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HISTORY OF THE POPES

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

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ORIGINAL SOURCES

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VOLUME XXVIII.
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URBAN VIII. A.D. 1623-1644.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONCLAVE OF THE YEAR 1623—URBAN VIII. AND THE BARBERINI.

WHEN on July 8th, 1623, Gregory XV., closed his weary eyes, the war enkindled by the Bohemian revolution was still raging in Germany. France and Spain watched each other with hostile eyes owing to the question of the Valtinella, the Small Italian States were divided by quarrels of every description and in the East of Europe the threat of a Turkish onslaught had not abated. Such a situation could not but add importance to the election of a new Pope.¹ But if on this

¹ I should like to thank Landesarchivar Dr. K. Lechner for his kind assistance in the preparation of this account of the Conclave of Urban VIII. There exists a large number of reports dealing with the Conclave. The most important are: (1) Report of a Conclavist: *Conclave di Urbano VIII.*, MSS. in many places (see LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 24 seq.), printed in *Conclavi de Pontefici Romani* (1667), 397 seq., and later, with unimportant corrections in the *Hist. des Conclaves*, Cologne, 1703, 369 seq. It was published earlier by H. CONRING, in a Latin translation: *De electione Urbani VIII. et Innocentii X. comment. hist. duo*, Helmstadii, 1651. (2) *Report of Cardinal Antonio Caetani in *Urb.* 856, p. 1, Vatican Library, and in Gaetani Archives, Rome (*Cod.* 21, No. 6) with the date of composition August 12, 1623. It is found, without author's name, in the State Library, Vienna, 6337, p. 271^b seq., and 6374, p. 164 seq. Petrucelli della Gattina made use of this report though without mentioning the fact, for the account he quotes, that of Lolli, Medici's conclavist, is different. (3) A third *Report, *Conclave di P. Urbano VIII.*, beginning with the words: "*La fortuna in ogni tempo in Roma,*" was found by Dr. Lechner in the State Library, Vienna (6086, p. 135 seq., 6160, p. 132 seq., and 6374, p. 28 seq.). I saw a fourth

occasion the intrigues of the ambassadors and envoys were on a smaller scale than at previous conclaves, the cause lay in the strict regulations of Gregory's Bull on the papal election.

At the time of Gregory XV.'s death only thirty-four members of the Sacred College were in Rome, but by the end of the conclave their number had risen to fifty-four. Of these five only belonged to a remoter period; one of them, Sforza, had been appointed by Gregory XIII.; two, viz. Sauli and Monte, had been created by Sixtus V., and two by Gregory XIV., viz. Borromeo and Farnese. Eight of Clement VIII.'s Cardinals were present, viz. Bandini, Ginnasio, Madruzzo, Este, Pio, Bevilacqua, Deti and Doria: whilst those of Paul V. numbered thirty-two, viz. Borghese, Millini, Barberini, Lante, Verallo, Leni, Crescenzi, Medici, Maurice of Savoy, Capponi, Ubaldini, Centini, Galamina, Priuli, Hohenzollern, Klesl, Savello, Serra, Camponi, Muti, Roma, Cobelluzio, Cennini, Bentivoglio, Rivarola, Scaglia, Borgia, Gherardi, Pignatelli, Valiero, Paniaqua and Carafa; finally there were nine Cardinals of Gregory XV., viz. Ludovisi, Sacrati, Caetani, Aldobrandini, Buoncompagni, Sanseverino, Gozzadini, Rodolfo and Torres.¹

copy in the Faloci Pulignani Library, Foligno. This report I quote as Report *La Fortuna*. (4) The *Report on the Conclave in the *Vita del già pontefice Urbano VIII.*, published by CARINI in *Spicil. Vat.* I. (1893), 336 seq., contains as QUAZZA justly notes (*L'elezione di Urbano VIII.*, in *Arch. Rom.*, XLV., 15, note 1) a great deal of gossip and anecdote, but it originated from someone in the entourage of Barberini, who heard much that others missed. (5) The **Relatione of Msgr. Cornaro, vescovo di Bergamo*, in *Cod. C.* 20 of the Boncompagni Archives, Rome, is of value. It was begun before July 12 and the main part was written between July 12 and 15; it then continues with notes written day by day, until the end of the Conclave. (6) **Scrutinii del conclave 1623*, in *Barb.* 4435 of the Vatican Library, with a *Pianta del conclave* (cf. the plan in the *La Canonizzazione di S. Ignazio*, Roma, 1923, 53) Among more recent works the most useful are: WAHRMUND, *Ausschliessungsrecht*, which reproduces Savelli's report of July 22 (p. 271) and QUAZZA, *loc. cit.*, who uses despatches from the Gonzaga Archives.

¹ See CIACONIUS, IV., 490.

The electors were split up into four parties, viz. the so-called "old ones", viz. those nominated previous to Paul V.'s pontificate; the "Cardinals Princes" viz. Maurice of Savoy, Medici, Farnese and Este; the so-called *Borghesiani*, viz. those created by Paul V., and lastly the Cardinals of Gregory XV. headed by Cardinal Ludovisi, nephew of the Pope.¹ The Borghesiani were the stronger party though not all of them obeyed the instructions of their leader, the famous nephew of Paul V. Thus the attitude of the Spaniards, Borgia and Paniaqua, was doubtful, and the Germans, Hohenzollern and Klesl—above all the Florentines—Capponi and Ubaldini, refused to follow him. On the other hand Este joined Borghese: so did Maurice of Savoy after some hesitation. The latter, owing to the fact that not one French Cardinal was at the conclave, was supposed to look after the interests of France. The number of Borghese's adherents is given as between twenty-two and twenty-five. According to a report of the Florentine envoy, all eyes were directed towards him as the most influential of all the Cardinals.²

Much smaller and less homogeneous was the party of Ludovisi. He disposed, to begin with, of the eight Cardinals of Gregory XV.; to them must be added Aldobrandini with four of Clement VIII.'s Cardinals, and lastly two Cardinals of

¹ For the following accounts of the Cardinals and their views see, besides the sources given in note 1, p. 1, LÄMMER's reports, *loc. cit.*, 22 *seq.*, and QUAZZA, *loc. cit.*, 6, note 1: **Discorso delle fattioni* in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, together with the MSS. discovered by Dr. Lechner in the Vienna State Library, 6061, pp. 106–200, **Scripta varia occasione electionis Urbani VIII.*, which he very kindly handed over to me, and in which the **Discorso dell'Abbate Giulio Araccini* (p. 140 *seq.*) and *ibid.*, 146 *seq.*, and a second **Discorso sopra l'elettione del nuovo pontefice* are valuable. The character sketches by the Venetian ambassadors in BAROZZI-BERCHET, I., 121 *seq.* and 160 *seq.* should also be studied. Finally, there is the *report of POSSEVINO of July 8, 1623, in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² Cf. the report of ELCI of July in the *Biografia del card. Campori*, Modena, 1878, 41.

Paul V., Caponi and Ubaldini. Dissatisfaction with Borghese on the one hand and, on the other, gratitude for numerous and signal favours received at the hands of Gregory XV., had led them into Ludovisi's camp, and similar motives decided Klesl and Zollern. Farnese and Borromeo, both of them men of mark and experience, were likewise decided adherents of Ludovisi, and in the end Medici also attached himself to Gregory XV.'s nephew.

The Spanish ambassador was of opinion that support of Borghese would best guarantee the realization of the wishes of his King, but Borgia, the leader of the Spanish Cardinals, gradually won them over to Ludovisi's side. The imperialists joined the Spaniards so that the number of Ludovisi's adherents reached nineteen or twenty, sufficient to enable them to procure the exclusion of any candidate. The rest of the Cardinals, especially Sauli and Monte, maintained their independence.

The situation created by the conflict of the parties was rendered still more acute by the great number of Cardinals whose years and merit gave them a just claim to the tiara. Though particular accounts vary as regards their number and attainments,¹ the same names recur in most of them. They were the following: in the first instance the two Cardinals created by Sixtus V., Sauli and Monte. Sauli was the senior of the whole Sacred College. He was remarkable for his great experience and political shrewdness, but it was thought that he possessed more aptitude for secular than for ecclesiastical affairs. Ludovisi favoured him but the Aldobrandini family were strongly opposed to him. Monte, who had the reputation of having led a very worldly life in his youth, was known for his French sympathies, hence he was distasteful to the Spaniards. On the other hand he was friendly with the Medici, for which cause Savoy was against him. Another *papabile* was Borromeo, a nephew of St. Charles,

¹ Possevino gives the highest number of papabili (twenty-six) in the *report quoted above, p. 3, note 1. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

a man of extraordinary piety, merit and strictness. He was very keen on the reform. He was believed to have been Gregory XV.'s chief adviser when that Pope drew up the Bull on the papal election, and this may have accounted for his unpopularity with many people; some went so far as to attribute to him peculiar and erratic notions. The Spaniards rejected him because of some of his canonical judgments. Three of Clement VIII.'s Cardinals were also considered as possible candidates; viz. Bandini, Ginnasio and Madruzzo, though the latter is not mentioned by all the chroniclers. Bandini, known for his great political experience and acumen and as a friend of foreigners, had many supporters, Capponi and Ubaldini being among the keenest. Not a few people had looked on him as the future Pope whilst Gregory XV. was still alive. It was precisely this circumstance that made him odious to Borghese, and by reason of some quarrel between these two houses, Medici also opposed him. The same was true of Aldobrandini, Savoy and Savelli.¹ Ginnasio had few opponents, but his supporters were also scanty. His intellectual powers were modest and men called him a miser. Spain, where he had been nuncio, opposed him whereas Farnese, Medici and likewise Ludovisi were friendly towards him. Madruzzo passed for a German, though he himself called himself an Italian. He was one of Spain's candidates and for that reason his candidature was opposed by those in sympathy with France. But because it was thought that he would be an excellent statesman rather than a good Pope, his prospects were slender. Most of the *papabili* were to be found among the Cardinals of Paul V. The names mentioned included Galamina, Barberini, Millini, Cobelluzio, Verallo, Campori, Cennini and Scaglia and in some reports those also of Carafa and Lante. Galamina, a former General of the Dominicans, was a man of exemplary conduct and great piety but somewhat inexperienced in secular business. He was very popular with the Roman people.² The Spaniards were sharply opposed to him because in the appointment of a successor in the Generalate he had not

¹ Cf. QUAZZA, *loc. cit.*, 18.

² *Ibid.*, 14.

considered their wishes and in addition to this he seemed to favour France. Borghese himself did not greatly like him whereas Ludovisi was not unfavourable to him. Barberini also was similarly placed. He was remarkable for his great kindness, learning and experience and had kept aloof from all party intrigues.¹ Moreover he was popular with most of the Cardinals so that his prospects of ascending the papal throne were excellent. Nevertheless he too had to reckon with many obstacles, especially the distrust of the Spaniards because his tenure of the Paris nunciature was supposed to have made him a friend of France. Borghese, too, did not favour him because Barberini's independent spirit had already prejudiced Paul V., the former's uncle, against the Cardinal. Nor did the Medici desire his elevation. Millini, who was equally experienced in ecclesiastical and secular affairs, more particularly in Italian politics, and who was powerfully supported by the Spaniards, might well have hoped to get the tiara had it not been that his undecided character, the huge crowd of his kinsfolk and the decided rejection of him by Ludovisi, constituted insurmountable obstacles. Cardinal Lante was also definitely against him whilst Borghese failed to exert his influence on his behalf. Cobelluzio cherished high hopes of becoming Pope. He was learned and keen on the reform but secretive and haughty. The Spaniards and Ludovisi gave him their support whilst Borghese and Farnese opposed him. Verallo was remarkable for his deeply religious conduct. Borghese was greatly taken with him nor was he unacceptable to the secular Powers, but he had incurred the displeasure of Ludovisi and his adherents because of his previous opposition to Gregory XV.'s Bull on the papal election, and the opponents of his kinsman Millini were his also. Campori was thought to be one of those whose chances stood highest; during the few days before the conclave his name was mentioned with increasing frequency.² At the last conclave

¹ "Il Papa è persona neutrale tra le fazioni," wrote the envoy of Este, immediately after the election, August 6, 1623. State Archives, Modena.

² Cf. for the following, QUAZZA, 12 seq., 17, 19.

he had been excluded by France, but this time no French Cardinal was present ; his other opponents were dead and Borghese was expected to give him strong support.¹ The Spaniards also wanted him and Ludovisi and Aldobrandini, nay, even Savoy seemed not unfavourable. His keenest supporter was Gonzaga. Cennini also might well feel full of confidence. In view of his loyalty to Borghese the latter favoured him in a marked manner,² but Ludovisi was a determined opponent. Scaglia, a learned Dominican, who had received many favours from Gregory XV., cherished a strong hope of obtaining the papacy, notwithstanding his youth ; for that reason he had left Brescia, his home town, and fixed himself at Cremona. Farnese and the Spaniards favoured him whilst the French and the Venetians rejected him. Only a few reports describe as *papabili* the Neapolitan Carafa, a man remarkable for his wisdom, experience and great zeal but rejected by the Spaniards who remembered Paul IV. and his nunciature at Madrid ; also Lante whom his virtuous life made a general favourite ; however, by reason of the opposition between their two families Borghese was unfavourable to him, moreover there was a fear that he would be too partial towards his nephews.³

Among the adherents of Ludovisi three *papabili* were in question, viz. Sanseverino, Caetani and Sacrati. The Neapolitan Sanseverino was distinguished for his blameless life and great learning and he enjoyed the esteem of all the Cardinals. Ubaldini was his most active supporter. However, it was precisely this circumstance that decided Borghese to offer the most determined opposition to his election. The King of Spain was also unfavourable to him. Caetani, too, had to encounter the opposition of Borghese, just as he had had to bear that of Paul V. He passed for a man of learning and ability for affairs though still young and somewhat peculiar.

¹ See the **Discorso sopra l'elezione del nuovo pontefice*, Cod. 6160, of the State Library, Vienna.

² See *QUAZZA, 14.

³ In the **Discorso* of Araccini, Crescenzi and Gherardi are also mentioned as *papabili*. State Library, Vienna.

Sacrati, who was esteemed for his piety and his knowledge of the law, also failed to please Borghese ; moreover he was still very young and there were those who thought he lacked energy. The prospects of the senior of all the Cardinals, Sforza, were of the slightest ; he was a warrior rather than a Prince of the Church and, on the whole, he sided with the Spaniards. ¹

Thus the difficulty of a choice, which was already very great owing to the rivalry between Borghese and Ludovisi, was still further increased by the unusual number of possible candidates. Much depended on the attitude of the secular princes. For the Emperor, in particular, it was a matter of no small concern that a Pope should be elected who not only would not lean towards France but who would be ready to give him financial help.² On the very day of the death of the deceased Pope, Hohenzollern, the Cardinal Protector of the German nation, had written to the Emperor that, in view of the strength of the opposition, he should urge all the Cardinals of the Empire to repair to Rome just as those of Spain had been urged to go there.³ Thereupon Ferdinand, as on the occasion of the death of Paul V., dispatched to Rome Cardinal Dietrichstein, " that faithful interpreter of his views," on whom he placed special reliance.⁴ Letters were sent to the Austrian ambassador Gavelli, to Cardinal Madruzzo and to Ludovisi to solicit their support for Dietrichstein in the coming discussions.⁵ The

¹ See *Hist. des Conclaves*, 386, and the **Discorso* of Araccini, State Library, Vienna.

² As early as November 16, 1622, the imperial envoy, Savelli, brother of the Cardinal, had written to the Emperor that in the coming conclave the question would be an alliance with the Spanish party, so as to push forward a Cardinal friendly to the Habsburgs, and eventually to exclude undesirables. One could reckon on Borghese, Zollern, Dietrichstein, Madruzzo, Rodolfo and Savelli. State Archives, Vienna.

³ See HURTER, *Ferdinand II.*, vol. IX., 259.

⁴ See RILLE, in the *Zeitschr. des Deutschen Vereins für die Gesch. Mährens*, XVI. (1912), 115 seq.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Emperor also wrote to Klesl, who had been released from his prison in the Castle S. Angelo on June 16th, asking him "to do his utmost for a favourable election".¹ However, Vienna failed to give definite instructions and this time also Cardinal Dietrichstein reached Rome too late.² Very different was the conduct of the Catholic King, The Spanish ambassador, Pastrana, who had only just arrived in Rome, had been instructed to exclude Galamina, as at the preceding conclave; also Borromeo and, if necessary, Carafa and Monte.³ Whereas the Spanish plenipotentiary, Cardinal Borgia, mindful of Cardinal Avila's neglect at the conclave of the year 1605, wanted the exclusion to be proclaimed at the very outset, Doria and Paniaqua were for putting it off until it should become unavoidable. So the two Cardinals were content to put their wishes before those of their colleagues who were well disposed towards them, but for greater security Pastrana called on the two leaders, Borghese and Ludovisi, on the evening before the closure of the conclave, to demand the exclusion of Galamina, notwithstanding the fact that Ludovisi had already taken steps on his behalf. Whilst Borghese agreed at once, Ludovisi would only promise not to put him forward.⁴ Thus Borghese became more or less a partisan of the Hispano-Imperial faction though his aim was in the first instance the elevation of one of his own adherents.⁵ The representative of France, Cardinal Maurice of Savoy, also refused to side with Ludovisi; he ranged himself alongside of Borghese.⁶

¹ See HAMMER-PURGSTALL, IV., 192.

² See WAHRMUND, 241, RILLE (*loc. cit.*), and PETRUCELLI (66), who incorrectly affirm that Dietrichstein took part in the election.

³ See WAHRMUND, 125 *seq.* According to *CORNARO's account, both Spanish representatives declared Sanseverino to be "diffidente". Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

⁴ Cf. *Hist. des conclaves*, 386, and PETRUCELLI, 54 *seq.* It is not true that Pastrana directly urged Borghese and Ludovisi to exclude Borromeo, as WAHRMUND (126) affirms.

⁵ Cf. the *report of the envoy Savelli of July 22, 1623, in WAHRMUND, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 385 *seq.*, and the *report *La fortuna*.

Ludovisi's main effort was to keep the Spaniards and the French mutually divided as well as to separate them from Borghese. With this end in view he successively proposed the names of Galamina, Bandini, Sanseverino on the one hand, and on the other those of Ginnasio, Madruzzo and Cobelluzio,¹ though with little success. The other envoys also called upon individual Cardinals in order to urge the elevation of some Cardinal acceptable to their respective sovereigns; thus acted the representative of Venice, which was opposed to Spain, that of Tuscany which was represented by the uncle of the Grand-Duke and by a number of *papabili*, and lastly the envoy of Savoy which greatly favoured the candidature of Borromeo.² The house of Gonzaga displayed great activity. It was represented by the Bishop of Mantua, Vincenzo Agnelli Soardi, who worked especially for the elevation of Campori and who was, on the whole, allied with Borghese. For all that the Bishop of Mantua kept in close though secret touch with the other pretenders and even with Ludovisi himself.³

In the meantime eleven days had gone by since the death of the Pope and the novena of funeral services was ended. A great dearth had broken out in the city, a fact by which the Sacred College was not a little perturbed. Extraordinary measures were taken to insure the tranquillity of Rome; strong military patrols paraded the streets and were posted before the palaces of the Cardinals and the nobility. Nevertheless many acts of violence occurred at night.⁴ On Wednesday, July 9th, after the Mass of the Holy Ghost and the customary discourse, delivered by Giovanni Ciampoli,⁵ the Cardinals entered the conclave in procession. They went first to the

¹ See the *report *La fortuna*, the *report of Savelli of January 22, 1622, *loc. cit.*

² See PETRUCELLI, 56.

³ See QUAZZA, 19.

⁴ See QUAZZA, 12, 17. Cf. BORZELLI, *Marino*, 172. Even during the conclave there was no lack of acts of violence in the city; see *Vita di Ag. Mascardi*, in the *Atti Lig.*, XLII., 130.

⁵ *Oratio de Pontifice maximo eligendo*, Romae, 1623.

Sistine chapel where the Bulls on the election of a Pope were read and their observance was sworn to. Thirty-three Cardinals stayed in the conclave from that moment ; the rest remained outside until the evening, spending the time in visits and discussions. Individual ambassadors likewise paid their last calls, the Spaniards especially making a supreme effort to bring about the exclusion of Galamina and Borromeo.¹ At five o'clock in the evening the conclave was closed. Fifty-one Cardinals had entered, Campori and Galamina having arrived that very day.² Serra arrived on the following day.³ The Jesuit Stefano del Bufalo was present in the conclave in the capacity of confessor.⁴ The extraordinary heat of the season, the great number of Cardinals and the restricted space which it was sought to remedy in part by holding the assemblies in the corridor of the Belvedere,⁵ as well as a presumably lengthy conclave, held out a prospect of fatiguing and wearing days.

The first scrutiny took place on the morning of July 20th. Everybody had kept his plans to himself, hence the votes were very much divided. No one got more than ten. Bandini secured that number, with an additional three in the *accessus*, so that he led with thirteen votes.⁶ Cobelluzio followed with eleven votes (five in the ballot and six in the *accessus*).⁷ Verallo and Galamina also obtained a few additional votes whilst Barberini only secured four.⁸ Whilst Galamina's votes quickly dwindled, Bandini remained to the fore because by

¹ See the *report of Cardinal Caetani, Gaetani Archives, Rome.

² See the *report of Cornaro, Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

³ See the *list of the scrutinies of July 20, 1623. Vatican Library.

⁴ His appointment might be regarded as a triumph for Borghese as against the Discalced Friar Domenico della Scala put forward by Ludovisi ; see the *report of Cardinal Caetani, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See QUAZZA, 17.

⁶ See *Conclavi*, 415, and the *report, *La fortuna*.

⁷ See QUAZZA, 21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 22, 23.

now Ludovisi had made him his chief candidate, less out of friendship than from opposition to Borghese. At the scrutiny of the morning of July 22nd—Borromeo and Scaglia had joined the conclave the day before¹—Bandini received twenty-one votes, Borromeo, Farnese and some of the Spaniards, but especially Cavalcante, Bandini's nephew and conclavist having worked hard for him.² Thereupon Borghese made a decisive move against Bandini and sought to force the election of one of his adherents. Whilst Campori's candidature had never really mattered,³ Millini had been getting more and more votes. Between the morning ballot and the evening one Borghese, together with Sforza, worked so hard that in the evening of the 22nd Millini obtained twenty-six votes (15 + 11) whereas Bandini lost a great many.⁴ On the advice of Sforza and with his help, Borghese now sought to collect the number of votes required to make Millini Pope on the following morning.⁵ Many Cardinals were approached, special efforts being made to win over Medici and Borromeo, and three times messengers were even sent to Ludovisi to induce him to change his mind, but they only obtained an evasive answer.⁶ In reality Ludovisi worked feverishly all through the night to bring about Millini's exclusion. He shrank from no humiliation or bribe, especially towards Este, Savoy and the older Cardinals.⁷ By the morning he had secured thirty-three votes: Millini only obtained twenty.⁸ Though grievously disappointed, Millini's friends did not give in, in fact up to July 27th he always secured the greatest number of votes. Neither did

¹ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 389, and the *report *La fortuna*.

² See *Hist. des conclaves*, 389, and the *report *La fortuna*.

³ See the **Vita in Spicil. Vat.*, 356.

⁴ See the *report *La fortuna*.

⁵ The *report *La fortuna* says that if the new Bull of Gregory XV. had not been in the way, Millini would have been raised to the papacy that very night, by "adoration".

⁶ See the *report of Cardinal Caetani, Gaetani Archives, Rome. *Hist. des conclaves*, 390 seq.; PETRUCELLI, 60 seq.

⁷ See the *report *La fortuna*.

⁸ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 391 seq.; PETRUCELLI, 61 seq.

Bandini's supporters despair.¹ Ludovisi, who had been rebuked by several Cardinals because of his efforts to bring about the exclusion of Millini and for having proposed, from the first moment of the struggle, a personality he himself mistrusted and whom the Borghese disliked,² now dropped Bandini and sought to gain his ends by other means. But the ensuing days brought no hope of a decision and the expectation of a long conclave became more general. Each of the chief parties hoped for victory; Borghese expected to prevail by wearing out his opponents and he continued to stick, in the first instance, to Campori and Cennini.³ Opposition between the two leaders had become so sharp—they no longer greeted each other—that some of the Cardinals resolved to bring about a reconciliation, were it a purely external one. After the morning scrutiny of July 26th and at the prayer of Savoy and Borgia, Ludovisi was induced to engage in an exchange of opinions with Borghese in the Sistine chapel and in the presence of other Cardinals.⁴ However, there could be no question of a real understanding so that it became necessary, once the more likely candidates of each party had been eliminated,⁵ to think of some other means of arriving at a result. The first was to put forward neutral Cardinals who, because of the high esteem in which they stood, could not well be rejected by both parties, viz. Ginnasio, Monte and Sauli. But though each of them had his own powerful advocate (Aldobrandini, Medici, Farnese), so many

¹ See the *report *La fortuna*. Cf. QUAZZA, 27.

² *Report of the Mantuan envoy of July 29, 1623, Gonzaga Archiyes, Mantua.

³ See QUAZZA, 23.

⁴ * "Hodierna die post habitum scrutinium Ludovisius advocatis primum et Borgia et Sabaudo, nulla habita ratione verborum quae contra se Burghesius effutierat, illum adivit, blande allocutus est, operam etiam suam obtulit" (SCRUTINII, in *Cod. Barb.* (see above, p. 1, note 1), Vatican Library). While the third, who took pains to bring about a reconciliation, is here said to be Este, other reports (*Hist. des conclaves*, 292 seq.; PETRUCELLI, 63 seq.) mention Cardinal Medici and give July 23 as the date of the occurrence.

⁵ See the *letter of LOLLI, July 26, 1623, in PETRUCELLI, 67.

difficulties arose nevertheless, or rather precisely because of that fact, that none of them succeeded.¹ Yet another manœuvre of Ludovisi's was the proposal to Borghese of three of the latter's Cardinals² for him to choose from. But Borghese refused for fear of sowing discord and jealousy among his followers. The same thing happened when Cardinal Borgia tried to act as mediator and proposed to Ludovisi some of the Cardinals whom Borghese esteemed most. Ludovisi declined, wishing to leave the choice to Borghese; the latter refused for the same reasons as before.³ Thus Borgia's proposal proved abortive. He was equally unsuccessful in his efforts on behalf of Sauli for the latter was opposed not only by Borghese but even by Pignatelli and Serra.⁴ Once again Este proposed Campori and others worked for Ginnasio; however, both proposals met with determined opposition.⁵

Though success failed to crown any of these efforts, at least a rapprochement took place between Ludovisi and Borgia who, notwithstanding the instructions of his king, preferred the nephew of Gregory XV. to Borghese.⁶ The important question for Ludovisi now was how to upset Borghese's relations with the Spaniards as well as with those who entertained French sympathies. Circumstances were all the more favourable as most of the Cardinals felt a certain irritation against Borghese, for in his opposition to the various candidatures proposed they saw the main cause of the delay of the election.⁷ When a rumour spread that, with a view to weakening the distrust of his own adherents, Borghese had sworn that he would rather die than allow a candidate of another party to obtain the papacy, Ludovisi began to agitate for the elevation of Borromeo. Already in the morning of June 28th

¹ See PETRUCCELLI, 64 seq.; *Hist. des Conclaves*, 393 seq.

² See PETRUCCELLI, 67.

³ *Ibid.*, 65 seq.; *Hist. des conclaves*, 394 seq.

⁴ Cf. the *report of Cardinal Caetani, Gaetani Archives, Rome.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See PETRUCCELLI, 66.

⁷ See *Conclavi*, 419; PETRUCCELLI, 65.

he had succeeded in collecting eighteen votes for Borromeo.¹ Maurice of Savoy and Valiero among the Borghesians voted for him.² The Spaniard, Cardinal Borgia, was aghast and sharply rebuked Borghese for he thought that only he could have supported Borromeo.³ However, the very next scrutiny gave an opportunity to Borghese, who laid all the blame on Ludovisi, to clear himself of this suspicion for, after a previous understanding with his followers, he was able to collect twenty-six votes for Millini, whereas Borromeo's eleven—five in the scrutiny and six in the *accessus*—were exclusively cast by Ludovisi's henchmen.⁴ Thus yet another effort had failed: in like manner a further discussion between Ludovisi and Borghese, in which the former declared himself in favour of Cobelluzio, failed to lead to a practical result.⁵

Meanwhile the situation in the conclave was becoming difficult, the heat and the lack of air rendering the sojourn in it increasingly trying and seriously threatening the health of the Cardinals. However, the end was not in sight owing to the great number of pretenders.⁶ In the city there occurred many murders and robberies, in the Campagna bandits multiplied their excesses and the cost of living had risen enormously.⁷ It was then that on the 29th after the midday scrutiny, a *pratica* (compromise) in favour of Barberini was

¹ *Hist des conclaves*, 395 seq.

² See the *report *La fortuna*.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See the *report from Mantua, of July 29, 1623, in QUAZZA, 27, and the *report *La fortuna*. On some points the accounts differ. Whereas almost everywhere the votes for Borromeo at both these scrutinies are given as 18, respectively 11, Cornaro's *account speaks of 24, respectively, 12 votes; and whereas the latter places the final result of the second scrutiny on the morning of the 29th, the *Copia degli scrutini*, used by QUAZZA (27), puts it on the evening of the 28th; moreover Millini is stated to have had 20, not 26 votes.

⁵ See the *report *La fortuna*.

⁶ See the *report of the Mantuan envoy and that of A. POSSEVINO, July 29, 1623, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁷ See the *report of CORNARO of July 30, 1623. Cf. QUAZZA, 29.

suggested from various quarters. It is difficult to ascertain from which quarter the first move originated because naturally enough in every account each party claims for itself the merit of having suggested it.¹ In point of fact Ludovisi seems to have had a good deal to do with it ; but so did Caetani and Farnese who had agitated in favour of Barberini even before the opening of the conclave. July 30th was wholly spent in consultations. A general stock-taking showed that the parties, if united, commanded between 21–23 votes and it was then only that Barberini was informed of the intentions of his friends. He saw clearly that if he was to succeed, he must begin by making sure of the support of the individual parties. So he repaired personally to Borgia, to Borghese and eventually to Ludovisi. Though their assurances seemed reliable enough, great caution was necessary in view of the mutual distrust of the two last named, the doubtful attitude of Borgia and the efforts which Medici was still making in favour of Monte. But the fear that the older Cardinals would refuse their support to a Cardinal who was not yet fifty-four years of age and who had a very strong physique and excellent health, a fear that had existed from the first, was only too well justified when on July 31st things began to look serious.² When the Cardinal of Savoy strongly dissuaded Barberini from pressing his candidature and urged him to defer it until some future and more favourable occasion, Barberini himself begged the leaders to withdraw his name.³ On the other hand the opposition was not idle during these transactions ; all this time Borromeo and Millini had obtained more votes than anyone else, though

¹ For what follows *cf. Hist. des conclaves*, 398 *seq.* ; PETRUCELLI, 72 *seq.* ; the *Vita* ed. Carini, 357 *seq.*, and the *account *La fortuna*. The *account of Caetani reports the decisive conversation between Borgia and Ludovisi. *Cf. PETRUCELLI*, 71 ; also QUAZZA, 39. L. A. GIUNTI (**Vita del card. Ludovisi*), emphasizes in the most marked manner the part Ludovisi played in the election of Urban VIII. *Cod.* 37, D. 8, of the Corsini Library, Rome.

² *Cf. the *report of CORNARO*, July 31, 1623.

³ *Ibid. Cf. also the *Vita*, ed. Carini, 357.

neither secured more than twenty.¹ As late as July 30th Ludovisi and Borgia had sought to put forward Scaglia, but the old Cardinals who had not yet given up hope, above all Borromeo, were opposed to him.² On the same day Priuli reached Rome, though shortly before he had sent a message to Borghese that he was detained at Siena by an attack of gout.³ Thus there were fifty-four Cardinals in the conclave.⁴ When on July 31st it became necessary to give up all action in favour of Barberini it seemed as if another period of inactivity would ensue. However, on the very next day Ludovisi, whose energy and spirit of enterprise far surpassed that of the rest, was ready with a fresh candidate. An exhaustive survey of the situation had led him to the conclusion that somehow a Pope would have to be found among the Cardinals of Paul V., hence he was now prepared to push with all his energy the candidature of Cobelluzio whom Borghese disliked and refused to support. In this endeavour Ludovisi was strongly supported by Borgia and the Spaniards who had now definitely taken his side. In the scrutiny of August 1st Cobelluzio got twenty-four votes (eighteen in the scrutiny and six in the *accessus*).⁵ However, Borghese had been informed of the plot. Once again he put forward Millini, who obtained twenty-two votes in the same ballot.⁶ Ludovisi's exertions during the night were rewarded in the morning with twenty-five votes for Cobelluzio (17—8), whereas Millini's sank to twenty-one.⁷ However, Maurice of Savoy was profoundly dissatisfied with these practices and opposed them. Borghese bitterly reproached Ludovisi for his support of a

¹ See the *report of CORNARO of July 29 and 30, 1623.

² See the *report *La fortuna*.

³ *Report of the Mantuan envoy of July 29, 1623, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁴ See the *report of CORNARO, July 30, 1623, and QUAZZA, 28.

⁵ See the *report *La fortuna*, and QUAZZA, 28.

⁶ Cf. PETRUCELLI, 74.

⁷ See the *report *La fortuna*; *QUAZZA, 28; *Hist. des conclaves*, 410.

Cardinal who was unacceptable to him.¹ To induce him to change his mind he could think of nothing better than to propose Cardinals Galamina and Carafa who were unacceptable to the Spaniards.² Thereupon Borgia dropped Cobelluzio and mutual promises ensued. Ginnasio also abandoned Cobelluzio in the hope of getting his own candidature accepted by Borghese.³ The consequence was that in the next scrutiny Cobelluzio only secured twenty-two votes.⁴ Thus this attempt also failed.

In the meantime, owing to the great heat, conditions in the conclave became altogether unbearable and malaria, which always threatens in August, made its appearance. A number of Cardinals fell ill.⁵ By August 3rd ten were down with fever and Gherardi as well as a number of conclavists had to leave the conclave. In the evening Borghese also was taken ill.⁶ The conclavists related that the conclave was much less concerned with choosing a Pope than with the exclusion of pretenders and that without a miraculous intervention of God it was impossible to foresee how it would end.⁷ Three great and clearly defined parties faced one another: the party of Borghese, that of Ludovisi allied with the Aldobrandini and

¹ See the *report *La fortuna* and CAETANI's report.

² See the *report *La fortuna*. It is not certain whether this proposal came from Barberini, as stated in the *Hist. des conclaves*, 410.

³ See CAETANI's *report.

⁴ According to CORNARO's *report, on the evening of August 2, according to the others not till early on 3rd. Millini had only nineteen votes; CORNARO says twenty-one.

⁵ See the *report of CORNARO for August 3, 1623. Cf. HEBEISEN, *Hohenzollern*, 170 seq.; CELANI, *Storia della Malaria nell'agro Romano*, Città di Castello, 1925, 362.

⁶ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 413; PETRUCELLI, 70, 74; *Vita*, ed. Carini, 351; *report *La fortuna*; *report of the Mantuan envoy, August 5, 1623; Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. All the reports state that the following fell ill: Sforza, Farnese, Pignatelli, Gherardi, Borghese; some reports mention others also.

⁷ See the *report of the Mantuan ambassador, August 5, 1623. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

that of the old Cardinals—twenty-two of their number were over sixty—who excluded all the others.¹ By now the neutral Cardinals were exceedingly embittered by these transactions and pressed for a termination of the conclave. Though Ludovisi and the Spaniards were not spared reproaches, their resentment was chiefly directed against Borghese.² A hope arose that illness would compel him to leave the conclave, but on the following day, August 4th, the fever had abated and he resumed his work on behalf of his adherents, especially Campori and Cennini, and even Monte, who was still favoured by Medici.³ It was probably he who put in circulation certain rumours⁴ calculated to prejudice the cause of Barberini whose elevation Farnese, Ubaldini and others had never ceased to advocate.⁵ In like manner Borghese promptly made known the attempts of Maurice of Savoy to raise Galamina to the papacy and proffered his help to Borgia.⁶ All hopes were now centred on the French Cardinals whose arrival was expected. Everyone believed that they would side with Borghese.⁷ Cardinal Orsini's arrival was hourly expected.

On the evening of August 4th Borghese had begged permission to leave the conclave.⁸ At that very moment Maurice of Savoy had called on Barberini to tell him that the time had come for energetic measures.⁹ A rapidly convened meeting of from six to eight friends of Barberini settled the main lines

¹ *Ibid.* the *report of CORNARO and PETRUCELLI, 69.

² *Hist. des conclaves*, 411; PETRUCELLI, 74.

³ See QUAZZA, 34.

⁴ With regard to the marriage of his nephew, see QUAZZA, 33.

⁵ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 408 seq., 412.

⁶ See CORNARO's *report; PETRUCELLI, 75.

⁷ Ludovisi cannot, therefore, be regarded as an adherent of the French party. Cf. the *report of the envoy of Savoy, August 4, 1623: "Notre cardinal de Savoie est ici preque seul." PETRUCELLI, 70.

⁸ See the **Vita*, ed. Carini, 360.

⁹ Cf. for the following, the **Vita*, ed. Carini, 360 seq.; it is drawn up by an intimate of Barberini and gives precise information on these incidents.

of further action. It was agreed to begin by winning over Ludovisi who had it in his power to pronounce anyone's exclusion. Rivarola was entrusted with this mission. In the early hours of the 5th Borghese's fever had gone up a good deal so that he made up his mind to leave the conclave after the evening scrutiny. His friend Pignatelli, who had suffered a relapse, had come to a like decision.¹ After the morning scrutiny Borghese convened all his adherents in his cell,² informed them of his decision and exhorted them to remain true and constant. He charged them, during his absence, to pursue all together the line of conduct they had hitherto followed and not to undertake anything until his return. Cardinal Leni was to be his representative.³ They agreed to everything. When this news became known in the conclave, there was no small stir. The hopes based on Borghese's departure were apparently shattered. Reproaches came from every quarter and there was a general determination not to allow him to leave the conclave,⁴ a resolve which had the special support of Cardinal Hohenzollern.⁵ Soon after Rivarola called on Cardinal Ludovisi for the exchange of ideas agreed upon on the previous evening. He now suggested the candidature of Barberini. Thereupon Ludovisi once more subjected to a serious examination all the *papabili* and their chances and at two in the afternoon decided to sound his friends with regard to Barberini's candidature. At that moment a truly wonderful change took place within the conclave.⁶ Nearly

¹ See the *report *La fortuna*, and CORNARO'S *report, August 5, 1623.

² Capponi, Ubaldini and Cobelluzio were excepted; see the *report *La fortuna*.

³ According to Scaglia, Borghese called the Cardinal of Savoy "capo"; see QUAZZA, 37, note 2.

⁴ See PETRUCCELLI, 75; *Hist. des conclaves*, 413; the *report *La fortuna*.

⁵ See PETRUCCELLI, 75; cf. HURTER, *Ferdinand II.*, vol. IX., 260, for the co-operation of Zollern.

⁶ CORNARO, in his *report for August 6, after the election had been made, writes: "Sino alle 2 hore della giornata di heri si

everyone realized that only by speedy election could they forestall Borghese. Thus it came about that Ludovisi was able to collect twenty-two votes.¹ The point now was to win over the remaining Cardinals, above all Borgia and the Cardinals Princes. Borgia was talked over by Caetani whilst the latter foregathered in the cell of Farnese who was indisposed.² At the evening scrutiny Barberini presented Borghese's request to leave the conclave, a prayer that was readily granted.³ The Spaniards at once repaired to Borghese urging him not to leave until after the scrutiny of the next morning, since Barberini's prospects were most favourable and on the point of realization. Paniaqua and Doria were particularly insistent, but Borghese would not listen to them. Maurice of Savoy who came after them with a similar request received a like answer.⁴ Valiero fared slightly better. Some other followers of his likewise besought Borghese to wait till the next scrutiny and he seemed inclined to yield when one of the elder Cardinals dissuaded him once more.⁵ Maurice of

ridusse il negotio della elettione del Papa a termine così imbrogliato e difficile che ognuno teneva per fermo che il conclave dovesse andar in lungo per lo meno ancora un paio di mesi." It appears that Borghese wished to leave the conclave. "Però quelli che havevano sino al martedì antecedente (August 17) mossa la pratica del card. Barberini imaginandosi che questo bisbiglio potesse essere buona occasione di proseguirla e ridurla a buon porto, cominciorno verso le 3 hore a trattarne tanto gagliardamente e così d'accordo che non si trovò contraddittione da nessuna parte, anzi in tutte le fattioni et nationi si scopri tanta prontezza che non havendo lui nemici da alcuno bando, furono molti cardinali che uno a gara dell'altro negotiorno a suo favore buona parte di quella notte."

¹ See *Vita*, ed. Carini, 362.

² See *Hist. des conclaves*, 414, 416 *seq.*; PETRUCELLI, 76; in greater detail in CORNARO's *report. For Borgia's part in the election of Urban VIII., see QUAZZA, 37, note 2, 38.

³ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 415.

⁴ See CAETANI's *report and *Hist. des conclaves*, 415 *seq.*

⁵ See CAETANI's *report.

Savoy strove in vain to bring him back to this first intention. Whereupon Pignatelli, who had been informed by Rivarola of the action in favour of Barberini, rose from his sick bed in order to induce Borghese to give up his plan. By eight in the evening success had crowned his efforts.¹ When some objection of Sforza, the spokesman of the old Cardinals, had been dealt with and the four Cardinals Princes had once more discussed the situation with Borgia until far into the night, the latter resolved to call on Borghese early on the following morning.² Barberini also received many visits from Cardinals almost throughout the night.³ However, the opponents were not idle, especially Campori, who was unwilling to give up the hope of his own election and Serra, who saw in Barberini a Pope who was likely to be rather favourable to Spain, as well as Bandini's conclavist.⁴ Nevertheless their efforts were fruitless. At six in the morning Barberini paid a short visit to Borghese for a last consultation.⁵ He was promptly succeeded by Maurice of Savoy who wanted to know how Borghese's adherents were to be informed of the impending election. It was decided that he himself should break the news to the junior Cardinals; Savelli was commissioned to communicate it to the others. The information met with a not unfavourable reception. Presently the Cardinals Princes and Borgia also arrived and soon after Ludovisi: it was now 10 o'clock.⁶ The old opponents became reconciled and a plan of procedure was settled. Ludovisi and his followers as well as other parties were to give their votes at the scrutiny whilst Borghese and his adherents

¹ See PETRUCELLI, 77. The *Vita*, ed. Carini, 365, reports that Borghese only heard of Barberini's imminent election from Pignatelli.

² See *Hist. des conclaves*, 417.

³ See **Vita*, ed. Carini, 365 seq. The conclavist Ceva so arranged things that the different Cardinals were able to make their visits unobserved by each other.

⁴ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 417 seq.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 419.

⁶ See PETRUCELLI, 77; *Hist. des conclaves*, 410; *CORNARO'S report.

would follow on in the *accessus*.¹ Each group was reckoned to dispose of eighteen votes.² Borghese even ordered the recall into the conclave of Gherardi who was still in the Vatican palace. Some smaller conventicles of the doubtful ones, and especially of the old Cardinals, which had been convened in the Sala Regia, were effectively prevented.³ Thereupon the Cardinals proceeded to the scrutiny. Barberini himself was very much excited; his partisans were full of confidence as they escorted him into the Sistine chapel, in fact Ceva, his conclavist, as soon as the chapel door was closed, sent out a ticket to the Cardinal's brother, Carlo Barberini, in which he announced the election as an accomplished fact.⁴ Borghese, Gherardi, Pignatelli and Sanseverino were not present at the scrutiny itself.⁵ The scrutators on that forenoon were Zollern, Scaglia, and Boncompagni.⁶ The ballot gave Barberini twenty-six votes. His election seemed assured and many exclaimed: *Papam habemus!* at the same time offering their congratulations. This alarmed the other Cardinals, with the result that almost all of them voted for Barberini at the *accessus*. However, when the ballot papers were examined, it was seen that there were only twenty-three papers for twenty-four Cardinals, whether through carelessness or some other cause.⁷ Already there were those who attacked the validity of the election, whilst Farnese and many others were of opinion that the missing vote was of no consequence in view of the great number of votes favourable to Barberini. The greatest excitement prevailed in the conclave, all the more so as news of Barberini's election had been spread all over Rome. The suspense lasted two hours. Borghese and Pignatelli also

¹ See *CORNARO's report.

² See the *report *La fortuna*.

³ *Hist. des conclaves*, 420 seq.; *Vita*, ed. Carini, 368 seq.

⁴ See *Vita*, ed. Carini, 368 seq.

⁵ See PETRUCELLI, 78.

⁶ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 422.

⁷ See the *report *La fortuna*. There were not lacking rumours to the effect that Scaglia had caused a voting paper to disappear up his sleeve; see *Hist. des conclaves*, 422 seq.

arrived meanwhile. In conformity with the Bull of Gregory XV., and in order to remove every pretext for impugning his election, Barberini himself demanded a repetition of the *accessus*.¹ This was done and the ballot papers were then found in order: He had twenty-four votes which, with the twenty-six of the *accessus*, made a total of fifty. Only three Cardinals had not voted for Barberini and he himself appears to have given his vote to Cobelluzio.² The result was received with general satisfaction. It was looked upon as a visible proof of the action of the Holy Ghost Who, notwithstanding the greatest difficulties and obstacles, had led the election to so happy a termination. When Barberini was asked whether he accepted the election, he went down on his knees to pray for a while. He then declared that he accepted and that he would take the name of Urban VIII. When he had put on the pontifical robes the Cardinals paid the first homage.³ The new Pope then withdrew to the cell of Borghese to take some refreshments. After that his very first act was to reconcile Borghese, Ludovisi and Aldobrandini with one another and to admonish them to desist from strife.⁴ At eight in the evening Urban VIII. was carried into St. Peter's for the second and public act of homage.⁵

The election called forth such joy in Rome that complete quiet was promptly established without any special ordinances to that effect.⁶ One contributory cause to this happy result may have been the rumour that the new Pope had taken the

¹ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 422 seq.; *Vita*, ed. Carini, 370 seq.; *CORNARO's report.

² Cobelluzio certainly received a further vote in the *accessus*; see QUAZZA, 37, note 1.

³ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 425; *Vita*, ed. Carini, 370 seq.

⁴ See CORNARO's *report and the *report *La fortuna*.

⁵ See *Hist. des conclaves*, 425; *Vita*, ed. Carini, 371; CORNARO's *report.

⁶ *Report of FABIO CARANDINI FERRARI of August 19, 1623, State Archives, Modena. For the rejoicings of the Romans see BIJDGAG, *tot de geschied. v. h. hertogdom Brabant*, VII. (1908), 70; for the Roman academicians, see ODESCALCHI, *Mem. d. Accad. dei Lincei*, Rome, 1806, 147.

name of Urban because of his special affection for Rome, the *Urbs* par excellence, and because he wished his name to be a perpetual reminder that he must curb his nature which was inclined towards sternness.¹ There was general surprise that amongst so many pretenders of more advanced years the choice should have fallen on a comparatively young man in excellent health.² However, the Pope's health was soon put to a searching test, for Urban VIII. had caught the malaria during the conclave and it was solely thanks to his extraordinarily sound constitution that he escaped with his life,³ for among the Cardinals and conclavists a good many succumbed to the disease.⁴

In Paris, where people had excellent recollections of him as nuncio, Urban VIII.'s election was hailed with delight⁵; Madrid, on the other hand, was greatly perturbed⁶ because

¹ " Egli dice haver preso il nome di Urbano per due cause, la prima per amar egli molto questa città, che s'appella Urbs per antonomasia, la seconda perchè conoscendo egli la sua natura tirar alquanto al rigidetto le fusse continuo raccordo di dover temperarla " (*Report of F. Carandini Ferrari of August 19, 1623, *loc. cit.*). According to the Venetian *obbedienza* ambassadors, Urban is said to have taken this name in memory of the great Popes who had borne it; see BAROZZI-BERCHET, I., 225. According to others he had in mind the Pope of the Crusades, Urban II.; see NEGRI, 174. Urban VIII. chose for his motto the words of Psalm xxv, 1: " In domino sperans non infirmabor "; see BARBIER, IV., 20.

² " Abbiamo fatto Papa Barberini, cosa reputata incredibile che tanti vecchi pretendenti habbino concordato in un giovane d'anni, ma di prospera salute tanto che non si può dire di più." *Report of F. CARANDINI FERRARI of August 6, 1623, *loc. cit.*

³ See CELLI, *Malaria*, 362 *seq.*

⁴ Cardinals Pignatelli, Serra, Sauli, Gozzardini, Sacrati and Gherardi died, and soon after Sanseverino and Sforza also; *cf.* CELLI, *loc. cit.* An *Avviso of August 16, 1623, reports the death of forty conclavists. Vatican Library.

⁵ For Louis XIII.'s special rejoicing see the report of the nuncio Corsini in *Barb.* 5891, 19, p. 386 *seq.* Vatican Library.

⁶ *Cf.* QUAZZA, 39.

it was feared it would not be possible to get from him as much as had been obtained from Gregory XV.

The new Head of the Church sprang from a family of Ancona which had become enriched by trade. Its original name was Tafani and in its coat-of-arms it had three wasps which in course of time became metamorphosed into bees. Subsequently the family took a new name from the castle Barberini situated on a picturesque height in the Val d'Elsa in the verdant region of Siena where to this day there is preserved the modest dwelling of Francesco Barberini, a contemporary of Dante and himself a noted poet.¹ The family had been established in Florence since the fourteenth century² where, in the Piazza S. Croce, we may see to this day the house of the Pope's parents Antonio Barberini and Camilla Barbadori.³ They had six

¹ A memorial still commemorates Francesco Barberini there to this day.

² See A. NICOLETTI, **Vita di P. Urbano VIII.*, lib. I, Vatican Library; cf. App. 26, XXIX. For his family cf. also C. STROZZI, *Storia d. famiglia Barberini*, Roma, 1640 (dedicated to Taddeo Barberini). The author was regarded as infallible in all matters of genealogy, so that Urban VIII. would only have his family history recorded by him; see *Lettere degli Strozzi preced. alla sua vita scritta da S. Salvino* (1859). Strozzi deserved the Pope's confidence, for he would have nothing to do with the genealogical method of the day, that of deducing the origin of old families from the assonance of names; cf. A. CONTARINI, 258 seq.; PESARO, 334 seq.; REUMONT, *Beiträge*, V., 117 seq.; PASINI-FRASSONI, in the *Riv. Arald.*, XVII. (1912), and *ibid.*, III. (1905), 55 seqq., gives the information for the Vatican MSS. which deal with the family. For Barberini's ancestors in Dante's time, see *Jahrbuch der preuss. Kunstsammlung*, XL. (1919), 106. *Monographs about the Barberini family collected by Fr. Ubaldini are in *Barb.* 4570 of the Vatican Library. For the documents concerning the family, in the State Archives, Florence, see *Carte Strozze*, I., 2, 714 seq. For the coat-of-arms, see PASINI-FRASSONI, *Armorial*.

³ As the Director of the Florentine Archives, Dorini, kindly informed me, the *Libro delle Ricerca delle cose dell'anno*, 1568, shows that the house was "presso la cantonata di Via della Fogna

sons ; the fifth was given the names of Maffeo Vincenzo when he was christened on April 5, 1568, in the Baptistry of the cathedral of Florence where Dante also had been baptized.¹ Maffeo lost his father when he had only attained his third year but his mother had him carefully educated. She began by entrusting him to the Jesuit school at Florence, a step which led many other aristocratic families to do in like manner.² Later on she sent him to Rome where the boy had an uncle, Francisco Barberini, a Protonotary Apostolic and a referendary of both Segnaturas.³ In the Eternal City Maffeo frequented the Roman College and there laid the foundation of his exquisite humanistic culture. Notwithstanding his marked predilection for poetry, ⁴ he took up the study of the law. This he did during a two years' stay at Pisa. When he gained his doctorate there, his mother, a daughter of a noble Florentine family, wanted him to marry.⁵ The plan miscarried and Maffeo returned to Rome during the reign of Sixtus V.

nel tratto che va da questa via alla cantonata di Via dei Pepi". The house, in which there is now a printing press, was in 1568, at the time of Maffeo's birth, in the possession of Antonio Barberini and his brothers. See *S. CROCE, *aroto n. 99 Gonfalone Bue dell'a*, 1566, and *aroto n. 52 del 1571 Gonfalone Bue*, State Archives, Florence.

¹ See ORLANDINI, in the *Riv. arald.*, 1909, 477.

² See NICOLETTI, **Vita di Urbano VIII.*, lib. I, *loc. cit.* In the private apartments of Prince Barberini, at Rome, two portraits of Urban VIII. are preserved, showing him as a young man of fifteen years ; there is also a portrait of him as a Cardinal ; it is, however, in a bad state of preservation.

³ Marble busts of Francesco Barberini are in the Barberini Palace, Rome ; see FRASCHETTI, 140. Cf. also about him, TSCHARYKOW, *Le chevalier Barberini (Raphael) chez le Tzar Ivan le Terrible*, Paris, 1904, 3 *seq.*

⁴ See NICOLETTI, **Vita di Urbano VIII.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See the **Vita di Urbano VIII.*, published by I. Carini in the *Spicil. Vat.*, I. (1890), 337. A sonnet of Maffeo refers to this time ; it begins thus : " Mentre di basso amor nel laccio involto/La mia primiera età." *Barb.* 4009, p. 9, Vatican Library. *Ibid.*, Letters of Maffeo, between 1583-9.

His uncle was a learned but peculiar, sickly and very parsimonious gentleman, as is the manner of the Florentines. However, Maffeo succeeded not only in winning the affection of his relative but even the goodwill of such influential Cardinals as Aldobrandini and Filippo Boncompagni.¹ At their suggestion, in October, 1588, his uncle bought for him, for the sum of 8,000 scudi, the post of an *abbreviatore di Parco maggiore*.² Later on Maffeo became a referendary of the *Segnatura di giustizia* and of the *Segnatura di grazia* under Gregory XV. He revealed himself as a skilful jurist in both these positions, whilst he showed his administrative gifts as *governatore* of Fano.³ When a post of a cleric of the chamber became vacant, the above named Cardinals prevailed on the rich uncle to buy this office also for his nephew.⁴ In 1598 Maffeo accompanied Clement VIII. to Ferrara and in the following year the Pope commissioned him to settle a dispute with Venice in connexion with the waters of the Po.⁵ When his uncle died [May 28th, 1600] Maffeo inherited his great wealth.⁶ At the close of 1601 Clement VIII. commissioned him to take to the Dauphin Louis some swaddling clothes blessed by the Pope.⁷ It was thought that he would soon be raised to higher dignities.⁸ Philip Neri, then an old man, was supposed

¹ See **Vita*, ed. CARINI, 338.

² See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, lib. I, Vatican Library.

³ He found the city in great unrest on account of the bandits; he kept his position for fourteen months; see the *notes of Fr. Ubaldini on the life of Urban VIII. in *Barb.* 4901, p. 28, Vatican Library. *Letters of Maffeo as "Governatore di Fano" to Cardinals Montalto, Caetani and others from 1592-3, in *Barb.* 5812, 3 *ibid.*

⁴ See **Vita*, ed. Carini, 339 *seq.*

⁵ See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, lib. I, Vatican Library. For documents on this period *cf.* *Barb.* 4351, *ibid.*

⁶ 100,000 scudi according to the **Discorso de'cardinali* of 1618, 400,000 scudi according to NICOLETTI, **Vita*, *loc. cit.*

⁷ See the present work, Vol. XXIII, 174.

⁸ See **Avviso* of October 31, 1601, Vatican Library. Barberini's praises in OSSAT, II., 494 *seqq.*

to have jocularly prophesied the cardinalate for him.¹ On his return from Paris Maffeo solved in such happy fashion the difficult problem of the regulation of the overflow of lake Trasimene which Clement VIII. had entrusted to him, that he gained the esteem of the Pope and the love of all Umbria.² But his hope of the cardinalate was not yet to be realized; however, he became Archbishop of Nazaret³ and nuncio in Paris at the end of 1604. He had scarcely settled down in that city when he received news of the death of Clement VIII. (March 5th, 1605). The loss was all the more painful to Maffeo as the new Pope, Leo XI., was not well disposed towards him and lent ear to the whisperings of his enemies. Maffeo's friends believed his recall imminent when Leo XI. died.⁴ Maffeo had had no relations with the new Pope, Paul V., but the *Datary*, Pompeo Arigoni, obtained his confirmation as nuncio in Paris. There he displayed a many-sided and fruitful activity, especially for the progress of the Catholic restoration.⁵ In the question of the acceptance of the decrees of Trent his perspicacity found a solution which was to be most successfully adopted in 1615.⁶ His elevation to the cardinalate, on September 11th, 1606, which had the support of France, took him by surprise, but it was thoroughly deserved. He

¹ See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, *loc. cit.*

² *Ibid.* In the inscriptions which Maffeo composed for the work, he modestly omits to mention himself; see **Vita di Urbano VIII. del P. Gualengo*, in *Barb.* 2645, p. 75, Vatican Library.

³ Middle of October, 1604; see NICOLETTI, **Vita*, *loc. cit.* Barberini only received the major Orders at that time; he had received the first tonsure before his entry into the prelature, and the four minor Orders when he was Governatore of Fano; see the account by Fr. Ubaldini of the life of Urban VIII. in *Barb.* 4901, p. 25^b, Vatican Library. A painting by Scipione Gaetano (Il Pulzone) in the possession of Princess Anna Corsini at Florence, represents Urban VIII. as a Bishop.

⁴ See **Vita*, ed. Carini, 345 *seq.*

⁵ See present work, Vol. XXVI, 1 *seq.*, 5 *seq.* A *letter of Barberini to the General of the Theatines, dated Paris, October 17, 1606 (thanks for congratulations on his cardinalate) in the original, is in the archives of the Theatines, Rome.

⁶ See MARTIN, *Gallicanisme*, 392.

received the red biretta at the hands of Henry IV. but continued at his post in Paris. He only set out for Rome on September 25th, 1607,¹ when he went to live not in the palace in the via dei Giubbonari² which he and his brother Carlo had jointly built and which he had let, but in the Palazzo Salviati near the Roman College.³ As nuncio he had greatly interested himself in the Catholics of England; so the Pope appointed him Protector of Scotland. In that capacity he had to see to the training of priests in the seminaries on the Continent.⁴ In October, 1608, he was given the See of Spoleto. A year later he lost his beloved mother.⁵ He took up residence in his diocese and restored the cathedral of Spoleto.⁶ His visits to Rome were infrequent. By means of visitations and reforms he accomplished much in his diocese⁷ but these activities came partly to an end when in August, 1611, he was given the legation of Bologna where, in consequence of the severity of Cardinal Giustiniani, discontent was rampant. Barberini discharged his legatine duties so well that by the time of his recall in the autumn of 1614, general contentment obtained once more.⁸ His free time was given to study.⁹

¹ See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, lib. I, Vatican Library.

² Cf. DONATUS, *Roma*, 398.

³ See **Vita*, ed. Carini, 348.

⁴ See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See **Avviso* of October 7, 1609, Vatican Library. The bust of Camilla Barbadori, sculptured by Bernini, has been lost; see FRASCHETTI, 140.

⁶ See **Ciaconius*, IV., 495. In the episcopal palace there still is a fireplace with the inscription: *Maff. Barb.*

⁷ See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, *loc. cit.* The records of the visitation of M. Barberini are in the Episcopal Archives, Spoleto. The homily at the Synod is in *Barb.* 4729, Vatican Library. Two letters of Barberini to G. B. Vitelli, of this period, are in FALOCIPULIGNANI, *Notizie del venerab. G. B. Vitelli*, Foligno, 1894, 27 seq.

⁸ See *Relazione di R. Zeno*, 146. An **Avviso* of October 10, 1611, mentions Barberini's departure for Bologna; Vatican Library. The catalogue of letters of Barberini belonging to the period of his legation at Bologna from 1611-14, is in *Varia polit.*, 139. Papal Secret Archives.

⁹ See I. NICII ERYTHRAEI *Pinacotheca*, I., 152.

On his return to Rome Barberini was assigned the important post of prefect of the *Segnatura di Giustizia* ¹ for which he was uncommonly qualified by his extensive knowledge of the law. He kept a great establishment, and had many servants and several carriages. His house was splendidly adorned with carpets, choice pictures and antique statues. Among his vestments there was a mitre studded with precious stones and valued at many thousands of scudi. He also collected a choice library which formed the foundation of the famous *Barberiana* library. A poet himself he loved the company of writers. On his drives to the various Roman Villas he was invariably accompanied by some literary man, such as Antonio Querengo, Giovanni Ciampoli, Gabriele Chiabrera, Fabrizio Verospi, Giovanni Battista Rinuccini, Paolo Emilio Santori and Angelo Grillo.² He had always led a spotless life and his conduct as a Cardinal was likewise blameless.³ Every Saturday evening he went to confession at St. Mary Major after which he assisted at Vespers. At S. Andrea della Valle, by his instructions, Matteo Castelli transformed into a family chapel the first chapel on the left, near the entrance, which recorded the fact that it was on this spot that the body of St. Sebastian had been thrown into a sewer. The chapel was richly decorated with marbles, gold and paintings.⁴ The high altar was adorned with magnificent marble columns; the reredos consists of a painting by Domenico Passignano of

¹ The *Vita*, ed. Carini, shows how the Cardinal induced Paul V. to confirm him in this office which at first he had only been granted provisionally.

² See NICOLETTO, *Vita*, *loc. cit.* Prince Barberini has some vestments of Urban VIII. preserved in his private rooms; also a *Missale Romanum*, ed. 1620, with a magnificent binding adorned with enamels, jewels and coloured copper plates.

³ See *Relazione di R. Zeno*, 148.

⁴ Cf. BAGLIONE, 177; NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*; TITI, 140 *seq.*; *L'arte*, XII., 421 *seq.*; ORTOLANI, *S. Andrea della Valle*, Rome (n.d.), plate 24; VOSS, II., 404; O. POLLAK, *Künstlerbriefe*, in the supplement of vol. 34 (1913) of the *Jahrbuch der preuss. Kunstsammlung*, p. 30; SCHUDT, *Mancini*, 103; POLLAK-FREY, 22.

the Assumption of Our Lady, in whose honour the chapel was dedicated on December 8th, 1616.¹ The chapel was further enriched with marble statues of St. John the Baptist by Pietro Bernini, of St. John the Evangelist by Ambrogio Buonvicino, of St. Martha by Francesco Mocchi, of St. Mary Magdalen by Cristoforo Stati. One picture perpetuates the memory of Maffeo's uncle Francesco who was buried here² and by whose side the Cardinal himself hoped to rest one day.³ The memory of his parents was perpetuated by two relief portraits by Guglielmo Porta which were fixed in the passage leading into the adjoining chapel.⁴

A character sketch of the Cardinal of the year 1618 speaks of Maffeo Barberini as a highly gifted man and praises his knowledge of Italian, Latin and Greek literature. Among the Cardinals he was particularly intimate with Aldobrandini, Bellarmine, Borromeo and Montalto.⁵ Towards the representatives of the secular Powers he observed the strictest neutrality. For all that, his hope of obtaining the tiara at the conclave of 1621 was not to be fulfilled ; his name was hardly mentioned and he played no conspicuous part even as a mere elector.

In view of Maffeo's intimate acquaintance with the tongue of Homer, Gregory XV. had named him protector of the Greek College⁶ and made him a member of Propaganda. During the brief pontificate of the Ludovisi Pope, Maffeo established excellent relations with all the ambassadors and entered into a secret and close understanding with the Cardinal of Savoy⁷ who represented the interests of France, a country towards

¹ See the inscription in FORCELLA, VIII., 265. *Ibid.*, 264, the inscription in the niche on the left side of the chapel, dedicated to S. Sebastian.

² See FRASCHETTI, 140 *seq.* The inscription on the tomb is in FORCELLA, VIII., 264.

³ See NICOLETTI, *Vita*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ The inscriptions are in FORCELLA, XII., 266.

⁵ See the **Discorso de' cardinali*, of 1618, Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

⁶ See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, *loc. cit.*

⁷ See **Vita*, ed. Carini, 349 *seq.*, 356.

which Barberini felt a great attraction ever since his nunciature and which had also furthered his elevation to the cardinalate. Nor was this the only circumstance to stand him in good stead at the conclave of 1623 ; he was also helped by the fact that he had not been raised to the purple by Clement VIII., though he had hoped for it then, for in that case Cardinal Borghese would not have accepted him.¹

It was a long time since Christendom had had so youthful a Pope, for Barberini, who had become a Cardinal when 38, was only in his 56th year. He was justly considered a handsome man.² A number of busts, among them several masterpieces of Bernini,³ and excellent portraits by Andrea Sacchi⁴ and

¹ *Ibid.*, 345.

² Cf. the panegyric of Andrea Taurelli, in the taste of the period, *Heros in solio divinitatis sive de rebus gestis in sacro principatu Urbani VIII. P.O.M. panegyricus*, Bononiae, 1639, 7.

³ The Barberini palace contains a wonderful marble bust by Bernini a bronze bust and a third bust in porphyry with bronze head. The bronze bust made by Giacomo Laurenziani in the hall of S. Trinità de'Pellegrini, disappeared during the French occupation and is probably the bust in the Louvre (see *Mel. Bertaux*, 344 seq.) ; it has now been replaced by a plaster bust. Bernini's gigantic bronze statue for Velletri (cf. PASSERI, 263) was destroyed by the French in 1798 ; it had been unveiled in 1633 (see TERSENGHI, *Velletri*, Velletri, 1910, 264). For the bronze bust in the cathedral of Spoleto (about 1640) cf. FRASCHETTI, 146 seq. ; *L'Arte*, XIX. (1916), 105. BRINKMANN (*Barockskulptur*, II., 240) declares that the bust at Spoleto is the best portrait executed by Bernini. The bust attributed to Bernini by FRASCHETTI (148), which is in a room adjoining the church of S. Lorenzo in Fonte, Rome (see *L'Arte*, III. (1910), 135 seq.) is one of the best. It belongs to the school of Bernini, according to MUÑOZ (*L'Arte*, XX. (1917), 18) ; REYMOND (73) takes it to be one of the earliest busts Bernini made of his patron. Urban VIII. appears in full majesty in Bernini's gigantic marble statue, unveiled in September, 1640, on the Capitol (see *Avviso of September 29, 1640, and Avviso 90, Papal Secret Archives) and also in the even more beautiful granite statue on his tomb in St. Peter's (see FRASCHETTI, 151 seq. ; MUÑOZ, *Roma Barocca*, 190 seq., 196 seq. ; POSSE, in the *Jahrb. der preuss. Kunstsamml.*,

Pietro da Cortona,¹ have perpetuated his outward appearance. He was a man of medium height and his complexion had that olive tint which is so common with Italians. He wore a long beard, cut square and quite black ; his hair was of the same colour though streaked with silver threads, the forehead was lofty and beautifully shaped and thick brows shaded dark

XXVI. (1905), 188 ; BENKARD, *Bernini*, 16 *seq.* ; STEINMANN, *Die Statuen der Päpste auf dem Kapitol*, Rome, 1924, 14 *seq.*). The bronze busts in Camerino are by unknown artists, probably pupils of Bernini (MUNICIPIO ; see *Le Marche*, IV. (1904), 40 ; *cf.* also B. FELICIANGELI, *Il card. Angelo Giori da Camerino e Bernini*, Sanseverino-Marche, 1917, 1 *seq.*) ; so are those in the Castle of St. Angelo, Rome (Museum) and in the possession of Marchese Fil. Cordini at Florence. A bust by Lorenzo Ottoni (died 1684) is in Museo Oliv. at Pesaro. The terracotta bust in the Barberini gallery, Rome, is signed : " Giov. Giambassi cieco fecit " (for J. Gonelli called Giambassi see THIEME, XIV., 370 *seq.*). An *Avviso of December 6, 1636 (*Urb.* 1104, Vatican Library) reports that a celebrated sculptor of Florence, who worked by touch, had completed a bust of the Pope " molto naturale ". The number of copperplates which portray Urban VIII. is very great ; the best are those of I. F. Greuter (in TETIUS, *Aedes Barb.*, Romae, 1643), Cherub. Albertus, Lukas Vostermann (1624), Simon Vouet (1624) (*cf.* *Portrait Index*, ed. by W. COOLIDGE LANE and NINA E. BROWNE, Washington, 1906, 1472) ; besides these, etchings by L. Kilian (1628), P. de Jode (Antwerp, 1639) (*cf.* DRUGULIN, *Porträt-Katalog*, Leipzig, 1860), Romain de Hooghe (with Castel St. Angelo in the background) and Seb. Vouillemont (1642, from a drawing of Guidus Ubaldus Abbatinus) ; copies of the above-named are in the imperial *Fideikommissbibliothek*, Vienna. The best etching, from a drawing by Bernini, adorns the Roman edition of the poems of Urban VIII. of 1631 ; see *L'Arte*, XX. (1917), 190.

⁴ The copy in the Galleria Barberini, Rome, is much better than that in the private possession of the Prince (see POSSE, *Sacchi*, 123 *seq.*) ; the Pope here appears grey-haired but still vigorous ; it was, therefore, presumably painted before 1640.

¹ In the gallery of the Capitol (much touched-up) ; Urban VIII. is represented full figure, seated. A water-colour by Pietro da Cortona, " Urban VIII. praying," is in the Pinacoteca at Ascoli.

blue eyes expressive of much shrewdness. One had the impression of being in the presence of a self-possessed and keenly observant man who brooked no contradiction. His whole attitude betrayed the great lord who, for all his majesty,¹ did not lack gentleness, a fact sufficiently proved by his great consideration for his servants.² He was very vivacious, spoke extremely well, was quick to grasp a question and possessed an excellent memory. His was a jovial disposition and like a true Florentine he loved to season his private conversation with clever and witty remarks.³ Every Monday he gave public audiences to which everyone was admitted.⁴ He sedulously attended to business. Most of the letters to princes and nuncios were enriched by him with marginal remarks: often enough the rough draft was from his pen.⁵ Renier Zeno, the Venetian envoy, admired Urban VIII.'s thorough acquaintance with political conditions which he had acquired during his Paris nunciature. The deep insight which he had thus obtained made him cautious and distrustful. He never relied on mere words but always insisted on written agreements. He was slow to make up his mind and easily roused though also quickly calmed down. His self-reliance was such that he disdained other people's opinions and would

The etching of J. F. Greuter (see above) is from the painting by A. Camassei. The portrait of Urban VIII. in the sacristy of S. Andrea della Valle, Rome, is in the manner of Camassei. A portrait of the Pope in the choir of the Capuchin Church, Rome, is unsigned; see D. DA ISNELLO, *Il convento d. S. Concezione de'padri Cappuccini in Roma*, Viterbo, 1923, 57. For the portrait of Urban VIII. by Justus Sustermans, see ORBAAN, *Bescheiden*, I., 359.

¹ Cf. NICOLETTI, in RANKE, III., 162.*

² See NICOLETTI, **Vita*, lib. VIII., ch. 15. Vatican Library.

³ See the *report of the Venetian *obbedienza* envoys in BAROZZI-BERCHET, III., I, 278; R. ZENO, 148 *seq.*; NANI, 35.

⁴ See *Avviso of June 19, 1624, Vatican Library. Since 1627 it had become difficult to obtain audiences; see STEINHUBER, I², 391, and the report in *Studi e docum.*, XXII., 217.

⁵ See **Barb.* 6439, Vatican Library.

not even listen to them. He was confirmed in this practice by the knowledge he had that nearly all the Cardinals were dependent on foreign princes so that no impartial advice could be expected from them.¹ Other envoys,² as well as the Mantuan, Possevino, draw a similar picture of Urban VIII. Possevino adds that there was no one on earth who could so quickly see through a man; neither flattery, fear nor interest could cause the Pope to swerve from a decision; he knew what he was and as such he wished to be treated in all things.³

Urban VIII. showed great ability in his dealings with ambassadors. He purposely spoke himself at great length but never gave a decision on the spur of the moment.⁴ If the ambassadors broached some disagreeable topic he had a masterly way of side-tracking them with the result that they got no chance of airing their views.⁵ It annoyed them greatly

¹ See R. ZENO, *loc. cit.*; G. PESARO, 329 *seq.*

² See BAROZZI-BERCHET, III., I, 226; G. PESARO, 329.

³ *" Se bene V.A. stando alla corte et fors'anco in Francia hebbe commodità di fare giuditio della natura et qualità del presente Pontefice, nondimeno perchè mi pare che alla hora meglio la persona si cognosca, quando nè deve nè ha bisogno di simulare, hora in due parole prendo ardire di significare a V.A. qual sia riputata la sua inclinatione. Sà assai, presume e cognosce di sapere, ne'propositi è costantissimo, nelle deliberationi tardo, cognosce l'inclinationi di tutti li principi, nè ha la terra huomo che meglio a prima vista squadri l'interno del compagno di lui, si che nè adulatione, nè blanditia, nè timore, nè interesse sono bastanti per rimuoverlo dal suo pensiero. Sà quello che è, et per tale pontualmente vuole esser tenuto." A. POSSEVINO to the Duke of Mantua, dated Rome, December 16, 1623. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁴ *" Il negoziare ordinario di N.S^{te} è stato sempre tale di discorrere assai et con vivacità del suo intelletto eccitar punti ne risolvere mai cosa alcuna, almeno la prima volta." *Report of the envoy of Este, October 7, 1623, State Archives, Modena.

⁵ **Memorie di M^{sg}r. Fr. Herrera, Barb.* 4901, Vatican Library. Fr. Herrera died as *segret. d. brevi segreti*, 1635; see the letter of Ferragalli to Panzano, of June, 1635, *Barb.* 8638, *ibid.*

that the Pope talked so much and hardly gave them a chance to open their mouths, so much so that one of them, whilst on his way to the Quirinal, remarked that he was going to give audience to the Pope.¹ The more astute ones among them, such as the Venetians, thought they had discovered that the Pope loved contradiction for its own sake, hence in order to obtain their ends, they themselves made objections so that the Pope would in the end fall in with their own views.² Giovanni Pesaro was of opinion that great as was the pleasure to listen to Urban VIII., one could not help wishing that it were unnecessary to try and get him to attend to politics.³ Even for the Cardinals Urban made the transaction of business no light task ; he showed great presence of mind in dealing with them. On one occasion, in order not to have to agree with the Pope's view, Cardinal Ludovisi objected that he was not informed on the question. Urban said, " I will at once call someone who will give you information," and when this had been done he said, " Now state your opinion." ⁴

In a report of 1624 drawn up for the King of France, we read : " The Pope remains as he always was, sincere and frank, a friend of books and scholars, quick, fiery, somewhat choleric, impatient of opposition but ready to yield to solid arguments, full of the best intentions for the Church, for Christendom and for the most Christian King. Notwithstanding his great affection for his relatives he has refrained from all nepotism, for though posts worth 200,000 scudi were vacant, out of that sum he assigned to his nephew Cardinal Barberini only 6,000 scudi and distributed the rest among the other Cardinals." ⁵ Other reports likewise inform us that at first Urban VIII.

¹ See JUSTI, *Velasquez*, I.³, Munich, 1922, 294.

² Cf. P. CONTARINI, 211, and ALV. CONTARINI, 368.

³ See JUSTI, *loc. cit.*, 295.

⁴ See **Memorie di Msgr. Herrera*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See the **Relatione della corte di Roma nel principio del pontificato di P. Urbano VIII. data al christ^{mo} Re di Francia Luigi*, 1624, in the *Miscell.*, II., 150, n. 3, of the Papal Secret Archives (to be quoted hereafter as *Relatione of 1624*).

wished his kinsfolk to remain in a modest position.¹ Unfortunately a complete change was soon to take place.

Urban VIII. had two brothers: one, Antonio, was a Capuchin, the other, Carlo, was married to Costanza Magalotti, a Florentine lady, who gave him three sons, Francesco, Taddeo and Antonio, whose conduct is described as irreproachable.² Two sisters of the Pope were in the Carmelite convent of Florence. To these was assigned, in 1628, the Benedictine convent of S. Maria Maddalena de Pazzi, the chapter house of which was famous for Perugino's crucifixion.³ Carlo Barberini received many tokens of goodwill from his brother at the very beginning of his pontificate⁴ and was eventually named Governor of the Borgo and General of the Church.⁵ The Pope placed full confidence in him as regards these offices, which Carlo seemed bent on carrying out to the best of his powers,⁶

¹ *" Ha detto alli sui parenti che non s'insuperbischino et che non li vuol far ricchi con la robba della Sede Ap. et veramente che sono persone molto modeste, gli ha prohibite le pompe et vuol che si aiutino con la parsimonia " (*Avviso of August 12, 1623). An *Avviso of August 19, 1623, reports that Carlo Barberini showed himself in Rome with his sons, riding in a *carozza ordinaria*, and by the command of the Pope had returned a pair of horses to Cardinal Bentivoglio (*Urb.* 1093, Vatican Library). Cf. also the report in *Studi e docum.*, XXII., 210, and the letter of the envoy of Este, August 26, 1623. State Archives, Modena.

² See *Avviso of August 9, 1623, *Urb.* 1093, Vatican Library. Cornelis Bloemaert made copper plates after the drawings of Sacchi, of the papal nephews, Francesco, Antonio and Taddeo, as well as of Cardinal Antonio the elder. They were for the work of TETIUS, *Aedes Barb.*; see POSSE, *Sacchi*, 123. There is a portrait of Carlo in the Palace of the Conservatori in Rome.

³ See REUMONT, *Beiträge*. V., 170 seq. Urban VIII. embellished and enlarged the convent; see BIGAZZI, *Iscriz. di Firenze*, 303.

⁴ See *Avvisi of August 30 and September 2, 1623, *Urb.* 1093, *loc. cit.*

⁵ He took the oath of allegiance on November 15, 1623; see *Diarium P. Alaleonis*, *Barb.* 2818, Vatican Library.

⁶ See the *report of the Venetian *obbedienza* ambassadors in BAROZZI-BERCHET, III., 1, 235.

though apart from this he was allowed no influence, at least for a time.¹ Nor did Carlo, a man sparing of words,² desire any. A former official in a bank he now appeared to be chiefly interested, "after the fashion of the Florentines," in adding to his wealth. "He knows well," the Venetian *obbedienza* envoys wrote, "that the possession of money enhances one's reputation and raises a man above the common herd, and he thinks that it is neither becoming nor reasonable that a kinsman of the Pope should find himself in straitened circumstances after the Pontiff's death."³

Among the sons of Carlo, Francesco, a gentle youth of blameless life and great promise, became a prelate and a member of the *Consulta* as early as August, 1623. He was assigned the rooms formerly occupied by Cardinals Borghese and Ludovisi so that he could approach his uncle at any time. Already on August 19, 1623, the envoy of Este gave it as his opinion that Francesco would rank as the first person after the Pope; as a matter of fact he obtained the purple on October 2nd.⁴ He was only twenty-six years of age, hence the Pope gave him an adviser in the person of the excellent Lorenzo Magalotti, the brother of Costanza. Magalotti had been intimate with the Pope from his youth, had served him

¹ See the **Relatione* of 1624, Papal Secret Archives.

² See ANG. CONTARINI, 262.

³ See BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Roma*, I., 235; for the greed for money of Carlo *cf.* the **report* of Béthune of December 17, 1628, State Library, Vienna.

⁴ See the **Avvisi* of August 16 and September 2, 1623, Vatican Library; the reports of the envoy of Este, August 19 and 26, 1623, State Archives, Modena (he says of Francesco that he was "di innocentissimi costumi"); CIACONIUS, IV., 525, Possevino thinks, December 16, 1623: **"Il Cardinale nipote è vergine, erudito, verecondo giovane, ma di molta aspetione"* (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). *Cf.* also R. ZENO, 152. There is a marble bust of the Cardinal in the passage to the sacristy in St. Peter; an oil portrait in the Vatican Library; *cf.* GROTTANELLI, in the *Rassegna naz.*, LVII., 814. A collection of the letters addressed to Fr. Barberini (originals) is in *Barb.* 2167-9 (1616-1629), 2170 (1630-1677), 2171, Vatican Library.

while he was vice-legate in Bologna, and at his recommendation had received important appointments at the hands of Paul V. and Gregory XV. Urban VIII., who justly valued Magalotti's diplomatic skill, named him secretary of the Briefs to kings, an office equivalent to the Secretariate of State.¹ Magalotti did well in that position. He became one of the most important personages in the Pope's entourage and on October 7th, 1624, he was raised to the purple at the same time as the Capuchin Antonio Barberini.²

Magalotti, with characteristic shrewdness, kept in the background as much as possible, so as not to provoke Cardinal Francesco's jealousy. This was one of the contributory motives of his retirement, in 1628, into his archdiocese of Ferrara where he did much for Church reform.³ But there was yet another reason. On February 7th, 1628, the elevation to the Cardinalate made *in pectore* on August 30th, 1627, of Antonio Barberini, another son of Carlo, was made public. Almost all the Cardinals disapproved an elevation whereby two brothers became members of the Sacred College, one of them being a youth who had as yet done nothing. But Urban VIII. had been unable to resist the demands of his family.⁴ Antonio's elevation threatened the position of Magalotti, and even that of Francesco Barberini, for the youthful Antonio was restless, passionate, bold and ambitious; however, since he was only twenty years old he lacked all experience.⁵ Thus it came about

¹ See the **Relatione* of 1624, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. R. ZENO, 154; P. CONTARINI, 214; *Studi e docum.*, XXII., 210.

² See CIACONIUS, IV., 531, 537.

³ See *ibid.*, 538. Magalotti died on September 18, 1637. Ginori Venturi, of Florence, possesses numerous documents of the Cardinal.

⁴ See the *report of Béthune to Louis XIII, February 11, 1628, State Library, Vienna. According to B. Paolucci's *report the outspoken Cardinal Madruzzo often asked the Pope why he had made a "ragazzo" without merits, a Cardinal. State Archives, Modena.

⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. the **Relatione* of 1624; P. CONTARINI, 215; the report in *Studi e docum.*, XXII., 213; which, however, makes

that Francesco, the most gifted of the Pope's kinsmen and the most attractive of all the Cardinal nephews of that period,¹ was able to maintain his position as the first personage after the Pope. The purity of his morals and his literary tastes greatly endeared him to Urban VIII.,² who could never do enough for him by way of endowing him with prebends.³ In 1627 he was given the rich abbeys of Grottaferrata and Farfa. He was also made archpriest of the Lateran in 1627, of St. Mary Major in 1629 and of St. Peter's in 1633.⁴ In the previous year, after the early death of Ludovisi, he had obtained the most profitable of all the posts of the Curia, that of vice-chancellor.⁵

The Cardinal was a warm friend of artists and scholars.⁶ Contact with the former was maintained through the learned antiquarian Cassiano del Pozzo. His income, which in 1630 amounted to 80,000 scudi,⁷ he put to excellent use. He was a passionate collector of books and manuscripts and founded

Antonio four years younger than he was. The fine bust of Cardinal Antonio, by Bernini, in the Barberini Palace, shows characteristics of enterprise and keenness (reproduced in MUÑOZ, *Roma barocca*, 188).

¹ This is the opinion of WAGNER, in the *Zeitschr. für Hamburgische Gesch.*, XI. (1903), 399.

² Cf. NANI, 34.

³ There are numerous *documents about the benefices of the Cardinal in the private archives of Prince Barberini at Rome, only a part of which is to be found in the Papal Secret Archives. The *conveyance of the *Badia Vallombros. di Spineto* to Cardinal Barberini, May 15, 1624, is in the State Archives, Florence, *Cisterc. di Firenze*.

⁴ See the *Avvisi of November 10, 1627; October 10, 1629 (*Urb.* 1097, 1099) and November 12, 1633 (*Ottob.* 3339), Vatican Library.

⁵ See MORONI, X., 176; **Pianta del Palazzo della Cancelleria*, drawn during the time of Vice-Chancellor Barberini, in *Barb.* 4400, Vatican Library.

⁶ See CIACONIUS, IV., 528; among painters, Valentin de Boulogne enjoyed the special favour of Cardinal Francesco; see VOSS, *Malerei*, 453. Cf. present work, XXIX., Ch. VI.

⁷ See ALV. CONTARINI, 371.

the Barberini library, the richest after the *Vaticana*.¹ He also started a collection of pictures, cameos and ancient coins and inscriptions.² He had at one time wished to become a Franciscan, hence he had a great love for that Order and in fact for all religious, and his sentiments were those of a true ecclesiastic. He was indefatigable in his attention to business. To Urban VIII. the tension between the two brothers was most unwelcome. He was unwilling that Antonio should contest the rank of his elder brother but wished authority to be centred in one hand³; for that reason he repeatedly sent the younger brother on legations abroad.⁴ In 1628 the latter already held the abbey of Tre Fontane; at the death of Ludovisi in 1623 he also obtained the wealthy abbey of Nonantola.⁵ In 1633 he acted as Legate at Avignon and in 1638 he was raised to the dignity of a Camerlengo.⁶ Like all the Barberini he furthered art and knowledge; he drew himself, and among painters he favoured in particular the excellent Andrea Sacchi.⁷ He even tried his hand at poetry and founded a rich

¹ Cf. Vol. XXIX., Ch. XII.

² Besides BLUME, IV., 136, cf. *Cod. Barb.* 5635, p. 1-86: *"Inventario di damaschi, biancherie, quadri, orologi, camei, marmi e statue, anelli, medaglie, cartoni dipinti appart. malla casa Barberini e dati, si come pare, in consegna ad un custode di casa 1631 Dicembre 3." Also here, p. 91 seq., **Ruolo di famiglia del card. Franc. Barberini*, May 6, 1655. After this come the Cardinal's accounts from 1628 to 1678. *Barb.* 3097: **Note di libri prestati o donati del card. Fr. Barberini*, beginning February, 1634. Vatican Library.

³ Francesco alone was initiated into all secrets. On the blank leaf of a manuscript volume of notes by Urban VIII., most of them unfortunately undated, on matters of importance to be discussed with his own ministers and with ambassadors, between 1623 and 1627, we read in the Pope's hand: "Non aperiatur nisi ab em. D. card. Barberini sub poena excommunicationis." *Barb.* 6438, Vatican Library.

⁴ See the **Relatione* of 1624, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ See CIACONIUS, IV., 564.

⁶ See the **Avviso* of July 31, 1638, *Urb.* 1106, Vatican Library.

⁷ See POSSE, *A. Sacchi*, 6 seq.

library.¹ His entertainments were most splendid.² His aristocratic and elegant appearance may be seen in his portrait by Maratta in the Galleria Corsini in Rome.³

In opposition to his younger brother Antonio, the elder brother, generally styled Cardinal of S. Onofrio after his titular church, presented the figure of a stern ascetic. When the Pope summoned him to Rome, he made the journey on foot, to the Pontiff's joy.⁴ He was a man of no pretensions and at first wanted to refuse the cardinalate,⁵ and after receiving the purple he lived as a simple Capuchin. Worldly-minded people despised him for his modesty and spoke of him as a simpleton. He held aloof from politics and the affairs of the court, devoted all his time to his duties as a member of various Congregations and busied himself above all with the reform of the monasteries. His revenues, which amounted to 30,000 scudi, were devoted to works of piety and charity.⁶ His character is well described in the inscription which he chose for his tomb in the church of the Capuchins erected by him in Rome: "Here rest dust, ashes and nothing."⁷

¹ See CIACONIUS, *loc. cit.*; **Index libror. card. Antonii Barberini*, Barb. 3110-3, 3122, 3141, 3154, 3195, Vatican Library. *Ibid.*, 3252; MAGNUS PERNEUS, **De nativitate et vita card. Ant. Barberini iunioris Papae nepotis*.

² See GUIDO BENTIVOGLIO, *Relazione della famosa festa fatta in Roma alli 25 di febbraio 1634 sotto gli auspici del card. Antonio Barberini, pubblicata da L. Passerini*, Rome, 1882. Cf. also POSSE, *Sacchi*, 7, and *L'Arte*, 1917, 34, 37.

³ See *Bollett. d'arte*, 1912, 195 seq. Cf. Voss, 599.

⁴ See the *report of the envoy of Este, September 16, 1623, who relates that the two brothers burst into tears on seeing each other. State Archives, Modena.

⁵ See the *Avvisi of September 30 and October 7, 1623, *Urb.* 1093, Vatican Library.

⁶ See AUG. CONTARINI, 215, 261; G. PESARO, 334; ALV. CONTARINI, 369; NANI, 33. Cf. also the **Relatione* of 1624, *loc. cit.*

⁷ See CIACONIUS, IV., 534. Cf. *Anal. Capucin*, XXIV., 56 seq.; CAES. LOCATELLUS (*iuriscons. Rom.*), **De vita activa et contemplativa*, dedicated to Cardinal Antonio Barberini, in Barb. 997, Vatican Library. There is a portrait of the Cardinal in the choir

If the three Cardinal nephews had been laden with numerous favours, the superabundance of papal favours poured itself out with perhaps even greater lavishness on Carlo Barberini and his son Taddeo. As early as the summer of 1624 Carlo Barberini found himself in a position to buy from the Orsini Monte Rotondo situate on the Via Salaria. In 1625 he bought for the sum of 57,000 scudi from Otto Colonna, who was heavily in debt, the *castello* of Roviano.¹ Only the septuagenarian's death at Bologna, in 1630, prevented him from taking possession of another great acquisition.² The *Conservatori* decided to erect a statue in his honour on the Capitol,³ and to celebrate his obsequies at S. Maria in Aracoeli. The wonderful catafalque was designed by Bernini,⁴ who also drew the plan of the monument of Carlo in that church.⁵

In 1630 the principality of Palestrina, together with the domain of Mezza Selva and Corcollo, was acquired in the name of Carlo though in reality for the benefit of his son Taddeo, the head of the family, for the sum of 725,000 scudi, from Francesco Colonna who was hopelessly in debt.⁶ So as not to deprive the vendor of his princely title, Urban VIII. transferred it to the domain of Carbognano near Ronciglione.

of the Capuchin church, Rome; see D. DA ISNELLO, *Il convento d. S. Concezione de'padri Capuccini in Roma* (1923), 47.

¹ See REUMONT, *Beiträge*, V., 134. Urban VIII. also granted Carlo Barberini numerous presents of books in 1625; see *Barb.* 3132, Vatican Library. Urban VIII. visited the new possession of Monte Rotondo, in November, 1628; see *Avvisi, November 1 and 8, 1628, *Urb.* 1098, *ibid.*

² See **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, *Barb.* 2819, Vatican Library; *Avviso of March 6, 1630, *Urb.* 1100, *ibid.*

³ See BORBONI, *Delle statue*, 315 *seq.*; RODOCANACHI, *Capitole*, 166. For letter of condolence of Maximilian I., March 25, 1630, see *Sitzungsbericht der Münchener Akad. phil. Kl.*, 1880, 362.

⁴ *"Bellissimo catafalco secondo il disegno del s. cav. Bernini celeberrimo architetto, con statue e colonne di mirabile artificio," we read in *Avviso, August 3, 1630, Vatican Library, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Cf. *L'Arte*, 1916, 108. A reproduction also in MUÑOZ, *Roma barocca*, 190.

⁶ See REUMONT, *Beiträge*, IV., 134.

Thus the famous Rocca dei Colonna, which once upon a time had defied Boniface VIII. and Eugene IV., and which for that reason had been twice razed to the ground, passed into the hands of the Barberini who thereby secured an outstanding position in the Roman aristocracy. On October 19th, 1630, Urban VIII. came over from Castel Gandolfo to inspect the new domain. As he entered the town the rainbow appeared in the sky whereupon the Pope instantly improvised the following verses which also contain an allusion to the peace of Ratisbon which was favourable to Italy :

Nuntiat en pacem rutilans in nubibus Iris
 Dum Praenestini circumdat culmina montis,
 Italiae populis gaudentes omine plaudant.¹

On the following day he said Mass in the cathedral and granted many favours,² after which he accepted an invitation of Filippo Colonna, Duke of Paliano, to his castle at Genazzano. At Cave, Filippo, who had mobilized all his vassals, received the Pope at the head of 6,000 foot soldiers and 500 horse. The tent of the conqueror of Lepanto recalled the services which that family, formerly so often in conflict with the Holy See, had rendered to it under Pius V.³

Taddeo had been married to Filippo's daughter Anne since October 24, 1627. The Pope had himself officiated at the nuptials in the chapel of his palace at Castel Gandolfo, in the presence of fourteen Cardinals.⁴ Anne Colonna was well aware that

¹ See JUSTI, *Velasquez*, I., 295.

² For Urban VIII.'s care of Palestrina see MAZZI, in *Propugnatore*, V. (1892), 350 seq.

³ See the *Avvisi of October 19 and 23, 1630, *Urb.* 1101, Vatican Library.

⁴ See **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, Barb. 2818, Vatican Library. *Avviso of October 27, 1627, *Urb.* 1097, *ibid.*; *NICOLETTI, c. 23, p. 1437 seq., *ibid.* Numerous wedding poems appeared at the time (*cf.* Vol. XXIX., Ch. VI.); one in *Italian in Barb. 1963, *ibid.* Letters of Testi are in *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XXXIV., 432 seq., 451 seq. *Cf.* CANCELLIERI, *Lettere sopra il Tarantismo*, 107. The tomb of Anna Colonna with her bronze bust was removed from S. Maria Araceli to the Galleria Barberini.

she was sprung from one of the oldest families of Rome and for a time she lived in great luxury, but once she came under the influence of the Oratorians, she began to devote herself to works of piety.¹ In 1643 she erected on the right bank of the Tiber a monastery for the discalced Carmelites and the church of Regina Coeli.² On the death of his father Taddeo Barberini succeeded him as General of the Church and Governor of the Borgo; in addition to these offices he also held those of a Castellan of S. Angelo and Captain of the Guard.³ When at the death of Duke Francesco Maria of Urbino, on April 28th, 1631, that duchy fell to the Church, Taddeo obtained the prefecture of Rome, a post hitherto held by the Rovere. On August 1st he made a solemn entry into Rome through the Porta del Popolo, on the 5th the Pope presented him with the insignia of his new dignity in the Sistine Chapel, in the presence of thirty Cardinals,⁴ and the day after he rode in great state through the streets.⁵ In March, 1630, the Pope bestowed the Golden Rose on him.⁶ Taddeo

¹ G. B. TARABUCCI, *Stato della corte di Roma nel. 1643*, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² See BONANNI, II., 603; MARTINORI, 77.

³ See ALV. CONTARINI, 370; PAGLIUCCHI, 65 seq.

⁴ See **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, Barb. 2819, Vatican Library. *Avviso of August 9, 1631, *Ottob.* 3338, p. II., *ibid.*; *NICOLETTI, IV., 623 seq.; *Arch. Rom.*, II., 272; *Nuova Rassegna*, 1894, I., 532, for the publications that appeared at the time. A painting in the private possession of Prince Barberini records the ceremony. **Epigrammata graeca ad Tad. Barberini praef. urbis*, in Barb. 2609, Vatican Library. Here belongs the poem dedicated to Taddeo, *Gli Prefetti Urbani*, by ALESSIO PULCI, in *Vat.* 7085, *ibid.*

⁵ See **Rclazione di Msgr. Andosiglia della solenne cavalcata fatta li 6 agosto 1631 da T. Barberini come prefetto di Roma*. Cod. E. 99, Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

⁶ *' 21 Martii 1632 Papa dedit Rosam praefecto qui associatus a cardinalibus usque ad suas cameras in palatio Apostolico (*Diarium P. Alaleonis*, Barb. 2819, Vatican Library). Taddeo also was given a commemorative statue on the Capitol, see BORBONI, *Delle statue*, 329.

made much of his dignity as Prefect of Rome,¹ so much so that he claimed precedence even over ambassadors, a demand which led to numerous disputes and serious difficulties with France and Venice.² Such disputes about precedence, which were common at most courts at that period, were handled like big questions of State in that era of meticulous etiquette. Precisely because nothing survived of the pompous prefectural dignity except the title, the Barberini attached all the more importance to the honorary prerogatives which went with it. In fact one Felice Contelori made exhaustive archæological researches on the subject the result of which he gave to the world in 1631, in a bulky tome.³ In the spring of 1632 Taddeo took possession of the magnificent palace which Bernini had built on the slope of the Quirinal near Quattro Fontane,⁴ but two years later he returned to the old family palazzo in the Via dei Giubbonari⁵ which he considerably enlarged by the purchase of adjoining houses and by building over the street which leads into the piazza Monte di Pietà.⁶ At the close of 1630 the palace near Quattro Fontane was occupied by young Cardinal Antonio, whilst Francesco, in his capacity as vice-chancellor, resided in the Cancelleria.⁷

Contemporaries agree in testifying that Taddeo was distinguished for the purity of his morals and that he refrained from meddling with questions of the Court and in politics. His whole interest was the administration and increase of his great wealth.⁸ His ground possessions alone yielded an income

¹ A terracotta bust of Taddeo in the full dress of his office as Prefect is in the Barberini Palace. In the gallery of paintings there is a portrait of Taddeo by C. Maratta. See PAGLIUCHHI, 67.

² See BELTRAMI, in *Arch. Rom.*, II., 272 seq.

³ *Ibid.*, 262 seq., 273 seq.

⁴ See POSSE, *Deckenfresco*, 96. Additional matter on this edifice, in Vol. XXIX., Ch. XII.

⁵ See the *Avviso of October 14, 1634, in ADEMOLLO, *Teatri*, 8.

⁶ See HEMPEL, *Borromini*, 59 seq.

⁷ See TOTTI, 211, 222, 273; MARTINELLI, 27.

⁸ See **Relatione* of 1624, Papal Secret Archives; R. ZENO, 153; P. CONTARINI, 215; ANG. CONTARINI, 266; ALV. CONTARINI, 370; G. B. TARABUCCI, *loc. cit.*

of 100,000 scudi in 1635.¹ In 1632 the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Pesaro valued Taddeo's landed property at 4,000,000 scudi, to which must be added his wealth in cash.² In 1634 he bought from Maria Sforza, for the sum of 427,000 scudi, Valmontone and its surrounding district,³ and since Cardinals Francesco and Antonio held posts that yielded an increase just as large the belief seems well founded that the regular income of the three brothers amounted to over 300,000 scudi a year.⁴ This went far beyond the sum which a Congregation of Cardinals, consulted by the Pope, had defined as a permissible allowance to the nephews.⁵ Small wonder that Urban VIII. should have had qualms of conscience as he lay dying.⁶ Later on, after the fall of the Barberini, truly fantastic sums were mentioned which they were accused of having acquired, partly even by dishonest means. According to these rumours Taddeo received 42,000,000 and his brother, the Cardinal, 63,000,000 scudi during the twenty-one years of Urban VIII.'s pontificate.⁷

However lavish Urban VIII. may have been towards his family, and whatever dignities and revenues he may have heaped upon them, he would not allow his nephews to influence his government in the slightest degree. Self-reliant and self-willed, he kept the management of affairs altogether in his own

¹ To this must be added 20,000 scudi which he received as General of the Church and as Governor of the Borgo and of Civitavecchia; see ALV. CONTARINI, 370.

² Cf. G. PESARO, 334.

³ See TOMASSETTI, III., 455.

⁴ Not 500,000, as RANKE states, III. 6, 16; see ALV. CONTARINI, 369.

⁵ Cf. the *resolution taken by this Congregation, August 28, 1643, in the App. No. 19, Vol. XXIX.

⁶ Cf. below, Vol. XXIX., Ch. V.

⁷ These data, which are generally found in reports of the conclave of Innocent X., appeared so incredible to RANKE (III. 6, 16) that he thought there must be a clerical error. They are, however, confirmed by the reports of the Tuscan envoys; see GROTTANELLI in the *Rassegna Naz.*, LVIII. (1891), 263. Cf. also CIAMPI, *Innocenzo X.*, 332 seq.

hands.¹ As early as 1626 one who knew the situation wrote that government had become absolute for none among the Cardinals dared to resist and none would offer advice without being asked.² If ever a Pope was jealous of his authority it was the present one. It was at first believed that Cardinal Borghese counted for something with Urban VIII. but he had disappointed people's expectations. Ludovisi and his close associates such as Aldobrandini, Bandini, Millini, Torres and Biscia received a little more consideration, but they too had no decisive influence. Ultimately Magalotti was the only confidant of Urban VIII. But when that important and very shrewd man retired in 1626,³ the other Cardinals, even Zacchia, Gessi and Pamfili, did the same.⁴

The rest of the Pope's more intimate entourage also had next to no influence. His first *Maestro di camera*, Virginio Cesarini, did not count at all, were it only because of his valetudinarianism,⁵ but even old and loyal servants such as the *coppiere* (cup-bearer), Girolamo Steffanucci, the *scalco*, P. Giovanni degl'Effetti, and the Captain of the Guard, Bernardino Nari, enjoyed, indeed, the Pope's confidence but on his policy they had not the slightest influence.⁶ The Bolognese Berlingherio Gessi, who had been Gregory XV.'s

¹ Cf. the **Relatione* of 1624, Papal Secret Archives; **Avviso* of October 19, 1624 (the Pope wishes to sign personally the Briefs hitherto expedited by the Prefect of the Signature of Briefs, Cardinal Ludovisi), *Urb.* 1094, Vat. Library; report in *Studi e docum.*, XXII., 210; P. CONTARINI, 212; ANG. CONTARINI, 261; NANI, 34 *seq.*

² See **Discorso della corte di Roma* of 1626, *Cod.* 620 of the Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

³ "**Sta ritiratissimo; -sta sempre sul negotio, non vuol seguito o corteggio,*" in order to avoid envy and jealousy. *Ibid.*

⁴ See **Discorso intorno li cardinali* 1632, *ibid.*

⁵ See the **Relatione* of 1624, *loc. cit.* V. Cesarini is omitted in MORONI'S list (XLI., 124); his successors were Fr. Adriano Ceva and Angelo Giori. As it was known how greatly Urban VIII. loved Cesarini, a memorial statue was erected on the Capitol to the prematurely deceased official; see BORBONI, *Delle Statue*, 309.

⁶ See the **Relatione* of 1624. Papal Secret Archives.

Maestro di casa, retained that office until the close of 1624. In 1626 he was raised to the cardinalate. He was succeeded from 1625 till 1626 by Laudivio Zacchia and from 1626 till 1627 by Marzio Ginetti, who was given the title of *Maggiordomo* which has remained in use ever since. On Ginetti's elevation to the cardinalate he was succeeded by the secretary of Briefs, Ulpiano Volpi, who died on March 27th, 1629. His successor, Fausto Poli, obtained the purple in 1613 and was replaced by Lorenzo Raggi.¹ Likewise in close contact with the Pope was the Secretary of Briefs, Giovanni Ciampoli, a friend of Galileo, but who fell into sudden disgrace in 1632 for taking the side of Spain,² and the *Datarius* Jacopo Cavalieri, who obtained the purple in 1626,³ and among the officials of the Secretariate of State Lorenzo Azzolini, Bishop of Ripatransone, who had also made a name for himself as a poet.⁴ He was to receive the purple but his death in October, 1632, prevented his elevation.⁵ After that the drafting of the dispatches of the Secretariate of State was entrusted to Pietro Benesse of Ragusa, who until then had acted as secretary to Cardinal Francesco Barberini. When Francesco Ceva, who had been secretary to the Pope during his cardinalate, returned from his

¹ See MORONI, XLI., 264 *seq.* Besides Ciampoli, other Secretaries of Briefs were Fr. Herrera, Giulio Rospigliosi and Marc Aurelio Maraldi; see BONAMICUS, *De claris script.*, 286 *seqq.*; MORONI, XLIII., 267; DENIS, *Nouvelles de Rome*, I., cxii.; G. B. TARABUCCI says of Fausto Poli: " *Si e conciliata la confidenza non solo di N.S. ma insieme di tutti li nepoti del Papa," and of Maraldi that he was industrious, universally beloved and might yet become a Cardinal. (*Stato d. corte di Roma nel 1643*, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.) For Urban VIII.'s Briefs see WIRZ, xxiv.

² Cf. Vol. XXIX., Ch. VI.

³ Egidio Orsini de Vivariis and Fabio di Lagonissa succeeded him in the *Dataria*; see MORONI, XIX., 136.

⁴ **Poesie di Mgr. L. Azzolini*, in *Vat.* 9926, Vatican Library, and *Cod. St. Germain*, National Library, Paris. Azzolini's *Satira contra la lussuria* (*Barb.* 3788) was printed in 1586 at Venice.

⁵ Cf. the *report of NICCOLINI, October 30, 1632, State Archives, Florence. *Med.* 3352.

Paris nunciature in 1634, he was appointed Benesse's assistant. He soon pushed the latter into the background but by reason both of his age and his covetousness he failed to obtain any great influence,¹ and he was eventually replaced by Giambattista Spada who had been governor of Rome since 1635.²

If Urban VIII. was able to hold the reins of government so tightly in his hands that nothing important was done without his knowledge,³ it was because he was quick to grasp every kind of business, even such as lay outside his sphere, as that of the Inquisition,⁴ and because he enjoyed very robust health.⁵ He owed its preservation to the simple, regular life in which he continued until the end.⁶

¹ See RICHARD, in the *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, XI., 734. Supplementary information on the MSS. bearing on the subject is to be found in CELANI, *La bibl. Angelica* (1905), 1 seq., 41 seq., and in *La Bibliofilia*, XIII. (1911), 172 seq., 336 seq.; XIV. (1912), 12 seq., 68 seq.

² See CARDELLA, VII., 107.

³ See ANG. CONTARINI, 212.

⁴ Cf. G. B. TARABUCCI, *loc. cit.*

⁵ He was seriously ill immediately after the Conclave; see *Avvisi* of August 16 and 19, September 2 and 6, 1623, *Urb.* 1093, Vatican Library; R. ZENO, 147; Report of F. CARANDINI FERRARI, August 16, 1623, State Archives, Modena. The same writes on August 30, 1623: *" S.B^{ne} sta senza febre e lunedì le cessò la dissenteria che la seconda volta l'era venuta, nè resta altro che ripigliare le forze. Ma non negotia con dire ch'in quattro giorni di salute spedirà più negotii che in un mese di convalescenza." Not until September 16, 1623, was the ambassador able to state that " yesterday, both in the forenoon and afternoon, three Cardinals had been received in audience. On September 20 the envoy of Este was given his first audience, in which Urban VIII., referring to his illness, said, *" che Dio l'avea nel bel principio voluto ammonito ch'era una vil cenere et che quanto il star male era altro avviso che non era il veder abbrugiar la stoppa, cerimonia che s'usa nell'incoronazione de Papi." The Coronation and the *Possesso* had to be deferred on account of his illness; see CANCELLIERI, 200 seq. An account of the Coronation is also in *Avviso* of September 30, 1623, *loc. cit.*, and in the *Atti Lig.*, XLII., 131 seq. For the *Possesso* see also CANCELLIERI, 200 seq., and *Avviso* of November 22, 1623, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See *Memorie di Msgr. Herrera*, Barb. 4901, Vatican Library.

Urban VIII. was an early riser, in fact he often rose at dawn. He began by reading his Breviary and then heard or said Mass, after which the whole morning was devoted to affairs, audiences and consultations. The afternoon was given up to recreation. After the midday meal he made a siesta or conversed with his nephews. He also delighted in listening to his own poems set to music. Towards the evening he took a good deal of exercise. He rode for hours in the gardens of the Vatican and the Quirinal when he displayed excellent horsemanship. His table was most frugal. He ate very little in the middle of the day, his chief meal being in the evening. At night he demanded absolute stillness, so much so that the birds of the garden had to be slain because their chirping disturbed his slumbers.¹

Already as a Cardinal Urban VIII., in keeping with the customary practice of the Romans, was wont to spend in the Alban Hills those incomparable autumn days when the clearness of the atmosphere, the splendid colouring of the leaves and the glowing tints of the mountains in the evening compel the admiration of the beholder. However, it was not merely the charms of nature that drew him into the hills, he was equally attracted by the perfume of the ancient classical legends which the whole of that country exhales. He was wont to take up his residence in a Villa belonging to Monsignor Visconti situated at the entrance of Castel Gandolfo,² a small hamlet built on the very edge of a lake which lies in the crater of a volcano. The hamlet had been acquired by the Camera Apostolica in 1596. Pope Urban bought the Villa and took possession of it in May, 1626; the autumn of the two preceding years had been spent in the Villa Mondragone belonging to Cardinal Borghese.³ After that the Pope went to Castel Gandolfo every year in May and October.

¹ See P. CONTARINI, 211; ANG. CONTARINI, 260; G. PESARO, 329; NANI, 35; NICOLETTI, lib. VIII., ch. 15. Vatican Library.

² Cf. CANCELLIERI, *Notizie di Castel Gandolfo*, Roma, 1817; A. GUIDI, *I paesi dei colli Albani*, Roma, 1880, 58 seq.

³ See **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, for October 17, 1624, and October 14, 1625, *Barb.* 2818, Vatican Library.

He usually stayed a fortnight, and not rarely even longer. During that time he explored the country on foot and on horseback, saying Mass in the morning in the various churches. Nevertheless business did not stop, for even during this *villegiatura* audiences were given to ambassadors and other important personages.¹

The structural alterations by which the Villa was turned into a palace surrounded by a wall, like a fortress, were concluded in 1629. At the same time a new carriage-road was also constructed. Carlo Maderno drew up the plan of the very plain, sober building; it was carried out by Bartolomeo Breccioli and Domenico Castelli.² Whilst still a Cardinal, Urban VIII. had extolled the beauty of this spot, the fairest of the whole district, in a poem dedicated to his friend Lorenzo Magalotti.³

As Pope, Urban VIII. frequently entertained at Castel Gandolfo, by preference poets and artists. One of the former, Lorenzo Azzolini, sang the new papal residence in a fine poem full of classical reminiscences.⁴ Joachim Sandrart, of Frankfort, was also entertained here and Urban VIII. commissioned him to paint his portrait. Sandrart depicts the Pope in the act of going down to the lake Albano, surrounded by his suite and

¹ See besides the detailed account in **Diarium P. Alaleonis* the **Avvisi* of May 1 and October 16, 1627, May 7 and October 25, 1628, May 9 and 19, 1629, May 30, 1630, October 18, 1631, May 20, 1632, October 8, 1633, May 6 and October 7, 1634, June 23, 1635, May 3 and October 25, 1636, May 16 and October 1, 1637, *Urb.* 1097, 1100, 1102-5, *Ottob.* 3338, P. II., and 3339, *Barb.* 6352, Vatican Library.

² See BAGLIONE, 182, 347; the inscription is in CANCELLIERI, *Lettere sopra il Tarantismo*, 107; BONANNI, I.¹, 594; MARTINORI, 75; TOMASSETTI, II., 188. Over the entrance of the first floor there is a very fine coat-of-arms of Urban VIII., probably based on a drawing by Bernini.

³ MAPHAEI BARBERINI, NUNC URBANI VIII. *Poemata*, Romae, 1635, 146; translated by REUMONT, *Beiträge*, V., 129.

⁴ The *poem is to be found in DOM. JACOVACCI, *Notizie di Castel Gandolfo*. The original is in the Archives of Prince Chigi, at Ariccia.

by the Swiss Guard, in order to watch the fishing.¹ The picture of the papal summer residence by the Dutchman, Pieter Schenck, is more in the nature of a realistic, topographical reproduction, though it is not devoid of a fine sense of nature in the South, which must have seemed so strange to him.² An idealized landscape combined with reality is exhibited in a canvas which Urban VIII. commissioned no less a man than Claude Lorrain to paint for him and which remains in the possession of the Barberini family to this day. It shows in the background the Pope's summer palace towering above the steep bank of Lake Albano; the charmingly treated foreground shows some country folk playing on rustic instruments of music in a harmoniously planned cluster of trees, and blending with it the almost circular crater of the lake together with the village, the castle and the luminous atmospheric spaces.³ Giovanni Baglione calls the summer residence of Castel Gandolfo "the Pope's delight".⁴ This predilection of Urban VIII. is easily understood if we take our stand on the East terrace of the first floor. Here the enchantment of nature blends with great historic memories. Whilst from the windows of the other side the eye ranges as far as the silver streak of the Tyrrhenian sea, and the cupola of St. Peter's greets us from the distant *campagna*, here we gaze down towards the deep blue waters of the lake fringed with a wreath of thick and verdant forests and surmounted by the cone of Monte Cavo with the remains of the temple of the ancient Latin confederation: here the memory of the primitive Latium, there, in the distance, the metropolis, from the noise of which this summer residence provided an escape. As such it was dear to many subsequent Popes, down to Pius IX.⁵

¹ See J. V. SANDRART, *Academie*, ed. by Pelster, Munich, 1925, 47 *seq.*

² See ROSE, *Spätbarock*, 16 *seq.*

³ See FRIEDLÄNDER, *Claude Lorrain*, Berlin, 1921, 47 *seq.* (with plates).

⁴ BAGLIONE, 182.

⁵ Since the reconciliation between Church and State in Italy, Castel Gandolfo once more provides rest and change for the Supreme Pontiff. Pius XI. has made repeated and lengthy stays in Urban VIII.'s summer residence. (Transl. note.)

CHAPTER II.

ATTITUDE OF URBAN VIII. TOWARDS FRANCE AND SPAIN—
DEVOLUTION OF THE DUCHY OF URBINO—CONFLICT OVER
THE VALTELLINA AND CARDINAL RICHELIEU'S POLICY—
THE PEACE OF MONZON—DEFEAT OF PROTESTANTISM IN
FRANCE AND GERMANY.

WHEN the diplomatists, after Urban VIII.'s elevation, discussed the political attitude which the new Pope was likely to adopt, opinions were extraordinarily divided, though the majority thought that his preferences would probably go to France. In Paris the election of Cardinal Barberini was viewed as a "miraculous turn", and the French ambassador in Rome expressed the hope that the new pontificate would differ from the foregoing one as fire differs from water.¹

To explain the French sympathies of the new Pope it was argued that his Paris nunciature had been the lever by which he had been raised; that Henry IV.'s recommendation had greatly contributed to his elevation to the cardinalate; that he had been much impressed by the frank and open manner of dealing with affairs which characterized French politicians and that he fully realized the importance of France as a counterpoise to the Hispano-Austrian power. The Venetian Renier Zeno detected in him a certain spiritual affinity to the French, for like them he loved neatness of style, poetry and the study of languages. Moreover he cherished fatherly feelings towards Louis XIII. at whose Baptism he had officiated in the name of Paul V. Nevertheless Zeno emphatically declares that he could not see in Urban VIII. a blind partisan of France, for the Pope was aware of the shadows in the French situation and in the character of that nation. On the whole, Zeno concludes, there was reason to

¹ See ROTT, III., 643. Cf. also *Rev. hist.*, LXXV., 32.

be thankful that this time a Pope had been elected who was not enamoured of the Spaniards.¹

It is worthy of notice that from the very beginning the view was expressed in Rome that the new Pope, seeing that he was well informed on the political situation, would pursue an impartial line of conduct which would enable him, as Head of the Church and the common father of all and as such raised above all parties, to preserve peace.² Such an attitude, in view of the frequently conflicting interests of the Catholic Powers, viz. Austria, Spain and France, seemed altogether indispensable for the strengthening and further expansion of the mighty advance which the Catholic restoration had made during the pontificate of Gregory XV., nor was it less necessary if the Pope wished to carry out the bold plans for the systematic repression of the Turks which he conceived in the first days of his pontificate.³

Urban VIII.'s anxiety to maintain good relations both with Spain and France appears from the autograph letters which he addressed to Philip IV. and to Louis XIII. on August 7th, 1623. In his letter to the former he expressly and gratefully acknowledges the great part which Cardinals Borgia, Doria, Paniaqua and the Spanish ambassador had played in his election. In the letter to the King of France he also alludes to the favourable attitude towards him of the French ambassador during the conclave: it was the King, the letter says, that inspired the ambassador with this affection, and for this he owed him gratitude, no less than for the reception with which he had met as Cardinal from the father of Louis XIII., "the great Henry."⁴

With the Emperor also Urban VIII. desired to continue the relations which he had with the supreme head of the

¹ R. ZENO, *Relazione*, 174 seq. Cf. with this the *Avviso of August 12, 1623, *Urb.* 1093, Vatican Library.

² See *Avviso August 9, 1623, *ibid.*

³ Cf. the *report of September, 1623, in LEMAN, *Urbain VIII.*, 19.

⁴ Both *letters in Papal Secret Archives, *Lett. di proprio pugno.*

Empire whilst still a Cardinal.¹ "The new Pope," Ferdinand II.'s ambassador, Prince Savelli, wrote to Vienna on August 6th, 1623, "shows particular affection for Your Majesty and for the whole illustrious House of Austria."² On August 8th, 1623, Ferdinand II. received an autograph letter from the Pope. In it the Pope not only acknowledged Cardinal Zollern's contribution to his election but assured Ferdinand of his best sentiments "both as regards the common interests of Catholicism and the private ones of the Emperor and his illustrious House".³

At the moment of Urban VIII.'s elevation to the pontificate the political horizon was far from clear. There was, first of all, the question of the Valtellina which continued to jeopardize peace between Spain, Austria and France. The danger of an armed conflict between these Powers was increased by the attitude of Venice and Savoy which were wholeheartedly on the side of France, so that the peace of Italy was immediately threatened. No doubt it was in view of this dangerous situation that on October 23rd, 1623, Urban VIII. prescribed

¹ In the *New Year congratulations of Cardinal Barberini to Ferdinand II. on December 15, 1621, we read: "Non cedendo io ad alcuno delli più devoti servitori di V. Mtà Ces. nel desiderio delli suoi prosperi successi, ne ho sempre indiritti al cielo affettuosi voti e tanto più poichè dalle felicità di Lei è per dependere la sicurezza e quiete del christianesimo," signed: "humill^{mo} e devotissimo servitore M. card. Barberinus." The original in State Archives, Vienna, *Hofkorresp.*, F. 11.

² The original of the *letter of August 6, 1623, *ibid.* *Rom. fasc.* 45.

³ Urban VIII. says in the *letter that his first thought on his recovery had been to reassure the Emperor: "accìo che si rallegrì d'havar in questa sede un Pontefice come negli interessi communi della religion catholica così ne'privati della Cesarea persona et casa sua congiuntissimo di voluntà. . . ." "He appreciates the Emperor's support at his election," al che ci sentimo particolarmente tenuti per quanto all'effetto della nostra elettione ha operato con molto ardore il card.^{le} Zollern. . . . State Archives, Vienna, *Hofkorresp.*, F. 12. *Ibid.* the official *letter to Ferdinand II. on the Election, dated August 23, 1623.

the Forty Hours' Prayers in the basilicas of St. Peter, St. Mary Major and the Lateran in order to implore God's blessing upon his government.¹

Besides the affair of the Valtellina, another important matter engaged the Pope's attention from the beginning of his rule. Eight days before the death of Gregory XV. Francesco Maria della Rovere, the 74 years old Duke of Urbino, had seen his only son die a sudden death as a result of his excesses. This tragedy opened the perspective of the devolution of that fief to the Church. Death prevented Gregory XV. from taking the requisite measures.² It was not its extent nor its glory, which had vanished long ago,³ that gave importance to the Duchy, but its position between the Romagna and the Marches and the coastal places of Sinigaglia, Fano and Pesaro, with their facilities for trade. Urban VIII. maintained the claims of the Holy See to Urbino with the greatest energy, but because these also extended to the county of Montefeltro, he had to reckon with the opposition of the Emperor and the Government of Florence.

The imperial pretensions rested on such slender foundations that Count Francesco Gambara whom Ferdinand II. dispatched to Urbino for the purpose of offering his condolence to the Duke, was restricted to ascertaining what were exactly the rights of the Empire in the matter. There had been no mention of these for centuries, whereas the vassalage to the Holy See had always been kept alive.⁴

In order to reinforce the claims of the Medici a betrothal had been arranged, during the vacancy of the Holy See, between Victoria, a niece of the Duke, and the youthful

¹ See **Acta consist.*, October 25, 1623, *Barb.* 2933, Vatican Library. Cf. also **Avviso* of October 25, 1623, *Urb.* 1093, *ibid.* According to **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, the devotion began on October 25, 1623. *Barb.* 2818, *ibid.*

² See the **report of Bernardino Campello* of February 18, 1628, Campello Archives, Spoleto.

³ Cf. the description in the *Discorso sopra lo stato di Urbino alla Stà di N.S. Urbano VIII.*, publ. da P. Mazio, Rome, 1858.

⁴ See REUMONT, *Toscana*, I., 404.

Grand-Duke of Tuscany. The girl was a mere infant but together with her mother, Claudia Medici, she was taken to Florence.¹ Though both the Government of Florence and the Duke of Urbino sought to deceive the Pope as to their real intentions, the latter was well informed² and demanded an unequivocal explanation from them. The negotiations initiated by Urban VIII. in Rome, and through his ambassadors at Florence, as well as with the Duke of Urbino, proved very difficult in as much as the Florentine jurists obstinately defended the Medici's claim to the County of Montefeltro as to an old possession exempt from vassalage to the Holy See and one in which, in default of the male line, the female line of succession was valid. The explanations of the old Duke were likewise none too satisfactory,³ but eventually Roman diplomacy succeeded in coming to terms with the old man who only wished to end his days in peace.⁴ On November 4th, 1623, Francesco Maria made an unequivocal declaration, in the form of a letter to the Pope written at Castel Durante, in which he expressly recognized the feudal sovereignty of the Holy See over the whole of the State of Urbino, Sinigaglia and Montefeltro, declaring at the same time that, should he die without male issue, the whole of it was to devolve to the Holy See.⁵

Further developments in this matter,⁶ which Urban VIII. had very much at heart,⁷ were greatly helped by the political

¹ Cf. UGOLINI, II., 447 *seq.*

² See the *report of Bernardino Campello, February 18, 1628, *loc. cit.*

³ See AGUCCHI's letter to the Paris nuncio Corsini, dated Rome, November 5, 1623, *Cod. X.*, VI., 16, of the Casanatense Library, Rome.

