



THE
HISTORY OF THE POPES

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

DRAWN FROM THE SECRET ARCHIVES OF THE VATICAN AND OTHER
ORIGINAL SOURCES

FROM THE GERMAN OF THE LATE

LUDWIG, FREIHERR VON PASTOR

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CLEMENT XIII. (1758-1769)

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXVII.

CLEMENT XIII., 1758-1769

	PAGE
Table of Contents	vii
List of Unpublished Documents in Appendix	xii
 The Church Policy of Charles III. of Spain—The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain.	I
 The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Naples, Parma, and Malta. The Monitorium to Parma. Preparations for the Papal Suppression of the Society of Jesus. Death of Clement XIII.	214
 Clement XIII.'s activities within the Church. The Creation of Cardinals. Canonizations. The Missions	362
 Appendix of Unpublished Documents and Extracts from Archives	437
 Index of Names	449

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXVII.

CLEMENT XIII., 1758-1769.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHURCH POLICY OF CHARLES III. OF SPAIN.—THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS FROM SPAIN.

A.D.		PAGE
	The reasons for the hostility towards the Jesuits in Spain	1
	The regular clergy annoyed with them. The effect of the disturbances in Paraguay	2
	Wall's policy	3
	Abusive writings against the Jesuits	4
	The character of Charles III.	6
	The influence on him of Wall and	8
	Tanucci	9
1759	Spinola on the ecclesiastical situation	16
	The dispute about the <i>Exequatur</i> ; Mésenguy's Catechism	18
1762	The Pragmatic Sanction	25
1763	Its suspension	27
	Wall succeeded by Grimaldi	28
	Restrictions of the Church's freedom	29
	Tanucci and the Jesuits	31
	Their former influence	34
	The ground prepared for their expulsion	35
	Campomanes and	40
	Roda	41
	Signs of the coming expulsion	44
1766	The " Hat and Cloak Riots "	48
	Charles III. leaves Madrid	52
	Aranda President of the Council of Castile	54
	Withdrawal of the royal concessions	58
	Tanucci on Aranda's appointment	60
	The search for the originators of the rising	62
	The clergy's alleged connexion with it	64
	Tanucci's views	67
	The Extraordinary Council of Castile	72
	Campomanes' first and	73
	Second reports; his charge against the clergy	74
	The search for evidence against the Jesuits	77
	The disturbances at Azpeitia	81

A.D.	PAGE
	84
	86
	88
1767	91
	97
	99
	100
	103
	105
	109
	111
	119
	124
	127
	128
	132
	134
	135
	136
	137
	138
	141
	143
	144
	150
	152
	154
	155
	157
	158
	159
	163
	164
	168
	170
	172
	173
1768	174
	176
	178
	184
	185
	187
	188
	189
	191

A.D.		PAGE
	The hunt for the Jesuit treasure	192
	The alleged anti-Spanish plots of the exiles	194
	Suppression of pro-Jesuit manifestations	197
	Measures for the extirpation of Jesuitism	199
	Campomanes' anti-clerical measures	201
	Decay of the ecclesiastical spirit in Spain	204
	The hierarchy attacked	206
	The disposal and administration of Jesuit property	208
	The king's servants rewarded	212

CHAPTER II.

THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS FROM NAPLES, PARMA, AND MALTA. THE MONITORIUM TO PARMA. PREPARATIONS FOR THE PAPAL SUPPRESSION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS. DEATH OF CLEMENT XIII.

	Tanucci's attacks on ecclesiastical rights.	214
	His delight at the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain	218
	His influence on Ferdinand IV.	220
	His grounds for expelling the Jesuits from Naples	221
	Charles III.'s attitude	226
1767	His final assent	229
	The expulsion commission	230
	The expulsion postponed	233
	The decrees of banishment	235
	The first expulsion	237
	Expulsion from Sicily	238
	Secularizations	239
	The people's reception of the expulsion	242
	The Pope's protest against the violation of his territory	243
	Has little effect on the Courts. Tanucci and the nuncio	244
	Tanucci's further anti-clerical efforts	246
	His tyranny over the royal family	248
	Expulsion of the Jesuits from Parma planned	251
	Charles III.'s advice	253
	The expulsion postponed	254
1768	Ferdinand signs the decree of banishment	255
	The execution of the decree and its effect on the outer world	257
	Its effects in Parma	258
	Downfall of Du Tillot. The expulsion of the Jesuits from Malta	259
	Parma's attacks on the Church	266
	Evoke a Papal monitorium	268
	Its effect on the Bourbons	269

A.D.	PAGE
	271
	275
	276
	277
	280
	281
	283
	285
	287
	288
	289
	293
	294
	296
	297
	298
	300
	302
	305
	307
	310
	311
	312
	314
	318
1767	320
	321
	324
	325
	330
	332
	333
	335
	336
	337
	338
	340
	341
	342
	345
	347
	349
1769	351
	354
	355
	356
	357
	358
	359

CHAPTER III.

CLEMENT XIII.'S ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CHURCH.
THE CREATION OF CARDINALS. CANONIZATIONS. THE
MISSIONS.

A.D.		PAGE
1759	The main task of Clement XIII.'s pontificate as delineated by himself. His letter to the Bishops .	362
	Clement XIII. and the censorship	365
	The cure of souls	367
	Learning	368
	Anxiety about secularization in Germany	370
1762	Difficulties with Venice,	371
1760	Genoa, and	374
1761	Lucca	377
	The Pope and the Bishops	378
1765	The petition of the twenty-eight Maurists	381
	Why the Orders were detested	383
	The commission of reform	386
1766	The suppression of a Papal Brief	390
	Spontaneous reforms within the Orders	391
	The cardinalitial promotion of 1758.	393
1758	The promotion of Priuli and Bernis	394
	The promotion of 1759	395
	The promotion of 1761	398
	The promotions of 1763 and 1766	399
	The canonizations of 1767	401
	Beatifications	402
1765	The Feast of the Sacred Heart	404
	The canonization process of Palafox	409
	The destruction of the foreign missions	413
1767	The Franciscans in California and Mexico	416
	The missions in North America and	417
	South America	419
1756	Pottier in Sutchuen	421
	The missions in the Far East,	422
	India, and	425
	Africa	426
	The Polish missions to the Jews	427
	The Uniats in Poland and	428
	The Near East	429
	Some missionary Briefs of Clement XIII.	434

APPENDIX OF UNPUBLISHED
DOCUMENTS AND EXTRACTS FROM
ARCHIVES.

	PAGE
1. Aranda to Roda, April 9th, 1766, on the " Hat and Cloak " Riots	439
2. Diplomatic Documents on the Suppression of the Jesuits	440

CHAPTER I.

THE CHURCH POLICY OF CHARLES III. OF SPAIN—THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS FROM SPAIN.

(1)

EVEN Catholic Spain had not been unaffected by the anti-clerical ideas of the age.¹ The upper ranks of the Spanish nobility, from which the diplomats and higher officials were drawn, travelled to London and Paris and formed connexions with the families of foreign aristocrats. They maintained relations with Diderot and D'Alembert, moved in the circles of Madame Geoffrin and Mademoiselle Lespinasse, and even went on pilgrimage to the patriarch of Ferney, where men accused their own nations of barbarity and fanaticism in the hope of being complimented by Voltaire on their enlightenment.² Complete unbelievers, however, like Count Aranda, were still rare in Spain. In many cases the philosophy of enlightenment was a question of fashion, a veneer which quickly wore off on the return to the fatherland. But there were others who brought back with them the desire to reform the land of their birth. Of these, one group was content to confine its efforts within the bounds set by religion and the monarchy. Others, on the other hand, had been impressed by the theory they had heard expounded abroad, that enlightenment was the real cause of national revival and of progress in general, and that conversely the backwardness of Southern Europe was attributable to the Church.³ In this way a mental

¹ MOREL FATIO, *Études sur l'Espagne*, II., Paris, 1890, 9 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, II., 564 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 169 *seq.*; FERNAN-NUÑEZ, *Vida*, I., Prólogo, xv; BRÜCK, *Die geheimen Gesellschaften in Spanien*, Mainz, 1881, I.

² MOREL FATIO, II., 137; COLOMA, *Retratos del antiaño*, 42 *seqq.*

³ DANVILA Y COLLADO, II., 565 *seqq.* Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 371.

attitude arose, in which a dislike of religion and the Church, together with fashionable conceptions of God and the world, and with the new principles of the structure of the State and society, were welded into a formal system. This opposition to the existing order received reinforcements from among the Jansenists, who sought to justify their resistance to the ecclesiastical authority by exposing the numerous ecclesiastical abuses.

So far as the Jesuits were concerned, a strong opposition to them had developed among the regular clergy. The Augustinians bore them a grudge for their attacks on the greatest of their scholars of that time, Cardinal Noris.¹ The monks in general had been irritated by the humorous romance *Fray Gerundio*, in which the Jesuit José Francisco de Isla had ridiculed the baroque style of preaching then in vogue and had scored a huge success. Isla had not the least intention of slighting monasticism but the fact of his hero being a monk aroused among the older Orders a certain dislike of the Jesuits. In any case, the time at which the book appeared was inopportune: in the Voltairean era it might well have been used as a weapon by those who scoffed at all religion. It is not surprising, therefore, that the book found its way into the Spanish and then the Roman Index. For the Society of Jesus the winning of so thorough a success by one of its members at the expense of other religious was a calamity.²

Great harm was done to the Spanish Government's relations with the Jesuits by the disturbances in Paraguay, which were connected with the "Treaty of Limits" between Spain and Portugal.³ The conflicts there also brought about a change in

¹ See our account, Vol. XXXV., 363 *seqq.*

² Cf. GAUDEAU, *Les prêcheurs burlesques en Espagne au XVIII^e siècle. Étude sur le P. Isla*, Paris, 1891; BAUMGARTNER in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXVIII. (1905), 82 *seqq.*, 182 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 149 *seqq.*; ASTRÁIN, VII., 205 *seqq.*; *Cartas familiares del P. José Francisco de Isla*, León, 1903, 1 *seqq.*; MURR, *Journal*, XI. (1743), 231-89.

³ See our account, Vol. XXXV., 416 *seqq.*

the policy of the Court. The Colonial Minister Ensenada¹ regarded the treaty as harmful to Spain; Queen Barbara, however, a Portuguese princess who still looked after the interests of her native land even when in another country, cherished it as her own work. Ensenada, who was also disliked by the English because of his anxiety to build a strong fleet for the protection of the colonies, was overthrown² and in his fall dragged down with him the king's confessor.³ The man who now had the shaping of Spain's foreign policy was Richard Wall, who considered the Indians' resistance to the treaty to be an obstacle in the way of his Anglophile policy

¹ For Ensenada, see RODRIGUEZ VILLA, *Ensayo biográfico de D. Cenón de Somodevilla, Marqués de Ensenada* (1878); EGUIA RUIZ, *El Marqués de la Ensenada*, Madrid, 1922; LEONHARD, *Agrarpolitik*, 10.

² *Valenti to Enriquez, August 15, 1754, Registro di lettere, Nunziat. di Spagna, 428, Papal Secret Archives. ROUSSEAU (I., 155 seq.) states that the Court of Naples, as the result of secret information received from Ensenada, raised objections to the frontier treaty, whereupon the queen, enraged by the breach of secrecy, caused Ensenada to be dismissed. Tanucci, on the other hand, maintains (*to Yaci, January 6, 1756, Archives of Simancas) that King Charles had certainly never spoken to his brother Ferdinand about American affairs. The nuncio Spinola also rejects the protest made by Naples (*to Torrigiani, April 23, 1759, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 285, *loc. cit.*) but ascribes Ensenada's downfall to the queen. Queen Maria Amalie (*to Tanucci on April 22 and June 3, 1760, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6040) and Charles III. say quite clearly that Ensenada was not to blame (*to Tanucci, July 8, 1760, *ibid.*, 6043). Cf. RODRIGUEZ VILLA, 194; EGUIA RUIZ, 56 seqq.

³ The nuncio Spinola (*to Torrigiani, April 23, 1759, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 285, *loc. cit.*) ascribes Rábago's dismissal also to the queen, who wanted to put an end to his influence on the king. Rábago *wrote to the Spanish Assistant Céspedes on December 2, 1755: "Solo diré que el confesionario nos ha perdido muchos buenos amigos, y nos ha substituido los falsos, que lo fingian para hazer sus negocios" (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7381).

and was accordingly angry with the Jesuits as the supposed authors of the insurrection. All the Jesuits' protestations of innocence were of no avail. On the other hand, great credit was attached to the reports of their enemies—and of Ibañez, who had twice been dismissed from the Order.¹ Confidential information about the Jesuits in Paraguay was forwarded, at Wall's instance, to the Cardinals Passionei and Spinelli in Rome.² When the General of the Order, Centurioni, offered to produce the complete correspondence of the missionaries in order to prove their innocence, he was met with the retort that, besides the letters he was prepared to produce, there were secret ones containing orders in the opposite sense.³ The missionary Gervasoni, who came to Madrid to represent the views and wishes of his brethren in Paraguay, was abruptly ordered by Wall to leave the country.⁴

The conditions in Paraguay supplied material for a veritable flood of abusive writings against the Jesuits.⁵ The reductions, which after all only formed a self-administered body⁶ which had been held closely in check by the Spanish Government, were represented as a State within a State.⁷ The

¹ Cf. **Razon de los Papeles*, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688, fo. 358.

² “ *He estimado mucho lo que V.E. me dice en punto de su conducta sobre las cosas de los Jesuitas en el Paraguay para instruir a Passionei y Spinelli, como lo haré ” (Roda to Wall, August 9, 1759, *ibid.*, Estado 4966).

³ *Centurioni to Wall, April 7, 1756, *ibid.*, 7381; *Wall to Centurioni, May 11, 1756, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 39.

⁴ *Wall to Portocarrero, February 24, 1756, *ibid.*

⁵ E.g. “ Republica de Paraguay ”, “ Verdad innegable contra la ambición declarada ”, “ Cartas de Palafox ”, “ Monedas del Re Nicola I. ”; *Jos. Ign. Fr. de Córdova and the licentiate Manuel de Salvatierra to Charles III. on March 21, 1760, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

⁶ FASSBINDER, 56 *seqq.*

⁷ *El Reyno Jesuítico del Paraguay por siglo y medio negado y oculo, hoy demostrado y descubierto su autor D. Bernardo Ibañez de*

colonial prosperity resulting from years of industry, thrift, and skilful organization was attributed to the exploitation of secret gold, silver,¹ or diamond mines.² The existence of large depositories in the commercial towns and harbours, which were used for the sale of surplus products, prompted their enemies to accuse the Jesuits of illicit trading.³ In addition, the missionaries had the bitter knowledge that these distortions of their self-sacrificing activity originated not only with Religious⁴ but even with former members of their own Society⁵ who did not shrink from spreading the rumour that the Pope would have liked the Bishops to forbid Jesuits to hear confessions; in Rome, they alleged, the suppression of the Society was being considered in all seriousness.⁶ Instructed by the Cardinal Secretary of State, the Madrid nuncio had to

Echavarri, Madrid, 1770 (according to p. 241, it was written in Paraguay in 1761). Cf. TESCHAUER, *Hist. do Rio Grande do Sul*, III., 14 *seq.*

¹ Neither gold nor silver is to be found in Paraguay. MOUSSY, II, 18 *seq.*; FASSBINDER, 83 *seq.*, 119.

² *Saez to the Rector of Vill[agarcia], December 7, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666.

³ MOUSSY, II, 17 *seq.*; FASSBINDER, 108 *seq.*; DUHR, *Jesuitenfabeln*⁴, 621 *seqq.*

⁴ "Lo cierto es, que es cosa dura: los Jesuitas por servir a la monarquia y a Dios se ben aqui tan maltratados, pues hasta aora el pobre P. Unger está en su prisión en el Rio [de] Janeyro, su compañero murió, y todas estas cosas no bastan para defender nos contra las calumnias sembradas de los emisarios del Portogal" (Ladislaus Oros to Jos. Robles, dated Córdova, 1766, September 27, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 690). The Dominican Mañalich had news, which he had himself invented or distorted, sent back from America and he then published it as news from Paraguay (*J.I. Fr. de Córdova and Salvatierra to Charles III., March 21, 1760, *ibid.*, 688). The authentic proofs are in fo. 316 *seqq.*

⁵ *Rafael de Córdova to F. Montes, March 20, 1767, *ibid.*, 777. The letter mentions the "alemanes hombres pacientisimos todos del trabajo".

⁶ *Torrighiani to Spinola, February 22, 1759, Nunziat. di Spagna, 410, *loc. cit.*

protest against the dissemination of such rumours, and his representations to the Grand Inquisitor and the President of the Council of Castile brought about the condemnation of seven or eleven of such writings, much to Wall's annoyance.¹

The atmosphere, therefore, was extremely tense, and no one could foresee the future.

On August 10th, 1759, shortly after Clement XIII. had ascended the throne, Ferdinand VI. of Spain died insane. How the relations between Church and State in the Iberian Peninsula would develop under the new pontificate depended entirely on the deceased monarch's successor, the former King of the Two Sicilies; as Charles III. he entered Madrid very quietly on December 9th, 1759.

From the time of his succession to the present day the impression given by the new king has been far from uniform. Just as his outward appearance is described by some writers as unprepossessing,² by others as knightly,³ so also in the domain of the spirit the destroyer of the Jesuit Order is regarded by some as a highly-gifted standard-bearer and the creator of a new era,⁴ by others as a man of limited intelligence.⁵ A certain measure of sound judgment is not to be denied him; on the other hand, the personal expressions of opinion to be found in the hundreds of letters he wrote to his

¹ *Ibid.*; *Spinola to the Grand Inquisitor, March 21, 1759, Archives of Simancas, Inquisicion, 443; *Grand Inquisitor Quintano to Spinola, March 23, 1759, *ibid.*; *Spinola to Torrigiani, March 19, 1759, Nunziat. di Spagna, 285, *loc. cit.*; Torrigiani's *answer, of April 5, 1759, *ibid.*, 410; Decree of the Inquisition of May 13, 1759 (printed), Archives of Simancas, Inquisicion, 443, and Nunziat. di Spagna, 262, *loc. cit.*

² ROUSSEAU, I., 8; TRIPODO, *L'espulsione dei Gesuiti dalle Sicilie*, Palermo, 1906, 19.

³ FERRER DEL RIO, I., 197.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁵ "Era hombre de cortísimo entendimiento, más dado a la caza que a los negocios, y aunque terco y dudoso, bueno en el fondo y muy piadoso, pero con devoción poco ilustrada, que le hacía solicitar de Roma con necia y pueril insistencia la canonización

relatives, and especially in those he wrote to his confidant Tanucci, scarcely afford grounds for regarding him as having natural gifts above the normal. Apart from his poor handwriting, his mode of expression is awkward, almost as wooden as a schoolboy's, and, most noticeably, it is devoid of any flight of thought. As is typical of petty minds, Charles III. was self-willed and obstinate ; once he had formed an opinion, withdrawal from it was unthinkable. Along with this, he had a lofty conception of his dignity and duty as a ruler.¹ He reserved decision for himself in all matters of government, but in the process he involved himself so deeply in details that business was transacted with extreme slowness.

Charles III.'s private life was irreproachable.² He kept faith with his consort, Maria Amalie, a daughter of Augustus III. of Saxony, and even after her early death he did not cast about for mistresses. His mode of life was always simple, as also was his dress. He rose punctually every morning at 5.45. The pastime in which he indulged with a certain avidity was hunting, with which he hoped to counter the hereditary melancholy of his House and to steel himself against sexual sensitiveness.

In the matter of religion Charles had the reputation of being a convinced Christian. Apart from daily Mass he prayed every morning and evening for a quarter of an hour and was an

de un leguito llamado el hermano Sebastián, de quien era fanático devoto, al mismo tiempo que consentía y autorizaba todo género de atropellos contra cosas y personas eclesiásticas y de tentativas para descatalogar a su pueblo " (MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 130). " Undeservedly he appears in history, surrounded by a halo of glory, as the sole originator of the Spanish experiments in reform, which in fact were undertaken under, not by, him . . . His merit consists principally in his having selected a group of energetic and capable Ministers, whom he allowed to do the ruling, while he devoted his whole life to the chase " (LEONHARD, *Agrarpolitik*, 8 seq.).

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., *Introd.*, iv.

² *Ibid.*, II seq., 21, 109 ; FERNAN-NUÑEZ, II., 53 seqq. ; FERRER DEL RIO, I., 193 seqq.

ardent promoter of devotion to the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady.¹ He was a firm adherent of the Catholic Church and disapproved of the doctrines put about by the French Encyclopedists. None of this, however, prevented him in his capacity of ruler from relying on counsellors who were admirers and apt pupils of French enlightenment. In them he found willing helpers in the defence or restoration of his supposed sovereign rights in the ecclesiastical domain. He continued along the lines of his predecessors Philip V. and Ferdinand VI., who in the fight against the so-called encroachments of Rome bullied the Church out of one right after the other.

Charles' Minister in the first years of his Spanish period was Richard Wall, an Irishman who after some not very successful efforts in the service of the Spanish fleet had turned his attention to diplomacy. Active as a Spanish secret agent, first at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, then in London, he obtained the post of ambassador to the English Government and returned to Madrid in 1764, with the rank of field-marshal, to take over the Ministry. In foreign affairs he favoured an Anglophile policy; with regard to religious questions he was thoroughly imbued with the principles of the all-powerful State, but made every effort to conceal these convictions. He had no respect for the rights of the Apostolic See and would gladly have meted out to the Spanish Jesuits the fate that had befallen their colleagues in Portugal.²

¹ Cf. below, p. 404.

² " *Eccomi per tanto in obbligo di informare in oggi più distintamente l'E. V. avvertendola colla maggior segretezza, qualmente esso Ministro [Wall] . . . non può soffrire i Padri della Compagnia, e senza ascoltar ragione o fare le necessarie distinzioni, vorrebbe, si potesse, scacciarli da Spagna, godendo per tanto assai apertamente di ciò che attualmente succede ne' domini del Portogallo. Il peggio è, che la di lui, non so se dica avversione o animosità, si estende ancora contra la nostra corte ed i più incontrastabili diritti della Sede Apost., sicome io ho purtroppo riconosciuto chiaramente in diverse occasioni fuori della presente, malgrado la sua grande dissimulazione ed artificio per darmi intendere il contrario . . . Dopo aver letto quanto sopra, sarebbe

The really dominating mind, however, which forced the suspicious but at bottom well-intentioned king into its way of thinking and kept him there, belonged to a person who resided not in Madrid, but in Naples. This was Charles' former tutor, his Neapolitan Minister, and his confidant, Marchese Bernardo Tanucci,¹ whom he had left behind in Naples as the mentor of his son and successor, Ferdinand IV., who was not yet of age. One looks in vain for original ideas among Tanucci's works; the elegance with which he expressed himself had often to serve as a cloak for his poverty of thought,² but at the same time he possessed a goodly measure of knowledge. Choiseul thought but little of him. "Ministers of this type," he wrote,³ "are not cut out for the handling of great affairs. One has to confine oneself to punishing them by contempt of the paltry methods of their base and cunning policies." On another

V. E. forse sorpresa, se potesse qui vedere l'aria apparente di personale amicizia e confidenza con cui viviamo il prefato Ministro ed io; ma tale è il suo carattere, ed a me conviene di accomodarmi e pagare della stessa moneta . . ." [The letter was sent through an agent, Mgr. Boschi]. "Mi lusingo non disapproverà V. E. la precauzione non mai inutile o eccessiva, quando si ha da fare con gente scaltra e il di cui animo già naturalmente verso di noi ulcerato non bisogna irritare di vantaggio." (Spinola to Torrigiani, March 26, 1759, Cifra, Nunziat. di Spagna, 285, Papal Secret Archives).

¹ CALLÀ ULLOA, *Di Bernardo Tanucci e dei suoi tempi*, Naples, 1875; FERRER DEL RIO, I., 212 *seqq.*; MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 132; DANVILA Y COLLADO, II., 268 *seqq.*; COLLETTA, *Storia del reame di Napoli dal 1734 sino al 1825*, Naples, 1861; ROUSSEAU, I., 162; CROCE, *Storia del regno di Napoli* (1926), *Uomini e cose di vecchia Italia* (1927); ONNIS, *Bern. Tanucci nel moto anticurialista del settecento*, in *Nuova Riv. storica*, X., 328-365; DUHR in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LV. (1898), 292 *seqq.*; RINIERI, *Della Rovina*, *Introduz.*; CROCE, *Studi sulla vita religiosa a Napoli nel settecento*, in *Critica Rivista di lett., storia e filosofia*, XXIV. (1926), 1-82.

² CHŁĘDOWSKI, *Neapolitanische Kulturbilder*, 460; TRIPODO, *Espulsione*, 24.

³ To Aubeterre, October 4, 1768, in ROUSSEAU, I., 266.

occasion he brought a direct charge of deceitfulness against his colleague in Naples, who was himself never tired of robbing others of their reputation for honesty and truthfulness. "I confess," he wrote to Aubeterre, "I am astonished at the far too serious attention you pay to the barefaced swindles practised by Tanucci and Orsini and the stupid lies they tell at your expense."¹ The Papal Secretary of State, Torrigiani, also speaks of Tanucci's lies.²

Charles III. gave his former tutor his complete confidence. He addressed him as an intimate, told him of all his cares and business matters, made known to him all his plans and secrets, sought his advice, and did not change his attitude towards him even when Tanucci had fallen from power in Naples. Thus honoured, Tanucci repaid his ruler's friendship by devoting himself entirely to his service, incidentally achieving thereby his own promotion.³ With his restless activity⁴ he was the real and sole ruler of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. His despotism extended even to the family of his royal ward. Despite the tears of the young king and the anger of his wife he insisted on the removal of several trusted friends from the royal couple's entourage.⁵ By invoking the name of King

¹ *Ibid.*, 267, n. 2.

² "Ella sia pur certa, che tutto il discorso fatto dal Marchese Tanucci al Provinciale de' Gesuiti, che leggo nei suoi numeri de' 28 Settembre, è un imposto di bugie secondo il solito del medesimo sig. Marchese, che mai è costante ne' suoi detti e spaccia con straordinaria franchezza cento falsità in un discorso" (to Pallavicini, October 21, 1762, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*); Losada, August 10, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5977.

³ ONNIS, *loc. cit.*, 356 *seqq.*; CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 94 *seq.*, and in DÖLLINGER, III., 31.

⁴ Tanucci's *correspondence in the Archives of Simancas comprises thirty-nine quarto and eleven folio volumes (ONNIS, 356, n. 2).

⁵ *Tanucci to Charles III., November 1, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6006. For the removal of Queen Carolina's German confessor, *cf.* *Tanucci to Charles III., December 6, 1768 and February 7, 1767, *ibid.*, 6007.

Charles he broke down all resistance,¹ and he was clever enough to make his own thoughts and intentions known to his royal master in such a way that they came back to Naples from Madrid in the form of royal commands. He himself distributed all favours and, when it suited his purpose, took the reins of government from the young king's hands into his own.²

Like nearly all the Ministers of the European Great Powers at that period, Tanucci was pondering plans of reform. In particular, his object was to abolish the privileged positions of the feudal aristocracy and the clergy, so as to increase the power of the prince.³ In the matter of religion he was no friend of the Jansenists as a party,⁴ but he shared their dislike of Rome and the Church as it then was.⁵ Unfortunately, his dissatisfaction with the worldly activities of many prelates was often only too well justified; but the purpose of his censures was not to improve the Church but to drag its representatives, and thus the Church itself, into the mire and make it an object of contempt. His correspondence with trusted acquaintances shows some regular outbursts of rage in this respect. "Worse than Constantinople, where the Grand Turk rules," he wrote,⁶ "is the dung-heap of Rome." For him Rome was

¹ ONNIS, 346 *seqq.*, 351 *seqq.*

² Letter of Joseph II. to Maria Theresa, in CHŁĘDOWSKI, 460; COLLETTA, I., 83 *seq.*; DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 293 *seq.*

³ COLLETTA, I., 83 *seq.*

⁴ "Io non trovo i Giansenisti migliori dei Gesuiti; già li trovo egualmente bugiardi, calunniatori e sediziosi. Bisogna esser sicuro di non cader nei Giansenisti cacciando li Gesuiti" (*Tanucci to Galiani, August 8, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6001; ONNIS, 334). Tanucci was a reader of the Jansenistic *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* (*Tanucci to Catanti, April 9, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5993; ONNIS, 335 *seqq.*).

⁵ "Tanucci was probably the most hostile Minister the Curia had every encountered in a Catholic State. This was the man who controlled the destiny of Naples for forty-three years" (BROSCH, *Kirchenstaat*, II., 78). And yet he was not just an unbeliever (ONNIS, 335 *seqq.*).

⁶ *To Bottari, November 21, 1761, Bibl. Corsini in Rome, Cod. 1602.

a hotbed of atheism, where hypocrisy, the Inquisition, the Dataria, and the Jesuits held sway.¹ For more than ten centuries Rome had been the greatest enemy of the Christian, Apostolic, and universal religion and had always sacrificed it to Mammon and the passions.² According to him, in the Spanish Concordat Benedict XIV. had ceded the right of patronage in exchange for money.³ Clement XIII. was a simpleton,⁴ Archbishop Beaumont of Paris, with his manly defence of the Church, was a fool; ⁵ the Cardinals were the most verminous creatures in the world; ⁶ and there was no animal in the whole of the Apocalypse which could serve as a symbol for the Papacy as it was in his time, with that scoundrel Torrigiani and the anti-Christian Jesuits.⁷ The Pope called himself the servant of the servants of God, but was as proud as Sardanapalus or the Shah of Persia.⁸ Pombal's action against the Church met with Tanucci's full approval: for the first time in a century he had spoken the language of a Catholic prince. With jubilation Tanucci greeted the light that was now beginning to spread among the Catholic guardians of the State; they knew now how to distinguish dogma and worship from jurisdiction and fees.⁹

For the religious Orders the Minister had a particular dislike.¹⁰ The nobility, women, and monks were the plague of

¹ *To Centomani, October 2, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5978.

² *To Santa Elisabetta, November 30, 1762, *ibid.*

³ *To Nefetti, March 27, 1753, *ibid.*, 5935.

⁴ *To Charles III., September 20, 1763, *ibid.*, 5978.

⁵ *To Galiani, December 15, 1764, *ibid.*, 5991; to the same, February 11, 1764, *ibid.*, 5988.

⁶ *To Nefetti, December 17, 1753, *ibid.*, 5935.

⁷ *To Bottari, August 11, 1761, Bibl. Corsini in Rome, Cod. 1602.

⁸ *To Centomani, April 7, 1764, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5988.

⁹ *To Centomani, December 1, 1759, *ibid.*, 5959.

¹⁰ In Tanucci's opinion all monks were "un vero canchero del genere umano, presentemente, occupati d'avarizia e di ozio,

sovereigns. Wherever the monkish rabble settled, they sowed intrigue, unrest, and corruption.¹ There was no animal in the whole of Nature so ferocious as the monk, once he had broken his halter. Think of the bloodshed caused by St. Dominic! ²

Tanucci was also in agreement with the consequences that followed from these principles. Certainly the primacy of the Pope was incontestable; he was the supreme head and centre of the Church; he had the right to summon a General Council, and he was infallible, but only when he made decisions in conjunction with the Bishops.³ But the Papacy in the form it had assumed in his day would have to be abolished.⁴ His ideal of a Church was based on the Jansenist conceptions of the original one, whose noble simplicity would have to be restored; that is, there would be Bishops and parish priests, and that would be enough.⁵ For him the so-called privileges of the Gallican Church were no more than the common law of the Church.⁶ Consequently, he admired Febronius, the

principalmente, e di burlare li governi in tutto come se fossero stabiliti nelle repubbliche per disfarle, e opporsi alle lor leggi fondamentali" (to Bottari, April 5, 1760, in ONNIS, 341). A few exceptions apart, the clergy, both secular and regular, were "feccia del genere umano, viziosi per lo più e ignoranti, che non si mescolano di teologia nè di altre opere d'ingegno" (to Bottari, March 18, 1760, *ibid.*, 350).

¹ *To Bottari, October 6, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602.

² *To Nefetti, May 28, 1754, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5935.

³ To Galiani, March 19, 1768, to Bottari, March 4 and May 3, 1761, and July 13, 1762, in ONNIS, 336 *seq.*

⁴ " *Mancò [in Florence] il coraggio dopo aver presa senza esame la risoluzione di non ricevere il Nunzio, il quale in Firenze è quella cosa romana, che si deve cacciare qualche giorno dopo aver abolito il Papato, qual' è presentemente" (to Centomani, July 11, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6001). Cf. *Grimaldi to Tanucci, June 23, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

⁵ *To Centomani, April 11, 1767, *ibid.*, 6000.

⁶ *To Galiani, September 19, 1767, *ibid.*, 6002.

“ publisher of Du Pin ”,¹ and he praised the good Catholics of Utrecht,² whose council he found quite regular and unobjectionable. In order to condemn it the Pope himself had had to fall back upon a heretical assertion.³ In the course of time these utterances and principles were followed by deeds. Quite consciously and of set purpose Tanucci sought out opportunities of offending the Holy See.⁴ As an inevitable consequence he was opposed to the Society of Jesus, and Torrigiani indeed declared that Tanucci was the greatest enemy the Jesuits had in Naples.⁵

¹ *To Centomani, April 27, 1765, *ibid.*, 5993. Febronius did not go far enough for the Spanish envoy in Rome, Roda, as he had only repeated what others had written before him (*Tanucci to Catanti, November 22, 1765, *ibid.*). On account of his father's services, the son of Pietro Giannone, who had refused to recognize the Church as an association with sovereign rights and had denied its right to make its own laws, was granted by Tanucci a pension of 300 ducats (RINIERI, *Rovina*, *Introduz.*, XXXVII; BROSCHE, *Kirchenstaat*, II., 3 *seq.*).

² *To Catanti, November 22, 1763, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5987.

³ *Pamfili to Torrigiani, October 10, 1763, Cifre, Nunziat. di Francia, 518, *loc. cit.* “ *Vedo il concilio d'Utrecht regolare e canonico, non so perchè Roma se ne offende. Della Roma Rezzonica e gesuitica non mi maraviglierei, ma maraviglio della Roma Lambertina, che fece la scomunica ” (to Catanti, November 15, 1763. Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5987). “ *Il concilio d'Utrecht è stato condannato con una Bolla, la quale non vi ha trovato eresia ; per trovarvi da dire il Papa ha detto una eresia ” (to Catanti, June 11, 1765, *ibid.*, 5993). “ *Pero se ha notado, come la notarà tambien V. E., que en el sinodo [of Utrecht] non se contiene cosa que se pueda condenar por eretica o que se pueda oler de eretico ” (*Cardinal Orsini to Tanucci, May 7, 1765, *ibid.*, 4972).

⁴ “ *Costi si opera per dispetto e non solo non si lasciano, ma si cercano le ragioni per fare ingiuria alla S. Sede ” (Torrighiani to Lucatelli, October 28, 1760, Nunziat. di Napoli, 259, Papal Secret Archives).

⁵ *To Pallavicini, October 21, 1762, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*

In view of all this, it sounds incredible, although it is a fact, that Tanucci should have had a Jesuit as his confessor,¹ and have retained him until the very moment of the Society's expulsion. To the Minister Wall, who had heard of this strange practice from Charles III., Tanucci wrote² excusing himself on the ground that his teacher, an aged cleric, had insisted on his studying St. Thomas and confessing to the Jesuits. He had been confessing regularly to the same Jesuit for twenty years. His confessor was a saintly man, the least Jesuitical of all the Jesuits he knew, and Tanucci could not bring himself to cause the old priest pain by dismissing him. It is possible also that the Jesuit confessor served to conceal from the outside world Tanucci's dislike of the Society. Tanucci succeeded so well in masking his real feelings that on the confessor's recommendation the General of the Order, Visconti, extended to him the privilege of sharing in the spiritual merits of the Order! Tanucci's letter of thanks overflowed with expressions of appreciation: he regarded the favour as the greatest gift of God's grace he had ever received and a fresh encouragement to emulate the model piety and virtuous conduct of the Fathers of the Society!³ To the Sicilian Provincial, Trigona, who had informed him of his arrival in Rome, he wrote that his mind and his heart had been enthralled by this gesture; he hoped that Trigona would make use of his services (which were entirely at his

¹ Similarly his wife and daughter (RINIERI, *Rovina*, Introduz. xlv).

² *On April 14, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6092; *Tanucci to Yaci, May 26, 1761, *ibid.*, 5970.

³ " *Sento e ho sempre nutrito nel cuore una stima singolare ed una rispettosissima divozione verso l'esemplarissima Compagnia . . . Considero questa grazia per la maggiore che la bontà divina mi abbia compartito in tutto il corso della mia vita. Mi sarà esta un nuovo stimolo per mirare fissamente e procurar di seguire i costumi illibati e gli esempi continui de' Padri della Compagnia . . . " (to Visconti, November 7, 1751, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5934). Cf. the *letter to the confessor Micco, June 22, 1751, *ibid.*

disposal) and so give him the opportunity of showing his gratitude.¹

Shortly before Charles III.'s arrival in Madrid, Spinola, the retiring nuncio to Spain, had prophesied what the Church would have to suffer under the new régime, namely, attacks on the Jesuits and on ecclesiastical freedom. In the opinion of persons competent to judge, Wall would gain predominant influence, and then the banishment of the Jesuits from the missions, or at least from Paraguay, would soon follow. Wall was strongly prejudiced against the Jesuits and he had in his entourage a counsellor who was not only an outspoken anti-Jesuit but also a hater of Rome ; this man incited the Minister against the Curia on every possible occasion. The new king, continued Spinola, would be presented with plans for reform directed in particular against the power and privileges of officials and of both the secular and the regular clergy.² As had already been said, he wrote later, there were men in Wall's confidence who were filled with a thousand prejudices against the clearest rights of the Holy See. This he knew without a shadow of doubt. In the course of conversation Wall had

¹ " *V. R. per tutte le cagioni ha rapito il mio animo e il mio cuore. Son suoi l'uno e l'altro. Se ne vaglia V. R. con ogni arbitrio," etc. (on November 25, 1755, *ibid.*, 5937). Some of the letters written by Tanucci to the confessor Micco are still extant. In these we read of his boundless gratitude to him (*July 15, 1751, *ibid.*, 5934), of his pleasure at the appointment of the Jesuit Belgrado as confessor to the duke of Parma (*June 22, 1751, *ibid.*), of his sympathy with Micco in his ill-health (*undated [June 8 or 11, 1765], *ibid.*, 5993). Only a month before the Jesuits were driven out of Naples he is expressing his pleasure at seeing Micco's well-known writing again in a letter and is promising to pray for him (*October 21, 1767, *ibid.*, 6002). When Micco in his old age had to take to his bed, Tanucci was frequently asking how he was and sent him the customary gifts at Christmas and Easter (*Calcagnini to Torrigiani, April 21, 1767, *Nunziat. di Napoli*, 290, Papal Secret Archives ; RINIERI, *Rovina*, Introd. xliv, note 1).

² *To Torrigiani, October 23, 1759, *Cifre*, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 285, *loc. cit.*

often let fall statements in accordance with these principles, either in Spinola's own hearing or in that of many reliable witnesses. If the king was sufficiently receptive, Wall would counsel him—after the Jesuits had been struck the blow on which he had set his heart—to restrict the immunity of the secular and regular clergy, to expand the concessions of the last Concordat, to curtail the jurisdiction of the nuncios, and, finally, to hinder petitions to Rome for dispensations and the like.¹ He hoped that the monarch's piety would prevent his (Spinola's) misgivings coming true but the worst was to be expected if the king listened to certain suggestions. Full of the prejudices which were almost inseparable from the manner of life he had led till his sixtieth year, Wall favoured innovations and treated the gravest matters in a most superficial way. He might not mean any harm but, feeling himself to be the restorer of Spain, he was liable to turn everything upside-down. If a storm broke, the Bishops were hardly to be relied on; though for the most part well intentioned, they had not the moral strength to resist the royal authority.²

The nuncio Spinola wrote these reports for the benefit also of his not too capable successor, Pallavicini. Comparatively young and owing his appointment to this important post principally to his membership of an illustrious family, Pallavicini considered it his main duty to avoid collisions. Lest he might find himself in the awkward necessity of directly opposing the Government, he repeatedly urged the Jesuits

¹ *On November 6, 1759 (*ibid.*): "So che quanto da lui [Wall] si ritrovi nel sovrano la necessaria disposizione sta preparato, dopo l'articolo de' Padri della Compagnia, che sopra tutto gli preme, a proporgli in oltre di restringere le immunità, che in Spagna si godono dal clero secolare e regolare, di cercare ad estendere le concessioni dell' ultimo Concordato, di restringere la giurisdizione de' Nunzi Apost. e per fine di difficoltare a' subditi il ricorso a Roma per dispense e per indulte di qualsivoglia genere."

² *Spinola to Torrigiani, December 11, 1759, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 285, *loc. cit.* Spinola on the relinquishment of his appointment: *to Torrigiani, October 23, 1759, *ibid.*; KARTTUNEN, 254.

to exercise circumspection and restraint.¹ He seems to have been quite incapable of judging human character. He wrote that Roda enjoyed the reputation of being highly religious,² and he provided the Spanish agent Azara, who was a Voltairean,³ with a cordial letter of recommendation.⁴

Once Charles III. had chosen as his advisers members of the Young Spanish party, conditions were bound to develop as Spinola had foretold.

(2)

The first conflict between the Church and State after Charles's accession was concerned with the *Exequatur* or royal *placet*, the purpose of which, to use Tanucci's phrase, was to keep the Papacy in check.⁵ An opportunity of introducing the *placet* into Spain was offered by the dispute about the French Jansenist Mésenguy, whose *Exposition de la doctrine chrétienne*, commonly called the Catechism, had already been condemned by the Congregation of the Index under Benedict XIV.⁶ In 1758–1760 an Italian translation⁷ of the slightly

¹ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, October 21, 1760, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 285, *loc. cit.*; *on September 13, 1763, *ibid.*, 290; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, October 13, 1763, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 432.

² *To Torrigiani, January 22, 1765, Cifre, *ibid.*, 293.

³ According to ROUSSEAU, I., 80, note 1, 195.

⁴ *To Torrigiani, October 7, 1765, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 294, *loc. cit.* Cf. *El espíritu de D. José Nicolás de Azara descubierto en su correspondencia epistolar con D. Manuel de Roda*, 3 vols., Madrid, 1846.

⁵ “*Non abbiamo altre armi, nè altra briglia del Papato che l'Exequatur” (to Bottari, April 4, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

⁶ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 289; FERRER DEL RIO, I., 384 *seqq.*; MIGUÉLEZ, 285 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 112 *seqq.*

⁷ 5 vols., Naples. Each volume has a different title. Canon Domenico Cantagalli has been mentioned as the translator (Rosa, *Passionei*, 13). Another Italian translation appeared in Venice (*Tanucci to Bottari, June 13 and October 6, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602). Cf. REUSCH, *Index*, II., 764.

improved second edition ¹ was published in Naples with the approbation of the Cardinal Archbishop Sersale, and thousands of copies were distributed.² On the Pope's instructions this edition was carefully examined by a commission of twelve theologians, none of whom was a Jesuit.³ Hardly had the proceedings been opened when Tanucci began to use every means available in the kingdom of Naples to prevent the banning of the book by the higher authorities in Rome.⁴ Despite his assertion, made in other circumstances, that only the Church was competent to deal with matters of dogma, he left no expedient untried by which he might influence the free exercise of the Church's doctrinal authority. Violently abusing the Pope, the Secretary of State, and the Jesuits,⁵ he assured his confidants Bottari and Centomani that in Naples they would know how to defend the new catechism; theologians would oppose its prohibition in speech and writing so as to convince the whole world of the iniquity and invalidity of the Roman censorship, and the Government would withhold its *Exequatur*.⁶ Urged on by the Minister, Cardinal Sersale,

¹ 4 vols., Cologne, 1754.

² *Tanucci to Bottari, February 14, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602.

³ CORDARA, *De Suppressione*, 97 seq., and in DÖLLINGER, III., 32. Tanucci speaks constantly of ten theologians: "Dieci Frati non son Chiesa. Il Papa con dieci Frati non è Papa. Dunque quel che così decide, non è legge della Chiesa" (*to Bottari, April 4, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

⁴ Cf. his *correspondence with Bottari (*ibid.*) and Wall (Archives of Simancas, Estado 6092).

⁵ " *Cino a suo tempo diceva: purus canonista, purus asinus. In avvenire si dirà: puro cattolico romano, puro asino . . . Ognun sa, che la dottrina maggiore si trova appunto in quei libri, che Roma ha condannato e proibito, e che sol permett' ella alcuni libri di dottrina superficiale e favolosa venuta a galla dal fermento della furberia, dell' ambizione e rapacità della Curia . . ." (to Bottari, February 14, 1761, Biblioteca Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

⁶ " *Non mancheranno teologi, che predicheranno in contrario, e scriveranno ancora, e il mondo sempre più si persuaderà dell' iniquità e invalidità delle proibizioni romane dei libri. Qui

Archbishop of Naples, and his Vicar-General had to make an attempt at browbeating the nuncio,¹ but the result of this step was the reverse of what had been intended. Sersale yielded to the nuncio's arguments,² although the translation of the Catechism had been received with joy by all the Bishops and the whole Church in the Two Sicilies.³ Tanucci now turned to

non si darà Exequatur alla proibizione " (to Bottari, February 7, 1761, *ibid.*). " *Vedo che la proibizione accenderà un gran fuoco, probabilmente sarà qui dalla camera di S. Chiara proibita la proibizione e sarà scritto in contrario " (to Centomani, March 7, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5969). *

¹ *Tanucci to Bottari, February 14, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602. To Cardinal Orsini, the Neapolitan envoy to Rome, Tanucci wrote: " *Sento li scompigli, e il fuoco, che suscitano contro il santo e savio libro dell' ' Esposizione della dottrina cristiana ' stampata qui coll'approvazione di questo card. arcivescovo. Questo ne è afflitto, perchè siamo in pericolo del fuoco, che la violenza dei Gesuiti va a suscitare nella chiesa delle Sicilie, la quale è riscaldata, e pronta a difendere la sua dottrina, che sostiene per infinitamente più cristiana di quella dei Gesuiti " (March 7, 1761). Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5969.

² " *Io sperava, che qualche cosa si potesse fare, perchè il card. arcivescovo rimanesse costante nella difesa della sua approvazione. Ma so, ch'egli già impaurito cede in vece di ricorrere alla potestà secolare, perchè sostenga la vera dottrina cristiana. Perciò manca il terreno sotto i piedi a chi intraprendesse di portare il consiglio a un contrasto con Roma, mancando la chiesa stessa delle Sicilie, che chieda la protezione del Re. Comparirebbono laici, che volessero giudicare dell' opinioni teologiche; questo non è stato fatto nella chiesa neppur ai tempi della sua purità e disciplina migliore. Non mancheranno modi di punir la furberia e gli altri orrendi vizi dei Gesuiti. Ma questo è un lavoro lungo, e non è maturo per l'effetto che ora si vuole " (Tanucci to Bottari, March 7, 1761, Biblioteca Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

³ Mésenguy's work " è stato qui stampato con grande approvazione dello stesso cardinale, e avidamente ricevuto da tutti li vescovi, e da tutta la chiesa delle Sicilie, la quale bolle con Fragiani " (*Tanucci to Centomani, March 7, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5969).

the Minister Wall,¹ in the hope that the powerful aid of Spain would prevent the banning of the book. Wall had already been informed by Roda that neither the Pope nor the Secretary of State had read the translation and that the whole business was a machination of the Jesuits.² However, in spite of all efforts to the contrary,³ the work was condemned by the Congregation on May 28th, 1761. By a decree of June 14th, Mésenguy's Catechism was forbidden in all languages and editions,⁴ and in a Brief of the same day the Bishops were recommended to use the Roman Catechism in preference to all others.⁵ To avoid signing the documents, Cardinal Passionei, Secretary of the Briefs, had fled to his hermitage at Camaldoli, near Frascati. The Pope, however, sent him the Brief with the order either to sign it or lay down his office. Consumed with rage, Passionei signed. An hour afterwards the seventy-nine-year-old Cardinal received a stroke which deprived him

¹ *On March 3, 1761, *ibid.*, 6092.

² " *Ya tenía noticia por nuestro Roda de la prohibicion del libro de que V. E. me habla, conseguida por los Jesuitas a fuerza de intrigas y artificios . . . Contra este libro se ha declamado en Roma en los pulpitos ; pero lo estraño es que preguntados los declamadores si lo habian leído respondieron que no, que predicaban contro él porque el Papa, que tampoco lo habia leído, decia que era un mal libro. Su Santidad se explicaba así porque se lo habia oído decir a Torrigiani, y éste que confesó tambien non haberlo leído hablaba de él por lo que habia oído al General de los Jesuitas " (Wall to Tanucci, March 24, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6092).

³ " *Non credo, che dispiacera a V. E. ch'io trascriva le parole d'una lettera d'un teologo di un card. della Congregazione del S. Ufficio ad un teologo di questo card. arcivescovo : ' Tutti di proposito lavoriamo a favore del libro. Con noi è Venezia, Savoia, Spagna il di cui Ministro è senza pari, ed inimitabile nel difendere con coraggio la buona dottrina e la verità. Che bel trionfo della grazia di Gesù Cristo nell' unire tante nazioni per la sua difesa contro dei Semipelagiani dei nostri tempi ' " (Tanucci to Wall, April 28, 1761, *ibid.*).

⁴ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 521 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 522.

of his speech, and twenty days later, on July 5th, 1761, he died.¹

Departing from the old tradition of announcing decisions on religious doctrine without reference to the State authority,² the nuncio Pallavicini confidentially acquainted the Minister Wall with the situation, adding that he would follow the customary procedure.³ The decree of the Congregation he sent to the Grand Inquisitor, the Brief on the Roman Catechism to the Minister.⁴ With the agreement of his council, the Grand

¹ " *Il povero Passionei morto di collera dopo aver contro sua voglia e per sola condescendenza verso li familiari, che gli mettevano davanti lo stato, nel quale lasciava i nipoti, firmato il Breve della proibizione del catechismo, non si potrà rimpiazzare. Ne pur si potrà rimpiazzare Tamburini, che era un grandissimo teologo ; e li Gesuiti, e Torrigiani, e tutti li nemici della grazia efficace di Gesù Cristo trionferanno per li peccati del genere umano. Li Francescani si son divisi : li Cappuccini son per la grazia, gli altri sono stati sedotti dai Gesuiti, che anno guadagnato Ganganelli colle solite arti, e con una delle loro cappellanie di San Ignazio, che come sa V. E. son quattro di mille scudi romani l'una di rendita col solo obbligo d'una Messa l'anno all' altare di S. Ignazio, e si danno dal Generale a quattro cardinali, che vogliono acquistare. Lambertini ne aveva una, ma la di lui sincerità finalmente eruttò, e messosi in libertà fece l'Enciclica, essendo Papa, e la Bolla della visita dei Gesuiti del Portogallo " (Tanucci to Wall, August 4, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6092). Cf. the *letter to Bottari, of June 20, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602. " *Non dubito che li confessori faranno valere la proibizione brutale del catechismo. Il mio non mi burlerà, perchè leggerò, e non sarò tanto stolido di confessarmi di ciò che non è peccato " (Tanucci to Bottari, July 18, 1761, *ibid.*). Cf. Cordara in DÖLLINGER, III., 32. Galetti says nothing about the cause of the apoplectic stroke.

² *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, June 18 and August 6, 1761, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, August 18 and 24, 1761, Cifre, ' Esposizione di fatto,' *ibid.*, 286.

⁴ *Pallavicini to the Grand Inquisitor, July 10, 1761, *ibid.* ; *the Grand Inquisitor to the nuncio, July 12, 1761, *ibid.* ; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, July 21, 1761, Cifre, *ibid.*

Inquisitor Quintano Bonifaz gave orders for the Papal prohibition to be published.¹ Copies of it had already been dispatched when Bonifaz received instructions from Wall to postpone the publication of the edict.² The Grand Inquisitor excused himself by referring to the obedience he owed to the Holy See and added that it was impossible to recover in time the copies already dispatched. Moreover, he argued, the honour and reputation of the Inquisition would suffer and the people would form an unfavourable opinion of the king's religious zeal.³ Although Charles III. had been prejudiced for some time past by Roda and Tanucci against the imminent decision of Rome,⁴ he had made up his mind to permit its publication in due form.⁵ But now, piqued by the resistance offered, he banished the Grand Inquisitor from within twelve miles of the capital and all the royal residences.⁶

¹ August 9, 1761.

² *Wall to Tanucci, August 11 and 18, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6092.

³ *The Grand Inquisitor to Wall, August 8, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 287, Papal Secret Archives; FERRER DEL RIO, I., 388 *seq.* *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, August 18, 1761, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 286, *loc. cit.*

⁴ "No sé qué hacen los Jesuitas con ir moviendo tales historias, pues con esto siempre se desacreditan más, y creo que tienen muy sobrado con lo que ya tienen" (Charles III. to Tanucci, March 17, 1761, in FERRER DEL RIO, I, 380 *seq.*).

⁵ "S. M. por lo que mira a la publicacion del Breve y Enciclica en estos dominios . . . : el que siendo sobre asunto de dogma y puntos sustanciales de nuestra religion se le dará curso en la debida forma ; pero como el Nuncio ha caído enfermo y no lo ha presentado de oficio, no ha habido aun lugar de hacer formalmente lo que corresponde" (Wall to Tanucci, July 28, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6092). What Wall meant by "due form" was the royal *Exequatur*, as Pallavicini wrote to the Secretary of State on August 24, 1761 (Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 286, *loc. cit.*).

⁶ Decree of August 10, 1761. *Wall to the President of the Council of Castile, August 10, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 287, *loc. cit.*; *Wall to Roda, August 11, 1761, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 42.

Bonifaz retired without delay to the Benedictine monastery of Sopetrán, near Guadalajara,¹ whence, on August 31st, he wrote a humble letter begging the king's pardon.² As soon as he received this letter, Charles III. instructed the Council of Castile to retract the order of banishment.³ On being thanked by the Council of the Inquisition for his act of grace,⁴ he advised it not to forget this mark of his displeasure and never to allow itself even to dream of disobedience.⁵

This incident provided the Ministers with an opportunity of executing their designs against the liberty of the Church.⁶

¹ MIGUÉLEZ, 286.

² *Quintano Bonifaz to Wall, August 31, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 287, *loc. cit.*; MIGUÉLEZ, 286; REUSCH, *Index*, II., 767.

³ *Wall to the President of the Council of Castile, September 2, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 287, *loc. cit.*; *Wall to Tanucci, September 8, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6092.

⁴ *September 5, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 287, *loc. cit.*

⁵ “ * . . . pero que no se olvide este amago de mi enojo en soñando inovediencia ” ([September 8, 1761], Nunziat. di Spagna, 286, *loc. cit.*); *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 8, 1761, *ibid.* The Pope had also intervened on behalf of the Grand Inquisitor (*Clement XIII. to Charles III., August 27, 1761, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*). The nuncio was also to be humiliated (*Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 15, 1761, *ibid.*; *Wall to Roda, September 22, 1761, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 42).

⁶ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 22 and 29 and October 6, 1761, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 286, *loc. cit.* Tanucci wrote at that time: “ *Non dubito, che il Consiglio di Castiglia esaminerà profondamente la materia di quella parte della Regalia del Re, che appartiene all' Exequatur e all' obbligo di mostrarsi prima e manifestarsi al Re qualunque stabilimento ecclesiastico, anche appartenente al solo spirituale e a domma, essendo il Re capo della casa e obbligato a guardarla da qualunque insidia e discordia, per comando di Dio indubitato, e deve rendergli conto immediato d'averlo eseguito. Questo conto non potrebbero li sovrani renderlo a Dio, se dopo aver dalla storia saputo, quante insidie sono state dai Papi e altri ecclesiastici tese ai sovrani e ai popoli, e quanto abuso per interessi loro profani abbiano fatto della loro autorità

The Council of Castile was instructed to give its opinion as to how further transgressions of the kind might be avoided in the future.¹ The result of these deliberations appeared on January 18th, 1762, in the form of a Pragmatic Sanction, by which all decrees from Rome, except Briefs and dispensations in matters of conscience, were thenceforward to be subject to the royal *Exequatur*. Before they were forwarded to their destinations, all instructions to ecclesiastical tribunals, prelates, corporations, etc., were to be examined by the Council of Castile to see if they contained anything prejudicial to the Concordat, the royal prerogatives, or the customs, morals, and peace of the realm.² At the same time the Grand Inquisitor was ordered not to publish any Briefs or Bulls from Rome without special permission from the king. If a book was banned, the Spanish Inquisition had also to examine the work in question and, if necessary, to condemn it on its own authority without mentioning the Roman prohibition. Before such decrees were issued the royal assent was to be obtained and the defence of the authors concerned was to be heard.³

spirituale, non curassero di vedere quel che da questi si fa nello stato. Non sono nuove alli Spagnuoli tali massime di stato. Li scrittori di Spagna le anno insegnate alle altre nazioni, le quali volentieri per ciò leggono li Salgado, Solorzan, Belluga, Bobadilla, Covarruvias, etc. Passa per un capo d'opera contro la rapacità della Dataria e Segreteria dei Brevi di Roma il famoso libretto di Cordova Giovanni Chumazzero, al quale non potè rispondere il cardinal Bellarmino . . ." (to Wall, October 13, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6092).

¹ **Consulta* of the Council of Castile, August 27 and October 31, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 287, *loc. cit.*

² FERRER DEL RIO, I., 394 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 115 *seq.*; *Charles III. to the Council of Castile, November 27, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 286, *loc. cit.* The Pragmatic of January 18, 1762 (printed) in the Arch. general, Madrid, Estado, 2872.

³ *Wall to the Grand Inquisitor, November 27, 1761, Nunziat. di Spagna, 287, *loc. cit.*; *Wall to Pallavicini, November 27, 1761 *ibid.*

To Clement XIII. an arrogant message was sent by Charles III. As the Pope had expressed his regret that the publication of the decree issued by the Congregation of the Index had been accompanied by certain incidents, and the nuncio had apologized, he, the king, was perfectly ready to forget what had happened. To spare the Holy See similar embarrassments in the future, and to ensure prompt obedience for its lawful commands, he had, after consulting his Council, drafted some regulations whose chief object was to uphold the respect due to the Holy See and to his Holiness.¹

Tanucci welcomed this new Pragmatic Sanction with delight ; to him it was the sunrise heralding a day of happiness. From now on sovereign lords would acknowledge no superior but God alone.² Deeply distressed by this fresh step along the road of regalism, Clement XIII. appealed to the king,³ protesting against the innovation and its fatal consequences. He appealed to his piety to annul, or at least to modify and correct, the decree. But all his protests were in vain. The king's reply⁴ was a veiled negative, with complaints about the abuses which would occur without an *Exequatur*. To Tanucci he wrote⁵ that Rome did not realize that times had changed ; but there was one man at least who knew what was due to the Pope and what to the king. In spite of all this, all hope was not yet abandoned in Rome. To give more force to his efforts the Pope sent Father Monsagrati to Madrid with letters to the Queen-Mother and other influential persons.⁶ The king's confessor, the Franciscan Osma, was urgently

¹ *December 1, 1761, *ibid.*, 431, and Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 42.

² *To Wall, January 26, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6093 ; *to Orsini, February 13, 1762, *ibid.*, 5976 ; *Wall to Tanucci, January 5, 1762.

³ *On January 28, 1762, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Of February 16, 1762, *ibid.*, 287.

⁵ On November 2, 1762, in FERRER DEL RIO, I., 396.

⁶ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, November 11 and December 23, 1762, and January 6, 1763, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431 and 432 respectively, *loc. cit.*

requested¹ to do all in his power to bring about the withdrawal of an edict containing restrictions that cut so deeply into the freedom of the Church and the Apostolic See. These efforts were attended with success. By a decree of July 5th, 1763, Charles III. abrogated the Pragmatic Sanction on the ground that it contained many erroneous and strange interpretations that were not in accordance with his actual intentions.² On being informed that the Sanction had been suspended,³ the Pope expressed his heartfelt thanks.⁴

¹ *On June 2, 1763, Arch. general, Madrid, Estado, 2854.

² **Ibid.*, 2872; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, July 5 and 12, 1763, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 290, *loc. cit.*

³ *Charles III. to Clement XIII., July 12, 1763, Nunziat. di Spagna, 290, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *On July 28, 1763, *ibid.*, 432; *Charles III. to Clement XIII., August 16, 1763, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, July 23, 1763, Registro di cifre, *ibid.* In Naples the Papal prohibition and the Brief commanding preference to be given to the Roman Catechism did not receive the *Exequatur*; moreover, at Tanucci's instigation, the Jesuit Sanchez de Luna, who had produced the fifteenth volume of *La verità difesa*, was banished, and the work was prohibited: " *Qui non si è dato l'Exequatur nè all'a proibizione del Catechismo nè all' Enciclica, nè alla tradizione del Catechismo Romano, e forse non si darà. Abbiamo bensì proibito il libro dello sfrattato P. Sanchez " (Tanucci to Bottari, August 22, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602). Charles III. finally advised him to solve the difficulty by banning both the Brief and Mésenguy's Catechism on the score of their lacking the *Exequatur* (*to Tanucci, December 29, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6045). By a decree of the Spanish Inquisition of August 18, 1762, a sermon on probabilism preached by the Jesuit Neumayr in Augsburg was condemned and an order was given for the expurgation of the *Praxis confessarii* by Alphonsus Liguori (printed, Nunziat. di Spagna, 289, *loc. cit.*). Tanucci *wrote to Majò on April 8, 1760, " Le stampe di Lugano sono ristampe di libri contrari alla Compagnia. Fossombrone è finto. La stampa è di Venezia, ove è stato punito il revisore dei libri favorevoli alla Compagnia " (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5961). For Neumayr, see *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, IX.², 187.

While Rome rejoiced, bitter disappointment reigned in the camp of the regalists. Wall, who shortly before had written to Tanucci that the only way to treat the Pope was to follow Melchior Cano's advice—kiss his feet and bind his hands¹—was deeply offended,² and on August 21st, 1763, he tendered his resignation on the grounds of ill-health, especially of his failing eyesight.³ His resignation was accepted, and the regalists lost one of their chief supporters.⁴ Tanucci remarked in disgust that the king had lost much ground on the way to glory.⁵

But whatever fears Tanucci may have had of an imminent change of policy soon proved to be unfounded. The king appointed as Wall's successor the Genoese Grimaldi, who was then ambassador in Paris. Grimaldi, if more pliant than his predecessor, was no less regalistically minded.⁶ "On the day when princes open their eyes," he wrote to Tanucci,⁷ "they will admit that it lies with them to force the Roman Court to give them back what it has wrested from them. . . . God grant that the happy day will soon come when the Catholic part of Europe will break the fetters with which ignorance has held it down so long." In the autumn of the same year he expressed himself even more pointedly.⁸ After agreeing with Tanucci's views of the "Roman abuses and acts of usurpation

¹ *Wall to Tanucci, July 7, 1763, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6094.

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, July 12 and 26, 1763, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 290, *loc. cit.*

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, August 23, 1763, *ibid.* ; *Charles III. to Tanucci, October 18, 1763, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6049.

⁴ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, August 30, 1763, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 290, *loc. cit.*

⁵ To Losada, September 27, 1763, in FERRER DEL RIO, I., 400, n. 1.

⁶ *Grimaldi to Roda, October 18, 1763, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 38.

⁷ On March 15, 1764, in ROUSSEAU, I., 118, n. 3. Cf. Grimaldi to Tanucci, June 26, 1764, *ibid.*

⁸ *On September 25, 1764, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6096.

which hold the Catholic peoples in bondage," he proceeded to say: "I have observed that the prosperity or penury of States is proportionate to their dependence on Rome. The reason is as clear as can be, and I am only surprised that the cause is not removed by the roots. My master the king sees this only too well; and he has often made me aware of the fact, the last time being when he heard your Excellency's letter being read." To Tanucci's repeated demands that he should undertake the reform of Church affairs in Spain, Grimaldi replied ¹ that he had already made his plans but that he had to proceed gradually and unobtrusively. The trouble was not so much with the secular as with the regular clergy.

The Pope's joy at the withdrawal of the Pragmatic Sanction was not to last for long. In the following year the Fiscal Carrasco put forward a proposal in the Council of Castile to curtail the Church's powers of acquiring property by extending to the other parts of the country the so-called right of amortization held by the monarch in the kingdom of Valencia.² It was suggested to the king himself that he should restrict acquisitions in mortmain.³ Although these efforts were not immediately successful they revealed the spirit of the Ministers, who vied with Tanucci in opposing the excessively large numbers of the clergy and the supposedly enormous possessions of the monasteries.⁴ The *Treatise on the Royal Right of Amortization* which was published by the Fiscal Campomanes a year later purposed to discuss the Church's encroachments on the economic life of the community and to show how the wealth of the religious Orders could be held in check.⁵

A further attempt to restrict the Church's freedom was made by the Spanish Government in 1765, when a new nuncio was

¹ *On November 6, 1764, *ibid.*

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, July 10, 1764, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 292, *loc. cit.*

³ **Representacion al Rey*, June 1, 1764, *ibid.*

⁴ *Tanucci to Grimaldi, November 27, 1764, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6096.

⁵ *Tratado de la regia de amortizacion*. Cf. below, p. 41.

due to be appointed to Madrid. The nuncios had already been described by Roda in 1759 as the spies of a foreign power,¹ and Grimaldi had admitted that it had often been intended in Spain to shake off the yoke of the nunciature but that all attempts had been frustrated by the country's own weakness.² These views made little immediate headway but efforts were made to exert the greatest possible influence on the choice of a Papal envoy.

Towards the end of 1765, when the nuncio Pallavicini, who had proved unequal to his task, was about to be relieved, at the Pope's desire, Grimaldi took the liberty of indicating that one name on the list that had been sent³ (that of Monsignore Lucini) would be acceptable.⁴ The Pope objected to this impertinence,⁵ observing that the list of possible nuncios was sent to princes, not that they should select the one most acceptable to them, but to give the Governments an opportunity of rejecting a *persona non grata*.⁶ Grimaldi was so

¹ " * . . los Nuncios, que en substancia no son mas que unos espías para el caracter de Ministros, y en lo demas unos jueces estrangeros, que es contra todas las leyes civiles y politicas." To Wall [1759 ?], Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4966.

² *To Tanucci, July 31, 1764, *ibid.*, 6096. In 1764 the king demanded to be shown the list of candidates before the appointment of a new Auditor. *Roda to Grimaldi, May 17, 1764, *ibid.*, 5109; *Roda's *aide-mémoire* of May 24, 1764, Nunziat. di Spagna, 432, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Roda, May 24, 1764, *ibid.*; *Roda to Torrighiani, July 4, 1764, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Roda, July 18, 1764, *ibid.*; *Roda to Torrighiani, August 28, 1764, *ibid.*; *aide-mémoire*, August 28, 1764, *ibid.*

³ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, December 25, 1765, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 432, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, January 14, 1766, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. 65/4.

⁵ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, February 6 and 13, 1766, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*, copies in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072.

⁶ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, March 13, 1766, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, copy in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072.

angered by the Pope's attitude that he threatened to close the nunciature.¹ But Rome stood firm; the negotiations came to nothing and Pallavicini remained at his post. Possibly the Government delayed the new appointment for fear lest another nuncio might not be so easy to handle in connection with the expulsion of the Jesuits, which was already under consideration.

(3)

The Spanish statesmen being determined to obstruct and exclude the Papacy as much as possible, they were inevitably committed to the task of securing for the Spanish Jesuits the fate that had befallen their brethren in Portugal and France. For in their eyes the Society was the chief champion of the Papal claims.

Charles III.'s adviser, Tanucci, gave splendid testimony in favour of individual Jesuits. "Every Jesuit," he wrote, "with whom I have come in contact has been, to my knowledge, an excellent priest, full of charity, prudence, and every Christian virtue."² "All, or at any rate most of them," he said on another occasion,³ "are men of sound morals. The majority, at least nine-tenths of them, are good, blameless, well-behaved, and honest folk."⁴ He saw, however, no contradiction in accusing these individually good men of holding as a body principles which were highly injurious to religion, morals, states, and princes.⁵ The evil lay in the government of the Company and the spirit that drove the

¹ *To Azpuru, March 4, 1766, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. 65/4.

² "Ottimi sacerdoti ho sempre conosciuto i particolari Gesuiti, che io ho trattato, pieni di carità, di prudenza e di tutte le virtù cristiane" (*to Majo, September 5, 1758, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5965). DUHR, *Tanucci*, 303.

³ *To Losada, November 3, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5971.

⁴ "Moltissimi di loro, e senza dubbio nove decimi, sono buone persone e innocenti" (*to Losada, September 23, 1760, *ibid.*, 5964; *to Yaci, May 26, 1761, *ibid.*, 5970).

⁵ *To Squillace, January 1, 1765, *ibid.*, 5991.

governmental machine. This spirit had only one aim—wealth and power—and the Jesuits' desire was to be masters of the Church and the world, to weave intrigues at Court, and to procure pliant tools.¹ They were an intriguing *canaille*; ² wherever they appeared, Court, State, and people were lost. Their conduct was devilish, their morals Machiavellian; ³ everything was arranged by them to satisfy their selfish desires and their arrogance. In order to become rich and powerful they made morality lax.

But Tanucci's chief charge against the Jesuits and what he feared most was their fourth vow: obedience to the Pope. In attacking the Jesuits he was striking at the Pope. According to him it was with the help of the Jesuits that the Popes were trying to disseminate, at Court and in the confessional, principles prejudicial to the rights of princes and States. Although Christ had given to all the Apostles the authority to bind and to loose in the realm of conscience, the Jesuit restricted this authority to the Pope and for his benefit extended it beyond the realm of conscience. The only object of their numerous sodalities for high-class ladies and gentlemen was to get to the bottom of every negotiation and secret, and to report everything to their General or the Pope.⁴ According to Tanucci, the greatest crime of the Jesuits was not their lax morality or their false doctrine of grace—all that had existed before their time—but the creation by their Bellarmines and Pallavicinis of a hierarchic system

¹ " Il male sta in chi governa la Compagnia. Da questa stessa bontà universale dei loro sudditi traggono i loro superiori mille utilità pel corpo tutto, e questo corpo in capo loro ha da aver il dominio del mondo," etc. (*to Losada, September 23, 1760, *ibid.*, 5964); *to Yaci, May 26, 1761, *ibid.*, 5970.

² " canaglia intrigante " (*to Bottari, July 25, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

³ " Se entrano in essi [into matters of State], è perduta la corte, lo stato e il popolo. La lor condotta è diabolica, la morale il più velenoso macchiavellismo . . ." (*to Yaci, March 18, 1760, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5961).

⁴ *To Losada, November 3, 1761, *ibid.* 5971.

of religion which was essentially worldly, political, ostentatious, and tyrannical, and which had released the supreme Bishop and his Court from the obligations of honour and holiness.¹ All who had mixed with Jesuits and knew them thoroughly could only describe them as ambitious, avaricious, and seditious betrayers and corrupters of princes. They were the emissaries of the Papacy, an institution which did not derive from Christ and St. Peter but which had been formed in the last thousand years principally out of atheism, piracy, cyclopism, and chaffering in religion.² Whoever did not speak of the Jesuits as he did had been either misinformed or hoodwinked³; their well-wishers must be either simpletons or corrupted rogues.⁴

Such being his sentiments, it stood to reason that Tanucci should try to direct his royal master's policy towards the Jesuits along the lines laid down by Pombal, though he disapproved of the barbarous features of Pombal's measures.⁵

¹ *To Bottari, August 4, 1764, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602.

² " *Chi li conosce a dentro, chi gli ha trattati, non può non caratterizzarli per ambiziosi, rapaci, sediziosi, traditori dei sovrani et guastatori, ed emissari di quel Papato, che non è di Gesù Cristo, nè di s. Pietro, ma di quello che si è formato colla sostanza d'ateismo, di pirateria, di ciclopismo e mercatura di religione negli ultimi mille anni dell'era cristiana " (to Catanti, March 7, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5993).

³ *To Losada, January 17, 1764, *ibid.*, 5988. Tanucci drew exhaustively from defamatory writings against the Order. *On November 28, 1761, he asked Galiani for the anti-Jesuit brochures which had appeared in France (*ibid.*, 5971) and on January 5, 1762, he asked Finocchietti to send him copies of Sarpi, Boccaccio, and Lucrezio, and Passionei's written opinion on Bellarmine (*ibid.*, 5976).

⁴ *To Bottari, November 21, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602.

⁵ " Quel mandare nello Stato ecclesiastico li Gesuiti che non vogliono [the Portuguese] ne' loro stati, è un'altra stravaganza. Un sovrano può sfrattar dal suo stato una Religione, ma non portarla in un luogo determinato carcerata fuor del suo stato " (*to Wall, August 26, 1760, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6091).

But in Spain of all countries the destruction of the Society of Jesus was no easy matter. Until the middle of the eighteenth century the country which had given birth to the Society's founder had been regarded as its citadel. In the Provinces of Aragon, Castile, Toledo, and Andalusia there were roughly 120 establishments, with 2,792 members. In the oversea Provinces (Mexico, New Granada, Quito, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and the Philippines) there were 2,652 members.¹ The education of youth was to a large extent in Jesuit hands. In the mother country there were over a hundred colleges, some of which were really magnificent buildings, containing pupils who were mostly scions of noble houses. The Colegio Imperial in Madrid was reserved exclusively for the aristocracy; here the future grandees were trained in all the accomplishments expected of a perfect *caballero*. Overseas a chain of flourishing colleges stretched from the Argentine to Mexico and California. There were also at this time many Jesuits whose names were honoured in the scientific and literary world.² Large congregations were attracted by such popular preachers as Calatayud,³ and year after year missionaries voyaged across the seas to win the Indians and the negroes for the Faith. Equally active, in a quieter way, especially among the educated and those of noble birth, were the confessors of the Society.⁴ Both Philip V. and Ferdinand VI.

¹ The number of the establishments has been given as 120, 146, and 148; the estimates of the number of the members vary between 4,908 and 5,444. The number of the exiles who reached Corsica in 1767 is said to have amounted to 4,318.

² CIAN, *L'immigrazione dei Gesuiti spagnuoli letterati in Italia*, Torino, 1895 (from *Accad. R. delle scienze di Torino*, 1894-5); GALLERANI-MADARIAGA, *Jesuitas espulsos de España literatos en Italia*, Salamanca, 1897, 65 *seqq.*; NAVARRETE, *De viris illustribus in Castella Veteri Soc. Iesu ingressis et in Italia extinctis*, Bologna, 1793; ROUSSEAU, I., 134 *seq.*; *Civ. Catt.*, Series 16, vol. 5 (1896), 152 *seqq.*

³ [RODELES], *Vida del P. Pedro Calatayud*, Madrid, 1882.

⁴ DANVILA Y COLLADO, II., 581.

had placed themselves under the spiritual direction of Jesuits.¹ Charles III., being a member of the Third Order, had chosen a Franciscan as the keeper of his conscience,² but his mother, Elizabeth Farnese,³ and his consort, Maria Amalie of Saxony,⁴ confessed to Jesuits. Jesuits were employed by the king to instruct his sons: Ferdinand IV. of Naples, not yet of age, Prince Charles of the Asturias, and the other Infantes.⁵ Since the opinions of the king's confessors on ecclesiastico-political affairs and on appointments to the higher ecclesiastical posts was of great influence, their nomination was regarded by the nuncios as a highly important matter of State.⁶ Thus, Enrico Enriquez, before his departure from Madrid, recommended the Cardinal Secretary of State⁷ to send his successor a special Brief for the royal confessor, whose power, especially in Church affairs, exceeded that of any other person.

The difficulty of abolishing a body that was so firmly rooted in the life of the nation was fully appreciated by Tanucci. He therefore began by preparing the ground for the execution of his plans. He had already sown doubt and suspicion in his master's heart in Naples,⁸ so that afterwards

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 135.

² *Ibid.*; FERRER DEL RIO, I., 397, II., 180.

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, June 8, 1762, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 288, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Ricci to Savastano, October 25, 1760, *Epist. Gen. secretae*, in Jesuit possession. The queen died on September 27, 1760.

⁵ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 14, 1762, and April 5, 1763, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 289, 290, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Enriquez to Valenti, April 17, 1747, *ibid.*, 430; *Valenti to Spinola, November 6, 1755, *ibid.*, 428. Cf. *Valenti to Enriquez, August 15, September 5, 12, and 30, 1744, and July 13, 1747, *ibid.*, 430.

⁷ *On January 1, 1764, *ibid.*, 256.

⁸ "Allí [in Naples] el Marqués de Tanucci creyó pensión de su lealtad y su celo instruirle oportunamente sobre las máximas de estos Regulares... y quando vino a ocupar el trono de España los conocía perfectamente, acataba la vida ejemplar de los virtuosos y desaprobaba la ambición e inquietud de los intrigantes" (FERRER DEL RIO, II., 180).

he was able to assert that King Charles knew the Jesuits through and through, that they would find it impossible to win him over, and that the king's confessor was not a Jesuit and never would be.¹ Tanucci then sought to spread dislike and distrust of the Society among the royal entourage. In his correspondence he utilized current events for this purpose. That many people in Portugal were irritated by the Jesuits, he wrote to Wall, was to be explained by certain of their principles, which really could not be accepted by royal Courts.² In its constitution and in the whole of its nature the Society was opposed to the rights of princes.³ It sowed dissension everywhere, and at last men were beginning to see what they had never seen before and had not wanted to see.⁴ The measures taken by the French Parlements against the Jesuits did them honour; he could not understand the sympathy which had been shown the Jesuits in many quarters.⁵

In a confidential letter to Wall, Tanucci recommended him to procure a copy of Chalotais' *Compte rendu des Constitutions des Jésuites*. It was a masterpiece in which the real features of the Society might be seen as in a bright mirror. In this work it was shown as clear as daylight how the doctrine of

¹ " *Le rendo tutte le grazie pel nuovo libro contro li benemeriti della Chiesa... Il Re li conosce e non lo potranno mai conquistare " (to Bottari, April 29, 1760, Biblioteca Corsini, Rome, Cod., 1602). " *È probabile che vaglia sotto il nuovo governo la verità e la giustizia, che sono incompatibili co' Gesuiti. Il confessore del Re non è nè sarà Gesuita " (to Bottari, September 11, 1759, *ibid.*).

² " *Vedo il Portogallo molto inquieto e molto irritato co' Gesuiti. Veramente alcune massime, che si leggono nei loro libri, non possono essere accette nelle corti de' sovrani " (to Wall, March 27, 1759, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6090).

³ *To Bottari, December 6, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602.

⁴ *To the same, September 11, 1759, *ibid.*

⁵ " La cacciata dei Gesuiti farà a la Francia grand' onore. Non intendo la compassione " (*to Galiani, March 31, 1764, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5988).

regicide was a necessary consequence of the Constitutions. This part of the book was a revelation. He himself had already noted this deduction in the works of Bellarmine, which he had been given to read in his youth. The Minister was not only to read the book himself but also to ask the king to take cognizance of it. It was worthy of being read by a wise ruler who was striving after goodness and was the enemy of all falsity.¹ Wall was able to give Tanucci the reassuring information that he had already examined the book and that he also was convinced that the knowledge of its important contents ought not to be withheld from the king.² Further steps

¹ " *Io non ho veduta cosa più seria, più vera, più chiara, più sincera, più efficace. È un capo d'opera e lo specchio più lucido ove si veda la Compagnia... Vedrà V. E. la dottrina esecranda del regicidio, che nella Compagnia è una conseguenza necessaria delle sue Costituzioni. Questa parte del libro è evangelo. Io ho veduto tutto quel processo nelle opere di Bellarmino, che mi furon fatte leggere nella mia adolescenza " (to Wall, March 30, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6093). " *Mi rallegra, che V. E. abbia letto il 'Conto reso delle Costituzioni dei Gesuiti' dal Procuratore generale del Parlamento di Bretagna. Il pregio, che io aveva trovato, era la brevità, la chiarezza, l'efficacia, la serietà colla quale aveva trattata quel Procuratore una materia con tanta fraude e industria dai Gesuiti intricata, ai quali è riuscito il coprire per tanto tempo, ed ascondere ai sovrani lo spirito di sedizione, di avarizia, di ambizione enorme, di un corpo insidioso, che stava e sta dentro lo stato unicamente per divorarlo e sovvertirlo, e per toglierne la religione e la disciplina. Gli estratti, che della dottrina dei Gesuiti ha il Parlamento di Parigi presentati al Re, son bastanti a disingannare ognuno " (to Wall, May 11, 1762, *ibid.*).

² " *He leído el librito del Procurador general intitulado 'Compte rendu des Constitutions des Jésuites'; a la verdad merece bien los epítetos con que lo califica el discernimiento y juicio de V. E., y es digno como V. E. me añade, de que no se oculte su lectura e importante contenido a la comprensión del Rey. V. E. me encarga que yo lo lea, y puedo decirle que queda obedecido anticipadamente a su precepto, porque desde luego que se publicó me lo remitieron de Paris, y que formo

were proposed by Tanucci two months later in a letter to the major-domo Losada. The king had been appointed by God for great things and for the good of nations. Accordingly he hoped that God would also grant him the necessary time, opportunity, strength, and enlightenment to cleanse Spain and the Two Sicilies of the Jesuits and their collegians. He was well aware of the difficulties due to the deeply rooted prejudices of the Spanish people, but they could be removed. The best way of spreading enlightenment was to distribute small popular booklets in Spanish by good theologians of other Orders. In these little books the Jesuit doctrine, which was so utterly opposed to the Gospels and only pleasing to the morally lax, was to be compared with the true Christian doctrine.¹ "I should regret having to pass into the next world," Tanucci had written two years earlier to the Neapolitan envoy in Madrid, "with the knowledge that I was leaving behind me this [Jesuitical] poison in the house of my honoured lord."²

When, in spite of these tips and admonitions, Spain continued to delay in beginning the work of purification, Tanucci wrote that strong arms were still greatly lacking there. The first task was to drive all these devotees out of

(aunque con mucha menos erudicion y luces) el mismo concepto que V. E...." (Wall to Tanucci, April 20, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6093).

¹ "Spero, che [Dio] darà a S. M. il tempo... da purgar la Spagna e le Sicilie dai Collegiali e dai Gesuiti. Mi fo carico delle difficoltà e de pregiudizi radicati profondamente nella nazione spagnuola. La via d'illuminarla sono i piccoli libri fatti in lingua spagnuola da buoni teologi Domenicani, Cassinesi, Agostiniani, Filippini, colla vera dottrina cristiana comparata colla gesuitica, che è tutta contraria all' Evangelo e favorevole ai rilasciati" (*to Losada, June 22, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5977); ROUSSEAU, I., 18, n. 1. Tanucci had a series of writings of this kind published under the title of *Inquietudini gesuitiche* (4 vols.; 1764-69), the place of publication and the name of the publisher being omitted. They were printed in the Royal Printing Office in Naples (*Tanucci to Grimaldi, August 8, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6102).

² *To Yaci, March 18, 1760, *ibid.*, 5961.

their positions, and to clean out these Augean stables would take years; ¹ for the Court, the Ministry, and the clergy of Spain could not be transformed in a twinkling; at least half of them would have to be changed before the work could be taken in hand. Former Governments were to blame. Once the king's sons were of age and his mother dead, there would be no more Jesuits in the palace. It would probably be another twenty-five years before the Ministry and its principles were changed.² He himself would most likely not live to see that joyful day, for the edifice was a large one, with deep and strong foundations; but fall it would, if not in his lifetime. Meanwhile he was watching the Portuguese, the Parlements, and the Jansenists working hard to purge the old leaven out of the Christian people.³ It is a matter of conjecture whether the Minister had a strict regard for historical truth or whether he intended merely to create an impression, when he wrote that a certain Power had raised the question in Naples of joining that State in driving the Jesuits out of both their countries.⁴ In any case, Tanucci may claim

¹ "Vedrò volentieri Mons. Caraffa tanto studioso e desideroso della luce e del vero. Come tale, e come suo amico potrà di me far l'uso, che gli occorra. Pover' uomo! Quanto Ulisse, e quanto Giobbe gli sovrasta, ove regnano i Gesuiti, e regneranno per tutto il secolo. Portogallo ha emendato, come voleva Marziale far alle poesie di colui una litura. Francia è stata più rituale, ne ha pagata qualche pena, e Dio sa, se altra resti a pagare. Spagna cunctatur; manca ivi molto ancora in genere di braccia, ma medita. Non mi giungerebbe nuovo, se dura la pace, un concilio generale, che finisca l'abbozzo di Trento. Cacciar dalle cariche tutti li devoti, sarebbe per qualche anno in Spagna una pulitura della stalla d' Augia" (*to Bottari, February 26, 1763, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

² *To Centomani, September 8, 1764, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5990.

³ *To Bottari, May 14, 1763, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

⁴ " *Posso dirle, che da qualche sovranità siamo stati interrogati, se volessimo unirli con essa nel cacciare dai rispettivi paesi li Gesuiti. Veramente ognuno è nauseato di loro dopo averli scoperti satelliti e guastatori della corte di Roma, e traditori di

the distinction of having helped more than anyone to steer the Spanish Government into the anti-Jesuit channel.¹

The strong arms desired by Tanucci were soon available. To his great satisfaction the new Fiscal appointed to the Council of Castile in 1762 was Pedro Rodriguez Campomanes.² Beside his professional attainments Campomanes' historical and linguistic knowledge was not inconsiderable, and, following the prevailing current of the period, he devoted much of his time to political economy, whereby with a dilettantish trustfulness he, along with others, relied on the efficacy of theories. He was a friend of Benjamin Franklin and a correspondent of the Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, but above all he was a thoroughgoing regalist and anti-Jesuit.³ When in 1764 some Jesuits from the French Provinces of the Society fled into Spain to avoid taking the oath prescribed by the Parlements, and the question of giving them asylum was discussed in the Council of Castile, Campomanes, in conjunction with Valle y Salazar, spoke in favour of their being barred from the country.⁴ His motion, however, was

tutte le altre corti, e seduttori delle nazioni contro li sovrani e li magistrati, finalmente sostenitori delle dottrine ereticali di Gregorio VII. e di altri tali nella materia giurisdizionale. Lascio la scandalosa morale, l'avarizia, l'ambizione, la cabala, che non manca mai, ove il Gesuita si possa ficcare" (to Centomani, August 11, 1764, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5990).

¹ " Au surplus la main de Tanucci se retrouve jusque dans l'affaire des Jésuites d'Espagne ; et ce n'est pas à son insu que peu à peu le Conseil se peuple d'adversaires des Jésuites" (ROUSSEAU, I., *Intro.* xi).

² " *Lo sapeva per buon giuriconsulto, ma non sapeva, che ei non fosse del partito dei Gesuiti. Per non esser di tal partito bisogna buona dottrina, e inclinazione forte alla verità e all'honestà. Ove son queste due qualità, nulla possono li Gesuiti" (to Losada, August 10, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5977).

³ MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 134 *seqq.*

⁴ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, July 10 and 24, 1764, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 292, *loc. cit.* Cf. our account, XXXVI., 488.

lost.¹ In the following year he published his *Treatise on the Royal Right of Amortization*, a juridical compilation having as its object the restriction of the acquisition of property in mortmain. The work was frequently reissued and it served as a textbook for subsequent amortization laws in Spain.² The Marchese Grimaldi was no less regalistically minded.³

But all the above were surpassed in their hatred of Rome and the Jesuits by Manuel de Roda y Arrieta.⁴ Sent to Rome in 1758 as agent-general (*agente de preces*) and procurator for Spain,⁵ he was provisionally appointed as the Spanish representative to the Holy See in 1760, on the death of Cardinal Portocarrero.⁶ Here he fell completely under the influence of the Jansenist party and became a close friend of the Augustinian General Vasquez, an ardent opponent of the

¹ **El Consejo en el 23 de Agosto de 1764*, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 687; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, August 14, 1764, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 292, *loc. cit.*

² The complete title in MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 136. In 1825 the book, which had received the approbation of five clerics, was forbidden in Rome (REUSCH, *Index*, II., 937). In 1767 an Italian translation was made at the order of the Venetian Senate (*ibid.*). LEONHARD (*Agrarpolitik*, 97 *seq.*) describes the treatise as the standard work of regalism, full of bombastic, sonorous, and meaningless rhetoric.

³ *Charles III. to Tanucci, October 18, 1763, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6049; *Grimaldi to Roda, October 18, 1763, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 44.

⁴ " *Roda era uomo probo, odiava li Gesuiti, sapeva Roma da dentro e da fuori. Sicchè era un buon ministro di giustizia e di Chiesa " (Tanucci to Catanti, September 30, 1782, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6039).

⁵ *Wall to Portocarrero, February 28, 1758, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, Reales Ordenes, 40; *Aróstegui to Wall, May 25, 1758, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5011.

⁶ *Charles III. to Clement XIII. and *Wall to Roda, July 8, 1760, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, *loc. cit.*, 41.

Jesuits. He kept up a frequent correspondence with Vasquez after his return to Spain.¹ Similarity of thought also brought him into close touch with Tanucci, who respected and valued him highly.² The visit which Roda paid the influential Minister before his departure from Rome gave Tanucci the greatest pleasure,³ and it also occasioned the surmise that it was then that they agreed upon the plan for the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain.⁴ Under the influence of these friends Roda became, in Tanucci's words, "the bitter persecutor of the Roman fables and the Jesuits."⁵ Azara, who shared his opinions, facetiously said of him that he wore a pair of spectacles through which he could see nothing but Jesuits and

¹ This *correspondence (1765-1775) in Madrid, Bibl. S. Isidro, *Cartas de Vasquez*, 3 vols. (probably incomplete). Cf. JEMOLO, 117 *seq.*

² "Io lo amo, lo stimo, lo venero, ed era nella lusinga di ch'egli ne fusse persuaso" (*Tanucci to Bottari, April 5, 1763, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1602).

³ "Fu qui il buon Roda; li momenti furon pieni di soavità; io gli versai nel seno tutto il più riposto della mia coscienza," etc. Roda was "costì persecutore agro delle favole Romanensi e dei Gesuiti" (*to Bottari, March 23, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5992).

⁴ "*Nulla posson farle li Gesuiti di male. Fra li cardini della vita sua non ne è alcuno amico dei Gesuiti. Roda ha in Roma, essendo Ministro interino per sei anni di Spagna, esercitata un'aperta inimicizia colli Gesuiti, ed è stato fatto ultimamente dal Re Cattolico segretario della Giustizia, della Grazia e della Chiesa. Rida dunque, stia tranquillo..." (Tanucci to Catanti, March 16, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5992). "*Desidero alla Maestà Sua una ventina di Roda, e altrettanti Campomanes" (Tanucci to Losada, March 26, 1765, *ibid.*). "*Non tempo avverso, ma stanchezza e bisogno di riposo trattenne il buon Roda otto giorni in Genova, e la cortesia di Cornesor [Cornejo?]. Il bene, che ei farà in Spagna, non sarà alla pubblica cognizione, che dopo qualche tempo. Quelli, che lo vogliono veder subito, non sanno la condotta d'un ministro con un Monarca" (Tanucci to Centomani, April 6, 1765, *ibid.*).

⁵ See above, n. 3.

Colegiales mayores.¹ At the time when the Jesuits were being expelled from Portugal he is said to have told the Cardinals Passionei and Gian Francesco Albani that on the death of Queen Elizabeth Farnese the same thing would happen in Spain.²

Rome would have been glad to see this hostile Ambassador removed, for during the dispute about the Pragmatic Sanction³ he had obtained possession of a secret Papal Brief addressed to the king's confessor, Osma, and had published it with the object of wrecking the negotiations.⁴ Twice the nuncio Pallavicini was instructed by Torrigiani to ask discreetly for an envoy of high rank, which would have meant the removal of the obnoxious Roda,⁵ but the attempt was unsuccessful. Then, on January 17th, 1765, the Minister of Justice, Muñiz, Count of Campo Villar, died, and on the same morning Charles III. appointed Roda as his successor; this choice, the king thought, would please Naples as much as it would displease Rome.⁶ Both the friends and the enemies

¹ Roda, who in his schooldays was a *manteista* (a sort of charity-boy), nursed a grudge against the *Colegiales mayores* i.e. the favoured scholars of the upper classes. He accused them of unjustly monopolizing the higher posts in the civil service, of barring the way of capable officials of the middle classes, and, thinking only of preserving their privileges, of opposing every kind of progress (MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 139). "Homo hic [Roda] . . . qui e tenui fortuna cum fuisset, in aulae lucem opera Iesuitarum productus, sese externe amicum eorum ferebat," etc. (CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 96 seq.). Cf. FERNAN-NUÑEZ, I., 206 seq.

² CORDARA, *loc. cit.*, 98; RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 2.

³ See above, p. 25.

⁴ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, November 11, 1762, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, February 16 and March 24, 1763, *ibid.*, 432.

⁶ "No quiero dejar de decirte que aviendo muerto mi Segretario de Gracia y Justicia Muñiz (Colegial), he nombrado para tal empleo a Don Manuel de Roda, lo que creo que no te parecerá mal, y espero que me servirá bien, como lo ha hecho en Roma,

of the Jesuits regarded this step as a significant change of policy.¹ The Jesuit General, Ricci, unaware that the appointment had been made at the king's own desire despite numerous counter-efforts at Court, considered it expedient to apprise the Queen-Mother, who still wielded much influence, of the new Minister's way of thinking. He informed her, through her confessor Bramieri, that Roda was under the influence of enemies of the Church and of the Order and that these men, according to reliable evidence, were purposing to open a campaign in Spain against the Society of Jesus and would not desist until it was uprooted from the country. Immediately this object had been gained they would work for the suppression of the Society by the Pope.²

The nuncio Pallavicini's opinion in 1763, after Grimaldi's appointment, was that there were still no signs of a change of mind among persons of importance,³ though Italian Jansenists had known in the previous year of anti-Jesuit movements in the kingdom of Charles III.⁴ During the war with England this agitation subsided, only to rise again after the peace of Fontainebleau. It was not long before the Portuguese

a la que no sé si gustará tal elección " (*to Tanucci, January 22, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6049). *Grimaldi to Roda, January 22, 1765, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, Reales Ordenes, 45.

¹ " *Ha veduto [the Pope] finalmente dal Re, neglette tutte le altre premure della sua corte e ministero, farsi il Segretario della Giustizia e della Chiesa il più dichiarato disapprovatore dei Gesuiti, il quale neppure chiedeva, e certamente non desiderava un tal posto, eppur tuttavia il buon S. Padre si lascia lusingare dalla potenza gesuitica in Spagna " (Tanucci to Orsini, April 25, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5992). Cf. *Tanucci to Bottari, March 23, 1765 (see above, p. 42, n. 3).

² *Ricci to Bramieri, April 25, 1765, in Jesuit possession, *Ep. Gen. secretae*.

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 13, 1763, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 290, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Bandini to Foggini, June 22, 1762, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod. 1607.

envoy in Madrid, Sa e Mello, received a secret instruction to make private inquiries as to how the Jesuits stood with the king, the princes, and the Ministers, and whether the project of driving them out of the whole peninsula was likely to succeed.¹ The demand that had been voiced in the Parliament of Rouen, that the Christian princes should join together and make a united appeal to the Pope to abolish the Society,² had not gone unheard in Spain.

The extent to which anti-Jesuit feeling had taken root in Spain was shown by the treatment accorded by the Council of Castile to the Papal Bull of January 7th, 1765, issued in support of the Jesuits. In the report rendered to Charles III. the result of the deliberations was so worded as to give the impression that the Jesuits had paid no attention to the royal *Exequatur* and were again distributing the present Bull throughout the country without permission. On this ground alone, without entering into a discussion of the contents of the Bull, its publication might well be prohibited.³ As Pallavicini reported, the Papal manifesto was thought to be inopportune in Madrid; even those friendly to Rome and the Jesuits admitted that in the circumstances the Bull would do more harm than good, for, since it was attributed

¹ *§ 49. "Verá V. E. o que ahí sentem a respeito dos Jesuitas, e se poderá ou não conseguirse o intento que premeditamos de expulsarlos de toda esta península, sem que se presuma nunca o nosso empenho. § 50. Todos os Papeis que en este assumpto se remeterem a V. E. para el Rey, lhes dará V. E. em mão propria, pois que para este fim hão de hir ja vertidos em castelhano em razão de não entenderem muito bem nosso idioma. § 51. Procurará V. E. saber tudo o que lhe for possível dos mesmos Padres, e com especialidade o valimento ou favor que achão em el Rey, Principes, Ministros, etc." (Instruções para Ayres de Sa y Mello, embaixador extraordinario para la corte de Madrid, undated [November 1764?], Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7291). The instruction consists of fifty-six articles.

² See our account, Vol. XXXVI., 487, n. 1.

³ *February 28, 1765, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3518.

to pressure exerted by the Jesuits, it was presumed that their influence in Rome was enormous; the Papal Curia had completely failed to appreciate the true state of affairs.¹ With the tacit assent of the authorities the most extravagant rumours about the power and wealth of the Jesuits in Paraguay were put about in newspapers and pamphlets.² All candidates for official appointments were faced with the question of where they had done their studies, and Jesuit pupils were barred in advance.³ Personal records still extant show that attempts were made through secret inquiries to discover the attitude and the feeling of officials towards the Society.⁴

In view of what was happening both at home and abroad, clear-sighted Jesuits could not but see that the signs of the

¹ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, March 19, 1765, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 293, *loc. cit.*, translation in THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 65 *seq.*

² *Fr. Saez to the Rector of Villagarcia, December 7, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666. Years before, Torrigiani had complained about anti-Jesuit polemical writings (*to Spinola, February 22, 1759, Regolari, Gesuiti, 48, Papal Secret Archives). The French Jesuits who had taken refuge in Spain received a warning emanating from the Court to return to their own country without delay. (*Ricci to Nectoux, March 21, 1765, *ibid.*).

³ " Nell' anno precedente 1766 scrivevano al Generale i Superiori di Madrid, che chiunque chiedeva cariche, era interrogato, dove avesse fatti i studi, e rispondendo, che alle scuole de' Gesuiti, veniva escluso dalla carica apertamente ed espressamente per questo solo motivo; onde pensavano di fare ricorso a S. M., ciò che fu approvato, purchè si facesse senza offesa di alcuno". (Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 3 *seq.*).

⁴ **Noticia de los Ministros que componen el Consejo Supremo de S.M. y de otros dentro y fuera de esta corte* (undated, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 590); **Estado actual de la Real Chancelleria de Valladolid*, of August 10, 1765, *ibid.*; **Estado actual del Consejo de Navarra* (undated), *ibid.*; **Audiencia real de Oviedo*, of August 12, 1765, *ibid.* The characterizations used were " *Jesuita*", " *de 4 voti*", " *Thomista*", " *Indifferente*". The list of the members of the Council of Castile with their qualifications is reproduced in RAZÓN Y FE, XXIX. (1911), 169.

times portended a storm. "What depresses me most," wrote the Jesuit Isidro Lopez,¹ on hearing of Roda's appointment as Minister of Justice, "is that Roda belongs to that infamous party which is selling the Church for a handful of silver on the pretext of reforming the Jesuits." A few weeks later (in April, 1765), Nectoux, the Jesuit Provincial of La Guienne, reported to his General that a prominent Minister had stated that in Spain, too, the Jesuit colleges would soon have to be suppressed; his was the universal opinion, held by every State and Court in Europe. Soon there would be no more Jesuits outside Italy. In Spain there was a large party ready to take hostile action against the Society, and soon they would have the personal support of that sworn enemy of the Order who was then on his way from Rome to Spain to take over an office which would provide him with excellent opportunities of expelling the Jesuits.² Ricci was probably expressing his wishes rather than his convictions when he replied that in Rome this mournful prophecy was held to be not merely doubtful but completely false. He trusted that with God's help things would never come to such a pass. "But should the Lord," he continued, "allow the Spanish or other brethren to be afflicted with the same sufferings as have befallen the French Fathers, it behoves us to accept the visitations that the Lord sends us with unconquerable patience and humble submission. Meanwhile we will beseech the divine Goodness to grant us all, together with our trials, a greater measure of virtue."³

¹ *To Fr. Idiaquez, February 27, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

² *Nectoux to Ricci, April 1765, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666, copy *ibid.*, 688.

³ " *Quamquam ingeniosa adeo et in Societatis ruinam intenta sit furens supra modum malevolorum invidia, ut omnia, vel maxime tuta, timenda videantur, attamen tristia, quae praenuntiat R. V., non incerta modo, verum etiam falsa prorsus existimantur, atque fore confido, ut, iuvante Deo, nunquam eveniant. At si quibus probare socios gallos supremum numen voluit, iisdem exagitari infortuniis socios hispanos et quosvis alios

The trials were nearer than anyone imagined. The insurrections of the spring of 1766 alarmed the Spanish king and brought the slowly-growing crisis to a sudden head.

(4)

In his work entitled *The Good Government of a Catholic Monarchy*, Macañaz had warned the monarch in 1742 never to allow his Ministers and counsellors to order his subjects to change their national mode of dress for a foreign one. Decrees of this kind would be regarded by the people as tyrannical encroachments on their liberty, and might easily turn them against him and provoke a revolt, the quelling of which would cost the State many of its citizens and the monarch much of his prestige.¹ How justified this warning had been, Madrid was to learn by experience through the so-called "Hat and Cloak Riots".²

In spite of the misgivings of both the Fiscals,³ a decree was issued on March 10th, 1766, forbidding the use of the flowing cloak (*capa*) and broad-brimmed *sombrero* in all royal residential towns, university towns, and provincial capitals and prescribing instead the French wig and three-cornered hat. The contravention of this order was to be punished by the infliction of a fine or a term of imprisonment, and a third offence would render the culprit liable to banishment for four

permittat, ab ipsis utique invicta cum patientia humilique animi demissione toleranda erunt mala, quae fecerit Dominus" (Ricci to Nectoux, March 21, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666).

