that Ganganelli had considerable influence with the Pope, and that his opinion carried decisive weight with the Holy Office. But on account of his intrigues his reputation in the College of Cardinals had sunk very low and he had no chance of becoming Pope.³ According to the Venetian envoy, Ganganelli's character was a mystery to everyone,⁴ while the Austrian ambassador considered him to be an unreliable and dangerous person.⁵ Tanucci had nothing but bad to say of him. In 1761 he was saying that he deserved the same fate as Malagrida; he was trying to sit on two stools at once, and it would serve him right if both slipped from under him.⁶ There were other ways, too, in which the Minister expressed his contempt of the Cardinal, though he conceded that perhaps he could be used against the Jesuits.⁷

¹ **Piano per il Conclave* (see above, p. 2, n. 1).

² CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *Clément XIV.*, 254.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 186 *seq.*; CARAYON, XVII., 196.

⁴ *Erizzo to the Doge, May 20, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288. ⁵ ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, IX., 551.

⁶ *"Ganganelli forse merita altrettanto [quanto Malagrida], che tiene li piedi sulle due staffe. Merita almeno, che tutte due gli fuggano, e manchino sotto i piedi." *To Bottari, October 24, Archives of Simancas, Estado, Ley. 5971; see below, p. 89.

⁷ *To Centomani, June 4 and 11, *ibid.* 5986; *to Grimaldi, April 25, *ibid.* 6102.

Far less harsh than those cited above, all of which laid stress on the vacillatory side of Ganganelli's character, was the opinion held by the Jesuit Cordara. After pointing out that the opinions held of Ganganelli were contradictory, so that it was hardly possible to form a clear-cut picture of his character, Cordara gives it as his own opinion that he deserved neither the high-flown praises of his friends nor the destructive criticisms of his enemies. Endowed with more than ordinary intellectual gifts, scholarliness, and virtues, he also possessed wonderfully good sense, humility, moderation, charitableness, charm, contentedness, and the power of careful reflection. Though he was not the saint that over-zealous partisans maintained him to be, he might well be regarded as a good and God-fearing Religious. His irreproachable conduct and his great zeal for study were plain for all to see, and in his own Order he was esteemed as a scholar. Towards the Jesuits he had been well-disposed at first, but on becoming a Cardinal and seeing that this friendship would be an obstacle to his further advancement, he had turned away from them.¹ The former Spanish envoy Roda, with whom he had been on intimate terms, put him third among the *Papabili* and wrote of him that in his opinion Ganganelli would make a hard-working Pope who would meet the wishes of the sovereigns and would not oppose the rights of royalty or the principles of the age. What told against him was that he belonged to an Order and was sixty-four years old.² Even before the opening of the conclave the Papal Privy Chamberlain, Roselli, wrote to Tanucci that Sersale and Ganganelli were the two most reasonable candidates for the tiara, and that Ganganelli was the only one who could bring about the suppression of the Jesuits.³ A visit lasting four and a half hours which Azpuru paid him before the conclave aroused so much attention

¹ *De suppressione*, 121 seqq., 152 seqq.; DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, III., 42 seq.

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 297.

³ *To Tanucci, February 7, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

that he was already regarded by some of the people as the future Pope.¹

In the Spanish lists Ganganelli appeared consistently in the "good" class, but to be treated with caution. Choiseul in fact marked him "very good",² both he and Aubeterre defending him against the charge of being friendly to the Jesuits.³ Azpuru too described him as the best candidate after Sersale.⁴

In the opening days of the conclave Ganganelli received one or two votes, which rose to seven or eight in the first half of April, and then dropped again.⁵ In the second half of March a party seemed to be forming in his support,⁶ rumours were already afloat in the city that he was the candidate of the Bourbons, the French especially,⁷ and some already regarded him as the future Pope.⁸ At that time his personal attitude was quite obscure; he assured Bernis that he placed his vote at his disposal, but then avoided any semblance of being Francophile, so that Bernis knew not what to make of him.⁹

¹ Azara to Roda, February 16, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 222.

² See above, p. 32.

³ CARAYON, XVII., 144; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 202.

⁴ *To Orsini, April 7, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁵ Scrutiny list of February 21 to May 19, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

⁶ *Azpuru to Orsini, March 20, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, *loc. cit.*; *Orsini to Azpuru, March 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012.

⁷ *Brunati to Colloredo, March 18 and 22, State Archives, Vienna.

⁸ According to Azpuru (*to Orsini on April 4, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"; *to Grimaldi on April 6, *ibid.*, Registro, 108) and Orsini (*to Azpuru on April 6, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013) this was an intrigue of his opponents, especially the younger Albani, devised for his downfall.

⁹ CARAYON, XVII., 152, 155, 164.

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It was not until the Spanish Cardinals Solis and La Cerda had entered the conclave at the end of April that the election of a new Pope could be undertaken in earnest. Up till then the voting had only shown that certain Cardinals who had been proposed stood no chance of success; from now onwards a positive decision might be expected. The leadership of the princes' party now passed to Solis, the confidential agent of the Spanish crown. When apprised by Azpuru of his Government's plans, the two prelates placed themselves entirely at their king's disposal,¹ and on their visits to the Cardinals made no secret of his object of bringing about the suppression of the Jesuits,² although four years previously Solis had expressed to the Pope the joy and satisfaction caused him by the fresh ratification of the Society of Jesus.³

As the end of the voting was now within measurable distance

¹ " *Yo non daré paso que no sea arreglado á las instrucciones de nuestro Soberano." Solis to Grimaldi, May 4, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

² BUONAMICI, in *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 310; *Kaunitz to Colloredo, April 29, State Archives, Vienna. A **Foglio di nuove*, of May 2 (State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1503) reports as follows: "Avere inoltre i Spagnuoli molti fogli segnati con Real Sigillo da esporsi a tutto il Collegio, coi quali fogli giustificavasi il suo operato, massime circa la giusta espulsione dai suoi regni della proscritta Società, opera della quale era stato lo spargere per tutta la Spagna l'orrenda impostura della Real Successione al Regno, e contro la memoria della Regina Elisabeth, che in fin la penna ha ribrezzo di esprimere."

³ *Letter of thanks from Clement XIII. to Solis, of May 22, 1765, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 12. In it the Pope commends the Archbishop's joy that "iniuriam a maledicentissimis hominibus et religioni infensis S. huic B. Petri Cathedrae atque etiam Ecclesiae universae oblatam ea Constitutione Nos depulisse." The Pope rejoiced to hear that in the Jesuits the Archbishop had zealous fellow-workers in the care of souls and that they "verbo denique et suarum virtutum odore et exemplo fideles ad studia pietatis excitando, Instituti sui praeceptis abunde satisfacere".

the representatives of the Governments deemed it advisable to restate their attitude in vigorous language. Aubeterre thought that they ought to repeat their threat to leave Rome if anyone was elected of whom they disapproved.¹ But no such statement was made, Bernis arguing that this would leave their opponents free to fill all the influential posts.² Choiseul let it be known in Madrid that he entirely disapproved of such an odious step,³ whereupon Grimaldi gave way.⁴ Of greater moment was the statement made for the second time, on May 1st, by the Bourbon Cardinals to the Dean of the Sacred College, also to Lante, Pozzobonelli, and Rezzonico, that the Courts had no intention of making the Pope, but that he was not to be made without them, and that a surprise election would not be recognized by the envoys.

On the arrival of the Spaniards it again became a burning question whether negotiations about the suppression of the Society of Jesus were to be opened in the conclave and whether a promise to suppress the Society might be exacted from the chosen candidate. Cardinal Solis was astounded by there being any doubt of the legitimacy of such a step; he for his part could not reconcile it with his conscience to give his vote to a Cardinal who would not in this respect pledge himself to the king in the required manner.⁵ To save one's arm, he

¹ Aubeterre to Orsini, April 29, in CARAYON, XVII., 170; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 4, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108; *Centomani to Orsini, May 6, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 10337; Kaunitz *reported to Colloredo on May 3 (State Archives, Vienna) that Solis intended to leave Rome immediately, together with the embassy and his fellow-countrymen, if an unacceptable Pope were elected.

² *To Aubeterre, April 29, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f.

³ *To Ossun, May 16, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁴ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 30, *ibid.*

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 4, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

said to Centomani, one had to sacrifice one's finger ; he could not be satisfied with an oral promise, as his instructions demanded one in writing.¹ Solis was supported in his attitude by Azpuru.² Bernis' view was different. Solis's demand would estrange many of the Cardinals whose votes were needed for the silent exclusion which the Bourbon party intended to exercise, and their opponents would then have the upper hand. To Aubeterre's arguments Bernis retorted that the Spaniards would soon see for themselves the impossibility of the plan they had devised.³

On May 3rd those of the Cardinals who represented the Courts deliberated for several hours on the question still at issue. They soon agreed that to negotiate in the conclave on the Jesuit affair was impossible. Cardinal Solis then tried to justify his demand for a written promise of suppression ; for safety's sake this would have to be demanded from every Cardinal except Sersale, who was the right man to fulfil the royal wishes. Luynes and Bernis spoke against him. Luynes held that such a promise was simony, the spiritual being pledged for the temporal. He would rather leave the conclave than stain his conscience. Besides, the plan was impracticable. What would happen if the candidate were to reject the request as being simoniacal, and were to publish it in the conclave ? The future Pope might also refuse to fulfil what he had promised as a Cardinal, and if his promise was to be published the Pope, it is true, would be exposed, but so would also the three Courts. Apart from all this he too thought that the future Pope would have to suppress the Society of Jesus, even if it were guiltless, for it was of more profit to the Church to

¹ " * . . . Restrinse [Solis] il suo discorso, che non era venuto al Conclave, nè dalla M. S. Catholica era stato mandato per la semplice elezione d'un Papa, ma per eliggere un tal Papa, che voglia estinguere la Compagnia. . . ." Centomani to Tanucci, May 2, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1216.

² *Azpuru to Solis, May 2, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Conclave 1769 ".

³ CARAYON, XVII., 172-4.

satisfy the three monarchs than to preserve a religious Order. Bernis and Orsini expressed similar views. Solis could think of no other reply but that he would consult further on the matter with La Cerda and Azpuru.¹ The Venetian envoy wrote at the beginning of May that he knew for sure that attempts had been made to persuade certain Cardinals to support this project of obtaining a promise, but with no success. Consequently all hope in this direction had been given up.²

Even after the Spaniards' entry into the conclave the former confusion persisted. Rezzonico and Bernis were in lively disagreement as to the order in which the candidates for the Papacy were to be proposed, and this dispute was followed by others.³ The Bourbon Cardinals repeated their threat that a precipitate election would not be recognized by the foreign envoys.⁴ With the arrival of the Portuguese envoy

¹ *Solis to Azpuru, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769" (translation); Solis and La Cerda to Grimaldi, May 4, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 320; *Orsini to Tanucci, May 5, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504. Cf. CARAYON, XVII., 176. The **Notizie segretissime* (see above, p. 47, n. 4) maintain falsely that Bernis, too, was in favour of a written promise.

² *Erizzo to the Doge, May 6, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288.

³ *Bernis to Aubeterre, May 5 and 7, in Jesuit possession; *Solis to Azpuru, on May 4-7, and *Azpuru to Garcia, on May 7, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

⁴ " *Il paroît nécessaire que M. les cardinaux de Solis, de Luynes et Orsini se rendent chés le Doyen du S. Collège pour lui déclarer ainsi qu'au Sous-Doyen et au card. Pozzobonelli, le quel sera prié d'en instruire le cardinal Rezzonico, qu'en conséquence de la dernière déclaration, les cardinaux des Couronnes déclarent de nouveau que dans le cas où il se ferait une élection . . . sans qu'on se fût concerté auparavant avec les cardinaux des trois Couronnes sur le sujet élu, cette élection courroit grand risque de n'estre pas reconnue par les ministres des trois Cours. . . ." (May 5, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, f; Spanish text in the

Almada on April 30th the fear arose that his turbulent spirit would confuse the situation still more.¹ Further, the Court party began to have misgivings about the durability of its *esclusiva* when it lost Lante's vote through his leaving the conclave on account of illness and when Conti's health became so precarious that the validity of his vote was open to doubt.² So little progress was made with the voting that Aubeterre began to fear that Madrid would complain about his lack of zeal. Bernis, however, set his doubts at rest by writing him out a testimonial.³ Then Roda complained about Bernis and his intrigues.⁴ Bernis retaliated by repeating his protest against the tyranny of the Spaniards, whose vetoes left only mediocre intellects to be elected. Rossi and Ganganelli, he said, had already signified their unwillingness to be proposed for election.⁵ Aubeterre, on the other hand, did not take Ganganelli's plans for withdrawal so seriously. They arose, he thought, more from the fear that his proposal was not honourably intended. However that might be, Ganganelli was one of those who were most likely to fit in with the wishes of the Courts. Choiseul wanted him, and though Azpuru showed little confidence in him he could be made to change his mind.⁶

Azpuru was in fact won over as the result of a long conversation which the conclavist Aguirre had with Ganganelli

Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769"). *Aubeterre to Orsini, May 7, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1504.

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 4 and 11, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108; *Centomani to Tanucci, May 5, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., *ibid.* Cf. above, p. 26.

² *Garcia to Azpuru, May 6, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769". *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 306, 314.

³ CARAYON, XVII., 178 *seqq.* *Aubeterre to Azpuru, May 8, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Cartas confidenciales del Confesor del Rey 1769.

⁴ To Azara, in CARAYON, XVII., 180.

⁵ *To Choiseul, May 10, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

⁶ *To Bernis, May 11, *ibid.*, g. Cf. CARAYON, XVII., 182.

on the evening of May 12th. On this occasion he spoke so freely against the Society of Jesus as to give grounds for hoping that on becoming Pope he would suppress it.¹ The next morning Azpuru wrote Solis a letter setting out the lines on which the two Spaniards were to proceed. If Sersale's or Cavalchini's election proved impossible they might not only vote for Ganganelli, but further his cause in every other way.² The two prelates accepted this instruction obediently.

Solis was surprised to learn from conversations with the French Cardinals that they were far from agreeing to Ganganelli's candidature.³ On the following day, however, Azpuru forwarded to Solis the correspondence that had passed between Choiseul and Fuentes, from which Solis could see that Ganganelli was *persona grata* to the Court of Versailles, and that Aubeterre, too, no longer had any doubts about his suitability. Solis was to find out tactfully why it was that Orsini and the French Cardinals did not speak out their minds, and above all he was to bring about a conversation with Ganganelli, who would doubtless make some statements which would gratify the Court of Madrid.⁴

On the same day, May 15th, Solis was able to report that the French Cardinals had now received instructions to press for Ganganelli's election with all their power. The outcome of the conclave could no longer be in doubt. In a report of June 28th, 1769, Solis gave the reasons which had led him to decide in favour of Ganganelli. In view of the impossibility of Sersale's or Cavalchini's election, of Fantuzzi's and Colonna's exclusion, of the resistance offered to the French candidate Stoppani by Rezzonico and Albani, he had proposed Ganganelli

¹ " * . . . se explicó con bastante franqueza contra la Compañía, de suerte que pudiera esperarse su extincion, si este Señor lograse la tiara, lo que referí al Em. Solis, que lo celebró . . ." Aguirre to Azpuru, May 13, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Conclave 1769 ".

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 323.

³ *To Azpuru, May 14, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

⁴ *To Solis, May 15, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome Exped. " Conclave 1769 ".

at a conference. This Cardinal was worthy of the triple crown in virtue of the qualities which graced him and because he surely conformed with the wishes of the monarchs and would fulfil his Court's requirements of the new Pope. He was positive of this as the result of his talks with Ganganelli.¹

As Solis proceeded to relate, the only difficulties that now stood in the way of bringing the election to a speedy end came from Bernis. In numerous letters he raised objections to the Franciscan Cardinal, either because he really mistrusted him or out of injured pride because Ganganelli had not been proposed by himself. Nobody really knew, he protested, what to make of him. Of all the *Papabili* he presented the greatest problem when it came to prophesying what he would do as Pope. Moreover, he was much in the company of the Albani, from which it was to be supposed that he was well disposed towards the Jesuits. These objections made Solis all the more insistent. He knew Ganganelli's character, he said. If they let slip this opportunity they ran the risk of having a Pope who offered no security to the Courts.² Finally Bernis acquiesced in the representations made to him by Aubeterre on May 17th. Ganganelli's election, explained the envoy, was approved by the Courts, so that their representatives could not be blamed if his pontificate subsequently proved unsatisfactory. It was all a gamble in the long run. Ganganelli was as good as the others, the others were no better than he, and none of them was to be trusted. Either the Albani had been won over by large bribes or they had come to an understanding with Ganganelli and were betraying the Spaniards. It was only the future that would reveal the truth. In any case, no blame could be attached to the French Cardinals or to himself.³

On the evening of May 17th one of Bernis' conclavists,

¹ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 337.

² *To Azpuru, May 16, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013; *Garcia to Azpuru [on May 16], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769".

³ CARAYON, XVII., 190, 194 seq.; CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *Clément XIV.*, 265 seq.

named Deshaises, paid a visit to Ganganelli, and was highly pleased with his expressions of opinion on the French wishes in the matter of Avignon, on the Jesuits, on Bernis himself.¹ At a morning conference on May 18th, Bernis now came out in keen support of the Franciscan Cardinal.² The statements made to him by Ganganelli, he wrote, enabled him to put pressure on him in respect of those matters which the king had especially at heart.³ He had worked out instructions which contained all his obligations and all demands.⁴ In the memorandum which Deshaises took with him to Ganganelli on the evening of May 18th, Bernis maintained that the future Pope would owe his elevation to France and he set out the salient points of the French interests. The secretary was instructed to write down in the margin in Ganganelli's presence the Cardinal's replies to each article, but he was not to let the memorandum out of his hands. In its place he was to hand over another one containing recommendations for Aubeterre's and Bernis' protégés.⁵ Success now being within reach, it was time to think of rewards and punishments. Without any question the Secretaryship of State must be asked for Pallavicini; Branciforte, whom Tanucci wanted, was too weak for this position. Antonelli and Garampi must be removed from Rome because they had behaved in the most hot-headed fashion during the troubles of the last few years. These two bad characters must be made to feel the Courts' displeasure, if only for the impression which their disfavour would make on others.⁶

Aubeterre again had to deal with Bernis' suspicions in the small hours of May 19th. What would Ganganelli stand to

¹ CARAYON, XVII., 192.

² *Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Conclave 1769" (May 18).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ To Aubeterre, May 18 (afternoon), in CARAYON, XVII., 193 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Aubeterre to Bernis, May 18 and 19, *ibid.*, 199; CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *loc. cit.*, 270 *seq.*

gain, he argued, from a secret compact with the Jesuits, but to lose his good name for nothing? It was no longer possible for the Pope to save the Order despite the Powers, who would finally press him so hard that he would no longer be able to refuse its secularization. Ganganelli might have promised his services in general terms, but he could hardly have gone any further, as a definite pledge would involve him in embarrassing situations. In other respects he satisfied the Courts; it was the Spaniards who had come to terms with him, France had played only a secondary part in the affair.¹

The last days of the election were described by Orsini in a letter to Tanucci.² On the evening of Tuesday, May 16th, everything was still undecided. On Wednesday it transpired that almost all the members of the Court party and even some of the Cardinals created by Clement XIII., among them De Rossi, Paracciani, Negroni, and Calini, were inclined to support Ganganelli's election. The opposition began seriously to think of Pozzobonelli, to whom they intended to divert the votes previously given to Colonna. On Wednesday and on Thursday morning Cardinal Calini reported after the scrutiny that the other two Venetian Cardinals, Priuli and Molino, had decided to support Ganganelli, it being impossible for Pozzobonelli to win through. When Boschi saw that Pozzobonelli stood no chance he persuaded Rezzonico to support Ganganelli. Bonaccorsi also went over to him. Thereupon a meeting was arranged for Thursday evening between Rezzonico and Bernis as the delegate of the three Courts. They met in Pozzobonelli's cell, as the latter represented the emperor. Pozzobonelli behaved very nobly, asking Rezzonico to support his competitor Ganganelli and thus help to accelerate the election. As Bernis agreed to vote for the candidate put forward by the others, Rezzonico also announced that he would support him and promised to go the round of his followers the

¹ Aubeterre to Bernis, May 19, in CARAYON, XVII., 195 *seq.*

² *On May 23, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1554; *Solis to Azpuru, May 18 (evening), Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013; PETRUCCELLI, IV., 193 *seq.*

next morning, so as to secure their votes. When Bernis brought this reply to Orsini and the Spanish Cardinals, Orsini was anxious for the round to be made at once, so as to finish off the election the next morning, for any delay might be fatal. Rezzonico and Cavalchini complied with this request. On hearing the rumour that everyone was voting for Ganganelli, the two Albani and their friends also decided to support him, so that by 2.30 a.m. he had secured about thirty-five votes. Accordingly first Rezzonico, then the Cardinals of the Bourbon Courts went to Ganganelli for the ceremonial kissing of his hand. After 3 a.m. they were followed by all the others, and thus the agreement was concluded. On Friday morning, May 19th, followed the unanimous election, Ganganelli voting for Rezzonico.¹ On Sunday, May 28th, Ganganelli, taking the name of Clement XIV., was consecrated Bishop, and on June 4th he was crowned Pope with due solemnity.²

Definite candidates had been envisaged by the Bourbon Courts not only for the Papal throne but also for the most important posts in the Curia.³ Azpuru instructed Solis to make the Courts' wishes known before he left the conclave.⁴

When the new Pope, after his election, proceeded to

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, May 19, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 329: "Relazione di tutte le cerimonie fatte per la consecrazione in vescovo della S^{ta} di N. S. PP. Clemente XIV. il dì 28 maggio 1769 e susseguentemente della di lui coronazione seguita il giorno 4 giugno," Roma, 1769; *Ragguaglio delle funzioni e cerimonie che si sono praticate nella basilica di S. Pietro per la coronazione seguita il giorno 4 giugno 1769 del nuovo S. P. Clemente XIV.*, Roma, 1769.

³ See above, pp. 34, 55, 71.

⁴ " *Me veo precisado a avisar V. E. antes que salga del Conclave, que el ambaxador de Francia me dixo anoche, que sus ordenes eran como las que yo tenia para pedir a Palavicini por Sec. de Estado, y no tenia facultades para pedir por otro: y pues V. E. ve que en esto estamos conformes, espero que proponga al nuevo Papa el referido card. Palavicini para dicha Secretaria." Azpuru to Solis, May 19, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

St. Peter's he was cheered by an enormous concourse of people.¹ According to Orsini they expected the princes' gratification with Clement XIV. to result in a happy pontificate and the return of peace and tranquillity. Many hoped that he would be another Sixtus V.² The atrabilious Azara, on the other hand, reported that on the whole the Romans had shown but little joy, that the only difference between the new Pope and his predecessor was his number, that the satirists were saying that instead of a dove a raven had come down from heaven, and whereas war was being declared on the monks in every other part of the world, the Cardinals had chosen the only Frate among them.³ The Jesuit General Ricci, on the contrary, saw it as the working of Providence that in spite of the universal hatred of the Orders a Religious should be chosen, and, what was more, a man distinguished for his rectitude, knowledge, talents, and circumspection.⁴ Similarly Alessandro Albani reported to Vienna that the election had been carried out with such accord that even doubters must recognize it as the work of the Holy Ghost.⁵ The Jesuit Cordara, however, wrote of the election that the people rejoiced, the nobility were astonished, the educated reserved their opinion, the conventuals were jubilant, and only the Jesuits grieved in gloomy foreboding, knowing that the Pope was heart and soul in agreement with Spain.⁶

Of the statesmen, Tanucci, who had been no friend of Ganganelli's, sent only a cool reply of acknowledgment to

¹ A. TOSI, *Lo stato presente della Corte di Roma*, I., Roma, 1774, 75.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, May 19, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 25, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108; BUONAMICI, in *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XX., 315.

³ To Roda, May 25, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 283 seq.

⁴ **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, 7, fasc. II., n. 154.

⁵ *To Colloredo, May 19, State Archives, Vienna.

⁶ In DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, III., 42 seq.

Orsini's first detailed report on the election.¹ In confidential letters the young king of Naples openly expressed his annoyance at Sersale's defeat² and he acknowledged the nuncio's announcement of the election in icy language. According to Azpuru, however, the Bourbons had every reason for satisfaction.³ In sending Bernis, Aubeterre's successor, his letters of credence, Choiseul congratulated him on the result of the election, which, he said, did him great honour.⁴ To Ossun, the French ambassador in Madrid, he described the new Pope as one of the men they had most wanted to succeed.⁵ In Spain, Ganganelli's elevation was received by the leading personalities and by the whole of the capital with unalloyed rejoicing. As related by Azpuru in an audience with the new Pope, Charles III. saw it as a miracle performed by St. Francis and the venerable Palafox⁶; the man who had been chosen, the king had said, was one of the few of whom he could have hopes of their fulfilling his rightful wishes.⁷ The royal confessor Osma wrote to Solis that he kissed the feet of the chosen one with the lips of his heart.⁸ Roda, who waited on

¹ *To Orsini, May 20, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{292}{1037}$.

² " *Nelle prime istruzioni di Spagna era Ganganelli tralli sospetti di Gesuitismo. Certamente li Gesuiti lo promossero già, si sà amico degli Albani, si sà incostante e pronto a quante bandiere gli bisognino per far quel camiño che ha destinato " (Tanucci to Losada, May 23, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6008). *Tanucci to Centomani, June 3, *ibid*.

³ *Azpuru to Tanucci, May 19, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{400}{1145}$.

⁴ *May 30, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

⁵ *On May 30, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4571.

⁶ *Azpuru told Clement XIV. " che S.M. in quel primo momento di giubilo s'era spiegato che riconosceva esser questo un visibile miracolo di S. Francesco e del venerabile Palafox." Erizzo to the Doge, June 17, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288.

⁷ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 30, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49.

⁸ *To Solis, May 29, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

events, framed his comment in more sober language.¹ Orders were given for a *Te Deum* to be sung in the royal chapel, and for three days buildings were to be illuminated and officials were to wear full-dress uniform.² The two Spanish Cardinals were commended and each received 2,000 doubloons more to defray the cost of their journey.³ Solis received an additional 1,000 doubloons,⁴ Azpuru the archbishopric of Valencia,⁵ and Malvezzi the expectation of the Dataria ⁶ as a reward for his support of Spain in the conclave.⁷

Bernis took advantage of the occasion to free himself of a debt of 207,000 *livres*. Now that the king had granted him the title of Minister of State, he thought that it would be only consonant with the royal bounty to restore his pension, especially as it was universal knowledge that it was principally due to him that Ganganelli had been raised to the throne. Without this mark of favour he would never be happy. If he could also obtain a company for his nephew he would be eternally grateful to Choiseul.⁸ The Minister granted his request, but in return asked Bernis to free him from the importunate demands of the Spaniards, who with less sense than Pombal, were persistently pressing him to instruct his envoy in Rome to demand the suppression of the Jesuits.⁹

¹ To Azara, June 13, in CARAYON, XVII., 200 *seq.*

² *Grimaldi to Roda, May 31, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

³ *Grimaldi to Solis, June 13, *ibid.*; *Solis to Grimaldi, June 29, *ibid.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Solis and Muzquiz, September 17, *ibid.*

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, January 16, 1770, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes.

⁶ *Malvezzi to Charles III., July 5, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5885.

⁷ *Azpuru to Solis, May 19, 1769, *ibid.*, 5013.

⁸ To Choiseul, June 7, in CARAYON, XVII., 200.

⁹ *To Bernis, July 10, in Jesuit possession, *De suppressione*, d.

(10)

EVEN before Clement XIV. had ascended the throne the diplomats were discussing the question of the suppression of the Society of Jesus. Although the new Pope, reported Centomani, owed his initial success to the Jesuits he had not much liking for them. Like the rest of the world he too had had his eyes opened by the events of recent years, especially those connected with the beatification of Palafox.¹ At his first audience with the Pope Centomani gained the impression from what he said that the Powers would have no difficulty in obtaining from him the suppression of the Order.² Cardinal Solis drew the same conclusion from the way in which the offices were filled and from the Pope's repeated admission that he owed his position to the King of Spain and had no other desire but to live in harmony with the three Courts.³ The well-informed Venetian envoy reported to the Doge that the ambassadors of France, Spain, and Portugal thought that the suppression would undoubtedly take place and that the time, manner, and means might safely be left to the Pope.⁴ Cardinal Malvezzi stated quite bluntly in Bologna that the abolition of the so-called Company of Jesus was definitely a preliminary condition of any understanding between the Holy See and the temporal Powers, especially Portugal.⁵ Azpuru saw some significance in the inscription on the first medal struck by the Pope: *Fiat pax in virtute*

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, May 19, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 471, 1218.

² *To Tanucci, June 16, *ibid.*

³ *To Grimaldi, May 25, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

⁴ *Erizzo, May 25, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 288.

⁵ “*[Malvezzi] ha dicho sin la menor reserva, que tiene por cierto la proxima total abolicion de la llamada Compañía de Jesús, añadiendo, que es una expresa preliminar condicion del acomodamiento de las Coronas, y particularmente de la de Portugal, con la S. Sede.” Zambeccari to Grimaldi, July 1, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4734.

tua. Moreover, Clement XIV. had said that he intended to follow the same policy as Benedict XIV. He held different—or, rather, opposite—views from those of his predecessor; he was filled with the desire to gratify the Spanish king, to whom he felt himself deeply indebted. Before his election, Clement XIV. had neither refused (like Stoppani) nor agreed to make any promise about the suppression, but he had used such terms as to leave Solis in no doubt that he would set to work about it after his elevation. Aspuru did not attach much weight to the coldness with which Clement XIV. had received the Jesuit General at the ceremonial kissing of his foot (as the latter commended his Order to the Pope he had dismissed him immediately by giving him his blessing). The Romans, it is true, looked on this as an omen, especially as the Pope had given a cordial reception to the heads of the other Orders, and the Jesuits themselves thought it to be a bad sign.¹ A far more convincing piece of evidence, in Aspuru's opinion, was Clement's retention of the conduct of the process of beatification of Bishop Palafox; at the audience the Pope had spoken of the suppression in such a way that it was clear that he intended to conform with the desires of the Spanish king.²

At one time it was a much disputed question whether or not Clement XIV. had bound himself before his election to abolish the Society of Jesus.³ Tanucci appears to have maintained

¹ When Ricci presented himself for an audience with the Pope, he was left to wait in the ante-room for a long time and was finally not received at all. *Brunati to Colloredo, July 29, State Archives, Vienna.

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 330 *seq.*

³ MASSON (p. 105, n. 2) and SAINT-PRIEST (p. 77) leave the question open. With the exception of CRÉTINEAU-JOLY modern historians deny the existence of a simoniacal pact. RAVIGNAN (II., 368) shows that the Jesuits or ex-Jesuits were foremost in opposing this calumny, the sole exception being GEORGEL (*Mém.*, I., 123; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 265 *seq.*), who left the Society in 1762, viz. before the expulsion from France. According to Masson (*loc. cit.*) Carayon also maintained the existence of the simoniacal

that he had done so.¹ But Tanucci was in Naples, far away from the conclave, and those who were nearest to the scene of action knew nothing of any such simoniacal bargain. Azpuru's definite denial of anything of the sort has already been cited and on the eve of the election he was writing to Grimaldi that Orsini and the French Cardinals had obstinately refused to make any such proposals to their fellow-prelates; he himself had opposed their view but without success.² Solis, it is true, was speaking at the end of June 1769, of special negotiations that were being conducted with Ganganelli before his election, from which he was assured that the demands which the Spanish Court wanted to lay before the new Pope would be met by him.³ But the nature of these secret negotiations is revealed in statements made by Bernis: there was no question of any formal promise to suppress the Order. In a report of July 26th, 1769, Bernis says of an audience with Clement XIV., "The Pope stated his attitude towards the suppression of the Jesuits in the same terms as he had used to me at the time of the election. He added in confidence that then the proposal had been made to him to commit to writing his view of the suppression, but he had confined himself to saying that provided the canonical regulations were not infringed, he considered it possible and even profitable."⁴ Two days later, Bernis, writing of the two Spanish Cardinals, said, "The document which they got the Pope to sign is in no way binding. The Pope himself gave me the wording of it."⁵ When the Spaniards accused Bernis of not really trying to work for the suppression, he again referred them, on

pact, but Carayon writes in *Documents inédits* (Introduction, p. xxiv): "Les fils de la s. Église n'accepteront jamais la gratuite hypothèse d'un Pape simoniaque."

¹ " *Il Papa promette l'estinzione nel conclave a nei primi giorni del sul pontificato." Tanucci to Grimaldi, October 31, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102.

² Azpuru, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 327.

³ *Ibid.*, 337, n. 1.

⁴ *To Choiseul, July 26, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036.

⁵ To the same, July 28, in CARAYON, XVII., 202; MASSON, 107.

November 20th, 1769, to the part he had played in the conclave. Again he said that the Spaniards had done nothing more than obtain a document which was in no way binding ; in it Ganganelli had merely stated as a theologian that in his opinion the Pope could dissolve the Society of Jesus with a good conscience, provided the precepts of canon law and the principles of prudence and justice were observed. He, on the other hand, in the matter of the suppression, had, in the conclave, tied the knots with which the Pope was now bound fast. He it was who had laid the foundation-stone of the building, since his last dispatch from the conclave contained real promises and showed the way which the Holy Father was disposed to take in that delicate matter.¹ But the so-called promises were the same that Deshaises had obtained in his talk with Ganganelli and also went no further than phrases of a general nature. Bernis himself had to admit later : " I have discovered, to my great surprise, that the Pope has not bound himself either to Spain or to us and that we have no other hold on him than the general assurances he gave me in the conclave." ²

Nor did Charles III. know of any formal promise made by Ganganelli. He wrote to Tanucci that he too grieved that Sersale had not been chosen, but that to form a just opinion of the new Pope they must allow some time to pass ; he, the king, was confident that the just God would help him and support him.³ In a dispatch of the same day Grimaldi wrote of the indefinite hopes that were being held.⁴ He would

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 296 *seq.*

² MASSON, 108 *seq.*

³ To Tanucci, June 13, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 335.

⁴ " *Nos cuentan todo cuanto ha ejecutado y cuanto ha dicho, y de todo sacan esperanzas, aunque indecisas " (Grimaldi to Tanucci, June 13, *ibid.*). The note to which Crétineau-Joly appeals does not represent any simoniacal pact in the canonical sense. " Dans ce billet, Ganganelli déclare, ' qu'il reconnaît au Souverain Pontife le droit de pouvoir éteindre en conscience la Compagnie de Jésus, en observant les règles canoniques, et qu'il est à souhaiter que le futur Pape fasse tous ses efforts pour

not have written in this way if definite assurances had been given that the suppression would take place.

On the other hand it is difficult to deny that in the conclave Ganganelli had let drop remarks which were sometimes in favour of the Jesuits, sometimes to their disadvantage, so that both parties could appeal to him. The Augustinian General Vasquez reported that after the conclave one of his subjects had had a conversation with a Jesuit, who told him that Cardinal Pirelli had read him a passage from his diary, according to which, as the conclave was drawing to an end, Ganganelli had sent a note to Borromei, assuring him that the Jesuits would not be suppressed.¹ Whereas on one occasion he had said of the Bourbons, "They have long arms, stretching beyond the Alps and the Pyrenees," he had given the Cardinals who did not want to sacrifice the Jesuits merely on account of fantastic accusations, the following assurance, uttered in a tone of conviction: "There ought to be no more thought of abolishing the Society of Jesus than of overthrowing St. Peter's."² One day in the conclave Ganganelli was asked by chance if he would vote for Stoppani. "On no account," was his reply, "for once he is Pope he would certainly suppress the Jesuits." The reply came so promptly and decisively that it gave the impression of coming from his heart and it did much to influence the Cardinals in his favour.³

accomplir le voeu des Couronnes'." (*Clément XIV.*, 260). The note is the reply in which Ganganelli signified his agreement with the written work which appeared during the conclave: "Se N. S. Clemente XIII. . . debba in coscienza condiscendere alle istanze . . . per la Soppressione," etc. (see above, p. 38, n. 1). Cf. RAVIGNAN, II., 370 *seq.*

¹ *To Roda, January 30, 1772, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, *Cartas de Vasquez*, vol. II.; ROUSSEAU, I., 298. Pirelli's diary was not accessible to the author, as the department of the Vatican Archives where it was formerly kept was being rearranged when this chapter was written.

² CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *Clément XIV.*, 256.

³ CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 121; DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, III., 41.

One evening, the story is told by Azara, Cardinal Rezzonico was going through the conclave collecting votes for a certain candidate. Ganganelli, being under an obligation to Rezzonico, placed his vote at his disposal, but observed at the same time that this meant a great sacrifice for him, as the Cardinal in question would suppress the Jesuits the day after his election. Rezzonico took fright and dropped the candidate—as Ganganelli intended he should.¹

To represent Ganganelli as a liar on account of this two-faced policy, as is done by a modern historian,² would, we think, be going too far. We should probably be nearer the truth in regarding him as a weak and ambitious character who aspired to the triple tiara. Confronted by a friend or a foe of the Jesuits, he merely echoed the opinion expressed, himself a complete prey to uncertainty.

The key to the understanding of the policy and the tribulations of Clement XIV. lies in the conclave of 1769.

¹ Azara to Roda, June 22, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 296.

² ROUSSEAU, I., 298. Cf. Cordara as discussed by DUHR in the *Stimmen der Zeit*, CX. (1926), 211, n. 2.

CHAPTER II

CLEMENT XIV.'S PREVIOUS CAREER AND PERSONALITY—HIS POLICY OF PEACE AND CONCESSIONS—THE SETTLEMENT WITH PORTUGAL.

(1)

THE new Pope was born on October 31st, 1705, at Sant' Arcangelo, a town near Rimini, in the Legation of Ravenna.¹ His father, Lorenzo Ganganelli, was in medical practice there ; his mother, Angela Serafina, was a member of the noble family of Mazza in Pesaro. The real home of the Ganganelli was Sant' Angelo in Vado, in the duchy of Urbino, whence they moved to Borgopace, a hamlet in the diocese of Urbania. According to the baptismal register of the church of S. Agata in Arcangelo, Lorenzo's son was baptized on November 2nd, 1705, and was christened Giovanni Vincenzo Antonio.²

¹ RUGGERI, *Memorie riguardanti la terra di S. Arcangelo in Romagna*, Cesena, 1817 ; MARINI, *Mem. stor. di S. Arcangelo*, Roma, 1843. The triumphal arch erected in honour of Clement XIV. at Sant' Arcangelo, next to the Palazzo Municipale, is reproduced in the *Dizionario corografico dell'Italia*, VII., 2, 1073.

² " A.D. 1705 die 2 Nov. Ego Alex. Gualterius rector baptizavi infantem natum ex perill. et excell. dom. Laurentio Ganganello physico meritissimo huius terrae ac perill. dom. Angela Seraphina de Maciis coniugibus huius paróchiaie S. Agathae Archangeli, cui impositum est nomen Iohannis Vincentii Antonii." (P. Galletti, *Notizie della famiglia Ganganelli con molti Brevi di Clemente XIV., Cod. Vat., 7983, Vatican Library, where there are a number of notes on the Ganganelli and Mazza families and some Briefs to his home-town). Cf. P. T. SALVETTI, *De patria Clementis XIV.*, Romae, 1822 ; MARINI, *loc. cit.*, 113 ; UGOLINI, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, N.S., III., 1, 40, 57 *seqq.* (correction by Theiner), IV, 1, 185 *seq.*, 188 *seq.* (family tree) ; PASINI FRASSONI, *La famiglia di Clemente XIV.*, in the *Riv. arald.*, IX. (1911), 482 *seqq.*, and CASALI, *Gli antenati di Clemente XIV.*, *ibid.*, XI. (1913), 401 *seq.* In 1769 the inhabitants of Urbania erected a statue to the Pope in the main street ; its inscription in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, N.S., IV., 1, 149. *Ibid.*, 187, the inscription of the statue at Sant' Arcangelo in Vado, of the year 1769.

Losing his father in his early youth, the orphaned Giovanni found a protector in one of his mother's relatives, and on the latter's death he had the good fortune to find at Rimini, where he had been sent by his mother, who had moved to Veruchio, another well-to-do protector, who saw to his education.¹ At Rimini the young Ganganelli was much in the company of a Franciscan Conventual who was a relative of his. Strongly influenced by this connection, he decided when still short of his eighteenth year, in May 1723, to enter the Franciscan Order at Mondaino, on which occasion he changed his baptismal name for that of his father. Having completed his noviciate at Urbino,² Fra Lorenzo took his solemn vows on May 18th, 1724. Outstandingly successful as a student of philosophy and theology in the Order's convents at Pesaro, Recanati, and Fano, from 1728 onwards he completed his studies during nearly three years' residence in the College of St. Bonaventure in Rome, under the direction of Antonio Lucci, afterwards Bishop of Bovino. After he had taken his doctor's degree in 1731 his superiors employed him for nine continuous years as a teacher of philosophy and theology in the convents of Ascoli, Bologna, Milan, and again in Bologna. In these places Fra Lorenzo was on so friendly terms with the Jesuits that he was regarded as one of their family.³ When engaged in Milan in the public defence of certain theological theses he dedicated them to St. Ignatius and used the opportunity of having printed at the head of his theses a brilliant

¹ Besides the *Ragguaglio della vita di Clemente XIV.*, Firenze, 1775, 2 *seqq.*, and the *Storia della vita di Clemente XIV.*, Napoli, 1778, 5 *seq.*, cf. **Sincere notizie concernenti la persona del nuovo S. Pontefice P. Clemente XIV.* in the Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, No. 579. In his **Brief to Rimini*, of July 15, 1769, Clement XIV. said that he regarded that town as "tanquam alteram Nostram patriam". Cod. Vat., 7983, Vatican Library.

² Recalling these times in his *Brief to Urbino* of June 24, 1769, Clement XIV. wrote "civitatem istam quam patriam ac parentem Nostram nuncupare iure possumus". THEINER, *Epist.*, 5.

³ CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 154.

speech in praise of the Society of Jesus.¹ It was owing to his recommendation by a Jesuit named Urbani to Cardinal Annibale Albani, the patron of the College of St. Bonaventure, that Fra Lorenzo was appointed Rector of the college in May 1740.²

In the following year there took place the General Chapter of the Franciscans, at which Benedict XIV. presided and at which Ganganelli had the honour of welcoming him with an eloquent address.³ With the patrons of the College of St. Bonaventure, the two Cardinals Albani, Ganganelli had so violent and protracted disputes that relations between them were constantly strained.⁴ When the post of a First Consultor to the Inquisition, which was at the disposal of the Franciscans, fell vacant, the talented Ganganelli, who had hitherto acquitted himself most creditably in all his tasks, was proposed by his Superiors, and at Easter, 1746, he was appointed to this office by Benedict XIV. It was a post which was likely to be a step to the cardinalate, as it had been in fact for his two predecessors Centini and Brancati, provided that he was not appointed to higher positions within his Order. For this reason he twice, in 1753 and 1759, declined to accept his election as Franciscan General.⁵

As Fra Lorenzo performed his task in the Inquisition very well,⁶ was also theologian to Cardinals Tanara, Gentili, and

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.* (the date given is in accordance with the **Sincere notizie* mentioned on p. 84, n. 1). In 1740 Ganganelli lost his mother; *v. Riv. arald.*, XI. (1913), 402.

³ Reprinted in FREDIANI, *Lettere*, 416 *seq.*

⁴ *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 20, 1769, State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ MASSON, *Bernis*, 141. *Cf.* FÖRSTER, *Papstwahl*, 22.

⁶ Evidence of this is provided by his **Censura del libro* "Fra P. Sarpi giustificato col finto nome di Giusto Nave", allegedly published in Cologne in 1752 (*v. REUSCH*, II., 325) but actually, as Ganganelli surmised, printed in Italy and written by a Tuscan. The work claims to exculpate Sarpi from the charge of heresy and even portrays him as a saint, who has worked miracles after his death. Ganganelli's verdict was " *Io reputo questo libro più

Bolognetti, and took an active interest in the missionary college of S. Antonio dei Monti, which at his instigation was moved from Assisi to Rome,¹ his prospects of becoming Cardinal increased. Clement XIII. wishing to include a Religious in the promotion of autumn 1759, his choice fell on the Franciscan who was so intimate with the Jesuits as almost to be one himself,² and it was chiefly due to this circumstance that the pro-Jesuit Pope admitted Ganganelli to the Sacred College on September 24th, 1759. The titular church assigned to him was S. Lorenzo in Panisperna, which he afterwards changed for SS. Apostoli.³ His conventual dwelling near the

pernicioso di quello sarebbe, se impegnasse sfacciatamente qualche dogma cattolico". Regarding Sarpi's heresy he refers to Bossuet's verdict and cites the nuncio's report that Sarpi died unreconciled with the Church (*cf.* our account, Vol. XXV, 215, n. 1). Even if Sarpi was not a heretic, Ganganelli continues, he was certainly no saint, and his books had been banned by the Church. To represent Pallavicini as Sarpi's calumniator, as Giusto Nave does, was absurd. "Censeo itaque hunc librum damnandum esse tanquam continentem propositiones alias a S. Sede damnatas, S. Sedis iuribus iniuriosas, seditiosas, catholicis scriptoribus contumeliosas, piarum aurium offensivas et respective schismaticas. D. ex S. Apost. 14 Apr. 1753. Ego fr. Laurentius Ganganelli, S. Uffic. consultor." Cod. Vat., 8379, p. 32 *seqq.*, Vatican Library.

¹ **Sincere notizie*, *loc. cit.*

² REUMONT (*Ganganelli*, 39) and MASSON (*Bernis*, 141) state, without giving any authority, that Ganganelli was recommended to the Pope by the Jesuit General Ricci. There is no confirmation of this in Ricci's *diary (in Jesuit possession). As against this, Kaunitz reported in a *letter to Colloredo, of May 20, 1769: "Avendo in più occasioni manifestato il sul contragenio al Gesuitismo, fu per opera del card. Spinelli e del card. Erba promosso alla porpora" (State Archives, Vienna). It would seem from this that Ganganelli had begun his double-dealing even before it has been generally supposed.

³ *Cf.* our account, vol. xxxvii, 397. According to an *Avviso of September 23, 1759, Ganganelli, foreseeing his promotion, had appointed as his auditor the excellent Abbé Ferri. (Cod. Barb., LXXIII., 36, Vatican Library). On October 27, 1759, the town

latter church he occupied until his election to the Papacy—a period of over nine years—living there in the same strict poverty as when he had been a simple Religious.

Both as a Cardinal and previously, when Rector of the College of St. Bonaventure, Ganganelli engaged in extensive correspondence with the most diverse personalities, both clerical and lay. One of his correspondents was Giovanni Lami, a learned Florentine, involved in numerous controversies, who was librarian of the Riccardiana and professor of church history at the Florence *liceo*. After Ganganelli's death Lami conceived the project of publishing his correspondence, but unfortunately he handed over this task to the Marchese Luigi Antonio Caraccioli, a prolific writer who could offer no personal guarantee for the authenticity of the letters. In 1776 Caraccioli published in Paris a collection of Ganganelli's letters in two volumes,¹ supplements appearing later. The publication caused a great stir, but the greater the interest taken in it the more outspoken were the doubts about the genuineness of its contents. Though not all the letters are fabrications, even those who uphold the authenticity of the publication admit that Caraccioli's interpolations greatly altered very many of the letters and that quite a number are sheer inventions of his own. Consequently, one shrinks from drawing on so suspicious a source.²

of Rimini included the new Cardinal among its patricians ;
 • *v. Riv. arald.*, IX. (1911), 483.

¹ *Lettere interessanti di Clemente XIV.*, Parigi, 1776 (French translation, Amsterdam, 1776, German trans., Frankfurt, 1776) ; latest edition by Frediani, Firenze, 1845 and 1847.

² As Bernis and others (POTTER, *Ricci*, I., 328) claimed to have seen the originals of the letters which THEINER (*Klemens XIV.*, German ed., I., xiv.) condemns *en bloc* as fictitious, RANKE (III., 139, n. 1 ; Eng. ed., II., 449 n.) considers them to be essentially authentic. He holds that " the living man is to be seen in them " and that they could not have come from the pen of Caraccioli, the insignificant biographer of Clement XIV. ; he cannot deny, however, that the letters were interpolated. REUMONT, who

After he had attained the rank of Cardinal, Fra Lorenzo, like so many others, was possessed by the ambition to become Pope.¹ Why should not the lot that fell to the fourth and fifth Sixtus be his too? It was said by an Austrian diplomat that Ganganelli was created a Cardinal on account of his success as a theologian and canonist, which always carried great weight in Rome, also on account of his great charm of manner, the concealment of his real views, and the skill with which he emerged successfully from awkward situations. Even when he had been a simple friar, no one had been able

discusses the matter clearly in his *Ganganelli* (1847, pp. 40 *seqq.*), was on the whole in agreement with Ranke, but admits that "doubtless much is spurious" and, what is worse, that Caraccioli, "an indefatigable scribbler, could offer little personal guarantee." Accordingly, in his translation, Reumont omits altogether some of the letters which are obvious inventions and also admits that "many of the letters are spurious in places" and that "many of the rather daring and ambiguous expressions must be attributed to the editor". Later, Reumont was of the opinion that the interpolations were far more numerous than he had supposed in 1847 (*Hist. Jahrbuch*, V., 636). Cf. also REUMONT, *Bibliografia*, 218. A most glaring falsification occurs in the letter to an anonymous Count of December 31, 1741, in which Ganganelli is supposed to have recommended Giannone's *Storia di Napoli*. (Compare this with Ganganelli's *'Censura' of the book on Sarpi; see above, p. 85, n. 6.) I have lately discovered a piece of evidence against the authenticity of the letters which should settle the question. A ciphered *letter from the Cardinal Secretary of State to Bellisomi, the nuncio at Cologne, of December 27, 1776, contains this passage: "Fra le diverse produzioni specialmente epistolari attribuite fantasticamente al defunto Pontefice non erano a mia notizia i Dialoghi costì divulgati col titolo 'Entrevues'," which is a scandalous book (Nunziat. di Colonia, 772, Papal Secret Archives). The work by DE LA TOUCHE, *Clément XIV. et Carlo Bertinazzi. Corresp. inédite*, Paris, 1827 (German trans. by Rüder, Leipzig, 1830), is quite fantastic.

¹ "At cardinalatum adeptus respectare etiam coepit pontificatum. Haec omnes ferme cardinales perurit urtica." CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 154.

to form a definite opinion on what he really thought.¹ As time passed, however, and the Jesuit question caused an ever deeper cleavage in the minds of men, it became impossible for him to please both parties. How bitter was the feeling against him in anti-Jesuit circles can be seen from a letter of Tanucci's, written in the autumn of 1761. This Cardinal, wrote Tanucci, was such a double-dealer that he really deserved, like Malagrida, to be executed as a traitor; in any case, he certainly deserved to be dropped by both parties.² As the years went by and the Jesuits were assailed with ever greater violence, Ganganelli realized that he was not likely to attain to the supreme office if he stayed on their side. He therefore drew away from them, turned towards their enemies, and formed a friendship with the anti-Jesuit Spanish ambassador, Roda. Cordara, who relates this, thinks that he acted thus for the sake of appearances only and that it was not a question of Lorenzo's thoughts and wishes.³ This view was held by others, too. In the State Archives in Naples is a collection of character sketches of the Cardinals, dated October 14th, 1765, in which Ganganelli appears among the *Papabili*. This is his description: "He adheres to the scholastics, but has sufficient knowledge and is much addicted to intrigue. He often gives the appearance of being against the Jesuits, but actually he is much attached to them and did his utmost to promote the Papal prohibition of Mésenguý's Jansenistic Catechism. Since becoming Cardinal he has lost the esteem of even his own Religious, who on Sciarra's death wanted Chigi as their protector, to the exclusion of Ganganelli."⁴ The Cardinal's attitude towards the question of Mésenguý's Catechism was

¹ *Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

² See above, p. 61.

³ CORDARA, *loc. cit.*, 154 *seq.*

⁴ "È puro scolastico di sufficiente dottrina e molto intricante. Dopo il cappello ha persa ogni stima anche presso de' suoi religiosi . . . Affetta alle volte di parlare contro i gesuiti, ma gli è addettissimo e fu gran censore e promotore per la proibizione del catechismo di Mesanguì. [Cf. our account, vol. XXXVII, 18 *seqq.*] Non sarà dunque in minima considerazione." Piano per il

a great disappointment to the anti-Jesuit Cardinal Spinelli, who had supported Fra Lorenzo's promotion, having been led to suppose from his utterances that he was of like mind with himself. Spinelli suffered another disappointment when the beatification of the anti-Jesuit Palafox, which Spain was promoting with all its power, was under consideration. In the course of the negotiations Ganganelli managed to secure for himself the office of a *ponens* but did nothing to advance the cause. On the contrary he raised so many formal difficulties that no progress was made.¹

On the other hand, Clement XIII. too, could not but see that he had been mistaken in thinking that in the person of Ganganelli he had summoned to the Sacred College a Jesuit in Franciscan clothing,² for Ganganelli obstructed his ecclesiastical policy whenever he could. He directly censured as noxious the Secretary of State's, Torrigiani's, attitude towards the Courts and he alone opposed the taking of money from the treasure of Sixtus V.³ It must have sorely grieved the Pope to learn that Ganganelli sided with the Duke of Parma and had sent the French ambassador a defence he had written on the duke's behalf against the Papal monitorium.⁴

Conclave, dated October 14, 1765, State Archives, Naples, Pot. Est., 1554.

¹ *Letter from Centomani to Tanucci, May 7, 1771, State Archives, Naples. Cf. our account, xxxvii, 413.

² CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 154.

³ " *Egli si è mostrato sempre contrario al passato governo biasimando la nociva condotta del card. Torrigiani nelle brighe prese colle corti cattoliche e fu egli l' unico che si oppose all' estrazione di denaro fatta dal tesoro di Sisto V. in occasione di carestia e di altre emergenze." Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 20, 1769, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 23, 1768 (Archives of Simancas, Est., Ley. 5222); " Dias pasados [the Cardinal nephew] acusó a su hermano Msgr. Mayordomo de traidor a la S. Sede ; al card. Negroni de coligado con las Cortes, especialmente con esa, atribuyendo a esta causa, y su oficiosidad, el haverse retractado su acusacion ; al card. Ganganelli tener trabajado un voto,

Clement XIII. may never have discovered that Ganganelli had secret connexions with the Duke of Parma,¹ but the Cardinal's general behaviour was such that he was forced to exclude so untrustworthy a man from participation in affairs.²

The character sketches of the Cardinals made in connexion with the conclave of 1769 and preserved in the archives of the Austrian embassy to the Vatican show how firmly the reputation of untrustworthiness was attached to Ganganelli. He is portrayed here as double-faced and dangerous; at the condemnation of Mésenguy's Catechism he had sold his vote to both parties.³ In another memorandum belonging to the same archives and dated February 8th, 1769, he is described thus: "He is a proper Frate. In theological controversies, in order to win over both parties, he has compromised himself with each and has thus grievously exposed himself. Since his deceitfulness has been discovered he has been detested by everyone and nobody trusts him any longer. These and several other insincerities have cast a stain on the Cardinal from which he will not succeed in cleansing himself. He is

o dictamen theologico reprobativo del Breve contra Parma, y suministrado al embaxador de Francia las especies, que dixo al Papa, en su ultima audiencia acerca de la excomunion declarada en dicho Breve."

¹ This is clear from a *letter of Du Tillot's to Azpuru, of December 11, 1768, in which he says, "He presentado al S^{or} Infante la carta del em. card. Ganganelli. S. A. R. ha agradecido esta serie de las atenciones que constantemente ese purpurado a demostrado a S. A. — Quedo attento en observar sobre esto acto el silencio que me encarga V. S. — Veo que es muy fundado que sea assí, y quedo en remitir a su tiempo a V. S. la respuesta de S. A. R. a ese Em^o." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768.

² *Centomani to Tanucci, May 17, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1⁴⁷¹/₂₁₆.

³ "La sua neutralità lo fa passare per un' uomo doppio, pericoloso e venduto agli uni e agli altri suo voto in occasione delle condanne del catechismo di Mesanguie." "Osservazioni per il prossimo Conclave", Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, No. 579.

reckoned to be a supporter of France and in the conclave may pass himself off as belonging to the *Zelanti*.”¹

Ganganelli's connexion with the Spaniards was far more intimate than with the French. In 1767 an Austrian diplomat called him their “dragoman”.² It was, in fact, the influence of Spain and France, to which he had consistently rendered valuable services as a Cardinal in the Congregations,³ which gained him the ardently desired goal of many years of striving, the tiara. Writing to Tanucci on the day of the election, the Neapolitan agent Gaetano Centomani said that of all the candidates he was the most acceptable to the Bourbon Courts. He would proceed on different principles from those of Clement XIII., he added, and it was thought that he was not favourably disposed towards the Jesuits, in spite of his being indebted to them for his initial success.⁴ Tanucci himself, like

¹ “Dotato di talento fratesco. Nelle controversie teologiche di questi tempi per guadagnarsi ambi i partiti, si è impegnato e compromesso con tutte due, e scopertasi la di lui doppiezza è rimasto odioso all'uno e all'altro e nessuno si fida più di lui. Tratto che unito a molt'altri ha finito di spargere sopra di questo cardinale una vernice di discredito, dalla quale non si saprà purgare: passa per attaccato alla Francia e sarà fra' finti zelanti” (“Giudizii e caratteri di cardinali papabili,” dated February 8, 1769, written by an opponent of the Jesuits; *ibid.*). Kaunitz *wrote to Colloredo on May 20, 1769, that Ganganelli was at first in favour with Clement XIII. “ma volendo poscia nelle controversie teologiche seguite poco dopo tener l'equilibrio fra i due partiti, cadde in disgrazia, come si coll' avvenire è in discredito dell'uno e dell'altro, fu abbandonato da tutti, disistimato fin dagli stessi suoi promotori e da' propri frati, anche a tacciarlo da ignorante”. State Archives, Vienna.

² “*turcimano della Spagna” (May 1767); “*molto in grazia de' Spagnuoli” (May 26, 1767). Character sketch in the Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

³ See the *letter from Kaunitz mentioned at n. 1.

⁴ “*Si crede non molto propenso alla Compagnia, quantunque il principio delle sue fortune riconoscesse dalla medesima.” Centomani to Tanucci, May 19, 1769, State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*

many others, thought that in his heart of hearts the new Pope was not hostile to the Jesuits. He was, he wrote to Centomani, half Jesuit, half Spaniard, and wholly Frate.¹ To understand this expression fully one must remember that the "enlightened" men of the period, of whom Tanucci was one, ascribed the worst qualities to the "Fрати" and classed them all indiscriminately as utterly degenerate monks.

Ganganelli had certainly never been a Frate of this kind. In point of morals he had always kept himself unsullied; his piety was shown by his marked devotion to Our Lady.² His appointments as teacher in the convents of his Order and as Consultor to the Inquisition gave him ample scope for putting his knowledge of theology and canon law to good purpose. He was gravely handicapped, however, by never having been out of Italy or ever having held a diplomatic post. This was why it was said of him in a character-sketch probably drawn by Brunati that he was as clever and keen-witted as a Religious could be who had never moved about the world and who therefore lacked a wide vision; he knew little about the princes' interests and his knowledge of the Courts was far from perfect.³ The same witness, agreeing with Cordara,⁴ emphasized the many good qualities that swayed the heart of Clement XIV., as indicated by the benevolent expression of his features. "Already as a Frate and a Cardinal he showed his desire to be friendly and affable and used his influence to do good to everyone. He is glad to recommend others, he shows his gratitude, and is a loyal friend; he loves the good and hates the corrupt, the wicked, and the turbulent. Good-natured, kind, and at bottom genuinely humble, he did not at first allow himself to be dazzled by his possession of the tiara. He has no love for malicious gossip and being above many prejudices he has sympathy with human frailties.

¹ *Tanucci, July 11, 1769 (*ibid.*).

² Cf. *"Sincere" notizie (see above, p. 84, n. 1), Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

³ Text *ibid.*

⁴ *De suppressione*, 152 *seqq.*

He is filled with the best intentions for the good of the Church and the State. He calls those men foolish who oppose the princes and the true interests of the Holy See. His unexampled selflessness is likely to save the Curia from the charge of base cupidity. So far is he removed from nepotism of any sort that to him only the genuine poor are his relations. Moderate and simple in his choice of food, an enemy of comfort in any form, he likes to take his recreation in the company of his trusted friends and to divert himself by jesting with them. Gentle and charming by nature and pleasant in his discourse, he is distinguished for the refinement and the courtesy of his intercourse with others. His natural tendency is to dispense favours, but he is easily dissuaded from so doing by any little hint that may be whispered in his ear.”¹

The writer touches here on one of the most fatal characteristics of the new Pope : his lack of will-power and his timidity, which were the inevitable cause of his unreliability and dilatoriness.

“Clement XIV.,” we read in the notes probably made by Brunati, “lacks courage and stability ; he is unbelievably slow in taking any decision. He takes people in with fine words and promises, weaves his web around them and enchants them. He begins by promising them the world, but then makes difficulties and in true Roman fashion withholds a decision, so finally to remain as the victor. At first, therefore, everyone falls into his trap. He is a past-master at evading any kind of decision in his replies to the envoys ; he sends them away with fine words and hopes which are never realized.

¹ *Memoranda in the Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican. Kaunitz *reported to Colloredo on May 20, 1769 : When the Postmaster General presented himself to Clement XIV. and offered to send the news of his election by couriers to his relatives, the Pope replied : “che fin dal momento che si fece frate non riconosceva più parenti.” (State Archives, Vienna). As to the way in which Clement XIV. showed his detestation of any form of nepotism, see also the Lucchese report of January 9, 1771, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 382 seq. See also BOURGOING, I., 188 seq.

Anyone who seeks a favour should endeavour to obtain it at his first audience. One may add that as he is very fond of talking, an observant envoy can detect his double dealing." ¹

This information, from an Austrian source, tallies in essentials with Bernis' reports, the chief difference being that the latter, with his French vivacity, lays on the colours much more thickly and that the splashes of light retreat before the shadows. "Clement XIV.'s desire," Bernis wrote to Choiseul as early as November 30th, 1769,² "is to be another Sixtus V. and to be compared with him. It is true that both were of the same Order, and both had equal luck, but Clement XIV. has neither the bad qualities nor the talents of a Sixtus V. The latter was a great genius and exercised a great skill in political matters; moreover he had great courage and pursued his aim, which was kept an absolute secret, with a firm determination. Clement XIV. is intelligent, but his knowledge is confined to theology, church history, and a few anecdotes of Court life. He is a stranger to politics, and his love of secrecy is more than his mastery of it; he takes a delight in friendly intercourse and in the process he lays bare his inmost thoughts.³ He has a pleasant manner. He wants to please and is in mortal fear of displeasing. In vain he arms himself with courage; timidity is the fundamental feature of his character.⁴ In his government he will show more kindness than firmness; to the finances he will bring order and thrift. He is frugal and active, though not a quick worker. He is cheerful and he wants to be at peace with everyone and to live long."

Clement XIV.'s great timidity produced another characteristic, his desire to do everything on his own, as secretly as

¹ *Memoranda, *loc. cit.*

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 262 *seqq.*

³ "Sa Sainteté est assez maîtresse de ses paroles, mais nullement de son visage," Bernis wrote on December 20, 1769, *ibid.*, 205.

⁴ "La timidité fait le fond de son caractère." *Ibid.*, 263.

possible and with no help from strangers.¹ This was due not so much, as was supposed, to his wanting to keep the credit for any success to himself, as to his fear of being influenced by others. He feared the envoys, the nobility, the Jesuits, the Press, and, above all, the Cardinals.² Even his Secretary of State, Pallavicini, he trusted so little that he kept him in the greatest possible ignorance of secret affairs; it was only externally therefore that the Cardinal fulfilled his functions.³ The other Cardinals, too, were seldom, if ever, asked for their opinions and in fact were treated with disrespect. More than once an allocution contained passages that were offensive to them. The following incident was probably even more wounding to their dignity. At a consistory Clement made as if to produce the manuscript of a speech and everyone expected an announcement to be made. To the Cardinals' surprise, however, not a manuscript but a snuff-box appeared, and on returning to his apartments he waxed merry at their discomfiture.⁴ It was supposed by many persons that in so behaving he was taking revenge for the slight esteem in which he had been held in the College of Cardinals in Clement XIII.'s reign.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Cardinals appealed to the Dean of the Sacred College, Cavalchini, to remonstrate

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, December 10, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{472}{1217}$; *Orsini to Tanucci, November 20, 1770, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1476. Cf. *Tanucci to Catanti, July 11, 1769 (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6009); *Gentili to Colloredo, August 19, 1772, State Archives, Vienna.

² MASSON, *Bernis*, 141. Cf. Orsini's *letter, n. 1.

³ *Evidence of the Austrian diplomat, *loc. cit.*, confirmed by Bernis (THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 387, II., 129, 346). Centomani *reported to Tanucci on February 23, 1773: "Il segretario di Stato non è ne pure inteso, anzi trattato con disprezzo e non gli si dà arbitrio alcuno di esser dal Papa, come non li ha potuto parlare per parteciparli a nome dell'arcivescovo di Malta la nuova elezione del Granmaestro prima che si propalasse per Roma." State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{477}{1223}$.

⁴ Centomani's *report to Tanucci, March 19, 1771, *ibid.*, $\frac{473}{1215}$.

with the Pope on the manner of his behaviour towards them. Cavalchini acknowledged that these complaints were justified, but as his own relations with the Pope were so strained that he had ceased to ask for an audience of him, he declined at his age of eighty-eight years to expose himself to a certain snub.¹

The Cardinals finally paid the Pope back in his own coin. At ceremonies they appeared so late that the Pope, already vested, had to wait for them. Sometimes they failed to appear at all, as, for instance, at the Vespers of Epiphany, when the Pope had to enter the chapel accompanied by a single deacon. Many members of the Sacred College were absent from the Good Friday procession of 1770. Normally many of the Cardinals attended the annual distribution of dowries to poor girls which took place on the feast of the Annunciation in the Minerva. In 1772, however, only two Cardinals, Negroni and Corsini, took part in the procession to the church. This was doubly mortifying to the Pope, as on this occasion he had wanted the ceremony to be more than usually impressive, owing to the presence of the Duke of Gloucester.² The Pope's relations with the Roman nobility too were so bad that the master of ceremonies was informed by Gian Francesco Albani and Marcantonio Colonna that they refused to assist at the Papal throne or in fact to serve in any capacity.³ These circles deeply resented the Pope's surrounding himself with persons of the lowest standing instead of consulting the Cardinals. Among these men of low degree was one who immediately⁴

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci; March 12, 1771 (*loc. cit.*).

² *Centomani to Tanucci, March 31, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{472}{122v}$.

³ *Loc. cit.* "Si Vd oyera lo que aqui se dice de el a la oreja, se moriria de risa: ha tenido la habilidad, en menos de cuatro meses, de disgustar a toda clase de gentes, no solo terciarios, sino aun sus enemigos los mas austeros, cardenales, pretes, frailes, nobleza y plebe, todos estan que rechinan, y si los primeros tuvieran apoyo en alguna corona, esta era la hora que teniamos un cisma infaliblemente." Azara, September 21, 1769, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., 331.

⁴ *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 24, 1769, State Archives, Vienna.

played the leading part as the Pope's confidant : the Franciscan Bontempi, the son of a cook in Pesaro. A former pupil of Ganganelli's, he had been made his secretary when his teacher became a Cardinal. In this capacity he won his master's confidence to such a degree that he was used by him as a go-between in his dealings with the envoys. Immediately he was elected Pope, Clement called him to the Vatican and employed him as his private secretary. On the death of the aged Papal confessor, Bontempi took his place, though there was no official appointment.¹

Immediately he engaged Bontempi as his private secretary Clement XIV. forbade him to have any dealings with the envoys, Cardinals, or nobles, and employed him for the conveyance of information to the representatives of Spain only. Bontempi obeyed this order so strictly that he declined an invitation sent him by Cardinals Bernis and Orsini. Orsini wrote of him to Tanucci in September 1772: "He is about fifty years of age. He has no relatives, he is sly, and he has never declared himself either for or against the Jesuits. He speaks very little, and when there is talk about important affairs of the Holy See he is either silent or he says that he knows nothing about them. Actually, however, no one is so deeply versed in the Pope's secrets as this Friar."²

Bontempi, being thoroughly conversant with the Pope's character, knew how to make himself indispensable to him. He kept himself as far as possible in the background and humbly went about everywhere on foot. To maintain his position he tried to keep his master away from every other influence but his own,³ which increased as time went on. In November 1771, it was Bernis' opinion that to enjoy the goodwill of

¹ Cf. the "**Ritratto del Padre Bontempi*" which was sent by Orsini to Tanucci on September 15, 1772, and of which the Cardinal said: "*è mia dettatura, e tutto vero.*" State Archives, Naples.

² *Ibid.*

³ **Memoranda* in the Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

the Pope for long one had to win the friendship, or at least the neutrality, of this favourite.¹ In the spring of 1773 the Neapolitan agent Centomani was saying that Bontempi could get the Pope to do anything. It was thought, he went on, that he would get the red hat, unless he preferred it to be given to his friend Martinelli, who had become Consultor to the Inquisition in place of Paskovich.² Everyone in Rome was amazed when in October 1773, he suddenly fell into disgrace; but it lasted only till the following year.³

So influential a man as this naturally had his enemies. There was talk of his morals not being entirely irreproachable, but there is no evidence in this direction. It is certain, however, that he was wide open to bribery, which the Spanish representatives especially made good use of. Financial interests also were the chief cause of his close friendship with Niccolò Bischì, who had married a near relation of Clement XIV.'s and, being entrusted by the Pope with the provisioning of Rome, had regular access to his Holiness.⁴

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 128.

² “*P. Buontempi è prepotente presso il Papa non solo per farli qualche grazia in affare non discussa, ma per far anche rivocare qualunque risoluzione che la S.S. avea già esaminata e concertata con suoi Ministri per farla poi eseguire” (Centomani to Tanucci, February 23, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{477}{122\frac{1}{2}}$). Cf. *Centomani to Tanucci, March 23, 1773 (see above, p. 96, n. 4), and Moñino's *letter of January 7, 1773, State Archives, Naples. In the *memoranda in the Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican also it is said of Bontempi: “onnipotente appresso S.S.” and of Cardinal Colonna: “Non può niente nel vicariato contro gli impegni di Buontempi.”

³ *Memoranda, *ibid.*; *Tiepolo, on December 11, 1773: “Buontempi in disgrazia presso al Papa, che ha preso altro confessore: Buontempi promise pensioni gesuitiche a nome d'Almada e pensioni non vengono.” State Archives, Venice.

⁴ “*[Bontempi] Passa per galante, ma cautelato; vi è chi pretende che abbia amica una delle fanciulle Lovati. Gira sempre solo a piede. Cordone tirato con Bischì e altri negozianti di campagna” (Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican). It is noteworthy that Centomani, who was always willing to

Besides Bischì, the following persons also formed part of Clement XIV.'s intimate entourage: a Neapolitan prelate of the name of Macedonio, who was looked on as his Holiness's Benjamin¹; Marefoschi, who was entirely submissive to the French and the Spaniards, and had been brought into the College of Cardinals in September 1770, through their influence; and finally Brother Francesco of the Franciscan Conventuals, who controlled the Pope's kitchen and private disbursements but was also used by him to negotiate with the Portuguese envoy, Almada.² Brother Francesco, in Bernis' opinion, did not play the lead, but he pleased the Pope without displeasing Bontempi and the others.³ Macedonio, who became Secretary of the Memorials, was thought to have a large hand in the negotiations with Portugal, where his brother was representing Naples.⁴ It was in the company of these men that Clement

repeat scandals, says nothing of this kind about Bontempi in his *letter to Tanucci of July 26, 1772. He says only: "Per morte del primo confessore molti riguardevoli soggetti furono posti in vista, ma il Papa non volle per allora scegliere alcuno, e volendovi seriamente pensare, destinò interinalmente il P. Buontempi suo intimo confidente, del quale li stessi Padri conventuali non sono punto contenti, e per Roma non ha tutto il buon nome" (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{4}{1221}$). For his bribery by the Spaniards, see below, Chap. IV.

¹ " *Macedonio, segretario de' Memoriali dei Riti, Beniamino del Papa, buono cristiano, benevolo e umano: molti lo credono Gesuita, ma falsamente; ha havuto parte alla di lui promozione. Mediatore con Almada ne' affari; tutto di Bernis guadagnato e di Orsini." Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

² For Marefoschi, see below. A pungent note in the *Memoranda, *loc. cit.*, which shows that Fra Francesco had a part to play even before the Papal election, says of Marefoschi: "Quando era segretario di Propaganda persecuzione fatta al card. Ganganelli per la resa de' conti delle missioni intaccati da S. Efrem per 3,000 scudi, Fra Francesco lo salvò trovando varie carte disperse con cui rese conto."

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 127.

⁴ *The nuncio Conti to Pallavicini, Lisbon, 1772, April 14, Nunziat. di Portog., 119, Papal Secret Archives.

XIV. took his recreation, regularly playing billiards with them or, in fine weather, bowls (*boccia*; much played in Italy at that time) in the garden of the Quirinal or at the Villa Patrizi.¹ Other forms of recreation favoured by the Pope, who was inclined to corpulence, were energetic walking and regular horse-riding.² He indulged in this latter form of exercise to a marked degree in the autumn of 1769, when he went into residence at Castel Gandolfo. He had made for himself a short white overcoat, white boots, and a round red hat, and thus attired he rode about the beautiful environs, greeted everywhere with pleasure by the country folk, whom he had relieved of one of their taxes.³ While on these rides he frequently spurred on his horse and left his companions behind. His close friends warned him of the great risk he was running, and at first this warning took effect: on October 21st, 1769, it was mentioned in a report on the Pope's residence at Castel Gandolfo that he was visiting the Castelli Romani only on foot or by carriage and that he was also amusing himself in bird-snaring.⁴ How justified was the warning against careless riding was shown as soon afterwards as November 26th, at the ceremonial taking possession of the Lateran. In the imposing procession, which attracted the whole population of Rome, the Pope was attended on horseback by civil and ecclesiastical dignitaries and the Cardinals. Although, for safety's sake, a particularly placid mount had been chosen for him from Prince Borghese's stables, and he had ridden it two days before, the animal was so frightened by the lusty cheering of the crowd that on the ride down from the Capitol to the Forum, near the Arch of Septimius Severus, it reared and unseated its rider. The

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 272.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 20 and October 5, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. An account in *Collecção*, III., 221, says of the Pope, who had a "sonora e gagliarda voce", that his step was as brisk as a youth's.

³ Cardinal Bernis, October 4, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 273.

⁴ Report of the Lucchese envoy, of October 21, 1769, *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 382.

Pope fell to the ground and was lucky to escape any serious hurt. He drank a glass of water, went a short way on foot, and covered the rest of the route in an open carriage.¹

In spite of this mishap Clement XIV., in the autumn of 1771, at Castel Gandolfo, could not resist his desire to put his equestrian skill to the test again. But after he had fallen twice and had injured his shoulder he confined himself to making his excursions on foot or by carriage.² In a room leading off the billiard-room in Castel Gandolfo there are two frescoes showing the Pope with his companions; in one he is seen on horseback, wearing his white riding-coat, on the point of leaving Castel Gandolfo with his retinue; in the other he is taking a stroll in the garden.³

Clement XIV. was of so cheerful a disposition that he himself made light of his fall at the "Possesso", which the superstitious Romans looked on as a bad omen. He is reported to have said that on his ride up to the Capitol he looked like St. Peter and that he hoped to goodness he looked like St. Paul when

¹ For the "Possesso" on November 26, 1769, *cf.* besides CANCELLIERI, 406 *seqq.*, and AZARA, I., 368 *seq.*, Cardinal Bernis' letter of November 26, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 253 *seq.*, and Azpuru's *report to Grimaldi of November 30, 1769 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), according to which Clement XIV.'s arm was bruised but quickly healed. It is typical of SILVAGNI's inaccuracy that in his *La Corte e la società Romana* (I., 1884, 9 *seqq.*) he has Moñino take part in the procession although he did not come to Rome till July 1772. For Clement XIV.'s consecration as Bishop, coronation, and "Possesso" see *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 1 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), and *to Tanucci on June 9, 1769 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, ⁴⁰⁰/₁₁₄₅). *Cf.* above, p. 73.

² *Centomani to Tanucci, October 1, 1771, *ibid.*, ⁴⁷⁴/₁₂₁₉. *Cf.* AZARA, II., 218.

³ At Castel Gandolfo, at the beginning of the road to Albano, is a stone inscribed: "Clemens XIV. P.M. Arduam antea ac difficilem ad oppidum viam latiore ac molliorem ponte constructo reddidit, in oppido pene disiectam lapide stravit, portam hanc restituit ornavit Anno MDCCLXXIII. Pontificatus sui V." The gateway and bridge no longer exist.

he fell.¹ Many other such witty sayings were reported of him. When Clement was in a good mood, his intimates also might indulge in decidedly curious jokes and pranks, which gossip coarsened in such a way as inevitably to tarnish the reputation of the Supreme Pontiff.² Equally damaging was the amount of talk there was about the suspicion, jealousy, and petty cloister-intrigues that went on among the Pope's intimate associates,³ though he himself never disclosed his real feelings even to this narrow circle.⁴

(2)

In view of Clement XIV.'s weakness of character, his desire to meet the demands of the Bourbon Courts as far as possible and thus to restore peace was only to be expected. How far he was prepared to go in this direction was seen as soon as he took up the reins of government.

The most important post at his disposal, that of Secretary of State, was transferred on the very evening of the election

¹ NOVAES, XV., 161.

² The *Memoranda (*loc. cit.*) allude to "trastulli per far ridere" without explaining their nature. In his *letter to Tanucci of February 16, 1773, Centomani mentions a complaint to Macedonio about the bad condition to which Rome had been brought by Bontempi and Bischì; nevertheless, he says, "S.S. se ne va ogni giorno a trastullarsi nella villa Patrizi, a giocare alle bocchette ed a fare mille ragazzate indegne di qualunque persona sessagenaria non che in un principe ed in un Papa." He then relates that Clement XIV. took no steps to punish the two servants who beat the Maestro di Camera Potenziani for not seeing to the removal of the stinging nettles from the Quirinal garden (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1222). But Centomani's story of the "burla del P. Buontempi" with the Abbé Rusca, which resulted in the latter's death, is quite incredible (*to Tanucci, November 10, 1772, *ibid.*, 1221). This incident seems actually to have happened, as it is mentioned in the *Memoranda of the Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

³ Cardinal Bernis' report, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 127.

⁴ *Memoranda (see above, p. 98, n. 3), *loc. cit.*

day to one who was completely devoted to Spain, Cardinal Pallavicini, who had been the nuncio in Madrid from 1760 to 1767.¹ That the appointment was an acknowledgment of the support the Pope had received in the conclave from the secular Powers is clear from his words to Cardinals Orsini and Luynes: "Are you satisfied?"² The former Secretary, Torrigiani, continued in office for three more days, and then Pallavicini took his place on May 22nd.³ With what sentiments he was animated may be gauged from the words he addressed to the King of Spain: he owed his office to him, he put himself under his protection, and he would prove his devotion to "the exemplary Catholic Charles III."⁴

In one of the first audiences given to Cardinal Orsini the Pope emphasized his desire to have all the princes in full accord with the Holy See. His opinions were not the same as his predecessor's and he intended to deal with all the envoys directly.⁵ The Neapolitan agent, Centomani, reported joyfully that His Holiness had not taken the name of Sixtus VI., and did not talk in the manner of Sixtus V., but paid the

¹ " *Due hore dopo mezzogiorno ha destinato per segretario di Stato il sig. card. Pallavicini " (Orsini to Tanucci, May 19, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 12937). In his *report of May 20, 1769 (State Archives, Vienna), Kaunitz stresses that Pallavicini's attitude was one of submissiveness to Spain and afterwards also of hostility to the Jesuits. Pallavicini had proposed to the Spanish Government that Spinola should be pushed forward as a candidate for the Secretaryship of State, but Spinola was not trusted to handle the Jesuit affair in the right manner and they would only accept him if the promise to suppress the Jesuit Order were given. They would rather that Branciforte were given the post (*Grimaldi to Azpuru, Aranjuez, May 30, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013).

² *Orsini to Tanucci, May 19, 1769, *loc. cit.*

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, May 23, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

⁴ *Pallavicini to Charles III., Rome, June 22, 1769. Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

⁵ *Orsini, May 23, 1759, *loc. cit.*

sovereigns the greatest respect and attention.¹ Another indication of his attitude was his announcement that he did not intend to use the customary forms in bringing his election to the knowledge of the princes; he would open his heart to them in messages written in his own hand.²

Clement XIV. had already expressed his gratitude to Cardinal Orsini, after his second "adoration", for the support given him in his election by Charles III.³ Within the next few days he repeated this expression of gratitude to Cardinal Solis, who was thus able to report to Madrid that the Pope would fulfil all the king's wishes.⁴ After his coronation Clement XIV. told Cardinal York that he intended to restore friendship with the sovereigns, no matter what the Curiali might have to say on the subject.⁵

This was not merely talk. Among the most important offices was the Secretaryship of the Latin Briefs; this was taken away from Michelangelo Giacomelli and given to his adversary, Monsignore Stay, who was completely subservient to the French and Spanish envoys. Giuseppe Garampi was also expected to lose his post as Secretary of the Ciphers, seeing that he had been repeatedly commended by Clement XIII. and had been on intimate terms with Cardinals Torrigiani and Boschi.⁶ The next Secretary of the Memorials was to be Archinto, the nuncio to Florence.⁷

Clement XIV.'s confirmation in their offices of certain high

¹ " *Il nuovo Papa non si è posto il nome di Sisto VI., non parla colli termini di Sisto V., ma dimostra tulla la maggiore venerazione ed attenzione per li sovrani." Centomani to Tanucci, Rome, May 23, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, ⁴⁷¹₁₂₁₈.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, May 23, 1769, *loc. cit.*

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 1, 1759, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Cardinal Solis to Grimaldi, May 25, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5013.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, June 6, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

⁶ *Centomani to Tanucci, May 30, 1769, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, ⁴⁷¹₁₂₁₈.

⁷ *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 20, 1769, State Archives, Vienna

officials who had been appointed by his predecessor—such as Cardinal Cavalchini as Prodatarius, De Simone, of Benevento, as his Auditor, Giovanni Battista Rezzonico as Maggiordomo, and Scipione Borghese as Maestro di Camera—was due solely to his unwillingness to make too obvious a break with his predecessor, to whom he owed his cardinalate.¹ That a totally different course would now be taken was no longer doubted by the ambassadors. Formerly their opinion of Cardinal Ganganelli had been quite sharply divided, but it now underwent a complete change: they were thoroughly satisfied with him, whereas Cardinal Torrigiani, the two Cardinals Albani, and Cardinal Rezzonico were hard put to it to hide their grief in silence.² The opinion of the Spanish ambassador Azpuru was that the new pontificate would bring the peace to the Church that the Bourbon Courts desired. Even as Cardinal, he said, Clement XIV. had regretted the unyielding attitude that his predecessor had shown towards the princes. Now he would show how different was his opinion and he would make many concessions, especially to the Catholic king. This was also the interpretation put upon the inscription round the first medal struck by the Pope: *Fiat pax in virtute tua*. Azpuru was convinced that Clement XIV. would pursue the same policy as Benedict XIV., which opinion he expressed most definitely on several occasions.³ The Neapolitan Minister Tanucci was particularly pleased to learn that the Pope, who was so generous with his audiences,⁴ dealt with all his

¹ *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 24, 1769, *ibid.*

² *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 20, 1769, *ibid.*; *Centomani to Tanucci, May 23 and 30, 1769, *loc. cit.*

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 21, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. *Cf.* above, p. 78.

⁴ Centomani *reported to Tanucci on July 11, 1769, that Clement XIV. gave audiences from the morning till two hours after the evening Angelus, so that he only had time for Mass and meals and very little for business (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 471/1216). The Pope worked day and night, gave audiences to everyone, and was at his desk at night, but made no use of Pallavicini (AZARA, I., 302, 305; but see above, p. 103, n. 2).

business as secretly as possible, without consulting anyone.¹ Although, said Kaunitz, there were still many adherents of the old policy in the Pope's entourage, especially in the College of Cardinals, the new Pope, whom no difficulty deterred, went to great lengths to please the princes. His guiding principle was to agree to everything if it was at all possible, and as to how far he could go in this direction, His Holiness reserved judgment to himself.²

If the enlightened Ministers in the Catholic Courts had really desired an honourable peace with the Holy See they could have been quite certain of meeting with the utmost agreement on the Pope's side. In their messages of congratulation the Kings of France, Spain, and Naples protested their loyalty to the Holy See in the strongest terms; they were resolved, they said, to remain its devoted sons.³

While it still remained to be seen if these fine words would be followed by corresponding deeds, the Portuguese Government had already entered into serious negotiations on a settlement of its disputes with Rome. For ten long years the feud had persisted, causing grief and anger to the royal family, the grandees, and the Catholic people of Portugal. The necessity for Pombal, the leading Minister, to change his policy was rendered all the more inevitable by the daily increase of the difficulties and complications caused by the break with Rome. Moreover, he had no desire to remain in disagreement with the Curia while the other Catholic Powers were seeking a settlement.⁴

While the conclave was still in progress, Almada, the former Portuguese envoy, arrived in Rome with instructions to co-operate with France and Spain in refusing to recognize the elevation to the Papacy of a pro-Jesuit Cardinal.⁵ On

¹ *Tanucci to Grimaldi, Naples, July 11, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102.

² *Kaunitz to Colloredo, July 6, 1769, State Archives, Vienna.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 319 *seqq.*, 335 *seq.*, 344 *seqq.*

⁴ Report of the Austrian envoy Lebzelter, in DUHR, *Pombal*, 129. Cf. GOMEZ, 242 *seq.*

⁵ *Collecção dos negocios de Roma*, III., 54.

the negotiations that led to the election of Clement XIV. he was unable to bring any influence to bear.¹ The highly accommodating attitude of the new Pope, who at first, strangely enough, was thought in Lisbon to be a friend of the Jesuits and was regarded with suspicion,² showed itself, among other ways, in his receiving Almada in audience on May 25th, although his letters of credence had not yet arrived. Almada was highly satisfied with this, his first, meeting with the Pope. After he had spoken with him, he told the Spanish ambassador, Azpuru, he had had no doubts about the suppression of the Jesuit Order, and this would result in a complete settlement of the dispute between Portugal and the Holy See. This latter task was reserved for the future nuncio to Lisbon, Monsignore Innocenzo Conti.³

In June Cardinal Orsini learnt that Almada had already come forward with requests concerning the occupation of eight Portuguese episcopal sees that had fallen vacant.⁴ At the end of the month it was reported that after his audience with the Pope Almada had wept for joy; he had embraced everyone he met, whether he knew him or not, and had declared that an agreement had already been reached. This announce-

¹ GOMEZ, 230. Cf. above, p. 26.

² *V. Macedonio (brother of the Roman prelate, see above, p. 100) to Orsini, Lisbon, July 18, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1763³; *V. Macedonio to Orsini, August 22, 1769 (little trust was placed in the new Pope) and September 12 (there was no talk of the Government effecting a reconciliation with Rome), *ibid.*, 1763⁴.

³ Orsini's *letter to Tanucci, Rome, May 26, 1769 (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4877), and Azpuru's *report to Grimaldi, Rome, June 1, 1769 ("no duda de la extincion de la Compañia despues vió y oyó el Papa en d. audiencia que me referió el otro dia con gran complacencia confirmandome la noticia que di el correo pasado de que irá Nuncio Mgr. Conti luego que se ajustasen las diferencias entre su corte y esta"). Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, June 25, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1474.

ment was premature, as it happened, as even the Pope spoke of a misunderstanding.¹ But there was no doubt that things were moving in a peaceful direction ; one indication was that on August 14th, the day after he had presented his letters of credence, Almada had the Papal arms exhibited at his residence alongside the Portuguese.²

Clement XIV. conducted the negotiations directly and in the greatest secrecy with the King and with Pombal. It was agreed that in return for the readmission of a nuncio to Lisbon the red hat was to be bestowed on Paulo Carvalho, the brother of the all-powerful Minister and president of the tribunal of the Inquisition, which was completely dependent on the Government.³ Of the four proposed candidates for the nunciature Pombal had given his preference to the Auditor of the Rota, Innocenzo Conti,⁴ clearly because, as Azpuru rightly surmised, this prelate had the "merit" of being in the Jesuits' bad books.⁵ For this reason too, even during the conclave, Conti had been marked down by the French ambassador, Aubeterre, for the Secretaryship of State.⁶

Conti received his appointment as nuncio on November 26th and at the same time the Pope sent his portrait to Pombal by Almada.⁷

November 26th, 1769, had been chosen for the publication of Conti's appointment because this was the day on which the Pope solemnly took possession of the Lateran and, as was correctly anticipated, the joyful spirit of the Romans was bound to be increased by the news of the restoration of peace

¹ *Rivera to Lascaris, June 30, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5885.

² NOVAES, XV., 167, *cf.* 172 *seqq.*

³ SCHÄFER, V., 456.

⁴ *Collecção*, III., 71.

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 29, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. On November 30 Azpuru *reported to Fr. Joachin that Conti had been accused of Jesuitism. *Ibid.*

⁶ *Aubeterre to Azpuru, Rome, May 21 and 22, 1769, *ibid.*

⁷ *Collecção*, III., 71 *seqq.*

with Portugal.¹ Everyone was very happy, reported Cardinal Orsini on November 30th, and regarded the renewal of diplomatic relations with Portugal as evidence of the Pope's desire to be on good terms with the Courts. Almada, he said, had played some part in the turn of affairs, but the chief merit was due to His Holiness.²

The event came as a complete surprise to everyone.³ Owing to the strict secrecy with which the negotiations had been conducted, it was some time before it became known how it had been brought about. Even the Spanish ambassador, Azpuru, who usually was excellently informed by his spies, reported on November 30th, 1769, that he had not yet been able to lift the veil.⁴ It was not till the secret consistory of December 18th, 1769, that a little more light was thrown on the subject, when the Pope appointed a Cardinal *in petto*,⁵ the person chosen being Pombal's brother, Paulo Carvalho. How high a price this was to pay for peace may be seen from Cardinal Pacca's opinion, according to which "the newly appointed Cardinal was even worse than his brother; he had allowed himself to be used by the Minister for any and every purpose, including even the judicial murder of Malagrida."⁶ Prospects of further concessions were held out to the Portuguese Government. The Brief in which Clement XIV. thanked the king for accepting Conti as nuncio contained the assurance that he, the Pope, would give him the same proofs of his co-operation in the matter known to him (namely that of the Jesuits) as he would to the Spanish king. A similar hint appeared in the Pope's letter of thanks to Pombal, of the same date. In this the Minister is described as the originator

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 30, 1769, *loc. cit.*, and *Orsini to V. Macedonio on the same day, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ²⁹⁵/₁₀₄₀.

² *Orsini to Viviani, November 30, 1769, *ibid.*

³ AZARA, I., 369 *seqq.*

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 30, 1769, *loc. cit.*

⁵ NOVAES, XV., 176.

⁶ PACCA, *Notizie*, 68; DUHR, *Pombal*, 131.

of the peace which had been restored and which, it was hoped, would be a lasting one.¹

By the time these words were written, events in Lisbon had almost endangered the reconciliation. On December 3rd, 1769, an attempt was made on the king's life. Immediately the Jesuits were accused, on no evidence whatever, of being the originators of the outrage. The opportunity was taken by Almada of joining, along with the Bourbon envoys,² the enemies of the Jesuits by submitting a memorial in which he demanded the suppression of so dangerous an Order.³

Clement XIV. visited S. Antonio, the national church of the Portuguese, on January 15th, to thank God for the preservation of the king's life, sent him a special message of congratulation, and on January 18th, the feast of the Chair of St. Peter, caused a solemn *Te Deum* to be sung in St. Peter's. On the 29th in an allocution delivered in a Consistory before the assembled Cardinals he expressed his horror at the attempted assassination and his joy at the preservation of the king's precious life. At the same Consistory Paulo Carvalho's cardinalitial appointment was made public.⁴

The Jubilee Bull of September 11th and the Papal letter of December 12th, the latter addressed to all Patriarchs, Archbishops, and Bishops throughout the Christian world,⁵ had already been sent, on January 4th, 1770, by the Cardinal Secretary of State to the Prime Minister, so that he could make them known to the Portuguese Bishops. Pombal replied on February 4th, 1770, that he had immediately laid them before the king, in whom they had aroused so strong feelings of filial tenderness, edification, and pious gratitude that it was

¹ Text of both documents, dated December 10, 1769, in *Collecção*, III., 72 seq.

² GOMEZ, 239 seq. Cf. below, Chap. III.

³ Azpuru's reports of January 11 and 18, 1770; a copy of Almada's memorial is attached to the latter. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Collecção*, III., 142, 145; *Bull. Cont.*, V., 144. Cf. the king's autograph letter of thanks in *Collecção*, III., 146.

⁵ Text in THEINER, *Epist.*, 39 seqq.

impossible for him to put them into words. "I am in whole-hearted agreement," continued Pombal, who had suddenly become a pious believer, "in the most sacred truths which the Holy Father has set out with such firmness—truths in which we must believe and in accordance with which we must act, truths which are again being defended so brilliantly by the Holy See of St. Peter against those pernicious and rebellious opinions which are so numerous and which invoke the spirit of disunity in order to destroy the Catholic piety of recent centuries. Now that men's minds are being set at rest by the Church's love of peace, we will trustfully throw ourselves into the arms of God's omnipotence which has decided to give Christ's flock so holy and enlightened a shepherd, and we will hope that he will also succeed in bringing back the strayed sheep to the one and only flock." ¹

On February 25th Pombal addressed another letter of thanks to the Pope, with similarly pious phrases about the Encyclicals. On this occasion he referred to the goodwill which Clement XIV. had promised to show in the question of the Jesuits, "the most important matter with which the Catholic world has been occupied since the revolutionary appearance of Calvin and Luther." The king, he added, was in no doubt about the fulfilment of the "sacred promise" given by the Pope.² At the same time Almada was instructed to go on pressing for the abolition of the Jesuit Order.³

When the news reached Lisbon on February 18th, 1770, that Paulo Carvalho's cardinalial appointment had been made public, the recipient of the honour was no longer alive.⁴ His place in the Sacred College was to be taken by another favourite of Pombal's, João Cosme da Cunha, Bishop of Evora.⁵ Pombal first succeeded in securing Cunha's appointment on March 31st, 1770, as Grand Inquisitor, the former

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 502 n. Cf. also *Collecção*, III. 254 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 148.

³ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁴ Lebzelter's report in DUHR, *Pombal*, 131.

⁵ In Lisbon Carvalho's replacement by Cunha had been envisaged as early as January 18, 1770; v. *Collecção*, III., 238.

holder of the office having been banished to a convent (where he was still living) for defending the rights of the Church.¹ This appointment was communicated by the Pope to the Portuguese king and his Minister on April 5th.² At the same time the Lisbon Government requested that other creatures of Pombal's be rewarded with episcopal sees and that a number of monasteries be suppressed.³ A particularly difficult problem was presented by the see of Coimbra, whose excellent Bishop, Miguel d'Anunciação, had been deposed by Pombal in 1768 for having condemned works by Voltaire, Rousseau, and "Febronius" and had been thrown into prison as a traitor to his country.⁴ The Minister refusing under any conditions to agree to the Bishop's reinstatement, Clement XIV. asked the prisoner to resign "for the sake of peace", which he refused to do, since "he could not with a good conscience abandon his diocese, which Pombal had ravaged".⁵

The negotiations on this affair and, still more, Almada's fresh demands concerning the Lisbon nunciature, delayed Conti's departure. He finally set out on February 3rd, 1770, after having been honoured with the title of Archbishop of Tarsus.⁶ The negotiations being still in progress, he made no attempt to hurry, and chose the overland route, reaching Turin in the middle of March.⁷ While crossing the Pyrenees he caught a feverish cold which necessitated his staying at

¹ Cf. our account, XXXVI, 366.

² *Collecção*, III., 241 seq., 247 seq., 251 seq.; THEINER, *Epist.*, 74 seqq.

³ *Collecção*, III., 256 seq., 275 seq.

⁴ Lebzelttern's reports in DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 113. Cf. our account, XXXVI, 364. The pastoral letter in the *Life of Pombal*, trans. Jagemann, II., Dessau, 1782, 270 seq.

⁵ " *se tuta conscientia sponsae suae valedicere non posse, eo quod magis magisque a despota Carvalho fuisset dilaniata."

⁶ Cherubini (Portuguese nuncio 1817-1823), *Nunziat. di Portog., 148, Papal Secret Archives.

⁷ Conti's *letters to Pallavicini, Florence, February 2, 1770 (Nunziat. di Portog., 118, *ibid.*), and Turin, March 4, 1770 (*ibid.*, 119).

Gerona from April 22nd till May 5th.¹ On May 22nd he reported from Barcelona, and on June 5th from the Spanish capital, which he had reached on the eve of Whit Sunday.² After spending five days at Aranjuez as the guest of the Spanish king³ he finally made his entry into Lisbon on June 28th. The Pope had remitted him 60,000 *scudi* to enable him to make an imposing appearance.⁴ In Lisbon there was great jubilation over the attitude of the new Pope, who was lauded to the skies, the news having arrived that he had not had the Bull *In Coena Domini* read on Maundy Thursday.⁵ This had been done by all the Popes until then, as the document contained a summary of the censures reserved to the Head of the Church.⁶ Philip II. and Rudolf II., labouring under the delusion that the excommunications caused unrest and discontent, had forbidden their publication in their domains, and when, on January 30th, 1768, Clement XIII. had used the Bull for solemnly excommunicating the Duke of Parma for having trampled on ecclesiastical liberty, a regular onslaught was launched against it. Pombal immediately caused the printing and the sale of the document, or the appeal to it in a court of law, to be prohibited, as an act of rebellion. Besides Parma, Naples, Genoa, Venice, and even the Empress Maria Theresa joined in the fight against the Bull. A scurrilous pamphlet produced by the anti-Roman writer Le Bret⁷ depicted in lurid colours the "fearful consequences for the State and the Church of the infamous Bull *In Coena*". Clement XIV. had already

¹ *Letters to Pallavicini, Gerona, April 22, and May 5, 1770, *ibid.*, 119.

² *Conti to Pallavicini, Barcelona, May 22, 1770, and Madrid, June 5, 1770, *ibid.*

³ *Conti to Pallavicini, Madrid, June 11, 1770. *ibid.*

⁴ *Cherubini, *loc. cit.*

⁵ DUHR, *Pombal*, 137.

⁶ For what follows, *cf. Hist.-polit. Bl.*, VII., 78 *seqq.*; HAUSMANN, *Reservatfälle*, 384 *seq.*; DIENDORFER, in the *Freiburger Kirchenlex.*, II.², 1475 *seqq.*

⁷ Published in 1769, the name of the place where it was printed not being given.

failed to make any mention of the Bull in his announcement of the jubilee of 1769.¹ On April 5th, 1770, the Spanish ambassador, Azpuru, was able to report that he had learnt from a reliable source that it would not be published on Maundy Thursday. A week later he confirmed this news.² The Pope had yielded to the pressure put on him by the enlightened Ministers of the Courts. Many regarded this policy as a false one and as a heavy blow to the prestige of the Holy See. Dissatisfaction was shown by the Cardinals, who had not been consulted, joy by the "enlighteners", who, as, for instance, the Voltairian Azara, declared it a triumph of good sense to do away with "this monstrous Bull, a work of darkness and a treaty with the Devil".³ But men of Azara's type were still not satisfied, for, they held, even though the Bull was not published, the excommunications still went on; it must be formally revoked once for all.⁴ In the following years too the reading of the Bull was omitted. The Pope told Cardinal Orsini that he had never understood how, in contrast with the discipline of the first centuries of Christianity, such a custom could have taken shape, and on Maundy Thursday of all days⁵—a view which was hardly the result of deep study.⁶ In 1774 he ordained that it was no longer to be cited.⁷

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, September 12, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1474.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 5 and 12, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ AZARA, II., 43 *seq.*, 46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁵ *Orsini to V. Macedonio, March 27, 1771 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 10³⁰¹/₁₆), and *Orsini to Tanucci, March 29, 1771: "In questo tempo di riconciliazione de' fedeli con Dio, non avea mai capito perchè in questi giorni si era introdotto il costume di fare alcuni passi totalmente contrari a questa vera massima ed alla disciplina de' primi secoli della Chiesa" (*ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1478).

⁶ For the manifold reasons why Maundy Thursday seemed particularly suitable for the exclusion of certain persons from the Christian community, see BINTERIM, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, V., 3, 197.

⁷ *Brunati to Colloredo, July 18, 1774, State Archives, Vienna.

As if by way of reward for Clement XIV.'s highly conciliatory attitude, Conti was to be received in as grand a manner as possible. The nuncio described in a self-satisfied way the great marks of honour with which he was welcomed. On crossing the frontier he was met, not by a small detachment of troops, as was his predecessor, but by a complete regiment. The king had placed his own galley at his disposal for the crossing of the Tagus, and his state coach was waiting for him on the other side.¹

On July 4th, 1770, Conti, on entering office, was received in audience by the king and queen; his Briefs of authority for the exercise of his jurisdiction he had first to lay before the Ministry. "They will be returned to me," he reported on July 10th, "with a covering letter containing certain restrictions mutually determined in accordance with an old formula. This has not been done yet, but it soon will be, and then I shall be able to present to the Court and to the Ministers the persons appointed to exercise the jurisdiction and to manage the affairs of the nunciature's tribunal. To-morrow I am to have a formal audience of Pombal, who has been prevented by indisposition from receiving me on previous days. Everything is being done here with the greatest propriety and in the most harmonious spirit, so that I hope that in future we shall settle all affairs quickly and satisfactorily."² In a second dispatch of the same day Conti reported that he had been specially commissioned by the king to bring to the knowledge of the Holy Father his urgent desire to display openly to the whole world his filial devotion to the Holy See. The same commission had been given him by the queen.³ Conti was highly pleased with the first official audience he had with Pombal, which took place at last on July 11th. For two hours, he reported, he had discussed current business with the Minister, whose disposition he found most favourable for the restoration of

¹ Conti to Pallavicini, from Lisbon, July 3, 1770, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 510 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 511.

³ *Ibid.*, 511 *seq.*

complete harmony with the Holy See. He had also been assured that his Briefs of authority would be returned to him shortly. They had been passed for perusal to the tribunal of the Embargo (dispatch). On returning the visit on the following day Pombal informed the nuncio that now only the royal assent was needed for the opening of the nunciature, but Pombal was prevented by indisposition from obtaining it immediately.¹ In spite of these complications Conti reported on July 24th that he was perfectly content and he laid stress on Pombal's honesty.² On July 31st he submitted a report on the good intentions of the king and queen; the queen had implored her husband to make an honourable peace with the Holy See at last.³ Thus encouraged, Conti, on August 1st, represented to the Minister the inconveniences that had arisen since the prohibition in 1760 of communication with Rome. Many Bishops had granted all manner of dispensations for marriage between different degrees of relationship, with the added clause: "since the prevention of free recourse to the Holy See still continues." Several of them, including the Cardinal Patriarch himself, continued to exercise this self-conferred right, even in the presence of the Papal nuncio, being too ready to comply with the civil authority, which had not yet revoked the edict of 1760. Conti asked Pombal to put an end to the situation as soon as possible. When the nuncio made further urgent representations Pombal offered the excuse that he had been prevented by eye-trouble from settling the matter immediately and promised to satisfy Conti with the least possible delay.⁴ He repeated this assurance on August 14th and succeeded in pacifying the nuncio.⁵

Conti's patience was tested still further until finally, on August 23rd, Pombal informed him that the king assented to

¹ *Ibid.*, 512.

² *Conti to Pallavicini, July 24, 1770, Nunziat. di Portog., 119A, Papal Secret Archives.

³ *Cifra from Conti to Pallavicini, July 31, 1770, *ibid.*, 118.

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 517.

⁵ *Conti to Pallavicini, August 14, 1770, *loc. cit.*, 119A.

the tribunal of the nunciature being opened without prejudice to the laws and rights of the kingdom. The relative edict, however, provided only for the suspension of the ordinance of August 4th, 1760,¹ announcing the break with Rome, but in such a way, it is true, as to leave the duration of the suspension undetermined. The term "suspension" could not well be avoided, Conti observed apologetically in his report of August 25th, 1770, to the Cardinal Secretary of State, "because the word 'revocation' was too likely to impair the honour of the ruler, who himself issued the ordinance of 1760 against Rome."²

In his eagerness to show the world some success as the result of his pacific policy, Clement XIV. had not waited for the opening of the nunciature, but on receiving the first reports of Conti's honourable reception had expressed to the Cardinals in a secret Consistory of August 6th, 1770, his "unbelievable joy" at the attitude of the Portuguese Government. The king, he said, had "suddenly and of his own accord offered him his love" and with fresh and important proofs of his filial feelings he had increased respect for the Holy See, that excellent heritage of his ancestors. He was sure that in the future, too, he would be able to give the whole Church cause for rejoicing. To show the king his goodwill and his respect, the Pope, at the same Consistory, raised to the purple the Archbishop of Evora, João da Cunha, the Foreign Minister's brother. The red hat was to be taken to him by Cesare Lambertini, a grand-nephew of Benedict XIV.³ At the same

¹ *Collecção*, III., 107 seq., 109 seq.

² THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 519. *G. Antonini to Pallavicini, from Lisbon, August 25, 1770: "Oggi doppo aperta la Nunziatura è stato presentato [the nunciature staff of officials] al Re da Monsignor Nunzio." *Nunziat. di Portog.*, *loc. cit.*

³ THEINER, *Epist.*, 100 seq. *Ibid.*, the Briefs of thanks to the King of Portugal and to Pombal, and on pp. 105 seq. the letter dealing with Lambertini's mission. Pallavicini's *letter to Almada about Cunha's promotion, of August 6, 1770, in *Nunziat. di Portog.*, 144, *loc. cit.*

time new Bishops were installed in six Portuguese sees, two of which were new erections.¹

The negotiations between Clement XIV. and Pombal having been conducted with the strictest secrecy, the announcement on September 14th, 1770, of the opening of the Portuguese nunciature² was received in Rome with the most joyful surprise and raised the highest hopes.³ Cardinals Bernis and Orsini sent flattering letters of congratulation to Almada.⁴ The Pope displayed the greatest satisfaction. Avid of success, he accepted the proposal, even before the negotiations on the Portuguese nunciature had been concluded, to have a medal struck for the feast of SS. Peter and Paul with the inscription *Post tenebras lucem*. Objections were raised to this immediately, and the Pope suspended the stamping of the medal, reserving to himself the composition of the final legend.⁵ On Almada's advice⁶ he chose at length the motto *Sol refulsit*, which Azara regarded as a sign of unparalleled conceit.⁷ Another supposed inscription was straightway circulated by the satirists: *Sol refulsit et nos in tenebris ambulamus*.⁸ The celebration of the success was, in fact, decidedly premature, for Conti, it was true, had made his triumphal entry into Lisbon, but Pombal was still holding back the revocation of the ordinance of 1760. It was being said by the Romans that he was embracing Rome with one hand and boxing its ears with the other.⁹ Nevertheless the Pope decided to celebrate the occasion with more than ordinary pomp—more as if a victory like that of Lepanto had

¹ AZARA, II., 88.

² *Azpuru to Tanucci, September 14, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{A_{14}^{100}}{1145}$.

³ Cf. Cardinal Albani's *letter of September 15, 1770, Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, and AZARA, II., 104.

⁴ *Collecção*, III., 114 seq.

⁵ AZARA, II., 68 (June 7, 1770).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 72 (June 21, 1770); cf. 77.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 75 (June 28, 1770).

been won, remarked Azara¹—and what was more, immediately. Foot-trouble, however, necessitated the Pope's postponement of the festival and it was not until September 24th, 1770,² that a Consistory was held in which Clement XIV. announced his success to the Cardinals. He had chosen September 24th, he said, because on that day thirty years before he had come to Rome and on the same day in 1759 he had been received into the Sacred College. In the further course of his speech Clement went to excessive lengths in expressing his extraordinary joy and his admiration of the king and queen. Generous compliments were lavished also on Almada and Pombal. The latter, he asserted, had now given glorious proofs of his zeal and his respect for the Pope and of his loyalty to the king. The Cardinals were asked to express their gratitude and their devotion to the Portuguese rulers by open manifestations of joy.³ Immediately after the Consistory the Pope, who told those who congratulated him that it was the happiest day of his life, proceeded to the church of SS. Apostoli, where a *Te Deum* was sung. In the afternoon he went in solemn procession to S. Antonio, the national church of the Portuguese, attended Benediction there and presented the church with the Golden Rose. For the evening the illumination of the whole city was ordered.⁴ Full of self-confidence, the Pope remarked to Cardinal Bernis, "Do you see now how I am ruling alone, as I told you I would as we left the conclave?" His Holiness, the Cardinal reported to Choiseul on September 25th, "is at the height of his joy and glory."⁵ More thoughtful persons, including many of the

¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

² *Collecção*, III., 112.

³ THEINER, *Epist.*, 109 *seq.* *Ibid.*, 107, the Briefs of thanks to the King of Portugal and to Pombal, dated September 20, 1770. Almada's *letter of thanks to Pallavicini, Rome, September 26, 1770, for the Pope's "eccellente allocuzione", in *Nunziat. di Portog.*, 144, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ *Azpuru to Tanucci, September 28, 1770, State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 525 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 526.

Cardinals, doubted on very good grounds the justification for these feelings, having seen no sign of any reparation for the insults which Portugal had offered to the Holy See and being well aware of the price at which peace had been bought.¹

Directly the settlement had been made known, Azara, with the keen perception of an enemy of Rome, remarked to those who upheld the settlement that perhaps they might tell him what Pombal meant by the rights of the Crown which were to suffer no prejudice. Until they saw that the nunciature was reopened they had no cause to rejoice as they were doing. Rome expected the ordinances against the Holy See to be revoked, but he could see no sign of it. On the contrary, only the prohibition of communication with the Curia had been revoked, certainly not everything that had happened in the last ten years to the advantage of the royal rights, and that, forsooth, was no trifle. In fact, since the Pope, in making the settlement, renounced any counterclaims, it amounted to a ratification of what had happened since 1760.²

This view was completely justified. Clement XIV.'s victory over Portugal was a Pyrrhic one, a serious defeat and a weakening of the Church in Portugal.³ Similarly, the bestowal of the purple on Cunha as on Paulo Carvalho cannot be described otherwise than as an accommodating gesture of doubtful value.

Pombal, whose success had won for him a special distinction from the king,⁴ observed in the fulsome letter he sent the Pope

¹ CHERUBINI, *Nunziat. Lusit., II., in *Nunziat. di Portog.*, 148, *loc. cit.*

² AZARA, II., 104.

³ Cf. DUHR, *Pombal*, 129 *seqq.*, based on Lebzelter's reports.

⁴ On September 27, 1770, the Minister, formerly Count of Oeyras, received the title "Count of Pombal" (*v.* *CHERUBINI, *loc. cit.*), under which name he is known in history. Conti, who *reported this on September 28, 1770, to Pallavicini, remarked, "Credo che il premio al conte d'Oeyras sia relativo alle cose nostre. Il Re ha molto gradito la straordinaria premura del Ministro nel conciliare gli affari con me." *Nunziat. di Portog.*, 119A, Papal Secret Archives.

to thank him for Cunha's appointment, that the man who had been promoted was closely bound to his deceased brother Paulo by ties of veneration, respect, and true friendship.¹ This praise was very understandable. The Austrian envoy Lebzelttern described Cunha as a man devoid of talent or any particular merit, who from being a mere monk had raised himself in a few years to such a high position by his blind subjection to Pombal's will and his complete devotion to his person. On account of his relationship with the most powerful and illustrious families in the kingdom, Pombal considered him a likely person to act as a support for his family one day in the future. With this object in view he had tried to attach him to his person by conferring great distinctions on him and by showing a complete confidence in him. Cunha was also the only person to whom the Minister opened his mind and who seemed to some extent to enjoy his esteem.²

Cunha's submissiveness to the Government was shown during the break with Rome, when he had taken it on himself to issue dispensations within the degrees of relationship reserved to the Pope, and in the face of all Pombal's forcible measures he maintained a cowardly silence, when, indeed, he was not eagerly supporting him.³ A signal proof of this was his acceptance of the presidency of the royal censor's office (*Real mesa censoria*),⁴ which performed its duties in an anti-clerical spirit.⁵ In this he was supported by the Oratorian Antonio Pereira, who was said by Cardinal Pacca to have exalted the episcopal authority in his works with Jansenistic cunning, so as to abase the primacy of the Pope and to reduce it to a mere title of honour.⁶

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 520.

² DUHR, *Pombal*, 132.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Cf.* below, p. 129.

⁵ SCHÄFER, V., 453 *seq.*, and, in addition, DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 65 *seq.* For character sketches of the *mesa censoria*, *cf.* the *letter of the Cardinal Secretary of State Pallavicini to the Portuguese nuncio Muti, of May 15, 1777, *Nunziat. di Portog.*, 187, *loc. cit.*

⁶ PACCA, *Notizie*, 70.

A courtier through and through, the Archbishop of Evora preferred to take up his residence in the capital rather than in his diocese. Later (in 1771) he obtained the Pope's permission to do so on condition that he showed himself to his flock at least from time to time, but it was six years before this happened, when it was a question of receiving the king there. Afterwards Cunha repaid Pombal's many benefactions by leaving the sinking ship in good time.¹

Cunha's admission into the College of Cardinals was by no means the only concession that Clement XIV. had to make. Pombal had many other demands to make. Sorely in need of money, he aimed at incorporating the revenues of rich monasteries in the State treasury. From April 1770 onwards Almada was instructed to press for the dissolution of nine Augustinian convents whose estates had been destined for the Franciscan convent at Mafra. The Franciscans there were to be distributed among other convents of their Order, the convent itself was to be taken away from them and placed under royal patronage, which meant that the prior, the vicar, and four counsellors would be appointed by the king. In Almada's instruction it was said that these measures, necessary "for the service of God", could be taken by the king himself, with the assent of the Bishops, but he preferred, "out of filial respect for His Holiness," to seek his consent. The alleged reason for the whole attack was the necessary reform of the Religious, whose decay Pombal was otherwise encouraging. Actually it was a question of gaining an annual revenue of 80,000 guilders for the State treasury.² The result of the lengthy negotiations was that Clement XIV. gave his assent to the extraordinary measures in a Bull of July 4th, 1770.³ He also gave way when Pombal asked for a free pardon for Pagliarini, who had been excommunicated and hanged in effigy for the letters he had written not only against the Jesuits but also the Curia. In May 1771 Conti was able to

¹ DUHR, *Pombal*, 132, 134.

² *Collecção*, III., 275 *seqq.* Cf. DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 43, 120.

³ *Collecção*, III., 281 *seq.*; *Bull. Cont.*, V., 201 *seq.*

hand over to the king a Brief in which Pagliarini was absolved from all blame and was decorated with the distinguished Order of the Golden Spur! ¹

Far more serious were the concessions which the Pope deemed fitting to be made in regard to the occupation of the Portuguese sees. Pombal's intention was to reward the prelates who were servants of the Government, and for this reason he pressed for the erection of new sees. The towns selected for this purpose were Beja in the archdiocese of Evora, Penafiel in the diocese of Oporto, and Braganza in the diocese of Miranda. In this case, too, the alleged reason for the measure was the need of religion, whereby an impudent reference was made to Cunha's pastoral solicitude as Archbishop of Evora.² The actual purpose of these episcopal appointments is disclosed by a glance at the Government nominees. Four of them had signed the "outrageously unjust verdict" ³ passed by the royal censoring authority on the pastoral letter of the excellent Bishop of Coimbra merely because he had condemned some writings of the Encyclopedists.⁴ The first of these four, Manoel de Vasconcellos Pereira, who also had rendered good service to Pombal as Inquisitor in Lisbon, became Bishop of Miranda; the second, Frey Manoel de Cenaculo, according to Lebeltern a man of learning but still more an intriguer and a creature of Pombal's, received the see of Beja; the third, Frey Ignacio de S. Cayetano, received that of Penafiel; and the fourth, Lemos de Faria, was earmarked for Coimbra.⁵ In the autumn of 1770 Pombal had the triumph of witnessing the arrival of the Papal Bulls which fulfilled his desires and confirmed the appointment of the eight new Bishops nominated by the king.⁶ For three dioceses no nomination had yet been

¹ Lebeltern's report, in DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 24. Cf. also the derision in AZARA, I., 196.