⁴ See the **Relatione* of 1624, Papal Secret Archives, II., 150, No. 3.

⁵ See BALAN, VI., 733.

⁶ The account in GALLUZZI, VI., ch. 6 and 7, is supplemented by information from NICOLETTI, II., 105 *seqq.* The version of GROTTANELLI, *Claudio de' Medici*, 100 *seq.*, is very obscure.

⁷ Cf. the *report of the envoy of Este, November 8, 1523, State Archives, Modena.

situation. Owing to the war in Germany, the Emperor depended on papal assistance. Spain would rather see an extension of the States of the Church than an increase of the power of Florence, whilst Venice and the other States of Upper Italy looked rather towards the Valtellina than in the direction of Urbino. In these circumstances the regency of Florence, which viewed with alarm the concentration of papal troops on the frontier, also resolved to give way. In so doing it hoped to secure better terms for the allodial possessions. Therefore, on November 16th, the regency, acting in the name of the Grand-Duke Ferdinand, gave its approval to the declaration of the Duke of Urbino. Though it proved impossible to get the Emperor to act in like manner, the imperial declaration of March 2nd, 1624, was nevertheless of such a nature that it could not create any difficulties in case of an eventual taking of possession by the Pope.¹ The Venetians, who had begun by siding with Tuscany and the Emperor, now beat a hasty retreat and even offered their assistance to the Pope.²

In a consistory of December 18th, 1623, Urban VIII. communicated to the Cardinals the declaration of the Duke of Urbino and its confirmation by the Florentine regency.³ The documents were likewise communicated to the nuncios for the purpose of showing them to the Governments to which they were accredited.⁴ On June 14th, 1624, the Pope was able to inform the Cardinals of an agreement concluded on April 30th with the Duke of Urbino and with Florence,⁵ which settled any and all points that might give rise to difficulties after the devolution of the Duchy.⁶

¹ See REUMONT, *Toscana*, I., 406.

² See NICOLETTI, II., 507 *seq.*

³ See **Acta consist.*, Barb. 2933, Vatican Library.

⁴ See the **Instruction* for Giulio Sacchetti, nuncio for Spain, January, 1624, Casanatense Library, Rome, X., V., 15. The *Instruction* is to be found in the Library at Amberg, in the *Inf. polit.*, X., of the State Library, Berlin, and in *Cod. A.F.*, X., 3, of the Brera Library, Milan.

⁵ See BALAN, VI., 723 *seq.*

⁶ See **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*

Notwithstanding these agreements, Urban VIII. was haunted by the fear that the Duchy might yet escape the Church. This explains the Pope's insistence that all officials and military commanders in the Duchy should bind themselves by oath to submit unconditionally to the Holy See on the death of Duke Francesco Maria who, weary of life itself and dissatisfied with the settlement of April, 1624, decided in December of that year, to lay aside the burden of government and to retire to his residence of Castel Durante, situate in the valley of the Metauro. Besides a suitable income and the right of imparting favours in the future also, he had made only one condition, viz. that no fresh taxes should be imposed on his subjects. In exchange for the artillery and its ammunition, the Apostolic Camera paid the Duke the agreed sum of 100,000 scudi. On January 1st, 1625, Berlingherio Gessi, who had been nuncio in Venice from 1607 to 1618,¹ and whom Urban VIII. had appointed governor, began to rule the Duchy which, besides the towns of Urbino, Pesaro, Gubbio, Sinigaglia, Fossombrone, San Leo and Cagli, likewise included 300 villages and castelli and yielded an annual revenue of 300,000 scudi.²

¹ "Prelato pieno di meriti e di virtù," says *NICOLETTI (II., 193), where there are further details about Gessi.

² Cf. *Bull.*, XIII., 268 seq.; BAROZZI-BERCHET, I., 227; MURATORI, *Annali*, XI., 102; REPOSATI, *Zecca di Gubbio*, II., 246 seq.; UGOLINI, II., 354 seq., 460 seq.; BALAN, VI., 734 seq.; CAMPELLO, *Storia di Campello*, 360. Campeggi followed Gessi, Bishop of Sinigaglia, to whom the old Duke often complained of the miscarriage of justice and other matters. When the old Duke died on April 28, 1631, Urban VIII. resisted the temptation to give the Duchy to his nephew Taddeo. Msgr. Herrera reports in his **Memorie* (see above, p. 36, note 5), that the Pope said at the time: "Se lo stato de Urbino fusse patrimonio della casa Barberina, e altri ci consigliasse che ne infeudassimo una persona di altra Casa, vi pare che faessimo bene a seguitare questo consiglio? Dicendo essi di nò, soggiunse: Hora, essendo patrimonio della Chiesa, alla quale siamo infinitamente più obligati che a casa Barberini, volete che lo togliamo a lei, per infeudare altri, ancorchè del nostro sangue?" (Vatican Library). The

Far more difficult than the settlement of the question of Urbino was the composition of the dispute over the Valtellina from which the Huguenots hoped for the fulfilment of their fondest wish, namely a war between France and Spain.¹ The last act of Gregory XV. had been to take over the fortresses of the Valtellina which were to remain in his keeping, as the trustee of France and Spain, until the settlement of the dispute. The surrender had not been complete for the Spaniards still occupied Chiavenna and Riva on the lake of Mezzola. Urban VIII.'s first step was to demand the surrender of those places also.² After some dilatoriness the Spanish Government yielded to so fair a demand.³ The Pope who, whilst still a Cardinal, had not approved the conduct of Gregory XV. when he took over the strong places,⁴ aimed at composing the disputes between France and Spain to their mutual satisfaction though with the express condition that the interests of religion in the Valtellina should not suffer thereby. To this end Urban VIII. created a special congregation of theologians.⁵ An agreement concluded in the first days of November of 1623 between the ambassador of Spain, the Duke of Pastrana, and the ambassador of France, Noel Brulart de Sillery, with

addition of Urbino to the States of the Church (*cf.* the Relation of A. DONATO, new reprint in SEGARIZZI, *Relaz. degli Amb. Venetii*, II., Bari, 1913, 237 *seq.*), a matter which Urban VIII. had more at heart than the acquisition of Ferrara (see UGOLINI, II., 461), was communicated to the Cardinals by the Pope on May 12, 1631; see **Acta consist.*, MS. from the library of Card. Gentili in my possession. A **Relazione intorno all governo dello stato d'Urbino* by Giov. Fr. Pica, dated Rome, November 9, 1636, and addressed to Urban VIII., is in *Barb.* 5376. *Ibid.*, 1823, p. 24, a poem to the Pope on the acquisition of Urbino. Vatican Library.

¹ *Cf.* the **"Relatione della Nunziatura di Francia fatta da Msgr. arcivescovo di Tarso al sig. card. Barberini a dì 27 Ottobre 1623,"* Casanatense Library, X., V., 15.

² **Brief* to the Governor of Milan, September 16, 1623, quoted by NICOLETTI, II.

³ See ROTT, III., 643 *seq.*; QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 14.

⁴ See **NICOLETTI*, II., 485.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 451.

the aid of the Pope's mediation, failed to win the approval of the Spanish Cabinet which demanded the addition of a clause which would have guaranteed to the Spaniards the free use, at any time, of the military road from Colico to Bormio. On December 10th Philip IV. declared to the Spanish nuncio that he must decline to confirm the agreement negotiated in Rome.¹

Spain's procedure greatly annoyed Urban VIII. ; so much so that under the stress of the first impression and in agreement with Sillery, he thought of dropping all further attempts at mediation.² However, anxiety for the preservation of peace soon prevailed over every other consideration. This preoccupation, which finds expression in all Urban VIII.'s letters of that period,³ impelled the Pope to further attempts at mediation. His concern for the preservation of peace disposed him to agree to every imaginable concession in favour of Spain, and he even won over to his view the French ambassador Sillery. On February 24th, 1624, two agreements were elaborated, one of them insuring the position of Catholics in the Valtellina with the Kings of Spain and France as guarantors ; the other, which was intended to compose the political differences, allowing Spanish troops to pass freely through the Valtellina and through Bormio, not indeed from Germany and Italy, but under certain conditions from Italy into France. Both the French and the Spanish ambassador in Rome expressed satisfaction with a compromise which put a check on Spain's territorial aspirations in Italy whilst it also made it possible to assist the Emperor in his struggle with the Protestants.⁴ Thus a happy solution of the problem seemed to have been found. Urgent Briefs to Louis XIII. and to Philip IV. pressed for its acceptance.⁵ But meanwhile Nicolas Brulart de Sillery fell from power and was

¹ See ROTT, III., 675.

² *Ibid.*, 678.

³ Cf. the *Brief to Louis XIII., January 7, 1624, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See ROTT, III., 693 *seq.*

⁵ See the *Brief to Louis XIII. and Philip IV. of March 2, 12, 23, 1624, *Epist.*, I., Papal Secret Archives.

replaced by La Vieuville. The new orientation of France's policy found expression in the rejection of the concession concerning the free passage of Spanish troops and in the replacement of Noel de Sillery by Baron Philippe de Béthune.¹

The question of Urbino had by itself alone occasioned expenses which, in view of the exhausted state in which Urban VIII. had found the Camera Apostolica, weighed heavily on him,² but the occupation of the Valtellina fortresses demanded even greater sums.³ The Instruction for the new Spanish nuncio, Sacchetti, describes them as an intolerable burden.⁴ In these circumstances the Pope was unable to comply with the repeated requests of the Emperor and of Maximilian of Bavaria for larger pecuniary subsidies for their expensive struggle with their opponents. All that Ferdinand II. could obtain was the payment of two delayed monthly contributions amounting to 40,000 florins, nor did Maximilian get more than 10,000 scudi.⁵ On the other hand,

¹ See ROTT, III., 693 *seq.*, 696; COCHIN, *A. Arnauld*, Paris, 1921, 18 *seq.*; *cf.* MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 18; QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 31 *seq.*

² *Cf.* the *Avvisi of August 30 and September 2, 1623, *Urb.* 1093, Vatican Library.

³ *Cf.* XXVII., 218. On August 31, 1623, Urban VIII. *wrote to the King of Poland about his great expenses (*Epist.*, I., Papal Secret Archives). According to the *Avviso of September 20, 1623, 45,000 scudi had to be withdrawn from the Castle of St. Angelo, for the troops in the Valtellina (Vatican Library, *loc. cit.*). *Cf.* also the *reports of the envoy of Este, September 20 and 27, 1623, State Archives, Modena.

⁴ " *Instruzione a Mons. Sacchetti, vescovo di Gravina, nuntio appresso la Mtà Catt." (January, 1624), *Cod.* X., V., 15, Casanat. Library, Rome. The **Conti del esercito papale durante l'occupazione della Valtellina*, 1623-5, were offered for sale in 1913, in catalogue 414 of the Leipzig antiquarian, Hiersemann.

⁵ See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 169 *seq.* *Cf.* also GÖRZ, *Akten* 307, 352 *seq.*, 408, note, 430 *seq.* For the mission of Georg Sigmund, Freiherr von Herberstein, to Rome, see the *reports of Altoviti, dated Vienna, May 4, 11, 18, June 22, and July 13, 1624, State Archives, Vienna. *Med.* 4375.

Urban VIII. lent diplomatic assistance to the two Princes in whose struggle he took the liveliest interest.¹ Repeatedly, as for instance already on November 3rd, 1623, he urged the Archbishop of Salzburg and the Bishops of Würzburg and Bamberg to lend financial help to the League.² In Paris the papal nuncio Corsini did all he could to keep the French Court to its friendly attitude towards Maximilian. Thus it came about that Louis XIII. openly sided with the Duke of Bavaria in the question of the Electorate and accredited a special envoy to his Court.³

The Instruction to Giulio Sacchetti, Bishop of Gravina, who had been appointed nuncio to Spain in January, 1624, urges him, in view of the revival of France's old jealousy of the Habsburgs, to do his best for the maintenance of a good understanding between these two great Catholic Powers and especially to get Philip IV. to agree to a compromise on the question of the Valtellina. In this matter, we read, the Pope was neutral, his one concern being the general peace and the furtherance of religion. He desired the maintenance of existing conditions in Italy, though unfortunately the Spaniards, by their frequent concentrations of troops in Milanese territory, provoked much anxiety in Venice. As soon as the Valtellina controversy should be settled and peace secured in Italy, he would promote a war against the Turks. The Instruction rejects the suggestion that the disturbances in Germany and Hungary could be appeased by the marriage of Habsburg princesses respectively with the hereditary Prince of the Palatinate and the unreliable Bethlen Gabór. The nuncio

¹ Besides the Brief to Ferdinand II., of October 21, 1623 (cf. SCHNITZER, 170), see the *letter of congratulation to Maximilian I. and to Tilly, for the victory over Brunswick, October 28, 1623, *Epist.*, I., Papal Secret Archives.

² **Epist.*, I., *ibid.* The Brief of March 16, 1624, to Mayence, urging him not to allow the League to be defeated, is in Götz, *Akten*, 431, note.

³ See the *letter of AGUCCHI to Corsini, Rome, February 21, 1624, Casanatense Library, Rome. Cf. RIEZLER, VI., 252.

is instructed to oppose such a project by every means humanly possible.¹

Similar instructions for the preservation of good relations between France and Spain were given to Bernardino Spada, Archbishop of Damietta, whose appointment as nuncio in Paris, in succession to Corsini, almost synchronized with that of Sacchetti.² In the Instruction for this diplomatist we read that just as it was of the utmost consequence for Catholic interests that France should further the efforts of the Duke of Bavaria for the attainment of the electoral dignity, so was it no less important that the jealousy of French statesmen should not wreck the projected Anglo-Spanish marriage. Should this happen, not only would it redound to the injury of English Catholics, but the danger would arise of a rupture between France and Spain. The Instruction speaks openly of the Pope's deep sorrow that France was giving support to Mansfeld and Christian of Halberstadt, "those rebels against religion and empire."³ Six months earlier Ferdinand II. had complained directly to Louis XIII. of the subventions which France granted to Mansfeld. He had been unwilling at first to believe, the letter says, that he who in the preceding years had been supported by the Huguenots now received similar help from the King of France. The Emperor invited Louis XIII. to give the matter serious thought and not to encourage the rebels of his own realm by such conduct but rather to maintain good neighbourly relations with Ferdinand.⁴ These representations remained without effect.

¹ *Instruction for Sacchetti, Casanatense Library, Rome (see above, p. 64, note 4). Urban VIII. informed Philip IV. of Sacchetti's mission by a *Brief of January 27, 1624 (*Epist.*, I., Papal Secret Archives). The **Relazione del viaggio di Mons. Sacchetti in tempo che andò Nunzio in Spagna, fatta da lui medesimo* (his departure was on January 21, 1624), in *Barb.* 5259, p. 134 *seqq.*, Vatican Library.

² See the *Brief to Louis XIII., December 23, 1623, *Epist.*, I., Papal Secret Archives.

³ See LEMAN, *Instructions*, 47 *seq.*

⁴ See HURTER, IX., 306.

If from the year 1622 France's attitude had been equivocal, and if tolerable relations with Spain had been maintained only with difficulty, the attitude of the Bourbons towards the Habsburgs deteriorated considerably when, in August, 1624, the Chancellor of France, La Vieuville, saw himself compelled to resign in favour of a political genius destined to give a new orientation to European politics. This was Armand Jean du Plessis, surnamed Richelieu after his ancestral seat in Poitou. From the moment of his elevation to the purple in September, 1622,¹ Richelieu secured a position which in that golden age of the protocol assumed exceptional importance.² He had been summoned to the royal council at the end of April, 1624, but only now did he attain the object of his ambition, only now did his influence become paramount.

Each of the two great parties opposed to each other in France at that period, put its hope in this extraordinary man who, to a penetrating intelligence joined astonishing shrewdness and caution, consummate diplomatic skill, tireless activity, an iron will, and an altogether exceptional ability for a cool appreciation of what was possible and what could not be realized. Richelieu had been a model Bishop. In widely read controversial writings, which were even translated into foreign tongues, he had defended the Catholic teaching against the attacks of the Huguenots and in other ways also he had rendered distinguished service to the Catholic party.³ His political attitude had been so shrewdly reserved that both the party in favour of good relations with Spain as well as the so-called "politicians" who clung to the traditions of Henry IV., desired his entry into the Cabinet.⁴ The hopes of the former were destined to be cruelly disappointed, those of the latter were to be realized beyond their most sanguine aspirations.

As an exponent of a Machiavellian policy of might, without

¹ Cf. Vol. XXVII., 85.

² Cf. HANOTAUX, in the *Rev. des deux Mondes*, 1902, March 1.

³ Cf. our account, Vol. XXVI., 48, 54.

⁴ Cf. NABHOLZ, in *Jahrbuch für schweiz. Gesch.*, XXVI., 21.

scruple or regard for right, and shrinking from no means, however revolutionary, Richelieu took up once more the far-reaching plans of Henry IV., the purpose of which had been to secure for France the hegemony of Europe instead of the House of Habsburg both in regard to the branch reigning in Spain and that of Germany with which the former was identified. Just as the Cardinal had to struggle for years before he succeeded in concentrating all power in his own hands and in overcoming all internal difficulties, so did his hostility towards the Habsburgs reveal itself only by degrees. In June, 1624, he dealt the Spanish power a first blow, when Louis XIII. pledged himself to pay the Netherlanders, who were once more at war with Spain, the sum of 1,200,000 livres, and another million in each of the two following years, in return for which the Netherlanders pledged themselves to repay him, should the need arise, half of this sum, or to provide him with a proportionate number of soldiers or ships, and not to conclude either peace or armistice with anyone without his consent.¹ Richelieu's second blow consisted in that, after the breakdown of the Anglo-Spanish marriage plan, he brought to a successful conclusion, towards the close of 1624, negotiations for the betrothal of the sister of Louis XIII., the princess Henrietta Maria, to the Prince of Wales, to the consternation of the Cabinet of Madrid.²

Relying on his alliance with Holland, Savoy and Venice, the French Cardinal proceeded even more ruthlessly in the matter of the Valtellina not only against Spain but even against Urban VIII. himself. The Marquis Philippe de Béthune, France's new ambassador at the Vatican, was instructed to demand the surrender of the Valtellina to the Confederates! Urban VIII. put it beyond a cavil that his duty of safeguarding the Catholic faith forbade him ever to agree to such a proposal. Even the opening of the passes of the Valtellina, which constituted the chief bone of contention between France and Spain, was not a matter of indifference

¹ See FLASSAN, II., 302 *seq.*

² Cf. XXIX., Ch. IV.

for religion since here there was question of the dispatch of troops against the Protestants both in Germany and in the Netherlands. Both Archbishop Marquemont of Lyons and Béthune in vain exhausted all their powers of persuasion to induce the Pope to yield; Urban insisted on the execution of the agreement entered into on February 24th by Béthune's predecessor.¹ The Pope was strengthened in his resolve by the people of the Valtellina who protested that on no account would they consent to fall again under the domination of the Grisons. The further declaration of the Valtellinese, viz. that they were ready to submit to the Pope's authority, was treated as a manœuvre of the Spaniards and Paris would not hear of such a solution.² Béthune left nothing undone to overcome the Pope's opposition, in fact, in obedience to his instructions he even threw out dark hints that France might enter into an alliance with the Protestant Powers. When he had exhausted all his eloquence, Béthune at last openly declared on August 23rd, that war was unavoidable unless the Marchese di Bagno, who commanded the papal garrisons in the Valtellina, was instructed to hand over to France, Venice and Savoy, the places occupied by him. When this threat also failed of its purpose, Béthune remarked that now words must be pressed home by arms.³

For this the French Government had been making extensive preparations for a considerable time. After renewing, on July 11th, 1624, the convention of February, 1623, with Venice and Savoy, France decided, on September 5th, 1624, in conjunction with these two Powers, that a fortnight later

¹ See SIRI, V., 586 *seq.*, 611 *seq.*, 636 *seq.*; ROTT, III., 746.

² Cf. SIRI, V., 644 *seq.* The declaration of the people of the Valtellina that they were prepared to do homage to the Pope may have given rise in Urban VIII.'s mind to the idea of granting that territory to a Barberini, if we may believe Béthune's statements to the Venetian ambassador, P. Contarini (in BROSCHE, I., 402, note 1). These allegations of the declared enemies of the Pope, require further substantiation before they can be believed.

³ See ROTT, 748. Cf. SIRI, V., 645.

the troops of the allies in France would march towards the frontier of Savoy and those in Piedmont towards the Genevese-Milanese frontier so as to mask the invasion of the Grisons and the Valtellina.¹ With a view to the execution of this bold plan the Marquis de Cœuvres had been dispatched as envoy extraordinary to Switzerland towards the end of June. He had secret instructions to the effect that in case Béthune's activities in Rome led to no satisfactory result, he was to raise troops in Switzerland. Refugees from the Confederation, headed by the former Protestant preacher, George Jenatsch, in conjunction with the Venetian Resident in Zürich, worked out a detailed plan of campaign. Thereupon Cœuvres, with French money and the assistance of the Government of Zürich, raised an army of 9,000 men.² Towards the end of October the small forces of Archduke Leopold in the Prättigau had to beat a hasty retreat before a surprise attack: even the valley of Münster had to be evacuated. On November 25th, at a congress in Chur, the three Federations were restored both in their original extent and their previous reciprocal relations, the former treaties negotiated by Scappi, the papal nuncio in Switzerland, having first been declared null and void; finally the alliance with France was also renewed.³ Warned by the papal nuncio of the danger that threatened them, the Catholic Cantons were prepared to offer resistance but they felt unable to bar the way to so powerful an army. At the end of November Cœuvres advanced from the Engadine through the pass of Bernina as far as Poschiavo and Brusio. After the fall of the fort of Piattamala he marched against the town of Tirano whose inhabitants surrendered at once. Marchese di Bagno, commander-in-chief of the papal army of

¹ See RITTER, III., 270. Cf. NABHOLZ, in *Jahrbuch für Schweiz. Gesch.*, XXVI. (1901), 27. On the same day, September 5, 1624, Richelieu induced the French King to send a kind of ultimatum to the Pope; see *Lettres de Richelieu*, VII., 545 seq.

² See HAFFTER, *G. Jenatsch*, 191 seq.

³ See HAFFTER, 206 seq.; RITTER, III., 270; ROTT, III., 857. Cf. for the campaign in the Valtellina, U. MARTINELLI, *La Campagna del Marchese de Cœuvres, 1624-7*, Città di Castello, 1898.

occupation, who regarded an attack on the army of the Holy See as unthinkable,¹ found himself constrained to surrender the Castle of Tirano on December 11th. A brief bombardment sufficed to get the castle of Sondrio into the power of Cœuvres. The only token of regard which the French commander paid to the Pope was to send back to Bagno on December 23rd the prisoners and the colours he had captured.² The Venetians had provided him with heavy artillery, hence a brief siege sufficed to wrest the castle of Bormio from the papal troops which, here as everywhere else, saw themselves attacked by immensely superior forces. By the beginning of 1625 the whole of the Valtellina and the county of Bormio were lost, only for the possession of Chiavenna did the struggle continue for the Spaniards had at long last hastened to its defence.³

What long years of discussion had failed to achieve that Richelieu realized in a short time with blood and iron. An enormous impression was made at every Court by this policy which heralded the dawn of a new era.

Urban VIII. and the Paris nuncio, Spada, had strained every nerve in the hope of solving the question of the Valtellina by means of a compromise. On September 24th, 1624, Spada made the most pressing remonstrances to the French King. What would the world say if the illustrious Crusader against the Huguenots were now to league himself with the Protestant Powers in order to attack Catholics? All that Louis could say was that the Spaniards would have it thus; but he would prove as good a Catholic as the Spaniards and would show the utmost consideration for the Pope. Though in the sequel everything was done to deceive Spada, the latter quite clearly saw through the plans of the French politicians. Towards the middle of October he told Richelieu to his face that if he went to war with Spain it would be exceedingly difficult for him, a Cardinal, to escape the "irregularity" with which the Church punishes those who favour heretics. Richelieu's

¹ See ROTT, III., 813.

² See SIRI, V., 711.

³ Cf. HAFFTER, 209; ROTT, III., 816 *seq.*

reply to Spada was very characteristic of the French Cardinal. He appealed to a papal Brief which he had obtained at the time of his appointment as a minister of State, by which he was empowered to treat any and all affairs that concerned the service of his King. Spada very properly remarked that such a Brief could not justify what he was doing now; in any case it could never allow him to do what was intrinsically unlawful, such as actively supporting heretics. However, Richelieu remained unmoved; he remarked that there were a hundred theologians of the Sorbonne who would find for the lawfulness of his action.¹

As soon as it became evident that the French meant to invade the Valtellina, the Pope wrote to Louis XIII. on November 5th, and three days later to Philip IV., urging them once more to agree to a peaceful settlement of the dispute.² On November 9th, Spada received instructions through a courier to make strong representations to the King on the subject of his action in the Valtellina. Louis XIII. replied that he would have the affair examined by his council; for the rest he was a devoted son of the Church and the Pope.³ As for Richelieu and the other ministers, they answered in general terms accompanied by shruggings of the shoulders.⁴ The French ambassador in Rome wrapped himself in enigmatic silence.

Meanwhile the most contradictory news reached the Curia. On the one hand it was reported that the papal garrisons in the Valtellina were not threatened, whilst from Milan Feria announced the very opposite and at the same time offered Spain's help to the Pope.⁵ This offer Urban was unable to accept, were it only that the junction of the papal and the Spanish troops in the Valtellina would have provided the French

¹ See SIRI, V., 663 *seq.*

² The *Briefs of November 5 and 8, 1624, in Papal Secret Archives, *Epist.*, II. The refusal of Louis XIII. in *Lettres de Richelieu*, II., 51 *seq.*

³ See SIRI, V., 723.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 724.

⁵ See ROTT, III., 812.

with a greatly desired pretext for their invasion. Hence on November 10th, Bagno was instructed to allow neither Spanish nor French troops to enter the Valtellina.¹ News of Cœuvre's attack on the strong places held by the papal troops reached Rome by mid-December. The action was an eloquent commentary on the assurances of the French Court. Although Richelieu instructed Cœuvres² to avoid all harshness and every oppression of Catholic missionaries, the proceedings were none the less an act of violence and an injury to the prestige of the Holy See. Spain sought to take advantage of the Pope's justifiable resentment,³ by trying to induce him to break with France. In contradiction to facts, rumours were circulated accusing Cœuvres of anti-Catholic measures. It was not enough for the Spaniards that the Pope complained bitterly to the French ambassador and the envoys of Venice and Savoy of the insult done to him—they demanded the sternest sanctions, namely the excommunication of the culprits! And since Urban VIII. could not be induced to take so perilous a step, the greatest indignation prevailed in Madrid where far-reaching plans hostile to Spain were ascribed to papal diplomacy. According to a report of the nuncio Sacchetti it was openly suggested there that the Pope should be removed either by poison or by some other means.⁴

¹ See **Istruzione al Marchese di Bagno*, November 10, 1624, *Cod. Barb.* 5256, p. 109, Vatican Library.

² Cf. ROTT, III., 825.

³ See the *Relazione* of P. Contarini, 210.

⁴ The report of Sacchetti, January 16, 1625, quoted by DÖLLINGER, *Vorträge*, I., 258, from MS. 8693 of the British Museum. According to NICOLETTI (II., 485) Cardinal Borgia, incited by the Spanish envoy, Pastrana, is said to have told the Pope at this time: "Se V.Stà starà così indifferente, non havrà per se nè l'uno nè l'altro re. Al che ripose il Papa: Ci metteremo in tale stato che l'uno e l'altro havrà caro di haverci dalla sua" (Vatican Library). The report of the envoy of Este of September 20, 1623, shows how Pastrana had tried at first to influence the Pope: "Il Duca di Pastrana nell'audienza c'ebbe sabbato da N.Sr^e dicesi che facesse un'oblazione alla Stà Sua in nome del Re Cattolico, che S. Mtà haverebbe sempre

The Spaniards sought to render him suspect in public opinion by hinting at the existence, on the question of the Valtellina, of a secret understanding between Rome and Paris.¹ It was not difficult for Urban VIII. to refute such a calumny. Already on December 20th he had energetically protested in a Brief addressed to Louis XIII.: "The acts of your soldiers," he wrote, "speak another language than the letter of Your Majesty." None the less the Pope cherished the hope that Cœuvres had acted solely on his own authority.² Similar Briefs were sent to the Queen, to several Princes and to the French Cardinals, especially to Richelieu.³ The bearer of these documents was Bernardino Nari.⁴ He was instructed to demand the punishment of Cœuvres, the conclusion of a two or three months' armistice and the surrender to the papal troops of the Valtellinese strong places.⁵

To add weight to Nari's negotiations, Urban VIII. ordered a levy of troops in Rome. Nine thousand men were to be mobilized and dispatched in three divisions, under the supreme command of Taddeo Barberini, Prince of Palestrina, and of

tenuta la protezione di casa Barberini, et mandata una croce accompagnata da una commenda di 10^m scudi annui per il suo nipote e che S.B. li rispondesse che molto ingratiava la Mtà Sua di questa amorevole dimostrazione verso casa sua, ma ch'in quanto alla croce et commenda non era tempo ancora di honorarne il suo nipote." State Archives, Modena.

¹ See SIRI, V., 737; ROTT, III., 827. On October 5, 1624, G. Altoviti reported from Vienna: "Sono andati attorno alcune voci, ma popolari e delle piazze, che s'habbia qualche ombra del procedere del Papa quasi per qualche gran fine suo s'intenda con chi è contrario a casa d'Austria." State Archives, Florence. *Med.* 4375.

² See *Brief of December 20, 1624, in *Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives.

³ See **Epist.*, II., *loc. cit.* *Ibid.*, a similar *letter of complaint to the Duke of Savoy.

⁴ See the *letter to Louis XIII., December 30, 1624, in *Epist.*, II., *loc. cit.* Cf. also QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 51.

⁵ See **Istruzione a Bernardino Nari*, s.d.; *Cod. Barb.* 5256, p. III., Vatican Library.

Duke Federigo Savelli, brother of the imperial ambassador at the Roman Court, to Ferrara, Romagna and Bologna. These troops, which were to be further reinforced, so Urban assured the imperial ambassador, were raised for the purpose of resisting anyone who disturbed the peace of Italy or who sought to introduce Protestantism there. The Pope's immediate aim was the conclusion of an armistice which was to be but a preliminary to a final settlement. That done he would form a league of all the Italian Princes for the defence of Italy in order that he might be free to turn his arms against the heretics and the Turks. In a Brief of January 28th, 1625, to Ferdinand II., the Pope spoke to the same effect.¹

Urban returned to the subject of the preservation of peace in Italy at the beginning of February when the imperial ambassador Savelli once more asked him to act as mediator with France. The Pope's answer was that he could hope for no advantage from such a step since the French showed but scant regard for the Holy See, as was proved by recent events. The Pope then expatiated on the way in which the French disturbed the whole of Europe and Italy in particular, seeing that there was reason to fear an irruption on their part into Piedmont as well as an advance on Milan and Genoa, for which they would probably employ Protestant troops.

Savelli had a feeling that in such an eventuality the Pope would not be disinclined to join his troops to those of Spain with a view to protecting Italy.²

Great as was his indignation just then, the Pope nevertheless preserved that impartiality which alone enabled him to mediate for peace. The Spanish party took this decision in very bad part and sought to rouse public opinion against Urban by every conceivable means. Besides other caustic remarks the following query was pasted up one day on the Pasquino: *Se il Papa è Cattolico* ("Is the Pope a Catholic?" that is, a partisan of the Catholic King of Spain). The reply

¹ See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 173 seq.; BROSCH, I., 395. There is more information about the preparations for war in Rome in the *Avvisi* of January 8 and 15, *Urb.* 1095, Vatican Library.

² See SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*

could be read on the Marforio : *Tace, tace, è Christianissimo* (" Silence ! silence ! he is most Christian " ! viz. a partisan of the most Christian King of France.¹ To put an end to the growing agitation Urban decided to send his nephew, Francesco Barberini, as Legate *a latere* to Paris where the negotiations conducted by Nari and the nuncio Spada had failed to lead to any result.² The appointment was made in the Consistory of February 19th.³ Information of this important step was communicated on the same day, in special Briefs, to the Kings of France and Spain, to the minister Olivares, to the Duke of Feria in Milan, to the Viceroy of Naples, to the Emperor, the Doge of Venice, the Duke of Savoy, the smaller Italian States, to the King of Poland, the ecclesiastical Electors, to Maximilian of Bavaria and to the Swiss Cantons.⁴ A good deal of time and money was spent in the composition and equipment of the Legate's suite.⁵ The following were outstanding personalities in Barberini's escort : Lorenzo Azzolini, Bishop of Ripatransone and the auditor of the Rota, Giovan Battista Pamfili who was to ascend the papal throne under the name of Innocent X., and among the laymen Cassiano del Pozzo and Carlo and Cesare Magalotti. The two last-named have left a detailed account of the Cardinal

¹ See KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 983, where further verses are given and reports concerning certain preachers against whom the Pope was obliged to proceed.

² Cf. SIRI, V., 748 *seq.*, 758 *seq.*, 763 *seq.*, 767 ; ROTT, III., 828 *seq.* ; FAGNIEZ, I., 198 *seq.*

³ See **Acta consist.*, Barb. 2933, Vatican Library.

⁴ All these *Briefs in *Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.*, a second *Brief to Louis XIII., February 21, 1625, on the mission of Cardinal Barberini : . . . *Facultatibus munire voluimus card. Barberinum Nobis et consanguinitate et benevolentia coniunctissimum. Speramus gratum fore et regali autoritate amotum iri quaecumque impedimenta possent facultates legati executionis fructu privare.*"

⁵ On Sunday 12,000 doppie d'oro were taken from the Castle of S. Angelo for Barberini's legation, says the **Avviso* of March 19, 1625, Vatican Library, *loc. cit.*

Legate's journey,¹ but they confine themselves chiefly to externals so that the Legate's own reports, which have been preserved in their entirety, constitute our chief source of information concerning the negotiations themselves.²

What was the attitude towards the mission of the papal Legate of Richelieu whose influence had already become so great that, according to a remark of Nari, without him the King and the Queen-Mother hardly dared to breathe ?³

The beginning of 1625 had brought heavy anxiety to the French minister. It was caused by an armed rising led by Soubise, the head of the Huguenots, who fell upon Blavet after which he summoned his co-religionists to rebel. Even

¹ * "Legatione del s. card. Barberini descritta dal Cassiano del Pozzo," *Barb.* 5688, 5689, Vatican Library, utilized by MÜNTZ, in *Bull. de la soc. de l'hist. de Paris*, XII., and by D'ANCONA (Pisa, 1891, *Nozze-Publ.*). A work generally but wrongly attributed to Count Cassiano del Pozzo, but actually written by MAGALOTTI, (see GUGLIEMOTTI, *Squadr. perm.*, 328, 375 ; *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, II., 129, and IL MURATORI, I., 276 seq.), is still unpublished. It is the " Viaggio di Francia dell'ill. et rev. sig. card. Francesco Barberini, vicecancell. di s. chiesa, nipote e legato a latere di N. S. Urbano VIII. P.M. a S.M. Christ. Luigi XIII. nel 1625 ", dedicated to Cardinal Barberini, *Cod. Barb.* 5686, Vatican Library, and *Cod. M.I.*, 22, of the Chigi Library, Rome. LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 26, 49, 130, notes other MSS.

² The account in the *Mém. de Richelieu* and in SIRI (Vol. V.) rests on the reports of the French ambassador ; according to RANKE (*Französ. Gesch.*, V., 177 seq.), the latter source is the more accurate one. The main sources are, however, the numerous *letters of Barberini which are to be found in *Cod. Barb.* 6150, 6151, Vatican Library. *Ibid.*, 55 and 56, also the *letters of the French nuncio Spada. A. BAZZONI (*Franc. Barberini legato in Francia ed in Spagna nel 1625-26 in Arch. stor. ital.*, 5 Series, XII., 340 seq.) has not made adequate use of Barberini's reports ; though short the account of FAGNIEZ (*P. Joseph*, I., 216 seq.) who had access to Barberini's reports, is much better. Cf. also *Barb.* 4785, 5273, 6150, 6151. ROTT's account (III., 886 seq.) rests on predominantly French sources.

³ Spada and Nari to Cardinal Barberini, dispatch of January 23, 1625, in SIRI, V., 758.

before Rohan followed his example in May there could be no doubt that a general Huguenot rising was being planned. Richelieu saw at once that the internal peril must first be removed before he could engage in a serious struggle with Spain.

The repercussion on the Valtellina question was immediate in as much as to an energetic offensive there now succeeded a hesitating restraint, though every appearance of weakness was skilfully avoided. Now as before Richelieu insisted with the utmost energy on the restoration to the Confederates of the much contested valley, but Cœuvres no longer received direct support and had to carry on operations at his own risk. The sole purpose of these now was to enable Richelieu to secure for France a favourable conclusion of the conflict. To this altered policy, of which the rejection of the offer by England of an offensive alliance formed part, were due the negotiations with the Pope which clearly betrayed a wish for an amicable solution.¹ To further Béthune's new proposals with Urban VIII., Richelieu had recourse to one of his most intimate and most gifted collaborators, the Capuchin Father Joseph,² the future world-famed " Eminence Grise " who was

¹ See NABHOLZ, in *Jahrb. für Schweiz. Gesch.*, XXVI., 35 seq.

² Originally François Leclerc du Tremblay; born in Paris, in 1577, on the termination of his studies in 1595, he made a journey to Italy, took part as a volunteer in the siege of Amiens in 1597 and made his apprenticeship of high politics when he accompanied the ambassador H. de Maisse to England. Under the influence of Bérulle he decided to abandon a worldly career and entered the French Capuchin novitiate in 1599, and from 1606 he had exercised a very fruitful apostolate. His acquaintance with Richelieu, whose right hand he became, had far-reaching consequences on his career of activity in the field of the Catholic counter-reformation. Fr. Joseph's great project of a Crusade against the Turks was obstructed by the policy of Spain. This determined him to co-operate with Richelieu in his plans against the Habsburgs. The Cardinal met Fr. Joseph's ideas of a Crusade with a supercilious smile, but succeeded in converting the Father so completely to his policy that he became one of his best helpers,

about to set out for Rome on business of his Order. At the beginning of February Louis XIII. gave the Friar letters of recommendation to the Pope and to Béthune. However, in consequence of a series of adverse circumstances, Fr. Joseph's departure for Rome was delayed for a month and he only reached the Eternal City on March 24th.¹

Meanwhile the war which Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, had planned in concert with France, had broken out in Upper Italy. The first objective was the conquest of Genoa, Spain's financial centre, to be followed by that of Milan, Monferrato and Corsica. At the beginning of March, Charles Emmanuel held a review, near Asti, of the Franco-Savoyard forces. They consisted of 24000 foot, 3000 horse and a considerable artillery. Starting from Novi the force invaded the territory of the Genoese who begged the help of Spain, urging that the fall of their city must necessarily be followed by that of Milan.²

In a Consistory of March 17th, 1625, Cardinal Barberini

and in 1632 was considered as a possible successor to the Cardinal. The two men completed each other. Fr. Joseph, however, never lost sight of his plan for a Crusade. The strengthening of France was to serve the purpose of making her a first-class Catholic Power. But as a true "child of his Macchiavellian times", Fr. Joseph disregarded the ways and means by which the rise of France was to be realized and this notwithstanding his sincerely religious instincts (*cf.* on this point, BREMOND, II., 160 *seq.*). The work of FAGNIEZ (Paris, 1894, 2 vols.), excellent in many respects, attempts the difficult task of justifying Fr. Joseph. *Cf.* KUKELHAUS, in the *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1894, 1040 *seq.*, and WILKENS, in the *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, XVII., 465 *seq.* From the point of view of French nationalism, DEDOUVRES (*Le P. Joseph polémiste*, Paris, 1895) greatly admires Fr. Joseph, but his account has justly met with severe criticism; see FAGNIEZ, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, LX., 442 *seq.*; *Études*, LXX., 397 *seq.*, and *Hist. Zeitschr.*, LXXIX., 327 *seq.*, CXXIII., 26. Recently ANDREAS (*Geist und Staat. Hist. Porträts*, München, 1922, 45 *seq.*) has given us a spirited study of "the Grey Eminence".

¹ See FAGNIEZ, I., 205 *seq.*, 210.

² See *Muratori Annal.*, XI., 92 *seq.*; BALAN, V., 712.

had received the legatine cross,¹ after which he started on a journey against which the French ambassador, Philippe de Béthune, had vainly raised the most impassioned protests.² An encyclical dated March 26th, announced to the whole Christian world the dispatch of the Legate whose mission it was to restore peace, for war only benefited the heretics, hence all the Bishops were to urge the faithful to pray and to undertake works of penance in order to draw down God's blessing on the step taken by the Pope.³ Cardinal Barberini journeyed as far as Civittavecchia where he took ship for Leghorn from whence he intended to travel to Paris by way of Genoa and Lyons.⁴

Richelieu was greatly put out by the dispatch of a papal Legate, a measure which he ascribed to Spanish influence. He was afraid of becoming suspect to his Italian allies and even more so to his Protestant friends in England and Germany.⁵ But he was also sharply tormented by the anxiety lest the opposition of the strictly Catholic party in France, which was already grievously perturbed by the unscrupulous foreign policy of the French Chancellor whom it had at first regarded as one of its own, should be further strengthened by the presence of a papal Legate. That opposition had always pointed out by various means, even by printed pamphlets, the dangerous consequences of a war against Spain. The Cardinal had put powerful weapons into the hands of his enemies not only by giving support to the Calvinist

¹ See *Acta consist.*, Barb. 2933, Vatican Library. The Brief to Louis XIII., the French nobles and Cardinals, and to Richelieu are dated March 15, 1625 (*Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives, where the Brief to Louis XIII. is found in duplicate).

² See KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 983 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 984 *seq.*

⁴ For Barberini's departure see *Avviso of March 19, 1625. Vatican Library, *loc. cit.* Urban VIII., who had recommended Barberini by Briefs of March 15, 1625, to the Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany, returned thanks to him for his reception at Leghorn in a Brief of April 26, 1625, *Épist.*, II., *loc. cit.*

⁵ Cf. ROTT, III., 886.

Confederates against the Catholic Valtellinese, but by his alliance with Holland and England, by lending help to Mansfeld against the Habsburgs and lastly by his protest against the deposition of the Count Palatine. The cry which became ever louder throughout Germany and Spain, that everywhere Richelieu made common cause with the Protestants and that his policy was bound to injure the Catholic Church, found a powerful echo in France.¹ In a refutation of these criticisms published in May, 1625, Richelieu, who was wide awake to the value of public opinion, sought to justify his conduct, especially in respect of the Valtellina, by trying to prove that Cœuvres' operations were necessary for the honour and prestige of France, the interests of the State, the preservation of European equilibrium and that the prospect of certain success sufficiently justified them. Even the Pope, he asserts, must have at heart the maintenance of the balance of power quite as much as the rest of the smaller Italian States; hence the occupation of the Valtellina was no attack on him.²

It is impossible to ascertain what arguments Fr. Joseph adduced in defence of his master in his secret negotiations with Urban VIII. for all the documents referring to his mission have been destroyed.³ There could have been no lack of zeal on the Friar's part, for he, too, was a Frenchman first and a Catholic afterwards. His hatred for Spain and the Emperor blinded him to such an extent that he saw in the destruction of the Catholic Habsburgs the necessary preliminary towards the realization, on the part of the Christian Princes, under the leadership of France, of his pet project of a Crusade against the Turks.⁴ Though Richelieu did not share these dreams, both men agreed that in view of the Huguenot rising the war against Spain would have to be deferred and that a peaceful liquidation of the Valtellinese muddle, under conditions as favourable as possible for France, imposed itself. During his four months' stay in Rome,

¹ Cf. NABHOLZ, in *Jahrb. für schweiz. Gesch.*, XXVI., 28 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 33 seq.

³ See FAGNIEZ, I., 211.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 213 seq.

Fr. Joseph, who had known the Pope personally since 1617, had two audiences each week and these usually lasted from three to four hours. If his proposals in regard to a settlement of the Valtellina problem nevertheless met with no success, the reason was probably that Urban VIII. could not possibly forestall the Legate whom he had only just dispatched to Paris.¹ Cardinal Francesco Barberini, after journeying from Toulon viâ Avignon² and Lyons, reached the French capital on May 21st. Ever anxious to keep up appearances, Richelieu caused the unwelcome guest to be received both on his journey and on his arrival in Paris, with all the honours due to his rank. The entry of the Cardinal Legate, in which Archbishop Gondi, the clergy and numerous members of the nobility took part, was marked by the utmost pomp. Louis XIII.'s own brother escorted the Cardinal to the Louvre. After a short prayer at Notre Dame, Cardinal Barberini betook himself to the apartments prepared for him in the Archbishop's palace which had been suitably furnished by order of Louis XIII. The King also bore the whole of the cost of the entertainment of the Legate and his suite.³

The arrival of the Cardinal Legate, as Richelieu had correctly calculated, revived the hope of the strictly Catholic party that a rupture with Spain might be averted. The joy of those circles found vivid expression in the Latin manifesto with which Pelletier greeted the Legate. In that document, which bears the pointed title: "On the Preservation of Peace among the Catholic Princes," the nephew was hailed as an angel of peace who would prevent the outbreak of war between two Kings bound together by ties of kinship, as were Louis XIII. and Philip IV.⁴

¹ See SIRI, V., 850 *seq.*

² He gave the red Burse with the three keys which the town of Avignon presented to him to his familiar Luciano Fabriani. It is now in the possession of the Barberini family.

³ See SIRI, V., 853 *seq.*; KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 987 *seq.*; QUAZZA, *Politica europa*, 64.

⁴ "De pace inter principes catholicos tuenda per T. Pelletierinum, Lutetiae, Paris, 1625. Cf. NABHOLZ, *loc. cit.*, 446.

When the visits prescribed by etiquette had been paid,¹ Barberini opened conversations with Louis XIII. and his all-powerful minister. The Paris nuncio, Spada, likewise took part in the discussions whilst Richelieu called in the councillor of State Schomberg and the Secretary Herbault. Acting on instructions from Madrid, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, Mirabel, declined to have anything to do with the deliberations.²

Cardinal Barberini, as directed by Rome, began by demanding a general armistice and satisfaction for the expulsion of the papal troops by the surrender of the fortresses into the keeping of the Holy See. The first demand was met with a refusal, the second with an evasion. Moreover, in view of the fact that Richelieu insisted on the Confederates securing full sovereignty over the Valtellina, Barberini failed to get his way when he proposed a definite settlement of the situation. So unpromising an opening did not discourage Cardinal Barberini. He accompanied the Court to Fontainebleau where he was accommodated in the royal palace. But the negotiations conducted during the month of July only served to bring to light the continued existence of an enormous divergence of opinions.

For Richelieu the inflexibility with which Barberini persisted in his demands was explained by the fact that in Rome it was believed that the Huguenot rising and the pressure of the strictly Catholic party would force the Government to capitulate.³ For this reason he sought to frighten the Cardinal Legate with the threat of an alliance with the Protestants, and above all with the terrifying spectre of a treaty of peace with the Huguenots. The Legate demanded some explanations on the subject inasmuch as, if peace were concluded with the Huguenots, he, as representing the Holy See, could not be a party to the treaty. Richelieu roundly declared that peace with the Huguenots was a political

¹ See SIRI, V., 857 *seq.*

² See ROTT, III., 887.

³ See the letter of Richelieu to Louis XIII., September 3, 1625, *Lettres*, II., 623.

necessity, all the more so as they were prepared to agree to tolerable conditions. This answer induced Barberini to ask for an audience with Louis XIII. With the utmost freedom he pointed out to the King the injury which peace with the Huguenots would inflict on France and on the Catholic religion. There could be no doubt that in that event they would become even bolder and more exacting in their demands. The Legate also referred to the fruitlessness of the negotiations in which he had been so long engaged and complained bitterly of France's irreconcilable attitude towards the Pope who had personally intervened in the question by sending him as Legate. The King answered coldly; peace had not yet been concluded, he said, though it probably would be. As for a conciliatory attitude, it was impossible for him to concede more than his ministers. Louis XIII. held so firmly to these declarations that the Legate felt that they had been previously agreed upon.¹

With a view to getting one of the main difficulties out of the way, Barberini consulted the Capuchin Zaccaria of Saluzzo and his confessor, the Jesuit Andrea, to whom he submitted the clauses suggested by France for the purpose of safeguarding Catholics in the Valtellina. After an exhaustive examination, these found the French assurances adequate, even in the eventuality of the Valtellina falling once more under the domination of the Protestant Grisons, but it was for the Pope to speak the last word in the matter.² Fr. Joseph, who had left the Eternal City on July 13th, reached Paris on August 19th, that is, before the papal decision arrived in Paris.³ In the entourage of the Legate it was thought that the Capuchin would no longer be able to alter the situation.⁴

¹ Ciphred *report of Cardinal Barberini to Cardinal Magalotti, dated Fontainebleau, July 30, 1625, *Barb.* 6150, Vatican Library. A passage from it is in A. BAZZONI, 341.

² See BAZZONI, 343 *seq.*

³ The *letter from Magalotti is dated August 21; a passage is in A. BAZZONI, 345-6, complete in *Barb.* 6150, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See the report of Cassiano del Pozzo in MÜNTZ, in *Bull. de la Soc. de l'hist. de Paris*, XII., 263.

Fr. Joseph himself, full as he was of his Roman impressions, thought he would be able to discover even now a middle course by which to conciliate the opposing interests. He at once opened discussions with the Legate whom, in his incredible optimism, he hoped to win over by fresh concessions. He already saw himself within reach of his goal when Richelieu's inflexible insistence on France's exclusive right of a free passage ruined everything. Until now the Court had sought to attenuate, by the honours heaped on the Legate, the bad impression which the course of the negotiations could not fail to make on the Pope. When Barberini said his first Mass, on August 15th, the King and Queen were present. At a banquet in the great hall of the château of Fontainebleau, on August 19th, the Legate was the object of unusual attentions. On August 23rd, the King, escorted by a brilliant suite, paid him a visit in his apartments. On this occasion business was not so much as mentioned. That was done on the following day in an audience, for meanwhile, orders had come from Rome to the effect that the Legate was to insist on the first demands, especially in regard to the safeguarding of religion in the Valtellina, as well as on a definitive termination of the negotiations.¹ The course of the audience was such that Barberini gave up all hope and on August 29th he announced his departure.²

¹ See SIRI, VI., I *seq.*

² *" Io nel veder tanta durezza in materia così chiara ho preso risoluzione di partirmi et hoggi ho mandato il S. Nari a dirli che io ho deliberato andar di mattina a Parigi, donde poi m'invierò verso Italia o sarò a pigliar licenza qua in Fontanablo da S. Mtà non più come legato ma come card. Barberini suo devotiss. servitore già che'l negotio della pace era escluso nell'ultima conferenza fatta alla Maison rouge da Richelieu e gli altri ministri con i miei prelati. . . . Parmi che in questa terminatione dell'affare si guadagna almeno il porre i Francesi in una estrema mala fede e'l giustificare appresso il mondo che non da S. B. nè da me veniva il concluder la pace tanto bramata e vigilata da N.S. e promessa con quell'industria maggiore che ha potuto uscir della mia debolezza. . . . Di Fontanablo li 29 Agosto 1625," *Barb.* 6150, p. 117, Vatican Library.

Meanwhile all hope of peace with the Huguenots had likewise vanished. Richelieu, who saw himself faced by two opponents, the Calvinists on the one hand and the Catholic opposition which sided with the Legate, found himself in one of the greatest embarrassments of his life. He himself subsequently confessed that at that moment he was seized with mortal fear.¹ He resolved to save himself by an extraordinary expedient. On September 3rd he wrote to the King advising him to convoke an assembly of notables for the purpose of examining the question.² If he secured that assembly's approval of his policy, he would obtain valuable cover against the Catholic opposition, whilst at the same time he might be able to induce the Legate to postpone his departure. In the meantime, by a decisive blow, he would force the Huguenots to sue for peace. His triumph over the Huguenots was not long in coming. As a consummate exponent of an unscrupulous diplomacy, Richelieu, who had no fleet, made use of that of his English and Dutch allies who were incensed against the Huguenots because of their relations with Spain. On September 15th, Soubise suffered a complete defeat near the isle of Ré. News of the event had scarcely reached Paris when Barberini set out for Rome on September 21st. He had been right in his forecast that Richelieu would prevail on the assembly of notables to sanction his attitude in the question of the Valtellina and to approve his policy of war with Spain. Barberini's unexpected departure threw the French Government into the greatest embarrassment, all the more so as the Legate refused a gift offered to him by Louis XIII. He journeyed to Avignon by way of Lyons.³

Rome had set the highest hopes on Barberini's mission. It

¹ " Je n'ay jamais esté au milieu des grandes entreprises qu'il a fallu faire pour l'Estat que je ne me sois senti comme à la mort, tesmoing quand le legat etait ici," says Richelieu, in his memorandum of 1628, *Lettres*, III., 208.

² *Lettres*, II., 119 seq.

³ See SIRI, VI., 20 seq. Cf. HURTER, IX., 385; NICOLETTI, II., 1228 seqq. Vatican Library.

was confidently felt that he would bring about peace¹ for which Urban VIII. had ordered public prayers in April.² Great was the Pope's grief when, after four months of negotiation, the Cardinal Legate saw himself compelled to return to Rome without the slightest success to his credit.³ As soon as he was informed of that decision, the Pope, on October 8th, wrote a very stern letter to Louis XIII., in which he lamented the barrenness of Barberini's legation. Only one thing comforted him, the Pope wrote, namely that in this affair he himself had shut his ears to those counsellors who wished him to put his private interest before the general good. The whole of Europe was so well aware of his affection for France that he was suspected of making common cause with Cœuvres. But now things had gone so far that in Italy people openly complained that the Holy Father was wasting time in useless discussions and prolonging the war by his excessive patience, hence he would make one more appeal to Louis XIII. : "Hearken to the groans of the Church; St. Louis exhorts you to defend the Catholics; the victory of the Isle of Ré is like a voice from heaven; in this way, that is, by fighting the Huguenots, Your Majesty can win glory and victory."⁴

Meanwhile during his passage through Sens and afterwards at Avignon, new proposals for a compromise in the Valtellina question had reached the Legate, the authors of which were the indefatigable Fr. Joseph and the Oratorian Pierre de Bérulle. However, a careful examination convinced Barberini that he

¹ See *Avviso of March 19, 1625, *Urb.* 1095, Vatican Library, confirmed by the report of Cattaneo in *QUAZZA, Polit. europ.*, 55.

² See Avviso of April 30, 1625, *loc. cit.*, Vatican Library, and *Diarium P. Alaleonis, Barb.* 2818, *ibid.*

³ The Pope approved of Barberini's policy throughout, "e specialmente fu lodato ch'egli avesse accelerata la partita per non trovarsi ad un consiglio generale che poteva servir d'argomento ad una publica censura della sua legatione." *NICOLETTI, II.*, 1221, Vatican Library.

⁴ *Epist.*, III., Papal Secret Archives. The example of St. Louis is also held up to Louis XIII. in the pamphlet *Mysteria politica*, mentioned p. 89.

had to do with "eels which slipped all the more quickly through the hand, the more firmly they were grasped".¹ This opinion was fully justified; Richelieu merely pretended to agree with the intentions of those two pious men whilst in reality all he wanted was to frighten the Huguenots and to await a military success in the war theatre of Upper Italy. As soon as this hope was fulfilled, the Spaniards having been compelled to raise the siege of Verrua, Richelieu bluntly informed the Cardinal Legate who by that time had reached Toulon, that unless the sovereignty of the Confederates over the Valtellina was first recognized in one way or another, the fortresses would never be given up: the discussions might go on for two hundred years but an agreement could only be arrived at if his demands were complied with.²

The Pope rightly felt that it was precisely to the subjection of the Catholic Valtinellese to the domination of the Protestant Confederates that he could never give his assent. As late as the end of August he had expressed himself unequivocally in this sense both to the Venetian and the French ambassadors. When the latter pointed to historical precedents and quoted reputable theologians who taught that it was lawful to permit lesser evils in order to avoid greater ones, the Pope confuted their arguments by explaining that the honour of the Holy See as well as his own conscience compelled him to remain firm in his demand for the surrender of the fortresses.³

The intrigues of the all-powerful minister, his attitude in the question of the Valtellina, his connections with England, Holland, Bethlen Gábor, nay, with the Turks themselves and, lastly, his intervention in Germany on behalf of the Palatine and the Calvinists, had roused an ever growing agitation among the staunchly Catholic party both within and without the boundaries of France. After the failure of the Legate's efforts on behalf of peace, the indignation of these circles vented itself in a pamphlet entitled: *Admonition of a*

¹ See HURTER, IX., 385.

² See FAGNIEZ, I., 225 *seq.*, 228.

³ See NICOLETTI, II., 548 *seq.*, *loc. cit.*

Theologian to the Most Christian King Louis XIII., which was first published abroad, in Latin, but was soon circulated in a French translation. Whereas a similar pamphlet published in spring and entitled *Political Secrets*, had protested against Richelieu's foreign policy even for political reasons, the *Admonition* does so exclusively on Catholic grounds.¹ Cœuvre's conduct in the Valtellina is described in most bitter and often exaggerated language, whilst the Dutch are spoken of as a band of robbers. The remaining associates are said to be no better: "O wretched felicity of the French realm which cannot be secure unless the Dane, the Swede, Gábor, the Turks and the Tartars ravage and disturb Germany with brigandage, lust, murder, fire and heresy!" The writer implores the French King to shake off his ungodly alliance with the Protestants and to refrain from an unjust war against the Catholics, the continuation of which would inflict grievous injury on religion. All this was obvious enough, but the pamphlet overshot the mark when it ascribed to Richelieu a direct intention of injuring Catholic interests everywhere. Such an accusation could not be substantiated. Far from entertaining any sympathy for the Protestant cause, Richelieu considered an alliance with the Protestant Powers as a political necessity and he sought, though with but little success, to counteract the injury to Catholic interests which was bound to result from such an association.²

Both pamphlets caused a great sensation. A vast number of refutations sought to weaken the powerful impression they had created.³ Not satisfied with this, Richelieu had them publicly burnt by the executioner on October 30th,⁴ after previous condemnation by the Sorbonne and the Assembly of the

¹ Cf. HUBAULT, *De politicis in Richelium lingua latina libellis* (These), Paris, 1856; Puyol, II., 257.

² Cf. FAGNIEZ, I., 249. Lavissee (VI., 2, 245) says that the censure of Richelieu was justified for he separated politics from the Church and secularized the former, a fact which his defenders would not acknowledge.

³ Cf. on these letters, NABHOLZ, *loc. cit.*, 54 seq.

⁴ See *Mercure français*, XI., 1062.

Clergy, with a view to securing by this means a formal approval of his policy.¹ The nuncio Spada had prevailed on the Sorbonne to word its condemnation in general terms, lest the prerogatives of the Holy See should be injured in any way. The assembly of the clergy, however, would not hear of this. It entrusted the drafting of its verdict to the Bishop of Chartres. The work of that courtier betrayed his political Gallicanism in so acute a form that the nuncio felt compelled to try and induce a number of Bishops to propose some toning-down of the document. But Parliament, to Richelieu's joy, forbade the Bishops to publish the censure under pain of *lèse-majesté*. On February 26th, 1626, the Bishops, headed by Cardinal Rochefoucauld, made a protest, condemned unanimously the censure of the Bishop of Chartres and drew up a fresh one condemning the two pamphlets whilst refraining from any actual encroachment on the prerogatives of the Holy See.² On March 3rd, parliament declared this decision null and void and ordered the Bishops to return to their dioceses. Led by the Archbishop of Auch and the Bishop of Angers, the prelates protested against this unheard-of interference. Parliament would have liked to punish them but at this phase Richelieu intervened so skilfully in the conflict as to draw a laudatory Brief from the Pope.³ On the one hand he induced the Bishop of Chartres to tone down his censure, and the assembly of the clergy on the other to accept it in this new form. However, calm was not yet established for now Richer came forward with his theories on the monarchical power of the Pope in a pamphlet in which he combated the arguments by which Cardinal Rochefoucauld had obtained the rejection of the censure drawn up by the Bishop of Chartres. Richer's intervention called forth such applause that he began to entertain the most extravagant hopes.⁴

¹ Cf. for what follows, *Puyol*, II., 259 *seq.* See also FAGNIEZ, II., 5 *seq.*

² Urban VIII. praised the Bishops in a *Brief of March 28, 1626, *Epist.*, III., Papal Secret Archives.

³ *Dated April 4, 1626, *ibid.*

⁴ See *Puyol*, II., 268 *seq.*

Richelieu, as may be imagined, did his utmost to discover the authors of the pamphlets directed against his person. The enemies of the Jesuits in Paris made capital of the opportunity. Some named as the author the Jesuit Scribani, others Fr. Eudæmon Joannes, who, like Scribani, had been in the suite of Barberini.¹ Since neither accusation could be substantiated another culprit was found in the person of the Jesuit François Garasse who was subjected to a searching though fruitless interrogatory. Nevertheless the agitation against the Jesuits in France assumed ever wider dimensions, so much so that at the opening of their course of Advent sermons in Paris they solemnly protested against the accusation that they were the authors of such writings, the exaggerations of which they reprobated.²

The French Jesuits had good reasons for affirming that the author of the two pamphlets was none of their number. As a matter of fact he lived abroad, but the secret was so well kept that the most recent research can do little more than make a surmise. There exist strong reasons to believe that the *Political Secrets* are from the pen of the pugnacious Rector of the Jesuit College of Munich, Jacob Keller, but there is not sufficient proof to affirm the same of the *Admonition to Louis XIII.* In view of the fact that Maximilian of Bavaria was in the habit of using Keller on other occasions and that the latter could not have made so powerful an inroad into current politics on his own initiative, we are justified in supposing that the Duke of Bavaria, who was at that time doing his best to induce the Cabinet of Paris to cease from supporting the Protestants, by dispatching to the French capital the Capuchins Giacinto da Casale and Alessandro Alice, may also have sought to bring pressure to bear on it in the same sense by means of the aforesaid pamphlets.³

¹ Richelieu too believed him to be the author; see QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 81.

² See PRAT, IV., 581 *seq.*

³ Cf. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, II.; DUHR, in *Freiburger Kirchenlex.*, VII.², 363; RIEZLER, V., 268, VI., 381 *seq.*; HUBAULT (see above, p. 89, note 1), 46 *seq.*; DEDOUVRES, *Le P. Joseph*

Even though the Duke of Bavaria failed to impress Richelieu by appealing to his conscience as a Catholic, the increasing commotion which the two pamphlets called forth in strictly Catholic circles in France, helped to make the Cardinal pause. If ever there was a statesman endowed with an uncommon sense of political possibilities, Richelieu was such a one. He now had to ask himself whether he could go on fighting the Huguenots on the one hand, whilst on the other he provoked both the Pope and the strict Catholics whose influence was felt at Court as well as in the country, by making common cause, for the purpose of war on Spain, with the Dutch, English, Swiss and German Protestants. In these circumstances prudence demanded that he should extricate himself in time from a position which was becoming impossible as soon as an occasion presented itself for a tolerable solution of the question of the Valtellina. Cardinal Barberini had reached Rome on December 17th, 1625, in a state of deep dejection as a result of the fruitlessness of his legation.¹ His feelings were shared by the Pope.

Already in April, 1625, the French ambassador in Rome, Béthune, had foretold that should the Cardinal's mission of peace prove a failure, the Pope would yield to the demands of those who advised him to recover the Valtellina fortresses by force. In the autumn the Spaniards declared themselves ready to undertake that task at their own expense. Urban deliberated for a long time whether or no to accept the offer. Notwithstanding his anxiety to preserve the neutrality which his

polémiste, Paris, 1895, 247 *seq.* *NICOLETTI (II., 752) remarks: "Si riseppe che d'accordo d'essi (the author of both letters) fosse stato il P. (name omitted) confessore dell'elettore di Colonia" (Vatican Library). The confessor was a Father of the residence of Bonn, one Georgius Schrotelius; see **Catalogue of the Prov. Rhen. Inf.*, 1625/6. Archives of the Society of Jesus.

¹ See the **Avviso* of December 17, 1625, *Urb.* 1095, and the **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, *Barb.* 2818, Vatican Library. On December 20 the Cardinal Legate was received in Consistory; see **Acta consist.*, *Barb.* 2933, *ibid.* A **Carmen de card. Barberini e Gallia reditu* by CAROLUS BARTOLUS, in *Barb.* 1825, *ibid.*

position as Head of the Church imposed on him, he could not in the long run bear the reproaches of the Spaniards who blamed him for taking the injury done to him without protest.

Despite his financial straits¹ Urban VIII. had made great military preparations during the summer of 1625.² On 25th August he informed the King of Spain through Sacchetti that he had 6,000 foot and 600 horse for the reconquest of the Valtellina, but that this information was to be kept secret until the return of the Legate.³ As a matter of fact Rome seemed to be extraordinarily determined.⁴ In January, 1626, at a Diet of the Catholic Cantons, the Swiss nuncio, Scappi, announced that the papal troops were on the march. Thereupon the French ambassador, Bassompierre, remarked that his King had the greatest regard for the keys of St. Peter but that he did not greatly fear the sword of St. Paul. In consequence of the continuous warlike preparations in Rome and in the States of the Church, Béthune asked the Pope for an explanation. Urban replied that if the fortresses were not given up there remained nothing but to reconquer them by force.⁵

All the same the Pope still hoped that things would not go so far.⁶ The compromise which could not be arrived at in Paris might be concluded in Madrid. On the pretext of representing the Pope at the baptism of a daughter of Philip IV., in

¹ Cf. the *Avvisi of June 7 and 11, 1625, *loc. cit.*, Vatican Library; see also SIRI, VI., 50.

² Cf. the *Avvisi of June 7 and 11, July 22, August 23, September 20, 1625, *loc. cit.*, Vatican Library.

³ See the *notes made by PIETRO BENESSE: *Memoria di quelle che ha fatto N.S. in diversi moti di guerra fra i principi cattolici*, Vat. 6929, p. 38, Vatican Library.

⁴ See ROTT, III., 965.

⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. *Lettres de Richelieu*, II., 202.

⁶ For the hopes which nuncio Sacchetti set on the presence of Barberini at Madrid, cf. his report of July 2, 1625, in Appendix I. Vatican Library.

accordance with an invitation made in 1625,¹ it was decided that Cardinal Francesco Barberini should go to Madrid.²

The warlike preparations of Urban VIII., notwithstanding the explanations of the nuncio Spada,³ caused grave displeasure in France and a state of real consternation in Venice. The moderate elements in the Senate of the Republic of St. Mark pressed for an understanding with the Pope, but they were in a minority against the younger generation which in consequence of its having imbibed the teaching of Sarpi, was hostile to Rome and would not heed the Pope's complaints.⁴ In order to enlighten the Venetian Government as fully as possible on the intentions of the Pope, the ambassador of the Republic was summoned to the Secretariate of State towards the end of January, 1626. On this occasion Cardinal Barberini, Cardinal Magalotti being also present, seeing that he was to act for the former during his legation to Spain, made a full statement of the aims of the Holy See in the affair of the Valtellina. "Since the fortresses that had been given up to the Pope had been taken from him by the Protestant Grisons who in this act of violence had the support of France and her allies,

¹ The letter of the Spanish King to the Pope, in which he asked for this favour, dated October 4, 1625, is in *NICOLETTI, II., 1247/8, Vatican Library. Cf. QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 76 seq., 80.

² The nomination of Barberini took place at a Consistory, January 7, 1626; see **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*, and NICOLETTI, II., 1254 seq., *loc. cit.* The *Briefs to Philip IV. and the Spanish grandees with regard to Barberini's mission, are dated January 26, 1626, *Epist.*, III., Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.*, a *Brief to the Grand Duke Ferdinand of Florence of the same date, states that Barberini was not only sent for the baptism but also in the interests of peace. For the apprehension which France, Venice and Savoy felt at the mission of Barberini, see NOVOA, in the *Documentos ineditos*, LXIX., 36; GÜNTER, *Habsburger Liga*, 16, note 55.

³ Cf. the commission given to Spada, in an autograph letter of Urban VIII., January 14, 1626, in *NICOLETTI, II., 1293 seq., *loc. cit.* Cf., *ibid.*, 1299, for Urban VIII.'s statements to Béthune.

⁴ Cf. the *report of the Venetian nuncio, January 10, 1626, in *NICOLETTI, II., 555, *loc. cit.*

and since the stronghold of Riva, the only one still in his power, was in the hands of the Spanish rather than in those of the papal troops, the Pope was resolved to occupy that strong place with his own soldiers and to drive the heretics from the others with the help of the Spaniards. He entertained no hostile intentions towards Venice, France and Savoy and pursued no selfish aims: zeal for religion and the honour of the Apostolic See alone caused him to insist on the surrender of the fortresses; he would content himself with this satisfaction and forget what had occurred." The report of these communications created a profound impression in Venice. True, the Senators of Sarpi's school repeated the old calumny that Urban VIII. wished to bestow the Valtellina on one of his nephews, but the more moderate elements appreciated the Pope's declaration and emphasized the necessity for the Republic to extricate itself as best it could from this dangerous game, unless the French were prepared to send larger bodies of troops to Italy. So great was Venice's fear of being abandoned by France and Savoy that their respective ambassadors were forthwith summoned to give an unequivocal promise not to conclude a separate agreement.¹ In the negotiations with the French ambassador, no mystery was made of the fact that rumour had it that in this question of the Valtellina there existed a secret understanding between Paris and Rome. A fortnight later the French ambassador appeared in the Senate and gave such solemn assurances that the most confirmed sceptics thought that they could view the future with equanimity. A French army, he assured the senators, was about to march to the conquest of the Palatinate and another would move towards Italy; the Valtellina would be defended even if in so doing it became necessary to attack the soldiers of the Pope. Let the Republic continue as in the past to do its duty for the common good and to make even greater exertions than before on behalf of the Valtellina. Louis XIII. swore by his crown and on his honour that in respect to the Valtellinese

¹ See the *report of the Venetian nuncio, February 4, 1626, in *NICOLETTI, II., 557, Vatican Library.

question he had no understanding of any kind with the Pope, nor would he enter into any compact with whomsoever on this question without first informing Venice.¹

The astonishment of the Venetians was only equalled by that of the Dutch and the English when, not long after, it was reported that France and Spain had agreed, at Monzón, to conclude a separate pact on the Valtellina question. The surprise of France's allies was shared by the Pope² and by Cardinal Barberini who, having left Rome on 31st January, 1626,³ had just set foot on Spanish soil at Barcelona and now saw the whole purpose of his mission stultified.⁴

It is one of the achievements of the most recent research to have discovered the motives which induced Richelieu thus to betray his allies.

From October, 1625, Fargis, the French ambassador in Madrid, had been treating with Olivares, the all-powerful Spanish minister. Pressed by the Oratorian Bérulle, who enjoyed great influence with the French Queen, to conclude peace at any cost, Fargis did so at his own risk on 1st January, 1626. However painfully taken aback Richelieu may have been by this arbitrary action of his ambassador, he felt so insecure in view of the Catholic opposition and the general agitation in France that he did not dare to set aside the settlement with Spain but merely sought to modify it so as to render it more

¹ See the *report of the Venetian nuncio of March 28, 1626, *ibid.*, 563.

² On January 7, 1626, Cattaneo had stated that the Curia thought it had the matter in hand; see QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 84. By the middle of March, 1626, the Pope had heard nothing of the negotiations in Monzón, *ibid.*, 91.

³ See **Diarium P. Alaleonis, Barb.* 2818, Vatican Library. Barberini had received the legatine cross at a Consistory of January 28, 1626, see **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.* For his companions, see *NICOLETTI, II., 1291. The *Briefs concerning Barberini's mission, of January 26, 1626, are in *Epist.*, III., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See SIRI, VI., 112. For Barberini's journey *cf.* KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 1325 *seq.*; PRESSUTTI, in the periodical *Il Muratori*, I., 274 *seq.*; *NICOLETTI, II., 1323. For the expenses of the legation see *Carte Stroz.*, I., 2, 88 *seq.*

favourable to France.¹ The Cabinet of Madrid agreed to the amendments he proposed in view of the fact that in the meantime, by the peace concluded with the Huguenots on February 5th, 1626, France had recovered her freedom of action. In order to cut short any interference on the part of the Cardinal Legate, the discussions were kept secret. When they were concluded in April the agreement was dated as from March 5th, 1626, at Monzón in Aragon. Louis XIII. having ratified it on May 2nd, it was published with the false date.

The peace of Monzón guaranteed to the Valtellina, Bormio and Chiavenna, under the joint protectorate of France and Spain, the exclusive exercise of the Catholic religion. Politically it re-established the conditions which had obtained in 1617, all treaties imposed on the Confederates for the purpose of a free passage for Spanish troops and the aggrandisement of Austrian territory being revoked. Though in future the Valtellina was to be placed under the suzerainty of the Confederates, their authority would be a purely nominal one for the Valtellinese were granted the right to elect their rulers with complete freedom. The fortresses were to be surrendered to the Pope and immediately razed, never again to be rebuilt.²

Articles 10 and 18 gave rise to serious difficulties when it came to the execution of the treaty. These laid on the Pope's representatives the duty of entering into immediate negotiations with the Protestant Grisons and that of razing of the Valtellinese fortresses. Urban VIII. refused, as a matter of principle, to enter into official relations with apostates from the Church. He likewise hesitated to agree to the razing of the fortresses inasmuch as such action would gravely jeopardize the position of the Catholic Valtellinese in the event of their being attacked by the Grisons. The Pope proved unyielding on these points, hence the negotiations became exceedingly

¹ See FAGNIEZ, I., 229 *seq.* Cf. RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 304 *seq.*

² See DU MONT, V., 2, 487; SIRI, VI., 113 *seq.*; ABSCHIEDE, V², 2, 2123 *seq.*

difficult.¹ Cardinal Barberini could not get over his disappointment at having been excluded from the negotiations,² but he ended by realizing that interference on his part would do more harm than good. Both Olivares and Philip IV., who outwardly had shown the utmost deference to the representative of the Pope,³ did not desire a prolongation of his stay. In one of his last audiences the King made him the offer of the protectorate of Aragon and Portugal which had become vacant through the death of Cardinal Farnese, as well as a pension of 12,000 scudi. The Legate declined both offers with thanks. He could not, however, refuse a portrait of the King set in diamonds worth 12,000 scudi as well as various decorations for the prelates of his suite.⁴ Pamfli remained in Spain as nuncio whilst Cardinal Barberini took boat at Valencia and returned to Rome by way of Nice and Genoa.⁵

The discussions on the execution of the treaty ended on November 11th in a compromise by the terms of which the

¹ See A. BAZZONI, in *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5 Series, XII., 353 seq., where the ciphered reports of Barberini from Madrid, dated July 4 and August 6, 1626, are given. As against ROTT, LEMAN shows in the *Rev. d'hist. éccles.*, XII., 329, that the opposition of Urban VIII. was not based on the Pope's annoyance at the defeat of his Legate, but on fundamental considerations which arose from his position as Head of the Church.

² Cf. QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 102 seq. *Ibid.*, for the criticism passed on his and the Pope's policy, in Rome.

³ See *NICOLETTI, II., 1359 seqq.; KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 1327 seq. Cf. the scarce letter of J. ANTONIO DE LA PEÑA, *Discurso de la Jornada que hizo a los Reynos de España el ill. y rev. s. Don Francisco Barberini, cardinal etc.*, Madrid, 1626.

⁴ See A. BAZZONI, *loc. cit.*, 359 seq.

⁵ The *diarium* of the return journey in *Cod. Barb.* 5349, p. 104, written probably by Barberini's secretary, Lorenzo Azzolini, has been published by PRESSUTTI in the periodical, *Il Muratori*, II. (1893), 177 seq., 219 seq., together with an appendix on the gifts distributed by the Cardinal in Spain and an estimate of the cost of the journey. The **Instruzione a Msgr. Pamphilio restato mio successore nella Nuntiatura di Spagna* (cf. BIAUDET, 278), s.d. in the Rospigliosi Archives, Rome, but it is incomplete.

fortresses were to be razed under the supervision of the Kings of France and Spain. Cardinal Barberini reached Rome on October 13th, 1626, and betook himself at once to the Pope at Castel Gandolfo. Urban VIII. received him with every sign of sincere satisfaction.¹

As a matter of fact Urban VIII. had every reason to be pleased. Though his Legate had been excluded from the negotiations, their issue nevertheless represented a triumph for the Holy See and the Catholic cause.² That which Urban VIII. had always aimed at in the first instance, namely the safeguarding of the Church in the Valtellina, had been fully realized. He also obtained full satisfaction for the expulsion of the papal troops. At the beginning of 1627 Cœuvres had to consign the places conquered by him into the hands of Torquato Conti, commander of the pontifical troops. Charles Emmanuel saw himself compelled to abandon his enterprise against Genoa,³ whilst the Venetians rejoiced that they had not ventured too far against Spain. The danger of war in Italy—the Pope's one great fear—had vanished. Full of joy Urban VIII. informed all the Powers of this happy turn of events in special Briefs dated March 6th, 1627.⁴ A few days earlier he had informed the Cardinals in consistory of the happy settlement of the disputes over the Valtellina which had given him so much anxiety from the first days of his pontificate. In his indefatigable efforts in this matter, he declared, he had only had the cause of God before his eyes, and he trusted that the harmony now re-established between

¹ See the **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, *loc. cit.* Vatican Library. Barberini's reception in the Consistory took place on October 27, 1626; see **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*, Vatican Library. By a *Brief of September 13, 1626, Urban VIII. thanked the Grand Duke Ferdinand of Florence for his reception of Barberini. *Epist.*, III., Papal Secret Archives.

² The opinion of BROSCHE (I., 382).

³ See BALAN, VI., 714.

⁴ See the *Briefs to the Emperor, the Kings of France, Spain and Poland, to Maximilian I., the Italian Powers and Switzerland, all of March 7, 1627, in *Epist.*, IV., Papal Secret Archives.

France and Spain would yield rich fruit for the advantage of the Catholic religion.¹

As a matter of fact the harmony of the two great Catholic Powers at a moment when everyone expected a decisive struggle between the two rivals, was bound to help enormously the progress of the Catholic restoration. Whilst the relations between England and France, which had been troubled before this, quickly ripened into an open rupture, the King of Denmark, Christian IV., and the other opponents of the Emperor in Germany found themselves in a very sorry plight.

How great had been the anxieties of Maximilian of Bavaria and the Emperor appears from their pressing requests to the Pope for help. To some extent Rome underestimated the peril, for it was believed that Tilly would easily dispose of so motley a crowd as the King of Denmark's untrained troops.² Urban VIII. turned to the German Bishops³ and the wealthy Chapters of Spain with a view to obtaining money from them.⁴ In February, 1626, he set aside for the Duke of Bavaria 216,000 imperial thalers, whilst he deplored his inability to give more for the time being. Notwithstanding Maximilian's

¹ See **Acta consist.* for March 2, 1627, *loc. cit.*

² See the *report of Savelli of June 21, 1625, State Archives, Vienna, used by SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 178. Complaints of Maximilian of inadequate help by the Pope, February and November, 1625, in Görz, II., 59, 454.

³ See the *Briefs to the Archbishops of Salzburg and Mayence, and to the Bishops of Bamberg, Würzburg, Worms, Eichstätt, Spire, Strassburg, Constance, Basel, Liège, Ratisbon, Passau, Freising, Trèves, Augsburg, Münster and Paderborn, dated June 14, 1625, *Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See the *Brief to Olivares of June 14, 1625: "Eget novis exercitibus stipendiisque Germania." The lower ranks of the clergy of Italy and Germany had given their support. Why should "canonici cathedralium pollentes opibus" be only "spectatores" and contribute nothing? Your defenders say that you wish to reserve your riches for the last moment. "Comprobate hanc defensionem. Pecuniae vestrae arma sunt." *Epist.*, II., *loc. cit.*

continued and pressing requests, the Pope stuck to his decision, basing his refusal on the circumstance that the raising of an army for the reconquest of the Valtellinese fortresses had made too heavy inroads into his financial resources.¹ Instead of a subsidy, earnest exhortations were addressed in April, 1626, to the ecclesiastical Electors and the German Bishops urging them to provide money for the holy war.²

When Duke Johann Ernst of Weimar, whom the Danish King had dispatched to Osnabrück, after crossing the Weser and advancing against the above-mentioned town, compelled it to elect a Danish Prince as coadjutor, both the Emperor and Maximilian were urged by the Pope to reconquer that diocese.³ As soon as Weimar's troops had been driven back, Urban congratulated the Emperor on his success, at the same time begging him to give his support to the anti-Danish league, for he was fully aware that Germany's misfortunes also redounded to the injury of the Holy See.⁴ On June 6th, 1626, he congratulated the Emperor and his general, Wallenstein, on the brilliant victory over Mansfeld at the bridge of Dessau,⁵ and on June 10th he assisted at a thanksgiving service in the German national church.⁶ Simultaneously assurances of the strongest possible support for the League were given to Maximilian and to the Archbishop of Mayence⁷; however, only part of the promised 216,000 imperial thalers could be handed over.⁸ At the beginning of August, 1626, Ferdinand II., whose position had become worse in consequence of a peasant rising in Upper Austria, begged for a subsidy of 100,000 scudi. Urban replied that however much he deplored Ferdinand's straits, his own financial exhaustion rendered him helpless

¹ See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 182 seq.

² See the *Briefs of April 4 and 11, 1626, *Epist.*, III., *loc. cit.*

³ See the *Briefs of April 11, 1626, *ibid.*

⁴ *Brief of June 13, 1626, in SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 183 seq.

⁵ See *Epist.*, III., *loc. cit.*

⁶ See SCHMIDLIN, 454.

⁷ See the *Brief of June 6, 1626, *Epist.*, III., *loc. cit.*

⁸ Cf. GÖTZ, in *Forschungen zur Gesch. Bayerns*, XII. (1904), 114 and 115, note 1.

for the moment inasmuch as the troubles in Italy alone had cost him two millions, and he could not yet see how he might curtail his expenditure.¹

The continual warlike preparations, we read in a Brief of August 25th, 1626, to the Emperor, exhausted the papal treasury.² In these circumstances it came as an extraordinary stroke of fortune when on August 27th, 1626, Tilly inflicted a shattering defeat on the Danish King near Lutter, on the Barenberg. The consequences of this victory were all the greater inasmuch as France and England were exceedingly remiss in fulfilling their promises of financial assistance. Hence Urban VIII. could already speak to Maximilian of his hope of the utter destruction of the Danish army.³ Towards the close of 1626 Bethlen Gábor made his peace with the Emperor and almost at the same time the death took place of Mansfeld and the Duke of Weimar. A third notable enemy of the Catholic cause, Christian of Halberstadt, had died in June, a victim of his excesses. Thus the campaign of 1627 opened under excellent auspices.

At this juncture Urban VIII. conceived the daring plan of taking advantage of the newly established concord between the two great Catholic Powers for the purpose of a joint action by them against England. Charles I. himself had provided the pretext. In obedience to the Puritans and contrary to the marriage contract signed by him, he had banished from England the Catholic entourage of his Queen, leaving with her only two priests and a few ladies. This action was a personal insult to Louis XIII., whilst by his intrigues with the French Protestants he threatened the tranquillity of that realm. Rome watched these events with the greatest attention. In his Instruction of March 1st, 1627, Bagno, the French nuncio, was directed to persevere in impressing on Louis XIII., the Queen-mother and Richelieu the necessity for France to

¹ See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 184 *seq.*

² *Epist.*, III., *loc. cit.*

³ *Brief of October 3, 1626, similarly to the ecclesiastical electors, *Epist.*, IV., *loc. cit.* For the thanksgiving celebrations in the Anima on September 20, 1626, see SCHMIDLIN, 454.

insist on the full execution of the marriage contract. The nuncio was told to keep a close watch on all that took place at the English Court in this respect.¹

The Pope was even more concerned about England's relations with the French Protestants and in particular with La Rochelle. After the peace of 1625, the Protestants remained by no means quiet. At the close of that year the town of La Rochelle dispatched a formal embassy to the King of England, as to "a distinguished member of the Church of God on earth", to beg his protection for their lives and liberty.² In consequence of this demand, Charles I. dispatched as his representatives with the Huguenots Devic and Montague, whilst the latter appointed Soubise and Brancard as their agents with the King of England. The result of the negotiations was a promise to support the Huguenots of La Rochelle with an English army. Rumour had it that the aim of the proposed expedition was nothing less than the establishment of a Protestant principality between the Loire and the Garonne.³

Whilst Urban VIII. thus earnestly drew the attention of the King of France to England's alliance with the Huguenots, a fact that brought a fresh rising of the latter appreciably nearer, as well as to the flagrant breach of the marriage settlement, he also reminded Philip IV. of his duty to go to the assistance of the English Queen, his near kinswoman.⁴ These warnings fell on willing ears both in Paris and in Madrid. In April, 1627, as a result of negotiations conducted in the strictest secrecy, France and Spain concluded an agreement which included a resumption of the plan of a landing in England.⁵

Though this convention was to be kept from the outside world, some sort of warning of impending danger seems

¹ LEMAN, 144 *seq.* Cf. Vol. XXIX., Ch. IV.

² In RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 240 *seq.*

³ LINGARD, VII., 318 *seq.*

⁴ See RANKE, *Päpste*, II.⁶, 339.

⁵ See LINGARD, VII., 320; RANKE, *Päpste*, II.⁶, 340 *seq.*; *Eng. Gesch.*, II.⁴, 188 *seq.*

to have reached England.¹ Be this as it may, on July 30th, 1627, without previous declaration of war, an English fleet appeared before La Rochelle with 10,000 troops on board, under the command of the Earl of Denbigh, Buckingham's brother-in-law, who called upon the French Huguenots to defend their independence.

The Catholic world was threatened with a heavy blow. By reason of its position the Isle of Ré would have constituted an admirable *point d'appui* for England against both Spain and France ; it would also have interrupted communications between Spain and the Netherlands and put England in permanent contact with the Huguenots. Consequently Richelieu might well count on a good reception when in the course of the following month he proposed to the nuncio Bagno that the Pope should also join the alliance between France and Spain. Bérulle who headed the sincerely Catholic party at court and who enjoyed great influence with the Queen-mother, spoke to Bagno in the same sense and even expressed the opinion that the Pope should seize the opportunity to reassert his pretensions to Ireland. When the nuncio passed these suggestions on to Rome ² he announced at the same time that the Duke of Savoy had offered to act as mediator for peace with England. Richelieu indignantly rejected the offer, one reason being that he disliked the mediator, the Abbate Scaglia. The projected league against England gave exceptional pleasure to the Pope, though he entertained some misgivings about the Holy See's participation in it, in the first place by reason of the great distance between England and Rome and, secondly, because of his lack of money. He was nevertheless resolved to make a substantial contribution, but reminded Bagno that on a similar occasion Sixtus V. had promised to open his treasury only when a landing on English soil should be an accomplished fact.³ As a matter

¹ See BROSCII, *Engl. Geschichte*, VII., 129.

² *Letter of Bagno to Rome, August 13, 1627, in *NICOLETTI, *Barb.* 4732, p. 383, Vatican Library, and of August 20, 1627, *ibid.*, 384 *seq.*

³ *Letter of September 7, 1627, *ibid.*, 385 *seq.*

of fact unless that condition were first realized, the Catholics of England could build no great hopes on the Pope's help, seeing that it would look like a purely political action.¹

However, Richelieu kept on working on the mind of the nuncio. He suggested that the Pope should dispatch either two regiments of Walloons, of 3,000 men each, or eight galleys of the papal navy. This would make it possible to seize a harbour in Ireland and to bring about a rising of the people.² Urban VIII. replied that he could only make a pecuniary contribution and that he wished to wait till Spain also asked for his help. He must be given time to collect the money ; it would make no difference whether the subsidy came at once or only in the course of the enterprise, and he had to proceed with the utmost caution for the sake of the English Catholics.³ Nor did the Pope trust the alliance between France and Spain since at that very time Richelieu was seeking to renew the alliance with the enemies of Spain, the Dutch, and was providing the Danes with money.⁴ Richelieu kept his ambassador in Rome, Béthune, in such ignorance of the situation that the latter could speak to the Pope of the conclusion of peace between France and England, which he imagined to have taken place. Urban VIII. merely replied that Louis XIII. should remember the broken matrimonial treaty and that La Rochelle could not be included in any peace treaty ; to act otherwise would be to encourage all rebels to follow the example of that town.⁵

Meanwhile dissatisfaction was growing in France owing to the delay in the arrival of the promised Spanish galleys. The Pope had foreseen these hesitations ; nevertheless, through his nuncio and Béthune, he urged the King to proceed against La Rochelle. The expedition against England

¹ *NICOLETTI, 386 *seq.*

² *Bagno, on August 17, 1627, *ibid.*, 387 *seq.*

³ *To Bagno, September 17, 1627, *ibid.*, 388.

⁴ *NICOLETTI, 389.

⁵ *To Bagno, September 21, 1627, *ibid.*, 390.

could be started as soon as ever the Spanish galleys should arrive.¹

Richelieu seemed satisfied with the Pope's reasons for refusing to join in a Franco-Spanish league, but Bagno could not help suspecting that he only talked thus because he himself meant to break up the treaty under pretext of the Pope's abstention. To Bagno's hope that the Pope's claim to Ireland would be respected in any case Richelieu gave an evasive answer.²

Richelieu announced his intention to follow the Pope's advice even without the support of the Spanish galleys; the King himself would personally take part in the siege of La Rochelle; if there was any hesitation at all, it was due to lack of money. The Pope should allow the King to sell certain ecclesiastical properties, or at least to grant him a tenth for two years—that is, double the present contribution made by the clergy. However, before making the request, the King wanted to know how the Pope would receive it; accordingly Bagno should at once send a courier to Rome; this would encourage the King to speed up the enterprise. Bagno had his misgivings as to the advisability of a step of this kind, for the French clergy were of opinion that such subventions were its own concern, not the Pope's; moreover, they were afraid lest the tenth should become a permanent institution. Hence Bagno merely sent a confidential report to Rome, adding that the occasion was favourable for inducing the French clergy to make an act of effective recognition, for since the money contributed was to be spent for the benefit of religion and that of the realm, an object towards which the clergy had already made an offer of 500,000 scudi, that body would probably raise no objection to the papal command,

¹ *NICOLETTI, 391. "E veramente l'abbattimento di detta Rocella fu uno de' principali desiderii che hebbe Urbano in quei primi tempi del suo principato." *Ibid.*

² *Bagno on October 3, 1627, *ibid.*, 392 *seq.* But Richelieu added in jest, "Se Dio vuole che vi arriviamo, farà vedere il cardinale Richeliù, che non è così nero come in Roma lo dipingono." *Ibid.*

especially if at the same time they were given an assurance that at the end of two years the tenth would no longer be demanded and that the whole of the money would be spent on the enterprise against La Rochelle. Two Bishops should be appointed to collect the money, and if at all possible, the nuncio should act in conjunction with them.¹

Béthune, who showed to the Pope a plan of La Rochelle,² pressed the Pontiff to impose on the clergy a contribution of one million for the raising of which he suggested various ways and means. The Pope listened kindly to his proposals but gave it as his opinion that the consent of the clergy was necessary in spite of the ambassador's strong insistence that the King's request should be granted at once. During the ensuing discussions in Rome it was pointed out that counter-demands should be made, as was the practice of the assembly of the clergy when making money grants. One condition in particular should be that some order be put into the system of prebends in the dioceses of Metz, Toul and Verdun, for though they were not included in the French concordat, the royal approval was nevertheless demanded in the conferment of benefices.³

The Pope was very much gratified on being told that Louis intended to join the army of La Rochelle in person and that his mother had been named Regent for the duration of his absence. Nothing became the King so well, the Pontiff declared, as to chastise the English who planned to defend La Rochelle, for their infringement of the marriage settlement. At that very time some writings had been published in France by Pierre Dumoulin and others, attacking the Holy See, so that in view of these productions alone Urban VIII. was glad of the campaign against La Rochelle since it would mean the destruction of the workshop where these weapons were being forged.⁴

¹ *Bagno, September 20, 1627, *ibid.*

² See the *report of Béthune, of September 23, 1627, in *Cod.* 7215 of the State Library, Vienna.

³ To *Bagno, October 20, 1627, in NICOLETTI, 396-9.

⁴ To *Bagno, November 4, 1627, *ibid.*, 300 *seq.*

The result of the discussions in Rome on the contributions was a decision to adopt Béthune's advice, namely, not to impose anything on the French clergy by way of a command but to send them a Brief of exhortation.¹ To this Richelieu also agreed. In return for the clergy's compliance the Holy See demanded the free collation to benefices in Metz, Toul and Verdun, liberty for Bishop Sponde to make use of the services of some religious of the Apostolic Delegation, a thing which the royal council had forbidden him, the punishment of Filesac for his bad books and the settlement of the situation at Verdun where the Bishop had been maltreated and Church property had been seized.²

Whilst Urban VIII. was patiently waiting for the Spaniards to make a move and the French were beside themselves because of the latter's endless delays, a serious disagreement arose between Richelieu and the Pope. The Cardinal wanted two things: the first was to be named coadjutor to the Abbot of Clugny, the other the right to give its Priors *in commendam*. Now Clugny was the head of a branch of an Order and it was an unheard-of thing that the Abbots of such houses should have a coadjutor or that their Priors should be given *in commendam*, and it would have been no less strange to appoint a Cardinal as coadjutor to a monk. Yet the Pope's refusal infuriated Richelieu to such an extent that to the nuncio he seemed like one demented. Bagno gave it as his opinion that seeing Richelieu's power, and in view of the fact that there existed a few ancient precedents of such coadjutorial appointments, it would be difficult to refuse him Clugny but that with regard to the Priors, the Pope would do well not to yield.³ Cardinal Barberini kept pressing Urban VIII. and at length the Pope gave a decision in the sense of Bagno's suggestion, and even threw in yet another abbey and remitted

¹ *Ibid.*, 401.

² *Bagno, November 19, 1627, *ibid.*, 402; to *Bagno, November 4, 1627, *ibid.*, 402 *seqq.* For the events at Verdun *cf.* Bagno, October 15, 22, and November 5, 1627, *ibid.*, 405 *seqq.*; to *Bagno, November 17, 1627, *ibid.*, 408.

³ *Bagno, August 27, 1627, *ibid.*, 413 *seq.*

the fees. But Cardinal Barberini returned with his counter-demands, namely, concessions in regard to the dioceses of Metz, Toul and Verdun, the question of the Bishop of the last named town and the dispatch of an *obbedienza* embassy. Lastly there arose the question of Bérulle's elevation to the Cardinalate.¹ Although, according to Bagno, Richelieu deemed all this but a trifle by comparison with what he thought he was entitled to, for once the Cardinal admitted that by conferring Clugny on him the Pope had given proof of uncommon magnanimity and accordingly he himself made some favourable promises in respect of the papal counter-demands.²

Meanwhile, under the very eyes of the King and Richelieu, the French army drove the English from the Isle of Ré. The success was achieved without the Spaniards who were subjected to not a little irony for their dilatoriness.³ The Pope was overjoyed. "Now La Rochelle must fall," he told the French ambassador.⁴ He congratulated the King and Richelieu and urged them to turn their armies at once against the Huguenots in general; by this means they would best win the world's respect. With regard to the English, Louis should insist on their fulfilling the clauses of the marriage contract, and personally take part in the siege of La Rochelle. Bagno was instructed to make similar representations to the Queen-mother and to Bérulle.⁵

¹ *To Bagno, September 7, 1627, *ibid.*, 415 *seq.*

² NICOLETTI, 416, *seq.*

³ *Bagno to the Spanish and Flemish nuncio, November 19, 1627, *ibid.*, 419.

⁴ "Maintenant La Rochelle ne peut plus échapper." Béthune's report December 5, 1627, State Library, Vienna.

⁵ The Secretary of State, December 15, 1627, in NICOLETTI, 420 *seq.* Celebrations of thanksgiving in Rome for Louis XIII.'s victory, see *Avviso, December 4, 1627, Vatican Library. Offence was taken in France because the Pope had not allowed a *Te Deum* to be sung as was done after the victory of the White Mountain. Bagno defended him; *cf.* his *letter of December 31, 1627, in NICOLETTI, 249 *seq.* Béthune *reports on December 18, 1627, that

In view of the Pope's sentiments, the nuncio was not a little surprised when Bérulle handed him a letter of Richelieu which stated that the Roman ambassador, Béthune, had reported that the Pope would neither contribute any money himself for the English enterprise nor command the French clergy to do so ; that, on the contrary, he was opposed to the alliance and urged the conclusion of peace with England. The letter ended on a note of complaint because in Rome the Cardinal only met with lukewarmness, not to say coldness whereas he had looked for the opposite from the Pope.¹ Bagno easily confuted these accusations ; for the rest, the nuncio was of opinion that the minister's complaint was not serious and that his real purpose was to induce the Pope to remove every cause of complaint by the grant of subsidies.² In point of fact, after the first victory over the English, Richelieu started the attack on La Rochelle ; that was why he wanted the Pope to allow him to impose a double tenth on the clergy for two years or to alienate as much Church property as would yield a revenue of 100,000 scudi.³ To this the Pope would not consent. The sale of Church property, he said, had led to disastrous results, as he himself had witnessed during his nunciature in France. He shrank from imposing under obedience a double tenth, for such a measure could not fail to call forth discontent in the Assembly of the Clergy which was then imminent. Let the King discuss the matter with each Bishop individually, in this way he would more readily obtain the contributions of the clergy than by demanding them from a full assembly.⁴ These counter-

the Pope would have gone to the *Te Deum* at S. Luigi de'Francesi, but the consideration that this would have been visited upon the English Catholics restrained him. Urban VIII. told Béthune at the time that he did not think Spain really desired to see the extirpation of heresy in France. State Library, Vienna.

¹ *Bagno, December 15, 1627, in NICOLETTI, 421 *seq.*

² *Ibid.* Béthune had also brought his complaints to the notice of Cardinal Magalotti ; *ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 424.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 427 *seq.*

proposals did not irritate Richelieu as much as had been feared; all he asked was that Bagno should keep secret, until the clergy should have assembled, the earlier hortatory Brief which had not as yet been made public.¹ The Pope persisted in his point of view, and when Béthune represented to him that if La Rochelle was not taken,² the blame would be laid at His Holiness' door, he replied that that would be impossible, that on the contrary the Assembly of the clergy would be blamed since they had refused to grant the necessary subsidies.³

The Assembly of the clergy at Fontenay submitted neither to the royal demand for 4,000,000 francs nor to the papal hortatory Brief.⁴ The Bishop of Orleans reproached the government for having appealed to the Pope, adding that a money contribution would only be voted on condition that the King would never again have recourse to Rome in similar circumstances.⁵ The latter was reminded of the way in which previous subsidies had been misused as well as of the poverty and the depressed condition of the clergy. The utmost that could be granted was a million at once and another million after the fall of La Rochelle. Richelieu was indignant at this proposal; he heaped reproaches on the Archbishop of Sens and the Bishops of Orleans and Aire and swore that he would sooner be burnt alive than grant another Bishopric to persons of blameworthy lives. A deputation of Bishops fared no better when it presented itself before the King. If 4,000,000

¹ *Ibid.*, 429.

² To *Bagno, February 9, 1628, *ibid.*, 435 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 438. For the rest, in order to prejudice the Pope's influence in France, Richelieu's adviser, Fancan, had suggested that they should ask for a million ducats of the Pope in open consistory and insist that otherwise it would be necessary to conclude peace. "Le Pape assurément refusera et on aura un beau sujet de faire la paix et rejeter l'envie sur le défaut d'assistance de Rome." KÜKELHAUS, in *Hist. Vierteljahrschrift*, II. (1899), 33.

⁴ NICOLETTI, 444-8.

⁵ NICOLETTI, 446.

francs were not voted he would have nothing to do with them, he told them, as he turned his back on them.¹ In the end the Assembly voted 3,000,000. No reply was sent to the Pope ; when the nuncio demanded one he was told that it was customary to issue one only when no satisfaction could be given to the wishes of the Pope.²

The English offensive against France proved a complete failure. After their defeat on the Isle of Ré, the English no longer seriously sought to relieve La Rochelle. True, a squadron under the command of the Earl of Denbigh was sent to relieve the town ; but at the end of a week Denbigh returned to England. Buckingham, who was appointed to succeed him, was assassinated. Thereupon the Earl of Lindsay assumed the supreme command, but he too soon returned to England. Meanwhile, mainly through the Venetian envoys at both Courts, peace pourparlers were actively pursued, but they had not been concluded by the end of October, 1628, when hunger forced La Rochelle to surrender.³ This defeat was another heavy blow to the Protestant cause ; it put an end to the existence of the Huguenot republic on French soil where it had constituted a foreign body in the structure of the State. The Protestant world had to ascribe to the King of England this fresh discomfiture of its co-religionists, whilst Catholic France, whose capital received Louis XIII. in triumph,⁴ stood covered with fresh glory.

¹ *Ibid.*, 447.

² *Ibid.*, 448.

³ Cf. LAUGEL, *H. de Rohan*, Paris, 1889, 248 ; E. RODOCANACHI, *Les derniers temps du siège de la Rochelle. Relation du Nonce Apostolique*, Paris, 1899 ; DELAUAUD, in *Archives hist. de la Saintonge*, XLIII. ; QUAZZA, I., 259 ; *Arch. Rom.*, XXII., 328 seq. ; FRAINEAU, *La dernière guerre de La Rochelle*, Chef-Boutonne, 1916. The downfall of the Huguenot party was also occasioned by internal divisions, cf. M. G. SCHYBERGSON, in *Hist. Vierteljahrschrift*, IV. (1901), 355-365. Their leaders became mercenaries of Spain ; Rohan received 40,000 ducats from Spain per year, his brother Soubise, 8,000.

⁴ See ROCCA, 334.

The happy issue of the campaign was due in no small measure to the Pope. After the victory on the Isle of Ré and using Bérulle as his intermediary, he urged the King the Queen-mother and the ministers not to enter into any peace negotiations but to prosecute the war against La Rochelle.¹ Béthune, the French ambassador in Rome, had been the chief promoter of a premature peace. Urban VIII. offered no objection when Bérulle wished to recall him, but the attempt failed for lack of a suitable person to take his place.² The Pope's chief concern was lest Louis XIII. should leave the camp before La Rochelle to return to Paris. The King was told that things might take a fatal turn if he absented himself even for a short time, that Richelieu could not replace him, that on the contrary, the latter's supervision was distasteful to the commanders nor was it to be expected that the latter would wear themselves out in order that in the end the glory of victory should go to a man like Richelieu. To the Queen-mother the Pope wrote that it would not be very creditable to the King were he to leave at a moment when the situation looked so promising.³ Urban VIII. did not feel reassured when Béthune communicated to him the contents of a letter in which Louis XIII. gave assurances that at any rate he would be present during the last stages of the siege. The Pope exhausted all his eloquence to make it clear to the ambassador that the King must be present not only from time to time, but all the time. However much Louis might long for the pleasures of the chase and the comforts of Versailles, the Pope nevertheless succeeded in keeping him before La Rochelle.⁴ But before long Louis' patience gave out ; he wrote to Rome that he must return to Paris, though only for a short while, for weighty reasons, but according to a letter of Bagno dated February 25th, 1628, these were simply his passion for the chase. One day, whilst hunting, the King narrowly escaped being captured by the Huguenots ; this

¹ *Bagno, December 15, 1627, in NICOLETTI, 426.

² *Ibid.*, 433 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 431 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 432.

incident provided the Pope with a pretext for once more urging him to return to La Rochelle. As a matter of fact, during the King's absence a plan had cropped up to raise the siege on the plea of the Emperor's threat to give armed assistance to the Bishop of Verdun who had long been unjustly oppressed by the French Government. Great was the Pope's consternation at this news. It was imperative, he wrote to Bagno, that an end should be made of the disorders at Verdun and the possibility of doing so was there since the Bishop was anxious to resign and to abandon the ecclesiastical state. The siege must not be raised; to do so would only be to encourage the enemy; Bagno must accompany the King to camp and not leave his side without the Pope's command.¹

Urban received the longed-for news² of the fall of the chief bulwark of French Protestantism through the nuncio in Turin and he was the first to inform Béthune who had been without news since October 9th. The joy of the Pope, the latter reports, is immense; that of Cardinal Barberini indescribable.³ Both saw in the fall of this fortress reputed impregnable⁴ the end of Calvinism in France.⁵ The Pope spoke in this sense in a consistory of November 27th.⁶ Notwithstanding the opposition of the Spanish ambassador and Cardinal Borgia who tried to belittle the magnitude of the triumph, he persisted in his intention of assisting in person at a solemn service of

¹ *Ibid.*, 441 *seq.*

² *Cf.* the *reports of Béthune, January 21 and 25, February 7 and 11, March 22, April 6, and October 19, 1628, State Library, Vienna. Urban VIII. ordered prayers for a successful issue, in May. *Avviso, May 10, 1628, Vatican Library.

³ *Report of November 30, 1628, State Library, Vienna.

⁴ *"Piazza tenuta inespugnabile," says F. Allici (*Negotiatio*, etc., *Cod.* 35, F. 25 of the Corsini Library, Rome). A map published in Rome in 1627, "*Vero disegno della Roccella piazza fortissima degli eretici di Francia*," at the end of the *Avvisi* of 1628, in *Cod.* C. 7, 27, of the *Angelica*, Rome.

⁵ See the *Brief to Louis XIII., in LEMAN, *Urbain VIII.*, 12.

⁶ See **Acta consist.*, Papal Secret Archives; *Béthune's report of November 30, 1628, *loc. cit.*

thanksgiving in the French national Church.¹ On December 18th, escorted by several Cardinals, he rode from St. Peter's to S. Agostino where the rest of the Cardinals awaited him. From thence he went on foot to S. Luigi where the *Te Deum* and the psalm *Exaudiat* were sung. The Pope then said Mass, his countenance beaming with joy. At night salvos of guns were fired from castle S. Angelo and bonfires lit up the darkness. Soon a number of Latin and Italian poems appeared in praise of the capture of La Rochelle. The Pope himself prompted the composition of one of these works.²

Meanwhile Protestantism had also been defeated in North-Germany, and that so heavily that it lay prostrate as after the battle of Mühlberg in 1547. Nearly everywhere Ferdinand II.'s enemies had been driven from German soil, and from the shores of the North Sea to the Baltic, North-Germany was occupied partly by imperial, partly by leaguist troops. No obstacle seemed now to stand in the way of a happy consummation of the Catholic restoration which, ever since the defeat of the Winter King, had made enormous strides both in the Austrian territories and within the boundaries of the Empire.

¹ *Béthune's report of December 17, 1628, *loc. cit.*

² *Béthune's report, of December 31, 1628, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Diarium P. Alaleonis* and *Avviso of December 20, 1628, *Urb.* 1098, Vatican Library. See also GIGLI, in FRASCHETTI, 80.

CHAPTER III.

THE CATHOLIC RESTORATION IN THE TERRITORIES OF THE EMPEROR FERDINAND II. AND IN THE ROMANO-GERMANIC EMPIRE.

(I)

WHEN new appointments of nuncios were made at the beginning of Urban VIII.'s reign, it was thought that a change would take place at Vienna also ¹; however, the experienced Carlo Carafa was maintained at his post. In September, 1623, Carafa drew up a detailed report on the religious conditions in Bohemia and the adjoining countries, on the basis of his personal observation. He described the successes which had been achieved though he did not disguise from himself how much remained to be done for the Catholic reform and restoration in consequence of the decay of religion and the lack of priests. When he accompanied the Emperor on his journey to Prague after the Diet of Ratisbon, he had himself noticed with horror how, with one solitary exception, they had not encountered a Catholic parish priest all the way from Pilsen to the Bohemian capital. However, Carafa did not lose heart. He recommended in particular the erection of new episcopal sees in Bohemia and Silesia.²

Carafa's insistence on the need of going on with the Catholic restoration received additional force from the fact that the Emperor's enemies in Germany had been defeated and peace had been made with Bethlen Gábor. Ferdinand II. was now in a position to apply in Bohemia the principle of territorial jurisdiction, *cujus regio ejus religio*, which had been adopted by the innovators and had become incorporated in the code of the Empire for the purpose of establishing the new religion. The year 1624 brought forth a series of decrees of vital

¹ Cf. the *report of Altoviti, dated Vienna, October 7, 1623, State Archives, Vienna.

² See KOLLMANN, I., 351 seq., 371 seq.

importance for Bohemia.¹ Whereas until then the Emperor's orders had been directed only against the foreign preachers,² there now followed ordinances the immediate purpose of which was to recall both burghers and peasants to the old religion. In future, in all royal cities, Catholics alone were to enjoy the rights and privileges of burghers. Those who had received their citizenship from the rebel Government could only be confirmed in it if they returned to the Catholic faith.³ On May 18th, 1624, Ferdinand instructed the Archbishop and the Governor to search diligently for the Protestant preachers in the domains of the nobles. Two days later another decree forbade non-Catholics to register, and thereby to render valid in law, any sales and purchases, testamentary dispositions and distribution of heritages.⁴ In 1625 fresh ordinances deprived obdurate heretics of the right of contracting valid marriages.⁵

When these ordinances reached Prague a man had entered upon his work in that city whose mission it was to give new strength to Bohemia's religious transformation, and by the laborious exertions of forty long years to carry it to a fruitful consummation. When Archbishop Lohelius died (November 2nd, 1622),⁶ the Emperor proposed, two days later, the youthful Count Ernest Adalbert von Harrach, born on November 4th,

¹ Cf. TOMEK, *Gesch. Böhmens*, 407.

² See *Decreta Germ. sacrae restauratae*, 84 seq.

³ See GINDELY, *Gegenreformation*, 201; CARAFA, *Commen.*, 212, and *Decreta*, 88.

⁴ See GINDELY, *loc. cit.*, 213. The latter law was not carried out strictly; see *ibid.*, 245. The decrees of May are in *Decreta*, 86 seq., 87 seq. A *Brief of September 3, 1624, admonishes Ferdinand II. to continue the restoration of Catholicism in Bohemia. *Brev.*, I., Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 218. The decision to take this severe measure seems to have been reached through the consideration that obstinate Protestants received the Sacrament of marriage in a state of mortal sin and therefore committed an act of sacrilege. Cf. a paper by Lamormaini which will be discussed further on, in *Hist. polit. Blätter*, XXXVIII. (1856), 899.

⁶ PICHERT, in *Anal. Praemonstrat.*, III., 125 seq.

1598, as his successor. A son of the Emperor's confidant Karl von Harrach, Adalbert began his studies in the Colleges of the Jesuits at Neuhaus and Krumau and concluded them in Rome at the German College. He received episcopal consecration on April 2nd, 1624, and two years later Urban VIII. raised him to the purple.¹ His activity embraced a period extending beyond the end of the Thirty Years' War (1624–1667) and marked a decisive epoch for Bohemia. Harrach's adviser for many years was the Capuchin Valerian Magni, "a truly great man in word and deed as well as in stature."²

Before all else the new Archbishop sought to establish an ordered pastoral ministry so as to provide for the instruction of the people. That he might obtain accurate information on the religious state of the country he appointed, in the very first year of his administration, "certain able and picked men whose duty it was to visit every single church of the archdiocese and those who served them, to give encouragement as well as to correct everywhere, and to re-establish among the clergy the ancient strictness of manners and holiness of life." Another duty of theirs was to draw up an accurate inventory of the privileges and revenues of parishes, to nominate pastors to widowed churches, and to establish a better distribution of the clergy as, for the time being, all vacancies could not be filled.³ The Archbishop's representatives were likewise to call together the priests for the purpose of joint consultation, to listen to individual grievances, to denounce preachers who worked in secret and to examine the various means by which the country might be spiritually renewed.⁴ At Prague the Archbishop himself, during the whole of 1626, presided at a weekly meeting of the theologians convened by him for the

¹ See KRÁSL, *Arnöst hrabě Harrach, Kardinál*, Praha, 1886; GINDELY, *loc. cit.*, 151; KOLLMANN, I., 216 *seqq.*

² CARAFA, *Comment.*, 207; GINDELY, 160 *seq.*, 179 *seq.*, note 1. For Valerian Magni *cf. Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XLVII., 248 *seqq.*, where, however, the statements of ROCCO DA CESINALE are overlooked (II., 630 *seq.*).

³ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 207.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 212.

purpose of studying various plans of reform.¹ In 1631 Bohemia was parcelled out into some twenty-three districts from which, after 1632, numerous reports came in year by year concerning the condition of the parishes, the clergy and the number of non-Catholics.²

At first the Archbishop chose his delegates exclusively from the old Orders, the Franciscans and the Dominicans.³ On their first tour, in 1624, the secular authority empowered them to remove Protestant preachers. An ordinance of Liechtenstein, dated August 9th, demanded obedience to them from all the inhabitants of Bohemia.⁴ Nevertheless the removal of the preachers was to be carried out "with the greatest possible leniency". Where sterner action was required they were to refer the case to the Archbishop and the secular authorities.⁵

The first journey of his plenipotentiaries, which lasted up to the end of 1625, merely served to bring home to the Archbishop the sad condition of the country and the difficulty of the work of reform. Thus in the circle of Kourzim and that of Czaslau the Dominican, Fr. Stiegler, found only fifteen priests. When certain new arrangements had been made by Stiegler, every one of the new parish priests had to minister to six or seven parishes, whilst the priests of Böhmisches-Brod and Seelau had to serve as many as thirteen each.⁶ The visitor Mantilla complained that the few remaining priests were so rude and ignorant that they were unable to say Mass.⁷ The priest of Schwarz-Kosteletz had to look after eighteen parishes.⁸ Often enough the activities of the Protestant preachers were

¹ *Ibid.*, 272.

² REZEK, 130 *seqq.*

³ SCHMIDL, III., 887 *seq.*; GINDELY, *Gegenreformation*, 204. Urban VIII., in a *Brief of December 7, 1624, implored the Emperor to protect the Carmelites in Bohemia, *Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ GINDELY, 205.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 206 *seq.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁸ REZEK, 131.

encouraged by the feudal lords, so that no one dared to proceed against them.¹ The Captain of the circle of Czalau informed Liechtenstein that there was not one preacher on his estates, though the contrary was known to everybody.² When the Franciscan Mantilla fixed his seals on a Protestant church in the territory of the lord of Zierotin, the latter tore them off and publicly reinstated the preacher.³ The Franciscan Lappius had induced a Protestant preacher to return publicly to the ancient Church, but whilst the new convert was making his profession of faith in the church of Leitmeritz, another preacher took his stand outside the building declaring that "he would kill the renegade should anyone try to assist him".⁴

The greatest hindrance to the progress of the Catholic reform was the lack of good and capable priests. At Kuttenberg, a completely Protestant town, the Archbishop had no one for the post of Dean except a man who did not even enjoy the esteem of the Catholics. The worst rumours were current about him, among them that of his having suspicious relations with women whilst his most intimate friend was a heretic in disguise. On one occasion, at a public banquet, the Dean and the Master of the mint quarrelled so violently that they threw plates at one another.⁵ None the less, in 1623, the Master of the mint Wrzesowitz ordered everyone to attend the Catholic services⁶; two years later he threatened to expel all non-Catholics⁷ and in the ordinances with which he compelled people to return to the ancient Church he made use of the most unseemly language.⁸ These measures produced but little result. This ill-success was in great part due to the fact that the mines of Kuttenberg, the yield of which had been

¹ " Vixque erat qui auderet, illis invitis tales Pseudoevangeliis ministros arcere." CARAFA, *Comment.*, 217 seq.

² GINDELY, *loc. cit.*, 210.

³ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 208.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 218, 229, 231.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 234, 235.

decreasing since the opening years of the century,¹ became still less profitable, and this not without the fault of the Master of the mint.² The preachers who had been expelled on July 27th, 1623, returned to the town in women's dress and found ready listeners. The Catholics complained that they were treated like lepers and Jews, were subjected to all manner of insults, and that during religious functions they were stared at as if they were comedians. One man was murdered by people who mistook him for a priest.³

The greatest resistance to the reform decrees came from the men attached to the glebe, the proletariat and the townspeople, especially the artisans. "If they were pressed by somewhat stern measures," Carafa reported, "their overlords were left with depopulated towns, an experience which had occurred not once or in one place only, for some set fire to their own houses and withdrew into the forests with their wives and children, whilst others sought a home elsewhere."⁴ In many places serious risings occurred. When the landed proprietor Count Paul Michna invited the Jesuits to Networzitz on June 3rd, 1624, "some of his tenants left their homes and hid in the forests lest they should have to foreswear the use of the chalice." After a prolonged struggle the Jesuits at last won over to their side the heads of the villages, who thereupon gave assistance to the missionaries, convened the peasants in the castle and sequestered the cattle of the fugitives. But those who were hit by these measures also called the people together, with the result that they decided to offer armed resistance. Late at night the leaders of the rebellion visited the villages, roused the heads of families from slumber and bade them follow them. The alarm was sounded and the whole neighbourhood flocked together as if to put out a fire. A considerable band soon collected, armed with guns, swords,

¹ See JANSSEN-PASTOR, VIII.¹³⁻¹⁴, 67, and GINDELY, 222, 224.

² GINDELY, 222 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 232.

⁴ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 219. In order to understand the construction of the passage, lines 8-29, "Non procul . . . Praga subierunt," must be discounted as a later addition.

clubs or wooden palings. Two houses owned by Catholics were plundered. After this exploit more than three hundred peasants headed for the castle of the feudal lord. However, when it was rumoured that soldiers were on the way from Prague, most of them returned home, and when the troops arrived those who had stayed behind also lost heart. The rising, as well as the presence of the soldiers who plundered the houses of the fugitives in the rebellious villages, lasted six days.¹ In August, 1625, at Manietin, where an ex-hangman officiated as preacher and the greatest ignorance prevailed in matters of religion, the population proved completely deaf to the teaching of two Jesuits. For many weeks the inhabitants only visited their homes at night; at daybreak everyone of them disappeared. It was decided to set fire to the houses of those who returned to Catholicism. In a nocturnal assembly the populace swore, with raised right hand, rather to give up life than the chalice. On the following day, when the feudal lord, George Mitrowski, had the half-drunken ringleader of the conspiracy removed to Pilsen, open rebellion broke out. The castle was surrounded and its preservation was solely due to the advice of one of the rebels who suggested that they should put off storming it until their fellow citizens had slept off the effects of their debauchery of the previous Sunday. Meanwhile the proprietor, who had been able to save himself, returned with a few armed men whereupon the peasants promised to lay down their arms. Among other peace conditions Mitrowski demanded acceptance of the Catholic faith. However, insults and actual attacks on Catholics were not wanting in the sequel so that the proprietor was forced to summon the military to their defence. Thereupon the bulk of the town and twelve villages foreswore the errors of Huss.²

Much more serious was the peasant rising in the domain of Markersdorf. The proprietor, Otto Heinrich von Wartenberg, had incurred the hatred of his subjects in consequence of his arbitrariness and oppression. When in 1625 he gave them a time limit in which to change their spiritual allegiance,

¹ SCHMIDL, III., 572 *seq.*; KRÖSS, *Geschichte*, II., 1, 188.

² SCHMIDL., III., 663-8; KRÖSS, 190.

a deputation of peasants presented a petition begging for a delay; Wartenberg cast six of the leaders into chains, threatened them with death and ordered instruments of torture to be got ready. In a second assembly, in which the subjects of several other lords took part, the peasants decided to set the prisoners at liberty, if need be by force. The sight of the grief-stricken wives of the latter only roused them the more. Returning to the villages they took up arms and surrounded the castle. Though Wartenberg granted all their demands, they would not be satisfied. The insurgents spent the whole night round their camp fires before the castle. When it became known in the morning that Wartenberg was making preparations for defence, they battered in the castle gate and dragged the Count from his hiding place to a dunghill where they beat him and his wife to death with wooden stakes and clubs. The fury of the populace vented itself in horrible fashion even on the corpses, and to demonstrate that the murder was the joint deed of them all, everyone present was forced to drive the prongs of a fork into the bodies of the victims.¹

After this crime the peasants continued rebellious, swore to stand by one another and even secured a lawyer who was prepared to plead their cause with the Government. Their numbers soon reached 5,000 men and they even had a few pieces of ordnance, so that the governors found themselves compelled to seek military assistance from the Emperor who dispatched to Bohemia five squadrons of the Breuner regiment. Thereupon the peasants dispersed rapidly. They offered no opposition to the arrest of twenty-three of the ringleaders, three of whom were executed in July and August of the following year. The rest received mild sentences owing to the intervention of the murdered Wartenberg's mother who pleaded for them.²

The example of the subjects of Markersdorf found imitators in the Duchy of Friedland and in the domains of Count

¹ GINDELY, *loc. cit.*, 405-7; CARAFA, *Comment.*, 219; KRÖSS, 189.