¹ MACAÑAZ, *Auxilios para bien gobernar una monarquía católica*, Auxilio 21, §§ 19 and 20; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 41 *seq.*

² The first official report on the uprising in Madrid occurs in Aranda's *letter to Roda, dated Madrid 1766, April 9, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009, fos. 99-102. See below, p. 63 and Appx. 1.

³ *Squillace to Roda, State Archives in Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 790; *Campomanes to [Roda?], undated, *ibid.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 12, n. 1.

years.¹ The reasons given for this measure were that the cloak and sombrero were not a Spanish costume and that their only use was to enable criminals to hide their faces and thus go unpunished.²

Spanish national pride was deeply hurt, and the law was most ill-timed. The winter of 1765 had been so extraordinarily cold that the coastal waters of the Bay of Biscay had frozen, and since 1760 an unbroken series of summer droughts had badly affected the harvests, causing a considerable rise in the prices of the staple commodities of bread, oil, and wine.³ The populace attributed the increased cost of living, not to the poor harvests, but to the machinations of the Finance Minister Squillace (Esquilache), who was detested as a foreigner and as the introducer of various unpopular measures of reform⁴ and, moreover, was reputed to be enriching himself at the expense of the people.⁵ Great excitement prevailed in the poorer quarters. During the night the Government notices vanished and in their place other placards were posted up, bearing this announcement: "Fifty men are ready to defend the cloak and *sombrero*. Every true Spaniard who joins this party will be provided with arms, ammunition, and all other essentials."⁶

The clumsy way in which the decree was enforced still further increased the popular indignation. Over-zealous officials hurried through the city, calling on the people to be obedient, only to be received with taunts and mockery. They

¹ *Bando* of March 10, 1766 (printed), Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 790. Cf. "*Vando*" of January 19, 1760 (printed), Arch. general central in Madrid, Estado, 4900; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 12 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 177.

² *Squillace to Roda, February 21, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 790.

³ *Grimaldi to Choiseul, April 2, 1766, *ibid.*, Estado, 4557.

⁴ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 9 *seqq.*

⁵ Tanucci also accused him and his wife of cupidity (*to Losada, June 3, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5997; *to Cattolica, September 16, 1766, *ibid.*, 5998).

⁶ ROUSSEAU, I., 178. FERRER DEL RIO (II., 14) speaks of 3,000.

then sent out commissaries accompanied by tailors who were to cut short offenders' cloaks in the open street and bend back their hats. The excitement rose to boiling point when a detachment of the Walloon Guard was called out to take action against recalcitrants. The Walloons had been disliked in Madrid since the firework display in honour of the marriage between the Princess Maria Luise and the Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany, the measures they took to preserve order on this occasion resulting in a score of persons being crushed to death.¹

The pent-up rage of the populace broke out on the afternoon of Palm Sunday, March 23rd, 1766. Two men muffled in cloaks strode to and fro in a provocative manner outside the barracks. When challenged by the guards they made a defiant reply, and as they were about to be taken into custody one of them struck down a soldier with his sword. At a given signal a body of armed men rushed out from a neighbouring street, overpowered the guard, and disarmed them. Shouting "Long live the king! Down with Squillace!" the rioters poured through the streets, hurling insults at the Minister's rapacious wife.² Their number swollen by the curious, they now amounted to about 3,000. The king, who was just returning from the hunt, showed great perturbation. The Duke of Medinaceli, whose open-handedness had won him popular favour, was sent to calm the excited mob, but his appeal to them to return to their homes was only partly successful, as they now took it into their heads to go to Squillace's residence, with the intention of putting him to death. Squillace, however, had managed to escape in disguise to the royal palace, while his wife, immediately the first rumour of the tumult had reached her ears, had hurriedly gathered together her jewels and fled to the nunnery where her two daughters were being educated. The mob, having plundered Squillace's house and drunk freely of the wine they found

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 178.

² For her, *cf.* ROUSSEAU, I., 17; FERRER DEL RIO, I., 245 *seq.*; *Tanucci to Losada, June 3, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5997.

there, proceeded to Grimaldi's residence, for he, a Genoese, was equally unpopular, but here they contented themselves with smashing the windows. Finally, towards midnight, after showing their hatred of Squillace by shattering the street lamps he had had erected, and by burning his effigy in the Plaza Mayor, they dispersed.¹

On the following day a crowd of men, women, and children approached the royal palace, where the Minister still lay in hiding, and tried to force their way in. The Walloon Guard fired some warning shots, killing one woman and wounding another. The infuriated crowd bore down on the soldiers, killed several of them, and with loud cries dragged their mangled bodies through the streets. Again the Dukes of Medinaceli and Arcos tried to pacify the insurgents, but in vain. Some monks who attempted with crucifix in hand to control the crowd were equally unsuccessful. This was no time for preaching, they were told by the insurgents; they were Christians and would listen to no one but the king. Whereupon Yecla, Prior of San Juan in La Mancha,² advised the crowd to present a petition to the king. With all speed one was drawn up in a tavern and was signed by all who wished to do so.³ The following eight requests were made of the king "in the name of Almighty God, the most holy and undivided Trinity, and the most blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God": the banishment of Squillace and his family, the formation of a Ministry of Spaniards, the dissolution of the food commission, the withdrawal of the Walloons, the liberty to dress as they pleased, the cheapening of staple commodities, general pardon for all that had occurred, and the king's assent to this petition to be given in the Plaza Mayor. If these demands were refused, Madrid would be destroyed that very night.⁴

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 178 *seqq.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 14 *seqq.*

² ROUSSEAU (I., 183) calls him Fr. Cuenca.

³ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 18 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 180 *seq.*

⁴ **Capitulaciones del pueblo de Madrid con el Rey el dia 24 de Marzo de 1766*, Arch. Prov. Tolet. in Madrid, Chamartin, P: FERRER DEL RIO, II., 22 *seq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 182.

In the garb of a penitent, Yecla approached the king with this petition. Although the Prior stood guaranty for the monarch's safety with his own life, Charles did not dare to go among the people and dismissed the Prior with the instruction to assure the people of his good will. After briefly conferring with his entourage, the king gave orders for the crowd to be admitted into the palace yard, where Yecla again presented the petition to him and falling on his knees besought him to exercise his royal clemency and grant the requests. The king indicated his assent and the people, obedient to the Prior, retired, but only to return after a brief interval in procession, with palms in their hands and a statue of the Queen of the Rosary, borne by four Dominicans, in their midst. Songs of joy mingled with the muffled beats of the Basque drum.¹

As some of his courtiers protested that his life was still in danger so long as he remained in the city, Charles III. left his palace during the night by means of underground passages and from St. Vincent's gate drove in a carriage to Aranjuez. The Queen-Mother alone opposed this departure, which had the appearance of a flight, but when she failed to persuade any of her hearers she refused, in spite of her parlous state of health, to leave her son.²

On the following morning, March 25th, while the people were making ready to demonstrate their gratitude to the king, the news spread that he had left the city during the night. All were seized with anger and alarm. Thinking that they had been tricked, they feared that troops would close in on Madrid, that the concessions would be withdrawn, and that the insurgents would be punished. They were already thinking of going to Aranjuez and bringing the monarch back to the capital, when the President of the Council of Castile, Bishop Diego de Rojas of Cartagena, offered to deliver a message from the people to the king. He had already reached the Toledo bridge when the mistrustful populace changed its

¹ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 23 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 182 *seq.*

² FERRER DEL RIO, II., 29 *seq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 183.

mind. The Bishop was made to return to his palace, where, weakly compliant, he composed a memorial in which, with violent expressions of abuse, he held the Minister Squillace responsible for all the sufferings and calamities of recent years. While the President was kept in the city as a hostage, the document was taken to Aranjuez by a certain Avendaño.¹

Meanwhile Madrid was in the hands of the rebels. They seized the arms and ammunition depôts and opened the houses where the prostitutes were kept under surveillance. All this was done with a great deal of noise but was not accompanied by any serious acts of violence. At last the messenger returned from Aranjuez, and from the balcony of his palace the Bishop read to the silent multitude the monarch's reply. Charles III. affirmed on his royal word that he would keep the promises he had made the day before but that he expected the people to restore peace and order in return for these favours and that everyone would resume his normal occupation.² The Cardinal Archbishop was asked to use the services of the secular and regular clergy in calming the population.³ The crowd received this message with satisfaction and immediately surrendered some of their weapons.⁴

The insurrection was not confined to Madrid. Other provinces and cities, such as Saragossa, Barcelona, Salamanca, Murcia, Corunnà, and Ascoitia, were soon affected by the movement. Records show that in every case the disturbances were due to the increased cost of food ; everywhere the cry went up for cheaper food and the punishment of the profiteers.⁵

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 183 *seq.* ; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 30 *seqq.*

² ROUSSEAU, I., 184 *seq.* ; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 34 *seqq.* ; Roda to the President of the Council of Castile, March 25, 1766 (printed), Arch. general, Madrid, Estado 4900, reproduced in FERRER DEL RIO, II., 36 *seq.* A placard (*Cartel*) of March 25, 1766 (printed, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 4900) contains a list of the various concessions.

³ *O'Reilly to Grimaldi, March 25, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Guerra moderna, 578.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ ROUSSEAU, I., 185 *seq.* ; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 56 *seqq.*

Charles III., who had played a rather ignoble part during the outbreak, was so upset by these bad tidings that it was feared that his health had been seriously affected. He was especially angry with the capital for having set the example in the rising. In spite of the pardon he had granted he refused to return to Madrid, and in Court circles there was already talk of changing the capital.¹ As for Squillace, the king had declared at first that so long as he had a slice of bread he would share it with him, but at the critical moment he forgot his promise. On March 27th the Minister left Aranjuez and travelled under military escort to Cartagena, whence on April 24th he took ship for Italy.² Although enjoying a generous pension of 19,000 ducats, he never ceased to demand his reinstatement. Finally, after six years, he was given the post of envoy to Venice.³ In his place Miguel Muzquiz was appointed Finance Minister and Gregorio Muniain Minister of War.⁴

Another new appointment was of far greater consequence. Bishop Rojas' position had become untenable. He had shown a weakness towards the rebels that was unworthy of his episcopal dignity and of the high position he held in the State. The king appointed in his stead, as President of the Council of Castile, the energetic and competent Count Aranda, who until then had been Captain-General of Valencia.⁵

An Aragonese by birth, Aranda had at first undertaken

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 187; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 83 *seq.*

² ROUSSEAU, I., 185; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 38 *seq.*

³ *Squillace to Roda, April 5, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009. Cf. FERRER DEL RIO, II., 39 *seq.*; *Tanucci to Catanti, May 13, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5997.

⁴ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, March 26, 1766, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 46; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 52 *seq.*

⁵ *Charles III. to Aranda, April 11, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; *Aranda to Roda, April 12, 1766, *ibid.* For Aranda, cf. MOREL FATIO, II., 141 *seqq.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 84 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 189 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, II., 566 *seqq.*

military service and in the wars in Italy had acquired the reputation of being a capable officer. Afterwards he embarked on a diplomatic career. As envoy to the Court of Lisbon he fell out with Pombal and was transferred to distant Poland. From here he attended the manœuvres conducted by Frederick II. in Silesia. Accustomed to strict military discipline, he combined with an iron character a somewhat rough sense of honour. Inclined on the one hand to forcible reforms, he nevertheless showed himself to be a fanatical defender of the royal authority, though this did not prevent him in the last years of his life from adopting a sympathetic attitude towards the French Revolution. In his long travels through Europe he had perfected his knowledge of military and civil administration, not omitting at the same time to form connections with the philosophers of "Enlightenment". Closely acquainted with D'Alembert, the Abbé Raynal, and Voltaire, he was celebrated by the last-named in poetry and prose as the Spanish Hercules who had cleaned the Augean stables, blunted the teeth and cut the claws of the Hydra, and plunged into the dark obscurity of the tomb the hellish power of the Inquisition.¹ Though completely estranged from the Faith, Aranda seems to have complied with the outward forms and precepts of the Church.² With certain clerics he was on good terms. His former tutor, the Jesuit Martinez, was a welcome visitor to his house³ and two of his cousins were Jesuits.⁴ This was probably the reason why Roda thought

¹ MOREL FATIO, II., 148 *seq.*, 163; ROUSSEAU, I., 195 *seqq.*; MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 140 *seq.*, 199 *seqq.*; GALLERANI-MADARIAGA, *Jesuitas expulsos de España*, 131 *seqq.* (in which further literature on the subject is cited); COLOMA, *Retratos de antaño*, 211 *seq.*; LEONHARD, *Agrarpolitik*, 93.

² On being made a Knight of the Order of the Holy Ghost he made the customary profession of the Catholic Faith.

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, May 20, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, Papal Secret Archives, copy in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072.

⁴ José and Nicolás Pignatelli, brothers of Count Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in Paris.

him a fanatical supporter of the Jesuits.¹ Like many of his contemporaries of similar standing he was a *bon viveur* whose relations with womenfolk were only too notorious.² He was a great favourite with the people, who appreciated his exceptional powers and looked to him to administer justice without regard to persons.³

Charles III. had appointed Aranda on April 11th and had instructed him to begin his duties on the following day. The new President arrived in Madrid between five and six o'clock next morning, had himself apprised of current business by Bishop Rojas at seven, and by eight o'clock he was taking the official oath before the Council of Castile.⁴ With soldierly courage he set to work. To restore order his first object was to clear the capital of the rabble which was streaming into it from all parts of the country and was increasing the number of the malcontents. The unemployed loafers were either expelled from Madrid or confined in workhouses.⁵ He confirmed Squillace's order by which all clerics living in the city without any duty to perform were to return to their parishes.⁶ A corporal who had shouted "Long live the king! Down with Squillace!" was condemned by him to run the gauntlet.⁷

¹ "Este [Fuentes] es aun más fanático que su primo Aranda" (*Roda to Azara, 15 (?) June, 1765, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, R.) "Yo espero mucho de Aranda en bien de la España, y non poco en bien de la Compañía a quien quisieron embolver en el alboroto de Madrid" (*Cabrera to Poyanos, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777).

² MOREL FATIO, II., 170 *seqq.*

³ *Aranda to Roda, April 12, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; ROUSSEAU, I., 191 *seq.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 85 *seq.*

⁴ FERRER DEL RIO, *ibid.*

⁵ *Bando* of May 16, 1766 (printed), Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; *Aranda to Roda, May 1, 2, 3, 1766, *ibid.*

⁶ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, May 6, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*

⁷ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 89.

A respected citizen of Murcia who had been so bold as to state that the revolution would continue until the blood of the Bourbons had been made to flow, he had hanged.¹

One of the main causes of the insurrection was the rise in the cost of food. To obviate mismanagement in the distribution of food, the Council of Castile, at Aranda's instigation, passed the resolution that the people should be represented in the local administration. All places with 2,000 inhabitants were to have four deputies elected by the people, other places two; these deputies, together with the aldermen, were to have a controlling right.² The numerous pamphlets of a derisive, abusive, or threatening character, which had been stirring up the passions of the populace both before and after the revolt, were another cause of the general discontent. They were mainly directed against the Italian element in the Government and demanded delivery from the tyrannical yoke of the foreigners who were sucking the life-blood of the people and trampling down their freedom.³ While confirming the general pardon granted by the king, the Council of Castile issued a ban against this type of publication.⁴

While the party led by the Duke of Alba was endeavouring to keep the king away from Madrid, Aranda and his supporters used every means in their power to bring the monarch back to the capital. Charles himself was the prey to conflicting emotions: on the one hand, his absolutist self-conceit rebelled against the notion of maintaining the concessions that had

¹ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, July 1, 1766, Cifre, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 302, *loc. cit.*

² *Auto acordado* of May 5, 1766 (printed), Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 91 *seqq.*

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, April 22, 1766, Cifre, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 301, *loc. cit.*; Ossun to Choiseul, April 10, 1766, in ROUSSEAU, I., 187, n. 2. Several of these lampoons and defamatory letters in the Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

⁴ April 14, 1766 (printed), Archives of Simancas, Guerra moderna, 578; *Aranda to Grimaldi, April 15, 1766, *ibid.*; *Roda to Aranda, April 16, 1766, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

been wrested from him¹; on the other, his sense of justice recoiled from the breaking of his word. A way out of the dilemma was provided by Aranda. At his instigation, the nobility, the city council, and the five guilds presented a joint memorial to the king. While condemning the excesses that had occurred they protested against the favours that had been granted without their concurrence and which were therefore illegal, and they besought the king to return to the capital.² Lest he should appear to be judging his own cause, Charles referred the petitions to the Council of Castile, which, adopting the opinion of the Fiscals, declared the concessions to be null and void and decided on their withdrawal; the maintenance of the general pardon, however, they left to the judgment of the monarch.³ In consequence an edict was issued on June 23rd, 1766, whereby, at the request of the nobility, the city council, the guilds, and the clergy, the Council of Castile declared the concessions granted to be against the Constitution and the law and therefore void and ineffectual.⁴

¹ "Puntos que quiere el Rey para su honor y seguridad del pueblo" (Roda's *autograph, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009). The king's reasons and decision: Roda's *autograph, undated, *ibid.*

² *Aranda to Roda, June 3 and 10, 1766, *ibid.*; *Roda to Aranda, June 13, 1766, *ibid.* Tanucci called them "artificiali rappresentanze" in a *letter to Losada, July 1, 1766, *ibid.*, Estado, 5997. *The nobility of Madrid to Aranda (undated), Italian translation in Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*

³ *Respuesta fiscal* [June 9, 1766] (printed), Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 4900; **El Consejo pleno de 10 de Junio de 1766*, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

⁴ *Real Provision* (printed), *ibid.* On June 7 the clergy of Madrid delivered to Aranda an address in which they gave thanks for the favours granted, expressed their love for their ruler, and asked him to return to the capital. Highly content, Aranda forwarded the address to the Court (*Aranda to Roda, June 7, 1766, *ibid.*). Here, however, it was objected to, on the ground that it had assumed the concessions as of right instead of regarding them as null and void and asking for their suppression. The Count (without mentioning the royal instruction) was either to

With this recantation the king's prestige and sense of power were satisfied, at least externally. Aranda, however, was statesman enough to see that all eight points could not be cancelled without the risk of further disturbances. On July 6th the Walloon Guard returned to Madrid without any fresh incident.¹ No further attempt was made by Aranda to alter the national dress, but he urged the upper classes to adopt the French cocked hat of their own accord, so as to set an example to the common folk.² When the normal period of residence in Aranjuez was drawing to a close, Aranda asked the king to spend a few days in the capital before leaving for San Ildefonso. His return seemed imminent when the death of the Queen-Mother³ provided the still unwilling monarch with a welcome excuse for avoiding Madrid. This death had a further significance: it removed from the Court the last support of the Jesuits and the last obstacle that had hindered the Ministers from carrying out their plans.

Aranda's appointment to the highest office under the Crown was of great importance in yet another respect. It signified the strengthening of Charles III.'s ecclesiastical policy. Already by April 16th, 1766, the nuncio Pallavicini was communicating to the Cardinal Secretary of State the apprehensions caused him by the promotion of Aranda, the violent critic of the clergy.⁴ His gloomy forebodings were not unfounded. The previous day Grimaldi had informed Tanucci of the new appointment, and had expressed his expectation that the change in the leading personality in the Council of Castile undoubtedly meant that the handling of ecclesiastical affairs by this tribunal would now be very different. The

have the text amended or get rid of the petition altogether (*Grimaldi to Roda, 8 [June, 1766], autograph, *ibid.*; *Roda to Aranda, June 9, 1766, *ibid.*). By June 11 Aranda was able to forward the Court a petition from the clergy which was agreeable to it (*Aranda to Roda, June 11, 1766, *ibid.*).

¹ *Aranda to Roda, July 6, 1766 (autograph), *ibid.*

² FERRER DEL RIO, II., 99 *seq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 194 *seq.*

³ July 10, 1766.

⁴ *Cifre, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 301, *loc. cit.*

influence of the monks would no longer be so great and more attention would be paid to the interests of the king and his subjects. The Count was not a man to be influenced by the threats of hell with which the monks attempted to intimidate anyone who disagreed with them. The king in his great wisdom had at last done what had been so ardently desired in Spain for the last century : he had wrested from the hands of the clergy the direction of a tribunal entrusted with the protection of his royal rights.¹ Needless to say, the news evoked a joyful response from Tanucci. The change would encourage every patriot and every man of culture. The clergy were the enemies of the State and of the country with their sordid lust for money and their arrogant striving after independence. The heretical principles of the Jesuits and the Roman Court aimed at the usurpation of royal power, at insurrection, and at the undermining of national rights.² In another letter written on the same day Tanucci congratulated the monarch on his wisdom in putting an enlightened and honourable Captain-General in the place of the cleric, who had probably been but a doubtful protector of the royal rights. In striving after riches and power the clergy had abandoned the teachings of the Gospel and of the Apostles, which had enjoined on the servants of the Church obedience towards the prince, the civil authorities, and the laws of the State, and the observance of poverty.³ In his reply the king assured him that these considerations had long been in his mind and that only the fear of being accused of wanting to change the whole system of his predecessors had held him back. But already he had deeply regretted his hesitation. And Tanucci was to keep this admission to himself.⁴

Charles' regalist advisers had every reason to be pleased

¹ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, April 15, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6099.

² *To Grimaldi, May 6, 1766, *ibid.*

³ *To Charles III., May 6, 1766, *ibid.* Cf. also *to Charles III., June 10, 1766, *ibid.*

⁴ *To Tanucci, May 27, 1766, in FERRER DEL RIO, II., 56, n. 1.

with the appointment of Aranda. Like them, he deplored the predominance of the clergy at the expense of the royal prerogative. Under the pretext of religion they exerted an excessive influence on the masses. The patient and innocent lay folk were always the victims, while the exempt were ever more arrogant, as they always came off unpunished.¹

Among the many nobles who hastened to the royal residence at the time of the uprising in Madrid was Ferdinand VI.'s former Minister, the Marquis de Ensenada, of whom Charles III. had personally testified that he had been the victim of his nationalistic policy.² On April 19th, Ensenada received instructions to return to his place of banishment. He obeyed the command immediately. Opinions differed as to the reasons for this order. Some thought that his having been cheered by the rioters had made him an object of suspicion; others held him guilty of having urged on Squillace the fatal decree against the slouch-hats. The best-founded explanation was that Ensenada had been represented to the monarch as an ambitious person who was taking advantage of the opportunity to regain power and honours.³ What is

¹ " *Observo con inexplicable sentimiento mio el predominio eclesiastico contra los respetos de la real jurisdiccion y contra los intereses de S. M. y de los vasallos, sin que sea menor el influxo con que a la multitud se persuade en supuestos de religion : viniendo la ultimo a ser la victima por todos los ramos, los pacientes e inocentes legos, y mas arrojados los esentos por lo impunes que en todo salen " (Aranda to Roda, June 8, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009, *loc. cit.*).

² See above, p. 3.

³ *Pallavicini to Torrighiani, April 22, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*, copy in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072; *Nota di Garampi, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.*; *Fernandez Angulo to Roda, April 26, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; *Tanucci to Cattolica, May 13, 1766, *ibid.*, Estado, 5997; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 49 *seqq.* Tanucci blamed the Marquis Ensenada for having filled the nation with that pernicious patriotism the effects of which the king was now having to suffer (*to Charles III., June 24, 1766, Archives of

certain is that those in Ministerial circles were convinced that his removal was a bitter blow to the Jesuit party.¹

(5)

The "Hat and Cloak Riots" occasioned, or afforded the pretext for, the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain.² The Fiscal Campomanes held them responsible for the disturbances,³ and as the result of his memorandum the Society was expelled from every part of the kingdom.

The reports which adhere most closely to events and are still uninfluenced by party motives contain no hint of the Jesuits being responsible for the uprising. The circular note sent by the Government to its foreign representatives on March 26th, 1766, the day after the Madrid insurrection came to an end, gives as the sole cause of the trouble the banning of the cloaks and slouch-hats and emphasizes that no ring-leader could be found.⁴ The historical value of this official notice may be questioned on the score that the account it contained was probably painted in bright colours so as to create a favourable impression, but there are other documents of the same period whose private and confidential character exclude any such

Simancas, Estado, 6099). Tanucci calls him "il più gran fomentatore" of the revolt in a *letter to Cattolica of June 24, 1766, *ibid.*, 5997.

¹ "Cierto es que los del partido de la Compañía han sentido mucho la salida" (*Angulo to Roda, April 26, 1766, *loc. cit.*). EGUÍA RUIZ, *El Marqués de la Ensenada*, 89 *seqq.*

² "El tumulto de Madrid, que se imitó con mas fuerza en Zaragoza, dió motivo y medios para echar de España una Sociedad que aunque habia hecho mucho bien al reino, tenía en él muchos enemigos, y entre ellos el Duque de Alba, que hacía años le tenía declarada la guerra, y sobre todo, el Ministro de Gracia y Justicia, Don Manuel de Roda, que le tenía una aversion grandisima" (FERNAN-NUÑEZ, I., 206 *seq.*).

³ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 123 *seq.*

⁴ **Minuta para las cartas de noticias que se escriben a las Cortes*, March 26, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

objection. Charles III.'s first letters to his confidant Tanucci,¹ Roda's letters to Azara,² and the nuncio's reports to the Cardinal Secretary of State,³ contain no hint as to the authors of the disturbances. In a detailed letter to Choiseul, Grimaldi stresses that only the worst of the rabble had taken part in the risings and proceeds to say: "The poor harvests of recent years, the high price of food, the hatred of Squillace, which was increased by the belief that the shortcomings in the provision of food were attributable to him, and the banning of a certain style of hats and cloaks—these were the causes of the tumult."⁴ By dint of promises the *corregidor* of Madrid, Don Alonso Perez Delgado, had succeeded in gaining the confidence of three of the chief participants in the rising.⁵ He was informed by them that only the lower classes were involved in the insurrection and that the lampoons and anonymous letters must have been written by idlers.⁶

The most important document in this respect is the detailed report submitted by Count Aranda to the Minister of Justice, Roda, on April 9th, 1766. As the result of the searching and secret inquiries into the origin, course, and actual state of the tumult which he was instituting on behalf of the Court, he repeatedly stresses that the original intention of the rioters had simply been to slaughter the Minister Squillace on Maundy Thursday and thus to rid the nation of a man who by his machinations was preventing the complaints and petitions of the people from reaching the ear of the king. In the course of the disturbances the hatred of the Walloon

¹ *March 26 and April 1, 1766, *ibid.*, Estado, 6054.

² March 26 and May 27, 1766, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, March 26, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Choiseul, April 2, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4557.

⁵ Portoles, Gomez, Molina.

⁶ *Delgado to Roda, April 15, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; *Roda to Delgado, April 16, 1766, *ibid.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 7 *seqq.*

Guard had also played a part. In conclusion Aranda called attention to the extraordinarily large number of inflammatory placards by means of which another class of the population was trying to revive the discontent of the masses and to exploit their original actions for their own ends.¹

Valle y Salazar also, who was instructed by Roda to make secret inquiries about the originators of the insurrection, says nothing in any of his three reports about the clergy's participation in the disorders.² In Saragossa, similarly, popular feeling was not directed against the king or the viceroy, the Marquis of Castelar, but against those who were generally thought to be enriching themselves at the expense of the poor, namely, the usurers. Among the Religious who were mentioned as having endeavoured to calm the excited mob were the Jesuits.³ In none of these documents, which are the nearest in time and place to the actual events, are the clergy in general or the Jesuits in particular accused of having caused or encouraged the rising.

But already, according to the nuncio's reports, there were vague rumours afloat that tended to burden the clergy with the responsibility for the disturbances, although it was precisely the clergy, both secular and regular, who had tried so hard to settle them, whereas, when things were critical, the nobles and the members of the Council had been completely inactive.⁴ The opinion of competent observers was that there was no conspiracy at all and that the whole tumult was purely an outburst of popular feeling and not the result of any premeditation⁵; nevertheless, it was sought to cast the whole

¹ See Appx. I.

² *Valle y Salazar to Roda, April 3, 5, 6, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

³ SEBASTIAN Y LATRE, *Relacion individual y veridica del suceso acontecido en la ciudad de Zaragoza el dia 6 de Abril de 1766 y de todos sus demas progresos, formada de orden de S.M....* p. 52.

⁴ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, April 15, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, April 29, 1766, *ibid.*

odium on the Church, by representing the clergy in general or a particular Order as having provoked and protected the rebels. That individual clerics were observed among the rioters was doubtless correct, but it was probably curiosity that had drawn them into the streets. There was no cause to fear for the Jesuits, thought Pallavicini, for they must have wanted Squillace to continue in office, unless they wished to contradict themselves. Therefore, not the slightest shadow of suspicion that they had fomented or participated in the rising could fall on them, since its original purpose had been this Minister's overthrow.¹ The nuncio again expressed his misgivings on June 10th, 1766, remarking that an inquiry into Jesuit conduct was being instituted and that Pombal was trying to exploit the prevailing atmosphere by writing against Clement XIII.'s Bull in favour of the Jesuits, hoping that this would lead to their expulsion from every Catholic country.²

These messages naturally caused considerable apprehension in Rome. They were on the eve of a conflagration, wrote Torrigiani, which threatened to destroy an Order that was of great help to the Church and to the salvation of souls. Roda was one of those who nursed a hatred of the Jesuits. Wherefore

¹ " *Della sollevazione di Madrid si seguita a sentire da persone autorevoli che è stata accidentale, cioè senza capo o complotto determinato e positivo. Ma non per questo si lascia di farne ricadere in qualche special modo la odiosità sopra gli ecclesiastici... Che eglino [the Jesuits] dovesser desiderare e desiderassero la continuazione di Squillace nel suo ministero, per me è cosa innegabile, perchè senza supporli, diciam così, contrarii a se stessi, non si può lasciar di riconoscerli come esenti dal più rimoto sospetto di fomento o concorso in quella frenetica sollevazione, lo scopo originario della qual altro non fu che la caduta di Ministro " (Pallavicini to Torrigiani, May 27, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072). Cf. the anonymous *letter to the king, of July [7 ?], 1766, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, May 6 and 20, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*, and the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072.

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, June 10, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*

the nuncio was to be on his guard and act vigorously in their defence. He was to lose no opportunity of speaking openly and clearly with the Ministers and, above all, with the king himself.¹

The French envoy in Madrid, the Marquis Ossun, makes no mention in his letters of this period either of the Society of Jesus or of any particular Jesuit in connexion with the insurrection.² The secretary of the Portuguese embassy attributes Squillace's downfall to French influence, but he observes that others ascribe the disturbances to the " Reverendos ", who were not being treated too well by the Government and feared that on the death of the queen-mother, which was imminent, they would be rooted out entirely.³ In a letter of denunciation written by a certain Candano, monks and priests are held suspect of having been the spiritual instigation of the various outbreaks. Some satirical verses and letters against the king, Squillace, and the foreign Ministers were the work, he said, of the Cistercian monk Rozas of Madrid.⁴ The Minister Du Tillot in Parma, who had not voiced any suspicion up to April 12th,⁵ declared on the 28th that on hearing of the revolt his first thought had been that it was the priests, the monks, and the Papal hierarchy who had secretly blown on the flames of the rebellion.⁶ Later still he said that when reading the verses written in fire and blood he had had the impression that they had been written after the riots in order to spur the

¹ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, June 5 and 26, 1766, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.* Roda came to hear about the first letter and tried to exonerate himself in a *letter to Azara of August 5, 1766 (in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.).

² ROUSSEAU, I., 207, citing in support documents from the Foreign Office in Paris.

³ *Giov. Crisostomo to Pagliarini, May 16, 1766, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 215, I.

⁴ *Candano to Angulo, Vitoria, April 22, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

⁵ *Du Tillot to Azara, April 12, 1766, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, Exped. " Parma ", 1766.

⁶ *Du Tillot to Azara, April 28, 1766, *ibid.*

Government on against the Religious, who were no doubt mixed up in the disturbances.¹

Tanucci's views regarding the originators of the revolt were subject to curious fluctuations. In his first letters to the king,² to his confidants Losada,³ Cattolica,⁴ and Catanti,⁵ and to the Minister Grimaldi⁶ he knows of no other culprits than the rabble of Madrid, this "low, barbaric mob, unworthy of belonging to the human race, only fit to be classed with the stupidest of animals."⁷ Two weeks later he had formed the opinion that "the ignorant, lazy, and vicious priests and monks with their false doctrine of exemption had encouraged corruption and the disrespect of princes, authorities, and laws." At the same time, Squillace was not without fault; when he was in Naples he had made an unfortunate choice of his subordinate officials and by his strictness and excessive zeal in the execution of the laws he had brought upon himself such hatred that, according to his own admission, it would have been impossible for him to stay much longer in Naples

¹ " *He leído los versos escritos con fuego y sangre. Pero si V. S. non me aseverase el contrario, los creeria compuestos despues de la sedicion, y quasi para animar mas el gobierno contra los frayles, que sin duda han tenido parte en ella " (Du Tillot to Azara, July 11, 1766, *ibid.*). " *En Sevilla y en Cordova se ha hecho una sigilosa pesquisa sobre un papel que se publicó en Madrid, y decia : Impreso en la Casa profesa de Sevilla. Era, contro el Rey y sobre tumulto. Presto se descubrió la calumnia, y quedó mas asegurado el buen nombre y fidelidad debida a nuestro Rey. Toda la provincia se porta con gran juicio en este y otros puntos " (Fr. Gamero a Fr. Montes, Cadiz, July 1, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777).

² *April 22 and 29, 1766, *ibid.*, Estado, 6099.

³ *April 15 and 22, 1766, *ibid.*, 5996.

⁴ *April 15 and 22, 1766, *ibid.*

⁵ *April 15, 1766, *ibid.*

⁶ *April 15 and 22, 1766, *ibid.*, 6099.

⁷ *Tanucci to Cattolica, July 29, 1766, *ibid.*, 5997. Cf. *Tanucci to Orsini, April 26, 1766, *ibid.*, 5996. He would have liked the king to deprive Madrid of the royal presence for ever (*to Losada, May 27, 1766, *ibid.*, 5997).

after the departure of Charles III.¹ On May 3rd Tanucci was rejoicing that the king had come to the conclusion that the monks and priests had been the instigators of the rebellion, and that for this reason he had replaced the clerical President of the Council of Castile by a Captain-General.² Three days later he was promising the king to offer a special prayer to the Holy Ghost to disperse the residue of darkness that might be concealing some relics of malignity and sedition.³ A week after this he writes to Catanti: "It is already agreed in Spain that the calamity has come and is still coming from the ecclesiastical *canaille*, and from the most intriguing element, the Jesuits, the most prominent of whom are a certain Lopez and Zito, satellites of the Don Zenone [Ensenada] who has been banished to Medina del Campo."⁴ "The Jesuit Lopez is an enemy of the king; I told His Majesty when he was leaving here. His comrade is Zito, to whom also I have drawn attention."⁵ By June 3rd the diffuse suspicions had crystallized into the definite accusation: "Some of the satires show clear traces of the Churchmen, the Jesuits in particular."⁶ According to

¹ *To Losada, April 29, 1766, *ibid.*, 5996; *to Catanti, May 13, 1766, *ibid.*

² *To Cantillana, May 3, 1766, *ibid.*

³ " *Pieno della più viva umilissima riconoscenza per la pietà, ch'io leggo della M. V. per me, prego lo Spirito Santo che in questi suoi giorni illumini il resto delle tenebre, tra le quali possa esser involta tuttavia qualche maligna e sediziosa reliquia " (to Charles III., May 6, 1766, *ibid.*, 6099).

⁴ " Già in Spagna si sono accorti, che il male è venuto e viene dalla canaglia ecclesiastica, e dalla più intrigante, che è quella dei gesuiti, tralli quali un certo P. Lopez e un P. Zito si sono segnalati, satelliti di Don Zenone, che come saprà, è stato esiliato a Medina di Campo " (to Catanti, May 13, 1766, *ibid.*, 5997). To Losada, June 17 and July 22, 1766, *ibid.*

⁵ *To Cattolica, May 13, 1766, *ibid.* The same accusations were made in a *letter to Losada of the same date, *ibid.*

⁶ " Alcune pasquinate mostran chiaramente la gente di Chiesa, e particolarmente li Gesuiti " (*to Losada, June 3, 1766, *ibid.*, 5997).

another letter written about this time, Squillace's flight meant the victory of Spanish nationalism, which detested Italians and French alike.¹ Tanucci agrees with Squillace that he was driven out because he was a foreigner, an ardent regalist, and a reformer.² A fortnight later his anger was again directed against Lopez, who was not only an intriguer but a trouble-maker, an enemy and a rebel against the king. As proof of this he had had a document in his possession since 1759. It would not surprise him if Lopez had been the cause of what had happened to Ensenada, who during his term of office after the death of Philip V. had openly proclaimed his anti-foreign convictions.³

Tanucci's aims become clear in a letter to Centomani of July 12th, 1766. The "Spanish satires which appeared before the rising are Jesuit poison. For any other monarch that would have been sufficient cause to clear the Jesuits out of the country". Only the Spanish sovereign lacked an enlightened and dutiful law-court, such as the kings of Portugal and France had at their disposal. Lisbon already had its Primate and was about to organize the election of Bishops and all the rest of the Church's discipline according to the system of the primitive Church.⁴ From now on especially Tanucci is working for the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain with the most tiresome frequency and varied phraseology in his correspondence. Thus, he writes to Losada⁵: "With the last letters from there a satire was sent me which shows such a criminal spirit that I wonder how Aranda can have the face to talk to the king about returning to Madrid. Your Excellency has no

¹ *To Centomani, June 7, 1766, *ibid.*

² *To Losada, June 10, 1766, *ibid.*

³ " *Il P. Lopez non solamente è intrigante, ma è sedizioso, nemico e ribelle del Re, e io ne ho un documento in mano fin dal 1759. Non mi meraviglierei, che egli fosse stata la cagione di quel, che è avvenuto a Ensenada..." (to Losada, June 24, 1766, *ibid.*). Similarly *to Cattolica and Catanti on the same date, *ibid.*

⁴ *To Centomani, July 12, 1766, *ibid.*

⁵ *On July 15, 1766, *ibid.*

doubt seen it. It obviously comes from a Jesuit or one of their tertiaries. The Jesuits have been driven out of France and Portugal for less than this."

As already mentioned, Tanucci stated that he was in possession of evidence incriminating the Jesuit Lopez. This would have been of great importance in the inquiry which had been set up for the definite purpose of discovering the instigators of the rebellion ; but when he was asked to produce the document, he began to shift his ground. Prince Yaci, he said, had written to him in 1759 that he considered Lopez and Zito had little liking for the king ; in his opinion it was they who were spreading the mutinous ideas and prophecies that a king with an Italian upbringing had a poor chance of success in Spain. Another letter of Yaci's spoke of a plot of the Jesuits Rábago, Micco, and Altamirano, together with the President of the Council of Castile, to keep the monarch away as much as possible from State affairs. He had read all these letters to the king at the time. To find the required documents among three hundred odd letters would mean a long search and he was so busy with State affairs that he hardly had the time for this. In any case, he did not see what purpose such a confidential letter would serve.¹ Nevertheless, he did not cease to spur on Charles III.'s entourage to expel the Jesuits. France's example should be followed, and those Orders which it was desired to keep in the country should be reformed, while those it was intended to expel should be handed over for examination to the parliaments. "Regarding the Jesuits, France and Portugal will always be two shining examples. It if is ever intended to carry out the work, this is the most favourable moment, when the examples are still fresh in our memory. The Jesuits in Spain may be no worse than those in France and Portugal, but they are certainly no better. Their conduct is as inimical to religion and Christian morality as it is to the State. The history of Paraguay is enough to show that the Jesuits are more harmful to Spain than to France.

¹ *To Losada, August 5, 1766, *ibid.* Cf. the *letter to Losada of September 16, 1766, *ibid.*, 5998.

In Paraguay there is not a single Spanish Jesuit but only foreigners who control over three million subjects and thirty thousand soldiers." ¹ Similar sentiments were expressed by Tanucci in a letter to the Spanish agent Azara. "I have done everything in my time to prove the truth of this [the wickedness of the Jesuits] to the king. The king knows them. I am sure that in his heart His Majesty has often applauded, if not actually envied, Portugal and France, which have done with the Jesuits. I am also convinced that his mother has frustrated many resolutions which the king would probably have carried out, and which he now will carry out." It was no good tackling the business piecemeal; the whole work should be done at once. "I know with what fanaticism the Spanish soul is animated in favour of the Jesuits; that is why I have no hope that the great work of expulsion, liberation, and salvation will be performed without help from outside." ²

The verdict had been given before the inquiry had properly begun.

(6)

On receiving Grimaldi's accounts of the Madrid riots, Choiseul advised the discovery and punishment of the instigators; in this case forbearance was tantamount to weakness.³ As early as April 12th—whether as the result of this suggestion or not is uncertain—Roda conveyed to Count Aranda the king's ardent desire to see the origin, the instruments, and the promoters of the uprising conclusively (*con fundamento*) established.⁴

Under date April 21st, 1766, the king imparted to the President of the Council of Castile the official order and authority to institute a secret inquiry into the excesses that had taken place in the capital. He was to discover the authors, distributors, and instigators of the rebellious pamphlets that had appeared after March 26th and which purposed by means

¹ *To Losada, August 26, 1766, *ibid.*

² *To Azara, August 30, 1766, *ibid.*

³ *Choiseul to Grimaldi, April 7, 1766, *ibid.*, 6099.

⁴ *Roda to Aranda, April 12, 1766, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 1009

of distorted news to render the Government detested, to diminish the prestige of the Crown at home and abroad, and to imperil the peace of the realm. The witnesses were not only to have their names kept secret but were to enjoy the special favour of the king. To ensure that the proceedings were carried out in accordance with the law, the President was to avail himself of the services of the Fiscal Campomanes and another member of the Council.¹ Aranda chose for this purpose Miguel Maria de Nava.² An exceptional court of justice was thus set up and was given the misleading name of the "Extraordinary Council of Castile",³ in order to qualify all the resolutions of this special court in the face of public opinion with the high moral reputation enjoyed by this supreme judicial, legislative, and administrative body.⁴

At the request of the Government⁵ the secular clergy⁶ were granted leave by the Vicar General of Toledo, and the regular clergy⁷ by the nuncio Pallavicini, to give evidence before the lay judge. Both had thereby exceeded their powers, but the Pope made good the legal defect, with the qualification that the permit granted was to be valid only for one year and solely in respect of the *lèse-majesté* committed during the outbreak.⁸ The Government's action had indicated

¹ *Charles III. to Aranda, April 21, 1766, *ibid.*

² *Aranda to Roda, April 22, 1766, *ibid.*

³ *Consejo de Castilla en el extraordinario* was its official title.

⁴ ROUSSEAU, I., 203.

⁵ *Aranda to the Vicar-General Varones, May 13, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; *Grimaldi to Pallavicini, May 15, 1766, *ibid.*, Estado, 4982.

⁶ *May 14, 1766, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

⁷ *May 18, 1766, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.*

⁸ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, June 12 and July 10, 1766, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*, and Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072. Cf. *Pallavicini to Torrighiani, May 20, June 24, July 1 and 8, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 301 and 302, *loc. cit.* Thereupon Pallavicini sent Grimaldi, with a *letter of July 1, 1766 (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4982), a new, valid *permission (Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.*).

that in the Ministries the clergy were thought to be involved in the insurrection, and this supposition became a certainty when the Fiscal Campomanes rendered his first report on June 8th, 1766.¹ After some introductory remarks about the importance and difficulty of his task, Campomanes made the following statement: The misleading of the simple people was a result of the preposterous ideas of the royal authority disseminated by the clergy and was a product of the fanaticism they had been propagating for centuries. The lampoons were the work of privileged persons or of those who had acted on their instructions. Even before the rising rumours about it were already circulating through the whole country and were passed on by the only people who had any knowledge of the secret, namely, the clergy. It was made a meritorious work to undermine respect for the lawfully constituted authority. It was clear, he continued, that this investigation and the action to be taken as the result of it could not take place with due speed in full council, firstly on account of the difficulty in assembling unobtrusively, and secondly on account of the variety of opinions, quite apart from the necessity of entrusting numerous subordinate officials with the drawing up of the protocol. They were compelled, therefore, to set up a special chamber which, furnished with the authority of the regular Council, was to meet in the residence of the President of the Council as and when secrecy demanded.²

¹ *Consejo extraordinario*, June 8, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; see DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 26 *seq.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 126 *seq.*

² “*Claro es que en el Consejo pleno no seria posible tratarse con la expedicion debida esta pesquisa y sus resultas por la dificultad de congregarse y la variedad de opinar, ademas de la precision de fiar a muchos subalternos la actuacion. Es por lo mismo necesario formar una sala que conozca de todas las providencias definitivas, o que tengan fuerza de tales, para que de esa suerte se proceda por la autoridad ordinaria del Consejo, y con la formalidad debida... Todo lo qual se podrá poner por el Presidente y Ministro de el Consejo que actuan en esta sigilosa pesquisa en la alta y soberana consideracion, a fin de que se

This was nothing more or less than a demand for a secret, exceptional court with secret judges, secret witnesses, and a secret procedure—a truly fitting creation of the absolutist age.¹ The nuncio's protest that it was a one-sided action against the clergy only was curtly rejected, with the remark that no complaints had been laid against laymen.²

The spirit in which the commission set to work was revealed still more clearly in the second report, which was rendered by Campomanes in the session of September 11th, 1766.³ The inquiry, he stated, had already made such progress that some idea could be formed of how the people had been incited to revolt. Under the cloak of religion, virtue, even of martyrdom, a movement had been provoked which was particularly dangerous on account of the extraordinary secrecy that surrounded it and its apparent peace and order in the midst of the general disorder. In all the ramifications of these intricate incidents could be discerned the activity of a religious body which even during the present inquiry was seeking, by spreading rumours, to win over the clergy and other bodies and to encourage a general dislike of the Government and its principles of reform. By its crafty system of flattering every class in terms adapted to its particular interests and grievances, it paved the way for the uprising, inducing the devout to believe that the money for the "*provocateurs*" came from the

deputen los Ministros del Consejo necesarios para formar sala particular en la posada del presidente todas las veces a las horas, y en la forma que mas conveniente parezca, a fin de observar el exterior y reservado disimulo que por ahora requiere la dependencia, o acordaran lo que estimen por mas conveniente." *Ibid.*

¹ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 36.

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, December 23, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.* Information had been laid against non-Jesuits also, but nothing is known of any proceedings being taken. Cf. the *denunciations of Fr. Blas de Madre de Dios sent to Muzquiz, July 17 and October 31, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009; *Candano to Angulo, April 22, 1766, *ibid.*

³ **Consejo extraordinario*, September 11, 1766, *ibid.*

apartments of the queen-mother.¹ Nor was there any lack of fabrications intended to make the other members of the royal family detested or unpopular. All this was done with the purpose of encouraging the weak-willed and the fanatics to act as instruments of the rising and to conceal the headquarters which made these exhaustive preparations and which issued these vast sums of money. Under the false appearance of piety these trickeries spread in all directions and produced such striking effects because they came from the mouths of persons consecrated to God. Once the people had been enlightened they would no longer be the plaything of so pernicious a credulity and the clerics would no longer devote themselves to the dissemination of such slanders. Deprived of these auxiliaries, this dangerous body, which sought to dominate the throne in every country and considered every means permissible whereby it might attain its ends, would be restricted to its own resources. At the moment the members of this body were proclaiming in their sermons the imminent destruction of the Society of Jesus, and in the provinces the rumour was abroad that Jesuits had been arrested. The object of this and similar talk was both to arouse men's tempers and to abuse the sympathy and the good nature of the people, so that they would make common cause with them in the defence of the Faith whose downfall was being prophesied. To frustrate the stratagems of these persons the monarch would do well to remind the Bishops and the heads of Orders that the secular and regular clergy were forbidden by the laws of Spain to speak against the king and Government.² As soon as the clergy knew that they were liable to be denounced they would give their sermons a form that was innocent and innocuous to the State. In this way the body would be isolated which was consistently opposing the laws

¹ Cf. *Aranda to Roda, November 22, 1767, *ibid.*, 582.

² An allusion to the laws of John I. and Henry III. The original text prohibited only speech against "*personas reales*". Roda added some words on his own account, so that the prohibition extended to the Government or the Ministers. Texts of the laws in the Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

and whose spirit, mode of government, and activities were sufficiently revealed by the documents of the present inquiry. Careful consideration would show that these people had been the sole originators of the past disorders and would continue to be such as long as this body existed within the State. With regard to this last point the Fiscal reserved the right to bring forward in legal form whatever motion he thought most expedient.¹

On the strength of this report the Extraordinary Council asked for the promulgation of the proposed decree, with the object of informing the people of the dependence of the clergy on the monarch, of keeping the whole of the Spanish clergy in subjection, and of making the royal power ready for action ; for the Council was gaining from the secret inquiries an ever deeper impression that this power would be needed.² This resolution was presented by Aranda to the king on the same day. A decree of this nature was necessary, he submitted, so as to enlighten the king's subjects about his rights, to keep in check the countless host of clerics, and to expose their weakness to the people. It would also help to prepare the public for the results of the inquiry, which would then be accepted by the exempt with more moderation and by the laity with greater submissiveness.³ By a royal ordinance of September 18th, 1766, all secular and regular clergy were warned against stirring up passions by their speeches, disturbing public order, and intervening in Government affairs, which were far removed both from their knowledge and their clerical duties.⁴ In transmitting this announcement to Azpuru, Grimaldi summed up the result of the conference in a few words : in the opinion of Count Aranda the laity in the recent disorders

¹ **Consejo extraordinario*, September 11, 1766, *ibid.* Cf. FERRER DEL RIO, II., 128 *seqq.* ; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 27 *seqq.*

² **Consejo extraordinario*, September 11, 1766, Archives of Simancas, *loc. cit.*, 1009, fo. 177-180.

³ *Aranda to Roda, September 11, 1766, *ibid.*

⁴ **Real Cedula* (printed), Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 46. Cf. DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 29.

had probably been seduced, and the seduction came from the clergy.¹

On what grounds did the Fiscal base his charges against the Society of Jesus? As already shown, in the official and private reports that were made in the first few weeks after the risings there was no reference to any Jesuit participation.² Inquiries made in this direction by the *Alcalde* Codallos produced no result.³ Various denunciations were made in the course of the inquiries but apparently led to nothing. Some satirical verses, for instance, were sent by a Hieronymite of Cordova to the Grand Inquisitor, but they were judged by him to have come, not from the Jesuits, but most probably from their bitterest enemies.⁴ We also know of a complaint brought against the Jesuit José Blas on account of a sermon he had preached at Lerida on the feast of St. Ignatius.⁵ A certain Fray Marcos Sanchez claimed to know on hearsay evidence of a Jesuit who had said that an association, with the popular preacher Calatayud as its president, had been formed in Pamplona with the object of murdering the king.⁶ An anonymous charge brought against various Jesuits ended with: "Unless the means are used now which have been used in France and which were recommended long ago by Palafox there will always be serious trouble in Spain; nor will the end be attained except by a blow struck by a master hand."⁷

When inquiries made in this direction had failed to produce

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, September 23, 1766, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 46.

² Cf. pp. 62 *seqq.*

³ Ricci, **Espulsione*, n. 63.

⁴ *Isidro Lopez to Guerra (undated, [c. May 30, 1766]), Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777; *Lopez to the Rector of Valladolid (undated), *ibid.*

⁵ *Roda to Aranda, September 25, 1766, *ibid.*, 1009. The extract from the sermon had been forwarded by the French envoy Ossun.

⁶ *Sanchez to Roda, September 22, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009. Cf. *Sanchez to Roda, June 13, 1767, *ibid.*, 688.

⁷ Undated (printed by hand), *ibid.*

any really suitable grounds for a charge, the Fiscal exerted himself still more energetically to prove by indirect means that the Jesuits had originated the revolt. In one denunciation the Jesuits Martinez and Arnal were accused of having introduced and circulated French apologetic works in Spain without official permission. It is a known fact that at that period Spain was flooded with pamphlets, mostly from France and Portugal, directed not only against the honour of the Society but also against the honour of the king and the monarchy.¹ Not only were they brought across the frontier without let or hindrance but they were approved by more than one Minister.² The Spanish Jesuits, in their desire to obtain a hearing for the defence against these attacks,³ had, in fact, been sending for a year past for apologetic works from abroad and had distributed them in Spanish territory, either in the original text or in Spanish translations.⁴ By dint of rumours and ill-will the charge against the Jesuits was aggravated into one of maintaining secret printing presses by means of which the numerous lampoons against the Government had also been produced.⁵ The matter was not only taken up by the Spanish

¹ *Isidro Lopez to Idiaquez, August 26, 1766, *ibid.*

² On November 23, 1766, Aranda *instructed the Minister Roda to send him Canon Perez' Spanish translation of Palafox's letter against the Jesuits, so that it might be given a proper printing licence (Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009). For the steps taken by Roda to prevent the *Febronius* being put on the Index, cf. *Roda to Azara, December 9, 1766, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I. See also FRIAS, *Los Jesuitas y el motin de Esquilache en la "Historia de España" por Rafael Altamirano, in Razón y Fe*, XXIX. (1911), 166.

³ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, September 18, 1766, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Cf. the following Jesuit letters: *Xav. Belicia to Meagher, July 9, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666; *Salvador Portela to Alustiza, February 28, 1766, *ibid.*; *L. Medinilla to Alustiza, March 21, 1766, *ibid.*; *Escorza to Alustiza, March 15, 1766, *ibid.*

⁵ The Jesuits had in their own houses private—but not secret—printing presses. Cf. *Lopez to the Rector of Villagarcia, June 11,

police and Inquisition but even high-ranking diplomats gave it their attention. The French printer Trebos of Bayonne, who had supplied the apologetic works, was put in prison and his stock of books was confiscated.¹ When certain houses were searched there was found in the room occupied by the Jesuit Poyanos, rector of the seminary at Calatayud, the Spanish translation of Grou's reply to the *Extraits des assertions*

1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777; *Lopez to Idiaquez, July 19, 1767, *ibid.* The accusation that the pamphlets against the king and the Government had been printed there was not proved by their opponents and was consistently denied by the Jesuits. One of the satires that appeared in Madrid bore the stamp: *Impreso en la Casa profesada de Sevilla*. Secret searches made in the colleges of Seville, Córdoba, Villagarcía, and Burgos showed straightway the utter worthlessness of the charges. "Presto se descubrió la calumnia, y quedó mas asegurado el buen nombre y fidelidad debida a nuestro Rey. Toda la provincia se porta con gran juicio en este y otros puntos" (*Gamero to Montes, July 1, 1766, *ibid.*). Cf. *Medinilla to Alustiza, October 26, 1766, *ibid.*, 666; *Pallavicini to Soto, October 23, 1766, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.*; *Pallavicini to Torrighiani, October 28, 1766, Cifre, *ibid.*

¹ **Extracto de carta del Duque de Choiseul al Marqués de Ossun*, of August 25 and 27 and September 15, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009. The principal works in question were the pastoral letter of the Archbishop Beaumont of Paris, the *Apologie des Jésuites*, the *Parecer de los obispos de Francia sobre la utilidad de la doctrina y gobierno de los Jesuitas*, the *Lettres critiques et historiques*, etc. (*ibid.*). " *Mons. Trebos impresor en Bayona imprime y envía libros españoles y traducidos de frances en español sobre los asuntos corrientes de Francia en materia de Jesuitas y de los Parlamentos. Estos se esparcen en España. Conviene saber con quienes tiene su correspondencia, los que le encargan de España la impresion, y a quienes envía los exemplares, quantos, y que genero de libros y papeles ha impreso. Y que se le impida la continuacion de este comercio ", (*autograph note from Roda, undated, *ibid.*). *Lopez to Idiaquez, September 15, 1766, *ibid.*, 688. After the banishment of the Jesuits Trebos applied to the Spanish Government for an indemnity (*Roda to Aranda, April 27, 1767, *ibid.*, 667).

dangereuses ; in Grou's work it was shown that more than seven hundred texts in this clumsy compilation had been falsified and also, incidentally, the accusation that Jesuits defended regicide and tyrannicide was refuted.¹ In the session of the Extraordinary Council of September 21st, 1766, Campomanes accused the Inquisition of partisanship. It suppressed, he said, the *Anales de los Jesuitas* and the *Cartas del Dr. de la Sapienza*, which were real masterpieces of history ; they had not been banned in France or Spain and they were eminently suitable for studying the problem of the Jesuit Institute. On the other hand, in open opposition to the Council, the Inquisition allowed free play to the numerous Jesuit works which contested the royal authority, the sovereign rights of the Crown, and sound doctrine generally. And it persisted in trying to bring about the condemnation of the *Febronius*.²

Calatayud, an aged priest, had been giving missions to the people in forty-one dioceses during the previous forty years. In his book *Doctrinas prácticas* and in his sermons he had attacked a form of contract much in vogue among the merchants of Bilbao and had condemned it as usurious.³ The merchants complained to Count Aranda, who, with the agreement of the Extraordinary Council, ordered the missionary to leave the Basque provinces at once.⁴ Calatayud abandoned the mission he was giving and left the next day for Valladolid.⁵ The General of the Order, through his Provincial Idiaquez,

¹ *Razón y Fe*, XXIX. (1911), 166, 280.

² **Consejo extraordinario*, September 21, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009. *Ibid.* Roda's *correspondence with the Grand Inquisitor.

³ *Lopez to Idiaquez, September 13, 1766, *ibid.*, 668 ; Ricci, **Espulsione*, 7, in Jesuit possession.

⁴ *Aranda to Comte de Fleignie, September 8, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666.

⁵ *Calatayud to Alustiza, September 16, 1766, *ibid.* ; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 30, October 14, and November 11, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.* Cf. [RODELES], *Vida del P. Pedro Calatayud*, Madrid, 1882, 429 *seqq.*

instructed his subjects to exercise the greatest care in their sermons and private conversation and above all to refrain from any criticism of the Government. Any transgressors were to receive from their Superiors punishment proportionate to the gravity of their offences.¹

At the same time as Calatayud was banished a prohibition was issued against any Jesuit's practising the Exercises or holding missions in the Basque provinces.² When the Madrid disturbances spread to the provinces the worst disorders took place in the small town of Azpeitia in the province of Guipúzcoa. At the first sign of trouble the Corregidor sent to Madrid exaggerated reports of the excesses committed by the rioters and asked for military support. Actually, the whole affair was quite unimportant; the misconduct of the rioters was due principally to drunkenness, under the influence of which, it is true, they uttered violent threats, but there was not a single case of bloodshed or incendiarism. When the measures taken were found to have been unnecessary, an attempt was made to put a different complexion on the affair. The Provincial Estates complained to Fr. Idiaquez that the Jesuits of Loyola had induced the stonemasons working on their church to be insubordinate.³ When the rector had called on them to hasten to Azpeitia and help maintain order there, the workers had replied (so ran the complaint) that they would rather take up arms to attack the town than to defend it. The rector firmly denied that he had heard any such declaration. Only two of the workmen had replied, he said; he had not heard what one of them had said, as he had muttered something to himself; the other had said that they wanted the prices of wheat and

¹ *Idiaquez to the Rector of San Sebastián, November 29, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, October 23 and December 11, 1766, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

² *Aranda to Comte de Fleignie, September 8, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666.

³ May 16, 1766 (printed), Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.*; *Roda to Aranda, April 27, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

maize to be lowered. Seeing that they were not inclined to answer his appeal he sent them back to their work. The whole accusation was full of contradictions ; it was admitted that he had called on the workmen to maintain order, and at the same time he was accused, in making this appeal, of having incited them to disobedience. The object of the whole business, thought Fr. Idiaquez, was to involve the Fathers in the insurrection, although it was common knowledge that they had tried to calm the people. Another charge was that the Jesuits had tried to obstruct the discovery and apprehension of the rioters who had fled to Loyola by unlawfully extending the right of immunity. In reply to this, Fr. Mendizabal asserted that they had been captured without the Fathers knowing anything about it.¹ It was possible, however, that after the event they had declared that the officials had violated ecclesiastical immunity.² To keep the peace, the Provincial gave orders that none of the workers who had refused to help the civil authorities in Azpeitia should continue to be employed in building the church.³ He also stated that he did not consider the church porch, which was the chief object of the dispute, to be within the area of immunity. His subordinate, Esterripa, whose manner of defending the immunity had been too impetuous, was transferred by him to the college of Logroño.⁴ The Council of Castile was apparently satisfied with these measures,⁵ but the Society's opponents continued to

¹ *To Lopez, May 23 and July 18, 1766, *ibid.*, 777.

² *Esterripa to Lopez, May 23, 1766, *ibid.* Cf. *Fr. Antonio del Valle to Mendizabal (undated [May 1766]), *ibid.*; *Uriarte to Lopez, June 5, 1766, *ibid.*

³ *Idiaquez to the Provincial Estates of Guipúzcoa, June 5 and July 21, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 666; the *Provincial Estates of Guipúzcoa to Idiaquez, June 22, 1766, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.*; *Lopez to Mendizabal, July 3, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777.

⁴ *Lopez to Idiaquez, June 18, 1766, *ibid.*; *Idiaquez to Aranda, June 28, 1766, *ibid.*

⁵ *Lopez to Idiaquez, July 16, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777.

exploit the incident with the object of undermining its reputation and paving the way for its destruction.¹ On Lopez's advice, Fr. Idiaquez went to Court to express the devotion and respect of the Society of Jesus for the king's person and Government and to rectify by personal speech the distorted description of the incidents in Loyola and of the dissemination of the apologetic works.² A few weeks later the Provincial sent Grimaldi a letter in which he regretted the excesses committed by some of his subjects, described the disciplinary measures he had taken, and expressed the hope that the monarch would not cause the whole body to expiate the guilt of a few members who, in their eagerness to defend the honour of the Order, had gone too far.³ The favourable reception accorded to Idiaquez by Charles III. gave grounds for supposing that the matter had been settled amicably,⁴ but any such hopes were dashed by Grimaldi's reply. From this it became clear that the king's satisfaction was only in respect of the Provincial in person, who was a son of the Duke of Gandia, and that the matter was going to be pursued. The Prince made the laws but it was the right of the magistrates to see to their observance and to punish the guilty.⁵

¹ " *Se han disparado mil calumnias contra nosotros, y aun ha havido quien soltase la especie de echarnos de la provincia. Con esta ocasion Campomanes . . . tirandra hacernos causa del tumulto " (*Mata to Poyanos, July 5, 1766, *ibid.*).

² *Lopez to Idiaquez, August 26, 1766, *ibid.*, 688 ; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 2, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.* The nuncio took this occasion to send the Secretary of State the work of the Portuguese regalist Pereira, so that he might learn the principles forming the basis of the accusations against the Jesuits of Loyola (*ibid.*).

³ September 20, 1766. The contents of the letter are known only from Grimaldi's reply (see below, n. 5).

⁴ *Lopez to Idiaquez, August 30, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688. Cf. NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., Manresa, 1893, 150.

⁵ " *Me refiere V. R. sucintamente el origen de sus mortificaciones : protexta que sin su permiso, y aun sin su noticia han cometido algunos subditos suyos los excesos que las causan :

On various occasions in the past a close watch had been kept on Jesuit correspondence, but now, with the object of discovering some grounds for a charge, the violation of postal secrecy was developed into a regular system.¹ Even the Papal

me asegura haber removido de su empleo al mas culpado, y tener resuelto proceder contra los demas transgresores a medida de su culpa: y finalmente me pide le comunique ordenes para la pronta correccion y castigo de ellos, y sobre todo que informe al Rey de la aficcion en que dexan a V. R. estos sucesos, templada unicamente con la esperanza de que su piedad ha de discernir entre la culpa que cometieron unos particulares, llevados acaso de imprudente celo por la reputacion, y defensa de su Instituto, y la inocencia del cuerpo y los que le mandan; quienes, aunque podrán padecer la nota de descuidados, no la de complices, a lo menos por lo que toca a V. R." (Grimaldi to Idiaquez, October 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7911). DANVILA Y COLLADO (III., 23) and ROUSSEAU (I., 209) conclude from this letter that Idiaquez admitted that his subjects were to some extent responsible for the uprising in Madrid. It is clear, however, from the words "impelled by an imprudent zeal for the reputation and defence of their Institute" that it is a question here of the importation and distribution of apologetic writings without permission of the civil authorities. *Cf. Razon y Fe*, XXIX. (1911), 164 *seq.*

¹ " *Luego que sucedió el tumulto por Marzo de 1766 se me dió la comision de orden de V. E. para interceptar la correspondencia de los Regulares de la Compañía en que entendí con la fidelidad que corresponde hasta que fueron expelidos de estos dominios por Abril 1769 ... El trabajo no solamente estaba reducido a interceptar las cartas que venian dirigidas a los Regulares que residian en Madrid, en el reyno, Indias, Italia y otros paises, sino a las que unos y otros respondian, sin reservar las de sus confidentes ya ecclesiasticos, ya seculares ..." Whereas others had been richly rewarded for services rendered in connexion with the expulsion, the writer had received nothing, so that he was almost forced to the conclusion that the Ministry had not thought too highly of his work. . . . " A la verdad que hoy en el dia me mantendr'a en este concepto, si la confianza de otro nuevo encargo que se me hizo el año de 1768, tambien de orden de V. E., para interceptar la correspondencia de todos los R^{dos}

nuncio's correspondence was not exempt. Already, in 1762, Torrigiani had advised the all-trusting Pallavicini to take more precautions in sending his dispatches,¹ and a year later he had to repeat his warning.² But the situation continued to deteriorate, especially after the Ministry had gained possession of the key to the cipher. On April 2nd, 1765, Tanucci thanked the Foreign Minister Grimaldi for communicating to him the contents of an intercepted letter of Torrigiani's.³ By similar means Roda received a copy of the letter in which the Cardinal Secretary of State apprised the representative of the Holy See of the anti-Jesuit convictions of the new Minister of Justice.⁴ When the Jesuit question in Spain became of prime importance the nunciature's correspondence was almost regularly broken open and deciphered, as is shown by the copies preserved in the archives of Simancas.⁵

In allotting to Tanucci some of the credit for the expulsion of the Spanish Jesuits, Roda was but stating the truth.⁶ With questionable logic Tanucci argued with Losada, Charles III.'s

Obispos con motivo de las especies de impugnacion que se suscitaron contra el, Juicio Imparcial " de la 1^a edicion, no me huviera facilitado una de las mayores satisfacciones, con que templé mi recelo..." (*Itúrbide to Grimaldi, July 8, 1770, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 670). Itúrbide made a further *application to Roda (*ibid.*) on July 28, 1770, whereupon, at the royal command, he was granted 12,000 *reals*, and his two assistants 6,000 *reals* each, from the fund created from the confiscated Jesuit property (*Roda to Aranda, August 10, 1770, *ibid.*). Cf. also the *correspondence between Angulo and Roda, *ibid.*, 1009, fo. 529-586.

¹ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, January 7, 1762, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, December 27, 1763, Cifre, *ibid.*, 290.

³ *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6097.

⁴ *Roda to Azara, September 16, 1766, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

⁵ Most of the intercepted *dispatches are to be found there in Estado 5044 and 5072, and in Gracia y Justicia, 767 and 1009.

⁶ Cf. *Tanucci to Roda, April 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6000.

Lord High Chamberlain,¹ that if no grandee or important military officer or Minister could be found to have led the rebellious movement, then the originators must have been priests, monks, and Jesuits. A week later he advised the removal of the schools from the influence of the Jesuits and the employment of teachers from other countries. By pleading the supremacy of the Holy See the Jesuits were trying to make all Catholic peoples their slaves.² A month later he said that he could understand the king's being worried about the Jesuits ; if those people knew how to forgive and forget one might at least attempt to win them over ; but that would not be possible without great sacrifices, for they were insatiable in their demands, and were they to come to power again, Rome would rule in Spain, the royal prerogatives would be no more, the State would be impoverished, and both art and science would perish.³ Another letter of Tanucci's to Charles III., of the same date, was wholly aimed at the king's suspicious nature. After asking him not to allow the future Queen of Naples to bring with her a Jesuit confessor from Vienna, he went on to say : " Your Majesty knows my many reasons for my pessimistic view. I humbly beg permission to say for the first and last time that I have still other serious reasons which Your Majesty does not know and will never need to know and which You would do best to have buried with Your old servant who has only a few days more to live. The moment is not yet come for Your Majesty to know of them, but the present time is fitting for You to guess at those reasons with advantage." ⁴

The General of the Order's correspondence with certain of his subjects in Spain, writes Tanucci to Cattolica, offers sufficient grounds for the severest measures. If Cattolica expresses the wish for a decision to be made as soon as possible regarding the false, pernicious, and seditious principles that had

¹ *September 9, 1766, *ibid.*, 5998.

² *To Losada, September 16, 1766, *ibid.*

³ *To Losada, October 14, 1766, *ibid.* Cf. also the *letters to Losada of September 30 and October 7 and 21, 1766, *ibid.*

⁴ October 14, 1766, *ibid.*

come to light in these letters and endanger the sacred person of the monarch, then he may remind Cattolica that he had foretold years ago in Naples what was now seen to be happening in Spain. Alone, deceived by her Austrian ladies-in-waiting, Queen Amalie was protecting the Jesuits. Now men saw how well-founded were the writings of the learned French *parlementaires*, especially the two volumes of Chalotais' *Compte rendu*.¹

Nor did Tanucci fail to make practical proposals. The cleansing of the country from Jesuits must be well thought out and must take place simultaneously throughout the realm. Every banished Jesuit was to be given enough for him to live on, not less than a hundred ducats a year, which could be

¹ “*Il carteggio legalizzato del Generale dei gesuiti con alcuni gesuiti, che stanno in Spagna, nel quale sono assunti bastanti a prendersi qualunque forte risoluzione. Vi compiaccete d'aggiungere, che desiderate quella risoluzione presa il più presto, che si possa, per le massime false, perniciose e sediziose, che escono da quel carteggio, le quali mettono in pericolo la sacra persona del Sovrano. Ah, da quanti anni ho io predicato qui quello stesso che ora voi dite e vedete! Io era, e sono stato tanto certo di tali sentimenti nutriti dai gesuiti. Io lo faceva con quello spirito di fedeltà e di zelo, che doveva al re, a per la certezza del vero, che io diceva, lo faceva alla presenza della santa anima della regina, la quale ingannata, al solito delle donne austriache, da quelle anime nere, che abitano nei corpi gesuiti, amava coloro, e li proteggeva. Voi sapete quanto forte fosse nelle sue opinioni, e nei suoi impegni quella G. Signora, e quanto pericoloso fosse l'opporsi, eppure io mi stimava obbligato a qualunque pericolo, perchè si evitassero li mali d'aver coloro nella corte, e si pensasse per tempo al modo di non gli aver nello stato. Una volta usciti, che sieno, presto finiscono le male semenze, se si pensi a favorire, e promuovere preti giovani secolari, e a situarli nelle parrocchie e nelle scuole. Ora voi vedete, con quanta ragione sieno scritti i libri francesi di tanti dotti parlamentari, e particolarmente li due tomi del , Conto renduto ' di Chalotais. Il fanatismo, che li gesuiti istillano ai loro penitenti e discepoli, è pericolosissimo...” (to Cattolica, November 19, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5988).

taken from the confiscated property. That was both just and expedient at the same time, for the Jesuits would then have to fear the loss of this pension, which they would not be able to replace from any other source. Nor would it be good to allow the non-professed to remain in the country as secular priests, as they had done in France; these men who had stayed behind were the cause of the disturbances that still went on there.¹ Tanucci's warnings did not fall on barren soil. On November 22nd, 1766, he was able to write to Azara that the work was under way and that the battle would be fought. "God give our Don Emanuel [Roda] the strength and endurance to bring the glorious work to a successful conclusion."²

The Augustinian General Vasquez also urged his friend Roda to bring about the banishment of the Jesuits. Their despotism, he wrote, had reached its zenith. They were unlimited potentates, they had a hand in everything, they worked with threats, promises, and other methods suggested to them by their arrogance. Palafox's letter was one of those documents which ought to be distributed in countless masses, so as to enlighten the blind Europeans and Americans and to render them disposed to accept as just any measure the Government

¹ " *La purga del paese dai Gesuiti deve ben maturarsi, ma una volta maturata deve eseguirsi tutto in uno stesso momento in tutto il regno. Bisogna dare a ciascun Gesuita fuor del regno tanto, che viva, che io non vorrei meno di 100 ducati l'anno, che si prendessero dai beni, che loro si sieno confiscati: questo oltro l'esser giusto è utile, perchè tiene la Compagnia in freno pel timore di perdere un denaro, al quale non potrebbe supplire altrimenti. Non sarebbe buono in Spagna quello che si è fatto in Francia, di permettere lo stare in Francia a quelli che non avendo fatto il quarto voto volessero rimanervi preti secolari; le reliquie d'inquietudine, che sono in Francia, vengono da questo; eppur sono in Francia circa 20.000 famiglie di gente di toga sparse per tutto il regno, che vegliano contra li Gesuiti, forza di vigilanza che manca alla Spagna " (to Losada, November 18, 1766, *ibid.*).

² *To Azara, November 22, 1766, *ibid.*, 5999.

might mete out to those who, under the mask of Christian piety, had hitherto transgressed all the laws of God and man. The good souls who had contributed towards the publication of this letter should lose no time in presenting the people with similar booklets which the common man could understand and read quickly. Thus, the light of truth would penetrate in every direction.¹ This suggestion was repeated by Vasquez the following month, with the passionate demand that the *Benemeriti*, their teaching, and their politics, incorporated in Ricci, Boscovich, and Forestier, be persecuted with vigour. He would recommend his subjects to avoid all intercourse with these dangerous people. Roda was to advise him about inserting in his circular letter something about the inquiry then being made in Spain.² At a meeting of Roman "Jansenists", he wrote later, the plan was discussed of urging Portugal to call an episcopal conference with the object of solemnly prohibiting the doctrine of Molina. In the course of time this step would have a good effect on the Spaniards. Roda might try to get Mello, the Portuguese envoy in Madrid, to support the project. Why was one so patient with the Jesuits? ³

The suspicion aroused by certain allusions in these letters that Vasquez had been informed by Azara of the intentions of the Spanish Government becomes a certainty on reading others. "Yesterday," he says, "someone told me he had seen a letter from Madrid in which it was said that we should see things there in April, or May at the latest, of which no one may

¹ " *El despotismo de los Benemeritos ha llegado a tal extremo que son dueños absolutos de todo quanto se hace," etc. (Vasquez to Roda, January 15, 1767, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, Vol. I.).

² *Vasquez to Roda, February 12, 1767, *ibid.*

³ " *En un congreso de Jansenistas se pensó aquí sugerir a Portugal que se procurase que los obispos hiciesen una asamblea, en que se prohibiese con proscripción solenne la doctrina de Molina. Eso seria un hecho que con tiempo podria producir efecto util a nosotros " [Roda might speak] "a nostro Mello a fin de que insistiese en su corte para la execucion del proyecto " (Vasquez to Roda, March 12, 1767, *ibid.*)

speak." He adds the wish that the Lord may give Roda the strength of soul and body needed to complete the great work with which divine Providence has entrusted him, "so that I and all of us may have the joy of seeing our prince's realm freed of the plague which is ravaging it."¹ All the Jesuits ought to be sent to Fuerte Ventura, one of the Canary Isles, which was entirely surrounded by cliffs and therefore practically inaccessible.²

By the middle of October the secret inquiry was sufficiently advanced for the Fiscal to round off his charge and lay it before the Extraordinary Council. At Aranda's request³ Charles III. granted the Council authority to accept the Fiscal's charge and proposals and to take whatever steps he thought suitable, though he was to obtain the king's decision before the final resolution was taken. To raise the Council's prestige the number of its members was increased by three.⁴ In accordance with a further decree of October 31st, 1766, all the members of the Council were bound by oath to observe the strictest silence about the names of the witnesses and the whole proceedings; any infringement of this prohibition would be regarded as high treason.⁵

¹ " *O por prevision, o per noticia sugerida por los Terciaros aquí tienen alguna luz de que allí se medita algo contra los Benemeritos, y están con un gran temor y blasfeman contra los Jansenistas, especialmente V. E. que ha hecho tanto rumor allí contra el Breve de privilegios en virtud de una gran escritura que yo hice contra él y envié a V. E. Assi lo oyó Giorgi pocos días ha en una conversacion. Ayer me dixo uno que habia visto una carta de Madrid en que se decia que por el Abril o Mayo a mas tardar se sabrían aqui cosas que non licet homini loqui... Reciba V. E. memorias del L^{or} de Jansenio " (Vasquez to Roda, March 25, 1767, *ibid.*).

² *Vasquez to Roda, April 9, 1767, *ibid.*

³ *Aranda to Roda, October 16, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

⁴ *Charles III. to Aranda, October 19, 1766, *ibid.*

⁵ *Charles III. to Aranda, October 31, 1766, *ibid.* The *decree of October 31, 1766, *ibid.*, 667. Cf. DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 36.

These long negotiations being at last concluded, the day of decision drew near which was to seal the fate of the Jesuits in the Spanish world. In the session of January 29th, 1767, the Extraordinary Council, adopting the opinion of the Fiscal Campomanes, decided on the banishment of the Jesuits from the realms under the Spanish Crown and on the confiscation of their property by the State. The relative document, which was submitted for the royal approval, was in two parts. The first consisted of a historical description of the facts and the legal grounds on which the court had arrived at its verdict, the second dealt with the measures by which the resolution was to be put into effect. Unfortunately, the first and more important part has been mislaid,¹ but the gap is filled by a document (*Exposición sumaria*) which, it is true, was compiled by

¹ When the question of the readmission of the Jesuit Order, which had been restored, came up for discussion in the Council of Castile in 1814-15, the Fiscal Francisco Gutierrez de la Huerta established the fact that the first and most valuable part of the *Consulta* of January 29, 1767, was missing. FERRER DEL RIO (II., 136, n. 2) maintains that this part was lost at the time on its way from the Ministry of Justice to the Fiscal's office. But in the document he cites, namely, the **Consulta* of October 24, 1815 (Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3517), we read: "En 14 del mismo mes de Enero se pidieron dichos documentos y antecedentes: se remitieron en 11 y 17 de Febrero siguientes por D. Pedro Cevallos y D. Tomas Moyano los unicos que existian en los archivos de las respectivas secretarias de su cargo, a saber: de la primera Secretaria de Estado un exemplar impreso de la Pragmatica Sancion sobre el extrañamiento de los Jesuitas; copia de uno de los capitulos de la Consulta del Consejo extraordinario de 29 de Enero de 1767... Por el Ministerio de Gracia y Justicia se remitieron (con la expression de no haberse hallado mas) la carpeta original de la Consulta del Consejo extraordinario fecha 29 de Enero de 1767, con una parte simple que parecia ser de ella." According to this the part of the *Consulta* of January 29, 1767, in question was already missing from the archives. ROUSSEAU (I., 216) suggests that the documents were deliberately destroyed by Charles III.'s Ministers. Cf. DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 39.

Moñino for Clement XIV. two years after the Jesuit expulsion, but which represents in the main an extract from the missing first part of the memorandum of January 29th, 1767.¹ The gist of it is as follows.

From the time of Charles III.'s accession to the throne of Spain the Jesuits had evinced a definite dislike for his person and his Government. Accustomed to the despotism which they had formerly enjoyed as Court confessors, they saw with bitterness that their creatures were no longer promoted to high offices because the king, in his enlightened wisdom, was no longer willing to tolerate the misuse they had made of their power for so many years. Among the various complaints which came to the ears of the monarch were two which grievously affected the body and the government of the Society of Jesus. The churches in India complained of the unheard-of violence with which the Jesuits had cheated them out of their tithes. Bitter complaints were also brought to the foot of the throne by the postulators for the canonization of Palafox; namely, that through the crafty machinations of the Jesuits during Ferdinand VI.'s period of decrepitude some of the works written by this venerable servant of God were burnt, to the scandal of the nation,² which writings were afterwards approved by the Congregation of Rites. By listening to these representations the king offended the honour and the self-interest which had always been the idols of this terrible Society. At the same time, by a happy chance, their usurpation of sovereignty in Paraguay was discovered, and also their rebellion and ingratitude, as was clear from the authentic, original documents, which brought to light the usurpation and the excesses which for a century and a half were a problem, or rather an impenetrable mystery, for the whole world. When, on the death of Rábago, his vacant post on the tribunal

¹ *Exposicion sumaria de los excesos cometidos por los Jesuitas, que se remitió a Roma para entregar al Papa*, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 686; see FERRER DEL RIO, II., 137 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 672 *seqq.*

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXXV., 322, and below, p. 409.

of the Inquisition was conferred by the king on his confessor, the Society regarded this blow as an attack on its honour and as a loss of the means whereby to make itself respected and feared ; it realized at the same time what little prospect it had of ever regaining the position of Court confessor and, with it, its despotic power. This step of the king's, which had been taken in order to reduce to its proper proportion the fearful faction created by the Society in all classes of the State, aggrieved the Jesuits in the inmost depths of their souls ; for until then they had been accustomed to see only their creatures chosen for high positions in the spiritual and temporal hierarchy, creatures who had been brought up to venerate and be blindly subservient to their principles. That the monarch entrusted the instruction of his children to members of this body was a clear indication that he had no personal dislike of them. But as the Jesuits were not to be satisfied with anything less than the recovery of their former arbitrary power, they formed the plan of setting the whole kingdom in a state of turmoil, and it was only by the special protection of Providence that the realm was preserved from the terrors of a civil war and its disastrous consequences. For long past they had sown among the loyally Catholic Spanish people suspicion both of the king and his Ministers, as though they were heretics and as though religion had declined since the king's arrival and would be changed in Spain within a few years. They spread these and other terrible slanders at first in private conversation, later in their Exercises, giving their opinion of the Government and its measures in a depreciatory manner. At the same time they broadcast all kinds of mysterious prophecies about the length of the king's life and reign ; since 1760 they had been spreading the rumour that he would be dead within six years. For a long time past this rumour-mongering had been brought to the knowledge of the Ministers by completely reliable persons. Abusing the office of preaching they disseminated from the pulpit predictions of rebellions and calamities. With the connivance of the Order's controllers they translated and distributed throughout Spain secretly printed leaflets and pamphlets opposing their expulsion from

Portugal and France ; they cast suspicion on the religion of the Ministers and officials of those States and sowed hatred and suspicion of the king's Ministry, as though it were not well disposed towards them. Similarly, they tried to stir up distrust and discontent among corporations and individuals of repute, so as to bring about a secret and dangerous association in which all were involved.¹

After the Jesuits had prepared men's minds in this manner for some time, they, as ringleaders and plotters, held their secret meetings in the capital, and here that terrible revolt was hatched. At first, no doubt, it was directed against the Finance Minister, Squillace, and his ordinances, but the Jesuits were skilful enough to turn it into a war of religion, the rioters calling themselves soldiers of the Faith. The risings being represented not only as permissible but even as meritorious, fanaticism in some cases rose to such a pitch that certain wounded rioters refused to admit that they were guilty of sin and declared that they would die as martyrs. In Madrid, gross slanders were spread about the king's morality, and also rumours about the discord that prevailed between him and the heir to the throne. It was asserted that the queen-mother was on the side of the rebels. In short, no measures were too base whereby to instil the people with hatred of the monarch and his Government, to force him into the infamous humiliation of including in the Ministry someone completely devoted to, and controlled by, the Jesuits, and of appointing one of their men as royal confessor, which would prepare the way for their return to their old position of power. This is what the Jesuits were aiming at. But as the people saw no future for

¹ Together with the Jesuits a number of other persons were accused of having instigated and participated in the uprising in Madrid. The best known of them were Miguel Antonio de la Gandara, Luis Velasquez, Benito Navarro, Antonio Idiaquez, and Lorenzo Hermoso. A critical appreciation of the *proceedings brought against them (Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 582) brings to light nothing incriminating the Society. Some of the accused were even opponents of the Jesuits. Cf. ROUSSEAU, I., 210 *seqq.*

themselves in these things, it ceased to make suitable requests, and so the plot failed and was buried (*depositado*) in the hearts of the leaders of the revolution. In speech and writing the Jesuits tried to excuse the excesses of the mob and to represent the tumult as a heroic undertaking. This is shown by their reports to the Dutch journal where the incidents are described with approval. Not only did they try to kindle the flames of revolt throughout the kingdom, but they also spread false news about the mother-country in the colonies and *vice versa*, hoping in this way to set everything ablaze. In their mission-sermons at Barbastro they foretold the fall of the House of Bourbon on account of its alleged sins ; in Gerona they said that the comet then visible betokened the imminent death of the king. It was this school of fanaticism and the regicidal and tyrannicidal principles defended by the Jesuits that produced the criminal who was sentenced to death for threatening the life of the king. They expressed great grief in their letters at the execution of this pupil and favourite of theirs.

After undermining the foundations of the monarchy they attacked the Court officials and Ministers in anonymous writings, threatening fresh insurrections and pressing for the dismissal of the Court confessor and the Ministers, so that in this way the Jesuit party could regain possession of the helm. To increase the Government's anxiety they informed the President Aranda through the heads of the colleges in Madrid that a fresh revolt had been planned for the beginning of November, which turned out to be quite uncertain. Directly something had leaked out of what had been discovered by the secret inquiry, the Jesuits showed signs of great perturbation and sent each other instructions to restrict their correspondence and to burn their letters. The disturbances in Spain were accompanied by news of increased unrest in America. In one of their letters to those realms they announced that either the king would be replaced by another or a certain member of their party would be appointed Colonial Minister. Their own writings showed that they had set up an absolute monarchy in Paraguay, or rather an unprecedented despotism hostile to all the laws of God and man. The revolts of the Indians against

Spain and Portugal owed their origin to the Jesuits and their leadership. In Chile, according to their own accounts, they encouraged heathen customs, known as Machitun. In all their American missions their unbounded supremacy in spiritual and temporal matters was established.¹ In Quito and New Spain they foretold and instigated unrest. In the Philippines they preached against the Government, and during the occupation of Manila their Provincial contravened the law and stood on good terms with the English General. To pass over further details, it was pointed out in conclusion that they wanted to subject a part of North America to a foreign power, as was seen from the documents which were found at the seizure of the Jesuit entrusted with the negotiations. From these general conditions in Spain and its colonies and from the dangers that threatened, it was clear that there was absolutely no other remedy for this mass of evils than for the nation to cast out from her bosom these ferocious enemies of her tranquillity and happiness. The king could doubtless have instituted legal proceedings against so many culprits and have imposed on them the penalty they deserved, but both his paternal benignity and the realization that the evil lay in the principles of this body induced His Majesty to proceed against the disturbers of the peace with administrative measures. He did not want to punish the transgressions of individuals but to protect himself against the onslaught of this Society which was on the point of ravaging the kingdom.

Any idea of reforming the Jesuits was not only useless but highly dangerous. What hope could there be of a reform when this incorrigible body, in spite of its expulsion from France and Portugal, not only did not humble and improve itself but plunged into still greater crimes? The reform that had begun in Portugal at the king's request had brought about a dastardly attempt on his life. What Minister could advise his royal master to risk his valuable life while the reform was in progress? And what monarch could abandon his own safety

¹ **Consejo extraordinario*, December 31, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

and that of his realm during this period to the rage of the Jesuits? Moreover, a reform of this utterly depraved body would be tantamount to its destruction. With the Jesuits it was impossible and unnecessary to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. It was not that every member had been let into the secret of the conspiracy; on the contrary, many had acted in good faith; but these above all were the most dangerous enemies of the monarchy since by reason of their simplicity they were most easily used as tools by their superiors. Would it not be unheard-of foolishness to allow a madman the free use of his hands because he did not know he was doing wrong? ¹

On the strength of this indictment by the Fiscal the Extraordinary Council proposed the banishment of the Jesuits, the seizure of their property, and the absolute prohibition of any written correspondence with them.² On February 20th, 1767, a special commission (*Junta especial*) met to examine this resolution; it was composed of the Ministers Roda, Muniain, Muzquiz, and Grimaldi, together with the Duke of Alba, Masones, and the king's confessor, Osma. In view of the facts and weighty considerations which had been stated, also the integrity, experience, and erudition of the members of the Extraordinary Council, which ruled out any doubt of the thoroughness, justice, and legality of their proceedings, the special commission came to the conclusion that the king could and should make their verdict his own.³ With regard to the

¹ The memorial, which had been edited by Moñino and corrected by Roda, was sent to Grimaldi that he might check it. He sent it back on November 19, 1769, with the note: "Debuelvo a V. S. el papel que me confió; le he leído, y me parece muy bien, y a proposito para dar una idea general y somaria qual se pide" (*Grimaldi to Roda, November 19, 1769, *ibid.*, 686).

² **Papeles remitidos por la Secretaria de Gracia y Justicia . . .*, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3517. The *Resolucion* or decree belonging to it, *ibid.*

³ " *...estima la Junta, que en virtud de los muchos y diferentes hechos, que se refieren en dicha Consulta, y de los poderosos fundamentos, y urgentes motivos con que afianzan su dictamen

plan for carrying out this verdict the commission proposed seven amendments which amounted to a lessening of the severities attached to the law of banishment, such as that not every case of secret correspondence with the exiles was to be treated as one of high treason. To forestall any discussion about the motives for the banishment, the king was to include in the decree a statement that he was locking away in his royal breast the reasons for this decision, without entering into any judgment of the Institute of the Society of Jesus, or the morals and principles of its members. He might add, however, that his reasons were not only just and urgent but of such a nature that he felt himself bound in conscience to take this step, and that his decision was based on a thorough investigation and the advice of his Ministers and other persons of high repute.¹

los Ministros del Consejo extraordinario... y en la justa satisfaccion, y confianza, que la Junta debe tener de la integridad, practica, y literatura de dichos Ministros para no poder dudar de la solemnidad, justificacion, y arreglo en el procedimiento, y substanciacion de esta causa, puede y debe V. M. conformarse con su sentencia y parecer, y le persuade a la urgencia, y necesidad de esta providencia sobre las razones de justicia la consideracion de no haverse hasta ahora dado satisfaccion alguna al decoro de la Majestad, y a la vindicta publica por las graves, y execrables ofensas cometidas en los insultos pasados" (Junta mandata formar por V. M., February 20, 1767, *ibid.*).

¹ " *La primera [advertencia] es relativa a la extension del decreto, que debe publicarse, en cuio asunto se conforma la Junta con el dictamen del Consejo extraordinario en quanto, a que se diga, que S. M. reserva en su real animo los motivos de esta providencia, sin introducirse en el juicio, o examen del Instituto de la Compañia, ni de las costumbres, o maximas de los Jesuitas. Y aunque tambien cree, que se salve con la expresion de la Consulta la justificacion, que debe suponerse de dichos motivos, entiende la Junta, que puede insinuarse con mas viveza haver sido estos non solo justos, y urgentes, sino tales que han obligado, y necesitado sin arbitrio a que se tornase esa providencia... La segunda es tambien relativa al mismo decreto. Cree la Junta por muy conveniente que se dé a entender haver procedido V. M. con acuerdo, examen y consejo. Pero en quanto

“ Relying on the memorandum of the Extraordinary Council and of other highly placed persons, moved by weighty reasons, conscious of his duty to uphold obedience, tranquillity, and justice among his people, and for other urgent, just, and compelling causes, which he was locking away in his royal breast,” Charles III. issued on February 27th, 1767, the decree whereby he banished from Spain and its possessions overseas all Jesuits who had taken their first vows and novices who refused to secede, and ordered the appropriation of their movable and immovable property. The execution of this order was entrusted to Count Aranda, who was vested with full and exclusive powers. All civil authorities and the Superiors of the Order were required to obey the ordinance promptly under pain of the royal displeasure. It was to be carried out with the greatest respect, attentiveness, humanity, and co-operation.¹

The Jesuits knew, of course, that secret inquiries were afoot

a la formal expresion con que esto debe explicarse discurre la Junta, seria lo mas proprio decir ; que ha precedido el mas maduro examen, conocimiento y consulta de Ministros de mi Consejo, y otros sugetos del mas elevado caracter. Y quando V. M. no estimase suficiente esta expresion de Ministros en general, podria decirse a consulta de mi Consejo Real en Consejo extraordinario ” (Junta of February 20, 1767, *ibid.*).

¹ “ Coleccion general de las providencias hasta aquí tomadas por el gobierno sobre el estrañamiento y ocupacion de temporalidades de los Regulares de la Compañía...” I., Madrid, 1767, 1 *seq.* In this and other decrees it was stressed that the king was issuing these orders in virtue of his supreme administrative authority (“ usando de la suprema autoridad economica ”). The object of this phrase was to avoid conflicts with the ecclesiastical authorities on the score of competence, the Jesuits as clerics being subject to the *forum ecclesiasticum*. “ Ygualmente conviene dar a entender en el [decreto] a los prelados diocesanos, ayuntamientos, cabildos eclesiasticos y demas estamentos, o cuerpos politicos del reyno, que en S. M. se reservan los justos motivos, que mueven su real animo a esta justa providencia : valiendose para ella unicamente de su económica potestad, sin proceder con otros rigores, como padre y protector de sus pueblos ” (Consulta of January 29, 1767, second part : Papeles remitidos..., *ibid.*).

and that certain malignant persons intended to use every means to implicate them in the insurrections,¹ but strangely enough they placed their trust in the very persons who were to be the chief authors of their ruin, namely, Aranda and the king.² It was true that Aranda was a former pupil of theirs, that he had close relatives in the Order, and that his house was frequented by the Jesuit Martinez.³ And Charles III. had recently shown them marks of favour. The Jesuits Zacánini and Wedlingen were still teaching the royal princes, and continued to do so, right to the very eve of banishment.⁴ The Provincial and the heads of the Madrid houses had been received by the king with exceptional graciousness when they offered him their congratulations on the successful settlement of the disturbances.⁵ Isidro Lopez, who, on July 25th, 1766,

¹ “ *Aqui nos muelen los oídos con que en Madrid se hacen secretisimos procesos sobre aquella fatal sublevacion, y que los malignos hacen los maiores esfuerzos para embolver en ella a los Jesuitas. Dios quiera que la calumnia no halle en nuestra corte la acogida que halló en la de Portugal (Fr. Cabrera to Fr. Poyanos, dated Rome, 1766, July 2, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777). On June 28, 1766, Fr. De Torres wrote from Madrid to Fr. Undrés in Rome that he had heard that “ estos dias pasados havia una conjuracion formada para probar que los Jesuitas fueron los autores del motin, que es la mayor calumnia ” (*ibid.*).

² “ *Yo espero mucho de Aranda en bien de la España, y no poco en bien de la Compañía a quien quisieron embolver en el alboroto de Madrid ; pero yo espero que el Rey nos hará justicia, y de facto recibió con mucha benignidad al Provincial y sus Padres de Madrid que fueron a congratularse con S. M. sobre la tranquilidad restituida a la España ” (Cabrera to Poyanos, dated Rome, June 25, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777).

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, April 7, 1766, *ibid.* Estado, 5044.

⁴ NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 150. “ Il giorno che precedè alla notte della esecuzione, il P. Wedlingen, istruttore de’ reali infanti, avea data loro la consueta lezione ” (Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 42).

⁵ See above, n. 2.

tendered the monarch the customary thanks for the foundation of the college of Salamanca, had been so delighted with his charming amiability that he wrote that, however much they tried, the Jesuits could never repay the prince's kindness.¹ At about the same time, at the request of the Royal Society of London,² the king had gladly given permission to the famous astronomer Boscovich to travel to California to observe the transit of Venus.³ In December, 1766, leave had been granted to the professed house in Madrid to collect alms.⁴ Even as late as January 11th, 1767, forty Jesuits sailed from Cadiz to the missions in Paraguay and Chile with the royal assent.⁵

In spite of all this, the fear persisted in Madrid and Rome that certain persons were trying to kindle in Spain the same conflagration that had destroyed the Order in France.⁶ It was

¹ " *No le pagaremos lo mucho que nos honra, por mucho que nos esmeremos " (to Idiaquez, July 26, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777).

² *Masserano to Grimaldi, dated London, 1766, July 11, *ibid.* Estado, 6960.

³ *Grimaldi to Masserano, July 28, 1766, *ibid.* On May 11, 1767, this permission was revoked (*Grimaldi to Masserano, *ibid.*, 6964); later, for fear of espionage, no foreigner was allowed to enter the country (*Masserano to Grimaldi, December 11, 1767, *ibid.*, 6965).

⁴ *Resolution of the *Consejo*, of December 14 and 17, 1766, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ Cf. the *correspondence between the following Jesuits: I. de Torres to Andrés, March 7, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777; *Ignaz I. Gonzalez to Montes, March 14, 1767, *ibid.*; *Rafael de Córdoba to Montes, March 20, 1767, *ibid.*; RICCI, **Espulsione*, 14; PERAMÁS, *Annus patiens*, par. 21, pp. 38 *seqq.*, in Jesuit possession (see below, p. 113, n. 1). When the forty Jesuits landed in Montevideo on July 25, 1767, the decree of banishment was made known to them and their belongings were confiscated. They were later shipped to Europe along with the other Jesuits (*ibid.*).

⁶ " *Per quel poi che riguarda i sospetti concepiti contro i gesuiti non per altra ragione si afflige S. S^{ta} se non che per il

observed with misgiving that the patrons and friends of the Society were gradually removed or were kept away from the king's entourage.¹ The well-informed Lopez wrote to Idiaquez on September 15th, 1766: "I must assure Your Reverence once for all that it is the intention of various persons to see the Society of Jesus mishandled and destroyed exactly as it was in Portugal and France and that they are trying to attain this end by every possible means. I know that Your Reverence has other views on this matter, but it is my official duty to report things as I see them." He was convinced, however, that with his love of justice the king would side with the accused if the true facts of the case were laid before him. The only practical way of doing this was through the royal confessor, Osma. The Provincial might appoint someone to provide the latter with accurate information. He himself was scarcely suitable for the purpose, as he was looked at askance owing to his friendship with Ensenada.² In Paraguay, too, at this juncture there was a recurrence of hostile feeling after the departure of General Cevallos.³ His good treatment of the Jesuits seems to have embarrassed members of the Order in Spain, for they advised him very strongly not to make his entry into Madrid accompanied by the Jesuits Orbagozo and

timore che quel fanatismo che altrove regna contro la Compagnia, si propaghi anche nelle Spagna. Non mancano ne pure costà delle persone che accenderebbero lo stesso fuoco che ha consumato in Francia questo Istituto. E quantunque la moderazione del Re, le buone massime della maggior parte de' consiglieri possano assicurare alquanto l'afflitto animo della S^{ta} Sua, pur non può egli lasciar affatto di temere e abbandonare ogni pensiero di accorrere fin dal principio al pericolo di una minacciata ruina. A tal effetto furono dati a V. S. I. quelli ordini pressanti [June 12]" (Torrigiani to Pallavicini, July 10, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado 5072).

¹ *Fr. Poyanos to Fr. La Mata, July 7, 1766, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 777. Cf. NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 145 *seq.*

² *Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

³ *Fr. L. Oros to Fr. I. Robles, September 27, 1766, *ibid.*, 690.

Carrio, as this would only increase the jealousy of the envious.¹

The nuncio's reports also provided grounds for serious apprehension. Lopez's banishment from Madrid with no reason given,² the ordering of the Jesuits to pay tithes in the mission countries with effect from the year 1662,³ the ordering

¹ **Copias de cartas de Buenos Ayres de los años de 1765 y 1766* (a brief analysis in Roda's hand of various letters from Jesuits), *ibid.* The same Bishop of Buenos Ayres who had given the Jesuits such a good testimonial complained to Madrid about them and Cevallos (September 14, 1766), which complaints came up for discussion before the Extraordinary Council on February 5, 1767. In his speech the Fiscal Campomanes stressed that the greatest, or more precisely the only, crime committed by Cevallos was the persistently energetic protection he had afforded the Jesuits; had it not been for this he would have been the greatest hero (*Consejo extraordinario*, February 5, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 690). The subject dragged on till 1769. In spite of all the accusations brought against him the General lost nothing of the esteem in which he was held by the people nor any of his honours and offices. (Further *documents on the subject, *ibid.*) It was peculiarly characteristic of Roda that he made no scruple to hold the worthy General up to contempt and ridicule. " *Dicen que [Cevallos] viene hecho un santo, dedicado a la oracion, y al retiro, y que nada pretende. Ya sabe V^d que empezaron los Padres a convertirlo con cien mil cueros que le regalaron, y a ocho pesos, que vale cada uno, son ocho cientos mil pesos " (Roda to Azara, February 24, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.). The same slander had been uttered by Campomanes in his speech for the prosecution (*Consejo extraordinario*, February 5, 1767, *loc. cit.*).

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, October 28, 1766, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.* Lopez was banished to Monforte de Lemus. (FERRER DEL RIO, III., 105; NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 153.)

³ *Real Cedula*, December 4, 1766 (printed), Nunziat. di Spagna, 302, *loc. cit.*; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, December 9 and 16, 1766, Cifre, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, January 8, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433.

of the Colegio Imperial to restore the usufruct it had derived from the freedom of the city of Arganda,¹ all pointed to a storm. Nevertheless, thought Pallavicini, the pious-minded king would not leave the path of justice and legality or take any unforeseen decision without the Pope's assent.² In the course of the following months he was increasingly troubled by the fear that some plot was being hatched against the Order. At his suggestion³ Clement XIII. addressed a letter to Charles III.,⁴ couched in a cordial, paternal tone, with which he hoped, without actually mentioning the Jesuits, to avert any arbitrary measure which it might be intended to take against them. It was left to the nuncio's discretion to choose the right moment for delivering the message.⁵ A week later the nuncio's fears had disappeared,⁶ only to recur more violently than ever at the beginning of February. He had, he said, the vague feeling that some blow was about to fall upon the Order. The French Parlements and the Court of Lisbon were trying to fan the flames; after the revolt had broken out Pombal had accused the Jesuits in the most decided and certain terms of having taken part in it. He personally was of the opinion that the investigation conducted by the Fiscals had demonstrated their innocence; on the other hand, private individuals were spreading the report in confidential conversations that the extirpation of the Society

¹ **Risoluzione del Consiglio*, December 3, 1766, *ibid.*, 302; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, December 23, 1766, Cifre, *ibid.*

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, October 28, December 16 and 23, 1766, and February 11, 1767, *ibid.*, 302 and 303.

