READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

HISTORY OF ROME

THE WAR FOR SUPREMACY IN THE WEST

CHAPTER I

CARTHAGE.

OPPOSITE to the far-spreading peninsulas and deep indented shores of Europe and her numerous islands, stretches in a long and uniform line the stony coast of Africa, the most compact part of the old as well as of the new world. No more marked contrast can be found, in such immediate between proximity, upon the surface of the globe, than the two continents which form the abodes of the black and white races of man. The solid mass of land in the sultry south, the primeval seat of unmitigated barbarism, has remained closed to the present day against the refinement of a higher civilization, whilst Europe early received the seed of culture and unfolded the richest and most varied forms of intellectual, social, and political life. On the east of Africa the narrow valley formed by the Nile is indeed separated from the heart of the African continent, and on the north the cheerless wastes of the interior bound a belt of land of varying breadth along the coast which is capable of much cultivation. These regions differ, however, essentially from the sea-girt islands and peninsulas of Europe, where a milder sun and a greater variety of climate have brought about gentler manners and richer forms of social and political life.

The Mediterranean Sea, on whose shores the stream of migration from east to west was arrested and divided, turned the Semitic races to the north coast of Africa and the Indo-Europeans or Aryans to the countries of Europe; and although its waters could not prevent the hostile encounters and alternating invasions of these two radically different peoples, still it has formed, during the lapse of centuries, an immovable barrier between them, dividing the civilized lands of Christian Europe from those of the Mohammedan Barbaresks who have again sunk almost into savagery.

We have but uncertain information with respect to the original population of the countries which extend from Egypt to the Atlantic Ocean and from the desert to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. One single race of people, the Libyans, divided into various branches, of which the Numidians, the Mauritanians, and the Gaetulians are the most important, have had possession of these regions from the earliest times; and in spite of migrations and mixing of races, the present Berbers may be considered the direct descendants of the original population. The nature of the soil caused considerable difference in the mode of life and in the character of the population. In the fruitful border-lands of the sea-coast, the Libyans led an industrious agricultural life; the shepherd hordes of the Numidians and Mauritanians ranged through the steppes and deserts; and in the recesses of the Atlas, the Gaetulians dragged on a miserable existence. None of these tribes possessed in themselves the elements of a higher cultivation. This cultivation came to them from without. During a period of many centuries, the Phoenicians, a people distinguished by ingenuity and enterprise, made the north coast of Africa the object of their voyages, and there they planted numerous colonies. It would appear that the course of these earliest explorers and founders of cities was at first directed more to the north of the Mediterranean; but encountering the Greeks on the shores and islands of the Aegean Sea, they retired before the greater energy of that people, in order to find on the coast of Africa and the western part of the Mediterranean an undisturbed territory for the development of their commercial and colonial policy. Thus numerous Phoenician settlements were formed on the coast of Africa, in Spain, and in many of the western islands.

The Phoenician colonies did not essentially differ from the Greek. Unlike the Roman colonies, they were not established by the mother country, in order to further her political aims, to extend and strengthen her dominion, and to be kept in dependence upon her. On the contrary, their foundation was the result of a spirit of enterprise in the emigrants, of internal quarrels at home, or of commercial projects; and only a weak bond of affection or interest united them with each other and with the mother country. Nevertheless the isolated and at first independent Phoenician cities in the west gradually grew into one powerful united state; and this small Semitic people succeeded by their concentrated and well-regulated force in ruling for centuries over numerous populations composed of differing races, and in stamping upon them an impression which was recognizable ages after the fall of the Phoenician dominion.

This union of the widely spread Phoenician communities into one state was the work of Carthage. No domestic or foreign historian has explained to us by what happy circumstances, by what political or military superiority on the part of the Carthaginians, or by what statesmen or generals, this union of scattered elements was brought about. The ancient history of Carthage has dis­appeared even more completely than that of her great rival Rome, and in its place we find only idle stories and fables. Dido or Elissa, the Tyrian princess, who is said to have emigrated from her native country in the ninth century before our era, at the head of a portion of the discontented nobility, and to have founded Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage, appears in the light of historical investigation to be a goddess. The stories of the purchase of a site for the new city, of the ox-hide cut into strips, and of the rent which for many years had to be paid for the land to native princes, are legends of as much, worth as those of the Roman asylum, or the rape of the Sabines. Carthage was at first, like Rome, an unimportant city, whose foundation and early history could not have aroused the attention of contemporary writers. She was but one among the many Phoenician colonies, and not even the oldest Phoenician settlement on the African coast. But the happy situation of Carthage appears to have promoted the early and rapid growth of the city; which, asserting her supremacy over her sister cities, placed herself at the head of all the settle­ments belonging to the Phoenician race. She made conquests and founded colonies, and gained dominion over the western seas and coasts by her commercial influence and by the strength of her forces in war.