² GINDELY, 407-410 (on p. 410, n. 7, the number is 1626, not 1625).

Michna, but there the military suppressed the rebellion without much difficulty.¹ Prompt flight alone saved Michna from death.² When the castle of Wlaschin was looted, one of the owner's captains was beheaded.³ The year before, on the estate of the Jesuits at Ausch, the administrator Vitus Kassiades was cruelly done to death by the peasants when he sought to enforce the reform decrees.⁴

In consequence of these occurrences certain feudal lords also had recourse to force. "In view of the fact that the Archbishop of Prague and the clergy could not travel themselves, or give commissions to others, without peril," Carafa wrote, "there were those who thought that recourse should be had to the secular arm. This was done by quartering soldiers in the houses of the non-Catholics, to the end that 'suffering might teach them'." (Is. xxviii, 19).⁵ This happened first at Beraun in 1625, where the imperial judge exempted the Catholics from having troops quartered on them but laid that burden on the Protestant householders.⁶ In Leitmeritz also the imperial judge proposed to quarter troops mainly on the Protestants.⁷ The town of Kuttenberg entered into an arrangement with the Emperor by which it was exempted from the burden of having the military quartered on its inhabitants. However, as a result of some acts of violence against Catholics, the military returned and only by submitting to the reform decrees could anyone escape them.⁸ At Komotau, where some of the troops were to be garrisoned after the campaign of 1625, Count Michna, in concert with the Rector of the Jesuit College, promised to preserve the town from such a burden on condition that it returned to the Catholic faith. The burghers were summoned to give their opinion individually.

¹ *Ibid.*, 411 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 412; CARAFA, *Comment.*, 272.

³ GINDELY, 412.

⁴ SCHMIDL, III., 657; KRÖSS, 180.

⁵ CARAFA, *Relatione*, 254.

⁶ GINDELY, 213.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 214.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 232.

Four of them who would not return to the old religion were thrown into prison and condemned to pay a fine of ten thalers a day. Thereupon three out of the four submitted to the reform decrees.¹

This recourse to coercion, to which the Emperor was at first opposed,² "had happy results in numerous instances but it induced others to leave the Empire."³ Many emigrated in particular to Saxony and the Cities of Empire.⁴ In view of the fact that all hope of converting the emigrants by force had to be abandoned, and because "the evil had increased still further",⁵ Vienna resolved to adopt a new policy. On the proposal of Carafa, on April 29th, 1626, Cardinal Harrach and Prince Liechtenstein were named imperial commissaries for the reform, with instructions "to consult together with a view to discovering a milder way of bringing the Empire back to the faith".⁶ The thought of gentler methods was partly due to the complaints which the Elector of Saxony and the Archbishop of Mayence had addressed to Ferdinand II. They did not object so much to the reform itself, they explained to the Emperor, as to the use of the military and the denial of the right to leave the country.⁷ The imperial councillors, when asked their opinion on these protests, declared that there was no doubt that the Emperor enjoyed the right of reform quite as much as any other prince; forcible means were not to be rejected *a priori*, but no more than one or two soldiers should be quartered in one house and they should be kept under strict discipline and forbidden to exact anything beyond their

¹ SCHMIDL, III., 651; GINDELY, 290 *seq.*

² GINDELY, 212, 293.

³ CARAFA, *Relatione*, 254.

⁴ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 219. Cf. LOESCHE, *Gesch. der Böhmischesen Exulanten in Sachsen*, Vienna, 1923; *Hist. Zeitschr.* CXXX., 508 *seq.*

⁵ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 219: "Sic perit expectatus fructus animarum auctumque malum alibi non facile superandum."

⁶ CARAFA, *Relatione*, 254 (accìò consultassero e trovassero modo più dolce per la reduttione); *Decreta*, 97-9.

⁷ HURTER, X., 164; KRÖSS 193 *seq.*

maintenance. The time limit for conversion should be at least two months.¹ With good reason the two Electors had protested against the sequestration of the property of the fugitives. Such proceedings contravened the religious peace of Augsburg. Accordingly, in August, 1626, the emigrants were permitted to sell their possessions, though under conditions which made it difficult for them to leave the country.²

Cardinal Harrach was one of those who did not wholly approve of the procedure hitherto adopted. In an exhaustive memorial drawn up in the summer of 1626, he stated his views which were to the effect that in future a uniform and well considered plan should be adopted. Towards the end of 1626 a commission was set up at Vienna, with Cardinal Dietrichstein as chairman, for the purpose of studying Harrach's proposals.

The Archbishop of Prague was particularly anxious for the erection of four new dioceses in Bohemia inasmuch as the one and only diocese of Prague was not enough for the whole country. The clergy should have restored to them both seat and vote in the Estates of the Empire, and that before the other Estates. The possessions of which the Church had been robbed since the time of the Hussites, should be given back or failing that, suitable compensation should be made. To bring about the religious transformation of the country, Harrach favoured legislation obliging all the non-Catholics to leave the kingdom. The great landowners should not be suffered to give shelter in their castles to Protestant preachers and officials. Harrach also demanded a stricter application of the prohibition of the religious marriage of non-Catholics.³

The theologians whom Ferdinand II. likewise consulted, considerably altered and softened Harrach's proposals. A final memorandum on the reform of Bohemia was drawn up apparently by the Jesuit William Lamormaini who had been the Emperor's confessor since 1624. It bears his signature and that of his colleague in religion, Henry Philippi, but the first four chapters bear also the signatures of other divines.

¹ KRÖSS, 194 *seq.*

² Cf. RITTER, III., 217 *seq.*

³ GINDELY, 242 *seqq.* ; HURTER, X., 165 ; KRÖSS, 196 *seq.*

Lamormaini was of opinion that in view of the state of the country it was necessary, for the time being, to do no more than deal with the most pressing needs, hence the erections of new dioceses might be deferred until a more favourable time.¹ "Once the needs of the parishes were satisfied," the memorandum said, "especially those wholly destitute of priests, it would be time to think of the promotion of the majesty of the Church and the dignity of the clergy. As for Church property now in secular hands, theologians are of opinion that the Emperor was not bound to restore it. Much of it had been taken from the Church by force, but some of it had changed hands in a lawful manner: in any case the Emperor had done so much for the Church that any obligation in this respect may be said to have been amply fulfilled."²

In view of a proposal to leave the execution of the restoration wholly in the hands of the Archbishop,³ Lamormaini was at great pains to argue in favour of a contrary policy. Even secular princes were bound to free their territories from error and heresies, for their power was of God "for the furtherance of the honour and worship of God", hence it was their duty to rule their subjects in accordance with the law of Christ and that of the Church, for their own safety and that of their subjects.⁴ Heresy, on the other hand, led astray from true doctrine and conduced to false (sinful) worship, hence whosoever spread such teaching deserved to be punished and to be banished from the Empire.

¹ A translation of the memorandum of Lamormaini, entirely in his own hand (HURTER, X., 166), is in *Hist. polit. Blätter*, XXXVIII. (1856), 888-910. Cf. also *ibid.*, CVII., 416 seq.; DUHR, II., 2, 344 seqq., 711; SCHLEINZ, *Gesch. des Bistums Leitmeritz*, I., Warnsdorf, 1912, 26 seq.; KRÖSS, 198 seqq. The date, as pointed out by DUDIK, *Korrespondenz Lamormainis*, 47 seq., is determined by the following passage: "The Emperor writes on December 11, 1626, that Harrach had yesterday declared himself satisfied with Lamormaini's view."

² *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XXXVIII., 900-3.

³ CARAFA, *Relatione*, 254; *Hist. polit. Blätter*, *loc. cit.*, 891, note.

⁴ *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, *loc. cit.*, 888 seq.

For the purpose of carrying through the Catholic restoration persons of distinction should be chosen from the ranks of the laity as well as the clergy for joint action, and it would be best if the clerical as well as the secular plenipotentiary were to proceed not only in the name of the Archbishop but in that of the Prince also.¹ As things were the heretics took no notice of the words of either Bishops or teachers; fear alone could induce them to listen to Catholic priests and to converse with them. Nevertheless force should only be employed on the advice of the Archbishop. As soon as the commission arrived in a given locality, care should be taken to explain the Emperor's reasons for enforcing the reform and a time limit should be fixed for submission.

“However, since this was not the affair of one day and the King did not wish anyone to become a Catholic before he was convinced of the truth of the Catholic faith, the Archbishop, as a loving father and shepherd, appointed certain priests of blameless life and full of zeal for God's cause, with mission lovingly to instruct within the appointed time limit all and sundry, both publicly and privately, in everything concerning the faith and the manner of keeping the commandments of God and the Church.” The length of the time limit must depend on circumstances! “Two or three active priests can do a great deal in three, four or five weeks.” “Day by day we have seen the wonderful successes achieved, with God's grace, by members of the religious Orders who devoted themselves to apostolic work. After a while the two commissaries should revisit the various localities in order to ascertain the results of the reform.”²

In the opinion of Lamormaini the military should only be employed in so far as the preservation of order required it. Fifty men, he thinks, would be sufficient escort for the commissaries.³ As soon as these have left a locality and the preachers have entered on their duties, the soldiers also must

¹ *Ibid.*, 891.

² *Hist. polit. Blätter*, XXXVIII., 893 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 903.

be withdrawn,¹ for catechists working in a spirit of meekness and charity are in no need of soldiers.² Only in one case should a longer garrisoning be inflicted, namely if the commissaries had to return to a locality a second time, for if a place refused to accept the Catholic teaching, it was due to obstinacy and hard-heartedness since the necessary instruction had not been wanting. Such obstinacy may be broken by quartering soldiers in the houses of the heretics.

Nor does Lamormaini agree with those who were in favour of the banishment of all those who would not submit to the imperial ordinances. On no account should anyone be banished from the Empire for the sake of religion who had not first become acquainted with the Catholic faith. If nevertheless either a Knight or a Baron remained obdurate in his errors, "we are of opinion that Your Majesty may overlook it without scruple, provided he keeps no preachers and at once removes his sons from heretical localities. As soon as they feel that we are in earnest, the burghers will return to the Catholic faith, as most of them have done at Prague." "In such a case it is right to proceed with greater mildness, to wait, to extend the time limit" provided they give no scandal and allow their children to be brought up as Catholics. The servants of the glebe must not be driven away for "in order to gain their freedom they would, everyone of them, abandon the true religion. They should be compelled to accept the Catholic faith by the discreet application of moderate penalties and, as the law of Bohemia expressly permits, their children should be taken from them and entrusted to such persons as shall give them a Catholic upbringing".³

Protestant officials on the feudal estates should only be retained in their posts on condition that they became Catholics, for their position would enable them, by a hundred secret

¹ In other words : Lamormaini did not want a military escort for his brethren.

² *Hist.-polit. Blätter, loc. cit.*, 903 (where the sentence is incorrectly translated).

³ *Ibid.*, 908 *seq.*

means, to turn subjects from their Catholic faith, to torment those who profess it, to favour the heretics and this by means which it would be wellnigh impossible to detect.¹

Not all the means employed in the cause of the Catholic restoration met with Lamormaini's approval. Thus he did not see the necessity of refusing to bless marriages even if the couples declared that they had not yet made up their minds to become Catholics, for the priest did not commit a sin by officiating on such occasions "since not he is the minister of the Sacrament, but the contracting parties".² Heretical books should be confiscated and only burnt where it was established that such action would not hurt the feelings of the new converts. On the other hand it was a good thing to refuse ecclesiastical burial to those who remained in heresy after the appointed time limit, for experience had shown the powerful impression that the concession or refusal of ecclesiastical burial produced in Bohemia. And since "the aim of the present proceedings was not only the restoration of the faith, but likewise of piety, the plenipotentiaries should also punish the non-observance of the commandments of the Church, blasphemy, disregard of parents, perjury in lawsuits, the keeping of heretical books and clandestine marriages."³

The memorandum of the theologians suggested a line of procedure which was adopted in the time immediately following. On February 5th, 1627, the conduct of the restoration was entrusted to Harrach, now a Cardinal, Count Jaroslav Borzita of Martinitz, Frederick von Talmberg, president of the court of appeal, and to Christoph Wratislav of Mitrowitz, first chancellor of the province.⁴ Their instructions were to the effect that they should select the more able among the clergy whose mission it would be to convert the Protestants by their preaching and to strengthen the faith of the converts. Each

¹ *Ibid.*, 910.

² HURTER (X., 899) speaks of "Servants" of the Sacrament (probably through misunderstanding the Latin term "minister").

³ *Ibid.*, 898-900.

⁴ See CARAFA, *Comment.*, 276 *seq.*, and also HUBER, V., 218, note 1.

of them was to be assisted by a secular delegate. At the expiration of the time limit for the instruction and conversion of the Protestants, the refractory must be punished, the obstinate bent by having soldiers quartered on them and if they threatened violence recourse could be had to armed force. This procedure should be tried first in Prague and eventually adopted throughout Bohemia.¹ The revolution in Bohemia had had for its aim not only the destruction of the Catholic religion but likewise the absolute domination of the Estates, viz. the nobility, hence as soon as the rising was quelled, the Sovereign sought to re-establish his authority. To this end a new constitution, the result of prolonged consultations, was published on May 10th, 1627. It restricted the privileges of the Estates to the right of approving taxes and tolerated no other religion but Catholicism.² Connected with it was the edict published by Cardinal Harrach in the name of the Emperor on July 31st, 1627. Until then the work of the reform had not been begun with the nobles nor with their subjects. The majority of the nobles clung to their errors and maintained their own preachers. The July edict decreed that all nobles and Knights who refused to become Catholics, were to leave the country within six months and after the lapse of yet another six months they would be compelled to sell their property.³ In consequence of this decree several nobles left the country, many burghers also preferred exile to a return to Catholicism⁴.

¹ See DECRETA, 108 *seq.*

² See CODIX IURIS BOHEMICI, ed. Hermenegild Jireček, V., 2.

³ See DECRETA, 112 *seq.*, *Ibid.*, 133 *seq.*, where there is a still more severe decree of June 20, 1628, in which the period allowed for conversion or exile was limited to six days. For the share taken by Carafa and the divers opinions on the decree of July, see CARAFA, *Comment.*, 342 *seq.*; SCHMIDL, III., 786.

⁴ W. Slawata estimates that the number of exiled proprietors of estates and houses amounted at least to 30,000; see SCHMIDL, III., 656. For the rest, religion was in many places only a pretext for emigration, e.g. in Kaaden, where almost all the "exiles" were heavily in debt; see *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XXVII., 66. The serfs had the prospect

At first chiefly members of the monastic Orders were employed in the task of bringing the country back to Catholicism in so far as the State took up the task, and little use was made of the services of the Jesuits. The latter were chiefly called in by the Catholic landed proprietors¹ for the religious instruction of their subjects, particularly by William Slawata, Liechtenstein, Lobkowitz, Wallenstein, the lords of Kolowrat, Oppersdorff and the widows of the lords of Sternberg and Mraczki.² The number of converts made by the Jesuits in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia in 1624 totalled 1,126 : in the following year it amounted to 18,479 and in 1626 to 25,144.³ By 1624 at Neuhaus (Zindrichuv Hradec) and at

of obtaining their freedom by emigrating ; see *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XXXVIII., 909. CARAFA'S statement (*Relatione*, 254) that many emigrants returned home is confirmed by the account of BILEK on Brüx (*Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XXVII., 57). GINDELY (*Gegenreformation*, 222 seq., cf. 418, 447) asserts that the chief consequence of the religious persecution in Bohemia was the decay of the mining industry ; he does not consider the other contributing causes, especially the fact that the decay of mining had already begun long before (see JANSSEN-PASTOR, VIII.¹³⁻¹⁴, 67). One reason for the decay of mining in Graslitz, e.g., was that gradually nothing could be found except at a very great depth (see *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XII., 213). GINDELY'S view that the cause of the desolation of the Bohemian towns was solely the change of religion is very one-sided. In Komotau, in 1626, all the citizens were converted except twelve who emigrated ; nevertheless of the 545 houses counted in 1604, only 139 were occupied in 1654 (*ibid.*, XXVII., 71, 73).

¹ SCHMIDL, III., 887 ; *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXVII. (1896), 327.

² SCHMIDL, III., 581, 630, 658.

³ *Ibid.*, in the unnumbered appendix. Cf. there, the summary of conversions from 1616 to 1632 :

1616	.	.	867	1621	.	.	685
1617	.	.	885	1622	.	.	5,519
1618	.	.	383	1623	.	.	2,552
1619	.	.	13	1624	.	.	1,126
1620	.	.	104	1625	.	.	18,479

Krumau (Cesky Krumlov) where they had been at work for some time, scarcely one among the burgher class still made open confession of Protestantism.¹ The royal town of Kloin spontaneously requested the Fathers to instruct the people,² and the town of Laun was completely won back to the old faith by two Fathers within the space of two months. The transformation was extraordinarily rapid.³ The successes of the Catholic restoration were bought at the cost of almost superhuman exertions. The number of the Jesuits who, in addition to the Colleges of Prague, Komotau, Krumau and Neuhaus also had one at Gitschin (Jicin) since 1623, was quite inadequate. In 1623 they totalled 136 members of whom only fifty-seven were priests.⁴ These were indefatigable in the work of preaching, confessing and catechizing. Thus the journal of the Rector of Gitschin says of Fr. Burnatius: "In the evening Fr. Burnatius was at Nemczowes, in the morning he went to Luzan, at noon to Zeleznicz; everywhere he preached. In the evening he set out for Smrkowitz."⁵ Another missionary succumbed to the excessive labour.⁶

The numerous conversions made by the Jesuits up till 1627, especially in the domains of certain landed proprietors, led to a change in the attitude of leading Government circles in their regard. From 1627 onwards so great was the demand for the Jesuits that the College of Prague alone gave sixteen priests and many were forced to curtail their studies or to interrupt them; others had to be ordained before the time solely in order to meet the demand for their services.

1626	.	.	25,144	1630	.	.	23,121
1627	.	.	16,259	1631	.	.	3,140
1628	.	.	65,746	1632	.	.	6,303
1629	.	.	55,570	Total	.	.	225,896

Praedicantes and Haeresis magistri, 97.

¹ *Ibid.*, 549.

² *Ibid.*, 659.

³ SCHMIDL, III., 660. Cf. for the activity of the Jesuits, KRÖSS, 180 *seqq.*

⁴ See SCHMIDL, III., 482 *seq.*

⁵ SCHMIDL, III., 527.

⁶ See CORDARA, I., 491.

This preference for the Jesuits, however, had the drawback that now they came in closer contact with the military escort of the commissions: "They set out, now with the royal commissaries when personal prestige would carry weight, now with an escort of troops, when the employment of force seemed necessary."¹

As soon as the reform commission reached the chief town of the province assigned to it, or the seat of some feudal lord, the nobles and the people were separately convened for the purpose of informing them of the Emperor's will. On the expiration of a more or less prolonged period of reflection, those who were willing to obey were entrusted to the Fathers to be catechized by them, to the others a time limit was assigned within which they had either to leave the country or to become Catholics. Those who remained obdurate were punished with imprisonment or fasts.² If the recalcitrants belonged to the upper classes, which was no rare thing, they were sent to Prague, to Count Jaroslav Martinitz, a member of the supreme reform commission and a man who devoted himself wholeheartedly to his task. He was wont to say that since his life had been spared at the time of the defenestration, it was no longer his own but God's, and he wished to spend it in spreading the Catholic faith. In most instances he successfully persuaded those sent to him to change their mind.³

The activity of the Jesuits was greatly furthered by the prestige they had acquired by their work in the schools, their care of prisoners, of those condemned to death, and generally of all who were in distress. They even succeeded in winning over some of the preachers; thus on one occasion they converted as many as twelve at once in the so-called "Old City" of Prague.⁴ The extent of their success may be gathered from their reports of the year 1628. In the autumn months not a day passed on which seventy or more people were not received into

¹ SCHMIDL, III., 886 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 888.

³ *Ibid.*, 889.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 894.

the Church and not a Sunday or holy day on which 300–400 converts were not reconciled. In the “New City”, where greater difficulties were encountered, the experienced Jesuit missionary Krawarski rendered effective assistance to Canon Platais.¹ The foundation in 1628 of a college in the “Kleinseite” of Prague was an important step especially for the Catholic formation of the youth of the upper classes.²

From many places reports came in of a ready acceptance of the Catholic restoration. Thus the inhabitants of Rudolfstadt—all of them German miners—spontaneously asked for a Jesuit of Krumau, because they wished to become Catholics.³ Elsewhere, as for instance at Eger, it took a long time to bring about a change. In that locality the Jesuits were the objects of the insults of the populace; in the street people spat before them and opprobrious writings were stuck on their door. In 1628 there were only 28 converts; in 1629, after the renewal of the decrees, there were 105.⁴ In 1628, at Dirná, many went into exile when they saw that the arrival of the Jesuits was imminent, but the example of their countrymen who returned to the Church and reports of the moderation of the Fathers, brought them back to their homes and to the ancient Church.⁵ Among those who returned to the bosom of the Church at Prague was Procopius von Templin who subsequently made a name for himself as a preacher and a poet. In 1628 he entered the Capuchin Order.⁶ The Capuchins who, in addition to their convent at Prague, founded two other

¹ *Ibid.*, 858, 893 seq. Cf. TANNER, *Soc. Iesu Apostolorum imitatrix*, Pragae, 1694, 859. That the minds of the opponents were finally won over was shown at the time of the Saxon invasion in 1631 (cf. the opinion of GINDELY, below, p. 137, note 2).

² Cf. G. BIERMANN, *Gesch. des k.k. Obergymnasiums der Kleinseite in Prag* (Progr.), Prag, 1889.

³ SCHMIDL, III., 896.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 922 seq. Not until the end of 1654 had the last Lutheran disappeared from Eger; see *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XXIII., 70.

⁵ SCHMIDL, III., 898.

⁶ Cf. the monograph by GADIENT, Regensburg, 1912.

houses, viz. at Rouduici and Budeowisi, were largely responsible for the revival of Catholicism in Bohemia and Moravia. Valerian Magni, their provincial and first prefect of the Bohemian mission, was in constant correspondence with Propaganda from which the seminaries of Prague and Olmütz immediately depended.¹ A fresh decree was published in June, 1628, for Bohemia, together with an Instruction to the imperial commissaries, urging them to give yet another warning to the refractory.² Whilst the nobles and burghers were free to leave the country, the servants of the glebe were to remain and to accept the Catholic religion. This programme was realized in the southern and western districts of Bohemia in the years 1628 and 1629, either by persuasion or by force, but the North and the East offered a more prolonged resistance.³

If the provisions for the ecclesiastical restoration assumed in Bohemia more than anywhere else a punitive and coercive

¹ Cf. KOLLMANN, I., 411 seq., 418 seq.; ROCCO DA CESINALE, II., 632, 634, 638; KOLLMANN, *O archivu S. Kongregace de propaganda fide*, in *Časopis Musea království českého*, 1892. To estimate the difficulties with which the Capuchins met in many places, cf. the report of the commission for reformation, of April 4, 1628, for the town of Teplitz in the *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, III., 188 seq.

² See *Decreta*, 130 seq., 133 seq.

³ Cf. K. Krofta, *Přehled dějin selského stavu v Čechách a na Moravě*, Praha, 1919. From the data given here, and from other sources of information it appears that the Catholic restoration of Bohemia could not be regarded as completely accomplished until after the middle of the seventeenth century. Even then the victory was not complete in eastern Bohemia as is witnessed by the revival of sects as late as the reign of Joseph II. Cf. A. Rezek, *Dějiny prostonárodního hnutí náboženského v Čechách od vydání toberančního patentu až na naše časy*, Praze, 1887"; by the same, *Děje Čech a Moravy za Ferdinanda III. až do konce třicetileté války (1637-1648)*, Praze, 1890; the same: *Dějiny Čech a Moravy nové doby. Kniha první; Od míru Westfálského až do smrti císaře Ferdinanda III. (1648-1657)*, Praze, 1892.

character, the reason was that in a country in which open rebellion had only been recently suppressed, there was question not only of ecclesiastical problems but also of constitutional and economic ones. After the repression of the rebellion it was in the interest of the State itself that the country should return to Catholicism as Carafa himself repeatedly pointed out.¹ In view of the means employed it is not surprising that at first the change was a purely outward one. For the rest, a noted Bohemian historian points out that the recatholicizing of Bohemia was not exclusively due to coercive measures but likewise to a sincere, inward return to the ancestral faith. Only thus, the writer says, can we understand how it came about that during all the months in which the Swedes besieged Prague in 1648, only one thought filled the hearts of young and old, students and artisans, namely to prevent the Swedes and their hated Lutheranism, from becoming masters of their city.² The measures adopted by Ferdinand III. for the restoration of the ancient faith bore a quite different character from those laid down by his father. During the first three years of his reign the new ruler issued several stern decrees against the innovators, but Cardinal Harrach had already entered on a policy of greater moderation during the latter years of

¹ See HIRN, in *Hist. Jahrbuch.*, XVI., 605.

² See REZEK, *Gesch. Böhmens unter Ferdinand III.*, I., 515 seq., and also v. HELFERT, in the *Wiener "Vaterland"*, 1893, No. 224. Gindely, too, says of the town of Prague: That the action of the Catholic clergy became more effective and finally won over the opponents, was shown at the time of the Saxon invasion at the end of 1631. On this occasion the returning emigrants entertained the hope that the old faith would revive; but very few of the inhabitants of Prague fulfilled these expectations; by far the greater number remained deaf to the exhortations of the Protestant teachers, thereby testifying that they had also renounced their opinions interiorly." Cf. *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXVII. (1896), 326. When further attempts were made to protestantize Prague, says KRÖSS (335), "the success was small. The greater number of the burghers remained true to the Catholic faith." Cf., however *ibid.*, 212, for the *Kleinseite*, of Prague.

Ferdinand II. As a matter of fact the country folk responded very willingly to his more kindly approaches. Thus in the town of Landskron there were at one time scarcely five or six Catholics, yet between 1628–1631 the Catholic restoration was carried through without recourse to harsh measures. The same happened in numerous localities, as in the domains of William Slawata, and almost everywhere in Southern Bohemia.¹ As early as 1635, with the concurrence of the Emperor, the Cardinal published an ordinance in which he states that what mattered most was regular preaching and catechizing, in other words, missionary work. The missionaries were still being escorted by lay commissaries, though for the most part no longer by the military, as for example in the Joachimstal, at Eger, Hradetz, Czaslay (Jáchynov, Egra, Hrádec, Cáslav) and Bunzlav, hence there could be no repetition of the former acts of violence. Ulrich Adam Popel von Lobkowitz, in an Instruction for the Joachimstal dated June 17th, 1637, expressly charged the lay commissaries to show moderation and consideration towards non-Catholics. In localities and districts which were less threatened the commissaries were given no lay escort of any kind.²

From 1635 onwards the work of the missions grew considerably. All the Orders took part in it, the Jesuits being in the front line: "For these there now opened a glorious period, more especially because the members of that Order were distinguished for their zeal for religion and their irreproachable conduct. The most remarkable among them were Adam Krawarski, Adalbert Chanowski, Bernard Opel, Paul Stephanides and, a little later, Frederick Bridel and others. The College of Gitschin supplied missionaries chiefly for the north-west of Bohemia. Their reports testify that, generally speaking, their activities were unaccompanied by any acts

¹ REZEK, I., 126. Cf. an official document in the *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XXVII. (1888), 227, which presupposes the complete conversion of Landskron by 1630.

² REZEK, I., 126 seq.

of violence and that they only sought to influence the people by their keenness for the cause and their blameless life. In this they were not without achieving some notable successes.¹ Wherever the Jesuits were able to obtain a permanent footing and to found a sodality of the Blessed Virgin, the Catholic Church made rapid progress.”²

Nevertheless the old faith was very far from triumphing throughout the realm. There was a lack of secular priests for the establishment everywhere of regular and constant pastoral ministration by which alone the fruits of the missions could be assured.³ As a rule one priest was in charge of half a dozen or more parishes and the insecurity and misery caused by the Saxon invasion of 1631 and the Swedish one of 1639, undid much of what had been so laboriously accomplished. To this must be added that many landed proprietors did not care what religion their subjects professed so long as their profit and gain were assured.⁴ Cardinal Harrach did all he could. He created a supreme directorate which assigned to every missionary the post for which he was best suited.⁵ He divided the country into vicariates and by means of reports from every part of Bohemia he got a clear notion of the number of Protestants and of the clergy available.⁶ From the secular authorities he subsequently received but little assistance and it was in vain that, at the close of 1637, the archiepiscopal consistory prayed for support of the ecclesiastical visitors. Three years later Harrach had to complain that laymen were

¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

² *Ibid.*, 128.

³ REZEK, I., 130, 135. The sixteen parishes of the estate of Friedland were served in 1638 by two priests only (SCHMIDL, IV., 468) and the fifty-seven villages near Smirzitz in the same year also by only two priests (*ibid.*, 472). Cf., *ibid.* 153, 262, 317 seq., 398, 574; V., 319.

⁴ REZEK, I., 135.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 129 seq., 136. Extracts from the reports of 1632 to 1641, *ibid.*, 130 seq.

appointed as inspectors of churches and priests, as if the Archbishop were not doing his duty.¹ True, the secular authorities proceeded against non-Catholics, but until the end of the Thirty Years' War Cardinal Harrach was thrown on his own resources as regards the setting up of ordered relations on the basis of the new situation.² An intolerable burden lay upon his shoulders. "Indomitable endurance, resolution, and power of application, were indispensable qualities, and it was a great good fortune for the future destiny of the Church in Bohemia that Cardinal Harrach possessed them in a high degree. He missed no opportunity that could in any way bring him nearer his goal. Visitation followed visitation and year by year the protocols of these inspections were expanded by additional rubrics with a view to obtaining the most accurate information on the condition of the clergy and the number of non-Catholics. Every year the imperial Government and Propaganda were supplied with detailed reports both of the general condition of ecclesiastical affairs and Harrach's new undertakings. When necessary Harrach did not shrink from using sharp language in order to rouse the Government to action. He could be most gentle and considerate; but if necessary, he could also insist on his rights, without regard for any one's feelings. One Instruction after another was issued to the Catholic parish priests and when, after 1642, accurate reports came to hand with reference to the parish priests of each vicariate, it became possible to insist on better order, to bestow praise and encouragement or, if need be, to mete out punishment. In this respect the Cardinal considered no one and suffered no one to dictate to him. "When the peace of Prague made orderly conditions possible, it became necessary to begin afresh with the work of the Catholic restoration, but this time it was carried to a successful conclusion."³

¹ REZEK, I., 143.

² *Ibid.* A memorandum by Harrach's adviser, the Capuchin Valerian Magni, 1637, *ibid.*, 137 *seqq.* For Magni's opposition to the Jesuits, *ibid.*, 141 note; *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXVII. (1896), 556.

³ REZEK, I., 143 *seq.*

In Moravia, which had made common cause with Bohemia during the rebellion, a similar procedure was adopted. Carafa saw to it that the imperial edicts for Bohemia were extended to Moravia.¹ Their execution was facilitated by the circumstance that Cardinal Dietrichstein, in his capacity as Bishop of Ölmütz (Olomone) and Lieutenant of Moravia, united in his person both the ecclesiastical and the civil authority.² One great obstacle to the Catholic restoration in that country was due to the Anabaptists, numbering some 20,000 souls, having settled there; because they were excellent workmen, they enjoyed the protection of many landed proprietors. Notwithstanding the opposition of the "politicians", Carafa had obtained their banishment in 1622.³ On September 17th of that year "the sect of the Anabaptists, which is prohibited and banned throughout the Holy Roman Empire", was banned from Moravia forasmuch as "it attracts to itself many simple people and, notwithstanding severe prohibition, leads them astray and out of the country" and "because it refuses to submit to any authority, as is meet and ordered and commanded by God".⁴ However, in view of the threats of Bethlen Gábor, the order was only fully carried out in 1624.⁵ Ten thousand Anabaptists consented to accept the

¹ Cf. KOLLMANN, I., 391.

² See CARAFA, *Relatione*, ed. Müller, 257.

³ See CARAFA'S Relation of September, 1623, in KOLLMANN, I., 385. Cf. CARAFA, *Comment.*, 152. The accounts of the numbers of the Moravian Anabaptists vary exceedingly. CARAFA (*Comment.*, 213) speaks of 20,000 in 1624. But far greater numbers have been mentioned; see *Schriften der hist. Sektion der mährisch.-schles. Gesellschaft*, VI. (1854), 258. Cf. also WOLF, *Geschichtl. Bilder*, 78; LOSERTH, in the *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XXX., 404, 409.

⁴ See *Schriften der hist. Sektion der mährisch.-schles. Gesellsch.*, XVI., 880 seq.; *Decreta*, 82 seq. Cf. LOSERTH, in the *Archiv für österr. Gesch.*, LXXXI., 213 seq.; KOLLMANN, I., 85, 87 seq.

⁵ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 206, 213; Decree of 1624 in Wolny in the *Archiv für österr. Gesch.*, II. (1850), 161; cf. V., 127.

Catholic faith, the others passed into Transilvania, Hungary and Walachia.¹

As early as April, 1622, Carafa had induced the Emperor to send a command to Dietrichstein, by the terms of which the inhabitants of Brno, Olomone and other royal towns were forbidden to assist at heretical sermons held in other localities and in August all guardians of orphans were instructed to recall their wards from the Calvinist schools abroad.² At Brno and Jihlava (Iglau), at the instigation of Carafa, the restoration to the Catholics of their churches was demanded.³ An ordinance of December 27th, 1624, to Dietrichstein, was of decisive importance: it ordered the expulsion of all Protestant preachers not only from the royal towns of Moravia but likewise from the domains of the Protestant nobles.⁴

The preachers were protected by some of the landed proprietors, as for instance Karl von Zierotin, and "against the will of the feudal lords hardly anyone dared to touch the ministers of the false gospel". However, in view of the fact that Liechtenstein had received orders, "in case of need," to be ready "to give protection and assistance with armed forces", no one had the courage to offer much opposition. "With joyful countenances and without resistance of any kind," so the reform commission reported to the Cardinal, "they suffered those to be driven from their domains to whom at one time they had entrusted their souls, nay they even co-operated in this with their subjects. As for the subjects, that is, the common people, they have shown in effect and with a unanimity which might have been the result of an agreement to which they had all sworn, that the banishment of the preachers was in accordance with their inclinations,

¹ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 213.

² See *Decreta*, 80 seq.

³ See KOLLMANN, I., 162 seq., 376 seq. For the Catholic restoration in Brünn, see B. BERTHOLZ, *Die Pfarrkirche St Jakob in Brünn*, Brünn, 1901, and *Gesch. Böhmens und Mährens*, III., Reichenberg, 1923.

⁴ See *Decreta*, 90 seq.

for they lent a hand in it and gave public expression to their dispositions when they prayed that truly Catholic priests should be sent to them and gave an assurance that the Roman faith would meet with ready acceptance.”¹

Znojmo (Znaim), where there remained only 100 Catholics, was entirely Catholic by the end of 1625.² At Jihlava also, when two years later the Emperor visited the town on his way to the coronation of Ferdinand III., he was gratified on hearing that not one heretic remained in a town which had completely fallen away from the faith.³ Here also Carafa and Dietrichstein exerted themselves to the utmost.⁴ The episcopal city of Olomone where, as at Brno, non-Catholics enjoyed toleration though not freedom of worship,⁵ counted only one non-Catholic burgher in 1625.⁶ The same may be said of the population of many other towns.⁷ After Cardinal Dietrichstein had erected in his city of Miknlov (Nikolsburg) a replica of the Holy House of Loreto and obtained a special indulgence for those who visited it on the feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, “immense crowds of people began to flock thither from Hungary, Austria, Moravia and other provinces. Solemn processions came from towns of Moravia such as were not too distant; from the smaller localities also and from the villages special pilgrimages came with their own insignia. On the way they sang hymns to God and to the Blessed Virgin.” Out of a spirit of penance “some of the pilgrims made the journey barefoot; others walked with arms stretched out cross-wise whilst other processionists scourged their bare backs till they ran with blood. It was impossible to ascertain the number of the pilgrims but there

¹ *Relatio Reformationis Dominiorum Namiestensis et Rostistensis*, of January 25, 1625, in D'ELVERT, *Beiträge*, I., 282 *seqq.* (the passage quoted is on p. 287).

² KOLLMANN, I., 163, 378; SCHMIDL, III., 648 *seq.*

³ CORDARA, I., 491. Cf. KOLLMANN, I., 376.

⁴ Cf. KOLLMANN, I., 161 *seq.*

⁵ CARAFA, *Relatione*, 257.

⁶ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 261.

⁷ *Ibid.*

were 10,000 communicants." The pilgrimage to Miknlov became an institution. On the feasts of Our Lady, Carafa wrote in 1627, processions come from seven, eight or ten different towns so that Miknlov and its suburbs are unable to accommodate the crowds of pilgrims.¹ Princes and the Emperor himself, together with his wife and son, were to be seen among the devout visitors.²

The religious transformation of Znojmo (Znaim) and Jihlava was due in large measure to the two Jesuit Colleges which the convert Michael Adolph Althan, jointly with the Emperor, had erected in these two towns in the year 1624.³ The catechetical instructions of the Jesuits had given the first impulse to the conversion of Znojmo. The Protestant teachers were removed from the three schools and the Catholic ones were commanded to bring the children to church on all Sundays and holy days for catechetical instruction. The children were the means of winning back the parents and eventually the whole population. The magistrates of the town, in conjunction with the Jesuits, also took measures for the reform of the surrounding country.⁴

In other places also the Society of Jesus was able to register great successes. At Lipnik (Leipnik), the property of Cardinal Dietrichstein, the number of Catholics rose to 3,500 in 1624. The burghers themselves demanded a decree of banishment against those "to whom heresy was dearer than their country." An ordinance of the council decreed that those who died without confession were to be buried without the sound of bells and outside the cemetery. Here, as everywhere else, the

¹ *Ibid.*, 261 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*

³ CARAFA, *Comment.*, 208, 314; SCHMIDL, III., 610; KRÖSS, 289 *seqq.* Cf. J. WALLNER, *Gesch. des Gymnasiums zu Iglau*. 2 Teil; *Gesch. des Gymnasiums unter den Jesuiten 1625-1644 (Progr.)*, Iglau, 1882. The command to restore to the Jesuits the Colleges which had been taken from them in Moravia in 1619, had been issued by Ferdinand II. as early as January 23, 1621; *Decreta*, 72 *seq.*

⁴ SCHMIDL, III., 648 *seq.*

Fathers' charity towards the poor and the destitute made an enormous impression. One poor man who had lain sick on a dunghill for three days, was taken to the infirmary by the Jesuits. Another who lay helpless in the street after a cartwheel had passed over him, was taken to the same hospital in their own conveyance. When the plague broke out they visited all the sick without discrimination, even the public executioner and his assistants, nor did they cease from their priestly tasks when one after another they all fell sick with the fever. The people hailed them as "the Good Samaritans of the Gospel and as true Shepherds". When Dietrichstein visited Lipnik, at Whitsun, a crowd of faithful people came to meet him out of a town in which there had been at one time only five Catholics. In his joy the Cardinal embraced the Fathers.¹

On the other hand at Bela Crka (Weisskirchen), which was also a fief of Cardinal Dietrichstein, the Jesuits encountered great obstacles. On the occasion of the Cardinal's journey through the domain, the rural population requested him to allow the heretical worship to go on; stern ordinances were needed to bring about a return to the ancient faith. One village, which offered particularly obstinate resistance, saw itself condemned to bear the burden of a military garrison for a whole week: at its close more than 400 peasants declared their readiness to submit.²

Not long afterwards one of the churches of the neighbourhood became a place of pilgrimage.³

On September 2nd, 1628, Ferdinand II. extended the time limit assigned to the nobility and the towns for conversion to the end of March of the following year, on condition that meanwhile they should seek instruction in the Catholic faith.⁴ By that time, as Carafa notes in his final report, the Catholic restoration had made great strides in Moravia. "The

¹ SCHMIDL, III., 582 *seqq.* Cf. CORDARA, I., 490; KRÖSS, 275.

² SCHMIDL, III., 584 *seq.*

³ "Neque enim facile uspiam gens aliqua est prae Moravica ad s. peregrinationes propensior," says SCHMIDL (III., 585).

⁴ See *Decreta*, 139 *seq.*

ordinances," he writes, "have yielded the good results that were expected from them. To-day, thank God, the Catholic religion flourishes throughout this province, not only as a result of the expulsion of all preachers and the prohibition of heretical worship, but also in consequence of the sound teaching and the good example which the people receive from the members of the new and the old Orders. Hence it is impossible to count those who have returned to our holy faith, and every day there are thousands of conversions all over the country."¹

This result was due in a large measure not only to Carafa, but likewise to Cardinal Dietrichstein. That splendid Prince of the Church was wont to sit in his confessional at Olomone like a simple priest.² Repeatedly he received Holy Communion under one kind.³ In Germany he did this with special solemnity on Corpus Christi Day, 1628, at the hand of the nuncio Carafa,⁴ so as to profess as forcibly as possible his own faith in the presence of Jesus Christ under *one* kind and to strengthen the same faith in the hearts of the people. At Brno he used to sit among the children during catechism and at the end of the lesson he rewarded those who had shown special attention.⁵ In Silesia, where Protestant intolerance had repressed and uprooted everything Catholic,⁶ the restoration met with certain obstacles of a judicial kind, in so far as the domains of the Emperor were concerned. When the Silesians detached themselves from the Bohemian rebellion in order to submit once more to the Emperor, the Elector of Saxony, as representative of Ferdinand II., promised them in 1621 that the existing religious situation would be maintained, a concession which the

¹ CARAFA, *Relatione*, 257. For the introduction of religious into Moravia, see CARAFA, *Comment.*, 314.

² SCHMIDL, III., 692 (annus 1626).

³ 1623 in Polna; SCHMIDL, III., 414.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 904.

⁵ TANNER, *Societas Iesu Apostolarum imitatrix*, Praga, 1694, 772b. Cf. for Dietrichstein, *Zeitschr. des deutschen Vereins für Gesch. Mährens*, XVI. (1912), 118 seq.

⁶ See GRÜNHAGEN, II., 158.

Emperor subsequently ratified. In consequence Rudolph II.'s *Letter of Majesty* was still in force there. As a rule, therefore, it was impossible to do more than to appoint Catholic noblemen as administrators of the *immediate* principalities, to give to Catholics the captaincy of the towns and to exact the surrender of the churches of which the Catholics had been deprived.¹ Only in the county of Glatz, which really formed part of Bohemia and which had come once more under the power of the Emperor at the end of October, 1622, were the preachers driven from the town on November 12th and not long after from the whole country.² In 1623 Ferdinand II. bestowed Glatz on his brother, the Archduke Charles, Prince-Bishop of Breslau, who promptly gave to the Jesuits a site on which to rebuild their College which had been burnt to the ground. At Neisse, the residence of the Prince-Bishop, the Jesuit Christoph Scheiner laid the first stone of a new College in 1623.³ In 1624 warlike disturbances drove the Jesuits of Olomone to Glogau, a town which by reason of its proximity to Poland, Pomerania, Brandenburg and Lausitz was deemed a strategic point of great importance. In the following year Count John III. of Oppersdorff made it possible for them to acquire a permanent establishment there and in 1627 they opened a school.⁴

In Silesia also the Colleges of the Jesuits were greatly frequented. Up to 1627 they had 300 pupils at Glatz and 600 at Neisse⁵ most of them being Protestants. It was not long before many of the children were won back to the old religion so that in 1625 several boys of Neisse allowed themselves to be whipped rather than eat meat on Friday.⁶ Through the children the old religious ideas once more found an entrance into

¹ See HUBER, V., 228.

² See SCHMIDL, III., 315; H. WIESE, *Der Kampf um Glatz*, Halle, 1896, 59 *seq.*

³ SCHMIDL, III., 463 *seqq.*; KRÖSS, 300. For Glatz, *cf.* DUHR, II., 1, 355 *seq.*; KRÖSS, 44 *seqq.*, 295 *seqq.*

⁴ SCHMIDL, III., 576, 597, 774; KRÖSS, 309 *seqq.*

⁵ SCHMIDL, III., 830.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 694.

the homes of the people.¹ Here also the charity of the Fathers and their visits to the poor and the sick won all hearts.² People came from miles away, even from as far as Breslau, to receive the Sacraments in their church at Neisse and 4,000 persons took part in the Rogation processions on the three days before the Ascension.³

The Bishop's command of 1625 that henceforth Communion should be given only under one kind and that those who obstinately demanded the chalice should be refused the privileges of citizenship and the right to contract matrimony, was promptly obeyed at Neisse and the surrounding district. These and other ordinances,⁴ the purpose of which was the realization of the Catholic restoration in the Duchy of Neisse, were issued in the name of the Bishop by his representatives, for on the death of Archduke Charles the twelve-years-old Polish Prince, Charles Ferdinand, a nephew of the Emperor, had been raised to the archiepiscopal See. In course of time the Catholic restoration spread from Neisse to the Duchy of Grottkau.⁵

In view of the fact that Mansfeld had received support from Upper Silesia in 1626, the Emperor was advised to declare null and void both the agreement with Saxony and the *Letter of Majesty*, and to deprive the Protestants of the freedom of religion which they had enjoyed until then. He refused to follow these counsels. Ferdinand II. was content to lay down

¹ *Ibid.*, 728.

² *Ibid.*, 593, 737.

³ *Ibid.*, 593.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 793; SCHMIDLIN, *Die Restaurationstätigkeit der Breslauer Fürstbischöfe*, Rome, 1907, 35 seq. For the election of Prince Carl Ferdinand see the dissertation of MOSBACH, Breslau, 1871. The event is significant as showing the lack of understanding of the true interests of the church on the part of ecclesiastical statesmen; see *Stimmen der Zeit*, 1918, July, No. 374, note 1. Cf. the complaints of Giacinto da Casale, on the "entourage" of the "good" Emperor, of February, 1624, in ROCCO DA CESINALE, II., 287 seq.

the principle that the *Letter of Majesty* could only confirm legitimate proprietorship and that the Protestants were bound to restore to the Catholics whatever they had acquired unjustly. Accordingly this line of conduct was adopted in the towns of the principalities immediately subject to the Emperor and in Wallenstein's Duchy of Sagan.¹ In 1628 Wallenstein laid the first stone of a Jesuit College at Sagan and published an ordinance commanding everyone to return to the Catholic Church. No one dared to resist openly.² When Wallenstein took the town of Troppau he also introduced the Jesuits there. The aversion which the burghers at first felt for them, vanished very quickly.³

At Glogau Ferdinand II.'s efforts for the Catholic restoration met with strong opposition. When Count George Oppersdorff insisted on the parish of St. Nicholas being restored to the Catholics, a demand often made in the past, the burghers, roused by the preachers, offered strong resistance and the bulk of the population only submitted after Oppersdorff had sent for the troops of Count Dohna.⁴ The Jesuit Nerlich condemned the coercion by the military which was practised on this occasion.⁵ When Catholicism was restored at Schweidnitz, at the beginning of 1629, the soldiery behaved with such rowdiness that the Jesuits left the town for a time.⁶ Although they too, in accordance with the spirit of the age and the practice of

¹ See K. A. MENZEL, VII. 144 *seq.*

² See SCHMIDL, III., 841, 925; KRÖSS, 318 *seqq.*

³ SCHMIDL, III., 770, 858, 931; KRÖSS, 323 *seqq.* The coping stone to the edifice of the Catholic restoration in Troppau as in Jägerndorf and Leobschütz was the Statute of Religion of 1630, whereby the citizens were obliged to promise not to allow anyone to take up residence in the town who did not profess the Catholic faith; see LOESCHE, *Zur Gegenreformation in Schlesien*, Leipzig, 1915/16.

⁴ See SCHMIDL, III., 844 *seq.*, 847 *seq.*; KREBS, *Acta publica*, VII. (1905), 224 *seq.*

⁵ See DUHR, II., 2, 350; KRÖSS, 312 *seqq.*

⁶ See KOPIETZ, in the *Zeitschr. des Vereins für Gesch. Schlesiens*, XV., 185. Cf. SCHMIDL, III., 1084.

the Protestants, were in favour of coercive measures, they nevertheless realized that the chief means by which a sincere conversion could be obtained and one that would, to some extent, soften the harshness of coercion, was instruction by means of sermons and catechizing.¹

Breslau remained untouched by the Catholic restoration for there the captaincy was pledged to the Protestant Council, and Catholic worship was only tolerated in two monasteries and on the Cathedral island.² The same thing also occurred in the vassal principalities of Liegnitz, Brieg-Wohlau and Münsterberg-Öls whose Princes were able to appeal to the axiom *cujus regio ejus religio*. Consequently Protestantism continued to be the dominant religion in a large section of Silesia, as well as in Upper and Lower Lausitz which it had been necessary, in June, 1623, to surrender as a pledge to the Elector of Saxony.³

(2)

As in Bohemia, so in the Hereditary States of Austria, Protestantism largely bore a revolutionary character. In Upper Austria, where they were not satisfied with toleration but sought utterly to uproot the Catholic Church,⁴ the Protestants strongly urged their pretensions even after the territory had been conquered by the armies of the League. With characteristic Bavarian obstinacy,⁵ the Estates opposed the victorious Emperor both in the religious and the political sphere.⁶ It was almost naïve on their part to demand the confirmation of their own conquests now that the rebellion

¹ See DUHR, II., 2, 5 seq., 67 seq., 351; HERMANN HOFFMANN, *Die Jesuiten in Glogau*, Breslau, 1926; *Festschrift zur Dreihundertjahrfeier (1626-1926) des Staatlichen Katholischen Gymnasiums zu Glogau*, Glogau, 1926.

² Cf. KOLLMANN, I., 387.

³ Cf. MENZEL, VII., 140 seq., 163 seq.

⁴ See CZERNY in 42nd report of *Museum Francisco-Carolinum*, XIII. (1884), 69 seq., 132; DUHR, II., 2, 348.

⁵ See RIEZLER, V., 294.

⁶ See HUBER, V., 229 seq.

had been quelled. When Upper Austria was given in pledge to Bavaria, Ferdinand II. retained for himself the suzerainty over the country. He was determined to make use of his right of reform. On October 4th, 1624, he decreed that all Protestant ministers and school teachers were to leave the country within eight days, inasmuch as by their blasphemous rantings and their influence on the common people they had contributed in no small degree to the previous rebellion, and because even now they continued their blasphemous denunciation and calumnies of the Catholic religion.¹ But in view of the fact that even after the preachers had quietly departed,² Protestant worship was still being held in certain secret conventicles and in the castles of the nobles, the Emperor appointed a reform commission which, on the instruction of Maximilian I., was likewise supported by the Bavarian Lieutenant, Adam von Herbersdorf. When the commission sought to introduce Catholic priests in the cities and market towns, the Protestants offered armed resistance on more than one occasion. In the county of Frankenburg 5,000 men flocked together, threatening the castle, in consequence of which Herbersdorf dealt out stern justice and executed seventeen men who had been found guilty; but the real ringleaders made good their escape.³ Thereupon on October 12th the reform commission published imperial letters patent by the terms of which all were commanded either to accept the Catholic faith by Easter, 1626, or to leave the country.⁴ The Emperor would not listen to the representations of the Estates and the nobility ended by complying with the decree. Not so the peasants, most of whom were armed. Exasperated by the harsh way in which the October decree was being carried out, as well as by the Bavarian occupation,⁵ they entered into a conspiracy which

¹ See KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 496 *seq.*

² *"Se ne sono andati senza strepito." Report of Altoviti, dated Vienna, October 26, 1624, State Archives, Florence, *Med.* 4375.

³ See KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 733 *seq.*

⁴ See RAUPACH, *Evangel. Österreich.*, IV., no. 45.

⁵ See HUBER, V., 233.

broke out with elemental violence on May, 1626, and quickly spread over the whole country.¹ The towns of Wels and Steier were compelled to fall in with the movement. In the course of a single fortnight the rebels became masters of the whole country, with the exception of Linz, Enns and Freistadt. Only in November, 1626, did the imperial and Bavarian troops succeed in quelling the dangerous rising in bloody fashion.² By that time the Emperor felt bound, even on political grounds, to carry through the Catholic restoration, for he had become convinced that the Protestants would never be loyal subjects. Maximilian also pressed for a speedy decision.³ Accordingly, in 1627, a decree was published giving the burghers one month, the nobles three months, in which to embrace Catholicism or to leave the country. As for the peasants, all that was insisted upon was that they should not assist at Protestant services, but that they should attend Catholic worship. There was no question of driving them out of the country.⁴

After the suppression of the peasant rising in Upper Austria, the Catholic restoration resumed its course in Lower Austria. In that district it had been restricted until then to the cities and market towns of the Princes and to the imperial officials, but in 1626 such lecturers and professors as held the new faith

¹ Cf. A. CZERNY, *Bilder aus der Zeit der Bauernunruhen in Oberösterreich*, Linz, 1876; GINDELY, in the *Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad. philos.-hist. Kl.*, CXVIII. (1889), 1 *seq.*; STIEVE, *Der oberösterr. Bauernaufstand des Jahres 1626*, 2 vols., Munich, 1891; (J. Strnadl,) *Der Bauernkrieg in Oberösterreich*, Wels, 1902.

² Urban VIII. could only give to the Emperor the help of his prayers as he told him in a *Brief of August 25, 1626, for "curata Italiae pax" had entailed great expenses and "arma nondum deposita vorant Pontif. aerarium", *Epist.*, III., Papal Secret Archives.

³ See HUBER, V., 239; RIEZLER, V., 312.

⁴ See RIEZLER, V., 312 *seq.* In August, 1623, when the Swedes invaded the country, the peasants rebelled again but Gustavus Adolphus abandoned them to their fate; see *ibid.*, 428 *seq.*

were removed from the University of Vienna.¹ On the other hand, the nobles retained the right to Protestant worship which Maximilian II.'s "Assecuration" had granted to them and which Ferdinand II. had confirmed by oath. Representations were made to the Emperor to the effect that, as a Catholic Sovereign, he was not bound by the law of the Empire to tolerate Protestantism in one of his Hereditary States since there the princes did not enjoy, together with suzerainty, the right of reform as they did in Silesia. Ferdinand submitted the question to a commission which, in addition to several privy councillors and councillors of the Government of Lower Austria, also included three Jesuits, his own confessor, Lamormaini, being one of them. Opinions were divided. Some held that it was not lawful to break a sworn promise and in view of the political situation, even recommended a postponement of drastic measures. The others similarly stood by the view that it was wrong to go against oath and promise, but argued that the Emperor was only bound towards the provincial Estates of the Confession of Augsburg; hence, since at that time there was not a single Lutheran preacher in Lower Austria who did not lean towards Calvinism, there was no obligation for the Emperor to tolerate such men. Cardinal Klesl opposed the banishment of the Protestants on the ground that by such a measure the Sovereign forfeited the love of the people, money was taken out of the country and many souls were imperilled, for the exiles would persevere to the end in their errors. If, on the other hand, these people were allowed to remain in the country, though without the right to practise their religion, their children at least would become Catholics and the evils he had pointed out would be avoided.² Thereupon the Emperor took a middle course: he decided to forgo the right of banishing the Protestant nobles, on the other hand

¹ See RAUPACH, IV., 430; MENZEL, VII., 131.

² See KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 303 *seq.* Klesl must have given his advice in writing for he only returned to Vienna on February 5, 1628; *Briefs of Urban VIII. of September 7 and 10, 1627, had recommended him to the Emperor. *Epist.* IV., Papal Secret Archives.

a decree was published on September 14th, 1627, ordering the removal from Lower Austria of all Protestant preachers and schoolmasters on the ground of their Calvinistic opinions and their attacks on the Catholic religion and the Government.¹ Though this measure made the practice of their religion impossible for the nobility, twenty years later there were still seventy-two Protestant noble families in Lower Austria. But in course of time Klesl's expectations were fulfilled.² An all-important contributory cause to this result was the fact that, side by side with the Catholic restoration, there also took place an internal reform. This was specially the case in Vienna. In addition to the Orders already at work in that city, others joined them as time went on, such as the Barnabites, the Trinitarians, the Carmelites, both friars and nuns. The gradual revival of religion was attested in the sequel by the erection of new churches.³

Up till then the Catholic restoration, notwithstanding every effort,⁴ had been unable to penetrate into Central Austria, Stiria, Carinthia and Carniola, inasmuch as the new religion found too strong a support in the nobles and knights who were the lords of a number of cities and market towns. In course of time the conviction gained ground that sterner measures

¹ See RAUPACH, IV., supplement no. 46; *Decreta*, 184 seq., cf. 188 (loyal priests are to take the place of the banished ones). Cf. HURTER, IX., 198 seq., X., 119 seq.; WIEDEMANN, I., 597 seq., 605. A *Brief of praise on account of the Edict was sent to the Emperor, October 9, 1627, *Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives.

² See MEIERN, *Acta Pacis Westph.*, IV., 174 seq. Cf. RAUPACH, IV., 464.

³ See VANCSA, in A. MAYER, *Gesch. der Stadt Wien*, IV., Vienna, 1911, 131. The Catholic restoration in Vienna was completed by the Abbot of Kremsmünster, who succeeded Klesl at the latter's death (September 15, 1630) and by Anton Wolfradt, Ferdinand II.'s minister, a native of Cologne. Cf. HOPF, in the *Programmen der Gumpendorfer Realschule*, 1891-3, and MAURER, *A. Wolfradt, Fürstbischof von Wien*, Vienna, 1894.

⁴ Cf. the ordinances of April 26, 1625, in *Decreta*, 148 seq., 151 seq., 167 seq.

against the sectaries would be in order.¹ Among the ordinances in this sense published in May 1626, we find an invitation addressed to the Bishops of Gurk, Seckau, Lavant and Lubian to see to it that the clergy led an exemplary life, for in this respect there was much to be desired.² The warning was renewed in March, 1628, whilst at the same time public notice was given of the duties of the reform commission which had been set up for the purpose of repressing heresy in the cities and market towns.³ A decisive step was taken on August 1st, 1628, when a general ordinance of Ferdinand II. decreed the banishment of all Protestant lords and knights from Stiria, Carinthia and Carniola.⁴ The collapse of the nobility involved that of the still powerful Protestant sections of the burgher and peasant circles.⁵ In December, 1628, Pallotto, who had succeeded Carafa, thanked the Emperor in the Pope's name for the execution of the Catholic restoration in Central Austria, at the same time begging him to persist in the task.⁶ Nevertheless it was some time before the Protestants in every stratum of society, with a few exceptions, consented to accept the new situation.⁷

At the time of the conclusion of the peace treaties with Bethlen Gábor in January, 1622, and May, 1624, the Emperor had been obliged to desist both from the political and the religious restoration of Hungary. Consequently, owing to Bethlen's power and the proximity of the Turks, a forcible restoration was rendered impossible.⁸ However, successes of

¹ See LOSERTH, *Akten und Korrespondenzen* (*Fontes dipl.*, 60), LVII. Cf. also *Archiv für österr. Gesch.*, XCVI., 127 seq.

² See LOSERTH, *Akten*, LXXIV., 737 seq.

³ *Ibid.*, XLI., 802. Cf. *Archiv für österr. Gesch.*, XCVI., 131.

⁴ See LOSERTH, *Akten*, 814 seq., cf. LXXV.

⁵ See *ibid.*, XLII.

⁶ Cf. KIEWNING, *Nuntiativberichte*, I., 332.

⁷ See LOSERTH, *Akten*, LXXV., cxi., seq.

⁸ See the *report of Altoviti, dated Vienna, October 26, 1624, from which it appears that the idea had not yet been quite abandoned (State Archives, Florence, *Med.* 4375); meanwhile Pázmány would not hear of violence.

greater value and far more lasting than any that might have been obtained by force were achieved by the spiritual power of a single man, namely, Peter Pázmány, Archbishop of Gran.¹

Born in 1570 at Wardein, of a Calvinist family,² Peter Pázmány received from his Catholic stepmother the first impulse towards his return to the Catholic Church, a step he took at the age of thirteen. Four years later he joined the Society of Jesus. The extraordinarily gifted young man began his studies in Vienna and continued them in Rome where he attended the lectures of Bellarmine. From 1598 onwards he taught philosophy and theology at the University of Graz, whilst on occasion he also undertook missionary work in Hungary. In 1607 the Archbishop of Gran, Cardinal Forgách, entrusted him with some important tasks in the interests of the Church of Hungary where conditions were deplorable.

The Cardinal had found the right man for Pázmány was most successful both as a preacher and as a writer. His chief work is his "Guide to divine truth" completed in 1613,³ which constitutes a veritable arsenal of spiritual weapons for the defence of religion. By reason of its clarity it became a

¹ HUBER'S opinion (V., 244).

² The foundation of our knowledge of the life and work of Pázmány has been laid by the two works published in Hungarian by V. FRAKNÓI: *P. Pázmány und seine Zeit*, 3 vols., Pest, 1868-1872, and *P. Pázmány, 1570-1637*, Budapest, 1886; the biography by J. H. SCHWICKER, *P. Pázmány und seine Zeit* (Cologne, 1898), is based on those works. Our knowledge has recently been considerably enlarged by the publication of all Pázmány's works, under the auspices of the Theological Faculty of the University of Budapest. This edition, consisting of two series, makes the Hungarian and the Latin works of Pázmány (Budapest, 1894 *seq.*, followed in 1910 by the letters of the Cardinal) accessible to scholars. In 1886 the "Ungarische Revue" published an essay on Pázmány, valuable on account of its illustrations. A very rare medal in the collection of coins in Vienna shows the fine, energetic head of the Cardinal.

³ HODEGUS, *Igazságra vezérlő Kalauz* (ed. I. Kiss), 2 vols., Budapest, 1897-8.

book of popular instruction as well as intellectual food for the educated classes. In this as in all his writings Pázmány shows himself a master of style so that he is justly considered a model of cultivated Hungarian prose.¹ His nomination, in the autumn of 1616, to the archiepiscopal see of Gran and to the primacy of Hungary, marks a decided turning point towards better conditions for the Church of that much tried country. Fully convinced that the nation's revival could only be brought about by its return to the old faith, Pázmány threw himself heart and soul into the struggle against Protestantism. If at times he appeared harsh, not to say pitiless, the explanation lay partly in his strong conviction that only in the Church could men find salvation, partly in the spirit of that warlike age which was implacable towards an opponent, but at no time did he have recourse to violent measures for he realized that lasting results could not be achieved by such means—hence he only employed spiritual ones.² However, his fight against the enemy was only one aspect of his reforming activity; another and much more important one in his eyes, was the intellectual and moral raising of the clergy whose decadence had to a large extent caused the religious innovations and contributed to their rapid spread. Hence he was indefatigable in founding educational establishments, colleges, seminaries,³ in holding synods and in enforcing ecclesiastical discipline.

To his Sovereign Pázmány gave his wholehearted loyalty and in the House of Habsburg he saw the strongest earthly support of the Catholic Church as well as the hope of its restoration in his beloved country. A hot-blooded Hungarian, he sometimes allowed himself to be carried away by his temperament when he did or said things that gave pain,

¹ See J. H. SCHWICKER, *Gesch. der ungarischen Literatur*, 1889, Leipzig.

² See SCHWICKER, *Pázmány*, 53, 93.

³ One of his creations is the famous Pazmaneum in Vienna; cf. C. RIMELY, *Historia Collegii Pazmanei*, Viennae, 1865; FRAKNÓI, *A bécsi Pázmány-intezet megalapítása* (The foundation of the Pázmány Institute in Vienna), Budapest, 1923.

but he always fought with open vizor. With the utmost courage he opposed the absolutist and centralist tendencies of the Viennese politicians. With a view to preserving the character and the freedom of his people, though himself a most fervent Catholic, he entered the lists on behalf of the preservation of the Protestant principality of Transilvania.¹

Pázmány's efforts on behalf of the regeneration of the Catholic Church in Hungary were admirably seconded by the members of the Society of Jesus who, though they had been established in the country since 1560, were only able fully to unfold their pastoral and educational activities under his patronage. They had Colleges at Nagy Szombat, Trnava-Tyrnau, Poszony (Bratislav-Pressburg), Győr (Raab), Hamonna, Szatmár (Satu-Mara) and Gyöngyös; in all these places they worked most zealously and fruitfully as educationalists, preachers and missionaries.²

Pázmány, who was raised to the cardinalate in 1629, also entrusted to the sons of St. Ignatius the University founded by him in 1635 at Nagy Szombat which was subsequently transferred first to Ofen and then to Pest.³ When Pázmány succumbed to an attack of the gout on March 19th, 1637, the future of the Church in Hungary was assured. His three immediate successors, who had been formed at the Germanicum in Rome, continued the work of their great predecessor.⁴ The revival of the Catholic Church in the kingdom of St. Stephen not only led to the regeneration of the nation, it also added fresh strength to the Habsburg monarchy which was thus enabled to fulfil in brilliant fashion its historic mission as the protagonist of Christian culture and the bulwark of Central Europe against Islam.

The zeal for the renewal of the Christian spirit which had

¹ See SCHWICKER, *Pázmány*, 94 *seq.*

² Cf. L. VELICKS, *Vázlatok A Magyar Jezsuiták Multjából*, I. (1560-1610), II. (1610-1690), Budapest, 1912/13, in which both MSS. and printed sources are given.

³ See SCHWICKER, *Pázmány*, 81 *seq.*

⁴ See STEINHUBER, II., 118.

animated Pázmány, also inspired the Emperor Ferdinand II.'s noble brother, the Archduke Leopold, who took up the government of the Tyrol and the Vorlanden in March, 1619. This illustrious scion of the Habsburgs had already given proof of his ardent zeal for ecclesiastical restoration when he held the sees of Passau and Strassburg.¹ Now, aided by the support of the Emperor, he wished to bestow its blessings in fullest measure upon the territories subject to him. His zeal for religion showed itself in his war against the Confederates in 1621, when he insisted everywhere on the banishment of the preachers and the introduction of Catholic priests.²

In the Tyrol, Archduke Ferdinand II. and Leopold's immediate predecessor Maximilian, Grand-master of the Teutonic Order, had done their utmost to promote the religious renewal.³ However, much remained to be done, nor had the followers of the new teaching wholly disappeared. It was precisely against these heretics, who had spread more particularly in the mining district of Kitzbühel and in the valley of the Adige, that the religious ordinances published from 1620 onwards, were directed. In order to put a stop to the spread of the new teaching, great watchfulness was exercised with a view to the discovery of heretical books. Leopold's zeal for the welfare of the souls of his subjects was especially shown by the energy with which he promoted the Institute of the so-called "religious agents", that is, the work of those who watched and cared for people who lived far from their homes in the midst of Protestants. This work was less needed in the Tyrol than in the Vorlanden whose frontiers were contiguous on every side to Protestant districts.⁴ The dangers to which such a position gave rise, account for the extraordinary strictness with

¹ Cf. our notes, Vol. XXVI., 339 *seqq.*

² See LUDWIG, in the 35th *Jahresbericht* of the *Hist.-antiq. Gesellsch. von Graubünden*, 1907, I *seq.*

³ Cf. present work, Vol. XXVI., 348.

⁴ Cf. TH. MAYR, *Einrichtung und Tätigkeit der Tirolischen Religionsagenten*, in *Forsch. und Mitteil. zur Gesch. Tirols und Vorarlbergs*, XIII. (1916), 37 *seq.*, 90 *seq.*

which Leopold governed the Vorlanden. But to a defensive policy the Archduke joined a constructive one, inasmuch as he sought to raise the moral condition of the people by means of missions and by the support he gave to the secular and regular clergy. In the Vorlanden, as everywhere else, the Jesuits were in the van of the movement for the Catholic restoration. The Archduke, who had always befriended them, continued to do so until his death in 1632. In 1618 he established an Academy for them at Molsheim in Alsace¹ and in 1620 he handed over to them the University of Freiburg in Breisgau, which ten years later was still further enlarged by him.² He spent 15,000 florins on the erection of the new Jesuit College at Ensisheim and he likewise contributed to the construction of their College at Colmar where, in 1627, the Emperor had given orders for the restoration of the Catholic religion.³ The Jesuit establishment of Innsbruck owes to him the erection of the magnificent church of the Holy Trinity.

In 1627 he himself laid the foundation stone of that splendid edifice whose imposing dome recalls Italy's fairest buildings.⁴

The other Orders also enjoyed the Archduke's favour. For the Servites of Innsbruck he erected the pilgrimage church at the foot of the Waldrastspitze,⁵ the grace and beauty of which inspired Jacob Balde with one of his most exquisite hymns to the Mother of God.⁶ The Franciscans who, in 1625, had accepted the reform of the Observants,⁷ were settled by him at Reutte and the Capuchins owe to him the erection of their convents at Sterzing, Neumarkt and Bruneck. Towards the construction of the Capuchin convent at Lindau, which the

¹ Cf. present work, Vol. XXVI., 339.

² See DUHR, II., I., 268 seq.

³ *Ibid.*, 273, 275.

⁴ See BRAUN, *Kirchenbauten der Deutschen Jesuiten*, II., 167 seq. DUHR, II., I., 212 seq. A forthcoming monograph by Professor PANGERL will trace the history of the building of this church.

⁵ Cf. TINKHAUSER-RAPP, *Beschreibung der Diözese Brixen*, II., 15 seq.

⁶ See WESTERMAYER, *J. Balde*, Munich, 1868, 130 seq.

⁷ See GUGGENBÜHLER, *Beiträge*, Bozen, 1880, 338.

Emperor successfully enforced, notwithstanding the protests of the town, he contributed 2,000 florins.¹ The deep piety of the Archduke, who cherished a particular devotion to the Mother of God, showed itself especially in his daily assistance at Mass and in the fact that during Holy Week he walked in a procession of penitents carrying a cross on his shoulders.² In 1626 he married Claudia, the daughter of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, after he had previously demanded in person and obtained the necessary dispensation from the Pope into whose hands he surrendered his ecclesiastical dignities.³ At his death in 1632 he could look with satisfaction on the situation in the Tyrol where by means of the co-operation of the secular and the spiritual Power, the ancient Church had recovered her former strength.

(3)

After the quelling of the rebellion, Ferdinand II., basing himself on the right of reform guaranteed to him by the religious peace of Augsburg, was as unwilling to suffer any of his subjects to profess another religion as were the Protestant Princes in their territories. His example could not fail to spur the other Catholic Princes of Empire to similar action. The latter's zeal was encouraged not only by the nuncio at the imperial court, but likewise by the Cologne nuncio, Pietro Francesco Montorio who, before his departure in May, 1624, pointed out to the Pope in a special memorandum ⁴ the great

¹ The *documents on this are in the Archives of the Capuchins at Bregenz. The town's "Protest" is dated May 10, 1630, the energetic answer of the imperial commission is of May 25, 1630, whereupon on May 25, 1630, the town sent in a rude *renewal of their protest. The original of the donation of the 2,000 florins is dated November 5, 1630.

² See EGGER, *Gesch. Tirols*, II., Innsbruck, 1876, 360 seq.; DUHR, II., 2, 290 seq.

³ Cf. Vol. XXIX., Ch. I.

⁴ *Relazione al papa Urbano VIII. delle cose appartenenti alla nuntiatura di Colonia per M^r Montorio, l'a. 1624. *Cod.* 6329,

advantages which, with the Pontiff's own co-operation, had accrued to the Church within the empire from Tilly's victories over both Christian of Halberstadt and Mansfeld. As a matter of fact at that time a new field lay open for the Catholic restoration in the Upper and Lower Palatinate and in Baden, whilst prospects were bright also in the North. At long last Osnabrück had once more a Catholic Bishop. Montorio likewise hoped that a Catholic Bishop would be elected at Minden, and that Catholic worship would at least be tolerated in the cities of the Hansa. In these cities, he thought, the Emperor would be able to impose toleration, all the more so as they derived great advantage from their trade with Spain and Portugal. But Montorio's great expectations from the Propaganda mission at Altona, from which he hoped for the spread of the ancient faith in Denmark and Sweden, were to remain unfulfilled.¹ He rightly emphasized that if the Catholic restoration was to endure, a reform of the German Bishops and Abbots was indispensable. Should circumstances prevent him from putting his hand to that task his successor should not fail to undertake it.

For the post of nuncio in Cologne the Pope appointed the Bishop of Tricarico, Pier Luigi Carafa, a man distinguished

p. 236 *seq.*, of the State Library, Vienna, and *Cod. A.E. IX.*, 24, of the National Library, Milan; copies also in the Library of Amberg, and the Communal Library, Bologna, and in *Ottob.* 3138, p. 21, Vatican Library. RANKE (III., 137) gives an extract without mentioning its source and without saying that the *Relazione* had appeared in a German translation in *Gött. Gel. Magazin*, I. (1787), 500 *seq.*

¹ As early as the summer of 1623 the Jesuit mission in Altona came to an end through an act of violence; see PIEPER, *Propagandamission*, 8 *seq.*, and DUHR, II., 2, 76, for the vain attempts of the Jesuits to establish missions in Denmark and Sweden. In Hamburg there had been working since 1624, though under great difficulties, the Propaganda missionary, Dom. Jansenius, whilst his brother Nicholas worked at Glückstadt; see PIEPER, 16 *seq.*, 22 *seq.* Cf. also BLAU, *La communauté cath. de Hambourg*, 1624, in the *Mél. à Ch. Moeller*, II., 311 *seq.*

both by high birth and diplomatic skill.¹ An Instruction dated May 26th, 1624, gives a minute description of his duties²; they were the preservation of the territories which had remained true to the old religion and the reconquest of those that have rejected it. One of the chief means towards the realization of that end was the restoration of discipline within the Church. In view of the fact that in Germany episcopal sees were filled by the Chapters, the nuncio should watch with the utmost care lest men be made Canons who were not sincerely attached to the Catholic faith. In like manner benefices in the gift of Bishops and Chapters must only be bestowed upon men of irreproachable conduct, and with regard to benefices the collation of which was reserved to the Holy See, the nuncio must keep a register of suitable candidates, and this list must be kept up to date. In order to safeguard such dioceses as were threatened by the Protestants and to recover those that had been lost, the Instruction insists before all else on the appointment of suitable coadjutors and once again emphasizes the necessity of supporting and completing, by an internal reform, the restoration of the ancient faith in the Protestant territories, a change which could be looked for in consequence of the victories of the Emperor and the League. This reform was to be brought about by means of visitations for the purpose of enforcing the decrees of Trent,

¹ The *Briefs accrediting P. L. Carafa to the Rhenish Archbishops and Bishops, to the Senate of Cologne, etc., are dated June 15, 1624, *Epist.*, I.^b, Papal Secret Archives.

² **Instruizione a Msgr. Carafa, destinato da N.S. Urbano VIII., nuntio in Colonia*, 1624, used by RANKE (III., 139) but without indication of source. The Instruction is in *Cod. X.*, V., 15, p. 341 *seq.*, of the Casanatense Library, and in *Barb.* 5528 and 5547, with date of June 26, 1624, in *Ottob.* 2437, p. ii., p. 392 *seq.*, Vatican Library; a copy is also in *Cod. V.*, 3, 96, of the Salzburg Library. S. PIETRASANTA, S.J., has described Carafa's journey to Cologne (ed. Ginzler, Würzburg, 1840), as well as other journeys of the nuncio; see SOMMERVOGEL, s.v. Cf. also *Giorn. stor. d. lett. ital.*, XXI., 466. For Carafa's struggle with the Bishop of Würzburg over jurisdiction see *Röm. Quartalschr.*, VII., 202 *seq.*

especially those on the Chapters, the celebration of diocesan and provincial synods and the appointment of good parish priests. Efforts should be made to bring back to the faith the Protestant occupants of episcopal sees. When a vacancy occurred in a diocese where the Chapter was wholly or in part Protestant, every effort must be made to secure the election of a Catholic Bishop, and to this end the help of the neighbouring Catholic Princes should also be invoked. It was important to make early provision for the appointment of a powerful Catholic coadjutor; that experiment had yielded excellent results at Paderborn and Münster.

As further means for the preservation and spread of the Catholic faith the Instruction indicates the holding of missions by good regular or secular priests, such as those whom Montorio had dispatched to Hamburg, Magdeburg, Halberstadt and Bremen, not only for the purpose of converting the Protestants, but in order to encourage those who had remained true to the Catholic faith¹; secondly, the furthering of Catholic schools, especially those of the Jesuits, and the erection of a Catholic University at Münster²; thirdly, support of the confraternities for the conversion of Protestants, more especially an association of the kind recently founded in the church of the Capuchins at Cologne on which Gregory XV. had bestowed divers favours. In Nassau-Siegen, where Count John had begun the Catholic restoration in 1623,³ efforts must be made to get the preachers banished and the possessions of which the Church had been robbed, restored to their lawful owners.⁴ The nuncio was also instructed to support the Count Palatine, Wolfgang Wilhelm von Neuburg, who had already done so

¹ Cf. PIEPER, *loc. cit.*, 16 *seq.*, 28.

² Cf. DUHR, II., I, 588 *seq.*

³ See ACHENBACH, *Gesch. der Stadt Siegen*, I. (1894), vii *seq.*, 46 *seq.*; DUHR, II., I, 92 *seq.*

⁴ * " Adesso per assicurare un tanto acquisto è necessario distruggere affatto le cattedre pestilenti e scacciare i falsi predicanti il che non può avvenire più agevolmente che col torre loro quei beni ecclesiastici ch'essi posseggono restituendogli a quelle persone ecclesiastiche a quali furono ingiustamente usurpati."

much for the Catholic cause, not only in his efforts on behalf of the reform but in other matters also ; in fact the nuncios of Vienna, Madrid, Paris and Brussels had received instructions to the same effect. The Instruction also expresses the hope that Landgrave Louis V. of Darmstadt, who had visited Rome with his son during the pontificate of Paul V.,¹ might possibly follow the example of the Neuburger. As for the Elector of Saxony, the hope was expressed that he would remain on the Emperor's side at least in his political aims and continue in his opposition to the Calvinists. The nuncio was particularly exhorted to press for the complete banishment of all Calvinists not included in the religious peace from the territories into which they had penetrated, as well as for the purging of the Catholic Universities, notably those of Cologne and Würzburg, of all elements hostile to the faith. All the professors and those promoted to degrees must make the profession of faith prescribed by Trent. Moreover the nuncio should keep himself well informed about the Protestant Universities as well as the existing religious condition within his province and supply Propaganda with detailed accounts.

The nuncio was also given special rules of conduct towards the Bishops and the religious Orders. He must show great regard towards the wealthy and powerful Bishops of Germany, notwithstanding their encroachments on the rights of the Pope. With regard to the Orders, the reform of the Mendicants, which had already begun, should be continued ; much good had already been accomplished in those Orders through visitations, as well as by the stimulating example of the new reformed Orders, such as the Capuchins, the Discalced Carmelites and the Jesuits. The nuncio would encounter more serious difficulties in dealing with the Benedictines ; the Congregation of Bursfeld in particular, in which discipline was at a very low ebb, was urgently in need of reform. In conclusion, the Instruction touches on the political situation which is described as threatening for the Catholic religion in Germany. The document stresses the fact that the safety

¹ Cf. our account, Vol. XXVI., 366.

of the ancient faith depended on the preservation of the League ; hence the nuncio must oppose with all his strength whatever might break up, or merely weaken, that confederation ; and since money is the sinews of war the nuncio must see to it that the members of the League punctually pay their contributions.¹ This warning² was all the more necessary as Urban VIII., in consequence of the troubles in the Valtellina and the menace of war in Italy, was not then in a position to grant to the League and to the Emperor any considerable subsidies.³

The comprehensive programme thus traced for Montorio could not be carried out to the letter so long as the enemies of the Catholic cause in Germany were not utterly defeated. But though, in the circumstances, effect could be given only to certain isolated measures, Rome never lost sight of this programme and watched with the utmost interest every attempt at Catholic restoration and reform in Germany.

In the Palatinate on the right bank of the Rhine, which was

¹ *" Del mantenimento della Lega cattolica di Germania depende la sicurezza della religione in quelli parti, la onde conviene andar incontro a tutto quello che la può indebolire o dissolvere. Questo principalmente sarebbe se il calore gli mancasse nel nervo della guerra, che è il danaro, imperocchè allora resisterebbe senza moto ; ond'è necessario fomentare questo con la contributione prontuale e sollecita di quanto fu ripartito tra quelli dell'imperio, allo quale s'intende ch'alcuni contradicono." For the want of voluntary self-sacrifice among the members of the League, see RIEZLER, V., 263 seq.

² It had already been sent, by a *Brief of March 16, 1621, to all the members of the League (*Epist.*, I.^b, Papal Secret Archives). Urban VIII. praises, in a *Brief of February 15, 1625, the Bishop of Trèves' " consilium quo curavit non dirimendum catholicum foedus " (*Epist.*, II., *ibid.*).

³ Cf. above, p. 65. It appears from the final account of the League's receipts at the end of 1627 (see STIEVE in the *Deutschen Zeitschr. für Gesch.*, X., 97 seq.) that Bavaria bore the main burden. The subsidies of the Powers not belonging to the League amounted to 2,635,890 florins in all, of which the Pope contributed 1,287,000 florins.

under Bavarian administration, nothing more was attempted at first than the expulsion of the Calvinist preachers, whilst efforts were made to bring back the apostates by gentleness and persuasion.¹ The same means were adopted in 1625 in the districts of the Bergstrasse (Bensheim, Heppenheim, Lorsch) now once more subject to Mayence. Here Archbishop Schweikart carried through the Catholic restoration for which he had done so much in his episcopal city.² Both here³ and in the Palatinate the Jesuits and the Capuchins took an active part in the task of restoration.⁴ Great satisfaction was caused in Rome by the persistent zeal with which Count John of Nassau,⁵ and the Palatine Wolfgang Wilhelm of Neuburg promoted the restoration.⁶ In 1624 Urban VIII. encouraged Philip Christoph von Sötern, Archbishop of Trèves, to proceed with the expulsion of the Calvinists.⁷ The Pope likewise furthered the Catholic reform in the abbey of Fulda⁸ and in the vast diocese of Constance. For the latter he urged the erection of a seminary in order to remedy the dearth of priests.⁹

¹ See CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 272; RIEZLER, V., 222.

² See CARAFA, *loc. cit.*, 208; A. VEIT, *Die Gegenreformation an der Bergstrasse*, in *Katholik*, 1904, II., 259 seq., 350 seq. On the progress of the religious life of the Church in Mayence under Schweikart see VEIT, *Gesch. der sakramentalischen Andachten in der Erzdiözese Mainz*, Mayence, 1911, 5 seq.

³ See A. VEIT, *Die Tätigkeit der Jesuiten an der Bergstrasse*, 1625-9, in *Katholik*, 1903, II., 245 seq.

⁴ See DUHR, II., I, 179. For the Capuchins in the Palatinate see below, p. 186, note 2.

⁵ Cf. CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 272 seq.

⁶ See the *Brief of May 18, 1624, *Epist.* I.b, Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.*, *Briefs to the Bishops of Eichstätt and Ratisbon.

⁷ See the *Brief of December 14, 1624, *Epist.*, II., *ibid.*

⁸ See KOMP, *Fürstabt Joh. Bernhard Schenk zu Schweinsberg, der zweite Restaurator des Katholizismus im Hochstift Fulda 1623-1632*, Fulda, 1878, 31 seq., 40 seq., 49 seq., where Urban VIII.'s *Brief of 1624 is printed. Cf. also RICHTER, below, p. 183, note 4.

⁹ Urban VIII. requested the Bishop of Constance, by a *Brief of April 20, 1624, to erect a seminary; *Briefs of December 28, 1624, admonished Ferdinand II. and the Bishop of Strassburg

In February, 1625, on the proposal of Johann von Leckow, a nobleman of the Marches, Propaganda decided to erect a mission in the March of Brandenburg, the cost of which was to be borne by the ecclesiastical possessions which had been recovered in the Palatinate.¹

In 1625 Pier Luigi Carafa appointed Martin Stricker as missionary apostolic for the Catholics scattered throughout North-Germany and especially in the Circle of Lower Saxony. The latter, who had been a pupil of the College of Braunsberg, had already been employed by Albergati, Carafa's predecessor. He was to reside at Magdeburg where Catholics were without a priest. From that town Stricker was also to look after the convents in the territories of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, the inmates of which, in the midst of universal apostasy, had shown heroic fidelity to religion and to their vows.² However, most of the convents, especially all the wealthy ones, had been forcibly diverted from their true purpose and Catholics had long ago resigned themselves to the change. But at this time, whenever the issue of the war rendered such action possible, they began to take possession of the monasteries of which they had been deprived by force. Sötern was one of the first to do so successfully in his capacity as Bishop of Spire,³ and his to support this undertaking. A *Brief of January 11, 1625, urges the Bishop of Constance to complete the "seminarium inchoatum". *Epist.*, I.^b, and II., Papal Secret Archives.

¹ See HILTEBRANDT, *Preussen und die römische Kurie*, I., Berlin, 1910, 5 seq. In 1628 Cardinal Klesl hoped for the conversion of the Elector George William, through the influence of the Catholic minister, Count Adam zu Schwarzenberg; see *ibid.*, 10 seq., 14, and *Quellen u. Forsch.*, XIV., 343 seq.

² See PIEPER, *Die Propagandakongregation*, 28 seq. Cf. HILTEBRANDT, *Preussen und die römische Kurie*, 6 seq. The year of the death of Stricker, who stuck to his post during the worst time of the Thirty Years' War, a date not given by Pieper, was supplied to me by Canon Wächter, Librarian of the Beverinian Library of the Cathedral of Hildesheim, who found the following notice on Stricker: "Obiit Hamburgi in qualitate missionarii cum facultate vicarii apostolici 1649 februarii die 14, aetatis cnno 72."

³ See RITTER, in the *Hist. Zeitschr.*, LXXVI., 86.

action was warmly approved in Rome. Like Montorio's Instruction, a Brief of Urban VIII. dated May 18th, 1624, urged the Palatine Wolfgang Wilhelm of Neuburg to press for the restoration of Church property.¹ Bavaria, the Government of Burgundy and Archduke Leopold worked in the same sense.

Of far greater importance than these proceedings in the conquered territories was the fact that the Catholics resumed with increasing energy their guerrilla of lawsuits even against the independent Protestant Estates of Empire, with a view to the restoration of monasteries and convents in the provinces. Between 1623 and 1624 the supreme tribunal of the Empire, on the complaint of the victims, opened a lawsuit for the purpose of securing the restoration of six monasteries. True, in the first instance, only some minor potentates were concerned, such as the Counts of Pappenheim, Stolberg, Hanau, Bentheim and the Chapters of Magdeburg and Halberstadt.² The outbreak of the war between Lower Saxony and Denmark put a temporary stop to these proceedings. How damaging to the Catholic cause the new war was, was shown by what happened at Osnabrück where for nearly a century Protestant Bishops had done their best to promote the new teaching. However, in 1624, to the great joy of the Pope,³ the Catholic Canons succeeded in electing Cardinal Eitel Friedrich of Hohenzollern, who had resided in Rome since 1621. The new Bishop immediately took up the task of restoring the Catholic religion. His efforts were crowned with success. He called in the Jesuits and held a synod,⁴ for which he was highly praised

¹ See *Epist.*, I.^b, Papal Secret Archives.

² See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 86 *seq.*

³ See the *Brief to the Cathedral Chapter of Osnabrück, June 1, 1624, *Epist.*, I.^b, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See CARAFA, *Relatione*, 392, and *Germania sacra*, 222; FORST, in the *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. von Osnabrück*, XIX. (1894), 95 *seq.*; *ditto*, *Polit. Korrespondenz des Grafen von Wartenberg* (1897), x *seq.*; DUHR, II., 1, 84 *seq.*, 89 *seq.* P. L. CARAFA, *reports from Cologne on March 16, 1625, that ecclesiastical matters are going well in Osnabrück, the Cardinal had held a diocesan synod and published the decrees of the Council of Trent. *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 8, Papal Secret Archives.

by the Pope.¹ The death of this scion of the Hohenzollerns, which took place on September 19th, 1625, to the great sorrow of Maximilian of Bavaria,² once more put everything in jeopardy. On October 18th Urban VIII. urged the election of a successor of similar disposition.³ As a matter of fact, in the person of Count Francis William of Wartenberg, son of Duke Ferdinand of Bavaria, the choice fell on a man of staunchly Catholic sentiments, large views, strong will, distinguished culture, piety and blameless conduct.⁴ However, the invasion of the Danes prevented him from taking possession of his see. In March, 1626, the Danish King enforced the election of his son Frederick as coadjutor.⁵ In view of the fact that the Protestant administrator of Magdeburg, Christian Wilhelm of Brunswick, had made common cause with the king of the Danes, it became necessary, on the happy conclusion of the war, to take measures for the recovery of the bishoprics of Lower Saxony, a policy which had been kept in view from the outset of the war by the nuncio of Cologne, Pier Luigi Carafa,⁶ as well as by the imperial Government. By bringing

¹ See the *Brief of April 5, 1625, *Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. also *Legatio P. A. Carafae*, 20.

² See *Briefe und Akten*, new series II., 2, 443.

³ See **Epist.*, II., *loc. cit.*

⁴ See *Legatio P. A. Carafae*, 29. Cf. *Briefe und Akten*, N.S., II., 2, 443.

⁵ See GOLDSCHMIDT, 15 *seq.*

⁶ In a detailed *report, dated Cologne, June 22, 1625, P. L. Carafa lays before the Cardinal Secretary of State, the intentions of the King of Denmark, who was exceedingly hostile to Catholicism ("capital nemico della religione cattolica") with respect to the sees of Bremen, Verden, Halberstadt and Magdeburg, and emphasizes the need for counteraction. "Si stima però necessario che prima c'habbiano effetto questi trattati che l'imperatore vi si opponga anche coll'arme comandando a tutti li sudetti capitoli d'assegnare a persone cattoliche la successione di detti vescovadi anco in vita de'loro pseudo-vescovi, poichè quei vescovadi ed altri sono stati occupati contra formam compactatorum Passaviensium, e perciò S.M. Ces. può con giusto titolo e in vigore di detti concordati restituire a cattolici detti vescovadi e ridurre il vero culto divino in quelle chiese profanate

pressure to bear on the Chapters of Halberstadt and Magdeburg it was hoped to secure these benefices for a son of Ferdinand II., Archduke Leopold William, who, though still a minor, not long after succeeded his uncle Leopold in the sees of Passau and Strassburg. Whilst in this way Carafa and Lamormaini sought to forward the interests both of the Church and the Emperor, they, and others with them, approached Ferdinand II. with a view to the restoration of the religious situation in the Cities of Empire where Catholics and Protestants enjoyed equal rights, by the terms of the religious peace of Augsburg.¹ After Tilly's splendid triumph near Lutter, on the Barenberg (August, 1626), a victory which was looked upon as a judgment of God,² there was every prospect that these efforts would prove successful. The Pope celebrated the victory with a Pontifical High Mass in the German national church of the Anima, as he had done on the occasion of Wallenstein's triumph at the Dessau bridge.³ The Pontiff had hoped that the victory would be exploited for the benefit of the Catholic restoration, hence great was his disappointment when nothing was done. No one knew in Rome who was to blame for this neglect, whether the Emperor or Wallenstein.⁴

dalla simonia e dalla perversità di quel re e dei suoi fautori, supponendo, che quando di presente Sua Mai. Ces. che si trova vittoriosa ed armata, non vi applichi il rimedio, si potrà giustamente temere, che impossessatosi il re Dano di quei vescovadi, possa facilmente aspirare ed occupare quelli d'Osnamburgo, d'Illesia, di Paderbona e di Monastero, che nella Westfalia sono contigovi a quelli. Ho stimato mio debito di dir tutto ciò a V. Ill^{ma} affine che se ne passino officii efficaci coll'imperatore, e per intendere se sarà trovato buono ch'io di quà ne promova trattato con Sua Mai. Ces."

¹ See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 88 *seq.*, 90 *seq.*

² See CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 310; TUPETZ, 359 *seq.*; RIEZLER, V., 341.

³ See SCHMIDLIN, 454 *seq.*

⁴ *Pare alla St^a di N.S. che Cesare o per colpa del suo consiglio o per quella de'suoi capitani o per soverchia cautatione del duca di Fridland poco frutto cavi dalle vittorie." The Secretary of State to Carafa, October 24, 1626, NICOLETTI, II., 993, Vatican Library.

Urban's view that now was the time for vigorous action¹ was shared by the bulk of the more fervent Catholics of Germany, especially by the members of the League. Their resentment of the robbery of so many bishoprics, abbeys and convents, which had gone on so long and in direct contravention of the letter of the law of the Empire, was a constant thorn in their side and their demand for a restitution was a just one.² Now that, except for a few fortresses still occupied by Danish troops, all opposition had been overcome throughout North-Germany, the long awaited favourable moment seemed to have arrived for the realization of the wish already expressed by Paul V. and Gregory XV.³ for a definitive settling of accounts. As regards the restitution of ecclesiastical property, Maximilian and most of the Leaguists were of opinion that instead of individual lawsuits which usually dragged on for years before the tribunal of Empire, they should demand a general and radical restitution. Under the influence of the victories in Holstein, Maximilian, on October 14th, 1627, instructed his delegate to the Diet of Electors about to be held at Mühlhausen, to take counsel with the representatives of the ecclesiastical Electors concerning the recovery of the Dioceses of Empire, seeing that God had now given them the means to restore and secure the Catholic religion within the Empire. More than that, Maximilian added that the ecclesiastical

¹ In a *Brief to Ferdinand II., of February 6, 1627, Urban VIII. praises his zeal concerning the restitution of stolen Church property (original in State Archives, Vienna). On June 24, 1627, Ferdinand II. is exhorted to further the restitution of Church property in Colmar, *Epist.*, IV., Papal Secret Archives.

² See DUHR, II., I, 460. The Catholics had always protested against the infringement by the Protestants of the *Reservatum ecclesiasticum* which these did not acknowledge. Religious peace was undoubtedly jeopardized by the confiscation of mediate and immediate monastic institutions by Protestant princes and municipalities; see TUPETZ, 331 *seq.*

³ Cf. the Instruction for C. Carafa of April 12, 1621; see XXVII., p. 230. Concerning Paul V., see our account, Vol. XXVI., p. 370 *seq.*

Electors should press the Emperor to take steps for the recovery also of the provincial dioceses and monasteries of which the Catholics had been unjustly deprived.¹ An occasion for such action arose out of the resumption of the lawsuits suspended in 1625, by the Bishop of Augsburg, Henry von Knöringen, the Abbot of Kaisheim and the Bishop of Constance against the Duke of Württemberg and the Markgrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach, for the restoration of eight monasteries confiscated by them, the annual revenue of which was reckoned at 170,000 thalers.² When the Emperor, who was fully alive to the importance of the matter—the Duke of Württemberg was one of the most powerful Princes of South Germany and had remained neutral in the last war—requested the Catholic Electors to give him their opinion as to the procedure to be observed in these matters, a decisive step had been taken. The reply, dated September 20th, 1627, was as follows: In view of the fact that the Protestants have rejected every compromise on the question of the bishoprics and the monasteries unjustly seized by them, the time had come for a judicial decision not only in regard to the particular cases mentioned, but generally on all the complaints of the Catholic and Protestant States, nor was there any doubt as to the Emperor's competence in the matter.³ Thus by laying down clear lines of procedure an end was about to be put once for all to lawsuits that had dragged on for seventy years. This decisive action

¹ See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 94 *seq.*

² See TUPETZ, 353 *seq.* Cf. RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 87. The envoy of the Elector of Trèves was instructed to find out secretly what was the opinion of the Elector of Saxony on the total prohibition of Calvinism within the Empire and "to work zealously with a view to the recovery of dioceses and other important convents and properties, by all rightful means in consequence of the religious and political peace and the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*. . . ." BAUR, I., 130.

³ See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 93, who, together with BREUER (34), gives as the date of the reply, September 20, whereas KHEVENHÜLLER (X., 1450) and LUNDORP (*Acta publ.*, III., 998) give it as September 28.

was continued at the Diet of Electors at Mühlhausen which met on October 18th, 1627. At this meeting, which had been called on the initiative of the Archbishop of Mayence,¹ and which left the decision of the question of the Palatine Frederick almost unconditionally to the Emperor, the Catholic Electors, urged by Carlo Carafa,² unanimously proposed this solution when they came to discuss the means by which internal tranquillity might be assured. In their surprise the Protestants sought to ward off the danger that threatened them by the attenuating declaration that the imperial decision would only be valid in so far as those concerned "submitted" to it.³ But though they succeeded in getting this gloss inserted in the memorandum addressed to the Emperor, its significance was purely platonic, for the Catholics in their separate discussions among themselves and in those with the imperial delegate, stuck to their demand and interpreted the clause in their own sense. In a secret and separate vote they pointed out that properly speaking the condition of "submission" had long ago been fulfilled and that the eventual imperial decision must include all ecclesiastical benefices as well as all principalities of which the Church had been robbed since the treaty of Passau in 1552. The Emperor must be well aware of their very great number as well as of the circumstance that the Protestants, at an assembly held at Nuremberg in 1619, had rejected every amicable settlement or compromise on the plea that the "ecclesiastical reservation" was not an essential element of the religious peace. But it was well known that the Constitution of the Empire was based no less on the preservation of the ecclesiastical Estates than on that of the lay ones and that this reservation was one of the conditions of the religious peace. In that treaty there was no question of

¹ "Proposto agli elettori dal elettore di Magonza," says Carafa in his *report of June 30, 1627, *Nunziat. di Vienna*, 83, p. 157, Papal Secret Archives. The instigator was therefore not Maximilian.

² See CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 363 seq.

³ See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 96 seq., and *Deutsche Gesch.*, III., 373 seq. Cf. BREUER, 89 seq.

conceding to the Protestants any authority whatever over the bishoprics and monasteries of the Empire, for the Catholic Estates would never have so readily agreed to the loss of the possessions which they had suffered previous to the treaty of Passau had they not felt that in so doing they were making sure that they would not be robbed of that which they still held. Even in common law and according to the laws of public order, no one is permitted to rob another of his property; how could such a right have been conceded to the Protestants against the Catholic clergy? If there were any doubt concerning this point of the religious peace, the common ecclesiastical law would still have to be applied until the doubt was removed in due form, with the consent of the Emperor and the Catholic Estates. And even granting that the Protestant Princes had an undoubted right to reform the monasteries and bishoprics within their territories, such a right could only extend to religion, not to the property, and to the clergy no less than the laity the right must be left of emigrating, of selling their property and of taking the price with them. Hence in his capacity as protector of the Catholic Church and supreme judge within the Empire, the Emperor was fully entitled to order the restitution of these stolen possessions. The circumstances which prevented the execution of such a measure no longer existed and there was nothing to fear from the hereditary enemy, whereas the Emperor's authority and the appropriateness of the measure were such that surely no one would dare to resist the just decrees of the Emperor or to look for grounds of complaint.¹

From now onwards the plan for a general restitution, which was chiefly advocated by the Leaguists, never disappeared from the order of the day at the imperial Court. Nevertheless the Emperor's councillors had grave misgivings² and these were not overcome as rapidly as Carlo Carafa, the nuncio of Vienna, would have wished. On November 29th, 1627, Carafa reported that, by the grace of God, he had at last

¹ See KHEVENHÜLLER, V., 1450. Cf. TUPETZ, 361 *seq.*; RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 97; BREUER, 93 *seq.*

² See TUPETZ, 365 *seq.*

obtained that the bishoprics of Lower Saxony and other territories occupied by the imperial forces should be restored to the Catholics without further discussions and as quickly as possible.¹

The nuncio of Cologne, who happened to be at Liège, also wrote a full report to the Secretary of State at this time: "Now that the arms of the Emperor were victorious both within and without the empire," he wrote, "it was possible to remove the Protestant Bishops and Canons who had made common cause with the enemy, on the just plea that they were rebels, and replace them by Catholics, without waiting for the peace conference."²

¹ See the letter in RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 99.

² *Dieede a V.S. Ill^{ma} alcune settimane sono relazione dello stato de vescovati occupati dagli eretici nella Germania settentrionale, e le soggiunsi quello che parve opportuno per ricuperargli. Ora mi occorre d'aggiungere a V.S. Il^{ma} che adesso che l'armi cattoliche sono vittoriose dentro e fuori dell'Impero e si sono impadronate di dette vescovati, è tempo opportunissimo di stingere la pratica sopra di queste, perchè sotto giustissimo titolo di ribellione si potrebbero proscrivere, e privare quei vescovi e canonici eretici c'hanno seguitato il partito nemico, e si potrebbe sostituire de'cattolici in luogo loro, senza aspettare in modo alcuno a trattar di questo principale interesse fino alla Dieta, che presentemente s'attende nell'Impero, perchè dovendosi trattar in essa della pace universale e conseguentemente del perdono universale di quelli ch'hanno fatto atti di ostilità contro l'Impero, cesserà il titolo di ribellione, il quale ora non potrà meglio militare di quel che fa in profitto della nostra santa religione, a cui fuor di questa congiuntura gioverà poco il protesto della fede per la permissione in Germania della Confessione Augustana. Il tutto suggerisco a V.S. Ill^{ma} per il mio debito, e le faccio umilissima riverenza.

Di Liegi a 14 Gennaro 1628.

Di V.S. Ill^{ma} e R^{ma}

umilissimo ed oblg^{ma} servo

Pier Luigi vescovo di Tricarico.

Nunziat. di Colonia, 10, Papal Secret Archives. For P. L. Carafa's long stay at Liège (1626-1634) see *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, VII., 584.

Thereafter Rome encouraged a policy of individual restoration whilst it refrained from giving an opinion on a general measure. On January 8th, 1628, Urban VIII. exhorted the Emperor to concur in the work of restoration undertaken by the Palatine, Wolfgang Wilhelm,¹ and on the 22nd of the same month, to support the Chapter of Strassburg in its demand for the restitution of the possessions of which it had been deprived by the Protestant magistrates.² Exhortations of this kind were scarcely needed, for at that very time more decrees of restitution emanated from the chancellery than at any previous period.³ However, all these ordinances dealt with particular cases. The significant thing was that Wallenstein now came forward as the champion of more general measures. According to a report of Carafa dated February 9th, 1628, the Duke of Friedland was of opinion that as soon as, by means of fortifications and similar measures, they should have made themselves unquestioned masters of the territories now occupied by the imperial troops, the Emperor should everywhere install Catholic Bishops in the course of from three to four months, banish the Protestant Canons and appoint

¹ **Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives. On the same day Urban VIII. thanked the Elector Maximilian I. for his assistance in effecting the Catholic restoration in Neuburg. State Archives, Munich.

² See **Epist.*, V., *loc. cit.*

³ CARAFA, *Decreta*, pp. 23 *seq.*, 34 *seq.*, 42, 44 *seq.*, 46, 47, gives the following decisions passed by the chancellery of State, in favour of the Catholic restoration : December 22, 1627, *re* the complaints of the younger brothers of the Elector Wolfgang Wilhelm of the Palatinate against the latter ; January 10, 1628, to the Bishop of Augsburg ; February 4 ; against Dortmund ; 21st : to the Count of Nassau-Siegen ; 25th : Strassburg ; March 2nd : for Trèves against Zweibrücken about the monastery of Hornbach ; 30th : the Church of St. Patrokus in Soest ; April 7th : concerning Sponheim ; 14th : about Rees and Werdenbroich ; 24th : letters-patent to the Electors August and John Frederick ; May 29th : to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights. Cf. CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 390 *seq.*, who remarks : *Fuere haec praeunntia futuri decreti generalis.*

Catholic ones.¹ How warmly this proposal was approved in Rome was shown by a laudatory Brief to Wallenstein of February 26th, 1628, which also urged him to follow a similar course in the time to come.² But the Leaguists wanted far more. Notwithstanding their threats in the summer of 1628, Vienna was not prepared to give in without further resistance³: on the contrary, the opinion of the influential Eggenberg⁴ prevailed at least for the time being and he objected on juridical grounds to summary proceedings.⁵ The Emperor's final decision, as he himself attested, was largely influenced by his confessor Lamormaini and the nuncio Carlo Carafa.⁶ Ferdinand's decision was based, in the first instance, on religious grounds. So deeply was he penetrated with the truth of the Catholic faith that he repeatedly attested that he would rather lose his crown and realm than consciously miss an opportunity of spreading the teaching of the Catholic Church; that he would rather beg his bread from house to house, with the beggar's staff in one hand and leading his wife and children with the other and so go into exile; nay that he would rather undergo the most shameful death than to behold any longer the injuries done to God and the Church within his territories.⁷ In December, 1627, he assured the Bavarian

¹ See the *letter in RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 99 *seq.*

² **Epist.*, V. Papal Secret Archives (see Appendix no. 3, Vol. XXIX.).

³ See TUPETZ, 371 *seq.*

⁴ See CARAFA, *Relatione*, 300

⁵ See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 100.

⁶ See ANTHIENY, *Carafa*, 26 *seq.*, and DUHR, II., I, 464 *seq.*, who gives details on the advocacy by the confessor of the Elector of Mayence, the Jesuit R. Zigler, of the edict; also on LAYMANN's tract "*Pacis compositio*" (Dilingae, 1629) and the "*Consultatio de modis Lutheranos ad Ecclesiae communionem reducendi et cath. religionis exercitium in liberis Imperii civitates introducendi*" (in MOSER, *Patr. Archives*, VI., 364, but dated 1649, instead of 1628). Cf. also W. KÖHLER, *Der Augsburger Religionsfriede und die Gegenreformation*, in the *Jahrb. für protest. Theol.*, XXIII. (1876), 630 *seq.*, 633 *seq.* See also TUPETZ, 62 *seq.*, 67 *seq.*; RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 95; RIEZLER, V., 342 *seq.*

⁷ See LAMORMAINI, *De virtutibus Ferdinandi II.*, in KHEVENHÜLLER, XII., 2383.

envoy that he had long ago dedicated all his aims and actions to the glory of God and the service of the Catholic religion.¹ At last the possibility to carry out a great work for the good of the Church seemed to open out before him, that is, the expiation of a long-standing injustice committed through the spoliation of bishoprics and monasteries on the one hand and on the other the salvation of hundreds of thousands of souls. Was he then not bound to do for the restoration of the ancient Church that which the Protestant Princes had done in order to found and spread the new one? Moreover he was also attracted by certain material and political advantages. If he recovered the North-German dioceses, the Archduke Leopold William, then still a minor, could be provided for, the number of Catholic votes in the Diet would be increased and a *point d'appui* was secured for the prospective hegemony of the Emperor in the Northern-Seas.² The Emperor was likewise spurred to action by the proposals of the Bishops of Würzburg, Bamberg, Eichstätt, Constance and Augsburg made in the course of September, 1628, and which unanimously demanded a summary judicial sentence and its prompt execution, to enable them to recover the property of which they had been unjustly deprived in Suabia and Franconia.³

In view of the favourable situation—German Protestantism was just then in a more helpless and humiliating condition than it had been after the Schmalkaldic war⁴—it is surprising that it was not until March 6th, 1629, that publication was made of the edict already demanded at Mühlhausen by which the Catholic Church was to be reinstated by a single stroke in possession of all the property and privileges she had lost after 1552. Various causes accounted for the amazing delay. In addition to the difficulty of finding a juridical formula,⁵ the disagreements were already making themselves felt which were to contribute so largely to the wrecking of the edict.

¹ See ARETIN, *Bayerns auswärtige Verh.*, 283.

² See TUPETZ, 374 *seq.*

³ See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 98; GUNTER, *Restitutionsedikt*, 42 *seq.*

⁴ Opinion of RIEZLER (V., 333).

⁵ Cf. RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 101 *seq.*

Above all it was the old antagonism between the Houses of Habsburg and Wittelsbach which on this occasion also gravely injured the Catholic cause. On February 22nd, 1628, an agreement had indeed been reached by the terms of which Maximilian, in exchange for the renunciation by him of Upper Austria, received the Upper and Lower Palatinate on the right bank of the Rhine. The consequence of this arrangement was that the Catholic restoration was completely carried out in the Upper Palatinate.¹ However, at that very moment the good understanding between the Emperor and Maximilian was once more put in jeopardy owing to the fact that the League saw itself relegated to the second place in the military sphere and imagined itself threatened and injured by the preponderant influence of Wallenstein who comported himself like a dictator.² A further cause of discord was the problem of the division of the spoils of victory.

¹ For the Catholic restoration in the Upper Palatinate which, out of consideration for Saxony, only began slowly in 1625 but took a more definite trend in 1627, and after the act of feudal homage in April 1628, was sternly enforced, see *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, III., 628 seq., CXII., 787 seq.; WITTMANN, *Gesch. der Reformation in der Oberpfalz*, Augsburg, 1847; SPERL, *Der oberpfälzische Adel und die Gegenreformation der Oberpfalz-Kurpfalz*, Freiburg, 1901; GÖTZ, *Akten*, 587; RIEZLER, V., 320 seq.; DUHR, II., 1, 242; II., 2, 341 seq.; M. HÖGL, *Die Bekehrung der Oberpfalz durch Kurfürst Maximilian I.*, Vol. I, Regensburg, 1903; *id.* *Die Gegenreformation in dem Stiftlande Waldsassen*, Regensburg, 1905. The latter shows that credit for the conversion was mainly due to the Jesuits, who were assisted by the Government by divers measures of violence, including the billeting of soldiers. They justified these forceful measures by pleading, the words of an official of the Elector, that: "all the world knows how tyrannically the members of the Confessions dealt elsewhere with Catholics" (see *loc. cit.*, 70). The alleged "Confession of faith" of the people of Kemnath, in the Upper Palatinate, who had become "papists", quoted in the *Zeitschr. für wissenschaftl. Theol.*, LV. (1913), 55 seq., is a forgery. See PAULUS in the *Köln. Volkszeitung*, 1913, no. 365.

² See RIEZLER, V., 333, 340 seq.; RITTER, III., 384.

Whilst the German Bishops and Abbots were doing their best to recover the monasteries and other ecclesiastical property of which they had been robbed, both the Emperor and Maximilian were concerned about the ecclesiastical principalities. They had had their eyes for a long time on Halberstadt.¹ On the death of the Protestant administrator, Duke Christian of Brunswick, Ferdinand II. offered to the Canons to forget the past and to confirm them in their benefices, on condition that they postulated for their Bishop his own son, Leopold William, who was already Bishop of Strassburg and Passau, Grand-Master of the Teutonic Order and Abbot of Murbach. For fear of incurring the imperial displeasure, the Canons complied with the request on December 30th, 1627.² With the help of Carlo Carafa, the Benedictine abbot of Hersfeld, which was in the hands of the Landgrave of Kassel, was likewise bestowed on the Archduke.³ On the other hand the attempt to secure for him the adjoining archdiocese of Magdeburg, which was much wealthier, threatened to fail, inasmuch as the Canons of that town decided in favour of Prince Augustus, the younger son of the Elector of Saxony. Notwithstanding the Emperor's indignation,⁴ Catholic circles feared lest in the end he should allow himself to be pacified by the Elector who was also his ally. For this reason, at the close of March, 1628, the Cologne nuncio wrote to his colleague at the imperial Court, as well as to the Cardinal Secretary of State, suggesting that through the imperial ambassador in Rome pressure should be put on Ferdinand II. in this matter.⁵ A fortnight later Urban VIII. was in a position to congratulate

¹ Cf. RIEZLER, V., 280, 343.

² See the report of Carafa in RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 99.

³ See CARAFA, *Relatione*, 385; *Germania sacra*, 376.

⁴ He had forbidden the Chapter, on February 11, 1628, to elect a Saxon Prince (see *Decreta*, 33 *seq.*), but before the receipt of this prohibition the Chapter had already chosen him. Nevertheless Ferdinand II. persisted in his plan; see CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 395.

⁵ See the *report of P. L. Carafa dated Liège, March 31, 1628, *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 10, Papal Secret Archives.

the Emperor on his excellent management of the affair of Magdeburg.¹ In October, 1628, Archduke Leopold obtained the archbishopric of Magdeburg²; shortly before the archbishopric of Bremen had also been secured for him, though not without some difficulty. In view of the fact that the administrator of that see, John Frederick of Holstein, had early abandoned the cause of the King of Denmark, he could not be removed in unceremonious fashion. However, in March, 1628, it was suggested to him that he should take the Archduke for his coadjutor.³ Thereupon a dangerous competitor arose in the person of a cousin of Maximilian, namely Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, Bishop of Osnabrück. The Brussels nuncio had declared himself in the latter's favour as early as December, 1627.⁴ Owing to the fact that Wartenberg, who had returned to his diocese in 1628, displayed such zeal in carrying through the Catholic restoration that the nuncio of Cologne went so far as to style him the apostle of North-Germany,⁵ and that Urban VIII.'s hands were already tied in the matter,⁶ a decision was rendered extremely difficult. In the end the consideration prevailed in Rome that Ferdinand of Wittelsbach, Archbishop of Cologne, could easily give up one of his five large bishoprics and that the House of Wittelsbach did not deserve more highly of the Church and had not rendered her greater services than that of Habsburg.⁷ At the beginning of August,

¹ See the *Brief of April 15, 1628, *Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives. In granting confirmation of the administration of Magdeburg, Urban VIII. rightly insisted that the spiritual administration was to be entrusted to a Bishop; see KIEWNING, I., cv. *seq.*

² See KIEWNING, I., 268.

³ See RITTER, III., 423.

⁴ See ARETIN, *Bayerns ausw. Verh. Urk.*, 284.

⁵ See KIEWNING, II., 260, note 2. For Wartenberg's restoring activity see GOLDSCHMIDT, 29 *seq.*, 43 *seq.*; FORST, *Fr. W. von Wartenberg*, in the *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. Osnabrücks*, XIX. (1894), *cf.* XXI. (1897/8); DUHR, II., I, 86 *seq.*, 91 *seq.*; MEURER, in "*Katholik*," 1894, II., 528 *seq.*

⁶ See GREGOROVIVS, *Urban VIII.*, 13.

⁷ See KIEWNING, I., 296.

1628, the Archduke was granted the right of succession to the archbishopric of Bremen,¹ whilst a little later, by way of compensation, Wartenberg was given the see of Verden. On the other hand, at Minden, which Maximilian also desired for his cousin, the Austrian Archduke opposed him once more.²

Besides this scrambling for bishoprics yet a further difficulty contributed to the delay of the publication of the edict of restitution. It was reasonable enough, and up to a degree perfectly just, that the older Orders should wish to recover the abbeys and monasteries they had at one time possessed. But to demand the return of *all* their houses was going too far, for there were not enough religious to fill them all. The only ones who might possibly have done so were the Franciscans who had recently been revitalized by means of a reform and who, from their monastery of Frauenberg, at Fulda, exercised a most beneficial action all over Central Germany.³ In the Rhine Palatinate also, the Franciscans-Observant laboured successfully against the Calvinists. But the old Orders, above all the Benedictines forming the Congregation of Bursfeld, notwithstanding the reform begun by the Cologne nuncio Albergati (1610-1612), had once more sunk so low that many of the monks led worldly lives, to the great scandal of the faithful.⁴ Here also Urban VIII. put his hand to the task. Already on

¹ See RITTER, III., 423.

² See RIEZLER, V., 346. Finally Wartenberg received Minden also in 1633.

³ See M. BIHL, *Geschichte des Franziskanerklosters Frauenberg zu Fulda* (1623 to 1887), Fulda, 1908. Urban VIII. supported the reform of the Franciscans with *Briefs to Ferdinand, Archbishop of Cologne, of August 8 and 10, 1628, *Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ Cf. the *Instruction for P. L. Carafa, in which reference is made to a report of the Cologne nuntio, P. Fr. Montorio, according to which " quei monachi sono molto rilassati e che attendono più tosto alle caccie et agli esercitii secolari ch'alla vita religiosa e monastica e che sotto pretesto d'usare l'ospitalità altro non fanno che lautamente banchettare, tutte cose anzi scandalose che esemplari," *Cod. X.*, V., 15, p. 371 *seq.* of the Casanatense Library, Rome.

June 27th, 1624, he had exhorted the Prince-Abbot of Fulda, Schenk zu Schweinsberg, to reform his exceedingly relaxed monasteries. However, so great were the difficulties that the Cologne nuncio, Carafa, was compelled, in 1626, to hold a visitation at Fulda in person, and even then it was no easy task to carry the reform decrees into effect.¹ In these circumstances the idea of using the newly recovered monasteries as Colleges and Residences of the one Order which more than any other served the Catholic reform and restoration presented itself naturally enough, as even the enemies of the Jesuits are forced to admit.² As early as 1624 the Cologne nuncio, Pier Luigi Carafa, had written thus concerning the Jesuits: "For having seen it with my own eyes I am able to attest that they have not only spread religion all over Germany by word and example, but they have also given fresh impetus to piety; whenever I have officiated in their churches it was always a source of great consolation and edification for me to see the faithful attending in their hundreds and thousands."³ A thorough examination of documentary evidence fully bears out this judgment.⁴ Wherever there was question of toiling

¹ See *Legatio P. A. Carafae*, ed. Ginzler, Wirceburgi, 1840, 36 seq.; KOMP, *Schenk zu Schweinsberg*, 48 seq., 57 seq.; RICHTER, *Zur Reform der Abtei Fulda unter J. B. Schwenk von Schweinsberg, 1623-1632*, Fulda, 1916. A *Brief of Urban VIII. to Schwenk von Schweinsberg on the reform of his monastery of September 18, 1627, in *Epist.*, IV., *loc. cit.* Carafa's adviser during his journey to Fulda was the priest Jacques Marchant, also known as a theological writer; see TH. RÉJALOT, in the *Ann. de la Soc. archéol. de Namur*, XXVII., 1. Cf. also BERLIÈRE, *Der Benediktiner-Kongress zu Regensburg*, in the *Studien aus dem Benediktinerorden*, IX., 399 seq.

² RITTER, III., 424. The accusation made by RITTER (*ibid.*, 425) against Laymann rests, as DUHR (II., 2, 168) shows, on a misunderstanding of the expression *motu proprio*.

³ Report to Urban VIII.; see DUHR, II., 2, 80.

⁴ See the second volume of DUHR's work, the outstanding scientific value of which is recognized even by the opponents of the Jesuits, such as J. LOSERTH, in the *Hist. Vierteljahrschrift*, 1914, 272.

for the interests of the Church in Germany, the Jesuits were sure to be on the spot and in the front rank. Their action in the teaching and educational spheres as well as their pastoral ministry and their works of philanthropy were all on the grand scale and of lasting benefit. As men of letters they also did much for the preservation of the ancient faith, though their literary activity was not limited to that object but included other fields of knowledge, especially those of theology and history, whilst Balde, Bidermann and Spe distinguished themselves as poets. The lyrics of Balde are remarkable for their patriotic fervour. However, the main purpose of the activities of the German Jesuits was always the promotion of the Catholic reform and restoration. Whenever the shifting of political power enabled the Emperor and the Catholic Princes to make use of the right of reform, the Order provided missionaries who turned the change of religion imposed by the State into an interior conversion. If they were not universally successful in this task, and if in consequence of pressure on the part of the authorities, who did not shrink from objectionable means, such as the quartering of soldiers on the heretics, feigned conversions were inevitable, it is none the less certain that in many parts of Germany the Jesuits obtained an entrance for the Catholic faith into the hearts of men and that they achieved lasting results. This was particularly the case on the banks of the Rhine and the Main and in Westfalia. The Jesuit Colleges at Cologne, Münster and Würzburg were frequented by as many as a thousand pupils, and the principle of gratuitous instruction was strictly maintained.

The progress of the Order in those parts of the Empire appears from the partition of the Rhine Province which took place in July, 1626. To the Province of the Lower Rhine 406 members were assigned and ten Colleges out of a total of twenty-two; namely, those on the Lower Rhine, in the territories of Trier and in Westfalia, and the residences at Bonn, Lippstadt, Warendorf, Xanten, Neuss, as well as eight mission stations. The Province of the Upper Rhine received 434 members and the Colleges of Mayence, Aschaffenburg,

Heiligenstadt, Erfurt, Fulda, Würzburg, Bamberg, Speier, Worms, Molsheim, Hagenau and Schlettstadt, and in addition the Residences of Fritzlar, Heidelberg, Bruchsal, Baden, Selz, and the mission stations at Heppenheim, Kreuznach, Bretten and Neustadt in the Palatinate. The Province of Upper Germany, which, besides Bavaria, also included the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Western Austria and Switzerland, had grown so much that there too a partition was seriously discussed in 1628.¹

Among the new Orders, the Capuchins took no mean part in the work of the Catholic reform and restoration of Germany. They worked with great success first at Cologne and Trèves, and afterwards at Mayence, in the Bergstrasse, in the Rhine Palatinate, in Alsace, in the districts round the lake of Constance and in Bavaria.²

Besides the staunchly Catholic disposition of the Emperor Ferdinand II., of Archduke Leopold, the Elector Maximilian of Bavaria, the Count Palatine Wolfgang Wilhelm of Neuberg,³

¹ See DUHR, II., I, 17, 143, 199. Cf., *ibid.*, 34, the map of the permanent and temporary settlements of the Jesuits in Germany in the first half of the seventeenth century.

² The call of the Capuchins to Mayence took place in 1618; their church was consecrated in 1625; see *Kapuziner in Mainz*, Mainz, 1901, 9 seq., 37 seq.; cf. FRANZISK, *Studien*, IV. (1918), 289 seq. For the Capuchin monastery in Frankenthal (after 1624) see *Monatschr. des Frankenthaler Altert. Vereins*, 1899. For the beneficent activities of the Capuchins in Münster-eifel (after 1618), see KATZFHEY, *Gesch. von Münster-eifel*, I., Köln, 1854, 211 seq. For the Capuchins in Alsace see *Strassburger Diözesanblatt*, 1899, 32 seq., 45 seq., 96; for their work in Ravensburg, 1626 seq.; *Tüb. Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1912, 323 seq. With regard to the Capuchins in Bavaria see the monograph of A. EBERL (1902). For their work in Dinkelsbühl see *Jahrbuch des Hist. Vereins Dillingen*, 1911, 87 seq.; cf. also ROCCO DA CESINALE, II., 496 seq., 503 seq., 524 seq., 530 seq.