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, December 30, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072.

⁴ *On January 22, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, January 22, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*

⁶ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, January 6 and 10 and February 17, 1767, Cifre, *ibid.*, 303; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, January 29, 1767, Reg. di cifre, *ibid.*, 433, copy in Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

in Spanish territory had already been decided on and that it would soon be put into effect.¹

These rumours were well-founded. On March 1st, 1767, the decree of banishment of February 27th was handed to Aranda,² who straightway drew up an executive instruction,³ which he had secretly reproduced, together with the decree⁴ and a circular note,⁵ in the royal printing press. Separate instructions were sent by the king to his officials, commanding them to carry out faithfully all the orders which Aranda would issue to them in the king's name and to address all correspondence on this matter to Aranda only.⁶ To lull the Jesuits into a sense of security and to distract public attention Aranda suspended on March 4th and 5th respectively the prohibitions against the holding of popular missions by Fr. Calatayud and in the Basque provinces.⁷ But the rumours persisted despite these attempts of his to mask his real intentions.⁸ The

¹ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, February 3, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*, copy in Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

² *Coleccion general* (see above, p. 99, n. 1), I., 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 6 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶ *March 1, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2453.

⁷ *Aranda to the Provincial Osorio, March 4, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*; *Aranda to the Comte de Fleignie, March 5, 1767; *Idiaquez to Ricci, March 7, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777; *Fr. Royo to Lopez, March 7, 1767, *ibid.*; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, March 17, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5044.

⁸ “*Hace unos quantos dias que en la imprenta de la Gazeta se están imprimiendo unos papeles del gobierno con tropa de vista, sin permitir salir a los ofiziales aun para dormir. Sobre su contenido se habia mucho . . .” (an unknown writer to Fr. Abad, March 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777). Cf. *Royo to Lopez, March 7, 1767, *ibid.* “*Quel che mi tiene presentemente in pensiero è la impressione arcana della qual feci parola a V. Eminenza nel ordinario scorso. Si crede terminata, e si vuole, che il giorno in cui finì venisse a riceverla

nuncio's view of the situation changed so frequently that he could not bring himself to deliver the Papal Brief, though he gave the Government to understand that in questions of a mixed nature the Church authorities should also be heard.¹ In a conversation with the Court confessor, through whom he hoped to arrive at the truth, he was given reassuring replies.² On March 31st he made further inquiries of his cousin, the Minister Grimaldi, who also reassured him.³ But the very next morning brought him the news that the banishment had already been put into effect.

Aranda, who had been informed by the political secret service of the rumours that were current, decided that any

e portarla al Pardo il sig. Roda. Nè con lui, nè col R^{mo} Padre Osma ho avuto opportunità nella settimana scorsa . . . quel discorso del qual a numero del mio ultimo dispaccio starà V. E. attendendo il ragguaglio. . . . Vorrei potermi persuadere che la materia dell' impressione occulta sia puramente politica, e di Stato, ma confesso a V. E. che non la suppongo tale. Per mia opinione si riferisce ad alcuni ecclesiastici, a quali, non saprei indovinarlo" (Pallavicini to Torrigiani, March 17, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5044). Cf. *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, March 10, 1767, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, April 2, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*, and Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

¹ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, March 10, 1767, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, March 26, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 412, *loc. cit.*

² " *Mi sono abboccato col Padre confessore. . . . Mi parve di ricavarne [from the conversation] una moral sicurezza di che nemen egli, il P. Osma, sapesse qual sia il soggetto della ripetuta impressione. . . . Conobbi di più o parvemi di conoscere che il detto degnissimo Religioso, appunto perchè ne ignorava il soggetto, non sapeva persuadersi che nella medesima siano gli ecclesiastici per trovarsi notabilmente interessati. In fatto non è verisimile che rispetto al corpo delli ecclesiastici in generale o a un de loro rami, si prenda veruna risoluzione ipso inconsulto" (Pallavicini to Torrigiani, March 24, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044). Cf. also *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, February 3, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

³ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 166, n. 1.

long delay would be dangerous. Accordingly, he proposed that the decree of banishment be postponed only until a time when the king was not residing in Madrid.¹ The king left it to the President's judgment to fix the final date for the carrying out of the decree, expressing only the wish that it be put forward one or two days.² Aranda therefore decided that the decree should come into effect on the night of April 2nd-3rd for the country as a whole³ and the night of March 31st-April 1st for Madrid and its environs.⁴

(7)

Under date March 20th, 1767, a circular letter was sent to the various civil authorities with instructions not to open the accompanying sealed packet before Thursday, April 2nd, and then to carry out immediately the orders it contained. Before that date no mention was to be made to anyone of the receipt of the note or of the secret packet. Any transgression would be punished as a violation of official secrecy and as neglect of duty in the king's service.⁵ The sealed packet contained a copy of the decree of banishment of February 27th, 1767,⁶ and of Count Aranda's instruction.⁷ The latter commanded the executive official to have all the approaches to the colleges occupied by the local militia during the night, to assemble all the Jesuits, to read them the decree of banishment, and to list their names and religious rank. He was then to proceed without delay to confiscate their archives, libraries, letters, written works, and business papers, to take possession of all moneys and articles of value, and to lock up the gold and silver vessels used in the churches so that an inventory

¹ *Aranda to Roda, March 16, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

² *Roda to Aranda, March 17, 1767, *ibid.*

³ *Aranda to Roda, March 22, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *Coleccion general*, I., 5, note.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 6 *seqq.*

of them could be made later. The novices were to be kept separate from the others in houses where they could decide in complete freedom whether they would follow the Fathers or not, but it was to be made clear to them that the banishment was irrevocable and that they would receive no pension. Within twenty-four hours of the proclamation of the order all Jesuits were to leave for their collecting points under military escort. They were allowed to take with them their clothes, linen, breviaries, prayer-books, tobacco, and chocolate. Those unfit to travel were to be taken to convents which did not subscribe to Jesuit principles; there they were to be cut off from all connection with the Religious and the outer world. In the schools the Jesuits were to be replaced immediately by secular priests who were not adherents of their teaching. In conclusion, precise particulars were given of the route to be followed by each college, of its first collecting-point, and its port of embarkation.¹ A supplementary instruction authorized the viceroys and governors of the colonies to take whatever measures were suitable for the arrest of the Jesuit missionaries and for their transport to Puerto de Santa Maria, near Cadiz. Their missions and other appointments were to be occupied by secular or regular priests.²

In a special order for Madrid the *alcaldes* were instructed to proceed at the head of military detachments to the Jesuit colleges half an hour before midnight on March 31st.³ At

¹ In Madrid the inventory of the Jesuit churches was to be taken that very night. The Vicar General, however, who had been summoned in *writing by Aranda on March 31, 1767 (Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*), to appear before him at 10.30 p.m., excused himself on the score of not having the requisite authority (**Compendio substancial de lo pasado anoche* [March 31, 1767], *ibid.*). The Archbishop instructed him to obey but to inform the nuncio, who granted him the authority (**Papel de orden dada por el cardenal a su vicario*, April 1, 1767, *ibid.*; *Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo to Clement XIII., April 4, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777).

² *Coleccion general*, I., 20 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 27 *seqq.*

eleven o'clock the various regimental detachments left their quarters and occupied the open spaces and streets around the six Jesuit houses. As midnight struck the *alcaldes* rang at the gates and demanded admittance in the name of the king. When all the inmates had been assembled the decree of banishment was read to them. Immediately afterwards they were told to pack their clothes, linen, breviaries, and other small belongings, and to return to the refectory. From here they went to the gate, where they had to enter the carriages which were waiting to take them to the port of Cartagena. The whole proceedings were over so quickly that all of the two hundred Jesuits were outside the capital two or three hours before daybreak. The novices who had decided to stay in Spain were taken to the Benedictine monastery of Montserrat, whence they were eventually fetched by their relatives. A similar procedure was carried out in all the other houses in the kingdom. Nowhere did the officials meet with any resistance.¹

On Thursday, April 2nd, 1767, the herald, accompanied by drummers and trumpeters, appeared outside the main gate of the royal palace and announced the Pragmatic Sanction regarding the banishment of the Jesuits. After the repetition of the decree of February 27th, the king made known to the other religious Orders his confidence, satisfaction, and esteem, which they had earned by their loyalty, sound doctrine, good discipline, zeal for studies, and non-interference in affairs of State. All Bishops, cathedral chapters, and political bodies were to be informed that the just and weighty motives which compelled the king to take action remained hid in his royal breast, while he in his royal clemency made use only of the supreme administrative authority, vested in him by God. All the Jesuit property would be combined into one solid block by which the encumbrances and bequests would be

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 222 *seq.*; ISLA, *Memorial*, 11 *seqq.*; *Coleccion de los articulos de La Esperanza sobre la historia del reinado de Carlos III., escrita por D. A. Ferrer del Rio*³, Madrid, 1859, 157 *seq.*; GALERANI-MADARIAGA, 196 *seqq.*; *Month*, CI (1902), 645 *seqq.*

defrayed according to the founders' wishes and by which the exiles would be maintained for life. The priests would receive yearly 100 *pesos*, the lay-brothers 90, but foreigners and novices were excluded. These pensions would be paid half-yearly. All Jesuits without distinction were to leave the country. If any of them left the States of the Church, to which they were banished, or by speech, writing, or deed gave cause for complaint, they would forfeit their pension. If, contrary to expectation, any one of them should write against this ordinance with the approval or permission of the Society, under the pretext of a defence or apology, or in any way endanger the peace of the realm, the pensions would be withdrawn from all the exiles. A decision would be made about the expenditure of Jesuit funds for pious purposes after consultation with the Bishops. Any of the exiles who returned to Spain would be heavily punished, even if they left the Order; if they had obtained the royal permission to return, they were neither to preach, nor to teach, nor to hear confessions; they were to take the oath of allegiance and to promise to have no communication, either direct or indirect, with the General or with any member of the Society. No subject was allowed to ask the General of the Order for participation in the spiritual benefits of the Order; ¹ those who already possessed it were to surrender it to the authorities, failing which they would be punished as traitors. No one was allowed to correspond in writing with the exiles. It was also made a matter of high treason to write, speak, or, without the royal permission, to print books for or against these ordinances under any pretext, since private persons had no right to judge or interpret royal commands.²

Ordinances similar to those for the mother-country were sent on March 6th, 1767, to the Spanish colonies in South America and to the Philippines.³ In a supplementary instruc-

¹ *Carta de hermandad, Communicatio bonorum spiritualium.*

² *Coleccion general*, I., 36 *seqq.*

³ *Aranda to Roda, March 16 and 22, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667; *Roda to Azara, April 7,

tion of March 1st, 1767, the President of the Extraordinary Council invested the Viceroys, Governors, and Presidents overseas with all his own powers and ordered them to convey the missionaries to Puerto de Santa Maria, near Cadiz, where they would receive further instructions. The civil administration of mission districts was to be entrusted provisionally to men of proved integrity. The spiritual welfare of the missions, which in future would be under the direct control of the Bishops, was to be handed over to secular priests or to other Religious. Missionaries in very remote situations were to be recalled by their Provincial or his representative without further information. To forestall any underhand delays on the part of the Provincial the arrest of the Jesuits in the colleges was to be carried out first, so that the missionaries to the heathen would obey orders more readily on seeing that they had been deprived of these supports. While observing the necessary security measures, the executive officials were to treat the missionaries, who were expected to submit quite readily, in a respectful and kindly manner and to use force only if unavoidable.¹

The expulsion decrees for overseas were sent first to the Governor of Buenos Ayres, the town which might be regarded as the key to the whole of Spanish South America. This important post was held at the time by Lieutenant-General Francisco de Paula Bucareli y Ursua. The decrees reached his hands on June 7th, 1767, with instructions to forward them to the Governor of Chile, the President of the Audiencia of Charcas, and the Viceroy of Peru.²

Bucareli had never made any secret of his dislike of the Society of Jesus and, to some extent at least, he owed his high

1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I. The submission of these decisions for the approval of the tribunal for the Indies on April 5, 1767, was a mere formality. DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 138.

¹ *Coleccion general*, I., 20 *seqq.*

² HERNANDEZ, *Extrañamiento*, 58 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 138 *seq.*

position to the deliberate policy of the Madrid Cabinet of cleansing all influential positions of " Jesuit tertiaries " and of filling them with adherents of the new movements. Acting as if he had to deal with dangerous rebels, Bucareli used a military force which was unnecessarily large for the purpose of expelling the Jesuits, but which would not have been sufficient in a real emergency. On the night of July 2nd-3rd the Jesuit establishments in Buenos Ayres were cordoned off by troops. The assembled religious were informed of their banishment, the inhabitants of the city were forbidden to communicate with them, and any disparagement of the royal measures or concealment of Jesuit property was made a punishable offence.¹ When day broke, the population discovered to its astonishment and dismay that its spiritual ministers were under arrest. Eight citizens who gave vent to their feelings too freely were temporarily banished. Five others, who were alleged to have prophesied that the banished clerics would return in three years, or who were thought to have some connection with the lampoons and squibs directed against the Government, afterwards suffered the same punishment. One citizen was saved from execution only by the intercession of the Bishop.² The military were also called out July 6th, 1767, against the four Jesuits belonging to the small establishment at Montevideo.³

The arrest of the inmates of the large college at Córdoba in the province of Tucumán was effected in a quite dramatic manner. Between 3 and 4 a.m. on Sunday, July 12th, a man appeared at the gates, supposedly to call a priest to attend to someone who was dying. Immediately the door was opened, armed men rushed into the house and ordered the rector to

¹ *Bando de Bucareli sobre el extrañamiento a 3 de Julio de 1767*, in HERNANDEZ, 356 *seqq.* Saint-Priest (44), Huber (421), and Böhmer (⁸158) err in stating that the Jesuits were expelled from the whole of the Spanish Empire on the same day and at the same hour.

² HERNANDEZ, 58 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 138 *seqq.*

³ CARLOS FERRÉS, *Época colonial. La Comp. de Jesús en Montevideo*, Barcelona, 1919, 79 *seqq.*; HERNANDEZ, 74.

leave his bed and assemble the community in the refectory. Here the royal decree was read out to them and their request to be allowed to hear Mass, it being a Sunday, was refused. A similar procedure was carried out in the other Jesuit establishments in the town.¹ Then, on the night of July 22nd the captives were put into carriages and were driven away. On August 18th they were put on board a ship in the gulf of Barragan and set sail on September 29th. Until they reached port they were given only one scanty meal daily.

Similar scenes were enacted at Santa Fe. On July 16th, 1767, the college was surrounded at 4 a.m., the rector was informed that he was wanted by a sick man, all the Jesuits were confined in the refectory until all the rooms were emptied, and in the afternoon they were driven out of the town without being allowed to take their leave of anyone.²

On July 26th, 1767, a party of Jesuits bound for the missions in South America put in at Montevideo. The Governor, with an armed escort, went on board immediately and informed them that they had to return to Europe.³

The colleges having been cleared, the next task was to arrest the missionaries to the Indians. The Jesuits from the Gran Chaco were taken to Buenos Ayres in comparatively tolerable conditions,⁴ but the journey of the Chiquitos missionaries caused them great suffering. The ten Reductions of this area were occupied by a Lieutenant-Commander Martinez operating from Santa Cruz. As the journey to Buenos Ayres seemed too long, the missionaries were taken to Porto Bello

¹ HERNANDEZ, 77 *seqq.*; PERAMÁS; *Annus patiens s. Ephemerides, quibus continetur iter annuum Iesuitarum, qui Corduba Tucumanix egressi sunt, iussi a Rege Catholico Carolo III. regno excedere et in Corsicam navigare a. 1767*, in *Letters and Notices*, X.-XII., Roehampton, 1875-9 (private), translated in PATRIGNANI-BOERO, *Menologio*, II., Roma, 1859, 547 *seqq.*, extract in CARAYON, XVI., 183 *seqq.*

² HERNANDEZ, 75 *seqq.*; BRINGMANN, *Pater Florian Baucke*, Freiburg, 1908, 118.

³ FERRÉS, 84 *seq.*; HERNANDEZ, 105 *seqq.*

⁴ BRINGMANN, 119 *seqq.*

on the Peruvian coast. Three old men who were too weak to ride across the snow-covered Cordilleras were carried in hammocks by Indians but died on the way. The remainder of the party did not reach Italy until after a journey lasting three years, having had to wait six months at Cartagena and twelve at Puerto de Santa Maria.¹

More than a year passed after the arrival of the royal decrees before Bucareli set about the task of rounding up the eighty priests and lay-brothers in Paraguay.² First, however, he sent an order to Balda, the head of the mission, to send the *corregidores* and chief *caciques* of the thirty Reductions to Buenos Ayres. Here they were kept for a whole year as hostages for the submissiveness of their fellow-tribesmen,³ for a considerable unrest had developed among the Guaranis after they had heard of what had happened in the towns. That no actual revolt took place was due to the Jesuits, for the Provincial exhorted every missionary, when speaking or preaching to the newly-converted, to persuade them to be obedient.⁴ The Governor was asked several times by the Mission Superior to effect the change with the utmost speed, as the Indians were momentarily calm but might easily change their mood if they were kept waiting much longer.⁵ It was not until May 24th, 1768, that Bucareli finally set out from Buenos Ayres with 300 men. In mid-June he had the decree of banishment read by two officers in the frontier stations. On July 15th he himself sent an official from the vicinity of the Yapeyu station into the Reduction, with orders to carry out the royal commands. To the commissaries' surprise, all complied without protest.⁶ By August 22nd, 1768, there

¹ HERNANDEZ, 162 *seqq.*

² For what follows, *cf.* PERAMÁS, *De vita et moribus sex sacerdotum Paraguaycorum*, Faventiae, 1791; MONUSSY, 22 *seqq.*; HERNANDEZ, 184 *seqq.*; *idem*, *Organización social*, I., 32 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 141 *seqq.*; FASSBINDER, 142 *seqq.*

³ PERAMÁS, 39, n. xcvi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, n. xcvi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 40, n. ci.

⁶ HERNANDEZ, 208 *seqq.*

was not a Jesuit left in the vast territory of Paraguay, save one decrepit old man, already nearly dead, who was left behind under a guard in Pueblo de Apóstoles.¹ Bucareli² and Latorre³ had sent reports to Madrid with violent charges against the Jesuits, but these were refuted by the fact that, thanks to the influence of the missionaries, there was no further talk of resistance by the Guaranis beyond the naive petition made to the Governor by the Indians of San Luis, that he should leave them their pastors, in return for which they would work twice as much as before and pay more tribute.⁴

The expulsion of the Jesuits was carried out in a similar fashion in the other Spanish dependencies. In Chile, Bucareli's messenger bearing the decree of banishment arrived at Santiago on August 7th, 1767. The four Jesuit establishments there were surrounded during the night of August 25th, and the decree was announced at three o'clock in the morning. Taking with them the sympathy of the population, the Jesuits left the capital on October 22nd.⁵ Similar proceedings were enacted in the other towns. In the colleges belonging to the Jesuit Province of Quito the decrees were carried out between

¹ *Ibid.*, 219 seq.; HUONDER, 66, 79 seqq., 140.

² To Aranda, September 4 and 6, 1767; July 25, October 1 and 14, 1768, in BRABO, *Colección de documentos relativos á la expulsión de los Jesuitas de la República Argentina y del Paraguay*, Madrid, 1872.

³ *To Charles III., August 9, 1767, Papal Secret Archives, Fondo gesuitico, 50 (Collezione Theiner); *Pastoral letter of the Bishop of Tucumán, August 16, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 230; to Aranda, September 5, 1767, in BRABO.

⁴ On February 28, 1768, in HERNANDEZ, 364 seqq., translation in Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 690; MONUSSY, 23 seq.

⁵ *Peter Weingartner to the Provincial Joseph Erhard, January 23, 1770, Archives of the German Province of the Order, VIII., A 3, translation in CARAYON, XVI., 307 seqq. Cf. ENRICH, *Historia de la Comp. de Jesús en Chile*, II., Barcelona, 1891, 305 seqq.; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 144 seqq.

August 2nd and September 6th, 1767.¹ In the mission district of the Mainas on the Spanish Marañon the royal commissary, bringing with him some other priests as replacements for the Jesuits, did not arrive to carry out the expulsion till the end of April, 1768.² The Viceroy of Peru, Manuel de Amat y Junient, executed the royal commission on September 9th, 1767.³ The Viceroy of Mexico, Marchese de Croix, received the banishment decrees on May 30th, 1767, and put them into effect on the night of June 24th.⁴ In California, a new Governor, Jasper Portola, arrived at the harbour of San José on November 30th, 1767; with fifty soldiers he continued his journey for another 150 miles as far as the first station, Loreto. Here he made known his commission on December 26th to the Visitor, Benno Ducrue, who had been summoned to meet him. The sixteen Jesuits departed on February 5th, 1768.⁵

In all these districts the expulsion of the Jesuits was carried out without resistance. The only exception was Mexico. According to the Viceroy's report, the expulsion proceeded here, too, in complete calm for the most part. This must be due, he thought, to the special protection of Heaven, for throughout the country there was hardly anyone who was not blindly in favour of the Jesuits. The banished clerics having complied obediently with the royal orders, he had given instructions that they should be treated with

¹ HEREDIA, *La antigua provincia de Quito de la Comp. de Jesús 1566-1767*, Riobamba, 1924, 31.

² CHANTRE Y HERRERA, *Hist. de las Misiones de la Comp. de Jesús en el Marañon español 1637-1767*, Madrid, 1901, 669 seqq.

³ ZARANDONA-CAPPA, *Hist. de la extinción y restablecimiento de la Comp. de Jesús*, II., Madrid, 1890, 149; *Herrn Wolfgang Bayers, ehemaligen amerikanischen Glaubenspredigers der Gesellschaft Jesu, Reise nach Peru. Von ihm selbst beschrieben*, in MURR, *Journal*, III., 313 seqq.

⁴ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 149 seqq.; CUEVAS, IV, 412 seqq.

⁵ DUCRUE, *Relatio expulsionis Soc. Iesu ex provincia Mexicana et maxime e California a. 1767*, in MURR, *Journal*, XII., 217 seqq.; BAEGERT, *Nachrichten von der amerikanischen Halbinsel Californien*, Mannheim, 1771-3.

respect and attentiveness. It was only in the mining towns of San Luis de Potosí and San Luis de Paz that the officials had met with insubordination. But the miners' revolts in these places were due, he said, to something very different from love of religion and the Jesuits; their complaint was that the high dues they had to pay amounted to oppression.¹ The situation as described by the rector of the Jesuit college of Potosí to the General of the Society was rather different. According to him, owing to the oppressive taxation there had latterly been frequent disorders in the town and its neighbourhood, and on each occasion the Fathers had managed to pacify the rioters. But when it became known that the Society of Jesus was to be expelled, the fire that had been smouldering all along beneath the ashes flared up again. All attempts to calm the excited mob, which forcibly opposed the Jesuits' removal, were in vain, so that in the end the commandant had to send them back to their college. It was not until a month had passed that the expulsion could be carried out under the protection of 2,000 regular troops who had been especially brought to the scene for the purpose. The rebels were punished with terrible severity. The Visitor Galvez had about 500 men and women thrown into prison, many were publicly executed, and others were deported to Havana and Vera Cruz.² In spite of these Draconian measures, loyalty to the exiles still persisted. In a written complaint³ to the Marchese de Croix the Archbishop of Mexico assured him that the people and many of the nuns regarded the Bishops and all who had co-operated in the banishment as heretics and excommunicates. In Madrid complaints were made about the indolence of the Mexican Inquisition, which allowed to go unpunished the

¹ *Croix to Aranda, July 6 and 7, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5062; *Noticias de Mexico, July 26, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 690.

² RICCI, **Espulsione*, n. 142; *Sentencia pronunciada y executada por Galvez en San Luis de la Paz y Potosí*, of July 18, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 690, text in CUEVAS, IV., 447 seq.; **Consejo extraordinario*, February 8, 1768, Archives of Simancas, *loc. cit.*

³ *November 24, 1767, *ibid.*

numerous pamphlets full of insulting charges against the spiritual and temporal authorities.¹ By a decree of November 26th, 1767, the Viceroy declared all authors and distributors of lampoons of this kind to be guilty of high treason, and an edict of a similar purport was issued by the Spanish Inquisition.

In the East Indies the expulsion of the Jesuits gave rise to no disturbances.² A charge of slackness in carrying out the royal decrees was brought against the Governor, Raón, and others,³ but they proved to be ill-founded. After Raón's death his successor was ordered to reverse the judgment passed on these men and to pay a fine of 6,000 pesos.⁴

The rigours and privations suffered by the banished Jesuits on their homeward journey are not to be put to the account of the Government, which had given orders that they should be treated with consideration,⁵ but unfortunately many of the executive officials sought to enrich themselves by curtailing the food which should have been given to the exiles and allowed them barely enough to keep alive. As a result, seventy-eight Jesuits died on the voyage from overseas possessions to Corsica, and the condition of the sick was indescribable.⁶ The total number of those who died at sea is estimated at 500.⁷

(8)

While the expulsion was gradually being carried out overseas, the situation had further developed in the mother-country. In accordance with the instructions it contained, the

¹ *The Viceroy to the Inquisitor, November 24, 1767, *ibid.*; *the Inquisitor to the Viceroy, November 25, 1767, *ibid.*

² *Charles III. to Tanucci, June 20, 1769, *ibid.*, Estado, 6060.

³ *July 20, 1769, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 691.

⁴ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 158 *seq.*

⁵ See above, p. III.

⁶ *Manuel Ignacio de Alva to Cornejo, October 6, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5058.

⁷ HERNANDEZ, 219. The number has probably been over-estimated. For the sufferings of the exiles in Portuguese and Spanish prisons, *cf.* DUHR, *Geschichte*, IV., 2, 536 *seqq.*; ENRICH, II., 326 *seqq.*, 338 *seqq.*; CUEVAS, IV., 418 *seqq.*; CHANTRE Y HERRERA, 692 *seqq.*

Pragmatic Sanction was sent in the first few days of April to all Bishops, Cathedral Chapters, and Superiors of religious Orders, with the request that it be made known to their subordinates, together with appropriate admonitions, and that a report on its execution be rendered to the Council of Castile.¹ All the prelates and Superiors promised on behalf of themselves and their subordinates loyally to obey the royal Pragmatic Sanction,² with the sole exception of the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo,³ who ventured to make a slight protest by way of the restrictive formula "in so far as the Church's freedom and immunity are not violated".

Besides these letters, which are more in the nature of acknowledgments of receipt, there are others from nine Bishops who, amid fulsome praises of the Government, express their entire approval of the expulsion of the Jesuits and indulge in violent invective against the Order's doctrine, mode of instruction, avarice, and lust for power, whereby it had become obnoxious to the Church of God.⁴ The key to the understanding and appreciation of these charges is provided by the letter

¹ **Notificaciones a los arzobispos, obispos, etc.*, of April 2, 3, 4, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3513.

² The written *replies, *ibid.*

³ *To Igareda, April 23, 1767, *ibid.* Cf. *Torrighiani to Vincenti, May 28, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433 *loc. cit.*

⁴ " *V. I. se halla bien instruido del empeño con que los Jesuitas han defendido el probabilismo con todas sus consecuencias, sin excluir las mas barbaras e inhumanas, y de las crueles persecuciones que han mobido a los prelados y doctores, que se han opuesto a sus máximas abominables, y así no estrañará que un obispo, que por su oficio es depositario de la doctrina, y centinela para que no se introduzcan en el pueblo errores contrarios a la pureza de la fe, o a la regla de nuestras costumbres, lebante las manos al cielo, alabe a Dios, y bendiga sus misericordias, como lo egecuto, por que en estos tiempos resucitó un rey santo, que con el mas sabio y prudente consejo halló el modo mas justo de librar su pueblo tantos males, etc." (the Bishop of Ávila to Roda, April 25, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688). Here also the *letters of the other eight Bishops (March 31-July 2, 1767) to the king, to Roda, to Campomanes,

written on February 14th, 1767, by an unknown person to the Bishop of Barcelona,¹ openly requesting the prelate to protest to the king against the Jesuits. In such a protest, said the writer, no more was to be cited than had been said by Palafox in his letter to Innocent X. : that the Jesuits always had been, always were and always would be the same, namely, bad ; that the Society was a body that by its constitution was harmful to religion, detrimental to the State, and essentially (*esencialmente*) incorrigible. The evidence was irrefutable. He thought his Excellency was convinced that the destruction of this Society, if not absolutely necessary, as it in fact was, would at least be very useful for the good of religion, for the improvement of ecclesiastical discipline, for the renovation of many universities, for the reform of doctrine and morals, and finally for the salvation of souls and the peace of nations. Was it not the specific duty of Bishops to put forward their demands ? But even Athanasius and Palafox had found no support among their fellow Bishops. By their disgraceful silence the prelates had furthered the wickedness of this pernicious corporation. Yet there had always been some pastors who had protested against the abuses of this Society. The last Council of Utrecht was first-class evidence and a compelling proof of the corruption of this association. One should be guided not by what others did but by what it was their bounden duty to do. In Spain they were going a different way from that of France—the way of secret inquiry. Once the king had decided that the destruction of the Order in the country was justified, he, as the supreme commander in his realm, would strike the decisive blow, without conferring with the Bishops. The writer would express himself more clearly. It appeared from the documents in the case that

etc. “*Los mas de los obispos de España han respondido celebrando la providencia y han empezado a publicar enciclicas y pastorales para su observancia. Los superiores de las religiones hacen lo mismo. Los pocos terciarios que hai callan y obedecen ” (Roda to Azara, April 28, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, 1).

¹ *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044.

certain Jesuits were guilty of causing the tumult, though it was not established that the whole body was guilty or that it had furthered the disorders. The crime of an individual could not be visited on the whole body, but the whole body deserved punishment if one considered not only the circumstantial evidence—which was admittedly not strong—but the evils which this Society had already brought and was still bringing into the world. Without it, the State and religion would be spared all the ills and injuries it was inflicting on them. The completion of the work which had already been brought to an advanced stage by the Minister would be considerably facilitated if the king were to hear from the mouths of the Bishops what he had already heard from the Ministers, especially as the prince was quite ready to follow the example of his two neighbours. In Portugal the Jesuits had been convicted of regicide. Was not this accursed attempt enough to justify their monarch in taking precautionary measures? Ought they not to attack this pest of religion and the State before an attempt was made on the life of their beloved monarch? It was indeed the most natural course of action for the Court to undertake the business of its own accord and to ask for the support of some of the Bishops. He would tell the Bishop in absolute confidence that the question of expulsion was being discussed. But the Court, also wishing to keep the matter a secret, would like those Bishops who were in its confidence to convey secretly to the king a call for help against the evils from which religion was suffering at the hands of this association. For the prince was now filled with suspicion of this body and would like to remove it from the lands he ruled.

According to a letter written by the Bishop of Salamanca in early May 1767 to Canon Perez Bayer, a friend of Roda's, he had been invited three months before by one of his fellow-Bishops to join the Bishops of Barcelona, Sigüenza, Ávila, Tarazona, Valencia, and others belonging to the same school, in asking the king to drive out the Jesuits. On their expressing their misgivings that such a step might land them in an awkward situation in their relations with the Holy See, they

had been told that the Bishops were not being asked to come forward as the originators of the decision which was intended and had already been taken, but only to recognize it as just, important, and necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, both in the mother-country and in the colonies. He was not so ignorant of the history of the Church and the Order as not to be able to bring forward many theological reasons showing the expediency of and the necessity for the expulsion and even the suppression of the Society. He had realized years ago that its morals were so lax, indeed so perverse, that they would shame even the Koran. The reputation of the Order had been attacked by learned, zealous, and holy men. Its reputation exposed, it was of no profit either to a country or to the Church as a whole. The Templars and the Humiliati had also been suppressed without any legal process. Luckily he had no need to fear the charge of inconsistency, as he had never written to Rome in defence of the Society.¹

Not only the Bishops but also the heads of the various religious Orders sent circular letters to their subordinates inculcating strict adherence to the instructions contained in the Pragmatic Sanction.² Whereas some confined themselves

¹ “ *Havrá como tres meses, que en sujeto de mi caracter me manifestó el pensamiento, que ahora se ha puesto en execucion, añadiendo, que para authorizar la resolucion se solicitaria, que algunos obispos la pidiesen y motivasen, contando entre ellos al de Barcelona, Siguenza, Ávila, Tarazona, auxiliar de Valencia, Salamanca y otros de la escuela de los referidos. Como algunos obispos hallaron en ello algunos inconvenientes, y temieron que semejante peticion los havia de poner en descubierto, y de mala fe con la Silla Apostolica, me escribió el mismo sujeto, que ya no se pretendia que los obispos fuesen los authores de la resolucion que se meditava, y que esta estava tomada, bien que con el deseo y designio de que los obispos al calificasen de justificada, de importantisima, y aun necessaria para mantener la paz y tranquilidad de los reynos de uno y otro mundo . . . ” ([May 5, 1767], Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688).

² The *replies of the Heads of the Orders to the Government in the Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3513. A number of

to a simple admonition, others went further, glorifying the measures which had been taken against the Jesuits and inveighing against their teachings.¹ The more this type of letter won the approval of the Ministers,² the less it enhanced the reputation of the Orders. "Campomanes," wrote the Uditore Vincenti to Torrigiani on May 12th, 1767, "looks on the religious Orders as a strong support, but he has declared that he will take care to make them weak by separating them from each other, and they themselves provide him with the means of doing so. They could and should have been a strong support for the Church, but Your Excellency may judge from the enclosed circular letters which they were moved to write how little they are to be counted on in these days, seeing how easily they agree to follow and defend the doctrine (of the *potestas oeconomica*), of which on other occasions they have disapproved."³ Certain religious, deeming this opportunity of giving free rein to their dislike of their fallen rivals too good to be missed, wrote books and pamphlets in which they defended the measures taken by the authorities and violently attacked the Jesuit doctrines and conduct.⁴

these circular letters (printed) in Nunziat. di Spagna, 303 and 304, *loc. cit.*

¹ *Torrighiani to Vincenti, May 28, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433.

² " *Ai va otra enciclica de los Geronimos. Torrigiani rabiara de ver como se explican acá los Frailes y los Obispos " (Roda to Azara, May 18, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.). Cf. also Roda's *letter of April 28, 1767, *ibid.*

³ *Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*, and Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

⁴ " *Dé Vá al P. Lutre gracias por los libritos que me ha embiado sobre la doctrina de Pallavicino. Yo haré que se traduzca, e imprima esta obra que es muy util " (Roda to Azara, May 12, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.). Cf. *Roda to Azara, May 18, 1767, *ibid.* A royal decree of May 23, 1767 (printed; Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*) approves and recommends a book written by a Dominican against the doctrines of probabilism, regicide, and tyrannicide.

As was only to be expected, the great event was hailed with joyful acclamations by the Society's opponents, who saw their long-cherished desires realized at last. Roda wrote sardonically to Azara in Rome: "Between Wednesday and Friday the whole of Spain underwent the Cæsarean operation (*operación cesárea*). Since March 6th similar orders have been issued to all the Indies, so that we shall shortly be making you a handsome present of half a million (!) Jesuits, the cost of whose passage and lifelong sustenance we are paying."¹ A week later Roda was harking back to the successful "Cæsarean operation", and informing Azara that the Jesuits were already on their way to the ports "whence we will ship you this precious cargo".²

Tanucci, who had also been informed by Roda of the joyful event, overflowed with fulsome congratulations. Roda had ascribed part of the credit to him but he had not done much more than bring the conversation round from time to time to the maxims and behaviour of the Jesuits when he had the ear of the king. He had immediately attributed the March incidents to them and had reported as much as he could and to whom he could, and had not omitted to produce reasons and instances. For there was a system behind the Madrid revolt. But no ringleader was to be seen, nor grandee, nor soldier, nor party-leader, nor association, nor assembly—therefore it must be the confessional and visits to high-born ladies and influential women! Besides, in spite of the diversity of the revolts, firmness, obstinacy, and unity had been observed. So it could not have been the Franciscans, Dominicans, Carmelites, or other Religious—these did not intrigue but at the most abused the Government from time to time—it was undoubtedly the Jesuits, with their strict privacy, their inquisitiveness, their ambition, their spying, and their intrigues. They penetrated into every class of society, openly declared themselves as enemies of the Government, served the Court of Rome, and for similar deeds were in bad odour

¹ *Roda to Azara, April 7, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*

² *Roda to Azara, April 14, 1767, *ibid.*

in every corner of the globe.¹ To Bottari Tanucci wrote : " We must congratulate Spain and our good friend Don Manuel [Roda] on having at last achieved the expulsion of the Jesuits, for which he has worked so hard." ²

In a letter to Castromonte in Paris the Neapolitan Minister expressed himself in these words : " Though late indeed it has come at last, the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain—of these myrmidons of the Pope, the emissaries of Rome, the incendiaries of the State, the agitators of the people, the instigators of treachery, robbery, and contraband, and the professional teachers of rebellion. The king's fame will be great ; his successors will owe him their tranquillity, and the peoples their discipline, wealth, freedom, and a pure religion. I am glad that Your Excellency found it apt, the title I gave to Count Aranda—the ' Spanish Hercules '." ³

The Augustinian General Vasquez wrote jubilantly to Roda : " Let us sing to the Lord, for He is gloriously magnified in Spain by its purification from the reptiles harmful to body and soul. God bless Your Excellency and all who have helped in this pious work, and may He assist you with His divine grace to finish it entirely and prevent the evils that may arise

¹ *To Roda, April 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6000.

² " *E da congratularsi colla Spagna e col nostro buon amico Don Emanuel [Roda] per aver conseguita l'espulsione dei Gesuiti, sulla quale egli ha tanto lavorato . . . Di tutta questa storia mi è dispiaciuta l'inquietudine del buon Re di Spagna " (April 18, 1767, *ibid.*).

³ " Tardi, ma finalmente è venuta l'espulsione dei gesuiti dalla Spagna, cioè delli sbirri del Papa, degli emissari di Roma, degl' incendiari dello stato, delli sollevatori dei popoli, degli artefici dei tradimenti, dei latrocini, dei contrabandi, dei professori perpetui della sedizione. La gloria del Re sarà grande : li successori saranno al Re debitori della loro tranquillità, li popoli della disciplina, dei patrimoni, della libertà e della pura religione. . . . Mi pregio di che V. E. abbia trovato giusta la denominazione data da me d' ' Ercole Ispanico ' al conte d'Aranda " (April 18, 1767, *ibid.*).

in America. I always believed that a radical measure would be taken whereby the goal of annihilation would gradually be reached, but I never dreamt that such speedy action would be taken. I now see that unknowingly I was uttering a prophecy when, at the end of my circular letter, I wished my brethren a blessing in the words of St. Paul: 'The God of peace crush Satan under your feet speedily.' Some ingenious folk have pointed this out and it is a subject for merriment at Jansenist meetings. . . . Doubtless they will publish the history, or rather the proceedings, with the historical proofs, of the deeds by which the *Benemeriti* have brought their extermination on themselves."¹ He then enclosed a draft order for the diplomatic representatives, by which the king was to forbid all who were dependent on Spain to have any intercourse with the Jesuits.² On April 23rd Vasquez thanked Roda for the copies of the incomparable Pragmatic Sanction and the instruction, which in his judgment had been composed with the special enlightenment of God. Marefoschi too, he said, was highly delighted, calling it a success that would make the memory of Roda immortal.³ The Augustinian General awaited

¹ " *Cantemus Domino: gloriose enim magnificatus est [Exod. xv, 1] en España con haberse purgado de unas sabandijas enemigos de las almas y los cuerpos. . . . Ni por sueño pensé que se pudiese obrar con tanta velocidad. Ahora veo que sin saber lo que me decia pronostiqué un suceso en la benedicion que di a mis frayles al fin de la enciclica con S. Pablo: Deus pacis conterat Satanam sub pedibus vestris velociter [Romans, xvi, 20]. Ya han hecho esta reflexion algunos de los combinadores de cosas, y sirve de divertimento a las asambleas giansenisticas. . . . Yo no dudo que se dará al publico una historia o per mejor decir el proceso historiado con que se han merecido los que fueran Benemeritos su exterminio " (Vasquez to Roda [April 16, 1767], Biblioteca S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, vol. I.).

² This proposal was acted on; cf. below, p. 159, and above, p. 110.

³ " *Doy a V.E. mil y mil gracias por los exemplares de la incomparable Pragmatica e instruccion, que juzgo hechas con particular ilustracion de Dios " (Vasquez to Roda, April 23, 1767, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, vol. I.).

with impatience the arrival of the ships with the banished Jesuits, who would doubtless bring with them their overthrown Penates : that was to say, their avarice, their ambition, their love of slander, regicide, and all the rest of their vices, which up till then they had passed off as Christian principles. " God be praised for all eternity for having rid us of such a plague." ¹

According to Roda, the people accepted the expulsion of the Jesuits with calmness and approval ; ² even in turbulent Madrid sensible persons were quite happy about it, while the Jesuit supporters were silent and kept their sadness concealed. There was no disturbance anywhere. ³ Any public demonstration in favour of the exiles had in fact been made impossible by the Pragmatic Sanction, which ruled that any protest against the royal decree was high treason. But the people were not unmoved by what had taken place. It appears from eye-witnesses' accounts that in many places the departing Jesuits were accompanied for miles by the sympathetic populace. ⁴

These were the final words of the report made to the Pope by the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo shortly after the events

¹ *Vasquez to Roda, May 7, 1767, *ibid.*

² *Roda to Azara, April 7, 1757, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

³ **Id. to id.*, April 14, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ " *En efecto, habia concurrido todo el pueblo [of Santiago] en grandes pelotones a ser testigo de ella [expulsion], mas no con ánimo de resistir a las reales disposiciones, sino precisamente para contestar con sus llantos y sollozos el amor que profesaban a los Jesuitas, y el sentimiento con que su ausencia los dejaba " (ISLA, *Memorial*, 311). " *Scrive il P. Medina rettore del noviziato di Madrid da Cività Vecchia . . . che la commozione de' popoli in Spagna era stata grandissima e che non potevano immaginarsi tanto affetto che piangevano, s'inginocchiavano e chiedevano i ritagli delle lor vesti per reliquie " (Ricci, *Espulsione*, 44). Cf. *Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767. After the restoration of the Order (1814) over forty towns and other bodies petitioned the Government to readmit it into Spain (**Nota de las representaciones*, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3517, pp. 26-59).

had taken place : " That is all, Holy Father, that has happened until now, and I report it to Your Holiness in all sincerity, with the frank admission that all I have seen in these Religious is the exact observance of their rules and a fervent zeal for the greater glory of God and the spiritual progress of the faithful." ¹ In a letter to Count Mejorada a certain Marchese Valle demanded that the *Cortes* of the whole realm should assemble on some pretext or other, to correct the great evils that were then rampant. There was not a citizen's or noble's family, he declared, that was not affected by these scandalous proceedings. Virtue and learning were being driven out of Spain. " Though subjects of a just king, we are actually slaves to the tyrannical passions of his Ministers." ²

The nuncio Pallavicini had been purposely kept in ignorance by the Government of the progress of the secret inquiry. ³

¹ " *Esto es, SS^{mo} Padre, lo que hasta ahora ha ocurrido, y quanto sincerisimamente hago presente a Va S^d con la mas fiel confesion, de que en estos Religiosos nunca he observado mas que una exacta aplicacion al cumplimiento de su Instituto, y un fervoroso celo para el maior culto de Dios y aprovechamiento espiritual de los fieles " (April 4, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777). On the *copy of the letter is a note : " N.B. En el pliego de Mons. Nuncio para el card. Torrigiani." Cf. *Azpuru to Roda, May 28, 1767, *ibid.*, 667 ; *Azpuru to Grimaldi [undated], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Sobre la expulsion de los PP. Jesuitas," 1767 ; *Roda to Azpuru, June 16, 1767, *ibid.*, Reales Ordenes, 47.

² *Alcántara, April 14, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3513. In forwarding the letter to Aranda, De la Mejorada remarked that the name Valle was a pseudonym and that the letter did not come from Alcántara but from Andalusia (*April 22, 1767, *ibid.*).

³ " Roda, De lo que debia decirse al Papa, en consulta del Consejo extraordinario de Enero 29 de 1767," in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 628. " *Non sarebbe nè difficile, nè strano che io venissi costà accusato, perchè non ho fatto uso della lettera di S. Stà dei 22 Gennaio. V. E^{za} e S. Stà sanno, perchè non l'ho fatto. Gli stessi principali interessati nel grande avvenimento non lo hanno scoperto, o non me hanno informato. Non ne ho avuto

It was not until everything was over that he was allowed to make his report to Rome.¹ His letters were more or less a reproduction of the charges brought against the Jesuits.² When he complained of the arbitrary treatment of a religious society by the secular power, he had been told by the Minister that in virtue of his sovereign authority the king had the right to take such an administrative measure. The royal confessor, Osma, from whom the nuncio had hoped to obtain an explanation of the current rumours, had misled him and had kept the truth from him, being bound by his oath of secrecy.³ Everything had been done by the Government to deceive the Jesuits too about their actual situation. Even

sentore per veruna di quelle altre indagini che praticavo. Quella unione de' consiglieri che seguiva in casa del sig. conte di Aranda, nel pubblico si chiamava giunta, e non consiglio, ed in questo supposto ni uno si figurava che ad una giunta si fosse per cometersi ed affidarsi interamente una risoluzione simile, ad esclusione del consiglio. . . . Quelli che la sapevano o la conducevano, hanno, come può credere, usato tutti gli artifici imaginabili per allontanare da me ogni sospetto" (Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767).

¹ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, April 1, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*

² *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, April 1 and 7, 1767, *ibid.* (the letter of April 7, 1767, is also in the Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767, and Estado, 5044).

³ " *Il P. Confessore, come già le scrissi [April 21, *ibid.*], è in colpa di aver tenuto a bada l'Eminenza Vostra con le sue restrizioni mentali, e con la sua equivoca condotta" (Torrighiani to Pallavicini, April 30, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*, and Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767). On August 6, 1767, *Torrighiani instructed the new nuncio Lucini to make use of Osma's services, " sebbene potremo noi grandemente querelarci, e imputare a codesto Religioso l'aver addormentato il sig. card. Pallavicini nel grande affare della espulsione, e trattenerlo da quelli passi, che egli col suo zelo, e cogli impulsi, che ne avea da S.S^{ta}, avrebbe fatti" (Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*, and Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767).

in the final weeks Aranda had shown several signs of friendship towards certain Jesuits, Idiaquez and his former teacher Martinez, for example. In the Government's view, the Jesuits, embittered by the systematic exclusion of their pupils from public and ecclesiastical offices, had fostered discontent among high and low, probably by way of the confessional and by private conversation. Presumably this view was substantiated by the evidence collected by the Fiscal. He knew, of course, that no accused person was condemned merely as the result of information laid against him, without being heard or legally defended, but in the Pragmatic Sanction the expulsion was represented as an administrative measure, not as a judicial punishment. If the Pope was intending to refer to the matter, or to the doctrine of the Jesuits, which indirectly was declared to be very bad, extreme caution was advisable. The Fiscal's careful and meticulously accurate mode of procedure, the king's deep-rooted judgment, his extraordinary piety, and the number and unanimity of the considered opinions, all vouched for the monarch's having taken these steps in the conviction that they were absolutely necessary. He had taken exemplary proceedings against the whole body, and not against individual culprits, being of the opinion that to draw a distinction between the guilty and the innocent would only have caused a serious disturbance of his own and the public peace. Another consideration was that the banishment of the Jesuits had been advised by not a few theologians and at least two Bishops. The king was also convinced that some of his secular advisers who had given him the same counsel were former supporters of the Jesuits, Count Aranda, for example, who had been brought up by them and had consistently maintained friendly relations with his teacher Martinez. But in making these remarks he himself had no intention whatever of deciding whether or not the Jesuits were really guilty. He knew that the lack of any defence could be cited in their favour and that the opinions of the theologians, Bishops, and Ministers had only as much value as the evidence on which they were based. The obscurity and indefiniteness of the expressions used in the Pragmatic

Sanction were purposely chosen to avoid the objections which were raised against the documents composed by Pombal and the French Parlements, so that in this case the king's first word might, if possible, be his last.¹ The blow was all the more destructive for the Society of Jesus because it came from a monarch who was so just, religious, virtuous, and discerning. "For if it is true that members of the Order have meddled in State affairs, I know not how they can be exonerated from all guilt, or how one can condemn those who have them removed because they despair of their improvement." And so he again advised caution. In his reply the Pope might complain in a loving and tender fashion about the scanty confidence placed in him by the king, and ask him to relieve him of his distress and to tell him in confidence what had been discovered about the doings of the Jesuits, so that he could handle the matter and be of help with a full knowledge of the facts.

As can be seen from these words of the nuncio, in which one can hear the voice of his cousin Grimaldi, Pallavicini, despite his former assurances,² was inclining towards the view that the charges against the Jesuits were not entirely unfounded. In fact, in his first report on the expulsion (of April 1st) he went so far as to say that what he had heard led him to believe that the Jesuits had deserved their punishment, so that he could say nothing to the Government about it. Shortly after April 7th Pallavicini fell seriously ill³ and the business

¹ " *Questa medesima oscurità, siccome i vaghi termini usati nella Pragmatica per evitare le contradizioni e le critiche che incontrarono gli scritti di Carvalho e quelli del Parlamento di Francia, è per fare che la prima parola di S. M. C. che suona nel pubblico su questa materia, sia, se è possibile, e la prima e la ultima " (*ibid.*).

² See above, pp. 64, 65.

³ The copy of Vincenti's *letter to Torrigiani, of April 14, 1767 (Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767), is marked " Hipolito Vincenti por indisposicion del Nuncio al card. Torrigiani ". *Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 27, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*

of the nunciature was taken over by his secretary, Count Vincenti. The Brief to Charles III., which the nuncio himself had asked for, was not delivered, since, as Vincenti reported, it would certainly have been rejected, for the Government already knew of it and the king was assured on all sides that the measure he had taken was not beyond his competency. The monarch's object was not to punish an individual but to ensure his own peace and that of his States, and there was overwhelming evidence that this was endangered or at least called in question by the Jesuits.¹ The other charges brought by the Secretary against the banished Jesuits, which seemed to him to leave no doubt about their guilt, originated, according to his own account, with someone in the confidence of the Fiscal Campomanes.² The Secretary thought it worth while repeating to the Cardinal Secretary of State such old wives' tales as that a casket had been found in the Colegio Imperial in Madrid, containing some chains, a powder, and a piece of paper with the words: "Chains and ashes from the eyes of Don John of Austria," the Jesuits, of course, having torn out his eyes. Then there were letters that had passed between Jesuits in Spain and America in which they had discussed a plan to stir up a revolt in America so as to obtain possession of part of the colonies.³ Although these letters were used for the most part purely as references it is easy to

¹ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

² " *Intorno a' gesuiti, persona confidente del sig. Campomanes ha riferito di aver inteso dal medesimo che i detti Padri erano convinti di complicità nel tumulto dell' anno scorso, anche per deposizione di sei di loro: dicesi che consti similmente dal processo che sieno stati i principali autori della sedizione di Saragozza, e che siensi incontrate in quelle lor case varie minute originali de' pasquini e notificazioni messe al publico " (Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 27, 1767, *ibid.*).

³ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 21, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767. Cf. *Vincenti to Torrigiani, June 30, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*

see in which direction the nuncio's opinions were tending. On August 25th, 1767, Lucini, Pallavicini's successor, reported that in Madrid the banishment of the Jesuits was accepted as an accomplished fact and was discussed either not at all or in the manner of Count Vincenti.¹ Both Pallavicini and Vincenti had to be told by the Cardinal Secretary of State that no credit was given to these rumours in Rome and that the guilt of the Jesuits was not considered to have been proved.² The blind obedience for which the Jesuits had hitherto been blamed was now commanded to be shown by subjects towards their sovereign.

Naturally the news of the banishment of the Jesuits from

¹ *Lucini to Torrigiani, August 25, 1767, *ibid.*

² “ *Ieri sera ricevemmo il difuso dispaccio dell' Em^{za} Va de' 7 stante, il quale in sostanza contiene un concetto ben differente di quello che qui si è concepito da S. Stà riguardo all' espulsione de' gesuiti dai domini di Spagna. Senza entrare a discutere la probabilità delle vane e vaghe presunzioni e congetture che si possono pensare sopra un fatto sì strepitoso, sarà sempre vero che i gesuiti sono ora condannati senza esser stati uditi, che per pochi o molti dei colpevoli vengono puniti tutti gli altri innocenti; che quando un solo innocente vi fosse, ingiustizia sarebbe il soggettarlo all' infamia e all' esilio, che in tanto il danno, che ne soffrono la religione ed il pubblico in codesti domini, specialmente nell' Indie, è grandissimo ” (Torrighiani to Pallavicini, April 23, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*). “ *Nuovamente mi assecura il conte Vicenti che niuno ormai dubita più delle reità de' gesuiti, ma quali elleno sieno, e su quali fondamenti si appoggino, non lo esprime; tutto si riduce al ' si dice o si pretende ', le voci sono varie, diverse e incostanti, come si rileva anche dalle pubbliche straniere gazette; costà tutto si suppone a disfavore de' gesuiti, perchè niuno è che possa difenderli, e forse niuno che si possa dispensare dallo discreditarli. . . . Si vuole che i sudditi prestino al sovrano quella cieca ubbidienza che si è finora condannata nei gesuiti rispetto al loro generale. . . . Le lettere circolari che sonosi pubblicate da alcuni vescovi e superiori regolari, abbastanza manifestanò un tale principio ” (Torrighiani to Lucini, August 16, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*).

strictly Catholic Spain caused a great stir abroad. Its reception varied. Whereas in England voices were raised against the Draconian measures, in Lisbon and Paris the banishment was hailed as a great and noble deed.¹ On May 9th the Paris Parlement published the resolution proposed by the Abbé Chauvelin to print and distribute throughout the country the Spanish Pragmatic Sanction of April 2nd, 1767. As reported by the Secretary to the embassy, Magallon, more than 40,000 copies of the French translation had already been distributed by April 24th. According to Choiseul, Louis XV. is said to have remarked that the guilt of the Spanish Jesuits must certainly have been very great to have impelled the king to take such a decisive step.³ But the French monarch did not express himself so definitely to his nephew, Duke Ferdinand of Parma. "I do not know," he wrote, but that he [the king] would not have done better first to punish the guilty severely, if there are any, for now there remains

¹ " *Solo los Ingleses han blasfemado y Carvalho hizo al consul ingles una amonestacion terrible. Los Ingleses y Romanos son del mismo sistema politico en el dia de hoy " (Roda to Azara, May 12, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.). " *De Paris y Lisboa escriben mil aplausos y de esta ultima corte dicen, que se han explicado contra nuestra providencia los Ingleses. Vea Ud que apoyo para Roma, que ha dado enfavorecer a Londres, y aliarse con los Protestantes " (Roda to Azara, April 28, 1767, *ibid.*). Masserano maintained that the news of the expulsion had been received with universal joy (*to Grimaldi, April 23, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6994).

² *To Roda, April 24, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet. Soc. Iesu, Madrid, Chamartin, P; *Roda to Azara, May 18, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*; *Vasquez to Roda, June 4, 1767, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, Vol. I.; *Azara to Grimaldi, June 4, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044. Chauvelin's speech in an Italian translation in the *Inquietudini de' Gesuiti*, III. (1767), Aggiunta alla Raccolta di Spagna. *Ibid.* the *Arrêt* of May 9.

³ *Choiseul to Ossun, April 21, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667. Cf. Choiseul to Aubeterre, April 21, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 400 *seq.*

a certain obscurity which will give rise to objections, although he has strictly forbidden them." ¹

In Vienna the news caused no little surprise.² During the secret investigation the Court had made inquiries of the General of the Order, through the Jesuit Liesganig, as to the precise nature of the serious offences which had caused such an unprecedented action. The General could only assure him that no offence of any importance committed by a Spanish Jesuit had come to his ears. Apart from the banishment of Calatayud and Lopez, the ban on missions in the Basque country, and the distribution of apologetic works without the permission of the authorities, nothing of an incriminating nature had as yet been reported to him or to the Papal Curia. Their Majesties might judge for themselves if these things were of such a nature as to call for the heaviest punishment possible.³ The Empress also had been little convinced of

¹ *Letter of April 27, 1767, Ducal Private Archives in Parma, Francia. The measures taken by the Spanish Government met with severe criticism even among the French freethinkers. D'Alembert wrote to Voltaire on May 4, 1767: " Ne pensez-vous pas qu'on devait permettre aux Jésuites de se justifier, surtout quand on doit être sûr qu'ils ne le peuvent pas? Ne pensez-vous point encore, qu'il serait très-injuste de les faire tous mourir de faim, si un seul frère coupe-chou s'avise d'écrire bien ou mal en leur faveur?" (CARAYON, XV., xlvi.).

² *Mahony to Grimaldi, April 30, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3518; *the Palatine envoy Von Ritter to the Minister of State Wachtendonk, May 16, 1767, State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz, 26/3.

³ *Ricci to Fr. Liesganig, January 10, 1767, *Epist. Gen. secretae*, in Jesuit possession. Ricci ends with the words: " Denum quid nobis in Hispania quid alibi futurum sit, Deus novit, tanta certe est adversariorum nostrorum violentia, fraudes tantae, ut non nisi Deo singulariter opitulante possimus evadere, cum optimos etiam et potentiores in fraudem et errorem inducant et a nobis aversos reddant. Caeterum Dei est potentia, Dei est regnum, ipse est super omnes gentes, ipse dabit pacem in diebus nostris, quia non est alius, qui pugnet pro nobis, nisi Deus noster " (*ibid.*).

the justice or expediency of the step by the vague wording of the Pragmatic Sanction or the explanations of the Spanish ambassador.¹

On May 14th Ricci was informed by the Pope of the alleged reasons for the expulsion: serious abuses in the American missions, against which the General had taken no action, illicit trading, and provocation, by means of satirical writings, of the disorders in Saragossa.² In the matter of the last charge, however, in the account of the rising which was published by official authority the Jesuits were commended for having done their best, in co-operation with other Religious, to bring the disturbances to an end.³ In reply to the first charge the General observed that no complaint about abuses of a grave or general character had ever been made to him or the Pope.⁴ The vague accusation of forbidden trading was

¹ *December 26 [1767]. "Alla mezza dopo mezzo giorno, ricevo l'udienza dall'Imperatrice ... Io qui glieli [the Jesuits] raccomandai in nome del Papa ... ed Ella: non poter mai capire le ragioni che possan aver le altre corti, poter però ella dire di trovare ad esser di loro contenta; esser essi utili, e se anno come uomini anch' essi dei difetti, e quello di un po intriganti se si lascian fare, basta corregerli a tempo, ed han difetti che avrebbe ciascun d'altra Religione. Confessare d'esser Ella e la sua casa per così dire come da essi educati, per ciò anco un po prevenuta, ma esser altresì vero di aver ne meno con ciò scoperto quel male che loro si imputa. Non cangierà perciò d'esser loro favorevole fin che crederà continuare come fanno ora a meritarselo, nè si lascerà trasportar dalla piena loro contraria" (Diario del card. Visconti, Nunziat. di Germania, 394, fasc. C, Papal Secret Archives).

² RICCI, **Espulsione*, 37-9.

³ SEBASTIAN Y LATRE, *Relacion individual y veridica del suceso acontecido en la ciudad de Zaragoza* . . . p. 52. King Charles authorized the Archbishop to go to the Jesuit College and thank the Fathers. The prelate appeared in full ceremonial dress to execute his task (RICCI, **Espulsione*, 14).

⁴ "Unicamente los Regulares de la Compañía de Jesús (merced a los hermanos que de continuo les iban de Europa, y a la facultad de expulsar de su seno a los que alteraban la armonía del Instituto)

rejected by Ricci as a calumny; isolated and exceptional cases had been dealt with by himself with all possible severity. Moreover, he asked with justice, why was it that the Government, which intervened in everything else, issued no prohibition against it? Why had the Bishops not opposed the trading? The evidence that had been produced was hardly sound. Even if it was true that three million *reales* in cash had been found in the Colegio Imperial in Madrid,¹ it was nothing extraordinary, seeing that it was the residence of the procurators of the four Spanish and seven American Provinces, who had to administer the funds of more than a hundred colleges and make purchases for the missions overseas. The existence of a fund of one million *reales* in the college of Salamanca could be explained just as simply. The Castilian Province having no fund for the maintenance of its scholastics, each house had to make an annual subscription. For years past sums of money had been set aside for the purpose of building up the desired capital fund.

The letter sent by Charles III. to Tanucci on the day of the expulsion² is couched in the same vague terms as his public edicts. That the ejection had proceeded without disturbance appeared to the king to be an obvious manifestation of the divine assistance. He therefore asked the Minister to join him in giving thanks to the Lord.³ He spoke more clearly to his confidant on May 19th, when he wrote of how his personal safety and that of the whole royal family had

se singularizaban por la pureza de las costumbres, por el arte de atraer a la cultura a los Indios. Todos los autores catolicos y protestantes exceptúan a los Jesuitas cuando hablan de la conducta escandalosa de las comunidades monasticas en el Nuevo Mundo. Los autores de las 'Noticias secretas' los celebran mucho" (FERRER DEL RIO, I., 441). Cf. also *Fray Pedro Jos. Parras to J. Andrés on December 27, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777.

¹ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 27, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, Papal Secret Archives.

² *March 31, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6056.

³ *April 7, 1767, *ibid.*

been endangered by the Jesuits. Tanucci and the Court confessor Latilla had certainly not exaggerated the danger in their reports to the young king of Naples. From what he had seen and what he had never wished to see, they had, if anything, fallen short of the truth.¹

A perusal of the king's letter to Tanucci of June 23rd, 1767, leaves the reader with the impression that he has struck a trail which might lead to the disclosure of the reasons the monarch had "locked away in his royal breast". He speaks here of confidential revelations made by the Minister to the young Ferdinand IV. on the strength of his letter of June 12th. From the words quoted he sees that he has been rightly understood. It would take too long to tell him everything; besides, he would also have to have the numerous documents in front of him. He has therefore instructed the Minister Roda to write and tell him of everything that has been discovered in Spain and that is still being discovered day by day.²

It was hoped that Roda's letter to Tanucci of the same date (June 23rd) would throw some light on the confidential information to which the king had alluded, but it proves to be nothing but a long speech for the prosecution. The Minister prefaces his remarks by stating that in spite of the strict silence that had been imposed he would relate, by order of his royal master, the causes of the expulsion and the way in which it was carried out. With princely clemency the monarch had pardoned those who had been guilty of the rebellion but, for his own justification and out of love for his subjects, he had given orders that the causes and the origin of these widespread disorders were to be definitely established. The investigations of the Privy Council had shown that the chief, indeed the only, originators of the conflagration were the Jesuits. They had aroused the passions of all classes

¹ *Letters of May 19 and June 2, 1767, *ibid.* Cf. *letter of August 4, 1767, *ibid.*, 6057.

² *Original, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6056; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 70.

of the people by printing and distributing rebellious pamphlets, by preaching sermons against Portugal and France, by inciting nuns, by casting doubts on the orthodoxy of the king and his Ministers, by threats and prophecies of disasters both before and after the rebellion, by complaints about the degradation of their partisans and their exclusion from public offices, and by their murmurings against all Government ordinances which ran contrary to their ideas and wishes. Their immorality, their slackness, their shady business-dealings, their intrigues—in short, all the charges which their foes had brought against them—had been confirmed by fresh, incontrovertible cases. Their hatred of the Bourbons, their dislike of the Family Compact, their attachment to the English, by whom they wished France to be suppressed, their trust in the Protestant princes, whom they preferred to the Catholic ones, and a whole host of other facts, abominable in themselves and contrary to religious discipline, had been established in an irrefutable manner. Adopting the proposal of the Extraordinary Council, in which to set his conscience at rest he had included ecclesiastical dignitaries, the monarch had decided on the banishment of the Jesuits and the confiscation of their property. The proposal was based on motives of justice and the dictates of conscience, also on the unavoidable duty of the sovereign to maintain peace and order among his people and to destroy the seeds of disunion. In addition, there were the opinions of the learned and virtuous prelates and highly-placed persons who had examined this weighty matter with the utmost impartiality. Their unanimous opinion compelled the king to take the measure which had since been put into effect. Finally, Roda offered to send Tanucci the *Monita secreta* with which he might enlighten the young prince still further on the subject of the Jesuits.¹

It seems therefore to be a fact that the king had been induced by Ministers or Court officials to believe that his life was threatened by a Jesuit conspiracy. The French ambassador Ossun reported to the Duc de Choiseul that the

¹ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 636 *seqq.*

king had told him that he had taken the decision because the Jesuits had plotted a murderous attack on him, intending to assassinate him and all his family when they were visiting the Holy Sepulchres on Maundy Thursday and that he owed his escape only to the lucky chance that the revolt broke out prematurely on Palm Sunday.¹ The same accusation was communicated by Charles III. through Prince Cattolica to Tanucci,² so that he in his turn could bring it to the knowledge of the young Ferdinand IV.

In order to refute this serious accusation, the Jesuit General Ricci pointed out that when Navarro, the Rector of the Colegio Imperial, received an anonymous letter requiring him under threats to take part in a fresh revolt, he had immediately passed the letter on to Count Aranda, who had consequently had the guards strengthened. The assumption that this was a trap laid for the Jesuits by the prime movers of the expulsion is not entirely unfounded.³ In the protocols of the Extraordinary Council the accusation of a regicidal plot was not made in so blunt a form, and it is scarcely feasible that any of the Ministers really believed in its existence. At any rate, according to Aranda's admission, the expulsion of the Jesuits had not been caused by any dark and murderous conspiracies, but by the general conviction that the Order was ill-suited to the times.⁴

¹ FERRER DEL RIO, II., 181 *seq.*, 182, n. 1. Cf. *Vincenti to Torrigiani, June 23, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*; *Fuentes to Grimaldi, dated Paris, 1767, May 8 [13], Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565; *Ayres Sa e Mello to Grimaldi, May 9, 1767, *ibid.*, 7280. Cf. RICCI, **Espulsione*, 46, 48.

² On May 5, 1767, in FERRER DEL RIO, II., 182, n. 1; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 60.

³ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 46.

⁴ Aranda to Fr. Isidro Lopez, dated Paris, 1775, July 3, in *Razón y Fe*, XXIX. (1911), 177, n. 1. The Jesuit pupil Fernan-Núñez writes in his biography of Charles III. (p. 209): "Toca á los soberanos y á sus Ministros decidir si el respeto á la religión y al trono se han aumentado ó disminuido desde entonces. Yo sólo debo decir, en honor de la verdad, que me crié con ellos,

Perhaps the most penetrating criticism to which the Pragmatic Sanction was subjected is to be found in a supposed extract from a London newspaper of May 6th, 1767. Every supporter of the natural and social law, we read here, must be outraged by so tyrannical a procedure. Even if the Jesuits were atheists, traitors, or devils in human form, as members of the body politic they ought not to have been detached from it without strict proof that they were so corrupt as fully to deserve this separation. If a prince can dispose of any particular body of persons just as he pleases, without giving any other reason than his own will, certain secret deliberations, and causes known only to himself, what is left of the security of the law? To demand a dumb and unprotesting acquiescence in such a secret procedure, under pain of being treated as guilty of high treason, and deliberately and arbitrarily to suspend all the laws opposing such a procedure—this is, in fact, to exercise a power which no nation that has not lost all sense of law, justice, and humanity can accept. The Almighty has never placed such a power in the hands of one of His creatures, for the whole purpose of the divine laws is the exercise of justice and mercy. With equal right the King of Spain might, by means of a similar secret and arbitrary act, banish any Order, or even any civic community, and confiscate their property. Everyone knows very well that the Spanish constitution, like our own, derives from the Gothic one. We also know that the father of the present king was preferred as successor to the throne on condition that he cared for the welfare of the nation and maintained the Spanish possessions undiminished. At that time, therefore, these peoples had the real and acknowledged right to think and to care for themselves; now, on the contrary, they are told

por orden y á expensas del Rey, como se ha visto en la introducción, y que cuantas máximas me enseñaron se fundan en uno y otro, y en verter por su defensa la última gota di mi sangre, si quiero vivir y morir con honor y gozar de gloria en este mundo y en el otro, sin que jamás les haya oído nada que directa ó indirectamente lo contradiga.”

that it is not for subjects to judge or discuss the orders of the sovereign. In other words they are reduced to the status of miserable slaves. These Jesuits have fathers, brothers, and blood-relations among all classes and ranks in Spain who are forbidden to inquire into the reasons for their banishment and spoliation, and at the same time the order has gone forth that every natural feeling of affection for them is to be buried in silence and obscurity.¹ This article, which according to the assertions of the Spanish envoy Masserano was not to be found in a London newspaper,² made so deep an impression that the Extraordinary Council had itself to deal with the matter.³ Every Spanish envoy was instructed to collect every copy he could lay his hands on. It was also resolved to publish anonymously a reasoned contradiction of it and together with France to work for the total suppression of the Jesuits, so as to put an end once for all to every kind of unrest and intrigue.⁴

An unintentional vindication of the Spanish Jesuits and an indication of the most fundamental cause of their expulsion are to be found in a letter from the free-thinking Minister Du Tillot to Azara. "I see," he wrote just before the impending expulsion, "that the philosophic spirit is steadily increasing. It is making headway in Spain as almost everywhere else in the Catholic world. It will make progress in Italy too, for it has already pushed forward in many places, such as Venice, Turin, Florence, Naples, and Genoa. But you will also see before a century has passed that, after it has first engaged itself in jurisdictional questions with Rome, it will extend to the civil and political domain of Governments. Men will try to bargain about their freedom and the limits of their obedience, and government will be more and more

¹ **Estratto delle Gazzette di Londra dei 6 Maggio 1767. Lettera indirizzata allo stampatore delle medesime.* Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

² *Roda to Aranda, July 27 and October 27, 1767, *ibid.*

³ **Consejo extraordinario*, August 23, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *Roda to Grimaldi, September 3, 1767, *ibid.*

difficult. The present discussions in France are steps towards breaking one link of the chains and fetters. Mental enlightenment does not take place without an attempt to open the way to freedom. Already several books, such as the *Contrat social*, contain ideas and principles which in time will cause the Ministries disquiet and apprehension. Despotie governments will feel it keenly. I could say much more on this point." ¹

The reasons given by the king for the expulsion of the Jesuits were the maintenance of obedience, peace, and justice, and other motives "which he was locking away in his royal breast". We now know from archival documents that this obscure expression was purposely chosen in order to forestall any discussion about the soundness or emptiness of the charges, but at the time when it was uttered, taken in conjunction with the fixed resolve with which Charles III. was working for the suppression of the Order, it gave rise to the most varied conjectures. It was thought that only reasons of a personal nature could have impelled the king to assume such a harsh attitude.

¹ " *Veo, come V. S. dice, que el espiritu philosophico va haziendo progressos. Los haze tambien en España, en fin en todo el mundo catholico, quasi. Los hará despues en Italia, pues ya ha adelantado en la mayor parte de ella, Venezia, Turin, Florenzia, Napoles, Genova. Pero verá N. S. que antes de un siglo ese espiritu, despues de haverse exercitado sobre materias de jurisdiccion en la clase que ha relacion con Roma, se estenderá a lo civil y politico en los gobiernos. Los hombres querrán tratar de su libertad y de los limites de su obediencia, el governo será mas arduo. Vea V. S. que lo que se discute en Francia, son pasos a romper algun pedazo de vinculos y cadenas. Las mentes no se iluminarán sin que se busque a abrir carrera a la libertad. Muchos escritos, como el 'Contrato social', van ya conteniendo maximas y principios, que con el tiempo alarmarán los ministerios. El gobierno despotico se sentirá de ello. Avria mucho que decir sobre este punto " (March 8, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma" 1767). "Tous les livres si sévèrement défendus à Paris, entrent librement en Espagne," wrote Voltaire to Villetelle on May 1, 1768, *Œuvres*, LX., 470.

Every attempt to make him suspicious of the Jesuits and thus to bring about their expulsion, having been frustrated, it is said, by the king's unshakeable love of justice, the enemies of the Society had recourse to an underhand trick. One evening, while the community of the Colegio Imperial in Madrid were engaged as usual in reciting the litany, a man came to the gate with a message for the rector. Navarro, the rector, told the porter to put it on the table in his room. After the litany the community went into the refectory for supper. During the meal two members of the Council suddenly appeared in the house and in the name of the Court demanded the key of the rector's room, which they had orders to search. After a brief apparent search they lit on the letter, still unopened, and took it away with them. In the letter it was said that Charles III. was not a legitimate son of Philip V. but the issue of a criminal liaison between his mother Elizabeth Farnese and the Cardinal Minister Alberoni. Consequently he was not a legitimate prince and the throne belonged to his brother Don Luis. This letter was laid before the king. Deeply hurt in his personal honour and filial piety, the monarch was henceforward determined to eject every Jesuit from his realm. In order not to compromise his honour and his mother's he employed in his decree the ambiguous phrase already mentioned.¹

¹ Anselm von Eckart in MURR, *Journal*, IX., 217-222. The substitution of the letters is described as a fact by CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, III.³, 237 *seqq.*; COLOMBET, *Histoire de la suppression des Jésuites*, II., 5 *seqq.*; SCHOELL, *Cours d'histoire*, XXXIX., 163; CARAYON, XV., *Préface*, XVII, *seqq.*; RAVIGNAN, I., 185 *seqq.*, II., 337; *Colección de los artículos de La Esperanza*³, Madrid, 1858, 438 *seq.*; LÉTOURVILLE, *Ravignan et ses contradicteurs*, 25 *seqq.*; MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 143; NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 158 *seq.*; GALLERANI-MADARIAGA, 163 *seqq.*; *Razón y Fe*, XIX. (1907), 505 *seqq.* Besides Murr the following also are cited as authorities: LAFUENTE, *Historia de España*, P. III., 1.8, c.8; COXE, *España bajo el reinado de la casa de Borbon*, IV., 171; SISMONDI, *Histoire des Français*, XXIX., 370; *Ami de la religion*, XXXII., 159; ADAM, *Histoire d'Espagne*, IV., 271; CANTÙ,

Even at first sight the picaresque character of this story inspires little confidence, and when its historical background is examined it loses all trace of trustworthiness. Although the secret documents (*reservada*) in the archives of Simancas and Madrid have been well searched by historians of the most varied convictions, no trace has yet been found of the planted letter or any allusion to it.¹ The disappearance of the prosecutory part of the Consulta of January 29th, 1767, proves nothing to the contrary, as this can be explained in another way. Further, no historian has ever accused Elizabeth Farnese of marital infidelity. It was in fact the unspotted

Storia dei cent' anni 1750-1850, I., Firenze, 1851, 165; DÖLLINGER-HORTIG, II., 2 (1826), 798. The authenticity of the trick is not accepted by SAINT-PRIEST, 57; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 123, n. 1; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 82 *seq.*; SYDNEY SMITH, in *The Month*, C (1902), 26; ROUSSEAU, I., 218 *seq.*

¹ Even Charles III.'s letter to Tanucci of August 4, 1767, affords no conclusive proof of the authenticity of the story about the faked letter. Tanucci *wrote to Charles III. on July 14, 1767, (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100), that the Prince of San Nicandro had asked him: "se era vero, che la congiura era di lasciar intatto il solo signor infante Don Luigi, perchè in tal caso avrebbe concluso, che di V. M. e della sua real prole fossero li Gesuiti nemici, e si potrebbe trattare colle regole della giustizia, esaminate che fossero bene le prove di delitto si grande." The king replied: "*Y por lo que me dizes que el tal te preguntó si hera cierto lo que se decia de mi hermano, te diré que creo que huviera tenido la misma suerte que todos los demas, si Dios no huviese puesto su santa mano, y que han sido infinitas las calumnias que los mismos esparcieron, y levantaron despues de lo sucedido a mi pobre madre que goze de Dios, y a el tambien para poner cizania, y division entre nosotros, ya que no avian podido lograr lo que querian, pero por gracia de Dios tampoco lo lograron, y se puso en claro la verdad, la inocencia, y su maldad" (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6057). The calumnies against his mother which the king ascribed to the Jesuits probably originated in the talk that the Fathers were putting it about that the money for the uprising came from the Queen-Mother's apartments. Cf. above, p. 75.

family life of the first three Bourbons that helped to establish their dynasty in Spain.¹ The earliest reports of the mysterious story of the letter appear in 1780, that is to say, thirteen or fourteen years after the supposed incident, and there are various versions of it.² According to one account, the letter purported to have been written by the General of the Order, Ricci³; according to another version it was a manuscript for a book that was folded in letter-form and was accompanied by a letter.⁴ The addressee is given alternatively as the rector of the Colegio Imperial and as the Provincial.⁵ Two unnamed Dominicans are mentioned as the writers of the book and the letter.⁶ The Duke of Alba is said to have admitted on his death-bed that he originated the supposed letter from Ricci.⁷ Another account has it that Choiseul was the author.⁸ Others assert that a Portuguese of the name of Perez composed the letter and that it was translated into Spanish by the Dominican Mañalich.⁹

There is still another version which is entirely different. Two Fathers from the Province of Quito on their way to a Congregation of Procurators in Rome had chosen the route through Madrid. When about to cross the Spanish-French frontier at Figueras they were stopped by a captain of the Swiss regiment (in March, 1767), their baggage was searched, and a packet was found bearing the seal of the nunciature and the inscription *Il Nunzio*. The letters were sent to Madrid

¹ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 82 *seq.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 123, n. 1.

² In MURR, *loc. cit.* Cordara makes no mention of the letter-story.

³ CRÉTINEAU-JOLY (*loc. cit.*), RAVIGNAN (*loc. cit.*), and others.

⁴ MURR, *loc. cit.*; NONELL, *loc. cit.*

⁵ TERMANINI, **Vita del R. P. Lorenzo Ricci*, in Jesuit possession, MS. No. 28. Cf. LUENGO, *Diario*, XIX., 388, in NONELL, 159, n. 2; CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, COXE, SPERANZA, *loc. cit.*

⁶ MURR, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ SCHOELL, COXE, CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *loc. cit.*

⁹ NONELL, *loc. cit.*

and the Fathers were held under arrest in a convent at Gerona. One of them, Larrain, died here only six months later, and it was not until nine years had passed that the other, Recio, was allowed to take up his residence in Italy.¹ Up to this point the account is in accordance with the historical facts.

But the interpretation of these facts is quite another matter. After his release from arrest Recio had been in Rome some considerable time when one day a former fellow-Jesuit entered his room and asked him if he still remembered the incident at Figueras and the packet of letters inscribed *Il Nunzio*. On his replying in the affirmative the Father showed him a letter in which it was stated that Pombal had admitted in his trial that it had been he who had enclosed in a packet with the nunciature's seal the letter about Charles III.'s illegitimate birth and had had it handed to the two Procurators for delivery in Rome. Recio could no longer remember clearly who it was who had actually handed him the packet but he was inclined to think that he had received it from the Provincial Mourin, who had earnestly requested him to guard it carefully.

Nothing is known of any such admission on Pombal's part. On the other hand, it is a fact that the Spanish Government was at great pains to spy on all the nunciature's correspondence as is still shown by the numerous copies of letters in Simancas. Knowing that in spite of these precautions certain information about its measures against the Jesuits had leaked out, it

¹ CARAYON, XV., 23 *seqq.*; NONELL, I., 219 *seqq.* Although a travel permit had been granted them by the Spanish Government, the Fathers' baggage and persons were subjected to a rigorous examination. All their papers, including even their toilet-paper, were recorded. In Madrid the *canard* was circulated that they had had in their possession 1½ million pesos, which they were intending to transfer to a safe place abroad. Actually, they had with them only 60 doubloons as journey-money. *Fr. Larrain to the Father Rector of Barcelona, dated Figueras, 1767, March 13, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777; *Fr. Torres to Fr. Escorza, March 27, 1767, *ibid.*; *Torrigiani to Pallavicini, April 2, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, Papal Secret Archives.

feared that the carefully guarded secret might be known in Rome prematurely and that the Pope might remonstrate with the king before the deed had been done.¹ Hence, the searching of the baggage for correspondence. Recio's long term of detention is explained by the fear of the Spanish Ministers, either genuine or assumed for the purpose of imposing on the king, that the English were planning an attack on the American colonies. In his speech for the prosecution the Fiscal Campomanes had already accused the Jesuit missionaries of a secret agreement with the English. On this suspicion a not inconsiderable number of German missionaries had been detained in Spanish convents, lest they might betray the military secrets of the colonial territories to a foreign country.² In any case, the discovery of the packet could not have influenced Charles III.'s decision, as the decree of banishment was signed on February 27th, whereas the arrest of the two Fathers took place on March 7th, 1767.

¹ *Aranda to Roda, March 16, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

² The Jesuit Johann Joseph Göbel, who had come to Madrid to transact some business affairs before the Jesuits were expelled from Mexico, had obtained a travel permit for his return to Germany from the Imperial *chargé d'affaires* Lebzelttern, but at Roda's instigation this was cancelled (*Roda to Aranda, May 20, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667; *Roda to Grimaldi, May 24, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5062). On June 11, 1767, the Extraordinary Council gave its attention to the matter (**ibid.* Gracia y Justicia, 667). As the result of its ruling Roda informed the Foreign Minister Grimaldi, " *Que de qualquiera manera nunca puede ser conveniente permitirle [Göbel] el pasar per Italia, ni la ida a Alemania por las noticias que podia dar del estado de las cosas en Nueva España, de que se halla mui instruido, como lo ha observado el Consejo por las que ha dado, y que deverá permanecer en Madrid que llegue la noticia del arresto y transporte de los Jesuitas de la America " (Roda to Grimaldi, June 15, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5062). In Jesuit correspondence Göbel is referred to as a lay-brother; Roda calls him Father (HUONDER, 108). Cf. MUNDWILER, in the *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XXVI. (1902), 621 *seqq.*

Similarly, the story of the letter may be easily and fully explained. During the Madrid revolt, as in every disturbance of any size, various unfounded rumours about the king were in circulation. The people, unable to understand how he could have any liking for a man of Squillace's type, ascribed to Charles illicit relations with Squillace's wife. Similarly, in the matter of the Jesuits. No reason being known for the king's hostility towards them—which attitude was the reverse of his predecessors'—the rumour spread that he was no real son of Philip V. So far as can be ascertained, however, this rumour did not arise until after the expulsion, when the Jesuits were already on their way to Italy, and it originated, not in Madrid or Spain, but in Rome. On July 4th, 1767, Du Tillot wrote to Azara: "Even in the Roman newspapers the report is being spread that the king is no son of Philip V. The Jesuits are capable of anything these days; they go about with their heads held high, and if their insolence is not forcibly repressed, they will stir up trouble every day and become still more insolent."¹ Although the Jesuits are not directly accused here of having originated the rumour, the juxtaposition of the two sentences practically amounts to this. Three weeks later Du Tillot informed Azara that he is having a secular priest taken quite secretly to Piacenza under arrest with no reasons given. "This impudent fellow," he writes, "was talking about the same sort of things that are current in Rome about the sacred person of the king; that is, about the queen and Alberoni. I should like to know who first began this talk in Piacenza. This town is full of 'oblates' and fanatics, the vilest *canaille*, that have sent so much scribbling to Madrid, with and without their Bramieri. But I shall write nothing to Madrid about the arrest."²

¹ " *Hasta en los buletinos de Roma van esparziendo de que el Rey no es hijo de Felipe V. Los Jesuitas oi son capaces de todo: van la frente alta, y, si no se reprime su insolencia con algun acto de rigor, cada día embrollerán mas y se harán mas insolentes." Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1767.

² " *Hablarán presto en Roma de un otro sacerdote que he

In view of his open hostility towards the Society, Du Tillot's ascribing of the responsibility for the rumours to the Jesuits is nothing surprising, but he produces no evidence. On the other hand, there is some foundation for thinking that the insulting rumour was concocted by the Jansenist party in Rome, and was foisted on to the Jesuits, for the purpose of confirming the monarch in his dislike of the Order and in the resolution he had formed, especially as the secret inquiry was continued even after the Jesuits had been driven out.

(9)

At the suggestion of the Extraordinary Council,¹ Charles III. addressed a letter to the Pope on March 31st, 1767, in which he briefly informed him that for urgent reasons—the peace of the State, the honour of his Crown, and the tranquillity of his subjects—he found himself compelled to expel the Jesuits from his territories and to transfer them to the States of the Church, so as to place them under the direct tutelage, which was as wise as it was pious, of the Father and Teacher of all the faithful. In order not to burden the Apostolic Chamber with their upkeep, he had allotted each of the banished clerics a lifelong pension. The Pope was to regard this step as an unavoidable administrative measure on which he had decided after long and mature consideration.² In the accompanying

hecho prender y conducir en un calabozo en Placenzia, sin que se sepa el motivo, y he dado ordenes porque se tenga secreto. Es un temerario, que tenia el mismo discurso insolente que corria en Roma sobre la persona sacra del Rey, hablando de la Reyna y del Alberoni. Quiero saber si ha sido el primer autor en Placenzia, que es una ciudad de oblatos y fanaticos, la mas vil canalla, y que han hecho tanto papel en Madrid con su Bramieri y sin él. No escribo nada de este aresto a Madrid ” (Du Tillot to Azara, July 25, 1767, *ibid.*).

¹ **Consejo extraordinario*, January 29, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3517.

² *Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47.

letter for the ambassador, Grimaldi remarked that for just and cogent motives, as must be supposed, the king had formed the resolution to banish the Jesuits from his dominions.¹ In delivering the royal autograph Azpuru was to avoid discussing in any way the motives for the decision either with the Pope and his Ministers or with anyone else. He was to confine himself to stressing the monarch's magnanimity in allowing all the exiles a yearly pension of 100 or 90 pesos.

Immediately after the courier arrived, the ambassador obtained an audience of the Pope. According to his account, the Pope, as he read the letter, repeatedly expressed his displeasure. On his inquiring the reason for the measure the ambassador gave him the answer which had been dictated to him, whereupon the Holy Father put a second question: "What are we to do with all these people?" He did not know yet, he said, what answer to make to the king's letter. Immediately after the interview with Azpuru, Torrigiani had a long conversation with the Jesuit General, and in the course of the afternoon he was received in audience by the Pope, who showed signs of serious perturbation during this and the whole of the following day. Azpuru claims to have heard from a reliable person that the Pope, acceding to the arguments put forward by the Cardinal Secretary of State and Ricci, was determined not to receive the exiles into the States of the Church.²

When Clement XIII. had recovered to some extent from this unexpected blow, he decided to make a direct appeal to Charles III., if only to fulfil his duty as Chief Shepherd, even

¹ " *Ha tomado el Rey nuestro Señor con la justicia y solidos motivos, que debe suponerse, la resolucion de extrañar de sus dominios a los Jesuitas . . ." (Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054).

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 16, 1767, *ibid.*, 5044. According to the Venetian envoy Erizzo, the Pope lapsed into complete silence and left unanswered Azpuru's twice-uttered question whether he had any reply to make to the king (Erizzo to the Doge, April 18, 1767, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 286).

if he failed to repair the evil.¹ In a Brief to the monarch he implored him to revoke the measures which had been taken, or at least to suspend them long enough to enable a mixed commission to investigate the matter. "Of all the blows of fortune," wrote the Pope, "which have befallen Us in the nine unhappy years of Our pontificate none has pained Our fatherly heart more than Your Majesty's decision to banish the Jesuits from Your realm. Is it possible that You, too, my son, desire to distress Your Father? Can it be that the Catholic King so dear to Us will fill the cup of Our sorrows and with this fatal blow plunge Our old age, full of tears and grief, into the grave? Is it possible that the pious and kind-hearted King of Spain is lending the might of his arm, which God gave him for the protection of the Church and the good of souls, to the enemies of God and the Church, for the purpose of robbing his peoples for ever of an Order which owes its origin and its brilliance to those heroes of holiness whom God chose for the spreading of His greater glory from the Spanish nation? My strength fails me at the thought of the deplorable consequences. But what grieves my heart most deeply is the fear that the wise, kind, and conscientious Charles III., who would not do an injustice to the least of his subjects, is risking his eternal salvation by desiring to extirpate entirely, without investigation, without trial, without defence, a complete religious Society dedicated to the service of God and the people, and to deprive it of its good name, its native country, and its lawful property. If this terrible measure can never be justified before God, of what use to You will be the approval of Your Ministers, when You appear before the supreme Judge? If We are to understand from Your words 'for the peace and tranquillity of our peoples' that a member of the Order caused the disturbances in March, why are the guilty not punished and the innocent left in peace? We testify before God and man that the Society as a whole, its Institute, and its spirit are completely guiltless, and not merely not guilty, but pious,

¹ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, April 16, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, Papal Secret Archives.

useful, and holy, both in its objects and in its rules and principles. In spite of all their efforts, its foes have never proved the contrary, but at the most have been able to broadcast lies and calumnies. True, the Order is composed of human beings capable of errors and shortcomings, but their offences find no support and no defence in the rules and the spirit of the Society. Can Your Majesty contemplate without dismay the consequences of this decree? Apart from the gaps left behind in Spain by these Religious and the wholesome fruits they have brought forth there, in what a sorry plight the missions to the heathen will find themselves when they are robbed of their shepherds and their spiritual fathers! If only one, or worse, if many, souls are lost thereby, what accusations will they make one day before the judgment-seat of God against those who robbed them of their means to salvation!"

As for the objection that this was a matter of a promulgated law, the Pope declared that what mattered was not what the world, but what Heaven would have to say to it, and cited the case of Ahasuerus, who, moved by the entreaties of Esther, took back his ordinance against the Jews and earned thereby the fame of a just king. "We will not recall the entreaties of Your departed consort, who from Heaven protests her love of the Society of Jesus, but the entreaties of the Bride of Christ, the Holy Church, who cannot behold without tears the ruin of an institution which has at all times produced such splendid fruits. To these We add Our own entreaties and those of the Roman Church, especially as Your Majesty and Your glorious ancestors have always attested a particular devotion to the See of Peter. By the sweet name of Jesus, which has always been the device of the sons of St. Ignatius, by the name of the ever-blessed Virgin Mary, whose immaculate conception they have always defended, by the sufferings of Our old age, We beg and implore Your Majesty to take back the order, or at least to suspend it and subject the whole affair to a regular examination, and to hearken to the counsel of the Bishops in a matter affecting the State and the Church, the salvation of souls, and the conscience and the eternal happiness of Your Majesty. We are convinced Your

Majesty will realize at once that the punishment and annihilation of a whole body are neither just nor befitting the offence, if only a few are guilty." ¹

As the nuncio Pallavicini was still lying sick,² the delivery of the Brief was entrusted to Vincenti, who, however, had no hope of its having any success.³ On his arrival in Aranjuez on the evening of April 28th his request for an audience was refused on the ground that the reception of an Uditore was contrary to Court etiquette.⁴ At the same time, however, Grimaldi expressed his readiness to transmit the communication. After reading the Brief, the king handed it over to the Extraordinary Council, that it might deliberate on a reply to Rome. To the Uditore he let it be known that the request had come too late; the steps he had taken after mature and careful investigation were inalterable, especially as they were already in process of execution and a large part of the banished clerics were already on their way to the Papal States. This being the case, replied Vincenti, the Pope desired to inform the king that he would not receive the Spanish Jesuits. The monarch's answer to this was that he was surprised at the refusal and found it odd that the Holy Father was unwilling to have those whom he had always so strongly commended. He had received the Portuguese Jesuits but was rejecting their Spanish brethren, who were not a burden on the States of the Church, as they had a lifelong pension. The Pope, of course, was the master of his own domains and could accept whom he wished, but he was also the Head of the Church. All Europe would say that it beseemed the father to accept his sons. But it was all one whether the Holy Father admitted the Jesuits or not; the king would not alter his decision. All the ships would make for the harbours of the Papal States to show

¹ *Ibid.* and Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47; translation in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 633 *seqq.*; THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 77 *seqq.*

² *Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 27, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*

³ Second *letter of Vincenti's to Torrigiani, April 27, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *Grimaldi to Vincenti, April 29, 1767, *ibid.*

the whole world that the king had done everything to accommodate the exiles in a fitting manner, so that the fault would not be on his side. The captains had orders to lodge a protest and to record it in a protocol. Meanwhile, the king would consider where to convey the exiles, for he was firmly resolved not to allow them to return to Spain on any consideration. For any untoward consequences the Pope would have only himself to blame.¹

To Aranda instructions were given to see that the officials carried out their former orders in the prescribed manner. If the disembarkation was resisted, the captains were not to use force but to make a solemn protest and to land the exiles in Corsica, and only in harbours occupied by the rebels who were protected by the Roman Court. This order, however, was to be kept from the knowledge of the executive officials until they stood off the coast of the Papal States, lest the Roman Curia took counter measures. Only Azpuru was to be informed in confidence.²

Any hope of success which the Pope might have had was looked on as lost when the Brief was handed over to the Extraordinary Council. This body was of the opinion that the communication, whose cordial tone has been recognized by both friend and foe,³ lacked the apostolic benignity and the courtesy and moderation due to the King of Spain. Strictly considered, it should have been rejected, as it treated of a purely secular affair of which no power on earth had the right to demand an account. But as it was the first communication on the subject it was just as well to accept it, so as to obviate

¹ *Roda to Aranda, April 29, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, May 2, 1767, *ibid.*; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 30, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47; *Vincenti to Torrigiani, April 30, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*

² *Roda to Aranda, April 29, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667; *Roda to Azara, May 12 and 18, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

³ THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 77; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 172; ROUSSEAU, I., 232 *seq.*

any objection on the part of the Roman Court. The notice of the banishment was purely an act of courtesy. To argue with the Pope about the justification of the measure would compromise the sovereignty of the king. The praise which had been given to the Society of Jesus the Consulta tried to invalidate by alluding to the enemies it had in Spain both within and without its own ranks and by repeating all the old charges of arrogance, despotism, lax morality, scepticism, Molinism, tyrannicide, and continual bickerings with prelates, universities, and other religious Orders. That the constitution and principles of the Jesuits conflicted with the law of the State and the Church, the natural law, and the positive divine law had been demonstrated by the courts and the writers of France and Portugal. With the superabundance of secular and regular clergy, the Jesuits would not be missed either in Spain or in the missions, where they had tolerated heathen superstition, seized all property for themselves, treated the Spaniards as enemies, usurped sovereignty, incited the natives to rebellion, taught terrible doctrines about duty to the prince, and even appeared at the head of armies against the troops of the king. Finally, they had been trying in Spain itself to alter the Government to suit their own ideas by advancing the most objectionable principles and putting them into practice. The Jesuits were neither useful nor indispensable ; on the contrary, they were notoriously harmful ; to tolerate them was to bring the State to certain ruin. The admission or expulsion of an Order was solely the business of the Government, for the Orders had not been appointed by Christ, like the Bishops and parish priests, and so were not essentially necessary for the Church. If only one Jesuit or another had taken part in the insurrections and conspiracies, their banishment would certainly have been unjust, and there would have been no unanimity in favour of the measure. But in the Society of Jesus the individual member could do nothing ; all the actions of individuals were dependent on the Order's directorate, and this was utterly corrupt. Then again, the procedure adopted was not judicial but administrative, and ecclesiastical immunity had not been injured in the slightest. In the fresh

proceedings desired by the Pope he would like to have Bishops and Religious appointed judges because he could exert considerable influence on them. That would set the whole country ablaze. Furthermore, the Archbishop of Manila and the Bishop of Ávila, both of whom had risen from the ranks of religious Orders, had not only agreed to the banishment but declared it to be necessary. And it was a Religious, namely Fray Juan Marquez, who was advancing the doctrine that there was nothing a sovereign had to fear more than powerful corporations. And what was more powerful than the Jesuit Order? Participation in the insurrection was not the only reason for their expulsion; there was also the spirit of fanaticism, revolt, false doctrine, and insupportable arrogance which had taken root in this body. The prince who yielded here would be the first victim. The king was therefore advised to couch his reply briefly and tersely, so as to cut short any further argument and so as not to break the rule of silence which he himself had imposed. The ambassador in Rome was to be given to understand that the expulsion of the Jesuits was a matter that depended solely on the authority of the monarch and that he considered it as closed.¹

In his letter of reply Charles III. asserted that he had the deepest sympathy with the Pope in his distress, respecting him both as the representative of Christ and for his own personal qualities. That the Holy Father considered his measure to be ill-founded caused him even greater sorrow. He could only declare that he had more than sufficient grounds for expelling the whole Society from Spain for ever, and not only individual members. With the grace of God he had never lost sight in this affair of the strict account he would one day have to render of the government of his subjects and their temporal and eternal welfare. Accordingly, he had taken steps also to ensure that the missions were not left without assistance.²

¹ **Consulta del Consejo extraordinario*, April 30, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47, and Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 174 *seqq.*

² Charles III. to Clement XIII., May 2, 1767, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 635 *seq.*; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 178 *seq.*

Meanwhile, on April 21st, 1767, the admission of the exiles was debated for two hours by an extraordinary Congregation of eight Cardinals in the presence of the Pope. Whereas Cardinals Rossi and Cavalchini were in favour of their admission, the other six were against it.¹ On the same day, therefore, Torrigiani informed the Madrid nuncio that Clement XIII. persisted in his refusal. It was against all custom for a prince to send so large a body of exiles into another's territory without first obtaining the latter's assent, or at least informing him in advance. The Pope could not possibly receive all the Jesuits from Spain and the Indies, however much it might offend his feelings of affection to have to reject the unfortunates. The Society had not sufficient houses to accommodate these thousands of exiles, and it was beyond its financial capacity to find so many suitable lodgings and to furnish them to any extent. Moreover, after his experience with the Portuguese, the Pope was loth to receive so many inactive and therefore useless Religious who, with feelings embittered by their sufferings and privations, would be easily prone to restiveness and desperate measures. Furthermore, owing to the poor harvest that year, it was feared that the rise in prices would lead to disturbances among the people. Above all, the insecurity of the pensions had to be considered. These could be withdrawn from all the Spaniards if any Jesuit in the world should say, do, or write anything against the measure which the king had taken. If this should happen, the whole burden of providing for the exiles would fall on the Holy See.²

Shortly after the Congregation had risen, Torrigiani informed the Spanish ambassador that the Spanish crews would be

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 21, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044, draft in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. 106; **Resumen de las correspondencias de Roma por lo respectivo a haberse negado el Papa a la admision de los Jesuitas*, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044.

² *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, April 21, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*, and Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. 106.

treated with proper respect and would be provided with the refreshments and comestibles that they needed. But the Pope, he said, stood by his refusal to receive the Spanish Jesuits. As the arrival of the first ships was near at hand, the ambassador should therefore make the necessary arrangements.¹ Azpuru retorted that that was not his duty and that he had had no instructions to act in this manner.²

As had been suggested by the Augustinian General, Vasquez,³ Azpuru, following the instructions contained in the royal Pragmatic Sanction, sent a circular letter on April 22nd to all grandees and Spanish religious Orders, informing them of the Jesuit expulsion and referring them to the order forbidding any Spanish subject to communicate with the exiles either orally or in writing.⁴ To the question put by some grandees, whether they, or at least their domestic staff, might continue to have intercourse with the Italian Jesuits, he sent the reply that they were to act as their prudence and their loyalty to the sovereign prompted them.⁵ As most of them were financially dependent on the Spanish Court, they had no option but to conform with the instruction.⁶ Azpuru himself, who until then had been in constant and intimate connexion with the Jesuits, no longer allowed himself to be seen in their company.⁷ The greatest subservience was shown by Monsignor Zelada, who had obtained his benefices through the Jesuits' recommendation and who was in almost daily contact with the most highly placed Superiors.⁸ Without waiting for the official

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 21, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044.

² **Resumen de las correspondencias*, *ibid.*

³ See above, p. 126.

⁴ *April 22, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. 106. Cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 16, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044.

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 23, 1767, *ibid.*

⁶ The *letters of submission in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. 106.

⁷ CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 104.

⁸ *Ibid.*

intimation he broke off all relations with the Jesuits on hearing of their banishment. He not only avoided their houses and forbade their admission to his residence, but he also shunned them in other people's houses, refused to give Communion to layfolk who practised their Exercises, chose a Franciscan instead of a Jesuit for his confessor, and appointed a Piarist as his theological consultant. So as not to have any dealings with the outlaws in his capacity of secretary to the Congregation of the Council, he instructed the officials to refer them directly to the Cardinal Prefect.¹ He had his prompt obedience brought to the notice of the Spanish Court, which rewarded him with the archdeaconry of the metropolitan church of Santiago.² Of the Roman nobility the most conspicuous for his zeal was the young Prince Doria. Although he had been a pupil of the Jesuits and had an uncle in the Society, he had a notice posted in the anteroom of his reception hall excluding them from his palace. He withdrew his two younger brothers from the Roman seminary without warning and cancelled a bequest of his mother's for Masses to be said in the Jesuit church.³ Prince Piombino withdrew from the Jesuit General the carriage he had always placed at his disposal.⁴ The Neapolitan envoy in Rome, Cardinal Orsini, who had received the Jesuit General after the announcement of the Pragmatic Sanction, received a reprimand from Tanucci for this "improper" conduct, whereupon he broke off all relations with the outcasts and also changed his confessor.⁵ The

¹ *Zelada to Azpuru, April 16, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044; *Zelada to Grimaldi, May 27, 1767, *ibid.*

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 17, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. 106.

³ CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 104; *Andrea Doria to Roda, July 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667; *Roda to Doria, July 28, 1767, *ibid.*; RICCI, *Espulsione*, 23.

⁴ CORDARA, *loc. cit.*; *TERMANINI, n. 32.

⁵ *Tanucci to Orsini, June 20 and 27, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6001; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 25, 1767, *ibid.*, 5044.

Dominican General, Boxadors, forbade his Spanish subordinates to celebrate Mass in the Jesuit church of the Gesù on the feast of St. Ignatius, as was their long-established custom. He had also given orders that if any Jesuits came to say Mass in S. Maria sopra Minerva on the feast of St. Dominic—which he could not prevent, it being an Italian convent—they were not to be brought to his room and no Spanish Dominican was to be there to greet them.¹ Similar instructions had been given by the General of the Camillians for their founder's feast.² Some Spanish Jesuits who had gone to the Church of the Spanish Trinitarians to say Mass there in honour of the newly-beatified Trinitarian Simon de Roxas, were ordered out of the sacristy, although the Trinitarians had previously entrusted the Jesuit Cordara with the writing of De Roxas' life.³ When the Cardinal Secretary of State protested, through the Uditore Vincenti, against these interferences with the Pope's domestic authority,⁴ Grimaldi defended Azpuru's procedure and commended his moderation.⁵ The Foreign Minister was given the instruction to make known through the ambassador to all grandees and prelates the king's particular satisfaction with the proofs of their loyalty and attachment.⁶ The intention had been, observed Grimaldi, to show how far the Spanish monarch's influence extended and at the same time to exert pressure on the Pope and Torrigiani

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 6, 1767, *ibid.*, 5045.

² *Ibid.*

³ CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 104 *seq.* " Qui demumcumque ad aulam Matritensem quocumque titulo respiciebant, nobiles, plebeique, religiosi perinde ac laici, continuo se ab omni Iesuitarum consortio abstraxere, imo eos defugere tamquam peste contactos coepere " (*ibid.*).

⁴ *Torrighiani to Vincenti, April 30, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, May 19, 1767, *ibid.*, 303.

⁶ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 5, 12, and 19, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47; *Roda to Grimaldi, August 24, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045.

and to make it clear to all who had relations with Spain that the monarch's gratitude would depend on their behaviour.¹

The Madrid Government not having reckoned with the Pope's resistance to the landing of the Jesuits, its representative was without instructions as to how to deal with this unexpected problem. Tanucci, to whom Azpuru had appealed in his embarrassment, advised the disembarkation of the clerics at any unguarded spot on the coast, on the island of Elba, or in Piombino, for the king's honour would not permit of their return to Spain.² The Spanish Court had Corsica in mind, and although Charles III.'s Ministers deemed it incompatible with the monarch's dignity to enter into negotiations with the Pope, they saw no difficulty in asking the Corsican insurgent leader Paoli to accept the deportees.³ However, it was soon decided to abandon this plan and to fall back on it only in an emergency.⁴ Through the consul Cornejo permission was asked by Grimaldi of the Genoese Senate,⁵ and through Count Fuentes of the French Government, to land the Jesuits in the harbours of the Genoese obedience occupied by the French.⁶ He also approached Paolucci, the Duke of

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 12, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47. The Elector Klemens Wenzeslaus of Trier also seems to have had pressure put upon him. The Palatine envoy in Vienna, Baron von Ritter, *wrote under date June 6, 1767, to the Minister of State Baron von Wachten-donk: " S.M. Catholique donnant une pension au Pr. Clément de Saxe, doit aussi avoir exigé de S.A.R. d'éloigner les Jésuites qui lui sont attachés et l'on ne doute pas que ce prince ne le fasse " (State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 26/3). On *June 27, 1767, the envoy returned to the subject (*ibid.*).

² *Tanucci to Azpuru, April 20, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044; *Charles III. to Tanucci, May 5, 1767, *ibid.*, 6056.

³ *Aranda to Roda, May 1, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

⁴ *Roda to Azara, May 5, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

⁵ *Grimaldi to Cornejo, May 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5651.

⁶ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, May 2, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

Modena's Secretary of State, with the same request.¹ Azpuru received secret instructions to detain the transports off Civitavecchia until the permits arrived.² The Powers in question showed an accommodating attitude, though Choiseul did not refrain from pointing out the considerable obstacles: Madrid was clearly ignorant of conditions in Corsica; it was quite impossible to provide 3,000 foreigners with board and lodging there.³

The courier bringing the king's reply to Clement XIII. arrived in Rome on May 12th, and on the following day Azpuru was again received in audience.⁴ After reading the letter the Pope observed that it gave him no consolation and only increased his grief; he had no other refuge now but the Father of Mercy and the God of all consolation. Nevertheless, he could not decide to accept the exiles, as he did not know where to accommodate so many people. To the ambassador's observation that the Spaniards, unlike the Portuguese, were not coming unprovided, the Pope replied that it was precisely the experience he had had in receiving the Portuguese which was one of the grounds of his refusal to accept the Spaniards.⁵

On the afternoon of the same day (May 13th) thirteen transports with 570 Jesuits from the province of Aragonia arrived in the roadstead of Civitavecchia.⁶ Following his

¹ *Grimaldi to Paolucci, May 5, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5048.

² *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 2, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47.

³ *Choiseul to Ossun, May 11, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4686; *Cornejo to Grimaldi, May 11, 1767, *ibid.*, 5651.

⁴ *Azpuru to Torrigiani, May 12, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044; *Torrighiani to Azpuru, May 13, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Fr. Berrio to Fr. Cornejo, February 5, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777.

⁶ *Note to Torrigiani, May 13, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Sobre la expulsion de los Jesuitas," 1767; *Captain Barcelo to Azpuru, May 13, 1767, *ibid.*; *Enriquez to Azpuru, May 13, 1767, *ibid.*

instructions, the Papal commander of the port had reinforced the troops, provisioned the fort with powder, and mounted the cannon.¹ Actually, these precautions were sheer bluff, as secret orders had been sent him that even if it came to the worst he was not to make use of his weapons.² The captains and the ships' officers, whom he treated with studied courtesy, were permitted to land, but the Jesuits, except for some who were seriously ill, had to remain on board.³ Azpuru again made an urgent request to the Cardinal Secretary of State for permission to land the exiles,⁴ and again the Congregation of Cardinals was summoned to meet in the Pope's presence. Those present varied in their opinions. Apart from the reasons for rejection that had already been brought forward, it was argued that it was scarcely dignified for a Pope to make himself the executor of a judgment pronounced by a lay tribunal, as was the Extraordinary Council of Castile. It was to be feared, were this to happen, that such weakness would pave the way for other princes to take similar steps, which would mean that the States of the Church would be flooded with 20,000 Religious. After all, either the Spanish Jesuits were good, in which case the king ought not to expel them; or they were bad, in which case the Pope did not want them either. Another group was of the opinion that the newcomers ought all to be secularized. The chief exponents of this view were the Cardinals Cavalchini and Stoppani, who argued that as the Society would have to be suppressed before long in any case,

¹ *Puccita to Azpuru, May 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045; NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 246.

² " *L'ordine a Civitavecchia fu di non permettere lo sbarco ad esclusione della violenza manifesta, perchè se i Spagnuoli l'avessero veramente fatta, non si voleva resistere. Il comandante de' sciabecchi cominciò a parlare alto; ma veduti alcuni picchetti di soldati girare pel porto, abbassò la voce. L'eccezione della violenza era segreta, acciò non venissero a questa " (RICCI, *Espulsione*, 42).

³ *Puccita to Azpuru, May 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045.

⁴ *Azpuru to Torrigiani, May 14, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

it mattered little if this were to happen a few years earlier. They could not lead a regular religious life outside their houses, and this would throw the door open to all sorts of scandal. To this it was objected that one could not with justice deprive so large a number of Religious of their status against their will when no offence had been committed. Besides, in this way the Pope would himself be furthering the aims of the Church's enemies, and it was extremely doubtful if this measure would induce the king of Spain to let the Jesuits remain in his dominions.¹ Siding with the majority of the Cardinals, Clement XIII. decided to abide by his refusal, which was immediately communicated by Torrighiani to the ambassador and the Madrid Government.² Azpuru now sought by private channels to persuade the Pope to change his mind, appealing for this purpose to the Pope's nephew, the Maggiordomo Rezzonico. The latter assured him that he had succeeded in altering his uncle's mind,³ but as the Angelus bell was sounding he received a note from the Cardinal

¹ For some time even Torrighiani seems to have entertained the idea of secularizing all the Spanish Jesuits, in the hope of thus preventing the flooding of the Papal States with the exiles (*Torrighiani to an unnamed Cardinal, April 18, 1767, Regolari, Gesuiti, 48, Papal Secret Archives). *Erizzo's report to the Doge of Venice (April 25, 1767, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 286) that the Jesuit General himself had asked for the secularization of his Spanish brethren is not confirmed by any entry in his diary. The opusculè entitled *Parere dell' Eminentissimo Sig. Cardinale Carlo Alberto Guidobono Cavalchini . . . esposto nelle [!] Congregazione de S. Officio [!] in occasione dell' espulsione de' Gesuiti dalla monarchia di Spagna* (Lucca, 1768) is only one of the many anti-Jesuit brochures of the time and is without any historical support. Cf. *Ricci, *Espulsione*, 35. " *Si sa però che i cardinali della Congregazione son risoluti ad escluderli, tolti i cardinali Cavalchini e Stoppani che hanno detto doversi già distruggere tra poco la Compagnia ed essere poco male che si distrugga qualche anno prima " (*ibid.*, n. 58).

² *To Azpuru, May 14, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.* ;

*to Vincenti, May 14, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*

³ **Resumen*, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044.

Secretary of State which merely confirmed anew the negative decision.¹ Azpuru ascribed this change of attitude to the audiences with the Pope which Torrigiani and Ricci had had in the meantime.² On the other hand, the Jesuit General repeatedly stated in his journal,³ and Torrigiani confirmed it in a letter,⁴ that he had not influenced the Pope's decision in any way, and that in the conversation in question the subject was not even mentioned by the Pope.⁵ Subsequent attempts by Cardinal Cavalchini⁶ and the Maggiordomo⁷ to move the Pope were brought to nothing by the obstinate adherence of

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 21, 1767, *ibid.*, 5045.

² *Ibid.*; *Resumen, *ibid.*, 5044. The same assertion which Azpuru had already made on April 16 (*to Grimaldi, April 16, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5044) was repeated in the *dispatch of the Venetian envoy Erizzo of May 16, 1767 (State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 286), also in the *Reflexiones crítico-históricas*, V., Venice, 1767, 31, quoted in FERRER DEL RIO, II., 197. It was also insinuated by Aubeterre in his letter to Choiseul of May 20, 1767 (CARAYON, XV., 405). This presentation of the situation is to be found in several subsequent histories, e.g. BROSCHE, *Kirchenstaat*, II., 122; HUBER, *Jesuitenorden*, 521. BÖHMER (2166) writes: "But when these luckless creatures tried to land in Civitavecchia they were received with cannon-shots, at the wish of their own General, who had already had enough of the exiled Portuguese." But even in the hostile sources there is no mention of cannon-shots. Cf. CARAYON, XV., XLI., n. 1; FERRER DEL RIO, II., 193, n. 1.

³ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 33; cf. 40, 41, 52.

⁴ On the same May 14 Torrigiani *assured an unnamed Cardinal that the Pope did not wish the Jesuit General to have anything to do with the matter (Regolari, Gesuiti, 48, Papal Secret Archives).

⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. TERMANINI, **Vita del R. P. Ricci*, n. 29.

⁶ *To Azpuru, June 23, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp., 106; *Azpuru to Cavalchini, June 23, 1767, *ibid.*

⁷ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 21, June 18 and 25, and July 30, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044 and 5045; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, July 14, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47. On account of his pro-Bourbon

the Spaniards to their conditions governing the payment of the pensions to the banished Jesuits.¹

In spite of the tension between the Courts of Madrid and Rome caused by the non-acceptance of the Jesuits, there was no serious inclination on either side to allow it to come to a rupture, though Azpuru accused the Cardinal Secretary of State and the Jesuit General of working to this end.² In view of the lamentable consequences of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Portugal which had befallen the Church in that country, prudence demanded the avoidance by the Roman Curia of another breach with a second Catholic power, although it let it be known that the Pope had no intention of purchasing peace at any price.³ In his conversation with the Uditore Vincenti⁴ and in his letters to Azpuru,⁵ Grimaldi had repeatedly let fall veiled threats, and the ambassador had not

attitude Rezzonico received the Cardinal's hat on the recommendation of France and Spain (*Grimaldi to Azpuru, July 21, 1767, *ibid.*; *Du Tillot to Azara, December 29, 1767, *ibid.* Exped. "Parma", 1767).

¹ *The nuncio Giraud assured Azpuru: "Que conocia ser ventajoso al Papa y su estado recibirlos si se asegurase el asignamiento hecho para su subsistencia, reformando la condicion penal de perderle todos, si alguno escribiese contra la Pragmatica y si S. M. se ofreciese a mediar con el Rey de las dos Sicilias y el Infante Duque de Parma para contener el golpe de igual extrañamiento que en sus Estados amenazaba á los Jesuitas" (*Resumen*, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044). Cf. *Roda to Azara, July 14, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 21, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 1767; *Azara to Grimaldi, April 21, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Corresp. Azara-Grimaldi", 1767. Tanucci thought that Azpuru's fears were groundless; Rome wanted no rupture (*to Centomani and Azara, April 25, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6000).

³ *Torrighiani to Azpuru, May 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 5045.

⁴ *Vincenti to Torrighiani, April 30 and June 16, 1767, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303 and 304, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 5, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. 65/4.

omitted to pass them on ;¹ but they were mere bluff, uttered in the hope that they would induce Rome to give way and thus spare the king a humiliating defeat. Actually, out of consideration for public opinion and the religious character of Charles III., the leading statesmen had no desire that the matter should go to extremes.² Even the ardent anti-Jesuit Vasquez warned his friend Roda against a breach with the Curia, lest the eternally blind might be able to say that the nations which parted with the Jesuits also parted from the Church.³

At last the permission of the Genoese Signoria arrived in Rome⁴ and on May 18th Azpuru sent instructions to the ships' captains to make a formal protest and then to proceed without delay to the port of Bastia, where further instructions awaited them.⁵ On their arrival there on May 22nd the Jesuits met with a fresh setback. Despite his Government's agreement, the French commander-in-chief, Count Marbeuf, firmly refused to allow them to land⁶—on humane grounds. To Choiseul he pointed out the absolute impossibility of accommodating such a large body of Religious on the island. Everywhere the torches of war were aflame, and there was no lodging or sustenance for these thousands of strangers. The inhabitants themselves had hardly enough to keep themselves alive, and his soldiers had to draw their rations from France.⁷

¹ Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 21, May 14 and 21, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044 and 5045.

² *Roda to Azara, May 5, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*

³ *Vasquez to Roda, April 23, 1767, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, *Cartas de Vasquez*, vol. I.

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, May 21, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045.

⁵ Azpuru's *circular letter to the ships' captains of May 18, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Sobre la espulsion de los Jesuitas ", 1767 ; *Azpuru to Barcelo, May 14 and 16, 1767, *ibid.*

⁶ *Barcelo to Azpuru, May 22, 1767, *ibid.*

⁷ *Marbeuf to Choiseul, May 16 and 22, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565 ; *Cornejo to G. Gnecco, June 25, 1767, *ibid.*, 5057.

Even after the Spanish ships had been lying at anchor for a whole month the negotiations had still not been concluded. The Jesuits, who were undergoing unspeakable sufferings caused by the inclemency of the weather and the sea, were allowed to take exercise on the shore for a few hours daily.¹ It was not till June 30th that Grimaldi was able to inform the ambassador in Rome that Marbeuf had received the definite order to admit the exiles. This meant the defeat of Torrighiani and Ricci, he added triumphantly.²

The insurgent Corsicans for their part had vouched for the Jesuits' security and had granted them a safe-conduct,³ and the Spanish Government had appointed commissaries⁴ to see to the accommodation of the exiles in the towns of Bastia, Ajaccio, Calvi, and Algajola, purchase provisions for them in Genoa, and distribute them in Corsica,⁵ but according to the descriptions of both friend and foe the situation of the Jesuits was far from enviable.⁶ All available accommodation in the

¹ *Enriquez to Azpuru, June 21, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Espulsion de los Jesuitas", 1767.

² *Ibid.* Reales Ordenes, 47.

³ *Proclamation of the town of Calvi, July 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5650; *Convention of Calvi [September 2, 1767], *ibid.*, 5651; NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 264.

⁴ *Grimaldi to L. Gnecco, July 3, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054. The Spaniards Laforcada and Coronel were made responsible for "administration" and supervision, the Genoese Geronimo and Luigi di Gnecco for the commissariat (*Roda to Grimaldi, July 11, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 667).

⁵ *Instruccion de los comisionados de Genova y Corcega, *ibid.*, Estado, 5054.

⁶ CIAN writes: "Tutti gli storici imparziali s'accordano nel riconoscere che la violenza usata dal Borbone di Spagna contro queste schiere di inermi, che piegavano tranquilli il capo sotto il peso del loro destino, era ingenerosa e crudele" (*Accademia Reale delle scienze di Torino 1894-95*, Torino, 1895). Detailed description of their treatment in ISLA, *Memorial*, 160 seqq.; BLASIUS LARRAZ, **De rebus Sociorum prov. Aragoniae Soc. Jesu ab indicto ipsis ex Hispania exsilio usque ad Societatis abolitionem*

coastal towns, which alone were held by the Genoese and French, having been occupied, the Jesuits from the Province of Toledo had to live for the most part at sea until finally, after five months, they found shelter of the barest description in Ajaccio.¹ Only a few of the exiles were billeted in dwelling-houses, where they had to live with the families day and night. The majority had to content themselves with a shake-down in old chapels, oil stores, barns, stables, and the like. Even the most essential household equipment, such as tables, chairs, bowls, and cutlery was lacking. The provisions were meagre, the food inferior and sometimes putrid, and prices were so high that the small pension barely sufficed. The scarcity of books was felt keenly. Philosophical and theological works were entirely lacking. The greatest distress was suffered by the priests in having to forgo the consolation of celebrating daily Mass, the supplies of wine, candles, vestments, and altar utensils being quite inadequate for so many. In addition to all this, their lives were constantly endangered by the skirmishes that took place almost daily between the insurgents and the occupying troops.² During the bombardment of the

commentarii tres, in Jesuit possession, Aragonia, 30; PARAMÁS, *Annus patiens*, translated in CARAYON, XVI., 259 *seqq.*; [RODELES], *Vida del P. Calatayud*, 448 *seqq.*; NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 241 *seqq.*; CUEVAS, IV., 426 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 238 *seqq.*

¹ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 69.

² “*Si trovarono i gesuiti in una miseria estrema; non avevano da mangiare, non da abitare, o pure solo magazzini d’olio, stalle, e simili; que’ pochi che aveano abitazione nelle case del paese, per la piccolezza di quelle doveano giorno e notte coabitare con femine; il poco e cattivo vitto costava carissimo; doveano pagare per celebrare la santa Messa; nessuna disciplina religiosa, nessun’ ordine, nessuna o poca comunicazione co’ Superiori, di più si trovavano tra due fuochi de’ Corsi assalitori e de’ Genovesi” (RICCI, **Espulsione*, 64). Cf. *Fr. Gaspar de Sola to the commissaries, dated Algajola, July 16, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Marina, 724; *Captain Enriquez to Cornejo, dated Calvi, July 21 [1767], *ibid.*, Estado, 5651; *G. Gnecco to Grimaldi, August 3 and 31, 1767, *ibid.*, 5057; *Fr. Osorio, S.J.,

fortified places, in which at one time or another about fifty of the Jesuits were lying ill, hunger, thirst, and death threatened, like phantoms, these strangers to the rough and tumble of war and thinned their ranks.¹ Within five months sixteen members of the Castilian Province were dead, including several who by reason of their ill-health or old age should never have been moved.²

In the course of time it was found possible to mitigate the worst hardships.³ The commissaries tried to bring more regularity into the distribution of provisions, the living quarters were improved as far as possible, and the General of the Society sent money, books, and Mass appurtenances.⁴ The exiles' relatives, especially those who were well-to-do, did their utmost to relieve their wants and sufferings by sending them money and food. A place of honour in the history of the Society is held by the venerable José Pignatelli who, supported by the generous gifts of his relatives, spent himself with untiring energy in mitigating the horrors of banishment and in making possible a semi-regular religious life, in so far as the turbulent conditions of war permitted.⁵

The shock of the arrest, the hardships of the journey by land and sea, the daily privations, the false rumours of the General's attitude,⁶ and above all the constant threat of death, were

to G. Gnecco, April 19, 1768, *ibid.*; *Laforcada and Coronel to Aranda, December 5, 1768, *ibid.*, 5048.

¹ *Coronel to Aranda, April 4, 1768, *ibid.*

² ISLA, *Memorial*, 184.

³ " *Conozerá V.S. ser imposible subsistir con la pension que S.M. nos tiene conseñada, como ya hemos empezado a experimentar, no teniendo para poderse vestir muchos de los sugetos a quienes se les ha acabado la poca ropa que se les concedió traer " (Fr. Osorio, S.J., to G. Gnecco, dated Calvi, 1768, April 19, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5057).

⁴ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 70.

⁵ NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 275 *seqq.*

⁶ " *I Gesuiti spagnuoli, cioè alcuni di essi, vedendosi in sì duro esilio, per trasporto di dolore pensarono che il Generale e i suoi di Roma gli avessero abbandonati alla loro cattiva sorte, special-

only too likely to provoke a feeling of irritation in naturally excitable temperaments. The lack of an ordered way of life, the tenuous connexion with their Superiors, and, worst of all, the complete inactivity to which the outcasts were condemned, naturally had a bad effect on religious discipline.¹ Complaints were voiced against the tyranny of their Superiors, whose instructions, however well intentioned, were regarded with suspicion by certain malcontents. For the sake of discipline and economy the order had been given that all were to surrender their pensions to enable the provisioning to be administered uniformly and to provide for the novices, who were not entitled to pensions. Some considered this to be an unlawful attack on their rights and appealed to the Spanish representatives for a ruling.² The discontent of certain individuals infected others. Many were obsessed by a single thought: to escape from this island of terror, to be released in Rome from their religious vows, and to make their way back to their own native land, for which they longed so ardently.³ Here, they promised themselves, they would lead a more peaceful and less necessitous existence. This feeling was assiduously nursed and fomented by the Spanish commissaries,⁴ who deceptively dangled before the eyes of the unruly members of the party the royal favour and rich benefices. The laments, advice, and entreaties of worldly-wise relatives did the rest. In view of the dangers already described the Superior of the Andalusian Province had advised his subjects to seek their own safety as best they could. On those who had lost heart the effect of this advice was as if the

mente per venire esclusi dallo Stato pontificio. Sopra di che scrisse il Generale al P. Eustachio Medina che di ciò lo avisava, giustificando con i fatti sopra raccontati la falsa apprensione" (Ricci, *Espulsione*, 74).

¹ Cf. above, p. 170, n. 2.

² *Letters from Frs. Losada and Vasquez to Azpuru, dated Rome, October 8, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5046.

³ *Captain Enriquez to Cornejo, July 21 [1767], *ibid.*, 5651; *G. Gnecco to Grimaldi, August 3, 1767, *ibid.*, 5057.

⁴ *Roda to Grimaldi, July 17, 1767, *ibid.*, 5048.

signal had been given for a general flight.¹ Assuming the most varied disguises they had themselves taken in fishing boats to the mainland. Thirty members of the Provinces of Toledo and Andalusia took to flight in this manner in a single day.²

The confusion was worse confounded in the late summer of 1767 and at the beginning of 1768 by the arrival of the banished Jesuits from the colonies oversea.³ Choiseul, who was then negotiating with Genoa about the transfer of Corsica to France, raised objections at first to their reception, pointing out that for want of food and shelter the outcasts would die of hunger and misery or would take to flight at the first opportunity.⁴ Eventually his misgivings were dispelled by Grimaldi, who argued that so long as the exiles did not return to Spain, Madrid would not regret their disappearance, as it would make room for those still to come. Moreover, conditions in Corsica could not be as bad as they were painted, otherwise the Superiors would be more likely to encourage the exodus and thus reduce the numbers than to hold them together by force.⁵ Thus persuaded, Choiseul undertook to admit all the Jesuits from America and to facilitate their disappearance. Hitherto, he said, he feared that the presence of these Religious would have a bad effect on the islanders, but now this fear had

¹ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 64.

² " *Me aseguraron ayer los referidos Andaluces, que en el dia de su fuga la hicieron como unos treinta de su provincia, y la de Toledo, y que los mas estaban inclinados a seguirlos " (Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 6, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5056). **Consejo extraordinario*, August 15, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 667 ; *Roda to Azara, September 1, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

³ An official *list gives the number of Jesuits transported from Spain to Italy as 2576, those from the colonies as 1812, a total of 4388 (1767-1772 : *Transportes a Italia desde Ferrol, Coruña, Cádiz, Málaga, Cartagena, Salou y Mallorca de los Regulares expulsos de España, Indias y Filipinas*, Archives of Simancas, Marina, 724).

⁴ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, August 8, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 4565.

⁵ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, October 31, 1767, *ibid.*

gone, for if they tried any tricks he would have them thrown into the sea.¹

The transfer, by purchase, of Corsica to France on May 15th, 1768, brought with it a complete change in the conditions on the island. Those in power in France being hostile to the Jesuits, they were clearly unlikely to grant the right of asylum in their newly-acquired possession to those whom they had suppressed in their own country.² As the Corsicans were no more inclined to submit to their new masters than to their old ones, the French found themselves compelled to send fresh troops to the island. A large number of the buildings hitherto occupied by the Jesuits were requisitioned by the military, and the Jesuits were consequently in such sore straits that even the Spanish commissary admitted to his Government that he could not see how the Religious would be able to survive the summer, so great was the lack of food and shelter. It was unavoidably necessary, he reported, to remove them from the island.³ To avoid complications with Rome it was thought undesirable to land them directly on the shores of the Papal States. Accordingly, the French commander, Lieutenant-General Chauvelin, fell back on a former plan.⁴ He gave orders for the Jesuits to be taken to Sestri, trusting that from there they would gradually make their way in small groups via Parma and Modena to Papal territory.⁵

The plan was carried out at first with such haste and precipitation⁶ that the first arrivals, 800 strong, in their

¹ *Choiseul to Grimaldi, November 12, 1767, *ibid.*, 4568.

² *Fuentes to Grimaldi, May 25, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565.

³ *Laforcada to Aranda, dated Ajaccio 1768, May 31, Arch. Prov. Tolet. in Madrid, Chamartin, P.

⁴ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, August 8, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

⁵ *G. Gnecco to Grimaldi, August 27, 1768, *ibid.*, 5057; *Grimaldi to Gnecco, September 20, 1768, *ibid.*; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, September 20, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48.

⁶ *Cornejo to Grimaldi, September 5, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5058.

tattered clothes, with no money and no definite destination, aroused the horror and the pity of the population of the Papal States.¹ Acting on reports from their representatives, who had been reviled by the populace on account of this inhuman treatment, the Spanish and French Governments decided to improve the travel arrangements for the succeeding Jesuits.² Every Jesuit who would allow himself to be secularized was allotted 40 *pesos*, and those who elected to stay in the Society received 20 *pesos*, as a special subsidy, the object being to encourage their departure from the Society by the difference between these sums and to enable those who had become seculars to procure themselves the correct dress.³ Clement XIII., who inwardly had been most unwilling to refuse acceptance of the outcasts, now allowed his natural sympathy to outweigh all his misgivings. He granted to the twice deported clerics entry into the Papal States on condition that they would not come to Rome without special permission from the General of the Society.⁴

¹ “ *Non debbo inoltre tacere d’esser medesimi così miserabili e laceri, che hanno bisogno di tutto : non potendo soccorrersi da questo collegio, che, secondo mi dice il P. Rettore, si trova gravato di altri 20 gesuiti di più di quelli, che sono venuti dalli stati di Parma ” (Cardinal Spinola to Torrigiani, dated Ferrara, September 28, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5049).
 “ *Frattanto venivano nello Stato ecclesiastico i miseri Spagnuoli, e i primi furono quei delle provincie d’America che erano stati condotti a Bastia in Corsica. Venivano laceri e sfiniti, avendo fatta gran parte di viaggio a piedi, senza quasi denaro, senza sapere che si fare nè dove andare, e facevano orrore e pietà ai popoli ” (Ricci, *Espulsione*, 139). Cf. *Cornejo to Grimaldi, September 26, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5058 ; *Fr. de Alva to Cornejo, October 6, 1768, *ibid.*

² *Ricci, *loc. cit.*

³ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, September 19, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565 ; *Grimaldi to Aranda, September 19, 1768, *ibid.*, 5058.

⁴ *Cardinal Orsini to Tanucci, October 11, 1768, State Archives in Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{2}{1053}$.

Both the official and the private correspondence of the Spanish Ministers throws a strange light on their Government's attitude towards the fugitives. After a certain vacillation it was decided to encourage the flight from the island and the Society and to support those who wanted to throw off the Society's "yoke".¹ The purpose of this was to reduce the numbers of its adherents and at the same time to bring about its dissolution from within.² The ambassador Azpuru received instructions to support by circumspect and underhand methods the applications made by malcontents for permission to resign, but the dispensations were to be made by the Penitentiary, not by the General of the Society, who was no longer recognized by Spain.³ Both in the instruction for the two commissaries Laforcada and Coronel and in the orders sent them by the President of the Council they were informed that one of their chief duties was to do their utmost to induce the exiles to leave the Society or, at any rate, the island. Their reports, however, show that they met with no slight resistance in the great loyalty to the Society of Jesus and to the fanatical *esprit de corps* instilled by the older members into the younger ones. The most intractable came from the Provinces of Aragon and Castile; less unanimity was shown by the Provinces of Toledo and Andalusia. One of the chief difficulties was that those who were willing made it a prime condition that they should return to their native land. In spite of this, the commissaries hoped that in view of the general dispiritedness a large part of the exiles would migrate to the Papal States with the coming of the spring.⁴ In return for their successful efforts

¹ **Consejo extraordinario*, November 1, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

² " * . . . por la massima adoptada de ir minorando los secuaces del Instituto " (Grimaldi to Azpuru, February 9, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48).

³ *Ibid.* Cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 24, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5046.

⁴ *Laforcada and Coronel to Grimaldi, February 11, 1768, *ibid.*, 5048.

the king gave instructions that the two commissaries were to receive his gracious thanks.¹

But it was Spain above all other countries that refused to receive the secularized outcasts, for fear lest "they spread their fanaticism still further", for not merely Jesuits but also "Jesuitism" was to be rooted out.² Had they not the whole of Italy in which to settle, except for the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Parma, and Tuscany? ³ The consuls who had issued passports to those who had quitted the Society were reprimanded and were ordered to grant them in future only to those who had received special permission from the king to re-enter Spain.⁴ This permission was made dependent on precise information regarding the character and previous activity of each individual.⁵ Without it both Jesuits and ex-Jesuits were strictly forbidden to set foot on Spanish soil. Laymen were threatened with capital punishment, ordained priests with lifelong imprisonment, and any accomplices were to be treated as if guilty of high treason.⁶ A lay-brother who

¹ *Grimaldi to Laforcada and Coronel, March 1, 1768, *ibid.*

² " *Aunque se secularizaran, nunca seria yo de dictamen de que volviesen con la mala leche que han mamado. No basta extinguir los Jesuitas, es menester extinguir el Jesuitismo, y en los paises, donde han estado, hasta la memoria de su doctrina, politica y costumbres " (Roda to Azara, August 4, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, R).

³ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, September 15, 1767, and February 9, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47 and 48; *Roda to Grimaldi, September 12, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667; **Consejo extraordinario*, February 6, 1768, *ibid.*, Estado, 5045.

⁴ **Consejo extraordinario*, August 15, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

⁵ **Resolucion del Rey* [September 20, 1767], *ibid.*, 688; *Aróstegui to Grimaldi, October 13, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5045.

⁶ *Memorandum of the *Consejo extraordinario* of October 1, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 667; **Real Cedula* of October 18, 1767, *ibid.*, 688, printed version in the *Coleccion general*, I., 149 *seqq.*; *Vando* of October 21, 1767 (printed), Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, Papal Secret Archives.

had dared to return to his homeland was sentenced to imprisonment for life.¹

This systematic incitement to desertion was not without effect. The fortitude of the exiles had already been severely tried by the mental and physical hardships of the journey² and by the serious privations they had endured amid the vicissitudes of war in Corsica. In addition, the hopeless future that lay before them and, above all, the enticements, accusations, and promises of the Spanish officials must in many cases have played a decisive part in upsetting their equanimity. In the belief that by leaving the outlawed Society they would be able to return to their own country and to ordered conditions, they appealed to Rome to release them from their vows. Realizing their extraordinarily difficult situation, the Roman Curia dealt with their request in a sympathetic and generous spirit.³ On January 5th, 1768, Grimaldi forwarded to Roda a list of twenty-two Andalusian Jesuits who had obtained secularization.⁴ A second list, of January 7th,

¹ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, June 20, 1768, Cifre, *ibid.*, 305.

² The Government had given orders to the ships' commanders to treat the exiles well and to give them good food (*Arriaga "a los Intendentes y Ministros" on April 3, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Marina, 724; *Instruccion que deberá observar el Oficial primero de Contaduria D.F^{co} Huidobro y Sarabia, of June 6, 1768, *ibid.*). There are extant statements in which some of the Superiors apprised the commanders of their satisfaction with the treatment (*dated Calvi, July 15 and 16, 1767, *ibid.*), but there are also complaints. Thus, Fr. de Alva complained that his people suffered with hunger on the crossing from Corsica to Sestri (*to Cornejo, October 6, 1768, *ibid.*, Estado, 5058).

³ " *Bravamente les van visitas de los expulsos a Ud. y ai parece que con franqueza los desfrailan aun a los de 4^o voto sin pruebas, informes, ni conocimiento de causa, siendo tan frailes como los cartujos. Ojalá que todos dejasen la ropa, y se fuesen por el mundo, como no se nos vengan a España, ni vaian a las Indias " (Roda to Azara, September 1, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.).

⁴ Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 668.

contained the names of ninety-two ex-members of the Society.¹ On February 11th Azpuru forwarded a list of thirty-one secularized Jesuits, of whom twenty were professed.² On April 25th Grimaldi sent to the Minister of Justice a list of twenty-six Jesuits who had applied from Corsica for their release.³ On June 2nd, 1768, the Spanish ambassador requested the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the services of Pedro de Castro, who had successfully assisted many of the exiles to obtain their secularization. He reported at the same time that 138 banished Jesuits had fled from Corsica and had arrived in Rome.⁴ Of the Spanish Provinces of the Society, Aragon and Castile were the most successful in withstanding the test.⁵ Of the former a total of seventy-five members left the Society in the period ending with its suppression in 1773; of these, about forty, who had not taken solemn vows, entered the married state.⁶ Less powers of resistance were shown by the Province of Toledo; of its 621 members 138 or 140 left the Society, including 17 professed.⁷ An unnamed Jesuit of the Andalusian Province wrote to one of his brothers in religion that he was trying to avoid answering any questions on the number of the fugitives and ex-members, on account of the disgrace a truthful answer would bring on his Province.⁸ With the arrival in Spain of the Jesuits from South America the efforts to obtain secularization assumed disquieting proportions. The cause of this lay in the mutual national antipathy of the Europeans and the Creoles, which was said to be the worst feature of the Jesuit missions.⁹ In the past the

¹ **Razon de los ya secularizados, ibid.*, Estado, 5046.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 11, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* Gracia y Justicia, 668.

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 2, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp., 107.

⁵ *Laforcada and Coronel to Grimaldi, February 11, 1768 (see above, p. 176, n. 4).

⁶ *MS. in Jesuit possession, Aragonia, 17.

⁷ *Catalogus Prov. Baeticae 1767*, Madrid, 1896.

⁸ Undated *letter, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5651.

⁹ “. . . pues lo demas que se nota en la Compañia son las

Creoles thought that they had often been passed over when various offices were being filled and hitherto it had been possible to bridge the gap in a makeshift fashion only by the strict enforcement of religious discipline. In the present circumstances, where it was no longer possible to maintain discipline with the former strictness, and distress and want gave added impetus to already existing suspicions, a serious clash was almost inevitable. Already during the long and trying voyage the opposition between the Spaniards and the colonials, hitherto more or less latent, had broken out openly. The malcontents, or dissidents, as they are called in the reports, kept themselves apart from the Europeans and conferred as to how they could free themselves from their vows and return to their own country. True to its principle of encouraging the exiles' efforts to leave the Society, the Government, through its officials, held before the "Americans" the prospect of an immediate return to the New World and of obtaining there ecclesiastical positions of honour, if only they would abandon the Society. On landing, in accordance with their own request, the "Americans" were housed separately, away from the loyal Jesuits. On June 1st two royal decrees were read to them; in these the king called them his sons and promised them his protection and ecclesiastical dignities and positions of honour.¹ A list of July 14th, 1768, contains the names of 102 dissidents, including twenty-one professed Jesuits, who had applied for their release from Puerto de Santa Maria.² Not long afterwards the aforesaid Pedro de Castro was in receipt of twenty-three more applications for

divisiones que padecen los Europeos y Criollos, y los disgustos que de ello se les originan interiormente, sin que en todo lo demas de su gobierno se note cosa, que se haga reparable" (JORGE JUAN Y ANTONIO DE ULLOA, *Noticias secretas de America* [London, 1826, 532; cf. *ibid.*, 529, where the authors speak of the "pasion nacional que es incorregible y general en aquellos payses").

¹ CARAYON, XVI., 237 *seqq.*

² *Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. 107.

release coming from the same port.¹ On November 10th, 1768, forty-one American Jesuits were asking to be secularized ; all but one belonged to the Peruvian Province, and twenty-one had taken solemn vows.² The available information about the Mexican Province is more detailed. Of the 677 members who were living at the time of the expulsion, seventy-four, of whom fourteen were professed and three had once been rectors, left the Society in the period ending with the year of suppression ; these figures do not include novices.³ An official list of the names of all Jesuits of the Spanish Assistancy secularized in the period ending November, 1771, gives their number at 719, of whom twenty had died.⁴ The dissidents' request not to be sent to Italy, as they would be able to obtain their release

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, August 25, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5049 ; *Paolucci to Grimaldi, September 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 5048.

² *Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, *loc. cit.*

³ ZELIS, *Catálogo de los sugetos de la Comp. de Jesús que formaban la Prov. de México el día del arresto 25 de Junio del 1767*, México, 1871.

⁴ **Catálogo de los secularizados hasta todo el mes de Noviembre 1771*, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. 1771/72. A statistical summary made by the commissary Coronel on January 8, 1772, contains the following particulars of the numbers of secessions (the numbers in brackets denote the sub-divisions of priests, scholastics, and lay-brothers) :—

Aragonia 55 (23, 13, 19)	Andalusia 125 (58, 22, 45)
Castile 66 (28, 6, 32)	Toledo 125 (46, 28, 51)
Mexico 70 (35, 12, 23)	Peru 179 (101, 41, 37)
Chile 5 (2, 1, 2)	Paraguay 28 (14, 7, 7)
Quito 18 (7, 4, 7)	Santa Fe 16 (7, 1, 8)
Philippines 3 (2, 1, 0)	

**Estado o Resumen del numero de los Regulares de la Compañia extrañados de los dominios de España y America, que arribaron a Corcega y a estos Estados pontificios . . .*, Bologna, 1772, January 8, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Bolonia", 1767-1775.

from Spain, was not granted ;¹ they had to go along with the rest to Corsica, where their indiscipline was noted by the officials.²

That it was not exactly the best elements that deserted the banner of Loyola in the days of emergency and distress needs no elaborate demonstration. The Spanish Government, therefore, could have derived little joy or honour from their protégés. Suddenly rid of the protective discipline of their Order, with no serious occupation and with no mature knowledge of the world, which most of them had left between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, many succumbed to the attractions and seductions of the capital,³ to the deep regret of their General⁴ and their former brethren in religion who had kept faith⁵ and who had to see to their bitter sorrow how

¹ Report by Peter Weingartner to Joseph Erhard, in CARAYON, XVI., 341.

² *G. Gnecco to Grimaldi, August 7 and November 13, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5057.

³ “ *Es cierto, que no pocos, y cuasi todos Andaluces viven licenciosa y aun escandalosamente lo que dias hace me consta por las personas destinadas a seguirles los passos . . ., assegurándome que la vida de no pocos es escandalosa, y algunos han contraído ya la enfermedad que es consiguiente a ella ” (Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 16, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 107). “ *En la carta adjunta da cuenta Don Thomas Azpuru de la vida licenciosa que hacen algunos Regulares de la Compañía extrañados de los dominios del Rey, que han obtenido la secularizacion y residen a Roma ” (Grimaldi to Roda, July 4, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 668).

⁴ “ *La massima parte di questi dispersi era della provincia Betica. Il Generale non sapeva nè poteva sapere chi ottenesse dal Papa la soluzione de' voti. Questi scandali facevano il gran dolore del Generale ” (RICCI, *Espulsione*, 77).

⁵ “ *It gives us the greatest pain to tell you what is happening here and what has been done and is still being done by those who do not want to stay. Recognizing no Superiors, they do whatever they like, to the great scandal not only to us but also to the laity. However, God has allowed it so that the Society

these deserters had lost, "together with the Society, their vocation, their honour, the respect of their fellow men—in fact, everything."¹ In Rome, where at first the exiles had been treated with great restraint in view of their being Spanish subjects, the Cardinal Vicar was finally compelled to take action against them on account of the scandal they were giving.² His admonitions seem to have borne fruit, for from that time onward no further complaints were made by the Spanish representative.

The darker the shadows cast on the Society's escutcheon by the inconstancy and scandalous conduct of many of its former members, the brighter shines the heroic firmness of the great majority, who remained true to their sacred oaths and vows amid the greatest material and spiritual sacrifices and privations. As opposed to the hundreds who were weak there were thousands who were strong; these, after experiencing danger and vicissitudes of every kind, eked out a miserable existence as poor exiles in obscurity and neglect, on the niggardly pension allowed them by the Government of the Catholic king. Their silent heroism has elicited the following admission from a modern opponent of the Society: "In the history of the Society of Jesus there are many pages redounding to its glory, but, to my mind, none are more illustrious than those that record its death-struggle and expiry. Of these glorious chapters none can compare with those that tell us of the exertions, sufferings, and heroic virtues which distinguished the Jesuits of the Spanish Assistancy from the days when they left the shores of Spain until the time when they settled in the cities of the Papal States."³

may be free of such people" (Benno Ducrue to Schwarz, January 14, 1769, Archives of the German Province of the Society of Jesus, III., 21, No. 1³).

¹ Weingartner to Erhard, quoted by MUNDWILER in the *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XXVI. (1902), 645.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 21, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 107.

³ MIR, *Historia interna documentada de la Compañía de Jesús*, II., Madrid, 1913, 506.

Even many of the young novices, hardly out of their boyhood, displayed a courage and constancy that roused the admiration of their elders.¹ According to the instruction for the executive officials, they were to be kept separate from the Fathers, so as to be able to decide quite freely whether to follow the others into lifelong banishment, without a pension, or to go back to their parents. No one was to sway them in either direction.² Actually, they were urged for weeks on end by the executive officials by means of warnings and promises, threats and mental tortures of every kind, to abandon their vocation. In some cases they were forced to do so. Religious and seculars, whom they were forced to consult about their vocations, told them on occasions that they were guilty of a grave sin in obstinately clinging to the Society and that they were rebels against the authority set over them by God. Many of them were forcibly deprived of their religious dress and were sent home under an escort of military police. The seventy-nine novices of the Castilian Province had to undergo this mental torture seven times, so that it is a matter for surprise that in the end there were still twenty who preferred the hard fate of banishment with all its trials and privations to a life of honour and comfort.³ Of the thirty-nine novices of the Province of Aragon nineteen (twenty-two) followed the Fathers into exile.⁴ In a letter by an unknown writer there is mention of the extraordinary steadfastness of seven Spanish novices.⁵ Of the thirty-six Mexican novices thirteen held out.⁶

¹ *Schaternichts to Schwarz, dated Puerto de S. Maria, 1768, November 16, Archives of the German Province of the Society of Jesus, III., 21, No. 1².

² *Coleccion general*, I., 8 seq.

³ NAVARRETE, I., 110 seqq., 133 seqq., 239 seqq.; ISLA, *Memorial*, 34 seqq.; CARAYON, XV., 1-85; CORNELY in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, VIII. (1875), 408 seqq., 495 seqq.

⁴ LARRAZ, **De rebus Sociorum Prov. Aragoniae Soc. Iesu*, c. 33, in Jesuit possession, Arag. 30; cf. Arag. 17.

⁵ *To Fr. Schwarz, S.J., on September 23, 1767, Archives of the German Province, III., 21, No. 15.

⁶ ZELIS, *Catálogo* (see above, p. 181, n. 3).

Round about March 1769, after the death of Clement XIII., there arrived in Rome twenty-six novices from the Province of Quito who had remained true to their decision despite all the physical and mental trials they had undergone.¹

The reports and memoirs of the exiles are full of examples of the heroic fortitude with which so many Jesuits kept faith with their Order.² When, on account of his great age and his impaired health, the seventy-eight-year-old Calatayud was given the choice by the *alcalde* of Madrid of remaining in Spain, the venerable priest replied that he would rather die in exile than be separated from his brethren.³ On the day of departure, when the community was assembled in the refectory, partaking of some final refreshments, the sixty-four-year-old Isla received a stroke which partially deprived him of his speech. Although the doctors advised against it, he insisted on following the others in a litter. On the march, a second and third stroke made it impossible for him to continue the journey. After recovering to some extent under the loving care of the Benedictine monks of St. Martin in Santiago, he hurried after his brethren and reached the port of Ferrol in time to embark with them on the *Nepomuceno* for Italy.⁴ A shining example of vocational fidelity was given by the brothers José and Nicolás Pignatelli. A third brother, the Count of Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, moved every possible lever to induce them to leave the Society.⁵ Through his important connexions at Court he had received the king's assent to the

¹ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 126 and 151.

² The Jesuits, Roda *reported to Azara on the strength of intercepted letters, "ponderan y aplauden la resolucion del Papa de no admitirlos, y sufren estos trabajos como un martirio por el bien de la Iglesia perseguida: Los Aragoneses son los mas fanaticos, y todos desean perder la vida por la Compañia" (July 28, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.).

³ [RODELES], *Calatayud*, 441.

⁴ ISLA, *Memorial*, 135 seq.; GAUDEAU, *Prêcheurs burlesques en Espagne*, 103 seqq.

⁵ *Roda to Aranda, April 30, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

gates of the country being left open for them in the event of their leaving the Society.¹ He received the same reply from both, that they had no reason to turn their backs on the Order to which they were bound by their vows, and he was asked not to mention the subject again.² The French commander Marbeuf, following instructions from the Court of Paris, offered them the hospitality of his own house, but this invitation they politely refused, saying that they had no other wish but to share the lot of their brothers in religion.³

In a circular letter from the Cardinal Secretary of State it was impressed on every Papal legate that it was his duty to treat the exiles from Corsica in an affectionate manner. The simultaneous prohibition against keeping them permanently in the Italian houses of the Society was due to the fear lest their pensions be taken away from them and the colleges be burdened with the cost of their support.⁴

As soon as a survey could be made of the chaotic conditions created by the precipitate removal of the Jesuits from Corsica a systematic distribution of the exiles was taken in hand. The

¹ **Consejo extraordinario*, May 11, 1767, *ibid.*; Count Fuentes to his brothers, dated Paris, 1767, in NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 259 *seq.*

² José and Nicolás Pignatelli to Joaquín Pignatelli, July 8, 1767, in NONELL, I., 260 *seq.* " *Los PP. Pignatelli han respondido a su hermano el conde de Fuentes, que no les escriba, si les ha de hablar de que dejen la ropa : que por ninguna de este mundo abandonarán la Religion, que han profesado. Fuentes, porque vuelvan sus hermanos a España, ha puesto a Choiseul en el empeño de la extincion de la Compañía " (Roda to Azara, August 4, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 230).

³ " *En virtud de las ordenes, que se dieron de Paris a Marbeuf, para que distinguiese a los hermanos del conde de Fuentes, quando llegase aí la conducta de los Jesuitas, los ha querido hacer desembarcar Marbeuf, hospedarlos y cortejarlos ; pero ellos no han querido sino seguir la suerte de sus hermanos de orden. Vea V^m, que traxa de dexar la sotana, como pretende el conde, que lo executen " (Roda to Azara, June 16, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *loc. cit.*). NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 258).

⁴ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 132.

Province of Castile and the greater part of the Mexican Province were accommodated in the legation of Bologna. The Provinces of Aragon and Peru and the rest of Mexico were allotted to Ferrara. The Province of Toledo found a home in Forlì, that of Andalusia in Rimini, that of Paraguay in Faenza. The Provinces of Santa Fe and Quito were ensconced in various towns in the March of Ancona and the Duchy of Urbino, such as Pesaro, Fano, Sinigaglia, and Gubbio, and the members of the little Province of the Philippines settled at Bagnacavallo.¹ Although the conditions were necessarily very humble on account of the meagreness of the pensions, life in the Papal States was far more tolerable and orderly than it had been amid the strife in Corsica, as was reflected in the diminution of departures from the Society. Not that there was any lack of trials of every kind here too. One of the most easily borne was the denunciation of scholastics and lay-brothers in Bologna for seeking distraction in military exercises, the exercises in actual fact being of a spiritual nature.² The Madrid Government continued its work of persecution in a petty manner. On June 14th, 1769, the General of the Society was directly required to cancel the Spanish and American place-names which had been given to the Society's Provinces and houses and not to give them such names in the future. If this request was not complied with in thirty days the pensions of all the exiles would be permanently withdrawn.³

¹ NONELL, *Pignatelli*, I., 330; [RODELES], *Calatayud*, 546 *seqq.*

² *Zambeccari to Roda, December 31, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 668; GALLERANI-MADARIAGA, 57, n. 1.

³ **Consejo extraordinario*, May 28, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 49; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, May 30, 1769, *ibid.*; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 14 and 15, 1769, *ibid.*, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 108; *Letter from the notary Mariotti to Ricci, June 27, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{2}{10} \frac{2}{37}$; *Tanucci to Orsini, June 20, 1769, *ibid.*; **Intima al P. Generale per non fare più Superiori con titolo delle provincie di Spagna*, June 14, 1769, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 186.

Naturally loath to expose the unfortunates to complete destitution, Ricci was obliged to submit to this interference with the internal affairs of the Society and to give different names to the Provinces and houses, such as the Province of the Most Holy Trinity.¹ A more serious trouble was that the pensions, which in any case were small enough, were paid with ever greater irregularity and delay. The Jesuit Idiaquez took the distress of his brethren so much to heart that he appealed to the king's confessor to help in this direction.²

Owing to the abundance of priests in Italy, activity in the care of souls was confined within narrow bounds, in consequence of which many of the exiles took to academic work. Some of them won for themselves a not inconsiderable reputation in the Italian literary movement of the day.³ Perhaps the most distinguished of them was Juan Andrés, whose prose compositions were not inferior to those of his most esteemed Italian contemporaries. His writings were concerned with the most varied spheres of knowledge, including physics, numismatics, astronomy, archæology, the instruction of the deaf and dumb, and literature. After teaching philosophy in Ferrara for several years, he was called as Court Librarian, first to Parma and then to Naples, and was finally appointed by the Austrian Government in 1799 as Prefect of Studies and President of the *Accademia Ticinese*. His work in seven volumes on the world's literature was so much admired by scholars that while he was still living the Spanish Government set up a special chair in the College of San Isidro for the purpose of introducing young students to this work.⁴ Of no less importance were Eximeno,⁵ Thiulen,⁶

¹ RICCI, **Espulsione*, 160.

² *Idiaquez to Osma, dated Bologna, 1771, May 3, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

³ Cf. CIAN in the *Accademia Reale delle scienze di Torino*, 1894/95, Torino, 1895 (where further works are mentioned); *Civ. Catt.*, 16, Series V. (1896), 152 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 16 *seqq.*; GALLERANI-MADARIAGA, 68 *seqq.*

⁵ GALLERANI-MADARIAGA, 81.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

and Hervás y Panduro,¹ the last-named being, when he died in 1809, the Prefect of the Quirinal Library founded by Pius VII.

After the expulsion, the surveillance of Jesuit correspondence was continued on a still more extensive scale. The Spanish post-master in Rome, Juan de la Riva, received instructions from Azpuru on May 27th, 1767, to deliver either to himself or to the Foreign Minister Grimaldi all letters from Spain addressed to Jesuits.² This instruction was amended soon afterwards by Grimaldi, to the effect that the postal missives in question were to be handed only to Azpuru.³ Letters to and from the kingdom of Naples destined for Jesuits were opened in the same way. Even the transmission of messages through private persons did not always secure their privacy, for the Fathers were sometimes betrayed by false friends.⁴ When Count Rosenbergh, the Tuscan representative, firmly refused to surrender the Jesuit mail and designated such a procedure as unjust, Tanucci professed great astonishment and pretended to view this attitude as a hostile act towards the Catholic king.⁵ Choiseul, on the other hand, immediately

¹ *Ibid.*, 84; PORTILLO, *Lorenzo Hervás. Su vida y sus escritos* (1735-1809), in *Razón y Fe*, XXV., 34 *seqq.* For his services to philology, see MAX MÜLLER, *Die Wissenschaft der Sprache*, I., Leipzig, 1892, 155 *seq.*

² “ *Conveniéndolo al real servicio de S. M. que se remitan al Sr. Marques de Grimaldi o se me entreguen todas las cartas que por los ordinarios puedan venir de España a ese oficio para Jesuitas, lo prevengo a V^m para su gobierno ” (Azpuru to I. de la Riva, May 27, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 106). *Riva to Grimaldi, May 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5046.

³ *Grimaldi to Riva, June 16, 1767, *ibid.*; *Riva to Grimaldi, October 29, 1767, *ibid.*, 5045.

⁴ *Copy of a letter with no signature or name of addressee, dated Palermo, 1767, July 8, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

⁵ *To Azpuru, November 3, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. “ Espulsion de los Jesuitas ”, 1767.

fell in with the Spanish request.¹ Du Tillot not only had the Jesuits' letters intercepted but by every kind of chicanery had their manuscripts removed from their carriages as they were travelling to the Papal States by way of Parma.² For this service he was specially commended by the king.³

Interference with the mail was not confined to Jesuit correspondence. The disappearance of letters⁴ and convenient "errors", such as the affixing of an incorrect seal,⁵ showed the Papal representatives that communication between the Secretary of State in Rome and the nuncios was being closely watched; either the packets were being opened by Government agents or copies were being made for the Government by cipher clerks in the nunciature's chancery who had been bribed.⁶ Even if the numerous copies in the State Archives of Simancas had not been preserved, the correspondence between

¹ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, November 9, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045; *Choiseul to Fuentes [November 20, 1767], *ibid.* " *Me ha dicho este Ministro que habia dada lo orden de abrir todas las cartas que se encontrasen en dichos oficios de correos para Italia, fuesen para quien fuesen . . ." (Fuentes to Grimaldi, December 7, 1767, *ibid.*, 4565).

² *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, September, 28, 1768, *ibid.*, 5048.

³ *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, February 19, 1769, *ibid.*

⁴ " *Garampi le fa sapere, che quella lettera riservata, che ella in più dispacchi ha scritto che sarebbe per altra mano pervenuta al sig. card. Torrigiani, non è per anche comparsa " (Garampi to Vincenti, September 14, 1768, Nunziat. di Spagna, 412, Papal Secret Archives).

⁵ *Torrighiani to Vincenti, May 19, 1768, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433.

⁶ *Garampi to Lucini, November 26, 1767, Cifre, *ibid.*, 304, and Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767, Estado, 5072. It is worth noting that for some time Pallavicini withheld access to the archives of the nunciature from his successor Lucini (*Lucini to Torrigiani, August 11 and 18 and September 15, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Lucini, August 27, October 1 and 15, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, August 13, September 17 and 27, 1767, *ibid.*, 412; *Torrighiani to Pocobelli, October 8, 1767, *ibid.*).

the Ministers would have been a sufficient proof of the fact. Thus, on August 11th, 1767, Grimaldi forwarded Roda an intercepted letter from Torrigiani to Vincenti, with the remark that he would have a copy of the part relating to Naples sent to Tanucci.¹ The correspondence of the Spanish Bishops and such private persons as were thought to have relations with the Jesuits was subjected to similar interceptions.²

Not content with violating the secrecy of the post, the Spanish envoy in Rome employed spies to watch the Fathers in their colleges. An architectural student, Mariano Miner, who had two brothers in the Society, managed to worm his way into the house "al Gesu" on the pretext of wanting to know his relatives' addresses in Corsica, and he succeeded in gaining the confidence of the Spanish procurator Andrés.³ The discoveries he made were of no moment, though he managed to ferret out the channels by which the Roman Jesuits communicated with their brethren in Spain, Corsica, and Naples.⁴ After Miner had been exposed in his true colours⁵

¹ *Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667. " *Despues de un prolijo reconocimiento de las cartas que van y vienen de Italia, no he conseguido mas fruto que el de las inspidas copias relativas a asuntos de los Regulares de la Compañia, y me es sensible el no poder conseguir otras correspondencias de los sujetos sospechosos que V. Ex^a se ha dignado indicarme : a ellas van agregadas las demas que ha producido la tarea reservada . . ." (J. Fernandez de Alonso to Grimaldi, November 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777). *Nota [October 6, 1767 ?], autograph by Llaguno, *ibid.*, Estado, 5045.

² *Itúrbide to Grimaldi, July 8, 1770, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 670 ; undated *Nota from Llaguno [1767/68], *ibid.*, Estado, 5045.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 10 and 17, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045 and 5046.

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, October 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 5045 ; *Tanucci to Azpuru, October 17, 1767, *ibid.*, 6002 ; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, November 3, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47.

⁵ **Delacion contra el P. Andres*, November 9, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet. in Madrid, Chamartin, P.

various information was obtained by Azpuru from the professed house by means of other spies.¹ Whether their reports were due to misunderstanding or to pure invention is of minor importance, but they were not always in agreement with the facts.²

It would have been of considerable interest to the Spanish Minister to know where the Jesuits had hidden their "treasures", regarding the magnitude of which the most incredible rumours were afloat. Thus, Azara asserted in all seriousness that the Province of Paraguay alone contributed yearly, at a modest computation, four million *pesos* to the Society's funds.³ The Venetian envoy Erizzo may have been drawing on the same source of information when he accused the General of the Society of having been swayed by selfish motives, with no regard for the demands of humanity, in using every means to prevent the exiles landing in Civitavecchia; he preferred, said Erizzo, to use the huge treasures which the Society had obtained from Paraguay and which it had accumulated in the Papal States, for his own secret plans rather than for the support of his destitute brethren.⁴ Details about the wealth of the Jesuits eventually assumed fantastic proportions. The supplement of an unidentified journal⁵ contained the report from Genoa of an inventory found by the Government commission in the college at Barcelona. In the

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 26 and December 17, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 25, 1768, *ibid.*, 5046.

³ ' *Hablemos solamente de Paraguay, adonde los Padres en vez de ir a padecer el martirio, van a reinar y en cambio de trabajos van a coger tesoros, conveniencias y regalos. Segun el calculo mas reducido, que yo he sacado de las memorias de un Jesuita que fue allí misionero, pasa el producto que da anualmente aquella provincia a la Compañia de quatro millones de pesos " (Azara to Grimaldi, February 5, 1767, *ibid.*, 5095).

⁴ *Erizzo to the Doge, May 16, 1767, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 286.

⁵ *Gazzetta di Mantova*? *Lucini to Torrigiani, September 12, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*

cellars, besides a vast number of stamped pieces of gold and silver, large bags of diamonds, rubies, and other precious stones had been discovered, and on the country estates herds of cows, bulls, and sheep were to be counted by the thousand.¹ In response to an inquiry by Torrigiani² as to the facts, the nuncio Lucini assured him that neither in Madrid nor Barcelona was there any knowledge or talk of such a discovery, so that he had to assume that it was a pure slander.³ It was possible, he added, that the Jesuits of Barcelona had possessed a rich church-treasure of silver or had had the custody of valuables belonging to the laity, as was the case in Madrid, where after the expulsion the owners had reclaimed and recovered their property.⁴ In like manner, as the result of searching questions put by the envoy Masserano to the director of the Bank of England, the stories about the sixteen million pounds sterling which the Jesuits had deposited with the bank, and the fourteen million gulden which they had conveyed to a safe place in Holland, were shown to be sheer inventions.⁵ The exaggerated descriptions of the Society's possessions were put abroad largely for the purpose of undermining its good name and to make it disliked by the people, whereas in fact its material condition was far from brilliant.⁶ The difficulties

¹ Gold and silver pieces : 33,662 *pezze* ; diamonds, rubies, etc. : 56,441 *pezze* ; gold cross with diamonds and rubies : 18,000 *pezze* ; 4700 sheep, 1200 bullocks, 652 cows, etc. (Genoa [1767], August 20, *Nota, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.).

² *Torrighiani to Lucini, September 3, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

³ *Lucini to Torrigiani, September 22, 1767, Cifre, *ibid.*, 304.

⁴ *Lucini to Torrigiani, September 29, 1767, *ibid.*

⁵ *Masserano to Grimaldi, October 14 and November 18, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6969 ; *Grimaldi to Masserano, October 31, 1768, *ibid.* ; *Vincenti to Garãmpi, April 11, 1769, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

⁶ " *Entre otras cosas desearia yo mucho, que no fuesemos tantos en Madrid, en donde está la mitad de esta provincia. Esto nos hace daño, como otras cosas, singularmente en la calidad de las haciendas. Mas el ruido que nos daña y hace poco honor,

encountered in providing for the exiled Portuguese Jesuits were only too well known,¹ and even Tanucci admitted that the Society could not find the money necessary for the support of the thousands of banished Spaniards.²

Rumours which bore the stamp of invention but which were treated with all seriousness by the Ministers of the time, were current not only about the Society's wealth but also about its hostile intentions towards Spain and its colonies. The whole business might justly be regarded as a deliberate trick to confirm the king, who was in any case of a suspicious nature, in his antipathy towards the Society and to prepare him for plans of still greater import. Thus, Prince Masserano reported from London on April 30th, 1767, that the Portuguese envoy De Mello, when informed of the Jesuit expulsion, told him that these Religious were buying arms in England and intended to employ as soldiers and officers Slavs and Swiss, who would be shipped to Paraguay from Ancona and Civitavecchia. Masserano advised Grimaldi to see if Mello had some ulterior political motives in repeating such rumours.³ Although thoroughgoing inquiries proved them to be groundless,⁴ the envoy received instructions to probe still deeper into the matter⁵; he could only report, however, that there was no

que la substancia, que es bien miserable. Quisiera yo que los que nos aborrecen por ricos, fuesen Provinciales nuestros un par de años. Pero el ser pobres no nos daña; lo que nos perjudica, es parecer ricos" (Anton Mourin to Fr. Montes in Rome, dated Madrid, 1767, February 28, *ibid.*, 777).

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 337. " *Dissi [to Emperor Joseph II.] sapere l'angustia grande per i soli Portoghesi, ed i molti argenti delle loro chiese, già dati dal Generale per prevedere alla sussistenza di quelli " (*Diario del cardinal Visconti*, December 25, 1767, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 394, fasc. C, Papal Secret Archives).

² Cf. above, p. 88.

³ *Masserano to Grimaldi, April 30, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6964.

⁴ *Masserano to Grimaldi, May 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 5062.

⁵ *Grimaldi to Masserano, May 25, 1767, *ibid.*, 6964.

cause for anxiety.¹ Similar messages about the machinations of the Jesuits came in from Rome,² Lucerne,³ Venice,⁴ Lisbon,⁵ and Buenos Ayres.⁶ At one time it was a plot against the king's life,⁷ at another it was a question of the Jesuits going as parish priests to Florida, which the English Government intended to settle.⁸ This was soon followed by the rumour of a joint incursion of the Jesuits and English into Paraguay or some other South American colony.⁹ Maps with the names of places and fortresses in Portugal, which had been found in the noviciate of Villagarcia, and three treatises on military, educational, and financial administration, which had been brought to light in some other place, were sufficient confirmation for the Fiscal Moñino of the vast plans which had

1 " *Haviendo continuado mis diligencias para averiguar, si los Jesuitas han hecho pasar armas de aqui para el Paraguay, como me havian dicho, hallo que tampoco consta en esta aduana que se hayan embarcado ningunas armas desde Agosto del año pasado hasta fin del año. Ya en otra ocasion he escrito a V. E. que no se hallaba que se huviesen embarcado sino 28 fusiles para Holanda en el curso del presente " (Masserano to Grimaldi, June 10, 1767, *ibid.*).

2 *Lopez de la Barrera to Roda, June 4, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet. in Madrid, Chamartin, P.

3 Conde del Asalto to Grimaldi, June 12, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5048.

4 *Vignola to the Venetian Senate, dated London, 1767, July 14, *ibid.*, 5762. This letter was sent to his Government by the Spanish envoy, the Duca de Montealegre.

5 *Pombal to Souza, June 16, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4564.

6 **Consejo extraordinario*, September 5, 1768, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

7 *Lopez de la Barrera to Roda, June 4, 1767, *loc. cit.*

8 *Vignola to the Venetian Senate, July 14, 1767, *loc. cit.*; **Consejo extraordinario*, September 8, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

9 *Pombal to Souza, June 16, 1767, *loc. cit.*; *Grimaldi to Roda, September 1, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 688; **Consejo extraordinario*, September 17, 1767, *ibid.*

been nursed by the exiles, especially with regard to the colonies.¹ Other town-plans and documents from the college in Barcelona were decisive proof for the Ministers that the revolt would certainly have broken out in that great seaport if timely measures had not been taken to prevent it.² Under date July 7th, 1767, a circular letter was sent by the Foreign Minister to the Spanish representatives at foreign Courts instructing them to acquire precise information about Jesuit intentions and activities.³ Once again all investigations proved fruitless.⁴ On December 9th, 1767, Roda forwarded to Count Aranda an anonymous letter which the French ambassador had brought to his attention. In this there was talk of another Sicilian Vespers having been planned for Christmas Eve in Madrid, at which the Protector of the Faith would appear with the flag of the Faith.⁵

Greater importance was attributed to the rumour that Lavalette, under the name of Duclos, was recruiting troops in Flanders and was buying munitions, with the intention of sailing in a man-of-war to Madeira and thence to Chile or Paraguay, in order to conquer these colonies for England.⁶ On three occasions the Extraordinary Council of Castile gave its attention to this adventurous affair⁷ and the Fiscal Campomanes expressed his settled conviction that the Britons

¹ *Valle y Salazar to Roda, January 18 and February 6, 1768, *ibid.*

² *Valle y Salazar to Roda, February 18, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *Roda to Grimaldi, June 14, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 5062; Grimaldi's circular *note of July 1767, *ibid.*; *Grimaldi, on July 7, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47.

⁴ *Mahony to Grimaldi, August 12, 1767, Arch. general central in Madrid, Estado, 3518; *Grimaldi to Roda, September 1, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 667.

⁶ *Masserano to Grimaldi, June 22, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 6964; *Roda to Azara, September 1, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

⁷ **Consejo extraordinario*, September 5, 8, and 17, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

and Jesuits were in close political relationship. The bogey vanished only with the news that the volatile ex-Jesuit had been arrested in Toulouse. It was only on account of his ill-health that he was not being taken to Paris, and the Spanish Government would be sent an abstract of the suit that would be brought against him.¹ Finally, Count Fuentes was able to report that Lavalette was dead. Choiseul, he wrote, had not been able to find anything of importance in the papers he had left but would submit them to him for inspection.² It was also fear for the colonies, either real or feigned, that caused the arrest of the two procurators of the Province of Quito and the retention for many years of German missionaries in Spanish convents.³

The Spanish Government not only set a watch on every step taken by the exiles abroad but tried to suppress every manifestation in favour of the Society that might be made at home. According to reports that reached Ricci, all festivals of the Jesuit Saints were forbidden.⁴ A printed decree of the Fiscal Moñino⁵ was directed against the prophecies of some

¹ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, September 28, 1767, *ibid.*, Estado, 4564; *Fuentes to Grimaldi, October 12, 1767, *ibid.*; *Masserano to Grimaldi, October 23, 1767, *ibid.*, 6965.

² *Fuentes to Grimaldi, January 31, 1768, *ibid.*, 4566. Actually Lavalette was never in prison; he died in his own apartments in Toulouse on December 13, 1767; see ROCHEMONTEIX, *Lavalette à Martinique*, 278. Further *reports by Masserano on the Lavalette affair are in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6994 and 6995.

³ MUNDWILER in the *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XXVI. (1902), 621 *seqq.*

⁴ RICCI, **Espulsione*, n. 161.

⁵ *Carta circular a los Diocesanos y Superiores Regulares respecto a los Conventos de Monjas, dirigidos antes por los expulsos, y ahora por los secuaces de su fanatismo*, of October 23, 1767, in the *Coleccion general*, I., 154 *seqq.*; *Suplemento a la circular de 23 Octubre de 1767, dirigida a los Diocesanos y Superiores Regulares. Instrumentos autenticos que prueban la obstinacion de los Regulares expulsos y sus secuaces, fingiendo supuestos milagros para comover y mantener el fanatismo sobre su regreso*, *ibid.*, II., 6-43.

nuns who announced the speedy restoration of the Society in Spain.¹ His colleague Campomanes urged Roda to take decisive action against twenty-seven recalcitrant Dominican nuns who refused to submit to the ordinances on this subject issued by the Government and by their Superiors.² Don José Agustín de Uriarte, by a resolution of the Extraordinary Council passed on November 17th, 1767,³ was relieved of his post as Inquisitor in Saragossa for having written to the two procurators of Quito interned in Gerona and to his sister, a Dominican nun in Vitoria, disapproving of the action taken by the leading Spanish statesmen against the Jesuits.⁴ In spite of the strict prohibition contained in the royal pragmatic, one satire after another in favour of the exiles appeared in print. Both the Inquisition⁵ and the Government⁶ found themselves forced to proceed against them. As late as 1772 Roda was urging President Aranda to take definite steps against these writings, which by their criticism of the expulsion of the Jesuits and their demand for their recall amounted to a reviling of the most just decisions of the Government.⁷ A Carmelite who had had the temerity to send Aranda a lampoon against the king was locked up in the convent prison.⁸ The Piarist General sent a long letter of apology to Roda because some appreciations of the Jesuits had found their way into the biography of the founder of the Order. It had

¹ *Roda to Aranda, July 12 and August 6, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

² *Campomanes to Roda, November 30, 1767, *ibid.*, 688.

³ **Consejo extraordinario*, November 17, 1767, *ibid.*, 582.

⁴ *November 3, 1767, *ibid.* Cf. **Consejo extraordinario*, May 29, 1771, *ibid.*

⁵ Decree of the Inquisition in Madrid, April, 1768 (printed), Nunziat. di Spagna, 305, Papal Secret Archives.

⁶ *Real Cedula* of October 3, 1769 (printed), Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

⁷ *Roda to Aranda, September 25, 1772, *ibid.*

⁸ *The General of the Discalced Carmelites to Fr. Juan Evangelista de Jesús Maria, July 29, 1769, *ibid.*, 777.

happened, he pleaded, before the expulsion and had been done solely with a view to the forthcoming canonization of the founder. In the Spanish translation, he continued, the offending phrases had been omitted. He ended with the assurance that the spirit of his Order was utterly opposed to that of the Jesuits and to their doctrines and principles. All his brethren were devoted admirers of the Spanish monarch.¹

No opportunity was neglected by the Madrid Government in its determination to rid the country of every trace of "Jesuitism". In the decree setting out the new system of education the Jesuit monopoly was held responsible for the neglect of Latin and the low standard of public instruction.² All universities and theological schools were forbidden to defend the doctrine of regicide and tyrannicide³; similarly all the professorial chairs of the so-called Jesuit school were abolished, and the use of Jesuit textbooks, especially the moral philosophy of Busenbaum, was forbidden.⁴ A letter from the Provincial of the Calced Augustinians⁵ bristling with grisly charges against the Jesuit missionaries, was forwarded with a covering note from the king to the Spanish ambassador

¹ *January 21, 1768, *ibid.*, 666.

² " . . . particularmente en lo tocante a las primeras letras, latinidad y retórica, que tubieron en sí como estancada los citados Regulares de la Compañía, de que nació la decadencia de las letras humanas . . ." (*Real Provision* of October 5, 1767, in the *Coleccion general*, I., 137).

³ *Real Cedula* of May 23, 1767, *ibid.*, 144 *seqq.* On taking their degree candidates for doctorates had to make the following sworn promise: " Etiam iuro me nunquam promoturum, defensurum docturum directe neque indirecte quaestiones contra auctoritatem civilem, regiaque Regalia " (*Real Cedula* of January 22, 1771, cited in MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 164).

⁴ **Real Cedula* of August 12, 1768, Arch. general central in Madrid, Estado, 4900.

⁵ *Fr. Juan Rodriguez to Charles III., dated Chao-King-Fu, 1766, Nov. 29, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48.

to the Holy See,¹ obviously in order that it might be used in the war against the Society. The press campaign against the banished clerics was both openly and secretly encouraged by the Ministers. Many of the Society's enemies would have had the Government publish the reasons for the banishment, supported by documents from the Society's archives,² but this, it was stated, was contrary to the king's desire and was to be done only as a last resource.³ A certain Contini who had undertaken the defence in Italy of the measures adopted by the Extraordinary Council was led to believe that he would be recompensed for his trouble.⁴ Similarly encouragement was given to the dissemination of the *Historia chronologica*, which had been published on Pombal's instructions.⁵ The prelate Marefoschi, who had provided anti-Jesuit writers with material from the archives of the Propaganda, was given to understand that Charles III. would use his influence to obtain for him a Cardinal's hat.⁶ The action taken by the Venetian Republic to put a stop to the spate of abusive writings met with Roda's disapproval, but he was at pains to protect from the disciplinary measures of the Cardinal Secretary of State a certain Farina who had reviled the Jesuits in the coarsest fashion.⁷ The Madrid Gazette was allowed to announce unhindered the printing of the Bishop of Gerona's pastoral letter and the Spanish translation of an anti-Jesuit book in Portuguese.⁸ A year later the Extraordinary Council gave permission for the sale of the book by the ex-Jesuit Ibañez

¹ *Charles III. to Azpuru, February 6, 1768, *ibid.*; *Thomas de Mello to Azpuru, February 6, 1768, *ibid.*

² *Vasquez to Roda, July 9, 1769, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, *Cartas de Vasquez*, Vol. I.

³ *Roda to Azara, April 7 and September 22, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

⁴ *Roda to Azara, September 1, 1767, *ibid.*

⁵ *Roda to Azara, September 22, 1767, *ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Roda to Azara, September 29, 1767, *ibid.*

⁸ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, June 7, 1768, Cifre, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 305, *loc. cit.*

on the Jesuit State in Paraguay¹ and other such works, on the ground that they were suitable for opening the eyes of the people to the despotism of the Society of Jesus in the missionary field.²

After the expulsion of the Jesuits the general tendency to repress the influence of the Church became still stronger in Spain. Only a few months had passed when Campomanes made his first attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the nunciature,³ and he succeeded in prejudicing the whole Council of Castile against it.⁴ Already on February 20th, 1766, in his capacity of Fiscal, he had submitted a request both to the king and to Roda, the Minister of Justice, for the re-enforcement, to preserve the royal prerogative, of the pragmatic of January 18th, 1762, which had been suspended.⁵ This would preclude Papal Bulls and other decrees being disseminated in the country without the royal endorsement. At the time of writing, he alleged, the Jesuits were putting into circulation the last Bull, of 1765, confirming their Institute, also Spanish translations of French apologetic works defending the Society, and Papal Briefs to the Bishops. If such controversial matters as these were disregarded, popular unrest might result, disunity and disorder would develop, and authority would be shaken. In his letter to Roda, Campomanes suggested also some alterations in the censorship regulations, for he had heard that the Inquisition was about to condemn certain books,

¹ *El Reyno Jesuitico del Paraguay por siglo y medio negado y oculto, hoy demostrado y descubierto su autor D. Bernardo Ibañez de Echavarri*, Madrid, 1770. The work forms the fourth volume of the *Coleccion general*. Cf. above, p. 4.

² **Consejo extraordinario*, July 18, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 669.

³ *Lucini to Torrigiani, August 18 and September 1, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.* Even the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo was an opponent of the jurisdictional powers of the nunciature (*ibid.*). *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, May 21, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433.

⁴ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, May 31, 1768, Cifre, *ibid.*, 305.

⁵ See above, p. 25.

which would certainly not be to the advantage of public instruction and would injure the royal prerogative. The malpractice of printing Bulls and Papal decrees without the royal assent had recently been prohibited, he observed, in France, Portugal, Parma, and Naples.¹ Two years passed before Charles III. decided to yield to his Ministers' importunity. Finally, by the pragmatic sanction of June 16th, 1768, he decreed that all Bulls, Briefs, and edicts of the Roman Curia, in so far as they were not concerned with matters of conscience, were to be submitted to the Council of Castile before publication.² The grief inflicted on the Pope by this fresh encroachment on ecclesiastical freedom was rendered still more bitter by the fact that whereas formerly the Bishops had remonstrated with the monarch and had demanded the withdrawal of the measure, the present pragmatic had been drawn up with the approval and on the advice of five prelates.³

In 1766 a Spanish translation of the *Febronius* had appeared, and in the following year the Council of Castile, adopting a proposal by Campomanes, decided to have the original reprinted.⁴ Lucini, on taking over the nunciature, hoped to have the work condemned,⁵ but in June, 1768, Vincenti was sure that both Pereira and the *Febronius* would be circulated with impunity.⁶ On all sides the demand was being made, sometimes with threats, that bounds be set to the power and influence of Rome.⁷ The example set by the Imperial Lieutenant, Count Firmian, who had prohibited the Lombard

¹ *Campomanes to Charles III. and Roda, February 20, 1766, Arch. general central in Madrid, Estado, 2872.

² *Pragmatica Sancion* of June 16, 1768 (printed), Nunziat. di Spagna, 305, *loc. cit.*

³ *Torrighiani to Vincenti, July 7, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222.

⁴ REUSCH, *Index*, II., 941 *seq.*

⁵ *Lucini to Torrighiani, August 11, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*; *Vincenti to Torrighiani, June 23, 1767, *ibid.*

⁶ *Vincenti to Garampi, June 28, 1768, *ibid.*, 305.

⁷ *Visconti to Torrighiani, September 24, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, Papal Secret Archives.

Bishops from proceeding with the publication of the Bull *In Coena Domini*,¹ was soon followed in Spain.² On the occasion of the dispute between Parma and Rome, Campomanes published a work entitled *Juicio imparcial* (Impartial Judgment) and had it sent to the Bishops and cathedral chapters.³ It had received the approbation of the five prelates whom the Government had appointed to the Extraordinary Council to participate in the deliberation on the distribution of Jesuit property.⁴ It was clear that the object of the work was to transplant into Spain the Gallican idea of canon law. However, the principles it put forward, many of which had been taken from the *Febronius* and torn from their historical context, caused such a stir and so much indignation that the king ordered the work to be withdrawn for revision.⁵

Soon after the expulsion of the Jesuits the Extraordinary Council, influenced by Tanucci,⁶ turned its attention to their

¹ *Visconti to Torrigiani, October 10, 1768, *ibid.*, 388.

² *Vincenti to Torrigiani, June 20, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 305, *loc. cit.*

³ *Juicio imparcial sobre las letras en forma de Breve que ha publicado la Curia Romana, en que se intentan derogar ciertos edictos del Serenísimo Señor Infante Duque de Parma y disputarle la soberanía temporal con este pretexto* (1768). The work was composed by Campomanes and edited by Moñino (REUSCH, *Index*, II., 937). Cf. below, pp. 302 *seqq.*

⁴ *Vincenti to Pallavicini, August 15 and 29, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

⁵ *D. I. Fermin de la Garde to the Bishop of Gerona, September 17, 1768, *ibid.*, 777; *the Bishop of Gerona to D. I. de la Garde, September 25 and 28, 1768, *ibid.* Cf. FERRER DEL RIO, II., 235 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 255 *seq.*; MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 155 *seqq.* According to Menéndez y Pelayo (III., 156), among other statements appearing in the work is the following: "En los primeros siglos de la Iglesia . . . nada se hizo sin la inspección y consentimiento real aun en materias infalibles, dictadas por el Espíritu Santo."

⁶ *Tanucci to Losada, March 24, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6000; *Tanucci to Charles III., July 14 and 21, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

confraternities and their sodalities of the Blessed Virgin Mary,¹ which, according to the Fiscal Campomanes, had been nothing but secret societies and instruments for political intrigue under the cloak of religion.² Accepting his opinion, the Council asked for the dissolution of all confraternities attached to former Jesuit churches in Spain and its colonies. The proposal did not at the time meet with the king's approval; several more promptings were necessary³ before he finally ordered, on September 7th, 1770, the abolition of all sodalities attached to the former Jesuit churches in Madrid.⁴

The extent to which the ecclesiastical spirit had atrophied is to be seen in a circular letter addressed by the Infante Don Gabriel to the Order of St. John of the Spanish tongue, in which he invoked the Jansenistic Council of Utrecht as an authority against the Jesuit doctrine of tyrannicide.⁵ One Bishop went so far as to defend this schismatic Church.⁶ In view of such incidents as this it is not surprising that the

¹ **Consejo extraordinario*, September 26, 1767, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

² *Ibid.*; **Consejo extraordinario*, February 8, 1768, *ibid.* 690.

³ "Para la aplicacion de los bienes que pertenezcan a las ilegítimas Congregaciones clandestinas erigidas en las casas y colegios de los Regulares expulsos, cuya extincion es precisa, como en la mayor parte forman un cuerpo confederado de Terciarios, se tendrán presentes los Seminarios conciliares, Casas de hospitalidad, y otros fines piadosos, segun hubiere lugar, y pidan las circunstancias" (*Real Cedula* of August 14, 1768, in the *Coleccion general*, II., 90). "Sobre que cesen las Congregaciones erigidas en los colegios de los Regulares, mientras no reciban nueva, y competente, auctoridad" (*ibid.*, 107).

⁴ **Consejo extraordinario*, June 18, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 669. Here also is the note: "Como parece F^{ho} en 7 de 7^{bre} de 1770."

⁵ *Lucini to Torrigiani, January 12, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 305, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

Uditore Vincenti should have said that the influence of Rome was decreasing at a frantic pace.¹

By the strong pressure it exerted on the clergy and by the prohibition of any free expression of opinion on the supposed rights of the State, the Government gradually succeeded in reducing to silence the champions of ecclesiastical rights and freedom. About a week before the Jesuit expulsion the Vicar General Varrones of Madrid had lodged a written protest against the violation of ecclesiastical immunity, freedom, and dignity, and was particularly indignant about the wholesale and serious suspicion cast on the clergy in the royal decree of September 18th, 1766.² As a result he was closely watched from that time onward. During the taking of the inventory in the sacristy of the Colegio Imperial he removed the first volume of a French apology for the Society of Jesus and had it translated by a Brother of the Christian Schools. This action served the Ministers as a pretext for proceeding against him and other clerics in the Extraordinary Council, on the charge of having infringed the pragmatic sanction of April 2nd, 1767.³ Varrones was also accused of being involved in the Madrid insurrection, a witness stating that he had heard that he had treated some rioters to wine in a tavern. Further, on the night of the expulsion, he had refused to assist in the

¹ " *Le nostre cose qui van a rotta di collo " (Vincenti to Garampi, June 28, 1768, *ibid.*). Lucini was sure that the Court was thinking of extending the episcopal jurisdiction to the detriment of the Papal; he had been openly told that it was intended to tear off the bridle with which Rome had been holding Spain and the other countries in check. " Los Frailes son aun nuestros enemigos, y nuestra ruina. Lo cierto es que estamos mal, y que iremos siempre peor, si no se toma una providencia general " (*to Garampi, December 29, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072).

² *Varrones to Olloqui, March 25, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777; *Roda to Azara, May 5 and 12, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

³ *Aranda to Roda, May 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

taking of the inventory, the excuse being that he had to get the Archbishop's permission, whereas his real intention was to inform the nuncio. Further, the favourable report on the Jesuits rendered to Rome at that time by the Cardinal Archbishop was to be attributed to the promptings of the Vicar General. Just as clerics were under more obligation than others to be gentle and peaceable, and were highly respected on account of their status, in the same way all their words, actions, and writings were all the more dangerous inasmuch as they made a deeper impression on the people and, under the appearance of religion, easily aroused their feelings. As a punishment Varrones was forbidden on May 24th, 1767, to live within forty miles of Madrid or to enter any royal place of residence.¹

Some months later a similar fate befell the Cardinal Archbishop himself, a copy of whose report, mentioned above, had been sent by the ambassador Azpuru to the Ministers in Madrid.² Giving no reasons, Aranda sent him the laconic information that the Extraordinary Council found that the king's interest would be better served by his leaving Madrid as soon as possible and by his not showing himself in the capital or in any royal place of residence without the permission of the king and the council.³ In compliance with the order the prelate left immediately for Toledo.⁴

A far more grievous punishment was suffered by the Bishop

¹ **Consejo extraordinario*, May 24, 1767, *ibid.*, 688; *Roda to Azara, June 16, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 230; *Vincenti to Torrigiani, June 16 and July 7, 1767, Cifre, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 304, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, June 18, 1767, *Registro di cifre*, *ibid.*, 433.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Espulsión de los Jesuitas", 1767; *Azpuru to Roda, May 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667; *Roda to Azpuru, June 16, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47.

³ *Aranda to the Cardinal Archbishop, October 24, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 667.

⁴ *The Cardinal Archbishop to Aranda, October 24, 1767, *ibid.*

of Cuenca, Isidro de Carvajal y Lancaster, who had had the audacity to express his opinion about the ever greater oppression of the Church and its servants in an outspoken letter to the Court Confessor, Osma.¹ Osma, he wrote, would do well in his relations with his master to imitate the courageous conduct of Cardinal Baronius, who had told Pope Clement VIII. that if he would not free the French king from the ban that had been placed upon him he should find someone else to absolve him from his sins, for he could not do so. The pity of it was, wrote Carvajal, the truth never reached the king's ears. Charles III., on hearing of the letter, invited the prelate to declare the grounds of his complaints openly and fearlessly, for nothing grieved him more, he said, than to be reputed a persecutor of the Church.² Encouraged by the king's engaging tone, the Bishop in his reply cited all the violations and restrictions of ecclesiastical rights and liberties that had taken place since Charles had come to the throne. For this reason, he alleged, God had allowed Spain to be visited by such punishments as the conquest of Havana by the heretics, the loss of part of the colonies and of the large fleet, the exhaustion of the army without a battle being fought, the rising of the people, and the spreading of erroneous doctrines. Spain had become the plaything of its enemies. The monarch was offended by the bitter tone of the letter, his counsellors by its matter. Campomanes, who felt himself to be particularly affected, made no less a proposal than that the Bishop should be banished from the kingdom as a traitor.³ Others, however, in their political prudence, were unwilling to make him a "martyr of fanaticism" but nevertheless were eager to call him to account. Carvajal was accordingly involved in a tedious suit conducted by the Council of Castile, in which a jurist of Moñino's skill had little

¹ Of April 15, 1766, in ROUSSEAU, I., 197.

² May 9, 1766 (printed), Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Espulsion de los Jesuitas", 1767.

³ *Lucini to Torrighiani, September 1, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*

difficulty in convicting the prelate of certain inaccuracies and, by reason of his criticism of the financial administration of the ex-Minister Squillace, in representing him to be a malcontent and fomenter of insurrection. On June 14th, 1768, in compliance with the Council's resolution,¹ Carvajal was compelled to make a most humiliating apology in the President Aranda's house.²

The regalistic principles of the Spanish Government were paramount also in the deliberations on the disposal of the confiscated property of the Jesuits.³ In the taking of the inventory the participation of the nuncio had been avoided and now there was the definite intention to exclude the co-operation of Rome and its representatives. The Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo, it is true, declined to take part in the business but complete uncertainty prevailed about the attitude of his fellow Bishops.⁴ As soon as the question arose, the Holy See declared that the Bishops had no authority whatever to give their opinion as to the mode of disposing of the Jesuit property. The right to decide about the property of exempt Religious was reserved to the Pope alone.⁵ No regard, however, was paid to this intervention, though the

¹ Judgment of October 6, 1767 (printed), Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Espulsion de los Jesuitas", 1767.

² Cf. FERRER DEL RIO, II., 201 *seqq.*; MIGUÉLEZ, 331 *seqq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, II., 365 *seqq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 197 *seqq.*; MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 152 *seqq.*

³ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, May 26, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 303, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, May 26 and July 7, 1767, *ibid.*, 303 and 304.

⁵ *Torrighiani to Vincenti, June 11, 1767, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433. At the expulsion the procurators of the Jesuit provinces and the various colleges had been kept back in Spain so that they might give information about the financial situation. The questions to be put to them, such as about capital abroad, were published in No. 26 of the *Supplemento alla Gazzetta di Parma* of July 30, 1767.

project of allowing only laymen to control the disposal of Church property was dropped, for fear of popular indignation. Towards the end of 1767 the Archbishops of Burgos and Saragossa and the Bishops of Tarazona, Albarracín, and Orihuela were called to Madrid to deliberate in common with the Extraordinary Council on the future destiny of the Society's property.¹ In the nuncio's opinion these prelates and their theological advisers were completely imbued with Febronian principles.² At the audience given at their reception the king declared to the Bishops that he was asking nothing for himself and that their duty lay solely in giving their opinion as to how the Jesuit property was to be used in the service of God and to the profit of the Catholic religion.³ Torrigiani instructed the nuncio to let the Bishops know that they had no authority to dispose of the property of exempt Religious, least of all when it was situated outside their dioceses.⁴ Lucini, having no hope that this step would be successful, fulfilled the instruction with reluctance. His representations had no effect on the Ministers.⁵ For a time indeed it looked as if the Bishops were alive to the Church's interests, it being reported that they had proposed communication with Rome,⁶ but apparently the rumour was only put about with the object of pacifying Rome until the deed had been done.

Before the Extraordinary Council, thus enlarged, actually

¹ *Roda to Aranda, November 9, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 1009.

² *Lucini to Torrigiani, December 15, 1767, and January 5, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304 and 305, *loc. cit.*

³ *Lucini to Garampi, December 29, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072.

⁴ *Torrighiani to Lucini, January 7, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Lucini to Torrigiani, January 26 and February 2, 1768, Cifre, *ibid.*, 305.

⁶ *Lucini to Torrigiani, February 9 and 16, 1768, Cifre, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Lucini, February 18, 1768, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433.

entered on its deliberations, the two fiscals, Campomanes and Moñino, expounded in a solemn declaration at the session held on January 13th, 1768, the royal rights and powers over the property of the banished Order. Appealing to history, they established that all the houses, colleges, possessions, and rights of the Jesuits were at the free disposal of the king and were directly subject to his patronage and his protection. After hearing the Bishops the monarch could decide as to what use they might be put. To appeal to another authority would be an innovation and would mean the overthrow of the royal prerogatives. Property belonging to a foundation was to be used in accordance with the founder's will, or, if necessary, diverted to another good purpose, this right belonging to the king as the supreme ruler of the country. If any property was encumbered with obligations of a pious nature, they were to be fulfilled as before or converted after consultation with the diocesan. The Society's property which had been acquired unconditionally could be used by the monarch for any pious object he pleased, including the missions and anything that furthered the spiritual and temporal welfare of his subjects. This opinion, in which the Extraordinary Council and the five prelates concurred at the session of January 20th, 1768, received the king's approval. At further conferences the Fiscals represented the expediency and necessity of setting aside part of the Jesuit property for the instruction of the young, and for the establishment of Tridentine and missionary seminaries, boys' boarding schools, girls' schools, hospitals, and poorhouses.¹ The administrators of the properties were

¹ All these documents were collected together in the *Real Cedula* of August 14, 1768, and are to be found in the *Coleccion general*, II., 52-III. The English, Scottish, and Irish colleges in Seville, Valladolid, and Madrid were allowed to continue under different administration (*Grimaldi to Masserano, June 29, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6964; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, September 8, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47). The Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo, who had hitherto defended the ecclesiastical standpoint, now declared himself in favour of partitioning the Jesuit estates, to the

instructed in a circular letter to use the stores of goods and household articles in the colleges for charitable institutions and, above all, for the furtherance of agriculture.¹

The acquisition of the Jesuit estates took place very opportunely for the Ministers with their schemes for encouraging immigration. They were used on a large scale in establishing the German colony in the Sierra Morena.² Either by coincidence or design, on the same April 2nd, 1767, on which the expulsion of several thousand Spanish Jesuits was put into effect, the royal decision was made to introduce 6,000 foreign settlers, mostly German or Flemish, which decision was notarially confirmed by royal decree (*Real Cedula*) on April 4th.³ From the houses of the Society the settlers were supplied with hemp, wool, beds, clothing, household and culinary utensils, and every implement that could be used for agriculture. Their pastors were provided with vestments and other church requisites from the same

Ministers' surprise, and acknowledged the right of the Extraordinary Council, in conjunction with the Bishops, to decide on the disposal of these estates (*Vicenti to Torrigiani, July 5, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 266, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, July 21, 1768, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433).

¹ *Circular letter to the commissioners entrusted with the administration of the estates (July 29, 1767; *ibid.*, 304). At the suggestion of Raphael Mengs, Campomanes instructed the commissioners on May 2, 1769, not to sell the original paintings by Spanish and foreign Masters which were in the Jesuit colleges but to segregate them. They were also to cease from selling the libraries, which were to be transferred to the universities and other centres of study. The private correspondence of the Jesuits was to be deposited in the Archives of S. Isidro (*Orden a los Comisionados*, in the *Coleccion general*, II., 140 *seqq.*). For the ordinances dealing with the property of the various colleges, see the *Coleccion general*, III.

² FERRER DEL RIO, III., 1-57; ROUSSEAU, II., 44 *seqq.*; WEISS, *Die deutsche Kolonie an der Sierra Morena und ihr Gründer Johann Kaspar v. Thürriegel*, Cologne, 1907.

³ WEISS, 33.

source.¹ The future parish priests in the colony were to be allotted unoccupied chaplaincies which had been incorporated in the colleges.² On February 8th, 1768, the Government approved of the undertaking being supplied with goods to the value of 1½ million reals from the proceeds of the auction of the Jesuit estates.³

Nor did the king's faithful servants go unrewarded at the sharing of the booty. At Aranda's suggestion each of the two Fiscals Campomanes and Moñino received a pension of 2,000 ducats, Carrasco, the Fiscal to the board of revenue, one of 20,000 reals, and Campomanes' two daughters and the niece of the Archbishop of Burgos were each assigned an annuity of 500 ducats.⁴ Tanucci's wife was appointed lady-in-waiting to the queen (*Dama de la Reina*), as a reward for the services rendered by her husband, as Charles III. expressly emphasized.⁵ Grants of various amounts were made to subordinate officials in proportion to their co-operation.⁶ After the Duke of Arcos had been lent 3 million reals from the Jesuit estate, the Extraordinary Council found it difficult, in view of his services, to refuse Alba's application for a loan of

¹ *Ibid.*, 75.

² *Ibid.*, 74; *Supplemento alla Gazzetta di Parma*, No. 34 (August 25, 1767), §XX.

³ WEISS, 87.

⁴ *Vincenti to Torrigiani, July 5, 1768, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 266, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Charles III. to Tanucci, October 6, 1767.

⁶ Itúrbide, after enumerating the services he had rendered in connection with the interception of the Jesuit correspondence, went on to say: " *No bien se hizo la expulsion, quando desde luego se repartieron de los fondos de las mismas temporalidades premios, gratificaciones, sueldos y sobresueldos a todos los que avian trabajado en este negocio, como era justo, y aun a otros muchos que nada hicieron y estaban esperando a que mataran el gallo para desplumarlo. Nada me tocó de esta cucaña que me sirviera de satisfaccion sino enfermedad " (Joaquin de Itúrbide to Grimaldi, July 8, 1770, *Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia*, 670).

1½ million at 2½ per cent interest.¹ Similar demands were made by other grandees and by various municipalities.²

As in the case of so many other enactments, those dealing with the Jesuit property were either of no more value than so much paper or were carried out only partially and after much delay. To allay the popular discontent which was being voiced at the continued closing of the Jesuit churches, Charles III. ordained in 1769 that they were to be reopened and used for divine service as soon as possible, so that the existent bequests for Masses might be discharged.³ A year later Roda again had cause to complain of the neglect and non-observance of numerous ordinances. The majority of the former Jesuit schools and churches had not been opened, he wrote; the Mass bequests, missions to the people, and other obligations which had been undertaken by the exiles, were not being fulfilled; and this negligence was giving rise to bad feeling among the people, was a cause of scandal to the faithful, and provided Jesuit supporters with material for calumny. Not only were the estates badly administered and maintained but they were being wasted, embezzled, or used for purposes entirely contrary to the piety and the just intentions of the king.⁴

¹ *Roda to Aranda, September 25, 1772, *ibid.*, 671; **Consejo extraordinario*, October 12, 1772, *ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, 672.

³ *Roda to Aranda, January 9, 1769, *ibid.*, 669.

⁴ Undated *note from Roda [1770/71], *ibid.*, 688.

CHAPTER II.

THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS FROM NAPLES, PARMA,
AND MALTA. THE MONITORIUM TO PARMA. PREPARATIONS
FOR THE PAPAL SUPPRESSION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.
DEATH OF CLEMENT XIII.

(1)

THAT Naples and Parma, the two States which passed by succession to the younger sons of the king of Spain, would follow the example set by the Court of Madrid, was a foregone conclusion. Politically both States were completely dependent on Spain¹ and in addition their leading Ministers had a deep dislike of the Society of Jesus.

When in 1759 Charles III. had entered on his Spanish inheritance and had waived his right to the crown of Naples in favour of his nine-year-old son Ferdinand, Tanucci, as the head of the regency council, was the supreme ruler. The ecclesiastical authority had already been assailed from time to time, but he now opened a systematic campaign on behalf of the sovereign rights of the prince, which in his view had been whittled away by the Church.

With his forcible measures against the Church and its institutions, with his arbitrary and unjust limitation of its property and the number of its priests, and with his really absurd extension of the royal *placet* to ecclesiastical edicts, whether old or new, he did all in his power to shake to the foundations the Church's liberty and independence.² Through the instrumentality of his compliant chaplain-in-chief he was

¹ COLLETTA, I., 90 ; *Aróstegui to Grimaldi, April 21 and 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5881 ; *Tanucci to Charles III., July 2, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100 ; *Roda to Tanucci, August 4, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P.

² Cf. above, p. 9.

constantly expanding the royal rights of patronage, countering all opposition on the part of the Bishops by withholding their stipends.¹

Not only were the letters of the Cardinal Secretary of State Torrigiani to the Spanish nunciò² full of complaints about Tanucci's ruthless and insidious policy towards the Church; the Prince of San Nicandro, the young king's steward and tutor, was continually complaining to Charles III. about the high-handed conduct of the First Minister, whose innovations were creating confusion and mischief.³ The assaults on ecclesiastical jurisdiction were finally so numerous that Clement XIII. found himself compelled to invoke the intervention of the young king's father, to whom he sent a summary, under twenty-nine heads, of the complaints against Tanucci and his cat's-paw Fraggiani.⁴ Charles III., in view of his renunciation of his royal rights in respect of Naples, refused to intervene in its governmental affairs,⁵ but the Papal letter did at least have this effect: the Minister received instructions that during Ferdinand IV.'s minority he was to refrain from aggressive measures and to observe the agreements contained in the Concordat.⁶ But Torrigiani was wrong

¹ *Tanucci to Caraccioli, May 1, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5977.

² Cf. *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, June 11, 1761, April 8, August 12 and 26, 1762, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, Papal Secret Archives; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, December 8, 1761, Cifre, *ibid.*, 286.

³ *August 10, September 21, and November 2, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6086; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, August 19, 1762, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *August 26, 1762, Nunziat. di Spagna, *ibid.* Here also the contemporary **Compendio de' più recenti aggravii*.

⁵ *To Clement XIII., November 16, 1762, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, September 16 and 30, December 9 and 23, 1762, Reg. di cifre, *ibid.*; *Osma to Clement XIII., July 24, 1762, Cifre, *ibid.*, 289; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 21, 1762, *ibid.*

⁶ *Tanucci to Wall, October 12, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5978.

in thinking that Tanucci's influence would now begin to wane.¹ Anxious though he was to avoid any sort of public scandal, in his heart the Spanish king was on the side of the Minister.²

The very life-nerve of the religious Orders was attacked when Tanucci, acting through Fraggiani, forbade Superiors to carry out instructions received from their Generals in Rome without first obtaining the *exequatur* of the State.³ Whenever the occasion offered he would inflict some injury on the Orders by an arbitrary interpretation of the law. Thus, overriding the objections of the jurists,⁴ he declared the Jesuit College of Sora to be a professed house, since it accommodated neither novices nor scholastics, and was therefore unqualified to inherit any property.⁵ Nor did he shrink from attacks on the teaching authority of the Church, as was exemplified by his attitude towards the condemnation of Mésenguy's Jansenistic Catechism.⁶

The decision taken after some hesitation, by Sersale, Archbishop of Naples, not to allow himself to be used by Tanucci as a mere tool, deprived the Minister of a weapon for indirect aggression, and at about this time the death took place of Cardinal Passionei, shortly preceded by that of

¹ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, November 18, 1762, Reg. di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*

² " *Veo quanto me dizes tocante a Roma, pero te aseguro que yo tambien temo que no aprenda de mi respuesta, pues saves que la conozco " (Charles III. to Tanucci, January 23, 1763, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6048) ; *". . . es menester hir con mucho tiento, y manejando insensiblemente y sin ruido " (Charles III. to Tanucci, April 5, 1763, *ibid.*).