The Carthaginian empire was in its constitution not unlike that of Rome. Both had grown out of one city as their centre; both ruled over allies of alien and of kindred race; both had sent out numerous colonies, and through them had spread their nationality. But with all this resemblance there were causes existing which impressed upon the two states widely different characteristics and determined their several destinies.

We dare not decide whether Rome was richer than Carthage in political wisdom and warlike spirit. Both these qualities distinguished the two peoples in the highest degree, developed their national strength, and made the struggle between them the longest and most chequered that is known in ancient history. Even we, who draw our knowledge of the Carthaginians only from the questionable statements of Greek and Roman writers, can arrive at a full conviction that they were at least worthy rivals of the Romans. The decision in the great contest did not depend upon superiority of mind or courage. No Roman army ever fought more bravely than that under Hamilcar Barcas on Mount Eryx, or than the garrison of Lilybaeum, or than the Carthaginians in their last desperate conflict with Scipio the Destroyer. The wisdom of the Roman senate, which we cannot rate too highly, did not accomplish more than the senate of Carthage, which for 600 years governed the greatest commercial state in the old world without a single fundamental revolution. What, then, was the decisive force which, after the long trembling of the balance between Rome and Carthage, turned the scale? It was the homogeneousness of the material out of which the Roman state was constructed, as compared with the varied elements which formed the Carthaginian. The Romans were Latins, of the same blood as the Sabines, the Samnites, the Lucanians, and the Campanians, and all the other races which formed the prin­cipal stock of the population of Italy. They were related in blood even with their Grecian allies, and they harmonised in a great measure with the Etruscans in their mode of life, in political thought and religious rites. But the Carthaginians were strangers in Africa, and they remained so to the end. The hard soil of Africa produced an unimpressible race, and the Semitic Phoenicians were exclu­sive in their intercourse with strangers. Though the Carthaginians and Libyans lived together in Africa for many centuries, the difference between them never dis­appeared. With the Romans it was different. They could not help growing into one people with their subjects. Difference of race rendered this impossible to the Carthaginians. If they had been numerous enough to absorb the Libyans, this fact would have been less prejudicial. But their mother country, Phoenicia, was too small to send out ever-fresh supplies of emigrants. The roots of their power had not therefore struck deep enough into the soil of their new home, and the fearful storm which broke upon them in the Roman wars tore them up.

To this element of national weakness was added a second. Italy is a compact, well-defined land. Large enough to hold a numerous population, it is not broken up by mountains nor deeply indented by arms of the sea, like Greece. It is surrounded on almost all sides by water, and consequently not much exposed to the danger of foreign encroachments. If we compare this with the Carthaginian territory, we shall find that the long stretch of coast from Cyrene to the ocean, her uncertain frontier towards the interior of the African continent, her scattered possessions beyond the sea, in Sicily, Sardinia, Malta, the Balearic Isles and in Spain, formed a very unsafe basis for the formation of a powerful and durable state.

These were the weak parts of Carthage. It has indeed been said that the Carthaginians were merely a nation of traders, bent on gain, animated by no warlike spirit, and that therefore they were doomed to succumb in the struggle with Rome. But this assertion is untrue, and the inference is unjust. The Carthaginians were by no means exclusively a commercial and trading people. They practised agriculture no less than the Romans. Their system of tillage was even more rational and more advanced than the Roman. They had writings on husbandry which the Roman senate caused to be translated expressly for the instruction of the Roman people. If, therefore, peasants possess more than the people of towns the requisite quali­ties of good soldiers, (which may, however, be doubted), still this fact would be no argument for denying that the Carthaginians excelled in war. And indeed how could a people have been wanting in warlike spirit who braved the storms and rocks of every sea, who established themselves on every coast, and subdued the wildest and boldest races? If the Carthaginians formed their armies out of hired foreign troops and not out of citizens, the cause is not to be found in their want of courage or deficient patriotism. The men, and even the women, of Carthage were ever ready to sacrifice their lives for the defence of their homes; but for their foreign wars they counted the blood of citizens too dear. A mercenary army cost the state less than an army of citizens, who were much too valuable as artisans or merchants, as officials or overseers, to serve as common soldiers. Military service is sought only by rude and poor nations as a means of subsistence. The Samnites, the Iberians, the Gauls, and the Ligurians, and, among the Greeks especially, the Arcadians and the rest of the Peloponnesians, served for hire, because they were needy or uncultivated. Love of the military service as a profession and occupation of life is never found in the mass of an advanced people where the value of labour ranks high. We must not on this account reproach such a nation with cowardice. The English are surpassed by no people of Europe in bravery; and yet in England, except the officers, none but the lowest classes adopt a soldier’s life, because it is the worst paid. Of course in times of national enthu­siasm or danger it is different. Then every member of a healthy state willingly takes up arms. So it was among the Carthaginians, and therefore we are not justified in crediting them with less capacity for war than the bravest nations of the old world.