² *Collecção*, III., 256 *seqq.*

³ The expression used in DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 136.

⁴ *Collecção*, III., 300 *seq.* Cf. our account, XXXVI, 364.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 257 *seq.*, 264 *seq.*, 270 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 262; *Bull. Cont.*, V., 203, 207, 210. The Bulls are dated July 10, 1770. The see of Pinhel was erected on the same

made, and Pombal was in no hurry to see to the matter.¹ Faria's nomination to Coimbra presented a special difficulty. The then Bishop, Miguel d'Annuniação, had been deposed—though only by Pombal—and condemned to lifelong imprisonment,² but this deposition had no ecclesiastical validity and the admirable Bishop was standing on his rights. Though urged by Conti to release him, Pombal refused,³ and it was not till July 1771 that the Bishop's secretary and his Vicar General could leave the gaol in which they had languished for three years.⁴ Nor was there any talk of releasing the other priests and Religious whom Pombal had thrown into horrible gaols.⁵ Finally, even in this important question of the bishopric of Coimbra, Clement XIV. gave way. On April 12th, 1774, Lemos de Faria, who had been appointed by the Government as Vicar Capitular of Coimbra in December 1768,⁶ was appointed at the Pope's instigation Bishop Miguel's coadjutor and successor.⁷ The imposition of this man on the diocese was all the worse for his having taken the place of the rightful Bishop, under the Government's protection, and for his having exercised his powers in a Jansenistic direction.⁸

Probably none of these things could have happened had not Conti, the Lisbon nuncio, allowed himself to be deluded so grievously by Pombal. As it was, this weak man attributed far too much importance to the Minister's eloquent assurances and to the honours paid him by Pombal both in the capital

day (*ibid.*, 213), that of Castelbranco on June 7, 1770 (*ibid.*, 189). *V. Macedonio to Orsini, Lisbon, October 22, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{304}{1049}$; DUHR, *Pombal*, 134 seq.

¹ *Conti to Pallavicini, November 9, 1771, and April 21, 1772. Nunziat. di Portog., 119, Papal Secret Archives.

² *Collecção*, III., 299 seq.

³ *Ibid.*, 313 seqq.

⁴ *V. Macedonio to Orsini, from Lisbon, July 9, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{303}{1048}$.

⁵ PACCA, *Notizie*, 68; DUHR, *Pombal*, 134.

⁶ *Collecção*, III., 312.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 318 seqq.

⁸ DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 134 seq.

and at his country seat. Conti reported gleefully on September 25th, 1770, that at the first dinner he had given to the diplomatic corps Pombal had been present from the very start, contrary to his custom, which was not to appear at such functions until the coffee was served.¹ The king also giving repeated assurances in the strongest terms of his devotion to the Holy See, Conti indulged in the most extravagant hopes of the restoration of concord between Lisbon and Rome.² Even later he failed to discern the aims pursued by the Portuguese Government. "The attention shown me by Pombal," he wrote in his report of July 28th, 1772, "is unbelievable. His cordiality compels my sincerest gratitude."³ But of positive results of the Minister's affection for the nuncio there was little to show. Nevertheless, a step in the right direction had been made a year before: the king, in a circular letter, had requested all the Bishops in the realm to resume in their ordinances the former phrase "Bishop by the grace of the Apostolic See" (*et Sedis Apostolicæ gratia*) and to pay, as before, the fees for dispensations to the tribunal of the nunciature, these fees having in the meantime been received by the episcopal curias.⁴ In return for this the Pope was all the more willing to meet the wishes of the Government respecting the translations of Bishops,⁵ in which it was nearly always a question of rewarding courtiers. The nuncio was won over by the appointment to bishoprics of two of his officials who were Portuguese.⁶ In Rome, from time to time, Conti's intimacy with Pombal aroused suspicion,⁷ but it was allayed by the consideration that Pombal was after all the most authoritative man in Lisbon and was continuing to be such in spite of the visible deterioration of his health which set in at

¹ *Conti to Pallavicini, September 4 and 25, 1770, *Nunziat. di Portog.*, 119A and 119, *loc. cit.*

² *Conti to Pallavicini, November 27, 1770, *ibid.*, 119.

³ *Conti to Pallavicini, July 28, 1772, *ibid.*, 119A.

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 83.

⁵ *Conti to Pallavicini, January 14, 1772, *loc. cit.*, 118.

⁶ *Conti to Pallavicini, July 28, 1772, *ibid.*, 119A.

⁷ CHERUBINI, **Nunziat. Lusit.*, II., *ibid.*, 148.

the beginning of 1772.¹ He had talked the well-meaning but weak king into believing that it was the Jesuits who had formerly prevented harmonious relations with the Holy See and that he alone was in a position to maintain them now that they had been restored.² Clement XIV., having led a cloistered existence and with no knowledge of the world, was no match at all for the crafty Pombal. He still went on hoping for an honourable peace, whereas the cunning statesman was concerned only with creating the appearance of one, his real purpose being to obtain as many concessions as he could. Among these was the Papal renewal in the autumn of 1771 of the ratification of the Crusade Bull, which brought in two million guilders for the Government, of which sum the Roman Curia received only 18,000 guilders.³ Other Papal Bulls, observed the historian of the Portuguese nunciature, had no interest for Pombal, since, as he himself used to say, they brought in nothing.⁴

Nowhere else is the spirit of Pombal's ecclesiastical policy so clearly visible as in its effect on the religious Orders. After the Jesuits had been driven out, the other Orders were to be brought into complete dependence on the Government, since by this means their further decay would be promoted and the Government could lay its hands on their rich estates.⁵ To Conti fell the almost impossible task of upholding the rights of the Orders "without declaring war on the Government".⁶ Already in December 1770 he had to report on Pombal's astounding plans in regard to the Capuchins.⁷ When it was evident that the Minister's aim was to nullify any influence that the Generals resident abroad might bring to bear on their Orders, the Pope commanded Conti to work for the retention

¹ *Conti to Pallavicini, February 3, 1772, *ibid.*, 119.

² *CHERUBINI, *loc. cit.*

³ DUHR, *Pombal*, 141.

⁴ *CHERUBINI, *loc. cit.*

⁵ **Ibid.*

⁶ *Conti to Pallavicini, December 25, 1770, *Nunziat. di Portog.*, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

of the conditions prevailing hitherto, but at the same time to use the greatest prudence.¹ Conti did his utmost to save "what was left of the rights still possessed by the Holy See" and to circumvent the great difficulties caused by the attitude of the Government.² But the more he conceded—which, as he himself admitted, was a great deal—the more he was confronted with fresh demands. From time to time they were too much, even for him, and he rejected them.³ He neither could nor would have anything to do with the complete exclusion of the foreign Generals from the government of the Orders in Portugal.⁴ It was but a slight consolation for him that the royal couple were repeatedly giving assurances of their devotion to the Holy See, that all the Ministers vied with one another in paying him honour and, as he thought, showing him unprecedented helpfulness in the affairs of the nunciature.⁵ But as for the Orders, he had to acknowledge in the summer of 1772 that under the cover of reform the Government was working for their destruction.⁶

Equally unpleasant experiences had to be undergone by Conti in all other ecclesiastical matters. In May, 1771, there appeared a collection of all the laws affecting the ecclesiastical sphere which had been issued in the previous decade.⁷ Among them were regulations appreciably restricting the Church's acquisition of property, pious requests, even for Masses for the dead, and the admission of novices into the Orders. By a royal decree even the ordination of a priest was made dependent on the Government's permission.⁸ The collection of laws, Conti had to report to Rome, contained all the

¹ *Conti to Pallavicini, September 10, 1771, *ibid.*

² *Conti to Pallavicini, February 26 and April 22, 1772, *ibid.*

³ *Conti to Pallavicini, May 26, 1772, *ibid.*, 119A.

⁴ *Conti to Pallavicini, June 16, 1772, *ibid.*

⁵ *Conti to Pallavicini, July 10, 1772, *ibid.*, from which I took the date, whereas the text is printed without the date in the *Vita di Clemente XIV.*, Venezia, 1775, 52 *seq.*

⁶ *Conti to Pallavicini, July 21, 1772, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Conti to Pallavicini, May 11, 1771, *ibid.*

⁸ SCHÄFER, V., 458 *seq.*; DUHR, *Pombal*, 115 *seq.*

regulations which had led to the serious injury of the Church's rights in Portugal.¹ From Rome warnings were sent to Conti to be vigilant ; he replied that he would not fail in this respect but that success did not depend on him and that perhaps no one could effect a change in such circumstances.²

Besides the laws proper, many ordinances, either written or verbal, had been issued which were harming the Church and which did not escape Conti's attention, but no authentic information about them was obtainable. Thus, in 1760 all Orders for men or women were forbidden to admit novices. Although it was thought that this prohibition was to last only ten years, in 1770 the royal assent had still to be sought for the admission of every monk or nun.³

Outstanding among the innovations made during the breach with Rome was the royal board of censors (*Real mesa censoria*), which was set up on April 5th, 1768, and of which mention has already been made. It was preceded by a decree which suppressed the Bull *In coena Domini* and all Bulls relating to the Index which had been issued subsequently without the royal *Placet*, ordered their surrender within three months, and forbade their reprinting and sale. The *Real mesa censoria* had its headquarters in the Court in Lisbon, it had at its head a president, and it had its own specific jurisdiction in everything that concerned the examination, approval, or condemnation of books and writings printed in or imported into Portugal.⁴ This authority was to be used to prohibit all works which defended the rights of the Holy See and opposed the nationalization of the Portuguese Church.⁵ Conti's representation of the authority as being as harmless as possible⁶ was not in accordance with the facts, for even after the restoration of

¹ *Conti to Pallavicini, March 22, 1772, *loc. cit.*, 119A.

² *Conti to Pallavicini, September 1, 1772, *ibid.*

³ *Conti to Pallavicini, March 22, 1772, *ibid.*

⁴ SCHÄFER, V., 453 ; DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 114.

⁵ Cf. the French ambassador's report, of April 19, 1768, in SANTAREM, VII., 328.

⁶ Report of January 29, 1771, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 76 *seqq.*

peace with the Holy See the censorship was exercised in an anti-Roman direction just as much as before,¹ which even Conti could not gloss over.² The Inquisition, which had become a purely State institution, exerting its powers in the same direction, the books of innovating authors could be distributed in Portugal without hindrance, whereas the importation and printing of Catholic writings met with the greatest difficulties. The means employed to spread anti-clerical doctrines are shown by an instance cited by Cardinal Pacca. An application to read forbidden books received the answer from the royal board of censors that it was permissible to read a work so notoriously anti-Christian as Bayle's Encyclopædia, but that other works, especially those by Bellarmine, were forbidden!³

An even more effective means of propagating his principles was found by Pombal in the complete reformation of the university of Coimbra. As a precursor of the "reform" a voluminous work was put into circulation by Pombal, ascribing the decay of studies at Coimbra to the bad influence of the Jesuits, though, in the opinion of the Austrian envoy, Lebzeltner, the charges brought against them were merely an endless repetition of spiteful accusations and contradictory absurdities.⁴

After Pombal had had himself proclaimed Visitor of the university in August 1772 the new statutes were solemnly

¹ CHERUBINI, *Nunziat. Lusit., II., *loc. cit.*

² On January 14, 1771, he *reported, "Assai spesso [la Mesa censoria] proibisce l'uso di quelle opere che non incontrano la fortuna del clima." As many were doubting that the licences of the *Mesa* were permitted, he was issuing them. On November 10, 1771, he *reported that the *Mesa* had approved the theses of certain clerics which he would not have been able to approve. Nunziat. di Portog., 119A, Papal Secret Archives.

³ See the important *report from Pacca to Consalvi, dated Lisbon, September 18, 1800, and partly in cipher, which provides a most instructive survey of the development of ecclesiastical affairs in Portugal resulting from Pombal's efforts. *Ibid.*, 134.

⁴ DUHR, *Pombal*, 98, 99 *seqq.*

announced on September 29th.¹ This was followed by the opening, with great pomp—Conti being among those present at the ceremony—of the “new” university. The king’s satisfaction was not shared by the students. After the reading of the statutes there was an uproar which was not easily quelled. At first only a hundred of the former two thousand students stayed on, and even by December the number of those who came back amounted only to four hundred. As the university could not continue its existence in these conditions a fresh tax was imposed for its benefit, creating a very bad impression.² Taking no notice of this, Conti reported to Rome on December 22nd, 1772, on the earnest endeavour with which the completion of the great work of the new university was being taken in hand; Pombal was indefatigable and was making every effort to ensure the success of the institution.³ The nuncio seems to have been totally unaware of the Minister’s intention in “reforming” the university, though the character of the persons chosen for the purpose should have aroused his suspicion. After Cardinal Cunha the most noteworthy person whose services were enlisted was the new Bishop of Beja, Manoel de Cenaculo, who in conjunction with Antonio Pereira revised on anti-Roman lines the statutes for the theological faculty.⁴ The appointment of the professors followed on the same lines.⁵ The “reform” was also eagerly promoted by Lemos de Faria, who did his best to influence education in the diocese of Coimbra in a Jansenist and Febronianist spirit. Like Cunha in the diocese of Evora, he introduced Montpellier’s Catechism, which had been rejected by the Holy See.⁶ Pacca said of this man, who had been entrusted with the supervision of Coimbra University, that he might be described without any misgiving as an open heretic,

¹ GOMEZ, 300.

² DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 100 *seq.*, in accordance with Lebzeltern’s reports.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 191.

⁴ SCHÄFER, V., 439.

⁵ *CHERUBINI, *loc. cit.*

⁶ DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 134 *seqq.*; *cf.* 114.

by reason both of his anti-Catholic principles and his implacable hatred of the Apostolic See. All officials and advocates and Church dignitaries underwent their training at this university and Faria took advantage of this to imbue them with his principles. Thus it was, according to Pacca, that almost all who had studied here were filled with innovatory views and a dislike of the Holy See and its representatives that verged on hatred.¹

These consequences did not develop to their full effect until later, but they originated in the time of Conti's nunciature. The nuncio's attitude of optimism persisted too long, but in the end even he was forced to reckon with the impossibility of the nunciature tribunal attaining any importance. Under the influence of the views taught at Coimbra, the public abandoned the nunciature and had recourse to the royal Ministers. In consequence, the nunciature tribunal found itself with insufficient revenue, and Portuguese priests or insignificant advocates had to be employed to co-operate with the Papally appointed Auditor.² In addition to this, things developed badly in another direction. After its reopening the nunciature was assailed by the Ministry with royal requests that increased as time went on. These Conti thought that he had to consider, to avoid worse ills. This gave rise to the opinion that the nuncio was in duty bound to pay attention to such representations and that any resistance to them was a crime. But the royal proposals affected such important matters of church discipline as the suspension of Chapters of Orders and the appointment of Provincials, whereby the nuncio was not allowed to choose freely the worthiest and fittest men for the post. By degrees the Government took upon itself the appointment not only of the Superiors of Orders but also their procurators and even doorkeepers. Still worse,

¹ See Pacca's *report of September 18, 1800, *loc. cit.*, mentioned at p. 130, n. 3. Cf. also *CHERUBINI, *loc. cit.*

² Pacca's *report of September 18, 1800, *ibid.* Conti also had to complain of the paucity of the fees coming into the nunciature tribunal; see his *report of March 19, 1771, *ibid.*, 119.

it demanded, and obtained, the authority to appoint Apostolic Visitors with extraordinary powers. This led inevitably to the complete disintegration of monastic life, the monks now striving solely to win the favour of the Ministers and even the ladies of the Court, since by this means the nuncio would be forced to fulfil their wishes.¹

Conti suffered under these conditions as much as his successors. In a report of March 22nd, 1772, he poured out vehement complaints about the decay of the nunciature tribunal.² On Pombal's recommendation Clement XIV. had already created him a Cardinal *in pectus* at a secret Consistory held on September 23rd, 1771. His friends in Lisbon waited for the publication with growing impatience.³ Conti must have sighed with relief when it ensued on April 19th, 1773,⁴ announcing, as it did, the approaching end of his difficult nunciature. His successor, Bernardino Muti,⁵ was appointed on December 2nd, 1773. Conti remained at his post until Muti arrived in Lisbon in the spring of 1774,⁶ when he advised

¹ Pacca's *report of September 18, 1800, *ibid.*

² " *Da tali e tante novità non è cosa strana che ne derivi la decadenza del tribunale di questa Nunziatura. Una volta che i luoghi pii non possono acquistare e colla scusa delle mani morte tutto resta in mano ai secolari o al fisco, le cause ecclesiastiche devono mancare per necessità. Tutte le questioni di legati pii, di enfiteusi, di testamenti, di donazioni, di fondazioni, di cento altri articoli privativi al foro ecclesiastico sono andate in fumo, e a dir la verità, ora nella Nunziatura il numero e la qualità delle cause si riduce alla sola materia de' sponsali. Di più tutte le grazie che faceva il Nunzio a frati e monache sono ridotte al niente, perchè quando non si moltiplica il numero de' soggetti le grazie antiche non si rinnovano e niuna se ne concede di nuova." Conti to Pallavicini, March 22, 1772, *ibid.*

³ V. Macedonio's *letters to Orsini, of May 15, June 18 and 25, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma.

⁴ NOVAES, XV., 191.

⁵ KARTTUNEN, 251.

⁶ Conti's *report of January 25, 1774 (" Si prepara a partire senz' altro avviso coll' espressa condizione di consumare tutto l'occorrente di sua commissione e dopo aver posto Msgr. Muti in

him to exercise the greatest caution in his dealings with "the highly jealous and suspicious Portuguese Government". How justified this warning was, Muti very quickly realized. "Here," he reported on August 11th, 1774, "all letters are opened."¹ It was for this reason that Conti had already had the cipher code of the nunciature changed in his day.²

In spite of all the signs shown by Clement XIV. of his conciliatory attitude, Almada continued his demands for the abolition of the Jesuit Order.³ It was remarkable, on the other hand, that the interest of the Portuguese Government in this affair, which it itself had initiated, suddenly seemed to flag. There being no question of Pombal's animosity against the Jesuits cooling off, this attitude was inexplicable.⁴ But undoubtedly the chief driving force behind the demand for the suppression was not Portugal but Spain.

corrente esercizio"), and April 28. One of Muti's first official duties was to forward an **Editto della Reale Mesa Censoria* of April 28, 1774, which condemned a written work dealing with Malagrida's innocence. Nunziat. di Portog., 120, Papal Secret Archives.

¹ *Muti to Pallavicini, August 11, 1774, *ibid.*

² Conti's *report from Lisbon, June 2, 1772, *ibid.*, 119A.

³ GOMEZ, 247.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 248.

CHAPTER III.

THE BOURBONS' DEMAND FOR THE TOTAL ABOLITION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS AND CLEMENT XIV.'S RESISTANCE IN THE FIRST YEARS OF HIS PONTIFICATE.

As in the case with Portugal, Clement XIV., as soon as he was elected, strove to obtain peace with Spain, France, and Naples by showing them the utmost goodwill. Here, however, he was faced with far more serious obstacles, the three closely united Bourbon Courts being determined to make a settlement dependent on the granting of very great demands. According to the ultimatum drawn up by Choiseul while the conclave was still in progress, the new Pope was to be compelled, by force if necessary, to make the following concessions: (1) Satisfaction for the duke of Parma; (2) the surrender of Benevento and Pontecorvo to Naples, which, in return, was to waive its claim to Castro and Ronciglione; (3) the surrender of Avignon and Venaissin to France in return for a monetary compensation; (4) the total abolition of the Jesuit Order.¹

With regard to the last point it was long thought that Cardinal Ganganelli had given a definite promise during the conclave and that his election had resulted from it. The authentic history of Ganganelli's elevation to the Papacy, however, shows that those who imputed to him a simoniacal transaction were doing him a grievous injustice. It has been proved, on the contrary, that the Cardinal refused to enter into any such pact and that there is no question of his having given a formal promise before his election.² It is equally certain, however, that the ambiguous position towards the Jesuit question which he had adopted as a Cardinal was maintained by him in the conclave.

Inexperienced in the ways of the world, the Cardinal did not realize what a lever this attitude of his was giving to the enemies of the Jesuits; now that he was Pope they could

¹ MASSON, 119. ² Cf. above, p. 78.

exert pressure on him. If the utterances he had made, they calculated, were a true reflection of his inward conviction, he must, now that he had acquired the power, as Head of the Church, to suppress the Society, put them into execution. At first, however, this calculation showed no sign of coming true, though there was some evidence to indicate that Clement XIV. was moved by anti-Jesuit feelings. When the Generals of the religious Orders presented themselves, as usual, to do homage to the new Pope, they were all received with affection except the Jesuit General Ricci, who was given an icy welcome by Clement XIV. When Ricci commended his Order to the Pope, the latter said not a word in reply but straightway imparted his blessing, which, of course, was the sign of dismissal.¹ No less interest was aroused by the Pope's retention of the office of *ponens* for the process of beatification of the anti-Jesuit Palafox, which was so eagerly espoused by Charles III. Clement told the Spanish ambassador Azpuru that he would take a particular interest in the matter on account of his veneration of Bishop Palafox and his regard for the king's desire. As for the suppression of the Jesuit Order, Azpuru obtained no very clear statement from the Pope, it is true, but he thought that there were grounds for hoping that his king's wish in this matter, too, would receive favourable attention, seeing that the Pope himself had told him that he would remove the obstacles.² The French

¹ On May 25, 1769, Azpuru *reported to Grimaldi on the "frialdad con que [Clement XIV] recibió al beso del pie al General de la Compañía a quien dijo pocas palabras, y cuando le recomendó su Religión, lo despidió inmediatamente, dándole Su S^a bendición, singularidad que hasido generalmente notada, y se tiene por un pronostico de la extincion, mayormente comparada esta sequedad con el amor y benevolencia con que recibió a los demas generales"; which the Jesuits also admitted to be "muy funesto pronostico". Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² "Se quitarian las espinas" (Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 25, 1769, *ibid.*). Orsini had already *reported to Tanucci on May 23, 1769, that the Pope would continue to be the "Ponente della

ambassador Aubeterre was assured by Clement XIV. at an audience on May 31st, 1769, that he would arrange everything to the satisfaction of the House of Bourbon; as for the Jesuits, he must be given a little time, as he could not do everything at once; but he could assure him that the Courts would have cause to be satisfied.¹

Like Aubeterre, Azpuru, at another audience on June 3rd, made no official request for the suppression of the Jesuits but merely stressed his king's great interest in the matter, arising from "Catholic zeal for the good of the Church", he being her obedient son and protector. Azpuru received the same answer as Aubeterre; he also learnt at this time that the Pope had spoken disapprovingly to Cardinal Orsini and the Maltese envoy of the Jesuits' attitude during the pontificate of Clement XIII.² On June 15th Azpuru reported to Madrid that not a day passed without the Pope's showing signs of his goodwill regarding the suppression, so that there could be no doubt about it. In the audience he had granted him the day before he had spoken in exactly the same way as on June 3rd and he had asked confidentially for information about the property of the Spanish Jesuits in Rome. The Secretary of the Propaganda, Marefoschi, was collecting in the archives all the documents relating to the Jesuits, and Palafox's process was to be accelerated. Azpuru concluded: "I have no doubt that the Pope will satisfy our king in everything."³ Tanucci's friend, the Neapolitan agent Centomani, gave it as his opinion on June 20th, 1769, that the suppression of the hated Order was imminent or at any rate was no longer remote.⁴

causa Palafoxiana"; on May 26 the Cardinal *wrote that he thought that the Pope would undertake the suppression of the Jesuits. State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1473.

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I, 353. Cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 1, 1769, *loc. cit.*

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 8, 1769, *ibid.*

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 15, 1769, *ibid.*

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, June 20, 1769, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, 1216.

This conception was erroneous if only because the Bourbon envoys had still refrained from taking any official step. This was certainly not due to any lack of zeal, for it is hard to say who nursed the greatest hatred of Loyola's Order—Tanucci in Naples, Choiseul in Paris, or Charles III. in Madrid. The same feelings animated the envoys in Rome, the main topic of whose reports were now the "extincion de los Jesuitas".¹ Azpuru was determined to do everything in his power to bring this about, as he considered that the destruction of the Order was necessary for the good of Christianity.² The same view was held by Cardinal Orsini, who had once been a supporter of the Order when the Courts had been more favourably disposed towards it.³ Cardinal Bernis, too, who succeeded Aubeterre as the French ambassador on June 27th, 1769, was filled with the conviction that now that the main branch of the tree had been lopped off, the axe must be laid to the trunk, for this was demanded by the political situation and the peace of the Catholic States and the Holy See.⁴ The underlying reason for the eagerness shown by the Bourbon statesmen was undoubtedly the fact that nothing short of the complete destruction of the Jesuit Order could sanction the forcible measures they had taken in their respective countries.

But despite the unanimity regarding their goal, the means of attaining it were far from clear.⁵ Charles III. was of the opinion that the new Pope should be dealt with as firmly as

¹ "Extincion" or "extinction" was the standing expression used in the reports; "suppression" or "abolition" occurs only occasionally. In a *letter to Tanucci of August 1, 1769 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{293}{33}$), Orsini rejected "ogni espediente medio" and demanded "la totale, intera abolizione" in accordance with Charles III.'s intention.

² *Azpuru to Roda, September 12, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 13, 1771, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1477.

⁴ MASSON, 120. Aubeterre, *reported Orsini to Tanucci on June 27, 1769, was leaving highly dissatisfied with both Bernis and Choiseul. *Ibid.*, 1473.

⁵ MASSON, 147.

Clement XIII. had been, seeing that he was compromised both by his attitude when he was a Cardinal and by his election, which appeared to be the work of the Bourbons. This view was shared by Azpuru and Aubeterre. But Cardinal Bernis, the experienced diplomat, considered it more advisable to work for their desired object by gentle methods than by blustering and forceful ones. This immediately earned for him the mistrust of the Spanish king, who was burning with desire to see the Jesuit Order completely annihilated. The partisanship left behind by Loyola's disciples, even in the countries from which they had been driven out, he wrote to Louis XV. on June 7th, 1769, was undoubtedly harmful both to religion and to national tranquillity. He considered the appointment of a Cardinal as ambassador endangered the attainment of their common goal to such an extent that Choiseul had some difficulty in setting his mind at rest on the score of Bernis' reliability.¹ Inevitably the view held by the Spanish king affected the relations between Azpuru and Bernis. Even before the Cardinal had taken up his post as ambassador, a serious disagreement arose between them on account of Bernis' unwillingness to put the suppression of the Jesuits before all other demands.² Soon their differences grew so many that Azpuru wrote complaining to Madrid that Bernis was trying to postpone the settlement of the Jesuit question as long as possible. This was correct inasmuch as the Cardinal wanted to obtain the extinction of the Order by gradually crippling it, without using force and provoking a stir. The complaints made by Madrid to Paris about Bernis' attitude were so frequent that Choiseul had to defend his ambassador every week.³

Madrid was firmly convinced that Bernis was a friend of the Jesuits. Charles III. accused the Cardinal of falsely asserting that he, the king, was trying to conduct the affair by indirect and secret methods. Everything was in the balance, he

¹ MASSON, 122.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 6, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy to Rome.

³ MASSON, 145 *seq.*

averred, because the Cardinal was not following the instructions of his Court. This charge was quite unfounded, for actually Bernis had no instructions, Versailles not being in so feverish a hurry as Madrid. Choiseul was primarily concerned with the acquisition of Avignon and he feared, not without cause, that Clement XIV. wanted to combine the two affairs. On June 19th, 1769, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, De Fuentes, was instructed to see to it that strict orders were sent through Choiseul to Bernis to work for the suppression with energy and in conjunction with the other Bourbon envoys.¹

Choiseul took umbrage at the suspicion of the Madrid Cabinet and he disapproved of their haste. "Our feelings about the Jesuits," he wrote to Bernis on July 4th, 1769, "are no less sincere than those of the Courts of Madrid and Naples, and nothing could be more unjust than to try to sow suspicion about our alleged lukewarmness. We have no other desire than to speak and act in conjunction with these two Powers and we shall never refuse to march along with them, step by step. I also notice with regret that our attitude towards their Ministers is far more open and sincere than theirs towards us. However, for prudence sake, we must overlook this and continue to strive as effectively as we possibly can after our worthy object by methods that are gentle, honourable, and creditable to the three Crowns. The way in which the Pope has already expressed his opinion of the Jesuits on various occasions is enough to set our minds at rest, both as regards the issue and his definite wish to be given time to fulfil the demands of the three rulers. The mere fact that he is inclined in this direction entitles him to consideration. Cardinal Solis and Azpuru agree with Your Eminence in this and they would be contradicting themselves were they to complain of a delay the necessity and propriety of which they appeared to acknowledge. But if Azpuru were to make Your Eminence the proposal which has already been submitted to Aubeterre, namely that you should hand the

¹ *Ibid.*, 146.

Pope a copy of the memorandum made for Clement XIII. on the general and complete suppression of the Jesuits, there is nothing against Your Eminence taking this step." "I am entirely of your opinion; in the handling of the matter in question gentleness and firmness must be used simultaneously with skill and intelligence. Success is often delayed by trying to rush things; the only result is to weary and upset the persons who have the say in the matter, and instead of progressing one loses ground. Your Eminence's wise power of discretion is a certain security for your conduct and it is much to be desired that the envoys of Spain and Naples should imitate you in this respect."¹

This instruction did not reach Rome till July 9th, 1769. On the 5th Bernis had reported from there to Choiseul that two days previously he had had a conversation with Cardinal Orsini and another with Azpuru, with the object of bringing some order and agreement into the proceeding which was occupying the attention of the three Courts. Azpuru had assured him that he would show "the same willingness to follow my advice" as he would Aubeterre's; he had shown him a dispatch which prescribed this line of action. If, as was expected, Cardinal Solis was not entrusted with the affairs of Spain, he, Bernis, would command the greatest influence in all matters of common interest to the three Courts. The Portuguese envoy had spoken in the same sense. He could also reckon on Cardinal Orsini, who, it was true, had the bad habit of reporting to Tanucci the most trivial details that were brought to his attention and of laying too great weight on whatever came to his ears from any quarter.

Bernis reported further that he, Orsini, and Azpuru had had a talk with Almada, who seemed to see the necessity of conducting the affair with great circumspection and absolute secrecy. "We will consult together as to how to find various excuses for seeing the Pope alone. The simplest way, in my opinion, would be to make it appear that the affairs of Parma, Benevento, and Avignon were the subjects of our conversation

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 355 *seq.*

with the Pope.”¹ On July 13th, 1769, Bernis reported on a talk he had had with the General of the Augustinians, a Spaniard who had been let into the secrets of the Madrid Cabinet. This enemy of the Jesuits was also convinced that the matter of the suppression must be handled with extreme care and in the greatest secrecy and that it must not be allowed to pass through several persons’ hands. The General thought that the carelessness and incompetence of the Portuguese envoy Almada, the imprudent vivacity of Cardinal Orsini, and the limited knowledge possessed by Azpuru resulted in his, Bernis’, being badly supported. The General had also called his attention to the presence of Jesuit emissaries among his entourage. In the further course of the conversation the Cardinal managed to shake the General’s belief that secret negotiations were being carried on between the Pope and the Spanish Court through the medium of Manuel de Roda and Charles III.’s confessor.²

There were two persons whom Cardinal Bernis suspected of working in secret for the Jesuits. He had discovered by clandestine means, he reported, that Cardinal Delle Lanze had been consulted on the Brief to Parma and that he had warmly approved of it. Formerly this Cardinal was reputed to be a Jansenist, but since the expulsion of the Order from France he had become an out-and-out Jesuit. Secret inquiries had also brought to his knowledge that at a recent audience with the Pope this Cardinal had stated in the name of his prince, the King of Sardinia, that even if the Jesuit Order was suppressed he would still keep it in his dominions.

Bernis also viewed with great distrust the offer made by the Polish *chargé d’affaires*, the Marchese Antici, who declared his readiness to subscribe to France’s request for the suppression of the Jesuits. Bernis advised Cardinal Orsini to ask the Marchese if he was making the offer in the name of the king and the republic, or merely in the king’s name, or of his own accord. “In the first and second cases we would inform our Courts, in the third case we should make no reply.” Finally,

¹ *Ibid.*, 354.

² *Ibid.*, 356.

Bernis reported that probably the Augustinian Georgi, a plain, accommodating, and learned man, of whom the Pope thought very highly, would be given the task of drafting the Bull for the suppression of the Jesuits.¹

In a private letter bearing the same date, July 13th, Bernis had another, unpleasant, piece of news to impart to Choiseul. Grimaldi had written to Azpuru that an order had been sent to Bernis to renew the request for the suppression, and Azpuru showed the French ambassador Grimaldi's letter on the subject. "This," considered Bernis, "was sadly out of tune with a secret negotiation; and apart from that I am amazed that the Spanish ambassador is not instructed how to handle a case that must be well prepared before it is presented to the Pope. So far as I am concerned I have constantly declared that I would not hold back when Spain had made up its mind to take the Jesuit question in hand; but it must first be decided whether it is to be conducted with the Pope in secret or with a noise and a publicity that would endanger the success of the affair and are bound to create many obstacles."²

After Bernis had received on July 19th, 1769, the instruction of the 4th he had no other course but to carry it out. In this he was aided by an unexpected incident.

By a Brief of July 12th, 1769, Clement XIV., following an old custom, had granted indulgences to the missionaries of the Jesuit Order and their charges. In this document it was stated that the Pope was complying with the request of the Jesuit General because he wished to foster and increase the piety and activity of the missionaries in question and the devotion of those to whom they were sent.³

The impression made by this Brief, which was perfectly harmless in itself and was couched in the usual chancery style, was unexpectedly great. After all that had gone before it was only natural that the Brief should give rise to much rejoicing among the friends of the Jesuits and the Jesuits themselves, but it was tactless to have it copied and circulated in Rome and elsewhere as a proof that Clement was a friend of the

¹ *Ibid.*, 357 *seqq.*

² MASSON, 147.

³ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 30; *Ius pontif.*, IV., 159.

Jesuits and that with the same steadfastness as his predecessor he would reject every request of the Courts for their suppression.¹

The excitement it aroused in the opposite camp was equally great. Was this mark of favour a prelude to the hoped-for suppression? "What a catastrophe!" Azpuru wrote immediately to Bernis, "A Brief in favour of the Jesuits!" He personally was of the opinion that remonstrances must be made to the Pope. What did His Eminence think about it? ² This question was easily answered. It was a most opportune moment for the Cardinal to demonstrate to Spain his readiness to co-operate in the Jesuit affair. He invited Azpuru and Orsini to a conference on July 18th, 1769, in the Palazzo Sciarra, which he was occupying until October.³ All three agreed that the time had come to take official steps. Bernis was charged with the composition of a memorial in which not only was a protest to be made against the Brief but also the suppression of the Jesuit Order was to be demanded.⁴ He set about his task without delay. On July 21st Orsini and Azpuru approved the memorial, which Bernis was to present at his next audience.

Clement XIV. was extremely upset by the unexpected effect of the Brief. Cardinal Negroni, who had signed it and who acknowledged that he was in favour of the suppression, protested that it was quite harmless.⁵ The Pope was at especial

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 20, 1769, and *Fernando Coronel to Aranda, Rimini, July 28, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² *Azpuru to Bernis, July 17, 1769, *ibid.*

³ In October, 1769, Bernis moved into the palazzo built for the De Carolis family by Alessandro Specchi, a pupil of Carlo Fontana's; it faces S. Marcello and belonged to the Jesuits. Later, the house was acquired by the Marchese Simonetti, and in 1833 by the Boncompagni. It is now occupied by the Banco di Roma.

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 20, 1769, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, July 21, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ²⁹³/₁₀₃₃.

pains to pacify Azpuru, through the agency of Bontempi. He assured him that he had approved of the Brief, along with other petitions, without looking into it closely, but he had now forbidden it to be reprinted and he was ready to grant all Spanish missionaries the privileges held by the Jesuits before their expulsion. Azpuru replied that he would report the matter to his king; in any case, it affected not only Spain but also the other Courts which were agreed about the suppression. At the consultation with Bernis and Orsini it was recognized that the Pope was not to blame for the Brief and that he could not withdraw it. In spite of his reassuring them through Bontempi that he had not changed his view and that the Jesuits were triumphing too soon, the ambassadors held to their decision that the memorial must be presented to him.¹ This was done by Cardinal Bernis on July 22nd, at a secret audience which lasted several hours.

The memorial read as follows: "The ambassadors of France, Spain, and Naples have the honour to represent to Your Holiness that in accordance with the instructions of their Courts and at the same time to give the Holy Father a proof of their respect, they have delayed until to-day the renewal of the petition which has already been submitted by their sovereigns to Clement XIII. on the subject of the complete suppression of the Jesuit Order. It seemed fitting to the three Courts not to interrupt Your Holiness's occupation during the first days of Your government and equally to allow Your Holiness the time asked for by Your exalted Self in which to formulate a scheme in a matter the settlement of which is absolutely necessary for the peace of the Church, the tranquillity of the Catholic States, and the preservation of the harmony that must prevail between the State and the Church. Your Holiness has expressed Yourself so clearly and has deigned to enter into the details Yourself of the measures to be taken in this matter, that it would have been a lack of confidence in the virtues of Your Holiness

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 20, 1769, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, July 8, 1769, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1474.

to show impatience regarding the unanimous wishes of the rulers of France, Spain, Naples, and Portugal and the secret wishes of all other Catholic princes, who, though they do not openly declare themselves, are awaiting the event.

“As much as a month ago the ambassadors of Spain and Naples received orders from their Governments to resume proceedings against the Jesuits. Cardinal Bernis also received instructions to join in these proceedings, but at the same time to pay every consideration due to the Head of the Church, the ruler of the Pontifical States, and still more to the great merit which Your Holiness above all men possesses.

“The three ambassadors mentioned above would not be presenting again the petition already addressed to Clement XIII. were it not that the Brief of July 12th makes further silence impossible. The Jesuits and their adherents are exploiting this Brief, they are drawing from it conclusions which mislead the weak, foster fanaticism, and encourage the protectors of a degenerate Order. The most virtuous and learned persons have always held its morality to be lax and dangerous, its theology to be anything but strict in matters of importance. Disobeying ecclesiastical ordinances it has taken part in commercial transactions, intrigues, and plots. After careful consideration the four renowned rulers were compelled to drive it out of their dominions, not only for reasons of State but also because of their devotion to religion and their filial respect for the Holy See. Though they have no wish to repeat here the serious charges against the Jesuits, what reply can be made to the following? An Order which at all times and in all countries has made a terrifying impression on other Religious, on the secular clergy, the nobility, the royalty, the Bishops, and even on the Popes, on whom it is wholly dependent, even now, when it is almost destroyed, still inspires terror. The aforesaid Brief, which in other circumstances could only appear as a formality, is in these days, owing to the advantage which the Jesuits are trying to gain from it, capable of stirring up suspicion and uneasiness between the Holy See and the Governments.

“The aforesaid ambassadors were therefore of the

unanimous opinion that it was their duty to carry out the orders of their Governments regarding the suppression of the Jesuit Order. They assure Your Holiness that the three rulers deem this destruction to be profitable and necessary, without thereby violating the secrecy which appears to Your Holiness to be needful in this weighty and difficult matter. They accordingly apply to Your Holiness to-day, asking only that You give the matter Your earnest attention and then issue a favourable reply.

“Your Holiness is too enlightened not to know that the Jesuit Order has always held in honour the principle ‘He who is not for us is against us’. Consideration for those who demand absolute devotion is needless. In affairs of this kind time is so precious that the loss of it jeopardizes everything and one runs into danger oneself. Fanaticism is never lulled to sleep, it always has its eyes open and its weapons in its hand; if one pays regard to it one only strengthens it still more. It can only be anticipated and overcome by courage and swift action. Your Holiness knows full well what disastrous consequences can follow for the man who allows time to an adversary who thinks that all is lost. Your Holiness’s perspicacity and experience see through everything. May Your Holiness therefore communicate Your thoughts and plans to the rulers who have always formed the support and ornament of the Papal throne; then Your Holiness will find a sure solace and aid in their devotion and power.”¹

Clement XIV. accepted the memorial most reluctantly, regarding it as premature and as a sign of mistrust.² He justified the Brief of July 12th, on which the Jesuits had had the impertinence to preen themselves. He had reprimanded

¹ This memorial of the three ambassadors, dated July 22, 1769, in the Archives of Simancas (Est. 5036), the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, and the State Archives, Naples (Esteri-Roma $\frac{290}{1635}$); printed, with no indication of its origin, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 363 *seq.*

² For what follows, *cf.* Bernis’ report of July 26, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 363 *seq.*

Cardinal Negroni for not having supplied the envoys with advance information of the Brief and would shortly lower the Jesuits' pride by two other Briefs. As for the suppression of the Order, he must pay regard to his conscience and his honour: to his conscience by observing the rules of the Church and following the example set by his predecessors in similar cases; to his honour by not lightly disregarding the consideration he owed to the princes and States which were not asking for the suppression, namely the emperor and empress, the Polish republic, the King of Sardinia, the Venetians, the Genoese, and even the King of Prussia. Although he had been threatened and even made to fear for his life, fear would not prevent him from accommodating the Bourbons immediately. But he also knew the regulations and his obligations, and no human consideration would induce him to renounce them. He promised the three rulers of the House of Bourbon to confirm all the measures they had taken against the Jesuits in their States and he was willing to prevent their return for all time, but he wished to have the considered opinion of the clergy of these kingdoms. "We came to an agreement," added Bernis, "by which the Pope was not to take any step in the matter without giving me time to inform the king about it." Supported by the opinions of the clergy of France, Spain, Naples, and Portugal, Clement asseverated, he could act on good grounds and with honour. These opinions were sure to be favourable and would be the signal for the other Catholic States to follow suit. All the princes, or at any rate the greater part of them, would petition for the suppression of the Jesuit Order. Meanwhile, he would work towards this goal himself, step by step, and every day he would give greater proof of his sincerity, but prudently and systematically. If the General of the Jesuits were to die he would delay the election of his successor. But he must be given time, and regard must be paid to his position.

When Bernis broached the question of the suspected dealings with Spain, Clement assured him that they had never existed. "He gave me a sufficiently strong proof," continued the Cardinal, in his report to Choiseul, "by asking me earnestly

to suggest to our king (he calls His Majesty 'our king') on his behalf that he petition Charles III. to issue all commands respecting the suppression of the Jesuits through you, Monsieur le Duc, and to direct these instructions exclusively to me, so that these negotiations may continue to be conducted by the Holy Father and myself." Bernis observed that it might be suspected that this proposal originated with him, whereupon the Pope replied with considerable warmth: "Refer everything to me, quote me all the time, write in my name and at my request, for it would be impossible for Cardinal Orsini, careless as he is, to keep such a secret." Finally, Clement promised Bernis to indicate to him another way of communicating with him in safety without increasing the number of audiences. He explained that he was surrounded by adherents of the Jesuits, who were the real masters of the Pontifical States, and that his life was threatened. Nevertheless, his life was in God's hands and he would never be moved by revenge or complaisance, still less by fear, to destroy an Order that had been confirmed by his predecessors. His inmost desire was to please the king and to win his friendship and the benevolence of the other princes. But he was not only the Pope of the Bourbons but also the Pope of the empress, the emperor, and the other Catholic princes. He must also consult the clergy, so as to provide his plans with a respectable basis; the world must not believe that conditions had been imposed upon him in the conclave. At the end of the audience the Pope embraced Bernis several times and told him that he wanted him to be a friend of Brother Lorenzo's and to trust him. "From all this," said Bernis, "we must conclude that time alone will show how much of what I am reporting on the Pope's way of thinking is true. For although I judge him to be very subtle and I have little trust in Italians in general, least of all the Frati, nevertheless it seems to me it would be carrying suspicion too far to imagine that the Pope is only intending to deceive the Courts in order to gain time. As each day passes his actions will throw more light on his character, which I find to be composed of much intelligence, a fairly wide knowledge of foreign

countries, a gift of easy communicativeness, a good memory, no vanity, and extraordinary cheerfulness." ¹

Four days later Azpuru, too, was received in audience by the Pope, who told him what he had told Bernis. He also complained bitterly about the mistrust he was encountering and authorized Azpuru to write to Grimaldi that the king would do well to trust him and let Fra Lorenzo Ganganelli handle the matter. If he was prevented from carrying on with the scheme he had formed he would hand the Jesuit affair over to a Congregation, as Clement XIII. had done. In the face of this threat Azpuru replied that his royal master was far from distrusting His Holiness; on the contrary, he set so much store by the Pope's wisdom, talent, and love of all Catholic princes that he considered it unnecessary to consult anyone else. Clement's reponse to this was that secrecy was an important part of every negotiation, and of this one especially. It was for this reason that he had not consulted even his Secretary of State.²

These binding statements of the Pope's, who only asked for time, made a deep impression not only on Bernis and Azpuru but also on Orsini and even Tanucci. It was no slight thing that so violent an anticleric as the Neapolitan Minister should now give it as his opinion that after the fourfold statements made to the Bourbon envoys there could no longer be any doubt about the sincerity of the Pope's promises. He must be given time, for the extinction of the Company was a far more difficult business for the Pope than its expulsion was for the princes. The expulsion had given and was still giving much trouble, and after two years was still incomplete.³

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 364 *seq.*

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 27, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ *Tanucci to Losada, August 8, 1769, from Naples: "non pare che si deva dubitare della promessa del Papa circa l'estinzione della Compagnia. S. S^{ta} la ha finora ripetuta quattro volte ai tre Ministri Borboni. Vuol tempo; non credo che gli si possa negare. Per il Papa è affare più scabroso di quel che sia stata ai sovrani

As a result of the audiences he had had in the first half of August Azpuru decided to fall in more than ever with Bernis' view that the Pope ought not to be pressed too closely and that he must be allowed to act on his own. There was no doubt that he was seriously contemplating the dissolution of the Order which, as he said, both in the time of Clement XIII. and now was disturbing the peace of the Church and was breeding discord among the princes.¹ On August 12th Azpuru was able to express his thanks for the removal of the Jesuit employed in the Spanish foundation at Loreto. In this connexion Clement remarked that he was happy to meet all the king's wishes ; only let him be trusted and given time. It was also on this occasion that the Pope told Azpuru as a secret that in agreement with Bernis he had decided to withdraw from the Jesuits the direction of the Greek College in Rome.²

Flattering as was the commission of July 22nd, Bernis saw clearly from the beginning that in view of the persistent distrust of the Madrid Cabinet its execution would prove to be very difficult. He wrote to Choiseul that unless a change took place he could relieve him of his post and entrust the matter entirely to Azpuru. He could only undertake the task if his advice was followed and the path of moderation and prudence was taken. " I am an opponent of all party spirit and I abominate the intrigues, despotism, and fanaticism of the Jesuits. On the other hand, I am fully convinced of the danger that would arise with the triumph of the Jansenists." ³

Choiseul's chief interest at that time was not the Jesuit question but the acquisition of Avignon. Bernis, however, warned him against combining the two affairs, since success could be obtained only by giving way on one of the two demands. It would be better, he thought, to let the Spaniards

secolari l'espulsione, la quale ha esatta molta cura, la quale dura ancora, e dopo due anni non è finita." Archives of Simancas.

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 10, 1769, *ibid.*

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 17, 1769, *ibid.*

³ MASSON, 148 *seq.*

handle the Jesuit question, for they had nothing to lose, and Charles III.'s confessor, filled with monkish spite, would have nothing more to say.¹

It is strange how Madrid persisted in the fixed idea that Bernis was playing a crooked game in the Jesuit affair. Charles III.'s dissatisfaction finally came to such a pitch that Choiseul feared that the political alliance with Spain was endangered. It was for this reason that the matter now assumed for him, the frivolous free-thinker, an importance that he had hitherto failed to ascribe to it. He accordingly decided to disregard every other consideration and on August 7th, 1769, he peremptorily ordered Bernis to address a note to the Pope, threatening to break off diplomatic relations in the event of further delay. Two months would be the limit of his patience.² The extent of the Foreign Minister's annoyance can be seen from a confidential letter written in cipher, in his own hand, which he attached to Bernis' instruction. He would not be in the least surprised, he wrote, if in the present circumstances the Pope, who still retained much of the character of the Frati, driven by the cowardly fear of being poisoned, had entered into secret negotiations with the monkish confessor of the Spanish king. Nor would he be surprised if he had offered him the prospect of a red cap. "However that may be," continued Choiseul, "our requests will put a stop to the dealings of the *fratacci*. We shall be free of the squabbles between the Courts which are being stirred up on account of this wretched business—squabbles which might become very serious if we do not cut through the knots. Best of all, we shall counter the intrigues of Monsieur Tanucci. We shall remove for good and all any possible grounds for the insults and suspicions about our indifference towards the suppression of the Jesuits which are being voiced in Madrid, Naples, and even in Lisbon. We shall give the Pope other causes for fear, to set against those he already has. We shall put a stop to the petty Roman tricks and find out what we are to make of the Pope's way of thinking. I have

¹ *Ibid.*, 149 *seq.*

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 370 *seq.*

no trust in him at all, for it is difficult for a Frate not to be always a Frate, and more difficult still for an Italian Frate to handle matters openly and honestly. Work together with Azpuru, who enjoys Grimaldi's complete confidence. As for the Spanish Cardinals, they are insignificant apes."¹ In another private letter Choiseul complained that the Jesuits had been persecuting him now for ten years. In France, he said, everyone was sure that he had caused their expulsion, in Spain it was thought that he was supporting them. Neither was true, that he would swear before the whole world. In the whole of his life nothing had been so indifferent to him as the Jesuits, but now he had had enough of them, for they had become so much the bugbear of Governments that the people in Madrid forgot England, Pitt, and the most vital interests so as to think only of Loyola's disciples and "to pester me. The deuce take the Jesuits, and the Pope too, if he doesn't rid me of them".²

In his anxiety to satisfy Spain Choiseul went to extremes. The aforesaid instruction for Bernis was not enough; on August 3rd, 1769, he uttered the bitterest reproaches to the unsuspecting nuncio, Giraud, about the Brief of July 12th. The king, he declared, was tired of waiting; if the Order was not dissolved within six weeks he would recall Bernis, and France would break with the Holy See. The Spanish envoy De Fuentes, who had appeared in the meantime, also made the most bitter complaints about the Brief, and he and Choiseul decided to inform the Spanish king of the instruction sent to Bernis.³ In this way Choiseul hoped to put an end to Charles III.'s suspicion and Clement XIV.'s "intrigues".

Bernis had not expected this new instruction and had asked the Pope in a confidential note on August 11th, 1769, to name a day each week on which he could speak to His Holiness;

¹ Choiseul to Bernis, August 2, 1769, partly in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 372, supplemented in MASSON, 151, n. 2.

² MASSON, 150 *seq.*

³ See Giraud's report, in cipher, of August 7, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 369 *seq.*

this would be better, he said, than secret meetings arranged by indirect means. As Clement, to repair the offence given by his Brief of July 12th, had informed the Cardinal that two other Briefs would shortly be published, which would lower the pride of the Jesuits, Bernis thought Madrid would rest content with that and remember that the Pope had to pay regard to those princes who had entrusted their universities, seminaries, and missions to the Jesuits. He was strengthened in this view by Azpuru's having informed him of a dispatch stating that his Government would allow the Pope time. As Choiseul also wrote that Charles III. was pleased with him (Bernis), the latter thought that the two months' grace laid down in the instruction of August 7th was not meant seriously. He believed that in the end he would be able to satisfy Spain without resorting to extreme measures.¹

Meanwhile, the luckless Clement XIV. was harassed by a thousand apprehensions. His fear of the Jesuits and their friends was so great that he took precautions against being poisoned. Azpuru reported that the Jesuit General Ricci concluded from this fear of the Pope's that it would not come to a suppression.² His fear of poisoning, which recurred later, was a source of amusement to Choiseul and Frederick II. The former wrote to Bernis: "The Society of Jesus may be a danger to the State and a collection of intriguers, but it does not consist of poisoners."³ The Pope was also perturbed by the question of the suppression being discussed in numerous written works, in which curious views were frequently expressed. Two Jesuits in Pesaro went so far as to assert in a highly polemical work entitled "Thoughts on the Behaviour of the Bourbon Courts towards the Jesuits" that the Pope had not the authority to dissolve the Society. This could only irritate Clement XIV., and one can understand his prohibition of the work.⁴ It was a great embarrassment to him that not

¹ *Ibid.*, 367 *seq.*; MASSON, 152.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 24, 1769, *loc. cit.*

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 554. Cf. DUHR, *Jesuitenfabeln*, 73.

⁴ See, along with THEINER (*Hist.*, I., 382), Bernis' *letter to Azpuru, of August 19, 1769 (he was to inform the Pope of the

only Austria and Sardinia but also Prussia and Russia would have nothing to do with the suppression of the Order.

The Pope also made great difficulties for himself through wanting to do everything on his own and in trusting nobody.¹ He had not even confided in the nuncio Giraud, thinking that he was in connexion with Torrigiani and Ricci,² but the whole plan of the suppression had been revealed to the nuncio by Choiseul and through a breach of secrecy on the part of the secretary of the ciphers everything had come to the knowledge of the Jesuits.³ Clement XIV. was seriously intimidated by Choiseul's threat to break off diplomatic relations. "Why," he complained to the Abbé Deshaises, whom the careful Bernis had sent to him in advance of himself, "should the new Pope be blamed for his predecessors' mistaken attitude towards the Bourbons, especially as he has definitely promised to do everything in his power to repair these errors and commit them to oblivion? Why doubt his sincerity in the Jesuit affair, when he asks only for time, which is absolutely necessary to do justice to the canonical regulations and to the duty, the decency, and the consideration he owes to the clergy and the Catholic princes who have entrusted the Jesuits with their seminaries, missions, colleges, and universities? That cannot be done in two months, which are barely enough for the preparation of a well-reasoned Bull." The Pope expressed his astonishment especially at being threatened with a diplomatic rupture if he did not carry out the complete dissolution of the Jesuit Order within two months. He considered that as Head of the Church and as

work produced by the Jesuits Franchini and Stefanucci at Pesaro), Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, also Azpuru's *letter to Grimaldi, of August 24, 1769, *ibid.*

¹ On August 29, 1769, Tanucci *wrote to Losada about the Pope: "Volendo fare tutto da sè, o non volendo aver di chi fidarsi, è naturale che si trovi imbarazzato per tante disposizioni e providenze delle quali ha da esser composta l'Opera Grande." Archives of Simancas.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 375.

³ Bernis to Choiseul, August 30, 1769, in MASSON, 153.

a secular prince more consideration should be paid to him and that he ought not to be treated as an open enemy when in the three months of his reign he had shown his unalterable determination to satisfy the Bourbons.¹

Clement XIV. referred to these complaints when Bernis appeared in audience on August 29th, 1769.² As evidence of his anti-Jesuit attitude he cited his procedure in the matter of Loreto and Frascati and, still more, his recent forbidding of the Jesuits in Rome to preach in their churches during the jubilee. At the moment, he said, he was working on the condemnation of some of their books and on the closing or restriction of several of their houses. This would give the clergy an opportunity to declare themselves against the Order, and the other Catholic princes to join the Bourbons. France and Spain must support him in this in Germany, Poland, Genoa, and Venice. To doubt his promises regarding the Jesuits was nothing less than to doubt his honesty. Violence and over-hastiness were incompatible with his principles; nothing would be gained by force and threats; but he would always respect the will of "our" king—as he again called Louis XV.—as long as he did not ask him for anything which offended his dignity as Pope and common father of all the faithful. Later on in the conversation the Pope remarked that although many Jesuits had rendered good service to the Church and to learning in the past, the Society itself had always provoked unrest. But he refused to hasten its suppression, as this conflicted with the canonical regulations, common fairness, and a sound and reasonable policy.

Bernis replied that he knew the Jesuits well enough already. It was not a question of convincing him but the Kings of France and Spain. "What am I to do, then?" asked the Pope impatiently. "Am I to go to Versailles and Madrid myself? Shall I commit to writing my honest opinion and send it to our king and the King of Spain? I will do that and hand you the letter together with a copy for Choiseul."

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 375.

² Bernis' report of August 29, 1769, *ibid.*, 376 *seq.*

Nothing could have been more welcome to Bernis than such an offer. Content with this success, he refused under any consideration to take a step further and force an immediate decision. "If the Pope is not given time," he wrote to Choiseul, "and a rupture is brought about, I must ask the king to recall me, for as priest, Bishop, and Cardinal, I will not make the first move leading to the separation of France from the Holy See."¹

Choiseul, burning with desire to be finished with the Jesuit question, which was proving such a nuisance to him, had sent Bernis on August 26th, 1769, more stringent instructions, at the same time accusing the Pope of ambiguity and dishonesty, particularly for having spoken of obtaining the opinions of the Bishops and the princes who still tolerated the Jesuits. Incidentally, he admitted quite openly that he had not meant his former threats to be taken seriously and had intended them only as a means whereby to spur on the Pope to come to a decision.²

How deeply the director of French policy was disgusted with the whole affair can be seen from the letter he sent to Bernis on August 26th. "I do not know," he wrote, "if it was a good thing to drive the Jesuits out of France and Spain. They have been expelled from all the States of the House of Bourbon. I think it was even worse, once these monks had been expelled, to take steps in Rome in a sensational manner to bring about the suppression of the Order and thus call the attention of Europe to the matter. But this has been done, and the Kings of France, Spain, and Naples are at open war with the Jesuits and their adherents. Will it come to a suppression or not? Who will be the victors—the kings or the Jesuits? This is the question which is agitating all the Cabinets and is the source of the intrigues, the annoyance, and the embarrassment of every Catholic Court. Truly one cannot regard this spectacle in cold blood without also perceiving its indecency, and were I ambassador in Rome I should be ashamed of

¹ MASSON, 153 *seqq.*

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 377.

seeing in Father Ricci a worthy opponent of my sovereign.”¹ Thus the matter was regarded as purely one of power, not of right. Bernis’ reply, of September 9th, was on the same lines: as matters now stood, for the sake of their honour, the Kings of France and Spain would have to win the battle they had begun against the General of the Jesuits. “Only the Pope can win the victory for us and it only remains for us to induce him to do so. He is a Bishop and must follow the canonical forms and must look after the clergy and his own prestige. Being a secular prince, he is obliged to pay considerable regard to the Courts of Vienna and Turin, also Poland. The reply he gave me when I renewed the request can appear suspicious if one really considers him to be too weak or a deceitful character. A poor Religious, the son of a village doctor, with no relations, and no friends in the Sacred College, his strength must be in his spirit, which is not predominant in him as in Sixtus V. but which one cannot deny altogether, seeing that he has openly declared himself against the Jesuits in his public actions and has definitely promised the Ministers of the three Crowns to extinguish this Order in due course. He will even renew this promise to the King of France and the King of Spain under his own hand. That is not a sign of either weakness or deceit. Time will unveil his intentions more and more, and if they are bad there will always be ways of employing threats and the appearance of force, which would now be both unjust and inopportune. The whole art of the negotiations must therefore consist now in inducing the Pope to take some steps every day which will involve him in a net from which he cannot free himself without causing a great stir. No other procedure is applicable to his character, for in this affair he wants to avoid the appearance of obeying the princes more than the canonical regulations.”²

Clement XIV. acted in accordance with this principle when in southern Italy Tanucci confiscated the properties of the Roman College of the Greeks, so as to force the removal of

¹ *Ibid.*, 378.

² *Ibid.*, 378 *seq.*

the direction of this institution from the Jesuits. The Pope made this dependent on the previous restoration of the properties, lest he give the impression of yielding to the power of the princes.¹

Whereas Bernis and even Orsini gave credence to Clement XIV.'s assurances,² in Azpuru there was a reawakening of the old mistrust. He complained that the Pope's behaviour was shifty and vacillating: his promises were always of a general, never of a definite nature.³ Accordingly, another assault seemed necessary. In agreement not only with Azpuru but also with Bernis and Orsini, the Portuguese envoy Almada presented a note from his Government, dated September 15th, demanding the complete extirpation of a Company which was notorious for its disturbance of public order, was hostile to the Popes, and was destructive of Catholic dogma and sound morality.⁴ Bernis also presented a fresh memorandum from the Bourbon ambassadors, dated September 18th, which demanded the promise, not only to approve of the measures taken hitherto against the Jesuits in France, Spain, and Naples in a Brief *motu proprio* but also to make known a plan for the complete suppression of the Order.⁵ The Pope replied that he was resolved to carry out his promises, but that to satisfy his conscience he wanted the Bourbon Courts to provide him first with a memorandum setting out the reasons for the expulsion

¹ *Ibid.*, 381.

² *Orsini to V. Macedonio, September 14, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ²⁹⁴/₁₀₃₉.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 14, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. The letter was in answer to one of Grimaldi's, of August 29, 1769, dealing with the excitement caused by the Brief of July 12, 1769.

⁴ *Almada to Clement XIV., September 15, 1769, *ibid.* Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, September 12, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1474. Azpuru had instigated Almada to take the step in a *letter of September 10. Archives of Simancas.

⁵ *Copies of the *Mémoire* of September 18, 1769, in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome and in the State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ²⁹⁰/₁₀₃₅.

of the Jesuits, together with some testimonies from Bishops and theologians ; then no future Pope would be able to declare his Brief invalid.¹

Eight days later, to confirm his statements, the Pope composed a letter to Louis XV. Out of consideration for the king he chose the French language for the purpose, but as his command of it was none too good and as, for secrecy's sake, he did not wish to speak quite openly, the resulting composition was a curiosity² which Bernis thought would make the king laugh. It did, however, succeed in making it clear that the Pope was still resolved to approve whatever steps were taken by the Bourbons in the Jesuit affair and then to dissolve the whole Order as quickly as possible.³

When Bernis appeared in audience on September 25th the Pope handed him this letter unsealed and repeated the

¹ Bernis' *letter to Azpuru, of September 19, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, and to Choiseul, of September 20, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 384; it is, however, dated September 18 in the copy in the Archives of Simancas, Estado 4571. See also *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 21, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² According to the *original in the Archives of Foreign Affairs in Paris, the Brief reads as follows: "Clemens P. P. XIV. Charissimo in Christo Filio Nostro Ludovico Francorum Regi. Charissime in Christo fili noster, salutem et apostolicam benedictionem! Le dernier projet nous manifesté au nom de Votre Royale Majesté par le Cardinal Bernis touchant le commun connu affaire, a été par nous avec agrément accueilli: nous semblant beaucoup à propos pour le bien conduire à sa fin avec satisfaction réciproque. Cependant nous serons en attention de recevoir par le même Cardinal les mémoires qui sont nécessaires pour cela, afin de pouvoir après examiner l'affaire: ce qui ayant été accompli, nous donnerons une marque constante de notre paternelle affection avec laquelle donnons à Votre Majesté et à la Royale sa famille l'apostolique notre bénédiction. Datum apud Sanctam Mariam Maiorem pridie calendas octobris 1769, Pontificatus nostri anno primo." Cf. MASSON, 154 *seq.*; THEINER, *Epist.*, 31.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 385 *seq.*

assurances it contained. On Bernis' remarking that it could have been more positive he received the reply that he, the Cardinal, could explain his views in greater detail. The accusation of delay was made light of by the Pope. "Events," he said, "will justify us, both you and me. You are a Bishop and I am the Pope; we have our rules to obey and our honour to preserve; but the sovereigns will be satisfied. If only I could betake myself to the rulers of France and Spain for just an hour! They would do justice to me, and in fact they will do so! As for you, you are my friend, my consolation, and my support. All would be lost if ever you left your post in Rome."

Later on, the Pope informed the Cardinal that an attempt had been made to persuade him that France wanted only a reform of the Jesuits, not their suppression; but he had refused to believe it. With the object of destroying the good relationship between the Courts of Madrid and Versailles he had been advised to give credence to this view, as the alliance was a danger to the Holy See. To this he had replied that Providence had raised him to his exalted position so that he might strengthen the Papal throne by concord with the great sovereigns, and he would always find his glory, his security, and his tranquillity in the preservation of this concord. "In a word," concluded Bernis, "God alone knows the thoughts of men, but it is impossible to express them in a more unexceptionable way than is done by the Pope."¹

The Papal letter to Louis XV., with its unconditional promise of suppression, provided evidence of both the Pope's and Bernis' straightforward conduct in the whole affair. It was high time that Bernis procured such evidence, for the animosity against him in Madrid, which Choiseul thought he had silenced, had risen to extreme heights. On September 9th, 1769, De Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, had handed Choiseul a dispatch from Grimaldi, of August 28th, which stated in the most severe terms that the Cardinal's conduct was threatening to destroy the good relations between

¹ Report of September 27, 1769, *ibid.*, 386.

Madrid and Paris. "This Cardinal," it said, "is full of ignorance or malice blended with some secret interest. Personally I consider it would be better for His Eminence were we to presume that he is acting in this matter like a dolt."¹

Choiseul lost no time in justifying the Cardinal's conduct through the medium of the French envoy in Madrid, the Marquis Ossun. Bernis, he said, was co-operating most closely with Azpuru and he could only presume that the accusations came from a personal enemy. If the good relations between Louis XV. and Charles III. were to be preserved, the source of the accusations must be discovered. Ossun, who through his long residence in Madrid had become more Spanish than French, was unable to procure the required information. He knew only of a direct correspondence between Clement XIV. and Charles III.'s confessor, dealing principally with the beatification of Maria of Ágreda and the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.²

Bernis had better luck in his investigations. He discovered that the accusation originated with Tanucci, who wanted the kingdom of Naples to be separated from Rome, not only politically but ecclesiastically. For this purpose Benevento was to be wrested from the Pope, the abbeys were to be confiscated and their revenues were to fill the State treasury, and the Bishops were to be nominated by the king. Tanucci feared that if Bernis solved the Jesuit question successfully he would no longer be able to fish in troubled waters.³ Consequently he was untiring in his intrigues, not only against the

¹ MASSON, 155 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 156. Grimaldi, *writing from S. Ildefonso on September 19, 1769, had sent Azpuru Charles III.'s letter about Maria of Ágreda and the Immaculate Conception (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). On September 7, 1769, Clement XIV. had *written to the King of Spain about the progress of the Causa Palafox and at the same time had recommended a letter of the Bishop of Barcelona to be examined by the ecclesiastical judges. (Archives of Simancas, Est. 4977.)

³ MASSON, 157.

Pope but also against Bernis and Azpuru, endeavouring by sowing suspicion to bring their honour into disrepute and contempt.¹ In Rome he used for this purpose his agent Centomani, who acted as *chargé d'affaires* during Cardinal Orsini's *villeggiatura*. "My accusers," Bernis reported to Paris on September 27th, "are Tanucci, Centomani, and Azara. The last-named hoped to grab the sole direction of the Jesuit affair and thereby to open up a diplomatic career for

¹ On September 14, 1769, Tanucci *wrote to Catanti: "E vien Macchiavelli che dice tutt' uomo composto di bene e di male. Probabilmente piacerà anche a Ganganelli il passare sotto questo aforismo, sapendo o dovendo sapere, che in quel suo nuovo mestiere il bene non è stato neppure l'uno per cento." On September 19, 1769, Tanucci *complained to Catanti that the Pope "non mantiene le promesse ai Ghibellini, non le disdice. Laonde e Guelfi e Ghibellini non lo qualificano che per disertore e fanfarone". *Writing to Orsini on September 23, 1769, Tanucci asks: "Why does the Pope want the Bishops' opinions on the suppression? Why does he want to be informed how the Jesuit properties are to be used? And with what right?" On September 26, 1769, Tanucci was *writing to Cattolica: "Le notizie di Roma minacciano burla, e tricare e intrigare e fare addietro quei passi, che si voglion far credere progressi. Tre preti, Ministri dei Borboni in Roma, non mi fanno sperare, e mi fanno temere che stiamo in un castello, che doviamo difendere dalla parte di dentro e dalla parte di fuori." On the same day he *wrote to Losada: "Comincio a sospettare che il Papa ci burli. Dio voglia che non sia vero il sospetto. Certamente ora mette alla sua promessa dell'estinzione dei Gesuiti una condizione, ora una altra, e va anche pescando da noi qualche condiscendenza per la via." He repeats his complaint in another *letter to Losada on October 3: "Non vedo come finirà l'affare di Roma. Finora non sono sicuro di qualche burla dell'accorto Papa. Continua il pascere di promesse, ma in ogni udienza il card. di Bernis trova qualche nuova cosa che il Papa vuole e colorisce in maniera che persuade Bernis e Azpuru. Orsini, se devo credere alle di lui lettere, ascolta e avvisa e non si dichiara." In a *letter to Catanti of October 17, 1769, Tanucci uses stronger language with reference to Clement XIV.'s autumn holiday in the Alban Hills: "Il Papa cavalca, e ride in Castel Gandolfo di chi lo ha fatto, e sperato, e creduto." Writing

himself." Bernis made it clear to Tanucci as well as Choiseul that he would not put up with this behaviour any longer.¹

The effect the intrigues had in Madrid is seen from a letter of Grimaldi's to Azpuru, dated October 17th, 1769, which described Cardinal Bernis' report of his audience at the end of August as misleading and inaccurate and the procedure proposed by him as offensive to the king. Copies of this letter were dispatched to and received by Bernis besides Choiseul.²

In these circumstances it was difficult for Bernis to obtain the required memorandum on the motives of the Bourbons' expulsion of the Jesuits, especially as Choiseul showed little desire for such an exposition but feared rather another delay. The same view was held by De Fuentes, who pointed out that Charles III. had already rejected a similar request made by Clement XIII. Choiseul asserted that it was for the Spanish king to decide this question. "I should be very glad," he wrote on October 9th, 1769, "if there were no such persons as Jesuits, but what interests me much more is that the Spanish

to Roda on the same day, Tanucci says : "Tempo continua a dirci il Papa dopo sei mesi. Intanto dice altre cose, che pur son tempo ! I nostri di Roma sperano tuttavia, ma il tempo è lo stratagemma, sul quale Roma suol confidare, e spesso felicemente. Compatisco il Papa che sta circondato da Terziari e da persuasi che i Gesuiti sono lo strumento più efficace ora della machina Romana. Un Papa dotto, che avesse buona intenzione per eseguirlo, dovrebbe uscir da Roma." To Losada Tanucci *wrote on October 24, 1769 : "How easy it would be for the Pope to copy the Bull against the Jesuati ! And the business 'che lo aveva fatto Papa' has been dragging on for six months. But the three Ministers either cannot or will not see through the Roman trickery. Her Imperial Majesty does not hate the Jesuits." . . . "On October 31, 1769, Tanucci was *complaining to Cattolica that Bernis and Azpuru had an interest in supporting the Roman cabals against the suppression. How can there be any fear of the next Pope revoking the suppression ! The monkish confessor will have scruples about it." All these letters in the Archives of Simanças, Estado 6009 and 6010.

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 397 ; MASSON, 157.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 387 seq.

king should have no cause to complain about France. Our interest demands that every consideration be paid to Charles III.'s ardent desire for the suppression of the Jesuits." ¹

Choiseul as well as Bernis must have been relieved when it slowly dawned on the Spanish monarch's limited intelligence that Bernis had been suspected unjustly. But this did not by any means put an end to all the discrepancies.² Madrid set to work on the memorial required by the Pope, for which the Bishops were invited to state their views,³ whereas Paris would not hear of any such step.⁴ In Rome Bernis, assisted by Azpuru and Orsini, and ignoring Azara's intrigues and agitations,⁵ entered on another confidential discussion, in which Almada, the Portuguese representative, also joined. The written work, entitled *Réflexions*, which resulted from their labours, endeavoured to show the impossibility of acceding to the Pope's request for a memorial and put forward the counter request that all the proceedings which had been taken in the Bourbon States against the Jesuits and their property should be approved unconditionally in a Brief *motu proprio* and that finally the sovereigns should be informed of the plan whereby the Order was to be completely suppressed.⁶

¹ MASSON, 157 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 158 *seq.* ; THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 398.

³ The minute of the *circular to the Bishops, dated S. Lorenzo, October 22, 1769, in the Archives of Simancas, Estado 686, which contain also the Bishops' replies ; sixteen of them take refuge in an eloquent silence.

⁴ MASSON, 159.

⁵ In a *letter to Grimaldi of November 2, 1769, Azara declared that Bernis was on bad terms with Azpuru, Orsini with Centomani. Fra Lorenzo (i.e. the Pope) : " da oydos á uno y á otro y se rie de entrambos, ganando entretanto tiempo que es el fuerte de su sistema. No piensa hacer nada sino por fuerza y se saldrá con ello." Azpuru, he says, was pretending to be ill so as not to have to execute the business with the Pope that had been entrusted to him. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁶ " Réflexions à communiquer confidentiellement à S.S. par le card. de Bernis," *ibid.* The conference on the *Réflexions*, to

It was soon seen how difficult it was to give effect to these demands, for the nearer the time approached for a decision the more Clement lapsed into complete despondency. Not only did he fear the Catholic States which had not joined the Bourbons but he was also apprehensive lest England, Prussia, and Russia might stand up for the Jesuits and threaten the Papal States, where his own subjects would rise against him were he really to proceed with the complete suppression of the Order. He was also alarmed by the prophecies of his imminent death which were rife in Rome at this time. When he handed the Pope the *Réflexions* on November 13th, 1769, Bernis tried in vain to persuade him that his fears were exaggerated and were merely bogies conjured up by Jesuit supporters to intimidate him. The Pope retorted that His Eminence did not know the intrigues of the Jesuits well enough; they were his sworn enemies, they would never forgive the humiliations he had already made them suffer, and he hoped that the Bourbons would appreciate his perilous situation. He only asked for time, to enable him to see to the suppression at a favourable opportunity and in accordance with the canonical regulations. "His Holiness," reported Bernis, "has renewed in the most definite fashion his former promises regarding the *Motu proprio* and the communication of his plan and he has charged me to bring this positive assurance to the attention of the Ministers at the Courts of Paris, Madrid, Naples, and Portugal." "I still maintain, therefore," the Cardinal concluded his report, "that the Pope is honestly working against the Jesuits but that he is full of fears, since he, being a Religious himself, knows far better than anyone else what unruly monks are capable of, when driven to extremes."¹

Azpuru, too, when he was received in audience the following evening, found the Pope melancholy, worried, and full of fear of Jesuit intrigues, which were robbing him of his sleep. He

which Almada also was invited, took place on November 11, 1769, in Bernis' residence; *vid.* *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 16, 1769, *ibid.*

¹ Report of November 15, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 399 *seq.*

had, he said, to apprehend disturbances in the States of the Church, the putting in of Russian ships at Ancona, the appearance of Greeks at Loreto ; and the King of Prussia was favouring the Jesuits. Azpuru tried to calm him by telling him that he could rely on the troops of the Spanish king for his protection. Clement assured him that he would resign the tiara rather than not keep his word with Charles III. Cardinal Orsini was given similar assurances on November 15th.¹

The extent to which the Pope was dominated at this time by morbid fear of the Jesuits would hardly be believed had we not authentic evidence, especially that of Azpuru² and Bernis, to testify to the fact. Wherever he looked he saw the Jesuits plotting against his person and his State : they had bribed his officials ; Antici had sold himself to them, as well as Cardinal Albani ; they were in touch with the Russian fleet which was wintering off Tuscany, and with the Greeks, and they were planning an insurrection in the Papal States. If he was to keep his promise, France must afford him security. "The Pope," thought Bernis, "has looked too long on the deep gap he has to cross."³

It is curious how often with Clement XIV. deep depression was succeeded by the opposite emotion ; he had only to think of Sixtus V. to regain courage, which, however, soon disappeared again.⁴

Meanwhile, Louis XV.'s reply, of October 29th, 1769, to the Pope's letter in French, had arrived in Rome. The king

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 16, 1769 (*loc. cit.*) and *Orsini to Tanucci, November 17, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{295}{1040}$.

² *Azpuru to Fray Joaquín (De Osma), November 16, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. In a *letter to Grimaldi of November 21 Azpuru draws the following conclusion : "Quanto inescusable y urgente es la entera aniquilacion de una Sociedad que origina tan graves temores a su mismo Gefe." *Ibid.*

³ See Bernis' reports in MASSON, 159.

⁴ "C'est la fièvre tierce, un jour bon, un jour mauvais," says Bernis (*ibid.*, 160). Azpuru, *writing on November 21 (see above, n. 2), mentions that the Pope was quiet and free from fear.

expressed his thanks and his hope that His Holiness would delay no longer in a matter which did not touch on dogma and which lay entirely in his hands. He could assure him that the French clergy would accept the Brief of suppression with submissiveness and gratitude. It lay with the Pope to decide on the most suitable form, but the longer he delayed the greater would be the abuses and difficulties.¹

On handing this letter to the Pope on November 20th, Bernis supported his king's desire for the speediest possible suppression of the Jesuit Order. The Pope told him that he would carry out his former promises irrevocably, as soon as circumstances permitted. As he had always said, he must also obtain the assent of the Viennese Government and the other princes, for without their counsel and their petition he could not suppress an Order which was being protected by them and which was maintaining so many necessary and useful institutions in their States. The Pope insisted at this audience that he had not promised to suppress the Jesuit Order immediately, but only when circumstances permitted. "I deduced from this clearly enough," said Bernis, "that the Pope fears that his admissions and the promises he has given will be used to force him to do on the spur of the moment what he believes can be done wisely and without loss of his prestige only after a certain lapse of time. I have often remarked that too firm language and too terse arguments displease the Pope and cast down his spirits. Accordingly, as my audience drew to an end, I did my best to encourage him and to persuade him to take at least the first few steps. At the same time I coaxed him into thinking that the difficulties and obstacles which he

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 393 *seq.* *Ibid.*, 394 *seq.*, for the apocryphal letter from Clement XIV. to Louis XV., which first appeared in the *Gazzetta di Florencia* of October 21, 1769. According to Azpuru's *report to Grimaldi, of November 30, 1769 (*loc. cit.*), the Pope was so incensed that he was thinking of making representations to the Florentine Government. Like many others, Clement ascribed this forgery to the Jesuits or their friends. He remarked to Bernis that it was just as well that the Jesuits were always doing something stupid. THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 396.

foresees and which hitherto have occupied too much of his attention will disappear. We shall have our way with the Pope only by persuading him without his noticing it. His gentle and conciliatory character often leads him to make promises without realizing at once their full consequences. Since this last discussion with His Holiness I have realized far more clearly that he must be led on, step by step, whereby one should be generous with coaxings but sparing with threats. As for the *Réflexions* which have just been handed to him the Pope said quite openly that in his *Motu proprio* he would never be able to ratify the dissolution of the Order on the authority of the Parlements, nor the appropriation of the Jesuit estates without knowing precisely how it was carried out. He hoped, however, to formulate his Brief in such a way and to base it on such grounds as would satisfy the sovereigns, without incurring the reasoned reproaches of the Catholic world or the clergy. The material for this Brief had already been prepared and its arrangement was nearly complete. On this point too he would explain himself quite clearly in a letter which he will send to the King of Spain to-morrow. But in view of the publication of this Brief he will describe to his Catholic Majesty his present situation, together with his fears for his own safety and that of his States. He will tell him that he looks to the friendship of the three monarchs, not only for counsel but also for effective means whereby to secure himself against the intrigues and the cunning plots of the Jesuits and their protectors." . . . "The Pope," Bernis added, "says indeed that he has only one fear—not to be true to his duties—but he fears dangers, great and small. He fears to offend certain Powers by complying with the wishes of others. He fears that he will be accused of having accepted the Papacy on condition that he dissolves the Jesuit Order. Above all he fears the revengeful and angry spirit of the Fathers and the intrigues of the old Cardinal Albani, their protector."¹

For ten days more Clement XIV. put off the dispatch of the

¹ Bernis' report of November 23, 1769, *ibid.*, 400. Bernis had informed Azpuru of his audience in a *letter of November 21, 1769 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). He mentions

promised letter to Charles III., then finally signed it on November 30th. "We conceive it Our special duty," he wrote in his own hand, "to inform your Royal Majesty about Our intentions, which aim always at providing you with visible proofs of the fulfilment of Our obligations. We have made it Our business to collect the documents which We must use in composing the *Motu proprio* agreed upon, by which We will justify to the whole world Your Majesty's wise conduct in expelling the restive and rebellious Jesuits. As We must work at this alone and are burdened with so many other cares, it is not a question of neglect but only of delay, which has become necessary to bring so important a matter to a successful end. We ask Your Majesty not to conceive any distrust of Us, for We are firmly resolved to act, and We are occupied in giving the public irrefutable proofs of Our righteousness. We shall submit to the wise consideration of Your Majesty a plan, which Your Majesty will receive shortly, for the complete dissolution of this Society. We shall also conclude other matters which have been entrusted to the care of Our dear son, Monsignor Azpuru, Your Majesty's plenipotentiary envoy. In short, We shall not cease to provide your Majesty with sincere proofs of Our good-will." ¹

With this formal, written, and unconditional promise Clement XIV. departed from the course he had previously followed, of oral and indefinite assurances. Herewith, in

here also that Almada was supporting him in every step he took. Cf. *Orsini to V. Macedonio, November 16, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{295}{104}$. On November 21 Orsini *reported to Tanucci: "Sabbato Almada fu dal Papa, ma finora tace con noi. Nondimeno è stato invitato al congresso d'oggi" (*ibid.*). On November 30, 1769, Azpuru *reported to Grimaldi once again that the Pope was contemplating the suppression more definitely than ever; to Bernis he was repeating "sus promesas y que haria más de lo que havia ofrecido" (*loc. cit.*).

¹ THEINER, *Epist.*, 37. MASSON (160, n. 3) reproduces from the Archives of Foreign Affairs in Paris the French translation of the Italian original, in which "benevolenza" towards the king has become "zèle et attachement".

regard to the Jesuit question, he took a decisive step forward along the road on which he had set out. In December it was known that he was having preparations made for the suppression by such professed enemies of the Jesuits as Marefoschi, Jacobini, Bishop of Veroli, and the Augustinian Georgi. Marefoschi was to collect the necessary documents, for which task the archives of the Spanish Embassy were placed at his disposal in absolute secrecy.¹ Also at the Pope's instigation the process of Palafox's beatification was resumed.² Further assurances were given to Bernis and Azpuru, the Pope asking only for time and giving as one of his reasons the continuing obscurity of the attitude of the Empress Maria Theresa.³

Choiseul attributed the greatest importance to the letter written to Charles III. The Pope, he said, could now no longer retreat, for it was highly dangerous to go back on one's word, once it had been given to such a prince as the Spanish monarch.⁴

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, December 5, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{2035}{1010}$, and C. Farnes, 1474; *Centomani to Tanucci, December 10, 1769, and *Orsini to Tanucci, December 12 and 15, 1769, *ibid.* Cf. also *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 30 and December 14, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. In a *letter to Losada of January 23, 1770, Tanucci rejoices at Marefoschi's appointment, describing him as "prelato dotto, onesto, savio e conoscitore della cabala Gesuitica e di altri ordini frateschi". (Archives of Simancas, Estado 6011.)

² *Orsini to Tanucci, December 12, 1769 (there is mention here of Charles III.'s sending the Pope tobacco, cocoa, and vanilla), and Tanucci's *reply of December 16, *loc. cit.*; cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, December 14, 1769, and *Grimaldi's letter of thanks, of January 2, 1770, *ibid.*

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, December 21 and 28, 1769, *loc. cit.*

⁴ MASSON, 161. In a *letter to Tanucci of December 9, 1769, Grimaldi asserts that "il papa ha promesso al re l'estinzione in iscritto, finora era stato di palabra" (Archives of Simancas, Estado 6102). Charles III.'s letter of thanks to the Pope, of December 26, 1769, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 540 *seq.*; cf. also Grimaldi's *letter to Fuentes, of January 1, 1770, *loc. cit.*, Estado 5088.

And yet from now on the matter was protracted more than ever. Bernis, who had been principally responsible for the promise made to the Spanish king, was not apprised of its text till two months had passed. At the same time he had to suffer the mortification of the whole business being taken out of his hands by Louis XV. and Choiseul and placed entirely in Azpuru's. He thus found himself relegated to the rôle of an idle spectator when, in early January, 1770, Azpuru informed the Pope on behalf of his Government that the required documents could not be supplied until the *Motu proprio* had been drawn up and the plan for the suppression had been made known to them.¹

Azpuru, for whom Charles III. had obtained the wealthy archbishopric of Valencia as a mark of his satisfaction,² had already been unwell in December,³ and his health did not improve as time went on. Meanwhile great excitement was caused in Rome by the news that an attempt had been made on the life of the King of Portugal.⁴ The hot-blooded Almada immediately ascribed the murderous attack to the Jesuits and used this wholly arbitrary supposition as the basis of a memorandum in which he peremptorily demanded the suppression of the Order.⁵ This he handed to the Pope in a private audience

¹ Bernis' reports in MASSON, 161 *seq.*; *cf.* the *letter sent by Bernis to the sick Azpuru on December 11, 1769 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

² *Roda to Azpuru, December 26, 1769 (announcement of the nomination to Valencia), *ibid.*; *cf.* *Fray Joaquín de Osma (Charles III.'s confessor) to Azpuru, December 26, 1769, and *Grimaldi to Azpuru, December 27, 1769, *ibid.* On December 7, 1769, Azpuru had told the king's confessor that the Pope would preconize him as Archbishop of Thebes *i.p.* at the consistory of December 18, "haviendo escogido el papa este titulo"; *cf.* *Azpuru to Fray Joaquin, December 21, 1769, *ibid.*

³ *Azpuru to Fray Joaquin on the same day (his "salud" was "poco menos que arruinada"), *ibid.*

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, January 9, 1770, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1475.

⁵ *Cf.* above, p. 111.

on January 7th.¹ After reading the document, which was framed in the most violent language, Clement, without making any pronouncement on it, returned it to Almada, who could produce no authority from his Government to take any such step.² But the incident had seriously alarmed the Pope, who now renewed his former promises to Azpuru.³ The opinion of the Augustinian General Vasquez was that though the Pope asked for time he was determined on the suppression.⁴

Nevertheless, and although it was still quite unknown whether the Jesuits had played any part in the crime,⁵ Bernis and Orsini made common cause with Almada and decided to remind the Pope of his promise by means of another memorial. It was to be presented by Bernis. Two days before he was received in audience Azpuru had an apoplectic stroke.⁶

The memorial presented by Bernis on January 22nd⁷ was such that not even the most outright enemies of the Jesuits have dared to publish it.⁸

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, January 11, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 512.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, January 18, 1770, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Vasquez to Roda, January 18, 1770, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez I.

⁵ Even Almada admitted this (THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 543).

⁶ *Bernis to Orsini, January 19, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³⁹⁶/₁₀₄₁, and *Orsini to Tanucci on the same day, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1475.

⁷ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, January 22, 1770, *loc. cit.*, and *Orsini to Tanucci, January 23, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1475.

⁸ "Il est vraiment douloureux," even THEINER wrote (*loc. cit.*, 543), "que ce prince de l'Église (Bernis) se soit fait, en cette occasion, l'instrument aveugle de cette intrigue portugaise; d'autant plus que de tout temps il avait exhorté toujours les cours à la modération et à des conciliantes mesures. Son mémoire, présenté le 20 de ce mois au Saint-Père, est un fidèle écho de la fureur aveugle du Portugal contre la Société de Jésus. Nous le laisserons pour cette raison, ainsi que celui d'Almada, s'éteindre dans l'oubli (pour ne rien dire de plus) qu'il mérite, et nous ne les

Clement's reply was that he gladly accepted it, as Azpuru assured him that it did not contain a single word of distrust of his intentions. He would read it, he said, but he would answer it, not with words but with deeds.¹

The memorial was approved by Madrid,² but no order was issued for any further action. It was content with Choiseul's assent to Spain's taking the lead in the Jesuit affair and with Bernis' compliance.³ It was now resolved to send Azpuru the written opinions of thirty-four Bishops who had declared in favour of the suppression of the Jesuits, together with a short report on the cause of their expulsion from Spain. These documents, however, were not to be submitted to the eussions pas même mentionnés, si ce n'eût été nécessaire pour faire connaître au lecteur quelle était, en ces tristes temps, la position du pape . . ."

¹ On January 25, 1770, Orsini *reported on his talk with Bernis on the 23rd, when the latter told him about his audience on the 22nd (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). On January 30, 1770, Orsini *reported to Tanucci: Yesterday the Pope told Bernis that he would answer the memorandum with deeds, not words, as he knew that the Holy See would know no peace with the princes until the Jesuits were suppressed. Bernis calmed him by saying that the King of Spain had a written promise and was satisfied with that, Bernis, who is extremely pleased with the confidence shown by the King of Spain, keeps the said Archbishop of Valencia [Azpuru] informed about everything (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{296}{1041}$). Bernis' *letter to Azpuru, of January 30, 1770, refers to the accompanying report of Orsini's, of January 25, 1770 (see above), and adds: "Sa Sté a confirmé dans l'audience hier au soir la même réponse: elle a ajouté qu'elle étoit convaincue de la nécessité de supprimer la Société des Jésuites pour le bien et la tranquillité des États catholiques et l' 'avantage du S. Siège'. Elle s'est expliquée par ce point avec plus de franchise et d'ouverture que jamais. Du reste en désirant satisfaire les cours, Sa Sté veut agir avec prudence et éviter autant qu'il sera possible les inconvéniens sans chercher cependant de vains prétextes pour différer." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² *Grimaldi to Azpuru, January 30, 1770, *ibid.*

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 544.

Pope officially, but only confidentially, as France and probably also Naples were disinclined to take a similar step.¹

Azpuru, who had recovered his health to some extent but was still ailing,² kept the Madrid Cabinet informed about the audiences given to Cardinal Bernis. It was gathered from his reports and the accompanying notes of the Cardinal that the Pope was renewing his promises to produce the *Motu proprio*, was continuously occupied with its composition, and was asking for an Italian translation of the Bishops' opinions.³ Although this tedious task considerably delayed the matter,⁴ it had to be undertaken. On March 6th, 1770, Bernis reported that Marefoschi had been instructed to prepare the *Motu proprio*, the draft of which would be notified to the ambassadors.

¹ With his *letter of January 23, 1770, Roda forwarded the Bishops' reply "sobre la extincion de los Jesuitas para entregarla confidencialmente al papa"; he sent also "una pequeña apuntacion de los motivos que determinaron el extrañamiento" (Archives of Simancas, Estado 5078). On the same day Grimaldi sent on the *documents to Azpuru with instructions to show them to Bernis and Orsini (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). On January 27 Grimaldi *authorized Fuentes to show the documents to Choiseul (Archives of Simancas, Estado 4572). The replies of the sixteen Bishops who were against the suppression were not forwarded (**ibid.*, Estado 686).

² *Orsini to Tanucci, January 23, 1770: "Azpuru sta malissimo." **Id.* on January 26, 1770: "Martedì il S. Viatico a Azpuru. Oggi sta un po meglio." **Id.* on January 30: "Azpuru sta sempre meglio." **Id.* on February 9th: Azpuru has left his bed (State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1475).

³ *Bernis to Azpuru, March 6, 1770, and *Azpuru's reply on February 7, 1770; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 15, 1770, enclosing Bernis' note of the 13th; **Id.* on February 22, 1770, enclosing Bernis' note of the 20th and Orsini's of the 19th; **Id.* on March 1, 1770, enclosing the Secretary of the Propaganda's request for the translation of the Bishops' opinions. The translator was "Andres Catani, hombre de bien fiado y de secreto" (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, March 13, 1770, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1475.

Although the Pope was seriously occupied with the scheme for the total suppression, the report went on, he was so timorous that he would only advance slowly, step by step.¹ On March 16th the Pope told Bernis that the *Motu proprio* was nearing its end²; on the 19th he again assured him of his readiness to fulfil the promises he had made in his letter to Charles III.³ The same assurance was given to Orsini. "We are working Ourselves and having others to work for Us," said the Pope. "The matter is making progress but it must be done well, with the assent of the whole of Europe, such as was given to Our Encyclical."⁴

But little was known of any serious steps being taken against the Jesuits in accordance with these assurances. Bernis and Azpuru could only report that they had been forbidden to hold their Lenten missions and catechizings in S. Ignazio⁵ and that they had been relieved of the direction of the seminary in Frascati.⁶

Choiseul, meanwhile, had lost all patience. "This is absolute mockery," he wrote in the margin of the dispatch in which Bernis had reported for the tenth time the work that was being done on the *Motu proprio*.⁷ "These alternations of

¹ *Bernis to Azpuru, March 6, 1770, and *Bernis to Choiseul, March 7, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, March 6, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{296}{1041}$.

² "Touchoit à sa fin." *Bernis to Azpuru, March 17, 1770, *loc. cit.*

³ Bernis to Azpuru, March 20, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5037.

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, March 20, 1770, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{296}{1041}$; cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 22, 1770, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, February 2, 1770, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1475.

⁶ *Centomani to Tanucci, February 16 and 23, 1770, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{296}{1041}$, and C. Farnes, 1475; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 15, 1770, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Bull. Cont.*, V., 147, and S. CAMBO, *Il Tusculo e Frascati*, 43 seq., with a reproduction of the bust of Cardinal York.

⁷ MASSON, 163.

courage and fear with which the Pope is afflicted *à propos* of the Jesuits," he complained to Bernis on March 27th, 1770, "give us no promise of the speedy or thorough decision which must come about." "It is now almost a year since he has occupied the chair of St. Peter and we have had nothing from him but the promise to produce the *Motu proprio* and the scheme for the suppression of the Order. But we have handed over the direction of the matter to Spain, and it is reported from Madrid that Charles III. is so firmly convinced of the Pope's good intentions and sincerity that he has no fear at all."¹ This was perfectly correct. The only thing that was repeatedly said by Madrid was that Bernis was to keep strictly to Charles III.'s instructions² as passed to him by Azpuru.

On March 26th Clement wrote to Azpuru that the material for the *Motu proprio* had been prepared and that he was now waiting for a model for it from a distant country, but he asked that the strictest silence be kept about the whole affair.³ Although the *Motu proprio* thus lost all its value, no objection was made by Madrid to this request.⁴

When in April Azpuru had to retire to the coast to recuperate, the negotiations were left almost entirely to Orsini and Bernis.⁵ On April 3rd Bernis reported to Azpuru that the Pope was working with Marefoschi on the *Motu proprio* and on the scheme for the suppression; his motives were sincere and he had learnt to his joy that no objection would be raised by Vienna. The Pope had also asked him for a copy of Clement XI's Brief on the suppression of Port Royal.⁶ On April 7th

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 548.

² *Bernis to Azpuru, February 6, 1770: Every courier from Paris brought him orders to obey every instruction coming from Charles III. (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, February 6 and 13, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ²⁰⁶/₁₀₄₁.

³ *Copy in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome; cf. *Bernis to Azpuru, March 28, 1770, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 17, 1770, from Madrid, *ibid.*

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 5, 1770, *ibid.*

⁶ *Bernis to Azpuru, April 3, 1770, *ibid.*

Orsini informed Azpuru and Bernis, on the Pope's authority, that the *Motu proprio* was being revised, and that the scheme for the suppression would be communicated to Charles III., to whom France and Naples had handed over the further conduct of the matter.¹ On April 9th Orsini wrote to Tanucci that the Pope had almost finished correcting the *Motu proprio* and that in a few days Marefoschi would submit it to him in draft form.² But instead of this there was another delay. Succumbing once again to fear and despondency,³ the Pope suddenly announced on April 23rd that he was not yet able to communicate the draft as he had been unable to discuss certain points with Azpuru, who was indisposed; also he was so dissatisfied with its style that it seemed necessary to reshape the whole document.⁴

Bernis, as well as Orsini and Azpuru, was grievously disappointed by this fresh setback. The French Cardinal, who was suffering from a chill, gave expression to his feelings in a letter to the Pope of April 27th, hinting at the calamitous effects that were likely to ensue.⁵ Azpuru wrote a similar letter from Palo, where he was convalescing, and offered to come to Rome to inquire further into the matter.⁶ The Pope was seriously put out by this renewed pressure. When Bernis appeared in audience on April 30th he gave vent to the most bitter complaints about Tanucci's ecclesiastical reforms in Naples, which grievously contravened the Spanish concordat of Benedict XIV.'s. In spite of his trying to repair the mistakes made by Clement XIII., he protested, he was being more

¹ *Orsini to Azpuru, April 7, 1770, *ibid.*

² *Orsini to Tanucci, April 10, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{297}{1042}$. A similar *report was made by Azpuru to Grimaldi on April 12, 1770, *loc. cit.*

³ *Bernis to Choiseul, April 11, 1770, *ibid.*

⁴ *Bernis to Azpuru, April 24, 1770, *ibid.* Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci on the same day, Esteri-Roma $\frac{297}{1042}$, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Bernis to Clement XIV., April 27, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁶ *Azpuru to Clement XIV., April 28, 1770, *ibid.*

violently opposed than his predecessor. Nevertheless he would keep his promises to Charles III. and would shortly have the *Motu proprio* ready. But Bernis could not ascertain any precise date for this.¹ Azpuru's comment was that the Pope was frightened of the Jesuits and their friends and that he would have to be encouraged.²

At the audiences which were granted to Bernis on every Monday in May he was always given the same assurances.³ Clement even informed him that in further support of his promises he intended to add another *Motu proprio* to the one which was now almost ready,⁴ but the document in question was not to be obtained from him. On May 21st Clement authorized Bernis to pacify Azpuru by referring to this second Brief.⁵ At the end of May he told Orsini that the Courts ought to be pleased with the delay, as good use would be made of the time.⁶

What Paris thought of the situation is shown by the comment made by Choiseul to Bernis, that there was a world of difference between going slow and not going at all and that hitherto, as far as he could see, the Pope had not taken a single step to bring about the suppression of the Jesuit Order, which was absolutely necessary.⁷ But before this letter arrived in Rome, Bernis, on June 9th, 1770, had again described, and

¹ *Bernis to Azpuru, May 1, 1770, *ibid.*, and *Bernis to Choiseul, May 7, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4571. Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, May 1, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{297}{1042}$.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 1, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ *Bernis to Azpuru, May 9 and 16, 1770, *ibid.*; also Archives of Simancas, Estado 5087.

⁴ *Bernis to Azpuru, May 22, 1770, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.* and *Bernis to Choiseul, May 23, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4571.

⁶ *Orsini to Tanucci, May 29, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{297}{1042}$. Cf. *Bernis to Azpuru, May 29, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5087.

⁷ Choiseul to Bernis, May 20, 1770, in THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 548.

more urgently than before, the serious consequences of delay.¹ Clement took this insistence very badly; he was neither timorous, nor weak, nor insincere, he told Bernis in audience on June 11th, and it was insulting to mistrust him after the letter he had written to Charles III., and all his other solemn promises. He could give only an hour a day to the *Motu proprio*, but in spite of that it was nearly finished. But he must be given time for the companion document; it was an unheard-of thing to try to bind a Pope down to a time-limit.² He expressed himself in similar terms at an audience he granted Bernis on June 18th: in the covering document he intended to throw light on the Jesuit morality, which could not be done so quickly. If he was thought to be honourable he must be trusted; if not, any kind of negotiation was a waste of time.³

On June 19th the Pope tried to persuade Azpuru, who was now recovered, of the necessity for the delay in publishing the *Motu proprio*; the king, he said, would see that he would do even more than he had promised; he intended to write to him shortly, but it would have to be kept secret.⁴ On June 25th he reassured the French Cardinal that he would keep his promise, but he did not want his scheme to fail for want of deliberation.⁵ On July 3rd Bernis reported that the Pope had not gone more deeply into the Jesuit question on the previous day, but had merely remarked that he was still at work and that the delay would not be so long as expected.⁶ After the declarations made on July 9th, Bernis wrote on the 11th, it was only a question of time, but he had not been able to obtain

¹ *Bernis au Pape, June 9, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² *Bernis to Azpuru, June 12, 1770, *ibid.* The Pope's anger was vented wholly on Bernis; his manner towards Orsini and Azpuru was less severe; *vid.* Orsini's *letter about his audience of June 10, dated June 12, 1770, *ibid.*

³ Bernis to Choiseul, June 20, 1770, in THEINER, *Hist.*, 549. Cf. *Bernis to Azpuru, June 19, 1770, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 21, 1770, *ibid.*

⁵ *Bernis to Azpuru, June 26, 1770, *ibid.*

⁶ *Bernis to Azpuru, July 3, 1770, *ibid.*

any clear statement as to how long this would be.¹ Orsini was told by the Pope that he would not be able to give the reason for delaying the *Motu proprio* until later; he wanted the lightning to precede the thunder by only a brief interval and to have its devastating effect only where he directed it.²

However dissatisfied he was with the delay, Choiseul firmly refused to allow Bernis to abandon his rôle of passivity.³ On July 3rd he sent him the most definite instructions not to write or say anything before receiving the order to do so from the Spanish king.⁴ Bernis finally received clear information about Madrid's views in mid-July. He discovered that Charles III. had been induced by his confessor, Osma, to grant the Pope the time he had asked for. Osma hoped in this way to obtain the canonization of Maria de Ágreda and the definition as a dogma of the Immaculate Conception. However little sympathy Choiseul had for these aims of the confessor, on July 30th he repeated the order he had given at the beginning of the month.⁵ Bernis had no other course but to obey. One must arm oneself with patience, he had written on July 27th,

¹ *Bernis to Azpuru, July 11, 1770, *ibid.*

² " *Che il lampo di poco preceda il tuono ed il fulmine danneggi solo dove noi lo indirizzeremo e non altrove." Orsini to Tanucci, July 3, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{295}{1043}$. On July 6, 1770, *Orsini informed Tanucci of the " misteriosi detti e passi del Papa che ha già sul tavolino un minutissimo dettaglio di tutti gli effetti e somministrazioni che hanno i Gesuiti nello Stato pontificio ". *Ibid.*

³ Orsini *reported to Tanucci on June 5, 1770, that at the meeting of the ambassadors Bernis had informed them of a dispatch from Versailles that had come the day before, " sulla dilazione veramente eccessiva della, soppressione dei Gesuiti." State Archives, Naples, Estero-Roma $\frac{297}{1042}$. Orsini himself, as he *wrote to Tanucci on June 12, 1770, thought that Clement XIV. should be given time, as " sovrano " and " Papa ". On the 19th he *wrote again to Tanucci, " Il Papa sa bene cio che promise in iscritto al Re Cattolico, inutile di dimandare ; Marefoschi dice che seguirà la soppressione." *Ibid.*

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 550.

⁵ MASSON, 164 *seqq.*

and not alarm a nervous soul who had been a Religious for more than forty years and did not know how to be a ruler.¹ But Bernis soon grew restive again owing to the report in Rome that Charles, his scruples confirmed by his confessor, would not strike the final blow against the Jesuits. The Pope, it was said, agreed with the confessor, and it would end with the Spanish king withdrawing his request for the suppression of the Jesuit Order. In these circumstances Bernis advanced the view that if nothing happened after the expiration of the time allowed by Spain a firm attitude must be adopted. If this was not done by Spain, France could do so, with the object of acquiring Avignon.²

The frivolous Choiseul passed on these confidential messages to Ossun, the French envoy in Madrid, who submitted them to Grimaldi. As a result Bernis was suspected by Charles and his Ministers of wanting to alienate Spain from France and thus to bring about the downfall of Choiseul. Actually, however, Bernis had merely done his duty as reporter and otherwise had kept strictly to the instructions of the Spanish Cabinet as passed to him by Azpuru.³ When finally Madrid became seriously disturbed⁴ and instructed Azpuru at the end of July and again in August to give the Pope an emphatic reminder about his promises,⁵ Bernis, at the end of August, lent Azpuru his support. In reply to their representations both received the calming assurances they had heard so often before.⁶

In a long report of September 5th Bernis sought to justify his conduct up to date. It had not been his fault that the affair

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 552.

² Report of August 1, 1770, in MASSON, 165.

³ *Ibid.*, 166 seq.

⁴ On June 5, 1770, Grimaldi *wrote to Azpuru that the long delay was beginning to cause Charles III. "desconfianza"; *on July 8, 1770: France, too, was beginning to lose confidence. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁵ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, July 31, 1770, also on August 6, 14, and 28, 1770, *ibid.*

⁶ *Bernis to Azpuru, August 28 and September 4, 1770, and *Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 30, 1770, *ibid.*

had not progressed more rapidly. For two months the text of the Papal letter to Charles III., of November 30th, 1769, had been withheld from him. He had been subordinated to an ambassador who wanted to play the lead in spite of his ill-health but who had been unable to provide any means of solving the problem. Bernis then repeated his opinion that the question of the possession of Avignon must be linked with the suppression of the Jesuits, but to this proposition Choiseul again refused to listen.¹ Bernis had to bow to Choiseul's decision on this question as on the continued relinquishment of the entire direction of the Jesuit question into the hands of Spain. Meanwhile Azpuru's insistent pleadings merely elicited from Clement XIV. correspondingly lively renewals of his promises. When the anti-Jesuit Marefoschi, who had been created Cardinal *in petto* on January 29th, was proclaimed as such on September 10th, 1770, the Pope pointed to this as a clear proof of the sincerity of his motives.² The resumption of the process of Palafox's beatification at the end of August had the same end in view.³

¹ MASSON, 167 *seq.*

² Bernis to Azpuru, September 12, 1770, *loc. cit.* Madrid also took this view of Marefoschi's appointment; *vid.* *Grimaldi to Azpuru, October 2, 1770, *ibid.*

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 21 and 31 and September 21 (State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1476): [Copia di lettera scritta dal card. Orsini al sig. marchese Tanucci in data del 21 agosto 1770.] "Fui venerdì alla udienza del Papa e parlando a Sua S^{tà} sul punto della soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù, con buona maniera gli dissi la bella riflessione che V. E. mi scrisse colla sua confidenziale degl' 11, che poteva credersi che l'idea di Sua S^{tà} fosse di fermare sul punto nel quale ora si trovano le cose, e trattenere tutte le potenze, che vogliono l'estinzione de' Gesuiti, nell'espettazione, e nella inazione; e gli feci questo discorso, perchè nel congresso tenutosi oggi fa otto giorni 14. del corrente tanto il card. de Bernis, che msgr. arcivescovo di Valenza mi dissero, che venendo l'opportunità lo dicessi al Papa in aria, che il Ministero de' tre sovrani Borbonici poteva ciò dubitare. Sua S^{tà} mi rispose: Di questo non vi è dubbio, per sopprimere la Compagnia di Gesù hò impegnato la mia riputazione,

Cardinal Orsini was assured by the Pope that he was working at the suppression, which would come about when it was least expected. As to any steps taken by England in favour of the Jesuits the Pope knew nothing, and to King Frederick II. of Prussia's communication, which was a mere recommendation, he had made no reply.¹ Bernis, at the end of September, confined himself to asking the Pope to make good use of the time allowed him; to which request Clement smilingly assented.²

At this juncture Clement was in the best of spirits, thanks to the settlement with Portugal, and he took up his usual autumn residence in Castel Gandolfo.³ At the end of October he made reassuring statements to Bernardo del Campo, who had been sent from Madrid to Rome on a secret mission.⁴ On October 16th Charles III. had written to the Pope that as he had never doubted the sincerity of His Holiness he had not hitherto

sono costante, farò vedere la mia fedeltà, et avendo la direzione dell'affare Sua M^{ta} Cattolica, quel sovrano in questa dipendenza è il mio oroscopio. Hò avuto bisogno, e l'hò tuttavia, di qualche poco di tempo; li motivi non posso dirli. A suo tempo li sapranno non solo i sovrani, ma anche loro signori i Ministri qui residenti, e quando li sapranno mi daranno ragione. Poi m'insinuai a dire de' Gesuiti quale era stata la loro condotta passata negli intrighi, nella ambizione, nella morale e nella disubidienza alla Santa Sede quando questa non conveniva colle loro massime. Non mi lasciò finire il Papa e m'interruppe, dicendomi: Di questo sono persuasissimo, e ne hò letto, e studiato assai, specialmente da che sto in questa Sede, avendo riassunto i fatti della condotta de' Gesuiti a tempo de' miei antecessori, e per fine conchiudo che mi riporto a come Io penso della Compagnia di Gesù ai termini, co' quali ho scritto su di essa alle mie lettere di pugno a Sua M^{ta} Cattolica."

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, September 12, 1770, *loc. cit.*

² *Bernis to Azpuru, September 25, 1770, *ibid.*

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, October 12, 1770, C. Farnes, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, October 23, *ibid.* Cf. MASSON, 168. Clement XIV. sent Charles III., through B. del Campo, a picture of the Saviour by Guido Reni; *vid.* *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 1, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

directly reminded him of his promises, but now a speedy settlement was wanted and he offered every possible help to bring this about.¹ On his return from Castel Gandolfo the Pope at first put off seeing Azpuru and Bernis,² but when they were finally received they heard such good news that Azpuru gave it as his opinion on November 8th that the end of the Jesuits was quite near.³ On November 14th the Pope wrote to Charles III. that if he would wait just a little his wishes would be fully satisfied.⁴ But it was just then that the attention of the Spanish Cabinet was diverted by the danger of war with England,⁵ which made it all the easier for the Pope to hold off the ambassadors. He pointed out to them that he had a tedious sort of mosaic work to do⁶ and at the same time he took

¹ *Charles III. to Clement XIV., from S. Lorenzo, October 16, 1770, *ibid.* On November 8, 1770, Azpuru *reported that the letter had been handed to the Pope (*ibid.*). Charles had been exerting pressure through his ambassador. On September 4, 1770, Grimaldi *instructed Azpuru to press for the conclusion of the *Motu proprio* and the scheme for the suppression, as there not a few who thought "que el Rey se ha entibiado en el empeño que manifestó al principio en lo que toca a la extincion". That was not so, and he was to go on pressing. On the other hand, *on September 12 he reminded Azpuru that the Pope was not to be forced; threats would only make the situation worse. *Ibid.*

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 1, 1770, *ibid.*

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 8, 1770, *ibid.* Orsini, who was pressing the Pope at the time, was told that he could not apprise him of the obstacles he was encountering. *Orsini to Tanucci, November 13, 1770, *ibid.*

⁴ *Clemente XIV. a Carlo III., November 14, 1770, *ibid.*

⁵ MASSON, 168 *seq.*

⁶ *Orsini to Tanucci, November 21, 1770 (Archives of Simancas, Estado 5087): "Fui alla udiienza ieri mattina e non lasciai di opportunamente insistere per la soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù. Il Papa mi rispose: Noi manterremo quel che abbiamo promesso, dobbiamo far il quadro, ma essendo lavoro di mosaico, uniamo tutte le pietre per comporlo, ed a questo ci applichiamo e continueremo ad applicarci; e senza altro dirmi sul proposito, cangiò discorso."

measures calculated to show his anti-Jesuit attitude. Thus he had a secret instruction conveyed to the Jesuits expelled from Naples to retire from the frontier into the interior of the Papal States and gave a negative reply to the question of the Bishops, whether the unfortunate clerics were to be employed on pastoral duties. Soon, he said, to Bernis he would do still more.¹

While the enemies of the Jesuits were working for the dissolution of the Order one of their most frivolous opponents was overtaken by his fate. On December 25th, 1770, Choiseul succumbed to the intrigues of Louis XV.'s mistress, the Comtesse Du Barry. The Minister who had ruled France for ten years was banished as a traitor. The hopes, however, of the Jesuits' friends and the Jesuits themselves which were raised by this event were not to be realized. France's close connexion with Spain in the Jesuit affair continued unimpaired,² and of this the Pope was expressly informed on January 21st, 1771.³

As in Madrid the suppression of the Jesuits was closely connected with the beatification of Palafox and at the same

¹ *Bernis to Azpuru, December 18, 1770: "Le Pape a dit hier soir au card. de Bernis qu'il avait donné ordre à tous les Jésuites renvoyés du royaume de Naples et qui étoient restés sur les confins de ce royaume ou dans les villes maritimes, de rentrer dans l'intérieur de l'État Ecclésiastique. Les évêques qui ont écrit à Sa S^{té} pour savoir s'ils pouvaient employer les susdits' religieux dans le s^t Ministère ont reçu de sa part une réponse négative. Le Pape a ajouté au card. de Bernis que dans quelque tems il se feroit autre chose de plus marqué par rapport à ces mêmes religieux, et qu'il ne perdrait pas de vue ce qu'il avait promis" (*ibid.*). Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, December 18 and 25, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ²⁰⁹⁹/₁₀₄₄ and C. Farnes. 1476; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, December 27, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Another anti-Jesuit step was Marefoschi's appointment as Corsini's successor in the Congregation to which the Collegium Germanicum was subordinated. This was *reported by Orsini to Tanucci on December 21, 1770 (*loc. cit.*).

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 106; MASSON, 169 *seq.*, 176.

³ *Bernis to Azpuru, January 22, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

time far-reaching concessions were being sought in regard to the tribunal of the nunciature, no great difficulty was experienced by Clement XIV. in postponing the decision still further. Wrapping everything in an even greater secrecy than before,¹ he quietly assured Azpuru through his confidant Macedonio that the canonization of Palafox would be followed immediately by the death of the Jesuit Order.²

Cardinal Bernis, who still had to follow the instructions of the Spanish Cabinet just as closely as ever,³ had returned in January, 1771, to his old plan of attaining the suppression of the Jesuits (and thus satisfying Spain) by the surrender of Avignon. But Choiseul's successor, La Vrillière, would not agree to this. The fact that the Paris nuncio Giraud had demanded the return of Avignon on February 11th, 1771, and again on March 3rd, was not known to the Cardinal. In accordance with his orders he pressed for the preparation of the *Motu proprio* and confined himself to that. Clement, however, now declared that an observation on the dissolution of the vows of the French Jesuits must be inserted. Bernis acquiesced, but Paris regarded it as prejudicial to the royal power and therefore intolerable. The *Motu proprio* which the Cardinal had been demanding for two years now had to be rejected by him, and the only result of his renewed insistence on the subject of Avignon was his being informed on March 9th, 1771, of the steps taken by Giraud, with the observation that the king would settle the question when he knew Charles III.'s opinion on it.⁴

¹ *Orsini to V. Macedonio, January 24, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³⁰⁰/₁₅.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, January 31, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5088. As he *reported to Grimaldi on January 17, 1771, Azpuru had previously informed the Pope through Bontempi "que no havia tenido particular gusto S.M. quando riciviò su carta, viendo defraudado la esperanza que tenia de que se explicase il S. Padre en términos más claros y menos indiferentes y equívocos." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ THEINER, *loc. cit.*

⁴ MASSON, 179-181.

The Spanish Cabinet at this time obtained from the Pope, after long and secret¹ negotiations, a very important concession of an ecclesiastico-political nature. By a Brief of March 26th, 1771, the jurisdiction of the Auditor to the nunciature was superseded by a tribunal called the "Rota of the Apostolic Nunciature", to which the investigation and settlement of ecclesiastical lawsuits was to be transferred. The Brief thus secured for the monarch the most important influence in the appointment of the judges who were to exercise the Papal jurisdiction in the name of the nuncio.² Despite this important concession Madrid's old distrust of Clement XIV. persisted. No matter how reassuring were the statements made by the Pope to Orsini, Bernis, and Azpuru,³ he was not believed; as he gave no definite time-limit,⁴ it

¹ The Brief on the reform of the nunciature was to be issued before the departure of the new nuncio to Spain; *vid.* *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 26, 1770, *loc. cit.* Azpuru *dispatched the Brief on September 27, 1771 (*ibid.*). Cf. *Erizzo to the Doge of Venice, November 21 and December 22, 1770, State Archives, Venice.

² HERGENRÖTHER in the *Archiv für kath. Kirchenrecht*, XI. (1864), 375 *seq.*, 395 *seq.* The Brief, by which the nunciature tribunal became practically a royal ecclesiastical authority, was not published by the Spanish Government until after the suppression of the Jesuit Order, on October 26, 1773, the excuse given being the late arrival of the new nuncio, Valenti Gonzaga, who was prevented by illness from entering on his duties until the end of the year (see THEINER, II., 318; on p. 66 Theiner gives, in error, the beginning of 1773).

³ *Orsini to Azpuru, March 4, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome; *Bernis to Azpuru, March 5, 1771, *ibid.*; *Azpuru to Orsini, March 5, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³⁰¹/₁₀₄₆.

⁴ *Bernis to Orsini, March 12, 1771, *ibid.* On March 19, 1771, Bernis *reported to Orsini that the Pope had told him on the previous day that he would satisfy the Bourbons, but that he must observe the rules; "qu'on me laisse faire et tout ira bien" (*ibid.*). Orsini *wrote to Macedonio to the same effect on March 21, 1771 (*ibid.*). Tanucci fed Grimaldi's distrust, *writing to him on March 28, 1771: "Il Papa è pastore; ma N.S. cacciò subito

was argued, he was only using the Palafox affair to postpone the suppression of the Jesuits.¹ But its final settlement, as Grimaldi wrote to Azpuru on April 9th, 1771, was most urgently desired by the king.² Distrust also was at the back of Grimaldi's opinion that if Louis XV. agreed to the restoration of Avignon to the Papacy it should be delayed until the Pope had suppressed the Jesuits in accordance with his promises.³ Orsini was as confident as Bernis that Clement would keep his

i venditori dal tempio. Eppure quei contrattori di bestie non eran più rei dei Gesuiti. Perchè tarderebbe il Papa?" Archives of Simancas, Estado 6104.