³ *Pallavicini to Grimaldi, March 18, 1764, *ibid.*, 6096 ; **Memoria di Pallavicini* (undated), *ibid.* ; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, April 3, 1764, *ibid.*

⁴ *Tanucci to Charles III., March 22, 1763, *ibid.*, 6094 ; *Charles III. to Tanucci, April 5, 1763, *ibid.*, 6048 ; *Tanucci to De Marco, October 14 and 15, 1767, *ibid.*, 6002.

⁵ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, November 11, 1762, and January 6, 1763, Reg. di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431 and 432, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See above, p. 18.

Cardinal Tamburini. Nevertheless the *exequatur* was obstinately refused for the prohibition of the Catechism, for the Papal Encyclical, and for the translation of the Roman Catechism.¹ A way out of the difficulty was suggested by Charles III. himself. To uphold the State's *exequatur* in all its stringency and at the same time to avoid any serious dispute, a royal ordinance should be issued, stating that the monarch had learnt that several copies of the Encyclical and of Mésenguy's Catechism had been circulated without the consent of the civil authorities, and ordering the confiscation of both.²

As if in revenge for the condemnation of the Catechism the Minister had the fifteenth volume of "The Defence of the Truth" (*La verità difesa*) prohibited, and he banished from the country its author, the Jesuit Sanchez de Luna, son of the Duke of Sant' Elpidio, on the charge of having had the book printed in Venice without permission.³ The decree of banishment was published in the newspapers.⁴ No attention was paid to De Luna's written defence,⁵ and the appeals for clemency submitted by himself⁶ and his sister⁷ to the Spanish Minister Wall were equally ineffectual. It was not until petitions had been sent to Charles III. and to Wall by De Luna's eighty-year-old father⁸ that Tanucci was advised by Madrid to lift the ban.

When the work *Opera di Ercolano*,⁹ which was published under royal patronage, was ridiculed in the periodical *Frusta*

¹ *Tanucci to Bottari, August 26, 1761, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod., 1602.

² *To Tanucci, December 29, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6045.

³ *Tanucci to Wall, June 23, 1761, *ibid.*, 6092.

⁴ *Piccolo Diario*, No. 31, of July 28, 1761, *ibid.*, 5868; *Tanucci to Wall, August 4, 1761, *ibid.*, 6092.

⁵ *San Pietro to Tanucci, June 19, 1761, *ibid.*

⁶ *Sanchez to Wall, December 19, 1761, *ibid.*, 5868.

⁷ *October 11, 1761, *ibid.*

⁸ *March 2, 1762, *ibid.*, 5869.

⁹ Cf. SCHIPA, II., 231 *seqq.*

Letteraria,¹ supposedly by the Jesuit Zaccaria, the only way the General of the Society could pacify the deeply-offended Tanucci, of whom the worst was to be expected, was to punish Zaccaria in an exemplary manner by depriving him of both active and passive electoral rights, prescribing for him a week's Exercises, and forbidding him to have anything more to do with the publication.² Not only was the Bull by which Clement XIII. had renewed approval of the Institute of the Society of Jesus³ refused the *exequatur* in Naples⁴ through Tanucci's influence, but he also forced the Marchese Fogliani, Viceroy of Sicily, to withdraw the *exequatur* which had already been given there.⁵ Lest the Society might have any influence on the young King Ferdinand he saw to it that his Jesuit confessor was replaced by Bishop Latilla of Avellino,⁶ whose conduct was afterwards the subject of serious charges brought by Tanucci himself.⁷ His jealousy was such that more than once he complained to Charles III.⁸ that the young king's tutor, Father Cardel, engaged him in conversation between lessons, as did also Goyzueta, who with his wife was completely in the power of the Jesuits.

Hardly had the news of the expulsion of the Spanish Jesuits reached Naples when Tanucci, beside himself with delight, reported to Azara that Grimaldi had written in his own hand to tell him of the tragi-comedy of the Loyolites. He preferred the Spanish method to the Portuguese, for the pension of 100

¹ *Ibid.*, I., 297, n. 5.

² *Ricci to Zaccaria, November 26, December 10 and 24, 1763, in Jesuit possession, Registro di lettere (Ricci).

³ *Apostolicum pascendi*, of January 7, 1765 (see our account, Vol. XXXVI., 497).

⁴ *Tanucci to Galiani, February 23, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5992; *Tanucci to Orsini, April 20, 1765, *ibid.*

⁵ *Tanucci to Catanti, October 22, 1765, *ibid.*, 5995.

⁶ *Tanucci to Portocarrero, November 17, 1759, *ibid.*, 5959.

⁷ *Tanucci to Losada, March 29, 1768, *ibid.*, 6004. Cf. *San Nicandro to Charles III., October 28 and December 9, 1766, *ibid.*, 6087.

⁸ *On June 4, 1765, and April 22, 1766, *ibid.*, 6096 and 6099.

pesos would hold these priests of Antichrist on the leash. For the benefit of his king and country he now looked forward to the cure of and the recovery from all the evils which had been introduced under the cloak of religion by the devilish spirit of pride, revolt, intrigue, and trickery.¹ As to the legality of the measure there could, in his opinion, be no question, for every private person had the right to order a priest out of his house if his presence was inconvenient, even if he had committed no fault.² His own share in striking the great blow Tanucci had never denied; to his intimates, indeed, he boasted of it. "The Catholic King," he wrote to Bottari, "has at last opened the eyes of many sceptical and credulous persons. Don Emmanuel (Roda) has had great good fortune; when he found himself without any queens he had no more resistance to overcome. His zeal and his dialectics have worked successfully, encountering open ears and open minds. The business had already been contrived here; I have not neglected to further the good work which had been begun. Don Emmanuel has congratulated me thereon."³

The joy caused by the successful outcome of the counsel he had given, he assured Losada,⁴ had put new life into his dying system. He was eagerly desirous of freeing the kingdom of Naples too from "the poison and canker of the Jesuits." By indirect and circuitous methods he had long since prepared the ground, as he informed Losada on December 1st, 1767:

¹ *To Azara, April 18, 1767, *ibid.*, 6000; DUHR in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LV., 300 *seq.*

² *To Grimaldi, November 29, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

³ " *Il re cattolico ha finalmente disingannato molti increduli e leggieri. Gran fortuna ha avuto don Emanuel (Roda), quando si è trovato senza Regine, non ha avuto più resistenza; il di lui zelo, la di lui dialettica ha operato felicemente, e incontrato *patulas aures et mentem*. La cosa era incominciata qui; io non ho lasciato la coltivazione ben cominciata; don Emanuel me ne ha fatti scambievoli complimenti " (May 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6000).

⁴ *On July 2, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001; DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 302.

“ For a long time past I have seen to it that the people were made aware of the Jesuits’ wickedness, robberies, insolence, envy, and unruliness, announcing from time to time in our journal here misdemeanours which have been committed somewhere or other through the fault of the Jesuits. Your Excellency will have noticed this during the last few years. Also from time to time I have had a volume produced by the royal printing office, entitled *Inquietudini dei Gesuiti*, containing various tracts, reports, and findings as they appeared day by day in every country in Europe. No mention was made of the royal printing office, as during the regency period I had to be very discreet. . . . Everything was eagerly read, and so all classes were prepared for the expulsion and were in favour of it.” The brochures and pamphlets were distributed to all guardrooms, offices, sacristies, shops, barbers, and coffee-houses.¹

At the request of Charles III. the young king was fully informed by the Minister and the Court Confessor about the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain. They explained to him their horrible maxims and how they had profaned the Christian religion. The Papacy, whose occupant was the primate of the Bishops, the successor of St. Peter, and the Vicar of Christ—that Christ who wanted to be poor and disclaimed any kingdom on this earth, who obeyed the ruler of the country and paid taxes—this Papacy had been transformed by the Jesuits into a rich, proud, and gorgeous court. It claimed to be above all sovereigns and to have the power to depose them and to transfer kingdoms from one person to another and from one royal house to another. For this reason the Church allowed them to preach the doctrine of tyrannicide, by which the prince who would not allow the Pope and the Jesuits free scope committed injustices and gave scandal ; he

¹ *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003 ; DUHR, *loc. cit.* Almost the same purport is conveyed by Tanucci’s *report to Grimaldi on December 1, 1767, *loc. cit.*, 6001. Cf. also Tanucci’s *letters to Cattolica, Roda, Catanti, and Azara of December 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 6003.

might be killed by anybody, and his murderer had earned the right to enter Paradise. Tanucci ended by advising the monarch not to speak about this conversation to others, so as to preserve respect for the Pope as head of the Church and not to scandalise his entourage, for the former pupils of the Jesuits were incapable of distinguishing religion from jurisdiction.¹ The Marchese had also to enlighten his royal pupil as to the cause of the banishment. On May 5th, 1767, he wrote to Cattolica : " I will begin with the sad news which on behalf of our king and master you sent me in the strictest secrecy for our dear monarch—namely, the news about the fearful plot of the Jesuits which had as its object the sacrilegious attempt on the sacred person of the king and the whole royal family which was to have taken place on Maundy Thursday, for the purpose of utterly exterminating them. . . . I marvel at the king's gentleness and clemency, in being content merely to drive the brood of serpents out of their homes. I foretold it long ago but you all contradicted me, and the late queen especially would have none of it." ² But however black he painted the picture, the Minister did not completely attain his object ; the young king, still retaining a spark of affection for the Jesuits, remained undecided.³

Ardently eager though he was to follow Spain's example—already on April 28th he averred that they were ready in Naples to carry out the instructions of the king's father ⁴—his situation was far from happy. For one thing there were no grounds for expelling the Jesuits, as he himself admitted in his letters to his confidants. Attempts on the lives of princes, riots, popular risings, which in Portugal, Spain, and France had had to serve as occasions for taking action against the

¹ *Tanucci to Charles III., April 21 and 28 and June 2, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

² *Ibid.*, 6000 ; DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 302.

³ *Tanucci to Charles III., June 9 and 23, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7100.

⁴ " *Qui staremo agli ordini paterni." To Roda, April 28, 1767, *ibid.*, 6000.

Jesuits, were not to hand ; there was not a single instance of a misdemeanour against the State.¹ When he tried to sound the Prince of San Nicandro as to his attitude towards his plans, he had to hear him say that as in Naples there were neither reasons nor occasions such as there were in the states mentioned, he could not see how the expulsion could justifiably be undertaken.² Shortly after the banishment had been carried out he let fall the admission that most of the Jesuits were innocent and that their only fault was their blind obedience to their General, which was a source of crimes against the State and the Crown.³ In his embarrassment Tanucci first lit on the plan of forbidding the Society in the kingdom of Naples to accept novices, hear confessions, hold missions, or manage schools or sodalities, and thus of condemning it to extinction. But this proposal failed to obtain the approval of the Government in Madrid, the king's view being that either the Jesuits must be left entirely in peace or they must be rooted out completely. Any other course

¹ " *Noi non abbiamo da far processi per vite sovrane attentate, per tumulti e sollevazioni, come si son fatti in Portogallo e Spagna e forse anche in Francia, contro gli Gesuiti. Non abbiamo fatti particolari che riguardino questo Stato " (Tanucci to Grimaldi, July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100). *To Charles III., July 7 and August 11, 1767, *ibid.*; *to Roda, July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001.

² *Tanucci to Charles III., July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

³ " *Innocenti dico moltissimi nel caso della Compagnia sciolta ed estinta, li quali non lo sono, mentre il corpo sta unito, poichè in tale stato li gesuiti tutti hanno il peccato dell' obbedienza cieca al Generale, nella quale sta un fonte di scelleraggini contro li secolari, contro li stati, contro li sovrani. Quel Generale è un vero Belzebub . . ." (to Centomani, December 17, 1767, *ibid.*, 6003). After explaining to Losada how the Jesuit system culminated in a struggle with the idea of sovereignty, Tanucci continues: " Ma ho sempre circoscritto questa mia opinione sul politico ; era così semplice la mia maniera di pensare, che io credeva e diceva esser nella Compagnia tutta, nel suo corpo, nel suo totale uno spirito attivo perverso, che la faceva malvaggia, ma essere gli individui quasi tutti buoni, e mi valeva del detto

would merely provoke their vengeance.¹ Tanucci accordingly decided to adopt the method of the French Parlements and to base his actions on reasons of State; also, if needs be, he would use as a juristic trimming the fact that their Order's Constitutions lacked the *exequatur*, which was customary before their arrival in 1543.² "Here, as in Parma," he wrote to Charles III.,³ "we must hang on to the Society's system of insurrection, to its perpetual insidious intrigues against the legitimate power of princes and the authority of officials, to their unashamed avarice, corruption of morals, and undermining of the Christian religion. The Parlements of France, the most learned and pious men of three centuries, have set forth all these sound reasons for hunting these noxious people out of the country. Besides, one need only glance at the procedures adopted by all alert Ministers to see what a pest they are to States." A week later (July 14th) Tanucci, using similar language, expounded his reasons for the expulsion of the Jesuits to the Minister Grimaldi⁴: "We have no individual misdemeanours against the State, but we have got their foul morality, their criminal maxims, their devilish

di quell' arcivescovo di Colonia che querelatosi del suo capitolo, a chi gli opponeva li particolari canonici che erano stimati buoni, replicava, sì canonici buoni, ma capitolo scellerato" (to Losada, July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001). DUHR, *loc. cit.*, 303.

¹ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, June 30, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100; *Tanucci to Grimaldi, July 21, 1767, *ibid.*

² *To Charles III., August 11, 1767, *ibid.*

³ *On July 7, 1767, *ibid.* A few days later the Minister wrote to Azara: " *Quanto più considero, tanto più mi pare che a noi bisogni una condotta mista. Di Spagna non potremo seguire altro, che un' inimicizia presuntiva dei Gesuiti contro tutta la casa del Re Cattolico regnante. Di Francia avrem qualche cosa di questo, ma assai poco, ed oscuro; ma avremo le dotte dissertazioni autenticate dalli consecutivi arresti dei Parlamenti sulle massime, sulla morale, sul sistema infernale della Compagnia, tutto incompatibile colla salute dei popoli, e dei sovrani, e colla religione cristiana" (July 11, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001).

⁴ *On July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

system, their spirit of rapacity, ambition, insolence, revenge, and insurrection, and their continual conspiring against princes, authorities, and Bishops, all of which things were sufficient for the Parlements of France to suppress them and expel them. Moreover, we have their deadly hatred of the House of Bourbon which they have been nursing since their banishment. On the other side, their legal position is extremely weak. They have come into the country clad in sheep's clothing—of humility and brotherly love. They have never laid their Constitutions before the Government ; consequently they are unknown and unrecognized, for where there is no knowledge there can be no agreement. It is not the duty of the Government to show reason for their expulsion : it lies rather with them to show that they must be admitted and tolerated. These are briefly the reasons which convince my feeble brain and impel my honest will to press forward with their expulsion without any further delay."

In a longer letter to Roda of the same date (July 14th) the Minister brought together the five reasons by which he was more and more convinced as time went on of the necessity of the expulsion : (1) As their conduct is informed with one and the same spirit, the Jesuits of the Two Sicilies are ready to perform the same actions as their brethren in Spain. (2) If the Spanish Jesuits are hostile to the House of Bourbon the Neapolitan ones must also be regarded as such. (3) The Jesuits have never forgiven : vengeance is part of their system. They will therefore aim at taking vengeance on this branch of the House of Bourbon, and they will attempt this if left alone here. (4) They have no right to stay here, as they entered the country secretly without ever presenting their Constitutions to the Government. It is their business to show that they have been lawfully admitted ; it is not the Government's business to show reason why they should be expelled. (5) In consequence of the edicts of the French Parlements they must be held guilty of the most lax morals both in theory and practice, also of false doctrinal opinions opposed to Catholic dogma. It must further be held that their governmental system is contrary to the natural, divine, and civil laws. . . . "As

these five reasons alone are enough for me to expel them, they ought also to be enough for a half-a-dozen honest officials.”¹ Roda was to put this before the king, so that this golden opportunity might not be lost in a maze of wearisome legal procedure. “For legal suits, such as are conducted there, are impossible here for want of material and form.” Acts of high treason were not to hand, nor were there officials discreet and skilful enough to collect really decisive evidence.² The fourth reason, the absence of State recognition, had been described by Tanucci himself as mere trimming.³ He betrayed his real thoughts about the fifth reason in a letter to Galiani in which he stressed the idea that daring doctrines on morals were to be found not only among the Jesuits but also among theologians of all periods.⁴

Another difficulty of Tanucci's was the lack of reliable assistants to support him in word and deed in his great under-

¹ *Ibid.*

² “*Quei processi, che V. S. Ill^{ma} dice fatti costì, qui sono impossibili per mancanza della materia e della forma. La materia dei delitti dei gesuiti contro la sovranità qui non apparisce; non è avvenuto alcun delitto di lesa maestà, che abbia dato corpo, e fune, e principio certo all' inquisizione. Manca la forma, perchè non abbiamo un ministero subalterno, o urbano, o provinciale, sicuro pel segreto, per l'efficacia, per la costanza, che basti alla conquista di tante prove esterne, materiali, geometriche, quali un numero di togati superiori possano persuadere e convincere, e sia sicura la conclusione, che la politica, la salute dei popoli, la quiete, e incolumità della casa reale richiedono al primo, e più sublime, ed alto ministero del Re. Questo deve consultare la sua sola coscienza, e quella del Re, e non deve dar conto dei metodi della sua persuasione” (to Roda, July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001). *To Grimaldi, July 21, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

³ See above, p. 223, n. 2.

⁴ “Li vostri Parlamenti mi saprebbe Ella dire il filo che hanno tenuto? Opinioni strane circa la morale; quis non di tutti li teologi di tutti li tempi? Dipendenza di Roma; son soli in questa stranezza li Gesuiti? Prima delli Gesuiti era Roma la scellerata che sappiamo.” To Galiani, August 8, 1767, in B. TANUCCI, *Lettere a Ferdinando Galiani*, II., 100.

taking. Nothing was to be expected from the State Council,¹ as it was full of Jesuit tertiaries ; of its eight members he could count on only one, at the most, as being of the same mind as himself. A direct order to take action, which he could have cited as authority, would therefore have been very welcome to him. " We are waiting here for orders from the father. Vienna, Venice, and Turin will also probably bestir themselves in emulation of the great example. Everyone thinks that Sicily and Parma will do the same, and indeed that they must do it." ² When by the end of May the order had still not come, the Marchese wrote to Catanti quite resignedly : " Everyone is shouting at me, ' Brutus, why are you asleep ? ' Outside Sicily everyone is crying out that action is not being taken in accordance with the great wisdom that has swept away the Jesuits. I have been assigned Vergil's rôle in Dante, namely that of making light by going ahead with a torch held behind my back. In front of me I have got Centola, San Giorgio, Sangro, San Nicandro, Reggio Michele, and Camporeale, that is to say darkness (mob), the rabble, and idolatry, not to use any harsher terms." ³

Charles III. did not leave Tanucci in the dark about his inward feelings. He shared his fears, he assured him, that the Jesuits would cause disturbances, for he knew by personal experience better than all the rest that they were capable of anything. He also saw perfectly clearly that the present state of affairs could not last. For many reasons there was nothing good to be hoped for and everything bad to be dreaded. Not only prudence but also duty demanded that it be forestalled. He was telling him this in case King Ferdinand might want to know his views.⁴ On hearing that the young ruler still had misgivings, Charles remarked angrily that his son had no cause to take the side of these people, " for I know what

¹ *To Azara, April 18, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6000 ; *to Castromonte, May 9, 1767, *ibid.*

² *To Roda, April 28, 1767, *ibid.*

³ *To Catanti, May 26, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *To Tanucci, June 9, 16, and 23, 1767, *ibid.*, 6056.

happened to me, and I attribute it solely to God's infinite mercy that he saved me and my family." He would never have believed it if he had not seen it with his own eyes. For the rest, he referred him to Grimaldi's and Roda's reports on this grave matter. The Minister should consult the Bishops; in Spain the prelates had proved to be Jesuits' bitterest foes.¹

Unambiguous as this language was, Tanucci had expected something different from his royal master in Madrid. He was most unlikely, however, thought Roda, to give a positive order, ardently as he longed to see the Jesuits removed from Parma and Naples.² To his friend Galiani, who was continually spurring him on to action, he described his situation on June 20th, 1767, as follows: ³ "The Court has been formed by the late queen, who was more pro-Jesuit than the Dauphin's wife, entirely of her own adherents. Fogliani is more of a Jesuit than Ricci, De Marco a Jansenistic declaimer, who almost believes more in canon law than in the syllogism. Tell the Duke [Choiseul] that I am quite alone, that I have done all I can in Spain to get instructions but I have not received them." He complained in a similar manner to Losada: ⁴ "My deepest conviction is that there ought not to be any Jesuits where there are Bourbon princes or even only Christians . . . I gave the king (Ferdinand) my opinion quite frankly that the Jesuits had to be expelled, so that he could ask his father's advice, but I doubt if he has done it. In the closets there is still something of the Jesuit leaven which has its influence on the king. Before long the Austrian woman ⁵ will be here, full of Jesuitism . . . and God knows what secret instructions. . . . Your Excellency, I speak openly,

¹ *To Tanucci, June 30, 1767, *ibid.*

² *Roda to Azara, May 26, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 234, I.

³ B. TANUCCI, *Lettere a F. Galiani*, II., 85.

⁴ *July 7, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6001.

⁵ Archduchess Josepha, d. October 15, 1767 (ARNETH, *Maria Theresia*, VII., 332 seq.).

for it is my duty, it being more than necessary, and I may do so because I am not swayed by any private interests, for I reckon that the advent of the new pole-star will mean my departure." The ground having been thus prepared, Tanucci exhibited the same apprehensions to his master. The princess and future queen, he said, was reputed to be very much in favour of the Jesuits, so that it was to be feared that the expulsion would never take place unless it was carried through before her arrival in November, for there was no one to be found who would dare to oppose the declared wish of the queen.¹

On July 11th Tanucci again revealed his embarrassment in a letter to Galiani. "Of the Jesuits I have nothing to report. De Marco and the rest have no idea how to set about the business. They ask me for evidence and remind me that in France the king was wounded, in Portugal likewise, while in Spain they had an attempt on the king's life and an uprising. These events, they tell me, provided material for prosecutions leading to a judicial decision. But how are they to start the work in Naples? They must have some faint glimmer of administrative justice to maintain the appearance of legality in the eyes of the people. I have long lost patience with this juristic pedantry, which hinders good and pampers evil. I intend to take a shorter way in this affair."²

No means was left untried by the Minister in his efforts to induce the Spanish king, in spite of his reluctance, to issue a definite command. On one occasion he reported to him that in reply to a remark by Galiani to the effect that no action would be taken against the Jesuits in Naples, Choiseul had declared: "But think! The Jesuits are the enemies of the

¹ " *Questa principessa, per quanto la fama porta, verrà molto persuasa a favore dei Gesuiti, onde è da sospettare, che se l'opera dell' espulsione non sarà terminata prima del Novembre, non si potrà più terminare, poichè non si troverà qui chi ardisca di resistere ad una dichiarata protezione e volontà della Regina " (July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100).

² B. TANUCCI, *Lettere a F. Galiani*, II., 93 seq.

House of Bourbon." ¹ A fortnight later he was telling him that the young monarch would rather have an order or a decision from his father than set up an inquiry, especially as he had heard that with the king's approval his cousin in Parma would soon begin the work of expulsion.² Charles III., however, thought that he had made his will sufficiently clear in his previous letters. So long as the present situation in Naples persisted, he wrote, he was filled with extreme anxiety and perturbation,³ for he had everything to fear from the Jesuits. He would tell him this also in the strictest confidence : what was being said about his nephew, the Duke of Parma, with regard to the Jesuits was founded on truth.⁴ At last all doubts were dispelled by a letter from Azara, who reported under the seal of the greatest secrecy that Parma had sought permission from the two heads of the House of Bourbon to expel the Jesuits. With a certain reluctance this permission had been granted. Although it was said in the two replies that it was not intended to give the Infante any instructions, the assurance that the removal of the Jesuits from the Duke's territories would be viewed with pleasure could and must be interpreted as a positive approval.⁵

This information gave the Minister fresh courage and enabled him to see his way more clearly.⁶ True to his principle

¹ *Tanucci to Charles III., June 23, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100. Cf. *Lettere a F. Galiani*, II., 85, n. 1.

² *July 7, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

³ The king had been made to fear for the life of his son. The Augustinian General Vasquez had told Roda that, knowing only too well the Jesuit doctrine of tyrannicide, he shuddered at the very thought of what might happen if an attempt was made on the life of the innocent prince, who had no successor. As soon as possible, therefore, the same thing ought to be done in Naples as had been carried out so successfully in Spain. *Vasquez to Roda, July 9, 1767, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, Vol. I.

⁴ *To Tanucci, July 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6057.

⁵ *Tanucci to Azara, July 18, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001.

⁶ *Tanucci to Grimaldi, July 21, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

that secrecy was the soul of politics,¹ he proceeded with the greatest caution. To lull the Jesuits into a sense of security he avoided anything that might give them cause for suspicion. In the many audiences he gave to the Provincial he treated him with the utmost politeness and assured him that he saw no cause for expulsion since in Naples they had not been guilty of stirring up the people.²

Plans were now formed to set up an expulsion commission. The better to conceal its purpose Tanucci called it the "Commission on Abuses" (*Giunta degli abusi*), whose nominal object was the investigation of a criminal matter involving the people's bank. It was to meet, not in Naples, but in Procida.³ Even now Charles III. let it be said officially that he could not bring himself to give advice. Everything was to be considered carefully in Naples itself and if the opinion was reached that the banishment of the Jesuits was for the good of the king, the people, and religion, then action should be taken quickly,

¹ *To Castromonte, May 23, 1767, *ibid.*, 6000.

² " *Signore, fui qui col principe di Jaci fin dai primi tempi dell' espulsione spagnuola nell' opinione di dover far credere ai Gesuiti, che forse di qua non sarebbero cacciati, allegando al Provinciale, e al Preposito del Gesù P. Matteis per ragion di sperare, ch' essi non erano qui rei di alcuna sollevazione; più volte su questo tenore parlai loro nelle occasioni di venir essi da me. . . . Ho fatto tanto questa figura dissimulante, e con tutta apparenza di cortesia per loro, che i loro nemici insofferenti e frettolosi mi hanno caricato di parzialità per essi. . . . So che lo hanno creduto, e lo hanno scritto ai loro corrispondenti in Roma, Genova, Milano, e allo stesso loro Generale; l' ho veduto con gli occhi propri nel Santufizio, nel quale ho disposte per li Gesuiti le ricerche più minute" (Tanucci to Charles III., July 21, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100). " *Qui van dicendo, che io gli ho assicurati, che non saranno espulsi, e la gente è tanto quanto rimasta ingannata per aver veduto più volte trattenersi meco nell' udienza il Provinciale, ed esser da me accompagnato secondo l'antico solito" (Tanucci to Charles III., July 28, 1767, *ibid.*).
CORDARA, *De Suppressione*, 107 seq.

³ *Tanucci to Roda, July 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6001.

before the arrival of the future queen.¹ The reply which the monarch sent through Roda was far more accommodating. He expressed his agreement with the principles expounded by Tanucci on July 14th and with the persons selected but would have liked the Cardinal Archbishop Sersale of Naples and the royal confessor Bishop Latilla to be included in the commission.² His inmost feelings were revealed in a letter of August 11, 1767. Nothing should be neglected, he wrote, nor any time be lost, for "I tell you again, they are capable of anything." He could not but approve of the resolutions taken by the conference, it being a question of preserving his son, whom he loved more than himself, and he hoped that God with His strong hand would complete the work there as successfully as He had done in Spain. He was glad to know that the members of the commission were of this opinion and he had no doubt that the Bishops were similarly inclined, for everyone who was still of sound judgment was bound to think in this way. "And I am confident that God will help you to decide on and carry out with all speed a work which will further God's service and honour."³

In appointing the members of the expulsion commission, Tanucci, for whom compliance was an essential qualification, was faced with many difficulties. The inclusion of Cardinal Sersale he rejected on the ground that participation in the expulsion of the Jesuits might subsequently bar his way to the tiara.⁴ He rejected the Court Confessor, Bishop Latilla, and the other prelates because he had already given out that the matter under consideration was of a criminal nature, and the participation of the Bishops in such an affair would give rise to popular excitement and suspicion.⁵ The Viceroy of Sicily,

¹ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, August 4, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

² *Roda to Tanucci, August 4, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P.

³ *To Tanucci, August 11, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6057.

⁴ *To Charles III., August 25, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

⁵ *To Roda, July 14 and August 25, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001 and 6002.

Marchese Fogliani, a declared admirer of the Jesuits, he would have liked to remove to Lombardy on some convenient and honourable excuse,¹ but Fogliani declined the offer and the Minister decided to exclude him entirely from the proceedings and not to send him the order of expulsion until the morning after it had been carried out in Naples.²

After preliminary conversations with De Marco and Prince Yaci, in which it was agreed that the commission was to decide in a single sitting whether, on the basis of the five principles put forward by Tanucci,³ the expulsion of the Jesuits was expedient, the "Commission on Abuses" was inaugurated on September 16th, 1767, by a royal decree.⁴ On October 3rd the Minister, at his own instigation, was instructed by King Ferdinand to make a thorough inquiry as to what measures should be taken against an Order which had been driven out of Portugal, France, and Spain on account of its unruly, undisciplined, and detestable behaviour, and whose impious, intriguing, covetous, ambitious, and rebellious system of government was incompatible with the well-being of religion and the State.⁵ As for the result of the deliberation, all doubt was excluded in advance, the Minister having chosen as members only those of similar mind to his own.⁶ In its opinion, delivered on October 25th, 1767, which was merely a summary of Tanucci's arguments,⁷ the *Giunta* called

¹ *To Charles III., August 11, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

² *To Charles III., October 13 and 20, 1767, *ibid.*

³ See above, p. 224.

⁴ TRIPODO, *L'espulsione della Compagnia di Gesù dalla Sicilia*, 37; *Tanucci to Charles III., September 8, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

⁵ TRIPODO, 36.

⁶ *Tanucci to Charles III., September 8, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Extracto de la consulta dirigida a S.M. por la Junta de abusos referentes a la expulsion de los Jesuitas*, in DANVILA y COLLADO, III., 119, n. 2. The considered opinion given by Vargas Machuca, a member of the commission, in TRIPODO, 126 *seqq.*

upon the king to repeat the procedure adopted by his father, which had won the approval of all right-minded persons.¹ The Society's property would be deemed to be ownerless and would be placed at the unconditional disposal of the monarch.²

This skilfully-laid plan nearly miscarried at the last moment. On October 19th there occurred a violent eruption of Vesuvius which struck terror into the whole of the city. The shocks were so great that the young king was compelled to return from Procida to Naples.³ At the same time a tremendous thunderstorm broke over the city, and a stroke of lightning penetrated the monarch's apartment. To complete the disaster news came through at this time of the death of the royal bride.⁴ In view of the general excitement and confusion and the panicky state of the people, to whom these events appeared as God's punishment for the threatened expulsion of the Jesuits,⁵ the Minister deemed it inadvisable to carry out the expulsion, which had been fixed for October 23rd.⁶ In a note written in his own hand he assured his confessor Micco that the ships assembled in Naples harbour were not intended for the Jesuits. He sent his physician-in-ordinary Ventapane to the Superior of the professed house to deliver to him the reassuring statement that the rumour going about in the

¹ § 11. "En vista de todo lo dicho, use V.M. de todo su poder imitando la conducta de su augustissimo padre que ha merecido la aprobacion de todos los buenos." DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 119, n. 2.

² § 12, *ibid.* On August 25, 1767, Tanucci *wrote to Roda that the Jesuit estates could not be seized by the State by a confiscatory procedure as there was no question of treason, but that, on the strength of the missing *Exequatur* he would declare the Jesuit colleges to be illicit corporations and therefore unable to support themselves and that he would award their property to the Fiscal as ownerless. Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6002.

³ *Tanucci to Charles III., October 20, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100; *Tanucci to Losada, October 20, 1767, *ibid.*, 6002.

⁴ See above, p. 227, n. 5. RICCI, **Espulsione*, n. 87.

⁵ *Tanucci to Charles III., October 27, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

⁶ *Tanucci to Roda, November 24, 1767, *ibid.*, 6003.

city that the Jesuits were about to be expelled was false ; he had no intention of driving out the Jesuits, for there was no reason for it—in short, they had nothing to fear.¹ In reply to an inquiry by the Papal nuncio he said that he could not see in Naples the grounds that had caused the other States to expel the Society.² As is to be seen from Tanucci's excited letters in his own defence written to Losada and Galiani, the view was held even in high circles that with his assurances the Minister had well overstepped the permissible bounds in his concealment of the truth.³

When the excitement had somewhat subsided, Ferdinand

¹ “ * . . . che il Marchese Tanucci spedito avea il suo medico, persona confidente al P. de Mattheis, ch'era ben visto al medesimo Marchese, assicurandolo, che quelle navi tutt' altro destino avevano, che quello della espulsione dei gesuiti ; anzi di più avea il medesimo Marchese scritto un biglietto al P. de Micco stato suo confessore, affermando lo stesso : la qual sicura notizia, specialmente del biglietto, che a parere anche di Ministri politici, veniva a togliere il dubbio prudente, servì a rassodare gli animi dei Superiori, che entravano malvolentieri nel dubbio ” (*Historia dell' espulsione dei PP. della Compagnia di Gesù dalla Sicilia*, 1768, p. 31, in Jesuit possession, Sicil. 180). Ricci relates the same incidents in his *Diary, with this observation : “ Su la parola di un primo Ministro così espressa si fidarono troppo i poveri Religiosi, che non sapevano che oggidì non si vogliono restrizioni mentali, ma non si ha difficoltà di dire menzogne aperte ” (*Espulsione*, n. 84).

² “ *Il Nunzio fu a viso aperto domandandomi, se si caccerebbono, come si sospettava, li Gesuiti. Caricai un poco la mano sulle ragioni di non doversi credere quello, che per altro io non sapeva, dicendogli, che da Portogallo e da Spagna il delitto di lesa maestà avea cacciati li Gesuiti, da Francia li Parlamenti, tre cagioni, che io qui non vedeva. Il Santufizio mi ha scoperto che il Nunzio partì da me dubbioso. Ventapane, gran Gesuitaio, pur voleva sapere, gli dissi lo stesso ; mi si dice, che stan tranquilli li Gesuiti.” Tanucci to Charles III., October 27, 1767. Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

³ *To Losada, January 19, 1768, to Galiani, January 30, 1767, *ibid.*, 6003.

IV., by a decree of October 31st, 1767, ordered the expulsion of all Jesuits who had taken solemn vows and he charged the Captain-General of the army, the Prince of Campofiorito, with the execution of this order. At the same time he commanded the local and provincial Superiors to engage their subjects to comply unresistingly with the royal decree.¹ In a further edict, dated November 3rd, the monarch, for safety's sake and for the happiness of his subjects, ordered the life-long banishment of all scholastics, lay-brothers, and novices of the Society who would not gainsay their vocation. All the banished, even if they left the Society or joined another Order, were forbidden to return to the country; if they did so, they would be treated as traitors. All their property, movable or immovable, was confiscated and would be used for the public good. Only Jesuits who had taken solemn vows were granted a pension of 72 ducats, and this would cease immediately if any of the exiles or any other Jesuit dared to write against the royal ordinance. Whoever applied for a share in the common spiritual property (*Carta di fratellanza*) or did not surrender it within a month if he was already in possession of it, would be treated as a traitor.² The Viceroy of Sicily was sent the definite order to expel the Jesuits from the island.³ In a covering letter Tanucci threatened to remove him from his post in the event of any opposition.⁴

¹ "Ordine del Re," in GUARDIONE, *L'espulsione dei Gesuiti dal regno delle due Sicilie nel 1767*, pp. 84 seqq.

² *Ibid.*, 73 seqq.

³ Ferdinand IV. to Fogliani, November 11, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003. The official covering letter from Tanucci, of the same date, *ibid.*, printed in GUARDIONE, 77 seq.

⁴ " *Si sa, che il genio, la propensione, l'abituazione in V. E. contrasterà collo zelo, coll' onore, con quello che si deve al Re; ma si tiene per fermo, che lo zelo, che l'onore, che il servizio del Re vincerà, e tutto sarà perfezionato colla maggiore efficacia, e rimarranno delusi quelli, che consigliavano diverso sistema, a principalmente un architetto, e un Agamennone meno dichiarato per quel corpo." Tanucci to Fogliani, November 13, 1767 (unofficial), Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003.

The expulsion of the Society of Jesus from the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was decided on by a lay commission of twelve members. To salve the royal conscience, the royal confessor Latilla was called in after the session to put his name to the document.¹ All the decrees and instructions for the executive officials had already been made out, when, only three days before the plan was to be put into force, the Minister decided to pay regard to Charles III.'s wishes and obtain the opinion of the Bishops and prelates, of whose agreement he was certain. Repeating the well-known accusations against the Society, they all spoke in favour of the expulsion.² The assent of the Cardinal Archbishop Sersale was not so easy to obtain. At first he refused to put his name to any document. It was not till lengthy efforts had been made to persuade him and the assurance given that his assent would be in no way to his disadvantage but would rather facilitate his advancement, for which the King of Spain had pledged his word,³ that he agreed to sign a statement. This was to the effect that the Cardinal believed that the King of Spain, a just and God-fearing monarch, had had genuine grounds for expelling the Jesuits, and that it was not inexpedient to safeguard the life of his son, the King of the Two Sicilies.⁴

To induce the young king to append his signature was infinitely more difficult, for he was prepared to sign only when the resolution passed by the "Commission on Abuses" had been approved by the Council of State. It being explained to him that a majority in favour of the expulsion was not to be obtained in that body, he ordered a way out of the difficulty to be sought which would involve neither himself alone nor the State Council. Tanucci accordingly arranged for Prince Yaci, De Marco, Latilla, and himself to meet as if by chance

¹ Cf. the *Extracto* in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 119, n. 2.

² The **Vota* of Bishops Testa, Ciochis, and Sanseverino, and of the Archpriest Andrisani in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

³ *Tanucci to Charles III., November 17 and 24, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *[November 17, 1767], *ibid.*

in the young king's apartment on the evening of October 31st. Here, behind closed doors, the final resolution was drawn up and furnished with the royal signature.¹

Maria Magdalena Sterlich, a nun who was revered by the people as a saint, had sent a letter to Ferdinand IV., urging him to regard the three disasters of October as warnings from Heaven and to refrain from expelling the Jesuits. The Minister, on the other hand, informed the young ruler that revelation had ceased with Christ, that the contrary was heresy, and that only one way lay open to him: to follow the light of reason and the advice of his illustrious father.²

The time was now fast approaching for the execution of the plan. On November 18th the king's orders were communicated to the executive officials, and simultaneously the commissaries left for the provincial towns where there were Jesuit colleges. To avoid the suspicion which a concentration of the military in the capital would otherwise provoke, a mock manœuvre of four regiments was held in the afternoon of November 20th, 1767.³ After the Angelus had rung, all the Jesuit establishments in Naples were surrounded by troops. Protected by the military, the officials went to the houses allotted to them, had the communities assembled by their Superiors, and announced to them the decree of banishment. They were then told to go to their rooms, pack their clothes, linen, breviaries, and other small articles, and prepare themselves for departure. Shortly afterwards the lay brothers and those scholastics who had not taken solemn vows were called together and informed that they could choose between following the Fathers into exile or leaving the Society and

¹ *Tanucci to Charles III., November 3, 1767, *ibid.*

² *Tanucci to Charles III., November 10, 1767, *ibid.*; *Tanucci to Roda, November 24, 1767, *ibid.*, 6003; **Istoria dell'espulsione de' Nostri da Napoli*, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 230, fo. 89.

³ Some historians, including Guardione (31), state erroneously that the expulsion took place on the night of November 3-4. Tanucci says in his *report of November 24, 1767, to Charles III.: "La notte del venerdì 20 al sabato 21 uscirono li Gesuiti da tutti i loro collegi e case." Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

remaining in the country. If they desired to go they could expect no pension ; on the other hand, lay-brothers who put off their religious dress, took up a trade, and married would receive a pension of thirty-six ducats ; scholastics who quitted the Society would receive preferential treatment when appointments were made to offices and benefices. The novices were taken to the Theatine convent, where they had to decide within twenty-four hours whether they would follow the Fathers or not. According to one report, their religious dress was taken from them there and they were sent back to their respective homes in ordinary clothes.¹ Except for a few who were gravely ill or very old, the Fathers, together with the scholastics and lay-brothers who had remained loyal, were taken under military escort to Pozzuoli. Here the younger scholastics and lay-brothers were detached from the Fathers and urged once more to reconsider their decision and to consult their relatives. The exiles were put on board on November 24th and were landed on the 26th at Terracina in Papal territory. The expulsion of the inmates of the other colleges on the mainland was carried out in a similar manner, the only difference being that most of them were transferred to Papal territory by land.²

Like their brethren in Naples, the Jesuits in Sicily had lulled themselves into a sense of false security, knowing that most of the Bishops, and the Viceroy in particular, were entirely on their side. When the expulsion of the Spanish Jesuits was not immediately followed by the dreaded after-effect in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Provincial withdrew his instruction to put some money aside in case of expulsion and issued fresh instructions that not the slightest alteration was to be made in their normal mode of living.

¹ **Istoria dell' espulsione de' Nostri da Napoli, loc. cit.*, 91.

² *Tanucci to Charles III., November 24, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100 ; *report on the execution of the expulsion of November 24, 1767, *ibid.*, 5881 ; **Espulsione da Napoli, loc. cit.*, 90 seq. ; *Tanucci to Yaci, November 22, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003.

This attitude he maintained in the face of all arguments to the contrary. Reassuring and disquieting rumours followed one another in lively succession until on November 27th the decree of banishment arrived in Sicily. The Jesuits in Palermo were informed secretly on November 29th that the decree would be announced at ten o'clock (Italian time) that night. The inmates of the thirteen colleges in the vicinity were interned in the Retreat House in the capital, while those of the other houses were confined in the Basilian convent of San Salvatore in Messina. The Fathers from Reggio and the other establishments in Calabria were also sent to this convent. On December 21st, 1767, the Jesuits from Palermo, and on February 1st, 1768, those from Messina, were taken to various places on the mainland, whence they were transferred to the States of the Church.¹

Of the 631 Jesuits who formed the Neapolitan Province at the beginning of the year 1767 ² twenty-one had left the Society at intervals on hearing of the expulsion from Spain. For many of the young scholastics and lay-brothers the prospect of being thrown out of their own country must have been a severe trial of their vocation. If they followed the Fathers into exile a life of stress and want would be their certain lot, but if they quitted the Society an alluring future was assured them. In addition they were subjected to the threats and cajolery of the officials. It was in these circumstances, then, that either on the announcement of the decree or in Pozzuoli, 210 scholastics and lay-brothers renounced their religious status. Many may have despaired of the continued existence of the Society. Of the 388 Neapolitan Jesuits who went into exile, a further sixty-four left the Society before 1770. Of these there were forty-one professed, who immediately on landing in Terracina applied for secularization, though they knew

¹ **Istoria dell' espulsione dei PP. della Compagnia di Gesù dalla Sicilia nel 1767*, in Jesuit possession, Sicil. 180; **Catalog.* 141, *ibid.*; RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, n. 98.

² Of these, eleven belonged to the Roman Province and fifteen were living outside the Neapolitan Province.

that notwithstanding this step the way back to their country was barred.¹

In the Sicilian Province the final result was even more lamentable. On hearing of the arrival of the expulsion order the Provincial summoned several prominent Fathers to confer on the situation. Many of them were of the opinion that the scholastics and lay-brothers should be given the assurance that the Fathers would share their pensions with them and see to their support. However, not only was this proposal not well received; the Superiors and spiritual Fathers were even urged to advise the scholastics not to follow the others into exile. Several lay-brothers were in fact advised by the Provincial to return to their parents.² In accordance with this policy, the novice-master Ferreri informed the rhetoricians and lay-brothers that in spite of their vows they were not obliged to remain in the Society and could apply for their release without misgiving.³ The steadfastness of those who were still loyal was completely shaken when a commission of theologians and high ecclesiastical dignitaries declared by an overwhelming majority that the Jesuits were not bound by their vows to perform such acts of heroism as banishment involved.⁴ Consequently, of the 786 members of the Sicilian

¹ **Espulsione da Napoli*, fo. 94; **Catalog. 1767, ibid.*, Neap. 172 and 173; RICCI, **Espulsione, ibid. Suppressio*, II., 42 seq.; CARAYON, XV., 152; *Orsini to Tanucci, December 27, 1767, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{2}{10} \frac{3}{28}$. There are some slight variations in the numerical particulars.

² **Espulsione dalla Sicilia 1767, loc. cit.*, 36 seqq.

³ *Ibid.*, 43 seqq., 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 62. " *Quello che fecero i giovani non sacerdoti ed Fi ratelli di Palermo e contorni, fecero similmente quei della parte di Messina, dove però non era stato in tempo il Provinciale di dare providenze, e come si ebbe per lettera di Messina, quasi tutti deposero l'abito. Di Palermo soli sette giovani e tre Fratelli lo ritennero. Le ragioni di questa scandalosa unione furono: 1. La tenerezza de' parenti, che nei Siciliani è singolare. . . . 2. Il parere unito degli arcivescovi di Palermo, Montreale e Messina e dei vescovi di Catania e Siracusa che si trovavano in Palermo,

Province only 352, including nine scholastics and fourteen lay-brothers, went into exile. By the year 1772 seventy-two of these exiles, including forty-one professed and five former Rectors, had left the Society.¹ The greatest pain and shame was caused to the loyal members by the secession of the seventy-nine-year-old Marcellus Tipa, who had twice been Provincial and on three occasions had taken part as an Elector in the General Congregation in Rome.²

The total revenues from all thirty-five establishments in the Sicilian Province amounted in round figures to 148,900 scudi. Incomes of any appreciable size were possessed only by the larger colleges in Palermo (30,000 scudi), Trapani (14,000), Catania (8,000), and Messina (7,000); the financial situation of the other houses was far less favourable.³ The annual income of the Neapolitan Province has been estimated by a modern historian at 280,600 ducats⁴; that of the college at Naples is said to have amounted to 30,000 ducats.⁵ Tanucci, who had formerly declaimed against the unbounded riches of the Jesuits, was so grievously disappointed by the outcome

e specialmente di Msgr. Castiglia, Vicario Generale di Palermo, de' teologi esteri e specialmente regolari d'ogni Ordine: questi dicevano essere lecito, anzi necessario lasciare l'abito e accusavano la fermezza anco di ostinazione peccaminosa. . . . 3. Le insinuazioni di alcuni nostri malcontenti Professi." *Ibid.*, 53 seq., n. 116.

¹ **Espulsione dalla Sicilia, loc. cit.*, 381-541.

² *Ibid.*, 517 seqq. In a *letter to Fr. Schwarz of February 24, 1768, it was reported that only three lay-brothers and seven scholastics went into exile (Arch. Prov. Germ., III., 21). According to a summary in the *Catalogus Prov. Sic. tempore dispersionis 1769* the result would be somewhat more favourable, 272 being listed as having left the Society and 116 as doubtful.

³ **Espulsione dalla Sicilia, loc. cit.*, 180.

⁴ Schipa in RINIERI, *Rovina*, Introd. li., n. 1.

⁵ *Tanucci to Yaci, November 23, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003. Cf. on the other hand, the official *Nota sent to Rome on December 9, 1767, by the nuncio Calcagnini. Nunziat. di Napoli, 290, in RINIERI, *loc. cit.*, xlix.

that he declared at first that they had conveyed their valuables to a place of safety in good time.¹ Subsequently, as a result of the investigations instituted by the "Commission on Abuses", he was forced to admit that in the kingdom of Naples the Fathers had not been so wealthy as in Spain, having in fact left a debt of 200,000 ducats.² After deduction of 130,000 ducats for the exiles' pensions, there was, he said, barely enough to maintain the schools and to fulfil the conditions of the pious bequests.³

According to the Minister, the Jesuit expulsion was accepted by the people with the greatest calm, even with joy, which fact he attributed to the years of preparatory work done by the pamphlets.⁴ Six months later he was complaining that among the nobility the number of those who favoured the Jesuits was still large and that among the ladies it had probably increased.⁵ On the strength of various letters he had received, the General, Ricci, noted in his diary that distress and grief had been widespread among all classes of the population as a result of the expulsion and that sympathy with the outcasts had been shown in every possible way.⁶ The true feelings of the people may be gleaned even from the sardonic sketch drawn by the anti-Jesuit historian Colletta. "Opinions on the expulsion of the Jesuits," he writes, "were divided. The fools and hypocrites were grieved, the wise were satisfied, and the general mass were merely curious. With their traditional animosity, the other monks and clerics, who had regarded the former greatness of the Jesuits with envious eyes, were jubilant. The Minister Tanucci rejoiced, the king

¹ *To Cattolica, December 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003.

² *To Azara, January 19, 1768, *ibid.*; *to Centomani, February 20, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *To Cattolica, January 5, 1768, *ibid.*

⁴ *To Grimaldi, December 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001; *to Losada, December 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 6003.

⁵ *To Charles III., May 3, 1768, *ibid.*, 6001; *to Cattolica, May 3, 1767, *ibid.*, 6004.

⁶ RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, n. 43.

remained indifferent.”¹ When the news of the expulsion reached Madrid, Charles III. lost no time in communicating to the Marchese Tanucci his satisfaction with the successful completion of the expulsion, “for which I never cease and never shall cease to give due thanks to God and our glorious St. Januarius, for he has saved the precious life of my dearly beloved son and has given me such peace of mind as I have never had before.”² Although Tanucci wanted no reward,³ Charles insisted on showing his royal gratitude to his faithful servant, who “had done three-quarters of the work,” by making sumptuous gifts to the Marchese’s only daughter.⁴

In the Roman Curia bitter resentment was felt on more than one score. Through his nuncios in Naples and Madrid and at the other Catholic Courts the Pope protested against the violation of international law and of his sovereignty.⁵ In the midst of peace, he asserted, the Jesuits had been driven by force of arms into the States of the Church, against the will of the lawful and independent ruler. The Holy See could offer no resistance to such an act of force and would not even if it could, not wanting to violate the laws of humanity. But before God and the world he raised his voice in protest, for this was a violation of common law and the mutual trust between States which lived in peace and concord.⁶ A separate

¹ COLLETTA, I., 99.

² *To Tanucci, December 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6057.

³ *To Losada, April 12, 1768, *ibid.*, 6004; *to Charles III., August 16, 1768, *ibid.*, 6006.

⁴ *Tanucci to Losada, May 24, 1768, *ibid.*, 6005.

⁵ *Torrigiani to Lucini, December 10, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.* According to the *report of the Venetian envoy the Pope summoned each representative of the Powers separately to hear his protests against the ejection of the Jesuits from Naples and their disembarkation in the States of the Church. Erizzo (II.) to the Doge, December 5, 1767, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 287.

⁶ *Memoria of December 10, 1767, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

protest was made by the Pope against the confiscation of the endowed property of the Roman College in the territory of Naples, which infringed the agreements of the last Concordat.¹

This protest of the Holy See aroused but a feeble echo in the European Courts.² The Empress Maria Theresa, who was then negotiating with Madrid the marriage of her daughter Caroline to the young King of Naples, expressed her sympathy to the Pope but regretted she could do no more than pray that the Church might suffer no harm.³ The Emperor Joseph⁴ and the Ministers Kaunitz and Colloredo⁵ wrote in similarly polite but cool terms. Ferdinand IV. being now of age, the Court of Madrid declined to intervene in any way in his affairs of State.⁶ At Naples the affair gave rise to a lively exchange of opinion between the nuncio and Tanucci, in the course of which Calcagnini accused the Minister of trickery, while the latter accused the Pope and his representative of hostility towards the young monarch.⁷ As a retort to the Papal memorandum the Marchese composed a masterpiece of sophistry, well spiced with sarcasm. The young king, he wrote, was surprised and pained by the Holy Father's letter. His right of banishment was being disputed—an age-old custom of every nation, which had already been put into practice by three monarchs and which was as necessary for the peace and

¹ *Clement XIII. to Ferdinand IV. [December 12, 1767], Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003; *Lucini to Grimaldi, December 28, 1767, *ibid.*, 5882.

² Cf. *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge, December 19, 1767, State Archives, Venice, *loc. cit.*

³ *To Clement XIII., January 9, 1768, Nunziat. di Germania, 388, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ *January 11, 1768, *ibid.*

⁵ *January 9 and 10, 1768, *ibid.*

⁶ *Lucini to Torrigiani, December 22 and 29, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Lucini, January 21, 1768, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 433.

⁷ *Tanucci to Orsini, December 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003; *Torrighiani to Lucini, January 21, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

security of princes and peoples as expecoration was for the human body. The whole of Christendom would be scandalized if the Pope, who during his glorious pontificate had favoured this Order before all others and had received the banished Portuguese Jesuits, were now to reject their Neapolitan brethren. As for the estates of the Roman College, they had become ownerless through the Society's expulsion from the kingdom of Naples and in accordance with the universal civil law they were now in the charge of the fiscal.¹ Tanucci's reply was not left unanswered. There appeared in Rome a forceful criticism, exposing all his contradictions, sophisms, and absurdities.² This set the Minister in such a rage that he went so far as to declare that, rather than the banishment of the Jesuits, the nepotism and sale of offices in the Papal Court were signs of atheism, just as they were evidence of the corrupt morals and doctrine that held sway there.³ If, in spite of these violent outbursts, Tanucci was anxious to avoid a break with Rome at any price, it was due to considerations of political prudence, "the greatest part of the people always consisting of ignoramuses ready to be scandalized."⁴

The example set by Spain was followed once again and all Neapolitan subjects in Rome were told to break off all relations with the Jesuits. Some of them not obeying sufficiently

¹ **Risposta*, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003; *Tanucci to Orsini, December 15, 1767, *ibid.*

² **Analysis della Risposta data dal S^r Marchese Tanucci alla Protesta del Papa nell'affare dei PP. Gesuiti*, *ibid.*, 5882, translation in CARAYON, XVI., 444 *seqq.*; *Rivera to Lascaris, January 29, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

³ *To Centomani, January 16, 1768, *ibid.*, 6003; *to Grimaldi, March 8, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

⁴ *To Grimaldi, June 2, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100; *to Orsini, August 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6002. It was also solely on account of political considerations that in spite of the strained relations and the occupation of Benevento that had taken place in the meantime the tribute of the "China" was sent to Rome in June, 1768. *Orsini to Tanucci, June 28, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma $\frac{0}{10} \frac{8}{31}$; *Pignatelli to Orsini, June 29, 1768, *ibid.*

quickly, Cardinal Orsini was instructed to furnish a list of those who still frequented the schools, churches, and sodalities of the Jesuits, confessed to them, received them in their houses, or had any dealings with them.¹ The chaplaincies at the Gesù founded by the Farnese family were withdrawn and the ambassador was ordered to admonish anyone dependent on the Court of Naples not to visit the Jesuits at night or in secret.²

Meanwhile the Minister continued his efforts to decrease the Church's sphere of influence. The Bishops were forbidden to use their influence in filling the pastoral offices in the Jesuit churches, which, after their conversion into school chapels and parish churches, were to come under the exclusive patronage of the sovereign. He also forbade the Church authorities to interfere in any way in the conversion of the pious foundations attached to these churches and chapels, these being at the disposal of the king in virtue of his supremacy.³ Most of the vacated teaching posts in the Jesuit schools were filled with laymen. Only a third of the teaching staff might be seculars, and monks were entirely excluded.⁴

¹ *Tanucci to Orsini, December 22, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003.

² *Ibid.* and *letters of January 23 and 26, 1768, *ibid.*; Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, pp. 46, 48.

³ "che qui domina la massima, che il Re ha la potestà legislativa ancora nelle materie ecclesiastiche." Vincentini to Pallavicini, September 27, 1776, in RINIERI, *Rovina*, Introd., LVII.

⁴ "*Le scuole riaperte, come dice V. E., dovranno anch' esse ridursi al metodo che qui si tiene, e dovranno li maestri essere per la maggiore parte secolari laici, un terzo potranno esser preti secolari, ma niun Frate, o monaco, o altro Regolare. Vescovi non dovranno ingerirsi nelle scuole nè esercitare alcuna giurisdizione sulle chiese, le quali o capelle delle scuole, che divengano, o parrocchie hanno da esser patronato regio. In fieri nè giudice di monarchia nè arcivescovo devono mischiarsi in quella, che il Re colla sua suprema potestà sta facendo commutazione delle volontà, per le quali si composero e collegi e case professe. Già è preso il partito su questa commutazione, la quale deve essere una, unisona, uniforme, universale in tutti li Stati del Re."

Tanucci was mightily displeased with the Parmesan Minister, Du Tillot, who had handed back the schools of the duchy to the regulars.¹ If he had had his way it would have been the end of the religious Orders.² He would have liked to do away with their exemption.³ Disregarding the objections of the State Councillors he insisted on the *exequatur* for the ordinances of the Roman heads of Orders in the most rigorous fashion. In his view the residence abroad of Superiors General was harmful to nations and princes and was one of the manifestations of Rome's insidious policy, for which the Church could show no precedent during the first twelve centuries.⁴ He would have liked to restrict the entry into the religious Orders and to suppress a number of monasteries, but, as he complained to his confidant Galiani,⁵ for the time being nothing could be done in this respect except on orders from Spain. Wearing by his efforts to overcome the obstacles offered to his plans of reform, he remarked resignedly that after all something ought to be left for succeeding generations to do against the "Fрати".⁶

Bishops Sanseverino and Ciochis, who had been appointed by Tanucci to the "Commission on Abuses" some time after its inception, for the purpose of disposing of the Jesuit estate, had been forbidden by Rome to take any part in this commission, but disregarding this veto, the prelates continued to attend its sessions. Prompted by the Minister, they informed the nuncio that they could not comply with any Brief that

Tanucci to Fogliani, January 30, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003.

¹ *To Azara, March 8, 1768, *ibid.*, 6004.

² *To Galiani, February 20, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *To Grimaldi, April 19, 1768, *ibid.*

⁴ " *Ah! questo riseder in Roma i Generali degli Ordini regolari è un gran male delle nazioni e della sovranità, e una insidiosa al solito politica di Roma, della quale niun vestigio è nella Chiesa per tutti li primi dodici secoli." To Charles III., May 24, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

⁵ *On January 14, 1769, *ibid.*, 6007.

⁶ *To Nefetti, April 19, 1768, *ibid.*, 6004.

had not received the royal *exequatur* ; in fact they would like to hand back to the Papal representative the Briefs addressed to them. " We have no need of Pereira," observed Tanucci, " to show us that Rome has little power over the Bishops." ¹

The all-powerful Minister's hatred of the Roman Curia increased from day to day. When dealing with Rome, he declared, the rule was " Brandish your stick ! Keep your mouth shut ! That's the way to tame the Roman tiger." ² So far as he was concerned, the Pope was nothing more than a Bishop whose activity was to be wholly confined to the administration of the sacraments, to dogma, and to the liturgy. ³ In his view, the Pope's admonitory messages had fallen into discredit and excommunications in his day merely made the Roman Court an object of derision. By rejecting the proffered absolution in the course of its dispute with Paul V., Venice had demonstrated in the best way possible the ineffectiveness of the Papal censures. ⁴ The time was not yet ripe for the abolition of the nunciatures ; for the time being they could be left to pacify the masses, but they must be deprived of any influence on the State. ⁵ He inveighed against the celibacy of the priests ⁶ and thought it a splendid idea to bring the Huguenots back to France. ⁷

Even his young master's family was not spared the despotic Minister's arbitrariness. The king's consort, the Archduchess

¹ *To Azara, January 26, 1768, *ibid.*, 6003 ; *to Charles III., June 12, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

² *To Galiani, April 30, 1768, *ibid.*, 6004.

³ *To Castromonte, December 3, 1768, *ibid.*, 6007.

⁴ " *Le ortatorie sono screditate, e le scomuniche mettono in questi tempi in ridicolo cotesta corte. I Veneziani diedero a Paolo V. il grand' esempio della inefficacia delle censure col rigettarne anche l'offerta assoluzione." To Azara, October 4, 1768, *ibid.*, 6006.

⁵ " *Non era maturo abolir la Nunziatura ; dunque ritener l'Auditore, e per farlo lodarlo, e dichiararsene sodisfatto, e lasciarlo vedere ai popoli, come un indice di Nunziatura, mentre cessa l'amministrazione." To Grimaldi, April 19, 1768, *ibid.*, 6004.

⁶ *To Catanti, November 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 6006.

⁷ *To Galiani, March 26, 1768, *ibid.*, 6004.

Maria Caroline, was inevitably suspected by him of Jesuitism, if only because she was an Austrian.¹ For the same reason her confessor, Canon Gürtler, was another unwelcome arrival.² On the charge of having disapproved of the Jesuit expulsion Tanucci sent him back to Vienna after a year and appointed in his place the compliant Bishop Ciochis, who, he thought, had the right views on Jesuits and the royal prerogatives.³ As time went on the behaviour of the Minister, who by now would brook no contradiction, became insufferable. On October 18th, 1768, he was complaining to Charles III. that a party in the palace was working for a separation of himself from the monarch, whose wife had already been won over to the plot. The Spanish Government, he alleged, was being spoken of in these quarters in a most slighting manner.⁴ To break down opposition he drove away several trusted friends of the royal pair, which caused the king to weep and the queen to fly into a temper.⁵ Eight more years were to pass before the influence of Maria Caroline finally brought about his downfall.⁶

(2)

In Parma the entry of the Bourbons brought with it the French "enlightenment" and an unbounded prodigality.⁷

¹ *To Charles III., July 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100. Cf. above, p. 228, n. 1.

² *To Charles III., February 2, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

³ *To Charles III., December 6, 1768, and February 7, 1769, *ibid.*, 6007.

⁴ *To Charles III., October 18, 1767, Archives of Simancas, *ibid.*, 6006.

⁵ *Tanucci to Charles III., November 1, 1768, *ibid.*

⁶ October 26, 1776, According to COLLETTA (I., 121) and ULLOA (*Di Bernardo Tanucci e dei suoi tempi*, 128) Tanucci was almost destitute when he died. The Papal nuncio, on the other hand, reported that the Marchese left 300,000 ducats (Vincenti to Pallavicini, May 10, 1783, in RINIERI, *Rovina*, Introd. lix.) and was in receipt of a life pension (*ibid.*).

⁷ *Fr. Rábago to Portocarrero, November 2, 1751, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. 65/1.

The situation grew still worse when, during the minority of Duke Ferdinand I., the post of First Minister was occupied by the Frenchman Guillaume Du Tillot.¹ The son of a valet, he succeeded first in gaining the confidence of the Duchess Luise Elisabeth and finally political power in Parma to such an extent that he was the real ruler of the country. In his outlook on life he favoured the Encyclopedists and he kept up a correspondence with Voltaire.² He was also on intimate terms with the Spanish ambassador and future Minister, Roda, who had regalistic leanings. In the matter of constitutional law his views coincided on the whole with those of Sarpi and Giannone, and his ideal Minister was Pombal, who alone was worthy of the imitation of all wise men.³ His petty sensitiveness in questions of etiquette⁴ was surpassed only by his hatred of Rome. In his attitude towards the Jesuits there is no evidence of his showing any dislike of them at first, but with the arrival in Parma of the Theatine Paciaudi in 1763

¹ BENASSI, *Guglielmo Du Tillot, un Ministro riformatore del secolo XVIII.*, V., Parma, 1924, 2.

² " *Si V.S. quiere, juntaré todas las brochuras, que vienen quasi de semana en semana de Voltaire, y se las embiaré una o dos a la vez para recrearse un instante, y me las bolverá V.S. a votre aize " (Du Tillot to Azara, December 6, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1767). Cf. *Du Tillot to Azara, November 22, 1767, *ibid.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 174; ROUSSEAU, I., 245.

³ *Du Tillot to Azara [December, 1768] and [January] 27, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768/69.

⁴ Although he had been oppressing the Church most grievously for years, he took offence when the newly appointed nuncio to Paris, Giraud, on his way to France, paid his respects to the Grand Duke of Tuscany but not to the sixteen-year-old Duke of Parma (*Du Tillot to Azara, August 8, 1767, *ibid.*, Exped., 1767). He left a letter from the Carmelite General unanswered because the word "*umillimo*" had been left out, although he admitted that the phrase with which the General had ended his letter had the same meaning (*to Azpuru, July 23 and August 6, 1768, *ibid.*, 1768).

his views underwent a radical change. The influence of this violent opponent of the Jesuits, the examples given by the Bourbon statesmen, together with their instigations, and the increasing bitterness of the struggle with Rome—all this gradually led him into the ranks of the declared enemies of the Society of Jesus.¹

Almost as soon as the news of the banishment of the Jesuits from Spain reached Parma, Du Tillot took the firm resolve to make use of the favourable opportunity and to follow the example of the protector and head of the Spanish Bourbons. To his confidant Azara he declared that there were the same grounds in Parma for expelling the Jesuits as there were in Spain. As Charles III. had forbidden everyone who was in any way dependent on the Court of Madrid to have any intercourse with them, it would look strange if a nephew and a member of his House were to tolerate them in his country. It was his opinion that out of respect and love for the two heads of the family the sons and nephews would have to be guided by their attitude; to take the opposite course would be indecent, in view of the great obligations by which they were bound to them. The Jesuits themselves were awaiting their fate. Accordingly he would get his weapons ready and write to Grimaldi.²

On May 16th, 1767, the sixteen-year-old duke wrote an obviously dictated letter to Charles III., asking his consent to the intended blow against the Jesuits. Young as he was, he wrote, he had seen through their conduct and their principles. He regarded it as a matter of honour to follow throughout his life the shining example set by the two heads of his family. As these Religious had been found guilty in France and still more so in Spain, he believed that he ought not to wait until the occasion offered for them to prove themselves

¹ BENASSI, V., 72 *seqq.* Du Tillot had already written to Roda in the spring of 1763: "Creo que algun día se hará algo tambien en España contra los Reverendos" (DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 177).

² *Du Tillot to Azara, April 19 and May 2, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. 1767.

guilty in Parma too. To keep them in his States would be a disgraceful and shameful thing for him to do. Their removal would make room for institutions which would benefit the State and do honour to him, the prince. Immediately he had received news of the measures taken in Spain he had deemed it his duty to give the Spanish king, his uncle, a proof of his love and respect. It would be easy to put the measure into effect in Parma. Du Tillot would let the Minister Grimaldi know the steps that would be taken, but first of all he needed the king's approval and permission.¹

On the following day Du Tillot informed the Spanish Foreign Minister that Choiseul had caused an inquiry to be made, whether Parma was not thinking of coming to some decision about the Jesuits. What Choiseul had told him about their plots in Madrid had filled him with horror and rage.² On hearing of the expulsion of the Society from Spain the Infante had said that they would have to think of doing likewise in his duchy. But as it was not fitting to take such a step without the royal uncle's approval, the duke had asked him to inform the Spanish Minister that he held fast to his decision and that only one thing delayed its execution: he wanted to wait for the king's assent, and he hoped that in his goodness he would grant it. The same grounds that were present in France and especially in Spain were also present in his country. Since the crisis with Rome the Jesuits had made fanatical accusations against the Government both orally and in writing; he had reliable information about this, though he had no actual evidence in his possession. Moreover, everyone expected Parma to follow Spain's example. There were about 170 Jesuits residing in the State, and of these only about ten were natives of the country. There were two ways by which expulsion might be carried out; either the Jesuits could be told of the decision a few days in advance or they could be cleared out suddenly. The first method did not seem to him

¹ *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055; ROUSSEAU, I., 246 *seq.*

² *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, May 17, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055.

to be in keeping with the ducal dignity ; it would be more seemly to copy the severity and decisiveness of the king's uncle. Besides, in the first case there might easily be popular unrest. The Spanish procedure was therefore to be preferred and the decree of banishment was not to be made public until the morning after their departure. A life pension would be given to the ten native-born Jesuits of the 170 residing in the duchies of Parma and Piacenza, and the Jesuits Fumeron and Belgrado would continue to receive their salaries as tutors and confessors.¹ After the pensions and the cost of religious services had been deducted, the revenues of the Jesuit estates could be used for the advancement of the university and the support of destitute hospitals.²

These communications from Parma were put before the Extraordinary Council in Madrid, which also held the view that the second, severer method of expulsion was to be preferred.³ In his written reply Charles III. appeared to give his nephew a free hand, but in a thorough discussion of the methods by which the banishment was to be carried out he left no doubt as to what he expected. He agreed with the Council in advocating an expulsion by surprise. This was to be designated an administrative measure (*providencia economica*), which would be more in keeping with the right of the prince and at the same time would be less likely to be contested by the ecclesiastics. As for the seizure and distribution of the Society's property, it would seem to be proper to keep strictly to the Spanish precedent, so that in defending his own case against the claims of Rome he, the king, would simultaneously be indirectly supporting his nephew's.⁴

¹ For these two, see BENASSI, V., 73.

² *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, May 17, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5056 ; ROUSSEAU, I., 247 seq. ; *Du Tillot to Azara, undated [May 16, 1767 ?], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " Parma ", 1767.

³ *Aranda to Roda, May 29, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055.

⁴ " *A l'égard de l'affaire, je vous dirai par ordre de S. M. qu'après avoir mûrement examiné et fait examiner votre exposé,

The expulsion of the Jesuits from the duchies of Parma and Piacenza seemed to be imminent when, to Du Tillot's disgust, the instruction came from Choiseul to put it off for a while as discussions were taking place between Paris and Madrid regarding the entire suppression of the Order. The French proposal was that Naples and Venice should make a joint request to the Pope for the suppression of the Society, threatening, in the event of a refusal, to drive it out by force.¹ The plan, however, was frustrated by the firm opposition of both Naples and Spain, which were unwilling to risk a diplomatic defeat.² To prepare the public for the coming

le Roy laisse à la disposition de l'Infant et de son Conseil la détermination tout comme il croit que S. A. R. qui a demandé son avis au Roy son oncle, l'aura également demandé au Roy très chrétien son grand père . . . Au reste, sur les mesures à prendre, pour justifier l'expulsion, celle de fonder la résolution sur "una providencia economica" qui correspond au droit de tout souverain, paroît la meilleure et la moins sujette à contestation . . . pour ce qui est relatif à la saisie des biens, et leur distribution après, il paroît aussi qu'il conviendrait à l'Infant de se modeler exactement à ce qui s'est pratiqué et pratiquera en Espagne, que de cette façon sa cause avec Rome seroit unie à celle d'Espagne sans qu'on put trouver aucun coin pour l'en séparer, et que le Roy défendant la sienne, défendrait et soutiendrait implicitement celle de l'Infant son neveu, sans qu'il fut nécessaire d'entrer dans des détails séparés" (Grimaldi to Du Tillot, June 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055). *Charles III. to Ferdinand I., June 7, 1767, *ibid.*; *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, June 14, 1767, *ibid.*; *Du Tillot to Azara, June 13, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1767.

¹ *Du Tillot to Azara, August 1 and September 13, 1767, *ibid.*
 " *Dio sa, se è un di tali raggiri la proposizione francese di domandarsi al Papa da Napoli e Venezia la soppressione dei Gesuiti colla minaccia di espellerli, se non saran soppressi. Nello stesso tempo si scrive da Francia a Parma, che sospenda la sua espulsione " (Tanucci to Roda, September 1, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6002). *Tanucci to Losada, September 1, 1767, *ibid.*

² Cf. below, pp. 336 *seq.*

blow, Du Tillot had the anti-Jesuit decrees of foreign Governments printed in the *Gazzetta di Parma* and French pamphlets against the Order translated into Italian and distributed. Spies in priests' clothing were on the look-out everywhere for a chance to attack and venal pens knew how to magnify the most trivial incidents into cases of national importance.¹

On December 28th, 1767, Du Tillot was able to inform Spain that the preparations for the banishment had been concluded and that precautions had been taken against any interruption in the scholastic curriculum. All difficulties about entering and traversing neighbouring States had been overcome.² Instead of the expected commendation the Minister received a reprimand from the Court of Madrid, which did not agree with him on all points. It especially objected to inquiries being made of adjacent countries, for they might cause the plan to become known and in the event of a refusal political complications might ensue. In any case in the king's opinion it was superfluous to ask him now for his approval of the measures which had been taken, when Du Tillot had omitted to seek his advice when postponing the expulsion. It would have been better to bring the Jesuits to the frontier in small groups and thence to let them find their way home. In this way the neighbouring princes would have had no ground for complaint, for they could not have regarded such small numbers of emigrants as a violation of their territorial rights.³ Deeply hurt, Du Tillot complained to Azara about this censure. He had only put off the execution of the banishment, he said, because he had been forced to do so, having to find replacements for the Jesuit professors from places outside Parma.⁴

On February 3rd, 1768, in the greatest secrecy, Duke Ferdinand signed the decree whereby, for expedient and urgent reasons which had been approved by the Council of

¹ BENASSI, V., 209 *seqq.*

² *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, December 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055.

³ *Grimaldi to Du Tillot, January 12, 1768, *ibid.*

⁴ *Du Tillot to Azara, January 25, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768.

State and eminent theologians, all Jesuits were banished for ever and irrevocably from his States. In the goodness of his heart he had given orders that the exiles were to be taken to the frontier at his expense and that here each of them was to be paid six sequins as journey-money. They would then be free to go where they pleased. If any Jesuit who was not a priest or professed would put aside his religious dress and deny his vocation he was immediately to be reckoned as a loyal subject. All natives of the country who chose to reside in Italy would receive a pension of 60 scudi if they were professed, and 40 scudi if they were of the rank of lay-brother. Surpluses from the revenues of the Jesuit estates were to be used for needy hospitals or other pious purposes. All correspondence with the exiles was forbidden, as was also the preservation of letters from Jesuits. The heaviest penalties would be inflicted on anyone who spoke or wrote about the expulsion, even in private, and even if he were to praise it or consent to it.¹

At last, on February 7th, the Minister was able to report to Grimaldi that the expulsion would take place that night. By seven o'clock next morning there would not be a Jesuit left in the ducal States and an hour after their departure all the teaching posts would be filled again.² In a letter to his royal uncle which was sent at the same time the Infante added apologetically that he himself would have liked the "operation" to take place earlier, but the nature of the measures to be taken had not allowed of any greater acceleration.³

In faithful imitation of the Spanish model a ducal official

¹ BENASSI, V., 213. The draft shows many corrections in Paciauci's hand (*ibid.*, nn. 1 and 2).

² *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055. Copy of the Pragmatic of February 3, 1768 (printed), *ibid.*; a reprint also in the *Inquietudini de' Gesuiti*, IV. (1769).

³ " *Je compte que dans toute la journée de demain, tous les Jésuites seront hors de mes États: j'aurois bien désiré que cette opération eût pû se faire plutôt, mais la nature des arrangements à prendre, ne m'a permis de l'accélérer au gré de mes désirs." Ferdinand I. to Charles III., February 7, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055.

with a number of soldiers appeared in every Jesuit college on the night of February 7th–8th. After the inmates had packed up their clothes, linen, breviaries, crucifixes, and other small articles, they were assembled in one room. Here the decree of banishment was read to them, and then they were taken under military escort to the frontier, where each was handed the prescribed journey-money. Most of them made their way to Bologna, from where they were distributed among the various Jesuit establishments in the Papal States.¹ They were formally assured that their manuscripts, which were their only possessions, would be restored to them and forwarded to their new addresses, but, with a few exceptions, this promise was never kept.²

Those who were of like mind with the Government of Parma did not fail to signify their approval of its action. The self-complacent Minister was not a little flattered by the observation made by the Danish envoy in Paris, that the method of expulsion was improving every day.³ In the Court of Madrid the news that the expulsion had been carried through aroused great joy; Charles III. let Du Tillot know that he was particularly satisfied with its smooth and successful issue.⁴ The Duke's subjects were not so highly elated. Towards

¹ *Du Tillot to Roda, February 10, 1768, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 668; *Torrighiani to Giraud, February 18, 1768, Nunziata di Spagna, Carte sciolte, 412, *loc. cit.*; **Miscellanea de expulsione Societatis e statu Parmensi*, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 223, I., and 230, French translation in CARAYON, XV., 153 *seqq.*

² BENASSI, V., 217 *seqq.* "E il trattamento degli espulsi, se si toglie la pensione mantenuta, secondo l'editto, ai sudditi e a pochi eccettuati, fu ingiusto e crudele" (*ibid.*).

³ *Ibid.*, 214.

⁴ " *El Rey ha celebrado en sumo grado esta noticia, habiendole parecido muy bien los terminos en que está extendida la Pragmatica de extrañamiento, y muy prudentes y acertadas las medidas que se tomaron para el exito de aquella operacion " (Grimaldi to Du Tillot, February 23, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5055). *Charles III. to Ferdinand I., February 23, 1768, *ibid.*, 5220; *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, March 6, 1768, *ibid.*, 5055.

the end of the year the Minister wrote to the Spanish envoy Azpuru,¹ "if all the supporters of the Jesuits were to be sent out of the country the population would be reduced by at least a third."

The banishment was followed immediately by the seizure of the Society's property. Contrary to the Minister's apprehensions, it was found that nothing had been abstracted prior to the confiscation. The movable goods, except for those which had been allotted to the university and the hospital, were publicly auctioned and found their way, for the most part, into the hands of Jews, there being no other buyers. For the period March 1st to December 31st, 1768, the revenues from the confiscated estates amounted to 343,632 lire. One of the articles of the decree of expulsion provided that the Bishops of the duchy should be consulted with a view to filling the ecclesiastical posts formerly under Jesuit administration with learned and exemplary clerics. Actually the Bishops were presented with accomplished facts. The notices informing them of the perpetual banishment of the Jesuits bore the date February 6th but were not delivered until the morning after the event. The Jesuit churches came under the immediate protection of the ruler of the country, who controlled the arrangements for divine services without reference to the competent Church authority.²

The high hopes of the country's efflorescence which was expected to result from the expulsion of the Jesuits were not to be fulfilled. According to the confidential account contained in the letters written to Grimaldi by the Spanish envoy-extraordinary Llano, the situation soon became desperate. The tuition given to the young duke was such as would be tolerated only in the freethinking Courts of Berlin and London. The hospital, which had been endowed with the Jesuit property, was on the point of economic collapse. The university professors, mostly secularized Religious, had a bad

¹ *On December 24, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768.

² BENASSI, V., 220 *seqq.*

reputation, and the moral laxity in the university was appalling. In the Collegio dei Nobili discipline had totally disappeared, and its debts amounted to 700,000 reals.¹

As early as 1769 the young ruler's relations with the autocratic Minister had become so bad that the Kings of Spain and France had to admonish him not to despise the counsels of his old and faithful servant, especially as there was no one to replace him.² But as time went on the differences between the two became so great that any collaboration was impossible. With his over-hasty and anti-clerical reforms Du Tillot had made many enemies for himself and they were determined to dislodge him from his position no matter what the cost.³ Dismissed by the duke without even a final audience, the Minister had to leave the country like a runaway in the middle of the night of November 19th, 1771. He betook himself to Paris, where he succumbed to an apoplectic stroke on December 13th, 1774.⁴

(3)

On the island of Malta, which Charles V. had handed over to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, to be held in fee from Sicily, on March 24th, 1530, the Jesuits had been conducting a college since 1595, and a small parochial settlement on the neighbouring island of Gozo. Even in this little ecclesiastical State the Society had its enemies. After the catastrophe in Spain the Knights from that country had to part company with the Jesuits. The Grand Master, Emanuel Pinto da Fonseca, a Portuguese by birth, was still active in mind and body, in

¹ *Llano to Grimaldi, August 9 and 16, [1771 or 1772], Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5204. On Du Tillot's dismissal Llano was appointed in his stead. Cf. BENASSI, V., 250 *seqq.*

² *Louis XV. to Ferdinand I., May 22, 1769, Private Ducal Archives in Parma, Francia; *Charles III. to Ferdinand I., August 8, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5228. Cf. FIGORINI, *La corte di Parma nel secolo XVIII.*, in the *Nuova Antologia*, 3rd series, XXXIX. (1892), 275 *seqq.*

³ BENASSI, V., 336 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 354.

spite of his eighty-seven years, but was indifferent to anything that was not to his own advantage. His countryman, the Bailli Guedes, had hitherto been active as a declared enemy of Rome and the Jesuits, and other Knights shared his dislike of the Society. The situation of the Jesuits, therefore, had become very insecure, and after the expulsion of their brethren from the kingdom of the Two Sicilies the question of their continued residence in Malta became very acute. The Order of St. John having, as a spiritual corporation, to pay heed to the Pope, and at the same time wanting to keep in favour with the King of Naples as it was a fee-holder of the Sicilian crown, a double game of a peculiar kind now began to be played. Whereas in Naples the Grand Master as good as offered to expel the Jesuits, in Rome he pretended to be morally compelled to take this step, and asked that it be tacitly condoned.¹

As reported by Tanucci to Madrid on February 9th, 1768, Pinto had stated through his representative that, being obliged by his feudal status to expel from the island the king's subjects who had been found guilty of crimes against the State, he was prepared to meet his obligation if the king would assure him that the Jesuits had been guilty of such a crime. The Minister had replied that his master regarded these Religious as enemies of the State, so that by reason of the feudal treaty they could no longer remain in Malta. The Cardinal Secretary of State, on behalf of the Pope, had forbidden the expulsion of the Jesuits (continued Tanucci), but the Grand Master seriously intended to yield to the royal pressure. The Ricevitore Pignatelli, who was the source of this information, showed in this affair the greatest interest in the king's service, in return for which he would like to be placed on an equal footing with other envoys to the Court of Naples.² Madrid's attitude was most accommodating. It agreed to Pignatelli's promotion and desired the Knights of

¹ RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 57 seqq.

² *Tanucci to Charles III., February 9 and 16, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

St. John to be promised the king's support in their dealings with Rome.¹ To cover himself against any counter-measures that might be taken by the Holy See, Pinto, probably also at Portugal's instigation, asked the King of Naples for a letter urgently demanding the banishment of the Society of Jesus. Tanucci gladly agreed to this request.²

In Rome the Grand Master made out that his Order was in a position of constraint. The Neapolitan Government was threatening to sequestrate all Maltese commanderies in its State and to stop commercial traffic and the export of grain from the mainland, if he refused to eject the Jesuits. In these circumstances he asked that the expulsion be tacitly condoned.³ The Holy See gave credence to these asseverations

¹ " *Alabando yo la idea de S. M. como de razon, atendida la solidez de sus fundamentos, añadí, que pudiera acaso el gobierno Maltés querer se le ofreciese ser sostenido de esse monarca, y procurar que tambien S. M. le protegiese contra los rigores, y acaso vias de hecho de la Corte Romana, antes de determinarse a la expulsion de los Jesuitas, porque los estados pequeños miran mas que los grandes en lo que arriesgan " (Grimaldi to Tanucci [March 8, 1768], *ibid.*). *Charles III. to Tanucci, March 8 and April 19, 1768, *ibid.*, 6058.

² " *Il Gran Maestro di Malta nell' espulsione dei gesuiti, che dal Re si sollecita, mostra coraggio contro il furore minacciante di Torrigiani, forse è venuto il coraggio dalla patria, essendo Portoghese. Ha voluto ch' io gli scriva una lettera più pressante di real ordine; la scrissi sabato " (Tanucci to Charles III., March 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 6001). *Tanucci to Charles III., June 14, 1768, *ibid.* The Grand Master wanted " *una lettera del Re, colla quale gli si prescrive quell' espulsione, che già gli si era insinuata, dei Gesuiti. Si è fatta, ed egli spera, che questo gli abbia a servir di usbergo e scudo contro il furore e le convulsioni di Torrigiani " (Tanucci to Grimaldi, March 29, 1768, *ibid.*).

³ " *Secondo alcune notizie Malta ha gettato sopra noi l'odio dell' espulsione dei Gesuiti, facendo credere al Papa, che se non si facesse, noi avremmo sequestrate tutte le commende di Malta, e sospeso il commercio, tanto che Torrigiani si lasciò persuadere a non far per una ventina di Gesuiti tanto danno alla religione, e alla popolazione di quell' isola " (Tanucci to Centomani, April 9,

and undertook to give the Knights a free hand on condition that the Fathers were removed in a fitting manner and without the use of military force. Further, every member of the Society must be given a pension. The Inquisitor was to take possession of the Jesuit property in the name of the Pope and was to employ it to the best advantage of the islanders.¹

Thereupon on April 22nd, 1768, the Grand Master issued an edict in which he stated that the King of Naples had informed him that he had banished the Jesuits from his country on account of grave political offences and had at the same time requested him to effect their banishment from Malta in accordance with the existing treaties. He accordingly expelled these Religious from the island for ever. Each would receive a pension of 80 Roman scudi.²

On the very next day the Jesuits, about twenty in number, left Malta and were conveyed by a French ship to Civitavecchia.³ In all other respects the prescribed conditions were disregarded by the Grand Master.⁴ At Tanucci's behest⁵ he had the immovable property of the Jesuits confiscated by his officers and some soldiers and he entrusted its administration to the procurators of the Maltese Order's common treasury, saying nothing to his Order's councillors about the arrangements made by the Holy See and the Maltese envoy.⁶

On this last matter serious differences arose between Pinto and the Inquisitor Mancinforte, who tried to protect the

1768, *ibid.*, 6004). *Tanucci to Charles III., April 12, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge, May 21, 1768, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, "Roma", 287.

¹ Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 57 *seqq.*

² *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101, translation in CARAYON, XVI., 449 *seq.*

³ *Tanucci to Charles III., May 10, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

⁴ *Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *To Centomani, April 29, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6004.

⁶ *Rivera to Lascaris, July 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge, May 7, 1768, State Archives, Venice, *loc. cit.*

rights of Rome. Again Tanucci intervened, declaring that as the sovereign rights over the island belonged, not to the Pope, but solely and exclusively to the King of the Two Sicilies, who was the feudal lord, the Grand Master, as the monarch's concessionaire, and under no other title, had the right to dispose of the Jesuit property for other pious purposes.¹

The Inquisitor now appealed to Rome² and even within the Maltese Order the illegal measures met with opposition. Four Grand Crosses, having learnt the true state of affairs, lodged a protest against the Grand Master's procedure, in consequence of which the latter finally agreed to write a submissive letter to the Pope asking him to settle the matter as leniently as he could.³ Thus appeased, Clement XIII. sought a solution whereby regard would be paid to Pinto's position of constraint and at the same time the rights of the Holy See would be at least formally upheld. Accordingly, after issuing a serious reprimand, he prescribed that the military were to be withdrawn from the Jesuit properties and that all inventories were to be handed to the Inquisitor; on the other hand, he allowed the Grand Master to retain possession of the properties themselves as the Papal plenipotentiary, until the Holy See had decided how they were to be used for the advancement of religion and the common weal.⁴

Pinto earned little thanks from Naples for having given way. In the decree of expulsion which had been published the Grand Master referred to himself as being "invested with

¹ *Tanucci to Innocenzo Pignatelli, May 20, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5882; *to Charles III., May 24, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

² *Bailli de Fleury to Fuentes, August 21, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565.

³ *Ibid.*; *Rivera to Lascaris, July 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge, July 9, 1768, State Archives, Venice, *loc. cit.*; [Azpuru], **Informazione sulla destinazione dei beni gesuitici in Malta*, undated [July 7, 1768], Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4976.

⁴ Brief of Clement XIII. to the Grand Master of Malta, July 13, 1768, *Bull. Rom. Cont.* 1458; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge, July 16, 1768, State Archives, Venice, *loc. cit.*

sovereign rights." This was regarded by Tanucci as an infringement of the sovereign rights of the Sicilian crown over Malta and he demanded that the words be expunged. The Minister also urged that the Knights of Malta, contrary to their constitution, should make common cause with the House of Bourbon against the Pope.¹ In the course of the long and vexatious dispute the Marchese went so far as to prohibit the export of grain from Sicily to Malta, in order to render the Order subservient to his wishes.² Finally Spain intervened as mediator,³ but the dissensions within the Order, which had begun with the expulsion of the Jesuits, continued for several years.⁴

(4)

Hitherto the Bourbon powers had conducted their campaigns against Rome and the Jesuits separately, but shortly after the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and Naples all the princes of the House made common cause against Rome and the Society. The occasion for this was offered by Parma.

The duchies of Parma and Piacenza had long ceased to acknowledge their feudal relations with the Holy See. With the death in 1731 of Duke Antonio Francesco the ducal family of Farnese was left without male issue, and the dispute which then arose between Austria and Spain over the succession ended with the recognition of the Spanish Infante Don Carlos as Duke of Parma. When Carlos ascended the throne of Naples in 1738, he was succeeded in Parma by his brother

¹ *Fleury to Fuentes, August 21 and 30, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565; *Choiseul to Fleury, August 29, 1768, *ibid.*

² *Fleury to Fuentes, January 10 and 12, 1769, *ibid.*, 6136.

³ " *Me mandó S. M. enviar al Marqués de Tanucci un allanamiento que me presentó, y recomendarle su admision." Grimaldi to Fuentes, January 30, 1769, *ibid.*

⁴ Cf. *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 10, 1770, State Archives, Venice, Esteri-Roma $\frac{400}{1145}$; *El Recibidor di Malta a Grimaldi, April 14, 1770, *ibid.*

Don Felipe, whose long-disputed rights were finally recognized in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.¹

The Pope had always objected to these diplomatic agreements. When the male line of Farnese became extinct the Holy See did not neglect to assert its ancient rights over the duchies, and it lodged a protest against the decisions which had been reached in the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. From this time onward, year after year on the vigil of SS. Peter and Paul a protest was read in St. Peter's after solemn vespers to obviate the Papal rights falling into desuetude, and no ruler had taken objection to this procedure.² When Duke Felipe, who died at the end of 1765, was succeeded by his fifteen-year-old son Ferdinand, Clement XIII. took the opportunity to re-affirm in an allocution the overlordship of the Holy See over Parma and Piacenza. Again no objection was raised in any quarter.³

As time went on, these territorial questions were accompanied by disputes of an ecclesiastico-legal character exacerbated by the intransigent attitude of the First Minister, Du Tillot, Marchese di Felino. Compared with him, Ferdinand, the Duke of Parma, was of little significance. The education of the young duke, bereft of his parents at an early age, had been entrusted by Du Tillot to the two philosophers Condillac and Keralio, whose instruction, however, was little suited to enlarge their pupil's mind. The result of their efforts was anything but brilliant.⁴ The duke, as niggardly endowed by nature with physical as with intellectual gifts, remained dependent on others the whole of his life, requiring the guidance, first of Du Tillot, then of his wife Maria Amalie, the

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXV., pp. 126 *seqq.* For the antecedent period, see the Bull of Clement XI., of July 27, 1707, *Bull.* XXI., 295. Cf. BENASSI, V., 261, n. 3, 262, n. 1.

² THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 114 *seq.*; ROUSSEAU, I., 242 *seq.*

³ *Allocution of December 12, 1765, Nunziat. di Spagna, 432, Papal Secret Archives; *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, December 12 and 26, 1765, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*

⁴ *Llano to Grimaldi, August 9 and 16, 1772, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5204.

sixth daughter of Maria Theresa. Responsibility for the contest with the Holy See can hardly be ascribed to the duke, who was only seventeen years old and can hardly have grasped its significance.¹

In his boundless ambition ² the autocratic Minister attacked even the rights of the Church. Supported and urged on ³ by secular and regular clerics eager for reform, he invaded the liberty, jurisdiction, and immunity of the clergy by a series of edicts in a way which was bound to provoke the opposition of the Pope.⁴ Not only did he claim for Parma the same concessions that had been granted by the Holy See to the Spanish Government by the Concordats of 1737 and 1753, but by various measures he strove to restrict possessions in mortmain, which, according to his allegations, covered two-thirds of the territory's surface. For this purpose he had already issued a law in the lifetime of Duke Felipe, on October 25th, 1765. By a decree of January 13th, 1765, without the agreement of the ecclesiastical authorities, he had imposed dues on ecclesiastical property.⁵ Rome's complaints to the Court of Parma evoking no response, Clement XIII. had representations made through the Madrid nuncio to the duke's mother, Elizabeth Farnese, to the effect that the immoderate innovations in Parma might force the Holy See into the regrettable necessity of giving public utterance to its disapproval.⁶ No help, however, was to be expected of Madrid, Du Tillot having secured in advance the Spanish king's consent to his offensive against Rome.⁷ Thus unrestrained, the Minister proceeded

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 245.

² *Pignatelli to Grimaldi, July 28, 1765, Cifre, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5188.

³ Cf. BENASSI, V., 60 *seqq.*

⁴ BENASSI, vol. 5.

⁵ *Pignatelli to Grimaldi, March 3, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5188.

⁶ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, April 16, 1765, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 293, *loc. cit.*

⁷ On December 15, 1765, Du Tillot asked Grimaldi for an official approval of his laws for the reform of ecclesiastical-political

further on his course.¹ On February 8th, 1766, he created a special law-court for the maintenance of the royal jurisdiction, its duties being to ensure the execution of the aforesaid decree and to penalize its infringements. The Pope's attempts to effect an improvement in relations by friendly negotiations were frustrated by an absence of good-will on Du Tillot's part. Just as an agreement was about to be concluded, relying on "the gracious assent of His Catholic Majesty",² he suddenly broke off the negotiations on some paltry excuse.³ Unperturbed by the Curia's objection he proceeded with his ecclesiastical reforms until finally an incident trivial in itself changed the slowly-developing crisis into an open conflict.

A weak-minded man of the name of Descalonne alleged that his wife had been allowed to marry again although his marriage with her had been validly solemnized in the presence of the Bishop. The Bishop submitted all the necessary documents to the Holy See to show that these statements were untenable and in addition he produced evidence of the complainant's

relations, as it was required "de la prudence, et de ma sûreté, que notre cour ne prenne aucune résolution sur les affaires de Rome, sans qu'elle reçoive auparavant les volontez et l'intention de sa Majesté par une lettre d'office". Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5219.

¹ *Erizzo to the Doge of Venice, January 24 and 31, 1767, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 268.

² *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, January 5, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5220.

³ " *V. S. Ill. è già ben informata quanto lungo trattato siasi avuto con quella corte per la revoca dei precedenti editti, quanta impegnata ella vi... fosse, quanto per parti di N. S. si fosse condisceso alle soddisfazioni della medesima, e quanto abbia poi ella stessa mancato alla buona fede e alle leggi della negoziazione, rompendo inaspettatamente, mediante un nuovo assurdo pretesto, la finale conclusione del trattato già quasi conchiuso " (Torrighiani to Giraud, March 9, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Francia, 455, Papal Secret Archives). BENASSI, V., 111-171. As opposed to Torrighiani, ROUSSEAU (I., 248) ascribes the blame to the Pope, asserting, without evidence, that the Holy See had disavowed its spokesmen and had rejected every offer of agreement.

insanity. The matter was now brought before the Roman courts despite the protest of the diocesan Bishop, who appealed to an indult granted by Paul III. and confirmed by Benedict XIV., which empowered the Bishop of Parma to decide on his own account all matters in dispute within his diocese in the last instance, without the possibility of appeal to Rome. A Congregation appointed by Clement XIII. to test the validity of this privilege came to the decision that Paul III.'s indult did not prohibit an appeal to the Holy See if one of the parties to the dispute desired it.¹

Thereupon there appeared on January 16th, 1768, a governmental decree which, to the accompaniment of attacks on the higher ecclesiastical authority, forbade the reference of disputes to foreign tribunals, not excepting Rome. It was also forbidden to present foreigners to ecclesiastical benefices in the duchy without the duke's assent, and the ducal *exequatur* was prescribed for all decrees issued by ecclesiastical superiors.² A Congregation of Cardinals and prelates was immediately convened by the Pope to consider this fresh incident. As a result of their deliberations a Brief, dated January 30th, 1768, was posted up on the evening of February 1st in the traditional places in Rome where such announcements were made,³ it being impossible, as was stated in the Brief, to publish it in the States of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. In it the territorial rights of the Holy See to the two duchies were upheld and the anti-clerical laws promulgated by Parma were enumerated and declared to be null and void because of their conflict with the rights of the Holy See and ecclesiastical immunity and the incompetence of their origin. All their originators and participants came under the censures set out in the Bull *In Coena Domini*, liberation from which the Pope reserved to himself. The Bishops, the regular and the secular clergy, and the laity were forbidden to

¹ ROUSSEAU, I., 248 *seq.*

² Cf. *Bull. Cont.*, III., 1395 *seq.*; BENASSI, V., 257 *seqq.*

³ *Aubeterre to Choiseul, February 3, 1768 (copy), Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565; BENASSI, V., 275.

co-operate in the execution of the condemned decrees under pain of excommunication.¹

In a covering letter which he sent along with this monitorium to the Paris nuncio, the Cardinal Secretary of State explained how the Pope, tired of the continual attacks on the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Parma, had deemed it his unavoidable duty to make a public protest. The Brief, he said, was composed on the model of similar edicts of former Popes, such as Clement XI., who had had to deal with less serious infringements of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Whereas Venice and Vienna had remedied the complaints of the Holy See, no satisfaction had even been made by Parma. The last edict had gone beyond all bounds and therefore called for an emphatic condemnation. The text of the Brief contained ample material for refuting the malicious interpretations² of the Papal decision by ill-disposed parties.³

In the Bourbon Courts the monitorium had the effect of a declaration of war. The official and unofficial correspondence of the envoys and Ministers of this time show like a lightning flash the great revolution that had taken place in the world of religious and ecclesiastical ideas in France and southern Europe. The Spanish agent Azara immediately launched a furious onslaught on the Brief, which he described as an attack on the authority of the princes. According to this Brief, not only the Duke of Parma and his Ministers but also the Kings of France and Spain, together with their Ministers, came under the ban as accomplices and advisers, and their subjects were as good as released from their oath of obedience. Although Tanucci afterwards admitted that the Jesuits and their "tertiaries" had nothing to do with the matter,⁴ these

¹ Printed, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5220; *Bull., loc. cit.*

² "Si può dare una maggiore bestialità di quella commessa dalla Corte di Roma in questo affare?" Abbate Berta to Paciaudi, February 17, 1768, in BENASSI, V., 260, n. 3.

³ *Torrigiani to Giraud, February 3, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Francia, 455, *loc. cit.*

⁴ At the time of the suppression of the Jesuit Order, when there was a question of returning the territories wrested from the Holy

unfortunate Religious were represented as being the originators of the Papal edict and had to suffer accordingly. It was they who had obtained the publication of the decree, it was alleged, by representing the King of Spain to the Pope as a good Christian who would fall on his knees at the mere mention of the word "excommunication" and would send his nephew from Parma to Rome with a rope round his neck. The monarch's eyes would be opened and he would realize the wickedness of Roda, who had seduced him into taking all these steps against the Jesuits. If the experiment succeeded in Parma, the same action would be taken against all the other States.¹ Tanucci indulged in his usual unbridled language. With a flood of insults against Clement XIII. he declared to his friend Galiani that there were only two ways of repairing Rome's crime against Parma: either to pass it over with contempt and silence or to strip the Pope of his secular power. As long as the Bourbon Courts failed to unite to depose the Pope and divide his territories among Venice, Tuscany, Modena, and Naples, they would have to maintain a contemptuous silence. The attitude of the Catholic Powers was incomprehensible to him. If a Bishop went a little beyond his powers, he was threatened with the withdrawal of his revenues. But although the Pope was the greatest, the most outrageous, and the craftiest enemy of all the princes, no one thought of depriving him of his worldly possessions, which were the cause of his having abandoned the law of Christ and

See, Tanucci refused to hand over Benevento on the ground that neither the Jesuits nor their "tertiaries" had been the originators of the monitorium. " *Prescindo tambien de que aora [Tanucci] clame sobre que los Jesuitas y sus terciarios no fueron los autores del monitorio de Parma, y que tenga escrupulos de que se usase del medio de la retencion de estos Estados para obtener la supresion, quando no los tiene para intentar quedarse con ellos de hecho." Moñino to Grimaldi, August 5, 1773, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Extincion", 1773.

¹ Azara to Roda, February 4, 1768, in *El espíritu de Azara*, I., Madrid, 1846, 10.

the teaching of the Apostles.¹ His advice was to ignore the monitorium with contempt. One could just laugh at an unarmed Court like Rome, ignore it, and continue as before.² In his excitement on first hearing the news Choiseul forgot his usual diplomatic calm and called the monitorium an unheard-of stupidity. "The Pope," he exclaimed, "is a complete ninny, and his Minister is a first-class fool. The insult is aimed not only at the Duke of Parma: it applies to the whole House of Bourbon. It is an act of revenge, a reprisal against those monarchs who have driven out the Jesuits. If this first detestable step is tolerated, the Roman Court, led by a man that knows no bounds, will stop at nothing. The dignity of the monarchs and the Family Compact demand that we allow no prince of this House to be insulted with impunity."³

Du Tillot, who had been pressing for an open rupture for years past, now, in order to cover himself, began to work for the union of all the Bourbon Courts and their joint action against the Jesuits. According to his information, he assured the Spanish Foreign Minister, the passionate tone of the Brief, which was artificially induced, was due solely to the Jesuits' vengeful feelings against all the Bourbons. Rome's attack was directed not only against the Infante but against all princes who had turned out the Society of Jesus and whom it was now hoped to strike in the person of the youngest scion of the House—that was the underlying meaning of the monitorium. The expressions used in the Papal document were so insulting and uncalled-for as to arouse the interest of every monarch.⁴ In Paris Du Tillot complained of the immoderate bitterness with which the Roman Curia opposed his ecclesiastico-

¹ Tanucci to Galiani, February 6, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6003; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 184.