In speaking of the Carthaginian people we must strictly include only the Punians, that is to say, the population of pure Phoenician descent. These were to be found only in the city of Carthage and in the other Phoenician colonies, and were very few in proportion to the mass of the remaining population. The aboriginal African race of the Libyans inhabited the fruitful region south of Carthage to the lake Tritonis; these the Phoenician settlers had reduced to complete dependence and made tributary. They were now the subjects of Carthage, and their lot was not enviable. It is true that they were personally free; but they formed no part of the Carthagi­nian people, and they had no rights but those which the generosity or policy of the Carthaginians granted them. The amount of the services which they had to render to the state was not fixed and determined by mutual agreement, by stipulation or law, but depended on the neces­sities of Carthage; and on this account they were always ready to join with foreign enemies whenever the soil of Africa became the theatre of war.

During the 600 years of Carthaginian supremacy, a certain mingling of the races of the Libyans and Carthaginians naturally took place. A number of Carthaginians, citizens of pure Phoenician blood, settled among the Libyans, and thus arose the mixed race of the Liby-Phoenicians, who probably spread Carthaginian customs and the Phoenician language in Africa in the same way as the Latin colonies carried the Latin language and Roman customs over Italy. From these Liby-Phoenicians were principally taken the colonists who were sent out by Carthage to form settlements, not only in Africa, but also in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and the other islands. We have no very accurate information about the Liby-Phoenicians. Whether they were more animated by the Phoenician spirit, or whether the Libyan nationality prevailed, must remain undecided. It is, however, probable that, in course of time, they assumed more and more of the Phoenician character.

The Carthaginian citizens, the native Libyans, and the mixed population of the Liby-Phoenicians constituted therefore, in strictness of speech, the republic of Carthage, in the same way as Rome, the Roman colonies, and the subject Italian population formed the body of the Roman state. But the wider Carthaginian empire included three other elements; the confederate Punic cities, the dependent African nomadic races, and the foreign possessions.

It is a sure sign of the political ability of the Carthaginians that, so far as we know, no wars arising from jealousy and rivalry took place between the different Phoenician colonies, like those which ruined the once flourishing Greek settlements in Italy and Sicily. It is true that the Phoenicians were careful to exclude other nations from the regions where they had founded their trading establishments, and Carthage may also have en­deavoured to concentrate the trade of her African possessions in Carthage itself. But there were no wars of extermination between different cities and the Phoenician race. All the Tyrian and Sidonian colonies in Africa, on the islands of the western Mediterranean Sea, and in Spain, which had in part been formed before Carthage, gradually joined themselves to her, and acknowledged her as the head of their nation. How this union was effected is hidden in the darkness of the early Carthaginian history. We may perhaps assume that the common national and mercantile interests prompted the isolated settlements of the far-sighted Phoenicians to a peaceful union and sub­ordination to the most powerful state. Thus it was possible for a handful of men of a foreign race to establish in a distant part of the world an extensive dominion over scattered tracts of land and wild barbarian populations.

The most important city of these Phoenician confederates was Utica, situated at no great distance north of Carthage at the mouth of the river Bagradas. In the public treaties which Carthage concluded, Utica was generally mentioned as one of the contracting parties. It was therefore rather an ally than a subject of Carthage, holding to her the same relationship which Praeneste and some other Italian cities bore to Some. We have very little information about the remaining Phoenician cities on the north coast of Africa. None of them were of such importance as to be placed in the same rank with Carthage and Utica. They were bound to pay a fixed tribute and to furnish contingents of troops, but they enjoyed self-government and they retained their own laws.