³ There is no monograph on Wolfgang Wilhelm. The account in the *Allg. Deutsche Biograph.*, XLIV., 116, is inadequate. To the works listed there the following should be added: MARSEILLE, *Studien zur Kirchenpolitik des Joh. W. Wilhelm von Neuberg*,

Count John of Nassau-Siegen¹ and the Markgrave William of Baden,² a circumstance of decisive importance was the fact that the German episcopal sees were for the most part held by men who stood for the Catholic reform. Among these the two Archbishops of Mayence, John Schweikart von Cronberg (died 1626) and George Frederick von Greiffenclau (died 1629) were particularly distinguished. The nuncio, Carlo Carafa, could not sufficiently praise Schweikart's zeal for the restoration of ecclesiastical discipline.³ Eager to promote religion in his diocese by every means in his power, Schweikart founded a Jesuit College at Aschaffenburg and a Capuchin convent at Mayence and he laboured with great success for the return to the Church of the people of the Bergstrasse and the Eichsfeld.⁴ To assure a succession of able priests, the pious Bishop permanently defrayed out of his own purse the cost

Marburg, 1898; G. NECKERMANN, *Gesch. des Simultaneum religionis exercitium im vormaligem Herzogtum Sulzbach*, Regensburg, 1897; DUHR, II., 2, 293 seq., 339 seq.

¹ See ACHENBACH, *Gesch. der Stadt Siegen*, II., viii., 12 seq.; DUHR, II., 1, 93 seq. *Ibid.*, 98 seq., for the efforts made by the convert Count Johann Ludwig von Nassau-Hadamar [in 1629] for the Catholic restoration. See also PAGENSTECHEK, *Zur Gesch. der Gegenreformation in Nassau-Hadamar*, 1628/9, Wiesbaden, 1897.

² Cf. *Beitr. zur Gesch. der Stadt Köln*, 1895, 206 seq.; DUHR, II., 1, 183 seq.; II., 2, 204 seq.; WEECH, *Badische Gesch.* (1890), 164 seq.

³ See CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 310. P. L. Carafa wrote on September 25, 1626, from Liège on Schweikart's death: "Li cattolici di Germania hanno fatto una gran perdita, perchè quel buon vecchio era in tanto concetto appresso di tutti che anche gli eretici l'havevano in venerazione, e veramente il molto zelo, la pietà e la prudenza di lui non meritava altro ricompensò fra gli huomini, credendosi comunemente che adesso habbia quello della gloria fra beati." He adds further on, "E il duca di Sassonia stesso con altri principi eretici ne facevano grande stima." *Nunziat di Colonia*, 9, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See IOANNIS, *Script rer. Mogunt.*, I., 923 seq.; DUHR, II., 1, 148; II., 2, 327 seq., 329 seq.; KNIEB, 335 seq.

of the education of twenty-four students for the priesthood.¹ His successor, George Frederick von Greiffenclau, shared his sentiments and followed in his footsteps. Both Archbishops had received their ecclesiastical training at the Germanicum, as had the Bishops of Augsburg, Brixen and Ratisbon.² In the archdiocese of Trèves the Catholic restoration had been carried through in the main by Lothar von Metternich³; what remained to be done was accomplished by his successor, Philip Christoph von Sötern, who was also administrator of the archdiocese of Spire. He did his utmost to recover the monasteries and parishes of which his diocese had been robbed; when this was done he restored them to the ancient faith, not by measures of force, but by kindly teaching and persuasion. He already possessed a seed-plot of well trained and blameless priests in his seminary at Trèves and founded a similar one at Philippsburg for the diocese of Spire.⁴ Ferdinand of Bavaria, Archbishop of Cologne, who likewise governed the dioceses of Liège, Münster, Paderborn and Hildesheim, promoted in all of them the Catholic reform and restoration.⁵ The same policy was also ably pursued by the Bishop of Osnabrück, Francis William von Wartenberg,⁶ and the Prince Abbot of Fulda, Schenk zu Schweinsberg.⁷

The vast diocese of Constance was admirably governed by Jacob Fugger (died 1626) and by his successor Johann

¹ See CARAFA, *Relatione*, 334; STEINHUBER, I., 401 *seq.*

² See STEINHUBER, I., 286, 402.

³ See CARAFA, *Relatione*, 375.

⁴ See BAUR, I., 471 *seq.*; II., 359 *seq.*, 407.

⁵ Cf. CARAFA, *Relatione*, 416; RANKE, II.⁸, 206; KELLER, III., 261 *seq.*, 609 *seq.*; DUHR, II., I, 53, 56 *seq.*; SCHAFMEISTER, *Herzog Ferdinand von Bayern, Erzbischof von Köln, als Fürstbischof von Münster (1612-1650)*, Haselunne, 1912.

⁶ Cf. above, p. 182, note 5.

⁷ Cf. besides the valuable works mentioned on p. 184, note 1, by KOMP and RICHTER, also E. CHARVÉRIAT, *Un réformateur au XVII^e siècle : J. B. Schenk de Schweinsberg*, Lyon, 1884. Schenk zu Schweinsberg also called Benedictine nuns to Fulda in 1626; see L. LEMMENS, *Das Kloster der Benediktinerinnen ad s. Mariam zu Fulda*, Fulda, 1898.

Truchsess von Waldburg, and that of Chur by Joseph Mohr.¹ Excellent pastors also were the Bishops of Würzburg² and Brixen,³ and the Archbishop of Salzburg, Paris von Lodron, whom Carafa extols as the best of all the German Bishops.⁴ Paris was the creator of the splendid cathedral of Salzburg, for the dedication of which Orazio Benevoli wrote a magnificent Mass [September, 1628].⁵ The Bishop of Augsburg, Henry von Knöringen, must be described as one of the greatest prelates of this period; under his administration the internal reform always kept pace with the external restoration.⁶

Thus it came about that from 1621 onwards, as Carafa explained in his report of 1628, the Catholic Church made remarkable progress. Not only in Bohemia, Moravia and the Austrian Hereditary States, but in the territories of Maximilian of Bavaria, the ecclesiastical Electors and the other members of the League, she had become firmly established. In many cities of Empire, such as Spire, Strassburg, Hagenau, Colmar, Augsburg, Ratisbon, Kaufbeuren, Dinkelsbühl, Ulm, Kempten, Memmingen, Schwäbisch-Hall, Frankfort-on-the-Main, efforts were made, for the most part successfully, to restore their rights to the Catholics,⁷ whilst at the same time a possibility

¹ See CARAFA, *Relatione*, 367 *seq.*

² Cf., *ibid.*, 327.

³ On the excellent Bishop Wilhelm von Welsberg, see CARAFA, *Relatione*, 364.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 333.

⁵ See WIEDEMANN, III., 288 *seq.* On the cathedral at Salzburg see WEINGARTNER in *Neuen Reich.*, 1925. For Benevoli's Mass see AMBROS, IV., 112; ADLER, in the *Riv. musica ital.*, X. (1903), and *Denkmäler der Tonkunst in Österreich*, X., Vienna, 1903.

⁶ See CARAFA, *Relatione*, 365. The internal ecclesiastical reformation of Henry of Knöringen is excellently described by SPINDLER, in the *Jahrbuch des Hist. Vereins*, Dillingen, 1911, 1 *seq.*, for his work in reforming the cities of Empire, the countryside, and the other parts of his diocese, *ibid.*, 1915, 24 *seq.*, 66 *seq.*, 108 *seq.*, 115 *seq.*, 137 *seq.*, 147 *seq.*

⁷ See CARAFA, *Germania sacra*, 391, 393 *seq.*; *Relatione*, 383. For the Swabian cities of Empire see especially SPINDLER, in the *Jahrbuch des Hist. Vereins Dillingen*, XXVIII. (1915), 66 *seq.*

offered itself of opening the door to the ancient Church in Württemberg in the South, and in the North in Lower Saxony, by means of these restitutions.¹

But even brighter prospects for the recovery of long lost positions opened when the Emperor allowed himself at last to be prevailed upon to issue an authentic explanation of the religious peace of Augsburg. This was a measure which Maximilian of Bavaria, Henry von Knöringen, Bishop of Augsburg, the nuncio Carlo Carafa and Lamormaini, had never lost sight of because in this way the Church would recover by a single stroke all the possessions of which she had been robbed since the Treaty of Passau. At the very moment when Carafa was replaced in the nunciature by Giovan Battista Pallotto, that is on October 14th, 1628, consequently almost at the time of the fall of La Rochelle, the imperial Council agreed on the text of the edict of restitution to be submitted to the Emperor for his signature.² Ferdinand II. first submitted

and DUHR, II., I, 245 *seq.* The counter-reformation in Colmar is treated by ROCHOLL in *Beiträge der Hist. antiq. Gesellsch. zu Basel*, N.F., IV. (1896). Cf. also DUHR, II., I, 275 *seq.* In 1628 it became possible at last to summon the Capuchins to Frankfort; see ROCCO DA CESINALE, II., 495. In 1628 the Jesuits also sought to establish themselves in that city, though in vain; see KRACAUER in the *Archiv für Frankfurts Gesch.*, 3 series, vol. 2.

¹ Carafa hoped for Catholic episcopal elections in Verden and Schwerin (*Relatione*, 393 and 416).

² Cf. KIEWNING, I., cvi, 306; RITTER, III., 422. Pallotto had been nominated extraordinary nuncio already on April 8, for the purpose of mediating in the matter of the Mantuan succession; on April 22 he had left Rome, on May 22 he arrived in Vienna and then joined the Emperor at Prague, where he arrived on the 26th and stayed a month. On 3rd July he was back at Vienna together with Carafa; see KIEWNING, I., 36 *seq.*, 41 *seq.*, 54 *seq.*, 110 *seq.* Carafa, who left Vienna on October 28, 1628 (see *ibid.*, 262) had incurred the disfavour of Urban VIII. by his arbitrary attitude in the Mantuan question; see *ibid.*, lxiii *seq.*, and ANTHIENY, 28 *seq.* Carafa passed through Venice in November; see *Avviso di Venetia of November 18, 1628, *Cod. C.* 7, 27 of the Angelica Library, Rome. *Ibid.*, C. 7, 28.

the document to the ecclesiastical Electors and waited for the expression of their opinion on it. The Archbishop of Trèves, von Sötern, made some objections. However much he approved the substance of the edict, as an old jurist he felt dissatisfied with its form. In his opinion the Emperor could only take a measure of this kind with the consent of a Diet of Empire, for the religious peace of Augsburg also emanated jointly from the Emperor and the Diet.¹ However, previous discussions had only too clearly demonstrated the impossibility of arriving at a compromise by such means. Both parties had entered the Thirty Years' War with the cry: "Our grievances must be satisfied!"² Why delay any longer now that a decision had been reached on the battlefield! Ferdinand's right was unquestionable, so much so that even the Elector of Saxony, in answer to the complaints of the Duke of Württemberg, admitted that he could not refuse to acknowledge the Emperor's jurisdiction in ecclesiastical affairs since it had been conceded to him by the Electors.³ In the end Sötern too approved the proposals of the Council of Empire. Maximilian, Elector of Bavaria, and the Elector of Mayence wished to go even further than the Emperor. They suggested the insertion of an ordinance concerning the rights of Catholics in the cities of Empire where Catholics and Protestants had equal rights and the general exclusion of the Calvinist sect from the religious peace. Ferdinand II. rejected the first proposal but took note of the second when he added the clause that only those who professed the Confession of Augsburg could benefit by the religious peace.⁴

*Avviso di Roma of February 10, 1629: "Msgr. Carafa si prepara di passarsene in breve alla residenza del suo vescovado d'Aversa (cf. LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 92). Carafa died at Aversa in 1644.

¹ See BAUR, I., 152 *seq.*

² See RITTER, *loc. cit.*, 83.

³ See SATTLER, *Gesch. Württembergs*, VI., 222.

⁴ See LUNDORP, III., 1045; RITTER, *Restitutionsedikt*, 102. For the opinion of the Elector of Mayence see HURTER, X., 42. The Elector of Cologne must certainly have adopted the view of Maximilian.

The exclusion of the Calvinist sect, in which Maximilian saw the sole source of all the ills of the Empire,¹ was of far-reaching effect, for besides the Landgrave of Hessen-Kassel, the Elector of Brandenburg had also gone over to Calvinism in 1614 for the sake of Jülich. In Württemberg also and in Saxony—the only territories of considerable size that were still Lutheran—the restoration of monasteries and bishoprics gave an opportunity for further intervention, forasmuch as the express concession of the right of reform to the Catholic States made it possible to introduce the Catholic reform once more in many districts in which the new faith had prevailed for several generations. Tilly's efforts to found Jesuit Colleges at Lüneburg, Verden and Stade² showed what might be expected in this respect. At the beginning of January, 1629, Wallenstein founded an Academy for Catholic nobles at Güstrow in Mecklenburg and advised the Emperor to erect Jesuit Colleges in North Germany.³ It was surely an exaggeration to assert, as has been done, that the integral execution of the edict of restitution would have meant the end of German Protestantism⁴; on the other hand it is certain that had that plan succeeded, heresy would have been confined within such narrow boundaries that it could never again have become a danger to Catholic Germany. Success, however, depended on the preservation of concord in the Catholic world, but that happy state was even then being put in jeopardy by the most disastrous complications.

¹ See KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 487.

² See DUHR, II., I, 128.

³ See OPEL, III., 745 *seq.*

⁴ See HUBER, V., 354 *seq.*; SCHÄFER, *Weltgesch. der Neuzeit*, I.⁵, Berlin, 1912, 246 *seq.*

CHAPTER IV.

THE MANTUAN WAR OF SUCCESSION—TENSION BETWEEN THE HABSBURGS AND THE POPE—FRENCH INTERVENTION IN ITALY—CONQUEST OF MANTUA BY THE IMPERIAL TROOPS—THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION NULLIFIED—RICHELIEU'S ALLIANCE WITH GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS AGAINST THE HABSBURGS, 1628-1632.

(1)

THE preservation of the impartial and uniformly benevolent attitude which Urban VIII., as supreme Head of the Church, was at pains to maintain towards the rival Catholic Powers, was rendered exceedingly difficult both by France and by Spain. The more anxiously the Pope sought to preserve his position as father of all Christendom, the more he was accused by one party of doing too much and by the other of doing too little. His rejection of the Spanish suggestion to punish the expulsion of the papal garrisons from the Valtellina with the severest penalty, viz. rupture with Louis XIII., was construed by Madrid into an act of hostility towards Spain. Madrid had hoped to win over the Pope by great promises in favour of his nephew. When this hope remained unfulfilled and Urban VIII. sought a peaceful settlement of the Valtellina dispute, discontent rose still higher. From Urban's goodwill towards France and Venice it was concluded that he sided with the enemies of the Habsburgs and favoured their most dangerous plans.¹ Philip IV.'s advisers completely lost sight of the fact that, notwithstanding the arrogant manner of the Spanish ambassador in Rome, the Duke of Pastrana,² the new Pope had at the very outset of his pontificate not only extended

¹ Cf. KHEVENHÜLLER, X., 621 *seq.*

² See the account of the Lucchese envoy, 1625, in *Studi e docum.*, XX., 211.

certain concessions of a financial order which were of the greatest value to Spain, viz. the *Cruzada*, the *Subsidio* and the *Excusado*, but that in a number of particular questions he had met the wishes of the Catholic King.¹ Urban VIII.'s scepticism in regard to Olivares' emphatic assurances that if Philip IV. was for ever at war, it was solely in the interests of religion,² was perfectly justified. Urban VIII. deemed it neither possible nor advisable to yield to all Philip IV.'s requests. He was aware of the insatiable demands and the lust of power of Spanish Cæsaropapalism and feared Spain's preponderance in Italy which would have been a menace to the secular as well as to the spiritual independence of the Holy See; hence he considered the maintenance of a counterpoise through France a necessity.³

The extent of Spain's pretensions was revealed at the very outset of Urban VIII.'s pontificate when she demanded the extension of the *Cruzada* to Naples⁴ and the purple not only for the learned Canon of Toledo, Enrico Guzman, but likewise for the Madrid nuncio, Innocenzo de' Massimi.⁵ The latter, by various acts of his, had incurred the displeasure of Urban VIII., so much so that his recall was decided upon at an early date and carried into effect at the close of 1623, notwithstanding the opposition of the Spanish Government.⁶

The new nuncio, Giulio Sacchetti, met with the greatest opposition, not only in the affair of the Valtellina, but in a number of ecclesiastical questions also. His Instruction⁷

¹ See **Negocios del servicio de Su M^a que a alcanzado de Su B^a el S. Duque de Pastrana* in Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, III., 5.

² See the report of nuncio Sachetti in DÖLLINGER, *Vorträge*, I., 258.

³ See *Relazione di R. Zeno*, 176.

⁴ See the **Istruzione a Msgr. Sachetti, Nuntio appresso la M^{te} Cattolica, Cod. X., V., 15*, of the Casanatense Library, Rome.

⁵ See the **Briefs to Philip IV. of January 8 and February 7, 1624, Epist., I., Papal Secret Archives.*

⁶ See *Relazione di R. Zeno*, 176.

⁷ **Istruzione a Msgr. Sacchetti, vescovo di Gravina, Nuntio appresso la M^{te} Catt. (dated January 27, 1624), Cod. X., V., 15, pp. 149-194, Casanatense Library, Rome.*

indicates the preservation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and immunity as the most difficult task of a Spanish nuncio, as, notwithstanding the Catholic sentiments of the king, his ministers permitted themselves grave interferences. The document complains in particular of the royal council of Castile and directs the nuncio to defend the rights of the Church with energy though with prudence and gentleness. The royal council had been appealed to by a canon of Seville, Corruvias, the author of a book against the Holy See, which had already caused much worry to previous nuncios. With regard to the judicial competence of the nunciature, Sacchetti was instructed to defend its indubitable rights; as for his relations with Chapters and Bishops, he was urged to show both caution and resolution. With regard to the internment of Cardinal Lerma, a wish was expressed that he should be allowed to take up residence in Rome. The Collectors should be exhorted to moderation for the royal tribunals frequently complained, not without cause, of their conduct. The Instruction sought to pave the way for tolerable relations between Church and State in Spain. But in this respect there was not much to hope for, because the Spanish Government persisted in its politico-ecclesiastical pretensions; with its wonted tenaciousness, in fact, it even sought to extend them,¹ so much so that the Pope saw himself repeatedly compelled to protest against the encroachments of Spanish ministers and lay tribunals, more particularly in Portugal.² However, by granting all sorts of

¹ Cf. ALTAMIRA, *Hist. de España*, III., Barcelona, 1906, 405 seq.

² Philip IV. had been approached by Urban VIII. in a *Brief of February 27, 1624, on the question of the ecclesiastical immunity of Portugal (*Epist.*, I., Papal Secret Archives). On *June 14, 1625, he had to complain bitterly to the King and Olivares on account of the banishment of the auditor of the nunciature and the oppression of the papal Collector in Portugal (see the *Brief to Philip IV. and Olivares, *loc. cit.*). No satisfaction was given, although Urban VIII. in a *letter of September 12, 1625 (*Epist.*, II., *loc. cit.*) complained to Philip IV. In a *Brief of October 8, 1625, the Collector in Portugal, Giov. Batt. Pallotto, was praised for his steadfastness and exhorted to hold out at his post, notwithstanding his many difficulties (*Epist.*, III., *loc. cit.*). He

favours he proved his desire then, as always, to remain on good terms with Spain.¹ If the tension nevertheless remained, the cause must chiefly be looked for in the fact that in the affairs of the Church Urban VIII. was altogether intransigent where the rights of the Holy See were concerned, and with regard to politics, he was resolved, notwithstanding the Spaniards' threats, to preserve his impartiality.² The chief obstacle to any improvement in their mutual relations was precisely the fact that Madrid absolutely refused to believe in Urban VIII.'s impartiality. An authentic document of 1625 clearly shows how much Spanish Statesmen were dominated by the fixed idea of the Pope's Francophil sentiments.³ A striking proof that Urban VIII. pursued a middle course may be seen in the fact that at that very time Louis XIII. described the Pope as wholeheartedly pro-Spanish!⁴ With how little consideration Madrid could treat the Pope was painfully shown on the occasion of the peace of Monzón in 1626, when Cardinal Barberini, who had been specially dispatched to Madrid, was excluded from the discussions which re-established harmony between the French and Spanish Governments on the question of the Valtellina.⁵

Philip IV.'s distrust of Urban VIII. was not a little fanned remained there until 1628; see KIEWNING, I., xxxvii, who rightly points out that the Instruction for Pallotto published by LÄMMER (*Zur Kirchengesch.*, 26 seq.) does not belong to the time of Clement IX. but to that of Urban VIII. In a Brief of September 6, 1625, Urban VIII. had complained to Philip IV. that the Archbishop of Mexico was being oppressed by the Viceroy (*Epist.*, II., *loc. cit.*).

¹ See the **Relacion* of Diego Saavedra of November 3, 1627, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, I., 9.

² See the relation of the envoy of Lucca dated June, 1625, in *Studi e docum.*, XXIII., 211.

³ See **Extracto de la Instruccion que el rey Philipppo IV. dió al Conde de Oñate, embaxador a la S^{da} de Urbano VIII.*, dated July 1, 1625, Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome, III., 9.

⁴ See the dispatch of Lorkin of September, 1625, in RANKE, *Französ. Geschichte*, II.^w2, 298, note 1.

⁵ Cf. above, p. 97 seq.

by the Duke of Alba, viceroy of Naples since 1627. Ill-disposed towards the clergy in general, the Duke nursed a special hostility towards the Pope. No one in Madrid was more persistent in asserting that Urban VIII. was wholly in favour of France than Alba, though he was shrewd enough not to allow disputes on points of jurisdiction to become too acute in Naples¹; but Spanish officials saw to their continuation, for almost all of them were imbued with a similar spirit.² The appointment as viceroy of Naples of a man like Alba was a most serious threat to the Pope, for from no side were the Pontifical States more vulnerable than from the south.³ In view of so dangerous a situation Urban VIII. had every reason to see to the reinforcement of his armed forces and the defensive works of the Papal States, so as to have a measure of security against the Spaniards.⁴

It was a disaster that in course of time the troubled relations between Rome and Madrid also led to a tension with the German Habsburgs who were closely allied to the Spanish line. The strong Catholic sentiments of Ferdinand II. and his hostility to Protestantism were so highly appreciated by Urban VIII. from the very beginning of his pontificate, that it was said at Venice that any request of the Emperor, if at all legitimate, was acceded to in Rome.⁵ Vienna was aware of this, in fact it had hoped⁶ that the new Pontiff would

¹ Cf. CESARE MONTI (nuncio in Naples from April 17, 1627, to May 29, 1628; see BIAUDET, 206), **Relazione dei ministri Napoletani lasciata al suo successore (Aless. Bichi), Cod. XXIII., B. 8, p. 53 seq.*, of the library of the *Società di stor. patr.*, at Naples.

² See **Istruzione a V.S. Mons. Bichi, vescovo dell'Isola, destinato da N.S. Nunzio ord. in Napoli*, dated Rome, May 28, 1628, MS. in my possession.

³ See *Relazione di P. Contarini*, 201.

⁴ See BROSCHE, *Kirchenstaat*, I., 395.

⁵ See *Relazione di R. Zeno*, 173. In a **Brief of May 10, 1625*, Urban VIII. praised the Emperor: "Pietas qua constitutiones eccles. libertati perniciosas delevit." Cf. also the laudatory **Brief of July 1, 1625, Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives.

⁶ Cf. the **report of Altoviti*, dated Vienna, August 19, 1623, State Archives. Florence, *Med.* 4375.

continue the financial subsidies which Gregory XV. had so copiously bestowed on the Emperor for his war in Germany; hence disappointment was all the keener when Urban VIII. declared his inability to lend such help.¹ But whereas the Court of Munich soon got over its disappointment,² the breach between the Emperor and the Pope widened to a dangerous extent. A certain soreness had already been caused at the Court of Vienna because at the creation of Cardinals in January, 1626, the Emperor, like the Kings of France and Spain, had only been given one Cardinal,³ but discontent grew still further in consequence of the attitude of Urban VIII. on two other questions. The one concerned the partition of the Patriarchate of Aquileia,⁴ which included both Venetian and imperial territory. Notwithstanding the resistance of the Republic of St. Mark, the Pope was inclined to accede to Ferdinand's wishes. However, the Emperor's intermediary, Provost Albrecht Presler, urged his master's suit in so blustering a fashion that he only damaged his case. On his not being granted an audience at once, the Provost sought to obtain it by force. An extremely painful scene occurred in the papal antechamber where Presler, in a loud voice, interpellated the Pope who was in the audience chamber, and ended by throwing a written protest against the door of the room. In this document Urban VIII. was accused of partiality towards Venice and an anticipated protest was made against any decision by the Holy See in the affair of the Patriarchate of Aquileia which might be prejudicial to the Emperor.⁵ In another controversial matter, concerning the legal position

¹ Cf. above, p. 64.

² See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 185-9.

³ For Urban's reasons see his Brief in SCHNITZER, 190.

⁴ Cf. *NICOLETTI, III., 268 *seq.*, 454 *seq.* (Vatican Library), who follows the reports of the nunciature, and *cf.* the dissertation in *Barb.* 136 (*ibid.*) representing the imperial view and used in part by KIEWNING (I., lxxvii *seq.*).

⁵ See the *letter of the Secretary of State, Carafa, February 25, 1628, in *NICOLETTI, III., 273, *loc. cit.*; *cf.* KIEWNING, I., lxxix.

of the Benedictine Abbey of St. Maximinus of Trèves,¹ the Emperor himself had been betrayed into a false step. The letter he dispatched to the Pope in June, 1627, was couched in terms from which the respect due to the Head of the Church was completely absent. On July 18th, 1627, Urban VIII. replied that he assumed that the Emperor had not read the letter and that he hoped that the representations of the nuncio would draw an answer worthy of the Austrians' sense of religion and justice. The Secretary Ciampoli had on his own authority given a specially sharp point to one passage in the Brief, so that it was now the Emperor's turn to take offence.²

French politicians strove with no less eagerness than success to increase the tension between the Pope and the two Habsburg lines. The then French ambassador in Rome, Philippe de Béthune, needed no one to teach him how to set to work in this sense. He never missed an opportunity to draw attention to the ecclesiastical and political encroachments of the Spaniards. Again and again he insisted that the aim of Spanish policy was to reduce the Pope to being no more than the Catholic King's Chaplain.³ Though Urban VIII. was very far from favouritism towards Spain, Béthune was not satisfied. He was of opinion that the Spaniards' influence in Rome was far too great: all their demands ended by being complied with for they never allowed themselves to be put off by an initial refusal.⁴

It came most opportunely for Béthune that the new Spanish ambassador, Count Oñate, by his arrogant and unworthy

¹ Cf. *NICOLETTI, III., 199 *seq.*, *loc. cit.*; MARX, III., 136; KIEWNING, I., lxx *seq.*; BAUR, *Sötern*, I., 443 *seq.*

² See KIEWNING, I., lxxi *seq.*, who persistently gives the incorrect form "Ciampoli". For Ciampoli see above, p. 50, and Vol. XXIX., Ch. VI.

³ See the *reports of Béthune to Louis XIII., dated Rome, June 2 and 16, 1627, and August 25, *Cod.* 7215 of the State Library, Vienna.

⁴ See especially the *letter of Béthune to Louis XIII., of July 15, 1627, *ibid.*

behaviour and his baseless complaints that the Holy See took sides against Spain, occasioned a conflict with the Pope which, but for Urban VIII.'s moderation, might have led to a rupture between Madrid and Rome.¹ Very adroitly the French diplomatist pointed out that Oñate's arrogance was not due to his own bad disposition but that it was a natural sequel of Spain's excessive influence in Italy.² Urban VIII. was made to feel Spain's pressure yet more sensibly as a result of Philip IV.'s close alliance with Ferdinand II. For these reasons the Pope favoured a rapprochement between France and the Emperor's rival, the Duke of Bavaria, which would create a counterpoise.³ For the rest, Urban VIII. quite frankly declared to the French ambassador that he would feel towards France just as he did towards Spain at that moment if France were to acquire a similar preponderance in Italy.⁴

Urban VIII. clearly saw that the balance of power could not be suffered to be further disturbed in favour of Spain, hence he viewed with considerable anxiety the problem of

¹ See *NICOLETTI, III., ch. 7, *loc. cit.* Cf. Béthune's *reports to Louis XIII., especially of August 12 and September 4 and 8, 1628, *loc. cit.* Oñate, who came to Rome as ambassador on June 17, 1626, had been thus characterized by Sacchetti, in a *letter to Cardinal Magalotti, as early as April 24, 1625: *"Ognate di cui si sta deliberando per l'imbsciata, credo che costì sia ben noto et io l'ho riputato molto doppio e attissimo a far mali offizi et particolarmente a porre gelosie e diffidenze non tanto al principe, al qual vien mandato, quanto fra quello et i ministri degli altri principi." NICOLETTI, III., 503, *loc. cit.*

² *Letter from Béthune to Louis XIII. of August 12, 1627, *loc. cit.*

³ After the estrangement between Munich and Rome had been removed in May, 1627 (see SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 189), Urban VIII. initiated an agreement between France and Maximilian I. according to a *report of Béthune's to Louis XIII., July 15, 1627, State Library, Vienna.

⁴ * "Ces mesmes pensees qu'il temoignoit contre les Espagnols, il les auroyt contre V.Mte, si elle avoyt la puissance qu'ils ont en Italie." Letter of Béthune of July 15, 1627, *loc. cit.*

the succession to the Duchy of Mantua-Monferrat which would arise out of the extinction of the Gonzagas. That ancient and illustrious family, to which Mantua owed its splendour, had long ago fallen from its former greatness. Vincenzo I., Rubens' patron, failed to strike a balance between his inherited passion for the arts, the stage and music, and his income, and he had ended by throwing himself headlong into insane extravagance. His three sons, who rapidly succeeded each other, continued on this fatal road and pursued a course of luxury and immorality, the consequence of which were short lives and barren marriages.¹ The elder of the two sons, Francesco, only left a daughter, Maria, of his marriage with Margherita, a princess of Savoy.² The other two Dukes, Ferdinand, who died in 1626, and his successor, the worthless Vincenzo II.,³ were without legitimate heirs whilst the sickliness of Vincenzo II., worn out as he was by his excesses, rendered his early death probable.

It is not surprising that the question of the Mantuan succession should have occupied nearly all the chancelleries of Europe from 1624,⁴ for the rise of a new ruling house in an important Italian principality could not fail to rouse the jealousy, not only of the Italian Powers, but that also of France and Spain.⁵ The Duchy of Mantua was an imperial fief and in Montferrat the succession ran in the female line also. Besides the Emperor, Spain was particularly interested in the succession owing to the Gonzaga territory being contiguous to that of Milan, and since the Duchy of Montferrat, with

¹ See SIRI, VI. 298; MURATORI, XI., 104; ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, in the *Zeitschrift für allg. Gesch.*, II., 702; FOCHESSATI, *I Gonzaga di Mantova e l'ultimo duca*, Mantova, 1912. Cf. also ADEMOLLO, *La Bell'Adriana ed altre virtuose del suo tempo alla corte di Mantova*, Città di Castello, 1888.

² Cf. G. B. INTRA, *Maria Gonzaga-Gonzaga*, Firenze, 1897.

³ Cf. for him besides our remarks, Vol. XXV., 336, also QUAZZA, *Mantova e Monferrato nella politica europea alla vigilia della guerra per la successione (1624-7)*, Mantova, 1922, 236 seq.

⁴ See the full account of QUAZZA, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See SCHNEIDER, *Mantuaner Erbfolgestreit*, 5.

its strong fortress of Casale on the Upper Po, wedged itself in between Milan and Savoy, the lust of aggrandisement was likewise roused in the breast of the restless Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy.¹ The affair became still further complicated because Carlo Gonzaga who, in view of the exclusive right of the male line in Mantua and the preference to the female line in Montferrat, was without doubt nearest to the succession,² was unacceptable to the Spaniards, ever sensitive about their hegemony in Italy, because as Duke of Nevers and Rethel he was a vassal of the King of France. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the objections to which this circumstance gave rise at Madrid, it does not seem that Spain at first seriously thought of contesting the Duke's right. According to an express assurance subsequently given by Count Olivares, Philip IV.'s leading minister to the papal envoy, Cesare Monti, the Spanish Government, on being informed of the grave illness of Vincenzo, had decided to send a courier to the Duke of Nevers with an offer of Spain's assistance to enable him to take peaceful possession of Mantua and Montferrat.³ It is probable that certain conditions would have accompanied the offer by way of guarantee, but there was as yet no thought of the exclusion of the Duke of Nevers.⁴

Circumstances were even more favourable to Nevers at Vienna where he had a warm supporter in the person of the Empress Eleonor, his near relative, for she was the daughter of Duke Vincenzo I. For this reason the Empress thought of having the Princess Maria taken to the imperial Court so that she might herself watch over her upbringing. Khevenhüller was dispatched to Madrid at the beginning of 1628; besides negotiating this affair, he was also instructed to give assurances

¹ Cf. QUAZZA, *loc. cit.*, 209.

² See SCHNEIDER, *loc. cit.*, 3 *seq.*

³ Cf. reference to this in the report of Francesco degl'Albici: " *Negotiato di Mons. C. Monti (see below, p. 203, note 3) in RANKE, *Päpste*, II.^o, 347, note 2.

⁴ See RANKE, *loc. cit.*

to Nevers with regard to his succession to the Duchies.¹ There the Spaniards' lust of aggrandisement of their Italian possessions was still so fresh in the memory of all that in 1615 everyone took it for granted that, in the event of the extinction of the male Gonzaga line, Madrid would override the rightful claims of the Duke of Nevers. Notwithstanding many smooth assurances, both Rome and Paris felt convinced that, should the eventuality arise, the Madrid Cabinet would do its utmost to incorporate Mantua, or at least Montferrat, in the Duchy of Lombardy, or to install at Mantua a successor who would be favourably disposed towards Spain.² Urban VIII. deemed it imperative to forestall all such attempts from motives both of policy and justice; to this end he discussed with the French ambassador, Béthune, all the necessary steps. With a view to creating a *fait accompli*, it was decided that the son of Duke Charles of Nevers, Charles, Duke of Rethel, who had been staying at Mantua since December, 1625,³ for the purpose of familiarizing himself with Italian manners and to gain popularity, should marry Maria Gonzaga, then staying at the convent of St. Ursula, whose claims to the succession of Montferrat were very strong ones. With the utmost secrecy Vincenzo II. was persuaded to name Nevers as his successor in his will. The necessary dispensation for his marriage with his niece Maria was all the more readily granted by Urban VIII.

¹ See KIEVENHÜLLER, XI., 30 *seq.*; KIEWNING, I., xlv *seq.* On the Empress *cf.* G. B. INTRA, *Le due Eleonore Gonzaga imperatrici*, Mantova, 1891.

² See RANKE, II.⁶, 347.

³ See KIEWNING, I., xl.; QUAZZA, *Mantova e Monferrato*, 121 *seq.* The purpose of the dispatch of young Nevers to Mantua is thus stated by FR. DEGL'ALBICI (**Relazione del negotio fatto nella corte di Spagna da Mons. Ces. Monti Nuntio straord. per la pace d'Italia*): "Acciò apprendendo i costumi d'Italia e trattandosi bene con quei sudditi si rendesse capace dell'amor loro et insinuandosi ad essi quai insensibilmente le raggioni del padre gli facesse più facilmente restar persuasi ad accettarlo per signore." *Cod.* 35 and 25 of the Corsini Library, Rome; I bought another copy in 1905 from the library of P. Pieri.

as from the time of his French nunciature the Pope was well acquainted with the staunchly Catholic feelings of the Nevers family.¹ The dispensation had hardly arrived when the wedding was solemnized on the evening of December 25th, 1627.² That same night Vincenzo II. died at the early age of 34. Thereafter events moved rapidly. Without any previous request to the Emperor as supreme feudal lord, but also without any objection being made by anyone, young Nevers took possession of the vacant Duchy and in his father's name received the homage of the subjects and occupied the citadel of the town.³

These events only became known when news arrived of Duke Vincenzo's death. Great was the surprise of Turin, Madrid, and Vienna. Charles Emmanuel of Savoy gave himself the air of being the most hard hit, for he had built up a clever array of arguments to substantiate his pretensions in regard to Montferrat, and he had also toyed with the idea of a betrothal of his son to Maria Gonzaga. The Savoyard began to arm with a view to satisfying his lust of conquest by force. Similar feelings stirred the breast of the new Governor of Milan, Gonzalez of Córdoba, a man of extraordinary ambition, who supported the pretensions of Ferdinand Gonzaga, Duke of Guastalla, a descendant of a distant collateral line of the Gonzagas. To give effect to these ambitions Gonzalez, shortly before the death of Vincenzo, had dispatched

¹ See the *reports of Béthune to Louis XIII., dated Rome, July 15, 1627, September 8 and 23, October 22, December 31, *Cod.* 7215 of the State Library, Vienna. Cf. FAGNIEZ, *P. Joseph*, I., 123 seq.; KIEWNING, I., xl; QUAZZA, *Mantova e Monferrato*, 190 seq., 193 seq.

² Cf. besides the work by Intra referred to above, p. 201, note 2, and the essay by the same writer on the monastery of St. Ursula in the *Arch. stor. Lombard*, 1895, especially QUAZZA, *Mantova e Monferrato*, 194 seq.

³ See MURATORI, XI., 105; KIEWNING, I., 23, note 3. For young Nevers, whose contemporaries depreciated him, see H. DE BEAUCAIRE, in the *Rev. d'hist. dipl.*, XVI., 3.

Count Giovanni Serbellini to Mantua, though to no purpose.¹

Gonzalez of Córdoba did not hesitate to enter into an alliance with the Duke of Savoy, who, not so long ago and ostensibly in the interests of Italian liberty, had fought the Spaniards arms in hand. When Khevenhüller, whose visit to Mantua was without object now that Maria Gonzaga was married, arrived in Milan, he found Gonzalez busy with the preparations for an attack on Casale. As in duty bound, he pointed out to him that Nevers' conduct, which was due to distrust, could not justify such a step; in any case proceedings against Casale could only be taken with the consent of the Emperor, the supreme feudal overlord. What would the world say if the lieutenant of the King of Spain were to do that which in the Duke of Nevers he describes as a crime of *lèse-majesté*? In that case Philip IV. would utterly forfeit the confidence of the German princes, and strengthen them in their view that in Spain the *raison d'État* took precedence over juridical procedure and that might came before right. The Pope and the Italian princes, to whom Spain's power seemed excessive as it was, would be compelled to take counter-measures whilst France would not leave the Duke of Nevers defenceless; hence a sanguinary war must ensue, the issue of which would be doubtful, and which might cost the King of Spain more millions than the fortress was worth. Besides, everybody knew that the Duke of Savoy was wont to trim his sails according to the wind. These warnings of Khevenhüller Gonzalez could counter with nothing better than reasons of opportunism: if he did not besiege Casale, Nevers would hand it over to the King of France. Now, since the latter was engaged just then in a struggle with the Huguenots, success was bound to crown immediate action. To Madrid Gonzalez also sent word that he would take Casale without striking a single blow.²

¹ See KIEWNING, I., xli *seq.*; SCHNEIDER, *Mantuaner Erbfolge-streit*, 4 *seq.*; QUAZZA, *Mantova e Monferrato*, 185, 191. For Gonzalez's ambition see SCHNEIDER, 16, note 3.

² See KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 36 *seq.*; *cf.* KIEWNING, I., 129.

The Spanish Government, without for the moment ratifying the treaty between Gonzalez and Savoy which these had concluded on their own initiative, nevertheless identified itself with the object at which it aimed, and this all the more readily as there was nothing to fear from the French whose attention was wholly taken up by their wars with the Huguenots and with England. Olivares, who knew how to guide Philip IV. in the same way as Prince Eggenberg prompted the decisions of the Emperor Ferdinand,¹ was determined at all costs not to suffer Montferrat to get into the hands of a prince so closely tied to France.² He had no inkling of the risks he was taking.³ Full of haughty self-sufficiency he told the nuncio, Giovanni Battista Pamfili, that the Duke of Nevers must at least be castigated, as in the betrothal of his son to Maria Gonzaga, the great-grandchild of Philip II., he had brushed aside the regard due to the King of Spain.⁴ Olivares hoped to satisfy the Savoyard with a few territorial concessions but to secure for Spain the greater part of the long-coveted Duchy of Montferrat. Both at Milan and at Turin preparations were eagerly pushed forward for the invasion of the country which it was intended to seize, and the whole manœuvre was to be covered with the authority of the Emperor !⁵ Ferdinand was in no hurry to give his decision as sovereign feudal lord. When the aged Duke of Nevers arrived in Mantua on January 17th, 1628, he immediately dispatched the Bishop of that town as his envoy to the imperial Court. with mission to ask for investiture. But the Emperor, who felt justly offended by the arbitrary action of Nevers both as sovereign feudal lord and as

¹ See Alvise Mocenigo in BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Spagna*, I., 650, 686, and Seb. Venier in FIEDLER, *Fontes dipl.*, XXVI., 145.

² Cf. the passage in ALBICI'S **Negotiato di Monti* in RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 340, note 1.

³ See the *report of Monti in KIEWNING, I., 159, note 2. Gonzalez afterwards justified himself by saying that he had only acted in consideration of the wishes of the King and Olivares which were known to him ; see *Documentos ineditos*, LIV., 377.

⁴ The passage from Pamfili's report in RANKE, II., 349, note 1.

⁵ See KLOPP, III., I., 164 ; KIEWNING, I., liv.

husband of Eleonor, a princess of Mantua, refused to receive the Bishop in the capacity as Nevers' envoy. When at last, through the intervention of the Empress, the Bishop was received in his private capacity, Ferdinand did not disguise his displeasure at Nevers' taking over government without referring to him and marrying his son to Maria Gonzaga. None the less he at the same time gave a solemn promise that he would not suffer Nevers to be injured.

At the very time when the Bishop of Mantua presented a memorial on the subject of his lord's investiture with Mantua and Montferrat, the Duke of Guastalla and the Duchess of Lorraine, Margherita Gonzaga, also put forward their claims.¹ But the most active person at court was the Spanish ambassador, the Marquis de Cadareita. In view of the help which his Government had for so long given to the Emperor, by supplying him both with troops and money, he demanded insistently that the Emperor should reject the claims of Nevers and bestow Mantua on the Duke of Guastalla, and Montferrat on the Duchess Margherita of Lorraine. Either the Emperor must put the two principalities under sequestration or look on whilst Gonzalez and Charles Emmanuel made themselves masters of Montferrat by force. There was no question of juridical grounds but solely of the interests of Philip IV., for Italy, it was alleged, was the very heart of Spanish power.² As for the Empress, she was given to understand that since her marriage she no longer belonged to the house of Gonzaga but to that of Habsburg. But that valiant woman was not to be intimidated. Now as before she pointed out that justice was clearly on Nevers' side and that he was above all suspicion, inasmuch as in the war against the Turks he had risked his life in the Emperor's cause.³

The Council of Empire, to which Ferdinand II. had referred the matter, also had to acknowledge the indisputable right of the Duke of Nevers. Nevertheless, in the interest of public tranquillity and with express reference to the King of Spain

¹ See KIEWNING, I., xlvii *seq.*

² See RITTER, III., 399.

³ See KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 34 *seq.*

who was prepared to go to war, the Council was of opinion that the Emperor should sequester Mantua and Montferrat until the question had been juridically settled.¹ This subservience of the imperial power to Spain's policy of force was only surpassed by the readiness with which the Privy Council gave its assent to so fatal a suggestion.²

However, all is explained if we bear in mind that most of these Councillors were in receipt of regular pensions from Spain.³

On March 10th, 1628, the Emperor expressed his agreement with the opinion of his Council and on April 1st he issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Duchies of Mantua and Montferrat enjoining them, under the severest penalties, to do homage to Duke John of Nassau-Siegen whom he had appointed as his commissary. Nevers was not so much as mentioned.⁴ On this occasion Ferdinand II. made an even worse blunder than when he bestowed Mecklenburg on Wallenstein. His procedure drove the Duke of Nevers into a close alliance with France and challenged the latter Power whilst it added new strength to the old accusation that the House of Austria aimed at world domination.⁵

A contemporary, Leonard Pappus, justly remarks that however difficult it may be to say what should have been done in the affair of Mantua, it could nevertheless be boldly affirmed that the worst possible step was taken.⁶

The Bishop of Mantua could rightly complain of the injustice done to his lord who was the legitimate Duke and who had only done his duty when he made a demand for investiture. He was fully justified when he asked whether the conclusion of a matrimonial alliance and the assumption of government without previous consultation with the Emperor were sufficient

¹ Text of memorial in KIEWNING, I., i. *seq.*; SCHNEIDER 27 *seq.*

² See RITTER, III., 399.

³ See the account of SEB. VENIER in FIEDLER, XXVI., 143.

⁴ See LÜNIG, *Cod. ital. dipl.*, I., 1437 *seq.*; SIRI, VI., 384 *seq.*; KIEWNING, I., 17; SCHNEIDER, 33 *seq.*

⁵ See KLOPP, III., 1, 165 *seq.*

⁶ PAPPUS, I., 40 *seq.*

grounds to justify before the world a war by a Catholic King against a Catholic Prince.¹ The Bishop's reference to Spanish influence, which had prompted the Emperor's intervention, touched the core of the whole affair. Venice, which feared the worst from an increase of Spanish power in Upper Italy, did not think differently. The Emperor was only lending his name to a plot forged at Madrid, it was said in Venice; the Spaniards wanted to subjugate all Italy but the plan could not be realized unless they first made themselves masters of Casale.²

Gonzalez of Córdoba was resolved to take advantage of the imperial decree of April 1st to act as Ferdinand's plenipotentiary; though on April 2nd and previous to the arrival of the text of the document he had begun the siege of Casale.³ The Duke of Savoy also set out on that day. In vain did the Emperor protest against such arbitrary proceedings; in vain, through Khevenhüller, did he complain at Madrid of the abuse of his name in Italy⁴; the arrogant Governor of Milan cared for none of these things and went on with the siege of Casale. So far from lending him any help, Charles Emmanuel's only concern was to make sure of his own booty. A series of rapid victories made him master of Alba, Trino, Pontestura and Montecalvo.⁵ Against such attacks the Duke of Nevers could not at first hope for much assistance from the French Government which was wholly engrossed in its struggle with the Huguenots and the English. However, he did not lose heart; on the contrary, he was resolved to defend his just claim to the utmost, in the hope that the French would end by coming to his help.

Urban VIII. had not at first taken a serious view of the question of Mantua,⁶ but he soon realized how dangerous it

¹ See KIEWNING, I., lvi.

² See KLOPP, III., I, 165.

³ See SCHNEIDER, 35.

⁴ See KIEWNING, I., lvii.; SCHNEIDER, 37 *seq.*

⁵ See SIRI, VI., 379 *seq.*; BALAN, VI., 716; ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 89 *seq.*

⁶ Cf. QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 77 *seq.*

threatened to become. His hope that it would be settled between the Italian Powers, without foreign intervention, was not fulfilled.¹ Just as the Pope with his dispensation had made possible the marriage of young Nevers with Maria Gonzaga, so he favoured his father, not only because of his Catholic sentiments and his rightful claim to the Duchy of Mantua, but also because, owing to Nevers' connections with France, there was no reason to fear an increase of Spanish influence in Upper Italy and a consequent disturbance of equilibrium.² None the less, in view of the future possibilities of the situation, the Pope maintained the cautious reserve which both the circumstances and his own position seemed to demand. He was perfectly clear in his own mind that as Head of the Church (*Padre commune*) it was his duty to do all he could for the preservation of peace among the Catholic Powers, for on this depended the progress of the Catholic restoration. In like manner he fully realized that he could never act as mediator if he sided with any one party.

True, opinions in the Sacred College were divided as to the attitude the Pope should adopt. Some spoke to the effect that the Pope should oppose Spain's insatiable desire for expansion and to this end enter into an alliance with the other Italian Powers, for where great perils threatened the freedom of them all, the worst thing would be to remain neutral; by such an attitude they neither made friends nor defeated the enemy. The opposite view was defended by Cardinal Spada who had been nuncio in France from 1625 to 1627. He emphatically counselled neutrality inasmuch as it was in accord with the paternal dignity of the papacy, whilst at the same time it compelled the respect of the contending parties. To prove that warlike action did not become the office of the Supreme Pontiff he pointed to the period of Julius II. and Clement VII. Hence the Pope should maintain his reserve and neutrality and refrain from entering into any kind of alliance, even a

¹ Cf. Urban's words to d'Aglié the envoy of Savoy in the latter's report of February 26, 1628, in CANTÙ, *Storia degli Italiani*, III. (1868), 652.

² Cf. the *Relazione* of ANG. CONTARINI, 282.

purely defensive one. Even though, in view of his position as head of an Italian State, a defensive league might seem advantageous, as Head of the whole Catholic Church Urban was bound to subordinate all worldly interests to the interests of the Church.¹

Spada's memorandum voiced Urban's own feelings ; hence it decided his course of action. In the light of the difficulties he had had to contend with in the Valtellina dispute he was well aware of the arduous and thorny path that stretched before him. He foresaw that even with the best of wills he would not be able to comply with every demand and that his words and acts would be misunderstood and misrepresented. From that point of view the Spaniards were most to fear, for they persistently suspected him of favouritism towards France and watched with jealous eyes his every word and action, nay, the very play of his features. Even in his private apartments the Pope could not feel safe from Spanish spies,² whilst the representatives of France and Venice harried him incessantly with requests that he should support Nevers with his armed forces.

When news reached Rome on December 31st, 1627, of the death of Vincenzo II., the French ambassador, Philippe de Béthune, requested an audience on the very next day with a view to ascertaining what attitude the Pope would take in case Spain, relying on the authority of the Emperor, were to take steps contrary to Nevers' rightful claims. Béthune was well aware that the last thing the Pope wished for was a further increase of Spanish power in Upper Italy ; accordingly he harped on that string from the first. " In such an eventuality," he said, " Your Holiness must act with energy if subsequent Popes are not to be reduced to being no more than the chaplains of the Kings of Spain." Urban replied that he

¹ The **Parere* of Spada was first quoted by A. PIEPER in the *Wissenschaftl. Beilage to Germania*, 1899, no. 37.

² During the audience which Béthune had on January 1, 1628, the Pope rose twice to see that no one was listening at the door. *Report of Béthune to Louis XIII., Rome, January 2, 1628, *Cod. 7215*, of the State Library, Vienna.

thought that the Spaniards, who had bitterly complained of his excessive readiness to grant a dispensation for the marriage between young Nevers and Maria Gonzaga, were only threatening and would never resort to measures of violence the use of which he was precisely striving to prevent. When Béthune asked what he would do if the contrary were to happen, the Pope merely answered: "We shall see."¹ When at last facts gave the lie to the optimistic view of the situation which had prevailed in Rome until then,² the representatives of France and Venice at once suggested that the Pope should join an anti-Spanish league for the protection of Nevers as well as the common interests of Italy. The Venetian ambassador suggested that the Pope should at least dispatch a special envoy to Nevers, thereby acknowledging him before the whole world as the rightful Prince.³ Béthune insisted that it was not enough for the Pope to make either demands or representations; to save the freedom of Italy he must meet the Spaniards openly and enter into a league with the Italian Powers.⁴ Urban VIII. would not hear of it; on the contrary, he warned the King of France not to treat Nevers, now Duke of Mantua, before the whole world as if he were a Frenchman, or to support him with armed forces. Louis XIII. should exert his influence on Nevers and induce him to pay due respect to the Emperor whose plan it was to deal with the matter in accordance with the law.⁵

In the last week of March, 1628, the Pope instructed the nuncio at Vienna to do all he could to get the pretenders cited before the Emperor's tribunal lest they should seek to establish their claim with the sword. On March 26th Urban VIII. addressed a Brief to the Emperor on the subject of this proposal.⁶ The Pope also made similar representations to

¹ See Béthune's *report quoted in preceding note.

² Cf. the *report of Béthune to Louis XIII. of January 21 and 27, 1628, *loc. cit.*

³ See KIEWNING, I., lx.

⁴ See Béthune's *report to Louis XIII., Rome, March 22, 1628, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See the code instruction to the French nuncio dated March 7, 1628, in KIEWNING, I., lxi.

⁶ Printed, *ibid.*, 36 seq.

Philip IV.¹ and declared inadequate the grounds for forcible action which Gonzalez de Córdoba had laid before him through the Milanese Senator Corio who had been dispatched to Rome for that purpose.²

With a view to minimizing the danger of a further spread of the conflict which had broken out in Upper Italy, Urban VIII., on April 8th, 1628, resolved to work for peace by the dispatch of nuncios extraordinary.³ Moreover, to draw down the blessing of God on this mission of peace, he proclaimed a universal jubilee under the same date. The enemy of mankind, the Pope said in his Bull, was endeavouring to render useless the great triumphs that had been won over the foes of the true faith by provoking intestine quarrels among the Catholic Princes.⁴ What importance the Pope attached to the jubilee is shown by the fact that on April 12th he took part in person in the procession from St. Peter's to S. Spirito in Sassia with which the solemnities began in Rome.⁵

The nuncios extraordinary were named on April 8th, 1628, They were Giovan Battista Pallotto for the imperial Court,⁶ Cesare Monti for Spain,⁷ and the Swiss nuncio, Scappi, to whom

¹ See the *Brief to Philip IV. of March 26, 1628, *Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives.

² See FR. DEGL'ALBICI, **Negotiato fatto nella corte di Spagna da Msgr. Ces. Monti*, which gives Corio's reasons in detail. *Cod.* 35, F. 25 of the Corsini Library, Rome.

³ Béthune had suggested the dispatch of a Legate or nuncio extraordinary. Urban VIII. declared that he wished to reserve the dispatch of a Legate for an extreme crisis; see Béthune's *report to Louis XIII. of April 6, 1628, *Cod.* 7215, of the State Library, Vienna.

⁴ See *Bull.*, XIII., 654 *seq.* Cf. *Avviso of April 12, 1628, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ See **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, Barb. 2815, *ibid.*

⁶ See KIEWNING, I., 37.

⁷ The dispatch of Monti was announced to Philip IV. by a *Brief of April 15, 1628; a second *Brief states that Monti was at the same time to bear congratulations on the victories over the Protestants in the Netherlands and Germany. *Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives.

was joined Giovan Francesco Sacchetti, for the Princes of Upper Italy.¹ Sacchetti betook himself at once to his post ; Pallotto set out on April 22nd ; Monti, until then nuncio at Naples, came to Rome on April 25th and set out for Madrid from there ; Scappi left Lucerne on May 25th.²

By his action for peace Urban VIII. aimed not only at the re-establishment of tranquillity in Upper Italy, he also hoped to serve the cause of the Church and the true interests of Spain and the Emperor. If Philip IV.'s armed forces were engaged in Italy, the Dutch, those irreconcilable enemies both of Spain and the Catholic religion, were bound to feel encouraged to undertake fresh attacks in the Netherlands and in Spanish America. Should the Emperor become involved in the war it was certain that his old enemies would not miss so favourable an opportunity to snatch from him, in Germany, the fruits of his victories which had been so important for ecclesiastical restoration within the Empire.³

Whilst the nuncios entered upon their arduous task the Pope was careful to assist their mission of peace by scrupulously avoiding taking sides with any one of the contending parties, lest he should depart from the attitude of impartiality which his position as Head of the Church laid on him. But this did not prevent him from sharply condemning the brutal intervention of the Spaniards. Like the Venetians, he saw in Spain's action but one more attempt to render still heavier the burden

¹ See the *Briefs to Charles Emmanuel of Savoy of April 8, 1628, and to Cardinal Maurice of Savoy of April 10, 1628, *Epist.*, V., *loc. cit.* *Ibid.* the *Briefs to *Carolus, dux Mantuae*, to *Carol. Emanuel*, to *comes de Nassau*, etc., of April 10, 1628, concerning Scappi's mission. Cf. QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 216. With regard to Pallotto, see KIEWNING, I., 36 *seq.*

² Monti reached Madrid on June 17, 1628 ; see KIEWNING, I., lxx., 127. *Ibid.*, 42, note 3, for a fragment of Sacchetti's Instruction. The *credentials of May 26, 1628, for the Spanish nuncio "in gravi negotio", refer to the matter of Monti's mission. *Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives.

³ These points of view are expounded in the **Instruzione* to Msgr. Bichi, nuncio at Naples, MS. in my possession.

of foreign domination which had so long crushed unhappy Italy. For all that he had no mind to repeat the adventure of Paul IV. by opposing armed resistance to Spanish domination. At the beginning of April he told Béthune that he had done his utmost for the preservation of peace and that the new nuncios would work in the same sense, but he could not declare war on Spain. He was not equal to so extreme a course, for the Spaniards were in a position to threaten his capital at any moment from Naples; he also lacked the necessary means, for the affair of the Valtellina had involved him in an expenditure of two millions in gold. Should France and Venice intervene, he would not lag behind any of the Powers in his efforts for justice and peace. Béthune, on the other hand, was of opinion that open intervention was necessary; the *raison d'État* demanded that if our neighbour takes up arms we must do the same. But these arguments did not impress the Pope. "Even if Your Majesty starts war," Béthune reported to Louis XIII., "it will only be possible to move the Pope in the same direction step by step, and as it were without his being aware of it." Even Barberini, who showed much more courage, Béthune wrote, was against war.¹

How anxious the Pope was not to spoil the chances of his peaceful mediation is shown by his opposition to the dispatch by Nevers of an *obbedienza* embassy, not because he altogether refused to recognize the latter as Duke of Mantua,² but because he deemed such a step premature and dangerous, and one that might call forth protests both from the Emperor and the Savoyard. When the Marquis Strozzi nevertheless came to Rome as Nevers' *obbedienza* envoy, Urban VIII. refused to receive him in that capacity, declaring that he did not wish

¹ See Béthune's *letter to Louis XIII., Rome, April 6, 1628, State Library, Vienna.

² In the first *Briefs to young Nevers and his wife (of January 5 and 15, 1628) in which Urban VIII. offers his congratulation on their marriage, they are only addressed as *princeps* and *principessa*; the *Brief to their father, January 29, 1628, exhorting him to peace, is addressed to *Carolus Gonzaga, dux Mantuae. Epist., V., Papal Secret Archives.*

to forestall the Emperor's authority, and not only did he refuse to listen to Nevers' request for assistance with money and troops, but on the contrary, he earnestly besought him to come to terms with his feudal lord ; for this object he promised him his earnest support.¹

Béthune again met with failure when he made fresh efforts to persuade the Pope to change his mind.² In the end Louis XIII. imagined he would obtain his end if he promised that after the fall of La Rochelle a French army would march into Upper Italy. This seemed all the more important to him because Venice would not dare to take a definite step without the Pope.³ On May 25th Béthune was commanded to inform the Pope of the King's intention.⁴ However, the communication failed to produce the desired effect though Béthune left nothing undone to convince the Pope of the necessity " of defending the liberty of Italy and the Holy See ". Once again Urban VIII. pointed out that he was defenceless against a Spanish attack coming from Naples. He further insisted that, notwithstanding his solicitude for the independence of Italy, he was likewise bound to take into consideration his position as Head of the Church. That position obliged him to seek a peaceful solution : only in a case of necessity could he declare war. With all his insistence Béthune succeeded in obtaining no more than a promise that the Pope would consider the affair for a few days. When on June 20th Béthune went to sound Cardinal Barberini, he was told that the Pope was still of the same opinion. Béthune had only with difficulty repressed his annoyance in presence of Urban VIII., but to the nephew he now spoke with extreme vehemence. If fear caused the Pope to show so little decision when it was question of his own

¹ See SIRI, VI., 396 *seq.* Cf. KIEWNING, I., lxiv ; QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 122 *seq.*, 125.

² Cf. Béthune's *reports to Louis XIII. of April 19, May 3 and 18, 1628, State Library, Vienna.

³ See SIRI, VI., 415, 417. The arbitrariness of the Spaniards was the reason why Urban VIII. welcomed the rapprochement between Venice and France ; see RUSSO, 29.

⁴ See SIRI, VI., 403.

interests and those of Italy, then the only matters the King of France could in future discuss with him would be ecclesiastical questions and the bestowal of benefices. To Louis XIII. Béthune expressed his annoyance over Urban's refusal to join a Franco-Venetian league in the most opprobrious terms. More and more he got into his head the fixed notion that the Pope's conduct was inspired by his great timidity and his fear of the inevitable expenditure, sentiments which the Pontiff's brother encouraged.¹

In Paris even bolder language was used by Richelieu towards the nuncio Bagno, for the Cardinal's words contained a direct threat that France would refuse obedience to the Pope if the Holy See were to become a willing tool of Spanish policy.² This threat also failed to impress Rome. Bagno was instructed to give Richelieu the same answer as that which Béthune had received in Rome. As for Richelieu's threat, Barberini's comment was that as one well acquainted with the history of his country, the French minister must surely know that even at a time when the Emperors enslaved the papacy, the French Church had remained loyal to the Vicar of Christ who strove

¹ See Béthune's *report of June 25, 1628, State Library, Vienna. Cf. also the *letter in cipher of the State Secretary to Bagno in the *Nunziat. di Francia*, 68, p. 177^b *seqq.*, Papal Secret Archives. Ang. Contarini shared Béthune's views; see his *Relazione*, 283 *seq.* That Urban VIII.'s fears of danger threatening him from the direction of Naples were justified is shown by the care of the Spanish Government that this side of the States of the Church should remain unprotected. In the **Instruccion del Rey Felipe IV. al conde de Oñate embax. ord. en Roma*, dated July 26, 1628, we read concerning this point: "Y porque se ha tenido por de inconveniente considerable que los Papas en el estado de la Iglesia hayan fortificaciones en los confines de Naples, procurareys obviarlo y estorbarlo con mucha manera y destreza si se offreziera la ocasion." Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome.

² See the code *letter of Bagno, dated *Dal Campo sotto la Roccella*, 1628, June 17 (decif. July 10), *Nunziat. di Francia*, 18, p. 184 *seqq.*, Papal Secret Archives.

to fulfil as well as possible his duty as Father of the whole of Christendom.¹

The Spaniards and the Emperor were even more annoyed than the French with the attitude of the Pope. For Cardinal Barberini this was a proof that Urban VIII. only worked for peace, for no honest mediator has ever succeeded in satisfying both parties in a dispute.²

At Madrid the proposals of Monti and the nuncio Pamfili were very coldly received. Philip IV.'s all powerful minister Olivares would hear neither of peace pourparlers nor of an armistice ; in the Pope's efforts for a compromise he saw only a desire to support French interests.³ His King, he roughly told the nuncio, could not suffer himself to be coerced by the Pope into making peace, for he was not a child. The cause of all the trouble was the marriage dispensation with Maria Gonzaga which Urban VIII. had granted to the young Duke of Nevers. Never had Pope been so hostile towards Spain ; the upshot of it all would yet be a complete break with Rome.⁴ Olivares was not the only one to think thus. At a sitting of the Spanish Council of State, Feria said that of all the Popes Urban was the one most hostile to the Catholic King and the most subservient to France. He denied the favours of which his predecessors had been so lavish and, under plea of ecclesiastical immunity, interfered with the rights of jurisdiction of

¹ **Al Nuntio (di Francia), messo in cifra 12 Luglio, 1628, ibid., 187b.*

² See KIEWNING, I., 169.

³ FR. DEGL'ALBICI writes in great detail of their negotiations, **Negotiato fatto nella corte di Spagna da Msgr. Monti, Cod. 35, F. 25, Corsini Library, Rome.* Cf. also the *reports of Pamfili and Monti, in cipher, in the *Nunziat. di Spagna*, used by KIEWNING, I. and II.

⁴ *" S'alterò il duca alle parole del Nuntio dicendo, che ben s'accorgeva che il Papa voleva indurre il suo Re alla pace con le sforzate, ma che non pensasse di camminare per questa strada, perch'egli non era un fanciullo. Doveva dall'altro canto pensare che la guerra era stata cagionata dalla dispensa del matrimonio, etc.," ALBICI, *Negotiato di Msgr. Monti, loc. cit.*

the crown. In view of the partiality which caused him to grant the marriage dispensation so secretly and so promptly justice could not be expected from him.¹

If Pamfili and Monti were in a difficult position at Madrid, Pallotto was no less so at the imperial Court where Spanish pressure was almost unbearable. The suspicion that Urban VIII. was unreservedly on France's side was successfully fostered from that quarter. Pallotto did his best to clear up the situation, but Spanish underground activity always thwarted the establishment of a real understanding: the nuncio had never done rectifying distorted facts and deliberate falsehoods.² No matter what assurances he gave, Ferdinand II. clung to his belief that the Pope was his enemy. The imperial ministers invariably ascribed the worst possible motives to everyone of Urban VIII.'s measures, so much so that Pallotto described their distrust as positively insuperable.³

In June, 1628, the Duke of Alba, viceroy of Naples, requested permission for the passage through the States of the Church of 1,000 horse who were to support Gonzalez de Córdoba. The Spanish ambassador, Oñate, made every effort to persuade Urban VIII. to give his consent. The Pope was exceedingly perplexed and submitted the matter to some theologians for examination. The latter realized the danger of war in case of a refusal and advised the granting of a passage, but the viceroy should be given to understand the difficult situation which such a concession was bound to create for the Holy See. When the Pope gave the required permission Béthune expressed his amazement that Spain should have asked permission for a passage which, after all, the Pope could not refuse, and he inferred that this formality was meant to create

¹ *" Qual Pontefice e stato più alieno dalle cose di V. Mtà del presente, qual più obligato per le sue grandezze alla corona di Francia? Qual più ritroso in concedere quelle grazie che tanto largamente hanno distribuite i suoi predecessori? Qual più turbatore della Vostra giurisdittione sotto il manto del mantenimento della libertà ecclesiastica? " *Ibid.*

² See KIEWNING, I., lxxvii.

³ See KIEWNING, I., 83 *seq.*, 125, 131.

an opinion in France that the Pope sided with Spain.¹ But even so, the Spaniards were not satisfied; they wanted still more.

Now, as before, the French were anxious to win over the Pope to an anti-Spanish league and to this end they spared no effort. Nevertheless Béthune could only report that, in spite of the most pressing representations, the Pope held to his previous decision to lend Nevers diplomatic help but no military aid.² Urban was by no means blind to the danger that threatened from Spain's hegemony, or to the need of a counterpoise by means of France,³ but he could not be induced to take up arms. However, Béthune did not yet despair of his ability gradually to coax the Pope into such a path. To this end he induced him to increase his armaments. Again and again he represented to the Pontiff how greatly his interests demanded that he should prevent any further increase of the power of the Spaniards who were just as capable of attacking the Papal States as they had but now been of assailing the Duke of Mantua.⁴ Nevertheless on September 21st Béthune had to report that Nevers' representative had failed to obtain from his Holiness anything beyond kind words and good wishes for the Duke, and that the Venetian envoy had fared no better.⁵

Not long afterwards the imprudence and brutality of the Spaniards brought the French ambassador to within an ace of complete success. At the beginning of October Count Oñate, the Spanish ambassador, who never missed a chance

¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

² See Béthune's *report of July 13, 1628, State Library, Vienna.

³ See Béthune's *report of July 22, 1628, *ibid.*

⁴ See Béthune's *reports to Louis XIII., dated Rome, August 24, 1628, and September 7, State Library, Vienna. On September 8, 1628, Barberini wrote to the French nuncio: " *Nell'udienza che presi hieri l'ambasciatore Bethune ritocò il dichiararsi del Papa, ma n'ebbe le solite risposte." *Barb.* 8070, Vatican Library.

⁵ See Béthune's *letter to Louis XIII., dated Rome, September 21, 1628, State Library, Vienna. Cf. also the *report of Nevers' representative, in QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 227.

to show his hostility to the Pope,¹ proved once again that Spanish Cæsaro-papalism was not dead when he opposed the canonical visitation of the Spanish national church in Rome, S. Giacomo. The consequence of this opposition was that the administrator of the church was excommunicated and the building laid under an interdict.² Urban VIII. found himself compelled to complain to Philip IV. and to Olivares of so great an injury to his most sacred rights.³ Béthune, of course, sought to exploit the incident in the interests of France, and it was his good fortune that at that very moment he had been informed of the early fall of La Rochelle, an event most eagerly desired by the Pope.⁴ In his audience of October 6th he began by skilfully turning the conversation to this longed-for prospect and at last he succeeded in getting Urban VIII. to declare that if Louis showed himself at Lyons with the avowed intention of defending Nevers and Italian liberty, he would mobilize about 12000 men who, in conjunction with the French army, would be able to oppose a successful resistance to the Spaniards. Béthune confesses, however, that he gathered from the Pope's words that he would only fulfil this promise after a previous summons to the Spaniards to desist from their undertaking. The report adds: "Until now the Holy Father has never gone so far. His dislike for the Spaniards grows daily. I told him that if he put off an open declaration there was reason to fear the fall of Casale. This the Pope would not admit since the place had plenty of provisions and defenders; in any case the usurper could be compelled to surrender his prey should he be incautious enough to risk his Italian possessions. I interrupted with the remark that it was therefore imperative

¹ See ALBICI, **Negotiato di Msgr. Monti, loc. cit.*

² For this *cf.* Béthune's *report of October 5, 1628, *loc. cit.*, and the *letter of Barberini to the French nuncio, October 18, 1628, *loc. cit.* See also the *Discorso in Vat.* 7851, p. 349 *seq.*, Vatican Library.

³ See the *Brief of October 4, 1628, *Epist.*, V., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See in App. No. 4, Vol. XXIX, Béthune's *report of September 23, 1628, Archives for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

that he himself should mobilize his troops at once. The Pope would not grant that such a measure was required inasmuch as everything was in such a state of readiness that in case of need the army could take the field at once." Béthune ends his report by expressly remarking that the fulfilment of the Pope's promise depended on the fall of La Rochelle.¹ In the course of the ensuing weeks the ambassador displayed a feverish activity in order to rouse the Pope to resentment against the Emperor also.² The task was easy for Pallotto's reports from Vienna were not encouraging. The latter's efforts were all in vain, though he himself, together with the papal nuncios in Upper Italy,³ did his utmost to reconcile the disputants, a task in which he received valuable support from Ferdinand II.'s confessor, the Jesuit Lamormaini.⁴ The Emperor could not make up his mind. On the one hand the Spaniards, to whom he was under obligation for some important services they had rendered him, pressed him to resist the pretension of Nevers; on the other, the Empress pleaded for the Duke, whilst, through Pallotto, the Pope reminded him of the claims of justice. Ferdinand II. took Pallotto's action in bad part, as he did his insistence on the disastrous results of a war for the interests of Catholicism. When a few French auxiliaries joined the Duke of Mantua, Eggenberg threatened to flood Italy with German troops. Thereupon Pallotto appealed to the Emperor's love of peace whilst at the same time pointing out that Nevers defended himself exclusively with the forces at his disposal in France.⁵ This created bad blood in Vienna. No credence was given to

¹ See in App. No. 5, Vol. XXIX., Béthune's *report of October 7, 1628, *ibid.* Cf. App. No. 26, Vol. XXIX. for Siri.

² See Béthune's *letter to Louis XIII., dated Rome, October 19, and November 4, 1628, State Library, Vienna.

³ KIEWNING gives extracts from their reports in his introduction to his first volume. Cf. also QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 220 *seq.*

⁴ See KIEWNING, I., lxxviii. *seq.*, 135 *seq.*, 139; DUHR, 112, 700 *seq.* (see there on p. 691 *seq.*, a full account of Lamormaini's life and character).

⁵ See KIEWNING, I., 158.

the assurance that the Pope would never join a hostile league against the Emperor. The short-sightedness of Nevers who expected everything from the intervention of the French and who would not listen to the proposals for a compromise made by the nuncios Sacchetti and Scappi, was ascribed at Vienna to the attitude of the Pope, who encouraged the Duke's resistance in order to undermine the Emperor's prestige in Italy.¹ How embittered the situation was in Vienna is shown by the fact that utterly impossible and ludicrous rumours of hostile plans which the Pope was alleged to have matured against the Emperor, found credence there. Cardinal Barberini explained that these mischievous rumours were invented by a party which wanted at all costs to drag the Emperor into war.²

The tension between the Pope and the Emperor was rendered still more acute by the fact that to the long-standing and unsolved disputes concerning the partition of the Patriarchate of Aquileia and the Abbey of St. Maximinus of Trèves,³ fresh ones were constantly being added. Ferdinand II. had complained already in May, 1627, that Urban VIII. had taken no notice of his request for the nomination of a German Cardinal, whereas he had given satisfaction to France and Spain. Nor would he allow that those two nominations were merely meant to fill vacancies created by death, since Cardinal Zollern was also dead and Klesl was failing. With regard to the Emperor's complaint of the denial of favours by the Holy See, Cardinal Barberini, on June 3rd, 1628, was able to point to a long list of concessions, some of them weighty ones, more particularly to the cession, in May, 1628, of part of the Church revenues in the Palatinate, in consequence of which 200,000 florins flowed into the imperial exchequer.⁴ We are probably right if, in regard to the Emperor's demand for various ecclesiastical favours, we suspect the influence of Spain, for calm reflection would have shown that things were being asked

¹ See *ibid.*, lxxxiii-lxxxvi.

² *Ibid.*, 170.

³ Cf. above, p. 198.

⁴ See KIEWNING, I., 71.

for which the Holy See could not grant, as, for instance, the demand for a dogmatic definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, a purely theological question the definition of which belonged to a Council, or failing that, to the Supreme Head of the Church. The same was true of the demand for the insertion of new Saints in the Calendar. Rome could justly ask what was to become of the ancient ecclesiastical liturgy if every Sovereign demanded the insertion in the Calendar of five new Saints.¹ A truly morbid sensitiveness is revealed by the fact that Vienna felt hurt because on the occasion of an indisposition of the Emperor, no public prayers were ordered in Rome. Cardinal Barberini's explanation that no such action had been taken on the occasion of the grave illness of the Kings of France and Spain in previous years, nor on other such occasions, and that this line of conduct could not be altered, all the more so as the Emperor's indisposition had not been dangerous, failed to give satisfaction, as did the assurance that care would be taken to ask the prayers of priests and nuns for His Majesty's well-being.²

Like the heads of a hydra, complications arose in ever increasing numbers. Thus the Pope was asked to erect new dioceses in Bohemia though such a step was impossible so long as no assured revenues were assigned to them. Not satisfied with the fact that Urban VIII. had done all that was in his power in order to enable the Archduke Leopold William, Ferdinand II.'s son, to secure the secular administration of the archdiocese of Magdeburg, the imperial Court wanted that Prince to be given the ecclesiastical administration as well, though he was a layman. To this the Holy See could not assent.³

In order to prevent the conflict from becoming still more acute if Nevers were placed under the ban of Empire, a threat contained in a *monitorium* dated August 17th, 1628, the Pope, in the first days of September, 1628, appealed to

¹ *Ibid.*, 196, 220.

² *Ibid.*, 284.

³ *Ibid.*, cv. seq., 316.

Maximilian, Elector of Bavaria, on whose mediation he set high hopes.¹

Whilst the Emperor threatened to pronounce the ban of Empire against Nevers, though he did not dare to carry out the menace, lack of money and Córdova's incapacity had paralysed the Spaniards' military operations, the chief element of which still was the siege of the stronghold of Casale. It was of decisive importance that the garrison which Nevers had thrown into the place should defend itself with the utmost tenacity and until the time when, at the end of October, La Rochelle, the old Huguenot bulwark, was at last forced to capitulate.² The fall of La Rochelle liberated the forces of France for intervention in Italy. The fears of the French nuncio, Bagno, were now realized.³ A long war broke out for Richelieu, with characteristic determination, took up his old plan for the overthrow of the Habsburgs and the establishment of the hegemony of France over all Europe. By staking all his authority he at last overcame the opposition of the Queen-Mother, Cardinal de Bérulle and all those who were anxious for a good understanding with Madrid, to a war with Spain. Thereupon he induced Louis XIII. to cross the Alps in mid-winter and to open the campaign in Upper Italy. Diplomatic action went hand in hand with extensive military preparations so that the struggle for the succession of Mantua became a question of European importance.⁴ All the enemies of the House of Habsburg—the Dutch, the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus, Bethlen Gábor and the Turks, sensed their opportunity and in Italy itself all those who hated the Spanish hegemony raised their heads.⁵ Meanwhile Richelieu successfully deluded the Spaniards with diplomatic pourparlers until

¹ See KLOPP, III., 2, 167; KIEWNING, I., 207, note 1; SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 192 seq.

² Cf. above, p. 113.

³ Cf. **Cifra del Nuntio di Francia a Msgr. Monti*, s.d. (*decifr.* 2 Novembre 1628), Barb. 8070, Vatican Library.

⁴ See KIEWNING, I., c. seq.; Mariéjol in LAVISSE, VI., 2, 291; MOMMSEN, 36 seq.

⁵ Cf. *NICOLETTI, III., 1381, Vatican Library.

such time as the French army was ready to strike. In Italy itself he sought to unite in an anti-Spanish league Nevers, Venice and the Pope. At first Venice wished to make its accession dependent on what the Pope would do but ended by promising military aid to the Duke of Mantua so soon as the French expeditionary force should reach the Italian frontier.¹

In order to win over the Pope for warlike action Richelieu had sent for the nuncio Bagno immediately after the fall of La Rochelle: "Monsignor," he said, "there is no time now to lose in Italy and the King is about to deal energetically with the situation in that country. Make haste to inform the Pope of this intention so that he may give us a secret assurance whether, when we shall have reached Montferrat and Venice comes to our assistance, he too will lend us the help of his troops as he has promised, so that we may draw up our plan of campaign accordingly. The Pope need not come out into the open; it will be enough if he lends assistance either with troops or with money only in case such help becomes necessary; but I must have a prompt and categorical answer." Bagno repeated that all that the Pope thought of was the preservation of his neutrality and all his armaments were for the purpose of protecting the States of the Church, hence it was not possible to give the desired categorical reply. "Write all the same," Richelieu replied: "we must have either Yes! or No! so that we may take our measures: the secret will be kept for it is to our interest that the Pope should only declare himself in case we need his help." Bagno wished to make further objections but the Cardinal cut short the audience.²

In December Béthune renewed his efforts to induce the Pope to abandon the neutrality which he had observed until then, but Urban VIII. would not commit himself beyond the

¹ See KIEWNING, II., xxvii. *seq.*

² See the *report of Bagno of November 2, 1628, according to *NICOLETTI, III., 1385 (*loc. cit.*) used first by RANKE (*Päpste*, II.⁶, 357) where only Richelieu's question, but not Bagno's reply is given. In greater detail in KIEWNING, I., 299, note 1, according to *Nunziat. di Francia*, 68, p. 250, Papal Secret Archives.

declaration that if France invaded Italy he would mobilize 10,000 men for the defence of the Papal States ; if he had made more definite promises it was solely in order to induce the disputants to make peace. Nor would the Pope listen to Béthune's request that he should at least mobilize before the arrival of the French since as soon as that happened a struggle would begin which might prove dangerous to the Papal States also. When Cardinal Barberini reported this conversation to Bagno on December 15th, 1628, he praised the nuncio for his refusal of a categorical answer and instructed him to abide by that decision.¹

Richelieu also endeavoured to win over the Pope by assuring him that his intentions in driving the Spaniards from the Duchy of Milan were entirely disinterested ones, so much so that as the price of his co-operation in the liberation of Italy he offered the Pontiff part of the Duchy for his nephew. In reply Bagno merely re-affirmed the Pope's resolve to remain neutral.² For all that Béthune was instructed to try again. Precisely in his capacity as Vicar of Christ, the ambassador explained in January, 1629, His Holiness was bound to prevent by force of arms the unjust oppression of Nevers, and French help was at hand.³ Everybody expected the Pope to strike a blow for the freedom of Italy.⁴ Louis XIII. was coming as another Charlemagne to deliver the Holy See from the oppression of the Spaniards. Though Béthune displayed all his eloquence he obtained little enough. Nor were his efforts greatly helped by the fact that, after the fall of La Rochelle, Louis XIII. tolerated the continuation of Calvinist worship, a proceeding against which the Spaniards raised loud protests in Rome.⁵ Urban VIII. promised to mobilize 8000 foot and

¹ See App. No. VI, Vol. XXIX, for the *letter of Barberini to Bagno, December 15, 1628, Vatican Library.

² *Report of Bagno in code, dated Paris, December 28, 1628 (*decif. Jan. 14, 1629*), *Barb.* 8070, Vatican Library.

³ *Béthune to Louis XIII., dated Rome, January 6, 1629, State Library, Vienna.

⁴ *Béthune to Louis XIII., dated Rome, January 12, 1629, *ibid.*

⁵ See *Béthune's report of January 12, 1629, *ibid.*

100 horse who would never march against France, which was more than he could promise the Spaniards. "I have always told Your Majesty," Béthune reported to Paris, "that from the Pope one could only obtain a little at a time." Urban VIII. recalled his grave words to Monterey, the Spanish ambassador, in favour of Nevers and promised to speak more strongly once the French should have intervened. But Béthune remained unsatisfied.¹ On January 29th, 1629, he sent a somewhat subdued report of his most recent representations: "I failed to obtain a decision in accordance with Your Majesty's desires," he begins; "beyond good wishes I obtained nothing whatever." He then goes on to say how the Pope had stressed the fact that as Supreme Head of the Church he could not take sides for only thus could he bring about peace. Though the Paris nuncio, Bagno, had skilfully prepared the ground, all the arguments brought forward by Béthune failed to make an impression on Urban VIII. "To all I said the Pope replied that in view of the existing situation he could not bind himself in any way to join the league—but he would arm." Béthune sought to console his Sovereign by pointing out that armed intervention by the Popes had never been of any real use; its only advantage was the impression it made on public opinion; on the other hand Venice would certainly lend help to France.² Urban VIII.'s unwillingness to abandon his policy of reserve³ was a bitter disappointment for Béthune, all the

¹ *Béthune to Louis XIII., dated Rome, January 21, 1629, *ibid.*, where he remarks: "Il me faut nullement douter que son inclination et volonte ne soient tres grandes pour V. M^{te} et qu'il ne lui desire tout heureux succes, mais comme il est tres craintif de son naturel et que ses etats son environnes des Espanols, il va retenu a en donner des effets."

² *"A tout cecy, Sire, le Pape me donna pour reponse finale qu'en l'estat que les choses estoient, il ne pouvait faire aucune declaration n'y entrer en ligue ou association." *Letter of Béthune to Louis XIII., January 29, 1629, *loc. cit.* Cf. the *letter of the Secretary of State to Bagno, January 29, 1629, in *NICOLETTI, III., 1407 *seq.*, Vatican Library.

³ Cf. *Béthune's report to Louis XIII. of February 9 and 24, 1629, *loc. cit.*

more so as he still hoped to succeed¹ seeing that the Pope had made no secret of his profound displeasure at the violence of the Spaniards who had forced the Emperor's acquiescence, regardless of the claims of justice²; but there was no persuading him to enter into an anti-Spanish league or to join in the war.³ At the end of January, in a letter to the French nuncio, Bagno, the Pope justified his action by expressly stating that his position differed from that of the other Italian Powers for he was not merely a secular Prince but the Head of the whole Church.⁴

Meanwhile Richelieu had arrived at the "Gateway of Italy". On February 18th, 1629, the French army under Louis XIII.'s command, marching through snow and ice, began the arduous crossing of Mont Genève, the pass of which was reached on

¹ See *Béthune's report to Louis XIII., December 17, 1628, *loc. cit.*

² Every prince ought really to support the cause of Nevers, Urban VIII. had said in the middle of December, 1628, in the presence of the Bavarian envoy Crivelli, for, sooner or later, any one of them might suffer the same injury as that which had been committed against the Duke of Mantua. At the same time the Pope complained that the Spaniards opposed Bavaria's mediation at the Court of the Emperor (see SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 195). Urban VIII., who was ever determined to attain a peaceful settlement of the question, had planned during the second half of December, to appeal to the Emperor's conscience on the subject of Nevers and was prepared to make use of the Carmelite Domenico di Gesù Maria, who had deserved well of the House of Habsburg by his share in the victory of Prague. If the Pope complained bitterly of the Spaniards at this time, he was not alone for they were hated throughout Rome as the cause of the ruin of Italy. A rumour was current there, that a league was being prepared against them (SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*).

³ Cf. the *Instruction of Barberini to Bagno, January 18, 1629, in Russo, 273 *seq.*

⁴ See the *Instruction in cipher to Bagno of January 26, 1629, *Barb. LXIX.*, 60, p. 4, Vatican Library, published in part in KIEWNING, II., 33, note 2.

March 1st.¹ Headquarters were established at Oulx, four miles from the fortified place of Susa. From there, on March 3rd, Richelieu replied to Béthune's report on the negative attitude of the Pope. The letter ² betrays the Cardinal's annoyance at the news from Rome, though he did not give up hope of obtaining the desired end by means of further negotiations, for he was fully aware how important it was for the successful progress of his enterprise that the Pope should take part in it. To this end he forwarded a fresh plan for the league which better disguised his selfish design. The scope of the alliance was no longer exclusively the rescue of Nevers but the preservation of freedom and the restoration of tranquillity in Italy. Surely the Pope could no longer hesitate to join a league of this kind. To bring about this end Béthune was to display all the resources of his eloquence. He was to remind Urban VIII. of his previous declarations and point out that the league was a purely defensive one, and that as Head of the Church the Pope was bound in conscience and in honour to defend his neighbours against unjust oppression as well as to restore peace in Italy. "If the Pope refuses," the letter proceeds, "I shall hereafter make my plans without considering what he may say or wish." Richelieu then went on to expatiate on the auspicious opening of the campaign; the Alps were crossed, the army stood before Susa, everything had been admirably prepared. "Tell the Pope," we read, "that in four days from now I shall march into Piedmont with 27,000 men and that two other armies are ready in support."

The proud assurance expressed in this letter was justified by subsequent events. On March 6th the French troops were ordered to attack the strong place of Susa in consequence of the failure of negotiations with the Duke of Savoy for a free passage. The enterprise which, it was alleged, had been undertaken solely for the righteous cause of the Duke of Nevers, was inaugurated as if it were a crusade. In presence of the whole army Mass was celebrated and Louis XIII. and his

¹ See FAGNIEZ, *P. Joseph et Richelieu*, I., 406 seq.; QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 320.

² *Lettres de Richelieu*, III., 238-245.

highest dignitaries received Holy Communion at the hand of Richelieu after an appeal to the soldiers and their leaders to follow their King "in the service of God and of righteousness".¹ The troops, led by their officers, threw themselves with typical French élan² upon the defences which were carried in the first rush. Thereupon the Duke of Savoy found himself under the necessity of bending before the approaching storm. On March 11th he pledged himself to grant to the French a free passage towards Montferrat, and in exchange for Trino he renounced Montferrat as well as his alliance with Spain. On March 18th the Spaniards were obliged to raise the siege of Casale.³

In order to lend force to the representations of Béthune who was beginning to despair of success,⁴ Richelieu sought to influence the Pope through the nuncio Bagno who accompanied the King. If necessary, he told the nuncio, he would be content with secret assistance and a small armed force. To this proposal Bagno added the remark that a refusal by the Pope would almost infallibly lead to serious tension with the King and Richelieu. On March 22nd Richelieu renewed his proposals with even greater insistence and sought to win over the Pope with the suggestion that the league would serve the Pope's interests in the question of the devolution of Urbino.⁵

Notwithstanding the strongest pressure as well as every solicitation, Urban adhered to his principle that his position as Head of the Church made it impossible for him to join a league which, from a defensive alliance, might all too easily become

¹ *" In servitio di Dio e della giustizia," says ALBICI (*Negotiato di Msgr. Monti, loc. cit.*), in describing the scene.

² *" Con gran ferocia." ALBICI, *loc. cit.*

³ See RICIOTTI, IV., 268 *seq.*; CARUTTI, 289 *seq.*; FAGNIEZ, I., 407 *seq.*; QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 321.

⁴ See Béthune's *report of March 10, 1629, State Library, Vienna.

⁵ See Bagno's reports of March 12 and 15, 1629, *Barb. LXIX.*, 60, p. 28 and 31, Vatican Library, published for the greater part by KIEWNING, II., 146, note 2.

an offensive one. He could not take a step that would impede him in his duty as a peacemaker. In a letter of April 2nd to Bagno the Pope justified his conduct in detail. The Pontiff also mentioned how seriously the Papal States were threatened by Spain, not only from the direction of Naples and the Abruzzi, but likewise from Lombardy in the north. Against this danger the league offered no protection, especially as France was too far removed and Venice would have its hands full with the defence of its own territory. Moreover it was not seemly that as a member of the league, the Pope should be compelled to give his support to Venice in case that republic were attacked by the Emperor in consequence of its alliance with the Dutch and the Protestants. To all this must be added the danger that Spain might sequester the *annates* and refuse its obedience.¹

Though Richelieu failed to persuade the Pope to join the league,² he succeeded in getting Venice to conclude, on April 8th, a six years' defensive alliance with France to which Nevers and Charles Emmanuel of Savoy also gave their adhesion.³ The Cardinal achieved another important success when, notwithstanding the representations of the Pope who had repeatedly warned him against an understanding with England, and who, in the matter of the execution of the marriage settlement, had reminded him of what he owed to his own conscience,⁴ he concluded peace with Protestant England by foregoing a literal execution of the articles agreed upon at the time of the marriage of Charles I. with Henrietta Maria, a concession in return for which England dropped the

¹ See the *Instruction to Bagno of April 2, 1629, *Barb.* LXIX., 60, p. 30, *loc. cit.*; a passage in KIEWNING, II., 146, note 2, and another in PIEPER, in the *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XCIV., 473.

² See Béthune's *reports to Louis XIII. of April 22 and May 6, 1629, *loc. cit.* Cf. also Béthune's letter of May 19, 1629, to Richelieu, a part of which is in *Lettres de Richelieu*, III., 330, note 3.

³ See QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 335.

⁴ For the Pope's warnings cf. the account by KIEWNING, I., 299, note 2, against RANKE (*Päpste*, III., 158).

Huguenots.¹ Satisfied with the rapid and brilliant results of the campaign, Louis XIII. returned to France on April 18th in order to quell a Huguenot disturbance whilst Richelieu, with 16,000 troops, remained at Susa until the ratification of the treaties. On May 11th he too, together with his confidential adviser, Fr. Joseph, set out for France. In the south of that kingdom the war against the rebellious Huguenots, who were supported by Spain, had already begun.² In a Brief of April 29th, 1629, Urban VIII. praised Louis XIII.'s action against the Calvinists,³ but in this matter also the Pope was to experience a grave disappointment,⁴ for Richelieu who wished to concentrate all the forces of the realm for the struggle against the Habsburgs, granted to the defeated Calvinists the free exercise of their religion in the same way as he had done in the preceding year.

The oppressive domination of the Spaniards had called forth so universal and so profound a detestation of them that their punishment by the French gave the greatest satisfaction throughout the Peninsula ; in fact many people regarded the French as their liberators. Satisfaction was all the keener as the wrong done to Nevers was clear to all. This feeling was shared by Urban VIII.⁵ and by his nuncios.⁶ The fate of the restless Duke of Savoy the Pope considered as a just judgment upon a man in whom he saw the real cause of all the recent troubles.⁷ The Curia hoped that the Spaniards would

¹ For the peace between France and England concluded at Susa on April 24, 1629, and the importance of this step, see RANKE, *Engl. Gesch.*, IV.⁴, 223, VIII., 122 ; BROSCH, VII., 137. Cf. also FEDERN, *Richelieu*, 117. ² See FAGNIEZ, I., 414.

³ See **Epist.*, VI., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ By a new **Brief* to August 12, 1629, Urban VIII. had again praised the efforts of France against the Huguenots. *Ibid.*

⁵ See Béthune's **report* to Louis XIII. of April 3, 1629, *ibid.*

⁶ Cf. the report of Aytona in GÜNTER, *Habsburger-Liga*, 37.

⁷ See ANG. CONTARINI, *Relazione*, 292. Urban VIII. was not alone in this opinion. Béthune wrote on August 27, 1629, about the Savoyard prince, **" Et l'on dit qu'il est l'Hélène d'Italie, laquelle n'a este troublee depuis la paix de 1559 jusque a cette heure que par lui."* State Library, Vienna.

now show a greater readiness for peace,¹ and Rome would have been glad if France, now that Casale was relieved, had likewise shown a more conciliatory disposition towards the Emperor.² In his zeal for the restoration of peace,³ Urban VIII., through the intervention of Maximilian of Bavaria, had hoped to obtain at Vienna a solution favourable to Nevers. When the attempt failed his annoyance was very great. Already in January, 1629, he had dropped the remark that the pride of the House of Austria was such that it would not heed any Prince : but God would chastise it.⁴

The Pope's indignation at the hostile attitude towards Nevers of the cabinets of Vienna and Madrid⁵ proved most useful to Richelieu in Rome where his peace with England was accepted in silence and his policy judged far too lightly. When Maximilian of Bavaria reported to Cardinal Barberini that France was giving financial assistance to Denmark, Urban VIII. refused to believe it ; he declared the thing was impossible for various reasons and offered his services as before with a view to promoting an understanding between Bavaria and France. The Paris nuncio, Bagno, was doing all he could in the same sense. Like the Pope himself he too hoped that an alliance between France and Bavaria would induce Richelieu to break with the German Protestants ! In this respect Bagno shared the delusions of Barberini who, in view of Richelieu's temporary friendliness towards the Holy See, was of opinion that one could trust him up to a point.⁶

¹ See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 201 ; QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 359.

² See ANG. CONTARINI, *Relazione*, 293.

³ To this end a Jubilee was prescribed at the beginning of March ; see *Avviso of March 7, 1629, Vatican Library. Cf. **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, *ibid.*

⁴ See the report of Crivelli of January 27, 1629, in SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*, 199.

⁵ The Pope's remarks on the matter were repeated at Madrid in a distorted version ; see *NICOLETTI, III., 1380, Vatican Library.

⁶ Cf. SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*, 200 *seq.*, 257 *seq.* ; RUSSO, 35 *seq.*, 274 *seq.*

Urban VIII.'s opinion on the pride of the House of Austria seemed justified in view of the fact that two warlike undertakings were being simultaneously planned at the Emperor's court. There was question not only of forcing the Duke of Nevers to submit to the sequestration imposed by Ferdinand II., but an irruption of imperial troops into the territory of Venice was to take place at the same time. Nothing less than a real war of rapine was planned in order to conquer territory for the Austrian field-marshal Collalto and for Wallenstein.¹

These bold designs having been crossed by Louis XIII.'s brilliant campaign, Ferdinand II. threw himself into the "Italian adventure", thereby challenging the most formidable of all his enemies.² In April, 1629, the Emperor who, according to the remark of a contemporary, seemed incapable of refusing anything to the Spaniards,³ made the necessary preparations for seizing, with the utmost secrecy, the Swiss passes so as to secure for himself the gateways of Italy. On April 24th he explained to the Electors that this action was necessary for the preservation of the authority and jurisdiction of the Empire. The Elector of Mayence, together with John George of Saxony and Maximilian of Bavaria, refused to participate in so risky an enterprise.⁴ However, notwithstanding every warning to the contrary, Ferdinand, whom the peace of Lübeck, concluded on May 29th, 1629, with Denmark, had freed from the burden of the German war, continued on his fatal path. In coming to this decision he was swayed, in addition to pressure by Spain and the obstinacy of Nevers, by the circumstance that the bitter hatred felt in Germany towards the undisciplined imperial soldiery rendered advisable the employment of those bands of mercenaries on Italian territory.⁵

At the end of May, 1629, the vanguard led by Count Mérode, followed by the main force under Collalto, seized the pass of

¹ See RITTER, *Wallenstein's Eroberungspläne gegen Venedig*, in the *Hist. Zeitschr.*, XCIII., 47 seq.

² See RITTER, III., 440.

³ PAPPUS, I., 46.

⁴ See KLOPP, III., I, 288.

⁵ See GINDELY, *Wallenstein*, II., 207.

Santa Lucia, occupied Chur and from there pushed on through the pass of Sett as far as Chiavenna. The consternation of the Italian Powers at the occupation of the Grisons and the Valtellina by the imperial troops was immense, whilst Urban VIII.'s displeasure was still further increased when he was informed that among the imperial soldiery there were many Protestants. The Swiss nuncio also reported that these wild mercenaries openly declared their desire to sack Rome a second time. Similar threats by the Emperor's partisans were reported by the Venetian ambassador in Vienna¹ and the representative of the Duke of Mantua.² In this perilous situation Urban VIII. at last undertook in earnest such military preparations for the defence of the Papal States as France had been counselling for a long time in his own interest,³ whilst he also entered into closer relations with the Duke of Bavaria and the Bavarian league. He still clung to the hope that Maximilian would succeed in restraining the Emperor from warlike measures against Nevers. When this hope vanished he prayed Maximilian to give the Papal army a tried leader in the person of Tilly. Though the Duke declined to comply with that request Urban VIII nevertheless continued to rely on his assistance more than ever. Cardinal Barberini expressed the opinion that the Pope loved the Wittelsbach Prince more than all the other Princes and that he desired to be always at one with him. Day by day it became more evident that he could not rely on the others and he now regretted that he had not previously given his support to the league.⁴

¹ See KIEWNING, II., 213, 214, note 1 ; SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 210.

² See QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 391 *seq.*

³ See KIEWNING, II., 242 ; QUAZZA, I., 366. At the end of June all subjects of foreign princes were taken away from the garrison of Castel S. Angelo which was to consist exclusively of subjects of the States of the Church (*Avviso of June 23, 1629, Vatican Library). From the beginning of July troops were enlisted and preparations carried forward in all frontier fortresses of the States of the Church (*Avviso of July 11, 1629, *ibid.*).

⁴ See SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*

When news arrived of the invasion of the Grisons, Urban VIII. suggested to the imperial envoy Savelli the idea of a conference in Rome at which he was prepared to play the rôle of mediator—though none but that. Only if the congress yielded no result should recourse be had to arms, and in view of the fact that for the time being the imperial troops stopped in the Valtellina, the project of a congress did not seem hopeless. On June 22nd, 1629, the nuncios of Vienna, Madrid, Lucerne and Paris were instructed to work in this sense on the Governments to which they were accredited.¹ The nuncio Pallotto exerted all his energy both by word of mouth and in writing in order to win over the Cabinet of Vienna for the idea of a conference, but its members refused all discussion until the French troops should have withdrawn from Italy. It was for the Pope to persuade them to do so, Eggenberg declared! In the fullness of his arrogance, and as if the Pope were no more than the chaplain of the Habsburgs, the all-powerful minister, in view of the position of his imperial master who greatly under-estimated the dangers with which he was threatened, declared his conviction that the tragedy which was then opening would end most happily with the Emperor's coronation, for which, seeing that the Popes did not like to perform such ceremonies in Rome, Urban VIII. would have to come to Bologna or Ferrara!²

As a result of the military preparations which had been forced on the Pope by the threat of an invasion of Upper Italy by imperial troops, 7,000 infantry and 800 cavalry were on a war footing by the beginning of July. "I did not ask that these troops should be joined to those of Your Majesty," Béthune wrote on July 6th, "for further developments will come of their own accord."³ Béthune did all he could to

¹ See KIEWNING, II., liv., 214, 221, 231. The *Brief to the Swiss nuncio, not mentioned here, is in *Epist.*, VI., Papal Secret Archives.

² See the report of Pallotto of August 10, 1629, in KIEWNING, II., 286, 289. Cf. also the passage from *NICOLETTI, in RANKE, *Päpste*, II.⁶, 360.

³ See *Béthune to Louis XIII., dated Rome, July 6, 1629, State Library, Vienna.

alarm Urban VIII. whose fear was lest, under various pretexts, the German mercenaries should invade the States of the Church from their Milanese base. He recalled the days of Clement VII. and the Sack of Rome which was still fresh in everybody's memory. The slow progress of the military preparations got on the nerves of Béthune who was continually pressing, though unsuccessfully, for a speeding up, so much so that towards the end of August he begged Louis XIII. to write to the Pope urging him to greater haste.¹ Urban VIII. armed slowly because, notwithstanding the cold reception which his proposal of a conference had met with in Vienna, he clung to the idea of such a gathering as long as possible.² However, all hope of a peaceable solution vanished when on September 18th, 1629, Ferdinand issued a proclamation announcing the advance of his troops into Italian territory. The document enumerated the reasons for the confiscation of Nevers' territory, commanded the vassals of Empire to conform with the orders of the imperial generals and forbade them to lend any support to the Duke of Mantua, under pain of being punished as rebels.³

The imperial army had been raised to 20,000 men. Collalto drew up a plan of campaign in conjunction with Spinola who had taken Córdoba's place in Milan and who had brought with him two million thalers in cash. The Spanish army was to occupy the territory of Montferrat whilst the imperial troops advanced on Mantua. Some delay was caused by Collalto falling sick, but on his recovery the imperial troops, like a mountain torrent, poured themselves⁴ all over the territory of Cremona and Mantua. The cowardly soldiers

¹ See *Béthune's letter of August 27, 1629, *ibid.*

² See KIEWNING, II., lxx. *seq.*; QUAZZA, *La guerra*, I., 415 *seq.* The *credentials for Giulio Mazarin (who had been appointed to accompany the nuncio Scappi, instead of Sachetti) were addressed to Spinola and the Princes of Upper Italy, dated September 12, 1629, in *Epist.*, VI., Papal Secret Archives.

³ See KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 644 *seq.*; ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 133.

⁴ See PAPPUS, I., 47.

of Nevers and those of Venice gave way all along the line. By the end of October the imperial troops stood beneath the walls of Mantua, but here their victorious advance came to a standstill owing to the fact of the city being surrounded on three sides by marshy lakes. In Montferrat also no decisive action had taken place because Spinola could not make up his mind to lay siege to Casale.¹

The progress of the imperial troops had thrown Urban VIII. into the greatest consternation.² However unpromising the prospect must have seemed he nevertheless renewed his efforts for the restoration of peace and expressed his readiness to agree with any proposal that might lead to such a consummation.³ Taking advantage of a letter of Philip IV., dated September 2nd, which arrived in Rome at the end of that month, he returned to his proposal of a conference. In his letter the King of Spain promised that if the Pope obtained the withdrawal of the French troops from Italy, he would do his best to secure the withdrawal of those of the Emperor.⁴ The Pope held a consultation with Cardinals Barberini, Ginnasio, Pio, Lante, Capponi, Aldobrandini, Caetani, Zacchia, Gessi, Verospi and Ginetti, after which couriers were dispatched with fresh credentials and appropriate instructions for the nuncios in Madrid, Vienna and Paris. The Spanish nuncio was to draw Olivares' attention to the dangerous situation in the Netherlands where, in consequence of the employment of imperial troops in Italy, two places as important as Hertogenbush (Bois-le-Duc) and Wesel had fallen into the hands of the Dutch.

¹ See MURATORI, XI., 116 *seq.*; ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 135 *seq.*, 290 *seq.*

² Cf. *Béthune's report of September 11, 1629, on his audience of September 7: "J'ai trouvé a mon arrivée Sa Sté avec un visage tant trouble comme ayant entendu des choses qui lui fussent peu agreables. J'eü promptement la preuve de cela, car ses premiers paroles furent: Nous sommese a la guerre." State Library, Vienna. Cf. QUAZZA, I., 427.

³ Cf. QUAZZA, I., 427 *seq.*, 429.

⁴ SIRI, VI., 730 *seq.* *Ibid.*, 732 *seq.*, for Urban VIII.'s answer. Cf. QUAZZA, I., 445, 504.

Pallotto was instructed to represent in Vienna what was to be feared from the Turks, the Danes and the Swedes. The gains which Eggenberg hoped for from the Italian campaign were most uncertain for in that country there were still many hard nuts to crack. The occupation of the Swiss passes was bound to irritate both the Swiss and the Italian Princes, whereas France's power had never been so strong as just then. In view of the injury which a war would certainly inflict on the Catholic religion the Emperor should listen rather to his confessor than to his worldly advisers since the matter was one that concerned his conscience.¹ For the purpose of influencing Ferdinand II. still further in this sense the Carmelite Domenico di Gesù Maria was sent on a special mission to Vienna.²

The injuries which threatened Catholicism from the outbreak of war were likewise emphasized in the Bull of October 22nd, 1629, in which the Pope proclaimed a universal jubilee in order to avert the disaster of war and its usual companions, plague and famine.³ When the nuncios at last succeeded in inducing the Emperor and the King of Spain to appoint plenipotentiaries to negotiate an armistice, one of the outstanding diplomatists of the Curia, Giovanni Giacomo Panciroli, was dispatched to Upper Italy as nuncio extraordinary.⁴ He was instructed to urge a peaceful settlement in Mantua and Milan and with the commanders of the imperial and the French troops. So as to

¹ See the important letter in cipher of Barberini to Pallotto of October 6, 1629, in KIEWNING, II., 345 *seq.*

² See the *Brief to Ferdinand II., of October 30, 1629, which says: "Arma lucis ad muniendam religionem deferet Dominicus a Iesu Maria discalceatus." *Epist.*, VII., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. QUAZZA, *La guerra*, II., 19 *seq.*

³ *Bull.* XIV., 113 *seq.*

⁴ A *Brief for Panciroli to *Carolus dux Mantuae* was drawn up as early as October 20, 1629 (*Epist.*, VII., *loc. cit.*). Further *confirmation of November 1 and the *Instruction of November 7, 1629, are in *Nunzial. di Paci*, 4 and 5; see KIEWNING, II., 372, note 4. Cf. also ANG. CONTARINI, *Relazione*, 388; QUAZZA, I., 499; MÜLLER, *Friedensvermittlungen*, 137 *seq.*; *report of Béthune of November 14, 1629, State Library, Vienna.

leave nothing undone Urban VIII. further resolved to dispatch on a mission of peace Cardinal Antonio Barberini, the brother of his Secretary of State. The nomination took place on November 19th. Besides Panciroli, the youthful but highly gifted Giulio Mazarin, who until then had acted as secretary to Sacchetti in Lombardy, was also added to the personnel of the legation. Barberini's mission was not confined to Italy but included the Emperor and the other Princes.¹ Together with Cardinal Antonio Barberini, Carlo Barberini was sent to take the command of the Papal troops which were to defend the frontier of Mantua. By the middle of November these forces had been raised to a total of 10,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry.² The Spaniards showed great resentment at these precautionary measures. Cardinal Borgia and Philip IV.'s ambassador in Rome assured the Pope that he had nothing to fear from their king, though at the very same time the ambassador sought to rouse the resentment of the Cardinals against Urban VIII. who had made them contribute to the cost of the military preparations.³ In these preparations the representatives of France and Venice saw the fulfilment of their keenest wishes, though in view of previous experiences, they did not delude themselves into believing that Urban VIII. had any intention to take part in the war. They realized that

¹ See **Acta consist.*, Papal Secret Archives, and the **report* of Béthune of November 14, 1629, State Library, Vienna. For A. Barberini's mission see also the Instruction in cipher to Pallotto of November 3, 1629, in KIEWNING, II., 373. Bologna, Ferrara and Ravenna were informed by **Briefs* of November 1, 1629 (Papal Secret Archives). SIRI's remark (VII., 79) that the French had taken Cardinal A. Barberini to be wholly incapable on account of his youth, gave rise to the same opinion in the minds of later writers; M. MIAGLIA (*La legazione del card. A. Barberini nella guerra del Monferrato*, Roma, 1902) agrees with Siri, as does also QUAZZA, II., 49.

² See Béthune's **letter* to Louis XIII., dated Rome, November 14, 1629, *loc. cit.* Cf. Russo, 33.

³ See both ANG. CONTARINI, *Relazione*, 289, and the **reports* of Béthune of December 22, 1629, and January 12, 1630, *loc. cit.*

all he meant to do was to preserve his neutrality and to work for peace.¹

In the same consistory of November 19th, 1629, Urban VIII. took an important step by which he hoped to put the warring parties into a more conciliatory mood. This was the bestowal of the purple on three of the Emperor's candidates, namely, the Archbishop of Gran, Peter Pázmány, Theodor Trivulzio and the nuncio of Vienna, Pallotto. The latter nomination was all the more remarkable as until then no German nuncio had ever received such a distinction. The red hat was at the same time bestowed on the Paris nuncio, Bagno, and on Richelieu's brother, Alphonse Louis, Archbishop of Lyons.²

Whilst Cardinal Antonio Barberini, who had left Rome on November 12th,³ added his efforts to those of Panciroli and Mazarin, with a view to the conclusion of an armistice,⁴ Richelieu led the Pope to hope for the withdrawal of the French troops,⁵ though in reality the leader of France's policy cherished very different plans. He had successfully crushed the Huguenot rising in the South, but this time also he had granted them freedom of religion (by the edict of Nîmes,

¹ See ANG. CONTARINI, *Relazione*, 299, and Béthune's *reports to Louis XIII., dated Rome, February 2 and 3, 1630 *loc. cit.* Cf. QUAZZA, I., 499.

² For the others named at that time, see XXIX., Ch. 2.

³ The mission of Barberini and the publication of a Jubilee (see above, p. 240) were announced by a *Brief of November 22 to the Duke of Alcalá, Viceroy of Naples, by one of November 24 to the Emperor, the King of Spain and many other Princes, as well as to Venice (*Epist.*, VII., Papal Secret Archives). Cf. Russo, 280, *" November 11, 1629: Carolus Barberinus capit. general. praestitit iuramentum et recepit baculum. 12 Nov.: Card. Antonius et eius pater Carolus discesserunt Roma propter rumorem belli et discordias principum." **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, Vatican Library.

⁴ Cf. F. AMADEI, in ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 296, 305 *seq.*, 310 *seq.*, 316 *seq.*

⁵ See the *Brief to Richelieu of January 19, 1630, *Epist.*, VII., *loc. cit.*

June 28th, 1629),¹ for he wished to unite all the forces of France and to leave no malcontents in his rear during the fresh campaign in Italy which he was meditating. For this undertaking he raised an army of 20,000 men. This time also he was concerned neither with the fate of Nevers nor the security of Venice; all he thought of was the strengthening of French power in Italy.² How far-sighted, but also how unscrupulous his policy was, appears from the fact that all the time he was doing his best to undermine the loyalty of the German Princes and to form a vast anti-imperial coalition which was to include Holland, England, Venice and Sweden.³

Far more astute than the imperial statesmen who, even in 1629, treated the Pope in arrogant fashion and even advocated an attack on the Pontifical States,⁴ Richelieu had sought to put Urban VIII. under obligation to him⁵ when on December 7th, 1629, he compelled Edmund Richer, the most extreme and indefatigable protagonist of the Gallican principles, to publish an unconditional recantation of his opinions.⁶

With his Sovereign the Cardinal had by then reached the peak of his power. Louis XIII. who, by letters patent dated November 21st, had granted him the title of prime minister, named him on the 24th his lieutenant-general with the army of Italy. Richelieu was given such vast powers both for peace and war that it was said at Court that his Majesty had kept nothing for himself except the ancient privilege of the rulers of France, that of healing goitre.

¹ Cf. H. DE LA GARDE, *Le duc de Rohan et les protestants sous Louis XIII.*, Paris, 1884.

² See ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 147 *seq.*

³ See RITTER, III., 440 *seq.*

⁴ See KIEWNING, II., lxxiv. *seq.*, lxxvi.

⁵ "' Per obligar il Papa," says *NICOLETTI (III., 932, Vatican Library).

⁶ See besides REUSCH, *Index*, II., 359, LASSBERG, in the *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, X.², 1190, and *NICOLETTI, III., 922 *seq.*, *loc. cit.* Cf. also the *Brief to Richelieu of January 19, 1630, Papal Secret Archives.

On December 29th, 1629, Richelieu left Paris with his trusted Fr. Joseph. On one side of his carriage rode the Duke of Montmorency, on the other Marshals Schomberg and Bassompierre.¹ On his way to Italy the Cardinal passed through Lyons, Grenoble and Embrun. He was not bent on war at any cost but he was resolved to dictate peace on the basis of the strength of his army; hence the attempts at mediation by the papal envoys Mazarin, Panciroli and the nuncio of Turin proved in vain.²

A most equivocal attitude was likewise adopted by Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy. In his memoirs Richelieu calls him a cunning fox, but the truth is that in the Cardinal the Duke had found his master. Richelieu was fully aware that the negotiations conducted by the "doorkeeper of the Alps"³ were only intended to delay the advance of the French army until he should be strong enough to resist them by force. When the discussions with the Prince of Piedmont, which took place between March 4th and 8th at Bussolino, two hours' march beyond Susa, yielded no satisfactory result,⁴ Richelieu, instead of advancing on Casale, decided to use force against the Savoyard who might have barred his retreat. He concentrated his army in the valley of the Doria Riparia and on March 13th he moved it against the Duke of Savoy whose 15,000 men were drawn up between Avigliana and Rivoli. The Cardinal rode at the head of his troops, cuirass on back and pistols in holster. The Doria was crossed during the night of March 17th to 18th, whilst a storm of rain raged with such fierceness that the infuriated soldiers cursed the Cardinal. However, the undertaking was a complete success. Previous to the advance of the French the Duke of Savoy had withdrawn from Rivoli to Turin and had openly made common cause with

¹ See SIRI, VI., 800.

² Cf. SIRI, VII., 15 seq.; *NICOLETTI, III., 875 seq., Vatican Library. See also ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 150; KLOPP, III., I, 392; COUSIN, *La jeunesse de Mazarin*, 316 seq.; QUAZZA, II., 25 seq., 31 seq.

³ See CAPRIATA, 719.

⁴ Cf. KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 1373 seq.; CAPRIATA, 718 seq.

the Spaniards and the imperialists.¹ The position of the French was a difficult one. To throw troops without provisions into Casale would only have worsened conditions in the town. To stay where they were was dangerous for several reasons and an attack on Turin would have been a desperate venture. In these circumstances Richelieu, who was no less eminent as a strategist than as a statesman, decided on a bold stroke. Swinging his forces round, he advanced in a southward direction along the front of the army of Savoy, against the inadequately defended town of Pinerolo which dominated the road from Mont Genève. By the end of March Pinerolo was forced to capitulate.² Everyone was amazed when they saw one "who had come to protect the oppressed now himself engaged in oppressing an ally".³

With the Piedmontese passes in his hands and the certainty that Casale would be able to hold out for a while, Richelieu was in a position to wait for the next move by his opponents. The latter could not agree. Spinola, as Khevenhüller puts it, had all sorts of petty quarrels with Collalto because the former wanted to command the imperial troops also.⁴ The successes of the French seemed to dispose their opponents to agree to a compromise. In view of Panciroli's ill success, Barberini himself took up the affair. He left Bologna on March 4th, 1630.⁵ A preliminary meeting at Alessandria with Spinola and Collalto, at which Panciroli and Mazarin were also present,⁶ gave him fresh hope. He then proceeded to Rivoli, but on arriving

¹ See CAPRIATA, 723; QUAZZA, II., 53 *seq.*

² See CAPRIATA, 223 *seq.*; ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 153 *seq.*; QUAZZA, II., 53

³ See RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 360, after the letter of the Legate of April 5, 1630, in *NICOLETTI, Vatican Library.

⁴ See ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 155.

⁵ NICOLETTI, III., 1525, *loc. cit.*

⁶ March 12, 1630; see *NICOLETTI, III, 1531 *seq.* (*loc. cit.*) where the *letter of March 16, of the Legate to Card. Barberini is quoted. *Ibid.*, 1545, the *letter of Cardinal Barberini of March 22: "N.S. ha benedetto e lodato la prudenza e lo spirito con che V.S.I. ha promosso il negozio della pace," etc., Vatican Library.

there he found the Duke of Savoy in a very angry mood. The Duke complained bitterly of Richelieu and begged them to defend his interests. Meanwhile the fortress of Pinerolo had fallen, with the consequence that Richelieu would not think of surrendering any of the advantages he had gained. Cardinal Barberini nevertheless paid him a visit and Richelieu honoured the Pope's representative by going two miles to meet him. Fresh negotiations began at once in presence of Panciroli and Mazarin as well as the Venetian envoy and Marshal Créqui, but they failed owing to Charles Emmanuel's obstinate insistence on the surrender of Pinerolo. On that point Richelieu remained inflexible so that Cardinal Barberini was forced to return to Turin without having achieved anything. At the beginning of April Panciroli and Mazarin made yet another fruitless appeal to Richelieu. The Cardinal angrily told Mazarin that he was amazed that he should be asked to give up Pinerolo; he had expected, on the contrary, that the representatives of the Pope and the Italian Princes would beg of him not to release his hold on it, for the tranquillity of Italy could only be secured from attack by either Spain or Savoy if that fortress remained in the hands of the King of France.¹ Nor would Richelieu agree to a meeting with Spinola which Panciroli and Mazarin proposed with a view to facilitating a compromise. A further effort by the Legate, who had returned to Pinerolo for that purpose, was equally unsuccessful. Only now did Barberini give up all hope; but in order that some papal diplomatists might always be at hand in case of any fresh development, he left

¹ *" Ma prima che il Mazzarino giungesse a Camargliola, tornò di nuovo a Richeliù per ritentare il punto di Pinarolo, di che quasi commosso Richeliù svelatamente dissele di restare molto ammirato che gli si facesse istanza della restituzione di quella piazza e specialmente stimava che gli dovesse esser dissuasa dal Legato e da ogni altro ministro del Papa e da tutti i principi italiani, dipendendo la sicurezza della provincia dal mantenersi in mano del re di Francia di quella fortezza, senza la quale gli Spanuoli e'l duca di Savoia, quando erano disgustati co' Francesi, havrebbono potuto turbarla." *NICOLETTI, III., 1584, *loc. cit.*

Panciroli and Mazarin behind whilst he himself returned to Bologna on April 21st.¹ From there he sent a detailed account of his fruitless negotiations to Rome. Urban VIII. nevertheless wished the discussions to go on.²

In his annals of Ferdinand II. Khevenhüller justly remarks that everything failed because Collalto hoped for fresh military successes whilst Nevers looked for French help.³ It was Richelieu's good fortune that his opponents Spinola, Collalto and the Duke of Savoy could not agree ; consequently he had little ground to fear an attack on his strong position. So he entrusted the supreme command to Marshals Schomberg and La Force, and on May 2nd returned to France where internal troubles demanded his presence.⁴ On the 14th of the same month, to the great displeasure of the Pope who could only think of peace,⁵ Louis XIII., at the head of an army of 14,000 men, invaded Savoy which he rapidly subdued, with the sole exception of the fortress of Montmelian. In July yet another French army appeared on the scene which robbed Charles Emmanuel of the town of Saluzzo. As for Charles of Nevers, the French no longer gave him a thought.

The Duchy of Mantua had suffered much whilst the storm of war raged in Savoy. The plague, which had broken out during the winter months in the Duchy and in the whole of Upper Italy, spread even more rapidly as the warm season approached.⁶ When at the end of May, near Villabuona, Venice's land forces suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the imperial troops, the fate of Mantua was sealed. The French only thought of strengthening their position in Savoy and there they stayed ; hence the Duke of Nevers would have been fully justified had he come to terms with Collalto.⁷

¹ See MIAGLIA, *loc. cit.*, 29.

² Cf. the *Brief to Card. Ant. Barberini of May 11, 1630, *Epist.*, VII., Papal Secret Archives.

³ KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 792.

⁴ See QUAZZA, II., 73.

⁵ See SIRI, VII., 79 *seq.* ; ANG. CONTARINI, *Relazione*, 293. Cf. *Lett. de Richelieu*, III., 669, 677 *seq.*

⁶ See QUAZZA, II., 82.

⁷ See CAPRIATA, 752 *seq.*, 754 *seq.* ; ZWIEDENECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 155 *seq.*, 166, 331 ; BÜHRING, 5 *seq.*

Had he done so he would have spared his capital, which had remained most loyal to him notwithstanding the trials of a prolonged siege followed by famine and pestilence, the terrible fate which now overwhelmed it. In the night of July 17–18th, 1630, the imperial troops succeeded in effecting an entry into Mantua. There now followed for one of the most magnificent capitals of the Renaissance period three days of terror, looting and destruction on the part of a soldiery burning with the lust of plunder. The foulest outrages were committed, whilst the imperial generals, first among them being Aldringen, laid their hands on the valuables and the works of art of the ducal palace. The total value of the booty was reckoned at 18,000,000 scudi. The Duke and his son who, together with the commander of the French garrison and the Princess Maria, had sought refuge in the citadel, were forced by a conflagration to throw themselves on the generosity of the imperial commander. The two princes were taken to Ariano in the territory of Ferrara where the Princess Maria was subsequently allowed to join them.¹

The conquest of Mantua brought the fall of Casale nearer and with it the decision of the Italian war in favour of Ferdinand II. and Philip IV. The power of the Emperor seemed greater than ever. But these appearances were deceptive; Ferdinand's position had never been so perilous as it was at that moment.

