

THE ATTIC ORATORS

FROM

ANTIPHON TO ISAEOS.

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CHAPTER XII.

ISOKRATES.

LIFE.

ISOKRATES was born five years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and died just after the battle of Chaeroneia. It might have been expected that such a life, touching both limits of such a century, would have been in its written records the vivid image of that century itself, with all its vicissitudes of struggle, with all its variety of impressive contrasts. One whose youth had known the intense and desperate energy of that war in which Imperial Athens was fighting for existence, whose early manhood had witnessed the terrible and moving drama of her overthrow, whose middle age had been passed under the dominion of Sparta now changed from the deliverer into the despot, whose later days had seen the restoration of Athens to the headship of a great Confederacy, the rise of Epameinondas—a second, though a Theban, Perikles for Greece—and his death before his national patriotism could give a new coherence to the nation, then

the space of hopeless quarrelling and confusion, with the voice of Demosthenes heard above it all, but heard in vain, till Philip came in and struck his blow—surely, it might have been thought, a political essayist with such a compass of personal experience must be of almost unique value for the comparison of period with period. Isokrates in one sense disappoints any such hope. For us, he lives and thinks and feels almost exclusively in the years 380—338 B.C. By his ideas and aspirations, by the whole bent of his character, he is thoroughly detached from that order of things under which the first part of his long life was passed; he has carried little or nothing of its mind on with him; it is a memory, giving a certain tragic irony to his after-life, not a force blending with the new forces. As Antiphon breathes the spirit of the elder commonwealth, as Andokides is associated with the troubled politics of Athens in the second half of the Peloponnesian War, as Lysias expresses the ordinary citizen-life of the restored democracy, so Isokrates is distinctively the man of the decadence—an Athenian, still more a Greek, of the age of declining independence.

Birth and parentage.

Isokrates was born in 436 B.C. (Ol. 86. 1.)—five years before the birth of Xenophon¹, a native of the same deme of Erchia, and seven years before the birth of Plato. His father Theodoros owned slaves skilled in the trade of flute-making,—a

¹ Curtius (v. 147, Ward) follows Bergk in assigning the birth of Xenophon to 431 B.C.

fact of which Comedy, when it attacked Isokrates, did not forget to avail itself¹,—and was rich enough to have been choregus; his mother's name was Hêduto. He had three brothers, Diomnêstos, Tele-sippos and Theodoros; and a sister. The teachers of the young Isokrates are variously enumerated. One thing is clear, that two contrasted influences came to bear upon his early training; the influence of Sokrates and the influence of the sophists.

The dramatic date of the *Phaedros*—whatever is its actual date—may be placed about 410 B. C., when Isokrates was twenty-six years of age, and when Lysias, according to the received account, was forty-eight. At the end of the conversation, Sokrates suggests that Phaedros should relate it to his friend Lysias.

*The augury
of the
Platonic
Sokrates.*

Phaedros. And you—what will you do? *Your* friend ought not to be neglected either.

Sokrates. And who is he?

Phaedros. The gentle Isokrates. What message will you take to him, Sokrates? What are we to call him?

Sokr. Isokrates is still young, Phaedros; but I do not mind telling you what I prophesy of him.

Phaedros. And what may that be?

Sokr. He seems to me to have a genius above the oratory of Lysias, and altogether to be tempered of nobler elements. And so it would not surprise me if, as years go on, he should make all his predecessors seem like children in the kind of oratory to which he is now addressing himself; or if—supposing this should not content him—some diviner impulse should lead him to greater things. My dear Phaedros, a certain philosophy is inborn in him. This is my

¹ Strattis, *Atalanta*, frag. 1, Meineke, p. 292.

message, then, from the gods of the place to my pet Isokrates—and you have your message for your Lysias¹.

This memorable prophecy offers to Isokrates the choice of two careers; and the fact that, in Plato's sense, he did *not* eventually rise to the higher career only increases the interest of such a testimony. The 'philosophy' of Isokrates—the way in which he was affected by Sokrates, and his relation to the Sokratics—must be considered separately. At present we are concerned with the outer facts of his life. It appears, then, from the *Phaedros* that Isokrates was intimate with Sokrates; and further, that there was a time in his earlier life when he seemed to Plato capable of rising from the art of expression to the highest search for truth. The companionship of Sokrates has left a broad mark upon his work, in his purpose of bringing his 'philosophy' to bear directly on the civic life: the 'philosophic' bent which raised and disappointed the hopes of Plato may perhaps be traced in his constant effort to grasp general conceptions and to bring phenomena back to principles.

Early relations with the Sophists.

Nearly all the popular sophists of that day are named as teachers of Isokrates². Prodikos, skilled in the distinguishing of synonyms, seems to have been esteemed by Sokrates; and it is probable that Isokrates, like Xenophon, was a pupil of both. Pro-

¹ *Phaedr.* pp. 278—279 E, where see Dr Thompson's note.

² *Prodikos* is named by [Plut.], Suidas and the anon. biographer (in Dind. ed. of *Isokr.* 1825):—*Protagoras* by Suid.: *Theramenes* by [Plut.], Dionys., Anon.: *Gorgias*

by [Plut.], Dionys., Suid., Anon. *Tisias* is added, no doubt wrongly, by [Plut.] Dionys., Suid.; and Suidas gives 'Εργίβος,—corrected by Rulnken (*Hist. Crit.* p. 60) into 'Αρχίβος (the patriot of 403: Dem. in *Timocr.* § 135).

tagoras may have helped to form, by grammatical studies, a style which was afterwards as correct as it was free. Theramenes was the master through whom Isokrates first knew the art of Gorgias. Of all the merely literary influences which reached *Gorgias*. Isokrates, that of Gorgias was by far the strongest. Isokrates was not, indeed, a mere imitator. His matured style was not only severer but more completely artistic than that of Gorgias can ever have been. But the first literary inspiration of Isokrates came from the great Sicilian rhetorician; and it is another proof of the astonishing natural force, the power of impressing and fascinating, which Gorgias certainly possessed. It was probably not until about 390 B. C., after he had begun his professional life at Athens, that Isokrates came into personal contact with Gorgias. He then visited Gorgias in Thessaly¹; and, in all likelihood, brought back with him the idea of the work which occupied him for the next ten years,—the *Panegyrikos*.

Want of nerve and weakness of voice—defects *Life of Isokrates to 404 B. C.* which at Athens, as he says, entailed more than the ignominy of disfranchisement²—kept Isokrates out of public life. During the last years of the Peloponnesian War,—that time so vividly described in the *Memorabilia*, when it was easier to find money in

¹ *Orator* § 167. For the residence of Gorgias in Thessaly, Isokr. *Antid.* §§ 155, 6.—J. G. Pfundt, *de Isocr. vita et scriptis* p. 14, puts the visit in *Ol.* 97,—390—386 B. C. The *Panegyrikos*

belongs to 380 B. C.

² Those who want *φωνή* and *τόλμα* are *ἀτιμότεροι τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῶν δημοσίων*: *Panath.* (xii) § 10.

the streets of Athens than a man able and willing to lend it¹,—Isokrates lost all his patrimony². Then came the taking of Athens by Lysander and the eight months' rule of the Thirty Tyrants—from July, 404, to February, 403. In the autumn of 404 Theramenes was put to death. When he was denounced by Kritias, and sprang for safety to the altar, Isokrates alone, so the story went, dared to rise and make an attempt to plead for him. Theramenes begged him to desist;—death would be bitterer if it was the death of a friend too³. Whatever may be the worth of this story, it is likely that Isokrates, a young man of promise and a disciple of the new culture, should have been an object of suspicion to the party of Kritias; and the proscription of the Art of Words would have been another motive for leaving Athens in the case of one who, having lost his fortune and being unfitted for a public career, had now to rely on some kind of literary work.

*Stay of
Isokrates
at Chios,
404—403 B.C.*

It can hardly be doubted that it was at this time—in the autumn of 404—that Isokrates left Athens for Chios. In that island he opened a school of Rhetoric, and had some success. He seems to have returned to Athens either just before or just after the Athenian democracy was formally restored in September, 403⁴.

¹ Xen. *Mem.* II. vii. 2.

² *Antid.* (xv.) § 161.

³ [Plut.] *Vit. Isocr.* The story is amplified by the Anonymous Biographer, but not noticed by Dionysios, although he makes Iso-

krates a pupil of Theramenes. Compare the story of Isokrates daring to wear mourning for Sokrates [Plut].

⁴ The date of I.'s sojourn at Chios is a vexed question.

Now begins the first period of his regular professional life—that period during which he wrote speeches for the law-courts. The six forensic speeches which are extant cover a period of about ten years. The speech Against Euthynus (XXI) may be placed in 403, immediately after the restoration of the democracy; that Against Kallimachos (XVIII) in 402; the *De Bigis* (XVI) in 397 or 396; the speech Against Lochites (XX) in 394; the Trapezitikos (XVII) and Aeginetikos (XIX) in the second half of 394 or early in 393.

Life at Athens as a writer for the law-courts, 403—393 B.C.

In his later writings Isokrates nowhere recognises this phase of his own activity. He speaks with contempt of those who write for the law-courts, and emphatically claims it as his own merit that he chose nobler themes¹. It may have been partly the tone of such passages which emboldened his adopted

His later repudiation of Forensic Rhetoric.

(1) Sauppe, followed by Rauchenstein (Introd. to *Select Speeches*, p. 4), thinks that Isokr. was at Chios from about 393 to 388 B.C. His argument is this. Cicero (*Brut.* § 48) quotes Aristotle as saying that Isokrates *first* wrote forensic speeches, and *afterwards* taught rhetoric. But his earliest known forensic speech, Or. XXI, refers to 403 B.C.; the latest (Or. XVII, XIX) belong to 394 or 393. If, then, Aristotle is right, his *teaching* at Chios cannot have begun before 393.

(2) Sanneg (*De Schola Isocratea*, Halle, 1867) puts the stay at Chios in 398—395 B.C.; arguing that the years 395—388 are claimed for Athens as against Chios by

the life-chronology of certain of I.'s pupils (esp. Eunomos—Philomelos—Androtion: *Antid.* § 93).

The important point, in my view, is this:—Isokrates wrote forensic speeches for about ten years from 403: he began to teach regularly at Athens about 392. He may have taught for a livelihood at Chios in 404—3, but this was an accident. It does not represent a period of his life-work. Cic. *Brut.* § 48 does not apply to it. Surely some such strong outward pressure as the Tyranny makes I.'s migration more intelligible. I find that A. Kyprianos, τὰ ἀπόρητα τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους, Athens, 1871 (pp. 22—3) agrees with me.

¹ See especially *Panegy.* [Or. IV]

son Aphareus to assert that Isokrates had never written a forensic speech. This statement is decisively rejected by Dionysios, who concludes, on the authority of Kephisodoros, the orator's pupil, that Isokrates wrote a certain number of such speeches, though not nearly so many as Aristotle had reported¹. The modern hypothesis that Isokrates composed the extant forensic orations merely as exercises (*μελέται*), not for real causes, is another attempt to explain his later tone². But these later utterances merely mean that Isokrates regarded his former work for the law-courts as an unworthy accident of his early life previous to the beginning of his true career. Nowhere, be it observed, does he deny that he ever wrote for the courts, or that, to use his own phrase, he had been a doll-maker before he became a Pheidias³. He only says that his *choice*, his real calling, lay in another direction.

392 B.C.
Beginning
of his ca-
reer as (1)
an educator,
(2) a public-
ist.

It was about the year 392 that this choice was finally made. He opened a school at Athens near the Lykeion⁴; and thenceforth his social function

§§ 11, 12: *Panath.* [XII] § 11 :
Antid. [xv] §§ 3, 48—51, 227—8,
276.

¹ Dionys. *Isocr.* c. 18.

² This hypothesis has been maintained (e.g.) by (1) Westermann (in his *Hist. of Greek Oratory*, p. 82), (2) Benseler, *De Hiato*, p. 56 so far as regards Orr. xvi, xviii, xix, xx. He thinks xvii and xx spurious. On the other side, see Müller *Hist. Gr. Lit.* II. 159 (Donalds.); Henn *de Isocr. rhetore* (he justly lays stress on Arist.'s notice); Starke *De Oratt. Forens.*

Comment. p. 1, note; Rauchenstein *Introd.* p. 4.

³ *Antid.* § 2, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις Φειδίαν τὸν τὸ τῆς Ἀθηναῖος ἔδος ἐργασάμενον τολμῶη καλεῖν κοροπλάθον.

⁴ Probably between the Lykeion and the Kynosarges; see Sanneg. *de Schol. Isocr.* p. 14; Anon. *Biogr. πρὸς τῷ Λυκείῳ τῷ γυμνασίῳ*. The talk of the Sophists about him in the *Lykeion* (*Panath.* § 18) was held, then, in his close neighbourhood.

was twofold. He was first of all an educator; next, not for his pupils only but the whole Greek public, he was a political essayist.

The discourse Against the Sophists is the manifesto which he put forth (about 391) at the beginning of his professional life, as the speech on the Antidosis is the apologia in which about forty years later he reviewed it. In this first pamphlet he negatively defines his view of culture by protesting against three classes of 'sophists'; (1) the Eristics, by whom he seems to mean the minor Sokratics—the reference to Plato is not certain here, as in the *Helenae Encomium*—especially Eukleides and the Megarics: (2) the ordinary professors of deliberative and forensic speaking, whom he censures chiefly for the imposture (*ἀλαζόνεια*) of ascribing a boundless and infallible efficacy to a technical method; (3) the earlier writers of 'Arts,' of whom he complains, as Aristotle complained afterwards, that they confined themselves to the least worthy, the forensic, branch of Rhetoric.

Here, then, we have hinted the leading ideas of the new culture which Isokrates was preparing to interpret: (1) it is to be practical—avoiding barren subtleties: (2) it is to be rational—resting on the development of the whole intelligence, not on technicalities; (3) it is to be comprehensive—not limited to any single professional routine.

To judge from the ages of the men who were his pupils, Isokrates must have been successful from the first. The outer history of his school falls into

*The Dis-
course
'Against
the So-
phists.'*

*Leading
ideas of the
Isokratic
culture.*

three periods: 1. from 392 to 378: 2. from 376 to 351: 3. from 350 to 338 B.C.

First period of his School, 392—378 B.C.

From 392 to 378 his pupils were almost exclusively Athenian. His own literary activity is marked by the *Busiris* (391 or 390)—in which he undertakes to shew Polykrates, a rhetorician afterwards of some repute, how to treat mythical subject-matter: and by the *Panegyrikos*, which made his name known throughout Greece.

The years 378—376.

In 378 the new Confederation revived for Athens at least a shadow of that naval supremacy which had been given up just a century before. It was probably during the next two years (378—376) that Isokrates was the companion and the secretary of Timotheos the son of Konon—known to him since about 384¹, and at this time successfully energetic in organising the new League both in the Archipelago and in the Ionic Sea². The friendship of Isokrates with Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, the friend of Konon and his son, may have begun at this time.

Second period of the School, 376—351 B.C.

Between the years 376 and 351 the school of Isokrates reached the height of its prosperity and fame. His own reputation, and the new rank of Athens as the centre of the Naval Confederacy, combined to bring him pupils from all parts of Greece, from Sicily in the West and from Pontus in the East. Some of these pupils stayed three years with him, some even four. Meanwhile he was

¹ Pfundt *de Isocr. vit. et scr.* p. 16. From [Dem.] *ἑρωτικός* § 46 it appears that Timotheos was not in early youth a pupil of Iso-

krates.

² Curtius v. 87 (Ward): Samneg *de sch. Isocr.* p. 10.

writing much. In the letter *To Nikokles* (374 B.C.) and the discourse, *Nikokles, or the Cyprians* (372?), he discusses the mutual duties of king and subjects. The letter of advice *To Demonikos* is of about the same date. The *Helenae Encomium* (370) and the *Evagoras* (365) are examples of imaginative and of historical panegyric. The *Plataikos* (373) and the *Archidamos* (366) deal with the contemporary affairs of Boeotia and Lacedaemon; the *Areopagitikos* (355) and the oration *On the Peace* (355) treat the domestic and the foreign politics of Athens. The speech *On the Antidosis* (353) reviews the professional life of the writer—then eighty-three—and defends the ideas to which it had been devoted.

In the year 351 Mausôlos, dynast of Karia, died; and his widow Artemisia proposed in honour of his memory a contest of panegyric eloquence which brought a throng of brilliant rhetoricians to Halikarnassos. No competitor (it is said) presented himself who had not been a pupil of Isokrates; and it was certainly a pupil of Isokrates—Theopompos the historian—who gained the prize. A tradition that this day of glory for the school was a day of personal defeat for its master may safely be rejected. One who had always been deterred by want of nerve and of voice from speaking in the Athenian ekklesia was not likely, at the age of eighty-five, to ignore these defects, for the purpose of competing in a foreign city with his own pupils. The Isokrates named as a competitor by Suidas was unquestionably Isokrates of Apollonia¹.

¹ Suidas (s. vv. Ἀμύκλα, Ἴσοκράτης) says that none but pupils of

*Third pe-
riod of his
School,
351—338 B.C.*

The speech *On the Antidosis* (353) would have been a fitting farewell to a long and prosperous career. During the last thirteen years of his life (351—338) the foremost interest of Isokrates cannot have been in his work as a teacher. Philip of Macedon was coming to his full power; and in the *Philippos* (346) Isokrates already hails the destined restorer of Greece. But to the end of his life Isokrates continued to teach. The *Panathenaiikos* was begun in 342. It was about half-finished when he was attacked by a disease against which—when he finished the discourse in 339—he had been fighting for three years¹. But he was still working hard every day. He speaks of himself, in another place², as revising it with some young pupils. He was then ninety-seven.

*Renown of
the School.*

The importance of his school for Athens and for Greece can best be judged from the series of men whom it helped to form. Hermippos of Smyrna wrote a book on the 'Disciples of Isokrates';³ and the monograph of a modern scholar has brought together forty-one of these⁴. In the speech *On the*

Isokrates entered, and mentions 'Isokrates' as a competitor. Taylor (*Lectt. Lys.* iii. p. 233), Ruhken (*Hist Crit.* p. 85) and Clinton (*F. H.* sub anno 352) understand the Athenian orator. So also [Plut.] *Vit. Isocr.*

Photios *cod.* 176 quotes Theopompos as speaking slightly of his master Isokrates; and Porphyry's statement (*ap. Euseb. Præcept. Evang.* x. 3. P. 464 c) that Theopompos scorned Iso-

krates *because* he had beaten him was probably founded on this. Sanneg thinks that the Athenian *wrote* an oration which the Apolloniate *spoke*; an ingenious but surely an improbable compromise.

¹ *Panath.* [xii] § 267.

² *Ib.* § 200.

³ Athen. xiii. p. 592 v.

⁴ The excellent and exhaustive essay of Sanneg, *De Schola Isocrateæ* (pp. 60 : Halle, 1867), has already been more than once cited.

Antidosis it is part of the imaginary accuser's indictment that the pupils of Isokrates have been not only private persons but statesmen, generals, kings¹. Cicero describes the school of Isokrates as that in which the eloquence of all Greece was trained and perfected². Its disciples were the foremost speakers or writers of their time—brilliant, as he says elsewhere, 'either in battle or in pageant'.³ According to Dionysios, Isokrates was the most illustrious teacher of his day; he educated the best youths of his own city and of all Greece—distinguished, some as politicians, some as advocates, some as historians; and made his school the true image of Athens⁴. Among the statesmen are Timotheos, the orator Leôdamas of Acharnae, Lykurgos and Hypereides. Among the philosophers or rhetoricians are Isaeos, Isokrates of Apollonia, successor of his master in the school, and Speusippos, successor of his uncle Plato in the Academy. History is represented by Ephoros and Theopompos.

Representative pupils of Isocrates.

But it was not only or most directly through the statesmen, speakers and writers whom he trained that Isokrates was related to the public interests of his day. His own political writings, read throughout Greece, gave him greater influence upon popular opinion than belonged to any other literary man of the time; and he used this influence principally to enforce one idea.

His influence as a political writer.

¹ *Antid.* § 5.

² *Brut.* 32: *Orator* § 40.

³ *De Orat.* II. § 94, *partim in pompa, partim in acie illustres.*

⁴ Dionys. *Isocr.* c. 1, τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἰκόνα ποιήσας τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σχολήν.

*Isokrates
and Greece.
—Conflict
of tenden-
cies in the
4th century
B.C.*

The fourth century B.C. is filled with the feverish struggle of the Greek States for two objects, one of which was no sooner partly gained than it seemed to conflict with the other;—the unity of Greece, and the freedom of the individual Greek state. Athens is the centre of this struggle. The sentiment of Greek unity created by the Persian Wars revived after the exhausting struggle of the Peloponnesian War. For the next twenty years, however, it was kept down by the oppressive dominion of Sparta. In 378 it received a partial expression in the new Naval Confederacy of which Athens was the head, just as, in 478, it had been more completely expressed by the Confederacy of Delos. But the second hegemony, like the first, gradually passed into an empire irksome to the allies. At the end of twenty years it was broken up by the Social War. Unity was overthrown in favour of freedom. Two speeches of Isokrates mark the two crises.

*The Pane-
gyrikos and
the De
Pace.*

The *Panegyrikos* (381) is a call to the unity partly realised just afterwards: the speech *On the Peace* (355) foreshadows the victory soon to be gained by the rival principle of separate autonomy¹.

*Gradual
separation
of Society
from the
State.*

Under this struggle, as the cause of its feverishness and its futility, lay the mortal disease which had already stricken Greek civilisation. From the close of the colonizing period that civilisation had been almost stationary; for it was not so highly

¹ The general relation of Isokrates to the Greek and Athenian politics of his day is well sketched in Oncken's *Isokrates und Athen*

(Heidelberg, 1862). In his introduction (pp. v. vi) he has brought out this contrasted significance of the *Panegyrikos* and the *De Pace*.

or so flexibly organized that it could go on developing itself greatly on a limited area or continue to advance otherwise than by self-diffusion¹. And now the arrest of development had given place to the beginning of dissolution. The process of this dissolution might be defined as the gradual divorce of Society from the State. In the normal Greek conception Society and the State were one. The man had no existence apart from the citizen; morality was inseparable from civic virtue². But meanwhile new intellectual and moral needs had come into being, to which the limited elasticity of the state-life could no longer respond; and on the other hand Greek democracy had passed the point up to which, organized as it was, it was capable of a healthy growth. The individual had begun to draw more and more away from the State. Instead of the citizen's duty being the standard of spiritual life, the needs of individual development became the measure of what could reasonably be expected from the citizen. The most striking proof of this is the decay—almost the disappearance—of a virtue which has its root in the idea of the State—readiness for personal self-sacrifice. Active love of one's own city—the central instinct of healthy

¹ The edition of the Orations of Demosthenes and Aeschines *On the Crown*, by Mr G. A. Simcox and Mr W. H. Simcox (Oxford, 1872) contains an excellent Essay by Mr G. A. Simcox, *On the Practical Politics of the Age of Demosthenes* (pp. lxxvii—xcii), to which

I shall have occasion to refer again. See § 3, 'Arrest of the Material Development of Greece.'

² Oncken (*Isokr. u. Athen*, p. 2) points out how,—even when society was most overpowering and breaking up the State,—the theory of this identity was kept up.

Greek life—begins to merge in contemplative citizenship of the world¹.

*Athenian
cosmopoli-
tanism.*

At Athens this cosmopolitanism at least assumed its noblest form. It was there that the distinction between Greek and barbarian had taken its finest edge; and it was there that the first movement was made towards effacing it. The old Greek communal feeling, now no longer in sympathy with the State, found its new seat in the schools of the philosophers, in a republic of the cultivated and the thoughtful. They formed a polity apart, of which the franchise was possible for all who could prove kinship with the Hellenic spirit. Isokrates was the prophet, as Epameinondas and Timotheos were the practical exponents, of this new and more comprehensive Hellenism which is not of the blood but of the soul. 'Athens,' he says, 'has so distanced the rest of the world in power of thought and speech that her disciples have become the teachers of all other men. She has brought it to pass that the name of Greek should be thought no longer a matter of race but a matter of intelligence; and should be given to the participators in our culture rather than to the sharers of our common origin².'

But it was not only in this ideal sense that the sympathies of Isokrates were panhellenic: he was animated by a practical patriotism for the whole of Greece, a patriotism which was vividly affected by the miseries of the time and which burned with

¹ See especially Curtius, v. 116 and 204 (Ward).

² *Panegyrr.* § 50.

the hope of relieving them. The special evils springing from the general condition of Greece were mainly three. First;—after the Peloponnesian War the wealth of the community had ceased to grow, as population had ceased to grow about fifty years sooner. The rich went on accumulating; the poor, having no means of enriching themselves by enterprise, were for the most part occupied in watching for some chance of snatching from the rich a larger fraction of the stationary total. Secondly, the Greek desire of personal distinction was manifesting itself—since the breach between Society and the State—as the egotism of unprincipled ambition. Hence the traitors and reprobates who, as Demosthenes says, were positively admired¹. Thirdly, swarms of ‘men without cities,’ paupers, political exiles, malefactors, were for ever moving over the face of Greece, ready to take military service with any one who would pay them. In 401 Cyrus had found it difficult to raise ten thousand mercenaries from all Greece. In 338 ten thousand mercenaries formed a single contingent at Chaeroneia². In his Letter to Archidamos, Isokrates draws a fearful picture of the misery caused by these roving desperadoes, ‘who speak our language, but in character are barbarians. They slay, they banish, they plunder; children are outraged; women, whom none but kinsmen had ever seen even veiled, are stripped before all eyes³.’

The three special evils of the time.

¹ *De Fals. Legat.* § 265, οὐχ ὅπως ἀργίζοντο ἢ κολάζειν ἠξίουσιν τοὺς ταῦτα ποιούντας, ἀλλ’ ἀπέβλεπον, ἐξήλουν, ἐτίμων, ἄνδρας ἠγοῦντο.

² Cp. Mr G. A. Simcox’s Essay cited above, § 4, pp. lxxiii—lxxxiii.

³ *Ep.* IX. § 10.

Idea of invasion of Asia.

How were these evils to be cured? By inducing the Greeks to lay aside their quarrels with each other, and to unite in some common cause. And Isokrates conceived that there was but one cause which could so unite them—war against Persia.

Possible leaders of the invasion. Athens and Sparta.

He was not the first advocate of this idea. Gorgias had long ago proclaimed it in his speech at Olympia. Lysias had eloquently urged it at the same festival in 388¹. Isokrates set it forth with all the power and finish of consummate art, in his *Panegyrikos*; a work which he had probably conceived during his visit to Gorgias in Thessaly. It is said to have occupied him ten years², and was published in 380 B.C., probably at the time of the Olympian festival in the autumn; though it is unlikely that it was actually spoken. He calls upon Athens and Sparta to forego their jealousies, and to take the joint leadership of an expedition to Asia.

The appeal failed. Isokrates ceased to hope that either of the foremost States, as such, would lead forth the united Greeks to the East. But for thirty-four years he persevered in the endeavour to find some man who would lead them.

Jason of Pherae.

Jason of Pherae was master of Thessaly from 374 to 370,—a man of great ability and great ambition³; he had talked of a war with Persia, and

¹ Above, vol. i. p. 203.

² Quint. x. 4 § 4: auctor *περὶ ἔψους* c. 4 (Spengel *Rh. Gr.* i. 294), *Οἱ μὲν* (the Lacedaemonians) *τριάκοντα ἔτεσι Μεσσήνην παρέλαβον, ὁ δὲ* (Isokrates) *τὸν πανηγυρικὸν ἐν μόνους δέκα συνετάξατο.*—

Plutarch, in the *De Gloria Atheniensium* (*Moral.* p. 350 E) calls it *rhetorically* ‘almost three olympiads’—*μικροῦ τρεῖς ολυμπιάδας ἀνήλωσεν ἵνα γράψῃ τὸν πανηγυρικὸν λόγον.*

³ For the ability and the plans of

had gained popularity thereby. He was the pupil of Gorgias and the friend of Isokrates. If the latter did not directly appeal to him he must certainly for a time have hoped in him. Jason was assassinated in 370. It was then, probably, that Isokrates turned his eyes on Dionysios I., tyrant of Syracuse. The *Dionysios I.* fragment of the extant letter to Dionysios is only prefatory; it appears to have been written in 368 B.C. and encourages Dionysios with the prospect of Athenian support; elsewhere he takes credit for having spoken boldly¹. Dionysios died in 367. Archidamos III., who succeeded his father Agesilaos as a *Archidamos III.* king of Sparta in 361, next attracted the hopes of Isokrates. The letter to Archidamos belongs probably to 356 B.C. It urges him to undertake a task to which his father Agesilaos was devoted, and in which he failed only because he tried to do two things at once—to make war on the Great King and to restore his political friends to their cities². But meanwhile Philip of Macedon had become strong. After a fitful *Philip.* war of ten years, peace was made between Philip and Athens in March, 346. The letter or pamphlet which bears his name was addressed to him by Isokrates about April in 346. Philip is summoned as a Greek and a descendant of Herakles to levy war against Asia. Either he will conquer Persia, or at least he will detach from it all that lies west-

Jason, Grote x. 266 (ch. 78): Curtius iv. 443. Isokrates notices Jason's talk of going to Asia in the *Philippos* (Or. iv.) § 119; their personal friendship in *Ep.*

vi. § 1.

¹ *Philippos* § 81. As to the Letter itself (*Ep.* i.) see below.

² *Ep.* ix. § 13.

ward of a line drawn from Cilicia to Sinôpê. In either case he will free the Asiatic Greeks and make new settlements for the Greeks who are now homeless. Seven years later—in 339—Isokrates remonstrates with Philip for recklessly exposing his life in frays with barbarians which only delay his real task¹. In the Third Letter—of which the genuineness, though not unquestioned, is hardly questionable—he rejoices, a few days before his death, that he has lived to see part of his hopes fulfilled by the battle of Chaeroneia.

In the conventional view this is enough. Isokrates is condemned. He has blindly abetted, to the last moment, the destined enslaver of Greece, even if he has not congratulated him on success. It may be worth while, however, to consider these two questions;—first—what was the abstract worth of this ruling idea of Isokrates—war with Persia? Secondly—how far is he to be held the dupe, or, if not the dupe, the unpardonable accomplice of Philip?

War with Persia as a cure for the ills of Greece.

Isokrates believed that the first necessity of the day was to heal the strife of Greeks with Greeks by enlisting all Greeks in one cause. This was undoubtedly true. He believed that such a cause would be furnished by an aggressive war on Persia. Here he was probably mistaken. The state-life of the separate cities, and consequently their capacity for acting, as cities, with each other, was so thoroughly undermined that they could be united by nothing

¹ *Ep.* II.

but an evident and imminent danger. Now Persia did not represent such a danger. On the contrary, the Great King influenced Greek affairs, in so far as he did so, through Greece itself. Union might have been had for a war of defence. Union was not to be had for a war of aggression. Demosthenes saw the truth, when speaking in 354 of war with Persia, and of the proposal to anticipate the rumoured preparations of Artaxerxes Ochus by a bold initiative, he said—‘Do not talk of calling the Greeks together *when they will not listen to you.*’¹ The special results which Isokrates expected obviously do not affect the merit of his scheme as a remedy in the first instance for disunion; and it is of secondary importance that here he was partly wrong. He expected three main results:—(1) the liberation from Persia of the Asiatic Greeks; (2) the drafting of the dangerous classes into new Asiatic settlements; (3) a certain influx of wealth into Greece Proper. Now when a Greek expedition against Persia really took place, the chief result corresponded to the second of the hopes of Isokrates—only it was on a much grander scale. The new settlements were made; but then all Hellenism moved eastward; Pergamus, Antioch, Alexandria became the Athens, Thebes, Sparta, of the future².

But next—how far was Isokrates deceived by Philip? Or is he to be called false to Athens or Greece? *Relations of Isokrates with Philip.*

Isokrates had despaired of Athens and of Greece

¹ Dem. *περὶ συμμαριῶν* (Or. XIV.) § 38.

² Cp. Mr G. A. Simcox's Essay (quoted above) pp. lxxiii and xci.

unless some strong State or some strong man could unite the discordant cities, by the spell of a national enthusiasm, under a leadership which must be military. He pictured this man as another Agamemnon. There had been a time when his hope was that Greece should be saved by Athens. He could hope that no longer. The best type of the individual State had been found wanting. He turned from the ambition, though not from the patriotism, of an Athenian to the ambition of a Greek; he looked for the deliverance of Greece by all the Greeks, united under one who could command them.

*Tendency of
the age
towards
Monarchy.*

The whole thought of that age was setting in the same general direction. Nothing is more characteristic of it than the new tendency in favour of monarchy. In the dialogue, attributed to Xenophon, between Hieron of Syracuse and Simonides, the despot fails to convince the poet that the estate of the absolute ruler is not enviable or that he may not be a public benefactor¹. So far as a speculative thinker may be supposed likely to be influenced, in the way of attraction as well as of repulsion, by the actual political tone around him, Plato is a witness to this bent². Where Aristotle is describing that unique combination of gifts which belongs to the Greek race—warlike, like the continental Europeans, but of greater subtlety, keen, like the Asiatics, but with a higher

¹ See especially the summary of his own view given by Simonides at the end. *Xen. Hier.* c. 11.

² Curtius, speaking of Plato in connexion with this tendency of the age, points out what was monarchical in his spirit (v. 209, Ward).

spirit—here, he says, is a race, which, if brought under one polity, might rule the world¹. It was under the presidency of Macedonia that Aristotle foresaw a possible renewal and a larger future for the outworn life of the Greek republics. He is said to have advised Alexander to treat the Greeks in the spirit of a leader (ἡγεμονικῶς), and the barbarians in the spirit of a master (δεσποτικῶς)². The same kind of leadership which in old times had been exercised by Argos, by Athens, by Sparta, or by Thebes, was now to be vested in the person of a Macedonian King. There is nothing to show whether Aristotle had considered any probable difference between the old hegemony of a city and the new hegemony of a strong dynasty except the obvious difference that the latter was likely to be steadier. But in one sense, at all events, his dream of a boundless sway for the Greek race, when ‘brought under one polity,’ came to pass. It has been too much the custom to speak of Chaeroneia as if it were something by which Grecian history was brought to an abrupt end. A crushing blow to the spirit of political freedom in the old Greek sense Chaeroneia indeed was. But it was also the beginning of a new life to replace the life so hopelessly decayed—of that new empire for Greek thought and

¹ Arist. *Polit.* vii. 7, τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος—δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μίᾳ τυγχάνον πολιτείας. Eaton *ad loc.* quotes St Hilaire:—‘ Cette pensée d’Aristote a sans doute quelque rapport aux entreprises politiques des rois de Macé-

doine. Ce fut Alexandre qui réussit enfin à réunir la Grèce en un seul état; et ce fut là, en quelque sort, la condition préalable de sa grande expédition.’

² Plut. *Alex. Virt.* i. vi.

Greek art which opened in Macedonian times, an empire which made Greece to Asia and Europe what Athens had been to Greece, and by which Aristotle's prophecy was at last fulfilled in the world-wide and immortal dominion of which he was himself a founder¹.

*The view of
Isokrates
compared
with that of
Aristotle.*

Isokrates held with Aristotle that the first condition of greatness for Greece was unity. Seeing that the old civic life was thoroughly corrupted, he did not believe that this unity could be attained under the hegemony of a State. But he believed that it could be attained under the hegemony of a chief who should draw together the sympathies of all the States. The difference between the view of Aristotle and the view of Isokrates seems to have been this. Aristotle conceived such a personal hegemony as political and permanent, without perhaps having formed to himself a definite idea of the manner in which it would affect the individual city. Isokrates conceived it as primarily military, and as assumed for the special purpose of an expedition to Asia. Absorbed in this scheme, and believing in it as a cure for all evils, he does not seem to have contemplated the probable permanency of such a leadership. But if he had been told that such permanency was a condition of the enterprise, he would unquestionably have consented. Only he would have insisted, as Aristotle did, on the distinction between leader and master. Isokrates idealized his Agamemnon of Pella; he could not read

¹ On Aristotle's presentiment *Athen*, pp. 38 f.; Curtius v. 476 for Greece, see Oncken *Isokr. u.* (Ward).

Philip's mind. Had he been able to read it, however, what would have grieved him would not have been the idea of an established Macedonian hegemony, but the discovery that Philip desired this more for its own sake than for the sake of the expedition to Asia. On the other hand, assuredly Greece and Athens had no more loyal citizen than Isokrates, no one prouder of their glories, no one to whom their welfare was dearer; and, before he is judged, let it be remembered that his notion of the largest good possible for them differed only by lesser clearness from that of the greatest thinker in practical politics who then lived¹.

The first concern of Isokrates was with Greece. Isokrates and Athens. But two of his speeches relate specially to Athens; the *De Pace* to her foreign policy, the *Areopagitikos* to home affairs.

The root of all the troubles which beset Athenian Foreign Affairs of Athens. action abroad was this, that few citizens performed military service. Campaigns were longer than they used to be; war had become a profession in which amateurs were at a disadvantage; and the spirit of sacrifice for the State was extinct. A General, representing the city, commanded mercenaries. When things went wrong, the citizens at home avenged themselves directly on their representative. Hence the standing strife between the orators and the

¹ Niebuhr, it is well known, pronounces Isokrates 'an utterly bad citizen' (*Lectures on Anc. Hist.* II. 335). It is curious to see how Niebuhr is, all through, yet half unconsciously, trying Isokrates

by a Roman standard. He is always thinking of him as the man who had *despaired of the republic*. He does not stop to ask what *was* the republic for an Athenian of that time.

Generals. On the other hand, the General could keep his mercenaries together only by payment. He was obliged to turn the war, now and then, to some lucrative quarter. Burdened with this necessity, he could neither obey definite orders from home nor form any large plan for himself. His situation forced him to become more and more independent of the other States. It was natural that he should often form connexions with foreign princes on his own account. Timotheos was in alliance with Jason of Pherae, with Alketas the Molossian and with Amyntas of Macedonia. He is said to have received the towns of Sestos and Krithôtê as a gift from Ariobarzanes. Iphikrates was the ally of Kotys, whose sister he married and from whom he received the town of Drys in Thrace. Charidemos was the ally and brother-in-law of Kersobleptes; Chares was in alliance with Artabazos and had his residence at Sigeion; Chabrias did almost as he pleased in Egypt¹. Home affairs were in no better condition. Politics had ceased to have a living interest for the best men; such men held aloof; while in the *eklesia* 'one went and another came, and there was no one to care for the common good².' There was an active and intelligent public opinion, but it had no organised or effective expression; there were cliques but there were no parties. While the higher aspects of the festivals were vanishing, the *Theôrikon*, or money given by the Treasury to the citizens to pay for their places at the theatre—

Home Affairs.

¹ Curtius v. 123 f. (Ward).

θεν, ὁ δ' ἀπῆλθεν, μέλει δ' οὐδενὶ

² Dem. *de F. L.* § 136, ὁ μὲν ἤλ-

τῶν κουνῶν.

already doubled and trebled since the time of Perikles—had become the most important item of the budget. It must never be forgotten that the Theôric fund meant essentially a provision for public worship and only accidentally a provision for public amusement. When Eubulos took office as Treasurer in 354, he brought in a law making it capital to propose any diversion of the Theôrikon to other purposes. It was the sacred character of the fund which made it possible for him to do this and so hard for Demosthenes to get it undone¹. On the other hand, in a religion which identified worship with festivity the merely festal spirit was sure to prevail more and more over the devotional as the general tone of the community became lower. The policy of Eubulos found favour with the people mainly because it provided them with shows. This was the true significance of the phrase used by Demâdes when he called the Theôrikon the ‘cement of the democracy².’ Eubulos was further supported by that party of commercial interests which the Essay ‘On the Revenues of Athens’—ascribed, but no doubt wrongly, to Xenophon³—represents with an

¹ Curtius (v. 136, Ward) seems to put too much out of sight the religious character of the Theôric fund, which has been so clearly set forth by Grote; and to bear rather hardly on Eubulos.

² Plut. *Moral.* p. 1011 B, ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης, κóλλαν ὀνομάζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας. (Sauppe, *Or. Att.* II. 315.)

³ On the Περὶ προσόδων (later

than Ol. 96. 2, i. e. 355 B.C.) see Curtius v. 174 (Ward). Oncken (*Isokr. und Athen*) points out that the leading idea of the Essay *On the Revenues* is the same as that of the *De Pace* of Isokrates. He contrasts with both the words of Demosthenes (*De Cor.* § 89)—τῆς εἰρήνης ἦν οὗτοι κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος τηροῦσιν οἱ χρηστοὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς μελλούσαις ἐλπίσαν.

Social Life. almost grotesque candour. The social life which this political life implies hardly needs to be described. On the one hand there was an intellectual world apart; on the other, there was the people, consoled for what was unsatisfactory abroad and at home by a certain provincial joviality. Philip is said to have offered the sum of a talent for a report of the proceedings at the meetings of an Athenian club called the Sixty who dined together at the Herakleion¹.

*Isokrates on
Foreign
Policy.*

Such was the Athens to which Isokrates had to address his counsels. The Speech On the Peace was written probably in 355, just before the conclusion of the treaty which closed the Social War and broke up the Naval Confederacy of 378. Athens is urged to resign the dream of supremacy, and to treat allies as friends, not slaves. In his fervour the orator personifies that Empire which, like a false mistress, has allured and betrayed the two foremost Republics of Greece. 'Is she not worthy to be hated?'² Let Athens turn from her and prize, next to the favour of the gods, the esteem of Greece. It is substantially the policy of Eubulos which is advocated; but it is advocated on higher grounds than those of the holiday-makers or the merchants. Isokrates held that hegemony passes into empire, and that empire begets an insolence which at last

¹ The Sixty seem to have had a corporate reputation as wits. *τοσαύτη δ' αὐτῶν δόξα τῆς ῥαθυμίας ἐγένετο ὡς καὶ Φίλιππον ἀκούσαντα τὸν Μακεδόνα πέμψαι*

τάλαντον, ὃν ἐγγραφόμενοι τὰ γελοῖα πέμπωσιν αὐτῷ. (Athen. xiv. 615 E.)

² *De Pace* [Or. viii] § 105. Cf. §§ 133—5.

ruins the imperial State. The experience of Athens and of Sparta bore him out: and, as he conceived the interests of Greece, there was nothing to be gained by Athens striving at all hazards to keep the League together. The *Areopagitikos* (also 355 B. C.) supplements the *De Pace* with his view of what is wanted in home politics and in private life. ‘We sit in the taverns abusing the state of affairs; we say that never under a democracy were we worse governed; yet in practice and in our policy we prefer this to the democracy handed down by our fathers.’¹ His ideal is the elder democracy of Solon and Kleisthenes. Under it, citizens were not to be seen casting lots for their daily bread outside the law courts, while they paid mercenaries to fight their battles—nor choregi, splendid in golden robes, who were destined to shiver through the winter in rags². Let us return to the elder democracy of Solon and Kleisthenes, when equality meant honour where honour is due, and magistrates were not chosen by lot. Above all, let us restore to the Areiopagos its control over the education of the young and its general censorship of morals. When habits of industry are enforced, there will be no more pauperism; and when public men are forced to be respectable, the affairs of the city will go on well. Isokrates was certainly right in holding that a great need of the day was a sense of shame; though he was probably mistaken in thinking that the vices of a society such as that of the new Athens were within the reach of a censorship. To govern Athens

¹ *Areop.* [Or. vii] § 15.

² *ib.* § 54.

by the Areiopagos would indeed have been like governing Greece by the Amphictyonic Council¹.

*Private Life
of Isokrates.*

The private life of Isokrates was too evenly prosperous to have a history. He is said to have taught his Athenian pupils gratis, and to have taken fees only from foreigners². However this may be, the wealth derived from his school appears to have excited the envy of his rivals; and he says that they exaggerated it³. He was one of the 1200 richest citizens⁴ who, after the financial reform of 378 B. C., formed the twenty unions (or 'symmories') for the assessment of the war-tax; he had thrice been trierarch; and had besides discharged other public services in a liberal manner. On marrying Plathanê, the widow of Hippias of Elis, he adopted Aphareus, one of her three sons,—afterwards a rhetorician and a tragic poet of some mark. It was a somewhat rare distinction for an eminent Athenian to have had only one lawsuit⁵; and in this—a challenge

¹ Simcox, p. lxxxii.

² Anon. Biogr. ἐλάμβανε δὲ χρήματα πάμπολλα ὑπὲρ τῆς διδασκαλίας, παρὰ μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδέεν, ὥσπερ γέρας τοῦτο κατατιθέμενος καὶ τροφεία καταβάλλων τῇ πατρίδι, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ξένων χιλίας δραχμαῖς. Kyprianos (ἀπόρρητα τοῦ Ἰσοκρ. p. 30) takes this statement as literally true, and refers, in support of it, to the language of Isokr. himself in *Antid.* §§ 39, 146, 164. These passages say merely (1) that Isokr. did not live, like the forensic rhetoricians, on the lawsuits of his fellow-citizens; and (2) that his wealth came chiefly from the gifts

of foreigners.

See, on the other hand, Dem. πρὸς Λάκριτον (Or. xxxv). Lakkritos had been a pupil of Isokrates (§ 15)—and, says the speaker, πιστεύει τῷ λέγειν καὶ ταῖς χιλίας δραχμαῖς ἃς δέδωκε τῷ διδασκάλῳ (§ 42). Cf. *ib.* § 40, εἴ τις βούλεται σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ Ἰσοκράτει ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκειν. It is conceivable, of course, that there should have been an earlier and a later period of his practice in this respect.

³ *Antid.* §§ 155 f.

⁴ *ib.* § 145.

⁵ As to the mistake of the pseudo-Plutarch in saying that Isokr. was

to take the trierarchy, or exchange properties, offered to him in 345 by one Megakleides—Isokrates, who was ill at the time, was represented in court by Aphareus. The verdict seems to have gone against him¹.

In 338 B.C. Isokrates was in his 98th year; his His death. health, which had been strong throughout his long life, had broken down under an illness which had attacked him three years before. According to the Difficulties in the ordinary account of it. usual account, he was in the palaestra of Hippokrates when he heard the news of Chaeroneia. He repeated three verses from Euripides—verses commemorating three aliens who had been conquerors of Greeks—Danaos,—Pelops,—Kadmos²; and four days afterwards, on the burial-day of those who fell at Chaeroneia, he died of voluntary starvation. This dramatic picture of a violent disenchantment and a mortal despair—a picture consecrated by tradition and by poetry—is hard to reconcile with the repeated testimony of Isokrates himself to his own views and hopes. There is no good reason for doubting the genuineness of his Third Letter—a Letter which was evidently written just after Chaeroneia, and which ends with these words:—‘For this only do I thank old age, that of those

twice challenged to an antidosis, see below, introd. to Or. xv.

¹ *Antid.* § 5.

² Each the *first* line of a drama a fact which adds some point to the story:—

(1) Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατήρ. (v. 1 of the lost *Ar-*

chelaos:—Nauck *frag. Trag.* p. 340.)

(2) Πύρρος ὁ Ταντάλειος εἰς Πίσαν μολών. (*Iphig. in Taur.* v. 1.)

(3) Σιδώνιον ποτ' ἄστν Κάδμος ἐκλιπών. (v. 1 of the lost *Phrixos*:—Nauck p. 493.)

early aspirations which I sought to express in my *Panegyrikos* and in my Address to you, I see part already coming to pass by your agency, and the rest, I hope, soon to come¹. That is to say, there was now an established leader for Greece; and there would soon be a war with Persia. Suppose, however, that the Third Letter is spurious. Still, how is the motive of the suicide to be explained? Undoubtedly Isokrates regretted the struggle between Athens and Philip; it had been brought on by a policy which he disapproved. But the result of the struggle was that the idea of his life—the idea on which depended, as he thought, the welfare of Athens and of Greece—had become practicable. Isokrates cannot have destroyed himself because Philip had won. The conduct of Philip to Athens after Chaeroneia was studiously temperate and conciliatory; there was nothing in it to estrange Isokrates from his ideal Panhellenic chief, who, having struck one necessary blow, was now bent on healing the discords of Greece. It is more conceivable that Isokrates should have destroyed himself because he saw Athens still resolved to resist, and because he dreaded the conflict, when Philip should be at the walls, between his duty to Athens and his duty to Greece. If the tradition of the suicide is considered too strong to be set aside, this seems the most reasonable account of it².

¹ *Ep.* III. § 6.

Vit. Sophist. 1. 17. 4: (4) Lucian(?)

² The authorities for the story of the suicide are (1) Dionys. *Isocr.* 1: (2) Paus. 1. 18. 8: (3) Philostr.

Μακρόβιον § 23: (5) [Plut.] *Vit. Isocr.* § 14: (6) Anon. *Biogr.* (Dind.'s *Isocr.* p. XII).

Isokrates was buried on a piece of rising ground near the Kynosarges,—a sanctuary of Herakles, with a gymnasium, just outside the Diomeian Gate on the east side of Athens¹. The tombs of his kindred were there,—covered once by six tablets of stone, which had disappeared, however, before the Plutarchic Life was written. On the tomb of Isokrates himself was a column about forty-five feet high, crowned with the image of a siren,—a symbol of winning eloquence in which only a thoroughly modern ingenuity could discover an unconscious irony. Near this column was a pictorial stone tablet representing Isokrates with his teachers and with some of the poets. It is significant that Gorgias, looking at an astrological sphere, was the

The story has been examined by Blass in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1865, pp. 109—116. Aphareus, the adopted son of Isokrates, had written some forensic speeches as well as tragedies—and had appeared for his father in the lawsuit brought by Megakleides. [Plut.]: Dionys. *Isocr.* c. 18. Blass suggests that the suicide may have been a fiction to which Aphareus first gave currency in a forensic speech, and which friends diligently spread, in order to redeem the name of Isokrates from imputations of disloyalty to Athens.

Blass points out that the Third Letter is too moderate in tone for any but the most skilful of forgers—supposing him to have had a hostile motive; and, except a hostile motive, there could have been no motive for going against the

ordinary account.—Schäfer (*Demosth.* III. p. 5 note) gives no reason for pronouncing the letter spurious except its conflict with the tradition.—Cartelier (*Le Discours d'Isocr. sur lui-même*, Paris 1862, p. xcix) ingeniously suggests that the whole tradition of the suicide may have arisen from the accident of Isokrates dying on the burial-day of those who fell at Chaeroneia. [Plut.]—Kyprianos (p. 42) and Oncken (*Isokr. und Athen*, p. 17) believe in the suicide.—Curtius observes that the authority of the Third Letter—which he thinks doubtful—cannot invalidate the tradition; and offers the explanation noticed above. (*Hist. Gr.* v. 459 Ward.)

¹ For the Kynosarges, see Dr Dyer's *Ancient Athens* (1873), pp. 285 f.

central figure, with his pupil standing at his side. A bronze statue of Isokrates, on a column near the Olympieion, bore a votive inscription by his adopted son; another, the work of Leôchares, in the temple of Eleusis, recorded the admiring friendship of Timotheos¹.

*Character
of Isokrates.*

In his strength, as in much of his weakness, Isokrates may be compared with Cicero. He was a master of expression, with few ideas, but with much ingenuity in combining and varying these; a politician between whom and the power of seeing facts as they were, over any wide field, there usually floated the haze of some literary theory which vanity made golden; a man of warm, if somewhat exacting, benevolence, always ready to do his best for those who believed in him; industrious, earnest, with that simplicity which has been called an element of nobleness, and with the capacity for a generous enthusiasm which was never kindled to a brighter flame than by the glories of his city or his race. Cicero's powers, naturally more various, were more thoroughly brought out and far better disciplined by a life in which studious retirement alternated with public cares. Isokrates missed those lessons of the world which are proverbially useful to a successful teacher; but in an unbroken privacy he kept his ardour for work unchilled and the purity

¹ [Plut.] *Vit. Isocr.*: Paus. i. 18: Philostr. i. 17.—The inscription at Eleusis was

Τιμόθεος φιλίας τε χάριω ξύνεσιν
τε προτιμῶν

Ἴσοκράτους εἰκὼ τήνδ' ἀνέθηκε θεαῖς.
Leôchares ranked as a sculptor beside his contemporaries Skopas and Praxiteles. On his work, see Curtius v. 198 f. (Ward.)

of his ideal hopes unstained. His chief efforts were given to promoting what he believed to be the interests of Athens and of Greece ; and it has been the misfortune of his fame that his conception of these interests set him in contrast with a loftier genius and a more heroic nature than his own. In his school he did a service peculiarly valuable to that age by raising the tone and widening the circle of the popular education, by bringing high aims and large sympathies into the preparation for active life, and by making good citizens of many who perhaps would not have aspired to become philosophers.

CHAPTER XIII.

ISOKRATES.

HIS THEORY OF CULTURE.

Usage of the term 'philosophy' in the time of Isokrates.

In a passage of the *Phaedros*¹ just before that quoted at the beginning of the last chapter, Sokrates asks what a man is to be called, who, whatever may be his particular line of work—whether for instance he is a Homer, a Lysias, or a Solon—works in the light of true knowledge, using no terms which he cannot define, making no statements which he is not prepared to defend. It might be presumptuous, Sokrates says, to call such a man, or any man, 'wise;' but he may fairly be called 'a lover of wisdom,' a 'philosopher.' It is probable that the term 'philosophy'—said to have been invented by Pythagoras—did not come into general use at Athens much before the time of Sokrates; and that, for nearly a century at least, 'philosopher' continued to be the laudatory name for the man of intellectual or literary pursuits generally,—as 'sophist,' used with the same large meaning, came by degrees to have more and more of a disparaging sense. The para-

¹ p. 278 B.

mount intellectual eminence of Plato and Aristotle, as well as the lessened importance of Rhetoric after the extinction of the old political life, led to the name 'philosopher' being gradually appropriated, from about the end of the 4th century B. C., to the speculative seeker for truth¹. Aristeides, writing in the latter half of the second century A. D., objects to this restriction of the term, saying that in the best times 'philosophy' meant simply 'literary study and refinement;—being used, not in its present sense, but for *discipline* or *culture* (παιδεία) generally².' Now it is in this general sense that Isokrates applies the term 'philosophy' to his art, 'the discipline of discourse,' ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία, as he more precisely terms it. In the speech *On the Antidosis* he expressly marks this general sense:— 'Now you have heard all the truth about my *faculty*, or *philosophy*, or *study*—*whichever you like to call it*³.'

¹ On the history of the term φιλοσοφία, see Dr Thompson's note to *Phædr.* p. 278 D.

² Aristeid. II. 407, Dind. (quoted in the note just referred to): φιλοσοφία meant φιλοκαλία τις καὶ διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους, καὶ οὐχ ὁ νῦν τρόπος οὗτος ἀλλὰ παιδεία κοινῶς.

I would add that in Aristotle there is at least one clear example of the older and larger use of the word,—*Rhet.* II. 20, where he is saying that, if we have no illustrations at hand from real life or history, we must taken them from fiction—τοῦτο δὲ ῥᾶδιον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, i.e. 'Literary knowledge will make this easy.' In *Rhet.* II.

23, the verb φιλοσοφεῖν has a corresponding sense; but I do not press this, because there may be, as Spengel thinks, a reference to Isokr. *Antid.* § 173; and in that case the use of the word might be ironical.

In the letter (purporting to be Aristotle's) which some later hand has prefixed to the ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (Speng. *Rh. Gr.* I. 173), Rhetoric is called ἡ τῶν λόγων φιλοσοφία.

³ *Antid.* § 50, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐμῆς εἴτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμεως εἴτε φιλοσοφίας εἴτε διατριβῆς, ἀκηκόατε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Modern prejudice against him caused by his use of it.

This use of the term 'philosophy' though warranted by the ordinary usage of his day, has in modern times proved a serious misfortune for Isokrates. 'Philosophy' has for us only its later and restricted meaning: its original and larger meaning has been forgotten. Isokrates and Plato were strictly contemporaries—one, the great speculative thinker, the other, the great popular educator, of his century. The tendency to contrast them is natural. On the one side stands the true philosopher; on the other, the graceless anti-Plato who is continually insisting that his political rhetoric is philosophy. Now, to be just, we ought to remember that the point of the supposed contrast depends partly on an altered verbal usage. When Isokrates speaks of his Philosophy, he means his Theory of Culture. It may be worth while to inquire what this theory was, and to see how far that which Isokrates professed to do was done well by him.

His Theory of Culture described

The two important documents for the 'philosophy' of Isokrates are the discourse *Against the Sophists* (Or. XIII. 391 B. C.), and the speech *On the Antidosis* (Or. XV. 353 B. C.), the alpha and the omega of his professional life. In the first of these he declares what his 'philosophy' is *not*; in the second he explains what it *is*.

(1) *negatively,*

It is distinguished, then,—first, from all theoretic inquiries, as from those of the Ionic physicists, and from the ethical and political speculations of the Sokratic schools. Secondly, from Eristic, or the art of disputing for disputation's sake. Thirdly, from mathematical science. Fourthly, from all literary

activity which has no direct bearing on the higher political life: as (i) mythological research, ‘genealogies of the heroes,’ and the like; (ii) history, considered as the compiling of annals, apart from political essay-writing; (iii) philology and criticism of the poets; (iv) rhetoric applied to low or trivial subjects, whether forensic, or of the sportive epideiktic kind¹.