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, March 26, 1771, *ibid.*, Estado 5038. On April 3, 1771, Roda *wrote to Marefoschi from Aranjuez that Charles III. was very much afraid that the Palafox affair would be protracted, and that therewith "el efecto que más anhela, que es el de la extincion de la Compañía, por contemplarlo mui urgente y necesario, y creer que insta su execucion al bien de la Iglesia universal, a la tranquilidad de los soberanos y a la quietud y seguridad de S. S^d misma. No ignora S. M. el arte y manejo de estos Regulares y la astucia con que han burlado siempre las resoluciones que en diferentes tiempos se han querido tomar por los Sumos Pontifices y Principes católicos contra su perniciosa conducta, su mala doctrina, sus intrigas politicas y sus excesos y desórdenes". "How much more so now that the Holy See has approved so many of the venerable Palafox's writings in which the Society of Jesus is so violently attacked," etc. Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez II.—When Azpuru asked the Pope, who had given as a date the *Antipreparatoria della causa Palafox*, when this Congregation would assemble, the Pope shifted the date to the day of the recognition of Palafox's "virtù eroiche". v. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 11, 1771. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² " *Ha servido de gusto a S.M. que el S. Padre continue en su primer propósito : pero desea vivamente ver el fin de un asunto en que si hay dificultades, tambien ha pasado much tiempo para vencerlas." He was to continue "sus oficios" at a suitable time. Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 9, 1771, *ibid.*

³ *Grimaldi to Ossun, April 22, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5233. Cf. MASSON, 184.

word,¹ but nevertheless thought it necessary to acquaint him with the feeling in Madrid. The Pope replied to him on April 19th that he was keeping to his word and that his letter to Charles III. and the latter's reply formed the basis of the matter, to settle which he was constantly at work. If he was still hesitating it was only because he wanted to settle the business properly. After all, His Majesty had handled the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain in a similar way, although he had more power than the Pope.²

As time went on Clement had to admit to himself that he

¹*Orsini to Grimaldi, April 4, 1771: "Certamente il Papa ritarda molto l'adempimento delle sue promesse, dice averne forti ragioni, quali non comunica; io credo lo adempirà, ateso è stato sempre uomo di parola ed accortissimo; onde non puote non prevedere le funestissime conseguenze alla S. Sede ed al proprio credito, se ci mancasse; questo raziocinio, dando al Papa il solo attributo di uomo che ragiona, non mi fa dubitare, e che in ogni udienza fo il mio dovere, prego l'E. V. esserne certa." Archives of Simancas, Estado 5088. On April 11, 1771, Orsini repeated to Macedonio his view of the Pope's intentions: "Io non dubito." State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{301}{1048}$; *Bernis to Azpuru, April 9, 1771: "Le Pape en parlant de l'affaire des Jésuites a dit hier au soir ces propres paroles au card. de Bernis: 'J'ai bonne mémoire et bonne volonté'; ensuite Sa Sainteté m'a parlé avec reconnaissance de la réponse que lui ont faite leurs Majestés très Chrésiennes et Catholiques touchant le Bref qu'Elle a écrit à ces deux monarques au sujet de l'accommodement des cours de Madrid et de Londres: le Saint Père, après Dieu, met toute sa confiance dans l'amitié des souverains de la maison de France. Le Card. de Bernis a l'honneur de renouveler à Msgr. l'archevêque de Valence les assurances de son sincère et respectueux attachement." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. On April 16, 1771, Bernis *reported to Azpuru: "A l'égard de l'affaire des Jésuites Sa S^{té} a dit au card. Bernis qu'elle ne la perdoit pas de vue, mais qu'Elle vouloit la faire bien et qu'elle en étoit sérieusement occupée" (*ibid.*). Similarly *Bernis to Orsini on the same day. State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1478.

²*Orsini to Azpuru, April 22, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

must give Charles III. more obvious proofs of his good intentions than mere words. He therefore decided to strike some telling blows at the Jesuits, even though some considerable time would have to pass before they could take effect. On March 6th he had authorized Marefoschi to visit a Jesuit institution, the Irish College,¹ which duty, as was only to be expected of a man of Marefoschi's type, was performed in an anti-Jesuit manner.² What was far more wounding to the Jesuits was the subsequent issue of a similar ordinance in respect of one of their chief teaching institutions in Rome. On May 8th a Brief was published, entrusting the Cardinals York, Marefoschi, and Colonna with the visitation of the Roman Seminary.³ The Cardinals, the first two of whom, like the secretary to the visitation, Carafa di Colombrano, were professed enemies of the Jesuits,⁴ were given the most extensive powers of investigation into the temporal and spiritual conditions of this college. This measure, the execution of which began on May 16th, caused the greatest stir in Rome.⁵ The enemies of the Society were already proclaiming in

¹ *Brief to Marefoschi, March 6, 1771, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{301}{1016}$.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, March 19, 1771 (*ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1478), also on the 10th (alteration of the oath, Jesuit confessor removed) and 28 May, 1771 (Marefoschi ordered the pupils henceforward to attend lectures at the Propaganda), *ibid.* On June 13, 1771, Azpuru *reported to Grimaldi: "Entre las novedades que han resultado de la Visita Apostolica del Colegio de Iberneses cometida al card. Marefoschi" one was "la absolucion á los alumnos de qualquier juramento, que hasta ahora huviesen dado, y que desde hoy en adelante le presten del modo que lo hacen los alumnos de Propaganda Fide, como informará a V. E. la adjunta copia del Decreto dado para este efecto por el referido card. Marefoschi". There followed the decree of April 27, 1771. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. It was not till September that Marefoschi presented the Pope with the final report on the visitation of the Irish College. *Vid.* *Orsini to Tanucci, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1477. It appeared in printed form.

³ *Orsini to V. Macedonio, May 9, 1771, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{301}{1016}$.

⁴ Bernis, in MASSON, 185.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, May 17, 1771, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{302}{1017}$.

triumph that the suppression would take place at once.¹ Even the Pope expressed himself in this sense to Bernis on May 13th : " You see, My Lord Cardinal, that when I am trusted and allowed to act, all goes well. I am a man of my word ; but impatience and precipitation do more harm than good." ²

With these two blows were associated a number of other measures calculated to inspire confidence in Clement's repeated asseverations of his fixed resolve.³ Already under Clement XIII., when the approval of the veneration of the Sacred Heart was under consideration, he had, as Cardinal Ganganelli, declared his opposition to this favourite devotion of the Jesuits,⁴ and he now came out again on the side of the opponents. At the end of May the Abbé Collet was banished from Rome for having set up an image of the Sacred Heart in the Coliseum.⁵ The punishment must have seemed all the stranger

¹ " *Si va all' estinzione " (Centomani to Tanucci, May 10, 1771). Tanucci *wrote exultingly about this fresh stroke to Orsini on May 18, 1771. On the same day Orsini *wrote to V. Macedonio, " siamo sicuri," and again on June 7, 1771, " sono sicuro della soppressione." *Ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{302}{1047}$.

² " *Le Pape, en parlant hier soir au card. de Bernis de la visite qui va se faire du Séminaire Romain, par les ordres de Sa S^{té}, lui a dit ces propres paroles : ' Vous voyez, M. le Cardinal, que quand on se fie à moi et qu'on me laisse agir, les choses se font mieux et dans toutes les règles : je suis homme de parole ; croiés que l'impatience et la précipitation gâtent plus les affaires qu'elles ne les arrangent.' Le cardinal de Bernis n'a pas manqué de louer le Pape sur la pureté de ses intentions et de l'assurer que nos Cours en étoient bien persuadées." Archives of Simancas, Estado 5038. Cf. *Bernis to Orsini on the same day. State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*

³ *Bernis to Azpuru, April 28, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5038 ; *Bernis to Orsini and Tanucci, April 28, 1771, also to Orsini on May 7, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{302}{1047}$; *Bernis to Aspuru, May 7, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ Cf. our account, vol. xxxvii, 407.

⁵ *Vid.* besides Bernis' reports in MASSON, 184, n. 1 *seq.*, Vasquez's *account of the "escandaloso suceso del Coliseo !" sent to Roda

in view of the fact that permission to hold the feast in the Coliseum ¹ had been given by Clement XIV. to Cardinal Rossi, who was known to be a friend of the Jesuits.² In the following month another step was taken by the Pope. Up till then it had been customary for the Jesuits to use for their procession from the Gesù on the last day of the octave of Corpus Christi the canvas sun-screens that had been used previously for the celebration of the feast in the Piazza di S. Pietro. This favour

on May 16, 1771. An eye-witness said that "el objecto de la adoracion (mejor diria : supersticion), practicada en dicho Coliseo era una imagen de Jesu Christo, que abierto el pecho mostraba su corazon como vaso que contenia partículas consagradas ; y Jesu Christo con una partícula en la mano comunicándola a una muger, que los prudentes interpretes juzgan que sea imagen de la famosa Alacoc, ya que al mismo tiempo se publicó la relacion que incluyo a Don Juan, en que verá V. Ex. citada una vision de esa profetisa jesuitica ! — Blasi ha compuesto una obra contra la supersticion del corazon separado del sacrosanto cuerpo del nuestro Redentor, la qual la ha pulido Giorgi, corrigiendo algunas cosas y haciendo algunas notillas !" Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez, II. For Collet's banishment, see *Orsini to Tanucci, May 31, 1771, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1478. In Spain the devotion to the Sacred Heart was prohibited by Charles III. (*vid.* *Roda to Azpuru, from Aranjuez, May 28, 1771), for which *Roda extolled him as a "principe illuminato" in a letter to Marefoschi of the same day (*loc. cit.*). For the advocate Camillo Blasi's written attack on the devotion to the Sacred Heart, see HURTER, *Nomenclator*, V³, 79, 496.

¹ MASSON, *loc. cit.*

² *Vasquez to Roda, June 20, 1771: At first the Pope had approved of "el escandaloso suceso del Coliseo !" Cardinal Rossi had been betimes in obtaining the Pope's permission, to Marefoschi's indignation. "Lo que nos aflige sumamente y debe afligir a quien ama la religion, es que vemos casi imposible el remedio, bien considerado el caracter del Papa. Si Dios no toma alguna providencia extraordinaria, esta supersticion, como otra qualquiera que quieran inventar los Jesuitas y sus Terciarios, sussistirán sin que haya quien los disipe !" Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

was now refused them, as were also the loan of the Papal musicians and the escort of the Swiss Guards. "This is further evidence of the Pope's firm intention to keep the promises he gave the king," reported Azpuru to Madrid on June 18th, 1771.¹ A few days previously Clement had again excused himself, first to Orsini and then to Bernis, for having delayed matters up till then, but he could not tell them the reasons for it. If only, he said, he could have a quarter of an hour with Charles III. !² To dispel the mistrust of him that still persisted in Madrid,³ he agreed in June, 1771, to stand as godfather to the child that was expected by the Princess of Asturias, the King of Spain's daughter-in-law.⁴ He knew well how much Spain's attitude counted in the recovery of Avignon. Bernis advised its return in the first dispatch he sent, on June 26th, 1771, to Choiseul's

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 13, 1771: "En el último día de la octava del Corpus Domini los Jesuitas de la Casa Profesa han hecho siempre por la mañana la procesion de esta solemnidad con las mismas tiendas, que por motivo del sol y más decencia se ponen en la que se hace en la basílica de San Pedro, y están á cargo del Mayordomo del Papa, pero se han visto precisados en esta ocasion á hacerla por la tarde, pues habiendo pedido las referidas tiendas, se las han negado de orden de S. B^d con la circunstancia, que no asistió á la funcion, como era costumbre, la musica de la capilla del Papa, en lo que parece ha manifestado mayormente su constante ánimo de cumplir quanto ha ofrecido á S.M. relativo á la extincion." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, June 7, 1771, *loc. cit.*, C. Farnes.

² *Orsini to Azpuru, June 16, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, and *Bernis to Orsini, June 25, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³⁰²/₁₀₄₇.

³ On May 14, 1771, Grimaldi *wrote to Azpuru that it was clear from what the Pope said that he was trying to put off the suppression, so that a settlement was further off every day. Procrastination was tantamount to a breach of promise. The king suspected that the Palafox affair was being dragged out so as to postpone the suppression. Archives of Simancas, Estado 5088.

⁴ *Charles III. to Clement XIV., from Madrid, June 9, 1771, and *Clement XIV. to Charles III., June 20, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

second successor, the Duc d'Aiguillon. The Paris nuncio Giraud, who had pressed for the settlement of this matter on May 14th and 28th, renewed his request in a very urgent manner on August 25th. Grimaldi, however, had already informed the French Cabinet on July 21st that Charles III. did not approve of the premature return to Avignon; no such step must be made until the Papal promises had been fulfilled. The return of Avignon, Charles insisted, must take place simultaneously with that of Benevento and Pontecorvo, as they were also closely connected with the suppression of the Jesuit Order, no matter whether the latter preceded or followed the return. In the latter case there must be a clause providing against the Pope's failure to keep his promise.¹

The Spanish Cabinet was also concerned about an ordinance of Louis XV.'s of June 15th, 1771, whereby all priests who had been banished from France since 1756 were allowed to return to the country.² Grimaldi demanded that at least the Jesuits be excluded from this amnesty, but this was rejected by Paris as an interference in France's internal affairs, for the king had no cause to complain about the secularized Jesuits, and their toleration in France had no connection with the demand for their suppression.³ In the end, however, Bernis received the same instruction as before, namely to support whatever steps were taken by Spain. With this demand the Cardinal complied.⁴ Azpuru, however, had another stroke in July while resting at Frascati⁵ and was hampered in taking any energetic steps not only by his poor health but also because he flattered

¹ MASSON, 185 *seq.*, 187.

² Misgivings were immediately expressed by Fuentes, who sent Grimaldi the royal ordinance with his *letter from Paris of June 24, 1771. Archives of Simancas, Estado 4579.

³ MASSON, 190.

⁴ " *Bernis e Azpuru hanno parlato al Papa per la soppressione con calore sommo " (Orsini to Tanucci, July 16, 1771, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1477).

⁵ On July 9, 1771, Orsini *reported to Tanucci that Azpuru had retired to Frascati on medical advice; on July 16 he *reported that he had had a stroke. *Ibid.*

himself that he had prospects of becoming a Cardinal.¹ With regard to his promise Clement consistently expressed himself in such a way as to leave no doubts as to his sincerity in the minds of Bernis and Orsini. They were confirmed in this impression by the ardour with which the Pope pressed on in two matters which he described as being an important part of his scheme for the suppression, namely the visitation of the Roman Seminary and the Palafox process.² The spirit in

¹ On July 27, 1771, Tanucci *complained to Orsini about Azpuru "che pretendendo al cardinalato inacquava l'affare dei Gesuiti. Ma l'estinzione dee marciare sola come il sole per cielo". Archives of Simancas, Estado 6104.

² *Bernis to Azpuru, July 2, 1771: "La Pape s'est entretenu assez longtems avec le card. de Bernis, dans l'audience de hier au soir, de l'affaire de Palafox. Sa Sté est contente de la dernière écriture qui vient d'être finie: Elle fit l'histoire abrégée de cette affaire et se plut à raconter toutes les intrigues qui en ont successivement embarrassé la marche. Il est aisé de conclure de cette narration que notre St Père est toujours dans les mêmes sentimens, et que son projet est de finir l'affaire des Jésuites à la satisfaction de nos Cours, en observant les règles canoniques." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. *Bernis to Orsini, July 2, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{305}{1048}$; *Orsini to V. Macedonio, July 3, 1771: "What an honour for Pagliarini! The two copies of Blasi's book, for you and Conti, have been dispatched to Genoa. The visitation of the Irish College is practically over; only the Rector is staying there for a short time. The visitation of the seminary is making progress, with some modifications." *Ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{302}{1047}$. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 4, 1771 (the Pope wants to settle the Jesuit affair "a satisfaccion de las cortes interesadas y sin faltar a la observancia de las reglas canónicas"), Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome; *Bernis to Orsini, July 9, 1771 (yesterday evening the Pope spoke [on the Jesuit affair] as theologian, father, and judge; he has a systematic plan, of which the visitation and Palafox form essential parts), State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*; *Orsini to V. Macedonio, on July 9 (visitation of the Roman Seminary) and 11, 1771 (we have no doubts about the suppression), *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1477; *Orsini to Tanucci, July 16, 1771 (on Sunday morning the seminarists went to the Lazarists, in accordance

which the latter was conducted is shown by the exclusion, at the Pope's command, of the Jesuit Acquasciolti from all participation in the proceedings and by the prohibition of any attack on Palafox's writings, on the score that they had

with Marefoschi's decree), *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1744; *Orsini to V. Macedonio, July 25, 1771 (the "soppressione" is certain), *ibid.*; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 25, 1771 (measures affecting the Seminario Romano and the Congregazione Antipreparatoria), Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome; *Orsini to Tanucci, July 23, 1771 (in a few days an extensive summary will be distributed for the Congregazione Antipreparatoria), State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*; *Orsini to Azpuru, July 30, 1771 (yesterday morning the Pope repeated his well-known assurances, adding that the *Motu proprio* was ready and that the princes would be pleased with it. Next September the Palafox case would be dealt with; this would herald the fulfilment of the promises. The Pope praised all the princes), Archives of Simancas, Estado 5038. On the same day he *wrote in a similar vein to Tanucci, adding that despite the "impenetrabilità dei consigli del Santo Padre conta sempre sulle promesse de S.S^{ta}" (*loc. cit.*), C. Farnes, 1477; *Bernis to Orsini, August 6, 1771 (the Pope spoke in such a way that it was impossible to doubt his motives), State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{303}{1045}$. The same view was expressed by Orsini in a *letter to Tanucci of August 6, 1771, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1477. *Bernis to Orsini, August 13, 1771 (yesterday the Pope showed himself "invariable dans ses maximes" regarding the Jesuits), *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{303}{1045}$; *Bernis to Orsini, August 27, 1771 (continuation of the visitation of the Roman Seminary), *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1477; *Bernis to Orsini, September 3, 1771 (the Pope held fast), *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{304}{1049}$; *Orsini to V. Macedonio, September 4, 1771 ("Sempre più si assicura la soppressione"), *ibid.* On September 10, 1771, Bernis *reported to Azpuru that the Pope was aware of all the intrigues against the "causa Palafox" and despised them. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. The same *report was made on the same date by Bernis to Orsini, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{304}{1049}$. Also on the same date Orsini *replied to Tanucci's complaint about the Pope's postponement of the decision by referring to the Palafox affair, "preparatoria all' estinzione" (Archives of Simancas, Estado 6104).

already been approved.¹ Two events that took place at this juncture were very opportune: on Chigi's death Marefoschi was appointed in July as Prefect of the Congregation of Rites,² and a written work imputed to the deceased Bishop of Utrecht, declaring Palafox to be a Jansenist, proved to be a forgery by a Belgian Jesuit.³ Amid general excitement the so-called preparatory commission which was customary in canonization processes met, under the Pope's presidency, on September 17th, 1771. In spite of the secrecy to which its members were bound, Azpuru was able to report to Madrid on September 26th that not a single vote had been cast against Palafox, that twenty-four had been cast in his favour, and that ten members had asked for a postponement of the decision.⁴ The pleasure

¹ *Il P. Postulatore to Azpuru, September 11, 1771, and *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 12, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Orsini reported on September 12, 1771, to V. Macedonio that before Marefoschi received the considered opinions he caused a Papal decree to be read out, which forbade everyone except the Postulator of the Faith to say anything against Palafox's teaching. *Loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{303}{1048}$. Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, September 13, 1771, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1477.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, July 19, 1771, *ibid.*

³ This work, attributed to the Bishop of Utrecht, which had already appeared in Italian in 1760 and was now distributed in a French edition, caused an enormous sensation, as it was calculated to damage the Palafox process. *Azpuru (to Grimaldi, August 1, 1770; Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome) and *Orsini (to Tanucci, August 2, 1771; State Archives, Naples) immediately denounced it as spurious. Azpuru's secretary, Igareda, in his *letter to Mahony of August 3, 1771, ascribed it to the "Jesuitas o sus Terciaros". Grimaldi was apprised of Charles III.'s vexation by a *letter written from S. Ildefonso on August 20, 1771 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). *Ibid.*, the *protest of the Jansenist Bishops of Holland, addressed from Utrecht, August 12, 1771. Tanucci rejoiced at the profit it brought to the Palafox case; cf. his *letter to Orsini, September 3, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{304}{1049}$.

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 26, 1771; he also reported that the vote of the Jesuit consultor "nada concluye en substancia

with which Charles III. received this news¹ was impaired by the report from Rome that even Marefoschi thought that Clement was making use of the Palafox process to delay the suppression; moreover, not ten but eighteen members of the commission had voted for the postponement.² The apprehension already expressed by Tanucci a few months previously now became more widespread: the visitation of the seminary and the Palafox process might drag on so long that the Pope would die before they were over.³

The Spanish Cabinet was also constantly worried by France's attitude towards both the Jesuit question and the return of Avignon. In mid-September Grimaldi stated in energetic terms that the restitution of the Papal territories was a matter that was of equal interest to all three Bourbon Courts and one that took time to settle. He also complained bitterly about Giraud, the nuncio to Paris, especially on account of his statement that it was only Spain that wanted the suppression.⁴

y lo ha despreciado S.S." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, from S. Lorenzo, October 7, 1771, *ibid.*

² *Vasquez to Roda, October 31, 1771, *loc. cit.* As Roda *wrote to Azpuru on July 16, 1771, Charles III. regarded the Palafox affair as a pledge of the suppression of the Jesuits. *Ibid.*

³ *Tanucci to Grimaldi, July 9, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6104.

⁴ Grimaldi's *letter to Ossun, the French envoy in Madrid, cited by MASSON (191) with no mention of date or source, bears the date September 16, 1771 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome and Archives of Simancas, Estado 5233). Grimaldi *dispatched it on the same day to Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, stressing how displeased Charles was with Giraud's note to Aiguillon about the restitution of the Papal territories (*ibid.*). On September 17, 1771, Grimaldi complained in a *letter to Azpuru of the "indecencias escandalosas del Nuncio en Paris", who, apparently at the Pope's request, was associating with the Du Barry (*loc. cit.*, Estado 5233). Cf. Fuentes' *report from Paris to Grimaldi, of September 5, 1771, confirming Mme du Duffand's statement (*Correspondance*, éd. Lescure, II., 186) that Fuentes avoided all contact with the Du Barry.

The Duc d'Aiguillon replied that in regard to Avignon no steps would be taken except in agreement with Spain, and in the Jesuit question France would adhere to the instructions already given to Bernis. Charles III. took no further step in the matter, but noted with growing annoyance that Aiguillon was not only tolerating but even protecting the Jesuits in France.¹

Fresh instructions were sent to Azpuru, who was lying ill at Frascati, to bring pressure to bear on the Pope (through Orsini and Bernis) to suppress the Jesuits.² The two Cardinals, however, were unable to perform this task, as the Pope was busily occupied with the Palafox affair³ and made use of his customary autumn residence at Castel Gandolfo to avoid listening to any further representations by the envoys.⁴

¹ MASSON, 191 *seq.* On September 15, 1771, Grimaldi *authorized Fuentes to raise objections to the Jesuits preaching in certain Paris churches; such conduct was intolerable at a time when the sovereigns were demanding their suppression. Archives of Simancas, Estado 5088. Aiguillon's defence was that in France only the Institute of the Jesuits was proscribed, not the separate individuals as in Spain. *Vid.* *Fuentes to Grimaldi, October 4, 1771, *ibid.*, Estado 5088. *Cf.* *Aiguillon to Ossun, October 7, 1771, *ibid.*, Estado 4580.

² *Azpuru to Orsini, from Frascati, September 13, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ *Tanucci to Orsini, September 21, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{304}{1049}$.

⁴ On September 20, 1771, Orsini *reported to Tanucci: Monday, Consistory and Thursday or Friday departure to Castel Gandolfo, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1477. Before the departure Orsini, at an audience on September 23, 1771, renewed in the name of the King of Naples "l'istanza per la sollecita soppressione della Compagnia de Gesù". He received the following reply from Clement XIV.: " *Di quest' affare, non accade più parlare. Sono memore di quanto hò promesso, lo adempirò, non posso dimenticarmene, vi penso, e ci travaglio continuamente, lascino fare a me; ed indi interrogò lo scrivente se avea veduto il decreto del Venerabile Palafox, col quale si vieta di oppugnarsi la dottrina del servo di Dio; lo scrivente rispose, che lo avea ammirato; il Papa replicò: Ne godo, lascino fare a me, e poi passò ad altri affari." Orsini

Clement, however, did not neglect, during his *villeggiatura*, to celebrate the birth of a grandson to Charles III.¹ by all manner of festivities² and directed the consecrated swaddling clothes to be sent to the prince.³ In a secret Consistory on November 11th he informed the Cardinals of the joyful news that had come from Madrid and of the entry of Louis XV.'s daughter into the Carmelite Order.⁴ On November 14th, 1771, he had a cordial message of congratulation sent to Charles III.⁵

Meanwhile fresh expressions of misgiving were coming from the Spanish capital. At the end of October, Vasquez, full of apprehension, wrote to Roda that the Pope was in good spirits but was doing nothing to keep his word. It was to be feared, he continued, that he was hoping to satisfy Charles III. with the Brief confirming the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain, and Marefoschi too was still of the opinion that the Palafox affair was merely to serve as a means of postponing the suppression.⁶ The process of beatification had indeed developed in an increasingly mysterious manner. On October 10th Azpuru had reported that the decree on Palafox's heroic virtues would appear shortly,⁷ but when on November 17th, Orsini, acting for the sick Azpuru, urged that the matter be brought to a conclusion, the Pope pointed out that they were waiting for certain documents from Spain. He also complained about the incompetence of the postulators, which was the

to Bernis, September 24, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

¹ Charles III. informed the Pope of the birth and baptism of the Infante Carlos Clemente in a *letter written from S. Lorenzo on September 19, 1771; he had represented the Holy Father at the christening. *Ibid.*

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, October 3, 1771, *ibid.*

³ *Pallavicini to Azpuru, November 3, 1771, *ibid.*

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, November 12, 1771, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1477, and Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 14, 1771, *loc. cit.*; the Pope's speech in THEINER, *Epist.*, 188.

⁵ THEINER, *Epist.*, 190.

⁶ Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez, II.

⁷ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, October 10, 1771, *loc. cit.*

cause of the fresh delay.¹ Tanucci wrote to a friend at this time, "As I have always feared, the Pope, Frate and Romagnolo that he is, will fool us."² Centomani, Tanucci's agent in Rome, complained that the last Consistory had been as fruitless as all the thirty-one months of Clement XIV.'s pontificate. The orders given so far in respect of the Roman Seminary were only half-measures.³ Orsini, on the other hand, thought that the forthcoming publication of the report of the visitation provided safe grounds for presuming that the suppression would take place.⁴ Soon afterwards, however, he had to admit that the Pope had never said the suppression would follow the conclusion of the Palafox process.⁵

While Clement was repeating to the Bourbon envoys the assurances he had made so often before and was waiting for the arrival of the Palafox documents,⁶ Bernis' attention was

¹ *Orsini to Azpuru, November 18, 1771, *ibid.* Cf. Orsini to V. Macedonio, November 5, 1771 (Orsini had no doubt about the suppression), State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{304}{1045}$.

² *Tanucci to Nefetti, from Caserta, November 19, 1771: "Il Papa frate e Romagnolo burlerà, come io ho sempre creduto." Archives of Simancas.

³ *Centomani to Tanucci, November 19, 1771, State Archives, Naples.

⁴ *Orsini to Macedonio, December 12, 1771, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{305}{1055}$.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, December 31, 1771, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1477. Cf. **id.* on December 29, 1771 (*ibid.*), on the banishment of the Trinitarian Perez from Rome to Spain; this measure, in which Clement XIV. fully concurred, was taken by Charles III. because Perez had voted against Palafox. Cf. Roda to Azara, December 24, 1771, in CRÉTINEAU, 345.

⁶ *Orsini to Macedonio, January 2, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{306}{1051}$; *Bernis to Azpuru, January 7, 1772 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), also on January 14, February 4 and 11, 1772, *ibid.*, and Archives of Simancas, Estado 5038; *Orsini to Azpuru, January 28, 1772 (the Pope said, "Mantenemo ciò che abbiamo promesso a S.M.C."), *ibid.*; *Bernis to Azpuru, February 18, 1772: "Il a paru au card. de Bernis que le Pape est toujours sérieusement occupé de la cause du vén. D. Jean de

distracted from the Jesuit question by new commissions from his Government. The most important one was the conferment of the purple on Giraud, the ambitious nuncio to Paris, who was doing all in his power to achieve this honour, and on the Archbishop of Rheims, De la Roche Aymon. Clement XIV., very rightly, had but a poor opinion of both these men, who were favourites of the Comtesse Du Barry, but on December 16th, 1771, he was forced to give way, so far as the incompetent Archbishop was concerned. Before attaining his end, Giraud had to wait till April 19th, 1773.¹ Besides these two, Bernis had many other affairs to deal with.²

Palafox et de l'affaire des Jésuites ; il veut terminer l'une et l'autre en observant les règles canoniques et celles de la justice et de la prudence, comme l'exigent le devoir et la gloire des trois monarques et la sienne propre. Le card. de Bernis a saisi cette occasion d'assurer le Pape que S. M^{té} Très-Chrétienne, toujours fidèle au système d'union des trois couronnes, vouloit que son ministre à Rome appuiât et secondât constamment les ordres et les instructions qui lui seroient communiqués par le ministre de Sa M^{té} Catholique. Sa S^{té} étoit déjà persuadée de cette vérité, sur laquelle elle n'a jamais eu lieu de former aucun doute." **Id.*, on February 25, 1772 : " Il ne fut question dont l'audience d'hier au soir que des sentimens du Pape en faveur des cours catholiques et principalement de celles de la maison de France. Le Pape assura le card. de Bernis qu'incapable de manquer à ses promesses, il chercheroit toujours avec empressement les occasions de prouver son amitié et son attachement aux trois couronnes." (*Ibid.*) On November 4, 1771, Aiguillon had written to Ossun : " M. le cardinal de Bernis s'est conformé aux ordres que Sa M^{té} Catholique a adressés à M. l'archevêque de Valence par rapport aux nouvelles instances à faire pour la suppression des Jésuites, et continuera d'agir avec ce prélat et avec M. le cardinal Orsini dans un parfait concert sur cet objet." Archives of Simancas, Estado 5200.

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 122 *seq.* ; MASSON, 192 *seq.*, who treats here also of Clement XIV.'s *letter to Louis XV. (omitted by Theiner ; Archives of Foreign Affairs, Paris), the bulk of it being written by Bontempi, the Pope being responsible for the beginning and end only. According to NOVAES (XV., 185) Giraud had already been appointed *in petto* on June 17, 1771.

² MASSON, 196 *seq.*, where there are further details about the

Azpuru had long been too ill to do full justice to his duties and when the cardinalial appointment of the Archbishop of Rheims brought home to him the futility of his own aspirations for the purple he vented his ill-temper on the Pope, and there was a violent scene with Father Bontempi.¹ He had previously tendered his resignation as ambassador, which must have greatly embarrassed Clement XIV., but this time Charles III. accepted it² and in January, 1772, entrusted the temporary direction of the Spanish embassy to the Count de Lavaña,³ who had hitherto been his representative in Naples. Lavaña, in concert with Bernis and Orsini, was to press the Pope with every possible means and with the greatest energy to suppress the Society of Jesus.⁴

The change in the Spanish ambassadors was viewed with apprehension by Clement XIV., who expected that the representations made by a layman, as Lavaña was, would be

rumour that Louis XV.'s daughter was trying to bring about the dissolution of the Du Barry's marriage, so that she could marry the king. Cf. GRANDMAISON, *Madame Louise de France*,⁸ Paris, 1922, 138.

¹ Cf. *Centomani to Tanucci, January 14, 1772, State Archives, Naples. Orsini *wrote to Tanucci on December 31, 1771, that the Pope had never said either to him or Bernis "che volesse far Azpuru cardinale", *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1477, and again *on January 28, 1772, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1479. That Azpuru's dismissal was not the result of his illness but "per disgusto di noi e vergogna di non venir promosso cardinale" is brought out in Vincenti's *letter to Pallavicini, February 4, 1772, Nunziat. di Spagna 268A, Papal Secret Archives.

² *Grimaldi to Azpuru, January 21, 1772: Azpuru and Igareda were to inform Lavaña of all current affairs, "particularmente del de la extincion de los Jesuitas" (Archives of Simancas, Estado 5103).

³ *Charles III. to Clement XIV., El Pardo, January 21, 1772, *ibid.*

⁴ " *Solicitar por todos los medios y con toda la eficacia posible estimular al papa a la extincion de la Compañia " (Grimaldi to Lavaña, January 21, 1772, *ibid.*).

even more urgent than those he had already had to deal with.¹ Bernis, in reporting this to Paris on January 17th, 1772, gave a most interesting explanation of the Pope's position in the Jesuit affair.² "The Pope's private letters to the King of Spain and the good offices of the confessor Osma have had no other object up to now than to gain time while the essential documents for the process of the Jesuits are being searched for and collected. I have grounds for thinking that the real subject of the matter has never been discussed either by the Pope or the king, nor put into proper order. The Pope has always asked for time and up to now it has been granted to him. The Palafox process was represented as the introduction to that of the Jesuits, but even this affair is not yet finished with and will take another year or two, after which the Pope presumably will have to express himself more clearly.³ The complete suppression of the Jesuits, which hitherto has been demanded only by the Courts of Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon, will be difficult to carry out unless it is also demanded or expressly acquiesced in by the other Catholic Courts, such as Vienna, Turin, Florence, Milan, and Genoa. But a demand will never be made by these other Courts, and their definite assent will be difficult to obtain. The Pope has stated that as judge of the affair it does not become him to invite it. On account of this difficulty alone I have always regarded the complete suppression of the Jesuit Order as a well-nigh impossible undertaking."

¹ Bernis on January 1 and 17, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 200, 202.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 202.

³ On January 21, 1772, Bernis *wrote to Azpuru, "Sa Sainteté s'est informée des intrigues et des moyens qui sont employés pour mettre les plus forts obstacles à la canonisation de cet évêque, contre lequel de tous tems les Jésuites et leurs partisans fanatiques se sont élevés. Sa Sainteté veut procéder dans cette affaire selon toutes les règles : mais comme Elle est persuadée de la bonté de la cause, Elle ne doute pas que la justice et la vérité ne triomphent de tous les efforts de la passion et de l'intrigue." (Archives of Simancas, Estado 5038.)

Bernis gives the following reasons for this conclusion. The Pope cannot be expected to fall out with half of the Catholic sovereigns for the sake of satisfying the others on so vexed a question, in which the Pope, unless he is to fail in justice and honour, cannot act otherwise than in accordance with the canonical rules and forms and on the strength of reliable documents which clearly show that the Jesuit Order is quite corrupt and absolutely incapable of improvement. "So far as I have been able to see into the Pope's mind," Bernis continued, "I have grounds for supposing that the Pope wanted to go slowly, firstly to obviate any suspicion that the suppression of the Jesuits was a condition of his election. Secondly, because at the beginning of his reign he found that tempers were very heated, and doubtless he wanted by his hesitation to give them time to cool. The Brief *Motu proprio* was rejected by Portugal and was declared to be inadmissible by France, but for some time it engaged the attention of the Court of Madrid. At the present time the Pope could put in its stead the beatification of Palafox, a matter with which he is fully conversant but which will take a fairly long time to bring to a final conclusion. Lampoons against Palafox's teaching are being circulated daily, although it was approved by the Congregation of Rites under three different Popes. If Lavaña agrees with the suppression of the Jesuits not being taken seriously in hand until after Palafox's beatification, the Pope would still have plenty of time, but eventually the moment for a definite statement would draw near and then the Holy Father would probably be able to explain to the Spaniards the impossibility of making away with the Jesuits in the States in which they are protected, especially if the utter corruption of the Order cannot be established."¹

This being the situation one can readily understand Lavaña's doubts of his ability to execute his difficult task.² As it

¹ For the pain caused to the Pope by the writings against Palafox which were continually appearing, see also *Orsini to Tanucci, January 28, 1772, *loc. cit.*

² *Lavaña to Grimaldi, February 19, 1772, from Turin ("muchísimo miedo"), *loc. cit.*, Estado 5103.

happened, he was never able to assume his new position ; his death on February 23rd meant another gain of time for the Pope. Previous to this the Jesuits had been dealt further blows calculated to dispel the distrust of the Pope's intentions which had been conceived for years past by Tanucci in Naples and his agent Centomani.¹ After the visitation of the Roman

¹*Tanucci to Losada, June 5, 1770 : " La condotta del Papa è quale io ho sempre aspettato. Verrà l'approvazione dell'espulsione dei Gesuiti fatta dai Borboni e l'impiego dei loro beni, perchè il farla è interesse di Roma. L'estinzione si differirà tanto che si muti tutto l'aspetto delle cose presenti ; e forse finirà il Papato Regnante prima di sopirsi le difficoltà che nasceranno parte naturalmente, parte per industria." *On August 7, 1770 : " Di Roma non parlo ; mi dispiacerà che si verifichi quel che ho pensato fin da principio, cioè che il Papa confiderà nel tempo, e intanto pascerà di promesse." *On January 8, 1771 : " Di Roma da qualche settimana nulla ! Son cessate anche le promesse benchè vane, che si ripetevano tutte le settimane." *Loc. cit.*, Estado 6012, 6014. *Centomani to Tanucci, January 11, 1771 : " Si proibiscono i ministeri ai soli Gesuiti espulsi : non si proibisce la vestizione dei novizi. Quindi non si va all'estinzione . . . dopo 20 mesi di Pontificato. Il P. Zaccaria fa portare qua la sua biblioteca : quindi crede che la C^{ia} vivrà " (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1218). *Tanucci to Grimaldi, March 12, 1771 : " La scusa settimanale del Papa è che non può mandar via dal suo Stato li Gesuiti, come han potuto fare li Sovrani Borboni e il Portogallo, laonde ha bisogno di tempo. Questo suonerebbe tempo lungo, qual sarebbe quello della morte di tutti o della maggior parte de' Gesuiti che stanno nel paese ecclesiastico, e involverebbe la vita dello stesso Papa, e neppur basterebbe, sapendosi ch'ei permette ai Gesuiti il vestir novizi clandestinamente " (*loc. cit.*, Estado 6014). *Tanucci to Orsini, June 22, 1771 : Always the same old policy of the Roman Court, to spin things out and make use of the time thus gained. A proof of this was " la Bolla 28 mesi sono ; la Bolla de' Gesuiti era distesa e mancava solo il tradurla dallo stil forense in Gregoriano, opera di poche ore : questo fu scritto a tutti li Borboni " (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). *Centomani to Tanucci, June 28, 1771 : " Da 25 mesi aspettiamo la soppressione. Chi può vedere chiaro ? " State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma

Seminary had been brought to a conclusion in January, 1772,¹ Clement relieved the Jesuits of its administration and closed the students' hostel (*Convitto*) that had been run in connexion with it.² Both in this case and that of the Irish College he

1218). *Centomani to Tanucci, August 6, 1771, enumerating the Pope's measures against the Jesuits and pointing out that the admission of novices had never been forbidden, whence Centomani concludes: "che solo il timore può sforzare S. S. al passo definitivo" (*ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1219). *Tanucci to Orsini, October 21, 1771: "Benchè Spagna e Francia insistano e rinnovino anche le istanze, bisogna tolerar le dimore del Papa quanto si possa riguardo all'estinzione dei gesuiti, dei quali è ormai nauseante il discorso e poco decoroso" (Archives of Simancas, Estado 6104). *Du Tillot to Azara, February, 1771 (no day given), casting suspicion on Bernis as a (Jesuit) Tertiary (State Archives, Parma). *V. Macedonio to Orsini, Lisbon, January 15, 1771, admitting that "la soppressione è un passo un po' duro per la S. Sede" (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{300}{145}$), but he wrote on June 25, 1771, to Orsini: "Perchè tante tergiversazioni quando si vuole estinguere? E se le scuole Gesuitiche sono cattive, perchè non si finisce tutto d'un colpo?" (*ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{302}{147}$).

¹ On January 17, 1772, Orsini *reported to Tanucci that Carafa di Colombrano had handed the Pope the "Relazione della visita del Seminario Romano" (*loc. cit.*, C. Farnes, 1479).

² CORDARA, 138, who relates how Marefoschi, in his hatred of the Jesuits, entrusted the investigation of the economical administration to the expert accountant Smuraglia, who had been initiated into Marefoschi's schemes. Smuraglia, after examining the seminary's account-books for two centuries, declared that 5,000,000 gold *scudi* were missing and that they had been embezzled by the Jesuits. Although the Jesuits laughed at this accusation, as the seminary was groaning under heavy debts and they were hard put to it to maintain the *convittori*, Marefoschi asseverated that there could be no doubt about his allegation. Clement XIV. accordingly deprived the Jesuits not only of the administration of the seminary but also of the *Convitto* for noble students, which was managed in connexion with it, and had proved to be of great benefit; the house was closed and was finally put up for sale. Smuraglia was richly rewarded, but Marefoschi never

gave unqualified credence to the impassioned reports of Marefoschi. The direction of this latter institution too was taken away from the Jesuits and handed over to secular priests.¹ Almost simultaneously a Papal circular letter was sent to all Bishops in the Papal States ordering them to forbid the Jesuits expelled from Spain, Parma, and Naples to hear confessions, preach, or even catechize. To Azpuru this was a sure sign that the Pope was determined on the suppression.² A similar interpretation was put upon a most severe measure that was taken against the Jesuit General, Ricci. The *Promotore della Fede*, Monsignore Pisani, had made a will appointing his brother as his heir, but on his death-bed, as his brother was living in Malta, he handed over the administration of his estate, pending the heir's arrival in Rome, to another brother, who was a Jesuit. The last-mentioned, having no experience of business, entrusted the affair to the Jesuit Casali. Although Casali fulfilled his duty most conscientiously, Pisani's other brother, when he finally arrived in Rome, dreaming of untold wealth, accused him of embezzlement and, to the general dismay of the Romans, brought an action against his own brother, the Jesuit. Clement XIV. intervened by appointing as judge Monsignor Alfani, whose reputation was bad but who happened, conveniently, to be a bitter enemy of the Jesuits. Without hearing his defence Alfani condemned Father Pisani to restore 7,000 gold *scudi* which were alleged found the 5,000,000 *scudi*. Even Centomani spoke of Smuraglia's "conti e composti fantastici" in his *letter to Tanucci of May 26, 1772 (*ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1220).

¹ *Orsini to Macedonio, January 30, 1772, according to which the administration was handed over to Marefoschi (*ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{306}{1501}$).

² *Azpuru to the king's confessor, January 31, 1772: "Estos días ha expedido Su S^d una carta circular a todos los Obispos de este su Estado, encargándoles que a los Jesuitas expulsos de esos Reynos, del de Napoli y Parma no permitan el administrar el s^{to} sacramento de la penitencia, predicar, ni explicar el catequismo, y esta parece ser una neuva prueba de la determinada voluntad del S^o Padre en punto de la extincion de la Compañía." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

to have been embezzled, and the Pope ordered the Jesuit General to pay out this sum. Disregarding Ricci's reasoned remonstrances, Clement XIV. caused, through Alfani, the sum demanded to be subtracted from the funds of the Roman College.¹

In spite of the Pisani case, Tanucci's agent in Rome, Centomani, had frequently repeated, with reference to the suppression of the Jesuits, the words uttered by the doubting Thomas. Orsini, on the contrary, saw the case as another "Lavalette affair".² In Rome, where, shortly before, the postponement of the suppression had been made fun of in the comedies acted during the Carnival, so radical a change took place in public opinion³ that the Pope was now generally regarded as a

¹ CORDARA, 129 *seq.* *Centomani also, when writing to Tanucci on July 19, 1771, referred to Alfani as "perpetuo Anti-Jesuita" (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1219). He *reported to Tanucci on December 27, 1771: "Il P. Generale Ricci condannato proprio motu e pubblicamente dal Papa medesimo a pagare nella causa Pisani. — Così gli ha detto Alfani sub secreto: l'esecuzione sta rimessa a' 8 o 10 gennaio prossimo." *On February 14, 1772: "Alfani ha sequestrati mille e più luoghi di Monte del Collegio Romano, che vuol dire presso a 130^m scudi: quindi minaccierà lunedì il Procuratore Generale, se non pagherà gli 8^m scudi dovuti, e prontamente, di fare subastare o aggiudicare detti luoghi sequestrati. — Così si farà se non verrà da palazzo qualche ordine di sospendere." *On February 25, 1772, Centomani informed Tanucci that the Father General would not agree to pay money which was not owed. Consequently Mgr. Alfani had ordered, on Saturday morning, "secondo le facultà comunicategli dalla S^{tà} Sua, la traslazione di luoghi 54 del Coll^o R^{no} a favore dell'erede del fratello del defonto, e costituiscono la somma di scudi 7 mila." Another reason why the Father General refused payment was that "la sua Compagnia non ha data veruna causa e non è stata ne pur udita". On March 3, 1772, Centomani forwarded the "Decreto di Msgr. Alfani nella causa Pisana", dated March 1. State Archives, Naples.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, March 6, 1772, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1479.

³ "Comedie che potranno finire in tragedie," wrote Centomani to Tanucci on February 11, 1772, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1220.

serious persecutor of the Jesuits.¹ Even the Jesuit Cordara, who had known the Pope of old, now began to waver in his opinion that Clement XIV. was no personal enemy of the Order and had only allowed one injustice after another to be done to it in order to save it from the worst disaster, namely suppression, which was so ardently desired by the Spanish king.² Even this witness, who was the last person to pronounce an unfavourable judgment on Clement XIV., had to admit that the Pope had made a fatal mistake in not openly and frankly rejecting the first demand of the Bourbon envoys by the firm declaration that although he was no friend of the Jesuits he could not and would not suppress their Order.³ And indeed, what reply could Charles III. have made to a Pope whom he esteemed as a learned and holy man who was wholly devoted to him and whom he took to be an enemy of the Jesuits, if he had refused to intervene in a matter concerning the whole Church, on the ground that the Bourbons, who had driven the Jesuits out of their realms, had not the slightest right to demand that the same thing be done in the other realms where the Order was still existing? ⁴ But Clement XIV., weak and fearful, never open and straightforward, had not the courage to utter a decisive "No". Instead, he took the course of dissimulation and delay.⁵ Priestly sincerity and firmness of speech would have befitted no Pope more than him, is Cordara's judgment, for he was a Religious by profession and had no *nepoti*, and so had nothing to fear. "However," continues Cordara, "he trusted too much to his

¹ CORDARA, 130.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 125, 260.

⁴ When Cordara visited the sick King Carlo Emanuele, in Turin, and recommended his Order to him, the king said: "For my part, I cannot see why the King of Spain, after he has driven the Jesuits out of his own country, wants them to be destroyed in every other one." This, he added, had placed the Pope in great difficulties and he would hardly be able to resist the force the Bourbon princes were bringing against him.

⁵ "Simulandi ac tergiversandi consilium cepit" (*ibid.*, 160).

keen wits, and consulting no one he preferred crafty plans to sound ones and thus, as we say, cut his own throat. In a torrent of words he mingled ambiguous statements to the envoys, actually promising nothing but giving the impression that he wanted to satisfy their demands, so that when they left him they were full of hope.”¹

Cordara is by no means blind to the failings of his fellow-Jesuits. He laments, with just cause, the trust put by elderly Fathers, some of them even highly cultured and serious men, in prophecies which dispelled all fear of a suppression. He refers especially to a woman in Spain, pious perhaps but certainly simple and uneducated, who foretold that the Pope would never disband the Jesuit Order. In Sicily the Jesuits took this as a heavenly oracle, gave it the widest circulation, and reported it to the highest authorities of their Order. “To tell the truth,” admits Cordara, “I too have never feared the worst, not on the strength of prophecies but on rational grounds. I had a high opinion of the Pope’s good-will and prudence. Besides, whatever he thought, and even if he were regarded as our greatest enemy, I could not persuade myself that to please the King of Spain he would rob himself of his picked troops and hamstringing himself, so to speak. For all religious Orders serve the Pope, it is true, but the Society of Jesus is reputed to be his bravest and most loyal legion. This reason alone weighed so much with me that it seemed certain that Clement XIV. would never consider for a moment the dissolution of the fighting body which has always done service on behalf of the Apostolic See with such ardour.”² Cordara, therefore, was exceedingly surprised when Clement XIV., concealing his plans in a mysterious obscurity, showed his hostility towards the Jesuits so openly as not even to grant an audience to their General.³ “The Pope’s attitude was such,”

¹ *Ibid.*, 125.

² *Ibid.*, 127 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 124. The Lucchese envoy reported on July 29, 1769, that on the Thursday the Jesuit General Ricci intended to invite the Pope to attend the Feast of St. Ignatius in the Gesù, but after being kept waiting in the Anticamera for two hours he was

explained Cordara, "as hardly to be distinguishable from that of a really embittered enemy. He did not even consider the Fathers to be worthy of his blessing. When he was out driving and saw them kneeling in the street and thus showing their reverence for him, he turned his eyes away. He also forbade his friends and everyone in the Papal palace to have any dealings with the Jesuits. Not satisfied with this he openly showed his dislike of their adherents and protégés. The opinion thus took root that whoever sided with the Jesuits would fare badly with the Pope and if he were applying for a post he would certainly stand less chance than others." To show that this was not mere talk Cordara cites a case that was known only to a few. When Garampi was appointed nuncio to Poland in April, 1772, Clement forced him to dismiss his secretary, Franciscus Cancellarius, who was as competent as he was learned, on the score that in the circumstances then prevailing men attached to the Jesuits could not be employed in public positions.¹

But in spite of all his efforts Clement did not succeed in misleading Charles III. about his plans. "No amount of dissimulation availed him in a city such as Rome," says Cordara, "where there were so many who saw through him. These men sent word to Madrid that the king must not allow himself to be hoodwinked. The Pope's anti-Jesuit attitude, they said, was not genuine; he was playing a crafty game so as to gain time and meanwhile to find out other ways of leaving the Jesuits undisturbed."²

Cordara thinks that the harsh measures taken by the Pope against the Jesuits were intended to remove Madrid's firmly rooted suspicion that his conduct was deceptive and that he wanted to be an apparent rather than an actual opponent of the Jesuits. All the wounding blows that he struck against the Order, even the appointment of the extortioner Alfani as judge, appear to Cordara as merely means whereby to put not admitted into the Pope's presence. *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 380.

¹ CORDARA, 128 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 124.

the King of Spain under an obligation to him by this humiliation of the Jesuits and thus to save the Order after all. Cordara's chief reason for taking this view was that even when three years of his pontificate had gone by, the Pope was still holding out against the ceaseless insistence of the Bourbons. "He kept on putting off the fulfilment of their demands," he wrote, "and played with them, as it were. This is all the more remarkable seeing that by putting the suppression into effect he could have regained Avignon and Benevento with a stroke of the pen. He preferred the diminution of his power to the destruction of the Order." "And would a Pope have done that," he asks, "who was really an enemy? He seems to have feared only one thing, to show the Jesuits any sign of his benevolence, as that might have given offence to the King of Spain's representative. This was why he returned the Jesuits' petitions unread, but when the description "Jesuit" was left out he gave his approval without ado, even when he knew the petitioner very well."¹

Cordara's view of Clement's attitude towards the Jesuits was confirmed by the Procurator General of the Hieronymites, Felice Nerini, who was a particular favourite of the Pope's. Nerini informed Cordara that he was quite sure that Clement loved the Order and that he was trying every means of saving it. If he possibly could, he would leave it untouched, but he was obviously very hard pressed and he was setting his hopes on procrastination and some unexpected happening. In 1772, when the Franciscan Conventual, Giovanni Carlo Vipera, an old and intimate friend of the Pope's, came to preach in Rome, Cordara learnt from him that the Pope had said that he had no intention of suppressing the Order, but that it still had much to suffer for the sake of its preservation. For this reason Cordara likens Clement XIV. to Pilate, who had Christ scourged so as to save him from death.² The unwearying defender of the Pope, who attributes even his worst actions to his good intentions, cites many other instances of how Clement XIV. neglected no opportunity of appearing inimical to the

¹ *Ibid.*, 129 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 131 *seqq.*

Jesuits. Thus the Jesuit Antonio Lecchi, although he had rendered splendid service in draining the marshes near Bologna, got the worst of his dispute with the Vice-Legate Ignazio Boncompagni, despite the view taken by the Congregation of Cardinals, because the Pope sided with the Vice-Legate. To show that anyone who had business dealings with the Jesuits got the best of it by favour of the Pope, even when the right was not on his side, Cordara recalls the instance when Clement XIV., disregarding a judicial verdict, compelled the Jesuits to hand over their General's summer residence near Castel Gandolfo, although they had bought it lawfully from the Irish College, and, to please Cardinal York, he deprived them of their college and church at Frascati.¹

Cordara relates further, that however much the Jesuits were pained by all this, they accepted it patiently, in the hope of escaping their doom. But the more Clement tried to pacify the Order's enemies by insulting it, the more urgently the Bourbon envoys demanded its complete suppression.² To justify their attitude—and this was unknown to Cordara—they could always invoke the fatal promise contained in Clement's letter to Charles III., of November 30th, 1769.

The urgings and baitings of the Bourbon Courts, which had been going on now for three whole years, were to reach their climax when the sickly Azpuru was replaced by a diplomat of the first rank who, keeping his object in view with inexorable consistency, used every weakness and every concession of the Pope's to force a victory over his timid but ever-struggling opponent.³

¹ *Ibid.*, 139 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 140.

³ DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 446.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS—THE ORIGIN AND THE ISSUE OF THE BRIEF 'DOMINUS AC REDEMPTOR', OF JULY 21ST, 1773.

(1)

THE much-coveted post of ambassador to the Holy See¹ was entrusted on March 24th, 1772, to one of Spain's leading advocates and keenest supporters of the royal prerogatives, José Moñino, fiscal to the law-court of Castile.² Charles III. and Grimaldi had agreed on the selection of this man in the

¹ High hopes of obtaining the post had been held especially by Roda's ambitious spy, the Caballero de Azara, who had already been intriguing with Tanucci against Azpuru and Bernis with the object of becoming the ambassador in Rome himself. (v. THEINER, *Hist.*, I., 544 *seq.*). Consequently Lavaña's appointment was a "colpo inaspettato e sensibile" for him (*Vincenti to Pallavicini, from Madrid, January 28, 1772, Nunziat. di Spagna, 268 A, Papal Secret Archives). Pallavicini was "contentissimo" with Azara's failure, Bernis and Orsini were satisfied with Lavaña for other reasons. *Centomani to Tanucci, March 11, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1220. Cf. also Vincenti's report of February 25, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 201. Vincenti *reported Lavaña's death to Pallavicini on March 10, 1772 (referring to Lavaña as "creatura di Grimaldi"), and mentioned as likely candidates for the post in Rome Carvellos who, however, was "notato con carbone negro per spacciato Gesuita", and Fuentes (Nunziat. di Spagna, *loc. cit.*). Aiguillon *wrote from Versailles to Ossun on March 10, 1772, that henceforward the French and Portuguese representatives would bear the title of "ambasciatori" (Archives of Simancas, Estado 4582).

² Moñino, b. 1738, d. 1819, lived to see the restoration of the Jesuit Order; v. COXE, *Hist. d'Espagne*, V., 153; MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, *Heterodoxos*, III., 159; NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 376; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 39 *seqq.*, where further special literature is mentioned.

greatest secrecy ; on the day of its publication ¹ it came as a surprise to the whole world.² It greatly displeased the Count of Aranda and the king's confessor, the Franciscan Osma, who feared, not without cause, a diminution of their influence, which had hitherto been very great.³ It also caused much grief to the Auditor of the Madrid nunciature, who painted a most sinister picture of the new ambassador in his report to the Cardinal Secretary of State on March 24th, 1772 ; in his opinion the appointment was bound to appear to the world as a declaration of war. " I know the man," he wrote, " and the spirit that animates him. I know how averse he is to Rome, and that with his suave, courteous, and temperate behaviour he gives the appearance of being deeply religious, although his attitude towards Rome, the Papal authority, and clerical jurisdiction is one of hostility." In support of this statement the nuncio referred to a number of Moñino's considered opinions, which show that he had been exceedingly crafty, clever, a past master in the art of deception, and outstandingly active in working for the destruction of the Jesuits ; at the same time, it could not be said with certainty whether he was actuated by principle, or animosity, or self-interest.⁴ That the chief object of Moñino's mission was the suppression of the Jesuit Order, the Auditor learnt from Grimaldi himself.⁵ It was also stated by Charles III. when writing to Tanucci.⁶

Moñino's instruction, dated May 5th, 1772, and issued at Aranjuez, was drawn up by Grimaldi, who had lost all trust in

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, from El Pardo, March 24, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² *Vincenti, writing from Madrid to Pallavicini on March 17, 1772, said of the candidates for the post in Rome : " Ceballo sarà ripudiato per la consaputa ragione, Squillace anche, non si parla più di Moñino." (Nunziat. di Spagna, 268, *loc. cit.*).

³ *Vincenti to Pallavicini, March 24, 1772 (Roda also was dissatisfied). On March 31 he *wrote that Moñino was hated by his colleagues (*ibid.*).

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 209.

⁵ *Vincenti to Pallavicini, March 24, 1772, *loc. cit.*

⁶ PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 40.

Clement XIV.'s sincerity.¹ Moñino was instructed to press on with four demands: (1) The suppression of the Jesuit Order, (2) the conclusion of the process of Palafox's beatification, (3) the final regulation of the Madrid nunciature, (4) the restriction of the right of asylum. The first point was the most difficult one, said the instruction, but in the king's eyes the most important. In this connexion the ambassador was to act in concert with the other Bourbon envoys.² This last item was added although even according to his own admission Grimaldi distrusted both Bernis and Orsini, as being clerics.³

Moñino's appointment filled all the enemies of the Jesuits with hope, for he had the reputation of being the most determined opponent the Society of Jesus had in Spain.⁴ Orsini's comment was that this diplomat might well succeed in taking the fortress that had been besieged for three years in vain.⁵ Tanucci's agent, Centomani, wrote that even if Clement XIV. received the new representative of Spain with greater craftiness than ever he would not succeed in diverting this man from the right path.⁶ It was Moñino's task to win the victory, which, however, in view of the Pope's extremely

¹ On April 28, 1772, Grimaldi *wrote to Fuentes that in spite of his numerous promises the Pope did not really want the suppression; the Palafox process was merely a blind; after that was finished with, the assent of all the princes would be asked for and then it would be merely a question of a reform and the diminution of the Jesuits' privileges. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² " *Instrucción para Don Joseph Moñino," given at Aranjuez, May 5, 1772, *ibid.*

³ On the first page of the *draft of Moñino's instruction (Archives of Simancas, Estado 5108) there is an observation which throws suspicion on Bernis' and Orsini's loyalty to their princes by reason of their being clerics.

⁴ Aiguillon in MASSON, 200.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, April 14, 1772, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1479.

⁶ " *Non mai lo potrà fare prevaricare ne pure intepidire come con altri è seguito." Centomani to Tanucci, May 5, 1772, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1220.

timorous nature, could be obtained only by vigorous language.¹ The Queen of Portugal wrote to Charles III. that King Joseph I. had accorded Moñino the highest praise and had sent Almada formal instructions to support him.² Similar instructions were sent to Bernis by the Duc d'Aiguillon, Louis XV. having completely relinquished the conduct of the Jesuit question to the King of Spain.³

In Rome, Moñino's arrival, naturally enough, was awaited with anxiety, it being very doubtful if this hard-headed jurist, who, as a layman, had no favours to seek from Clement XIV., would allow himself to be put off as long as his predecessor Azpuru had been.⁴ Bernis, who in his latest reports had spared neither Azpuru nor the Spanish Cabinet,⁵ was equally perturbed. The Pope himself was unable to conceal his disquiet; he is said to have ejaculated to the Portuguese envoy Almada, "May God forgive the Catholic king for sending Moñino!"⁶ Not only Clement, who up till now had retained control of the Jesuit situation,⁷ but the whole of Rome felt

¹ " *Sicuramente si stima da tutti che ad un tal passo (suppression of the Order) non sarà mai per venirvi se son forzato e condotto da un giusto timore." Centomani to Tanucci, May 19, 1772, *ibid.* **Id.* on May 26, 1772: It was thought that the Pope "per natura timidissimo" would not have the "coraggio di resistere quando con efficacia gli venga parlato risolutamente". *Ibid.*

² *Letter of April 20, 1772, *loc. cit.*, Estado 7297.

³ MASSON, 203. Cf. *Bernis to Azpuru, March 31, and June 2, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, June 2, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1220; *Orsini to Tanucci, June 2 and 9, 1772, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1480.

⁵ MASSON, 202 *seq.*

⁶ Bernis' reports in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 211, 219, and Moñino's in DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 446. " *Il n'a été question dans l'audience d'hier au soir que de la prochaine arrivée du nouveau ministre de S.M. Cath." and of the Queen of Naples. Bernis to Azpuru, June 16, 1772, *loc. cit.*

⁷ Bernis' report of January 1, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 200. With reference to Azpuru's apoplectic stroke the Augustinian General Vasquez had *written on January 25, 1770, that the

that the decisive moment was approaching.¹ The excitement that gripped everyone found expression in numerous written articles, satires, and illustrated broadsheets. In the words of a contemporary, it rained such productions.² Most of them were concerned with the Palafox process, which was still being promoted by the Pope.³ A publication which came to Rome from France and which attacked Palafox's loyalty as a subject was suppressed by order of the Pope, who had it refuted by the learned Dominican Mamachi.⁴

Pope was frightened of losing this envoy, as he helped him to put up a resistance. If Azpuru died, Vasquez hoped that a different, vigorous, non-clerical envoy would be sent in his place. (Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez, I.). Vasquez repeated this warning on April 18, 1771, for he held Azpuru responsible for the perpetual delay. If only Roda could come to Rome for a month or two! For "no será cosa estraña, que S.M. aun teniendo aqui Su Ministro, se sirva de V.E. en un negocio de tanta importancia, que seria menos glorioso sujetar toda la Europa a su dominio, que extirpar una Sociedad que emposesada de todo el Mundo Catolico, se ha hecho ley el atentar contra lo mas sagrado que hay en cielo y tierra" (*ibid.*, Vasquez II.).

¹ " *Qui niente si fa, aspettiamo Moñino." Orsini to Pignatelli, June 17, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1053.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, June 26, 1772, *ibid.*

³ *Orsini to Azpuru, January 8 and 28, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Lettres de Philarète sur l'orthodoxie de Palafox*, Rome, 1772-3. For the *Epître en réponse à un ami sur l'esprit de sédition de Palafox*, v. *Orsini to Tanucci, April 14, 1772, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1479, also **id.* to Igareda, April 14, 1772, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1052, according to which Orsini was immediately informing Grimaldi also of this step, and **id.* to V. Macedonio on April 16, 1772, *ibid.* Centomani also *reported to Tanucci on April 14, 1772, on the "due foglietti stampati credesi nella privata stamperia del Collegio Romano contro il decreto ultimo (of September) del papa nella causa Palafox—è una orrenda satira—vi si attacca anche il Passionei", *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1220. Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, April 21, 1772, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1479. On April 16, 1773, Azpuru *sent Grimaldi, as evidence of the way in which Palafox's enemies went to work, two writings which the

An enormous stir was caused by an engraving of the Last Judgment, with Charles III. among the damned, which found its way everywhere, even into Spain. Azara condemned it with alacrity, thinking that this would be an excellent means of restoring his diminished reputation in Madrid.¹ Clement XIV. also lost no time in taking steps to stop the picture being circulated in Rome. All concerned in its distribution were arrested, the shop owned by the Tyrolese bookseller who had offered the picture for sale was closed, and the Maestro del Sacro Palazzo was severely reprimanded for his lack of vigilance.² Bontempi saw to it that these measures were

members of the Congregation of Rites had had sent to them from Milan. They were (1) " Note di falsità che dimostrano apocrifo un cotal decreto spacciato come pontificio in certa carta spagnola, la quale dicesi stampata ' Madrid en la imprenta de Josef Doblado ' senza data ne anno ne mese tradotto dal francese in italiano " ; (2) seventeen theses published in Lucca. Dedicated " all' honore della immacolata Sede Cattolica ", they brought the most serious charges against Palafox, of having favoured Jansenism (which the author tried to prove by numerous examples), for which reason the Jansenists had glorified him after his death and had defended him in their writings until 1769. (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.) Orsini, *writing to Tanucci on December 18, 1772, before the appearance of Mamachi's three small volumes defending Palafox's doctrine, described them as " capo d'opera ". (State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1480.) Centomani *announced the forthcoming appearance of this work on December 29, 1772 (*ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1221). Bontempi *wrote to Roda on April 23, 1772, that the Pope had caused the suppression in Venice of a work against Palafox. (Archives of Simancas, Estado 688.)

¹ *Azara to Grimaldi, April 23, 1772, *ibid.*, Estado 5068.

² Along with THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 205 *seq.*, see *Azara to Grimaldi, April 23, 1772, *ibid.*, and *Orsini to Grimaldi on the same day, *ibid.*, Estado 5038. Bernis *wrote to Azpuru on April 28, 1772: " . . . Sa Sainteté s'est étendue ensuite davantage sur la punition décernée contre le distributeur d'une estampe abominable qui a été répandue à Rome, pendant quelques jours, et qu'on croit avoir été gravée dans la province du Bassan de l'Etat de Venise. Sa Sainteté gémit profondément des excès auxquels le fanatisme

reported to Madrid.¹ Needless to say, the Jesuits were immediately accused of being the originators of the satire, which they denied.² Even so vehement an enemy as Centomani pitied the poor Jesuits, those who had been expelled from Spain and Naples being threatened with the loss of their pensions.³

Grimaldi, with undue haste, denounced the Jesuits as being the undoubted authors of the satire, which made the suppression of the Order more necessary than ever.⁴ As the result of investigations made by order of the Pope, it appeared that the engraving had been made by a speculative bookseller of the name of Remondini at Bassano in Venetian territory and that it was a reproduction of one which had appeared as early as 1606, with the crest of Cardinal Arrigoni, and again in Paris in 1765, when the Cardinal's crest was replaced by that of the

se porte dans ces tems malheureux ; elle met toute sa confiance en Dieu, dans la Religion et dans l'amitié des Augustes Monarques de la Maison de France " (*ibid.*). *Igareda to Grimaldi, April 30, 1772 (arrest of the distributor), *ibid.*

¹ *Bontempi to Roda, April 23, 1772, *ibid.*, Estado 688.

² *Centomani to Tanucci, April 28, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1220.

³ *Centomani to Tanucci, May 5, 1772, *ibid.*

⁴ " *Los autores de esta sacrilega satira sin duda son los Jesuitas " (Grimaldi to Muzquiz, May 16, 1772, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5068). Similarly, *Grimaldi to Arriaga on May 11, 1772: " Se ha vendido publicamente y esparcido en Roma la estampa de que incluyo un exemplar ; y por la carta adjunta de Don Nicolas de Azara (que me devolverá V.S. y lo que le ha escrito el Sr D^a Manuel de Roda) se enterará de lo que ha pasado con motivo de su publicacion. No pudiendo dudarse que es obra de los Jesuitas quiere S. M. que en llegando a Roma, dé a entender al Papa y sus Ministros, que S. M. ha recibido una injuria muy grave con esta sacrilega satira, la cual manifiesta el odio que tienen sus autores a su sagrada persona, valiendose V. S. de este acontecimiento como de una nueva razon de la urgente necesidad en que nos hallamos de que S. B^d cumpla sin mas dilaciones lo que tiene ofrecido, y de que S. M. lo solicite por todos medios hasta lograrlo." In Grimaldi's *letter to Azara of May 12, 1772, praising

Spanish crown.¹ Further steps were taken by Venice as well as by the Pope, principally for the purpose of discovering the real author and of making every possible satisfaction to the Spanish Government.² Although from first to last nothing

him for his ardent condemnation of the engraving, he calls it a "sacrilego insulto de los Jesuitas", who are thus displaying "toda la maldad de que son capaces" (*ibid.*). Roda, too, *writing on May 11, 1772, to thank Bontempi for what he had done in the matter of the engraving, said that the hatred thus shown by the Spanish Jesuits for Charles III. demonstrated the necessity for their suppression. (Archives of Simancas, Estado 688.) Vincenti also *reported to Pallavicini on May 9, 1772, that Grimaldi ascribed the authorship of the engraving to the Jesuits (Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Spagna 268 A). On June 2 and 16, 1772, Vincenti *reported that this view still persisted (*ibid.*), although Isidro Martin had *reported from Venice on May 9, 1772, that it was clear that the name of the originator was Remondini (*loc. cit.*, Estado 5068).

¹*Azara to Grimaldi, April 20, 1772: "En el negocio de la satira que remiti á V. E. par el Correo pasado he sabido que el Papa haciendo continuar el proceso, ha averiguado haver sido impresa aquella infame estampa en Basano en la imprenta de un tal Remondini, noble Veneto; por lo cual piensa el Papa usar algun oficio de quexa con la Republica para vendar la injuria hecha à nuestro Amo. Yo que he observado que se ponía mucho ahinco en averiguar los vendedores y estampadores de esta obra de tinieblas, he insinuado que me parecia mas necesario buscar quien es el autor o autores de ella, porque esto es lo principal que importa saber, conocer y castigar; y me parece la cosa tan clara que supongo se hará assi . . ." (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.) The step taken by the Pope through the nuncio and the Venetian envoy, to enable Venice to clear the matter up, was *reported by Isidro Martin to Grimaldi from Venice on May 9, 1772, *loc. cit.*, Estado 5068. *Ibid.* *Igareda to Grimaldi on June 4, 1772, also *numerous relative documents. *Orsini to Tanucci on June 23, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1³⁰⁸/₀₅₃.

²*Mgr. Onorati to Isidro Martin, May 7, 1772 (efforts were being made to discover the author), Archives of Simancas. *Igareda to Grimaldi, May 21, 1772 (the nuncio and the Venetian envoys in Rome and Madrid have caused the Senate to take

prejudicial to the Jesuits came to light, their enemies persisted in maintaining that the satire could only have originated with them.¹

This was followed shortly afterwards by another publication which greatly displeased the Spanish Government. This was a written work, entitled "The truth, revealed to our lord the king by Fra Francisco de Alba", in which the Gallican, Jansenist, and anti-Jesuit innovations in Spain were sharply attacked. Naturally this too was suppressed by the Spanish Government,² but it was as helpless as the Pope to prevent the continuance of satirical publications in Rome. One of the most acrid manifestations of the time was a broadsheet circulated in Rome in which the Jesuit General was shown with his hands bound, facing the Pope, with the Bourbons on his left and the Emperor and the Kings of Sardinia and Prussia on his right. Beneath the portrait of the Pope was the legend, "What shall I do with this man?" "Crucify him, crucify him!" reply the Bourbons. "What evil hath he done?" asks Clement XIV. "I find no cause of death in him," declares the King of Sardinia, and the Emperor protests, "I am

vigorous steps), *ibid.* The *resolution of the Pregadi, dated May 29 (*ibid.*, Estado 5782) reads as follows: "Ha deliberato il Senato che si dichiari innocente il Remondini, e che per giustificazione della Repubblica verso la corte di Spagna sia formata una circolare, la quale dichiari le buone ragioni che ha avute il Governo per supporlo innocente nelle accuse addossategli, tra le quali principalmente quella: Che la stampa gira Roma sin' da otto anni a questa parte, senza che questa abbia spiacciuto o sia stata rilevata dalla Santa Sede." On July 9, 1772, Grimaldi *wrote to Azpuru that he trusted that Venice would do what was necessary to punish those who were guilty in the affair. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

¹ *Tanucci to Grimaldi, June 28, 1772, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6105. *Ibid.* 688, a severe *edict of the Spanish Inquisition of October 13, 1772, against "estampas satiricas alusivas a las providencias tomadas con los regulares expulsos".

² *Vincenti to Pallavicini, June 16, 1772, Nunziat. di Spagna 268 A, Papal Secret Archives.

innocent of the blood of this just man." Into the mouth of Frederick II. of Prussia, however, are put the words, "What will you give me and I will deliver him unto you?" The concluding words of the broadsheet admirably interpreted the prevalent feeling in Rome: "They consulted together that by subtilty they might apprehend him and put him to death."¹

On Moñino's departure from the Spanish capital on May 18th, 1772,² Grimaldi wrote to Tanucci that he had no extravagant hopes of success, as Rome often had recourse to extraordinary methods of seduction.³

Moñino reached Rome on July 4th, when the Eternal City was sweltering in the summer heat. His advent was expected to clear the situation, for unlike Bernis and Orsini, he was not the man to be satisfied with the fine assurances that had been

¹ MASSON, 203. In his *reports to Tanucci of June 16, 19, and 23, 1772, Centomani speaks of other satires against the Pope, not only on account of his attitude in the Jesuit question but also because of the suppression of the Congregation of S. Rufo, which Clement XIV. was thought to have ascribed to the Jesuits. He accordingly caused investigations to be made through Cardinal York in Monte Porcio, where the Jesuits were alleged to have printed the writings, but nothing compromising was found (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1220). Igareda *reported to Azpuru on June 25, 1772: ". . . Remito a V. E. los acostumbrados Chracas y manuscritos de los demas avisos diarios de esta Capital, que acompañan otros dos que han salido con titulo de testamento y codicilio de Jesuitas. No he podido lograr el folio de las observaciones contra el Breve del Papa relativo a la supresion de la Orden de Sⁿ Rufo y su incorporacion a la Militar de Sⁿ Lazaro, ni tampoco la carta del Prelado que escribe a un amigo de Turin, porque algunos cardenales y otros que las han rasgado." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² Aiguillon to Bernis, in MASSON, 203. When in Barcelona Moñino received Roda's letters of May 19, 1772, with the engraving of the Last Judgment. See *Monino to Roda on July 9, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, from Aranjuez, May 19, 1772, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6105.

repeated so often by Clement XIV.¹ The time was past for putting off Charles III. by means of such compliments as the

¹ On April 7, 1772, Bernis *wrote to Azpuru that on the previous day he had again reminded the Pope of his promises : " Sa Sté a répondu à ces nouvelles insinuations avec cordialité ; elle paroît véritablement occupée de préparer les moyens de satisfaire à ce qu'elle a promis." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, April 28, 1772 : " Non dubiti della soppressione dei Gesuiti quantunque ritardata." (State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1479.) On May 5, 1772, Bernis *wrote to Azpuru : " Le pape dans l'audience de hier au soir n'a parlé qu'indirectement des Jésuites, mais il a paru au card. de Bernis plus serein et plus satisfait qu'à l'ordinaire ; il a même laissé échapper cette parole : J'espère qu'avec l'aide de Dieu tout ira bien. Il n'a pas été possible au dit cardinal de faire expliquer d'avantage Sa Sté, laquelle paroît toujours de plus en plus dans le dessein de mériter l'amitié et la confiance des trois couronnes." On May 12, 1772, Bernis *wrote : " Le Pape dans l'audience de hier au soir n'a dit rien de particulier ni de remarquable au card. de Bernis sur l'affaire des Jésuites ; il a parlé en général de l'intérêt que les princes catholiques ont de proscrire les livres impies et dangereux qui attaquent ouvertement les fondemens de notre religion. Les sentimens de Sa Sté envers les trois couronnes sont toujours les mêmes ; elle se plaît à en démontrer la vivacité et la sincérité." *On May 19 : " La conversation a roulé hier au soir à l'audience du Pape pendant assez longtemps sur les Jésuites. Sa Sté s'est montrée toujours dans les mêmes sentimens à leur égard et le card. de Bernis n'a pas manqué de lui rappeler que l'union de Sa M^{te} Très Chrétienne avec leurs Majestés Catholique et Sicilienne sur le point de la suppression comme sur tous les autres seroit inaltérable. Le S. Père n'en a jamais douté et le card. de Bernis a toujours été autorisé à convaincre le pape de cette vérité." *On May 26, 1772 : " Le Pape dans l'audience d'hier au soir n'est entré dans aucun détail sur l'affaire des Jésuites ; il s'est entretenu seulement de la prochaine arrivée de Don Joseph Moñino nouveau ministre de Sa M^{te} Cath. Il est plus vraisemblable que jusqu'à cette époque Sa Sté ne s'ouvrira qu'imparfaitement sur l'objet de la suppression étant bien informée que la commission du card. de Bernis est d'exécuter les ordres de Sa M^{te} Cath. qui lui seront communiqués sur cette

Pope's agreeing to be godfather to the child expected by the Princess of Asturias.¹ The idea that England's influence might save the Order also faded out.² A sign of the importance attributed to the new ambassador was that, contrary to the usual ceremonial, Cardinals Orsini and Bernis visited him first, on the day following his arrival.³ On July 7th, instructed by the Pope, the Franciscan Bontempi presented himself to Moñino to explain that the audience which the Pope would normally have granted him would have to be postponed. After Bontempi had made the most fine-sounding assurances about the Pope's disposition and had laid stress on his desire for peace, Moñino replied in his dry manner that that depended entirely on His Holiness.⁴

négociation et de seconder efficacement les démarches." *On June 23, 1772: At yesterday's audience we spoke about the engraving of the Last Judgment. "Il n'a été question des Jésuites que par occasion." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

¹ MASSON, 204. Regarding the medal with the circumscription "Deus nova foedera iunxit" Centomani *reported to Tanucci on July 8, 1772, that it had been developed into an elegiac couplet: "Cum Rege Hispano Clemens nova foedera iunxit, Cum Loyolitis foedera prisca tenet." (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1221.) In a *letter to the Spanish king of August 1, 1772, Clement XIV. expressed his joy at being the godfather to the child expected by the Princess of Asturias. State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1479. Cf. above, p. 194.

² At the French Court, as reported by Giraud, Caprara's mission to London was ascribed to the Pope's intention of inducing England to favour the Jesuits. See THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 174.

³ *Ibid.*, 212 seq. On the same day, July 5, Moñino visited Pallavicini and saw Almada. *Centomani to Tanucci, July 7, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1221.

⁴ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 8, 1772. Moñino's *original reports in the Archives of Simancas, Estado 5039 seqq., have been used and reproduced in part by ST. PRIEST (1846, App. n. VI.), LAFUENTE (*Hist.*, XIV., 249), FERRER DEL RIO (II., 359 seqq.), DANVILA Y COLLADO (III., 462 seqq.), DUHR (*Aufhebung*, 446 seqq.), PACHECO Y DE LEYVA (41 seqq.). THEINER (*loc. cit.*, II., 215 seqq.) thinks

It was impossible for Moñino to speak to his predecessor, Azpuru, as the latter died a tragic death on July 7th, 1772.¹ But he had a long talk with Bernis, which gave him, however, very little satisfaction, though the Cardinal was by no means remiss either in showing the new ambassador every attention or in justifying his own past conduct. When Moñino asked him what the Pope really wanted and whether he was hesitating from weakness or had changed his mind, Bernis could give but a meaningless reply. Moñino gave him to understand with the utmost distinctness that Charles III. would never alter his opinion of the Jesuits, and in the general interest the business must now be finished with at last. For three years they had been following the wrong course in aiming at the complete destruction of the Order while combining it with other things.

that little faith is to be placed in Moñino's genuine reports, as with his pride he would certainly magnify things, and it was in his interest from the first to give his Court a favourable impression of what he had achieved. For this reason THEINER relied for the most part on Bernis' reports, which agreed with Moñino's in essentials and did not bear the stamp of Spanish pride and braggadocio. DUHR (*Aufhebung*, 447) also touches on the question whether everything that Moñino reported as having been said by the Pope was true, and remarks appropriately: "Moñino's despatches, which describe the course of the audiences in an almost dramatic fashion, give an impression of truth, though we must remember that their tone was probably influenced by the thoughts and feelings of the ambassador and his employers. On the other hand, it would be rash to take every saying of the Pope's as reported by Moñino as unconditionally guaranteed and certain, on the sole testimony of this diplomat."

¹ Since March 26, 1772, most, and since April 30 all, the *reports had been prepared by Igareda. On May 21, 1772, he *described Azpuru's condition as hopeless; *on July 6 Azpuru received the Last Sacraments; *on July 7 he died in agony, his legs, which had been poulticed with spirits of wine, having caught fire. Moñino saw to it that he had a magnificent funeral in S. Mario in Monserrato. Cf. besides Igareda's *report of July 9, 1772 (*loc. cit.*), Centomani's *letters to Tanucci of July 7 and 10, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1221.

The *Motu proprio* and the Palafox process were therefore to be put on one side, the Pope was not to be allowed any further evasion, and they were to march straight towards their goal.¹

With this plan the Augustinian General Vasquez, with whom Moñino had a long talk soon after his arrival, was in complete agreement. To Vasquez's suggestion that the Pope be handled with gentleness and kindness, like a wax model, and be forced to drink the bitter chalice Moñino replied that he entirely agreed. Nevertheless the General went on urging the ambassador to do his utmost to free the Church with the greatest energy from the pest which had been weakening it for two centuries.²

From the start Moñino kept the whole business so much in his own hands that he did not apprise Bernis or Orsini of everything. On July 12th he finally obtained his first audience, which had been postponed until then owing to the Pope's having a cold. Clement used all his skill to win over the ambassador. Leaving the main point untouched, he professed his love for Charles III. and enlarged on his aversion to the Jesuits. This encouraged Moñino to say outright that the suppression of the Jesuit Order was not difficult, and that it would benefit the Church and content the Catholic princes.

¹ Bernis' report of July 8, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 216 seq., and *Moñino's to Grimaldi of June 9, 1772, Archives of Simancas. Cf. MASSON, 205 seq.

² *Vasquez to Roda, July 9, 1772: Moñino's arrival on the 4th "a las nueve y media de la noche". Visit to Vasquez and practical information. The result of the "Arrenguilla" was: "Pero tras la suavidad y dulzura es necesario hacerle ver al Papa como en bosquejo, y a lo lexos el caliz de amargura que se le hará probar infaliblemente." And Moñino replied, "Esto mismo estaba yo actualmente pensando." Vasquez insisted that everything be done with the greatest energy "para purgar la Iglesia de la peste que por dos siglos la tiene enferma". Both were in the fullest possible agreement as to the undertaking that had been planned . . . Moñino knew Zelada as "hombre el mas pernicioso al bien de España . . ." Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez, II.

The Pope held that the matter required time, secrecy, and trust. "My king," replied Moñino, "is a very pious prince. He honours the Pope and loves Your Holiness personally, but after carefully considering the matter in question he is firmly resolved to carry it out. He is a man of honour and an enemy of any kind of deception; if mistrust were to creep into his heart, all would be lost." Moñino also hinted that a continued refusal on the part of His Holiness might result in the suppression of *all* the Orders in Spain.

In spite of this unmistakable language Clement, throughout this conversation, which lasted an hour and a half, avoided making any definite statement that he would suppress the Jesuit Order, adhering to his general request for time. Moñino asked for an audience on a fixed day every week, to avoid the attention that would be aroused by special audiences. Clement promised to meet this request, but regretted that for the present he was unable to do so owing to the necessity of taking a course of Turkish baths to cure a herpetic rash. To convince the insistent ambassador of the truth of this statement he bared his arm and showed it to him.¹

The time which the Pope had thus gained once more—his cure, during which all audiences were cancelled, being stretched over three weeks²—was not left unused by Moñino. He saw clearly that the chief cause of the delay which had occurred hitherto was the weakness and the disunity of the envoys.³ He therefore decided to remedy this trouble first. Knowing that Bernis' prime concern was to retain his post as ambassador, he pointed out to him that this depended on his attitude

¹ Moñino to Grimaldi, July 15, 1772, in ST. PRIEST, 317, and Bernis' report of the same day, in MASSON, 206; *cf.* DANVILA Y COLLADO, 464. THEINER (*Hist.*, II., 219) errs in dating the audience July 13, 1772.

² *Gentile to Colloredo, August 26, 1772. The treatment, remarks Gentile, was undergone "per curare la sua salsedine, che molto le molesta". (State Archives, Vienna.)

³ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 30, 1772, Archives of Simancas, *loc. cit.*

towards the Jesuit question.¹ And in fact the Cardinal changed his attitude before any further pressure was put upon him by Madrid. The extent to which he did this is seen in the report he sent Aiguillon on July 21st. "I wish very much," he wrote, "that for his own honour and probably also for his peace of mind in the future that the Pope would alter his procedure regarding the Jesuits. The oracular attitude has its uses, but after three years' delay one must speak openly, and that is the only way for the Pope to escape with honour from this embarrassment. For a long time it has been possible to believe that the Holy Father had an understanding with the Court of Spain, which would have explained his mysterious behaviour, but to-day it is quite clear that the King of Spain contained himself in patience only out of respect for the Head of the Church and preferred to let suspicion fall on his Ministers and those negotiating the matter rather than doubt the honesty of the Pope. As he is keeping to his resolution to make His Holiness fulfill his promise, the Pope will find himself in a greater embarrassment than ever if he goes on procrastinating. Moñino will not agree to be satisfied so easily as the Archbishop of Valencia (Azpuru)." "To get to the root of the matter, Moñino said to me, the Pope's former promises were either sincere or equivocal. If he gave his word sincerely, for three years he has failed to keep it; but if he wanted to gain time, he has been merely playing with the King of Spain and the other rulers of the House of Bourbon. Whereas formerly it was only a question of the Jesuits, it is now a question of the Pope, who has given His Catholic Majesty a promise in writing." "It is a matter of a very serious nature for the Pope," commented Bernis, "if Spain is determined to view it in this light, especially if, as Moñino made me realize, the settlement of all the other matters which are so important for

¹ MASSON, 206 *seq.* On August 11, 1772, Grimaldi *wrote to Moñino that the king was very pleased with Bernis, and Fuentes would see that Bernis was made to realize "que del buen exito del negocio de la extincion depende su permanencia en esta corte". Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

the Holy See are to depend on the outcome of the Jesuit question." ¹

The seriousness of the situation was realized in Versailles too. Bernis was repeatedly instructed that the part he had to play was to be an active one only when Moñino thought fit, as the matter must remain under the sole direction of the Spanish king.² Another success for Moñino was that he restored the good relations between Bernis and Almada that had been disturbed.³

Having to wait some time for his second audience, owing to the extension of the Pope's cure, Moñino used the opportunity to explore the ground. He carefully examined the previous course of the negotiations, the Pope's character, and the personalities with whom he would have to deal in the pursuit of his aims. From the Secretary of the Memorials, Macedonio, he learnt how easily the Pope made promises and how prone he was to delay their execution. The same source supplied him with particulars about the poor capabilities of Orsini and Almada.⁴ For his purposes, therefore, Bernis was still the chief personality. Although he still distrusted him he revealed much of his plans to him. He intended, he said, to send the Pope a memorandum which would compel him at last to come to a decision on the Jesuit question; he would represent to him that any further delay would be regarded as perfidy and would be bound to create the danger of an open breach between Madrid and Rome. Spain could not rest content with a reform of the Order; it insisted on its complete suppression. If the Pope continued to evade the obligations he had entered into he was running a very grave risk.⁵

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 221 *seq.*

² MASSON, 207; THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 223 *seq.*

³ PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 44.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁵ He was confirmed in this by Grimaldi; *v.* his *letter of July 7, 1772, in which Bernis was judged very unfavourably: he had used every guile to avoid the suppression or at least to delay it; he thought only of his personal interests; but now he would receive definite instructions. Archives of Simancas, Estado 5108.

The longer Moñino's audience was postponed the more impatient he became. The Pope's illness was the subject of the most diverse rumours. Many surmised that it was merely an excuse for withdrawing himself from public affairs and doubted that he was really ill. This was not correct. It was known on good authority that both his illness and his excessive nervousness, which made him frightened of every fly he saw, were reducing him to a state of melancholy. The Augustinian General Vasquez and Cardinal Marefoschi, both enemies of the Jesuits, declared that Clement XIV.'s state of health was such that he would either go out of his mind or would soon die.¹ Moñino had little sympathy with the invalid. He wrote to Grimaldi that he was more convinced every day that the Pope needed to be driven forward with firmness and a certain vehemence, coupled sometimes with courteousness.² Nor was he impressed by Clement's solemn announcement to him on August 20th that he would shortly bless the consecrated swaddling-clothes for the new-born Spanish prince.³

What was to prove of the greatest importance was that Moñino succeeded first in intimidating the Pope's most influential confidant, the Franciscan Bontempi, then in corrupting him with promises. Finally Bontempi was ready to render any service to the ambassador, making only one condition: the preservation of the utmost secrecy.⁴

It was thanks to him that Moñino secured his second audience with the Pope on August 23rd. Six whole weeks had passed since his first one. This time the Pope was the first to broach the great question by revealing to Moñino a plan which without actually suppressing the Order would inevitably bring it to an end. As Innocent XIII. had planned in his day, the Jesuits were to be forbidden to admit novices, hear confessions, or preach; the General's powers were to be

¹ *Vasquez to Roda, August 20, 1772, *loc. cit.*

² Letter of August 20, 1772, in DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 447.

³ *Clement XIV. to Moñino, August 20, 1772, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5039.

⁴ Bernis' report of August 6, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 232, and Moñino's of August 20, 1772, in MASSON, 207 *seq.*

transferred to the Provincials. Clement XIV. was not allowed to develop this idea, as Moñino rejected any such palliative, insisting that the evil must be removed by the roots. To the Pope's misgivings of the great difficulties that would arise in the countries where the Order still existed, Moñino remained deaf.¹ As in the same audience he had put forward the restriction of the right of asylum in Spain, the Pope communicated to him the draft of the Brief on this subject at a third audience on August 30th. To the suppression of the Jesuits Clement renewed his former objections, namely that the Jesuits were still active in a large part of Germany, in Bohemia, Tuscany, Venice, Modena, and even in the Papal States. Moñino, who had received instructions to hasten a decision and who had been informed by Macedonio of the Pope's vacillating character, countered this by saying that his misgivings existed more in his imagination than in reality. That His Holiness might inform himself on this point he would like, he said, to submit to him a plan by which, while preserving his honour, he could put an end to the embarrassing situation in which he found himself with regard to the Bourbons. "So saying," reported Moñino to Madrid, "I drew forth a paper on which were written my intentions and views and I was about to read it when the Holy Father gently signed to me to desist. I put my paper away again but showed by my demeanour my displeasure with this refusal. The Pope then said that he intended to undertake something which the other princes would be unable to oppose and with which His Majesty would be highly satisfied, but it would take time. My reply was that such a delay would expose him to many dangers and that only the complete suppression of the Jesuit Order would satisfy the king. I had to tell him clearly that if the delay was at all long a big fire might spring up, bigger than one thought—I meant the suppression of all the Orders.

¹ Bernis' report of August 23, 1772, and Moñino's of August 27, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 234 *seq.*, MASSON, 208 (here the audience is wrongly dated the 28th); DANVILA Y COLLADO, 417 *seq.*; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 49.

When the Pope said that he would throw some water on the fire I rejoined that unfortunately the water was four hundred hours away from the fire and therefore could not be strong enough to quench it, and who knew what might happen in the meantime? The Pope objected that if great care was not taken with the quenching the Jesuits would be all the more terrible, being driven to desperation. But if they were allowed to hover between fear and hope, they would keep quiet. 'No, most Holy Father,' I replied, 'the pain from a diseased tooth can only be removed by pulling it out by the roots. I ask Your Holiness in Christ's name to believe me and to look on me as a man who is filled through and through with the love of peace.' " But the Pope was not to be moved from his refusal to listen to Moñino's scheme yet awhile.¹

True to his principle that what could not be got by kindness must be taken by force, Moñino, not content with threatening the Pope himself, used Bernis also to intimidate the unhappy Clement still more until he promised to consider the acceptance of Moñino's plan.² This "miracle" having been worked,³ Moñino urged on his victim still further. At another audience, lasting an hour and a half, on September 6th, he made an emphatic reference to the stringent demands contained in his instructions, to the dangers of any long delay, and to the decisive measures which would be taken by the Courts if the Pope broke his word. First and foremost, Bernis had said, the Pope must be stripped of his false hopes and made to realize the dangers that threatened.⁴ Noticing the agitation caused by his threats, Moñino did not fail to point out that the suppression of the Jesuits was in the interest of the peace of the whole Church, the authority of the Holy See, good

¹ Moñino's report of September 3, 1772; v. FERRER, II., 387 seq.; ST. PRIEST, 325 seq.; DANVILA Y COLLADO, 473.

² MASSON, 209; DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 447; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 51.

³ Moñino to Grimaldi, September 3, 1772, v. DANVILA Y COLLADO, 474.

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 243.

relations with the Catholic States, and the tranquillity and the reputation of the Holy Father. Regarding this last point, he allowed himself to remark that as soon as the Jesuit question had been settled to the Bourbons' satisfaction they in return would pave the way for the restoration of Avignon and Benevento and the settlement of all other matters touching the Holy See. Though the Pope rejected this last observation, remarking that he did not drive bargains like a merchant, Moñino gained his main point: the Pope accepted detailed proposals for the drawing up of the Bull of suppression.¹

This document,² which had been worked out with careful regard for the Pope's apprehensions and was to form the basis of the Brief of July 21st, 1773, contained in eighteen articles the main points of the eventual Brief of suppression. According to this document it was to be explained that the suppression was the result of weighty and urgent reasons which affected the good government of the Church but which the Pope must keep within his inmost heart. The Pope was to forbid the whole clergy, including the Jesuits, to attack the suppression or its reasons or without special permission to disparage anyone in the matter, either in writing or by word of mouth, publicly or privately, under pain of major excommunication, which was reserved to the Pope alone. All princes, spiritual

¹ For the important audience of September 6, 1772, see Moñino's report of September 10, 1772, largely reproduced in FERRER, II., 391, and Bernis' of September 9, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 241 *seq.*; *cf.* PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 52 *seq.*, 100 *seq.*

² Its history, based on the original documents, is told in detail by PACHECO Y DE LEYVA (70 *seqq.*). On p. 70 he gives the "Facsimile del primer Apunte o Nota latina", though only the first page; on pp. 70-81 the "Primer borrador de la minuta razonada traducida al castellano del Apunte o Nota latina"; on pp. 82-9 the "Copia del borrador latino del Apunte o Nota para el breve de Sopresion", presented on September 6, 1772; all three pieces from the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. On pp. 90-99 is a *Spanish translation from the Archives of Simancas; on both documents Moñino had made marginal notes justifying the various points.

and temporal, were called upon to execute the Bull of suppression conscientiously. The Pope was to admonish all the faithful to remember that they were children of the one mother, the Church, and that therefore they were to love one another and were to abhor divisions and disunity, envy, enmity, and insidious persecution. The novices in the Society were to be dismissed and sent back to their families. Those who had taken simple but not yet solemn vows were to be released from every obligation and might choose another profession. Those who had taken solemn vows were also to be discharged and could either enter another Order or remain as secular priests under the obedience of the Bishops of their place of residence. Priests who did not wish to leave the houses of the Society for want of employment or a decent dwelling might remain in their houses for the time being, provided that they dressed as secular priests and obediently subjected themselves in every way to the local Bishop. Each Bishop was to authorize two or three reliable ecclesiastics in his diocese to make an exact account of the properties, revenues, and charges of all the Jesuit houses, colleges, and hospices ; they were to use the revenues partly for the good of the bishopric, partly for the maintenance of the members of the suppressed Society of Jesus, especially those who could find no employment or had remained in their Order's houses for the reasons already stated. The Jesuit houses were to be used as they thought fit, but only for religious purposes ; their previous names were to be altered and they were to be called after some saint. The new object to which these houses were to be devoted was to be decided on as far as possible with the agreement of the Government and the Pope. The Bishops could grant or refuse permission to the members of the suppressed Society to hear confessions or perform other ecclesiastical duties, but in so doing they were to exercise caution and were first to examine the Religious carefully to see if they were fit for these duties. The more competent Jesuits might be employed in instructing the young, either religious or lay, but they were not to direct the establishments.

The Jesuits who stayed on in their houses were not to be

replaced by others when they died or left the Society; the houses could thus be used for their new purpose as quickly as possible and it would be plain to all that the Society really had been suppressed. With regard to the Society's houses in Rome the execution of the aforesaid regulations was to be entrusted to a Congregation of Cardinals, which might be identical with the visitation commission of the Roman Seminary. The same Congregation might also be empowered to investigate and settle all doubtful points which might arise when the regulations were being carried out; but in all difficult matters the Holy Father was to be consulted and his permission obtained. The Congregation of Propaganda was to decide on the missions, but without departing from the regulations laid down in the Bull of suppression. The powers of the General, the Provincial, the Rectors, and of all other Superiors of the Order were to be annulled in their entirety and for ever. The princes were to be invited to support with their power the execution of this constitution of suppression. Simultaneously with the publication of this constitution it would be urgently necessary to order the General and his Assistants, the Rectors, and the Procurators General to leave Rome at once and to allot them separate destinations where they were to remain until further orders and to enjoy their complete freedom.

This plan was not communicated to Bernis, it being known that the nuncio in Paris was informed of everything. In any case the French Cardinal had no need to know the details, as his duty consisted merely in inspiring the Pope with confidence in Moñino and in convincing him that Charles III. could only be satisfied with the suppression of the Jesuit Order and that the dangers this would incur were only imagined.¹ Orsini's task was similar.² The leading rôle Moñino retained for himself; keeping in close touch with the ambitious Azara,³ he was in constant connexion not only with the two

¹ MASSON, 209.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, September 8, 1773, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1480; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 55.

³ *Vincenti to Pallavicini, September 22, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Spagna 268 A.

Cardinals but also with Almada and with Bontempi, Macedonio, Alfani, and Carafa de Colombrano, all four of whom had been bought with Spanish gold.¹

At an audience on September 9th Orsini reminded the Pope of his promise, and the Pope complained of this to Moñino when he presented himself on the 13th. On this occasion the Spanish ambassador tried to hand over to the Holy Father the records of a Provincial Council held in Mexico in October, 1771, and a message from this assembly to Charles III. ; in both cases the complete suppression of the Jesuit Order was demanded. The Council's memorial to Charles III. was a formal indictment of the Jesuits and a request for their abolition. The Pope, it was argued, had the power not only to found new Orders but also to suppress existing ones. In support, reference was made to the fate of the Templars, the Humiliati, the so-called Jesuitesses, the Barnabites and Ambrosians *ad Nemus*, the Armenian Basilians, the Canons Regular of S. Giorgio in Alga in Venice, the Jesuati, the Hieronymites of Fiesole, and two other societies. Then all the charges brought against the Jesuits by their enemies were repeated: their wealth, their ambition, their false doctrines, their commercial dealings, their attitude in the ritual question, their secretiveness, their intrigues, political and otherwise, their participation in attempted assassinations and their consequent expulsion. Hence followed the necessity for their suppression, for which so favourable an opportunity would never occur again.² The Pope refused to accept this voluminous document, though agreeing to look into it later, if necessary.

¹*Moñino to Grimaldi, September 19, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. For the pensions for Macedonio, Carafa di Trajetto, Carafa di Colombrano, and Alfani, *v.* *Orsini to Tanucci, September 11, 1772, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1480. For Spanish pensions for Cardinals and other persons, see also *Centomani to Tanucci, April 28, 1772, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1220. ² The *exposition of the Council, written from Mexico and dated October 26, 1771, was signed by four Bishops and two procurators and covers 69 pages. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., n. 9.

When Moñino opened the subject of Avignon, Clement again retorted that he was making no bargains in matters of this kind.¹

Even less satisfactory was Moñino's two-hours' audience on September 20th. The Pope complained of the measures taken by the Tuscan Government against the Franciscans, which seemed to him to be reprisals for his measures against the Jesuits in Rome. Moñino repeated that the longer the Pope hesitated the greater the risk he was running. At this the Pope, after some resistance, accepted an abstract of the documents of the Mexican Provincial Council and used very strong language about the Jesuits, but refused to discuss the scheme for their suppression; he would study the matter, he said, during his residence at Castel Gandolfo.²

Before the Pope left Rome for his *villeggiatura* two more blows were struck against the Jesuits. Despite the objection of the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, Colonna, a visitation decree of September 17th ordered the provisional closing of the Roman Seminary and its *Convitto*, the transference of its administration to the Visitors, the removal of the Jesuits there, and the distribution of the seminarists among other institutions.³

¹ Moñino's report of September 17, 1772, in PACHECO Y DE LEYCA, 55 *seq.*; *cf.* MASSON, 209, who makes the following comment on Clement's negative reply, "Néanmoins, on s'était entendu."

² Moñino to Grimaldi, September 24, 1772, in FERRER, II., 404; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 57 *seq.*

³ On the strength of a Papal *rescript "ex audientia S." of September 11, 1772 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1221), the Visitors issued on September 17, 1772, a *decree which ordered the closing of the Seminary "per modum suspensionis" (*ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1480). On the same day Azara *reported to Grimaldi: "Hoy por la mañana se esté haciendo la clausura del Seminario Romano. Van los visitadores en publico (menos el Card^l Colona que no ha querido concurrir, y se ha declarado siempre por los Jesuitas) y echarán de la Casa al Rector y demas Jesuitas, y distribuirán los Seminaristas por varios estudios de Roma, mientras se toma otra providencia." (Archives of the Spanish

The Pope had evidently accepted the figures put before him by Smuraglia, who on Marefoschi's behalf had examined the books of the institution.¹ The same thing happened when Marefoschi presented the report on the visitation of the Irish College, in which the Jesuits were accused of having secretly appropriated certain sums from the college revenues and of having trained their pupils badly. This institution too was taken from the Jesuits and placed under the direction of Cardinal Marefoschi as the Protector of Ireland.² As had been feared, the Jesuits found it impossible to maintain themselves in Rome once they had been condemned to pay the enormous sum they were alleged to have embezzled during their administration of the Roman Seminary.³ No wonder that at first the measure taken was regarded as the forerunner of the suppression.⁴ But the general opinion soon veered round again. As Orsini wrote to the ever-suspicious Tanucci, such paltry measures satisfied neither friend nor foe.⁵

Embassy in Rome.) Similarly *Moñino to Grimaldi on September 17, 1772, *ibid.* For Colonna's opposition *v.* *Centomani to Tanucci, September 22, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1221. According to *Orsini's letter to Tanucci on September 1, 1772, Marefoschi was against the seminary, Colonna for it, York midway between the two. (C. Farnes, 1480, *ibid.*)

¹ CORDARA, 138, and above, p. 208, n. 2. A *refutation of Smuraglia's calculations in Cod. 288 in the Bibl. Estense at Modena, where also there are other relative *documents. The Jesuits' reply is mentioned by Orsini in his *letter to Tanucci of September 22, 1772, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1480.

² CORDARA, 139. The *decree concerning the Irish College, of September 23, 1772, State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*

³ " *La perizia obligando i Gesuiti a pagare in Roma 374,000 scudi rovina la Compagnia " (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, September 18, 1772, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma 1222.

⁵ *Centomani to Tanucci, September 29, 1772: " L'affare ora conchiuso del Seminario Romano fu eccitato dal Clero fin dal principio del presente Pontificato, per questione di spese. Quindi non vi è questione della soppressione Gesuitica, come neppure nella chiusura del Collegio Ibernese . . . La detta soppressione non

Pleased as Madrid was with Moñino's activity and even with Bernis',¹ it was still worried by the Pope's attitude. It was thought that he must be reckoning on French support. Wherefore Charles III. wrote on September 21st to Louis XV., asking him to send Bernis the most stringent instructions to press for the suppression by all possible means. Louis' reply was that he still agreed that Bernis was to conform to Moñino's direction in all respects.² In Madrid the greatest impatience persisted. On October 6th Moñino was again instructed to leave nothing untried and again to offer as a bait the return of Avignon.³ When Clement had assented to the diminution of the right of asylum,⁴ Charles III. used the opportunity on October 13th, when writing his letter of thanks, to recommend once more the speediest possible suppression of the Jesuit Order "in the interest of public security and the peace of the Church."⁵

All negotiations being suspended⁶ during the Pope's

appare come conseguenza di nessuna provvidenza del Papa. Al contrario vi sono segni di protezione" (*ibid.* 1221). *Orsini to Tanucci, on the same day: "Si, si, piccole misure, che 'neque amicos parant, neque inimicos tollunt'" (*ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1480). For Tanucci's mistrust, *v.* his letter to Grimaldi and Losada, of September 29, 1772, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, 484.

¹ *Grimaldi to Moñino, September 8 and 22, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, and *on the same day to Magallon (Spain's representative in Paris), Archives of Simancas, Estado 5089.

² Charles III.'s letters of September 21, 1772, and Louis XV.'s reply of October 3, 1772, in MASSON, 210.

³ *Grimaldi to Moñino, October 6, 1772 (*loc. cit.*): The king was very pleased with the Brief dealing with the restriction of asylum but was impatient about the "extincion", wherefore Moñino was to press the matter again. Although the Pope said "que no hacía comercio de la extincion", Moñino was to point out that if the "extincion" were secured the restoration of Avignon would be secured also.

⁴ Brief of September 12, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 499 *seq.*

⁵ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 254 *seqq.*

⁶ *Moñino to Grimaldi, October 1, 1772, *ibid.*

residence in the country, to which he had retired on September 21st,¹ Moñino went to Naples on October 9th, but very soon returned, as in his absence the Duke of Arcos, with a brilliant retinue of Spanish nobles, had unexpectedly arrived in Rome.

The Pope invited the duke to Castel Gandolfo, where a splendid banquet was held in his honour. When Arcos, obeying Charles III.'s instructions, began to touch on the Jesuit question, the Pope broke in with the words, "His Majesty will be satisfied; only let him rely on me. His ambassador has no doubt already informed him of the happy state of affairs that has been reached."²

This view was not shared by Moñino, who was still affected by the impression he had derived from the interview of September 20th, following which he had written to Grimaldi that all was lost. Nor was his mistrust dispelled by the news of the fresh steps which had been taken against the Jesuits in Rome and Loreto.³ It had been confirmed, in fact, by a fresh difficulty raised by the Pope: he could not hold a Consistory for the suppression because, except for York, Marefoschi, and one other, all the Cardinals were against such a measure or were, at any rate, not certainly in favour of it.⁴

After Clement had returned to Rome at the end of October, Moñino wrote to Grimaldi that although His Holiness certainly had no love for the Jesuits, someone was holding him back

¹ *Azara to Grimaldi, September 24, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 247 *seqq.*; *Orsini to Moñino, October 5, 1772, and *Moñino to Grimaldi, October 22 and 29, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, October 2, 1772: More threats against the Society, especially in Loreto . . . It was said that the reports on the Irish College and the Roman Seminary would be printed "con tutte le licenze ed approvazioni", in other words as so many official documents against the Society . . . Corsini and Alfani would be entrusted with another visitation. State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³⁰⁹/₁₀₅₄.

⁴ *Moñino to Grimaldi, October 20, 1772, Archives of Simancas; cf. DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 448.

from taking the last step, either Bontempi or the friends of the Jesuits. Notwithstanding the assurance given to Arcos, if the Pope went on hesitating throughout November, the Neapolitan Government would have to exert decisive pressure by occupying Castro and Ronciglione.¹ How greatly Moñino distrusted Bontempi is seen from a report to Grimaldi of November 5th, in which he says that he has prevailed upon Almada to threaten Bontempi. "Two things must always be kept before the eyes of such a man: gratitude or punishment. He deserves the latter rather and so we must close our eyes until we see whether he will help us out of our difficulty or not."²

What Moñino learnt from Macedonio also confirmed him in his mistrust that Clement would keep his word. "But I am not losing heart," he wrote to Grimaldi, "the Pope has bound himself."³

Tanucci's opinion at that time was that Moñino was the only Spaniard who knew how to manage affairs in Rome.⁴ Moñino indeed shrank from no method of achieving his purpose, whether it was bribery of the Pope's confidants or threats against the Head of the Church himself. On November 8th he went to an audience, which he almost had to obtain by force, determined to stick at nothing. He first presented Charles III.'s letter of October 13th, with an Italian

¹ *Moñino to Grimaldi, October 29, 1772, *loc. cit.*; cf. DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 488. In his *letter to Grimaldi of October 20, 1772 (see p. 243, n. 4), Moñino said that everything had been arranged with Naples in the event of the Pope's deceiving them. Fuentes had already proposed in the summer to compel the Pope to agree to the suppression by occupying Castro and publishing his letters to Charles III. See *Grimaldi to Fuentes, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5039.

² DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 451.

³ *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 5, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ " *Moñino per me finora è l'unico spagnuolo che sia capace di trattar negozi in Roma." Tanucci to Fogliano, October 21, 1772, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6019.

translation, and he also took with him Grimaldi's instruction of September 29th, according to which he was to work for the suppression by every possible means. He hoped in this way to intimidate the Pope, but unexpectedly Clement offered resistance and pointed out the necessity of obtaining before the suppression the assent, not only of the Court of Vienna but also of the Italian princes and States. Only when that had been done could he unfold to the Spanish king the scheme which was to be followed. Moñino, stifling the annoyance caused him by this announcement, asked for speedy information, if possible within a month. Although the Pope at this audience had insisted on the strictest secrecy, Moñino paid not the slightest attention to this request. He communicated the gist of his interview to Bernis, and his report to Grimaldi ended with "Now Castro must be occupied".¹ This was entirely in accord with Tanucci's way of thinking; on November 10th he wrote to Grimaldi that as all Rome was for the Jesuits force would have to be used with the Pope and he would have to be threatened with a complete rupture with Spain, Naples, France, and Portugal.²

Although Bernis urgently represented to the Pope the danger threatened by the Bourbons,³ and Almada presented a violent letter from Pombal,⁴ Clement still held out. His reply to Charles III.'s letter, which reply he communicated to the Spanish ambassador through Bontempi, was couched throughout in general terms, the Jesuits not being even mentioned.⁵ As against this, what signified a Brief that allotted the property of the Jesuits in Frascati to Cardinal

¹ *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 12, 1772, *ibid.*; cf. DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 448; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 59; Bernis' report of November 11, 1772, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 256 *seqq.*

² *Tanucci to Grimaldi, November 10, 1772, *loc. cit.*, Estado 6105.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 259.

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, November 10, 1772, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1480.

⁵ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 260; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 489.

York's seminary and spoke of still further steps, in particular a visitation of the Jesuits' chief teaching establishment in Rome, the Roman College? ¹ Moñino told Bontempi that if the Pope went on delaying a decision and concealed his thoughts in ambiguous and artificial language, the Spanish Government would cast aside nice feelings and Bontempi would be the first to suffer.² In spite of this threat Clement told Moñino at an audience on November 15th that he needed more time to study the matter, firstly for reasons of conscience, secondly not to give rise to the belief that the suppression of the Jesuit Order was a condition of his election. "At this," reported Moñino, "I could no longer contain myself and with a vehemence I had never used before I told him how surprised and bewildered I was by this new manner of speech." The ambassador then tried to show the Pope that he could salve his conscience with the declaration of more than thirty Spanish Bishops and the request of the Mexican Provincial Council. As for his other misgiving Moñino observed with a smile that after three and a half years no one could well accuse the Pope of having bound himself in the conclave to bring about the suppression. Moñino then explained at length how unnecessary it was, and how little consonant with the dignity of the Holy See, to seek the agreement of every Catholic prince, whether great or small, in a matter which depended solely on His Holiness. When the Pope admitted that no Government, but only the nuncios in Vienna and Paris, had interceded on the Jesuits' behalf, Moñino suggested that the silence of the other Governments might be taken as consent. He then painted in lively colours the renown the Pope would win by the restoration of peace and even suggested that the Jesuits themselves would be glad to be rid of the

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, November 4, 10, and 17, 1772, and *to Giancane on November 19, 1772, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{309}{1054}$. Cf. Clement XIV.'s *Brief to Cardinal York of November 10, 1772, and *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 19, 1772, both in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² THEINER, *loc. cit.*

continual suspense and dread. The interview came to an end with Moñino still urging the Pope.¹

At the next audience, on November 22nd, Moñino repeated the threat of a rupture. The effect of this on the Pope was to make him speak more clearly. After complaining about Marefoschi's poor observance of the bond of secrecy, he declared that he could trust no one and for this reason he had to compose the draft of the Brief of suppression himself. He also spoke of how he intended to shape the preamble to the document.² But as the Pope spoke rather less decisively to Bernis,³ Moñino was still distrustful.⁴

Meanwhile every courier from Madrid brought further urgent and insistent instructions.⁵ Moñino could think of no other course but to bribe the Pope's associates and in particular to bind Bontempi to himself with Spanish gold.⁶ Through the Pope's confidants, in conjunction with threats, the goal was to be reached at last. According to Orsini's report of November 24th, Clement expostulated to the importunate envoy, "Have a care for my death! You are trying to force me to ride at post-haste speed, but now that I have laid my scheme I will not alter it."⁷ Highly agitated, he complained

¹ *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 17, 1772, *loc. cit.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 491 *seq.*; Bernis in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 261 *seq.*

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 26, 1772, *loc. cit.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 493; Bernis on November 24, 1772, *v. MASSON*, 212.

³ MASSON, *ibid.*

⁴ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 493.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 494.

⁶ *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 26 and December 3, 1772, *loc. cit.*, DANVILA Y COLLADO (493) quotes this report of November 26, in which it is stated that Bontempi was to receive 40,000 *scudi*. The passage runs: "Solo me falta dar el ultimo asalto de interes al influxo del P. Buontempi, de quien me hay revelado, que tiene ya impuestos cerca de 40^m escudos; sin varias alhajas que recibe. Si este ataque no da lumbre, no ay que esperar. Estoy en el concepto de que no la dará." Archives of Simancas, Estado 5039.

⁷ *Orsini to Tanucci, November 24, 1772: "Temete la mia

bitterly to Almada about the pressure to which Spain was subjecting him.¹ But this pressure together with the influence of his confidants finally brought him to the decisive turning-point.

On November 26th Moñino wrote in confidence to Grimaldi in his own hand, "I have nothing more to do now than make the final assault on Father Bontempi, who, I have been told confidentially, apart from his acceptance of sundry jewels, has already incurred obligations to the tune of 40,000 *scudi*. If this attack does not open a breach, the prospect is hopeless."² The attack launched on November 27th was so successful that on the following day the Father was able to report to Moñino that the final victory was close at hand.³ Moñino found this news confirmed at his audience on the 29th.⁴ Using the strongest terms, Clement repeated his promise to suppress the Jesuit Order, adding that he wished to bring the matter to a speedy end. Moñino would see that he would keep his word. To Bernis also he spoke in a similar sense. "It is true," he said, "that three and a half years of my pontificate have passed, but I have been continually active and I have already succeeded in destroying the Jesuits' prestige in Rome with the nobility, the prelates, the Curia, and the people. It was necessary to open the road towards our goal in this manner. When the suppression has come to pass, I will explain to Your Eminence the reasons for the delay and then you will acknowledge that I was right." "The Pope,"

morte," exclaimed the Pope in response to the Ministers' importunity, adding, "Mi volete far camminare con cavalli di Posta, ma io non voglio cangiare l'idea del progetto fissato." But he confirmed all his promises. State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1480.

¹ *Moñino's second report to Grimaldi, of December 3, 1772. *loc. cit.*

² DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 451 *seq.* Cf. above, p. 247, n. 6.

³ *Vid.* Moñino's *report mentioned above, at n. 1.

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 263. According to Bernis' report of December 2, 1772, which is quoted here, Cardinal Colonna, who was formerly favourably inclined towards the Jesuits, is said to have used his influence with the Pope in the contrary direction.