(2)

No less fatal than this intervention in the struggle for the succession of Mantua was another measure decided upon by

¹ See CAPRIATA, 759 *seq.*; SIRI, VII., 139 *seqq.*, 145 *seqq.*; ZWIEDENECK-SÜDENHORST, II., 169 *seq.*, 212 *seq.*, 340 *seq.*, and in the *Zeitschr. für allg. Gesch.*, II., 711 *seq.* (in both places the fall of Mantua is wrongly placed in June!) and especially QUAZZA, *La guerra*, II., 124–141, who shows against *Romanin* (VII., 301 *seq.*), that the chief blame for the fall of the town was due to Venice; *cf.*, *ibid.*, p. 146 *seq.*, 149 *seq.*, for an account of the dispersal of the looted works of art and the atrocities of the soldiery. *Cf.* also LUZIO, *La Galleria dei Gonzaga*, Milan, 1913, 78 *seq.*

the Emperor though only after prolonged hesitation.¹ On March 6th, 1629, he signed the so-called "Edict of Restitution" in the form of an authentic interpretation of the religious peace of Augsburg, some of the clauses of which were very obscure.

In the introductory section of the edict with which both Ferdinand II. and the League hoped to reap the fruit of their victories, the Emperor is at pains to prove that he was not only materially but formally authorized and even obliged to take such a step. He points out how the Protestants had illegally seized both mediate and immediate ecclesiastical property and how by their obstinacy they had made impossible an amicable settlement of the conflicts which had arisen in consequence, and in the end they had criminally had recourse to arms. However, God had punished their arrogance and granted victory to a just cause. Then follows a demonstration to the effect that both the Catholic and the Protestant Estates of Empire had repeatedly demanded from the Emperor a judgment on the so-called "Grievances of Empire". In consequence the following points were enforced: first, restoration of the abbeys and monasteries and other Church property not immediately subject to the Empire which at the time of the treaty of Passau, or subsequently, were in the possession of the Catholics from whom they had been taken by violence, against the plain text of the religious peace. Secondly, the edict declares illegal and invalid the ownership of abbeys and dioceses immediately subject to the Empire which the Protestants had seized in violation of the ecclesiastical reservation (*Reservatum ecclesiasticum*) of the peace of Augsburg, hence their Protestant occupants were entitled to neither seat nor vote in the Diet of Empire, nor could either regalia or fiefs be allocated to them. Thirdly, the so-called right of reform, that is, the execution of the axiom *cujus regio ejus religio* belonged to the Catholic Estates in exactly the same way as to the Protestant ones, inasmuch as Ferdinand II.'s declaration in an opposite sense was not contained in the religious peace treaty and had never been communicated

¹ Cf. above, p. 191 seq.

to the tribunal of the imperial Camera. Henceforth that tribunal would give its decisions in accordance with these principles and in notorious cases the Emperor himself would see to it that they were carried into effect. Special commissaries were to carry the edict into effect in each circle and in case of need they were empowered to demand the aid of the military. Lastly, only Catholics and the followers of the unaltered Confession of Augsburg of the year 1530 were to benefit by the religious peace and none of the other "sects" would be tolerated.¹

Though according to the letter of the law the edict of restitution could not be attacked,² it seems none the less extremely questionable whether from a political and practical point of view it was prudent to embark on so risky an undertaking. Nearly three quarters of a century, viz. seventy-four years, had elapsed since the conclusion of the religious peace. Was it possible to ignore all that had happened during so long a period and to pronounce it null and void, as if it had never taken place at all? The Princes had become used to their new possessions and had quite forgotten that they had been unjustly acquired. Now they were suddenly to give up everything! No less than two very wealthy archdioceses (Magdeburg and Bremen), and twelve dioceses (Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Magdeburg, Meissen, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, Lebus and Kamin), which the Protestants had illegally acquired one after another,

¹ See KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 438 *seq.*; TUPETZ, 338 *seq.*

² Among contemporary Protestants, the opinion of Kaspar von Schönberg, President of the Privy Council at Dresden, was as follows: "I possess all the acts and documents which were issued in 1555 on the conclusion of the "religious peace" and I consider the Imperial edict consistent with justice and rectitude" (in SPITTLER, *Hannover*, II., fasc. 90). Among more recent judgments, see especially the opinion of K. A. MENZEL, VII., 182 *seq.*; DÖLLINGER, *Kirchengesch.*, II., 2, 478; MAILATH, III., 165, 169; KOCH, *Ferdinand*, III., vol. I, xv.; HURTER, X., 27, 53 *seq.*; KLOPP, III., 1, 203 *seq.*; DUHR, II., 1, 460, 463; BAUR, I., 123; SPINDLER, in *Jahrbuch des Hist. Vereins Dillingen*, 1915, 20.

were to be restored simultaneously. The number of confiscated collegiate churches, abbeys, monasteries and churches exceeded 500. To this must be added that the Calvinists, according to the letter of the treaty, were expressly excluded from its benefits, hence there was scarcely a princely house, scarcely a town, which was not very hard hit by an edict the effect of which, as regards property rights, might be compared to that of an earthquake.¹ And since the edict expressly allowed the application of the right of reform in the territories which the Protestants were ordered to restore, the question of ownership also became one of religion for a large section of the Protestant population.² Small wonder then that even in those Protestant States which had remained loyal to the Emperor, Ferdinand II.'s edict gave rise to a sullen resentment which was skilfully exploited by France.³ A few far-sighted persons had foreseen these consequences.

In December, 1628, Count Collalto drew the Emperor's attention to the risk lest his action should impart to the war the character of a religious struggle.⁴ Among the Catholic Estates, though they were convinced of the legality of the edict, "many considered it inadvisable to bring about restitution by force, because they foresaw that this would embitter many minds in the various Estates and occasion all manner of complications and disturbances throughout the Empire".⁵ The risk of war was still further increased by the fact that the Emperor's position as a whole was no longer as favourable as it had been at the end of 1627. Among his old enemies the French were more active than ever, and they were now being joined by Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, who already in the autumn of 1628 had decided to attack Germany.⁶ The Elector of Saxony, John George, an ever loyal follower

¹ See MAILATH, *loc. cit.*; TUPETZ, 395 *seq.*; HUBER, V., 354.

² See WITTICH, *Magdeburg*, I., 326; DUHR, II., I, 462.

³ See TUPETZ, 392 *seq.*; JANSSEN, *Frankreichs Rheingelüste*, Frankfurt, 1851, 47.

⁴ See KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 184.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 437.

⁶ See DROYSEN, II., 3 *seq.*; CRONHOLM, I., 74 *seq.*

of the Emperor, had drawn the latter's attention to the external menace as soon as the edict had been published.¹

It was surely a grave political blunder that in this decisive hour the Catholics did not preserve the close unity which the common interest demanded, for thus their military preponderance, from which alone they could hope for a successful execution of the edict, was bound to be lessened.² Causes of discontent were plentiful in view of Ferdinand II.'s Italian policy, which was dictated by Spain, and the conduct of Wallenstein, his generalissimo. The Duke of Friedland, who was in point of fact the real master of Germany, allowed his rough soldiery to commit every kind of oppression and violence, and since Wallenstein's despotism often encroached on the rights of the territorial lords, discontent grew to an alarming extent even in the States that were loyal to the Emperor. The most disgruntled were the members of the League who thought their loyal support of the Emperor would be acknowledged; instead they were treated like enemies by Wallenstein in whose army there were more Protestants than Catholics.³ For all that the common interest should have caused the Leaguists to repress their hatred of Wallenstein and their distrust of the Emperor, as at first there was a lack, on the Protestant side, of the necessary cohesion to render the edict of restitution ineffective. Everyone thought of himself alone in an effort to save as much as he could, leaving everybody else to do the best for himself.⁴

In these circumstances it was a piece of great good fortune for the Protestants that the unity among Catholics which the application of the edict imperatively demanded, became increasingly jeopardized. Acute dissensions broke out early concerning the use of the monasteries and the benefices which the Protestants had seized by force and which they were being compelled to surrender. As head of the League,

¹ See KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 456.

² See SPINDLER, *loc. cit.*, 21.

³ Cf. HUBER, V., 335 *seq.*, 339 *seq.* For the Protestant character of Wallenstein's army see GINDELY, *Wallenstein*, II., 311 *seq.*

⁴ See GÜNTER, *Restitutionsedikt*, 53.

Maximilian of Bavaria protested against the appropriation by the Emperor of the bishoprics of Lower Saxony since Tilly had won these with the forces of the League. Whereas the main concern should have been to restore the Catholic Church, questions of property and political power began to claim first place in Leaguist circles. Thus passions were roused to such a degree that Maximilian's confessor, the Jesuit Vervaux, gave it as his opinion that conduct such as this was bound to provoke the anger of God and to defeat the purpose of the edict.¹ The climax was reached when a dispute broke out as to who was to have the disposal of the restored Church property, the Emperor or the Pope.²

In their eagerness to pronounce in favour of the Emperor, the statesmen of Vienna had done their best to keep the Pope out of so important a matter and one in which he obviously had a right to be heard.³ They submitted the draft of the edict to the Catholic Electors but not to Urban VIII., and to the Viennese nuncio's great displeasure the Pope was not so much as mentioned in the whole document. Worse was to follow, for in the selection of the commissaries who were to carry out the edict, the Holy See was completely left out—the Emperor wished to settle everything himself.⁴

Quite apart from the existing tension between Vienna and Rome in consequence of the Emperor's Italian policy, it was not to be wondered at that as a result of such encroachments of the secular power on the ecclesiastical domain,⁵ the Curia should have observed an attitude of great reserve towards

¹ See ADLZREITER (= Vervaux), *Annales boicae gentis*, III., 202.

² See DUHR, II., 2, 157. Cf. KLOPP, III., 1, 417 seq.; *Zeitschr. für die Gesch. des Oberrheins*, N.F., X., 636 seq.; *Sitzungsber. der Münchner Akad.*, Hist., Kl., 1880, 361.

³ Already in the *Brief of February 6, 1627, the Pope told the Emperor, after praising his zeal for the restitution of Church property: "Volumus tamen grave negotium nostro nomine tecum agi cum ven. fratre episcopo Aversano, Nuntio apostolico." State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ See TUPETZ, 443; KIEWNING, I., cvi.

⁵ See NEGRI, *Urbano VIII.*, 179.

the edict of restitution. Though Pallotto lent his support to the wishes of the imperial court that the publication of the edict should be celebrated with public manifestations of joy, processions, and so forth, such as had marked the fall of La Rochelle, Rome would not listen to the suggestion. The Pope confined himself to the dispatch of a Brief in which he thanked the Emperor.¹ He also made an appreciative remark about it in the Consistory.² But this attitude of Urban VIII. is no proof of partisanship against the Habsburgs, for when the Spaniards took the important fortress of Breda, the event was celebrated in Rome with the public demonstrations of joy which had marked the fall of La Rochelle.³

Cardinal Barberini justified the reserve of the Holy See by explaining that it was necessary to wait till the edict had been carried into effect and that the Pope had never recognized the Treaty of Passau on which the whole of this measure was based. In addition to this the Holy See once more rejected the demand previously made that the Emperor should have the right to name the first occupants of all the benefices and bishoprics which would be recovered from the Protestants.⁴ Urban VIII. was likewise dissatisfied with the Emperor's choice of commissaries; they did not seem to him sufficiently devoted to the interests of the Church. Hence he demanded that their places should be taken by the Bishops of the Empire. This was also the wish of the Leaguists, whilst the imperial Court Council was wholly opposed to it. The Bishops were strictly forbidden to have recourse to Rome in the matter of the cession of the monasteries and the nuncio was told that the affair was no concern of his, nay, it was laid down as a principle that Kings and Princes were only bound to obey the Pope's decisions in matters of faith, but that in questions

¹ The text of the document dated May 5, 1629, in KIEWNING, II., 172 *seq.*, who has overlooked the fact that the Brief had already been published by GINZEL (*Legatio Carasae*, 193 *seq.*).

² See **Acta consist.*, April 30, 1629, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. PALLOTTO, in KIEWNING, II., 192.

³ See PIEPER, in *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XCIV., 478.

⁴ Letter of April 28, 1629, in KIEWNING, II., 163 *seq.*

affecting the government of the Church they might offer strong opposition !¹ The imperial Court Council was obviously willing to follow Spain's lead in all politico-ecclesiastical questions. How strongly Cæsaro-papalism was entrenched at the Court of Vienna was repeatedly and painfully revealed in the course of the execution of the edict. The nuncio of Cologne, Pier Luigi Carafa, saw himself compelled to protest emphatically against the new and unheard-of abuse of nominations to canonries, and even to episcopal sees, being made by the Emperor without any reference to the Holy See. Carafa had further to complain that no discrimination was exercised when Protestant Canons were replaced by Catholic candidates at Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Ratzeburg and other localities. The imperial commissaries appointed mere boys, or persons who, owing to other obligations, or ties, would be unable to fulfil the duty of residence. Ferdinand II., who was always open to good advice, promised to remedy these abuses. To the Bishops to whom the Emperor had already granted the sees of Minden and Lübeck, and who now requested Carafa to obtain for them the papal confirmation, the nuncio replied that there could be no question of it—the nomination must proceed from the Pope who alone had the right of appointing Bishops. And so it was done at Minden, whilst at Lübeck, which was still held by the Duke of Holstein, things never got as far as the appointment of a Catholic Bishop.² Notwithstanding these encroachments Urban VIII., in appointing Bishops, met the Emperor's wishes as far as it was possible. He had already consented to Ferdinand's son, Archduke Leopold William, being named to the bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt ; now, after a good deal of hesitation, he granted to the fifteen years old lad the archbishopric of Bremen³ which was an important *point d'appui* for the mastery of the sea which the Emperor was anxious

¹ See TUPETZ, 443 *seq.*

² Cf. GINZEL, *Legatio Carafae*, 72 *seq.*

³ See TUPETZ, 446 ; STORCK, *Die Ausführung des Restitutions-edikt von 1629 im Erzbistum Bremen* (Diss.), Münster, 1906. Cf. above, p. 182.

to secure, though Bavaria was likewise anxious to obtain that post and there were reasons for doubting whether so youthful a Prince would be equal to his ecclesiastical duties.¹

The question of the disposal of the monasteries which were to be given up by the Protestants led to particularly scandalous dissensions among the Catholics. In their eagerness to recover all their former possessions, the old Orders forgot that they were not able to occupy so many houses, nor did they sufficiently consider the higher interests of the Church. On the other hand the nuncios and many Bishops kept these interests in mind when they gave their support to the demand of the Jesuits that some of the monasteries taken from the Protestants should be used in a way that would meet the most crying needs of the Catholic restoration, including the establishment of new Jesuit Colleges.² In the disputes which arose in consequence, the interests of both parties collided as violently as they did in the dispute between the Leaguists and the Emperor on the use of the ecclesiastical benefices that were about to be recovered.³

On top of everything came a divergence of opinions as to the execution of the edict of restitution. Whilst some were of opinion that now that so many victories had been won, everything was ripe for the harvest and prompt action should be taken—to do otherwise would be cowardice, since there was question of God's glory and the salvation of so many souls—others advocated a slow and cautious advance seeing that the

¹ Cf. CARAFA, *Relatione*, 186.

² See the detailed account of DUHR, II., 2, 162 *seqq.* Urban VIII. had already emphasized the interests of the Catholic restoration in a *Brief of February 16, 1630. *Epist.*, Papal Secret Archives.

³ GÜNTER (*Das Restitutionsedikt*, 143 *seq.*) gives an impartial and detailed account of the conflict in the Catholic camp over the restored religious houses, showing that in this dispute the Jesuits: "were undoubtedly the more generous and exact," though they suffered most: "Rejected and suspected by their co-religionists and feared and doubly opposed by the Protestants as their more dangerous enemies, they got between the hammer and the anvil" (140).

power of the Emperor was not so great as it appeared.¹ Among these moderates was the Elector of Trèves, von Sötern, who was of opinion—and also acted on it—that in each individual case an action should be brought before the tribunal of the Imperial *Camera* or the imperial Court Council which, on the basis of the religious peace of Augsburg, would be bound to pronounce in favour of the Church. True, he granted that this procedure was doubtless a much lengthier process, but it was far more certain to lead to the goal than an attempt to secure everything by a single stroke.² Fraught with even graver consequences than the disputes connected with the edict of restitution was the indignation of the League at Ferdinand II.'s external and internal policy, more especially his arbitrary intervention in Italy, as well as the detestation, carefully fanned by France, of Wallenstein's military dictatorship. Maximilian of Bavaria's long-standing suspicion of the designs of the domineering imperial generalissimo became stronger than ever. At his instigation the Archbishop of Mayence, Anselm Casimir von Wambold, summoned a meeting of the League at Mergentheim for the month of December, 1629.³ Starting from the principle that the Empire should not be involved in another war, the assembly of Mergentheim on the one hand flatly refused to comply with the Emperor's wish that the troops of the League should be employed in support of the Spaniards against the Dutch allies of France, and on the other it deferred the demand for the deposition of Wallenstein and a decision with regard to the possession of Mecklenburg to the Diet of the Electors which opened at Ratisbon on July 3rd, 1630.⁴

A few days later Gustavus Adolphus landed on the coast of

¹ See DUHR, II., I, 466.

² Cf. BAUR, *Sötern*, I., 152 seq.

³ Cf. GINDELY, *Wallenstein*, II., 163; RIEZLER, V., 351 seq.

⁴ Cf. HURTER, *Wallenstein*, 326 seq.; GINDELY, *Wallenstein*, II., 227 seq.; HOPF, *A. Wolfradt*, in the *Progr. der Oberrealschule* in the 6. Bezirk of Vienna, 1892, 28 seq., 41 seq. Cf. also ALTMANN, *Der Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 1st part: *Vorgeschichte*, Munich, 1913.

Pomerania at the head of 12,000 men. The secret negotiations for an alliance which Richelieu conducted with the King of Sweden through his ambassador Charnacé, had not remained unknown. The Paris nuncio Bagno, who got wind of them towards the end of 1629, induced Louis XIII. to insist that at least Gustavus Adolphus should not attack the Catholic Princes of the League. In February, 1630, Bagno reported that Gustavus Adolphus had promised that he would only seek the reinstatement of the Dukes of Pomerania and Mecklenburg against Wallenstein and the Emperor. Bagno did not oppose an alliance of this kind ¹; as a matter of fact in the Spring its conclusion was still a remote contingency.² In consequence of Bagno's reports Urban VIII. indulged the delusion that the King of Sweden would confine himself to opposing the Emperor's expansionist aspirations on the Baltic. The Pope, in fact, shared Maximilian's and the League's dissatisfaction with this "Habsburg, non-Catholic policy", as with the Mantuan war.³ It is certain that he under-estimated the peril that threatened from Gustavus Adolphus; too late he became aware of the conflagration in Germany which, besides the Habsburgs, was about to attack all the other Catholic Princes.⁴

The Franco-Swedish negotiations, the vast armaments in Sweden, finally the appearance of Gustavus Adolphus on German soil, powerfully affected the Emperor's attitude during the Diet of the Electors at Ratisbon.⁵ The Pope dispatched to that assembly Ciriaco Rocci ⁶ who had been appointed nuncio to the Emperor ⁷ on May 18th, 1630, in succession to Pallotto

¹ Cf. SIRI, VII., 173 *seq.*; RUSSO, 53; *NICOLETTI, VIII., 941 *seq.* Vatican Library.

² See DROYSEN, II., 51.

³ See RIEZLER, V., 368; RUSSO, 57.

⁴ See RUSSO, 57.

⁵ See FAGNIEZ, I., 566.

⁶ See the *Briefs to Ferdinand II. and the other Catholic Princes of Germany, dated May 18, 1630, *Epist.*, VII., Papal Secret Archives.

⁷ In the **Memorie di Msgr. Herrera*, Rocci is designated as a "persona di mediocre capacità" (*Barb.* 4901, p. 45, Vatican Library). He certainly was no match for Fr. Joseph.

who had received the purple. In the course of his journey, on July 1st, 1630, Rocci paid a visit to the Duke of Friedland at Memmingen. Wallenstein received him with unusual courtesy for, in view of the storm now gathering against him, he was anxious not to antagonize the representative of the Pope. In the course of the interview, among other statements, Wallenstein declared that he was for peace in Italy; he held the war against Nevers to be unjust, in fact he had at first refused to send any troops against him; but now the Emperor's honour was at stake so that he needs must dispatch both infantry and cavalry. In the course of the conversation Wallenstein remarked "with malicious irony", that nearly a hundred years had elapsed since the "Sack of Rome". On the occasion of that plundering, the booty had been close on 600 silver vessels, but to-day there would be more than 60,000, for the luxury and the wealth of Rome were such that there was nothing like it anywhere on earth. From the entourage of Wallenstein also Rocci had to hear equally pointed remarks.¹ In these circumstances it is easy to imagine the impression made on the Pope and the Curia by the cry of indignation which resounded throughout Italy at the news of the horrible sack of Mantua,² especially as on that occasion Protestant officers of the imperial army had vented their fury against churches and monasteries.³ The terrifying spectre of the awful days when Rome was stormed by the imperial troops in 1527 (Sack of Rome) and which none could forget, presented itself with greater realism than ever and caused the Pope many a sleepless night.⁴ Three events, Urban VIII. was wont to say, had caused him unspeakable grief: the first was that during his French nunciature the edict banishing the Jesuits which had been pronounced against them during the struggle of the

¹ See Rocci's *report, dated Memmingen, July 15, 1630 (decif. 31 detto), *Barb.* 6967, p. 14, Vatican Library, used by GREGOROVIVS, 16, and GINDELY, *Wallenstein*, II., 265 seq., from the copy in *NICOLETTI, IV., ch. 1.

² Cf. above, p. 248.

³ See BURGUS, 115.

⁴ See GIOV. PESARO, *Relazione*, 340.

interdict, had been upheld by Venice ; secondly, that it had not been granted to his mother to see her son raised to the Chair of St. Peter ; thirdly, the catastrophe of Mantua at the very moment when Gustavus Adolphus was resolved on invading Germany.¹

It had been assumed that at the Diet of Ratisbon Rocci lent support to the efforts of all the German Estates which were actively encouraged by Richelieu's emissary, Fr. Joseph, to bring about Wallenstein's dismissal, an event which became known on August 13th, 1630.² Nothing of the kind is mentioned in the nuncio's correspondence with the State Secretariate in Rome,³ though it is true that there are gaps in it. Moreover Rocci only reached Ratisbon a fortnight after Maximilian's letter to the Emperor in which he demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein.⁴

The chief cause of the dismissal of Wallenstein, who fought for his position up to the last moment,⁵ was the fact that the Electors, whose exasperation against the imperial generalissimo had reached its limit, made their help against Sweden dependent on a satisfactory solution of this question. Only by such a sacrifice could Ferdinand II. hope to realize his greatest ambition, namely the election of his son Ferdinand as King of the Romans.

So long as the Cabinet of Madrid opposed the restoration of peace, it was impossible for Urban VIII. to give his full support to the election to the dignity of King of the Romans of a Prince

¹ See NEGRI, 187 *seq.*

² See GREGOROVIVS (17).

³ *Barb.* 6967 : " *Cifre di Rocci, 1630." *Barb.* 7063 : " *Cifre al Rocci, 1630-1," Vatican Library.

⁴ See PIEPER, in the *Hist. polit. Blätter*, XCIV., 478. Cf. GINDELY, in the *Allg. Zeitung*, 1882, fasc. 103. EHSSE also shows in the *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XVI., 338, that Urban VIII. congratulated Wallenstein on January 17, 1632, on his reappointment as Commander-in-Chief.

⁵ Cf. the *reports of the Tuscan envoy to the Emperor, *Nic. Sacchetti*, dated Ratisbon, July 8 and 12, 1630, State Archives, Florence. *Med.* 4384.

so closely allied to Spain. The Pope would have very much preferred to see the election of Maximilian who supported his peace policy.¹ On the other hand, in a question of this importance, he was unwilling to seem to oppose the Emperor. Hence on August 24th Rocci received credentials which did not specify the matter to be discussed but of which he might make use should the situation prove favourable to Ferdinand. The nuncio, who had got in touch with Maximilian and who proceeded with the utmost caution, kept back the Brief, for he soon perceived that there was no hope of Ferdinand being elected. Rome, where that election was thought imminent, was getting anxious so that two fresh Briefs were dispatched on November 22nd, one for the ecclesiastical Electors and one for Maximilian, both warmly recommending the election of Ferdinand. When information came that in view of the opposition of the Electors, an opposition which Fr. Joseph did his best to encourage, the election of Ferdinand was not to be brought about, Rocci was instructed on November 26th not to present the Briefs.²

Rocci displayed great zeal when Saxony and Brandenburg sought to obtain from the Catholic Electors the suspension of the edict of restitution as the reward of their support in the question of Wallenstein. Notwithstanding Eggenberg's assurances that the Emperor had no thought of yielding, Rocci nevertheless feared that he would give way. In view of the importance of the question, Rocci had from the first closely allied himself with the Duke of Bavaria and the ecclesiastical Electors who promised that in everything that concerned religion they would co-operate with the Pope's

¹ See Russo, 65, 256. That the Pope would have been glad to see Maximilian elected was also known to N. Sacchetti. (See his *report in cipher, dated Ratisbon, September 16, 1630, State Archives, Florence); but the papal wish found no echo with Maximilian (see RIEZLER, V., 364). According to the reports of the Savoy envoy, d'Aglié, Urban VIII. was reported to have said in 1631-2 that the "casa Savoia" had a better claim to the imperial crown than the Habsburgs, see NEGRI, 179.

² See Russo, 260 *seq.*

representative. It is due to Maximilian above all others that this affair, which caused the Pope so much concern and which was of such consequence for the interests of Catholicism, was never seriously considered.¹

In view of the fact that the Curia saw in the League the strongest bulwark of the interests of Catholicism, whereas it clearly perceived that the imperialists chiefly pursued political aims,² when the reorganization of the army came up for discussion, Rocci definitely stood by Maximilian, the leader of non-Austrian Catholic Germany. The plan of the Cabinet of Madrid to weaken Bavaria and to break up the League³ failed completely, but so did the efforts of the Catholic Electors who wanted the command of the imperial troops to be given to Maximilian. At the end of lengthy discussions a middle course was decided upon about the middle of October: Tilly was made commander-in-chief of a diminished imperial army as well as of the forces of the League which were to remain as a separate army.⁴

It goes without saying that the insistent demands of the Catholic Electors that the Emperor should put an end to the war in Italy and thereby render possible better relations with France, found an ardent advocate in the papal representative,⁵ seeing that on August 3rd, as soon as he received the news of the fall of Mantua, Urban VIII. had urged the Emperor to

¹ See the *reports of Rocci of September 9, October 7 and 22, 1630, *Barb.* 6967, Vatican Library; cf. RANKE, *Päpste*, II.^o, 365, and *Franz. Gesch.*, II., 365 seq. Through *Cifra* of November 2, 1630, Rocci was instructed to stand firm by the edict of restitution (*Barb.* 7063, *loc. cit.*). Maximilian advocated a slow and careful procedure in the execution of the edict, but his view did not prevail. See DUHR, II., 1, 466.

² See the *Instruction to Rocci of September 28, 1630, in the App. No. IX., Vol. XXIX.

³ See GÜNTER, *Habsburger-Liga*, 51, 56.

⁴ See HEYNE, *Kurfürstentag*, 88 seq.; RIEZLER, V., 362.

⁵ *" Per la pace d'Italia io non lascio alcuna opportunità e faccio continuamente gli officii con chi bisogna," Rocci reports, September 9, 1630, *Barb.* 6967, Vatican Library.

restore peace to Italy ¹ and this exhortation he had repeated on August 17th. On the same day the Pope made a similar appeal to Philip IV., Louis XIII. and the Duke of Saxony.²

At first Ferdinand II. showed very little inclination to lend ear to these appeals. One is reminded of "the ancient times of the universal power of the Emperor" when we read in his *Triplica* of August 7th, 1630, that "the Roman Empire consisted of the Kingdom of Germany, Italy, Gaul and Arles; that the Italian vassals were linked to it by the same feudal ties, nay even more stringent ones, than the Germans; that France had dispatched an army into the fiefs and possessions of the Holy Roman Empire, thereby presuming to interfere with the imperial jurisdiction and that in accordance with the statutes and observance of the Empire, the Electors were bound to repel an aggression of this kind".³ The imperial explanations failed to impress the Electors. In their reply they declared with complete frankness that the alleged feudal connexion of the Italian Princes was quite meaningless, and they blamed the Emperor for intervening in Italy without previous consultation with the Estates or at least the College of Electors.⁴ To Rocci's urgent request that the Emperor "would restore peace to poor Italy", Ferdinand II. replied that he fully intended to do so but the affair could not be settled in a hurry. Not a few among the Emperor's advisers, in view of Gustavus Adolphus' irruption into German territory and the ferment provoked in Germany by Wallenstein, were in favour of putting an end to the war,⁵ but the Spanish ambassador, who hoped for the early fall of

¹ See *Epist.*, VII., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. also the **Cifra al Rocci*, of August 3, 1630, *Barb.* 7063, *loc. cit.*

² See Russo, 60, 281.

³ See HEYNE, *Kurfürstentag*, 98.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *" In fine due o tre volte mi disse: Monsignore, faremo la pace, ma non si può così in un subito. . . . Molti ministri dell' Imperatore inclinano alla pace d'Italia vedendo il progresso del re di Suetia et il dubbio di nuove sollevationi." *Cifra* of Rocci, of August 19, 1630, *Barb.* 6967, Vatican Library.

Casale, exerted himself to the utmost in the opposite sense though in this respect he failed, just as he did when he urged that the German Protestants should be allowed to retain the Church's property¹; he failed all the more as both the Electors and Bavaria, supported by the papal representative, pressed with all their strength for the conclusion of peace.² Whilst in this respect a complete change of outlook became at last apparent in the Emperor,³ good news was also received concerning Richelieu's attitude. The Cardinal realized that circumstances did not favour his policy of aggression; the French nobility were weary of the war, the people were crushed by taxation and the party of the Queen-Mother was exceedingly active. Then there was the additional fact that the military situation in Italy was unfavourable, so that there was reason to fear that hard pressed Casale would fall into the hands of the Spaniards. In August, 1630, the Venetian envoy expressed the opinion that at present all that Richelieu thought of was how to extricate himself from a bad business.⁴ On September 4th, as a result of Mazarin's tireless efforts, the warring parties in Upper Italy concluded an armistice which was to run until October 15th. Two days before that time limit peace was signed at Ratisbon. Great difficulties had had to be overcome, especially where the Spaniards were concerned, for the latter pressed Ferdinand to come to terms with the German Protestants and even with the King of Sweden.⁵ To this was added the fact that the Emperor, in return for his yielding on the Italian question, demanded that France should guarantee not to lend any kind of support to any attacks directed against his person, his hereditary States and the Empire. The French ambassador at Ratisbon, Brulart, whom Richelieu left for a whole month without instructions, did not deem himself empowered to give his assent to a demand of this

¹ See Rocci's *report of October 7, 1630, *loc. cit.* Cf. Russo, 76.

² Cf. the *reports of Rocci in cipher, August 19 and 26, September 2, 9, and 16, and October 7, 1630, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. the *letter to the Pope in KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 1190 *seq.*

⁴ See BÜHRING, 93 *seq.* Cf. HEYNE, 122 *seq.*

⁵ Cf. Russo, 76.

kind, but his companion Fr. Joseph, "whose conscience was more elastic," reassured him with the *arrière-pensée* that the promise they were asked to make might very well be interpreted in the opposite sense! ¹ Thereupon, on October 13th, a treaty of peace was drawn up. The document began with a reference to the Pope, the shepherd of the whole Church, to whose unceasing exhortations ² the agreement was due. The first article stated that France would give no support of any kind to the enemies of the Emperor and the Empire, and vice versa. The Emperor undertook to give the investiture of Mantua and Montferrat to Nevers as soon as the latter had made amends: the other pretenders, viz. the Dukes of Savoy and Guastalla were to be consoled with a sum of money. ³

The papal nuncio was afraid lest the Spaniards should upset even now the work of peace, ⁴ nor did he trust Fr. Joseph. ⁵ On the other hand Rome was very hopeful. This feeling found expression in a cartoon scratched on the walls of a palazzo in which the Pope was represented with his left hand joining the hands of Louis XIII. and Ferdinand II. and his right hand raised in blessing. ⁶ In point of fact Urban VIII. was full of

¹ See RITTER, III., 459, and also KELLER, *Die Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Frankreich und dem Kaiser auf dem Regensburger Kurfürstentag*, 1630, Bonn, 1902, 54. For Fr. Joseph's conduct at Ratisbon and his negotiations with the imperial commissaries, see also FAGNIEZ, I., 447 *seq.* Cf. also KLOPP, III., I, 542 *seq.*

² On October 5, 1630, Urban VIII. directed two *Briefs to Ferdinand II., the first "de Italiae pacis stabiliendae proxima spe", the second with a request to invest Nevers with Mantua and Montferrat. On October 29, *Briefs were sent to the Emperor, to Maximilian of Bavaria, to the ecclesiastical Electors, etc., exhorting them to further the re-establishment of peace in Italy at the Ratisbon Diet. *Epist.*, VIII., Papal Secret Archives.

³ See SIRI, VII., 230 *seq.*

⁴ The Spanish envoy was said to be full of grief at the peace, "onde e da dubitare che i Spagnoli possino trovarci qualche oncinio da disturbarla." **Cifra* of October 14, 1630, *Barb.* 6967, Vatican Library.

⁵ Cf. the *report of Rocci in cipher of October 22, 1630, *ibid.*

⁶ See JUSTI, *Velasquez*, I., 295 *seq.*

hope for the future. "The joy and jubilation of the Holy Father cannot be described," Barberini wrote to Maximilian of Bavaria.¹ The Pope ascribed the happy issue in the first place to the Duke of Bavaria of whom he spoke in terms of the highest praise in the hearing of the latter's Roman representative, Crivelli. When Crivelli observed that henceforth the Pope should no longer reckon his pontificate by the years that had already gone by, Urban VIII. replied: "Yes I have begun to-day—the hand of the Almighty hath wrought this change." On his way to Palestrina, as he sat in his carriage, he wrote some verses on the auspicious conclusion of peace.² In Rome itself he ordered public demonstrations of joy. On October 28th he celebrated at S. Maria Maggiore a solemn service of thanksgiving at the conclusion of which he received the congratulations of the Cardinals,³ whilst special Briefs expressing his gratitude were dispatched to the Emperor, the Empress and to Eggenberg.⁴ Even Spain's opposition to the execution of the peace treaty seemed to have been overcome: at the end of October, when pressed by Mazarin, Santacroce signed the treaty by which Casale was ceded to Nevers.⁵ On November 13th, the Pope communicated to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory a letter of Ferdinand on the conclusion of peace and urged them to return thanks to God for having bestowed so great a blessing upon Christendom.⁶ To this end he himself repeatedly offered Mass in thanksgiving at St. Mary Major.⁷

¹ *Brief dated October 26, 1630, in GREGOROVIVS, *Urban VIII.*, 118 *seq.*

² See CRIVELLI'S *report to Gigli, November 2, 1630, State Archives, Munich, used by GREGOROVIVS, 19–20. The letter of thanks, printed by Gregorovius on p. 117 *seq.*, does not belong to 1630, as is clear from the text, but to 1631. PIEPER'S sharp criticism of Gregorovius' work (*Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XCIV., 472 *seq.*), is once more justified by this instance.

³ See the *report in *Diarium P. Alaleonis*, Vatican Library. Cf. the *Avviso* of October 30, 1630, *ibid.*

⁴ See Russo, 79 *seq.*

⁵ See QUAZZA, II., 205 *seq.*

⁶ See **Acta consist.*, Papal Secret Archives.

⁷ Cf. **Avvisi* of November 13 and 27, 1630, Vatican Library.

On November 17th he acknowledged the Emperor's letter with many expressions of praise and a few days later he exhorted him to put Nevers in possession of Mantua.¹

Richelieu, however, adopted a very different line of action. During the period of the armistice he had successfully reinforced the French fighting strength in Italy, so much so that he could reckon on saving Casale. Consequently he induced his royal master, who had so recently hailed with joy the treaty of Ratisbon, to change his mind once more. He skilfully made capital of the circumstance that there was opposition between his own former instructions and the terms agreed to by his envoy which was sufficient ground to reject the settlement. Brulart was instructed to explain to the Emperor that he had exceeded his powers, that in consequence Louis XIII. would not ratify the treaty and that fresh negotiations would be necessary. Thus war threatened to break out afresh in Italy whilst the Emperor saw himself cheated of the one and only advantage the treaty gave him, namely the possibility of employing against Gustavus Adolphus the troops which he maintained in Italy.²

The most recent research seems to have finally established the motives of the King of Sweden's war against the Emperor. The assumption that the only reason why Gustavus Adolphus intervened in the affairs of Germany was his desire to save Protestantism within the Empire, has been shown to be untenable.³ Long before the publication of the edict of

¹ See the *Briefs of November 17 and 24, 1630, *Epist.*, VII., Papal Secret Archives.

² See AVENEL, *Lettres*, III., 960; RITTER, III., 460. On November 11, 1630, Rocci *reported on the changed situation (*Cifra* of this date); on November 15, he writes: * "Qui corre voce che i Francesi non vogliono la pace et che in Italia habbino pensieri vasti attribuendosi ciò al sig. card. Richelieu" (*Barb.* 6967, Vatican Library). For Richelieu's policy, see also KELLER, *loc. cit.*, 56, and MOMMSEN, 41, note 37.

³ Cf. among non-Catholic German authors, especially DROYSEN, *Gustav Adolf*, II., 14 seq., 32 seq., 96 seq., and STIEVE, *Abhandlungen*, 201 seq., 204 seq.; among Swedish historians, CRONHOLM,

restitution the Swedish King had made up his mind to invade Germany, still wealthy but torn by internal dissensions. For seven whole years a "demonic impulse" to a war of conquest had whipped up his soul; for seven whole years he had looked for a chance to start it, until at last the armistice with Poland in the autumn of 1629, the conclusion of which was due to Richelieu's mediation, cleared the way for his attack on the Emperor.¹

Long after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish Chancellor Oxenstjerna, who was more deeply initiated than anyone else in his master's designs, thus summed up the motives which impelled that man of titanic ambitions: "King Gustavus Adolphus wanted the coast of the Baltic: it was his ambition one day to become Emperor of Scandinavia. The new empire was to include Sweden, Norway, Denmark as far as the Great Belt and all the Baltic States. With this scheme in mind he first concluded as favourable a treaty with Denmark as he could hope for, after which he came to terms with Russia over the Baltic coast. He deprived Poland of its coast and the mouths of the rivers, because of the profitable income derived from customs dues. Finally he attacked the Roman Emperor and by way of a war indemnity, demanded from the Protestant Princes the Duchies of Pomerania and Mecklenburg. These Princes were to be indemnified with Catholic territories. Denmark was to be shorn of its territory as far as the Great Belt and Norway was to become ours. Thus did that great King plan the foundation of an independent empire."²

Recent research has fully confirmed this judgment by a

Gustav Adolf in Deutschland (trans. by Helms), I., 87 seq., and ODHNER, *Politik Schwedens*, I seq. Even GUTJAHR, who places the religious question definitely in the foreground (*König Gustav Adolfs von Schweden Beweggründe zur Teilnahme am Deutschen Kriege*, Leipzig, 1894) admits (p. 71) roundly: "The reasons were not altogether religious."

¹ Cf. RITTER's discussion of the large edition of the writings and papers of Oxenstjerna in the *Gött. Gel. Anzeigen*, 1901, 76.

² See DROYSEN, II., 666.

well-informed contemporary. It has shown that considerations of a political and economic character were important factors in the King's determination. His idea was to establish a common system of customs between Sweden and Germany and to initiate a comprehensive scheme of colonization. Germany was to provide the capital which Sweden lacked as well as a market for Swedish iron ore.¹

These purely political and economic considerations were the chief motives that inspired the Statesman and military leader who then wore the crown of Sweden.² It is difficult to ascertain how far his conduct was inspired by considerations of a religious nature,³ since Gustavus Adolphus' political interests coincided almost completely with his religious ones. Just as Elizabeth of England, the Church's bitterest enemy in the sixteenth century, was committed to the Protestant party from her birth, so was her greatest enemy in the seventeenth century also closely bound up with heresy. Gustavus' earliest recollections were associated with the struggle of his father, Charles IX., a brave but passionate and cruel man, against the lawful King, Sigismund III.⁴ He owed the crown of Sweden to the defeat of Sigismund and in view of the fact that the latter never renounced his rightful claims, and the fear lest he should receive help from the few Catholics who were still in hiding in various parts of the country, Draconic laws were passed against those who professed the ancient faith, and especially

¹ See F. BOTHE, *Gustav Adolfs und seines Kanzlers wirtschafts-politische Absichten auf Deutschland* (Frankfurter Hist. Forschungen, IV.), Frankfurt, 1910.

² See the opinion of LAVISSE (VI., 2, 297) and BÄR (*Pommern im Dreissigjährigen Kriege*, Stettin, 1910, 83 seq.).

³ See the controversy between WITTICH (*Magdeburg*, I., 500 seq.; II., xiv. seq.) and DROYSEN, who only admits political reasons. The interplay of both motives is noted by KRETZSCHMAR (*Gustav Adolfs Pläne und Ziele in Deutschland (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Gesch. Niedersachsens, XVII.)*), Hannover, 1904, 153 seq.) and SCHYBERGSON (*Hist. Studier.*, Stockholm, 1906, 1-23).

⁴ Cf. our account, Vol. XXIV., 102 seq.

against Catholic priests.¹ Thus, filled as he was with prejudices and aversion for the Pope and the Church, Gustavus looked on his political struggle with the Emperor as a religious war also.² Nevertheless, as a political realist who would be guided by cold reason alone, the King of Sweden did not hesitate to subordinate religious interests to his foreign policy whenever he deemed it necessary. This was instinctively felt by the German Protestants who, for a long time, viewed the self-invited auxiliary with considerable distrust. At first only the cities of Stralsund and Magdeburg allied themselves with him of their own free will, as well as a few princelings who had nothing to lose. The rest, among them even his brother-in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, and the Elector of Saxony, who was directly threatened by the edict of restitution and who was considered as the head of the German Protestants, only allied themselves with the Swedes after much persuasion, not to say downright compulsion.³ That Gustavus Adolphus knew quite well how to subordinate religious interests to his purely political ones was best shown by the treaty of alliance which he signed with Catholic France at Bärwalde, in January, 1631. In this document he at last agreed to the conditions laid down by Richelieu,⁴ viz. the maintenance of the Catholic religion in the places he should conquer and neutrality towards the League, so long as the latter remained itself neutral. In exchange he received from France the money which was indispensable for his predatory campaign and which Sweden, exhausted as she was by the war, was unable to raise, namely for each of the next five years 400,000 imperial thalers (a million livres) and for the year that had just come to an end

¹ Cf. HERMAN LEVIN, *Religionstvang och religionsfrihet i Sverige*, Stockholm, 1896, I seq.; REIFFENBERG, 581 seq.; PIEPER, *Propaganda*, 14 seq.; DUHR, II., 2, 77 seq.; *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXV., 412 seq. See also our account, Vol. XXVI., 231, note 6.

² Cf. STIEVE, *loc. cit.*, 202.

³ Cf. DROYSEN, II., 155 seq., 215 seq.

⁴ In 1630 he had refused toleration of the Catholic religion; see DROYSEN, II., 50; VIGIER, in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, L., 439 seq.

120,000 thalers. In return the Swedish King bound himself to raise against the Emperor an army of 30,000 foot and 6,000 cavalry. The aims of the alliance were stated to be the security of the Baltic and the Ocean, freedom of trade, the razing of the fortresses on the coasts of the Baltic and the North Sea and those in the Grisons, the defence of their common friends and the restoration of the oppressed Estates of Empire, with a view to re-establishing in general the situation that had obtained in 1618.¹ Accordingly, on the basis of this agreement, Maximilian should have renounced both the Palatinate and the dignity of an Elector whilst the League abandoned the edict of restitution. How could the League remain neutral in such circumstances?

Without a doubt the Franco-Swedish alliance was fraught with grave danger to Catholic interests. For that reason Richelieu insisted on the article in favour of Catholic worship in the conquered places. He needed that article to justify himself in the eyes of the sincerely religious King of Catholic France, and especially the Pope. Urban VIII. was not unaware of the fact that France's alliance with Sweden would give to Gustavus Adolphus' undertaking an importance far beyond Pomerania and Mecklenburg. Hence, from the beginning of 1631, he had been doing all he could to prevent an entente of this kind. Though the Secretariate of State at first thought such an alliance of the two Powers improbable, the Paris nuncio, Bichi, was nevertheless instructed to oppose it.² On March 29th, 1631, Rome was still in complete ignorance of the agreement of Bärwalde and Bichi was told to find out what truth there was in the rumours concerning it.³ When the

¹ See MOSER, *Patr. Archiv.*, VI., 163 seq.; DROYSEN, II., 255 seq.

² See the instructions to Bichi in LEMAN, 3 seq. and 16, who rightly rejects the contrary assertion made by many authors; among these are not only ROCCO DA CESINALE (II., 648) but also HOUSSAYE (*Bérulle*, 493), FAGNIEZ (*P. Joseph et Richelieu*, I., 551) and SCHNITZER (*Zur Politik*, 214).

³ *Barberini to Bichi, dated March 29, 1631, *Barb.* 8113, Vatican Library.

Pope, on Ferdinand II.'s protest, represented to the French ambassador that France's attitude was incompatible with the agreement of Ratisbon, he was told that the whole thing was an invention! Nevertheless, on April 9th, 1631, Urban VIII. told the imperial ambassador, Savelli, that he was prepared to warn France. The chief argument which the French brought forward against the genuineness of the treaty of alliance, the Pope said, was the fact that in that document the name of the King of Sweden came before that of the King of France, a thing that Paris would never have allowed. Savelli replied that the Emperor was quite certain of the authenticity of the treaty. In the course of Savelli's audience, Cardinal Barberini came into the room to give the Pope the glad news that, with the co-operation of his envoys Panciroli and Mazarin, peace had been concluded at Cherasco on April 6th, between Gallas, the commander-in-chief of the imperialists, and the French Marshal Thoiras. Urban VIII.'s joy was immense. As the ambassador was about to leave he assured him once more that he would leave nothing undone to dissuade the King of France from allying himself with Sweden.¹

Ferdinand II., however, refused to ratify the treaty of April 6th, 1631, because one of the clauses demanded the surrender of the Grisons passes. Nothing could have better pleased Richelieu. When about the middle of April the French nuncio presented to Louis XIII. the letter in which the Pope begged of him to renounce the alliance and at the same time exhorted him to act as mediator between the Emperor and the Swedes, an act which would earn for him the glory of having settled Europe's troubles, the King replied that the alliance had been concluded solely in order to force the Emperor to withdraw from Italy, a thing which was also in the interest

¹ See KLOPP, III., 2, 34, on the authority of the documents of the treaty of peace in the Vienna Archives, fasc. 9^b. The Pope had followed the negotiations for peace with the utmost anxiety; in February, carnival festivities were forbidden and prayers for peace ordered (see *Avviso of February 26, 1631, Vatican Library). They were ordered again later on (see *Avviso of April 2, 1631, *ibid.*).

of the Holy See to which he himself was more devoted than ever. Furthermore he begged the Pope not to imagine that he intended to lend assistance to the Protestants since, on the contrary, he was still persecuting them: his action had been dictated by the higher interests of the whole of Christendom; in any case, he had taken measures to preserve the Catholic faith from injury.¹ On May 2nd Bagno reported that everything depended upon a final pacification of Italy.² Urban VIII. was delighted with the efforts of Maximilian of Bavaria with the Emperor.³ In consequence of the threatening advance of the Swedes in Germany, Ferdinand II. saw himself at last compelled to break off at all costs the war in Italy. On June 19th, 1631, a definitive peace was concluded at Cherasco, with the co-operation, once more, of the representatives of the Pope. The Emperor granted the investiture to Nevers and withdrew his troops from Italy: he was likewise forced to give up the Grisons passes. By a secret treaty with Savoy (March 13th, 1631), Richelieu had acquired the frontier fortress of Pinerolo and thereby assured France's influence in Upper Italy.⁴

This was in keeping with Urban VIII.'s wishes⁵ quite as

¹ * "E mi disse che pregava la S.S. a creder che egli continua nella medesima volontà di non aiutare, ma di perseguitare gli eretici, ma che il rispetto del maggior bene della christianità universale l'havea mosso a quanto havea fatto, nel che pure havea usate precautioni di indemnizare i cattolici e la religione." Report of Bagno of April 15 (*decif. Maggio 15*), 1631, *Barb.* 8077, p. 56, Vatican Library.

² * Report, *d.d. Moret 2 di Maggio (decif. li 27 detto)*, *Barb.* 8078, p. 24, *ibid.*

³ See the *Instruction in code to Bagno, May 24, 1631, *Barb.* 8113, *ibid.*

⁴ Cf. KHEVENHÜLLER, XI., 1990 *seq.*, 1999 *seq.*; SIRI, VII., 363 *seqq.*, 387 *seqq.*, 413 *seqq.*; BÜHRING, 141 *seq.*, 147 *seq.* In a *Brief of August 2, 1631, Urban VIII. praised the Emperor for the investiture of Nevers. *Epist.*, VIII., Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ The Pope was suspected of being privy to the cession of Pinerolo to France, but this cannot be proved; see LEMAN, 24, note 1.

much as the restoration of peace, for the Pope was anxious for a balance of power since by reason of the exclusive preponderance of Spain in Italy, he had cause to fear not only for the autonomy of the Papal States but for that also of the Holy See itself, in the same way as his predecessors at the time of the Hohenstaufen. Under pressure of this fear, which the sack of Mantua and the endless meddling of the Spaniards with ecclesiastical affairs,¹ increased still further, Urban VIII. undertook some military preparations and allied himself even more closely with Maximilian I., the leader of the non-Austrian Catholics of Germany. In this policy the Pope found himself in line with Richelieu who was precisely endeavouring to make of Catholic Bavaria a counterweight to the growing influence of the Habsburgs in Germany.² When Urban VIII. advised Maximilian to cultivate good relations with France, he was prompted not only by his aversion to Spain which dominated the Emperor, but by the desire also to detach the Cabinet of Paris from the German Protestants.³ The Papal nuncio Bagno, who was very much under Richelieu's influence, was negotiating, though without any authorization,⁴ a Franco-Bavarian alliance which, however, was only signed on May 30th, 1631, at Fontainebleau, after Bagno's recall. Maximilian

¹ The Madrid nuncio, Giov. Battista Pamfili, met with innumerable difficulties on questions of jurisdiction, so that his prestige and with it that of the Church declined constantly; see the *Relazione* of *Alv. Mocenigo* in BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Spagna*, I., 677 seq. For the encroachments in Naples, see the *Brief to the viceroy of Naples, the Duke of Alcalá, dated February 2, 1630 (a sharp censure, "quod detentum in carceribus Inquisitionis vi creptum ad tribunal regium duxerit," *Epist.*, VII., *loc. cit.*) and the *Brief to Spinola, Governor of Milan, on the infringement of the *immunitas eccles.*, dated March 2, 1630, *ibid.* Madrid realized too late that these quarrels must be amicably settled. Cf. the instruction to the new viceroy of Naples, April 18, 1631, in GÜNTER, *Habsburger-Liga*, 69.

² Cf. DÖBERL, *Bayern*, I., 545.

³ Cf. SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 218.

⁴ See LEMAN, 81 seq. FAGNIEZ doubts this, see *Rev. d'hist. de l'Eglise de France*, 1921, 353.

defended such a pact by urging that only by this means could France be prevented from entering into an alliance with the German Protestants, as she threatened to do. He also pleaded his express reservations with regard to his obligations towards the Emperor and the Empire. If Richelieu nevertheless agreed to the alliance, he was probably prompted, besides his hostility towards Spain, by the hope that circumstances would in the end compel the Duke of Bavaria to sever his cause from that of the Emperor. However, the alliance proved useless, for the latter expectation remained unfulfilled, just as Urban VIII. was doomed to disappointment in his hope that it would be the means of sundering Richelieu and Gustavus Adolphus. Maximilian was equally cheated of his hope that France would lend him help against the King of Sweden, against whom the treaty was chiefly aimed.¹

As in the past so now both Munich and Vienna clamoured for generous pecuniary assistance from the Pope.² In the spring of 1631, Urban VIII. granted to the League one half of the ecclesiastical revenues of the Palatinate and one half of the income of all Church property so far recovered from the Protestants.³ Ferdinand II. was greatly angered by this concession and demanded its revocation. The Pope declined to do this since he had expressly stated that this fresh concession was not in any way to interfere with the moiety of the revenues of the religious houses of the Palatinate which had been previously granted to the Emperor.⁴ Nor was Maximilian satisfied; he complained of the Pope's reserve.⁵ The sharp criticism of the Pope in which the Bavarians indulged completely ignored the fact that the papal finances were in a truly deplorable state.⁶ Cardinal Barberini was only stating facts

¹ See DÖBERL, I., 547 *seq.* Cf. RIEZLER, V., 380 *seq.*

² See the detailed account of SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 216 *seq.*, based on the correspondence in the Munich State Archives.

³ See *Bull.*, XIV., 201 *seq.*, 218 *seq.* ⁴ See LEMAN, I4, note I.

⁵ See details in SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*, 216, 218 *seq.*

⁶ The yearly deficit, which was increased by the expenses of the Mantuan war, amounted according to ANG. CONTARINI (*Relazione*, 258) to 84,000 scudi. Cf. LEMAN, I5.

when, in May, 1631, he explained to the Bavarian agent Crivelli that the measures of defence which had been forced upon the Pope by the unfortunate Mantuan war, and the expenditure caused by plague and famine, had swallowed up several millions. Apart from the exhaustion of the papal exchequer, the reserve of the Pope was no doubt due, as was the case with many German Catholics, to the fact that he under-estimated the Swedish peril. After the capture by Tilly, on May 30th, 1631, of Magdeburg, "the strong city of the Protestants," Urban conceived vast hopes for the triumph of the Catholic cause. "The situation in the North is completely changed," he said in his letter of congratulation to Tilly.¹ That was also the prevailing view in Germany: the Protestants trembled, the Catholics exulted. In point of fact Gustavus Adolphus' whole enterprise was at stake, but he extricated himself from his peril and Richelieu successfully deluded the Pope. This is made quite clear by the dispatches of the French nuncio. When, in June, 1631, the latter on receipt of the news of the impending conclusion of peace in Italy, remonstrated once more with Louis XIII. because of his alliance with Sweden, he was told that as soon as Italy was pacified, the King would not fail to urge Gustavus Adolphus to come to terms with the Emperor. On his part Richelieu was lavish with assurances that he was determined to root out Protestantism not only in France but likewise in Germany!² Maximilian of Bavaria's representative in Paris was assured that France had no intention whatever to lend assistance to the Swedes and the Protestants.³ In July, Louis XIII. assured

¹ The *letter of congratulation to Tilly (Brussels Archives) in App. No. X, XXIX. By *Briefs of June 28, 1631, Urban VIII. congratulated the Duke of Bavaria (who had informed him on June 5 of the capture of Magdeburg; see SCHNITZER, 258) and the Emperor, on their victory. *Epist.*, VIII., Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.* another *letter of felicitations to the Emperor on the victory, July 12, 1631. For the Consistory of July 7, 1631, see LEMAN, 14.

² See App. XI., *report of June 20, 1631, Vatican Library.

³ BICHI's *report of June 28, 1631, *Barb.* 8079, *ibid.*

the nuncio that, so far from wishing to injure religion in Germany, he wanted, on the contrary, to promote it; that as soon as the reasons ceased which for the present compelled him to give "some assistance" to the Swedes, he would do his best to bring about a good peace; in the meantime he would not suffer the Catholic Princes of Germany to be injured in any way.¹ At that very time Richelieu waxed still bolder. He demanded that the Pope should lend him assistance against his opponents by the dispatch of laudatory Briefs; since he was a cleric and a Cardinal, it was the Holy See's duty to protect him. He dwelt on the services he had rendered to the Church by fighting the Huguenots and reminded the Pope of his proffered help in the question of Urbino.² Thereupon Barberini advised him, in view of the hatred of his enemies, to withdraw to Rome.³ But after Marie de Medici's flight to the Spanish Netherlands, Richelieu became more powerful than ever.⁴

Meanwhile events of importance had taken place in Germany. On August 22nd, 1631, the Landgrave William of Hesse-Kassel allied himself with the foreign invader—the first German Prince to do so of his own accord. On September 11th the Elector of Saxony, John George, acted in like manner and

¹ BICHI's *report, July 17, 1631, *ibid.*

² "BICCHI's *report from St. Germain, July 15, 1631 (*Barb.* 8080, p. 8, Vatican Library, who remarks: "Ho scansato al possibile questa materia senza pormi in impegno.")

³ *Barberini to Bichi, dated August 30, 1631, *Barb.* 8114, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See RANKE, *Französische Gesch.*, II.², 403. I have not been able to find Bichi's *report of August 30, 1631, quoted here without indication of source; on the other hand, *Barb.* 8080, p. 98 (Vatican Library) has a *report of Bichi's, dated Meaux, August 28, 1631, in which it is said: "Il cardinale che vede il re gettato in tutto nelle sue braccia, si tiene in maniera sicuro che nulla teme." He had established greater harmony than ever between the King and his wife, "et ella medesima dice pubblicamente esser obligatissima al cardinale e vuol male a tutti quelli che l'havevano mal'impressionato."

added his troops to those of Gustavus Adolphus. On September 17th battle was joined at Breitenfeld, north of Leipzig, in which the superior tactics and better equipment of the Swedes gave them complete victory. It was as decisive a battle as that of the White Mountain, but in the opposite sense. By this time Gustavus Adolphus had learnt the art of winning popularity. By openly proclaiming himself the protector of German Protestants,¹ who now no longer needed to be afraid of the edict of restoration, he entered on a victorious progress through Thuringia and Franconia which was to carry him to the very banks of the Rhine. Simultaneously with the news of the battle of Breitenfeld another alarming report reached Rome. The cession of Pinerolo and the valley of Perusa to France robbed Spain of the chief benefit of the peace of Cherasco so that a fresh warlike conflagration threatened in Italy. Urban VIII. felt that his first duty was to avert such a peril. If he could prevent an open rupture between France and Spain, so he thought, he would also help the Catholic cause in Germany, for otherwise the Emperor would lose Spain's financial assistance against Gustavus Adolphus, a support which the papal *Camera* was unable to give.² Urban VIII. set all his diplomatists to work for the preservation of peace. The Paris nuncio was instructed to point out to Richelieu the perilous position of the Catholic Church in Germany and to implore him to refrain from supporting Gustavus Adolphus,³ whilst the Pope did all he could to persuade the Cardinal to restore Pinerolo to the Duke of Savoy. However, on both these points the Pontiff met with insuperable opposition on the part of the French Cardinal who had no thought of giving up Pinerolo; on the contrary, he was planning an Italian league with a view to the safety of the

¹ See KRETZSCHMAR, *Gustav Adolfs Pläne und Ziele in Deutschland*, 169. Cf. DROYSEN, II., 408.

² See LEMAN, 37 *seq.*

³ *" Ritorni a pregare e fare uffizi per la desistenza delli aiuti e calori che di costà pervengono al Sueco." Instruction of Barberini to Bichi, November 8, 1631, *Barb.* 8114, Vatican Library. Cf. LEMAN, 41, 55.

new acquisition, nay, he even went so far as to try and induce the Pope, of course unsuccessfully, to join such a league! ¹

The French nuncio was equally unsuccessful in his endeavour to interest Richelieu in the fate of the ecclesiastical Electors whom Gustavus Adolphus threatened with destruction. In this matter the Cardinal acted with the same hypocrisy with which he protested his peaceful intentions with regard to Pinerolo. He would gladly lend help to the Catholic Princes of Germany provided they would allow the French to garrison their fortresses; in return for so "disinterested" a service, Urban VIII. was to bestow on Louis XIII. and his minister the title of "Defenders of the Catholic Faith!" ² In his anxiety the Pope had recourse to prayer. By a Bull of December 15th, 1631, he proclaimed a universal jubilee, in order to invoke the help of God for His hard pressed Church. Processions of supplication traversed the streets of the Eternal City and at the conclusion of the solemn ceremonies the Pope visited in person the German national Church of the Anima. ³

Besides spiritual assistance, Urban VIII. also bestowed material help by granting a subsidy of 120,000 thalers for a year, to be paid in monthly rates and equally shared between the Emperor and the League. He would have been glad to give more but the expenditure which the troubles in Italy had forced him to incur, according to an accurate calculation, amounted to 4,851,535 thalers. Urban himself felt that his help was wholly inadequate and by way of excuse he pleaded that in an equally dangerous situation Paul V., in his time, had granted no more. ⁴ In order to leave nothing undone, on December 13th, 1631, the Pope wrote once more to the King of France, to the Queen and to Richelieu, imploring them not to suffer Protestantism to triumph in Germany. The nuncio was likewise instructed to point out that in view of the "portentous progress" of the King of Sweden, the cause of the Emperor could no longer be separated from that of Maximilian and the other Catholic Princes, if they wished to

¹ See LEMAN, 38 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 62 *seq.*, 65.

³ See *Bull.*, XIV., 254 *seq.*; SCHMIDLIN, 455 *seq.*; LEMAN, 73.

⁴ See LEMAN, 74.

retain their confidence.¹ Such a distinction would undoubtedly injure the Catholic religion. Cardinal Barberini on his part pointed to the shameless way in which the King of Sweden contravened the clause of the agreement of Bärwalde which protected the Catholics. From all parts of Germany reports came of bishops, priests and religious being robbed and maltreated, so that Bagno's remonstrances were fully justified.²

On December 13th, 1631, the Cardinal Secretary of State reverted to this matter: the oppression, he wrote, under which Catholics were groaning all over Germany, and which was against the spirit as well as the letter of the treaty, showed clearly that the Austrians and the other Catholic Princes received the same treatment at the hands of the enemies of religion: in the end such injuries to the Church could not fail to be visited upon France also.³

It is impossible not to admire the patience with which the Pope and his nuncios strove time after time to induce France to break with Gustavus Adolphus and to bring about a reconciliation between the Houses of Bourbon and Habsburg. To this plan Roman diplomacy stuck with unparalleled tenacity.⁴ though the prospects of success were more hopeless than ever. In January, 1632, Madrid had decided on an open rupture with France and though the news of the loss of the fleet which was bringing gold from America, somewhat damped the ardour for war, it by no means quenched it. On his part Richelieu relentlessly pursued his policy of a covert war on the Habsburgs through his Protestant allies. He now stretched forth his hand to seize Alsace, an act which he justified by the necessity of protecting that fair country from Gustavus Adolphus. The efforts of the Pope and his nuncios for a reconciliation between France and the Habsburgs met with ever increasing obstacles. They now tried, though in vain,

¹ *Ibid.*, 75.

² See App. No. XII., XXIX., the *letter in code of Barberini to Bichi, November 22, 1631, Vatican Library.

³ See App. No. XIII., the *letter in cipher of Barberini to Bichi, December 13, 1631, *ibid.*

⁴ See LEMAN, 100 *seq.*

to bring about a rapprochement between Richelieu and Olivares in a mistaken conviction that the chief hindrance to peace was the rivalry between the two ministers. The difficulty was more deep-seated, for it lay in the divergent aims of France and the Habsburgs.

In the first months of 1632 fresh attempts were made by the Pope for a peaceful settlement of the disputes between Louis XIII., Philip IV. and Ferdinand II. If the effort failed the fault did not lie with the Pope and his agents: on the contrary, they did all they could to put an end to the distress of the German Catholics by means of the restoration of concord among the Catholic Powers.¹ Neither Madrid nor Vienna appreciated these endeavours, on the contrary, in both capitals the Pope was angrily and violently accused of viewing impassively the ruin of religion in Germany. In December, 1631, Olivares, keenly anxious to drag the Pope into an alliance with the Habsburgs against France, summoned the nuncio into his presence and informed him that the whole world, including the Holy Father, knew with what disinterestedness the Catholic King had acted both in Germany and Italy. Now that Protestantism was everywhere triumphant, no time was to be lost and the utmost efforts must be made in order to save the Catholic religion. The Pope must assist the Emperor by every means in his power; at the same time he must enable King Philip to continue the war by allowing him to raise large sums of money from the clergy; and all this must be done as quickly as possible.²

Nor was Spain content with representations. Philip IV. resolved to exert the utmost pressure on Urban VIII. and to harry him as his predecessor Philip II. had harried Sixtus V. On December 19th, 1631, Cardinal Borgia, who after the recall of Count Monterey had become Spanish ambassador to the Holy See, was instructed to make the most earnest representations to Urban VIII. in order to induce him, on the one hand, to send financial help to the Emperor and on the other to make it possible for the King of Spain, by means of a considerable

¹ See the detailed account in LEMAN, 101-118.

² See LEMAN, 76 *seq.*

levy from the clergy, to give assistance to Ferdinand. To this end he was to submit a detailed scheme for the taxation of the Spanish clergy. If the demand was refused Borgia was to declare the Pope responsible for all the misfortunes that would ensue. He was to raise a solemn protest and in order to enhance the solemnity of the protest he was to make it in the presence of the Spanish Cardinals. All this was explained in detail in a letter to Cardinal Barberini, the presentation of which was to be Borgia's opening move. All the Spanish Cardinals and some others also were invited to give their support to this step.¹

Vienna, where the Spaniards were extraordinarily active, gave its approval to the scheme of the Cabinet of Madrid. On January 18th, 1632, the imperial ambassador in Rome, Prince Paolo Savelli, received pressing instructions to pray once more for papal assistance, and in February two fresh imperial agents, viz. Prince Frederick Savelli and the Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Pázmány, were dispatched to Rome on a similar mission. They were also commissioned to request the Pope to join the Hispano-Imperial League which was about to be formed.²

Philip IV. had made a bad selection when he chose Cardinal Borgia as his advocate. It is enough to look at the marvellous portrait of the Cardinal by Velasquez to realize the Spanish King's mistake: beneath a broad forehead there lurks a pair of deep-set, imperious brown eyes; the toothless mouth, with the tightly closed lips, is expressive of determination; the speech of such a mouth would be dry, slow, cutting.³

Cardinal Borgia, the cause of more than one scene with Paul V.,⁴ had annoyed Urban VIII. on several occasions. Thus

¹ See LEMAN, 77 *seq.* *Ibid.*, 745 *seq.*, for the text of the instruction for Borgia. Cf. also GINDELY, *Gesch. des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, II., Prague, 1882, 240 *seq.* ² See LEMAN, 84.

³ See JUSTI, *Velasquez*, II., 92. MAYER (*Gesch. der spanischen Malerei*, Leipzig, 1922) does not think the identity of the painter absolutely certain. The portrait has been at the Städelsche Institute, Frankfort, since 1867.

⁴ See our account, Vol. XXVI., 359.

in connexion with the question of the Valtellina, in order to induce the Pope to favour the plans of Philip IV., he had held over his head the threat of the invasion of the Papal States by Spanish troops.¹ At the close of 1630, at a sitting of the Inquisition, when certain measures were taken against a fanatical Franciscan who was also a protégé of Borgia, a fresh collision occurred between the Pope and the Cardinal. Borgia's remarks on that occasion were particularly offensive. Borgia's friend, Cardinal Sandoval, also made some biting remarks about the Pope and even threatened to leave Rome. "Let him do so," Urban replied, "I am only responsible to God for my actions."²

Borgia's arrogance showed itself also on subsequent occasions. Although as Spanish ambassador he should have observed special reserve, he criticized, in May, 1631, the measures taken by Urban VIII. and advised the faithful not to support him with their money.³ In January, 1632, he violently complained that the Pope preferred to support Bavaria rather than the Catholic religion, of which he had no care! Urban replied that he knew very well what his duty was towards the Catholic religion and needed no instruction on the subject from Borgia.⁴ The unfairness of the Spanish Cardinal's reproach appears from the fact that at that very moment the Pope endeavoured to persuade the French King, through the Paris nuncio, to stay the advance of the King of Sweden against the dioceses on the Main and the Rhine.⁵ Other accusations which Borgia made at that time against

¹ See **Memorie intorno la vita di Urbano VIII. di Msgr. Herrera, al quale S.S^{ta} le dettava*, Barb. 4901, p. 40 seq., Vatican Library. Cf. also QUAZZA, *Politica europea*, 92.

² See the **Avviso* of December 28, 1630, Vatican Library. Cf. ADEMOLLO, *Ambasciatori francesi in the Riv. europea*, An. VIII. (1877), III., 207.

³ See LEMAN, 18.

⁴ See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 227 seq.

⁵ See Carafa's **letter* of January 23, 1632, in GUDENUS, *Cod. dipl.*, IV. (1758), 797. Cf. FALK, in *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXX., 238 seq.

Urban VIII., as well as the violent manner in which he proffered them, clearly showed that the Cardinal was no diplomatist.¹

Unable as he was to grasp the fact that the interests of the Holy See could not invariably coincide with Spanish policy, and convinced that the Pope should support the Catholic King in all things, Borgia was delighted with the dangerous commission with which a courier of January 22nd, 1632, charged him.² Between January 29th and February 4th, the Pope and the Cardinal Secretary of State gave audience to Cardinals Borgia, Colonna, Sandoval, Spinola and Albornoz. Borgia had drawn up a summary of the Spanish demands and this he presented to the Pope together with the letter of his King. A curious light is thrown on the Spanish demands for money by the fact that in the summer of 1631, they had rejected Cardinal Ludovisi's generous offer of 100,000 scudi and the revenues of his ten Spanish abbeys, for the duration of the war.³ Urban VIII. must also have been deterred by the circumstance that he had already granted to the Spaniards very extensive concessions in previous years.⁴ For all that Borgia now demanded that the Spanish clergy should provide one-third of the nineteen and a half million ducats which Philip IV. wished to raise in his European possessions. At the beginning of February, Urban VIII. gave leave for the raising of 600,000 ducats for one year, not three, as Philip IV. demanded, and only the clergy of Spain, Sardinia, Majorca and

¹ See LEMAN, 119 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 121 seq.

³ See the *letter of Ludovisi to Olivares, dated Bologna, June 16, 1631, in GIUNTI, **Vita e fatti di Ludovico card. Ludovisi*, Cod. 32, D. 8, of the Corsini Library, Rome. Giunti relates there that he himself took this offer to Madrid, where it was not accepted.

⁴ See *Bull.*, XIV., 4 seq., 32 seq., 140 seq., 165 seq., 198 seq. Besides this Urban VIII. had granted, on October 9, 1629, for a further period of six years, both the Cruzada, as well as the Subsidio and the Excusado ; see **Indice de las concessiones que han hecho los Papas*, Cod. I., 9, of the Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome

Minorca were to be affected ; nor was the levy to be made directly by the King ; a further condition stipulated that the money must be spent exclusively in supporting the Emperor.¹ The imperial ambassador, Paolo Savelli, who in an audience of February, 1632, demanded another extraordinary subsidy, received a negative answer, the reason being that in order to raise the money already promised to the Emperor, it had been necessary to impose several fresh tenths, and the lack of money made it quite impossible to go any further. When Savelli pointed to the great peril of the Catholic religion in Germany the Pope replied that he would reconsider the matter. The further request that the whole subsidy should go to the Emperor, the League being excluded, Urban VIII. declared he could only grant this in case the League were to refuse to do its duty by the Emperor. The Pope also promised to consider Savelli's proposal for an Italian League against Sweden. Some Spanish Cardinals had requested the Pope to excommunicate Louis XIII. as long as he remained an ally of Sweden. Urban VIII. deemed this extreme measure inopportune and dangerous. He reminded them of Clement VII.'s experience with England and pointed out that such a step would only serve further to irritate the King of France and to drive him into an even closer alliance with Sweden and the Protestants. On the other hand he declared his readiness to dissuade once more both the King and Richelieu from their alliance with the Protestants, and to exhort them to become reconciled to the Habsburgs, so that the great Catholic Powers might present a united front to the Swedish King.²

Cardinal Borgia and his friends were exceedingly dissatisfied with the result of these discussions but they did not as yet despair of their ability to cause the Pope to change his mind and when they failed to obtain a collective audience,

¹ Cf. *Bull.*, XIV., 272 seq.; LEMAN, 123 seq. GINDELY is, therefore, altogether mistaken when he says (*Gesch. des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, IV., 7) that Urban VIII. "had not consented to the taxation of the Spanish clergy".

² See Savelli's report of February 7, 1632, in SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 259 seq., and the reports in LEMAN, 126.

they presented themselves individually, though without result.¹

On February 22nd, 1632, Prince Frederick Savelli arrived in Rome,² and on the 27th he was received in audience together with his brother Paolo. They had no fresh proposals to make. With regard to their request for larger subsidies, Urban reminded them of the heavy expenses he had been obliged to incur in connection with the troubles in the Valtellina and the Mantuan war. The two envoys not being satisfied with these explanations, the Pope promised to examine once more what he could do. But he seized the opportunity to complain of the scant goodwill with which he had met, not of course on the part of the Emperor, but on that of his ministers, even in questions where right was on his side, as in the dispute over the Abbey of St. Maximinus of Trèves, the Patriarchate of Aquileia and the City prefecture. With regard to a defensive alliance of the Catholic Princes against the Swedes he showed great readiness but pointed to the fact that the Grand-Duke of Tuscany had already taken the matter in hand. For the rest, Urban VIII. told them that he had been informed that Gustavus Adolphus intended to turn his weapons against Artois and that the French had assured him that, through their being masters of Pinerolo, they could guarantee the peace of Italy.³

Whilst Savelli apparently still hoped to get something,⁴ hot-blooded Borgia lost his head. After a previous understanding with the Spanish Cardinals and a few others who sided with him, such as Ubaldini and Ludovisi, he resolved to have

¹ See LEMAN, 127 *seq.*

² See *Avviso of February 28, 1632, Vatican Library.

³ See P. Savelli's report of February 28, 1632, in SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 260 *seq.* Cf. KLOPP, III., 2, 661; LEMAN, 131, and PIEPER, in the *Hist.-polit. Blätter.*, XCIV., 473 *seq.*, who asserts, against GREGOROVIVS (40 *seq.*) that the more severe words that the Pope is said to have used by SIRI (VII., 481) are in contradiction with all reliable reports. LEMAN is also of this opinion (131, note 2).

⁴ Cf. the information of the Florentine envoy, in PIEPER, *loc. cit.*

recourse to the extraordinary expedient which his King had empowered him to employ. March 8th, 1632, was the date of the customary secret Consistory. It was presided over by the Pope and took place in the new consistorial hall of the Vatican facing towards the piazza of St. Peter's.¹ As Cardinal Protector of Spain it fell to Borgia to make the first proposal for filling two vacant Spanish sees. This done he produced a document drawn up by Cardinal Ubaldini and, without first asking leave to do so, he began to read it in his rasping voice. It ran as follows: "No sooner had the Most Serene Catholic King of Spain received information of the conspiracy of all the heretical Powers with the King of Sweden, and of the defeat of the Catholics in Germany, than his one anxiety was to meet so great a danger at once, knowing that thus he would walk in the steps of his ancestors who had bequeathed to him so glorious a title, because they too fought for religion even more

¹ With regard to the extraordinary occurrences at the consistory of March 8, 1632, the account given by GREGOROVIVS (42 seq.) is, as PIEPER rightly emphasizes (*Hist.-polit. Blätter.*, CXIV., 479 seq.) very one-sided. In the appendix (123 seq.) he gives the actual words of Borgia's protest, an *Avviso from Rome of March 13, and the short letter of P. Savelli of March 8, 1632, an *Avviso di Roma* and a *Relatione* from the State Archives, Modena. But Gregorovivus has not used the main source, which has been in print since 1875. It is the report drawn up immediately after the conclusion of the Consistory, and signed by seven Cardinals, published by LÄMMER, *Melet.*, 244-9. LÄMMER took it from *Cod. A. E.*, XI., 75, of the Library of S. Pietro in Vincoli, where we find on p. 4 seq., the first draft, and p. 69 seq. the original with the signature of the seven Cardinals. LÄMMER only names the first two Cardinals (Bentivoglio and Vidoni); the five others are: Berlingerius, Gipsius, a Balneo, Verospius, and Ginettus. LEMAN (135 seq.) has used many other reports on the Consistory; the most important of these are the letter of the Secretary of State to the nuncios and the report of Borgia to Philip IV. (Archives at Simancas, 3096). I reproduce the former in App. XIV. As the text of the protest is inaccurate in Gregorovivus, Leman has republished it from a copy in the archives at Simancas (pp. 563-4).

than for their Kingdom. For this reason the King has put on one side his interests in the Indies, in Italy and in the Netherlands ; has supported the Emperor with vast subsidies in money and has commanded his troops in the Netherlands to resist the Swedes. Whilst thus mobilizing the resources of his Kingdom with a view to a yet greater effort, he realized that the combined forces of the heretics could only be driven back by the united armed forces of all Catholics. For this reason he has had recourse to Your Holiness as to the common Father, praying you with all humility, though also most earnestly, that you would deign not only to contribute generous sums of money but, what is even more important, that you would warn all Catholic Princes and peoples of their danger and earnestly exhort them to defend the cause of religion, in this present danger, with all their resources, and that by your apostolic zeal Your Holiness would show yourself also to be a Pope like the most holy and most illustrious among your predecessors who raised their voice like a trumpet, summoning all Christendom to form glorious alliances both for the defence and the spread of the faith. His Majesty is entitled to hope that in view of your exalted wisdom and piety Your Holiness will lend yourself to so splendid an enterprise. But since the evil grows daily and Your Holiness still hesitates . . . ”

At these words the Pope, who until then had listened in silence, sharply interrupted the Cardinal and bade him stop. Borgia made as though he had not heard and tried to read the protest to the end. It ran thus : “ For this reason His Majesty has commanded me to express in his name, in this illustrious assembly, all that the venerable lords, the Spanish Cardinals, and myself have frequently told Your Holiness in private, in order that as many of the venerable Fathers as are here present, may be witnesses before God and men that neither as regards zeal, authority or action, the King has failed the cause of God and the faith. At the same time he commanded me to protest with all due respect and humility, that any injury suffered by the Catholic religion must be ascribed not to himself, the most pious and obedient King, but to Your Holiness.” The Pope prevented the reading of these concluding paragraphs

by once more commanding the Cardinal to keep silence. He asked Borgia in what capacity he spoke, whether as a Cardinal or as Philip IV.'s ambassador. When he answered : " As a Cardinal," the Pope replied : " The Cardinals are not entitled to speak at a secret Consistory without first obtaining our leave or without being questioned by us." When Borgia replied that he had also spoken in his capacity as ambassador, the Pope said with emphasis : " As ambassador your Eminence has no seat here ; what you have to say in that capacity we shall listen to in an audience." " I could not obtain one," Borgia replied. This the Pope emphatically denied, reminding him that within the preceding fortnight he had had four or five audiences and once more he imposed silence on him. Borgia, now greatly excited, nevertheless went on contradicting the Pope. This so roused the Cardinal of S. Onofrio, Antonio Barberini, that he went up to Borgia and summoned him to keep silence. In so doing he seized the latter by the arm, but the Pope, by a gesture, signified to him to refrain. Cardinal Colonna also sought to make Borgia realize that he was in the wrong whilst some other Cardinals took the side of Borgia and a very heated contest arose. In view of the fact that Colonna belonged to the imperial party, his action particularly irritated Borgia : " I have nothing to do with your Eminence," he exclaimed, " I want to protest to the Pope ! "

Urban VIII., who had been profoundly angered by Borgia's conduct, the offensiveness of which went beyond all bounds, soon recovered his complete self-possession. He had enough self-control to take note of Borgia's protest and to say : " We have at heart the care of the Catholic religion to which we have zealously devoted ourselves and we shall continue to do so. Our concern for the Catholic King has been shown by deeds. Let us now go on with the business of filling vacant episcopal sees."

On the next day Urban VIII. made a dignified protest to the King of Spain ¹ and instructed his nuncio to make further

¹ The Brief to Philip IV., of March 9, 1632, is not unpublished, as LEMAN asserts (139) ; it was published from a copy in the library of S. Pietro in Vincoli by LÄMMER, *Melet.*, 248, note 1

remonstrances. On the very day of the Consistory he also put his signature to a Bull to the following effect : " Borgia and his supporters, by reason of their conduct, which is unjustifiable both in substance and in form, have incurred the canonical penalties, so that proceedings might be taken against them ; nevertheless, lest an occasion be given to the ill-disposed to put on the incident a construction unfavourable to Philip IV., we put off, for the time being, the execution of these penalties, out of regard for the Catholic King." ¹

Meanwhile Borgia, who had the support of Cardinals Ubaldini, Scaglia, Sandoval, Spinola, Alborno and Aldobrandini, had given the widest publicity to his protest all over Rome, whilst the representatives of the foreign Powers, who were taken aback by such a document, sent the text to their Governments. In a letter to Philip IV., the Spanish Cardinals affirmed their solidarity with Borgia. The latter, as well as Cardinals Aldobrandini and Spinola, advised the King to take advantage of the opportunity to bring to a head, once for all, the various questions in dispute between Rome and Madrid, especially the ecclesiastical ones.²

On March 11th, at a sitting of the Inquisition at which the Bull of March 8th was repeated and amplified,³ further violent altercations broke out between the Pope and Borgia. The viceroy of Naples having threatened with a council and the force of arms in support of the latter, Urban VIII. was afraid to adopt the advice of those Cardinals who recommended an exemplary punishment of Borgia.⁴ Avoiding all precipitation he submitted the case to a commission of experienced canonists, and though these pronounced unanimously against the Spaniard,⁵ Urban VIII. nevertheless refrained from further action. The chief reason for such restraint was doubtless the

(line 4 read " ignarus " instead of " ignaris "). On March 6, 1632, Urban VIII. had complained to Philip IV. of encroachments by the Spanish government in Portugal ; see *Epist.*, IX., Papal Secret Archives.

¹ See *Bull.*, XIV., 280 *seq.*

² See LEMAN, 136 *seq.*

³ See *Bull.*, XIV., 283 *seq.*

⁴ See LEMAN, 138.

⁵ Cf. LÄMMER, *Melet.*, 245, note 2, 247, note 1.

fact that Borgia was backed by King Philip, and however great the Pope's annoyance may have been, he could not go the length of a complete rupture with Spain. So he deferred the punishment of Borgia¹ and the other Spanish Cardinals, but towards their Italian accomplices, Ubaldini and Ludovisi, he showed no such consideration.² Domenico Cecchini, a supporter of Ludovisi, relates in his autobiography that Cardinal Robert Ubaldini, who had had altercations with Maffeo Barberini on previous occasions,³ and who was believed to be the author of Borgia's protest, had been threatened with internment in the Castle of S. Angelo and that he was only preserved from such a fate by the opposition of the fiscal official, Fabri.⁴ According to other reports it was Cardinal Francesco Barberini who prevented extreme measures; nevertheless Ubaldini was compelled to offer a written apology. As for Cardinal Ludovisi, the Pope informed him on March 18th, through Cecchini, that he was to betake himself to his archdiocese of Bologna within ten or twelve days; if he did not go willingly he should be made to do so by force.⁵ Ludovisi

¹ Cf. the decree in *Bull.*, XIV., 289 *seq.*

² Cf. LEMAN, 141.

³ Cf. on these dissensions the *report in *Barb.* 4729, p. 341 *seq.*, Vatican Library.

⁴ See the passage in the **Autobiografia* of CECCHINI in *Arch. stor. d. Soc. Rom.*, X., 295, which, however, is disfigured by a printer's error which alters the sense: in line 9 read "Borgia" instead of "Borghese".

⁵ LEMAN, 142. Cecchini has related in detail in his autobiography the misfortunes that befell him through the execution of this mission—he lost the favour of his beloved patron Ludovisi, and also, for a year, that of the Pope who was very angry. (Copies of the Autobiography are in the Barberini, Chigi and Corsini Libraries, Rome, and in the Library at Forli). Cf. *Arch. d. stor. Rom.*, X., 295 *seq.* Cecchini did not die at that time of vexation, as SIRI (VII., 485) asserted; he became a Cardinal under Innocent X. and lived until 1656; see CARDELLA, VII., 53. According to a *Letter of Agucchi to Card. Ludovisi, July 27, 1624, the Pope at that time held the nephew of Gregory XV. in great esteem. Corsini Library, Rome, *loc. cit.*

communicated the news to his friends in the Sacred College, including the Spanish Cardinals. It is characteristic of the insubordination of Borgia that he urged Ludovisi not to obey the Pope's command, assuring him at the same time of the protection of the King of Spain. According to Cecchini's account, the Spanish Cardinal so far forgot all sense of duty as to promise that in such an eventuality, and as a proof of the rupture of the Spanish Government with the Holy See, he would secure the expulsion of the Papal nuncio from Naples. Cecchini hints at further extravagant proposals by Borgia on that occasion.¹ However, Ludovisi was unwilling to follow him on that road; he told Borgia that he was a servant of the Pope and had no thought of denying obedience to him.² On March 27th he left his residence, the magnificent palace of the Cancelleria, which he had occupied as vice-chancellor and said good-bye to his beloved Rome.³ He was already

¹ * "Il cardinale Borgia esortò il cardinale Ludovisi a non partire e che il re l'haveria sostenuto in Roma offerendo di far cacciare il Nuntio di Napoli, et altre esorbitanze." (Corsini Library, Rome, *loc. cit.*). Cf. also the reports in LEMAN, 142.

² * "Dicendo ch'era servo et vassallo del Papa e che non conveniva partirsi della sua grazia (CECCHINI, *loc. cit.*). In view of this testimony of a well-informed witness, the report by a partisan, ALV. CONTARINI (*Relazione*, 379), that Ludovisi, in concert with the Spaniards, had plotted the summoning of a Council against Urban VIII., commands no credence. RANKE (*Päpste*, II. 6, 370) and GREGOROVIVS (49 *seq.*) accept it unquestioningly, although they knew Cecchini's autobiography. How the Pope was being influenced against Ludovisi by tale-bearers, cf. CRIVELLI's report in SCHNITZER, 235, note 5.

³ * "La mattina del 27 Marzo (not 26th as SIRI (VII., 486) states), 1632, il card. Ludovisi partitosi di Cancelleria, piuttosto cadavere spirante che huomo, tanto maltrattato dalla podagra, andò alla casa professa delli PP. Gesuiti, dove udita la messa nella cappella già stanza di S. Ignatio, salutati tutti gli amici, che in gran numero erano concorsi, et me in particolare, al quale sorridendo disse: Mons. Cecchini, per un pezzo non mi porterete più di quelle imbasciate, e con le lagrime di tutti montò in lettiga (*Vita del card. Cecchini*, Corsini Library, Rome, *loc. cit.*). Ant.

grievously stricken with gout; eight months later death released the one-time all-powerful nephew of Gregory XV. from his bodily and mental sufferings.

After prolonged deliberation Urban VIII. published a special decree which was inserted in the Consistorial Acts. It renewed the ancient rule according to which no Cardinal, either in his own name or in that of anyone else, not even if commissioned by an Emperor or a King, could bring up for discussion any topic other than the subjects which the Pope had put on the agenda.¹

Shortly after the incident in the consistory of March 8th, Cardinal Barberini told the imperial ambassador, Paolo Savelli, that the way in which the Spaniards acted was not the one to induce the Pope to change his mind; on the contrary, it could only turn him against the Habsburgs and their interests. As a matter of fact the outrageous conduct of Borgia showed only too clearly what the Pope might expect should the Habsburgs obtain the hegemony of Europe.² In these circumstances it was not surprising that Ferdinand II. failed to obtain the subsidy he had asked for³; on the contrary, the Pope began to work for the realization of a plan which had been suggested by a report of Bichi, to the effect that a reconciliation between France and the Habsburgs still remained a possibility.⁴ Urban VIII. told the imperial ambassador Savelli that he intended to appoint three extraordinary nuncios for the purpose of peace negotiations, viz. to the Emperor and to the Kings of Spain and France respectively.⁵ The decision was communicated to the Cardinals

Giunti (**Vita e fatti del card. Ludovisi, Cod. 32, D. 8, Corsini Library, Rome*) describes Ludovisi's death (November 18, 1632) in detail.

¹ See LÄMMER, *Melet.*, 249, note 1.

² Cf. DE MEAUX, *La Réforme*, II., 424 *seq.*

³ See LEMAN, 144.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See P. Savelli's report of March 13, 1632, in GREGOROVIVS, 129 *seq.* Cf. also the *letter of Savelli to Eggenberg, March 20, 1632: the nuncios were to "conciliar gl'animi e togliere le gelosie per beneficio della christianità universale" (State Archives,

in a Consistory of March 29th, 1632. The following were appointed: Girolamo Grimaldi, Governor of Rome, to the Emperor; Lorenzo Campeggi to Philip IV. and Adriano de Ceva to Louis XIII.¹ In the same consistory the Pope pronounced an address which sounded like an answer to Borgia's protest of March 8th, but its tone was extremely moderate. Urban VIII. spoke earnestly of his solicitude for the interests of the Church; if he had not always informed the Cardinals in detail, he had remedied the omission by the creation of a special Congregation which had given its consent to the dispatch of the nuncios. The Consistory had begun so punctually that twelve Cardinals came late, among them Sandoval, Spinola and Albornoz; Borgia also was present.²

The day before the Consistory of March 29th, the Hungarian Cardinal Pázmány, a wholehearted supporter of the Habsburgs, had arrived in Rome as special envoy of the Emperor.³ Pázmány's mission⁴ had already been grievously prejudiced by the conduct of Borgia, and in addition to this the latter's entourage had spread a rumour that Pázmány would adopt the same line of conduct as he himself. In consequence of this report the Pope gave orders that Pázmány should be informed that he could not be received as an envoy of Ferdinand II.⁵ He was nevertheless received with every mark of honour and (Vienna). The mission of the nuncios was connected with the Pope's exhortation to peace, addressed to all Catholic Princes on April 1, 1632; see *Bull.*, XIV., 286 seq.

¹ Cf. LEMAN, 213 seq.

² Cf. besides the report used by LEMAN (140 seq.) *that of P. Savelli of April 3, 1632, in App. No. XV.

³ See LEMAN, 148.

⁴ Pázmány's reports were first published by MILLER DE BRASSO (*Epistolae card. P. Pazmany*, II., Budae, 1822), and more fully in the edition of the complete works of the Cardinal, sponsored by the theological Faculty of the Budapest University, begun in 1894, ed. by HANUY (*Petri card. Pazmany epistolae*, I. (1601-1628), II. (1629-1636),) Budapest, 1910-11. Besides LEMAN, 147 seq., cf. also FRAKNOI, *P. Pázmány*, III., 14-59.

⁵ *Relatio Legionis Romanae*, in HANUY, *P. card. Pazmany epistolae*, II., 147; LEMAN, 147.

was given ample opportunity to expose his grievances. At the Cardinal's first audience, on the very day of his arrival, the Pope, after a few friendly remarks about the Emperor, expressed his satisfaction at the slowing down of the Swedish advance in Germany. Pázmány replied that a slowing down of this kind was like a feverless day in a sick man's life; the enemy would not be stayed in his victorious progress. The Cardinal supported his opinion with a survey of events in Germany since the battle of Breitenfeld. Urban VIII. expressed his astonishment: if such was the situation the enemy must have had wings, so to speak; at any rate his progress was that of a traveller rather than that of an army on a war footing; it looked as if the German towns were inadequately fortified and defended since the Swedes had been able to penetrate even into those which were provided with very strong garrisons.¹ On April 6th, the Pope received Pázmány in solemn audience.² As the Cardinal was about to present his credentials, Urban VIII. put to him a question which the conduct of Borgia justified, viz. whether that document accredited him as imperial ambassador? If that was the case, he would be unable to accept the letter since Cardinals, who rank as Princes, were not allowed to act as ambassadors of secular rulers. Pázmány quoted precedents but the Pope declared that they were not to the point. Thereupon the Cardinal deemed it best to put an end to the discussion by declaring that he merely intended to carry out the instructions of the Emperor. The Hungarian Cardinal was a theologian of distinction and as a Bishop he had rendered the highest services to the cause of the Catholic restoration in Hungary,³ but he was no diplomatist, for in that case he would not have been betrayed by his zeal for the Emperor's cause into representing

¹ See MILLER, II., 127 *seqq.*

² *Cf.* for this audience both the reports of Pázmány in MILLER, II., 74 and 132 *seq.*; and his printed *Secreta Relatio*, *ibid.*, 149 *seq.*; also KLOPP, III., and HANUY, II., 317.

³ *Cf.* our account, Vol. XXIV., 102, note, and above, p. 156 *seq.* See also the *letter of praise of June 8, 1630, *Epist.*, VII., Papal Secret Archives.

the war as a purely religious one, nor would he have ascribed Saxony's going over to the Swedes solely to the edict of restitution; still less would he have asserted that the Pope had given his approval to that document, for these assertions were contrary to the facts. It was not fear of the edict of restitution that drove the weak and hesitant Elector of Saxony, John George, into the Swedish camp, but rather the fatal mistake of Tilly who invaded Saxony in order to force it to abandon its armed neutrality in favour of the Emperor.¹ But quite apart from all this the Pope's attitude towards the imperial edict had been one of cool reserve.² Consequently Urban VIII. at once emphatically declared that, as could be proved by the minutes, he had spoken of the edict in such general terms that it was evident that, though he had praised the Emperor's zeal and piety, he had by no means given his approval to that document.³ If, in his letter to the Emperor, the Secretary of Briefs had said more than that, he did so against the Pope's intention. No doubt he, the Pope, had approved the aim of the edict of restitution, but not by any means either its form or the manner of its execution. He complained bitterly of the fact that none of the recovered possessions "had been restored to their lawful owners, but that the Princes had kept everything for themselves; perhaps that was the reason why they were now being punished by God".⁴ To this Cardinal Pázmány had nothing to answer so he went on with his report: "The Emperor is well aware that there are not wanting those who, led astray by the passion of hatred, believe themselves, and try to convince others, that the war in Germany was simply a political struggle which had nothing to do with religion, or, which comes to the same, that the sole purpose of the war was to break the power of the House of Austria, without thereby injuring religion. These

¹ See DÖBERL, *Bayern*, I., 551.

² Cf. above, p. 294 *seq.*

³ That in this there was no "truly heroic untruth" as GREGOROVIVUS (57) asserts, has been shown by TUPETZ (443, note 2).

⁴ Cardinal Barberini wrote in the same sense on April 10, 1632, to Rocci; see LEMAN, 150, note 2.

allegations were made chiefly to the end that those who could and should support the common cause might play the rôle of idle onlookers. But if anyone considers the origin and progress of this war, and in particular the conduct of the King of Sweden, he will easily arrive at the conclusion that this is an invention and that, on the contrary, there is question of the destruction of the Catholic religion." Pázmány then described the conduct of the Swedes in the dioceses of Würzburg and Mayence.

Three requests made by the Cardinal concerned the grant of more generous subsidies to the Emperor, another attempt to dissuade the King of France from the alliance with Sweden, and participation by the Pope in a great military alliance which, in addition to Spain, was to include other Catholic Powers and which was evidently aimed, not only against Sweden, but also against France.¹ To the first point Urban opposed the huge debts of the Holy See, the enormous expenses, especially in connection with the war in Italy, and the subsidies previously granted to Germany. To the second point his reply was that he had already done his utmost to bring about a rupture of the Franco-Swedish alliance and that he had instructed his nuncio in Paris to give his support to the imperial ambassador in this matter. "Raising his voice," the Cardinal reports, "the Pope repeatedly declared that he had exerted himself a great deal in this respect." "To my third point," Pázmány continues, "namely that the League would be directed solely against those who sought to destroy the Holy Roman Empire, the Pope objected: 'And what happens if one of the confederates falls upon another?' I replied that this was foreseen in the articles of the treaty, and that any anxiety on that score would best be removed by the participation of the Holy See. Having heard me to the end, the Pope assured me once more of his sympathy with the Emperor and promised to consider everything."

When Urban VIII. complained of Borgia's protest, Pázmány

¹ For this alliance, the draft of which is printed in *Theatr. europ.*, III., 537 seq., cf. RITTER, in the *Hist. Zeitschr.*, XCVII., 246.

committed the imprudence of attempting to justify so offensive an action. The protest, he said, had not been made without weighty reasons, nor without consideration having been given to its grave consequences, especially when one considers that it was made by so cautious a nation as the Spaniards who are wont to subject all important matters to mature reflection. "Though the secrets of Courts are hidden from me," Pázmány went on, "there are not a few people who think that between Your Holiness and the King of France there exists a secret understanding which threatens the House of Austria." In proof of his assertions Pázmány referred to a copy of an alleged report of the Paris nuncio, Bagno, in which it was stated that the Pope was anxious for the imperial dignity to pass to the House of Bavaria. He had also seen the text of a treaty between France and Savoy, concluded a few years ago, for the partition of the Spanish possessions in Italy, in which the Kingdom of Naples was assigned to the Holy See. Other reports also had given cause for suspicion. The fact that the Pope was increasing his troops and strengthening his fortresses had given rise to a suspicion that he was preparing for a big war, nay, there were those who, from confidential expressions, drew the conclusion that His Holiness was in a good or a bad mood according as the affairs of the Habsburgs took a turn for the better or the worse, for even the most secret things could not remain hidden from powerful rulers. Hence the Pope should remove every cause of suspicion and forestall the consequences of Borgia's protest by becoming reconciled to Philip IV. The only means to that end was participation in the League; in that eventuality he, the Cardinal, guaranteed that, through the mediation of the Emperor, the conflict with Spain would be amicably settled. In conclusion Pázmány pointed to the dangers which were bound to arise if, deceived by France's promises, the Pope were to provide a pretext for a rupture.

Urban VIII.'s amazement on hearing these allegations is intelligible enough. He protested against the accusation that he cherished any hostile sentiments towards the Habsburgs and pointed out that many things were said which could not

be proved.¹ He concluded with some strictly confidential communications on which Pázmány's letter is silent.² From a report of Pázmány dated April 9th, 1632, we gather what sharp expressions the Hungarian Cardinal permitted himself if not towards the Pope, then at least towards Cardinal Francesco Barberini and the Secretary of State, Azzolini. It was inevitable, he said, that Christendom should be scandalized if the Pope rejected so holy an alliance as the one proposed by the Emperor, which was one to which no Christian Prince could take exception. He was not going to look into the causes of the Mantuan war, but he could not refrain from asking whether it was really necessary for the Holy See to incur such heavy expenses in its own defence seeing that it had nothing to fear either from the Emperor or the King of Spain. If on that occasion the Pope could spend six millions

¹ What foolish rumours were spread is shown by the anonymous letters from Rome of April 3 and 10, 1632, in SÖLTL, III., 292 *seq.* and 295 *seq.* With regard to the favourable utterances which Urban VIII. was supposed to have addressed to Pázmány about the Swedish king, PIEPER has already established that there is no mention of them in the Cardinal's reports. "To take a thing of this kind to be true," PIEPER rightly remarks in his criticism (*Hist. polit. Blätter*, XCIV., 486-8), "demands the faith of a Sötl!" GREGOROVIVS also doubts the allegation, but thinks it could not be based on pure invention (70). KLOPP says very truly (III., 2, 674): "Just as these reports lack external evidence, so are they intrinsically most improbable. It is, however, possible that in Rome, as had happened in Venice, many let themselves be deceived by the assertions of Richelieu and his partisans, that the French alliance with the Swedish king had made religion secure in Germany. It is also possible that disappointment over the Mantuan war and the echoes of this misfortune, caused some Romans to consider that the ill fortune of the Imperial arms was in some way a punishment. But from this to rejoicing over the success of the Swedish arms, is a very long step! Pázmány indeed spoke sharply enough to the Pope and to the Emperor about the Pope; but not a hint is found in his words that Urban VIII. was favourably disposed to the King of Sweden." Cf. also LEMAN, 151, note 1.

² See MILLER, II., 151; HANUY, II., 319, 331; LEMAN, 152.

simply for fear of the Emperor, how was it that now, when religion was so hard pressed, he was unable to raise one million to oppose the Protestants? ¹

Though the Hungarian Cardinal could hardly fail to realize that he would not obtain much, his obstinacy in acting as imperial ambassador in defiance of the papal prohibition put an end to any hope he may have entertained.² However plainly the Pope told him that his conduct was irreconcilable with his position as a Cardinal, he stuck to his point of view: "I would rather give up the red hat than your service," he wrote to Ferdinand, "for my first oath of fidelity was made to the Emperor."³

Meanwhile news had arrived that on March 9th Tilly had wrested Bamberg from the Swedish General Horn and inflicted serious losses on the latter's army.⁴ The Pope congratulated Maximilian I. and Ferdinand II., wishing them further and even greater victories.⁵ On April 17th he informed the Emperor of the impending departure of his nuncio extraordinary who would be the bearer of the money subsidy he had requested.⁶

Cardinal Pázmány had written as early as April 10th that it was useless to hope for a larger subsidy, for the Pope was firmly resolved not to touch the treasure deposited in the Castle of S. Angelo by Sixtus V., and because it was not so easy to raise the necessary funds by the usual means.⁷

Urban VIII. was further strengthened in his resolve by the support of the Romans. On April 19th an assembly of the

¹ This **Relation* which is not in Miller, is to be found in the State Archives, Vienna, *Romana fasc.*, 49. Cf. also LEMAN, 153.

² Cf. LEMAN, 154.

³ Letter from Pázmány to Ferdinand II., dated Rome, 1632, April 16, in HANUY, II., 275.

⁴ Cf. DROYSEN, II., 523 *seq.*; RIEZLER, V., 405.

⁵ See the **Briefs* of April 10, 1632, *Epist.*, IX., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XVI., 338 *seq.*

⁶ See **Brief* of April 17, 1632, Papal Secret Archives; the original is in the State Archives, Vienna. Grimaldi reached Vienna, June 21, 1632; for his activity there see LEMAN, 218 *seq.*

⁷ See MILLER, II., 76; HANUY, II., 266.

citizens on the Capitol resolved to pray the Pope, in the name of the people of Rome, not to grant any subsidies to foreign Princes out of the treasury of the Castle S. Angelo for thereby Rome and the Holy See would be robbed of its means of defence¹: so lively was even then the memory of the Sack of Rome which the accounts of the looting of Mantua by the imperial troops so recently revived!

Urban VIII. himself was haunted by the fear of the possibility of a return of the days of Clement VII. To the delegates of the Roman people he said that he had spent over four millions on the equipment of his troops, the strengthening of the fort of Urbano near Bologna and the Castle S. Angelo, and that he had also spent 600,000 scudi on the purchase of arms, so that Rome should not be defenceless as at the time of the various lootings which it had had to undergo. To prevent further devastations of this kind the Romans themselves should provide a fund out of which unforeseen necessities might be met.²

The discussions whether Pázmány was empowered to act as imperial envoy, which were not yet ended, did not prevent further conferences between the Hungarian Cardinal and Cardinal Barberini, nor even his being once more received in audience by the Pope on April 24th.³ Meanwhile the military situation had taken an unfavourable turn for the imperialists and the Leaguists, for on April 7th Gustavus Adolphus had succeeded in taking Donauwörth, the key to Bavaria.⁴ Pázmány made the best of Maximilian's dangerous situation as well as of the report that Hungary was being threatened by Rakoczy, Prince of Transilvania. He laid stress on the grave danger which menaced the Catholic religion in Germany from the King of Sweden; and yet, as he knew from a sure

¹ See GREGOROVIVS, 138 *seq.*

² See the *report of Fr. Niccolini of April 24, 1632 (State Archives, Florence) used by GREGOROVIVS, 54. Cf. Avviso, May 1, 1632, Vatican Library.

³ Cf. HANUY, II., 279 *seq.*, 282 *seq.* See also KLOPP, III., 2, 670 *seq.*; LEMAN, 158 *seq.*

⁴ See RIEZLER, V., 407 *seq.*

source, the King of France was prepared to pay to the Swede one million livres in the following month and a similar sum at the end of summer. Instead of taking precautions against future dangers which were after all doubtful, it would be better for the Pope to think of the peril which threatened here and now. Hence he prayed His Holiness to give a favourable reply to the Emperor's requests. The answer was already drawn up; the Pope read it and added some oral explanations. With regard to the request for a money subsidy, in view of his own financial distress caused by the troubles in the Valtellina, the Mantuan war, and more recently by a dispute with Venice, he could not possibly go beyond the contributions he had already promised, but these he would continue. He would also earnestly warn the French King, as he had done before, not to strengthen the power of the Protestants by entering into an alliance with them. Cardinal Azzolini would explain why it was impossible for himself to join an Austro-Spanish League. The Pope, so we read in a memorandum drawn up by the Cardinal, was firmly resolved never to conclude an alliance which might involve him in a war with any Catholic Prince, for this would be at variance with his rôle of common Father of Christendom. Moreover it had been left open to heretical Powers to join the League, and with these the Pope could never enter into relations, just as he could not undertake to defend every ordinance of Empire, such as, for instance, the treaty of Passau, which was so damaging to the Church. Although through his nuncio he had acted as mediator at the peace of Ratisbon, he had assumed no responsibility for its maintenance, hence he was not to be held to account if anything was done against that agreement and if France refused to restore Pinerolo which she had taken from the Duke of Savoy. Nor could the Supreme Head of the Church enter into negotiations with the Grisons, seeing that they were heretics, on the subject of the Alpine passes. Since the only reason why the Pope was wanted in the League was that he should provide subsidies, and since he was prepared to pay these if he was able to do so, without any league, there was no reason for his joining it. Lastly it was not in keeping with

his dignity to join a league the conditions of which had been drawn up without his participation.¹

Notwithstanding his previous experiences, Pázmány was still unwilling to give up all hope. To Cardinals Azzolini and Barberini he made the most pressing representations, which he renewed when the dreadful news arrived that Tilly had been mortally wounded and that the Swedes had invaded Bavaria. In a letter to Barberini—illness confined him to his room—he drew an eloquent picture of the ever growing peril, of the outrages committed by the Swedes in Bavaria, and of the traitorous attitude of France which had abandoned Maximilian to the Swedish King instead of preventing him, as bound by treaty, from entering Bavarian territory, or of giving to Bavaria the assistance to which the treaty also bound her in the event of invasion.²

As soon as his health allowed it Pázmány made yet another attempt to induce the Pope to change his mind. This took place on May 13th and 14th at Castel Gandolfo where Urban VIII. was making a brief stay. Once again the Cardinal made the most pressing representations and remarked that the King of Sweden, who had penetrated as far as Augsburg, was also threatening Italy. "However," he reports, "I obtained no more than before, namely that it was not the will to help that was lacking but that the means were exhausted."³ Seeing that Urban VIII. was firmly resolved not to join an Austro-Spanish league, Pázmány made preparations for his departure. On May 26th, the Pope, who meanwhile had returned to Rome,⁴ received him in solemn farewell audience. Urban VIII. informed him that he had ordered public prayers with a view to averting the Swedish peril; also that Grimaldi would go to Vienna as nuncio extraordinary, and that he would explain the financial distress of the Holy See and its incapacity for further large scale material sacrifices. Nevertheless he was willing to make a substantial advance payment, charging it to the usual

¹ See HANUY, II., 279; LEMAN, 157 *seq.*

² See KLOPP, III., 2, 673; LEMAN, 160 *seq.*

³ See MILLER, II., 98 *seq.*; HANUY, II., 304 *seq.*; LEMAN, 162.

⁴ May 18; see *Avviso of May 20, 1632, Vatican Library.

monthly subsidies. The Pope's hope that the Emperor would calm himself was based on the fact that Urban was actually dispatching to Vienna, through Grimaldi, the sum of 130,000 thalers, whilst he even promised a further contribution. However, of all this he said nothing to Pázmány whom he refused formally to recognize as the Emperor's envoy, so that it is not surprising that when the Cardinal left Rome at the beginning of June, he was in a very dissatisfied mood. The hot-blooded Hungarian aired his feelings freely in the course of his return journey. Wherever he went he complained that the Pope would not take into account the perilous situation of Christendom, that he refused to join the league proposed by the Emperor Ferdinand, that on the contrary, he stood in close relations with the latter's enemies.¹

Crivelli, the representative of the Elector of Bavaria in Rome, was given to understand how deeply hurt the Pope was by talk of this kind, for he too, by command of his master, was pressing Urban for money. The Pope told him that he was willing to listen to friendly representations but that he would not be compelled. "The blustering manner of the Hungarian Cardinal has spoilt everything," Crivelli wrote on May 29th, 1632. He was nevertheless able to report that the Pope had addressed three autograph letters to the King of France in order to recommend to him the interests of the German Catholics and especially those of Bavaria.²

What were the intentions of the Pope appears from the Instructions of May 1st, 1632, to the nuncios Grimaldi, Campeggi and Ceva, who were being dispatched to the Courts of Vienna, Madrid and Paris.³ Two weighty tasks were entrusted to them, viz. first to reconcile the great Catholic

¹ See LEMAN, 164 *seq.*, 218.

² See SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik*, 234.

³ Cf. above, p. 293. Grimaldi's Instruction, which could not be found by LEMAN (225, note 5) is dated May 1, 1632. It is preserved as an autograph copy by Barberini in *Barb.* XXXIII., 149, Vatican Library. It is, as LEMAN rightly supposed, identical with that of Ceva (*Arm.* III., 47, p. 1 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives) and probably also with that of Campeggi.

Powers and then to combine their forces against the Swedes. History taught, so we read, that the enemies of the Catholic religion, whether infidels or heretics, always derived the greatest advantage from the dissensions of Catholic Princes. This was true also in the case of Gustavus Adolphus who, not content with his attack on Germany, would before long threaten Italy, the Netherlands, France and Poland, nay, the whole Catholic world. It it came to that, those Princes who at present are content with the rôle of onlookers, or perhaps even go so far as to support the King of Sweden for the sake of their own separate interests, would be made to feel how fatally mistaken they had been. Even now the King of Sweden only sought his own advantage. How will he not act when his power shall have extended still further ? On the French side it was argued that France must have a free hand on her frontiers, but the Swede, who was already reaching out for the Rhine and the Alpine passes, would get these frontiers into his power. The only remedy lay in the restoration of concord among the Catholic Princes. France should ponder the hopes the Huguenots set on the Swedes, especially in view of the discords in the royal household ; and Spain should consider that the Dutch Calvinists were bound to wax bolder. Hence it was the nuncio's task to solve the discord between France and the Habsburgs and to reconcile Richelieu and Olivares. The Instruction then examines the differences between the aforesaid nations, whilst at the same time it justifies the papal policy. Mention is also made of the divergences between the Emperor and the Catholic Princes, more particularly Maximilian of Bavaria, and the hope is expressed that these disputes would be quickly settled, though it would take more time to bridge the far deeper cleavage between France and the Habsburgs. However, in view of the immediate peril there was no time to lose ; a provisional arrangement should be arrived at so that the great Catholic Powers might combine their forces against Gustavus Adolphus ; once he was defeated there would follow a final settlement. The reconciliation was conceived in the form of a reciprocal promise by the Powers not to attack one another for the duration of the struggle with

the Swedes. Of all the matters in dispute that of Pinerolo was the most difficult, and it was this which until then had wrecked every attempt at a compromise, hence it is discussed in detail and various suggestions for a settlement are made. After a detailed statement of the manifold efforts of the Pope to bring about peace, and of some fresh points of view which should be taken into account in the new efforts to be made, stress is laid on the following facts: the Pope's one aim was the security of religion and the guarantee of peace, hence he favoured neither one party nor the other. For this reason particular proposals must not be made in the Pope's name, for he only wished to mediate, not to arbitrate. The interests of the Catholic Church must be defended against the Protestants, but the nuncios must not enter into direct negotiations with them. There must be close contact and perfect harmony with the local nuncio, and daily reports should be sent in, if necessary through couriers. After describing the incidents in connection with Cardinals Borgia and Pázmány, the Instruction explains why the Pope was unable to grant to the Emperor and to the League anything beyond the monthly subsidy of 10,000 thalers. It was a mistake to imagine that the Holy See possessed mountains of gold which the Pope was unwilling to lend for the war against the Protestants. The Pontifical States were very small and their revenues, in comparison with those of other States, were but slender whereas expenditure since 1623 had gone up enormously; and as for the treasure in the Castle of S. Angelo, other Popes had refused to touch it and the Romans had manifested their opposition to such a measure. With regard to the Franco-Swedish alliance, the Pope had done all he could, by means of nuncios, Briefs, and other letters, to bring about its dissolution. The Holy Father would never depart from his impartial attitude as the common Father of Christendom by participating in leagues the aims of which were in part political, for only thus would he be in a position to work for the restoration of peace among the discordant Catholic Powers. He could attest before God's tribunal that peace was the object of his constant and most earnest solicitude.

The Pope foresaw the difficulties which the nuncios extraordinary would have to contend with. As a matter of fact they achieved nothing whatever,¹ hence, as on several previous occasions, the Pontiff had once more recourse to God. He ordered special prayers in view of the distress of the Church, especially in Germany, and granted Indulgences to the faithful.² On June 6th, 1632, which was Trinity Sunday, and on the two following days, the Forty Hours' Prayer was to be observed in the church of S. Maria della Vittoria, and a Plenary Indulgence was granted to all those who would take part. On the third day the Pope, accompanied by a number of Cardinals, went in person to celebrate a Votive Mass in that church which owed its name to the victory of the White Mountain.³ At the same time Urban VIII. ordered that the Elector of Bavaria should receive 50,000 out of the 130,000 thalers of which Grimaldi was the bearer. When an undue delay occurred in the payment of the money, the Pope was greatly annoyed; he blamed the Spaniards who envied Maximilian that subsidy and who in general had always been the disturbers of the peace.⁴

Pázmány was wholeheartedly on the side of the Spaniards; in fact he so far forgot himself that, on his return, he sought to induce the Emperor to make some bold manifestation against the Holy See.⁵ Fortunately Ferdinand II. shrank from a step which would have meant an open rupture, but Madrid was ready for extreme measures even if they included the danger of a schism. The voices of those who blamed Borgia's conduct as inopportune, and who declared that by granting 600,900 scudi the Pope had shown his goodwill, found no echo, whilst Philip IV., at the instigation of Olivares, approved Borgia's protest, praised the Cardinal and maintained him

¹ Cf. LEMAN, 213-240.

² Cf. *Bull.*, XIV., 223 seq., 254 seq., 286 seq.; MÜLLER, *Friedensvermittlungen*, 165 seq.

³ See SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*; LEMAN, 194 seq.

⁴ See Crivelli's report, July 26, 1632, in SCHNITZER, 235.

⁵ See SCHWICKER, 78.

as his ambassador with the Holy See.¹ Court theologians submitted memoranda to the King in which they approved and justified the protest. One of these documents counselled Philip IV. to sequestrate all the revenues which the Pope drew from Italy; another suggested that he should demand the suppression of all the abuses condemned by the Council of Trent; and yet another gave the advice that the King should arrange for the convocation of a General Council and meanwhile convene a Spanish National Council.² In Rome Cardinal Borgia comported himself with unparalleled arrogance; he carried things so far as to refuse to greet the Cardinal Secretary of State, Barberini, when driving past him in the street.³ In his conceit he boasted everywhere that Philip IV. had approved his action and would maintain him as his ambassador. At the end of May the Marchese Castel Rodrigo arrived in Rome as envoy extraordinary of Spain. The hope that Borgia would be recalled was not fulfilled. To avoid a greater evil the Pope, who had been so grievously offended by the haughty Cardinal, had to endure his continued presence in Rome as the representative of the King of Spain.⁴

Richelieu behaved with far greater discretion than either the Spanish Statesmen or Pázmány. At the very time when the latter was defending Borgia's conduct, the French Cardinal took advantage of the incident to ingratiate himself with the Pope as well as to excite still further his resentment against the Spaniards. The proof of it is in the following letter which the French Cardinal wrote to Urban VIII. on April 20th, 1632. It runs as follows: "Most Holy Father, whilst the King's piety feels grievously hurt by the misfortune inflicted on the Church by the division and discord of the Christian Princes, His Majesty has been further shocked by the wicked

¹ See GREGOROVIVS, 73 *seq.*; LEMAN, 175. *Cf. Arch. stor. ital.*, LXXII., I (1913), 316.

² See GINDELY, *Gesch. des Dreissigjühr. Krieges*, in three parts, II., Prague, 1882, 242 (evidently based on documents at Simancas).

³ See Barberini's *letter to C. Monti, quoted by GREGOROVIVS, 76 *seq.*, after *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 5, Vatican Library.

⁴ See LEMAN, 199 *seq.* *Cf. GREGOROVIVS*, 77 *seq.*

attitude of some Spanish ministers towards your Holiness, and by the want of respect on the part of one who is specially bound to honour your Holiness. I cannot find words to express my astonishment that a man should have so far forgotten himself as to utter complaints and disrespectful expressions instead of the praise and humble gratitude which are due to the particular goodness and circumspection of the government of your Holiness. Your Holiness has given such signal proofs that you always desire to assure the tranquillity of Christendom and to compose the differences by which it might be troubled, that no one, unless he were blinded by passion, can fail to see that you have left nothing undone that could forward so excellent a purpose. If there are any among those who cannot be ignorant of the truth, who yet assert the contrary, everyone sees clearly that only their selfishness blinds their eyes in presence of justice, and opens their mouth in discourses which are at variance with the voice of their conscience. It would seem that of late God has permitted several incidents of this kind, to the end that your Holiness may be given fresh proofs of the zeal of the most pious as well as the greatest of princes in all Christendom who always deems it his particular glory to identify himself with all your interests, and to associate himself with the exertions and the good intentions for the advancement of religion and the security of public tranquillity of which your Holiness has always given so many proofs. The King is of opinion that he will be doing no small thing if he gives the example of the deference that is due to the Holy See itself, and which is specially called forth by a Pope so eminent by reason of his rare virtues. As for myself, most Holy Father, I should deem myself wholly unworthy of the honours which I enjoy in the Church, as well as of the favours of a Prince to whose service I am bound by so many ties, did I not also work for that tranquillity which your Holiness and His Majesty are so anxious to procure for Christendom and which, until now, has only been troubled by those who are for ever seeking to oppose both your persons. I trust that God will make the truth more and more evident to the whole world, and that your

Holiness will have cause to agree that even as the King is ever ready to do all he can for God's honour, the good of the Church and general peace, so he will not miss any opportunity to prove to you the sincere interest which he takes in your House. To these, in accordance with his intentions and the merits of your Holiness, I also shall always be faithfully devoted." ¹

The purpose of this letter appears from another which Richelieu simultaneously addressed to Cardinal Bagno; "My advice is," he says in that letter, "that His Holiness should take a good and strong resolution against the insolence of Cardinal Borgia. It is said that the Pope is resolved to send all these Spanish gentlemen into their dioceses. In my opinion he will do well to act thus, for this is a step on which he can insist with the approval of the whole world. However, a thing like this must not be begun unless he is determined to carry it through, in spite of any opposition or contradiction that he may meet with. By this means the Pope will free himself from the annoyances which Spain creates for him with the intention of tormenting him to death; and when perhaps ten years from now God disposes of his person, all these enemies will be away from Rome and thus prevented from injuring his House. I beg of you to assure both his Holiness and Cardinal Barberini of the interest which I shall always take in all that concerns them." ²

Urban VIII. was far too shrewd to yield to the temptation of breaking completely with the Spaniards, however much they might provoke him. He knew very well that, apart from various evil consequences, one result would be that instead of the pressure of the Government of Madrid he would have to endure that of the Cabinet of Paris. Accordingly his answer to Richelieu's letter, beyond an expression of thanks for his protestations of devotion, contained nothing except an exhortation to France on behalf of peace ³; in

¹ AVENEL, IV., 284 *seq.*, trans. in KLOPP, III., 2, 667 *seq.*

² AVENEL, IV., 283 *seq.*

³ See the text of the *Brief of May 22, 1632, in *Epist.*, IX., Papal Secret Archives.

other words, Richelieu was asked to renounce his alliance with Sweden. The French Cardinal entertained no such notion, though he was beginning to view with jealous eye the enormous successes of Gustavus Adolphus. The divergent aims of the two allies were also becoming increasingly apparent. All the Pope's exhortations fell dead on Richelieu's ears.¹ The answer which he gave to the Paris nuncio in August, 1631, when the latter remonstrated because of his connection with Gustavus Adolphus, is characteristic of Richelieu's sentiments : The Swede's hostility to the Emperor, he asserted, could only enhance the prestige of the Pope which otherwise would have suffered greatly in Italy ; it was precisely consideration for the advantage of the Pope that calmed his own conscience in respect to his alliance with the Protestant King.² The Cardinal's conscience, however, did not prevent him from turning a blind eye to the infractions of the clause of the treaty of January, 1631, with the Swedes, concerning the preservation of the Catholic religion in the conquered places. True, the clause in question, apart from political and other considerations, put a certain restraint on the Swedish King. He refrained from introducing Protestantism by force in the Catholic towns conquered by him, and in marked

¹ See **Memoria* in *Vat.* 6929, p. 38-42, Vatican Library. Cf. LÄMMER, *Analecta*, 38 seq. ; SCHNITZER, 250.

² RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II.², 406. When Ranke adds : " The nuncio had nothing to say to this," he says what is not true. NICOLETTI, whom Ranke knew, reports on the contrary the following reply of *Bagno, quoting from his cipher report of April 11, 1631 (*decif. May 15*) : " Io replicai con le più forti considerazioni sopra le quali pregai S.E.^a a fare qualche riflessione, e dissi che fra tanto sarei accordato a presentare al re il breve di S.St^a in simile proposito." Finally Richelieu said in a confidential tone that he and his king were sad that the Pope was not so favourably disposed to them as before and that he refused all favours, dilating on this for half an hour. Bagno replied that he was happy to see that he and the King were so " ansiosi " for the Pope's favour. The letter itself is in *Barb.* 8077, p. 51, of the Vatican Library.

contrast to the lawlessness of the imperial troops, he maintained strict discipline in his army.¹

Gustavus Adolphus acted with extreme astuteness. To the Protestants of Sweden and Germany he represented his undertaking as "a war of liberation for his oppressed co-religionists", whereas in Paris and Venice he declared that it was an Austrian lie to assert that he was waging a war of religion.² To make the latter assertion more credible, immediately after the battle of Breitenfeld, he set at liberty several Catholic priests who had been made prisoners and when he took Würzburg he proclaimed that he would not curtail the religious liberty of those who were willing to submit to him.³ Well calculated also were the friendly remarks which Gustavus Adolphus dropped in more than one place about the Catholic priests and even about the Jesuits,⁴ but how little reliance could be placed on these fair words and the promises of the King is sufficiently shown by what took place at Erfurt. After his entry into that city of the Elector of Mayence, the King inspected the fortifications on October 2nd, 1631. When he arrived on the Petersberg, he had a conversation with the Jesuit Rector which was specially exploited in France in the interests of the Franco-Swedish alliance.⁵ As a matter of fact an authentic account leaves no doubt that Gustavus Adolphus conversed in the friendliest way with the Jesuits and left them free either to remain in Erfurt or to leave the town. Should they decide to adopt the latter course he would give them a safe-conduct, for he would not

¹ BURGUS (*De bello Suecico*, Leodii, 1633, 45), shows how greatly this was in Gustavus Adolphus's favour. Cf. also RICCIUS, 295, 302.

² Cf. KLOPP, III., I., 409; III., 2, 312. Cf., *ibid.*, III., 2, 655 seq., how excellently Gustavus Adolphus's game succeeded in France. For the view of the Venetians, see MOCENIGO, *Relazione di Spagna*, in BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Spagna*, I., 672.

³ See HÄBERLIN, XXVI., 349, 357, who quotes the Catholic RICCIUS (271, 275).

⁴ See DUHR, II., I., 416 seq., 421 seq., 431 seq. Cf. RIEZLER, V., 419.

⁵ See CORDARA, II., 564.

consent that a hair of their heads should be touched by his followers; if on the contrary they chose to remain in Erfurt they would have to promise in writing not to do anything against Sweden; thereafter they would enjoy full liberty in things spiritual.¹ They gave the promise, and the King went so far as to provide a guard for them. These protectors, however, carried out their duty in such a way as to exhaust the resources of the College. After the King's departure the Jesuits remained unmolested for a period of over six months, but after that they were expelled by the City Council. The latter also deprived the Catholics, who had already suffered much at the hands of the Swedish soldiery, of the principal church. Clergy and Jesuits relied on the protection promised to them by Gustavus Adolphus. On the King's return to Erfurt towards the end of October, 1632, a deputation of the local clergy, both secular and regular, presented a respectful petition in which they humbly reminded him of the protection and liberty of religion which he had guaranteed to them, as well as of the loyalty and obedience which they had sworn and faithfully observed. The poor men did not know as yet that, contrary to all his promises, Gustavus Adolphus, on October 9th, had already assigned to the Protestant Council of Erfurt two collegiate churches, nine monasteries and all the parish churches as well as the Jesuit College, together with all their possessions!² There can be no doubt that notwithstanding the paragraph of Bärwalde, the King of Sweden aimed at the gradual extinction of the Catholic Church in Germany.³

¹ See the *Historia domus Erford. Soc. Iesu*, used by SCHAUERTE, *Gustav Adolf und die Katholiken in Erfurt*, Köln, 1887, 10 seq., but previously printed in RÄSS, *Konvertiten*, X., 430 seq. This report, which was not intended for publication, deserves greater credence than the accounts in GFRÖRER-KLOPP⁴, 673 seq. It agrees also with CORDARA (II., 465), who adds a few details. Cf. also *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXV., 503 seq.

² See SCHAUERTE, *loc. cit.*, 40 seq., 50 seq.

³ See BAUR, *Sötern*, I., 204. Cf. SCHIAROLD, *Gesch. der schwedischen Zwischenregierung*, in the *Archiv. des Hist. Vereins für Unterfranken*, VII., 2 (1842), 87.

As in Erfurt, so elsewhere also, the Catholics, and above all the Jesuits, as the chief champions of the Catholic restoration, had to suffer much in consequence of the victorious progress of the Swedes. In many places Gustavus Adolphus systematically handed over the possessions of the Catholics to the Protestants, thus cutting the ground from under the feet of the Catholic clergy.¹ In this way the recent Jesuit foundations at Verden, Goslar and Stade came to a sudden end, and nearly all the houses of their Rhine Province, and still more so those of the Upper German one, had much to suffer.²

It was to be expected that wherever possible, Gustavus Adolphus would make the edict of restitution retro-active. In this way the dioceses of Lower Saxony were once more lost to the Church. In the diocese of Würzburg the Lutheran preachers and schoolmasters who had been expelled from the localities belonging to the nobles, were reinstated.³ At Kaufbeuren, Donauwörth and Augsburg, the Protestants gained once more the upper hand,⁴ and many monasteries in Württemberg were again confiscated.⁵ Thus at one blow the whole situation was changed into its opposite. The Catholic restoration, which was about to make extensive reconquests in northern,

¹ Cf. SODEN, I., 122 seq., 205, 207, 233, 263 seq., 440; DROYSEN, II., 447; FALK, in the *Hist. polit. Blätter.*, CXX., 240.

² See DUHR, II., I, 129 seq., 133, 392. Cf. DAMIANUS, *Synopsis Soc. Iesu*, Tornaci Nervior. 1641, 346 seq.

³ See DROYSEN, II., 447.

⁴ Cf. STEICHELE, *Bistum Augsburg*, III., 578, 750; VI., 408; DROYSEN, II., 534, 548; SPINDLER, in the *Jahrbuch des Hist. Vereins Dillingen*, XXVIII. (1915), 42 seq. During the negotiations over the oath of loyalty required from the Augsburg clergy, Gustavus Adolphus sent an assurance to the Benedictine monks of St. Ulrich: "regem neque conscientiiis aut religioni aliquid contrarium exigere neque privilegia aut immunitates infringere aut canonum statuta imminuere statuissse" (see **Relatio status cleri Augustani*, in *Cod. N.* 21, p. 95 seq. of the Vallicelliana Library, Rome), whereupon the Benedictines took the oath; the rest of the clergy refused it; see DUHR, II., I, 417 seq.

⁵ Cf. GÜNTER, *Das Restitutionsedikt von 1629 und die katholische Restauration Altwürttembergs*, Stuttgart, 1901.

central and southern Germany, was definitely checked in its progress and received wounds from which it never recovered.¹ Elsewhere also, in consequence of the intervention of the King of Sweden, the prospects of the Catholic cause evaporated.²

In view of the complaints of the heads of the League to Louis XIII. and Richelieu of the non-observance of the paragraph of the treaty of Bärwalde in favour of the Catholics, the French Cardinal was forced to make some sort of representation to Gustavus Adolphus, but of a serious attempt to compel the King of Sweden to observe the agreement there was no sign. For the rest, Richelieu saw to it that especially among the Romance peoples, the campaign of the Swedes should have the semblance of a purely political struggle. Favoured as he was by the universal aversion in Italy to the power of Spain and that of the Emperor, her ally, he succeeded in causing this view, which was strongly held by Venice, to prevail in Rome.³ In point of fact, in view of the intimate connection between political and religious interests, it was exceedingly difficult, and indeed almost impossible, to decide in every instance which were the deciding ones.⁴ Accordingly the Pope observed the utmost caution,

¹ There is an index of the restitutions planned and carried through, in TUPETZ, 523-566, but it is often inaccurate. In addition there are two very instructive maps. Cf. KLOPP, in the *Forsch.*, I., 77 seq.; LOCH, in *Jahresbericht des Hist. Vereins für Oberfranken*, 1876, 34 seq., for information regarding the Bishop of Bamberg, Johann Georg II., as President of the imperial commission for the execution of the edict of restitution. With regard to Württemberg see the detailed account of GÜNTER, *Restitutionsedikt*, 52 seq., 69 seq., 105 seq., 183-225.

² Thus, largely through Gustavus Adolphus's arrival in Germany, Geneva escaped the annexation which Vittorio Amadeo I. of Savoy and Richelieu were planning in 1631/2; see ROTT, in the *Rev. hist.*, CXII. and CXIII.

³ See O. KLOPP's criticism of RANKE's "Wallenstein" in the *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CIX., 409, 414 seq. Cf. HURTER, *Französ. Feindseligkeiten gegen Österreich*, Vienna, 1859, 46 seq.

⁴ Cf. QUAZZA, *La guerra*, II., 357.

seeing that both the Habsburgs and the Bourbon King sought to harness him to their own separate chariots. Through all the attempts to deceive him, Urban VIII. clearly discerned the private political interests pursued by the two rivals. He deemed it irreconcilable with his rôle of common Father of Christendom to serve the interests of either; therefore he steadily declined to join either of the leagues planned on the one hand by the Habsburgs and on the other by Louis XIII., ostensibly for the purpose of assuring the tranquillity of Italy and of Christendom.¹ By May, 1632, the situation had become such that the Pope himself began to think of forming a league, not, however, for the benefit of some particular interest, but solely for the defence of Italy against the Swedes, for reports came in from various quarters that Gustavus Adolphus was demanding a free passage through the Grisons for a section of his troops; nay, that he intended to cross the Alps himself and to invade Italy.²

What hopes the Protestants entertained at that time is revealed by certain leaflets which speak of a new march on Rome, like that of the Goths and the Lombards of old; the Swedish King was about to invade Italy, destroy the States of the Church and so inaugurate the domination of the new teaching on the other side of the Alps.³

In his alarm, which was very great, Urban VIII. took up once more a plan he had previously considered, namely, the creation of a defensive league of the Italian States to which

¹ See LEMAN, 179 *seq.*

² Cf. the reports in LEMAN, 188. The *letter of Bichi of June 4, 1632, quoted without indication of source by RANKE (*Französ. Gesch.*, II.², 432) is to be found in *Barb.* 8086, p. 66, Vatican Library; after the passage quoted by Ranke there follows this important remark: "Il che qui è stato espressamente negato rispondendosi che non si ha per bene che pensi a uscir di Alemagna."

³ See DROYSEN, *Gustav Adolf*, II., 593. L. Camerarius had already expressed the hope in April, 1632, that the Swedes would bring back the Heidelberg Library from Rome; see *Scraperum*, 1856, 229 *seq.*

Spain and the Swiss would be invited to lend their co-operation.¹ However, no one was prepared to fall in with his views ; neither Savoy nor Venice nor the Swiss would support the plan, whilst the suspicious Spaniards only saw in it a scheme for depriving them of a free passage through the Grisons.²

Having thus failed, Urban VIII. was all the more gratified by the improvement in the military situation which had marked the resumption of the supreme command by Wallenstein now invested with unusually wide powers. When on June 25th, 1632, news arrived of the capture of Prague by Wallenstein (May 25th), the Pope, though suffering from an attack of gout, went the very next day, accompanied by many Cardinals, from the Quirinal to the German national church of S. Maria dell'Anima, where he celebrated a Mass of thanksgiving at the high altar and recited the litany of the Saints.³ On June 26th enthusiastic Briefs were dispatched to the Emperor and Wallenstein : " This victory, the first fruits of the new campaign," we read in the letter to Wallenstein, " is an omen of complete triumph. We bless you, illustrious man, and we pray that under your leadership Germany may be delivered from harm and injury. With the blessing of the Church you will triumph and Europe will acknowledge that the power of so great a general is the shining spear of heaven." ⁴

The junction of the army of Wallenstein with that of Maximilian raised the commander's forces to over 40,000 men " of the handsomest and best people ", to whom Gustavus could only oppose 15,000 men for the time being. In these circumstances could the King of Sweden still think of a raid across the Alps? After many successes he saw himself

¹ See LEMAN, 188 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 190 *seq.*, 192.

³ See SCHMIDLIN, 456 ; LEMAN, 156.

⁴ The Brief to Wallenstein in GREGOROVIVS, 149, according to a copy in the State Archives at Modena, but with the wrong date, " June 15 " ; that to Ferdinand II. is in EISES, in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XVI., 339 *seq.*

constrained to remain on the defensive. Even when he succeeded in equalizing the relative strength of the two armies, his attack on September 3rd, on the fortified camp of the allies near Nuremberg, ended in failure. Thereupon the Swede made proposals for peace which Wallenstein, however, refused to discuss until he should have been empowered to do so by the Emperor.¹

The Duke of Friedland now held almost the whole of Saxony. The King of Sweden hearkened to the Elector's call for assistance but the days of the leader whose army had fought in nearly every part of Germany were numbered. On November 16th, 1632, was fought the battle of Lützen in which Gustavus Adolphus met with his death.² On the evening of December 9th an imperial courier brought the news to Rome. Frederick Savelli, who was acting for his brother at the imperial embassy, presented himself before the Pope on the following morning and renewed his request for larger subsidies for the Emperor. Urban VIII. replied as before that to his great regret he lacked the necessary means.³ The continued reserve of the Pope with regard to the grant of subsidies was without doubt also prompted by the shocking abuses in the administration of the imperial finances. As early as July, 1624, on the occasion of the complaints of the Emperor's confessor, Lamormaini, of inadequate support by the Pope, the Jesuit General, Vitelleschi, had pointed out how the money was being squandered in Vienna. The possessions of the rebels, which might have defrayed the expenses of the war for years, had been dissipated or fraudulently acquired by a few men. These circumstances had not been without influencing the Pope, for it is evident that in view of

¹ Cf. DROYSEN, II., 597 seq., 622 seq. ; RIEZLER, V., 425 ; RITTER, III., 537 seqq.

² See DROYSEN, in the *Forsch. zur deutschen Gesch.*, V. ; DIEMAR, *Über die Schlacht bei Lützen*, Marburg, 1880, and v. SRBIK, in the *Mittel. des österr. Institut*, XLI. (1926), 231 seq.

³ See Savelli's report of December 11, 1632, in EHSSES, in the *Festschrift des deutschen Campo Santo*, Freiburg, 1897, 281.

such abuses no Prince would easily be induced to send money to Vienna.¹

Whilst in Rome the imperialists exulted at the news of the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the supporters of France were in dismay and endeavoured to belittle as much as they could the significance of this event.² Such was also Richelieu's state of mind. Even though latterly, in view of the great successes of the Swedish King, he may have been haunted by the fear lest his ally should become too big for him, it is nevertheless not true that he welcomed his death as removing a rival. A document of 1633 shows that he feared that now he would have to intervene openly in the struggle, whereas it had always been his plan to wage the war covertly, through the Swedes, the German Protestants and the Dutch.³ Another invention, which the most recent research has finally disposed of, is the story that the Pope showed signs of grief at the death of Gustavus Adolphus. In the full knowledge that the Spaniards were for ever putting a wrong construction on all his actions, he resolved to forestall any possible misrepresentations of his feelings on this occasion. He therefore repaired to the German national church as early as December 11th, accompanied by many Cardinals, to celebrate a Mass of thanksgiving. It being Advent the Pope and the Cardinals wore purple vestments.⁴ Owing to an oversight on the part

¹ See DUHR, II., 2, 699. For the bad financial administration at Vienna, which had a parallel at Madrid, *cf.* also JANNSEN, *Die neueren Forschungen über den Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, in the *Tüb. Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1861, 562 *seq.* See also HUBER, V., 204 *seqq.*

² See in the *Festschrift des deutschen Campo Santo* (1897), 282, the report of C. H. Motmann, of December 11, 1632.

³ See MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 264 *seq.*

⁴ See EHSSES, in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XVI., 340, where the authentic account of the papal master of ceremonies, Paolo Alaleone, is used whereby the ridiculous question suggested by GREGOROVIVS (8 *seq.*) whether Urban VIII. had said a Mass "for the repose of the soul of the great hero", is finally disposed of. The details given by EHSSES and SCHNITZER (in the *Festschrift des*

of the Master of Ceremonies only the litany, but not the *Te Deum*, was sung at the end of Mass. This omission, which puzzled the Germans and prompted an immediate explanation by Cardinal Barberini,¹ was made good on the very next day: whilst the Ambrosian hymn of praise was being sung at the church of the Anima, a *feu de joie* was fired from the castle of S. Angelo.² As soon as the news of the death of Gustavus Adolphus reached Rome, the Secretary of State, Cardinal Barberini, wrote to the Paris nuncio, Bichi: "As you may easily imagine, the Pope heard the news with great joy, for now the snake is dead which sought to poison the whole world with its venom. So far we have no particulars of the victory, but whatever they may be, the death of so bitter an enemy of religion and of so mighty a leader will always represent a great advantage."³

On December 14th, 1632, Urban VIII. sent the following Brief to the Emperor: "Most beloved son in Christ! Greeting and Apostolic blessing. That which we have long desired above all other things and for which we have continuously offered to God our most ardent supplications, has been granted to your Majesty by Him, and we congratulate you with all our heart. We offer unceasing thanks to the God of Judgment that He has exercised vengeance against the proud and removed from the neck of the Catholics the yoke of their most pitiless enemy. The greatness of this favour of His bounty is realized by Germany, of which more than one province, now almost reduced to desolation by foreign arms, will for a long time to come lament the death of its inhabitants, the looting of its towns and the devastation of its territories;

deutschen Campo Santo [280 seq.], have disposed once for all of the fable that Urban VIII. grieved—instead of rejoicing—over the death of Gustavus Adolphus. Cf. also the opinion of BILDT in *Dagens Nystetter* of February 18, 1923.

¹ See the letter to Maximilian I., quoted by SCHNITZER, *loc. cit.*, 283.

² See the report of P. Alalcone in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XVI., 341. For the celebrations by the Germans, see SCHMIDLIN, 457.

³ Letter of December 11, 1632, in GREGOROVIVS, 155.

it is realized by us whose heart was ever full of nameless grief because of the anguish and oppression of our sons; it is realized by the whole of Christendom which heard the boast of this King who made war on Catholicism and who had become exalted by reason of his splendid armies and their triumphs, that he had beaten down with fire and sword and devastation all that stood in the way of his rapid march from the furthest shores of the Baltic as far south as Suabia. Accordingly, as soon as the report of the desired victory reached us, we offered with infinite joy the Holy Sacrifice in the German national church of our Blessed Lady of the Anima *to him that is terrible, even to him that taketh away the spirit of princes: to the terrible with the kings of the earth* (Ps. lxxiv, 13); and when we had thus returned thanks to Him, together with our beloved sons, the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, and a vast concourse of the faithful, for so great a benefit, we earnestly besought Him to lead to a happy issue all the splendid efforts which you are making for the defence of the Catholic Church. But do you, most dear son, take such measures as circumstances suggest, and prosecute the devastating war with righteous weapons, for the God of hosts who is girded with might, will fight against the enemies of the Church, and *death shall go before his face* (Habacuc iii, 4). We shall beseech Him unceasingly to further the cause of Christendom by crowning your arms with numerous victories. From a full heart we bestow upon your Majesty the Apostolic Blessing." ¹

¹ The original text is in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XVI., 399 *seq.*, the German translation in the *Köln. Volkszeitung*, No. 15, of January 7, 1895, where the truly insane fancies of the historiographer of the Evangelical Alliance, Secretary-General Dr. Carl Frey, on Urban VIII.'s attitude towards Gustavus Adolphus, are subjected to well-deserved criticism. Frey cannot be excused by the fact that DROYSEN wrote (II., 665), "the Pope, on receipt of the news, said a Mass of Requiem," for Droysen gives no authority for his statement; nor did WINTER (*Gesch. des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, 426) for a similar assertion.

CHAPTER V.

THE POPE'S FRUITLESS EFFORTS FOR PEACE—CONTINUATION OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR AND FRANCE'S OPEN INTERVENTION AGAINST THE HABSBURGS, 1633-1644.

THE death of so brilliant a commander as Gustavus Adolphus could not but prove an irreparable loss to the Protestant party.¹ For Urban VIII. "the great event"² was an incentive to renewed effort for the restoration of peace. But all such attempts were hopeless unless he succeeded in preserving the neutrality he had maintained until then. The Pope had reason to fear that now negotiations would prove even more arduous because the Spaniards, relieved as they were of the most dangerous of their enemies, would not fail to display greater arrogance than ever, whilst the French would also prove intractable lest an impression should be created that any concession on their part was due to fear of Austria's power.³ That these preoccupations were abundantly justified was demonstrated by the reception which Urban VIII.'s exhortations to peace met with in Paris and Madrid.⁴

Bichi, the papal nuncio in the French capital, soon realized

¹ In a letter to the Elector Johann Georg of Saxony, written soon after the battle of Leipzig, Arnim had described Gustavus Adolphus as irreplaceable; see GÄDECKE in the *Neues Archiv für sächs. Gesch.*, IX., 251. Cf. also DROYSEN, *Gesch. der preuss. Politik*, III., 1 (1863), 115; *Zeitschr. für thüring-sächs. Gesch.*, XIV. (1925), 75 seq.; GARDINER, *The Thirty Years' War*, 161.

² Cf. the views of Pallavicini in a letter to F. Chigi, of December 12, 1632, in MACCHIA, *Relaz. fra Sf. Pallavicini e F. Chigi*, Torino, 1907, 61.

³ See the letter of Cardinal F. Barberini to Bichi of December 11, 1632, in GREGOROVIVS, *Urban VIII.*, 155.

⁴ Cf. the detailed account in LEMAN, *Urbain VIII.*, 250 seq., 265 seq.

that no representations of his would bring about a change in Richelieu's mind. The Cardinal clung to the plan he had hitherto pursued, namely, to prosecute the "covert war" through his Protestant confederates until the Habsburgs should be utterly prostrate. He even won over Louis XIII. to this policy and in conjunction with the Capuchin Fr. Joseph, he displayed a feverish activity in fanning the warlike conflagration¹ which for the last twelve years had been consuming the strength of Germany. Richelieu's policy benefited by the fact that Axel Oxenstjerna, the Chancellor of Sweden, was bent on a continuation of the war the direction of which, however, he wanted to keep in his own hands, notwithstanding the opposition of the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg who nevertheless remained true to their alliance with Sweden. Oxenstjerna owed a great deal to the Marquis de Feuquières whom Richelieu had dispatched to Germany.² Such were the skill and energy—reinforced by bribery—with which Feuquières negotiated with the Protestant Estates of Swabia, Franconia and the Upper and Lower Rhine assembled at Heilbronn, that on April 23rd, 1633, he secured an agreement by the terms of which Sweden was to have both the conduct of the war and an indemnity, whilst the above-named Estates were promised their "liberty". At the same time the agreement of Bärwald between Sweden and France was ratified anew.³

These agreements revealed the futility of the exhortations which Urban VIII. and his nuncio Bichi had addressed both to Louis XIII. and to Richelieu. When Bichi pointed out to the French Cardinal the unlawfulness of an alliance with the Protestants and the harm it would inflict on the Catholic cause, Richelieu replied that Spain drove him to it and that, in

¹ See STANLEY LEATHES, in *Cambridge Modern History*, IV., 161.

² See *Lettres et négociations de M. de Feuquières*, I., Amsterdam, 1753; FAGNIEZ, *Le Père Joseph et Richelieu*, II., 113 seq.; BATIFFOL, in the *Rev. hist.*, CXXXVIII. (1921), 172.

³ Cf. HURTER, *Friedensbestrebungen Kaiser Ferdinands II.*, 37 seq.; KRETSCHMAR, *Der Heilbronner Bund*, 3 vols. (1922).

point of fact, a Catholic State always had a right to ally itself with Protestant princes when its security was at stake. Bichi answered that he had not expected such an attitude from a King who had a Cardinal for his adviser; France would surely be made to feel one day what it was to rest upon the pointed stake of Protestantism.¹ Notwithstanding loud protestations on the part of the French that in the new agreement with Sweden everything had been done to guarantee the preservation of Catholic worship in the conquered territories, Rome was under no delusion that this promise would be no more honoured in the future than it had been in the past.²

However strongly the Pope disapproved of France's conduct,³ the Spaniards would not be satisfied; they wanted a sterner condemnation, hence they were resolved to exert the greatest pressure in Rome.⁴ They wanted Urban VIII. to abandon the neutrality which his position as Head of the Universal Church imposed on him by unconditionally siding with the Habsburgs and breaking with France. The Pope could not agree to a proposal of this kind, were it only that by so doing, all his efforts for peace would have been stultified. As for the ecclesiastical censures which the Spaniards demanded against Richelieu, Cardinal Barberini declared on October 15th, 1633, that Urban VIII. was only too painfully aware of the consequences of Clement VII.'s over-hasty

¹ See Bichi's report of November 29, 1633, in LEMAN, 301, note 2.

² See the letter of Fr. Barberini to Bichi, June 18, 1623, *ibid.*, 299, note 2.

³ Cf. the *Brief to Louis XIII. of August 27, 1623, *ibid.*, 299, note 3.

⁴ *Fulvio Testi reported on February 23, 1633, that Cardinal Pio had told him "in estrema confidenza, che Castel Rodrigo ha presso di se una tal scrittura del re da dare a S. St^a molto più acuta e rigorosa che non fu la protesta di Borgia, e dubita che non vengano ordini precisi di presentarla." State Archives, Modena.

action against England.¹ In point of fact Richelieu was resolved, in the event of the Pope allowing himself to be prevailed upon by the Spaniards to excommunicate Louis XIII., to bring about a schism.² Madrid completely failed to appreciate any of these things. Because the Pope refused to adopt a particularist political point of view, he was made the object of the bitterest complaints; in fact, he was reproached with having no feeling for the sufferings of the German Catholics.³ How wrong this was, is shown by the fact that in April, 1633, Urban VIII. assigned the sum of 25,000 scudi jointly to the Emperor and the League.⁴ In March, 1633, he likewise granted to the King of Spain the heavy levies of money which the latter demanded from the clergy of Aragon and Catalonia, though these sums were to be exclusively spent in supporting the struggle "in Germany" against the Swedes and the other Protestant Princes.⁵ Though the conditions were so framed that the Spanish Netherlands were likewise included, Madrid was not only not satisfied but went so far as to read into them an intention to represent the King of Spain as a vassal of the Emperor!⁶ In 1633 a rumour was circulating in Rome to the effect that the Spaniards were agitating for the convocation of a Council directed against the Pope.⁷ In vain

¹ See the letter of Fr. Barberini to the nuncio at Vienna, Grimaldi, of October 15, 1633, in LEMAN, 318, note 2. He repeats a similar statement in the Instruction for Falconieri, April, 1635; see CAUCHIE-MAERE, *Instructions*, 182.

² Cf. PIEPER, in the *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XCIV., 481 seq.

³ See LEMAN, 316.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 317.

⁵ See *Bull.*, XIV., 324, 327.

⁶ See LEMAN, 320.

⁷ Nicoletti reported on April 30, 1633, to the Grand-Duke of Tuscany in connexion with the mission of Saavedra to Germany: "Nè manca hora chi dubiti che la voce sparsasi le settimane passate che Spagnoli pensino al modo di poter convocar un concilio, non fusse in tutto senza fondamento e che Saavedra deve attaccar questa prattica." State Archives, Florence, *Med.* 3353.

Urban VIII. represented to the Spanish ambassador, Castel Rodrigo, that he could not throw the mantle of silence over the motive for which he allowed the levy. The Spaniards, seeing that they could not get the clause dropped, ended by declining the subsidy altogether.¹ The tension was further increased² by the fact that Urban VIII. remained firm in his refusal to receive as ambassador for Spain Cardinal Borgia, the author of the protest of May 8th, 1632, and even insisted on the latter leaving Rome. Ostensibly for the purpose of settling this conflict Juan Chumacero and Domingo Pimentel were dispatched to Rome in the autumn of 1633 as royal commissaries; in reality their mission was to force the Pope to make some concessions of a politico-ecclesiastical nature, and since there was question of a religious war, to join a great anti-French league. In return for such a step Spain was prepared to sacrifice Borgia.³

Like the Spaniards, the French also sought to use the Pope as a tool to forward their own particular interests. They assured him anew that the cause of their conflict with Spain was a purely political one.⁴ In view of the danger which, so he alleged, Italy ran at the hands of the Spaniards, Richelieu proposed to form a league for the purpose of assuring the *status quo* on the Italian Peninsula, but with his wonted

¹ See GÜNTER, *Habsburger-Liga*, 95, 396 *seq.*

² “ *I disgusti tra il Papa e Spagnoli ogni giorno si augmentano e con Borgia particolarmente senza vedersi dove siano per passare.” NICCOLINI, on August 7, 1633, *loc. cit.*

³ See LEMAN, 340 *seq.* For the plan of a League *cf.* GÜNTER, 147 *seq.*, 376 *seq.*; for the demands with regard to ecclesiastical policy, see Vol. XXIX, Ch. II.

⁴ *NICCOLINI reports, December 1, 1633: “ *In tanto ne Franzesi si vede crescer manifestamente la mala dispositione verso Spagnoli per sentirsi toccar alcuni tasti che li fanno malissimo suono come particolarmente quello che S. Stà deve scomunicar il Re Christ^{mo} et il card. Richelieu perchè faccino la guerra contra la religione, nel qual proposito dicono che tra pochi mesi conosceranno Spagnoli dalli effetti che la guerra di stato è, non di religione.” State Archives, Florence, *loc. cit.*

astuteness he did not urge his proposal with the violence displayed by Olivares ; on the contrary he sought to gain his object by gentler methods. To this end Marshal Créqui was sent to Rome in June, 1633, but though strongly backed by Richelieu, all the Marshal's efforts were in vain. Urban's answer to Créqui was most decisive : it was to the effect that however much he had at heart the tranquillity of Italy, the league proposed by France was not the most effective means to assure it. Ever since the pontificate of Clement VII., every Pope, with the exception of Paul IV., had refused to join such a league, and rightly so, because any obligation of this kind was bound to injure the peace *pourparlers* which were of such consequence for the interests of the Church. In the existing circumstances the proposed league, so far from furthering the tranquillity of Italy, would only disturb it : from being a defensive alliance it would before long become an offensive one. " Leagues," the Pope declared, " guarantee nothing because their members only seek their own interests ; they have invariably injured the Holy See. The grounds on which the Cardinals dissuaded me, at the beginning of my pontificate, from joining a league with Spain, are still valid and they impose on me a similar attitude towards the French proposal." ¹

Urban VIII. had good reason to resist the insidious insinuations of France as well as Spain's attempts at intimidation, because only by maintaining his independence of all parties could he hope to restore peace among the Catholic Powers. He was all the more intent on this object because the course of events in the military sphere was becoming increasingly unfavourable to Catholic interests, one of the main causes being the ever-growing rivalry between Wallenstein and Maximilian of Bavaria, which prevented the full deployment of the military and political resources of the Catholics.

When in April, 1633, the Swedes, led by Bernard of Weimar and by Horn, swept over Bavaria for the second time,

¹ See Fr. Barberini's letter to Bichi of October 22, 1633, in LEMAN, 583 *seq.*

Maximilian was very properly anxious for some joint military action in the southern theatre of war. On the other hand Wallenstein favoured a defensive attitude : he was for seeking a decision in Saxony and Silesia and entered into conversations with the North German Electors, and particularly with John George of Saxony. Accordingly, when a Spanish army under the Duke of Feria, Governor of Milan, came to the support of the Bavarians, some noteworthy successes were obtained in Swabia and on the Upper Rhine. However, all these advantages were lost when, on November 14th, 1633, Bernard of Weimar made himself master of Ratisbon.¹ Fully realizing the dangers to which this disaster exposed Austria proper, Urban VIII., in December, granted to the League and to the Emperor a subsidy to the amount of 550,000 thalers. In March, 1634, he granted to the Emperor 250,000 scudi which were to be raised by means of a tenth on the ecclesiastical benefices of Italy.² At the same time he proclaimed a solemn jubilee in order to avert by prayer the dangers that threatened the Catholics of Germany. He took part in person in the procession which inaugurated the jubilee.³

Meanwhile Madrid persisted in its demand that the Pope should break with France. Urban VIII., however, realized full well that peace could not be restored by such means.

¹ See RIEZLER, V., 438 *seq.*, 444 *seq.*, 448 *seq.*; DÖBERL, I., 554 *seq.* Cf. also E. WEINITZ, *Der Zug des Herzogs von Feria nach Deutschland im Jahre 1633*, Heidelberg, 1882.

² See LEMAN, 336, 347. According to Rocci's report of April 1, 1634, Eggenberg said to him at that time: *" I ministri di Spagna si saranno hormai chiariti che non ha giovato loro il trattar con S. Stà con termini violenti. Ho detto più volte al conte di Ognate et al marchese di Castagneda che in avvenire dovrebbero trattare con S. Stà diversamente di quello che hanno fatto pel passato tanto più che la S. Stà non haveva tolto cosa alcuna del suo al Re cattolico nè haveva fatta confederazione o dato aiuto al Re di Francia, e che sperava che per l'avvenire mutarebbero modo di trattare." NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 1, Vatican Library.

³ See *Bull.*, XIV., 384; SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 458.

His representatives in Paris, Bichi and Ceva, made every effort to initiate peace negotiations. They ended by extracting a promise from Richelieu that he would send a delegate to Vienna, should Ferdinand II. accept France's mediation. To this the Emperor could not, of course, agree. An alternative plan seemed more likely to succeed: the Emperor was prepared to concede to the French the possession of Pinerolo and the fortress of Moyenvic, near Metz, provided the Cabinet of Paris did not interfere with the Spaniards' line of communication between Italy and Germany. In the end this proposal was also frustrated owing to both parties withdrawing the concessions previously agreed upon.¹ This fact was in part due to the circumstance that, by the assassination of Wallenstein (February 25th, 1634), the Emperor was freed from the grave danger that threatened him from a generalissimo who had strayed from the path of loyalty from the moment of his deprivation of the supreme command at Ratisbon in 1630 and who, during his second period of authority, had undoubtedly become more and more involved in treasonable plans against his sovereign.²

¹ See LEMAN, 362 *seq.*

² The extensive literature about Wallenstein, "one of the most intriguing figures of history," is given in the *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. der Deutschen in Böhmen*, XVII. (1879), XXI. (1883), XXIII. (1885), XXXIV. (1896), XLIX. (1911). Even if RIEZLER (V., 471) and WITTICH (*Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, XLV., 637) still believed "that the greatest representative of the type of the Condottieri on German soil" had only played with treachery (W. MICHAEL, in the *Hist. Zeitschrift*, LXXXVIII., 434), the majority of the more recent historians (*cf.* especially HURTER, *Wallensteins vier letzte Lebensjahre* (1862); HUBER, V., 485; DUHR, in *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, XL., 195 *seq.*, 303 *seq.*; E. DAHN, *Die Wallensteinfrage*, and L. v. RANKE, in *Pädag. Archiv*, XLIX. (1907), 641; PEKAR, *Dějiny Valdštejnského spiknutí* (Story of Wallenstein's conspiracy), Prague, 1895; RITTER, III., 561 *seq.*, 571 *seq.*; DÖBERL, I., 557) are of opinion that Wallenstein really betrayed his military superior. The latest student of the Wallenstein tragedy, v. SRBIK (*Wallensteins Ende. Ursachen, Verlauf und Folgen der Katastrophe. Auf Grund*

The news of Wallenstein's assassination caused an enormous sensation in Rome. So far from doubting the loyalty of the great captain, whose skill matched that of Gustavus Adolphus and had arrested the latter's victorious progress, Urban VIII., when in 1633 he unfolded his vast plan for an attack on the Turks, intended to assign an important rôle to the imperial generalissimo.¹ On receipt of the news of Wallenstein's successes in Lusatia the Pope had sent him a congratulatory Brief, November 12th, 1632, in which he styled him the liberator of Germany.² Wallenstein successfully deceived the Roman Court as he had deceived everybody else. Even after the catastrophe, it was thought in Rome that he had been betrayed rather than that he had himself acted the part of a traitor.³ On receipt of the nuncio Rocci's report on the guilt of the Duke of Friedland, Francesco Barberini remarked that peace negotiations would prove much more difficult if there was any truth in the suspicion which the Emperor expressed to the nuncio that France had had a hand in the plot.⁴ Spain's reaction to Wallenstein's fall showed itself at once in a growing unwillingness to discuss peace. Richelieu shared this feeling, though he hid his sentiments more skilfully than the passionate Spaniards.⁵ Though Richelieu protested to the French nuncio, Bichi, that he had taken no

neuer Quellen untersucht und dargestellt, Wien, 1920), of whose views I have availed myself above, considers that there is no doubt of his treachery (p. 3), but he accepts as an excuse the fact that Wallenstein played a double game in the hope of securing peace, though not such a peace as would have satisfied his Imperial master; against this view *cf.* BRAUBACH, in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XLIII., 122.

¹ See NICCOLINI's report of February 12, 1633, in LEMAN, 372, note 4.

² See LEMAN, 372, note 2. The importance attributed in Rome to Wallenstein's military successes just then is shown by the celebrations in the Anima; see SCHMIDLIN, 457.

³ See SRBIK, *Wallensteins Ende*, 310.

⁴ See the letter of Fr. Barberini of March 11, 1634, in LEMAN, 374, note 7.

⁵ See LEMAN, 375 *seq.*

part whatever in the treason of Wallenstein, and even swore that if the contrary were proved, he was willing to be described as "the most dishonourable man in the world", there is no doubt that it was only by a lucky accident that an agreement had not been arrived at in time with the imperial generalissimo, the terms of which guaranteed to the latter the sum of 1,000,000 livres to aid him in his campaign against the Emperor. Thus Wallenstein's death was a heavy blow to the policy of Richelieu and that of his collaborator, Fr. Joseph.¹

In spite of the unfavourable situation, Urban VIII. persevered in his efforts to pave the way for peace *pourparlers* and to exhort both France and Spain not to shrink from the necessary sacrifices in order than an understanding might be come to at last. It is significant that already at this time the Holy See proposed the solution which was accepted in 1641, namely, separate discussions for Catholics and Protestants. The former might take place in Rome, the Pope thought, but the Spaniards, unwilling to give up the hope of inducing Urban to break with France, refused to take part in any congress held in Rome and they sought to render suspect the intentions of the Holy See in Vienna which was in favour of peace. In the end the Emperor Ferdinand made his participation in a congress at Rome dependent on the impossible condition of the Pope acting as arbiter.² The plan failed finally when, towards the end of April, 1634, Richelieu also objected to Rome as the venue of the Congress, on the plea that it was necessary for it to be held in a town where his Protestant confederates could put in an appearance. Shortly before this the leader of France's policy had persuaded the Dutch to break off the negotiations with Spain which they had begun in 1632, and to go on with the war.³ At the same time French agents worked indefatigably against the Habsburgs. In

¹ See FAGNIEZ, II., 179 *seq.* Cf. GINDELY, in the *Allg. Zeitung*, 1882, fasc. 103.

² See LEMAN, 380 *seq.*, 384 *seq.*, 395 *seq.*, 416.

³ Cf. M. G. DE BOER, *Die Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633* (Heidelberg Diss.), Gröningen, 1897.

Germany they roused the Protestants and dissuaded the Elector of Saxony from concluding peace with the Emperor. In Italy they renewed their efforts for the formation of an anti-Spanish league ; Richelieu even went so far as to favour the occupation of the Valtellina by the Swedes. In the autumn of 1634 French troops occupied the territory of Duke Charles of Lorraine who had incurred the particular enmity of the Cardinal by his support of the brother of Louis XIII., an opponent of Richelieu's, and by giving him his sister in marriage. From Lorraine it was possible to hold out a hand to the Swedes in Alsace.¹ What splendid prospects for France's age-long appetite for the Rhineland territories !

In vain Urban VIII. sought to save the Duke of Lorraine ; in vain he protested against France's new alliances with the Protestants : Richelieu's answer never varied ; as soon as the Habsburgs ceased from plotting against France, he would conclude a genuine peace, renounce his alliances with the Protestants and once more put the Duke of Lorraine in possession of his territory.²

When the plan of a congress in Rome had thus failed, Urban VIII. suggested a similar meeting in some neutral town. The most distinguished members of the College of Cardinals approved of the scheme and once more rejected the Spanish demand for ecclesiastical censures against Louis XIII., as such a measure might provoke a schism.³ In July, 1634, the nuncios of Madrid and Vienna, together with the one at Paris, where Giorgio Bolognetti had replaced Bichi in April,⁴ were instructed to work for the newly planned congress. The

¹ See LEMAN, 397 *seq.*, 407 ; D'HAUSSONVILLE, *Hist. de la réunion de la Lorraine à la France*, I., 394-424.

² See LEMAN, 403 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 417.

⁴ In the *Instruction for G. Bolognetti, of April 1, 1634, we read : " Il maggiore e più importante affare, che oggi si maneggia in Francia et alla corte Cesarea e Cattolica, è il presente (dissidio) tra la casa d'Austria e la Francia e da questo dipende il bene e il male della christianità e della religione cattolica in Germania, la quale è travagliata tanto e sta in pericolo di perdersi del tutto ;

Emperor favoured it, except that, before nominating his representatives, he wished to have a guarantee of the sincerity of France's intentions.¹

Ferdinand II.'s distrust was fully justified, for Richelieu had no thought of giving up his plans of conquest. Urban VIII.'s exhortation that he should come to terms with the Habsburgs and march against the Turks, fell on deaf ears: Constantinople was too remote, the Cardinal replied. Even Fr. Joseph, the one-time apostle of war against the Turks, was of opinion that a crusade was not to be thought of because France could not trust Spain. So far from thinking of fighting the Turks, Richelieu was actually negotiating with them. In like manner, and notwithstanding renewed papal warnings to the contrary,² he stuck to his Protestant alliances and when, in consequence of the loss of Ratisbon (July 26th, 1632), the position of the Swedes in South Germany became endangered, he prepared to go to their assistance.³

imperochè se con la pace tra questi potentati si divertirà il Re dall'assistenza de Suedesi e protestanti, non sarà per avventura difficile alla casa d'Austria di porgli in ragione, ma se all'incontro non si troverà modo d'aggiustarli, si corre pericolo d'una manifesta rottura tra le corone con quelle dolorose et infelici conseguenze che V. S. può imaginar e con quell'avanzamento degli eretici e forse infedeli che in ogni tempo hanno cavato dalle discordie de'principi cattolici." There follows a review of the peace negotiations advocated in the past by the Pope. The policy of the Holy See is defined in the sense that it is impossible for the Holy See to take part in peace negotiations to which Protestants are invited, nor can it enter into an Italian League to protect the liberty of Italy, because the Pope must preserve his position as "Padre commune", which alone permits him to work for peace. "Questa regola serve a V.S. per indirizzo di tutte le sue attioni per non entrar mai senz'ordine espresso in alcun impegno col quale S. B^{ne} possa perdere la paternità commune." State Library, Vienna, *Cod.* 5645, p. 66 *seq.*

¹ See LEMAN, 423.

² Cf. the *Brief to Richelieu of August 16, 1634, in LEMAN, 404, note 4.

³ See *ibid.*, 421 *seq.* At the capitulation of Ratisbon, the city

A similar warlike mood prevailed in Madrid. Since Urban VIII. refused to pronounce any ecclesiastical censure against Louis XIII., the Spaniards declared that so partial a Pope was not a suitable mediator. Thus all the hopes of the Holy See rested exclusively on the Emperor whose new representative, the Duke of Bozzolo, promised that the Cabinet of Vienna would exercise a moderating influence on that of Madrid. Ferdinand likewise declared himself ready not to insist on the surrender of Pinerolo and Moyenvic. When Fr. Joseph also agreed to put this question on one side, the Curia indulged in such optimism that various suggestions were at once made as to the place where the Congress should be held, Avignon, Masserano, Crevacuore, Solothurn and Lucerne being successively put forward.¹

Just then an important decision took place in the South-German theatre of war. On September 6th, 1634, the imperial army, under the command of the heir to the throne, Ferdinand, and that of Count Galas, and reinforced by a Spanish expeditionary force of 9,000 men which had come from Italy through the pass of Worms, under the leadership of the energetic Cardinal-Infante Don Fernando,² inflicted on the Swedes and their Protestant allies a crushing defeat in the bloody battle

was guaranteed, among other things, liberty of religion and freedom of the Empire; see RIEZLER, V., 481. Urban VIII., who at the news of the capture of the city had ordered a thanksgiving service (see **Diarium P. Alaleonis* and Avviso of August 19, 1634, Vatican Library), also complained that the Emperor tolerated Protestantism there, "perchè ciò sarebbe servito di esempio all'altre città che si sarebbero ricuperate, ed era appunto come un nodrirsi i nemici nel seno, e tanto più che nella detta ricuperazione si erano spesi i denari del sussidio della Stà Sua e quelli delle decime di Spagna." On this point some heated discussions took place between Bozzolo and Fr. Barberini. *Letter of the Secretary of State to Rocci, August 26, 1634, in *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. I, Vatican Library.

¹ See LEMAN, 423 *seq.*

² Cf. A. DE AEDO Y GALLART, *Viaje del infante cardenal Don Fernando de Austria*, translated in part by WEINITZ, Strassburg, 1884.

of Nördlingen. Six thousand men, that is, one-third of the hostile army, remained on the field, whilst another thousand were made prisoners, Horn, the ablest of the Swedish generals, being among them. Bernard of Weimar fled with the remainder of his army in the direction of Frankfort.¹ Urban VIII.'s joy over this victory was unbounded. He had the banners captured by the imperialists exhibited in St. Peter's.² On September 21st he repaired to S. Apollinare where the Sacred College awaited him, and from there he proceeded to the German national church of the Anima where he intoned the *Te Deum*. On the following Sunday he took part in another service of thanksgiving for the victory at S. Maria Maggiore, whilst at the same time he prayed for a successful issue of the campaign of the Poles against the Turks.³ In his letters of

¹ For the battle of Nördlingen *cf.* the monographs by WENG (Nördlingen, 1854), I. FUCHS (Weimar, 1868), FRAAS (Nördlingen, 1869), STRUCK (Stralsund, 1893), LEO (Halle, 1900), JAKOB (*Von Lützen nach Nördlingen*, Strassburg, 1904), and I. FUENTES, in *Memorial de Artilleria*, 1906.

² See **Diarium P. Alaleonis* for September 21, 1634, Vatican Library. However, these must have been earlier trophies, for those of Nördlingen only arrived later; see **Avviso* of November 18, 1634, in ADEMOLLO, *Ambasciatori francesi*, 206. Marchese Sacchetti recently made a search for these trophies in the *foveria* of the Vatican, but without success.

³ See SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 458 *seq.*, also for an account of the military trophies presented to the Anima in the following year. The oration delivered in the Anima by the Jesuit G. Rho was printed in Rome in 1634. The story of GREGOROVIVS (*Urban VIII.*, 99 *seq.*), taken from Ameyden, that the Pope was not particularly pleased at the Emperor's victory, deserves no credence; see PIEPER, in the *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XCIV. (1884), 490 *seq.* The Pope only complained at a later date, when he heard that at Nördlingen, as at Ratisbon, the Protestants had been granted liberty of religion; see the *letter of Fr. Barberini to Rocci, October 7, 1634, in *NICOLETTI, ch. 1, Vatican Library. The Bishop of Vienna, Wolfradt, excused Ferdinand's action at Ratisbon and Nördlingen, to Rocci, as a "tolleranza ad tempus a fine di ridurre più facilmente all'ubbidienza le città protestanti e

congratulation to Ferdinand II. and Philip IV. the Pope extolled the victory of Nördlingen as the means whereby the imperial authority had been restored and religion freed from the yoke of its enemies.¹

With good reason Urban VIII. described the victory of Nördlingen as the most important for many years. The battle had the same significance as that of Lutter on the Barenberg. Just as in consequence of the latter, North-Germany lay open before the imperial and leaguist forces, so by the former South-Germany, as far as the Rhine, was now at their mercy. The enemy was driven from Swabia and Franconia whilst Württemberg was placed under the administration of imperial commissaries whose immediate task was to carry through the Catholic restoration. In the Palatinate on the right bank of the Rhine better prospects also opened for the Catholics as soon as the imperial and leaguist troops had gained a footing there.²

The decisive battle of Nördlingen was exploited to even better advantage by the man of genius who directed France's policy than by the Emperor. With the keen eye of the eagle watching its prey, Richelieu fully realized that after this

rimettere ne'loro stati i principi cattolici". Rocci replied by pointing out that when the Protestants conquered Augsburg, Ratisbon, Mayence, Würzburg and Bamberg, they ejected the Catholic clergy and introduced Protestant preachers. *Report of Rocci, October 21, 1634, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

¹ See LEMAN, 426.

² See CARAFA, *Legatio*, ed. Ginzel, 177 *seq.*; RIEZLER, V., 487; DÖBERL, I., 559 *seq.*; RITTER, III., 582 *seq.* For the second Catholic restoration in Württemberg in opposition to which Duke Eberhard, who had returned to his territory in October, 1638, was re-introducing Protestantism, in defiance of his solemn promise to carry out the decrees of the imperial resolution of December 9, 1629, *cf.* the monograph of GÜNTER, *Das Restitutionsedikt von 1629 und die katholische Restauration in Alt-Württemberg*, Stuttgart, 1901, which is based upon extensive documentary evidence. See also DUHR, II., 1, 278 *seq.*, and *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XLVI., 223. For the Catholic restoration in Baden, see WEFCH, *Badische Gesch.*, 344 *seq.*

sudden collapse of the Swedish domination in South Germany, Oxenstjerna and his Protestant allies would be forced to throw themselves unreservedly into the arms of France. On November 1st, 1634, a pact was signed in Paris which assigned to France Alsace and all the localities on the right bank of the Rhine from Breisach to Constance. In order to calm Urban VIII., who never wearied of protesting against the assistance given to the Swedes and the Protestants, Richelieu made it a condition of the treaty that the Catholic religion should be restored and preserved in the conquered territories. The agreement did not oblige France to declare war at once, but from its tenor it is clear that such an eventuality was deemed inevitable.¹ In point of fact Richelieu, with characteristic energy, made immediate preparations for armed intervention by France.² The occupation of Alsace by the French was but a prelude to what was to follow. Not content with this step, Richelieu pursued the "monstrous plan" of endeavouring to extort from the Elector of Trèves, Philip Christoph von Sötern, his nomination as coadjutor of Trèves and Spire, a design, however, which was frustrated by Urban VIII.'s opposition.³ Nevertheless the Cardinal refused to give up his plan. In December, 1634, he moved an army of 35,000 men towards the Rhine and, without any declaration of war, relieved Heidelberg which was being besieged by the Bavarians.⁴ In conjunction with Bolognetti, Mazarin who, as nuncio-extraordinary in Paris, was working for the restoration of the Duke of Lorraine and for France's participation in the peace congress, unsuccessfully pressed Richelieu to withdraw his troops. The Cardinal who, on February 8th, 1635, had concluded a fresh treaty with Holland with the object of fighting the Spaniards in the Netherlands,⁵ deluded the Pope's

¹ See FAGNIEZ, II., 190.

² See MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 43.

³ Cf. BAUR, *Sötern*, I., 317 seq.; LEMAN, 471 seq.

⁴ See RIEZLER, V., 489.

⁵ See WENZELBURGER, II., 930 seq.; LOUCHAY, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas, 1635-1700*, Brussels, 1896, 68 seq.

representatives with specious promises. It was his intention, he declared, to march against the Protestants, above all against Geneva, and to win Naples for the Pope! As for the peace congress, he promised at the beginning of March, 1635, that he would appoint plenipotentiaries if he was given an assurance that not only the Emperor but Spain also would take part in it.¹ Though the Emperor did not trust the French he nevertheless intervened in this sense with Philip IV. After prolonged hesitation the latter resolved, on April 17th, 1635, to empower the Cardinal Infante to delegate a plenipotentiary in the event of France and the Emperor also appointing their plenipotentiaries.²

Meanwhile events had occurred which defeated every prospect of a peace conference which the Pope was so anxious to promote. On March 26th, 1635, the Spanish Governor of Luxemburg, by a bold *coup de main*, captured the town of Trèves which the French had previously wrested from the Spaniards and carried off as a prisoner the Elector von Sötern who had become entirely subservient to France.³ Richelieu could not have wished for a better pretext for the open intervention in the war on which he had been resolved ever since the catastrophe of Nördlingen. Already at the end of March, and by his orders, the Duke of Rohan, the former head of the Huguenots, had occupied the Valtellina, thereby cutting the line of communication between the Tyrol and Lombardy.⁴ In April Richelieu ratified the treaty with Holland and by the

¹ See LEMAN, 456 seq., 463 seq., 468. Leman's account supplements in many points that of Bazzoni: "Un Nunzio straordinario alla corte di Francia nel secolo XVII.," Florence, 1882, 66.

² See GÜNTER, 205, 448; LEMAN, 488.

³ See KHEVENHÜLLER, XII., 1770 seq.; SIRI, VIII., 220 seq.; BAUR, *Sötern*, I., 373 seq., II., I seq.

⁴ See ROTT, *Hist. de la représent. dipl. de France auprès des cantons suisses*, IV., 2, 209 seq.; LADERCHI, *La campagna del duca di Rohan in Valtellina nell'a, 1635* (1888); BUZZETTI, *Campagna del duca di Rohan in Valtellina*, in the *Period. d. Soc. stor. p. la prov. di Como*, XIX. (1910).

convention of Compiègne made sure of the support of Sweden.¹ Whilst final military preparations were being made for the opening of the struggle, Richelieu, Louis XIII. and Fr. Joseph assured the papal representatives that France's one aim was peace and "for this", the Cardinal declared with tears in his eyes, "I would willingly sacrifice an arm!"² Paris still hoped to induce Urban VIII. to take sides. He was being pressed to enter into an Italian defence league whilst his attention was drawn to the injury done to the Church's immunity of which the Spaniards had been guilty when they arrested the Archbishop of Trèves. At that very time the Spaniards made fresh efforts to win over the Pope to a league for the maintenance of tranquillity in Italy and to get him to proceed against the leader of France's policy who had so recently renewed his alliances with the Protestants.³ However, Urban VIII. was determined to hold himself aloof from all political strife. True, on March 24th, 1634, he granted to the King of Spain a tenth to the amount of 600,000 scudi, to be raised from the ecclesiastical benefices of Portugal, Naples, Sicily and America, but on condition that the money was used exclusively for the Emperor's war against the Protestants. On the other hand he categorically declined to join an anti-French league and refused to budge from his position when the Spanish ambassador, supported by the imperial envoy, demanded that he should openly declare himself against France. He would allow neither threats nor promises to induce him to do anything which would be at variance with his position as the common Father of Christendom, or to enter into an alliance with Spain, and he met the pressure of the French in exactly the same way.⁴ Nevertheless, whilst fully maintaining his neutrality, he made no secret of his disapproval of the invasion of the Valtellina by the French and insisted on their withdrawal from that

¹ See FAGNIEZ, II., 199 *seq.* ; LEMAN, 520 *seq.*

² See LEMAN, 496.

³ *Ibid.*, 504 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 506 *seq.*, 508 *seq.*

territory. In like manner he demanded once more the restoration of the Duke of Lorraine ; France met both requests with a refusal.¹

Though the situation seemed desperate, the representatives of the Pope did all they could, up to the last minute, to prevent an open rupture between France and Spain,² in which case a general war would have been inevitable. Their representations led to no result because, thanks to the base of operations which he had secured in Alsace and on the Rhine, Richelieu felt strong enough to drop the mask. On May 19th, 1635, a French herald riding into Brussels, threw on the pavement of the great market place a document which no one had been willing to accept. The document was to the effect that the Most Christian King declared war on the Spaniards both on land and sea, forasmuch as they had unlawfully arrested an Elector who had invoked the protection of Louis XIII.³

It was Urban VIII.'s tragic destiny that instead of the longed-for restoration of peace, he was fated to see the war assuming the proportions of a gigantic struggle the end of which he was not to witness. His helplessness was further brought home to him by his failure to restrain the Emperor from concluding a peace which was bound to injure the interests of the Church, with the Protestant Elector of Saxony who had tired of the alliance with Sweden which had been forced on him. The initial demands of the Saxon Elector, namely, the restoration of property as it existed in 1612, and the abolition of ecclesiastical privileges and freedom for the Confession of Augsburg even in the Emperor's Hereditary States, was rejected by Ferdinand II. As a result of the battle of Nördlingen the Saxon Elector considerably reduced his

¹ *Ibid.*, 511 *seq.*, 516 *seq.* The French lost the Valtinella again in 1637. Whilst Captain George Jenatsch, who had returned to the Catholic faith, held Rohan at bay, the people of the three Cantons rose as one man on March 17, 1637, and the French were obliged to evacuate the Grisons and the Valtinella on March 26 ; see HÜRBBIN, *Schweizergesch.*, II., Stans, 1908, 369 *seq.*

² See LEMAN, 518.

³ Cf. SIRI, XIII., 318 *seq.*

demands, though he still insisted on the Edict of Restitution being abolished in practice, and on the Protestant Princes having guaranteed to them such ecclesiastical property as by 1620 had been in their possession for a period of at least fifty years, and such as in 1627, they had held for a term of forty years.¹ The prospect of a settlement of this kind naturally raised no small anxiety in Rome where excessive concessions to the Protestants had been feared as early as the spring of 1633.² The papal representative in Vienna, Cardinal Rocci, and his successor, Malatesta Baglioni, who arrived at Vienna on November 25th, 1634, were accordingly directed to make counter-representations. Ferdinand II. heeded these warnings,³ which were renewed after the peace preliminaries with Saxony concluded at Pirna on November 14th [24], 1634.⁴ He resolved to consult a number of theologians, in fact previous to this

¹ Cf. HELBIG, in *Hist. Taschenbuch*, 1858, 573 seq.; HURTER, *Friedensbestrebungen*, 62 seq.; IRMER, *Arnim*, 304 seq.

² See DUHR, II., I, 468.

³ Cf. Rocci's *reports of September 30, October 7 (the Emperor pointed out: "Che quando Sassonia altre volte haveva chiesto cose esorbitanti, come la libert  di coscienza ne stati hereditari, e che i vescovadi e beni ecclesiastici se gli permettessero in perpetuo, egli haveva risposto che pi  tosto di concedere cose simili si contentava con la sua famiglia di andare limosinando") and October 21, 1634 (an interview with Bishop Wolfradt, when Rocci told him "che metteva in considerazione a S. Mt  che mentre il mondo vedeva che dalle vittorie non si cavava frutto pel cattolicismo, con ragione poteva dire che quella non era guerra di religione, ma indirizzata a fini particolari e politici, e che non si vedeva come gli aiuti dati da S. St  con tanta incomodit  et i denari levati dagli altari ridondassero in servizio di Dio e della s. fede"). Furthermore, Rocci made representations on account of the toleration of Protestant preachers at Ratisbon and N rdlingen; cf. above, p. 333, note 3, p. 335, note 3). Fr. Barberini approved these representations of Rocci's in a *letter of November 11, 1634, see *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 1, Vatican Library.

⁴ See *Rocci's reports of December 16 and 23, 1634, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.* Cf. also LEMAN, 483.

step he had already sought the advice of the Electors, with the exception of the Francophil Elector of Trèves. Maximilian of Bavaria's advice was that the favourable situation as far as it regarded Saxony should be exploited to the utmost, and he pleaded that with regard to ecclesiastical property, no agreement should be concluded which was calculated to wound the Catholic conscience. Both he and his brother felt that the concessions of Pirna, which practically annulled the Edict of Restitution, were excessive.¹ On the other hand the Rhineland theologians consulted by the Elector of Cologne, among whom there were two Jesuits, were in favour of the widest concessions possible, on the plea that necessity knows no law.² In the end the Elector of Cologne agreed with his colleague of Mayence on a resolution which also met with the approval of several other ecclesiastical Princes, which was to the effect that these things were the business of the Diet of the Empire and that the Pope would certainly refuse to give his assent.³ In Vienna, in addition to the Spanish ambassador, Count Oñate, the Emperor was also pressed for concessions by the Prince-Bishop Wolfradt and Cardinals Pázmány and Dietrichstein,⁴ the last-named having become one of Ferdinand II.'s chief advisers since the death of Eggenberg. Their authority exercised a strong influence on the twenty-three theologians, among whom there were eight Jesuits and three Capuchins, who met in conference on February 5th, 1635. The main question, whether in a case of extreme necessity concessions of such gravity could be made without burdening the conscience, was answered in the affirmative by the majority, but the Emperor's confessor, Lamormaini, replied in the negative, whereas the confessor of the Queen of Hungary, the Spanish Capuchin Quiroga, together with the Capuchin Valerian, were just as decidedly

¹ See RIEZLER, V., 496.

² See VOIGT-WEITZEL, in *Rhein. Archiv*, XI., 318. Cf. DUHR, II., I, 469 *seq.*

³ See RITTER, III., 590.

⁴ See *Rocci's reports in LEMAN, 483 *seq.*

in favour of the concessions.¹ Lamormaini received strong backing from the representatives of the Pope who, in obedience to their instructions from Rome, never ceased to raise a warning voice, so that, in consequence, some heated discussions took place, more particularly with Quiroga and Oñate.²

After the divines had handed in their opinion, a meeting took place on February 27th, 1635, of the chief Privy Councillors, namely Cardinals Dietrichstein and Pázmány, Prince-Bishop Wolfradt, Counts Trauttmansdorff, Werdenberg and Schlick, and the president of the Aulic Council, Stralendorf. This gathering decided in favour of concluding peace with Saxony but recommended certain alterations in some of the articles in the Preliminaries agreed upon at Pirna.³ The Elector of Cologne also was of opinion that the Peace of Birna could not be ratified with a safe conscience. The Elector of Mayence and Maximilian found fault with the concessions in the ecclesiastical sphere. These representations decided Ferdinand to enter into further negotiations to be conducted at Prague. There the Emperor successfully forced Saxony to submit to a number of additional clauses which met, at least to some extent, the demands of the more intransigent party.⁴

¹ See DUHR, II., I, 468 *seq.*

² See the *reports of Baglione of March 3, 1634, in *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 10, *loc. cit.*, and of April 14, in RANKE, *Päpste*, II., 372, note 1. Lamormaini received great praise from Cardinal Fr. Barberini; see, besides the reports in DUHR, II., I, 468, note 7, Fr. Barberini's *letter to Baglione, March 17, 1635: "Al P. Lamormaini V.S. offerisca e ratifichi quelle obbligazioni che ho professato altre volte di dovergli essendo attione di generoso christiano e degno confessore di un pio imperatore cio ch'egli ha fatto rimirando più il cielo che la terra. Piacesse a Dio che tutti i confessori di principi lo imitassero et i principi nella pietà imitassero S.M. Cesarea." NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. GINDELY, III., 55 *seq.* For A. Wolfradt, see HOPF, *Wiener Schulprogramm*, 1893; *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, LV., 389 *seq.*, and MAURER, *A. Wolfradt*, Vienna, 1894. v. Györy is at work on a much needed monograph of Wolfradt.

⁴ See RITTER, III., 594 *seq.*

For all that the definitive peace signed at Prague on May 20th [30], 1635, contained much that was detrimental to the Catholic religion. Thus the Princes and States professing the Confession of Augsburg were allowed to retain all the mediate bishoprics, monasteries and other ecclesiastical property in their territories which they had seized before the treaty of Passau, whilst such ecclesiastical property as had come into their power after that treaty and up till November 12th, 1627, was to remain in their hands for a period of forty years from the conclusion of peace. This meant nothing less than the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution though that document was not expressly mentioned. With regard to the archbishopric of Magdeburg it was decided that it should be held by the younger son of the Elector of Saxony during his life-time; in like manner the bishopric of Halberstadt was to be held by the Emperor's son, Archduke Leopold William. With regard to Lusatia, which Saxony was to inherit, it was decided that no change should be made in matters of religion either with regard to the Catholic religion or to the modified Confession of Augsburg. As for the Protestants in Bohemia and in the rest of the Austrian hereditary lands, the treaty declared that, notwithstanding the intervention of the Saxon Elector on behalf of his co-religionists in those territories, His Majesty the Emperor could no more be deprived of the right of *cujus regio ejus religio* in his own lands than the Protestant Princes and States in theirs.¹ In regard to Silesia, an appeal was made to an imperial Resolution which granted to the Dukes of Brieg, Liegnitz, Wohlau and Öls and to the city of Breslau liberty to practise the Confession of Augsburg provided they begged forgiveness for all their offences and swore unalterable loyalty for the time to come.²

Cardinal Rocci, who previous to his departure had made a last effort to dissuade the Emperor from any concessions detrimental to the Catholic Church,³ was succeeded in the nunciature by Malatesta Baglioni who adopted a similar

¹ See LUNDORP, *Acta publica*, IV., 458 seq.

² See LÜNIG, *Reichsarchiv, Pars specialis*, I., No. 8.

³ See *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 1, Vatican Library.

policy. All the efforts of Dietrichstein and Pázmány to win him over to their views were in vain.¹ Against both Cardinals, as well as against Quiroga and Oñate, Baglioni resolutely maintained the standpoint of the Holy See which, in accordance with Canon Law, condemned every concession to Protestants. Oñate, as well as other people in Vienna,² allowed themselves to be so far blinded by passion as to insinuate that the Pope had sanctioned the French invasion of the Valtinella !³ The Emperor Ferdinand II. met Baglioni's representations with a declaration that he was determined to take no step for which he could not answer to God. The invasion of the Valtinella by the French had embittered him to the utmost and he complained that France pursued but one aim and purpose, namely the downfall of the sincerely Catholic House of Austria. Gladly would he have banished the Protestants from the Empire, as he had expelled them from his Hereditary States, had he not been prevented by the French King, who acted as the protector of the heretics. He was unable to understand the theology of the French and in more than one respect Richelieu's conduct was a scandal.⁴

Baglioni was informed of the conclusion of the peace of Prague by Wolfradt, Prince-Bishop of Vienna, who had the news proclaimed from the pulpit and only refrained from

¹ Cf. Baglioni's *report of March 3, 1635, Vatican Library.

² Cf. Baglioni's *report of April 28, 1635, *ibid.*

³ Cf. Baglioni's *report of May 5, 1635, *ibid.*

⁴ " L'Imperatore esagerò contra i Francesi per essere di nuovo calati nella Valtellina e perchè non nodriano altro pensiero che di abbassare la casa d'Austria, la quale pure si sapeva che sempre era stata devotissima verso la religione cattolica e ciò che haveva fatto per discacciare gli heretici da suoi stati hereditarii e lo stesso farebbe da tutto l'Imperio se non fosse divertito dal Re di Francia che teneva protezione di heretici e poi disse queste precise parole : Che la Mtà Sua non sapeva come caminasse questa teologia de'Francesi e particolarmente restava scandalizzato dal card. Richelieu dicendo con gran sentimento che ella sapeva che in Francia sino al Laetare si erano fatte feste e l'ultima era stata fatta dal med. Richelieu, e altre cose simili." From Baglione's *report in *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 10, *loc. cit.*

ordering a solemn *Te Deum* in consequence of the nuncio's protests.¹ Baglioni also bitterly resented the conduct of Fr. Valerian who boasted to his face of the part he had played in the peace which he described as holy, glorious, and lasting.²

The imperial ambassador in Rome, Prince Bozzolo, acted with far greater prudence. In a special audience, he handed to the Pope a letter from the Emperor. At the same time he informed Urban VIII. of the peace which circumstances had compelled his master to conclude and which he hoped would prove to be a first step towards a general pacification. On this occasion Bozzolo expatiated on the advantages which the Catholics would derive from the treaty, but passed over in silence the far greater ones which it assured to the Protestants. The Pope expressed his regret that the Emperor had not been able to secure greater advantages for the Catholics. He could not approve of the peace seeing that he had always condemned, and that quite recently in France, any treaty with the Protestants.³ Extreme moderation also characterized the remonstrances which the nuncio in Vienna, acting on the instructions of the Secretary of State,⁴ made to the Emperor

¹ See Baglioni's *report of June 2 and 9, 1635, *loc. cit.*

² See Baglioni's *report of July 7, 1635, *loc. cit.*

³ Noi non possiamo se non condolerci che S. M. Ces. non habbia potuto avvantaggiar maggiormente la religione cattolica, ma non possiamo approvar tal pace, come sempre habbiamo disapprovato le allegationi de'principi cattolici con gli heretici, et ultimamente pure il nuntio in Francia n'ha parlato liberamente al Re et a suoi ministri. Letter of Fr. Barberini to Baglioni of June 23, 1635, in NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ " Risponde N. Sre a S. Mtà Ces. nella forma che V. S. vedrà nell'accluso breve sopra la pace conchiusa con Sassonia, la quale da Sua Stà è stata sentita con quella passione d'animo che si ricerca in quella parte che tocca il pregiudizio della religione cattolica, onde non può esser quella pace approvata da S. Bne nè da questa S. Sede, i cui ministri si sono sempre astenuti dal prestar consenso e dall'ingerirsi negli affari degli heretici e nelle condizioni et in qualsivoglia trattato di simile pace. . . . Ma perchè al fatto non è più rimedio V.S. porterà il concetto di N. Sre col supporre il dispiacere dell'Imperatore istesso che non habbia

when he handed to him a Brief couched in the most cautious terms. The Pope's disappointment at the peace with the Protestant Elector of Saxony was in proportion to the disadvantages which it entailed for the Catholic religion, hence the Holy See felt unable to sanction the agreement. In view of the fact that the transaction could not be undone the Pope could do no more than deplore these bad times.¹

This moderation of language was due to the fact that Urban VIII. was still working even at this last hour to bring about an armistice, though his plan met with equal opposition in Vienna and in Paris.² It was not the Pope's fault if the war went on: "We must not neglect anything that may promote peace," Francesco Barberini wrote to the French nuncio, Bolognetti. At the same time he warned the latter to be cautious: "Do not forget that the Pope is not a direct mediator; he can issue no commands; all he can do is to try and prevent a further embitterment of the warring parties; on no account must he give them a pretext for distrusting him."³

In order to leave nothing undone, on July 24th, 1635, Urban VIII. had fresh instructions issued to the nuncios

potuto fare più nell'esercizio della sua pietà per servizio della religione cattolica, e con tal mezzo potrà discendere all'altre particolarità indicative della disapprovazione, ma in modo che Cesare non se n'offenda. Ma veramente dall'autorità di S.M. e massimamente trattando con suoi sudditi si poteva aspettare più in servizio della Chiesa cattolica. Ma perchè le cose sono fermate a questo segno, a noi altro non resta che deplorare di questi tempi." Cardinal Fr. Barberini to Baglioni, July 28, 1635, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

¹ See the *text (Papal Secret Archives) in App. No. XVIII, Vol. XXIX. *Ibid.*, No. XVII. for the first draft which was more severely worded.

² Cf. the *letter of Baglioni of June 23, 1635, in *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 10, Vatican Library.

³ See LEMAN, in the *Rev. d'hist. éccles.*, XIX. (1923), 371.

to the effect that they should urge the appointment of plenipotentiaries for the peace congress.¹ This was, of course, a forlorn hope for there was no inclination anywhere to begin negotiations. Vienna, where even the Capuchins Quiroga, Valerian and Basilio fanned the flames of war,² was all the more reluctant to forgo the advantages of the peace of Prague, as Hessen-Darmstadt, the Elector of Brandenburg and almost every North-German State of some importance, with the exception of the Elector of Hessen-Kassel, had by then agreed to it.

Madrid was in a very martial mood and resumed its former attitude towards the Pope. On July 17th, 1635, Philip IV. wrote to Urban VIII. : " I trust that now that there is chiefly question of the interests of religion, Your Holiness will deal with the King of France, who has allied himself with the Protestants, as the duty of a Pope demands." ³ Urban replied that he had at all times disapproved of alliances which disregarded the laws of the Church and injured the Catholic religion, but that sharp measures were not always the right ones : in any case he was resolved to go on working for peace.⁴ Paris was perhaps keener on war than even Madrid, for Richelieu was afraid lest the great advantages he had secured up till then should escape him, and reasons of internal policy likewise urged him to go on with the war.⁵ The House of Habsburg was to be subjected to fresh and more vigorous attacks in the Netherlands and on the Rhine. With a view to covering the Swedes in the rear, Richelieu helped to bring about the armistice of Stuhmsdorf between Sweden and Poland (September 12th, 1635). In order to divide the forces of his opponents he rekindled the war in Italy for which he

¹ *Letter from the Secretary of State to the nuncios in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. Baglioni's complaints in his *report of July 7, 1635, *loc. cit.*

³ See LEMAN, in the *Rev. d'hist. éccles.*, XIX. (1923), 372.

⁴ See the *Brief to Philip IV. of September 7, 1635, *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ Cf. RANKE, *Französische Gesch.*, II. (1854), 452 *seq.*

sought to enlist the Dukes of Savoy, Mantua and Parma.¹ The Pope did his best to dissuade Louis XIII. and the above-named from such a step,² but Odoardo Farnese of Parma was rash enough to fall in with Richelieu's plan, whilst the Duke of Rohan from the Grisons, and Marshal de Créquy from Piedmont, attacked the Spaniards in Milanese territory, in conjunction with Odoardo and the Duke of Savoy. However, the fortune of war refused to smile on their arms and before long Odoardo saw himself threatened in his own domains.³

The struggle on the European battlefields had its repercussion even in the Eternal City, in the streets of which Frenchmen and Spaniards repeatedly came into such sharp conflict that the Governor Spada and Cardinal Barberini found it exceedingly difficult to maintain order and tranquillity.⁴

Urban VIII.'s conduct amid so many difficulties was worthy of his high office. Like so many of his predecessors, he had from the outset of his pontificate, done his best to promote a crusade of all Christendom against the Turks, and now he strove to bring about a reconciliation between the warring nations. With the example of the great medieval Popes before him, he had in mind the true interests of Christendom,⁵ whereas the supreme preoccupation of Richelieu and Fr. Joseph was to secure the hegemony of Europe for their beloved France.

¹ Cf. AVENEL, V., 103 *seq.*; GÜNTER, 206.

² Cf. the *Briefs to Louis XIII., of September 8, 1635, and to the Dukes of Savoy and Modena, of February 19, 1636, *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.*, a fresh warning to the Duke of Savoy, March 22, 1636.

³ The struggle did not cease until the conclusion of the treaty mediated by the Grand-Duke of Tuscany on February 19, 1637, which settled the differences between the Duke, Spain and Rome for a time; see REUMONT, *Toscana*, I., 418.

⁴ For the scuffle in Piazza Navona on April 8, 1635, see the report of ADEMOLLO, *Ambasciatori di Francia*, in the *Riv. europ.* An. VIII. (1877), III., 288. Cf. also the *Relatione del governatore Spada* (MS. in the library of the German Campo Santo al Vaticano), which is used in Ch. V. of Vol. XXIX.

⁵ See LEMAN, *Urbain VIII.*, 525 *seq.*

What the leaders of France's policy wanted was not a reconciliation but a victorious peace. Richelieu roundly told the nuncio Bolognetti that peace with Spain could only be obtained through war ; and if he did not dare to refuse flatly to appoint plenipotentiaries for the peace congress, in the end he failed to name any, as did Philip IV.,¹ and since the Emperor also had only given vague assurances in this respect, the Pope resolved to hasten the opening of the peace congress by announcing, on September 17th, 1635, the nomination of a legate to that assembly. For this duty he had thought at first of Sacchetti, Durazzo and various other Cardinals,² but in the end his choice fell on Cardinal Marzio Ginetti, a man whom he could trust and one wholly above the least suspicion of partiality.³ The memory of the Cardinal is kept alive not only by the magnificent family palace at Velletri, but likewise by the many benefits he lavished upon his native city.⁴ In a secret consistory held on that day, Urban VIII. described his prolonged and energetic efforts for the restoration of peace between the Emperor and the Kings of Spain and France, and how he had warned them, and pleaded with them by means of personal letters, special couriers and ordinary and extraordinary nuncios ; yet up to that moment he had not been able to induce them to enter into peace negotiations. With a view to persuading them to do so, he was about to appoint Cardinal Ginetti to act as his legate with all the requisite powers. All the Cardinals gave their assent, whereupon the nomination followed.⁵ It was communicated on the

¹ See LEMAN, in the *Rev. d'hist. écclési.*, XIX. (1923), 374.

² See *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 10, Vatican Library.

³ See PALLAVICINI, *Alessandro*, VII., vol. i, 88.

⁴ Cf. TERSENGHI, *Velletri*, Velletri, 1910, 247 seq., 255 seq., 257 seq. The palace is famous for its staircase.

⁵ " *Die 17 mensis Septembris 1635 Romae fuit consistorium secretum in aedium Quirinalium aula Paulina consueta. S^{mus} haec verba protulit : Omnem operam iamdiu et omne studium contulimus, ut sublatis dissidiis pax inter Caesaream M^{tem} et utrunque regem coalesceret, utentes ad persuadendum illorum animis exhortationibus, litteris Nostra manu exaratis, tabellariis

same day by means of special Briefs, to the Emperor, the Kings of Spain, France and Poland.¹

The nuncio of Vienna further enlightened the Emperor on the ability and impartiality of Ginetti and emphasized the fact that the Pope had made this choice with a view to spurring on the Princes to appoint their plenipotentiaries; the legate would leave as soon as this was done.² Thereupon, on November 17th, the Emperor at last joined three more plenipotentiaries to the Bishop of Würzburg. Even Richelieu, probably in consequence of a growing opposition to him in France, as well as the slender successes of his troops in the Netherlands and in Italy, proceeded, on November 21st, to the nomination of France's plenipotentiaries. Olivares who, in reality, wanted to exclude the mediation of the Pope whom he suspected by reason of his neutrality, took a similar step on December 21st though he kept it secret for the time being.³

It only remained to fix the meeting place of the peace congress. This proved extremely difficult, not only because the plague had broken out in many parts, but because the Dutch, France's allies, demanded that it should be some locality within their territories. However, there could be no question of a papal legate making a lengthy stay in a Protestant town.⁴ Vienna had put forward in turn Constance, Spire, Augsburg, and Trent, and would have liked Constance best of all, because

expressis et nuntiorum ordinariorum et extraordinarium monitis et permultum temporis spatium neque eo pervenire potuimus, ut institueretur tractatio. Nunc res in eo statu est, ut videatur posse dari principium huic tractatui. Ideo Nobis propositum est etc." (*Acta consist.*, 1631-1644, MS. in my possession).

¹ See the *Briefs of September 17, 1635, in *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives.

² See the *report of Baglioni of October 13, 1635, in *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 10, Vatican Library.

³ See LEMAN, in the *Rev. d'hist. éccles.*, XIX. (1923), 375 seq.; GÜNTNER, 207 seq. For the publication of the names of the plenipotentiaries by the Pope, see SIRI, VIII., 382.

⁴ See LEMAN, *loc. cit.*, 379.

of the famous Council, though Spire was eventually even more strongly favoured. The French were in favour of Liège. However, the Pope realized that in view of its strong pro-French feelings that city would not be agreeable to the imperialists ; hence he caused his nuncio to propose Cologne, though without betraying that the latter town was the most acceptable to himself¹; just as he carefully preserved his position above all parties, an attitude which, as a matter of fact, was binding on him as the common Father of Christendom and alone enabled him to play the rôle of a mediator. His nephews also were anxious to prove their impartiality, as was shown by the circumstance that at the performance of the musical drama entitled " The Life of St. Theodora ", composed by Mgr. Giulio Rospigliosi, the future Clement XI., Cardinal Antonio invited the French Colony for the first representation ; for a second performance the wife of Taddeo Barberini invited Roman Society and for the third Cardinal Francesco invited the Spanish Colony.² Vienna still strongly favoured Spire and blamed the dilatoriness of the Spaniards in appointing plenipotentiaries. To the Pope's satisfaction Ferdinand rejected the demand of Charles I. of England for the restoration of the Palatine: on the other hand he declined Liège just as strongly as he insisted on Spire being the seat of the congress. In the end he proposed Frankfort on the Main, but to this the nuncio would not agree on the ground that the latter city was for the most part Protestant,³ and in this refusal he had the full support of Rome.⁴

¹ Cf. the *reports of Baglioni of August 4 and December 29, 1635, and of November 19, 1636, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.* A *Brief referring to this and addressed to Ferdinand II., dated December 15, 1635, is in *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives.

² See ADEMOLLO, *I Tenti di Roma nel secolo decimosesto*, Roma, 1888, 22.

³ See Baglioni's *reports of February 23, March 15 and 22, and April 5, 1636, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See Fr. Barberini's *letter to Baglioni of April 26, 1636, *ibid.*

When it became known that Spain had at last published the names of her plenipotentiaries, the Pope dispatched by special couriers Briefs dated March 15th and 16th, 1635, to Ferdinand II. and to Louis XIII. for the purpose of fixing the rendezvous of the conference.¹ The Madrid Cabinet was not approached because Philip IV. had announced that he would follow the Emperor's lead. With a view to hastening an agreement, Urban gave the legatine cross to Ginetti on April 6th, 1636.²

Even now Richelieu persisted in rejecting the four places proposed by the Emperor, though he approved of the choice of Cologne because that city was likewise acceptable to his allies the Swedes and the Dutch.³ Vienna also ended by giving way when the Pope represented that the Elector of Cologne was wholly devoted to Austria. Even before this information reached Rome, and with a view to hastening the imperial decision, Urban VIII. had allowed the Cardinal legate to set out on June 25th.⁴ On July 11th, 1636, he proclaimed a universal jubilee to implore the blessing of God

¹ See both *Briefs in *Epist.*, XIII.—XIV., Papal Secret Archives.

² " *Smus dixit illis (cardinalibus) se dare crucem legato, et licet videatur aliquibus nimis praepropere, tamen hoc facere, ut tollat omnem ansam et occasionem cuilibet retardandi expeditiones pro pace obtinenda et conficienda (*Acta consist.*, 1631—1644) MS. in my possession). The draft of the *Instruction for Ginetti, dated June 25, 1638, and drawn up by Pietro Benesse, is preserved in Papal Secret Archives, vol. 36, p. 1049 (*cf. Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, XI., 744, note 2). It is found in many MSS. I have found copies in ANCONA, Communal Library, *Miscell. libro sesto*; BERLIN, State Library, *Inf. polit.*, VII., 1 *seq.*; LUCCA, Library; MUNICH, State Library, *Ital.*, 98; NAPLES, National Library, XI., G. 34, p. 1 *seq.*; PARIS, National Library (see *Marsand*, I., 337, 656) and Library of the Arsenal; ROME, Barberini Library, LVIII., 15; Casanatense Library, 2075, p. 1 *seq.*; Chigi Library, I., III., p. 14 *seq.*; Corsini Library, *Cod.* 689; Vatican 6915; Ferraioli Library, 62, p. 1 *seq.*; Vittorio Emanuele Library, *Fondo Gesuit.*, 277; STOCKHOLM, Library, *Hist. ital.*, no. 14, p. 1.

³ See LEMAN, *loc. cit.*, 378 *seq.*

⁴ *Cf.* *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*; LEMAN, *loc. cit.*, 382 *seq.*

on the peace negotiations.¹ On September 6th, by way of compensation for yielding on the question of Cologne, Ferdinand demanded the red hat for the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, Wolfradt,² but the latter had made himself so unpopular in Rome by his approval of the concessions to the Protestants contained in the Peace of Prague, that no notice was taken of the request.³ On the other hand, with Briefs to the Catholic Electors dated August 20th and 25th, 1636, Urban strongly supported the election of Ferdinand's son as King of the Romans. This election was due to take place at Ratisbon.⁴ The nuncio of Vienna, Malatesta Baglioni, was sent as papal delegate to that assembly which opened on September 8th. He was instructed to bring up for discussion the arrest of the Archbishop of Trèves and the Spanish invasion of the papal fiefs of Parma and Piacenza, an act which Urban VIII. resented most grievously. He was also to prevent the restoration of the Duke of Würtemberg and that of the Palatine. The former question was strongly urged by Saxony and the latter by England. Baglioni also offered strong opposition to the projected investiture of the Protestant King of Denmark with the archdiocese of Bremen.⁵

As in Italy so in the other theatres of war, for instance, on the Rhine and the Elbe, a fierce struggle was raging. A

¹ See *Bull.*, XIV., 450.

² Cf. Fr. Barberini's *letter to Baglioni of September 6, 1636, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. the *Brief to Ferdinand II., of October 29, 1636, *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., *loc. cit.*

⁴ See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.* General *Briefs had already been issued on May 10, 1636, to the Emperor and the Catholic Princes on the subject of the safeguarding of the Catholic religion at the Diet of Ratisbon. *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., *loc. cit.*

⁵ See Fr. Barberini's *letters to Baglioni of October 2 and 26, 1636, and Baglioni's *reports of September 7, October 28, and November 9 and 18, 1636, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.* In view of the Spanish invasion of Piacenza and Parma, Urban VIII. appealed to the Governor of Milan, Leganés, in a *Brief of October 25, 1636, and in *one of November 15, 1636, to Philip IV. *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives.

daring offensive against Paris by the Spaniards and the imperialists, on July, 1636, failed in consequence of the unanimous resistance of the French who now rallied as one man round the indomitable Richelieu, as well as by reason of the discord between Johann von Werth and the Cardinal-Infante Fernando. In North-Germany, the Saxons and the imperialists took Magdeburg on July 11th, 1636, but on October 4th, they suffered a bloody defeat near Wittstock at the hands of the Swedish General Banér.¹

In the midst of these heavy blows of fate the sorely tried Emperor scored a great diplomatic triumph when his son Ferdinand was elected King of the Romans. On this occasion Saxony sought to force the restoration of the Duke of Württemberg, but on that point, as on the restoration of the Palatine, the Emperor refused to yield.² On December 22nd, his son was elected King of the Romans.³ From this act the Electors themselves had excluded the imprisoned Elector of Trèves by reason of his traitorous relations with France.⁴

¹ Cf. RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 463 seq.; O. VIGIER, in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, LVI.; RIEZLER, V., 512 seq.; R. SCHMIDT, *Die Schlacht bei Wittstock*, Halle, 1876.

² Cf. Baglioni's *reports of October 28, November 9 and 18, 1636, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

³ See HURTER, XI., 489 seq. The letter of Urban VIII. to the Chancellor of the Elector of Mayence, August 21, 1636, "de necessitate ac forma eligendi regem Romanorum" in *Bull.*, XIV., 556.

⁴ Cf. for this and for the protest of the Elector of Trèves and the Cathedral Chapter there, BAUR, *Sötern*, II., 25 seq., 29 seq. Ferdinand II. at once informed Urban VIII. by a *letter of December 22, 1636, of the election by the *principes electores Imperii*, and referred for further details to the reports of his envoys, Prince Bozzolo and the auditor of the Rota, Cornelius Henricus Motmann. On the same day Ferdinand III. wrote to the Pope: "Noverit igitur S.V. me indictis de more veteri septem rivalibus comitiis, concordibus S. Rom. Imperii electorum suffragiis . . . in augustum Romanorum regem electum et publice proclamatum fuisse." Urban VIII. communicated both letters to the Cardinals in a secret consistory, on January 12, 1637, "in

The Cardinal Legate, Ginetti, reached Cologne on October 22nd, 1636.¹ However, he found no plenipotentiaries there. Those of the Emperor and the King of Spain arrived at length, whilst the French still tarried.²

News of Ferdinand's election as King of the Romans reached Cologne on December 31st, 1636.³ It was the noble Emperor's last joy.⁴ Already grievously stricken, he returned to Vienna on February 8th, 1637, where he died on the 15th, before completing his fifty-ninth year. Even the bitterest opponents

aedibus Vaticanis in sala Clementina." "His peractis Smus decrevit celebrare missam pro gratiarum actione" (**Acta consist.*, 1631-1644, MS. in my possession). By a **Bull.* of December 3, 1637, the Pope deferred ratification of the election until Ferdinand III. should have prayed for it; see *Bull.*, XIV., 622 seq.

¹ See **"Viaggio del card. M. Ginetti legato per la pace descritto da Msgr. Benassa (sic) segret. di N. S^{re},"* in *Cod. M. I.*, 25, of the Chigi Library, Rome; also in *Ottob.* 2612, Vatican Library, and in *Varia polit.*, 159, p. 690 seq., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. also **Viaggio da Bologna a Colonia del card. Ginetti scritto da Msgr. Francesco degli Albizzi*, in *Cod. Q. II.*, 46, p. 1-12, Chigi Library, Rome. A **Brief* to the Doge, of September 20, 1636, thanks him for his reception of Ginetti. *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives.

² See HURTER, *Friedensstrebungen*, 207; LEMAN, in the *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, XIX. (1923), 383.

³ See the **Viaggio del card. Ginetti* by Benesse, quoted in note 1.

⁴ **Letter* of congratulation from Urban VIII. to Ferdinand II. and III. on the election as King of the Romans, January 13, 1637, in *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives. An **Avviso* of January 17, 1637 (*Urb.* 1105, Vatican Library) gives an account of the function on the occasion of the election of Ferdinand III. in the Sistine chapel, and the salvoes of artillery from Castel S. Angelo in the evening. Cf. also *Relazione di quanto e seguito in Germania circa l'elezione de Re de' Romani con un ristretto delle feste fatte in Roma*, Roma, 1637; L. MANZINI, *Applausi festivi fatti in Roma per l'elezione di Ferdinando III. dal. rev. princ. Maurizio card. di Savoia*, Roma, 1637. On the functions in the Anima, first on January 17, 1637, and then on February 1, in the presence of nearly all the Cardinals, see SCHMIDLIN, 460 seq.

of the Habsburgs have paid homage to the depth and genuineness of his piety.¹ In a consistory of March 16th, 1637, Urban VIII. spoke in warm terms of the many excellent qualities of the deceased monarch and expressed the hope that his successor would show a like devotion and attachment to the Church.² At the obsequies in the Sistine Chapel on the following day a panegyric of Ferdinand II. was pronounced, a quite unusual thing.³

The dispatch of an ambassador-extraordinary to Rome for the purpose of announcing the election and coronation of Ferdinand III. was at first put in jeopardy by the attitude of the imperial representatives in the Eternal City, Prince Bozzolo and the auditor of the Rota, Cornelius Henry Motmann. Motmann's conduct was such that Urban VIII. no longer received him.⁴ In the end Ferdinand appointed as his envoy-extraordinary Austria's wealthiest grand-seigneur, Prince Johann Anton von Eggenberg who, however, was by no means the equal of his famous father.⁵ The arrival of Eggenberg in Rome, on June 8th, 1638, gave occasion to a conflict of etiquette which lasted for several months. Finally, after the Pope had agreed to make some excuse for a breach of the ceremonial which had occurred at Eggenberg's first audience on June 8th, the latter made his solemn entry on November 8th, "with every imaginable pomp and display."⁶ The *obbedienza* took

¹ See v. ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, in PFLUGK-HARTUNG'S *Weltgesch.*, Neuzeit, Berlin, 1908, 502.

² See **Acta consist.*, 1631-1644, *loc. cit.*

³ See **Diarium P. Alaleonis*, for March 17, 1637, Vatican Library. *Brief of condolence to Ferdinand III., April 20, 1637, *Epist.*, XIII., *loc. cit.*

⁴ See *NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 10, Vatican Library.

⁵ See v. ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, in the *Archiv für österr. Gesch.*, LVIII., 200 *seq.*, for particulars of Eggenberg's instructions.

⁶ See *ibid.*, 205 *seq.* *NICOLETTI, VII., ch. 8, p. 551 *seq.*, *loc. cit.*, gives complementary information. Cf. also *Vat.* 7852, p. 448 *seq.*, Vatican Library. For the dispute about etiquette see **Relazione delle cose occorse nel governo di Roma, di Msgr. G. B. Spada*, MS.

place on November 16th, in the Sala Regia. In his address Eggenberg acknowledged the large part the Pope had had in his sovereign's election and in the latter's name promised due obedience, after which Urban handed to Eggenberg the Bull confirming the election and invited him to his table.¹

Whilst Urban VIII. held steadfastly to the traditional standpoint of the Roman Curia and firmly opposed the participation of heretical envoys in the peace negotiations, Richelieu did not give up hope that the Pope would yield, because not a few Cardinals were unwilling to forgo the annual pensions which France regularly paid them. He also thought he would make an impression on Urban by promoting the interests of the papal nephews. Accustomed to leave nothing untried, he did not shrink from telling direct lies to the supreme Head of the Church. Although at the beginning of 1637 he strove with all his might to win over Charles I., he instructed Mazarin to assure the Pope that out of love and devotion for Rome he had rejected every one of England's offers of alliance.²

of the Library of the Campo Santo al Vaticano. A description of Eggenberg's entry is in *Miscell. libro sesto*, p. 62 *seq.* of the Communal Library at Ancona.

¹ v. ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST (*loc. cit.*, 206) errs when he says that Eggenberg had only one audience on November 16; on the contrary, on that day the *obbedienza* took place (see **Epist.*, XV., p. 205 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives; NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*, 557 *seq.*), and on this occasion, not on November 7, Eggenberg delivered the allocution mentioned by Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, p. 214. Cf. also *"*Oratio habita in Aula Regia Vaticana 16 Nov. 1638 ab Antonio Marengi . . . ad Urbanum VIII. dum Io. Ant. princeps ab Echenbergh eidem pontifici Caesaris nomine obsequium praestabat*", see *Vat.* 7852, p. 485. According to Baglioni's *report of March 19, 1639, Eggenberg on his return expressed himself as very well satisfied with the Pope and laid, the blame for the misunderstandings on Count Bozzolo (*NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*). The Bull. of confirmation dated November 10, 1638, is in *Bull.*, XIV., 674 *seq.*; *ibid.*, 678 *seq.*, that of November 20 accepting the *preces primariae*.

² See AVENEL, *Lettres*, V., quoted in the *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1864, No. 1320.

The peace congress of Cologne was unable to begin negotiations owing to the attitude of France ; hence the war went on with increased fierceness. In April, 1637, the French lost the Valtinella and in Italy also, fortune refused to favour their arms nor did things look much brighter in the North. The bulk of the Emperor's armed forces was directed against the Swedes who, after the failure of their invasion of Saxony, were compelled to withdraw into Pomerania. In Hessen and on the Middle Rhine the imperialists also scored some successes. Bernard of Weimar, who had crossed the Rhine at the beginning of August, was forced to retire in September, nor could he maintain himself in Alsace. However, in the following year a disastrous reversal of fortune occurred, for the Duke von Savelli who, through the influence of the Court Marshal, Count Trauttmansdorff, had been appointed commander-in-chief, displayed the same incapacity which he had shown eight years earlier when opposed to Gustavus Adolphus.¹

At the end of January, 1638, Duke Bernard of Weimar, well supplied with large sums of French money, left his winter quarters at Delsberg at the head of his Swedish and German troops and soon marched from victory to victory. On April 2nd he took Freiburg in Breisgau ; on August 9th he defeated Savelli and Götz at Wittenweier, after which he besieged the strong place of Breisach—the so-called "pillow and precious jewel of the Holy Empire". With heroic fortitude the commander, Baron Henry von Reinach, held the place as long as possible and only surrendered on December 17th when compelled by hunger.² For the Habsburgs the loss of Breisach was all the more serious as thereby this particular line of communication between the Spanish possessions in Italy and the Southern Netherlands became severed.³ Bernard intended to make of this fortress, which dominated the wide plains of the

¹ Cf. HUBER, V., 517 seq. ; RIEZLER, v., 519 seq.

² Cf. besides ROSMANN-ENS, *Gesch. der Stadt Breisach* (Weiss, Freiburg, 1851) especially WETZER, in the *Mitt. des k.k. Kriegsarchivs*, new series, I., 223 seq., II., 257 seq., III., 1 seq.

³ Cf. DROYSEN, *Preuss. Politik*, III., I, 186 ; RANKE, *Osmanen*⁴, 463.

Upper Rhine, the centre of a new principality which was to be composed of Alsace, Breisgau and other territories of the Austrian Forelands. This plan involved him in a conflict with Richelieu who wanted the Rhine frontier for himself. Weimar's sudden death on July 18th, 1639, put an end to this dispute. Nothing could have been more opportune for the Cardinal than this death for at last he got into his own hands both the conquests and the army of Bernard. In this way France's preponderance on the Upper Rhine became an accomplished fact.¹

In the North also the military situation had taken an unfavourable turn for the Emperor. A fresh agreement between France and Sweden, concluded on March 6th, 1638, provided General Banér with reinforcements for his army which took the offensive in July and drove Gallas from Mecklenburg as far as the Elbe, and towards the close of the year forced him to fall back as far as Silesia and Bohemia. In February, 1639, Banér invaded Bohemia where he committed appalling devastations but failed to take Prague.²

The sorrow and anxiety which the prolongation of so bloody a war caused to the Pope were all the greater as in many localities the march of events did most grievous harm to the interests of the Catholics in Germany. To this was added the ever-present fear of an irruption of the Turks. But however gloomy the situation may have seemed, Urban VIII. continued his efforts to put a stop to the dreadful struggle by paving the way for an armistice. On June 20th, 1638, he appealed to all the warring Princes and their ministers and on December 18th he repeated his plea for peace.³ In January, 1639, he made a

¹ See DROYSEN, III., I, 190 *seq.*

² Not until 1640 was Archduke Leopold Wilhelm successful in driving the Swedes out of Bohemia; see HUBER, V., 527 *seq.*

³ The *Briefs of June 20, 1637 ("ut omnia nitantur, quae publicam concordiam renovare possint") addressed to Ferdinand II., to the Kings of France and Spain, to Richelieu, Olivares and the Duke of Savoy, are in *Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.*, XV.-XVI., the *Briefs of December 18 to the same.

fresh appeal to France,¹ but his words fell on deaf ears. At Cologne the Cardinal Legate, Ginetti, saw himself condemned to complete inaction and as he felt unequal to his task he longed for his recall.² However, he was not to blame for the failure of the peace conference; the fault lay chiefly with France, which persisted in her distrust of Spain.³

¹ *Brief to Louis XIII. of January 6, 1639, Papal Secret Archives.

² See **Breve relatione delle difficoltà frapposte nel radunare il congresso in Colonia avanti il card. Ginetti* 1637, 1638, e 1639, in *Cod. Q.*, II., 46, pp. 73-98, of the Chigi Library, Rome, and *Cod. XI.*, G. 34, p. 231 *seq.*, of the National Library, Naples. The copy in the Library at Stockholm (*Hist. ital.*, no. 14, p. 83) names *Abbate Dom. Salvetti*, as the author; the same is stated in the copy in *Barb. LVI.*, 83, Vatican Library.

³ RANKE (*Päpste*, II., 6, 372) is inclined to ascribe the fault to Ginetti's instructions, which are supposed to "have tied his hands with regard to those points which were most important and upon which everything turned"; such, he says, were the restitution of the Palatinate, the definitive cession of confiscated church property to the Protestants and peace with Holland and Sweden. Only those who misunderstand the nature of the papacy could take offence at the fact that the Holy See upheld its traditional policy in this matter of the maintenance of the rights of the Church; see HERGENRÖTHER, *Kirche und Staat*, 714. It was also the opinion of a Congregation of Cardinals held in the presence of the Pope on January 19, 1639, that it was France that caused the greatest difficulties at the Cologne Congress (see the protocol in Archives at Foligno, which since 1921 have been in the Papal Secret Archives, *Miscell.* 4196). Leman also judged that the Cologne congress failed through the action of France (see *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, XIX. (1923), 383). Cf. also the opinion of Maximilian of Bavaria in his letter to Ferdinand III. of April 16, 1638, in RIEZLER, V., 519. Only this much is correct, that Ginetti, on account of his want of "intelligenza agli affari del mondo" as PALLAVICINI (*Alessandro*, VII., I., 88 *seq.*), puts it, was not equal to his difficult task. A witness, though one not wholly free from partiality, P. Benesse, complains that the Cardinal did not always read the documents that concerned his mission; he also accuses him of meanness (Ginetti received 2000 scudi d'oro a month instead of the 1,500 that had been customary

In the spring of 1639 news of a most alarming kind reached Rome from the East, inasmuch as the disputes which had arisen in the previous year between Venice and Turkey threatened to lead to a war which would enable the Sultan Murad to wreak his anger upon the Republic of St. Mark.¹ Urban VIII. who, in December, 1638, had given Venice leave to raise a tenth from all ecclesiastical benefices for the war against the Turks,² took advantage of the opportunity to make a fresh effort on behalf of peace between the warring Catholic Powers so that they might turn their weapons against the traditional enemy of Christendom. To this end he announced to them the dispatch of nuncios-extraordinary: Gaspare Mattei, Archbishop of Athens, was to go to the Emperor Ferdinand III., Ranuccio Scotti to Louis XIII., Cesare Fachinetti, Secretary of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, to Philip IV.³ At the same time the Pope

hitherto) and of some other mistakes in matters of ceremonial. (**Viaggio del card. Ginetti (loc. cit.)*.) Cf. also the letter of Chigi in *Bollet. Senese*, XV. (1908), II.

¹ Cf. HAMMER, II., 201; ZINKEISEN, IV., 557 *seq.*

² See *Bull.*, XIV., 485 *seq.*

³ See the *Briefs to Ferdinand III. and numerous German Catholic princes of April 9, 1639, to Louis XIII., Richelieu and others of April 16, 1639, and to Philip IV., of May 12, 1639 (*Epist.*, XV.-XVI., Papal Secret Archives). Louis XIII. and Richelieu were again admonished to make peace by *Briefs of June 4, 1639 (*ibid.*). The original of the *Brief to Johann Anton, Prince of Eggenberg, is in the Herberstein Archives at Eggenberg. In the *Briefs to Louis XIII. of August 8 and 17, 1639, relating to the mission of Scotti (*Epist.*, XV.-XVI., *loc. cit.*), the Pope pointed out that "ex presentibus catholicorum dissidiis plurima religionis damna" had followed; therefore "paterna iteramus officia. Volumus hanc causam commendare". He then begs the King to show his zeal for the peace of Christendom. "Reliqua ex Nuntio" (*Epist.*, Papal Secret Archives). Cf. also *NICOLETTI, VII., ch. 6, and VIII., ch. 1, Vatican Library. The *Instruction for Mattei dated April 27, 1639, is in *Barb.* 5691, Vatican Library, and *Cod. Q.* I., 22, of the Chigi Library, Rome, *that for Fachinetti, dated May 21, 1639, is in *Barb.* LX., 67, *loc. cit.*

commanded the Jesuits to offer up special prayers for peace.¹

Facchinetti was given fair words concerning the war against the Turks,² but for peace he could do nothing at all owing to the fact that the pretensions of the Spaniards involved him in some exceedingly wearisome politico-ecclesiastical disputes.³ The prerogatives of the Holy See were likewise threatened in France where Scotti met with the greatest difficulties on the part of Richelieu with regard to the peace negotiations.⁴ In Germany Mattei likewise encountered the greatest obstacles. He began by attempting to negotiate an armistice with a view to facilitating the opening of the peace congress of Cologne.⁵ But the imperialists who until that time had shown themselves ready to enter into negotiations, had swung round to wholly opposite sentiments in consequence of their victory over the French

and is in the same sense. Mattei received a special * " *Instruttione per servizio della s. congregazione di Propaganda fide* " concerning the visitation of the Papal Colleges in Prague, Olmütz, Vienna and Dillingen ; further he was to support the missions of Propaganda in Bohemia, Transilvania and Lower Hungary, and admonish all Bishops to fulfil their *ad limina* obligation.

¹ Cf. DUHR, II., I, 450.

² Cf. the *Brief to Philip IV. of September 24, 1639, *Epist. loc. cit.*

³ Cf. Vol. XXIX., Ch. II.

⁴ Cf. the detailed *report of Scotti in his **Relatione della Nuntiatura di Francia* 1641, which is also very important with respect to the religious affairs of that country (cf. below, Ch. VI). It is preserved in numerous copies at Rome in the Papal Secret Archives (*Miscell.*, III., vol. 36, p. 1507 seq., and vol. 71, p. 1 seq.), in the Vatican Library (*Cod. Ottob.* 2437, p. 1 seq.), in the Chigi Library (*Cod.*, N., III., 65), and in the Corsini Library (*Cod.* 491, p. 1 seq., 473, p. 815 seq. (this was used by LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 149, and *Melet.*, 467), 491, p. 1 seq.); also at Gubbio, Lucarelli Library (see MAZZATINTI, I., 150), and at Pistoia, Fabroniana Library, *Cod.* 55.

⁵ See Mattei's *report of June 25, 1639, in *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 2, Vatican Library.

at Diedenhofen on June 7th.^{1,2} Towards the end of the year the imperial ambassador in Rome demanded a fresh subsidy from the Pope, otherwise his Sovereign, as had already been explained to the nuncio in September, would be compelled to conclude a peace with the Protestants which was bound to injure the Catholic religion.³ In view of the depleted condition of the papal finances just then, some very painful discussions arose on this point as well as on other questions,⁴ both in Vienna⁵ and in Rome,⁶ and these were still further embittered by the jealousy of the imperialists due to the fact that Bavaria had been granted permission to levy a tenth from Church property,⁷ a favour which the Emperor had first requested for himself.⁸

The Cardinal-Legate Ginetti who, as a result of the dispute between the imperialists and the French, saw himself condemned to complete inactivity, would have been glad to leave the Rhenish metropolis but he ended by allowing himself to be persuaded by the friends of peace to hold out for a while. By means of Briefs of February 11th, 1640, addressed to all the Catholic Powers, the Pope endeavoured to bring about an armistice and to initiate peace negotiations,⁹ though he was under no delusion as to the obstacles that barred the way, for, according to a report of Mattei dated February 25th, 1640,

¹ Urban VIII. congratulated the Emperor on this victory in a *Brief of July 9, 1639, **Epist.*, XV.–XVI., Papal Secret Archives.

² See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

³ See MATTEI'S *report of September 10, 1639, *ibid.*

⁴ Cf. the detailed *account, *ibid.*

⁵ See MATTEI'S *report of September 24 (Mattei says that the Pope had debts up to 30 millions) and October 19, 1639, *ibid.*

⁶ See Fr. Barberini's *letter to Mattei of December 10, 1639, *ibid.*

⁷ See the *Brief to Maximilian I. of November 12, 1639 (per annum conceditur decima pars eccles. reddituum), *Epist.*, XVII.–XVIII., Papal Secret Archives.

⁸ See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁹ The *Briefs to Ferdinand III., Louis XIII., Philip IV., Richelieu and Olivares, of February 11, 1640, are in **Epist.*, XVII.–XVIII., Papal Secret Archives.

the prospects of the opening of the Congress were the worst possible, inasmuch as the Spaniards would not admit the Dutch plenipotentiaries whilst, on the other hand, the Emperor refused to grant the safe-conduct which the French demanded for the Elector of Trèves, and the French on their part would neither give a safe-conduct to the Duke of Lorraine nor appear at Cologne without the Dutch.¹ A conference arranged by Bichi, the former Paris nuncio, between the plenipotentiaries of France and Bavaria which took place in the utmost secrecy at Einsiedeln in 1640, also failed because Richelieu's aim in these discussions was not peace but the driving of a wedge between Maximilian I. and the Emperor.²

The Pope was greatly worried by the fact that the imperialists held to the course on which they had entered when they signed the Peace of Prague, for in Germany the view gradually gained ground, even in the Catholic camp, that if the external enemies were to be effectively resisted it was necessary not to shrink from even greater concessions to the Protestants. Tendencies of this kind showed themselves already at the Diet of Electors at Nuremberg,³ and it looked as if they must prevail at the Diet of Empire which was due to meet at Ratisbon on July 20th, 1640. By means of Briefs dated June 30th, the Pope urgently pleaded with the Emperor and the Catholic Princes to safeguard the interests of the Catholic Church.⁴ He also instructed Mattei to make earnest verbal representations in this sense to the Emperor, and in particular to insist that the Catholic Duke of Bavaria must on no account lose the Palatinate, that the ancient Abbey of Hersfeld should be safeguarded and that

¹ * " Li Spagnoli non volevano dare il titolo di plenipotenziari agli Olandesi e l'Imperatore non volea dare il passaporto al elettore di Treviri chiesto da Franzesi e questi non volevano darlo al duca di Lorena nè volevano andare in Colonia senza gli Olandesi." Mattei's *report of February 25, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. RIEZLER, V., 539 *seq.*; DÖBERL, I., 560 *seq.*

³ See BROCKHAUS, *Der Nürnberger Kurfürstentag im Jahre 1640*, Leipzig, 1883, 110 *seqq.*, 241 *seq.*

⁴ See **Epist.*, XVII.-XVIII., *loc. cit.*

there should be no interference with the Catholic restoration in Württemberg where the Jesuits had established mission stations at Stuttgart, Backnang, Tübingen and Göppingen.¹ Nor did the Pope lose sight of the question of peace. On September 8th, 1640, he addressed fresh exhortations on the subject to the Emperor, to the Kings of France and Spain and to Richelieu and Olivares.²

The opening of the Diet of Ratisbon was put off until September 23rd, 1640, and that assembly's inclination to make concessions to the Protestants became even more marked in consequence of the conquest by the French, in August, of the strong fortress of Arras, the capital of Artois.³ This event also reacted unfavourably on the negotiations at Cologne where Cardinal Ginetti despaired of success. On September 10th, the Pope acceded to his request to be allowed to return to Italy. In his place Francesco Maria Machiavelli was appointed nuncio-extraordinary for the peace negotiations.⁴

¹ See FR. BARBERINI'S *letter to Mattei of July 14, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 2, *loc. cit.*

² See **Epist.*, XVII.-XVIII., *loc. cit.*

³ See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ " Die 10 Septembris 1640 fuit consistorium in palatio Quirinali in aula Paulina consueta, in quo S^{mus} dixit: Iam elapsum est quadriennium, in quo dil. fil. Noster card. Ginettus ad pacis tractatum inter catholicos principes dirigendum Nostri et Ap. Sedis de latere legati munus Coloniae sustinuit, et cum ibi adversa valetudine affici et otiose permanere saepius conquestus fuerit, frequenter instetit, ut redeundi facultatem eidem impertiremus, quam tandem eidem negare minime posse censuimus. . . . Ut autem assiduum Nostrum pacis studium omnibus perspectum sit utque ea ministrorum congressio, qui a principibus missi hactenus Coloniae appulerunt, continuari possit nec cuiquam forsan supermemoratae tractationi aditus praecludatur, decrevimus, ut ven. frat. Franciscus Maria patriarcha Constantinopolitanus in eadem civitate extraord. Nuntii (characterem) insignitus permaneat ad quodcumque pacis negotium se obtulerit absente legato pertractandum. Interea eidem legato significavimus, ut eo loci dirigat iter suum, unde si quae celeris atque urgens occasio postulaverit, ad negotiationem persequendam paratus sit " (**Acta consist.*, 1631-1644, MS. in my possession). Cf. also the

Meanwhile the Diet of Ratisbon had begun to discuss the question of an amnesty for those Protestant Princes who had not yet made their peace with the Emperor. This was a subject closely linked with the question of the extent to which they should be left in possession of ecclesiastical property of which they had robbed the Catholics from 1555 onwards. The majority were for yielding all along the line. In vain the Pope made a fresh appeal to the Electors.¹ Mattei was already thinking of lodging a protest similar to that which Commendone had been instructed to make at the Diet of 1566.² For the moment Rome restrained him but sent him a copy of the protest of 1566, in case he should need it.³ The Pope defined his position when he declared that he wanted peace in Germany, but not at the expense of the Catholic religion.⁴ The danger of such a peace grew steadily, for the Protestant Princes insisted on a general amnesty for all the Estates of Empire, including the Palatine.

Catholic theologians were divided in opinion as to how far one could go without sin in granting concessions to the Protestants. The more strict view was defended by the Jesuit Henry Wangnereck who unreservedly condemned the religious peace of Augsburg which his brother-in-religion, Laymann, had excused within limits, hence he logically concluded that the amnesty demanded by the Protestants was inadmissible. A paper written by him to this effect was handed to Mattei by the Bishop of Augsburg, Henry von Knöringen,⁵ and since it

*Brief to Ferdinand III. of September 15, 1640, **Epist.*, XVII.-XVIII., Papal Secret Archives. See also DENIS, *Nouvelles*, I., 13.

¹ See Mattei's *report of October 9, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. our account, Vol. XVIII., 252.

³ See Fr. Barberini's *letter to Mattei of November 3, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Words of Urban VIII. to Msgr. Peutingner in the *letter of Fr. Barberini to Mattei of November 10, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁵ "Quaestio ardua, an pax, quam desiderant Protestantés, sit secundum se illicita"; see STEINBERGER, 30 *seq.*, 169 *seq.* For Wangnereck, cf. also DUHR, II., 1, 472 *seq.*

tallied in every respect with his own views, the nuncio bestowed the highest praise on the pamphlet.¹ Mattei breathed more freely when the Emperor put off until the following year the Palatine question, but the arrival at Ratisbon in January, 1641, of the representatives of Lüneburg and Hessen filled him with fresh anxiety.² In March he learnt from the Elector of Cologne that on the subject of the amnesty the Emperor was inclined to yield to the demands of the Protestants.³ On April 18th he lodged a protest against such a step.⁴ Actually he believed that the danger had been averted⁵ when an imperial decree of August 20th settled the question of the amnesty in a way that favoured the Protestants.⁶ Ferdinand III. had consulted his confessor, the Jesuit Gans, on the subject,⁷ and in a paper dated July 16th, 1641, the latter, in company with the majority of the other divines, had given it as his opinion that the Emperor might grant the amnesty with a good conscience.⁸ Thereupon, on October 10th, that decree was embodied in the minutes of the Diet of Empire,⁹ a measure which provoked a protest on the part of Mattei, though only a verbal one.¹⁰

¹ See STEINBERGER, 31; DUHR, II., I, 473.

² See Mattei's *report of January 13, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.* *Ibid.*, the *Instruction for Mattei with regard to the question of the amnesty, January 16, 1641. Cf. also *ibid.*, the *letter of Fr. Barberini of April 20, 1641.

³ See Mattei's *report of March 12, 1641, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See ERNESTUS DE EUSEBIIS, *Iudicium theol. super quaestione, an pax, qualem desiderant Protestantes, sit secundum se illicita*, Ecclesiopoli, 1646, S. 4, R. 8, § 2; STEINBERGER, 37. Cf. DUHR, II., I, 474.

⁵ Cf. Mattei's *report of August 6, 1641, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See LUNDORP, V., 579 *seq.*

⁷ Cf. Mattei's *report of July 2, 1641, *loc. cit.*

⁸ See DUHR, II., I, 473 *seq.*

⁹ See SCHMAUSS-SENCKENBERG, *Sammlung der Reichabschiede*, Frankfurt a. M., 1747 *seq.*, III., 551 *seq.*

¹⁰ See Mattei's *report of October 18, 1641, *loc. cit.* Fr. Barberini *replied on November 2, 1641, that he should preserve all protests in the archives of the nunciature, that the Pope still hoped that the Emperor's piety "applicherebbe i rimedii opportuni" (*loc. cit.*). For the attitude of Mattei and the Pope in respect of the

The minutes also stated that for the peace negotiations between the Emperor and France and Sweden, the towns of Münster and Osnabrück had been chosen, and all the States were requested to send their delegates there. It was stipulated between the Great Powers concerned, namely the Emperor and Spain on the one side, and France and Sweden on the other, that the peace negotiations should open in both cities on March 25th, 1642.

On March 8th, 1641, the Pope had proclaimed yet another jubilee for the purpose of imploring the help of God for the peace negotiations.¹ On April 16th he congratulated the Emperor on his victory over the Swedes at Neuenburg, to the north-west of Cham,² and on June 1st and August 3rd he once more exhorted Ferdinand III., Philip IV., Louis XIII., Richelieu and Olivares to mutual reconciliation.³ However, the opening of the negotiations, not in Cologne but at Münster, and for the Protestants at Osnabrück instead of Hamburg, did not take place on the date agreed upon, viz. March 25th, 1642, owing to the opposition of France and Sweden.⁴ So the fury of war continued to rage. The French who, on January 17th, 1642, had inflicted a heavy defeat on the imperialists and the Bavarians at Kempen, near Krefeld, entertained the hope that the situation would take an even more decisive turn in their favour. Events justified that hope for the military operations of the Swedes terminated on November 2nd, 1642, with a brilliant victory over the imperialists and the Saxons on the blood-soaked plain of Breitenfeld.⁵ On this occasion the Emperor's dealings with the Palatine, see the *reports quoted by *NICOLETTI (VIII., 4). Mattei entered a protest, on May 10, against the Imperial decision of May 6, 1642 (see RIEZLER, V., 519). The negotiations finally came to nothing; see RIEZLER, V., 550.

¹ See **Acta consist.*, MS. in my possession.

² See **Epist.*, XVII.-XVIII., Papal Secret Archives.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. RIEZLER, V., 559.

⁵ Cf. H. BÖTTGER, *Die Ereignisse um Leipzig im Herbst 1642* (*Hallesche Abhandlungen*, XV.). See also *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4th series, XV., 23 seq.

Pope was unable to come to the assistance of the Emperor since he saw himself threatened in his own territory by Odiardo Farnese.¹

When Ginetti left Cologne in September, 1640, he was succeeded by Francesco Machiavelli, so as to make sure of the Pope's participation in the peace negotiations.² However, Machiavelli stood the climate of Germany very badly, hence at the end of August, 1641, Carlo Rossetti was appointed to succeed him as nuncio-extraordinary.³ The latter reached Cologne on October 25th, 1641, but achieved no more than his predecessor.⁴ Whilst waiting for the opening of the peace

¹ In Urban VIII.'s *reply to Ferdinand III.'s report of the defeat of the imperial arms, he says: "Utinam res Nostrae eo in statu essent, ut aliquid tibi suppeditandi subsidium facultas fieret"; unfortunately the Italian disturbances had exhausted his resources. *Brief of November 29, 1642, **Epist.*, XIX.-XXI., Papal Secret Archives.

² See BROM, *Archivalia*, III., 380, 478 seq.

³ Cf. PALLAVICINI, *Alessandro VII.*, I., 98 seq.; BROM, *Archivalia*, III., 381 seq. Rossetti had been for some time envoy to Queen Henrietta Maria, wife of Charles I. (see below, Vol. XXIX, Ch. IV). Urban VIII. *wrote to the Queen on August 10, 1641: "Laudes quibus comitem Rossettum isthinc ad Nos revertentem commendavisti, praeclarae opinioni respondent, cum eo integritatis ac prudentiae dotibus pollentem cognosceremus" (**Epist.*, XIX.-XXI., *loc. cit.*). Cf. *NICOLETTI, VII., ch. 4, *loc. cit.* A portrait of Rossetti is in the sacristy of the Cathedral at Ravenna.

⁴ "Qui le cose della pace camminano otiosamente e poco meno che destituite di tutte le speranze," wrote Rossetti's secretary, Vincenzo Armanni, on August 17, 1642; see *Arch. stor. ital.*, 4 series, XII., 338. Rossetti described in two detailed accounts the lack of success of his efforts both as "Nuntio straordinario" and later as Cardinal Legate; the first, dated June 15, 1642, was published by G. Ferraro in the *Atti e Mem. d. Deput. di stor. patr. per le prov. di Romagna*, III., ser. IV. (1886), 183 seq., 209 seq., together with a commentary as inadequate as it is one-sided. Here also (193 seq.) the *Instruzione al card. legato per il congresso della pace* with marked emphasis on the Pope's position as the impartial Father of Christendom and the prudent attitude which Rossetti was to assume: "Ella avvertirà di non diventare di

negotiations he received news, in August, 1643, of his elevation to the cardinalate which had taken place on July 13th.¹ On August 31st the Pope named Rossetti his legate *a latere*, in order to enhance his authority in the peace negotiations² which were about to be conducted at Münster between the Emperor and France and their respective allies, but so many objections were raised to Rossetti's admission to the deliberations, especially by France, that the Pope decided to recall him to Rome.³ After prolonged consultations Fabio Chigi, who had been at Cologne since June, 1639,⁴ was also entrusted

mediatore giudice degli interessi politici." Rossetti is to avoid arousing any kind of mistrust in either party, but to try to gain their confidence. "Bene avvertirà che nei negozii che includono interessi di eretici, N.S. non vuole avere parte dove si tratta di migliorare, vanteggiare od assicurarli, essendo N.S. obligato a procurare la loro estirpazione, mentre non vogliano convertire alla nostra s. fede." Rossetti is to support the interests of the Catholics of the Valtellina and the Palatinate when dealing with these territories. Finally he is given the formula for the Pope's participation in the peace negotiations.

¹ Cf. Vol. XXIX., ch. II.

² * "Ut decentius et maiori cum auctoritate huic muneri incumbere possit, illum Nostrum et Sedis Apost. de latere legatum intendimus eligere et deputare, prout eligimus et deputamus." Consistory of August 31, 1643, "in palatio montis Quirinalis in aula Paulina, *Acta consist.*, 1631-1644, MS. in my possession.

³ See PALLAVICINI, *Alessandro VII.*, I., 109 seq. Cf. the letter of Chigi in *Bollet. Senese*, XV. (1908), 118. Vincenzo Armanni's account of Rossetti's return journey, which began on May 11, 1644, was published by G. Ferraro in the *Atti e Mem. d. Deput. di stor. patr. per le prov. di Romagna*, VI., Bologna, 1888, 14 seq. (the MS. used by Ferraro is not so good as the copy in *Cod. N.* III., 71, of the Chigi Library, Rome, which he did not know). Rossetti saw the signs of the devastation wrought by the Swedes along the Rhine; in Protestant Frankfurt as well as in Nürnberg and Augsburg he stayed incognito. In the description of all his journeys, preserved in the Papal Secret Archives, this one also is described in a different way; DENGEL gave extracts from it in *Forsch. und Mitteilungen zur Gesch. Tirols*, I., 266 seq.