It forms the last and highest department of the citizen’s education. Boys at school learn grammar and read the poets. Older youths may profitably study astronomy or geometry up to a certain point, for the purpose of sharpening their faculties; a profound study of these subjects is useful only for professional specialists². Eristic may be used for practice in the same way; but the student must take care that his nature is not ‘dried up by it,’ and that he is not ‘stranded’ in such barren subtleties as (for instance) those of Empedokles and Parmenides³. Then, when the faculties have been thus prepared and trained, ‘philosophy’ comes in. What Gymnastic is for the body, Philosophy is for the mind. The teacher of Gymnastic practises his pupils in all the artificial exercises (σχήματα) which have been devised as preparatives for real contests. The teacher of Philosophy trains his pupils in all the artificial resources⁴ which prose-composition can employ. Then

¹ *Adv. Sophist.* [XIII] *passim*: φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκελετεν-
 ep. esp. *Helen. Encom.* [x] §§ 1—
 13: *Antid.* [xv] §§ 45, 46. θεῖσαν—ἐξοκείλασαν ἐπὶ τοὺς
 λόγους τοὺς τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν.

² *Antid.* §§ 261—264.

⁴ § 183, τὰς ἰδέας ἀπάσας αἷς ὁ

³ *ib.* § 268, μὴ μέντοι περιδεῖν τὴν λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος. With re-

he tries them in real work, in putting together (*συνείρειν*) the particular things which they have learned, so that they may grasp them more firmly, and may be able to use them readily in any combination which any given occasion may require. It is impossible to foresee exactly all these occasions; there can be no *science* of them. There can only be *opinion*, conjecture about them; and he is the wisest man who—exact foresight being out of the question—can best *conjecture* what any given crisis will demand of him¹. ‘Philosophy’ cannot of itself engage to produce a man able to speak and to act. Three things go to make such a man—natural capacity, training, and practical experience. The second has no power comparable to that of the first and third. All that training can infallibly do is to make the man better². And what is of supreme importance is the class of subjects to which the oratorical and literary faculty, as it grows, is turned. These must be (1) practical; (2) concerned with the largest public interests;—not with such private interests as employ forensic rhetoric, nor even with the exclusive interests of a single city³. Isokrates cites from his own works two examples of such

ference to literary composition, *ιδέα* is used by Isokr. in two distinct senses:—(1) *ιδέαι* in *Antid.* § 11 are the *τρόποι λόγων* of § 45,—the several *branches* or styles of literary composition; *e.g.* historical, rhetorical, critical: (2) *ιδέαι* in *Panath.* § 2 are the *figures* of rhetoric, properly called *σχήματα*, such as antithesis or *parisôsis*.

Here, in *Antid.* § 183, the mean-

ing seems akin to (2), but larger—including all those resources of a literary composer which can be reduced to *formulas*. For a precisely similar use, see *Adv. Soph.* [XIII] § 16.

¹ *ib.* §§ 184—185: cf. § 271, and *Helen. Encom.* § 5.

² *Antid.* §§ 187—191.

³ *ib.* §§ 276, 46: cp. *Panath.* [XII] §§ 1—3, 13: *Philipp.* [V] § 82.

‘nationally political,’ Hellenic subjects: one is the thesis—‘Athens has a better right than Lacedaemon to the hegemony¹’; another is—‘What measures are needed to reform the foreign and home policy of Athens²?’

The ‘Philosophy’ of Isokrates is, then, the Art of Definition. speaking and of writing on large political subjects, considered as a preparation for advising or acting in political affairs.

But something more than such a definition is Relation of Isokrates to his professional brethren. needed for the accurate appreciation of his work. It is necessary to determine his relation to other teachers who professed to be doing nearly the same thing. Isokrates conceives himself as belonging to a numerous and honourable profession, but as distinguished from most of his brethren by certain characteristics which give him a higher moral and intellectual dignity. The members of this profession he calls generically Sophists³; when he wishes to disparage he speaks of *vulgar* Sophists⁴. Under this general name of ‘Sophist’ he includes two distinct classes of teachers;—(1) those whom we should What he means by ‘Sophist.’ call philosophers,—as the Sokratics, in three of their principal sects,—Plato and the Academy, Antisthenes and the Cynics, Eukleides and the Megarics⁵;—(2) those whom we ordinarily mean when we speak of ‘sophists,’—teachers of political (that is, forensic

¹ Represented by an extract from the *Panegyrikos* (§§ 51—99), introduced in *Antid.* § 59.

² Represented by an extract from *the De Pace* (§§ 25—56, &c.), in-

troduced *ib.* § 65.

³ See esp. *Antid.* § 203.

⁴ *τρεις ἢ τέτταρες τῶν ἀγελαίων σοφιστῶν*, *Panath.* [XII] § 18.

⁵ *Helen. Encom.* [x] § 1.

or deliberative) discourse ; who professed to give a training, based on Rhetoric, for practical life¹.

*Analogy of
Sophistic to
Journalism.*

The power of speaking, coherently and effectively, in a law-court, in a public assembly or at a public festival, held a place in old Greek life roughly analogous to that which the journalistic faculty holds in modern Europe. The citizen of a Greek republic might be called upon at any moment to influence public opinion in behalf of certain interests or ideas by a neat, pointed, comprehensive address, which must be more or less extemporaneous. ‘Sophists’ in the ordinary sense were men who undertook to teach methodically the art of saying, under all possible circumstances, something which should pass muster at the time ; and, in controversy, of rebutting arguments, whatever their intrinsic worth, by counter-arguments which should at least serve the turn. In most hands such a discipline was probably either keen but immoral, or superficial and non-moral : Isokrates wanted to make it thorough and moral.

*Distinctive
merits of
Isokrates as
a popular
educator :*

The art which he and the ordinary sophists alike professed was thoroughly established as the essence of a practical Athenian education. In the speech *On the Antidosis* that place is vindicated for it, against those who denied its existence as an art, by an appeal to its proved and normal efficiency ; it produces the results at which it aims, and produces them with as much regularity as any other art². It was the educational merit of Isokrates that he strove honestly and in a great measure successfully to give

¹ *Adv. Soph.* [xiii] § 9.

² *Antid.* §§ 199—209.

to this established art a larger intellectual field and a higher tone. Let us forget that by a perversity, which at the worst is but verbal, he chose to call this art, in phrase sanctioned by his day, ‘philosophy;’ let us forget what is sometimes ludicrous in his egotism, in the literary self-complacency which believed itself statesmanlike; and let us see what there is in his conception and practice of his art which is really distinctive and really deserving of respect.

The first characteristic of Isokrates, as compared with the ordinary practical educator, is largeness of view. In the discourse *Against the Sophists* he remarks that the vision of these teachers is generally limited to the narrowest circle of an Athenian citizen’s interests; their object is to prepare victory in the Athenian lawcourts, victory in the Athenian ekklesia¹. His own aim, on the contrary, is to enlarge the mental horizon of his pupils by exercising them on subjects wider and nobler than the concerns of any single city; he describes these subjects of his choice as *Hellenic*². The *Panegyrikos* deals with such a subject. And even when his immediate subject concerns a particular city, the treatment is still in his own phrase, Hellenic; his point of view is not local but national. The *Archidamos*, the *Plataikos*, the *Areopagitikos* are instances. Now at the time when Isokrates was writing, this breadth was useful in two ways, intellectually and politically. Intellectually; for the divorce of society from the State brought with it a sharper separation between the few thinkers, who lived more and more apart, and

¹ *Adv. Soph.* § 20.

² e. g. *Antid.* § 46.

the mass of the citizens, whose social life had lost the higher spiritual elements almost as completely as it could do so without ceasing to be Greek. It was a great thing that a young citizen, who perhaps would never have been drawn into the sphere of the philosophers, should have set before his mind some interests wider and higher than those suggested by the routine of business or pleasure in his own city. Besides this intellectual gain, it was especially a political gain when he was reminded that, over and above the duties of local citizenship, he owed a loyalty to the higher unity of Greece. Most men found it hard to remember this in a time when the selfishness of the individual State, or citizen, was everywhere breaking the strongest and most sacred ties of the old common life. To keep constantly the idea of Greece before the minds of men who would afterwards have power at various points of Greece—and the pupils of Isokrates came from all cities—was a good service in itself, apart from the worth of any given doctrines, and independently of the mental enlargement which it implies.

2. *Elevation
of moral
tone.*

The second distinctive mark of Isokrates is general nobleness of moral tone. He did not attempt to find a philosophical basis for morals: rather he naively makes it his merit that, while theoretical moralists set before men a conception of virtue 'which no one else can recognise and about which they themselves dispute,' the virtue which he teaches is 'that which all men allow¹.' But if he was not a philosophical moralist, he had a genuine respect and love for the best and highest things that he knew,

¹ *Antid.* § 84.

a genuine contempt and hatred for what he felt to be mean and bad. He lived in times of which the deadly disease in public and social life was a narrow, dishonest and impudent selfishness; the spirit which animates his writings was in itself wholesome as a protest against this corrupt and abject cynicism. Isokrates has not passion; but in his eloquence ‘one breathes a large and pure air:’ the fineness of his spirit has its kindred weaknesses; but, when it is truest to itself, ‘it is marked by respect and love for all worthy sentiments; by the habit of moderation, by a just dislike for dishonest agitations; by antipathy alike for the brutal force of despots and for the brutal passions of mobs; by distance from superstition; by faithful attachment to what he called ‘philosophy’—including under that name the double benefit of the thought which illumines and of the speech which charms and touches—lastly, by the faculty of admiration,—the finest gift of his genius,—and by that lively feeling for the great aspects of his country in which we can still rejoice with him. And, however far Demosthenes may outstrip him, yet Demosthenes may have heard not without respect—perhaps not without envy—that serene eloquence, free from all precipitation and all rashness, which selects its thoughts as well as its words, which has never to lend itself to offensive sentiments, which never degrades itself or those who listen to it, which is nourished only on generous ideas, and which thus reflects the human spirit always on its nobler side¹.’

¹ Cartelier, *Le Discours d'Isocrate sur lui-même* (the Antidosis) p. lxii. The Introductory Essay from which I quote is throughout

3. *Thoroughness of Method.*

Thirdly, Isokrates is distinguished by his method of teaching. Aristotle notices the system followed by the ordinary sophists. It consisted in making their pupils commit to memory, first speeches, then dialogues. This method, Aristotle observes, was quick, but inartistic and barren of results; and was very much as if a shoemaker, instead of making his apprentices acquainted with the processes of the art, should content himself with showing them several pairs of shoes¹. Granting that this account of their procedure may be partly unfair to average sophists, it still seems clear that Isokrates stood alone in the stress which he laid, and the critical pains which he bestowed, on work done by his pupils themselves. First came technical expositions; then the learner was required to apply abstract rules in actual composition, and his essay was carefully revised by the master². Isokrates recognised fully the use of example; but while for most other teachers the setting of finished patterns before their school was almost everything, Isokrates seems to have regarded these patterns chiefly as counsels of perfection for advanced and gifted pupils³; the real essence of his method consisted in developing the learner's own faculty through the learner's own efforts⁴. He lays great

a subtle and sympathetic appreciation of Isokrates—especially on the moral side; and suggests how much has been lost to French literature with the scholar from whose pen it came.

¹ Arist. *περὶ σοφιστ. ἐλέγχων* xxxiv. 7.

² *Antid.* §§ 183f.: cp. *Epist.* vi. § 8.

³ See *Adr. Sophist.* § 18.

⁴ *Antid.* § 188. This fact is expressed by the tradition, preserved in the Plutarchic life and by Photios *cod.* 260, that Isokrates taught not merely by *μέθοδος*—i. e. technical precept—but also by *ἀσκησις*—practice under the eye of the master.

stress upon industry; he seems to have regarded a feeling for the pleasures of hard work as one criterion of a noble spirit¹; and in his ninety-seventh year, when he was suffering from illness, he prides himself on being still able to work hard². His course of teaching, besides being so much more thorough, seems to have been of longer duration than the ordinary; his pupils stayed with him from three to four years³.

It results from his whole conception of his art, and it is implied in his method of teaching, that Isokrates aimed at the production of work which should have a lasting value. This is a fourth characteristic which distinguishes him strongly from the mass of his profession, and, in a certain degree, even from its better members. Since the end of the fifth century B. C. a literature of political pamphlets had been coming into existence; writing was now recognised as a mode of influencing public opinion on the affairs of the day. Thrasymachos pleaded for the Larisaeans, as Isokrates for the Plataeans, in a rhetorical pamphlet; in the same way Isokrates attacked, and Alkidamas defended, the new Mes-sene⁴. Now to Isokrates belongs the credit of trying to raise the dignity and worth of this intermittent journalism. He aimed at making his essays on contemporary events something more than telling

4. *Desire of Permanent Result.*

¹ *Areopag.* [vii] § 43.

² *Panath.* § 267.

³ *Antid.* § 87. Cf. § 200, where he ridicules the popular notion that one year of such training ought to make a finished *ρήτωρ*.

⁴ On the lost speech of Thrasymachos *ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων*, see Sauppe

Or. Att. ii. p. 162; on the *Μεσσηνιακός* of Alkidamas (which may be contrasted with the *Archidamos* of Isokr.) *ib.* p. 154. Cp. Curtius *Hist. Gr.* v. 173 (Ward).

pamphlets; he wished them to have a lasting value both literary and political, answering to the conscientious labour and thought which had been spent upon them. The ambition which he set steadily before his school is not simply that of rising above the forensic eloquence which triumphs for a day; it is that of producing work which shall be respected—he says it boldly—‘in all companies and for all time¹.’ To be thorough; to aim at solid results—this rule, meant first for writers, was not less needed in that age for the future men of action; and in literature it had this special result, that literary skill, seeking some enduring form in which it might embody itself, was now applied with a new zeal to history. Three pupils of Isokrates are especially representative of this impulse. Androtion, in his *Atthis*, treated the local traditions and antiquities of Attica, and carried the history of Athens at least to 394 B.C. Ephoros wrote a History of Greece, in thirty books, from the Return of the Herakleidae to the siege of Perinthos by Philip in 341 B.C. Theopompos was the author of a supplement to Thucydides—relating, in twelve books, the events from the battle of Kynossema to the battle of Knidos (411—394 B.C.); and, in his *Philippica*, a work in no less than fifty-eight books, made Philip of Macedon the central figure of what seems to have been in fact a History of Civilization, arranged as a great picture of the contemporary world². It

¹ *Antid.* § 40.

² Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. xliii.
Vol. II. pp. 374—381 (for Ephoros

and Theopompos), pp. 391 f. (for Androtion); Curtius, *Hist. Gr.* v. pp. 176 f. (Ward).

was a benefit to an age intellectually poor in all but speculative interests to have turned literary energy towards something more substantial than the study of form. This was done by the historical school of which Isokrates became the indirect founder, and which shows, in one special manifestation, a general bent of his teaching.

These, then, are four chief things by which Iso- Summary.
 krates is distinguished from contemporary teachers of political rhetoric;—breadth of view; nobleness of moral tone; practical thoroughness of method; encouragement of solid work.

The relation of Isokrates to the Sokratics is in fact rather a biographical question than one which Isokrates and the Sokratics.
 concerns the examination of his art. His so-called ‘philosophy’ had no point of true contact with the Sokratic schools except his personal obligation to Sokrates. But, in so far as there was a real or an apparent antagonism between them, some attempt to estimate this may help to make the exact position of Isokrates clearer.

Sokrates held that it is of the essence of true philosophy to have a direct bearing on civic life. His relation to Sokrates.
 When Isokrates turns away from physical speculation and from all abstract study, considered as an end, he is so far Sokratic¹. But his master is the Xenophontic, not the Platonic Sokrates. He has taken the doctrine in too literal and too narrow a sense; he has not seen that the theoretic is the way to the best practical life. On the other hand he is versed in the maxims of just such a homely moral

¹ Compare *Antid.* §§ 263—265, with *Xen. Mem.* iv. vii. 3 and 7.

philosophy as Xenophon ascribes to Sokrates. Many parallelisms might be pointed out between the *Memorabilia* and (for instance) the *Letter to Demonikos*¹. Though the ideal tendency of Isokrates distinguishes him from Xenophon almost as decidedly as his unscientific habit distinguishes him from Plato, yet, in all that they owe to their common teacher, Xenophon and Isokrates are strongly alike.

*Supposed
references
of Plato to
Isokrates.*

At whatever time the *Phaedros* was written, whether when Isokrates was really a young man, or, as Cicero thinks², when he was of maturer age, there can hardly be a question that it is no sarcastic prophecy after the event³. When Plato wrote, he really hoped that Isokrates might choose what was in his opinion the noblest career. In the *Gorgias* there is a parody which need not be treated as passing the bounds of a friendly irony; Isokrates had said in his speech *Against the Sophists* that to be a good speaker requires 'a manly and imaginative spirit;' Sokrates is made to say in the *Gorgias* that rhetoric is the affair of 'a manful and conjectural spirit⁴.' A passage in the *Euthydemos* is stronger and more significant. Kriton reports to Sokrates the remarks made upon Sokrates and the philosophers by a critic who is not named, but who is described. The chief traits of this critic are, (1) that he iden-

¹ Compare *Ad Dem.* [Or. I] § 24 with *Xen. Mem.* II. vi. 6: *Ad D.* § 26 with *Mem.* III. ix. 8: *Ad D.* § 34 with *Mem.* III. ix. 14: *Ad D.* § 40 with *Mem.* I. ii. 15.

² *Or.* § 41.

³ See Spengel, *Isokr. und Platon* pp. 19, 39.

⁴ *Adv. Soph.* § 17, ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς: *Plat. Gorg.* p. 463 ψυχῆς στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας.

tifies Dialectic with Eristic; (2) that he has a rhythmical and antithetical style, of which Kriton gives a specimen; (3) that he lives a life withdrawn from action; and (4) that he dwells ‘on the borderland between Philosophy and Statesmanship.’ Sokrates is not harsh to this critic; we ought not to be irritated, he says, by claims of this kind; rather ‘we ought to esteem every man who says anything holding of practical wisdom, and goes with manly perseverance through his work¹.’

In the discourse *Against the Sophists* it seems doubtful whether there is any special reference to Plato, who at that time,—about 391 B.C.,—was perhaps not yet conspicuous; but the teachers of absolute knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) for pay must at any rate be some of the minor Sokratics². In the *Helenae Encomium*, however (370 B.C.), the allusion to Plato is distinct. He is brought in between Antisthenes and Eukleides,—being indicated as teaching that Valour, Wisdom and Justice form the subject-matter of one science³. In the *Panathenaios* (§ 118) there is what seems a controversial reference to Plato’s maxim in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, that it is better to be wronged than to wrong. ‘The Laws and Politics written by the Sophists’ which are slightly mentioned in the *Philippos* (§ 2) may possibly be meant for Plato’s works; though

*Supposed
references
of Isokrates
to Plato.*

¹ Plat. *Euthyd.* pp. 304—6. The passage is discussed by Dr Thompson (*Phaedr.* Append. II, pp. 179—182); who, with Spengel (*Isokr. und Pl.* pp. 36, 7), recognises the allusion to Isokrates.

² *Adv. Soph.* §§ 3, 4: Thompson (l. c.), p. 177, note 9.

³ *Helen. Enc.* § 1. Antisthenes and the Cynics are indicated by their *paradoxes*, Eukleides and the Megarics by their *eristic*.

*Isokratio
preference
of Opinion
to Know-
ledge—its
relation to
the Pla-
tonic anti-
thesis.*

this seems less certain. Lastly, in several passages of Isokrates the attainment of judicious 'opinion,' as distinguished from 'knowledge,' is declared to be the end of education. It is worth while to inquire how far these remarks strictly apply to the Platonic antithesis. In the discourse *Against the Sophists* (§ 16) Isokrates says:—'When people see that those who merely *opine* agree better and succeed oftener than those who profess to *know*, they naturally despise them.' In the *Helenae Encomium* § 5:—'It is much better to form *probable opinions* about useful things than to have an exact knowledge of useless things.' The Speech *On the Antidosis* § 271:—'Since it is impossible for human nature to acquire any *science* by which we should *know* what to do or say, in the next resort I deem those wise who, as a rule, can hit what is best by their *opinions*; and I call those men philosophers who give themselves to studies by which they will soonest acquire practical wisdom.'

In no one of these passages, nor elsewhere, does Isokrates deny a possible science of absolute truth; rather he implicitly recognises it. His contention is that this knowledge, supposing it attained, is worth less than judicious, though inexact, opinion on the affairs of practical life. That 'knowledge' or 'science' of which he *does* deny the possibility is a science of the contingencies which may arise in practical life. These cannot certainly be foreknown; the words or deeds which a future crisis may demand can never be more than matter of guesswork.

The supposed allusions of Plato to Isokrates

prove nothing more than his regret—sometimes expressed with sarcasm—that ability and industry should have been lost to the search for knowledge.

*Summary—
probable
relations
between
Plato and
Isokrates.*

The references of Isokrates to Plato show vanity and petulance; but no more than those on the other side do they justify the hypothesis of a serious feud. An inner friendship or harmony was impossible between the two men. But Plato seems to have regarded Isokrates with a sometimes pitying good will; and Isokrates, when not temporarily out of humour with Plato, was probably willing to visit him in the country, and to talk—as an impartial Peripatetic is said to have described—‘concerning poets¹.’

¹ “The philosopher [Plato] was a friend of Isokrates; and Praxiphanes has written a dialogue in which they are represented as conversing *περὶ ποιητῶν* in Plato’s country-house where Isokrates was a guest:” Diog. Laert. III. (quoted

by Dr Thompson l. c. p. 178). I assume that Praxiphanes had pardoned to old age the designation of Aristotle’s philosophy as *τὴν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας* (Isokr. *Epist.* v. § 3)—if the Dialogue On Poets had not been written before.

CHAPTER XIV.

ISOKRATES.

STYLE.

It has been seen that the end which Isokrates set before himself in all his work was practical, and practical in a high way. His teaching aimed at forming good citizens, not only of Athens, but of Greece. His writings aimed at showing how literary skill might be applied to the treatment of really political subjects. But, except during those few years of his earlier life in which he wrote for the law-courts, he had nothing to do with practical oratory. Want of nerve and of voice hindered him from coming forward in the ekklesia. With the exception of the six forensic speeches, all his extant compositions were meant to be read, not to be spoken. Considered in regard to subject-matter, he is a publicist. Considered in regard to form, he is a stylist. And his distinction as a stylist is this, that he was the first Greek who gave a really artistic finish to literary rhetorical prose.

*Isokrates
less an
orator*

*than an ar-
tist in rhe-
torical
prose.*

Isokrates began the career of his choice—when the labours not of his choice were over—about

392 B.C. Rhetoric was then represented at Athens chiefly by two classes of men. First, there were the writers of speeches for the law-courts. Lysias, then at the height of his fame, was the most eminent of these, and had already set before his brethren a new standard of excellence; though it is not likely that, so early as 390 B.C., the 'plain style' had made much way. Secondly, there were teachers of rhetoric who professed to impart a method of deliberative or forensic speaking, but who in the exercises which they wrote as models, seem to have preferred subjects of an epideictic character taken from mythology. Extant examples are the Speech of Odysseus against Palamedes, the Defence of Palamedes, the Controversy between Ajax and Odysseus for the arms of Achilles¹. It was in a half-disdainful rivalry with such efforts that Isokrates wrote his *Busiris* and his *Encomium of Helen*. But the real ambition of Isokrates was to raise the Art of Rhetoric above such themes as were supplied either by the law-courts or by the myths. He held that the subject-matter of Rhetoric was to be found neither in the petty concerns of to-day nor in a far-off age of heroes, but in the largest practical interests of Greek citizenship. He held, further—and here he was completing the theory of Gorgias—that not only may prose be artistic, but that the

Rhetoric at Athens about 390 B.C.

The writers for the law-courts.

The teachers of Rhetoric.

Distinctive aim of Isokrates.

¹ For the Ὀδυσσεὺς κατὰ Παλαμήδους προδοσίας, see Sauppe *Or. Att.* II. 156; for the ὑπὲρ Παλαμήδους ἀπολογία, *ib.* 132; for the Αἴας—Ὀδυσσεύς, *ib.* 167. The first used to be ascribed to Alkidamas; the

second to Gorgias; the third to Antisthenes. H. E. Foss in his *Gorgias* (pp. 81 f.; 78 f.; 94 f.) has shown each to be the work of a later writer.

utterance of Rhetoric may be, ought to be, a work of art as complete and as substantive as the utterance of Poetry; that it has its own ascertainable laws of rhythm and of harmony; and that the artist who, having mastered these laws, addresses himself to the treatment of a great subject, has with him a power, beside and beyond the strength of his cause or of his genius—a power coming to him, as to the poet, through his art, and springing from an essential music latent in language which his art has shown him how to bring upon the ear.

It has been said in a former chapter¹ that Dionysios distinguishes three principal ‘harmonies’ or modes of composition, whether in verse or in prose,—the ‘austere,’ the ‘smooth’ and the ‘middle;’ Antiphon being his oratorical representative of the ‘austere,’ Isokrates of the ‘smooth,’ Demosthenes of the ‘middle.’ The ‘smooth’ (or ‘florid’) harmony is thus described:—

*Dionysios
on the
‘smooth’
harmony.*

‘It does not seek that each separate word should be conspicuously seen, as if set on a broad, firm pedestal; or that the pauses between the words should be long. The slow, steadfast manner is not at all to its mind. Rather it likes movement and impetus of language; it wishes word to come on word as wave rides wave, each lending buoyancy to each, like flowing waters that never are still. It requires that all the parts of the context should be taken together and find their power in their whole effect. This result is wrought by a nicety of joining which leaves no pause that can be felt

¹ Vol. I. p. 21.

between word and word. In this, the style is like a web of fine warp, or a painting of which the lights melt into the shadows. Then it wishes that all its words should be musical, smooth, delicate, as with the bloom of a fair young face. It may be said to be at feud with rough syllables and all clashing sounds; and to be wary of everything rash and venturesome.

‘Nor is it only between word and word that it seeks this apt juncture and coherence. It desires that clause should be closely knitted to clause; that every sentence should be rounded to a period; that each segment of a period should be neither shorter nor longer than the just mean; and that the whole period should be within the compass of one full breath. A sentence not periodic, a period not jointed into members, or a member not symmetrical with the rest, are thoroughly foreign to its workmanship. The *rhythms* which it employs are not the longest but the middle or the shorter. It wishes the last words of a period to be rhythmical and firmly set, as on a base squared by line and rule;—thus reversing, in the structure of these final clauses, its practice in the ordinary harmonies of words. Ordinarily it makes word slide into word. But it would have the *closing* words of a period to stand clear, and be seen, as it were, from every side. The *figures* which it uses are not those which have an antique air, or which are notable for majesty or impressiveness or ruggedness; but rather the luxuriant and voluptuous, in which the elements of illusion and stage-glitter are strong. To speak

generally—this ‘smooth’ or ‘florid’ style is in essentials the opposite of the austere¹.

Representatives of this style

in poetry,

in prose.

This description may serve at the outset to hint the broadest characteristics of Isokrates as contrasted with the elder school represented by Antiphon. The typical poets of the ‘smooth’ style, according to Dionysios, are, in epos, Hesiod; of lyricists, Sappho, Anakreon, Simonides; among tragedians, Euripides only. When Dionysios comes to name a representative historian, he is at a loss; no one, he says, is strictly apposite; but Ephoros and Theopompos are so ‘more than most.’ This illustrates the degree in which the style of Isokrates was distinctive. The only prose-writers in the ‘smooth harmony’ whom Dionysios finds to mention are Isokrates and two pupils of Isokrates.

Diction of Isokrates.

In applying more closely to Isokrates the general description just quoted, the first point to be noticed is his choice of words. His diction is tempered of two opposite elements. It is a compromise between the ‘elaborate’ diction represented by Thucydides and the ‘plain’ diction represented by Lysias². But it is infinitely more Lysian than Thucydidean.

Its Purity.

Of its Lysian qualities, the first is purity; an excellence already³ explained as including two ideas—avoidance of obsolete, or novel or too poetical words⁴,—and correctness of idiom. In this Isokrates

¹ Dionys. *de comp. Verb.* c. 23.

² id. *Demosth.* c. 4.

³ Vol. I. p. 168.

⁴ As exceptions, note the words οὐρανομήκης, *Antid.* [xv] § 134: φιλοπροσήγορος (‘courteous’—more

general than εὐπροσήγορος, ‘affable’)

Ad Demon. [I] § 20: τερθρεία (‘jugglery’), *Helen. Enc.* [x] § 4:

φθόγη, *Aeginet.* [xix] § 11: τύρβη

Antid. § 130: ἐπικήρωσ, *Bus.* [xi]

§ 49: ἐνδελεχέστατος, *Antid.* § 156:

was the nearest rival, though not the equal, of Lysias¹. Next, though the general effect of Isokrates is ornate and the general effect of Lysias is plain, yet the Lysian simplicity belongs in a certain sense to the language of Isokrates. His composition abounds in *figures*—to be noticed presently; but his diction generally avoids *tropes*²; that is, it uses the individual word in the normal sense. Yet here again there is a difference. Lysias prefers common words; Isokrates, though he can distinguish occasions, has a general bent towards grandeur³. There is far less of this in the six forensic speeches than elsewhere; yet even here there is something⁴.

But choice of words was of comparatively small importance in determining the style of Isokrates, between whom and the elder ‘austere’ school the

κατασκελευθείσαν, *Ant.* § 268 : διασκαριφάσθαι, *Areop.* § 12. Also the metaphorical use of εἰλωτεύειν (*Pan.* § 131), ἐξοκείλας, *Ant.* § 268 and *Ep.* II. § 13. (Sandys, *Ad Dem.* and *Panegr.* pp. xi, xxxiv.

Aristotle instances ἔτλησαν (*Pan.* § 96) and φήμη (*ib.* § 186) as poetical words legitimately used in a climax: *Rh.* III. 7.

¹ Dionys. *de Isokr.* c. 2 : *Lys.* c. 2 : *Dem.* c. 4.

² *id.* *Dem.* c. 18—where Dionys. is criticising a passage from the *De Pace* (§§ 41—50) taken as showing Isokr. at his best—and notices the avoidance of τροπικαὶ κατασκευαὶ as even excessive. Hermogenes (*περὶ ἰδεῶν* a' c. 12, Speng. *Rh. G.* II. 33) observes that the first condition of *beauty* in expression is *purity*; now tropes give vividness,

but are against purity; hence Isokr., who thought most about beauty, made least use of tropes.

³ σεμνολογία (*Dionys. Isokr.* c. 20), σεμνοτῆς πομπικῆ (*ib.* 2), καλλιλογία (*Dem.* c. 4).

⁴ Speaking of the forensic work of Isokr. generally, Dionys. remarks that here he comes near to the manner of Lysias (*Isocr.* c. 18). Then examining the *Trapez.* [xviii] §§ 1—14 in detail, he points out that the manner is ὄλφ τῶ γένει distinct from that of I.'s deliberative or epideictic speeches; yet that it is Isokratic still—it bears the predominant stamp of *art* (c. 20).—Perhaps *Or.* xviii (Against Kallimachos) and xix (Aeginetikos) are the best examples of I.'s *plain* manner.

Prose-
rhythm.

essential point of contrast was just this, that they relied much on words, while he relied almost wholly on composition. It was Isokrates who developed, though he did not originate, the idea of a literary prose-rhythm. The Greek theory distinguished a music proper to the continuous (*συνεχής*) exertion of the voice in prose-declamation from the music of its exertion at intervals (*διαστήματα*) in singing¹. As singing can scarcely charm the ear or make claim to beauty until it has brought itself under definite laws, partly of rhythm, partly of harmony, so oratorical prose cannot give artistic pleasure until it has become, in its proper measure, rhythmical. This implies the bringing out of that musical element which is inherent in all language; and the technical Rhetoric early began to take account of the prose-rhythm into which this element must be wrought. Thus Aristotle² discusses the relative merits for rhetorical prose of the dactyl—which is too epic for ordinary use—the iambus, which is too common to give any distinctive effect—the trochee, which is too light—and the paeon, which he thinks on the whole the most serviceable,—the ‘first’ paeon (—) for the beginning of the period, the ‘fourth’ (—) for the end. Poetry has its strict correspondence of rhythms and its precision of metres. Prose has its irregular rhythms and its wandering melody in the fall of syllables—rhythms and metres

¹ Volkman, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* (1872), p. 430.

² *Rhet.* III. 8—where he observes that *metre* in prose is ἀριθμῶν, i. e.

destroys the rhetorical illusion, but *rhythm* desirable—simply, he thinks, as the period is—because ‘all men like to see to the end.’ Cf. Volkm. p. 447.

not bound by any rigid framework, yet reducible to certain general laws which the attentive ear can discover, and which the skilful speaker can apply in ever-varying combinations¹. Now the mistake of Gorgias had consisted in trying to bring the essentially free rhythms and metres of prose too near to the strict rhythms and metres of verse. Thrasymachos of Chalkedon was probably more judicious². But Isokrates was the earliest great artist in the rhythm proper to prose³,—so distinctly so, that Cicero more than once calls him its discoverer⁴. Great artist as he was, however, he was only a developer, not a perfecter; and the chief reason why he fell short of the highest excellence seems to have been this, that he sought too constantly to base his rhythms on a certain type of composite period.

With Antiphon⁵, as we saw, the structure of a period was still a matter of effort—admitting, too, of little variety: in Lysias⁶ the power of forming terse, compact periods is nearly perfect, and is com-

*The Peri-
odic style*

¹ Dionys. *Dem.* cc. 49, 50. Prose is to be εὔρυθμος and εὔμετρος—not like Poetry, ἔρρυθμος and ἔμμετρος, *bound*. Quintilian (ix. iv. 45) distinguishes the metre (*dimensio quaedam*) of verse from the rhythm (*numeri*) of prose: and so Cic. has *numerus* = ῥυθμός, *Or.* § 67.

² The artistic use of the paeon in prose is dated by Aristotle from Thrasymachos (*Rh.* iii. 8). Cp. Curtius, *Hist. Gr.* v. 168 (Ward).

³ For the precept of Isokr. in his own words, see the fragment of his τέχνη in Sauppe II. 225:—ὄλως δὲ ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω (*mere* prose), ξηρὸν γάρ' μηδὲ ἔμμετρος' καταφανές

γάρ' ἀλλὰ μεμίχθω παντὶ ῥυθμῷ, μάλιστα ἰαμβικῷ ἢ τροχαικῷ. Aristotle would have considered this recommendation of the iambus or trochee as retrograde—Thrasymachos having brought in the paeon. In *Adv. Soph.* (xiii) § 16 Isokr. speaks of the study needed in order εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν.

⁴ 'Isokr. was the first to see that in prose too a certain measure and rhythm (*modum et numerum*) must be observed': *Brut.* § 32. In *Orat.* § 175 he quotes Thrasymachos himself to the same effect.

⁵ Vol. I. p. 34.

⁶ *ib.* p. 166.

how developed by Isokrates.

binéd with skill in avoiding monotony; with Isokrates, the periodic style passes into an altogether new phase. The distinctive mark of the new Isokratic period is a certain luxuriant amplitude. Instead of aiming at the vigorous compression fittest for real contests, it rejoices in rich diffuseness—it unrolls itself like a clear river, luring the hearer on from bend to bend through the soft beauties of its winding course¹. Three kinds of period are distinguished by Demetrios: the Rhetorical, terse and round;—the Conversational, slack and simple;—the Historical, intermediate between these two². Lysias, as has been noticed, uses what may be called a ‘historical’ period in one special part of his work—in narrative parts of his public speeches. Isokrates, as a rule, uses everywhere the historical rather than the rhetorical period³—giving to it, however, a certain long and stately flow which is his own. The great fault of his management is monotony. Lysias knew at least how to brace or relax his framework; Demosthenes was a master of structural contrasts; but, in all the speeches of Isokrates, except the forensic, one long and finished period follows another with little variety or relief. He must always round his sentence⁴. Not only the form but the matter often

¹ This is the image used by Dionysios (*Dem.* c. 4) to describe the *ὑπαγωγικὴ περίοδος*, the *meandering* period, of Isokrates. Cf. *de Isocr.* c. 12, τὸ κύκλιον τῶν περιόδων.

² Demetr. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 19. (Speng. *Rh. Gr.* III. 265.) He illustrates the Rhetorical Period

by the opening of Dem. *adv. Lept.*; the Conversational, by the opening of Plat. *Rep.*; the Historical, by the opening of Xen. *Anab.*

³ Dionys. *Dem.* c. 18 notices the period of Isokr. as being rather ‘like that of the historians’ than *ἐναγώνιος* fit for real contests.

⁴ Dionys. *de comp. Verb.* c. 19 ob-

suffers for this artificial uniformity. A thought has sometimes to be diffusely, and therefore weakly, expressed, in order to afford a symmetry of clauses¹. But although there is this grave fault in his handling of the periodic style, it must not be forgotten that Isokrates gave a really important development to the idea of the period itself. Hitherto it had been too cramped: he was the first to give it a large and free expansion. He was the first, too, who showed how the ampler period might be worked up through the series of clauses and members to an artistic climax².

Next to this general characteristic, luxuriance, His use of Figures. the special marks of the periodic style in Isokrates depend on his use of figures. In order to see just what Isokrates does here, it will be a help to keep in mind the strict distinction between a 'trope' and a 'figure' (whether of language or of thought). 'Trope' and 'Figure.' A trope is the use of a particular word in other than its normal sense—as 'fire' for 'zeal' (metaphor) or 'steel' for 'sword' (synekdochê)—to take two of the commonest tropes. A 'figure' is an affair of whole clauses or sentences³. The 'figure of lan-

serves that the *best* style is sometimes more, sometimes less, periodic: but that Isokr. did not understand such variety: cf. his *κρίσις τῶν ἀρχαίων*, c. 5. This wholly periodic style (with no alloy of *ειρομένη*) is essentially epideiktic: cp. Cic. *Or.* § 207, Volkmann, p. 435.

¹ The invariable desire for a period and a rhythm drives Isokr. to use *παραπληρώματα λέξεων*, *παδ-*

ding, as Dionys. says (*de Isocr.* c. 3). The critic illustrates this minutely in his analysis of *De Pace* § 42 (*Dem.* c. 19). 'These drooping folds might have been pinned up more neatly'—*ταῦτα κεκολλημένα σφιγξάι μᾶλλον ἐνήν*.

² Cp. Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. xxxvi. (Donalds. II. 154—5.)

³ See Volkmann, *Die Rhet. der Gr. und Römer*, pp. 392 f. Cp. Quint. ix. 1 § 4.

guage' is a combination of words (each of which may be used in its normal sense) for the artificial expression of an idea—as antithesis. The 'figure of thought' depends on no special combination of words, but on an assumed attitude of the speaker's mind—as irony. Now Isokrates rarely uses 'tropes'—indeed, his avoidance of them was expressly noticed as a cause of tameness in his diction¹; nor—with one exception to be noted presently—does he often use 'figures of thought.' But he uses abundantly certain 'figures of language.' It was Gorgias who first brought a throng of the 'figures of language' into Greek Rhetoric². In so far as Isokrates saw more clearly than Gorgias where the line falls between prose-rhythm and verse-rhythm, Isokrates moderated the Gorgian use of these figures. On the other hand he established some of them as the distinctive ornaments of the 'florid' Rhetoric by developing them artistically within certain limits. The specially Isokratic figures of language are those which depend on a parallelism. These are chiefly three³. (1) A parallelism in sense—Antithesis: which may arise either (i) from two words of opposite sense used in the expression of a single idea—'let the *rich* give to the *poor*:' or (ii) from

Figures of Language.

¹ Dionys. *Dem.* c. 18: Hermog. *περὶ ἰδ. α'*, c. 12 (referred to above).

² Dionys. *Thuc.* c. 24. Quintilian (ix. 3 § 2) subdivides the 'figures of language' as (1) grammatical—mere *peculiarities* of pathology or syntax, with no rhetorical purpose—e.g. the schema Pindaricum: (2) rhetorical—where a certain effect

is meant to be wrought by the combination. Volkmann (who refers the distinction between *σχήματα λέξεως* and *διανοίας* not to Caecilius of Calacte, but back to Theophrastus, p. 392) analyses both kinds in detail, pp. 396—430.

³ Cp. Sandys *Ad Dem.* and *Panegy.* p. xiv.

the contrast of two ideas without contrast of words : ‘he did them good, but they took away his good name ;’ or (iii) from the contrast both of ideas and of words—‘he did them good but they did him evil.’ (2) A parallelism in form and size merely between two or more clauses or sentences—Parisôsis. (3) A parallelism of sound—Paromoiôsis : when the latter of two clauses gives to the ear an echo of the former, either in its opening or at its close or throughout¹.

The idea of all these three ‘figures’ is the same—that idea of mechanical balance in which the craving for symmetry is apt to take refuge when it is not guided by a really flexible instinct or by a spiritual sense of fitness and measure. No one can read Isokrates without feeling with what a leaden weight this elaborately wrought ornament lies on much of his work, often chilling the thought and almost crushing out its life². But a distinction must be noticed

¹ Hermogenes has an excellent remark (*περὶ ἰδ. α’* c. 12, *Sp. Rh. Gr.* II. 331) on the use of these two last figures—*παρίσωσις* and *παρομοίωσις*—by Isokr. and Demosthenes respectively. Demosth. has rarely a direct and absolute symmetry or consonance of clauses—Hermog. says he remembers only one instance, *In Androt.* § 1. Elsewhere Demosth. disguises the *παρίσωσις* either by ‘cutting it in two’—inserting a clause (*ἐπεμβολή*) between the two balanced clauses—or by taking care that the clauses equal in length shall not be symmetrical in structure: while he avoids

the direct *παρομοίωσις* by shifting one of the two words which would have jingled.

² Gellius (*N. A.* XVIII. 8) quotes some lines from Lucilius in which the satirist ridicules those ‘tasteless persons’ (*apirocali*) who wish to seem *Isokratic*, and who accordingly overload their sentences with *ὁμοιστέλεντα*, *πάρισα* and the like. Dionysios, greatly as he admires Isokr., repeatedly blames his ‘puerile’ or ‘vulgar’ use of the Gorgian figures. He instances *Panegy.* §§ 71—81 (*De Isocr.* c. 14): *Trapez.* §§ 9, 11 (especially—*ib.* c. 20): *De Pace*, §§ 41—50 (*Dem.* c. 20).

*Earlier
and later
manner of
Isokrates.*

*Figures of
Thought.*

*Avoidance
of hiatus.*

between his earlier and his later manner. The practical life of Athens had a gradual reflex action on that Sicilian Rhetoric which had been drawn into its sphere; and this was felt even by Isokrates¹. In the *Philippos* and still more plainly in the *Panathenaikos* he intimates that he had outlived much of his early taste for the 'figures of language.' As for those vivid reflections of the speaker's own mood which are called the 'figures of thought,' they belonged, generally, to a later and more animated school²; the large use of them by Andokides being precisely one of those points which show how little his natural faculty had been tamed to the technical Rhetoric of his day. Least of all were the figures of thought congenial to the smooth and tranquil manner of Isokrates. There is perhaps but one exception; he is fond of the rhetorical question in concluding an argument³.

Before we leave the technical traits of his composition, one striking trait remains to be noticed as the special cause of his 'smoothness.' This is the

Nothing, he says, more 'paralyses his force,' nothing more averts the ear, than these frigid figures.

¹ This is well marked in two passages: (1) *Philip.* (v) § 27,—346 B.C.; (2) *Panath.* § 2,—342 B.C.—where he says that he has quite given up attempting 'antitheses and parisôses and those other figures which compel applause.' Quintilian expressly recognises the two phases: IX. 3 § 74. Cp. Rauchenstein *Introd.* p. 12.

² See above, Vol. I. p. 99: cp.

Volkman, pp. 416 f. The great master of the 'figures of thought' was Demosthenes: *Cic. Orat.* § 136.

³ For examples of this ἐρώτησις, see *Panegyrr.* (iv) §§ 121, 183: *De Pace* (viii) §§ 11, 100, 105, 113: *Panath.* (xii) §§ 121 f. Volkman (p. 424) notices an instance of the figure called ἀντίφρασις or παράλειψις—when the speaker says that he will not mention a thing, but *does*—joined with hyperbole, in *De Pace* §§ 56, 81.

studious, the even pedantic care with which he avoids allowing a vowel at the end of a word to be followed by a vowel at the beginning of the next¹. Dionysios says that he had gone through the whole of the *Areopagitikos* without finding one instance of such a collision². The artificialism soon makes itself felt; and, as one critic justly says, a possible music of clashing sounds is lost³. In this, as in greater things, Demosthenes knew how to hit the mean⁴.

Passing from the province of Expression to the treatment of matter with its two departments of Treatment of Subject-matter. Invention and Arrangement, we find that here also Isokrates has his distinctive merits. As regards Invention—the art of discovering the available re- Invention. sources of a theme—Dionysios pronounces Isokrates equal to Lysias⁵; Quintilian praises not merely his facility but his effort to bring out the higher aspects

¹ For his own precept, see the frag. of his *τέχνη* (Sauppe II. 225)—‘vowels must not come together’ (δεῖ τὰ φωνήεντα μὴ συμπίπτειν), ‘for the effect is lame,’ *χολὸν γὰρ τὸ τοῖόνδε*. Benseler, in his work *De Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis et Historicis Graecis*, has applied this test to the whole extant text of Isokrates (Bk. I. Ch. 1).

² *De Comp. Verb.* c. 23 (where he analyses §§ 1—5). Benseler examines this statement (pp. 7—9). Among the more striking instances of hiatus in our text of the *Areopagitikos* are *ὕμᾱς γε φῶντο*, § 57: —ὥστε οὔτε, § 80.

³ Demetrios *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 68: who adds, in § 72, that such clashing, *σύγκρουσις*, suits the *μεγαλοπρεπῆς* *χαρακτήρ*. Dionysios (*Dem.* c. 4),

Quintilian (IX. 4 § 35) and Hermogenes (*περὶ ἰδ. α' c.* 12) agree with Demetrios in thinking the solicitude of Isokrates in this matter excessive: while Plutarch, with a somewhat frigid sarcasm, asks how Isokrates, *ὁ φοβούμενος φωνῆεν φωνήεντι συγκροῦσαι*—could help shrinking from the Macedonian phalanx? (*De glor. Athen.* c. 8, *Mor.* p. 350 E.) On the other hand, Longinus praises him for avoiding harsh collocations ‘which make the texture of the speech rougher and do not slide into the ear, but offend it, while they also arrest the speaker’s breath’ (*Rhet.* § 9, p. 560 in Speng. *Rh. Gr.* I. 306).

⁴ See Schäfer, *Demosth.* Vol. III. p. 317 note 2.

⁵ *De Isocr.* c. 4.

of his subject¹. In analysing the epideictic branch of Rhetoric, Aristotle notices one device as specially frequent in Isokrates—the use of the topic of comparison for the purpose of magnifying or extolling² (*αὔξησις*). The *Philippos* will supply an instance;—in order to show that Philip of Macedon could easily conquer Asia, Isokrates points out that harder things were done with smaller means by Alkibiades, Konon, Dionysios and the younger Cyrus³. The author of the Essay on Sublimity blames Isokrates—and rightly—for a too constant and ostentatious effort to heighten rhetorically the greatness of his theme⁴. This effort is akin to the essentially epideictic spirit of all his work, the spirit which is always tending to transform advice, as in the *Panegyrikos* and *Philippos*, or apology, as in the *Antidosis* and *De Bigis*, into encomium⁵.

Arrange-
ment.

In Arrangement Isokrates is very clever. He is generally said to have invented the fourfold division of the speech—used, however, before him by Lysias—with proem, narrative, proof, epilogue⁶; but his distinctive skill lay in the management of a more complex system. According to Dionysios, the arrangement of Isokrates excels that of Lysias in

¹ x. 1 § 79, *in inventione facilis, honesti studiosus*.

² Arist. *Rh.* i. 9. 'If one has no positive merits to urge, one should give the man relative merit by comparing him with others—as Isokrates used to do, owing to his familiarity with suit-pleading' (διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν—where Spengel's ἀσυνήθειαν is surely made

improbable by the general sense, by the testimony of Dionys. *Isocr.* 18, and by the contemptuous word *δικολογεῖν*).

³ *Philipp.* [v] §§ 58—67.

⁴ *περὶ ὑψους* in Speng. *Rh. Gr.* i. p. 287.

⁵ See Dionys. *Rhet.* c. 9 § 12 : Volkmann p. 83.

⁶ Vol. i. p. 180 *note*.

two main points—in fineness of subdivision and in variety,—this variety arising either from new combinations within the subject itself or from the introduction of episodes not strictly proper to it¹. The use of the latter is illustrated by a remark of Aristotle in regard to the opening of an epideictic speech. Here, he suggests, the speaker may take a hint from the flute-player. The flute-player preludes with anything that he can play effectively, and then knits this on to the keynote of his theme. So it is, says Aristotle, in the proem to the ‘Helen’ of Isokrates; the *Eristics* have nothing to do with Helen. ‘And here, even if the speaker *pass into a foreign region* (ἐκτοπίσῃ), it is better than that the speech should be monotonous.’ The ‘episode’ on Agamemnon in the *Panathenaios* (§§ 74—87) is a good instance.

One uniform type of structure may be recognised in all the best discourses of Isokrates. There is a leading idea—generally some large proposition about the affairs of Athens or of Greece—which is worked out on the principle of antithesis. Every contrast which it can yield is developed: but through all divisions and subdivisions the dominant idea is kept before the mind; and, at the close, the simplicity of the original proposition emerges from these intricate, yet never confused, antitheses in the simplicity of the conclusion. Take, for instance, the *Panegyrikos*. The leading idea is—A Greek war

¹ *De Isocr.* c. 4 ἰδίας μεταβολαῖς
—ξένους ἐπεισοδίου.

Arist. *Rh.* III. 14. The keynote
(ἐνδόσιμον) of the *Helenae* *Enco-*

mium is, of course, Helen. But
Isokr. *preludes* with an attack on
the *Eristics* (§§ 1—131).

with Persia. 'Greece' is dealt with in Part I., 'Persia' in Part II. In Part I. Athens is contrasted with Sparta; the services of Athens to Greece are analysed as (1) civil, (2) military—and here, as in wars between Greeks or in wars between Greek and barbarian. Part II. shows that (1) Persia is open to attack while (2) Greece has every motive for attacking. Then the conclusion:—A Greek war with Persia is both just and expedient. It is this power of dealing luminously with a large array of facts grouped round a central idea which Hermogenes praises as the 'distinctness' of Isokrates¹. Like his moral bent towards subjects of practical moment and towards permanence of literary result, this faculty of arrangement set an example useful beyond the sphere of Rhetoric. It helped to show the historian how large masses of material might be wrought into a form at once clear and interesting².

Isokrates compared with the Practical Orator.

But the merits of Isokrates whether on the verbal or the real side are not those which are best fitted to succeed in a law-court or in an assembly. It is true that, as Hermogenes³ says, he has in a very high degree that purity of diction and that distinctness of method which are at least two virtues of civil eloquence: it is true that, as Dionysios⁴ says, lessons may be learned from him in everything that goes to form the complete 'faculty of citizenship.' Yet his practical rhetoric is not oratory. It is for

¹ *εὐκρίνεια*: *περὶ ἰδεῶν* α' c. 4, Sp. *Rh. Gr.* II. 283.

² Curtius *Hist. Gr.* v. p. 175 (Ward).

³ *περὶ ἰδ.* β' c. 11, Sp. II. 412.

⁴ *De Isocr.* c. 4—where *πολιτικὴ δύναμις* denotes the complete faculty of *being a citizen* as distinguished from the power of civil rhetoric.

the palaestra, not for the battle-field¹. It has not the stamp of vigorous nature. The great speaker in real contests holds his own argument, and can seize that of his adversary, with an iron grasp; he is impassioned and can kindle passion, he can animate the embodiment of his thought with a living soul which seems to come to it, through him, from a present and inspiring power; the artist of the school—and it is as such that Isokrates most often appears—suffers neither keenness of controversy, nor feeling, nor even what perhaps is most divine in the idea which he is enforcing, to agitate him as he marshals the slow and stately pageant of an eloquence which moves with always the same cold brilliancy. One who had tried the experiment of declaiming the discourses of Isokrates says that he had found that they would not bear delivery with raised tones, or passion, or gesture: Isokrates, he says, has dropped his voice to the key in which a slave reads aloud to his master². The disappointed reciter is too severe; but that such compositions should be better suited for reading than for declaiming is natural; and it is worthy of notice that when Isokrates himself complains of his speeches being marred by bad reading, the two points of which he deprecates the neglect are both consistent with a *subdued* manner—namely, attention to the *êthos* (general moral tone)—and attention to the cadences of the rhythm¹. Dionysios has been at pains to contrast a passage of the *De*

¹ Quint. x. 1 § 79.

² ἀναγνώστου παιδὸς φωνήν, Hieronymos *ap.* Dionys. *Isocr.* c. 13.

In *Phil.* [v] § 26 he complains

of one who reads him μηδὲν ἦθος ἐνσημαινόμενος: in *Panath.* [xii] § 17 of those who read him διαίρουντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς, κ. τ. λ.

Pace (§§ 41—50) with a passage of the *Third Olynthiac* (§§ 23—32)—the contrast coming to this, that the former is a display of graces and the latter a stirring summons to action¹. But the fact is that it is unmeaning to compare Isokrates and Demosthenes at all. While practical oratory was parting more and more distinctly into two branches—the pure Deliberative, best represented probably by Kallistratos, the Forensic, by Isaeos, branches of which the excellences were for once to meet in Demosthenes—Isokrates was occupied apart from both in developing a literary rhetoric, important, certainly, in its influence on the practical oratory of a later day, but of contemporary significance in the way of style *chiefly* for that Rhetorical school of history in which Ephoros and Theopompos are the earliest great names. Chiefly—yet not solely. In so far as merely literary lessons have to be learned by a great speaker, Demosthenes learned much from Isokrates: but the spirit of Demosthenes was not to be bound to any rigid outward law of euphony². In the epideictic kind we can see from the Funeral Oration of Hyperides just the two points of contact between Hyperides and Isokrates—the large freedom of development, and the tone, sincere in all its rhetorical elevation, of a moralist speaking the language of panegyric³. But the best representa-

His real province.

Influence of his work on contemporaries.

¹ Dionys. *Dem.* cc. 17—22.

² Cp. Curtius, *Hist. Gr.* v. p. 228 (Ward).

³ The Isokratic element in Hyperides is well estimated by Cartelier (*Le Discours d'I. sur lui-même*

p. lxxviii)—who observes that the younger contemporaries of Isokr., generally, must have owed to him in no small degree their greater abundance of development and richness of phrase (p. lxxvi).

tive of Isokrates in his influence on the development of oratory is Cicero. Cicero was intellectually stronger than Isokrates; he had the power for real contests—living force and passion; and the greater width of his mental horizon was not due simply to the age in which he lived. But as a stylist he is inferior to Isokrates. The idea which Cicero got from Isokrates was that of number¹. To this Cicero added special Isokratic graces with more than the richness but with less than the elegance of the Greek master. Seldom, perhaps, has an unconscious criticism on self told the truth more neatly than does the phrase of Cicero when he speaks of having used ‘all the fragrant essences of Isokrates *and all the little stores of his disciples*².’ The brilliancy of Isokrates had come to Cicero through the school of Rhodes³.

¹ See especially *De Orat.* III. 44, § 173. The *sweetness* which he elsewhere praises (*De Orat.* III. 8, § 28) as distinguishing this ‘father of eloquence’ (*ib.* II. 3, § 10) means chiefly that same smooth, harmonious rhythm. So Quint. x. 1 § 108 says that Cicero had ‘artistically reproduced (*effinxisse*) the force of Demosthenes, the wealth of Plato, the *charm* of Isokrates.’

² *Ad Att.* II. 1, *totum Isocratis μροθήκιον atque omnes eius discipulorum arculas.*

³ In concluding this review of Isokr. under the technical aspects of his style, it may be worth while to quote, for those who care to look at it, the criticism of Hermogenes (*περι ιδ. β’ c.* 11, *Sp. Rh. Gr.* II. 412)—a masterpiece (as usual with

him) of compression, in which almost every word is pregnant—or rather overloaded—with technical meaning. I have tried to make this version do the work of a glossary:—

‘As regards purity of language and perspicuity of arrangement—those characteristics which make a speech luminous—Isokrates is the greatest master of civil eloquence; but want of moral charm and of a natural simplicity lessen his power of persuading. In finish however, and in ornament, he excels; nor is he less distinguished by elevation, save that his vehemence and his asperity—if indeed he can be said ever to employ these—are deprived of nervous force by his elegance. In *words* he is not very diffuse; but in de-

Its later influence. Cicero.

*Influence
of Isokrates
on the
Greek
Language.*

It was inevitable that when such a manner as that of Isokrates was developed and became widely popular it should have a certain reflex action on the language; and the nature of this action was determined by the fact that Isokrates had the Greek impulses in art without the sureness or fineness of the best Greek instinct. The invariable desire of rounding periods led to periphrasis, the craving for antitheses to a bold use of synonyms. Hence came a certain loss of that strict yet always graceful precision which had marked the best Attic, when the accurate expression of a clearly defined thought was the first thing, and the light which played over the words came through the eyes of the thought. That language which had been as a perfect human body to a vivid soul began in these later days to be more like a dress fitting loosely to a form still fair and stately; a dress which Oriental taste gradually changed into a flowing robe, with always ampler folds and heavier embroideries as there

veloping a *thought* he amplifies to the uttermost. Of fiery earnestness he has not a trace. Further—though the criticism may seem harsh—he is characterised by a certain languor and slackness, as well as by a pervading elderly sententiousness. Just because he is naturally poor in spontaneous impulse he is over-industrious in artifice, as if bent on the display of ingenuity—often for no practical purpose. This may be seen from cases of contrast between the treatment of an argument by Isokrates and by Demosthenes. Compare (e.g.) the

opening of the Fourth Speech Against Philip' [our *First Philippic*]' with the opening of the *Archidamos*. The proposition is the same in both places—viz. that young men ought to be heard even though they rise before their elders—but Isokrates has made it a distinct thesis, and has demonstrated it at full length; while Demosthenes has been content to support it by a single observation. At the same time the power of exposition possessed by Isokrates is by no means slight.'

was less and less of natural vigour or comeliness beneath.