Bernis said to Orsini, "has never spoken about the suppression so calmly and firmly before."¹ In the middle of December Clement deprived the luckless Jesuits expelled from Portugal of the pension granted to them by Clement XIII., which he had already reduced from 12,000 to 9,000 *scudi*.² At the same time, following on further threats by Moñino,³ he took another step in the deepest secrecy, which committed him still more. He commissioned the prelate Zelada, titular Bishop of Petra, who was born in Rome but had remained a Spaniard, to work out a Bull of the suppression together with Moñino, on the lines of the draft presented by the Spanish ambassador on

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, December 1, 1772: "Mi disse il Ministro di Spagna, che il Papa nell'udienza di domenica 29 del passato avevagli ratificato la promessa della soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù con termini fortissimi, soggiungendo che desiderava uscire presto da questo affare, che presto ne sarebbe uscito mantenendo la parola e Lei signore cavaliere lo vedrà; che trovò il Papa allegro e gli sembra risoluto. Il card. de Bernis poi mi riferì avergli il Papa detto, dalla cui udienza allora tornava: 'Ripeto la promessa fatta alli tre sovrani Borboni di sopprimere la Compagnia di Gesù, è vero che sono passati tre anni e mezzo del mio pontificato e vi ò sempre pensato e travagliato e già sono riuscito a far perdere il credito, che la Compagnia aveva in Roma presso la nobiltà, la prelatura, la Curia ed il popolo, conveniva aprirmi una strada, già me la sono aperta. Si compiaccia scrivere a S.M.^{ta} Christ. che mi favorisca d'assicurare e d'entrare garante con S.M. Cattolica, che mantengo la parola data di sopprimerla; quando ciò sarà seguito dirò a Lei signor cardinale i motivi, che ò avuto, per differirla e Mi darà ragione o almeno compatimento.' E mi narrò il cardinale in fine, che il Papa era allegro e mai gli aveva parlato sull'assunto con eguale ilarità e fermezza." State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1480.

² *Centomani to Tanucci, December 18, 1772, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma 1221; *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, December 19, 1772, State Archives, Venice; *Orsini to Tanucci, December 22, 1772, adding that the General Ricci had been forbidden "di domandar licenze di far debiti, di alienare capitali". State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1480.

³ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 498.

September 6th.¹ "This seems to be the end," was Grimaldi's comment. "Bontempi shall have his jingling reward, but not until the deed is done."² Clement had exacted from Zelada an oath not to inform anyone of the commission he had received.³ "This secretiveness of the Pope's," said Moñino, "is all of a piece with his character. He likes surprises. He is timid and suspicious. I fall in with his ways as far as I can, so as to forestall any excuse. The reliability of his man of confidence (Zelada) is not above suspicion, but he is so ambitious that he is always ready to change sides. However, his duty is confined merely to formal alterations; the main business is settled, unless these priests are deceiving us."⁴ Moñino soon saw that he had nothing to fear from Zelada. In a joyful letter to Grimaldi dated on the last day of this eventful year, 1772, he reported the "good progress" that had been made: "Zelada has examined my draft for the Bull of suppression, has approved of it, and praises it beyond all measure. He suggested only four unimportant alterations, to which I immediately assented." At the end of this letter Moñino observed that although all seemed to be going well he would be apprehensive until the suppression had actually been carried out. All depended now on preserving secrecy in every direction, especially that of Paris, to prevent any intrigues by the nuncio there.⁵ The latter, however, like many others in Paris, soon discovered everything, although Bernis observed complete silence in his official dispatches, and had

¹ Bernis' report of December 16, 1772, produced by MASSON (212, n. 4) from the private archives of the Bernis family. Masson observes that the accounts to be found there "détruisent absolument le récit de Theiner".

² *Grimaldi to Moñino, December 22, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ MASSON, 214 n.

⁴ Tanucci's letter of December 23, 1772, in PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 61; cf. Moñino's report of December 17, 1772, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 498 *seq.*

⁵ The letter is reproduced in full in PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 121 *seq.*

asked Aiguillon to inform no one but the king. The text of the draft was not communicated even to Bernis, who, as he wrote, left Spain the honour, or rather the responsibility, for the whole affair. The Pope was left in no doubt that until it was all settled there was to be no question of the return of Avignon.¹

The failure to preserve the secret resulted in it becoming generally supposed that the Jesuit cause was lost. This was accentuated when the strange opinion that Frederick II. would intervene on the Order's behalf proved to be false. At the end of 1772 a letter of December 4th from the Prussian king to D'Alembert became known. It contained the following passage: "Amid all these various movements the Order of the Jesuits is to be destroyed at last and the Pope, after wriggling for a long time, has yielded at last, so it is said, to the importunities of the first-born sons of his Church. I have received an emissary of the General of the Ignatians, who urges me to proclaim myself as the protector of this Order. My answer to him was that when Louis XV. deemed it advisable to disband the Fitz-James regiment I did not consider myself entitled to intercede on its behalf, and that the Pope was sufficiently master in his own house to undertake any reform that he found to be right and fitting, without any heretics meddling in the business."²

The enemies of the Jesuits saw at once what a weapon the Prussian king's letter had placed in their hands.³ Pombal sent the Pope a copy of it,⁴ as did also Charles III. In his covering letter to Moñino Charles said that the letter would convince the Pope of the open rebelliousness of the Jesuits against the Catholic princes and the Holy See and their

¹ MASSON, 213 *seq.* In a *letter to Grimaldi of December 24, 1772, Moñino reports on Zelada's work and complains "del poco secreto que guarda el Ministro de Francia en estos asuntos, y las malas resultas que puede esto tener". Archives of Simancas.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 267 *seq.*; *Corresp. de Frédéric II.*, IX. (*Œuvres*, XXIV.), 587, here dated December 4.

³ DUHR, *Gesch.*, IV., 14 *seq.*

⁴ Letter of December 21, 1772, in *Collecção*, III., 164 *seq.*

intrigues with the non-Catholic Powers. He spoke in a similar fashion to the Auditor of the Apostolic nunciature in Madrid, who added to his secret report of January 5th, 1773, the remark, "It is generally thought here that the fate of the Jesuits will be decided very shortly."¹ And this surmise was correct.

On December 28th, 1772, Zelada had reported to the Pope on the execution of his task. Clement expressed his satisfaction and bade him proceed with the composition of the Bull, on which he was to report progress every Monday. By January 6th, 1773, the draft of the Bull had been prepared by Zelada, approved by Moñino, and handed to the Pope. The document, a copy of which was sent by Moñino to Madrid on January 7th, was similar in all essentials to the Brief *Dominus ac Redemptor* which decreed the dissolution of the Order. The alterations made in Zelada's draft were of a purely formal nature.² News of the decisive step was sent by Moñino to the King of Spain and his confidants, and shortly afterwards to Tanucci in Naples. No wonder that it occasioned much joy³; at the beginning of 1773 the Neapolitan troops were withdrawn from

¹ THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 268. The *copy of Frederick's letter is in the Archives of Simancas, Estado 5039. Cf. also *Nunziat. di Spagna 268 A, fo. 438, Papal Secret Archives. In Rome Frederick II.'s letter was generally known by the beginning of 1773; *Orsini to Tanucci, January 12, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³¹⁰/₁₀₃₅.

² Bernis' private reports of December 30, 1772, and January 6, 1773, in MASSON, 215 *seq.* (where, however, the day on which Zelada made his report is given erroneously as December 30); Moñino's reports of December 31, 1772, and January 7, 1773 (by which the copy of Zelada's draft was sent to Madrid), in PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 121 *seq.*, 134 *seq.*; *ibid.*, 137 *seq.*, the reproduction of this copy; *ibid.*, 102 *seq.*, the "segunda minuta modificada que sirvió para la formal expedicion del breve de extincion", according to Moñino's autograph, and 123 *seq.*, the Italian translation of this piece. Cf. *ibid.*, 62 *seq.*

³ *Tanucci to Moñino, December 26, 1772, and January 2, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6020.

the frontier of the Papal States.¹ But there was still some doubt that the affair would continue to make good progress. This was the case especially with the keen-sighted Moñino,² who was well aware of Clement's indecisiveness and timidity and, in particular, his fear of being accused of having bound himself in the conclave by a formal promise. "I hover between fear and hope," Moñino wrote to Grimaldi on January 7th, 1773. "I fear that something unforeseen may intervene and I realize that any incident, however trivial, may give rise to difficulties. However hard we tried to soothe the Pope he would harbour misgivings about the agreement of the Viennese and Florentine Governments."³ This being the situation, every possible influence was brought to bear on the unhappy Pope, especially through his confidants, Zelada and Bontempi in particular, who, with others, had been corrupted.⁴ By January 7th Moñino was already suggesting how Zelada was to be completely won over, but the important man, he emphasized, was Bontempi and Bontempi only. Of Zelada he remarked that he hoped to make his fortune by the whole affair; in any case everything would be kept secret.⁵ Nevertheless the Venetian envoy Tiepolo discovered the close relations between Moñino and the Pope's most trusted counsellors; he thought that Bontempi would probably get the red hat.⁶

¹ Tanucci had already stated in his *letter of December 26, 1772 (see p. 253, n. 3), that the occupation of Castro was unnecessary. The withdrawal of the Neapolitan troops was *reported by Tiepolo to the Doge on January 9, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

² He had already given expression to this anxiety in his *report of December 22, 1772. Archives of Simancas, Estado 5040.

³ PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 136.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 247, n. 6.

⁵ *Grimaldi to Moñino, January 5, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Moñino also tried to influence the Pope by sending him the translation of an opinion advocating the suppression written by a member of the Sorbonne. *Ibid.*

⁶ *Tiepolo to the Doge on January 13, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

In his audiences of January 10th and 17th Moñino had the impression that though the Pope still wanted to withhold his assent he was resolved as in honour bound to announce the suppression. At the audience of January 17th Clement definitely informed the ambassador that he had only two or three points to set out in the draft and that they did not affect the substance of it.¹ Nevertheless Moñino did not feel certain of the final result. Although Bontempi tried to reassure him, and Zelada was showing the greatest zeal, he thought that the Pope would get caught up in the formalities of the document.² At an audience on January 31st he noted that the Pope apprehended the resistance of the Florentine Government. From Zelada he learnt that he had put before the Pope a fair copy of the Brief of suppression³; after Clement had read it it would be passed to the secretariate for execution.⁴ Simultaneously it became known that the Pope had lapsed into melancholy because a prediction had been found in the palace that he would die during the Carnival.⁵

When Moñino heard of this fresh indecision of the Pope's, he expressed his impatience in strong language at an audience on February 6th, 1773, whereupon Clement rejoined that soon, very soon, the Bourbons would be satisfied. Nevertheless on the 7th the Spanish ambassador induced Cardinals Orsini and Bernis to press the Pope again, although the former had not been initiated into the secret.⁶ As the result of this pressure, on February 11th the Pope had a copy of the Brief of suppression sent through Bontempi to Moñino, to be

¹ PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 64; DANVILA Y COLLADO, 504 *seq.*

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, January 28, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Cf. DANVILA Y COLLADO, 506 *seq.* Grimaldi expressed his confidence in a *letter to Tanucci of February 23, 1773. Archives of Simancas, Estado 6106.

³ "Minuta en limpio."

⁴ *Moñino to Grimaldi, February 4, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁵ *Centomani to Tanucci, February 2, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1222.

⁶ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 507; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 156.

forwarded to Charles III., as he wished this matter to be dealt with as between sovereigns.¹ Bontempi now considered that everything had been settled. The document was dispatched by courier to Madrid on the same day. "To get this far," added Moñino, "it needed a discussion with the Pope which was pretty sharp and irritating."²

In Madrid,³ where the draft arrived at the beginning of March, Charles III. was highly satisfied with the fulfilment hitherto of all his wishes.⁴ The draft, according to his judgment, was in accord with the principles of justice and fairness and was calculated to put an end for ever to the disturbances caused by the influence of the Jesuits in every Catholic State. By this act the Pope would win honour and glory. The king offered to write in his own hand to the Kings of France, Naples, and Portugal and to the Empress Maria Theresa and to send them a copy of the draft. Moñino was instructed to express to the Pope his acknowledgment of this fresh proof of his paternal love and to assure him that all his conditions, especially that of secrecy, would be conscientiously observed.⁵ Tanucci also received news immediately of the event which was "desired with such uncommon ardour and was so important for our holy religion and our whole family." As the copies of the draft to be conveyed by the couriers had yet to be made

¹ Bernis, in MASSON, 216, and *Moñino on February 11, 1773.

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, February 11, 1773, *ibid.*, DANVILA Y COLLADO, 507 *seq.*; DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 448; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 156 *seq.*, where the whole report is reproduced.

³ Grimaldi had already *written to Tanucci on February 23, 1773, that according to the report rendered by Moñino (who, it must be said, was still not entirely certain of success) the future might be faced with confidence; Pombal, too, was pressing very hard. State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1801. For Pombal, *v.* his *letter to Almada of December 21, 1772, in *Collecção*, III., 153 *seqq.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Moñino, March 2, 1773, *loc. cit.*; *Grimaldi to Magallon on March 5, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5040.

⁵ DANVILA Y COLLADO, 509. The **Resumen del breve* in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

out, he was sending him in the meantime an extract through Grimaldi. "We must give thanks to God," he wrote, "for the peace of Our realms and the safety of Our person could not be guaranteed in any other way."¹

On March 5th Charles III. wrote in his own hand to Louis XV. and Maria Theresa, on the 6th to King Joseph I. of Portugal, from whom, as also from the French monarch, he could confidently expect a reply of assent, since Pombal was in command in Lisbon, and from Versailles Aiguillon had already written on January 25th, "If Spain approves of the draft, we shall do likewise, without even reading it." On March 9th Charles wrote to King Ferdinand of Naples.²

In his letter to Maria Theresa the Spanish king reminded

¹*Charles III. to Tanucci on March 2, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6067; DANVILA Y COLLADO, 509. Tanucci had already, on February 20, 1773, *expressed his pleasure at the victory, for which both the victor and the Pope deserved praise (*loc. cit.*, Estado 6020). On reading the draft, Tanucci could not refrain from making some critical remarks, of which, however, he said nothing to the king. See *Tanucci to Charles III. on March 30, 1773, *ibid.*, Estado 3720.

²PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 65; MASSON, 216 *seq.*, where the letters sent and received by Louis XV. and also Aiguillon's are reproduced. Joseph I. of Portugal's letter in *Collecção*, III., 165 *seq.*; *ibid.*, 177 *seq.*, his letter of assent, of March 13, 1773. Joseph's letter met with Grimaldi's complete approval, but in Louis XV.'s letter he was not pleased with the expression "condescendencia del Christ^{mo}" and thought that it must have come from Aiguillon. His advice, therefore, was to show only the first letter and to make only a verbal reference to Louis XV.'s. See *Grimaldi to Moñino, March 23, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. *Ibid.*, in the second letter of the same date, further laments about the unfortunate wording of Louis XV.'s letter. Moñino *replied on April 8, 1773, that he could not show the Pope Joseph I.'s letter only; it would be better not to show either. Even if Louis XV.'s letter did seem strange, Bernis had his instructions to insist on the suppression (*ibid.*). Joseph I.'s great joy was brought out also in the Queen of Portugal's *letter to Charles III. of May 2, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 7297.

her of the statement she had made in 1770, that she would not oppose an eventual suppression by the Pope.¹ Attached to this letter was the original draft of the Brief which had been sent to Moñino by way of Bontempi.² In Clement XIII.'s pontificate Maria Theresa had been inclined to give positive support to the Jesuits, but by February, 1768, she had already decided not to offer any opposition to the Bourbons.³ In March, 1769, she had definitely declined formally to take sides against the Order, remarking that this was also the attitude of her son, Joseph II.⁴ This latter assertion was afterwards falsified, for on January 15th, 1770, Joseph wrote to Choiseul that his view of the suppression was the same as the French Minister's, as he knew of Jesuit plans for a tyrannical autocracy. Kaunitz, who was all-powerful with the Empress, was, he alleged, also in agreement with Choiseul and Pombal.⁵

¹ ARNETH, IX., 564 *seq.*

² PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 65 *seq.*

³ DUHR, *Maria Theresia*, 208 *seq.* Duhr was the first to make clear the empress's position regarding the Jesuit Order, after he had previously disposed of the tale that a general confession made by the empress had been revealed by the Jesuits (*Jesuitenfabeln* ⁴ [1904], 40 *seqq.*), a tale which was still being served up to his readers by LEA in 1896 (*History of auricular confession*, II., 455 (Philadelphia)).

⁴ *Aubeterre to Bernis, March 28, 1773, in Jesuit possession, *Suppr.* 9.

⁵ *Joseph II. to Choiseul, January 15, 1770, copy in MSS. 3518/1389, fo. 40, of the Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome. Cf. MASSON, 218. Mgr. Siva had *reported to Garampi on March 25, 1769, that the emperor himself had told his confessor that the Order would be suppressed by the new Pope and that he himself would be indifferent (Nunziat. di Germania, 389, Papal Secret Archives). On September 23, 1769, Vincenti *wrote to Pallavicini that the emperor remained cool and indifferent, even in the face of Prussian pressure. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Regarding a spurious letter from Joseph to Choiseul, of January, 1770, v. *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CXXXIII. (1904), 787 *seqq.* Joseph II. was afterwards not hostile to the ex-Jesuits.

The Spaniards were not unaware how much depended on the decision to be taken by Austria, the most important of the Catholic Powers. If the Court of Vienna, Azpuru had said at the beginning of 1770, refrained from protecting the Jesuits, it would mean "a big step towards the suppression."¹

The "big step" was taken as a result of the empress's ardent wish to see her daughter Marie Antoinette married to the Dauphin, the future Louis XVI. On March 16th, 1770, Fuentes was able to report to Madrid that the Imperial envoy, Mercy, had informed Choiseul that although the empress, so far as her States were concerned, had no grounds for the suppression such as had been cited by the Bourbons, she would not oppose whatever the Pope thought necessary in the matter for the good of the Church, provided that he gave previous notice of it to the imperial Court.² When the French interpreted this as a request of the empress's, she made it clear to the nuncio that she had merely stated that, neither urging nor objecting, she awaited the Holy Father's decision on the fate of the Jesuits. Should His Holiness deem it expedient to reform them or suppress them, she had no objection to raise.³ Madrid realized at once how powerful an encouragement this "indifference" offered to anti-Jesuit opinion. Maria Theresa's statement, Grimaldi wrote to Azpuru, was of the greatest importance; the Pope must be given

¹ *Azpuru to Bernis, 7 February, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² *Fuentes to Grimaldi, March 16, 1770: Count Mercy had told Choiseul that with regard to the suppression the empress had stated to him "que aunque no tenia ella, por lo que miraba a los de sus Estados, los motivos que los Principes de la Casa de Borbon, para solicitar la abolicion de la Orden, no se opondria a lo que el Papa creyese deber hacer en este asunto por el bien de la Iglesia".—But, continued Fuentes, Her Imperial Majesty had asked to be informed of the Pope's decision. Mercy, speaking for the empress, had brought this also to his knowledge, so that the interested parties [especially the Pope] should be quite clear as to the situation. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ DUHR, *Maria Theresa*, 209 *seqq.*

exact information of it, for every excuse now fell to the ground.¹

At the end of March, 1770, news of the empress's attitude reached Rome. Azpuru had it conveyed to the Pope by means of Orsini.² The Bourbon envoys were already hoping that the Pope would induce the Court of Vienna to ask for the suppression, but Clement's reply was that this was inconsonant with his dignity and that it was the business of the Bourbons to take such a step.³ From these words alone, apart from other reports, it may be deduced that the Pope would have welcomed positive opposition from the empress in spite of his constant allusions to the great difficulties caused by those countries from which the Jesuits had not yet been expelled. Worried and threatened as he was, Clement XIV. knew only too well what an important weapon it would have been for him in his struggle with the Bourbons if he could have pleaded the opposition of the empress. In view of the anti-Jesuit attitude of the other Catholic Powers, it could only be a question of Austria when he objected again and again that he could decree the suppression only with the agreement of all the Catholic States of Europe.⁴ After the empress's statement in the spring of 1770 the appeal to Austria had lost much of its force, Maria Theresa having bound her hands, though not yet entirely, but in 1773 the arrival in Vienna of Charles III.'s letter gave her another opportunity of making a decisive intervention, and her attitude was awaited with universal excitement.⁵ But the empress failed again. Her reply to Charles III. was already prepared for her signature by April 4th, 1773. The draft had been composed by Kaunitz, but at the last moment

¹ "Este paso es esencialísimo," Grimaldi to Azpuru, March 27, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² *Bernis to Azpuru, March 28, 1770, and *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 19, 1770, *ibid.* Cf. *Orsini to Tanucci, April 17, 1770, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1475.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 23, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5087.

⁴ DUHR, *Maria Theresia*, 208.

⁵ *Magallon to Grimaldi, March 16, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Estado 6106.

the empress gave it a less formal tone and inserted a passage favourable to the Jesuits. Despite the high esteem, she declared, in which she had always held the Society of Jesus, which indeed it had merited by its zeal and its good conduct in Austrian territory, she would put no obstacle in the way of its suppression if the Pope considered it expedient and profitable for the unity of their holy religion. But she must state confidentially that she did not accept the clause dealing with the Jesuit properties, as she could not recognize the Pope's right to dispose of the Orders' estates and persons.¹

In Madrid, Grimaldi found the answer better than had been expected. The one condition made by the empress would have to be fulfilled, whatever difficulties were raised in Rome.²

Charles III. immediately declared his readiness to support this "just demand",³ for his main purpose had been achieved: the Pope's last defensive weapon had been struck from his

¹ ARNETH, IX., 93 *seq.*, 565 *seq.*; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA (66) errs in giving the date of the letter as April 7, FERRER (II., 454) as April 2. Tanucci did the empress an injustice when he *wrote to Grimaldi on March 9, 1773, that she would give way about the acquisition of the Jesuit property. *Loc. cit.*, Estado 6106.

² *Grimaldi to Moñino, April 27, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ See the corresponding instruction issued to Moñino in Grimaldi's *letter of April 27, 1773, which also speaks of Charles III.'s great joy at the empress's reply. Archives of Simancas, Estado 5040. *Cf. ibid.* 6106, *Grimaldi to Tanucci on April 27, 1773. Moñino found the empress's request perfectly justified and promised to support it (*letter to Grimaldi of May 13, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), but he was worried about what Maria Theresa meant by "the persons of the Order". Could it be, perhaps, that the empress wanted to send the "good" Jesuits to Lombardy? (Second *letter of the same day, *ibid.*) Grimaldi *replied on June 1, 1773, that the expression puzzled him too, but that the Pope would clearly not put any difficulty in the way of fulfilling the condition. Moñino was to proceed in such a way that "cada uno pueda entenderlo en el sentido que mas le acomode"; the king relied entirely on his proved acumen. *Ibid.*

hand. Clement XIV. had hoped in vain that the sincerely pious empress who had inherited from her forbears a liking for the Jesuits, who had entrusted to the Jesuits the education of her sons and daughters, and who in all other respects too was very well disposed towards them, would never agree to their suppression. With Maria Theresa high policy, the desire for good relations with the Bourbons in Paris, Madrid, Naples, and Parma, had proved superior to all other considerations. The welfare of her daughters weighed very heavily with her. Moreover, anti-clerical counsellors, such as the Voltairian Kaunitz, pro-Febronian Catholic "enlighteners", such as the Provost of the Augustinian canonry of St. Dorothea in Vienna, Ignaz Müller, the empress's confessor, and the Jansenist Van Swieten, all sworn enemies of the Jesuits, exerted a powerful influence on the great sovereign, who in this case "played the part of a weak woman and a fond and anxious mother."¹ She succumbed to the stronger will of those around her and to political and family considerations. That she was acting against her convictions was admitted by one in her confidence, the Lord High Steward Khevenhüller, who thought that she would rue this step till her dying day but would never be able to repair it.² She was not spared the regret. Cardinal Migazzi relates that after the suppression, a few months before her death, he was to hear her say, "If only I had taken your advice and listened to your remonstrances!"³ Her regret would have been greater still had she known the fate that awaited her daughter in France, for the sake of whose marriage she had sacrificed the Jesuits.⁴

¹ The foregoing is based on DUHR's excellent treatment of the subject (*Maria Theresia*, 211, 216 *seq.*). Visconti had *reported to Pallavicini on September 23, 1769, that the enemies of the Society were the theologian and imperial confessor (Provost Müller ?) and the principal physician, Van Swieten. Nunziat. di Germania, 387, Papal Secret Archives.

² KHEVENHÜLLER-METSCH, *Tagebuch 1770-1773*, 183 *seq.*

³ WOLFSGRUBER, *Migazzi*, 186.

⁴ DUHR, *Maria Theresia*, 221.

Authentic documents show how much importance at this last stage of the proceedings was attributed to the attitude of the Viennese Government. On January 26th, 1773, Grimaldi wrote to Moñino that the Viennese Court must be worked on.¹ The question put by the Minister to Moñino on March 9th, "What will be the answer of the Courts?"² could refer only to Vienna. Austria's agreement, Grimaldi emphasized, was absolutely necessary.³ The Pope was worried by the empress's failure to reply, Moñino reported to Grimaldi on March 25th.⁴ Charles III.⁵ and Tanucci⁶ feared that the empress would have conscientious scruples. On April 22nd Moñino summed up the situation thus: "If Vienna resists, the Pope will do nothing," and on the 29th he wrote of the intense interest with which Maria Theresa's answer was awaited, which answer would also decide the attitude of the Florentine Government.⁷ A modern historian was perfectly correct in saying that Maria Theresa's act of friendship towards the Spanish king, chiefly motivated by the love of her children, meant the death-blow to the Society of Jesus which she valued so highly.⁸

In Piedmont, in the meantime, King Carlo Emanuele, who was friendly to the Jesuits,⁹ had been succeeded by Vittorio Amadeo, who was closely related to the Bourbons and was

¹ *Grimaldi to Moñino, January 26, 1773, in forwarding him the copy of the Brief of suppression in draft form, "que he podido, digamoslo assi, robarla." Archives of Simancas, Estado 5040.

² *Grimaldi to Moñino, March 9, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ *Grimaldi's second letter to Moñino, of March 9, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Estado 5040.

⁴ In the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁵ *Moñino to Grimaldi, April 6, 1773, *ibid.*

⁶ *Tanucci to Charles III., April 20, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 3720.

⁷ *Moñino to Grimaldi, April 22 and 29, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁸ DUHR, *Maria Theresia*, 210 *seq.*

⁹ The news of his death was known in Rome, as Orsini *wrote to Tanucci on February 26, 1773, "mercoledì sera." *Loc. cit.*, Estado 4987.

always ready to comply with their desires.¹ Tuscany's attitude was decided by that of Vienna. Consequently the only States left on the Jesuit side were a few small ones in Italy and Germany, which, being of little importance, could not influence the decision,² but when inconvenient opinions were voiced even there they were kept hidden from the Pope. The zeal of his entourage in this respect is shown by the fact that Bontempi simply suppressed the letters from German Bishops recommending the Jesuits and surrendered them to Moñino.³ And when the Catholic world was thus apparently united, what signified it that a few non-Catholic Powers, such as Prussia, Russia, and England seemed to be well-disposed towards the Jesuits? In any case, so far as Prussia was concerned, the hope cherished by the Jesuits' supporters had already been destroyed by Frederick II.'s letter to D'Alembert, which had become generally known.⁴

Although Clement XIV. disdained the advice of the Cardinals, the antipathy of the majority of them towards the suppression of the Jesuit Order was nevertheless a serious obstacle in the way of such a measure. This was attested by no less a personage than Moñino, who as early as October, 1772, advised the Pope to create Cardinals of other ways of thinking.⁵ But it was some time before the next promotion

¹ CORDARA, 137. In a *letter to Grimaldi of April 1, 1773, Moñino expressed his joy at the change that had occurred in Turin. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² *Neither Vienna nor Turin will make any difficulties about the suppression, and Genoa need not be considered, wrote Tanucci to Orsini on July 31, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021.

³ Cf. the letter from Moñino mentioned above, n. 1.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 251.

⁵ *Moñino to Grimaldi, October 1, 1772, *loc. cit.* By attending the New Year Eve's service in the Gesù in 1770 eight Cardinals openly showed their sympathy with the Jesuits. Cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi on January 10, 1771, *ibid.* In his *letter to Tanucci of February 3, 1772, Orsini stated with satisfaction that "Martedì sera" only five Cardinals appeared in the Gesù (State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1479).

took place. It was not till April 19th, 1773, that Zelada received the red hat, along with Francesco Carafa. On March 15th Simone also was invited to join the senate of the Church ; of the thirteen new Cardinals chosen by the Pope on April 26th only Braschi and Delci were proclaimed as such.¹

The skill with which Moñino acted led Bernis to remark that if Spain had sent an ambassador of that kind four years earlier the thorny problem would not have dragged on so long.² Moñino was indeed untiringly active in all directions. He calmed Tanucci's ever growing impatience,³ and, to keep the Pope complacent, he put forward a proposal in mid-April 1773, shortly before Zelada's cardinalial appointment, regarding the return of Avignon and Benevento, whereby due attention was paid to the Pope's aversion to using the Jesuits for bargaining purposes. Clement was to offer to mediate between the Duke of Parma and Charles III., and the settlement of the dispute was to be followed by the return of the two territories. Charles, who had the same misgivings as the Pope, approved the plan, but Louis XV. and the Duke of Parma would have none of it. But while Paris was still objecting, Clement had already undertaken the task of mediation, insisting that the return of Avignon and Benevento should precede the publication of the Brief of suppression.⁴ By May there was no one in Rome who doubted that he was resolved to sacrifice the Jesuits,⁵ but the conjectures as to the causes of the delay were widely divergent. According to Cordara, the Pope would rather have yielded to the Bourbons' pressure by

¹ NOVAES, XV., 206 *seq.*

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, 513.

³ *Ibid.*, 514.

⁴ MASSON, 219. Vincenti, who *communicated to Grimaldi "in the deepest secrecy" the plan elaborated by Moñino, said that its object was to save "il decoro delle corti Borboniche ed insieme della S. Sede e di N. Sg. per non dare a divinare che motivi temporali mosso avessero il S. Padre alla convenuta estinzione de' Gesuiti". Report to Pallavicini, of June 18, 1773, from Aranjuez, Nunziat. di Spagna 268 A., Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ DANVILA Y COLLADO, 518 *seq.*

some other means than the Brief of suppression, as he feared that this would provoke discontent and open unrest, would scandalize the pious, and give the heretics cause for triumph and contempt. Moreover, solicitude for the reputation of the Holy See made him hesitate to decree the dissolution of an Order which his predecessor had confirmed only a short time previously. Thus it was that again a plan was formed which would bring the Jesuit Order to an end without it being possible for anyone to say that it had actually been suppressed. Under cover of an Apostolic visitation the Bishops in the Papal States were to close the noviciates in their dioceses, discharge the scholastics, forbid those Jesuits who were priests to indulge in any spiritual activity, and subject them to episcopal authority like any other clerics. It has been thought by some that the Pope intended by these measures to prepare the people for the imminent suppression of the Jesuit Order.¹ But Clement XIV.'s apologist, Cordara, who went on steadily searching for excuses for the Pope, interpreted his motive in the sense indicated above. He thought that if the affair were allowed to develop slowly on a long roundabout course something might intervene to prevent its consummation.²

The first attempt to put this strange plan into practice was made in Bologna, where Cardinal Malvezzi, an ardent opponent of the Jesuits, was Archbishop.

On January 13th, 1773, the Pope ordered the visitation of the Fuccioli College, which was under the direct control of the Jesuit General, and entrusted this duty to Marefoschi and Alfani.³ This and other measures, such as the refusal of the

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 326; DANVILA, 506 *seq.*

² CORDARA, 140.

³ *Centomani to Tanucci, January 1 and 19, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1222. *Orsini to Tanucci, January 15, 23, and 26, 1773, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1481, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4987, and State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 310. In 1646 Giovannantonio Fuccioli had founded a small college in Rome, called after himself, whose pupils (of whom

Camera Apostolica to sanction the sale of silver articles to the amount of 10,000 *scudi* for the maintenance of the Jesuits expelled from Portugal, showed quite clearly what was to be expected in the future.¹ When the Jesuits of Bologna, fearing that they would be reduced to beggary like their Portuguese brethren, attempted to sell some valuables, Malvezzi reported them to Rome. Clement thereupon gave the Cardinal permission, in a secret Brief, to visit all the Jesuit houses in the diocese of Bologna and to secularize those Fathers who made such a request.² Malvezzi, who belonged to the diplomatic school of Benedict XIV.,³ would, with all his animosity against the Jesuits, have preferred another method of procedure.⁴ He feared difficulties with the Legate, inadequate support from the Pope, and opposition from the strongly pro-Jesuit Bolognese.⁵ It was not till March that Malvezzi acted on a fresh summons by the Pope, who furnished him with greater powers.⁶ He began his visitation at Cento, where, in accordance with his instructions, he did not show the Papal

there were six in 1785) attended lectures at the Roman College. Cf. Pius VI. on April 6, 1785, *Bull. Rom. Cont.*, VI., 2, pp. 1473 seq.

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, January 12, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1035}$.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, February 9, 1773, *ibid.* Cf. Bernis in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 326.

³ This was the opinion given by *Kaunitz to Colloredo on May 20, 1769 (State Archives, Vienna).

⁴ Malvezzi and Marefoschi, Vasquez surmised in a *letter to Roda, were the men who " moverán la barca que está parada por falta de remeros ". Vasquez 1, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, February 26, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4987, and *on March 2 and 5, 1773, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1481; *Tiepolo to the Doge on February 27, 1773, also reporting on the " dispiacere del papa per la violazione del segreto sul breve " (State Archives, Venice).

⁶ *Tiepolo to the Doge, March 6, 1773, *ibid.* *Malvezzi to Macedonio and to Clement XIV., March 6, 1773, in Jesuit possession; *Orsini to Tanucci on March 12, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1035}$.

Brief,¹ since, as Orsini surmised,² it contained matters that could not be made public. Malvezzi himself regarded the Papal order to keep the Brief secret as something quite extraordinary and would have liked to have another Brief; he would also have liked to know if the resolution to suppress the Society was definite, so that he could be on safe ground when carrying out the visitation.³ In this duty he showed no lack of zeal. At Cento he ordered the Jesuit schools to be closed. As it was intended to do the same thing in Bologna,⁴

¹ *Malvezzi to Clement XIV., March 10, 1773 (here Malvezzi asks why the Brief contains the words "si mihi videbitur"; it was for the Pope to issue commands), and *March 13, 1773, which contains the following: The Brief orders me "ricercare della vita, costumi e riti loro", but Chinese or Malabar rites are not in usage here. As far as their life and customs go, "apparentemente sono buoni. — Della dottrina e morale precisamente non parla il Breve." But "V^a S^{tà} m'insegna che la dottrina è molinistica e la morale un vero schietto probabilismo! Prima di tutto che V.S. dia facoltà di separarli dal loro Generale e d'obbligarli ad aprirsi". In Jesuit possession.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, March 23, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4987. Cf. also *Conte G. Zambecari to Orsini on March 17, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1037.

³ *Malvezzi to Clement XIV., March 24, 1773: He (Malvezzi) had that day summoned the four Jesuit Rectors to tell them about the visitation. "Se la S^{tà} V^a non me l'ordina, mi astengo dal produrre il Breve di Commissione, benché regolarmente si dovrebbe produrre sulle prime."—He asks for another Brief, "che sia totalmente conforme alle sue determinazioni."—He asks the Pope to give him "ulteriore schiarimento sulla determinata soppressione", so that the visitation may be carried out on sure ground. In Jesuit possession.

⁴ *Malvezzi to Macedonio, March 31, 1773: The schools in Cento have been closed, and the same thing will happen in Bologna. "Se le rispettive Diocesi lasceranno Noviziati, Scuole, Seminari, Collegi di Convittori, non potrà V^a S^{tà} venire al suo fine. Lasciare nelle mani di tal gente l'educazione della gioventù, questa se gli affeziona . . . e prende i loro pregiudizi e gli dissemina . . . ad eternare le massime gesuitiche." *Ibid.*

a disturbance arose among the people which soon grew more serious.¹ But the Cardinal was no more intimidated by this² than by the great difficulties he encountered in his dealings with the Jesuit novices and scholastics. In a letter to the Pope he asserted that the Jesuits were real seducers, both in the pulpit and in the confessional. The withholding of the Brief, he now thought, was in the interest both of the Pope and the Visitor.³ In April an order was issued to the novices in the Jesuit college in Bologna to return to their families within three days. With the exception of two *Convitti*, all the Jesuit schools were closed, and their sodalities were disbanded.⁴ No provision for the education of the young was made by Malvezzi,⁵ whereupon the Bolognese Senate complained to the Pope and demanded a substitute for the lost schools and sodalities.⁶

There can be no doubt that Malvezzi intended to drive out

¹ *Malvezzi to Clement XIV. on April 3, 1773 (the attachment of the Bolognese tertiaries still persisted, if only out of sympathy), *ibid.*, and Bernis on April 14, 1773, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 327.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, March 30, 1773, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1487.

³ *Malvezzi to Clement XIV., April 3, 1773: Have obeyed the Pope; the novices were discharged. Report on the execution of the task. The Jesuits are real seducers, both in the pulpit and in the confessional. To keep silent about the Brief is of advantage to the Visitor as well as to the Pope. "Poichè in tal modo rimane nel pieno arbitrio di V^a St^a il restringere, rivocare ed ampliare le facultà, e all'Esecutore quelle maniere usare che sono più adattate alle circostanze e conformi alle intenzioni di V^a St^a. Poi in fine stabilir il mio operato . . . coll'Ap^{lica} Sua Approvazione." In Jesuit possession.

⁴ *Letter from the Provost of the archiepiscopal chancery, Natali, to the Rector of the Jesuit College of S. Lucia in Bologna, Jacopo Belgrado, April 5, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ *Zambeccari to Orsini, April 14, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³¹²/₁₀₃₇.

⁶ Undated *copy of the petition, which shows that the sodality had a membership of 2,000. In Jesuit possession.

the Jesuits entirely from Bologna and his diocese. That he still concealed this object was due solely to the regard he had to pay to the local population.¹

In such a difficult situation the Bolognese Jesuits decided to seek the advice of their Superiors. Jacopo Belgrado, the Rector of the Jesuit College of S. Lucia, appealed first to his Provincial at Modena, who encouraged him to resist and demanded to be shown Malvezzi's powers in writing.² Through the Provincial, Belgrado also received the General Ricci's instructions of April 3rd. According to these, he was to resist if Malvezzi tried to deprive the Fathers of their name, their dress, and their dependence on the General. If they were refused an insight into the Brief, the Rector was to have recourse to the Pope. Supplementary instructions were issued on April 7th, the principal one being that the dissolution of the vows and the destruction of the noviciate was not to be allowed.³ In a further instruction the General's Assistant made

¹ On April 7, 1773, *Malvezzi justified his mode of action to Macedonio, who acted as intermediary with the Pope. Its object, he said, was not only not to betray "quello che si vuole tener celato" but also "avvezzare il popolo a stare senza di loro". A fresh Brief had not yet been found necessary, "sembrandomi che se non altro le lettere di Lei che presso di me ritengo abbastanza mi garantischino." In Jesuit possession.

² *Provincial Angelo Melchiori to Belgrado, from Modena, April 6, 1773: We for our part cannot alter what the Church decided two centuries ago. Caprice lacking any sure basis must be resisted. P.S. in the evening: If His Eminence insists, he should be asked for his written orders. The duke here will receive as many Jesuits in his lands as can live there. But how can one live there? *Ibid.*

³ *Ricci to Belgrado, April 3, 1773: Istruzione: 1. Are the name of Jesus, the dress, the dependence on the General to be abolished? No, and again no! 2. If orders are given, he is to show the Brief, and if he does not show it: recourse to the Pope (*ibid.*). *On April 7, 1773, Ricci added the following instructions: 1. To the dispensation from the vows the answer is: No. In this connexion the Brief is always shown. 2. Equal resistance must

it clear that Ricci desired Belgrado not only to demand an inspection of the Brief but also to insist on Malvezzi giving his orders in writing. If force was used, Belgrado was to make a formal protest.¹

The resistance offered by the Jesuits and the Senators caused Malvezzi great annoyance. He sneered at the Senators' anxiety to have a proper system of education,² and the Jesuits' counter-representations he left unanswered.³ In the midst of the storm the Fathers remained calm.⁴ Although the people were on their side, Malvezzi continued to take steps against them. On April 22nd he forbade them to engage in any spiritual activity, including even the teaching of the catechism and the care of prisoners,⁵ and he also had an inventory taken of their property.⁶ All this failed to shake the Fathers' equanimity.⁷ Malvezzi showed less self-control; when the Jesuits submitted to him a written defence of their

be offered when the noviciate was disbanded (*ibid.*). Melchiori's *letter of April 9, 1773, forwarding the General's instructions (*ibid.*).

¹ *Melchiori to Belgrado, April 16, 1773: Fr. Gorgo explains the General's will as follows: 1. The Cardinal is to show his Brief. 2. The orders are to be given in writing. 3. If force is used, a legalized protest must be made. Fr. Rusca has acted very well in the matter of the novices and up to now has been successful. *Ibid.*

² *Malvezzi to Macedonio, April 17, 1773: How ridiculous these pro-Jesuit Senators are! They think their efforts "possano se no altro ritardare le sovrane determinazioni!" and they want "pur far credere, che il non lasciare le scuole a' Gesuiti faccia mancanza nella Città". *Ibid.*

³ *D. Luis de Gnecco to Grimaldi, April 20, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5042.

⁴ " *Sereni in mezzo a si critiche vicende." Zambeccari to Orsini, April 21, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{31}{1057}$.

⁵ *Malvezzi to Belgrado, April 22, 1773, in Jesuit possession.

⁶ *Orsini to Tanucci, April 27, 1773, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1481.

⁷ They were still setting their hopes on Maria Theresa's resistance, *reported Zambeccari to Orsini on April 28, 1773, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{312}{1057}$. Fr. Gorgo, Ricci's Assistant, also *wrote to Belgrado as late as May 29, 1773, that it was reported

position, he straightway tore it up.¹ To make his position more secure, the Cardinal sought an extension of his powers, which Clement XIV. granted him by a further Brief on May 15th.² On the strength of this Malvezzi, on May 25th, declared the scholastics to be absolved from their vows and forbade them to wear the dress of their Order.³ To demonstrate the invalidity of these steps Belgrado, with the agreement of the Provincial and the General,⁴ composed a treatise, which, so far as is known, never reached the Pope's hands.⁵ With regard

from Vienna "che presto vedremo gl'effetti della protezione di Casa d'Austria". In Jesuit possession.

¹ *Belgrado to Melchiori, April 28, 1773, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1550.

² Extract from the *Brief *Concedimus speciali* of May 15, 1773 : "Queste sono le facultà concesse all' Arcivescovo di Bologna nel Breve." Comprehensive powers relating to the novices, the students of philosophy and theology, who are to be released, and to all the other Jesuits of the diocese, whom the Cardinal may secularize if they request it. Authority also to prohibit all pastoral activity and to take charge of goods, archives, sacred vessels, etc. (in Jesuit possession). Malvezzi thanked the Pope in a *letter to Macedonio of May 22, 1773 : Thanks for the two Briefs ! But why "concedimus" and not "iniungimus" ? . . . What would the Jesuits say about the said authority ? In the accompanying letter I am asking you to give the Pope a list of the "facoltà del secondo Breve" with my observations, so that he "per di lei mezzo mi significhi il suo volere" (*ibid.*). Gnecco to Grimaldi, June 1 and 8, 1773, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, 521.

³ *Malvezzi to Belgrado, May 25, 1773 : "D'ordine della S^{tà} di N.S. ed in virtù di s. Ubbidienza si comanda al padre Rettore : a) di dimettere nel tempo discreto i due carissimi e tutti i filosofi ; b) di dichiarar a suddetti studenti che il Cardinale ' li dispensa da qualunque voto da essi fatto secondo l'Istituto della Compagnia ', c) di intimar a' medesimi il divieto di riprender l'abito senza ' la licenza della stessa S^{tà} di N.S.' ; d) di ricevere nella sua casa altri Gesuiti che vorrebbero stanziarvi ; e) di rilevare ne' conti il risparmio che nascerà dalla partenza." *Ibid.*

⁴ *Gorgo to Belgrado, May 29, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ The **Memoriale al Papa*, drawn up after Malvezzi had ordered the secularization of the scholastics, who were real Religious,

to the dissolution of the scholastics' vows, the Rector insisted with great firmness that he be made acquainted not merely with a portion of the Papal Brief but the whole of it.¹ Malvezzi's view was that this might be asked of a simple prelate but not of a Cardinal and Archbishop of a Papal State.² On June 2nd he repeated his ordinances of May 25th.³ As his threat to remove Belgrado from his post in the event of further disobedience⁴ had no effect, he proceeded to use force. On June 5th he had Belgrado and his procurator arrested and taken across the frontier under military escort.⁵ Macedonio informed Malvezzi that the Pope approved of his procedure against Belgrado and desired him to continue to act on these lines.⁶ The Pope's withholding of the final blow, he wrote, was to make certain of its effect; the Cardinal's execution of his orders would put courage into Clement XIV.¹ Malvezzi also received a letter from the Augustinian Giorgi in Rome complimenting him on his "admirable attitude" towards the Bolognese Jesuits.⁸

After succeeding in making the novices return to their homes Malvezzi hoped to intimidate the fourteen scholastics, but they persisted in maintaining that they could only obey

on May 25, *ibid.* It quoted the words used by Malvezzi to the Rector of the two Jesuit colleges of S. Lucia and S. Ignazio in Bologna: "Voi non avete ne delitti ne accuse." For Malvezzi's irregular proceeding, see also *Belgrado to the Provost Natali on May 29, 1773, when Belgrado invoked the Bull *Superna* of Clement X (*ibid.*). Against the ban on preaching the Jesuits appealed also to the Congregazione de' Vescovi e Regolari (*v.* *Melchiori to Belgrado, June 1, 1773, *ibid.*).

¹ *Belgrado to Natali, June 1, 1773, *ibid.*

² *Malvezzi to Clement XIV., May 12, 1773, *ibid.*

³ *Malvezzi to Belgrado, June 2, 1773, *ibid.*

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 330.

⁵ *Zambeccari to Orsini, June 5, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{313}{657}$.

⁶ *Macedonio to Malvezzi, June 11, 1773, in Jesuit possession.

⁷ **Id.*, June 10, 1773, *ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

if their consciences were set at rest by seeing the Papal ordinance. Malvezzi refused to show it to them, saying that a Cardinal had to be believed when he gave an assurance about the Pope's will. He then put an end to the dispute by having the scholastics brought under guard to the villa of the seminary, depriving them there of their religious dress, and sending them home.¹ Some, to his annoyance, entered Modenese territory, where, however, the duke forbade them to resume their dress; others went to Ferrara. These Malvezzi requested the Legate of Ferrara to imprison.²

The Fathers who had stayed on in Bologna and who were unanimously resolved to continue their resistance were at first kept under guard. On June 15th their church was closed, their goods were confiscated, and administrators were put in charge of their colleges.³ The Cardinal found little money with the Jesuits but many debts.⁴ The riches attributed to them by their enemies, therefore, proved to be illusory. To escape further persecution, Scotti, the Rector of the Collegio dei Nobili, and soon afterwards some of his colleagues, fled from

¹ *Zambeccari to Orsini, June 5, 1773, *loc. cit.*; *Zambeccari to Grimaldi, June 8, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4737; *Orsini to Tanucci, June 8, *ibid.* 4987; *Gnecco to Grimaldi, June 8, 1773, *ibid.*, 5042; *Malvezzi to Macedonio, June 5, 1773, in Jesuit possession; *Centomani to Tanucci, June 11, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1222; *Orsini to Tanucci, June 11 and 15, 1773, *ibid.*, C. Farnes, 1481.

² *Zambeccari to Orsini, June 9 and 16, 1773, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma $\frac{312}{1057}$; *Gnecco to Grimaldi, June 15, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5656; *Orsini to Tanucci, June 15, 1773, *loc. cit.*

³ *Zambeccari to Orsini, June 5 and 16, 1773, *loc. cit.*, and to Grimaldi on June 22, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Estado 4737; *Malvezzi to Macedonio, June 19, 1773, in Jesuit possession. *Macedonio to Malvezzi, June 26, 1773 (the Pope's approval), *ibid.*; *Tiepolo to the Doge, June 26, 1773, State Archives, Venice. According to Orsini's *letter to Tanucci of June 22, 1773, the Pope considered that "il card. Malvezzi ha eseguito esattamente il nostri ordini in Bologna", State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1055}$.

⁴ *Gnecco to Grimaldi, July 6, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5656.

Bologna, where any usefulness on their part had been made impossible. Hunger would reduce the others to subjection, Malvezzi wrote to the Pope.¹

The news of these events, which violently incensed the Bolognese,² spread through the whole of Italy and gave great offence. Even Bernis spoke of the unusual severity which had been used.³ The Pope, unable to ignore the general feeling, was more perturbed than ever.⁴ His embarrassment was increased by Moñino's having openly asserted from the beginning that the Bolognese visitation, of which he had not been told in advance,⁵ was merely another way of putting off the final settlement.⁶ The appearance in Rome of the intriguing Giraud and the restitution problem caused Moñino the greatest anxiety at the beginning of June.⁷ To prevent another retreat, as he himself reported on June 3rd, he launched out into further threats and reproaches against the Pope, who, deeply depressed, asked him not to worry and frighten him so much. Though it lasted two hours, the interview had no result. Moñino went away grievously

¹ *Malvezzi to Clement XIV. and to Macedonio on June 30, 1773, in Jesuit possession. On August 4, 1773, Malvezzi *reported to Macedonio: These Jesuits are gradually leaving . . . are being fêted in Modena (*ibid.*). On August 14, 1773, Tiepolo *reported to the Doge that almost all the Jesuits had left Bologna (State Archives, Venice). On the same day Malvezzi complained in a *letter to the Pope that the Duke of Modena was giving a cordial welcome to all Jesuits (*ibid.*).

² *Zambeccari to Orsini, June 23, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{313}{1057}$; CORDARA, 141.

³ MASSON, 221.

⁴ CORDARA, 141; MASSON, 211, n. 3.

⁵ *Moñino to Grimaldi, February 22, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁶ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 226; MASSON, 216; PACHECO Y DE LEYVA, 157. Centomani also spoke sceptically of the proceedings in Bologna in his *letter to Tanucci of February 23, 1773. State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{477}{1222}$.

⁷ DANVILA, III., 521.

troubled and discouraged and immediately called Zelada and Bontempi into consultation. All were agreed that Giraud must have been intriguing and that now the Pope must be spoken to in the most threatening manner possible.¹ But it is improbable that Moñino would ever have reached the goal unaided. Clement XIV.'s confidants, Zelada and Bontempi, had to be induced by fresh promises of money to lend their aid,² for, as Moñino reported on June 29th, "they alone can save us."³

In a confidential report to Grimaldi on April 29th, 1773, Moñino had already remarked that Zelada had admitted to him that he was heavily in debt; in view of the good service this man had rendered and was still able to render—and not only in the matter of the suppression of the Jesuits—6–7,000 *scudi* would be appropriate, and an equal or greater sum was proposed for Bontempi.⁴ On June 3rd Moñino acknowledged the receipt of a royal order in respect of 8,000 *scudi* for Zelada, and asked also for a generous benefice for him.⁵ On May 18th Charles III. had sent Moñino 8,000 *scudi* "for secret expenses in the royal service"; Bontempi was to have his reward later.⁶ That both men had rendered good service to Spain was again attested by Moñino in a letter of May 20th, 1773.⁷ From a letter written from Aranjuez on June 1st, 1773, to the Franciscan Archbishop Osma, the Spanish king's confessor, we learn that immediately after Zelada had been made a Cardinal he had been presented by Louis XV. with an abbey bringing in 2,000 Roman *scudi* annually and that Charles III., following his example, had decided to present him with benefices

¹ *Ibid.*

² DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 448.

³ *Moñino to Grimaldi, June 3, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ DUHR, *Aufhebung*, 452; DANVILA, 515.

⁵ DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 453.

⁶ *Grimaldi to Muzquiz, May 17, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5040; *Grimaldi to Moñino, May 18, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome; DANVILA, *loc. cit.*

⁷ In the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

amounting annually to 3,000 Roman *scudi*.¹ In accordance with the advice given him by the Pope's confidants, Moñino, as he reported on June 10th, was not sparing of strong expressions and threats at his next audience. He reported at the same time that the Pope intended to announce the Brief of suppression at a Consistory in the manner of a peace treaty. But when, he asked, would the Brief be signed and printed? ² Incidentally Moñino did not trust Bontempi; this is clear from his suggestion that the 10,000 *scudi* destined for this cleric should be accompanied by an instruction that they were not to be paid until the Brief of suppression had been published.³

Charles III. continued to satisfy without delay all Moñino's requests on behalf of the Pope's confidants. By a royal ordinance of June 14th Zelada was presented to two canonries in Seville and Cordova which had an annual value of 60,000 *reales*.⁴ A great sigh of relief was breathed in Madrid on the

¹ DANVILA, III., 516. Grimaldi had already *informed Moñino on May 25, 1773, that Charles III. would do more for Zelada than Louis XV. (*loc. cit.*).

² Moñino's second *letter of June 10, 1773, *ibid.*, DANVILA, *loc. cit.*

³ *Moñino to Grimaldi, June 24, 1773, *loc. cit.* The 10,000 *scudi* were remitted on July 13, 1773, DANVILA, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Moñino, June 15, 1773: "Al Card. de Celada ha presentado el Rey para dos Canongias que se hallan vacantes en las Santas Iglesias de Sevilla y Cordova, cuyo valor anual se regula en treinta mil reales poco mas o menos cada una de ellas. Por la carta adjunta le doy esta noticia; y si V. S. gusta, podrá anticiparsela por sí mismo antes de hacerle entregar la carta." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Roda *wrote on the same day to Moñino that Zelada was rewarded solely on account of "el zelo, trabajo y desempeño en la grande obra que tanto nos interesa" (*ibid.*). The thanks of "His extremely useful Eminence" was conveyed by *Moñino to Grimaldi on July 1, 1773 (*ibid.*). In Zelada's *letter of thanks to Grimaldi, of July 1, 1773, he said that with all the will in the world he was not capable of serving the king as his magnanimity deserved, but he would do his level best. Archives of Simancas, Estado 5048.

arrival of Moñino's report of June 17th that Clement XIV. had succumbed to the latest assault ; he had signed the Brief of suppression at last and had handed it over to him to be printed, as he could not trust the Camera Apostolica.¹ But immediately a fresh delay occurred, for Clement was unwilling to have the Brief published until after the restitution of the Papal territories ; he feared that otherwise Tanucci would retain Benevento and Ponte Corvo.²

Madrid was constantly consumed with the greatest impatience. "We thought we had reached harbour," Grimaldi wrote to Moñino on June 22nd, "and it hardly redounds to the honour of the Pope and the sovereigns if their word is open to doubt." He presumed that Giraud had reopened the question of restitution, as the Pope refused to bargain and knew the intentions of the Kings of France and Spain. He also suspected the influence of the English envoy.³

As Louis XV. obstinately refused to agree to Moñino's plan of solving the restitution problem by Papal intervention in Parma, Charles III. gave way.⁴ He promised to ensure the

¹ *Moñino to Grimaldi, June 17, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. It is not possible to say with certainty on which day the decision was made. Bernis wrote on June 16, 1773, to Aiguillon, "Le Pape a signé le bref d'extinction des Jésuites." MASSON (221) thinks that the signature took place as early as June 8, as Bernis wrote on the 9th, "Le Pape a promis à M. Moñino de signer hier le bref de la suppression des Jésuites." PACHECO Y DE LEYVA (67) takes it to be June 9.

² MASSON, 221.

³ *Grimaldi to Moñino, June 22, 1773: "Es sensible, que quando nos creiamos al puerto de nuestra negociacion, salgan ahi con una pretension contraria a la inteligencia en que estabamos de acuerdo con ellos ; que es poco decorosa para el Papa mismo, para los Reyes, y que ofende a dos Soberanos, dudando que puedan faltar a su palabra. V. S. verá lo que dize de oficio y lo que se han respondido de Francia a la idea de la mediacion del Papa para el ajuste del Infante : me remito pues a la de oficio, y no me dilato mas, por no replicar aqui lo mismo, y por falta de tiempo." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Grimaldi to Magallon, June 28, 1773, *ibid.*

removal of the Pope's doubt about Tanucci's honesty by writing to his son, the King of Naples.¹ Meanwhile Moñino had been as active as ever. Through Bontempi he went to extremes in pressing the Pope and threatened to inform the Portuguese envoy, Almada, of everything if there was any further delay.² He was disturbed by the thought that the forcible steps taken by the Pope against the Jesuits in Bologna were only a way of gaining time,³ especially as further visitations similar to that in Bologna had been ordered for Ravenna and Ferrara.⁴ In Rome itself the Pope had caused the notorious Alfani to have the archives of the Jesuit noviciate sealed up for the purpose of a visitation⁵ and at the same time he had issued an order, by a Brief to Cardinal Acquaviva, Legate of Urbino and Pesaro, for the confiscation of all Jesuit

¹ *Grimaldi to Moñino, June 29, 1773: "No tengo que decir sobre el negocio principal, pues avrá ya visto V. S. que no quieren en Francia la mediacion del Papa para reconciliacion con el Infante, y si persisten en que preceda la restitucion á la extincion, veo el negocio mal parado; embio a V. S. copia de lo que escrivi ayer en mi confidencial a Magallon [see the preceding note] sobre el asunto para que quede V. S. enterado de todo, y sola añadiré que si el temor de ahí nace de que desconfian de Tanucci, pueden deponerle, pues el Rey está resuelto a escribir al Rey su hijo que deve absolutamente restituir Benevento, y lo executará S. M. por el Correo proximo." *Ibid.*

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, June 24, 1773, *ibid.*

³ Bernis to Aiguillon, June 16, 1773, in MASSON, 222, n. 2. The impetuous Centomani had already objected *on January 12, 1773, to the resumption of these petty visitations, "che poco meno diventano eterne e questo dopo tre anni e mezzo di pontificato e sei di promessa estinzione". Letter to Tanucci, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1222. Cf. *ibid.*, a second *letter of Centomani's to Tanucci of January 19, 1773.

⁴ *Moñino to Grimaldi, June 24, 1773, *loc. cit.*; CORDARA, 141.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, June 25 and July 2, 1773, also *Centomani to Tanucci, June 25, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{319}{1035}$ and 1222. According to Tiepolo's *letter to the Doge, of June 26, 1773 (*loc. cit.*), Cardinals Pamfili and Corsini had refused to become Visitors to the noviciate.

property in those places. The Bishop of Montalto received a similar order on June 25th.¹ There could be no doubt that the Pope's intention was to extend the measures taken in Bologna to the whole of the Papal States. But to this Moñino objected so violently that the dispatch of further Briefs of visitation was suspended and it was resolved to set up a Congregation of Cardinals to determine the measures to be taken after the suppression of the Jesuit Order.² The establishment of this Congregation, which wielded even greater powers than the Inquisition, was literally forced on the Pope by Moñino, as the latter himself admitted. "It costs me unbelievable efforts," he wrote on July 1st, "to induce the Holy Father to move with the speed the affair demands."³ But there was still the question of the restitution of Avignon and Benevento to be settled. Moñino urgently desired a decision to be taken and complained of the embarrassing situation in which he was placed by the contradictory attitude of the Courts, especially Tanucci's endeavour to retain Benevento.⁴ He was worried also by the dispatch of the Brief of visitation, in spite of his objection, to Cardinal Borghese, Legate of

¹ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 613 *seq.*

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 1, 1773, *loc. cit.* The names of the Cardinals as given by MASSON (222 *seq.*) are not entirely correct. I have adopted the particulars given by *Tiepolo in his letter to the Doge on July 17, 1773, *loc. cit.*, and those of Clement XIV. (in THEINER, *Epist.*, 259).

³ *Letter of July 1, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 1 and 8, 1773, *loc. cit.*; *Tanucci to Charles III., April 27, 1773, *loc. cit.* In his *letter of July 6, 1773, Charles III. urged his son Ferdinand IV. most strongly to restore Benevento to the Pope (Archives of Simancas, Estado 5233; DANVILA, 525). Tanucci, however, was absolutely opposed to it. On July 13, 1773, he *wrote to Grimaldi: "Il Breve è già in Firenze: Erizzo ne ebbe comunicazione dal Granduca. Sappia che se non si tratta la conservazione di Benevento adesso, tutto sarà finito; Dio sà quando si darà una altra occasione . . . Poi, 'non debbono esser patti per l'estinzione.'" Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

Ferrara.¹ On July 7th Malvezzi wrote to Clement that he would do well to turn a courageous front against the Society, not that of St. Ignatius but of Lainez and Acquaviva.² While Alfani was still at work on the archives of the noviciate, Cardinal Orsini, on the Pope's authority, sealed up the archives of the English College. Further Briefs of visitation were sent to Cardinal Acquaviva in Urbino and to the Bishop of Montalto.³ The Venetian ambassador regarded all these measures as a confirmation of the coming suppression, but apart from the Bourbon envoys no one had any certain knowledge of the time or manner in which the Brief of suppression would be published.⁴

On forwarding to Charles III. Maria Theresa's answer, the Pope had written on July 8th that he would not delay much longer in "bringing to an end the most thorny problem which we have in hand"; he tendered his thanks for the marks of favour bestowed on the new Cardinal, Zelada.⁵ The publication of the Brief of suppression was still withheld, however, though on July 15th Moñino was able to report that the Brief relating to the commission of Cardinals had been made out at last but he was still far from satisfied with Clement XIV.'s demeanour.⁶ And indeed the Pope's behaviour seemed to be

¹ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 8, 1773, *ibid.*; *Orsini to Tanucci, July 6, 1773: "Sabbato sera partì il breve per Borghese." Archives of Simancas, Estado 4987..

² The *letter discusses in detail the manner of utilizing the various Jesuit properties in general and those in the Papal States in particular. In Jesuit possession.

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, July 9, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³¹⁰/₁₀₅₅.

⁴ *Tiepolo to the Doge, July 10, 1773, State Archives, Venice. On the Pope's orders Malvezzi had arrested on July 8 and 9, 1773, three Spanish Jesuits who had written in defence of their Order and against Palafox. They were afterwards banished. Zambeccari to Orsini, July 10 and 13, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma ³¹²/₁₀₅₇; *Gnecco to Grimaldi, July 13, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5456.

⁵ DANVILA, 527.

⁶ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 15, 1773, *loc. cit.*

more mysterious than ever. "The Brief of suppression would have to be issued either before or at the same time as the appointment of the commission of Cardinals," was Tiepolo's opinion, "but perhaps the suppression will take place without a Brief, as the Sacred College has not been consulted at all in this affair."¹ Tanucci was already doubting whether at his age he would live to see the annihilation of the Jesuits.²

That the intended suppression had meanwhile ceased to be a secret no longer troubled Clement XIV., who thought that in this way the world would get used to what would happen. Instead of taking any action, he ordered prayers to be said, performed spiritual exercises,³ and had investigations made about the Jesuit property in the States of the Church.⁴

Moñino was finally so exasperated that on July 22nd he wrote in very strong language to Grimaldi about the postponement of the suppression until after the feast of St. Ignatius and advised him not to admit the nuncio to Madrid.⁵ On the same day he wrote a threatening letter to Bontempi. The Brief, he said, was still without a date and the signature, and His Holiness intended to take his course of baths as usual. The nuncio in Madrid would not be accepted and the restitution of the Papal territories would not take place until the suppression had been carried out.⁶ This "extreme step" was not without effect. Bontempi went to Moñino with the information that he could send to Madrid or wherever else he

¹ *Tiepolo to the Doge, July 17, 1773, *loc. cit.*

² *Tanucci to Charles III., July 20, 1773. To arouse King Ferdinand's anger, Tanucci relates in this letter that a sailor with an iron-tipped stick had been caught in the royal garden. This man pretended to be mad, but it had come to light that at the instigation of the Jesuits he had come from Terracina to murder the king. Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021.

³ For the Pope's visit to Paul of the Cross (CORDARA, 142), see below, Chapter VIII.

⁴ MASSON, 222 *seqq.*

⁵ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 22, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁶ *Moñino to Bontempi, July 22, 1773, *ibid.*

pleased the copies of the Brief of suppression which had been printed in the greatest secrecy and were dated July 21st.¹ The opinion in Madrid was that the Pope, who owing to his bathing cure was not receiving visitors,² had taken such a decisive step that retreat was now impossible. It was decided in Madrid not to publish the Brief for the time being but to wait until it was published in Rome, so that it would be clear in Spain that the measure originated in Rome.³

While the Brief of suppression was being sent off in packets to Versailles, Naples, Lisbon, and Vienna, the visitations of the Jesuit colleges in the Papal States were continued⁴ and the commissaries were appointed for the execution of the Brief in Rome.⁵ The aforesaid Congregation of Cardinals met on August 6th; Marefoschi was its president, and Corsini, Zelada, Casali, and Carafa were also members. Macedonio,⁶ who was in the closest touch with Moñino,

¹ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 29, 1773, *ibid.*

² “ *Alfani è senza lavoro essendo il papa in retiro ” (Centomani to Tanucci, July 30, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1222). Cf. *Tanucci to Orsini, July 31, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021.

³ *Grimaldi to Moñino, August 17, 1773, in reply to Moñino's letter of July 29, 1773. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Tanucci to Moñino, July 21, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021. *Orsini to Tanucci, August 8, 1773, on the visitation of Sinigaglia and Ferrara, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1481. *Malvezzi to Macedonio, August 4, 1773, in Jesuit possession.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 10, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³¹⁰₁₀₅₅.

⁶ Casali, who was not trusted by Moñino, was dropped (DANVILA, 526). Other alterations were made; v. *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 15, 1773: “ Añado a V. E. que hay alguna variacion en los Prelados que deben asistir a la Congregacion, pues en lugar de Pallota concurrirá Macedonio como Secretario y me alegro, porque es persona de mi intima confianza. Este me ha confiado la correspondencia del Card. Malvezzi Arzobispo de Bolonia, que es excelente, y en ella ha hecho al Papa grandes y solidas reconvençiones. Tenga V. E. paciencia, pues con ella iremos, si Dios quiere, arrivando al termino . . . ” *Loc. cit.*

functioned as secretary, Alfani as assessor, the Dominican Mamachi and the Franciscan Observant Carlo Cristoforo da Casale as consultants.¹ The first session of the Congregation took place on August 9th. "At the moment of writing," reported Bernis on August 11th, "it is not yet known on what day the Brief of suppression will be published, but it is not far off now and it may be expected at any moment."² A Papal constitution of August 13th imparted to the Congregation the powers which had already been made out, enabling it to deal with any matter still affecting the Society of Jesus suppressed by the Brief of July 21st. It also bound the members of the Congregation to the strictest secrecy on pain of excommunication, which would take effect immediately and which, except in danger of death, could be remitted only by the Pope.³

Meanwhile all the Jesuit churches in Rome were filled with the faithful, and the Fathers performed all their usual functions as though there was nothing to fear.⁴

At the first session of the Congregation on August 9th the Pope had announced that the suppression would take place on the 16th.⁵ This time there was no more delay. On the evening of the appointed day the secretary of the Congregation of Cardinals, Macedonio, an intimate of Moñino's, accompanied

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 13, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma ³¹⁰/₁₀₅₅. Cf. THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 337 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 337. " *La soppressione è più affare d'ore che di giorni," Macedonio informed Cardinal Malvezzi on August 14, 1773, in order to pacify the man, " che più d'ogni altro si è immortalato nello zelo l'assecondar le idee del S. Padre, che sono di togliere dal campo evangelico il seme di discordia." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ THEINER, *Epist.*, 259 *seq.* The document is not among the **Epist. Clementis XIV.* in the Papal Secret Archives. Theiner does not mention where he found it.

⁴ *All the Jesuit churches are crowded and the Jesuits are carrying on with their usual functions, academies, etc. (Tiepolo to the Doge, August 14, 1773, State Archives, Venice.)

⁵ *Moñino to Grimaldi, August 12, 1773, *loc. cit.*

by soldiers and police officers, presented himself at the professed house "al Gesu" and announced to the General Ricci and his Assistants the Brief by which the Order of St. Ignatius was dissolved.¹

Ricci, a gentle and peace-loving character, had never thought of using any other defence against the growing storm than prayer and still more prayer. With his "almost naive sense of justice" he could not imagine his Order being suppressed by the Pope, especially as he had formed a very good opinion of Clement XIV., even at the time of his election.² Even after Clement had struck some very severe blows at him personally as well as at his Order, it seemed to him incredible, as Cordara explains, "that the Vicar of Christ will burden his conscience with so blatant an injustice as the destruction of a society which has deserved well of the Holy See and the whole Church, and this without a court of inquiry and without revealing the charges that have been raised. Surely the Pope agrees—and to think otherwise is impossible—that before an accused person can be condemned his guilt must be evident and that he must be given the opportunity of proving his innocence? All this is demanded by natural justice, which no monarch and no Pope can violate, and failing which any finding of a court of justice would be null and void. And is it also to be believed that a Vicar of Christ would contradict

¹ Along with Bernis' *report of August 18, 1773 (Archives of Foreign Affairs, Paris), v. Moñino to Grimaldi, to Mahony, to the Conte de Aguilar (in Turin), to Laforcada, Coronel e Gnecco (in Bologna), all on August 19, 1773 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). Azara refers to these reports in his *letter to Grimaldi of August 19, 1773, in which he congratulates him on the "triumfo" (*ibid.*). Cf. *Llano to Grimaldi, August 19, 1773: congratulations on the victory to Grimaldi, the sole leader in the struggle, to Moñino, and to the king, "otro Hercules verdaderamente en la circunstancia para descargar el golpe de gracia sobre la Hydra . . ." The Dominican Ferrari, he adds, claims to have assisted in the reconciliation of the duke with the Infante. Archives of Simancas.

² In Jesuit possession.

what was said by his predecessor eight years ago in the Bull *Apostolicum*, in which two hundred Bishops concurred? In this Bull the Pope approved of our Institute and took it under his protection, he praised the members of this Society, and stated that it was persecuted only by heretics, unbelievers, and free-thinkers, that it was only they who desired its destruction and for no other reason than because this Order had defended the rights of the Holy See so vigorously and had opposed the errors of the time. Was the present Pope to contradict this because he has not the apostolic courage to oppose the libertines and infidels? And is it to be believed that the Head of the Catholic Church, an enlightened theologian, like the present Pope, will suddenly tear this great breach throughout the whole of Christendom by depriving it at a single blow of so many instructors of Christian youth in almost every Catholic city, of so many spiritual advisers, of so many heralds of the divine message in the pulpit, in the oratories, in the retreat houses, and by drying up the source of so many missionaries to the heretics, infidels, and savages? In this year alone they have converted a thousand Arians and other heretics in Transylvania. Is it not an outrageous injustice to a Vicar of Christ even to think him capable of creating such havoc in Catholic Christendom and of helping the enemies of the Church of Rome to gain such a triumph?"¹

On July 31st, the feast of the founder of the Order, Ricci had written to Cordara, "To-day, with God's help, we have celebrated the Feast of our holy father Ignatius with less pomp and ceremony but with the unusually large participation of the people. It was said that this would be the last time, but St. Peter was freed from his chains just as Herod was about to bring him forth to the people for execution."²

¹ P. TERMANINI, *Vita del P. Lorenzo Ricci, 84 seq. (ibid.). Cf. DUHR, *Ricci*, 85 seq.; CARAYON, *Ricci* (Paris, 1869), 79 seq. Many Jesuits hoped that the Order would be saved by the opposition of the Empress Maria Theresa and the other sovereigns attached to her; v. the *letter of the Assistant Gorgo to Belgrado, of May 5, 1773, in Jesuit possession.

² *Civiltà catt.*, 1927, III., 547.

No wonder that on reading the Brief Ricci was amazed ; but he retained full control of himself and when asked, on the Pope's orders, if he accepted the Brief, he replied that whatever the Pope decided must be sacred to everyone ; it did not need his concurrence.¹

At the same hour the Brief of suppression was made known to the Rectors of all the other colleges and houses of the Jesuits in Rome by prelates accompanied by armed escorts, and at the same time the archives, account offices, and sacristies of the Jesuits were sealed up by notaries. The Jesuits were forbidden to perform any ecclesiastical functions or to leave their houses until further notice. On August 17th the General Ricci was taken to the English College.²

The Brief of suppression, dated July 21st, which was not posted up in the usual places and of which it was impossible to obtain a printed copy in Rome as late as August 18th,³ opens with the following considerations : " Our Lord and Redeemer (*Dominus ac Redemptor*) Jesus Christ, who was preannounced and revealed as the Prince of Peace, committed his office of atonement to the care of the Apostles and conveyed to them the power of the word, so that they, as emissaries of Christ, who is the God of peace and love, not of dissension, might proclaim this peace to the whole world and that all begot in Christ might form one body and one soul. Thus it is above all the duty of the Pope, who administers Christ's office of atonement, to secure the peace of the Church and in this cause to sacrifice even those things which are personally dear to him. Assuredly the religious Orders are the best means of ensuring the welfare of the Church, but if an Order ceases to fulfil the mission entrusted to it, the Pope must revive it, reform it, or dissolve it." ⁴

This preface is followed by the body of the Brief composed

¹ Another phrasing, but of the same purport, is found in RUHR, *Ricci*, 87.

² See Moñino's *report mentioned above, p.284 , n. 1.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 340. DUHR, *Ricci*, 87.

⁴ We found the *original of the Brief of suppression in Sec. Brev. 3801, Clementis XIV. Divers., I., III., 1773, p. 130b *seqq.*

of three main parts : the first two are of a historical character intended to provide the grounds for the last one, which contains the actual enactments and the provisions made for their execution.

The first part, then, is a survey of the actions taken by the Popes in regard to the reform or extinction of religious Orders. To effect this purpose Clement XIV. goes back to the time of Innocent III. and then cites in chronological order the suppression of the Templars in 1312, of the Humiliati, of the Reformed Conventuals in 1626, the Order of SS. Ambrose and Barnabas *ad Nemus* in 1643, then the reform of the Poor Servants of the Mother of God of the Pious Schools in 1645, the suppression of the Order of St. Basil of Armenia in 1650, of the Priests of the Buon Gesù in 1651, of the Canons of St. George in Alga in Venice, of the Hieronymites of Fiesole, and of the Jesuati of St. John Colombino—these last three in 1668. On all these occasions the Pope had not adopted any regular judicial procedure, which would only have provoked further dissension, but had acted on his own authority “according to the dictates of prudence”, decreeing the suppression at a single stroke without leave of appeal or defence. With the same care (these words introduce the second part of the Brief), he too, Clement XIV., has informed himself about the origin, existence, and present state of the Society of Jesus.

At this point the Brief refers at length to the history of this Order, sketching it in broad strokes and treating it in a highly

Archives of the Briefs, Rome. It was frequently reproduced, on several occasions in Rome in 1773. The Papal ordinance was first drawn up as a Bull ; for its conversion into a Brief, *v. Sec. Brev.* 3801, *loc. cit.*, p. 119 : “*Die 18 Mai 1773 : Sanctissimus mihi consignavit minutam Bullae suppressionis Societatis Jesu et iussit, ut ea mutanda esset iuxta stylum literarum in forma Brevis.— Die 7 Junii 1773 : Facta huiusmodi mutatione eidem Sanctitati Suae consignavi minutam non solum dictae Bullae sed etiam Brevis.— Die 12 Augusti 1773 : Sanctitas Sua mihi restituit minutam tantum dicti Brevis a se subscriptam et mandavit ut in ea apponenda esset data diei 21 Iulii proximi praeteriti.”

one-sided manner. Everything good and favourable which should certainly have been said about the Order has been carefully passed over in silence, whereas the shady side has been proportionately accentuated. The assertion is made and an attempt made to prove it by evidence that "at the very birth of this Society there germinated manifold seeds of dissension and jealousy, and that not merely within itself but also against other Orders, against the secular priesthood, against academies, universities, public schools, and even against the princes in whose States the Jesuits had been received." ¹

Thus it is, the Brief proceeds to relate, that steps against the Order have been taken in Rome by individual princes from the earliest times. The inquiry undertaken by Sixtus V. at the urgent request of Philip II. of Spain unfortunately had to be left unfinished owing to his death. In spite of all the subsequent Papal decrees and privileges the accusations and disputes increased. The prohibition against Jesuits taking part in State affairs was of no more avail than the most recent confirmation of the Order—extorted rather than petitioned—by the Pope's predecessor, Clement XIII. Those princes "whose piety and magnanimity towards the Society of Jesus, inherited from their forefathers, is universally renowned" have indeed decreed the expulsion of the Society's members from their lands to preserve the unity of the Church, but for the sake of the lasting pacification of the whole Church they have insisted on the general suppression of the Order.

And so in the last part of the Brief Clement XIV. disposes of the Society in the following manner: "Since it can no longer bring forth the abundant fruits or be of the usefulness for which it was founded," also because "it is hardly, if at all, possible to restore a true and lasting peace to the Church as long as it remains in existence", and finally for other reasons "suggested to Us by the principles of prudence and which We retain concealed in Our breast", "after mature deliberation, with certain knowledge, and in the fulness of Our

¹ THEINER, *Gesch.*, 363.

apostolic power, We dissolve, suppress, extinguish, and abolish the said Society." ¹

The various executive instructions which follow correspond entirely with the eighteen points of the draft which the Pope accepted from Moñino's hands on September 6th, 1772.² The novices were to be released, the members of the Order who had taken simple but not solemn vows were to choose another occupation within a year, those who had taken solemn vows were to leave their houses and either enter another Order or place themselves under the direction of a Bishop as secular clerics; only when the first of these two alternatives was impossible might they reside in their houses as secular clerics until the premises were finally used for charitable purposes. Next come instructions concerning the hearing of confessions and preaching by the ex-Jesuits, with episcopal licence, their exclusion from schools and missions, their release from the vow of poverty, whereby they had been forbidden to accept benefices and Mass stipends, also the revocation of all the privileges and liberties which had been granted to them. Finally any attempt to lodge an appeal which would have a delaying effect, or to defend the Order by word or writing, was forbidden. The princes were asked to issue the necessary laws for the execution of the Brief, and the faithful were admonished to preserve peace and concord.

This Brief of July 21st, 1773, represented the most obvious victory of "enlightenment" and royal absolutism over the Church and its head, and for this reason, naturally enough, the most diverse judgments have been passed upon it. In the camp of the "enlighteners" and in the Bourbon Courts it was received with sheer joy, while the enemies of the Society praised it to the skies. A calmer and more sober judgment was reserved for recent times.

Of the Pope's authority to suppress the Order there can be no doubt, but whether the measure was justified, that is to say whether the motivation which was imposed on the Pope was sound enough and whether he personally was convinced

¹ *Ibid.*, 368 seq.

² For particulars, see above, p. 236.

of its justice, is another question. That the text of the Brief itself was conclusive evidence against the Society of Jesus must be firmly contested, for the signature on the document which was practically appended under duress is of no value for establishing the truth. The decisive step had already been taken by Clement XIV. on November 29th, 1772, when he gave his word to the King of Spain.¹ All former statements might have been considered as private expressions of opinion having no binding force, but this was in answer to an official request. Previously it might have been possible for him to utter a *non possumus* (which he never had the strength to do), but from that moment onwards his hands were tied. If any fact can be established by documentary evidence it is that the Pope was subjected to enormous moral pressure.

This, of course, does not answer the question, to what extent the Order was responsible for its fate and whether the mischief it caused really called for its reform or suppression. This is not the place to speak of the great services rendered by the disciples of St. Ignatius in the cause of the Catholic restoration and the missions. On the other hand, that there were many instances of individual failings cannot be denied: pronounced exclusiveness, for instance, and interference in political matters. There may well have been other discrepancies, such as those of a financial nature in the various houses, though these were of a purely local and personal character. But the Pope did not dissolve the Order on account of its immorality or its false doctrines or its relaxed discipline, but solely to preserve the peace of the Church.² It was tragic that precisely those princes who had gained most power, both internally and externally, through the work of the Jesuits and the Catholic restoration should have been misled by evil counsellors to use that power to wreck the Society. But that it aroused so much hostility among the "enlightened" was due, not to its lapses and failings, which might occur in any human undertaking, but to the realization that this was the

¹ See above, p. 248.

² I. B. WEISS, *Weltgeschichte*, XIII. 4, 78.

strongest bulwark of the Roman Church and that it had to be destroyed.¹

There still remains to be considered Clement XIV.'s personal attitude towards the Society of Jesus. The complaint was often raised by those who were in frequent contact with him that no one knew what the Pope really thought about the Order. In this respect his actions were no true guide. If he was convinced of the Jesuits' guilt and was sincerely opposed to them he would hardly have resisted for three years. If he thought them innocent he should have taken the part of the persecuted and harassed Order in a more energetic fashion. Cordara, who knew the Pope well and consistently tried to justify his conduct, was of the opinion² that at first Clement was a friend of the Jesuits. When he was promoted to Cardinal, he says, Clement XIII. called him a "Jesuit in Franciscan clothing". But in order to gain the Papacy Ganganelli thought it expedient to throw in his lot with the other side and he entered the conclave as an enemy of the Order. His behaviour there confirmed his adherents in their belief that as Pope he would certainly and quickly decree the suppression, but what actually happened was very different.

Was it that as Pope he felt a heavier responsibility in the matter than as an ambitious Cardinal? However that may be, he took care not to let his temporizing attitude, which became more and more suspicious as the affair approached its climax, appear too noticeable, and in his efforts to convince the importunate Bourbons of his zeal he overstretched himself. He still hoped to escape from the net that he himself had woven, but beginning with trifling concessions he allowed himself to be driven from one weakness to another, and the crowning tragedy was that the few counsellors to whom he lent an ear had been corrupted. He hesitated long before inflicting this deep wound on the Church; but there was no other way left. Why was it too that he dealt only with the

¹ BLUNTSCHLI (*Memoiren*, III., 249): "The attack on the Jesuit Order was a blow struck at the heart of Papal absolutism."

² CORDARA, 154 *seq.* Cf. above, pp. 84, 90.

princes, never with the dignitaries of the Church, never with the Bishops? Why too in a matter so important for the Church did he allow the decision to rest with the temporal Powers? ¹ And even after the Brief had been issued and he thought that it could not be revoked, Clement XIV. still continued his enigmatic attitude, showing remarkably little interest in the fate of the victims.

¹ “*Non vi è esempio d’un pontificato più grazioso per i principi e più umiliante per il sagro collegio del presente.” Brunati to Colloredo, August 13, 1774, State Archives, Vienna.

CHAPTER V.

THE RESTITUTION OF THE PAPAL TERRITORIES OF AVIGNON AND BENEVENTO—THE EXECUTION OF THE PAPAL BRIEF SUPPRESSING THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.

(1)

ALL the enemies of the Jesuit Order were filled with an indescribable joy when, after using every possible means to attain this end, they finally obtained its complete suppression. The greatest jubilation was in Portugal, where Pombal had initiated the persecution of the Jesuits and had set the example to France, Spain, and Naples. A special courier dispatched by Almada arrived in Lisbon with the Brief of suppression on September 6th, 1773, but its publication was postponed by King Joseph I. until he had received the nuncio, Cardinal Conti, on the following day.¹ The document was then announced to all Portuguese dominions by an order (*Carta de Lei*) of September 9th, signed by the king and all his Ministers. This order contained "the whole gamut of possible and impossible fables about the Jesuits": the Society of Jesus had given rise to nothing but revolutions, tumults, and dangerous scandal; no fewer than twenty-four Popes had tried to reform it; care should be taken lest there were still remnants and conventicles of it in existence, and lest there were people going about in Jesuit garb. Information about all

¹ " *Ieri al momento che comparve il corriere sospese il Re di palesarne al publico l'importanza, perchè si riserbò di riceverne prima da me officio. In fatti questa mattina nel presentarmi alla corte ho havuto su tale assunto colla M^{ta} Sua lunga sessione in dettaglio e si è poi resa publica l'autorevole decisione del S. Padre a contentamento di tutti i buoni." Conti to Pallavicini, Lisbon, September 7, 1773, Nunziat. di Portog. 119 A, Papal Secret Archives.

such things was to be laid with the law-court in Lisbon. A royal letter of the same date addressed to the Cardinal Patriarch and the Portuguese Bishops contained a request to execute the Brief and to organize demonstrations of delight.¹ The nuncio also commanded the Bishops to observe the regulations of the Brief with the utmost exactitude.²

The Government imparted a definitely ecclesiastical character to the celebrations.³ Although Pombal was confined by ill-health to his country seat at Oeyras he insisted on making the arrangements himself, down to the last detail⁴; after all, as the English envoy Robert Walpole wrote, was it not he who had been the first of his century openly to attack an Order which in Portugal as elsewhere, until Joseph I. ascended the throne, had wielded so great an influence?⁵ On Pombal's instructions a finely printed translation in Portuguese of the Brief of suppression was prepared and sent off along with the decree of September 9th.⁶

On September 29th and 30th and on October 1st a solemn service with *Te Deum* was held first in the patriarchal church, then in all the other churches of Lisbon. Out of regard for the Protestant envoys the diplomatic corps was not invited to the celebrations. The nuncio Conti, however, always ready to be

¹ *Collecção dos negocios de Roma*, III., 115 seq., 217. Cf. DUHR, *Charakteristik Pombals*, 447. With the sub-title "Impress. na Impressão Regia em Latim e Portuguez; e anda ordinariamente junta a todas as Collecções das Leis Estravagantes" the Brief of suppression was admitted into the body of Portuguese law (*Collecção da legislação Portuguesa*, ed. Ant. Delgado da Silva, III., 684.) The royal placet for the Brief, of September 9, 1773, *ibid.*, 709.

² *Collecção dos negocios*, 219. Cf. *Conti to Pallavicini, November 2, 1773, *loc. cit.*

³ *Pallavicini to Conti, October 28, 1773, *ibid.*

⁴ *Almodovar to Grimaldi, September 28, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 7303.

⁵ SMITH, *Memoirs*, II., 154.

⁶ *Conti to Pallavicini, September 21, 1773. Nunziat. di Portog., 116, *loc. cit.* Cf. DUHR, *loc. cit.*

of service, took part in them, to the great satisfaction of the Government. For the evenings of the said three days orders were given for the illumination of the whole city.¹

On September 14th Pombal authorized Almada to express to the Pope the king's thanks for the destruction of so pernicious an Order.² Besides this, on September 30th, Joseph I. addressed a special letter to Clement XIV., praising in emphatic phrases "the most highly enlightened, the exceedingly wise and decisive Brief".³ Charles III. too, in his letter of thanks, extolled the glory the Pope had gained and the service he had rendered not only to the Church but also to the State.⁴ On reading this message Clement XIV. was moved to tears.⁵ Similar messages were sent by Louis XV. of France and the King of Naples.⁶ Tanucci emphasized the merits of Charles III. and Moñino.⁷ The Spanish envoy in Venice, Squillace, wrote that it was due to Moñino that the janissaries of the Holy See, as Benedict XIV. had called the

¹ *Conti to Pallavicini, October 5, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 119 A;

*Almodovar to Grimaldi on the same day, *loc. cit.*, Estado 7303.

² *Collecção*, III., 218.

³ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁴ *Charles III. to Clement XIV., from S. Ildefonso, September 7, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁵ " *Il Papa piangeva leggendo la lettera di S.M^{ta} Catt." (Bontempi to Moñino, September 22, 1773, from Castel Gandolfo, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5043.) Cf. DANVILA, III., 540 *seq.*, where Clement XIV.'s letter to Charles III., of September 30, 1773, is also reproduced.

⁶ Louis XV.'s letter in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 386 (presented by Bernis on September 20, 1773; v. *Orsini to Tanucci, September 21, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Estado 4987); the *letter from King Ferdinand of Naples, of September 12, 1773, in the State Archives, Venice. In the *Regolari Gesuiti in the Papal Secret Archives the letter bears the date September 13, which is wrong, as it was sent by Tanucci to Orsini on the 12th; v. C. Farnes. 1481, State Archives, Naples.

⁷ *Tanucci to Azara, August 21, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021.

Jesuits, had been vanquished, destroyed, and annihilated.¹ This was also Grimaldi's view ; in a letter to Moñino of August 31st, 1773, he credited him with the whole glory of having suppressed the Jesuit Order.² Roda considered that Moñino had celebrated a greater triumph than any of the ancient Romans, for he had founded a new epoch, had given peace both to the Church and to the State, and had justified the Governments which had expelled the Jesuits.³ Moñino's accomplices, Azara and Bischi,⁴ and, above all, Bontempi, were duly rewarded. Instead of the 10,000 *scudi* that had been reserved for him,⁵ the Franciscan received a life pension of 1,500 *scudi*, which was to be kept secret and was to be debited to extraordinary expenses with no mention of any names.⁶

¹ *Squillace to Moñino, Venice, August 28, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² **Ibid.*, and Archives of Simancas, Estado 5043. Grimaldi's *letter to Moñino, of September 7, 1773 (*ibid.*), was also full of praise.

³ *Roda to Moñino, September 7, 1773: "No es razon, que guarde silencio en una ocasion en que tanto se interesa su honor y gloria de V. S. I. y es justamente aclamado. Ha conseguido V. S. I. un triunfo mayor que todos los que se conservan en las reliquias de los antiguos Romanos. Ha dado V. S. I. una epoca a la historia, que no se borrará jamas en los siglos venideros, y no se podia esperar en los tiempos pasados. V. S. I. se puede decir que ha dado la paz a la Iglesia y al Estado, y el honor a los cortes que expelieron los Jesuitas. El Rey está sumamente agradecido y lo ha explicado haciendole a V. S. I. Camarista de Castilla. Doy a V. S. I. mil enhorabuenas y al mismo tiempo gracias par lo que V. S. I. ha hecho a favor de n^{ro} Azara volviendo por su estimacion y decoro, para desagraciarlo de lo que ha padecido." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ DANVILA, III., 545 ; *Grimaldi to Moñino, September 7, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See above, pp. 248, 276, also *Grimaldi to Moñino, July 13, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁶ On August 26, 1773, Moñino *reported to Grimaldi that Bontempi had refused the 10,000 *scudi*, which were accordingly returned by Moñino on September 10 (*letter from Muzquiz,

As a mark of his gratitude King Charles III. assigned to his ambassador an important post in the law-court of Castile and conferred on him one of the noblest titles in the realm, the Count of Florida-Blanca.¹

Clement XIV. received many other acknowledgments of his work. A letter from Cardinal Malvezzi contained the following passage: "After all the toil, the sleepless nights, and the tears which the Brief has cost him, may the Pope now enjoy the glory and the universal approval."²

This wish, however, was not to be fulfilled. The restitution of the occupied Papal territories was to cause the Pope all kinds of trouble and painful insults.

His desire that the return of the Papal possessions precede the suppression had finally to be abandoned in face of the opposition of the Bourbon Courts. They pointed out that such a procedure was capable of an interpretation which would be most injurious to the Holy See and it would give rise to the suspicion that the Jesuits had been sacrificed for material interests.³ Moñino's project of avoiding the appearance of a barter by the Pope's acting as intermediary in the

Archives of Simancas, Estado 5043); *on September 7, 1773, Grimaldi agreed that he should have instead a secret pension of 1,500 *scudi* per annum; v. *Moñino's *letters of this date and of September 23, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

¹*Grimaldi to Moñino, September 5 and October 12, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Cf. THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 391; DANVILA, III., 544 *seq.* Grimaldi *wrote, *inter alia*, to Roda on September 5, 1773: "El Rey ha venido a conceder Plaza del Consejo de la Camara a Don Joseph Moñino, Ministro del Consejo, y interino de S. M. cerca la Santa Sede, en atencion a sus meritos y servicios, y particularmente a los que ha hecho desde que exerce al Ministerio de Roma: lo que de orden de S. M. participo a V. E. para que par su medio se expeda el decreto correspondiente." Archives of Simancas, Estado 5043. Cf. *Moñino to Grimaldi, on September 28, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

²*Malvezzi to Clement XIV., September 1, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti.

³ARNETH, IX., 95.

dispute between the Infante Ferdinando, Duke of Parma, and Charles III., was frustrated by the opposition offered by Louis XV.¹ Nevertheless, if such an impression was not to be given, Parma would have to supply the pretext, it being Clement XIII.'s quarrel with the Duke of Parma which had led to the occupation of Avignon by French troops and of Benevento by Neapolitan ones.²

As before, the greatest difficulties were presented by Tanucci's attitude, he being bent on retaining Benevento at all costs. His manœuvrings irritated even Moñino.³ Having failed to persuade the French to retain Avignon, Tanucci now tried to spread the idea that it was Spain which objected to the restitution of the Papal territories.⁴

This was entirely contrary to the facts. Actually Charles III. wrote so firmly to the King of Naples on the subject of Benevento that Naples had to yield. Tanucci then tried to procure special advantages for Naples, especially in regard to the rights to Castro.⁵ On August 23rd Cardinal Orsini read the Pope a letter from Tanucci which said that to show his gratitude for the suppression of the Jesuit Order the King of Naples was ready to surrender Benevento and Pontecorvo while reserving his rights to these territories as well as to Castro and Ronciglione. This came as a painful surprise to the Pope, who said that the question of restitution would first have to be settled in agreement with France and Spain. He stressed at the same time that it must not appear to be the price paid for

¹ Cf. above, p. 277.

² MASSON, 231.

³ In his *letter to Grimaldi of August 5, 1773, Moñino stressed Tanucci's contradictory attitude. Tanucci wanted to retain Benevento, but he, Moñino, had his doubts "de que se usasse del medio de la retencion . . . para obtener la supresion." In another *letter written to Grimaldi on the same day Moñino deplored Tanucci's persistent equivocation in the restitution question. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Tanucci to Caracciolo, August 7, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ *Tanucci to Moñino, July 31 and August 14, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021; MASSON, 231. Cf. above, p. 278, n. 1.

the suppression of the Jesuits.¹ When Orsini, speaking for Tanucci, said on this occasion that Moñino was in agreement, he was not telling the truth. Moñino, like Grimaldi,² no more approved of Tanucci's clumsy manœuvre³ than he did of the French Cabinet's demand for the prior settlement of all differences of a material nature affecting Avignon.⁴ Convinced of the necessity of avoiding everything that might lead the outside world to suppose that the restitution was by way of compensation for the suppression, he proposed on August 25th to the French king that he agree to the unconditional return of the territory. Louis XV.'s inability to adopt this proposal was due solely to his reluctance to be a party to the untruth that Clement XIII.'s procedure had been caused by the Jesuits. But he was in complete agreement with Spain that any suspicion of chaffering must be avoided by the Duke of Parma's providing some excuse for the restitution.⁵ He therefore approved of the proposal submitted by the Spanish Cabinet that the duke should ask the three Bourbon kings to agree to the restitution, which seemed to be facilitated by the letter written in his own hand by Ferdinand of Naples on September 12th, thanking the Pope for the suppression and offering the

¹ *Tanucci to Orsini, August 21, 1773, *to Grimaldi, August 24, *to Charles III., also on August 24, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021, 6106; MASSON, 232.

² In a *letter to Moñino of August 31, 1773, Grimaldi stressed that it must not appear to the world as if the restitution was a reward for the suppression. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Cf. also *Grimaldi to Aranda on September 27, 1773, where he says that after the suppression the restitution must also take place; but it was necessary "que no parezca ser un medio de pagar la providencia de la extincion o que el Santo Padre la haya exigido como condicion precisa: pues de ello resultaria poco honor a Su Santidad y a los mismos soberanos". Archives of Simancas, Estado 4590.

³ *Moñino to Tanucci, August 17 and 18, 1773, *ibid.*, Estado 5233.

⁴ *Moñino to Grimaldi, December 30, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ MASSON, 233.

immediate and unconditional return of Benevento and Pontecorvo.¹ To make things easier, Aiguillon suggested that Clement XIV. should send the Duchess of Parma the Golden Rose, whereupon the Duke was to ask for the restitution. The Pope, however, would not adopt this proposal, being unwilling to recognize the Infante as the Duke of Parma until he had asked for his enfeoffment by the Holy See.² When the Infante was finally reconciled with Charles III. the Pope sent cordial letters of congratulation to the Spanish and French monarchs.³ Tanucci now began to beat a retreat, and tried to excuse himself to Charles III.⁴ On October 23rd the Infante wrote an encouraging letter to Clement XIV. on the subject of the restitution.⁵ On November 6th he asked the kings of Spain, France, and Naples to restore the occupied territories to the Pope.⁶ On the Pope's return from Castel Gandolfo the King of Naples, obeying the instructions of his father, Charles III., repeated his offer of September to surrender Benevento and Pontecorvo. Cardinal Bernis, who had still not received any direct instruction from his Government to

¹ See Ferdinand's letter of September 12, 1773 (mentioned above, on p. 295, n. 6), to which Clement XIV. did not reply till December 28.

² MASSON, *loc. cit.* In his *letter from Fontainebleau, of October 22, 1773, Aranda pointed out to Grimaldi that such presentations as the Golden Rose were made, according to custom, only to independent sovereigns. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ THEINER, *Epist.*, 268 *seq.* Charles III.'s *acknowledgment, of October 5, 1773, in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Tanucci to Charles III., October 5, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021. *Ibid.*, another *letter of Tanucci's to Charles III., of October 12, 1773, in which he made much of his intention to prevent the whole odium of the suppression falling on Spain.

⁵ *The Duke of Parma to Clement XIV., October 23, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5208.

⁶ *Letter from the Duke of Parma to Charles III., Colorno, November 6, 1773, *ibid.* *Ibid.*, Charles III.'s *reply, of December 7, 1773.

offer the return of Avignon, was all the more embarrassed by Clement's showing his displeasure at this silence.¹ The Pope responded to the Infante's overture by sending him a letter of thanks on December 2nd, but avoided using the ducal title.² On December 7th Aiguillon instructed Bernis to negotiate with the Pope on the return of Avignon in concert with the Spanish ambassador. The Cardinal, without waiting for any further instructions from Paris, arranged with the Spanish and Neapolitan envoys that they should inform the Pope verbally that His Most Christian Majesty, by reason of his attachment to and his filial respect for the Holy Father and the Holy See, and out of regard for the mediation of the Infante Ferdinando, was resolved from that moment to transfer the occupation of Avignon and the county of Venaissin to a delegate appointed by the Pope. In the future the Pope was to possess the States as his predecessors had done, without prejudice to the rights of the French crown.³

When Cardinals Bernis and Orsini communicated this statement to the Pope on December 20th, he showed great satisfaction with it, but made it clear that this act of pure magnanimity and duty on the part of the king ought no longer to have the appearance of a negotiation and that he accordingly already regarded the Franco-Spanish proposal as a definite declaration and as a matter that was settled.⁴

Meanwhile, however, a dispatch from Paris had arrived in Rome making the restoration of Avignon dependent on the settlement of certain awkward points of dispute, such as the free passage of goods destined for the Dauphiné. This greatly embarrassed Bernis, and Moñino too saw that it was impossible now to make any such terms. The Pope in fact informed Bernis that the surrender must take place quite simply and without any conditions and must not be postponed any longer

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 418 ; MASSON, 234.

² THEINER, *Epist.*, 271.

³ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 419.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 420. *Orsini to Tanucci, December 21, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³¹⁰/₁₀₃₅.

on any pretext. He intended, he said, to entrust the administration of the legation of Avignon to the former nuncio to Poland, Angelo Maria Durini, who was *persona grata* to Louis XV., and to instruct him to fulfil every reasonable wish of the king's, to put down every kind of contraband, and to compensate with pensions the officials who would lose their employment as a result of the transfer.¹

Contrary to his wont, Clement XIV. now acted with the greatest celerity. By Briefs of December 28th, 29th, and 30th, he conveyed to the kings of Naples, France, and Spain his joy and gratitude for their assurance of the speedy return of his States.² At the same time he thanked the Infante Ferdinando for his mediation.³ And he went still further. In his Brief to the Infante he spoke of the surrender as if it had already taken place and he decided to announce it in the most solemn manner and to celebrate it with the greatest pomp. In his eagerness to bring about an accomplished fact he quite overlooked how little the affair had redounded so far to the honour of the Holy See. Diplomats such as the Venetian ambassador, who had had no part in the affair, did not conceal their opinion of such a procedure. "Just as the suppression of the Jesuit Order is generally considered to be of little advantage to the Holy See, it having been carried through by

¹ MASSON, 235 *seq.* On September 30, 1773, Orsini had *reported to Tanucci that now not a Vice-Legate, but a President, was to be sent to Avignon, as to Urbino, and that a Neapolitan would be sent to Benevento as Governor. State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1481.

² THEINER, *Epist.*, 277 *seq.*, 279 *seq.*, 281 *seq.* *Orsini to Tanucci, December 28 and 31, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma 10³¹⁰/₅₅.

³ The Brief of December 30, 1773, which is missing from Theiner, is in the Archives of Simancas, Estado 5208. *Cf. Vita di Clemente XIV.*, Venezia, 1775, 129 *seq.* In the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome it bears the date September 28. Ferdinand *wrote on January 6, 1774, to Clement XIV.: "Quando era per scrivere al Papa annunziando che i tre sovrani Borboni fanno di buon cuore le restituzioni, viene il secondo Breve che anticipa i ringraziamenti." *Loc. cit.*, Estado 5208.

the Bourbons," Tiepolo wrote to the Doge on January 15th, 1774, "it is not to be expected that the Pope will gain much from the restitution, but he persists in celebrating it."¹ Nor would he be diverted from his purpose even when France raised such obstacles as to disconcert Grimaldi.²

On January 17th, 1774, a Consistory was held for the sole purpose of considering the question of the restitution. In a verbose address Clement announced to the Cardinals the great event. "Of their own free will," he told them, "Our beloved sons Louis of France and Ferdinand of Naples prevail upon Us to re-enter into Our former possessions of Avignon, Venaissin, Benevento, and Pontecorvo, and they conduct Us back there again with their own hands, in the most loving fashion. In no man has the desire to increase his possessions been so great as their joy and generosity in handing back to Us the rights and the property of the Church." Their decisions were supported, he said, by King Charles of Spain, who, together with the Infante of Parma, was covered with the most fulsome praise. And it was not only the princes who were accorded the highest praise imaginable for their piety and wisdom but also the envoys. The second part of the address announced the thanksgivings which the Pope had ordered to be made to God.³

If Clement expected his speech to make a deep impression he was greatly mistaken. All the reports agree that, apart

¹ *State Archives, Venice.

² *Grimaldi to Aranda, January 17, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5233.

³ The text of the speech in THEINER, *Epist.*, 283 *seqq.*, corresponds to a contemporary printed version. Cf. *Bull. Cont.*, V., 678. What Conti *wrote about the allocution to Pallavicini on February 22, 1774, was characteristic: "Niente si potrebbe immaginare di più eroico che l'espressivo ritratto fatto da N. S. della pietà dei sovrani, niente di più glorioso può augurarsi al trono pontificio che l'affettuosa concorrenza di tutti a celebrare il nome del Sommo Pastore dopo una epoca bastantemente equivoca sul punto della reciproca tranquillità." Nunziat. di Portogallo 120, Papal Secret Archives.

from Cardinals Corsini and Marefoschi, the members of the Sacred College received it in a "chilly silence".¹ This was yet another matter in which their advice had not been sought and they now observed that the restitution had only been promised and had not yet taken place; they scented also secret agreements that were prejudicial to the Holy See.²

When the Consistory had concluded the Pope went in solemn procession to the church of SS. Apostoli, where the *Te Deum* was intoned. Two pompous inscriptions in praise of Clement XIV. had been affixed to the façade of the basilica,³

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, January 18 and 21, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1223; *Brunati to Colloredo, January 22, 1774, State Archives, Vienna. Moñino also brings out in his *report to Grimaldi of January 20, 1774, the "insensibilidad" both of the Sacred College and the people towards the restitution. Archives of Simancas, Estado 4086. Tanucci *wrote to Losada on January 25, 1774, "Fu notabile il silenzio e il niuno applauso dei cardinali infetti dalla scabbia Gesuitica eccettuati Corsini e Marefoschi." *Ibid.*, Estado 6022.

² See Centomani's *letter of January 21, 1774, mentioned in the foregoing note.

³ The inscriptions on the basilica of the Twelve Apostles ran as follows: "Clemens XIV. P. O. M. omnium virtutum exemplar et praeium; scientiarum amplificator et custos; Regum conservator et vindex; Ecclesiasticorum patronus et iudex; Dilectae Christi Sponsae iura disciplinam candorem integritatem inter maxima temporum morum legum discrimina ita servat atque tuetur ut nulli Pontificum Regum Principum secundus ubique locorum fulgeat sapientia pietate prudentia. — Clemens XIV. P. M. ex inclita divi Francisci ordinis Minorum Conventualium familia nullo humano favore sed peculiari divino consilio ad regendam et gubernandam Petri navim in medio mari aquarum impetu diu concussam, cunctis suffragiis evector pietate doctrina prudentia dexteritate ab imminente periculo liberavit ac solus super frementes undas suis ipsis manibus salvam et incolumem in portum veritatis et unitatis reduxit fluctuum inde ventorumque ingentem vim ita composuit ut facta sit tranquillitas magna perpetuo duratura." State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1223.

and these, like his exuberant allocution, were sharply criticized.¹ On the following day, the Feast of St. Peter's Chair, the *Te Deum* was sung again in St. Peter's, whence the Pope drove back in his carriage with Cardinals Bernis and Orsini.² On these two evenings the city was brilliantly illuminated,³ but there was no sign of any genuine rejoicing on the part of the people. In his progress through the city the Pope had not been cheered by the onlookers⁴; the only cries that were heard were rather of a threatening nature, attributable to the bad material conditions that prevailed. It was only the taking of timely and stringent measures that prevented a rising of the bakers, which was to break out on January 18th, when the Pope was proceeding to St. Peter's.⁵ Naturally all this greatly distressed the Pope, but he was not to be deterred from his course of action. On January 19th he communicated his allocution, accompanying it with still more praises, to the Bourbons and to the Empress Maria Theresa and Joseph II.⁶ At the same time he authorized the Archbishops of Avignon

¹ See Centomani's *letter of January 21, 1774, mentioned above in n. 1, p. 304.

² Centomani commented on the incident in his *letter of January 18, 1774 (see above, p. 304, n. 1): "Il Papa volle associarvi Orsini e Bernis umiliandoli più tosto che dando loro onori."

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, January 18 and 19, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{313}{1035}$; *Moñino to Grimaldi, January 20, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5233; *Azara to Grimaldi, January 20, 1774, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, January 22, 1774: "Ne nel Sacro Collegio si sa' esservi stata alcuna dichiarazione di compiacenza, ne nel popolo . . . si sentì alcuna voce di acclamazione." State Archives, Venice. Brunati also *reported to Colloredo on January 22, 1774: "Pare incredibile l'indifferenza di quasi tutta Roma nelle pubbliche dimostrazioni fatte dal Papa per la recupera di Avignone, Benevento e Ponte Corvo. Si fosse intesa una sola voce di Eviva e di publico applauso!" State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ *Centomani to Tanucci, January 25, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1223.

⁶ THEINER, *Epist.*, 287 seq.; *ibid.*, 354, Joseph II.'s reply.

and Benevento to take possession in his name of the surrendered lands.¹

It was soon apparent that all these arrangements were sadly premature, for the actual surrender of the territories was delayed to an extent which no one thought to be possible. Where the obstacles lay was known only to those immediately concerned. The Venetian ambassador Tiepolo described the behaviour of the Bourbons in this question of the restitution as absolutely enigmatic.² As no precise information was available it was thought that the affair was developing pretty badly for the Holy See.³ Always prone to satire, the Romans now observed that the Pope seemed to have been swindled even over the price to be paid for the suppression of the Jesuits.⁴

The surrender of Avignon was hindered by the French Government's refusal to revoke the changes in the administration it had introduced during the occupation. The chief trouble was that the Parlement of Avignon, like all the other Parlements in France, had been suspended, and its restoration would have meant a serious reverse for Aiguillon. No definite statement on this question could be extracted from the Pope.⁵ To no one was this *contretemps* more welcome than to the old enemy of France, the artful Tanucci, who in his turn delayed the surrender of Benevento. On January 25th, 1774, he had given orders for this to take place,⁶ for which he had

¹ *Pallavicini to Doria, January 19, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Francia 461; *Orsini to Tanucci, February 1, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{313}{1055}$. Cf. THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 467.

² *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, January 29, 1774, *loc. cit.*

³ *Brunati to Colloredo, January 22, 1774, *loc. cit.*

⁴ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 468.

⁵ MASSON, 237. For Clement XIV.'s attempts to recover Avignon in the same way as Alexander VIII. had recovered it in 1689, v. *Cifra al Nunzio Doria, of January 26, 1774, Nunziat. di Francia 461, Papal Secret Archives.

⁶ Tanucci *reported to Charles III. on January 25, 1774, that the relevant orders were being issued that evening. Archives of Simancas, Estado 6107.

been duly thanked by the Pope, who then issued his instructions for the taking over¹; but two days later Tanucci made it dependent on the surrender of Avignon.² A Papal commissary had already taken possession of Pontecorvo, but this had not yet happened at Benevento owing to the absence of the Archbishop Francesco Pacca, who had been authorized to take possession and who died on February 13th, 1774.³

Paris was extremely angry with the Neapolitan minister. Louis XV. and Aiguillon described Tanucci as the most mischievous, mendacious caviller that had ever walked the earth.⁴ The Spanish king also was highly annoyed by the delay in the handing over of Benevento⁵ and absolutely refused to hear of any conditions being attached to the surrender of Avignon. Whatever was necessary to put things into order there, said Grimaldi, could be settled later.⁶

The firmness with which Charles III. insisted on the return of Benevento and his dissatisfaction with Tanucci's conduct, of which Tanucci was made aware, were such that the latter

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, January 28, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³¹³/₁₀₈₈.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 467. The date given here, January 17, is wrong; the right one is given in the German edition, II., 465.

³ GAMS, *Series*, 673; ZIGARELLI, *Storia di Benevento*, Napoli, 1860, 165. Joannes de Vita, Bishop of Rieti, was nominated as Pacca's successor. If he, commented Centomani in a *letter to Tanucci on February 22, 1774, "non si fosse mostrato terziario [pro-Jesuit], al pari di Mgr. di Liguori vescovo di S. Agata, sarebbe degno soggetto per dottrina e costume." State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1223.

⁴ MASSON, 238. Tanucci accused Aiguillon as well as Bernis of trickery in the matter of the restitution; see *Moñino to Grimaldi, February 17, 1774. Archives of Simancas, Estado 4986.

⁵ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 468; DANVILA, III., 550.

⁶ At Grimaldi's request Aranda *wrote to Aiguillon on February 2, 1774, that the restitution of Avignon must take place "sans y mettre aucune condition ni restriction laissant pour après les arrangements que l'on prétend". Archives of Simancas, Estado 5233.

had to give way. He admitted that he had misled the King of Naples with his advice and begged Charles's pardon ;¹ on March 23rd, 1774, he had the city and district of Benevento evacuated.²

The return of Avignon and the Venaissin was decided on at the same time, but the Pope had to allow the administration introduced by France to remain unchanged. The commandant of the county, the Marquis Rochechouart, released the inhabitants from their oath of loyalty to Louis XV. on April 25th, replaced the arms of France by the Papal ones, and then departed with his troops.³ When the news of this reached Rome on May 3rd, Bernis and Durini hurried to the Pope,⁴ who sent a letter of thanks to Louis XV. on the next day.⁵ Clement XIV.'s joy was so great that he decided to send the Spanish king a valuable cameo depicting Moses' brazen serpent in the desert.⁶ But the hapless Pope was to have even this joy embittered. Hardly had the French troops withdrawn when the newly-appointed Vice-President of the county, the

¹ *Tanucci to Charles III., March 15, 1774, *ibid.*, Estado 6107.

² *Orsini to Tanucci, March 25, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{313}{1033}$; *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice on March 26, 1774 (it is thought here that Tanucci has delayed so much with Benevento because he did not want to make restitution before France), State Archives, Venice ; *Tanucci to Azara, March 26, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6022 ; *communication of March 26, 1774, *ibid.*, Estado 5784. In a *letter to Tanucci of April 12 Charles III. expressed his satisfaction with the restitution of Benevento by the King of Naples (*ibid.*, Estado 6069).

³ MASSON, 238. The *Lettres patentes* for the restoration of Avignon were issued from Versailles on April 10, 1774. Copy in the State Archives, Venice. The letter of thanks to Aiguillon, dated April 20, 1774, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 303 *seq.*

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, May 3, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1224. ⁵ THEINER, *Epist.*, 304 *seq.*

⁶ MASSON, *loc. cit.* Moñino was already reporting to Grimaldi on April 28, 1774, that the Pope "muestra un reconocimiento bivissimo a los officios del Rey que supone con razon ser la causa verdadera del buen efecto". Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

Archbishop of Avignon, Francesco Maria de' Manzi, abolished all the offices set up during the occupation and restored the administration to the condition in which it was on June 11th, 1768. This Aiguillon refused to tolerate. He demanded the nullification of Manzi's ordinances and the deposition of Manzi himself as Vice-President. In vain Bernis advised him to rest content with the fulfilment of the first of these demands. Aiguillon insisted on both of them and by means of threats forced Clement to give way entirely. The Pope had to acquiesce not only in Manzi's banishment but also in the reconversion of the whole administration by Doria, the nuncio to Paris, to the state it was in before the surrender.¹ The matter was not finally settled until well after the death of Louis XV. on May 10th, 1774.² It had cost Clement XIV. so much anxiety

¹ MASSON, 238 *seqq.* In his *report to Grimaldi of May 12, 1774, Moñino attributed the blame to Manzi (*ibid.*). Grimaldi *replied on May 31, 1774, that he approved of Manzi's action being repudiated, but why had the Pope not made things clear to him in advance ("prevenido claramente")? (*ibid.*). Tiepolo *reported on May 28, 1774, that the Archbishop of Avignon had not been made acquainted with the secret articles (State Archives, Venice). Doria took his auditor with him to Avignon, in consequence of which there is a big gap in the *nunciature reports, extending to August 17, 1774; *v.* Nunziat. di Francia 461, Papal Secret Archives.

² Clement XIV.'s anxiety about Avignon was *reported by Tiepolo on July 2, 1774. On July 9 he *reported on the difficult situation that had been brought about in Avignon by the nuncio Doria, who could not leave the nunciature without offending to some extent the royal family and the King of Spain. On August 6 he *wrote of the extraordinarily confused state of affairs in Avignon (State Archives, Venice). The matter was settled by Aiguillon's successor, Vergennes, in August, 1774; *v.* MASSON, 239. Clement XIV. sent a letter of condolence to Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette on June 1, 1774 (THEINER, *Epist.*, 309 *seqq.*), announced the death of Louis XV at a consistory on the 6th (allocution in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 315 *seq.*; *cf.* *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, June 11, 1774, State Archives, Venice), and at the exequies had a funeral oration delivered by Lelio Falconieri in

that even in February, 1774, fears were entertained of his health. What particularly distressed him was the many rumours and conjectures on the question of the restitution, whereby nearly always the accusation was made that he had allowed himself to be betrayed by his egotism and the cunning of the envoys. It was said quite openly in Rome that the Society of Jesus had been sold in exchange for Avignon and Benevento.¹ The conditions imposed by France were universally thought to be severe.² Fault was found too with the far-reaching concessions made by Clement XIV. to the Spanish king with regard to the tribunal of the Madrid nunciature. Further complaints were made about the economic conditions in Rome.³ The feeling of the Romans was shown on the occasion of the Pope's procession to the Minerva in the spring of 1774: almost the whole of the aristocracy and all the Cardinals absented themselves on the plea of rainy weather.⁴ Later the Pope's uneasiness was enhanced by the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the new nuncio to Madrid, Aloisio Valenti Gonzaga,⁵ and the difficulties encountered in putting into effect the Brief suppressing the Society of Jesus.⁶

the Quirinal (*v.* *Tiepolo to the Doge, July 9, 1774, *ibid.*). The exequies, organized by Bernis with great pomp, took place on July 28 in S. Luigi dei Francesi. MASSON, 269 *seq.*

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 468 *seq.*

² *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, March 30 and May 7, 1774, State Archives, Venice.

³ **Id.*, February 2, 1774, *ibid.*

⁴ **Id.*, April 16, 1774, *ibid.*

⁵ **Id.*, June 16, *ibid.* For the Spanish nunciature, see above, p. 188. A Valenti Gonzaga, formerly nuncio to Switzerland, who had been appointed to Madrid as far back as August 28, 1773 (THEINER, *Epist.*, 263), arrived there on December 17, 1773 (THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 318), but Tiepolo was still reporting on the "cose imbarazzatissime della nunziatura in Hispania" on August 6, 1774 (*loc. cit.*). It was only in one of his last Briefs, of September 8, 1774, that Clement XIV. was in a position to thank Charles III. for settling the matter of the Spanish nunciature. THEINER, *Epist.*, 325.