⁴ See PALLAVICINI, *loc. cit.*, I., 86 seq.

with the duty of representing the Holy See at the peace conference at Münster¹ where the Spanish and Imperial delegates assembled in October, 1643, and where they were at last joined by the French plenipotentiaries in April, 1644. Urban VIII did not live to see the opening of the negotiations properly so-called: he died on July, 1644, four months after the arrival of his representative in the capital of Westphalia.²

As to the issue of the dreadful struggle which turned large tracts of German territory into a desolate wilderness, the Pope could no longer be under any delusion: Sweden, Holland and France had the advantage everywhere, whilst the Emperor and Spain were everywhere at a disadvantage. One decisive factor was the rapid decline of Spanish power which France had begun to challenge successfully at sea also, though there the most important victory fell to the Dutch. After the destruction of the Spanish Armada by Martin Tromp (1639), Spain's line of communication with her overseas possessions was no longer secure.³ In Italy the scales were turned in 1640, when the French under Harcourt, the ablest of France's generals at that time, defeated a Spanish army near Casale and the Spaniards lost one place after another; on April 29th the Marchese de Leganés, Governor of Milan, lost both his war chest and his artillery and was forced to retire to the left bank of the Po.⁴ But the heaviest blow was dealt

¹ Cf. the *Brief to Ferdinand III. of December 7, 1643, **Epist.*' XIX.-XXI., Papal Secret Archives. The command to Chigi is in *Bull.* XV., 296. See also PALLAVICINI, I., 121 *seq.*; BRÖM, *Archivalia*, III., 383 *seq.*, 479.

² See PALLAVICINI, I., 124 *seq.* Cf. Chigi's *reports of April 1 and May 27, 1644 (Vatican Library) in App. Nos. XX. and XXI.

³ Cf. DROYSEN, III., I, 195 *seq.*; RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 491 *seq.*; *ibid.*, OSMANEN¹, 464 *seq.*; A. GOUGEARD, *La Marine de Guerre: Richelieu et Colbert*, Paris, 1877. For the bloody naval battle near Genoa, September 1, 1638, in which the French maintained the upper hand, cf. besides the authorities quoted by RANKE (*loc. cit.*, 494), also the **Relatione* in *Ottob.* 2416, I., p. 74 *seq.*, Vatican Library.

⁴ See LEO, V., 636; RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 490, and OSMANEN, 464.

to Spain by Richelieu when he furthered the secession of Catalonia and Portugal and made common cause with the rebels of those two provinces.¹ This action shows anew that for the Cardinal all means were fair if they served his end, viz. the hegemony of France in Europe. That realist and determined politician, who in France stood for monarchical absolutism, felt no scruples in supporting the rebels of Portugal and Catalonia. In view of the fact that Philip IV. needed a large proportion of his troops for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion in these two important provinces, the fortune of war became increasingly unfavourable to the Habsburgs both in the Netherlands and in Germany. Everywhere the French marched from success to success and it was yet another piece of good fortune for them that one of their most dangerous opponents, the Cardinal-Infante Fernando, died in November, 1640.² Mazarin, Richelieu's worthy successor, prosecuted the struggle, partly with a view to keeping the restless nobility busy outside France. When on May 1st, 1643, a few days after the death of Louis XIII.,³ Condé destroyed the flower of the Spanish nobility near Rocroi, notwithstanding the most heroic resistance, the great struggle for preponderance in Europe

¹ RANKE, *Osmanen*, 467 seq., 472 seq.; GARDINER, *Thirty Years' War*, 196. Cf. Vol. XXIX., Ch. II.

² See PHILIPPSON, in *Pflugk-Harttung's Weltgesch.*, Neuzeit, p. 624. The defection of Catalonia and Portugal, not sufficiently recognized as an important factor in the downfall of Spain, was foreseen by TESTI in 1641 (B. CROCE, *La Spagna nella vita italiana*, Bari, 1917, 251), has been justly emphasized by MOMMSEN (*Richelieu*, 45), and PLATZHOFF (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, CXXX., 102).

³ Urban VIII. spoke of the news of the death at the consistory of June 22, 1643; without praising the dead man he ordered the usual exequies in the Sistine Chapel for the 26th (**Acta consist.*, MS. in my possession). The *letters of condolence to Louis XIV., to Queen Anne, to Henrietta Maria of England, etc., had already been dispatched on June 6, 1643. **Epist.*, XIX.-XVI., Papal Secret Archives.

was decided in favour of France though the ghastly slaughter still continued.¹

When in consequence of the Peace of Prague a large section of the German Protestants lent to the Emperor its armed assistance for the purpose of driving out the Swedes, whereas Catholic France, with a view to helping the latter, threw into the balance not only her money, as hitherto, but her weapons also, the war was completely stripped of its character of a war of religion which, notwithstanding strong political features, it had borne at the beginning. It had become a purely political struggle, a war of conquest for France and Sweden on the soil of the unhappy German Empire.² In view of the importance to their subjects of the faith of the territorial lords, every conquest had a strong bearing on the religious situation. Now it was precisely during the last stage of this gigantic struggle that Catholic countries like the Rhineland, Alsace, Bavaria and Austria were repeatedly swept by Protestant armies which, for the most part, displayed even greater hostility to every thing Catholic than had been the case at the time of Gustavus Adolphus. In many places, as when Bernard of Weimar took Ratisbon in 1633, all Catholic priests and religious were expelled.³ What vicissitudes the bloody strife brought in its train may be gauged from the fact that up to the year 1643 the unhappy episcopal city of Bamberg was taken and retaken thirteen times.⁴ More and more the unending war degenerated into a massacre of the defenceless population. The armies which traversed the various countries devastated them systematically and vented their fury upon the peaceful citizens and country people, whether friend or foe, often enough with

¹ See K. FEDERN, *Mazarin*, Munich, 1922, 634 seq.; STEGEMANN, *Der Kampf um den Rhein*, Berlin, 1925, 234 seq. Cf. GARDINER, 204.

² See STEGEMANN, 228. Cf. RANKE, *Osmanen*, 491; RIEZLER, V., 499; GARDINER, 182 seq.

³ Cf. DUHR, II., I, 233; DUDIK, *Die Schweden in Böhmen und Mähren*, 1640 bis 1650, Vienna, 1879.

⁴ See DUHR, II., I, 409.

inhuman barbarity.¹ War, hunger and pestilence, the three exterminating angels of humanity, reaped so plentiful a harvest that foreign travellers were appalled.² A Bavarian artist, Hans Ulrich Frank, of Kaufbeuren, has perpetuated both with his brush and his etching needle the robberies and rapine of the soldiery, those "wolves in human form", as Grimmels-hausen calls them in his *Simplicissimus*.³ The tragedy and the horrors of the war were depicted by Rubens in 1638 in a painting destined for the Grand-Duke of Tuscany and now in the Pitti Gallery. It is an allegorical portrait of Europe torn by war.⁴ The principal figure is Man advancing with blood-stained sword whilst fantastic monsters symbolize the inseparable companions of war, hunger and pestilence.⁵

The injury which the long-drawn struggle inflicted on the Church was incalculable. Much that had been planted with so much labour and care, was destroyed by the Swedish soldiery. The secular and regular clergy in particular underwent an appalling ordeal. The story of the German Jesuits of that period is an endless chain of want and terror. The worst sufferers were the Rhenish Provinces and those of Upper Germany. In the last period of the war—the Franco-Swedish one—nearly every Province had its share of the misery and want caused by the war,⁶ hence the manly constancy with which the Fathers held out in many places and the magnanimity and self-sacrificing spirit and the heroic trust in God

¹ Cf. RIEZLER, V., 536 seq.

² Cf. the travel notes of 1636 in GARDINER, 183 seq. Of the prevailing famine, which often led to cannibalism, Rossetti's account mentioned above, p. 371, note 3, gives a dreadful picture; cf. FERRARO's edition, p. 59 seq. Cf. also the report of 1641 in RIDOLFI, *Dispacci*, ed. Tourtual, 24 seq., and MENZEL, VIII., 51 seq.

³ See WEIZINGER, *Ein Illustrator des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, in the *Zeitschr. "Der Aar"*, III., 2 (1913), 537 seq.

⁴ See GUHL, *Künstlerbriefe*, II., 205.

⁵ See WAAGEN, *Kleine Schriften*, Stuttgart, 1875, 275 seq.

⁶ Cf. the detailed description in DUHR, II., I, 142 seq., 200, 392 seq., 404 seq.

which prompted them to do all they could in order to allay the sufferings caused by the war are all the more deserving of recognition. They distinguished themselves especially during the frequent outbreaks of the plague, which is wont to accompany war. It has been calculated that in the first half of the 17th century more than two hundred of these religious men fell victims to their charity in serving the plague-stricken, that is about ten times as many as fell during the war.¹ The other Orders also, more especially the Capuchins, suffered numerous losses from the same cause.²

It is impossible to maintain that the last phase of the Thirty Years' War was a war of religion. That it was not is proved by the fact that many Catholic soldiers fought under the banners of Sweden whilst not a few Protestants served in the armies of the Emperor, and in many localities these troops committed great outrages against Catholic worship.³ The army with which Condé, in 1636, invaded the free Duchy of Burgundy, which belonged to the Spaniards, included many Lutherans and Calvinists. Against these the citizens of Dôle, led by the Capuchin Père Eustache, put up a successful defence. To Condé's remonstrances that his conduct could not be justified either before God or man, the Father replied that he fought for an innocent people and for the preservation of the

¹ Cf. PII. ALEGAMBE, *Heroes et victimae charitatis Soc. Iesu*, Romae, 1658; DUGOUT, *Victimes de la Charité*, Paris, 1907. See also DUHR, II., 2, 240, p. 305 *seq.*, for the part the Jesuits played in the care of souls during the war; for further information on the military apostolate cf. A. NAEGELE's biography of Abbot Benedict Rauh of Wiblingen, military chaplain to the Bavaro-Imperial army in the Thirty Years' War. *Urkundl. Beiträge zur Gesch. der deutschen Militärkuratie*, Freiburg, 1911.

² Cf. EBERL, *Gesch. der bayr. Kapuziner-Ordensprovinz*, Freiburg, 1902; GRATIAN V. LINDEN, *Die Kapuziner im Elsass*, *ibid.*, 1890. As J. B. BAUR shows (*Die Kapuziner und die schwedische Generalität im 30 jähr. Krieg*, Brixen, 1887), the Capuchins had less to suffer from the Swedes than the rest of the clergy; the Lutherans oppressed the Catholics during the Swedish invasion even more than the Swedes (p. 12 *seq.*, 15).

³ See RIEZLER, V., 536.

Catholic religion. The Bishop of Besançon also sided with the citizens of Dôle against the army of the "Most Christian King", in whose ranks Protestants abounded.¹

That political, not religious questions were at stake, appeared at times in drastic fashion. Bernard of Weimar who expelled the Jesuits from Dilligen where their presence had been tolerated by the Swedes, and who after taking Breisach held a Lutheran thanksgiving service in its magnificent minster, did not scruple, in 1638, to arrange for yet another solemn service when at last a greatly-longed for heir, the future Louis XIV., was born to the Most Christian King.²

No one preserved a colder indifference in presence of the sufferings which the war brought upon Germany in general and the German Catholics in particular, than the man who guided France's policy. Deaf to all the exhortations of the Pope, Richelieu stuck to his alliances with the Protestant Dutch and Swedes, for any means seemed fair in his eyes if they furthered the greatness of France. Perhaps no passion renders a man so pitiless and so blind as political passion. Richelieu had repeatedly beheld with his own eyes the horrors of war which were so faithfully depicted in Callot's engraving entitled: *Les misères et les malheurs de la guerre* (Paris, 1633). But it did not trouble this particular Cardinal that his co-religionists beyond the Rhine were undergoing unheard-of sufferings and that the wretched territory of Germany had become "a horrible playground for the dreadful bands of soldiers who, an object of terror to friend and foe alike, swept again and again over the exhausted land, exercising the right of the sword with boundless bestiality, with diabolical hatred of all that was sacred, and with insatiable lust for blood and

¹ Cf. J. MOREY, *Les Capuchins en Franche-Comté*, Paris, 1881.

² Cf. DUHR, II., 1, 415 seq.; *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CV., 776. Urban VIII. sent congratulations on the birth of the Dauphin in a *Brief of October 13, 1638 (**Epist.*, XV., Papal Secret Archives) and by a special envoy, a present of swaddling clothes blessed by him; cf. MACSWINEY DE MASHANAGLASS, *Le Portugal et le St. Siège*, II., Paris, 1899, 26 seq.; cf. 64 seq.

rapine".¹ When the Cardinal died on December 4th, 1642, the joy of the Spaniards knew no bounds,² but it was premature,³ for Richelieu's worthy successor, Mazarin, followed the main lines of his predecessor's policy. In conjunction with Sweden, efforts were redoubled to draw the Prince of Transylvania, George Rákóczy, as well as the Porte, into the war against Ferdinand III. On November 16th, 1643, Rákóczy concluded an alliance with Sweden and France and on February 2nd, 1644, he called upon the Hungarian Protestants to take up arms against the Emperor.⁴ By Briefs dated January 7th, 1644, and addressed to Mazarin and to the Queen, Urban VIII. sought to prevent this fresh alliance against the Emperor, but this effort also remained barren.⁵

¹ See DROYSEN, III., 1, 201-2, who for a description of the state of the Empire, refers to a pamphlet, "*Actæon Germaniæ, das ist Abbildt wie Ellendt das heylige Römische Reich von ausländischen Völkern zerrissen und zerstückt wird, vom Jahr 1640.*"

² For the joy of the Spaniards see Nicoletti's report in RANKE, *Osmanen*, 564 *seq.*

³ *" Si pensava che la morte del card. Richelieu partorisce la pace ; assai sarebbe se la facesse concepire. La natura non opera in un istante, il moto non cessa di repente, et egli, come dicono, haveva caricato quell'orologio per tutto il 1643." F. Chigi wrote to Fr. M. Merlino from Cologne on February 5, 1643. *Bollet. Senese*, XV. (1908), 118.

⁴ See KRONES, III., 526 ; HUBER, V., 557 *seq.*, 561.

⁵ The *Briefs to Mazarin, the Queen and to the Duke of Orleans are in **Epist.*, XIX.-XXI., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. *Annales de St.-Louis*, II. (1897), 359.

CHAPTER VI.

RICHELIEU'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHURCH AND THE PAPACY—THE CATHOLIC RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND ST. VINCENT DE PAUL.

(1)

FRANCE'S foreign policy no less than her domestic one was guided by Richelieu in a way that was utterly incompatible with the duty of a Catholic Bishop, not to speak of that of a Cardinal. In his foreign policy, the Cardinal was actuated by purely national ambitions, to which even the interests of the Church had to yield,¹ whilst his home politics were based on royal absolutism. From the very outset Richelieu took the view that he was a Cardinal not so much by the favour of the Pope as by the grace of the King. In his opinion the red hat, which had been one of the immediate objects of his ambition, was only one more means towards political power and personal immunity in his own country.² He was a Frenchman first

¹ See LODGE, *Richelieu*, 203.

² See FEDERN, *Richelieu*, 79 *seq.* In his letter of thanks to the King for procuring him this distinction, dated September 23, 1622, Richelieu went so far as to declare that he would rather die than not devote his whole life, his new dignity and all that he possessed entirely to the service of His Majesty (*Lettres*, I., 730), so that one might almost believe, as AVENEL (*Richelieu*, III., 369) remarks, that there was question of a purely worldly honour. Richelieu's attitude towards his cardinalate is shown by the fact that he never dreamt of going to Rome to receive the red hat; he only valued the purple as a means for the increase of his prestige and position in the State (HANOTAUX, in the *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 1902, VIII., 106). Fraschetti's statement that Richelieu received the Cardinal's hat at a consistory of April 17, 1635 (BERNINI, III), is based on a confusion with his brother, the archbishop of Lyons; see **Acta consist.*, MS. in my possession. Richelieu therefore belongs to the very small number of Cardinals who never received a titular church in Rome.

and foremost¹ and a realist in politics. As such he pursued his political objectives with cold aloofness and utter indifference to religious and ethical principles.² His ideal was the *State* to which all must bow, the King included, and for him the State was not the twenty million Frenchmen which it embraced, but the man who, having gathered all power in his own hand, alone guided its fortunes. This new system, which he applied with ruthless logic, whilst he decked it out with the title of *raison d'Etat*—reason of State—was not limited by any constitutional rights or any consideration of religion or ethics. Whatever stood in the way of this mysterious and awe-inspiring conception of the State must be crushed; whatever could serve it was lawful and even commanded, were it falsehood, treachery, harshness and cruelty.³

Both in the creation of an absolutist rule within the realm, as in the exploitation of every other State for the purpose of securing the hegemony of Europe for France, in place of the Hispano-Habsburg Power, the boundless ambition of the despot was singularly favoured by fortune which blinded many of his contemporaries, though by no means all of them.⁴ As a matter of fact Richelieu had to wage an endless struggle against

¹ See PUYOL, II., 242 *seq.*

² See MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 13, 38, 58 ("Richelieu is everywhere a Statesman, not a Catholic, let alone a Churchman"), *cf.* FEDERN, 148, and Andreas, in MARCKS, *Meister der Politik*, I. (1923), 623 *seq.*

³ See AVENEL, I., 188 *seq.*, 233 *seq.* "Révolutionnaire dans son but, Richelieu le fut nécessairement dans ses moyens. Parmi les nombreux procès politiques qui signalent son ministère, beaucoup furent iniques, mais tous furent illégaux. Il n'en est pas un où les formes de justice aient été respectées," says AVENEL (I., 194). *Cf.* ANDREAS, *loc. cit.*, 634.

⁴ *"Vulgus felicia scelera pro virtutibus ducit, tu (viator) contra nihil infelicius felice scelere cogita," we read in an epitaph of Richelieu which deals severely with his sins and says of him: "Supra omnes mortales ambitione laboravit, super plurimos avaritia, regiae pecuniae prodigus, suae parcus. Crudelis offensus, ubi offenderat crudelior. Ecclesiam afflixit cardinalis, sanguinem fudit sacerdos." *Barb.* 2645, p. 91, Vatican Library.

covert and open resistance. His alliances with the Protestants, which the Pope condemned, were opposed by the fervent section of French Catholics, though their resistance was ineffective. In consequence of successive wars, taxation had become an intolerable burden, hence risings of the harassed populace took place in several provinces, as, for instance, by the *Croquants* ("poor devils") in Périgord and Saintonge, and the *Nus-pieds* ("bare feet") in Normandy. Richelieu easily crushed these risings in bloody fashion. Far more serious were the dangers that threatened him from certain coalitions of some of the nobles and from the character of the King himself. None the less he succeeded in maintaining himself in the favour of Louis XIII. and in destroying all those political opponents who rose against a man whom they considered as "the oppressor of France and the disturber of Europe". Some of these opponents had to flee, others went to prison, many, as, for instance, Marshal de Marillac, the Duke of Montmorency, the Marquis of Cinq-Mars and President De Thon ended on the scaffold.¹ By such means did the man round whose person there hung an aura of blood and terror,² bring about the triumph of his home and foreign policy. His favourites and relations were given the highest posts in the army, and his niece he married to a Prince of the royal blood, viz. the eldest son of Condé, the Duke of Enghien. In all these things he acted as a complete autocrat and his despotism grew steadily, until he ruled like a king and only lacked the title of one.³ Louis XIII., whom he bent to his will with speeches breathing the deepest respect but instinct with inexorable logic, yielded in everything, so much so that he did

¹ Cf. DE VAISSIÈRE, *L'affaire du maréchal de Marillac*, Paris, 1924; J. P. BASSERIE, *La conjuration de Cinq-Mars*, Paris, 1895; L. D'HAUCOUR, *La conspiration de Cinq-Mars*, Paris, 1902.

² See FEDERN, 133.

³ Cf. the eulogy published by LÄMMER (*Zur Kirchengesch.*, 51): "Theologus in aula, Episcopus sine plebe, Cardinalis sine titulo, Rex sine nomine. Unus tamen omnia. Nativam habuit felicitatem in consilio, securitatem in bello, victoriam sub signis, socios in procincto, amicos in obsequio, inimicos in carcere, cives in servitute,

not even dare to offer resistance to orders concerning his own household,¹ nay, he even suffered his minister to choose his confessors, and to these guides of the King's conscience the latter gave at times some very strange directions.²

Though originally far from wealthy, Richelieu successfully bettered his financial status. Eventually his annual income amounted to as much as three million livres, half of which came out of Church property.³ Even the Cardinal's bitterest enemies could not cast the slightest aspersion on his moral conduct, which was blameless, but his behaviour at Church functions was not always correct. Of his intellectual superiority Richelieu was as conscious as of his pre-eminence in the State. It was his ambition to be the first after the King. As a Cardinal he

hoc uno miser, quod omnes fecit miseros. Tam saeculi sui tormentum quam ornamentum." In a satire of 1636 these lines occur :—

. . . C'est le ministre des enfers,
C'est le démon de l'univers,
Le fer, le feu, la violence,
Signalent partout sa clémence.

Les frères du roi maltraités,
Quatre princesses exilées,
Trente provinces désolées,
Les magistrats empoisonnés,
Les grands seigneurs emprisonnés
Les gardes des sceaux dans les chaînes,
Les gentilshommes dans les gênes.

ROCA, *Richelieu*, 307. Cardinal Maurice of Savoy addressed the following apostrophe to Richelieu :—

O tu cui fu da Dio concesso il vanto
D'esser nel Vaticano cardine altiero
Dei Galli armati hor fatto condottiero,
Tingi nell'altrui sangue il rosso amianto.

See MAGGIOROTTI, *In Piemonte dal 1637 al 1642*, Città di Castello, 1913, 24.

¹ Cf. RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II. (1854), 544.

² Cf. FOUQUERAY, IV., 398; V., 81, 85 seq., 98.

³ See AVENEL, I., 419; MARIÉJOL, *Hist. de France*, VI., 2, Paris, 1905, 435 seq. Cf. STANLEY LEATHES, in *The Cambridge Modern History*, IV. (1906), 154.

enjoyed precedence at Court over the royal Princes, but against all rules he claimed a similar right in his own house. On one occasion he refused to greet with his right hand Vittorio Amadeo, Crown Prince of Savoy. Another time, when Queen Anne called on him when he was unwell, he refused to rise from his chair, alleging that such was the custom in Spain, whereupon the daughter of Philip III. replied that she had completely forgotten the manners of her own country and had become quite French.¹

The Cardinal was difficult of approach. He lived most of the time in the neighbourhood of Paris, at his country seat of Rueil, protected by a bodyguard sworn to him and paid by him and which escorted him even into the King's palace. Young noblemen of the most distinguished families performed the duties of his personal service. He kept more servants, better stables and a more sumptuous table than the King himself. The magnificence of his Paris residence also surpassed that of the King. He owned three palaces in the capital. One of them, the *Palais Royal*, which had cost ten millions, bore the inscription "Palais Cardinal" in large letters. His private chapel, which blazed with gold, his library and his collections were famous throughout Europe.² In his castle in Poitou, which he had magnificently restored, he had collected the most precious art treasures, among them being pictures by Mantegna, Perugino, Albrecht Dürer, Rubens, Poussin, Champaigne, Simon Vouet; also two hundred antiques and Michelangelo's group of the "Two Slaves".³ He had his own private theatre with a richly decorated stage. He personally examined the plays that were to be performed; in 1639 he himself composed a piece entitled "Mirame" of which a costly representation was given in 1641. He gloried in the applause which the play called forth as in one of his most personal triumphs. Personal ambition, as well as the desire of making

¹ See MARIÉJOL, *loc. cit.*; BOULANGER, *Le grand siècle*, Paris, 1911, 34.

² See RANKE, *loc. cit.*, 540 *seq.*

³ See EDM. BONNAFFÉ. *Recherches sur les collections des Richelieu*, Paris, 1883.

of French the universal language of the civilized world, instead of Latin, prompted the foundation of the French Academy [1634]. That institution saw itself compelled to make some petty criticisms of Corneille's "Cid", in consequence of the Cardinal's jealousy of the splendid success of the poet.¹ Yet Corneille himself lauded the position which Richelieu held with the King, nay, he went so far as to assert that such servants are raised above the laws.² It is no exaggeration to say that never yet had France had a ruler who so completely controlled her very life and being as did Richelieu.³ Though his ailments were frequent and serious, his activity was nevertheless astounding. He managed everything himself. From his study he directed not only all diplomatic relations with foreign countries, but likewise every branch of internal administration and the affairs of the Court without ever falling from the rôle of a faithful executor of the royal commands. He even laid down in all their details the operations of the army and the navy; units were drawn up, orders given, provisions made ready, the strength of the various corps fixed, levies made and weapons and ammunition bought according as he directed.⁴ With all that the mighty Statesman still found time for literary work.⁵ Bernini's bust of him in the Louvre expresses in masterly

¹ For further details *cf.* BAUMGARTNER, V., 297 *seq.*

² " Et l'art et le pouvoir d'affermir des couronnes,
Sont des dons que le ciel fait à peu de personnes.
De pareils serviteurs sont les forces des rois,
Et de pareils aussi sont au-dessus des lois.

RANKE (*Französ. Gesch.*, III., 355) drew attention to this passage.

³ See PHILIPPSON, in *Pflug-Hartungs Weltgesch.*, Neuzeit, 628.

⁴ Numerous examples in AVENEL, *Lettres*, especially in Vol. V. (Paris, 1863). *Cf.* *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1864, 1313 *seq.*; LODGE, *Richelieu*, 224.

⁵ Richelieu's "Mémoires" (see PETITOT, 2nd series, Vol. XXI.-XXX., 1823; MICHAUD-POUJOLAT, vol. XXI.-XXIII., 1837; new critical ed. in the collection of the *Soc. d'hist. de France*, five volumes to date, extending to 1626), except for the first part, were compiled after his death from material gathered by himself, see both MOMMSEN, *Richelieu, Elsass und Lothringen* (Berlin, 1922) and the *Rev. hist.*, CXLI.-CXLII. (1922-3).

fashion the genius and mental vigour that distinguished Richelieu.¹

To stony impassability Richelieu allied the greatest cunning and circumspection. He secured the submissiveness of the weak King by astute calculation and that of the royal Princes and all other officials by unbending hardness. Whilst he showed a princely liberality towards willing and capable tools he was exceedingly stern with those who did not come up to expectations or who endangered one of his finely spun schemes. With cold relentlessness he suffered his former colleague, Canon Fancan, whose hatred for the Pope and the Jesuits was such that he would not hear of any restraint being put on the Huguenots, to be taken to the Bastille as "an atheist, a supporter of the reformation and a spy of the Lutherans". The wretched man was not to leave that fortress alive. The fate of a man or a human life meant nothing to him. Like Fancan, many others who had become either suspect or dangerous, disappeared in prison.²

After eighteen years of domination exercised with pitiless violence, during which the conception of the intangible power of the State hung like a sword over the heads of his enemies,³ Richelieu saw the realization of his chief plans, namely the crushing of all opposition in France itself against his absolutist government and the downfall of the Hispano-Austrian power. The unscrupulous pupil of Machiavelli had reached the height of his triumph when death drew nigh to the man who knew no pity shortly after he had uttered the words: "De Thon must die." As soon as he realized that his condition was hopeless, Richelieu asked that the Sacraments of the dying should be administered to him by the parish priest of St. Eustache. When the priest, before giving him Extreme Unction, asked

¹ Cf. REYMOND, in *Bullet. des Musées de France*, 1910, 65 seq., and in the *Gaz. des Beaux-Arts*, LIII. (1911), 389 seq.; BENKARD, *Bernini*, 43.

² See ROCA, 16; FEDERN, 77, 112, and WIENS, *Fancan* (1908), 60 seq., 118 seq. *Ibid.*, 142, for proof that Richelieu was unjustly accused of murder by poison.

³ RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II., 533, 545.

him whether he firmly adhered to all the articles of the faith, the Cardinal replied: "All, without exception, and if I had a thousand lives I would give them all for the faith and the Church." "Monseigneur," the curé went on, "do you forgive your enemies?" "I have never had any enemies other than those of the State and the King," was the reply.¹ These words uttered on the threshold of eternity, cast a lurid light on the state of mind of the Cardinal whose impassible calm on his deathbed filled the Bishop of Lisieux with horror.

In effect there are few instances in History which show with such evidence to what extent political passion may blind a man as the fact that up to the hour of his death Richelieu identified himself with the State and felt himself to be the embodiment of the "raison d'État".² He seems to have had not so much as a shadow of remorse for having sought the triumph of his home and foreign policy by any means, even the most blameworthy. Because in his enemies he saw the enemies of the State, he deemed the cruelty with which he destroyed them sufficiently justified. As for his pacts with the Protestant Swedes, he soothed his conscience with the thought that it was part of his contract with them that they should protect the Catholic religion in the conquered territories. But the hope of making use of the Swedes against the Emperor without grievous injury to the Catholic Church, was not fulfilled.³

¹ See GRIFFET, *Hist. de Louis XIII.*, III., 576. According to an anonymous account, probably drawn up by a member of Richelieu's household, he spoke these words before receiving the Viaticum: "Voilà mon juge qui me jugera bientôt; je le prie de bon cœur qu'il me condamne, si j'ay eu autre intention que le bien de la religion et de l'État." *Rev. hist.*, LV., 305.

² See MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 58, and W. ANDREAS, *Geist und Staat, Hist. Porträts*, Munich, 1922, 64.

³ MOMMSEN, in discussing Richelieu's memorandum of 1632, remarks (263 seq.) that the protection of the German Catholics against Sweden seemed necessary to Richelieu chiefly for internal political reasons and out of regard for the King's sentiments, but that he was more concerned with creating the appearance of France doing everything possible to help the Catholics, than with actually saving the German Catholics. *Cf.*, *ibid.*, 282 note.

In spite of everything, in the pursuit of his one aim, viz. the aggrandizement of France, Richelieu continued on his fatal road heedless of the fact that his policy arrested the progress of the Catholic religion in Germany and prepared the victory of Protestantism.

The Cardinal was also blind to yet another aspect of his triumphs, viz. that they had to be bought with streams of French blood, exorbitant taxation¹ and a crushing absolutism which eventually paved the way for the Great Revolution.² It is clear that under such a régime the Church's action was bound to be severely hampered. The fact that the all-powerful minister wished to dominate her as absolutely as he lorded it over his diplomatists, governors and generals, was bound to render his relations with the Holy See exceedingly awkward. The standpoint adopted by him has been described as political or practical Gallicanism.³ Starting from the conviction that he himself was best able to govern the Church of France, he ascribed to the State, to the widest extent, the right to regulate every detail of Church life,⁴ so that he took it as an injury to the nation when the Holy See refused to concede it. A book written under his inspiration complained of France's oppression by the papal power, whilst the same writer declared that the King was not bound by the laws of the Church. To this was added a threat that the fees paid for the expedition of Bulls in Rome might be reduced.⁵ To this long-standing dispute many more came to be added. Thus the Holy See insisted on the informative processes of new bishops being conducted by the nuncio, whilst the Government based itself on an ordinance

¹ Cf. the gloomy picture drawn by an outstanding authority, G. D'AVENEL (*Prêtres, soldats et juges sous Richelieu*, Paris, 1907).

² Cf. MAYNARD, IV., 8 seq.; STANLEY LEATHES, *loc. cit.*, 157; AVENEL, *Richelieu*, I., 244 seq.; WILCKENS, in the *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, XV., 285; PHILIPPSON, in *Pflug-Hartungs Weltgesch.*, Neuzeit, p. 625, 628.

³ See PUYOL, II., 241 seq.; AVENEL, III., 366.

⁴ See MOMMSEN, 86 seq.

⁵ The document is entitled *Le Nonce du Pape Français*; see AVENEL, III., 367.

of the Parliament of 1639, which placed the affair exclusively in the hands of the diocesan bishops, whereupon the Pope threatened to refuse canonical institution to those who did not have recourse to the nunciature.¹ The tension, still further increased for other reasons, was so great at that time that the nuncio was forbidden to have anything to do with the clergy.² It became even more acute when, on September 18th, Parliament, with Richelieu's support and under pain of high treason, forbade the publication of a papal Constitution directed against the injury done to the rights and possessions of the Church.³

More than once Richelieu sought to force the nomination of Cardinals and as often the Pope rejected such meddling with the government of the Universal Church,⁴ though he failed in his efforts to stem the Cæsaro-papalism of France. There the affairs of the Church were freely treated on the same footing as those of the State, with open disregard of the liberty and independence of the Church. On political or national grounds Generals of Orders were forbidden to enter French territory, and monasteries were arbitrarily transferred from near the frontier to the interior.⁵ Appeals from ecclesiastical judges to secular ones (*Appel comme d'abus*), that characteristic Gallican discovery which Richelieu condemns in his political testament together with so many other devices of his, became increasingly numerous.⁶

¹ See AVENEL, III., 367.

² See *Lettres de Richelieu*, VI., 650. Cf. below, p. 413.

³ See AVENEL, III., 368.

⁴ See Vol. XXIX., Ch. II.

⁵ See examples in AVENEL, III., 370. For Richelieu's attitude to the General of the Dominican Order Ridolfi, see MORTIER, *Hist. des Maîtres généraux de l'ordre des frères prêcheurs*, VI., Paris, 1913, 379 seq.

⁶ See AVENEL, III., 374 seq. MOMMSEN (87) rightly emphasizes the fact that the provisions in Richelieu's testament against the "appels comme d'abus" were more for the purpose of strengthening the authority of the Crown against the powerful Parliaments than for the benefit of ecclesiastical authority.

The worst encroachments were perpetrated by the various Parliaments which frequently assumed the rôle of Councils by pronouncing on matters connected with the faith. They arrogated to themselves the right to decide whether or no a papal Bull should be received ; they protested in the name of the Gallican liberties if a theological book was forwarded to Rome for examination ; they watched not only the use of Church property but even the administration of the Sacraments, annulled religious vows and busied themselves with the form and the hours of Divine Service. The Church, so the assembly of the clergy told the King in 1636, would soon be robbed of her authority and jurisdiction if no steps were taken in this respect. This was no exaggeration, for many Parliaments arrogated to themselves a universal competence ; they decided who should be absolved from excommunication ; they went so far as to note where religious lodged when on a journey. Above all they watched the sermons of the clergy. How far Richelieu himself went in this respect is shown by the fact that at the time of the dispute with the Queen-Mother he threatened with the Bastille any priest who spoke of the reverence for parents prescribed by the fourth commandment !¹

In these circumstances the position of confessor to the King, with which the Jesuits were entrusted, must have been an exceedingly thorny one. To an absolutist minister like Richelieu such an institution was in itself an inconvenience. He would have preferred to take the office from the Jesuits and to give it to some other Order whose Superior resided in France.² This he dared not do, but woe to the royal confessor who upset his schemes ! Even the clerical dress could not protect him from cruel persecution. Of this the Jesuit Nicolas Caussin, whom Richelieu had himself chosen in 1637 as confessor to Louis XIII., was to have bitter experience. Caussin entered on his duties at a critical time because the continuation by Richelieu of his war against the Habsburgs was found increasingly intolerable even in France, whilst all

¹ See AVENEL, III., 371 *seq.*, 373.

² *Ibid.*, 377.

the time the Pope's exhortations to peace became more and more insistent. Caussin was urged from many quarters, and at last by the Queen herself, to enlighten the conscience of his penitent and to represent to him how his people were crushed with imposts and taxes in order to defray the cost of a war enkindled solely by the ambition of the Cardinal and continued by him in order to make himself indispensable.¹ Caussin had before his eyes Aquaviva's Instruction to the confessors of Princes forbidding them to meddle in any way in political matters, though at the same time it demanded that the princely penitents should patiently listen to representations not only on things touching their own conscience, but also on the suppression of abuses and excesses committed by their ministers for which Princes were responsible in conscience even though they occurred without their knowledge.² Caussin felt all the more bound to make some representations of this kind as his own General, Vitelleschi, had drawn his attention to the lamentations of so many nations anxiously longing for peace. Moreover rumour had it that Richelieu, in addition to his alliance with the Protestants, contemplated entering into a pact even with the Turks. On December 8th, 1637, therefore, before hearing the King's confession, Caussin, with the utmost freedom, made some earnest representations to him. Louis XIII. was deeply affected and did not hide his emotion from his entourage. As soon as he was informed of the occurrence, Richelieu, who had his spies everywhere, wrote to the King a very clever letter in which he put before his Sovereign the alternative of choosing between his confessor and himself,

¹ See FOUQUERAY, V., 89 *seq.* Cf. DE ROCHEMONTEIX, N. *Caussin et le card. Richelieu*, Paris, 1911. DUHR (*Hist. Jahrbuch*, XLVI., 377) justly remarks that Caussin deserves a monograph; Fouqueray often makes use of letters of his, the genuineness of which is not always beyond doubt.

² Cf. DUHR, *Die Jesuiten an den deutschen Fürstenhofen des 16ten Jahrh.*, Freiburg, 1901, 6. AVENEL (*Richelieu*, III., 379) draws attention to the fact that Richelieu in his *Mémoires* (III., 225) only mentions the prohibition of interfering in politics but suppresses the rest.

his minister.¹ Louis XIII. was anxious to settle the dispute by means of a conference between himself and the two ecclesiastics, but he was no match for an intriguer like Richelieu who, somehow, managed to keep Caussin out of the discussion so that the King only heard his views. He once more proposed the alternative between Caussin's dismissal and his own resignation. Louis decided for the former.² Not content with his success Richelieu now wreaked his vengeance on one who had refused to be his tool.³ At first he wished to send Caussin into the wilds of Canada; subsequently he banished him to Quimper in Brittany, where he was watched like a prisoner, his good name having been previously destroyed by a spiteful notice in the *Gazette de France*. It is characteristic of the Cardinal that he was clever enough to exploit the incident still further by claiming that it was due to him that Caussin's action had not brought persecution upon the Society of Jesus; in this way he successfully deceived not only the Provincial but even the General of the Jesuits.⁴

What kind of a "Protector" the Society had in the Cardinal was shown again a few years later by the way he dealt with Father Monod, the confessor of the Duchess Christina of Savoy. Having failed to win over that honourable man to a policy hostile to his own country, on which the Cardinal wished to lay hands, Richelieu resolved to crush him. In this instance also he was not satisfied with Monod's removal from Court; he would not rest until the Jesuit was transferred, in May, 1640, to Miolans, the Bastille of Savoy, which only housed thieves and murderers.⁵

¹ See AUBERY, *Mémoires*, V., 472. Cf. AVENEL, *Lettres de Richelieu*, V., 1067; FOUQUERAY, V., 91 seq.

² See FOUQUERAY, V., 93 seq.

³ DE ROCHEMONTEIX (280 seq.) has shown the impossibility of maintaining the serious accusations against Caussin which Richelieu makes in his memoirs.

⁴ See FOUQUERAY, V., 97 seq.

⁵ Cf. DUFOUR-RABUT, *Le P. Monod et le card. Richelieu*, 43 seq., 58 seq., 67 seq., 106 seq.; FOUQUERAY, V., 108 seq., 121 seq. Cf. also S. FOA, *Mission du P. Monod à Paris* in the *Mém. de l'Acad. des Sciences de Savoie*, ser. 4, vol. XI.

Whilst Richelieu thus broke those among the Jesuits who stood in his way, he also sought to crush the independence of, and to harness to his political chariot, the Order itself which, notwithstanding the opposition it met with, was still powerful in France.¹ In 1625 he was unscrupulous enough to take advantage of the publication of a book in Rome with the *Imprimatur* of the General of the Jesuits and the *Maestro del Sacro Palazzo*, by the Italian Jesuit, Antonio Santarelli, entitled *On the Power of the Pope to punish Heresy, Schism, Apostasy and the Abuse of the Sacrament of Penance*.² The book made exorbitant claims for the papal authority; among other things it asserted that the Pope could depose kings and absolve their subjects from their oath of allegiance, not only on account of heresy and schism, but also for incompetence. To the many enemies of the Holy See and the Jesuits in France nothing could be more welcome than so indiscreet a discussion of such delicate questions just at that critical moment when the revolutionary notions of Richer were being revived, and the enemies of the Society of Jesus, especially those of the Paris University, were redoubling their assaults.³

¹ " Il faut réduire les jésuites à un point qu'ils ne puissent nuire par puissance, mais tel aussi qu'ils ne se portent pas à le faire par désespoir; auquel cas il se pourrait trouver mille âmes furieuses et endiablées qui, sous prétexte d'un faux zèle, seraient capables de prendre de mauvaises résolutions qui ne se répriment ni par le feu ni par autres peines " we read in RICHELIEU'S *Maximes d'état et fragments politiques*, ed. by Hano-taux, in the *Docum. inéd. sur l'hist. de France, Mel. hist.*, III., Paris, 1880.

² " Tractatus de Haeresi schismati, apostasia, sollicitatione in sacramento poenitentiae et de potestate Romani pontificis in his delictis puniendis "; see SOMMERVOGEL, s. v. SANTARELLI. The pamphlet received the General's imprimatur after it had been censored by three Jesuits, on condition that it was passed by the *Maestro del Sacro Palazzo*. The latter had the book examined by three Dominicans on whose approval permission was given to print it; see PRAT, *Recherches hist. et crit.*, IV., Lyon, 1896, 712 seq.

³ " Nunc vivit doctrina mea," Richer proudly asserted; see PUYOL, *Richer*, II., 269, 273 seq.

On March 13th, 1626, Parliament ordered Santarelli's book, to which hardly any attention had been paid in France, to be burnt by the public executioner. On the following day the Provincial, Father Coton, and the Superiors of the three Jesuit houses in Paris were summoned before the magistrates who demanded that they should put their signatures to the following declaration: "1. The King rules solely by the will of God and by the authority of his sword; 2. the King acknowledges no superior within his realm except God; 3. the Pope cannot lay an interdict on him and his realm, nor for any reason whatsoever absolve his subjects from their oath of allegiance; 4. the Pope has no coercive power over the King in any matter whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately. The Jesuits refused to sign these propositions since they are the embodiment of the spirit of political Gallicanism and declared that on these four points they were unable to think otherwise than the Bishops, the Universities and the Orders.¹ Urban VIII. blamed Santarelli's book as inopportune and instructed the Paris nuncio to exert a moderating influence. The General of the Jesuits, Vitelleschi, gave orders for Santarelli's work to be withdrawn and a new edition printed without the offending passages.²

But this did not calm the storm which threatened the French Jesuits. Coton met with so chilly a reception from the King that he fell ill from sheer excitement and grief; and no wonder, for the expulsion of the Jesuits from France seemed at hand. At this point Richelieu, who had cautiously remained in the background until then, showed his hand. He did not want to crush the Jesuits but, by abandoning them to their enemies and thoroughly frightening them, he hoped to render the Order subservient to his schemes.³ It was indispensable, he

¹ FOUQUERAY, IV., 147 *seq.* (after GARASSE, *Récit au vray*, in CARAYON, *Docum. inéd.*, D., III.).—For the effect which the Sorbonne's censure of Santarelli had on the history of Gallicanism, cf. V. MARTIN, in the *Rev. des sciences relig.*, VII. (1927), 205 *seqq.*, 373 *seqq.*

² See FOUQUERAY, IV., 153 *seq.*

³ See PUYOL, II., 277 *seq.*, 279 *seq.*; FOUQUERAY, IV., 155. Cf. PRAT, *Coton*, IV. and V.

explained, that they should offer some satisfaction to the King. Thereupon, for fear of being expelled, the Jesuits of Paris, on March 16th, 1626, consented to make the following declaration which Coton likewise approved: "We reject the false teaching contained in Santarelli's book concerning the person, the authority and the territories of the King, and we acknowledge that kings hold their power from God alone; we promise to subscribe to the censure which the clergy or the Sorbonne may pronounce against this pernicious doctrine; lastly we promise never to defend opinions and doctrines in opposition to those held on this point by the clergy, the Universities and the Sorbonne."¹ This declaration satisfied both Richelieu and the King, though not the anti-Roman Parliament. The latter wanted more and on March 17th resolved to bring against the Jesuits an accusation of *lèse-majesté*, that is, of high treason. When the usher of the tribunal served the dying Coton with the notice of the inculcation the old man exclaimed: "Must I then die a traitor against his Majesty and a disturber of the peace when for twenty years I have so faithfully served two Kings?" The day after Coton was dead.² Thereupon his brethren submitted, to as great an extent as was at all possible, to the fresh demands of Parliament; the only thing they refused to agree to was the denial to the Pope of indirect power in secular matters.³ Richelieu was a step nearer his goal, viz. the intimidation of the Jesuits. He now ostentatiously attended their church.

The Paris Jesuits cannot escape the reproach that their equivocal declaration of March 16th paved the way for the doctrines of political Gallicanism in their ranks,⁴ hence Urban VIII. was greatly displeased with their conduct, more particularly with the promise that they would submit to a censure to be passed by the Sorbonne. Through the nuncio he had a

¹ See D'ARGENTRÉ, II., 2, 206; cf. Garasse, in CARAYON, *Hist. des Jésuites de Paris*, Paris, 1866, 163.

² See PRAT, *Coton*, IV., 776; FOUQUERAY, IV., 161 seq.

³ See FOUQUERAY, IV., 166 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 171-2. Cf. the severe judgment of PUYOL (*Richer*, II., 80).

warning given to the General not to try to avert the storm by means of which the Holy See would be compelled to disapprove.¹

The concessions made by the Jesuits only served to encourage their deadly enemies in the Sorbonne for fresh attacks which, this time, were directly aimed at the Holy See.² Richelieu reappears in this second stage of the affair Santarelli. As an opponent of the doctrine of the Pope's indirect authority he eagerly welcomed its condemnation by the Sorbonne, but since the latter was going too far, he once more assumed the rôle of a peacemaker.

Against the protests of the ecclesiastically-minded theologians, the doctors of the Sorbonne, who were for the most part Gallicans and followers of Richer, decided to declare the opinion of Santarelli to be novel, false, erroneous, interfering with the supreme authority of the King which depends on God alone, and hindering the conversion of heretical Princes.³ Spada had made a last minute appeal to Richelieu. He protested against the precipitation with which this delicate matter was being handled. A deadly blow was being aimed at the rights of the Holy See at a time when Cardinal Richelieu was Provisor of the Sorbonne. He reminded Richelieu of the courageous defence of the Apostolic Church made by Cardinal Du Perron before all the Estates, and besought him to intervene.⁴ Richelieu, however, was no Du Perron; he did nothing. On April 4th the censure was accepted as proposed by a majority of the Sorbonne.⁵ Thereupon Richelieu charged Père Bérulle to express to Spada his regrets that he had been

¹ See Barberini's *letter to Spada, April 21, 1626, *Nunziat. di Francia*, LXV., 153 seq., translated in FOUQUERAY, IV., 172. Cf. also the *Brief of Bérulle of May 7, 1626, in HOUSSAYE, *Bérulle et Richelieu*, II., 147.

² See FOUQUERAY, IV., 173 seq.

³ Cf. PUYOL, II., 291 seq.; V. MARTIN, in the *Rev. des sciences relig.*, VII. (1927), 205 seqq.

⁴ See Spada's letter to Richelieu, April 1, 1626, in HOUSSAYE, *Bérulle et Richelieu*, II., 140 seq., and FOUQUERAY, IV., 176 seq.

⁵ See PUYOL, II., 295. Cf. LEMAN, *Instructions*, 116, note.

unable to prevent the censure. Indignant at such duplicity Spada said to Bérulle: "The Cardinal is eager to play with the King the rôle of a good Frenchman when there is question of the interests of Rome and the Pope, but he fails to prove himself a good Catholic, or he does so with but little sincerity and only for show. I acknowledge his ability and influence, but let him know that I shall express my disapproval everywhere until he thinks seriously of applying a remedy."¹

In Rome also there was no small stir. "The Most Christian King, the eldest son of the Church," Urban VIII. remarked, "is no longer in communion with the Church since he will not acknowledge the Pope as its Supreme Head." He added that he would discuss the censure of the Sorbonne and, if necessary, would even convoke a Council. The whole of the Roman Court shared the Pope's indignation, Cardinal Marquemont reported to Paris, for the Pontiff felt no less offended by the censure of the Sorbonne than France by Santarelli's book. He, Marquemont, had himself heard the Pope's strong protests at the meeting of the Inquisition, for Urban felt more deeply hurt by this proceeding than by the action of the French in the Valtellina. Unless they cried a halt, a rupture was inevitable.² Richelieu would not go the length of risking a rupture, were it only because of the impending war with England, when he would need the Pope. Another factor was the strong disapproval of the censure of the Sorbonne by the strictly Catholic section of the people, inasmuch as it injured the rights of the Holy See. In these circumstances Richelieu resolved to make concessions, though without forswearing any of the principles of political Gallicanism.³ Nor did it escape him that if he stopped this dangerous movement his prestige in Rome would be greatly enhanced.⁴ Moreover the incident provided an excellent opportunity for humbling,

¹ See FOUQUERAY, IV., 179. After Bérulle's death Richelieu tried to lay all the blame on him! See HOUSSAYE, II., 174 *seq.*

² See the reports of Marquemont of April and May, 1626, in FOUQUERAY, IV., 179 *seq.* Cf. PUYOL, II., 312.

³ Cf. PUYOL, II., 309 *seq.*, 315 *seq.*, 317 *seq.*, 323 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. FAGNIEZ, II., 9.

in the interests of his absolutist aims, the Sorbonne, the University which in April had made common cause with the theological Faculty, and the Parliament. The Sorbonne and the University hastened to make their submission at the beginning of 1627. Parliament proved more intractable, but in the end Richelieu triumphed there also. However much he disapproved of Santarelli's teaching, he declared, it was none the less not the business of the King, or Parliament, or the Sorbonne, but only the Pope's, to define articles of faith. Moreover the political situation demanded the avoidance of any kind of conflict between the Pope and the King, for the displeasure of Urban VIII. would retard a settlement of the affair of the Valtellina. This explanation disarmed Parliament; the censure of the Sorbonne was dropped.¹ On the other hand Richelieu failed to obtain the condemnation of Santarelli's book by Rome. In Briefs of February 23rd, 1627, addressed to Louis XIII., Richelieu and Bérulle, the Pope expressed his satisfaction at the condemnation by royal authority of the insolent censure of the Sorbonne, but at the same time he made it clear that he was unwilling to take up once more a question which had occasioned so many difficulties in the past.² For the rest, even the "Richerists" were anxious for the censure of the Sorbonne to be replaced by one of the Roman Inquisition.³ In the sequel that party indulged in some violent attacks against those who had brought about the suppression of the censure. The quarrel, which had been suppressed only with difficulty, flared up once more in a new form in 1628.⁴ At that time Richelieu's attention was taken up with the conquest of La Rochelle so that he was unable to deal with it at once, but he took it up as soon as he was back in Paris. Since in view of the political situation the Pope's attitude was an all-important factor, he decided, with cool calculation, to

¹ See PUYOL, II., 335 *seq.*, 343 *seq.*; FOUQUERAY, IV., 183 *seq.*; FERET, in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, LXVIII., 439 *seq.*

² See **Epist.*, IV., Papal Secret Archives. Cf. App. No. 2, Vol. XXIX.

³ See PUYOL, II., 345 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 346 *seq.*

give satisfaction to Rome. He imposed silence on Parliament which submitted at once. Richer, the chief cause of all this bother in the Church, he sacrificed all the more readily as he had a strong objection to the democratic element of his system. The old sectary bowed to the decision of the autocrat : on September 7th, 1629, he signed an unconditional recantation of the opinions enunciated in his book on the ecclesiastical and secular power.¹ The dispute in the Sorbonne was all the more easily composed as André Duval who, until then, had been the chief defender of the papal prerogatives, consented to a compromise which sought to bridge the gap between political Gallicanism and the views of Rome. Thus whilst the theories of Richer gradually lost ground, though they did not wholly disappear, those of Duval, which paved the way for a moderate form of Gallicanism, gained ground.²

Richelieu's subsequent attitude towards the Holy See was also largely influenced by the imperialistic aims which he relentlessly pursued. Thus it became increasingly clear that his policy was incompatible with that of Rome. As the common Father of Christendom, the Pope strove for the restoration of peace for the sake of the common good whereas Richelieu, who sought before all else to raise France to the position of the first Power in Europe, continued, in close alliance with his Protestant confederates, the war against the Catholic Habsburgs. All the Pope's efforts to induce him

¹ See PUYOL, II., 348 *seq.*, 352 *seq.*, 355 *seq.* There also the refutation of the fable which Döllinger, after his apostasy from the Church, dished up for his readers, when he states that Richer was compelled to recant "in the presence of two assassins who would have punished a refusal on his part with immediate death". The truth is that at the decisive discussion, Fr. Joseph and the curé of St. Gervais were present ; see FAGNIEZ, II., 12. That scholar says pointedly (*ibid.*) : "D'ailleurs il ne s'agissait pas pour Richelieu de détruire le Gallicanisme ; il s'en serait bien gardé, quand même il l'aurait pu. Il s'agissait de lui imposer silence jusqu'au jour où il deviendrait utile de lui rendre la parole."

² See PUYOL, II., 365 *seq.*, 367, 439 *seq.*, 448 *seq.* Cf. FAGNIEZ, II., 19.

to desist were in vain.¹ Thus whilst Urban VIII. had every reason to be angry with Richelieu, the latter repeatedly assumed the rôle of an injured person. Very skilfully he would adopt a confidential tone with the nuncio, Bichi, when he would point out, as for instance in the spring of 1631, how keenly his King and he himself felt the fact of their being no longer in the good graces of his Holiness who appeared reluctant to grant both great or small favours.² At the same time he endeavoured to win over the Pope by a show of great willingness to meet his wishes in matters of less importance, as, for instance, in connection with a papal fief in Savoy.³ But these little tricks could not remove the acute opposition between them. Richelieu often made demands which the Holy See could not grant, as when in 1634 he asked to be appointed coadjutor to the Bishop of Spire, von Sötern, in order that by this means he might also become the latter's coadjutor at Trèves and thereby an Elector of the German Empire. The Pope could not accede to such a request, were it only that it would be against the German concordat. Though Urban avoided a direct refusal and put off dealing with the matter until there remained no prospect of its ever succeeding, Richelieu was not a little annoyed when his plot was thus thwarted.⁴

Yet another scheme of the Cardinal also fell through in Rome. In 1629, yielding to the repeated requests of the French Government, Urban VIII. had granted the red hat to Richelieu's brother, Alphonse, Archbishop of Lyons,⁵ because

¹ Cf. above, ch. V.

² See *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 2, Vatican Library.

³ See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*, who quotes a report of Bichi of January 18, 1631. In a frontier dispute between Urban VIII. and Venice, Richelieu also intervened in favour of the Pope; see *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 21.

⁴ See LEMAN, 471 *seq.*

⁵ Cf. the *Brief to Louis XIII. of May 25, 1624, according to which the red hat was also asked for the Bishop of Tours. **Epist.*, I., Papal Secret Archives, and *ibid.*, III., the *Brief to the King, of May 23, 1626.

that prelate was worthy of such an honour.¹ But such was not Rome's opinion of Richelieu's most intimate confidant, the Capuchin Fr. Joseph. In November, 1632, the Paris nuncio, Bichi, learnt that Richelieu was trying to get the purple for Fr. Joseph for a number of reasons, such as that this was in the public interest as well as that of the Holy See; that since his last illness he, Richelieu, was in need of an assistant who was invested with the cardinalial dignity; that it was surely better if he chose as an assistant a religious rather than a layman who would hold different principles and would be less beholden to the Holy See.² All these representations failed to impress Rome. On January 1st, 1633, Bichi was instructed to cut short all hopes on that point.³ For all that Richelieu would not be denied,⁴ though there was no prospect of the Pope yielding. It was only too well known in Rome that public opinion ascribed to Fr. Joseph a decisive part in the continuation of the war and that both in the German and the Spanish camp it had been said that if such a man were given the purple, it would be an incentive to leave the Church. Moreover rumour had it that Fr. Joseph had so far forgotten his connection with a mendicant Order as to have established himself in splendid apartments and to allow himself to be completely absorbed by affairs of State. For these reasons the Pope's brother, the Cardinal of S. Onofrio, who was himself a Capuchin, as well as other distinguished members of the Order, such as the highly respected P. Negro, offered decided opposition to Fr. Joseph's elevation to the cardinalate.⁵ That which clinched the matter was the circumstance that the elevation of a man who cherished such deadly hatred against the Emperor and against Spain could not but be fraught with disastrous consequences. Accordingly Urban VIII. gave the French ambassador, Créqui, a categorical

¹ See the *Brief to Louis XIII. of December 2, 1629, **Epist.*, VIII, *loc. cit.*

² See *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 21, *loc. cit.* Cf. FAGNIEZ, II., 247.

³ See *Direction in NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Bichi's *report of February 15, 1633, *ibid.*

⁵ See NICOLETTI, in FAGNIEZ, II., 250.

refusal¹ and all further efforts by Richelieu failed completely.²

Rome was beginning to think that the affair had been finally disposed of when the French representative unexpectedly brought it up once more in the summer of 1635. Although he obtained nothing in his first audience, he returned to the subject in the next one whilst Richelieu sought to win over the Paris nuncio.³ However, the Cardinal met with a decided refusal. The Pope, he was told, did not consider Fr. Joseph's friendly relations with the Barberini, or anything else; all he thought of was the interests of the Church and the Order to which Fr. Joseph belonged, together with the consequences that might ensue if he gave way. For all that Richelieu would not desist from having pressure brought to bear upon the Pope until the latter (in September, 1635) in his annoyance at the constantly recurring demand, declared that he had now so often stated the grounds of his refusal that he deemed a repetition of them unnecessary. Let the King be frankly told, he declared, that the admission of such a personality into the supreme Senate of the Church was absolutely out of question.⁴ Even then Richelieu would not give up his plan,⁵ and in 1638 he almost realized it for Fr. Joseph was given great credit at the Curia for his success in securing the suspension, in June of that year, of an ordinance against the payment of taxes to Rome. But just as his prospects had improved in Rome, the Friar fell hopelessly ill, whereupon Richelieu instructed his ambassador to refrain from further efforts to secure his nomination

¹ Cf. FAGNIEZ, II., 248 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 255.

³ Cf. Barberini's *letter to Bolognotti of July 18, 1635, and Bolognotti's *report of August 31, 1635, in *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 21, Vatican Library.

⁴ See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.* For the justification of Urban VIII.'s resistance see RONDONI, in *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5th series, XV., 416. Cf. *Rev. des quest. hist.*, LVI., 537 *seq.*

⁵ See FAGNIEZ, II., 407; *cf.* 48.

to the cardinalate.¹ Thus did Fr. Joseph die on December 18th, 1638, without having obtained the purple.

With good reason the Pope strongly disapproved of Richelieu's practice of employing ecclesiastics, even prelates in high positions, on secular and even on military business.² On October 4th, 1636, Urban VIII. remonstrated with the King of France for having given to the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Henri de Sourdis, and to the Bishop of Nantes, Philippe Cospéau, the command of the fleet sent out to meet the Spaniards, since this was at variance with the Church's laws; Bishops must fight with prayer, not with arms.³ In the previous year another favourite of Richelieu's, the Cardinal Archbishop of Toulouse, La Valette, who had wholly turned warrior, had given even graver scandal by invading Catholic territories with the troops he commanded on the Rhône. The scandal, of which the Pope complained bitterly in a Brief of September 25th, 1635,⁴ was all the greater as La Valette, the General with the priest's cap, as his soldiers ironically called him, was to operate in conjunction with the Lutheran Duke of Weimar.

As in this case so in others, Richelieu rode roughshod over canonical prescriptions. On the occasion of the construction of the citadel of Verdun he razed several churches to

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, 403 *seq.*

² Numerous examples are to be found in MARIÉJOL, *Hist. de France*, VI., 2, Paris, 1905, 368.

³ See **Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., Papal Secret Archives. In 1641 and 1642 the Holy See renewed its representations against the employment of the Bishop of Bordeaux; see *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 9, p. 431, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *" Milit. copias ultra Rhenum transtulisti, ubi fertur ad Nos te impedimento esse, quominus catholici in suam ditionem restituantur. Facultatem excedis (*Brief to Cardinal La Valette, September 25, 1635, **Epist.*, XIII.-XIV., *loc. cit.*). Richelieu demanded, of course in vain, the recall of this Brief; see ADEMOLLO, *Gli ambasciatori Francesi a Roma*, in *Rev. europ.*, An. VIII. (1877), III., 228. For La Valette see CIACONIUS, IV., 454; DE NOAILLES, *Le cardinal La Valette* (1633-9), Paris, 1906.

the ground and when Bishop Francis of Lorraine excommunicated all those who took part in the work, he was driven from his diocese and deprived of his revenues.¹ A list in the Papal Secret Archives enumerates a long series of encroachments by Richelieu.² To this must be added Richelieu's attitude towards the prefectural dignity of Taddeo Barberini, which was a personal insult to the Pope.³

A particularly painful impression was created in Rome when, for political reasons, Richelieu sought to obtain the annulment of the secret marriage of Gaston, Duke of Orleans and a brother of Louis XIII., with the Duchess Marguerite of Lorraine, although it had been celebrated with all the formalities prescribed by the Church.⁴ From the discussions with the nuncio Bichi, Richelieu clearly perceived that the Holy See would never connive at such an injustice; but that did not discourage him.⁵ Realizing the inadequateness of the arbitrary

¹ See *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CL., 861. Cf. H. ROUSSEL, *Hist. de Verdun*, Paris, 1745, 2nd ed., Bar-le-Duc, 1863 *seq.*; CLOUËT, *Hist. de Verdun*, 3 vols., Verdun, 1867-1870.

² Cf. *"Pregiudizii che la Sede Apost. ha ricevuto dal card. Richelieu, in *NICOLETTI, VIII., 224^b *seq.* Among other things the following are mentioned here: "Infinite abadie consistoriali non spedite in Roma, ma godute col solo brevetto; il torto fatto al Papa nel priorato di S. Martino vacato per la morte del card. Ludovisio (cf. on this *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 21, *loc. cit.*); Gli eccessi fatti e intentati contro le vacanze del card. di Lorena et il voler sottoporre ai concordati della Francia quel ducato; Il parlamento istituito in Metz non ostante le preghiere del Papa, e se ben fu levato non fu per rispetto di S. Stà" (cf. LEMAN, *Instructions*, 182 *seq.*), "Il pretendere d'erigere una congregazione per i ricorsi de regolari et il mantenere in vigore l'editto de'banchieri e controlori a danno della Dataria Apostolica." Vatican Library.

³ Cf. *NICOLETTI, in *Barb.* 4734, p. 760^b *seq.*, Vatican Library. Cf. DEGERT, in *Rev. hist.*, CXLIV., 42 *seq.*, where there is further information on the subsequent development of this affair.

⁴ Cf. *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 16, *loc. cit.*; BAZZONI, *Un Nunzio straordinario*, 166; FAGNIEZ, II., 42 *seq.*; FOUQUERAY, IV., 409, 427 *seq.*

⁵ Cf. BAZZONI, *loc. cit.*, 166 *seq.*

declaration of nullity of the marriage pronounced by the Parliament of Paris,¹ which was promptly condemned by Urban VIII., notwithstanding all Richelieu's exertions to the contrary, he submitted the affair to the assembly of the French clergy in the summer of 1635. That gathering, which was mainly composed of supporters of Richelieu, laid down the axiom that marriages contracted by Princes of the blood without the consent, or against the will and prohibition of the king, were illegal and invalid. The Duke of Orleans made a semblance of submission but declared that the question could only be finally decided by the Pope.² This was evident to Richelieu also; accordingly he resolved to bring the utmost pressure to bear on Rome. He dispatched thither the dexterous Bishop of Montpellier, Fenouillet, who stood in special esteem with the Pope because of his zeal for the conversion of the Huguenots. But he too failed to obtain anything. The Pope replied that he could not dissolve a marriage contracted in accordance with all the rules laid down by the Council of Trent; the particular laws of France may indeed have civil consequences but they did not affect the Sacrament.³

Perhaps Richelieu was even more disappointed when his plan to get into his hands the supreme government of the whole Benedictine Order in France was dashed by the opposition of Rome. In this matter the Cardinal felt all the more sure of success because he skilfully disguised his ambitious designs under a semblance of zeal for ecclesiastical reform and the assurance that his only aim was the advantage of the Church and the glory of God.⁴ He had already become Abbot General

¹ Cf. the *Brief to Richelieu of October 10, 1634, on the "illata in Ecclesiam a Paris. parlam. iniuria, cum adversus canones de matrimonii nullitate iudicandum usurpavit. Decretum nullum esse," he was to see to its speedy cancellation. **Epist.*, XII., Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.* on the same matter a very grave *Brief to Louis XIII., dated December 4, 1634.

² See FOUQUERAY, V., 64 seq.; DEGERT, *loc. cit.*, 10 seq., 13 seq., 17 seq.

³ See FOUQUERAY, V., 66 seq.; DEGERT, *loc. cit.*, 30 seq.

⁴ See the letter of February, 1639, in the *Lettres*, VI., 290.

of the Monks of Cluny in 1629 ; he now wished to have all the other Benedictine Congregations of France under his dominion. Accordingly, in 1637, he had himself postulated as commendatory Abbot of Citeaux and General of the Cistercians. He also made a similar attempt with the Premonstratensians. Though the Pope had agreed to his assumption of the Generalate of the Cluniacs, he refused his consent in regard to the other two Orders. A Roman Congregation, specially convened for the purpose, decided that such a union of Generalates could not be sanctioned seeing that it was against Canon Law and the decrees of the Council of Trent, as well as a Bull of Eugene IV., by the terms of which the Generalate could only be held by one who was a member of the Order. Richelieu, however, did not trouble about the consent of the Holy See ; he assumed the management of the temporal and spiritual affairs of the two Orders.¹ As for the

¹ The position of the Holy See in the matter of the reform of the Cistercian Order, most one-sidedly described by DENIS (*cf.* below, p. 433, note 1) is thus depicted by SCOTTI, in his *Relatione della Nunziatura di Francia* : "A Roma fu consultato l'affare come importantissimo e n'uscirono dalla congregazione deputata voti uniformi di stimarsi impossibile l'ammissione di Sua Eminenza al generalato. Pr^o, si per disporre i sacri canoni e concilio di Trento come per particolare constitutione di Papa Eugenio di non poter alcuno essere ammesso che non sia professore della medesima religione. 2^o, perchè essendo il sig^r card^{le} generale de'Cluniacensi, restava incapace d'esserlo d'altro Ordine. 3^o, nel tempo della postulatione non vacava esso generalato, non si dando giustificazione che in detto tempo fosse fatta et ammessa la pretesa rinontia almeno legittimamente e con precedente assoluzione dal vincolo ch'esso generale haveva, anzi constava che dopo detta postulatione continuò a nominarsi generale come prima negl'atti che fece. 4^o, fu ommessa la forma necessaria, non essendosi costretti gli eligenti alla sola postulatione, neanche essendo stata espressa incapacità del postulato. 5^o, trattandosi d'atto solenne, era necessario che vi concorressero tutti li requisiti, che ne mancarono molti. 6^o, non concorrervi necessità o almeno utilità della religione, senza la quale non si dà postulatione rilevante. 7^o, avanti d'ottener della Sede Apostolica l'ammissione, essendosi

necessary reforms he achieved but little, though he made use of the military against the recalcitrants.¹

The affair was still in suspense when Ranuccio Scotti, who had been designated to succeed Bolognetti, entered upon his nunciature on August 28th, 1639.² He was instructed not to yield on this point. Richelieu began by making difficulties in receiving Scotti as ordinary nuncio and affected to recognize him only as an extraordinary one in connection with the peace pourparlers. Scotti describes this manœuvre as the prelude to the other obstacles which he was fated to encounter.³

il sig^{te} card.^{le} ingerito nel generalato rispetto la temporalità e la spiritualità, si rendeva invalida la postulatione,

Non ostante tali dichiarazioni contrarie ad ottenere le bolle, senza queste Sua E^mza gode i frutti del abbatia, tiene in Parigi un vicario generale dell'Ordine e governa tutti li monasterii Cisterciensi in Francia dal Clarevalense in poi, per essersi l'abate opposto in non volerlo riconoscere per generale nè eseguir li suoi ordini, come ultimamente rifiutò quello di non dover più vestir novitii senza espressa licenza di Sua E^mza, rispondendo caminar bene il proprio monastero nella regular osservanza senza bisogno di nuova riforma, che accetterà quando da Sua Santità gli verrà comandata.

Al sigr cardinale preme grandemente tale affare, parendoli che la sola riputatione della sua qualità dovrebbe senz'altra istanza tirar a se le bolle, con superarsi da Sua Santità ogni difficoltà.

Ann. III., vol. 71, p. 29 seq., Papal Secret Arcives. The final decision of the Holy See of May 28, 1641, which set aside the plans for union, in DENIS, *Richelieu et la réforme*, 350 seq. How prejudiced and blindly attached to Richelieu Denis is, appears from the statement that the Pope had always seen "le grand cardinal . . . soumis et plein de respectueuse déférence envers le St.-Siège!" (p. 261).

¹ See MARIÉJOL, VI., 2, 379.

² This date is given by Scotti in the **Relatione* quoted above, 405, note 1. Bolognetti remained, as here stated, until October 28.

³ *"*Presso, com'ho detto, il possesso della Nuntiatura ordinaria, hebbi il primo incontro, che fu preludio degl'altri, essendomi dopo tre giorni stata presentata una scrittura per parte del re espressiva che non m'havrebbe Sua Maestà sentito se non come Nuntio straordinario per la pace, movendolo a ciò vari rispetti descritti

How great they were appears from his account of his nunciature. He describes in detail the way in which the royal judges, always hungering for lawsuits, called to their tribunals all ecclesiastical suits, especially by means of the *appel comme d'abus*, which the Gallicans exalted as a sacrosanct liberty and one peculiar to France, and how they paralysed almost completely the jurisdiction of the Bishops.¹ An attempt

nel foglio, ma non quello di mia persona, gradita alla corte anche con la Nuntiatura ordinaria, quando l'havesse da esercitar alcuno. Io però, non ostante detta scrittura con l'oggetto del decoro della S. Sede, non m'astenni mai di far tutte quelle funzioni in publico e in privato che si ricercano nel ministero ordinario, si con l'esercizio della facultà come con l'audienze." SCOTTI'S **Relatione*, Papal Secret Archives, *loc. cit.*

¹ *" Della giudicatura sopra gl'ecclesiastici, pregiuditivevole a vescovi. Gli giudici regii si può dire che levino tutta la giurisdizione ecclesiastica in Francia alli prelati :—

1°. Con l'appellatione ab abusu, poichè, subito fatta la citatione et apena cominciato il processo, la parte è solita appellare al Parlamento ab abusu, ancorchè il giudice ecclesiastico non abbia fatto alcuno abuso ; e così resta spogliato del giudicio.

2°. Sotto pretesto del possessorio ctiam ad ogni negotio spirituale ; perchè pretendono ogni cosa possessoria essere temporale e di più allegano privilegio di Martino V. Così havendo nelle mani il negotio o la causa, sotto questo titolo entrano nel petitorio, dopo che hanno data la sentenza in possessorio.

3°. Con l'apparenza del caso privilegiato s'attribuiscono la cognitione di tutti i delitti degli ecclesiastici ancora in prima istanza, estendendo oltre modo questi capi privilegiati, principalmente a quelli delitti a quali è dovuta la pena capitale, procedendo alla morte senza alcuna degradatione, già che i vescovi, per non haver fatto i processi, si scusano di non potervi prestar il consenso.

4°. Levando alla chiesa le cause matrimoniali sotto pretesto di ratto, tirando tal delitto come gli piace.

5°. Le decime passano in una taglia perpetua sopra li beneficii, crescendo di tempo in tempo.

6°. Li regii s'attribuiscono la cognitione delle decime quando sono infeudate alli laici.

7°. Dell'heresia della simonia intorno alle cessioni de'beneficii

by the Government, towards the end of Scotti's nunciature, to make the Bishops more than ever dependent on the secular power failed owing to the resistance of the Pope.¹

How Richelieu sought to exploit every possible circumstance for his own advantage is shown by his attempt to secure for Antonio Barberini junior, who, in opposition to Francesco Barberini, entertained anti-Spanish sentiments, the post of a Conprotector of the French realm which Cardinal Bentivoglio had resigned. If he succeeded, the opposition between the two nephews would be intensified, so that it would be possible to fish successfully in troubled waters whilst at the same time the neutrality hitherto maintained by the Pope between the belligerent Powers would be shaken.² However, as neither the extraordinary ambassador, Créqui, nor the ordinary one, Count de Noailles, had any success in the matter,³ Richelieu,

in manibus Sanctissimi alle collationi e provisioni si fanno di continuo nuovi editti regii approvando o riprovando le bolle pontificie.

8°. Le chiese non hanno più immunità da Francesco I°. in quà.

Le principali cause ecclesiastiche d'appellatione ab abusu s'estendono a quattro. La 1ª, quando le bolle pontificie o sentenze de' vescovi sono contrarie all'ordinanze del regno; la 2ª, quando il vescovo s'ingerisce in materia fuori dei suoi dritti; la 3ª, mentre apparisca qualche cosa contro li sacri canoni antichi; la 4ª, quando si vogli toccare gl'arresti del Parlamento, etc." SCOTTI'S **Relatione*, loc. cit. Cf. for the *Appel comme d'abus*, BAUER, in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, III. (1872), 539 seq.

¹ * "Ultimamente pretesero i ministri regii da Sua Santità una commissione contro alcuni vescovi assai generale senza nominarli, a fine di tenerli in freno; ma Sua Beatitudine, conforme la sua vigilanza di sempre nella conservazione della libertà ecclesiastica, non volse conceder tal Breve, valendosi del titolo di non esser stati espressi i nomi, se bene senza questo neanche mai l'haverebbero ottenuto; il che è riuscito di gran contento a questi vescovi che l'han penetrato." **Relatione*, SCOTTI, loc. cit.

² Cf. LE VASSOR, *Hist. de Louis XIII.*, 1^{re} partie, 31-60, and *NICOLETTI, V., ch. 14, Vatican Library.

³ Cf. ADEMOLLO, *Gli ambasciatori Francesi a Roma*, in *Rev. europ.*, An. VIII. (1877), III., 201 seq. Noaille's mission ended

in order to break Urban VIII.'s resistance and apparently on the advice of Mazarin,¹ sent to Rome a man who had already given proof of his domineering character in connection with the affair of the Valtellina, viz. Marshal François Annibal d'Estrées, Marquis de Cœuvres. But he, too, failed to secure the desired end, though he spared no effort, especially when in the autumn of 1636 the Cardinal of Savoy resigned the protectorate of France in order to take up that of Germany which had become vacant through the death of Dietrichstein. Urban VIII. also remained firm when, in the autumn of 1637, the French renewed their pressure, for he realized that his neutrality was at stake and only by maintaining it could he work for peace.² In the end, in order to keep the French protectorate from Antonio Barberini, he himself made proposals in the consistory with regard to filling French episcopal sees.³

The dispatch of d'Estrées turned out to have been a grievous blunder for the Marshal's arrogance only damaged his cause. Richelieu none the less retained him at his post—to please Fr. Joseph, it was said.⁴

The situation became even more tense when, on July 11th, 1638, the Council of State forbade the payment to Rome of the fees for Papal Bulls.⁵ Further disagreements arose in the summer of 1639. Four Turkish slaves, converts to Christianity, having escaped from the villa of Luis de Moncada, the son-in-law of the Spanish ambassador, Marchese Castel Rodrigo, sought refuge in the College of Catechumens from which they were removed to the gaol of the Spanish embassy. They succeeded, however, in fleeing thence to the church of SS. Trinità dei Monti, then under French protectorate, but the Spanish ambassador had them forcibly removed. The Cardinal Secretary of State demanded that the fugitives

early in September, 1636; nevertheless he did not leave Rome until a month later; see *ibid.*, 231.

¹ See AUBERY, *Hist. ducard. Mazarin*, in RANKE, II. (1854), 513.

² Cf. NICOLETTI, VI., ch. 19, *loc. cit.*

³ *Ibid.*, VII., ch. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VIII., ch. 6.

⁵ See MARIÉJOL, VI., 2, 385. Cf. above, p. 401.

should be handed over to the Pope, a request which occasioned a violent dispute between him and d'Estrées. Papal soldiers secured the extradition of the slaves who were taken back to the College of Catechumens. This perfectly correct procedure was not to the liking of d'Estrées who wanted to be absolute master in the Pope's own capital. In his rage against Barberini the Marshal made friends with the Spanish ambassador though the latter's sovereign was at war with Louis XIII. !¹

Richelieu gave his wholehearted support to d'Estrées, a circumstance which occasioned some sharp disputes between him and the nuncio Scotti. Richelieu was also very much annoyed at the difficulties made in Rome concerning the bestowal of the red hat on Mazarin who from the time of his mission to Paris in 1635, had won the greatest goodwill of the man who presided over France's policy,² and into whose service he had entered after the death of Fr. Joseph. How far the tension had gone is shown by Richelieu's complaints to the Pope's representative at the beginning of September, 1639. Urban VIII., the Cardinal asserted, did nothing for France and only thought of offending her. After some bitter comments on the Pope's attitude in the question of peace, Richelieu reverted to the subject of the intransigence of the Holy See. Not one concession could he obtain from Rome. The red hat was refused to good Fr. Joseph and at present objections were made to its bestowal on Mazarin. If this opposition was persisted in, the King was resolved to recall his ambassador from Rome and thereafter France would only recognize the Pope in so far as he was the head of the Church. To this Scotti replied that his Eminence should tell him what more the Pope should have done for the cause of peace after all he had done for so many years. Peace could only be realized at a congress, yet at Cologne the only plenipotentiaries they were waiting for, were the French ones. Against the cardinalate of Fr. Joseph there were weighty reasons, to which was added the circumstance that there would then have been

¹ See the detailed account in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

² See LEMAN, 467.

two Capuchins in the Sacred College, and Poland was pressing for yet a third in the person of Fr. Valerian. If there were some difficulties in the appointment of Mazarin, these had nothing to do with his personal character, but were due to the fact that the candidates already chosen by the Emperor and the King of Spain were all Italians. "That does not interest me," Richelieu replied, "but if Mazarin's promotion does not come off, what I have said will take place; write strongly in this sense to Rome."¹ Scotti did so. He further reported that from Venetian sources he had learned that Richelieu was rousing the Turks and the Prince of Transilvania against the Emperor, and that, through the Dutch, he was working against peace. The latter manœuvre, however, he sought to hide,

¹ According to Scotti's *report to Barberini of September 3, 1639, Richelieu said among other things: "Per adesso vi dico solo che il Papa non fa niente per la Francia nè pensa ad altro che a disgustarla. . . . È gran cosa che non possiamo ricevere una sodisfazione da Sua Santità. Non volse far cardinale quel buon padre Giuseppe Capuccino, et hora fa difficoltà sopra Mons^r. Mazzarino, ma tenga pur per certo, che se non lo promuove, il re leverà da Roma il suo ambasciatore, e la Francia non reconoscerà più Sua Santità che in quello richiede l'esser capo della chiesa. A queste parole rispose il Nuntio Scotti, che desiderava saper di Sua Em̃za che cosa voleva che Sua Santità facesse di vantaggio per la pace dopo tanti dispendii, spedizioni di Nunzii e di Legato, e dopo una cura et applicazione incessante di tanti anni? Questa non poter conseguirsi senza congresso, et in Colonia non si aspettavano altri che i plenipotenziarii di Francia, giachè i passaporti per gli Olandesi erano spediti. Che in quanto al luogo dal principe non si desiderava se non per giustizia come appariva dalle scritte date. Che circa la promotione del padre Giuseppe eranvi stati rispetti molto rilevanti di non promoverlo, e specialmente perchè il collegio haverebbe havuti due capuccini, et il terzo era il padre Valeriano Magno preteso da Polonia. Che si vi era alcuna difficoltà per Mons^r. Mazzarino, non era in risguardo della sua persona, ma per gli altri nominati dall'Imperatore e dal re di Spagna tutti italiani. Allhora Richeliù disse: Non ho che far con loro, ma se non si promuoverà Mons^r. Mazzarino, si eseguirà ciò che ho detto, e scrivetelo pure efficacemente a Roma." *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

for France hated the Cardinal's war policy, and in every Province nothing was more keenly longed for than peace, a fact of which he had had personal evidence in many places.¹

Whilst Richelieu was lodging a solemn protest with Scotti against the infringement of the right of sanctuary at Trinità dei Monti,² a fresh incident occurred in Rome. One of d'Estrées' equerries forcibly rescued from the hands of the Papal police one of his servants, an Italian, who had been arrested for illegally keeping a gambling establishment, and on account of this a price had been set on his head. The man's head was handed in and exposed on the bridge of Castel S. Angelo together with the heads of other miscreants. D'Estrées protested against this action as infringing international law, and broke off all relations with the Cardinal Secretary of State. The situation became even more acute when Urban VIII. forbade a funeral service for Cardinal La Valette because the latter, in contravention of a Papal prohibition, had engaged in warlike undertakings. Paris was greatly incensed. On December 8th, 1639, the nuncio Scotti was informed that in order to please the Spaniards, Cardinal Barberini had planned another insult to the King of France; hence the latter

¹ * " che il card. Richeliù fa sollecitare il Turco contro l'Imperatore, stimola il Transilvano ad entrar armato nelle viscere dell'Imperio sta unito col principe d'Oranges acciochè li passaporti non siano accettati dagli Olandesi, sono cose scoperte da Veneziani; e di più che hora si pretendono altri passaporti per l'elettore di Treveri e Palatino, sono tutti artifici per isfuggire coll'apparenza di pace l'odio della Francia, la quale crede che Richeliù non la voglia, e pure in tutte le provincie del regno non si sentono se non clamori di miserie, et i popoli fanno dimostrazioni si grandi nel credere che il Nunzio habbia portata la pace, che in arrivare in tutti i luoghi si vedevano piene le strade, i cortili, le camere stesse piene di genti, che sempre chiedevano la pace e la beneditione, onde risapendo Richeliù questi applausi verso Sua Santità, dovrebbe anch'egli muoversi a desiderarla almeno in planctu populi (*NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*). As early as 1631 Biechi, in a ciphered *letter of May 22, had reported on " l'odio universale contro Richelieu ". *Barb.* 8078, Vatican Library.

² See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

could no longer receive him until he should have been given satisfaction. Scotti replied that the Holy See could not be frightened with threats such as those indulged in by Richelieu with a view to securing the cardinalate for Mazarin; since everybody knew how angry Richelieu was in consequence of the refusal of the generalate of the Cistercians, the dispute over the equerry could only be considered as a mere pretext. If Richelieu imagined that by fighting the Holy See, by suspending the nunciature and working for a national council he would get the red hat for Mazarin, he was quite mistaken.¹ Scotti's bold representations were unavailing. On December 16th, 1639, the Bishops were forbidden to have anything to do with him, whilst his house was put under observation.² In a Brief of January 13th, 1640, Urban VIII. protested against such proceedings towards his representative and invited Richelieu to remedy the situation,³ but his exhortation fell on deaf ears. Scotti remained completely isolated; he complained to Cardinal Barberini that even the Jesuits avoided him,⁴ but the Cardinal excused them by explaining that the Fathers had reason to fear the worst for themselves so that they could not give him any help.⁵

The irritation of Richelieu and the King against the Holy See sprang chiefly from the fact that d'Estrées had given a quite one-sided account of the incident of the equerry.⁶ Urban VIII. and Cardinal Barberini did all that was possible in order to settle the affair. As a matter of fact, on one occasion, through the Venetian ambassador, Richelieu gave a hint

¹ Cf. **Relazione dell'abboccamento seguito in Parigi tra il Sr di Savigny e Mons. Scotti Nuntio nel convento de' Minori Francescani and *Discorso fatto da Msgr. Nuntio Scotti al S. di Savigny segretario di stato di S.M. Christ., in the Racc. Mong., No. 67, p. 7 seq., 11 seq., State Archives, Turin.*

² See *Lettres de Richelieu*, VI., 650.

³ See **Epist.*, XV.-XVI., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ BAZIN, IV., 183 seq.; FOUQUERAY, V., 411.

⁵ See Barberini's *letter to Scotti of July 9, 1640, in FOUQUERAY, V., 411.

⁶ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, p. 237 seq., *loc. cit.*

to Scotti that he would forgo a formal satisfaction if on political questions the Pope would take the side of France. Scotti declared that that was not to be thought of; that the Spaniards had also vainly sought to induce the Pope to adopt a one-sided attitude.¹

At this very time of extreme tension alarming rumours reached Rome to the effect that France was on the verge of schism; nor was the fear of such a danger altogether unfounded. Already at the beginning of 1627 Richelieu had expressed a wish that, as a reward for his services in fighting the Huguenots and the English, he should be appointed Legate of the Holy See in France.² It was known in Rome that at a synod held at Castres in the autumn of 1626, the Calvinists had declared their readiness to submit to a patriarch who would be independent of Rome.³ Quite apart from these dangerous symptoms it was utterly impossible for the Pope to make a concession of this kind since there was good reason to suspect that in that case other Catholic Powers, above all Spain, would make similar demands, to the detriment of the supreme authority of the Holy See. This aspect of the matter was pointed out, to the Pope's great satisfaction, by the nuncio Bagno when Richelieu made fresh efforts to secure the legatine dignity as a reward for crushing the Calvinists and for his determination to stop Parliament from meddling with the affairs of the Church.⁴ The fear of a lessening of his authority also caused Urban VIII. to view with

¹ *" Il tirare a tale risoluzione l'animo di Papa Urbano era affatto impossibile, poichè Sua Santità saria stata sempre colonna immobile e costantissima a non lasciarsi smuovere dalla neutralità; e che dovea bastar l'esempio de'Spagnoli, che in ciò non l'havevano mai potuto muovere un punto." Scotti's *report to Barberini, April 27, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*, p. 258.

² See *FAGNIEZ, II., 46.

³ See the Instruction for Guido del Bagno in LEMAN, *Instructions*, 93, who believes that Richelieu had suggested this idea to the Huguenots.

⁴ See App. VII. and VIII. for the *report of Bagno of April 3, and Cardinal Barberini's *letter of April 14, 1629, Vatican Library.

displeasure the assemblies of the clergy. Since he could not very well forbid them he impressed on the nuncios the importance of seeing to it that they were attended solely by representatives of the Bishops and that they confined themselves to questions of finance.¹

It was against Richelieu's nature quickly to drop an idea once conceived by him. It would have been an immense satisfaction to him to gather into his own hands the spiritual as well as the secular power of the realm. His whole attitude clearly shows that he wanted to dominate the French Church and to have her wealth absolutely at his disposal for the benefit of the State finances which had been exhausted by his wars,² whilst at the same time he intended to make her as independent of Rome as possible. The rejection of his ambitious and dangerous demands both in the political and the ecclesiastical sphere embittered him to such a degree that he ended by committing acts of direct hostility to the Holy See. When he had forbidden money to be sent to Rome for the bestowal of benefices, certain Court Bishops were bidden to study the question of the abolition, or at any rate the lowering, of the annates, and the holding of a synod which would counter the alleged usurpations of Rome.³

A learned canonist, Pierre de Marca, president of the Parliament of Pau, who was summoned to Paris in 1639 as a councillor of State, suggested to Richelieu a means that would give him absolute dominion over the French Church. This was that the Cathedral Chapters should make over to the King the right of election which the Concordat gave them, after which the Concordat would be suppressed as an abuse. As soon as the Bishops named by the King would be in sufficient numbers a national council could be convened for the purpose of proclaiming Richelieu Patriarch of the Gallican Church.⁴

To plans of this kind the ambitious Cardinal lent a willing ear and he charged several Bishops and canonists, among

¹ See LEMAN, *Instructions*, 83.

² Cf. below, p. 426 *seq.*

³ See FOUQUERAY, V., 410.

⁴ *Ibid.*

them the Oratorian Morin, to study the question. However, in the end, as a sober and cool politician, even he shrank from so dangerous an attempt and one which would have entailed a schism. In ecclesiastical as in worldly affairs Richelieu's policy varied according to the requirements of the moment. As a sober realist he never aimed at anything but what he knew to be within the realm of possibility; accordingly this time also he was content with making himself feared in Rome as everywhere else, whilst as secretly as possible he was busy loosening the bonds which united loyal Catholics to the centre of the Church's unity.¹ To this end he got in touch with certain notable writers. Thus he commissioned the historian Dupleix to draw up a report of all the grievances of the Kings of France and their disputes with the Popes. When Dupleix had completed his task, he thanked him profusely and commanded him to compile a similar report of the disputes between the Popes and the Kings of Spain, for he was anxious to hide his real purpose even from his tool Dupleix. Finally Dupleix was commissioned to draw up an account of all the favours which the French Kings had bestowed upon the Holy See.²

Two other writers, close friends of Richelieu, Pierre and Jaques Du Puy, composed a huge work on the rights and privileges of the Gallican Church, the purpose of which was to provide the State with historical and legal weapons against the Holy See and the French clergy. The authors endeavoured to prove that previous to the eighth century the Popes had never exercised any authority in France; at the same time they attacked the Church's immunity in respect to jurisdiction and taxation.³ The nuncio Bolognetti was not the only one to object to the destructive work of the two Du Puy and

¹ See D'AVRIGNY, *Mémoires chronologiques et dogmatiques*, 136; FOUQUERAY, V., 410.

² See DUPLEIX, *Histoire de Louis-le-Juste*, II., 198.

³ Cf. *Bibl. de l'École des chartes*, V. (1844), 587 seq.; PERRENS, *L'Eglise et l'État*, II., 451 seq.; HURTER, *Nomenclator*, I.², 854.

to demand its suppression.¹ Eighteen Bishops, with Cardinal La Rochefoucauld, also protested against the fatal liberties here advocated, which they described as a heretical servitude.² In consequence of this firm attitude of the Bishops, which was praised by the Pope,³ Richelieu forbade publication on the ground that the book had appeared without privilege,⁴ but this was only for appearances' sake. The Cardinal took good care not to allow the book to be censured; more than that, he who was wont to step in so promptly now suffered the book-sellers to sell it almost openly.⁵

For a time Rome failed to see through Richelieu's equivocal attitude,⁶ but in 1640 a glaring light was suddenly thrown upon it by a book entitled: "*Optatus Gallus: How to avoid a schism, a warning to the French episcopate.*"⁷ The writer,

¹ See Bolognetti to Barberini, February 11, 1639, in LÄMMER, *Melet.*, 467.

² See the letter which was printed immediately, in *Ottob.* 2491, p. 39 *seq.*, Vatican Library. Cf. LÄMMER, *Melet.*, 468; FOUQUERAY, V., 411.

³ See the *Brief to the "cardinales, archiepiscopi et episcopi Parisiis nunc agentes" of March 28, 1639, in which we read: "Digni estis, quorum salutare consilium Pontificis commendatione decoretur" (**Epist.*, XV.-XVI., Papal Secret Archives). Cf. the letter of Bolognetti in LÄMMER, *Melet.*, 468.

⁴ See PERRENS, II., 452.

⁵ See D'ARGENTRÉ, *Coll. iudic.*, III., 2, 452; PERRENS, *loc. cit.*; SCHULTE, *Quellen*, II., 587.

⁶ On March 20, 1639, Urban VIII. *wrote to Louis XIII. that he would win undying fame if he protected the honour of the Church. He had shown his piety "compressa illius libelli editione, qui de Gallic. eccles. libertatibus inscriptus erat". On June 20, 1639, the following *Brief was sent to Richelieu: "Prudentiae est praecavere et compescere. Maxime commendanda plurim. antistitum censura, qua liber de Gallic. eccles. libertatibus improbatur, qui falsis assertionibus refertus ad segregationem tendebat." We praise you and hope "ut Dei causam in posterum propugnes". **Epist.*, XV.-XVI., Papal Secret Archives.

⁷ "Optati Galli de cavendo schismate ad ill. et rev. ecclesiae Gallicanae primates, archiepiscopos, episcopos liber paraeneticus" (39 pp., 8°).

who remained unknown as well as his publisher, was at pains to show that the old attachment of the French to the Holy See had diminished; that there was question of establishing a patriarchate in France; that they were on the verge of a schism which would resemble that of England. The book draws the Bishops' attention to the peril and urges them to take suitable precautions. The proofs with which the writer justified his fears were taken, not only from the book of the two Du Puys, but likewise from recently published writings against the Holy See, among which he made special mention of the Parliamentary resolution concerning the validity of the marriage of the Duke of Orleans and the proposal to stop payment of the annates. D'Estrées' conduct in Rome was also discussed in detail.

It was impossible to doubt that the book was aimed against the conduct and plans of Richelieu; hence the sensation it caused was all the greater. Everywhere, especially in Paris, the book was eagerly read.¹ The Cardinal, who realized that he was hit and that no one could fail to perceive it, took immediate counter-measures. At a session of Parliament on March 23rd, a decree was passed ordering the book to be publicly burnt by the hangman.² Not content with this Richelieu saw to it that the Bishops who met in Paris on March 28th, under the presidency of Archbishop Jean François de Gondi, condemned the work as false, scandalous, offensive, upsetting public tranquillity and undermining the obedience due to Kings, in consequence whereof they forbade the clergy to read it.³ On the same day sixteen Archbishops and

¹ *'Durante le differenze con Roma, la mattina di S. Gregorio del 1640, si trovarono nella maggior parte delle chiese e palazzi di Parigi alcuni libretti stampati, gettativi da persone sconosciute. Il titolo era: 'Optati Galli de cavendo schismate ad primates, archiepiscopus et episcopos,' Dentro si faceva la descrizione di vari abusi della chiesa Gallicana, dovendosi guardar ciascheduno dal pericolo d'un scisma che stimava si vicino per i disegni dell' erezione d'un patriarcato nel regno.'" SCOTTI'S **Relatione*, Papal Secret Archives.

² Cf. AVENEL, VII., 256.

³ See FOUQUERAY, V., 413.

Bishops then in Paris gave their adhesion to the condemnation.¹

In view of the wide publicity which this cry of alarm obtained from the first, Richelieu judged it necessary to repel the dangerous attack by means of counter-publications. Using as an intermediary the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Henri de Sourdis, who was devoted to him, he had recourse, in the first instance, to the learned doctor of the Sorbonne Hallier who, however, as a loyal son of Rome, declined to defend the facts which were justly, though violently, blamed in the book.² However, Richelieu found other pens ready for the task. The first in the field with a pamphlet for the defence was a certain Boschetti, who was promptly rewarded with the title of a Councillor of State. His refutation was, on the whole, a clever piece of work, but it was spoilt by personal attacks on the Bishop of Beauvais, Augustin Potier, whom Richelieu suspected to be the author of *Optatus Gallus* because he had at one time opposed the lowering of the annates.³ Two other replies, one of which was by the royal advocate Salomoni, endeavoured to dispel the fear of a schism by pointing out that Richelieu had repeatedly forbidden the anti-Roman theses of the Sorbonne, and that as a priest he had always set an excellent example.⁴

These publications, which appeared towards the close of 1640, were succeeded by yet another apology of Richelieu in the following year from the pen of the Jesuit Michel Rabardeau. It adopted a very violent tone and defended the royal edict concerning the marriages of Princes and the taxation of the clergy, whilst it asserted that no one thought of the establishment of a patriarchate. On this point Rabardeau went so far astray as to maintain that the erection of new patriarchates would not be a schismatical act and would not need the consent of the Pope, just as his consent had

¹ See D'ARGENTRÉ, III., 2, 244.

² See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, Vatican Library.

³ Cf. the *letter of Barberini to Scotti of July 21, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

not been required for the erection of the patriarchates of Constantinople and Jerusalem.¹ Even more than this publication which was disapproved by the Provincial² and put on the Index in 1643,³ a fifth apology attributed to the nephew of the famous Jesuit and confessor of the King, Sirmond, and which was at once translated from the French into Latin, called forth great indignation in Rome.⁴ If this work, which openly defended the political principles of Richelieu and which contained several erroneous theological assertions,⁵ was really from the pen of the aged Sirmond, as was generally believed, one can only bitterly lament such an aberration on the part of so deserving a scholar.⁶

¹ See FOUQUERAY, V., 413. Cf. *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.* The work of Rabardeau, written on Richelieu's instructions, shows that he entertained the idea of a French patriarchate. The only uncertainty is whether this was solely intended to intimidate Rome, as MOURRET (*Ancien Régime*, 307) says, or whether it was a seriously considered plan. The reasons with which MONTOR (V., 434 *seq.*) exculpates Richelieu are very weak. Not only AVENEL (III., 366 *seq.*), but also STANLEY LEATHES (*The Cambridge Modern Hist.*, IV., 156) are of opinion that Richelieu undoubtedly aimed at becoming the head of the French Church.

² See FOUQUERAY, V., 414.

³ See REUSCH, II., 363.

⁴ The nuncio Grimaldi's *opinion on August 2, 1642: "Il libro del P. Rabardeo e pessimo e temerario." *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 9, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Thus among other things: *"che il battesimo fosse valido con vino e olio," and: "esser dodeci i sacramenti"; see Scotti's *report, May 23, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁶ NICOLETTI (*loc. cit.*) *reports on the basis of a letter of Scotti dated July 3, 1640, as follows: "Il Nunzio Scotti havutane certa notizia procurò con tutto lo spirito che le sudette proposizioni si occultassero; e non solo il detto Sirmondi ravisto del suo errore, se gli professò obligato e ringraziollo, ma fecelo ringraziare dal Padre Generale, appresso di cui anche il cardinale Barberino operò che le prefate opinioni per riputatione dell'autore e della Compagnia si occultassero. Nondimeno il Padre Sirmondi ne'travagli del medesimo Nunzio e nelle calummie inventate contro il cardinale Barberino non aprì mai bocca in lor difesa nè disse

Richelieu had offered a reward of 10,000 thalers to whomsoever should discover the author of *Optatus Gallus*¹; for all that his name remained a secret; all that transpired was that he was a Frenchman and that paper and print came from Paris.² The fact that the book gave a full and accurate account of d'Estrée's doings led at first to the belief that Rome had had something to do with it. However, this was not the case; the nuncio Scotti was quite as much taken by surprise as everybody else by the appearance of the book. In defending himself from the suspicion that he had had cognizance of the mystery, he was helped by the circumstance that the account of certain disputes at Pavia and Lucca contained many errors which would not have been made by one in touch with Rome. The author of *Optatus Gallus* had purposely allowed these mistakes to creep in so as to divert suspicion from Rome. After a time he revealed his identity to the nuncio; he was Charles Hersant, a doctor of the Sorbonne, who had taken up his pen out of sheer love of the Holy See and of France. Rome greatly appreciated Hersant's action and loyally kept his secret.³ When, after a stay in Brittany, Hersant returned to Paris with a refutation of the attacks on his book, Scotti dissuaded him from publishing it in France lest Richelieu, who was still in hot pursuit of the author, should get on his tracks. On Mazarin's advice Scotti wished to have the refutation published in Flanders—the internuncio Stravio acting as his intermediary—seeing that

una parola per l'accommodamento, nè meno contradisse alla risoluzione che fecero i Gesuiti di privar lo stesso Nunzio del proprio confessore, ch'era della lor religione, per non dar gelosia al re et a Richelieu, e pure tutti gli altri Regolari trattarono sempre francamente con Mons^r Scotti, e lo tennero per Nunzio ordinario, e fecero fedì autentiche di haverlo sempre riputato per tale."

¹ Cf. Scotti's *report of July 3, 1640, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

² *" Furono fatti vari giudicii et insieme esquisite diligenze per rinvenirne l'autore, che per il stile infine fu conosciuto esser francese, come la carta e stampa di Parigi, ma non è stato mai possibile trovarlo." SCOTTI'S **Relatione*.

³ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

it was necessary to confute the false rumours spread by d'Estrées. Such was not the opinion of the shrewd Cardinal Secretary of State. "If an adequate refutation is undertaken," he wrote to Scotti, "it will be difficult to remain within the bounds of moderation, whilst a temperate confutation has only an academic value. The Holy See needs no defence against d'Estrées. Besides, the book *Optatus Gallus* has already sufficiently breached the walls of the enemies' stronghold."¹ As a matter of fact this was the case: it had crossed Richelieu's plans in a manner he was bound to feel and had created an immense impression in France.

In November, 1640, the Holy Father was to realize anew how little Richelieu was qualified to act as Legate of the Holy See in France, not to speak of his being made Patriarch of the whole French realm. When at the end of October, 1628, La Rochelle, the stronghold of French Protestantism, which had never been taken in the course of the wars of religion, was conquered by Richelieu, there was great rejoicing in Rome and the Pope himself intoned the *Te Deum* in the French national church of St. Louis.² The Briefs which Urban VIII. dispatched on November 29th, 1628, to Louis XIII., to the widowed Queen Marie, to Queen Anne and to Richelieu, to congratulate them on this event, besides high praise, also expressed a strong hope that an effort would now be made to root out the last remnants of heresy.³ There was bitter disappointment when this hope was not fulfilled. Richelieu indeed restored Catholic worship at La Rochelle, but he also allowed Protestant worship to go on. It was enough for him to have broken the political autonomy of the Huguenots,

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Cf.* above, p. 115.

³ See **Epist.*, VI., Papal Secret Archives. Richelieu's reputation as a literary opponent of heresy is characterized in a *Brief of Urban VIII. addressed to him on March 2, 1624, in which the following passage occurs in connexion with a Latin translation of a French controversial work of his: "Non uni nationi par est loqui sapientiam tuam haereticorum formidine toti christianae reipublicae commendatam." **Epist.*, I^b, *loc. cit.*

their State within the State ; beyond their places of security he took nothing from them and the Edict of Grace of Nîmes confirmed the Edict of Nantes as far as freedom of worship was concerned.¹ This leniency was due to consideration for his Protestant allies, the Lutheran King of Sweden and the Dutch Calvinists.² In this instance also religious considerations had to yield to political ones. That the complete restoration of religious unity in France was eminently desirable by no means escaped that thoroughgoing protagonist of centralization, but he did not wish to realize such an object by forcible means, such as the Keeper of the Seals, Marillac, and Bérulle advocated, but rather by persuasion, for the use of force would have jeopardized the interests of the State. Accordingly he furthered popular missions and the erection of monasteries in Huguenot localities ; but besides these he had in view other means. He intended to hold a great religious disputation but forgot that all such attempts had proved utter failures in the past, and had even done serious injury to the Catholic religion. The Jesuit Etienne Audebert was commissioned to sound the Huguenot preachers on the subject, but the Pope, with good reason, refused to have anything to do with the experiment.³ No less reprehensible was Richelieu's idea of winning over the Huguenot preachers by bribing them⁴ ; but most dangerous of all was his plan

¹ See HOLTZMANN, *Französ. Verfassungsgesch.*, 476 seq. Ideas of toleration must not be attributed to Richelieu ; the concession of freedom of conscience to the Huguenots was due to political considerations ; see LODGE, *Richelieu*, 194. Cf. also *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1901, 553, and HERMELINK, *Kirchengesch.*, III., Tübingen, 1911, 278.

² Cf. PUYOL, II., 245.

³ See DUSSIEUX, *Le card. Richelieu*, Paris, 1886, 222 ; FOUQUERAY, V., 409. Cf. LEMAN as to the view taken at Rome of the discussions on religion (*Instructions*, 93). When in 1639 a discussion on religion gave rise to scandal, Richelieu himself condemned this method ; see FOUQUERAY, IV., 264.

⁴ See NICOLETTI, in RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, II.², 609. "Le cardinal," says AVENEL (III., 419), "comme les grands manieurs d'hommes croyait tout possible avec l'adresse et l'argent."

to obtain this end by dogmatic concessions. Scotti obtained particulars of the latter scheme from the Oratorian Bertini and from Hallier. According to their information Richelieu was closely studying plans for a reunion which he secretly discussed with the Huguenot preacher Mestrézat. On November 30th, 1640, Scotti reported to Rome that it appeared that in that interview Richelieu had stated his willingness to drop certain doctrines which were not part of dogma, such as the superiority of the Pope over the council, his authority in secular matters, nay, he was ready to forgo even the dogma of Purgatory.¹ By order of Richelieu views of this kind were likewise defended by the ex-Jesuit François Véron in his sermons in the church of St. Germain, as well as in his book entitled: "Catholic Rule of Faith, purged from all the Opinions of Scholastic Theology and from all Abuses." The work was dedicated to Richelieu; the Roman Inquisition condemned it and its diffusion was prevented by the nuncio Scotti.² Through Mazarin, Scotti learnt that Richelieu nevertheless stuck to his plans.³

Rome's caution in dealing with France is shown by the fact that, towards the end of 1640, yielding to Richelieu's insistent demand for satisfaction, Cardinal Barberini skilfully disposed of the incident of d'Estrées' equerry by means of a declaration which in no way compromised the prerogatives of the Pope.⁴ Nevertheless the period of calm which had been hoped for, did not ensue and in January, 1641, the Marshal provoked fresh incidents.⁵ Thereupon the Pope decided to send Mazarin to Paris with mission to explain that the interests of France

¹ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, Vatican Library. RANKE (*loc. cit.*, II., 510) says that according to "a tradition not to be despised" (RICH. SIMON, *Lettres choisies*, I., 1; BAYLE, *s.v. Amyraut*) Richelieu had promised to reformed preachers even dogmatic concessions, e.g. with regard to 'transubstantiation'! Scotti, however, reports nothing of the kind.

² See FOUQUERAY, V., 408 *seq.*

³ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 283.

herself demanded the recall of so unsuitable a diplomatist.¹ The necessity of such a measure was demonstrated in February and March when d'Estrées occasioned fresh disputes in the course of which he also insulted the College of Cardinals.² Richelieu, however, would not be persuaded to recall the Marshal. If the French authorities waited for perfect tranquillity to be restored before taking such a step, Cardinal Barberini wrote to Scotti in March, 1641, they were mistaken, for that hypochondriac was too restless. With justifiable scorn the letter proceeds: "At the very time when, by shutting his doors, d'Estrées proclaimed that the *Jus Gentium* had been infringed, he boasted that he would not leave Rome without giving people even stronger grounds for remembering him." However, in reality, though he planned fresh extravagances, d'Estrées' fears were even greater than his locked doors suggested.³

Some remarks by Urban VIII. in the course of a conversation

¹ *Ibid.*, 285.

² Cf. Scotti's *report in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

³ *"Tutte queste novità venivano riconosciute per non voler Richeliù richiamare il maresciallo da Roma, di che dolendosi il cardinale Barberino scrisse a Monsgr. Scotti così: Non si potevano aspettare che accidenti infausti e conformi al genio del maresciallo, et al particolare studio, col quale egli che non ha per guida o per compagno altri che la stravaganza, conformemente opera. E se costì vogliono per richiamarlo accettare un tempo, nel quale sia un total quiete, è impossibile, perchè è troppo feconda miniera il suo cervello, e se le malattie dell'animo si devono attribuire al corpo, egli stesso si duole di esser hipochondriaco, si che non è da dubitare de'sintomi, ma solo da discorrere in qual parte del suo corpo risieda la ragione. È meraviglia che nello stesso tempo che con le porte chiuse della sua casa vuol dare ad intendere la lesione del *Ius gentium*, nello stesso egli brava che non si partirà da Roma, che non habbia lasciata maggior memoria di sè. Nè sta in questo la meraviglia, ma in quello, che mentre egli parla così e rumina stravaganze, ha più timore in se stesso di quello, che le porte chiuse rappresentino. In somma è huomo in tutte le cose di cuor doppio." Autograph letter of Barberini to Scotti, March 27, 1641, *Barb.* 4737, p. 297 *seq.*, Vatican Library.

with Count Fieschi show how greatly the Pope resented d'Estrées' conduct: "The King of France," he said, "is a good and just man, but he is served by men whose behaviour is worse than that of barbarians. We do not meddle with his government; hence we are of opinion that we have a right to demand the same for ourselves." D'Estrées, who got to hear of this remark, reproached the Pope with having spoken ironically of the King and criticized Richelieu! ¹

D'Estrées' conduct in Rome became ever more and more intolerable. In April, 1641, he accused Cardinal Antonio Barberini of having admitted into the *Cancellaria* certain bandits who had murdered one of the servants of his equerry.² Scotti was able to prove to Richelieu that this was a calumny for those concerned were not bandits but men who had been banished.³ D'Estrées ended by realizing himself that his position in Rome had become untenable. After having a protest posted upon Pasquino and elsewhere against "the violation of the palace of his King", he withdrew to the castle of Caprarola. In Paris a rumour was circulated that he no longer felt safe in Rome.⁴

In the long run so shrewd a man as Richelieu could not fail to see that an ambassador of the type of d'Estrées could

¹ * "Intendo, che havendo N^{ro} S^{re} detto al conte Fieschi le seguenti parole, parlando del medesimo maresciallo: Il re è buono, è giustissimo, è integerrimo, ma ha dei ministri che il loro procedere è peggio di quello de' barbari. Noi non procuriamo d'inquietare il suo governo, e così crediamo che nè meno Sua M^{ta} vorrà permettere che venga inquietato il Nostro. Questo discorso ingenuo di Sua Santità è stato dal maresciallo sinistramente interpretato, cioè che il dire di Sua Beatitudine circa la bontà del re era stato ironico, volendo intendere della debolezza o minchioneria, e che essendosi doluto de' ministri, haver voluto intendere del card. Richeliù." Autograph letter of Barberini, March 27, 1641, *loc. cit.*

² See Scotti's *report of April 14, 1641, in *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

³ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6.

⁴ See the *report quoted above, note 1.

only damage the cause of France in Rome.¹ Moreover the Pope was also resolved to make a change in the Paris nunciature. Girolamo Grimaldi,² who had been appointed to succeed Scotti on March 9th, 1641, had already arrived in France when at last d'Estrées also was recalled.³ A *détente* now ensued, but Richelieu's nature remained the same. In 1640, notwithstanding the resistance of the clergy and the warnings of the Pope, he had forcibly imposed increasingly heavy contributions on the former. Resentment against these imposts was all the keener because the Cardinal used them to support France's Protestant allies.⁴ In the end Urban VIII.

¹ Scotti says in one of his *reports that d'Estrées was causing the French King to be hated in Rome. *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

² See BIAUDET, 269.

³ *" Richeliù spedì corriere al card. Antonio, ch'erasi fatto trattenere in Parigi 1½ mese senza rispondergli, con la richiamata del maresciallo, giachè Msgr. Grimaldi nuovo Nunzio era già pervenuto in Francia." *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

⁴ A royal edict of May 30, 1639, which taxed Church property to the amount of seven millions (see FOUQUERAY, V., 414), led to an extraordinary assembly of the clergy which opened at Paris on February 15, 1641, but was subsequently transferred to Mantes, in the diocese of Chartres, whose Bishop, Léonor d'Estampes, was a friend of Richelieu. Before this Urban VIII. had warned the King and Richelieu by *Briefs of December 24, 1640, not to lay unbearable burdens upon the clergy (**Epist.*, XVII.-XVIII., Papal Secret Archives). Unfortunately these representations fell upon deaf ears (see *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*). Richelieu sought to manipulate the elections for the assembly in such a way that only " personnes paisibles et faciles à gouverner " (see AVENEL, *Lettres*, VI., 742) would be chosen. None the less, a strong opposition arose, for Richelieu demanded no less than 6,600,000 livres. The opposition urged that the clergy were only bound to help the King in his wars with their prayers. But servile persons were also found who, like Claude de la Madeleine, of Autun, were not ashamed to declare that " no Frenchman could have any doubt " that " the entire property of the Church belonged to the King, who could confiscate it all so long as he left the clergy a modest competence (see

was forced to intervene himself. On June 5th, 1641, he published a Bull against those who interfered with the goods and rights of the Church. When the nuncio Grimaldi handed this document to Richelieu the latter declared that Parliament would reply to it.¹ On September 18th, 1641, that assembly published a decree forbidding the publication of the Brief under pain of high treason.² Richelieu tried to make Grimaldi believe that Parliament had taken this decision without the knowledge of the Government, but the nuncio knew this to be a lie.³ In a letter to Grimaldi of November 9th, 1641, Cardinal Barberini complained of the prohibition of the Bull and instructed the nuncio to press for its repeal. Urban VIII. also made earnest representations to the French ambassador and stressed the danger of a policy which imitated that of England.⁴ Richelieu told Grimaldi that a repeal was out of the question for he was bound to uphold the authority of his King.⁵ Thereupon Grimaldi appealed to the Chancellor of France but without success.⁶ Though already mortally

Mém. de Montchal, II., 1 *seq.*). Richelieu obtained a grant of 4,700,000 livres, payable in three years, but only by excluding from the assembly and banishing to their dioceses those who opposed him, namely the Archbishops of Sens and Toulouse, Octave de Bellegarde and Montchal and four other Bishops, "because they had been remiss in the performance of their duty," see *Mém. de Montchal*, II., 132 *seq.*; AVENEL, III., 380 *seq.*; FOUQUERAY, V., 415 *seq.*; DE MUN, in the *Rev. d'hist. dipl.*, XXI., 4.

¹ See *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 9, *loc. cit.*

² MARIÉJOL (VI., 3, 388) remarks on this: "Ainsi procédait contre l'Église gallicane le cardinal-ministre qui, aux États généraux de 1615, déclarait au nom de son ordre: "N'est-ce pas une honte d'exiger de personnes consacrées au vrai Dieu ce que les païens n'ont jamais désiré de ceux qui étaient dédiés au service de leurs idoles?"

³ See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*, p. 415 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Grimaldi's *report of December 13, 1641, in *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See his *report of January 10, 1642, *ibid.*

stricken, Richelieu wrote to the Chancellor on September 22nd, 1641, instructing him to declare to the nuncio, in threatening terms, that the decree of Parliament was only the prelude to even sterner measures "in defence of the royal prerogatives", for only in this way would it be possible to bring the Court of Rome to reason.¹

In the very year of his death the Cardinal was planning a further extortion of money from the French clergy towards whose rights and privileges he adapted, in the opinion of his entourage, "an altogether peculiar theology," as he did in fact in many other respects.² Nevertheless, now as before, he was anxious to assure the so-called Gallican liberties with a view to curtailing the ecclesiastical prerogatives of the Pope as much as possible. This is shown by his attitude towards Pierre de Marca. That learned canonist was instructed to write a book for the express purpose of proving that the Gallican liberties, if properly understood, were not in any way antagonistic to the supreme authority of the Pope. A task of this kind was beyond the powers of even so skilful a jurist as de Marca. His first draft was rejected by Richelieu as too favourable to Rome.³ So he had to start afresh and this time he succeeded in satisfying his high patron. The first four volumes of his work "On the concord of Church and State, or on the Gallican liberties" were published in 1641.⁴ The author gives proof of very wide reading in his historical and critical study of the position of the Pope in the Church in general and his

¹ *Lettres de Richelieu*, VI., 877. In these circumstances the Holy See was obliged to content itself with publishing the Bull in Rome, in the customary manner, and making it known to all the French Bishops. See *NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*

² See CIVRAYS in his review of the work of J. TOURNYOL DU CLOS, *Richelieu et le clergé de France*, Paris, 1914, in the *Rev. de l'Église de France*, V. (1914), 72.

³ *"Écrit de M. de Marca sur le libelle intitulé Optatus Gallus", in *Cod. E.*, f. 13, of the St. Geneviève Library, Paris. See PUYOL, II., 436.

⁴ *De concordia sacerdotii et imperii seu de libertatibus ecclesiae Gallicanae libri VIII.*, books 1-4, Parisiis, 1641.

influence in France in particular, as well as the relations between the French monarchy and the Church. De Marca is on the look out for a compromise between the Gallican liberties and the authority of the Pope. A diplomatist rather than a theologian, he becomes involved in the most astonishing contradictions so that he could be appealed to by both parties¹; but substantially he takes the standpoint already adopted by Pithou in 1594 in his codification of the Gallican liberties which until then had been very ill-defined. He likewise defended the *Appel comme d'abus*. Small wonder that on June 11th, 1642, his book was put on the Index.²

¹ See SCHULTE, *Quellen*, III., 594 *seq.* Cf. also PUYOL, II., 478 *seq.*

² See REUSCH, II., 355, 364 *seq.* Cardinal Barberini was at great pains to convert so able and influential a man from his errors and to reconcile him with the Holy See. At the beginning of 1643 he wrote to Grimaldi: Since the censure of Marca's work had seemed too severe in France, he had had it revised; but the Roman theologians whom he had consulted had come to the same conclusion and had condemned it. Still unsatisfied, and because the Roman censors were perhaps too severe, he had added two foreigners to their number, whom he had asked to be as lenient as possible; but these also had come to the conclusion that the censure could not be altered (Barberini's *letter in *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 9, *Barb.* 4737, p. 467 *seq.*, Vatican Library). It was now suggested to Marca that he should withdraw his book indirectly by publishing another. To this Marca consented (*cf.* Grimaldi's *report, *ibid.*, p. 474). Unfortunately a crisis then arose for the French Government nominated him to the See of Conserans. In a long letter of February 4, 1643, Barberini explained to the French nuncio Grimaldi that the Holy See could not consent to this appointment: the fundamental principles of Marca's work and the conclusions which the author drew from them, whether consciously or unconsciously, and which might be drawn by others, showed clearly the harm it might do. One of his chief aims was to defend the Gallican liberties in the sense of Pithou. In a second *letter of February 19 the Cardinal expatiated again on Marca's errors on account of which it was impossible to confirm his nomination as a Bishop (both letters in NICOLETTI, *loc. cit.*,

The position of Grimaldi, who did all he could to win over the doctors of the Sorbonne,¹ was greatly strengthened by the fact that on December 16th, 1641, Mazarin, who had done good work for a settlement of the incident provoked by d'Estrées,² at last received the eagerly longed-for purple at the hands of Urban VIII.³ A year later Richelieu died and Mazarin succeeded him. There were those who began to hope for an improvement in the ecclesiastico-political relations between Paris and Rome which had once again become strained,⁴ all the more so as a number of Bishops made to Grimaldi promises of a most reassuring kind.⁵

(2)

Richelieu had caused the Holy See grievous disappointment, great annoyance and serious anxiety. The only satisfaction

p. 470 *seq.*). The confirmation was not obtained until Marca had presented a recantation in 1646, which was regarded as sufficient in Rome; see SCHULTE, III., I, 594.

¹ See Grimaldi's *report of January 24, 1642, in *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 6, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. BAZIN, IV., 189.

³ *Ibid.*, 339; CARDELLA, VII., 14.

⁴ Cf. the *hortatory letter to Louis XIII., dated August 13, 1642, which declares that the composition of disputes in the religious Orders belonged to the Holy See; (*Bull.* XV., 201), and the *Brief to the King of November 25, 1642 (*Nimis a tuo obsequio alienae sunt novae rationes. Galliae orator variis quere- moniis Roma se discessurum professus fuerat*), **Epist.*, XIX.-XXI., Papal Secret Archives. Similar *letters to Richelieu and Mazarin, *ibid.*

⁵ Barberini accordingly *wrote to Grimaldi in answer to his *report of April 13, 1643: "Sia lodato la divina bontà per lo zelo di cotesti ecclesiastici e di V.S. che procurano di restituire la disciplina e dignità ecclesiastica nel suo dovere, che V.S. opera molto degnamente. Io m'ingegnerò di servirmi com'ella accenna dell'occasione de'beneficii di Bertagna per tener ben affetta l'università di teologi, benchè tal volta sia molto difficile il poter resistere alle raccomandazioni degli ambasciatori e di altri in questa corte." *NICOLETTI, VIII., ch. 9, p. 460, *loc. cit.*

he gave it was the part he took in the reform of the Church in France. In view of numerous and even crying abuses,¹ he was determined, here as elsewhere, to establish law and order²; but his whole conception of the Church as "one of the most important wheels in his political machine",³ incapacitated him from the outset for the work of a true reformer, so that in many ways he hindered the efflorescence of the Church which was then in progress. Moreover, his intervention was frequently so violent that he did more harm than good. This was seen when, as in the case of Richer, he sacrificed, in May, 1638, his one-time friend the Abbé de Saint-Cyran. Scenting political danger he cast the latter into the dungeons of Vincennes, an act which could not fail to win fresh sympathizers and adherents for that Jansenist.⁴ In like manner in his assuredly praiseworthy, though by no means disinterested, efforts to reform the old Orders,⁵ especially the Benedictines, he barred the way to enduring success by his own violence and that of his officials.⁶ Far more fatal was another consideration. A man who had embraced the ecclesiastical state without a real vocation and from purely worldly motives,⁷ who personally took part in the chase after positions and money which was one of the failings of the French clergy and nobility, and who appropriated to himself the richest prebends and benefices, was hardly equipped

¹ A more detailed picture is to be found in AVENEL, *Richelieu*, III., 227-341. Cf. our account Vol. XXIII., 151 seq., and XXVI., 1 seq. See also the details given in AULAGNE, *La réforme cath. au XVII^e siècle dans le diocèse de Limoges*, 85 seq.

² Cf. FAGNIEZ, II., 22 seq.; GOYAU, *Hist. relig.*, 399.

³ See Philippon in PFLUGK-HARTTUNG'S *Weltgesch.*, Neuzeit, p. 626, who shows (p. 627) that the Church was so dominated as to seem but a department of the royal administration.

⁴ For further particulars, XXIX., ch. 1.