² *Tanucci to Centomani, February 6, 1768, Archives of Simancas, *loc. cit.*

³ Choiseul to Grimaldi, February 19, 1768 (*ibid.*, 4565), in ROUSSEAU, I., 250. Cf. Fuentes to Grimaldi, February 19, 1768, *ibid.*

⁴ *Du Tillot to Grimaldi, February 7, 1768, *ibid.*, 5220.

political measures, all of which had been taken in agreement with the Courts of Madrid and Versailles. On the other hand, he was sure that the old bogey of excommunication was a foolish and out-of-date threat that was not worth considering. But as some turbulent monk or other might take this opportunity of creating a disturbance, he was thinking of publishing a decree through the jurisdictional commission, in which the Papal constitution would be represented as apocryphal.¹ He would like Choiseul's view of the matter.² The young duke too, in his letters to the Kings of France and Spain, had to represent the Jesuits as the real authors of the monitorium.³ On the Superiors of the religious Orders the Minister imposed prudence and silence, holding over them the threat that if a single Religious spoke or wrote against the edict he would clear the whole Order out of the country. To the two Inquisitors at Piacenza he had orders sent that as soon as the monitorium had been published they were to leave the duchy within two hours.⁴ As a result of this intimidation no Bishop or cleric, whether regular or secular, dared to object to the Government's anti-clerical laws.⁵

At first the Minister had no great hope of success from a paper war, although he had been looking out in Venice for a theologian versed in canon law and Church history who might possibly write against Rome.⁶ Soon, however, he abandoned his first opinion and had a manifesto circulated in which the Papal Brief was contested and the Government's

¹ Spedalieri had advised this method as causing less disturbance while preserving the duke's honour. BENASSI, V., 263, n. 4; Du Tillot to Roda, February 10, 1768, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 186.

² *Du Tillot to D'Argental, February 10, 1768, Parma Library, Correspondance de Mr. du Tillot avec Mr. d'Argental, 574.

³ *Ferdinand I. to Charles III., February 10, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5220.

⁴ *Du Tillot to Azara, February 13, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768.

⁵ *Du Tillot to Azara, February 21, 1768, *ibid.*

⁶ *Du Tillot to Azara, February 13, 1768, *ibid.*

reform laws were energetically defended.¹ Several writers offered him their services spontaneously, and a series of polemical works appeared in which, on the authority of Gerson, Sarpi, and Fleury, the sovereign rights of the prince were upheld against the pretensions of the Papacy.²

Although Du Tillot had declared that in his proceedings against ecclesiastical jurisdiction and immunity he had always acted in agreement with Versailles and Madrid, he was not entirely without misgivings as to the attitude these Cabinets would adopt. To the notice of his January edict which he had sent to Grimaldi, he had received an evasive reply. Assuredly, Grimaldi observed, the edict would greatly benefit the country but he would not like to say if it was consonant with Parma's privileges. He did not doubt, however, that it had been drawn up in accordance with the opinions of jurists and theologians. Piqued by this reply, the Minister declared that for an ordinance of this kind there was no need of privileges; it was justified by the natural right of self-defence.³

His troubles were soon to disappear. From all sides the representatives of the Bourbon Powers hastened to the aid of their like-minded colleague. "Let there be no mistake about it," wrote Aubeterre, "there is no question here of a personal matter of the Infante's but of a policy which has gradually been formed since the banishment of the Jesuits. A trial is being made with one of the less powerful princes, from whom, it is thought, there is nothing to fear; later, proceedings will be taken against the others. Apart from the demands of blood-relationship, this affair of the Infante's must become the common cause of all sovereigns. Their authority will be at stake if they let the Roman Court impose disobedience with impunity on the clergy and its subordinates

¹ *Manifesto o la Memoria della corte di Parma sulle lettere in forma di Breve pubblicate e affisse in Roma nel giorno primo Febbraio 1768*, in BENASSI, V., 268 seqq. The manifesto met with Voltaire's heartiest approval; see *ibid.*, 269, n. 4.

² Cf. *ibid.*, 274 seqq.

³ *Du Tillot to Azara, February 13, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768.

under pain of excommunication." ¹ In Rome, where the Brief had been posted up at 11 p.m. on February 1st, 1768, all the notices had been torn down again by 1 a.m. the next morning.² In other quarters too the cries for help uttered by Du Tillot and, under his direction, Duke Ferdinand, did not go unheard. Charles III. assured the young monarch of his sympathy with him in the distress caused him by Rome and promised him his support in so far as his cause was just. He would have the matter examined by a commission of prelates and jurists and make their opinion known to the King of France, so that both Courts, in conjunction with Naples, could take the necessary steps in Rome.³ In the letter in which the Spanish monarch demanded Tanucci's co-operation he observed, "We must act in unison, speak one and the same language, and continually give unending thanks to God that we no longer have in the lands of our family these pernicious and corrupt men who are against our holy religion and their rulers."⁴ The Extraordinary Council of Castile, augmented by five Bishops, came to the conclusion under the leadership of the two Fiscals, Campomanes and Moñino, that it was not the Infante who had encroached on the rights of the Church, but that the Roman Curia with its monitorium had overstepped the boundaries of love, moderation, and reasonable consideration for the Duke of Parma. The excommunication was therefore null and void and the Roman Ministry was in duty bound to withdraw the Brief and to keep inside its barriers in the future.⁵

Tanucci's high-flown plans of despoiling the Pope of his worldly possessions ⁶ met with no approval from Choiseul with his sense of reality. The French Minister insisted above

¹ *Aubeterre to Choiseul, February 3, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Charles III. to Ferdinand I., February 23, 1768, *ibid.*, 5220.

⁴ Charles III. to Tanucci, February 23, 1768, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 186.

⁵ *Consulta* of February 23, 1768, *ibid.*, 187, n. 1.

⁶ Tanucci to Galiani, February 6, 1768 (see above, p. 271, n. 1.)

everything on the necessity of the Kings of France, Spain, and Naples taking joint action against Clement XIII. In a memorandum to the Pope the representatives of these three Powers were to express their amazement that he should have published, without previous negotiation or warning, a decree against the Duke of Parma which was in itself both insulting and unjust, since it apparently inflicted excommunication on him for a purely secular matter. Family interest did not allow the rulers of the House of Bourbon to overlook this insult. They therefore found themselves compelled to demand, with the means placed in their hands by God, formal satisfaction for the insulted party. The Holy See must formally and publicly countermand the Brief. If the Pope did not comply with the request within a week, the three monarchs would recall their envoys from Rome and expel the Papal nuncios from their States. In the event of a refusal, which was anticipated, relations with Rome were to be broken off for the remainder of the pontificate. Business would be carried on, "but we will deal with the Court of Rome in such a way that we will be the masters of the next conclave, and the most pressing task of the next Pope will be to make good the stupidities of his predecessor." Should a rupture occur the House of Bourbon would have nothing worse to fear than the loss of a few Cardinal's hats, which was really rather a gain, for the Crown Cardinals allowed themselves to be entangled in intrigues as soon as they got to Rome, whereas it was easy to buy the votes of the Italian members of the Sacred College, and they would not let themselves be duped. If the Pope obstinately persisted in his refusal, they would make themselves masters of the possessions which the Holy See was holding unjustly, such as Avignon, Benevento, Pontecorvo, Castro, and Ronciglione. By these means the Bourbons would be able to dictate terms when a reconciliation was eventually made and obtain the suppression of the Jesuit Order.¹

¹ Choiseul to Grimaldi, February 19, 1768, in ROUSSEAU, I., 251 *seqq.*

The Extraordinary Council of Castile, to which Charles III. submitted these proposals of Choiseul's for its consideration, expressed its agreement with them in essentials but thought that the occupation of the Papal States was a better method than breaking off relations. The Council was sure that this step would lead to a diplomatic rupture but it was in the interest of the Powers to be able to put the blame on Rome. In this way they would obtain both the breach and the occupation of part of the temporal possessions. "We shall thus be more the masters on the day of settlement and will be better able to attain what we have in view, namely the suppression of the Jesuit Order."¹

As Choiseul, when communicating with the Papal nuncio, had brought the same accusations against the Holy See as when writing to Grimaldi, Torrigiani exposed their worthlessness in his reply to Giraud. For years past the Pope had looked on at Parma's activities with forbearance and long-suffering. His repeated attempts to settle the conflict had been frustrated by the First Minister's dishonesty and had been answered only by fresh encroachments. The Court of Parma had never made any representations to Rome before issuing its reforming edicts, so that no reproach should be brought against the Pope for observing the same procedure, especially as on previous occasions he had made it clear that he reserved to himself the right to make use of his supreme authority. After the unpleasant experiences he had had in years gone by, to have once more entered into negotiations would have meant exposing himself to fresh refusals and insults and would have tied his hands. To describe the Brief as a hostile act against the House of Bourbon was a worthless pretext for the obvious purpose of putting the Holy See in the wrong. In condemning and nullifying laws which were harmful to the Church the Pope was only performing the duties of his office, and he was not swayed by any personal motives. The protest against the Bull *In Coena Domini* might

¹ *Grimaldi to Choiseul, March 2, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

have had some justification in a Brief for France, where it was not allowed to be promulgated, but not in a decree for Parma, where the Bull had always been recognized and put into force. For centuries it had been accepted as the norm in similar cases ; the Pope had done no more than use the language of his predecessors.¹

Almost all the Catholic Governments forbade the circulation of the monitorium in their States. Despite the nuncio's energetic efforts to persuade Louis XV. to have the Brief published, the Paris Parlement, instigated by Choiseul, banned it on February 26th, 1768. It was only the Minister's cool-headedness that prevented the order being given for its public burning by the executioner.² On March 13th the Parmesan Government, adopting the opinion given by the royal Giunta, issued a decree by which the failure to surrender the monitorium incurred the penalty suffered by rebels and traitors.³ On March 16th, 1768, the Council of Castile published against the Pope's admonitory letter a royal ordinance to which were attached the opinions of the two Fiscals, Campomanes and Moñino, with their harsh invectives against Rome.⁴ An edict of the King of Naples, of June 4th, 1768, ordered the surrender of the *papel de Roma*, as the Brief was contemptuously dubbed, and the Bull *In Coena Domini*, threatening anyone who retained them with the penalty for high treason.⁵ Similarly, on April 30th, the Portuguese Government ordered the collection of every copy of the monitorium and declared that anyone who distributed, copied, or retained it was a traitor.⁶

¹ *Torrighiani to Giraud, March 9, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Francia, 455, *loc. cit.*

² THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 122 ; BENASSI, V., 266.

³ The publication of the edict did not follow until March 26, 1768, after the approval of the Courts of Spain and France had arrived (BENASSI, V., 268). A copy of the edict in the Arch. general central in Madrid, Estado, 4900.

⁴ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 191 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 200.

⁶ THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 122.

Meanwhile, after the Bourbon Powers had agreed on the manner of their procedure,¹ the representatives of the three Courts had asked the Pope for a private audience. Clement XIII., who had been notified well in advance of the joint action that was about to be taken, was not only not disheartened but was firmly resolved not to depart from the decision he had taken. He was convinced that he must not fail in the obligations of his spiritual office in order to save the worldly possessions of the Holy See, and that he could make no concession inconsonant with his dignity as Head of the Church and guardian of the laws.² On April 15th and 16th the envoys presented their memoranda³ in which they demanded in the name of their royal masters the recall of the monitorium and the unreserved recognition of the Infante Ferdinand's sovereignty over Parma and Piacenza. In the event of a refusal, they threatened reprisals; if, on the other hand, the Holy See agreed to the request made by their Courts, the latter would be willing to act as intermediaries in the negotiations for a settlement. But the conditions for making satisfaction to the Infante must first be fulfilled before they could enter into further discussions, in which the Cardinals Torrigiani, Negroni, Boschi, Bonaccorsi, and Castelli were to take no part.⁴

The Pope skimmed through the memorial presented by the French representative, Aubeterre, and told him he would

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 5, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, April 5, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

² *Torrighiani to Vincenti, March 24 and 31 and April 14, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 24, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

³ *Memoria di Spagna, of April 15, 1768, in Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*; copies of the three *aides-mémoires* (April 15, 1768) in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

⁴ In an *aide-mémoire* of June 9, 1768, the Republic of Venice approved of this step of the Bourbons. *Ibid.*

neither withdraw nor alter the Brief, for he could not do so with a good conscience. It was only at the prompting of his conscience that he had published the monitorium. The threat of reprisals he treated with contempt. The same reply was given by Clement XIII. to the Spanish envoy, with the observation that he would rather die than betray the rights of the Apostolic See and burden his conscience with a heavy load for which he would have to account at the judgment seat of God. He was not afraid of reprisals. The monarchs might take as many as they wished; they would meet with no resistance, for he had neither weapons nor soldiers with which to oppose them. Even if he did have them, he would not use them against Catholic princes and sons of the Church. The only weapons he had were prayer and the Cross of Christ, in which he put all his trust. The Pope's countenance, while he was making this reply, showed signs rather of joy than of grief.¹

Whereas Clement confined himself to this dignified rejoinder to the representatives of France and Spain, he could not refrain from calling the attention of Cardinal Orsini, the representative of the Two Sicilies, to the unworthiness of his procedure. In the *aide-mémoire* which Orsini had to present in his king's name, the monitorium was described as an outrage against the person of the Duke of Parma and as an attack on his sovereignty.² "No one would dare," protested the aged Head of the Church, "to throw such an accusation in the face of any other monarch, without communicating with his Minister." He would never have believed that his own sons would declare war on him, the universal father; but with all their reprisals they would not obtain from him the recantation of the Brief. He condemned as a worthless subterfuge the envoy's excuse that the Courts were not satisfied

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, April 15, 1768, *ibid.*; BENASSI, V., 270 *seq.* Cf. also *Torrighiani to Vincenti, April 21, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*; THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 125 *seq.*

² *Copy in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

with the Minister and therefore had to deal directly with the Pope. To Clement's reproaches that he had not been true to his obligations as a Cardinal, Orsini replied that he did not consider that he had offended against his oath.¹

Attempts were made to bring other Catholic Powers into the league against the Holy See. In the spring of 1768 Charles III. had hopes of Austria being drawn more closely towards the Bourbon policy through the marriages of the Duke of Parma and the French Dauphin with the two archduchesses.² On April 19th he wrote joyfully to Tanucci that, according to the reports that had come from Paris, Austria and Portugal had joined with the Bourbons.³ This news, however, proved to be untrue. On May 12th Torrigiani had in his hands the assurance that the Imperial Court would take no step against the monitorium despite all the efforts of the Bourbon envoys.⁴ The reason for this attitude was intimated to the Spanish representative as being the unwillingness of Austria to expose itself to a rebuff such as had been suffered by the Bourbons, especially as the latter had not waited for any German mediation.⁵ In spite of Prince Kaunitz's marked predilection for France, the Empress maintained her negative position; in fact, according to the nuncio Visconti's report, she positively approved of the Pope's attitude towards Parma and the Bourbons.⁶ Her view was shared by the King of Sardinia, who remarked that for three armed Powers to proceed in this

¹ *Orsini to Grimaldi, April 20, 1768, *ibid.*

² *Charles III. to Louis XV., March 2, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2850; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 189 *seq.*

³ *To Tanucci, April 19, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 6059; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 198.

⁴ *Torrighiani to Vincenti, May 12, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Mahony to Grimaldi, May 21, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6504.

⁶ *Visconti to Torrigiani, May 28, June 14 and 18, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, Papal Secret Archives.

way against the unarmed Roman Curia hardly redounded to their honour.¹

Pombal, who had long desired closer relations with Spain, saw the dispute over Parma as a welcome opportunity of effecting this connection. On March 20th, 1768, he empowered the Portuguese envoy to conclude an agreement with the object of compelling the Pope to "fulfil his duty" and, if necessary, of occupying Papal territory. In a covering letter containing violent abuse of the Jesuits he proposed that the Head of the Church should be proceeded against with force of arms and that the Papal States should be divided among the neighbouring princes.² He was thinking also of sending the envoy Almada back to Rome so as to combine with the French and Spanish representatives in obtaining satisfaction for Parma.³ However, much as the Bourbon Courts desired to strengthen the anti-Papal group by the admission of further Catholic Powers, they did not entirely trust the Portuguese Minister's intentions. Both Choiseul⁴ and Tanucci⁵ suspected that Pombal's over-eagerness concealed ulterior political

¹ *Tanucci to Cattolica, May 10, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6004; *Visconti to Torrigiani, June 4, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *loc. cit.*

² Copies of both documents in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7290.

³ *Pombal to Ayres de Sa e Mello, April 9, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1768.

⁴ " *M. d'Oeyras est tout feu quand il est question de Rome et des Jésuites, pour lesquels nous n'avons pas besoin de lui et où il n'est qu'incommode; mais lorsque nous traitons l'alliance contre Angleterre il me persifle, comme on dit dans ce pays-ci; et je crois qu'il fait pire, car il négocie un nouveau traité de commerce avec Angleterre " (Choiseul to Grimaldi, May 3, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2850). " *Il faut laisser faire ce que voudra M. d'Oeyras à Rome; quant à nous, l'affaire des représailles est en règle " (Choiseul to Grimaldi, May 27, 1768, *ibid.*). *Grimaldi to Choiseul, May 16, 1768, *ibid.*

⁵ *To Azpuru, May 7 and 31, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1768.

motives and they feared that Portugal's accession would be more of a burden than a relief to the allies. Almada's efforts to secure the support of the French and Spanish ambassadors in his project of returning to Rome as envoy met with so cool a response that he finally abandoned it.¹

Rome, being well aware of the possible consequences of the steps that had been taken, took pains to prevent a rupture of diplomatic relations. An attempt was made by the Pope to appease the Courts of Versailles and Madrid by assuring them that he had not the slightest intention of offending the two sovereigns but that in his procedure against Parma he had been led only by his conscience. But both Choiseul and the Spanish envoy Fuentes refused to accept the Papal memorandum.²

After Clement XIII.'s refusal to give way, reprisals were expected to follow immediately. Tanucci, however, entreated Charles III. to postpone them until the wedding of King Ferdinand and the Archduchess Carolina had taken place, since, if the Pope were to impose the penalty of excommunication on the invaders of the Papal States, this step, in view of the religious outlook of the Empress and her daughters, might throw the whole nuptial project into confusion.³ The Madrid Government accordingly proposed the 10th of June, 1768, for the occupation of Benevento and Pontecorvo and the following day for the occupation of Avignon and Venaissin.⁴ As a result of Choiseul's and Tanucci's representations it was finally agreed that the two States should take simultaneous

¹ Cf. *Correspondencia del Sr Com^{dor} Almada Mendoza a M^r Azpuru, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1760/69.

² *Fuentes to Grimaldi, May 30 and June 3, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

³ *To Charles III., May 3, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

⁴ *Grimaldi to Choiseul, May 16, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2850; *Choiseul to Grimaldi, May 27, 1768, *ibid.*; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, May 16, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

action on June 14th.¹ This plan was put into effect. On the appointed day the troops of the two Powers entered the Papal possessions; the legates and the Jesuits had to leave the occupied territories and the French and Neapolitan officials took over the civil administration.²

However hard the Bourbons strove to preserve the appearance of unanimity, the mutual relations of their representatives and Ministers were anything but harmonious. The French envoy Aubeterre especially had a strong dislike for the Spanish and Neapolitan agents, Azara and Centomani, who were bent on playing important parts no matter what the cost, meddled in everything, criticized every step taken by their own ambassadors, and tried to create the impression that it was they who had the confidence of their Courts.³ Choiseul was equally exasperated by Tanucci's wily schemes. In his first plan the French Foreign Minister had included among the places to be occupied Castro and Ronciglione,⁴ to which Naples had previously laid claim.⁵ This step was favoured also by Azpuru on the ground that the Roman Curia, deriving as it did an annual revenue of 100,000 scudi from these districts, would be the more effectively assailed in a vital nerve.⁶ But as Spain wished the occupation of Papal territory to be conceived as a reprisal and not as the deprivation of an illegitimate possession, exception was taken to the scheme, especially as France and Austria stood guarantee for Castro according to the peace treaty of 1738.⁷ Nevertheless, to

¹ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, May 25, 1768, *ibid.*; *Tanucci to Grimaldi, May 31, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

² *Tanucci to Grimaldi, June 14, 1768, *ibid.*

³ Aubeterre to Choiseul, August 18, 1768, in ROUSSEAU, I., 266.

⁴ Choiseul to Grimaldi, February 19, 1768, *ibid.*, 251 *seqq.*

⁵ *Tanucci to Azpuru, May 31, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1768.

⁶ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 24, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

⁷ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, July 26, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

increase the pressure, the occupation was to be used as a threat and was to be carried out if the Pope persisted in his obstinacy.¹ Tanucci thought this a good opportunity of obtaining for his royal master the triumph of a slight increase of territory. He declared that the retaliatory measures taken by the three Powers were insufficient: they must also possess themselves of Castro and Ronciglione, which lay practically outside the gates of Rome, especially as Naples had long had rights to them. When Ferdinand's troops appeared on the banks of the Tiber, before the Castel S. Angelo, the Roman populace would rise and force the Pope to grant every one of the Bourbons' demands. To lend more weight to his proposals he spread it abroad that Choiseul had persistently urged him to occupy the districts in question.² In Rome the Marchese had at first caused the rumour to be spread that regarding Castro and Ronciglione no decision had yet been reached.³ In Madrid the step was held to be imprudent, it being desired to cow the Romans by the fear of further seizures of territory and to render them inclined to make greater concessions.⁴ In consequence Tanucci instructed the envoy Orsini to circulate the report that Spain was now agreeable to the occupation of further portions of the Papal States and that France was insistent on it.⁵ To Centomani he gave the feast of All Saints as the day fixed for the entry of the Neapolitan troops.⁶ Orsini knew no rest until he had shared this information with

¹ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, May 25, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565.

² *Choiseul to Ossun, September 20, 1768, *ibid.*, 5222. Cf. ROUSSEAU, I., 267, n. 1.

³ *Azpuru to Du Tillot, July 7, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768; *Tanucci to Azpuru, July 12, 1768, *ibid.*, Exped., 1768.

⁴ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, July 26, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, June 26, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

⁵ *Tanucci to Orsini, August 16, 1768, *ibid.*, 6005; *Tanucci to Grimaldi, August 16, 1768, *ibid.*

⁶ *Tanucci to Centomani, August 20, 1768, *ibid.*, 6006.

Cardinal Cavalchini.¹ This aroused a storm of indignation in Vienna and Versailles. When asked for an explanation, Orsini denied everything and declared that Cavalchini, who was hard of hearing, had misunderstood him.² Tanucci in his turn disavowed the representative of Naples.³

The Curia was not alarmed by these manœuvres, having heard from the Viennese nuncio that the empress had let it be known at the Bourbon Courts that she could not view the occupation of Castro with indifference.⁴ Choiseul gave vent to his anger in contemptuous language aimed at Tanucci and Orsini.⁵ Indignant at the misuse of his name, he protested against Tanucci's dishonesty and trickery⁶ and demanded that he be severely reprimanded by the King of Spain.⁷ Thus exposed, the Marchese wrapped himself in a profound silence.⁸ Later he complained that the French Foreign Minister, with all the fuss and bother he had made, had encouraged the Pope in his resistance.⁹

Du Tillot also thought that the time had come to increase

¹ *Negroni to Aubeterre, August 24, 1768, *ibid.*, 5222 ; *Aubeterre to Negroni, August 25, 1768, *ibid.*

² *Azpuru to Aubeterre, August 31, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *Tanucci to Charles III., October 4, 1768, *ibid.*, 6006.

⁴ *Visconti to Torrigiani, August 26, 1768, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *loc. cit.* ; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, September 1, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.* ; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 22, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222.

⁵ Choiseul to Aubeterre, October 4, 1768, in ROUSSEAU, I., 266. Cf. p. 9, n. 3.

⁶ *Choiseul to Vicomte Choiseul, envoy to Naples, September 20, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222 ; *Choiseul to Aubeterre, September 20, 1768, *ibid.*

⁷ Grimaldi to Fuentes, September 19, 1768, in ROUSSEAU, I., 276, n. 2 ; Grimaldi to Azpuru, September 20, 1768, *ibid.* ; Choiseul to Aubeterre, October 4, 1768, *ibid.*

⁸ *Tanucci to Galiani, October 8, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6006.

⁹ *To Castromonte, October 29, 1768, *ibid.*

his master's territory—which was far too small—at the Pope's expense, but his attempts to sound the friendly Bourbon Courts and the Imperial House met with such strong opposition that he soon dropped the project.¹ Hopelessly he wrote to Argental that this was the most favourable occasion to show a manly spirit and to cut short all jurisdictional controversies. This was to be done by stripping the Pope of every vestige of temporal rule, confining him to his episcopal functions, and thus putting an end to the powers he had arrogated to himself and to all his usurpations. A vigorous war should be waged to reduce the Roman Court to the lowest level and to separate it from the person of the Pope, from his dignity, from public worship, and from religion. Unfortunately, however, he went on bitterly, there were only four persons at Versailles and Madrid who understood him; the monarchs with their inherited prejudices could not apprehend such ideas and owing to an apparently childish attachment to religion they would order him to halt at the very first step he took.²

¹ BENASSI, V., 278 *seqq.*

² “*Si, como V. S. dice, fuesemos para aprovechar de la ocasion dichosa que hemos tenido y troncar de una vez con viril animo sobre todos los puntos de jurisdiccion, quitando hasta la mas minima especie de temporal al Papa y reduciendolo a lo que deve ser y a sus funciones de obispo, y que con constancia se bolviesen a llamar todas las autoridades que injustamente se han arrogado y destruir todas las usurpaciones de aquella corte, y seria de parecer que se continuasse la guerra la mas sangrienta, reduciendo la corte de Roma al punto mas baxo, y separando esa corte iniqua de la persona del Papa, de su dignidad y del culto y de la religion. Pero aunque quatro personas lo entiendan asi en Madrid y en Versailles, los amos lo entenderán diversamente. Al primer paso nos pararemos, como ya se ha hecho una o dos vezes, y no haremos nada de lo que pudieramos y devriamos... Nuestros reyes que han nacido y viven escrupulosos y llenos de lo que interpretan ser amor filial de la religion...”. Du Tillot to Azara, August 21, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. “Parma”, 1768-9.

The Bourbons were not content with territorial reprisals. On June 16th, 1768, by way of a manifesto against the monitorium, the Pragmatic of January 18th, 1762, which prescribed the royal *exequatur* for all Papal edicts and which had hitherto been in abeyance, was revived to its full extent. This gave the greatest pleasure to Tanucci, who regarded it as the only way of upholding the royal prerogatives together with the tranquillity of princes and nations, Christian morals, and even the Catholic religion itself. In his exuberance he went so far as to say that with the *exequatur* the defection of Germany and the whole of the North could have been prevented.¹

This action of Spain's was a precedent for others to follow. On August 9th, 1768, Count Firmian, the Imperial Lieutenant, addressed a circular letter to all the Bishops in Lombardy, forbidding the publication in future of the Bull *In Coena Domini*.² This was followed on October 19th by a public edict banning the Bull and prohibiting its application in any way whatever.³ A similar ban was issued in Naples on October 11th, 1768.⁴ Du Tillot considered it his duty to exploit the breach with Rome. When banning the Bull on November 3rd of the same year, on the ground that it conflicted with the royal rights,⁵ he expressed his lively regret that Count Firmian had forestalled him with his ban, so that it looked as if he were merely his imitator.⁶ The Duke of Modena also tried to take advantage of the favourable situation and to seize the legation of Ferrara for himself. He was restrained from so doing only by the intervention of the Court of Vienna, for so

¹ *To Grimaldi, July 12, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado 6101.

² *Cardinal Borromei to Garampi, August 24, 1768, Nunziat. di Germania, 388, *loc. cit.*

³ BENASSI, V., 289; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 202 *seq.*

⁴ BENASSI, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 286 *seqq.*; *Du Tillot to Azpuru, November 6, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768.

⁶ *Du Tillot to Azara, October 30, 1768, *ibid.*

little did he fear excommunication that he even desired it.¹ Venice, which in 1767 had forbidden the mendicant Orders to accept any more novices until further notice,² went a step further in the following year, ordering the Bishops to visit all convents and churches belonging to Religious, whereby the exemption of the regular clergy was practically abolished.³

Soon after the occupation of Benevento and Avignon, Clement III. had turned for help to the Court of Vienna.⁴ Maria Theresa expressed to the Pope her regret at the step taken by the Powers⁵ and intimated her readiness to mediate if the Bourbon Courts were inclined to accept her services in this direction.⁶ For a time it seemed as if Austria and Sardinia intended to take concerted action to settle the conflict, but their Ministers showed little inclination to give definite support to the Pope's cause.⁷ By the beginning of September

¹ *Visconti to Torrigiani, August 15, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *loc. cit.*; *Borromei to Garampi, August 24, 1768, *ibid.*, 388. On taking leave of Duke Francis III. of Modena, the Capuchin Turchi wished him as something desirable the same excommunication as had been pronounced by Rome against the Government of Parma. BENASSI, V., 280, n. 2.

² *Montealegre to Grimaldi, October 17 and December 12, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5762.

³ *Montealegre to Grimaldi, September 17 and 24 and December 5, 1768, *ibid.*, 5763.

⁴ *Clement XIII. to Joseph II., June 29, 1768, Nunziat. di Vienna, 661, Papal Secret Archives; *Clement XIII. to Maria Theresa, June 29, 1768, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Visconti, June 11 and 29, 1768, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*

⁵ *Visconti to Torrigiani, July 21, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Maria Theresa to Clement XIII., August 2, 1768, Nunziat. di Vienna, 661, *loc. cit.*; *Joseph II. to Clement XIII., August 2, 1768, *ibid.*; *Colloredo to Clement XIII., August 2, 1768, Nunziat. di Germania, 388, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Alessandro Albani, August 17, 1768, Nunziat. di Vienna, 661, *ibid.*; *Torrighiani to Visconti, August 20, 1768, *ibid.*

⁷ *Visconti to Torrigiani, August 13 and 16, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *loc. cit.*

it was known in Paris that no attempt at mediation would be made by the Court of Vienna.¹ Towards the end of the month the Empress admitted in an audience given to the nuncio that the Bourbon princes had given her to understand that they wished not to be delayed in their undertakings; to tell the truth, she was at the moment in the greatest embarrassment. The fact was that her anxiety not to endanger the marriage negotiations that were pending with France and Parma outweighed her willingness to help the Pope.²

The occupation of parts of the Papal States put into the hands of the three Powers a hostage which enabled them to exert strong pressure on the Holy See. As opposed to Tanucci's opinion, that the Pope should be left to fend for himself in the new conditions,³ the two Great Powers had envisaged negotiations from the start. They had given their representatives advance instructions to avoid relations with the Curia as much as they could after the reprisals had been taken, to have no official correspondence whatever with the Cardinal Secretary of State, and to intimate, whenever the occasion offered, that in the event of any discussion Cardinals Torrigiani, Bonaccorsi, Boschi, Castelli, and Negroni⁴ were to be excluded. Whether other Cardinals and prelates belonging to the Jesuit party were to be excluded was left to the envoys' discretion.⁵

The hatred of the Bourbon statesmen, however, was concentrated on Torrigiani, whom they regarded as being the moving spirit behind the resistance to their regalistic

¹ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, September 9, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4566.

² *Visconti to Torrigiani, September 29, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *ibid.*

³ *Tanucci to Azpuru, May 31, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1768; *Tanucci to Grimaldi, May 31, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

⁴ See above, p. 278.

⁵ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, April 5, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48; *Choiseul to Aubeterre, April 26, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

demands. The competent, industrious, and somewhat hot-tempered Florentine had been appointed Secretary of State by Clement XIII. in 1758, despite his unwillingness to accept the post, and with the agreement and approbation of the envoys.¹ But as the energetic Cardinal showed no sign of acceding to the wishes and demands of the civil Powers,² the Bourbon representatives had formed the plan in the autumn of 1767 of driving the adamant defender of the Church's rights and liberties out of office.³ The Spanish Government tried to win over Paris and Vienna to this plan by representing to them that Torrigiani was completely under the spell of the

¹ " * . . . habiendolo comunicado primero Su Beatitud a los Ministros estrangeros y ninguno tuvimos dificultad sobre la eleccion, pues el sujeto es muy digno, y a proposito para un tal empleo " (Portocarrero to Wall, October 12, 1758, *ibid.*, 5131). In the accompanying note Cardinal Rezzonico is given the fourth place in the first class of Papabili (*dignissimi*) and Torrigiani is marked as suitable for the Secretaryship of State. " *Nombró ya Su S^d al card. Rezzonico por Vice Canciller, y al card. Torrigiani por Secretario de Estado, y empezó desde luego este E^{mo} a exercer su empleo. Se dice que se resistió fuertemente a aceptarle, y que el card. Cavalchini de orden de Su S^d le persuadió. Era a quien el Papa se havia inclinado mas, desde el principio, y se cree que convenieron los Ministros de las Cortes en su eleccion. Es Florentin y sugeto de talento, y expedicion, aunque algo fuerte de genio, y está versado en los negocios de esta Corte por la mano que tuvo en tiempo que era Secretario de Estado el card. Valenti Gonzaga, por que el Papa Benedicto XIV. le estimaba mucho y le hizo cardenale siendo Secretario de la Consulta " (Roda to Wall, October 12, 1758, *ibid.*, 4957). Cf. *Tanucci to Caraccioli, October 14, 1758, *ibid.*, 5957.

² *Erizzo to the Doge of Venice, January 3, 1767, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 286 ; *Tanucci to Azara, January 17, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5999.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, October 8, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3915. Cf. " Cardenal de Torrigiani, relativo al proyecto que formaron los Ministros de las potencias catolicas cerca de S.S^d para remover al d^{ho} cardenal de la Secretaria de Estado ", *ibid.*

Jesuit General and that he was pressing the Pope to break with the House of Bourbon.¹ After some hesitation, however, the Court of Versailles rejected this impudent interference with the sovereign rights of a foreign ruler. The king, explained Choiseul,² did not find it quite in keeping with his own and his cousin's dignity to demand from the Pope the dismissal of one of his Ministers, which in any case would be useless unless his successor was nominated at the same time, otherwise there was the risk of Torrigiani's bringing someone even worse into the position and of guiding and directing the Pope through him. For this reason the Court of Madrid let its plan drop for the time being,³ though complaints and accusations against their inflexible opponent were still made in the Ministers' and envoys' correspondence. In defiance of the facts they represented the Secretary of State as a pliant tool in the hands of his confessor, the Jesuit General Ricci,⁴ although since Torrigiani's appointment to his new office Ricci had ceased to be his spiritual director. Hardly had the monitorium to Parma appeared when the Bourbon representatives described it as the work of Torrigiani and Ricci, who had forced the weak-willed Pope to take this step.⁵ On account of the bad feeling which had thus been artificially engendered the Bourbon Government refused to have any further dealings with the Secretary of State and requested Clement XIII. to appoint another Cardinal as negotiator.⁶ Whereupon Torrigiani tendered his resignation.⁷ For God's

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, October 27, 1767, *ibid.*, 3915; *Grimaldi to Mahony, October 31, 1767, *ibid.*; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, October [31], 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4982.

² *To Fuentes, November, 16, 1767, *ibid.*, 4564.

³ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, December 8, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *Tanucci to Azara, January 17, 1767, *ibid.*, 5999.

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 24, 1768, *ibid.*, 5221. Cf. also above, p. 269, n. 4.

⁶ *Aubeterre to Clement XIII. [June 15, 1768], *ibid.*, 5222.

⁷ " *Ma secondo le mie notizie, la domanda che si farà da chi ha il carico di portar la parola degli altri, sarà l'esclusiva mia, e la positiva richiesta di un altro per trattar seco, ed agiustar le

sake and the sake of his own conscience, he said, he had fought with all his strength for the rights of the Church, but as he now saw that it was his person that had caused the storm to break he said, like the prophet Jonah, "Cast me in the sea!"¹ For a short time it seemed as if the Pope would accept his trusty servant's resignation; Cardinal Rossi had already been spoken of as his successor when at the last moment the efforts of the Cardinal—nephew Rezzonico to find a way out of the difficult situation succeeded. Torrigiani retained the secretaryship, but Craindal Negroni, the objections to whom had been withdrawn² as a result of Azpuru's representations,³ was appointed as negotiator with the Bourbon envoys.⁴

cose di tutto il mondo. Quanto sarà facile ad accordarsi la prima petizione, ed io ne darò per parte mia tutta la mano, altrettanto veggo difficile la seconda, a nè sarò io solo ad oppormi. Mi dispiace di doverle dire, che anche la petizion secca non principia bene. Il Papa me ne uscì da sè medesimo ieri sera, e non lo vidi punto inclinato a secondarla" (Torrighiani to Erizzo, June 11, 1768, *ibid.*, 5764). Cf. *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 23, 1768, *ibid.*, 5222.

¹ " *El correo pasado avisé a V. S. la audiencia que tubo M^r d'Aubeterre para pedir el nuevo Ministro con quien tratar... Torrigiani declaró al nepote con la mayor resolucion que queria retirarse y dejar absolutamente el manejo de los negocios; que segun Dios y su conciencia habia peleado por la Iglesia con todas sus fuerzas, pero que viendo que la tempestad venia por su persona, decia con Jonas: Mittite me in mare." Azara to Grimaldi, June 23, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Corresp. entre Azara y Grimaldi.

² *Aubeterre to Clement XIII. [June 15, 1768], *ibid.*, 5222; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 9, 1768, *ibid.*, 5221.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 24, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

⁴ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 23 and 30, 1768, *ibid.*, 5222; Azara to Grimaldi, June 23, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, June 30, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

In spite of this important concession the Secretary of State and the Jesuit General were still the objects of attack and suspicion. Ricci, Aubeterre avowed, was the real ruler of the Vatican and the Quirinal; it was he who in his frequent conferences with Cardinals Torrigiani, Rezzonico, Boschi, and Castelli determined the course of Papal policy.¹ Many of the reports which bear the stamp of invention would seem to be calculated to confirm the suspicious Charles III. in his dislike of the Jesuits and to induce him to take further steps against the Society. Thus the rumour was spread that on Ricci's advice the Pope had sent to Vienna an *aide-mémoire* showing that as a result of the occupation of Benevento the kingdom of the Two Sicilies had reverted to the Holy See, so that the Pope now had the right to enfeoff another prince with it. The Jesuit General, it was alleged, advocated the transference of the crown to the second son of the King of Sardinia or even to a son of the King of England, if he showed any desire to be converted. The General was incessantly pluming himself on the reputation he enjoyed in England and prophesied that the occupation of Papal territory would cause the outbreak of a general European war. Choiseul, however, thought that Ricci was incapable of such ridiculous exaggerations. There were enough genuine accusations to be brought against the Society and its head, without having to

¹ “ *Tout est présentement tranquille dans l'intérieur du Palais. Il n'y est plus question d'aucun changement, et il paroît décidé que le card. Torrigiani restera Secrétaire d'État : le P. Ricci le veut ainsi, et rien ne résiste à ses volontés ; il trouve moyens de faire rester un Ministre en place, sans que celui-ci, ni son maître s'en soucient. Il va coucher, presque tous les soirs, au noviciat, pour être plus à portée de se rendre au palais, dès qu'il est nuit, sans être apperçu. Il n'y a presque pas de jour qu'il n'y aille, ou chez le card. Rezzonico, ou chez le card. Torrigiani, et souvent ils confèrent tous ensemble avec les cardinaux Boschi et Castelli,” (Aubeterre to Choiseul, July 6, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4568). “ *Si pretendeva anco dai Ministri della casa Borbone che il General facesse tutto col Papa e col detto cardinale

fall back on slanders in order to make them guiltier still.¹ To deprive these malicious rumours of any foundation, the Secretary of State had instructions sent to the General of the Society not to frequent the Papal palace any more.²

The struggle in which Clement XIII. found himself engaged in defence of the rights of the Holy See was desperate. The Bourbons knew that in the Roman Curia and even within the College of Cardinals there was an opposition party who disapproved of the step taken against Parma. Cardinal Ganganelli had agreed to condemn the monitorium in a secret memorandum of a theological-canonistic nature and had supplied the French envoy Aubeterre with the groundwork for his arguments against the Brief.³ To recommend strongly Onorati,

[Torrighiani], di cui era amico. E esso causa di non essersi ricevuti i Spagnuoli [Gesuiti] e del Breve di Parma e di che no? Questa presunzione inetta si metteva in ridicolo dai consapevoli degli affari. Il Generale in dieci anni mai aveva parlato di affari che non fossero della Religione, anzi mai di persone, nè promosso veruno etc. La sua indole non lo portava ad ingerirsi, aveva intrighi infiniti, non voleva pregiudicare agli affari suoi, sapeva che sarebbe dispiaciuto a Palazzo, non voleva farsi odioso nè nuocere a veruno e intendeva che non conviene ai religiosi. Tutti, cominciando da Sua S^{tà}, gli erano testimoni di questo contegno; è assai credibile che lo conoscessero anco' quelli che dicevano il contrario, ma si servivano di questo pretesto per far del male." (RICCI, *Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 68). Cf. *Torrighiani to Vincenti, March 24, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

¹ THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 133; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 30, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222.

² " *Soleva il Generale andare da S. S^{tà} circa una volta il mese, ed occorrendo affari, più spesso. Questa frequenza era odiosa ai nemici de' Gesuiti; si vede che fu fatta doglianza, perchè il card. Torrighiani, Segretario di Stato, avvisò il Generale a non frequentare Palazzo, ed ei con dolore dovette astenersene " (RICCI, *Espulsione della Spagna*, 68).

³ " *Dias pasados acusó [Cardinal Rezzonico] . . . al card. Ganganelli tener trabajado un voto, o dictamen teologico reprobativo del Breve contra Parma, y suministrado al embajador de Francia las especies, que dixo al Papa en su ultima audiencia

the former Venetian nuncio, for the Madrid nunciature, Montealegre informed his Government that Onorati had been very painfully impressed by the over-hasty Papal manifesto against Parma.¹ Even in his own family the Pope was faced with adversaries. His nephew, the Maggiordomo Rezzonico, is said to have advised Aubeterre, who was a close friend of his, to intimidate his uncle with threats and to force him to give way.² The persecution he was supposed to suffer at the hands of the Jesuits and his brother, the Cardinal nephew, on account of his siding with the Bourbons,³ was, according to Azara,⁴ merely feigned for the purpose of obtaining from Spain and France the recommendation for a Cardinal's hat. The pressure exerted on the Curia by the representatives of the three Courts increased as time went on. Not content with having excluded the Secretary of State from the negotiations, they alleged a few months later that it was useless to enter into discussions as long as Torrigiani conducted the correspondence with the nuncios to the Bourbon Courts.⁵ So strong was his

acerca de la excomunion declarada en dicho Breve " (Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 23, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222). " *He presentado al S^r Infante la carta del E^{mo} card. Ganganelli. S. A. R. ha agradecido esta serie de las atenciones que constantemente ese Purpurado ha demostrado a S.A. Quedo atento en observar sobre este acto el silencio que me encarga V.S. Veo que es muy fundado que sea asi, y quedo en remitir a su tiempo a V. S. la respuesta de S. A. R. a ese E^{mo}." (Du Tillot to Azpuru, December 11, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., " Parma ", 1768.)

¹ *Montealegre to Grimaldi, March 19, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5763.

² *Tanucci to Orsini, November 8, 1768, *ibid.*, 6006.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, June 23, 1768, *ibid.*, 5222; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, July 12, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48.

⁴ *To Grimaldi, August 4, 1768, *ibid.*, Exped. " Parma ", 1768.

⁵ *Aubeterre to Azpuru [August 3], 1768, *ibid.*, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 107 (1768); *Grimaldi to Azpuru, August 30, 1768, *ibid.*, Reales Ordenes, 48.

desire for peace that Clement XIII. thought that he ought to give way and entrusted the correspondence to Negroni.¹

While the Pope was trying to obtain the support of the other Catholic Powers he had not omitted to protest to the Bourbon rulers against the violation of his territorial rights and to demand the return of the areas that had been wrested from him.² At the same time he appealed to the Cardinals of France and Spain³ and to the Court confessor, Osma,⁴ to use their influence at Court in the interests of peace. A long time passed before the princes agreed on their answer to the representative of Christ. Naples needed a special instruction from Madrid even to accept the Papal letter.⁵ On September 20th and 21st the envoys handed their written replies to Cardinal Negroni,⁶ who described them as fine words but ugly deeds.⁷ Wrapped in courteous phrases and assurances of respect they contained a sharp criticism of the Papal action and an undisguised acknowledgment of regalistic

¹ *Negroni to Vincenti, September 1, 1768, Nunziat. di Spagna, 412, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, September 1, 1768, *ibid.*, 433; *Orsini to Tanucci, August 29, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{287}{1032}$.

² *To Charles III., June 23, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222; *to Louis XV., June 23, 1768, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 50 (Collezione Theiner); *to Ferdinand IV., June 28, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Carte Farnesiane, 1501.

³ *To Cardinal De Solis, June 22, 1768, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, June 23, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221.

⁴ *Clement XIII. to Osma, August 31, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2854; *Torrighiani to Vincenti, September 1, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, August 2, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101; THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 137.

⁶ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 22, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222; *Orsini to Tanucci, September 22, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{288}{1035}$.

⁷ *Negroni to Vincenti, September 22, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

currents of thought. In Versailles the remark was made that the Brief concealed beneath humble language the principles of Gregory VII.¹

In defence of the young Infante, Louis XV. observed that although the temporal power which this prince, like all others, derived from God alone, gave him the right to abolish abuses in his country on his own authority, nevertheless, out of filial respect for the Holy See, he had been loath to issue any ordinance without the co-operation of Papal authority. "It was not until all his endeavours had spent themselves in vain against the unbending opposition of Your Holiness and he had no other hope that he made use of his authority, though with a moderation and righteousness that should have brought him praise from Your Holiness. Had You apprised me of the nature of Your grievances before the publication of the Brief, I should, in agreement with the other princes of my House, have laid before You the causes which would have restrained You from taking so unbecoming and arbitrary a step against a monarch who in every way deserved a more considerate treatment and who in this case has carried out, in the interest of his States, only a tithe of what other Catholic sovereigns have done long before him. It would be neither just nor reasonable to regard as unjust in Parma what elsewhere is just. I have too high an opinion of Your discernment and virtue not to be convinced that it was never Your intention to attack the independence of the secular power, over which the Church has no authority, either direct or indirect. It lies solely with Your Holiness to remove the ills which cause You pain and disquiet and to procure for Yourself the repose which I wish You with all my heart." ²

Charles III. brought out in his letter that the present troubles were caused by the Pope's having been persuaded by

¹ *Aubeterre to Azpuru [August 3, 1768], Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 107 (1768).

² *Louis XV. to Clement XIII., August 29, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Carte Farnesiane, 1501.

evil counsellors to misuse the Church's weapons against a young prince, who with his ordinances had not overstepped the limits of the power given him by God, had not violated true immunity, and had in fact done no more than other Catholic princes had done before him. The unjust action taken against him, due more to political than other considerations, was an insult to all Catholic monarchs. The concessions made by former sovereigns did not give the Head of the Church unalterable rights, especially when in the course of time these concessions proved to be harmful to the people. If the Pope thought he had ground for seizing temporal possessions on the strength of claims that had long since become obsolete, he ought not to be surprised when others tried to recover their property. This was the opinion, not of a single individual, but of many persons, of every rank and class, who had distinguished themselves by their virtue, learning, and reverence for the Holy See. If the Pope had consulted him before issuing the monitorium he would have put these considerations before him. Unfortunately the suggestions of the universal mischief-makers who with sacrilegious perversity cast suspicion on the orthodoxy of the princes and their counsellors, had won the day. "It is my greatest pride and honour to be the most devoted son of the Church. In my love for the sacred person of Your Holiness I give place to no one, and no one desires more ardently than I that You may obtain the satisfaction You desire ; but at the same time I perceive that You alone by Your own hand can obtain that repose which I wish You so heartily." ¹

Even sharper and more wounding was the language used in the Neapolitan reply, in which Tanucci's cast of mind was

¹ *On August 16, 1768, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.* The reply drawn up after the session of the Extraordinary Council was in a sharper tone. One of the king's remarks was that the Pope too before taking any action might call to mind the account (of which he reminded others) that would have to be rendered before the judgment-seat of God. Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222.

discernible throughout.¹ The king expressed his regret at the grief suffered by the supreme Bishop, who was the head and centre of the Catholic Church; it pained him still more, however, to have to see that the Pope was still maintaining that the monitorium to Parma had given no occasion for the measures which the Bourbon Powers had felt themselves obliged to take. The Infante had neither set a hand on religion nor had he violated the sanctuary. Neither dogma nor sacraments, neither ritual nor the doctrine of Christ, as contained in Holy Scripture, nor even a single article of the Church's pastoral office, were touched on in the edict issued by the Ministry of Parma. It was to the concessions of the Catholic princes that the Church owed its possession of temporal goods. The monarchs were the origin of the temporal jurisdiction of the Bishops and of the exemption of Church property from taxes. The royal prerogatives and the protection of those institutions which were necessary for the welfare, the peace, and the security of peoples were inseparable from the princely power. Nothing was more natural than to reform a law which in the course of time had proved through abuse to be harmful and unjust. That the Pope had had his eyes dazzled by profane and monetary interests hiding under the vaneer of religion was not the fault of the duke but of those who were known to be the enemies of the Church, of the sovereigns, and the whole human race. It was they whom the Pope must hold responsible for his grief, which he could have avoided if he had not proceeded with such gross insults against the Infante, who since the Treaty of London had been recognized by the whole of Europe as the lawful sovereign of those states. The contemptuous treatment of the requests made by the three crowned heads, to whom the greater part of the Catholic Church was subject, had brought their patience to an end. This result could easily have been foreseen. When, contrary to the commandments of Christ and St. Peter, the

¹ *Negroni to Vincenti, September 29, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*; *Vincenti to Torrigiani, October 15, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 388, *ibid.*

sovereignty prescribed by God had been violated, insidiously attacked, and reviled, and by the institution whose duty it was, more than all others, to respect it, the princes were forced at last to bestir themselves and act in their own defence. The civil authorities found themselves compelled to protect the people from surprise-attacks and to remind them of the respect they owed to their rulers. God forbid that the peoples should ever come to realize that it was the counsellors and Ministers of the Holy See who were the cause of the trouble which it laid at the door of his officials and the virtuous and learned men who had stood by him in word and deed.¹

At the end of their replies the three monarchs had referred the Pope for further negotiations to their representatives, who had been sent appropriate instructions. As a preliminary condition for the settlement of the conflict the envoys were to put forward five demands: the recall of the monitorium, the recognition of the complete independence and sovereignty of the Duke of Parma, the cession of the occupied areas to France and Naples, the removal of Torrigiani from Rome, and finally the suppression of the Society of Jesus and the banishment of its General, Ricci.² The princes' intention was that

¹ Ferdinand IV. to Clement XIII., September 7, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Carte Farnesiane, 1501, printed in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 206, n. 5.

² *Grimaldi to Azpuru, August 16, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48; *Choiseul to Aubeterre, August 29, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Carte Farnesiane, 1501; *Tanucci to Orsini, September 13, 1768, *ibid.* Choiseul's original instruction contained only the first four points (*Choiseul to Grimaldi, May 27, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2850); the fifth article was inserted at the instigation of Charles III. or his advisers. On sending a copy of Choiseul's instruction to the Spanish ambassador *on July 26, 1768, Grimaldi added that if Portugal were to demand from the Pope the suppression of the Jesuits the Bourbon Powers would certainly support the request (Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48). A week later he told Fuentes that in the king's opinion the three sovereigns ought to demand the

these conditions were to be presented only after proposals had first been made by the Holy See ; otherwise the envoys were to maintain their previous silence, as it did not beseem the Courts, as the offended parties, to open the negotiations.¹ These conditions were necessary, Grimaldi remarked in a subsequent supplementary instruction, to arrive at a compromise which would do justice to the rights of both sides. Spain's principal demands were confined to two : the recall of the monitorium and the suppression of the Jesuits ; the others were of minor importance. The former was a demand of justice, since no monarch could tolerate the Brief ; the latter was indeed a favour, but of a kind that had to be demanded by the Bourbons in view of their situation and for the tranquillity of their States. It beseemed the Holy See to make this concession to the princes, who ruled four-fifths of the Catholic world. The Catholic religion would suffer no loss thereby, and it would save Portugal from schism. In return for the granting of both demands the envoy was to offer the suspension of the occupation of Castro. To facilitate the Pope's recantation of the Brief to Parma it was suggested that the following statement should be made by way of explanation : in the clause in which all the decrees of Rome that lacked an *exequatur* were declared to be null and void, the duke had

suppression as an indispensable condition (*condicio sine qua non*) for an understanding. " *El segundo es que se pida por condicion preliminar, precisa, ademas de las otras, la de extincion de la Orden jesuitica, porque piensa S.M. ser no solo conveniente, sino oportuno el tenerse firme sobre ello antes de ningun acomodo " (August 1, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565). Charles III. was confirmed in this opinion by that given by the Extraordinary Council. " *Aquel tribunal opina, que no se dé oídos a composicion con Roma sino bajo las condiciones que se pensaron en esa Corte, y la esencial de la extincion de Jesuitas, que añadió S.M. y en que se ha confirmado mas cada dia, contando con el beneplacito del Rey su primo " (Grimaldi to Fuentes, August 11, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Carte Farnesiane, 1501).

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, August 16, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48.

not had in mind edicts dealing with faith and purely spiritual matters. Rome was to reply to this that as the Holy See had had principally this kind of edict in mind, the monitorium had been rendered pointless by the duke's statement and would be withdrawn. These proposals, however, were to be kept absolutely secret. Even Aubeterre and Orsini were not to know of them. Azpuru was to negotiate about them with Negroni only.¹

While the negotiations were in full swing the Fiscal Campomanes undertook in the literary field the refutation of the principles laid down in the monitorium. His work, entitled *Impartial Judgment*,² acquired a certain repute in the controversial literature of the period. A liberal historian calls it an enduring monument of the true Spanish spirit and a mirror of the truth,³ whereas a conservative historian describes it as an omnium-gatherum of regalistic doctrines culled haphazard from Febronius, Van Espen, Salgada, and others, devoid of system, style, or skill, and overladen with lengthy and, in many cases, inappropriate quotations from digests and collections of Council proceedings.⁴ As many objections were made to the work on its first appearance, at the king's command it was laid before the five episcopal members of the Extraordinary Council for their examination. But they too found so many faults that the first edition was withdrawn

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, September 20 and October 13, 1768, *ibid.*, Exped., 1768. Cf. below, p. 349, n. 2. According to Grimaldi's instruction the five articles were to remain absolutely secret (*ibid.*) but Aubeterre did not keep the secret. *Grimaldi to Tanucci, October 4, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101; *Tanucci to Castromonte, October 15, 1768, *ibid.*, 6006.

² See above, p. 203, n. 3.

³ FERRER DEL RIO (II., 235).

⁴ MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO (III., 155 *seq.*). Cf. MIGUÉLEZ, 388; ROUSSEAU, I., 255 *seq.*; DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 212 *seqq.*; REUSCH, *Index*, II., 937. According to MASSON (*Le cardinal Bernis depuis son ministère*, Paris, 1884, 88), the real author of the work was the Abbé De Joubert, son of the president of the tax office in Montpellier; Campomanes only had it translated.

and the Fiscal José Moñino was given the task of producing a revised version.¹

In the author's opinion the temporal power is completely independent; the Church in its relations with it had only the right to counsel and admonish, it had no punitive authority. The true form of government for the Church was not monarchic but aristocratic-episcopal, in which all the Bishops had equal power and rank. The legitimate vehicles of infallibility were the General Councils. In the Pope's person the temporal prince should be distinguished from Christ's successor and the Visible Head of the Church. The Bishops had always acknowledged the incompatibility of the priesthood with the princely power. The clergy had its rights, exemptions, and immunities, not by any divine right, but thanks to the favour of pious princes. The work was especially bitter in its attacks on the "abuse" of referring disputes to Rome and above all on the doctrine of the indirect authority, which put the supreme rulership of the Christian world into the hands of the Roman Curia and gave the Pope the power to decide disputes between princes and to dispose of crowns and kingdoms. The champions of this theory were the Jesuits. It was through them that it had been disseminated in all the schools, until the day (May 27th, 1767) when the Extraordinary Council of Castile, in accordance with the Council of Florence, had banned the pernicious doctrine from the universities.

The second part of the work attempts to show that the Holy See had no right to the duchies of Parma and Piacenza. Its claims had already been rejected in the Treaty of London (1718) and again at the conclusion of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The decrees of the Duke of Parma to which exception had been taken had been issued by the legitimate authority, in the author's view, as they dealt with temporal matters affecting the welfare of the people and the State. Excommunications ought not to be dispensed with prodigality and

¹ MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 156. In this second edition, of 1769, some of the matter was put in a milder form. REUSCH, *Index*, II., 937.

they should be preceded by warnings, to give the accused time to justify himself. The penal regulations of the Bull *In Coena Domini* were inapplicable to the present case, which was of a purely temporal nature. The final chapter of the *Impartial Judgment* dealt with the right to resist the Roman Curia when it usurped royal prerogatives. One of the proofs cited in support of these assertions is a dictum of Melchior Cano's, according to which in such a case the Pope may be opposed by force of arms.¹ To bolster up the views put forward in the *Impartial Judgment* Juan Luis Lopez' history of the Bull *In Coena Domini*,² with a preface by Campomanes, was printed in the same year.

On September 19th and 21st, 1768, after the return of the Marquis d'Aubeterre from his summer sojourn in Frascati, the three Bourbon envoys handed the replies of their sovereigns to Cardinal Negroni, who was to forward them to the Pope. On Negroni remarking that the Curia had been hoping that the French ambassador would make proposals that would lead to peace, both Aubeterre and Orsini gave him to understand that they had no instructions of the kind ; it was Rome's business to open negotiations.³ When the Cardinal stated in a private conversation that it was Clement XIII.'s most ardent desire to come to an understanding with the Bourbon monarchs, Azpuru told him that his personal opinion was that a settlement of the conflict was impossible unless he persuaded the Pope to withdraw the monitorium and to suppress the Society of Jesus completely. These were the indispensable preliminary conditions. Once they were fulfilled, an agreement would easily be reached on the other

¹ DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 212 *seqq.* ; ROUSSEAU, I., 255 *seqq.* Grimaldi had a copy sent to Prince Kaunitz through the Spanish ambassador. *Mahony to Grimaldi, September 24, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6504.

² *Historia legal de la Bula llamada In coena Domini . . .*, Madrid, 1768. Cf. MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, III., 158, n. 3.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, September 22, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222 ; *Orsini to Tanucci, September 30 and October 4, 1768, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 16⁸⁸₃₃.

points in dispute.¹ In consequence of this, on October 19th, Clement XIII. sent the representatives of the three Powers an *aide-mémoire* in which he again explained that for him the Parma affair was not a question of power but of conscience. His sense of responsibility did not allow him to recall the monitorium and to abandon the rights of the Holy See to Parma, which had been so jealously guarded by his predecessors. Let the duke retract his edicts, and the Brief would automatically collapse.² All the envoys refused to pass the document on to their Governments, on the ground that instead of opening the door to further negotiations it merely confirmed the negative reply to the repeated requests of their masters. If Negroni attached any value to the memorandum he could present it through the representatives of the Holy See at their Courts.³ The Cardinal, with a certain bitterness, drew attention to the inconsistency of the ambassadors' procedure: they had no scruples in delivering to the Pope memoranda full of gross insults, but they refused to accept his answer, although there was nothing in its form or contents that called for such treatment. It had given him the impression that their intention was to add to the affronts. The Courts were pursuing paths that ran entirely opposite to that of agreement and they were trying to lay down the law to the Holy See.⁴ In spite of this unpleasant incident Negroni

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, October 13, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222.

² *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5232; *Negroni to Azpuru, October 19, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *Azpuru to Negroni, October 20, 1768, *ibid.*; *Orsini to Negroni, October 24, 1768, *ibid.* As Tanucci *informed Cardinal Orsini on November 29, 1768, the Bourbon monarchs approved their ambassadors' rejection of the *aide-mémoire* (State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{288}{1033}$). The Pope's demand that the duke should first withdraw his edicts was called "frivolous" by Du Tillot (*to Azara, October 30, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. 1768/69).

⁴ *Negroni to Vincenti, October 27, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

decided to send the Papal message to the three Courts by way of the nuncios.¹ The only reply was a fresh rejection.²

The Pópe's negative reply, accentuated by Negroni's memorandum,³ was more than the Spanish national pride and the absolutism of the Bourbons could stomach. Charles III. and his advisers, ascribing, in disregard of the facts, Clement XIII.'s resistance to the influence of the Jesuits,⁴ resolved to

¹ *Ibid.*

² **Consulta* of the Extraordinary Council, November 13, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5232; *Grimaldi to Aranda, November 18, 1768, *ibid.*; *Fuentes to Grimaldi, November 11, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, November 21, 1768; *ibid.*; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, November 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101; *Grimaldi to Azpuru, November 22, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48; **Consejo extraordinario*, November 30, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036.

³ When, at a subsequent interview, Azpuru referred to the two chief demands, Negroni's reply was that without a formal request the Pope would never bring himself to suppress the Society of Jesus, and his own influence was not great enough to induce him to take such a step. Azpuru concluded his report with the observation that little hope was to be placed in Negroni's influence and he feared that force would have to be used (*to Grimaldi, October 20, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5222). Cf. Almada to Azpuru, September 3 and November 5, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1760/69, Corresp. del Sr Com. Almada a Msgr. Azpuru, 1768. When Torrigiani fell seriously ill in November, 1768, it seemed for some time that he was about to retire. The Bourbon envoys urged the Pope in this event not to appoint as Secretary of State any of the Cardinals and prelates who had been excluded from the negotiations on the monitorium. Least of all would the Catholic King assent to the appointment of Antonelli or Garampi. *Almada to Azpuru, November 12, 1768, *ibid.*, Corresp. Almada; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, November 24, December 1, 8, and 29, 1768, *ibid.*, Registro de Corresp. oficial, 107.

⁴ Negroni, who, according to Azpuru's assurance, was not well-disposed towards the Jesuits (*to Grimaldi, March 24, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5221), testified that the Pope had no dealings with the Jesuits and that neither the General nor any

make a formal request to the Holy See to abolish the Society entirely, its existence being a perpetual hindrance to a genuine reconciliation between *imperium* and *sacerdotium*. This demand was to be put forward on its own merits as an indispensable condition for the settlement of the Parmesan affair, quite apart from the other conditions.¹ With this the relations between Rome and the Bourbons entered into an entirely new stage. The monitorium incident was completely relegated to the background and for the next few years the suppression of the Jesuits was the all-important aim of the Bourbon policy towards the Church.

(5)

Clement XIII.'s continued and determined refusal to withdraw the Brief to Parma suddenly brought to a head the plans which had been discussed for years past in anti-Jesuit circles and whose roots can be traced back to the first half of the eighteenth century.²

As early as May 2nd, 1739, Retz, the Jesuit General, wrote to the Imperial Court confessor, Tönnemann, that according to Father Kampmiller's reports, certain persons had formed a plot to destroy the Society, and he was urged to do his utmost, through the Emperor's intervention, to prevent so great an evil.³ If we are to believe the assertions made by

other Jesuit had ever been consulted or listened to on ecclesiastical matters. But it was part of the enemies' tactics, he said, to make the public think the opposite, so as to cloak the injuries they were doing to the Holy See and to religion. *Negrioni to Vincenti, November 24, 1768, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433. *loc. cit.*

¹ *Charles III. to Tanucci, November 29, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6059; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, November 29, 1768, draft, *ibid.*, 6101; **Consejo extraordinario*, November 30, 1768, *ibid.*, 5036.

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIV, 79 *seq.*, and XXX., 207 *seqq.* (Palafox's letters).

³ " *Istum (Fr. Campmiller) singulariter rogavi, ut R. V. informaret et etiam notitiam de inita ad extinguendam Societatem certorum hominum conspiratione cum R. V. communicaret.

Vasquez, the General of the Augustinians, there is a document in the archives of the Propaganda, among the papers dealing with the ritual dispute, in which the Pope is advised to suppress the Jesuit Order on account of its obstinate and repeated refusal to obey the instructions of the Congregation.¹ The Pro-Visitor Favre relates that when he was describing to a high Roman prelate the continued misdemeanours of the Jesuit missionaries in Cochin China the latter exclaimed, "Even the Templars did not commit such excesses as the Jesuits are guilty of! How is it that in this enlightened century of ours the princes don't open their eyes to such things?"² The well-known theologian and historian Zaccaria was told by Count Christiani that as far back as 1750 he had received a written invitation to join an association (*concerto*) for the destruction of the Jesuits, in return for which he was offered at the same time 20,000 scudi.³ On a passing visit to Rome in 1760 or 1761 Alvisè Mocenigo, afterwards Doge of Venice, informed Ricci, the Jesuit General, that the destruction of the Society had been resolved upon in France as early as Fleury's time, when he was ambassador there, and it would have been carried out had it not been for the intervention of the Cardinal, who wanted to avoid a disturbance and to keep the peace at home.⁴

Spero satis a . . . R. V., ut quidquid poterit ad impedienda tanta mala per Augustissimum conferre velit, id quod a R. V. enixissime petendum quidam ex praecipuis E^{mis} his diebus mihi commendavit. Epist. NN. ad diversos," in Jesuit possession. Cf. *Theresian. of May 2, 1739.

¹ *Vasquez to Roda, February 2, 1769, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, *Cartas de Vasquez*, vol. I.

² *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses sur la visite Apostolique de M. de la Baume, évêque d'Halicarnasse à la Cochinchine en l'année 1740. . . pour servir de continuation aux Mémoires historiques du R. P. Norbert Capucin par M. Favre, prêtre suisse, Protonotaire Apostolique et Provisiteur de la même visite*, Venice, 1746, 239.

³ RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, I. Ricci received this information in 1767 from two entirely different sources (*ibid.*).

⁴ " *Il S^r Alvisè Mocenigo, poi Doge di Venezia, essendo a Roma di passo nel 1760 o 1761, disse al generale, che l'estermínio

Though such reports are more or less isolated, the idea of suppression gained ground as the persecution increased in Portugal and France, and it was deliberately propagated.

A few months after the election of Clement XIII. an "academy" was held in the Roman Seminary in honour of the new Head of the Church, and on the following morning a madrigal was found affixed to the seminary gate, not only announcing the expulsion of the Fathers from Portugal, France, and Spain, but also prophesying the complete extinction of the Society.¹ A few weeks later the Cardinal Secretary of State, Torrigiani, felt himself compelled to issue a *démenti* of the rumour, which had probably originated in Portugal and was being disseminated in Spain, that the suppression of the Society was being seriously contemplated in Rome.²

To bring these ideas of suppression to the knowledge of the masses, the Society's adversaries made skilful use of the Press. On July 30th, 1759, the Paris nuncio, Gualtieri, sent the Secretary of State a broadsheet entitled "Urgent and

della Compagnia era concluso in Francia fino dai tempi del card. di Fleury, quando esso era ivi ambasciatore, e si sarebbe allora eseguita, se non l'impediva il cardinale, nemico del rumore." RICCI, *loc. cit.*, 2.

¹ O Volpi reverende — Non valgono accademie.

Queste a chi ben intende — Sono l' ultime nenie.

Son le voce ferali — De' vostri funerali.

L'Ismano e 'l Portoghese — Vi aborre e vi discaccia,

E 'l gallico paese — Spero che presto il faccia.

In Roma che sperate — O voi che il Papa vostro sì adulate ?

RICCI, *loc. cit.* These verses, whose author was thought to be one of Cardinal Passionei's friends, were cited, with unimportant variations, by other contemporaries, such as Cordara (DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, III., 24) and Benvenuti (*Irriflessioni dell' autore d'un foglio intitolato Reflessioni delle Corti Borboniche sul Gesuitismo*). Cf. ROSA, *Gesuiti*, 359, n. 1.

² *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, February 22, 1759, Nunziat. di Spagna, 410, *loc. cit.*; CORDARA, *De suppressione*, 44.

compelling reasons binding the conscience of the spiritual and temporal authority to abolish the Society of Jesus." ¹ A fortnight previously the same nuncio had enclosed in his mail a brochure entitled "Exposure of Molinism and materialism." ² Hardly had the Order been expelled from Portugal when there was talk in Rome that the Pope and the Jesuits could do what they liked but the web that was to destroy the Society was spun so closely that it would be a miracle if it escaped. ³

As was realized at the time in many quarters, the destruction of the Society was only the first objective; the grand assault would be against the Church and the Apostolic See, whose profuse jurisdiction was felt to be a restriction of their own rights by the Catholic temporal Powers. The struggle with the Society of Jesus was therefore a struggle with the Papacy. The rulers thought that their sovereignty was not completely effective unless they also had the full rights of supremacy in the ecclesiastical sphere (*ius circa sacra*). Hence the continually increasing encroachments on ecclesiastical administration and jurisdiction, the energetic dissemination of anti-clerical principles in speech and writing, the contemptuous and insulting treatment of the Vicar of Christ. The ruling principle in nearly every State was that all the externalities of ecclesiastical life, both property and persons, came under the control of the temporal sovereigns. For this reason the Bull *In Coena Domini* was banned in most Catholic countries as being an attack on the rights of princes. ⁴ According to an admission of a violent opponent of the Jesuits,

¹ *Gualtieri to Torrigiani, July 30, 1759, Nunziat. di Francia, 504, *loc. cit.*

² *Gualtieri to Torrigiani, July 16, 1759, *ibid.* Four more pamphlets followed with the nunciature's despatches of September 10 and 17, 1759, *ibid.*

³ RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 2. CORDARA (*De suppressione*, 41) maintains that he read this in a letter written by the Jansenist cleric Clément.

⁴ *RICCI, *loc. cit.*, 14, 63 *seq.*

there was at this time hardly a single Catholic Power in which movements were not afoot "to shake off the yoke which in the centuries of barbarism had been imposed by the Court of Rome on the childish credulity of princes and peoples."¹

The campaign against the Jesuits derived fresh impetus from the disputes about the continued existence of the Order in France. A resolution passed by the Parlement of Rouen on March 3rd, 1763, included an invitation to the whole Catholic world to make a united effort to destroy the Society of Jesus.² A year later the Paris Parlement called upon the king to combine with the other Catholic Powers to bring about the suppression of Loyola's institution.³ A fierce light was thrown on the situation by the reception accorded to the Bull by which Clement XIII. reaffirmed and reapproved of the Society of Jesus. Most of the Parlements and Governments prohibited its publication.⁴ It was about this time that Vasquez, the General of the Augustinians, expressed the wish that the Spanish king would press in Rome for the Pope to abolish the Order entirely, for it was a scourge and a scandal to Christianity.⁵ Pombal published a work of his own against the Bull. It contained the usual invectives against the Jesuits and the Popes, repeated all the old charges that had been brought against the Order by Protestants, Jansenists, and

¹ " *Apenas hay potencia catolica en quien no se noten movimientos dirigidos a sacudir el yugo que en los siglos de barbarie impuso esta Corte a la inocente credulidad de los principes y de los pueblos." Azara to Grimaldi, March 12, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1767.

² *Pamfili to Torrigiani, March 14, 1763, Cifre, Nunziat. di Francia, 518, *loc. cit.*; *Torrighiani to Pamfili, March 30, 1763, *ibid.*, 453 (see our account, Vol. XXXVI, 487, n. 1).

³ *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, September 4, 1764, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 292, *loc. cit.*; Fr. Berrio to Fr. Cornejo, June 26, 1766, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 777.

⁴ THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 65 *seq.*

⁵ *March 5, 1765, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, vol. I.

Gallicans, and culminated in the desire that all Catholic States might compass its destruction.¹

Of all the enemies of the Jesuits there was probably no one who worked for their destruction with more alacrity, ardour, and indefatigability than Tanucci, the trusted adviser and political trainer of Charles III.² Though externally he gave the impression of being a supporter and benevolent friend of the Society, in his numerous letters to those who shared his views he developed a lively propaganda against it, frequently contradicting himself in the process. As early as 1758, when the works of Cardinal Noris were removed from the Spanish Index, he prophesied that the Jesuits, who, he said, had secured their prohibition, would suffer the fate of the Templars, since they had stirred up every nation and Government against themselves. If only the princes would open their eyes to the situation, there would soon be an end of the matter.³ Two years later he was speaking more freely.⁴ The Jesuits deserved to be suppressed, for their despotism, avarice, pride, malice, and superstition had made them universally detested. But, he added, this was not a task for a Minister who was already sixty years old; however, "our sons will complete the work." In a similarly resigned tone he remarked to Bottari,⁵ that the storm signals pointed to the downfall of the Society of Jesus, but just as Gregory the Great and the theologians of that period had erred in thinking

¹ *Terceira carta sobre a Bulla "Apostolicum pascendi"* (printed), Nunziat. di Spagna, 301, *loc. cit.*; *Pallavicini to Torrigiani, June 10, 1766, Cifre, *ibid.*

² *Cf.* above, pp. 9 *seqq.*

³ *To Yaci, April 4, 1758. "Era risoluzione dovuta a quel gran cardinale e alla Santa Sede; e già era noto, che quelle opere erano state costì proibite per sorpresa e scelleraggine dei gesuiti, ai quali al fine, mi par, che sovrasti il fato dei Cavalieri templari, che avevano irritato tutte le nazioni e tutte le potenze. Se i principi apriranno gli occhi, la cosa non sarà molto lontana." Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5947.

⁴ *To Finocchetti, February 19, 1760, *ibid.*, 5960.

⁵ *On April 5, 1760, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod., 1602.

that the world was coming to an end, the Jesuits too might last another century. On the one hand there was a lack of informative writing and competent Fiscals, on the other the royal Courts were dominated by women who encouraged the Order in every possible way. Moreover, other public evils, equally vast and obvious as the existence of the Jesuits, were tolerated with listless indifference. But all these evils could be got rid of more easily if there were no Jesuits and no monks of any kind in the world, for they were a veritable canker for the human race, their chief occupations being greed, idleness, and bringing Governments into contempt. Tanucci's chief grudge against them was their defence of the Papal rights at the expense of the sovereign rights of princes.¹ As an absolutist he regarded the powerful position which the Jesuits were alleged to have won for themselves in Paraguay as a sufficient reason for demanding their suppression throughout the world.² The dissolution of the Jesuit establishments in France was not at all to his liking; either, he thought, the Order must be suppressed entirely or these gentlemen would have to be properly flattered, otherwise they would grow stronger and more dangerous every day, for they would certainly learn a lesson from their setbacks and redouble their alertness.³

The greatest determination in working for the complete destruction of the Order was shown by that Great Power that was the last to rise against it. The band of anti-Jesuits in Spain was considerably strengthened by the appointment to the Ministry of Justice of Roda, who, according to a rumour emanating from his embassy at Rome, had vowed that he

¹ *To Losada, November 3, 1761, Archives of Simancas Estado, 5971.

² “ *Del Paraguay vorrei una relazione di Cevallos governatore di Buenos Ayres, che tiene piede al Sacramento; tutt' altro può ingannare o col poco. Non la dispero. L'America spagnuola divien domestica. Saranno sempre un'aristocrazia indiana tutte le forze dei Gesuiti del Paraguay, e giusta cagione di pretendersi l'estinzione della Compagnia in tutto il mondo.” To Catanti, July 30, 1765, *ibid.*, 5994.

³ To Galiani, April 24, 1762, *ibid.*, 5977.

would never rest till he had accomplished the total abolition of the Order.¹ These apprehensions were certainly not unfounded. Roda's friends and admirers extolled the banishment of the Spanish Jesuits as a stroke of his master-hand which would immortalize his memory, and they expressed the hope that he would soon complete the work he had begun.²

When sending his congratulations on his master-stroke to the Minister of Justice, on April 24th, 1767, Magallon, secretary to the Spanish embassy in Paris, reported that Choiseul had written to the French representative in Rome that the Pope would do well to secularize the Jesuits, as their continued existence was not in the interest of either the Church or the State. The Minister, he said, had again expressed this opinion in the course of a conversation with the Uditore of the Paris nunciature, who, being a man of judgment and impartiality, held much the same view.³ Choiseul had in fact instructed Aubeterre on April 21st, 1767, to take every opportunity of

¹ *Ricci to Fr. Bramieri, April 25, 1765, Registro di lettere segrete, in Jesuit possession ; RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 2. Cf. above, p. 44.

² " *Declaran todos los sujetos de capacidad y mucho mas los Tercerios que el golpe les ha llegado de la mano maestra de V. S., y por apendice esperan el mismo en Napoles y Parma " (Lopez de Barrera to Roda, April 16, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P). " *Así como no puedo explicar el gran gusto y alegría que tengo por veer libre España de una tal peste, así no sé con quales terminos pueda congratularme con V. S. Ill. por la gloria inmortal, que se ha adquirido en una empresa digna de su talento, y propia de su constancia y corage " (Barrera to Roda, April 30, 1767, *ibid.*). *Vasquez to Roda, April 16 and 23 and June 4, 1767, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, vol. I.

³ " *Sé que ha escrito este Ministro a Mr. d'Aubeterre que le parecia que haria bien el Papa en tomar ahora el partido de secularizar la Orden, pues ni para la Iglesia, ni para los Estados podia convenir el mantenerla ; y así se lo ha dicho tambien al Auditor que hay aqui, el qual no está muy distante de este modo de pensar, porque es un hombre juicioso y bastante imparcial." To Roda, April 24, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P.

making it known that the King of France thoroughly approved of the measures taken against the Jesuits by his Spanish cousin. "If the Pope," Choiseul continued in his letter, "were prudent, enlightened, and strong, he could come to only one decision, to suppress this Society entirely by a Bull, so that there would no longer be a Jesuit Order." He knew, of course, that Clement XIII. would never agree to this and that Cardinal Torrigiani would gnash his teeth with rage at the very thought of destroying the Order. The Secretary of State cherished it for more than one reason, seeing that he drew a considerable income from it, for which he was not unappreciative. But if he had any idea of politics and had at heart the honour and the reputation of the Holy See, he must see that the suppression was necessary. Things would come to such a pass that Governments would identify the cause of these Religious with the very nature of the Roman Court and would send the Pope back not only the Jesuits but also his nuncios, inquisitors, Bulls, and everything else. That would be vastly unpleasant for the Holy See, the common centre of Christendom. It would be felt in Rome soon enough then what grievous harm this stubbornness and interest in an ephemeral side-issue had done to religion and the true welfare of the Roman Court. Aubeterre was to pass this on to the Maggiordomo.¹ The Minister did not flatter himself that such considerations would make any real impression on the Roman Court in its present attitude, nevertheless it was as well to let Rezzonico know that certain unpleasant happenings were foreseen.²

To this letter, which may be regarded as the first link in the long chain of negotiations leading to the suppression, the envoy replied that the Pope's nephew was fully in agreement with the Minister but did not believe that the Roman Court could be persuaded, for Torrigiani's truly fanatic attachment to the Jesuits was not based on any financial interest. Apart from the greatest selflessness he had shown the whole of his

¹ Rezzonico, Clement XIII.'s nephew.

² CARAYON, XVI., 400 *seq.*

life and his very generous almsgiving every year, he derived an annual income of over 80,000 scudi from his father's estate. Having no heirs and demanding little for himself, he had no interest in increasing his wealth, which was more than enough for his own needs. Although he, Aubeterre, personally thought that Torrigiani's mode of government was entirely wrong, he could not but give him credit for acting according to his convictions.¹

Meanwhile, either of its own accord or as the result of secret instructions, the Paris Parlement had been studying the Spanish pragmatic authorizing the Jesuit expulsion, and on May 9th, 1767, it presented a request to Louis XV. that he, as the eldest son and protector of the Church, should join the other Catholic rulers in urging the Holy See to abolish entirely the Society of Jesus, which was generally harmful and was especially dangerous to princes and States.² In forwarding this request to Aubeterre, Choiseul repeated his former proposal, adding that it seemed to him to be proved with mathematical precision that the dissolution of the Jesuit Order was necessary for the good of religion, the Holy See, the Catholic States, and even the individual members of the Order.³ The duke had developed these ideas at greater length

¹ Aubeterre to Choiseul, May 13, 1767, *ibid.*, 403 *seq.*

² "Sera le Roi supplié, en qualité de Fils Aîné de Protecteur de l'Église, d'interposer ses offices auprès du Pape, même de joindre, s'il le juge à propos, ses instances à celles des princes catholiques, à l'effet d'obtenir l'extinction totale d'une Société pernicieuse à la chrétienté toute entière, et particulièrement redoutable aux Souverains et à la tranquillité de leurs États. Arrest de la Cour du Parlement du 9 mai 1767," often reprinted, e.g. in *Inquietudini de' gesuiti*, III. (1767), *Aggiunta alla Raccolta di Spagna*, 38.

³ Choiseul to Aubeterre, May 12, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 402 *seq.* Cf. Choiseul to Aubeterre, June 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 409; *Vasquez to Roda, June 4, 1767, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, *Cartas de Vasquez*, vol. I.; *Azara to Grimaldi, June 4, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044; *Tanucci to Losada, June 9, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001; *Galiani to Orsini, August 31, 1767, State Archives,

the day before, in a dispatch to Ossun, the French envoy in Madrid. As he had already told the king when reporting on the expulsion of the Spanish Fathers, it would be best, in his opinion, if the monarchs of France, Spain, Austria, and Portugal were to unite in inducing the Holy See to abolish the Jesuit Order entirely. If the Pope paid attention to this demand of the Catholic Powers and decided to take this prudent step, he would convey a great benefit on religion, promote closer relations with the Holy See, and confirm the unity necessary for the preservation of sound doctrine. On the other hand, this unity would be bound to crumble away in the course of time if he persisted in protecting an Order which had been rejected by the Catholic Governments. Protectors and protégés would be easily confused one with the other, and ill-feeling would vent itself as much on the Holy See as on the Jesuits, who would soon cease to exist except in Rome. The Catholic princes, on account of their humane inclinations, were inwardly loath to take action, either directly or through their tribunals, against their subjects, who were certainly not all guilty, and if the Society were dissolved they would be able to receive the exiles back into their States. The individual members of the Society would be happy to return, free from all their fetters, to the bosom of their families and their country. The logical conclusion, therefore, was that the Pope, the sovereigns, and even the Jesuits ought to agree to the proposed measure. But the thought must have a vehicle. The king's reply to his arguments was that such a step required careful consideration. Ossun, therefore, was not to discuss the matter with Grimaldi officially but was to put forward these ideas as his own personal view and that of the envoy Fuentes, so that they might be considered by Charles III. and his Ministers.¹

Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1708¹. On August 1, 1767, the Parlement of Toulouse put forward the same request, almost word for word, as that of the Paris Parlement: Arrêt de la Cour de Parlement du 1^{er} Août 1767, Toulouse, 1767, 21.

¹ *Choiseul to Ossun, May 11, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4686. Two weeks later Choiseul suggested that the king

Choiseul found a zealous supporter in the Spanish ambassador Fuentes, whose dispatch of May 13th throws more light on the indecisive phrases with which the Minister had concluded his letter. On the previous day, he wrote, Choiseul had informed him of the address he had delivered to the royal council in the king's presence on the expediency and necessity of abolishing the Jesuit Order entirely. He, Fuentes, agreed with the duke: the Society of Jesus would have to be abolished, even though it were composed of absolute angels, if only to avoid the harmful effects that might result from men taking sides for or against the Order. Of his own accord, without any encouragement from the Spanish king, Louis XV. would never decide on such a step. Wherefore he suggested that Grimaldi should urge the king to slip some reference to the suppression into the letter of thanks for the Infante's investiture with the Order of the Holy Ghost.¹

Further support was given to Choiseul by the Neapolitan Minister. He had never had any doubt, wrote Tanucci to Castromonte,² that it was the duty of the Catholic monarchs

of Spain should put forward in Rome the demand for the suppression and that the king of France should support his request. *Choiseul to Ossun, May 25, 1767, *ibid.*

¹ " * . . . y a lo que por si solo y sin ser impelido por el Rey N.S., de quien tiene tanto concepto, no se determinará jamas " (to Grimaldi, May 13, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3518). Actually Louis XV. resisted his Minister's suggestions for a long time. " *Non intendo la difficoltà, per la quale il Re Chr^{mo} resiste all' eloquenza di Choiseul ; e fu necessaria ai machinanti la lettera del Rè Cattolico N.S. al Re Chr^{mo}, animandolo ad agire col Papa per la soppressione " (Tanucci to Azara, August 29, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 2002). According to Roda it was Fuentes who was continually spurring on Choiseul to work for the suppression, hoping in this way to bring back his two brothers, the Pignatelli, to Spain, they having told him that they would never leave the Order of their own accord (*cf.* above, pp. 171, 185). *Roda to Azara, August 4, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, R.

² *On May 30, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6000. In the same letter Tanucci, contradicting his former statements,

to clear their States of these seducers of the people and declared enemies of every temporal ruler, as all monks were, and the Jesuits in particular. If the French king were to listen to the requests of the Parlements and to combine with all the other Christian princes in obtaining their complete suppression, the assent or dissent of the various Courts would be a touchstone showing whether they possessed statecraft or the ability and knowledge that government required. To Azara he acknowledged that he had no news of how the Paris Court had received the proposal of the Parlement but that one might well believe that the King of Spain was firmer and more determined on this point. Kaunitz and his wife, on the other hand, were both Jesuitic, and consequently he was not in the least surprised by the Court of Vienna's reluctance to take part in the scheme.¹

wrote : “ *Non creda V. E., che il maggior numero sia dei gesuiti innocenti. Tutto Gesuita è un vaso di massime contrarie allo Stato, alla sovranità, alla nazione. L'ignoranza forse molti ne salverà dall'inferno.”—“ *È la parte più considerabile di questo arresto [May 9, 1767] il dichiarare li Gesuiti nemici delli Stati, e delle sovranità tutte, e la preghiera fatta al Re e a tutta la casa Reale d'allontanare dal servizio loro qualunque pubblico o segreto addetto ai Gesuiti, e di pregare il Papa ad estinguere in tutto il mondo la Compagnia. Vedremo ora, se il Re comincerà dal far la legge, della quale è pregato. Il Papa è così stolido, che è capace di resister ferreamente alle domande di sopprimere la Compagnia. Questa resistenza porterà senza dubbio, che li Gesuiti sieno cacciati dalle Sicilie, da Parma, e da Venezia ” (to Galiani, May 30, 1767, *ibid.*).

¹ “ *Mi ricordo d'aver letto qualche cosa di questa istanza da farsi dal Chr^{mo} al Papa in alcuna di quelle tante stampe del 1763 e 1764. È più credibile, che il Re Cattolico sia in ciò determinato, e fermo. . . . Kaunitz marito e moglie, sono due Gesuiti, onde non mi maraviglio di quella repugnanza nella corte di Vienna, che han detta costì, dall'entrare nel complotto ” (to Azara, May 30, 1767, *ibid.*). It was probably only a diplomatic move of Tanucci's to write to Azara again a week later : “ *Non so perchè Aranjuez repugna all' unione di procurar l'abolizione

Towards the end of May, Choiseul put forward this proposition for the third time in Madrid. He knew which note to strike to make the desired impression on Charles III. "Both in France and Spain," he wrote, "a host of intolerable and highly dangerous situations will arise from day to day if these two countries have not enough prestige to force the dissolution of the Jesuit Order through the Roman Court. It would be of great importance if the King of Spain, in conjunction with the Courts of Naples and Parma, which would be joined by France, were to unfold a plan. The whole of our rulers' family must urge and force the Pope to this suppression. It might be possible also to induce the Republic of Venice to support our request. Hemmed in by the King of Naples on the one side and the Republic on the other, the Pope would give ear to the requests of the Kings of Spain and France. It would be well for you to speak about this matter to the Marquis Grimaldi, who will probably discern the whole advantage of the plan, but your reply to me on this matter must be confined to private correspondence." ¹

The missive that was to break the resistance of Louis XV. came at last. On June 19th, 1767, Charles III., while thanking the French king for investing the Infante Don Antonio with the Order of the Holy Ghost, sent him the Golden Fleece for the Dauphin and the Count of Provence. He took this opportunity of remarking that he had been compelled to remove the Jesuits from his realm as their Order had degenerated from its original constitution and was no longer suitable for his domains. He considered indeed it would be beneficial if the Pope were to abolish it entirely. These were questions that needed to be examined. If Louis XV. considered it expedient they could exchange ideas and settle the ways and means by which they would undertake negotiations, in which, the present Ministry in Rome being what it was, they

della Compagnia, che Aranjuez stessa ha cacciata e abolita. Non vedo li timori dell' intendarla, nè le speranze del tralasciarla" (June 6, 1767, *ibid.*, 6001).

¹ *To Ossun, May 31, 1767, *ibid.*, 4686.

would certainly meet with great resistance.¹ A month later the French king stated that he was in agreement with the plan but that he considered it imperative to study the matter very thoroughly, in view of the many difficulties with which it was encompassed, and to settle the steps that would have to be taken to initiate the negotiations. On this, as on all other occasions, he was ready to take common action with the Spanish monarch.²

Almost simultaneously with this step of Choiseul's began Pombal's efforts at the Court of Madrid to bring about a union of the Catholic Powers for the purpose of abolishing the Society of Jesus. In an interview with the Spanish ambassador Almodovar, both Joseph I. and Pombal referred to the necessity of forming a union or alliance of the Courts of Madrid, Lisbon, and Versailles with the object of destroying the Jesuits and removing Torrigiani from the Secretaryship of State. With these just aims the Court of Vienna must also associate itself.³ Simultaneously Pombal was making the same proposal to the Spanish Government through the medium of the Portuguese envoy.⁴ But here the bitterness

¹ " *Mon ambassadeur eut ordre dans le tems, d'informer V. M. de la résolution que je fus forcé de prendre d'éloigner de mes États, les Pères de la Compagnie de Jésus ; cet Ordre, qui a dégénéré des principes de son Institut, ne convenait pas dans mes royaumes ; je pense même qu'il serait très utile, que le Pape voulût le dissoudre totalement ; c'est un objet à examiner, et si V. M. le jugeait ainsi, on pourrait en raisonner, et se concerter pour en entamer la négociation, laquelle rencontrera pourtant de grandes difficultés avec le présent Ministère de Rome." Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2850.

² " *Je pense de même que V. M. sur les motifs d'utilité qui pourraient engager le Pape à dissoudre entièrement la Société, mais comme cette affaire, ainsi que V. M. l'observe elle-même, éprouvera de grandes difficultés, il convient de penser mûrement " (July 19, 1767, *ibid.*). *Grimaldi to Fuentes, July 31, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

³ *Almodovar to Grimaldi, May 8, 1767, *ibid.*, 7290.

⁴ " *Considera Sua Magestade Fidelissima a expulsão dos Jezuitas de Espanha, não come huã providencia necessaria e a

caused by the last war was still alive and a bare letter of acknowledgment was considered an adequate reply.¹ Two months later Pombal returned to the subject, and bringing all sorts of fantastic accusations against the Jesuits made out that their suppression was unavoidably necessary and more urgent than was thought ; for the good of the Church and the safety of princes one ought not to shrink from extraordinary measures.² Grimaldi answered guardedly that his master was ready to co-operate but that everything must be well thought out beforehand, including, above all, what one intended to do if Rome refused to listen to their requests, as was only to be expected.³ The Portuguese Minister agreed that this point was so important that for its sake alone all differences should be laid aside, even though the two Courts were not on friendly terms. He himself would prepare a memorandum and the king's proctor would present a request to the king on this subject. He would see to it that both documents were sent to the Spanish Cabinet.⁴

Under date August 27th Pombal addressed to the Portuguese envoy in Madrid a lengthy document in which, under

mais acertada para a tranquilidade e segurança das preciosas vidas de el Rey Catholico, e da sua augusta familia, que tão de perto, e por tantas razões interessão aos Reyes Fidelissimos, meus amos ; não só como huã epoca de prosperidades para toda a Monarchia espanhola, mas tambem como hũ successo de importantissimas consequencias para a Corte de Roma, aonde he de esperar, que extinga e dezarme tantas imposturas, hipocrezias, e estratagemas, quantas são, e tem sido as com que aquella relaxadissima e soberbissima Companhia pretende artificiosamente surprender, e fazer inuteis as rectissimas, e piissimas intenções do Santissimo Padre Clemente XIII.' Ayres de Sa e Mello to Grimaldi, May 9, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7280.

¹ *May 21, 1767, *ibid.*, 7290. Cf. *Almodovar to Grimaldi, May 8, 1767, *ibid.*

² *Almodovar to Grimaldi, July 7, 1767, *ibid.*, 5054.

³ *Grimaldi to Almodovar, June 17, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *Almodovar to Grimaldi, July 28, 1767, *ibid.*

thirty-seven heads, he brought up all the old charges against the Jesuits, beginning with Arianism and Pelagianism and ending with the attempts at assassination and rebellion of recent years. To destroy the common enemy it appeared to be necessary for the King of Portugal to ally himself with the rulers of Spain and France, so as to bring the Roman Curia to its senses by joint action of a forcible nature. For this purpose the Papal territory was to be occupied without any further declaration of war and was not to be restored until the Pope had abolished the Order and had severely punished the monarchs' enemies, such as Torrigiani and Ricci.¹ In the covering note, which was handed over with the main document by the Portuguese envoy, he observed that his master considered that the Society of Jesus was so degenerate that there was no hope of its improvement and that he had therefore been instructed to enter into negotiations about its suppression.² The Portuguese queen, Mariana Victoria, probably not uninfluenced by Pombal, also tried to persuade her brother, Charles III., to take common action in this matter of the suppression, for, if he did not, both their lives would be in danger.³ Charles assured his sister⁴ that the three monarchs were all entirely of the same opinion and that every possible and permissible means must be used to effect the suppression of the Society of Jesus; but for many reasons

¹ *Pombal to Ayres de Sa e Mello, August 27, 1767, *ibid.* The dispatch, which was accompanied by the *Petição do recurso* of the attorney-general and the *Compendio chronologico analytico*, does not appear to have been sent off till the beginning of September. Cf. *Almodovar to Grimaldi, September 1 and 8, 1767, *ibid.*, 7288 and 7289; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, October 12, 1767, *ibid.*, 4565. Cf. pp. 337 *seqq.*

² *Ayres de Sa e Mello to Grimaldi, September 23, 1767, *ibid.*, 5054. Cf. DUHR in the *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XXII. (1898), 433 *seq.*

³ *To Charles III., September 12, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7290.

⁴ *On October 21, 1767, *ibid.*

the matter was extremely difficult and still required careful consideration and deliberation.

Pombal's memorandum was submitted by the king to the Extraordinary Council and the confessor Osma for their opinions.¹ Clearly Madrid was in no great hurry, suspecting Pombal, not without reason, of having secret additional motives, seeing that while talking of an alliance with the Bourbons he was negotiating a commercial treaty with England.² Choiseul was just as little pleased with his fantastic war plans against the Pope. "Pombal," he remarked,³ "loses his head whenever there is talk of Jesuits. But with skill and discretion some profit may be derived from the negotiations, if we draw Portugal into our alliance." But the Portuguese Minister would not hear of a political alliance with the Bourbons, as his Government, he said, could not give up the centuries-old friendship with England without injury to themselves; he had never had any other intention than to bring about a peaceful settlement of the frontier disputes in America.⁴ Moreover, with his desire for forcible measures, the Minister was far from satisfied⁵ with Spain's proposal⁶ regarding the manner of procedure in the matter of the suppression. Finally, therefore, Madrid and Paris decided to break off the negotiations, since they had no need

¹ *Grimaldi to the members of the Extraordinary Council, October 19, 1767, *ibid.*, 5054.

² *Cabello to Grimaldi, September 8, 1767, *ibid.*, 7291. Cf. *Choiseul to Grimaldi, May 3, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2850; *Grimaldi to Masserano, September 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6965.

³ *To Ossun, November 24, 1767, *ibid.*, 7290; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, December 8, 1767, *ibid.*

⁴ *Pombal to Ayres de Sa e Mello, March 15, 1768, *ibid.*; *Almodovar to Grimaldi, April 3, 1768, *ibid.*; *Mariana Victoria to Charles III., March 23, 1768, *ibid.*

⁵ *Almodovar to Grimaldi, April 7, 1768, *ibid.*, 5220.

⁶ **Proyecto de Memoria en respuesta a Portugal*, March 30, 1768, *ibid.*, 5054.

of Portugal and in view of Pombal's notorious untrustworthiness it would be rather a burden to them.¹

The efforts of the Bourbons to induce the Court of Vienna to join the alliance were far more in earnest. At first they had cherished the hope of bringing about the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Austrian hereditary lands and, as a necessary consequence, from the whole of the German Empire,² but all their exertions were of no avail against the sense of justice felt by the Empress Maria Theresa. As early as May, 1767, Choiseul had pointed out to the French envoy in Madrid the necessity for all the Catholic Powers to form themselves into a league.³ It was also Aubeterre's opinion that the secularization of the Order would never be obtained from the Pope by amicable means; it would have to be wrested from him. The most certain, and probably the only, way of attaining their object was a union of France, Austria, and Spain, the last-named drawing Naples and Parma in its train. The other States would join them immediately or at any rate would not dare to take action against so imposing a union.⁴ When the Extraordinary Council was asked by Charles III. to give its opinion on Pombal's propositions, most of the Councillors stated that every effort should be made to bring the Viennese Cabinet into the alliance or, if it was unwilling to take part

¹ *Choiseul to Grimaldi, May 3 and 27, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2850; *Grimaldi to Choiseul, May 16, 1768, *ibid.* Cf. above, pp. 281, 282; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, May 16 and June 6, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 7290.

² *Roda to Azara, June 16, 1767, in Jesuit possession, *Hist. Soc.*, 230; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, August 4, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100; *Baron Ritter to Baron Beckers, dated Vienna, 1767, December 9, State Archives, Munich, Kasten schwarz 26/3; *Baron Ritter to Baron Wachtendonk, March 26, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *Choiseul to Ossun, May 11, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4686.

⁴ To Choiseul, June 15 and 24, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 411 *seqq.*; *to Choiseul, July 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

in it, to see that it made no objection to the procedure of the Bourbons.¹ Grimaldi accordingly informed the Spanish envoy Fuentes and Choiseul that his master considered the co-operation of the Viennese Court to be indispensable; they should try, therefore, to induce it to make the demand for the suppression along with the other Powers. Austria's support was essential, for otherwise Rome could retort that it was not in a position to abolish an Order which other Governments wanted to be preserved. If France agreed, he was empowered to take the necessary steps with the Empress.² The negotiations that were going on at that time between Madrid and Vienna regarding the marriage of Ferdinand of Naples to another archduchess in place of the deceased Maria Josepha, were to serve as a means of obtaining Austria's collaboration.³

At the audience which the Spanish envoy in Vienna, Mahony, obtained for this purpose on the instructions of the Foreign Minister,⁴ the reply he received was evasive. Maria Theresa, who had already declared that the Jesuits in her country had given her no grounds for complaint,⁵ now told the ambassador that she could not come to any decision about his request until she had consulted her Ministers. Mahony did gather this much from the conversation, that the empress had no desire either to join the union or to hinder in any way whatever steps the Bourbons might take in Rome. This also,

¹ The considered *opinions of Masoues (November 13, 1767), Roda and Alba (January, 1768), Muniain (January 11, 1768), Osma (January 13, 1768), and Grimaldi (undated) in the Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054. Cf. pp. 338 *seqq.*

² *Grimaldi to Choiseul, December 8, 1767, *ibid.*, 4568. Two *letters from Grimaldi to Fuentes, of December 8, 1767, *ibid.*, 7290.

³ *Lucini to Torrigiani, December 8, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 239.

⁴ *Grimaldi to Mahony, December 8, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3518; *Fuentes to Mahony, December 17, 1767, *ibid.*; *Mahony to Fuentes, December 26 (28), 1767, *ibid.* ⁵ *Mahony to Grimaldi, December 12, 1767, *ibid.*, 6503.

he thought, would be the result of the ministerial conference, namely a declaration of neutrality.¹ To Rome the empress and her nearest advisers sent messages of reassurance.² This attitude was maintained by the empress in the period that followed, but in the outer circles of her entourage the undermining work of the Bourbons was not entirely without effect. According to the reports of the nuncio Visconti, the imperial physician-in-ordinary, Van Swieten, and the prelate of St. Dorothea's, the empress's confessor, were consistently hostile to the Jesuits. Further, the Bourbon representatives had invited Cardinal Migazzi to join the "conspiracy".³

¹ " *[Maria Teresa] concluyó la audiencia con el punto de los Jesuitas, y despues de varias y dilatadas reflexiones sobre esta Sociedad, dijo S. M. I. que en este asunto, que ya no era casero, no podia determinarse ni decirme su ultima resolucion sin haberlo consultado antes muy despacio con su Ministerio. Pude comprender de sus discursos que no vendria bien en unirse con las Cortes interesadas para la solicitud en Roma de la extincion de esta Sociedad, pero que tampoco haria ninguna oposicion a nuestras instancias, y juzgo de antemano que esta indiferencia será la resulta de las conferencias ministeriales. El embaxador de Francia y yo hemos quedado en explicarnos juntos sobre esta dependencia con los principes de Colloredo y de Kaunitz." Mahony to Grimaldi, December 28, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6503.