⁶ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, April 16, 1774, *loc. cit.*

(2)

These difficulties were not anticipated by Clement XIV., especially after the Jesuit General Ricci and his Assistants, to his surprise, had submitted to the order of dissolution immediately and without protest, and the sudden and energetic measures taken had been accepted without disturbance by the people of Rome in spite of their affection for the Jesuits.¹ The Congregation of Cardinals constituted for the purpose of executing the suppression had made careful and precise preparations² and in carrying out the decision taken both Alfani and Macedonio showed the most creditable zeal.³ By the morning of August 17th not a single Jesuit was able to function in any of the churches of his Order. All of these churches remained closed except the Gesù, S. Ignazio, and S. Apollinare, where the ecclesiastical duties were taken over respectively by the Capuchins, the Minorites, and a secular priest. The office of the Penitentiaries of St. Peter's, which the Augustinians had striven with the greatest energy to secure for themselves, was transferred to the Franciscan Conventuals.⁴

On August 17th the commissaries of the Congregation of Cardinals reported on their activities in the Roman Seminary, in the German, Greek, and Scots Colleges, and in the Casa di Trastevere, where the Jesuits expelled from Portugal were

¹ **Id.*, August 21, 1773, *ibid.*; *Centomani to Tanucci, August 20, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1223. Even so ardent an opponent of the Jesuits as the Augustinian General Vasquez acknowledged in his *letter to Roda, of August 19, 1773, that Ricci "y todo su sinedrio se sujetaron a la intimacion con toda resignacion a la voluntad de Su Santidad y de Dios". Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez III.

² **Giornale dell'esecuzione del Breve*, compiled by Fr. Rhomberg, in t. VI., Regolari, Gesuiti, Papal Secret Archives.

³ For Alfani, see *Centomani to Tanucci, August 20, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1223. For Macedonio, see "Almada" in *Collecção*, III., 182; cf. *ibid.*, 183.

⁴ Brief of August 10, 1774, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 775; *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, August 21, 1773, *loc. cit.*

accommodated. These and all the other Jesuit establishments were occupied in the name of the Holy See, and the valuables and papers found there were sequestrated.¹ No resistance was offered anywhere ; in every case the Fathers complied with the orders given.² In the Germanicum the pupils were admonished to obey the will of the Vicar of Christ, to refrain from any expression lacking respect, either among themselves or in their letters home, and to behave as submissive sons of the Holy See.³ The powers of the Cardinal Protectors had been suspended by the Pope and had been transferred to the aforesaid Congregation.⁴

All the Jesuits in Rome were confined to their houses, which were occupied by soldiers, for eight days, while the secular dress they now had to wear was being got ready for them.⁵

On August 18th the Congregation of Cardinals, when transmitting the Brief of suppression to all the Bishops in the world, attached to it a special circular letter containing instructions for carrying it out. According to one of its clauses the various properties of the Jesuits were to be seized in the name of the Holy See and held at its disposal.⁶ Naturally this exasperated the representatives of the States which had seized the properties of the Jesuits at the time of their expulsion. Moñino was especially offended, as this regulation of the Congregation of Cardinals directly contradicted the previous arrangement which Maria Theresa had made with the Pope through the mediation of the King of Spain.⁷ Through Zelada he complained bitterly to the Pope. Alarmed by Almada's indignant attitude,⁸

¹ See the **Giornale* mentioned above in n. 2, p. 311.

² *Pallavicini to Caprara, August 21, 1773, Nunziat. di Colonia, Papal Secret Archives.

³ STEINHUBER, II., 180.

⁴ *Macedonio to Borgia, August 16, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda in Rome.

⁵ See the **Giornale* mentioned above in n. 2, p. 311.

⁶ Text in *Collecção*, III., 186 seq.

⁷ ARNETH, IX., 101.

⁸ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, August 27, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

Clement now explained that it was only a question of the Jesuit properties in the States of the Church, excused the offending clause on the plea that it was of a purely formal nature, without prejudice to the rights of the sovereigns, and ordered the Congregation to withdraw the circular letter.¹ Another factor which necessitated this was that in Turin and Milan the clause had caused a suspension of the execution of the Brief. The *contretemps*, which was not easily smoothed over, left a most unpleasant impression, the Spanish agent Azara regarding it as another instance of "Rome's bad faith".²

Another difficulty arose from the dispatch by the Congregation of Cardinals on August 22nd to the Propaganda of a case of sealed instructions for missionaries throughout the world, with the order to forward it immediately to its destination. Zelada drew the attention of Propaganda to this procedure being contrary to the Brief of suppression, in which the Pope had expressly reserved to himself the right of sending instructions to the missions.³ Clement, however, waived his right on this occasion and committed to Propaganda the charge of making out the necessary instructions.⁴

There was a second point in which a departure was made from the stipulations of the Brief of suppression. The Brief left it to the judgment of the Bishops to grant or refuse the Jesuits powers to hear confessions and to preach. On September 1st, however, the Pope, acting through the Congregation of the Bishops and Regular Clergy, forbade all the Bishops of the States of the Church to employ the Jesuits on such

¹ *Moñino to Almada, August 25, 1773, *Collecção*, III., 187; *Moñino to Grimaldi, August 26, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. See also *Moñino to Mahony, August 21, 1773, *ibid.* For Moñino's exertions, see also *Grimaldi to Almodovar, September 9, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 7308; *Orsini to Tanucci, August 30/31, 1773, *ibid.*, Estado 4987.

² *Azara*, II., 440 *seq.*

³ *Letter from the Propaganda to Zelada, August 22, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda in Rome.

⁴ *Macedonio to Borgia, August 24, 1773, *ibid.*

pastoral duties or for educational purposes, unless they had first obtained his permission.¹

Before the Brief of suppression had been published the Augustinian General Vasquez had written to Roda that it was above all necessary to proceed against the ex-General and to render him incapable of having any communication with his adherents.² And in fact action was taken on these lines. Whereas from August 24th onwards the other Fathers were allowed out again in secular dress, the General and his Assistants were kept back in the English College.³ This was all the more remarkable seeing that Ricci had submitted himself unreservedly to an authoritative decision, which had been carried out without an inquiry, interrogation, or the concurrence of an advocate.

This heroic bearing of the former General was not imitated, it must be said, by all the Jesuits. In their indignation at the decree of suppression, they so far forgot themselves as to utter insults and imprecations not only against the Spanish

¹ Text of the letter in the *Vita di Clemente XIV.*, Venezia, 1775, 115 *seqq.*; *Orsini to Tanucci, August 31, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1055}$; *Orsini to Moñino, August 26, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5043, and *on September 3, 1773, *ibid.*, 4987; *Moñino to Grimaldi, September 2, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. According to Tanucci's *report to Orsini, of September 7, 1773, King Ferdinand of Naples thought that the order ought to be enforced all over the world. State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes, 1481. For Germany, see below, pp. 352 *seqq.*

² It was necessary, above all, he *wrote in his letter of July 22, 1773, "de asegurar el P. Ricci de modo que viva gozando de todos los bienes de este mundo, pero incapaz de comunicacion alguna con Jesuitas de sotana, de capilla y de spada." Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez III.

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 24, 1772, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4987, and another *letter to the same person on the same date, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1055}$. On September 2, 1773, Moñino *reported to Grimaldi that all the Roman Jesuits were now dressed as abbés and that many had left their houses. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

king as being the author of the measure but even against the Pope.¹ Although these Fathers were not distinguished for their knowledge or their virtue they were readily listened to by both the nobles and the common folk.² This was equally the case with the prophecies then in circulation, according to which the Jesuits would shortly rise again. Prominent in this connection was the Dominican nun Maria Teresa Poli of Valentano, who, though she had formerly foretold that the Pope would never suppress the Order, still found many credulous listeners, among them the ex-Jesuits of Turin.³ When Teresa Poli foretold the early death of the Pope⁴ and her prophecies were circulated in the course of time throughout Italy, the Pope was compelled to cause the Inquisition to take proceedings against her.⁵ The ex-Jesuits and their friends who had allowed themselves to be deluded by a woman's fantasies did no good service to their cause,

¹ CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 159.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁴ MASSON, 290.

⁵ The process was instituted by Clement XIV., in July, 1774 (*v.* *Alfani to Macedonio, June 8, 1774, *Regolari, Gesuiti II.*, Papal Secret Archives, and *Biglietti all' Abate Pacifici, *ibid.*), and continued and concluded under Pius VI.; *v.* *Grimaldi to Roda, March 25, 1776, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5061, with the attached decree of the Cardinals of the Inquisition Torrigiani, Castelli, Rezzonico, Colonna, Boschi, and Antonelli. Involved in the process were some ex-Jesuits, Mayoli, Poli's confessor, and Azzaloni, the confessor of the peasant woman Bernardina Renzi, the second chief prophetess, and Antonio Venizza and Coltraro, who were in correspondence with Mayoli and Azzaloni; *v.* BOERO, II., 111. The Inquisition found the accused guilty of "grande imprudencia, temeridad y soberbia y un espiritu refractario a las constituciones de la Sede Apostolica y sedicioso contra los principes". The accused women were given spiritual punishments, likewise the Jesuits; Mayoli was prohibited for life from exercising pastoral duties. *Cf.* DANVILA, III., 569 *seqq.* Many *documents relating to the process are preserved also in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

for Moñino naturally did not fail to draw attention to these excesses and to complain of the over-lenient treatment of the ex-Jesuits.¹ As the result of his representations the Pope not only issued the said ban on hearing confessions and preaching but also took such harsh measures against the wholly innocent Ricci that even Cardinal Bernis could not withhold his disapproval.²

On August 26th Ricci underwent his first interrogation.³ Two days before, the ex-Jesuit Orazio Stefanucci, a most learned canonist, who had been accused quite groundlessly of having written a work on the simoniacal election of Clement XIV., had been confined in the Castel S. Angelo.⁴ Soon afterwards two other Fathers shared his fate.⁵ At the end of the month they were joined by a lay-brother who was alleged to have helped Stefanucci burn some correspondence in the German College.⁶ Connected with these measures was an edict of the Congregation of Cardinals, dated August 26th, forbidding anyone under pain of excommunication which would come into effect *ipso facto* to conceal or remove letters of credit, moneys, valuables, or documents belonging to the suppressed Order.⁷ By way of precaution, the Pope, on September 7th,

¹ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, August 28, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

² MASSON, 229.

³ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 27, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1035}$; *Tiepolo to the Doge, August 28, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 24, 1773, *loc. cit.*; *Tiepolo, in the report cited in n. 3; *Moñino to Grimaldi, August 26, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5043. The written work on Clement XIV.'s simoniacal election never existed; see below, p. 317, n. 3.

⁵ Moñino's second *letter to Grimaldi, August 26, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁶ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 30/31, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4987.

⁷ *Regolari, Gesuiti III., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. the letter of Orsini's cited in the preceding note.

granted the Congregation of Cardinals, at its request, the most far-reaching powers.¹ Members of the high aristocracy, such as the Duchessa Lante, had already been subjected to police investigations,² and now, under Alfani's direction, the investigations assumed quite grotesque forms. Alfani himself reported how he had searched the privies of the German College for forbidden writings in the hope of getting on the scent of the treatise on Clement XIV.'s simoniacal election.³ But apart from this he thought he already had enough material to deal with Stefanucci and Rhomberg, the Assistant for Germany, without going into the formalities of extra-judicial proceedings.⁴ In spite of the perseverance with which Alfani performed his unappetizing task he failed to find the treatise on Clement XIV.'s simoniacal election for the simple reason that, according to Macedonio's testimony, no such writing ever existed.⁵ All the other charges against Stefanucci having been proved to be baseless, the Congregation of Cardinals wanted to release him, but this was

¹ The Congregation's *application bears on the reverse the note: "N.S. nell' udienza del 7 Settembre ha dato le necessarie facoltà." Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti I.

² " *Il giudice Andreotti " to Macedonio, September 4, 1773, in which he wrote that the duchess asserted that she possessed neither writings nor anything else belonging to the Jesuits. *Ibid.*

³ In his *letter to Macedonio, of September 6, 1773, Alfani said that he would explore his " finds " " a dispetto d'un enormissimo fetore. Dopo aver combattuto con i Gesuiti, mi restava a combattere con i loro escrementi, ma tutto si faccia in servizio e per la gloria del S. Padre." Macedonio was to convey this information to the Pope. *Ibid.* According to Caballero, there was a dissertation of Stefanucci's entitled *De electione simoniaca*, but this had been written in 1768 at the instance of Cardinal York, so that it could not have treated of Clement XIV.'s election as having already happened. Cf. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, VII., 1527.

⁴ " *Senza le fredde formalità degl' estragiudiciali." Alfani to Macedonio, September 8, 1773, Regolari, Gesuiti II., Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ Macedonio's testimony, in his report to Pius VI., in BOERO, II.², 77 n.

prevented by Alfani. Stefanucci remained a prisoner and died as such in February, 1775.¹ The false rumour of the existence of a written work on the election of Clement XIV. served to instil into the Pope the fear of a schism and to set him against the Jesuits more than ever.² In other ways, too, the most evil reports about the Society were put in circulation by its enemies. The Augustinian General Vasquez talked wildly about the discovery of a Jesuit plot against the House of Austria.³ As was only to be expected, the greatest zeal in spreading evil rumours was shown by Moñino, who reported to Madrid that every day brought fresh discoveries of Jesuit machinations, some of which were extraordinarily incriminating.⁴ On September 10th Alfani issued an order prohibiting ex-Jesuits entering a nunnery or corresponding with nuns. On the same day the Archpriest of S. Eustachio, Catrani, was taken to the Castel S. Angelo.⁵

The manner in which Alfani extended his investigations was finally too much even for the Pope. He had him informed by Macedonio that what had been written or spoken before the suppression was not to be followed up. Alfani was not to let himself be distracted by purposeless investigations from his main preoccupation, namely the danger of a schism, which would certainly have occurred if the ex-General or others, under cover of specious pretexts, had tried to preserve the substance of the suppressed Order.⁶ For this purpose, therefore, the police investigations and arrests were continued.⁷ The Congregation of Cardinals was also busying itself in the same direction when the Pope retired to Castel Gandolfo

¹ *Ibid.*, 109.

² *Ibid.*, 77, n. 7.

³ DANVILA, III., 559.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 558.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, September 10, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 4987.

⁶ *Macedonio to Alfani, September 11, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Regolari, Gesuiti IV.

⁷ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, September 11 and 18, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

in the latter half of September.¹ The prime movers in the business were Moñino and Almada ; the Venetian ambassador thought that these two would never rest content until there was not a Jesuit left in Rome.²

Moñino's and Almada's persistency in demanding the most stringent measures³ was entirely to the liking of Charles III. and Pombal. When congratulating Tanucci on his part in obtaining the suppression at last the Spanish king declared that vigilance was more than ever necessary.⁴

Spain was chiefly interested in energetic proceedings being taken against Ricci, so that the public might be led to believe that the Bourbons' demand for the suppression of the Order was justified by reason of the serious misconduct of its head.⁵ Ricci was charged with having abstracted large sums of money and valuables.⁶ In mid-September the general opinion in Rome was that the unfortunate ex-General would never regain his freedom so long as Clement XIV. was alive.⁷ Meanwhile a beginning was made with the distribution of the precious objects and paintings owned by the Jesuits, in which,

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, September 21, 1773, according to which the Cardinals' deliberations took place at Marefoschi's or Carafa's residence. State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma 1223.

² Tiepolo's *report, communicated to the Pregadi on September 16, 1773. State Archives, Venice.

³ *Tiepolo to the Doge, September 18, 1773, *ibid.*

⁴ *Charles III. to Tanucci, September 7, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6068 ; *Grimaldi to Moñino, September 14, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁵ CARAYON, *Ricci*, 100 *seq.*

⁶ *Pallavicini to Mancinforte, September 15, 1773 : " Senti che nel banco di uno di codesti commercianti trovinsi 100,000 zecchini fattivi passare da questo abbate Ricci, durante il suo generalato, ed anche una cassetta di medaglie d'oro e di altre insigni qualità del Museo Chircheriano : quando sussista l'esistenza dei primi, grato mi sarebbe il sapere di quale spetanza appariscano."

**Id.* on September 25, 1773 : Thanks for the news of the frequent transfers of Jesuit funds to Florence. Nunziat. di Firenze, Papal Secret Archives.

⁷ *Moñino to Grimaldi, September 16, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5048.

besides the Museo Sacro in the Vatican and the Vatican itself, the Cardinals of the Congregations were not forgotten.¹ Even Ricci's Tokay, in which Zelada and Corsini took a particular interest, was divided among these gentlemen, Alfani keeping back a share for the Secretary, Macedonio.² The Venetian ambassador Tiepolo reported that these presentations were made at the express command of the Pope, to stimulate the Cardinals of the Congregation to still further efforts.³ This was unnecessary, as it happened, as on September 23rd the Congregation had decided to imprison Ricci in the Castel S. Angelo for safety's sake.⁴ The order was carried out late in the evening of the same day, Ricci being transferred to the Castel S. Angelo from the English College, where he had been treated with consideration.⁵ The same

¹ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, September 18, 1773, *loc. cit.*; *Alfani to Macedonio, September 24, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti I.

² *Alfani to Macedonio, September 25, 1773 (*ibid.*): Fr. Ricci's good Tokay, which Corsini and Zelada were looking for, was found and distributed "a tutti gl' E^{mi} componenti la S.C. e ne ò conservata la rata pel degnissimo Segretario: che ne dice Monsignore Ven^{mo}? O fatto male or bene? Certa cosa è che tutti ne anno marcato in voce ed in scritto un singolarissimo gradimento". "La rarissima serie delle posizioni di canonizzati, che era nella casa di S. Andrea" had been handed over to the Prefect of Rites, Marcfoschi, but everything referring to the Palafox process had been put aside for the Pope.

³ " *Onde animarle sempre più alla continuazione di un' opera che sommamente interessa le sue [the Pope's] cure e sollecitudini." Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, September 23, 1773, *loc. cit.* *Macedonio's instruction to Alfani, of September 14, authorized by the Pope, regarding the distribution of Jesuit belongings, *ibid.*, Regolari, Gesuiti IV.

⁴ " *Per motivo di più gran sicurezza," Alfani wrote to Macedonio on September 24, 1773, *ibid.*, Regolari, Gesuiti I.

⁵ *Centomani to Tanucci, September 24, 1773, *loc. cit.* The removal took place "alle cinque della notte", *loc. cit.*, Regolari, Gesuiti I. For Ricci's treatment in the English College, *v. Collecção*, III., 186.

lot was meted out to his secretary, Gabriello Comolli, and the five Assistants: the Italian Antonio Gorgo, the Pole, Carlo Korycki, the Spaniard, Francisco Montes, the Portuguese, João de Gusmão, and the German, Ignaz Rhomberg—the Sanhedrim, as Moñino called them. Alfani hoped that now Ricci's interrogation would also be conducted with more energy.¹ He wrote gleefully to Macedonio on September 25th: "Ricci and his five Assistants are in the Castel S. Angelo; all the arrangements were carried out with precision and without a hitch."²

Alfani insisted on the prisoners being treated with the utmost severity. Ricci and Stefanucci were prohibited from writing; Rhomberg's request for clothing was refused. When the others asked permission to take a little exercise they were told that security measures would first have to be taken by the Congregation.³

On September 24th the prisoners in the Castel S. Angelo were joined by four others, so that there were now thirteen of them, apart from the Archpriest Catrani. Precautions were taken to prevent their communicating with one another,⁴ and, not content with that, Alfani personally saw to the boarding up of their windows, so that they should not communicate with the outer world.⁵ At the beginning of October

¹ See Alfani's letter to Macedonio, mentioned on p. 320, n. 2.

² *Alfani to Macedonio, September 25, 1773. The letter (Regolari, Gesuiti, I., *loc. cit.*) begins with "Cantemus Domino".

*Moñino to Grimaldi, September 20, 1773: ". . . los dias pasados por precaucion trasportaron del Colegio llamado de los Ingleses al Castillo de S. Angel, al Abate Don Lorenzo Ricci, que fué General de la Compañia extinguida, y tambien a los asistentes de Italia, Polonia, España y Portugal." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

³ The ex-Jesuits' *petition and the Congregation's *reply in Regolari, Gesuiti IV., *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, September 28, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1223.

⁵ On September 1, 1773, Alfani sent Macedonio for forwarding to the Pope his "*Regolamento da osservarsi in questo

the inexorable gaoler had the permission to say Mass withdrawn from Ricci and his companions; on Sundays and holidays they were taken to divine service one by one, under military escort.¹ Alfani also induced the Pope to have orders given to the governor of the castle, Mgr. Salviati, to reduce by half the money spent on the prisoners' food.² When Giovanni Battista Faure, who had also been brought to the castle, was found with utensils with which he might have throttled himself, all the prisoners' cells were searched again with the greatest care. The governor still being thought to be too humane, he had attached to him a Major Pescatore, who was ordered to use the utmost severity.³ A report on the prisoners' demeanour had to be made to Alfani every evening.⁴

The avaricious Alfani was also engaged at this time in sequestrating the valuables of the Jesuits kept at the Gesù and at S. Andrea; he, who had accused the Jesuits of removing their treasures, now had to admit his surprise that this had not been the case in these two places.⁵ "By the mercy of God,"

seriosissimo emergente", adding that even after a day's strenuous labour he was not tired, "tanto ardente" was "il suo zelo per la gloria de S.S^{ta}". Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti III.

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, October 5, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1223.

² *Alfani to Macedonio, October 7 and 11, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Regolari, Gesuiti II.

³ *Centomani to Tanucci, October 12, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma 1223. Faure, who had written against Palafox, was arrested because he might have continued to do so! (*v. BOERO*, II.², 109 *seq.*) A drop of oil found on Faure's bed was taken for ink, in consequence of which a soldier was posted in his cell day and night to guard him (*ibid.*, III).

⁴ On October 9, 1773, Alfani *reported to Macedonio that on the previous day he had arranged with Mgr. Salviati, the Governor, and Pescatore: "in ogni sera mi si faccia tenere un preciso dettaglio degl' avvenimenti che possono occorrere alla giornata, onde il Santo Padre sia in giorno del tutto, anche le più minute cose di questo emergente." (Long report on the security measures taken, *loc. cit.*, Regolari, Gesuiti II.).

⁵ *Alfani to Macedonio, October 13, 1773, *ibid.*

he wrote to Macedonio on October 16th, "all instructions are most exactly performed in the castle; but I, the author of them, am the object of the most bitter hatred. The interrogation of Ricci and Faure is to be accelerated."¹ On October 26th Alfani reported to Macedonio that for the better surveillance of the prisoners Pescatore was employing sixty soldiers; all of them were Germans and therefore more exact in the performance of their duties.² Macedonio replied on the following day that the Pope, distrusting the governor as being friendly to the Jesuits, also insisted on the greatest vigilance.³ Alfani was delighted to hear this and that the Maestro di Palazzo, the Dominican Mamachi, who was as fiery as he was learned, was preparing a work against the Jesuits with feverish haste.⁴ On the other hand, he was far from satisfied with the attitude of the commission of Cardinals,⁵ in which, as opposed to the fury of Cardinals Casali and Corsini, Cardinals Zelada, Trajetto, and Marefoschi were all for the humane treatment of the prisoners.⁶ Another bone of contention among the members of the commission was the use to which

¹ **Id.*, October 16, 1773, *ibid.*, III.

² **Id.*, October 26, 1773, *ibid.*, II. The letter contains the names of the soldiers and their instructions.

³ *Macedonio to Alfani, October 27, 1773, *ibid.*, IV. Cf. also Tiepolo's *report to the Doge of Venice, of October 30, 1773, in which Alfani is described as the strict gaoler of the prisoners in the Castel S. Angelo and the Governor as being lenient. State Archives, Venice.

⁴ See Alfani's letter cited in n. 1, also *Mamachi to Alfani on January 19, 1774, and *Mamachi to Macedonio on March 28, 1774 (about his great work "quasi tutto fondato sulle carte dell'estinta società e il restante su d'incontrastabili documenti"), Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti VI. and II.

⁵ "Sia poi ringraziato Iddio che sino a giovedì non si radunerà più questa benedetta assemblea." Alfani to Macedonio, October 25, 1773, *ibid.*, II.

⁶ *Vasquez to Roda, October 7, 1773, saying that without "el miedo que le tienen al Ministro de España" Jesuitism would triumph, since Corsini always gave way to the other three Cardinals. Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Vasquez III.

the Jesuit valuables were to be put,¹ which led Tanucci to remark that the Congregation was more eager to track down the ex-Jesuits' money than their offences.²

Widely divergent views were also held on the problem of replacing the teaching staff in the former Jesuit establishments. How great a loss was inflicted on the schools by the suppression of the Order is seen from the fact that at the beginning of October many Bishops in the Papal States were asking for ex-Jesuits to be employed in the schools and sodalities in their dioceses. The commission of Cardinals found the question rather too difficult for them to deal with.³

The filling of the vacant posts in the teaching establishments in Rome that were formerly managed by the Jesuits presented particularly grave difficulties, although the Franciscans and Dominicans offered their services in this connexion.⁴ The Congregation of Cardinals held long sessions to discuss the matter. Alfani was sorely embarrassed by there being no suitable teachers for the lower schools⁵ and by the failure of many of those who had been licensed by the Pope.⁶ By the middle of October the Congregation found itself compelled to enlist the services of quite a number of ex-Jesuits⁷; to Tanucci's horror this took place, not only in many towns in Italy, but even in Rome itself, in the Roman College, to which the Roman Seminary had been transferred after the removal of the Jesuits. At the beginning of November Zelada and

¹ *Tiepolo to the Doge, October 2, 1773, *loc. cit.*

² *Tanucci to Azara, October 2, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6021.

³ *Alfani to Macedonio, October 16, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti II.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ In his *letter to Macedonio, of October 14, 1773, Alfani calls those proposed for the lower schools "scarsi atti a destar la risa, non il rispetto de' fanciulli". *Ibid.*, II.

⁶ See the complaints in Alfani's *letter to Macedonio, of October 16, 1773, *ibid.*

⁷ *Tiepolo to the Doge, October 16, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

Alfani had to employ five ex-Jesuits there despite the objections of two members of the Congregation.¹ The Jansenist party in Rome now spread the fearful news that henceforward the teaching at the Roman College would be entirely on Jesuit principles. Cardinal Zelada especially was subjected to contempt and suspicion, but Moñino's confidence in him remained unshaken.² The rigid anti-Jesuits in the Congregation succeeded in having the teaching of the students in the German College itself, entrusted solely to the Dominicans.³ The Venetian ambassador Tiepolo reported on November 13th that the disunity in the Congregation was such that some of its members no longer attended and that it now met only once a week. In fact there was talk of its being dissolved altogether.⁴

Clement XIV. wanted Marefoschi to undertake the direction of the Gesù, where Alfani with inhuman harshness had dragged the old and sick ex-Jesuits,⁵ but as he was to have the assistance of Alfani, he firmly refused to accept the appointment. As he wrote to Bernis, he did not want to have anything to do with a man who was universally detested in Rome.⁶ By the end of the year Marefoschi, who had gradually

¹ *Orsini to Giansante, November 4, 1773, and *Orsini to Tanucci, November 5, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1055}$; *Centomani to Tanucci, November 5, 1773, *ibid.*, 1223; *Tiepolo to the Doge, November 6 and 13, 1773, *loc. cit.*; *Moñino to Grimaldi, December 2, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5048.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 383.

³ See Orsini's letter to Giansante cited above, n. 1. Cf. STEINHUBER, II., 183 *seq.*

⁴ *Tiepolo to the Doge, November 13, 1773 (*loc. cit.*): he thought that Moñino would not put his hand in the wasps' nest ("vespaio").

⁵ BOERO, II., 2, 64.

⁶ *Marefoschi to Bernis, November 14, 1773 (with Bernis' *reply of the 15th) and November 19, 1773. In this second letter Marefoschi says of Alfani, "ha l'odio di tutti i sassi a Roma." In Jesuit possession. *Tiepolo to the Doge on December 4, 18, and 25, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

changed from an enemy to a friend of the Jesuits, also ceased to attend the meetings of the Congregation.¹ This was now dominated by Corsini and Zelada, whom Moñino designated as being most capable of completely extirpating Jesuitism.² Charles III. was also highly pleased with Zelada, who was known in Rome as the "Cardinal à la mode" (*el cardenal a la moda*).³

The Congregation of Cardinals was grievously embarrassed by the refusal of the Portuguese Government to make any payment towards the maintenance of the expelled Portuguese Jesuits in the Papal States. There were still 700 of them,⁴ and their upkeep cost the Camera Apostolica 60,000 francs a year,⁵ which was all the more distressing in that the reorganization of studies was also involving it in a heavy outlay.⁶ While Alfani was spying out the Jesuit properties in England,⁷ the Congregation was trying to lay its hands on their properties in Italy. With the Pope's approval it ruled that the revenues therefrom were not to be used for public charities until the Italian and Portuguese ex-Jesuits were dead.⁸ In many cases the ruling came too late, as the

¹ *Tiepolo to the Doge, December 25, 1773, *ibid.*

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, January 6, 1774: the Jesuits would give the world no peace "mientras existan sus cenizas". (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome) Moñino expressed himself in a similar fashion in a *letter to Grimaldi on June 6, 1774, referring to Zelada and Corsini as "los mas fuertes para desarraigar el tronco del arbol en todas partes". Archives of Simancas, Estado 4986.

³ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 560.

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, October 19, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1223; *Tiepolo to the Doge, December 18, 1773, and April 2, 1774, State Archives, Venice; *Orsini to Tanucci, January 21, 1774, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma 1058.

⁵ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 382.

⁶ *Tiepolo to the Doge, December 4, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Alfani to Macedonio, October 1, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti II.

⁸ Congregational *decrees of December 9, 1773, *ibid.*, and of December 19, 1773, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1481.

superintendents of the Camera Apostolica had already leased a number of the best properties to their favourites.¹ In addition, disputes arose with the Governments of Tuscany, Genoa, and Ragusa.²

Through the commissary Coronel, who was dispatched to Rome for the purpose, the Spanish Government came to an understanding with Clement XIV. about the pensions for the Spanish ex-Jesuits in the Papal States³; but it kept a very watchful eye on their behaviour⁴ and saw to it that they were kept scattered and separated.⁵ Still fearing a revival of the Society, they insisted on the banishment being prolonged.⁶ The Neapolitan Government took up a very similar position.⁷

It was this fear of a resurrected Order that caused the Congregation of Cardinals in November, 1773, to prohibit groups of more than four ex-Jesuits⁸; it was also the chief motive that actuated the proceedings against the incarcerated leaders of the Society, of whom it was said by Cardinal Orsini in early November, 1773, that they would never regain

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, December 24, 1773, *loc. cit.*

² *Tiepolo to the Doge, January 29, 1774, *loc. cit.*

³ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 537.

⁴ *Moñino to Laforcada, November 18, 1773, and his *reply of December 11, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁵ *Report of the three commissaries to Moñino, Faenza, January 15, 1774, *ibid.*

⁶ *Grimaldi to Moñino, October 19, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5208. On October 19, 1773, Charles III. *wrote to Tanucci that although he had to thank God for the suppression of the Jesuits, nevertheless they must never cease to "vigilar siempre mas sobre los que lo fueron". *Ibid.*, Estado, 6068.

⁷ *Orsini to Tanucci, August 24, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{310}{1655}$. For the punctual payment of the pension, *v.* DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 577. On August 28 Tanucci *wrote to Caracciolo: "Il Breve gesuitico fu pubblicato nel di 19. Insinui V.E. costì l'esaminarlo bene prima d'accordargli l'exequatur. Non vi mancano insidie. Qui faremo il nostro dovere." Archives of Simancas.

⁸ *Orsini to Tanucci, November 2, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma,

their freedom.¹ They were as carefully guarded as ever in the Castel S. Angelo and were treated very strictly.² They were completely cut off from the outer world, knew nothing of what was going on, and were not even given such harmless news as the deaths of their acquaintances. During the winter not even the aged ex-General was allowed a little fire.³ The Marchese Giani, a relative of Ricci's, tried in vain to induce the Pope to relax the treatment of the prisoner in a few particulars.⁴

The interrogation of the prisoners, about which the strictest silence was observed,⁵ was conducted by Andreotti, a judge from the law-court on Montecitorio, assisted by the notary Mariani. Alfani hoped at first that the proceedings would be carried out quickly and successfully,⁶ but when they showed signs of being protracted he tried every means of influencing the prisoners, even by making them presents of chocolate and coffee.⁷ But Ricci and Faure were impervious to his blandish-

¹ " *A mio credere non recuperanno la libertà." Orsini to Giansante on November 4, 1773, *ibid.*

² See the letter of Orsini's cited on p. 327, n. 8.

³ See the *Processo* 274 mentioned below, on p. 330, n. 2.

⁴ *Tiepolo to the Doge, November 13, 1773, State Archives, Venice.

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, November 19, 1773: The proceedings against the former General and his colleagues, the former Assistants of the suppressed Society, were wrapt in silence. They were still being very closely guarded in the Castel S. Angelo. Archives of Simancas.

⁶ *Alfani to Macedonio, October 7, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti II.

⁷ *Alfani to Macedonio, December 8, 1773: " Mi sto divertendo cogl'abbati Ricci e Faure ; quotidianamente mi godo i criminali, e procuro di infiammarli colle parole, colle cioccolate e con i caffè : ma la materia esce dalla loro sfera : l'E^mo Casali non per anco si è prestato al bramato congresso : ma io sono sempre pronto," *ibid.* Regarding the taking over of S. Andrea by the Lazarists and the transfer of the Passionists to SS. Giovanni e Paolo, Alfani writes (*ibid.*): " Per verità il chaos della soppressione gesuitica non mi è stato tanto incommodo e affannoso

ments. "I am almost bursting with impatience at the slow progress of the case," wrote Alfani, "but I am doing my utmost."¹ He complained of Andreotti to the Pope, apparently successfully.² No less energy was displayed by Alfani's closest ally, Moñino, whose influence in Rome was decisive at this period,³ and who was also effective in having Cardinal Malvezzi rewarded with the appointment of Datarius.⁴ It was also Moñino's agitations which were held responsible for the search by military police of the palace of the widowed Duchess Faustina Capranica Lante, who was a friend of the Jesuits; as she protested too loudly she was shut up in a convent.⁵ Her sons' tutor, the ex-Jesuit Benincasa, afterwards Bishop of Carpi, had already been taken to the Castel quanto mi è stato quest'affare con divoti e servi di Dio Signori." *Ibid.*

¹ *Alfani to Macedonio, November 26, 1773 (*ibid.*): "Mi sento crepare nella lentezza del giudice criminale: io a cacciarle in corpo un poco di fuoco lo chiamai ieri l'altro al congresso. Per dimani gliene ho intimato un altro: in somma faccio colle mani e co' piedi ecc."

² *Tiepolo to the Doge, June 11, 1774, *loc. cit.*

³ The firm cohesion of the Bourbon Courts was described as "admirable" in Brunati's *report to Colloredo on January 22, 1774: "danno qui il tuono, tengono tutti in soggezione e rispetto." State Archives, Vienna. Cf. *Tiepolo to the Doge, July 9, 1774, State Archives, Venice.

⁴ *Tiepolo to the Doge, March 26, 1774, *ibid.* In his *report to Grimaldi of April 14, 1774, Moñino speaks himself of his "rigorosos officios" for Malvezzi (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). On April 16 Malvezzi wrote Moñino a fulsome *letter of thanks, declaring "che niuna cosa terrà mai si presente all'animo suo quanto la somma bontà di Sua M^{tà} Catt." (*ibid.*). Malvezzi cut a poor figure in Rome. Centomani represented him in his *report to Tanucci of June 21, 1774, as "malatto, perseguitato da tutti, inodiatto da molti, odioso ai Terziari, poco ben visto dal Papa." State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1224. On July 5, 1774, *Centomani informed Tanucci that "Malvezzi continua a far qui nessuna figura". *Ibid.*

⁵ *Orsini to Tanucci, March 25, 1774: Apologies for the search made of the duchess's palace in spite of its bearing the royal arms of

S. Angelo at Christmas, 1773.¹ The interrogations came to an end in the middle of January, 1774. Why the result of them was kept secret is easily understood when one reads the questions and answers which were carefully noted down by Ricci,² not for his own justification, which he left to divine providence, but to restore the honour of his suppressed Society.

Ricci readily and fully supplied all the information required of him. When asked whether he considered that the suppression meant the end of his own authority, he gave a vigorous reply in the affirmative. To the further question, what authority he thought he would have had if the Pope had acted differently, he gave this answer: "Only the authority which the Pope would have allowed me in such a case." He pointed out that such questions were irrelevant to the case in hand and that they ought to keep to the investigation of his conduct. This was admitted to be correct by the examining judge.

From the beginning the questions put to Ricci about his conduct were concerned largely with the charge of having concealed or sent abroad moneys or property belonging to the Society. Andreotti spoke first of fifty, then of twenty-five, millions. Ricci replied, "I have concealed neither money nor goods; and nobody has done so with my knowledge and consent. When it was suggested to me recently that I should conceal certain things, I disapproved of it and strongly advised against it. It is true that a sum of money was sent to Genoa recently for an oversea mission. The amount will be found entered in the Procurator-General's books. The money was remitted to Genoa, not to be kept there, but to be

Naples, but they had to act "presto e segretamente". *Ibid.* Esteri-Roma 1088; *Tiepolo to the Doge, March 26 and April 2, 1774, *loc. cit.*

¹ BOERO, II.², 190.

² "Processo fatto al sacerdote D. Lorenzo Ricci già Generale delle Comp. di Gesù," in MURR, *Journal*, IX., 254 *seqq.*, and in BOERO, II.², 80 *seqq.*; French translation in CARAYON, XVII., 105 *seqq.* For Moñino's preliminary work in the proceedings, *v.* BOERO, II.², 79.

forwarded to the missions. Neither I nor anyone else, to my knowledge, sent anything out of the country to be kept aside or to be deposited in a bank. The rumour that we are in possession of millions, which we have hidden or invested, is just a lie, the baseless chatter of the common folk, which our enemies, no doubt, have bruited abroad with great delight and which, at best, had its foundation in the beauty, the richness, and the orderliness of our churches. The wealth ascribed to us is a fantasy, a stupidity, complete madness. I was amazed that men of repute and intelligence could give any credence to such fairy-stories. They ought to be convinced of the falsity of such rumours now that the minute and exceptional investigations made inside and outside Rome with the object of discovering at last these imagined treasures have proved fruitless." ¹

When it became known at the end of 1773 that the interrogations in the Castel S. Angelo were coming to an end, the verdict was awaited with general impatience. But as the interrogations had elicited nothing detrimental to the Society,² no verdict was given. Ricci accordingly requested Andreotti to inform him of the cause of his imprisonment. When Andreotti replied that it was not any offence that was the cause, Ricci decided to compose a petition to the Congregation of Cardinals. He was not allowed to write this down himself, but only to dictate it.³ In it he drew attention to his innocence, which had been fully established by the inquiry, to his age of seventy-two years, to his poor state of health, and to the injustice of keeping him in prison on the suspicion of wanting to restore the Order. This suspicion was completely baseless, as he had never attempted anything against the supreme

¹ This full reply of Ricci's to question 19 of his interrogation in MURR, *loc. cit.*, 268 *seq.* Cf. CARAYON, 114 *seqq.*

² This was not known till long afterwards. Albani *reports it to Colloredo on May 4, 1775. State Archives, Vienna.

³ The precise text of this *petition, which is quoted only from memory in MURR (*loc. cit.*, 268 *seq.*), is in Regolari, Gesuiti VI., Papal Secret Archives.

authority and any attempt at a restoration was both impossible and hopeless : impossible because all the property of the Society had been sequestrated and all the princes had accepted the Brief of suppression ; hopeless because the Pope was against it. His only desire was to end his days in peace. The only ruling on this petition was : “ *Si prende provvidenza.*” Nothing more was done in the matter before Clement XIV. died in September.¹ In October Ricci presented another petition to the Congregation of Cardinals.² The new Pope wanted to release Ricci but Moñino opposed this with all his might. He roundly stated that if the ex-General were openly declared to be innocent and were to be set free, it would be tantamount to pronouncing a verdict of nullification on the Brief of suppression. Moñino succeeded in having the interrogations continued. But as these merely established the innocence of the Assistants Montes and Gusmão, they were released, in view of their advanced age ; but they had to swear to maintain complete silence about their imprisonment.³ Moñino was unable to prevent this release or the granting of some slight alleviations to Ricci by Pius VI. But the harrowing imprisonment, which must have gradually worn down the old man’s strength, still went on.⁴ When Pius VI. proposed to intern Ricci in his birthplace, Charles III. advised caution and alluded to a letter from the Queen of Portugal, according to which there was a fear in her country of a restoration of the Order. And of this, declared Pius VI., there must be no question.⁵

When eleven months had passed since the death of Clement XIV. Ricci appealed to the Pope with a petition in which he described his situation in words whose simplicity made them

¹ MURR, 268. On December 4, 1773, Tiepolo had *reported to the Doge : “ I detenuti in Castel S. Angelo hanno presentato supplica, finora senza effetto.” State Archives, Venice.

² *Ricci to the Congregation of Cardinals in October 1774, *Regolari, Gesuiti, VI., loc. cit.*

³ DANVILA, III., 566.

⁴ DUHR, *Ricci*, 87.

⁵ DANVILA, *loc. cit.*

all the more moving. For fifteen years, he wrote, he had directed the Society of Jesus without a single complaint being made against him ; nevertheless he had now been kept for two years in the closest custody. His examination, which could have been finished in a few weeks, had been dragged out on flimsy excuses. Although his complete innocence had been established, he could ascertain no reason for his arrest, as the Congregation of Cardinals persisted in their decision of "*si prende provvidenza*". He had been granted some alleviations by the favour of His Holiness, it was true, but the sentence was still suspended and his incarceration still went on. He was still forbidden to speak to anyone but Major Pescatore and occasionally the Vice-Governor ; even the consultations with his physician had to be conducted in the presence of others. Ricci concluded by saying that if the mercy of the Pope did not release him from that slow and painful death, there was nothing left to him but to beg the Lord to summon him from his misery quickly and to prolong the life of His Holiness for many years, to the great advantage of His Church.¹ To this appeal to his compassion Pius VI. was not entirely deaf ; in May Ricci and his companions received permission to move about freely in the Castel S. Angelo. But their actual release was successfully opposed by Moñino.² He even obtained the resumption of the interrogations, but before they could be completed death released the General from his sufferings on November 24th, 1775. At the command of Pius VI., his obsequies were held in a fitting manner, at the expense of the Camera Apostolica, in S. Giovanni de' Fiorentini. He was buried, not, as his Spanish gaolers would have liked it, in the Castel S. Angelo, but in the Gesù.³

After Ricci's death the proceedings against his companions

¹ "Memoriale alla S^{tà} di P. Pio VI. del abbate L. Ricci," in MURR, *loc. cit.*, 272 *seqq.*

² MASSON, 323 *seq.* Cf. *Moñino to Pius VI. on May 31, 1775, Papal Secret Archives.

³ BOERO, II.², 103 ; DUHR, *Ricci*, 89, with the observation "Ricci lies there by the side of the departed Generals, as worthy as the worthiest of his predecessors".

were suspended ; in any case, there was no more evidence of guilt to be brought against them than against their General.¹ Even Moñino had to give way now.² Fathers Le Forestier and Gualtier were released on July 29th, 1775, Faure and Benincasa in August,³ and finally the remaining Assistants in February, 1776.⁴

One of these, the eighty-two-year-old Rhomberg, almost a complete cripple, could hardly be moved out of the castle. He declared that he would rather remain there, for there at least he had two fellow-prisoners who took compassion on him and carried him every morning to the chapel, where he could hear Mass and receive Holy Communion.⁵ Ricci's secretary, the seventy-year-old Gabriello Comolli, had already succumbed to the rigours of imprisonment on January 13th, 1774. Alfani kept his death a secret and had him buried at night without any religious ceremony.⁶ Two Jesuits and two secular priests who were detained in the Castel S. Angelo and who seemed to be compromised in the affair of the prophetesses of Valentano, were brought before the Inquisition but were soon absolved and had only to perform some spiritual penances.⁷ Stefanucci had already succumbed to the sufferings of his two years' imprisonment.⁸

¹ The interrogations are reproduced in BOERO, II.², 105 *seq.* See also the " *Relazione delle cause de' carcerati in Castel S. Angelo (1. Il Generale e gl' assistenti. — 2. Faure. — 3. Catrani. — 4. Benincasa. — 5. Le Forestier. — 6. Sante Zazzera), 1773-1775 ". Papal Secret Archives.

² DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 569.

³ BOERO, II.², 120, and Moñino's *autograph (1774-5) in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ MASSON, 326. According to BOERO (II.², 120) Le Forestier, Gualtier, and his brother were released on July 29, 1775, Faure and Benincasa in August.

⁵ BOERO, II.², 120 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 105 *seq.* ; *cf.* 119.

⁷ Bernis' *report of March 6, 1776, in the Archives of Foreign Affairs, Paris, cited by MASSON (327), and the letter from Fr. Coltraro, who was arrested in Orvieto in May 1774 and was treated in a really barbarous way ; *v.* BOERO, II.², 112-6.

⁸ See above, p. 316, and STEINHUBER, II.², 181.

Apart from the absence of evidence against the accused,¹ it must be remembered that it was priests who remained priests, and some of them over seventy years old, who were subjected to this severity by Moñino and Alfani. That they succeeded in keeping such men in prison as though they were criminals is less to be wondered at, perhaps, than that Clement XIV. gave way to them on this point as on so many others. That many hard measures were taken against the prisoners without the Pope's knowledge and against his will is clear from the account given by Louis Gualtier, who was taken to the horrible prison of San Leo in September, 1774.² Nevertheless, of the many tragedies that have taken place in the dungeons of the Castel S. Angelo, the confinement of Ricci and his companions is one of the most appalling. Besides, even if only to preserve the appearance of justice, the proceedings that were brought against them should have preceded the suppression of the Order. The Christian resignation with which all this was borne by the prisoners will be admired for ever.³

(3)

In Portugal, Spain, and Naples, from which the Jesuits had already been banished in the pontificate of Clement XIII., the promulgation of the Brief of suppression merely meant that

¹ The interrogating judge, Andreotti, admitted himself that a more innocent person than Ricci had never been prosecuted. See CORDARA (*De suppressione*, 159), who, as ever, is at pains to excuse Clement XIV. and harks back to Boniface VIII.'s proceedings against Celestine V. Cordara says here that there were many Jesuits who wanted to remain such, just as before, and that if Ricci had been free they would have regarded him as their head, just as some Fathers had asserted that the Rector of the college in Breslau was to be regarded as the General because Frederick II. had not had the Bull of suppression published. The Papal authority might thus have suffered grave injury. Cordara also ascribes the severity of the imprisonment to Alfani's baseness and brutality. Incidentally, he seems to be repeating hearsay, for the most part.

² BOERO, II.², II *seq.*, 116-8.

³ *Ibid.*, 119.

their return to their native country continued to be impossible.¹

Though watched with Argus-eyes by the Spanish diplomats, the execution of the Brief in Italy met with only minor difficulties, which were soon overcome.² This was not the

¹ The publication of the Brief of suppression in all Spanish territories was ordered on September 16, 1773; *v.* DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 537. *Grimaldi to Moñino, September 28, 1773, and the latter's *reply of October 14, 1773, in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² In BOLOGNA the Brief of suppression was published by Archbishop Malvezzi as early as August 25, 1773, in Ferrara on the 28th, and then in Ravenna; *v.* *Gnecco to Grimaldi, August 31, 1773, from Bologna, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5042; *Zambeccari to Orsini, from Bologna, August 26, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{312}{1057}$. Typical of Malvezzi's severity was his refusal to allow an ex-Jesuit to attend Marshal Pallavicini on his death-bed. Malvezzi *reported this himself to Clement XIV. on September 25, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti I. Sympathy for the Jesuits persisted for some time in Bologna, some of the nobles there now sending their sons to Modena; *v.* *Malvezzi to Clement XIV., October 27, 1773 (*ibid.*, II.); on November 3, 1773, he *reported (*ibid.*) that the schools had reopened "con altri soggetti di merito non inferiore ai Soci". — In FLORENCE, with the archduke's permission, the Brief was communicated on August 28, 1773, by the nuncio to all the Bishops (*Viviani to Moñino, Florence, August 28, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome). At first the regulation dealing with the Jesuit property raised difficulties (*Viviani to Moñino, September 4, 1773, *ibid.*), whose solution was made dependent by the archduke on the decision of Vienna (*Zambeccari to Orsini, September 1, 1773, State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.*). *Cf.* REUMONT, *Toscana*, II., 167.—In GENOA the Government came to an understanding with the Archbishop, the Spanish Consul Juan Cornejo doing his utmost to bring about the speedy execution of the Brief; *v.* his *reports to Moñino on September 21 and October 4, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome and Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5658.—In MODENA the execution went off smoothly. The State Archives there possess numerous relevant documents. *Cf.* DANVILA Y COLLADO, III.,

case in France, where the Order was dissolved, but where its members had not been driven from the country.

No royal letters patent were attached to the Brief of

553.—The difficulties that arose in PARMA were soon overcome (*ibid.*, 546 *seq.*).—This was not the case in PIEDMONT-SARDINIA (*ibid.*, 552 ; *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, September 11 and 18, 1773, State Archives, Venice) ; but the Spanish envoy Aguilar, supported by the Papal *chargé d'affaires*, managed to have a beginning made with the execution of the Brief by the end of September (*Aguilar to Moñino, August 27, September 22 and 29, October 1 and 6, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome ; *Moñino to Aguilar on October 2, 1773, *ibid.*, and Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5345). On October 7, 1773, Moñino was able to report to Grimaldi that in Turin “ *va todo ya felizmente ” (*ibid.*).—The behaviour of VENICE, which was reported in detail by the Spanish envoy Squillace, was characteristic. At first the publication of the Brief in Rome had no effect there (*Squillace to Moñino, August 28, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), the Senate waiting for the official communication (**id.*, September 4, 1773, *ibid.*, and *to Grimaldi on the same date, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5783), so that the Jesuits in Venice went on performing their usual functions as before (*Zambeccari to Orsini, September 9, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{312}{1087}$). “ If Venice proceeds to give effect to the Brief,” *wrote Squillace to Moñino on September 11, 1773 (*loc. cit.*), “ it will not be for Rome’s sake but for its own.” On hearing this, Moñino bestirred himself to see that Rome sent the Brief officially, and in this he succeeded (*Moñino to Squillace, September 11, 1773, *ibid.*). The Brief was handed by the nuncio to the Venetian authorities in mid-September (*Squillace to Grimaldi, September 18, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Estado, 5783). Thereupon orders were given for the publication of the Brief, the Jesuits in the meantime continuing their activities undisturbed (*Squillace to Moñino, September 25, 1773, *loc. cit.*, and *to Grimaldi on the same day, *loc. cit.*, Estado, 5783). Finally, towards the end of the month, a decree authorizing the execution of the Brief was published, providing for all contingencies (*cf.* “ In Pregadi ” of September 29, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5783, and State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{290}{1035}$), and the execution was duly carried through

suppression which had been transmitted by Bernis, nor was it registered in any of the Parlements of the kingdom, the Jesuit Order being regarded as non-existent since the royal edict of 1764. The document was, however, communicated by the Government to all the Bishops.¹ Whereas in Spain several of the Bishops dependent on the Court had acclaimed a measure which their king had wrested from the Pope,² the situation was different in France. The sympathy which the French clergy had shown with the Jesuits since 1764 was now increased. No one thought that the Pope could have been so weak as to destroy his most loyal supporters, and the joy this caused the unbelieving philosophers and the Jansenists was viewed with horror.³

In the first flush of indignation there was talk of making a protest, even of summoning a Council. Aiguillon sought to prevent this by putting all the blame on Spain, while emphasizing the necessity of keeping on good terms with this Power for reasons of foreign policy, and by declaring that Bernis had had no part in composing the Brief of suppression.⁴ The Minister succeeded in restraining the French Bishops from remonstrating with the Pope,⁵ but he could not stifle the

(*Squillace to Grimaldi, October 2, 1773, *loc. cit.*, Estado, 5783, and *Centomani to Tanucci on October 8, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1223). In the middle of October the Jesuits were officially informed of the Brief and were ordered to dress as secular priests and to refrain from hearing confessions and preaching (*Squillace to Grimaldi, October 16, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5783). In the middle of November a proclamation was made by the Doge, supported by one from the Archbishop (*both *ibid.*, Estado, 5656), whereby everyone in possession of property originally belonging to the Jesuits was obliged, under pain of heavy penalties, to report it and to return it, compensation being paid at the rate of 20 per cent.

¹ THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 385.

² *Ibid.*, 391 *seq.*

³ RÉGNAULT, *Christophe de Beaumont*, II., 228; MASSON, 241.

⁴ MASSON, 242.

⁵ *Ibid.* The letter from the Archbishop Beaumont of Paris to Clement XIV., published by CRÉTINEAU-JOLY (*Clément XIV.*,

sympathy which was felt with the Order. Some of the Bishops thought of taking advantage of the permission granted in the Brief to continue employing Jesuits in the cure of souls by stretching the meaning of this activity.

Many laymen also sided with the Jesuits, and popular opinion swung round in their favour.¹ Louis XV. himself made no secret of his regret that the poor Jesuits were now being treated like criminals.² Magallon, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, found that his attempts to pacify the king—a difficult task in any case—were rendered ineffectual³ by the warm sympathy felt with the victims by the king's Carmelite sister, Louise.⁴

For the Bishops to use the Jesuits in their dioceses a royal decree was necessary. The Government, however, chiefly because of its fear of offending Spain, thought that it could not take this step before it was quite certain that the Jesuits had completely submitted to the suppression and had no intention of continuing as an Order. It was at this juncture that Bernis intimated that he had heard from the Pope himself that there was evidence of the existence of extremely compromising documents, the principal one being a circular letter of Ricci's in which he had demanded that novices should still be admitted.⁵ The result of this was that Louis XV. put off signing the decree and requested Bernis to produce authentic evidence for his assertions. But this was more than Bernis or Clement XIV. was able to do. The Pope asked the king to withhold his signature until the result of Ricci's examination was known; he himself, he said, had nothing

334), is rejected by MASSON, and its genuineness is justifiably contested by THEINER (*Hist.*, II., 475). SICARD also denies its authenticity (*Les évêques*, Paris, 1905, 451, n. 1).

¹ MASSON, 241.

² " *Pauvres Jésuites, on traite les particuliers comme s'ils avaient commis de grands crimes." Magallon to Grimaldi, Paris, September 3, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4589.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ MASSON, 214, 243.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 243.

against the individual ex-Jesuits and their employment by the Bishops, but rather against their coalescing into a Congregation.¹ But this was precisely what the Archbishop of Paris and the king's daughter, Louise, had in mind. In these circumstances Aiguillon pressed all the more vigorously for the divulgence of Ricci's letter. But, as before, Bernis was unable to produce the slightest evidence of its existence.²

Meanwhile the Archbishop of Paris had worked out a detailed scheme for the union of the French Jesuits into a Congregation under its own head, which plan was forwarded by Aiguillon to Bernis. Both these men were extremely perturbed, for the restoration of the Order in France was bound to lead to a conflict with Spain. Bernis tried to induce the Pope to declare his disapproval. Clement objected at first, but then allowed himself to be persuaded by Moñino and Bernis. Cardinal Zelada was instructed to prepare a Brief definitely condemning the conduct of the Jesuits in Silesia and the scheme for a French Congregation. When the document was ready Clement suddenly said that he could not issue it as it would only lead to complications; instead he promised to give his views to Bernis in a special letter.³ This was finally prepared on March 9th, 1774; it said that the Pope insisted on the Brief of suppression being put into effect and authorized Bernis to inform the French Bishops that they were not to tolerate anything in their dioceses that ran contrary to the Brief.⁴ Bernis accordingly composed a comprehensive circular letter to the Bishops, but the French Government forbade its despatch. Keenly as the Princess Louise fought for the reunion of the French Jesuits, Aiguillon insisted, as before, on the Pope condemning this plan in a fresh Brief.⁵ Meanwhile,

¹ *Ibid.*, 244 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 254 *seq.*, 247 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 251 *seqq.*, 254 *seq.* Cf. Doria's *report to Pallavicini, March 21, 1774, Nunziat. di Francia, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ THEINER, *Epist.*, 297 *seq.* It was this Brief of which Brunati received confidential information from Bernis. See ARNETH, IX., 123.

⁵ *Tiepolo to the Doge, May 28, 1774, State Archives, Venice.

on May 10th, 1774, Louis XV. died. His successor, Louis XVI., was thought to be favourably inclined towards the Jesuits. The solicitude of their enemies increased when the Brief of suppression met with serious opposition in Germany, Prussia in particular, and in Russia.¹

(4)

Hardly had the draft of the Brief of suppression been brought to the Hofburg in Vienna, by way of Madrid, at the end of March, 1773, for the approval of the empress,² than Maria Theresa, acting in concert with Joseph II., placed before Prince Kaunitz a number of questions about the measures to be taken. At the Minister's suggestion³ the empress instructed the state councillor Kressl on May 17th to set up a commission to deliberate, in the event of the suppression, on the educational, financial, and personal aspects of the situation.⁴ In its memorandum of June 9th the commission laid down the principle that the Jesuits should be subject spiritually (*quoad spiritualia*) to the diocesan Bishops, financially to the local authorities (*Länderstellen*), and scholastically to the commission of studies. The management of the aristocratic academies, the hostels (*Konvikte*), and the charitable institutions could be left to the ex-Jesuits, though not exclusively. Since the Brief accused them of laxity they were to be removed from the chairs of theology, ethics, and metaphysics, but might usefully be retained for the other faculties, especially as they were unrivalled in the mathematical sciences and their maintenance would cost less than that of lay teachers. As the "common folk" were more attached to the Jesuit churches

¹ *Doria to Pallavicini, April 25, 1774, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. above, p. 257; DUHR, *Jesuitenfabeln*, 61; *id.* in the *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XXII. (1898), 441 *seq.*, and the *Stimmen der Zeit*, CX. (1925), 207 *seqq.* Part of what follows in our account overlaps the pontificate of Clement XIV.

³ *April 8, 1773, State Archives, Vienna, K[aiser] F[rantz] A[kten] 75a, No. 5.

⁴ **Ibid.*; copy and additions, *ibid.*, Staatsakten 1773 ad No. 2953.

than was "desirable" and were not so easily to be rid of their prejudices, in places where there were schools the teachers could also hold divine services, elsewhere other Religious were to be employed, after consultation with the Bishops. In connexion with the proposed methods of appropriating and utilizing the Jesuit properties the assertion was made without any evidence that "the exportation and concealment of their famous wealth had begun" about the year 1760.¹

In her reply to Charles III. of Spain Maria Theresa had stated that she could never recognize the right claimed by the Pope in the Brief to dispose of the Order's property, but that it was her intention to provide for every member of the Order in her realm.² After an initial resistance³ Clement XIV. gave way to Spanish pressure on this point.⁴ At the beginning of July he informed the empress that, relying on her sense of duty, he had struck out the offending passage from the Brief and asked her to utilize the houses and properties for the good of religion and the State.⁵

On August 30th, 1773, the Brief arrived in Vienna in its final form.⁶ The special Congregation charged with the execution of the suppression had a circular letter attached to it,⁷ addressed to all the Bishops in the world, which was to give rise to many unedifying disputes. In this letter the Bishops were ordered to take possession of the Jesuit properties in

¹ **Ibid.*, K.F.A. 75a, No. 10.

² ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, IX., 93.

³ Mercy to Kaunitz, Paris, June 16, 1773; Kaunitz to Mercy, July 1, 1773; ARNETH, *loc. cit.*, 94 *seq.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Magallon, April 26, 1773, State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A. 75b, B.

⁵ ARNETH, IX., 566 *seq.* The Pope's letter, which also went by way of Madrid, was not to be presented to the empress until the Brief of suppression had been put into effect; *Clement XIV. to Charles III., July 8, 1773, State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A. 75b, B; *Grimaldi to Magallon, July 26, 1773, *ibid.*

⁶ Maria Theresa to Grand Duke Ferdinand, August 30, 1773, in ARNETH, *Briefe*, I., 228.

⁷ On August 18, 1773, *Institutum S.J.*, I., 331.

the name of the Holy See and to hold them at the disposal of the Pope. On the remonstrances of the Austrian *chargé d'affaires*, Herzan, the letter was withdrawn so far as Austria was concerned,¹ but in that and other countries it caused considerable ill-feeling towards Rome,² so that the nuncio Visconti found it advisable to have other copies of it printed,³ from which the passage in question was omitted.⁴

After the empress, who deeply regretted the fate which had overtaken the Jesuits,⁵ had taken counsel with Cardinal Migazzi and Baron Binder,⁶ the instruction was issued to all local authorities on September 10th to affix the *exequatur* to the Brief of suppression and to carry it out in conjunction with the episcopal commissaries, to promise the former

¹ *Herzan to Kaunitz, August 23, 1773, State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A. 75b, B.

² *Visconti to Macedonio, September 9, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti 52; *Visconti to Pallavicini, September 16, 1773, Nunziat. di Germania, 387, *ibid.* The Pope told the Austrian envoy Herzan that the letter had been issued without his knowledge (*Herzan to Kaunitz, August 23, 1773, *loc. cit.*). Macedonio *wrote to Visconti: "Sebbene la S^{ta} di N. S. abbia fatto spedire una lettera circolare a tutti i vescovi, con cui si ordina di prendere possesso nomine Sanctae Sedis dei beni generalmente dell'estinta Compagnia gesuitica, e ciò per serbare l'uniformità di quelle lettere spedite per lo Stato pontificio e per gli altri Stati, giusta lo stile e regola della S. Congregazione de' Vescovi e Regolari, nondimeno . . .". State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A. 75b, B.

³ There is a copy in the Vienna State Archives, Staatsratsvorträge, 170 (1773), IX. Cf. DIENDORFER, *Die Aufhebung des Jesuitenordens im Bistum Passau* (1891), 29 *seqq.*

⁴ *Maria Theresa to Kaunitz, September 1, 1773, State Archives Vienna, Staatsratsvorträge, 170 (1773), IX.; *Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, September 16, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ Cf. Maria Theresa to Archduke Ferdinand, August 30, 1773, in ARNETH, *Briefe*, I., 228; to Baron von Neny, September 10, 1773, *ibid.*, IV., 315 *seq.*; to Countess Enzenberg, October 16, 1773, *ibid.*, 568.

⁶ *Binder to Maria Theresa, September 6 and 8, 1773, State Archives, Vienna, Staatsratsvorträge, 170 (1773), IX.

Jesuits protection and favour in the name of the sovereign, on condition that they comported themselves as loyal servants of the Church and the State, but to take possession of their properties for the good of the educational establishments. The church inventory was to be made by the commissaries of the regional authorities, who were to hand a copy to the representatives of the ecclesiastical authority. In general the notification was to be made "with every discretion, indulgence, and courtesy, and neither now nor in the future were the former Jesuits to be treated with discourtesy".¹ According to the executive regulations laid down by the commission of suppression on September 19th the ecclesiastical commissary had only to read out the Brief of suppression and the covering letter, whereas the two Government representatives had to take possession in the name of the State of the entire property of the colleges and the churches, without allowing the ecclesiastical commissary to have any say in the matter. There was no longer any mention of a copy of the church inventory.² The elderly and feeble Jesuits were to be collected together in one house. Each Jesuit was to receive 100 florins for the purchase of secular clerical dress. Those who were not to be employed in the schools or in the cure of souls were to receive a monthly pension of sixteen florins.³ As, according

¹ *Decree of September 10, 1773, *ibid.*, Staatsratsakten, 1773, No. 1986.

² Count Firmian gave effect to the civil claims in Lombardy with particular severity, putting an unduly wide interpretation on the arrangements made between the Pope and the empress. The State commissaries took possession not only of the collegiate properties but also of the churches, the sacred vessels, the vestments, and even the tabernacles. The only function left to the ecclesiastical authority was the reading of the Brief (*Pozzobonelli to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 52).

³ *State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A. 75b, B. In the following year the pension was raised to 25 fl. for a number of aged Jesuits (*decree of the Court treasurer, of February 22, 1774, State Archives, Innsbruck, Kattan, 494).

to the instructions in the Brief, those Jesuits who continued to live in community were forbidden to perform any ecclesiastical function except the celebration of Mass, it was suggested to the Bishops that they should cause those ex-Jesuits who were destined for the cure of souls to leave their colleges without delay and that they should confer jurisdiction on them anew, to obviate interruption in the services in the Jesuit churches.¹ The supplementary regulation issued by the Congregation of Cardinals on September 1st, 1773,² which forbade the Bishops to employ ex-Jesuits in the schools or in the cure of souls without obtaining permission from Rome in each separate case, was treated as a dead letter in Austria as in the whole of the German Empire.³

After the Brief of suppression had been published in Vienna on September 10th,⁴ its execution proceeded in the rest of the country in the course of the following months.⁵ For the classes in mathematics and physics as well as in the humanities the Jesuits were retained, but they were excluded from the chairs of philosophy and theology, in spite of Migazzi's remonstrances.⁶ Maria Theresa still bestowed marks of her favour on the former Jesuits. Not a few of them were installed in ecclesiastical posts of honour by her and her son. The best-known of them was Count Hohenwart, who was entrusted with the superintendence of the education of the sons of Grand

¹ *September 18, 1773, State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A. 75c; **ibid.*, Archives of the Ministry of Education, Abt. 92, No. 107.

² A copy in the State Archives, Munich, Iesuitica, 694.

³ Cf. *State Archives, Vienna, Staatsratsakten, 1773, Nos. 2037 and 2042; *ibid.*, K.F.A. No. 31.

⁴ *Letter of the Church Councillor D'Effner, Vienna, October 23, 1773, Kreisarchiv, Munich, Gen.-Reg. 728/29.

⁵ The Austrian Province of the Order, which included Hungary, numbered no less than 1,806 members in 1767, 1,899 in the following year, and there were still 1,819 in 1773. DUHR, *Gesch.*, IV., 1, 347.

⁶ *Migazzi to Tioli, September 13, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 52.

Duke Leopold of Tuscany¹ and who afterwards became Prince Bishop of Trieste² and finally Archbishop of Vienna.³

When the investigation into the wealth of the Jesuits failed to produce the results expected,⁴ it was only natural that soon the most extravagant stories of their defalcations were being bandied about. In consequence of talk about the Bohemian Jesuits having made away with a million florins and of having been guilty of various other frauds, the Government commissaries were instructed to examine all the account-books from 1760 onwards.⁵ More rigorous measures proposed by the commission for the ex-Jesuits were rejected by the empress on the score that so far only suspicions, but no proofs, of Jesuit misappropriations had been brought to her notice.⁶

¹ *Crivelli to Pallavicini, February 22, 1777, *ibid.*, Nunziat. di Firenze, 165.

² *Herzan to Zelada, May 20, 1791, Nunziat. di Vienna, 692, *ibid.*

³ METZLER, in the *Linzer theol. Quartalschrift*, LXIV. (1911), 276 *seqq.* Under Joseph II. the two ex-Jesuits Kalatay and Splenyi were made Bishops of Grosswardein and Waitzen respectively. Cf. Caprara to Buoncompagni, August 23 and 27, 1787, January 7 and February 7, 1788, Nunziat. di Germania, 436 and 431 respectively, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Garampi to Pallavicini, July 9, 1776, *ibid.*, 423; *report of the Councillor to the Legation, Von Mühl, October 23, 1773, State Archives, Osnabrück, 340b, No. 27.

⁵ **Ibid.* Bags of gold and chests of silver were said to have been buried or walled up in Millstatt. Thorough investigations on the spot showed that the assertion was quite baseless (*Statement of Count Kollowrat, of March 9, 1774, State Archives, Vienna, Staatsratsakten, 1774, No. 628). Cf. *Referendum of August 3, 1774, *ibid.*, No. 2028.

⁶ In the protocol of the ex-Jesuit commission of February 31, 1774, is the following marginal *note in the empress's hand: "Up to *dato* all *asserta* were mere *assumptionen*, which have been found to be false. Thank God I have not allowed myself to be led astray by all the letters from abroad. As soon as anything *reel* is put before me I shall look into the matter sharply enough. M." State Archives, Vienna, Staatsratsakten, 1774, No. 1135.

Out of consideration for popular feeling¹ the Government at first left everything much as it was; it was only with the passage of the years that more considerable changes took place.

As a large part of the revenues from the Jesuit estates was swallowed up by the cost of the civil administration² and the State Bank lowered its rate of interest, it became necessary to close altogether a number of smaller establishments. This was begun under Maria Theresa and was continued to a wider extent under Joseph II.; schools and hostels for the less wealthy students of the middle and peasant classes were shut down and their endowments in many cases were transferred to the Theresianum, whose revenues in 1781 amounted roughly to 60,000 florins.³ Under the influence of the freethinking members of the State Council the buildings and finances of the Order were partly alienated from their original object and were used for purely State, mostly military, purposes. Thus in 1776 the War Office was moved to the Professed House in Vienna.⁴ The conversion into barracks of the Professed House and the College of St. Nicholas in Prague provoked considerable discontent.⁵

Owing to the poverty of the country Switzerland was seriously embarrassed by the abolition of the Jesuit Order. The Brief of suppression, together with the news of its execution in Rome, reached Lucerne on the evening of September

¹ Cf. DIENDORFER, *loc. cit.*, 5 *seqq.*; DUHR in the *Jesuitenfabeln* 437 *seqq.*, and in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, VI. (1885), 413 *seqq.*

² *Garampi to Pallavicini, July 9, 1776, Nunziat. di Germania, 423, Papal Secret Archives.

³ *Garampi to Pallavicini, December 13, 1781, May 16 and August 23, 1783, Nunziat. di Germania, 411, 412, *loc. cit.*

⁴ EBERLE, *Das Kriegskanzleihaus Am Hof*, Vienna, 1913, 36, 50.

⁵ *Garampi to Pallavicini, July 9, 1776, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 423, *loc. cit.* On August 1, 1776, Maria Theresa gave her consent to the removal of the barracks at Linz to the Jesuit College there (KOLB, *Mitteilungen über das Wirken der PP. Jesuiten in Linz*, Linz, 1908, 180).

1st, 1773.¹ On the 3rd the Council of Lucerne, which had been receiving information about the intentions of the Bourbons for some time past,² sent word of what had happened to the friendly Catholic cantons and to the Abbot of St. Gall.³ The next day the nuncio Valenti sent the official documents to the Swiss Bishops, requesting them to make preparations for their prompt execution and to take possession of the properties of the Society of Jesus in the name of the Pope.⁴

The whole of Catholic Switzerland was gravely perturbed.⁵ The people were seized with grief and indignation and gave vent to their feelings with a frankness characteristic of Swiss confederacy.⁶ The Jesuits themselves accepted their fate with resignation and submissiveness.⁷ In general, the local authorities, though not all of the same way of thinking, showed much indulgence in the performance of their duties,⁸ although they

¹ The agent Fargna had already informed the council of Lucerne, from Rome, on August 18, 1773. State Archives, Lucerne, Jesuiten, Fascicle I. (provisional label).

² Cf. *protocol of August 27, 1773, *ibid.*, *Ratsprotokolle, V., 62.

³ *Circular letter, *ibid.*, Jesuiten, Fascicle I.

⁴ *Valenti to the Bishops on September 4, 1773, Nunziat. di Svizzera, 222, Papal Secret Archives. *Valenti to Corsini, September 11, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ “* . . . tutta l’Elvezia è in grandissimo fermento” (Valenti to Pallavicini, September 25, 1773, Nunziat. di Svizzera, 191, *ibid.*).

⁶ *Valenti to Pallavicini, September 4, 1773, *ibid.*

⁷ “*I religiosi poi a quel che sento, hanno anche qui presa questa prima notizia con rassegnazione e sommissione” (*ibid.*). “*Quod Friburgenses et Soloduranos [Jesuitas] attinet, omni encomio sunt digni: submissionem perfectam, mores inculpatos, laborem assiduum et doctrinam insignem in eis laudo et diligo” (Prince Bishop Joseph Nikolaus von Montenach of Lausanne to the nunciature secretary Castorno, April 24, 1774, Episcopal Archives, Fribourg, Case 30, Colleg. Soc. Iesu, IV., 6). There were 110 Jesuits (including 82 priests) working in Switzerland, distributed over six colleges.

⁸ *Valenti to Pallavicini, September 4, 1774, *loc. cit.*

were greatly embarrassed as to how they were to carry on the schools in view of the notorious poverty of the colleges.¹ According to the regulations of the Brief the Jesuits lost all authority to teach or to minister to the faithful if they continued to live a communal life in their colleges. But as the endowments were insufficient to maintain the ex-Jesuits and to pay other teachers—of whom it was almost impossible to obtain an adequate number of a suitable quality²—both the Bishops and the cantonal authorities appealed to Rome to relax the regulations to some extent.³ The nuncio himself advised against a blunt refusal of their proposals, lest the Swiss authorities be driven to desperate measures, such as laying hands on the estates of the churches and convents.⁴ In the event Rome granted the dispensation which had been sought, though for one year only,⁵ but either explicitly or tacitly it must have been renewed, for everywhere the ex-Jesuits continued, as secular priests, to live in community and to perform their previous functions in the churches and the schools.⁶

The Council of Lucerne, which had already, since 1769, been

¹ KRATZ, *Die wirtschaftliche Lage der deutschen Jesuitenniederlassungen am Vorabend der Aufhebung*, in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXXIX. (1919), 527, 547 *seqq.*

² *Valenti to Pallavicini, September 4, 1773, *loc. cit.*

³ *Protocols of September 24, November 5 and 17, 1773, State Archives, Lucerne, Staatsprotokolle V., 65-9; *Valenti to Montenach on September 22, 1773, *Nunziat. di Svizzera*, 222, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Valenti to Pallavicini, September 25, 1773, *ibid.*, 191.

⁵ *Pallavicini to Auditor Servanzi, February 12, 1774, *ibid.*, 285.

⁶ The well-known convert N. J. Albert von Diesbach, formerly an officer in the service of the King of Sardinia, who became a Jesuit in 1759, was seriously considered by the Pope in 1782 as the prospective Bishop of Lausanne. Cf. *Cardinal delle Lanze to Caprara on June 11, 1782, *Nunziat. di Svizzera*, 226, *loc. cit.*; *Pallavicini to Uditore Zampirolo on July 6, 1782, *ibid.*, 196; *Pallavicini to Garampi, August 17, 1782, *Nunziat. di Vienna*, 682, *ibid.*; *Caprara to Boncompagni, July 17 and October 2, 1788, *Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania*, 435, *ibid.*

receiving from the college an inventory of its possessions and all its titles to property, intended at first to act entirely on its own account in the manner of the princes of the Empire.¹ After lengthy negotiations with Cardinal Rodt in his capacity of Bishop of Constance² an agreement was reached by which the college was to be closed, and its possessions were to come under civil administration, but the ex-Jesuits were to resume their former activities as members of a community of secular priests headed by one chosen by themselves and subject to episcopal jurisdiction.³ After the Bishop and the Council had come to an agreement about the disposal of the Jesuit property,⁴ the official announcement of the Papal Brief took place, after several postponements, on January 17th, 1774. At nine o'clock in the morning a "deputation of honour" from the Council, accompanied by the episcopal commissary, Hartmann, arrived at the college, where "all the 'Herren Jesuiten', still wearing their Jesuit dress and cloaks, stood quite sad and distressed". After a solemn speech expressing the universal grief of Catholic Switzerland, but also recalling the obedience due to the Holy See, the Bishop's representative read the main dispositions of the Brief. The outgoing Rector, Segesser, then handed to Governor Mohr a silver plate on which were the keys of the college and the church. Thereupon both commissaries and Jesuits left the building. On the following day, the ex-Jesuits, clothed as seculars, being reassembled in the Xaverian House, as the college was now

¹ *Valenti to Pallavicini, September 4, 1773, *loc. cit.*

² *Protocol of September 17, 1773, State Archives, Lucerne, Staatsprotokolle V., 64 *seq.*; *Valenti to Pallavicini, September 25, 1773, *loc. cit.*

³ *Servanzi to Pallavicini, December 4, 1773, Nunziat. di Svizzera, 191, *loc. cit.*; SEGESSER, *Rechtsgeschichte der Stadt und Republik Luzern*, IV., Lucerne, 1858, 70 *seqq.*; STÄHELIN, *Der Jesuitenorden und die Schweiz*, Basel, 1923, 94 *seqq.*; FLEISCHLIN, *Aus den Annalen des Gymnasiums zu Luzern*, in *Monatsrosen*, XXX. (1885-6), 410 *seqq.*

⁴ *Servanzi to Pallavicini, December 25, 1773, January 1 and 8, 1774, *loc. cit.*

called, the commissary Hartmann accepted their pledge of loyalty to the diocesan Bishop and granted them the necessary spiritual faculties, while the president of the "deputation of honour" handed them back their keys and authorized them to continue with the direction of the *lycée* on the same footing as before.¹

The dissolution of the Order took place in Porrentruy (October 13th)² and in Fribourg (October 15th, 1773)³ earlier than in Lucerne. Solothurn followed in the spring of 1774.⁴ The Valaisans found it hardest to bow to the inevitable; it was not till May, 1774, that the Prince Bishop of Sion could proceed to execute the Brief in Sion⁵ and Brigue.⁶

In the course of time large gaps were created in the ranks of the ex-Jesuits by death or transfer to parishes. Their places were gradually filled by secular priests. In Brigue and Sion the schools were taken over by Piarists; they were followed by the Fathers of the Faith of Jesus, who paved the way for the return of the resurrected Society of Jesus.

¹ *Protocol of January 17, 1774, State Archives, Lucerne, Protokoll der Räte und Hundert, II., 168-170; *Castorno to Montenach, February 7, 1774, Episcopal Archives, Fribourg, Case 30, V., 3.

² In Porrentruy, which belonged politically to the principality of Basel, ecclesiastically to the archbishopric of Besançon, the Vicar General was the suffragan Bishop Gobel who made a name for himself in the French Revolution. See VAUTREY, *Hist. du Collège de Porrentruy* (1886), 148.

³ " *Diarium Ministri Colleg. Friburg. Helv.", Arch. Prov. Germ., VI, 27.

⁴ *State Archives, Solothurn, Ratsprotokolle 1774, pp. 281 seqq.; FIALA, *Geschichtliches über die Schule von Solothurn*, V. (1881), 24.

⁵ *Resolution of the ordinary Maien-Landrat at Sion (May 9 to 18, 1774), State Archives, Sion, L 2 (Resolutions, 1771-5); JÉRÔME ZIMMERMANN, *Essai sur l'hist. du Collège de Sion* (1914); 83 seqq.

⁶ IMESCH, *Zur Gesch. des Kollegiums zu Brig* (1912), 47; PFÜLF, *Anfänge der deutschen Provinz*, Fribourg, 1922, 56 seqq.

Even prior to the Brief of suppression the Jesuits in Bavaria had been hard hit by a State measure. In 1769 the Electorate of Bavaria, following the current mode of thought, issued a number of ordinances aimed at the restriction of monastic life. Among these was one, issued on December 30th, obliging all Orders having more than three houses in the territory to form an independent religious Province with a Bavarian Provincial, whose election or appointment needed the sanction of the civil Government.¹ The Jesuit Provincial, Joseph Erhard, tried every possible means of averting the blow, which affected the Upper German Province particularly severely as all its seminaries lay in Bavaria. But in vain. On November 1st, 1770, the separation was effected. The Upper German Province was left with twenty-one colleges and 471 members of the Society, while the new Bavarian Province had eleven colleges and 542² or 546 members.³

When, towards the end of August, 1773, news of the suppression that had taken place in Rome reached the Court of Munich,⁴ the Elector Max Joseph appointed a commission, with Count Seinsheim as its president, to make the necessary provisions for the forthcoming dissolution of the Order in Bavaria.⁵ Any hopes the Jesuits may have had of being allowed to go on living together as secular clerics⁶ were soon dispelled.⁷ Adopting the proposal of the commission, the

¹ DÖBERL, *Entwicklungsgesch. Bayerns*, II. (1912), 275.

² Including the Regensburg College in the prince-bishopric of that name.

³ DUHR, *Gesch.*, IV., I, 222 *seqq.* In 1773 the Bavarian Province numbered 514 members, the Upper German Province 509 members; the scholastics and novices of the latter Province, however, were still in Bavaria.

⁴ *Max Joseph to Seinsheim (undated), State Archives, Munich, *Iesuitica*, 696.

⁵ **Ibid.* Cf. *Hist. Jahrbuch*, VI., 417 *seqq.*

⁶ Erhard to the Prince Bishop Ferdinand Christoph of Chiemsee, September 4, 1773, in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, VI., 421, n. 2.

⁷ According to a *conference minute of September 7, 1773, the Elector refused the application. State Archives, Munich, *Iesuitica*, 694.

prince, "moved by hereditary devotion to the See of Rome," decided to "publish the Brief and to have it put into effect in every point that does not touch on *temporalia*".¹ Even before the arrival of the Brief electoral officials appeared at the various establishments to set their seals to the safes, account books, and church treasuries.² Like Maria Theresa, the Elector, as ruler of the country, was given permission by Rome to dispose freely of the Jesuit property to the common good of the Church and the State.³ After the practical details concerned with the suppression had been worked out with the diocesan Courts, the publication of the Brief took place in Bavaria in the first days of October, 1773,⁴ the collaboration of the ecclesiastical authorities being confined to the reading out of the Papal document, while their representatives received inventories of the church treasuries.⁵ The Jesuits had to pledge their word orally and in writing to submit to the Holy See and to obey the ruler of the country.⁶ All foreigners had to leave the country. Novices and scholastics of Bavarian origin were allowed to continue their theological studies at Ingolstadt. The old and feeble were allotted the former noviciate at Landsberg "for their sustenance". Those of the rest who were not given employment in churches or schools received twenty florins a month. Those who were entrusted

¹ *Max Joseph to Baron von Prugglach and Church Councillor Eichberger on September 4, 1773, *ibid.*, Iesuitica, 695; *Macedonio to Alfani, October 15, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 55.

² Cf. *protocol on Ingolstadt of August 30 to September 1, 1773, State Archives, Munich, Iesuitica, 1539.

³ *Max Joseph to Baron von Prugglach, September 4, 1773, *ibid.*, 695.

⁴ *Abbate Israldi to R. Padre . . . [?], Munich, October 5, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53.

⁵ *The Prince Bishop of Freising to the Congregation for the suppression, October 19, 1773, *ibid.*; *commission protocol of Ingolstadt, State Archives, Munich, Iesuitica, 1539.

⁶ The *formula of obedience with the signatures of the Ingolstadt Jesuits, *ibid.*

with pastoral duties had to reside outside the colleges. At Ingolstadt two-thirds of the teachers were retained, the other third were replaced by seculars or Religious, the object being to effect a breach in the monopoly and the spirit of the Society.¹ According to the reports made by the commission the suppression was carried out without any disturbance, the Jesuits adapting themselves with a good grace to their new mode of life.²

The assets of the Order, the total value of which was estimated at 7,382,000 florins, passed under State administration and were used principally for educational purposes.³ When in 1780, the Elector Karl Theodor instituted the Bavarian *langue* of the Maltese Order by way of providing for his illegitimate son, the Prince of Bretzenheim, it was intended at first to include some convents in the endowment. But when they objected, the Jesuit assets were allotted to the Knights of Malta, at the instigation of the nuncio to Cologne, Bellisomi, with the charge of being responsible for the pensions for the ex-Jesuits, while the abbeys had to supply the teaching staff.⁴ As a result, some of the *Gymnasia*, such as Mindelheim⁵ and Landsberg,⁶ went entirely out of existence, while the others lost more and more of their former character.

¹ Undated **aide-mémoire*, State Archives, Munich, Iesuitica, 695; **Kreisarchiv G.L.* 1489/1521, No. 9; *Ordinariatsarchiv*, Augsburg, K 98, No. 2.

² Cf. **Ickstadt and Prugger to Elector Max Joseph*, November 1, 1773, State Archives, Munich, Iesuitica, 1539. In protest against the Brief of suppression Benedikt Stattler published his *Amica defensio Societatis Iesu* anonymously (Berolini et Vratislaviae, 1773). Cf. [LE BRET], *Sammlung der merkwürdigsten Schriften*, Frankfurt, 1773 seq.

³ DÖBERL, II., 275.

⁴ **Bellisomi to Pallavicini*, November 1, 1780, and July 31, 1781, *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 196 and 197, Papal Secret Archives; *Hist. Jahrbuch*, VI., 437.

⁵ ZÖEFL, *Das Mindelheimer Jesuitenkolleg*, in the *Archiv für die Gesch. des Hochstifts Augsburg*, VI. (1921), 53.

⁶ *Landsberger Geschichtsblätter*, XVIII. (1919), 77.

In the free imperial city of Augsburg the first news of the suppression of the Jesuit Order caused such consternation and excitement that there was a fear of popular risings.¹ The magistrate of the Catholic confession left nothing undone in his efforts to effect the preservation of the Jesuits in some form or other, protesting against the Brief of suppression to the Pope and Emperor,² Cardinals, and Princes of the Empire. When it was realized after some weeks that no concession would be made, the college's two endowed estates, Kissingen and Mergenthau, were appropriated by Bavaria, in whose territory they lay. In reply to the summons of the Elector Klemens Wenzeslaus, the Bishop of Augsburg, not to hinder the execution of the Brief any longer, the deputies of the Catholic magistrate pointed out the impossibility of providing for the upkeep of the ex-Jesuits so long as the endowed estates were retained by Bavaria and the college funds by Austria.³ After tedious negotiations, protests lodged in Vienna were finally successful. In accordance with the *conclusum* of the Imperial Court Council of May 14th, 1776, Bavaria finally surrendered the sequestered districts. The proclamation of the Brief followed a few days later, on the 20th. The outgoing Rector, Joseph Mangold, was appointed episcopal director of the College of St. Salvator.⁴ The Jesuits submitted without protest to the Papal ordinance and, with the permission of the ecclesiastical authority, continued with their educational and pastoral duties, and with their communal life.⁵ When death and disease thinned their ranks the gaps

¹ *Church Councillor Nigg to Konferenzminister von Hornstein on September 9, 1773, Ordinariatsarchiv, Augsburg, K 98, Aufhebungsakten, 1773.

² DUHR in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, VI., 428, n. 1.

³ *Provost von Ungelter to Count Lagnasco, August 24, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, Regulari, Gesuiti, 52.

⁴ *Ordinariatsarchiv, Augsburg, K 80, t. II., No. 159.

⁵ *Klemens Wenzeslaus to Pius VI., November 9, 1775, *ibid.*, No. 163; copy in the Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Germania, 395.

were filled first by ex-Jesuits, then by secular priests. In face of the dangers presented to the Church in Germany by the forces of "enlightenment" the ex-Jesuits of St. Salvator provided a valuable support to the representatives of the Holy See.¹ When Augsburg fell to Bavaria in 1806 they were forced not only to abandon their college but to leave the city.² The Catholic *lycée* was closed and in its place the Protestant St. Anna-Gymnasium was declared to be an unsectarian institution for both confessions³; the buildings of the Jesuit college were thenceforward used as barracks.

In the little imperial city of Rottweil on the Neckar, as in Augsburg, legal disputes about the Jesuit assets hindered the execution of the Brief of suppression until February 28th, 1776.⁴

The Elector Karl Theodor of the Palatinate refused at first to have the Brief put into effect in his lands so long as he had not been officially notified.⁵ Accordingly, at the request of Canon Robertz,⁶ the nuncio to Cologne sent a copy of the Brief to the Minister Oberndorff,⁷ who promptly replied that

¹ *Nuncio Odescalchi to Nuncio Ziucci, January 29, 1799, *ibid.*, Nunziat. di Colonia, CXCII. (192); *Annibale della Genga to Antonelli, June 2, 1799, *ibid.*, 208.

² *Royal decree of July 10, 1807. The ex-Jesuits were placed under police observation.

³ PLAZIDUS BRAUN, *Gesch. des Kollegiums der Jesuiten in Augsburg*, Munich, 1822, 93 *seqq.*

⁴ GREINER, *Gesch. der Schule in Rottweil*, Stuttgart, 1915, 82.

⁵ *Karl Theodor to Bishop Damian August von Limburg-Styrum of Speyer, September 11, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regulari, Gesuiti; *Karl Theodor to the Neuburg Government, September 13, 1773, City Archives, Augsburg, Akten des Jesuitenkollegs 55.

⁶ *Robertz to Caprara, September 18, 1773, Regulari, Gesuiti, 58, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Caprara to Oberndorff, September 21, 1773, *ibid.*; Generalandesarchiv, Karlsruhe, Akten: Pfalz, Generalia, 6263.

his master would give effect to the Papal ordinance.¹ Meanwhile the Palatine Government instructed its agent Antici to obtain from the Holy See permission to dispose freely of the persons and property of the Jesuit Order in the electoral domains.² On October 20th, 1773, the nuncio Caprara informed the Minister, on behalf of the Pope, that his prince might regard as non-existent the passage in the opposite sense in the circular letter of August 18th.³ The necessary arrangements having been made with the diocesan Courts, the Brief was proclaimed in Neustadt an der Haardt on October 23rd,⁴ in Mannheim on November 15th, and in Heidelberg on November 16th.⁵ In Neuburg an der Donau the proclamation was delayed until March 15th, 1774.⁶ Those Jesuits who were suitable and were so inclined were allowed to continue their work in church and school and to live together as secular priests.

The procedure adopted in the lands of Jülich-Berg was even more lenient. On the conclusion of negotiations with the ecclesiastical authorities the Jesuits in the colleges of Düsseldorf, Düren, Jülich, Münstereifel, and Ravenstein⁷ were

¹ *Oberndorff to Caprara, September 25, 1774, *loc. cit.*, *Regolari, Gesuiti*, 58; *Caprara to Pallavicini, September 30, 1773, *ibid.*, *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 180.

² *September . . ., 1773, *Generallandesarchiv, Karlsruhe, Akten: Pfalz, Generalia*, 8684.

³ *To Oberndorff, October 20, 1773, *ibid.*, 6263.

⁴ **Ibid.*, *Kopialbuch*, 455, pp. 131 *seqq.*

⁵ *Fiscal Heimes to Elector Emmerich Joseph, November 17, 1773, *Ordinariatsarchiv, Augsburg, K 107*; *Cathedral Archives, Mainz, Case III, Ex-Jesuiten No. 2.

⁶ *Church Councillor Steiner to Elector Klemens Wenzeslaus, March 16, 1774, *Ordinariatsarchiv, Augsburg, K 107*.

⁷ Cf. KNIFFLER, *Das Jesuitengymnasium zu Düsseldorf* (1892), 34 *seqq.*; HARNISCH, *Der bergische Schulfonds in Düsseldorf*, in *Jahrbuch für den Regierungsbezirk Düsseldorf*, XIV. (1909), 198 *seqq.*; VAN LAAK, *Gesch. des Gymnasiums in Düren* (1926), 120 *seqq.*; KUHL, *Gesch. der Stadt Jülich*, III. (1894), 153 *seqq.*; KATZFHEY, *Gesch. der Stadt Münstereifel* (1854), 237 *seqq.*;

secularized in January and February, 1774, and subordinated to episcopal jurisdiction, but they were left in their houses as a Congregation of secular priests charged with the duty of conducting the institutions on the same lines as before.¹ Although the Roman Congregation for the suppression and the nuncio to Cologne made repeated requests for the complete execution of the Brief and threatened the Jesuits with the withdrawal of their spiritual faculties,² they never prevailed upon Karl Theodor.³ The five colleges kept going for twenty more years until the occupation of the Rhineland by the French and the confiscation of ecclesiastical property gradually reduced the institutions, which had already lost much of their old prosperity, to the point of extinction. Some schools closed down altogether and were not revived in an altered form until after the wars of liberation.

In general, in both the ecclesiastical and secular States of Germany the Brief of suppression was carried out in a considerate manner. The sole exception was the Electorate of Mainz. Here harsh measures were used which aroused the indignation of contemporaries⁴ and which were probably due

Verzameling van Charters en geschiedkundige bescheiden betrekkelijk het Land van Ravenstein, II., s' Hertogenbosch, 1850, 633, 640 seqq.; VAN MIERT, *De Jezuiten te Grave en het Land van Ravenstein* (separate impression), Ravenstein, 1914, 21 seqq.

¹ *Notarial deed relating to the suppression in Düsseldorf, of January 31, 1774, in the Archdiocesan Archives, Cologne, Jesuitenakten, Aufhebung 293 i; protocol in the State Archives, Düsseldorf, Julich-Berg; Geistl. Sachen, *Specialia*, 136; *Copia di lettera alla S. Congreg. Deputata, of February 3, 1774, Nunziat. di Colonia, 180, Papal Secret Archives.

² *Corsini to Caprara, March 2, 1774, *ibid.*, 275; *Caprara to Belderbusch, April 14, 1774, *ibid.*, 181; *Caprara to Count Goldstein, August 19, 1774, *ibid.*; *Pallavicini to Caprara, September 3, 1774, *ibid.*, 275.

³ *Caprara to Corsini, August 18, 1774, *ibid.*, 181.

⁴ Cf. VOGT, *Rheinische Geschichten und Sagen*, IV, Frankfurt, 1836, 210; SCHROHE, *Zur Gesch. der oberrhein. Ordensprovinz*, in the *Freiburger Diözesanarchiv* N.F., XXVII, 250 seqq.

to the Archbishop's aversion to the central authority of the Church and to its defenders.¹ Already in 1771 the Government had demanded from every religious house in the Electorate an exact account of its financial state, under pain of confiscation. By a decree of August 21st, 1773, special commissaries were again appointed to take stock in the course of the following few days of the property owned by the Jesuit colleges. Both the officials and the heads of the various houses were strictly enjoined to preserve silence on the matter.² On September 2nd, 1773, as soon as the news of the suppression of the Society of Jesus arrived in Mainz, the Elector Emmerich Joseph appointed a commission to put the suppression into effect.³ In the capital this was done in a sensational manner. On the evening of September 6th the cannon on the ramparts were turned against the city and five hundred men from the garrison occupied the principal squares and the streets leading to the Jesuit college and noviciate.⁴ Meanwhile the commissaries disclosed the Electoral orders to the assembled community. They were to cease their communal life, they were all allotted another place of residence, where they were to exchange their Jesuit clothing for the dress of secular clerics, and the officials were to take possession of the Order's property in the name of the Elector.⁵ This announcement was received

¹ At the suppression of the Mannheim College, Fiscal Heimes made the following *statement on behalf of the Elector of Mainz, who was also Prince Bishop of Worms: "The aforesaid Breve Apostolicum has come into the hands of the Elector, who after due examination of it did not wish to oppose the Roman See in this request." (Heimes to Emmerich Joseph, November 17, 1773, Ordinariatsarchiv, Augsburg, K 107).

² *City Library, Mainz, Iesuitica B, Lad. 12 H; *ibid.*, Exjesuiten-Schulfonds A X I, 1a.

³ **Ibid.*

⁴ VOGT, *loc. cit.*; *Baron von Hochstetten to the king [of Prussia], September 14, 1773, Secret State Archives, Berlin, R.7, 68, No. 5, reproduced in *Katholik*, LXXXIV, 1 (1904), 79 *seq.*

⁵ *Instruction (undated; September 2, 1773) in the City Library, Mainz, Exjesuiten-Schulfonds A X I, 1a. According to

submissively by all the members of the Order. After they had provided themselves with a minimum of clothing they were taken in carriages to neighbouring convents, where they were provisionally confined.¹ The worst blow to them was the order given on September 18th, forbidding them to perform any spiritual function except the celebration of Mass in a private chapel.² After a few weeks they were gradually released with the threat that if they rebelled in word or deed against the measures taken they would not only lose their pensions but would be imprisoned for several years, if not for life.³ Some of them found employment as teachers or as pastors. The old and infirm were accommodated in the noviciate, now destined to be a priests' seminary. The scholastics were given the choice of entering the ecclesiastical seminary or the training college for teachers.⁴ All the rest were given a yearly pension of

the documents the Brief itself was never published. The nuncio to Cologne seemed to be hinting at this when he wrote: “*Il Sig. Elettore di Magonza ha visitati e sciolti i gesuiti; si è servito delle Bolle in certo modo come di modello, per mostrare al pubblico d’averli soppressi con potestà ordinaria.” Caprara to Pallavicini, September 23, 1773, Nunziat. di Colonia 180, *loc. cit.*

¹ The Superiors of the convents where the Jesuit lay-brothers were accommodated had to employ them in manual labour, dressed as laymen, “especially as the vows taken in their Order have been dissolved by *Eminentissimo* as their supreme Archbishop and *Ordinario*” (Protocollum archiepiscopalis Commissionis Regularium, of September 6, 1773, Decretum secundum, City Library, Mainz, Exjesuiten-Akten A I, 1).

² **Ibid.* (deputation protocols). Cf. VOGT, *loc. cit.*; *Katholik*, *loc. cit.* Several incidents were passed over in silence by the *Mainzische privilegierte Zeitung* No. 108, of September 8, 1773. WERNER (*Der Dom zu Mainz*, III, [1836] 207 *seqq.*) blames the Court Chancellor Benzel for the various instances of harsh treatment.

³ “*Extractus Protocolli Commissionis electoralis Moguntinae,” of September 11, 1773, City Library, Mainz, *loc. cit.*, A X I, 1.

⁴ “The revenues of the Jesuits and their college are being applied to the extension of the splendid school established so

170 rix-dollars. The suppression was carried out in a similar manner in the other colleges of the archdiocese, except that in Eichsfeld, apparently, no recourse was had to the military.¹

The desire of the Jesuits of Cologne to continue their existence in the guise of a Congregation of secular priests² seemed to have been realized when, on Christmas Eve, the Vicar-General, Von Horn-Goldschmidt, announced in the Collegium Tricoronatum that, with reference to the Brief of suppression, the Elector Maximilian Friedrich would secularize the Jesuits and would convert the college into a seminary for clerics and priests living in common, whose duty it would be to continue the celebration of divine service and the instruction of youth in the accustomed manner. According to this same Electoral command, the new institution was declared to be an episcopal seminary, under the direction of Praeses Sorgnit.³ It was

gloriously by the Elector some years back. For the most part the school-books from the Heckersche Realschule in Berlin have been introduced and, so far as possible, only such teachers are being employed as are free from all religious *Préjugés*" (*Katholik, loc. cit.*)

¹ Cf. SPIRINGER, *Zur Gesch. des Aschaffener höheren Unterrichtswesens* (1901), 41 seqq.; GRIMME, *Gesch. des Gymnasiums zu Heiligenstadt* (1875), 20 seqq.

² *Idea oblata R^{mo} D. Vic. Generali [praesent. in Vicariatu 25 Oct., 1773], Archdiocesan Archives, Cologne, Jesuitenakten 293c; **aide-mémoire* on the necessity of retaining the Gymnasium of the Tricoronatum (undated), City Archives, Cologne, Stadtkölnische Sachen, Geistl. Abteilung, Jesuiten, 7; SCHRÖRS, *Ein Bericht über die Aufhebung des Jesuitenkollegiums zu Köln*, in the annals of the *Hist. Verein für den Niederrhein*, CIX, 68 seqq.

³ *Decree of December 22, 1772, Archdiocesan Archives, Cologne, Jesuitenakten, Aufhebung 293a; *Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti 58; *Copia di lettera scritta al card. Corsini, December 30, 1773, *ibid.*, Nunziat. di Colonia, 180; *Caprara to Pallavicini, January 6, 1774, *ibid.* The suppression was carried out in Bonn, Neuss, and the colleges of Jülich-Berg in a similar manner (State Archives, Düsseldorf, Jülich-Berg. Geistl. Sachen, Generalia, 147, Vol. I, 4).

clearly the Elector's intention to convert the College of the Three Kings, where not only the classics but also philosophy and theology were taught, into a Tridentine seminary and to use its considerable property to relieve the constant financial embarrassments of the diocesan seminary. As opposed to this, the city council insisted that the Tricoronatum was a municipal institution whose character had not been affected by the council having entrusted its direction to the Jesuits almost two centuries before. It would, however, gladly recognize the Archbishop's rulings in the spiritual sphere. As a settlement of the differences could not be reached, the council took possession of the college properties on January 4th, 1774, while still leaving their administration to the Jesuits. After a temporary period of agreement relations became so bad that on June 20th, 1774, the Elector had the Brief of suppression and the circular letter published, together with a decree depriving all Jesuits of their spiritual faculties and ordering them, with the exception of the teachers, to leave the college.¹ In justification of his procedure the Archbishop could plead that he was being incessantly pressed by Rome to fulfil the Brief to the letter.²

In these circumstances the council's seizure of the Jesuit properties proved to be fruitless, as they lay for the most part outside the city's territory and had been sequestered by the Electorates of Cologne and the Palatinate. While Maximilian Friedrich was trying to induce Rome to agree to the transfer of the Jesuit properties to the diocesan seminary,³ the Cologne Council appealed to the Imperial Court Council in Vienna,⁴

¹ The electoral *decree is dated June 18, 1774. Authentic copy in the Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 58 ; official report in the City Archives, Cologne, Stadtköln. Sachen, Geistl. Abt., Jesuiten 2, No. 34. *Ibid.* *Ratsprotokolle 221, fo. 102, U, VI., 161, p. 654 ; *Copia di lettera scritta al card. Corsini, June 23, 1774, *loc. cit.*

² *Pallavicini to Caprara, January 13, 1774, *ibid.*, 275 ; *Corsini to Caprara, January 22 and 29 and April 17, 1774, *ibid.*

³ *Caprara to Corsini, September 8, *ibid.*, 181.

⁴ *Caprara to Corsini, July 17, 1774, *ibid.*

which recognized it as the "secular authority of the Jesuit College" by a *conclusum* of October 20th, 1774.¹ But the vague ruling that the Archbishop was to further the work of teaching and training in conjunction with the City Council gave the former an excuse to drag out the execution of the decision year after year² until finally, by a *conclusum* of the Imperial Court Council of January 27th, 1777, the Elector was threatened with a "Realexekution".³ On February 11th, 1777, a compromise was reached, by which the bulk of the possessions owned by the Tricoronatum was awarded to the city of Cologne, thus assuring the former of a material foundation.⁴ In November, 1777, after long negotiations and only in return for considerable gifts of money, Karl Theodor assented to the release of the collegiate estates in Jülich-Berg.⁵

Hardly had this dispute been settled when another one was started by the cathedral chapter, whose dignity was offended by not having been invited to take part in the settlement. Led by the Vicar-General and supported by the nuncio Bellisomi,⁶ it questioned the validity of the spiritual faculties with which the Archbishop had reinvested the ex-Jesuits.⁷ The result was that those who wanted to engage in pastoral work

¹ BIANCO, *Die alte Universität Köln*, I., 396 seqq.

² *Caprara to the Conclave, December 22, 1774, Nunziat. di Colonia, 181, *loc. cit.*

³ *Archdiocesan Archives, Cologne, Jesuitenakten, Aufhebung, 293e.

⁴ KUCKHOFF, *Gesch. des Tricoronatum*, Cologne, 1931, 634 seq.

⁵ Karl Theodor received 2000 carl d'or, Lieutenant-General Belderbusch 2000 rix-dollars, Privy State Counsellor Castell 1000 rix-dollars ("*Nota des Herrn Secretarii Wirtz fürgebracht in Commissione d. Apr. 7, 1783," City Archives, Cologne, Stadtköln. Sachen, Geistl. Abt., Jesuiten, 13, No. 9).

⁶ *Bellisomi to Belderbusch, April 10, 1779, State Archives, Düsseldorf, Kurköln IX., Stadtköln, 36 G.

⁷ *Letter from the Cologne cathedral chapter to Pius VI. and Pallavicini, March 2, 1777, Nunziat. di Colonia, 193, *loc. cit.*; *Bellisomi to Pallavicini, February 27, 1777, *ibid.*

had to live outside the college.¹ Better times returned for them with the nunciature of Pacca, to whom they were of welcome assistance in his struggle with the innovating tendencies of the University of Bonn.²

With the suppression of the Jesuit Order the brilliance of the old school gradually faded. Hindered in its peaceful development by the constant chicaneries of the Electorate of Cologne, it could never really flourish again, despite its munificent subsidies. The decree issued by Elector Max Franz on August 10th, 1789, excluding from all ecclesiastical and civil posts in the Electorate those who studied at Cologne University, marked the beginning of an inevitable decay.³ The French army of the Revolution merely completed the work of destruction when in 1794 it removed to Paris,⁴ where to some extent they still remain to this day,⁵ the most valuable items of the collections of art and science. The Tricoronatum survived the occupation for a few years more until the central administration at Aix-la-Chapelle decreed the suppression of all three Gymnasia in Cologne on October 3rd, 1798, and set up in their stead a central school on the French model.⁶

The situation of the Jesuits in Saxony was peculiar inasmuch as they were the only clerics active there, and the confessor to the Electoral Court was also the Vicar Apostolic.⁷ On receiving

¹ " **Diarium* in Betreff der Approbation einiger Herren Ex-jesuiten," *ibid.*

² *Pacca to Zollio, July 14, 1786, March 13, 1788, and July 7, 1789, Nunziat. di Monaco, 35, Papal Secret Archives.

³ KUCKHOFF, 652 *seqq.*

⁴ RICHARTZ, *Ausgewählte Schriften von Ferdinand Wallraf* (1861), 199 *seqq.*

⁵ A volume of autograph letters from Leibniz to B. des Bosses, S. J., in the Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 10,355.

⁶ KUCKHOFF, 658.

⁷ The Saxon mission, which was subordinate to the Bohemian mission, numbered eighteen members at the time of the suppression: fourteen in Dresden, three in Leipzig, one in Hubertsburg (Catal. pers., 1772).

news of the suppression the Elector Friedrich Augustus III. gave the missionaries to understand that he would retain in their former offices all who wished to remain.¹ But as the ecclesiastical faculties became extinct with the announcement of the Brief, the Elector proposed in Rome that the Electoral confessor, Franz Herz, after he had laid aside the dress and name of his Order, should be confirmed in his vicarial administration so that he could straightway impart the necessary approbation to the other Jesuits for their ecclesiastical offices.² The Roman Curia was at a loss, for nothing was known there of the "alleged" Vicar Apostolic in Saxony.³ On January 18th, 1774, Clement XIV. asked the prince to have patience for a while, as the Saxon Vicariate was quite unknown in Rome and despite the researches that had been made no document on the subject had yet been found.⁴ Even when, on May 5th, 1774, the Saxon agent Bianconi presented an authenticated copy of the Papal letter of confirmation,⁵ the Curia still had its doubts.⁶ It was not till after the election of Pius VI. that the required Brief was sent to the Saxon Elector. When Herz died on December 8th, 1800, he was succeeded by the Court Preacher Alois Schneider, who had likewise

¹ *The Palatine *chargé d'affaires* Posch to Count Seinsheim, September 10, 1773, State Secret Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 57/3.

² *Posch to Seinsheim, September 17, 1773, *ibid.*

³ *Zelada to Macedonio, January 12, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53.

⁴ THEINER, *Epist.*, 289 *seq.* The Spanish ambassador Moñino had first been asked to state his view of the matter.

⁵ *Torrighiani to Franz Herz, S.J., January 25, 1769, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53, *loc. cit.*; *Bianconi to Macedonio, May 5, 1774, *ibid.*

⁶ *Pallavicini to Caprara, May 7, 1774, Nunziat. di Colonia, 275, *loc. cit.* Actually the Spanish party was bent on ruining the project. For this reason Zelada advised the ambassador Moñino to procure copies of the Elector's letter and the Pope's reply, so that he could pass them on to Charles III., who had great influence in the Saxon Court. *Zelada to Macedonio, January 12, 1774, *loc. cit.*

belonged to the Jesuit Order and was the first of the Vicars Apostolic of Saxony to be raised to the episcopal status, by Pius VII.¹

The abolition of the Jesuit schools in Poland caused greater confusion than in Germany. When the Brief of suppression arrived in Warsaw in mid-September, 1773,² the country, already riven and distracted internally for years past, and threatened externally as to its very existence, was still in a violent ferment owing to the first partition, which had only recently taken place and whose ratification was still awaiting execution. With the exception of the pro-Russian party, the overwhelming majority of the nation saw itself endangered not only in its political independence but also in its religion. As recently as September 13th, in the course of a debate on the treaty with Prussia and the free practice of religion in the ceded territories, the Castellan Gurowski had proposed that the continued existence of the Jesuits in these parts be guaranteed, as they alone were maintaining the schools that were necessary for the preservation of religion.³

To the Government the suppression came as an unwelcome surprise.⁴ The nuncio Garampi affirmed that the guarantee by treaty of the free exercise of religion in the territories newly acquired by Prussia and Russia had brought him little consolation, as simultaneously with this had come the suppression of the Jesuit Order, which had disturbed him more than

¹ **Liber Memorabilium*, Dresden, Kath. Pfarramt; *copy in the Arch. Prov. Germ.

² Addressed, strangely enough, only to the Ruthenian Bishops, although the Jesuits were all Latins and were not in any way subject to Ruthenian jurisdiction. " *Se dassi loro corso, non solo non avrebbero effetto, ma cagionerebbero una irritazione grandissima, non solo nei vescovi latini, ma anche nella Repubblica, gelosissima di non lasciar avanzar in qualunque minima cosa i Ruteni " (Garampi to Pallavicini, September 15, 1773, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58, Papal Secret Archives).

³ **Ibid.*

⁴ *High Chancellor Mlodziejowski to Garampi, May 27, 1774, *ibid.*, 118.

anything else. Opinions on the subject swayed this way and that. The circular letter issued by the Congregation for the suppression, with its regulation about the appropriation of the Jesuit properties in the name of the Holy See, had caused particular annoyance, which Garampi had managed to remove only by pointing to the concessions made to Austria. In view of the critical situation the nuncio and the Bishops thought it expedient to postpone the publication of the Brief until the dissolution of the Diet, to avoid an undesirable (" *strana* ") resolution of Parliament.¹ Popular feeling was at first so hostile that the Court and the Bishops were apprehensive of disturbances.² A proposal of Garampi's to ban two works written against the suppression was rejected by the king on the ground that his authority was not strong enough for him to risk so arbitrary an act with a nation that jealously guarded the freedom of the Press and was deeply embittered by the suppression of the Society of Jesus.³ The Jesuits themselves were completely crushed at first, but on reflection they resigned themselves to their lot.⁴ Their partisans, foreseeing the harm that would ensue to religion and education, resolved in the first flush of their indignation openly to reject the Papal communication. The Bishops, on the other hand, fondly hoped that they would be able to use the schools and properties of

¹ *Garampi to Pallavicini, September 15, 1773, *loc. cit.*

² *Garampi to Macedonio, September 12, 1773, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 58, *loc. cit.*

³ The King " tennesi sempre fermo nel suo proposito, cioè di non avere tanta autorità da fare un coup d'éclat in faccia a una nazione, gelosissima della libertà delle stampe, e amareggiatissima della estinzione dei gesuiti ". Garampi to Pallavicini, November 24, 1773, *ibid.*

⁴ *Garampi to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, *loc. cit.* In their first excitement the Jesuits had the announcement made to the Diet, through the well-known Jesuit Wirwicz, that they were ready to surrender their property to the republic and to continue with their educational work for nothing, on one condition: that the king and Diet should not permit the execution of the Brief of suppression. ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 50.

the Jesuits for their own seminaries; they were, moreover, not unduly downcast by the decease of an exempt society whose great reputation with the nation detracted from their authority.¹ The general discontent, however, persisted for a long time, and it is an interesting fact that devotees and freethinkers, Catholics and heterodox, friends and enemies of the Society, all in their own way were unanimous that the suppression of the Jesuit Order would bring in its train great harm or at least grave dangers to religion.² Severe and precipitate measures were advocated only by those magnates who wanted to exploit the national exasperation so as to

¹ The Bishops " *nè sono per altra parte malcontenti, che cessi un corpo di esenti, che per il credito universale, che otteneva in tutta la nazione, era anche ad essi formidabile ". Garampi to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, *Nunziatura di Polonia*, 58, *loc. cit.*

² " *Non le parlo nè delle mormorazioni che qui si fanno nè dei gravi danni, o almeno pericoli, che l'operazione attuale può cagionare non solo alla pietà, ma anche alla religione in questo regno. Cosa singolare! E i devoti, e i libertini, e gli amici della Società e i nemici, anzi e i cattolici e molti dei dissidenti si riuniscono negli stessi sentimenti " (Garampi to Pallavicini, November 3, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 113). In 1775, when there was a question of extending to Poland the diminution of Church holidays which had been conceded to Austria, Garampi advised against hasty action, lest the reputation of the Holy See, which had already been damaged by the suppression, should be still further discredited. " *Ora un Indulto che si desse così subito sulla forma dell' austriaco . . . screditerebbe moltissimo la Sede Apostolica. Pur troppo, a dirle in confidenza, ne abbiamo sofferto colla soppressione dei Gesuiti. Ognuno vede la dilapidazione e rapina, che si è fatta dei loro beni. Ognuno vede, che l'istruzione e la educazione della gioventù, hanno ricevuto un gravissimo colpo, e che la religione stessa, nonchè la pietà, ne soffriranno con l'introduzione di professori o dissidenti o cattolici di nuova moda, sicchè, eccetto quelli che hanno partecipato delle spoglie gesuitiche, niuno è che non riguardi la soppressione come una nuova calamità per il morale della nazione." Garampi to Pallavicini, May 9, 1775, *Cifre*, *ibid.*, 316.

introduce the *exequatur* and to restrict or entirely abolish the jurisdiction of the nunciature.¹

Gradually all who were in any way acquainted with the course of the negotiations that were going on in Rome were of the opinion that it was impossible to refuse to publish the Brief of Suppression. The chief difficulty lay in the appropriation and utilization of the Order's assets. If Garampi had had his way, the Bishops would have taken the matter in hand. But they intimated to him that they had not the power to ward off the clutching hands of the laity without the aid of the civil authority, wherefore it would be better to summon the support of the secular arm in advance.² The Austrian and Russian envoys saw in the suppression a welcome means of coming to the help of the exhausted Treasury.³ Under the influence of Count Stackelberg the pro-Russian party tried to exclude the co-operation of the ecclesiastical authorities altogether and to transfer the assets to the State.⁴ After lengthy arguments this way and that, the resolution was formed on October 6th to accept the Brief and to assign to the king the right to dispose of the Jesuit property, on condition that a pension was provided for the members of the extinct Order⁵ and that the education of the young should be promoted.⁶ For this latter purpose a second resolution

¹ *Garampi to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, *loc. cit.*

² " *Progetto concertato coi vescovi ", of September 20, [1773], *ibid.*, 118.

³ *Garampi to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Stackelberg to Panin, October 2/13, 1773, State Archives, Moscow, Affaires étrangères III., Warsaw, October 1773, Réception.

⁵ In 1772-3 the Polish Assistancy consisted of four Provinces numbering 2,359 members. After the first partition of Poland 1,769 remained in the republic, 213 passed to Prussia, 196 to Russia, 162 to Austria. *Garampi to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Risoluzione della Dieta polacca, of October 6, [1773], Nunziata di Polonia, 118, *loc. cit.* According to ZALENSKI-VIVIER (I., 50) the Brief was first discussed on October 7.

was passed on October 20th, by which a commission was set up and sworn commissaries were appointed to take possession of the properties with the co-operation of the Jesuits. The Bishops were left free in their turn to dispatch representatives to proclaim the Brief and to make inventories of the church furniture and vessels. To make it possible for the schools to continue, a provisional allocation of 300,000 florins in Polish currency was made for the maintenance of the ex-Jesuits for two months.¹

When the Diet resumed its sessions on November 17th, 1773, the Society of Jesus had ceased to exist in Poland. On November 3rd the suppression had been carried out in Warsaw, Posen, and other bishoprics.² The confederation had forbidden private persons to take possession of the Jesuit property, but this prohibition was largely ignored. Even before the Brief was published the laity was trying to lay its hands on Jesuit property.³ Even worse, most of the commissaries appointed to carry out the suppression took part in the plundering themselves.⁴ Two admonitory letters written by Garampi to the Primate Podoski⁵ had little effect. The Chancellor, Bishop Młodziejowski of Posen, replied⁶ to the nuncio's protest by accusing the ex-Jesuits of various offences and referring to similar occurrences in Rome. The nuncio's letters draw a most melancholy picture of the situation: the

¹ “*Stabilimento della commissione letteraria di educazione. Istruzione ai lustratori per i beni gesuitici,” October 20, 1773, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 118, *loc. cit.*; “*Projet de l'établissement de la commission pour l'éducation nationale et des lustrateurs,” October 14, 1773, State Archives, Moscow, *loc. cit.*, October 1773, Réception. For further particulars, *cf.* ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 60, 85.

² *Garampi to Pallavicini, November 3, 1773, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 58, *loc. cit.*; *Garampi to Macedonio, November 3, 1773, *ibid.*, *Regolari, Gesuiti*, 53; ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 81 *seq.*

³ *Garampi to Macedonio, September 22 and October 27, 1773, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 58, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Garampi to Pallavicini, November 24, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ On *October 28 and December 9, 1773, *ibid.*, 80.