{ Yet, if Isokrates does not give the intimate Attic charm, it must not be forgotten that a Greek could still distinguish him from Lysias by saying that Lysias was to Kalamis and Kallimachos what Isokrates was to Praxiteles and Pheidias¹: his beauty and his majesty are genuinely Greek; and, until the sense of these is wholly lost, Isokrates must always take rank as one of the great masters of expression. The growing divergence of the modern ideal from his has already, perhaps, narrowed the modern faculty of appreciating him; but most readers can still admire his power of feeling, and of honouring, what is admirable. A French scholar has observed that, in regard to expression, the grave oratory of the preacher alone preserves for the modern world an image of Modern analogue for his oratory—that of the pulpit. that in which Isokrates excelled; and has at the same time rendered to Isokrates a tribute as high, perhaps, as the modern world could offer, in bringing proof that Isokrates had some share in forming whatever owed its virtue to form in the eloquence of Bossuet². }

Isokrates cannot be represented by extracts; the structure and the total effect are especially important for him just because he is specially an artist. But three passages may be taken as showing the bent rather than the compass of his art,—the contrast, in

¹ Dionys. *Isocr.* c. 3.

² Cartelier, *Le Discours d'I. sur lui-même* p. lxxxvi. Plato, Demosthenes and Isokrates are the

three Greeks to whom Bossuet acknowledges a debt in the matter of style.

the *Areopagitikos*, between the social lives of the old and of the new democracy; the eulogy, in the *Panegyrikos*, of the first Athenian empire; and the passage on beauty in the *Helen*.

In the *Areopagitikos* he is contrasting the social Athens of 500 B.C. with that of 355 B.C.:—

Areop. [VII]
§§ 51—54.

‘Under the supervision of that Council, the city was not distracted with law-suits and grievances and taxes and penury and wars; people lived on good terms with their neighbours and peaceably with all men. Athenians were the trust of Greece and the terror of barbarians; they had saved their country, and had so punished the enemy that he was glad enough to be let alone. And so, thanks to this, they lived in such security that the houses and establishments in the country were handsomer and richer than those within the wall,—many citizens never coming to town even for the festivals, but preferring their own snug homes to a share in the bounty of the State. The public spectacles, for which they might have come, were managed sensibly, and not with an insolent profusion. People did not measure happiness by shows, or by rivalries in the equipment of a chorus, or by the like forms of pretentiousness, but by soberness of life, by everyday comfort, by the absence of destitution among citizens. These are the tests of a real prosperity as distinguished from a policy of low makeshifts. Is there any sane man who can help being stung by what goes on now-a-days—when he sees numbers of citizens actually drawing lots for daily bread before the law-courts, yet condescending to feed any Greeks who

will row their ships for them,—coming on the stage in golden apparel, and passing the winter in garments of which the less said the better—with the rest of those economical contrasts which redound to the infamy of Athens?’

In the *Panegyrikos* the first Athenian empire is used as an argument for making Athens equal leader with Sparta in a war against Asia. An implied contrast with the Spartan influence from 405 to 380 B.C. runs through the whole:—

‘All, I think, would expect that State to be the best president of Greece under whose former rule those who accepted it were, as a fact, happiest. Now it will be found that under our leadership private households throve best and cities, too, became greatest. We were not jealous of the growing States; we did not sow the seeds of strife by setting up in them a government adverse to their own, in order that they might be divided by faction and that both factions might pay court to us; rather, holding the concord of our allies to be a common good, we governed all the cities by the same laws, debating their affairs in the federal spirit, not in a spirit of absolutism; watching over the interests of the whole league, but leaving every member of it free,—helping the commons and warring against despotisms,—thinking it a shame that the many should be under the few, that men worse than their fellows in nothing but fortune should be scouted for office, aye, and that, when Greece is the mother of us all, some Greeks should be tyrants while others are barely residents on sufferance, and that a franchise

Panegyri.
[iv] §§ 103—
106.

bestowed by nature should be cancelled by law. Finding these vices, and more than these, in Oligarchy, we gave to our allies the same form of government under which we lived ourselves—one which I see no need to praise at much length when it can be described so shortly. Under that government the allies lived for seventy years unvexed by tyrants, independent of barbarians, at unity among themselves, at peace with all the world.'

In the *Helen* it is interesting to mark both the likeness and the deep unlikeness to a Platonic strain:—

Helen. En-
com. [XI]
§§ 54—58.

'They had reason for their choice, and I for the greatness of these praises; for she was gifted above all others with Beauty, the first of all things in majesty and honour and divineness. It is easy to see its power; there are many things which have no share of Courage, or Wisdom, or Justice which yet will be found honoured above things which have each of these; but nothing which is devoid of Beauty is prized; all things are scorned which have not been given their part of that attribute; the admiration for Virtue itself comes to this, that of all manifestations of life Virtue is the most *beautiful*. The supremacy of Beauty over all other things can be seen from our own dispositions towards it and them. Other things we seek merely to attain, as we may have need of them; we have no further affection of the mind about them; but beautiful things inspire us with love—love, which is as much stronger than wish as its object is better. We are jealous of those who excel in ability or anything else, unless they

conciliate us by daily benefits and constrain us to feel kindly towards them: but the beautiful inspire us with goodwill at first sight; to them alone, as to the gods, we are never tired of doing homage, delighting to be their slaves rather than to be rulers of others, and feeling more gratitude to those of them who set us many tasks than to those who lay no commands upon us. We reproach the subjects of any other despotism with the name of flatterers; but we see only a clear-eyed and noble zeal in the lieges of Beauty. Care for that gift is to us so perfectly a religion that we hold the profaners of it in themselves more dishonoured than sinners against others, but honour for all time, and as benefactors to the State, those who have guarded the glory of their own youth in the chasteness of an inviolable shrine.'

CHAPTER XV.

ISOKRATES.

WORKS.

PRINCIPLE OF CLASSIFICATION.—SCHOLASTIC WRITINGS.

TWENTY-ONE Speeches or Discourses, and nine Letters, are extant under the name of Isokrates. All these are probably genuine¹. Nor is any lost work, except the 'Art of Rhetoric,' known from a definite citation². Suidas speaks of thirty-two discourses³. In the Plutarchic Life, the number given is sixty,—of which only twenty-eight were allowed as genuine by Caecilius and only twenty-five by Dionysios⁴.

¹ As to the questions raised in the cases of Or. xvii, xviii, xxi, see below.

² These, indeed, have been *supposed* to be lost:—(1) An *ἐπιτάφιος* Γρύλλου [Gryllos, Xenophon's son] was written, according to Hermippos *ap.* Diog. L. ii. 55, by Isokrates; but this probably refers to Isokrates of Apollonia: see Sauppe *O. A.* ii. 227. The same explanation applies to the case of (2) a *Μαυσώλου ἐγκώμιον* ascribed to our Isokrates in the Plutarchic Life, which Jerome Wolf follows (p. 684, ed. of 1570). Suidas expressly ascribes this *ἐγκώμιον* to the Apol-

loniate. (3) From Arist. *Rh.* ii. 19 it has been quite needlessly assumed—as by Benseler *de Hiatu* p. 56—that there was a *λόγος πρὸς Ἐῤῥωνον* distinct from the extant *πρὸς Ἐῤῥώνου* [Or. xxi]. But see Sauppe *O. A.* ii. 227. (4) From the *Philippos* [Or. iv] § 81, Wolf, l. c., assumes a lost 'oratio ad Dionysium.' But the allusion—even if it does not refer to the first of the extant epistles—evidently does not warrant any definite inference. As regards the 'Art of Rhetoric,' see below.

³ s. v. Ἴσοκράτης.

⁴ [Plut.] *viz.* *Isocr.* § 20.

Photios knew only twenty-one¹. Dionysios, the strictest, may be taken as also the best canon. If it may be assumed that his collection included ours, we have all but four of those compositions which he thought genuine.

The text of our collection is tolerably perfect. *Text.* The only gaps of any importance are at the end of Oration XIII (Against the Sophists); at the beginning of Oration XVI ('De Bigis'); and probably at the end of Letters I, VI and IX².

The writings of Isokrates are arranged differently in different MSS.³ The order followed in most modern editions is not that of any one manuscript, but that which was adopted, for the sake of convenience, by Jerome Wolf⁴. His arrangement aims at a fourfold distribution:—

- | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. <i>Hortatory.</i> | VII. Areopagitikos. |
| I. To Demonikos. | VIII. On the Peace. |
| II. To Nikokles. | 3. <i>Epideictic.</i> |
| III. Nikokles. | IX. Evagoras. |
| 2. <i>Deliberative.</i> | X. Encomium of Helen. |
| IV. Panegyrikos. | XI. Busiris. |
| V. Philippos. | XII. Panathenaikos. |
| VI. Archidamos. | XIII. Against the Sophists. |

¹ Phot. *cod.* 159, οὕτω μὲν καὶ τοσοῦτους ἔγνωμεν Ἰσοκράτους λόγους, ἕνα καὶ εἴκοσιν ὄντας. In 260,—φέρονται δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ξ' (60), &c.—The statement is simply a transcription from the Plutarchic Life.

² In the case of each of the three Letters, another explanation is possible—that they are merely prefaces, προπεμπτικά, to essays or

pamphlets sent along with them or after them.

³ A table showing the arrangement in the Urbino MS, and in six other manuscripts, is given by Baier and Sauppe *Or. Att.* Vol. I, preface to the Text of Isokrates, p. iv.

⁴ For Wolf's own account of this classification, see p. 684 of his edition of 1570.

4. <i>Forensic</i> .	XVII. Trapezitikos.
XIV. Plataikos ¹ .	XVIII. Against Kallimachos.
XV. Antidosis.	XIX. Aeginetikos.
XVI. Against Alkibiades	XX. Against Lochites.
(περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους).	XXI. Against Euthynus ² .

*Objections
to it.*

The principle of this classification seems hardly the best. 'Deliberative' has to be strained in various directions in order to include the *Panegyrikos*, the *Philippos*, the *Areopagitikos*. 'Epidictic' applies ill to the essay *Against the Sophists*. The *Antidosis*, though thrown for literary purposes into the form of a defence in court, cannot properly be called 'forensic.'

*Another
classification.*

Setting the six real Forensic Speeches apart, the other writings of Isokrates ought to be classified, not according to accident of form, but by subject-matter. They may be considered as I. *Scholastic*, II. *Political*. The whole list will then stand thus:—

¹ The Plataikos is an appeal to the Athenian ekklesia. Wolf gives its forensic vehemence of tone as his reason—a strange reason—for classing it as forensic.

² With this classification according to *form*, it is worth while to compare that of Photios (*cod.* 159):—I. συμβουλευτικοί: *To Demonikos, To Nikokles, Nikokles, On the Peace, Panegyrikos, Areopagitikos, Plataikos, Archidamos, Philippus*. II. ἐγκώμια: *Busiris, Helen, Ecagoras, Panathenaios*. III. δίκαικοί: *Antidosis* (δικαικός τις εἶναι δοκεῖ), and then the real Forensic Speeches, omitting, no

doubt by an oversight, the περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους,—which is wanted to make up the 21. The κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν is characterized merely as κατηγορία τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων αὐτῷ σοφιστῶν.

A stricter classification according to *form* would be:—I. Deliberative: *Philippus, Archidamos, Plataikos, Areopagitikos, On the Peace*: II. Forensic: *Or.* XVI—XXI: III. Epidictic: *Ecagoras, Panegyrikos, Panathenaios, Busiris, Helen, Against the Sophists, Antidosis*: IV. Hortatory: *To Demonikos, To Nikokles, Nikokles*.

A. SCHOLASTIC WRITINGS.

I. *Hortatory Letters or Essays.*

1. To Demonikos. [Or. I.]
2. To Nikokles. [Or. II.]
3. Nikokles. [Or. III.]

II. *Displays.*

1. Busiris. [Or. XI.]
2. Encomium on Helen. [Or. X.]
3. Evagoras. [Or. IX.]
4. Panathenaikos. [Or. XII.]

III. *Essays on Education.*

1. Against the Sophists. [Or. XIII.]
2. Antidosis. [Or. XV.]

B. POLITICAL WRITINGS.

I. *On the relations of Greece with Persia.*

1. Panegyrikos. [Or. IV.]
2. Philippos. [Or. V.]

II. *On the internal affairs of Greece.*

1. Plataikos. [Or. XIV.]
2. On the Peace. [Or. VIII.]
3. Archidamos. [Or. VI.]
4. Areopagitikos. [Or. VII.]¹

¹ Benseler (German Translation of Isokrates, vol. I, Life p. 16) thus arranges the speeches according to subject-matter:—I. Relating to War with Persia: *Panegyrikos*, *Philippos*. II. Relating to internal feuds of Greece: *Plataikos*, *Archidamos*, *On the Peace*. III. Concerning Athens and her Constitution: *Areopagitikos*, *Panathenaios*. IV. Cyprian Discourses: *Evagoras*, *To Nikokles*, *Nikokles*, *To*

Demonikos. V. Writings against the Sophists: *Against the Sophists*, *Busiris*, *Helen*. VI. An Apology for his Life: *Antidosis*. VII. Forensic Speeches soon after the time of the Thirty: *Against Kallimachos*, *Against Lochites*, *Against Enthynus*. VIII. Three other Forensic Speeches:—*Aeginetikos*, *On the Yoke of Horses*, *Trapezitikos*.

C. FORENSIC SPEECHES.

- I. *Action for Assault* (δίκη αικίας).
Against Lochites. [Or. xx.]
- II. *Claim to an Inheritance* (ἐπιδικασία).
Aeginetikos. [Or. xix.]
- III. *Action to recover a Deposit* (δίκη παρακαταθήκης).
 1. Against Euthynus. [Or. xxi.]
 2. Trapezitikos. [Or. xvii.]
- IV. *Action for Damage* (δίκη βλάβης).
On the Yoke of Horses. [Or. xvi.]
- V. *Special Plea* (παραγραφή).
Against Kallimachos. [Or. xviii.]

D. LETTERS.—FRAGMENTS.

SCHOLASTIC WORKS.

I. HORTATORY LETTERS OR ESSAYS.

I. 1. *To
Demonikos.*

1. *To Demonikos* [Or. i.]—The person to whom this Letter of Advice is addressed is known only from the Letter itself. Demonikos lived in a monarchical State (§ 36), which may have been Cyprus¹. He was still a youth (§ 44); rich, and of distinguished (§ 49), though not of royal (§ 36), birth². His father, Hipponikos, lately dead (§ 2), must have been in some way a well-known man (§ 11).

¹ The author of the Greek argument says:—Ἰππώνικός τις, ὡς ἔχει ὁ πολὺς λόγος, Κύπριος μὲν ἦν τῷ γένει, Ἰσοκράτους δὲ φίλος τοῦ σοφιστοῦ. The λόγος was founded probably on the fact that three other treatises of Isokrates were connected with Cyprus.

² Referring to § 36, Mr Sandys (*Ad. Dem. and Panegyrr.* p. xxxi.) observes that it disproves the statement of Tzetzes that Demonikos was son of Evagoras king of Cyprus; and the statement of Porphyrogenitus that Demonikos himself ruled the island.

The date at which the Letter was written cannot *Date.* be determined; but it may be assigned conjecturally to about the same time as the two other Hortatory Discourses—the *Letter to Nikokles* and the *Nikokles*¹—374—372 B.C.

The Letter consists of three parts: I. Intro- *Analysis.* duction, §§ 1—12: II. Precepts, §§ 13—43: III. Epilogue, §§ 44—52.

I. There is no greater difference between good and bad men (*σπουδαῖοι—φᾶνλοι*) than in the durability of their friendships. Isokrates wishes to testify his friendship to Demonikos, and his regard for the young man's late father Hipponikos (§§ 1—2). He does not intend this letter to be a mere stimulus to intellectual exertion (*παράκλησις*) but an exhortation to moral excellence (*παραίνεσις* §§ 4, 5).

II. The following are the principal heads under which the precepts in §§ 13—43 may be brought:—

1. *Duty towards the gods*; § 13.

2. *Duty towards men*; prescribed generally as the obligation to be just (§§ 38, 39) and true (§§ 22, 23); and specially in three chief relations, (*a*) as towards the State, §§ 16, 37: cf. § 36: (*b*) as towards parents, § 14: (*c*) as towards friends, §§ 24—27, 33: cf. § 30.

3. *Duty of regulating personal character*, in respect (*a*) to the use of wealth, §§ 27, 28, and of pleasures, §§ 17, 32:

¹ I have given my reasons above (*Life of Isokr.*) for believing that his stay at Chios was from the autumn of 404 to the autumn of 403 B. C. Mr Sandys, inclining to Sauppe's view that Isokrates was at Chios from 393 to about 388 B. C., ascribes to the local Ionic influence (cf. Herod. I. 142) certain forms which occur in the *Ad Demonicum*: viz. *θαρσαλέως* (§ 7),

συνειδήσεις (§ 16). Now the form *θαρσαλέως*, though Ionic, is, as Mr Sandys observes, *early Attic* too; and in *Antid.* § 121, two good MSS. (*Urb.* and *Vat.*) read *θαρσήσουσι* (*Introd.* xxxiv). If, again, *εἰδήσω* is more Ionic than Attic, it is at any rate used by Aristotle (*Magn. Mor.* I. i. 3, 18. Sandys, note to § 16).

(b) to the exercise of body and mind, § 40; and particularly to the acquisition of knowledge, §§ 18, 19; (c) to demeanour in society, §§ 15, 41, 42, 31.

III. Many of the rules just given will not suit the present age of Demonikos; but by and by he will need them, and this letter will then serve him as a storehouse (*ταμειῶν*) of advice (§ 44). The reward of Herakles, and the doom of Tantalos, are warnings to strive after real nobleness (*τῆς καλοκαγαθίας*); and, in so striving, we must seek help from every quarter. 'For hardly, by this care, may we master the failings of our nature' (§§ 51—52).

*Genuine-
ness of the
Letter
needlessly
doubted.*

The authenticity of a treatise remarkably characteristic of its author has, with singular perversity, been questioned both in ancient and in modern times. 'Feebleness of diction'¹ is the trait which the writer of the Greek argument mentions as having been found suspicious in this and like compositions of Isokrates. Alleged peculiarities or solecisms in language, dialect or grammar,—the occurrence, in a few instances, of hiatus,—and defective arrangement of subject-matter, are the tokens of spuriousness which the most recent and most careful sceptic² has discovered. It is needless, here, to examine these objections in detail. It is enough to say that, even if they could all be proved, they would be decisively outweighed by the thoroughly Isokratic stamp of the treatise as a whole, in lan-

¹ ἔγραψε πολλοὺς λόγους, ὧν εἰσὶν αἱ παρανέσεις, εἰ καὶ τινες ἠβουλήθησαν αὐτὰς μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τῆς φράσεως. Auct. Argum. *ad inil.* As Mr Sandys shows, in his first note on the Argument, its date cannot be earlier than the fourth century A. D.

² Dr G. E. Benseler, in the preface to his edition of Isokrates, Leipsic, 1851. His objections, and those of earlier critics, are examined, and (in my judgment) disposed of, by Mr Sandys, in his Introduction to the Speech, pp. xxxii—xxxviii.

guage, in structure, in spirit. As to external testimony, Dionysios¹ and Hermogenes² are affirmative witnesses; in Harpokration³ two passages cancel each other.

The distinguishing mark of the *Ad Demonicum*, Its general stamp. viewed as a treatise on morals, is a combination of loftiness and meanness. It is the man of the world who assumes the part of the preacher. Where he gives, in a simple form, the maxims of a somewhat vulgar prudence, he is excellent; it is when he strives to connect them with doctrine that he fails. The morality of the *Ad Demonicum* is probably at least on a level with the average practical morality of Greece; on the other hand, the higher sentiment which it contains is not affected; but the absence of harmony between them is Isocratic.

2. *To Nikokles*. [Or. II.]—Nikokles, to whom 1 2. To Nikokles. the Second and Ninth Discourses are addressed and for whom the Third was written, succeeded his father Evagoras as king of the Cyprian Salamis in 374 B.C.

It was probably soon after the accession of Date. Nikokles that Isokrates addressed this speech to him. The opening words have a formality which suggests that the writer is either wholly or almost a stranger; and the tone of the Letter generally implies that Nikokles was young both in years and in office. The intercourse thus opened appears to

¹ Dionys. *Ars Rhet.* v. 1.

² Hermog. *περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* 25.

³ Harpokration, s. vv. *ἐπακτὸς ὄρκος*, gives the *Ad Demonicum* to Isokrates of Apollonia. Else-

where, s. v. *παράκλησις*, quoting some words from § 5, he adds, *Ἰσοκράτης παραιέσειεν*,—where in the absence of definition, we must understand the Athenian.

have become intimate; and it is possible that Nikokles may have been among the pupils of Isokrates¹.

Analysis.

‘The usual offerings to a king, Nikokles, are garments, or gold, or bronze, things in which he is richer than the givers: I offer you advice. Private men are schooled by the struggle of life, by the laws, by the poets: kings have little schooling. Hence those frequent disasters which, even in vulgar eyes, balance the pleasures of a royal lot. People fancy that the office of a king, like that of a priest, may be assumed without any special preparation². In particular crises, you will have the counsel of others: my counsels shall be general (§§ 1—8).

‘First—What is the function of a king? To stay the troubles, to guard the welfare, to raise the greatness of his realm (§ 9).

‘In order to perform this task well, you ought, in the first place, to be intelligent. By converse with the ablest men, and by reading, you must make yourself capable of deciding small questions, and of grappling with great³ (§§ 10—14).

‘Next, you must be the friend of mankind and of your realm (§ 15). Keep the people alike from doing, and from suffering, outrage (§ 16). Let your laws be not only just and consistent, but framed for the settlement, rather than for the raising, of issues (§ 17). Rule the State like your own house, generously but carefully (§ 19). Let your word be held surer than other men’s oaths. Honour less those strangers who bring gifts than those who deserve to receive them (§ 22). Be royal, not in severity, but by the recognised supremacy of your wisdom: warlike in knowledge and preparation, peaceful in abstinence from aggression (§ 24). Choose your associates with care, knowing that the many

¹ Cp. *Antid.* [xv.] § 30, οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἰδιώτας φησὶ μου γεγενῆσθαι μαθητάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ βασιλείας καὶ τυράννοους.

² § 6. τὴν βασιλείαν, ὥσπερ ἰε-

ρωσύτην, παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

³ § 13. παρασκευάζε σεαυτὸν τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων κριτήν, τῶν δὲ μείζονων ἀγωνιστήν.

will judge you by them (§ 27). Deem it the most kingly thing of all to be subject to none of your own desires (§ 29). Take it as a sign that you are reigning well if you see your subjects growing richer and better (§ 31). Let your dress be splendid and your life hardy (§ 32): be witty, and be dignified (§ 34). Observe the fates of kings and of private persons; and divine the future from the past (§ 35). Let safety for the State and for yourself be your first object: but, if you are forced into danger, choose a noble death before a life of dishonour. In all things remember your royal office, and be mindful to do nothing unworthy of it (§§ 36, 37). Since your body must die, seek to make the memory of your spirit immortal (§ 37). If you emulate a man's fame, copy his actions (§ 38). Think those wise who can speak well on great questions, not those who can refine on trifles;—and those whose prosperity shows their prudence, or whose resignation proves their philosophy (§ 39).

‘Practical advice must not aim at being novel, and can hardly hope to be amusing (§§ 54—56). Hesiod, Theognis, Phokylides are praised—and neglected: Homer and the dramatists are the poets of the people (§§ 40—49). You, Nikokles, are a king, and ought to think first of what is useful. A good adviser is the most royal of possessions (§§ 40—53). Encourage others to bring you gifts like mine; gifts which, instead of wearing out in use, become more valuable the more they are used’ (§ 54).

Isokrates wrote for the cultivated. His idea of an expedition to Asia needed the help of the powerful. On both grounds it was natural that he should cultivate friendly relations with Hellenic kings and tyrants,—with Nikokles of Salamis and Timotheos of Herakleia no less than with Dionysios of Syracuse and Philip of Macedon. In the *Antidosis*, (where he is answering the imputation of being too much a friend to monarchy,) he quotes the speech which many years ago he had addressed to Nikokles.

*Claim made
for the
Nikokles
in the
Antidosis*

He claims to have spoken in it 'freely and worthily of the city'; to have upheld the cause of the people; to have 'reproved monarchy' by observing how ill monarchs are usually trained for their duties. The claim is somewhat exaggerated. On the other hand, Isokrates might fairly have taken credit for setting before Nikokles a standard, higher than the common, of the king's duty to the subject. His ideal monarchy is absolute, but it is intelligently and honestly paternal.

*how far
just.*

*l. 3. Niko-
kles.*

3. *Nikokles* or *The Cyprians*. [Or. III.]—In the last Discourse Isokrates had traced for Nikokles the duty of a king: in this it is Nikokles who sets forth the duty of subjects (§ 11). The piece was no doubt written to order; Nikokles perhaps thinking that the perception of a king's obligations which the former work may have quickened in some Salaminians might be usefully complemented by a sense of their own. Since the prince can appeal to his people's past experience of him as a ruler (§ 63), the date can hardly be earlier than 372; on the other hand it cannot be later than 355; and may probably be placed between 372 and 365.

Date.

Analysis.

I. 'Some people are hostile to all discussion on the ground that selfish gain, not virtue, is its aim. Why do not those who blame the endeavour to reason well blame also the desire to act rightly? Action, not debate, is the chief instrument of selfishness. It is the faculty of persuading which has civilized life.

'For a king, the first questions are of the relations between rulers and ruled. Isokrates has traced the duty of a king; I will now attempt to trace the duty of subjects (§ 11). But first I will try to show (1) that monarchy is the

best form of government; and (2) that I am entitled, historically and personally, to be your king (§§ 1—13).

II. 'A Monarchy, as compared with a limited or with a pure Republic, has these advantages:—1. It discriminates the different degrees of merit. Equality is the principle of republics. A Monarchy gives the first place to the best man, the second to the second-best, and so on (§§ 14, 15).—2. It has, more than other forms of government, an insight into the natures and actions of men; merit, wherever it exists, is therefore sure of recognition.—3. It is the mildest of governments; since it is easier to propitiate one man than many (§ 16).—4. Its ministers, being not annual but permanent, learn and discharge their duties more thoroughly and composedly (§§ 17, 18).—5. It is prompt in action. A popular assembly consists of men who are immersed in private affairs, and who meet only to wrangle: in a cabinet there are fewer distractions and delays (§ 19).—6. It has no jealousies. In a Republic there are always at least two parties, each of which hopes that the other will mismanage the country as grossly as possible. A monarch, having no rivals, has no spite (§ 20).—7. It has a more direct interest in good government. Republicans regard themselves as stewards, a monarch regards himself as the owner, of the State (§ 21).—8. It is more effective in war. Secret preparation, striking display, versatile intrigue, are easier for it than for other governments (§ 22).

'Experience shows that these advantages are not imaginary. In Persia, devotion to Monarchy has been rewarded with unequalled greatness. In Sicily, the absolutism of Dionysios has not only delivered an enslaved country, but has made it the first in Greece. Carthage and Sparta, oligarchies at home, become monarchies in the field. Athens, the most anti-monarchical of States, has generally failed when she sent out a committee of generals, and succeeded when she gave the command to one. Lastly—Is not Zeus monarch of the gods? Whether the gods really live under that form of government or not, the fact of men ascribing it to them proves at least a human sense that it is the best (§§ 22—26).

‘Having shown the advantages of Monarchy, I will show more briefly that I am entitled to be your monarch. First, historically. Teukros, the founder of our house, brought hither the forefathers of the present Cyprians. His throne, lost for a time by his descendants, was regained by my father Evagoras, who put down Phoenician rule at Salamis and restored it to its original kings (§§ 27, 28). Next, personally. At my accession, I found the treasury empty, the State disturbed, Cyprus on bad terms with the rest of Greece and with Persia: and I met all these difficulties without wronging any man (§§ 29—35). Nor have youth (§ 45) and opportunity ever drawn me into licence (§§ 36—46).

III. ‘As the lawful holder, then, of a beneficent power, I may advise with a right to be heard.—Let each man do his appointed task carefully and fairly (§ 48).—Do not make haste to be rich (§ 50).—Murmur not at one of my commands, knowing that those who serve me best will best serve their own fortunes.—Let everyone be sure that nothing of which his own conscience is aware will escape me (§ 51).—Form no clubs, hold no meetings, without my knowledge (§ 54).—Guard the present constitution, and desire no sort of change (§ 55).—Be humble to me, and magnificent in the service of the State (§ 56).—Consider that the greatest and surest wealth which you can leave to your children is my favour (§ 58).—Be not jealous, but emulous, of my counsellors (§ 60).—Think my words, laws—and keep them.—In short, be to your king what you wish your subordinates to be to you (§ 62).

‘If you follow this course, while I do not change mine, your prosperity and my power will grow together. Such a hope might well encourage to any toils. But you need not toil at all. You need only to be just and loyal’ (§§ 63—64).

Perhaps the most interesting part of this Discourse is that in which the writer, putting himself at the king’s point of view, offers a popular plea for Monarchy as against Republic. Here Isokrates is

essentially the professional rhetor—it being distinctive of Rhetoric as an art that, like its counterpart Dialectic, it is equally ready to argue either side of a question¹. Isokrates has given us the other side in the *Panathenaios* and the *Areopagitikos*, where he interprets his own ideal—a democracy tempered by a censorship.

II. DISPLAYS.

1. *Busiris* [Or. XI.]—The *Busiris* and the *Encomium on Helen* [Or. X.] are slight essays by Isokrates in a province which was not his own. Declamations on subjects taken from epos or from the myths had always a prominent place among the ‘displays’ of ordinary Sophists. Such, for instance, are the *Encomium on Helen* and the *Defence of Palamedes* ascribed to Gorgias; the speech of Odysseus *Against Palamedes* ascribed to Alkidamas; the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus, in the contest for the arms, ascribed to Antisthenes². The bent of Isokrates, as he himself tells us³, was not towards this kind of composition. He was not, indeed, hostile to it, any more than he was hostile to criticism of the poets and other branches of literary work which employed the Sophists⁴. The encomia which he depreciates in Or. X. § 12 are encomia on bumble-bees and salt; on the other hand he expressly commends the choice of such a subject as Helen (§ 14); and if he speaks of

II I. *Busiris*.

Purpose of the 'Busiris'—merely illustrative.

¹ τὰναντία συλλογίζεται, *Ar. Rhet.*
I. 1.

² See above, p. 55, note 1.

³ *Panath.* § 1.

⁴ Cf. *Antid.* § 45. In *Panath.*

§§ 19 ff. he shows how much he had been nettled by the charge of depreciating all kinds of literary work except his own.

Busiris as a poor theme (Or. xi. § 22) he clearly means only that it is one which baffles the panegyrist. Yet it is important to note that he comes upon this field of 'display' not as a candidate for distinction but merely as a critic. The *Busiris* and the *Encomium on Helen* are alike criticisms, in which he first reviews the work of others, and then shows, for the sake of vindicating his right to criticise, how he would have done the work himself.

Polykrates. The *Busiris* is addressed to Polykrates, who has lately been driven by need to become a professed rhetorician. Isokrates has never seen him; but, sympathising with his misfortunes, wishes to help him with advice. Pausanias says that Jason of Pherae preferred Gorgias to Polykrates, although the school of Polykrates had then gained no small repute at Athens¹. Gorgias died about 380 B.C. At some time, then, before 380 Polykrates had made a name at Athens. But the *Busiris* speaks of him as a beginner; and it is known from Diogenes Laertius that the 'Accusation of Sokrates' mentioned in § 4 contained an allusion to the rebuilding of the Long Walls by Konon,—i. e. was written later than 393 B. C.² All the conditions will be satisfied if we suppose that Polykrates published his 'Accusation of Sokrates' in 393 or 392, and

His 'Accusation of Sokrates.'

¹ Paus. vi. 17, 9, Ἰάσων ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ τυραννήσας, Πολυκράτους οὐ τὰ ἔσχατα ἐνεγκαμένου διδασκαλείου τοῦ Ἀθήνησι, τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπίπροσθεν Γοργίαν ὁ Ἰάσων ἐπούησατο. Here τυραννήσας can hardly refer to the ταγεία, for Jason was not tagos till about 374 B. C.: cf. Curtius iv. 445.

² Diog. Laert. ii. 5. 39, Φαβωρίνος δέ φησιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων μὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον τὸν Πολυκράτους κατὰ Σωκράτους· ἐν αὐτῷ γάρ, φησι, μνημονεύει τῶν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τειχῶν ἀνασταθέντων, ἃ γέγονεν ἔτεσιν ἑξέτης τοῦ Σωκράτους τελευτῆς ὕστερον.

the 'Defence of Busiris' soon after; that he had become a teacher of repute at Athens about 388 B. C.; and that Isokrates wrote the *Busiris* soon after the appearance of the 'Defence' which it criticises,—perhaps in 391 or 390. At this time, Polykrates was teaching at Cyprus¹; he and Isokrates—as the essay tells us—had never met.

*Date of the
'Busiris.'*

Polykrates evidently held a respectable rank among the rhetoricians of his time. He is mentioned by Dionysios in company with Antiphon, Thrasy-machos of Chalkedon, Kritias, Theodoros of Byzantium, Anaximenes, Zoilos and Isaeos². He was, however, no favourite of Dionysios, who describes him as 'empty in practical oratory, frigid and vulgar in the rhetoric of display, and devoid of grace in the subjects which demand it³.' He wrote for the law-courts; and the 'Accusation of Sokrates' itself was supposed by some to have been actually spoken at the trial⁴. But 'display' was probably his chosen

¹ γράφει πρὸς Πολυκράτη τινὰ σοφιστήν, Ἀθηναῖον μὲν τῷ γένει, σοφιστεύοντα δὲ νῦν ἐν Κύπρῳ. Others—who believe that in 391 Isokrates was at Chios—suggest, though without sufficient ground, that the *auctor argum.* has invented this statement to account for Isok. and Polyk. being strangers (Spengel *Syn. Texn.* p. 75).

² With Antiphon, Thrasy-machos, Kritias and Zoilos, *Isae.* c. 20: with Antiphon, Theodoros, Isaeos, Zoilos and Anaximenes, *Dem.* c. 8.

³ *Isae.* c. 20: κενὸς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀληθνοῖς, ψυχρὸς δὲ καὶ φορτικὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ἄχαρις δὲ ἐν τοῖς χαρμεντισμοῦ δεομένοις. By τὰ ἀλη-

θινά, as opposed to τὰ ἐπιδεικτικά, Dionysios seems to mean the treatment of practical questions either in Forensic or in Deliberative speaking. Demetrios, *περὶ ἔρμ.* § 120 (in Walz, *Rhet.* ix. 54), makes the want of earnestness the great defect of Polykrates. ἔπαιξε γάρ, οὐκ ἐσπούδαξε, καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς γραφῆς ὁ ὄγκος παίγμιόν ἐστι—a passage which Spengel ingeniously compares with the ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκάμιον ἔμὸν δὲ παίγμιον of [Gorg.] *Helen. Enc.* § 21, in support of his view that Polykrates wrote that piece; but the point is not a very strong one.

⁴ Diog. Laert. II. 5, 39 notices

branch. His ingenuity appears from the circumstance that he composed an encomium upon mice¹, and his versatility from the fact that he praised both Agamemnon² and Klytaemnestra³.

*Fancied
motive of
the piece.*

No weight can be given to the suggestion made by the author of the Argument that the real meaning of Isokrates was to attack Polykrates for the 'Accusation of Sokrates', and that, deterred by the temper of Athens from doing this openly, he did it under pretext of a criticism upon the 'Defence of Busiris.' There is no trace in the piece of any such covert intention; the vindication of Sokrates, so far as it goes, is perfectly frank; and this very frankness defines its place as a secondary topic.

Analysis.

'Your worth, Polykrates, and the change in your way of life are known to me by report. I have read some of your writings, and would gladly discuss freely with you the whole theory of those studies to which you have given yourself. General precepts, however, shall be reserved until we know each other. In the meantime I send you some special criticisms. Wishing you well, I do not shrink from the risk of giving offence.

'You put trust in your *Defence of Busiris* and your *Accusation of Sokrates*. As to Busiris, you have made his case worse than ever; others accuse him of having immolated strangers; you, of having eaten them. As to Sokrates, your 'Accusation' glorifies him; you make him the teacher of Alkibiades,—who is not known to have been his disciple, but who certainly was a remarkable man. Could the dead hear

this tradition, but contradicts it on the authority of Favorinus: see p. 94, n. 2. Cf. Quint. II. 17, 4 (*Polykrates*) *composuisse orationem, quae est habita contra Socraten, dicitur*. By the *auctor argum.*

Polykrates is described as *καὶ σοφιστῆς καὶ λογογράφος*.

¹ Arist. *Rhet.* II. 24.

² Demetr. *περὶ ἔμμ.* § 120, in Walz's *Rhet.* IX. p. 54.

³ Quint. II. 17, 4.

you, you would have the thanks of the philosopher and the hatred of the king. Such, too, is your disregard of consistency that you have described Busiris as emulating the fame of Aeolos and Orpheus, who lived long after him; and who, moreover, were utterly unlike him. I will try to show you briefly how the subject ought to have been handled (§§ 1—9).

‘The father of Busiris was Poseidon; his mother, Libya, daughter of Epaphos the son of Zeus, and earliest queen of the land which bears her name. Not content with his mother’s realm, Busiris, after wide conquests, founded a monarchy in Egypt. He saw that that country had the best climate in the world, was the most fertile, and had in the Nile a perpetual barrier against invasion. For other lands, the steward of rains and droughts is Zeus; for Egypt, the Nile. That river is at once their protector and their nourisher, giving them the wealth of a continent with the security of an island (§§ 10—14).

‘Having got a good country, Busiris next sought to give it a good government. He divided the population into priests,—craftsmen of various sorts,—and soldiers. In his theory of a really good economy, each kind of work ought to have its permanent workmen. Sparta has taken one hint from this system. She has made her citizens a military caste. But her defect is that she is purely military. Egypt provides at the same time for the protection, and for the prosecution, of industry (§§ 15—20).

‘Nor was mental culture neglected. The priests, having wealth and leisure, developed a science of medicine,—to which it is due that the Egyptians have the best health and the longest lives. Other sciences were cultivated also; and while the elder men were busied with great affairs, the younger studied astrology, logic, geometry.

‘But it is for their reverent worship of the gods that the Egyptians are most admirable. Exaggeration is harmful in most things; but it is good for human life that men should have an even exaggerated idea of the gods’ power to reward or punish. To the Egyptian mind this power is so awful that oaths taken in Egyptian temples have a greater

sanctity than elsewhere. The Egyptians believe that retribution will follow sin, not bye-and-bye, but instantly. Their priests enjoin upon them a multitude of observances, meant both to strengthen the habit of obedience and to test, by visible proof, their reverence for things unseen.

‘The philosophy of Egypt, and the spirit of its scrupulous ritual, were first brought into Hellas by Pythagoras; who felt sure that, if not requited by the gods, he would at least be esteemed by men. And to this day the silence of his disciples is more admired than the eloquence of others (§§ 21—29).

‘You will perhaps say that I have praised the laws, the piety, the thought of Egypt without proving that these are due to Busiris. It would ill become you to reproach me as illogical; you have yourself said that it was Busiris who distributed the Nile by its seven channels through the land, and who, at the same time, slew strangers on his altars; thus ascribing to him at once the fury of a beast and the faculty of a god. But my account is not merely as reasonable as yours; it has intrinsic probability. The benefits which it imputes to Busiris have not been shown to be due to any one else; and who is more likely to have wrought them than the son of Poseidon and of Libya,—the most powerful man of his time? The falseness of the charges laid against him is seen in this, that they represent him as having been slain by Herakles. Herakles lived four generations¹ after Perseus. Busiris lived two centuries before Perseus (§§ 30—37).

*Chronology
of the
Heroes.*

‘But you have had no care for truth—you have followed the blasphemies of the poets, who love to represent the gods as more vicious than men. These blasphemers have often suffered, though less than they deserved; some have become wandering beggars, some blind, some exiles, some foes, of their own kindred: Orpheus, the worst of them, was torn to pieces. Now it is my faith that not the gods only, but their children, are without spot of vice. If the gods have not the wish to make their own sons good, they are

¹ *i. e.* about 130 years: cf. Herod. ii. 142, γενεαὶ...τρῆς ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν ἔτεά ἐστί.

worse disposed than men; if they have not the power, they are less able than sophists (§§ 38—43).

‘Much more might be said; but my object is to give hints, not to make a display. You have defended Busiris from the charges against him by admitting them, but arguing that they might be brought against others. How would you yourself like to be defended in this fashion? Or if any of your own friends had acted like Busiris, would you praise him? You will say, perhaps, that you wished merely to set an example of defending difficult causes. But a defence of this kind is futile, and tends also to bring philosophy into disrepute. In future you must choose better subjects, or treat those which you do choose more judiciously. Do not resent the advice of a stranger who has not even the privilege of age; it is not age or intimacy, it is knowledge and goodwill which give the right to advise in such matters’ (§§ 44—50).

The subject of the *Busiris*—so well-worn by *Remarks:* logographers¹ and poets—is treated by Isokrates in a very simple manner. He praises the customs, religious and political, of Egypt; and then remarks that Busiris is as likely as another to have been the founder of these. The crimes imputed to the inhospitable king he rejects as blasphemies. But if, as an encomium, the piece has not even the merit of ingenuity, it has a real interest of another kind. It illustrates very strikingly the attitude of Isokrates towards the myths generally. He complains that Busiris has been represented as contemporary with Aeolos and Orpheus; whereas the fathers of

¹ See §§ 37, 38—λογοποιῶν—ποιητῶν. By λογοποιοί here, as in *Philipp.* § 109 (οὔτε τῶν ποιητῶν οὔτε τῶν λογοποιῶν), &c., are meant the chroniclers who were called

λογογράφοι before the latter word got its forensic meaning. So Herod. v. 125 calls Hekataeos λογοποιός. Cf. Verg. *Geo.* III. 5.

the two latter were not born in the time of the former (§ 8). How, he asks, can Busiris have been slain by Herakles, who lived four generations after Perseus, while Busiris lived more than 200 years before Perseus? (§ 37.) He rejects the current legends about Busiris because they shock his religious instinct: not only the gods but the children of the gods must be deemed sinless (§ 41). Thus, like Herodotos, Isokrates accepts the myths as a whole¹,—distinguishing in history a human and a superhuman race, and regarding the latter as not less real than the former; on the other hand, he applies to the myths not, like Herodotos, a strict historical criticism, but only certain general notions of the becoming.

II. 2. *Encomium on Helen.*

2. *Encomium on Helen.* [Or. x.]—In § 14 Isokrates praises ‘the writer on Helen’ for his choice of a subject, but finds one fault with his work—viz. that it is less an encomium than an apology. He then says that he will endeavour to show this writer how the subject ought to have been treated; and that he will avoid topics already handled by others.

The Encomium ascribed to Gorgias.

It is probable, if not certain, that the allusion here is to the *Encomium on Helen* extant under the name of Gorgias. The criticism of Isokrates exactly applies to this composition, which is, in fact, a defence,—with the apologetic character indeed

¹ For example, he treats as historical the list of kings from Kekrops to Theseus, *Panath.* §§ 12 ff.; the adventures of Herakles, *Archid.* § 18, cf. *Philipp.* § 111; the divine origin of Aeakos;—the battle of Peleus with the Centaurs and his marriage with Thetis, *Evag.* 14—16, &c.

strongly marked¹. Further, the Isokratic encomium keeps clear of the ground traversed in the encomium ascribed to Gorgias. The chief topics of Isokrates are (1) Theseus, who loved Helen: §§ 18—38: (2) the preciousness of Helen shown by the choice of Paris and by the expedition against Troy: §§ 39—53: (3) the power of Beauty generally: §§ 54—60: (4) the divinity of Helen: §§ 61—66. The other writer, after some introductory remarks (5) devotes the rest of his composition to the various theories by which Helen's desertion of her home can be explained. She may have been taken to Troy (1) by divine agency: (2) by violence: (3) by persuasion: (4) by love: and, on *any* of these suppositions, says the writer, is excusable: §§ 6—20. Thus the work attributed to Gorgias answers both conditions of the case. It is called an encomium, while it is really an apology; and its special topics are not the topics of Isokrates.

But was Gorgias indeed the author? After censuring Gorgias by name in § 3, it would have been strange if Isokrates had praised him in § 14 without naming him. Besides, the language of § 3 implies that Gorgias is dead; the language of § 14 implies that the unnamed writer is alive. Nor does the so-called encomium bear any distinctive marks of the style of Gorgias. Spengel² would ascribe it to Polykrates. But then if Polykrates had been

¹ See, for example, § 2 of the [Γοργίου] Ἐλένης ἐγκώμιον (printed in Sauppe's *Orat. Att.* II. 132), where the writer declares at the outset that his object is ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἐλένην. And at

the conclusion (§ 21) he says—ἀφείλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκλειαν γυναικός, κ.τ.λ.

² Spengel, *συναγωγή τεχνῶν*, pp. 74, 75.

*Question of
its author-
ship.*

the author, Isokrates either would have addressed him, as in the *Busiris*, or would at least have named him. The author of the Argument rejects the notion that Polykrates is meant; remarking that, instead of Isokrates attacking Polykrates, it was Polykrates who attacked Isokrates for this work: and concludes that the allusion is probably to Anaximenes of Lampsakos; ‘a speech by whom is extant which is rather a defence of Helen than an encomium¹.’ It appears not improbable that Anaximenes may have been the real author of the work ascribed to Gorgias; and that it is Anaximenes of whom Isokrates speaks. But on this point we must be content with conjecture².

Was Anaximenes the author?

Date.

Two indications help to fix the time at which Isokrates wrote. 1. From § 3 it may be inferred that Gorgias was dead³; and Gorgias died about 380 B.C. 2. In § 1 there is an allusion to the three

¹ See this *ἑπὶ θεοῖς* in Benseler's edition of Isokrates, vol. i. p. lx.

² Blass (*Att. Bereds.* p. 66) thinks it unlikely that Anaximenes is the writer meant by Isokrates. The author of the Argument notices also the view that Gorgias is the writer alluded to. This, Blass thinks, shows that an Encomium of the kind described was then extant under the name of Gorgias; and this, he argues, can hardly be other than the Encomium which we possess. But, then, is it not singular that, while the author of the Argument mentions the fact of such a work by Anaximenes existing, and cites this fact in support of the theory that Anaximenes is

meant, he does *not* say that there is any work by Gorgias to which a reference can be supposed? If he had known of any Encomium by Gorgias corresponding to the description of Isokrates, he would surely have mentioned it, as he mentions the Encomium by Anaximenes. I am strongly inclined to believe that the speech extant under the name of Gorgias was known to the writer of the Greek Argument only as the work of Anaximenes.

³ Spengel, *συν. τεχν.* p. 74. Among ‘Protagoras and *the sophists of that day*’ Gorgias is mentioned as he ‘*who presumed to say,*’ &c.: § 3.

chief Socratic sects—the Cynics, the Academy, the Megarics. These sects must have already been mature. The language implies further that Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics—who died in 376 B.C.—is still alive. The *Encomium* may probably be put about 370 B.C.¹

‘There are persons who pride themselves on being able *Analysis.* to treat tolerably some paradoxical thesis;—as that one cannot lie; that courage, wisdom, justice, are the same thing—namely, knowledge; that nothing exists; that the same things are at once possible and impossible. This style of discussion has not even the charm of novelty. Who does not know the paradoxes of Protagoras and Gorgias, of Zenon and Melissos? The experts in this jugglery would do better if they took subjects which had some bearing on practical life. But in fact their only aim is to get money from young men, whom these subtleties amuse. The pupils have an excuse; the teachers have none. Some of the impostors go so far as to maintain that beggars and exiles are more enviable than other men. Preference for such themes is a sure sign of weakness. If a man wishes to prove himself a good athlete, he does not go to a palaestra which he will have all to himself. A panegyrist of bees or of salt² has no difficulty in appearing equal to his subject. But it is harder to rise to the height of a great argument. On this ground I give all

¹ Thompson, *Phaedr.*, Appendix II. p. 175. The references are thus marked:—(1) *Cynics*. ‘Those who have grown grey,—where the tense, *καταγεγηράκασιν*, suggests that Antisthenes was alive—‘in asserting that it is impossible to lie,’ &c.—alluding to the Cynic paradoxes. (2) *Academy*. ‘Those who hold that Valour, Wisdom, Justice are the same thing,’ &c. (3) *Megarics*. ‘Those who pass their time in disputes (*ἐριδας*) which

can serve no purpose but that of giving trouble to their pupils’—the Eristic.

² Cf. Plat. *Symp.* 177 B, ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε ἤδη τιτὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐνήσαν ἅλεις ἐπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχρὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐγκεκωμισμένα. Besides his encomium on mice (Ar. *Rhet.* II. 24) Polykrates wrote in praise of *χύτραι* and *ψῆφοι* (Menander rhetor, p. 611 Ald.).

praise to the writer on Helen—for celebrating one who was brilliant beyond compare in birth, beauty and fame. One point, however, has escaped him—that, while he professes to have written an encomium, he has, in fact, offered a defence. And—lest I seem to be doing what is so easy—blaming the work of others without showing my own—I will myself attempt to speak of Helen, omitting all that has been said by others (§§ 1—15).

‘Of all the children whom Zeus begat, the dearest to him were those of whom Alkmene and Leda were the mothers. Herakles and Helen were both destined by him to deathless life in heaven and deathless fame on earth; but to Herakles he gave strength—to Helen, that beauty which vanquishes the strong (§§ 16—17).

‘Her first lover was Theseus, called the son of Aegeus, but in truth the son of Poseidon. He fell in love with her when she was yet a young girl; and when Tyndareus rejected his suit, bore her away from Lacedaemon to Aphidna in Attica.

Theseus.

‘Now the man who thus loved her stands alone in completeness of merit, having not some great qualities, but all. Contemporary with Herakles, he rivalled him. Both were athletes in the cause of human life; but with a difference;—the exploits of Herakles redounded more to his own glory—those of Theseus, to the good of others. Many deeds prove his courage and his reverence for the gods. His wisdom and moderation were proved by this,—that he was the first who joined Monarchy to Political Equality; gathered scattered villages into one town; and opened to all its citizens a free career, making their goodwill his bodyguard¹ (§§ 18—38).

Paris.

‘When Theseus descended with Peirithoos to Hades, Helen returned to Sparta. The oath taken by her suitors—that he who won her should, if robbed of her, be helped by the rest—showed their foresight of the strife which she must cause. That foresight proved true, though the private hope of each was baffled. Alexander, son of Priam, was chosen umpire of beauty by the goddesses. Hera offered him the

¹ § 37. For the Isokratic view of Theseus, cf. note on *Panathen.* § 126.

sovereignty of Asia,—Athene, victory in war,—Aphrodite, the hand of Helen. He could not tell which goddess was fairest ; but he knew which offered the best gift. He chose Helen ; desiring not her beauty alone, but to be allied with Zeus. Have those who, looking to the sequel, blamed his choice, a judgment better than that to which gods deferred ? Or do they blame him for electing to live with her for whom demigods were content to die ? (§§ 39—48).

‘And who would have scorned wedlock with her for whose sake all the Hellenes went to war as if Hellas had been ravaged ? They regarded the issue as lying, not between Alexander and Menelaos, but between Europe and Asia. The land which held Helen must be most blest. As thought men, so thought the gods. Zeus sent his son Sarpedon, Eos sent her Memnon, Poseidon sent Kyknos, Thetis sent Achilles, to a fate which they foreknew, but which, they deemed, could not be more glorious (§§ 40—53).

*The war of
Troy.*

‘And naturally : for Helen was endowed beyond compare with beauty—the most august, the most honoured, the most divine of all things ; the quality for which, if absent, nothing can make up ; which, where it is present, wins goodwill at first sight ; which makes service sweet and untiring, which makes tasks seem favours ; beauty, the profanation of which by those who possess it we deem a crime more shameful than any wrong which they can do to others, while we honour for all their days those who guard it sacred as a shrine (§§ 54—58).

*The power
of beauty*

‘Before beauty Zeus himself is humble—approaching it by craft often, never with violence ; it is beauty which has raised most mortals to the gods (§§ 59—60).

*and of
Helen.*

‘Helen’s power was proportionate to her supremacy in this gift. She became not only immortal but omnipotent. When her brothers were already the prisoners of Death, she lifted them to heaven ; and in token of the change, set in the sky that star to which storm-tost sailors pray. To Menelaos, too, she gave deliverance from earthly troubles, and a place in heaven at her side ; and at this day, at Therapnae in Lacedaemon, Helen and Menelaos are worshipped, not as blessed spirits only, but as gods. When Stesi-

choros blasphemed her, she struck him blind ; and when he recanted, gave him back his sight. Some of the Homeridae say, too, that it was Helen who stood by Homer in the night, and bade him sing the War of Troy. Seeing then that she can punish and can reward, let rich men honour her with gifts, wise men with praise (§§ 61—66).

‘More than has been said remains untold. Besides the arts, the ideas, the other gains which Greece owes to her and to the Trojan War, it owes its very freedom from the barbarian. Before that time, Greece was a refuge for unlucky foreigners—for Danaos, for Kadmos, for Pelops, for the Karians who settled in the islands. After the war, our race grew strong enough to conquer towns and territory from the alien. If others choose to work out this theme, they will find no lack of matter for past praise of Helen’ (§§ 67—69).

The *Encomium on Helen* is, as a composition, greatly superior to the *Busiris*. The effort to adorn an ungrateful theme renders the *Busiris* constrained and somewhat frigid ; here, there is more freedom and more glow. But the principle of the two pieces is the same. Isokrates conceived that dignity and gravity might be added to encomia of the conventional type by connecting with mythical subject-matter some topic of practical interest, political or moral ; and he was willing to allow to such topic a greater prominence than its bearing on the special subject could warrant. This purpose is served in the *Busiris* by the discourse on the institutions of Egypt ; in the *Helen* by the devotion of a large space to the reforms of Theseus.

II. 3. *The Evagoras.*

3. *Evagoras* [Or. IX.]—On the occasion of a festival held by Nikokles in memory of his father Evagoras, Isokrates sends this encomium as his tribute. The

words in § 78—(πολλάκις σοι διακελεύομαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν)—have been taken as indicating the Letter *To Nikokles*, and as showing, therefore, that the *Evagoras* is later than that work¹. The scholiast further remarks that, though the speech is an epitaphios, it lacks two regular elements of such a composition—the lament (τὸ θρηνητικόν) at the beginning and the consolation (τὸ παραμυθητικόν) at the end; a fact for which he accounts on the supposition that many years had elapsed since the death of Evagoras². Neither this inference nor that drawn from § 78 appears safe. Another, perhaps of greater weight, may however be derived from another circumstance. The death of Evagoras was violent. He was assassinated in 374 B.C. by Thrasydaeos, a eunuch whose master, one Nikokreon, had just fled from Salamis on the detection of a plot against the king's life³. Now, §§ 70—72 of this speech are so worded as to imply, without saying, that Evagoras had closed a prosperous life by a happy death⁴. If Isokrates had been writing while the memory of the king's death was fresh, could he have written thus? The Letter *To Nikokles* may, as we saw, be placed in 374 or 373, the *Nikokles* between 372 and 365. The *Evagoras* is probably as late as 365; possibly later⁵.

¹ The scholiast who wrote the argument to Or. 9 takes this view (Sauppe, *O. A.* II. p. 8): and so Dr O. Schneider, *Isocr. Ausgewählte Reden*, Part I. p. 31.

² See the scholium on Or. 9. § 1 (Sauppe, *O. A.* II. p. 9).

³ Cf. Grote, c. 76, vol. x. p. 32.

⁴ § 71, κάλλιστα κτησάμενος τὴν βασιλείαν ἐν ταύτῃ διετέλεσε τὸν βίον... τοσοῦτον δ' ἐβίω χρόνον ὥστε μήτε τοῦ γήρωσ ἄμοιρος γενέσθαι μήτε τῶν νόσων μετασχεῖν τῶν διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡλικίαν γιγνομένων.

⁵ The *Evagoras* cannot, of course, be later than 353, since in

The speech is arranged as follows:—I. Proem, §§ 1—11. II. Evagoras: (1) his lineage and his acquisition of the throne, §§ 12—40: (2) his character, and his domestic reforms, §§ 41—50: (3) his wars, §§ 51—64: (4) general retrospect of his career, §§ 65—72. III. Hortatory conclusion, §§ 73—81.

Analysis.

I. ‘Seeing you, Nikokles, bringing costly offerings to the tomb of your father,—honouring his obsequies with contests of athletes and of poets, with chariot-races and tireme-races,—I, too, wish to bring my tribute. If the soul of Evagoras is aware of what is done on earth, I believe that nothing could be more grateful to him than the commemoration of his virtues and his trials. The splendour of shows, the rivalry of self-glorifying poets, does not supply this; plain prose, then, shall attempt it. If it were the fashion to extol contemporary, instead of ancient heroes, a double gain would accrue; the panegyrist would be forced to respect truth, and his hearers would be encouraged to effort by the hope of praise. Envy hinders this. But the custom prescribed by envy must be broken through; without innovation there can be no improvement. The task is hard, since prose does not command the graces of poetry; yet it shall be tried whether merit cannot be praised without the help of metre¹ (§§ 1—11).