On the south and west of the immediate territory of the Carthaginian republic lived various races of native Libyans, who are commonly known by the name of Numidians. But these were in no way, as their Greek name (Nomads) would seem to imply, exclusively pastoral races. Several districts in their possession, especially in the modern Algeria, were admirably suited for agriculture. Hence they had not only fixed and permanent abodes, but a number of not unimportant cities, of which Hippo and Cirta, the residences of the chief Numidian princes, were the most considerable. Their own interest, far more than the superior force of the Carthaginians, bound the chiefs of several Numidian races as allies to the rich commercial city. They assisted in great part in carrying on the com­merce of Carthage with the interior parts of Africa, and derived a profit from this forwarding trade. The military service in the Carthaginian armies had great attractions for the needy sons of the desert, who delighted above all things in robbery and plunder; and the light cavalry of the Numidians was equalled neither by the Romans nor by the Greeks. A wise policy on the part of Carthage kept the princes of Numidia in good humour. Presents, marks of honour, and intermarriage with noble Carthaginian ladies, united them with the city, which thus disposed of them without their suspecting that they were in a state of dependence. That, however, such an uncertain, fluctuating alliance was not without danger for Carthage—that the excitable Numidians, caring only for their own immediate advantage, would join the enemies of Carthage without scruple in the hour of need, Carthage was doomed to experience to her sorrow in her wars with Rome.

Besides her own immediate territory in Africa, the allied Phoenician cities, and the Numidian confederates, Carthage had also a number of foreign possessions and colonies, extending her name and influence throughout the western parts of the Mediterranean Sea. A line of colonies had been founded on the north coast of Africa as far as the Straits of Gibraltar, and even on the western shore of the continent, i.e. on the coasts of Numidia and Mauritania; but these were intended to further the com­merce of Carthage, not in any way to assist her in her conquests. In like manner, the earliest settlements in Spain and the islands of the Mediterranean, in Malta, the Balearic and Lipari Isles, in Sardinia, and especially in Sicily, were originally trading factories, and not colonies in the Roman sense. But where commerce required the protection of arms, these establishments were soon changed into military posts, like those of the English in the East Indies; and the conquest of larger or smaller tracts of land and of entire islands was the consequence. It is evident that for several centuries the Carthaginians in Sicily were not bent on conquest. They avoided encountering the Greeks, they gave up the whole south and east coast, where at first there had been numerous Phoenician colo­nies, and they confined themselves to a few small strongholds in the extreme west of the island, which they required as trading and shipping stations. They appear only in the fifth century to have made an attempt to get military possession of the greater part of Sicily. But after the failure of this attempt by the defeat at Himera (480 B.C.) we hear of no further similar undertakings till the time of the Peloponnesian war.

Sardinia, on the other hand, seems early to have come Sardinia, into the power of the Carthaginians, after the attempt of the Greeks of Phocaea to make a settlement there had been thwarted by the Carthaginian fleet. Sardinia was not, like Sicily, a land that attracted many strangers. It was not the eternal apple of discord of contending neigh hours, like the richer sister island, and so it seems that, as the Carthaginians found no rival there, it was acquired without much effort on their part.

Gades, the earliest Phoenician colony in Spain, and the other kindred settlements in the valley of the Baetis, the old land of Tartessus, appear to have stood in friendly relations to Carthage. The African and Spanish Phoenicians carried on an active intercourse with each other without jealousy or mutual injury, and in war they aided each other. At a later period, when Carthage was extending her conquests in Spain, Gades and the other Punic places seem to have stood to her in the same relationship as Utica.

Thus the Carthaginian state was formed out of elements differing widely from one another in origin and geogra­phical position. The constitution and organization of the state were admirably fitted for times of peace, and for commercial and industrial development. By the activity of the Carthaginian merchants, the varied productions of the several districts found their markets. The different peoples mutually supplied their wants, and could not fail to recognize their common interest in this intercourse with one another, and in the services rendered by Carthage. But for the strain of a great war such a state was too slightly framed. Prom the nature of things it was hardly to be expected that it could undertake any war with success, or survive a great reverse. But Carthage, notwith­standing, came out victoriously from many a struggle; and for centuries she maintained herself as the first state in the western sea, before she sunk under the hard blows of the Roman legions. This result was brought about by a wise political organization of the state, which bound the heterogeneous elements into one solid body.