⁶ On *May 17, 1774, *ibid.*, 118.

former members of the Order were wandering about in distress,¹ many of the churches and mission-stations were abandoned, the pious foundations were not being maintained, the profanation of church furniture was even a scandal to the dissidents. The selling price of the Jesuit possessions was raised or lowered according to the good pleasure of the commissaries. One thing was certain: the curse of the whole nation would rest for ever on all who had taken part in these outrageous injustices. The worst mischief was that the Bishops of Posen and Vilna, who headed the commission, actually abetted the transgressions. It was this that was doing immense damage to the whole of the clerical profession and was making everyone detest it.² At Garampi's suggestion,³ Clement XIV. sent Briefs on September 14th, 1774, to the king, the senate, the two Bishops mentioned above, and to the nobility, calling on them to oppose the squandering of the Jesuit assets and to provide the ex-Jesuits with a decent existence.⁴ It was not till 1776 that the Diet, goaded into activity by complaints coming from all over the country, abolished the two commissions which had been set up in Poland and Lithuania to dispose of the Jesuit property and transferred their powers to the school commission, which succeeded in rescuing the residue of the property for educational purposes.⁵

Shortly before the official publication of the Brief the nuncio had written to the Cardinal Secretary of State that the thought of the religious indifference and scepticism that were rife in the capital and among the aristocracy made him fear and

¹ Their petition to the king (ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 76 *seqq.*) discloses the utter hopelessness of their plight.

² *Garampi to Pallavicini, May 18, 1774, Cifre, Nunziat. di Polonia, 314, *loc. cit.*; **id.* to *id.*, May 18 and July 13, 1774, *ibid.*, 58; *Garampi to Macedonio, May 18, June 8, and July 13, 1774, *ibid.* Cf. *Corsini to Garampi, June 22, 1774, *ibid.*, 45; THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 502 *seq.*

³ *Garampi to Macedonio, June 8, 1774, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Copies in the Nunziat. di Polonia, 118, *loc. cit.*

⁵ ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 105 *seqq.*

tremble for the future training of youth.¹ His apprehensions may have been somewhat exaggerated, but it is undeniable that at first the sudden suppression of the Jesuits threw the school system into disorder and confusion.² The decay of the academy at Vilna in particular was deplored by Garampi. The endowments having been squandered, the professors were obliged to look elsewhere for a bare living. By 1775 the teaching staff was on the point of extinction, so that the theological candidates had no means of continuing their studies in Vilna.³ About 270 ex-Jesuits were re-employed in their former educational institutions, others found posts as tutors to the families of magnates.⁴ At their own request, several Bishops were given permission to employ on pastoral work not only those ex-Jesuits who were living alone, but also those who were living in community in their former colleges.⁵ Even in Clement XIV.'s time some of them were regarded as likely candidates for bishoprics,⁶ and others were actually raised to this dignity by his successor.⁷

The execution of the Brief of suppression in Belgium was entrusted on September 2nd, 1773, by Maria Theresa to Duke Charles of Lorraine, the stadholder of the Austrian Nether-

¹ *Garampi to Pallavicini, October 27, 1773, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 58, *loc. cit.*

² *Garampi to Pallavicini, May 9, 1775, *Cifre, ibid.*, 316; ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 75, 442 *seq.*

³ *Garampi to Castelli, July 12, 1775, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 75, *loc. cit.* For the decay of studies and discipline in the Papal school at Vilna which had been transferred to the Basilians, *cf.* *Archetti to the Proto-Archimandrite Joseph Morgula, of August 1, 1781, *ibid.*, 85.

⁴ ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 442 *seq.*

⁵ *Macedonio to Garampi, February 19, 1774, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 45, *loc. cit.*; *Corsini to Garampi, May 21, 1774, *ibid.*; *Garampi to the Bishops of Cracow, Vilna, Plock, etc., July 2, 1774, *ibid.*, 81.

⁶ *Garampi to Macedonio, September 3, 1774, *ibid.*, 59.

⁷ *Garampi to Pallavicini, November 27, 1776, *ibid.*, 60.

lands, who left it to the Minister Plenipotentiary, Prince Starhemberg, to arrange the "Detail".¹ As the feeling in Government circles was anything but pro-Jesuit,² it is not surprising that the suppression in Belgium was carried out so harshly that even Kaunitz and the empress were not in agreement with all the orders issued.³

According to the *Lettres patentes* of September 13th, 1773, at 7 a.m. on the 20th the executive officials had to go to the colleges allotted to them, announce the empress's orders and the Papal Brief to the assembled community, close the churches and schools, and set seals to the archives, libraries, and other articles of value.⁴ In accordance with the declaration of the letters patent, that the execution of the Brief was the exclusive duty of the civil power, the majority of the *Comité jésuitique* wanted at first to keep the Bishops right out of the affair, not even notifying them of the measures to be taken. Starhemberg, however, who had first consulted Prince Kaunitz on the matter, found this to be "improper". The Bishops were therefore permitted to send a representative to attend the deed of execution, by which the ex-Jesuits were to be forbidden to hear confessions, preach, celebrate Mass in

¹ BONENFANT, *La suppression de la Compagnie de Jésus dans les Pays-Bas autrichiens* (1773), Bruxelles, 1925, 49 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 40 seqq.

³ *Ibid.*, 4, 64. In the " *Resolutio Caes. Regia " on the protocol of the Viennese ex-Jesuit commission of October 9, 1773, we read : " I approve the measures taken in the Low Countries and Italy, though the former went too far with the closing of churches, etc. What a commotion it would have caused here ! " State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A., 75 c.

⁴ BONENFANT, 56 seq. There were two Provinces of the Order in the Austrian Netherlands : the Flandro-Belgian with 468 members, the Gallo-Belgian with 387 (PONCELET, *Nécrologe des Jésuites de la province Flandro-Belge*, Wetteren, 1931, xlvii). At the dissolution of the Order in France in 1762 the former Province lost four colleges with fifty members, the latter ten houses with 230 members. Their reception into Belgian colleges had been forbidden by the Austrian Netherlands Government (*ibid.*, p. cxxxix).

public, or wear the dress of their Order.¹ The commission's attitude was already shown clearly enough in the decree of September 13th, 1773; the subsequent proceedings threw a still brighter light upon it. The novices were sent home at once, while the other Jesuits were confined to their houses and were cut off from all communication with the world outside. The Flemish Provincial, Clé, was taken to the Charterhouse, the Walloon Provincial, Richard, to the abbey of Caudenberg in Brussels.² In the course of October all, except the Superiors and the Procurators, were given their freedom. By December 7th all the ex-Jesuits were out of their houses.³ But it was not till December 8th, 1775, that Starhemberg ordered the release of the four last Jesuits still imprisoned.⁴ Meanwhile all the former members of the Order were kept under special observation,⁵ which was not relaxed until the rebellion of Brabant.⁶

The justification put forward for these stringent measures was the suspicion that the Jesuits might secrete and embezzle some of their assets. Ever since their expulsion from Spain rumours about the surreptitious transfer of capital had been floating round the whole of Europe. The commission prided itself on recovering for the Treasury half a million florins which had been hidden away by the Jesuits.⁷ But even a superficial reading of the relative documents discloses any number of frivolous charges, distortion of facts, exaggerations, and malicious insinuations.⁸ After the ex-Provincial Clé had

¹ BONENFANT, 58 *seq.* Cf. *Nuncio Ghilini to Macedonio, September 10, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 52.

² BONENFANT, 56 *seq.*

³ *Ghilini to Macedonio, October 8 and 26 and December 7, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 53.

⁴ BONENFANT, 87.

⁵ "Les Jésuites furent traités en ennemis publics." *Ibid.*, 88.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 76. In his reports to Rome the nuncio Ghilini associated himself with the accusations of the *Comité jésuitique.* Cf. *Ghilini to Macedonio, October 8 and 26, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁸ BONENFANT, 75.

been kept in custody two whole years and had been represented to the central Government in Vienna as a dangerous criminal, Starhemberg had to admit that all that could be brought against him was conjectures that would not justify a regular action at law.¹ In this he was merely repeating the judgment passed a year before by several State Councillors in Vienna on the protocol drawn up by the *Comité jésuitique*: that it consisted solely of assertions and conjectures, with no proofs.²

The Bishops were provisionally prohibited from restoring their spiritual faculties to the ex-Jesuits.³ The commission would have liked to make this prohibition permanent, but it was not allowed to have its way. In response to a protest made by Cardinal Franckenberg of Malines⁴ the empress, by a decree of September 6th, 1775, allowed the Bishops to employ the ex-Jesuits in pastoral work, with the proviso that in every case the civil authority was to be asked a month in advance if there was any impediment. This condition enabled the Government to render the empress's permission valueless for all practical purposes. Having been rebuffed on two or three occasions, the Bishops made no further use of this humiliating concession.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*; PONCELET, p. CXXXV.

² *Protocol of the Viennese ex-Jesuit commission of November 6, 1773, April 7 and 18, 1774, State Archives, Vienna, Staatsratsakten, 1773, No. 2465, and 1774, No. 1135. In his considered *opinion of May 12, 1774, State Councillor Stupan explained that he could not advise that all Belgian Jesuits be deprived of the right of inheritance and be excluded from school and church, "since all the information that has been laid as to *facts* lacks legally valid proof; so that at present it all consists still of *assertions* and *presumptions*, which also was the most enlightened view taken by Your Majesty of the previous protocol of the commission of February 11 of this year [1774]." *Ibid.*

³ *Ghilini to Macedonio, October 26, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁴ BONENFANT, 89.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 88 *seq.*; *Ghilini to Macedonio, December 7, 1773, *loc. cit.* Cf. Cardinal Franckenberg's *aide-memoire in *Garampi to Pallavicini, March 7, 1779, enclosure 1, Nunziat. di Germania, 426, Papal Secret Archives.

As the *Comité jésuitique* refused to sanction the ex-Jesuits as teachers they were excluded from educational as well as pastoral work. In the programme drawn up by the schools commission instituted in 1776 it was contemplated that the professors, who would be appointed by competitive examination, should be laymen or secular clerics. All colleges were subjected to State surveillance. This abolition of the freedom of education met with the mute opposition of the clergy. On the whole, the reform produced little fruit, as it left untouched the primary and higher schools, and the State could not obtain a sufficient number of teachers.¹ Towards the end of the Austrian rule education in the Low Countries was worse than before the suppression of the Jesuits.²

The suppression of the Society of Jesus was not in accord with the wishes of the people. It gave satisfaction to only a strictly limited circle composed almost exclusively of the leading personalities in the Government who, like Nény and the members of the *Comité jésuitique*, were under the spell of the "enlightenment". The majority of the Bishops were favourably disposed towards the Order. To certain regulars and seculars, who regarded the Jesuits as rivals, the event brought a measure of satisfaction. The people did not fail to show the Fathers that they had their sympathy. The *Comité jésuitique* found it difficult to recruit enough agents to carry out their orders; but nowhere was there any actual rebellion.³

¹ BONENFANT, 162 *seqq.*

² "A la fin de l'ancien régime l'enseignement belge, privé des Jésuites, était plus pitoyable qu'avant leur chute : le prestige de la Compagnie de Jésus s'en trouva fortifié dans bien des esprits." BONENFANT, 165.

³ *Ibid.*, 165 *seqq.* "Le 19 de ce mois, lorsque l'on sçut, à n'en pouvoir plus douter, que le lendemain il n'y auroit plus de Jésuites, on alloit en foule à leur église ; jamais n'avoit-elle été plus remplie, nombre de personnes devoient rester sur la rue ; on voulut entendre leurs dernière voix sur la chaire de la vérité ; on voulut avoir leur dernier salut ; c'était précisément qu'on le faisoit pour les agonisants, on plaignoit ou pleuroit les pauvres

The revenues from the Jesuit properties were estimated at 220,000 florins. At first the commission thought of providing every member of the Order with the not inconsiderable pension of 500 florins, but Kaunitz refused to agree to anything more than the absolute minimum, so that it was reduced to 200–450 florins, according to the age of the recipient.¹ The value of the productive Jesuit properties was estimated by the committee at ten and a half million florins.² The sale by auction of the furniture realized 920,198 florins.³ The church plate, valued at 478,689 florins, was partly presented to other churches (to the value of 42,333 florins), but most of it was sold (for 389,150 florins).⁴ The paintings were valued at 118,008 florins. About thirty of the most valuable ones, including masterpieces by Rubens, Van Dyck, Breughel, and De Crayer, found their way to Vienna, mostly to the imperial galleries.⁵ The total number of books in the Jesuit libraries amounted to c. 500,000 volumes. Three-quarters of them were classed as theological rubbish and sold for the value of their paper.⁶ Whereas the administration was still presenting a surplus of 8,000 florins in 1780, there was found to be a deficit of 83,000 florins in 1792. The Jesuit funds disappeared with the Austrian rule on the invasion of the French army of the Revolution.⁷

With the suppression of the Order the work of the Bollandists seemed also to be endangered. The *Comité jésuitique's* first intention was to have the great undertaking carried on by laymen from the Academy, but Kaunitz decided that the

Pères ; on se plaignoit encore plus hautement du Pape." Report of the commissary Luytgens of September 23, 1773, on the suppression in Roermond, in BONENFANT, 67, n. 1.

¹ *Ibid.*, 111 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 134.

³ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁴ Except in the archdiocese of Malines the relics were not removed from the reliquaries before they were sold (*ibid.*, 138 seq.).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 139 seqq.

⁶ "Rapport de Gérard à Charles de Lorraine," of January 17, 1779, *ibid.*, 141 seq.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 145 seq.

services of the former collaborators were to be re-enlisted.¹ At first they were left in their old home, the Professed House in Antwerp, but in 1775 they were told to vacate the premises as they were wanted for a military academy. Through the efforts of the learned nuncio Garampi² a new arrangement was made in 1778. The empress assigned the Bollandists the abbey of Caudenberg in Brussels as a residence and paid every assistant a salary of 800 florins, with the result that the fifty-first volume of the work appeared in 1780. When the abbey fell a victim to Joseph II.'s assault on the monasteries in 1786 the Theresianum in Brussels, the old Jesuit college, was designated as the next headquarters of the *Acta Sanctorum*. Here the fifty-second volume appeared in the same year. But when the condition imposed by Joseph II., that a fresh volume must be produced every year, was found impossible to fulfil, the emperor stopped the work in 1788, observing that in any case it was "of little interest to really educated men". The whole organization was sold to the abbey of Tongerlo, where the fifty-third volume was published in 1794. It was not long, however, before the work was brought to a standstill by the invasion of the French troops, followed by the confiscation of the monastic properties and the persecution of the Religious. It was not till 1837 that the great enterprise was resumed.³

The further course of Jesuit history was vitally affected by that of the kingdom of Poland.

¹ *Ibid.*, 161 *seq.*

² *Garampi to Pallavicini, July 11, 1776, Nunziat. di Germania, 395, *loc. cit.*; further relevant *documents *ibid.* Rome was very happy to hear that the continuation of the work had finally been assured. *Pallavicini to Garampi, December 27, 1776, Nunziat. di Vienna, 665, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Pallavicini to Garampi, June 22, July 27, and September 28, 1776, *ibid.*, 665, 666; *Archbishop Beaumont to an unknown correspondent, June 28, 1778, Nunziat. di Colonia, 194.

³ DELEHAYE, *L'œuvre des Bollandistes 1615-1915*, Bruxelles, 1920, 162 *seqq.*; PONCELET, *Nécrologe*, cxii *seqq.*

CHAPTER VI.

THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND AND THE FATE OF THE CATHOLICS IN THE ANNEXED TERRITORIES—FEBRO- NIANISM IN GERMANY.

(1)

IN north-eastern Europe the Polish-Lithuanian elective monarchy was rapidly approaching its downfall. The civil war between the pro-Russian Government troops and the patriotic Confederation of Bar, the incursion of the Haidamaks, and the Russo-Turkish war brought death and destruction to almost every region of the realm.

All attempts to restore peace were frustrated by the inactivity of the other European Powers and the obduracy of the Muscovites. Stanislaus Poniatowski already felt that his throne was tottering and in his helplessness he became more and more subservient to the will of Russia, which was represented in Warsaw with brutal determination first by Wolkonski, Repnin's successor, and then, after 1771, by Saldern.

In spite of all this, fresh confederations of the Polish nobility were being formed on a small scale in all directions, and this, together with the constant feuds that were being waged, led to incalculable confusion. Declarations and protests flew hither and thither¹; a summons to peace issued by the king² was completely disregarded. The nuncio Durini sent full accounts to Rome³ of the skirmishes that were fought with varying results in the different theatres of war, stressing especially the victories of the Confederates and the Turks. Even in Prussian Poland there were clashes with the Lutherans,⁴ and fresh leagues of nobles were formed there

¹ E.g. the manifestoes of June 20 and 29, 1769, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 286 *seqq.*

² On July 7, 1769, *ibid.*, 290.

³ See his reports of June 28, 1769, *ibid.*, 291 *seqq.*

⁴ Durini's report of August 2, 1769, *ibid.*, 299.

in the name of freedom and the Catholic faith.¹ Between times the hope was again expressed that things would soon change for the better,² there was a threat of a confederation that would declare invalid all the resolutions taken by the Diet since 1763 and would even dethrone the king,³ and diplomatic correspondence was falsified and thrown in the form of pamphlets among the contending parties.⁴

What was still worse, the religious spirit in Poland had been largely undermined by the ideas propagated by West European "enlightenment". This was shown most clearly when the Papal nuncio was instructed to visit the Piarist establishment in Warsaw.⁵ The Provincial of the Order himself, Konarski, was regarded as the chief representative of anti-ecclesiastical thought; although one of his works had been put on the Index and several ecclesiastical warnings had been given him, he still continued to disseminate "enlightened" writings in Poland. When the nuncio tried to begin his visitation the documents of the previous one were withheld from him and an appeal was made to Rome.⁶ Bishop Młodziejowski of Posen, a faithful partisan of the king and the Russians, even tried to justify the Piarists to the nuncio,⁷ while Bishop Turski of Chelm revealed to him that it was Konarski who had urged the king to close the nunciature in 1767.⁸ Finally the king too forbade the visitation, whereupon Clement XIV. declared this edict to be of no effect and

¹ *Id.*, August 16, 1769, *ibid.*, 302 seq.

² "Anche un mese, e viva Dio, la Polonia tornerà nello stato pristino di cattolicismo e di libertà; l'uno e l'altra sono così strettamente legati in questo regno, che l'uno non può fare senza dell'altra." Durini's report of July 8, 1769, *ibid.*, 295.

³ This was one of the resolutions of the Confederation of Brest (Durini's report of August 2, 1769, *ibid.*, 299).

⁴ Durini's second report of October 7, 1769, *ibid.*, 313.

⁵ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 297 seqq.

⁶ Durini's report of October 14, 1769, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 314.

⁷ Durini's second report of October 28, 1769, *ibid.*, 315 seq.

⁸ Durini's second report of December 9, 1769, *ibid.*, 320.

informed Durini that the matter would be referred to the Congregation in Rome.¹

Shortly after this there occurred another incident that showed quite clearly the spirit that animated the Bishop of Posen. On December 23rd, 1769, the Pope sent the nuncio the circular letter announcing the jubilee year, also a covering letter instructing Durini to have the Polish Bishops make this announcement and to discuss with them the best means of maintaining the rights of the Church and of saving the Catholic faith.² At the same time Clement XIV. informed the king of this communication.³ When the circular letter was published it was found that Młodziejowski had distorted the text outrageously, interpolating as one of the conditions for gaining the jubilee indulgence unconditional obedience to the king, thus turning an ecclesiastical document into a political party cry against the Confederation of Bar.⁴ The Confederates replied with a flaming protest⁵ before God and the world, Church, and fatherland, against an episcopal edict which only prolonged the political distress and was of service only to the enemies of Poland. They renewed their oath to defend with all their might the freedom of the nation, the Constitution, and the Catholic faith of their fathers. They also protested⁶ against the sacrilegious and vandalic conduct of some Russian auxiliary troops in a Franciscan convent in Poland, when even the Blessed Sacrament had been outraged. Later there were further arguments between the nuncio and the Bishop

¹ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 299.

² *Ibid.*, 323, also THEINER, *Epist.*, 47.

³ THEINER, *Epist.*, 47 *seq.* Presented by Durini at the audience of January 21, 1770; *v.* his report of January 27, 1770, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 341 *seq.*

⁴ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 431; Durini's second report of April 7 and his first report of April 14, 1770, *loc. cit.*, 347 *seqq.* On June 16, 1770 (*ibid.*, 361 *seq.*) Durini reported that there was not a copy to be had, as the notices had been torn down from the church doors; a refutation of the pastoral letter had also been published.

⁵ On April 18, 1770, *ibid.*, 324 *seqq.*

⁶ On April 21, 1770, *ibid.*, 326 *seqq.*

of Posen, whom Durini described as a disaster for the whole Church in Poland.¹

Like Młodziejowski, the rest of the Polish episcopacy was sadly deficient in loyalty to Rome and the Church. Of the twenty-seven Bishops, wrote Durini in April, 1770, only five could be regarded as being true Bishops of the Catholic Church, and two of these were prisoners of the Russians.² The most unworthy of them all was, as ever, the Primate of Poland, Archbishop Podoski of Gnesen. In July, 1771, he arranged with the Russian ambassador that he, Podoski, should be carried off by force and that the crime should be attributed to the Confederates. This plan had to be abandoned, but in its stead another farce was acted: he was taken into what appeared to be Russian custody and was thus represented to his people as a political martyr.³ This failing to produce the desired effect, in the course of the year he followed his mistress, with whom he had formerly been living in Warsaw, to Elbing.⁴ In the years that followed he continued to look on idly at his people's ruin, refusing to leave his Prussian retreat.

In November, 1771, a mysterious attempt on the life of King Stanislaus was made in Warsaw, the responsibility for which was again foisted on the Confederates. But this too failed of its desired effect; in spite of the legal proceedings that were instituted the general public soon regarded the whole affair as but another trick of the Government party.⁵

¹ E.g. by reason of the ordination of two clerics (Durini's first report of April 7, 1770, *ibid.*, 346) and a censorship opinion on Marmontel's romance *Bélisaire* (second report of April 14, 1770, *ibid.*, 349).

² Durini's second report of April 14, 1770, *loc. cit.*

³ JANSSEN, 115; Durini's report of August 17, 1771, *loc. cit.*, 402 *seq.*

⁴ Durini's report of September 7, 1771, *ibid.*, 403 *seq.*

⁵ Cf. Durini's reports of November 6, 16, 23, and 30, 1771, *ibid.*, 409 *seqq.*, also the report forwarded by Durini, *ibid.*, 381. Cf. JANSSEN, 119 *seqq.*; HERRMANN, V., 502 *seqq.* The manifesto of protest issued by the Confederation of Bar on December 4,

Formal messages of congratulation were sent to the king by the foreign Courts and by Clement XIV.¹

In the complete confusion that prevailed in public life the enemies of the Church had an easy task. The Russian-sponsored schismatic party worked eagerly for the secularization of monastic property, and the Primate had forbidden all appeals to Rome. Further, the schismatization of Poland had begun in earnest, making especial headway in the Ukraine, under the pressure of the Russian occupation.² In the gloomy picture of the ecclesiastical situation in Poland as painted by Durini,³ only the Orders—and no longer all of them—stand out as the last props of the Church. No one hesitated any longer to express his anti-clerical views quite openly. The most flagrant example of this was the grand festival of the free-masons held on St. John's Day, 1770, in Warsaw, "this new Babylon," as Durini called it.⁴ The whole city knew about it three weeks before, but no one made any move to stop it, least of all the competent diocesan Bishop Młodziejowski of Posen. It was common talk that the king had contributed towards the cost of the sumptuous banquet that was held in the evening and that the Bishop had attended it in disguise.

By this time the Confederates were preparing to deliver

1771, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 384. Cf. Durini's report of December 25, 1771, *ibid.*, 412 *seq.*, and THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 36. The solemn celebration of the anniversary was reported by Garampi under date November 3, 1772, *ibid.*, 461. For the subsequent judicial proceedings, *v.* HERRMANN, V., 540, and Garampi's second report of September 1, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 548 *seq.*

¹ The Pope's letter, of December 24, 1771, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 197 *seq.* Prince Kaunitz's letter of sympathy in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 382. The ceremonies held in connexion with the solemn thanksgiving for the preservation of the king's life were described by Durini on January 4, 1772, *ibid.*, 438.

² JANSSEN, 115 *seqq.*; THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 436.

³ JANSSEN, 117 *seq.*, where further details are given.

⁴ Durini's first report of July 7, 1770, *loc. cit.*, 364 *seq.*; THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 346 *seq.*

their final blow against the wielder of the royal power, the unworthy protégé of Russia. In spite of all its efforts the Government failed to form a counter-confederation subservient to itself.¹ As the king refused to join the Confederates of Bar, they published in August, 1770, a manifesto which had been drawn up some time before and which had been approved by the Ottoman Porte. In this they held the king responsible for all the misfortunes that had happened since the death of his predecessor and declared that he had forfeited his royal status on account of the unconstitutional and forcible methods by which he had been elevated to the throne. He was guilty, they asserted, of the blood of his countrymen and of the universal despair; himself a tyrant, he had delivered and betrayed his country to the enemy. Consequently all the decrees that had been passed since the death of Augustus III. were of no effect. The present state of Poland was that of an interregnum and the whole nation must rally against the enemy and the usurper.² For Lithuania the interregnum was declared by the Marshal of the Confederation Pac, on the strength of the ancient Polish principle, "We are the electors of the kings and the destroyers of tyrants."³

In the following year, 1771, the Confederates of Bar tried to give effect to this manifesto. There was talk of an imminent convocation of the Diet to elect a new king, various candidatures were discussed, and a time-limit was fixed for the recognition of all acts of the State affecting individuals which had been put into effect since 1763.⁴ But the long

¹ These efforts of Wolkonski's were reported by Durini on December 2, 1769, *loc. cit.*, 318 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 333 *seqq.*, the manifesto of August 9, 1770. For its subsequent fate, *cf.* the report of September 1, 1770, *ibid.*, 337.

³ Declaration of October 22, 1770, *ibid.*, 338. *Cf.* THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 438.

⁴ *Cf.* the circular of the Bar Confederates of December 4, 1771, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 383, and Durini's reports of May 13, July 6, October 19 and 26, 1771, *ibid.*, 393, 399 *seq.*, 407 *seq.*

struggle wore down the strength of the Confederation and the enormous pressure exerted by the foreign Powers rendered the realization of its aims impossible.

In these complicated conditions it was difficult for the nuncio to maintain a non-party attitude. In any case, it was known that he favoured the Bar Confederates. In his report to Rome of January 11th, 1772, he approved also of the interregnum,¹ as the maintenance of Poniatowski's kingship would be of the greatest harm to the freedom and Catholicity of Poland, each of which was closely bound up with the other.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Polish Government viewed Durini's presence and activity as a check on their aspirations. Attempts were made in various ways to undermine his position.² This could best be done through the Polish representative in Rome, Antici, whose continuous reports on Poland naturally differed on many points from those of the nunciature.³ Antici finally succeeded in obtaining Durini's recall; he was succeeded by Garampi, who had proved his diplomatic worth in Germany. Durini was painfully surprised when the news of this change was made known in Poland by Antici before he himself had been informed of it.⁴ On May 30th he made a formal complaint to the Curia that the nuncio was always the last to hear of the decisions taken by his own Court.⁵ Government circles in Warsaw looked forward to having in Garampi a man favourably inclined towards their way of thinking and they made no secret of their satisfaction with the change. All the greater courtesy, therefore, was used

¹ *Ibid.*, 438 seq.

² Durini's report of January 19, 1771, *ibid.*, 386.

³ *Id.*, September 28, 1771, *ibid.*, 406 seq.

⁴ "Durinio magni itidem cultique ingenii, sed fervidioris naturae viro, qui apud regem nescio quibus de causis offenderat" is how Cordara's *Commentarii* account for his recall (CIAMPI, I., 114). A rumour to this effect had already been spread by Antici on a previous occasion. Cf. Durini's report of March 16, 1771, *loc. cit.*, 387.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 447 seq.

in bidding farewell to Durini and in furnishing him with the necessary safe-conducts.¹

Durini's departure, however, did not take place immediately. Although Garampi left the Eternal City in May it was not till September that he entered into his new sphere of activity. He had been commissioned to make a lengthy stay in Vienna and discuss there with the Imperial Government the questions directly affecting the fate of Poland, in particular the plan, which was now the chief political problem occupying the attention of her neighbours, of reducing the boundaries of the Polish kingdom for the benefit of the adjacent Powers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

This so-called First Partition of Poland originated in the aim of Prussian policy to throw a bridge across the Polish corridor on the lower Vistula to the East Prussian possession of the monarchy.² Frederick the Great found that the execution of this plan was seriously impeded at the Russian Court, which, chiefly owing to Panin's influence, was not so interested in the acquisition of various Polish territories as in gradually reducing Poland to a state of complete dependence on the Russian Empire. Catherine expressed her agreement with the Prussian plan at first almost jocularly when conversing with the Prussian Prince Heinrich on January 8th, 1771, then quite definitely on June 1st in the following year.³ Austria

¹ Durini's report of September 7, 1772, *ibid.*, 449.

² For the previous history of the Partition, cf. AD. BEER, II., 37 *seq.*; ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, VIII., 293 *seqq.*; JANSSEN, 122 *seqq.*; FORST-BATTAGLIA, 168 *seqq.*; SSOLOWJOFF, 131 *seqq.*; KOSER, II., 463 *seqq.*

³ JANSSEN, 134-141; FORST-BATTAGLIA, 172 *seq.* The importance of Prince Heinrich's journey to St. Petersburg and Frederick's careful attitude towards the other Powers, which in 1770 were not yet disposed to agree to the partition, is shown most clearly in two letters written at this time by Frederick to his brother. They were published by KOSER in the *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1908, I., 286 *seqq.* See also in particular R. KRAUEL, *Briefwechsel zwischen Prinz Heinrich von Preussen und Katharina II. von Russland*, Berlin, 1903.

had given a certain impetus to this agreement by its incursion into the Polish Zips for the purpose of enforcing ancient Crown rights. In spite of this, Vienna still went on working at pacificatory plans for Poland, until they were finally frustrated by the almost complete inertia of the French.¹ It is now known that Maria Theresa was practically forced against her will and conscience to give her assent to Austria's participation in the Partition by the pressure brought to bear on her by Joseph II. and Kaunitz.² The Prussian Government was officially informed of Austria's acquiescence on February 28th, 1772. The following summer brought the constitution of the triple alliance of the partitioning Powers, and on September 18th their representatives in Warsaw presented one note for all three Powers stating the absolute necessity of a suitable readjustment of the frontiers at Poland's expense.³ The sole purpose of this step was to legalize the state of affairs already existing, for in the preceding months the three Powers had occupied with their military forces, without bloodshed, the territories to which they laid claim.⁴ One of the rare instances of any resistance being offered, and then only for a short time, was at Elbing.⁵

King Stanislaus must now have seen with a horrifying clarity the results of his fatal policy, and in his political

¹ BROGLIE, *Le secret du roi*, II., 359 *seqq.*; JANSSEN, 149; SSOLOWJOFF, 131.

² ARNETH, VIII., 358 *seqq.*; BEER, II., 140 *seqq.*; FORST-BATTAGLIA, 178; JANSSEN, 157; SMOLKA, 14 *seqq.*; *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, LXXXII., 149.

³ BEER, II., 204 *seqq.*; JANSSEN, 158-164; Garampi's second report of September 19, 1772, in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 457. Stackelberg was the new Russian ambassador, Reviczky the Austrian; Prussia continued to be represented by Benoît.

⁴ Austrian statements on the occupation, of June 10 and 17 and July 6, 1771, in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 418 *seq.*, 420; the Russian statement, under date September 5, 1772, *ibid.*, 421. Cf. Garampi's two reports of July 6, 1772, *ibid.*, 451 *seq.*; FORST-BATTAGLIA, 179.

⁵ Garampi's second report of September 19, 1772, in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 457.

isolation he sent last-minute appeals for help to all the Courts of Europe.¹ To his dismay not a single hand was stretched out to save him.² Only one Power made any serious intervention on his behalf, the one whose friendship he had made the least attempt to gain: the Papal Curia.

As soon as it seemed likely that the partition project would be realized, Clement XIV. tried to stop it through the mediation of the Catholic Courts. At the end of February 1771 the fear was already expressed in an instruction to the Paris nuncio that it would come to a partition.³ In March the nuncios to Vienna, Paris, and Madrid received instructions containing an impressive exposure of these "horrible" aims.⁴ When Austria's participation seemed probable, the nuncio Visconti was asked to make vigorous counter-representations to the Government.⁵ One of the reasons why Garampi was required to spend some time in Vienna on his way to Warsaw was to discuss the Polish question.⁶ In various letters to their imperial majesties the Pope begged them to use their influence

¹ *Ibid.*, 432 seq., of October 27, 1772. The king even turned to the Doge of Venice for help; v. No. 244 in EHRENBERG, *Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der in der heutigen Provinz Posen vereinigten ehemals polnischen Landesteile*, Leipzig, 1892. Cf. also DAM. FERRERO, *La diplomazia piemontese nel primo smembramento della Polonia, studio su documenti inediti*, Torino, 1894.

² For the refusal of the English and the French, cf. Garampi's report of December 14, 1772, *loc. cit.*, 464. Braniski's mission, the last hope, also failed; v. Garampi on December 19, 1772, *ibid.*, 464 seq.

³ *Cifre of February 27, 1771, Nunziat. di Francia, 461, also the *Cifre of April 3, 1771, *ibid.*, 455B, Papal Secret Archives; BEER, II., 315.

⁴ JANSSEN, 168 seq.

⁵ Clement XIV. to the nuncio to Vienna, March 30, 1772. Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 171.

⁶ His letters of recommendation to the emperor and the empress, of April 15, 1772, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 222 seqq. Cf. *Gesch.* II., 171 seq. In his letter of March 4, 1772, the Pope notified the empress of Garampi's arrival in Vienna (THEINER, *Epist.*, 211 seq.).

on behalf of the Polish Catholics.¹ Numerous instructions were issued to the Paris nunciature in 1772 and 1773 with the object of securing the intervention of the French with the partitioning Powers.²

¹ See the letters of March 4, April 15, October 24, and December 5, 1772, and March 20, 1773, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 211 *seq.*, 222 *seq.*, 231 *seqq.*, 233 *seqq.*, 247 *seqq.*

² “ *L’esposizione di quei passi che sono venuti preparando la prossima catastrofe della tragedia polacca, scommoda assai e pregiudiziale alla maggior parte di quelli attori palliati, che non sono mai comparsi effettivamente sulla scena, si è, come Ella ha ben previsto, gradita assai da Nostro Signore ; ma la di Lui avvedutezza non gli ha permesso di reputare giustificato abbastanza il contegno a cui si appigliò cotesto gabinetto, quando il re di Prussia dimandò, se la Francia si sarebbe doluta del di lui ingresso in Polonia, quando l’avesse eseguito per esercitarvi i suoi diritti. Egli è così avvezzo a cavar profitto da quelle anticipazioni di misure che sa procurarsi, che nella sola impossibilità di attraversargli la rinnovazione degli esempi già datine può trovarsi di che giustificare il languor della risposta e della inazione francese corrispondente al sovraccennato punto della da Lei riferita negoziazione.” Cifra of June 17, 1772, Nunziat. di Francia, 455 B, fo. 401, Papal Secret Archives. “ *Nel colmo dei mali, che affliggono attualmente la Polonia sarebbe stato molto opportuno che da cotesta corte si mandassero le occorrenti commissioni ai ministri residenti in Vienna e in Pietroburgo per mitigare la sorte del cattolicismo e della religione, esposta a gravissimi pericoli . . . Quanto alla S^{ta} Sua, non ha egli trascurato di far prima d’ora direttamente colle Loro M^{ta} Imperiali tutte quelle parti che incombevano all’apostolico suo ministero e che poteva meritare un oggetto di tanta importanza ; ma per fare altrettanto con quei sovrani, che non sono nella nostra santa comunione, egli non può valersi di altro mezzo che della efficace interposizione dei principi cattolici et principalmente di Sua M^{ta} Christ^{ma}, a cui, come a primogenito della Chiesa, non può non esser grata ed accettata qualunque occasione che gli si presenti di segnalarsi in di lei sostegno e difesa.” Cifra al Ab. Riva in Paris, of June 9, 1773, *ibid.*, 461, fo. 308 *seq.* Cf. *Cifre of July 8, 1772, *ibid.*, 455B, and September 27 and March 17, 1773, also that to Riva of April 28, 1773, *ibid.*, 461.

Time after time the Polish Government asked Durini to report to the Curia on the lawless conduct of the foreign troops in Polish territory and to bring about the intervention of the neutral Powers.¹ After the presentation of the note of partition in Warsaw King Stanislaus sent a personal appeal for help to the Pope on September 23rd²; a few days later he expressed his gratitude for the Papal autograph handed to him by Garampi.³

Garampi had conducted negotiations in Vienna with the imperial couple and with Kaunitz, but was unable to prevent the incursion into Poland of Austrian troops on the pretext of restoring order and of asserting the ancient rights of occupation claimed by the Hungarian Crown.⁴ With no tangible success to his credit, he left Vienna and was received with great cordiality at the Polish Court, where he presented urgent letters of exhortation and recommendation from the Pope to the king, the Bishops, and the magnates of the realm.⁵ On Durini's quitting his post in Warsaw the king recommended him to the Pope for promotion to Cardinal,⁶ a tardy compensation for the disagreeable experiences he had had in Poland.

The passage of time brought no succour to the Polish king.

¹ E.g. under date June 4 and 19, and July 18, 1772, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 418, 419, 420.

² *Ibid.*, 424, also THEINER, *Epist.*, 344 *seq.*

³ On September 26, 1772, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 425 *seqq.*, and *Epist.*, 346 *seq.* He also wrote on the same day to the Secretary of State (THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 426).

⁴ See his report of June 15, 1772, *ibid.*, 449 *seq.* For Hungary's 'crown rights to the kingdom of Galicia' v. SMOLKA, 19 *seq.*

⁵ At his first audience on September 6, 1772. Cf. his report of September 9, 1772, *loc. cit.*, 455 *seq.* The Briefs, dated April 15, 1772, are reproduced in THEINER, *Epist.*, 218 *seqq.* Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 173.—In Warsaw too Garampi indulged his literary propensities; he first worked at a history of the Polish nuncios from early times until his own day and then principally at a history of the Polish bishoprics. See the evidence in CIAMPI, I., 114 *seq.*, II., 109.

⁶ THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 177. The king's letter of September 26, 1772, in the *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 425.

In October, 1772, he again approached the European Courts,¹ including the Curia. The Pope made another attempt to induce the French to intervene at the Russian Court, several such exhortations being sent to the nuncio in Paris, but they were all ineffectual.² In February, 1773, Stanislaus wrote once more to the European Powers,³ but all his pleadings were in vain; no one lifted a finger to stop the territorial robbery that was being perpetrated by the three Great Powers.

To ratify the partition treaties with Poland an extraordinary Diet had to be convoked. On March 6th, 1773, the Pope wrote to the king, the senate, the Bishops, and the nobles,⁴ exhorting them to support the rights of the Church unyieldingly in spite of every tribulation. The foreign Powers having fixed April 19th as the latest date for the opening of the Diet,⁵ the provincial elections were held at the end of

¹ Under date October 27, *ibid.*, 432, and THEINER, *Epist.*, 347 *seq.* Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 177. *Ibid.*, the release of the four Polish nobles who had been taken prisoner (see our account, vol. xxxvi., 227, 228); the relevant requests of the Polish Ministry, of October 17, and Garampi's, of October 20, 1772, with Stackelberg's reply, of October 18, 1772, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 429 *seqq.* The Pope's letters of congratulation to Soltysk and Rzewuski, of March 6, 1773, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 243-5.

² Cf. above, p. 389, n. 2. On November 28, 1772, the Pope *wrote again to the king about the sufferings of the Catholics (Epist. Clem. XIV. ad princ. 171, p. 179, Papal Secret Archives). The letter is missing from Theiner's *Monumenta*. Under date December 2, 1772, the Pope *wrote to the Basilian monk Porphyreus Starbek Wazinski, praising his zeal (Epist. Clem. XIV., a° IV., p. 184, *loc. cit.*).

³ On February 17, 1773, THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 465 *seqq.*

⁴ THEINER, *Epist.*, 239-243. *Ibid.*, 246, a similar letter from the Pope to the nuncio, of March 16, 1773. Under date March 20 he also exhorted the emperor and empress to fulfil their duty of protecting the Church in Poland (*ibid.*, 247 *seqq.*); similarly to the kings of France (*on August 24) and Spain (*on March 25; Epist. Clem. XIV. a° IV., p. 335, Papal Secret Archives).

⁵ Garampi's report of February 3, 1773, in THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 516; JANSSEN, 173.

March.¹ The terrorism that prevailed on this occasion was greater than ever. The Russian ambassador tried to gain influence by enticements of every kind or by the threat of employing military force.² Here and there the assemblies were interrupted and fresh dates for their termination had to be appointed. Numerous protests were made against the forthcoming Diet and the projects for partition. After the election of the president of the provincial diet at Lublin the nobles left the meeting-place, one after the other, so that finally there were only three men left who were entitled to vote and no election of deputies could take place.³ The forthcoming Diet therefore was expected to be only thinly attended.

In these circumstances there was no prospect of the treaty being accepted unanimously and without opposition, which condition was stipulated by the Constitution. To ensure success without violating the Constitution it was necessary to form a new confederation which would dominate the Diet. But this would have to be done with skill and circumspection, as in recent years all attempts to form a confederation devoted to the Government had ended in failure. The Russian ambassador Stackelberg now set about the task by the free distribution of the necessary bribes and by the appointment of the two Marshals—Poninski for Poland and Radziwill for Lithuania—before the opening of the Diet.⁴ With the deceptive watchword "for religion, monarchy, and freedom!" a programme was drawn up, which, from April 15th onwards, was signed by some of the deputies. On the 19th, after the usual church ceremonies, the Diet opened immediately with the proclamation of the confederation. This was contrary to the Constitution and aroused the most violent opposition.

¹ Garampi's report of February 24, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 519.

² Garampi's first report of April 7, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 251. Cf. BEER, II., 215 *seq.*

³ The situation as a whole is described in Garampi's second report of April 7, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 521 *seq.* Further instances in BEER, II., 218.

⁴ Garampi's reports of March 3 and April 14, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 519, 522 *seq.*

A group of the opponents, led by the Lithuanian Reitan, a member of the Bar Confederation, tried to break up the new union, but their intention was frustrated by the other side simply seizing the reins of government without more ado and presenting the Bar Confederates with accomplished facts.¹

For a few days more the Diet discussed the validity of the new confederation but finally had to yield to the armed pressure of the Russians.² To deal with the treaties the old and well-tried procedure was adopted of appointing a delegation furnished with full powers of deliberation and settlement. This time the king revolted against the stupidity of such a procedure, but had to declare that the circumstances forced him to accept it. But so as not to repel the patriotic opposition he demanded in his speech the unconditional preservation of the Catholic religion and its prerogatives and, abandoning his former attitude, he spoke in favour of the privilege of the Catholics of occupying the highest political positions in the State. He also demanded the retention of the old laws against apostasy, and the abolition of the mixed tribunal. These points were included in the instruction for the negotiating committee,³ which, after fresh reprisals on the part of the Russians, was appointed by a narrow majority.⁴

This attitude of the king's won for him the hearts of all his patriotically-minded subjects, who had formerly opposed him. At the last moment the instinct of unity and self-preservation seemed to be reawakening in the Polish nation and to be triumphing over all its adversities. At the same time the genuineness of the king's change of heart was not above

¹ FORST-BATTAGLIA, 182; BEER, II., 220 *seqq.*; Garampi's third report of April 21, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 525 *seqq.* The sessions of the Diet were guarded by 4,000 Russians; v. THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 280.

² Garampi's reports of April 28, May 5 and 12 (second report), 1773, *loc. cit.*, 527-537. Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 283 *seqq.*

³ Garampi's two reports of May 12, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 532 *seqq.*

⁴ Garampi's report of May 15 and the first report of May 19, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 535 *seq.*; JANSSEN, 176; FORST-BATTAGLIA, 183 *seqq.*

suspicion, even the nuncio Garampi describing it as highly dangerous.¹

While the new confederation was trying to maintain itself against the Confederation of Bar by means of circular letters and edicts,² negotiations began on June 2nd, 1773, between the delegation and the foreign representatives.³ At the beginning of July the treaties, which had been presented in more or less the same wording by all the partitioning Powers, were discussed separately, first the one with Austria, then the Russian one, and finally that with Prussia. Garampi sent precise reports to Rome on every detail and forwarded copies of the notes and replies that passed between the parties.⁴ The discussions were conducted under the constant threat of armed interference by the Russians, while the spectre of complete partition was already looming on the horizon.⁵ When the Diet reassembled at the end of September the foreign representatives demanded unconditional acceptance of the proposals.⁶ Again there was violent opposition, which was quelled only by further threats of punitive measures.⁷ In early October it was resolved to authorize the king to ratify the treaties,⁸ which was done on November 24th in the Bishop of Posen's palace.⁹ The foreign troops were to evacuate the territory that was still Polish in a fortnight's time. Austria was the first to begin this operation.¹⁰

Poland thus lost almost a third of its territory. Prussia

¹ Garampi's first report of May 12, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 532 *seqq.*

² Garampi's reports of June 23 and 30, 1773, *ibid.*, 539 *seqq.*

³ Garampi's report of June 9, 1773, *ibid.*, 539; BEER, II., 225 *seqq.*

⁴ THEINER, *Monumenta*, *loc. cit.*, 470-515; also Garampi's reports, especially those of August 18 and September 1, 1773, *ibid.*, 546, 548 *seq.*

⁵ Garampi's report of July 28, 1773, *ibid.*, 544.

⁶ Garampi's report of September 22, 1773, *ibid.*, 550.

⁷ *Ibid.*, also the reports of September 29, 1773, *ibid.*, 550 *seqq.*

⁸ Garampi's reports of October 6, 1773, *ibid.*, 552.

⁹ Garampi's report of November 24, 1773, *ibid.*, 555 *seq.*

¹⁰ Garampi's reports of November 3 and 17, 1773, *ibid.*, 554 *seq.*

acquired the region about the lower Vistula, the province of West Prussia ; Austria obtained Galicia, Russia an elongated sector on the north-east border of Poland, constituting the White Russian districts extending to the Dnieper-Dvina line. Subsequently the frontier-posts were shifted, without previous agreement, further and further into Polish territory from the Austrian and still more from the Prussian side. The delegation was already complaining of this to the representatives of the two other partitioning Powers in February 1774.¹ In the summer of that year Russia was induced to check this unlawful procedure by issuing an official declaration on the matter.²

(2)

The work of the delegation appointed by the Diet was not finished with the settlement of the treaties of partition. Russia had evolved for Poland a new Constitution, which was to restrict the royal powers by the introduction of a "Permanent Committee."³ The negotiations made but slow progress ; the Diet had to be adjourned a few more times⁴ before a settlement was reached in 1775.

In the negotiations conducted by the delegation the solution of ecclesiastical questions was given special attention. The claims of the Dissidents, of which nothing had been heard for a long time, suddenly cropped up again in 1774 in the form of a proposal put to the delegation by Poninski. The discussion

¹ Garampi's reports of March 23, April 13 and 20, 1774, *ibid.*, 284, 286 ; in addition, the complaints of March 16, April 7, 12, and 14, 1774, *ibid.*, 569 *seqq.* Cf. JANSSEN, 180 *seq.* ; KOSER, *Friedrich II.*, II., 475 *seq.*

² On August 22, 1774, THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 579 *seq.*

³ HERRMANN, V., 542 *seqq.* ; Garampi's reports of July 7 and December 8, 1773, April 27 (first report), May 4, August 27, and September 17, 1774, *loc. cit.*, 541 *seq.*, 557 *seq.*, 586 *seq.*, 587, 596, 598 *seq.*

⁴ Garampi's reports of January 26, February 2, May 11 (second report) and 15, September 24, and October 1 (second report), 1774, *ibid.*, 581 *seq.*, 588 *seq.*, 599 *seq.*

of the matter was left to a sub-committee under the chairmanship of a Bishop.¹ Some differences of opinion were expressed, but it was finally agreed to uphold the laws against apostasy in a mitigated form and that 1717 should be the standard year for deciding conflicting claims to the possession of expropriated churches.² The Dissidents were to be excluded from the highest political posts and they were not to send more than three deputies to the Diet.³ It is to be seen from this decision what a subordinate rôle the Dissident question had played in the aims of the non-Catholic Powers in respect of Poland.

Another important matter was the regulation of ecclesiastical conditions in the territories to be ceded. The nuncio Durini urged the members of the delegation to insist on the maintenance of the *status quo*; he himself drew up two memoranda, which he handed in.⁴ Together with Poland's insistence Austria's firm attitude in this matter was of great advantage. The imperial ambassador Reviczky affirmed⁵ that no special article was necessary in the treaty to be made with his Government, as the Catholic principles of his sovereigns would be valid also in Galicia, but he agreed to the inclusion of such a clause in the treaties with the other Powers if Poland granted equality of rights to the Dissidents in its own territories. Clement XIV. had made a special appeal to Maria Theresa to safeguard the rights of the Church.⁶ The Russian representative at first wanted to restrict himself to

¹ Garampi's report of February 23, 1774, *ibid.*, 583.

² Garampi's first report of March 2, 1774, *ibid.*

³ The latter point was not definitely settled until 1775; v. LIKOWSKI, I., 131, 162; PELESZ, II., 563; BEER, II., 310 *seqq.* Cf. THEINER, *Zustände*, 266 *seq.*; JANSSEN, 184.

⁴ Garampi's second report of August 18, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 547.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 485.

⁶ On March 20, 1773, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 249 *seq.* Emperor Joseph II. replied under date April 25, 1773, that nothing had been neglected by the participating Powers in this connection (*ibid.*, 349).

an assurance of the principles of toleration held by his sovereign,¹ but then accepted an article in the treaty by which the Catholics of both rites in the new territories were to enjoy complete freedom of religion and the security of their possessions. Similarly in the treaty with Prussia the *status quo* in the religious conditions in West Prussia was guaranteed and the Catholics were promised the same toleration as existed in the other Prussian provinces.²

How necessary these precautions were, especially in the case of Russia, was to be seen very soon. In spite of a fresh edict of toleration issued by the Czarina, the ecclesiastical rights of the Russian Catholics were gravely endangered. In the ecclesiastical sphere the fatal consequence of the disintegration of the Piast Empire, which began with this first partition of Poland, was the gradual and systematic destruction of the Greek Uniate Church in the Ukraine and in White Russia.

Since the Union of Brest in 1596 those portions of the Russian people over whom the double empire of Poland and Lithuania had maintained its rule on its eastern borders, had gradually ranged themselves under the primacy of Rome, with the exception of a small minority gathered round the Orthodox bishopric of Mohilev. The internal conditions of this Uniate Church were not exactly exemplary, with the possible exception of the Basilian Order, which also supplied the Bishops. The root trouble was the inadequate training of the secular clergy, who were unable to grasp in the proper manner the dogmatic differences between the Church of Rome and that of Byzantium. Moreover, the Uniates were not considered as their equals by the Latin Catholic Poles, and complete equality of political rights was obstinately refused them. It is understandable, therefore, that these peoples, who in any case were more closely connected with the Russians

¹ THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 491.

² THEINER, *Zustände*, 258. For the new administration of West Prussia, cf. KOSER, II., 481 *seqq.*; for ecclesiastical questions, p. 496 in particular.

of the Czarist Empire by reason of their religious rites and racial ties, felt little loyalty towards the Polish Crown.¹

As the result of the first partition of Poland this Uniate Church, all of which had formerly been in Polish territory, was split into three politically separate portions. Only a small portion remained in Poland, that of the Western Ukraine, under the Metropolitan of the Union, Archbishop Wolodkowicz of Kiev, whose moral conduct and fulfilment of his pastoral duties were hardly laudable.² The western portion of the Uniates, in Galicia, fell to Austria, the northern portion, in White Russia, to the empire of the Czars.

Of the 2·7 million Polish subjects who passed under the rule of Maria Theresa about two-thirds were Ukrainian Uniates (Ruthenians), concentrated for the most part in the dioceses of Lemberg and Przemysl. Important as were the efforts made to bring about a reform, especially those made by Bishop Leo Szeptycki of Lemberg, and however flourishing the spiritual and economic activity of the Basilians, the religious state of the people and the secular clergy was bad.³ As the imperial Government made it one of its chief tasks to improve these conditions, the Galicians adapted themselves to the new regime with joy and inward relief.⁴ An imperial edict of

¹ Further details in LEHTONEN, 115-133; LIKOWSKI, I., 136 *seqq.*

² LIKOWSKI, I., 165-177; PELESZ, II., 499 *seq.*, 529 *seqq.* For the ecclesiastical disciplinary proceedings against him, *cf.* also in particular THEINER, *Zustände*, 262.

³ PELESZ, II., 598 *seqq.*; KORCZOK, 10 *seqq.*

⁴ KORCZOK, 24 *seq.*; ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, VIII., 420; L. CHOTKOWSKI, *Histoire politique de l'Église en Galicie sous le gouvernement de Marie-Thérèse*, in the gazette of the Academy of Sciences in Cracow, Cracow, 1910, 25 *seqq.* An important change that afterwards took place was the withdrawal of the privilege enjoyed by the Basilians of being the only Order to occupy the cathedral chapters and the episcopal sees (PELESZ, II., 614-627). For the cultural and colonizing activity of the Germans after 1772, *cf.* R. F. KAINDL, *Geschichte der Deutschen in den Karpathen-ändern*, III., Gotha, 1911, 3 *seqq.*

July 28th, 1774, assured the Uniates of an effective equality of rights and changed the mutual attitude of the Catholics of the two rites, which had frequently been hostile, to one of successful co-operation.¹ The empress provided for the training of the clergy by setting up the *Barbaræum* in Vienna and a seminary for priests in Lemberg in 1783. Subsequently the Ukrainian standard of education also was raised and the Uniates were even given their own Metropolitan constitution.²

The fate of the Uniates in the eastern districts was just the reverse. As most of the nobility in these parts had attached themselves to the Latin rite for the sake of political privileges, the Union had gained ground only among the uneducated country-folk and even here it had been undermined by the self-seeking and simoniacal practices of its priests.³ The Ukrainian Uniates had had a hard time of it even before the first partition of Poland, and the subsequent period was not to bring with it any lasting improvement. Since the incursions of the Russians and the Haidamaks in 1768 the Greek Catholics had been made to become schismatics by force of Russian arms and measures of violence,⁴ in addition to which there were a number of voluntary apostasies. In 1764 there were

¹ PELESZ, II., 647; KORSZOK, 28; SCHIRMER in the *Revue internationale de théologie*, X. (1902), 348, XII. (1904), 292.

² KORCZOK, 29 *seqq.*, 45 *seq.*, 71; PELESZ, II., 635 *seqq.*, 655 *seqq.*; P. WERHUN in *Ukraine und die kirchliche Union*, 31.

³ A. J. BRAWER, *Galizien, wie es an Österreich kam*, Leipzig-Wien, 1910, 17 *seqq.*; for the internal situation of the Church, *ibid.*, 98 *seqq.*; *cf.* also LEHTONEN, 130 *seqq.*; LIKOWSKI, I., 284-304.

⁴ THEINER, *Zustände*, 259; PELESZ, II., 535 *seqq.*; LIKOWSKI, I., 139-159, especially also for the propaganda made by the schismatic clergy. For the persecution of the priests, *cf.* Garampi's report of March 10, 1773, *loc. cit.*, 519 *seq.* *Ibid.*, Garampi's gift of money for the priests held in captivity, which was to be distributed by a suitable Basilian. Also the collection of documents which Garampi sent to Rome (*ibid.*, 512 *seqq.*) and his own full report (*ibid.*, 562 *seqq.*, and THEINER, *Epist.*, 359 *seqq.*).

1,900 Uniate parishes in the Ukraine and only twenty Orthodox ones; by 1775 in only two districts of the province the Uniates had been robbed of 1,300 churches.¹ In Volhynia the Uniate priests were the victims of atrocities, being imprisoned in the most barbarous fashion or tortured to death if they refused to forswear the Union or to hand over their churches to the schismatics.² The Polish Government, the delegation of the Diet in particular, made several protests against this persecution of the Catholics and declared to be baseless the Russian accusation that the Uniates had interfered with the Russian occupation and had committed deeds of violence.³ On February 18th, 1774, after Stackelberg's conciliatory assurances had proved to be ineffectual, he was handed a memorandum in which the most recent incidents were enumerated⁴; in March another official complaint was lodged.⁵ In spite of this the measures taken by the Russians, especially their popes, against the Uniate priests showed a marked increase and assumed barbaric forms. On June 5th the delegation handed in a third protest, which the Polish king, at Garampi's instigation, supported with a note of his own addressed to St. Petersburg.⁶ He also appealed to the

¹ LEHTONEN, 135. After the restitution of the churches in 1775 there were still 186 of them remaining in Orthodox hands in these districts alone, whereas formerly there were only twenty Orthodox churches in the whole of the Polish Ukraine. Moreover, by 1773, in the diocese of Kiev, for instance, the Russians had deprived the Uniates of twenty-three deaneries and left them only nine; *v. Hist.-pol. Blätter*, CIV., 551.

² THEINER, *Zustände*, 263.

³ PELESZ, II., 542 *seqq.*; THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 512 *seqq.*

⁴ THEINER, *ibid.*, 561 *seq.*; *id.*, *Zustände*, 264.

⁵ *Id.*, *Zustände*, 265.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 266. For Garampi's energetic support, *v. PELESZ*, II., 537 *seqq.* In general, *cf. LIKOWSKI*, I., 159 *seqq.* In a letter of July 24, 1773, the Pope exhorted the king to fulfil his royal duty of protecting his country's Church (THEINER, *Epist.*, 256 *seqq.*). Garampi's reports of May 4 and 25, 1774 (first report), deal with the maltreatment of Bishop Rylo of Chelm, who was sent by

foreign Powers to use their good offices on his behalf at the Czarist Court. Garampi was continually sending the most precise reports on the subject to Rome and as early as March, 1773, he forwarded a memorandum for Maria Theresa, requesting her intervention with Catherine II. Shortly before, an instruction with the same purport had been sent from Rome to Visconti.¹ On April 25th Maria Theresa and Joseph II. did indeed promise the Pope to support the harassed Uniates and when in 1774 Clement XIV. forwarded Maria Theresa a description of the situation as given by Garampi the empress sent it straight to the Czarina, with a personal letter from herself.²

Finally the Czarina concluded a formal religious peace with Poland in 1775³ and ordered the release of the imprisoned priests and the return of the misappropriated churches. Nevertheless only a fraction of what had been confiscated was returned and many a priest was given his freedom only after signing a statement that he voluntarily renounced his own Church in favour of the schismatics.⁴

Another method of gradually detaching the Catholics from their faith was adopted in those districts of White Russia which had been annexed in perpetuity by Russia in 1772, and where the transfer to Russian administration had been carried through with scarcely any resistance.⁵ The population consisted roughly of 100,000 Roman Catholics, 800,000 Greek Uniates, and 300,000 Russian schismatics. Catherine's main object here was to keep the Uniates, who in any case were more in sympathy with the Orthodox Russians than with the Catholic Poles, as a separate entity and then gradually to

Garampi on a secret visitation of the Ukraine; THEINER, *Monumenta*, IV., 2, 587 seq., 589, also LIKOWSKI, I., 178; PELESZ, II., 539.

¹ THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 286, 288, 297.

² *Ibid.*, 437 seqq.

³ The chief concession she made here was her renunciation of the "iudicium mixtum". LIKOWSKI, I., 162.

⁴ LEHTONEN, 135.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 271.

loosen their ties with Rome and incorporate them into the Russian State Church.¹ And this plan succeeded. For the Latin Catholics a similar plan had been prepared.

It was only in recent years that the number of Latin Catholics in Russia had increased to such an extent that a special regulation of their religious conditions seemed to be necessary. This was attended to by Catherine II. in the spirit of toleration and State religion by means of a manifesto of July 22nd, 1763.² According to this, the Catholics of the Latin rite—there were no longer any of the Greek rite—were to enjoy freedom in the practice of their religion, in the building of churches, and in the selection of their priests, but they did not receive permission to propagate their faith or to establish monasteries. In legal and administrative matters the churches were subject to the authority of the State.

For the time being this piece of legislation was sufficient, but when in 1772 a hundred thousand White Russian Catholics were annexed to the Russian Empire the need arose to regulate their hierarchy, which was to be built into the rigid structure of the absolutist State. For on no account would St. Petersburg agree to these communities being left under their former Bishops still resident in Poland, as was at first proposed by the ecclesiastical authorities. On the contrary, White Russia, in the same way as it had been incorporated into the Czarist empire as a separate political province, was at least to be raised to the dignity of a separate ecclesiastical province. The systematic concentration of the Uniates in this province was also contemplated, for on the one hand this was a new confession for the great empire and on the other its connexion with the Latin Catholics, already loose enough, was to be severed altogether if possible.³

¹ For the secret attempts made by Koniski, the schismatic Bishop of Mohilev, to stir up trouble among these Uniates, *v. LIKOWSKI, I., 198 seqq.*

² LEHTONEN, 543.

³ Nevertheless numerous Uniates preferred to go over to the Latin rite (*LIKOWSKI, I., 203 seqq.*), although Clement XIV.

The task of preparing a plan for the ecclesiastical constitution of White Russia was entrusted to the Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Count Saldern, as being the most reliable person with a knowledge of the situation. His opinion, dated November 9th, 1772, was substantially approved by the Russian *Conseil* at the end of the month, Count Czerniszew making a few additions to it before presenting it to the Czarina.¹ The gist of it was that the Uniates with their former hierarchy were to be put under the Archbishop of Polotsk, while the adherents of the Latin rite were to be included in a new bishopric embracing the whole of Russia. As the most suitable holder of this new office the convert Siestrzencewicz, a member of the Lithuanian Calvinist nobility, was proposed. This plan was borne out in the main, though not in every particular, in the imperial ukase on the ecclesiastical organization of the Russian Catholics² which appeared on December 14th, 1772. A new "Bishopric of White Russia", administering the whole of Russia, was erected for the Roman Catholics, while the Uniates remained subject to Archbishop Smogorzewski of Polotsk.³ Both dignitaries received for their support a consistory, not a cathedral chapter; in disciplinary and administrative questions appeals might be made to the superior civil authority; the latter was to see that no propaganda was made by the Catholics among the Orthodox; Papal Bulls and Briefs were subject to the imperial *exequatur*.

This decree, issued a few weeks after the announcement of the partition, was irregular on two counts: Poland's assent by treaty to the territorial annexations had not yet been

renewed, under date April 16, 1774, the prohibition of this practice originally issued by Urban VIII. on February 7, 1624. See P. WERHUN, *loc. cit.*, 25.

¹ LEHTONEN, I., 546-552; MACIEJ LORET, *Kościół Katolicki a Katarzyna*, II., 32-6.

² LORET, 38 *seq.*; LEHTONEN, 557 *seqq.*; P. PIERLING, *Caterina II. e i cattolici della Russia*, in *Civ. catt.*, 1909, II., 456 *seqq.* Catherine had previously been handed a counter-memorial.

³ For Smogorzewski, see LIKOWSKI, I., 192 *seqq.*; PELESZ, II., 549 *seqq.*

given and, what was far worse, the ecclesiastical sanction had not been obtained. Naturally this arbitrary interference of the schismatic empress aroused Rome's indignation. The Congregation of Propaganda lost no time in drawing up a protest and submitting it to the Pope. This was done on March 17th, 1773.¹ No further trace of this document can be found; evidently it was not sent on to St. Petersburg.

Meanwhile the Czarina proceeded along her course unchecked. Her next task was the nomination of the Roman Catholic Bishop. Saldern had proposed Stanislaus Bohusz Siestrzencewicz, a lively *bel esprit* of wide interests, whose mental energy was dissipated in too many directions. After a stormy past he was now tutor to the House of Radziwill.² In April, 1773, at the request of his Russophil Bishop, he was nominated by the Pope as Bishop of Mallo *in partibus infidelium* and as Coadjutor-designate in Vilna. Being on good terms with the Russophil party, he was appointed the first Bishop of White Russia by a ukase of the Czarina's on November 22nd (December 3rd), 1773.³ Siestrzencewicz had to conform to Catherine's will in many respects, but he sometimes took the liberty of disregarding it. He refused, for instance, to take over his new post without first obtaining Papal confirmation.⁴ The Czarina allowing him to apply to the Curia, he wrote to the Pope,⁵ asking him to recognize his nomination, and basing his request on the great interest and solicitude felt by his sovereign in the welfare of the Catholics.

Rome now found itself constrained to declare its attitude towards the illegal proceedings that had been taken in Russia. The ensuing negotiations, which went on for most of the

¹ PIERLING, *loc. cit.*, 459.

² *Ibid.*, 460 *seqq.*; LEHTONEN, 573 *seqq.*; LORET, *loc. cit.*, 43-51; also Garampi's letter to Castelli, of April 6, 1774, in LORET, 214. His correspondence in the Papal Secret Archives (Nunziat. di Polonia) was edited by Parczewski Szantyr (*v. ibid.*).

³ PIERLING, *loc. cit.*, 468; LORET, 55; *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, X. (1919), 65 *seqq.*, 308 *seqq.*

⁴ LEHTONEN, 579 *seqq.*, 575.

⁵ On February 10, 1774; *v. PIERLING*, 469.

following year, were conducted by the nuncio Garampi.¹ He, having already great confidence in Siestrzencewicz, defended his protégé on all points to the Propaganda, but stressed at the same time that in spite of her principles of toleration the Czarina was opposed to any close connexion between her Catholics and the Holy See or the rest of the world.² In these circumstances it was impossible for the Pope to recognize the arbitrary erection of the new bishopric, but the Propaganda, reluctant to jeopardize any kind of ecclesiastical organization and sacred ministry for the Russian Catholics, agreed to nominate Siestrzencewicz as Apostolic Delegate for the former Polish, now Russian, territories. The relevant decree, of January 31st, 1774, received Papal confirmation on February 20th.³

In addition, Rome applied to the Court of Vienna for support, and the Propaganda transmitted a copy of Garampi's instruction to the nuncio to Vienna, Visconti.⁴ In its declarations and memoranda the Curia emphasized the glaring contrast between the Czarina's quite unprecedented and arbitrary action and her repeated assurances of toleration and the retention of the *status quo* in ecclesiastical matters; they declared the ecclesiastical constitution of Russia as ordained by St. Petersburg to be invalid, since it lacked Papal confirmation,

¹ See the correspondence between Rome, Garampi, and Siestrzencewicz in LORET, 59 *seqq.*, 209 *seqq.*

² Garampi to the Propaganda on March 9, 1774, *ibid.*, 211 *seq.* For Garampi's confidence, *cf.* LEHTONEN, 462, 465. Rome's reply was full of misgivings; *v.* Castelli to Garampi on March 5 and 16, 1774, *ibid.*, 212 *seqq.* Garampi praised and recommended Siestrzencewicz again under date April 6, 1774, *ibid.*, 214 *seq.* He also consoled Siestrzencewicz and encouraged him at any rate to show a keen activity in the meantime in those spheres in which he had jurisdiction as Coadjutor of Vilna; *v.* his letter to him of August 1, 1774, *ibid.*, 215 *seq.*

³ PIERLING, 470; LORET, 59-63.

⁴ LORET, 87, 218 *seqq.*; memorandum from the Propaganda to Visconti in Vienna, with two enclosures (memoranda on the regulation of the Russian ecclesiastical constitution).

and expressed the fear of a schism. In particular the Propaganda considered it monstrous that the Catholics in White Russia and those scattered over the whole empire should have only one Bishop, which made the satisfactory fulfilment of pastoral duties impossible. Without question two dioceses must be erected for the territory newly acquired from Poland, while the Catholics in the Russian diaspora would be cared for, as before, by the missionaries of the Propaganda. For the Uniates too the single archbishopric of Polotsk was insufficient ; at any rate a larger territory should be allotted to the Archbishop of Smolensk, who had become a Russian subject. But that all appeals in ecclesiastical questions must be directed to Rome and not to St. Petersburg was in accordance with a fundamental principle, the observance of which was demanded by Rome without exception from every Catholic Christian community throughout the world.¹ The nuncio Visconti, while acknowledging to the full the good will of the empress, raised some doubts about the reliability of the Viennese Court.² It did in fact make some conditions about the Uniates in Galicia, but on receiving a favourable reply from the Pope³ Maria Theresa entered on a correspondence with the Czarina on the question raised by Rome.⁴

Nevertheless all the Curia's attempts to obtain some concession from the Czarina seemed to be doomed to failure, so that it became necessary to communicate with her by direct means, in so far as that was compatible with the dignity of the Curia. A good opportunity for this was offered by the mission undertaken by the Knight of Malta, Sagramoso, who, at the request of Pallavicini, the Secretary of State, was

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, 224 *seq.*, his letter to Pallavicini of February 24, 1774 ; *cf. ibid.*, 88.

³ Maria Theresa wanted the Church government in Galicia to be " as if there were no country in Europe that went by the name of Poland" (*ibid.*, 89). The Pope replied under date March 5, 1774, that he would instruct the nuncios to Vienna and Warsaw to make further inquiries and conditions (THEINER, *Epist.*, 296 *seq.*).

⁴ LORET, 89-92.

to be sent by his Grand Master to the Russian Court.¹ While there, he was instructed by Pallavicini,² he was to have a personal talk with Catherine about the situation of the Catholics in her empire. She was to guarantee for Russia the effective union between the head and members of the Church and to sanction an adequate number of Catholic parish priests and Bishops for these districts, as circumstances warranted. Not one of the least favours His Holiness expected to receive in virtue of her magnanimity and justice was the re-establishment of religious peace and well-being among the Uniates of the Ukraine. On the same day, May 28th, 1774, Clement XIV. addressed a personal letter to Sagramoso on the subject of his mission.³

Clement XIV. did not live to see the execution of this scheme. It was interrupted by his death, but was resumed by his successor.⁴

(3)

Clement XIV., engrossed as he was with the Jesuit question, could give only half his mind to the development of the ecclesiastical situation in Poland, and he devoted still less time to the anti-clerical movements in Germany.⁵ In consequence, not only was Febronianism able to spread almost undisturbed in the latter country, but the first attempts were made to put its principles into practice.

In the autumn of 1769 the information reached Rome that the book of Justinus Febronius was being printed in Frankfurt in a new and considerably enlarged edition. The Pope thought the matter so serious that on October 14th he wrote a strongly

¹ For Sagramoso, *ibid.*, 94 *seq.*

² By letter of May 28, 1774, *ibid.*, 226 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 225 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁵ SCHMID, *Geschichte der kath. Kirche Deutschlands*, 10; STÜMPER, 158. For the sections dealing with Febronius, Pastor had collected a number of sources from the Vatican which are here developed by others.

worded letter of admonition to the Archbishop of Trier.¹ To avert fresh injuries to the Church Klemens Wenzeslaus was urged to use every effort and care "to stifle that poisonous and pestilential abortion before it sees the light of day". As an additional precaution the Pope had his Secretary of State inform Maria Theresa, under date November 18th,² that in view of the unheard-of audacity of the author it was also the duty of the Empress to intervene, especially as the publication was taking place without mention of where it was being printed or the real name of the author, which was a patent violation of the imperial laws. She was asked, therefore, to instruct the imperial censor in Frankfurt to impound this new edition immediately.

But in imagining that anything could be done by imperial intervention in the predominantly Protestant free city on the Main the Pope was indulging in vain hopes, and in Trier also his Brief failed to have the desired effect. In fact the first step taken by the Elector there was to entrust the drafting of a reply to Rome to no other than his suffragan Bishop Hontheim. Hontheim's draft consisted of a flat refusal to interfere with the printing on the score that Frankfurt was a free city of the empire; but some prospect was offered of the book being banned by Trier. The Elector, deeming this reply to be too brusque, rejected Hontheim's draft and used more courteous terms, though the effect of his letter was hardly more favourable.

Actually there appeared in the February of the following year not a new edition but a second volume of Febronius's work, purporting to be published at "Frankfurt and Leipzig".³ It was not a continuation of the first volume, but a full discussion of all the refutations that had hitherto

¹ In *Epist. ad princ.*, 165, p. 298, Papal Secret Archives, reproduced in THEINER, *Epist.*, 32; *Bull. Cont.*, V., 98 seq. Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 273 seq.; STÜMPER, 158.

² Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 274.

³ The title, exactly the same as in 1763, was followed by the explanation: "tomus secundus, ultiores operis vindicias continens."

appeared. Hontheim went on with his trick of giving the author a false name by introducing pseudonyms for the writer of each one of the objections. In addition, he invented a new editor,¹ the pseudonym "Febronius" appearing only as the writer of the final section on the obedience due to the Holy See.

Hontheim's presumable intention in publishing this new volume under the protection of his Elector and with only a feeble intervention on the part of the reigning Pope was to reawaken public interest in his work and to set going again the arguments it contained. In this he was completely successful. In a few weeks the Bishop of Mainz and Worms was writing to Visconti, the nuncio to Vienna, that Febronius's work was much in demand and was selling well in spite of its high price. It was to be feared, he said, that the secular Governments would extend their jurisdiction more and more at the expense of the spiritual authority. In this respect, he added, the Court of Mannheim was already showing its willingness to follow the example of other Catholic princes.²

In May, 1771, the Roman Congregation of the Index banned this second volume as it had done the first.³ In August, when the nuncio to Cologne was asked to make careful inquiries as to how Trier really stood towards Hontheim,⁴ it was already believed in Rome that the Elector Klemens Wenzeslaus had forbidden the author of "Febronius" to publish a third volume.⁵

¹ Caprara, the nuncio to Cologne, suspected the editor to be the Canon and Professor Hillesheim (SCHNÜTGEN, *loc. cit.*, 753).

² *Letter of March 24, 1770, from Worms, Nunziat. di Germania, 652, Papal Secret Archives. It contains the following passage: "Dicunt ultro aperteque quod, si liceat ecclesiasticis contra potestatem papalem scribere eamque coarctare, ipsi in mala partem non possit verti, si et ipsi vigiles sint."

³ Cf. the *communication of the Secretary of the Index of February 21, 1777, Nunziat. di Germania, 189A, *loc. cit.*, which gives May 24, whereas REUSCH (*Index*, II., 942) gives May 14.

⁴ *Cifre to Caprara of August 10, 1771, Nunziat. di Colonia, 272, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ Thus *Orsini to Tanucci on August 9, 1771, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1477.

Meanwhile the literary warfare was resumed with renewed vigour. The most important work on the orthodox side was the *Antifebronius vindicatus* of the Italian Jesuit Zaccaria, which appeared in four volumes in 1772-73.¹ When the Dominican Mamachi personally presented the Pope with his refutation of the "Febronius" in July, 1771, he was highly praised.² The Dean of Cologne University, Johann Gottfried Kaufmanns, was also thanked by the Pope in a Brief of August 17th, 1771,³ for sending him his work against the "Febronius". Similarly the nuncio Caprara was instructed in May, 1773, to convey the Pope's thanks to the Jesuit Carrich for his refutation.⁴

Hontheim was not by any means disposed to suffer these attacks in silence. He was already preparing to launch another general assault, by means of two further volumes written in his own defence. The third volume duly appeared in 1772, the fourth in 1773-74, the latter being in two parts. The former consisted chiefly of a discussion with Walch, the author

¹ In Rome and Cesena. A reprint of the first two volumes, probably sponsored by German Jesuits, appeared in Frankfurt in 1772. Hontheim attacked the work in the fourth volume of the "Febronius". For details, cf. O. MEJER, *Febronius*, 91 seqq. Even Brunati said that Zaccaria was one of Febronius's most competent opponents (*letter to Colloredo, February 2, 1774, State Archives, Vienna). It is significant that the two anti-Febronian works were on the Viennese Index of 1780 (REUSCH, II., 942).

² *Vasquez to Roda, August 15, 1771, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez.

³ In *Epist. ad princ., 169, p. 65, Papal Secret Archives. THEINER, *Epist.*, 173. J. G. KAUFFMANNs, *Pro statu Ecclesiae catholicae et legitima potestate Rom. Pontificis contra J. Febronii librum*, Cologne, 1770. For Kauffmanns, cf. WESSELMANN, Kempen, 1881; *Annalen des Hist. Ver. f. d. Niederrhein*, XLIII. (1885), 210.

⁴ *Cifre to Caprara, of May 22, 1773, Nunziat. di Colonia, 272, loc. cit. For the literary history of the "Febronius" in the reign of Clement XIV., see also WALCH, *Neueste Kirchengesch.*, VI. (1777), 189 seqq.

of the *Neueste Kirchengeschichte*¹; Hontheim himself had supplied him with an article on the origin of his work, but in it he had drawn a clear dividing line between the Protestant idea and the "purified" ecclesiastical system of Febronius. As opposed to Walch, Hontheim defended the doctrinal infallibility of the Church without the slightest qualification. The most notable feature of the fourth volume is the highly conceited preface,² where allusion was made to the obvious success of the work among Catholic Government circles and it was again emphasized that the object of the book was the reunion of the Churches. It was the author's duty, it was said here, to "denounce those execrable and obnoxious superfluities which deter the Protestants especially from returning to the Church". And it was not only the clergy that were to judge of the matter, but the whole Christian world. But in its first phase at any rate the attainment of his object rested with the action and the good will of the politicians. The most recent ecclesiastical reforms carried out by several Catholic princes were to be welcomed as the first steps along the road, likewise the suppression of the Society of Jesus, the abolition of the Bull *In coena Domini*, Portugal's breach with Rome, and other such measures. All this, for Febronius, helped to purify religion.

In March, 1773, the third volume of Febronius was condemned by the Congregation of the Index without any specific censures.³ At the same time it instructed its secretary to apply to the Pope for another solemn condemnation of the pernicious work. The secretary fulfilled his commission, but

¹ Vol. III., pp. 313 *seq.*

² Dated "V Idus Martii 1773". According to Krufft (MEJER, 174) Hontheim intended to close his "career" with this double volume and to retire to his property of Montquintin in Luxemburg, but found himself unable to do so either on this occasion or two years later.

³ *Communication of the Secretary of the Index, of February 21, 1777, Nunziat. di Germania, 189 A, *loc. cit.*, which gives the date as March 29, whereas REUSCH (II., 942) gives it as March 3. Volume IV. is not on the Index.

without effect ¹; the ideas contained in the book had already gained admittance into the ecclesiastical policy of the German princes and had in fact, to some extent at least, been derived by the author from ecclesiastico-political practice.²

The doubtful honour of being the first to take steps in this direction in a notable manner is due to the three Rhenish Archbishops. In 1769 the Courts of Mainz and Cologne had already issued invitations ³ to the Archbishop of Trier and afterwards probably to one or two other Bishops, to attend a conference on the removal of various abuses. In the December of that year Van Deel, the deputy from Mainz, Hillesheim, Canon and Professor of Cologne, and Hontheim, suffragan Bishop of Trier, met at Coblenz as the plenipotentiaries of their spiritual lords. Hontheim presided ⁴ over the proceedings, the protocol of which may be regarded as the prologue to the notorious Punctation of Ems of 1786.

The very preamble to the document,⁵ which was signed on December 13th and contains thirty articles, is pervaded with the Febronian spirit. The agreements begin with a general denunciation of the Roman Curia, whose abuses and exaggerated claims had been steadily increasing since the fifteenth century. So far from wanting to loosen the bond with the Holy See, the three Electors were intent on strengthening it anew by removing all excrescences. This could be done by restoring the episcopal authority to its original condition and by freeing their subjects from the oppressive taxes levied by Rome. The emperor himself, with his powerful protection of the German Church, was asked to obtain from the Pope the restoration of its ancient freedom and to help clear away all the scandals and abuses.

¹ Cf. the *communication mentioned in the previous note.

² These territorial roots of the "Febronius" have been brought to light by LEO JUST in *Das Erzbistum Trier und die luxemburgische Kirchenpolitik (Die Reichskirche, I.)*, Leipzig, 1931.

³ MEJER, *Febronius*, 76 seqq.

⁴ SCHNÜTGEN, *loc. cit.*, 745; SCHMID, *Geschichte der kath. Kirche Deutschlands*, 10.

⁵ Printed for the first time in LEBRET, *Magazin*, VIII., 1 seqq.

The desires of these Rhenish ecclesiastics, which they set out one by one, were of a varied nature, some of them merely borrowings from the usual *gravamina*, but most of them demands for reform of a Febronian and "enlightened" character. Thus complaints were raised against the excessive number of new Apostolic Constitutions, whose publication in future would need episcopal assent before they were legally valid; the same condition would have to be applied to all Papal rescripts and the granting of favours. The informatory process for the purpose of confirming an episcopal election would have to be opened not only with the nunciature but also with the competent or the nearest Ordinary. The payment of annates and other moneys not only meant that a free nation and the first of the Catholic peoples was subjected to a formal tribute, but they were an appreciable drain on the economic resources of the ecclesiastical principalities and set them at a disadvantage compared with the Protestant principalities. Then come the usual complaints about the system of appeals and the other powers of the nuncios that evaded the episcopacy. This was followed by the demand for the Apostolic faculty of dispensation for every Bishop. To restore the episcopal authority to its former condition, exemptions were to disappear and the regular clergy and the administration, reform, or suppression of the religious houses were to be subject to the local Bishop.

These agreements made at Coblenz were approved by the three Electors, who on February 1st, 1770, sent similarly worded notes containing their demands to the imperial Government, with the request that they be put before the Pope.¹ In Vienna, where the empress especially, with her respect for religious authority, jibbed at the overweening demand,² the matter was shelved until the autumn, when a reply was sent in which the Electors' comprehensive pro-

¹ MEJER, 81 *seq.* According to Krufft (*ibid.*, 271) the Bishop of Würzburg, who had also been invited to Coblenz, shortly afterwards sent his communication too.

² THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 413 *seq.*

gramme was picked to pieces, all the points within the competence of the imperial diet and those which did not seem to be too urgent being separated from the rest. For the remainder, which needed to be discussed, further evidence was requested. But it was due also to the Elector of Trier that the affair turned out otherwise than was desired. It was only owing to Hontheim's insistence and after a long delay that Klemens Wenzeslaus put his name to the reply proposed by Mainz and Cologne, and then he did not allow it to be dispatched. He also rejected the further proposal to send a personal plenipotentiary to Vienna, having precise information from that quarter, as he said, "that the favourable moment had not yet presented itself." Finally the Coblenz protocol was sent also to the French Government, whereupon Cardinal Rohan, who was asked to act as intermediary, expressed his disapproval of the document and was praised by the Pope for so doing.¹ So it came about that these agreements of the ecclesiastical Electors had no immediate results, but they merit attention in so far as most of the points reappeared ten years later in the Josephine programme of reform.

But the Febronian-minded Archbishop of Mainz, Emmerich Joseph von Breidenbach, was not to be diverted by this failure from continuing his efforts to make good his pretensions.² The very next year the Cardinal Secretary of State was complaining that force was being used in Mainz to obstruct inconvenient appeals.³ The Elector was also said to be making fresh efforts at the imperial Court to win favour for his aspirations,⁴ despite the counter-efforts of the nuncio

¹ THEINER, *Epist.*, 106.

² For the episcopal influence of the Archbishop of Mainz on the Archbishop of Trier, v. SCHNÜTGEN, *loc. cit.*, 752; cf. *ibid.*, 744.

³ *Cifra to Nuncio Giraud in Paris, of July 24, 1771: "ed ora con minaccie, ora con forza, hanno trattenuto gli appellanti a desistere da ogni ulteriore ricorso." Nunziat. di Francia, 461, fo. 137, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ Among other ways, by sending another memorandum. Cf. *Cifra to Nuncio Giraud of July 24, 1771, *loc. cit.*, fo. 140, and THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 3.

Visconti,¹ and to be soliciting the interest of the other German Bishops in his aims.² Consequently the nuncios to Vienna and Cologne were advised repeatedly to keep a special watch on his whole line of conduct.³

Anti-clerical tendencies gradually made their way also into the ecclesiastical policy of the secular princes. The Elector Palatine, Karl Theodor, who was also Duke of Jülich and Berg, issued various decrees against the religious Orders through the leader of his Government in Düsseldorf, Count Goldstein, a friend of Hontheim's.⁴ It was only the protest made by Caprara, the nuncio to Cologne, that prevented them being put into effect.⁵ Similar tendencies developed at the Court of the Bavarian Elector, Max III. Joseph, so that here too Caprara had to intervene, this time in the project to use the revenues of the religious houses for the training colleges of the clergy.⁶ Since 1768 there had been enacted a number of reforming decrees affecting the relations between the Church and State,⁷ which could not be allowed to go uncontested by the ecclesiastical authorities. The necessity of erecting a barrier against these encroachments gave rise to certain unifying tendencies among the Bishops of the Bavarian Electorate,⁸ which after numerous opinions had been given

¹ THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 3.

² *Cifra to Nuncio Giraud (undated ; between September 4 and 11, 1771), *loc. cit.*

³ Among other occasions, on August 22, 1772 (in THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 143 *seq.*), and on August 28, 1773 (*ibid.*, 274 *seqq.*).

⁴ Knowledge of Goldstein and his ecclesiastical policy is best obtained from the oft-quoted work by SCHNÜTGEN (*loc. cit.*, 743 *seqq.*).

⁵ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 411 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 413.

⁷ Cf. G. PFEILSCHIFTER-BAUMEISTER, *Der Salzburger Kongress und seine Auswirkung 1770-1777* (Veröffentlichungen der Görres-Gesellschaft, Sektion für Rechts- und Staatswissensch., Heft 52), Paderborn, 1929, 119 *seqq.*, and 168-174 in particular. All the original sources are also collected together in this volume (pp. xviii-xlij).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 184 *seqq.*

led to the calling of an episcopal congress.¹ Invitations to this were also issued at the end of June 1770 by the Archbishop of Salzburg, Sigmund Christoph von Schrattenbach.² The conferences began at the end of July and went on, under the chairmanship of Dean Truchsess of Zeil, until February 1771. At the twenty-seven sessions the general subject of discussion, after the preparation of a Bavarian concordat, was the various measures of reform. The conferences were continued as a congress of delegates until the end of 1772.³ In spite of the high hopes that were justified by such an enterprise, it failed for personal and tactical reasons.⁴ The only direct effect it had was a certain moderation in the Electoral policy towards the Church. When the congress opened Clement XIV. encouraged Archbishop Schrattenbach by sending him a special laudatory Brief⁵ and he afterwards thanked him for informing him of the lampoons that had been launched against him.⁶ Nor did Clement XIV. disdain to appeal directly to Max III. Joseph and to advise him most earnestly not to associate himself with the aims of the Rhenish Electors.⁷ But the greatest joy was shown by the Pope on hearing that under the influence of the Duke of Württemberg, Karl Eugen, Klemens Wenzeslaus had withdrawn from the conspiracy formed by the Elector of Mainz.⁸ And finally the latter too expressed his regret to the Pope for his former conduct in a memorial of October 21st, 1773, and received in return, a few months before he died, a letter of thanks from Clement XIV.⁹

¹ *Ibid.*, 191 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 220 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 402-423.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 431 *seqq.*, 658 *seqq.*

⁵ THEINER, *Epist.*, 121 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 91. Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 419 *seqq.*

⁷ Already on March 10, 1770 (THEINER, *Epist.*, 69 *seq.*), also on January 19 and March 14, 1771 (*Hist.*, II., 3 *seq.*).

⁸ *Cifre to the Auditor Rion in Paris, of July 14, 1773, Nunziat. di Francia, 461, Papal Secret Archives, also the Papal letter to the Duke of Württemberg, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 290 *seq.*

⁹ Of February 5, 1774, *ibid.*, 292.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SURVIVAL OF THE JESUITS IN PRUSSIA.

THE conquest of Silesia and the partition of Poland brought under Prussian rule vast areas in which, in 1773, there were twenty-six Jesuit establishments of varying size and importance, containing about 350 members of the Order.¹ Frederick the Great's attitude towards the Jesuits has often been the subject of historical study.² His distaste for the Catholic Church, which had been implanted in him in his youth, continued to have its effect long afterwards, in spite of his proclivity to free thought; inwardly he never overcame it, though later on in life, for political reasons, he allowed it to recede more and more into the background.³ During the first Silesian war he assured the nuncio to Warsaw that he would leave the Silesian Catholics in full possession of their rights and liberties, with no exception, not even the Jesuits,⁴ but in

¹ When the Silesian Province of the Order was erected on January 1, 1755, it numbered 225 members, in 1770 only 144. In Jesuit possession, Bohemia 202. Cf. DUHR, *Gesch.*, IV., I, 404 *seqq.* In the former Polish territories there were about 213 Jesuits. *Garampi to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, Nunziat. di Polonia 58. Papal Secret Archives.

² PETER PHIL. WOLFF, *Allg. Gesch. der Jesuiten*, IV., 54 *seq.*; MENZEL, *Gesch. der Deutschen*, IV.² (1855), 62 *seqq.*; REINKENS, *Die Universität zu Breslau* (1861), 110 *seqq.*; ZELLER, *Friedrich d. Gr. als Philosoph* (1886), 152 *seqq.*; GRÜNHAGEN, *Schlesien unter Friedrich d. Gr.*, II. (1892), 449 *seqq.*; WITTE, *Friedrich d. Gr. und die Jesuiten* (1892); PIGGE, *Die religiöse Toleranz Friedrichs d. Gr.* (1899), 285 *seqq.*; KOSER, *König Friedrich d. Gr.* (1903), 550 *seqq.*; THOEMES, *Friedrichs d. Gr. Bündnis mit der Gesellschaft Jesu* (1901). Cf. *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXI. (1901), 91 *seqq.*; LÖFFLER, *Friedrich d. Gr. und die Jesuiten*, in *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXIV. (1909), 257 *seqq.*

³ DUHR, IV., I, 417.

⁴ WITTE, 40

the Seven Years' War he was guilty of baseless suspicions and excessively severe measures.¹ It was during this period of political and confessional animosity that the king uttered those contemptuous opinions of the Order that clearly show the influence of the polemical literature emanating from Portugal and France. "It would be a good thing," he wrote, "to abolish this Order altogether and let it share the same fate that was meted out to the Templars with less justice. There is any amount of the breed in Silesia. I should like to do away with them as the Catholics have done. Perhaps I shall take courage and follow their example."² A month before the signing of the preliminaries to the Peace of Hubertusburg, Schlabrendorf, his Minister of State for Silesia, submitted to him the memorandum he had ordered, setting out in full the measures to be taken for "the removal of the Jesuits". According to this memorandum, the 194 Jesuits in Silesia possessed a yearly income of 45,731 rix-dollars, 21,436 of which they had to pay away in taxes and other State dues.³ It may have been the meagre results of this inquiry and, more probably still, political considerations that caused the king to shelve his plans for the expulsion of the Jesuits. With the far-seeing vision of the true statesman he saw that his military conquests would be jeopardized if they were not followed by the moral conquest of his new subjects.⁴ Moreover, in the desperate situation of the State finances, he was not likely to forget that he would never obtain another teaching body at so low a price for the necessary work of reconstruction. But his antipathy to the Order still persisted. He refused to give his *placet* to the Bull of confirmation of 1765, "not for any love of Calvin, but so as not to give any further encouragement to the existence in the country of the noxious vermin that sooner or later will suffer the same fate as that dealt out to it by France and Portugal".⁵ In 1767, in his letters to Voltaire and

¹ DUHR, IV., I, 412 *seqq.*

² KOSER, II., 550.

³ March 7, 1763. LEHMANN, IV. (1883), 105 *seqq.*, No. 106.

⁴ *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXXVIII. (1910), 471.

⁵ KOSER, II., 550.

D'Alembert, he was still expressing his sincere joy at the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain.¹

The earliest evidence of Frederick's change of attitude and language is found in his letter to D'Alembert of January 7th, 1768. After saying that the Jesuits had been driven out of half of Europe and that he could not guarantee what would happen to them in Austria when Maria Theresa was dead, he made the following declaration: "As for myself, I shall tolerate them as long as they keep quiet and don't attempt to strangle anyone." A few weeks later he remarked that however much of a heretic he was he had no desire to copy the example of the Catholic Powers, which, to pass the time, waged war on the poor Jesuits. "I shall leave this Order alone as long as it doesn't try to interfere with the secular power or murder me or mine. Lions and tigers," he added sarcastically, "are kept for the wild-beast fights in the circus, then why not tolerate the Jesuits too?" And he remained true to this attitude,² for in the course of the same year, 1768, he had the offer made, of his own accord, to the Jesuit General to provide a refuge near Potsdam for the expelled missionaries, on condition that they applied themselves there principally to the advancement of mathematics and natural science.³

When in the conclave of 1769 the Bourbon Powers were exerting themselves to the utmost to secure in advance the destruction of the Society of Jesus and only a few voices were raised in its defence, Ricci preferred not to wait for the outcome

¹ "Vivent les philosophes!" wrote Frederick to D'Alembert on May 5, 1767. "Voilà les jésuites chassés de l'Espagne. Le trône de la superstition est sapé, il s'écroulera dans le siècle futur" (*Œuvres*, éd. Preuss, XXIV., 422). It is interesting to note that Frederick referred to the expulsion from Spain in a letter to Voltaire of February 10, 1767 (*ibid.*, XXIII., 122), although it was prepared in the deepest secrecy and was not put into effect until April 2, 1767.

² KOSER, II., 550 *seq.*

³ Ricci to Dobrosław, September 3, 1768. In Jesuit possession, *Epp. Gen. ad Externos*. Cf. *Stimmen der Zeit*, XCIII. (1917), 350 *seqq.*

of the conclave before thanking the king for having spoken so often in favour of the persecuted Order, asking him at the same time for his further protection.¹ His letter could hardly have arrived in Berlin when Frederick was again referring to the Jesuit question in his correspondence with D'Alembert. He thought that the forthcoming Papal election would depend, more than on anything else, on the total abolition of the Jesuit Order. "So far as I am concerned, I consider it will redound to my honour to preserve its fragments in Silesia and not to aggravate its misery, heretic as I am. In future, anyone who wants to see an Ignatian will have to go to Silesia, the only province where he can find a relic of the Order which only a short time ago was ruling the Courts of Europe with an almost despotic power. One day you in France will repent of having turned out this Order, and in the next few years the instruction of youth will suffer for it."² The Jesuit General was thanked by the king in courteous terms. "Talent and learning," he wrote, "have always had a right to my benevolence." Ricci, he said, could depend on his giving proofs of this at the opportune moment.³ He repeated this assurance to the General in a letter of September 13th, 1770.⁴ Such statements coming from a Protestant Power and from a monarch whose exceptional personal qualities and successes had made a deep impression on public opinion were not without their effect in Rome, and for the Society of Jesus, whose very existence was already being threatened, they were of high moral value.⁵

¹ Ricci to Frederick II., April 8, 1769. *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXXVIII. (1910), 472.

² Written on *April 22, 1769. LEHMANN, IV., 360; *Œuvres*, XXIV., 451; WITTE, 81 *seq.*

³ *April or May, 1769. Italian translation in Mamachi's *letter to Alfani, January 19, [1774], Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti 57.

⁴ *Original in Jesuit possession, Suppr., Assist. Germ.

⁵ HEINRICH STÜMCKE, *Hohenzollern-Fürsten im Drama*, Leipzig, 1903. Cf. *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXV. (1903), 593 *seqq.*; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, August 27, 1765, Archives of Simancas,

A short time before, Frederick had in fact taken a step that was intended to benefit the persecuted Order. In 1770, when the Pope's acquiescence in the suppression seemed to be imminent, the Minister Finckenstein, at His Majesty's express command, had to write to Ciofani, the Prussian agent in Rome, that as a Protestant his royal master could not interfere with the internal affairs of the Catholic Church, but as he was entirely satisfied with the conduct of the Jesuits in his own territories, especially Silesia, his desire was that in the event of a suppression they were not to be included and that they should be allowed to continue their activities as before.¹ On Ciofani venturing to doubt the advisability of making representations on the strength of mere rumours Frederick insisted on his taking the necessary steps without delay and on his informing the Pope himself as quickly as possible of the king's satisfaction with the Jesuits and of his wish to keep them in his States no matter what happened.²

There were some who suspected that the overriding motive of Frederick's attitude towards the Jesuits was financial,³ but although after the suppression had taken place he did in fact lay claim either directly or indirectly to some portions of

Estado, 6097; *Tanucci to Grimaldi, September 17, 1765, *ibid.*; *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXXVIII., 471 *seq.*

¹ Finckenstein to Ciofani, June 30, 1770, in LEHMANN, IV., 403 *seq.*, No. 382.

² Finckenstein to Ciofani, September 22, 1770, *ibid.*, 406 *seq.*, No. 386. How great was the sensation caused by the letter of June 30 is indicated by Tanucci's inability to believe it. *Tanucci to Grimaldi, September 4, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6103.

³ *Lacy to Grimaldi, November 19, 1773, *ibid.*, Estado, 6637; *Grimaldi to Moñino, January 4, 1774, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1774: ". . . e mi creda, che essendo una forte raggione l'interesse e la speranza di tirar persone, che portin denari, non vedendo comparire nè questi nè quelle, forse si straccarà." *Prince Bishop Schaffgotsch to Garampi, Troppau, February 16, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 119, Papal Secret Archives.

the Jesuit estate¹ it must still be remembered that his change of attitude had already occurred when the suppression was by no means certain. As an outspoken free-thinker the royal philosopher had certainly no cause for any predilection for an Order whose view of life was directly opposed to his own; nor was a practical statesman of his calibre likely to intervene from purely chivalrous motives. It is all the more plausible, therefore, that as a man of intelligence and foresight he rose superior to common prejudices and that as a ruler of statesmanlike ability and power, whose life-task it was to strengthen his kingdom, he did not neglect the opportunity of laying his Catholic subjects under an obligation of gratitude and devotion.² Although in view of the anti-Jesuit exertions of the Bourbons his attitude was not entirely devoid of mischievousness, it would be wrong to suppose that his protection of the Jesuits was merely a means of obtaining the recognition of his royal title by the Curia. This question was of more concern to his Ministers than to himself.³ Practical considerations were what told with Frederick. A year before he had intervened in Rome on the Jesuits' behalf he had obtained from the Augustinian Abbot Felbiger a detailed report on the school system in Silesia.⁴ In spite of the gloomy picture he painted of the state of the Jesuit schools the Abbot concluded his report with recommending that education be left in Jesuit hands, owing to the scarcity of other teachers and still more to the lack of funds, as the Fathers taught for nothing. The University of Breslau, at that time the only training institute for theologians in Prussia, would present an

¹ *Wilhelm Classen, Vice-Rector of the college at Emmerich, to the archiepiscopal commission, May 31, 1774, Archdiocesan Archives, Cologne, Jesuitenakten, Aufhebung 293 i; *Elector Maximilian Friedrich to Vicar General Von Horn-Goldstein, September, 1774, *ibid.*

² *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXXVIII., 469 *seqq.*

³ KOSER, II., 552.

⁴ Felbiger's report of January 5, 1769, in LEHMANN, IV., 447 *seqq.*, No. 331.

even greater problem if it lost the Jesuits.¹ From time to time Frederick scoffingly referred to the promise he had given in the peace treaties to leave the Catholic religion *in statu quo*,² especially as his Silesian Ignatians had had no part in Malagrida's plot nor in Lavalette's bankruptcy; besides, Ganganelli had cut off their tails, so that they could not, like Samson's foxes of old, set fire to the harvest of the Philistines³—but the decisive motive for this "enlightened" sovereign was his interest in education and the training of the Catholic youth, for which, in his judgment, the Jesuits were irreplaceable. It was with this argument that he countered the urgent remonstrances of his French friends and justified the steps he took at the Court of Rome.⁴ In Rome, however, the word of the petty Protestant Prussian could have little weight with the Great Catholic Powers, especially when Austria persisted in its strict neutrality, which in this case amounted to support of the Jesuits' adversaries and was appraised by them as such. It was for this reason that Frederick bluntly refused to intervene directly to save the Order as a whole, as he was urged to do by the Sardinian Jesuit Pintus, excusing himself on the ground that the Pope was master in his own house and that as a heretic it was not for him to interfere.⁵

¹ KOSER, II., 551; DUHR, *Gesch.*, IV., 1, 410 *seq.*

² Frederick II. to the Electress Maria Antonia of Saxony, September 8, 1773, and January 8, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 530 *seq.*, No. 518, and 580, No. 558.

³ Frederick II. to Voltaire, December 10, 1773, *ibid.*, 575, No. 551.

⁴ *Id.* to *id.*, October 24 and December 10, 1773, and November 18, 1777, *ibid.*, 566, No. 540; 575, No. 551; V., 240, No. 318; Frederick to Electress Maria Antonia of Saxony, January 8, 1774, *ibid.*, IV., 588, No. 558; Frederick to D'Alembert, January 7, March 11, and May 15, 1774, *ibid.*, 579, No. 557; 593, No. 573; 603, No. 588; *Frederick to Ciofani, August 17 and September 10, 1774, in Jesuit possession, Suppr., Assist. Germ.; *Nuncio Doria to Pallavicini, April 4, 1774, Cifre, Nunziat. di Francia, 561, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ Frederick to D'Alembert, December 4, 1772, in LEHMANN,

Frederick was staying in Breslau when the news crossed the Alps that the suppression of the Society of Jesus had taken place in Rome. On August 29th, 1773, he intimated to Strachwitz, the suffragan Bishop and Apostolic Administrator, that the Brief was not to be published in his States.¹ By a Cabinet instruction of August 31st the Department of Religious Affairs was requested to issue an immediate order for the suppression of the "Papal Bull".² Under date September 6th a formal instruction was issued to all Government offices to take the necessary measures to see that this was done.³ The Silesian Provincial, Franz Gleixner, was informed by the king that he had forbidden the publication of the "Bull of suppression". He felt all the more impelled to take this measure, he said, as he had promised the maintenance of the *status quo* in the peace treaty. His royal word was far

IV., 478, No. 472. The king was wrong, however, in calling Pintus a delegate of the Jesuit General. Cf. Ricci to Pintus, January 30, 1773, in DUHR, IV., I, 14 *seq.*; Pintus to Zelada, January 10, 1774, in [BOERO,] *Osservazioni*, II.², 124 *seq.* *"Io viddi la lettera scrittale(!) da un soggetto del Collegio Romano, che l'esortava a tal passo con aggiungere 'non si meravigli ch'io scriva, mentre qui sono tutti smarriti, e il Generale più di tutti'." Schaffgotsch to Garampi, February 16, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 119, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. above, p. 251.

¹ *Diarium Sem. Glac., of August 20, 1773, Gymnasialarchiv, Glatz; Carner to Frederick II., August 30, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 525, No. 512; *Frederick to Strachwitz, September 19, 1773, Latin translation, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53; *Strachwitz to the Congregation for the suppression, September 27, 1773, *ibid.*

² LEHMANN, IV., 528, No. 515; *Latin translation in the Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53.

³ LEHMANN, IV., 529, No. 516; Latin translation, *loc. cit.* The corresponding *decree of the West Prussian Government is dated September 14, 1773 (*ibid.*, Nunziat. di Polonia, 36). The circular issued by the Government of Cleves bears the date September 16, 1773 (printed copy in private ownership). Cf. *Garampi to Macedonio, September 22, 1773, Cifre, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58, Papal Secret Archives.

too sacred to be withdrawn in consequence of something happening abroad. The Provincial was asked to lose no time in obtaining the views of the Silesian Fathers and of the other Superiors and then to make some practical proposals. In return for this favour the sovereign expected the Jesuits to continue to devote themselves with all possible industry to the training of youth and the advancement of studies.¹ Karl von Reinach, the Superior of Wartenberg, who enjoyed Frederick's particular confidence, was earnestly requested by the Minister Carmer to interest himself in the matter and to set out in a provisional opinion the difficulties that might arise from the Order's Constitution and how they could be overcome. As the Society, Carmer continued, was empowered by the Bull *Iniunctum nobis* (1543) to alter its Constitutions according to the circumstances of time and place, fresh orders could be issued without infringing the fundamental rules. The vow of obedience to the Pope offered no obstacle, as his true feelings on the step that had been forced on him were well known and, besides, it was stipulated in the vow that it was only to serve the good of souls and the spreading of the faith. If the General of the Order was thinking of taking up his residence in Prussia he would receive "a very gracious welcome" from the king. Reinach was asked to attend to the matter with care and assiduity, as his sovereign was disposed to extend his protection, if need be, to the most remote settlements of the Society of Jesus.²

The Government's plan of having the Jesuit headquarters in Prussia being frustrated by the arrest of Ricci and his Assistants, the Provincial Gleixner, at Carmer's instigation, summoned the Rectors of the Silesian colleges to a conference

¹ Carmer to Gleixner, August 30, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 525 seq., No. 513. Cf. *Reiffenauer, Rector at Breslau, to Schorn, the Rector of Braunsberg, on September 8, 1773, Nunziat. di Polonia, 119, Papal Secret Archives.

² Carmer to Reinach, August 30, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 527 seq., No. 514. Cf. *Carmer to the Rector of Glatz, September 11, 1773, Gymnasialarchiv, Glatz.

at Neisse to deliberate on the problem of giving effect to the Government's intentions in the situation then existing. It was agreed to invite the Jesuits of the other Prussian provinces and those abroad to combine with the Silesian Province of the Order and to elect a Vicar General as soon as possible.¹ On October 3rd and again on October 14th, 1773, the king gave his permission for the calling of a General Congregation and at the same time indicated the Superior Reinach as the most suitable man for the post of Vicar General.²

The benevolent attitude of the Protestant king of Prussia towards the persecuted Order gave great joy to the Jesuits in other countries, especially the astronomers Hell³ and Mayer. It was hoped that the Court of the Palatinate would keep the Jesuits in its dominions and incorporate them in the Silesian Province. Similarly the Jesuit missionaries in Holland, England, and non-European countries were to be attached to the Silesian Province and be governed from Breslau.⁴

¹ Carmer to the Cabinet, September 29, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 552 *seq.*, No. 527. Corresponding letters were sent to the Jesuits in England, Holland, and East and West Prussia. Cf. *Gleixner to Schorn, October 2, 1773, Nunziat. di Polonia, 119, Papal Secret Archives; THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 494 *seq.*

² LEHMANN, IV., 553, No. 527; Carmer to the Cabinet, October 10, 1773, *ibid.*; Cabinet letter to Gleixner, October 21, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 561, No. 538. Garampi on the other hand *wrote to Pallavicini on October 6, 1773, that the Jesuits had refused to hold the election on conscientious grounds. Cifre, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58, Papal Secret Archives.

³ Letter from Hell, September 17, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 576⁴.

⁴ Carmer to the Cabinet, November 17, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 571, No. 546. In a letter from Rome of September 1, 1773, signed "The Jesuits", the king was asked to provide a retreat in his dominions. Frederick was ready to grant the favour on condition that they kept quiet. *Frederick to the Jesuits in Rome, September 28, 1773, in Jesuit possession, Suppr., Assist. Germ.; *Frederick to Ciofani on the same day, *ibid.* Ciofani thought it inadvisable to present this letter, and Frederick assented (November 26, 1773, *ibid.*).

These far-reaching hopes soon proved to be illusory. On November 1st, 1773, the former English Provincial, Henry More, while thanking the king for his great favour, reported that the English Province was already extinct and that its members had been secularized.¹ The replies from the other countries were probably to the same effect. In many cases confidence in Frederick was shaken by the widespread rumour that his sole intention was to attract to his dominions the Jesuit funds and then to withdraw his protection from the Order.²

The Jesuits of Ermeland and West Prussia were not so responsive to the king's wishes.³ Both the Rector of the college at Braunsberg and the headmaster of the Papal school there informed the nuncio to Warsaw, in the name of their colleagues, that they were willing to submit to the Brief of suppression. Through Prince Bishop Krasizki of Ermeland they would petition the monarch to allow them to comply with the Papal ordinances. If the reply was unfavourable, they would leave the country immediately, so as to avoid the appearance of wanting to frustrate the commands of Rome.⁴ On the same day the episcopal Official, Szczepanski, wrote to Garampi that the Jesuits would follow the instructions of the Holy See as soon as this could be done without injury to religion, which would probably suffer if they left against the wish of the sovereign.⁵ The Government, which had received information of this correspondence, administered a reprimand

¹ LEHMANN, IV., 577². The Provincial's Christian name was Henry, not Thomas, as Lehmann gives it.

² Carmer's report of January 2, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 576 *seqq.*, No. 555. Cf. *Senzinnen (?) to Caprara, Düsseldorf, September 22, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 58.

³ By the end of October the nuncio had not yet made the Brief available to the Bishops of Kulm and Ermeland. *Garampi to Macedonio, October 27, 1773, *ibid.*, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58.

⁴ *Laszki to Garampi, November 22, 1773, *ibid.*, 7; DUHR, IV., I, 460.

⁵ *Szczepanski to Garampi, November 22, 1773, Nunziat. di Polonia, 7, Papal Secret Archives.

to the two Superiors and forbade them to have any connexion with "the clergy in Poland".¹ It was only when they protested that the school at Braunsberg was financially dependent on the nuncio² that the king withdrew his prohibition.³

Strachwitz, the Apostolic Administrator of the Prince-Bishopric of Breslau,⁴ found himself in a most awkward position. Frederick had told him orally on August 29th, 1773, that he was resolved to keep the Jesuits in his kingdom, and when, in spite of this, on the arrival of the Brief he applied for permission to publish it,⁵ he met with a refusal.⁶ To publish any Papal edict without the royal *placet* was more than he dared to undertake and so, to avoid still greater trouble, he had to desist from his request for the time being.⁷

Macedonio was in full agreement with Strachwitz's zealous

¹ Cabinet order to Domhardt of January 13, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 581, No. 560; *Latin translation [Marienwerder, January 19, 1774], Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*; Domhardt to Laszki, January 26, 1774; *Latin translation, *ibid.*

² Braunsberg, January 26, 1774; *Zeitschrift für Geschichts- und Altertumskunde Ermlands*, XII. (1897), 137 *seqq.* Szczepanski to Garampi, March 1, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*

³ Cabinet order to the West Prussian Government, of March 10, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 592 *seq.*, No. 572; *Frederick II. to Krasizki, March 10, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*; Garampi to Pallavicini, March 23, 1774, *ibid.*, 58.

⁴ Prince Bishop Schaffgotsch had been excluded from the administration of the diocese and interned in Oppeln by Frederick II. on account of his attitude during the Seven Years' War. Cf. Schlabrendorf to Schaffgotsch, March 11, 1763, in LEHMANN, IV., 107.

⁵ Hoym to the Cabinet on September 12, 1773, *ibid.*, 531 *seq.*, No. 520.

⁶ Cabinet order of September 16, 1773, *ibid.*, 532; *Government of Glogau to Strachwitz, September 17, 1773; Latin translation in the Papal Secret Archives, Regulari, Gesuiti, 53; *Frederick II. to Strachwitz, September 19, 1773 (Latin translation), *ibid.*,

⁷ *Strachwitz to the Congregation for the suppression, September 27, 1773, *ibid.*

and prudent conduct, which had saved him from useless and dangerous dealings with the king. But he asked the Administrator to make it clear to the Jesuits that it was their strict duty in conscience to put no obstacle in the way of the Brief and to ask the king to put it into effect. Strachwitz was also asked to remind them that their faculties had come to an end and that they could no longer make use of them without giving scandal to the Church and doing harm to souls.¹

Garampi's advice was that, in view of the king's character and the attitude he had adopted hitherto, it was better to wait and to dissemble, for any hasty step might be fraught with grave dangers. Above all, the Jesuits, who were not without their hotheads and fawners on royalty, were not to be forced into submission by the threat of canonical penalties or to be branded as rebels, as that might easily lead to furious polemics. The support of the Bishops could not be relied on for the moment. It would be more advisable to leave the Jesuits to the pricking of their conscience. In time those of them who were conscientious would either leave Prussia or join the Bishops in begging the monarch to give way, and this he was sure to do, once his first ardour had cooled.² After consulting the Spanish ambassador ³ Corsini wrote to Garampi that as there was no hope of obtaining the king's consent to the publication of the Brief he would do well to impress on the Jesuits in Prussia that it was their bounden duty to submit voluntarily to the Pope, otherwise they were rebels and excommunicates. He might also bring forward other motives

¹ November 13, 1773. The letter itself has not been found. Its contents are deducible from Zelada's *letter to Macedonio of November 13, 1773 (*ibid.*), the date from Strachwitz's *reply to Macedonio of December 5, 1773 (Latin translation in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5043).

² *Garampi to Pallavicini, November 3, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58; THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 408 *seqq.* Cf. also *Garampi to Macedonio, October 27, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*, 74.

³ *Moñino to Macedonio, November 24, 1773, *ibid.*, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53.

which would help to detach them of their own free will from the Power which was maintaining them in existence.¹ The Cardinal Secretary of State's reply was considerably milder. He found Garampi's explanations convincing. He had not yet spoken on the matter to the Pope as he had taken no immediate part in the Jesuit affair and knew in any case that Clement XIV. was opposed to any harsh measures. Perhaps the nuncio could persuade the king through the Prince Bishop of Ermland to abandon his opposition. Whatever course he took he was on no account to let it be known that he was acting on the authority of Rome.²

While these messages were still on the way Strachwitz was again expounding to the Congregation for the suppression—officially entitled the *Sacra Congregatio deputata pro exequendo Brevis Suppressionis Societatis Iesu*—the difficulties that impeded the execution of the Brief. There was no lack of willingness on his part, but he was hindered by his opponents. The Jesuits were continuing their activity in the churches and schools on the ground that they had not yet been officially informed of the Brief. The person chiefly to blame was the Superior Reinach, who stood in the king's favour. Many of the laity were still confessing themselves to the Jesuits, others were keeping away from them. He himself had been the subject of complaints brought by them to the Minister because he had refused to allow their scholastics to take their priestly vows and had allotted other, special, confessors to some of the women's convents. He was thus between Scylla

¹ *Corsini to Garampi, December 4, 1773, *ibid.*, Nunziat. di Polonia, 118.

² “ *Ad ogni modo non ne ho io tenuto un discorso opportuno con N^{ro} Sig^{re} per i due seguenti motivi: uno il mio, non aver parte diretta nell'affare gesuitico; l'altro il sapere, che il Papa è assai alieno dal procedere *in subiecta materia* a quelle rimbombanti e positive dichiarazioni ch'Ella saviamente sconsiglia. In punto di uffici poi dirò, che se ne praticano, compariranno sotto altro nome.” Pallavicini to Garampi, December 4, 1773, Cifre, *ibid.*, 44.

and Charybdis. On the one hand his conscience forbade him to go against the Brief, on the other heavy penalties and injuries to religion were to be expected if he went against the orders of the sovereign. Rome, therefore, might consider it advisable for the Pope to set aside etiquette and apply to the king to allow the Brief to take its course. One might also commend the matter to Bishop Krasizki, who was very influential in Berlin. From Prague the Provincial in Glatz could be ordered not to offer any further obstacles to the execution; and possibly the Congregation might admonish the Provincial directly, under pain of heavy penalties, to submit to the Brief at last, together with his brethren.¹

After launching some diatribes against "the sons of mistrust" and praising the zeal of the suffragan Bishop, to whom the Pope would show his gratitude at a favourable opportunity, Macedonio exhorted him to be firm, to go slowly ("*cunctando*"), not to ordain any Jesuit, and to keep them away from the schools and the sacred ministry, as the regulations of the Brief must be maintained unaltered.² Instructions of a similarly vigorous nature were issued a few days later to Archbishop Prichowsky of Prague.³

At the turn of the year the rumour was abroad in Rome that at Frederick's instigation the Jesuits had elected a Vicar General pending Ricci's release from imprisonment.⁴ Frederick

¹ *Strachwitz to Macedonio, December 5, 1773; Latin translation in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5043.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 496 *seq.*, *Epistolae*, 350 *seq.*, No. 296; *Corsini or Macedonio to Strachwitz, January 15, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 45, Papal Secret Archives, in LEHMANN, IV., 582 *seq.*, No. 565.

³ On January 19, 1774. THEINER, *Epist.*, 352 *seq.*; LEHMANN, IV., 585 *seqq.*, No. 565. This *letter, with a covering letter from Garampi, of February 12, 1774, in the State Archives, Vienna, K.F.A. 75b B.