II. ‘The descent of Evagoras, well-known though it be, must be mentioned. The house of the Aeakidae, the

353—which may be assumed as the date of the *Antidosis*—Nikokles is no longer alive: *Antid.* § 67. We get no help, then, from § 8, in which this speech is said to be the first encomium of the kind ever written *in prose*. This only shows the speech to be earlier than 351 B. C. (Schäfer: Clinton, 352), in which year Artemisia proposed a contest of prose *ἐγκώμια* in honour of Mausolos (above, p. 11).

¹ § 11. Isokrates appears to mean that the *ἐγκώμια* recited at banquets, in honour of living victors at the games, &c., or at funeral festivals in honour of the dead, had hitherto always been in verse. Prose encomia on mythical or other subjects had, of course, long been in vogue *as exercises* with the Sophists,—such as the *Helenae encomium* and the *Busiris* of Isokrates himself.

noblest in Greece, was founded by a son of Zeus, Aeakos, to whom stands the temple in Aegina—a memorial of that intercession with his father by which he once delivered Greece from a sore drought (§ 18). From Aeakos sprang Peleus and Telamon; from Peleus, Achilles; from Telamon, Aias and Teukros. Teukros, after the taking of Troy, founded in Cyprus the town of Salamis and the present dynasty (§§ 12—18).

‘That dynasty has not, however, reigned uninterruptedly. ^{How} ^{Evagoras} ^{won the} ^{throne.} A Phoenician exile came of old to Cyprus; won the trust of the king; ousted him, and took his throne¹. The usurper’s descendants still ruled when Evagoras was born. Distinguished in youth by beauty, strength, temperance, in early manhood by courage, wisdom, justice, Evagoras gave uneasiness, but not alarm, to the reigning house. He seemed too brilliant for a private lot, and yet too honest to snatch a royal one. Fortune fulfilled both auguries. It gave him a crown without driving him to a crime. One of the powerful nobles² formed a conspiracy against the

¹ § 19. κατὰ μὲν ἀρχὰς οἱ γεγονότες ἀπὸ Τεύκρου τὴν βασιλείαν εἶχον· χρόνῳ δ’ ὕστερον ἀφικόμενος ἐκ Φοινίκης ἀνὴρ φηγάς, κ.τ.λ. When Evagoras was born, *the descendants* (ἔκγονοι) of this man were ruling: § 21.

Isokrates conceived the Phoenician usurper as having seized the throne at some time—he did not know at precisely what time—long after the first establishment of the Teukrid dynasty; but also long before the birth of Evagoras. A succession of Phoenician kings had reigned over Salamis in the mean time. This is intimated not only in §§ 19—21, but also in § 47, where Salamis is described as having been barbarised διὰ τὴν Φοινίκων ἀρχήν.

At the time of the Ionian revolt (500 B.C.) Salamis was governed by Greek princes (Her. v. 104—

114);—the appearance in whose family of the Phoenician name Siromos (Hiram) may perhaps be accounted for, as Professor Rawlinson suggests, by intermarriage, Mr Grote would place the dispossession of the Greek dynasty by the Phoenician usurper about 450 B.C. (c. 76: vol. x. p. 21). This seems very probable. But to my mind the words of Isokrates convey the notion that he, at any rate, imagined the Phoenician usurpation to have taken place much earlier.

² § 32. εἰς γὰρ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐπιβουλεύσας τὸν τε τύραννον ἀπέκτεινε, κ.τ.λ. By οἱ δυναστεύοντες here Isokrates seems to mean the great men of Salamis. The slayer of the Phoenician usurper was Abdémon—a Citian, according to Theopompos (frag. 111): a Tyrian, according to Diodoros

despot, and slew him; and sought at the same time to lay hands upon Evagoras, who fled to Soli in Cilicia. He there rallied round him a band of fifty men; landed with them in Cyprus; and, forcing his way the same night into Salamis, attacked the palace. The mass of the inhabitants standing neutral, he succeeded in taking it; expelled the usurpers; and restored the sceptre to his own house¹ (§§ 19—32).

‘If I were to say no more, the surpassing merit of Evagoras would have been sufficiently proved. No hero of legend or of history ever won kingly power in a manner so brilliant. Take the most famous instance of all—that of the elder Cyrus, who transferred the empire from the Medes to the Persians. Cyrus conquered by his army; Evagoras by his own courage: Cyrus slew his mother’s father; Evagoras incurred no guilt’ (§§ 33—40).

‘His use of power was worthy of the manner in which he had gained it. Gifted with great and ready talents, he was at the same time minutely and incessantly diligent. He attended personally to all affairs; knew every citizen; did nothing on hearsay. The love of the gods for him, and his own love of men, were so apparent in his government that strangers visiting Cyprus envied the subjects no less than the king. Enemies found him resistless, friends pliant; he was dignified, but never harsh; consistent in deeds as in words; versatile in taking from every form of constitution its best part; at once a friend of the people, a large-minded statesman, and a far-seeing general (§§ 41—46).’

(xiv. 98). Mövers, thinks that he may have been a native of Citium who had migrated from Salamis to Tyre (Grote, x. p. 22, note 1).

¹ The date of the restoration of the Teukrid dynasty by Evagoras cannot be exactly determined. At his death in 374 B. C. he was *ὁ γήρωτος ἄμωρος* (§ 71). Andokides is said to have visited Cyprus just after the fall of the Four Hundred, which took place in the autumn of

411 B. C., and to have found Evagoras reigning at Salamis: [Lys.] *in Andoc.* § 28. Mr Grote concludes that Evagoras began to reign ‘about 411 or 410 B. C.’ (411 B. C. is probably the latest year we can take)—justly observing that ‘he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbour Konon in 405 B. C., after the battle of Aegospotami.’ (vol. x. p. 25).

‘The history of his reign will be found to justify these praises. He found the State barbarised by the Phoenicians; ignorant of arts, without commerce, without even a harbour; at enmity with all Hellas¹. He not only repaired these evils, but acquired territory, built forts, created a fleet, and thus put his city on a par with any in Greece. His civilising influence reached even the barbarian countries adjacent to Cyprus. That island itself became a resort of distinguished settlers from the rest of Greece² (§§ 47—50).

His reforms in Cyprus.

‘Foremost among these was Konon. The friendship, closer than kinship, which at once sprang up between him and Evagoras was strengthened by the bond of a common sympathy for humiliated Athens. That Persia made the war against Sparta a maritime and not a land war, was due to the joint council of Konon and of Evagoras. They saw that a victory on the Asiatic continent could benefit only the Asiatic Greeks; but that a victory at sea must benefit all Hellas. And so it proved. The battle of Knidos was fought, and the bondsmen of Sparta were freed. Statues of Konon and Evagoras, placed side by side near the statue of Zeus the Deliverer, commemorated the gratitude of Athens (§§ 51—57).

His friendship with Konon.

‘Meanwhile Artaxerxes had viewed uneasily the genius and the fortune of Evagoras; and he now seized a pretext for hostilities. Though utterly without material resources, Evagoras, by his own ability and that of his son Pnytagoras, triumphed more marvellously than before. He reduced almost the whole of Cyprus; ravaged Phoenicia; stormed

His war with Persia.

¹ § 47. The disposition of Phoenicians in Cyprus towards Hellenic visitors at this period is strikingly illustrated, as Mr Grote observes (x. p. 22 n.) by [Lys.] *in Andoc.* § 26: *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν (Ἀνδοκίδης) ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοῦς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον θάνατον ἐφοβείτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα, οἰομένος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι.*

² The years 413—405 were years of great distress for Athens; and, after 405, cases of banishment and confiscation were numerous in every city where there was a Spartan dekharchy. Thus the early years of the reign of Evagoras coincided with a period when such a refuge as Salamis was likely to attract the greatest number of settlers. See Grote, x. p. 26.

Tyre; threw Kilikia into revolt; filled Persia with mourning and with loathing of the war, until, against all precedent, the Great King made peace before the rebels were in his hands¹. In a war of less than three years, Persia had stripped Sparta of Empire; after a war of ten years², Persia was compelled to leave Evagoras in full possession of his kingdom (§§ 57—64).

‘Legend celebrates the conquest, by united Hellas, of the town of Troy; but must not that achievement yield to the defeat, by the single city of Salamis, of all Asia? Or where in history is the man who, after winning a throne and civilising a kingdom, won victories which changed the destinies of a race? It is hard to decide whether Evagoras is most admirable for his warfare against Sparta, for his warfare against Persia, for his acquisition, or for his exercise of power.

‘If the gods ever bestowed immortality in reward for virtue, surely it may be deemed that they have given it to Evagoras. During his lifetime, their favour graced him with all gifts of mind and body, with unchanging prosperity, with fame, with years, with noble children (§§ 65—72).

‘Failing powers have not suffered me to praise Evagoras aright; yet a slight tribute, at least, has been offered; and the portrait of a man’s character is a better memorial than an image of his body. For you, Nikokles, and for your children, that character should be a spur to excellence. Most men have to take example from strangers; you need not go beyond your own family. I did not forget that you have begun your course well; I exhort you only as by-

¹ § 64. 396—394 B.C. Isokrates considers the war between Persia and Sparta as having virtually begun in 396 B.C.—in which year Agesilaos took the command in Asia, and Konon took the chief command of the Persian fleet. He considers that Persia *took away the empire* (ἀφείλετο τὴν ἀρχήν) of Sparta by the victory of Knidos in 394.

This is, of course, a rhetorical exaggeration; for though it is true that the *maritime* power of Sparta was crushed at Knidos, the Spartan ἀρχή in Hellas lasted till Leuktra. The three years’ war spoken of here is called ὁ πόλεμος ὁ περὶ Ῥόδου in *Panegyrr.* § 142.

² § 64. Probably 385—376 B.C. The date of the war is discussed in a note on *Panegyrr.* § 134.

standers cheer a runner who is winning. Persevere, and you will prove worthy of yourself' (§§ 73—81).

The *Evagoras* is professedly an encomium; but the praise which it awards does not, on the whole, appear to be exaggerated. The chief facts known about Evagoras speak for themselves; they show him to have been a man of unusually strong character, and of great abilities both military and political. A memoir of him is valuable not only on this account, but also on account of the peculiar position in which he was placed. Cyprus was divided between Phoenician settlements, such as Citium and Paphos, and later Greek settlements, such as Salamis and Soli. But the bulk of the population was, till long after the time of Evagoras, Phoenician¹; and continual contact with the non-hellenic East must always have tended to depress the Greek element in Cyprus. Evagoras was the champion of Hellenism against barbarism at this out-post; first, as restorer of that Greek civilisation which the Phoenician and Tyrian masters of Salamis had effaced; afterwards, as antagonist of Persia in a War of Independence. Perhaps the most striking passage in the memoir is that which describes how commerce, arts, letters, humane intercourse with the outer world, having become extinct under the rule of the barbarian, speedily sprang into a new life under the rule of the Hellene².

*The
Cyprian
Salamis an
out-post of
Hellas.*

4. *Panathenaiikos* [Or. XII.]—Isokrates began the *Panathenaiikos* when he was 94 years of age (§ 3)—*i. e.* in 342 B.C. A celebration of the Great Pan-

*IV. 4. Pan-
athenaiikos.*

¹ See Professor Rawlinson's note (S) on Herod. v. 104.

² §§ 47—50.

athenaea—mentioned in § 17—fell in Hekatombaeon (July—August) of that year, the third of Olympiad CIX. 3. It was probably the original intention of Isokrates that his speech should be published at this festival, as the *Panegyrikos* was probably published at Olympia: thus in § 135 he defends himself against the charge of discussing subjects unsuited to a great festal gathering. But this design, if he entertained it, was frustrated. He had written about half the discourse when he fell ill (§ 267); but at last it was completed and published when he was ninety-seven years old (§ 270), *i.e.* in 339. It is thus the latest of his works¹.

Date.

Analysis.

The *Panathenaios* falls into three parts. I. §§ 1—34: Introduction. Of these sections only §§ 1—4 are properly introductory. The rest—§§ 5—34—form a parenthetical defence of his ‘philosophy’ generally, in reply to an attack made upon him by some ‘vulgar’ (*ἀγελαιῶι*) sophists ‘a little before the Great Panathenaea’ (§ 17).—II. §§ 35—198. The praises of Athens.—III. §§ 199—265. A supplement, in which the author notices certain criticisms upon his work, and relates the circumstances under which it was composed.

I. ‘In my younger days I used to write, not on legends or remote history, nor in forensic causes, but on practical interests of Athens and Hellas—bringing to bear upon these all the resources of rhetoric. Such subjects and such a style do not now become my ninety-four years; rather it becomes me to speak as all men are apt to think that they could if they would, but as none can without toil.

¹ The ἤδη ἀπειρηκῶς of § 268 ρηκῶς of the Third Letter (§ 4)—tallies with the παντάπασιν ἀπει- written in 338.

‘I shall speak of the deeds of Athens and the goodness of our ancestors. But first I must touch upon a personal matter. All my days I have been misrepresented by obscure and worthless sophists, and misjudged by those who knew me but from hearsay. Health, wealth, a certain repute among the educated have been mine; and yet, in old age, I am discontented. Nature denied me force for action, and gave me but imperfect talents for speech. Strength of voice and firm nerves were denied to me; and at Athens it is more discreditable to lack these than to owe money to the treasury. Not daunted, however, I took refuge in a literary life; and hoped, as the counsellor of Hellenic unity and of war against Asia, to gain more esteem than the speakers who rail against each other in the ekklesia. This hope has failed; I have been praised,—and slighted. It is not strange, indeed, that the public should treat me thus, when the professional sophists, who make their living by plagiarising from me, are my worst enemies. Their slanders never annoyed me until, a few days before the Panathenaea, I learned that a group of them, talking in the Lykeion about Hesiod, Homer and other poets, had spoken of me as scorning all such subjects,—as ignoring all fields of thought, all lines of culture, except my own. I thought that I was safe from a charge of this kind; but I find that I did not overrate the spite which has baulked me of due recognition. Instead of retorting upon the slanderers, or arguing with those whom they influence, I will state in a few words what my notion of culture is. Geometry, astrology, eristic dialogues are good for the young, if only as employing them; but they do not make practical men. By an educated man I understand one who can deal with all that comes upon him day by day; who is honest and mannerly in society; who rules his desires; who is not spoiled by good fortune. So much for culture: my views about the poets shall be set forth at some other time. I have already passed the limits of a preface (§§ 1—34).

II. ‘The beneficence of Athens to Hellas has often ere now been praised by me incidentally; but it has never been, as now, my special theme. I am moved to choose

that subject at once by the intemperate censure and by the feeble, or else extravagant, praise bestowed upon our city; also by my own advanced age, which will make failure pardonable and success more creditable (§§ 35—38).

‘As purple or gold is most brilliant when it has a foil, Athens will be best estimated if we place beside her another great city—Sparta (§§ 39—41).

*Athens
contrasted
with
Sparta.*

‘The comparison may begin from the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesos. Now our ancestors will be found to have cherished loyally the traditions of the Trojan war—concord with Hellas, and enmity against the barbarian. When the Kyklades, about which there had been disputes in the time of Minos, were at last seized, by the Karians, Athens restored them to the Hellenes¹. She founded cities on either continent, drove the barbarians from the Asiatic seaboard, and taught the Greek communities how to live. Sparta, meanwhile, careless of agriculture and of all civilising arts, was concentrated upon one selfish object—the conquest of the Peloponnesos; all of which, save Argos, fell under her power. Thus, so far, Athens had been a friend to Hellas; Sparta, only to herself (§§ 42—48).

*Services to
Civiliza-
tion.*

‘When, later, Xerxes invaded Greece, Sparta, the ruler of the Peloponnesos, sent but ten triremes to Salamis—Athens sent more than all the other states together. Sparta was represented by Eurybiades, who all but ruined Hellas; Athens, by Themistokles, who saved it (§§ 49—52).

*Services
against
Persia.*

¹ § 43. The relations of the Karians to Minos are thus described by Herodotus (i. 171):—τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν ἔοντες Μίνω τε κατήκοοι καὶ καλούμενοι Λέλεγες εἶχον τὰς νήσους, φόρον μὲν οὐδένα ὑποτελέοντες, ὅσον καὶ ἐγὼ δυνατὸς εἰμι μακρότατον ἐξικέσθαι ἀκοῇ· οἱ δὲ, ὅπως Μίνω δέοιτο, ἐπλήρουσι οἱ τὰς νέας. See, as an excellent commentary on Herodotus, Curt. *Hist. Gr.* bk. i. c. iii. vol. i. pp. 71 ff. tr. Ward. Cf. Clinton *F. II.* i. p. 39: ‘It seems, however, that at the death of Minos the Karians retained, or

at least recovered, possession of the Kyklades; and that they were not finally expelled till the time of the Ionian colonies; for Isocrates and Plutarch [*de exil.* p. 603 B] describe them as possessing the Kyklades after the return of the Heraklidae into Peloponnesos, and ascribe their expulsion to the Athenians.’ Clinton thinks that the words of Isokr. in this passage refer ‘to the Ionic migration, when the colonists seized upon the Kyklades’: *ib.* p. 39, note *g.*

‘Each of the two cities was in turn empress of the sea, The two Empires. and thereby of the greater part of Hellas. Athens used that power to give to her allies the same form of government which she had herself found best; Sparta used it to impose upon her subjects an unheard-of form of tyranny—the de-karchies, which led to such enormous evils. We held our empire 65 years; when attacked by Greece and Persia combined, we resisted ten years, and afterwards reestablished our power in less time than it had cost to overthrow it. The Spartans kept their empire barely ten years; lost it by a single battle; and have never recovered it. In treating with the Persian king, we forbade him to come west of Halys or Phaselis¹; the Spartans made him master of Hellas (§§ 53—61).

‘Those who reluctantly admit the positive merits of The faults of Athens compared with those of Sparta. Athens will perhaps attempt to qualify them by citing her crimes. I do not say that Athens has been faultless; but only that, where she has sinned, Sparta has sinned more. We are accused of having forced our allies to bring their causes to our tribunals. Is not the number of those summoned before our courts smaller than the number of those whom Sparta put to death without trial? We are accused of having taxed our allies. But they paid tribute of their own choice, for their own defence, out of property which we had preserved to them; and, in return, were brought by us out of their forlorn condition to a prosperity as great as that of the Peloponnesians who paid no impost. We are accused of cruelties to Melos, Skione, Torone. If Athens has sometimes been guilty in this respect, the sufferers were petty islands or towns; while the cities which Spartan ambition has made desolate are the greatest in the Peloponnesos, —Messene, which sent Nestor to Troy,—Argos, which sent Agamemnon (§§ 62—73).

‘(Can I pass by Agamemnon without a word of special (Digression—Agamemnon.) praise, feeling for him, as I do, the sympathy of one who, like him, has missed his due fame? What element of greatness did Agamemnon lack? The only man who ever

¹ § 59. See *Panegyri*. § 115 note: *Areop.* § 80 note.

was leader of all Hellas, he led it against Asia, with kings for his subalterns; fought, not for his own gain, but for the safety of Greece, against such foreign adventurers as Pelops, Danaos, Kadmos; and, after keeping his army together for ten years by his own ability, took Troy, and quelled the insolence of the barbarians.) §§ 74—87.

‘I was saying that the victims of our severity have been insignificant; those of Sparta’s illustrious, and, moreover, her own allies against Troy; the Messenians, namely, whom she drove from their country; and the Argives, with whom she is still at war. Plataea, the only city of Boeotia loyal to Hellas in the Persian war, was soon after taken by Sparta, and most of its citizens were put to death, in order to please Thebes. Athens, on the other hand, gave an asylum at Naupaktos to the Messenians, and bestowed her franchise upon the surviving Plataeans (§§ 88—94).—Both Athens and Sparta are accused of having reduced those cities, of whose liberty they professed themselves champions, to vassalage. Now in the early history of Athens there is no instance of her having aimed at ruling a single other city; whereas the policy of Sparta in the Peloponnesos has been from the first aggressive. Down to the time of our disaster at the Hellespont, we had never caused in any city the factions, the bloodshed, the revolution which, under Sparta, became rife everywhere. It was only when the Lacedaemonian power, after having become the first in Greece, began to decline, that two or three of our generals were guilty of imitating in a few cases a policy of which Sparta had set the earliest example.

‘Lastly, there is an offence against Hellas which Sparta has committed, but Athens, never. When most closely pressed by her neighbours, Athens has never forgotten the enmity which all Greeks ought to feel against the barbarian. Sparta used the alliance of the great king to advance her own power in Hellas; and rewarded him by supporting the rebel Cyrus with the forces led by Klearchos. Then, when Persia had defeated the Spartans at Knidos, they conciliated her by giving up the Asiatic Greeks (§§ 95—107).

‘Discreet admirers of Sparta will admit the truth of

these criticisms. But those who cannot allow any fault in her will perhaps try to shift the ground of comparison to the relative merits of the Spartan and Athenian Constitutions. They will contrast the temperance and discipline which prevail there with the licence common among us.

‘I hope to show the superiority of the Athenian Constitution—not, indeed, in its present form, but in the form which it had under our ancestors; and which they abandoned, not because they were dissatisfied with it, but from necessity. A land-empire is maintained by moderation and strict discipline; a maritime empire requires nautical skill, hands to row the ships, and a certain reckless, piratical spirit. It was plain that in becoming naval, Athens must lose her old decorum and her hold upon the affection of the allies; but even this was better than submitting to the rule of Sparta.

*Athenian
Constitution.*

‘The history of our ancestors’ polity must be traced from a time when as yet Oligarchy and Democracy were not; when barbarians and Greeks alike lived under Monarchies. If the savage heroes of other cities have claimed mention, much more do those of Athens deserve it. The horrors of which, in those days, Thebes and Argos were full, have supplied endless material for tragic poets; Athens, meanwhile, had already a noble civilisation. The favour of the gods was shown by this rare blessing—that from Ericthonius to Theseus the line of hereditary kings was unbroken¹.

¹ § 126. As Mr Clinton observes (*F. H.* vol. i. c. 2, p. 61), Isokrates considers Ericthonius properly as the first of the Attic kings. And it is probable, though not certain, that he regarded Theseus as the last. See § 130: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Θησέως ἀρετῆς νῦν μὲν ὡς οἶόν τ’ ἦν ἀνεμνήσαμεν...περὶ δὲ τῶν παραλαβόντων τὴν τῆς πόλεως διοίκησιν ἢν ἐκεῖνος παρέδωκεν οὐκ ἔχων τίνας ἐπαίνους εἰπὼν ἀξίους ἂν εἶην εἰρηκώς.....κατεστήσαντο γὰρ δημοκρατίαν.* This would naturally mean

that, on the death of Theseus, a Democracy was established. And such an interpretation is in perfect harmony with *Helen. Encom.* § 36—*ὅσθ’ ὁ μὲν* (Theseus) *τὸν δῆμον καθίστη κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, οἱ δὲ μόνον αὐτὸν ἄρχειν ἠξίουν, ἡγούμενοι πιστοτέραν καὶ κοινοτέραν εἶναι τὴν ἐκείνου μοναρχίαν τῆς αὐτῶν δημοκρατίας.* It was not monarchy, but *his* monarchy, which they preferred: on his death, then, they would have the democracy.

Elsewhere I have spoken at length of Theseus, or this would have been a fitting time to celebrate him. It was his glory that he chose work before the mere pleasures of a kingly lot; and that he shared the government of the city with the people. His successors established a Democracy tempered with Aristocracy. Some regard Aristocracy, like Timocracy, as a distinct type of polity¹. I recognise but three distinct types—Oligarchy, Democracy, Monarchy. The principle which selects the best men for office is applicable to any one of these; and, in all alike, insures prosperity. At present we have to consider the application of this principle to Democracy only. If the subject seem to some too grave for such an occasion as this, it will at least interest those whom I most wish to please; though I doubt my own power of doing justice to it.

The Old Democracy.

‘The excellence of the old Democracy was due to the moral discipline to which the people had been subject under the monarchy. They did not forget the lessons learned then; they chose for leaders men friendly to the new system, but characterised by the old virtues of justice and sobriety. Under the presidency of such men, they soon got a thoroughly good code of laws,—compact, fair, useful, and consistent. Officials were chosen by the demes and tribes, and looked upon office as a task, troublesome, indeed, but honourable. The punctual discharge of this task was followed by moderate praise and designation to some fresh labour; the slightest failure in it was infamy and ruin. Office, therefore,

¹ § 131. Isokrates denies that ἀριστοκρατία and ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν τιμημάτων πολιτεία are to be reckoned ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις. See, on the other hand, Plato *Polit.* § 291 D, where the three types of government (as popularly conceived) are said to be:—1. Monarchy, subdivided into (a) βασιλεία, constitutional monarchy, (b) τυραννίς, unconstitutional: 2. ‘The rule of the few,’ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεία, subdivided into

(a) ἀριστοκρατία, the good term, (b) ὀλιγαρχία, the bad: 3. Democracy: of which the good sort and the bad are called by the same name. In Aristotle (*Politics* III. vi.—viii) we have three normal (ὀρθαί) types—1. μοναρχία, 2. ἀριστοκρατία, 3. πολιτεία (Republic): and three corresponding perversions (παρέκβασεις)—1. τυραννίς: 2. ὀλιγαρχία: 3. δημοκρατία.

was rather shunned than courted in those days; and the people were content with a constitution which, while exempting them from services, gave them sovereign power over their servants. The proof of this contentment is the fact that the constitution remained unchanged for not fewer than 1000 years,—from its origin to the time of Solon and of Peisistratos¹. The latter used his demagogic power to make himself a despot. If it is objected that I speak too positively of a remote past, I reply that this is at least a generally credited account (§§ 108—150).

‘The principles of the old polity have been stated; it remains to speak of its results. But a possible objection must first be met. It will, perhaps, be said that both the civil and the military institutions of Athens in the earliest times were borrowed from Lykurgos. The resemblance may be allowed. But it was Sparta that borrowed from us the idea of a Democracy tempered with Aristocracy, and of elective, instead of sortitive, offices. The Areiopagos, again, was the model of the Gerousia (§§ 151—154).

*Mutual
Political
Lessons.*

‘As regards military science, too, it can be shown that the Spartans did not practise it earlier, or use it better, than we did. First, however,—in order to appreciate the manner in which our ancestors used their military skill,—it is necessary to remember how both Athens and Sparta dealt with Hellas after the Persian wars. They made peace with Persia, and attacked each other. Argos and Thebes followed their example; and to this day Persia is arbiter of Hellas (§§ 155—160).

*Military
Science.*

¹ § 148 οὐκ ἐλάττω χιλίων ἐτῶν. The Constitution spoken of here must be that δημοκρατία just mentioned (§ 147)—δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατία χρωμένη (§ 131)—which succeeded the Monarchy. There would be no point in the passage if in αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία he meant to include the Monarchy. We are driven, then, to infer that the Isokratean date for the close of the Monarchy is 1560 B. C.—some 500 years earlier than the date assign-

ed by the commoner tradition to Kodros, and about 400 earlier than that assigned to Theseus, whom (as was remarked above) Isokrates seems to have regarded as the last king. (In the *Encom. Helen.* Isokr. himself makes Theseus a lover of Helen.) But, in the vagueness of the legends about early Attica, a writer—especially a rhetorical writer—was at liberty to take almost any round number that suited his purpose.

‘The rulers of Athens before the Persian war had no aim but the national well-being. They mediated between cities which were at variance; drove the barbarian from the islands and coasts which he had seized; and thus gave the Greeks wealth and security (§§ 161—167). Their military repute may be judged still better from their interference on behalf of Adrastus, when the Thebans, alarmed at their approach, consented to bury the Argive dead (§§ 168—171). (In the *Panegyrikos*¹ the Athenians were spoken of as having prevailed by force; but the more exact account given here proves no less the fame of their arms (§§ 172—174).)

*Early wars
of Athens
and of
Sparta.*

‘Further, compare the early wars of Sparta with those of Athens. Immediately after the Dorian conquest, the aristocratic party became predominant in Lacedaemon; and, instead of allowing the people to share the franchise, fixed them to dwell as vassals in outlying villages, subject not only to the burdens of war, but to outrage and death at the caprice of the civic body. The victories of our Athenian ancestors were not of this shameful kind, but were won in three different periods of war against aliens. One period was that of the struggle with Xerxes; another, that of the war for the possession of the Asiatic colonies,—in which no Dorian took part. In the third (the earliest) period, Thracians, Scythians, and Eurystheus with his Peloponnesians, were in turn defeated; and, later, the troops of Dareios were routed at Marathon. Victorious so often, our fathers were yet true to their old, steadfast character; for they knew that the highest soldiership is impossible to immorality (175—198).

Epilogue.

III. ‘Here, at its climax, this discourse would naturally have ended. I will explain how I have been forced to prolong it.

‘It had been written thus far, and I was revising it with three or four of my young pupils. We thought that nothing but a conclusion was wanted; but it occurred to me to ask a friend of oligarchical sympathies, and devoted to Sparta, if he could point out any misstatement which we had over-

¹ § 58.

looked. He came; heard, and praised, the greater part of the essay; but evidently disliked the criticisms upon the Spartans. ‘If Hellas owes them nothing else,’ he said, ‘it should be grateful to them for this—that they discovered the noblest rules of conduct, which they observe themselves and have taught to others.’—‘All would allow,’ I replied, ‘that piety, justice, prudence, are the best rules of conduct. The Spartans have been settled no more than 700 years in the Peloponnesos. If, then, these rules were first observed at Sparta, were they unknown to Herakles and Theseus, to Minos, Rhadamanthos, Aeakos? Again, discoverers are usually men of more than average intelligence and knowledge; but the Spartans are ignorant of the rudiments of letters. And as for their morality, they train their youth to rob the surrounding country; punishing them if they are found out, and promoting them if they are not.’ ‘By rules of conduct,’ he answered, ‘I did not mean piety, justice, prudence. I meant a manly, warlike training, and loyalty to one common purpose.’ ‘None are so blameable,’ I said, ‘as those who put good things to a bad use. The Spartans employ their warlike science to harass, and their unanimity to divide, the other Greeks’ (§§ 199—228).

‘My opponent was silenced, and went away a wiser man, inasmuch as he had learned the lesson recommended at Delphi. He had learned to know himself—and Lacedaemon. I had my essay written out immediately. But three or four days later new misgivings assailed me. It seemed to me that I had been too supercilious and too bitter in my expressions about Sparta. At last I called a council of friends to decide whether the composition should be burnt or published. It was read to them, and well received. The rest were talking it over among themselves, when my original adviser, the partisan of Sparta, addressed me. ‘I suspect,’ he said, ‘that you are not really uneasy about the manner in which you have spoken of the Lacedaemonians, and that you have brought us here only to try us. Your first idea was to extol Athens by comparing it advantageously with Sparta. Then, conscious that you had always been a panegyrist of Sparta, you became afraid of seeming inconsistent. Accordingly, you

*Convers-
ation with a
friendly
critic.*

*New mis-
givings.*

*The critic
as a com-
forter.*

gave the semblance of censure to what was really praise. You have reproached the Spartans as arrogant, warlike, grasping. Now arrogance is allied to a lofty spirit. It is a warlike, not a peaceful temper which enlarges and guards possessions. Covetousness on a petty scale is, indeed, unpopular, and so defeats its own ends; but the covetousness of nations and despots has results which all the world admires. I am no enemy to the fame of your performance in thus pointing out its covert meaning. The hint will assist intelligent Spartans to perceive that, in accusing their city of having conquered all its great neighbours, you have glorified it; and that, in dwelling upon the faction and bloodshed among its dependents, you have implied the exemption of Sparta from such evils. You are to be congratulated upon the fame which you must win for having made both Athens and Sparta appear admirable;—Athens, to the many; Sparta, to the thoughtful. Do not burn your essay, but publish it, adding the discussion to which it has given rise; and so prove that you are as superior to the ordinary writers for the festivals as Homer to the poets who have copied him.’

‘These remarks were applauded enthusiastically; and all urged me to take the counsel. I thanked my able adviser; but did not tell him how far he had hit, or missed, my real mind (§§ 229—265).

*Conditions
under
which the
work was
written.*

‘My work is finished; a word in conclusion as to the circumstances under which it was done. It was begun in the 94th year of my age, and was half-completed, when I was seized with the disorder against which I have been struggling for three years. For a long time I did not allow it to stop my labours; but had at last given in, when friends pressed me not to leave this speech unfinished. I did as they wished, though in my 97th year, and in a state in which few could bear to be listeners, much less writers. This is not said to win indulgence, but simply in order to make the facts known. An acknowledgment is due to those who value instructive and artistic essays above mere displays; and a warning to those who judge rashly what they do not understand’ (§§ 266—272).

Isokrates prefaces the *Panathenaikos* with the Remarks. remark that both in respect to subject-matter and in respect to style it belongs to a different class from those works which employed his best years. Those works dealt with contemporary politics; this is purely historical: those displayed all the resources of an elaborate rhetoric; this is in a plain, though finished, style. He fears that the *Panathenaikos* will seem somewhat languid—*μαλακώτερος*—if compared with its brilliant predecessors: it must be judged, he says, in view of its own special scope.

There is one comparison, however, which can The Panathenaikos compared with the Panegyrikos. hardly be avoided on this plea. The chief topics of the *Panathenaikos* are embraced in the first half of the *Panegyrikos*. These are:—1. The early services of Athens to Hellas in founding colonies, and in repelling the barbarians: *Panath.* §§ 42—48: *Panegyry.* §§ 34—37. 2. The early wars of Athens: *Panath.* §§ 175—198: *Panegyry.* §§ 51—70. 3. Athens in the Persian wars: *Panath.* §§ 49—52 and 189: *Panegyry.* §§ 71—74, 85—98. 4. The maritime empire of Athens: *Panath.* §§ 53—61: *Panegyry.* § 104, &c. 5. The misdeeds in Hellas of Athens and of Sparta respectively: *Panath.* §§ 62—107: *Panegyry.* §§ 100—132. Now, it is not merely in rhetorical brilliancy, it is in point and definiteness of thought, in vigour, in clearness of arrangement, that the *Panegyrikos* is so greatly superior to the *Panathenaikos*. The *Panegyrikos* is the earliest of its author's longer compositions, and the best; the *Panathenaikos* is the latest, and must be pronounced the weakest. The symptoms of the condition in which

the writer then was—‘exhausted both by sickness and by old age’ (§ 268)—are indeed evident in many places. They appear in the diffuse yet incomplete reply to his detractors inserted at the beginning; in the long digression on Agamemnon, closed by the avowal that he knows not whither he is ‘drifting’ (§ 88); in the disorder especially of §§ 155—198; and in the rambling supplement §§ 199—265. This last raises a curious point. Isokrates evidently felt that his vehement censures of Sparta in the *Panathenaios* were inconsistent with much in the general tone of his other writings (§ 239). But how far did he seriously mean to hint, as his own, the view which he makes his critic suggest—that these censures were, in their esoteric meaning, praise; since arrogance, aggressiveness, rapacity often win prizes which command [vulgar] admiration? In § 265 he declines to say how far the critic’s suggestion had hit or missed his mind. If the critic was in any measure right, then the ingenuity of Isokrates had, indeed, declined.

*Isokrates
on Early
Athens.*

The *Panathenaios* contains, as has been seen, little that is not said better in the *Panegyrikos*; but it has at least one passage of distinctive interest. In §§ 108—154 Isokrates sketches his theory of the early Constitutional History of Athens. The characteristic feature of this theory is that it ignores any Oligarchical period, properly so called, between the Monarchy and the Democracy. The Monarchy is immediately succeeded by a Democracy; a Democracy tempered, indeed, by the principle of preferring the ‘best men’—*δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατία*

μεμιγμένη (§ 153). The term ‘oligarchic,’ as applied to the statesmen of this period, was a mere calumny of Peisistratos (§ 143). The elasticity of meaning which Isokrates gave to ‘democracy’ may be illustrated from *Areopag.* § 61, where he says that the Lacedaemonians are best governed because they are *most democratic*. It is noticeable, however, that in the *Areopagitikos* he dates that elder Democracy which he holds up to imitation, only from Solon—ὁ δημοτικώτατος (§ 16); perhaps because that pre-Solonian democracy which he here extols appeared to him a practically unattainable ideal.

III. ESSAYS ON EDUCATION.

1. *Against the Sophists* [Or. XIII.]—As Isokrates himself tells us, this discourse was written at the beginning of his professional life¹; and it may probably be assigned to the year 391 or 390 B. C.² *Date.* The speech would thus have the character of a manifesto in which, at the outset of his career, the

¹ ὅτ' ἠρχόμεν περὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν πραγματείαν: *Antid.* § 193. He wrote it ἀμάρζων (opposed to πανόμενος τῆς φιλοσοφίας), *ib.* § 195.

² Sauppe would place it in, or about, 388 B. C. But a passage in the *Gorgias* has been taken, and no doubt rightly, as alluding to a phrase in the κατὰ σοφιστῶν. *Gorg.* p. 463 A, δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι (ἢ ῥητορικῇ) ᾧ Γοργία, εἶναι τί ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσ-

ομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Cf. κατὰ σοφιστ. § 17, ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι. It can scarcely be doubted that Plato's στοχαστικός is a sarcasm upon δοξαστικός as used by Isokrates. Now, the composition of the *Gorgias* is probably to be placed in the interval between 395 and 389. The κατὰ σοφιστῶν, then, is probably earlier than 389. Sanneg (*de Schol. Isokr.* p. 7) puts it in Ol. 96 (396—393 B. C.).

teacher protests against the system adopted by other members of his profession, and declares the principles by which he himself intends to be guided. In its extant form the discourse is plainly imperfect. It breaks off at the point where Isokrates is passing—as he passes in the introductions to the *Busiris* and the *Encomium on Helen*—from destructive criticism to positive illustration¹.

Analysis. ‘If those who undertake to instruct others would only tell the truth, instead of promising more than they can perform, they would not have been in such ill-repute with the non-professional world. As it is, their reckless boasting has brought discredit upon literary studies generally.

Teachers of ‘Eristic.’ ‘First, the professors of Eristic Discussion are to blame. They assert that their pupils will know how to act under all circumstances, and will, through this knowledge, be happy; thus claiming a prescience which Homer, wisest of poets, denies to the gods,—for he represents them debating. And this precious secret of happiness is sold by its proprietors for three or four minae. Most absurd of all, they do not appear to believe that the persons whom their course of teaching is to inspire with virtue and moderation will be ordinarily honest at the end of it. They take securities from their pupils for the payment of fees. Is it not natural that plain men should look upon such teaching as an imposture? (§§ 1—8.)

Teachers of Rhetoric. ‘Next, the teachers of Forensic and Deliberative speaking² are to blame. They say that the art of speaking well on all occasions can be taught as certainly as the alphabet. Would

¹ *Busir.* [Or. xi.] § 9: *Helenae Encom.* [Or. x.] § 15. In both these places the transition is marked by the very same phrase which in the *κατὰ σοφιστῶν* introduces the concluding sentence of § 22:—*ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκᾷ* ‘but lest I seem (to be

criticizing others while unable to do better myself).’ The lost part of the *κατὰ σοφ.* contained that exposition of the author’s own principles to which these words led up.

² § 9 *πολιτικοὶ λόγοι*. See below, p. 131, n. 4.

that it were so! As it is not so, such idle talk ought to be stopped. All literary men suffer by the prejudice which it excites. It is surprising that teachers can succeed who assume an analogy between an art depending on fixed rules and the exercise of a creative faculty. The letters of the alphabet are the same for every one. The conditions of a good speech are not precisely the same for any two persons. A speech, to be good, must be worthy of the subject, suitable to the occasion and to the speaker, and in some measure original. All would allow that the art of speaking has often been mastered, both in theory and practice, without professional aid. Talent and experience are the two requisites for success. Instruction can polish, but cannot make, oratorical power. It is not difficult to learn the elements (*ιδεῶν*)¹ out of which all speeches must be composed. But to combine and temper these elements rightly, and to give to the resulting whole a proper colouring, requires a vigour, an imaginative force, which cannot be communicated; although, where these exist, they will be developed under a teacher who himself possesses them. (§§ 9—18).

‘The pretentious school of sophists which has lately sprung up, however flourishing now, will, I feel sure, be at last reduced to admitting this. As for the sophists before our time who wrote the so-called Arts of Rhetoric, they, too, had their faults. They undertook to teach the mode of conducting law-suits—thus confining their subject to its most odious branch, and falling below the Eristics, who at least professed to aim at virtue, whereas these avowed themselves teachers of rapacity. Now the study of practical rhetoric, though insufficient to form a good speaker, might at least have been used to inculcate fairness in argument. Justice cannot be taught; but a spirit of justice may be encouraged and developed by lessons in Deliberative speaking.

‘That I may not seem to be complaining of what others undertake to do, and myself, at the same time, undertaking what is impossible, I will give the reasons which

¹ For this use of *ιδέα*, see above, p. 39, note 4.

have led me to this view'..... (§§ 19—22: Conclusion wanting).

Isokrates was, and called himself, a sophist¹, that is, a professional teacher of philosophy and rhetoric; though he distinguished himself from the ἀγελαῖοι σοφισταί, the common herd of the profession. Who, then, are those sophists whom in this speech he condemns; and what was the extent of his disagreement from them?

*Definition
of the
censures.*

(1) *The
'Eristics.'*

Three classes of teachers are censured. (1) The Eristics,—οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας διατρίβοντες (§ 2). Their chief characteristic, as described by Isokrates, is that they profess to impart, for a small fee, absolute knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, § 3), which will enable its

¹ It is true that Isokrates often speaks with contempt of 'sophists'; but these are 'vulgar' sophists (ἀγελαῖοι σοφισταί, *Panath.* § 18): 'obscure and worthless sophists' (σοφισταὶ ἀδόκιμοι καὶ πονηροί, *ib.* § 5); or persons who claimed the honourable name of sophist without having any real title to it—τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας εἶναι σοφιστάς, *Helen. Encom.* § 9: so τῶν φασκόντων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἄλλο δὲ τι πραττόντων, *Antid.* § 215: and τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν, *ib.* § 221.

It is in reference to these vulgar, these sham sophists, that Isokrates describes himself as ἀνομοίως ζῶντα καὶ τοῖς σοφισταῖς καὶ τοῖς ιδιώταις, *Antid.* § 148.

On the other hand, he distinctly calls himself a σοφιστής in the general sense of that term, as describing a man who followed a certain profession; who gave lite-

rary, and in particular rhetorical, instruction for pay. The whole of §§ 167—269 of the *Antidosis*—his Apology for his life—is devoted to answering ἡ κοινὴ περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διαβολή (§ 168). In § 157 he says—referring to exaggerated reports about his own wealth—that it is a mistake to suppose that a sophist's business is as lucrative as an actor's. And in refuting the charge, laid against himself and others, of corrupting the youth, he says, with evident allusion to the distinction attained by many of his own pupils—'It is a sophist's noblest and greatest reward if some of his pupils prove themselves men of high character, sensible men, men respected by their fellow-citizens'—σοφιστῆ μισθὸς κάλλιστός ἐστι καὶ μέγιστος, ἦν τῶν μαθητῶν τινες καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ καὶ φρόνιμοι γένωνται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολιταῖς εὐδοκμοῦντες (*Antid.* § 220).

possessor to act rightly under all circumstances; virtue being included in the knowledge so taught (§ 6). In this description, the sarcasm upon knowledge, and the preference given to intelligent opinion (§ 8), would seem to reflect upon the Sokratics; just as elsewhere Isokrates speaks of ‘Eristic dialogues’ with apparent reference to the Platonic dialogues¹—ignoring that distinction between Dialectic and Eristic on which Plato insists in the *Philebos* and the *Euthydemos*². It may be questioned whether here Isokrates means Plato, as he certainly does in a later work, the *Encomium on Helen*; but at least there must be a reference to the minor Sokratics, and especially to Eukleides³.

(2) The second class of teachers blamed by Isokrates are the professors of ‘Political Discourse’,^{(2) The Teachers of Rhetoric.} that is, of Practical Rhetoric, Deliberative and Forensic⁴. Now it was the professed aim of Isokrates,

¹ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικούς καλουμένους οἷς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι μάλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅστις ἂν ἀνεκτοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσειεν: *Panath.* § 29. This is undoubtedly an allusion to the popularity of the Platonic (and, generally, of the Sokratic) dialogues, as Dr Thompson points out (Appendix II, *Phaedr.* Append. II. p. 176).

² See, e.g., *Phileb.* p. 17 A: *Euthyd.* p. 278 E, and *ad fin.* Cf. Arist. *περὶ σοφ. ἐλέγχ.* c. 11, οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοί (i.e. unsound reasoners) ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμόν, σοφιστικῶν.

³ Thompson *l.c.* p. 177; Spengel, *Isokrates und Platon*, p. 15. On the other hand, Mr H. Sidgwick (*Journal of Philology*, vol. IV. no. 8, p. 292, ‘The Sophists’,) thinks that the Platonists are included.

⁴ This was the proper sense of πολιτικός λόγος: see Vol. I. p. 90. But Isokrates considered as πολιτικοὶ λόγοι only those discourses (whether, in form, Deliberative or not) which treated what he called political subjects (above p. 41). He regards Forensic speeches as merely *sham* πολιτικοί: cf. § 20, &c. —ἐκεῖνοι δ’ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς λόγους παρακαλοῦντες πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ πλεονεξίας ἰπέστησαν διδάσκαλοι εἶναι.

no less than of Protagoras¹, to impart a practical training for the active duties of a citizen. The clue to the meaning of the censure pronounced here is to be found in that passage of the *Antidosis* where Isokrates defines the scope of his 'philosophy'². He there says that three things go to form a first-rate public speaker—nature, discipline, experience. Of these, natural aptitude is by far the most important; experience ranks next; instruction, *παιδεία*, is of least moment; for without one, at least, of the other qualifications it can do little. At the same time all persons, whatever their capacity, who have been properly taught, will bear the stamp of a uniform scientific method³. What, then, he means to censure in the professors of whom he speaks here is not their pretension to a scientific method of teaching Practical Rhetoric; it is the unlimited efficacy which they claimed for instruction, independently of nature or experience. They promised unconditionally to make anyone a good speaker: this promise Isokrates denounces as imposture (*ἀλαζονεία* § 10).

(3) *Writers of 'Arts.'*

(3) Besides these two classes—the Eristics and the teachers of Political Discourse, who are described as of recent growth³—a third class of sophists is condemned by Isokrates. This consists of 'those who lived before our time and wrote the so-called Arts of Rhetoric.' Here, again, the limits of the censure must be noted. Isokrates himself probably

¹ Cf. Plat. *Protag.* 318 E: where Protagoras undertakes to teach *εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων*, and power *τὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ λέγειν καὶ*

πράττειν.

² *Antid.* §§ 186—191

³ *Antid.* § 205.

wrote an ‘Art;’ at any rate, some of his extant precepts on rhetorical composition might certainly have had a place in such a treatise. It is not the attempt to reduce the theory of Rhetoric to a system which he is condemning here. He is complaining that the earlier writers of Arts devoted themselves entirely to the least noble branch, the Forensic. They professed to teach men ‘political discourse’; but really ‘they undertook to be teachers of meddlesomeness and greed’ (§ 20), whereas the Eristics at any rate aim at imparting virtue. The writers on Rhetoric primarily meant are, no doubt, Korax and Tisias—perhaps also Antiphon. Such treatises as those of Gorgias, Thrasymachos of Chalkedon, and Polos, however unsatisfactory in other respects they might seem to Isokrates, were probably less liable to the particular censure passed here. It may be presumed that they dealt, not with Forensic Rhetoric exclusively, but with Rhetoric in all its branches, especially the Epideictic. The complaint of Isokrates is in one aspect perfectly just. It is repeated by Aristotle; who remarks that the earlier writers of Arts almost confined themselves to Forensic Rhetoric just because they had not a really scientific method, and therefore preferred that field in which chicanery (τὸ κακοῦργον) had the freest scope¹.

The Speech *Against the Sophists* ought to be read along with the Speech *On the Antidosis*, written some thirty-five years later, when his career was drawing to a close. Taken together, they express

*Relation of
this Dis-
course with
the ‘Anti-
dosis’.*

¹ Arist. *Rhet.* I. 1, § 10.

his whole educational and literary creed. There is a thorough harmony between the principles of the two essays; but there is likewise a difference between their points of view. In the earlier discourse, Isokrates is concerned solely in distinguishing himself from false brethren. In the later, he is not only defending himself, but vindicating the entire profession to which he belonged, from the criticism of laymen.

III. 2. *On the Antidosis.*

2. *On the Antidosis* [Or. xv.] The discourse was written when Isokrates had completed his 82nd year (§ 9), *i.e.* later than midsummer¹, 354 B. C.; and alludes to the fine imposed upon Timotheos (§ 129), who was now dead (§ 101). Timotheos was brought to trial about midsummer, 354, and died at Chalkis later in the same year. This speech may probably, then, be placed in the first half of 353 B. C. The latest work of Isokrates quoted in it is the *Speech On the Peace* (§ 66), which belongs probably to the earlier half of 355 B. C. Isokrates had lately been called upon to undertake the trierarchy, or to make exchange of properties (*antidosis*) with his challenger. The case had come to a trial; the trierarchy had been imposed upon Isokrates, and he had discharged it (§ 5). Vexed, however, by the general prejudice against his pursuits to which he felt that the verdict had been due, he determined to publish an *Apologia*—a discourse ‘which should be an image of his mind and life’ (§ 7). This he throws into the form of a speech made in court against one Lysimachos (§ 14),

Date.

Form of the discourse.

¹ Cf. Clinton, *Fast. Hellen.* s. ann. 436 & 354.

who, by working on popular prejudice, is seeking to cast the burden of the trierarchy upon him. Much of the discourse is not, he allows, in the forensic style (§ 10); yet, by the concluding allusion to a verdict (§ 323), he aims, in a measure, at sustaining the fiction to the end.

It is known that, in 355 B. C.¹, Isokrates had really been challenged to an exchange of properties by one Megakleides; and, being unable through illness to appear in court, had been represented by his adopted son Aphareus, whose speech on the occasion is quoted by Dionysios². Now this is probably the trial to which Isokrates refers as having been decided against him. It must have taken place at least a year before the date of this discourse, since it is implied that the public service had now been discharged (§ 5). Lysimachos is a fictitious person who stands for the Megakleides of the real trial³.

‘If this speech were an ordinary specimen of the Forensic or Epideictic class, it would need no preface. As it is of a new kind, its origin must be explained. I had long known that some of the sophists slandered my pursuits, and represented me as a writer of speeches for the law-courts. They might as well have called Pheidias a doll-maker, Zeuxis or

¹ The date is fixed by Dionys. *De Dinarch.* c. 13—ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζῶντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας—i.e. the last campaign of the Social War, in the spring of 355 B.C.

² Dionys. *De Dinarch.* 13: *De Isocr.* 18.

³ See § 8, εἰ δ' ὑποθείμην συκοφαντῆν τινα. It was evidently through taking Lysimachos to be a real person that the pseudo-Plutarch was led into stating that

Isokrates had had *two* lawsuits (ἀγῶνες) about the trierarchy (*Vitt. x. Oratt.*). Isokrates and his adopted son Aphareus were among the 1200 richest citizens (συντελείς), and had thrice borne the trierarchy as well as other leiturgies (§ 145). The Aphareus mentioned as a past trierarch by Dem. (*Agst. Euergos and Mnesippos* § 31) is probably this one: Schäfer, *Dem.* III. Append. v. p. 197.

The fiction based on fact.

Analysis.

Parrhasios a sign-painter. Believing that I had made it clear that my subjects are not private disputes but the greatest and highest questions, I supposed such idle calumnies to be powerless. Now, however, at the age of 82, I have discovered that they influence the general public. A person who had been called upon to serve as trierarch challenged me to exchange properties with him, or else to take the duty. A lawsuit followed. The plaintiff dwelt upon the evil tendency of my writings, upon my wealth and the number of my pupils; and the court imposed the trierarchy upon me. The expense I bore with equanimity; but I wish to correct the prejudices which led to such a verdict. This discourse is meant as an image of my mind and life. It is cast into the form of a defence in an imaginary trial. It contains some things that might be said in a lawcourt; some, unsuited to such a place, but illustrative of my philosophy; some, which may profit young men anxious to learn; some, taken from my former writings and introduced here in harmony with a special purpose. The resulting whole must not be judged as representing any one class of speech, but as made up of several distinct elements brought in with several distinct aims. It ought to be read, not continuously, but part by part. (§§ 1—13.)

Motive and nature of this piece.

Appeal to the Court.

‘The worst knave is he who brings against another charges to which he himself is liable. Lysimachos, delivering a composed speech, has dwelt most of all upon the insidious skill of my compositions. Do not be swayed by calumny; remember the oath taken yearly by judges that they will hear impartially accuser and accused. Ere now Athens has regretted a hasty verdict; and it would be shameful that Athenians, reputed in all else the most merciful of the Greeks, should be rashly cruel in their own law-courts. No one of you, the judges, can tell that he will not be the next victim of Lysimachos. A good life is no protection from such men; they show their power upon the innocent in order to be bribed by the guilty. Never till this day have I been brought before judge or arbitrator; now, if you will hear me, I hope to prove my real character.—Read the indictment. [*Indictment.*] (§§ 14—29.)

‘Here, in the indictment, he charges me with corrupting the youth by teaching them to be tricky litigants. In his speech, on the other hand, he represents me as the most wonderful of men;—as one among whose pupils have been public speakers, generals, kings, despots. He thinks that I shall be envied on the latter account, and detested on the former. Dismiss prejudice, and decide upon the merits of the case. That my literary skill has not been used for bad purposes, appears from the fact that I have no enemies. If I had, they would have profited by this trial to appear against me. This skill itself, if it has been well used, is a claim to esteem. The difference between me and a writer of law-speeches will appear if you compare our modes of life. Men frequent the places from which they draw their subsistence. Those who subsist by your litigation almost live in the law-courts. No one has ever seen me in a council-chamber, at the archon’s office, before judges, before arbitrators. Pettifoggers thrive at home; my prosperity has always been found abroad. Is it probable that Nikokles of Cyprus, sovereign judge among his people, should have rewarded me for aiding him to become a pleader? No mere writer of law-speeches has ever had pupils; I have had many. But it is not enough to show that my line of work has not been this. I will shew you what it has been. (§§ 30—44.)

‘First, it must be remembered that there are as many branches of prose as of poetry. Some prose-writers have spent their lives in tracing the genealogies of the Heroes. Others have been critics of the poets. Others have compiled histories of wars. Others have woven discussions into dialogues. My work has lain in yet another field,—in the composition of discourses bearing upon the politics of all Hellas, and fitted for recitation at Panhellenic gatherings. Such discourses evidently stand nearer to poetry than to forensic rhetoric. Their language is more imaginative and more ornate; there is greater amplitude, more scope for originality, in the thoughts which they strive to express. They are as popular as poems; and the art of writing them is much studied. Unlike forensic speeches, they deal with matters of universal interest; they have a

*Isokrates
has been
conversant,*

*not with
Forensic
Rhetoric,*

*but with
Panhellenic
Politics.*

lasting value, independent of any special occasion. Besides, he who is a master of these could succeed also in a law-court; but not *vice versa*. At these I have worked; and have got by them a reputation better than law-courts could give. (§§ 45—50.)

A challenge. 'I am ready to impose the severest terms upon myself. Punish me, not merely if my writings are proved harmful, but if they are not shown to be matchless. It is not necessary here to argue on probabilities. My writings are themselves the facts in question. Samples of them shall be shown to you, and you shall judge for yourselves. The discourse from which the first sample shall be taken was written when Sparta was at the head of Greece and Athens in a low estate. It seeks to rouse Hellas against Persia; and disputes the claim of Sparta to sole leadership.—(Begin at the mark in the margin, and read them the passage about the hegemony.) [Here is read an Extract from the Panegyrikos, §§ 51—99.] (§§ 51—59.)

(1) Quotation from the 'Panegyrikos'.

'Is the writer of this a 'corrupter of young men,' or their inciter to noble daring? Does he deserve punishment; or is he to be thanked for having so praised Athens and your ancestors that former writers on the same theme feel remorse, and intending ones, despair? (§§ 60—61.)

'Some who, themselves unable to create, can only criticise, will say that this is 'graceful' (they could not bring themselves to say 'good'); but that praise of the past is less valuable than censure of present mistakes. You shall hear, then, part of another speech in which I assume this office of censor. Its immediate subject is the peace with Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium; it goes on to show the drawbacks to a maritime supremacy; and ends by addressing to Athens exhortation, censure and advice.—(Begin there, and read this extract to them.) [Here is read an Extract from the Speech On the Peace, §§ 25—56: §§ 132¹ ff. to the end.] (§§ 62—66.)

(2) Quotation from the Speech 'On the Peace.'

'You have now heard parts of two discourses; a short passage from a third shall be read, in order that you may see

¹ After the words *καθεστάναι πολιτείαν* in § 133 is introduced a sentence which does not occur in our text of the *De Pace*, but which is a paraphrase of the opening words of § 136 of that speech.

how the same tendency goes through all that I have written. Here, addressing Nikokles of Cyprus, I did not aim at regular composition, but merely strung together a number of detached precepts upon government. It is not for their literary merit, but simply as showing the spirit of my dealing with princes as well as with private men, that they are quoted here. One who so boldly advised a king to care for his people, would surely be no less frank in the popular cause under a Democracy.—I begin by blaming the usual neglect of special preparation by a monarch; and then urge Nikokles to regard his office as a task calling for serious labour. [*Here is read an Extract from the Discourse To Nikokles*, §§ 14—39.] (§§ 67—72.)