Our information about the constitution of Carthage comes to us indirectly through Greek and Roman authors, and many points with respect to it remain obscure and unintelligible in consequence, more especially its origin and progressive development; but its general character is tolerably clear, and we cannot hesitate to rank it, on the authority of Aristotle and Polybius, among the best of ancient constitutions. A striking phenomenon may here be noted. In spite of the radically different national character of the Semitic Carthaginians, their political institutions, far from presenting a decided contrast to the Greek and Italian forms of government, resembled them strongly, not only in general outline but even in detail. This similarity led Aristotle to compare the constitution of Carthage with that of Sparta and Crete, while Polybius thinks that it resembled the Roman. This likeness may be partly explained by the fact that these foreign observers were inclined to discover analogies in Carthage to their own native institutions, and that they were strengthened in this view by the employment of Greek and Roman names, just as they were constantly recognizing the Hellenic deities in the gods of the barbarians. Put without a correspondence of outline in the constitution of these states, such a com­parison would not have been possible, and so we are compelled to infer that in political life the Carthaginians were not Asiatics but Occidentals, or else had become so through the force of circumstances.

Carthage had from the very commencement this feature in common with the Greek and Roman republics, that the state had grown out of a city and preserved the municipal form of government. In consequence a republican administration became necessary, that is to say, there took place a periodical change of elected and responsible magistrates, the people being acknowledged as the source of all political power.

The first officers of state, who were called Kings or Suffetes (a term identical with the Hebrew Shofetim, judges), were chosen by the people out of the most distinguished families. If we had more particulars about the gradual growth of the constitution of Carthage, we should probably find that these officers were at first invested with comprehensive powers, but that in the course of time, like the corresponding authorities in Athens, Sparta, Rome, and other places, they became more and more restricted, and had to resign to other functionaries a part of their original authority. At a later period, the suffetes appear to have discharged only religious and other honorary functions, such as the presidency in the senate; and perhaps they also took some part in the administration of justice. It is remarkable that we cannot state with cer­tainty whether one or two suffetes held office at the same time; but it would seem probable that there were always two, as they were compared to the Spartan kings and the Roman consuls. Still more uncertain is the duration of their term of office. It may perhaps be taken for granted that, if the dignity was originally conferred for life, it was afterwards limited to the period of a year.

The most important office, though perhaps not the highest in rank, was that of the military commander. This was not limited to a fixed time, and seems generally to have been endowed with extensive, in fact almost dictatorial power, though subject to the gravest responsibility. In the organisation and employment of this im­portant dignity, the Carthaginians proved their political wisdom, and chiefly to this they owed their great successes and the spread of their power. While the Romans continued year after year to place new consuls with divided powers at the head of their brave legions, even when fighting against such foes as Hannibal, the Carthaginians bad early arrived at the conviction that vast and distant wars could be brought to a successful issue only by men who had uncontrolled and permanent authority in their own army.

NO petty jealousy, no republican fear of tyranny, kept them from intrusting the whole power of the state to the most approved generals, even if they belonged, as repeatedly happened, to an eminent family, and succeeded to the command as if by hereditary right. For a whole century members of the Mago family were at the head of the Carthaginian armies, and Carthage owed to their prudence and courage the establishment of her dominion in Sicily and Sardinia. This feature of the constitution of Carthage stands out in boldest relief in the war of Hannibal, when, according to the common view, the most flourishing age of the state was already over. Hamilcar Barcas, the heroic father, was followed by his heroic son-in-law, Hasdrubal; and Hamilcar’s fame was only sur­passed by that of his more glorious sons. None of these men ever attempted to destroy the freedom of the republic, while in Greece and Sicily republican institutions were always in danger of being overthrown by successful generals, a fate which Rome herself suffered at a later period. The Carthaginian commanders-in-chief, like the generals of modern history, were uncontrolled masters in the field, but always subject to the civil authority of the state. The statesmen of Carthage sought to obtain their end by a strict subordination of the military to the civil power, and by the severe punishment of offenders; not by splitting up the chief command, or limiting its duration. They instituted a civil commission, consisting of members of the select council, who accompanied the generals to the field, and superintended any political measures, such as the conclusion of treaties. Thus every Carthaginian army represented in a certain degree the state in miniature; the generals were the executive, the committee of senators were the senate, and the Carthaginians serving in the army were the people. How far such a control of the generals was unwise or the punishments unjust, we have no means of deciding with our scanty means of information. But the fact that the best citizens were always ready to devote their energies and their lives to the service of their country speaks well for the wisdom of the control and the justice of the sentences.