⁴ Bernis to D'Aiguillon, January 5, 1774, in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 497. Garampi, when asked for an explanation, could only say that he knew nothing about it; *to Macedonio, February 2, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58, Papal Secret Archives.

had in fact thrown out the suggestion a good time before,¹ but the man selected by him, Father Reinach, begged to be excused on account of his failing physical and mental powers.² Pintus, on whom Carmer had cast his eye, neatly evaded the Minister's offer by pleading that he was no longer a Jesuit as he had already been officially informed of the ecclesiastical decree. If the king obtained permission from the Pope for the Jesuits to continue to exist in Prussia and for him to govern them, he would accept the office, otherwise it was impossible.³ Later, Karl von Troilo und Roveredo, the former Provincial, was reported in foreign journals as having been elected, but this aged Father, who had been living in retirement in the college at Glatz, had already passed away on January 30th, 1774.⁴

Acting on instructions from the Congregation for the suppression, Garampi had asked the various diocesan Bishops for information about the mode of life and the intentions of the Jesuits in Prussia. The Primate of Poland reported that in his territory they were still wearing the dress of their Order and were living in accordance with their old rules. He had ascertained from conversation with several of the Fathers that the Prussian Government intended to preserve their

¹ *Reiffenauer to Schorn, September 8, 1773, *ibid.*, 119; Carmer to the Cabinet, September 29, 1773, in LEHMANN, IV., 552, No. 527; Cabinet orders of October 3 and December 8, 1773, *ibid.*, 553, No. 573.

² Report of Minister Zedlitz, of January 15, 1774, *ibid.*, 581 *seq.*, No. 561.

³ Pintus to Zelada, January 10, 1774, in [BOERO], *Osservazioni*, II., 125 *seq.*; *Schaffgotsch to Garampi, February 16, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 119, Papal Secret Archives; *Garampi to Macedonio, March 2, 1774, *ibid.*, 58.

⁴ *Schaffgotsch to Garampi, February 16, 1774, *ibid.*; *Garampi to Macedonio, February 23, 1774, *loc. cit.*, *Regolari, Gesuiti*, 53. By their representations to Frederick the Silesian Jesuits had succeeded in having the matter deferred. *Garampi to Pallavicini, March 2, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Gazeta Warszawska* of March 5, 1774. Theiner's account (*Gesch.*, II., 498 *seq.*) is criticized by ZALENSKI-VIVIER (I., 178 *seq.*).

Order even against the will of Rome, but they all assured him nevertheless that they had no desire to detach themselves from the obedience they owed to the Head of the Church. The sincerity with which these assertions were made confirmed the Primate in his conviction that the Jesuits were far from harbouring the rebellious sentiments that were imputed to them.¹ Bishop Bajer of Kulm was sure that the few Jesuits there were in his diocese would long since have laid aside their religious dress if they knew how they were going to keep themselves alive. He could not support them and they could expect no pension from the Government if they acted on their own initiative; besides, it was to be feared that any such step on their part would have disastrous results for the rest of the clergy. He was very worried about the ex-Jesuits who were streaming into his diocese from Poland, where the Brief had already been published; they had no pension and no employment and were eking out a precarious existence as beggars.²

The Silesian Jesuits also were loath to continue their life as Religious, in revolt against the Holy See, however much they hoped that the necessary permission would be obtained from the Pope by their sovereign. In the middle of December, 1773, the Provincial Gleixner had asked the Bishop of Ermland through his brother to try to obtain Rome's consent. Gleixner had repeatedly explained to the Minister in Breslau that if the Jesuits were to be kept in existence the assent of the Holy See was indispensable. The reply he received was an exhortation to be calm and patient; the wound was still too fresh to expect the request to be granted immediately, but the future was not without hope. According to reliable reports the king was in negotiation with Rome. "One thing is certain," said Gleixner, "we are not rebels; on the contrary, we are ready to obey as soon as the king has lifted the ban and the Pope's will is made known to us by the ecclesiastical

¹ *Podoski to Garampi, January 18, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 119, Papal Secret Archives.

² *Bajer to Garampi, February 18, 1774, *ibid.*

authority." He was sure, he said, that it was not their duty to press for the announcement of the Brief and to reject the favour freely offered by the king, for many Catholics would suffer in consequence. So let their consciences be at rest and let them go on with their pastoral work.¹ But in Garampi's view this was merely lip-service,² and in his reports to the Congregation for the suppression he continued to condemn the Silesian Jesuits as recalcitrants.³

As time went on the situation became more difficult. Strachwitz, continually pressed by the nuncio to execute the Brief, refused to consecrate the Jesuit scholastics. He had maintained a passive attitude up to the present, not wishing to disobey the king's command, but he could not positively participate in the preservation of the Jesuits by ordaining them, without making himself liable to the ecclesiastical penalties prescribed in the Brief.⁴ The Jesuit Provincial, in his turn, complained to the king that by refusing to ordain his brethren and by excluding them from processions the Bishop was depriving them of the confidence of the faithful and was treating them as open rebels, although it was well known that they had not taken a single step towards the preservation of their Order and although up till then no official communication had been made to them which would release them from their religious vows. And they had no right to release themselves from obligations which they had undertaken before God. In the firm hope that by the mediation of the king the difficulties with the Curia would be removed, it was suggested that the Bishop be earnestly requested to leave the Jesuits in the peaceful possession of their spiritual faculties until the matter had been completely settled.⁵ When in reply to an admonitory

¹ *Gleixner to Schorn, February 19, 1774, *ibid.*

² *Garampi to Strachwitz, February 19, 1774, *ibid.*, 81.

³ *Garampi to Macedonio, March 23, 1774, *ibid.*, 58.

⁴ Strachwitz to Zedlitz, March 15, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 593 *seqq.*, No. 574. Cf. also *Bajer to Garampi, June 21, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Gleixner's letter of April 3, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 596, No. 576; Latin translation in the Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*

letter from Berlin¹ Strachwitz again expounded his standpoint,² he was told to behave towards the Jesuits as though the Brief of suppression had never appeared. "And you will be guided by this most strictly."³

Similar difficulties arose in West Prussia, where the Jesuits complained to the king that by refusing ordination and approbation the Bishops were putting the Brief into effect without its being published.⁴ When Bishop Bajer expressed his displeasure to Garampi at this change of attitude on the part of the Jesuits,⁵ he was advised to exercise patience. He too, said the nuncio, had imposed moderation on himself. Though he was not to approve of the insubordination, he was recommended to refrain from any authoritative step which might offend the secular power.⁶

The moderate tone of this letter of the nuncio's may well have been a reflection of the more conciliatory attitude of the Roman Curia, which in March, 1774, in response to a representation made by the Bishop of Ermeland, had given permission to the Bishops to employ the ex-Jesuits in pastoral duties even if they were still living in community.⁷ Within

¹ Cabinet letter to Strachwitz of April 6, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 596 *seq.*, No. 577. Cf. Carmer to Strachwitz of April 6, 1774, *ibid.*, 598, No. 581.

² LEHMANN, IV., 598, Nos. 582, 583, 584.

³ Cabinet letter of April 21, 1774, *ibid.*, 602, No. 585.

⁴ Letter from the West Prussian Jesuits of June 8, 1774, *ibid.*, 606, No. 592; Cabinet order to Zedlitz of June 19, 1774, *ibid.*, 607, No. 594. The letter from the Jesuits is subscribed "Your Majesty's most loyal and humble *Provincia Prussiae occidentalis Societatis Iesu*". There was in fact no Province of this name. The title is explained to some extent by Garampi's *letter to Macedonio, in which he speaks of "Il Provinciale di Polonia Maggiore [Orlowski], prima della formale promulgazione dei Brevi ritiroso in Prussia, dove vive e governa come Provinciale i collegi prussiani." (March 23, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 58, Papal Secret Archives).

⁵ *Bajer to Garampi, June 21 and July 16, 1774, *ibid.*, 119.

⁶ *Garampi to Bajer, June 30, 1774, *ibid.*, 81.

⁷ *Garampi to Canon Olekowski, March 19, 1774, *ibid.*

the next few months the nuncio imparted this authority to the Bishops who had applied for it, stipulating, however, that the Jesuits were to accept the Brief and from then on were to regard themselves in their own consciences as secular priests. Prudence demanded, he added, that this news should not appear in the public journals and that the Religious themselves should not talk about it.¹ Without mentioning a word about the aforesaid conditions Garampi also made this favour known to Krasizki, the Prince Bishop of Ermeland.² This communication may have given rise to the rumour that Clement XIV. had approved of the continued existence of the Society by means of a secret Brief.³

To put an end to the continual difficulties with the episcopal authorities the Superior Reinach suggested to the king on August 16th, 1774, that through Bishop Strachwitz he inform the Pope of his unalterable decision to maintain the Jesuits in existence and to obtain his consent to this.⁴ On the very next day Frederick authorized the Bishop⁵ and his agent Ciofani⁶ to explain to the Supreme Head of the Catholic Church that the Jesuits were indispensable for the upbringing of the youth of Silesia, wherefore he was asked to dispense

¹ *Garampi to Strachwitz, April 20, 1774; *to Bajer, July 19, 1774, *ibid.*

² “*P. S. La Santità di N. Signore si è degnata di accordarmi facoltà di abilitare all’ effetto di amministrare i Sacramenti e le parole di Dio, nonchè di esercitar le Scuole, quei Socii dell’ estinto Istituto, che gli Ordinari dei Luoghi giudicheranno necessari al servizio delle chiese o scuole, ancorchè continuino a vivere in convitto comune nei collegi già di detto Istituto.” June 27, 1774, Nunziat. di Polonia, 295, Papal Secret Archives.

³ Cf. Father Michael Orlowski’s letter of July, 1779, in [BOERO], *Osservazioni*, II.², 247; ZALENSKI-VIVIER, I., 224 *seqq.*

⁴ *Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*, 119.

⁵ August 17 and 28, 1774, *ibid.*; LEHMANN, IV., 611, Nos. 600 and 601.

⁶ *August 17 and September 10, 1774, in Jesuit possession, Suppr., Assist. Germ.; *Frederick II. to Reinach, August 17, 1774, Gymnasialarchiv, Glatz.

them from the " Bull ". Although the words used in his letter to his agent meant that Frederick was asking for the total preservation of the Order in his States, he was at that moment prepared to make concessions which in his eyes were mere details but which in fact struck at the very heart of the Society. When on December 23rd, 1773, Garampi asked Krasizki to obtain for him the king's permission to execute the Brief, he hinted that in return the Curia was ready to make certain concessions in order to satisfy the king's wishes and his honour.¹ The Prince Bishop, after taking ample time in which to study the ground,² sent his cousin, Count Rzewuski, to Warsaw on June 19th, 1774, to put the king's views before the nuncio and to discover Rome's attitude towards them.³ Highly delighted, Garampi replied that there was no obstacle at all to the reconciliation of the just desires of the king with the demands of the Church. When next the Prince Bishop was in Warsaw detailed arrangements could be made. Meanwhile complete secrecy was to be observed so as not to spoil the negotiations.⁴

The secret was not so strictly kept by the other side. At the audience which Frederick gave to the Rector Hertle at Glatz on August 19th, he let it be understood that if it was not possible to keep the name and the dress of the Order the Institute must be left untouched in every other respect.⁵ A few days later he informed the Apostolic Administrator that he would be satisfied if the Brief of suppression were modified in such a way that the Jesuits laid aside their name and dress but continued to conduct their schools under another title.⁶

¹ Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Polonia, 80.

² *Krasizki to Garampi, May 15, 1774, *ibid.*, 142.

³ *Krasizki to Garampi, June 19, 1774, *ibid.*

⁴ *June 27, 1774, *ibid.*, 295.

⁵ *Diarium Sem. Glac., of August 19, 1774, Gymnasialarchiv, Glatz.

⁶ *Strachwitz to Garampi, August 29, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*, 119. Cf. *Schaffgotsch to Count Hatzfeldt on October 30 and November 4, 1774, State Archives, Vienna, Staatsratsakten, 1774, No. 2718.

The nuncio to Vienna, too, Cardinal Visconti, in a conversation with the Abbot Felbiger held out some prospect of Rome's coming to terms. Felbiger reminded the nuncio that the preservation of the ex-Jesuits as a corporate body necessitated the admission of novices, ordination at the end of the course of studies, and definite rules for the new Institute. He added on his own initiative that the only hope of success was for the Holy See to recognize his sovereign's royal title. The abbot concluded from the nuncio's reply that this would not meet with any insuperable obstacles.¹ The way had thus been prepared for an agreement² when the death of the Pope interrupted the negotiations.³

¹ Felbiger to Carmer, September 14, 1774, in LEHMANN, IV., 615 *seq.*, No. 608.

² *Corsini to Garampi, September 17, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*, 118. Cf. Caraffa to Pallavicini, undated [1779-1780], *ibid.*, 242. Printed version in *Causa Pignatelli*, II., Summarium, 116 *seqq.*

³ *Garampi to Schaffgotsch, October 22, 1774, State Archives, Vienna, Staatsratsakten, 1774, No. 2718; *Schaffgotsch to Hatzfeldt on November 28, 1774, *ibid.*; *Strachwitz to Garampi on December 3, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*, 119.

CHAPTER VIII.

CLEMENT XIV.'S ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHURCH—THE MISSIONS.

(1)

NOT many of Clement XIV.'s decrees were concerned with the inner life of the Church. At the opening of his pontificate he proclaimed the usual jubilee for the invocation of the divine protection. He first issued a Brief on this subject to the city of Rome on September 11th, 1769,¹ and then, on December 12th of the same year he issued the same Brief, with modifications suited to its wider destination, to the whole world.² An introduction on his elevation to the Chair of St. Peter was followed only by the arrangements made for the celebration of the jubilee. It was symptomatic of the new Pope's desire for peace that the accompanying Encyclical, also of December 12th, addressed to all Bishops,³ should contain a prolix exhortation to them to keep their flocks obedient to the secular princes.⁴ The only other reference in the Encyclical to the conditions of the time was an exhortation to make a stand against the ever-spreading disbelief and to oppose it by preaching Christ crucified.⁵ In Rome the jubilee, which was to last two weeks, was opened by the Pope in person; accompanied by twenty-three Cardinals, the nobles of his Court, and an immense crowd, he took part on foot in the procession from S. Maria degli Angeli to S. Maria Maggiore.⁶

¹ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 40.

² *Ibid.*, 68 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 70 *seq.*

⁴ "omnem sollicitudinem vestram ad populum regum obedientia ac obsequio rite imbuendum convertatis" (*ibid.*, no. 5, p. 72).

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 3, p. 71.

⁶ NOVAES, XV., 167.

As usual, the proclamation of the jubilee met with difficulties in France. In a special Brief to Louis XV.¹ the Pope explained why he had made no mention of the Bull *Unigenitus* in his proclamation: whoever objected to it was by that very fact incapable of obtaining the indulgence. The Pope succeeded in arranging for the jubilee Bull to be published without the authorization of the Parlement.² If we are to accept the testimony of the Archbishop of Sens, Cardinal Luynes, the jubilee made a great impression in France.³ The Archbishop of Aix petitioned the Pope to extend the time during which the indulgence could be gained, on account of the lack of priests in his diocese, and this request was granted by a Brief of May 30th, 1770.⁴

A second extraordinary jubilee was proclaimed by Clement XIV. on March 16th, 1771.⁵ It was to last from Maundy Thursday till Low Sunday, but was to apply only to the Papal States. According to the ancient custom a jubilee year was celebrated every quarter of a century, and the next one was due in 1775. Clement XIV. made a preliminary announcement of this to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory on April 18th, 1774,⁶ and asked them to restore and decorate in a befitting manner the churches whose titles they bore or which had been placed under their protection; he himself would attend to St. Peter's and to his former titular church of the Twelve Apostles and would also try to improve the main roads. In the Consistory of May 9th he spoke of the general announcement which would soon take place, on the feast of the Ascension (May 12th); missions would be held in Rome to prepare

¹ Of January 3, 1770, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 50.

² THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 441. For the Bishops' protest in 1770 against the Parlement's *placet* introduced in 1768 for Papal concessions, cf. PICOT, IV., 363. The decree of 1768 was somewhat attenuated by Louis XV. (*ibid.*, 365).

³ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 442.

⁴ THEINER, *Epist.*, 88.

⁵ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 290.

⁶ THEINER, *Epist.*, 302.

the faithful for the jubilee.¹ He sent a special invitation to Emperor Joseph II. to visit him in Rome,² but Clement XIV. was not to live long enough to celebrate the jubilee year of 1775.

The summons to fight against the disbelief of the time which Clement XIV. issued in his Encyclical to the Bishops was repeated by him later. On March 1st, 1770, the Inquisition condemned a so-called extract from Fleury's *Histoire ecclésiastique*, which purported to have been printed in Berne but which was actually printed in Berlin. The preface was written by Frederick the Great, and the book itself was thought to have been written, at Frederick's instigation, by the Abbé de Prades.³ Two other decrees were issued against works by Lamettrie and Voltaire, and further works by the latter were banned on December 3rd, 1770, and November 29th, 1771.⁴ Prior to the assembly of the clergy the Pope wrote to Louis XV. on March 21st, 1770,⁵ asking him to support the clergy's efforts to stem the flood of anti-religious and immoral productions of the Press. In support of this plea the Archbishop of Toulouse, assisted by the theologian Bergier, drew up, in the name of the assembly, a petition to the king in which nine pernicious writings were singled out for special censure. A warning from the assembly against the dangers threatening from unbelief was distributed in all the dioceses.⁶ The Pope expressed his gratitude for this in a Brief of September 26th, 1770.⁷ When the clergy met again in 1772 the Pope instructed the nuncio on February 12th to convey the same exhortation to the assembly and to send to Rome all the

¹ *Ibid.*, 305. The Bull by which the jubilee was proclaimed to the whole of Christendom was dated April 30 (*Bull. Cont.*, V., 716 *seq.*).

² On June 29, 1774, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 317.

³ REUSCH, 590; PICOT, IV., 328.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 158.

⁶ PICOT, IV., 333 *seqq.*

⁷ To the king, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 112; to the Archbishop of Rheims as President of the Assembly, *ibid.*, 113.

works written for or against religion since 1770, so that they might be appraised in a special periodical.¹

The clerical assemblies of 1772 and 1775 also spoke against the encouragement and propagation of disbelief by means of the written word²; and the same was done by the most highly esteemed of the Bishops.³ Both the Pope and the clergy pointed out that the undermining of religion also undermined the foundations of the State. Piety and the fear of God, the Pope wrote to the king,⁴ were the foundation and life-force of civil society; so long as the people were subject to God they could easily be kept obedient to the civil power; the welfare of the State depended not so much on armed might as on the sincere respect for God and loyalty to revealed doctrine. The clerical assembly of 1770 attacked especially Holbach's *Système de la Nature*, which held that all the king's authority was conferred on him by the people, which could limit or withdraw it; the end of such doctrines, said the assembly, was the abyss of complete lawlessness.⁵ But the Government refused to listen to these warnings. They did, it is true, condemn some pernicious books,⁶ but they were not really in earnest⁷; a book such as Holbach's could be sold with impunity.⁸ The king acknowledged to the assembly that amid the mental ferment the clergy alone maintained its principles with calm and steadfastness,⁹ but he would not listen to the clergy's advice and allowed the revolution to develop undisturbed.

Among the measures taken by the Pope to facilitate the cure

¹ THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 181.

² PICOT, IV., 370; ROCQUAIN, 338.

³ PICOT, IV., 347 *seq.*

⁴ On March 21, 1770, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 159.

⁵ PICOT, IV., 334.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 341, 370.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 370.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 335.

⁹ " qu'il n'oublierait jamais, qu'au milieu de la plus violente fermentation des esprits le clergé était seul resté calme et immuable dans ses principes " (*ibid.*, 370).

of souls, as distinct from those taken to ward off dangers from outside the Church, some of his directions for the reorganization and administration of the bishoprics should be recorded. At the suggestion of the King of Sardinia, Carlo Emanuele, he separated Biella from Vercelli and elevated it to the rank of an independent bishopric¹ and gave the little town of Susa, "the ancient gateway of Italy," a Bishop of its own in place of the abbot who had formerly enjoyed episcopal authority.² As Spello lay too far from the diocese of Spoleto, to which it had belonged hitherto, it was joined to that of Foligno.³ The Bishops of Tortona and Acqui were empowered to appoint a Vicar General for those parts of their dioceses which lay in Genoese territory.⁴ The same arrangement was made for the towns of Mentone and Roccabruna (Roquebrune), over which the Bishop of Ventimiglia recovered his spiritual supremacy.⁵ In the East, Clement combined the bishoprics of Sirmium and Diakovar.⁶ The Vicar Apostolic of the Uniate Greek Ruthenians, who had his seat at Munkacs, was promoted Bishop of that town,⁷ whereby strong misgivings against removing Munkacs entirely from the supervision of the Bishop of Erlau or of some Latin prelate had to be overcome.⁸ In accordance with the previous concordat the kings of France did not have the right of nominating Bishops to those sees whose territory was subsequently added to the French crown; each king had to be invested with this right. Clement XIV. conveyed it to Louis XVI. on July 20th, 1774, in respect of Besançon, Orange, Brittany, and Burgundy.⁹

¹ On June 1, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 442; GAMS, *Series*, 813.

² On August 3, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 481; GAMS, 823.

³ On April 29, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 433.

⁴ On March 5, 1773, *ibid.*, 557.

⁵ Briefs of January 29 and March 30, 1772, *ibid.*, 414, 420.

⁶ On July 9, 1773, *ibid.*, 616; THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 270.

⁷ On September 19, 1771, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 382.

⁸ Clement XIV. to Maria Theresa on October 10 and November 17 and 24, 1770, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 115, 128 *seq.*; THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 393 *seqq.*, II., 19 *seqq.*; ARNETH, IX., 83 *seqq.*

⁹ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 754, 756, 761, 763. Cf. PICOT, IV., 417 *seqq.*

It was a joy for Clement on September 9th, 1769, to be able to congratulate the Elector Palatine, Wilhelm, on his conversion and to thank Duke Karl Theodor of Sulzbach, whose influence had been chiefly instrumental in bringing the Elector back to the old Church. Following the example of his father Eberhard, Count Xavier of Solms in Lusatia also joined the Catholic community.¹ As a consequence the Saxon Ministers contested his right to the fee of Sonnenwalde ; he appealed to the Pope, who wrote to the Empress Maria Theresa on August 26th, 1769, asking her to mediate on the Count's behalf.²

(2)

No canonization was performed by Clement XIV., but within a few weeks of his elevation to the throne, on June 4th, 1769, he solemnly proclaimed as *beatus* Francesco Caracciolo, and three years later, on May 13th, 1772, he honoured in the same way Paolo Burali of Arezzo.³ Caracciolo, in conjunction with the priests Giovanni Adorno and Fabricio Caracciolo, had founded an Order of minor clerks regular for the purpose of performing pastoral duties ; it had been confirmed by Sixtus V. in 1588. Caracciolo died in 1608 at the age of only forty-five.⁴ Paolo of Arezzo, who has been likened to Charles Borromeo, belonged to the Theatine Order ; he was raised to the Cardinalate by Pius V.⁵ The liturgical veneration of some other distinguished men and women was sanctioned by a declaration of the Congregation of Rites confirmed by the Pope, though not by a solemn beatification. Among these was one who was close to the Pope in time, his fellow-Franciscan Bonaventura of Potenza (d. 1711) ; Giuliana of Busto Arsizio, of the Order of St. Ambrose (d. 1540), was more or less a contemporary of Paolo of Arezzo. The Sylvestrine

¹ THEINER, *Epist.*, 23 *seq.*, 24 *seq.*

² THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 276.

³ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 7 *seq.* and 438 *seq.*

⁴ *Freiburger Kirchenlex.*, IV.², 1821.

⁵ Cf. our account, vol. xvii, 165.

Giovanni di Bestone lived in the thirteenth century. The others were all of the fourteenth or fifteenth century: the Augustinian Hermit Gregorio Celli of Rimini (d. 1343); the lay-brother with the Franciscan Observants, Sanctes of Montefabro (d. 1390); Caterina of Pallanza (c. 1478), also of the Order of St. Ambrose; Tommaso Bellacci (d. 1447), a lay-brother of the Order of Franciscan Conventuals; and Giovanna Scopelli (d. 1491), a Discalced Carmelite. Germany was represented by Margrave Bernhard of Baden (d. 1458 at the age of about thirty). Prominent among these beatifications was that of Antonio Primaldi and no less than 840 companions, all of whom were executed by the Turks in 1480 at the taking of Otranto for refusing to deny their Christian faith.¹

(3)

Having no high opinion of the counsel that the College of Cardinals might have to offer him, Clement XIV. showed little eagerness to fill its gaps; on the twelve occasions when promotion to this rank was made only seventeen persons, besides eleven whose rank was never published, were raised to the purple; of these seventeen sixteen survived the Pope.

On June 22nd, 1769, he solemnly presented the red hat to the French ambassador, Cardinal de Bernis, who had been created by his predecessor.² The first Cardinal of his own choice was announced to the Consistory of December 18th, 1769. The man thus honoured was Paulo de Carvalho e Mendoza, prelate of the patriarchal church in Lisbon, president of the queen's council and of the senate, Grand

¹ For all the above, cf. NOVAES, XV., 169, 178, 184, 189, 208, and GUÉRIN, *Les petits Bollandistes*. For the martyrs of Otranto, v. *Freiburger Kirchenlex.*, IX.², 1150 seq. In the *Analecta iuris Pont.*, XX., 12, the decrees relating to the degrees of heroic virtue attained by the Oratorians G. B. Villani and Antonio Grassi, the Augustinian Hermit John of St. William, Peter of Bethencourt (founder of the Bethlehemites), and Charles of Sezze.

² MASSON, 136.

Inquisitor, and Grand Prior of Guimarães. His admission to the supreme council of the Church was probably due not so much to his possession of all these titles as to the fact that he was Pombal's brother. Unfortunately he also had his brother's anti-clerical disposition; indeed Cardinal Pacca thought that he was even worse than the Minister.¹ Carvalho was created *in pectus* and he died, on January 17th, 1770,² three days before his promotion was published.

In 1770 four promotions to cardinalial rank were made.³ Mario Marefoschi (d. 1780), the Secretary of the Propaganda and afterwards Prefect of the Rites, was created *in pectus* on January 29th, the publication not taking place until September 10th. He was followed on August 6th by Cosme da Cunha, Archbishop of Evora (d. 1783),⁴ and on September 10th by the Maestro di Camera, Scipione Borghese (d. 1782), and Giambattista Rezzonico, Clement XIII.'s nephew.⁵ Rezzonico died in 1783, universally mourned as a highly gifted, generous, and charitable prelate. On December 12th two more Cardinals

¹ "del fratello ministro assai peggiore." *Notizie*, 68.

² NOVAES, XV., 171.

³ *Ibid.*, XV., 179 *seq.* Conveyance of the Cardinals' biretta to Acquaviva, with *Brief of April 13, 1773, *Epist.* a° IV., p. 361, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ Cf. above, pp. 110-112.

⁵ The *allocution on the occasion of their appointment and the publication of Marefoschi's appointment in *Epist.* a° II., p. 126, and State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473. Orsini, writing to Tanucci from Rome on September 11, 1770 (*ibid.*, 17, 170²⁹⁸), speaks of the opposition encountered by Marefoschi in the Jesuit party. Spain and France had recommended him and had thanked the Pope for his elevation. Du Tillot *wrote at that time to Azara (from Parma, on December [23], 1770; Exp. "Parma"): "No sé tan poco qué gran favor será para España, Portugal y Francia el nombramiento de todos sus nuncios a cardinales, ni qué vanidad o utilidad podemos sacar de toutes ces petites attrapes-là, qui devroient [être] bien usées. Mais nous vieillissons et l'expérience ne nous rajeunit pas." For Rezzonico's promotion the Pope was thanked by his brother Abondio. His *reply of September 22, 1770, in *Epist.* a° II., p. 141, *loc. cit.*

were created *in petto*: the Governor of Rome, Antonio Casali (d. 1787), and the President of Urbino, Pasquale Acquaviva di Aragona, a native of Naples (d. 1788). The publication of these two promotions followed on March 15th, 1773.

The three promotions of the following year, 1771, filled only four of the vacancies in the Sacred College.¹ On June 17th the nuncios to Vienna and Paris, Antonio Eugenio Visconti (d. 1788) and Bernardo Giraud (d. 1782), were created Cardinals *in petto*, and on September 23rd the nuncio to Lisbon, Innocenzo Conti (d. 1785). These three nuncios had to wait till April 19th, 1773, before their promotions were published. The last promotion of 1771, on December 16th, and the only one of the following year, on December 14th, 1772,² brought honour to two foreigners: Charles Antoine de la Roche Aymon, Archbishop of Rheims (d. 1777), and Leopold Ernst von Firmian, Bishop of Passau.³

The last three promotions followed in 1773.⁴ On March 15th Clement XIV. raised to the purple the Uditore Santissimo,

¹ NOVAES, XV., 185. Conveyance of the biretta to Conti with *Brief of April 24, 1773, and recommendation of the bringer by a *Brief of April 29, *Epist.* a° IV., p. 371, *loc. cit.* Conveyance of the biretta to Giraud with *Brief of May 1, *ibid.*, to Visconti with *Brief of May 15, *ibid.*, 396. Casali's and Acquaviva's publication was announced by *Orsini to Tanucci on March 13, 1773 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{3010}{1055}$). "Casale, fratello del P. gesuita Casale, si considera come un protettore della Compagnia: così i Terziari sono contenti. . . . Ma che scontezza nella prelatura!" (*Centomani to Tanucci, Rome, March 16, 1773, *ibid.*, 1222)

² NOVAES, XV., 185, 191.

³ For Giraud, see above, p. 187. Conveyance of the biretta for La Roche Aymon by *Brief to Louis XV. of December 16, 1771, and *Brief to Firmian of January 10, 1773, *Epist.* a° III., p. 193, a° IV., p. 228, Papal Secret Archives. *Orsini to Tanucci, December 15, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{309}{1054}$. Cf. ARNETH-GEOFFROY, *Briefwechsel Maria Theresias mit dem Grafen Mercy*, I., 270, 289.

⁴ NOVAES, XV., 206 *seq.*

Gennaro Antonio de Simone (d. 1780), on April 19th the Secretary of the Congregation of Bishops and Regular Clergy, Francesco Carafa di Trajetto (d. 1818), and Francesco Saverio Zelada (d. 1801), born in Rome of Spanish parents. At the twelfth and last promotion on April 26th, the third in 1773, thirteen Cardinals were created, though only two of them were made known: Giannangelo Braschi, Clement XIV.'s successor, and Francesco Delci (d. 1787).¹ The remaining eleven were created *in petto* only and strongly as the dying Pope was urged to publish their appointments he refused to give his consent.²

These final cardinalitial appointments excited general interest, as it was thought to be the Pope's intention to form a strong party in the Sacred College which would confirm the decisions he had taken, especially the one that concerned the Jesuits.³ Centomani seemed to be disappointed with the choice made by Clement XIV.; according to him, all those promoted or ear-marked for promotion were friendly to the Jesuits.⁴

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, April 27, 1773, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1481.

² See below, p. 531 *seq.*

³ “*Si crede che il Papa si prepara . . . un buon numero di cardinali, che col credito e con la voce sostengano le sue determinazioni, quali esse siano, particolarmente sul punto dei gesuiti.” *Tiepolo to the Doge, March 27 and April 3, 1773, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma 291. “Este metodo nuevo de tenerlo todo secreto y suspenso, mortifica de modo toda esta prelatura, que no me admirara que rebienten dos docenas de ellos, porque todos esperan y todos desesperan, y estan en tan fuerte agitacion que no se puede concebir. Para Pascua, o antes, hay apparencias de que sera hecho el resto de la promocion, y puede Vd. considerar la barahunda que aqui andara, pues sabe Vd. que una promocion interesa mas a Roma que todo quanto hay en el mundo.” *El espiritu de Azara*, II., 397.

⁴ “*Tutti i promossi o promovendi sono Terziari, come dice bene V.E.” Centomani to Tanucci, Rome, March 30, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1222.

(4)

In Clement XIV.'s time there were few signs of progress in the inner life of the Church in any of the Catholic nations of Europe ; on the contrary, almost everywhere the Church was losing ground as the result of powerful attacks from without. The most important feature of this latter aspect, apart from the abolition of the Society of Jesus, was the gradual destruction of the religious Orders. In this the leading part, which was copied by other countries, was played by France.¹ In 1768 several Orders had been required to amend their Constitutions, and in the following year similar instructions were sent to the various branches of the Franciscan Order—the Strict Observance, the Recollects, the Conventuals, and the Capuchins—also to the Dominicans, the Calced and Discalced Carmelites, the Augustinians, the Cistercians, the Antonians, the Premonstratensians, and the Canons Regular of the French Congregation.²

The fate of the French Franciscans had already been under discussion in the pontificate of Clement XIII. The documents of the commission for the reform of the Orders provide a splendid testimonial for them ; most of the Bishops, when asked for their opinion, spoke decisively in their favour, saying that they were useful and necessary for their dioceses ; only a few of them wanted the suppression of this or that house and brought forward complaints.³ The most favourable judgment was passed on the Recollects and the Capuchins.

¹ Cf. our account, vol. xxxvii., 386 *seqq.* Statistics of the French Orders in 1770 and 1790 in GÉRIN, *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XVIII. (1875), 88–90.

² PRAT, 206.

³ HOLZAPFEL, 363. Extracts from the episcopal opinions in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 91–103. The Bishop of Angers was “very content” with his five Franciscan convents ; according to the Archbishop of Rheims they were of great benefit to the country parishes ; the Bishop of Noyon praised their zeal and usefulness ; the Bishop of Séz found them useful and very necessary ; the Bishop of Evreux was “extrêmement satisfait du zèle et de la régularité” of the convents at Evreux and Verneuil. *Ibid.*, 92 *seq.*

No complaint whatever was made against either of these Orders by the Bishops, parish priests, or municipalities.¹ Nevertheless the commission thought that the Capuchin Constitutions needed alteration as being over-strict and suppressed twenty-two of their 421 houses.² It also strongly recommended the amalgamation of the Observants and the Conventuals. As long ago as 1745 Benedict XIV. had granted the French Observants the right to own real property and to draw permanent revenues, which brought them near to the Conventuals.³ The reform commission now gave way entirely to the will of the Government. By a Papal Brief of August 9th, 1771,⁴ the eight Provinces of the Observants with their 287 convents and 2,000 members were incorporated with the three Provinces of the Conventuals. The Observants thereby ceased to exist in France and they no longer wore the dress of their Order or bore its name. Instead of the eleven Provinces that formerly existed there were now only eight, with 278 convents.⁵ The Brief authorizing this union was written by Clement XIV. in his own hand.⁶

Several Orders were completely abolished. A royal edict of March 25th, 1770, forbade the Benedictine Congregation of the so-called Exempts to admit novices.⁷ Archbishop Loménie appeared at the chapter of the Antonians and announced that all further negotiation was useless and that any resistance would be dangerous ; all houses with less than twenty inmates would have to be closed. The Order sought to save itself by uniting with that of Malta.⁸

In the first years of his pontificate Clement XIV. wrote to

¹ *Ibid.*, 127, 132.

² *Ibid.*

³ HOLZAPFEL, 360.

⁴ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 265 *seq.*

⁵ Enumeration of the Provinces with their convents in the Brief of December 23, 1771, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 401 *seqq.* Cf. HEIMBUCHER, II., 417.

⁶ NOVAES, XV., 183.

⁷ PRAT, 209.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 210.

the Bishops and the nuncio to Paris to protest against the high-handed proceedings of the commission, which had even violated the rights of the Holy See by suppressing exempt convents without consulting the Pope and by prescribing in the new Constitutions given to the Orders the teaching of the Gallican propositions of 1682.¹ On December 3rd, 1770, a Brief to the same effect was sent to the king,² which was answered on the 12th by Choiseul in non-committal phrases. Practically nothing was gained by all these Papal messages. From 1772 onwards the Pope agreed to confirm the new Constitutions which had been submitted to him by certain Orders. He did so, for instance, for the Carmelites,³ the Augustinians,⁴ the Franciscan Recollects,⁵ and the Theatine convent in Paris.⁶ The French Trinitarians devoted to the redemption of imprisoned Christian slaves had, since 1629, embraced a more rigorous rule within the Order and had formed their own Congregation, but they now numbered only sixty members distributed over eight houses; with Papal approval they were compelled to abandon their former separation from the main body of the Order. Even in 1767, though, they had restored to freedom 200 prisoners in the Barbary States of North Africa.⁷ The abuses affecting the religious poverty of the French Benedictines, especially the Cluniacs, were checked by the Pope.⁸ After lengthy negotiations the Congregation of St. Rufus was also suppressed by Papal decree in 1773.⁹

A definite decay had set in in the religious life of the

¹ Letters of July 26 and December 20, 1769, in THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 309; to the nuncio of March 14 and June 20, 1770, *ibid.*, 452, 454.

² *Ibid.*, 461.

³ On May 30, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 441.

⁴ On July 4, 1772, *ibid.*, 455.

⁵ On April 3, 1773, *ibid.*, 570.

⁶ On July 29, 1774, *ibid.*, 766.

⁷ Brief of August 13, 1771, *ibid.*, 371. Cf. PRAT, 205.

⁸ On July 13, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 474 *seqq.*

⁹ PRAT, 211. Cf. JAGER, 432; MASSON, *Bernis*, 274.

Celestines. At the chapter which they were ordered to hold at Limay-les-Mantes those in favour of a relaxation in the rules were in the ascendancy and elected one of themselves as Vicar General. He in a petition to the Pope expressed the desire for the suppression of the Order. The General also wrote to the Pope, but in the opposite sense. Clement XIV. chose a middle course between the two opposing requests, and authorized the Bishops to visit the Celestine convents in their dioceses and to report to Rome on their condition. The opinions submitted were not favourable, and the Pope ordered the suppression of various houses.¹ What was left of the Order was allotted the house at Marcoussy as a retreat by a decree of the Conseil of July 4th, 1778.² With this the Order was as good as extinct.

The famous Dominican convent of St-Jacques in Paris having fallen away from its former high level, Clement XIV., on February 15th, 1773, appointed the Bishops of Arles and Meaux as Visitors and placed the convent under the immediate direction of the Dominican General.³

The same year saw the issue of another edict of reform⁴ for the religious Orders; some of its regulations were beneficial, but its prohibition of exemptions was an encroachment on the rights of the Holy See. This was brought to the Pope's notice and he succeeded in having some of the regulations in the original draft removed.⁵

Naturally the continual interference of the State with the religious life had a discouraging effect on vocations. Between 1768 and 1771 250 French Capuchin priests had died and had

¹ Fourteen of them are enumerated in PRAT, 215. Briefs with permission to dissolve Celestine houses: to Cardinal Luynes, of March 28, 1764, for the house at Sens (*Bull. Cont.*, V., 701); to the Bishop of Metz, of May 4, 1774, for the house there (*ibid.*, 723). There were only four Religious left in either house.

² PRAT, 215.

³ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 553 *seq.*

⁴ PRAT, *Pièces just.*, n. V., pp. xvi.-xxvii.

⁵ THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 312.

been replaced by only twenty. In 1770–1790 they lost 1,700 of their 4,400 members.¹ In the same period the four Franciscan Orders on French soil had lost a total of 3,756 professed members.² Any encouragement from Clement XIV. was not to be expected by the Orders; he confirmed the various modifications in the Constitutions submitted to him, but for the most part the question of the Jesuits forced him to fall in as far as possible with the wishes of the Governments.

The French Government's treatment of the religious Orders was an inducement to the other Powers to follow suit. When the preparatory steps were being taken for the suppression of the Jesuits the other Orders realized that they too might be threatened with the same fate; many of their members who had formerly opposed the Jesuits now began to draw closer to them.³ In 1773 the Spanish Government did in fact begin to take steps in Rome to obtain the enactment of measures which would limit the number of Religious; a request was also to be made to raise the age at which vows could be taken. An additional reason for presenting these demands was to exert pressure on the Pope, who was still hesitating about the suppression of the Jesuits.⁴ Moñino wrote⁵ that plans prejudicial to the Orders were being discussed all over Europe; the whole question was being

¹ GÉRIN, 130.

² *Ibid.*, 135.

³ "Invece di diminuire, cresce sempre più il numero dei Terziari e quasi in tutte le Religioni, ed in quelle le quali erano positivamente opposti alli Gesuiti." Why? Because the Jesuits had persuaded them that it was a question of a common danger. Centomani to Tanucci, Rome, April 14, 1772, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1220.

⁴ "*Para poner al Papa en cuidado y moverle a la extincion que tenia ofrecida, pareció conveniente que asi en Napoles como aqui se diese tal qual movimiento a algunos asuntos interesantes a la Corte de Roma," among others "la reduccion de numero de los Regulares". Grimaldi to Moñino, February 3, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 53.

⁵ *To Grimaldi, September 13, 1773, *ibid.*, Exped. "Roma".

studied by Zelada; and vows were not to be taken before the twenty-first year. One newspaper¹ took it on itself to report that the Pope was thinking of allowing only four classes of Religious, and Aranda, writing to Roda, much approved of it.² Zelada had already drafted a Bull on the taking of vows, and Moñino had a few alterations to propose³: vows were not to be solemn at first and were automatically to lose their binding force if the recipient left the Order. What had hitherto been peculiar to the Jesuits, he maintained, would thus apply to all the Orders. Apparently Clement XIV. was inclined to consider these proposals,⁴ and Zelada went on working with Moñino at the projected Bull, which was to apply to the women's Orders also.⁵ Moñino sent the draft to the King of Spain, observing that similar projects were being considered in Vienna and Paris.⁶ One drawback to the universal introduction of simple vows was that it looked as if a page was being taken from the Jesuits' book.⁷ Moñino was in favour of it nevertheless, but Zelada thought that it would be inconsonant with their honour to pursue this plan after the Society of Jesus had been suppressed.⁸ Charles III. and Grimaldi would not hear of a General of an Order who was not a Spaniard, and similar views were held in Portugal.⁹

¹ *Courrier du Bas-Rhin*, No. 77.

² *On October 2, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia 778.

³ *To Grimaldi, October 2, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Roma".

⁴ " *Tengo buenas esperanzas de que hemos de lograr la Bula para la edad de las profesiones." Moñino to Grimaldi, October (4?), 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ *Moñino to Grimaldi, October 21, 1773, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4986. *Grimaldi to Moñino, from San Lorenzo, November 9, 1773. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordines, 53.

⁶ *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 25, 1773, *ibid.*, Exped. "Roma".

⁷ *Moñino to Zelada, December 19, 1773, *ibid.*

⁸ *Grimaldi to Moñino, December 14, 1773, *ibid.*

⁹ " *Los Portugueses parece que no quieren que ninguno de sus

Otherwise, even in Clement XIV.'s time, the state of the Orders was not wholly unsatisfactory. The Capuchins of Savoy received an excellent testimonial on the whole from the Archbishop of Turin, Francesco Lucerna Rorengus de Rora, who in the capacity of Visitor had inquired into the condition of their houses. His admonitions and instructions, confirmed by the Pope,¹ were directed principally against the penetration of the spirit of nationalism, "that pernicious invention introduced some years ago," which was capable of devastating or upsetting in a very short time the whole Province, however good it might be and however large its number of holy men. No concessions were to be made to it in the choice of their Superiors.² As for their studies, the same professor was not to be asked to lecture on philosophy and on moral and dogmatic theology; it would be best to appoint a special professor for each of these subjects.³

The Capuchin Province of Cologne as hitherto existing Clement XIV. divided into the Provinces of Cologne and Westphalia.⁴ The antipathy between the Flemings and the Walloons, which also made itself felt among the Capuchins, necessitated the taking of a similar step in Belgium.⁵ Separate Provinces of the Franciscan Observants were erected in Estremadura⁶ and in Bavaria,⁷ of the Minims of St. Francis of Paula in Tuscany,⁸ and of the Camaldolese in the kingdom

frailes ni estos de S. Francisco ni de otra ninguna Religion dependan de General extranjero: no sé como lo componen con Roma." Grimaldi to Moñino, November 30, 1773, *ibid.*

¹ July 4, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 456-473.

² " Spiritum, ut vocant, nationum . . . perniciosum inventum, paucis tantum abhinc lustris invecum quod brevi totam provinciam, etsi optimam sanctisque viris foecundam vastari queat aut perturbare." *Ibid.*, § 12, 463.

³ *Ibid.*, § 19, 469.

⁴ January 22, 1770, *ibid.*, 140.

⁵ February 25, 1773, *ibid.*, 555.

⁶ April 10, 1770, *ibid.*, 169.

⁷ June 25, 1772, *ibid.*, 452.

⁸ May 18, 1771, *ibid.*, 339.

of Naples.¹ Of the German Benedictine monasteries Ettal received the Cassinese privileges,² St. Maximinus near Trier the confirmation of its Constitutions.³ From now on the Portuguese Province of the Carmelites was to form a Congregation of its own.⁴

It was in the pontificate of Clement XIV. that the Carmelite Order attracted universal attention through the entry, as a simple Sister, into their convent at Saint-Denis, on April 11th, 1770, of a royal princess, Madame Louise, a daughter of Louis XV.⁵ Educated at first with the king's three youngest daughters at the convent at Fontevault, Princess Louise from the age of thirteen was under the care of her pious mother, Maria Leszczyńska, and took it deeply to heart that her father should be wallowing in the depths of vice, destined apparently for eternal damnation. She resolved to devote herself to a life of penance and atonement and finally received her father's permission to enter Saint-Denis. Without taking leave of the royal family, she drove there on April 11th, 1770, and announced to her astonished retinue that she intended to stay in the convent for ever. On September 10th, 1770, she was solemnly clothed in the presence of twenty-four Bishops, the nuncio, and the whole Court. It was an impressive scene when the princess, surrounded by her ladies-in-waiting, and clothed in a jewel-studded gown, knelt before the nuncio and prayed in the customary form for "the mercy of God, the poverty of the Order, and the company of the Sisters"; she then retired to an adjoining room and reappeared in the chapel wearing the coarse habit of the Carmelites. Afterwards she held in all earnestness to her resolve that with her entry into the Order Madame Louise should die and that she would live

¹ May 13, 1771, *ibid.*, 321.

² On January 27, 1770, *ibid.*, 146.

³ On July 10, 1771, *ibid.*, 353.

⁴ Brief of April 28, 1773, *ibid.*, 575.

⁵ GILLET, *La vénérable Louise de France*, Paris, 1880; GEOFFROY DE GRANDMAISON, *Madame Louise de France, la vénérable Thérèse de Saint-Augustin (1737-1787)*, Paris, 1922.

as a simple Sister like any other under the name of Thérèse de St-Augustin.¹ Joseph II, when visiting her in 1777, told her that he would rather be hanged than live a life like hers.² Louis XV.'s opinion was not much different.³ It should be mentioned that she had already begun to mortify her body when she was still a princess.⁴ On several occasions she was elected Prioress of the convent. Her influence at Court she used for the furtherance of religious aims, such as the provision of a refuge for those of her Sisters in religion who had been expelled, the canonization of prominent Carmelite nuns, a community life for the French Jesuits after the suppression of their Order in France, and relief for the extreme poverty of her convent.⁵ These causes necessitated her entering into an extensive correspondence, in consequence of which she was accused of being an intriguer, and various contemptuous observations were passed upon her.⁶ "The world despises me and I it; so we are quits" was her view of the situation.⁷ Clement XIV. came into touch with her on several occasions. On hearing of her entry into religion he wrote to congratulate her⁸ and empowered her confessor to dispense her from the strict rule if the need arose. But she would not accept this favour; as long as she was well, she said, she did not want the dispensation, and if she was ill she would have no need of it.⁹ The nuncio to Paris was authorized by Clement XIV. to preside at her clothing and the taking of the vows, in the

¹ GRANDMAISON, 76, 95, 99, 120, 175.

² *Ibid.*, 156.

³ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 119 *seqq.*, 132 *seqq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 140; MASSON, 276. For her efforts in support of the Jesuits, *cf.* MASSON, 240 *seqq.* For the assertion that Louise tried to get Rome to declare the Du Barry's marriage null, so that she could marry the king, *v.* GRANDMAISON, 138; MASSON, 197.

⁷ GRANDMAISON, 82.

⁸ On May 9, 1770, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 83.

⁹ GRANDMAISON, 86.

Pope's name.¹ On other occasions he thanked her for sending him her portrait² and supported her efforts to reform the Carmelites at Charenton.³ His attempt to use her influence with Louis XVI. to obtain the retention of Cardinal Bernis in his ambassadorial post in Rome was not a happy move.⁴ He allotted her convent at Saint-Denis an annual income from the abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Prés.⁵ At her request he permitted the veneration of relics she had received from the Roman Catacombs⁶; and it was also at her request that he sent her the crucifix and the candlesticks which had belonged to the Jesuits of the Roman College and which afterwards, during the Revolution, found their way into the mint.⁷ The horrors of the Revolution were spared her, as she died at the age of fifty on December 21, 1787. "I could not have believed it was so sweet to die," she had said shortly before.⁸

Further evidence that the love of a religious life in community was not yet extinct in the eighteenth century was the springing up of new Congregations. In Genoa, for instance, a number of secular priests formed themselves into a community devoted to the cure of souls and taking Francis de Sales as their model.⁹

Clement XIV. had intimate relations with the recently founded Order of the Passionists and its founder, Paolo Danei, known in religion as Paul of the Cross (b. 1694).¹⁰ As the names

¹ Briefs of July 18, 1770, to the king and the nuncio, of August 14, 1771, to Louise herself and the king, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 96, 97, 170, 171.

² On February 26, 1772, *ibid.*, 208.

³ Briefs of April 15, 1772, *ibid.*, 217; *Bull. Cont.*, V., 432. According to MASSON (256), the reform had little success.

⁴ By Brief of August 10, 1774, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 323. Cf. MASSON, 271.

⁵ Brief of October 5, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 511.

⁶ On September 8, 1773, *ibid.*, 658.

⁷ GRANDMAISON, 126; MASSON, 249 *seq.*

⁸ MASSON, 82.

⁹ Brief of confirmation of November 8, 1771, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 388 *seq.*

¹⁰ Cf. our account, Vol. xxxv., 311. Biography by STRAMBI,

of the Order and its founder indicate, the object of the new society was the veneration of Christ's passion by means of contemplation and penance and by the preaching of penance and the love of Christ. The thoughts that form the *leit-motif* of his Order had been developing in Paul's mind from his early youth. The memory of Christ's passion had been implanted in him by his mother and even as a small child he took no interest in games but sought solitude in order to devote himself undisturbed to prayer and mortification. With the passage of the years this tendency grew stronger. Preferring to live in complete poverty for God alone, he refused to accept the legacy left him by an uncle nor would he avail himself of the offer made by a pious, childless couple to adopt him. But with all this Paul was not simply a recluse ; at every stage of his life he exerted an important influence on those with whom he came in contact. Even in his youth he was the centre of a select circle of companions, and he constantly emerged from his solitude to instruct the people and to preach penance. He soon formed the plan of finding others who would live as he did and of founding a society of the " Poor of Jesus ". At the age of twenty-four he had himself clothed by his spiritual director, the Bishop of Alessandria, Arboreo di Gattinara, in the habit which was afterwards to be that of his Order and he straightway set about the task of drafting the Rule of his future community.¹

At first he was not successful in obtaining Papal sanction for his new foundation. In beggar's clothes he presented himself for an audience with Innocent XIII. but failed to gain admittance. He retired in 1722 to the rocky caves in the peninsula of Argentaro on the Tuscan coast, thence to Gaeta and to Troia in Apulia, everywhere combining preaching with the life of a hermit. In 1725, taking with him a letter of recommendation from the Bishop of Troia, he went to Rome again and this time he was more successful. As he knelt in St. Peter's with his brother, who shared his way of life, he

Rome, 1786, revised by VALENTIN LEHNERD, Innsbruck, 1926 ; HEIMBUCHER, III., 309 *seqq.*

¹ LEHNERD, I-27.

attracted the attention of the future Cardinal Crescenzi, the friend of Leonardo di Porto Maurizio.¹ The pious Crescenzi and Cardinal Corradini saw to it that the two brothers were well received by Benedict XIII., who gave them oral permission to recruit more companions.² On Whitsun Eve, 7th June, 1727, Benedict XIII. ordained them priests.

The new Order now began to take its rise. After 1742 the first convent at Ortebello was followed by others. Benedict XIV. confirmed the Rule by Briefs of May 15th, 1741, and March 28th, 1746 ; and on April 10th, 1747, the founder was chosen as the first General of the new Congregation.³ In the jubilee year of 1750 he preached in Rome with Leonardo di Porto Maurizio, and did so again in 1769.⁴

With Clement XIV. Paul of the Cross stood in high repute. He had prophesied that Cardinal Ganganelli would receive the tiara,⁵ and when he came to Rome soon after the Pope's accession to the throne Clement XIV. sent a carriage to fetch him.⁶ He reconfirmed the rules of the Congregation in their altered form by a Brief of November 15th, 1769,⁷ and on the next day he granted the undertaking several privileges by means of a solemn Bull.⁸ On April 21st, 1770, he sent the founder and his Congregation a Brief of appreciation.⁹ When, after the suppression of the Jesuits, their noviciate on the Quirinal came into the possession of the Lazarists, the Pope presented the church and residence formerly used by the Lazarists to the Passionists.¹⁰ It was the Pope's wish that Paul of the Cross should visit him as often as possible ; he was to be admitted even when no audience was granted to anyone

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. xxxv., 324, 335.

² LEHNERD, 39.

³ *Ibid.*, 60, 62, 64.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 79, 100.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 98, 252.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁷ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 105-126.

⁸ *Ibid.* (arranged in the wrong order), 75-79.

⁹ THEINER, *Epist.*, 80.

¹⁰ Brief of September 16, 1774, *ibid.*, 781-8.

else.¹ On January 26th, 1774, when Paul had been ill for a long time and was in danger of death, Clement XIV. visited him and conversed with him alone.² The same honour was paid to the dying man by Pius VI. on the first Sunday in Lent, in 1775, a few days after his accession to the throne.³ Shortly before Paul's death on October 18th, 1775, the Constitutions, which had again been altered, were confirmed anew by Pius VI.⁴

A female, purely contemplative, branch of the Congregation came into existence on May 3rd, 1771, with the foundation of the convent of Corneto.⁵ Its first Superior was the Duchess Anna Maria Colonna Barberini, widow of Sforza Cesarini, who on the death of her husband had devoted herself to a life of religion and had retired entirely from the world. Her appointment was made by Clement XIV., who had also approved of the rules for the Passionist nuns.⁶

Contemporaneously with the Passionists the Congregation

¹ LEHNERD, 106.

² According to LEHNERD (116) this was the last meeting between Clement XIV. and Paul of the Cross, but Centomani reported a visit paid by Clement in August (Appx. 3, i). Cf. below, p. 523, n. 1. Cordara (in DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, III., 52) relates that Clement asked for Paul's opinion on his intention of suppressing the Society of Jesus and that Paul dispelled his doubts on this score: "nisi aliter sua reddi possit Ecclesiae quies, dignitas et libertas, quam societate suppressa, eam suppressere ne vereretur." But this is merely Cordara's conjecture, as the two men conferred in private. Besides, after the expulsion from Spain, Paul thought that the Order would rise again with even greater splendour. Letters to Reali of September 22, 1767, *Lettere*, ed. by Amadeo della Madre del Buon Pastore, IV. (1924), 21; BOERO, *Osservazioni*, II., 239; *Analecta Bollandiana*, 1926, 462. Once Paul referred to Ignatius of Loyola as his friend (LEHNERD, 225) and he often used the Exercises (*ibid.*, 66, 70, 85, 240, etc.).

³ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁴ On September 15, 1775, *ibid.*, 117.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 93, 109.

⁶ Brief of February 9, 1771, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 137 *seqq.*

of the Redemptorists was also assuming its final shape, in the very place where it seemed impossible for a religious society to make any progress—Naples, the paradise of regalism.

(5)

Tanucci's spirit had not yet lost its hold on the southern half of the Italian peninsula. When Paris was considering the appointment of an envoy to Naples, Aiguillon was informed in the name of the King of the Two Sicilies¹ that the envoy would have to be anti-Jesuit and anti-Roman. On the occasion of Clement XIV.'s taking possession of the Lateran, Tanucci had instructed his agent Centomani to see to the triumphal arch which it was the custom of the Dukes of Parma and Piacenza to erect for the ceremony, but in the inscription to refer to them also as the Dukes of Castro and Ronciglione. This slight on the Pope's rights of enfeoffment was obviated only by the Pope's being satisfied with an arch without an inscription.² It was made difficult for the Bishops and the clergy to communicate with Rome and even with the nuncio³; and it was forbidden to pay taxes to Rome.⁴ The anti-Papal works of Giannone and Sarpi were reprinted.⁵ The religious Orders were to come under the sole supervision of the State, and the Camaldolese and the Brothers of Mercy, who had allowed themselves to be won over to this point of view, had to be threatened by the Pope with excommunication.⁶ Long negotiations were started about the so-called regulations of the chancery, whose reservations and evocations in favour of Rome Tanucci refused to recognize for Naples. He called the whole Dataria an Augean stable⁷; in his view the chancery

¹ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, Fontainebleau, October 26, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4580.

² THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 328 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, II., 188.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I., 517.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 518.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 329, 517.

⁷ *To Orsini, May 18, 1771, State Archives, Naples.

regulations cut across the rights both of the princes and the Bishops.¹

The episcopal authority, as it happened, was restricted by Tanucci as much as the Papal one. No pastoral letter or episcopal decree could be published without the royal *placet*.² The Government tried to curtail the Archbishop of Capua's right, fixed by concordat, to the presentation of benefices. The Archbishop, the Theatine Michele Galeota, would not give way and was praised by the Pope for his conduct. If there were more prelates of his character, wrote the Secretary of State on June 18th, 1771, the Church would be in a better situation.³ The Government had to cede finally to the Archbishop's demands, but for a time, in 1772, he was expelled from his diocese.⁴ Similar difficulties were created by Tanucci for the Bishop of Troia, Marco di Simone. The nuncio to Naples was instructed by letter from the Secretary of State, dated July 16th, 1771, to defend the Bishop's rights on the basis of the concordats.⁵ The intention formed by several Bishops in the Neapolitan kingdom to appeal to the king against the Government's encroachments on their rights met with the Pope's approval and encouragement.⁶ Tanucci's dislike of the clergy included the priests' schools. "Better not to study at all," he said, "than to take poison with one's studies."⁷ For the monks he had a supreme contempt.⁸

The Jesuits were still a bugbear for Tanucci. He feared

¹ *To Orsini, May 12, 1770, *ibid.*

² THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 517.

³ *Ibid.*, II., 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 83, 188.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 83 *seq.*

⁶ Letter from the Secretary of State, September 3, 1771, *ibid.*, 85.

⁷ " *Meglio che non si studi, che studiando si beva il veleno." Tanucci to Fogliano, July 1, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6009.

⁸ " *Il fratume però è getto e cloaca della gente stolta e pericolosa." To Nefetti, Portici, May 13, 1773, *ibid.*, Estado, 3023, 803.

their return, he tried to forestall such an unpleasant contingency,¹ and he calculated the amount of money that was leaving the country in the form of pensions for the exiles.² For the Pope, on the other hand, the Jesuit question was a means of defence against the encroachments of the Government. These constant violations of the concordats, he complained to Orsini, hindered him in the execution of the important resolutions he had formed to satisfy the importunities of the kings of Spain and France; they were making his life such a misery that he felt like abdicating and shutting himself up for good in the Castel Sant'Angelo.³ Even Orsini protested⁴ against Tanucci's desire to nationalize the Church and told him straight out that together with the Italian and Spanish Bishops he considered the Pope to be above even the Ecumenical Councils.

Without first obtaining the Government's approval, the nuncio, acting in the name of the Pope, was to proceed against the priests and Religious who were spending their time in Naples for no better object than to amuse themselves.⁵ In a secret memorial⁶ Tanucci was advised not to enter into

¹ *Tanucci to Grimaldi, June 4, 1771, *ibid.*, Estado, 6104.

² *To Orsini, August 11, 1770, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 109.

³ *These encroachments, the Pope is said to have complained, were "una specie di fraporre ostacolo alle cose grandi, che meditiamo, e siamo disposti a fare a premure di S. M^{ta} Cattolica e Christianissima". He was ready "per il bene delle Chiesa ad andarsi a rinchiudere in Castel S. Angelo" (Orsini to Tanucci, Rome, May 8, 1770, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 1475). *Azpuru and the Pope were continually saying that the innovations in Naples were delaying the suppression (Centomani to Tanucci, Rome, January 22, 1771, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, 1218).

⁴ *On May 29, 1770, *ibid.*, C. Farnes. 1475

⁵ November 8, 1771, THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 86. "La maggior parte dei vescovi" was reprehensible, *wrote Tanucci to Centomani on March 24, 1770 (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6011). "Vogliono ozio non residenza."

⁶ *"Secreta memoria," State Archives, Naples, Raccolta da vari Archivii Napoletani, 676.

negotiations with the Roman Curia, as they always resulted in profiting the Curia and damaging the Catholic States. Without more ado and with no further preparation a regiment should be put into Castro to occupy the territory; the *chinea*¹ tribute should not be paid, and the revenues that Rome drew from the Bulls, Briefs, reservations, etc., should be withheld. By this means the Bishops would recover their powers of dispensation. Had not Christ Himself commended His Church to the Apostles and the temporal rulers? The *Monarchia Sicula* was a strong support for the Government. All Neapolitans resident in the Papal States must be recalled and all Papal subjects who owned property in Neapolitan territory must be compelled to reside there or pay a huge tax. Even the expelled Jesuits might be brought back and confined in two fortresses, so that their pensions should not go to the benefit of foreigners. The writer explained that the principle on which he based his proposals was that the internal discipline of the Church was the business of the Bishops, the external that of the rulers. He failed to understand, he said, why his king did not make up his mind not to be bothered with the Roman Curia any more. It was only in the domain of dogma that a few concessions were made to the Pope. As a model for the Minister to copy, the memorial cited the behaviour of Venice towards the Holy See.

In Clement XIV.'s pontificate the Signoria did indeed issue a number of decrees that trespassed on ecclesiastical ground. The Bishops were forbidden to leave their dioceses without permission.² The faculty of releasing Bulls, for which hitherto the parish priests had to apply to the nuncio and pay him the appropriate fee, was transferred to the Patriarch.³ To Papal Briefs concerned with the assignment to benefices the Republic refused to give its *exequatur*.⁴ The object of these measures

¹ The annual tribute paid to the Pope by the kings of Naples since the time of Charles of Anjou.

² *Montalegre to Grimaldi, Venice, June 10, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5765. ³ *Id. to id.*, March 31, 1770, *ibid.*, 5780.

⁴ *Orsini to Tanucci, Rome, January 8, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1055³¹⁰.

was to prevent money leaving the country, and in pursuance of this policy the Signoria even prohibited pilgrimages to the shrine of St. Francis at Assisi. As the number of pilgrims was assessed at 15,000 it was hoped in this way to prevent the expenditure of three million reals.¹ Another regulation was that no cleric was to be in possession of two canonries, abbotships, priorships, or simple prebends; he was to have only that one where he had his residence.²

The most serious interferences on the part of the State had to be suffered by the monasteries and convents. As early as September 7th, 1768, a law had been passed by which the Religious were made immediately subject to the Bishops.³ As this ordinance failed to meet with universal acceptance, on April 29th of the following year all who had not submitted within six months were threatened with immediate banishment.⁴ All communication with foreign Superiors was forbidden.⁵ On June 10th, 1769, the Spanish envoy to Venice reported that seventy-four Franciscan convents had been closed by the Republic and that measures had been taken to restrict the number of vocations to the priesthood, whether secular or regular.⁶ On June 17th he wrote that every week some decree or other against the Orders was passed by the Senate, but that at the time of writing only the Franciscans had been affected.⁷ But it was not long before the Dominicans were also subjected to the State's zeal for reform.⁸ By the middle of August, 1770, eighteen Dominican, twelve Carmelite, and three Augustinian convents had been suppressed. This

¹ *Montalegre to Grimaldi, Venice, June 8, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5781.

² **Id.* to *id.*, Venice, March 31, 1770, *ibid.*, 5780.

³ *Cf.* our account, vol. xxxvii., 373.

⁴ *Montalegre to Grimaldi, Venice, May 6, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5765.

⁵ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 329.

⁶ *Montalegre to Grimaldi, *loc. cit.*, Estado, 5765.

⁷ **Ibid.*

⁸ *Finocchietti to Orsini, Venice, December 2, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1704²⁹⁵₀.

was paving the way, thought the Spanish envoy, for the seizure of the Benedictine monasteries, whose riches and power were well known.¹ And in fact, on December 5th, 1770, four of the twelve Benedictine establishments of the Cassinese Congregation were swept away²; they were not allowed to accept any more novices until the number of Religious had dropped from 300 to 160, which number they were not to exceed in future; the priests and lay-brothers received an annual pension of 220 and 190 ducats respectively.³ Between April 7th, 1770, and August 26th, 1771, the Republic made 387,389 ducats by the sale of fifty-two religious houses.⁴ But the "work of reform" did not finish here; on September 12th, 1771, it was extended to twenty-one houses belonging to the four Orders of the Camaldolese, the Olivetans, the Canons of the Holy Redeemer, and the Canons of the Lateran.⁵ A year later it was the turn of four other Orders. The Augustinians of the Venetian Province lost nine of their thirteen convents, their fellow-Religious of the Lombard-Venetian Province six of their ten convents, the Congregation of Monte Ortone three of their six monasteries. The Servites fared no better; in their Province of Venice they were left with only six of their thirteen convents, in the March of Treviso with three of their six establishments. The Minims were treated more leniently; of their seven houses they lost only two; whereas the Hieronymites kept only five of their nine convents.⁶

The Jesuits were told to elect their Provincial in Chapter

¹ " *Pregadi," August 2, 1770, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{298}{1043}$; *Orsini to Tanucci, August 14, 1770, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473; *Montalegre to Grimaldi, August 11, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5780.

² CECCHETTI, I., 224.

³ *Montalegre to Grimaldi, Venice, December 15, 1770, *loc. cit.*

⁴ CECCHETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *J. Martin to Grimaldi, Venice, September 28, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5781.

⁶ CECCHETTI, II., 161. A *collection of Venetian decrees on "proprietà et jurisdict. ecclesiastica, ordini regolari et luoghi pii 1769-1775" in the Vatican Library, Vat., 9469-9470.

in future, in the manner of the Theatines.¹ Permission to do so had arrived from Rome, it was stated.² Tanucci made out that the Jesuits' reply to the Senate's demand was ambiguous,³ but the Senate advised them that if they wanted to remain within the frontiers of the Republic they would have to throw off all dependence on their General and cease from all communication with him, and in future they would not be allowed to receive any more novices.⁴

Clement XIV. did not receive these invasions of the ecclesiastical domain in silence. Time and again he protested against them in his Briefs, he sent Martorelli to Venice to remonstrate, and he instructed the nuncios to invoke the mediation of the Catholic Courts.⁵

The Bishop of Brescia, Cardinal Molino, having refused to obey the Senate's summons to undertake on his own episcopal authority the visitation of the religious houses in his diocese, had to leave Republican territory.⁶ Clement solved the difficulty by appointing Molino Apostolic Delegate and instructing him in this capacity to perform the visitation in his name. Molino was allowed to return and was reinstated in the possession of the property that had been confiscated from him.⁷ For this favour the Republic received Clement's commendation.⁸ Perhaps the most arbitrary act of the

¹ " *Pregadi," on May 6, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5765.

² *Finocchietti to Orsini, July 22, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1033.

³ *To Orsini, August 1, 1769, *ibid.*

⁴ *Montalegre to Grimaldi, September 30, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5765.

⁵ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 330.

⁶ Cf. our account, vol. xxxvii., 374; *Orsini to Tanucci, June 16, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1473.

⁷ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 15, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 108. *Orsini to Tanucci, June 30, 1769, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1474.

⁸ *Montalegre to Grimaldi, June 24, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5765.

Senate was the order it gave to the Bishop of Udine to compose a catechism recommending obedience to the sovereign.¹

In Tuscany, Duke Leopold II., who in ecclesiastical matters shared the views of his brother, Emperor Joseph II., began his reforms in the spiritual sphere in the year of Clement XIV.'s accession to the throne, though they did not reach their climax till the reign of Pius VI. The exequatur had to be affixed to the decrees of all foreign Superiors ; no applications to Rome for dispensations might be made without permission of the secretary for affairs of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The right of asylum was abolished. The only notice Rome took of this decree was to publish it. The monastic prisons were brought under the control of the State. Nothing is known of any protest raised by Clement XIV. against all this.² In 1769 there was promulgated a law, based on an ordinance of 1751, restricting the amounts of property in mortmain. The law was framed in general terms, but it was aimed at the diminution of ecclesiastical property. Estates held in mortmain had to be given in copyhold, so that the original owners were left with only the annual rent as a fixed income ; actually this meant that Church property passed into the hands of laymen.³

Leopold II. was especially anxious to reduce the number of religious houses. On taking over the Government he had complained of the large number of nunneries ; in 1767 the religious houses had to render an account of the state of their revenues ; in 1777 he requested his Finance Minister Rucellai to submit him detailed measures which would reduce the number of houses and Religious. Rucellai's answer was that no religious clothing should take place without the Grand Duke's assent and that no vows should be taken before the

¹ *Finocchietti to Orsini, Venice, December 9, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{295}{1040}$.

² REUMONT, II., 158.

³ HERMANN BÜCHI, *Ein Menschenalter Reformen der Toten Hand in Toskana* (1751-1790), Berlin, 1912, 88 *seqq.* Text of the law, *ibid.*, 79 *seqq.* For the real purpose of this legislation, *v. ibid.*, 43, 71, 109.

age of twenty-one.¹ In the early seventies a beginning was made with the suppression of unimportant establishments.² The suppression of the ten Jesuit establishments was carried out in 1773 without difficulty.³

Regardless of the dangers to law and order that were likely to arise from lack of religious unity, the Austrian Government in the Milanese contemplated settling a hundred Protestant families from Germany with the object of stimulating trade and industry. The Papal Secretary of State protested against this in a letter to the nuncio to Vienna of September 28th, 1771, and in the event Maria Theresa withheld her assent to her Ministers' project.⁴ The Cardinal Archbishop of Milan was also asked to give his support to the plans of the Austrian statesmen, and on November 16th, 1771, the Secretary of State again warned the nuncio to be on his guard.⁵

To reduce the number of religious houses was the policy of almost every Government. In Lombardy the Imperial Government proposed to amalgamate some of the smaller houses, particularly those of the Olivetans and Hieronymites, and accommodate their inmates in one or two larger establishments, with the object of raising the standard of discipline and studies. The revenues that would thus become redundant were to be used for other religious purposes. "To avoid worse harm,"⁶ Clement XIV. sent the necessary powers to the nuncio in Vienna, with instructions to obtain from the Bishops precise information about the condition and the effectiveness of the houses in question.⁷

When the possession of Corsica passed from Genoa to France

¹ *Ibid.*, III.

² REUMONT, 166.

³ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁴ THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 87.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 89 *seq.*

⁶ Pallavicini to the nuncio in Vienna, November 25, 1772, *ibid.*, 192.

⁷ The Pope to the nuncio, October 17, 1772, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 230; to the empress, October 24, 1772, *ibid.*, 231.

in 1768 various difficulties were created for the Holy See.¹ In the temporal sphere the Papal Government claimed the overlordship of the island on the strength of the donation of Pepin and the precedent created by Innocent II. and Honorius III. In so far as spiritual matters were concerned, the Pope could not acquiesce in silence in the French king's desire to treat Corsica as if it were one of the French dioceses, in accordance with which he introduced in October, 1769, the administration of Church revenues according to the French system and the obligation to observe the four Gallican propositions of 1682.² By a Brief of March 14th, 1770,³ Clement XIV. acknowledged the French king's right to nominate the Corsican Bishops. As for the temporal supremacy over the island, it was said in the Brief that the Holy See did not renounce its claim to its temporal rights in Corsica; the French Government had at first rejected the Papal claims,⁴ but had finally admitted a reservation in general terms.⁵ In spiritual matters the Brief stated that the Pope reserved to himself all the rights which he had exercised in Corsica since time immemorable. In August, 1769, Clement XIV. had sent the Bishop of Tiana as Visitor to the island to restore order to the disorganized ecclesiastical conditions.⁶

The only State in the whole of Italy with which the Pope was on really friendly terms was the kingdom of Sardinia, and that only during the lifetime of its ruler, Carlo Emmanuele III. The king obtained from the Pope the extension of certain Spanish privileges on the island of Sardinia,⁷ also certain restrictions of the right of asylum⁸ and the erection of the

¹ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 312 *seqq.*, 464 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 313.

³ *Bull. Cont.*, V., 152 *seqq.*

⁴ The nuncio in Paris to Pallavicini, in THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 312 *seq.*

⁵ Covering letter to the Brief of March 14, *ibid.*, 469.

⁶ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 314.

⁷ Brief of November 29, 1769, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 130 *seq.*; THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 332.

⁸ THEINER, *Gesch.*, I., 520.

bishopric of Biella for the needs of the mountaineers in northern Piedmont.¹ On March 8th, 1772, the Pope had to inform the Cardinals in Consistory of the king's death.²

(6)

Clement XIV.'s accession to the throne inspired the former Controller-General Laverdy with the idea of making an attempt to obtain some sort of ecclesiastical recognition for the French Jansenists. Charles III. of Spain was to use his influence with the Pope on their behalf, while from the Jansenist side a dogmatic statement was to be presented in Rome ; if this met with approval, the French Government was to lay it before an assembly of prelates, " who were already peacefully inclined or who could be induced to become so by the Court." Naturally the project came to nothing.³ In any case the party was no longer interested in doctrinal strife ; until 1773 the principal aim of its leading men was the destruction of the Society of Jesus.⁴

The Jansenists in Holland also took fresh heart under Clement XIV. The archbishop of Utrecht wrote immediately to the Pope,⁵ telling him of his longing for union and reconciliation and speaking of love and forbearance, of the pure faith of the Church of Utrecht, of Bossuet, and the freedom there should be in matters of doubt. The men of Utrecht had been the victims of calumny, and their arguments ought to be heard by Rome. Furnished with recommendations from the

¹ Brief of June 1, 1772, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 442.

² THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 315.

³ PRÉCLIN, 306 *seq.*

⁴ Until 1773 " la destruction de la Compagnie de Jésus demeure l'objectif principal que poursuivent les chefs du jansénisme " (*ibid.*, 305).

⁵ *On May 9, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 254-9. F. DE VRIES, *Vredespogingen tusschen de oud-bisschoppelijke Cleresie van Utrecht en Rome*, Groningen, 1930 ; *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, 1931, 151 *seqq.*

Empress Maria Theresa,¹ an envoy from the Church of Utrecht came to Rome. The steps taken by the Dutch Jansenists were supported by the Spanish Court. Roda wrote from the Escorial to the Archbishop of Utrecht² that Charles III. was convinced that the pastoral letter ascribed to the Archbishop's predecessor, Meindaerts, three years after his death, was a calumnious falsification intended to besmirch the reputation of the venerable Palafox and by means of false imputations to vilify the doctrine and the faith of an illustrious Church which had been founded by the king's most glorious ancestors. The king had been moved to hear of the conditions in Utrecht, of the great devotion to the Holy See, of the great purity of faith, of the intense longing for reconciliation; he was extremely glad to hear that Jansen's five propositions had been rejected by Utrecht and he would take steps at the Court of Rome to promote concord, peace, and love.

Azpuru did in fact hand the Pope, in his king's name, a memorial recommending the requests made by the Archbishop of Utrecht.³ The Pope replied verbally that a plenipotentiary might be sent to negotiate on the question of reunion, but that first and foremost the appeal to a ecumenical council must be withdrawn. The request for reunion must be made in the name of the Church of Utrecht, not in the name of the present Bishops, who were not recognized by Rome. If these conditions were fulfilled, the Pope, out of regard for the king's intervention, would gladly put out his hand in the cause of

¹ Mozzi, II., 450 *seq.* *Orsini to Tanucci, Rome, July 20, 1770, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 17043 (on the agent employed by Utrecht, Fernandi).

² *San Lorenzo (Escorial), September 30, 1771, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 589.

³ In this memorial Charles III. asked the Pope to protect the men of Utrecht "contra las calumnias que se les levantan, los admita en su gremio . . . asegurándose de la fé y católica creencia que deben tener y ofrecen observar" (*Azpuru to Roda, October 31, 1771, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 110).

reunion, so far as the purity of the faith allowed.¹ In the following year too Roda wanted Moñino to take up the matter and persuade the Pope to send a competent nuncio to Brussels to initiate negotiations.²

Later on the Dutch Jansenists tried again to get Maria Theresa to recommend them in Rome, but this time the empress would have nothing more to do with them.³

(7)

In general, as we have said, the internal life of the Church in the time of Clement XIV. presents anything but a cheerful picture, and a particularly gloomy feature of it is the mission field. It is now generally acknowledged that the destruction of the missionary Orders, the Society of Jesus in particular, at the close of the eighteenth century was bound to have the most disastrous effects in the mission field. The geographer Wappäus wrote in 1865 on the expulsion of the Jesuits from Paraguay⁴: "It is no longer a very bold statement to make that these measures were as much an injustice towards the missionaries as they were harmful for the Indians and consequently for the countries themselves. . . . A century has passed since then and they have not been replaced, but even to-day their memory is still treasured by the Indians, who speak with eagerness of the Fathers' regime as of a golden age." Duflot de Mofras,⁵ who explored America in 1840-42, speaks of the "brilliant results" obtained by the Jesuits in New France and by the Spanish Franciscan missionaries in California when working among the Indians, but he also says that everything had been destroyed. "To his astonishment

¹ *Macedonio to Azpuru, December 3, 1771, *ibid.*, 110. Cf. THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 51 *seq.*

² *Roda to Moñino, El Pardo, February 22, 1774, Exped. "Roma".

³ MOZZI, II., 450.

⁴ *Handbuch der Geographie und Statistik*, I., 3, 1013.

⁵ *Exploration du territoire de l'Orégon*, II., Paris, 1844, 384.

the traveller in the most remote districts of America comes across quite heavy crosses set up by the Indians. From the very earliest times of the conquest the natives had a feeling of reverence for the missionaries, as men who, in contrast with all the other whites, did nothing but good to them and always protected them. A nation that is not bent on destroying the Indians . . . should send out missionaries before anyone else, to continue the work of civilization begun in so admirable a way by the Jesuits and Franciscans. . . . The wooden crosses of a few poor Religious have won more provinces for Spain and France than the swords of their best military commanders." Alexander von Humboldt wrote of the Atures Indians on the Orinoco¹: "The Jesuits of old set them to work and they never lacked a livelihood. The Fathers grew maize, beans, and other European vegetables; they even planted sweet oranges and tamarinds round about the villages; and on the prairies of Atures and Carichana they had 20-30,000 horses and heads of cattle. . . . Now nothing is grown but a little manioc and bananas . . . the cultivation of maize is entirely neglected, the horses and cows have disappeared. . . . During an interregnum of eighteen years [after the expulsion of the Jesuits] the missions were visited only occasionally, by Capuchins. The *hatos*, the villages established by the Jesuits, were administered by Government officials calling themselves "royal commissioners", in a disgracefully slovenly fashion. . . . Since 1795 the cattle bred by the Jesuits has entirely disappeared." Gothein² also states as a fact that on the downfall of the Order the Spaniards "broke into the territory that had been protected from them for so long, like a pack of ravenous wolves, and in a short time they reduced it to ruins. . . . In a few years the country's stock of cattle was practically demolished and the population had

¹ *Reisen in die Äquatorialgegenden des Neuen Kontinents, in deutscher Bearbeitung von H. Hauff*, III., Stuttgart, 1860, 186.

² *Der christlich-soziale Staat der Jesuiten in Paraguay*, Leipzig, 1883, 15, 61.

shrunk by more than half.”¹ Of Ecuador an eye-witness,² after speaking of the amazing monumental buildings of the early period in the towns, goes on to say, “To-day, then, we look in vain for those flourishing Indian colonies in the evergreen forests between the Cordilleras and the Amazon. The towns and villages built there by the missionaries . . . have either disappeared without a trace or are mere ruins overgrown with vegetation or, most rarely of all, have degenerated into miserable settlements. The Indians themselves have not merely reverted to their former wildness but through their temporary contact with unscrupulous and greedy merchants have become even more depraved than they were before the missions.”

Baluffi,³ the future Cardinal, goes so far as to say that

¹ Cf. HÄBLER, in HELMOLT, *Weltgeschichte*, I., 409: “Those who entered into their [the Jesuits’] inheritance managed in a few years to turn the Indians away from all the cultural progress that had been made under the Jesuits,” etc.

² LUDWIG DRESSEL, in *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, XVII. (1879), 474.

³ He calls the suppression “un avvenimento che mutò l’aspetto d’America. Se la caduta della Compagnia produsse quasi ovunque rimarchevoli effetti, sono tali in America da contraddistinguere il secolo, da fargli prendere il nome dal discacciamento di lei”. *L’America in tempo spagnuolo riguardata sotto l’aspetto religioso dall’epoca del suo scoprimento sino al 1843* (Ancona, 1844), II., 256. The Araucans, says Baluffi, were so exasperated by the expulsion of the Jesuits that in their blind rage they destroyed everything that reminded them of Spain (*ibid.*, 256). Mgr. Ranjel, the first Bishop to visit the old missions of the Marañon, in 1807, found them almost deserted, and they never revived (*ibid.*, 259). “As for New Granada, I wept when I read the reports written in their own hand by the Viceroys Espeleta and Mendineta, lamenting the decay of the missions, which began on the day the sons of St. Ignatius were parted from them” (*ibid.*). *Ibid.*, 260, the decay in instruction. Cf. *Nuncio Caleppi to the Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro, February 23, 1816 (Papal Secret Archives, Nunziat. di Brasile): The Government protests against the restoration of the Society of Jesus, as

the destruction of the Society of Jesus has changed the face of America. The downfall of the Order, he says, had remarkable effects almost everywhere, but in America it marked the beginning of a new era, that of the expelled Society of Jesus.

Public opinion had been prepared for the destruction of the missions many years before by the flood of writings aimed at the destruction of the Society of Jesus and pretending to justify themselves by the alleged conditions of the Jesuit missions.¹ It had already been initiated, before Clement XIV.

it has taken place without previous agreement. The nuncio will continue to refrain from speaking about the matter to the Minister, "non essendo questo certamente il momento da potersi sperare un cambiamento di opinione rispetto ai gesuiti, che però non lasciano di avere anche qui ed a Lisbona un partito ben grande, confessando pur anche li loro contrari, che la civilizzazione degli Indiani disgraziatamente è così ritardata nel Brasile per la espulsione de' predetti religiosi, che avevano maniere ammirabili per attrarli, e toglierli dalla barbarie."

¹ "About the middle of the eighteenth century," writes Robert Streit, the bibliographer of the missions (*Bibliotheca Missionum*, III., Aachen, 1927, vii.), "there appears a genus of missionary literature which shows unmistakable signs of being a sham. It is work done to order. The superficiality with which it was written, the haste with which it was published, the unscrupulousness with which it was thrown at the public, are unparalleled in the history of literature. It culminates in a regular flood and overflows into every civilized country and colony in a torrent of editions and translations. It was a literary onslaught on the Society of Jesus, its missionary activity in particular.—We are not concerned here with the investigation of the grounds and facts which gave rise to this disgraceful campaign of lies and brute force, nor is it our duty at the moment to state what grounds there were for the accusations brought against the missionary work of the Jesuits. What we must expose on the evidence of the literary material to hand is the unscrupulous means, the reprehensible method, the brutal execution, and the disastrous consequences. We have spared no pains to name this genus of missionary literature and to determine it bibliographically. Its very bulk is repugnant and gives the impression of a list

ascended the throne, by the measures taken by the Portuguese and Spanish Governments. The Papal Brief of suppression seemed merely to set the seal to their procedure, but before Clement XIV.'s death it had hardly been announced in the outlying mission fields¹ and until it had been officially promulgated the missionaries did not cease to be Jesuits. For the most part, therefore, evidence of the effects of the suppression can only be expected in the pontificate of Clement XIV.'s successor.

Only a few days elapsed, however, between the publication of the Brief of suppression and the issue of the order for its application to the missions. On August 21st, 1773, a case full of sealed letter-packets was brought to Propaganda by a messenger who told a subordinate official of the secretariate to send them off without delay to all the missionary Bishops. Borgia, the Secretary of the Propaganda, protested to Cardinal

of goods which have been ordered and paid for. The tragic and serious part of this affair, however, is that this literature was a mighty weapon in the hands of those who were bitterly opposed to the universal mission of the Catholic Church, that far and wide and for a long time it influenced public opinion, that it crippled the life of the missions at home, and inflicted dire wounds on the life of the missions abroad, and finally that it contributed not a little to the destruction of the Jesuit Order, one of the greatest of the missionary Orders. The evidence with which this literature operated, hawked about from door to door in every country, can be narrowed down on closer inspection to a few assertions. But for many a long year afterwards, right into the nineteenth century, we find it cropping up again in various books and pamphlets, dragged out like a rusty weapon to be used against the Catholic Church and its missionary activity. Now at last they have been relegated to their proper places as some of the lies of history, but this missionary literature and the persons who wrote it, and the spirit that inspired it were of so preponderating influence that it was they who gave the eighteenth century its characteristic stamp. . . ."

¹ The relevant documents are listed under Pius VI. (vol. xxxix., chap. 7).

Zelada¹ against this informal procedure, which was contrary to all the rules of the chancery, and he reminded him that in the Brief of suppression the Pope had reserved to himself the settlement of missionary affairs in view of their importance. If the special circumstances of each mission field were not taken into account, it would lead to nothing but disorganization and confusion. If the Vicars Apostolic were not empowered to allow the Jesuit missionaries to continue their work for the time being the 23,000 Catholics in the North American colonies would suddenly be without their pastors, for it was only Jesuits who were working there. In England a third of the mission-priests, with more than 100,000 souls under their care, were members of the suppressed Order. In the Scottish mission, where there was a lack of priests, the removal of ten of them would be a sad loss for the 22,000 Catholics who had steadfastly kept the Faith in spite of every persecution. If the ex-Jesuits were to be allowed to continue their educational and pastoral work in Catholic countries, the same permission should be granted them in the missions. In view of the multiformity of missionary work and of the hundreds of thousands of persons who had hitherto been entrusted to the care of the Jesuits, mature deliberation and adaptation to the prevailing local conditions were absolutely necessary.

After consulting the commission for the suppression and the Pope, the Secretary of the Memorials replied² that the postal packets had been delivered on the Pope's instructions and that Propaganda was to attach to them an instruction which enjoined the immediate execution of the Brief, but which also empowered the missionary Bishops to employ ex-Jesuits as secular priests until further orders, on condition that they willingly complied with the Papal provisions. On

¹ “*Memoria per l'Em. de Zelada,” of August 22, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V. In the packet for the nuncio in Brussels there were Briefs for Bishops in Albania and Red Russia, whereas several for Ireland and Scotland were missing. *Ghilini to Borgia, September 21, 1773, *ibid.*

² *On August 24, 1773, *ibid.*

the following day a circular to this effect was addressed by Cardinal Castelli to the Papal nuncios and the missionary Bishops. According to this the missionaries had to signify their submission by personal signature.¹

On receipt of these official documents the nuncio to Brussels lost no time in having the Papal order carried out in the mission fields in his jurisdictional area, namely Holland, England, Scotland, and Ireland.² Up to the beginning of the eighteenth century the Jesuits of the Flandro-Belgian Province had conducted more than forty mission-stations in Holland, but they had subsequently lost a considerable number of them as a result of Calvinist intolerance and Jansenist intrigues. By 1773 there were only thirty-two Jesuits left in the territory of the States General, who were looking after twenty-one parishes in eighteen places.³ There being no Bishop in the country who was in communion with Rome, the nuncio Ghilini instructed the seven archpriests to execute the Brief under the above-mentioned conditions.⁴ As early as September 27th, 1773, the archpriest of Amsterdam reported the willing submission of the two Jesuits there and urgently asked for their retention in their posts, as they were gifted, respected, and exemplary priests.⁵ Similar reports followed shortly afterwards from the other archpriests.⁶ On returning the authenticated formulas of submission the nuncio remarked that the whole business had gone off without the missionaries

¹ Castelli to Challoner, August 25, 1773, in HUGHES, *Documents*, 602.

² *Ghilini to Castelli, September 21, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V.

³ PONCELET, *La Compagnie de Jésus en Belgique. Aperçu historique*, Bruxelles, 1907, 33; *id.*, *Nécrologe*, cii. seq; VAN HOECK, *De Jezuieten te Nijmegen, 's Hertogenbosch*, 1921, 143 seqq.

⁴ *Ghilini to Castelli, September 21, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ghilini to Borgia, October 1, 1773, *ibid.*; H. J. ALLARD, *De Sint Franciscus Xaverius-Kerk op den Krijtberg te Amsterdam*, Amsterdam, 1904, 105 seq.

⁶ *Ghilini to Castelli, October 8, 12, and 19, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V.

offering any difficulty.¹ On requesting the Secretary of the Propaganda to convey to Ghilini the gratitude and esteem of the commission for the suppression, Cardinal Corsini, with prudent foresight, also had the recommendation conveyed to the nuncio to remove the ex-Jesuits from their stations one by one in some tactful manner, so far as this could be done without prejudice to the Dutch mission.² As the Government of the Austrian Netherlands refused to allot the mission priests from Holland a pension from the Belgian Jesuit fund, the nuncio himself took care of some of the most needy. Those of the ex-Jesuits who lived long enough were still at their posts when their Order was restored.³

The English Province of the Order numbered about 285 members in 1773; about 140 of them were active in the kingdom itself, the remainder were in the English colleges on the Continent and the North American colonies.⁴ According to the instruction of Propaganda the Bishops had to send a copy of the Brief of suppression to each individual Jesuit. Challoner, however, the Vicar Apostolic in London, thought this a dangerous procedure, as the publication of Papal decrees in England was still a punishable offence, and he

¹ *Ghilini to Castelli, November 2 and December 21, 1773, *ibid.*; *Borgia to Ghilini, January 18, 1774, *ibid.*

² *April 16, 1774, *ibid.*

³ *Soc. Iesu in Neerlandia Historiae Compendium*, 's Hertogenbosch, 1860; PONCELET, *loc. cit.*, 33; *id.*, *Nécrologe*, civ.; BONENFANT, 175.

⁴ FOLEY, *Records of the English Province*, VII., 1, Analytical Catalogue, 1696 to 1773. The Records (XII., 214) give the total number as 274.—The Florence journal published the news that the original correspondence on the Gunpowder Plot had been discovered in the archives of the Jesuit noviciate in S. Andrea in Rome. In answer to the Pope's request for more information on the subject Mgr. Alfani replied that he had found nothing that had any bearing on it, either direct or indirect, though he had found a report of the execution of five Jesuits in the year 1679. Cf. *Macedonio to Alfani, December 6, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 55. *Alfani to Macedonio, December 8, 1773, *ibid.*, 53.

decided instead to convey the chief provisions of the Brief to each Jesuit by word of mouth when next he met him and to send the formula of submission for signature to those living far away.¹ The Provincial and twelve Fathers of the London district signed on October 1st.² The signatures from the other three districts came in one by one.³ By January 15th, 1774, all the sixty Jesuits of the Northern District had signified their voluntary submission.⁴ The whole proceeding had taken place peacefully and quietly, without any difficulty being made by the Jesuits.⁵ The announcement of the Brief to the seventeen Jesuits in Ireland⁶ and the ten in Scotland⁷

¹ Challoner to Stonor, September 24, 1773, in HUGHES, *Documents*, I., 2, 604. Challoner to Hornyold, October 1, 1773, in BURTON, *Life and Times of Bishop Challoner*, II., London, 1909, 167.

² BURTON, II., 167.

³ *Challoner to Castelli, October [5], 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V. *Ghilini to Macedonio, October 8, 1773, *Regolari, Gesuiti*, 53, Papal Secret Archives. Challoner to the Coadjutor Bishop Walton, October 21, 1773, in BURTON, II., 168. *Ghilini to Castelli, November 16, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, *loc. cit.* On December 2, 1773, Bishop Hornyold *reported to the Prefect of Propaganda the submission of all the Jesuits in the Midland District (*ibid.*).

⁴ *Walton to Castelli, January 15, 1774, *ibid.* *Ibid.* the names of the signatories.

⁵ *Ghilini to Castelli, November 2, 1773, *ibid.* “. . . ut proinde illis hoc testimonium promptae suae obedientiae possimus exhibere.” *Walton to Castelli, January 15, 1774, *ibid.*

⁶ For the number of Jesuits in Ireland, *v.* *Ghilini to Castelli, October 8 and November 19, 1773, *ibid.* The deed of submission signed on February 7, 1774, was sent by the Primate Carpenter from Dublin on April 20, 1774, to the nuncio Ghilini, *ibid.* For the execution of the Brief in the diocese of Cork, *cf.* *Marefoschi to Macedonio, March 24, 1774, Papal Secret Archives, *Regolari, Gesuiti*, 53. BRACKEN, *Memoirs of the suppression and restoration of the Society of Jesus in Ireland*, in *Memorials of the Irish Province S.J.*, I., Dublin, 1900 (privately printed), 133 *seqq.*

⁷ *Bishop Grant and his Coadjutor Hay to Castelli, November 10, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V. *Macdonald to Castelli, November 20, 1773, *ibid.*

went off equally smoothly. The Vicar Apostolic of the Lowland District asked the nuncio in Brussels to have the Scottish ex-Jesuits living on the Continent return to their own country to relieve the pressing need for priests.¹ All the reports to Propaganda stressed the calm and humble obedience with which the Jesuits took this hard blow.² The continuation of their missionary labours was facilitated by the absence of any noticeable change in their outward mode of life. The transitional period was made easier for them to bear by Bishop Challoner's chivalrous gesture of appointing their former Provincial, Henry More, as the Vicar General for the ex-Jesuits in his district.³

The missionary seminaries in Lisbon, Seville, Valladolid, and Madrid had already been removed from the control of the Society of Jesus when the Jesuits were expelled from Portugal and Spain.⁴ When the Society was suppressed in Rome the direction of the English College was at first entrusted to Italian secular priests.⁵ The Irish College had already been closed in 1771.⁶ When the Order was suppressed in France the Jesuits moved their flourishing college at St-Omer to Bruges.⁷ On their being overtaken by the general suppression eleven years later most of their teachers and pupils retired to Liège, where their institute of philosophy and theology had

¹ *Grant and Hay to Ghilini, October 14, 1773, *ibid.* *Ghilini to Castelli, November 16, 1773, *ibid.*

² Cf. above, p. 482, n. 4. TAUNTON, *The History of the Jesuits in England*, London, 1901, 473

³ BURTON, II., 168.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 100 *seqq.* FOLEY, *Records*, VII., I, Introduction, xxi. *seqq.*; TAUNTON, 472 *seqq.*

⁵ GASQUET, *History of the Venerable English College, Rome*, London, 1920, 177 *seqq.* Stonor reported to Challoner as early as August 10, 1773, that the Cardinal Protector Corsini was no longer willing to allow the Jesuits to administer the college. BURTON, II., 163.

⁶ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 440 *seqq.*

⁷ BURTON, II., 39 *seqq.*

a happier existence.¹ The Prince Bishop Francis Charles of Welbruck had had the Brief of suppression published forthwith, but he allowed the English ex-Jesuits to continue to manage their college as secular priests.² The last Rector, John Holm (*alias* Howard), he appointed as the first President of the institute, which had now been raised to the status of an academy. In 1778, by declaring it to be a Papal seminary and giving his approval to its form of administration, Pius VI. rendered it secure against all attacks of its enemies.³ The invasion of the Netherlands by the French Revolutionary army compelled the teachers to take refuge in their own country, in a mansion at Stonyhurst in Lancashire which had been placed at their disposal by one of their former pupils.⁴

¹ *Ghilini to Macedonio, October 26, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53. TAUNTON, 472 *seq.*; BONENFANT, 125; GERARD, *Stonyhurst*, Belfast, 1894, 8 *seqq.* An attempt was made to continue the college under the direction of English Dominicans, but it was frustrated by the resistance of the students (*ibid.*). The noviciate and tertianship at Ghent were also suppressed (FOLEY, *Records*, VII., 1, Introduction, liii. *seqq.*).

² *Caprara to Pallavicini, October 24, 1773, Nunziat. di Colonia, 180, Papal Secret Archives.

³ For Challoner's efforts to convert the English college at Liège into a seminary for secular priests, *v.* *Challoner to Castelli, October [5], 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V. " *Memoriale del Vicario Apostolico di Londra a Sua Santità 1774 " (*ibid.*). *Challoner to Castelli, June 7, 1774 (*ibid.*). *Challoner to Stonor, June 14, 1774 (*ibid.*). BURTON, II., 165 *seqq.* On March 4, 1774, Gallus Leith, Abbot of the Scottish convent of St. James in Regensburg, *asked Elector Max Joseph of Bavaria to assign to the boys' seminary of his convent the foundation instituted in 1626 by Maximilian I. for the English college in Liège (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 405/15). On March 28, 1781, Elector Karl Theodor ordered the foundation to remain with the college at Liège (printed). In Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 226, fo. 25 *seq.*

⁴ GERARD, *Stonyhurst*, 21 *seqq.*; FOLEY, *Records*, V., 188 *seqq.*, VII., 1, Introduction xlvi. *seqq.*; GUILDAY, *The English Catholic*

In Scotland the disposal of the Jesuit property gave rise to differences of opinion between the Vicars Apostolic and the ex-Jesuits.¹ In 1773 the direction of the Scots College in Rome was transferred to a Congregation of five Cardinals. For forty years the Rector of the institute had been an Italian, to the great dissatisfaction of the Scottish Bishops, and on July 8th, 1793, the three Scottish prelates declared that for the last twenty years the Scots College in Rome had been more of a nuisance than a benefit to the Scottish mission.² In Madrid the missionary college for Scotland had lost its revenues in 1767 with the expulsion of its former directors. By agreement with the Spanish ambassador in London the Visitors of the Scottish mission delegated the priest John Geddes as their spokesman to make representations to the Spanish king. Cardinal York supported this move with a memorial which Azpuru, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, was to send to the king.³ In effect, Charles III. did not extend the law dealing with Jesuit property to the real estates, which had only been administered by the Society. To compensate the Scots for the loss of the suppressed college in Madrid he allotted them the magnificent college formerly belonging to the Jesuits in Valladolid.⁴

The area under the Vicar Apostolic in London included the

Refugees on the Continent 1558-1794, I., London, 1914, 151 *seqq.*, 343. For the destruction of the colleges at Bruges, *v.* PLOWDEN in FOLEY, *Records*, V., 173-183. For the suppression of the college at St-Omer, *ibid.*, 168-173; BURTON, II., 39-81. On March 8, 1773, Cardinal Corsini became Protector of England, and all the English colleges were made subordinate to him (*Ius pontif.*, IV., 183 *seqq.*).

¹ BELLESHEIM, *Schottland*, II., 376.

² *Ibid.*, 376, 390, 394.

³ *York to Azpuru, Frascati, April 24, 1770, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro, 109.

⁴ BELLESHEIM, 389. JAMES WALSH, *History of the Catholic Church in Scotland*, Glasgow, 1874, 511. On August 18, 1773, Fr. Geddes, Rector of the college in Valladolid, was empowered to admit his students to vows (*Ius pontif.*, IV., 195).

English colonies in North America,¹ where twenty-three Jesuits were taking care of the 23,000 Catholics of English, Irish, and German descent.² After some hesitation as to how to proceed,³ Challoner decided to send the missionaries the forms of submission with the request that they should sign them and return them to him for forwarding to Propaganda.⁴ This was done by all the Jesuits without any objection.⁵ Under their former Superior, John Lewis, whom Challoner appointed as his Vicar General for the colonies,⁶ they cheerfully continued their labours, in which they were assisted by reinforcements of their brethren from Germany and England. Among the latter was John Carroll, who was afterwards the first Bishop of Baltimore.⁷

The mission to Canada ("New France"), which at one time had been so flourishing, had suffered a set-back.⁸ After the surrender of Montreal all the professors in the college there had gone back to France,⁹ so that in 1766 there were only thirteen Jesuits still working there.¹⁰ As soon as the Brief

¹ BURTON, II., 123 *seqq.*

² *Borgia to Zelada, August 22, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V. The numerical statistics of the missionaries vary.

³ *Challoner to Castelli, October [5], 1773, *ibid.*

⁴ Challoner to Fr. Lewis, October 6, 1773, in HUGHES, *Documents*, I., 2, 606. GUILDAY, *Life and Times of John Carroll, Archbishop of Baltimore*, New York, 1922, 51.

⁵ BURTON, II., 147. That the Prefect of the Propaganda was unable to send the nuncio Ghilini a receipt for the signatures before July 8, 1775, was probably due to the war of American independence which had broken out in the meantime. HUGHES, *Documents*, I., 2, 607.

⁶ GUILDAY, *Carroll*, 56.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 51 *seqq.*; A. BAUMGARTNER in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, XI., 18 *seqq.*; XXXVII., 329 *seqq.* Leonard Neale, Carroll's immediate successor, also belonged to the Society of Jesus.

⁸ At times it had numbered forty and more members. THWAITES, *Jesuit Relations*, 73 vols., Cleveland, 1896 *seqq.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, LXXI. (1901), 394, n. 24.

¹⁰ ROCHEMONTEIX, *Les Jésuites de la Nouvelle France*, II., Paris, 1896, 204.

of suppression arrived in Quebec in 1774 Bishop Briand conferred with the English Governor, Carleton, on how it was to be carried out. Although Carleton was not a Catholic, he advised Briand to do everything as quietly as possible and to avoid making any outward change, so as not to provoke any hostile demonstration on the part of the non-Catholics and give Lord Amherst, the conqueror of Canada, an opportunity of renewing his claim to the Jesuit property.¹ The Bishop was all the more willing to fall in with the wish of the civil authority as he had no one to replace the Jesuits, especially in the Indian missions. It was accordingly in complete secrecy that he informed the Jesuits of their suppression; no one except himself, his secretary, and the Governor knew that there were no longer any Jesuits in Canada, as they had to retain their name, their dress, and their pastoral duties. All submitted to the Brief with a willing obedience and, in their new status of secular priests, placed themselves entirely at the Bishop's disposal.²

The permission given by Propaganda to leave the ex-Jesuits at their missionary posts was a great relief to the Vicar Apostolic of the Northern missions, Count Gondola, who had been informed by the Danish envoy in Vienna that his king wanted no other missionaries than the ones he had at present, having had several years' experience of their zeal and peaceableness.³ On sending to Propaganda on December 19th, 1773, the statements of submission signed by the eighteen ex-Jesuits, Gondola attached an honourable testimonial to their obedience,⁴ but pointed out at the same time that their future ought to be provided for, so as not to compel them to

¹ THWAITES, LXXI., 392, n. 23.

² Briand to Castelli, November 8, 1774, in ROCHEMONTEIX, 214 *seq.* Pius VI. renewed the indulgences and privileges attached to their churches (*ibid.*, 216).

³ Count Gondola, Bishop of Tempe i.p., to Castelli, Vienna, September 20, 1773, Archives of the Propaganda, Miss. Miscell., V.

⁴ *"Nemo erat, qui non plena cum resignatione, etsi non sine intimi animi sensu et dolore, obedientissime se submitteret." *Gondola to Castelli, December 19, 1773, *ibid.*

fend for themselves after they had given the best years of their lives to the service of the mission. The ex-Jesuit Weckbecker, who had already been notified of the Brief at Aachen, was attached to the ecclesiastical department of the imperial embassy in Copenhagen.¹

In the Northern missions the effects of the suppression were not immediately palpable, as the ex-Jesuits, true to their ideals, held on to their arduous outposts in the North. But as they gradually fell out through illness and old age it was difficult to find replacements.² From the end of the eighteenth century onwards the number of souls cared for by most of the missions steadily sank.³ In Norway, after the suppression, the Catholics were left completely orphaned.⁴ Even after the destruction of the Order the Northern seminary at Linz on the Danube remained under the direction of the ex-Jesuits until it was suppressed by Joseph II. in 1787.⁵ The suppression of the Jesuit Order, followed by the measures taken by Joseph II., caused most serious injury to the German College in Rome.⁶

As regarded Sweden, the friendliness shown by the successor to the throne to the nuncio in Paris when visiting that city⁷ promised greater toleration for the Catholics.

In a Consistory on June 17th, 1771, the Pope was able to announce the good news that the Patriarch of the Nestorians in Persia and Kurdistan, Simeon VI., had professed the Catholic faith and had submitted to the Pope.⁸ The union with Rome of the Nestorians in Persia and Kurdistan had

¹ *Gondola to Visconti, December 20, 1773, *ibid.*

² METZLER, 172.

³ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 225.

⁵ METZLER in the *Theol.-prakt. Quartalschrift*, LXIV. (1911), 276 *seq.*

⁶ STEINHUBER, II., 179 *seqq.*

⁷ THEINER, *Gesch.*, II., 48 *seq.*

⁸ THEINER, *Epist.*, 155 *seq.*; *Ius pontif.*, IV., 173 *seq.*; SAM. GIAMIL, *Genuinae relationes inter Sedem apostolicam et Syrorum Orientalium s. Chaldaeorum ecclesiam*, Romae, 1902, 386.

taken place already in 1551, but in 1670 it was in danger of being broken ; this was a renewal of the bond. In a letter of December 12th, 1772, the Pope commended the Patriarch on his efforts to bring about the return of his subjects also to the one true Church.¹ On the same day he conveyed his joy at their return to the Church to the Chaldean Patriarch Elias in Mesopotamia and the Chaldean Bishop Josue.² As these two Patriarchs were now in union with Rome and the third head of the former Nestorians, the Patriarch of Diarbekir, Joseph IV. Lazarus Hindi, a pupil of Propaganda, had always been so,³ it came about that in 1772 all three Patriarchs of the East Syrians were in obedience to Rome.

A decree of Propaganda issued at this time⁴ was of importance to the Melchites, the Arabic-speaking Catholics in the Levant, as it subordinated also the Melchites in the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria to the Patriarch of Antioch. Some Briefs in reply to the Melchite Patriarch Theodosius⁵ and Bishop Demetrius of Gibel⁶ show that the ecclesiastical union with Rome was still being maintained. The beneficial activity of the Melchite Basilian monks was acknowledged by the Pope ; petitions on their behalf submitted by their Abbot General and the Patriarch Theodosius he referred to Propaganda.⁷ The chief of the Druses was thanked by him⁸ for having supported, especially through his brother Mansur, the decrees of the Apostolic See in the internal disputes among the Melchites.

An Armenian Bishop, John, appeared in Rome in person,

¹ *Ius pontif.*, IV., 173, n. 1.

² *Epist. 171 ad Princ. 193 ; *Epist. a° IV., 189. Papal Secret Archives.

³ Reply of August 24, 1771, to the Patriarch's congratulations on the Pope's accession, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 174.

⁴ On July 13, 1772, MANSI, *Coll. Concil.*, XLVI., 575-582. Cf. KARALEVSKIJ in *Dict. d'hist. et de géogr. eccl.*, III., 650.

⁵ Of January 20, 1770, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 55.

⁶ Of September 7, 1771, *ibid.*, 180.

⁷ Briefs of February 1, 1772, *ibid.*, 204, 205.

⁸ On December 9 1769, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 38.

having been put to flight by his opponents. He brought with him a letter of recommendation, of March 25th, 1771, from the Patriarch of Cilicia and Syria, Michael Peter; the Pope replied to it on May 25th, promising to take a nephew of the Patriarch's into the Propaganda.¹ In the same year news came from Armenia that the jubilee in honour of the Pope's accession to the throne had borne fruit. Clement XIV. replied by granting spiritual privileges to the Armenian Catholics of Ancyra.² A more important step was his nomination of Joseph Balit, a pupil of Propaganda and at that time a mission priest in Aleppo, as successor to John Tasbas, Archbishop of Mardin, who had resigned.³

A Maronite Bishop also appeared in Rome to seek justice at the Pope's hands. The opponents of the Patriarch Joseph Estephan and his measures of reform had not held their peace during the new pontificate. At first they held a meeting and addressed a written appeal to the people, and then kept quiet for a time. Soon afterwards, however, on November 29th, 1769, they wrote complaining again to Propaganda, but were turned away with a reprimand. Finally on September 25th, 1771, they laid their complaints before the Pope himself. Clement XIV. exhorted them to keep the peace and referred their cause to Propaganda. He repeated these instructions in a special Brief addressed to some members of the El-Khazen family who had written to him separately.⁴ The Papal

¹ *Ibid.*, 154.

² To Malachias Jeniserchis on December 18, 1771, *ibid.*, 193; *Ius pontif.*, IV., 179.

³ On March 20, 1771, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 168.

⁴ DIB in *Dict. de théol. cath.*, X., 93 seq.; Briefs of May 23, 1772, *Ius pontif.*, VII., 206 seq., 207. Further Briefs arising from the dispute were issued on October 10, 1770, to the Patriarch, with a recommendation of the Capuchin Cesario of Neustadt (in THEINER, *Epist.*, 118), and to Archbishop Arsenius of Aleppo on July 20, 1771 (*ibid.*, 165). On April 15, 1773, Clement *replied to complaints made by the Maronite Bishops that Propaganda would instruct the Patriarch to treat the monks more gently. Similarly the Bishops were recommended to induce the Patriarch

admonitions, however, bore no fruit; on the contrary, the embitterment increased. The Patriarch was held responsible for the excesses of the visionary Anna Agemi and his resignation was demanded. Complaint after complaint was made against him to the Roman authorities. A Papal delegate, the *Custos* of the Holy Sepulchre, Valeriano di Prato, who held an inquiry into the affair from July 20th to September 10th, 1773, was inclined to favour the Patriarch's opponents, but came to no final decision. Then in August, 1774, the Patriarch Estephan appointed the Archbishop of Damascus to represent his cause in Rome. But on arriving there the Archbishop found that Propaganda had already come to a decision, on July 8th, several points of which were altered in Pius VI.'s pontificate. Estephan took Agemi's part. He had raised the feast of the Sacred Heart to a holiday of obligation and he was glad to have in his patriarchate Agemi's religious community, dedicated to the Sacred Heart.¹ Clement XIV. also put an end to the long-standing quarrel between the Aleppines and Lebanese who were Maronite monks of St. Anthony, by confirming their separation and the division of their property.²

Bad news came in about the Maronites in Cyprus: the clergy was in want and had to earn its living by tilling the fields and similar work. Christian doctrine was consequently neglected, many were going over to the schismatics or the Mohammedans, and Christian children were being brought up in the ways of Islam. The Pope tried to encourage the Maronite Patriarch to better these conditions.³

The Capuchin mission in Georgia, which had been destroyed,

to exercise gentleness and to exhort the monks to be obedient. *Epist.*, a° IV., fo. 364, Papal Secret Archives. Faculty given to the Maronite Bishops on April 6, 1770, to impart the Papal blessing twice yearly, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 163 seq.; THEINER, *Epist.*, 144. For Agemi, cf. our account, vol. xxxv., 398.

¹ DIB, *loc. cit.*

² On July 19, 1770, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 164. Cf. DIB, *loc. cit.*, 135; KARALEVSKIJ in *Dict. d'hist. et de géogr. eccl.*, III., 865.

³ Brief of August 11, 1773, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 258.

fared better when King Heraclius came to the throne in 1761. The mission was able to reopen in Tiflis and Gori in 1767, though on their return the Capuchins did not receive their churches back again.¹ Clement XIV. thanked the king for the good-will he was showing the Catholics and the missionaries and asked him to continue with his protection.² In Persia, on the other hand, the ban which had been placed on missionary activity in 1770 had still not been lifted.³

The effect on the Maronites of the suppression of the Society of Jesus was the transference of their seminary in Rome to secular priests and its confiscation and sale by the French in 1808. It was not revived till the time of Leo XIII.⁴ When the Jesuits were driven out of France the French Government laid its hands on the funds set aside for the Maronite seminary in Antura in the Lebanon.⁵ In general the events in Europe involved the missions to the Levant in serious losses. The Jesuits there were not paid the pensions allotted to their brethren in France. In their distress the Jesuits in Syria and Egypt appealed to the Bishop of Orleans⁶ to plead for them with the king. To this they received no reply. From Constantinople the Jesuit missionaries had previously sent an appeal for help to the Minister for Naval Affairs,⁷ pointing out that not only had their funds been confiscated but that a fire had broken out in Smyrna, in consequence of which their mission was on the brink of ruin. The appeal was made in vain. After the Papal suppression the French consul in Aleppo, Deperdriau, wrote to the Naval Minister, De Boynes,⁸ that the missionaries were in the deepest distress. They found an intercessor in the person of the French ambassador, De

¹ TERZORIO, VII., 277.

² On August 23, 1769, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 22.

³ TERZORIO, VI., 178.

⁴ DIB, 62.

⁵ RABBATH, I., 139.

⁶ The Superior of the mission, Périgord, on August 18, 1766, *ibid.*, 138.

⁷ On June 3, 1764, *ibid.*, II., 597.

⁸ On August 10, 1773, *ibid.*, I., 137.

Saint-Priest, who wrote ¹ to Choiseul's successor, Aiguillon, probably with some exaggeration, that in the Levant none of the monks had given any attention to the mission itself and that for a long time the Jesuits had been the only Religious to put their heart into the work. This justice, he went on, ought not to be denied to them, as it was not suspect now that they had ceased to exist. The progress that the Catholic religion had made among the Armenians and Syrians was largely due to them. And as the ex-Jesuits enjoyed the confidence of the Sultan's subjects they must be kept at their missionary work. As soon as the Brief of suppression became known he wrote to Aiguillon ² that the Brief forbade the Jesuits to undertake the cure of souls, but in the Levant to restrain them from administering the sacraments and to seize their property meant that the missions there, especially in Constantinople, would be thrown into utter confusion. For his part he had instructed his subordinates to allow no one to confiscate Jesuit property.

Subsequently Cardinal Bernis reported to the ambassador ³ that the Pope agreed with his instructions and that the strict execution of the Brief would indeed spell the ruin of the missions to the Levant. Nevertheless the Brief was officially notified to the Jesuits by the Franciscan Massimo di Merlino on March 24th, 1774.⁴ The question who was to empower them to continue with their pastoral duties was solved by a letter from the Prefect of the Propaganda, Castelli.⁵ In Smyrna the Jesuits were replaced in 1774 by the Capuchins, under whose direction the mission flourished until its extinction in the Napoleonic wars.⁶

The activity of the Jesuits in Aleppo was crowned with a brilliant success. With few exceptions the Jacobites there,

¹ On November 10, 1773, *ibid.*, II., 597. But that other Orders had also done great work for the mission, *v. ibid.*, n. 1.

² On September 2, 1773, *ibid.*, 593.

³ On January 12, 1774, *ibid.*, 594.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 602.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 605.

⁶ TERZORIO, IV., 38.

together with their clergy, went over to the Catholic Church. Even their Bishop sent his profession of faith to Rome. But at this point the Jacobite Patriarch hurried over from Mardin and threatened to start a persecution by bribing the Turkish officials. He was induced, however, to agree to a compromise: the Catholics promised him an increase in his revenues and he entrusted the administration of the church in Aleppo to the former Jacobite Bishop Géroué, who had become a Catholic. But fresh difficulties arose immediately. The Franciscans doubted the sincerity of Géroué's conversion and appealed to Propaganda, which nominated as arbitrator Kodsi, the Syrian Catholic Bishop of Jerusalem. Kodsi found against Géroué, but others supported him. After the French consul Deperdriau had intervened in the dispute it was settled by a Papal Brief of June 22nd, 1776.¹

Needless to say, Clement XIV. renewed the decrees affecting the Holy Land which had been enacted by his predecessors.²

In Eastern Europe there was a danger of the Catholic Ruthenians in Hungary being separated from Rome; in 1751-61 the connexion had in fact been broken. Consequently Maria Theresa was anxious for their Vicar Apostolic to be elevated to the status of a regular Bishop of the Greek rite with his seat in Munkács. Clement XIV. gratified her wish by a Bull of September 19th 1771.³ Differences between the Ruthenian Metropolitan Wolodkowitz and his Coadjutors were settled through the mediation of the nuncio to Poland, and the conclusion of peace between them was confirmed and ratified by a Papal Brief.⁴

Several Briefs of Clement XIV.'s were concerned with the missions in the Far East. Francesco Maria Zen of the Chinese

¹ Letter from Deperdriau of November 13, 1772, in RABBATH, II., 591, with note, and 592.

² On July 12, 1769, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 158. Faculty for the Custos to confirm, *ibid.*, 180.

³ *Ibid.*, 176, with the letters to the empress of November 17, 1770, and to the Bishop of Erlau of October 10, 1770, *ibid.*, n.

⁴ Of March 20, 1773, *ibid.*, 185.