‘This shall be the last of these long extracts; but I reserve the right of referring in detail to my own writings whenever it can be useful. I offered just now to bear any penalty, not merely if it could be shewn that my writings were harmful, but unless it could be shewn that they were incomparable. That boast has been justified. What attempt could be holier or more righteous than the attempt to praise our ancestors worthily of their exploits; what theme nobler than his who urges Hellenes to unite against barbarians? Good laws are allowed to be the greatest blessings to human life. Yet these benefit only the individual city; my discourses profit all Hellas. It is easier to be a legislator than to be a competent adviser of Athens and Hellas. The legislator, in an advanced stage of civilisation, is often little more than a compiler; the thoughts of an effective speaker must be his own. Teachers of moral philosophy differ from each other and from the world as to what is virtue; the virtue which I inculcate is recognised by all. Those theorists seek only to draw disciples to themselves; my object is to impress a public duty upon Athens. The alleged vices of my teaching are disproved by the affection of my pupils; who, at the end of three or four years, have left me with regret. Lysimachos has accused me, without a shadow of proof, of corrupting them; but I will refute him formally. (§§ 74—92.)

‘You know my writings; you shall now hear who have been my associates from childhood, and the evidence of my

⁽³⁾ *Quotation from the Discourse To Nikokles.*

Comments.

His friends have been good men.

contemporaries shall prove the statement. Among my friends in youth were Eunomos, Lysitheides, Kallippos; afterwards Onetor, Antikles, Philonides, Philomelos, Charmantides¹. All these were crowned with golden crowns for their services to Athens. Whether you suppose me to have been their adviser and teacher, or merely their companion, my character is vindicated. If it is not, what would it have been if among my intimates had been such a man as Lysimachos? Some will perhaps say that I am citing good men whom I barely knew, but keeping out of sight the rascals who were my pupils. I am ready to waive all credit for honourable friendships, and to bear the full discredit of any which can be shown to have been disreputable. (§§ 93—100.)

Timotheos.

‘The general charge against me in the indictment—that of corrupting my associates—has been sufficiently answered. But special stress has been laid upon my friendship with Timotheos; and, since the interests which he long controlled were so great, especial pains have been taken to slander him. I, therefore, who am supposed to have been his adviser and teacher, cannot be silent. If he is shown to have been a bad man, let me share the blame. If he is proved to have been incomparable as a general and as a citizen, let the honour be his alone. Now, in the first place, no general ever took so many and such important cities. Corcyra, important in regard to the Peloponnesos,—Samos, for Ionia,—Sestos and Krithôtê, for the Hellespont,—Potidaea, for Thrace,—were taken by him with slender resources. He forced Lacedaemon

¹ *Eunomos* is perhaps identical with the Eunomos who commanded an Athenian fleet in 388 B.C. (Xen. *Hellen.* v. i. §§ 5—9), and with the Eunomos mentioned by Lysias as sent on a mission to Sicily (*de bon. Arist.* §§ 19 ff.) 2. *Lysitheides* is named by Dem. *adv. Callipp.* § 14, as a friend of Isokrates and Aphareus; and in *Mid.* § 157, along with Kallaeschros, as among the wealthiest citizens. 3. *Kallippos* is perhaps

identical (as Sauppe thinks) with the person against whom Demosthenes wrote *Or.* LII. 4. *Onetor*, the brother-in-law of Aphobos: Dem. *Oratt.* xxx. & xxxi. 5. *Antikles*, unknown. 6. *Philonides*, unknown: unless he is the Φιλωνίδης Μελιτρεῖς against whom Lysias wrote his speech in a trial βιαιῶν (Sauppe *Att. Oratt.* II. 208), and whom the comic poets ridiculed (Bergk *Rel. Com. Att.* pp. 400 ff.). 7, 8. *Philomelos*, *Charmantides*, unknown.

into the present peace¹, the most advantageous ever concluded by Athens. In a word, he took 24 towns at a smaller outlay than the single siege of Melos cost our fathers. These exploits were achieved at a time when we were weak and our enemies strong. By what qualities did Timotheos achieve them? He was not of the ordinary type of your generals,—neither of a robust frame, nor trained in the camps of mercenaries. But he knew against whom, and with whose aid, to make war; how to form, and to use, a force suitable for each attempt; how to bear privations, and to remedy them; how to win for Athens the trust and the love of Greece. A general who, like Lysander, has one brilliant success is less great than one who for years deals wisely with ever-varying difficulties. Yet Timotheos was brought to trial for treason; and, although Iphikrates took the responsibility for what had been done, Menestheus for what had been spent, they were acquitted, while Timotheos was fined in an unheard-of sum². Ignorance, envy, excitement, go far to explain this result; but it must be owned that the character of Timotheos contributed to it. He was no anti-democrat, no misanthrope, not arrogant; but his unbending loftiness of mind made him liable to seem all this. Against my advice, he refused to conciliate the speakers who sway the ekklesia and those who direct the opinion of private circles. These men made it their business to frame falsehoods about him—falsehoods which, had I space, I could bring you to see and hate. But I must go back to my own case. (§§ 101—139.)

Why Timotheos was condemned.

‘I hardly know how to arrange the topics on which it remains for me to speak; perhaps it will be best to take each as it occurs. But here I am checked by the warning of a friend,—which you shall hear. ‘If you describe your blameless life,’ he said, ‘you will only provoke jealousy. That you should have so written as to deserve public gratitude,

A friend's counsel.

¹ § 109. *ταύτην αὐτοῦς ἠνάγκασε συνθέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην*—i. e. the Peace of Kallias, 371 B.C. The victories of Timotheos had, by weakening Sparta, led up to this peace; although it cannot pro-

perly be represented as the direct result of them.

² The sum was 100 talents—i. e. about £24,000: Deinarch. *in Demosth.* § 14.

and that your intimates should have been men whom Athens delighted to honour; that, till now, you should have been a stranger to lawsuits; that, while seeking no public emoluments, you should have enrolled yourself and your son among the twelve hundred who pay the war-tax and bear the public services; that you and he should thrice have discharged the trierarchy, and performed the other services at a greater cost than the laws enjoin; that you should receive presents from abroad, and avoid all display at home—these things will but irritate your judges.’ When my friend said this, it seemed to me that it would be strange if any reasonable men could object to my bearing the city’s burdens and yet declining its rewards. I decline its rewards not from arrogance, but from preference for a quiet life. It is not because I am very rich that I take so large a share of its burdens. No sophist has ever made a great fortune. Gorgias of Leontini, who passed much time in Thessaly when it was the richest part of Greece—whose life was spent in seeking wealth from city to city, and who had no family burdens—left only 1000 staters. The income of a sophist must not be judged by that of a popular actor. Compare me, if you will, with the most successful men in my own profession; and you will find that I have been at once a thrifty householder and a liberal citizen. (§§ 140—158.) Things have changed at Athens since I was a boy. Then wealth was not only dignified but safe, and every one affected to be richer than he was. Now it is more dangerous to be suspected of wealth than of the worst crime. When my fortune was wrecked in the Peloponnesian war, and I resolved to repair it by teaching, I hoped that success in my new profession would bring credit and respect. It has brought, however, only envy and slander. Lysimachos, who lives by the informer’s trade, is accuser—I, who have not preyed on you, but have prospered through the gratitude of men whom I had saved, stand in danger. Our ancestors made Pindar their public friend (proxenos), and voted him 10,000 drachmas¹ because he bore witness that

The wealth of Sophists exaggerated.

The new dangers of riches.

Pindar and Athens.

¹ About £400—not an illiberal *douceur*, even if we adopt that version of the story which repre-
sents the poet as having been heavily fined for this panegyric by his fellow-countrymen, and the

Athens is the stay of Hellas. It would be hard if I, who have given her praise ampler and nobler than that, should not be allowed even to end my days in peace. (§§ 159—166.)

‘The indictment has now been answered. But from the first I have foreseen that I should have to combat, not merely the charges against myself, but the prejudice against these studies generally. Reflection, however, assured me that among you I should find fairness, and that the cause of Philosophy could be satisfactorily defended. In the fact of the prejudice against it there is nothing strange. Athens is large and populous. Public opinion here is irregular and vehement as a winter-torrent. It sweeps down all men and all things that it chances to seize. This has befallen my studies. But you must decide calmly.* Remember that it is not my case alone which is at issue, but the education of our youth—upon which the future of Athens must depend. If Philosophy is a bad thing, it should be absolutely banished; if it is a good thing, it should be encouraged, and its detractors should be silenced. I wish that this accusation had been brought against me (if it was to be brought) at a time when I could have pleaded the cause of philosophy with the vigour of a younger man. However, I will try to set before you, as well as I can, its nature—its power—its relation to other sciences—the benefits which it is able to confer—and the degree in which I profess to impart them. If the style of the defence is singular, pardon it to the difficulty of the subject. (§§ 167—179.)

‘What Gymnastic is for the body, Philosophy is for the mind. In the one as in the other, the pupil learns first the technical rudiments, and then how to combine them. The physical and the mental training will alike improve natural powers. But the master of the palaestra cannot make a great athlete, nor the teacher of Philosophy a great speaker.* To make the latter, three things are needed—capacity,*

Athenians as merely reimbursing him with 100 per cent. interest—
διπλὴν αὐτῷ τὴν ζημίαν ἀπέδοσαν,
[Aeschin.] *Ép.* iv. Pindar’s words
were αἶ τε λιπαρὰ καὶ ἰοστέφανοι

καὶ δοῖδιμοι, | Ἑλλάδος ἔρρισμα,
κλειναὶ Ἀθῆναι, δαμόνιον προλιέ-
θρον. (*Frag.* 46, ed. Donaldson,
p. 346.)

*Public
Opinion at
Athens.*

*Analogy of
Philosophy
to Gym-
nastic.*

training, and practice. Capacity—which includes intellect, voice, and nerve—is the chief requisite. Practice, however, can by itself make a good speaker. Training is by far the least important of the three. It may be complete, and yet may be rendered useless by the absence of a single quality—nerve. (§§ 180—192.)

Proof that Isokr. has always discountenanced false claims.

‘Do not suppose that my claims are modest only when I address you, but larger when I speak to my pupils. In an essay published when I first began to teach, the excessive pretensions of some teachers are expressly blamed.—This passage will explain my view.

[*Here is read an Extract from the Essay Against the Sophists, §§ 14—18.*]

You see, then, that at the outset as at the close of my career, in safety as in danger, I have held this language.

‘This, I well know, will not satisfy those against whose prejudices I am contending. Much more must be said before they can be converted or refuted. Their prejudice utters itself in one of two assertions:—that the system of the sophists is futile; or that it is effectual, but immoral. (§§ 193—198.)

The Sophistic system is (1) effectual,

‘Those who say that it is futile try it by a standard which they apply to none of those arts in which they believe. They demand that all its disciples shall become finished speakers in a year. The success of the sophists is, in fact, equal to that of any other class of teachers. Some of their pupils become powerful debaters; others become competent teachers; all become more accomplished members of society, better critics, more prudent advisers. And what proves the training to be scientific, is that all bear the stamp of a common method. These who despise such culture assume that practice, which develops every other faculty, is useless to the intellect; that the human mind can educate the instincts of horses and dogs, but cannot train itself; that tame lions and learned bears are possible, but not instructed men. (§§ 199—214.)

and (2) not immoral.

‘Others maintain that Philosophy has an immoral tendency, and hold it responsible for the faults of a few who pervert it. I am not going to defend all who *say* that they are

sophists, but only those who say so truly. And first—What are the objects which tempt men to be dishonest? I answer that the object is always one of three things—pleasure, profit, or honour. Could it be pleasant, profitable, or honourable for a sophist that his pupils should be known as rascals? It may perhaps be replied that men do not always calculate; that a margin must be left for intemperate impulse. But, even if a sophist indulged such impulses in himself, it could be no more for his pleasure than for his interest to encourage them in his pupil. Are the strangers who come from Sicily, from the Euxine and other quarters to the rhetorical schools of Athens brought hither by the desire to become knaves? Or, if that were their wish, could they not find teachers at home? But the whole tenor of their life among us proves them honest men. Again, if power in discourse is in itself a corrupting thing, all those who have possessed it, and not some only, ought to have been tainted by it. Yet the best statesmen of our generation and of the last were those who had most studied oratory. To go back to old times, Solon, Kleisthenes, Themistokles, Perikles, were all distinguished orators: Solon was even called one of the Seven Sophists. Perikles studied under Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, and under Damon¹, who was the ablest Athenian of his time (§§ 215—236).

What motive has a Sophist for being dishonest?

The best statesmen have been orators.

‘But I can point out the places in which may be found those who are really liable to the charges falsely brought against the sophists. Read the tablets, giving notice of lawsuits, which are published by the Thesmothetae, by the Eleven, and by the Forty². Among the names of wrongdoers and of false accusers which figure there will be found those

The real corruptors are the sycophant.

¹ Damon, the musician, is mentioned as a master of his art in Cic. *de Orat.* III. xxxiii. § 132, and was said to have taught Perikles. (Plat. *Per.* c. 4). Plato’s high estimate of him appears from the *Laches*, p. 180 D, where Nikias says that Sokrates has lately recommended to him a teacher of music for his sons—‘Damon, a pupil of Agathokles—a most accom-

plished musician, and not merely that, but in every respect a desirable companion for young men at their age.’

² § 237 οἱ τετταράκοντα—judges who went circuit through the Attic demes (δικασταὶ κατὰ δήμους), deciding cases of *aikia* and *βιαιών* and *δικαι* in which not more than ten drachmas were at stake: Smith, *Dict. Ant.* s. v.

of Lysimachos and his friends,—not mine, nor that of any member of our profession. Were we really corrupters of youth, our accusers would have been the fathers and relatives of those whom we corrupted,—not such men as Lysimachos, whose interest it is that Athens should be demoralised. Just now I spoke of the hostility which some educated men feel towards our art. That hostility, I venture to hope, will have been disarmed by these plain statements. But there is, I think, a jealousy which is even more widely spread. It is because all ambitious men wish to be able speakers, but are too indolent to work for that end, that they dislike those who are ready to go through the necessary toil. It is strange that, while Athenians reproach the Thebans and others with neglecting culture, they should revile their fellow-citizens for seeking it; that the goddess of Persuasion should be honoured with yearly sacrifice, while those who wish to share her power should be regarded as desiring something evil; that bodily training should be esteemed, while mental training—to which Athens owes her place in Hellas—is slighted (§§ 237—257).

*How men
worship
'Persua-
sion' at
Athens.*

‘If a man used his inherited wealth, his skill as a hoplite or as an athlete, in doing harm to his fellow-citizens, he would be punished, though the founders of his fortune, the teachers of his skill, might be praised. The gods have given us speech—the power which has civilised human life; and shall we not strive to make the best use of it? (§§ 251—257.)

*Speech—
man's no-
blest gift*

‘Lysimachos and such as he are not the only enemies of Rhetoric. It is attacked also by the professors of Eristic. Instead of retorting their reproaches, I wish simply to aid you in estimating their studies relatively to ours. Eristic discussion, like Astrology or Geometry, seems to me not to deserve the name of Philosophy, since it has no practical bearing; but, rather, to be a good preparation for Philosophy.) Schoolboys are trained to work and to think accurately by grammar and literary study; Philosophy forms a more manly discipline of the same sort for young men. But no one should allow his mind to be dried up by barren subtleties, or to drift into such speculations as those with which the Ionic physi-
cists juggled (§§ 258—269).

*The true
place of
'Eristic' in
education.*

‘Having said what Philosophy is not, I must try to explain what (as I think) it is. My view is very simple. A wise man is one who can make a good guess (knowledge being impossible) as to what he ought to say and do. A philosopher, a lover of wisdom, is one who spends his time in the pursuits by which he may best gain such perception. And what are these pursuits? My answer will probably shock you; but I should be ashamed to betray the truth for the sake of peace in the fraction of life remaining to me. Well, then, I hold that there is no communicable science of Virtue or Justice; but that a man ambitious of speaking well, of persuading others, and (in the true sense) of *gain*, will incidentally become more virtuous and more just. Desirous of speaking with applause, he will occupy himself with the noblest themes, and dwell upon the worthiest topics of these. Desirous of persuading, he will strive to be just, since nothing is so persuasive as a character which is felt to be upright. Desirous of real gain, he will seek the approval of the gods and the esteem of his fellow-citizens. It is only by a perversion of language that the ‘desire of gain’ has been associated with knavery; as ‘wittiness’ with buffoonery, and ‘philosophy’ with the mystifications of the elder sophists. This conception of philosophy as something unpractical—this tendency to discourage all systematic training for affairs—has its result in the lives of our youth. Their occupations are to cool wine in the Enneakrunos,—to drink in taverns,—to gamble,—to haunt the music-schools. The informers do not molest those who foster *these* pursuits. They attack us, who discourage them; and say that youths who spend on their education a tithe of what others spend on vice, are being corrupted (§§ 270—290).

‘Power of speaking, when simply natural, is admired; it is strange, then, that blame should be cast upon the attempt to cultivate it. When acquired by labour, the faculty is more likely to be used discreetly than when it is an accident of genius. Athenians, of all men, ought not to despise culture. It is cultivated intelligence which distinguishes men from beasts, Hellenes from barbarians, Athenians from Hellenes. Athens is regarded as the teacher of all who can

Philosophy is the art of conjecturing what should be done.

Virtue cannot be taught.

But the philosopher will be virtuous.

Young Athens.

The culture of eloquence

distinctive of Athens.

speak or teach others to speak ; the greatest prizes, the best schools, the most constant practice are supplied by her. For her to disown the study of eloquence would be as if Sparta laid disabilities on military education or the Thessalians on skill in horsemanship. In athletic prowess, Athens has many rivals ; in culture, none. Her intellectual culture is what most commands the admiration of foreigners ; as the prevalence of informers is the one blot to which they can point. You ought to punish those who bring disgrace upon you, and honour those who do you credit. Miltiades, Themistokles, Perikles, became great by the pursuits which these informers vilify. Remembering this, strive to keep the lawcourts pure for the citizens generally ; and honour the ablest and most cultivated among them as the truest guardians of the democracy (§§ 291—309).

*Her glory
and her
shame.*

Epiloguc.

‘The length of my defence has already passed due limits ; but there are still a few words that I would say to you. It is bitter to me to see the informer’s trade prospering better than the cause of education. Would our ancestors have looked for this ? Solon, eldest of the Sophists, was put by them at the head of the State ; against informers they appointed not one mode of procedure only but many,—indictment before the Thesmothetae, impeachment before the Senate, plaint to the Assembly. And informers are worse now than they were then. Their audacity has grown with the licence of those demagogues to whom our fathers entrusted the protection of the Athenian empire ; who, by reproaching our most distinguished citizens as oligarchs and partisans of Sparta, made them such,—who harassed, and so estranged, our allies,—who brought Athens to the verge of slavery. Time is failing me ; I must cease. Others conclude by committing their cause to the mercy of their judges and the entreaties of their friends ; I appeal to my past life. The gods, who have protected it hitherto, will protect it now. Your verdict, whatever it may be, will be for my good. Let each of you give what sentence he will’ (§§ 310—323).

*Ancient
respect for
culture.
Solon.*

*The dema-
gogues.*

The speech *On the Antidosis* falls into two main divisions. In §§ 1—166 Isokrates defends himself.

In §§ 167—323 he defends his Art—‘the discipline of discourse’, ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία (§ 168). His own practice, as described in the first part, agrees with his theory, as set forth in the second. What that theory was—what Isokrates claimed, or did not claim to do—and how he was distinguished from his brother ‘sophists’—it has been attempted to explain in a former chapter¹.

¹ Ch. XIII. p. 36.

CHAPTER XVI.

ISOKRATES.

WORKS.

POLITICAL WRITINGS.

I. ON THE RELATIONS OF GREECE WITH PERSIA.

I 1.
Panegyrikos.

1. *Panegyrikos* [Or. iv.]—The date of the speech is determined by § 126. It is there said that the Spartans are besieging Olynthos and Phlius. Olynthos was besieged in 383 B.C., Phlius early in 380; both fell towards the close of 379. The speech cannot, then, have been published before 380 or after 379. Now the year 380 B.C. was the first of the hundredth Olympiad. The title *Panegyrikos*—given to the speech by Isokrates himself—points only to some great festival, and has been referred by one critic¹ to the Greater Panathenaea. But, taking the other circumstances into account, it seems hardly doubtful that the *Panegyrikos* was published at the time of the Olympic festival in the autumn of 380 B.C.²

Date.

¹ Preller, *Demeter and Persephone*, p. 71 n., who refers to § 62, εἰς τὴν χώραν ταύτην: but ταύτην merely answers to ἐξ ἧς—(that land, from which). The Greater Panathenaea fell in the third year of each Olympiad. The celebrations

nearest to 380 B.C. would therefore have been those of 382 and 378; and the Lesser Panathenaea can scarcely be thought of.

² An ingenious, but to my mind improbable view, has lately been suggested by W. Engel (Rauchen-

The duty of Hellenic unity against the barbarian had already been the theme of Gorgias and of Lysias in speeches delivered at Olympia¹. It is not likely that, like theirs, the oration of Isokrates was recited at the festival by its author. His want of nerve and voice, and much in the contents of the speech itself, would probably have deterred him from such an attempt. The speech may, indeed, have been recited for him; but it is more likely that it was first introduced to the Greek public by copies circulated at Olympia, and sent to cities in which Isokrates had friends among the leading men².

His appeal to Panhellenic patriotism was made at a time when such patriotism was sorely needed. By the Peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C. Artaxerxes II. had become master of the Asiatic Greeks, and ultimate arbiter in the affairs of western Hellas; the

stein, *Introd. to Panegyri*. p. 21). Engel thinks that the whole speech—*except* §§ 125—132—was written and published as early as 385 B. C. He observes that (1) in §§ 125—132 the Spartans are spoken of with a bitterness which is in contrast with the conciliatory tone used towards them in the rest of the oration: (2) in § 141 the defeat of Evagoras by the Persians (placed by Diod. in 386 B. C.) is alluded to; but Isokrates seems to know nothing of the capitulation of Evagoras in 385 (acc. to Diodoros xv. 4). Engel thinks that the war between Evagoras and Persia began in 394 B. C. It lasted 10 years, and ended in 385 B. C. (Diod. xv. 9). The six years of § 141 are then, 391—385.

Now argument (1) from the tone of §§ 125—132 appears to me wholly untenable; since in §§ 129—132 Isokrates expressly and elaborately apologises for whatever may seem harsh in the tone of §§ 125—128. As regards argument (2), it is valid only if the chronology of Diodoros is accepted. Clinton, *F. H.* vol. II. p. 279 (Appendix c. 12, on the Cyprian War), thinks that Diodoros is clearly wrong. He believes that the war began in 385 and ended in 376. Grote, too, rejects the authority of Diodoros, and places the war in 390—380 B. C.: c. 76, vol. x. p. 30 n.

¹ See above, on the *Olympiakos* of Lysias.

² Sandys, *Introd. to Panegyri*. p. xli.

Aegean, no longer protected by an Athenian fleet, was infested by pirates; the party strife which the dekararchies had exasperated was everywhere filling the smaller cities with bloodshed; and Sparta, regardless of the autonomy which the Peace had guaranteed to every state, was using these troubles for her own ends. In 385 the Spartans had destroyed Mantinea; in 383, besieged Olynthos; in 382, seized the Kadmeia; in 380, besieged Phlius.

Analysis.

The *Panegyrikos* falls into two main divisions. In the first (§§ 1—132) Isokrates urges that Athens and Sparta, laying aside their jealousies, should assume the joint leadership of Greece. He argues that, if Sparta at present holds the first place, Athens has the better historical claim to it; and that, therefore, a compromise might well be made. In the second part (§§ 133—189) he shows the direction in which the forces of Greece, once consolidated, ought to be turned—namely against Persia.

A summons to unity.

I. ‘It is strange that the founders of the great Festivals should have kept all their rewards for a physical prowess which serves only the athlete himself, and should have assigned no honour to the mental toil from which flow benefits to all. Content, however, with the hope of simple approbation, I am here to offer counsels of unity among Greeks and war against the barbarian (§§ 1—3). If the theme is not new, it admits of better treatment than it has received (§§ 4—5). The crisis is not yet past,—nor, therefore, the season for advice (§§ 3—5); and it is of the essence of oratory that it seeks to put familiar facts in a more impressive way (§§ 7—10). There are some who dislike all elaborate speaking, and who cannot distinguish between occasions for safe plainness and for a loftier effort. I address myself to those who

expect speakers on a great theme to rise above the common level; and I crave no indulgence if I fail to do so (§§ 11—14).

‘That the various cities of Greece should renounce their feuds and turn together against the barbarian, has often been urged; but the point from which such unity must begin has been missed. Hellas is divided, for the most part, between oligarchies dependent on Sparta and democracies dependent on Athens. Before the lesser States can be in harmony, the leaders must be reconciled, and must consent to share the headship (*τὰς ἡγεμονίας διελέσθαι*, § 17). Sparta is the obstacle. She fancies that she has an ancestral right to sovereignty. If it can be shown that this right belongs rather to Athens, Sparta will either yield something, or, if she does not, will be clearly in the wrong (§§ 15—20).

*Obstacle to
Greek
concord—
Sparta.*

‘Maritime Empire belongs of right to Athens, whether the test be (*a*) naval efficiency, (*b*) antiquity, or (*c*) services done to Greece. Her services have been of two kinds, (1) civil, and (2) military (§§ 21—27).

*Claims of
Athens to
Empire.*

(1.) ‘The first things which human life needs came to Hellas through Athens. Demeter, visiting Attica in her search for Persephone, gave to its inhabitants two gifts,—the corn-crop, and the rite of the Mysteries. Athens did not keep these blessings to herself, but freely shared them with all. If the tradition be questioned because it is lost in antiquity, on the other hand this antiquity implies wide acceptance. It is accredited by the fact that most Greek cities pay to Athens a yearly tribute of first-fruits. It has also an *a priori* likelihood. The earliest men, most needing, were most likely to obtain, direct help from the gods; and the people of Attica are confessedly the oldest of races (§§ 28—33).

*Gifts of
Athens to
primitive
Greece.*

‘The next great boon which Athens bestowed on early Greece, was the enlargement of the area covered by Greeks. Seeing the barbarians widely spread and the Hellenes straitened for space, she provided the cities with leaders under whom they conquered from the alien new homes both in Europe and in Asia; peopled islands in every sea; and, in opening a career to colonists, saved the mother country (§§ 34—37).

*Athens the
mother of
Colonisa-
tion.*

*Athens the
founder of
civil life.*

‘These primary benefits were followed by others. Athens was not content with having given the Hellenes the necessities of life; she gave them civilisation. Hers were the earliest laws, hers was the earliest Constitutional Polity. With her originated the arts which minister to men’s needs or pleasures. The central emporium of Hellas, the Peiraeus, was established by her. All the advantages, all the charms of those great gatherings at which Greeks of every city forget their differences in a sense of common worship and of common blood, are supplied in an unequalled measure by the festivals of Athens; nay, she herself is for all visitors a perpetual festival. Practical philosophy, the deviser and organiser of all these things—rational eloquence, the permanent distinction of high natures—are honoured by her as by no other city. So pre-eminently is she the seat of national culture that a man is not considered in the fullest sense a Hellene merely because he is of Hellenic blood, unless, further, he bears the stamp of the Athenian mind (§§ 38—50).

*The
Athenian
Festivals.*

*Athens the
military
champion.*

(2.) ‘Such are the services which Athens has rendered to the civil life of Hellas. Her military services have been equally great, both in wars between Greeks, and in wars of Greek against barbarian.

*(1) of op-
pressed
Greeks:*

‘In Greece she has always shown herself the unselfish champion of the oppressed. Thus she successfully aided Adrastus against the Thebans and the Herakleidae against Eurystheus. The greatness of Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese—a recollection which ought to restrain Sparta from injuring, or claiming to rule, Athens. Argos, Thebes, Sparta, were in early times, as they are now, the foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was greater than them all—the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of those who founded Sparta (§§ 51—65).

*(2) of
Greeks
against
barbarians.*

‘Against the barbarians Athens has waged more wars than could fitly be told here: a few of the chief only shall be named. In the infancy of Hellas, Attica was invaded by the Thracians under Eumolpos, son of Poseidon, and, later, by the Scythians leagued with the Amazons, daughters of Ares. The Thracians were so crushed that they withdrew

from their old seats on the Attic frontier to a more distant abode. Of the Amazons, not one who came hither returned; and those who had stayed behind were driven from their realm on account of the disaster (§§ 66—70).

‘Similar in spirit and in result were the wars against Dareios and Xerxes. In these, Athens won a double victory; she drove back the apparently irresistible hordes of the enemy, and took the prize for valour from allies whose bravery it seemed impossible to surpass. Lacedaemon, indeed, did brilliant service; the greater the glory for Athens of having outshone such a rival. The Persian Wars claim special mention here, illustrating, as they do at once the heroism of our ancestors and the hostility of Greek to barbarian. The subject has been well-nigh exhausted by the speakers of Funeral Orations¹; but, as it relates to my present purpose, I must not shrink from touching upon it (§§ 71—74).

‘Praise is due, first of all, to those earlier generations of Athenian and Spartan statesmen who sowed the seed of the valour which afterwards saved Hellas. They were characterised in all things by unselfish public spirit. They were thrifty of the resources of the state; they were sensitively loyal to its honour and to its interest in their personal conduct and in their legislation. Political parties, political clubs then vied only in benefits to the city. Thus were formed the men who, surpassing the captors of Troy, vanquished Asia; men whose merit transcends all that has been said or sung of them. Surely some god must have ordained that struggle in order to bring into full light natures worthy of the demigods of old (§§ 75—84).

‘The rivalry between Athens and Sparta was never so noble as in the Persian wars. When the army of Dareios

¹ Cf. the note of Mr Sandys on *Paneg.* § 74, where he enumerates the known early *ἐπιτάφιοι*, viz. (1) that of Perikles in honour of those who fell at Samos in 440 B.C.: (2) the speech of Perikles in 431 B.C.: (3) the *ἐπιτάφιος* of Gorgias: (4)

the *ἐπιτάφιος* commonly ascribed to Lysias: (5) the *Μενεχένος* of Plato: (6) the *ἐπιτάφιος* ascribed to Demosthenes and purporting to have been spoken after Chaeironia: (7) the *ἐπιτάφιος* of Hypereides.

invaded Greece, the Athenians, without waiting for the allies, met it at Marathon; the Lacedaemonians, on hearing of the peril, had no thought but to hasten to the rescue. When, later, Xerxes came with his host, marching over the Hellespont and sailing through Athos, Sparta won glory at Thermopylae, Athens at Artemision. Then began the last period of the war: and in this the Athenians distanced all competitors. Scorning the overtures of an enemy who actually held their city, and true to allies who had forsaken them, they made ready to fight alone at Salamis. Shame brought the Peloponnesians to their side; but, of the Greek ships engaged, Athens furnished more than all the other States together.

‘If there is now to be an expedition against the barbarians, who ought to lead it? Who but the foremost fighters, the most unselfish sufferers, in the former war; the founders, in ancient days, of cities to which, later, they became saviours? Would it not be hard if, having borne most evil, we did not receive most honour; if, having once been chosen to lead, we should now be forced to follow? (§§ 85—99.)

*Charges
against
Athens.*

‘Everyone must allow that, up to the close of the Persian wars, Athens had deserved the supremacy. But it is objected that, after her attainment of maritime empire, she did much evil to Greece; notably in the cases of Melos and of Skione¹. Now, these were towns which had made war upon her; they were treated simply with a rigour usual in war. The true test of Imperial Athens is to be found in the condition of her loyal subjects. These, during seventy years, enjoyed exemption from tyrants, from barbarians, from the strife of factions, from enmity in any quarter. The settlement of Athenian citizens upon the lands of conquered rebels has been quoted in evidence of her rapacity. But such settlements were meant merely as defensive garrisons, not as outposts of

*Test of
Imperial
Athens.*

The kleruchiae.

¹ § 100, τὸν Μηλίων ἀνδραποδισμὸν καὶ τὸν Σκιωναίων ἄλῃρον. The fate of the Melians in 416 B. C. (Thuc. v. 84—116) and of the Skioneans in 423 B. C. (Thuc. v. 37) was the same;—the men of military age were put to death, the women

and children sold as slaves. If any real antithesis is meant between ἀνδραποδισμός and ἄλῃρος, it must refer to the fact that the very name of Skione was effaced. The territory was given to the Plataean refugees: Thuc. v. 32.

aggression. If Athens is indeed so acquisitive, why has she never seized Euboea? (§§ 100—109.)

‘Though we have given such proofs of moderation, we are actually accused of selfishness and harshness by those partisans of Sparta who supported the dekarchies in the various cities;—who inflicted on their own countries a fate worse than that of Melos;—who enslaved themselves to a Helot¹, and honoured the assassins of their fellow-citizens more than their own parents;—who brought such misery to every hearth that no man had time to grieve for his neighbour. These presume to criticise the tribunals of Imperial Athens,—although they, in three months, put to death untried a greater number of persons than Athens put on trial during the whole period of her empire. A single decree might have cancelled the ‘severities’ of our rule; the bloodshed and lawlessness of theirs are irreparable (§§ 110—114).

*Imperial
Sparta.*

‘Sparta has, indeed, given nominal peace² and nominal independence to the Greek cities. But the state of Hellas is very different from what it was in the days of Athenian ascendancy. Pirates on the sea, marauders on land render life insecure. The ‘independent’ towns, if not desolate, are subject to despots, to harmosts, or to Persia. Formerly, when the Great King invaded our territory, Athens made him tremble for his own: she even forbade him to launch a warship west of Phaselis³. Now, he has landed troops in Laconia,

*Present
condition
of Greece.*

¹ Lysander was a *μύθων*,—i.e. the son of a Helot, brought up as foster-brother of a Spartan, and afterwards freed: see Lidd. and Scott *s. v.*

² § 115, the Peace of Antalkidas.

³ § 118, ἐπὶ τὰδε Φασηλίδος. The so-called Peace of Kimon has usually been placed in 450 B.C.: Clinton *F. H.* The tradition was founded on the fact of an Athenian embassy to Persia headed by Kallias: Her. viii. 151. Grote and Curtius take different views of this. Grote thinks that Kallias really

negotiated a treaty—in 449 B.C.; c. xlix. vol. v. pp. 455—464. Curtius thinks that the embassy of Kallias failed; no treaty was formally concluded; but the terms of the legendary treaty represent truly the relative positions of Persia and Hellas at the time. (*Hist. Gr.* vol. II. p. 412 tr. Ward.) Note that (as Mr Sandys observes) the cessation of Persia from hostilities is described in § 118 as a simple result of Athenian victories; in § 120, as the result of a definite convention. This well illustrates the view of Thirlwall,

taken Cythera, ravaged the Peloponnesos. The treaty made with Persia under our empire was a notable contrast to that which has just been concluded. Sparta went to war for the purpose of freeing the Greeks, and has ended by giving up a large proportion of them to Persia. The Ionians are not merely tributaries to the barbarian, they do not merely see his garrisons in their citadels: they suffer worse bodily usage than our bought slaves. Sparta is answerable for this. She has become the ally of absolutism against constitutional freedom. She has devastated Mantinea, seized the Kadmeia, besieged Olynthos and Phlius; she is in league with Amyntas of Macedon¹, with Dionysios of Syracuse, and with the master of Asia. Is it not monstrous that the city which claims to lead the Hellenes should have formed against them a perpetual alliance with the barbarians?

*The
Spartan
alliances.*

‘I have spoken harshly of Sparta; but not as an enemy who would denounce,—rather as a friend who would admonish. Instead of making her neighbours helots to herself, let her make the barbarians dependents of Greece. Instead of crushing the Aegean islands with taxation, let her seek wealth on the continent of Asia (§§ 115—132).

*Appeal to
Sparta.*

II. ‘To lookers-on our conduct would seem madness. While we quarrel among ourselves, the king of Persia profits by our divisions. We suffer him to blockade one Greek armament [that of Evagoras] in Cyprus²; while another—the

*The posi-
tion of
Persia.*

Curtius and others, that the belief in a definite treaty grew out of the vague boasts of orators who were seeking a contrast to the treaty of Antalkidas.

¹ § 126. Amyntas II. began to reign in 394 B. C. In 393 the Illyrians invaded Macedonia. Amyntas, compelled to evacuate Pella, made over to the Olynthian Confederacy the towns and territory on the Thermaic gulf, and withdrew to Thessaly. In 383 he succeeded in recovering the greater part of his kingdom. But the

Olynthians refused to restore that part of it which he had given into their keeping. Hereupon, in 383, Amyntas sent envoys to Sparta asking for help against Olynthos (Diod. xv. 19). Envoys from Akanthos and Apollonia came on the same errand about the same time: Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2. 11. Throughout the Olynthian war (383—379) Sparta was actively aided by Amyntas: Diod. xv. 19—23.

² § 134. The war between Evagoras and Persia lasted ten years (Isokr. *Evag.*, Or. ix. § 64: Diod.

Ionian contingent with Teiribazos¹—fights his battles. If,

xv. 8, 9). In the course of it, Evagoras got together 200 triremes and attacked the Persian fleet at Citium, but was utterly defeated; was blockaded soon afterwards in Salamis; and, after a brave resistance, capitulated.

Diodoros assigns the war to 394—385 (xv. 8, 9); the seafight to 386 (xv. 2, 3); the capitulation (*ib.* 8) to 385. Isokrates alludes in § 141 to the seafight, and here (§ 134) speaks of the blockade as existing. He says, moreover, that the king of Persia has now wasted six years in the war; which naturally means, and has always been taken to mean, that it is six years since the war began.

I. Engel reconciles Diodoros with Isokrates by supposing that, with the exception of §§ 125—132 which allude to 380 B.C., the *Panegyrikos* was published in 385, just before Evagoras capitulated. The 'six years' of Isokrates are, then, 391—385, during which the war was actively prosecuted,—394—391 having been years chiefly of preparation. (See Rauchenstein, *Introd. to Panegyrr.* p. 21 and *note* above.)

II. Clinton, holding the natural view that the entire *Panegyrikos* was first published in 380, sets aside the chronology of Diodoros. He believes that the war began in 385, in which year Evagoras suffered his defeat at sea, and ended in 376. The 'six years' of Isokr. are, then, 385—380. The blockade of Salamis must have followed soon upon the defeat; and we have, then, to suppose a resistance of some nine years on the part of

Evagoras, if, as Diodoros says, the blockade was terminated only by his surrender.

III. Grote also places the *Panegyrikos* in 380. But he assigns the war to 390—380 or 379. Xenophon (*Hellen.* iv. viii. 24) mentions that an Athenian fleet was sent to the aid of Evagoras in 390 B.C. Grote relies on this fact as showing that the war between Evagoras and Persia had begun in 390. Clinton, on the other hand, thinks that this Athenian expedition, and a subsequent one in 388, related to hostilities which preceded formal war. Grote does not define the 'six years' of Isokr.; but suggests that they may be taken either from the Peace of Antalkidas (from which, however, 380 was the *eighth* year) or from the defeat of Evagoras in 385.

It seems impossible—in the absence of better data—to arrive at a certain or satisfactory conclusion. For my own part, I incline to prefer, with Clinton, the authority of Isokrates to that of Diodoros; to suppose that the Athenian expeditions of 390 and 388 preceded any formal declaration of war; that the actual war began in 385; that the naval defeat of Evagoras also fell in 385, and was soon followed by the blockade; but that Evagoras held out (whether able to take the sea again or not) till 376.

¹ § 134. The Persian fleet (at this time blockading Salamis) was commanded by Gaos; the Persian land-forces by Orontes and the satrap Teiribazos. With Teiriba-

instead of disputing about the Kyklades¹, we united in marching on Asia, these very Ionians would be with us. As it is, Artaxerxes holds such a position as no Persian king ever reached before. He is king of all Asia and master of the Asiatic Greeks (§§ 133—137).

*The real
weakness of
Persia.*

‘Some stand in awe of his strength. Were he indeed strong, that would be but another reason for attacking him before he is stronger. But he is not strong. His importance has been due to our dissensions. Even Chios² has ere now made a difference by throwing itself into one or other of two trembling scales. Egypt resisted for three years³, and finally discomfited, the three best generals of the great king—Abrokomas, Tithraustes and Pharnabazos. Evagoras has kept him at bay for six years. In the war around Rhodes⁴ Artaxerxes allowed the whole fleet,—led by the ablest living commander, Konon, and favoured by the sympathy of Sparta’s oppressed subjects—to be held in check⁵ for three years by

*Persian
repulses.*

zos served a contingent of Ionian Greeks: *οἱ μετὰ Τειριζάζου στρατευόμενοι*, § 135.

¹ § 136. The particular dispute—if any such is referred to—is unknown. Isokrates perhaps means merely that Athens and Sparta contended for the hegemony, and for that privilege of levying contributions on the Aegæan islands which belonged to the head of a naval confederacy. Cf. § 132, *χρηὶ τοῦς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονούντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν μάλλον ἢ νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν*. Rauchenstein remarks: ‘Das nähere über diesen Hader ist nicht bekannt, aber Athen konnte den Verlust der Kykladen in Folge des Friedens (§ 115) nicht verschmerzen.’

² § 139. Alluding to the revolt of Chios from Athens at a critical time in 412 B. C.: Thuc. viii. 7.

³ § 140. This revolt of Egypt is not known from other sources; but

is again alluded to in the *Philippos*, § 101. As Mr Sandys observes, it must at any rate have been over before the active hostilities of Persia against Evagoras began, and may be placed about 392—390, or 390—388.

⁴ § 142. By *ὁ πόλεμος ὁ περὶ Ρόδου* is meant the naval war which the Persian fleet, under Konon and Pharnabazos, waged with the Lacedæmonian fleet under Pharax and Peisandros, beginning nearly at the same time as the first campaign of Agesilaos in Asia, and ending with the battle of Kuidos: 396—394 B. C.

⁵ § 142. The Greek words answering to ‘held in check for three years’ are *τρία ἔτη πολιορκούμενον*. But by *πολιορκούμενον*, as Schneider on § 142 points out, is meant not merely the literal *blockade* of Konon by Pharax in Kaunos (Diod. xiv. 83) in 395;—that, of course, did not last three years;—

100 Lacedaemonian triremes. It was only the formation of the league¹ of which Corinth was the centre which at last drove him to fight—and conquer. I pass over the successes, against Persia, of Derkyllidas, of Drakon, of Thimbron², of Agesilaos. Nor is the mettle of Persian troops better than the quality of Persian generalship. This was well seen in the case of the Greeks who accompanied Cyrus. After the loss of their leader, surrounded by difficulties of every kind, they effected their retreat as smoothly as if the Persian force which sought to harass it had been a guard of honour. Chastised when he invaded Europe—defeated on the sea-boards of Asia—the Persian king has actually been mocked under the walls of his own palaces³. (§§ 138—149.)

*The 'Ten
Thousand.'*

'This weakness naturally results from the political and social system of Persia. The country cannot have good soldiers while the mass of the people is an unruly, nerveless, slavish mob. It cannot have good generals while the men of the upper classes are insolent and abject by turns, with pampered bodies and craven spirits, grovelling before their human master, and scorning the gods. The satraps who come down to the coast of Asia do not belie their home training. Faithless and arrogant to friends, they quail and cringe before enemies. Thus they lavished gifts on the army of Agesilaos, but maltreated the Greeks who helped them against Cyprus. Konon, who led them to victory, was seized that he might be put to death⁴: Themistokles, who defeated them, was enriched. (§§ 150—154.)

*Causes of
Persian
weakness.*

but the fact that, during 396—394, even after the revolt of Rhodes from Sparta, Konon kept his fleet in harbours, avoiding engagements on the open sea, until just before Knidos.

¹ The alliance against Sparta of Athens, Thebes, Argos, Euboea and Corinth in 394 B.C., the first year of the Corinthian war: 'Corinth was the *συνέδριον* of the allies (Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 4. 1. and Diod. xiv. 82)': Mr Sandys *ad loc.*

² § 144. Thimbron commanded

in Asia in 400: Derkyllidas in 399—397: Agesilaos in 396—395. Derkyllidas having taken A tarneus in Mysia in 398 placed Drakon there as harmost: Xen. *Hellen.* ii. 11.

³ § 149. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* ii. 4. 4. (in allusion to the victory at *Κυ-ναξα*): *ἐνικῶμεν τὸν βασιλέα ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις αὐτοῦ καὶ καταγέλασταντες ἀπήλθομεν.*

⁴ § 154 *ἐπὶ θανάτῳ*. Konon was seized by order of Teiribazos in 390. How he actually perished

*Greek
hatred of
Barbarians.*

‘They merit our hatred; and they are hateful also to our gods, whose shrines they have desecrated. The Ionians did well when they swore that every temple burnt by the Persians should remain in ruins, a perpetual record of the impiety which had destroyed it. Nor has Athens been less constant in its enmity. The business of our Ekklesia and of our Senate is always prefaced by an anathema upon any citizen who shall make overtures to Persia. We delight most in those legends which immortalise the disasters of Asia. Nay, we find a special charm in the poetry of Homer, because it embodies our hereditary loathing of the barbarians. (§§ 155—159.)

*Reasons
for a War
on Persia.*

‘We have every motive, then, for attacking Persia. The moment is favourable. Egypt and Cyprus¹ are in revolt; Phoenicia and Syria² are desolate; Tyre has been stormed; the greater part of Cilicia is with us. The prince of Karia, Hekatomnos³, has virtually, if not openly, rebelled. From Knidos to Sinope the Greeks are impatient to rise. If we delay, Rhodes, Samos and Chios may incline to the enemy; but, if we preoccupy them, Lydia, Phrygia and the up-country generally will probably come into our power. Our fathers, having allowed Persia to be beforehand with them and to get Ionia, were forced to stand a death-struggle at home. Let us take warning. Let us go in time to Asia. There is a further reason for making war *now*. The present generation has a claim to be indemnified for long sufferings and privations. There never was in Hellas a greater mass of individual distress; though, indeed, the troubles of individuals seem almost trivial at a time when whole countries are afflicted—

*Suffering
in Greece.*

was never known. According to Deinon, an historian of the 4th century, quoted by Cornelius Nepos, *Con.* § 3, Konon escaped from the Persians.

¹ § 161. See notes above on §§ 134, 140.

² § 161. Evagoras had ‘ravaged Phoenicia, stormed Tyre, made Cilicia revolt from the king’: *Isokr. Evag.* (Or. ix.) § 62.

³ § 162. Hekatomnos, Greek prince of Karia, had been appointed by Artaxerxes admiral of the Persian fleet at the beginning of the war with Evagoras (*Theompomp. frag.* 111, ed. Müller, quoted by Mr Sandys on § 134); but had afterwards become disaffected, and had secretly supplied Evagoras with money (*Diod. xiv.* 98).

as Italy¹ has been devastated and Sicily² enslaved by Dionysios. (§§ 160—169.)

‘Since the leading statesmen of the various cities are apathetic or timid, it is the more incumbent on men outside the political sphere to press this grave question. Before we can have firm peace, we must have common war against Asia. Before we can shake off our poverty, we must cease to prey upon each other, and must unite in gathering spoils elsewhere.

‘The Treaty of Antalkidas is no real obstacle. Its more Peace of Antalkidas. creditable articles—those guaranteeing the autonomy of the Greek cities in Europe—have been violated already. Only its shameful articles—those which surrender our allies to Persia—have been observed. These must forthwith be annulled: they were never compacts—they were dictates. The negociators of the Treaty are much to blame. One of three courses ought to have been taken by them. They ought to Its terms criticised. have stipulated that each Greek State should hold (1) simply its own original territory; or (2) *all* that it had ever acquired by conquest; or (3) as much as it actually held at the time of the treaty.—As it was, the terms of peace were left to be settled arbitrarily by the Great King. As if he were parcelling out the world between himself and Zeus, he has taken one-half of it³; and this stands recorded in our public temples. If, for Helen’s sake, our fathers rallied against Troy, The invasion will be a theoria. ought not an insult to Hellas to kindle a war now—a war which will move forward, not liable to repulse, but with the stately progress of a sacred embassy⁴? (§§ 170—182.)

¹ § 169. In 389—387 B.C. Dionysios I. had reduced successively Kaulon, Hipponium and Rhegium in Magna Graecia: Diod. xiv. 106 ff.

² § 169. Dionysios had surrendered some Sicilian towns—as Akragas, Himera, Selinos—to Carthage; and brought others—as Naxos, Leontini, Messene—under his own power: see Diod. xiii. 114.

³ § 179. The meaning seems to be:—‘Zeus is absolute lord of the whole earth. But Artaxerxes claims to be absolute lord of half the earth, i. e. of the continent of Asia. Europe—the other of the *δισσαὶ ἡπείροι*—is all that he leaves for Zeus.’

⁴ I have ventured to paraphrase the meaning of the image—so deeply suggestive to a Greek—contained in the words *θεωρία*

Summary.

‘From every point of view this is the right course. Those who look to nothing but abstract justice cannot refuse to punish our malignant foes. Those whom the sight of unmerited prosperity provokes, indeed, yet leaves prudent, may safely resent a grandeur almost superhuman which is, at the same time, divorced from merit. Those who wish to consult both justice and expediency see before them evil-doers who are rich and helpless. The cities will gladly bear the burden of the campaign; and its fame will surpass that of the war against Troy. (§§ 183—186.)

Asia shall
pour its
wealth into
Europe.

‘At the outset I had hopes of doing some justice to my subject; now, at the close, I feel how inadequately I have handled it. Try, then, to imagine for yourselves what an achievement it would be to transfer to Europe the prosperity of Asia. And let aspirants to oratorical distinction, instead of engaging in petty rivalries, vie in the treatment of this great theme. So shall they benefit themselves, and be regarded as benefactors by others.’ (§§ 187—189.)

Fame of the
Panegy-
rikos.

The *Panegyrikos* is the greatest work of Isokrates. The renown which it enjoyed in antiquity is attested by Dionysios¹ and Philostratos²; and the tradition, found in several writers³, that it employed Isokrates for ten or more years, whether literally true or not, at least shows that the speech was recognised as a masterpiece of careful work. It is, indeed, artistic in a double relation, in regard to expression and in regard to structure. The expression has not only a finished and uniform—almost too uniform—brilliancy; it has also in some

Merits of
expression.

μᾶλλον ἢ στρατεία προσεικώς
(§ 182).

¹ Dionys. *de Isocr.* c. 14 ἐν
τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ, τῷ περιβόητῳ
λόγῳ.

² Philostr. *Vit. Soph.* i. 17.—Iso-
krates himself, in the *Philippos*

(Or. v.) § 11, notices the prestige of
the *Panegyrikos*.

³ Quint. *Inst.* x. 4: Plut. *Mor.*
p. 350 E (‘almost three Olympiads’):
[Plut.] *Vitt. X Oratt.*: Phot. *Cod.*
260.

places a wonderful felicity, a deep poetical suggestiveness; as when it is said that the expedition to Asia will be less a march through an enemy's country than such a solemn and secure procession as, at the seasons of the great Festivals, goes forth from each city to the welcoming shrine of the Delphian Apollo or the Olympian Zeus (§ 182); and that Sparta, instead of making Greeks helots to herself, ought to make the barbarians dependents of Greece (*περίοικοι*, § 131). It is, however, in the structure of the entire work that the highest power of the master is seen. The central idea is simple:—‘To give counsel about war against the barbarian and unity among Greeks’ (§ 3). But in the development of this idea a vast range of topics must be surveyed;—the historical claims of Athens and of Sparta to lead Greece; the recent history and actual state of Persia, with all the multitude of particulars which group themselves round each of these large questions. As the speech goes on, the mass of facts with which it has to deal is ever growing. Yet so thorough is the writer's grasp that each thought leads to the next without violence and without confusion. As the circle of ideas gradually widens, the central point is still kept clearly in view; and the details, even where most complex, are seen to belong to an organic whole.

Foremost among its author's works in merits of execution, the *Panegyrikos* stands first also in the interest of its subject-matter. Its value as a political pamphlet has been considered in a former chapter¹;

¹ Above, p. 20.

and on this head, one remark only need be added here. Isokrates emphatically claims (§§ 15—17) to be not only more philosophical, but more practical, than previous speakers on the same subject; alluding, no doubt, to Gorgias and Lysias among the rest. As regards Gorgias, this claim cannot now be decided. As regards Lysias, it is questionable: at least the large fragment of his *Olympiakos* offers advice not less definite or less sensible than that in the *Panegyrikos*¹. But whatever was, at the time, the political worth of the *Panegyrikos*, its permanent historical worth can hardly be overrated. To the history of Greece it contributes a vivid picture of the whole Hellenic world, and of the barbarian world² in contact with Hellas, at a critical moment. To the history of Athens it contributes a striking sketch of the growth and influence in Greece of the specially Athenian ideas, religious, political and social³. For the personal history of Isokrates it is of surpassing interest; it is the earliest⁴ and most complete⁵ expression of the ruling thought of his life; the thought which he afterwards urged upon Dionysios, upon Archidamos,—at last upon Philip.

1. 2. *Philippos*.

2. *Philippos* [Or. v.]—Philip had taken Amphipolis in 358 B. C. and Potidaea in 356. The hostilities between him and Athens, carried on intermittently

¹ See vol. I. p. 206.

² See esp. §§ 133—159.

³ §§ 28—50.

⁴ See the *Philippos* (Or. v.) §§ 128, 129.

⁵ In the *Philippos*, § 84, he speaks of the difficulty of putting

his conceptions in a new way—the *Panegyrikos* has beggared him; he can only say over again what he has said there: *ὁ λόγος ὁ πανηγυρικός, ὁ τοὺς ἄλλους...εὐπωρωτέρους ποιήσας, ἐμοὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρέσχηκεν.*

from 356¹, were closed in March, 346, by the so-called Peace of Philokrates. Before that event Isokrates had been composing a letter to Philip ‘On Amphipolis,’ urging peace on the ground that Amphipolis, the chief cause of the war, was not a desirable possession either for Athens or for the king of Macedon (§§ 1, 3).

This letter had not been sent when peace was concluded (§ 7). Isokrates now writes on another and a larger subject. He sees in Philip, at length reconciled to Athens, the man who can lead the united Hellenes against Persia. Ever since the failure of the *Panegyrikos* to bring about such an expedition under the joint leadership of Athens and Sparta, he had been looking for an individual powerful enough to execute his favourite plan (§§ 84, 128, 129). He had already applied to Dionysios I.—probably about 368 B.C. (*Ep.* I. § 8)—and in 356 to Archidamos III. (*Ep.* IX. § 16). This oration was addressed to Philip soon after the peace (§§ 8, 56), but before the conclusion of the Sacred War (§§ 54, *Date.* 74); that is, between March and July², 346 B.C.

‘Do not be surprised, Philip, if before entering upon the *Analysis.* immediate subject of this address I say a few words upon another. The war between Athens and you, which arose out of your acquisition of Amphipolis, has just been closed by a Peace (§ 7). Before this Peace was concluded, I was preparing to write to you in reference to Amphipolis. It was my purpose to show that it was not your interest to hold that town, since, if you surrendered it to Athens, you would still

¹ Cf. Grote, c. 86, vol. XI. p. 332.

² Cf. Clinton, *F. H.* sub ann. 346.

be virtual master of it, and enjoy our goodwill besides; nor yet the interest of Athens to receive it from you, since she would, in return, have been obliged to consult your designs in that quarter—paying you the same kind of homage which the elder Amadokos¹ formerly received for protecting our colonists in the Chersonese. This argument for peace has become unnecessary; but the desire that the Peace itself should be permanent leads me to offer you counsel on another subject. (§§ 1—9.) This subject is a noble one—too great, perhaps, for my failing powers. I am going to urge you to place yourself at the head of a united Hellas, and to make war upon the barbarian. (§§ 10—16.) Friends at first dissuaded me from the presumptuous design of offering advice to the statesman who has brought Thessaly to acquiesce in obeying, instead of ruling, Macedonia—to the general who has subdued the Magnetes, the Perrhaebi, the Paeonians, all Illyria save the seaboard of the Adriatic; and who has given to Thrace what masters he pleased. But when my dissuaders heard what I had to say, their opposition was changed into encouragement. (§§ 17—23.) Advice on great and pressing questions is more effective when it is given orally. Mine will not have that advantage; nor is it set off with rhetorical ornament. It is a plain statement of facts; but these facts are so supremely important to you that I hope for your attention. (§§ 24—29.)

Philip must lead Greece against Asia.

His first duty.

‘I say, then, that you ought, as their common friend, to

¹ § 7. Ἀμάδοκος, or Μήδοκος, king of the Thracian Odrysae, is called here ὁ παλαιός to distinguish him from the Amadokos who inherited, in 358 B.C., part of the dominions of Kotys, and who was perhaps his son: see O. Schneid. *ad loc.* The elder Amadokos is first heard of in 405 B.C.: Diod. XIII. 105. Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 8 says that in 390 B.C. Thrasybulos, then commanding an Athenian fleet, reconciled Amadokos to Seuthes, ruler of Lower Thrace (ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἄρχοντα), and received both of them

into friendship and alliance with Athens:—νομίζων καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ Θράκη οἰκούσας πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας φίλων ὄντων τούτων μᾶλλον προσέχειν ἢν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸν νοῦν. Isokrates speaks here as if the object of the favour shown to Amadokos had been rather to restrain him from interfering with the Athenian colonies in Thrace than to impress the Greeks in that region with the influence of Athens over the Thracian princes. Cf. Dem. *in Aristocr.* p. 623.

bring into amity the four great cities of Hellas—Argos, Sparta, Thebes, Athens.

‘This obligation is laid upon you by your descent. Argos was the native city of your ancestors¹. Thebes honours above other deities Herakles, the founder of your line. Sparta has long been ruled by the Herakleidae: and Athens was their friend at need. No quarrel should ever have divided these cities from you or from each other. There have been faults on all parts. But now you have a glorious opportunity of benefiting them and yourself too,—when harassed by war, each of them resembles rather a single combatant, following a blind, vindictive impulse, than a State with a government and a policy. (§§ 30—38.)