² *Maria Theresa to Clement XIII., January 9, 1768, Nunziat. di Germania, 388, Papal Secret Archives; *Joseph II. to Clement XIII., January 11, 1768, *ibid.*; *Kaunitz to Clement XIII., January 9, 1768, *ibid.*; *Colloredo to Clement XIII., January 11, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *Visconti to Torrigiani, January 21 and March 3, 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *loc. cit.* " *Quanto ai Gesuiti dei Stati austriaci, so che le Corti di Lisboa, Madrid e Napoli danno impulso alla Imperatrice Regina, acciò anch' ella gli sopprima e discacci. Ella però con sua lettera dei 9 scorso ha assicurato N. S. di proteggere tutti i sacri ministri, ' si ipsi sacri sui instituti ac muneris, ad quod vocati sunt, rationes rite sequantur, et a suis erga Ecclesiam, principes et populum officiis minime declinent. Hoc si Regulares Societatis Iesu, qui in

In her final reply Maria Theresa declared that she had not been informed, either officially or confidentially, of the grounds of the expulsion. Though she was willing to suppose that the other Catholic Powers had good grounds (though they had not been made known to her) for the expulsion and complete dissolution of the Jesuits, she could take no action against these Religious, seeing that they were guilty of no crime in her domains. If the interested States succeeded in obtaining the suppression from the Court of Rome, she would take no action on behalf of the Jesuits nor would she withhold her assent to the Holy See's decision. The statement made by Prince Kaunitz was more explicit. Neither the publications made by Portugal nor the indefinite phrases of the Spanish decrees had satisfied him or provided the required explanation. The Jesuits had caused no disturbance in Austria, and the reprehensible principles they were now accused of holding had been ascribed to them more than a hundred years before, when they were still held in honour and respect in Spain, France, and Portugal. Moreover, the Austrian Jesuits were simple and peaceful folk, so that there was nothing to fear from them. The emperor thought otherwise. Mahony was certain that he would gladly lend a hand with the suppression of the Society. When he came to power, one of the first steps he would take—in the opinion of most people—would be to reduce the numbers and the revenues of the Religious. Summing up, the ambassador observed that at the moment neither the empress nor her Ministers were inclined to join the league, because they could see no reason for abolishing the Society. The Bourbons, therefore, would have to be satisfied with the offer not to oppose the scheme.¹ Neverthe-

ditione mea sunt, semper, ut sperare oportet, agent, non est quod sibi metuant ; e in simili termini si è espresso anche l'Imperatore." Torrigiani to Giraud, February 17, 1768, Nunziat. di Spagna, 412, *loc. cit.*

¹ “*Respondióme la Emp^z Reyna que deseava firmemente ir acorde en todo con Potencias tan amigas, pero que no la habian comunicado estas, poco ni mucho, los motivos particulares en que habian fundado la expulsion de los Jesuitas ; que comprendia,

less, Mahony did not give up all hope of securing Austria's co-operation in the course of time.¹ Before the letter

no obstante de no hallarse informada ni de oficio ni confidencialmente, que Potencias tan catolicas, tan politicas, y tan amantes de la quietud y bien de sus pueblos no hubieran tomado el partido de excluir de sus dominios todos los Jesuitas y de desear ahora la extincion general de la Orden, si para efectuar este pensamiento no hubiesen concurrido las mas solidas y eficaces razones. Que no podia proceder directamente en sus dominios ni en el Estado Eclesiastico contra Religiosos, que no eran reos en su país, aunque lo serán en otros, de delitos que no se publicaban, pero que siempre que las Cortes interesadas pudiesen lograr su extincion en la Corte de Roma, no daría S. M. I. paso alguno en su favor y que consentiria en ver extinguida esta Sociedad (que para con ella no era delincuente) en los mismos terminos que lo consiguiesen las Potencias y conociendola rea solicitasen su extincion. . . . El Principe de Kaunitz se extendió mas que la Emp^z sobre este asunto, dijo que si se han fundado en gran parte todas las Cortes que los han expelido en la inquietud que causaba esta Compañia en sus reynos, no tiene la Emp^z Reina la misma razon para echarlos fuera dominios, en los quales esta Sociedad no ha sido inquieta : que extrajudicialmente habia visto algunos papeles de Portugal que no satisfacian su deseo de aclararse mas sobre esta materia ; que los cargos que hacia la Corte de España en sus Edictos eran generales, y no daban la luz particular que buscaba ; que las maximas que se atribuian a los Jesuitas, aunque tan perversas, eran las mismas ahora que las que se les habian atribuido mas de un siglo ha, quando florecian tanto en España, Francia y Portugal ; y por fin que los Jesuitas de los países hereditarios eran mas simples que cabilosos, y apoyó mucho en esta pretendida simpleza para persuadir que non eran temibles en Viena como en otras Cortes. . . . Casi no dudo que el Emperador daria gustoso la mano a la expulsion e igualmente a la extincion de esta Compañia, como también creen los mas que si reinase seria una de sus primeras operaciones el disminuir las rentas y el numero de individuos de otras Ordenes religiosas de los países hereditarios" (Mahony to Grimaldi, February 9, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6504). Cf. *Grimaldi to Mahony, March 8, 1768, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 3518.

¹ *Mahony to Grimaldi, April 12, 1768, *ibid.*

containing these observations had reached Madrid, Charles III. had declared that if the empress was unwilling to join the Bourbons he would be content with her offering no opposition to the efforts made by the other princes.¹ Maria Theresa held fast to her decision despite all the attempts made to move her,² whereas Joseph II. maintained his neutrality solely out of regard for his mother. He had told his confessor, the Jesuit Parhamer, by way of advice, that it would be best if the Jesuits themselves were to bring about the dissolution of their Order, for in this way they would anticipate in a worthy manner what was eventually bound to happen.³

While the Bourbon Powers were casting around for allies, the French envoy in Rome, instructed by Choiseul, had already taken preliminary steps. He did not find the ground here entirely unprepared. Since the time of the persecution in Portugal an anti-Jesuit party had been working for the downfall of the Society by both speech and writing. The anti-Jesuit meetings in S. Agostino and near the Chiesa Nuova had produced a crop of lampoons, broadsheets, and books, whereby inventions and calumnies against the Society were spread as far as the Indies and America.⁴ In the work entitled "The Wolves Unmasked" the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and Naples was already being demanded in 1760.⁵ The most disgraceful collection of these broadsheets

¹ *To Tanucci, February 9, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6058.

² The Neapolitan envoy, the duke of S. Elisabetta, also received instructions to concur in the steps taken at the Imperial Court by France and Spain. *Tanucci to Charles III., 22 March, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

³ *Visconti to Torrigiani, January 2, 1769, Cifre, Nunziat. di Germania, 392, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See our description, Vol. XXXV., 390 *seq.*

⁵ *I lupi smascherati*², Aletopoli, 1764, Plirothopanorthosis (see *Orsini to Tanucci, November 28, 1760, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4954). On p. 226 is the following passage: "Revelabo pudenda tua in facie tua [Nahum, III., 5], sino a tanto, che con Bolla pontificia non si estingua questa Società di christiani postici, religiosi di corteccia, lupi mascherati." Cf. *ibid.*, 245.

appeared in a resplendent form in Lugano. Week after week journalists from Rome broadcast the most fabulous stories in the pages of the Lugano Gazette. With the help of "good friends" the enemies of the Jesuits insinuated themselves into Jesuit houses in the hope of picking up a careless word. To misrepresent quite harmless affairs, recourse was had to distortion and exaggeration.¹ The old charges of tyrannicide, covetousness, laxity of morals, probabilism, rebellion, and the rest reappeared in the travesty of a hymn² ending with an appeal to the Most Holy Trinity to bring about the downfall of the Jesuit Order.³ For the same purpose a *Dies Iræ* was composed in a similar tone and with similar ideas.⁴ The Spanish agent Azara, who was not a stranger to anti-Jesuit circles, scarcely ever omitted in his letters and reports to urge the Minister Grimaldi to strive for the destruction of the Jesuits.⁵ On the non-Italian side of the Alps the anti-Jesuits were not blind to the difficulties arising from the Pope's refusal to co-operate and the determined resistance shown by Torrigiani; however, said Fuentes, every problem had its solution; with cleverness, firmness, and money anything was to be had in Rome, where, as the old joke had it, it was not the *Dio Trino* but *quattrino* that was all-powerful.⁶ The opinion was voiced that an attempt should be made to win over the Cardinal Secretary of State, whose energy and firmness compelled the respect even of his enemies,⁷ but all who had

¹ RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 14, 63 seq.; ROSA, 365.

² "Aeterne Rex altissime."

³ " *Praesta Beata Trinitas | Ut ad quietem publicam | Veramque tui gloriam | Haec pereat Societas. Amen." MS. in Jesuit possession, *Miscellanea*, 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ " *Azara me dice con el viejo Caton : delenda est Carthago, y en realidad esto mismo parece debieran decir todas las Potencias catolicas." Grimaldi to Tanucci, October 27, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6100.

⁶ *To Roda, July 10, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P.

⁷ Choiseul to Aubeterre, April 21, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI.,

intimate knowledge of his noble, irreproachable, unbribable character¹ knew that he would never abandon his principles for opportunist reasons or for personal interests.² This sense of justice would not allow him, out of consideration for the Courts, to sacrifice an Order which had rendered great services to the Church and had not been guilty of any crime. But not all the Cardinals shared his view. At the session of the Congregation which had deliberated on the admission of the Spanish Jesuits into the Papal States, Cavalchini and Stoppani had said that as the Society would have to be suppressed in any case before long, no great harm would be done if it was made away with a few years earlier.³ Cavalchini intimated to a trusted friend that he was not the only member of the Sacred College to hold this opinion.⁴ When the Jesuits were expelled from Naples the suppression of the Society was again discussed. According to a confidential report of Cardinal Calini's, of the eight Cardinals who were present Stoppani, Giovanni Francesco Albani, Fantuzzi, and Cavalchini spoke in favour of it. They acknowledged that the Society had been of service to religion and had not decayed but as the princes no longer wanted it in their States its preservation exposed the Church to great dangers.⁵ The Paris nuncio Pamfili was also convinced

400 *seq.* (see above, pp. 314 *seqq.*); *Dictamen del Consejo extraordinario, March 21, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054; *Du Tillot to Azara, August 21, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768/69.

¹ THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 146.

² Aubeterre to Choiseul, May 13, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 404.

³ RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 25. See above, p. 164.

⁴ *Lopez de Barrera to Roda, April 30, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P.

⁵ " *In una delle congregazioni tenute per tale affare che furono varie, fu proposta l'abolizione della Compagnia di Gesù. Furono per questà opinione i cardinali Stoppani, Gio. Franc. Albani, Fantuzzi e Cavalchini; vero è che premisero, che la Compagnia era assai benemerita della Chiesa e che non era guasta, ma il solo motivo che gli determinava era che i principi oggidì non la volevano e che il sostenerla era porre in maggiori pericoli

of the necessity of the suppression and had promised to work out a considered opinion on the subject and submit it to Rome.¹

Among the Society's opponents was a nephew of Clement XIII., the Maggiordomo Rezzonico. In contrast to his brother, the pious Cardinal Rezzonico, he made no secret of his dislike of the Jesuits, believing that they had effectively opposed his promotion. He had remarked to a confidant that the affairs of the Society were approaching the end they had deserved; he and his friends would like the Pope to be compelled by the Courts to give the Order its *coup-de-grâce*; they would gladly and joyfully play their part.² Choiseul had splendid promises made to this prelate: if he succeeded in persuading his uncle to abolish the Jesuits, the French king would pay him 100,000 scudi; and as much again might be expected from Spain, for both Courts had every intention of rewarding their followers generously. Further, he gave him grounds for thinking that he would obtain the protectorate over France as soon as he was made a Cardinal. Aubeterre was to make this offer in a delicate and careful manner and was to apprise the duke of Rezzonico's response in private letters only.³ That the number of the Bourbon adherents in the Sacred College might be increased, the French ambassador continually pressed the Pope to raise his nephew to the purple. His candidature was supported also by Azpuru, for the Maggiordomo was the only member of the Apostolic household to speak out openly in his uncle's presence in favour of the Catholic monarchs, stoutly defending the

la Chiesa. La raccontò al Generale come saputo di certo il card. Calini, e lo affermava una sorda ma comune voce di Roma." Ricci, *Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 44.

¹ *Fuentes to Grimaldi, June 10, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4566. Cf. *Fuentes to Grimaldi, June 27, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565; *Grimaldi to Roda, July 6, 1768, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 668.

² *Lopez de Barrera to Roda, April 30, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4982; Aubeterre to Choiseul, May 27 and June 17, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 407, 410.

³ Choiseul to Aubeterre, June 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 409.

measures taken by the Spanish king, and extolling his justice, piety, and religious zeal.¹ This step of Azpuru's won scanty applause from Madrid, but for good or ill, out of consideration for France, it was decided to favour the nephew's ambitious schemes.²

The Maggiordomo's first attempt to change his uncle's mind had a poor reception, news having just been received from the nuncio in Vienna of the empress's statement that she was satisfied with the Jesuits in her domains and that they had nothing to fear so far as she was concerned.³ An unofficial step taken by Aubeterre himself was equally unsuccessful. In the course of an audience the anti-Jesuit resolution passed by the Parlement of Aix was mentioned, and the ambassador said that he could not conceal his fear that the lively interest taken in the Jesuits by the Pope would bring trouble to the Holy See. He did not wish to enter into the question of guilt but he could not deny that in the public estimation the Order was doomed, and the effects of a deep-rooted opinion were the same as those of a clearly demonstrated truth. These religious could do no good nowadays and were therefore of no more use to religion. But if they were secularized all dissensions would be removed, a benefit would be conferred on the Society and its individual members and a great favour would be done to the monarchs who had expelled them. There was no other way of escaping the unpleasant results that would undoubtedly accrue from the affair. He had no authority to speak in this

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4982.

² *Grimaldi to Fuentes, July 20, 1767, *ibid.*, 4976. Some thought that the Maggiordomo's opposition to the Jesuits was merely a clever move to obtain from the Bourbon Courts a recommendation for a Cardinal's hat. *Azara to Grimaldi, August 4, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. "Parma", 1768; *Du Tillot to Azara, October 30, 1768, *ibid.*, Exped., 1768/69; *Tanucci to Orsini, November 8, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6006.

³ Aubeterre to Choiseul, May 27 and June 24, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 407, 412. Cf. above, p. 327 *seq.*

way but was certain that these ideas merely expressed the general opinion of every country. The Pope, who had followed the envoy's statements with the closest attention and had vigorously objected to them from time to time, remarked drily at the end that such matters were not to be considered for a moment ; if the Jesuits could do no more good in the countries from which they had been expelled, they would do so elsewhere.¹ Spain was definitely annoyed by this over-hasty step of the French ambassador's.² To smooth things over, Choiseul observed that though Aubeterre's procedure was not entirely laudable, an expression of his private opinion would not prejudice the sovereigns' plans, as it could only prepare the Court of Rome for the steps that would soon be taken by the princes.³

In his report on the audience Aubeterre remarked that in the opinion of the maggiordomo nothing less than a combined effort of all the Catholic Powers could induce the Pope to suppress the Order.⁴ His personal conviction was that it was an illusion to think that Clement XIII. could be persuaded by any friendly means to take this step ; it would have to be wrested from him by force. The King of France was therefore faced with the necessity of occupying Avignon and Venaissin, which would otherwise always remain a hotbed of unrest for his country. The Apostolic Camera derived no profit from these possessions, and the Romans regarded them with indifference, if not with dislike, on account of the Popes having once resided there. Afterwards the monarch could offer the Holy See an indemnity of three or four million scudi and (secretly)

¹ Aubeterre to Choiseul, June 24, 1767, *ibid.*, 413 ; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, July 2, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5044 ; Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 26.

² *Grimaldi to Azpuru, August 4, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 47 ; *Grimaldi to Llaguno [August 4, 1767], Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5045.

³ *To Fuentes, August 9, 1767, *ibid.*, 4565.

⁴ To Choiseul, June 24 and July 8, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 413 *seqq.* ; *to Choiseul, July 15, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

the Pope's family a substantial reward. At first the offer would certainly be refused but in the end it would be found to be acceptable.¹

In July, 1767, Choiseul had expressed to the Spanish ambassador his desire that Naples should take the lead in the matter by being the first to request Rome to suppress the Society, for firstly they would forestall the retort that those Powers which had expelled the Jesuits had nothing more to fear from them, and secondly Rome would be more careful in its dealings with Naples, lest it provoke Tanucci to banish them from his territory. Naturally the other Courts would immediately have to support the step taken by Naples.² But neither Madrid nor Naples was inclined to fall in with this scheme. As a result of the continued suspicions that were cast on the Jesuits, Charles III. feared for his son's safety; the enemies, he said, must first be cleared out of the house before he could make representations in Rome or join others in doing so.³ Tanucci objected to the request more vigorously still. Choiseul, he wrote excitedly, should think rather of the coming conclave than of the suppression of the Jesuits under the present Pope,⁴ who was as stupid and incapable as a man without intelligence or education could be. The best thing the Courts could do was not to be drawn into any dealings with Rome.⁵ It was waste of time in this pontificate, and possibly in many future pontificates, to discuss the secularization of the Jesuits, for three-quarters of the Cardinals and prelates had been their pupils. Whoever made such a proposal either had a poor knowledge of the Curia or did not mind

¹ To Choiseul, July 8 and 15, 1767, in CARAYON, *loc. cit.*

² *Fuentes to Roda, July 10, 1767, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, P.

³ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, July 31, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, August 4 and September 15, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100.

⁴ *To Charles III., August 25, 1767, *ibid.*, 6100; *to Roda, August 25, 1767, *ibid.*, 6002.

⁵ *To Castromonte, August 29, 1767, *ibid.*

a rupture.¹ In his view, secular Ministers ought to ignore Rome as much as possible ; the less Rome, the more peace, more honesty, and more religion.²

On account of the resistance offered by Madrid and Naples the duke let his plan drop³; he could do this all the easier as Aubeterre thought that a threat to expel the Jesuits from Naples would have little effect on the Papal Court, as it had long been expected. The only correct way was for the three Courts to act together with the fixed resolve to drive the matter to extremes ; then Rome would have to yield in the end. If it refused at first, the monarchs had means enough in their hands to make their resentment felt in such a way that in time resistance would be impossible. In the next pontificate everything could be set to rights again.⁴

Through the ambassador Ossun, Choiseul informed Madrid that though his master regarded the suppression of the Jesuit Order as a matter of the highest importance and awaited with the greatest eagerness his cousin's proposals for the joint measures, they must not flatter themselves that their object could be attained under the reigning Pope. Their chief attention should be directed to finding a suitable successor to the aged and sickly Clement XIII.⁵ Even then it was doubtful if the Bourbons would attain their aims so long as the Jesuits were protected by other Catholic and even Protestant Powers.⁶ The only useful course was to make a well-reasoned demand for the suppression of the Society of Jesus and for the surrender of its General to Spain, where he would have to answer for his actions ; at least one could always threaten to arrest him in

¹ *To Castromonte, October 10, 1767, *ibid.*

² *To Azara, August 29, 1767, *ibid.*

³ *Choiseul to Fuentes, October 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 4564.

⁴ Aubeterre to Choiseul, September 16, 1767, in CARAYON, XVI., 418.

⁵ *To Ossun, October 15 and November 3, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4686; *Ossun to Grimaldi, October 17, 1767, *ibid.*

⁶ *Choiseul to Ossun, November 10, 1767, Appx. 2b.

Rome. Ricci would certainly not go to Madrid, but his fear and that of Rome would hasten the secularization of the Order, especially if the demand of the Courts was backed by some companies of Neapolitan grenadiers. Every means other than force led to nothing.¹

Madrid, however, shrank from employing force. The Foreign Minister would not give his final opinion as to the method to be followed before hearing the opinion of the Extraordinary Council. His Government would no longer insist on Torrigiani's dismissal. It was realized that Clement XIII. would not allow himself to be persuaded by any friendly means to suppress the Society, but there was a middle way between softness and severity. A real war, such as Pombal suggested, was too brutal a measure. What was essential was to obtain the co-operation of the Court of Vienna.²

In the course of January, 1768, the opinions on Pombal's memorandum which Grimaldi had requested³ came to hand; they were to serve also as an answer to Choiseul's proposals. In his introduction the royal confessor Osma stressed that the position held by the Jesuits in Rome was so strong that their suppression was a sheer impossibility; but, notwithstanding this, confidence must be placed in the assistance of divine providence. His expositions on the threefold question, whether the suppression of the Society of Jesus was just, whether it was expedient, and what means were to be taken to effect it, were summarized in the following principles. The justice of the demand was to be seen in the writings of many learned and saintly men and in the reasons which had moved the four monarchs to expel the Jesuits, such as the relaxation of the Society's discipline, the falling away from their original rules, their political system of government, their commercial dealings, their lax morality, and the consequent decay of the

¹ *Choiseul to Grimaldi, November 12/16, 1767, *ibid.*

² *Grimaldi to Choiseul, December 8, 1767, *ibid.*

³ *Aranda to Grimaldi, December 14, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4568; *Grimaldi to Osma, December 22, 1767, *ibid.* Cf. above, p. 324.

virtues and morals of Christendom. The princes whom God had set up as rulers over the world must either submit themselves slavishly to their maxims or they would not be safe at their hands. How could the abolition of so harmful and corrupt a corporation ever be anything but just? And if it was just, then it was also the duty of princes who had perceived its harmfulness to demand its complete suppression. As this Order was the same everywhere, it was equally harmful on every side. Now as ever the Jesuits were against the Catholic Church, against its true doctrine, and against the spirit of the Gospel. It was therefore the duty of the four kings, as the first-born of the Church, to free the children of our Holy Mother Church from the infectious disease which they had discovered in their lands. In so doing, the ends they must have in view were the honour of God, the welfare of the Church, and the preservation of the purity of religion. To reach this goal the gentlest and at the same time the most effective means must always be used. Consequently Osma's advice was first to win over the other princes to their cause, especially the emperor and empress. Then Torrigiani, who personified the might of Rome and the powers of resistance of the Society of Jesus, was to be removed from the Secretaryship of State. Further, the Bishops and cathedral chapters of all four kingdoms were to be prevailed upon to present petitions to the Holy See for the abolition of the Order. On the strength of these documents the formal, well-argued request for the suppression was to be submitted to the Pope. If Torrigiani's retirement was successfully effected, a favourable outcome was to be expected, otherwise the ambassadors were to obtain an audience and present their request with the declaration that they refused to deal with the Secretary of State in the affair and that the Pope was to transmit his answer through another, impartial Cardinal. The language used on all occasions was to be respectful but emphatic. Once begun, this affair was not to be abandoned until the goal had been attained. The worst possible results would ensue if the business was begun and afterwards abandoned, for the Jesuit Order was a terrible body and it would be even more terrible if it were

to emerge triumphant from an engagement with four sovereigns.¹

Roda's opinion² lacked, of course, the Court Confessor's religious embroidery, but otherwise expressed similar trains of thought. He stressed especially the Order's incapacity to be of any more use in the Christian world. It was a scandal for the faithful to see the Jesuits, after they had been expelled by the noblest of the Catholic Courts, protected in other countries and in Rome. This might well give rise to doubts about the justice of their banishment. Besides, these Religious would leave no means untried of obtaining their return, so that a fresh disturbance of minds would constantly be threatening. Therefore the only practical means of preserving peace and quiet was their complete suppression. It would be very useful if all the Bishops and prelates, by referring to the incidents that had taken place in their dioceses, were to show the Pope the advantage and necessity of the suppression and to present a formal request for it, which request, however, they must first submit to the Government for examination. So as not to allow the Jesuits any time for a counter-move, speedy action was essential, especially as in view of Clement XIII.'s advanced age and ill-health one would have to reckon with his early demise. It would be of great value to present the request in the lifetime of the present Pope, so that it would be known in the next conclave, when the demands must be repeated and a protest made against any and every Pope who might be chosen without the suppression being made a condition of his election. They must also press for Torrigiani's removal, at any rate from this affair, since he was the most fanatical opponent of the rulers' royal prerogatives. The request must be agreed on by the princes and then presented as simultaneously as possible. While showing all due respect, they must not refrain from a display of energy and must let it

¹ **Dictamen del P. Confesor*, of January 13, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054.

² **Dictamen del Señor Roda*, of January 1767, *ibid.*; see Appx. 2a.

be understood that the monarchs would defend themselves at all costs, if necessary by force of arms. Since no impression could be made in Rome except by fear or a prospect of advantage, the Cardinals should be dealt with singly, with the object of winning them over. Their chief care, however, should be the future conclave, to ensure the election of a Pope who was well-disposed towards the Courts and was not prejudiced in favour of the Jesuits.

Grimaldi's opinion too ¹ would have nothing to do with Pombal's plans of war and the occupation of the States of the Church. Apart from other considerations, he did not think such a procedure to be just. If the suppression was regarded as a spiritual matter, the princes had no right to compel the Pope by force to take a step that was repugnant to him. If it was regarded as a secular affair, then again the four monarchs had just as little right to demand from Rome a measure which at present concerned only other States, since the Order no longer existed in their own countries. As suitable methods Grimaldi indicated the winning over of the Court of Vienna, the formation of a special Congregation of Cardinals and prelates to deal with the affair, and the skilful handling of the members of the Congregation, partly by arguments as to facts, partly "by those methods which are customarily used to advantage everywhere, and especially in Rome". In matters in which temporal interests were involved reprisals might be hinted at, such as the abolition of the law-court attached to the nunciature in Spain. But so far as respect for and obedience to the Vicar of Christ on earth and the spiritual sphere in general were concerned, the world must be made to realize that the allied monarchs were not to be outdone by anyone.

Before it was handed to the Portuguese ambassador ² the *aide-mémoire* which had been prepared by Grimaldi from the individual opinions was again submitted for approval to the

¹ Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054 ; see Appx. 2c.

² *Grimaldi to Aranda, February 26, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054.

Extraordinary Council and the Bishops who had been included in it. The Bishops were of the opinion that it was unavoidably necessary to demand from Rome the complete suppression of the Society. The summoning of a Council for this purpose was not expedient ; what was advisable was to urge the Bishops and Superiors of Orders to make the request in Rome together with the Government. It might be useful to instruct some men of learning and repute to produce some written works in support of the princes' demand. The co-operation or acquiescence of the other Catholic sovereigns was well worth striving for. On the other hand it did not seem consonant with the dignity of three powerful monarchs to make war against the Pope, a weak secular ruler and the common father of the faithful. But at the time of the conclave it ought to be made known to the college of Cardinals what a risk they would be taking in electing a Pope who would not co-operate honourably in the suppression of the Jesuits. The project of punishing the General of the Order and his Assistants as partners in the crime would have to be dropped. To ask for Torrigiani's dismissal and his exclusion from this affair was of doubtful value, for his successor might easily be a secret and cleverer adherent of the Jesuits ; it would be better to see if the Secretary of State could not be won over. Naturally in this case he would have to be indemnified for the loss of the revenues brought him by his protection of the Society. Even if they had to spend a considerable sum for this purpose, it would be more profitable and cheaper than an armed incursion into the States of the Church. On no account were they to discuss proposals for reform or any kind of palliative measure.¹

In the *aide-mémoire* which was handed on March 30th, 1768, to the Portuguese envoy Ayres de Sa e Mello as a reply to Pombal's proposals, the prefatory statement was made that the complete suppression of the Society of Jesus would be extremely useful to the Church and was indispensable for

¹ **Dictamen del Consejo extraordinario* [March 21, 1768], *ibid.* ; see Appx. 2d.

the safety of the Courts. Wherefore the five monarchs who had banished the Jesuits must bring about the complete suppression of this terrible and harmful body without delay and with the utmost energy and were not to take half-measures to effect their purpose. The method of negotiation was to be preferred to all others, though the threat to occupy the Papal States could be used as a last resort. It was also unavoidably necessary to assure themselves in advance of the co-operation, or at least the neutrality, of the other Catholic Powers, especially Austria. In making their proposal to the Pope the weighty and just grounds for their request (contained in the *Deducção cronologica* in the case of Portugal, in the decrees of banishment in the case of Spain) should be set out with all due respect but with energy and firmness. It would be useful if the Bishops, prelates, universities, and other representative bodies in the five states petitioned their rulers to ask the Pope for the complete abolition of the Jesuit Order, for which purpose they might be provided with the relevant intimations. It was advisable to act quickly, firstly to prevent the Jesuits making any counter-move, secondly because it was very important that the proposal should be made before Clement XIII.'s death. For if the demand of the Courts was already known in the next conclave, the Sacred College would be more likely to pay heed to the princes' request, to avoid the risk to which it might otherwise expose itself in electing a Pope. In the official proposal the Pope was to be urged to suppress the Society of Jesus by a fatherly measure of administration, without engaging in a formal legal process, just as Clement V. had proceeded against the Templars and subsequent Popes had proceeded against the Humiliati, the Jesuati, and other Orders. The notoriety of the offences, the assurances of such respected monarchs, and the peace of the Church and State demanded, in the case in point, that the method taken to suppress the Society be the speedy one of decree. It must be insisted that this method be adopted, and at all costs Rome must be prevented from handling the affair according to the rules of a suit for suppression. This latter procedure would greatly impede the attainment of the object for which they

were striving, for by various machinations delay could easily be caused, and, even worse, it would jeopardize the honour of the princes, it being inconsonant with their dignity to appear as accusers before a court or to bring a case against a Jesuit General.¹ Any Congregation that was formed for the purpose of providing the Pope with information should be composed exclusively of impartial Cardinals and prelates. To gain their votes every appropriate means should be used, for in matters of this kind only fear or a prospect of advantage was effective with the Curia. Further, it must be stressed in Rome that the monarchs would use every means permissible, even if they were prejudicial to the interests of the Roman Court, such as the suppression of the court attached to the nunciature in Spain, the restoration of the full original authority of the Bishops, and the stoppage of appeals to Rome, except in cases which had already been reserved to the Holy See in the old ecclesiastical discipline. Other States had at their disposal other means of intimidating the Papal Curia, but all must let it be known that in the event of obstinate resistance they would have recourse to serious and effective measures.

During the negotiations between the Courts, broad hints were given to the nuncios that the monarchs were prepared to go to any lengths to secure the suppression of the Society of Jesus. When Lucini complained about the secret landings of the Neapolitan Jesuits in the States of the Church, Charles III.'s confessor retorted that the Pope had the means in his hands of escaping from the difficulty and of satisfying the orthodox princes, by suppressing the Jesuit Order. Grimaldi spoke more bluntly still. The Courts had laid down the principle that the Jesuit body must be done away with. If Clement XIII. would not agree to this decision with a good grace, the sovereigns would continue on their course and temporal losses in the States of the Church would be inevitable. If,

¹ **Proyecto de Memoria en respuesta a Portugal, según se envió al Consejo extraordinario* (definitive text of March 30, 1768), Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5054 ; see Appx. 2e.

on the other hand, the Curia satisfied the Catholic monarchs, the losses would be made good and fresh ones would be avoided.

The Portuguese envoy also informed the Madrid nuncio that his Court made the resumption of relations with Rome dependent on the suppression of the Jesuit Order. All the Governments, he said, had now resolved to leave no means untried of inducing the Pope to take this step.¹ The great secret of the time, wrote Lucini to Garampi in January, 1768, was the conspiracy formed by Spain and the other European Courts against the Roman Curia, with the object of peremptorily demanding the suppression of the Jesuits and of rendering the Papal authority superfluous in every State. The Bishops who were true to Rome were humiliated and abased; their greatest enemies were the Frati. King Charles III.'s hatred of the Jesuits and consequently of Rome too was unbelievable.²

In his reply Torrigiani remarked that there was a great difference between the Templars, with whom the Portuguese representative had drawn comparisons, and the Jesuits. The Templars' offence was notorious, whereas the Jesuits had hitherto been notorious only for the great good they had done and were still doing. And now they were suddenly to be condemned on charges of a general nature, with no proofs and no details about their crimes. Moreover, there was a plain contradiction in the charges. In Portugal their crime consisted in not observing their Order's regulations, in France in following

¹ *Lucini to Torrigiani, December 22, 1767, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 304, Papal Secret Archives, copy in the Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 767.

² " *Il grand arcano, che esiste ora, è la congiura combinata con le altre corti dell' Europa contro la corte di Roma, mentre si vuole assolutamente la suppressione de' Gesuiti, e ridurre inutile l'autorità pontificia in tutti i regni " (Lucini to Garampi, January [12 ?], 1768, Cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 305, *loc. cit.*). *Di Rivera, Sardinian ambassador to Rome, to Lascaris, January 29, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101.

them too closely. Only children would be frightened by the talk that these Religious were a danger to the monarchs. All the laws of humanity had been violated when they were expelled from Portugal, and they had been driven out of France, Spain, and Naples like scabby sheep. Not one had protested; no one except the Pope had stood up for them, and these were the giants who were supposed to dominate the rulers! Equally ridiculous was the theory that they dominated the Holy See. Let the proofs be produced and they would be the first to remove the Jesuits from occupations which were inconsonant with their vocation. Ever since the great persecution began they had taken special care not to employ them in such business, even when they could have been of good service to them. If their domination of the Pope was deduced from the protection extended to them by the Holy See, this was a false deduction, for the Pope's duty was to protect them just as he would any other Order in similar circumstances. The whole conflagration was solely the result of the plot concocted by the Courts. The attempt to induce the Pope to lend a hand to these intrigues and to set his seal upon them would never succeed. Grimaldi had declared that the Holy See would be buried beneath the ruins of the Jesuit Order, that it would forfeit more and more of its spiritual and temporal rights, and that it was a question of its saving any of its temporal possessions. He would like to put the question, what the Jesuits had to do with the present encroachments of the rulers on the privileges of the Holy See, with the indirect attacks on religion itself. Why was not attention directed rather to the pernicious principles of that century? Why did the rulers lend so willing an ear to the flattery of politicians? What had the Jesuits to do with the temporal supremacy of the Holy See, if it was to lose it on their account? Neither the present nor any future Pope could destroy an Order which, on the testimony of Bishops and princes throughout the world, had been helpful to religion and the State, when there was no evidence that as a whole it had departed from its rules, that it had committed colossal crimes, and that it was obviously incorrigible. These were the views of the Holy

Father, which the nuncio was to express with force at every opportunity.¹

The memoranda of the Courts and the *aide-mémoire* were ready² when, on January 30th, 1768, the issue of the monitorium to Parma altered the whole situation and led to the occupation of Avignon and Benevento. As an indispensable preliminary condition for the settlement of the dispute the suppression of the Jesuit Order was demanded by Spain,³ and the first step, which, it was hoped, could be supported by the other Powers, was to come from the Bourbons.⁴ Convinced that to deal with the Jesuit affair in conjunction with the complication with Parma could only do harm, Choiseul made no mention of the suppression as a condition of peace in his

¹ " *V. S. save quales son, y quales deven ser las maximas de la Sta Sede ; las del Papa no son, ni pueden ser diversas, con que no podrá nunca ni el Papa presente, ni el que venga despues de el destruir una Orden religiosa que por authoridad de los obispos de todas las partes del mundo, y por confesion de los mismos principes del siglo, ha sido hasta aora util al servicio de Dios, y al del Estado, sino se prueba que haia degenerado de lo que era, y que estos hijos haian cometido enormes delitos : estos son los sentimientos de Su Santidad, y estos son aquellos a los quales V. S. deve dar siempre toda la eficacia con su celo." Torrigiani to Lucini, January 7, 1768 (translation), *ibid.* 5072.

² " *No omito advertir a V. E. aqui que, quando recibimos la noticia del Monitorio del Papa contra la corte de Parma, estaba ya formada la Memoria y que esta se dispuso segun las circunstancias anteriores en que nos hallabamos con Roma." Grimaldi to Fuentes, May 16, 1768, *ibid.*, 5054.

³ " * . . . y no temas que la composicion con Roma sea segun ella lo piensa, pues por mi parte no se hará así, y antes bien a de ser con la total extincion de los Jesuitas " Charles III. to Tanucci, May 10, 1768, *ibid.*, 6058. " * . . . es S. M. de dictamen, que tambien se pida por las tres cortes, como articulo sin el qual no tendra efecto la composicion con Roma. Este articulo le propone S. M. como dictamen, y no como resolucion, si le aceptasen en Francia, lo avisaré a V. E." (Grimaldi to Tanucci, July 26, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101).

⁴ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, May 16, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565.

instruction to Aubeterre, merely remarking that if Portugal put forward this demand it might rely on the help of the Bourbon Governments.¹ In fact he urged the Cabinet in Madrid to withhold the request until the coming conclave or the election of the next Pope, since all requests of this nature were hopeless at the present time and might lead Clement XIII. to take a step which his successor might be unable to undo.² A different view was taken in Spain. Both the king and the Extraordinary Council insisted on the suppression of the Society of Jesus being the first condition of an understanding, and until this was fulfilled all other negotiations were purposeless.³ Grimaldi had to inform Choiseul that his Court could not confine itself to the support of Portugal and regarded the suppression as the most essential condition. The prelates and jurists were incessantly reminding the king that as long as this Order existed in any corner of the world real peace was

¹ "Quant au Portugal, il demande l'extinction totale de la Société des Jésuites, et je ne doute pas que les trois cours n'appuient cette demande" (Choiseul to Aubeterre, undated [July 11, 1768 ?], in CARAYON, XVI., 433). *Grimaldi to Azpuru, July 26, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48.

² "*Nous pensons entièrement comme le cour de Madrid sur la nécessité et l'utilité de l'extinction absolue de la Société des Jésuites, mais nous sommes persuadés que toute réquisition que nous ferions à cet égard dans les circonstances actuelles seroit très inutile. Le Pape qui s'est si opiniâtrément refusé à la révocation du Bref du 30 Janvier, à laquelle on lui avoit fourni un moyen de se déterminer sans compromettre sa dignité ni son amour-propre, se prêteroit encore moins à l'abolition et à la sécularisation de l'Ordre jésuitique et se porteroit peut-être au parti extrême de faire prendre au St-Siège et à l'autorité pontificale des engagements si forts sur cet objet, que les successeurs de Clément XIII. pourroient se croire dans l'impossibilité d'y déroger" (Choiseul to Ossun, July 19, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4568). *Ossun to Grimaldi, July 28, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *Grimaldi to Fuentes, August 1 and 11, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565, 4566; Giraud to Torrigiani, November 28, 1768, in CARAYON, XVII., 138 *seq.*

impossible. However tenuous the prospect of success, Rome's need of peace might shake the obstinacy of the Pope and his Minister.¹ In accordance with this attitude the Spanish ambassador was instructed unofficially that the recall of the Brief to Parma and the suppression of the Jesuit Order formed the nucleus of the Spanish demands.²

The firm stand taken by Clement XIII. confirmed Charles III. in his resolve to let drop for the moment the settlement of the Parmesan dispute and to concentrate on the suppression of the Society of Jesus as his first objective.³ Following on the approval of the plan by the Extraordinary Council on November 30th, 1768,⁴ the official memorial proposing to the Pope the complete suppression of the Society of Jesus was sent to Azpuru on December 6th, 1768. The disturbances, it was argued, caused by the Jesuits in Spanish lands, the

¹ *Grimaldi to Choiseul, August 2, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565.

² *Grimaldi to Azpuru, September 20, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped., 1768; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, October 4, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge of Venice, October 1, 1768, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 287.

³ “ * . . . me remito a lo que Grimaldi te escribe sobre la demanda que yo he juzgado que devemos azer de su total extincion, separandola totalmente de los otros puntos y negocios pendientes con Roma ” (Charles III. to Tanucci, November 29, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6059). “ *Des de que intentaron entregar a nuestras gentes su negativa rotunda, no han vuelto a desplegar los labios, aunque se les nota alguna turbacion por las apariencias que ven acia Castro y Ronciglione. El Rey por su parte quiere aumentarles el sobresalto, pidiendo absoluta y positivamente la extincion total de la Compañia, como articulo separado de los negocios de Parma, y que nada tenga que ver con ellos ni con las demas condiciones que deben preceder a su ajuste ” (Grimaldi to Tanucci, November 29, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101).

⁴ **Consejo extraordinario*, November 30, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48. Cf. *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036.

outrages they had systematically committed against the Government and the common weal since their foundation, had caused the Catholic King to remove this centre of unrest from his dominions. This was required of him by his duty to his subjects. As the son and protector of the Church, of religion, and pure doctrine, he now found himself compelled to take a further step. The moral corruption of these Religious in their teaching and behaviour, the manifold insurrections and assassinations of which they were accused on all sides, the relaxation of discipline within the Order, the departure from the spirit of their founder, their secularized system of government, their absolute dependence on the will of a single individual, their hostility towards every kind of authority established by God, the advancement of the doctrine of tyrannicide, the persecution of prelates and holy men, their attacks on the Apostolic See when it opposed their views, the incidents in the Eastern missions, in Portugal, and in other countries—all this evidence went to show that not only were they of no more use to Catholic countries but that they were positively harmful, since they were more likely to scandalize than edify. Similarly they were a hindrance to the union of the unorthodox with the Church, for these too must fear the same dangers. The Catholic King, moved by these notorious reasons and as a dutiful son of the Church, filled with longing for its greater glory, for the good, the honour, and the preservation of the rightful authority of the Holy See, for the peace of Catholic States, whose happiness, he was firmly convinced, was irreconcilable with the existence of the Order, in fulfilment of his duties to religion, the Holy Father, himself, and his subjects, begged His Holiness most urgently for the absolute and complete suppression of the Order of the so-called Society of Jesus and the secularization of all its members, without the permission to exist as a community or congregation or under any title of reform or of a new Order, or to have any other head than their local Bishop.¹

¹ *Memoria en solicitud de que el Papa extinga el Instituto de la Compañía de Jesus*, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome,

Copies of this memorial went to the friendly Courts of Paris and Naples, which were expected to supply their representatives in Rome with similar demands within a short time. Until their arrival Azpuru was to observe strict silence and then in conjunction with Aubeterre and Orsini to take the necessary steps for the official delivery of the documents.¹

On December 27th, 1768, at the instigation of the King of Spain, Choiseul sent to the French ambassador Aubeterre the memorial from France,² which contained the categorical demand for the immediate and unconditional suppression of the Society of Jesus throughout the world, the secularization of its members, and the express prohibition of its continued existence in any form whatever. To avoid a revival of the old controversies, not a word was written in this document about the Jesuit doctrine or morals, but the ambassador was instructed to assure the Pope that his master fully agreed with the Spanish memorial.³

Tanucci, whose opinion of the Spanish memorial had been invited by Grimaldi,⁴ was not in favour of negotiation and recommended rather a policy of silence. Rome, he said, would insist on a suit at law but it did not beseem the kings to appear as prosecutors. Moreover, there was a world of difference between the Jesuits and the Templars, whose licence was notorious. If the guilt of the Order was not made clear

Reales Ordenes, 48. Text in FERRER DEL RIO, II., 250 *seqq.* Ricci's removal from Rome was dropped. RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 73 *seq.*

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, December 6, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 48; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, December 6, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6101; *Grimaldi to Fuentes, December 5, 1768, *ibid.*, 4565; *Azpuru to Grimaldi, December 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 5036.

² Text in CARAYON, XVII., 140; THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 142 *seq.*

³ Choiseul to Aubeterre, December 27, 1768, in CARAYON, XVII., 139 *seq.*; *Choiseul to Fuentes, December 27, 1768, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4565; *Grimaldi to Tanucci, January 9, 1769, *ibid.*, 6102.

⁴ *Grimaldi to Tanucci, November 22, 1768, *ibid.*, 6101.

and manifest in the suit and a verdict unfavourable to the Powers resulted, the consequences would be inconceivably disastrous.¹ As the Court of Madrid stood fast by its decision, the Minister gave way to the pressure of Spain,² though inwardly unable to overcome his misgivings.³ On December 31st, 1768, he sent Cardinal Orsini a memorandum essentially similar to the Spanish one,⁴ in which the Pope was asked, in view of the sorry plight of the Church, not to delay the suppression of the Jesuit Order any longer, as its continuance was a perpetual menace to the peace and unity of Catholics and to the honour of the first episcopal see of Christendom.

The last memorandum, that of the French, arrived in Rome on January 12th, 1769, and almost immediately the three ambassadors met to discuss their method of procedure.⁵ At an audience which took place on Monday, January 16th, at 11 o'clock in the morning, Azpuru handed the Pope his Government's memorial, saying nothing of its contents. Clement, asking no question about the purpose of the document, began to read it but soon broke off and laid it on his desk, saying that he would examine it later and give his reply. The ambassador having no further business to discuss, the Pope dismissed him with his blessing. The grief which showed itself in Clement's features as he read the document and the deep silence into which he fell revealed his inward emotion and the pain which this action of the Courts had caused him. All audiences were cancelled for this and the following day.⁶ At the audience on January 20th, when

¹ *To Grimaldi, December 13, 1768, *ibid.*, 6102.

² *To the same, December 20, 1768, *ibid.*

³ *To the same, January 17, 1769, *ibid.*; see Appx. 2h.

⁴ Translation in DANVILA Y COLLADO, II., 274 *seq.* Translations of the three memoranda in the *Gazette de France* [January], 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036.

⁵ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, January 12, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036; *Orsini to Tanucci, January 13, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{290}{1035}$.

⁶ " *Lunes una hora antes del medio dia, me presenté a Su Santidad y entregué dicha Memoria, sin decirle lo que contenia,

Cardinal Orsini performed his Government's commission, the Pope, who was suffering from heart-trouble, broke down and began to weep¹ but soon regained his composure. When Aubeterre delivered the document from his Court on Tuesday, January 24th, 1769, he too was told that he would receive his answer later, whereupon a conversation upon matters of indifference ensued.²

porque así me encargó el embaxador de Francia que lo practicase, dudando yo que la quisiese recibir, y haviendola tomado en la mano, sin preguntarme el fin a que se dirigia, empezó a leerla, pero lo suspendió muy luego y poniendola sobre el bufete, me dijo que la veria: me preguntó si se me ofrecia otra cosa y haviendole respondido que no, tocó la campanilla y me dió su benedicion. La suspension del Papa en leer dicha Memoria luego que por el principio de ella pudo penetrar el objeto que tenia, su melancolico semblante y profundo silencio en dicha audiencia, me persuadieron a creer que lo havia cogido desprevenido de la instancia de dicha memoria, lo que me confirmó el cardenal Negroni, pues haviendo pasado inmediatamente a referirle dicha audiencia, entendi por su conversacion, que en la que havia tenido aquella mañana de Su Santidad le havia preguntado si sabia el asunto de la mia, y sé ciertamente que de resultas de ella estuvo el Papa de muy mal humor en aquel dia, y que en siguiente la negó a quantos se la pidieron " (Azpuru to Grimaldi, January 19, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036). " *Era già stato prevenuto il Papa delle richieste e del loro ordine da Mons. Giraud Nunzio di Francia " (Ricci, *Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 74). Theiner errs in giving January 18 instead of the 16th as the day of the audience, also the 22nd instead of the 24th as Aubeterre's day of audience (*Histoire*, I., 142). *Orsini to Tanucci, January 17, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{289}{1035}$; *Negroni to Vincenti, January 19, 1769, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, Papal Secret Archives; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge of Venice, January 21, 1769, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 288.

¹ *Orsini to Tanucci, January 20, 1769, *ibid.*, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{289}{1035}$.

² Aubeterre to Choiseul, January 25, 1769, in THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 144; *Orsini to Tanucci, January 24 and 28, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, $\frac{289}{1027}$ and $\frac{290}{1035}$; *Azpuru

The greatest satisfaction with the step taken by the Powers was shown by Charles III., who indeed had been the driving force behind the undertaking.¹ He did not conceal from himself that the Pope's reply would be in the negative but it would be enough to begin with, he thought, that the request for the suppression had been made, and that it would remain tabled for some time to come.² The more he thought about it the gladder he was that he had carried out his decision.³ Tanucci, who had followed Spain's procedure with inward reluctance and on instructions from above, made no secret of his discontent. Not only was he annoyed by Aubeterre's premature disclosure of the secret but he was greatly displeased with the French memorandum, by reason of its cool tone and because in its very preamble the whole odium of the business had been shifted onto the King of Spain.⁴ If the Pope called a consistory, two-thirds of the votes would certainly be cast in favour of the Jesuits unless through motives of worldly prudence some of the Cardinals deemed it advisable to be indisposed on the appointed day.⁵

The request for the suppression caused a great stir amid the population of Rome⁶ and naturally it plunged the members

to Grimaldi, January 26, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5036; *Negrioni to Vincenti, January 26, 1769, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge of Venice, January 28, 1769, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 288.

¹ *Negrioni to Vincenti, February 2, 1769, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 433, *loc. cit.*

² *To Tanucci, January 31, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6060.

³ *Charles III. to Tanucci, February 18, 1769, *ibid.*

⁴ *To Azara, January 24, 1769, *ibid.*, 6007; *Erizzo (II.) to the Doge of Venice, January 28, 1769, State Archives, Venice, Ambasciatore, Roma, 288.

⁵ *To Orsini, January 31, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6007; *to Azara, January 31, 1769, *ibid.*

⁶ Aubeterre to Choiseul, January 25, 1769, in THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 144.

of the Society itself into the utmost consternation.¹ In order not to appear indifferent in a matter affecting the very existence of the Order, Ricci summoned his Assistants to an extraordinary council. Among the many proposals made the one that seemed to promise most success was an appeal to the other Catholic rulers for their support. Since important interests affecting the whole Church were involved in the affair, the General intended to consult the Pope before making a final decision, but the latter sent him word that he was not to seek an audience as his appearance in the palace would be misinterpreted and the Pope could very well surmise what he had to say. He also advised him not to appeal to the other princes as they were bound to have been informed of what had happened and not one of them would openly espouse the cause of the Society of Jesus.²

The man most deeply affected by the blow was the aged Clement XIII., so long dogged by misfortune. "His Holiness," so ran the letter he caused to be written to the nuncios accredited to the Bourbon Courts, "cannot understand how these Courts could find the dire courage to add yet another sorrow to all the sufferings which are already afflicting the

¹ " *È facile imaginare la costernazione de' Gesuiti, sostenuta però dalla sicurezza di loro innocenza, dalla fiducia nella giustizia del Papa e sopra tutto nell' assistenza divina. Onde proseguirono i loro ministeri nella consueta forma, e per divina misericordia non nacque turbazione alcuna, anzi universalmente si videro anco i giovani sempre più fermi nella vocazione." Ricci, *Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 74.

² " *Il Generale consultò che cosa dovesse farsi, determinato però a non far passo senza li consenso di S. S^{ta}. Conveniva in primo luogo presentarsi a S. S^{ta} sì per rispetto e sì per non mostrarsi indifferente in affare di tanto rilievo per la sua Religione. Si pensò poi di fare ricorso ad altri principi. Ne scrisse al Cardinale Segretario di stato, che, avendo sentito il Papa, rispose che S. S^{ta} lo dispensava di andare da Lui, perchè la comparsa a Palazzo si sarebbe malignata ; e poi S. S^a s'imaginava ciò che poteva dirgli. Dissuase anco il fare parte co' principi che doveano credersi prevenuti e tra quali non vi sarebbe stato chi prendesse scoperto impegno." Ricci, *loc. cit.*

Church, with no other purpose but to torture still more the conscience and sorely distressed heart of His Holiness. Disinterested posterity will be the judge of it. Posterity will determine whether such actions can be regarded as fresh proofs of the filial love for His Holiness which these sovereigns pride themselves on cherishing, or as pledges of their professed devotion to the Holy See.”¹ But great as was the Pope’s grief, his courage remained unbroken. It was said by Cardinal Calini that he had heard him say in the course of the last few days that he would rather have his hands cut off than sign the Brief of suppression.² As the Bourbon representatives had correctly foretold,³ his answer to the three memorials was a repeated refusal. His predecessors, it was stated in a drafted reply, had been definitely favourable towards the Jesuit Order. Therefore, were he to accede to the king’s request, he would be departing from the principles held by those whose example he considered it an honour to follow, whereas the princes with their endeavour to destroy the Society of Jesus were abandoning the trail blazed by their ancestors. His conscience did not allow him to take a hand in such a work.⁴

¹ THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 145.

² “*Ripeto a V. E. che il Papa defonto non era già inchinato per la soppressione dei Gesuiti; e presentemente dice il card. Calino aver inteso negl’ ultimi giorni dal Papa, che si sarebbe fatto tagliar le mani più tosto, che sottoscrivere il Breve per detta abolizione” (Centomani to Tanucci, February 14, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 126). “*El santo hombre estaba tan tenazmente determinado a dar la negativa redonda a las Cortes sobre la extincion pedida, que se habria dexado primero martirizar que dar el sí” (Vasquez to Roda, February 9, 1769, Bibl. S. Isidro, Madrid, Cartas de Vasquez, vol. I.).

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 2, 1769, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro de la Corresp. oficial, 108; *Centomani to Tanucci, February 10 and 14, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1216; *Orsini to Tanucci, February 14 and 28, 1769, *ibid.*, Carte Farnesiane, 1473.

⁴ **Risposta di Clemente XIII. alle tre Memorie*, Papal Secret Archives, Regolari, Gesuiti, 48; *Torrighiani to an unknown Cardinal, February 1, 1769, *ibid.*

Unwilling, nevertheless, to act independently in a matter of such importance which affected the whole Church, the Pope had appointed a Congregation of Cardinals to meet on February 3rd, 1769, to consider the Jesuit affair,¹ when at eleven o'clock on the night of February 2nd a heart-attack brought his life to an end.

(6)

For years past the Pope's state of health had given cause for serious anxiety.² His physical strength, never very great, had been undermined by the exhausting resistance he had offered to the importunate demands of the political Powers. He had attended all the Christmas ceremonies of 1768,³ and on Candlemas Day he had celebrated Holy Mass with the deepest reverence and piety, as was ever his wont, and had even performed the customary blessing of the candles. In the afternoon he had left his apartment to pray before the Blessed Sacrament, which had been exposed for the Forty Hours' Prayer. He returned in apparent good health and spirits,⁴ but a few hours later, during the night, he died of heart failure.⁵

¹ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, January 3, 1769, Archives of Simancas-Estado, 5012; *Centomani to Tanucci, February 14, 1769, State Archives, Naples, Esteri-Roma, 1216.

² See our account, Vol. XXXVI., 168.

³ *Azpuru to Grimaldi, December 29, 1768, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome.

⁴ Cordara in CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 514.

⁵ According to the *Vita di Clemente XIII.* (101) he passed away, without the servants being aware of it, "ingnocchiato dinanzi ad un Crocifisso." Cf., however, NOVAES, XV., 145 *seq.*, and Azpuru: "Ayer jueves por la noche a las cuatro horas de este relox asaltó al Papa un accidente, que en poco tiempo le quitó la vida. Por la mañana estuvo en la capilla y asistió a toda la funcion del dia de la Purificacion de Nuestra Señora e hizo la bendicion de los cirios con la solemnidad acostunbrada; por la tarde recibió al bezo de pie a quantos fueron a presentarle las velas, con que cada comunidad eclesiastica le obsequia en dicho dia; por la noche cenó y estuvo en conversacion con su sobrino

The news of his death was received with universal surprise. Of the seventy-six years of his life, over ten and a half had been spent as Head of the Church. He was a gentle and devout Father of all Christians, inexorable only when the rights of the Church and justice were in question. Very little money was found in his estate, but there was evidence in plenty of the bountiful alms he had given with the utmost liberality.¹

On February 4th the Pope's corpse was brought to the Vatican and its burial in St. Peter's took place on the 7th.² The sumptuous monument which now marks its resting-place

el senador, hasta que se retiró a la cama, y a poco tiempo de estar en ella, empezó a sentir los efectos del accidente, y no pudiendo hablar, alargó el brazo a un camarero para que lo sangrase; hizolo inmediatamente con dictamen del medico en uno y otro brazo, y al abrirle la segunda vez la vena, arrojó de la boca porcion de sangre y quedó muerto. Esta improvisa novedad, que aqui ha sorprendido a todos, he creido ser digna de la expedicion del extraordinario" (to Grimaldi, February 3, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012). *Gentili to Colloredo, February 4, 1769, printed supplement, State Archives, Vienna; *Tanucci to Castromonte, February 11, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 6007. The rumour that the Pope had been poisoned by the Jesuits was relegated by Tanucci to the world of fables. " *Il veleno supposto dato al Papa per opera dei Gesuiti è riuscito una delle solite favole romane. Il corpo del Papa era fatto per una tal morte " (to Azara, February 26, 1769, *ibid.*). *Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 9, 1769, *ibid.*, 5012.

¹ *Vita*, 104.

² NOVAES, XV., 146. Cf. *Ragguaglio della morte del S. P. PP. Clemente XIII., delle funzioni e trasporto del corpo al Vaticano*, Roma, 1769; *Relazione delle funzioni e di quanto più notevole si pratica dopo la morte del Sommo Pontefice sino all' ingresso dell'em. e rev. sig. cardinali nel conclave*, Roma, 1769; *Relazione del magnifico catafalco eretto nella basilica di S. Pietro per le solenni esequie di PP. Clemente XIII.*, Roma, 1769; *Relazione o sia proseguimento delle funzioni e cerimonie fattesi nella ss. basilica di S. Pietro dopo la morte del S. P. Clemente XIII.*, Roma, 1769. *Relazione del solenne funerale fattosi nella ducale basilica di S. Marco in Venezia il dì Febr. d. 18 1769 per la morte del S. P. Clemente XIII.*, Venezia e Roma, undated (1769).

was erected twenty-three years later by three of his relatives, two of whom were Cardinals bearing his name. It was unveiled in the Holy Week of 1792.¹ It is a masterpiece of the Venetian sculptor Antonio Canova, who had already made a name for himself five years previously with his monument of Clement XIV. In the figure of the Pope, writes a contemporary critic,² the artist has succeeded in showing most happily how all the virtues enjoyed by this successor of St. Peter had their deepest roots in his piety: his figure, assuredly one of the artist's best portraits, is shown kneeling, wrapt in prayer, his features expressing calm joy and benignity, just as he might have looked when he was overtaken by death. On one side of his sarcophagus sits the mourning genius of Death with lowered torch, while on the other stands the allegory of Faith, upright and vigorous, crowned with rays and holding a gigantic cross. On the front of the sarcophagus are figures in relief of Love and Hope.³ The base is guarded by a pair of sturdy lions, symbolic of the watchful power and strength of a deeply pious man who here awaits the Resurrection.

In less troublous times the pontificate of this true father of Christendom would have been far happier.⁴ However strongly they may have condemned his attitude in ecclesiastico-political affairs, even his opponents could not refrain from

¹ It cost 22,000 scudi. Cf. the *letter to Capello, of April 7, 1792: [This tomb] "fa tacere persino l'invidia, e per generale opinione è il più bel ornamento in tal genere che decori la chiesa di S. Pietro." State Archives, Venice.

² [G. GH. DE ROSSI], *Lettera sul deposito di Clemente XIII. nella basilica Vaticana*, Bassano, 1792, xiv. seqq. Cf. Lücke in DOHME, *Kunst und Künstler des 19. Jahrhunderts*, I. (1886), 10 seq.; MISSIRINI, *Canova*, Porto, 1824, 61 seq.; MALAMANI, *Canova*, Milano, 1920, 31 seqq.; CECHELLI, 28; CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 389; but especially A. G. MEYER, *Canova*, Bielefeld-Leipzig, 1898, 21 seq.

³ See MEYER, 21 seqq., illus. 7-9.

⁴ Cordara's opinion in CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 514. Cf. also **Poesie e satire circolanti in Roma durante il pontificato di Clemente XIII.*, Add. 8382 in the British Museum, London.

paying tribute to his personal qualities.¹ Genuine piety, purity of morals, active love of his fellow-men, humility and meekness were his to a high degree. In the face of the many adversities with which he was beset in his pontificate he showed a greatness of soul and a confidence in God that bordered on the heroic. Granted that he did not always estimate correctly the personalities of his entourage, whom in his innate charity he often judged too favourably, just as he was not always successful in his selection of his assistants; granted, too, that with his gentle disposition he was too easily inclined to give way and to accept the judgment of others; but this leniency of his was not unlimited: when his duty and his conscience were in question he displayed a firmness which was not to be shaken by any threats or dangers² and which earned for him the title of "the Gregory VII. of the eighteenth century".³ Mundane interests had no influence on his conduct. Even the loss of his States failed to make him recall his Brief to Parma. To sacrifice the rights of the Church for the sake of temporal advantages seemed to him to be a betrayal of his lofty office, a misuse of the hereditary estate of the Church of Christ which had been entrusted to his hands.⁴ That Clement XIII., in spite of his good nature, came frequently into violent conflict with the temporal Powers was due, not to differences of personal opinion, but to the clash of philosophic conceptions and principles of justice, which even a greater than he could hardly have avoided if the lofty traditions of his predecessors

¹ " * . . . no se puede negar que el S^{to} Padre estaba adornado de virtudes, y poseia en alto grado la de la humildad " (Azpuru to Grimaldi, February 9, 1769, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5012). " Le règne de Clément XIII. n'a que trop démontré que la piété la plus sincère, les mœurs les plus pures et les intentions les plus droites ne suffissent pas pour faire un bon Pape " (Instruction for Cardinals De Luynes and Bernis, of February 19, 1769, in CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, *Clément XIV.*, 210).

² RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 75 seq.

³ Choiseul to Aubeterre, July 18, 1768, in CARAYON, XVI., 435.

⁴ *Torrighiani to Lucini, January 7, 1769 (translation), Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5072.

were to be upheld. Thus it was that his pontificate of eleven years was one unbroken sequence of suffering and oppression for the Church and of grievous humiliation for the rights of the Holy See. His character, which was based on ecclesiastical principles, and the misgivings of his conscience met with no appreciation from the politicians of his time.¹ His best intentions were met by the princes with obstinate resistance or a cold-hearted rejection—they scarcely condescended to answer his letters or they did so in terms of acrid bitterness which grieved him to the heart and slighted the dignity of his sacred office. Since the brutal battles for power which had been waged against the Papacy in the Middle Ages by the German emperors and the French kings, a Pope had seldom been treated with so little consideration as was Clement XIII. Christendom had to witness the doleful spectacle of the Pope's messages being prohibited or even burnt in public by the executioner, if not at the command, then with the cowardly connivance, of Catholic rulers.² But one thing was beyond the power of his adversaries: they could not tarnish the serene and clear-cut portrait of the Pope's character for the impartial eye of posterity, which will honour in his person the noble champion of the Church's rights and liberty against the demands of unlimited absolutism. It had not been blind prejudice but the profound conviction that in defending the Jesuit Order he was ultimately defending the Church itself that had confirmed Clement XIII. in his determination to oppose the demands of the Bourbons with a definite refusal, when the sudden intervention of the darkness of death forced his assailants to break off the engagement for the moment.

¹ Tanucci distinguished himself by continuing to revile the Pope after he had died (to Losada, February 7, 1769, in DANVILA Y COLLADO, III., 285, n. 1).

² THEINER, *Histoire*, I., 146, *seq.*

CHAPTER III.

CLEMENT XIII.'S ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CHURCH. THE CREATION OF CARDINALS. CANONIZATIONS. THE MISSIONS.

(1)

IN his first allocution to the Cardinals¹ Clement XIII. delineated as the main task of his pontificate the preservation of the deposit of faith entrusted to his care, the protection from assault of the Church's governmental authority at the centre of its unity, and the fostering and the valiant defence of everything, either spiritual or temporal, which lay within the duty of the Holy See. In pursuance of these aims, he said, he did not count his life more precious than himself² and he put his confidence in the divine protection.

The allusion to the danger to which the faith was exposed by the teachings of the Jansenists and Encyclopedists and to the threatened encroachment on the spiritual domain by the temporal Powers was expressed here as unmistakably as the Pope's conviction that the only protection the Church could expect was from God's providence. All over the world it was threatened with dangers, injuries, and daily-recurring tribulations. He spoke in a similar sense at the proclamation of the customary jubilee on his accession to the throne³: the Church's weapons wherewith to ward off all these ills were prayer, fasting, and good works, which would draw down God's mercy on the world.

In the circular letter sent by the Pope to the Bishops on his

¹ On July 19, 1758, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 2.

² Acts, XX., 24.

³ Address to the Cardinals on September 11, 1758, *ibid.*, 26; announcement of the Jubilee for the whole of Christendom, of the same date, *ibid.*, 27.

entering office ¹ he spoke of the struggle against the powers of hell which the Church would have to undergo, but he had nothing to say of any trust that could be put in earthly powers ; everything depended rather on the Church's fortifying and sanctifying itself and thus making itself worthy of the divine protection. Apart from the customary exhortations to procure good priests, and to observe the obligations of residence and visitation, the letter was entirely an ascetic instruction on episcopal duties. They were to close their ranks with a strong spirit of internal unity and were to cast aside pride, envy, and all that was contrary to unifying charity. Prelates should not regard their positions of honour merely as a means of playing the *grand seigneur*. " Let us live in the belief that we are come, not to lord it over the Church, but to serve it " ; " there is no poison so nauseous and dangerous as the love of power " ; " vainglory is a hidden reef for Bishops." They occupied Church property not as proprietors but as stewards. Preaching, especially preaching the crucified Christ, was the chief duty of a Bishop, who was not to consider it beneath his dignity to take his share in the work of an ordinary priest. Clearly alluding to the conditions of the time, he finished his letter with an appeal for fortitude : " Let us not be like dumb dogs, not able to bark,² and let us not allow our flock to be preyed upon and ravaged. Nothing must deter us from exposing ourselves to every manner of conflict for the honour of God and the salvation of souls. Let us think of Him who suffered such violent contradiction at the hands of sinners. If we allow ourselves to be intimidated by the boldness of iniquitous men, it will mean the end of the energy of the episcopal dignity, of the exalted and divine power of ecclesiastical government. We can no longer be Christians when we have come to fear threats and persecution. Let us not rely on ourselves but on God, who raises from the dead."

The guiding principle marked out by Clement XIII. for his pontificate is here clearly stated. And he was to abide by it

¹ On September 14, 1758, *ibid.*, 30-37.

² Isaias, LVI., 10.

except when he was hindered by timorous or disingenuous advisers. For him no good would come of continual yielding. He would raise his voice against injustice and take on himself the easily foreseeable consequences, confident that the Church would triumph in the end.

Clement XIII. sought to inspire not only the Bishops but the clergy in general with the loftiness of their task. No sooner had he ascended the throne, he said,¹ than he had received from zealous pastors and missionaries the unanimous complaint that in many clerics they had encountered an excessive striving after money and possessions. This produced indifference to the obligations of the clerical calling, quarrels arose for the sake of some paltry profit, services unworthy of clerics were performed, and as a result the laity conceived a contempt for the culprits which was soon extended over the whole of the clerical profession. Procurators of religious Orders, too, often allowed themselves to transgress the bounds of ecclesiastical moderation. The Pope therefore renewed his predecessors' prohibition of trading by clerics. Apart from what had been expressly forbidden in this respect, the clergy were to avoid every appearance of worldliness in the administration of their properties and were not to make themselves the lackeys of the laity, even when splendid titles were invented for such positions. Bishops were not to consecrate anyone not provided with a decent sustenance.

An address given to the parish priests of Rome in 1764² was of a similar character. He exhorted them to be watchful, for Christ's flock was being threatened not only by open enemies but still more by hidden ones. "Oh, how true it is, that everywhere and only too often, even in this holy city—We say this with infinite sorrow—ravenous wolves are disguised in

¹ To all Bishops on September 17, 1759, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 248 seq.

² *Allocuzione finora inedita di Papa Clemente XIII. ai parrochi di Roma l'anno 1764*, Venezia, 1874. Cf. *Due allocuzioni inedite di S. S. Clemente XIII. P. M. tenute l'una ai parrochi l'anno 1764, l'altra ai predicatori di Roma l'anno 1765*, Venezia, 1874.

lambs' clothing and have no mercy on the flock." ¹ " Only too often wickedness endeavours to cloak errors with an appearance of zeal, to propagate them under the placard of virtue, and thus to poison simple and unheeding Christians more easily, but with all the greater deception."

Apart from the Jansenists, to whose activity, even in Rome, these words may have alluded, the poisoning was mostly done at that time by the Encyclopedists. The chief works of this movement were not passed over in silence by Clement XIII. On January 31st, 1759, he condemned Helvetius's book *De l'esprit* and on June 26th he commended the theological academy of Paris for having proceeded against this clumsy piece of work.² This was followed on September 3rd by a Brief against the *Encyclopédie*,³ which had been put on the Index on March 5th. On October 26th, 1763, he opposed Rousseau's *Émile* in a laudatory Brief for the Sorbonne, which had condemned both Berruyer and Rousseau.⁴ To prohibit one after the other all the works that formed the huge corpus of anti-Christian writing was both impossible and purposeless; instead, a circular letter was sent to all Bishops on November 25th, 1766,⁵ identifying and condemning all writings of this nature. The authors of these works, said the letter, denied God, or at least His providence, the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, and everything supersensual and supernatural. Morally they were wading in filth, and in the ecclesiastical sphere they contested the authority of the Holy See. The Bishops therefore were to warn the faithful and to summon the assistance of the civil power, so that priest and king could unite in fighting the evil.

The appeal to the civil power, however, was hardly likely to

¹ " Oh quanto è vero che da per tutto e pur troppo... anche in questa santa cività, sotto mentite spoglie di agnelli si nascondono lupi rapaci! ". *Ibid.*, 8.

² *Bull. Cont.*, III., 96, 155.

³ *Ibid.*, 243.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 827.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1119 seq.

succeed. On February 6th, 1759, it is true, the Paris Parlement had condemned some anti-Christian writings, including the work by Helvetius and the *Encyclopédie* ¹; and on March 19th, 1765, fresh Parliamentary edicts were issued against Voltaire.² But these steps were not taken in real earnest, in fact favour was shown to irreligious writings on the plea that if they were not printed at home they would be printed abroad and thus the French book trade would suffer. Malesherbes, who controlled the publication of books from 1750 to 1768, earned the praise of the Encyclopedists for curbing the zeal of the censors and for showing men of letters how to circumvent the law.³ The Pope's judgment was all the firmer. In a laudatory Brief to the Bishop of Freising and Regensburg,⁴ who had spoken against the dissemination of evil literature, he said quite bluntly that nothing was more corrupting than the reading of impious books,⁵ and he confirmed ⁶ the declaration of the Bishop of Langres: the principles of the new philosophy destroyed the conceptions of duty and right, led to the dissolution of marriage, of relations between parents and children, and of loyalty to king and country; if self-interest was to be the only motive of human conduct, the citizens in a State would finally confront each other like the members of a robber-band.⁷

The danger to the Holy See caused by the attacks of the Encyclopedists was further increased by Febronius's book, against which the Pope took action.⁸ He again banned

¹ PICOT, IV., 1 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 158.

³ *Ibid.*, 4. Cf. BAUMGARTNER in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, LXVII. (1904), 72-85; FAGUET in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 5th Period, I. (1901), 794-824.

⁴ Of September 17, 1766, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 1114.

⁵ "Nihil profecto exitialius dominico gregi impiorum lectione librorum."

⁶ Brief of May 6, 1767, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 1157 *seq.*

⁷ See our account, Vol. XXXVI., 187 *seq.*

⁸ See our account, Vol. XXXVI., 265.

Berruyer's writings¹ and firmly denounced the Jansenistic catechism compiled by Mésenguy.²

But the Pope's solicitude was not confined to defence; if it had rested with him, he would have intervened constructively in all directions. It was his ardent desire, he wrote,³ to be told how he could put into effect in the various bishoprics the zeal he owed to God and Jesus Christ. The occasion for this utterance was given him by a letter written by the Archbishop of Vienne on the project of merging the Order of Canons Regular of St. Rufus into the military Order of St. Lazarus, and it is typical of the period that this design was already well advanced before it occurred to the Archbishop of Vienne and the Bishop of Valence even to bring it to the knowledge of the Pope.⁴ Clement XIII. commended the two prelates⁵ for not approving of the plan. Other admonitions of the Pope show that pastoral questions were especially dear to his heart. In Alsace a movement was afoot to declare mixed

¹ Prohibition of the 3rd part of the *Histoire du peuple de Dieu* and renewal of the prohibition by a Brief of December 2, 1758, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 67; praise of the Spanish Inquisitor for having prohibited Berruyer, Helvetius' *De l'esprit*, and slanderous writings against the Jesuits: Brief of July 17, 1759, *ibid.*, 229.

² Cf. above, pp. 18 *seqq.*

³ On December 30, 1760, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 427.

⁴ "Qua de re nihil adhuc, ut id quod est fateamur, ad aures Nostras pervenerat" (*ibid.*, 428). There are many allusions to the secularization of S. Ruffo in the Nunziat. di Francia, 450, 512-14, 519: *Torrighiani to Pamfili, November 29 and December 9, 1761; on April 22, 1761 (list of eleven secularized convents in France of the period 1735-1759); July 11, 1761 (application by the king for the secularization of the abbeys of Murbach and Lure). *Ibid.*, 451: *Torrighiani to Aubeterre, January 26, 1767: Torrighiani had handed to the Pope the application for the association of S. Ruffo with S. Lazaro. *Ibid.*, 452: *Torrighiani to Pamfili, January 27, 1762: "Ecco la risposta definitiva della Consistoriale: Constare de causis saecularisationis et unionis delle badie di Murbach e Lure. Così, perchè la Corte è tanto impegnata." Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 427 *seq.*

marriages permissible, on the ground that they were bound to turn out to the advantage of the Church if the Catholic education of the children was insisted on. In a letter to the Bishop of Strasbourg, Cardinal Rohan, Clement explained at length ¹ that no reliance could be placed on the education of the children of such marriages and that they were more likely to pave the way for the dissemination of false doctrine and, what was worse, for the reign of religious indifference. An arch-confraternity had been formed for the teaching of the catechism and endowments had been made for presenting a marriage dowry to young women who undertook the Christian instruction of female youth. In confirming and reorganizing ² this fraternity, the Pope was able to say of himself that he had taken every opportunity of showing his zeal for the Christian instruction of the people. Regarding colleges and seminaries, he wrote to the famous Bishop of Coimbra, Michael of the Annunciation,³ that he more than others had been taught by long experience of what abundant use and profit for the Church these institutions were. On another occasion, after praising the Tridentine decree on seminaries, he said ⁴ that in the spirit of the Council he gladly acceded to the requests for the erection and equipment of seminaries. The hospice for converted Jews also received Papal protection.⁵

Nor was ecclesiastical learning forgotten by the Rezzonico Pope. Bishop Michael of Coimbra had founded an academy for liturgy and Church history in the reign of Benedict XIV. and now sought the ratification of its statutes. The Pope wrote to him ⁶ that he knew of no greater joy than to be asked to lend the prestige of his name for the protection and advance-

¹ On November 16, 1763, *ibid.*, 834 *seq.*

² On September 26, 1759, *ibid.*, 275 *seq.*

³ On September 20, 1759, *ibid.*, 256. Statutes of another college and their Papal confirmation, of July 21, 1760, *ibid.*, 559-568.

⁴ In a message for the seminary of Forlimpopoli, on October 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 1372; *cf.* 1384, 1403.

⁵ Brief of October 26, 1766, *ibid.*, 1116.

⁶ On September 20, 1759, *ibid.*, 257.

ment of the sacred sciences, for the permanent establishment of the academies, and the exact observance of their statutes. As for the works written by the academicians, it was laid down in the statutes¹ that each one of them was free to defend the view that he considered to be more probable and that there was no need for him to follow his predecessors slavishly²; but in confuting others he should take care to do so in generous terms. In the Bulls confirming the universities of Lemberg³ and Cagliari⁴ Clement spoke with high praise of the usefulness of such institutions. To the Archbishop of Valencia, Andrés Mayoral, who had founded a library, he wrote⁵ that it should be known to everyone that nothing was more ardently desired by the Holy See or more energetically promoted than the cultivation, first of the sacred, then of the other sciences.

A Brief on the general monthly communion in Capuchin churches⁶ and a circular letter on the value of fasting⁷ were devoted entirely to the inner life of the Church. For the West Indies in particular Benedict XIV.'s ordinances on fasting were renewed.⁸ Like his predecessor, Clement XIII. had to deal with the question of either permitting work on holidays⁹ or of abolishing the festivals.¹⁰

Clement XIII. had also to express his mind on the burning questions of the right of sanctuary and ecclesiastical immunity.¹¹ The Pope's problem-child in this respect was Germany. Frequent and serious complaints, he wrote, had

¹ n. 26, *ibid.*, 260.

² "pecudum more."

³ Of April 1, 1759, *ibid.*, 122 *seqq.*

⁴ Of July 12, 1763, *ibid.*, 789 *seq.*

⁵ On March 12, 1760, *ibid.*, 324.

⁶ Of July 28, 1751, *ibid.*, 572.

⁷ Of December 20, 1759, *ibid.*, 294.

⁸ On August 19, 1765, *ibid.*, 1019 *seqq.*

⁹ On February 10, 1764 (for Mallorca), *ibid.*, 853; on August 30, 1763 (for Piacenza), *ibid.*, 803; on June 27, 1767 (for Burgos), *ibid.*, 1163.

¹⁰ On October 2, 1767 (for Sardinia), *ibid.*, 1376-1392.

¹¹ On September 30, 1758 (for the Palatinate), on March 21, 1759, and September 3, 1763 (for Sardinia), *ibid.*, 46, 116, 808.

long been coming in almost daily about the decline, or rather the headlong downfall, of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and from nowhere did he receive more doleful news than from Germany. This was all the more painful to him because in former times no nation had surpassed the German in obedience to the Church and in respect for ecclesiastical legislation.¹ He complained that even clerics were helping to increase the weight of the yoke which already had been as good as laid on the Church's neck.²

(2)

Scanty as the prospect was that the princes of the eighteenth century would listen to the Pope, Clement XIII. was convinced that his position as guardian of justice did not allow him to keep silence.³ Germany caused him much anxiety on account of the threatened secularization of the ecclesiastical foundations. It is true that he did not regard the terrible struggle between the leading Catholic Powers of Austria and France on the one hand and the Protestant protagonists, Prussia and England, on the other, as a war of religion.⁴ The occasion of this war, he wrote to Louis XV.,⁵ lay in the temporal sphere ; but the non-Catholic princes were using their battles and victories to trample underfoot everything Catholic and to bring Protestantism to the top. For this reason they were bent on destroying the ecclesiastical principalities in Germany. At the conclusion of peace they would do all in their power to restrict still more the freedom that still remained to Catholics as the result of treaties made even in the most unhappy times. He therefore asked for the intervention of the king who called himself the first-born of the Church. A few days later he made

¹ To Bishop Hutten of Speyer, December 18, 1762, *ibid.*, 724 *seq.*

² To the Archbishop of Mainz, December 18, 1762, *ibid.*, 724. Cf. DENGEL, 60 *seqq.*

³ See above, p. 364.

⁴ See our account, Vol. XXXVI., 194, 195.

⁵ On November 15, 1758, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 61 *seq.*

a similar appeal to the Emperor Francis I.¹ The Pope's anxiety was renewed when on March 26th, 1761, Frederick II.'s adversaries proposed a peace congress to be held at Augsburg, and Prussia with its allies agreed. When in 1761 the rumours of the imminent injury with which the ecclesiastical principalities were threatened grew louder than ever, Clement wrote again to the Kings of France and Poland, to the Emperor,² to Maria Theresa,³ to the Elector of Bavaria,⁴ and to the King of Spain.⁵ The peace congress at Augsburg did not take place but the Pope's anxiety persisted and caused him to address further letters of admonition and appeal in October, 1762, to Paris and Madrid,⁶ to Warsaw, and to the Emperor and Empress in Vienna.⁷ The danger of secularization was threatening for Osnabrück, which according to the Peace of Westphalia was to have in turn a Catholic and a Protestant Bishop. As Clement wrote to the canons there,⁸ on this matter too he appealed for mediation to the French king as the upholder of the Peace of Westphalia.

A cause of great concern to the Pope was his native city of Venice. At the very beginning of his pontificate he had settled the old disputes by means of a friendly letter written in his own hand,⁹ he had sent the Golden Rose to the City of the Lagoons in 1759, and he had imparted to it the right for all time to nominate an Auditor of the Rota.¹⁰ He gave it its Cardinal, like the other great Powers,¹¹ and invested with special privileges the church in Venice in which he had been

¹ On November 18, 1758, *ibid.*, 62 *seq.* Cf. the letter to Klemens August of Cologne of January 10, 1759, *ibid.*, 107.

² On May 13, 1761, *ibid.*, 504-6.

³ On May 17, 1761, *ibid.*, 507.

⁴ On June 13, 1761, *ibid.*, 518.

⁵ On June 17, 1761, *ibid.*, 528.

⁶ On October 6 and 7, *ibid.*, 712 *seq.*

⁷ On October 9, *ibid.*, 714-16.

⁸ On March 26, 1763, *ibid.*, 748.

⁹ See our account, Vol. XXXVI., 158.

¹⁰ NOVAES, XV., 17 *seq.*

¹¹ See below, p. 404.

baptized.¹ Nevertheless he was not to be spared serious conflicts with the city of his birth. Leo X. had given the Greeks in Venice permission to build themselves a church for Catholic services, which was to be directly subject to the Pope. This privilege was re-confirmed by Paul III., and the civil assent was granted by ordinances issued by the State Council in 1534 and 1542 and by the senate in 1720 and 1721. Under Clement XIII., however, the Greeks chose for their church of St. George in Venice a certain George Facea, a schismatic priest who had himself consecrated bishop by schismatics. Schism thus threatened to set its foot firmly in Venice. The Pope immediately protested,² but the senate answered evasively with the general statements that it would never diverge from the faith of its fathers and that Facea had not yet exercised any episcopal jurisdiction. Clement retorted that Facea had solemnly proceeded to the church in episcopal vestments, had sat on the episcopal throne, and had held a service. He therefore repeated his request to the Senate to intervene and he threatened ecclesiastical penalties,³ but he did not even obtain a reply from the Republic. When Pius VII. was elected Pope in Venice the Greek clergy were still there in schism and refused to be present at the new Pope's pontifical proceedings.⁴

Even more serious complaints had to be made by the Pope in a letter to the Venetian Bishops of October 1st, 1768.⁵ The many sorrows of his pontificate had been increased by a law of the Signoria which on the pretext of reforming the religious Orders aimed at their complete destruction.

That monastic life in Venetia was in need of reform was not denied by the Pope. But the occurrence of the abuses and the

¹ On February 10, 1759, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 101.

² On February 27, 1762, *ibid.*, 618.

³ On January 22 and December 31, 1763, *ibid.*, 736, 842.

⁴ GIUS. CAPPELLETTI, *Le chiese d'Italia*, IX., Venezia, 1853, 366. For Facea, cf. PICOT, IV., 259; BART. CECCHETTI, *La repubblica di Venezia e la Corte di Roma nei rapporti della religione*, II., Venezia, 1874, 350-368; MORONI, XCII., 590, 592.

⁵ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 1472 seq.

impossibility of removing them were attributed by him to the interference of the civil power in the ecclesiastical sphere. The Republic, in fact, was too jealous of its own prestige to tolerate the co-existence of priests and Religious who were respected by the people, and for this reason it frustrated the attempts at reform undertaken by the ecclesiastical authority.¹ Consequently, said the Pope, the abuses had gone from bad to worse. But the law that had just been promulgated was more likely to destroy the Orders than heal them.

By a decree of the Senate of November 20th, 1767, all Orders were in fact forbidden until further notice to receive novices. Another ordinance, of September 7th, 1768, abolished the authority of the heads of the Orders in the territory of the Republic and subordinated their members to the Bishops ; the prohibition of the reception of novices was to continue for the mendicant Orders, while in the other Orders no one was to be clothed before his twenty-first year. The clothing ceremony, the taking of vows, and the scholastic training were to take place only within Republican territory. Religious could take over parishes or perform pastoral duties only in places where they had convents. Finally they were forbidden to send money out of the country. An ordinance of the Great Council, encroaching on the rights of the Orders, forbade notaries and public officials to accept officially notifications of gifts to churches, Orders, or confraternities.²

In respect of these laws Clement first exhorted the Venetian Bishops to respect the exemption of the Orders and thus not

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXV, 114.

² PICOT, IV., 260 *seq.* A memorandum of August 27, 1768, in which the motives of the law are manifest, in CECCHETTI, II., 79-99. The State "reform" was a defiance of Rome. In the decay of the Orders, it is said on p. 80, "il pontificato Romano trovava il suo conto." The many new statutes in the Orders (p. 85) withdrew them from the jurisdiction of the Bishops "e li concatenarono con vincoli indissolubili nella dipendenza e negli interessi della Corte Romana", etc. In CECCHETTI, II., 113-19, is a memorandum of December 29, 1766, "sul numero e sullo stato patrimoniale dei Conventi." Cf. BALAN, VIII., 217.

to make use of the authority which had been unjustly granted to them by the State, otherwise they would be rebelling against the Apostolic See, from which the exemption derived.¹ On October 8th, 1768, he reminded the Senate that the Orders' independence of the Bishops had been ordained by canon law, especially by the Council of Trent, which the Republic had been the first of all States to accept. The reform of religious societies was not the business of the temporal power; for this purpose recourse should be had to the Pope.²

The Papal Brief arriving in the vacation, no reply came from the Senate until November 19th. It began by protesting its outstanding devotion to the Holy See and then rebutted the Pope's remonstrances by citing the powers invested in the civil authority. In a further Brief, of December 17th, the Pope declared that these powers were based only on a civil law avid for reform and were unknown in the early stages of the Church's history and to the predecessors of the present wielders of authority in Venice. The Senate's reply to this Brief on December 31st was precisely the same as before.³ The Bishops Marcantonio Lombardi of Crema and Cardinal Molino of Brescia refused to carry out the visitation imposed on them by the State, whereupon Molino had to leave Republican territory and his revenues were confiscated. The Venetian envoy in Rome was instructed not to have any communication with the Cardinal if he showed himself in that city.⁴

As much trouble was caused to the Pope by the Republic of Genoa as by that of Venice.⁵ Unwillingly and full of grief, he wrote on May 17th, 1760,⁶ he raised his voice in complaint,

¹ *Bull., loc. cit.*

² AL. GUERRA, *Pontificiarum constitutionum in Bullario Magno et Romano et aliunde desumptarum epitome*, III., Venetiis, 1772, 347.

³ The Brief of December 17, 1768, and the Senate's replies of November 19 and December 31, *ibid.* Cf. NOVAES, XV., 141-5.

⁴ PICOT, IV., 261.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 30-4; BOTTA, *Storia d'Italia*, IX., Paris, 1832, 337-358; NOVAES, XV., 51-53.

⁶ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 353.

but his pastoral office did not allow him to hide in his heart for ever the sorrow caused him by the Genoese edict against the Bishop of Segni, whom he had sent as Apostolic Visitor to Corsica.

Since the fourteenth century Corsica had been subjected to the rule of Genoa, but since about 1730 the Corsicans had broken out into open revolt against their oppressors on the mainland, and this revolt had increased in violence as the years passed by. The rule of Baron Neuhof, who declared himself king of the island in 1736, had no permanence, but since 1755 General Pasquale Paoli had been fighting successfully against the Genoese and he continued to do so until they sold the island to France in 1768.

Amid these conflicts religious life suffered most severely. The Bishops were driven off the island as adherents of Genoa, there was a serious scarcity of priests, morals deteriorated, and superstition took the place of religion. Benedict XIV. tried to be of help by appointing on one day, May 29th, 1741, three new Bishops, to the dioceses of Aleria, Sagona, and Nebbio, and another to Ajaccio on November 27th.¹ From May 1744, onwards, at the Papal suggestion, the great Franciscan missionary Leonardo da Porto Maurizio had been successfully fighting the moral degeneration with his sermons² until the effects of an unlucky fall brought his activity to an end.

The Genoese Government had already asked for an Apostolic Visitor to Corsica in 1733. Clement XIII. intended to appoint one but on his giving notice of this to the Republic he received a disdainful and offensive reply. Nevertheless he thought that only a Visitor who was on the spot could decide what methods should be employed to remedy the appalling situation and he nominated as such the Bishop of Segni, Cesare Crescenzo de Angelis.³

By Paoli the Visitor was given an honourable reception, but not by the Republic. On August 14th, 1760, almost as

¹ GAMS, *Series*, 764 *seqq.*

² PICOT, IV., 31 *seq.*

³ On September 18, 1759, *Bull. Cont.*, 254.

soon as it was learnt in Genoa that De Angelis had embarked in Civitavecchia for Corsica, it offered a reward of 6,000 *scudi* for his capture. He was to be taken first to one of the strongholds on the island which were still in Genoese hands and was thence to be conveyed to Genoa.

The Pope informed the Cardinals of these events in a consistory held on May 7th, 1760.¹ On the 15th he declared the Republic's edict null and void² and on the 17th he complained about it in a Brief addressed to the Doge and Governatori.³ The king of Naples offered, through Orsini, to act as mediator. The Pope's reply to the conditions proposed was that if Genoa withdrew the insulting edict which it had issued against him he would recall the Visitor in an unobtrusive fashion.⁴ The dispute came to an end with the cessation of the Genoese rule over the island. The Visitor's honourable reception by Paoli and the Republic's hostility towards him might lead one to suppose that he was regarded in Genoa as a party-man. Actually he had been expressly instructed by Clement XIII. to attend only to spiritual matters and to keep off politics.⁵ De Angelis stayed four years in Corsica, returning to Rome in 1764.⁶

It was not long before the Pope had further occasion to complain in the strongest terms of a fresh act of violence on the part of the Genoese. "Is it possible," he wrote,⁷ "that they have so utterly forgotten the piety so zealously displayed by their forebears? Have they really departed so far from

¹ *Ibid.*, 350 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 355 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 353 *seqq.*

⁴ NOVAES, XV., 52; БОТТА, *loc. cit.*, 354 *seq.*

⁵ "Ea Visitatori mandata dedimus, quae ad spiritualem tantum illarum aut perditarum aut periclitantium ovium salutem pertinerent, nihil praeterea curaret, immo se abstineret ab iis, quae motus turbasque illuc iamdudum exortas respicerent." *Bull. Cont.*, III., 351.

⁶ БОТТА, 358.

⁷ To the Archbishop of Genoa, October 22, 1763, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 826.

their devotion to the Church and the Pope of Rome that no jest or pastime seems to them so diverting as to suppress the authority given by God to the Church and to cause the Apostolic See ever sorer grief ? ”

There was just cause for so open and so bitter complaints. The Servite General had sent one of his subjects to Corsica to visit the Order's convents there. This did not please Genoa, where it was thought, as the Pope said,¹ that the Corsicans would be rendered more submissive if all spiritual support were withheld from them. The General recalled the Visitor but his immediate departure was prevented by circumstances beyond his control. Although, therefore, neither the Visitor nor the General nor least of all the Servite Order was to blame, the Republic expelled all the Servites from its territory and handed their convents over to other Religious.

In the face of this act of brute force the Pope was, of course, quite powerless, but his reason for not preserving silence on this as on other occasions he explained in a letter to the Archbishop of Genoa,² in which he called on the Bishops of the Republic to do their duty in the face of these acts of violence. “ For if we whom God has appointed as guardians and shepherds of His Church become so despondent through vain fear as not to be able to speak like priests and to let the voice of zeal and truth be heard by princes and the secular power, where are we to find that man who will speak in our place and come forward as the advocate of the house of the Lord ? ” It certainly redounded to the credit of the Holy See that he, and he alone in the whole of Europe, raised his voice in the defence of violated justice, heedless of the anger of the mighty which he was now drawing down upon himself more than ever.

Another dispute arose with Lucca. On May 26th, 1754, Benedict XIV. had conceded to the Republic the right to nominate three candidates when the archiepiscopal see fell vacant, the Pope to choose one of them as the new incumbent. In 1761, on the death of Archbishop Palma, Clement XIII.

¹ *Ibid.*, n. 3.

² *Ibid.*, n. 5. Cf. PICOT, IV., 33 ; BALAN, VIII., 191 *seqq.*

appointed a cleric of the name of Torre to succeed him, at the same time requesting him to set aside part of his revenues for a pension. Lucca, however, maintained that in granting the Republic the right of nomination to the see the Pope had simultaneously granted it the right to dispose of its revenues. The dispute was settled by concessions on both sides, but from 1761 until 1764, when it was filled by the celebrated scholar, Mansi, the archbishopric of Lucca was left unoccupied.¹

(3)

When the occasion demanded it, Clement XIII. did not shrink from addressing grave words of reproof to the Bishops as well as to secular potentates. On the death of the Elector of Cologne, Klemens August, his brother, the "Cardinal of Bavaria", Johann Theodor, demanded to be raised to the sees of Cologne and Münster, in addition to his three bishoprics of Freising, Regensburg, and Liége, but this request the Pope flatly rejected.² The words he used when speaking of the departed Elector of Cologne were seemingly intended to remind the Cardinal of the grave responsibility attaching to the episcopal office and grave language was certainly applicable to the Cardinal of Bavaria, for the threefold Bishop had been leading a highly scandalous life. At the very beginning of his pontificate, and again in 1762, the Pope addressed urgent admonitions to him, but to no effect. He then thought of inflicting canonical punishments upon the culprit but decided first to try, through the mediation of the Elector of Bavaria, to remove the scandal by a change in the Cardinal's entourage. Garampi, however, who was to enlist the aid of the Elector, advised severe measures, even to the extent of suspending the threefold Bishop. The Cardinal's death on January 27th, 1763, rendered all further steps superfluous.³

¹ SFORZA in the *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XIX. (1887), 230 seq.; GAMS, *Series*, 741.

² On March 18, 1761, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 466.

³ DENGEL, 67-71.

Clement XIII. had not satisfied the Cardinal of Bavaria's demand for new dignities, but the death of the Elector Klemens August, which had occasioned this demand, compelled the Pope to give his permission once again for the union of several dioceses under the control of one person. The Westphalian bishoprics were in danger of secularization during the Seven Years' War. England and Brunswick had impeded an episcopal election in Hildesheim for two years,¹ and had succeeded in preventing any member of a powerful princely house from becoming Bishop. It is understandable, therefore, that in these circumstances the Pope offered no objection when Klemens Wenzeslaus, the fifth son of the Polish king Augustus, was simultaneously invited by Münster, Paderborn, and Hildesheim to be their Bishop.² He confined himself to urging him to devote himself with energy to the study of the sacred sciences.³

Further difficulties were caused in Germany by the ever increasing jealousy of the ecclesiastical Electors, who begrudged the Papal nuncio his rights. Clement XIII. did not withhold his blame from the Elector of Trier, Johann Philipp von Walderdorff,⁴ and he reprimanded him some years later⁵ for having, as an ecclesiastical prince, abolished the legal privilege of the clergy, thus setting a bad example to the secular rulers. A week later, however, the Pope was able to express his pleasure at the Elector's withdrawal of his ordinance.⁶

A severe reprimand was administered also to Bishop Philip Felician Volodkovicz of Vladimir,⁷ on whom the Polish nuncio had reported: "From time to time the Metropolitan makes

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 196, and the Briefs of April 18, May 16, and October 19, 1761, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 491, 506, 604.

² To Augustus of Poland, August 1, 1761, *ibid.*, 586.

³ October 13, 1761, *ibid.*, 603. Cf. DENGEL, 57 seq.

⁴ Briefs of April 18 and September 16, 1761, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 491, 600.

⁵ On January 29, 1766, *ibid.*, 1054.

⁶ Brief of February 5, 1766, *ibid.*, 1055.

⁷ On April 21, 1762, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 629.

a show of firm resolution but he has neither the talent nor the mode of living necessary for the successful furtherance of religion and there is no one here who would show him any affection or respect.”¹ Even the otherwise excellent Bishop of Eichstätt, Raimund Anton von Strassoldo, while receiving generous praise from the Pope for other reasons, was reproached by him for having shown too much compliance with the increasing desire of the Bavarian Court for secularization.²

The principles enunciated by the Pope from time to time in these deprecatory Briefs on the administration of the episcopal office throw light also on his own conduct during his pontificate. “If,” he writes, “the compliance shown by the Bishop of Eichstätt arises from the desire to enjoy at last a rest from incessant worries, he should reflect that there is no rest and freedom from care in the episcopal office and that it must not be said of Bishops that through fear of conflict and through cowardice they have fallen short of their duty.”³

The censure administered to the Bishop of Angers, Jacques Grasse,⁴ was comparatively mild. In 1761 Grasse had signed the memorandum of the forty-five Bishops in support of the Jesuits but had then taken the liberty of commending in a pastoral letter the *Extraits des assertions dangereuses et pernicieuses*,⁵ which had served as an excuse for persecuting the French Jesuits. The Pope instructed him that it was the business of the Church, not of temporal princes, to decide on the truth or falsity of theological theses and that very many of the theses which had been unfavourably criticized were quite blameless. Moreover, the extracts had been compiled by persons who had long shown themselves to be the enemies of

¹ PELESZ, II., 505.

² September 26, 1766, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 1115.

³ “in episcopatu nullum esse quietis et tranquillitatis locum cavendumque maxime, ne nimia otii cupiditate per animi mollitiam officium nostrum prodidisse insimulemur” (*ibid.*).

⁴ On September 19, 1764, *ibid.*, 896.

⁵ See our account, Vol. XXXVI., 449, 450.

the Church.¹ That the reference here was to the Jansenists was directly stated in a letter to the Bishop of Sarlat.² The *Extraits des assertions dangereuses et pernicieuses* were in fact the work of the Jansenists Goujet, Minard, and Roussel de la Tour.³ The Jansenists played an important part in every way in the expulsion of the French Jesuits. The Order's Constitutions were denounced to the Parlement by the Abbé De Chauvelin, an ardent Jansenist.⁴ In drawing up his memorandum on the Constitutions he had the support of the Abbé Terray and the vehement Jansenist Laverdy,⁵ on whose proposal twenty-four works of the Jesuits were condemned to be burnt.⁶

(4)

Jansenism contributed to the corruption of many a member of the other Orders in an entirely different way, namely by causing the disappearance of the original spirit of the Order. The greatest stir was caused by the public exposure of the decay which had been taking place within the most famous of the religious bodies of that time, the French Benedictine Congregation of St. Maur. On June 15th, 1765, twenty-eight

¹ The French Bishops had found fault with the "Extracts" for containing "nonnullas opiniones in scholis communes, quasdam etiam quas fere innumeri sequuntur theologi et iuris utriusque consulti, tum, quod deterrimum est, quasdam in erroribus numerari, quas inter theologos omnes constat esse verissimas" (*Bull. Cont.*, III., 896, n. 3). Grasse came round again to the opinion of the other Bishops; *cf.* PICOT, IV., 137, 190.

² Brief of November 4, 1764, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 902, n. 7: "Nos praeterea inhorruimus, perditissimam sectam nullum ad animarum perniciem, quam ille liber afferre potest, habuisse respectum. . . . Magnum enim scandalum simplicioribus hominibus offert notitia, fuisse in Ecclesia doctores, qui pravas huiusmodi doctrinas tradiderint. Sed non animarum salutem Ianseniani curant . . ."

³ LAVISSE, *Hist. de France*, VIII., 2, 323.

⁴ "ardent Janséniste," *ibid.*, 321.

⁵ "Janséniste passioné," *ibid.*, 322.

⁶ *Ibid.*

monks of the abbey of St-Germain-des-Prés in Paris addressed a petition to the king in which they sought the relaxation of their religious discipline. They no longer wished to wear the customary dress of their Order, and the austerity of their daily life and their night-prayers in choir had become distasteful to them. Those who were continuing the *Gallia Christiana* and the edition of the French historical sources of the middle ages were among those who signed the petition, which through its being printed became publicly known and was sent to every house in the Congregation.¹

In other respects too the Maurists had fallen away sadly since the great days of Mabillon and Montfaucon. To a large extent their literary activity had deviated from the cultivation of ecclesiastical learning; such worldly matters as the construction of chimney-pieces and organs, rhetoric, and grammar,² were the subjects of their writing, and the many attempts to stifle the Jansenistic spirit in the Congregation were only partially successful.³

The petition put forward by the twenty-eight monks, however, not only displeased the king, the Archbishop, and the assembly of the clergy but also met with keen opposition in the Congregation itself, especially on the part of the Blancs-Manteaux. The General and the governing body of the Order, with over 1,700 subjects, were also against the would-be reformers. After making various tortuous statements the twenty-eight signed a recantation placed before them by the Archbishop of Paris, but the Congregation never regained its old spirit. An extraordinary General Chapter held at St-Denis in April, 1766, declared in favour of upholding the Order's observance, but at the ordinary General Chapter in September it was only the royal vetoes that kept the innovators in check. Nevertheless the General and his assistants were taken from

¹ PICOT, IV., 172-180; BRAUNMÜLLER, in the *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, VIII.², 1077 seq.; L. DERIES, in the *Rev. Mabillon*, 1930, 50 seqq.

² BRAUNMÜLLER, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXIV., 57, 282 seq., 455 seq.

the representatives of the old order of things, though there was also a committee formed for the promotion of studies. At the Chapter held at Marmoutiers in 1769 the malcontents were prevented from having their way by the authority of the king, and the new Constitutions, whose composition had been decided on at the Chapter at St-Germain, were accepted. Although entirely Gallican, in externals they were still strict.¹ But it was no longer possible to stem the advance of decay by means of laws. The French Revolution brought the famous Congregation to an end, though its last days were illumined by a gleam of glory ; forty-two Maurists refused to take the oath, and with their General at their head, they sealed their devotion to duty by dying by the hand of the executioner.²

It might be presumed from the Government's attitude towards the Maurists that they were favourably disposed towards the Orders but, in general, this was not the case. The spirit of the age, to which the Governments acted as servants, had as its object not only the annihilation of the Jesuits but also the destruction of all the other Orders, for the simple reason that the monasteries formed important strongholds of religion. Frederick II. of Prussia wrote to Voltaire³ that he

¹ BRAUNMÜLLER, *loc. cit.*

² *Ibid.*, 1079.