In addition to the suffetes and generals, other Carthaginian officers are occasionally mentioned, and these are designated by corresponding Latin names, such as praetors and quaestors. In a powerful, well-ordered, and complicated political organism, like the Carthaginian republic, there were of course many officials and many branches of the administration. To hold an office without salary was an honour, and consequently the administration was in the hands of families distinguished by birth and riches.

These families were represented, everywhere among the ancients, in the senate, which in truth was the soul of the Carthaginian state, as it was of the Roman, and which really conducted the whole foreign and domestic policy. In spite of this conspicuous position, which must always have attracted the attention of other nations, we have no satisfactory information about the organization of the Carthaginian senate. It would seem that it was numerous, containing one or two special committees, which in the course of time became established as special boards of administration and justice. The criminal and political jurisdiction was intrusted to a body of 100 or 104 members, who probably formed a special division of the senate, though we are by no means certain of it. According to Aristotle, they were chosen from the Pentarchies, by which we are perhaps to understand divisions of the senate into committees of five members each. At least it is impossible that the Carthaginian senate could have remained at the head of the administration if the judicial office had passed into other hands. But if the Hundred (or Hundred-and-four) were a portion of the senate, and were periodically renewed from among the greater body, they could act as their commissioners. Through these the senate controlled the entire political life, keeping especially the generals in dependence on the civil authority. The Corporation of the Hundred, which had at first been renewed by the yearly choice of new members, assumed gradually a more permanent character by the re-election of the same men, and this may have led to their separating themselves as a distinct branch of the government from the rest of the senate. A second division of the great council is men­tioned, under the name of select council. This numbered thirty members, and seems to have been a supreme board of administration. No information has come down to us with respect to the choice of members, the duration of their office, or their special functions. Our knowledge, therefore, of the organization of the Carthaginian senate taken altogether is very imperfect, though there can be little doubt about its general character and its power in the state.

The influence of the people seems to have been of little moment. It is reported that they had only to give their votes where a difference of opinion arose between the senate and the suffetes. The assembly of the people had the right of electing the magistrates. But that was a privilege of small importance in a state where birth and wealth decided the election. The highest offices of state were, if not exactly purchasable, as Aristotle declares, still easily attained by the rich and influential, as in all countries where public offices conferring interest and profit are obtained by popular election.

In the Greek republics the people exercised their sovereignty in the popular tribunals still more than in the election of magistrates. The choice of the magistrates could, in a fully developed democracy, be effected by lot, but only the well-considered verdict of the citizens could give a decision affecting the life and freedom of a fellow-citizen. These popular tribunals, which, as being guided and influenced by caprice, prejudice, and political passions, caused unspeakable mischief among the Greek states, were unknown in Carthage. The firmness and steadiness of the Carthaginian constitution was no doubt in a great measure owing to the circumstance that the judicial Board of the Hundred (or Hundred-and-four) had in their own hands the administration of criminal justice.

The Carthaginian state had in truth, as Polybius states, a mixed constitution like Rome. In other words, it was neither a pure monarchy nor an exclusive aristocracy nor yet a perfect democracy; but all three elements were combined in it. Yet it is clear that one of these elements, the aristocracy, greatly preponderated. The nobility of Carthage were not a nobility of blood, like the Roman patricians; but this honour appears, like the later nobility in Rome, to have been open to merit and riches, as was to be expected in a commercial city. The tendency towards plutocracy draws down the greatest censure which Aristotle passes upon Carthage. Some families were conspicuous by their hereditary and almost regal influence. But, in spite of this, monarchy was never established in Carthage, though the attempt is said to have been made twice. No complete revolution ever took place, and there was no breach with the past. Political life there was in all its fullness, and consequently also there were political conflicts; but these never resulted in revolutions stained with blood and atrocities, such as took place in most of the Greek cities, and in none more often than in the unhappy city of Syracuse. In this respect, therefore, Carthage may be compared with Rome; in both alike the internal development of the state advanced slowly without any violent reaction, and on this account Aristotle bestows on her deserved praise. This steadiness of her constitution, which lasted for more than 600 years, was due, according to Aristotle, to the extent of the Carthaginian dominion over subject territories, whereby the state was enabled to get rid of malcontent citizens and to send them as colonists elsewhere. But it is mainly due, after all, to the firm and wise government of the Carthaginian aristocracy.

CHAPTER II.

SICILY.