⁵ Cf. LODGE, *Richelieu*, 191.

⁶ Cf. AVENEL, *Richelieu*, III., 229. See also *ibid.*, 350, for Richelieu's monastic reforms. He was well aware of the poor results which his measures achieved.

⁷ See MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 57, 290.

for the task of a reformer.¹ But the greatest hindrance to the

¹ The detailed work, based on wide research in archives, by the Benedictine DENIS, *Le card. Richelieu et la réforme des monastères benedictins*, Paris, 1913, attempts to justify Richelieu against the accusation raised even by many Benedictines that the Cardinal was unscrupulous in his means and greedy for benefices. Against this one-sided view (*cf.* above, p. 405, note 1), PLATZHOFF rightly remarks in *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CXII., 631, that it is doubtful whether Denis's attempt is successful. "Certainly Richelieu's reforming tendencies arose not from purely egoistical motives, but from a just appreciation of the advantages that would accrue to Church and State . . . but he did not entirely forget his own person; he wished to stand at the head of the unity which he planned. Moreover the failure of his undertaking was not simply due to the intrigues of his opponents and the Curia as Denis makes out, but partly to the Cardinal himself. The same man who proceeded so sternly against abuses in the monasteries, acquired ever more and more benefices and abbeys for himself. This difference between theory and practice was bound to affect his work unfavourably." Denis gives on p. 465 *seq.*, the following summary of the *Abbayes de Monseigneur le Cardinal* (Bibl. Nat., *Recueil Cangé*, 66, *Inv. Réserve*, F. 22, f. 187):—

L'abbaye de Redon	8,100 livres.
„ St. Pierre au mont	12,608 „
„ Ham	10,750 „
„ St. Riquier	10,000 „
„ Nostre Dame de la Vaulleroy	17,395 „
„ St.-Lucien de Beauvais	25,000 „
„ la Chaise-Dieu	4,000 „
„ Marmoustier	9,400 „
„ Signy	15,000 „
„ St.-Maixant	10,800 „
„ St.-Arnoul de Mets	6,000 „
„ St.-Benoist	18,000 „
St.-Martin des Champs	36,050 „
Le prieuré de Coussay	2,150 „
L'abbaye de Cluny	29,400 „
„ Cîteaux	22,000 „
„ Prémonstré	8,000 „
La pension à prendre sur les cinq abbayes de la Congrégation de Chezal Benoist	30,000 „
Total	274,653 livres.

progress of a Catholic reform was Richelieu's political Gallicanism.¹ Not the Church but the State stood first in his mind. The measures proposed by him for the removal of abuses were intended before all else to strengthen still further the already considerable meddling of the State and the Crown in the affairs of the Church.² If we compare the course of events in the Kingdom of Louis XIII. with that in the territories of the Catholic Princes in Germany, the Low Countries, or in the Kingdom of Poland, we perceive at once that in the latter States the Catholic reform was promoted by the various Governments in a very different fashion from that adopted in France.³ The cardinal point was the execution of the reform decrees of Trent, which was opposed by the French Crown and the Parliaments because both feared that thereby limits would be put to their intrusion into ecclesiastical affairs.⁴ The consequence was that these decrees were not universally accepted, but only in individual dioceses, as at Senlis by Cardinal de Rochefoucauld, and at Bordeaux by Cardinal Sourdis.⁵ However, for this Richelieu was not alone to blame, because in course of time the opposition of the Parliaments found supporters even in the ranks of the French clergy. As late as the year 1625, at an assembly in Paris in which three Cardinals and fifty Bishops had taken part, the clergy had declared that they felt bound in conscience to accept and to carry through the decisions of the Council.⁶

¹ Cf. A. ZIMMERMANN, *Die kathol. Reformation in Frankreich im 17. Jahrh.*, in *Wissenschaftl. Beilage zur "Germania"*, 1907, no. 17.

² See MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 87.

³ G. WOLF has recently drawn attention to this point in the *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, 1925, 139.

⁴ See LODGE, *Richelieu*, 185.

⁵ Cf. GABRIEL DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, *Le card. Fr. de la Rochefoucauld*, Paris, 1926, 194 *seq.*

⁶ See CHARLAS, *De libert. eccl. gall.*, I., 163. For the ecclesiastical Assembly of 1625, which greatly damaged its otherwise beneficial measures by its Gallican tendencies and especially by its decrees against the Regulars, see PICOT, I., 190 *seq.*; PUYOL, II., 217 *seq.*; FOUQUERAY, IV., 117 *seq.*

Such voices were no longer heard.¹ Those who cherished nationalist sentiments and opposed the influence of the Holy See as that of a foreign Power, found strong support in the autocratic minister, though a complete regeneration of ecclesiastical conditions was only possible if, in accordance with the desires of the Holy See, the decrees of Trent were accepted and applied. Rome was well aware of the fact that the Church in France was very wealthy,² but that she was still very sick, notwithstanding the movement of reform initiated in the days of Clement VIII. and Paul V.

The Instruction for the nuncio Spada in 1624 draws none too favourable a picture of religious conditions in France. Whilst fully recognizing that there was no lack of good Bishops and priests, the following abuses are mentioned: The scarcity of priests; the neglect of the duty of residence on the part of the more favoured parish priests and many Bishops; the bestowal of rich benefices on laymen, even on women and on heretics; the irregular life of country parish priests who were, for the most part, in receipt of wholly inadequate stipends; the decadence of many monasteries and their resistance to a reform such as had been undertaken with the Cluniac and Cistercian monks by that excellent man, Cardinal Rochefoucauld; lastly the Gallican tendencies of the Sorbonne and the various Parliaments. The only remedy, Urban VIII. insisted, was for France to accept and carry through the reform of Trent.³

¹ See V. MARTIN, *Le Gallicanisme et la réforme cathol.*, Paris, 1919, 392.

² Cf. AVENEL, *Richelieu*, III., 279-293. According to a "Journal" of the Strassburg citizen *Elias Brackenhofser*, of 1644, the yearly income amounted in 1644 to 103,500,000 thalers; see *Bull. de la Soc. de l'hist. du protestantisme français*, 1903, 254 seq.; the sum mentioned for 1635 in the *Basler Zeitschr. für Gesch.*, V., Basle, 1906, 453 seq., is 104,700,000 écus.

³ See LEMAN, *Instructions*, 24 seq. For Rochefoucauld's reform of the Benedictines, Cluniacs and Cistercians, see DENIS, *Richelieu et la réforme des monastères benedictins*, 12 seq.; FÉRET, *L'abbaye de St.-Geneviève et la Congrégation de France*, I., Paris, 1883, 194 seq., and G. DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, *Le card. Fr. de la Roche-foucauld*, Paris, 1926.

The Pope, who had seen the beginnings of the Catholic restoration in France and had encouraged it during his French nunciature (1604-7), had the progress of that movement very much at heart. The Cardinal Secretary of State, Francesco Barberini, who had been in France in 1625 as Legate, had been able to see things with his own eyes, and there were other sources of information also. Accordingly, both he and the Pope, in all the Instructions to the Paris nuncios urge the removal of abuses by the same means as had been successfully employed in other Catholic countries. The execution of the Tridentine decrees heads the list. To Guido del Bagno, who succeeded Spada as nuncio, an Instruction of February, 1627, assigns as the guiding principle of his activity, the preservation and diffusion of the Catholic religion; this was Urban VIII.'s supreme and keenest desire.¹ The best way to satisfy it was to carry out a radical reform, and the most effective means of recalling those who had strayed from the faith was to put an end to the ignorance and bad conduct of the clergy. Whilst it was left to the King to fight the Huguenots, sword in hand, a task in which he displayed the utmost zeal, it was the duty of the Pope's representative to apply other methods, namely, the holding of missions and watchfulness over the enemy. Since the ignorance and evil life of the clergy had done so much harm to religion in France, it was necessary to begin by applying a remedy in that field. Henceforth only those were to be promoted to bishoprics and to the priesthood whose teaching was pure and whose conduct was irreproachable; hence the erection of clerical seminaries was a vital question for the Church in France. No less necessary was the enforcement of the duty of residence for Bishops and priests and the reform of the Orders. For all this the Instruction sets the greatest hopes not only on the genuinely Catholic sentiments of the King, but likewise on Richelieu whose proceedings, just then, against the

¹ "La conservazione della religione cattolica dove ella è, e la restitutione e propagazione dove non è, deve essere lo scopo principale del Sommo Pontefice, et è in effetto il supremo e più ardente di Papa Urbano VIII.," LEMAN, *Instructions*, 89.

Sorbonne, the University and the Parliament, on the occasion of the troubles provoked by Santorelli's inopportune book, had created a very favourable impression in Rome.¹ Even with regard to the application of the decrees of Trent, which is once more insisted upon as the chief remedy, the Instruction hopes for the co-operation of the all-powerful minister.² Notwithstanding the latter's opposition to the Holy See on numberless points, the Curia entertained for a long time great delusions about his character, delusions which the Cardinal skilfully encouraged.³ That this was a fact may be gathered

¹ Cf. above, p. 293 *seqq.*

² See LEMAN, *Instructions*, 89 *seq.*, 125 *seq.*, 155 *seq.*

³ Thus in 1633 Richelieu called to order the learned but capricious Archbishop of Rouen, FRANÇOIS DE HARLAY, an opponent of the Regulars, who in his handbook, *De doctrina et disciplina ecclesiastica*, had eliminated everything that favoured Papal authority (*cf. Bull.*, XIV., 126 *seq.*); see AVENEL, *Lettres*, IV., 510 *seq.*; FOUQUERAY, V., 69. At the time of Scotti's nunciature, the latter was obliged to intervene again. Scotti reports thus on the incident: *"L'arcivescovo di Rohano è prelato letterato e naturalmente devoto alla St^a Sede, ma è sì vario nelle sue opinioni che ben spesso corre ad offendere la medesima in voce ed in scritto, senza riguardo del rispetto dovutole. Fece ultimamente dar alle stampe il Manuale o Rituale della sua diocesi, tutto riformato o piuttosto deformato, per non haver voluto comprendere nel nuovo quello che nell'antico del card. di Gioiosa suo antecessore riguardava ai titoli supremi di Sua Santità levandoli, toccando alcuni articoli di fede et appropriando a se in molte cose l'autorità pontificia. Mandai a Roma l'istesso Rituale, quale essendo stato corretto, ho procurato col mezzo del vescovo di Lisieux tutto zelante, a cui anche fu commesso l'affare dal sig^r cardinale di Richelieu, acciò l'arcivescovo eseguisca l'emenda di tutti li capi inviati conforme il senso della Sacra Congregazione et conforme la promessa fattami, procuri con nuova stampa di far apparire la stima verso la St^a Sede, non lasciando di dire concorrere l'istesso arcivescovo con altri molti vescovi di Francia in non poner nelle prefazioni 'Apostolica Sedis gratia,' ma solo 'Dei gratia'; quello di Rohano aggiungendo 'Miseratione divina, de venerabilium Fratrum nostrorum consensu, pontificatus nostri anno 25^o,'" etc., *Relatione*, 73 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives.

from the Instruction of 1634 for the new nuncio, Bolognetti. The latter was directed to warn France off her alliances with the Protestants of Germany, Sweden and Holland; he was to urge, among other reasons, that insistence on such a course would lead to a rising of the Huguenots. With due appreciation of the part which ambition played with Richelieu, Bolognetti was to represent to the Cardinal that if he were to carry into effect the Tridentine decrees, he would acquire infinite renown not alone in France, but throughout Christendom.¹ However, ever since the demon of politics had taken hold of him, Richelieu sought fame in the political rather than in the ecclesiastical sphere. Though he had at one time taken pride in the reform of his diocese and in his activities as a preacher and controversialist,² his main concern now was to raise France to the rank of the first Power in Europe. In view of the fact that he wielded unlimited authority in the realm, there can be no doubt that had he taken in hand the execution of the decrees of Trent, he would have succeeded, but to do so would have been against his political Gallicanism, his Cæsaro-papalism and his policy of furthering Protestantism abroad. Although his sense of order and the counsels of the Oratorians, Bérulle and Condren, caused him to promote a number of excellent men to episcopal sees, nevertheless with regard to the royal nominations to bishoprics, he looked not so much to the suitability of the candidates from the point of view of the Church as to whether they would be pliant tools of the Government.³ Not a few of the younger sons of the nobility—which had in part sunk very low—whom the Crown provided with fat prebends, embraced the ecclesiastical state solely for the sake of a living, took no interest in their official duties and gave grave scandal.⁴ Many French Bishops did

¹ LEMAN, *Instructions*, 174 seq., 176.

² Cf. HANOTAUX, *Hist. du card. de Richelieu*, I.², Paris, 1896, 94 seq., 99 seq., 104 seq., 106 seq.

³ See AVENEL, *Richelieu*, III., 239 seq., 248 seq., 331; MOMMSEN, *Richelieu*, 86. "Il s'est plus préoccupé du service de l'État que du bien de l'Église," is also MARIÉJOL's opinion (VI., 2, 377).

⁴ AVENEL, *loc. cit.*

not comply with the obligations of reporting periodically to Rome on the state of their dioceses,¹ notwithstanding repeated warnings from the Congregation of the Council.² Not a few entertained Gallican and *episcopalistic* tendencies, with the consequence that the controversies which were not wanting in other countries as to the extent of episcopal power, grew both in extent and in force.³ Those who bowed to the Government received preferment: in this way Léonor d'Estampes, Bishop of Chartres, became Archbishop of Reims in 1641.⁴ From Court Bishops such as these the Church had nothing to hope for. How far things had gone is shown by the fact that some prelates of this type styled themselves no longer Bishops by the favour of the Holy See but by the Grace of God. The Archbishop of Rouen, François de Harley, went so far as to make use in official documents of formulas exclusively reserved to the Pope.⁵ In 1639 Urban VIII. saw himself compelled to give a stern warning to several Archbishops and Bishops with regard to their conduct.⁶ Things were even worse with regard to the appointment of Abbots and Abbesses. In this respect the evil proceeded chiefly from the Government which assigned the revenues to courtiers, statesmen and soldiers, so as to enable them to retrieve their shattered fortunes.⁷ The rich revenues of the dioceses and abbeys of which the King had the disposal might easily have

¹ There are reports of *ad limina* visits of Bishops Donnaud of Mirepoix and Sponde of Pamiers; see *Vocations sacerdotales du Diocèse de Toulouse*, 1912. That besides these others were sent in is clear from LEMAN, *Instructions*, 73 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 185.

³ G. WOLF, in the *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, 1925, 40, rightly draws attention to this fact. Cf. MARIÉJOL, VI., 2, 381.

⁴ Léonor d'Estampes, when charged by the Assembly of the clergy of 1625 with the draft of a censure on the *Admonitio ad regem* and the *Mysteria politica* (cf. above, p. 88 seq.) uttered "un hymne d'idolatrie monarchique"; see FAGNIEZ, II., 6

⁵ Cf. SCOTTI's account, above, p. 437, note 3.

⁶ See *Bull.*, XIV., 697 seq.

⁷ See AVENEL, *Richelieu*, III., 337 seq. Cf. also N. M. BERNARDIN, *Hommes et mœurs du XVII^e siècle*, Paris, 1900.

been applied to the endowment of great and small ecclesiastical seminaries had it not been for the fear of curtailing the income of the abbés who basked in the sunshine of Court favour.¹ Another and no less necessary reform seems never to have been considered at all. Among the 150 archbishoprics and bishoprics some were too extensive, embracing as they did as many as 1,700 parishes; others, on the contrary, were inordinately small; some of the latter consisted of only thirty parishes.² An adjustment was urgently needed, but things remained as they were. The same was true of the duty of residence; since the King made the nominations, only too many imagined that they had no obligations except to him.³

Happily there were a number of splendid men among the Bishops appointed during Richelieu's reign. Cardinal François de Sourdis, Archbishop of Bordeaux, and Alphonse Richelieu, Archbishop of Lyons⁴ did excellent work in their dioceses; so did Charles de Montchal at Toulouse, Égide Bontault at Aire, Henri Listolfi at Bazas, Charles Leberon at Valence, François de Lafayette at Limoges, François de Raconis at Lavaur, Antoine Godeau at Grasse, Jacques Desclaux at Dax, Henri Maupas at Puy, Félix Violart at Châlons-sur-Marne, whilst the people revered as Saints Alain de Solminihac who became Bishop of Cahors in 1636, and Jean Baptiste Gault who almost immediately after his nomination to the see of Marseilles, died a victim of his pastoral zeal during a mission given by him to the galley slaves.⁵ In his relation of 1641 the papal nuncio Scotti singles out for their special devotion to the

¹ See ZIMMERMANN, *loc. cit.*

² See AVENEL, *loc. cit.*, 242 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. PICOT, I., 232 *seq.* For the provincial Council of Bordeaux see LABBE, XV., 1632 *seq.*

⁵ For all these see *Gallia christiana*, *passim.* Cf. PICOT, I., 236 *seq.*, and PRUNEL, *Réforme catholique*, 24. For Desclaux, see DEGERT, *Hist. des évêques de Dax*, Paris, 1903, 323 *seq.*; for A. de Solminihac, the biographies of CHASTONNET (1663) and A. DE VALLON (Cahors, 1900). The *Mémoires* of the Archbishops of Toulouse, CH. DE MONTCHAL, appeared in 1718, in 2 vols.

Holy See the Archbishop of Sens, Octave de Saint-Lary de Bellegarde, the Archbishop of Toulouse, Charles de Montchal, Philippe Cospeau, Augustin Potier and Nicholas Pauguin, respectively Bishops of Lisieux, Beauvais and Senlis. All these were in close relationship with Cardinal François de La Rochefoucauld who, as Scotti puts it, though advanced in years, defended the interests of the Holy See with all the fire of youth.¹ After years of indefatigable toil at the difficult task of the reform of the old Orders, a task likewise greatly furthered by Urban VIII., Rochefoucauld devoted his last years almost exclusively to works of charity and piety.² The Bishops of Cahors, Limoges, Bazas, Aire, Périgueux and Saintes erected seminaries in their dioceses. Urban VIII., who in 1625 had reminded the French Bishops of the duty of residence,³ inculcated in all the Bulls of canonical institution of newly appointed Bishops the obligation to erect seminaries in their dioceses.⁴ However, the influence of the Pope was greatly restricted in a country whose Government jealously watched every intervention of the Holy See and where the

¹ See SCOTTI, **Relatione*, Papal Secret Archives.

² Cf. LA MORINIÈRE, *Les vertus du vrai prélat représ. en l vie de Msgr. émin. card. de Rochefoucauld*, Paris, 1646; LALEMANT-CHASTONNET, *La vie de Charles Faure*, Paris, 1698; J. DESBOIS, *Biographie du card. de la Rochefoucauld*, Paris (1924); FÉRET, *Le cardinal de la Rochefoucauld*, Paris, 1878, and especially GABRIEL DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, *Le card. Fr. de la Rochefoucauld*, Paris, 1926. Urban VIII. sent a laudatory *Brief to Rochefoucauld on February 11, 1640 (Quod Ecclesiae iura tueri consueveris, documentis iam pridem novimus; and praises his zeal for the Apostolic See), *Epist.*, XVII.-XVIII., Papal Secret Archives. The Pope also arranged that Rochefoucauld should visit the Trinitarians in France; see *Serapeum*, 1870, 115. For the reform of the Benedictines in Limoges ordered by Urban VIII., see *Bull.*, XIV., 345 seq., *ibid.* 534 seq., 639 seq., for the reform of the Recollets, and XV., 172 seq., for the reform of the Franciscans Observants.

³ See the *Brief of April 5, 1625, *Epist.*, II., Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See DEGERT, *Hist. des Séminaires français*, I., 193.

Parliaments maintained a hostile attitude towards all that came from Rome.¹ In these circumstances we must look upon it as a particularly gracious disposition of Providence that at that very time a number of men arose whose highest aim was the reawakening of the religious spirit, more especially in the ranks of the clergy.

In this connection mention must be made in the first place of Pierre de Bérulle. On January 14th, 1625, Urban VIII. granted to the French Oratory founded by this remarkable man the privileges of the Oratory of Philip Neri.² In August, 1625, he raised Bérulle to the cardinalate. By the end of 1628 Bérulle had been made President of the Council of State; a little later, at the instigation of Richelieu, whose jealousy had been roused, he was to have been sent as ambassador to Rome, but his mission was prevented by his sudden death on October 2nd, 1629.³ He was succeeded as Superior General of the Oratory by the excellent Charles de Condren,⁴ and later on by Bourgoing. In 1629 the Oratory numbered forty-three houses,⁵ and seventy-one in 1631.⁶ From the first, one of the Congregation's main purposes was to work for the reform of the clergy. The Bishops of Luçon, Maçon and Langres entrusted their seminaries to them. In 1620 the Archbishop of Paris, Henri de Gondi, handed over to them the ancient Benedictine Abbey of Saint Magloire which was turned into a seminary.⁷ Bourgoing made it a *Grand-Seminaire*, and Richelieu, justly appreciating the usefulness of an institution of this kind,

¹ See MOURRET, *Ancien régime*, III.

² See *Bull.*, XIII., 273 *seq.*

³ See HOUSSAYE, *M. de Bérulle* (1875). Cf. LARGENT in *La France chrétienne*, 382 *seq.* For the attitude of the Oratory towards the erection of seminaries, so often wrongly interpreted, see DEGERT, I., 134 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. AMELOTTE, *Vie du P. de Condren* (1857); INGOLD, *Généralats du card. de Bérulle et du P. de Condren*, Paris, 1880. See also LARGENT, *loc. cit.*, 384 *seq.*

⁵ See DEGERT, I., 137; GOYAU, *Hist. relig.*, 407.

⁶ See PERRAUD, 169.

⁷ See PRUNEL, *Réforme catholique*, 54 *seq.*

gave him 3,000 thalers to enable him to receive candidates gratuitously and ordered the erection of similar seminaries at Rouen and Toulouse.¹ Gondi's example was quickly followed and by 1660 even the smallest dioceses had their own seminaries.² On the other hand Bourgoing's scheme for the erection of a French Seminary in Rome was only realized two centuries later.³

Besides Bérulle and his successors there arose yet another great priest and reformer of the French clergy whose fiery zeal was such that his contemporaries compared him to Elias and John the Baptist. This was Adrien Bourdoise.⁴ "There is only one remedy to the evils of the Church," he was wont to say, "and that is the erection of seminaries. It is the novitiate that makes the good Capuchin or Jesuit." With all his eagerness for an improvement in the state of the clergy, Bourdoise was anxious not to encroach on the prerogatives of the Bishops; hence he was content with the establishment, in his parish of St. Nicolas-du-Chardonnet, of an institution for the training of good parish priests. This very original foundation proved a substantial contribution towards raising the condition of the lower clergy.⁵ The famous Vincent de Paul pursued similar aims; on February 3rd, 1641, he expressed his satisfaction at the fact that all the Bishops were now keen on having each his own seminary.⁶ With the aid of two friends, Jean Jacques Olier, one of his disciples and an intimate of Condren and Bourdoise, founded in 1642, at Vaugirard, a seminary for the purpose of assuring a constant supply of good priests, and when he took charge of the difficult parish of St. Sulpice in

¹ See PRUNEL, in the *Etudes*, 1909, and *Réforme catholique*, 55 seq. Cf. DEGERT, I., 174 seq.

² See DEGERT, I., 194 seq.

³ See PRUNEL, *Réforme catholique*, 57 seq.

⁴ See DESCOURS, *Vie de M. de Bourdoise* (1714); DARCHE, *Le saint abbé Bourdoise*, 2 vols. new ed., Paris, 1884.

⁵ See M. SCHOENHER, *Hist. du Séminaire de St.-Nicolas-du-Chardonnet* (1909); DEGERT, I., 138, and PRUNEL, *Réforme catholique*, 59 seq.

⁶ See *Rev. de Gascogne*, 1909, 322.

Paris, Olier transferred his establishment thither. There this splendid priest founded a Congregation of secular priests called *Sulpicians*, whose chief work was to be the direction of ecclesiastical seminaries. By this means the Sulpicians exercised so profound a reforming activity among the French clergy that at a later date Fénelon declared that there was nothing so apostolic and so venerable as St. Sulpice.¹

Like Olier, Jean Eudes, a worthy colleague of the former, was also a pupil of the Jesuits. A member of the Oratory from 1625 to 1643 Eudes, who had done untold good as a preacher in Normandy, conceived the plan of a Congregation of secular priests whose task it would be to preach popular missions and to manage seminaries. He had the good fortune of finding a patron for his enterprise in the person of Richelieu himself, who through his niece, the Duchess of Aiguillon, put a considerable sum of money at his disposal.² On Lady-Day, 1643, the "Association of the Priests of the Seminary of Jesus and Mary" came into being at Caen. Better known under the name of "The Eudists", it spread rapidly in Brittany and Normandy. Eudes also erected at Caen a house of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd for the conversion of fallen girls.³

The names of Bérulle, Bourdoise, Olier and Eudes live in the annals of the Church. Like Eudes, the saintly parish priest of Mattaincourt, Pierre Fourier, who died in 1640, has also received the honours of the altar. The Congregation of Our Saviour which he founded and which Urban VIII.

¹ Cf. the biographies by GIRY (Paris, 1677), FAILLON (3 vols., 4th ed., Paris, 1874), G. M. DE FRUGES (Paris, 1904 and 1908), LETOURNEAU (Paris, 1906), MONIER (Paris, 1914). See also F. MONIER, *Les origines du Séminaire de St.-Sulpice*, Limoges, 1906. For the support granted to Olier by the General of the Maurists, see FR. ROUSSEAU, *Dom Grégoire Tarisse, premiersupérieur général de la Congrégation de St.-Maur (1575-1648)*, Lille, 1926.

² See the biographies of Eudes by J. MARTINE (2 vols., Caen, 1880, PINAS (Paris, 1901), BOULAY (3 vols., Paris, 1905 seq.), and JOLY (Paris, 1909).

³ See PRUNEL, *Réforme catholique*, 71 seq. Cf. G. BONNENFANT, *Les Séminaires normands du XVI^e au XVII^e siècle*, Caen, 1915.

approved in August, 1628,¹ was mainly devoted to the education of youth. Recent research has also brought to light the activities of other secular priests of that period who worked in the same apostolic spirit in the sphere of the home mission.² Some of them have been the subjects of special monographs, as, for instance, the noble Claude Bernard, surnamed "the poor priest", who spent the whole of his considerable property in Paris in the care of the sick and the poor and in apostolic labours, especially on behalf of criminals.³ He declines the offer of a rich abbey made to him by Richelieu, giving as his reason that he looked for his reward in heaven alone.⁴

The new Orders also had a salutary influence on the pastoral clergy, though they did not confine their activity within that sphere. The Jesuits and the Capuchins especially played an important part in the religious renewal of town and country.⁵

Apart from their work for the education of youth, the sons of St. Ignatius were likewise busy as preachers, directors of missions, retreats and confraternities, as well as writers. Many of their preachers, such as Coton, Garasse, Suffren, Lejeune, Arnoux, De Barry, Nicolas Caussin, won high reputation and achieved splendid successes.⁶ Among their literary men, there were two scholars of the first rank, viz. the Church historian, Jacques Sirmond and the chronologist and theologian, Denis

¹ See HEIMBUCHER, I.², 47 *seq.*; LAGER, *Der sel. P. Fourier*, Regensburg, 1884; KREUSCH, *Leben des hl. P. Fourier*², Steyl, 1889. Cf. our account, Vols. XXIII., 184, and XXVI., 56.

² See GRANDET, *Les saints prêtres français du XVII^e siècle*, p.p. Letourneau, 2 vols., Paris, 1897.

³ See the biographies of LEGAUFFRE (Paris, 1680), LEMPEREUR (Riom, 1834) and DE BROQUA (Paris, 1914).

⁴ See LEGAUFFRE, *Vie de Claude Bernard*, 177.

⁵ The Barnabites, who had founded a house at Annecy in 1602, did so also at Vienne in 1625, 1627 at Puy, and 1637 in Paris; see PREMOLI, *Barnabiti nel seicento*, Roma, 1922.

⁶ See FOUQUERAY, IV., 257 *seq.*, V., 256 *seq.*

Petavius [Petau].¹ The Jesuits devoted themselves with special zeal to giving missions when, after the defeat of the Huguenots of southern France by Louis XIII., Catholic worship was restored in those parts. Their zeal was crowned with remarkable successes : thus in 1625, in the small town of Aubenas, 150 families abjured Calvinism within the space of one month.² At that time the ravages of the plague were frequent, and the Jesuits showed the greatest zeal in tending its victims, displaying heroic self-sacrifice in the task. A great number of them gave their own lives ; in the Province of Lyons the number of these martyrs amounted to eighty in the years 1628–1630.³ The Jesuit Francis Regis who, from 1630 until his death in 1640, especially devoted his talent as a popular preacher and teacher to the catechizing of the poor countryfolk of Languedoc where he was revered as a Saint even in his lifetime, died a victim not so much of the plague as of his apostolic zeal.⁴

The extraordinary blessings which flowed from the popular missions of the Jesuits induced Richelieu in 1638 to request the King to extend them to the whole of France.⁵ In other ways also the Cardinal repeatedly played the rôle of a patron of the Society of Jesus after he had succeeded in humbling the powerful Order,⁶ but in order to retain that favour the Fathers had to take so many precautions that they found

¹ Cf. HURTER, III.³, 1073 *seq.* ; FOUQUERAY, IV., 266 *seq.* For Petavius see the biographies by STANONIK (1876) and CHATELAIN (Paris, 1884).

² See FOUQUERAY, IV., 259 *seq.*, 265 ; V., 262 *seq.*

³ See FOUQUERAY, IV., 277 *seq.* ; V., 272 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. the monographs by BONET (Toulouse, 1692), DAUBENTON (Paris, 1716), CROS (Paris, 1903), VIANEY (Paris, 1914), and NACHBAUR (Freiburg, 1924).

⁵ See FOUQUERAY, V., 264.

⁶ Cf. above, p. 391 *seq.* The protection came to an end when the Cardinal's own interests were at stake. Thus as Abbot of Clugny, he protested when the Jesuits of the Palatinate attempted to have an Alsacian Priory turned into a seminary ; see *Zeitschr. für Gesch. des Oberrheins*, N.F., X., 635.

themselves repeatedly in an equivocal position. In his reports the nuncio Scotti complains bitterly of the fact that the Paris Jesuits, for fear of rousing the ill-will of the royal minister, did not at first dare to call on him. This created all the more surprise as the members of other Orders, such as the Oratorians Bertini and Morini, established close contact with the nuncio, and even in the Sorbonne men like Isambert, Hallier, Le Maistre, Martineau and Robert Duval, a nephew of André Duval, rose in defence of the prerogatives of the Pope.¹ Scotti notes with bitterness that the Jesuits, who had been at one time the keenest defenders of the papal prerogatives, were now pushing them into the background, so that they were put to shame by many members of the Sorbonne. He expresses his satisfaction that besides the work on the Gallican liberties, Rome had also put on the Index certain books written by Jesuits, for this would bring them to a sense of their duty. Finally he expresses the opinion that it was desirable that the General of the Jesuits should reserve to himself the revision of the books written by the Fathers instead of leaving that task to the French Provincial Superiors.²

¹ See SCOTTI, *Relatione*, 101, Papal Secret Archives.

² “*Di Gésuiti non ne parlo, professando total ritiratezza, dubiosi sempre, nell'accostarsi al Nuntio, di non perdere appresso i ministri regii. Il Padre Pegioletti non ha però guardato a questo, comparendo ben spesso, e fine ha anco indotto il Provinciale e Rettore di Parigi a visitarmi: ossequio mostrato da tutti gl'altri religiosi sin'al mio arrivo, etc.*” *Relatione, loc. cit.*, 101.

Ibid., 71 seq.: “È molto necessario al Nuntio invigilar sopra la materia di controversie, che ogni giorno escono in stampa con grave pregiudizio dell'autorità pontificia, essendo arrivato il scriver a segno che s'ha per una cosa ordinaria.

“I Geisuiti, che dovrebbero essere, come altre volte, i difensori della Santa Sede, più degli altri la pongono in compromesso, ma con non poca confusione venendo a soggiacere alla censura dei Sorbonisti, per mostrarsi questi presentemente partialissimi della medesima, e però se ne deve far molto conto.

“Ha grandemente giovato appresso tutti i buoni e zelanti la risoluzione presasi a Roma di proibire fra l'altre opere quelle

The participation of the Jesuit François Veron in Richelieu's plans of reunion ¹ had led to a conflict at the very outset of Scotti's nunciature, in which, however, the latter proved victorious. He succeeded in getting Veron's book prohibited by the Roman Inquisition and a stop put to his controversial sermons in Paris which were attended by many Huguenots. When the followers of Veron approached the nuncio with a request for permission to read forbidden books most of them met with a refusal. It was necessary to keep a sharp eye on Veron, the nuncio declared, owing to his being a man of violent character and indiscreet zeal.²

However, Scotti himself cannot be absolved from a suspicion of partiality, for his reports contain never a word about the activity of the Jesuits in the home and foreign missions, whilst he is loud in the praise of whatever the Capuchins accomplished

della libertà della Chiesa gallicana e d'alcuni de' Giesuiti che da qui innanti meglio penseranno a quello che più li compla, et potendo il loro Generale tirare a sè la facultà data per la revisione alli Provinciali di Francia, riuscirebbe proficuo et di contentamento alla maggiore parte de'Giesuiti francesi."

¹ Cf. above, p. 424.

² *" Un tal dottor Verone, uscito dalla Compagnia di Gesù, fa professione di voler riunir li seguaci della religione pretesa riformata con la Chiesa cattolica. Al mio arrivo trovai che trattava di continuo la riduzione con gran concorso di Ugonotti, et haveva impresso un libro intitolato ' Il mezzo della pace cristiana '. Procurai subito dalla S. Congregatione del Santo Officio la prohibitione dell'opera stampata, essequendo io quella delle prediche con gran soddisfattione della Sorbona, come quella ch'indusse l'arcivescovo a levarli il pulpito in Parigi; et perciò si è ritirato in San Germano come abbazia esente, ove hora continua a predicare, ma non più di simil materia, almeno in publico. Sarà però bene l'attendervi, essendo persona vehemente e piena di zelo indiscreto; anzi voleva da me per una quantità de'suoi scolari licenza di legger i libri prohibiti, che egli fu negata, e concessa solo a sè et ad alcuni altri dottori, secondo il solito." SCOTTI, **Relatione*, 72 seq., loc. cit. REUSCH (*Index*, II., 361) names yet another work of Veron which was forbidden in 1642.

in that field.¹ Richelieu had successfully drawn that Order also into his net, and Father Joseph was not the only Capuchin whom the Cardinal used for his political ends. The Capuchins took no part in the discussion of the delicate and capital question of the papal power, just as, on the whole, they did not indulge in literary work; their field of action was the cure of souls, especially among the lower classes, and in that sphere they did excellent work. A profound impression was created when certain highly placed personages, such as the diplomatist Brulart de Sillery, left the world to take the habit of St. Francis, as the brother of Cardinal Joyeuse and the Councillor of State Charles Brochart de Champigny (d. 1624) had done at a previous period. The latter had been revered as a Saint under the name of Fr. Honoré.² Perhaps even greater admiration was called forth by the heroic charity displayed by the Capuchins during the terrible days of the plague, as in the years 1630–8 at Langres, Dijon, Chaumont, Bordeaux and Paris, where many of them fell victims to their devotion. At Gap seven Capuchins died out of ten who devoted themselves to the service of the plague-stricken,³ and in Franche-Comté, in 1636, more than eighty out of a total of 180 Fathers, as we learn from a Bull of Urban VIII.⁴ The Province of Lyons had to register similar sacrifices during those years.⁵ Great things are likewise reported of the activities of the Capuchins in the sphere of the home mission and the evangelization of the Huguenots. Whilst Fr. Marcellin preached in

¹ *" Non vi è parte del mondo che non goda del frutto delle missioni dei PP. Capuccini francesi. . . . In varie provincie di Francia sono pur missioni anco d'altri ordini, ma quelle de' Capuccini avanzano nel credito e profitto." *Relatione, loc. cit.*

² See PRUNEL, *Réforme catholique*, 86. Cf. MAZELIN, *Hist. du vén. P. Honoré*, Paris, 1892.

³ See PRUNEL, 86 *seq.*, 190.

⁴ See MOREY, *Les Capucins en Franche-Comté*, 82.

⁵ See **Brevis enarratio luctuosi status provinciae Lugdunensis. fr. minor. Capucin. in immani pestilentia* (Report of the Lyons Definitor Michel Ange of September 9, 1636, to the General of the Order), MS. 906 of the Town Library, Lyons.

Dauphiné and Fr. Honoré in Champagne, other members of the Order were busy in Languedoc and the Cevennes. At Barjac, where there were but a dozen Catholics in 1623, only twelve Protestants remained in 1630. At Florac the Capuchins converted over 1,000 Huguenots.¹ In this field special zeal was displayed by the famous Fr. Joseph, that strange man who had a finger in everything, the "Grey Eminence" on whom Richelieu bestowed his dangerous friendship and whom he initiated into his most secret designs. The two men, though so fundamentally different, were at one in their passionate efforts for the political greatness of France, an aim they pursued regardless of the fact that it implied an alliance with the Protestants and the arrest of the progress of the Catholic restoration in Germany. The Cardinal used by preference the versatile Capuchin as his intermediary in the most delicate and most secret affairs. It is difficult to understand the unscrupulousness with which Fr. Joseph co-operated with the great realist politician in his efforts to bring about the collapse of the Habsburgs. He sincerely believed—or, may be, he deceived himself—in the possibility of realizing his old plan of a crusade, once Spain should be defeated. The extent of the blindness of this bitter foe of the Huguenots and the Mohammedans is revealed by the fact that in his fight against the Habsburgs he welcomed an attack on Austria by the Calvinist Rákóczy and even by the Turks themselves.² Rarely have two such diverse characters been combined in one man, the statesman and the priest.

Fr. Joseph took advantage of his political influence to further, on a magnificent scale, both the foreign missions³ and the diffusion of his Order.⁴ In the midst of his diplomatic

¹ See PRUNEL, 190.

² Cf. W. ANDREAS, *Geist und Staat. Hist. Porträts*, 62 seq., 69 seq., 72, 78. Among the various character sketches of the "Grey Eminence" those by Andreas are the truest.

³ Cf. Vol. XXIX., ch. 3.

⁴ See FAGNIEZ, I., 288 seq.; PRUNEL, 189. Cf. DESCOUVRES, *Le P. Joseph . . . ses charges, ses prédications de 1604-1613*, Angers, 1915. The Capuchins had three houses in Paris. At Gondrieu

cares he composed some excellent spiritual books for the convent of the Daughters of Calvary founded by him. From 1617 onwards, to the Pope's great satisfaction and with his financial assistance, he organized the work of evangelizing western France where splendid results were obtained. Notwithstanding the hostility which they met with in those wholly Protestant districts, the Capuchins succeeded in bringing back to the Church 50,000 Huguenots within a period of ten years.¹

Catholic laymen also, such as Jean Dubois, a royal attorney at Saint-Lô, exerted themselves on behalf of the conversion of the Huguenots. Dubois was one of the many laymen in important positions who, like Michel de Marillac, René Gautier, Denis de Cordes and Baron Renty were indefatigable in the practice of works of piety and charity.²

In Fr. Lejeune the Oratory produced a distinguished missionary who from the first three decades of the century onwards devoted himself before all else to the task of converting sinners and easing the lot of the destitute. He entered on his work in the diocese of Langres, extending it later to that of Rouen where, at the age of forty, he suddenly lost his sight whilst in the pulpit ; but though blind, he went on with his work until 1672 when God called him to Himself at the age of eighty. In Advent and Lent Lejeune preached in the big towns such as Paris, Rouen, Toulouse, Metz and Orange, whilst during the rest of the year he announced the word of God in the boroughs and villages. He likewise worked in many

they established themselves in 1627-8 ; see *Rev. de Gascogne*, 1905, no. 4. In the diocese of Metz they made foundations at Diedenhofen in 1624 and at Saarburg in 1629 ; see **Notice hist. des couvents que les PP. Capucins ont dans la ville et diocèse de Metz*, Cod. 74, p. 219, of the Municipal Library, Metz.

¹ See FAGNIEZ, I., 288 seq., 315 seq. Cf. LEMAN, *Instructions*, 72 seq., 92 seq., 171.

² Cf. PICOT, I., 344 seq. ; SAINT-JURE, *Vie de M. de Renty*, Paris, 1664. For the history of the Third Order of St. Francis, established by Dubois, see H. GUILLOT, *Les Pères pénitents à St.-Lô 1630-1691 d'après des documents inédits*, St.-Lô, 1914.

episcopal cities ; thus at Limoges, Langres and Cahors he lent support to the reforming activities of the Bishops of those places. Like Francis Régis, Lejeune devoted himself for choice to the poor and the unlearned, taught the catechism, and visited the aged and the sick who were no longer able to go to church. Contemporary accounts of the conversions wrought by the blind Father, and the enthusiasm of his hearers, who on occasion would not let him go or brought him back by force, remind us of the great preachers of penance of the 15th century.¹

In his sermons Lejeune pitilessly scourged the vices of his time : the luxury of the towns, the exaggeration and the unseemliness of women's fashions, the affected elegance of the men, the effeminacy of youths. To the clergy also he spoke some bitter truths. The fact that many clerics, when punished by their Bishops, appealed to the secular authorities, that is, to the Parliaments, he stigmatized as an intolerable tyranny for the Church and an abiding scandal to the faithful. To parish priests who neglected their duty of residence he said : " Though you may discover casuists by whose ' mild ' opinion you form your consciences, those who dispense where God commands will not be able to protect you on the day of judgment." Lejeune put his finger on a fundamental evil of the period when he condemned the abuse which consisted in leaving the whole of an estate to the eldest son to enable him to keep up a splendid establishment, whilst the younger sons were made to enter a monastery or to become priests. To those who acted thus, he was wont to say, these words of the prophet could be applied : " They have sacrificed their sons and daughters to the devil !"—" In the first place, in order to create a great house, you give everything to your eldest, so that he may spend his days in luxury, dissipation, idleness and dissoluteness ; he will lead an effeminate existence because he will never know by experience what effort the acquisition of his wealth has cost. Secondly, his brothers murmur against him, envy him, are full of aversion for him,

¹ See RENOUX, *Le Père Lejeune*, Paris, 1875. Cf. *Katholik*, 1875, II., 599 *seq.*, and GOYAU, *Hist. relig.*, 412.

quarrel with him, bring lawsuits against him, and all too often they effect their mutual ruin. Thirdly, you force your younger son into the house of God, be it through the door or the window ; you compel him to become a priest. What appalling blindness ! What awful oppression of Holy Church ! ”

The secret of the charm of Lejeune’s preaching was its simplicity. Eschewing all the arts of rhetoric, especially that of quoting from profane literature, which was a very popular trick just then, he expounded the truths of religion and the duties of a Christian life after the manner of a simple country priest.¹ But the extraordinary impression which he created was due above all to the power of his own personality which embodied all the virtues. Like Francis Régis he presents, as it were, the ideal of a mission preacher.²

The work of these men, in conjunction with that of such Bishops as were themselves keen on reform, bore abundant fruit. In the fair lands of the Seine, the Loire and the Rhône, so richly blessed by nature, a marked change took place in ecclesiastical and religious conditions. It became increasingly clear that the French people meant to remain Catholic. In France also the Church had come out of the tremendous struggle with heresy with renewed strength and greater vigour than ever. The characteristic feature of the new period was a tendency towards a practical form of spirituality.³ There was a desire to form real Christians, and it was largely realized. The clergy were renewed, the upper classes were regained and the lower ones christianized by means of instructions, missions and confraternities. A new generation grew up, filled with the spirit of a St. Francis de Sales and men like him. This truly Catholic renaissance⁴ found expression in a keen desire to spread Christianity both in missionary countries and at home

¹ See RÉBELLIAU, *La chaire chrétienne au XVII^e siècle*, in *La France chrétienne dans l’histoire*, Paris, 1896, 435 seq.

² See PRUNEL, 187.

³ Cf. AVENEL, *Prêtres, soldats et juges sous Richelieu*, Paris, 1907, 93 ; DEGERT, *Hist. des Séminaires*, I., 131 seq.

⁴ “ C’est une véritable renaissance,” says LAVISSE (*Hist. de France*, VI., 2, 203-4).

by the erection of new churches, charitable institutions and monasteries. In this respect Paris, which had long ago become the real centre of France, set a splendid example. From the Rue Neuve de St. Honoré to the Porte St. Antoine, and in the district on the right bank of the Seine, an eye-witness writes in 1639, eighteen convents were built within a period of thirty years; seven in the Faubourg St. Jacques and eleven in the Faubourg St. Germain-des-Prés within the last twenty-seven years. As regards the erection of new churches, it was reckoned that sixteen had been built within half a century.¹ On December 8th, 1629, as a marble tablet testifies to this day, Louis XIII. himself laid the foundation stone of the most famous of these edifices, that of Notre Dame des Victoires, erected in thanksgiving for the defeat of the Huguenots.²

But the most important thing was always the internal renewal which could not fail to impress even the opponents. What was lacking in a degenerate clergy at the time of the outbreak of the religious divisions was now shown forth by a priesthood cleansed by the Catholic reform, namely, a worthy carrying out of the liturgy and a conscientious priesthood to which the faithful could look for guidance and consolation. These priests provided something very different from what was offered by the hard and pretentious Calvinist preachers to whose fury against everything Catholic the mutilated statues of many a magnificent church bear witness to this day. Protestantism had never really appealed to the French,³ a fact which explains the sweeping successes of the Capuchins and Jesuits in whose missionary activities a number of Bishops also took part. Of Henry Sponde it used to be said that whereas his episcopal

¹ See H. LEMONIER, *L'art français au temps de Richelieu et de Mazarin*, Paris, 1893, 222. Further details on the different churches in E. DUPLESSY, *Paris religieux*, Paris, 1900, 21 seq., 40, 45, 59, 67, 92, 219, 238, 338, 349, 354. Cf. also BRIGGS, *Barock-Architektur* (1914), 167 seq.

² See PIGANOL DE LA FORCE, *Description de Paris*, II., 517, 519.

³ See WEISS, *L'antipathie de la France contre le Protestantisme*, in *Bull. hist. et litt.*, 1900, II., 91 seq.

city was Protestant when he entered upon his office in 1634, he had almost completely brought it back to the Church when he resigned it in 1643 in order to devote himself wholly to study. Jean Henri de Salette, who became Bishop of Lescar in 1643, did much good by means of his controversial writings. Jean Jaubert de Barrault, who in 1630 was translated from Bazas to the archiepiscopal see of Arles, took a similar line of action. The Bishops of Montpellier and Mirepoix worked with success for the return of the Calvinists to the Church.¹ Rome was on the watch that no unlawful concessions were made, such as Richelieu and his collaborator Veron were only too disposed to grant.² On the other hand Urban VIII. willingly gave his approval to the Congregation of the Holy Cross for the conversion of heretics.³ Laudatory Briefs were sent to several distinguished personages, such as Maximilien de Béthune, a son of Henry IV.'s famous minister, to Duke Henri de la Trémoille and to Frédéric Maurice de la Tour, Duke de Bouillon, who had returned to the bosom of the Church.⁴

An Association formed in 1630 in honour of the Blessed Sacrament (*Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement*) adopted for its object, not only the conversion of the Huguenots, but likewise the spiritual training and moral uplifting of the lower classes and the relief of the poor. The instigators of the idea were Duke Henri de Ventadour and the Capuchin Philippe d'Angoumois. The Association counted among its first members the King's confessor, the Jesuit Suffren, the General of the Oratorians, Condren, Bishops Charles de Noailles of Saint-Flour and Jean Jaubert de Barrault of Bazas ; likewise

¹ See PICOT, I., 194 *seq.*, 196.

² Cf. above, p. 428.

³ *Bull. "Licet omnia" of June 3, 1624, State Archives, Paris, L., 357.

⁴ See the *Briefs to Béthune of April 27, 1624, to De la Trémoille of September 30, 1628, and to the Duke of Bouillon, of July 20, 1635, *Epist.*, 1^b, VI. and XII., Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.*, XIII., a *Brief to the convert *Io. Em. de Vieux, marchio Asserae*, of March 22, 1636. For numerous other converts see PICOT, I., 200 *seq.*, and RÄSS, *Konvertiten*, *passim*.

a son and nephew of Admiral Coligny, victim of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, who had both become fervent Catholics, as well as many distinguished State officials. The members met at first in the Capuchin convent in the Faubourg St. Honoré every Thursday, this being the day on which the Church honours the institution of the Holy Eucharist. Starting from the sound principle that a genuine reform must begin at home, the associates prepared themselves for their respective tasks by prayer and holy reading. These tasks consisted, besides the propagation of devotion to the Holy Eucharist, in relieving every form of social and spiritual misery. It may be asked why it was that an association with such excellent aims should have been so anxious to hide its existence, its name, its connexions, its activity, so that only the most recent examination of archives has successfully brought to light its existence and work.¹ The chief reason was obviously the fact that by carrying out their programme, which was the removal of abuses in

¹ The Jesuit CH. CLAIR drew attention in several articles published in the *Études* of 1888 and 1889 to the *Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement*, but the Association only became widely known when the Benedictine Dom Beauchet-Filleau discovered the *Annales de la Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement par le comte Marc-René de Voyer d'Argenson* in the National Library, *Fonds. franç.*, 14489, and published them at Marseilles in 1900. F. RAABE (*Rev. hist.*, LXXI. (1899), 243 *seq.*) wrongly attributed the rediscovery of the Company to himself which he described in a bitterly anti-Catholic manner. CHÉROT (*Études*, 1899) refuted him and demonstrated his great ignorance since Rabbe did not even recognize the name of St. Vincent de Paul and turned the famous Jesuit de Rhodes into Rodin. A collaborator of " *Siècle* ", R. ALLIER, also dealt with the Company in a hostile and passionate tone in his book, *La Cabale des Dévots* (Paris, 1902). Cf. against these DE LA BRIÈRE, *Ce que fut la Cabale des Dévots*, 1630-1660, Paris, 1906. A thorough investigation was made by A. RÉBELLIAU (*Un épisode de l'hist. relig. du XVII^e siècle. La Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement et la contre-revolution catholique* in the *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 1903, July, August and September), and PRUNEL (*Réforme catholique*, 143 *seq.*) where the monographs are discussed).

Church and State, the associates were bound to draw on themselves the mortal hatred of those who benefited by these abuses. "Experience has shown," so we read in the annals of the Society, "that salutary undertakings come to grief when they attract undue attention." None the less Richelieu and Louis XIII. were informed of the foundation and they gave their approval on condition that they should receive an occasional report on its activities. The King recommended the Society to the Archbishop of Paris, Henri de Gondi. The latter, however, owing to excessive jealousy of his authority adopted a hostile attitude towards an Association which consisted for the most part of laymen and which, though instigated and in part founded by a Capuchin, a Jesuit and an Oratorian, excluded religious from membership because of their dependence on their superiors. Thereupon recourse was had to the nuncio and eventually to the Pope himself, who readily granted a Brief together with Indulgences such as had been granted to other confraternities, but both he and his successors refused to give an official approbation. In this instance also the Holy See remained true to its principle not to recognize any secret society.¹ Such an attitude was exceedingly prudent for to what attacks would not a Society have been exposed if, in a country where nationalist feeling was so strong, it could have been represented as the tool of a foreign Power!

Thus, although the *Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement* lacked juridical recognition both by the Church and the State, the fearful ones could always be calmed with the assurance that the persons who mattered, namely, Richelieu and the King, knew all about it. As a matter of fact the Society spread rapidly throughout France. There were branches in all the big towns and in many of the smaller ones, but the Association of Paris always remained the centre. The élite of French Catholicism met there; Bishops eager for a reform, such as Alain de Solminihac of Cahors, Potier of Beauvais, Lafayette of Limoges, Godeau of Vence, Zamet of Langres; laymen in high positions at Court or in the diplomatic service;

¹ Cf. J. CROULBOIS, in the *Rev. d'hist. et de litt. relig.*, IX. (1904), 401 seq., 519 seq.

distinguished priests, among them Olier and Vincent de Paul. The scope of the Association, that of creating a centre for every kind of work of benevolence, was fully explained in a circular of a later date : it was " to do all the good possible, and to remove every evil at all times, in all places, and for the sake of all men. The Society recognizes no limits, no measures, no restrictions except such as are demanded by prudence and discretion. It co-operates not only in the usual works on behalf of the poor, the sick, the prisoners and the oppressed, but likewise in missions to the people, the erection of seminaries, the conversion of heretics, the diffusion of the faith throughout the world. It seeks to prevent all scandals, impieties and blasphemies, in a word, to forestall all evils by the application of suitable precautions and to promote the good of each and all by undertaking the most laborious tasks ". There can be no doubt that in the pursuit of this vast and indeed far too comprehensive programme, the Society did an immense amount of good and raised large sums of money for the relief of the destitute French people, until in 1660 it fell a victim to Mazarin's prohibition of all associations not approved by the State. However, it is not to be denied that in their zeal, its members often went too far, and that at times they adopted mistaken methods. Their greatest mistake was undoubtedly the pretence of mystery. For all that, the Association cannot be ranked with freemasonry since it differs fundamentally from that secret society both by the supernatural spirit that animated it and by its scope, viz. the salvation of souls and the exaltation of the Catholic religion. As a first attempt at organizing and giving a uniform direction to all charitable activities and the work of the home and foreign missions, the *Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement* deserves high recognition.¹

The most recent research has shown the existence of some *Compagnies de Dames du Saint-Sacrement*.² This need not

¹ See PRUNEL, 170 seq., 178 seq. Cf. also the *Rev. de l'hist. de l'église de France*, II. (1911), 369.

² See the essays of PRUNEL in the *Rev. pratique d'Apologétique* of January 15, 1911, and in the *Rev. de l'hist. de l'église de France* of July 25, 1911. Cf. also by same author, *Réforme catholique*, 154 seq.

surprise us for at that time the Catholic women of France eagerly took part in the work of rousing and furthering the Catholic spirit. At no other time, perhaps, could France point to so many noble women who, in the midst of a frivolous and self-indulgent society,¹ were themselves patterns of Christian piety and charity and worked with unexampled zeal and success for the regeneration of the spiritual life. To more than one of their number the Church has awarded the honours of her altars. Of Madame Acarie, known as Blessed Mary of the Incarnation, who shared with Bérulle the credit of introducing the Carmelites into France, and of Frances de Chantal, who at the prompting of St. Francis de Sales founded the Order of the Visitation, we have already spoken.² Numberless other women, in part belonging to the highest classes, form a worthy escort to these; among them we find Richelieu's niece, the Duchess of Aiguillon.³ The year 1634 witnessed the establishment of the *Compagnie des Dames de la Charité*, whose members, for the most part ladies of the aristocracy, in a spirit of unparalleled self-sacrifice, lent their help to the sisters who

¹ As against PERRENS (*Les Libertins en France au XVII^e siècle*, Paris, 1896), N. M. BERNARDIN (*Hommes et mœurs au XVII^e siècle*, Paris, 1900), has shown that at the time of Louis XIII., which was so rich in contrasts, free-thought was not nearly so predominant a feature as it is to-day. MARIÉJOL, too, says (*Hist. de France*, VI., 2, 459 seq.): "Les Libertins étaient une faible minorité, mais justement parceque leurs opinions faisaient scandale, ils passaient pour être légion. En tout cas ils se turent sous Richelieu. La poursuite contre Théophile de Viau fut un avertissement aux autres poètes gaulois ou orduriers, qui auraient été tentés d'opposer comme lui les droits de la nature à la morale chrétienne."

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXIII., 185 seq., XXVI., 68 seqq. For a Carmelite already greatly esteemed at that time in Beaune, see L. DE CISSEY, *Vie de Marguérite du Saint-Sacrement*, 1619-1648, Paris, 1857.

³ Cf. A. BONNEAU-AVENANT, *La Duchesse d'Aiguillon, nièce du cardinal de Richelieu. Sa vie et ses œuvres charitables*, 1604-1675, Paris, 1879.

tended the sick in the Hôtel-Dieu, the gigantic hospital of Paris, where they performed the meanest duties.¹

One of the most weighty problems for the future of the Catholic Church in France was the education of female youth for which much less was being done than for the boys, for whom the Jesuits and the Doctrinarians² were doing a great deal. The girls' schools of the old Orders had either been closed, or they had fallen on evil days during the wars of religion,³ whilst the Calvinists were doing their utmost to attract the Catholic youth to their scholastic establishments. In these circumstances it was of the utmost importance that a number of Orders arose which devoted themselves to the instruction and education of female youth. Mention must be made in the first instance of some female Congregations which adopted the Rule of St. Augustine and were approved by Urban VIII., such as the *Religieuses du Verbe Incarné*, founded at Lyons by some pious ladies; the "Sisters of our Lady of Mercy" at Aix; the "Sisters of the Holy Cross"; the "Penitents of Our Lady of Nancy"; and the "Daughters of Providence".⁴ To them must be added several educational establishments of the French Dominican nuns.⁵ All these, however, were surpassed by the Ursulines, who were introduced into France in 1594 by Françoise de Bermond (died 1630), and who spread widely and rapidly.⁶ The excellence of their educational methods and the wonderful zeal⁷ with which they carried out their duties, as well as the circumstance that they admitted not only the children of the rich but those also of the

¹ For the activities of the Dames de la Charité in the Hôtel-Dieu of Paris, which received about 25,000 patients a year, see R. DE COURSON in the *Rev. hebdomadaire*, 1908, July 25. Cf. P. COSTE, *Vincent de Paul et les Dames de la charité*, Paris, 1917, and G. GOYAU, *Les Dames de la charité de M. Vincent*, Paris, 1918.

² Cf. our account, Vol. XXIII., 184.

³ Cf. PRUNEL, 222 seq.

⁴ See HEIMBUCHER, II.², 300, 302, 303; III.², 542, 546.

⁵ See PRUNEL, 97 seq.

⁶ Cf. our account, Vol. XXVI., 62 seqq.

⁷ Opinion of RANKE, *Päpste*, II.⁶, 284.

poor, were responsible for the fact that they were in request in an ever increasing number of localities. If we survey the new foundations which, during Urban's pontificate, were added to those already in existence, we find that there was no place of any importance in France without its convent of Ursulines, and they were to be found even in quite small localities.¹

¹ The *Chroniques des Ursulines* (I., 189 seq.) give the following new establishments :—

1622. Paris (second house), Tours, Orléans, Nevers, Falaise ;

1623. Le Mans, Auxerre, Quimper-Corentin, Niort, Grenoble, Montdidier, Tulle ;

1624. Bayeux, Crépy, Bourg-en-Bresse, Montélimar, Boulogne, Dieppe, Parthenay, Arles, Blois, Ploermel, Saulieu, Saint-Brieuc, Caen ;

1625. Trégieur, Evreux, Auxonne ;

1626. Fougères, Loudun, Chartres, Amboise, Beaune ;

1627. Saint-Andéol, Châlons-sur-Saône, Nantes, Beauvais, Vauréal, Bolène, Tonnerre, Verrue, Chambéry, Carcassonne, Havre de Grâce, Angoulême ;

1628. Noyers, Bar-sur-Seine, Troyes, Saint-Denis, Loches ;

1629. Avallon, Emoutiers, Corbigny, Nantes, Cahors, Belley, Gap, Briançon, Beaugency, Gien ;

1630. Saint-Marcellin, Saint-Emilion, Château-Gontier, Issoudun, Valence, Gondrin, Gournay, La Rochelle ;

1631. Beaucaire, Lisieux, Bire, Bourges, Luçon, Semur, Sanges ;

1632. Avignon, Bazas, Montargis, Beaulieu, Thouars, Flavigny, Brignoles, Chinon, Saint-Jean-du-Gard ;

1633. Bourbon, Louey, Charlieu, Vitteaux, Thiers, Pontigny, Boutiers, Espalion, Salins, Lyons (second house), Celles, Crémieux, Riez, Condom ;

1634. Bar-sur-Aube, Monistrol, Villefranche, Châtillon-près-de-Dombes, Saint-Sever, Saint-Remy, Aubigné, Bourgoing, Alès ;

1635. Ciotat, Romans, Côte-Saint-André, Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Vienne, Mende, Pont-de-Vaux, Moulins-Engilbert, Saint-Symphorien, Barjols, Malzieu, Béziers ;

1636. Saint-Etienne, Sallanches, Tarbes, Aups, Marseilles (second house), Draguignan, Ussel ;

Besides the Ursulines, the Sisters of the Visitation and the Society of the Daughters of Our Lady of Bordeaux also devoted themselves to the work of education. The foundresses of these Orders, viz. St. Frances de Chantal and Blessed Jeanne de Lestonnac, exercised an admirable influence on the *milieu* in which they lived.¹ Both had left the world after the death of their husbands and had been led by extraordinary ways to found their respective Order. Yet another widow, Louise de Marillac, became the co-foundress and the first superior of the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul. This extraordinary man has done such wonders for the healing of the moral evils of his time, for the alleviation of poverty and the religious renewal of France, that the historian must do more than merely sketch his beneficent activity.

(3)

Vincent de Paul² had witnessed and experienced every form of want and destitution before he became himself the

1637. Pont-Saint-Esprit, Pont-Sainte-Marie, Tarascon, Nîmes, Gex, Pignan, Pézénas, Carpentras, Lamballe, Loubresac ;

1638. Bourg-Argental-en-Forêt, Apt, Morlaix, Tullins, Vézelay, Ambillou, Marseilles (third house).

1639. Lorgues, Saint-Remy (second house), Feurs, Clermont-en-Beauvoisis, Magny, Vif, Martigues ;

1640. Cuers, Trévoux, Salon ;

1641. Joinville, Grand-Andely, Hennebont, Périgueux, Montpellier ;

1642. Epernay, Ancenis, Valençay, Montereau, Sens ;

1643. Marcigny, Melun, Chambriart, Caromb ;

1644. Cramont, Guérande, Carhaix, Marmande.

¹ Cf. our account, vol. XXVI., 66 seq.

² ST. VINCENT DE PAUL, *Correspondance, entretiens, documents*. Edition publiée et annotée par Pierre Coste, vols. 1-14, Paris, 1920-5. Accounts of his life : ABELLY, 1664 (his authorship was wrongly questioned ; see COSTE, in the *Rev. de Gascogne*, XII. (1912), 313-19) ; COLLET, 1748 ; MAYNARD, *St. Vincent de Paul*,

benefactor of the destitute. Born on April 24th, 1581, at Pouy, near DAX,¹ as the son of a poor peasant, the first fifteen years of his life were spent in hard toil, with rough food and amid many privations. When his father conceived the idea of utilizing the extraordinary gifts of his son with a view to bettering his family, Vincent became familiar, during seven years, with the misery of a destitute student compelled to supplement his scanty subsidies from home by acting as tutor in well-to-do households and to make up by night-work for the time of which the coaching of pupils had robbed him. Vincent was ordained on September 23rd, 1600, whilst still engaged in his theological studies. On their termination he paid a visit to Rome. He ever retained a lively recollection of Clement VIII. ; he used to repeat that he had seen a holy Pope, a man

Sa vie, son temps, ses œuvres, son influence, vols. 1-4, Paris, 1860; L. AUDIAT, *St. Vincent de Paul et sa Congrégation à Saintes et à Rochefort (1642-1746)*, Paris, 1885; PRÉVOST, *St. Vincent de Paul et ses œuvres dans le diocèse de Troyes*, Troyes, 1896; F. CHARPENTIER, *St. Vincent de Paul en Bas-Poitou*, in the *Rev. du Bas-Poitou*, Fontenay-le-Comte, 1911; L. BRÉTANDEAU, *Les œuvres de St. Vincent de Paul dans le Réthelois*, in the *Rev. hist. ardennaise*, 1902; VEUCLIN, *St. Vincent de Paul en Normandie*, Bernay, 1890; ANT. REDIER, *La vraie vie de St. Vincent de Paul*, Paris, 1927.

¹ The year of his birth, according to COSTE (I., 593, XIV., 627) is not 1576, but 1581; but if this is so he must have received his ordination to the priesthood before he was twenty, a thing that happened frequently in France where the Tridentine reforms were not enforced. Cf. Council of Rouen, 1581 (HARDOUIN, *Conc.*, X., 1265); N. L. PRUNEL, *Séb. Zamet*, Paris, 1912, 96; COSTE, III., 87. For his birthplace see COSTE, II., 68 *seq.*; P. COSTE, *Hist. de la maison de Ranquine avant le XIX^e siècle*, in *Bullet. de la Soc. de Borda*, 1906, 337 *seqq.* For the attempts to make a Spaniard of him, see *Bullet. critique*, X. (1889), 197; *Polybiblion*, 1889; II., 29, 225. The prefix "de" appears before almost every peasant's name in Pouy and is not an indication of nobility. Vincent himself signed his name "Depaul" (see COSTE, I., 13); and he usually called himself by his Christian name: "Monsieur Vincent."

of God and a friend of peace to whose virtues even the Lutherans bore witness.¹

The years of preparation were scarcely terminated by his reception, in 1604, of the baccalaureate in theology, when a hard blow of fate seemed to put an end to all his prospects. A devout old lady had left a small legacy to the young priest so full of promise and by going to Marseilles Vincent successfully wrested it from the hands of a ne'er-do-well, though by means which he would not have made use of at a later period: he had his debtor arrested. On the return journey, which he wished to make by sea, he fell into the hands of Tunisian corsairs. There now ensued all the humiliations of exhibition and sale in the public slave market and a two years' servitude under various masters. However, he succeeded in bringing back to Christianity the last of his employers, a renegade, with whom he escaped to France.² The remarkable circumstances of his flight and escape drew the attention of the vice-legate of Avignon to Vincent and he took him for a companion on his journey to Rome. As a matter of fact from now onwards the one-time country lad came in close contact with the highest circles of society. Whilst in Rome he was made the bearer of a message from the French colony to Henry IV.³ Soon after, in 1609, he became almoner to Queen Margaret of Valois in Paris and in the

¹ " J'ai vu un saint Pape, qui était Clement VIII., un fort saint homme, tellement saint que les hérétiques mêmes disaient : Le Pape Clément est un saint " (Conference of May 30, 1647, in COSTE, IX., 316). " Clement VIII. qui était un saint homme, estimé non seulement des catholiques, mais même des hérétiques, un homme de Dieu et de paix, à qui ses propres ennemis donnaient des louanges ; et pour moi, j'ai ouï des luthériens qui louaient et estimaient sa vertu " (*Entretiens de septembre 1656, ibid.*, XI., 352). Cf. *ibid.*, IX., 9, 468 ; X., 365.

² Vincent himself reports on this on July 24, 1607, to his benefactor De Comet (COSTE, I., 1-13). REIDIER'S questioning of the authenticity of the document may be considered as unfounded (22 *seqq.*).

³ For this mission there is only the statement in ABELLY (COSTE, 18, note 3).

following year he was given an abbey which he surrendered in 1616.¹

Vincent had always been a blameless priest whose spirit of benevolence had asserted itself during his first stay in Paris as it had been a characteristic of his from his youth.² But so far he had no vision of the heroic deeds which were to fill the years of his later life. At that time his aspirations scarcely rose higher than the acquisition of a prebend so that he might spend his remaining days with his mother who was still living.³ However, the days of solitude and prayer which he spent in the newly-founded Oratory of the future Cardinal Bérulle⁴ altered his whole outlook; the change was also helped by four years of interior suffering from which he was only released when he resolved to devote himself unreservedly to the service of the poor.⁵

His next steps were all taken under the guidance of Bérulle. By his advice he took over the parish of Clichy which Bourgoing had resigned in order to enter the Oratory, and again on Bérulle's advice he took the decisive step of entering into close relations with Count Philippe Emmanuel de Gondi, Commander of the Galleys, when he undertook to act as tutor to the latter's two sons—a step fraught with the most important consequences.⁶ When in March, 1617, a longing to work for souls induced him secretly to leave the Count's household, it was Bérulle who obtained for him the parish of Châtillon-les-Dombes and again in obedience to Bérulle's advice he decided,

¹ MAYNARD, I., 67 *seq.* In a document of October 20, 1611, he is described as "Abbé commandataire de l'abbaye St.-Léonard, pays d'Aunis, diocèse de Saintes, conseiller et aumônier de la reine Marguerite" (COSTE, XIII., 14); for his renunciation of the abbey, see *ibid.*, 37.

² MAYNARD, *loc. cit.*

³ Letter to his mother, February 17, 1610, in COSTE, I., 18.

⁴ MAYNARD, I., 73.

⁵ MAYNARD, I., 69 *seqq.* Cf. COSTE, 32 *seq.*

⁶ COSTE, *St. Vincent curé de Clichy*, in the *Rev. de Gascogne*, XII. (1912), 241-256; R. CHANTELAUZE, *St. Vincent et les Gondi*, Paris, 1882.

towards the end of the year, to yield to the insistence of the Count and his wife and to resume his former occupation.¹ Even with one greater than Bérulle, namely with Francis de Sales, he also entered into relations on the occasion of the latter's visit to Paris in 1618. Throughout his whole life Vincent cherished the highest veneration for his friend the Bishop; he looked on Francis as the father of the Sisterhood founded by him² and often had recourse to him.³ On his part Francis de Sales entrusted the care of his newly-founded Order to Vincent,⁴ and he said of that modest priest that he knew no one that surpassed him in virtue.⁵

At the time when he deserved such high praise Vincent had only reached middle age and he had not yet called into being any of the great works which were to make of his name a household word. But they were there in germ and from that time onwards all his comprehensive undertakings grew as it were spontaneously and step by step out of their humble beginnings. In 1617 Vincent had been summoned from Gondi's Castle of Folleville to the deathbed of a dying peasant who was

¹ MAYNARD, I., 75, 80, 104. The documents for his nomination to Clichy and Châtillon are in COSTE, XIII., 17 *seq.*, 40 *seqq.* For his activities at Châtillon, see CORDENOD, in *Bullet. de la Soc. Gorini*, 1908, January. "N'ayant aucune des qualités requises pour être précepteur dans une famille d'aussi haute noblesse" he was leaving his post, he wrote to Gondi (COSTE, XXII., 21). The Countess's request for his return, *ibid.*, 21 *seq.*

² "Notre bienheureux père Monsieur de Genève" (*Entretien* of January 1, 1644, in COSTE, IX., 159, 170). "Feu notre bon père de Genève" (*ibid.*, XI., 26). Vincent's deposition in the process for the beatification of the Bishop of Geneva, *ibid.*, XIII., 66-84; his petition to Alexander VII. for the canonization of Francis, *ibid.*, VII., 584 *seqq.*

³ Cf. COSTE, XIV., 222-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XII., 422. The archiepiscopal nomination was dated May 9, 1628, *ibid.*, XIII., 84.

⁵ "qu'il ne connoissait point homme plus vertueux que M. Vincent (*Coqueret*, Doctor of theology, to Guilbert Cuissot, *ibid.*, XIII., 193).

universally considered a good man. Nevertheless it became apparent, and the dying man himself confessed the fact, that he had grievously offended in regard to his duties towards the Sacraments and that he had failed to use the Church's means of salvation to his own advantage.¹ Madame de Gondi's distress was immense; she now begged Vincent to exhort people to make general confessions: such was the success of the sermon, that Vincent was unable to cope single-handed with the conflux of penitents.² Vincent profited greatly by these first experiences. After his return from Châtillon he gave for the poor country-people on the estates of the Gondis a so-called "Mission", that is, a series of conferences on the ordinary duties of a Christian and the need of a thorough change of life. Soon he sought the co-operation of other priests. The Gondis gave 45,000 livres towards their maintenance and thus was founded an Association of priests who refused all work in the towns, renounced all ecclesiastical prebends and dignities and devoted themselves exclusively to the care of the simple people, always in subjection to the authority of the Bishops. For their livelihood they depended on the Society. Thus they went from village to village, preaching, teaching, exhorting, catechizing the children, and urging the poor people to make general confessions. They accepted no remuneration for their labours but distributed gratuitously what they had themselves received from the divine goodness.³ The Archbishop of Paris had previously assigned the Collège des Bons Enfants to the Fathers of the Mission⁴ and after the premature death of the Countess de Gondi, Vincent joined them there. When the College was made over to the new Society,⁵ and the Society itself received the approbation

¹ PORTAIL, in COSTE, IX., 58 *seq.*; Vincent himself, *ibid.*, XI., 2-5.

² Another reason why Countess Gondi mistrusted ordinary confessions was the ignorance of the priests; *ibid.*, XI., 169-171.

³ Agreement for the foundation of the Congregation of the Mission, April 17, 1625, *ibid.*, XIII., 197-202.

⁴ March 1, 1624, *ibid.*, I., 24, note.

⁵ June 8, 1627, *ibid.*, XIII., 208 *seqq.*, 213 *seqq.*, 215 *seqq.*

of the Archbishop¹ and the King,² Vincent was anxious to have it recognized as a religious Congregation. However, Propaganda rejected his request.³ In place of the somewhat dilapidated *Collège des Bons Enfants*, the new Society soon obtained a worthier home. Le Bon, Prior of the house of St. Lazare, the original purpose of which had been the care of lepers (a purpose which it had long ceased to serve), one day made to Vincent the unexpected suggestion that the priests of the Mission should take over his entire establishment. Vincent was speechless: he could not see how so vast a building would be in keeping with his modest Society.⁴ For a whole year Le Bon was forced to keep pressing him and at last Vincent agreed to leave the decision to his confessor, the professor of theology Duval. The latter was thus the instrument by which the new Society acquired its central residence and with it the popular name of "Lazarists".⁵

The Society of priests thus founded presented a new form of ecclesiastical community life. The Lazarists were meant to be and to remain not a religious Order but a Society of secular priests and as such they were approved by Urban VIII. on January 12th, 1632.⁶ Nevertheless the members bound themselves to their manner of life by the permanent tie of simple vows but which ecclesiastical authority refused to accept as vows in the canonical sense, or as religious vows.⁷ In this

¹ April 24, 1626, *ibid.*, 202.

² May 1627, *ibid.*, 206 *seqq.*; *cf.* 225 *seq.*, 232 *seqq.*

³ August 22, 1628, *ibid.*, 222 *seq.*, 225.

⁴ He said so himself later: "J'avais les sens interdits comme un homme surpris du bruit du canon qu'on tire proche de lui sans qu'il pense; . . . je demeurai sans parole, si fort étonné d'une telle proposition que lui-même (the Prior of Saint-Lazare) s'en apercevant, me dit: Quoi! vous tremblez!" To N. Étienne, January 30, 1656, COSTE, V., 533.

⁵ *Ibid.*, XIII., 244-7. The deed of January 7, 1632, for the transfer, *ibid.*, 234-244. For the history of Saint-Lazare, *ibid.*, XIV., 529 *seqq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, XIII., 257-267.

⁷ In a letter to Blatiron of February 19, 1655, Vincent develops the reasons for all this, *ibid.*, V., 315-323.

form the vows were approved by the Archbishop of Paris¹ as well as by the assembly of the French clergy of 1642 and by a committee of theologians of Paris.² The Roman authorities and the Pope held back their approval for a time but it was finally granted, after prolonged efforts, by Alexander VII., on September 22nd, 1655.³

Like the Congregation of the priests of the Mission, the Association of Sisters which Vincent called to life, also owed its origin to a seemingly trifling occasion. In one of his sermons as parish priest of Châtillon he had recommended a destitute family to the charity of his parishioners, with the result that that family was overwhelmed with food and other gifts. From this occurrence Vincent learnt that if charity was to be effective, zeal and love of the neighbour were not enough; there was need also of intelligent direction which would see to a proper distribution of charitable gifts. Accordingly he founded at Châtillon an association of devout ladies⁴ with mission to take in hand, in methodical fashion, the spiritual and material care of the sick and the poor. Other associations of the same kind composed of men, or of men and women, joined themselves to this one and for all of them Vincent laid down rules of conduct.⁵

By degrees these associations became so numerous that Vincent could no longer visit and encourage them personally, hence he was compelled to look for someone to take his place. Unlike himself the suitable person whom he had the good fortune to discover was not naturally directed by her very birth and upbringing towards a fellow-feeling for the lower classes,⁶ on the contrary, Louise Le Gras was sprung from a

¹ October 19, 1641, *ibid.*, XIII., 283-6.

² *Ibid.*, XIV., 443.

³ *Ibid.*, XIII., 380-2.

⁴ *Confrérie de la charité.*

⁵ COSTE, XIII., 417-537.

⁶ GOBILLON, *La vie de mademoiselle Le Gras*, Paris, 1676. More recent biographies by BAUNARD (Paris, 1898), E. DE BROGLIE (*ibid.*, 1912). A chronology of her life in COSTE, XIV., 319 *seq.*

most distinguished family. Her father was Louis de Marillac, Seigneur of Ferrières, one of whose two brothers was Keeper of the Seals and the other a Marshal of France. On the completion of a careful education, Louise had given her hand to Antoine Le Gras, Privy Councillor to Queen Marie de Medici. Notwithstanding her noble birth and refined upbringing, Louise felt drawn to the service of the sick and the poor even as a wife and mother, and when her husband died at the end of 1625, she began to live a life wholly consecrated to God. In 1624, Bishop Jean Pierre Camus, who had been her spiritual guide until then, on returning to his diocese, had directed her to Vincent de Paul¹ with whom, in spite of her delicate health, she henceforth co-operated as the indispensable complement of all his charitable undertakings. "When one sees her," Vincent wrote,² "one would think she came from the grave, so frail is her body and so pale her countenance; but God knows what strength of mind she possesses." From 1629 onwards Vincent used to send Louise on rounds of inspection of all his charitable associations.³ Accompanied, as a rule, by a few companions and provided with bandages and medicine, the great lady of former days now journeyed in a miserable coach, from village to village, putting up in wretched hostelries and partaking of the coarse food they supplied. Wherever she went she called together the members of the charitable associations, instructed and encouraged them and personally attended to the sick. She herself defrayed her travelling expenses and persevered in her laborious task in spite of her physical weakness.

Soon the sphere of her activity expanded. So long as this Society of Christian charity restricted itself to the villages, it consisted of simple people who personally visited the sick; but when it began to rope in the bigger localities and the capital itself, the aristocratic ladies shrank from visiting the poor in their miserable abodes and sent their maids instead.

¹ COSTE, I., 25, note, 85, note 1.

² To Blatiron, December 13, 1647, *ibid.*, III., 256 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 73 *seq.*

The latter, however, were not animated by the right spirit for such visits. Accordingly Vincent replaced them with pious country girls and since these " Daughters of Charity " (*Filles de la Charité*) were in need of instruction both as regards the care of the sick and the religious spirit, Vincent assigned to them a Superior in the person of Madame Le Gras.¹

All these works had grown, as it were, spontaneously, the one out of the other, but with the establishment of the " Daughters of Charity " the history of the care of the sick entered upon a new phase.

It now became woman's sphere to an unprecedented extent. However obvious it seems to us to-day that women, more than men, understand the needs of the sick and have the gentleness of touch, the compassion, the patience and the spirit of endurance which enable them to hold out in the midst of trials, the Middle Ages had known only one autonomous female nursing association, viz. the *Béguines*, and they only treated the sick in their own houses ; the others were simple pious associations linked to similar ones of men and they never acquired any importance. If religious societies of this kind were to develop and to last for centuries, they needed to be held together by the strong ties of perpetual vows. But as understood by the Middle Ages, religious vows for communities of women were unthinkable without perpetual enclosure ; yet such permanent segregation from the world rendered sick nursing on a large scale utterly impossible. Francis de Sales, in his Order, had allocated a large field to works of mercy, but the opposition he encountered was such that he dropped his first plan and restored the enclosure.² Vincent realized the conception of Francis and in this respect his society took the place of the one designed by the Bishop of Geneva, but lest he too should founder on the rock of the enclosure, Vincent wished the Sisters of Charity to be known as a simple Society

¹ Vincent himself describes the origin of the Congregation in this way in an account sent to the Archbishop of Paris, August or September, 1645, *COSTE*, II., 549 ; X., 101.

² *Cf.* our account, Vol. XXVI., 73.

or Sisterhood, not as a Congregation, lest someone should get it into his head to introduce the enclosure, as had been done for the creation of the Bishop of Geneva. He instructed the Sisters to resist any such attempt and to proclaim that it was their ambition to win the crown which God had intended for the Daughters of St. Mary, viz. the Visitation founded by St. Francis.¹ For all that, the Sisters carried out all the obligations of a religious Order; thus, for instance, their poverty was most strict. "You are entitled," Vincent used to say,² "to food and raiment, the rest belongs to the poor"; and of obedience, he said³ that as one diamond was worth more than a whole mountain of ordinary stones, so was humble subjection more precious than a whole string of good works. At a later date and at the request of the Sisters,⁴ he allowed them to take the three vows privately; but such vows could not turn them into nuns since there was no acceptance on the part of the Society.

Vincent was fully aware of the bearing of these regulations. The aim of the Society, he told the Sisters,⁵ was to imitate Christ Himself who went about doing good and healing the

¹ "de peur, si le nom de congrégation vous était donné, il s'en trouvât qui voulussent à l'avenir changer la maison en cloître et se faire religieuses, comme ont fait les filles de Sainte-Marie (the Visitation). Dieu a permis que de pauvres filles ont succédé à la place de ces dames. . . . Dites que vous voulez avoir la couronne que Dieu avait préparée aux filles de Sainte-Marie. Ne consentez jamais au changement. . . . Mes sœurs, je vous en conjure par les entrailles de mon cœur" (Conference to his Sisters on August 8, 1655, in COSTE, X., 102 seq.). The designation *Confrérie*, however, failed to please many of the Sisters (*ibid.*, VII., 440).

² *Ibid.*, IX., 89.

³ To L. de Marillac, April, 1630, *ibid.*, I., 82.

⁴ July 19, 1640, *ibid.*, IX., 25 seq., cf. 14. On March 25, 1642, Louise de Marillac and four others took their perpetual vows; after Vincent's death the custom arose of all members taking the three vows but always only for one year; *ibid.*, V., 353, note 4.

⁵ July 5, 1640, *ibid.*, IX., 15 seq.

sick. " You have the happiness of being the first to be called to so holy a service. With the exception of the women who ministered to the Son of God and to the Apostles, there has never been a Society with such a purpose in the Church of God." And what he said to the " Ladies of Charity " was likewise applicable to the Sisters,¹ namely that God had bestowed on them a rare and extraordinary privilege. " Nearly eight hundred years have gone by since women have exercised any public office in the Church. Formerly there were deaconesses whose duty it was to keep order among the women in church and to teach them the ceremonies which were then in use. However, about the time of Charlemagne, by a special dispensation of Providence, this custom became obsolete and your sex was deprived of every office and has held none ever since." At this time, however, Providence decreed otherwise and once more they were to be " mothers of the foundlings, to direct their hospital and to dispense the alms of Paris in the provinces, more particularly among the destitute ". In other respects also, Vincent used to tell the Sisters that their Society was a novelty, for they were the first to undertake every kind of work of mercy, to tend the sick both in their homes and in the hospitals and to care for their bodies, to instruct the poor, to take in the foundlings and to minister to prisoners and to the insane.² That the Society answered a need was proved by its rapid diffusion³: requests for Sisters poured in from all parts.⁴

In his two Societies Vincent had in hand two powerful instruments for the exercise of charity on the widest scale. Though it was not actually his ambition to see " the priests of the Mission " as numerous as possible—in fact he even feared

¹ July 11, 1657, *ibid.*, XIII., 809 *seq.* Cf. X., 594: " Les histoires ecclésiastiques et profanes ne disent point que l'on ait jamais fait ce que vous faites. . . . Oui, mon Sauveur, vous avez attendu jusqu'à cette heure pour vous former une Compagnie qui continue ce que vous avez commencé."

² COSTE, IX., 593 *seq.*; X., 113 *seqq.*, 124 *seqq.*, 143 *seq.*

³ Summary of the various establishments, *ibid.*, XIV., 109 *seq.*

⁴ Vincent, July 7, 1647, *ibid.*, III., 210; cf. X., 222; XIII., 751.

a too rapid spread of the Society¹—it nevertheless struck deep roots in a number of towns of France and Italy even in Vincent's lifetime.² At the time of the founder's death it counted 426 members of whom 196 were lay associates³—a splendid band on whom Vincent inculcated again and again the care of the poor. Christ Himself, he said, had had no higher aim: if He had been asked what it was He came to do on earth He would have had but one answer: to relieve the poor. They were His companions: He was but seldom seen in the towns, whereas He was nearly always to be found evangelizing the villages.⁴ "Should not a priest die of shame," Vincent exclaimed whilst speaking of the humility of the Son of God, "if he strove for honours whilst in the service of God, when he sees Jesus Christ rewarded for his labours with mockeries and a gibbet?"⁵ Accordingly, he banished all rhetorical efforts from the pulpit: the people were to be told in quite simple language and with simple arguments what they should do or leave undone. Masterpieces of eloquence did not bring about a change of conduct in their hearers whilst on the other hand he would never have done were he to relate only the

¹ *Ibid.*, XIV., 400.

² Houses were founded in 1635 at Toul, in 1637 at La Rose, near Agen, in 1638 at Richelieu, Luçon, Troyes, in 1639 at Alet, in 1640 at Annecy, in 1641 at Crêcy, in 1643 at Marseilles, Cahors, Sedan, in 1645 at Le Mans, Saint-Méen, Genoa, in 1648 at Tréguier, Agen, in 1650 at Périgueux (soon abandoned), in 1652 at Notre-Dame-de-Lorm, in 1654 at Turin and Agde, in 1655 at Rome, in 1658 at Meaux, in 1659 at Montpellier and Narbonne (*cf.* COSTE, XIV., 394-8). The Congregation settled in Poland through the influence of the French wife of John Casimir (MAYNARD, III., 60-97). A beginning was made in the foreign mission field with a settlement in Madagascar but the attempt had to be given up in 1674, after it had cost the Congregation 27 lives in 25 years (*ibid.*, 104-155; *cf.* COSTE, XIV., 359-365). For the plan of a mission on Lebanon see COSTE, VI., 19, 24, and R. RISTELHUEBER, in *Études*, CL. (1917), 713.

³ *Civiltà Catt.*, 1925, III., 102.

⁴ Conference of October 29, 1638, in COSTE, XI. 108.

⁵ To A. Portail, *ibid.*, I., 294 *seq.*

smallest fraction of what God had wrought by means of the simple discourses of the priests of the Mission.¹ These remarkable successes did not long remain confined to France. In the *Campagna*, with Rome as their centre, and in Corsica with Genoa as their base, the Lazarists induced even bandits and the most degraded of men to repent of their crimes.² In Ireland the priests of the Mission, according to the Bishop of Limerick, had accomplished more than the rest of the clergy together and through their ministry the greater part of the aristocracy had returned to the practice of an exemplary life.³ The missionaries whom Vincent sent to Scotland were able to report gratifying successes at least from the Hebrides, for in those islands Protestantism had not as yet struck deep roots ; however, there was a dearth of priests and the people had run wild. The Irish Lazarist Dermot Duiguin in particular successfully recalled many to a Christian and religious life.⁴

The missions which they gave to the rural populations of France brought it strongly home to Vincent and to his priests that their work was hopeless unless the clergy were raised from the low level to which they had in great part fallen. The means to that end had been indicated by Trent ; it was the erection of seminaries. But it was precisely in France that this work met with the strongest opposition. Vincent himself attests that the Bishops were anxious to have such training centres.⁵

¹ Conference of August 20, 1655, on the "petite méthode" in preaching ; *ibid.*, XI., 257-287 ; *cf.* 268 *seq.*, 270. *Cf.* J. CALVET, *L'influence de St. Vincent de Paul sur la prédication*, in the *Bullet. de litt. éccles.*, 1904, 312-19.

² Report from Corsica, July, 1652, in COSTE, IV., 411-16 ; *cf.* XI., 268 *seq.*

³ Bishop Edmund Dwyer to Vincent, about August, 1648, *ibid.*, III., 356. Similarly Bishop Thomas Walsh of Cashel, August 16, 1648, *ibid.*, 357 ; see BELLESHEIM, *Irland*, II., 506 *seq.* ; MAYNARD, III., 36 *seqq.*

⁴ Reports of October 28, 1652, and April, 1654, in COSTE, IV., 515 *seq.*, V., 116 *seq.*

⁵ He names, for instance, the Bishops of Meaux and Saintes. To Lebreton, February 3, 1641, *ibid.*, II., 153.

Bérulle's Oratorians had devoted themselves from the first to the task of raising the standard of the clergy by means of conferences of priests and by endeavouring to give to young men the necessary preparatory training in their houses, and in 1642 they erected regular seminaries in Paris and Rouen.¹ In 1644 Vincent wrote that there were seminaries at Bordeaux, Reims, Rouen, but that nowhere had the Church of France derived much benefit from them and that in Italy also, with the exception of Rome and Milan, things were no better. The explanation of this failure he sees in too literal an application of the decree of Trent which led to the admission of excessively youthful candidates who failed to persevere.²

Vincent was not opposed to boys' seminaries; he had had one himself since 1636 in the *Collège des Bons Enfants*.³ However, he very soon put that building to a different use. Already in 1628, starting at Beauvais, he had given the exercises in preparation for ordination⁴ in the course of which, besides ascetical directions, he also gave instructions on the duties of the priestly life. He soon realized that so short a preparation was inadequate. In 1640 Richelieu, to whom he explained that one or two years were the very minimum required, gave him 1,000 scudi for the maintenance of twelve clerics. These were joined by so many others who were able to pay their own expenses, that by 1645 the College had become too small, so that the *Petit-Séminaire* had to be transferred to Saint-Charles. Thus was effected the separation between the *Petit* and the *Grand-Séminaire*, a measure which proved a success. Not many years after Vincent was able to write⁵ that *Bons-Enfants* was full and that Saint-Charles was doing well.⁶

¹ N. PRUNEL, in the *Études*, CXVIII. (1909), 344-355.

² To Codoing, May 13, 1644, in COSTE, II., 459 *seq.*; to Lebreton, February 3, 1641, *ibid.*, 152 *seqq.*

³ COSTE, II., 226, 535.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I., 65.

⁵ March 10, 1652, *ibid.*, V., 334.

⁶ On April 9, 1647 (*ibid.*, III., 167) Vincent counted sixty priests at the *Bons-Enfants*, forty Seminarists at Saint-Charles, thirty priests at Cahors, eight in Annecy, eight at Le Mans, twelve to fifteen at Saint-Méen.

This first successful step was followed by others. The Lazarists were not the only ones to direct such establishments—the Sulpicians surpassed them—but when the Revolution broke out fifty-four *Grands-Séminaires* and nine *Petits-Séminaires* were in their hands.¹ Vincent attached quite as much importance to this educational work of his Society as to its popular missions² for he felt that the seminaries “were almost the only means for raising the status of the clergy”.³ On the other hand Vincent himself testified that not all priests were bad. For the purpose of encouraging the zeal of the fervent ones he gathered them together every Tuesday, when he spoke to them on the duties of a priest’s life, and with a view to the amendment of those who led bad lives he arranged for almost uninterrupted retreats at Saint Lazare, a measure which led to important results. Priests came from great distances in order to put their consciences in order at Saint-Lazare and of those who attended the Tuesday conferences Vincent himself affirmed that all of them led exemplary lives.⁴

In the priests who regularly attended these conferences Vincent had as it were founded yet another Association to whom he could recommend his works of mercy, with excellent

¹ MAYNARD, II., 197 *seq.* Cf. DEGERT, *Hist. des Séminaires français jusqu’à la Révolution*, Paris, 1912.

² COSTE, III., 273; V., 489; XII., 83.

³ To Menestrier and Rivet, August 26, 1657, *ibid.*, VI., 422, 424. Vincent wrote to the Bishop of Dax on October 2, 1647 (*ibid.*, III., 243): “Si vous, Monseigneur, ordonnez que nul sera reçu aux saints ordres qui n’ait passé six mois pour le moins dans votre séminaire, dans quinze ans vous aurez la consolation de voir que votre clergé aura changé de face.”

⁴ “Ce n’est pas que tous les prêtres soient dans le dérèglement; non, o Sauveur! qu’il y a de saints ecclésiastiques! Il nous en vient tant ici en retraite, des curés et autres qui viennent de bien loin pour mettre bon ordre à leur intérieur! Et combien de bons et de saints prêtres à Paris! Il y en a grand nombre et entre ces Messieurs de la Conférence qui s’assemblent ici, il n’y en a un qui ne soit homme d’exemple; ils travaillent tous avec des fruits non pareils (*ibid.*, XI., 10). Cf. for the effects of the Exercises, Dehorgny, in MAYNARD, II., 198–200.

results. Another benevolent society consisted of ladies of the upper classes of Paris.¹ One day he received the visit of the youthful widow of President Goussault who was unreservedly given to works of mercy. She lamented the absence of order in the hospital where the sick of every class, nation and religion were all mixed up ; the nursing Sisters of St. Augustine could not, unaided, apply a remedy to existing abuses. Accordingly her idea was to band together a few ladies of position and to get them to visit the sick. Vincent only fell in with the proposal when urged by the Archbishop of Paris. The new association was inaugurated at a meeting in the house of Madame Goussault.² In July of the following year it numbered 100–120 members drawn from the highest circles of society who did wonders among the 800–900 sick whose goodwill they won by adding some dainties to the ordinary hospital menu.³ Every three months fourteen ladies were appointed to visit and comfort the sick.⁴

The abundant resources and opportunities for benevolent purposes of which Vincent disposed through his associations and confraternities, enabled him in some measure to relieve the wretched condition of two classes of men whose welfare he had had at heart from the first days of his priestly life. As a slave in Tunis he became acquainted with the pitiable state of the captive Christians in the Berber States of Northern Africa, and as tutor in the house of Count Gondi, the Commander of the Mediterranean fleet, he saw the appalling conditions which prevailed among the criminals condemned for their infamies to the slavery of the galleys. Many years had to go by before Vincent was able to do anything for North Africa, but in 1643 the Duchess of Aiguillon put at his disposal the sum of 14,000 livres for the maintenance of four Lazarists

¹ *Dames de la charité de l'Hôtel-Dieu*. SEC DE BROGLIE, 135 *seq.* Cf. above, p. 459.

² Between January and March, 1634, COSTE, I., 229.

³ *Ibid.*, 253. The number was given as forty to fifty in 1656 ; *ibid.*, VI., 52. Addresses given by Vincent to the Ladies of Charity, *ibid.*, XIII., 761–820.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 762 *seq.*

at Marseilles who, besides attending to the personnel of the galleys and the prison hospital of Marseilles, were also entrusted with the cure of souls in the Berber States.¹ From their headquarters at the house of the French Consul, and as his chaplains, the Lazarists worked successfully among the Christian slaves in Tunis from 1645, and in Algiers from 1646 onwards.² On the death of the French Consul, the Bey of Tunis commanded the Lazarist Jean Le Vacher to take his place. When the Duchess of Aiguillon had purchased the right of appointment to the Consulate of Tunis and Algiers, that office was actually held by the Lazarists at least for a time.³ For the rest Vincent realized full well that the piracy of the Berber States could not be stopped by peaceful means. His plan was that the Mediterranean should first be swept clean of the Corsair ships, after which Algiers and Tunis could be wrested by force of arms from the power of Islam. These suggestions found an echo with Queen Anne and Richelieu. In 1620 Count Gondi carried out some successful cruises for the purpose of clearing the Mediterranean and in 1636 Harcourt and the Archbishop of Bordeaux undertook a campaign which was continued by Admiral Manti and others up till 1666.⁴

The supreme direction of the cure of souls on the galleys had been in Vincent's hands long before he founded his various societies.⁵ Arrangements were subsequently arrived at by which the office was always to go with that of the Superior of the Lazarists and Vincent was to be at liberty to pass on his powers to the Superior of the Lazarist house at Marseilles.⁶

¹ Document of July 25, 1643, in COSTE, XIII., 298-301.

² Cf. the reports of Julian Guérin and Jean Le Vacher, printed in COSTE, XIV., 254, 338.

³ Cf. Vincent to De la Haye-Vantelay, *ibid.*, V., 82-6. Obligations of the Consuls and missionaries in the States of Barbary, *ibid.*, XIII., 313.

⁴ DE GRAMMONT, in the *Rev. hist.*, XXVII. (1885), 21.

⁵ Royal decree of February 8, 1619, in COSTE, XIII., 55.

⁶ Decree of January 16, 1644, *ibid.*, 302 *seq.*; decree on the powers of the Aumonier royal des galères, *ibid.*, 309 *seq.*; rules for the chaplains of the galleys, *ibid.*, 310 *seq.* For Vincent's

During his stay with Count Gondi, Vincent personally attended to the galley-slaves, sought to win their embittered souls by divers acts of kindness and gave them conferences and missions, first at Marseilles and subsequently at Bordeaux when the galleys were transferred there during the siege of La Rochelle. There also his inventive charity won many triumphs.¹

Vincent even made use of some of his Daughters of Charity, as the Sisters of Charity were at first called, in the service of the convicts who were awaiting transportation to Marseilles in the prisons of Paris. "What a privilege it is," he assured them,² "to be allowed to minister to these poor galley-slaves who are handed over to people devoid of all compassion! I have seen them, the poor fellows, treated like beasts. God Himself was moved to pity: hence His goodness has done two things for them: first of all He has provided a house for them (Vincent had obtained the transfer of the convicts from their dungeons to better lodgings),³ and secondly He has so disposed things that they should be served by His own daughters, for Daughter of Charity signifies Daughter of God."

In the same conference to his Daughters of God Vincent traced the history of the rise of their work of mercy.⁴ They began by tending the sick wherever their services were called for. This was something new, for until then societies of this kind had only done so in the hospitals. Previous to their work

part in the founding of the hospital for convicts in Marseilles, *cf. ibid.*, II., 525-7. Of De la Coste, Vincent wrote on August 6, 1649, that he "avait le principal soin de l'hôpital des forçats de Marseille et qui en était comme l'auteur et le protecteur"; *ibid.*, III., 474. *Cf. COSTE*, in *Bullet. de litt. éccles.*, 1917, 364 *seqq.*; H. SIMARD, *St. Vincent et ses œuvres à Marseille*, Lyon, 1894.

¹ MAYNARD, I., 190 *seqq.* The story that in order to free a desperate prisoner, he had taken his place and put on his chains, is based on a misunderstanding. *Cf. COSTE*, in the *Rev. de Gascogne*, X. (1910), 292-308.

² October 18, 1655, in *COSTE*, X., 125.

³ MAYNARD, I., 188 *seq.*

⁴ *COSTE*, X., 124 *seq.*

for the galley-slaves they had undertaken yet another work of mercy, namely the care of foundlings. He also mentioned what they were doing for the destitute sick, for the old people in the hospitals of the Holy Name and for the insane.¹ If we add to this that the Sisters also taught poor girls,² tended the wounded in times of war,³ took care of the orphaned children in the localities ravaged by wars,⁴ not many forms of human misery will be left which their charity did not strive to relieve. The fate of the foundlings was particularly near Vincent's heart. As he himself explains, there was not enough money available for their maintenance,⁵ hence they had to be handed over to the first comer who often allowed them to die of hunger or sold them for thirty livres per head; such buyers as lived by begging often broke their arms or legs in order to rouse more easily the pity of the passers-by. In 1638 Vincent persuaded the Ladies of Charity to begin by receiving a dozen of these foundlings in a special home in order that they might be better cared for. A little later he suggested that they should extend their solicitude to all of them. The main difficulty was the question of money. For five or six foundlings, on Vincent's own admission, they needed 550 livres.⁶ Now they had to reckon annually with about two to three hundred poor creatures abandoned by their parents. Even though they only rescued fifty each year, expenses would amount to 4,000 livres. The difficulty seemed insuperable and Vincent could only tell them to do all they could. However on January 17th, 1638, he was able to write to Louise de Marillac⁷ that a largely attended meeting of the Ladies of Charity had

¹ *Ibid.*

² See the passages, *ibid.*, XIV., 115 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, III, for the years 1653, 1656, 1658.

⁴ *Ibid.*, V., 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, XIII., 775. *Ibid.*, 798, he says that they were sold "à des gueux huit sols la pièce. . . Il ne s'en trouve pas un seul en vie depuis 50 ans," except a few who had been made over to childless women.

⁶ COSTE, XIII., 776.

⁷ *Ibid.*, II., 6.

decided to adopt not only some of the foundlings, but all of them. The Sisters of Charity were available for this work also¹; soon it was in full swing. But the question of money always remained a problem. In the course of 1647, when the war caused great straits, Vincent himself no longer knew which way to turn. So he convened his Ladies of Charity, reminded them of all they had done for their protégés and told them that the poor creatures would be lost if those who had hitherto sheltered them were to stay their hand: "They will live if your charity goes on providing for them: they will most certainly perish and die if you abandon them." These simple words touched every heart: the undertaking was saved.²

The Hospital of the "Holy Name of Jesus", founded in 1633 with the help of a gift of 100,000 livres from an anonymous benefactor, and destined by Vincent to shelter forty old men,³ in view of its happy development, raised a hope in the hearts of the Ladies of Charity that Vincent would be able to realize yet another, immensely greater undertaking. At that time one of the plagues of society and a constant danger were the bands of professional beggars who in Paris alone constituted a fifth of its 200,000 inhabitants. They formed a strongly organized body, under regular leaders, and at night sheltered in eleven large courts.⁴ The idea of putting an end to such disorder by collecting the beggars in one large hospital where they would be made to work under proper surveillance, had long been entertained though no one felt capable of successfully carrying out so gigantic an undertaking. Now at last the right man had been found in the person of Vincent. The Ladies of Charity offered him large sums and from the Queen he obtained the extensive buildings of the Salpêtrière. However, he did not agree with all the ideas of his supporters; he objected in particular to the use of force when dealing with the beggars, and in the end he refused to burden his missionary priests and his Sisters of Charity with so gigantic a task.

¹ *Ibid.*, I., 437; II., 581.

² *Ibid.*, XIII., 801.

³ *Ibid.*, IV., 552; MAYNARD, III., 347 *seqq.*

⁴ MAYNARD, III., 351 *seqq.*

Nevertheless his disciple, and subsequent biographer, Abelly, became director of the hospital and several of the priests who attended the Tuesday Conferences eventually joined him.

The undertakings hitherto described are so vast that it is almost impossible to see how one poor, humble priest could be their originator. Yet after the year 1639, he accomplished even greater wonders for he became the benefactor of entire provinces devastated by war. In consequence of the wavering policy of Duke Charles IV., Lorraine had become involved in a war with France. Undisciplined French troops ravaged the land, the fields remained untilled for years, and owing to the lack of magistrates crime went unpunished. When in 1636 Richelieu declared war against Austria and Spain, all the miseries that follow in the wake of war also swept over Champagne and Picardie. These frontier provinces were in turn ravaged now by German troops under Johann von Werth and Piccolomini, now by French troops, for in those days friendly troops behaved no better than enemy ones, seeing that the mercenaries were always recruited from the same dregs of society. When the year 1648 brought peace with the German Empire, Condé rebelled in the eastern provinces, fighting for the Fronde against his own king, with the help of Spanish troops. These protracted campaigns, together with famine and pestilence, reduced the wretched population to appalling depths of misery. Thus we are told that in 1652, at Saint-Quentin, some of the starving populace were devouring the miserable rags that covered them and gnawing their own hands and wrists,¹ whilst at Étampes there were people who dug themselves into dunghills at night for the sake of a little warmth,² nor are these isolated reports.

The extent of Vincent's power for good, by means of his Societies and Confraternities and the immense sums he was able to collect, was now fully revealed. He began by going to the assistance of unhappy Lorraine. He sent two Lazarists

¹ COSTE, IV., 300.

² *Ibid.*, 488. Cf. ALPH. FEILLET, *La misère au temps de la Fronde et St. Vincent de Paul*, Paris, 1862.

to Metz, Toul, Verdun and Nancy respectively, each of whom had at his disposal 2,000 livres a month.¹ At a later date, Bar-le-Duc, Saint-Michel and Pont-à-Mousson became the centres of their relief work.² Bread to the value of 2,500 livres was distributed monthly.³ In 1650 Vincent also extended his charitable activity to the territory in which Condé and Turenne had fought out their quarrel for and against the Fronde, a territory stretching from Picardie and Champagne as far as the outskirts of Paris. The necessary funds were provided by the Ladies of Charity, whilst the missionary priests and the lay brothers, according to a letter of Vincent,⁴ visited the ravaged localities, ascertained the number of the destitute and the extent of their needs, the requirements of the sick and of such as were not able to earn a livelihood, and everywhere they distributed the clothes, seed corn and money with which they had been supplied. Their accounts of the spiritual and material misery which they encountered were printed and the Ladies of Charity distributed them in the houses of the well-to-do where they solicited alms. For a few years the monthly expenses amounted to as much as 16,000 livres. However, alms were getting sensibly less, as Vincent had to confess in 1657,⁵ owing to the scarcity of money and the rise in the price of corn in Paris. But, generally speaking, we are confronted with the spectacle of amazing charity. On one occasion Louis XIII. gave 45,000 livres for the religious of Lorraine⁶ who were enduring the most dire poverty and an unknown personage once gave 25,000 livres.⁷ On July 11th,

¹ To L. de Marillac, May 10, 1639, in COSTE, I., 551.

² To Codoing, July 26, 1640, *ibid.*, II., 80.

³ *Ibid.*, I., 590.

⁴ July 28, 1656, *ibid.*, VI., 52.

⁵ *Ibid.* In the following year Vincent wrote of the want in his own house, saying that often he could not pay for the necessary food. Everyone in Paris felt the scarcity; instead of the 16,000 livres which he formerly sent to the frontier provinces, he could only raise 1,000 and that with difficulty. November 17, 1657, *ibid.*, VI., 614.

⁶ Vincent to Codoing, July 26, 1640, *ibid.*, II., 80.

⁷ To Codoing, August 26, 1640, *ibid.*, 103.

1657, Vincent told the Ladies of Charity¹ that between July 15th, 1650, and the last general meeting, 348,000 livres had been distributed and another 19,500 since then, but that this was little by comparison with previous years. These sums had been spent on the destitute sick ; moreover about eight hundred orphan boys and girls from the devastated territories had been collected and cared for ; these children were being educated, provided with clothes and placed with artisans or in domestic service. By means of these sums he had been able to help many parish priests who otherwise would have had to leave their flocks, and to carry out the most urgent repairs to the churches which were in a pitiable condition. The localities where the alms had been distributed were Reims, Rethel, Laon, Saint-Quentin, Ham, Marle, Sedan and Arras. Besides money, clothing, bedding, blankets, shirts, vestments, missals and ciboriums had also been distributed. The houses of many of the ladies had been so stocked with articles of this kind that they looked rather like the warehouses of big merchants. " Providence," Vincent said,² " has had recourse to some Parisian ladies in order to assist two devastated provinces. Does not this strike you as something novel and unique ? History relates nothing like it of the ladies of Spain and Italy or any other country."

It was also a novel idea to extract and to broadcast by means of the printing press, the more interesting and touching details in the reports of the missionaries. Such accounts, after the manner of newspapers, appeared between September, 1650, and December, 1655. In them everyone could read how the soups provided by the alms of Paris had saved the lives of more than 2,000 sick refugees at Guise, Ribemont, La Fère and Ham ; how the nuns of La Fère and other places had been saved from starvation,³ how the bodies of the poor were swollen and covered with sores because they had nothing to eat except roots and bread that the dogs would hardly touch ; how a number of them dragged themselves over a distance of two or three miles in order to get a little soup, etc.⁴ So keen was the

¹ *Ibid.*, XIII., 804.

² *Ibid.*, 806.

³ *Ibid.*, IV., 88.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 97.

demand for these reports that reprints had to be made and they acted as a spur to renewed generosity.

Besides the Lazarists, other Orders also, at least in the neighbourhood of Paris, took a share in the distribution of alms, for instance the Jesuits, the priests of Saint-Nicolas-du-Chardonnet, the Capuchins, the Dominicans and others,¹ but the "priests of the Mission were the most experienced, and set an example to the rest".² Special zeal was also displayed by the Company of the Blessed Sacrament. Vincent had himself joined it and there can be no doubt that he taught it much, just as he in turn learnt from it,³ for as a matter of fact, Vincent did not make it a point to carry out none but his own ideas. He was emphatically not one of those men who delight in the vast schemes born of a brilliant imagination, or who throw off ideas which they leave it to others to translate into realities. More than one of his most important undertakings was due to the suggestion of someone else, and when a plan had taken root in his mind he never precipitated its execution. There were those who actually complained of his slowness, but he would reply that deliberateness had never yet harmed him, that precipitation leads nowhere, that the works of God develop only very gradually and that which is destined to last longest, takes longest to reach completion.⁴ However, once he had realized that an undertaking was possible, and had made up his mind to carry it through, he would allow no obstacle to deter him. If, for the time being, he was unable to get all he wanted, or only a small part of it, he did the little he was able to do, thus advancing step by step, from one thing to another, until enterprises were finally brought to fruition which he himself had not thought of at first. "All this," he says of his foundations,⁵ "has come to life by degrees, without its having been possible to say who gave the first impulse.

¹ *Ibid.*, IV., 540, note 10.

² *Ibid.*, 541.

³ *Ibid.*, and COSTE, in *Bullet. de litt. écclési.*, 1907, 353-369.

⁴ Cf. the passages, in COSTE, XIV., 197, s.v. *Empressement*.

⁵ Conference of May 17, 1658, *ibid.*, XII., 6-10. Cf. his letter to the too tempestuous Philip Le Vacher in Algiers (1650 or 1651) : "On gâte souvent les bonnes œuvres pour aller trop vite, pource

I had never thought either of our rules, our Congregation or as much as the word Mission—God has done it all. When I consider the guidance by which it has pleased God to cause this Society to rise in the Church, I confess I no longer know where I am ; all that I see around me appears like a dream. Everything has come about beyond my expectations and without my having given it a thought.”

Yet all the while the wonderful things he had achieved seemed to him small and inadequate. He himself confesses that whenever, in his earlier years, he returned to Paris from some mission,¹ he used to feel as if the city gates were about to fall on him and crush him because he did not spread in other localities the good he had done in the place he had just left, so that he was to blame for the loss of many souls. “ O what a wretched man I am,” he exclaims in the same address. “ I talk, but do nothing ! I tell others what they should do, but do it not myself ! ”² So lofty was his conception of the dignity and the duties of the priesthood that he often said that had he realized it as he did then, he would never have dared to become a priest.³ A priest who beholds Christ on the cross should be ashamed to die in his bed⁴ ; for himself he would have wished to breathe his last behind some hedge whilst on a mission.⁵ It was his most deeply rooted conviction that all that he himself or his companions were able to accomplish, was the work of God and an undeserved gift to one who was unworthy. The greater the success the more keenly he felt this sense of unworthiness : “ O, who will help us

que l'on agit selon ses inclinations, qui emportent l'esprit et la raison, et font penser que le bien que l'on voit à faire est faisable et de saison ; ce qui n'est pas ; et l'on le reconnaît dans la suite par le mauvais succès. Le bien que Dieu veut, se fait quasi de lui-même, sans qu'on y pense ” ; this was how it had been with all the works of the Congregation. COSTE, IV., c. 122.

¹ Address on November 25, 1657, *ibid.*, XI., 445.

² *Ibid.*, 444.

³ *Ibid.*, V., 568 ; VII., 463.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I., 294.

⁵ *Ibid.*, V., 204.

to abase ourselves even beneath hell itself," he once wrote after receiving a big gift,¹ "where can we hide ourselves when we behold the great goodness of God towards us?" and he can think of but one answer to his question: "in the wounds of our Lord."

It must be borne in mind that all Vincent's labours and sacrifices in the service of society were not the fruit of a vague, indeterminate humanitarianism and philanthropy, but that all he accomplished grew out of his Christianity and is wholly and utterly Christian. Christ is the pattern both of his Society of the priests of the Mission and his Sisters of Charity: it was their vocation to continue His life of sacrifice, in His spirit, after the pattern set by Him, and for His sake. Accordingly, for him the bodily welfare of his protégés is not the supreme object: before all else he aims at helping souls and that not only for the duration of this earthly existence, but for all eternity. In this way Vincent combined seemingly opposite characteristics; on the one hand a burning love of God, which found frequent expression in his addresses to his followers, and on the other hand the greatest coolness and caution in making his plans. His love of God, though so strong and ardent, expressed itself in a different manner from that of St. Philip Neri—his was predominantly an active love: "Let us love God, my brethren," he said, "but let us love Him at the expense of our arms and in the sweat of our brow."² Of visions there is hardly mention in his life and when in 1641 he declared that Madame de Chantal's entry into eternity had been shown to him, he expressly added that up to that time he never had had a vision.³ Vincent himself said that his favourite virtues, and the chief objects of his striving, were

¹ To Codoing, August 26, 1640, *ibid.*, II., 103.

² "Aimons Dieu, mes frères, aimons Dieu, mais que ce soit aux dépens de nos bras, que ce soit à la sueur de nos visages." COSTE, XI., 40.

³ "Mais ce qui fait penser que c'est une vraie vision, c'est qu'il n'est point sujet à aucune et n'a jamais eu que celle-ci" (*ibid.*, XIII., 127; *cf.* II., 122). He told the Sisters of Charity that ecstasies "sont plus dommageables qu'utiles" (*ibid.*, IX., 30).

simplicity, straightforwardness, and uprightness.¹ Closely related to this "holy simplicity" was a humility which in any other man would have been considered affected and insincere.² In his case, on the contrary, we are prepared to believe that even his strongest expressions in this respect came from the heart. It was humility that drew him towards the poor and the lowly; and it was precisely his devotion to the disinherited members of society which won for him immense prestige with the highest and the wealthiest and which led him to the Court itself. Louis XIII. sent for him that he might prepare him for death, and in his arms the King died.³ Shortly before his death he had requested Vincent to draw up a list of suitable candidates for the episcopate and he declared that, if he recovered, no one should be raised to that dignity who had not spent three years in the house of the Mission.⁴

Subsequently also Vincent had a great deal to do with episcopal nominations.⁵ After the death of Louis XIII. (May, 1643) the Queen-Regent, Anne, made him a member of the Council which assisted her in the business of government. Thus it came about that the son of a peasant, to whom high-born prebend-hunters paid eager court, sat next to Mazarin, the all-powerful minister, the Chancellor Séguier, the Bishops of Lisieux and Beauvais and the Grand Penitentiary of Paris, to decide jointly with them questions on which depended the welfare or injury of the French Church. It is not to be supposed that he felt at ease in the atmosphere of the Court; he only attended the Council when summoned,⁶ and would only deal

¹ "La sainte simplicité. . . . C'est la vertu que j'aime le plus et à laquelle je fais plus attention dans mes actions, si me semble." To Du Coudray, November 6, 1654, *ibid.*, I., 284.

² Cf. the passages, *ibid.*, XIV., 269 *seq.*

³ Vincent to Codoing, May 15, 1643, *ibid.*, II., 393 *seq.* "Depuis que je suis sur la terre, je n'ai vu mourir une personne plus chrétiennement" writes Vincent, *ibid.*; cf. X., 342 *seq.*

⁴ Vincent to Codoing, April 17, 1643, *ibid.*, II., 387; cf. XI., 132.

⁵ MAYNARD, III., 407 *seqq.*

⁶ "en cour, où je ne vas si on ne m'y appelle, ce qui arrive rarement." To the Vicar-General of Toul, July 8, 1650, *ibid.*, IV., 29.

with questions which concerned the Church or the poor,¹ and when a rumour spread that he had been dismissed from the "Council of Conscience" he ascribed to his sins the fact that the rumour was "unfortunately" not true.²

Fénelon of Cambrai, the former Bishop of Alet, the first President De Lamoignon, all bear eloquent testimony to his independence towards the Queen,³ whilst the dexterity with which he sometimes rejected demands for episcopal sees without giving offence may be admired to this day in some of his letters.⁴ Those Bishops who were animated by truly ecclesiastical sentiments were of course delighted to see Vincent in the "Council of Conscience". More than any other the zealous Bishop of Cahors, Alain de Solminihac, was wont to importune Vincent as soon as the danger arose of an unworthy candidate being named to a bishopric.⁵ Thus, to give but one instance, at Périgueux there was a youthful Bishop who not only put off his departure for his diocese, but there was also a proposal to give him an inexperienced Vicar-General. Alain begged Vincent⁶ to do his utmost with the Queen, Mazarin and the young Bishop himself, with a view to preventing such a step. In the same letter he also recommended to him some business of the Bishop of Lectoure and the reform of the Dominicans of Cahors, begging him to do his utmost, as before, for the appointment of good Bishops, for this was the greatest service he could render to God.⁷ The Bishop-Elect of Périgueux resigned at once, but the danger then arose of the nephew of the Bishop of Condom being appointed in his place. Without losing a moment Solminihac wrote to Vincent,⁸ begging him

¹ To Gallais, February 13, 1644, *ibid.*, IV., 29.

² To Codoing, January 1, 1645, *ibid.*, 500.

³ In MAYNARD, III., 400.

⁴ COSTE, IV., 18 *seq.*, 88 *seq.*

⁵ H. BREMOND, in the *Correspondant*, April 10, 1922, 117 *seqq.*

⁶ July 31, 1646, in COSTE, II., 625; III., 228.

⁷ "et de travailler fortement toujours, comme vous avez fait, à procurer de bons évêques à l'Église, qui est le plus grand service que vous sussiez rendre à Notre-Seigneur. *Ibid.*, II., 626.

⁸ August 20, 1647, *ibid.*, III., 228.

to oppose this nomination with all his might. Alain had yet another request : the Bishop of Valence was being hindered in his office by the lay Governor ; let Vincent persuade Mazarin to intervene ; if necessary the Governor could be removed, for it was easy to find good Governors but difficult to find good Bishops.¹

In this way he was for ever urging his friend to press for reforms and again for reforms : " I beg of you in God's name," he wrote,² " to have pity on the dioceses of Montauban and Sarlat, as well as on my own, which suffers in consequence of the disorders that obtain in the former " ; and since there was as yet no improvement in Périgueux he exclaims : " Will that poor diocese be left for ever in its wretched condition ? I had a mind to write to the Marquise de Senecey and, if you will, tell the Queen that I have written these things to you, and that there is nothing of which she will have to give to God a stricter account than if she fails to nominate to bishoprics men possessed of the requisite qualities.³ In this way the Bishop was for ever pleading now for this diocese, now for that,⁴ as well as for a number of monasteries in need of reform.⁵ We still possess some forty letters of this kind addressed to Vincent. Besides the Bishop of Cahors, several other prelates likewise appealed to the Saint, for instance the Bishops of Alet and Puy and the General of the Dominicans, Tucco.⁶ But the grandest recognition of Vincent's influence in the Council of Conscience lies in the fact that the cunning diplomatist who continued the work of Richelieu sought to paralyse his activity in this respect. Mazarin began by convening the Council of Conscience more and more rarely and by October 2nd, 1652, things had come to such a pass that Alain de Solminihac had

¹ *Ibid.*, 229.

² March 3, 1647, *ibid.*, 152.

³ To Vincent, April, 1648 *ibid.*, 295.

⁴ For Bordeaux, *ibid.*, II., 564 ; for Rhodéz, *ibid.*, III., 293 ; for Tulle, *ibid.*, IV., 24 ; for Toulouse, *ibid.*, 244 ; anxiety for a successor for himself, *ibid.*, IV., 146, 219.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II., 443, 464, 563 ; III., 238.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II., 536 ; III., 391, 394, 469.

to lament the fact that Vincent was no longer even a member of that Council.¹ During ten years he had taken an active part in its deliberations and in that time he had done a great deal, to the best advantage of the episcopate and the Orders.²

Mazarin was not mistaken when he saw in Vincent a dangerous opponent of his policy. The Saint had indeed strictly enjoined his followers not to meddle with affairs of State or even to speak of such matters.³ However, there was another side to Mazarin's policy besides the purely political one, one that laid upon the poor people unbearable burdens and injured religion. Like Richelieu, his master, Mazarin put the political greatness of France above that of the Church with whose purple he was adorned : like Richelieu he passionately sought to encompass the downfall of the Habsburgs, heedless of the fact that thereby he was hindering the Catholic Restoration in France and helping Protestantism to victory in North Germany.⁴

Vincent and Mazarin were contemporaries : the minister died in 1661, Vincent on September 27th, 1660, the most faithful of his collaborators, Portail and Louise de Marillac having preceded him in death by a few months. More than once the two men had stood face to face ; often, too, they had sat in the same Council Chamber ; both have greatly influenced their age and left a deep imprint on the history of the world. But what a contrast between them ! Mazarin, caution and cunning personified, Vincent the embodiment of lovable simplicity and straightforwardness ; the minister, besides directing the affairs of the State, equally keen to increase his power, to add to his wealth, to make princely provision for his relatives, whereas with Vincent it was an understood thing that self had always to be kept in the background, so much so that during the troubles of the Fronde he even had the courage to counsel the all-powerful minister to sacrifice himself in order to calm the storm.⁵ Mazarin's work did not last. It had been

¹ *Ibid.*, IV., 491 ; *cf.* 545.

² MAYNARD, III., 404-492.

³ To Lebreton, February 28, 1640, in COSTE, II., 29 *seq.*

⁴ *Cf.* MAYNARD, IV., 14 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

the Cardinal's determination to increase the royal power, and he succeeded indeed in enhancing it, but by so doing he roused the Revolution which overturned the throne. On the other hand, the work of Vincent withstood not only the storms of the Revolution, but will stand in time to come. It is not difficult to decide which of the two men was the greater benefactor of mankind.