College in Naples reported from Manila on January 15th, 1770, on the departure of the ninety Jesuits from the Philippines and added that the Archbishop was thinking of setting up a Tridentine seminary for clerics from India and China in their empty College of St. Joseph in Manila. A project of Cardinal Tournon's would thus be realized and it was just the time to establish such a seminary as there were several endowments for the missions in Manila which could then be easily acquired.¹ Propaganda sent out two newly ordained priests, Simonetti and Timoni, from the Chinese College in Naples, and Clement XIV. recommended them to the Archbishop of Manila,² exhorting him to show his zeal for the projected college by helping Propaganda to obtain possession of the copious funds bequeathed by Cardinal Tournon. But by 1799 the new seminary was still only mentioned as a project.³

From China two documents were sent in by the Bishop of Nanking, Godfrey of Laimbeckhoven.⁴ The first is noteworthy as showing that even if rarely there were still some upper-class Chinese who were Christians. The document dealt with the case of a Tartar mandarin, Ma Joseph, who had been condemned on account of his religion but whose sentence had finally been commuted to banishment. The second document testified to the Jesuits' obedience towards the Papal decrees.⁵

A lay official in the kingdom of Ava was praised by the Pope for having used his influence with the king to further the mission, and for this service he was created a knight of

¹ *Archives of the Propaganda, Indie Or. e Cina, Scritt. rif. nella Congr. 32, no. 20.

² On June 21, 1770, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 164; THEINER, *Epist.*, 93.

³ *Archives of the Propaganda, Indie Or. e Cina 1788-1799, Scritt. rif. Congr. 39, no. 25.

⁴ *On June 1, 1771, *ibid.*, 32, no. 38.

⁵ " *Misere ad me omnium S. Congregationis missionariorum testimonia de absolutissima Patrum Societatis erga decreta apostolica obedientia; quod si ne ista quidem S. Congregationi sufficient, nescio qua altera spongia tam nigras cavillationes " (the rest of the text is damaged), *ibid.*

the Golden Spur.¹ Similarly the king of Travancore was thanked by Clement XIV. in a special Brief for the goodwill he had shown towards the Carmelite missionaries in his country.² The same honour was paid³ to a Dutch Governor in Malabar who had extended his protection to the Catholics. Otherwise the mission in Malabar was in many respects in a definitely unfavourable situation. The Vicar Apostolic, the Carmelite Florentius of Jesus of Nazareth, Bishop of Areopolis and founder of a seminary in Verapoly, wrote on December 31st, 1770,⁴ that neither the Archbishop of Cranganore nor the Bishop of Cochin had a permanent residence; the Archbishop had been expelled by the king of Travancore and was now living in a lonely hut, the Bishop had experienced the same treatment at the hands of the English and was now staying near the church at Quillon. As both were Jesuits they had received no payment from the Portuguese Government since 1759 and were living on what they had saved before then. The few other Jesuits had already begun to sell the church decorations in order to live. On the Fishing Coast and in Madura, on the other hand, the Vicar Apostolic had heard say, there were still twelve Jesuits, each of whom had up to twelve churches in his care. In spite of his straitened circumstances the Archbishop of Cranganore, Salvator dos Reys, still seemed to be in good heart. In his ignorance of conditions in Rome he asked the Pope when congratulating him on his elevation to the Papacy⁵ to send him more missionaries, especially those from the Society of Jesus. On October 10th, 1772, the Archbishop was again asking Propaganda and the Pope himself for more missionaries; he himself, he said, had not the men to send out nor any means of maintaining

¹ *To Peter Millard, March 4, 1772, *Epist. ad princ.* a° III., no. 281, Papal Secret Archives.

² On July 2, 1774, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 318.

³ On July 23, 1772, **Epist. ad princ.* a° IV., p. 84, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Archives of the Propaganda, Indie Or. e Cina 1769-1771, Scritt. rif. Congr. 32, no. 36.

⁵ *On October 26, 1770, *ibid.*, no. 27.

them, as he was living in utter penury. Formerly Christianity had made a great advance in his diocese through the work of the missionaries, but for years past he had not had enough of them.¹ Soon after the suppression of the Jesuits the Pope tried to improve the situation by transferring, on September 5th, 1773, the former Jesuit missions in Madura, the Carnatic, Mysore, and neighbouring districts to the Discalced Carmelites.²

It was also the task of the Carmelites to cope with the difficult conditions that existed in the empire of the Grand Mogul. The Jesuit mission there had been completely destroyed, and there were no native priests for the "countless Christians" in the country, since, except in Malabar, the Jesuits had been chary of conferring Holy Orders on Indians. It is understandable, therefore, that a thorough reorganization of the Carmelite mission seemed to be necessary.³

In Cochin-China disputes among the different missionary bodies in the time of Benedict XIV. had necessitated the sending of a Visitor to mark off the different missionary areas. But this did not put a stop to all further disputes. Another Visitor, the Franciscan Julian of the Mother of God, again admonished the missionaries not to trespass on each other's areas.⁴ Under Clement XIV. the disturbances grew worse.

¹ **Ibid.*, 1772-73, Scritt. rif. Congr. 33, no. 19.

² *The Secretary of the Propaganda to the General of the Carmelites, September 9, 1773, *ibid.*, no. 27.

³ *Ildephonsus of the Presentation of the Virgin to the Secretary of the Propaganda, Vienna, March 28, 1771, *ibid.*, 1769-1771, Scritt. rif. Congr. 32. The Jesuit mission in Agra "si può dire finita, stante che era sostenuta dai PP. Gesuiti di Goa". *The Prefect of the Tibetan mission, Giuseppe da Rovato, Patna, December 29, 1769, *ibid.*

⁴ *Decree "datum in oratorio S. Francisci Raygon" on October 15, 1769, *ibid.*, no. 28. *Pastoral letter of November 2, 1769, *ibid.*, no. 30. *Letter to Denis Boiret about the disputes with the seminary priests, November 19, 1769, *ibid.*, no. 31. *Letter to Propaganda, Macao, November 29, 1770, *ibid.*, no. 32.

According to the account of the Vicar Apostolic, William Piguel, Bishop of Canatha,¹ the missionaries there consisted of three Jesuits, four Franciscans (including a missionary from Propaganda), and five missionary priests from the Paris Seminary. Two of the Jesuits had positions at Court, the Superior Loureiro as an astronomer, the other, Perroni, as a physician ; both of these could appear in public, the others had to live in hiding for fear of persecution. There was a cleavage between the French and the other missionaries. Loureiro wrote to Propaganda, asking it not to appoint any more Frenchmen as Vicar Apostolic or Provicar, otherwise the purity of doctrine would be endangered ; it was universal knowledge, he said, that in France the Parlement and a large part of the clergy contradicted the decisions of the Church ; and he went so far as to call the French missionaries arch-Jansenists. The Vicar General Halbout inflicted a censure on Loureiro as a calumniator. Loureiro appealed on December 31st, 1772, and on August 19th, 1773, the Vicar Apostolic of East Tongking, Bishop Fernandez of Hierocæsarea, decided in his favour. The Vicar Apostolic, who lived in Cambodia, far away from Cochin-China, was exceedingly embarrassed by the quarrel between his Vicar General and Loureiro ; according to the Vicar General's letters he ought to condemn Loureiro, and according to Loureiro's letters he ought to condemn the Vicar General. Both were priests, but which was speaking the truth ? Piguel suggested the appointment of a secret Visitor and the division of the Vicariate of Cochin-China into two parts, one for the Jesuits and the Franciscans, the other for the seminary priests.

The troubles were not confined to jurisdictional disputes. The letters of the Vicar Apostolic, Piguel,² are full of the most serious charges against the Franciscans and Jesuits in his Vicariate, the worst charge being one of immorality brought against the Jesuit Marquez. But apparently it was

¹ *To Propaganda, June 19, 1770, *ibid.*, nos. 18, 22.

² **Ibid.*, nos. 18, 22, 49 (to the Pope on June 10, 1771), and 50 (to Propaganda, June 14, 1771).

based entirely on hearsay. It was a point against Marquez that he had been dismissed from his Society, but it was in his favour that he had then been accepted by the Franciscans, in 1775.¹ On July 26th, 1772, a defence addressed to Propaganda "against the monstrous calumnies listened to by the Bishop of Canatha"² was signed by the Franciscan Camillus Zeller, the Jesuit Loureiro, "for thirty years missionary in Cochin-China and Superior of the Mission," and Francisco Juan Salguero, who signed as Provincial Commissary of the Franciscan missionaries. Again, on August 18th, 1773, these same missionaries made bitter complaints to Propaganda about the Vicars Apostolic from the Paris Seminary, who, they said, were avowed enemies of the Religious. The most notorious of these enemies, they alleged, were Marinus Thien, a pupil of the Frenchmen, and the Vicar General, Pierre Halbout.³ Previous to this, Julian of the Mother of God had testified that the Jesuits had had no part in the crimes which had been committed, as asserted by the French and the deceased Bishop.⁴ The Franciscan Camillus Zeller praised the Jesuits Loureiro and Perroni very highly: they devoted themselves with the greatest zeal, he wrote, to the cure of souls and through their influence at Court they had brought about a mitigation of the persecutions, so that the Christians

¹ **Ibid.*, 1776-78, Scritt. rif. Congr. 35, no. 15.

² " *Apologia contra immanes calumnias quas audiverat Vicarius Apostolicus episcopus Canathensis " (*ibid.*, no. 54). Even a French seminary priest, Fr. J. de Marion, speaks of " *Conincinensium maledica et calumniosa lingua " on December 27, 1771, *ibid.*, no. 55.

³ **Ibid.*, 1772-73, Scritt. rif. Congr. 33.

⁴ " " non hanno parte nei delitti commessi, come dicono nel processo li sign. Francesi ed il defonto Vescovo " (Piguel died on June 21, 1771), *ibid.*, no. 5. *On December 6, 1770, Piguel denied the charges brought against the French by Julian and Marquez (*ibid.*, no. 12). *Diego de Jumilla, on the other hand, wrote again on June 26, 1771, to Julian " de dominis Gallis calumnias contra Regulares foventibus et districtus eorum invadentibus " (*ibid.*).

enjoyed complete tranquillity.¹ The Frenchman Boiret, on the other hand, spoke ² of the lamentable state of affairs in Cochin-China ; he was thinking of coming to Rome to describe them there and thus put an end to so many scandals. Loureiro wrote ³ of the " infamous " calumnies committed by the Frenchmen against the Franciscan Ferdinand and the Jesuit Luis Marquez. The Frenchmen, he asserted, were bent on driving the Religious out of the country and in this aim they derived particularly strong encouragement from the efforts made by the Bourbon Courts to destroy the Society of Jesus. A letter from the Franciscan Camillus Zeller shows us one of the effects of this work of destruction. Zeller had a position at Court as an oculist and worked there " in conjunction with the Jesuits " for the best interests and the peace of the mission, though without much success. He asked Propaganda to send him some more money besides his 100 pataccas, as in his position he was continually having to make presents. But if in the meantime the venerable Society of Jesus was suppressed by the Pope he would leave the Court at once, for if the Jesuits were no more he would have such a burden to bear that a thousand pataccas would not be enough. For he knew how much it cost the Jesuits to make the king and the mandarins, if not favourable, at any rate less

¹ " *Ipsi enim iam a multis annis totum onus soli portarunt inexplicabili zelo sacramenta administrando christianis undequaque confluentibus, et mathesi et medicina animos magnatum infidelium lucrando, ne in christianos sanctamque legem acrius saevirent. Illorum enim opera multae persecutiones contra christianos fuere sopita, et quod missio haec magna fruatur pace et tranquillitate, ipsorum apostolicae sollicitudini in acceptis post Deum habemus. Unde non immerito columnae et sustentaculum huius missionis ab omnibus salutantur. Nec invidia unius aut alterius missionarii Galli eorundem integerrimam famam quam tum apud regem et magnates infideles quam alios missionarios habent, vel in minimo labefactare poterit." To Propaganda, July 16, 1772, *ibid.*, no. 14.

² *On August 16, 1772, *ibid.*, no. 18.

³ *On August 18, 1772, *ibid.*, no. 22.

severe towards the Christians, and it would be difficult to find others who would or could take these expenses on themselves. Wherefore it would be better for him to leave the Court and devote himself in obscurity to the cure of souls.¹

Needless to say, the reports on the conditions in Cochin-China were used to accelerate the suppression of the Jesuit Order.

The missions in Cochin-China and Tongking also played a certain part in the diplomatic negotiations under Clement XIV. It was Moñino's endeavour to ensure that the Vicar Apostolic of East Tongking was always a Spanish Dominican.² After the suppression of the Jesuits, Moñino and Bernis renewed their request that conditions in Cochin-China and Tongking be set to rights, in particular that some provision be made concerning the missions formerly conducted by the Jesuits. They accompanied their request with a draft of the required Brief.³ The Pope wanted the Vicars Apostolic to divide the territories among themselves, while Propaganda would gladly have retained the Jesuits for the missions.⁴ At the instigation of Spain and France Clement XIV. ultimately issued a Brief on the Vicariates in Indo-China.⁵ First

¹ " *Si vero interea venerabilis Societas Jesu auctoritate Apostolica fuisset extincta iuxta desiderium familiae Borbonicae, absque ulla mora aulam sponte relinquam, cum in defectu PP. Jesuitarum totum onus mihi imponeretur, ad quod portandum nec mille patacae sufficerent. Scio enim, Em. Domine, quantum impenderint PP. Jesuitae, ut animum regis et mandarinorum benignum et favorabilem vel saltem mitiorem redderent erga christianos, et difficile erit, alios invenire, qui easdem expensas in se suscipere possint vel velint. Unde melius erit, hanc aulam Cocincinae omnino relinquere, et in occulto munus Apostolicum obire." August 4, 1773, *ibid.*, no. 22 a.

² *Memorial of December 27, 1771, *loc. cit.*, no. 4. Several *memorials for the freedom of the Holy See in the nomination of the Vicars (*ibid.*, nos. 1-3).

³ *Cardinal Negroni to Macedonio, October 2, 1773, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 53.

⁴ *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 25, 1773, Rome, Reg. 111.

⁵ On November 20, 1773, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 198. On December

and foremost it was stated herein that the missionaries of the former Society of Jesus were no longer in possession of the privileges peculiar to their Order. If, however, the suppression of the Jesuits necessitated alterations in the conditions of the Vicariates, the Vicars Apostolic were to confer together and make their decisions on the subject, always bearing in mind the wishes of the kings of France and Spain.

Replying to John, Bishop of Ceramus, Coadjutor to the Vicar Apostolic, who had written from West Tongking, Clement XIV. wrote on January 29th, 1772, that the Bishop should be more and more convinced that nothing concerned the Pope more nearly than the progress of the French missions in Eastern India ; he would do all in his power to help them forward ; further details would be supplied by the Secretary of Propaganda.¹

In Tongking as in China the ritual question was still a live one. By the Papal decisions it had been forbidden to kotow before the coffin of a deceased person. The missionaries in East Tongking now asked if, presuming that there was no question of superstition, it was permissible to make this obeisance to the crucifix at the side of the bier or which had been placed at the head or in the hands of the deceased, at any rate when it was clear to everyone that the reverence was being paid only to the cross. The Holy Office replied in the negative.² The Chinese New Year might fall in the Christian Lent. In that event, came the question from Fu-kien, were the Christians bound to fast ? The " old missionaries " had inserted a more lenient ruling in the calendars. In this case, too, Rome refused the request³ and ordered the observation to be removed from the calendars. Next came a query from

28, 1773, Grimaldi *reported to Moñino the receipt of the Brief " by which the Pope assigns the former Jesuit missions in China, Tongking, and Cochin China to the Spanish and French missionaries " (Papal Secret Archives, Orden, 53).

¹ THEINER, *Epist.*, 203.

² On February 25, 1773, " Collectanea " of the Propaganda, I., 306, no. 494.

³ On July 16, 1770, *ibid.*, 302, no. 479.

Su-tchuen : what was to be done when the order went forth to subscribe money for the restoration of a temple or for sacrifices to idols ? Whoever refused would be punished with a thrashing or, if he were a Christian, he would be forced to apostatize. One Vicar Apostolic had ruled that the subscription might be made, not to abet superstition but to show obedience to the mandarin. Or if the request was made by the elders of the community the old missionaries thought that the declaration made by the Christians that their contribution was not for the purpose of helping idolatry was sufficient to safeguard them from sin. The Holy Office again gave a negative reply.¹ Nor might the Christian wives of heathen husbands use their culinary skill for the preparation of sacrificial offerings to the idols or to deceased persons, not even when their refusal meant that they would be soundly beaten.² A less strict ruling³ was given by the Congregation on the obligation of the Chinese Christians to observe the Sunday rest and the Christian feasts. It was no doubt owing to the peculiar difficulties of the Chinese mission that it was forbidden⁴ to print religious works there without the permission of Propaganda.

Difficulties of another kind were encountered by the missionaries in the West African districts of Loango and Kacongo. The incredible dullness of the negroes sometimes made them wonder if they were capable of receiving the sacrament of baptism.⁵ However that may be, the mission of secular priests in these parts provides evidence that even in the eighteenth century the spirit of heroic self-sacrifice was not yet extinct. The mission was opened in 1766 by the priest Belgarde, who had come to the Loango coast as a cabin-boy. But the first three missionaries soon fell victims to disease, which carried one off altogether and forced the other two to

¹ On November 16, 1769, *ibid.*, 300, no. 474.

² Decree of December 15, 1769, *ibid.*, 301, no. 476.

³ On July 13, 1769, *ibid.*, 299, no. 473.

⁴ On December 28, 1770, *ibid.*, 303, no. 482.

⁵ Decisions of the Holy Office of May 10 and November 8, 1770, in "Collectanea", I., 301, 302, nos. 477, 480.

return home. Two more priests who settled in Kacongo in 1768 fared no better. Nevertheless recruiting for this dangerous mission still went on in the home country; the assembly of the clergy of 1772 made it a grant of 6,000 *livres* and the Pope gave it every faculty. On June 28th, 1773, there was a fresh landing of five priests and six laymen at Jomba, but one priest and one layman died on the cross-country journey from there to Kacongo. The remainder were given a friendly reception in Kacongo, in the neighbouring Sogno, where the natives still retained some memories of Christianity implanted in them by former missionaries, and in a colony of Sogno beyond the Zaire. But soon there were only three of these missionaries left; then two of them died and the third returned to France in ill health.¹

In Upper Guinea, Coste, the "Apostle of Joal", worked among the Serers.² Off the east coast of Africa the islands of Réunion and Mauritius had been led back to Christianity by the Lazarists.³ In North Africa it was the Lazarists again who cared for the Christians under the supremacy of Islam. On January 1st, 1771, the General of the Congregation, Jacquier, testified to the constancy with which the missionaries had tried to alleviate the lot of the Christian slaves. When Algiers was in obvious danger of being bombarded by Danish ships the Lazarists were the only Religious who remained at their posts.⁴ On the retirement of the Vicar Apostolic, Philippe-Joseph le Roy, a member of this Congregation, the Pope appointed in his place another Lazarist, Pierre-François Viguier,⁵ who was placed in charge not only of Algeria, as his predecessor had been, but also of Tunisia, though, on account of the vast distances that had to be covered, he was

¹ PROYART, *Histoire du Loango, Kakongo et autres royaumes d'Afrique rédigée d'après les mémoires des Préfets Apostoliques de la mission française*, Paris, 1776, extract in PICOT, IV., 219-223.

² HENRION, II., 346; PIOLET, V., 130.

³ KILGER in the *Zeitschr. für Missionswissensch.*, VII., 104 *seqq.*; SCHMIDLIN, 375.

⁴ *Mém. de la Congr. de la Mission*, IX., 353.

⁵ On December 12, 1772, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 181.

to assign his powers to the Prefect of the Capuchin mission in the latter country.

In Mexico, after the departure of the Jesuits, the work of converting the Indians lay almost entirely in the hands of the Franciscans. The Mexican secular priests were incapable of so arduous an undertaking as the missions; repeated attempts to use them in place of the Religious failed. More than once the Franciscans had to be asked to take over missions which had gone to pieces; instances of this in the time of Clement XIV. were the missions in the Laguna de Parras and in the Paso del Norte on the borders of New Mexico.¹

Most of the work among the heathen Indians of Mexico was done from the missionary colleges, and it was at the end of the eighteenth century that "the Franciscan missionary colleges in Mexico were in full flower".² Four of them, Querétaro, Guatemala, Zacatecas, and Mexico, belonged to the Franciscan Observants, one, that at Pachuca, was conducted by the Discalced. Clement XIV. had on more than one occasion to intervene in the affairs of these important institutions. The four colleges of the Observants represented the advisability of combining the offices of Commissary Apostolic of the Missions and the Prefect of these same missions and of choosing the Prefect from each of the four colleges in turn. The Pope granted their wish on November 22nd, 1769.³ Originally these missionary colleges were independent of the Provincial and were immediately subject to the General of the Order. This regulation had been changed by Benedict

¹ LEMMENS, 242.—Pius IV. had laid it down on March 24, 1562, that parishes and stations in the missions were to be staffed only by Regular priests. King Ferdinand VI. of Spain, however, made out that the secular clergy were numerous and competent in respect of their virtue and knowledge and that the Archbishops and Bishops had often complained that they were being neglected. Benedict XIV. accordingly made a change here by Briefs of November 8, 1751, and July 10, 1753. *Ius pontif.*, III., 467, 539.

² STREIT, *Bibliotheca Missionum*, III., Aachen, 1927, vii.

³ *Ius pontif.*, IV., 162.

XIII., but as the result of painful experience the original arrangement was restored under Benedict XIV. so far as the four colleges of the Observants were concerned. There was now a fifth college, that of the Discalced at Pachuca, which from the outset had been controlled by the Superior of the Province of San Diego, in consequence of which it had drifted further and further away from its purpose of serving only the missions. At the request of the Commissary General for the Indies, Clement XIV. placed this college also under the direct control of the General of the Order. After ten years' work among the Indians, however, the missionaries were to be allowed to join the Province of San Diego.¹

In Lower California, where they arrived in 1768, the Franciscans departed in one respect from the custom of their predecessors, the Jesuits: they took over only the spiritual, but not the temporal, administration of the Indian villages; the latter was transferred to State officials. But on his arrival in June the Inspector General, José de Galvez, discovered that the civil officials were squandering the mission funds and for this reason he placed the civil administration also in the hands of the missionaries. Between April, 1768, and September, 1771, the Franciscans had baptized 1731 persons, all, with few exceptions, Indians. But they increased the former Jesuit stations by only one; the project of immediately establishing five others was frustrated by the Governor Barri, and soon afterwards the Franciscans retired altogether from Lower California. The reason for this was that on April 8th, 1770, Juan Pedro de Iriarte, the Vicar General of the Dominicans, had obtained the royal permission to open a mission in Lower California. To the Franciscans of the College of San Fernando in Mexico two Orders seemed too much for the sparse population of this region and so by an agreement signed on April 7th, 1772, and ratified by the Viceroy Bucareli on May 12th, they left Lower California to

¹ Brief of July 9, 1771, *ibid.*, 170 *seqq.* The amalgamation of the two offices in question was extended by Pius VI. to all Franciscan missions (*ibid.*, 426, no. 23).

the care of the Dominicans. Nine of these, with a lay-brother, landed there on October 14th, 1772. The ship carrying the Dominican Superior, however, was wrecked and he was drowned, so that the formal handing over of the mission to the Dominicans could not take place till May, 1773. By 1800 there were seventy Dominicans at work in seven stations in Lower California. In 1834 the mission was again entrusted to lay officials, under whose administration everything went to rack and ruin and the Indians took to flight.

After relinquishing Lower California the Franciscans moved to Upper California, where their achievements were among the most splendid in the whole history of the missions. But the full development of their activity here belongs to the succeeding pontificate.¹

A decree of Propaganda dated May 5th, 1774, contained a general instruction affecting all the missions ; it prescribed for the missionaries the study of the languages used by the natives committed to their charge.²

¹ Z. ENGELHARDT, *The Missions and Missionaries of California*, San Francisco, 1908 ; *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, III., 179 seq. ; LEMMENS, 252.

² "Collectanea," 312, no. 504. Cf. *ibid.*, 325, no. 527 (decrees of May 5, 1774, and March 7, 1778).

CHAPTER IX.

CLEMENT XIV. AS PATRON OF LEARNING AND ART—HIS GOVERNMENT OF THE PAPAL STATES—HIS ILLNESS AND DEATH.

CLEMENT XIV.'s efforts to preserve the traditional primacy of the Holy See in its encouragement of learning and art were more successful than his financial and economic undertakings. Highly cultured and an ardent bibliophile,¹ he aimed at enriching the Vatican Library with the latest works of literature, especially those from France²; possessed also of artistic taste, he bestowed his favour on scholars and artists. Doubtless his achievements in this direction would have been still greater had he not been forced to devote most of his attention to the harassing problems arising from the disturbed relations between the Church and State. Nevertheless he was able to encourage a number of *literati*.³ He extended his

¹ "Sa Sainteté aime les livres de préférence à tout." Bernis to Vergennes; *v. Corresp. d. direct de l'Acad. de France*, XIII., No. 653, p. 29.

² MASSON, 275 *seq.*

³ In 1771 Stefano Borgia, in the name of Propaganda, dedicated to the Pope the *Alphabetum Brammhanicum seu Indostanum Universitatis Kasi* of the Italian philologist I. C. Amadutius. Then Fattorini dedicated his history of the university of Bologna to him as a mark of his gratitude for favours received (*v. Riv. stor.*, 1897, 25), similarly Renazzi his *Elementi di diritto criminale* (*cf. ibid.*, 1909, 489; BAUMGARTNER, *Wellliteratur*, VI., 553 *seq.*) and his *De Academia Ferrariensi a Clemente XIV. P.M.O. restituta, Ferrariae*, 1772. The Pope took a personal interest in the edition of the ninety-first book of Livy's Histories discovered by the German scholar P. J. Bruns (*v. Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, III., 450 *seqq.*); *v. Azara*, II., 403, for the stop that was put to the printing as the result of Assemani's doubts. *Cf.* *Albani to Colloredo, July 10, 1773, State Archives, Vienna.—Many letters of thanks were sent by the Pope to scholars who had presented him with their works, e.g. to *G. C. Trombelli on July 29, 1769, for the dedication to him of his *Dissertationes liturgicae et polemicae* (Epist. Clem. XIV., A° I^b, 165, Papal Secret Archives);

Note 3 continued from page 508.

on October 6, 1770, to *Appiano Buonafede for the presentation of his four volumes on Emanuele de Cardona, also approving his decision to devote himself in future to church history (*ibid.*, A° II., 156); on November 24, 1770, *to Angelo Maria Bandini, approving his plans for the future and accepting with pleasure the dedication of his edition of *S. Epiphani Opera* (*ibid.*, 207); *on January 9, 1771, to Canon Pey of Toulon (*ibid.*, 258); on June 2, 1772, *to Bishop Arnaldo Speroni Alvarotti, O.S.B., of Adria for the tenth volume of his translations of the history of the Church which he had dedicated to him (*ibid.*, A° IV., 27); on October 27, 1772, *to F. Nonnotte for the presentation of his valuable *Dictionarium philosophicum religionis* (*ibid.*, 157); on May 21, 1773, *to Gabrieli Lancelotto Castelli principe de Turre Muzza for his book *De Siciliae et adiacentium insularum inscriptionibus* (*ibid.*, A° V. and VI., 3); on May 24, 1774, *to Raffaele Riano for his *Dissertatio de infantium Bethlehemiticorum caede* (*ibid.*, 155^b); *to the Franciscan G. B. Martini, "the European oracle in musical matters," for the presentation of his history of music (A° II., 284, Papal Secret Archives). Many examples of this type of letter have been reproduced by THEINER in his *Epist. Clementis XIV.* Thus on December 20, 1769, Gabriel Gauchat and on January 6, 1770, the Dominican Antonio Valsecchi were thanked for their apologetic works (*ibid.*, 46, 51); similarly M. Gerbert on January 6, 1770, for his *Opuscula theologica* (*ibid.*, 52), and Bonelli for the *Prodromus* to his new edition of Bonaventura (*ibid.*); Trombelli on May 26, 1770, for the second volume of his liturgical studies (*ibid.*, 88); Bishop N. A. Giustiniani of Verona on July 20, 1770, for the edition of opuscles written by his predecessor Cardinal Valerio (*ibid.*, 98); Bandini on July 28, 1770, for his catalogue of the MSS. in the Laurenziana in Florence (*ibid.*, 99); Archbishop Lorenzana on December 19, 1770, for his work on the Mozarabic rite (*ibid.*, 195); the Bavarian Elector on March 28, 1772, for the presentation of eleven volumes of *Monumenta Boica* (*ibid.*, 298 seq.; cf. THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 428); Joh. Gottfried Kaufmanns on August 17, 1771, and the Franciscan L. Sappel on December 14, 1771, for their anti-Febronian works (*ibid.*, 173, 193); and the Capuchin Vittore de Coccaglio on February 8, 1772, for seven volumes of theological works (*ibid.*, 207).—Foundation Bull for the University of Münster, of May 28, 1773, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 582 seqq.

protection in particular to the aged Pompeo Batoni¹ and the German painter Raffael Mengs, who returned to Rome in February, 1771, was received with great honour by the artistic world, and was elected "Principe" of the Academy of St. Luke.² Piranesi, the unrivalled engraver, dedicated to Clement XIV. his plan of Rome³ and his work on Trajan's Column.⁴ When Mozart came to Rome with his father in April, 1770, the Pope bestowed the Order of the Golden Spur on the infant prodigy, who after only one hearing was able to transcribe from memory with hardly a mistake Allegri's *Miserere* for nine voices.⁵

Clement XIV.'s chief interest was in increasing the treasures housed in the Vatican Palace. For the library he acquired in 1770 several valuable papyri from the Vettori collection. In 1774 he ordered a special room to be set aside for the Latin papyri.⁶ The ceiling of this room he had painted with brightly coloured frescoes by Raffael Mengs, which were highly admired by his contemporaries. In the central picture, made famous by Cunego's engraving, a beautiful female figure, "History," is writing on the back of an old, winged man representing "Time", the events of the past, which are indicated to her by the two-headed Janus on her right. On the left a Genius is bringing scrolls. Fame, sounding a trumpet, descends from on high, pointing to the Museum Clementinum in the background. Over the two doors Mengs painted the seated figures of Moses as the earliest historian and St. Peter as the guardian of the New Testament, both between two

¹ Reports of the Lucchese envoy, *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 379, 380; AZARA, I., 295; *L'Arte*, XIII. (1910), 454 seq.

² NOACK, *Deutsches Leben*, 85 seq.

³ *Goethe-Jahrbuch*, XVIII., Frankfurt, 1897, 222.

⁴ FOCILLON, *Piranesi*, 119.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 105, 415; *Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, XXII., 423; O. JAHN, *Mozart*, I.², Leipzig, 1867, 119. It was at this time that Batoni painted the young composer's portrait. Mozart, unlike Gluck, made no use of the title of nobility granted him by the Pope.

⁶ FORCELLA, VI., 185; CARINI, *Bibl. Vatic.*, 122.

youthful Genii. The figures are framed in a decoration consisting of Egyptian and classical components intertwined with Renaissance ornaments and naturalistic figures and garlands; this was the work of Christoph Unterberger from South Tyrol, who also did some allegorical paintings relating to Portugal and Avignon for Clement XIV. in Castel Gandolfo.¹

The Papal collection of coins was increased by the Pope through the purchase of Greek and Roman coins and 1,261 medals, including a series of bronze medals of Roman emperors of the largest size.² Great pleasure was caused to the Pope by the presentation to the museum of a large collection of ancient coins by Mgr. Passionei³ and of 126 gold medals by Louis XV.⁴

¹ PLATNER, II., 2, 330 *seq.*; BURCKHARDT, *Cicerone*, II., 926 *seq.*; WOERMANN in the *Zeitschrift für bild. Kunst*, V. (1894), 288. Cf. also O. HARNACK, *Deutsches Kunstleben*, 9 *seqq.*; HAUTECEUR, 150 ("L'œuvre est supérieure au Parnasse"); TIETZE in the *Kunstgeschichtl. Anzeigen*, 1912, 117. These authors failed to make use of COZZA-LUZI's treatise, which is important as giving details of the cost of the decoration of this room: *L'aula di papiri nella Bibl. Vatic.*, which appears as an appendix to *Monumenta papyracea Bib. Vatic. recensuit et digessit O. Marucchi*, Roma, 1895, 35 *seqq.* The decoration, which was not completed till the pontificate of Pius VI., is dated by the inscription over the entrance-door: Clemens XIV. P.M. A° IV. Cf. also VOSS, *Malerei*, 657; RENAZZI, IV., 282 *seq.*

² CARINI, 121; SERAFINI, I., xxxii. *seq.* Cf. GNECCHI in the *Riv. ital. di numism.*, XVIII. (1905), 11 *seqq.*

³ Report of the Lucchese envoy of June 15, 1771, *loc. cit.*, 383.

⁴ Clement XIV. thanked Louis XV. in a *letter of March 4, 1772 (Epist. ad princ., 169, p. 213, Papal Secret Archives). *Orsini to Tanucci, March 6, 1772, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1479. In MASSON, 204, n. 2, the inscription which Clement XIV. had placed on the case containing these coins. The Pope had occasion to write several other letters of thanks to donors of coins, e.g. on February 16, 1771, to Conrado Ferretti ("nummorum argenteorum ad Romanas familias spectantium series"), Epist. ad princ., 167, p. 304, *loc. cit.*; on November 18, 1772, to Duke Karl Theodor of Sulzbach (gold coins which had been taken into the Vatican Museum), Epist. Clementis XIV.,

The finest monument of Clement XIV.'s love of art is the museum of antiquities in the Vatican, whose name still perpetuates his memory. He saw to his sorrow that in spite of the prohibitions issued by his predecessors dealers such as Jenkins were still removing valuable antiquities from Rome and taking them abroad. Rome also lost the famous Niobids, which were removed from the Palazzo Medici to Florence in 1770,¹ and at the same time the King of Naples ordered the removal of the treasures of the Palazzo Farnese to his own capital.² In these circumstances Clement XIV., despite the deplorable condition of his finances, considered it his duty to save as far as possible the precious store of antiquities possessed by the Eternal City.³ In March, 1770, he bought from the sculptor Cavaceppi two magnificent examples of decorative art dating from the time of Hadrian, the famous Barberini candelabra.⁴ In April of the same year he paid 6,000 *scudi* for the statue of Meleager, of the Imperial period, copied from a work of Scopas or his school; it had once belonged to Paul III.'s physician, Francesco Fusconi, and was still in his house, which was afterwards the Palazzo Pighini.⁵ An important purchase of antiquities was effected in September,

a^o IV., p. 168, *ibid.*; on June 4, 1772, to the Empress Maria Theresa (another donation to the museum), Epist. ad princ. 171, p. 17, *ibid.*; on August 11, 1773, to Giovanni Bianchi, Epist., a^o V., 173, p. 23, *ibid.*

¹ JUSTI, *Winckelmann*, II.², 19.

² MASSON, 289.

³ HAUTECŒUR in the *Mél. d'archéol.*, XXX., 59 *seq.* On December 19, 1773, the Pope wrote a *letter of thanks to the conservators of the town of Velletri for presenting him with the funerary urn of Varius Marcellus which had been found there; *v.* Epist. Clementis XIV., a^o IV., p. 207, *loc. cit.*

⁴ AMELUNG, *Skulpturen des Vatik. Museums*, III., 627 *seq.*, 633.

⁵ AMADUZZI, *Novelle letterarie di Firenze*, 1770, 231; *Corresp. d. direct. de l'Acad. de France*, XII., No. 6148; HELBIG, I.³, 79 *seq.*; AMELUNG, II., 33 *seq.*, 37 *seq.* The museum acquired some other antiquities along with the Meleager, such as a seated dog (*ibid.*, 163). *Cf. Cracas* for November 17, 1770.

1770, on the advice of the Abate Giovan Battista Visconti, who was assisted by his son Ennio Quirino. For 4,300 *scudi* thirty-four statues, busts, bas-reliefs, and funerary urns were acquired from the villa of Giuseppe Mattei, who was heavily in debt. Among these were the beautiful Amazon, the so-called "Pudicitia", the Serapis, the Pan pulling a thorn from a satyr's foot, the colossal bust of Trajan's wife, Plotina, the funerary relief of a Roman married couple, so much prized by Niebuhr, and numerous figures of animals.¹ This purchase, on which occasion Clement XIV. expressly forbade Mattei to part with the famous bust of Cicero, decided the Pope to found the superb museum of antiquities in the Vatican. In the early part of 1771 the architect Michelangelo Simonetti began the conversion into a statue gallery of a portion of the former summer-house of Innocent VIII. near the Belvedere.² This he joined to the octangular courtyard which Bramante had built on to the summer-house. Simonetti encircled it with sixteen Ionic columns of Oriental granite with pilasters of coral breccia.³ An inscription records that this work was completed in 1773.⁴ Worthy rooms were thus created both for the antiquities which had already been in the possession of the Popes since the time of Julius II. and for Clement XIV.'s acquisitions, which were very numerous. No sooner were antiquities discovered than they were bought.⁵ The Pope also

¹ HAUTECEUR in the *Mél. d'archéol.*, XXX., 57 *seq.*, where, on p. 69 *seq.*, there is a reproduction of Braschi's Chirografo relating to the sale, dated September 12, 1770. Cf. HELBIG, I., 9, 151, 200, 221; AMELUNG, II., 87 *seq.*, 93, 255, 354, 453 *seq.*, 463, 475, 497, 573, 615.

² *Corresp. d. direct. de l'Acad. de France*, XII., No. 6234; FORCELLA, VI., 184. SINGER (*Künstlerlex.*, IV., 283) has almost nothing to say about Simonetti, who deserves more ample treatment. Above the door leading to the Sala de' Busti are the arms of Clement XIV.

³ JUSTI, *Winckelmann*, II., 2, 36; PLATNER, II., 2, 126; MICHAELIS in the *Jahrbuch*, I. (1890), 5 *seqq.*; CECHELLI, 100.

⁴ FORCELLA, VI., 185.

⁵ AMELUNG, II., 158, 378, 507.

acquired many objects from sculptors and dealers,¹ such as the colossal herma personifying a part of the sea, and the so-called Eros of Centocelle (Amore Vaticano), from the Scottish painter Gavin Hamilton.² Another brilliant acquisition was the statue of a Roman offering sacrifice, the finest togaed figure then known, once belonging to the Giustiniani estate.³ In December, 1771, the seated figure of Jupiter, from the Palazzo Verospi, was bought for 1,500 *scudi* ⁴; it now occupies the central niche in the Sala dei Busti. Among the objects moved from the Palazzo Barberini to the Vatican were the Orestes sarcophagus and the delightful figure of a girl running a race.⁵ The obelisk of Antinous, now on the Monte Pincio, and, in November, 1772, the colossal statue of Hera passed from the possession of the Barberini to that of the Pope.⁶ The Pope's agent in nearly all these purchases was his treasurer, Braschi.⁷ Some pieces were given to the Vatican,⁸ among them the Ara named after its donor, the Governor of Rome, A. Casali, with reliefs depicting the fall of Troy and the origin of Rome. The antiquary Orazio Orlandi provided an explanation of the reliefs supported by illustrations.⁹ Some Etruscan antiquities were also transferred to the

¹ *Ibid.*, 473, 498, 549, 591.

² HELBIG, I.³, 117 *seq.*, 197; AMELUNG, II., 408 *seq.*

³ HELBIG, I.³, 212.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 156; AMELUNG, II., 519. Amelung is incorrect in saying that Clement XIV. began his collection with this purchase.

⁵ HELBIG, I.³, 222, 234 *seq.*

⁶ *Novelle letterarie di Firenze* (1772), 711; HELBIG, I.², 195.

⁷ AMELUNG, II., 520; HAUTECEUR, *loc. cit.*, 67.

⁸ AMELUNG, I., 109; II., 83, 484, 554, 614. Mgr. Carrara's gift of an Etruscan statue is mentioned by Azara in his report of June 27, 1777. AZARA, II., 195.

⁹ Amelung's statement that the Ara Casali was acquired by Pius VI. is incorrect (II., 241). Cf. the *Avviso di Roma of August 18, 1772: "Nei scorsi giorni fu umiliata un ara antica alla S^ta di N.S. per parte di Msgr. Casali, gov. di Roma, e fu accompagnata da una elegantissima edizione con rami spiegati dal Sig. Orazio Orlando, noto antiquario." State Archives, Vienna. The bas-reliefs represent scenes from the Iliad and the history of Rome.

museum¹ and the foundations were laid of the Vatican collection of inscriptions.²

In February, 1773, Clement XIV. visited the Museum Clementinum,³ which brought the Vatican on a level with the Capitol as a collection of antiquities. Its establishment was due more to the Pope's adoption of another man's ideas than to any resolution of his own. According to Pasquale Massi⁴ and Giovan Battista Visconti, the idea of creating a separate museum of antiquities was the aforesaid treasurer's.⁵ It must, however, be placed to the credit of Clement XIV. that he entered into the project of his artistically minded subordinate with enthusiasm and understanding and that he saw to the collection and display of the antiquities with care and competence.⁶ The tragic part of the affair was that for spending so much money on the museum he was violently attacked by the citizens of Rome.⁷

The Pope having done comparatively little for the embellishment of the Eternal City,⁸ great discontent was caused by

¹ Report of the Lucchese envoy, *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 383; G. B. PASSERI, *De tribus vasculis etruscis encaustice pictis a Clemente XIII. in Museum Vaticanum inlatis dissertatio*, Florentiae, 1772. The ancient seal of the Garfagna which had been explained by Garampi (Roma, 1759) and which had been presented to the Pope by the future Cardinal Borgia was also added to the museum by Clement XIV. (v. BARBIER, II., 224).

² AMELUNG, I., 161; REUMONT, 779.

³ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, February 27, 1773, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 291.

⁴ P. MASSI, *Indicazione antiquaria del Museo Pio-Clementino in Vaticano*, Roma, 1792, 2. The roman numerals refer to Clement XIV.'s acquisitions.

⁵ G. B. VISCONTI, *Il Museo Pio-Clementino*, I., Roma, 1792, preface, p. 4, also HAUTECEUR, *loc. cit.*, 67.

⁶ O. HARNACK, *Deutsches Kunstleben*, 5. Cf. VOGEL, *Goethes römische Tage*, 154-9.

⁷ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, February 20, 1772, State Archives, Venice, *loc. cit.*

⁸ On a pretty fountain in the Via Ripetta is the inscription: "Munificentia Clementis XIII. P.M. Aqua Virgo A° 1774." For

the erection in his honour of an expensive triumphal arch in his native town of S. Arcangelo.¹ The town of Servigliano, which had been laid in ruins by a landslide, was rebuilt by Clement XIV. in 1771 and given the new name of Castel Clementino.² When the village of S. Lorenzo Vecchio was in danger of being flooded by an overflow from the lake of Bolsena he built a new home for the inhabitants, S. Lorenzo Nuovo, on a hill about a mile away.³ To meet the heavy expenditure involved Clement made personal sacrifices⁴ and tried to save money by leaving unoccupied or combining various posts in the State administration, a measure which aroused the lively discontent of the officials. But all this was of no use. While expenditure increased the revenues decreased in an alarming fashion, chiefly owing to the cessation of payments from Portugal and the Bourbon States. The budget fell into ever greater confusion; the annual deficit, which at the beginning of the pontificate was 150,000 *scudi*, by the fourth year had amounted to 500,000 *scudi*.⁵

Far greater than Clement XIV.'s material cares were those caused him by the suppression of the Jesuit Order and the

the work he did for S. Spirito *cf.* the inscription in FORCELLA, XIII., 491. Outside Rome the Pope's arms are to be found on one large and two smaller fountains in Genzano (*v.* TOMASSETTI, *Campagna*, II., 256) and on a tower which he built at Fiumicino. A barracks at Civitavecchia was begun in his reign and completed in Pius VI.'s. To the cathedral at Macerata he presented a damaged mosaic ("S. Sebastiano") which Guido Reni had made for St. Peter's.

¹ *Cf.* above, p. 83, n. 1; MARINI, 73.

² *Dizionario corografico dell'Italia*, VII., 1, 568.

³ Clement XIV.'s beneficence towards the inhabitants is recalled by two large inscriptions there. This act of kindness did not deserve the depreciation it has received at the hands of BROSCHE (II., 136 *seqq.*).

⁴ *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 31, 1769: the Pope was trying to improve the financial situation by surrendering his income from the Dataria; the prices of meat and oil were being reduced. State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ BROSCHE, II., 137 *seqq.*

deterioration of ecclesiastico-political conditions in the Catholic countries.

He had to admit to himself more and more that he had made a fatal error in thinking that in sacrificing the Jesuits he could restore peace with the Catholic States. Then came the realization of the evil consequences of the suppression of this important Order, which needed time to reach their full extent but which were already alarmingly great, especially in the missions. All this had the worst effect on the Pope's health, which at first had been perfectly satisfactory. In spite of his sixty-four years Clement XIV. on becoming Pope had still seemed a very vigorous man. He owed this to his very simple way of living and to his placid temperament.¹ The maintenance of his good health was due largely to his annual vacation at Castel Gandolfo, during which the trying audiences with the ambassadors were suspended. Accompanied only by his intimate friends the Pope roamed the lovely countryside on horseback or on foot. The afternoons he spent playing billiards. In 1770 he prolonged his residence at Castel Gandolfo from September 26th to the beginning of November.²

The only affection troubling Clement XIV. was a skin disease, an herpetic eruption which he successfully kept in check by taking a month's cure every summer with the acidulous water of the *Acqua acetosa*, which was already highly reputed in his day.³ In July, 1771, the trouble was particularly bad, the pimples and pustules being so malignant that one reporter referred to it as a kind of leprosy. Attempts were made to relieve it by giving the patient a rub-down before retiring. At this period there were also abdominal disorders. As Cardinal Stoppani fell dangerously ill at the same time with a similar complaint and there was a recrudescence of the prophecies that the Pope would have only a short reign, Clement XIV. was so upset that for several nights he was unable to sleep. His companions tried to distract him with

¹ *Kaunitz to Colloredo, May 20, 1769, *loc. cit.*

² MASSON, 290.

³ RICHARD, *Description de l'Italie*, VI., Paris, 1770, 243.

amusements which, if we are to believe Centomani, were hardly consonant with the gravity and the sacredness of so high an office.¹ More good was done on this occasion also with the *Acqua acetosa*.² In the following summer, of 1772, the trouble again occurred in an acute form. The customary water-cure,³ regular exercise in the Villa Patrizi,⁴ the temporary restriction and then the complete cessation of the audiences⁵ had a beneficial effect. But the Pope's spirits were at a constantly low ebb; it was already being reported in May that he was deeply depressed by the prophecy that he would not live to see the opening of the jubilee year.⁶ Still worse must have been the effect of Moñino's continual insistence, coupled with threats, on the suppression of the Jesuits.⁷ By the latter half of August Clement's apprehensions and

¹ " *Il Papa sta alquanto malinconico e varie notti di questa e della passata settimana non ha potuto dormire; se ne attribuisce la causa al non stare bene essendogli uscito fuori per tutta la vita molto umor salso facendogli delle pustole, che formano una specie di lepra; per lo passato ha sofferto simile incomodo, ma non a tal segno e con tanto prurito, per cui è obbligato nell'andare a letto di farsi fare replicate strofinazioni, ed in queste ultime settimane vi si è aggiunto il nuovo incomodo per la difficoltà di orinare, onde il Papa, entrato in maggiore apprensione, anche a riflesso dello stato pericoloso del card. Stoppani per un simigliante incomodo, non ha potuto dormire in alcune notti. Quindi risorgono le varie fantastiche profezie del breve suo pontificato da non dover oltrepassare il terzo o quarto anno. Si procura dai Palatini di sollevarlo con vari divertimenti ed invenzioni forse non convenienti alla serietà e santità di così supreme dignità." Centomani to Tanucci, July 12, 1771, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 474-1219. Cf. *ibid.* **id.* to *id.*, July 22, 1771.

² " *S. S^{tà} sta benone dopo la cura delle acque." Orsini to Tanucci, August 6, 1771, *ibid.*, C. Farnes., 1477.

³ *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 23, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

⁴ **Id.*, August 13, 1772, *ibid.*

⁵ **Id.*, July 30 and August 6, 1772 (" Non da audiencia a los Ministros estranjeros ni aun a alguno de los suyos "), *ibid.*

⁶ AZARA, II., 304. ⁷ *MASSON, 290. Cf. above, pp. 229, 230.

bodily sufferings had reduced him to such a state of melancholy that Vasquez and Marefoschi were certain that he would either lose his sanity or suddenly expire.¹ In September his physical condition improved, and at the end of the month he went to Castel Gandolfo and stayed there till October 28th.² The rest and the abstention from the agitating negotiations with the Bourbon ambassadors had a very good effect on his health.³ During the first half of 1773 Moñino had nothing but good to report on the Pope's condition,⁴ and at the end of July Clement began his customary water-cure,⁵ which was again successful.⁶ Highly relieved by the lack of resistance offered in Rome to the suppression of the Jesuits,⁷ he retired again to Castel Gandolfo on September 21st and enjoyed his afternoon rides in a carriage or on horseback in the beautiful environs.⁸ But at the same time it was noticed that he was more nervous now than at any time since his accession,⁹ the reason being that he feared that his adversaries had designs on his life. In consequence he took the most extensive safeguards; his food was brought to him daily from Rome in two specially guarded wagons; the guards of the palace were doubled; and whenever he left the palace he was attended by a military escort.¹⁰

¹ *Vasquez to Roda, August 20, 1772, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, *Cartas de Vasquez*, II.; HERGENRÖTHER, *K.-G.*, IV.⁶, 185, n. 2. Cf. below, p. 525, n. 2.

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, September 17 and 24, 1772, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. MASSON, 290.

³ *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 10, 1772, *ibid.*

⁴ **Id.*. January 28, April 15 and 29, June 3, 10, 17, and 24, July 1, 15, and 22, 1773, *ibid.*

⁵ **Id.*, July 29 and August 5, 1773, *ibid.*, AZARA, II., 431.

⁶ *Moñino to Grimaldi, August 12, 19, and 26, September 2, 9, and 16, 1773, *loc. cit.*

⁷ **Id.*, September 2, 1773, *ibid.*

⁸ **Id.*, September 23 and 30, October 7, 14, 22, and 28, 1773, *ibid.* Also *Pallavicini to Conti, October 28, 1773, *Nunziat. di Portog.* 183, Papal Secret Archives.

⁹ Cf. above, p. 154.

¹⁰ *Reports from Tiepolo to the Venetian Senate, October 2 and

He was also frightened and upset by the popular disturbances that broke out on Christmas Day, 1773, and lasted till the New Year.¹ He ascribed them to the Jesuits, but what really caused them was the discontent with his government. At that time the dissatisfaction was general ; only the Bourbon ambassadors were happy. Although order was restored by making an example of some of the malcontents, Clement XIV. had now entirely lost his nerve and imagined that his life was in serious danger.² His agitation was increased by the continual prophecies about his death,³ the disunity in the Congregation of Cardinals,⁴ the French attitude towards the Jesuit question, and the protection that was being afforded to the Jesuits in Prussia and Russia.⁵

In addition to these factors, which had a very bad effect on the old man's state of health, Bernis stresses the delay in the

16, 1773, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 291, copy in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5783, confirmed by Centomani's *report to Tanucci of October 1, 1773, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1223, and the report of the Lucchese envoy of October 9, 1773, Arch. stor. ital., 4th series, XX., 385. In his *report to Conti of October 28, 1773, Pallavicini speaks only of the Pope being physically well. Nunziat. di Portog., 183, *loc. cit.* Moñino did likewise in his *reports to Grimaldi of October 28, November 4, 11, and 25, December 2, 9, 16, 23, and 30, 1773. Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

¹ MASSON, 291.

² *Ibid.*

³ On March 5, 1774, Moñino sent Grimaldi an *abstract of these "falsas profecias que han esparcido los Terciarios Jesuitas". Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5048. On July 24, 1774, Brunati *reported that the prophets of evil and visionaries had become a perfect pest in Rome ; they were being arrested and confined in large numbers. "Poco manca che non risorgano le sibille e gli antichi oracoli." State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ Moñino to Grimaldi, February 17, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4986 ; *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, February 19, 1774, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 291.

⁵ This annoyed Tanucci very much also ; *v.* *Tanucci to Azara, March 26, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6022.

return of Avignon, which was published prematurely, and the attitude of Naples regarding Benevento; the annoyance caused him thereby, said Bernis, was all the more harmful because he tried to conceal it.¹ He did this so successfully that it was generally thought that his health was satisfactory. To confirm the Romans in this supposition he went to the church of the Minerva on April 10th, 1774, to take part in the customary distribution of dowries to poor girls. On reaching the Piazza Venezia he was overtaken by a sudden downpour of rain; seven Cardinals and most of his other attendants took to flight, but the Pope continued on his way and although wet through and without changing his clothes he took part in the ceremony. The result of this was a chill,² but far worse was the reappearance of the skin-disease,³ which now spread to his throat and mouth. At the Easter ceremonies, it was noticed that his formerly resonant voice had grown quite hoarse.⁴ To remove the trouble the water-cure was begun in June.⁵ Once again the Pope was worried by the attitude of Prussia and Russia towards the Jesuits, the sympathy shown

¹ MASSON, 286.

² Report in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 385, and the reports in MASSON, 291, where, however, as in THEINER (*Hist.*, II., 508), the incident is said incorrectly to have happened on March 25. *Brunati to Colloredo, April 13, 1774, State Archives, Vienna.

³ *Centomani to Tanucci, April 12, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1223. Cf. AZARA, III., 29. Brunati *reported to Colloredo on April 2, 1774, that the Pope had a bladder complaint. *Loc. cit.*

⁴ "Relazione" (*Collecção*, III., 221) sent by Charles III. to the Queen of Portugal; it is mentioned also by DANVILA Y COLLADO (III., 589) and LEBRET (VI., 139 *seqq.*). The "Relazione" was reproduced in a lengthier form in *Collecção*, III., 225. According to Bernis the Pope's health had already begun to deteriorate in February, 1774 (THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 510; MASSON, 286).

⁵ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, June 18, 1774 (State Archives, Venice, *Ambasciatore Roma*, 291).

with the suppressed Order in France, the gloomy prognostications, and Spain's demeanour in the question of the nunciature.¹ Besides all this the cardinalitial Congregation for the suppression of the Jesuits was unable to find suitable missionaries or to raise the necessary pensions for the ex-Jesuits.² Centomani reported on June 21st that the Pope was most uneasy, he was having novena after novena said, he maintained complete silence, and was more than ever solicitous about his health.³ This last was hardly surprising, as the skin-disease of his throat and mouth were causing him the greatest irritation.⁴ At the ceremonial payment of the quitrent for Naples on the feast of SS. Peter and Paul it was noticed how severely he was being tried by his physical and mental torture.⁵ From the shortness of his temper it was thought that he was afflicted by some organic trouble; he easily flew into a rage and when in this condition often used improper expressions.⁶ In July the preoccupations already mentioned were still worrying him.⁷ The founder of the Passionists, Paul of the Cross, whose

¹ **Id.*, April 16 and June 16, 1774 (*ibid.*). Cf. *Centomani to Tanucci, April 3, 1774: "Il Papa sta male, egli teme le profezie delle monache terziarie e dell'astrologo Casauria." (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1224). Tiepolo *wrote to the Doge of Venice on June 18, 1774: "Si sà che lo preoccupano l'affare degli Ex-Gesuiti, la reapertura del Seminario Romano, i vescovati nuovi di Polonia." (*Loc. cit.*)

² *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, April 16, 1774 (*ibid.*).

³ *Centomani to Tanucci, June 21, 1774, reporting the rumour "essersi sul dominio di Moscovia aperto il noviziato dei Gesuiti con esservi già 40 novizi" (*loc. cit.*).

⁴ " *Il Papa seguita nella sua malinconia e nell'incomodo della sfogazione dei sali, che dal basso ventre li serpeggia per il viso, onde si riconosce l'emaciazione e la malinconia " (Centomani to Tanucci, July 28, 1774, *loc. cit.*). Cf. Bernis in MASSON, 287.

⁵ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, July 2, 1774 (*loc. cit.*).

⁶ See in the Appendix (3b) Centomani's *report to Tanucci of July 12, 1774 (*loc. cit.*).

⁷ *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, July 23, 1774 (anxiety caused by the failure to execute the Brief of suppression in various

conversation was very welcome to him, advised him to ignore the prophecies,¹ but this had no lasting effect ; an attempt on the life of the King of Naples brought on another access of fear.²

The reports issued about the Pope's good health were not really believed, as the remarks let fall by his intimate circle were invariably disquieting. It was said that he often left his bed at night, that he had the windows of the gallery closed, and that he paced there restlessly to and fro. The only time the Romans saw him was when he went for a ride in the afternoon ; no one could gain access to him except the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Briefs, and Macedonio.³ Another bad sign was that he did not attend the exequies for Louis XV. at the end of July.⁴ On August 9th Centomani reported the continuance of the skin-disease, which he again

countries), *loc. cit.*, and *Centomani to Tanucci, July 26, 1774, *loc. cit.* (anxiety about the trend of events in Avignon)

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci, July 5, 1774, *ibid.* : " (Il P. Paolo de' Passionisti) assicurò il Papa quando lo vidde nella sua cella, stando egli infermo, che detta donna (Bernardina) era una semplice e di buoni costumi, ma gl'altri facevano dirla cose che ne pure s'era insognata di dire ; sicchè le di lei profezie sono da disprezzarsi, da non tenersene conto ; ed in tal modo il Papa si tranquillizò."

² *Moñino to Grimaldi, July 7 and 14, 1774, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. For the attempted murder, *cf.* the " *Relazione ufficiale " of May 11, 1774 (*ibid.*), and Tanucci's *report to Charles III. of May 24, 1774, in which he ascribed it to the Jesuits of Terracina (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6107).

³ " *L'aspetto del Papa dimostra essersi perfettamente ristabilito e pure non mancano quei che lo pongono in dubbio quantunque siano Palatini, perchè dicono che più delle volte si alza intempestivamente nella notte e serrando le fenestre della galleria si pone a spasseggiare violentemente. Nel giorno esce di buonora per le 21 e ritorna alle 23. Poche volte ha chiamato li due Segretari di Stato e de' Brevi ed anche Msgr. Macedonio e niun altro." Centomani to Tanucci, July 26, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1224.

⁴ MASSON, 291.

referred to as a kind of leprosy.¹ Formerly the pimples were discharging their watery fluid outwards, but now it was working into the body, so that blood-poisoning was feared. All the attempts of the physicians to bring the fluid to the surface were unsuccessful. Heated objects were brought into contact with the body and by means of lighted stoves the Pope's living room was made as hot as the blazing summer heat outside—as hot as a bathing cubicle at Ischia, it was said by some. But all to no purpose.² No wonder that the patient fell into the darkest of moods. He would neither listen to the advice of his physician Adinolfi nor hear of other physicians being called into consultation. Occasional audiences were granted only to Cardinal Negroni, the Tesoriere, and once only to Monsignor Macedonio. Everyone else had to make their business known through Bontempi, who was now more influential than ever. Macedonio, on the other hand, on account of a faithless servant, was in danger of disgrace. Another of Clement's former confidants, the layman Ronca, was forbidden to enter the Papal palace for having spoken ill of Bontempi and Bischi. Carlo Giorgi and the Abbé Buonanno, who had formerly been invited to join in the private discussions, were under a cloud for the same reason.³ On August 16th Centomani reported that if the Pope had not sweated or if everything had not gone as he desired he was angry beyond measure.⁴

¹ See the Appendix (3c) for Centomani's *letter of August 9, 1774 (*loc. cit.*).

² Cf. CORDARA (*De suppressione*, 152), Centomani's *letter of August 9, 1774 (*loc. cit.*; Appx. 3c), and *Moñino's *report to Grimaldi on August 18, 1774 (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4986).

³ Centomani's *letter of August 9, 1774 (*loc. cit.*) in the Appendix 3c.

⁴ See Centomani's *letter of August 16, 1774 (*loc. cit.*) in the Appendix 3d. Cf. also *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice on August 13, 1774 (State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 291). *Writing to Centomani on August 20, 1774, Tanucci deduced a "fisica alterazione" from the Pope's continual "irritazioni" (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6023).

Francesco Sanseverino, Bishop of Alife, said that the Pope's behaviour was becoming unbearable to those around him and that this was due possibly to mental as well as physical suffering.¹ There can be no doubt that Clement XIV.'s deep-seated mental and spiritual depression was connected with the reproaches he brought against himself for having suppressed the Society of Jesus. A classic witness in support of this is the well-informed Cordara, whose evidence is all the more important inasmuch as he always did his best to justify every act of the Pope's. "The Pope," he said, "was haunted by the ghost of the dead Society of Jesus, again and again he remembered the damage its suppression had wrought on the Church, the dishonour this unfortunate decision had brought to his name, the hatred it had engendered. He pondered on the loss to the Apostolic See of a safeguard and support, on how Christ's field had lost a picked band of workers; he thought of the scandal caused to the faithful, of the triumphant joy of the heretics, and of the great bewilderment of Christians throughout the world. This distressing thought so racked him day and night that sometimes he would babble in sheer grief and seemed to be beside himself. Often in the night he thought he heard the bronze bell of the Jesuits, though no one had rung it."²

¹ " *Era solito nella primavera, e gli andava crescendo nell' eta, di patire come un erpete per la vita. Codeste sfogazioni non sono cominciate a comparire che in questi ultimi giorni, sicchè è stato ed è tuttavia in molta agitazione, stranisce volentieri e si rende insoffribile a tutti coloro che lo servono. Oltre questa cagione fisica del male possono esservene delle morali." F. Sanseverino to Tanucci, Rome, August 23, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma ³⁹²/₁₁₃₇.

² CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 151 seq. For the Pope's mental disturbance towards the end of his life, cf. as a criticism of Theiner, *Hist.-pol. Blätter*, XXXIII. (1854), 752, n. 2. Vasquez feared "foggia" as far back as 1770 (see above, p. 233) [BOERO] (*Osservazioni*, II.², 73) also speaks of "alienazione di mente" and relates: "Aggiunge,ò solamente accennando di fuga che molti cardinali temendo che l'alienazione del Papa procedesse

That Clement XIV. repented of the Brief of suppression and declared that it had been forced on him is not said by Cordara. Nor is there evidence of this elsewhere. On the contrary, once the measures had been decided on the Pope insisted on their execution, although the harm they were causing could not have been unknown to him, but even if he had wanted to withdraw them he could not have done so, for this the Bourbons would never have permitted. Now that he had become their tool and victim the Bourbon representatives kept him firmly on the path they had marked out for him; they inspired him with such a fear of the Jesuits, with whom many members of the College of Cardinals were indeed in sympathy, that his only way of safety seemed to him to be the complete execution of the Brief of suppression.

And so the Pope's melancholy and excitability continued, also his seclusion from the outer world, which provoked the greatest curiosity and the most fantastic rumours. As only the Tesoriere and the Secretaries of Congregations were admitted into his presence for the transaction of urgent business and Zelada could only gain admittance in secret with the help of Bontempi,¹ all other business was at a standstill.² Finally even Moñino, hitherto so optimistic, began to fear that Spain was about to lose a very good friend.³ Both he and troppo oltre, si adunarono insieme, e commisero al card. Fantuzzi l'incarico di stendere una scrittura e proporre ciò che si dovesse fare nel caso proposito: e quegli la fece e presentolla al cardinale Decano." It seems fairly certain that the contents of this passage were taken from the "Memorie" of the Conte Marco Fantuzzi (the Cardinal's nephew), III.: "Della Compagnia di Gesù e sua abolizione." Original in the possession of the Contessa M. Torricelli; copy in the archives of the *Civiltà Cattolica*.

¹ See Centomani's *letter of August 9, 1774 (*loc. cit.*), in the Appendix 3c.

² *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, saying that the Pope would have no rest till the Spanish nunciature was really ("di fatto") opened (*loc. cit.*).

³ " *Me seria sensibilisimo que perdiesemos tan buen amigo " (Moñino to Grimaldi, August 18, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4986).

Bernis had their fears confirmed when they were finally admitted to an audience after the middle of August. They noticed no mental derangement in Clement XIV. such as was attributed to him by the current rumour, but they found him very thin and physically weak. "The Pope's former liveliness and high spirits had almost entirely disappeared," wrote Moñino. "He complained to me about his physical sufferings, but in the course of the one-and-a-quarter hour's audience I managed to enliven him a little, so that he even made some jokes."¹

Moñino and Bernis agreed in saying that the Pope's mental suffering was principally due to his constant fear of an attempt on his life. He tried to conceal this fear and to play the part of the brave man, but it showed itself clearly enough when Moñino in his audience referred to the recently attempted assassination of the King of Naples, which, together with the prophecies, had deeply affected the Pope. Both ambassadors say quite openly that the poison which was being administered to the Pope by his enemies was the fear of being poisoned, which they were subtly increasing. The ambassadors accordingly tried to persuade the Pope that the best way to protect himself against this sort of poison was to take no notice of the suggestions whispered in his ear.² But the Pope's nervousness was so great that so far from taking this advice he ordered still more stringent measures of precaution to be taken. No one was allowed to enter the Papal palace with a stick; it was strictly forbidden to stand about in the court-yards; the Swiss Guards were doubled; and the two *Palafrenieri* of the night watch were picked out by the Pope himself. As Bontempi was in sole control of all communication with the outer world, many thought that he was holding

¹ Reports from Bernis, who was still seeing the Pope, in MASSON, 286 *seq.*, and Moñino's *report of August 25, 1774 (*loc. cit.*, Estado, 4986), largely reproduced in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 580 *seq.*

² See Moñino's *report of August 25, 1774 (*loc. cit.*), in the Appendix 2.

the Pope prisoner, others that Clement XIV.'s state of health was hopeless. Francesco Sanseverino thought this was saying too much, though he too agreed that the situation was serious.¹ Moñino took the view that if the contemplated visit to Castel Gandolfo failed to be of benefit the worst was to be feared.²

Besides Moñino and Bernis, Almada was also granted an audience on two occasions, but in every case the condition was laid down that no business matters were to be mentioned. Pallavicini and Zelada were each admitted once, Negroni, the Secretary of the Briefs, three or four times. The Grand Penitentiary Boschi and the Prodatarius Malvezzi were given the necessary faculties to deal with matters which would normally have had to be reported specially to the Pope. In very urgent cases Malvezzi was to make use of Bontempi as an intermediary.³ Cardinals Negroni and Simone, however, had so little trust in the decisions conveyed by Bontempi that they demanded their confirmation by the Pope, which delayed still further the settlement of business.⁴ The Pope still went out for his daily drives; on August 25th, the feast of St. Louis, he appeared at S. Luigi dei Francesi in the afternoon, after the Te Deum, in spite of the heat, to pray there,⁵ but by the end of the month he who had once been so sprightly was unable to leave his carriage, as walking had become more and more of a trial. The change that was taking place in his outward appearance too was becoming more and more marked: one could hardly recognize the Pope of old in this emaciated man with the colourless visage, distracted

¹ *F. Sanseverino to Tanucci, August 30, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 137.

² See the report cited on p. 527.

³ Report of the envoy from Lucca, of September 3, 1774, in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 386. Cf. the letter of August 23, 1774, cited on p. 525, n. 1.

⁴ *Centomani to Tanucci, August 30, 1774, Esteri-Roma, 479, *loc. cit.*

⁵ MASSON, 292 THEINER (*Hist.*, II., 512) wrote absentmindedly that the Pope visited S. Luigi on July 25, "the feast of St. Louis," which error is repeated by DANVILA Y COLLADO (II., 388).

eye, and open, slaving mouth.¹ It was now hoped to improve his condition by altering his way of living. The senseless heating of his apartments was completely abandoned and, instead, the windows were opened wide. He had to give up his evening coffee, instead of which he was served with strengthening chicken-soup several times in the morning.² But above all it was hoped that a change of air would have some beneficial effect. In spite of the Pope's weakness³ everything was made ready for the move to Castel Gandolfo on September 12th.⁴ But this was not to be.

The decisive day for Clement XIV. was September 8th, the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin, on which day were dated the announcement of the universal jubilee in 1775⁵ and a letter of thanks to Charles III. for finally settling the question of the Spanish nunciature.⁶ Anxious to silence the rumours

¹ " *D'aspetto dimagrato, smunto di colore, rilasciato di corpo, estatico nell' exterior volto, bocca aperta e bavosa " (Centomani to Tanucci, August 30, 1774, *loc. cit.*).

² *Centomani to Tanucci, September 6, 1774 (*ibid.*): Mgr. Stay found the Pope exhausted, but he is still hopeful. The Ministers were being admitted again. " È stato cambiato metodo della cura ; e già si veggono aperte le finestre, e non sono diventate fornaci le stanze che si tenevano riscaldate con suffomigi ; gli si è tolto l'uso del caffè nella sera, e gli si danno replicati brodi di pollame per la mattina ; in breve andrà alla villeggiatura di Castello " ecc.

³ *The Pope " continua con alguna mejoria, pero siempre con debilidad que nos mantiene el temor " (Moñino to Grimaldi, September 8, 1774, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

⁴ *F. Sanseverino to Tanucci, September 9, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{39}{137}$; report of the envoy from Lucca, September 10, 1774, *loc. cit.*, 387 ; *Tiepolo to the Doge of Venice, September 10, 1774, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 291.

⁵ Cf. allocutions of April 18 and May 6, 1774, in THEINER, *Epist.*, 302, 305, and the Brief of May 14, 1774, *Bull. Cont.*, V., 724 seq.

⁶ *Moñino to Grimaldi, September 8, 1774 (*loc. cit.*) ; THEINER, *Epist.*, 325.

about the unfavourable state of his health, he drove in the company of Cardinals Pallavicini and Marefoschi to S. Maria del Popolo to attend the ceremonies there. But on his arrival he was so weak that he was unable to mount the steps of the throne unaided. The service had to be shortened and the Pope returned to the Quirinal quite listless with exhaustion. Nevertheless he insisted on the following day on driving to the Villa Patrizi, but on the way he was unable to impart his blessing in a proper manner. On the morning of September 10th he went to S. Maria della Vittoria, where he could only make the responses to the Litany in an unsteady voice. Another excursion in the afternoon to the Villa Patrizi was even worse for him than that of the previous day, for on the return journey he fainted. In the courtyard of the Quirinal a large number of curious spectators saw him lifted out of his carriage in a senseless condition and placed on a litter ; in this he was carried to his bedroom, which he was never to leave again. As a fever set in in the evening,¹ Adinolfi, his medical attendant,² ordered a vein to be opened. Meanwhile Cardinal Pallavicini had hurried to the scene and although the Pope would hear of no such thing he ordered Adinolfi to call in another physician, Saliceti, who was very highly reputed. In the morning, after a bout of sweating during the night had afforded the patient some relief, Adinolfi brought Saliceti to the bedside, and the Pope, now almost entirely free of fever, answered calmly all the questions put to him by the new doctor. Saliceti found nothing seriously wrong with him and thought that there was good hope of a recovery, but the patient would have to do his part by banishing all fear from his mind. This suited Clement admirably and he said he would like to see Saliceti again. Although the fever had

¹ Centomani's *report of September 13, 1774, in Appendix 3f. Tiepolo *reported on September 10, 1774 : " Il Papa è caduto in deliquio in villa Patrizi " (State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore Roma, 291).

² According to the *Lettres contenant le journal d'un voyage fait à Rome en 1773* (Genève, 1783 ; II., 56) Adinolfi was thought to be one of the " plus ignares de Rome ".

gone the Pope was still kept strictly segregated. None of the Cardinals who had hurried to the palace nor anyone else was allowed to see the patient, except his old associates Bontempi, Fra Francesco, and Niccolò Bischi, the valet Benedetti, and the two doctors. From the last-mentioned it was learnt that on the evening of the 11th there was again a slight fever and on the 12th the Pope was allowed to get up for a little to see for himself that there was no question of his being seriously ill. Mass was said daily in the sick-room and a bulletin was published that the improvement was still going on. Not much trust was put in this, however, as it was heard that the move to Castel Gandolfo had been abandoned and that Bontempi was utterly dejected.¹ But no other information than what had been published could be gleaned from him or the other men in the Pope's confidence. It was not till after the Pope's death that it was learnt that an Englishman of the name of Menghin had been to see him secretly and that he had sold him a powerful elixir as an antidote for more than 2,000 *scudi*.² Niccolò Bischi managed to obtain from the Pope a general absolution for his administration of the corn supplies. Moñino and Bernis, also Malvezzi, were foremost in callously pressing the Pope, gravely ill though he was, to publish the names of the Cardinals who had been reserved *in petto*, whereby Bontempi was also to be awarded with the red hat.³ They feared that at the next conclave their party

¹ See *Centomani's report of September 13, 1774, in Appendix 3f.

² On September 30, 1774, Centomani *reported to Tanucci on the nightly visits paid by the Englishman Menghin, "per mezzo del quale fece venire una specie di elisir contro il veleno con avervi speso due mila a più scudi; e si sono ritrovate innumerabili bevette" (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1224). The *Ragguaglio d. vita di Clemente XIV.* (Firenze, 1775), p. 69, says that after the Pope's death there were found "nelle tasche alquante pillole alessifarmache antisettiche", which he had often used.

³ *Centomani on September 13, 1774, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Tiepolo to the Doge, July 18, 1774, State Archives, Venice, *Ambasciatore Roma*, 291.

would be too small,¹ the majority of the Cardinals being on the side of the Jesuits.² Although by now the Pope was very weak, his memory was failing, and with open mouth and terror-stricken eyes he was constantly staring at some unseen object, he managed to summon enough strength to refuse the demand. The only instructions he gave were for the settlement of business that it was impossible to postpone. Those about him spread all manner of encouraging reports about the state of his health, but they were not believed.³

No further attempt to disguise the gravity of the situation was made after the morning of September 20th, when the prayers of the whole Church were asked for the dying man and the order was given for the exposition of the Blessed Sacrament.⁴ On the same day the Pope, who was now in a high fever and was suffering also from an abdominal inflammation, received the Viaticum. When Malvezzi made another attempt to induce him to publish the cardinalitial appointments Clement reminded him in excited tones of his benefactor Benedict XIV., who had also refused to undertake a promotion on his death-bed, although the vacancies in the Sacred College were more than at that time. According to another account Clement said that in his condition he could only look to the safety of his soul, which he had no desire to endanger still more.⁵ He also refused to make any testamentary disposi-

¹ Moñino reported on September 1, 1774, to Grimaldi on his and Bernis' efforts, "pues la baraja con que nos hallamos tiene pocas cartas buenas en que jugar." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

² Bernis in THEINER, *Gesch. Klemens' XIV.*, German ed., II., 511. This passage was omitted from the French edition (II., 511).

³ See Centomani's *reports of September 16 and 23, 1774, in the Appendix 3g, 3h.

⁴ Centomani's *report to Tanucci, of September 23, 1774 (*loc. cit.*); reports from the Lucchese envoy of September 21 and 24, 1774 (*loc. cit.*, 388 seq.).

⁵ See Centomani's *report of September 23, 1774 (Appendix 3h). Cf. *Tiepolo to the Doge, September 22 and 24, 1774 (State Archives, Venice, *loc. cit.*), and Bernis in THEINER, *Hist.*,

tion of his property. He received Extreme Unction late in the evening of September 21st and on the following morning between 7 and 8 o'clock he breathed his last.¹

The only person who was with him at the end was the Franciscan General Marzoni.² The corpse, which had immediately assumed a black-and-bluish hue, was embalmed and taken to the Vatican on the evening of the 24th, to be exposed in St. Peter's according to custom, but it was already so badly decomposed that the face had to be covered with a mask. After the ceremonial identification had taken place in the Cappella Paolina the authorities were forced by the terrible smell emitted by the corpse to enclose it in a cypress coffin, which was exposed in St. Peter's on September 25th-26th, the burial taking place on the latter day.³

Naturally there were rumours of his being poisoned,⁴ but

II., 513 *seq.* In the Lucchese report of September 24, 1774, his reply was to this effect: "Che nelle circostanze in cui trovavasi aveva da attendere agli affari della sua anima, la quale non voleva maggiormente aggravare." *Loc. cit.*, 389.

¹ *Acta consist.* in THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 516.

² " *Il Generale Marzoni assistette S. S^{ta} fino alla morte, però solo " (Tiepolo in the report cited in n. 5, p. 532). For the (entirely spiritual) presence of St. Alphonsus Liguori, *cf.* PICHLER, *Alphons.*, 292.

³ See Centomani's *report of September 26, 1774 (Appendix 3i). " *La sera di 24 [settembre] verso un'ora di notte furono le di lui [Clemente XIV.] interiora poste già in una vettina portate in una carrozza alla portinaia di SS. Vincenzo ed Anastasio a Trevi ed ivi consegnate al parrocho vestito in cotta e stola; che ricevette con quattro torcie di libre 5 l'una mandate prima da Palazzo e fatte le debite anotazioni furono riposte nel consueto luogo." *Liber in quo adnotantur obitus Summorum Pontif.*, Archives of SS. Vincenzo ed Anastasio, Rome.

⁴ *Macedonio to Almada, September 26, 1774: On the day after the Pope died and for some time afterwards there was much talk of his having been poisoned (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5076). During his illness there was only casual mention of any suspicion of poisoning. The first trace I found of it was in a *letter written by a friend of Tanucci's, Francesco Sanseverino,

this was definitely contradicted by the physicians and surgeons who carried out the autopsy. Their verdict was that the rapid decomposition was the natural result of the malignant fluids brought about by the cutaneous eruption.¹ The talk of

on August 30, 1774 (see above, p. 528, n. 1). This is his explanation of why the Pope's condition deteriorated after a stay in the Vatican: "In questo tempo non si usavano le precauzioni che si usano in Montecavallo circa il pranzo o altro che resta di suo uso. Sicchè il sospetto di una acquetta o di qualche specie di veneno non resta irragionevole o mal fondato. Si aggiungono li presagi che da quel tempo si cominciarono a spargere con più di furore e la storia ci mostra che così siasi sempre usato dalli Neri quando vollero commettere o avevano già commesso simili eccessi." The last remark shows how much value is to be attached to Sanseverino's suspicion. He also *wrote to Tanucci on September 9, 1774, that he thought that the poisoning had probably been done with "acquetta di Perugia". What he then goes on to write is typical: "L'esercito degli Ex-Soci e dei loro partitanti che tempo indietro si vedea umiliato ed avvilito, già comincia ad alzar la testa e con intollerabile impertinenza marcia baldanzoso e pieno di ardimento e di brio che l'incontrattarli fa rabbia." State Archives, Naples, *loc. cit.* Tanucci was as much obsessed with the fear of the Jesuits as Sanseverino, but not to the extent of believing the rumour of a poisoning (see p. 538, n. 2). For these rumours, see above, p. 154.

¹ On September 23, 1774, Centomani *wrote to Tanucci (*loc. cit.*) that the post-mortem had taken place in the morning. The Abbé Fioravanti had been informed by a physician who was an expert in anatomy and who happened to be present that the intestines were healthy and that the stomach was sound; the latter contained a black substance that was recognized as chocolate. There was a lesion of the pericardium and the lungs were destroyed; this removed all suspicion of poisoning such as the "Frati" were spreading abroad. Cf. Appendix 3h, i, k. *Centomani to Tanucci on September 26 and again on September 30, 1774 (*ibid.*): "Non ostante tutto ciò, li più savi però costantemente escludono tal veleno dato; ed il Papa se lo figurò da se e da se dopo lo produsse." When the Pope described all his symptoms to the physician Bianchi of Rimini he received the reply "che rasserenasse la sua mente, che quei effetti non

poisoning dwindled considerably when it became known that Clement XIV. had taken a potent elixir supplied to him by the Englishman Menghin. To put an end once for all to the rumours and conjectures the Cardinal Camerlengo Rezzonico had a detailed report on the Pope's illness and death prepared by the two doctors who had attended the Pope during his illness and the surgeon who had been present at the autopsy.¹ This medical certificate, which was confirmed on oath, stated that no poisoning had taken place and that the cause of the Pope's death was internal, not external or extraneous.² When, several years later, a celebrated toxicologist was shown Saliceti's opinion and the post-mortem report he gave his professional opinion as follows:—

1. Owing to the extreme scantiness of the data and the complete absence of scientific principles in the statements made by the medical attendants relative to the course of the illness and the post-mortem examination, it is impossible to give a definite opinion on the cause of the said Pope's death.

2. The fact that Ganganelli had suffered for a long time from extremely obstinate cutaneous eruptions, ulcers in the mouth, hoarseness, and scorbutic loosening of the gums, gives ground for thinking that he was subject to a chronic complaint, that to remedy these conditions he took an

procedeano dal veleno ; per gli altri incomodi della sfogazione col sudore si sarebbe liberato ”.

¹ *Centomani to Tanucci on October 4, 1774 : The talk about the late Pope's having been poisoned has much decreased “ dopo che si è reso certo dell'abuso da lui fatto delli potenti elisir fatti venire da Inghilterra ”. Some of the Cardinals had instructed Saliceti to render a precise report “ per smentire totalmente detta falsa voce ”. *Ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, 1225.

² The report in Italian and German in LEBRET, V., 305 *seqq.* Cf. GINZEL, *Kirchenhist. Schriften*, II., 271 *seq.* On October 25, 1774, Centomani forwarded the *“ Relazione ufficiale sulla morte del Papa ” with the observation “ Niente veleno, affermano i due chirurghi di Palazzo e Saliceti ”. *Loc. cit.*, Esteri-Roma, 1225. There are also *copies of the brief and full reports in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome.

excessive amount of mercury, as was often done in those days, and that chiefly through this last practice he induced the aforesaid symptoms in the mouth.

3. It is possible that he was suffering at the same time from a cancer of the stomach, and it is very probable that in the final stages this was accompanied by ascites and inflammation of the lungs.

4. It is impossible to determine whether or not poisoning took place, owing to the complete absence of evidence on which a judgment could be based. Although such a thing is not impossible it does not appear to be very probable, as diseased conditions were present, such as dropsy and inflammation of the lungs, which in themselves were capable of producing death.

5. All the symptoms which were observed on the outside of the corpse after death were merely the symptoms of decomposition, which set in rapidly owing to the dropsical condition of the corpse and the high temperature of the atmosphere at the time. They offer no evidence on which to determine the cause of death and it is entirely incorrect to connect them with any previous poisoning.¹

Many contemporaries, including even Cardinal Bernis, did indeed persist in maintaining that the Pope had been poisoned, but they were unable to produce a shred of evidence in support of their opinion.² A report ascribed to Moñino, in which, on

¹ GINZEL, *loc. cit.*, 249. There was already talk of cancer in the Lucchese report of September 21, 1774 (*loc. cit.*, 388), and in the "Relazione" in *Collecção*, III., 222.

² MASSON, 393 *seqq.* If those who held the poisoning theory relied on the evidence given by the Franciscan General, Marzoni, who was alone with Clement XIV. when he died, it should be known that on July 27, 1775, Marzoni stated on oath that in no manner and at no time had Clement XIV. told him that he had been poisoned or that he had noticed any sign of poisoning. See the text of the statement in CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, V.³, 329. Marzoni's printed circular letter on the Pope's death was forwarded by *Centomani to Tanucci on October 7, 1774 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1225).

the strength of the symptoms described in a medical work by Paolo Zacchia, it was asserted that there had been poisoning, was never written by the ambassador.¹ Moñino's real opinion is to be found in the letter he wrote to the Marquis Grimaldi, the Spanish Secretary of State, on September 29th. In this he said, "The rumours and the general suspicion of the people that the death was not due to natural causes were increased by the various signs visible on the corpse and by other inductive evidence." Moñino, who found the report on the autopsy too short, did all he could to discover the truth, but he could find no definite evidence.² In none of the contemporary reports in which it was maintained that a poisoning had taken place was any sound evidence produced. Those in which the opposite view was held were very numerous and included some that were written by anti-Jesuits.³ Thus Tanucci wrote on October 11th, 1774, to King Charles III. of Spain that Moñino had doubtless reported on the conjectures and the rumour of a poisoning by the Jesuits, but after examining precise and detailed reports from Rome he (Tanucci) had arrived at the opinion that the only poison the Jesuits had given the Pope was to make him believe that he was poisoned, and the antidotes he took in consequence caused his death. Tanucci wrote in a similar vein to Grimaldi on November 1st, 1774.⁴ Then in December, 1774, the news was

¹ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 504; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 585 *seq.*; GINZEL, 245 *seq.*; DUHR, *Jesuitenfabeln*⁴, 71. The report in question was the "Relazione" cited above in n. 1, p. 536.

² DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 72; MASSON, 294.

³ DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 73.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 75. Cf. DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 597 *seq.* Tanucci says in a letter to Nefetti of October 4, 1774: "Non crediate ucciso il Papa da altri che dal suo pensar fratescho; bon uomo ma non filosofo; ha sospettato un male, che ha voluto curare, lo ha curato troppo e male, ond' è venuto il male vero. Non è nuovo che si muori per mala medicina. Lasciamo maturare il suo successore . . . Fanfaronata delle solite è la vendetta di sant' Ignazio, che dicono cotesti o furbi, o fanatici, o delusi." Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6025. To Catanti *Tanucci wrote

published in the *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*, the Jansenist organ in Utrecht, that the Pope had been poisoned by the Jesuits.¹ But this made no impression on those who had been close to events. Tanucci wrote to a friend in August of the following year, "Ganganelli was a good man who did not deserve to die so quickly. In the pell-mell of the Jesuit question there were and still are many criminal characters and many fanatics capable of administering poison, but I adhere to my opinion that the Jesuits themselves are the authors of the poisoning story, for it serves their purpose of making people afraid of them and of displaying their power, just as women are not displeased by being thought to be of easy virtue, for this shows that men like them and it entices them to compete for their favours."²

Tanucci is here repeating the opinion held by the Neapolitan agent Centomani shortly after Clement XIV.'s death, that the pro-Jesuits had floated the rumour about the poisoning so as to realize their "diabolical plans" of making princes fearful of their lives.³

Cordara thinks that Bontempi originated the rumour about on October 11, 1774: "Non col veneno hanno li gesuiti ucciso il Papa, ma con farglielo credere. Egli è morto di medicina." *Ibid.*, Estado, 6024. He *wrote in the same sense to Centomani on October 8 and to Viviani *on the 11th, adding: "Li stolidi che lo credono [poisoning by the Jesuits] sono di tutti li generi." *Ibid.*

¹ The article which appeared in the *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* for December 19, 1774, is reproduced in *Collecção*, III., 230 *seq.*

² *Tanucci to Nefetti, August 8, 1775: "Ganganelli fu un buon uomo; non meritava di morir tanto presto. Nel guazzabuglio gesuitico erano e sono molti scellerati e molti fanatici, laonde quel veleno può essere; io però persisto nel credere che li stessi gesuiti siano autori della fama del veleno, anche non vero: serve l'opinione ad atterrire e a mostrar potenza, come non dispiace alle femine l'esser credute p. . . , perchè indica che piacciono agli uomini e gli alletta a concorrere." Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6025.

³ *Letters to Tanucci of October 4 and 11, 1774 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1225).

Clement XIV. being poisoned by the Jesuits. "The Superiors of the Jesuit Order," he says, "had already been imprisoned in the Castel S. Angelo for over a year, and the rest of them, even supposing that they were capable of so heinous a crime, would not have been so silly as to commit such a deed when everything was lost. But the authority of this one friar was not so great that he could persuade anyone to believe so incredible a story. Consequently the Cardinals treated the rumour as an utterly ridiculous calumny."¹ Modern research also has very rightly condemned the talk about Clement XIV.'s poisoning as a calumnious fable.²

The death of his exalted protector brought Bontempi's career to an end. Knowing full well how hated he had made himself in Rome he left the Papal palace as speedily as he could, taking with him, it was said, some important documents. Moñino, who sent his carriage to fetch him, afforded his

¹ CORDARA, 152. Even the compiler of the violently anti-Jesuit *Ragguaglio della vita, azioni e virtù di Clemente XIV.* (Firenze, 1775) says on p. 80 that it could not be maintained with any certainty that poisoning had taken place. Not so Caracciolo (DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 78 *seq.*).

² SCHOELL, *Cours d'hist. des États européens*, XLIV., 85; LAFUENTE, *Hist. de España*, XIV., Barcelona, 1889, 259; THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 518; UGOLINI in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, N. S. IV., I, 183; REUMONT, *Ganganelli*, 70; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 588 *seq.*; of more recent writers, most convincingly, MASSON, 297 *seqq.* Cf. GENDRY in the *Revue des quest. hist.*, LI. (1892), 429. The poisoning theory is rejected also by CAPPELLETTI in his *Il conclave del 1774 e la satira a Roma* (separately reprinted from *Bilychnis*, VII., Roma, 1918, 3). RANKE (*Päpste*, III.³, 201 *seqq.*) disdains even to mention the fable. Criticisms of the few writers who clung to the story, such as HUBER (*Jesuitenorden*, 552) and USCHNER (*Klemens XIV.*, Berlin, 1866), are in GINZEL (*loc. cit.*, 250) and DUHR (*loc. cit.*, 78 *seq.*). We are not surprised to find that such a writer as D. SILVAGNI still maintains the truth of the rumour in his *La Corte e la Società Romana nei secoli XVIII e XIX* (Roma, 1884, I., 221). Even LEWIN (*Gifte in der Weltgeschichte*, 516-520) rejects the poisoning theory and supports that of a chronic, cancerous disease of the internal organs.

protection also to Niccolò Bischi, who was no less detested on account of his administration of the corn supplies.¹ To the Dean of the Sacred College, Giovanni Francesco Albani, the Spanish ambassador addressed a solemnly worded letter saying that Bontempi and Bischi were under his king's protection and that he, the ambassador, hoped, the wisdom of the Sacred College being what it was, that no change had taken place regarding the suppression of the Jesuits and that a Pope would be elected who would prove to be a universal father. Otherwise the Spanish Government would renew its claims to Castro and Ronciglione and would have the Papal States invaded by Neapolitan troops. Albani replied that the College of Cardinals was not contemplating any change with regard to the Jesuit Order and the prisoners in the Castel S. Angelo; it had not the right to revoke the dispositions taken by the late Pope. At the next election the Cardinals would procure a Supreme Head who would be approved by every Catholic country. As for Bontempi, he could not be called to account as he had not held any official position. The same applied to Bischi; an account of the administration of the corn supplies had to be rendered by the President of the administration. On receiving this reply Moñino regretted having acted so brusquely. He sought an interview with Albani and informed him that it was Spain's intention to act in concert with France in the conclave and that Bernis would

¹ *Tiepolo to the Doge, September 24, 1774, State Archives, Venice, *loc. cit.* " *Queda entregado al P. Maestro Buontempi el titulo de Predicador, que V. E. se sirve remitirme con su carta de 22 de este mes. Este religioso ha tenido grandisimo consuelo y me pide que V. E. le ponga á los pies del Rey . . . Ya no tendrá que hacer uso alguno de esta gracia, porque Roma, segun su costumbre, empieza á olvidar enteramente á este hombre, y vendrá dia en que le hecherà menos. El se halla indispuerto, segun todas las apariencias padece la misma enfermedad que el Papa. Se trata la curacion con toda reserva, hasta que Dios quiere descubrir al mundo, si verdaderamente ha avido algun misterio de iniquidad." Moñino to Grimaldi, December 15, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5043.

be empowered to represent both Courts. As Moñino showed no interest in Macedonio and Alfani, although they had been accused of serious offences, the Neapolitan agent Centomani took up their case without being commissioned to do so by his Government. Albani assured him that no steps would be taken against Macedonio, but as for Alfani, many of the Cardinal's colleagues were for suspending him from the office of Uditore to the conclave, which office was joined with that of Uditore to the Segnatura. The General Congregation of the Cardinals, however, went no further in the matter.¹

Bontempi, keeping in close touch with Moñino, had taken refuge in the house of the General of his Order at SS. Apostoli. Here he showed the General Marzoni two Briefs written by Clement XIV. The first relieved him of all dependence on his Superior and gave him permission to choose whatever convent he liked. The second gave him the faculty to secularize himself as often as he wished. Bontempi then produced a third Brief confirming him in the possession of all his belongings. The General responded curtly that all he needed now was a fourth Brief to set his conscience at rest and save his soul.² Tanucci approved of Centomani's action and said that Bischì would do best to retire to some country under Bourbon supremacy.³ Bontempi, realizing that Rome was no place for him, made use of his Brief of secularization and left for Monte Porzio in the Alban Hills, where, consumed with remorse and quaking with fear, he eked out a miserable existence.⁴

It was the custom at Papal exequies to affix to the

¹ See Centomani's *report of September 26, 1774, *loc. cit.*, Appendix 3k.

² See Centomani's report cited above (n. 1).

³ *Tanucci to Centomani, October 8, 1774, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6024.

⁴ *"Sta sospettoso rimordendogli la coscienza, giacchè prende timore degli alberi prendendogli per tanti uomini posti in aguato per trucidarlo, onde prima della calata del sole ritorna alla sua abitazione," Centomani reported to Tanucci on October 18, 1774, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1225.

catafalque inscriptions setting out the principal deeds performed by the deceased. Those chosen for Clement XIV.'s catafalque were connected with the foundation of the Museum Clementinum, the enrichment of the Vatican Library, the recovery of Avignon and Benevento, the beatification of Francesco Caracciolo and the Franciscan Conventual Bonaventura of Potenza, and the return to union with Rome of the Nestorian Patriarch Simeon and other schismatics.¹ The suppression of the Jesuits was passed over in an eloquent silence. Nor was there any mention of it in the panegyric. Whereas usually there were any number of applicants for the honour of pronouncing the funeral oration, on this occasion it was only with difficulty that a suitable personage—Francesco Bonamici, Secretary of the Latin Briefs—was found to accept the duty. This silence with regard to the suppression greatly disturbed Tanucci²; it had been expressly enjoined by the Camerlengo, who, like most of the other Cardinals, had not been consulted by the late Pope on this highly important step and now gave public expression to his disapproval.³

¹ *Ragguaglio della vita di Clemente XIV.*, 85 seqq.

² *Tanucci to Centomani, October 8, 1774, *loc. cit.*

³ Centomani says in his *letter to Tanucci of October 18, 1774 (*loc. cit.*) that the College of Cardinals did not allow the suppression of the Jesuit Order to be mentioned in the inscriptions on the catafalque or in the funeral oration. There was also a personal incident that occurred in connexion with the exequies. The return of Avignon was represented by an emissary kneeling before Clement XIV., and on the emissary's cloak were visible the lilies of France. Bernis and the other Bourbon representatives refused to allow this. See MASSON, 302, n. 2. A *report of Centomani's to Tanucci, of October 11, 1774 (*loc. cit.*), contains the following passage: "I tre Ministri borbonici con identico biglietto fecero togliere dal catafalco le insegne Reali e i gigli del mantello. Nessuna menzione della Soppressione nè intorno al corpo del Pontefice, nè nella Orazione funebre, che non sarà stampata forse per diminuire la vergogna di una tale preterizione." Moñino's *note to the Camerlengo Rezzonico, of October 1, 1774, in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. In spite of this the panegyric did appear in printed form.

During the vacancy of the Papal See Rome was flooded with an unusually large number of satires, which were aimed not only at Bontempi and Bischi, but even quite directly against the late Pope. Clement XIV. was attacked and insulted in the most violent and malicious fashion.¹ In one pamphlet the following pictures appeared in the form of a pyramid: the Bull *In Coena Domini* thrown on the ground, encircled with the words "Destroyer of the Sacred Canons"; an altar with the statue of Jupiter Verospi, with a Jew and an Anglican in front, and the legend below, "Worshipper of Idols." Below a picture of the prisoners in the Castel S. Angelo were the words "Persecutor of the clergy", while the last picture showed a number of Religious stripped of their habits, with the legend, "Devastator of monasteries." At the base of the whole design was the name of the physician Adinolfi, with the title "Liberator of the City and the World".² In a sonnet entitled "Clement XIV. reproved by St. Peter" the Pope was accused of having surrendered the rights of the Church, of having surrounded himself with persons of the lowest degree, who had plundered the treasure, and in his efforts to save the bark of St. Peter, of having handed it over to its enemies. In another sonnet it was said that only the Jansenists of Utrecht could say Mass for Fra Lorenzo Ganganelli, surnamed Clement XIV.³ Naturally there was no lack of scornful observations on the "peace", for which so heavy a price in the way of appeasement had been paid, having

¹ See Appendix 4 for Brunati's *report of October 2, 1774, State Archives, Florence. Cf. *Moñino to Grimaldi, November 15, 1774, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Besides the satires cited in the notes that follow, cf. also the long "*Iscrizione satirica contro i cardinali, ministri, prelati, frati, autori, fautori ed agenti della soppressione della Compagnia". State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes., 1481. This satire of 1774 is reminiscent of earlier ones: "Venit ut vulpes (mendax). Regnavit ut lupus (false), Mortuus est ut canis (impie)." See L. MORANDI, *I sonetti romaneschi di G. G. Belli* (Città di Castello, 1889), CLXXXIX.

² THEINER, *Hist.*, II., 523 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 524 *seqq.*

brought nothing but the recovery of two portions of the Papal States. Even Clement's morals, which were really far above suspicion, were dragged in the slime, the late Pope being designated as "worse than Pharaoh and Beelzebub".¹ This plague of satires went on even after the opening of the conclave; one dramatic composition that appeared in the course of the conclave was of such a nature that the Cardinals had to have it publicly burned by the executioner along with other satires and malicious pamphlets.² The Bourbon representatives made no move whatever to protect the memory of the Pope who had been so complaisant with them.

The causes of the odium which Clement XIV. had incurred and the confusion in which he left the affairs of the Holy See were discussed by the Imperial agent Brunati in his report of October 2nd. He ascribed the confusion to the Pope's inertia—he had not written two hundred lines in the whole of his pontificate and had not read fifty—and to the misdoings of his incompetent and dishonest favourites, who were allowed to rule with despotic power.³ This complaint in general terms about Clement XIV.'s inertia is completely unjustified⁴ and the satirists were outrageously unjust in doubting the sincerity of his motives and in representing his interest in the Vatican Museum as the encouragement of paganism. But there were good grounds for the complaint

¹ *Ibid.*, 324 *seq.*

² MASSON, 307 *seq.* See also SILVAGNI, I., 246–267, and CAPPELLETTI, *loc. cit.*, 5 *seqq.*, for the play by the Abbé Gaetano Sertor of Florence, entitled "Il Conclave", which was particularly hostile towards Bernis, Zelada, Negroni, and Giraud.

³ See Brunati's *report in the Appendix 4.

⁴ For Clement XIV.'s activity, especially in the first years of his pontificate, see Chapter II. It was only during his water-cure and his residence at Castel Gandolfo that the Pope refrained from business as far as possible, and then again during his last illness. The complaints voiced by Brunati and others were due partly to Clement XIV.'s failure to publish the Cardinals reserved *in petto*. Brunati was already *complaining about this on January 26, 1774 (State Archives, Vienna).

raised by many other contemporaries, including even Bernis, about Clement XIV.'s mode of government. Brunati says of this that the Ministers had great difficulty in obtaining an audience and when they did present themselves the Pope gave them no time to speak ; they had to leave their requests behind in writing, which were then passed to Bontempi. In such a system of government, said Brunati, there was all the more need of competent Ministers whom the Pope could trust and to whom he could leave the settlement of affairs. But the opposite was the case. The Secretary of State, Pallavicini, was so insignificant that the Pope paid him no attention, and there was no other Minister in whom the Pope confided ; in fact the whole College of Cardinals was completely ignored. All decisions were left to the all-powerful and despotic Bontempi. So that he could rule undisturbed the practice was introduced of having every matter decided by rescripts from the Secretary of the Memorials, even when it should have gone to the Congregation of the Council or to that of the Bishops, or to the Vicariate, or to the Penitentiary.¹

The equally sorry picture which Brunati sketched of the government of the Papal States was also true to fact. A friend of Bontempi's, Niccolò Bischi, had unrestricted control of the provisioning of Rome and the grain trade. The directors of the various departments were simply figureheads.² It was calculated that a million *scudi* passed through Bischi's hands, and the only account he had to render of them was a general one, for which he had the Pope's authorization written in his own hand. According to Brunati, Bischi prevented certain

¹ Brunati's complaints about Bontempi's segregation of the Pope in his *reports of August 6, 13, and 20, 1774 (State Archives, Vienna).

² There were popular disturbances at Marino and other places on account of Bischi's maladministration of the corn supplies. Cf. *Centomani to Tanucci on October 6 and 9, 1772 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1221), and *Moñino to Grimaldi on October 22, 1772 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome). For the lowering of the taxes, cf. the *report of May 31, 1769 (State Archives, Vienna).

clerics from being made Cardinals, the most notable instance being De Vecchis, who was thought to be certain of the honour but who Bischi feared would expose his fraudulent administration. Along with other witnesses Brunati held Alfani responsible for the harsh treatment of the Jesuits locked up in the Castel S. Angelo; his influence with the Pope was so great, said Brunati, that it was he and not the Congregation of Cardinals who had taken the decision.¹

In Brunati's gloomy picture there was only one bright spot: the improved relations with the Courts, of whose displeasure Clement, according to Brunati, was in the greatest dread. In general, these relations were in the skilful hands of Cardinal Zelada, though even he was not entirely trusted by the Pope, who not infrequently, though with the greatest secrecy, took counsel of Cardinals Negroni and Simone. It is not surprising, therefore, that Clement XIV. was not remembered with affection or respect by any class of Roman citizen and that even those who had been in his confidence spoke ill of him.²

Brunati is not alone in his judgment; the Polish envoy Antici also gives as the reasons for the poor reputation Clement XIV. left behind him in Rome his scanty respect for the Cardinals, his blind confidence in persons of the type of Bontempi and Bischi, and the suppression of the Jesuits.³

¹ Appendix 4. Bischi, who subsequently received from Spain a monthly allowance of 125 *scudi* (*Grimaldi to Nicola Bischi, October 14, 1778, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome), was found guilty of embezzlement under Pius VI. (BENIGNI, *Getreidepolitik*, 94). Cf. MASSON, 197, n. 5, and 290; also *Centomani to Tanucci on October 6, 1772, and December 3, 1773 (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1221 and 1223). *Ibid.*, 1224, his *report of September 20, 1774, on the financial situation: "Un cardinale mi disse che in Camera Apostolica non vi è un quattrino per le spese del conclave, ne anche vi è grano sufficiente per Roma, e pur quel poco è di cattiva qualità. Per tutto lo Stato vi è positiva penuria di grano, legumi ed anche d'olio."

² Appendix 4.

³ Garampi made the following note on October 7, 1774, on the receipt from the King of Poland of Antici's report on the death

This one act was enough for the enemies of the Order and the representatives of an anti-clerical enlightenment to laud the Pope to the skies. Even in the course of 1774 there appeared on both sides of the Alps panegyric biographies of Clement XIV. in which the tastelessness of the encomia was surpassed only by their falsity. They extolled him as a "*grand esprit*" and placed him on a level with the most famous rulers of the age—Maria Theresa, Catherine the Great, and Frederick the Great—for having accomplished a work which would make his name immortal: the suppression of the powerful and firmly established Order of the Jesuits.¹ This unbridled glorification could only harm the memory of Clement XIV. When the enemies of the Jesuits were imprudent enough to ascribe even the working of miracles to the late Pope² and

of Clement XIV. : "**Dice Antici che niun papa è morto a' giorni nostri con tanta esecrazione che questo pel disprezzo che mostrava che avea per i cardinali, per le promozioni si eccessivamente segrete, per il predominio che ne avea Buontempi, per il cieco favore accordato a Bischi, che credesi aver defraudato l'Annona, e per la soppressione fatta de' Gesuiti.*" *Diario di Garampi*. Fondo Garampi, 73, p. 1059, Papal Secret Archives. Outside Rome, too, the judgment was anything but favourable. "**Povero Ganganelli,*" wrote Vincenzo Segneri from Bologna to a friend on September 28, 1774, "*obiit ingloriosus. Niente ha fatto, ma ha fatto solamente disfatto.*" State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{313}{1058}$.

¹ *Leben Klemens' XIV.* I., Berlin and Leipzig, 1774, 3, 5, cf. II., 129 seq.

² *Moñino reported on this to Grimaldi on July 20, 1775 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome): Rome was flooded with miracle-stories now instead of satires. *Ibid.* a *letter from Grimaldi to Moñino, of August 8, 1775, saying how Charles III. laughed at the stories of miracles. Cf. the acrid criticism of these tendencies in a *letter from A. Muzzarelli to a "Signora Ferrarese", undated (1774-5), in Regolari, Gesuiti, II., Papal Secret Archives. A work appearing in Germany (*De miraculis Clementis XIV. commodisque mendicantium ex abolita Societate Jesu*, Francoforti, undated) was countered by the *Notizie interessanti la sacra persona del gran pontefice O. M. Clemente XIV. con*

to talk of his canonization, the other side pointed bluntly to his great weaknesses and his timidity.¹ Some attacks on him, such as that of the Spanish ex-Jesuit Bruno Marti, were so violent that Pius VI. had to prohibit their production in the Papal States.² The prophecy made in a work of 1775 that Clement XIV. would be known in history as "the Great"³ has not been fulfilled. With the opening of the archives the glorification of Clement XIV. came to an end. The more the authentic sources came to light the less favourable was the judgment passed on him. When we look back on his pontificate as revealed by an examination of the archives, we must agree

l'aggiunta in fine di alcune lettere dello stesso non più stampate. Opera d'un teologo italiano. Lugano, 1778. On pp. 64-173 are reproduced the Notizie più sicure relative a varie prodigiose guarigioni seguite in varie parti a intercessione della S. M. di Clemente XIV.

¹ " *Processo per introduzione della causa di canonizzazione di Fra Lorenzo Ganganelli detto Clemente XIV.," a MS. of 58 pages, which I saw in Luziatti's bookshop in Rome in 1902. It denied the virtues ascribed to Ganganelli. The author treated: "(1) della fede di Fra Lorenzo" (or his "credulità" with regard to the prophecies about his death); (2) "Della speranza; (3) and (4) Della carità; (5) Della prudenza; (6) Della giustizia; (7) Della fortezza; (8) Della temperanza; (9) Della saviezza; (10) Della estimazione del s. Collegio; (11) his lack of respect for his Court."

² The work was entitled *Lettere del vescovo N. in Francia al cardinale N. in Roma*. The author was arrested in Ferrara. For this and the prohibition of the work as being "ingiuriosa a Clemente XIV.," see Pallavicini's *letter to the nuncio in Vienna, of March 29, 1777, Nunziat. di Germania, 667, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. URIARTE, *Obras anónimas y seudónimas*, I., Madrid, 1914, 396-8, n. 1169; SOMMERVOGEL, V., 617; RIVIÈRE, n. 1690; MASSON, 339.

³ *Der Geist Klemens' XIV. . . als Anhang zum Leben Klemens' XIV.*, London, 1775, 21, where it is said, "He was great as a friar, great as a consultor and cardinal, great as the supreme head of the Church and as sovereign, great as a genius and as a scholar, and great as a man and a Christian."

in essentials with the biographer of Cardinal Bernis when he writes, "A weak character and of only mediocre intellect, Lorenzo Ganganelli was given a position to which he was incapable of doing justice. Ambition led him into taking compromising steps which affected his whole attitude. The responsibility he undertook crushed him and the doubts to which he fell a prey exhausted an organism already weakened by old age and monastic discipline. Accustomed to the secluded, peaceful, simple life of a Franciscan, he found himself suddenly transported to a scene in which he imagined he could win all parties to himself with the artifices of the convent. But all his little ruses failed him when confronted with the immovable will of the princes; he had to deal with finished diplomats who led him imperceptibly, step by step, into a position where it was impossible for him to break the golden chains with which he had been bound. And when he thought that he had at least gained time with his promises there appeared the stern, arid, frigid Moñino, to carry the day by force. If Clement XIV. now flattered himself that he had at least recovered Avignon for the Holy See, it was to cost him a great deal of trouble. His position as friar was too low, as Pope too high, for him to be at home in the Roman milieu. A grim hostility was reserved for the son of a country doctor who was thought to be oppressing the Romans for the benefit of foreigners. This universal dislike of himself, which was displayed even at religious ceremonies by the absence of the Cardinals and prelates, he had to face alone, alone with Bontempi, who had been bought by Spanish gold, Fra Francesco, who was in the pay of Portugal, and Bischi, who was open to bribes from any quarter. He had all the virtues of a Religious: purity of morals, piety, modesty, probity, and thrift, but he was incapable of forming an entourage that was worthy of his dignity as Pope and would loyally support him. In destroying the Jesuits, the Church's trusty bodyguard, he seemed to ignore the fact that as Pope he ought to have respected them and that as a man he would have to fear them. He was assailed by pangs of conscience and a racking fear, but there was no one to give him comfort and

courage but his hireling confidants and the diplomats. His enemies battered on his fear and spread abroad false prophecies in which his death, which he feared so much, was daily predicted. The people of Rome, whom he loved and who, he hoped, would love him for his good intentions towards them, turned away from him like all the rest. He suspected poison everywhere and found it. His spirits exhausted, his soul robbed of its energy, his body diseased, death found him an easy victim."¹ This then was Clement XIV., one of the weakest and most unhappy of the long line of Popes, and yet one most deserving of sympathy, for though filled with the best intentions he failed in almost everything, being quite unfitted to deal with the extraordinarily difficult situation.² A contemporary criticism of him still holds good: "Clement XIV. lacked the qualities necessary for the good government of either Church or State. His great weaknesses, ambition and timidity, made him the laughing-stock and the slave of others. He will be known only for the serious wound he inflicted on the Church by the suppression of the Jesuits."³ Few Popes had been so yielding to the princes and so hard towards the Cardinals. Thus it was that he displeased everybody, except the Bourbons, who were already doomed to destruction.

For a long time it looked as if Clement XIV. was to have no monument for his tomb. He had left the worst impression on the Cardinals, and he would not hear of any "nephews",⁴

¹ MASSON, 297 *seqq.*

² After his election Clement XIV. is said to have summed up this situation with the words "The Church of Rome is on its Calvary." (*v.* CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 404).

³ " *Egli non avea talenti per buon governo, nè nella Chiesa, nè nelli Stati. I suoi difetti erano assai grandi e fra questi la sua ambizione e la sua timidezza lo resero ridicolo e schiavo degli altrui voleri. Sarà questo Papa per non altro celebre che per aver fatto magna piaga alla Chiesa colla distruzione dei gesuiti." These were the concluding words of the "Processo" cited on p. 548, n. 1.

⁴ According to the *Ragguaglio della vita di Clemente XIV.*, Firenze, 1775, 90, Clement XIV.'s estate consisted of "Patenti

which indeed was a creditable idiosyncrasy. He had not been on good terms with the other members of his Order, and the Bontempi and the Bischi wanted all the money they had amassed for themselves. That a monument was finally erected to his memory was due to the devotion of Carlo Giorgi, a "mercante di campagna" who through Clement's favour had become a wealthy man and was the only person to remain loyal to him after his death. Giorgi put down 12,000 *scudi* for a monument to be set up in SS. Apostoli¹ and in 1783 commissioned the young Canova with the work. Canova had come to Rome in the same year, 1779, in which death had deprived the city of the most celebrated artist of his time, Anton Raffael Mengs. Canova had already won renown with his "Theseus overcoming the Minotaur" and

di 538 luoghi di Monte, scudi 1500 incirca in cedole, contanti, e medaglie d'oro e d'argento, moltissimi rari quadri acquistati da S. Stà per regali fattigli da' principi e da privati personaggi, 3000 oncie incirca d'argento lavorato, 4 casse di squisito tabacco di Spagna, un gran numero di porcellane di varie fabbriche e specialmente i bellissimoi candelieri e statue della fabbrica di Sassonia regalatili dalla Reale Elettrice vedova. Vi furono inoltre ritrovate trenta fra pianete e tonacelle d'un grandissimo valore, una gran quantità di biancheria finissima tanto in pezze che in opera ed un prezioso anello con zaffiro contornato di grossi brillanti per non parlare della copia d'altri generi con molti altri preziosissimi che furono trovati e descritti colla prefata assistenza [the Maggiordomo was assisted by some other officials] nel Palazzo Pontificio del Quirinale. Tutta questa ricca eredità venne in possesso del predetto sgr. abbate Fabbri sebbene, considerato quel molto di più che avrebbe potuto, sì esso che la di lui casa, acquistare quando il gran Clemente non fosse stato sempre contrario al nepotismo, era certamente una scarsa porzione di ricchezza." So Tanucci had reason to *write to Centomani on October 8, 1774: "L'eredità di 70.000 scudi fa onore al papa." Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6024. The Abbé Geronimo Fabbri was the "unico sobrino que ha dejado Clemente XIV. en la carrera eclesiastica", Moñino wrote to Grimaldi on August 17, 1775 (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome).

¹ CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 404; NOVAES, XV., 218.

he confirmed it with his monument of Clement XIV., which took him four years to complete.¹

The monument was erected at the end of the left aisle of the said basilica, over the entrance to the sacristy, where unfortunately, owing to the poor light, it cannot be fully appreciated. It is in two parts. Over one side of a sarcophagus in the antique style is bowed the figure of "Temperance"; at the other side is the seated figure of "Benevolence" in an attitude of grief. Behind the sarcophagus rises a pedestal inscribed simply "Clemens XIII. Pont. Max." and bearing the over-life-size figure of the Pope. Clothed in the Papal robes and wearing the triple tiara, Clement sits enthroned, his right hand far outstretched, not in the act of blessing but as a gesture of command, in the style of a Roman emperor. The impression of energy is strengthened by the position of the left hand, which rests securely on the arm of the throne. Although the statue fails to reproduce the character of the deceased² this first monumental creation of classicism in Rome possesses values which are universally recognized: noble simplicity, clear composition, perfect harmony of architecture and sculpture. Art-historians are agreed that with his first Papal monument Canova had blazed a new trail for funereal sculpture.³

¹ MISSIRINI, *Vita di A. Canova*, Prato, 1824, 51 *seqq.*; LÜCKE in DOHME, *Kunst und Künstler des 19. Jahrhunderts* (1886), 7 *seqq.*; A. G. MEYER, *Canova*, Bielefeld, 1898, 18 *seq.*; MALAMANI, *Canova*, Milano, 1920, 27 *seqq.*; MACKOWSKY, *J. G. Schadows Jugend und Aufstieg*, Berlin, 1927, 105 *seqq.*; CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 404; ESCHER, 172; SANTILLI, *La basilica de' SS. Apostoli*, Roma, 1925, 86-91.

² GREGOROVIVS, *Grabmäler*, 93.

³ Mayer's judgment in MACKOWSKY (*loc. cit.*). In a letter of April 17, 1787, Francesco Milizia expresses the admiration of the younger school as opposed to the elder one of the Michelangelists, Berninists, and Borrominists. "In their design, expression, and drapery, these three statues would seem to have been chiselled in the best periods of Greek art. And all the accessories, the symbols, the architecture, are of the same noble simplicity. . . . No sinuosities

The monument was completed and set up in SS. Apostoli by the end of April, 1787,¹ but it was not till January, 1802, that the body of Clement XIV. was moved very quietly from St. Peter's to this basilica.² This was in the reign of Pius VII., who with his Constitution of August 7th, 1814, revoked the Brief of July 21st, 1773, and ordained the complete restoration of the Society of Jesus, since "as it seemed to him, it would be a serious offence in the eyes of God to withhold any longer in such troublous times these powerful and experienced oarsmen from the bark of the Church."³ If these words of Pius VII., a son of the Benedictine Order, were an indirect condemnation of Clement XIV.'s principal act, on the ground that the well-being of the whole Church had been gravely injured by the suppression of the famous Order, some Protestant historians concur in such a judgment when they describe the destruction of the Jesuit Order, extorted by Spain, as "directly contrary to the interests of the Papacy".⁴

and projections, no fretwork or volutes, no asperities or extravagances, not even flowers, festoons, and gilding, and certainly no variegated marbles. Of all the many monuments that I know, both to Popes and to others, there is not one that is superior either in whole or in part, in invention or in execution. . . . And this time my eyes do not deceive me, for apart from the general praise lavished on Canova by the whole people, who wish him health, wealth, and honour, I hear also the judgment of most intelligent artists, that of all modern works this is the nearest to antiquity." See MISSIRINI, *loc. cit.*, 59 seq.

¹ Report of the envoy from Lucca, in *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XX., 424.

² NOVAES, XV., 217.

³ *Bull. Cont.*, VII., 1097.

⁴ Thus G. KRÜGER, *Das Papsttum, seine Idee und ihre Träger*, Tübingen, 1907, 125. Others hold far stronger views.