His hereditary position.

‘The attempt which I propose to you can be shown to be feasible:—and first, on general grounds. The difficulty which would have been presented by the great predominance of any one State, as of Athens and Sparta, has vanished; changes of fortune have placed all the cities of Greece upon one level. Your position, on the other hand, is supreme. Experience proves that no enmities are too bitter to be overcome. Greece was reconciled to Xerxes; Athens has been the ally successively of Sparta and of Thebes. The interest of the moment is, in fact, the sovereign controller of political combinations. (§§ 39—45.)

It is possible for him to reconcile the Greeks.

‘The practicability of the attempt may be shown, further, on particular grounds. It is favoured by the respective conditions of the several States concerned.

‘Sparta wishes for peace, because, deprived of her empire Leuktra, she is now harassed by her neighbours and by her own serfs—distrusted and disliked throughout Hellas—and in daily dread of the Thebans making up their quarrel with the Phocians and turning upon her.

Sparta.

‘Argos desires peace, because her distress resembles, but

Argos.

¹ § 32. According to Herodotus viii. 137—8, Perdikkas I., founder of the dynasty of Edessa, was an Argive of the house of Têmenos. Another tradition—which cannot, however, be traced above Theo-

pompos—made Karanos, also an Argive and a Têmenid, the founder of the monarchy: see Grote, c. 25, vol. iv. p. 21. Cf. Liv. 27. 30 *Macedonum reges ex ea civitate (Argis) oriundos se referunt.*

exceeds, that of Sparta. She, too, is constantly harassed by her neighbours—with this difference, that they are stronger than herself. And in the intervals of war she is a prey to fierce democratic risings.

Thebes.

‘Thebes wishes for peace, because, through abusing the results of her great victory, she is now worse off than if it had been a defeat. No sooner had she won Leuktra than she began to interfere in the Peloponnese; enslaved Thessaly; threatened Megara; encroached upon Athens; ravaged Euboea; sent a fleet to Byzantium. Lastly she has made war upon Phokis,—a war which she thought to finish rapidly and to pay for out of the treasures of Delphi; but which, in the event, has brought her to the brink of despair.

Athens.

‘Athens is no longer yearning for peace; she has had the good sense to embrace it already. (§§ 46—56.)

The task is even easy.

‘The *possibility* of reconciling Hellas may be seen from these considerations. The *ease*, for you, of the attempt may be judged from the cases of other men, who, though less favoured by circumstances, have changed the destinies of whole countries. Alkibiades, exiled from Athens and resolved to force his way back, effected it by first throwing all Greece into a tumult. Konon, disgraced through no fault of his own, not only retrieved the disgrace by his own unaided energy, but lived to restore the glory of Athens. Dionysios, an ordinary Syracusan, made himself master of Sicily. The elder Cyrus, whom, in his infancy, his mother left to perish at the roadside, became sovereign of Asia. Shall not the achievements of these men be equalled by one who is, from the outset the descendant of Herakles, the king of Macedonia, the lord of such great multitudes? (§§ 57—67.)

What ill-natured people say of Philip.

‘The enterprise is one which may well rouse your ambition. What nobler position can be imagined than that of president of Greece—acknowledged arbiter of her destinies? It is also an enterprise which would silence certain calumnies now current against you. Some ill-disposed persons pretend that your avowed purpose of helping the Messenians merely veils a scheme for subjugating the Peloponnesos, as a step to subjugating all Greece. These slanders are heard gladly by

three classes of people—by those who, like the slanderers, secretly desire such an event; by those who, themselves indifferent to the public safety, are grateful to those who affect to care for it;—and by men who, admiring you, fancy that imputations such as these are fitted to raise your importance in the eyes of Greece;—not seeing that a project, which, if imputed to the king of Persia, would increase his reputation for courage, would be infamy for a Greek—for a Heraklid. Having a perfectly good conscience, you perhaps think it beneath you to notice such calumniators. Still you ought not to underrate the importance of being cordially trusted by all Greece,—trusted as your own friends trust you, or as Sparta trusts her Heraklid kings. (§§ 68—80.)

‘The counsel which I offer to you—as I offered it to Dionysios after he became master of Syracuse¹—does not come from a General, from a public speaker, from a person of influence in any way—but merely from one who lays claim to common sense and to education. (§§ 81, 82.)

‘Your duty towards Greece has been spoken of; it remains to speak of the expedition against Asia. The *Panegyrikos* has left me little that is new to say upon this topic—but I will attempt to trace its outlines with additional clearness.

‘The first condition of a successful attack upon Persia is this—that you should have all the Greeks either as helpers or at least as favouring spectators. It was here that Agesilaos failed. He tried to do two things at once—to make war upon the Great King, and to restore his friends² to power in

Invasion of Asia.

First condition of success.

Why Agesilaos failed.

¹ § 81, πρὸς Διονύσιον τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον. Dionysios I. became master of Syracuse in 406 B.C.: but Isokrates certainly did not write to him till after 380 B.C.: cf. *Philipp.* §§ 128, 129: *Ep.* I. § 8. The words τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον do not, however, imply that the application of Isokrates immediately followed the acquisition of the tyrannis by Dionysios. Ben-

seler and O. Schneider read τὸν τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον. The meaning would then be:—‘Dionysios I., founder of the despotism,’ as opposed to Dionysios II. who succeeded him in 367.

² § 87, τοὺς ἐταίρους—oligarchs who had been driven by political troubles from the towns of Asia Minor: see *Ep.* IX. § 13.

their respective cities. The feuds engendered by the latter purpose defeated the former. (§§ 83—88.)

A precedent.

‘All would admit that the sympathy, active or passive, of Hellas is a primary requisite. But most people, if they wished to encourage you by example, would quote wars in which Greece triumphed over Asia. I prefer to cite an expedition in which we were considered to have been worsted—that which was led by the younger Cyrus and Klearchos. The Greeks, victorious at Kynaxa, missed the rewards of victory by the death of Cyrus. Yet, though they were left forlorn and in danger by his loss, the Great King did not dare to attack them openly. He resorted to treachery in order to seize their leaders.—The example has been used by me before¹; but fact, not literary novelty, is important here.

Comparative advantages of Cyrus the younger and Philip.

‘Next, consider how far more favourable circumstances will be for you than they were for Cyrus. First, as regards facility of raising troops. The Asiatic Greeks looked coldly on his expedition, thinking that its success would probably aggravate the Spartan tyranny under which they groaned:—they will favour *your* expedition; and the great multitudes of homeless exiles and wanderers, ready to serve as mercenaries, will make it easy to raise a large army. Secondly, as regards the character of the former, and the actual, king of Persia. The father² of the present king proved too strong both for Athens and for Sparta; the reigning king³ is unable even to hold the towns given up to him by the treaty of Antalkidas.

Their respective opponents.

Position of Persia.

Thirdly, as regards the position of Persia. Then, as now, Egypt was in revolt⁴; but then Egypt dreaded an attack of the

¹ § 93. Cf. *Panegyrr.* § 91.

² § 99. Artaxerxes II. (Mnemon), king of Persia, 405—359 B.C.: Clinton, *F. H.* vol. II. Append. c. 18.

³ Artaxerxes III. (Ochos): 359—339 B.C.

⁴ As regards the earlier revolt mentioned here, see *Panegyrr.* § 140 *note*. The chronology of the later revolt, spoken of here as not

yet subdued, is uncertain. Schäfer (*Demosth. u. seine Zeit*, vol. I. pp. 436 f.) thinks that Ochos made three expeditions against Egypt: (1) On the occasion noticed, but without date, by Diod. xvi. 40. (2) In the winter of 351—350 B.C., when Nectanebos II. was assisted by Diophantos and Lamios: Diod. xvi. 48: cf. Isokr. *Ep.* VIII. § 8. This would be the expedition, al-

Great King ; now, the attack has been made—and has failed. Cyprus, Phoenicia, Cilicia, were then¹ arsenals of the Persian navy : now, Cyprus and Cilicia have revolted, Phoenicia is desolate. Idrieus², the wealthiest prince in Asia Minor, is bitter against Persia. Not he alone, but some of the satraps also will come over to you if you make heard throughout Asia that word—*Liberty*—which in Hellas has been the spell before which our empire, and the Spartan empire, vanished. (§§ 89—104.)

The true spell for Asia.

‘If I went on to offer you advice as to the *conduct* of the war, I might be reproached with want of military experience. But as to the *object* of the war, and as regards the general spirit of my counsels, I feel sure that the voices of your ancestors, if they could be heard, would be with me. The voice of your father³—for he was ever friendly to the cities which I urge you to befriend. The voice of the founder⁴ of the Macedonian kingdom—for, while establishing his own power securely, he abstained from every attempt to impose it upon Greece ; and thus, alone of all Greeks, came safely through the perils of monarchy. The voice of Herakles, author of your line—for, after composing a distracted Høllas, he made war upon Troy—after conquering it, he slew all the kings of barbarian tribes⁵ on the shore of either continent,—

These counsels are in the spirit of Philip's ancestry.

luded to here, in which Ochos was ignominiously repulsed. (3) In 340 B.C., when Egypt was reconquered—Ochos again commanding in person. See Thirlwall, c. 48, vol. VI. p. 187 n.: Clinton, *F. H.* vol. II. Append. c. 18.

¹ § 102. ‘*Then*’—i. e. at the time of the earlier Egyptian revolt, which was probably earlier than 385 B.C.: see note on *Panegyry*. § 161.

² § 103. Idrieus, second son of Hekatomnos, succeeded Artemisia, widow of his brother Mausólos, as dynast of Karia in 351 B.C., and reigned till 344. On the chronology of the princes of Karia, see

Clinton, *F. H.* vol. II. Append. c. 14.

³ § 106. Amyntas II., who began to reign in 394 B.C. and died in 370.

⁴ § 106. Perdikkas I.: see note on § 32.

⁵ § 112, τοὺς βασιλείας τῶν ἔθνῶν τῶν ἐφ’ ἐκατέρας τῆς ἡπείρου.—ἔθνῶν here can mean only βαρβάρων. ‘Man hat also für Europa nicht mit Benseler auch an griechische Fürsten, Neleus in Pylos, Hippokoon in Lacedämon, sondern nur an Barbaren wie an den Thrakerfürsten Diomedes (Apollodor 2, 5, 8) zu denken ; für Asien (und Afrika) ist an Mygdon, die Hippo-

and then set up the pillars which bear his name as memorials of his victory over the barbarians, and as boundaries of the Hellenic territory. If you cannot rival him in all things, you can emulate the spirit of his dealing with Greece. You have only to look to the examples in your own family to learn with whom, and against whom, an Heraklid should fight. (§§ 105—115.)—You may think that I am saying too much on ‘gentleness’ and ‘kindliness.’ Yet are not the kindly and gentle gods called ‘Olympian,’ and honoured with shrines and temples, while expiatory rites express our horror of an omnipotence which is cruel? (§§ 116—118.)

*Jason of
Pherae.*

‘The popularity which a Persian war would command in Greece may be estimated from the case of Jason of Pherae. He rose to greatness through his profession—never fulfilled—of an intention to attack Persia¹. What will your reputation be, if you put such a scheme into act?’

*Results
possible for
Philip.*

‘Three different degrees of success—the lowest of which is glorious—are possible. You may conquer the Persian empire. Or you may detach from it the portion of Asia Minor west of a line drawn from Cilicia to Sinôpê, and found, in this, new cities for the homeless Greeks who now are roving mercenaries. Or, at the worst, you cannot fail to free from Persia the existing Greek cities of Asia. We should be mad if, instead of wasting our strength on quarrels at home, we did not turn it upon our certain prey, the effeminate Asiatics. (§§ 119—127.)

Athens.

‘It may be made a reproach to me that I call upon you, and not upon my own city, to lead the enterprise. I have already appealed to Athens; but she gives less heed to me than to the brawlers of the platform. The greater credit is mine for constancy in asserting my principle, and for seeking everywhere the agents who seem most capable of putting it into practice. (§§ 128—131.)

lyte, Sarpedon (über Alle Apollodor 4, 5, 9), Busiris (obwohl Is. über diesen 11, 36 seq. anders urtheilt), Antaeus u. s. w. zu denken.’ O. Schneid. ad § 112.

tention, see the conversation which Polydamas of Pharsalos reported at Sparta as having passed between himself and Jason of Pherae: Xen. *Hellen.* vi. 1. 12.

¹ § 119. In regard to this in-

‘Shame should forbid us to see, unmoved, Asia more prosperous than Europe,—the descendants of Cyrus more prosperous than the descendants of Herakles. It is not power or wealth—you have more than enough of both already—it is glory that ought to be your motive. Hear, in this counsel of mine—would that it were more complete!—the suggestion of your forefathers,—of the heroes,—of the present opportunity. Do not believe that the despotism built up by a rude barbarian can defy a Greek champion of freedom. If, in a single city, the man who combines statesmanship and generalship is honoured, what honour will be yours, when the field of your statesmanship is Hellas,—of your strategy, Asia? No successor will surpass your fame; you have already outdone all your predecessors.

Asia cannot resist Greece.

‘Beneficence, not brilliancy, is the ultimate test of exploits, not only for the olden time, but in our own. Tantalos, Pelops, Eurystheus yield in popular repute to Herakles, Theseus and the captors of Troy. Athens took her highest glory, not from her empire or her wealth, but from Marathon and Salamis: Sparta owed more renown to the defeat at Thermopylae than to any of her victories. (§§ 132—148.)

Beneficence is the test of achievement.

‘If my words seem, in themselves, weak and poor, set it down to old age; but receive the thoughts which they have strived to utter as a message from the gods. The gods do not benefit men directly, but through human agents. They have prompted me to speak for them—they have chosen you to act. Your triumphs hitherto have been given to prepare you for this crowning effort. It is no disparagement, but the best praise, to say that what you have already done falls short of what you are worthy to do. (§§ 149—153.)

A message from the gods.

‘This, then, is the sum:—“Be the benefactor of Greece; the king (not the despot) of Macedonia; the governor, in a free Hellenic spirit, of Asia.” (§§ 154, 155.)

Remarks.

Dionysios extols the *Philippos* as an appeal to a powerful man to use his power for the noblest ends¹. That generous earnestness which the Dis-

¹ Dionys. *de Isocr.* c. 6.

course certainly breathes is not for us, however, its most striking feature¹. The leading characteristic of the whole is emphatic recognition of Philip as the first of Hellenes and the natural champion of Hellas². It is an accident that his subjects are aliens; the Heraklid spirit is still as true in him as it was in the Argive founder of his dynasty. This was the sincere belief of Isokrates. For Demosthenes, Philip was no Hellene who chanced to rule barbarians; he was in his own person the representative barbarian³—the head and front of the antihellenic interest.

II. ON THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF GREECE.

II. 1. *Plataikos*.

The Theban Revolution.

1. *Plataikos* [Or. XIV.]—The revolution of 379 B.C. at Thebes had been a blow to Spartan influence throughout Hellas, and especially in Boeotia. Agesilaos in 378 and 377, Kleombrotos in 378 and 376, had invaded Boeotia without gaining any advantage. By the end of 376 the oligarchies supported by Sparta had been abolished in all the Boeotian towns except Orchomenos⁴; and the Boeotian Confederacy, with Thebes at its head, had been reconstituted.

Plataea.

After its destruction in 427 Plataea had been non-existent till 386, when it was rebuilt by Sparta as a stronghold against Thebes. Cut off from Spartan support, Plataea had been brought, in 377 or 376, into the revived Boeotian Confederacy; but,

¹ See Thirlwall's remarks on §§ 73—80 of the *Philippos*: c. 44: vol. v. p. 480.

² See esp. §§ 32—38: 76—80: 108.

³ Demosth. *Philipp.* III. p. 118,

§ 31, directly calls Philip βάρβαρος—with political, if not with technical truth. Cf. Grote, c. 90, vol. XI. p. 604.

⁴ Grote, c. 77, vol. X. p. 217, n. 1.

like Thespieae and Tanagra (§ 9), had joined it unwillingly. The relief felt by most other towns at riddance from the philo-Spartan oligarchies was more than balanced, in the case of Thespieae, Tanagra and Plataea, by hatred of Thebes. Diodoros¹ states that the Plataeans secretly offered their town to Athens. At any rate the alarm felt at Plataea was so great that it was only on the days of public assemblies at Thebes that the men ventured to go into the fields, leaving their wives and children within the walls².

On one of these days a Theban force under the Boeotarch Neokles surprised Plataea, in the latter half of 373 B. C.³ The town was destroyed and the territory was again annexed to Thebes. The inhabitants, with such property as they could carry, sought refuge, like their ancestors in 427, at Athens. Their case was discussed there, not merely in the ekklesia, but in the congress of the allies (*συνέδριον* § 21); Kallistratos being the foremost advocate of Plataea, as Epameinondas of Thebes⁴. It was not till 338, after Chaeroneia, that Plataea was restored; this time through the enmity of Philip, as formerly through the enmity of Sparta, towards Thebes⁵.

*Occasion of
this Speech.*

The speech of Isokrates is supposed to be spoken by a Plataean before the ekklesia; and there is nothing in the matter or form of the speech itself

¹ Diodor. xv. 46.

² Paus. ix. 1. 6.

³ Pausanias (ix. 1. 8) defines the time as the third year before Leuktra, when Asteios was Archon (i. e. midsummer 373—midsummer 372). Schäfer (*Dem.* i. 61),

whom I follow, takes the last half of 373: Grote (c. 77, vol. x. p. 219) the first half of 372. Clinton, *F. II.* 374 B.C.

⁴ Diod. xv. 38: Grote c. 77, x. 221.

⁵ Paus. ix. 1. 8.

to make it improbable that it was actually so delivered¹. The date is 373 B. C.

Date.

Analysis.

Object of the Appeal.

‘We know, Athenians, that it is your custom to help the wronged and to remember those who have done you good. We have come, therefore, to beg that you will not allow Plataea to be devastated, in time of peace², by Thebes. No people have ever been more injured than we are; no people are more closely bound to you. We have to contend, not only against the Thebans, but against those Athenian advocates whose aid they have procured with our property. It will be necessary for us, then, to speak at some length. To describe our wrongs adequately would be difficult; enough that you know our town to have been razed and our lands seized. We will try to expose the arguments by which the Thebans hope to mislead you (§§ 1—7).

Pretexts of Thebes:
(1) *that Plataea rejected dependence:*

‘It is sometimes their pretence that they have thus dealt with us because we refused to be enrolled as dependents of Thebes. Judge if this is a sufficient warranty for such usage, or if it became Plataea to accept upon compulsion such a dependence. Thespieae³ and Tanagra also refused it; but they

¹ Cf. Grote, c. 77, x. 220.

² § 1. *εἰρήνης οἴσησ*. This is understood by Grote (c. 77, vol. x. p. 217 *n.*) as meaning simply that Plataea and Thebes were at peace—the autonomy of Plataea, subject to the Boeotian confederacy, having been guaranteed by Thebes when she reconstituted that confederacy in 377—376. Thirlwall, on the other hand (vol. v. pp. 70—73), understands the peace of 374 between Athens and Sparta, to which, he thinks, Thebes was a party, and under which the Spartan garrisons had been withdrawn from Boeotia. The words *ἦν πάλιν γένηται πόλεμος* (§ 43) must, as the context shows, refer to a prospective war between Athens and Sparta; and imply that, when the

Plataikos was written, those States were at peace. But the peace of 374 was of very short duration; and, if the reference is to it, the *Plataikos* would appear to belong to the year 37 $\frac{1}{2}$. Diodoros does, indeed, place the surprise of Plataea in that year (xv. 41, 46), and Clinton agrees with him. On the other hand, the clear and precise specification of the year 37 $\frac{3}{4}$ by Pausanias (ix. 1. 3—8) as that in which Plataea was seized, can scarcely be set aside. Schäfer, placing the *Plataikos* in the latter half of 373, thinks that the peace of 374 was still formally in force, but that Athens was on the point of resuming hostilities against Sparta; cf. § 38 (Schäf. *Demosth.* i. p. 61 *n.*).

³ § 9. The walls of Thespieae

were not treated as Plataea has been treated; they were not destroyed, but simply compelled to obey. It is difficult to see what is the claim of Thebes to such obedience. Historically speaking, Orchomenos is the head of Boeotia. Or if the peace of Antalkidas is to be recognised, then all cities, great or small, are independent (§§ 8—10).

‘Perhaps, however, the Thebans will take a different ground. They may say that we were leagued with Sparta against them, and that they have acted in the interest of their entire Confederacy. In any case the treaty ought to have protected us. But, moreover, we were the allies of Sparta perforce. A harmost and a garrison being in our town, while our army was at Thespieae, we had no choice. Many other Greek States are in the same plight. By allowing us to be punished, you will alienate them (§§ 11—16).

‘Remember that the war which you suddenly undertook, with Thebes, against Sparta, was not for liberty—you and your allies had liberty already—but for the independence of those whose rights, conferred by the Peace of Antalkidas, were being violated. Will you allow cities which you wished to vindicate from slavery to Sparta to be destroyed by Thebes? The Thebans complain of the Lacedaemonian seizure of the Kadmeia; but they themselves raze the walls of their neighbours. They were jealous of Oropos¹ having voluntarily given itself to

had been razed soon after the destruction of Plataea (Diod. xv. 46), but the inhabitants had not, like the Plataeans, been driven from their territory. Pausanias speaks of the Thespians as retreating from their town to Keréssos, a neighbouring stronghold, *after Leuktra* (ix. 14. 2). The prayer to the Athenians, which Xenophon puts into their mouth—*μη σφᾶς περιιδεῖν ἀπόλιδας γενομένους*—is sufficiently explained by the destruction of their walls—to which the *τῶν μὲν τὰ τεῖχη κατεσκάφασι* of § 35 may (as Mr Grote suggests) refer. Cf. Schäf. *Dem.* i. p. 62, n. 1.

¹ § 20. In 412 B.C. Oropos had been treacherously seized by the Boeotians (Thuc. viii. 60), and in 402 it was still in their power (Diod. xiv. 17). But at some time between 402 and 374 Oropos had placed itself under the protection of Athens. At the congress of 374 at Sparta—resulting in the brief peace between Sparta and Athens—Thebes probably laid claim to Oropos, but without success: cf. § 37 and see Schäf. *Dem.* i. 47. In 366 Oropos was seized by a party of exiles and placed in the hands of the Thebans (Xen. *H.* vii. 4. 1). It was not until, in 338, Philip gave the town to the Athe-

(2) that Plataea was leagued with Sparta.

Athens must defend the autonomy of the cities.

Athens; yet they themselves usurp territory by force (§§ 17—20).

The Theban policy.

‘They pretend that they have acted in the common interest of their allies. But, before the act, Athens ought to have been consulted. While the war lasted, Thebes spoke much of the common cause; now that she is secured by peace, she thinks only of her own advantage (§§ 21—25).

Plataea and Thebes—their deeds towards Athens contrasted.

‘They cannot plead that there is danger lest, if we get back our territory, we should go over to Lacedaemon. Plataea has been twice besieged and twice taken¹ on account of its loyalty to Athens. The Thebans, on the other hand, have been repeatedly false to you. Having caused the Corinthian war, and having been brought safely through it by you, on the conclusion of peace they forsook your alliance for that of Sparta; while Chios, Mytilene and Byzantium remained true. They were punished by the Spartan seizure of the Kadmeia,—when they found a refuge at Athens. But no sooner had they been restored to their city, than they made new overtures to Sparta, which were frustrated only by the severity of her terms. Yet these Thebans taunt others with ‘Laconism,’—they, who have been the slaves of Spartan ambition. Did they ever fail to take part in an invasion of Attica? Were they not your worst foes in the war of Dekeleia? Did they not, finally, give their solitary vote² for the enslavement of your population and the conversion of your country into sheep-pastures like those of Krisa? (§§ 26—32).

No danger from Thebes.

‘It may be said that Boeotia is the bulwark of Attica; and that, if you break off your friendship with the Thebans, they will join Sparta. They will not be so mad. It would be the ruin of the democratic party at Thebes,—watched, as it is, at once by the oligarchical exiles and by the malcontents in the Bocotian towns. Treat them as you did when they

nians that their possession of it became secure: see Paus. I. 34. 1.

¹ *i.e.* in 427 and in 373 B.C.

² In the debate held at Sparta, after Aegospotami, on the terms which should be granted to Athens (405 B.C.). But Isokrates exaggerates.

Not the Thebans alone, but the Corinthians and many others of the Peloponnesian allies, voted for the extermination of Athens. It was by Sparta alone that Athens was saved.—Xen. *Hellen.* II. ii. 19; Grote, c. 65, vol. VIII. p. 311.

blustered about your acquisition of Oropos. When you excluded them from the peace¹, they became humble; and they will become so now, if treated with like firmness (§§ 33—38).

‘Even supposing, however, that they were likely to act differently, it does not become Athens to regard their friendship more than the treaty to which she has sworn. Experience shows, moreover, the value in war of being able to appeal to a just cause. It was thus that Sparta roused Hellas against Athens; it was thus that Athens reft the empire from Sparta. Show your readiness to espouse the cause of right, and, in any future war, all Hellas will be with you. If, on the contrary, you allow Thebes to break her oaths, who, hereafter, will help you to make Sparta keep hers? Would it not be monstrous if you upheld the constant allies of Sparta against those who, in a single instance, were forced to side with her? (§§ 39—45).

The Peace of Antalkidas must be upheld.

‘Who could be found more wretched than we are? Our city, our land, our fortunes have been taken from us in a single day. With whom shall we take refuge? If with fellow-sufferers, we shall share their troubles; if with happier men, we shall be reminded of our own. Parents comfortless in their old age—children threatened with slavery on account of some paltry debt²—wives separated from husbands, daughters from mothers—are the miseries which we mourn daily. Have care for us; we are near to you in friendship,—many of us, in blood; for, through the right of intermarriage given to us, many of us are sons of Athenian mothers. Athens helped Adrastus to get from the Thebans burial for his dead; let her help us to save those who yet live (§§ 46—55).

Miseries of the Plataeans.

‘We ask you to give us back our land and town. Alone of all the Greeks, you owe us this charity. It is said that when, in the Persian Wars, your fathers were driven from their homes, our fathers, alone of all the dwellers outside the

Appeal to gratitude:

¹ § 37. The Thebans were excluded from the peace of 374 B. C. between Athens and Sparta—as afterwards from the general peace of 371—because they insisted on the formal recognition of Thebes as head of the Panboeotic confede-

racy: Schäf. *Dem.* I. 47.

² § 48, μικρῶν ἔνεκα συμβολαίων δουλεύοντας. Isokrates has borrowed this touch from Lysias *Against Eratosthenes* (Or. XII.) § 98, μικρῶν ἂν ἔνεκα συμβολαίων ἐδούλευον.

*and to the
sacredness
of the
Plataean
land.*

Peloponnesos, shared their perils. At least, if you do not care for our lives, defend our land—in which are the trophies of the victory won by Hellas from all Asia. Think of the gods and heroes who hold the place; think of your fathers, and of the feeling which would be theirs, if they could know that their graves were unvisited by offerings because the traitors who fought against them had swept their comrades from the soil. You used to make it the greatest reproach against the Spartans that Plataea had been destroyed to please Thebes; do not let that reproach fall upon you. Much must be left unsaid. But remember your oaths and the treaty; remember our friendship and their enmity; and give righteous judgment in our cause' (§§ 56—63).

Remarks.

The *Plataikos* shows great power of a certain kind: it is a glowing denunciation of a cruelty; and the peroration especially has true and noble pathos (§§ 56—62). But if the reasoning is examined it will appear that the pleas urged are liable to some abatement; and that, on grounds of general policy, there was something to be said for the Thebans. When the Plataean speaker appeals to the peace of Antalkidas¹, he forgets that Plataea could derive no right from that treaty, since Plataea did not exist when the treaty was made². And, though the character of the town since 386 as a Spartan outpost may have been imposed upon it by force³, it was still natural that that character should make Plataea obnoxious to the head of an anti-Spartan Confederacy. Thebes might urge with plausibility that the measures taken against Plataea, however severe, were necessary in the interest of the allies⁴. This view—as we learn

¹ § 18.

³ §§ 11—16.

² Cf. Grote, c. 77, vol. x. p. 220.

⁴ §§ 21—25.

from the speech itself—was taken by several Athenian debaters¹; and it was the view which prevailed, *The result.* for no attempt was at this time made to restore Plataea.

2. *On the Peace* [Or. VIII.]. Like the *Areopagitikos*, this political pamphlet has the form of a deliberative speech, purporting to be spoken in the ekklesia (§§ 1, 15). But the fiction is not so well kept up as in the case of the *Areopagitikos*, which concludes with an appeal to the assembly. Here the conclusion is more suitable to an essay than to a speech in debate, as if the writer had forgotten the supposition with which he set out (§ 145). In 357 B.C. Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium revolted from Athens. The Social War was concluded about mid-summer, 355, by a treaty which declared the revolted states to be independent, and no longer members of the Athenian Confederacy. The *Speech On the Peace* *Date.* was probably written while negotiations for peace were pending, *i. e.* in the first half of 355 B. C.² The ambassadors whose ‘offers’ are spoken of in § 25 must be envoys sent by the allies³. But the first overtures of peace had come from Athens, under pressure of Persian threats; and it is rather singular that no allusion to Persian hostility occurs in the speech⁴.

¹ § 3.

² Clinton says ‘before the conclusion of the peace—perhaps in the beginning of 355.’ Thirlwall—‘while the negotiation with the allies was pending, or soon after the peace’; but, Isokrates would hardly have delayed the publication till the question which he

discussed had been actually settled. Schäfer puts the speech in 355; so, too, Benseler (1854). Oncken (*Isokrates und Athen*, Appendix) argues for 357 B.C.—just after the attack of Chares on Chios.

³ Cf. Schäf. *Dem.* i. 169.

⁴ Thirl. v. p. 325, ch. 42.

Analysis.

‘It is the custom of everyone who addresses this assembly to premise that the subject on which he is about to speak is the greatest and the gravest that could be discussed. In this instance, if in any, such a preface would be fitting. We are here to consider the question of peace or war.

*Popularity
of the War-
Party.*

‘You are wont to drive from the platform all speakers but those whose advice meets your wishes; for, though in private life you hate flattery, you tolerate it in the counsels of the State. On the present occasion the advocates of war are naturally your favourites. They promise you the recovery of wealth and power. The supporters of peace have no such inducements to offer; they can only represent that it is best to remain quiet and not to seek dishonest gains. They preach that most difficult of virtues,—contentment. I fear for their success; for I observe that some are as eager for war as if it had been revealed to them by a god that we must conquer. If, however, the future is not indeed so certain, you ought not only to hear both sides, but to hear with especial attention that side to which your first inclinations do not lean.

*Athens too
ready to
espouse
quarrels.*

‘The older among you ought to recollect, the younger must have heard, that advocates of war have ere now brought us into trouble,—but advocates of peace, never. Yet we are always ready to plunge into war in anyone’s quarrel, even when we cannot promote our own advantage. The reason is that, whereas in our private affairs we pick our advisers carefully, in public concerns we listen to drunkards rather than to sober men, to folly rather than to prudence.

‘It is up-hill work to oppose your prejudices; we have a democracy, but freedom of speech is enjoyed only by the most foolish members of this Assembly and by the comic poets in the theatre. As, however, I am not here to court your votes, I shall say what I think; first, about the special business which the presidents have brought before us; then, about the affairs of Athens generally (§§ 1—15).

*True basis
for peace—
the Treaty of
Antalkidas.*

‘I say, then, that we ought to make peace, not only with Chios and Rhodes, and Byzantium but with all the world;—that we ought to adopt, not any special treaty drawn up for this occasion, but that broad treaty, arranged between Sparta

and Persia, which guaranteed the independence of every Hellenic city.

‘It will be asked why, if Thebes is to keep Plataea and Thespieae, Athens should needlessly resign what she holds. I hope to show on general grounds that all unjust acquisition is impolitic; but I will first endeavour to show what would be the results of this particular peace.

‘Security—prosperity—the esteem of Greece:—should we be satisfied if we obtained these things? What more we can desire, I know not. Well, all these things have been taken from us by the war, and will be restored by the peace. The war has given us peril—poverty—unpopularity. If we renounced it, we could obtain by diplomacy all that we are vainly fighting for. Philip¹ would not contest Amphipolis with us;—Kersobleptes² would not contest the Chersonese,—if they were once convinced that we were safe neighbours and that our policy was not aggressive. They would even resign to us something of their own, in order to have us as guarantors of their own power. We could get a slice of Thrace large enough for ourselves and for some of the distressed Greeks too. Athenodoros³, a private man, and Kallistratos⁴, an exile,

*Advantages
of peace for
Athens.*

¹ § 22. Philip had now been for two years (since 357 B.C.) in actual possession of Amphipolis.

² *Ib.* By a treaty concluded in 357 between Chares and Kersobleptes, the Thracian Chersonese, with the exception of Kardia, was formally recognised as belonging to Athens. But the treaty was not at once fully executed,—Sestos, among other places, still remaining in the hands of Kersobleptes; and hence Isokrates can still, in 355, speak of that prince as disputing the claim of Athens. See Schäf. *Demosth.* i. pp. 144, 380.

³ § 24. Athenodoros of Imbros, by birth an Athenian citizen (*Dem. in Aristocr.* § 12), had served with distinction as a captain of mercenaries in the army of Artaxerxes

Ochos during the war (360 B.C.) between the king and his satrap Orontes, who was supported by an Athenian force under Chares, Charidemos and Phokion. In that contest for the throne of Thrace which ensued on the death of Kottys in 359, Berisades was supported by Athenodoros, as Kersobleptes by Charidemos, and Amadokos by Simon and Bianor. The position of Athenodoros at that time (359—357) would have been one of sufficient influence to enable him to become founder (oekist) of a new town, though he was merely an *ιδιώτης*, i.e. neither a prince nor the official representative of a city. Schäf. *Dem.* i. pp. 137—144.

⁴ *Ib.* Kallistratos of Aphidna, the orator, was condemned to

nave planted towns there; much more could we. And such enterprises would become our rank in Hellas better than wars waged by mercenary troops (§§ 16—24).

*Aggressive
ambition is
a snare.*

‘This is enough to show that the offer of the envoys is advantageous. But I wish you to go away, not merely persuaded to accept this peace, but convinced that, universally, it is better to be quiet than to meddle. We fancy that nothing can go well with us unless we hold the sea with a large fleet and force the other cities to pay rates to us and to send deputies to Athens. It would not be difficult to show that honesty is the best national policy; and that a State which is tempted to become aggressive is like an animal which a bait draws into a trap. But, after proving this in theory, it is less easy to enforce it in practice. Athens has long been corrupted by a class of bribed impostors who presume to bid us imitate our ancestors. What ancestors? Those who won Marathon, or those who brought on the disaster in Sicily? If the former, then the contrast between their policy and that recommended to us is such as nothing but a sense of our desperate state could give me the courage to bring before you. Those ancestors fought for the Greeks against Asia. We bring Asiatic

*The men of
Marathon.*

death, and withdrew into exile, in 361 B. C. It was in 360 (Schäfer *Dem.* I. 120), that he induced the Thasians to recolonise the decayed town of Daton or Datos on the coast of Thrace, N.W. of Thasos. The excellence of the site, and its neighbourhood to the gold mines of Pangaeos, gave rise to the proverb *Δάτος ἀγαθόν* (Zenob. *prov. Graec. Cent.* 3. 11). The young colony was destroyed four years later, when, in 356, Philip founded Philippi in its near neighbourhood. Daton was probably on the site of Neapolis, the port of Philippi (Scylax, p. 27 § 67). Schäfer places the return of Kallistratos to Athens (immediately followed by his death)

in 355, before the end of the Social War, and observes that there is nothing in this passage to warrant the inference that he was alive when it was written. But the perfect *γεγόνασιν* (§ 24) surely implies that Kallistratos, as well as Athenodoros, still lived. The return of Kallistratos may perhaps be placed in 354, the year after this speech, when Aristophon and Chares brought Iphikrates, Menestheus and Timotheos to trial. Kallistratos, sympathising strongly with the accused, would have been tempted to come back to Athens at any risk for the sake of standing by them at such a time.

mercenaries against Greece. They exposed their lives for the safety of Hellas. We will not risk ours even to gratify our greed. Out of our penury, we pay mercenaries whose crimes we screen, but who would join a higher bidder against us. Not only when Athens was popular, but when she was most hated, her citizens fought her battles themselves, although the treasury was overflowing. Then, the aliens and slaves rowed the triremes and the citizens fought. Now, Athens is like Persia—an employer of hireling troops; and, in her fleet, the needy citizens are forced to row, while foreigners carry arms. When we make a descent on a hostile coast, the alien comes ashore with shield and spear,—the citizen—with a cushion (§§ 25—48). *Citizens no longer fight.*

‘Our prospects abroad, however, would not be hopeless if it was well with our domestic affairs. But these are in a state which calls for indignation. We, who are so proud of being children of the soil, have lavished our franchise on aliens with as little care for the purity of our blood as if we were Triballi or Leukani. The penalty for bribing is death; and yet the largest bribers of the ekklesia become our generals. We cherish the Constitution as the very life of the State; yet we reproach the advocates of peace with desiring an oligarchy, and court war, though by war the democracy has twice been overthrown. We are practised in debate and administration; yet we do not know our own minds for a day. We consider ourselves the most intelligent of the Greeks—and listen to the most contemptible advisers, making the worst citizens guardians of the city. Our ancestors judged that the ablest counsellors made the best generals. Our counsellors are not trusted to lead; we send out as generals, with plenary powers, our most incapable men (§§ 49—56). *Home affairs.* *Alien intruders.* *Corruption.*

‘Some one to whom these remarks apply may be stung into asking—‘How is it that, if our policy is so bad, we are still on a level with any city in Greece?’ ‘Because,’ I answer, ‘our competitors are as weak as ourselves. We save the Thebans, and they save us. It would be worth the while of either to provide pay for the ekklesiasts of the other. The oftener either holds assemblies, the better for its rival.’ If some more thoughtful questioner, admitting that the evils *The statesmen are no longer the generals.* *Thebes is as bad as Athens.*

exist, were to ask me what remedy I propose, I should be more at a loss for an answer; not for a satisfactory answer, but for one which would find favour with you (§§ 57—62).

*The remedy
—to resign
the Empire
of the sea.*

‘True national prosperity depends on a religious respect for the rights of one’s neighbours. How is the character which respects those rights most readily to be produced among us? By the surrender of our maritime Empire. Bear with me if I tell you that that empire is unjust, untenable, unprofitable. Unjust, because one city cannot claim to rule Hellas—a principle which we ourselves proclaimed in the case of Sparta; untenable, because wealth failed to hold it, and we are poor; unprofitable for both these reasons, and for others of which I will speak, if you will hear me as the admonisher, not denouncer, of Athens (§§ 63—73).

*Athens
before and
after she
was
Imperial.*

‘Let us compare the period before, and the period after, the city’s acquisition of maritime empire. The difference between them is the difference between Aristekides, Themistokles, Miltiades on the one hand, and Hyperbolos, Kleophon, the demagogues of to-day, on the other. Athens had formerly commanded the admiration and the confidence of the Greeks for whom she had fought. Empire demoralised and abased her; her citizens dared not go outside their walls to meet the enemy; her fleet, manned by all the scoundrels in Greece, was its scourge; nothing but the moderation of Sparta saved her from political annihilation. The men of Imperial Athens had reduced the art of unpopularity to a science. In the theatre, at the Dionysia, they used to display the balance of the money levied on their allies,—bringing in, at the same time, the children of those who had fallen in the war; thus reminding the allies of the extortion practised upon them, and the other Greeks present of the misery wrought by means of this plunder. It was the men of the empire who formed designs against Sicily, Italy, Carthage, at a moment when enemies held the suburbs¹ of Athens. Under their

*The men of
the Empire.*

*What they
brought
about.*

¹ § 85. Dekeleia—here called a *προαστέιον* of Athens—was 14 miles N. of it, and as many from the Boeotian frontier. It was occupied by the Peloponnesians in

the spring of 413 B.C.; and the Sicilian disaster came in September of the same year. It is of this passage that Dionysios is probably thinking when he speaks of Iso-

rule more disasters happened than in all the earlier or later history of the city—disasters in Egypt¹, at Cyprus², at Daton³, in Sicily, in the Hellespont; until the public tombs were filled with citizens and the public registers with aliens. The happiest people is that by whom the old families are cherished; the best statesmen are those who deserve, but do not grasp, power. Such was the Athens, such were the Athenians of the time of the Persian Wars; and therefore they did not lead the lives of pirates. Their successors, instead of ruling for the good of their subjects, wished to tyrannise for their own; and they met with the fate of tyrants. No person not reckless alike of the past and of the future could wish to imitate them. The earlier and the later experiences of Athens prove, in fact, two things; that Attica produces good men, and that empire spoils them (§§ 74—94).

‘The effect of naval supremacy may be further seen in the case of Sparta. Her polity, unaltered and unshaken ^{Imperial Sparta,}

krates as censuring, in the *De Pace*, τοὺς πρὸ τῶν Δεκελεικῶν γενομένους (*de Isocr.* c. 8). As to the large schemes of conquest—embracing Italy and Libya—entertained at Athens in 415, see *Curtius Hist. Gr.* bk. iv. c. iv. vol. III. p. 303 tr. Ward.

¹ § 86. Alluding to the destruction, in 455 B.C., of the Athenian armament sent to aid Inaros.

² *Ib.* In 449 B.C. Kimon laid siege to Citium in Cyprus. After his death, his successor Anaxikrates was compelled by famine to raise the siege; but the fleet was soon afterwards victorious near Salamis (*Thuc.* I. 112). Either Isokrates is here misrepresenting the unsuccessful siege as the destruction (*διεφθάρησαν*, § 86) of an Athenian armament; or he may refer to the earlier expedition in 460 B.C. of the Athenians and their allies, with 200 ships, to Cyprus, which Thucy-

dides mentions (I. 104), but of which he gives no particulars, except that it was ultimately abandoned for the purpose of helping Inaros in Egypt.

³ § 86. ἐν Δάτῳ δὲ μυρίους ὀπίστας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἀπόλεσαν. As to the site of Daton see note above. Herodotos mentions—but without closer definition of the time than that it was after 378 B.C.—an incident to which Isokrates is perhaps referring:—αὐτὸν δὲ Σωφάναε χρόνον ὕστερον τούτων κατέλαβε ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γερόμενον Ἀθηναίων στρατηγόντα ἅμα Λεάγρῳ τῷ Γλαύκωνος ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ Ἡδώνων ἐν Δάτῳ περὶ τῶν μετάλλων τῶν χρυσέων μαχεόμενον: IX. 75. But the *μυρίους* looks as if Isokrates was thinking also of the destruction, by the Thracians, of 10,000 Athenians at Drabêskos near Ennea Hodoi in 465 B.C.: *Thuc.* I. 1:0.

through seven centuries¹, was all but overthrown when she became imperial. Her sins against Greece were thus far worse than ours, that faction and bloodshed, entailing perpetual feuds, were rife in her subject cities. She was ungrateful, also, to all her benefactors in turn—to Thebes, to Chios, to Persia. She established despots in Italy and Sicily; and in the Peloponnesos outraged Elis, Corinth, Mantinea, Phlius, Argos. In fact she never ceased doing violence until she had prepared for herself the calamity of Leuktra,—which was not the beginning of her misfortunes but the result of her folly. She was ruined by the arrogance of Empire—Empire, which allures and betrays like a false mistress. Ought not the traitress to be detested who has brought both Athens and Sparta to misery? It is no marvel that, nevertheless, all woo Empire. No men know their own real interests. We, by meddling, prepared the Spartan ascendancy, and they, by insolence, brought about a reaction in our favour. The demagogues led up to the Thirty Tyrants, and these, in turn, made all of us ultra-democrats. The case is the same in regard to monarchy. Absolute power is universally coveted, though all know that an absolute ruler has an anxious life and usually a violent death. You admit this, and are yet unwilling to apply the same reasoning to the case of an Imperial State. You even allow that the despotism of Thebes wrongs Boeotia; but will not admit that your own government injures your allies. If, then, you listen to me, you will consider through what causes Athens and Sparta rose to rule Hellas, and then came into peril of enslavement; through what causes the Thessalians have lost their hereditary wealth, while the Megarians, placed among enemies and originally poor, have become the richest of the Greeks. It is moderation that has brought the blessing, intemperance that has brought the curse,—a curse which sometimes tarries, which an individual sometimes eludes by death, but from which there is no escape for the immortality of a State (§§ 95—120).

her insolence;

her fall.

Dangers of Empire.

Why Megara is rich.

¹ § 95. The beginning of the 'seven centuries' is taken from 1104 B.C.—the legendary epoch of the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesos. Cf. Isokr. *Archid.* § 12 δόξαν ἣν οἱ πρόγονοι... ἐν ἑπτακασίαις ἔτεσι κηρσάμενοι κατέλιπον; and *Panathen.* § 204.

‘Remembering this, you must not be led by demagogues The demagogues. who, in their words and in their deeds, resemble those who brought Athens to ruin. It was not such men as these who made, and kept, the city great; or who brought back from exile the victims of the Peisistratidae or of the Thirty. While Athens acquires a name for rapacity throughout Greece, these men enrich themselves at our cost. Perikles, one of Perikles. the earliest demagogues¹, at least did not fill his own purse, though he left 8,000 talents in the akropolis. Now, we hear nothing but the lamentations of those who are absolutely starving, or of those who, though not destitute, are crushed by public imposts. Unprincipled speakers and demagogues are our worst enemies. They do not merely compromise our national name; it is their interest that each one of us should be in actual want, and so at their mercy. They delight, therefore, in impeachments, indictments, and all that machinery of calumny by which we can be brought to the beggary which makes their wealth (§§ 121—131).

‘To sum up—the conditions of restoring Athens to prosperity are three:—that we should cease to assume that every informer is a true democrat, and every honourable man an oligarch;—that we should treat allies as friends, not as slaves;—that we should value above all things the esteem of Greece. Three conditions of welfare.

‘If you do this—and if, at the same time, you show yourselves warlike in preparation, but peaceful in the justice of your policy—Greece will be tranquillised, seeing your power ready to step in to the support of the injured. In any event, however, Athens will gain reputation. If wars cease, the credit will be ours. If they do not, we shall be the recognised champions of the weak. The infirmities of age do not suffer me to express all that I foresee as in store for us. But, in one word, let us be the deliverers, not the despoilers of Greece.

‘The position among the Hellenes at which Athens ought to aim is like that which the kings of Sparta held among the

¹ § 126. Περικλῆς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τοιούτων δημαγωγὸς καταστάς. Cf. *Pan-* *athen.* § 148, where Peisistratos also is described as a δημαγωγός.

The Spartan Kings.

Lacedaemonians. These kings are not despots, but leaders who command a devoted loyalty; the Spartan who shrunk from dying for them would be more disgraced than if he cast away his shield.

‘Two things warn me to cease—the length of this speech, and the number of my years. Let younger men strive, by speaking and writing, to give an honest direction to the politics of Greece. They may remember that, when Greece prospers, her most thoughtful men prosper too’ (§§ 132—145).

Remarks.

The *Speech On the Peace* excels in one respect almost all the other compositions of Isokrates. The elaborate evenness of his usual style is here broken by a sincere indignation; the disasters, moral and material, brought on Athens by the war rouse him to direct and vigorous utterance. Chares and Aristophon, the leaders of the War Party, are the men at whom his attack is specially levelled¹. It is this definite significance which gives their sting to his invectives against the corrupt generals² and the corrupt statesmen³.

Dionysios admires the *Speech* as an exhortation to a just and upright policy⁴; Isokrates himself quotes it in the *Antidosis*⁵ as an example of practical advice on contemporary affairs. The tenor of the advice is this:—Let Athens resign empire (*ἀρχή*), and be content with hegemony,—the headship of a Confederacy of which all the members shall be free—such a Confederacy as she presided over just after the Persian Wars. Abstinance from aggression,

¹ Cf. Schäff. *Dem.* I. p. 168.
Arist. *Rhet.* III. 17.

² §§ 45—56.

³ §§ 121—131.

⁴ Dionys. *de Isocr.* c. 8.

⁵ *Antid.* §§ 62 ff.

and the manifestation of a just temper, of a resolution to protect the weak against the strong, will suffice to place and to keep Athens at the head of such a league. Isokrates fails to remark that the Athenian hegemony of 478, and the revived hegemony of 378, had passed into empire by the same inevitable process. He has an ideal of a free confederacy which experience has not taught him to be impossible; and for the attainment of this ideal he believes nothing to be needful but that Athens should become and appear virtuous. In the *Areopagitikos* he propounds a simple return to old constitutional forms as the remedy for the internal disorders of Athens; in the speech he maintains that her foreign policy may be amended and made triumphant by a return to the spirit of Aristeides¹. The counsel is in itself good and noble, but is thoroughly unpractical; it estimates in a manner infinitely too flattering what Athens was capable of doing and what Hellas was ready to accept.

*On the
Peace.*

Archidamos [Or. VI.]. At the beginning of 366 II. 3. Ar-
chidamos. B. C. Sparta, Athens, Corinth and the smaller states dependent on Corinth, as Epidaurus and Phlius, were allied, and were at war with Thebes and her allies, of whom the chief was Argos. But in that year the treacherous attempt of Athens to seize Corinth gave the Corinthians a sense of insecurity and a desire for peace. They² accordingly sent envoys to Thebes, asking on what terms peace would be granted to the allies. The Thebans prescribed, as one con-

¹ Cf. § 75.

² And not the Spartans, as the au-

thor of the *ὑπόθεσις* wrongly says: cf. Grote, c. 79, vol. x. p. 399 *n.*

dition of peace, the recognition of the independence of Messene, the new state founded by Epameinondas in 370¹. A congress met at Sparta. The Spartans refused to recognise the independence of Messene; and accordingly remained, with Athens, at war against Thebes. The Corinthians, Epidaurians, Phliasiens, and probably some other small states², accepted the condition, and made peace on their own account, B.C. 366: see § 91.

Date and occasion.

The *Archidamos* is in the form of a deliberative speech. It purports to be spoken, in 366 B.C., by Archidamos III., son of the king Agesilaos, during a debate³ at Sparta on the Theban proposal. There seems no reason to doubt that the speech was written in 366 B.C., either just before or soon after the actual decision of the question⁴. It may have been com-

¹ Grote and Schäfer place the first invasion of Lakonia by Epameinondas, and the commencement of the new town of Messene, at the close of 370 B.C.; Clinton, at the beginning of 369 B.C. Xenophon speaks of the restoration as complete in 368: *Hellen.* vii. 1. 27.

² As Troezen and Hermione: Grote, c. 79, x. p. 400.

³ It may be questioned whether the scene of the debate was (1) the Gerousia, or (2) the Assembly of Spartan citizens above thirty, (*ἄπρελλα*, Plut. *Lys.* 35), or (3) that more select assembly of citizens—probably limited to the *ῥμοιοι*—which is heard of as being convened in special emergencies: Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 3. 18. But, except the kings and the ephors, no citizen

under 60 years of age could be a member of the Gerousia. On the other hand it is certain that the Public Assembly (*ἡ ἐκκλησία τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*, Thuc. i. 87) was sometimes the scene of a real debate, (and not merely of passive voting)—as of the debate in which the Peloponnesian War was decided upon: Thuc. i. 79—87. The king Archidamos and the ephor Stenelaidas are, indeed, the only speakers named on that occasion: and probably a private citizen could speak only by permission. Archidamos, though a Heraklid and next heir to the throne, apologises for presuming to speak: but mainly on account of his youth: §§ 1—2.

⁴ Referring to the opinion of Niebuhr that the *Archidamos* was

posed in the first instance as an exercise¹; yet, as discussing a question of contemporary politics from the point of view which a large party at Sparta must really have taken, it claims to be considered as something more. Isokrates probably sent it to Archidamos,—not, of course, for delivery, but as a proof of sympathy with the Spartan policy².

‘Perhaps some of you will be surprised that I, who have always been loyal to the customs of Sparta, should, in spite of my youth³, come forward to advise. Had my elders given counsel worthy of Sparta, I should have been silent. As it is, some of them have supported the demand of the enemy; others have but faintly opposed it. I must not, through regard for what becomes me individually, allow the State to pass a resolution which would dishonour it.

‘The royal house of Sparta is responsible for the conduct of war; surely it ought to have a voice in the debates on

written after the battle of Mantinea, Thirlwall says—‘We must however remember the speech which Cleon made for Lysander, and that Xenophon (*H.* vii. 4. 9) gives us reason to believe that the spirit prevailing at Sparta was just that which breathes through the Archidamos’: v. p. 178, c. 40.

¹ The Μεσορηναϊκός of Alkidamos of Elaea (*Ar. Rhet.* i. 13. ii. 23) may, as Spengel thinks (*συναγ. τεχν.* xxiv), have been composed in rivalry of the *Archidamos*.

² Spengel says of the *Archidamos* (*συναγ. τεχν.* xxiv) ‘non est ut Philippus oratio Archidamo missa, sed declamatio.’ It is not easy to see why the fact of the speech being a declamation should exclude the hypothesis of its having

been sent to Archidamos.—The speaker’s apology for the length of his remarks (§§15,16) may be noticed as an attempt to give the composition something of a Spartan air. But Spartan brevity was now no longer so severe as formerly: cf. *Plut. Apophth.* 16 (quoted by Thirlwall v. 179), where Epameinondas replies to a Spartan’s invective—‘At least the Thebans have taught you to make longer speeches.’

³ § 1. νεώτερος ὢν. Archidamos is mentioned as a young man in 378 B.C.: *Xen. H.* v. 4, §§ 25—33: and as commanding Spartan armies in 371 (*H.* vi. 4, §§ 17—26) and 367 (*H.* vii. 1, § 28). He may now have been about thirty-five years of age.

The issue. which war depends. The present crisis is the gravest in which Sparta has ever been placed. The question is not whether we shall rule others, but whether we shall obey the dictates of an enemy. As a descendant of Herakles, as son of a king of Sparta and heir of his dignity, I cannot look on in silence while the country left to us by our ancestors is made over to our slaves. Such a surrender would be for Thebes a triumph greater than Leuktra; a victory over that which they failed to conquer when they broke our ranks—the Spartan spirit (§§ 1—10).

The allies. ‘Our allies urge us to resign Messenia and to make peace. Worse traitors than those who revolted from us formerly and ruined only themselves, these seek to rob us of the glory which our ancestors were seven hundred years¹ in winning. We have often fought for our allies; they refuse to fight for us, and threaten, if we hold out, to make peace on their own account. Let them: a struggle without them will bring us the more honour (§§ 11—14).

‘I am no lover of words; but it will be useful at this moment to trace the historical claims of Sparta to Messene (§§ 15—16).

*Sparta's
title to
Messenia.*

‘When Herakles had passed from earth to the gods, his children were long vexed by Eurystheus; then, after their enemy's death, they settled among the Dorians. Their descendants in the third generation had occasion to consult the oracle at Delphi. It told them nothing as to the special object of their visit; but bade them go to *their fatherland*. Reflecting, they found that Argos belonged to them by hereditary right—since the offspring of Herakles were now the only representatives of Perseus: Lacedaemon, by gift—for Heracles had bestowed it upon Herakles who had restored him from exile: Messene, by conquest—for Herakles, wronged by Neleus and his sons, had slain them and taken their town.

*Return of
the Hera-
kleidae.*

‘Deeming that the oracle spoke of all these places, the Herakleidae rallied your ancestors around them, promising to divide the territory among their followers, but reserving the royalty to themselves. It need not be told how they

¹ § 12. Cf. note on *De Pace*, § 95.

conquered the Peloponnesos and divided it into three chief kingdoms. You have kept to this day the compact which your ancestors made with mine. But the Dorian invaders of Messenia had scarcely been settled in it when they slew their own leader and founder, the Heraklid Kresphontes. His sons fled to Sparta, imploring vengeance for their father, and offering Messenia to us. Encouraged by an oracle, we made war and conquered the country. Our right to it thus rests on the same grounds as our right to Lacedaemon; that is,—on the gift of the Herakleidae; on an oracle; and on conquest (§§ 17—25). *Sparta's*
threefold
claim.

‘All titles to possession are made stronger by length of occupancy. We acquired Messene before the Persians were masters of Asia, and before some of the Greek cities had been founded. Yet the Thebans, while recognising, in the case of Persia, a right less than two hundred years¹ old, deny, in ours, a right of more than twice that age. Only the other day² they devastated Thespieae and Plataea: after an interval of four hundred years³ they restore Messene—in each instance breaking oaths and treaties. Were they only bringing back genuine Messenians, it would be unjust; but in fact they are planting Helots on our frontier. *The The-*
bans.

‘Further, our claim to Messene has been indirectly allowed by our enemies. We have had ere now to make a humiliating peace; but neither Persia nor Athens has ever asked us for Messene. Our claim was also recognised by the oracle at Delphi,—the most august in Greece. It advised us to accept the offer of the sons of Kresphontes, and showed us how to succeed in the war; but was silent to our enemies. *Delphic*
oracle. In brief—we received Messene from its former owners—established our own right of conquest—drove out the impious foe of the Heraklidae—and have had our title confirmed by time, by the verdict of enemies, by the voice of the gods (§§ 26—33).

¹ § 27. Dating from the accession of Cyrus to the empire, 559 B.C.

² § 27. In 373 B.C.: cf. introd. to the *Plataikos*.

³ § 27. ‘Three hundred’ would have been more accurate. The Second Messenian War ended, and the conquest of the country was completed, in 668 B.C.