³ On March 24, 1767, *Œuvres*, ed. Preuss, XXIII., 129 : " Il n'est point réservé aux armes de détruire l'infâme ; elle périra par le bras de la vérité et par la séduction de l'intérêt. Si vous voulez que je développe cette idée, voici ce que j'entends : J'ai remarqué et d'autres comme moi, que les endroits où il y a les plus de couvents de moines sont ceux où le peuple est le plus aveuglément livré à la superstition ; il n'est pas douteux que, si l'on parvient à détruire ces asiles du fanatisme, le peuple ne devienne un peu indifférent et tiède sur ces objets, qui sont actuellement ceux de sa vénération. Il s'agirait donc de détruire les cloîtres, au moins de commencer à diminuer leur nombre. Ce moment est venu, parce que le gouvernement français et celui d'Autriche sont endettés, qu'ils ont épuisé les ressources de l'industrie pour acquitter les dettes, sans y parvenir. L'appât de riches abbayes et de couvents bien rentés est tentant. En leur

and others had remarked that where there were many monasteries the people were more than usually addicted to religion or, as he put it, superstition. Accordingly the campaign against the *Infame* would have to begin with the destruction or, for the time being, with the curtailment, of the monasteries. This would bring about a decrease in religion among the common folk and then they could proceed against the Bishops, for whom the time had not yet come to be attacked. The statesmen had yet another good reason for attacking the monasteries ; as Frederick II. also said, France and Austria especially were heavily in debt, so that the confiscation of the monastic revenues might come in useful. Voltaire thought that this plan of campaign against Christian "superstition" worthy of a great general.¹

The idea was also developed by the king in his correspondence with D'Alembert,² who four years previously had celebrated the expulsion of the Jesuits from France as the prelude to the destruction of all the other Orders.³ He approved of De Chalotais' dictum that the monastic spirit spelt disaster for the State. Of all who were animated by this spirit the Jesuits were the most powerful, so that a beginning

représentant le mal que les cénobites font à la population de leurs États . . . en même temps la facilité de payer en partie leurs dettes en y appliquant les trésors de ces communautés qui n'ont point de successeurs, je crois qu'on les déterminerait à commencer cette réforme ; et il est à présumer que, après avoir joui de la sécularisation de quelques bénéfices, leur avidité engloutira le reste . . . Voilà un petit projet que je soumetts à l'examen du Patriarche de Ferney . . . Le Patriarche m'objectera peut-être ce que l'on fera des évêques ; je lui répons qu'il n'est pas temps d'y toucher encore . . . Dès que le peuple sera refroidi, les évêques deviendront de petits garçons . . . La puissance des ecclésiastiques n'est que d'opinion, elle se fonde sur la crédulité des peuples."

¹ To Frederick II., April 5, 1767, *ibid.*, 132 : "Votre idée de l'attaquer [la superstition christicole] par les moines est d'un grand capitaine."

² On July 2, 1769, *ibid.*, XXIV., 456 *seq.*

³ *Sur la destruction des Jésuites en France. Par un auteur désintéressé*, no place of publication, 1765.

would have to be made with them in the effort to throw off the yoke of the pernicious tribe.¹ D'Alembert also proffered an infallible means whereby to ruin the Orders without creating a stir: all that was necessary was to forbid the taking of religious vows by anyone younger than twenty-five.² And this method was in fact employed. He has also disclosed with unmistakable clearness the spirit that animated the work of destruction, of which, in his view, the expulsion of the Jesuits was but the introduction. It was really, he said, philosophy—Encyclopedism—which through the mouth of the Parlements pronounced the verdict against the Jesuits. Jansenism was merely the prosecutor.³ The Parlements, he told Voltaire,⁴ think they are serving religion but actually they are serving "Reason", though they have not the slightest inkling of the fact. Though they are unaware of it, they receive their instructions from philosophy, and the Jesuits might well say to St. Ignatius, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." The expulsion of the Jesuits he definitely describes as the introduction to the destruction of the Church. Frederick II. called his plan of destruction a "reform" and the same word was used at the same time by the French Government when ordering the destruction of several monasteries.⁵

¹ "L'esprit monastique, a-t-il dit, est le fléau des États, de tous ceux que cet esprit anime, les Jésuites sont les plus nuisibles, parce qu'ils sont les plus puissans; c'est donc par eux qu'il faut commencer à secouer le joug de cette nation pernicieuse" (*ibid.*, 87). "La guerre qu'il [Chalotais] a faite avec tant de succès à la Société n'est que le signal de l'examen auquel il paraît désirer qu'on soumette les Constitutions des autres ordres" (*ibid.*, 88).

² To Voltaire, May 4, 1762: VOLTAIRE, *Œuvres*, LXVIII. (1784), 201.

³ "C'est proprement la philosophie, qui par la bouche des magistrats, a porté l'arrêt contre les Jésuites, le Jansénisme n'en a été que le sollicitateur" (*Sur la destruction des Jésuites*, 105).

⁴ On May 4, 1762, *loc. cit.*, 200.

⁵ PICOT, IV., 190, 213 *seqq.*; PRAT, 148 *seqq.*; GÉRIN in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XVIII. (1875), 76-135, XIX. (1876), 449-512.

After the ejection of the Jesuits the clerical assembly of 1765, fearing that the same fate would overtake the other Orders, sought to avert it by removing the abuses within them. Accordingly it commissioned the Archbishop of Toulouse, Loménie de Brienne, to report on conditions in the religious communities and it considered that the Pope should be asked to appoint some of the Bishops as commissioners to carry out appropriate reforms.¹ These steps the king was asked by the assembly to support in Rome. But the Government wanted no reform by the Pope. The Parlement, on inquiry, replied bluntly that his co-operation was unnecessary.² The assembly's message to the Pope was never dispatched.³ The assembly itself was dissolved and when it met again it received a message from the Royal Council, dated May 23rd, 1766,⁴ in which the king undertook to set up on his own authority a commission which was to acquaint itself more closely with the abuses in the monasteries, and this without any regard for privileges and exemptions, including therefore those which had the Papal guarantee. Again the assembly asked the king to obtain the co-operation of the Holy See. Louis XV. promised to do so but failed to keep his word.⁵

The commission was duly appointed on July 31st. Instead

¹ The assembly's message to the Pope in PRAT, *Pièces justif.*, p. vii. It stated that religious discipline was gradually declining; "discordia denique, ultimum malorum . . . cum profanarum vocum novitate [Jansenism and Encyclopedism] in pacis ac caritatis domicilia non sine gravi bonorum omnium luctu palam et ante omnium oculos ita perperam irrupsit, ut mutuis odiis distracti ac depugnantes ad civilium magistratuum potestatem confugere non erubescant religiosi homines."

² ". . . que l'intervention du Saint-Siège n'était pas nécessaire pour opérer la réforme qu'on désirait." Loménie to Bernis in June, 1769, in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, XVIII., 81.

³ The dispatch of the communication was made dependent by the assembly on the king's decision. "Cette lettre n'a pas été envoyée" (Loménie, *ibid.*). Cf. PICOT, IV., 215.

⁴ Reprint in PRAT, 154-6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 156 seq.

of confining itself to the task for which it was destined, namely the ascertainment of abuses, it gave orders on its own authority for various measures to be taken which furthered its idea of reform, without even informing the Pope. Not a single representative of the Orders was invited to its sessions; the commission's secretary was an advocate; the four secular priests appointed as theologians to the commission were confronted by four advocates, the five prelates by seven Councillors of State. In addition the commission had the right to co-opt any number of advocates or members of the lower ranks of the clergy. The President was the Archbishop of Rheims, Charles Antoine de la Roche-Aymon, but everything was under the control of the *rapporteur*, Loménie de Brienne, afterwards Minister of Finance.¹ Loménie was a friend of the Encyclopedists; later, when he was proposed as Archbishop of Paris, Louis XVI. rejected him, on the ground that he needed for the post someone who at least believed in God.²

As soon as the commission had been set up it was easy to foresee what would come of it: not the reform but the destruction of the Orders. Its establishment was quickly followed by a crop of written works, some advocating the abolition of the monasteries, others defending them.³ Their supporters maintained that the Orders were being attacked because the destruction of Christianity was the final object, and that to oppose the Orders was to lend a hand to the enemies of religion. These, they said, would not be content with the overthrow of the Orders if the secular clergy was left in peace, and religion was still in possession of its worship, its ceremonies, and its dogmas, and rejoiced in its rule over the hearts and souls of the faithful.⁴ But the ruin of religion would bring along with it the downfall of the State.

These considerations, however, did not prevent the commission, under Loménie's influence, issuing its decrees of

¹ PICOT, IV., 213, 305.

² WEISS, *Weltgeschichte*, XIV., 485. Cf. PRAT, 158-160.

³ PRAT, 164-178.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 172.

reform. On April 3rd, 1767, a resolution of the Council ordered every Order to hold a General Chapter for the purpose of comparing the constitutions in force with the original ones and of thus providing every community with a clear and unalterable statute-book ; it was added that the king would apply to the Holy See for its consent to the alterations.¹ On March 25th, 1768, the edict of reform was issued.² Just as the French anti-Papal decrees of this time began with asseverations of obedience to the Holy See, this edict on the monasteries opened with high praise of the religious life. This was followed by twelve regulations which gravely impaired the life of the religious communities. Firstly no one was allowed to take vows before the age of twenty-one years in the case of men, and eighteen years in that of women. Vows taken by persons below these ages were invalid. Persons who were not French, or who were French but who had taken vows abroad, were not to be admitted into French monasteries. From the date of publication of the decree no Order was to have more than two houses in Paris, and only one in other towns. Communities for men which were combined into a Congregation had to have at least fifteen members, besides the head and the lay-brothers, otherwise they were not allowed to admit postulants to their vows. For monasteries outside Congregations eight members sufficed.

With this the fate of the Orders was sealed. Several communities had to be dissolved forthwith and the vows already taken by very many Religious were immediately declared invalid. The complete destruction of the Orders which followed in the French Revolution was thus begun. The commission, which had applied itself so thoroughly to the "reform" lasted until 1779.³ When it began its work there were 26,674 Religious in France, distributed among 2,966 houses⁴ ; in ten years the number of Carmelites dropped from

¹ Extract *ibid.* *Pièces justif.*, pp. xiv-xvi.

² Reprint in PRAT, 182-196.

³ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁴ GÉRIN, XVIII., 88-90. Cf. PRAT, 203 *seqq.* ; JAGER, *Hist. de l'Eglise cath. en France*, XVIII., Paris, 1870, 432 *seqq.*

1349 to 1097, the Dominicans from 1610 to 1236 (in the year 1775). The Capuchins were reduced by 859.¹

Clement XIII. lived to see only the beginning of the work of destruction. On closer examination of the Benedictine Congregation of Saint-Vanne it was found that its constitutions had not been sanctioned by the State ; consequently they had to be altered to obtain the approval of the commission. In the course of the year 1768 the Minims, Benedictines, and Franciscan Tertiaries received instructions to have their constitutions altered by General Chapters in the presence of royal plenipotentiaries. Other communities did not receive this order till the following year, in the pontificate of Clement XIV.² Small establishments belonging to many different communities had to be suppressed even in Clement XIII.'s time ; the suppression of a whole Order, that of Grandmont, was begun in his pontificate but was not completed till February 24th, 1769, a few weeks after his death.³

All this took place even though the records of the reform commission itself showed that the alleged decay of the Orders was far from universal. The Bishops, when asked, gave many of the communities excellent testimonials. The great majority of them spoke decisively in favour of the Franciscans, stating that they were either useful or essential ; only a few of them wanted the suppression of a house here and there and had complaints to make. The most favourable opinions were won by the Recollects and the Capuchins.⁴ Fault was found with most of the twenty-three houses of the Cluniacs, it is true, but not a few of them were praised for the observance of their rule.⁵ Of the 288 Cistercian houses and the 49 houses belonging to the Congregation of St-Vanne not one was suppressed.⁶

¹ PRAT, 218.

² *Ibid.*, 206.

³ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁴ HOLZAPFEL, 363. The opinion of each Bishop in GÉRIN, XVIII, 90-102.

⁵ *Ibid.*, XIX., 463.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 471, 491.

The abbey of Trois-Rois in the Franche-Comté could plead that the mere rumour of suppression had set the workers and the poor in a turmoil of fear, lest they might lose their place of refuge and assistance.¹ Of the 162 monks belonging to the twenty-four houses of the Feuillants it was said that they were certainly not numerous but that their way of living was edifying.² One reason for the decay of many Benedictine abbeys was the system of commendaries, namely the encroachment of the civil power ; Saint-Bertin had to pay 92,000, Saint-Amand in Flanders 80,000, francs every year to their commendatory abbots, leaving the monks with insufficient money for their necessities.³

All these lawless acts of the reform commission the Pope was again unable to prevent. On December 24th, 1766, he addressed a Brief to the president of the commission, Archbishop De la Roche-Aymon.⁴ In former times, he wrote, when such reforms were contemplated, application was first made to the Apostolic See, but on this occasion he had not even been consulted ; worse still, he had been left in complete ignorance of what was afoot. The spirit of the times, on whose inspiration the civil power reckoned as a gain every injury done to the reputation of the Apostolic See and to the authority and jurisdiction of the Church, seemed to be at work here again.⁵ But the Commission should take care not to interfere in matters which appertained to the rights of the Holy See. Above all, they were not to make any alterations on their own account in the laws and regulations of the Orders. In any case this would not further their reform, which could

¹ *Ibid.*, 471 *seq.*

² Loménie in his report of March 26, 1770, *ibid.*, 475.

³ *Ibid.*, 451 *seq.*

⁴ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 1121 *seq.*

⁵ " [ut] Nobis non modo inconsultis, sed plane insciis institui coepta sit reformatio." He feared " ne qui per laicorum mentes haud ita pridem se infudit, in hanc quoque rem spiritus quidam se insinuaverit, quo saecularis potestas iure sibi recuperatum existimat quidquid de Apostolicae Sedis auctoritate et Ecclesiae potestate et iurisdictione detraxerit " (*ibid.*, n. 3).

only consist in bringing these communities back to their original purity.¹

The president probably never brought this Brief to the knowledge of the commission ; at any rate it had no effect. Venice followed the example set by the French.² In Modena also the duke had suppressed some small communities without Papal permission. When the Pope complained, permission was sought and was finally granted. Among the houses suppressed was the famous Cistercian abbey of Nonantola.³

Whereas in France and Venice an alleged reform was working to destroy the Orders, elsewhere strenuous attempts were made within these bodies to perfect religious discipline. At the suggestion of the General Chapter of Murcia, the Discalced Franciscans of the combined Provinces of Spain, Portugal, and Naples provided themselves with new statutes, which were confirmed by the Pope on July 15th, 1761.⁴ The Franciscan Tertiaries living in community sought the Pope's assistance in eliminating all ambitious striving for positions of honour within the Order.⁵ The flourishing condition of the Capuchins in their Province of Milan is shown in the survey of the number of their convents there as contained in a Papal Constitution of April 27th, 1759, which sought to satisfy the claims of the various custodians and nations there and to set bounds to their respective rights.⁶

The Italian Carmelites were prominent in providing for the spiritual and academic training of their younger members, particular houses being set aside for this purpose.⁷ The

¹ " Nulla enim corpora ab interitu retrahi aliter possunt, quam ea ad suum quaeque revocando principium " (*ibid.*, n. 5). Clement had laid down the same principle for the Jesuit question (see our account, Vol. XXXVI., 441).

² See above, p. 373.

³ NOVAES, XV., 140 *seq.*

⁴ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 561.

⁵ Brief of September 29, 1760, *ibid.*, 416. ⁶ *Ibid.*, 134 *seqq.*

⁷ Brief of September 24, 1759, *ibid.*, 265 *seqq.* To remove abuses, ten Lithuanian convents were separated from the Polish Province and made independent (May 17, 1766, *ibid.*, 1074 *seqq.*).

Benedictine Congregation of Vallombrosa also sought to raise the standard of its studies, stressing the importance of theology at a time when natural science and history were pushing all else into the background.¹ The Benedictine Congregation of Bursfeld asked the Pope to confirm anew the reforming statutes of Clement XI.² To encourage the desire for learning the Pope granted the newly-established Cistercian college of St. Bernard in Rome the right to confer the degree of doctor.³ Evidence of the desire for reform among the Basilians is provided by a Brief by which the Abbot-General, at his own request, was granted special powers for a visitation such as he had already completed in Italy.⁴ Decrees of reform were issued also for the Celestines,⁵ the Piarists,⁶ the Benedictines of Monte Vergine,⁷ and the Trinitarians.⁸ More than once the Pope devoted his attention to the youthful and struggling Order of Bethlehemites in the West Indies.⁹ He also encouraged¹⁰ the Dominican practice of holding annual retreats of forty days to commemorate Christ's sojourn in the desert and to revive the spirit of the Order. To many other Orders he accorded high praise and entrusted them with special offices. Thus a permanent professorship of moral theology at the Sapienza was reserved for the Carmelites,¹¹ and the two-hundred-year-old custom of the Servites of providing a confessor to the Papal family was converted into a right.¹² The Franciscans were honoured by the appointment

¹ Brief of July 21, 1760, *ibid.*, 380.

² Brief of March 18, 1767, *ibid.*, 1143 *seq.*

³ On July 28, 1764, *ibid.*, 881 *seqq.*

⁴ January 22, 1761, *ibid.*, 442.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 622, 1414.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 648.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 740.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 588, 606, 616.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 487, 770, 891, 956, 1112.

¹⁰ On November 18, 1765, *ibid.*, 1034.

¹¹ On June 13, 1759, *ibid.*, 152.

¹² On January 19, 1762, *ibid.*, 614 *seq.*

of Cardinal Crivelli as president of their General Chapter at Mantua.¹

A society of women teachers of girls (*Maestre pie*) had been founded by Cardinal Marcantonio Barbarigo (d. 1706) in his capacity of Bishop of Montefiascone. This society, which imposed no vows on its members, had been summoned to Rome by Clement XI., and in the reign of Clement XIII. it was conducting eight schools there. Its statutes, which had been drawn up in 1717 by the clerical members of the Congregation of Pious Workmen, were reduced in number and broadened by the Pope.²

(5)

Clement XIII.'s first creation of a Cardinal took place as early as September 11th, 1758, when he raised to the purple *in pectus* his nephew Carlo Rezzonico. At the publication of the appointment on October 2nd the Pope seemed to consider it necessary to justify this step, for he said that he had to call on persons in his immediate surroundings who in his opinion would be most serviceable in his government and it would be understood, therefore, that in the circumstances then prevailing he was looking for men in whom he could place his absolute confidence. Moreover, his nephew had already attained high rank as a prelate under Benedict XIV. It must be said, on the other hand, that it was not until he had attained a ripe age that Rezzonico had devoted himself to the service of the Church and had obtained his ordination at the hands of his uncle.³ However, in the matter of piety the nephew had the reputation of being a second Charles Borromeo.⁴ In a description of the Cardinals which appeared on Clement XIII.'s death it was said of Cardinal Rezzonico that he was of angelic purity of morals, that he was selfless, that he had not mixed himself up in state affairs, that he had formed no

¹ On February 16, 1762, *ibid.*, 617.

² On September 6, 1760, *ibid.*, 407-414.

³ Consistory of October 2, 1758, *ibid.*, 49.

⁴ NOVAES, XV., 16.

factions, and he had not abused the Pope's favour.¹ Rezzonico died in 1799 as Bishop of Porto and Archpriest of the Lateran.

While the first Cardinal to be created by the new Pope was a member of his family, the second came from his native city. At the last promotion of Benedict XIV.'s, in 1756, Venice had been passed over on account of an anti-clerical ordinance which had been issued there in 1754.² Negotiations and mediations to restore peace were unsuccessful at first and then the new Pope tried the effect of a private letter; this succeeded, the Signoria giving way to a fellow-countryman. Clement XIII. now no longer delayed in giving the Republic its Cardinal in the person of the Venetian Antonio Marino Priuli, at that time Bishop of Vicenza, afterwards Bishop of Padua.³

A simultaneous recipient of the purple was the French Minister François Joachim de Pierre de Bernis.⁴ Like Richelieu, Mazarin, and Dubois, Bernis was of the type of statesman who regarded the cardinalate solely as a means of enhancing his prestige. Bernis began his career as a young Abbé whose life was completely worldly and whose debts amounting to 12,000 *livres* were settled by a patroness of high rank, one of the Rohans. Poems now forgotten secured him membership of the Academy in 1744, and his praises of the almighty Pompadour the post of envoy to Venice. He was then selected to set in order the treaty of alliance of May 1st, 1756, between France and Austria against Prussia, and the plan for the partition of Prussia of May 1st, 1757. On Bernis'

¹ " *Em. Rezzonico : Veramente questo Porporato è un angelo di costumi ed ha assai dimostrato nel pontificato passato, che non è interessato ; non s'ingerisce negli affari, non ama di far fazioni e partiti, e non si prevalse dell'autorità di nepote padrone, essendo pure stato teneramente amato dal defonto Pontefice suo zio." *Nota sopra gli em. cardinali*. Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXXV., 346..

³ Consistorial address of October 1, 1758, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 53.

⁴ His *Mémoires et lettres* were published by F. Masson (Paris, 1878) ; biography *ibid.*, cxi.-cxxiv. ; FRÉD. MASSON, *Le cardinal De Bernis depuis son ministère 1758 à 1794*, Paris, 1884.

appointment as Foreign Minister, Clement XIII. could no longer withhold from him the Cardinal's hat, for which Choiseul had already applied on his behalf to Benedict XIV. But all these honours were followed immediately by the failure of the French policy and, for Bernis, the displeasure of the Pompadour and his precipitate downfall: in 1758 he was banished from Court and had to retire to one of his three abbeys. He now became more serious, was ordained priest, and received the archbishopric of Albi in 1764 and the post of envoy to Rome in 1769. Here he worked for the suppression of the Society of Jesus and died in 1794, after the Revolution had shattered everything for which he had worked the whole of his life.

These first appointments to the Cardinalate made by Clement XIII. were not immediately followed by any more, although there were twenty-two vacancies in the Sacred College. The reason for the delay was that Naples was claiming as much right to a Crown Cardinal as the great States of Europe.¹ Finally the Pope decided to complete the Sacred College without paying any regard to the wishes of the various Governments.² Among those promoted on September 24th, 1759, were four ex-nuncios. Ignazio Crivelli had held this office in Vienna, Filippo Acciaiuoli in Lisbon,³ Ludovico Gualterio de' Gualtieri in Naples and Paris, Girolamo Spinola in Madrid. Of the other new creations Giuseppe Maria Castelli was noted especially for his scholarly knowledge of all matters ecclesiastical, for his protection of scholars, for his noble character, and for his complete devotion to the Holy See.⁴ Likewise Giuseppe Alessandro Furietti, an untiring

¹ *Albani to Kaunitz, July 25, 1759, State Archives, Vienna, Röm. Korrespondenz.

² Consistorial address of September 24, 1759, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 273 *seqq.*; NOVAES, XV., 21. The Governments were decidedly dissatisfied with this: "più di tutti sono disgustati i Ministri esteri, che non hanno avuto alcuna influenza in questa promozione." The French envoy was particularly displeased. SFORZA, 21.

³ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 344. ⁴ NOVAES, XV., 27.

worker, a great student of law, a scholarly writer and a zealous cleric of unassailable morality.¹ Marcantonio Colonna was a scholar, of benevolent disposition and of tried virtue.² Of the creations of 1759 the best-known scholar was the Dominican Giuseppe Agostino Orsi, Secretary of the Index and Maestro di Palazzo, who tried to produce a dogmatically incontestable counterpart to Fleury's history of the Church. Of his other works the most outstanding were those on Papal infallibility (in opposition to Bossuet) and on the authority of the Pope in relation to the Councils.³

Just as he had conferred a distinction on his native city of Venice at the first public promotion to the rank of Cardinal, Clement XIII. intended to honour his episcopal city of Padua when he bestowed the purple on his successor there, Sante Veronese, and on the latter's early death (1763) again entrusted a Cardinal and a fellow-countryman, Priuli, with the direction of his former bishopric.⁴ Two other Bishops received the Cardinal's hat: that of Sabina, Andrea Corsini, Prefect of the Segnatura di Giustizia, and the Bishop Elect of Rimini, Ludovico Valenti. Of the remainder who were raised to the purple in 1759 two more died as Bishops, both having been entrusted with the direction of the suburbican bishopric of

¹ *Ibid.*, 31; G. B. GALLIGIOLI, *Memorie per la vita del card. Furietti*, Lucca, 1790. Furietti wrote a work on mosaics which was highly valued. MORONI, XXVIII., 75; HURTER, V³, 200. Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 192.

² NOVAES, XV., 32. Brunati, it is true, made the following comment on his appointment as Prefect of the Propaganda: *he is thought to be stubborn "e per troppo parziale de' Gesuiti; si teme che possa uscire del sistema del defonto cardinale suo predecessore in pregiudizio delle missioni e dell' apostolato". To Colloredo (?) on April 27, 1763, Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, Rom. t. 88.

³ *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, IX.², 1087; HURTER, IV.³, 1506, 1572. Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 192. His red hat was obtained for him by Cardinal Corsini. SFORZA, 20.

⁴ He paid a special honour to the Canons of the cathedral of Padua. Brief of April 16, 1763, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 749.

Palestrina : Girolamo Spinola, who became Bishop there in 1775, and Marcantonio Colonna (d. 1793), who succeeded Spinola on his death in 1784. The four nuncios among the new Cardinals were all titular Archbishops, as were also Ludovico Merlini, president of the duchy of Urbino, and the Maestro di Camera Antonio Maria Erba Odescalchi, who were also promoted on this occasion. The Cardinal Vicar of Rome, Ferdinando Maria de Rossi, whose name headed the list of the new promotions, bore the title of a Patriarch of Constantinople.¹

All the rest had held high offices in Rome. Pietro Francesco Bussi was Dean of the Rota, Gaetano Fantuzzi,² Auditor in the same tribunal, Giovanni Constanzio Caracciolo Auditor of the Camera, Niccolò Perelli its treasurer. Others were secretaries to Congregations: Pietro Antonio Guglielmi to the Congregation of the Bishops and Regular Clergy, Niccolò Antonelli to the Propaganda ; and Conti was Secretary to the Buongoverno. Antonelli was highly praised as an indefatigable worker.³ But the most famous of the Cardinals of 1759 was Lorenzo Ganganelli, afterwards Clement XIV. Many of those promoted on that occasion did not survive the Pope. Orsi, Gualtieri, and Odescalchi died in 1761, Merlini in 1762, Valenti in 1763, Furietti in 1764, Bussi in 1765, Acciaioli in 1766, Veronese and Antonelli in 1767, Crivelli in 1768.

¹ A character-sketch of Rossi, probably not too reliable, making him out to be a worldly and pretty insincere courtier, in the *notes on the Cardinals of Clement XIII., Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, Rome.

² C. BRANCADORO, *Elogio funebre del card. G. Fantuzzi*, Fermo, 1781.

³ " *Indefesso nel suo impiego, zelante, sufficientemente dotto, specialmente delle materie ecclesiastiche. Ha scritto sopra Parma, Piacenza e Comacchio " (Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, Rome). For Antonelli's scholarship, cf. HURTER, V.³, 112 seq. ; *Dict. d'hist. et de géogr. ecclés.*, III., 840. He especially distinguished himself by being the first to publish the discourses of the earliest of the Syrian Church Fathers, Aphraates (under the name of James of Nisibis).

Hitherto, with the exception of Bernis, all those promoted were Italians. At the next promotion, on November 23rd, 1761,¹ regard was paid to the other Catholic nations. Portugal had inevitably to be passed over, but Spain received its representative in the Patriarch of the West Indies, Bonaventura de Córdoba Spinola de la Cerda. Germany was honoured by red hats being given to the Bishop of Speier, Franz Christoph von Hutten, and to Christoph Anton Migazzi. Hutten "was one of the ecclesiastical princes of Germany who were most loyal to Rome and who took the administration of his diocese very seriously," even if he did begrudge the nuncios their jurisdiction.² Migazzi,³ Lord of Waal and Sonnenturn, born in 1714, was a pupil of the German College in Rome, became Auditor of the Rota for the German Nation and Austrian envoy to Spain in 1745, Bishop of Waitzen in 1756, Archbishop of Vienna in 1757. He died in 1803. France received three red hats, for the Archbishop of Besançon, Antoine Clairad de Choiseul Beaupré, for Jean François Joseph de Rochechouart de Fautoas, envoy to Rome and Bishop of Laon, and for the Bishop of Strasbourg, Charles Louis Constantin de Rohan Guemenée (d. 1779), who, in Garampi's opinion, conducted his extensive diocese with supreme skill.⁴ Four gaps in the College of Cardinals were filled by Italians: the Dominican Enrichetto Virginio Natta, Bishop of Alba; Giovanni Molino, Bishop of Brescia; Baldassarre Cenci, Secretary of the Consulta; and Cornelio Monti Caprara, Governor of Rome. Cenci (1763), Caprara (1765), and Natta (1768) died in Clement XIII.'s lifetime. Cenci died suddenly while he was superintending the draining of the Pontine Marshes.⁵

¹ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 604.

² DENGEL, 53; F. X. REMLING, *Gesch. der Bischöfe zu Speier*, II., Mainz, 1854, 674 *seqq.*

³ Biography by Wolfsgruber (21897).

⁴ DENGEL, 48.

⁵ *Brunati to Colloredo, March 5, 1763, Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, Rome, t. 88.

The next promotion, of July 18th, 1763, provided the Church with only two Cardinals: the Secretary of the Congregation of the Bishops and Regular Clergy, Bonaccorsi, and the Auditor to the Pope, Andrea Negroni.¹

It is hardly surprising, in view of the world situation then prevailing, that at his last two promotions to the Cardinalate in the year 1766, Clement XIII. again paid no attention to the foreign Courts.² On July 21st Bufalini and Boschi, on September 26th twelve others, were promoted; all fourteen were Italians. Of Boschi, from Faenza, fifty-two years old, Brunati wrote that he had won the hearts of all Romans. Bufalini, from Città di Castello, fifty-eight years old, had been Governor of Loreto during the passage of the Austrian troops and afterwards Swiss nuncio. He was said to have a hard and inflexible character and to have been one of Torrigiani's chief supports.³ Among the Cardinals promoted on September 26th special praise was given to Filippo Maria Pirelli, titular Archbishop of Damascus and Secretary to the Congregation of the Council. He was distinguished for his knowledge of jurisprudence and of Latin and Italian literature and was in high repute as a strong character of unblemished morals. Similarly Giuseppe Simonetti, titular Archbishop of Petra and Secretary of the Congregation of Bishops and Regular Clergy, was universally mourned when he died in 1767, short of his fifty-eighth year. When Nicolò Oddi died in the same year, 1767, only fifty-one years old, he took with him into the grave many hopes that had been held of his erudition, sagacity, and morality. He had been the Roman nuncio at the Diet of

¹ NOVAES, XV., 77. “*Il card. Buonaccorsi fu segretario de’ vescovi e regolari, d’anni 55 e d’un esteriore piuttosto ributtante, parzialissimo de’ gesuiti, piuttosto ignorante, pieno di buona intentione . . . , poco accetto alla Francia, per averne in più occasioni parlato con poco rispetto.” Brunati to Colloredo (?), July 20, 1763, Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, Rome, t. 88.

² NOVAES, XV., 109.

³ *To Colloredo, July 23, 1766, Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican, Rome, Varia.

Frankfurt which elected Joseph II.¹ and he died as a Jesuit, having taken the solemn vows of the Society at Arezzo a few days before his death.² The following had also served the Church as nuncios : Opizio Pallavicini (d. 1785), in Madrid ; Vitaliano Borromei (d. 1793), in Vienna ; and Pietro Pamfili Colonna, in Paris. Antonio Colonna Branciforte (d. 1786) was the nuncio extraordinary who conveyed the consecrated swaddling clothes to Paris.

Besides Oddi and Simonetti there was yet another Cardinal among those created in 1766 who failed to live through the following year. This was Niccolò Serra, titular Archbishop of Metelino and Auditor General. In 1768 this group suffered a further loss in the person of the Governatore of Rome, Enea Silvio Piccolomini Rustichini. On the other hand, besides those already mentioned, the following members of the group outlived the Pope : Saverio Canale, Treasurer General of the Camera (d. 1773) ; the Archbishop of Fermo, Urbano Paracciani (d. 1777) ; Benedetto Veterani, who at the time of his death (1779) was Prefect of the Index, and Ludovico Calini, Prefect of the Congregation of Indulgences and Relics (d. 1782).³

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXVI., 199.

² " Argomento di piacevoli discorsi è stata la professione solenne di Gesuita che fece in Arezzo nella casa de' Gesuiti poco prima di morire il sig. card. Oddi." SFORZA, 50 (under date June 6, 1767).

³ We give some extracts (possibly not entirely accurate) from *character sketches prepared for the Viennese Court of the fourteen Cardinals created in 1766. *Calini* : 70 years old, from Brescia. He was brought out of obscurity by his old friend, the Pope. " Se i Rezzonici e i gesuiti non contano sulla di lui abilità, contano sul di lui cuore e il buon costume." *Oddi* : 51 years old. " Non ha gran corredo di letteratura," but is very skilful and knows the European Courts. " Il suo spirito, le maniere soavi ed insinuanti, la moderazione, l'onoratezza lo rendono gratissimo a chi lo tratta." *Paracciani* : 52 years old ; highly talented. " Il solo interesse proprio può far tacere le sue massime e rovesciare i suoi pregiudizi." *Simonetti* : 57 years old. " Una somma probità, onoratezza e pietà formano la base del suo carattere . . . Scarso

The Patriarchate of Lisbon had carried with it the expectation of a Cardinal's hat.¹ This was confirmed as a prerogative by Clement XIII.,² who ruled that whoever was appointed Patriarch at one consistory was to be Cardinal at the next.

(6)

Only one solemn canonization ceremony was carried out under Clement XIII. Amid the ever-increasing sufferings and afflictions of the Church, he said,³ it was a consolation to him to direct the attention of the faithful to the great members of the Church who had gone their way firmly attached to Christ and undistracted by the fallacies of human wisdom. Four of the six chosen for canonization, Joseph of Calasanza, Joseph of

talento, lento, minuto e attaccato soverchiamente alle pretensioni di questa Corte." *Pivelli*: "Uomo di gran talento"; changes sides with every puff of wind; most conceited; not liked. *Borromei*: 45 years old; nunzio in Vienna. *Pietro Colonna*, known as Pamfili: 41 years old; the French Court was not too pleased with him as a nunzio; "gran pietà e illibatezza." *Serra*: Genoese, 60 years old, nunzio in Poland. "Non è uomo di strepito... , gode il favore della stima comune... , probità, dolcezza, onestà." *Canale*: 70 years old; "povero di talento, di cognizioni e di sostanze, ha egli saputo conseguire onori e accumulare ricchezze"; was first an intimate friend of Cardinal Fini's, then Auditor in Madrid; "tesoriere della Camera, dalla quale esce cardinale per costumanza e per non rovinare di più le rendite camerali; ha sempre mostrato un genio basso e popolare"; pro-Spanish. *Colonna Branciforte*: 55 years old, nuncio in Venice, splendour-loving, extravagant. *Veterani*: 62 years old; "talento, abilità, applicazione e onoratezza"; dislikes important business; favourite of the Albani. *Piccolomini*: 60 years old; "uomo di gran talento e penetrazione"; not liked; played his cards well with the Corsini and Rezzonico nephews. *Brunati (to Colloredo or Kaunitz), September 27, 1766, Archives of the Austrian Embassy to the Vatican.

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXV., 341.

² On December 17, 1766, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 1046.

³ Consistory of April 27, 1767, *ibid.*, 1152.

Copertino, Girolamo Miani, and Jeanne Françoise de Chantal, had been beatified shortly before by his predecessor.¹ At Clement's command they were joined in canonization by the professor of Cracow University, John of Kenty (John Cantius, d. 1473),² and the Capuchin lay-brother Serafino of Monte Granario or of Ascoli (d. 1604).³ The day appointed by the Pope for the canonization was August 16th, 1767, the anniversary of his coronation and the beginning of the tenth year of his reign.⁴

In 1761, on the anniversary of his coronation, Clement XIII. also decreed that the beatification might be undertaken of a Bishop and Cardinal who was especially dear to him as a relative and as a previous occupier of the episcopal see of Padua: Gregorio Barbarigo. On September 20th, 1761, Clement XIII. was able to grant him with all due solemnity the honour of being raised to the altars.⁵ On two further occasions he undertook a solemn beatification; on May 19th, 1766, he paid this honour to the Trinitarian Simon Roxas (d. 1624),⁶ and on April 29th, 1768, to the Capuchin lay-brother Bernardo da Corleone (d. 1667).⁷ Simon Roxas was closely connected with the Court of Madrid; Bernardo, who was at first a shoemaker and anything but a saint, being in fact a rowdy, afterwards succeeded with some difficulty in inducing the Capuchins to accept him, whereupon he made up for everything by the terrible austerity of his life.

On the recommendation of the Congregation of Rites,

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXV., 314.

² *Acta Sanct. Oct.*, VIII., 1042 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, VI., 128 *seqq.*

⁵ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXV., 131. Clement XIII. spoke of his veneration of Barbarigo in the decree of September 11, 1761, of June 1, *ibid.*, 1160.

⁶ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXI., 131. Clement XIII. spoke of his veneration of Barbarigo in the decree of September 11, 1761, which fixed September 20 for the beatification (*Bull. Cont.*, III., 594), and on April 16, 1763 (*ibid.*, 750).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1072 *seq.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1426.

Clement XIII. beatified many others who had been held in veneration since time immemorial. Among these were the five Augustinian hermits Agostino Novello (d. 1309), Antonio Turriani, Antonio della Mondola (d. 1350), Andrea di Montreale in the diocese of Rieti (d. 1479), and Filippo of Piacenza (d. 1306).¹ Agostino Novello, previously known in the world as Matteo of Tarano, was a famous jurist, the chancellor of King Manfred. As an Augustinian, in the pontificate of Nicholas IV., he composed with Clement of Osimo new Constitutions for his Order; under Boniface VIII. he was legate in Siena, and in 1298–1300 General of the Order.² The most noteworthy of the women who were beatified was Angela Merici, the foundress of the Ursulines, whose veneration was sanctioned on April 30th, 1763; then, along with the Dominican Benvenuta de Bojanis (d. 1292)³ and the Clarissine Mattia de Nazariis (d. 1513), Elisabeth of Reute (d. 1386), who under the name of "the good Beth" had long won a place in the hearts of the faithful in Upper Swabia; her life was written by her spiritual director, Kügelin.⁴ Elisabeth belonged to the Third Order of St. Francis. Clement XIII. confirmed the cult, already long practised, of two other sons of St. Francis: the Observant Matteo of Gimmara, Bishop of Girgenti in 1442–4,⁵ and the preacher of penitence and miracle-worker Pietro da Moliano (d. 1490). The same distinction was accorded to two Dominicans—the preacher of penitence and miracle-worker Sebastiano Maggi (d. 1494)⁶ and Antonio Neyrot of Rivoli, martyred in Tunis in 1460⁷

¹ The first three by a decree of July 11, 1759, the last two by the decrees of February 18, 1764, and August 27, 1766.

² *Acta Sanct. Maii*, IV., 614 seqq.; *Analecta Augustiniana*, IV., 326 seqq., VI., 120.

³ *Acta Sanct. Oct.*, XIII., 145 seq.

⁴ Published in the periodical *Alemannia*, IX. (1881), 275 seqq., X. (1882), 81 seqq., 128 seqq.

⁵ PIRRUS-MONGITORE, *Sicilia Sacra*, I., Panormi, 1733, 914 seqq.

⁶ *Monum. Ord. Praed. hist.*, XIV., 315.

⁷ *Acta Sanct. Aug.*, VI., 510 seqq.; *Analecta Bolland.*, XXIV., 157.

—also to the Carmelite Angelo Agostino Mazzinghi (d. in Florence in 1438) and to two Servites, the priest Giacomo Filippo Bertoni (d. 1483)¹ and the lay-brother Tommaso Cursin of Orvieto (d. 1343). Of a later period was the Theatine Giovanni Marignoni (d. 1562), companion of St. Gaetano of Tiene and confessor of St. Andrea Avellino.

The feast of the Patriarch of Venice, Lorenzo Giustiniani, was extended to the whole Church by a decree of September 12th, 1759.² The clergy of Vergara in Guipúzcoa received permission³ to honour with special ceremonies their fellow-countryman and Franciscan, Martin Aguirre, one of the twenty-six who were martyred in Japan in 1597; the clergy of Navarra obtained a similar privilege for the feast of the sainted abbots Raimund and Veremundus.⁴ At the request of Charles III. of Spain, Clement XIII. granted permission⁵ for the extraordinarily solemn celebration throughout the Spanish dominions of the feast of the Immaculate Conception. The Immaculate Mother of God was to be regarded as the supreme patroness of the whole realm and was to be invoked especially on Saturdays.⁶

The Papal licence for the celebration of a special feast of the Heart of Jesus was fraught with consequences. The veneration of the Heart of Jesus was already in existence in the Middle Ages⁷; the physical heart of the incarnate God

¹ *Acta Sanct. Maii*, VI., 165; *Monum. Ord. Serv. B.M.V.*, IV. (1901), 63.

² *Bull. Cont.*, III., 245 seq.

³ April 16, 1762, *ibid.*, 625 seq.

⁴ On May 8, 1767, *ibid.*, 1159 seq.

⁵ On November 8, 1760, *ibid.*, 419 seq.

⁶ Decrees of December 22, 1760, January 27, 1761, March 14, 1767, *ibid.*, 425, 437, 1141.

⁷ K. RICHSTÄTTER, *Die Herz-Jesu-Verehrung im deutschen Mittelalter*, München, 1924; *Ancient Devotions to the Sacred Heart by Carthusian Monks of the 14-17th centuries*, London, 1896; G. KANTERS, *La dévotion au S. Cœur de Jésus dans les anciens États des Pays-Bas du XII^e au XIII^e siècle*, Bruxelles, 1928, with Supplément 1929. For the devotion in general cf. N. NILLES,

was indeed just as worthy of adoration as, for example, the five revered wounds, and to do honour to the love of Christ, which is symbolized by the heart and involves the heart in its compassion, was only natural, seeing that it was precisely the love of God and man that impelled Christ to perform the actions of His life and to undergo the sufferings by which we were redeemed. In the seventeenth century the veneration of the Heart of Jesus became particularly widespread: incipient disbelief called for a new way of worshipping Christ and, as opposed to Jansenism, which taught that Christ did not die for all men and which frightened the faithful away from the sacraments, there was need for a devotion which stressed the love of Christ and encouraged a return of this love by means of frequent Communion. The impetus that caused the devotion to the Sacred Heart to spread throughout the Church came from a simple cloistered nun, Margaret Mary Alacoque, a member of St. Francis de Sales' Institute of the Visitation. Her revelations of 1674 and 1675 are not the foundation of this devotion but it is certainly remarkable that a nun in her cell should give the impetus to a movement that after two centuries was to have spread all over the world. The devotion was promoted especially by the Institute of the Visitation and the Society of Jesus; the Jansenists bitterly opposed it.

For a long time efforts to obtain Papal approval of a special feast of the Sacred Heart were unsuccessful. The missionary Jean Eudes introduced it in 1672 into the Congregation he had founded, but only with episcopal permission.¹ In 1726 Benedict XIV., as Prospero Lambertini, had to deal with requests for the introduction of the feast put forward by the Kings of Poland and Spain and the Bishops of Cracow and

*De rationibus festorum SS. Cordis Iesu et purissimi Cordis Mariae*⁵, Oeniponte, 1885; BAINVEL in the *Dict. de théol. cath.*, III., 271-351.

¹ BAINVEL, *loc. cit.*, 317; H. JOLY, *Le bienheureux Père Eudes*³, Paris, 1909, 162-187; DORÉ, *Le P. Eudes, premier apôtre des SS. Cœurs de Jésus et de Marie*, Paris, 1870.

Marseilles.¹ The Jesuit Gallifet, Benedict XIV. wrote later,² went to great pains in the matter but effected nothing. As he was making this statement another petition was put before him, in which the Mother General of the French Discalced Carmelites sought permission to introduce the devotion into her Order. But the Pope was not in favour of new devotions.³ Two years later the French Carmelites renewed their request,⁴ this time through the mediation of Queen Maria Leszczyńska, at whose instigation the Assembly of the Clergy of 1765 invited the French Bishops to adopt the devotion.⁵ Benedict, however, refused the request, referring the petitioners to his work on canonization.⁶

His successor Clement XIII. had himself founded an archconfraternity in honour of the Most Sacred Heart.⁷ Amid the ruin of their country the Bishops of Poland turned to him in their distress and sought permission to introduce the feast. This time the application was successful: on January 26th, 1765, the request was granted by the Congregation of Rites and on February 6th its decree was confirmed by the Pope.⁸ The adoration of the Heart of Jesus, it was stated in the Bull, had spread, with episcopal approval, into nearly every part of the Catholic world, and times without number it had been confirmed by letters of indulgence granted to the confrater-

¹ BAINVEL, *loc. cit.*, 337; *Freiburger Kirchenlex.*, V.², 1923.

² To Tencin, June 26, 1754, in HEECKEREN, II., 347; BENEDICT, XIV., *De canonizat.*, IV., P. 2, c. 31, c. 20-5.

³ "Nous ne sommes guère disposé à favoriser les nouvelles dévotions." To Tencin, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Gualtieri to Valenti, July 26, 1756, Nunziat. di Francia, 496, Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.* undated *letter of the nuns.

⁵ RÉGNAULT, *Beaumont*, II., 141 *seq.*

⁶ The undated *reply (August 8, 1756) in Nunziat. di Francia, *loc. cit.*; *letter from the Secretary of the Congregation of Rites to the Secretary of State, of August 9, 1756, *ibid.*

⁷ *Roda to Grimaldi, January 31, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5034; see RÉGNAULT, II., 93. For the first of this type of confraternity in Rome, *cf. Civ. Catt.*, 1929, III., 228.

⁸ *Bull. Cont.*, III., 933.

nities of the Sacred Heart ; the sanction of a special feast merely meant the encouragement of a devotion already in existence and refreshed the memory of the divine love with which the only-begotten Son of God had adopted human nature and had set the example of obedience, meekness, and humility.

In 1763 and 1764 twenty-one Spanish Bishops and twelve cathedral chapters had sought the Pope's permission for the feast¹; similar requests were made by nine Bishops and chapters in Spanish America and seventeen Bishops in Sicily ; in all there were 148 petitioners of high clerical rank.² In the final Papal decree, however, Spain was not mentioned. On May 10th, 1727, Philip V. of Spain had asked for the feast to be introduced³ and on June 12th, 1747, Aróstegui received instructions to renew the request in the king's name.⁴ For this reason the Spanish king was included in the petitioners named in the decree issued by the Congregation of Rites.⁵ At this point, however, Roda, backed by Cardinal Ganganelli,⁶ objected, on the score that his king's name had been mentioned without his knowledge. At the same time he appealed to Madrid to protest from that quarter too,⁷ and Azpuru, Roda's

¹ *Lista de los Prelados y Cabildos que han escrito al Papa suplicandole concediese el Oficio y Misa del Corazón de Jesús' (undated), Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 791. List of the Bishops and Chapters in NILLES, I., 91 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 91-6.

³ *Ibid.*, 36 *seq.*; POU Y MARTI, *Archivo de la Embajada de España cerca de la Santa Sede*, III., Roma, 1921, 19. Negotiations had been going on since 1725: *ibid.*, under "Corazón de Jesús"; REUSCH, *Index*, II., 983 *seq.*

⁴ *Carvajal to Aróstegui, June 12, 1747, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5034.

⁵ NILLES, I., 5.

⁶ " *V.E. se acordará muy bien de lo que trabajó entonces, y quien me dió noticia de lo que pasaba fué el card. Ganganelli y me ayudó en el empeño." Roda to Azpuru, May 28, 1771, Arch. Prov. Tolet., Madrid, Chamartin, R.

⁷ *Roda to Grimaldi, January 31, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5034.

successor, instructed by Grimaldi,¹ had to object to the sanctioning of the feast for Spain without the royal assent.² All the prelates who had taken part in the petition were sharply reprimanded in the king's name and at the same time the Spanish Bishops were forbidden to write to Rome on a matter of general import.³ After the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain all representations of the Sacred Heart were removed from their churches.⁴

A considered opinion given by the royal confessor Osma⁵ typifies the current feeling in Madrid. His eyes had filled with tears, he wrote, as he had read the envoy's report on the introduction of the new feast. What would the critics say about it in London, Berlin, Holland, and Denmark? Still less would he care to hear the opinions that would be passed on it in Rome, France, and the whole Catholic world. What grieved him most, however, was the scanty respect that was shown to the king in this affair. Was there then no longer a king in Spain? Were the Jesuits the rulers of Spain? This handful of Bishops and cathedral chapters were not the country's representatives and their request ought not to have been made without the royal assent. But it was the all too powerful Jesuits alone who were responsible for the tiresome business, in asking the prelates to write their letters. It was only these people, these *viri potentes a saeculo, viri famosi*⁶, who could have perpetrated such enormities. He would not

¹ *To Azpuru, March 5, 1765, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 45.

² *Azpuru to Grimaldi, March 21 and April 4, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5034; *to Torrigiani, April 15, 1765, Nunziat. di Spagna, 296, Papal Secret Archives.

³ *Grimaldi to Roda, November 9, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Gracia y Justicia, 791.

⁴ *Roda to Azpuru, May 28, 1771, Arch. Prov. Tolet. Madrid, Chamartin, R.

⁵ *To Grimaldi, February 22, 1765, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5034; *Lopez to Idiaquez, February 27, 1765, *ibid.*, Gracia y Justicia, 688.

⁶ "the mighty men of old, men of renown" (Gen., VI., 4).

venture to suggest to the Minister the measures that should be taken to abolish such serious abuses, since in his overwhelming grief he would probably not hit on the right one.¹ The French Jansenists spoke equally bitterly against the new feast.²

Another sign of the times was a request for a canonization which was put forward on this occasion by a powerful party. Up to the death of Ferdinand VI. of Spain the Spanish Government had shown a rather indifferent attitude towards the beatification of the anti-Jesuit Palafox. In fact the Inquisition in a decree of May 13th, 1759, had ordered Palafox's two anti-Jesuit works to be burned by the executioner along with other scurrilous writings against the Jesuits.³ With Charles III.'s accession to the throne the situation altered. Under date August 12th, 1760, the king petitioned Clement XIII. for Palafox's beatification; the two anti-Jesuit letters, he said, had not been burnt on account of their

¹ The motive of the hostility towards the Feast was given by Rábago on August 28, 1747 (Archives of Simancas, *loc. cit.*): " *La razón verdadera, segun se dijo y dice, es que en este empeño para el Corazón de Jesús a entrado la Compañía y esto basta para conciliar todas las contradicciones del mundo. Pero al fin, aunque a mucha costa, Dios bolverá por el Corazón de su SS. Hijo." Tanucci (to Bottari, March 23, 1765, *ibid.*, Estado, 5992) confirms it: " *Tralle cose che Roda mi disse, fu l'inganno fatto dai Gesuiti alla regina Barbara di Spagna per la festa del Cuor di Gesù di quella visionaria bugiarda, che aveva visto in paradiso chi non aveva mai amato Dio, tanto disapprovata costì dal Papa passato. Io me rallegrai, Roda si formalizzò di vedermi congratulato con una risoluzione di questo Papa favorevole a quella furberia; ma si serenò quando io spiegai, che io rideva del nuovo argomento dell' infallibilità del Papa, poiche Papa era Lambertino, che detestò e abrogò la cosa, Papa, Rezzonico, che l'approva e l'abbraccia, e l'uno e l'altro operava collo Spirito Santo della Corte di Roma, il quale è più simile a Proteo che al fato ineluttabile dell' Eterna Sapienza, qui locutus est per prophetas."

² RÉGNAULT, *Beaumont*, II., 144 *seqq.*

³ Printed, Archives of Simancas, Inquisicion, 443, and Nunziat. di Spagna, 262, Papal Secret Archives.

contents but because permission to print them had not been obtained.¹ Passionei, the so-called "*Ponens*" in the case, whose business it was to initiate the process of beatification, and who had applied himself to the task with great zeal, lost no time in publishing the king's letter.² Further, against all tradition and custom, he had printed, together with earlier documents in the case, the unanimous resolution of December 9th, 1760, by which Palafox's writings were declared to be free of any offence against the Apostolic decrees.³ He also urged the Spanish Grand Inquisitor, Quintano Bonifaz,⁴ to concur with the Roman decision, stating that the Apostolic decree deprived the Jesuits of any excuse for further intrigues. Roda too tried to influence the Inquisitor in the same direction. He assured him that the steps he had taken in the matter, which he had always urged forward without insulting the Society and with proper regard for its honour, had been guided, not by hatred for the Jesuits, but by his zeal for the glorification of Bishop Palafox, for the honour of the king, and the good of the Church.⁵ But what Roda really thought

¹ *Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 41; *Wall to Portocarrero, June 17, 1760, *ibid.*

² *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, November 6 and 20, 1760, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*; *Pallavicini to Torrighiani, December 9, 1760, Cifre, *ibid.*, 285.

³ *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, January 1, 1761, Registro di cifre, *ibid.*, 431; *Pallavicini to Torrighiani, January 20, 1761, Cifre, *ibid.*, 285.

⁴ *Passionei to the Grand Inquisitor, December 24, 1760, Archives of Simancas, Inquisicion, 443.

⁵ *To Quintano Bonifaz, December 25, 1760, *ibid.*, Estado, 4966. In January 1761, Palafox's letters were released by the Inquisition (*Decree of the Grand Inquisitor, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Registro di corresp. 101; *Quintano Bonifaz to Passionei, January 20, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Inquisicion, 443; *Wall to Tanucci, April 28, 1761, *ibid.*, Estado, 6092). The release of the letters was instigated by Roda; *cf.* *Roda to Wall, January 29 [1761] (*ibid.*, 4966): "He visto carta de España en que se refiere una proposicion de los Jesuitas, que dicen: Que mas daño les hace Roda en Roma, que Carvalho en

about Palafox and the Jesuits appears in his correspondence with Wall.¹ The most useful part of Palafox's writings were, in his opinion, his animadversions on the Jesuits, and it was a triumph for them when his letters against them were condemned to be burnt. The king would have to be informed about such things, he continued, so that he could secure his kingdom and colonies against the Jesuits. Roda thought that his own life too was in danger from these "regicides". In Rome, he wrote, he was regarded by the Jesuits as their enemy. He had been warned to be on his guard by several Religious and persons distinguished for their virtue and sagacity and thoroughly conversant with Jesuit doctrines and practices. "However, my life is of little moment to me. It is my honour and my conscience that I want to protect; for the rest, let it come to pass according to the will of God and the king."²

Meanwhile, in Rome, Palafox's friends rejoiced in the good progress that was being made in the process of canonization and in the discomfiture of the "ravens".³ Some of their false

Portugal. Si ahora viesen alzada la prohibicion, y reimpressas las obras de Palafox, y que a mi me lo debian, que dirian? Pero digan lo que dixeren."

¹ *Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4966.

² " *Es conveniente que el Rey se halle enterado. Mientras S. M. no las conozca, no puede asegurar sus reynos y menos las Indias. Io al Inquisidor no le hablo de los Jesuitas, sino por lo respectivo a esta causa Palafox, pues temo que se escandalice, y no me crea en nada. Io entiendo que lo mas util que escribió el Venerable son las obras contra los Jesuitas, donde los define... Ahora todo lloverá sobre mi. En Roma ya me tienen por su contrario los Jesuitas. De España escriben, que les hago yo mas daño en Roma que Carvalho en Portugal. El Inquisidor y su tribunal estaran rabiando conmigo porque los desacredito y obligo a que, contra su honor reformen el edicto. Aqui muchos Religiosos... me amonestan que me guarde..." To Wall, February 12, 1761, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4966.

³ *Bandini to Foggini, December 16, 1760, Bibl. Corsini, Rome, Cod., 1607.

rumours, such as that the Jesuits had called King Charles and Wall Jansenists and that they were trying to win over Dominicans and Carmelites against Palafox,¹ Ricci had no difficulty in refuting.² After Passionei's death on July 5th, 1761, the impetuosity with which the process had been pressed forward somewhat slackened.³ To such an extent was the cause regarded as a party matter that the mere fact that the Cardinals York and Giovanni Francesco Albani had abstained from voting was interpreted as ingratitude and enmity towards the Spanish king. It was not until James III. (the Pretender) had interceded on his behalf that York was readmitted into Charles' favour.⁴ After Passionei, Cardinal Galli was entrusted with Palafox's cause and on his death Ganganelli, who was

¹ *[Centomani ?] to Tanucci, March 27, 1761, *ibid.*, 6092.

² *Ricci to Orsini, December 8, 1760, *Epist. Gen. secretae*, in Jesuit possession; Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 78 seq.

³ " *I gèsuiti venuti dal Mexico portarono certa lettera stampata di Msgr. Azpuru scritta ad Angelopoli in cui si faceva trionfo grande per esser passato in Congregazione de' Riti certo articolo nella causa di Msgr. Palafox, e si diceva che i gesuiti avevano procurato d'impedirne il buon esito con le solite ingiurie contro di essi. Ma è falso, ed i gesuiti non se n'erano ingeriti niente affatto. Il sig. card. Terroni prefetto della Congregazione di p. m. aveva fatto dell' opposizione non per opera de' gesuiti, nè per far loro favore, ma perchè si procedeva irregolarmente, non avendo Msgr. Pisani allora Promotore fatto le animadversioni, se non per pura apparenza, non rilevando le vere difficoltà. E veramente questa causa si portava avanti con impegni, con frodi, con violenze, con danari, che non sono certo le maniere di promuovere i servi di Dio all' onore degli altari, dovendo in cosa si santa avere luogo la semplice verità " (Ricci, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 78 seq.). Cf. *Torrighiani to Pallavicini, January 1, February 12, and March 26, 1761, Registro di cifre, Nunziat. di Spagna, 431, *loc. cit.*; *Pallavicini to Torrighiani, January 20, 1761, Cifre, *ibid.*, 285.

⁴ *Roda to Wall, [January 22] and February 12, 1761, and March 25, 1762, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 4966; *Charles III. to Tanucci, January 6, 1761, *ibid.*, 6044; *Wall to Tanucci, February 17 and March 31, 1761, *ibid.*, 6092.

expected to bring it to a favourable and speedy conclusion.¹ Ganganelli continued to conduct the cause even after he was Pope. Under Pius VI. it had to be finally abandoned as impracticable, the last session taking place on February 28th, 1777.²

(7)

In the domain of the foreign missions there began under Clement XIII. the work of violent destruction. The same temporal powers which in past centuries had contributed so much to their construction had now lost all appreciation of their predecessors' great ideals and they destroyed one of the chief instruments which they had previously used for preference to spread Christianity : the Society of Jesus.

To get an idea of the yawning gap torn in the work of the missions by the step taken by Portugal, France, and Spain, one need only recall that in 1760 no less than 3,276 Jesuits were working as missionaries abroad.³ By that time Pombal had already begun his work of destruction. Ship after ship arrived in Lisbon, packed with Jesuits who had suddenly been torn away from their pastoral work in missionary countries. In May, 1759, ten or twelve came from Angola ; in

¹ *Grimaldi to Azpuru, February 17 and April 28, 1767, Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Reales Ordenes, 1767 ; RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 79.

² REUSCH, *Index*, II., 496. For subsequent Spanish efforts to obtain Palafox's beatification, cf. *Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, Exped. " El V^o Señor Don Juan de Palafox ", No. 27, 1785/89.

³ A. HUONDER, *Deutsche Jesuitenmissionäre des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, Freiburg, 1899, 30. In 1749, of the seven Provinces forming the Portuguese Assistancy, that of the mother country contained 861 Jesuits, the Province of Japan 57, Goa 150, Malabar 47, China 49, Brazil 445, Maranhão 145. The French Assistancy had 54 missionaries in Central America, 50 in North America, 25 in Greece, 17 in Syria, 7 in Persia, 22 in the East Indies, 23 in China, a total of 198 Jesuits in 36 missions. [WERNZ-SCHMITT], *Synopsis*, 321.

June, 1760, 230 from Brazil; in September of that year sixty-one from Madeira and the other islands; in December 115 from Pará. In May of the following year the first 119 Jesuits were brought in from the East Indies and, as most of them were ill, they were transferred to the hospital for criminals; twenty-three had died on the voyage, which had lasted five months. Even the years 1764 and 1769 brought a gleaning of Jesuits whom it had not been possible to lay hands on immediately.¹

From 1767 onwards the fate of the Portuguese Jesuits was visited also on their Spanish brethren. They too were suddenly arrested and were brought to Cadiz. In 1767-9 there were in all 2,273 Jesuit missionaries who were landed there from Peru, Chile, Paraguay, and Mexico, from the Philippines, and from Quito and New Granada.²

Most of these missionaries were re-embarked in Spain and Portugal, landed on the coast of the Papal States and left to their fate. Thus there arrived in Civitavecchia, from Portugal, 255 in October and November 1759, and 375 in February and October 1760 (from Brazil 265); from Maranhão 92, from Goa and India 59, in January and July 1761; then 29 more from various provinces in 1767.³ By the middle of June 1768, about 1,000 Jesuits from Spanish Provinces had been transported to Italy, and about 1,000 more were yet to arrive from America and the Philippines; ⁴ in 1767 there were 1,091 expelled Jesuits in Italy.⁵ Clement XIII. showed the refugees all possible affection but in the end

¹ DUHR, *Pombal*, 143.

² I. B. MUNDWILER in the *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XXVI. (1902), 639. Huonder (*loc. cit.*, 31) gives the total number of deported Jesuits as 2,617.

³ [WERNZ-SCHMITT], 337.

⁴ MUNDWILER, *loc. cit.*, 643; HERNANDEZ, *El extrañamiento de los Jesuitas del Rio de la Plata y de las misiones del Paraguay por decreto de Carlos III.*, Madrid, 1908; extract from Paramás' diary dealing with the expulsion in *Kath. Missionen*, XXVIII. (1899 *seq.*), 8 *seqq.*

⁵ [WERNZ-SCHMITT], 337.

he was unable to accept so many.¹ The Mexican Jesuits, 678 in all, tried to re-form themselves into a Province of their own in Bologna and Ferrara but in 1773 it had to be dissolved.

A worse fate was in store for those who were kept back in Portugal and Spain. Some, it is true, were given permission to return home and others were distributed for a time among the houses of various Orders. But the fate of the remainder was mostly very hard. As a result of their bad treatment several hundred had died already on their passage to Spain,² envied by those who at the will of the authorities had to undergo perpetual imprisonment without ever knowing the reason for their punishment. The sufferings of those who were locked away from the light and air in the damp, fetid, underground dungeons of St. Julian, at the mouth of the Tagus, were indescribable. After 1772 some were liberated at the intervention of Maria Theresa, Maria Leszczyńska, and other royal persons; others had to wait till they were released by death or Pombal's fall from power in 1777.³ Of the Spanish Provinces of the Order, shortly before their expulsion, the Province of Chile was caring for 7,718 Indians, Quito for 7,586, Peru for 55,000, New Granada for 6,594, Mexico for 122,001; on the Marianas and among the Tagalogs 156,052 new converts had been registered.⁴

From the French missions the Jesuits were not dragged away by force. Missions were maintained in Canada and Louisiana, in Martinique and Guadeloupe, in San Domingo and Cayenne, in Greece, Syria, and Egypt, in the East Indies and China.⁵ In all, 152 French Jesuits, including 113 priests, had devoted themselves to missionary work; from now on they gradually died out and were replaced to only a small extent.

¹ CRÉTINEAU-JOLY, V., 251. Cf. our account, Vols. XXXVI., 337, XXXVII., 158.

² See above, p. 118.

³ DUHR, *Gesch.*, IV., 2, 536-556.

⁴ [WERNZ-SCHMITT], 353, 361.

⁵ A list made for the Propaganda between 1762 and 1764 gives the names of the stations and missionaries; reprinted in HUGHES, II., 599 *seq.*

The twentieth century has collected enough evidence already of the result of European youth growing up without a Christian education and without divine service. It is not surprising, therefore, that for newly-converted peoples the loss of the missionaries meant the decline of Christianity and of a nascent culture.

But the disappearance of the Jesuits from the missions was not everywhere synonymous with decay. In California their places were taken by missionaries of first-class quality. Immediately after the Jesuits' expulsion in 1767 the Viceroy of Mexico handed over the Indian settlements to Franciscans from the missionary college of St. Ferdinand, who up till then had established five missions in the Sierra Gorda. On Good Friday, April 1st, 1768, headed by one of the most meritorious of the heralds of Christianity, the famous Juniper Serra, fourteen Franciscans arrived in Lower California. When preaching on Easter Sunday, Serra announced that the missions would be carried on in the old way, and he then distributed his companions and himself among the fifteen stations, to which a new settlement was added. The splendid progress that was subsequently made falls outside the pontificate of Clement XIII.¹

In Mexico too the Jesuits were replaced mostly by Franciscans, notably in the Nayarit Mountains² and what was then Pimeria, the present Sonora and Arizona, where they took over from the Jesuits fifty-two missions, with more than three hundred villages. On August 5th, 1767, the first fourteen missionaries were sent off from the missionary college of Querétaro, and the Franciscan Province of Jalisco also took its share in caring for the Indians.³ Excellent progress was made by the Franciscans in New Mexico; after serious devastations at the end of the seventeenth century, fifty

¹ LEMMENS, 251 *seq.*; ENGELHARDT, *The Missions and Missionaries of California*, San Francisco, 1908-1913, I., 270, II., 18.

² LEMMENS, 240 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 249.

years of work in twenty-five missions resulted in the rebuilding of churches and chapels which, according to a traveller's account, could vie with those of Europe, while in point of religion the Indians were not behind their Spanish neighbours.¹ In other missions, however, the results of the Jesuit expulsion were not so satisfactory. The Mexican secular priests to whom they were handed over proved to be unequal to their task ; in six years eleven Indian villages in the Parras lagoon were in ruins² and by 1780 only three of the twenty-two parishes in Tarahumara were still in existence.³

Not only the expulsion of the Jesuits but also the political events of the period had a disturbing influence on the missions. Canada, hitherto a French possession, was seized by the English in 1759 and was finally awarded to them by the Peace of Paris in 1763. At the surrender of Quebec on September 18th, 1759, the Bishop of that city was assured that the Catholics would be able to practise their religion freely, and during the peace negotiations in Paris the French ambassador in London was served with a memorial demanding for Quebec the continuance of the episcopal see and chapter. But the intention of the English Government was to set up a Protestant clergy in place of the Catholic. In its official documents the Bishop of Quebec, Oliver Briand (1766-84), was never accorded the episcopal title, which was reserved for the Anglican dignitary. Several members of the clergy returned to France in 1759 and 1763 ; this was viewed with approval by the new Government, which even placed English ships at their disposal. The Franciscans, Jesuits, and Sulpicians were forbidden to accept novices or to obtain reinforcements from abroad. The Catholic missionaries to the Indians were to be gradually removed and replaced by Protestants. The property of the Jesuits and Franciscans was declared to be State property in 1774,⁴ and the payment of 14,000 *livres*

¹ *Ibid.*, 243.

² *Ibid.*, 242.

³ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁴ *Catholic Encyclopedia*, III., 234, X., 380, 381 ; LAUNAY, 20 *seq.*

which had been made to the Jesuits by the French king for the Canadian missions to the Indians ceased after the English conquest.¹ Clement XIII. had cause to foretell² even more difficulties and acerbities for the Bishop-elect of Quebec than those which were inevitably associated with the episcopal office. The burden which awaited the prelate in Quebec, he said, was more than a man could ordinarily bear. However, in spite of all the vexations to which both clergy and laity were subjected, the Catholics of Canada remained true to their faith, so that the Government gradually deemed it better to mitigate its harshness. As early as 1768 it had been announced by the King's Privy Council that the English penal laws against the Catholics were not to be extended to Canada.³

Of the Franciscan missionaries to the Indians in Canada the most distinguished was Emanuel Crespel (d. 1775),⁴ of the Jesuits Jean Baptiste La Brosse (d. 1782), who devoted thirty-five years of his life to this exacting work.⁵ From about 1750 onwards these older Orders were joined by the Sulpicians. One of these, François Picquet, established a reduction in Ogdensburg and in four years collected 3,000 Indians there. He also set up four stations on the St. Lawrence and made many other converts on his missionary travels.

Of the thirty Sulpicians working in Canada in 1759 there were still two surviving in 1793, when the Government relaxed its severity, so that the Congregation was enabled to recover. From 1773 onwards the Sulpicians replaced the Jesuits in Canada, who were dying out.⁶

When Florida was transferred from Spanish to English hands in 1763, the Catholics were promised their religious freedom in an ambiguous article of the Anglo-Spanish treaty,

¹ HUGHES, II., 350.

² On April 9, 1766, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 125.

³ T. O'GORMAN, *A History of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States*, New York, 1895, 204.

⁴ LEMMENS, 266.

⁵ *Catholic Encyclopedia*, X., 380.

⁶ *Ibid.*

but in St. Augustine the Bishop's house was taken for the Anglicans, and the Franciscan convent, which had the best wells in the town, was requisitioned for the English troops, while the Indians' church was used as a hospital. Weary of these persecutions, almost the whole of the Spanish population betook itself elsewhere.¹

Other parts of what is now the United States, then under French or Spanish rule, had to bear their share of what was happening in the mother countries. In Spanish Arizona the churches were closed and the Indians were robbed of their priests.² In French Louisiana the Supreme Council, following the example of the Paris Parlement, condemned the Institute of the Jesuits as a danger to the authority of the king and the Bishops and to peace and security, declared the Jesuit vows to be null and void, forbade the name or dress of the Society of Jesus to be used, and had its property sold by auction, its chapels razed to the ground, and the Jesuits themselves transported to France. Only nine or ten Capuchins were left in the country, and they were too few to carry out all the pastoral duties that were necessary.³ On Martinique the law-court at Bourg-St-Pierre issued a resolution by which the Jesuits had to quit their houses and forgo the use of their dress and the name of their Order. On taking an oath, which was found permissible by the ecclesiastical authorities, they were allowed to continue their pastoral work in the parishes.⁴

In South America the Franciscans, operating from their college at Ocopa, sacrificed themselves without stint in bringing the faith to the natives of Peru. The college, situated east of the Cordilleras, near the Indian territories, had been planned as a preparatory establishment for newly-arrived missionaries, as a centre whence they would be distributed among the

¹ SHEA, *Carroll*, 90 seq.

² SHEA, *Colonial Days*, 532.

³ *Ibid.*, 587; ROCHEMONTEIX, *Nouv. France*, I., 397 seqq.; C. L. VOGEL, *The Capuchins in French Louisiana*, New York, 1928.

⁴ *Extrait des Registres du Conseil Supérieur de la Martinique du 18 Oct. 1763* (no place or date of publication); RICCI, **Istoria*, 170.

various stations, and as a refuge for the sick and weary. Strict discipline was to be kept in the college, the missionaries having to be ready, either to shed their blood for Christ, which often happened, or at least to forgo all the achievements of refined society while penetrating into wild country where there was often no other food than that offered by the untilled earth and the night's rest was taken where darkness overtook the traveller. All this the Franciscans put before the Spanish king, Ferdinand VI., in order to obtain his confirmation of their institute. This was granted them on March 17th, 1751, and again on October 2nd, 1757. The royal letter of safe-conduct was stamped by Clement XIII. with the seal of the Papal authority.¹

What the Franciscans had said about the difficulties of the missionary life was no exaggeration. They had their successes among the Indians, but revolts were frequent and on each occasion everything was destroyed. In a few decades their missionary labour had cost about thirty of them their lives.² From Ocopa the missionary college of Tarija in Bolivia was founded in 1754 and that of Chillán in Chile in 1756.³ In 1765, with his headquarters at Tarija, the Franciscan Franciscus del Pilar (d. 1803) began his work among the Chiriguano, a tribe that had hitherto offered an invincible resistance to all the efforts at conversion made by various missionary Orders. By prodigious patience and self-sacrifice he finally succeeded in winning them over to Christianity.⁴

After the banishment of the Jesuits in 1767 the Franciscans in Peru were given the missions in Lamas but shortly afterwards they passed to secular priests.⁵ It was also the Franciscans who filled the chairs at the university of Quito, formerly

¹ On August 18, 1758, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 5. The royal letter of confirmation is wholly contained in the Brief.

² LEMMENS, 295 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 297; ROB. LAGOS, *Hist. de las Misiones del Colegio de Chillán*, Barcelona, 1908.

⁴ LEMMENS, 319.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 301.

occupied by the Jesuits.¹ In Paraguay in 1767 the civil authority passed into the hands of Spanish officials, while the spiritual authority was taken over by Franciscans and Dominicans. The fifty-seven reductions containing 113,716 Indians fell into decay.²

In Guiana in 1762 the French tried to colonize the natives without the co-operation of missionaries. The undertaking was a miserable failure, and later, when it was decided to call in three Jesuits banished from Brazil, they were received by the savages as the messengers of God.³

The removal of the missionaries from the more highly educated peoples of Eastern Asia was not so disastrous as it was from the half- or wholly savage tribes of South America. So far as China was concerned, in Macao the Jesuits were arrested and shipped off to Europe,⁴ but the power of the Portuguese extended no further. In the Far Eastern Empire there were still forty Jesuits, eight Franciscans (including one Chinese), and one Carmelite in 1768.⁵ The south-western provinces (Sutchen, Yünnan, and Kwei-chou) had been entrusted to the Paris seminary for foreign missions. Sutchen even took a turn for the better, thanks to the circumspect and energetic leadership of Pottier (1756-92), appointed Vicar Apostolic by a decree of Propaganda, which, however, did not reach Macao till 1769. When Pottier arrived in 1756 the number of Christians in Sutchen was about 3,000; in

¹ *Ibid.*, 287.

² MOUSSY, *Mém. hist. sur la décadence et la ruine des Missions des Jésuites dans le bassin de la Plata*, Paris, 1864.

³ HERGENRÖTHER-KIRSCH, IV., 164.

⁴ “*Ut nuper ex literis P. Sigismundi a s. Nicolao didici (quod mihi summo dolori ac moerori fuit), omnes Patres Soc. Iesu, iussu regis Lusitaniae Macai capti, in carcerem coniecti inque Europam conducendi erunt. Porro cuncti missionarii s. Congregationis prohibentur Macai commorari.” Letter from a missionary from Canton, of January 18, 1763, Archives of the Propaganda in Rome, *Ind. Or. e Cina* 1758-1760, Scritt. rif. nella Congr. 30, n. 14.

⁵ SCHLUND in the *Zeitschrift für Missionswiss.*, IV., 12.

1769 it was 10–12,000, and when he died in 1792 it was over 25,000.¹ The five missions in south-east China, which had been founded by Spanish Franciscans from the Philippines, were also able to develop still further at first, as until 1768 the persecutions raged more fiercely in the interior. In 1767 there were 2,471 Christians in Shan-tung, 2,738 in Kiang-Si, 6,083 in Fu-Kien, 2,692 in Kwang-Tung.² Nevertheless, even in Suchuen the missionaries could work only in disguise; in an urgent request for reinforcements from the Paris seminary³ the Vicar Apostolic, Pottier, asked to be sent men who were slightly built, of pale complexion, and with black hair and eyes; such men, he said, were more likely to remain undiscovered. Pottier was fortunate in being able to replace some of the European missionaries by native priests; in 1767 he was able to give the four European priests four native ones as assistants⁴; the latter, however, complained that they were not treated as equals by the Europeans.⁵ In Peking the Jesuits, by exercising a certain caution, could go about their work almost unhindered.

The Franciscan Province in the Philippines felt the lack of missionaries even more, since scarcely any native could live the hard life led by the Franciscans in these parts and the Province was thus entirely dependent on Europe for reinforcements. Lest their missions in the Philippines themselves, where

¹ L. GUIOT, *La Mission du Su-Tschuen au XVIII^e siècle. Vie et apostolat de M^{gr}. Pottier, son fondateur, évêque d'Agathopolis*, Paris, 1892. For Suchuen, cf. PICOT, IV., 325. That the number of Christians in Suchuen amounted to 25,000 is queried in A. THOMAS, *Mission de Pékin*, 402, n. 1. Pottier's coadjutor is said to have estimated them at 3,000 in 1785. A visitation report on Yünnan in 1766 lists 18 catechumens, 566 baptisms of adults, 1,112 baptisms of children born of Christian parents, 1,314 Easter Confessions. In 1767 there were entries of 2,056 confessions, 106 adult baptisms, and 65 instructed catechumens. GUIOT, 181.

² LEMMENS, 146 *seq.*

³ Of October 8, 1759, in GUIOT, 140.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.

there were still large numbers of savages in the mountains, and the missions in China and Cochinchina might suffer further losses in man-power, they asked for a Papal prohibition against any of their men transferring to another religious Province without special permission. The request was granted by Clement XIII.¹ The removal of the 160 Jesuit missionaries was not felt so keenly at Luzon, where other Orders were working, as at Mindanao, where they had been conducting sixteen colleges.² The secular native clergy, who were to replace them after 1768 by a decree of Charles III., proved unequal to their task.³ The natives on the Marianas fared better, receiving Augustinian Recollects as their pastors in place of the departed Jesuits.⁴

Much anxiety was caused to the Pope by the mission of Tong-King. Disputes had broken out there between the various missionary societies, in which the faithful had joined and which had even led to blows.⁵ To allay the dissension, recourse was had to a procedure which had been employed in other parts lying too far beyond the scope of the Roman authorities and which had been used, among other such occasions, in the controversies with Palafox: ⁶ a so-called Conservator was elected to settle the trouble. The choice fell on the Jesuit Superior, Campos, who excommunicated the Pro-Vicar, the Augustinian

¹ On November 15, 1762, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 87.

² *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, VI., 693; *Die kath. Missionen*, 1880, 224. Francisco Maria Zen, of the Naples seminary, *wrote from Manila on January 15, 1770, that in a few days the Jesuits from the Philippines, ninety in all, would be embarked in three ships; about twenty old and sick Jesuits would be allowed to remain behind. Archives of the Propaganda in Rome, Ind. Or. e Cina 1758-1760; Scritt. rif. nella Congr. 32, n. 20.

³ SCHMIDLIN, 395.

⁴ CLEMENTE A TERZORIO, *Manuale*, 434, 441.

⁵ *Letter from the Vicar Apostolic of West Tong-King, Louis Nééz, Bishop of Ceomania, of June 20, 1759, Archives of the Propaganda in Rome, Ind. Or. e Cina 1758-1760, Scritt. rif. nella Congr. 29, n. 8.

⁶ Cf. our account, Vol. XXX., 208.

Adrian of St. Thecla. The Propaganda ruled that Superiors of Orders who were only temporarily in office were not allowed to be Conservators at all, that all Campos's ordinances were invalid, and that the Orders were not to quarrel about their privileges, otherwise they would have to be withdrawn. In particular they were not to use the privilege of appointing a Conservator. Clement XIII. confirmed this ruling.¹ In the civil wars that ravaged Tong-King at this period the Christians were often cited as the originators of the trouble, and from 1765 to 1774 they were savagely persecuted.² The difficulties this caused the Europeans explains why most of the priests in Tong-King at this time were natives.³

In Cambodia the persecution continued, and only a few Franciscans managed to steal back into the country.⁴ The Burmese incursions into Siam resulted in the Christian population dropping from 12,000 to 1,000. Mergui with its 800-1,000 Christians was destroyed in 1765 and the same fate overtook the capital, Ayuthia, in 1767. During the siege of Ayuthia many heathens took refuge in the Christian quarter, its occupants having saved the town once already by their courage. The Vicar Apostolic, Brigot, from the Paris seminary, used this opportunity to baptize several children. When the town was taken, Brigot fled to Pondicherry, where the general seminary was having considerable difficulty in maintaining its existence.⁵

In Pegu the Burmese took Siriam, the Vicar Apostolic, Nerini, losing his life as a result, in 1756, on the suspicion of having called in the help of the French against the king. Of the Barnabite missionaries who arrived in the next few years,

¹ On April 23, 1762, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 74 ; cf. 62. The decrees avoid mentioning Campos or the Jesuits by name ; they are to be found in GISPERT, 247 *seq.*

² WALZ, 374.

³ West Tong-King had twenty native priests in 1763, thirty-four in 1770 (LAUNAY, 67) ; in 1750 only one of the eight Dominican missionaries was a European (GISPERT, 239).

⁴ LEMMENS, 115 *seq.*

⁵ LAUNAY, 50, 92 ; PICOT, IV., 245 *seqq.* ; SCHMIDLIN, 388.

the sole survivor by 1762 was Giambattista Maria Percoto, who was appointed Vicar Apostolic in 1767 and carried out his task successfully until 1776. It was not long before the mission comprised ten churches and as many schools.¹

In 1759 the Indian missions were reckoned to be among the most flourishing in the world, but they were largely ruined by Pombal's action in 1760. On his orders 123 of the 220 Jesuit missionaries, along with seven companions in distress from East Africa, were cooped up on the third floor of the Jesuit college at Goa, whence they were transported to Portugal, 104 of them reaching that country alive.² No interest was taken by the Portuguese Government in obtaining replacements. "Even in Goa no provision has been made for the five former colleges of the Jesuits," wrote a missionary in 1765, "although it is the residence of the Viceroy and is in yearly communication with Lisbon."³ Nevertheless there were still some Jesuits holding on in several places, on the Fishers' Coast among others,⁴ and in Pondicherry they only

¹ DURAND, *Les Missions cath. françaises*, 380; **Hist. succincte de la dévastation du royaume de Siam par les Birmans de Pegu pendant près de deux ans depuis Janvier 1765 jusqu'en Avril 1767* (including an account of the siege of the town, which had three churches, and the taking of the town in March-April, 1767), Archives of the Propaganda in Rome, Ind. Or. e Cina 1765-8, Scritt. rif. nella Congr. 31, n. 26. The dispatch of two Barnabites to Ava, who had been recommended on February 14, 1760, to the Bishop of Meliapur: *Bull. Cont.*, III., 317.

² HUONDER, *Jesuitenmissionäre*, 30; PIOLET, II., 192; SCHMIDLIN, 387.

³ *Emiliano Palladino, dated Macao, December 28, 1765 (Archives of the Propaganda in Rome, *loc. cit.*, n. 12): "Le cose della corte di Portogallo camminano tanto lentamente, che neppur in Goa si sono fin' ora provisti i cinque collegii che furono de' Gesuiti."

⁴ " *Patres Soc. Iesu provinciae Malabaricae," wrote the Bishop of Cochin, José Collaço Leitao, on December 15, 1766, "quamvis inopia laborent atque a perturbationibus et periculis non omnino liberi, discedere tamen ab ora Piscariae neque

had to change their name.¹ Elsewhere they were at least unmolested.² But their reports tell the story of their gradual extinction.³

Of the African missions there is little to be said. The political changes in Europe took effect here too. In 1760 the seven Jesuits on the East African coast were taken to Goa and thence to Portugal.⁴ The Dominicans did their best to fill the gap.⁵ In the Dark Continent as elsewhere harm was done by the Peace of Paris in 1763, the colony of Senegal and the island of St. Louis passing from French to Protestant English hands; France retained only Gorée and a few unimportant factories on the coast. In Gorée in 1763 the French secular priest Demanet attempted to open a mission and met with some success but, broken in health, he had to return to France the same year. It fared no better with the three priests of the Paris seminary, in 1766, and two others, in 1768, who dared the murderous climate at Loango and Kakongo on the West

coguntur neque cogitant. Si forte aliquando discesserint vel, quod facile eveniet, decrescente suorum numero, non potuerint omnes illas ecclesias, ut antea, administrare perlibenter accersam religiosos Carmelitas Excalceatos" (*ibid.*, 1765-8, n. 24). Cf. HENRION, II., 462; SCHMIDLIN, 387; HERGENRÖTHER-KIRSCH, IV.⁶, 161.

¹ " *Iesuitae Pondicherii non turbati usque ad 12 Sept. 1768; 13 Sept. inventarium factum, Patres iussi induere habitum cleri saecularis et appellari 'Messieurs des Missions Malabares' " Archives of the Propaganda in Rome, *Hist succincte* (see above, p. 425, n. 1), 1769-1771, Congr. 32, n. 3.

² See the next note.

³ The Carmelite Carlo di S. Corrado *wrote to Propaganda on November 2, 1767 (*loc. cit.*, 1765-8, Congr. 31, n. 41) that the Jesuit Bishops of the Fishers' Coast and Cochin were still alive and that in the latter diocese two deceased Jesuits had been replaced by a Franciscan and a native priest; "i pochi Gesuiti che ancora si trovano in quelle parti, non sono più molestati dal Travancor."

⁴ See above, p. 425, n. 2.

⁵ KÜLB, *Missionsreisen nach Afrika*, 133.

African coast.¹ Two priests from the Paris seminary who settled in Socotra in 1759 were murdered by the Arabs in the following year.² The Capuchins were more successful, managing to maintain their stations in the east (Mozambique or Quiloa) and still more on the west coast (Congo, Angola, Benguela, Kakongo, and Loanda).

Whereas many of the most fertile fields of missionary endeavour seemed likely to run wild, several successes were reaped in Eastern Europe, an area which up till then had been considered to be fairly hopeless. A priest named Stephan Turczynowicz, parochial administrator in Vilna, devoted himself to the conversion of the Jews, and as his first attempts to gain his object by gathering together abandoned Jewish children failed, he founded for his purpose a kind of monastic society of pious maidens, known as the Society of the Life of Mary or Mariavitines. Under its first Superior, Aniela Potemkin, it flourished rapidly and withstood the storm that raged about the legality of the new foundation, though it was not, however, until after Turczynowicz's death that its lawful existence was recognized by a Brief of Clement XIV.'s. Amid the chaos brought about by the partitions of Poland the society was broken up, after having been the means of bringing 2,000 Jews into the Christian fold. The conversion of the Jews was encouraged by Stanislaus Poniatowski, who in 1762 and 1765 ennobled fifty-two Jews who had embraced the Faith.³

The activity of the Jewish pseudo-mystic, Jakob Frank,⁴ under whose influence many Jews accepted baptism, may be said to have profited the Church inasmuch as many of these

¹ PICOT, IV., 219 *seqq.*; LAUNAY, II., 38 *seq.*; SCHMIDLIN, 373 *seq.*

² LAUNAY, II., 30 *seq.*

³ CAVALIER in the *Zeitschrift für Missionswiss.*, IX. (1919), 176 *seqq.*

⁴ For Jakob Frank (Jankiew Leibowicz), *cf. ibid.*, 179-184; KAULEN in the *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, IV.², 1690-9; *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, V., New York and London, 1903, 475-8.

converts or their descendants gradually became sincere Catholics.¹

Otherwise, owing to the overwhelming influence of Russia, the religious situation in Poland was very unfavourable. Zealous missionaries, it is true, had saved the greater part of the Ukraine from schism and had led it towards the Ruthenian Union of Brest. Count Salesius Potocki built over a hundred churches for them on his estates in the Palatinate of Kiev, at his own expense. But the incompetent Metropolitan, Philip Felician Volodkovicz, deemed the endowment to be too small and refused his sanction. The Propaganda commissioned the zealous Bishop Maximilian Rylo of Chelm, who had been trained in Rome, to examine the affair. Rylo reported on August 16th, 1764, that he had established canonically nearly fifty Catholic parish churches but that there was need for as many more.²

Owing to a number of circumstances, such as the expansion of the Union of Brest, the counter-measures taken against the Russian schism, and the numerous difficulties that had arisen in carrying out the synodal decrees of Zamość, it seemed advisable to hold another Provincial Synod. On January 15th, 1765, Volodkovicz received permission to do so,³ and on April 3rd Antonio Eugenio Visconti, titular Bishop of Ephesus, was appointed president.⁴ But King Stanislaus Poniatowski made his permission for the opening of the assembly dependent on conditions which would have given him Papal prerogatives. The subject of the deliberations and the validity of the resolutions were to be subject to his sanction. In consequence of this the synod was never held.⁵ In any case Bishop Volodkovicz's authority over his metropolitan diocese of Kiev as

¹ The Frankists scattered in Poland and Bohemia were gradually transformed from feigned to real Catholics and their descendants merged into the surrounding Christian population." *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, V., 477.

² PELESZ, II., 529 seq., 704.

³ *Ibid.* ; *Ius pontif.*, IV., 117.

⁴ THEINER, *Neueste Zustände*, Dok. 256.

⁵ PELESZ, II., 502 seqq.

well as over the bishoprics of Vladimir and Brest was suspended by Rome and he was given representatives, which led to disputes lasting to 1773.

Some years before, the Archbishop of Gnesen had applied for a new synod, among other things, but had received the reply from Clement XIII.¹ that he first wished to read the Polish nuncios' reports.

The progress made by the Union of Brest in the early sixties of this century was followed by its destruction when, under Stanislaus Poniatowski, Poland was dominated by the Russian influence. In the resolution of the Diet of 1768, by which religious conditions were regulated in favour of the dissidents, the rights of the ecclesiastical Province of Ruthenia with its eight bishoprics were not even found worthy of mention. The standard year for the claims of the schismatics was to be 1686, and as the bishoprics of Lemberg, Przemyśl, and Lutzk had not joined the Union until after this year they were delivered into the hands of the schismatics.² The work of destruction was completed by the predatory bands of Haidamaks. Wherever they appeared the Catholic priests and churches, especially the Uniats, were their victims; corpses and ashes marked their trail. The Ukraine contained about 1,900 parishes, only 15–20 being schismatic. A large number of parish priests were slaughtered or driven out, and the schismatic Bishop of Pereyaslavl used the opportunity to install his people in their stead. When peace had been restored and the fugitives were able to return they found strangers ensconced around their hearths, who denied them entrance. All Uniats were treated as enemies; they were beaten, gagged, imprisoned, and cast out of their own homes.³

With regard to the Near East, Benedict XIV.'s fundamental prohibition against changing from one rite to the other was renewed in the reign of his successor.⁴ An instruction for

¹ On May 31, 1760, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 47.

² PELESZ, II., 518 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 525 *seqq.*

⁴ Propaganda decree of March 12, 1759, *Collectanea*, 264, n. 414.

the missionaries of Nicopolis and Sofia¹ condemned the superstitious custom called the Kurban, a relic of Jewish animal-sacrifice. For Serbia a prohibition had to be issued against a common practice among the Christians of assuming Turkish names and living outwardly as Turks.²

Like his predecessor, Clement XIII. had frequently to intervene in the confused conditions that prevailed in the Eastern patriarchates. The religious situation of the Melchites—the Christians in the patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem who were true to Rome—was still vitally influenced by the dispute between the Catholic Patriarch Cyril Tanas and his Greek Orthodox opponent Sylvester, who enjoyed the protection of the Sultan. Cyril had to flee before Sylvester to the Lebanon, where the Emir was well-disposed towards the Catholics and was to some extent independent of the Sultan. Even nowadays, generally speaking, the country to the north of Beirut is wholly Catholic, that to the south wholly schismatic, with the notable exception of Aleppo, which in the conflicts between the patriarchs adhered to the Catholic one with heroic steadfastness.³ Throughout the eighteenth century the Catholics derived their strength from the Basilian Congregation of the Kourites and the Salvatorians.

Cyril died in 1760, after having resigned in 1759 and having nominated his nephew Jauhar to succeed him under the name of Athanasius.⁴ Seven Bishops protested against this violation of their electoral rights, and when four of them appealed to Rome, Clement XIII. pronounced Jauhar's election to be invalid, on the grounds that Cyril had been unable to resign without the Pope's assent and that his twenty-seven-year-old nephew had not yet reached episcopal age. In virtue of the

¹ On February 9, 1760, *ibid.*, 271, n. 424.

² To the Bishop of Skupi, Matthäus Massarich, *ibid.*, 282, n. 443.

³ C. KARALEVSKIJ in the *Dict. d'hist. et de géogr. ecclés.*, III., Paris, 1924, 647.

⁴ For what follows *cf.* P. BACEL in *Échos d'Orient*, XIV. (1911), 340-351, XV. (1912), 49-60.

right of devolution, Clement himself appointed as the new patriarch Bishop Maximus Hakim of Hierapolis, to whom he sent the profession of faith he had to make.¹ Maximus died in November, 1761, and was succeeded by Athanasius Dahan, Metropolitan of Beirut, who was elected by the Bishops and took the name of Theodosius V. Jauhar, acknowledging neither Maximus nor Theodosius as patriarchs, went in person to Rome, to which his opponents also had appealed. The Pope recognized Theodosius,² and Jauhar was dismissed, receiving for his maintenance the bishopric of Sidon. In 1765 he returned to Syria and again had himself elected patriarch. After Clement XIII. had excommunicated him, as he had already done on the first occasion when he had taken the law into his own hands,³ he submitted to Rome in 1768.⁴ In the same year two of Jauhar's adherents attempted to provoke a schism, even among the so-called Syrians, the converted Jacobites, by consecrating as Bishop, in rivalry to the lawful Bishop Gregory, a monk named Michael from the Ephraim convent near Damascus. Clement XIII. again intervened with the ban of excommunication.⁵

For the Catholics of the Latin rite, both Europeans and Easterns, in the former territories of the patriarchates of

¹ Two documents of August 1, 1760: Pronouncement of the invalidity of the election and appointment of Maximus, in *Ius pontif.*, IV., 49 *seq.*, 51 *seqq.* A letter to the Melchite brethren and to two Druse chieftains friendly to Christianity, of August 1, 1760, *ibid.*, 57. Another letter, to an Emir, of November 15, 1760, *ibid.*, 51 n. Cf. below, p. 433. To put things in order, comprehensive powers were delegated to the Dominican De Lanceis. (*ibid.*, 57).

² On July 7, 1764, *ibid.*, 101. Theodosius received the Pallium (*ibid.*, n.).

³ On September 11, 1765, *ibid.*, 119; letters to Emirs of the same date, *ibid.*, n.

⁴ Cf. KARALEVSKIJ, *loc. cit.* Many documents relating to the incidents mentioned in the continuation of Mansi's Collection of Councils, vol. XLVI., 459-576.

⁵ On April 30, 1768, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 152.

Antioch, Jerusalem, and Cyprus, the Pope appointed as Vicar Apostolic the Lazarist Bossu.¹ The missionaries, including the Jesuits, were also made subject to him and were unable to exercise their authority without his ratification. The Pope also devoted his attention to the Greek-Melchite nunnery at Kesraouan.²

The Maronite Church repeatedly claimed the Pope's attention. In the Consistory of April 6th, 1767, he gladly welcomed the election of the Bishop of Beirut, Joseph Estephan, as the successor of the deceased Patriarch Tobias El-Khazen.³ Estephan fulfilled his expectations by displaying great zeal. With the Pope's encouragement⁴ he held an episcopal assembly in the presence of the Apostolic legate Ludovico da Bastia to execute the decisions of the Lebanon Synod of 1735. With a few modifications his rulings were ratified by the Propaganda on September 4th, 1769.⁵ The establishment of a clerical seminary proved to be uncommonly successful, subsequently producing a series of capable priests and Bishops.⁶

The visionary Anna Agemi⁷ had still a part to play in affairs. The attitude towards her of the late Patriarch Tobias had been one of reserve, but the indulgences granted by Clement XIII. to her, her nuns, and the visitors to her convent, increased to fever pitch the enthusiastic support of her by the common folk. The new Patriarch Estephan espoused her cause, it pleasing him to have in his patriarchate her Congregation, self-styled "of the Sacred Heart", whose feast he had raised to the first class, on a level with Easter and the Ascension. His eagerness for reform, however, and his support

¹ On June 27, 1762, *ibid.*, 80.

² *Ibid.*, 85.

³ *Ibid.*, 148; on pp. 147 *seq.* the letters to the newly elected Patriarch and to the Maronites, of June 29, 1767.

⁴ On August 2, 1767, *ibid.*, 149 *seq.*

⁵ DIB in the *Dict. de théol. cath.*, X., 91.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Cf. our account, Vol. XXXV., 398 *seq.*; KARALEVSKIJ in the *Dict. d'hist. et de géogr. ecclés.*, I., 1276-9.

of Agemi were to have fateful consequences for him in succeeding pontificates.¹

The over-rapid development of the Congregation of the Monks of Mount Lebanon gave rise to dissensions which led to a cleavage. Benedict XIV. tried to preserve unity and Clement XIII. exerted himself in the same direction, but eventually Clement XIV. had to acquiesce in the partition.²

Otherwise the situation for the Christians in Syria was not unfavourable. The Emir Molham (1732-61) was well disposed towards them; when a Franciscan convent and church were plundered by Greek corsairs, he had two of the ringleaders hanged. Several of Molham's children went over to Christianity. The Emir of Ghazir died a Catholic in 1768, and his son Bachir II. afterwards openly professed himself a Christian. Thanks to the exertions of the missionaries and the relations with the West, the Christians of the Lebanon were the leading body in Syria in point of numbers, activity, and education.³

Under Clement XIII. the Chaldean Catholics elected as patriarch the Archbishop of Diarbekir, Timotheus, to whom the Pope sent the pallium.⁴ The Chaldeans of Mosul on the Tigris were successfully cared for by the Dominicans who had been sent here in 1750 under the leadership of Francesco Turriani (d. 1767) and Domenico Codeleoncius.⁵

An event of importance for the Coptic Church was the ratification by Clement XIII.⁶ of the Constitutions which the monks of S. Stefano in Rome had composed not only for themselves but also for their brethren in the East.

In other parts too Clement XIII. did all in his power to encourage the missions and confirm them in their vocation. To the Franciscans in Albania and Macedonia, who usually

¹ DIB, *loc. cit.*, 92 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 134; *Ius pontif.*, III., 686 *seqq.*, IV., 27 *seq.*, 164 *seqq.*

³ H. LAMMENS, *La Syrie*, II., Beyrouth, 1921, 99, 101.

⁴ On March 24, 1760 (ann. incarn. 1759), *ibid.*, 23. Cf. GAMS, *Series*, 457.

⁵ WALZ, 369; HERGENRÖTHER-KIRSCH, IV.⁶, 147; LÜBECK, *Die kath. Orientmission*, Köln, 1917, 142.

⁶ On December 19, 1762, *ibid.*, 69.

spent twelve years on the mission, he granted special privileges on the extension of this term to twenty years.¹ The 150 Franciscan missionaries on Turkish territory, with their three convents, six residences, and thirty parishes providing for 150,000 Christians, had been separated from the Bosnian Province by Benedict XIV. on June 15th, 1757, but formed only a *custodia*. Clement XIII. gave them all the privileges of a religious Province.² He renewed³ the spiritual favours granted to the Jesuit missionaries by Benedict XIV. In response to requests made by the Jesuit General, Ricci, he sought to attract laymen in missionary countries towards apostolic work by dispensing, in a Brief of September 10th, 1766, spiritual favours to all who had brought the knowledge of the true God to an infidel or idolater⁴; to the Order's priests in these parts he granted generous favours and powers. For the Oratorians of St. Philip Neri in Guadalajara, who included among their activities the care of the newly converted, but who had only four priests who were physically fit, the rules governing the reception of the sacrament of ordination were relaxed,⁵ to enable them to increase their number. The missionary colleges were furthered by the Pope in every way possible. Benedict XIII. had given the Franciscans permission to set up one of these institutions in each of their Provinces⁶; under Clement XIII. marks of the Papal favour were given to their missionary college in Ocopa,⁷ the Ephraim College in Rome,⁸ the Pacheco College in Mexico,⁹ and, in general, all their missionary colleges in the West Indies.¹⁰ The missionary

¹ September 11, 1761, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 68.

² On December 15, 1758, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 83 *seqq.*

³ On July 9, 1762, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 81. *Cf. ibid.*, III., 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV., 125 *seqq.*

⁵ On June 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 145.

⁶ *Cf.* our account, Vol. XXXIV., 191.

⁷ *Cf.* above, p. 420.

⁸ Visitation Brief of March 6, 1762, *Ius pontif.*, IV., 72 *seq.*

⁹ Brief of December 20, 1762, *ibid.*, 88.

¹⁰ Brief of February 23, 1767, *ibid.*, 143.

college of the Trinitarians ¹ and the Chinese College in Naples ² were similarly honoured.

The aforesaid Brief for the Jesuits, of September 10th, 1766, was not without a sequel. Although it was no more than a renewal of privileges which, in accordance with the custom established since Pius IV., were granted for only twenty years, and although they consisted only of indulgences and powers to be used in connection with confession, it was used to stir up hatred of the Jesuits. In Rome Zelada managed to procure a copy of the Brief from the printers and immediately passed it to the Spanish envoy. The Spanish agent Azara spread the report that the Brief had been decided on in a secret Consistory and had been printed with the greatest secrecy.³ The Augustinian General, Vasquez, appealed to Roda in Madrid,⁴ where a storm of indignation arose. A lengthy investigation held in Madrid ⁵ ended with the king forbidding the publication of the Brief.⁶

The word-for-word renewal of the equally innocuous Brief for the Jesuits of July 9th, 1762, was to provoke further violent outbursts in the pontificate of Clement XIV.

¹ Brief of September 17, 1759, *ibid.*, 33.

² Briefs of April 24 and May 1, 1760, and August 13, 1764, *ibid.*, 43, 107, *Bull. Cont.*, III., 339. For the founding of the Chinese College, cf. GHERARDO DE VINCENTIIS, *Documenti e titoli sul . . . fondatore M. Ripa*, Napoli, 1904.

³ RICCI, **Espulsione dalla Spagna*, 3, 86.

⁴ *The Roman Jesuits "blasfeman contra los Jansenistas, especialmente V.E., que ha hecho tanto rumor allí contra el Breve de privilegios en virtud de una gran escritura que yo hice contra él y envié a V.E." Vasquez to Roda, March 25, 1767, *Bibl. S. Isidro*, Madrid, *Cartas de Vasquez*, vol. I.

⁵ *Roda to Azara, January 27, 1767, in Jesuit possession; *Azara to Roda, February 5, 1767, Archives of Simancas, Estado, 5095.

⁶ *Roda to the Marchese de San Juan, February 10, 1767, Arch. general central, Madrid, Estado, 2630.