‘ We are urged to make our decision on grounds of expediency, not of abstract justice. This is wrong in principle, and not easy in practice ; for what is expediency ? It is not clear that, supposing we obeyed Thebes, we should obtain a firm peace. Concessions of this kind always invite new attacks (§§ 34—39).

*Examples
of recovery
from disaster.*

‘ There are plenty of instances in which disasters as great as ours have been retrieved. Athens, to say nothing of her perils in remote times, came safely through the Persian war, and gained empire, because, when her position seemed desperate, she refused to listen to the dictates of the enemy. Dionysios¹ was on the point of abandoning Syracuse to the Carthaginians, when a friend reminded him that “royalty is a good winding-sheet” :—he remained, and triumphed. Amyntas² of Macedon, defeated by his neighbours and temporarily robbed of his whole realm, rallied, with a like result, from a like despair. Thebes is great now because she had patience to endure our attacks steadfastly. In short, good government and military skill are the two things needful to repair national misfortunes. No one will deny that in both these things we stand unrivalled (§§ 40—48).

‘ Some advocate peace because war is a bad thing in itself. But that depends on circumstances. Peace is for the prosperous : war is certainly the best hope of the unfortunate. Those who would be free must make peace, not when the enemy bids them, but when they have become stronger than, or equal to, him (§§ 49—51).

*Spartans
for Sparta.*

‘ We ought not to be less spirited in defending ourselves than we have always been in succouring others. Formerly, if a single Lacedaemonian went to the aid of a city allied with us, its deliverance was always ascribed to him. Pedaritos³ saved Chios, Brasidas saved Amphipolis, Gylippos

¹ § 44. i.e. Dionysius I. in 394 B.C.: cf. Grote, c. 82, vol. x. p. 695.

² § 46. See note on *Panegyris*. § 126.

³ § 53. When Chios revolted from Athens in 412 B.C. Pedaritos was posted there as Lacedaemo-

nian governor: Thuc. VIII. 28. Soon afterwards the Athenians set about fortifying Delphinion, a promontory on the east coast of the island: *ib.* 38. Pedaritos having refused to help Astyochos in supporting the revolt of Lesbos,

saved Syracuse. What one Spartan could do for others, shall not the whole Lacedaemonian people be able to do for themselves? Asia and Europe are full of the trophies of our victories in the causes of others; in the cause of Sparta shall not one blow be struck? We can afford to keep numbers of horses at a great cost; and shall we make peace as if we were beggars? We have the name of being the most laborious of the Hellenes; and shall we accept the terms of the enemy after one defeat¹, one invasion²—resigning so quickly the country for which the Messenians themselves stood a siege of twenty years³, and forgetting the dangers by which our ancestors won it? (§§ 52—57).

‘Some, reckless of our honour, advise peace because Sparta is weak and Thebes strong. But we have at least the strength of a good government, of temperate habits, of a brave spirit. Nor shall we lack external aid. Athens, though she is not with us in all things, will not see us destroyed. Dionysios of Syracuse; the king of Egypt; the various dynasts of Asia; the richest and most distinguished individuals in Hellas, whose political sympathies are with us—will help. Nay, even the democrats of the Peloponnese will soon begin to long once more for our protecting care, now that they have tasted the fruits of anarchy (§§ 58—69).

‘Even, however, if we were utterly forsaken, I should be ashamed to give up Messene, and to admit, either that our

Astyochos refused to support Pedaritos at Chios. The Athenian fort was at length completed. Pedaritos then sent an urgent message to the Spartan fleet at Rhodes, representing that, unless help came speedily, Chios must be lost. In the mean time he made an attack on Delphinion with such forces as he had, but was defeated and slain: Thuc. VIII. 55. The words of Isokrates—*εἰς Χίον εἰσπλεύσας τὴν πόλιν διέσωσε*—are calculated, therefore, to convey an inaccurate impression. Pedaritos

did, indeed, hold out in Chios for a year; but his command ended disastrously.

¹ § 56. i.e. Leuktra, § 10.

² § 56. At this time Epameinondas had thrice invaded Peloponnesos—in 370, 369, 367. But he had invaded Lakonia only once, in 370. The next invasion of Lakonia occurred shortly before Mantinea in 362.

³ § 57. Referring to the siege of Ithome in the first Messenian War, 743—723 B.C.

*Hopes from
without.*

The last resort.

ancestral title to it was bad, or that we had relinquished a right. Probably the tide will turn soon. But, if the worst comes, we must send away our women and children and old men to Sicily, Italy, Cyrene, Asia; we must quit Sparta; seize some strong position; and, from it, harass the enemy by land and sea. No city in the Peloponnese would long be able to bear what an army of desperadoes, unfettered by any polity, and able to plant themselves where they pleased, could inflict. Or if several towns combined, and brought their ill-disciplined levies to meet us in our fastnesses, what could serve us better? The essence of Sparta's strength lies in the resemblance of her civic system to an orderly and disciplined camp. If this resemblance becomes identity, what can resist us? The Athenians, in the cause of Hellenic freedom, once left their homes; the Phokaeans removed to Massalia rather than submit to the Persian king. It would be strange if we did not choose to quit Sparta for a time rather than to obey the dictates of our former subjects. But our thoughts ought not to dwell on the possible necessity of leaving Sparta,—they ought to anticipate our triumphant return to it. I have not spoken of what must happen; rather of what ought to happen before we surrender Messene. No lasting peace could be gained by such a compromise. If the Helots were once established at our side, endless annoyance and danger would be our portion (§§ 70—87).

Sparta a camp.

Appeal to reputation.

‘There could be no nobler cause in which to die than the present, when the prestige, when the very existence of Sparta is threatened. Epidaurus, Corinth, Phlius¹ may without reproach prefer safety to honour; Sparta cannot. The reputation of the city ought to be as dear to each Spartan as his own: he ought not to suffer it to desert the post at which our fathers placed it. How could we ever show our faces at Olympia² or at any Hellenic gathering, if we were to find our own slaves outshining us there by means of wealth taken from us? Dipaea³, where a single

¹ § 91. See introductory remarks.

² § 95. As Mr Grote observes (c. 78, vol. x. p. 314, n. 2), no free

Messenian theoria could have visited Olympia since 723 B.C.

³ § 99. According to Herod. ix. 36 the five ἀγῶνες in which Tisa-

line of Spartans routed many myriads of Arcadians; Thyrea, where three hundred Spartans defeated all the Argives; Thermopylae, where a thousand Spartans held their ground against the seventy myriads of Persia—ought to teach us self-reliance now. Nothing is hopeless in war. It was by war, not peace, that Athens and Thebes grew. And in this struggle we should be stimulated by remembering that all Hellas is watching us (§§ 88—106).

‘The true view of this crisis may be shortly given. By *Summary.* staking our lives on this good cause we shall save them; cowardice would be not only base but fatal. Let us imagine children and parents pleading with us—these, for Sparta’s future name; those, for her past. No king of our house has ever led you to defeat. Listen, then, as prudent men listen, to the advice of those who in practice have been found trusty guides’ (§§ 107—111).

The *Archidamos* has a real historical interest: it *Remarks.* may be taken as an expression, highly coloured but in the main faithful, of the feeling excited in a majority of Spartans by the reestablishment of Messenia at their side. The damage thus inflicted on Sparta did not consist merely in the reanimation of a hostile State which had long been in decay. It consisted in the creation anew of a hostile State which for three centuries had been dead; and in the subtraction, for that purpose, from Sparta of what had been for three centuries the fairest portion of her territory—of all the country from the Neda to C. Akritas and from the Western slopes of Taygetos to the sea¹. Archi-

menos of Elis was victorious in company with the Spartans were—
1. Plataea, 479 B.C.: 2. a battle at Tegea against the Tegeatans and Argives: 3. a battle at Dipaea—a town of Maenalia in Arcadia—
‘against all the Argives except the

Mantineans’: 4. the third Messenian War, 464—355: 5. Tanagra, 457. From this it may be inferred that the battle at Dipaea was fought between 479 and 464 B.C.

¹ Cf. Grote, c. 78, vol. x. p. 313.

damas denounces the allies who consented to such a measure as worse enemies to Sparta than helots and Messenians¹. He proposes that, if need be, the Spartans should send away the old and helpless—abandon Sparta—and pour themselves upon Messenia as homeless and desperate invaders². If the matter-of-fact narrative of Xenophon³ gives no hint of any feeling so passionate as that which is expressed by the second Tyrtaeos, it vouches at least for a resolution no less firm; a resolution which, four years later, again decided Sparta against accepting a peace⁴.

II. 4. *Areopagitikos*.

Areopagitikos [Or. VII.]—In this speech Isokrates contrasts the Athenian democracy as it existed in the middle of the 4th century B.C. with the democracy of Solon and of Kleisthenes (§ 16). He dwells chiefly on two features of the elder democracy:—
1. the preference of election (*αἵρεσις*) to ballot (*κλήρωσις*) in the appointment of state officers, §§ 22 ff.;
2. the supervision of public morals exercised by the Council of the Areiopagos: §§ 36—55. It is owing to the prominence of the latter topic that the speech has been called Ἄρεοπαγῆτικός. It is cast in a deliberative form. Isokrates supposes himself to have given notice in writing to the prytanes of an intention to speak ‘On the Safety of Athens’ (*περὶ σωτηρίας πρόσοδον ἀπογράψασθαι*, §§ 1, 15); and to be now urging

Form.

¹ §§ 11—14.

² §§ 70—87.

³ Xen. *H.* VII. 4, §§ 8—11. ἀκούσαντες δὲ ταῦτα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς τε Κορινθίοις συνεβούλευον τὴν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι καὶ τῶν

ἄλλων συμμάχων ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς μὴ βουλομένοις σὺν ἑαυτοῖς πολεμεῖν ἀναπαύσασθαι· αὐτοὶ δὲ ἔφασαν, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ After Mantinea: Diod. xv. 89: Plut. *Ages.* 35.

in the ekklesia, as absolutely necessary to the welfare of the city, the restoration of censorial power to the Areiopagos (cf. § 84). Like the *De Pace* (Or. VIII.), this speech was not delivered, or meant for delivery, in the assembly. The deliberative form was adopted merely for the sake of giving greater life and impressiveness to the pleading.

The date is to be inferred from five indications:— *Date.*

(1) There was now peace on the frontiers of Attica (τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν), and a confident sense of security at Athens, §§ 1—3: (2) The Athenians had ‘lost all the cities in Thrace’, (§ 9): (3) had spent more than 1000 talents on mercenaries, *ib.*: (4) had got a bad name in Hellas and incurred the enmity of Persia, § 10: (5) had been forced ‘to save the friends of the Thebans’ and to lose their own allies, *ib.*

These notices point to one of two dates; to 346 B.C., in which peace was concluded between Athens and Philip; or to 355, in which the Social War, begun in 357, was closed by a peace between Athens and her allies.

The year 346 best suits (2), since it was only in ^{*Arguments for 346 B.C.*} 347 that Philip became master of Olynthos and its confederate towns. On the other hand, a general sense of security (1) could not be said to have existed at Athens in 346. The war with Philip had been thoroughly disheartening; and the deep dismay at Athens when Philip occupied Phokis a few days¹ after the final ratification of the peace, has been described by Demosthenes². Further, if the speech belonged to 346, we should have expected in §§ 6, 7

¹ Dem. *de F. L.* § 125.

² Id. *de Cor.* § 169.

some mention of Olynthos, the latest and most striking instance of sudden disaster to a confident city; and in §§ 8, 81 some mention of Macedonia as a quarter from which danger was supposed to threaten Athens; for, though Isokrates did not himself admit any such danger, he could not ignore the large party who in 346 apprehended it, and to whom he refers when he writes in that very year to Philip: Or. v. §§ 73—80.

*Arguments
for 355 B.C.*

The year 355 evidently fits (1), (2) and (4) of the conditions mentioned above. Though the necessity of recognising the autonomy of Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium had been humiliating for Athens, the number of smaller States which still paid the syntaxis was large enough to inspire the Athenians with pride and confidence, in the absence of any danger so formidable as that which presently began to threaten them from Macedonia. The troops of Chares had been almost wholly mercenaries, and it had been felt as a relief at Athens when Artabazos helped to pay them. Artaxerxes III., incensed by the aid given to his rebellious satrap, had sent (probably in 355) an embassy to Athens, threatening to help the Chians with 300 ships; and this threat had hastened the peace¹. As regards (2), it must be allowed that, if 355 is the true date, the *ἀπάσας* of § 9 is a rhetorical exaggeration. According to common usage, *αἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης πόλεις* mean not only the towns of the Chalkidic peninsula, but often also the Greek colonies all along the southern coasts of Thrace². Philip had not yet got Olynthos or the

¹ Diod. xvi. 22.

² Rauchenstein, *Introd. to the Areopag.* p. 107.

32 towns of its confederacy. He had, however, alienated the entire Olynthian confederacy from the Athenian interest; and had taken, in 358—356, Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaea. As to (5), the words in § 10, τοὺς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων φίλους σώζειν ἡραγκασμένοι τοὺς δ' ἡμετέρους αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, have been explained in two different ways. Schäfer¹ refers them to the circumstance that during the Phokian war the Messenians, Argives and Megalopolitans had been threatened by Sparta, and on applying to Sparta had received a qualified promise of support. Rauchenstein² finds a better clue in the fact that Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium had been, since 364, friendly with Thebes³. In allowing these important allies to be severed from her confederacy, and in guaranteeing their autonomy, Athens was therefore giving a deliverance to 'friends of the Thebans.' The sense thus put on σώζειν is somewhat strange; but, on the whole, the explanation

¹ Schäfer, *Demosth. u. s. Zeit*, vol. I. p. 462 n.: Paus. IV. 28. 1, 2.

² Introd. p. 108: Diod. xv. 79.

³ Peace was concluded about midsummer 355: Clinton, *F. H.* Rauchenstein places the *Areopagitikos* in 354, following Böhnecke, who assigns the embassy from Artaxerxes III. to that year. But according to Diod. XVI. 22 the embassy preceded and hastened the peace; and the peace certainly belongs to 355.

Clinton refers the *Areopagitikos* to 353, the year (probably) of the *Antidosis*, which he thinks must have been published before

it. But on this point no inference can be drawn from the fact that the *Areopag.* is not mentioned in the *Antidosis*. In the *Antidosis* Isokrates quotes from several, but by no means from all, of his important works; and, in such an apology for his life and teaching, it can be easily understood why he avoided reference to the *Areopagitikos*, which may have been represented as hostile to the democracy—a calumny which he himself anticipates, *Areop.* §§ 57, 70. Schäfer, *Dem. u. s. Z.* III. 329, also puts the *Areopagitikos* in 355.

seems tenable. The latter half of 355¹ B.C. may be taken as the date of the *Areopagitikos*.

Dangers of confidence.

‘It will be asked why I come forward to speak on the “safety” of Athens at a time when she has a fleet of more than two hundred triremes; peace on her frontiers; the command of the sea; numerous allies. It is, in truth, this very persuasion of security which alarms me. The rise and the fall, first of Athens, then of Sparta, prove that anxious watchfulness leads to success,—arrogance, to ruin. Our present prosperity is hollow. We have lost the cities in Thrace, spent great sums on mercenaries,—become unpopular in Greece,—revived our enmity with Persia,—saved the friends of Thebes and lost our own. Yet we have twice² held a public thanksgiving; and in the ekklesia we are taking affairs as easily as if their position was absolutely satisfactory. The reason of this apathy lies deep. The whole political constitution of Athens is vitiated. When the victories, first of Konon, then of Timotheos, had given Athens the control of Hellas, she could not keep it for a moment. Her polity, her very soul, is distempered; and yet we do not attempt to minister to its disease. Chatting in the workshops, we admit that never under a democracy was there worse government; but in practice we are content to have it so. It is on this account that I have given notice of an intention to speak on the “safety” of Athens. Year by year her course becomes more perilous; and the only hope which I can see for her is in a return to the old paths. I wish to put before you the characteristics of that elder democracy which Solon founded and which Kleisthenes reconstituted. You can then choose between it and the present (§§ 1—19).

¹ Oncken (p. 79) seems to refer the *Areop.* to 358 B.C.

² One of these two occasions was probably when Chares, aided by Artabazos, had defeated the Persian army under Tithraustes in 356 B.C.: see Grote, c. 86, vol. xi. p. 324. What the other occasion was is more doubtful. Schneider

refers to the victory gained by Chares over Adaeus, one of Philip’s generals, at Cypsela on the Hebrus: but this was in 353 B.C. (see Schäf. *Dem.* i. 399) and no one, except Clinton, places the *Areopagitikos* later than 354: Schneider himself (p. 71) places it ‘soon after’ the end of the war in 355.

‘Under that democracy, licence was not confounded with freedom. Political “equality” has been understood in two senses—as meaning either that all are to share absolutely alike, or that every man is to receive his due. Our ancestors preferred that “equality” which does not efface the distinction between merit and worthlessness. They did not take officials at random from the crowd, but picked the fittest for each task¹. They held, also, that appointment to office by lot was less truly democratic than selection. In the one case, chance prevails—in the other, the desire of choosing genuine friends of popular government. This system satisfied the people generally, because, in those days, everyone had his own business to attend to. Office was not yet looked upon as an easier source of income than private industry. The people collectively reigned; the rich men, who had leisure, served it as a duty (§§ 20—27).

The old democracy.

Its ‘equality.’

‘Such was their political system. From it followed their relations to the gods and to each other. Their zeal in the services of religion was not spasmodic, but equable as the blessings for which it expressed their gratitude—regular as the sequence of seed-time and harvest. Their private intercourse was embittered by no class-feeling; the poor were proud of the great houses, and the rich helped all the enterprises of the needy. In a word, it was safe to have money, and easy to borrow it (§§ 28—35).

Its general tone.

¹ It is difficult to say how much Isokrates meant by this vague assertion. He states that the public officials generally (οἱ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες) were selected according to merit (προκρίνειν). It is now pretty well ascertained:—
1. That, in the election of the nine archons, Kleisthenes substituted the democratic ballot (κλήρωσις) for election (αἵρεσις). 2. That at least the ten Strategi, and the Tamias or Steward of the Public Treasury, were at all periods, as a rule, αἵπεροί, not κληρωτοί. 3. That, as regards most

other offices, lot was substituted for election about 478 B.C.—Isokrates probably believed that, in the case of archons, αἵρεσις continued to be the rule longer than it really did. It is possible, again, that in his time Strategi were sometimes appointed by ballot; and also that the proportion of inferior officials so appointed was larger than in former times.

See Curtius, *App.* to bk. II. c. 2, vol. I. p. 478 tr. Ward: Rauchenstein *Introd. to Areop.* p. 112: C. F. Herm. *Antt.* § 112. 7.

The Areiopagos:

‘If it is inquired to what causes such results may be traced, the principal cause will be found to be this—that the education of the citizen did not end with his boyhood. The Court of the Areiopagos was the recognised guardian of public decorum. Its influence at that time upon the whole community may be judged from its influence at this day upon its own members. We see how the worst men, when raised to it, cease to obey their own natures and become loyal to its traditions. It was the principle of this Court that deterrent laws, however strict, are useless without positive moral discipline; that the happiness of citizens depends, not on having the walls of their porticoes covered with laws, but on having justice in their hearts. The Areiopagos aimed, not at punishing merely, but at preventing crime. It was especially watchful over young men. For the poorer youths, work was found in agriculture and commerce; for the richer, in vigorous exercises of mind and body. This watch was maintained over the daily life even of adults, and was aided by the division of the town into wards, of the country into demes. The Supreme Court knew well that two things chiefly restrain crime; probability of detection and certainty of punishment. Thus controlled, the young men of that time did not spend their days in the haunts popular now; nay, if they had to cross the marketplace, they did so with downcast eyes. Disrespect to elders, dissipation, buffoonery, were not then in fashion.

guardian of the unwritten law.

‘I do not mean to be hard upon youthful follies. My censure is meant for those statesmen who, a little before our own time¹, abolished the controlling power of the Areiopagos. While that power lasted, Attica was so secure from invasion and from faction that the houses in the country were handsomer than those within the walls; many citizens never came to town even for the festivals. The contrasts of a thoroughly vulgar policy were not to be seen then. There were no citizens casting lots for their daily bread² outside

Sense of security.

¹ § 50. The law of Ephialtes is usually placed in Ol. LXXX. 2, 459 B.C.: by Curtius in 460 (*Hist. Gr.* II. 381 trans.).

² § 54: i.e. for employment as dikasts: cf. *de Pac.* (Or. VIII.) § 130 τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστηρίων ζῶντας.

the lawcourts, while they paid strangers liberally to fight their battles: no choregi, blazing in golden robes, who were doomed to shiver through the winter in rags. The Areiopagos, while it had power, found employment for the poor and restrained the excesses of the wealthy (§§ 36—55).

‘Some who have heard this account of our ancestors’ life, while admiring it, have thought that my advice was unpractical—long habit cannot be broken through,—and also dangerous to myself. I shall be suspected, they say, of desiring an oligarchy. Now if I were praising some new scheme of government, and urging the appointment of a special commission to carry it out, I might incur suspicion. As it is, I have only been urging a return to that old system under which, as everyone knows, Athens was greatest. On all other occasions, too, I have censured dynasty and supported democracy—not a reckless democracy, but one tempered like that of Sparta, in which the principle of equality is most truly expressed. If we go through the chief cities of Hellas, a democratical, not an oligarchical, form of government will be found to have been most frequently prosperous.

‘Even our corrupt democracy would seem god-made by the side of the government of the Thirty Tyrants. It was their doing that the walls of Athens were levelled; that the dockyards, which had cost 1,000 talents, were destroyed by contract for three; that 1,500 citizens were put to death untried, and more than 5,000 banished. When the exiles were restored, the ekklesia generously voted the payment of a debt contracted by the adherents of the Thirty in making war upon the Peiraeus; Athens resumed, on the proposal of Sparta herself, the empire of the sea, and, later, was besought for help by the Power which, under the Thirty, had constantly dictated to her. I say this to show, first, that I am no friend of oligarchies: next, that even a bad democracy is a less evil than an oligarchy.

‘You may ask why, then, I am dissatisfied with this democracy, seeing that it has been productive of so much good? I answer that it is not enough to excel the Tyrants; we must strive to reach the standard of our ancestors. No race ought to be better than the Athenians. As other

countries have their special products, Attica has her breed of men; we are of that breed, but at this moment we dishonour it. Enough of this: I return to my immediate subject (§§ 56—77).

‘If our general system of government remains unaltered, all its particular phenomena must continue the same—our conduct of war, our conduct of debate, the spirit of our private life. If we go back to the old system we shall get
A contrast. the old results. Then the Greeks trusted us; then the Persians launched no war-ship west of Phaselis; moved no camp beyond the Halys¹. The generals can tell you how the Greeks hate us now; the mind of the Persian king may be seen in his letters. Then, the citizens were so educated as to be a terror to invaders and to live comfortably with each other; now, not a man will fight but for pay, and there are more citizens destitute than solvent. If we imitate our ancestors we shall get rid of our own troubles and save Hellas. Believing this, I have come forward to urge it; reflect, and vote as you think best for Athens’ (§§ 78—84).

The purpose of the *Areopagitikos* involves a contrast between old times and new; it has therefore a double interest, as a picture of the past and of the present. As a picture of the older democracy it supplements the *Panegyrikos*. The *Panegyrikos* describes the external relations of Athens at the time of her most splendid activity²; the *Areopagitikos* portrays the inner life by which that activity was created and nourished. As a picture of the new

¹ Demosthenes *de Fals. Legat.* § 311 says that the conditions were —ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἡμέρας πεζῆ μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν βασιλέα, ἐντὸς δὲ Χελιδονίων (the Swallow Islands, opposite the frontier of Lykia and Pamphylia, and S.W.E. of Cape Phaselis) καὶ Κναβέων πλοίῳ μακρῷ μὴ πλεῖν. As Mr Grote observes (c. 45, v. 456),

even the ‘one day’s course for a horse’ is probably more than the truth. But the statement of Isokrates—if, indeed, he recollected where the Halys was—is a strange exaggeration. As to this legendary treaty, see note on *Panegyrr.* § 115.

² See esp. *Panegyrr.* §§ 51—99.

democracy, this speech may be compared with another spoken four¹ years later—with the *First Philippic* of Demosthenes. The *First Philippic* sets forth vividly the utter indifference of the Athenian public to the foreign concerns of Athens, their half-heartedness in all things, their habitual indolence broken by spasmodic efforts which always came too late: the *Areopagitikos* exposes in detail that civil and domestic life of which such a foreign policy was the counterpart. Demosthenes saw the true remedy in a more earnest attention to the actual crisis. Isokrates, who saw the inner decay but believed in no urgent danger from without, found the remedy in a simple return to old forms and manners².

The powers exercised by the Areiopagos before the reforms of Ephialtes were of two kinds, definite and indefinite. The definite powers were:—1. A limited criminal jurisdiction: 2. the supreme direction of religious worship, especially of the cultus of the Eumenides. The indefinite powers were:—1. A general supervision of all magistrates and law-courts: 2. a general guardianship of the laws, with the right of protest (though not of veto) when proposed new laws conflicted with old: 3. a general control of the education of the young: 4. a general censorship of public morals: 5. competence to assume, in emergencies of the State, a dictatorial authority³.

¹ For I follow Schäfer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, II. 66 ff., in placing the First Philippic in 351, and not, as it is usually placed, in 352.

² Dionys. *Isokr.* 8 characterises the *Areopag.* as an exhortation to *εὐκοσμία*—the *decorum* of the old

school.

³ Such as, *e.g.*, it assumed in the year of Salamis. Niebuhr compares this to the power conferred on Roman consuls by the formula 'videant ne quid detrimenti, &c.' *Vorträge üb. alte Gesch.* II. 29.

The definite powers of the Areiopagos were never at any time taken from it¹. But Ephialtes abolished almost² wholly the indefinite powers. It is for the revival of these—especially of (3) and (4)—that Isokrates is anxious. While it possessed these, the Areiopagos had been the strongest influence, though mainly a negative influence, in the State; it had been able to impress a conservative character upon the whole civic body³. Deprived of these, it was merely a criminal court of narrow competence. Its connection with what was most venerable in the old religion, and the high standing of its individual members, still secured to it, indeed, a large measure of respect. Isokrates speaks of the influences which, even in his own day, changed bad men when

¹ It has, indeed, been supposed that the jurisdiction of the Areiopagos was temporarily taken away by the Thirty Tyrants. It is in this sense that Mr Grote (c. 46, v. 498) understands Lys. *de caede Eratosth.* § 32:— ϕ και πατριόν ἐστι και ἐφ' ὑμῶν ἀποδέδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζειν—the passage mainly relied on by those who, like Meier, Boeckh and O. Müller, think that Ephialtes abolished the criminal jurisdiction of the Areiopagos. But there I think with Hermann that the meaning is simply:—(that court) of which it is the ancestral right, and to which it has been assigned in your own time also, to try causes of homicide.' The antithesis is between πατριον and ἐφ' ὑμῶν. ἀποδέδοται means, not 'restored,' but 'rendered, assigned as a province.' The ideamight have been expressed

thus— ϕ και πατριόν ἐστι και ἐφ' ὑμῶν ὑπάρχει. The statement of Demosthenes is precise and emphatic (*in Aristocr.* § 66):—τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δικαστήριον οὐχὶ τύραννος οὐκ ὀλιγαρχία οὐ δημοκρατία τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ἀφελείσθαι τετόλημην.

² The Areiopagos retained the power, shared by the Senate of Five Hundred and by all magistrates, of inflicting small fines: cf. Grote, c. 46, v. 498. And on at least one occasion subsequent to the reform of Ephialtes—namely in 405 B.C., after Aegospotami—the Areiopagos is found acting in a dictatorial capacity: Lys. *in Eratosth.* (Or. XII.) § 69, *πρατυούσης τῆς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῆς σωτήρια.*

³ Cf. Curtius, *Hist. Gr.* bk. III, c. II, vol. II, p. 378 tr. Ward.

they became members of the college¹. But politically the Areiopagos was now powerless. The plea of Isokrates for a restoration of its strength is strikingly illustrated by the protest of Aeschylus against its enfeeblement. It is not on any well-defined function, but rather on those prerogatives which, being vague, were boundless, that orator and poet alike insist :—

Here, on the Hill of Ares,
Once seat and camp of Amazons who came
In anger against Theseus, and defied
From their new ramparts his acropolis,
And poured blood unto Ares, where is now
The hill, the rock of Ares—in this place
Awe kin to dread shall hold the citizens
From sinning in the darkness or the light,
While their own voices do not change the laws.

* * * * *

This Court, majestic, incorruptible,
Instant in anger, over those who sleep
The sleepless watcher of my land I set².

¹ § 38. It is at least credible that democrats, on becoming members of an ancient and dignified official body, grew more conservative. On the esprit de corps of the Areiopagos Niebuhr says:—*Der Areopag est ein merkwürdiges Beispiel von dem was man esprit de corps nennt in seiner*

schönsten Bedeutung, wie vor der französischen Revolution der pariser Parlament eine Gravität und Unabhängigkeit hatte, die sich allen Mitgliedern mittheilten und das ganze Leben und Weise übergingen. Vorträge üb. alte Gesch. II. p. 31.

² *Eum.* 660 ff.

CHAPTER XVII.

ISOKRATES.

WORKS.

FORENSIC SPEECHES.

THE six forensic speeches extant under the name of Isokrates belong to the first period of his literary life, and cover about ten years 403—393 B.C. They are all in private causes, and may be classed thus:—

I. *Action for Assault* (δίκη αϊκίας). Against Lochites. [Or. xx.]

II. *Claim to an Inheritance* (ἐπιδικασία). Aeginetikos. [Or. xix.]

III. *Action to Recover a Deposit* (δίκη παρακαθήκης).

1. Against Euthynus. [Or. xxi.]

2. Trapezitikos. [Or. xvii.]

IV. *Action for Damage* (δίκη βλάβης). Concerning the Team of Horses (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους). [Or. xvi.]

V. *Special Plea* (παραγραφή). Against Kallimachos. [Or. xviii.]

I. *Against Lochites.*

I. ACTION FOR ASSAULT¹ (δίκη αϊκίας).

¹ It may be asked, 'What is αϊκίας rather than a γραφή ὑβρεως?'
there to show that this is a δίκη The language of the speech itself

Against Lochites [Or. xx.]—The plaintiff, ‘a poor man and one of the people’ (§ 19), brings an action against Lochites, a rich young citizen (§ 17), who has struck him a blow. The penalty demanded by the plaintiff is a heavy fine (§ 16).

Two points help to fix the date. (1) Lochites is *Date.* too young to have had any part in the doings of 405 B.C. (§ 11); (2) his insolence is compared to that of the oligarchs ‘who gave over our power to the enemy and levelled the walls’ (§ 11). This by no means proves, but it rather suggests, that the rebuilding of the walls by Konon had not begun; i.e. that the speech is earlier than 393 B.C. It is put by Sauppe in 394 B.C.¹

The fact of the assault (the prosecutor says) has already *Analysis.* been established by witnesses². Now, bodily injury is the most grievous kind of injury, and ought to be atoned for by the heaviest punishment. The framers of the Athenian laws have marked their sense of this by affording two special facilities for prosecution in such cases. First, the prosecutor is not required to deposit caution-money. Secondly, in cases of outrage (*ἔβρις*), the right of prosecuting is not confined to the person injured. Any citizen cognisant of the outrage can lay an indictment before the Thesmothetae. Again, it is

is ambiguous. The offence complained of is alluded to as *ἔβρις* in §§ 2, 7, 9, 16: as *αἰκία* in §§ 5, 15. But on general grounds it seems likely that a man placed as the speaker was would have brought a *δίκη αἰκίας*, as being easier to sustain, rather than the more serious *γραφὴ ἔβριως*. In § 5 his mention of the *contumely* seems to be an afterthought—*ὕπερ τῆς αἰκίας—καὶ τῆς ἀτιμίας—ἤκω*. I agree with Dobree, who says—

‘videtur esse actio *αἰκίας*, quam cum *graviori ἔβριως* studiosè confundit orator.’ The speech of Demosthenes against Konon (a case of *αἰκία*) shows just a like attempt at *δείνωσις*.

¹ *Ap.* Rauchenstein, *Ausgewählte Reden des Isokrates*, Introd. p. 4 note.

² ‘*Praecessit titulus MAPTURIAI*,’ Sauppe. But it does not follow that the speech, as we have it, is a fragment.

in order to prevent personal violence that the penalty for abusive language has been placed so high as 500 drachmas (§§ 1—3). Outrages which were committed under the oligarchy are punished; much more is punishment due to outrages committed under the democracy (§ 4). Lochites will perhaps argue that the blow has proved harmless. But it is not for the damage, it is for the insult that the plaintiff claims satisfaction. Lochites acted in the spirit of that insolence which has twice overthrown the democracy itself, and of which every manifestation ought to be checked as dangerous to the whole community (§§ 5—14). Rich men alone are interested in the security of property. But rich and poor alike are concerned in the repression of personal violence. If the prosecutor is a poor man, it is not less the duty and the interest of the judges to give him the protection of the law (§§ 15—22).

Remarks.

The cleverness of this speech lies in the speaker's identification of his own dignity 'as a man of the people' (τοῦ πλῆθους εἰς) with that of the judges—men of the people too, exposed to the freaks of young men who happen to have the temper of the Thirty Tyrants. There is a good deal of rhetorical skill in the passage which points out that this insolence of Lochites is just the insolence which has twice overthrown public freedom (§§ 9—11). The speech has one special characteristic in common with that of Demosthenes against Konon. Each deals with an action for *assault* (αἰκία); but in each the plaintiff constantly speaks of the *outrage* (ὕβρις)—thus seeking to combine the forces of two distinct forms of accusation¹.

¹ Cf. Demosth. *Or.* LIV. §§ 1, 11, etc.: esp. § 17 θαυμάζω γὰρ ἔγωγε εἴ τις ἐστὶ πρόφασις παρ' ὑμῖν ἢ

σκήψις ἐορημένη δι' ἧν, ἂν ὑβρίζων τις ἐξελέγχηται καὶ τύπτων, δίκην οὐ δώσει.

II. CLAIM TO AN INHERITANCE (ἐπιδικασία).

Aeginetikos [Or. XIX].—Thrasylochos, a citizen of <sup>II. Aegine-
tikos.</sup> Siphnos, one of the Kyclades, had at his death left his property to the speaker, whom he had previously adopted as his son¹. The speaker's right to the inheritance is disputed by a daughter of the testator; and the speech is in answer to her claim (ἐπιδικασία). The case is tried at Aegina, where the speaker had settled (κατοικισάμενος, § 24) before his death.

The date is uncertain. In §§ 18—20, there is a ^{Data.} reference to the seizure of Paros by some exiles from that island and from Siphnos; who afterwards took Siphnos, and drove out the party to which the speaker belonged. Now, from what the speaker says about his family in § 36, it is probable that he belonged to the oligarchic party, and that the successful exiles were democratic. A democratic revolution would have had most chance of success just after the sudden blow dealt to the power of Sparta—the support, throughout Greece, of oligarchy—by the defeat at Knidos in August, 394 B.C. Probably, then, the speech may be put at the end of 394 or early in 393 B.C.²

¹ This being lawful (in *all* Greek States according to § 50) when the testator had no legitimate son, and wished to leave his property away from the next of kin, who would otherwise succeed: see *Isaeos de Meneclis hered.* [Or. II.] § 13.

² Rauchenstein (Intro. to his

Select Speeches, p. 4) quotes Blass as putting the speech in 394 B.C., but without mentioning his reasons. Others put it in 402 or 401, according to Henn, *de Isocrate rhetore*, Köln, 1861: (perhaps referring the troubles in Siphnos and Paros to the effect of the Restoration at Athens in 403 B.C.).

The relationship of the persons chiefly concerned is shown by this stemma :—

Thrasyllos (by first wife)—(by second wife).

Daughter (the claimant against the speaker, § 6.)	Thrasyllochos (testator.)	Sôpolis (who died before Thrasyllochos, § 11.)	Daughter (wife of speaker, § 9.)
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Analysis.

The speaker is glad of the opportunity given him by this trial of proving publicly how much better his right to the inheritance is than that of the female claimant (§§ 1—4). He then explains the relations between the family of Thrasyllochos (the testator) and his own (§§ 5—9). From boyhood he had been intimate with Thrasyllochos, and had nursed him in his last illness. His friend showed his gratitude by adopting the speaker as his son—the necessary legal preliminary to making him his heir, and securing him against the claim of the next of kin. This proceeding is shown to be in accordance with (1) the law of Aegina, in which island Thrasyllochos and the speaker were resident when the will was made; (2) with the law of Keos, valid also in Siphnos, of which the parties were citizens; (3) with the law of the city to which the female claimant and her representatives in this action belonged. [The name of this city is nowhere stated] (§§ 10—15.)

The speaker next contrasts his own conduct towards Thrasyllochos with that of the female claimant. In the first place he had saved the very property now in question. Thrasyllochos and his brother Sôpolis, citizens of Siphnos, had, for security, placed the greater part of their fortune in the neighbouring island of Paros. Paros was suddenly seized by a party of democratic exiles, Parians and Siphnians, led by one Pasînos. At the risk of his life, the speaker sailed by night to Paros, and carried the endangered property back to Siphnos. Presently the democratic masters of Paros attacked and took Siphnos itself. The speaker—whose family belonged to the aristocracy of the island, and had even given it kings—was among those who were forced to fly. He took

with him, not only his own mother and sister, but Thrasylochos, who was then in weak health. The speaker and his family wished to remain at Melos. But Thrasylochos entreated them to accompany him to Troezen; and, though they knew the place to be unhealthy, they consented. The speaker's sister and mother died soon after their arrival. He afterwards nursed Thrasylochos through a long and distressing illness in Aegina. During that illness the half-sister of Thrasylochos, who now claims his property, never once visited him; nor, on his death, did she attend his funeral (§§ 16—33).

Her advocates do not question the genuineness of the will, but complain of it as unreasonable and unjust. It is, however, perfectly reasonable, since, by adopting the speaker as his son, Thrasylochos provided against his family being extinguished and his mother and sister left destitute. It is also just; for the speaker was in all respects best entitled to the inheritance. The choice of him as heir would have gratified Sôpolis, the late brother, and Thrasylos, the late father, of the testator (§§ 34—46). The speaker claims a verdict on the ground of his benefits to the deceased; of the will; and of the law with which the will accords (§§ 47—51).

This is perhaps the best of the extant forensic *Remarks.* speeches of Isokrates. It is almost free from the artificialism which injures more or less the effect of all the rest. The passage in which the speaker gives the proofs of his devotion to Thrasylochos (§§ 18—27) is powerful because it is clear and plain. Nowhere else does Isokrates come so near to the especial excellences of Lysias¹.

III. ACTION TO RECOVER A DEPOSIT (*παρακαταθήκης δίκη*).

1. *Against Euthynus* [Or. XXI.]—Soon after the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants, some personal

III. 1.
Against
Euthynus.

¹ Cf. Vol. I. p. 173.

enemies of Nikias the plaintiff threatened¹ to strike his name off the list of citizens and to have him enrolled for military service under Lysander. Thereupon Nikias mortgaged his house, sent his servants out of Attica, deposited the sum of three talents with the defendant Euthynus, and went to live in the country. Presently, wishing to leave Attica, he applied to Euthynus for his money. Euthynus repaid two of the three talents, but disclaimed knowledge of the third. At the time, Nikias could only complain to friends. He now brings against Euthynus an action for withholding (*ἀποστερηῆσαι*² § 16) the third part of the deposit. The speaker is a friend of the plaintiff; the date is evidently just after the restoration of the democracy, 403 B.C.³

Date.

Lysias wrote a speech, now lost, for Euthynus⁴. Diogenes Laertius also mentions a speech, in answer to that of Isokrates, by Antisthenes; which, if genuine, was probably a mere exercise⁵.

Analysis.

The speaker can show good reason for appearing as advocate of the plaintiff. Nikias is his friend, an injured man, and has no practice in speaking (§ 1). The facts of the case are then stated (§§ 2—3).

¹ As the tense expresses (§ 2)—*ἐξήλειφον—ἔεγραψον*.

² The technical word, apparently. Among his *ἀδικημάτων ὀνόματα*, Pollux gives *παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερηῆσαι* (vi. 154).

³ Paulo post Thrasymbuli et exulum in patriam reditum: Sauppe *O. A.* ii. 199.

⁴ *προς Νικίαν περὶ παρακαταθήκης*, cited by Clemens Alex. *Strom.* vi. p. 626.—Blass (*Att. Bereds.*

p. 358) and Sauppe (*O. A.* ii. 199) agree in referring it to this lawsuit.

⁵ Diog. Laert. vi. 15 *πρὸς τὸν Ἰσοκράτους ἀμάρτυρον*. Sauppe (*O. A.* ii. 167) thinks that this speech, or declamation, is directly alluded to by Isokrates, *Panegyri.* § 188, *τοὺς δὲ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητοῦντας (χρῆ) πρὸς μὲν τὴν παρακαταθήκην καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν φλυαροῦσι παύσθαι γράφοντας*.

As no one, freeman or slave, was present when Nikias deposited or demanded the money, no witness can be brought. The case for the plaintiff must rest solely on presumptive evidence (*τεκμήρια*, § 4). Now, vexatious lawsuits are usually brought by needy and fluent men against wealthy men who cannot speak. But, in this case, the defendant is poorer, and a better speaker, than the plaintiff. Again, the temptation to dishonesty was stronger for Euthynus than for Nikias; since for the former the gain was certain, but the claim of the latter might fail. The state of public affairs, too, at the time made robbery easy and redress hopeless (§§ 5—7).

Had Nikias wished to practise extortion, he would not have chosen as victim his own first-cousin Euthynus, a man, too, with little money but with many friends. Probably Euthynus himself would not have chosen out his kinsman to wrong, if the fact of the deposit had not made the opportunity too tempting (§§ 8—10). The strongest presumption for the defendant's guilt may be found in the time of the transaction. Under the Thirty, Euthynus was all-powerful. Nikias, merely on account of his wealth, was exposed to danger. Thus Timodemos extorted 30 minae from him by the simple threat of arresting him. At such a time, it is more likely that he should have been a victim than a slanderer (§§ 11—15). Euthynus will perhaps say that it is unlikely that he should have repaid two talents and withheld the third. It was just the foreseen plausibility of this argument which emboldened him. Judicious frauds of this kind are common; they ought not to be encouraged by the acquittal of Euthynus. Besides, the same argument will serve Nikias. Why, if he wished to extort money, should he not have claimed all three talents? No fraudulent motive can be assigned for his demanding only one. But the motive of Euthynus in repaying two is clear. It was notorious that Nikias had deposited a sum of money with him; but the amount of that sum was unknown. He saw, therefore, that it would be safe for him to steal a part of it, but unsafe to steal the whole (§§ 16—21).

Remarks.

Philostratos reckons this ‘unattested’¹ speech one of the two best of Isokrates, praising it for a temperate and compact power of expression², as he praises the *Archidamos* for brilliancy and spirit. The choice may seem arbitrary; but at least there is no adequate ground for doubting the genuineness of the speech against Euthynus. Benseler thinks it spurious; first and chiefly, because the examples of hiatus are stronger and more frequent than he can conceive Isokrates admitting; then, on account of the short, compact periods³. But surely the canons observed by Isokrates in his mature style cannot be applied so rigorously to early works, especially when these are forensic. The composition of the *Aeginetikos* offers a contrast as strong as possible to that (for instance) of the *Panegyrikos*, and yet the authenticity of the *Aeginetikos* is thoroughly well attested.

III. 2. *Trapezitikos*.

2. *Trapezitikos* [Or. XVII.]—A subject of Satyros, king of Bosporos⁴, brings an action against the

¹ Entitled in the MSS. πρὸς Εὐθύνοῦν ἀμάρτυρος, and cited by Philostratos simply as ὁ ἀμάρτυρος.

² Phil. *Vit. Soph.* i. 17, ὁ δ' ἀμάρτυρος ἰσχὺν ἐνδείκνυται κεκολασμένην πρὸς ῥυθμούς· νόημα γὰρ ἐκ νοήματος ἐς περιόδους ἰσοκώλους τελευτᾷ.

³ Bens. *de hiatus* p. 56, Isocratem contenderim ne potuisse quidem... tam foedus hiatus admittere [e.g. § 2, ἐπειδὴ οἱ τριάκοντα—§ 4 ἀνάγκη ἐκ τεκμηρίων—§ 11, διενόθη ἀδικεῖν].—Again: ‘Tota brevium sententiarum conformatio non Isocratea est’. Benseler is answered by Henn *de Isocrate rhetore* (Köln, 1861) p. 10 f.

⁴ It was to this Satyros that the Mantitheos of Lysias *Or.* xvi. (§ 4) was sent by his father.—Panticaepaeum (also called Bosporos) in the Tauric Chersonese, on the W. shore of the Kimmerian Bosporos, was founded by Miletos about 550 B.C. It became the chief town of the kingdom of Bosporos; of which the territory stretched west, along the coast, about 50 miles to Theodosia, another colony of Miletus; and also included parts of the east coast of the strait. The first dynasty of Bosporian kings, the Archaeanaktidae, began to reign about 480 B.C. according to Clinton. Satyros I. reigned from 407 to 393

banker Pasion, for the recovery of money alleged to have been placed in Pasion's hands. The details of the case are reserved for the analysis of the speech itself.

Two points fix the date. (1) The Lacedæmonian supremacy on the sea is spoken of as a thing of the past (§ 36); that is, the time is after the battle of Knidos, August 394 B.C. (2) Satyros I. of Bosporos is alive (§ 57): but he died at the siege of Theudosia in 393 B.C.¹ The speech belongs, then, to the end of 394 or early part of 393 B.C.

'An action of this class is always difficult to maintain. *Analysis.* The business between a banker and his customer is transacted without witnesses; and the banker usually commands money, friends, and credit (§§ 1—2). The facts of this case are as follows. I came to Athens, partly for pleasure, partly for business, having been sent out with two cornships by my father, who is governor of a large district, under Satyros, prince of Bosporos. I was introduced to Pasion and opened an account with him. Meanwhile my father had been arrested by Satyros on suspicion of treason. Some men from the Euxine who were at Athens received the orders of Satyros to take possession of all my property and to send me home. In this difficulty I consulted Pasion and decided to give up a small sum to the agents of Satyros, but to deny the existence of the larger sums which I had lying in Pasion's bank. To help the deception, Pasion was to represent me, not only as having no balance, but as owing money to himself and others. Having arranged matters with the agents of Satyros, I prepared to set out upon my homeward voyage, and applied to Pasion for my money. He told me that he had not the means of re-

B.C. [See Clinton *F. H.* II., Appendix XIII., on the Kings of Bosporus.]

¹ Diod. xiv. 93. Rauchenstein, *Introd.*

funding it just then. I then sent to him my friends Philomelos and Menexenos; and to them he repudiated the debt altogether (§§ 3—10).

‘Presently news came that my father was restored to the favour of Satyros. Pasion, aware that there was now no longer any reason why legal proceedings should not be openly taken against him, hid his slave Kittos, who knew the truth. When Menexenos demanded that Kittos should be given up, Pasion retorted that we ourselves had made away with him, after bribing him to give us money from the bank. Presently, however, Kittos was found in Athens by Menexenos, who then demanded that he should be given up by Pasion for torture. Pasion at first asserted that Kittos was a freeman. Subsequently, however, he consented to submit him to the question: but, when we met for that purpose, refused to allow torture to be applied (§§ 11—16).

‘Finding that his conduct was blamed by everyone, he next sought a private interview with me. He pleaded poverty as the cause which had forced him to deny the debt. He then gave me a bond that he would accompany me to the Euxine and there pay the money—thus avoiding a scandal at Athens. The bond, which stipulated that, if we could not come to an agreement, Satyros should arbitrate, was placed in the hands of Pyron of Pherae, a merchant in the Euxine trade. In the event of an amicable settlement, he was to burn it; otherwise, to place it in the hands of Satyros (§§ 17—20).

‘Meanwhile Menexenos had upon his own account brought an action for libel against Pasion. Pasion was now terrified lest Menexenos should get hold of our bond. He implored my mediation, which I refused. Desperate, he bribed the slaves of Pyron, and found means of tampering with the bond. He then became defiant, and refused to go with me to the Euxine or to pay the money. When the bond was opened before witnesses, it was found to release Pasion from all claims on my part (§§ 21—23).

‘Pasion will rely much on this forged document. That it is a forgery, is evident (1) from the terms of the docu-

ment itself; (2) from the absence of motive on my part for giving such a release; (3) from my daring to come into court now; (4) from Pasion's eagerness, before he had tampered with the bond, to have it cancelled. Such frauds are common. Last year, Pythodorus, a friend of Pasion, opened the balloting-urn of the Senate, and changed the names of those who had been nominated as judges in the festal contests. (§§ 22—34.)

'Or perhaps Pasion will contend that I had no money at all here. Among other things which disprove this is the fact that he himself became security for me in seven talents when a vessel upon which I had lent money was denounced as being the property of a Delian, and was in danger of being put to death untried. In a word,—which is more probable—that, at a moment when I was helpless, I should have brought a false charge against Pasion, or that he should have been emboldened to defraud me? (§§ 35—50.)

'Ultimately Pasion did not go himself to the Bosporos, but sent Kittus as his agent. Satyros declined to give a judgment, but took my part, and wrote in my behalf to Athens. It is the clearest argument for my claim that Pasion declined my challenge to have his slave tortured. Consider the strength of my cause; remember the benefits of Satyros and his father [Spartakos I.] to Athens, for whose sake he has often sent away empty the corn-ships of other States,—and give just sentence in my favour.' (§§ 51—58.)

The *Trapezitikos* has a special interest as illustrating the relations between Athens and the kingdom of Bosporos,—relations which remained no less friendly under the successors of Satyros I.¹ Benseler

¹ Satyros I. was succeeded in 393 by his son Leukon, who reigned till 353. Leukon received the citizenship of Athens, and on his part granted exemption from the tax on exports ($\frac{1}{30}$ th, *τριακοστή*) to Athenian corn-ships: Dem. *in Lept.* §§ 29 ff. In the time of

Demosthenes, about 400,000 medimni of corn (roughly, 600,000 bushels) came to Athens yearly from the Bosporos (*ib.*). The Satyros mentioned by Deinarchos (Or. I. § 43) and called *τύραννος*, is probably Satyros II., who did not come to the throne till 310 B.C.,

believes this speech, like the last, to be spurious. His ground is the frequency of hiatus¹. The *Trapezitikos* is, however, cited by Dionysios, not merely as genuine, but as the typical forensic work of Isokrates²; and is thrice named by Harpokration without suspicion³. It has been further asked—Was this a mere declamation⁴? There is nothing whatever to prove it; and one point is against it. Pasion, the banker, bore a high character at Athens⁵. The writer of a declamation would not have selected him as the object of an imaginary charge of fraud.

IV. ACTION FOR DAMAGE (*δίκη βλάβης*).

IV. Con-
cerning the
Team of
Horses.

Concerning the Team of Horses (*περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους*).
[Or. XVI.]—The speaker is the younger Alkibiades⁶. Tisias, an Athenian citizen, alleges that the elder

but who at that time (324 B.C.) may have shared the power of his father Paerisades.

¹ Bens. *de hiatus* pp. 54 ff.

² *De Isocr.* cc. 18—20. In c. 19, *Trapez.* §§ 1—14 are quoted and criticised. See above, p. 59.

³ s.vv. *δημόκοιμος*, *καρκίνος*, *σκηνίτης*.—Blass, *Att. Bereds.* II. 211—214, affirms the genuineness.

⁴ Both this and the speech Against Euthynus are apparently thought to be declamations by Benseler (l. c.) who gives no reasons. The same view is noticed, and rejected, in a good essay on this speech (*de Isocratis Orationibus Forensibus Commentationis Specimen* I.) by Hermann Starke, Berlin, 1845.

⁵ Demosthenes praises Pasion, (with whom his father had dealings, *In Aphob.* I. § 11,) even in the speech For Phormio, where he is attacking Apollodoros, Pasion's son (*Pro Phorm.* §§ 43—48).

⁶ In *Lys. Or.* XIV. (*κατ' Ἀλκιβιάδου* A.) § 28, Francken alters *αὐτῆς* to *αὐτοῦ*, making the Hipponikos mentioned there the brother of the younger Alkibiades; and thinks that it was for this Hipponikos that Isokrates wrote the speech. He is led to this view by a fancied discrepancy between the age of the speaker in *Lysias Or.* XIV. and the speaker here. But no son of Alkibiades named Hipponikos is anywhere mentioned. (*Comment. Lys.* p. 107 f.)

Alkibiades had robbed him of a team of four horses¹, and sues the son for their value.

The charge has a close likeness to another mentioned elsewhere. Alkibiades had entered seven four-horse chariots at the Olympic festival². One of these chariots had originally belonged to the city of Argos. Diomedes, an Athenian, had commissioned Alkibiades to buy it for him from the Argives; Alkibiades had done so, and had then entered it as his own. Plutarch identifies the case of Diomedes with this case of Tisias³. From § 49 of our speech it appears that the horses had won a victory for Alkibiades at Olympia, and in § 1 he is said to have bought them from Argos⁴.

Tisias could not charge Alkibiades the son with complicity in a fraud committed before he was born; he must therefore have brought against him simply an action for damage⁵. The damages were

¹ Ζεύγος must mean *quadrigae*, as the race for two horses (*συνωρίς*) at Olympia was first held in Ol. 93. 1, 408 B.C.: Diod. XIII. 75.

² Of Ol. 91, 416 B.C., according to Blass (*Att. Bereds.* II. 205): of Ol. 90, 420 B.C., acc. to Grote (VII. 76 n.) and Cox (*Hist. Gr.* II. 293): of Ol. 89, 424 B.C., acc. to Thirlwall (III. 316). I incline to 416 B.C.

³ Plut. *Alcib.* c. 12. After telling the story about Diomedes, he adds—*φαίνεται δὲ καὶ δίκη συστάσα περὶ τούτου, καὶ λόγος Ἰσοκράτει γέγραπται περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου παιδός, ἐν ᾧ Τισίας ἐστίν, οὐ Διομήδης ὁ δικασάμενος*. There are two other versions of the wrong done by Alkibiades to Diomedes.

(1) According to Diod. XIII. 74, Alkibiades was joint-owner with Diomedes, but left out the latter's name in entering the chariot for the race. (2) According to [Andok.] *in Alc.* § 26 Alkibiades took the horses from Diomedes by force—screened by his influence with the Elean *ἀγωνόθεται*. Hermann Starke, in his Commentary on this Speech and Or. XVIII., p. 16, identifies the cases of Tisias and Diomedes.

⁴ The substitution of 'Diomedes' for 'Tisias' may have been due, Blass suggests (*Att. Ber.* II. 205), to Ephoros (see above p. 48), from whom Diodoros probably got it.

⁵ Cf. Demosth. *πρὸς Ναυσίμαχον*

laid at five talents (§ 46). The defendant says (*ib.*) that, if cast in the suit, he will be disfranchised. This means that, as he was unable to pay, an action of ejectment (ἐξούλησις) would be brought against him: if cast in this, he would have to pay to the Treasury a sum equal to the original damages; and, failing to do this, he would be disfranchised (ἄπιμος) as a state-debtor.

Date.

In § 45 the speaker says that he was born just before his father's banishment (in 415 B. C.); that is, at the end of 416 or early in 415 B. C. The action could not have been brought against him until he was eighteen years old; *i. e.* until the end of 398 or the beginning of 397 B. C. On the other hand, not much time would have been lost in bringing it. The date, then, is probably 397 B. C.¹—about two years earlier than that of the Lysian speeches 'Against Alkibiades'².

The speech, as extant, appears to be mutilated at the beginning,—the lost part having contained the statement of the facts, followed by the citation of evidence³. The speaker now passes to a general defence of his father's life.

καὶ Χενοπείθην [Or. xxxviii.]. Nausimachos and Xenopeithes accused their guardian of malversation in his trust. After his death, they brought an action against his sons. But this was not a δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς: it was simply a δίκη βλάβης.

¹ The year 396 is assumed by Sauppe, *ap.* Rauchenstein, *Introd.* to *Select Speeches* (p. 4); by Krüger *ad* Clinton, *F. H.* sub anno Ol. 96. 1.: and by Hermann Starke

in his *Commentary* on this Speech and the *πρὸς Καλλιμάχον*, p. 21.

² Vol. I. p. 256.

³ In the Urbino MS. of Isokrates, according to Bekker, the words *μησθεῖς ἦδη* in § 320 of Or. xv. are immediately followed by the words *τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγῶσι* in § 3 of Or. xvi., though there is no mark of a lacuna. From this, Sauppe infers that a page or more was wanting in the archetype

The specific charge against him, the defendant says, has *Analysis.* now been disproved. It has been shown on the evidence of the ambassadors from Argos, and of others acquainted with the facts, that his father had bought the yoke of horses in question from the city of Argos, and had not taken them by force from Tisias the plaintiff. But, as usual, the defendant's appearance in a private lawsuit has been made an opportunity for slandering his father's political career. No vindication of that conduct will be required by the older men present. For the sake of the younger, however, the facts shall be briefly stated. (§§ 1—4.)

Alkibiades was the victim of the men who concerted the Revolution of the Four Hundred. Finding that he would not come into their schemes, they brought against him the two most odious charges which they could devise,—that of profaning the Mysteries, and that of undermining the democracy. Their accusations broke down; and he was appointed commander of the expedition to Sicily. In his absence, they again caballed against him. Sentenced to an unjust banishment, he still respected the welfare of Athens. He went to Argos and lived quietly there, until the persecution kept up by his enemies at home at last drove him to Sparta. The acts imputed to him—his having caused Dekeleia to be fortified, having thrown the islands into revolt, having guided the tactics of Sparta—admit either of denial or of justification. Athenian citizens, who tasted the bitterness of banishment under the Thirty, ought to sympathise with an exile who was eager to return. Let them remember, too, what Alkibiades was before his banishment—how, with 200 hoplites, he gained for Athens the greatest cities of the Peloponnesus,—and how he commanded in Sicily. Again, let them remember what was the position of affairs at the moment when they received him back. The democracy had fallen; the democratic army at Samos regarded the oligarchic rulers of Athens as worse enemies than the Spartans; and the

of our MSS. The title ΜΑΡΤΥ-
ΡΙΑΙ probably stood, he thinks,
before what now remains of Or.
xvi. (*Or. Att.* i. 291.) The style

of the opening is, as Blass says
(*Att. Ber.* ii. 206), decisive against
the theory that the speech is a
δευτερολογία.

oligarchs were seeking help from the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. The Persian king was paying the Spartan fleet; and 90 Phoenician ships were at Aspendos. Then it was that the generals sent for Alkibiades. Instead of disdaining them, he came at their call, and restored the prosperity of Athens at home and abroad. (§§ 5—22.)

It remains to speak of his private life—after a word as to his descent. On the paternal side, he sprang from the Eupatridae,—on the maternal, from the Alkmaeonidae—a family, one of whose members, Alkmaeon, was the first winner of a chariot-race at Olympia,—a family which was true to the people throughout the forty years of the Peisistratid tyranny, and which produced the leaders under whom the tyrants were overthrown. Alkibiades, whose father fell at Koroneia (great-grandson of him just named), became the ward of Perikles. On reaching the age for military service, he distinguished himself as one of 1000 picked hoplites whom Phormio led into Thrace. He afterwards married the daughter of Hipponikos,—whose hand was another prize won by him from many competitors. About the same time he conducted a sacred embassy to Olympia; and scorning to excel as a common athlete, sought a more splendid triumph in the chariot race. He entered more and better teams than the greatest State could have afforded; and gained the first, second, and third places. As regards his other public services, they might have been less brilliantly performed, and yet have formed the glory of other men: but to praise him for them would be trivial. (§§ 23—35.)

His loyalty to the democracy was proved by his sufferings. His banishment was the first preparation for the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and the first consequence of the oligarchy of the Thirty. His interests were, indeed, closely bound up with yours. The Tyrants knew this; and while they drove others from Athens, drove Alkibiades from Hellas; thinking that it would be vain to level the walls, unless they removed him who could restore them. Among those Tyrants was Charikles, brother-in-law of Tisias. Tisias himself was a senator under the Thirty, and yet dares, in this instance, to violate an amnesty which alone protects his own life. (§§ 36—44.)

The defendant appeals to the pity of the judges. He has had experience enough of troubles. He was not four years old when his father was banished,—his mother being already dead—and was then in danger of his life. He was still a boy when he was driven from Athens by the Thirty; and at the restoration of the democracy, was prevented by his enemies from benefiting by the grant of land made to those whose property had been confiscated. The damages are now laid at five talents. He is too poor to pay this, and will therefore be disfranchised. The father's victory at Olympia ought not to have for a result the son's disgrace,—a citizen who has ere now lost his privileges in the cause of the people ought not again to lose them by the people's vote. (§§ 45—49.)

Isokrates marks elsewhere his admiration for the *Remarks.* genius of the elder Alkibiades¹; and the praise given to him here, one-sided though it is, was probably not due merely to the partiality of an advocate. It has been suggested that so strong an eulogy of so unpopular a man can hardly have been written for delivery in court, and that the speech, as it stands, must have been retouched². Rather in this very offence against forensic persuasion, and in the thoroughly epideictic character of the whole, we may recognise the first, and not the second, thoughts of Isokrates. Lysias took some verbal hints from this speech when (in 396 or 395) he wrote for the nephews of Nikias³. It is interesting to contrast our speech with that Against Alkibiades of the pseudo-Andokides⁴,

¹ See *Philippos* [Or. v.] §§ 61, xviii. § 3 with Isokr. Or. xvi. § 21. 67: *Busiris* [Or. xi.] § 5. In Lys. § 4 compared with Isokr.

² Rauchenstein, *Schweizer. Mus.* § 5, Lys. § 4 with Isokr. § 46, &c., (1862), p. 277 f., *ap. Blass Att. Ber.* the imitation is less close, but still manifest. i. 490 and ii. 207.

³ Compare especially Lys. Or. ⁴ Vol. i. p. 133.

and with the two speeches of Lysias¹. In all four there is much wild misrepresentation; but together they are aids to estimating a man whom neither enemies nor friends could describe with moderation.

V. SPECIAL PLEA (*παραγραφή*).

V. *Against Kallimachos.*

Against Kallimachos [Or. xviii.]—Kallimachos had brought against the defendant an Action for Damage (*δίκη βλάβης*). The defendant has entered a Special Plea to show that the action is not maintainable.

The facts of the case are these. In 403 B. C., during the short reign of the Ten who succeeded the Thirty, Patrokles, the Archon Basileus, denounced Kallimachos for having in his possession a sum of money which was liable to confiscation, as being the property of a man who had joined the exiles in the Peiraeus. The Ten referred the case to the Senate, and the Senate decided that the money should be confiscated. On the restoration of the democracy, Kallimachos brought an action (1) against Patrokles, from whom he recovered ten minae; (2) against one Lysimachos, from whom he recovered two minae; (3) against the defendant. The defendant compromised the case, paying two minae; and this compromise was sanctioned by the award of an arbitrator² chosen

¹ Vol. i. p. 256.

² § 10 *δίαιταν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς ἐπέ-
τρέψαμεν Νικομάχῳ Βατῆθεν*. It was first agreed between Kallimachos and the defendant that the latter should pay two minae. They then chose Nikomachos arbitrator. He had no discretionary power. His business was simply to give the formal sanction of an

arbitrator's award to the terms already settled between the parties. This is the meaning of *δίαιτα ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς*, 'Arbitration *under terms*.' Cf. Or. xvii. § 19, *εἰ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ποιήσειε (Πασίων), διάιταν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς ἐπέτρεπε Σατύρῳ, ἐφ' ᾧ τε καταγιγνώσκειν ἡμίολι' αὐτοῦ τὰ χρήματα*.

by the parties. Such an award was a bar to further litigation. Notwithstanding this, Kallimachos presently sued the defendant for 100 minae on the same account. The defendant brought a witness to show that the action was barred by the previous arbitration. Kallimachos was then bound to prove that the witness was perjured. He did not attempt to do this, but, favoured by the Archon, merely brought his action afresh.

The defendant now avails himself of the new law *Form.* of Archinos, passed soon after the Restoration of the democracy. This provided that any person, against whom an action was brought in violation of the Amnesty, should be allowed to enter a Special Plea (*παραγραφή*); that such Plea should be heard before the cause was tried; and that the bringer of the Plea should speak first¹. If either party failed to obtain $\frac{1}{5}$ th of the votes on the Special Plea, he was liable to the fine of the *epôbelia* ($\frac{1}{5}$ th of the damages originally laid²). As the original Action for Damage would have been tried under the presidency of the Thesmothetae, these would be presidents of the court at the hearing of the Special Plea also.

¹ It seems probable that the *παραγραφή* itself, as a form of proceeding, came into existence with the law of Archinos; being at first limited to alleged breaches of the Amnesty, and afterwards extended to other grounds of exception. The older term for a special objection to the adversary's course of proceeding seems to have been *ἀντιγραφή* or *ἐξωμοσία*. (See C. R. Kennedy in the *Dict. Ant.* s. v.

Paragraphe.)

² Kallimachos is said to be threatened with *ἀτιμία* (§ 35) in the same sense as Alkibiades in Or. xvi. § 46: *i. e.* if he could not pay the damages, he would incur a *δίκη ἐξούλης*; if cast in this, a fine to the treasury; and for non-payment of the fine, registration as a public debtor, which implied *ἀτιμία*.

Date.

The Amnesty of 403 is recent (§ 29); on the other hand, there has been time for examples of that tendency to violate it which led to the measure of Archinos (§ 2). Probably the speech may be referred to the year 402 B.C.¹

Analysis.

The Special Plea is a novelty, and its form must be explained. The speaker then states the law of Archinos. He can show that Kallimachos has violated the Amnesty; that the charge is untrue in itself; and that the matter in dispute had already been settled by arbitration. (§§ 1—4.)

A narrative of the facts follows. (§§ 5—12.)

‘Kallimachos intends,’ the defendant goes on, ‘to deny that any arbitration took place. It is not likely, he will say, that he should have chosen as referee my friend Nikomachos; or that he should have taken two minae in payment for a hundred. But the terms of the reference left no discretionary power to Nikomachos; and it is not surprising that a claimant who had no real case at all should have been satisfied by two minae. Even, however, if there had been no arbitration; even if no witnesses could be brought; you could infer the truth from my past character. When the oligarchy was strongest,—when injustice was easiest,—I never assailed the fortunes or life of any citizen, nor struck any one off the civic list to place him upon the muster-roll of Lysander. Is it likely that I should have dared to do so when the oligarchy was tottering? (§§ 11—18.)

‘This is enough to show that the accusation is untrue. It can also be shown that the action is illegal. The Amnesty, and the oaths which ratified it, shall be read to you.

¹ § 29 ὑπόγειον γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξ ὧν
...εἰς ὄρκους καὶ συνθήκας κατεφύ-
γομεν, ὥς εἰ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τολμῶεν
παραβαίνειν, σφόδρ' ἂν ἕκαστος
ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειε. Weissenborn,
quoted by Hermann Starke (*Com-
mentatio*, p. 12, note 24), points
out that the latter clause implies

a time so soon after the troubles
that Athens still lay at the mercy
of Sparta. Blass (*Att. Ber.* II. 196)
takes 399 B.C.: Pfund and Benseler
(*ib.*) 397; Sanneg, 400; Rehdantz,
403—400; Krüger (*ap.* Starke)
400.

Kallimachos thinks to set aside the compact thus solemnly sworn to. Yet when Philon of Koelê was accused of malversation upon an embassy, and had no defence to offer, that compact protected him. And it deters your most influential citizens, Thrasybulos and Anytos, from claiming great sums of which they were robbed from those whom they know to be answerable. Do not allow Kallimachos to break an agreement which has been salutary to all Athens. Your verdict will affect the credit of public compacts generally. It is by these that civilized life is held together; in these, when we had been conquered by Sparta, we found refuge; and it would be ill for us if Sparta were to break her oaths. But how can we be trusted abroad if we violate pledges given among ourselves? You try this cause under two oaths—that which all judges take, and that which ratified the public amnesty. (§§ 19—34.)

‘Kallimachos will bewail his poverty and his peril; he will inveigh against the crimes of the oligarchy. The plea of poverty is no defence for a slanderer who has brought peril upon himself; the crimes of the oligarchy are irrelevant. (§§ 35—41.) Men will infer from your verdict whether the Amnesty is, or is not, to be observed. You yourselves know that that Amnesty has brought us peace and honour in exchange for an infamous civil war. (§§ 42—46.) Shall it be broken by a man of such life as Kallimachos? During the ten years of our war with Sparta, he kept away from us. When the Thirty came to power, he returned to Athens. When they were about to fall, he went to the Peiræus; when the Spartan army had blockaded the exiles there, he fled to Boeotia. You do not know him as I do. Kratinos once had a lawsuit for a farm with the brother-in-law of Kallimachos. A personal encounter took place; and the brother-in-law of Kallimachos swore that a female slave of his had died of a blow received from Kratinos during the fray. Kratinos allowed them to bring their action; and, as soon as Kallimachos had sworn that the woman was dead, produced her alive. That such a man should accuse others of falsehood is as if Phrynondas should say that his neighbours are blackguards; or, Philurgos, the stealer of the

Gorgon's head, should tax his neighbours with sacrilege. (§§ 47—57.)

‘But there will be other opportunities of denouncing Kallimachos; I wish now to recall one of my own merits. When our fleet was lost at Aegospotami, I was one of the few trierarchs who saved their ships; and the only one who, on returning to the Peiraeus, did not lay down his trierarchy. In partnership with my brother, I continued to serve, bringing corn to Athens in defiance of Lysander's prohibition. For this you crowned us—at a time when crowns were less common than they now are. Remember the contrast between Kallimachos and me; remember the Amnesty; and decide in the interests of justice and of Athens.’ (§§ 58—68.)

Remarks.

The genuineness of the speech has been doubted by some modern critics; one, at least, of whom is inclined to ascribe it to Isaeos¹. In uniform plainness, indeed, it differs even more decidedly than the Aeginetikos from the latter writings of Isokrates. But this plainness accords with his own forensic ideal as hinted in the Panathenaikos²; and, instead of proving anything against the authenticity, rather

¹ Fulvius Ursinus (*Virgilius cum Graecis scriptoribus collatus*, p. 230—quoted by Hermann Starke, *Comment.* p. 2) gives it to Isaeos on the ground of style. Spengel (*συν. τεχνῶν*, p. ix.) seems inclined to agree with him—‘si modo haec Isoeratis est; Ursino Fulvio Isaeus auctor videtur.’ Dobreë has merely—‘Qu. an Isoeratis’ (*Adv.* i. 281). Starke quotes Fabricius, *Bibl. Gr.* ii. p. 789, as pointing out that these doubts probably arise from the fact that in Harpokration s. v. ‘Πίνων, where the speech is quoted, Ἰσαῖος was a false reading for Ἰσοκράτης. Under δέκα καὶ δε-

καδοῦχος Harpokr. quotes Ἰσοκράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Καλλ. παραγραφῇ without suspicion: and so the Schol. to Ar. *Nub.* 1134.

² In *Panath.* § 1 he describes forensic speeches as τοὺς ἀπλῶς δοκοῦντας εἰρησθαι καὶ μηδεμίᾳ κομψότητος μετέχοντας. It is true that, there, he is describing the styles which (he says) he had not cultivated. But, assuming that he *did* write some forensic speeches, then probably—when most careful—he would have given them the characteristics which he recognises as distinctive of their class.

tends to show that his manner cannot be inferred from one period only of his work. The closeness and detail of technical argument, especially in §§ 1—41, is certainly like Isaeos. But this was made necessary by the complexity of the facts and by the very nature of the paragraphê, turning, as it did, upon the question of form.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ISOKRATES.

WORKS.

LETTERS. FRAGMENTS.

THE nine¹ Letters of Isokrates may best be taken in their probable chronological order.

1. *Letter I.,
To Dionysios.*

1. *To Dionysios* [Ep. I.]—This is the proem of a letter to Dionysios the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to 367 B.C., urging him to interfere, for

¹ The letter beginning *πρόπομποι καὶ ῥαβδούχοι, κ.τ.λ.*, which is printed in the older editions, with the heading ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΩΙ, as the Tenth Letter of Isokrates, is not his. It is by Theophylact Simocatta (flor. 610—629 A.D.) in whose extant collection of 85 letters it stands 79th. By a strange mistake it was added to the letters of Isokrates in the Basel edition of 1546; and, with a stranger negligence, it was retained in every subsequent edition until Baiter and Sauppe, in their *Oratores Attici* (1839—43), set the example of expelling it. See their Preface to the text of Isokrates, p. vi.—This is the substance of the Byzantine letter:—‘Escorts, ushers, heralds, the acquisition of a great throne are a

mist upon philosophy, a severance from virtue. You have not changed your nature with your fortune; the shell which encases your spirit is still fleshly; why, then, are you so puffed up with vainglory? The soaring flights of your fortune have taken you out of your old sphere of quiet thought—have quelled your sober madness of philosophy. Of old you were sublime in your humility; now you are low and earthy in your high estate. Resign, then, this false prosperity; desert the fortune which will desert you; for, if you are beforehand with the heartless goddess, you will not grieve when the change comes on you suddenly.’ (§§ 1—2.)

the common good, in the affairs of Greece. The fragment breaks off just as Isokrates is going to explain the purpose for which he asks this interference. But the purpose, which could hardly have been doubtful, is expressly stated in the *Philippos* (§ 8). Isokrates wished Dionysios to undertake the work which he had already¹ pressed on Athens and Sparta and which he afterwards pressed on Archidamos and on Philip—the leading of united Greece against Persia. *Object of the Letter.*

Three points are helps towards fixing the date. *Date.*
 (1) Isokrates is too old and infirm² for a voyage to Sicily: § 1. (2) The Spartan supremacy is past; the Carthaginians are in such a plight as to be thankful if they can keep their own territory: § 8. (3) Friendly relations exist between Dionysios and Athens. Now the references in § 8 might be applied to the latter part of 394 B.C.; in which year the defeat at Knidos destroyed at least the naval supremacy of Sparta, and Dionysios imposed an humiliating peace upon Imilkon. But in 394 B.C. Isokrates was only forty-two. And the good understanding between Dionysios and Athens was not established before 369 B.C.³ The time indicated is

¹ In § 129 of the *Philippos* (346 B.C.) Isokrates says that he had urged Athens to lead Greece before he had asked any other power to do so. If this was taken literally, it would show that the Letter to Dionysios is later than the Panyirikos; i. e. than 380 B.C. Such an indication could not safely be used as an independent argument. But it may be noticed as agreeing

with the hypothesis about the date advanced below.

² § 1, *προσπερίρηκα*—in which, as the context shows, the *προ* does not mean 'before my natural time,' but 'before the destined time for the war against Persia.'

³ When Dionysios began to take part with Athens and the Peloponnesian allies in the war against Thebes. As to the Athenian flat-

more probably 368 B.C. In that year Dionysios was again at war with the Carthaginians, and was at first, though not finally, successful¹. This letter may have been written at the time when the report of his first successes had reached Athens. Three years before, the Spartan empire had been finally overthrown at Leuktra.

Analysis. 'Were I a younger man, I would not have written but come to you. Written advice is at many disadvantages as compared with oral. But I trust that these disadvantages will be neutralised by your interest in the substance of my letter. Some have pretended that you prefer flatterers to advisers; but I do not believe that your pre-eminence in counsel and in action could have been reached if you had not been willing to gather the best thoughts of every mind. (§§ 1—4.) Do not take this letter for a rhetorical composition. Had display been my object, I should have sought my audience at some great festival. But my object is practical; I want a certain thing done, and therefore address the man who is able to do it. Purposing to give counsel for the welfare of Hellas, to whom ought I to speak but to the first of Hellenes? The time is opportune for such counsel. While Sparta was at the head of Hellas, you could not have interfered in our affairs without adding rivalry with Sparta to your actual struggle against Carthage. Now Carthage has been humbled; and Athens is ready to be your ally. (§§ 5—8.) Do not think it strange if one

teries of Dionysios at this time, see Schäfer, *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, i. 80.

¹ Grote, ch. 83, vol. xi. p. 61.—Dobree (*Adv.* i. p. 283) thinks that the Letter is written 'ad Dionysium iuniozem, sub regni initia' [i. e. 367 B.C.]. But in 367 the statement regarding Carthage would have been much too strong. Nor has Dobree observed that § 8

excludes the supposition of the Letter being addressed to the younger Dionysios:—ὄτε μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶχον, οὐ ῥάδιον ἦν ἐπιμελεθῆναί σοι τῶν περὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον, οὐδὲ τοῦτοις ἐναντία πράττειν ἅμα καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πολεμεῖν. Sparta lost the ἀρχή four years before the younger Dionysios came to the throne.

who is neither statesman nor general presumes to speak in the cause of Hellas, and to you. I can at least claim a share of culture, and of that culture which concerns itself with the greatest questions. But you shall at once judge for yourself whether my advice is worth any thing...’ (§§ 9—10.)

2. *To the Children of Jason.* [Ep. VI.]—Jason, ^{2. Letter VI., To the Children of Jason.} tyrant of Pherae and tagos of Thessaly, was assassinated in Ol. 102. 3, 370 B.C. The facts known about his successors may be summed up thus¹:—

370. On the death of Jason, his brothers Polydoros and Polyphron become joint tagoi. Polydoros is soon afterwards murdered by Polyphron.

369. Alexander, son of Polydoros, murders Polyphron and reigns in his stead.

359². Alexander is murdered, at the instigation of his wife Thebe (daughter of Jason), by her half-brothers Tisiphonos, Peitholaos and Lykophron. Thebe and Tisiphonos share the chief power.

358. Tisiphonos dies. Lykophron and Peitholaos presently avail themselves of the distraction caused by the Phocian (or ‘Sacred’) War, 357 B.C., to establish a joint tyranny³.

352. Philip of Macedon deposes Lykophron and frees Pherae from the tyranny.

This letter of Isokrates was written to Thebe and her half-brothers, the children of Jason⁴, in

¹ See esp. Diod. xv. 60, xvi. 14: Xen. *Hellen.* vi. iv. 33.

² Diodoros (xvi. 14) puts the death of Alexander in the year of Agathokles, 357 $\frac{1}{2}$ B.C.; but see Clinton, *F. H.* vol. II., sub anno 359, and Appendix xv. on Alex-

ander of Pherae: also Schäfer, *Dem.* I. p. 133, note 2.

³ See Schäfer, *Dem.* I. p. 457.

⁴ Plut. *Pelop.* c. 28, Θήβη, θυγάτηρ μὲν Ἰάσονος οὖσα γυνὴ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου.

359 B.C., soon after the death of Alexander. In §§ 7—14 Isokrates counsels the persons whom he addresses, and whom flatterers were ‘spurring on to despotism’ (ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννίδα παροξύνοντες, § 12), to think whether it is better to have honour from willing or from unwilling citizens. This is exactly illustrated by Diodoros, who says of Thebe and her brothers—‘At first they had great acceptance as despot-slayers; but afterwards they changed their minds,—made a bargain with hireling troops, and set themselves up as despots; and after putting out of the way many of those who wrought against them, and equipping their power to a noteworthy strength, seized the government¹.’ Isokrates wrote before they had wholly ‘changed their minds.’ The Athenian embassy noticed in § 1 had doubtless been prompted by the hope that the government of Pherae was about to become more democratic².

Analysis. ‘One of our envoys has brought me word that you asked

¹ Diod. xvi. 14.

² Through not observing the fact that Thebe and her brothers were the *children of Jason*, some have made the mistake of supposing this Letter to have been written in 370 B.C.—eleven years before its real date. Thus Dobree says (*Adv.* I. 284)—‘Statim, ut videtur, post Jasonis mortem, Olymp. 102. 3. Ait Diodorus xv. 60 successisse Jasoni fratrem Polydorum; fortasse sub specie tutoris.’ In a modern Greek edition of Isokrates (vol. II. of the ‘Ἑλληνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, Didot), the commentator says—εἰκὸς οὖν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην γεγράφθαι αὐτίκα

μετὰ τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς θάνατον τοῖς παισίν, ἢ γοῦν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς αὐτῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ἔτει, ὅπερ συμβαίνει τῷ τριακοστῷ ἐξηκοστῷ ἐννάτῳ [he ought to have said, τῷ τριακοστῷ ἐβδομηκοστῷ] πρὸ Χριστοῦ (p. 310). Blass (*Att. Ber.* II. 272) does not notice that Thebe was daughter of Jason; and supposes the παῖδες Ἰάσονος to be distinct persons from Thebe and her brothers. In the interval between the murder of Alexander and the setting up of the new tyranny, these sons of Jason may (Blass thinks) have been temporarily strong, and Athens may thus have been led to send envoys to them.

him privately whether I could be induced to take up my abode with you. For the sake of my friendship with Jason and Polyalkes I would gladly consent; but many things hinder me. First, old age. It would ill become me to leave Athens now, when, were I abroad, I ought to be hastening back to die. Next, to say the truth, I fear Athens. Her alliances, I see, are shortlived. Should her alliance with you prove so, I, who live among you, would incur at least the shame of siding with friends against friends. (§§ 1—3.)

‘I will try, however, to discuss your affairs as I would have done had I come to you. This letter is not meant for rhetorical display: it is written because I see you in great troubles. A man of my age is past writing well; but the very length of his experience qualifies him to advise. (§§ 4—6.) I always teach my pupils that, in composing a speech, the first thing needful is to define clearly the object which they wish the speech to effect; the next thing is to adapt the means to that end. This principle does not apply to the writing of speeches only; it applies to all enterprises, and to your case among the rest. You must reflect what mode of life, what kind of repute, you desire; whether you are ambitious of honours to be given by, or extorted from, your fellow-citizens; and then you must shape accordingly your daily conduct. To me the life of a private man seems better than that of a king,—the honours of a republic sweeter than those of a monarchy. I know that this view will find many adversaries, especially among those who are about you. They look only to the powers, the riches, the pleasures of royalty, ignoring its troubles and its dangers. Now this is just the feeling with which men dare crimes. They know that there is peril; but trust that they will contrive to avoid it. I envy such easiness of temper; but should be ashamed if, in advising others, I failed to state fairly both sides of the question. Expect, therefore, an impartial estimate.’... (§§ 7—14.)

3. *To Archidamos* [Ep. ix.]—This Letter is addressed to Archidamos III., who succeeded his father Agesilaos as one of the kings of Sparta in

3. Letter
IX., To
Archida-
mos.

361 B. C., and died in 338. In his Sixth Oration (366 B. C.) Isokrates supposes this same Archidamos giving heroic counsels to Sparta; he now urges him to become the leader of Greece against Persia.

Date.

In § 4 there is a reference to 'the battle in the city:' *i.e.* the attempt of Epameinondas to surprise Sparta in 362 B. C.¹ From § 16 it appears that Isokrates was now eighty. If he was not more, the Letter belongs to 356 B. C.

Either the Letter was meant merely to introduce a discourse sent along with it², or it is itself fragmentary. The latter supposition seems the more likely³.

Analysis.

'I leave to others, Archidamos, the easy task of praising you, your father, and your race. Those who choose that theme have topics enough ready to their hand,—the splendour of a descent from Herakles and Zeus; the valour of the Dorian colonies of the Peloponnesos; the achievements of Sparta under the Herakleidae, and the virtues taught by the unchanging Spartan discipline; the wisdom of your father; his conduct in times of disaster; and lastly that battle at Sparta in which you saved the state. But my purpose is not to speak of your past exploits; it is the more arduous one of inciting you to enterprises of a new kind—enterprises which will benefit not Sparta only but all the Hellenes. (§§ 1—7.)

'It is strange that no powerful statesman or speaker has

¹ See esp. Xen. *Hellen.* VII. v. §§ 9 f.—The achievement of Archidamos on this occasion consisted in routing, with 100 hoplites, the troops of Epameinondas, who was trying to occupy some high ground near the town.

² 'Propempticon, ut videtur ora-

tionis quam postea immutatam Philippo inscripsit':—Dobree, *Adv.* I. p. 285.

³ Letters I., VI. and IX. are fragments of just the same kind—*prefaces* to what must have been long discourses, like the *Philippos*, rather than mere Letters.

yet taken pity on the present miserable condition of Hellas. *The state of Greece.* Every part of it is full of war, factions, massacres, woes unnumbered. Most wretched of all are those Greeks on the seaboard of Asia whom by the treaty we gave over, not merely to the barbarians, but to those of our own race who are barbarian in all save speech. These roving desperadoes, under any chance leader, form armies larger and better than those of the settled communities; armies which do trifling damage to Persia, but bring desolation to the Greek cities which they visit. They slay, they banish, they plunder; children are outraged; women, whom none but kinsmen had ever seen even veiled, are stripped naked before all eyes. (§§ 8—10.)

‘These miseries, now long continued, have as yet attracted the indignation of no leading city in Greece; nor of any leading man, except your father. Agesilaos stood alone *Agesilaos.* in his life-long desire to free the Greeks and to turn their arms against the barbarian. He failed only because he sought to combine the war against Persia with the restoration of his personal friends to their respective cities. He thus excited factions which left men no leisure for the war. The moral of his life is that the Greeks must be reconciled among themselves before they are led against the Great King. (§§ 11—14.)

‘Some, perhaps, whose so-called ‘philosophy’ has none but petty aims, will call it madness in me to suppose that Greece at large can be better or worse for any words of mine. But, though eighty years old and worn out, I am arrogant enough to believe that such counsels can come from no one so well as from me, and that perchance they will bear fruit. I believe that, if the other Greeks had to pick out the man who could best advocate, and the man who could best execute, measures recognized as useful, the choice would fall on none but you and me. My part is the smaller; to say what one thinks is not hard; but you should be moved by your descent, by your place in Sparta, by your name in Greece, to rise to the height of your new duty. Leave all else, and give your mind to two things only—the deliverance of the Greeks from their miserable feuds, and the crushing of barbarian

insolence. That these things can be done,—that they are expedient for you, for Sparta, and for the rest of Hellas,—it shall now be my task to explain.’ (§§ 15—19.)

4. Letter
VII., To
Timotheos.

4. *To Timotheos* [Ep. VII.]—Klearchos, a citizen of Herakleia on the Euxine, had been a pupil of Isokrates, and also of Plato. He was recalled from Athens to Herakleia by the nobles, who wished for his help against the people. He changed sides, became a demagogue, and then, in 364 B.C., tyrant¹. His reign was cruel². He died in 353, leaving his brother Satyros guardian of his two sons Timotheos and Dionysios, and regent for the elder. Satyros seems to have ruled at least for some years, and worse even than Klearchos. But he was true to his nephews, and in due time gave up the royal power into the hands of Timotheos, who reigned from about 346 to 338. Timotheos then ‘began to make the government milder and more democratic; so that for his deeds he was called no more tyrant, but benefactor and saviour³.’ He afterwards shared the power with his brother Dionysios, who succeeded him.

¹ Diod. xv. 81. Justin (xvi. 4, 5) adds a plot between Klearchos and Mithridates of Pontus for the betrayal of Herakleia, which led only to the betrayal and seizure of Mithridates by Klearchos.

² Theopompos, in Book xxxviii. of his *Ἱστορίαι*, stated of Klearchos *ὡς βιαίως ἀνήρει πολλοὺς καὶ ὡς τοῖς πλείστοις ἐδίδου κώνειον πιεῖν*: Athen. iii. p. 85 A.

³ *παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτω ταύτην ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δημοκρατικώτερον μετερρίθμιζεν, ὡς μηκέτι*

τύραννον ἀλλ’ εὐεργέτην αὐτόν, οἷς ἔπραττε, καὶ σωτήρα ὀνομάζεσθαι—Memnon *ap.* Phot. cod. 224. Memnon of Herakleia—whose date is uncertain, but who cannot have lived *before* the time of Augustus—wrote a history of Herakleia. Photios (cod. 224) gives an abstract of Books vi—xvi. inclusive, from which most of the above facts are taken. According to Memnon, Klearchos had been a pupil of Isokrates for four years—and also a hearer of Plato.

The date of this Letter can be only approxi- *Date.*
mately fixed. Timotheos had now had time to
show himself a good ruler. The year 345 B.C. would
probably not be far wrong.

‘ You have probably often heard of the old friendship *Analysis.*
between your family and me ; and I rejoice to learn that
you are ruling more nobly and more wisely than your father.
His failings will but redound to your praise. (§§ 1—2.)
Think by what means, with what aid, by what counsels you
may repair your city’s misfortunes—encourage the citizens
to steady industry,—and make their lives and happiness
more secure. A foolish king harasses and pillages his sub-
jects. A wise one consults at once their happiness and his
own safety ; ruling so that none will plot against him, but
guarding his own life as if it were in danger from all. You
have no motive for incurring hatred in amassing wealth ;
your father has left you rich. (§§ 3—6.) If your objects
are more money and more power, seek advice elsewhere ;
but if you prefer honesty and a good name, attend to my
words and to worthy examples. Such an example is Kleom-
mis of Methymna, under whom the whole community lives
securely ; who restores exiles and trusts the citizens with
arms,—fearing no evil, or content to suffer if his generous
confidence is belied. (§§ 7—9.)

‘ Autokrator, the bearer of this letter, is my friend ; our
pursuits are the same, and I have often been helped by his
skill. For these reasons I would have you use him well.
Do not marvel that I thus write to you, though I never
made any request of your father Klearchos. When he was
with us, all agreed about his kindness ; but after he got
power he was said to have changed. I was estranged from
him ; but your friendship would be prized by me. Fare-
well ; if you want any thing from here, write.’ (§§ 10—13.)

5. *To the Rulers of Mytilene.* [Ep. VIII.]—The *5. Letter*
democracy at Mytilene had lately been overthrown *VIII. To*
by an oligarchy. But the victorious oligarchs were *the Rulers*
of Mytilene.

now showing their moderation by recalling many of the democratic exiles. This letter prays the government of Mytilene to receive back their fellow-citizen Agênor¹, a distinguished musician, with his father and his brothers.

The revolt of the allies from Athens was followed, at the close of the Social War (355 B.C.), by revolutions in many of the cities. Oligarchies arose at Corcyra, Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and in the cities of Lesbos—Antissa, Methymna, and Mytilene². We know that, in 351 B.C., the government of Mytilene was oligarchical³. And in § 8 of this Letter we read that, 'if Konon and Timotheos were living, and if Diophantos had come back from Asia,' they would interest themselves for Agênor. Timotheos, son of Konon, died in 354 B.C. And Diodoros names 'Diophantos the Athenian' and 'Lamios the Spartan' as serving Nectanebis, king of Egypt, against Artaxerxes Ochos in a campaign which occupied the winter of 350—351 B.C.⁴ Now there can be little doubt that it was by this struggle that Diophantos was detained in the East. The date of this Letter is probably 350 B.C.⁵

Date.

¹ Agênor and his school, the Ἀγηνόρειοι, are mentioned among the earlier musicians before Aristoxenos: Blass, *Att. Ber.* II. 304.

² Schäfer, *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, I. 427, 434.

³ *Dem. Or.* xv., ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥοδίων ἐλευθερίας, (date 351 B.C.) § 16.

⁴ *Diod.* xvi. 48. Cf. Schäfer I. 437.

⁵ 350 B.C. is the date taken by Blass (*Att. Ber.* II. 303). But

another is possible, against which I have felt great difficulty in deciding—347 B.C. We know that the oligarchy at Mytilene was followed (whether immediately or not) by the tyranny of one Kammes; but that, in 347—6 B.C., the democracy was restored with Athenian help. (*Dem. Or.* xl. πρὸς Βοιωτὸν περὶ προυκός, §§ 36 f.; Schäfer, vol. III., Appendix, p. 224). Now:—1. Isokrates certainly compares the

‘My grandsons, the sons of Aphareus, have asked me to write to you on behalf of Agênor, formerly their master in music; and to beg that, when you have restored some other exiles, you will allow him, his father and his brothers, to return to Mytilene. I objected that I, a stranger to you, could not reasonably ask so great a favour; but at length I yielded to their importunity. You have done wisely in being reconciled to your fellow-citizens, and in seeking, like Athens, to efface the memory of faction. But, even if you had received back no other exiles, Agenor and his family would deserve a pardon. Mytilene, a city famous in the history of culture, ought not to keep in banishment the man who excels all contemporaries in his art. (§ 4.) Other cities give their franchise to men distinguished in noble pursuits; you ought not to suffer your own countryman to be a sojourner among strangers. Such as he do more lasting honour to their city than successful athletes. (§§ 3—6.)

‘It will perhaps be said that this request is just, but that I have no claim to make it. I have not, indeed, been a statesman or public speaker; but I have been the adviser of the speakers truest to you and to our other allies; and have myself written more in defence of Greek liberty than all the ranters of the platform put together. Were Konon and Timotheos alive—had Diophantos returned from Asia—they

moderation of the prevalent party at Mytilene to that of the Athenian democracy in 403 B.C., § 3: 2. Diophantos may not have come back from Egypt till 346 B.C.: for, while Diodoros and Clinton (*F. H.* II. App. 18) put the end of the war in 350, Thirlwall (c. 48, vi. 187*n.*) argues from Isokr. (*Philipp.* § 101) that the Persian reconquest of Egypt cannot have been achieved before the latter part of 346. My reasons for, on the whole, preferring 350 are these:—1. We do not know that, in 347, a party overthrew a party. When Kammes

fell, the democracy may have been restored unanimously. 2. The letter is inscribed (as Blass has observed) τοῖς Μ. ἄρχουσι, not Μ. τῶ δῆμῳ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ. 3. In § 7 Isokrates takes credit for having always vindicated the ελευθερία and αὐτονομία of the Greeks,—in other words, as the context shows, the independence of the allies from Athens (cf. his Speech *On the Peace*). This would point to 350 rather than to 347, when, on the restoration of the democracy, Mytilene came again into the Athenian league.

would support my request. Think, then, by whom and for whom the favour is asked; and, if you can grant it, let Agênor and his brothers understand that they owe it, in some measure, to my mediation.' (§§ 7—10.)

6. *Letter II., To Philip.*

6. *To Philip.* [Ep. II.]—In §§ 5—12 of this Letter, Isokrates remonstrates with Philip for recklessly exposing himself to personal danger; and, in § 12, says:—‘I would give a great deal that I had written this to you *before the expedition*; since then, if you had listened to me, you would not have run so great a danger; or, if you had not listened, at least I should not have seemed to be repeating in my advice what all the world has been persuaded of by the event.’

Philip was engaged in a Thracian War from 342 to 339 B.C.¹ War between Philip and Athens was declared in 340 B.C. Now it is clear from the tone of § 14 that, when this Letter was written, the hostility between Philip and Athens was not yet open. Further, in 342, Philip had given a new constitution to Thessaly, appointing tetrarchs for the four chief districts². Isokrates alludes to this—evidently as recent (§ 20); and urges Philip to intervene, with the same prudence, in the affairs of Athens;—meaning that he should come forward as the reconciler of factions, and as the leader in one great common purpose—an expedition against Asia. The date of the Letter is probably the end of 342 B.C.³

Date.

¹ Schäfer, II. 414 ff.

² Dem. *Phil.* III. § 26: Schäfer, *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, II. p. 402.

³ Dobree (*Adv.* I. p. 283) refers the Letter to 339 B.C., when Philip was wounded in an encounter with

‘ Men are more grateful for praise than for advice. But *Analysis.* having undertaken once before to advise you as to what it would best become you to do, I must not shrink, in a more urgent crisis, from pronouncing upon what you have done. You are universally condemned for courting danger with a headlong rashness unbecoming a king. In the conduct of war you ought to imitate republics. When they send forth their armies, they are careful to keep safe at home those who are responsible for the commonweal. If the Spartan kings take the field, it is with a devoted body-guard of the most distinguished citizens. The value of a king’s life may be judged from the cases of Xerxes and of Cyrus. Xerxes, when his troops were beaten, guarded his own life, and lived to restore the greatness of Persia ; Cyrus, by throwing away his life, cancelled an actual victory, and brought upon his followers the extremity of suffering. (§§ 1—8.)

‘ It is unworthy of you to aim at a reputation for mere reckless courage. The special risks of a monarch are enough without adding to them the risks of a soldier. Glory of a higher kind is within your reach. Carry war against the barbarians on your frontier no further than is necessary for the safety of Macedonia ; and set the Greeks an example of making war upon the Great King. I wish that this advice had been given before your expedition ; for then it might have averted your danger, or at least have proved my foresight. (§§ 9—12.)

‘ Though this letter is already too long, a word must be said in conclusion about Athens. If you blame Athens for listening to those who slander you, do not listen to those who slander her. The influence which worthless men have here is only the influence that might be yours. I do not deny that Athens has made some mistakes ; but I maintain that no city in Hellas could be a more useful ally for you. Her merely passive friendship would give you strength both in Hellas and against the barbarian. You have been applauded

the Triballi, and reported dead. But §§ 14, 20 are, I now think, decisive against this. See Blass, this volume, I assign it to 339. *Att. Ber.* II. 299.

for your just and benevolent interference in the affairs of the Thessalians, a high-spirited people torn by factions. Confer the same benefits upon Athens. The Thessalians are your neighbours in territory; we, in power. It is nobler to take gratitude, than cities, by storm. (§§ 13—21.) You may believe me when I speak of Athens; I have never been her flatterer, but always her severest censor. The careless crowd suspect you and me alike; you, because you are great; me, because I think. You can easily dispel that prejudice; for me it is too late. This, then, is my advice;—give your kingdom and your prosperity into the keeping of the goodwill of the Hellenes.’ (§§ 13—23.)

7. Letter V.,
To Alexander.

7. *To Alexander*. [Ep. v.]—Alexander was with his father¹ at the time when Isokrates wrote this Letter, which was sent along with one addressed to Philip—doubtless the Letter just analysed. Philip was in Thrace or the Chersonese from May, 342, to the latter part of 339 B.C.; and, at some time after his departure, appointed Alexander his regent in Macedonia². But, when this Letter was written, that arrangement had not yet been made. Alexander, a boy of fourteen, is busy with his studies; and Isokrates cannot refrain from a little thrust at the young prince’s new tutor. It was probably in this very year (342) that Alexander began to receive the lessons of Aristotle³.

¹ The phrase in § 1, *περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα σὲ τόπον ἐκείνῳ*, seems to imply a foreign region. The danger in which Philip’s life had just been placed would account for Alexander having been summoned to him.

² Schäfer, *Dem.* II. 416.

³ Apollodoros stated in his *χρονικά* that Aristotle came to

Philip’s court ἐπὶ Πυθοδότῳ ἀρχόντῳ, Ol. 109. 2, 342½ B.C., Diog. v. 10. Apollodoros adds Ἀλεξάνδρου πεντεκαίδεκά ἔτη ἤδη γεγονότος. Alexander only completed his 14th year in July, 342 B.C. He can but barely have entered on his 15th year when Pythodotos ceased to be archon.

‘As I am writing to your father, and you are with him, *Analysis.* it would be strange if I did not greet you also, and show that old age has still left me some sense. (§ 1.) All say that you are kindly, fond of Athens, fond of learning,—and this in a wise way. The Athenians with whom you live are not uncultivated men, with low political views; but men pleasant socially, and also able to give sound counsel. *Your* chosen philosophy is not the eristic, which teaches subtlety in private discussion; but the practical philosophy which educates a statesman in debate, in political action, in discerning right and wrong. (§§ 2—4.) You do well to make this your study; and give promise of surpassing other men as far as your father has surpassed all.’ (§ 5.)

8. *To Antipater.* [Ep. iv.]—This Letter was ^{8. Letter IV.} written after—probably soon after¹—the renewal of <sup>To Antipa-
ter.</sup> the war between Athens and Philip in 340 B.C. Antipater had now been for at least seven years prominent both as a soldier and as a diplomatist. In 347 he seems to have held a command in the Thracian war; in 347 and 346 he was the chief envoy from Macedonia to Athens². At this time, in 340 or 339, Antipater is living in Macedonia, apparently as regent, or as chief minister of Alexander, during Philip’s absence in Thrace.

The Letter commends to Antipater one Diodotos and his son, who wish to enter the service of Philip. Nothing is known from other sources about this Diodotos³. He seems to have been an Athenian who

¹ The words in § 1—*νῦν ὅτε πο-
λεμοῦμεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, as op-
posed to *τῆς εἰρήνης οὔσης*—sug-
gest that the declaration of war
was recent.

² Schäfer, *Dem.* II. p. 34.

³ Sanneg, in his essay *De Schola
Isocratea* (Halle, 1867), notices
Diodotos among the pupils of Iso-
krates; but has nothing to add to
the information furnished by this
Letter. In the modern Greek

had taken service, probably as a captain of mercenaries, under more than one of the despots of Asia Minor. 'For speaking freely to these about their own interests' (§ 7) he had 'been stripped of his privileges at home'; in other words, he had been deprived of the Athenian citizenship on the charge of supporting an anti-Athenian policy abroad. Alone of the nine Letters, this has the ease of a private friendship: Isokrates had made the acquaintance of Antipater at Athens.

Analysis. 'Even in time of peace, a letter from Athens to Macedonia runs risks; much more now, when we are at war. But I was determined to write to you about Diodotos, and, since I am too late to introduce him to you, at least to add my testimony in his favour. Men of various countries have been my pupils; some with a special faculty for speaking; some with powers of thought and action; some of small ability, but good men and pleasant companions. Diodotos has a nature so happily tempered that in all these respects he is perfect. (§§ 1—4.) You will find, too, that he is thoroughly outspoken. Princes of a large mind honour such frankness; it is the feebler who fear it, thinking that it will drive them into acting against their wishes, and not seeing that free criticism is most likely to put them in the way of attaining what they desire. No monarchy—nay, no republic—is likely to last without advisers who dare to offend. Yet such advisers are slighted,—as Diodotos has found to his cost. There are some princes in Asia whom he has served both by counsel and by perilous deeds; through freedom of speech, however, he has lost not only his dignities in his own country but many hopes besides. He is inclined to distrust princes as a

edition of Isokrates quoted above (p. 241 *note*) on Letter VI., the commentator suggests that this Diodotos is possibly identical with

the interpreter of Herakleitos mentioned by Diogenes Laertios, ix. 15.

voyager once unlucky fears the sea ; but he has done well in going to you. He will benefit by your kindness ; you, by his loyalty and ability. (§§ 5—9.)

‘ His son, too, is advised by me to take service under your government. He is ambitious to do so ; but feels like an athlete eager for a crown which he dares not hope to win. He is without experience ; and has defects of person which he fears will be against him. In any case, whether he resides in Macedonia or (as a neutral) at Athens, pray watch over his safety and that of his father. Look upon them as a trust committed to you by my old age—my fame (if that is worth aught)—my friendship. Forgive the length of an old man’s letter ; I had but one aim,—to show goodwill for the best of friends.’ (§§ 10—13.)

9. *To Philip*. [Ep. III.]—The biographical question raised by this Letter has been noticed in a former chapter¹. The Letter was written in 338 B.C., some time after Chaeroneia, when Isokrates had completed his ninety-eighth year. It is thus the latest of all his extant writings.

‘ I have already had some talk with Antipater about your interests and those of Athens. But I resolved to write

¹ Ch. XII., p. 31. I have there noticed the suggestion of E. Curtius that, if Isokrates did indeed commit suicide, the motive may have been despair at seeing that Athens was still resolved to resist. If we hold, as I do, the genuineness of the Third Letter, this explanation of the suicide is admissible only on the supposition that the Letter was written *before* the conclusion of the peace between Athens and Philip. Now I confess I think the Third Letter was written *after* the conclusion of the peace, and was taken to Philip by Antipater on

his return from Athens: see §§ 1—2. Cf. Schäfer, III. 25.

The tradition of a suicide prompted by patriotic despair must then be given up altogether. But the tradition of the suicide itself may be true. The real motive may have been an access of his disease: and Aphareus, or some friend—availing himself of the coincidence that Isokrates died on the day when those who fell at Chaeroneia were buried—may have invented the heroic motive. See Blass, *Att. Ber.* II. 89 f., 300.

^{9.} *Letter III. To Philip.*

Analysis.

to you, too, regarding the course which, as I think, you ought to take after the peace. This letter will be to the same purpose as my discourse, but much shorter. (§ 1.) Formerly I urged you to bring about concord in Hellas by reconciling the chief states, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Argos. Now, persuasion is no longer needed. The recent struggle has proved them to have no will but yours, and to admit that the war which they have been making upon each other ought to be turned against Asia. They ask me whether the idea of an expedition against the barbarians was originally yours or mine; and when I say that, to the best of my belief, it was yours, they entreat me to confirm you in it. No deed, they say, could be nobler, better for Hellas, or more timely. (§§ 2—3.) Had not my powers utterly failed, I would have come to you and urged this in person. In one thing it is good to be insatiable—in the desire of true glory; and your glory will be perfect only when you have made the barbarians helots to the Greeks. To that result it will be an easier step than it was from the first to the present stage of your power. That result gained, nothing will remain for you but to become a god. I thank old age for this alone, that those youthful projects which I set forth in the *Panegyrikos* and in the discourse sent to you are in course of completion by your agency, and will, I hope, be completed.' (§§ 4—6.)

*Philip's
mission.*

FRAGMENTS.

The only lost work¹ of Isokrates known from definite citations is his *Art of Rhetoric*. It has, indeed, always been questioned whether he was the author of the treatise once current under his name. Quintilian, in quoting it for an opinion of Isokrates,

¹ As to the Γρύλλον ἐπιτάφιος as to the supposed speech πρὸς (Diog. L. II. 55), see above, p. 80; Εἰθυρον (*Ar. Rh.* II. 19) see below.

adds—‘if it is really his’¹; and Photios hints a like doubt². Modern criticism³ is divided. Some infer from extant notices, direct and indirect⁴, that Isokrates really published a systematic ‘Art.’ The direct notices are, with one exception, of slight interest. They inform us that Isokrates defined Rhetoric as ‘the science of persuasion⁵,’ insisted, in reference to forensic speaking, on the importance of taking up a strong position in that general statement of a case (*κατάστασις*⁶) which precedes the detailed narrative of facts, as well as on the need of comprehensiveness in the narrative (*διήγησις*) itself⁷;

¹ Quintil. *Inst.* II. 15 § 4.

² Photios, *cod.* 260. γεγραφέναι δὲ αὐτὸν τέχνην ῥητορικὴν λέγουσιν, ἦν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπιγραφομένην τῷ ὀνόματι. οἱ δὲ συνασκήσει μᾶλλον ἢ τέχνῃ χρῆσασθαι κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τὸν ἄνδρα φασί.

³ Spengel, *συναγωγή τεχνῶν*, pp. 154—172; Sauppe, *O. A.* II. p. 224. Sauppe denies all force to the objections of I. G. Pfund, *de Isocratis Vita et Scriptis*, pp. 21 f., which Bernhardt on Cic. *Brut.* p. 37 appears to think of weight.

⁴ The direct references to the lost *Τέχνη* are collected by Benseker, *Isocr.* vol. II. p. 276. They are the references noticed here. Besides these, Sauppe has brought together ten other instances in which he believes that he has discovered allusions to the treatise. All, or most, of these are, however, doubtful. See Sauppe, *O. A.* II. pp. 224 ff.

⁵ Sextus Empiricus, *πρὸς μαθημ.* II. § 62, p. 301 F: Ἰσοκράτης φησὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς

ῥήτορας ἢ ἐπιστήμην πειθοῦς. Quintilian, indeed, states that Isokrates said, ‘esse rhetorice persuadendi officem, id est πειθοῦς δημιουργόν’: *Inst.* II. 15. § 4. But, as Sauppe observes, Sextus is probably the more accurate. The definition mentioned by Quintilian is known to have been given by Korax and Tisias (Spengel, *συναγ.* p. 34) and is ascribed by Sextus himself to Xenokrates.

⁶ Max. Planudes, scholia on Hermogenes, *περὶ ιδεῶν β’*, in Walz *Rhet. Graec.* v. 551. *κατάστασις* is here what Dionysios calls *πρόθεσις*:—that general setting forth of the matter in hand which usually comes (at least in the speeches of Lysias) between the exordium (*προοίμιον*) and the detailed narrative: (καὶ ἔστι μεθόριον αὐτῷ ἐκατέρας τῶν ιδεῶν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἢ πρόθεσις: *Lys.* c. 17.)

⁷ Syrianos, scholia on the *στάσις* of Hermogenes, in Walz *Rh. Gr.* IV. 302.

and observed on the dislike of 'Atticists' to coining new words¹. The only citation more precise and satisfactory than these is made by Maximus Planudes². 'We learn,' he says, 'from the *Art* of Isokrates what kind of diction is called pure; for that writer has been so attentive to purity of style as to give in his own treatise such precepts as these upon the subject:—'In composition³, vowels must not clash⁴, for that has a lame effect; nor is it well to begin and end with the same syllable, as εἰποῦσα σαφή, ἡλικά καλά, ἔνθα Θαλῆς; or to put the same conjunctions close together, making the latter answer immediately to the former⁵. As to particular words, use those which are figurative, but not harshly so; or which are noblest—least artificial—most familiar. In short, your prose must not be prose,—that is dry; nor metrical,—for that betrays art; but tempered with all manner of rhythms, especially iambic

¹ οἱ Ἄττικισταὶ παντελῶς ἀποτρέπουσι τοῦ ὀνοματοποιεῖν καὶ μόνοι προστάττουσι κεχρησθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις λέξεσι καὶ τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ὡς φησὶν Ἰσοκράτης: Max. Planudes (acc. to the Par. ms.), Walz *Rh. Gr.* v. 498. It is no rash assumption of Benseler's (*Isocr.* II. 276) that this remark must have occurred in the *τέχνη*.

² Walz *Rh. Gr.* v. p. 469.

³ δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῇ μὲν λέξει τὰ φωνήεντα μὴ συμπίπτειν, κ.τ.λ. The words ἐν τῇ μὲν λέξει are opposed to ὀνόματι δὲ χρησθαι, κ.τ.λ., lower down. Λέξις means here the style of *composition*, as contrasted with ὀνόματα, the *diction*.

⁴ Dionysios (*de Isocr.* c. 2) says

that Isokr. deprecates (παρατεῖται) τῶν φωνηέντων τὰς παραλλήλους θέσεις, ὡς λυούσας τὰς ἀρμονίας τῶν ἡχῶν καὶ τὴν λειότητα τῶν φθόγγων λυμαινομένας. The 'injury to the smoothness of the sounds' is what is meant by the lameness—*unevenness*—spoken of here.

⁵ καὶ τοὺς συνδέσμους τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ σύνεγγυς τιθέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐπόμενον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ εὐθὺς ἀνταποδιδόσθαι. For instance, if two consecutive sentences began with ἐπεὶ γάρ, the second ἐπεὶ would be ἀνταποδομένον, in regard to the first,—'made to answer to it,' placed in the same position in the sentence. Such repetitions, the rule says, ought not to be made εὐθὺς—*i. e.* without a certain interval.

or trochaic. In narrative, set the first incident, the second, and the rest, in regular sequence. Do not pass to a fresh point before you have done with the first, or then come back from the end to the beginning. Let your separate thoughts be severally completed and rounded off.' These rough notes—for they are no more—doubtless represent the substance of precepts which Isokrates really gave at least orally¹ to his pupils, whether their present form is, or is not, that in which they were actually put forth by him.

There is nothing to prove that any of the numerous² apophthegms ascribed to Isokrates were taken from writings of his now lost³. Many of these apophthegms are mere repartees in conversation; others are maxims of morality or prudence which may, of course, have been found in books, but which are in no instance quoted from any particular book. The average quality of the sayings may be

¹ Cf. *Epist.* vi. § 8 (λέγειν): *Panathen.* § 236. Cicero says, 'We find no Art which is ascertained (*constat*) to be by Isokrates himself, though we meet with many technical writings by his disciples' [*e.g.* Ephoros, Naukrates]: *de Invent.* ii. 7. Aristotle, *ap. Cic. Brut.* § 48, says that Isokrates, on giving up forensic work, betook himself wholly *ad artes componendas*. Blass thinks (*Att. Ber.* ii. 98) we may understand this of *collecting* notes, rules, &c., on the theory of Rhetoric—not of writing a formal treatise.

² Benseler has collected thirty-seven: *Isocr.* vol. ii. pp. 276 ff.

³ One disputed instance must,

however, be noticed. Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 19: καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατὸν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον· ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὐρεῖν. Benseler (*de hiatus* p. 56) thinks that this quotation is from a lost speech of Isokrates πρὸς Εὐθύνον, and that our Or. xxi. πρὸς Εὐθύνον has been falsely attributed to him. But, as Sauppe (*O. A.* ii. 227) says, it is more natural to suppose that the saying quoted by Aristotle referred to rhetorical skill generally, not to the arguments bearing on any special lawsuit.

judged from a few specimens. On being asked how he, who was no public speaker, could teach others to speak, he answered that a whetstone cannot cut, but can fit iron to do so¹.—‘A father having said that he never gave his son any companion but a slave, —‘Well then,’ Isokrates answered, ‘you will have two slaves².’ ‘If you have a fair body and an ill mind, you have a good ship and a bad pilot³.’—‘The root of learning is bitter, the fruit sweet⁴.’—On being asked in what the industrious differ from the indolent, he said—‘As the pious from the impious—in good hopes⁵.’

It would, of course, be idle to inquire what proportion of these sayings is genuine. A master of neat expression, who was at the same time singularly sententious, could not fail to be credited with many such *γνώμαι* as those with which the *Ad Demonicum* abounds, and for which the Greek taste received a new impulse from the Peripatetics⁶.

¹ Plut. *Mor.* 838 E.

² [Plut.] *Vitt. X. Oratt.*

³ Anton. Meliss. p. 65.

⁴ Hermog. I. 22.

⁵ Steph. *Apophthegmat.* p. 697.

⁶ ‘Neque exstare (magnum nu-

merum apophthegmatum) in tanti nominis isocratei claritate et studii quo Graeci inde a peripateticorum disciplina talia colligerent alacritate mirum est.’ Sauppe, *O. A.* II. 227.

CHAPTER XIX.

ISAEOS.

LIFE.

THE silence which surrounds the life of Isaeos, in contrast with the reputation of his work, has a meaning of its own. Dionysios, in setting forth those few and barren facts which the Augustan age could discover to his search, unconsciously indicates the chief cause of their scantiness. ‘I cannot tell,’ he says, ‘what were the politics of Isaeos, —or *whether he had any politics at all*¹.’ Unlike Antiphon or Andokides, unlike even Lysias or Isokrates, Isaeos, so far as is known, had no definite relation, literary or active, with the affairs of Athens. Nothing could better illustrate the workings of that deep change which was passing over the life of Athens and of Greece. Half a century earlier, a citizen with the like powers could not have failed to find his place in the history of the city; and a resident who, like Lysias, did not possess the citizenship, would at least have left some evidence

¹ Dionys. *Isae.* c. 1, οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς πείν ἔχω; οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν εἰ προεἰλητό
προαρέσεως τῶν πολιτευμάτων (εἰ- τινα πολιτείας.

of his interest in Athenian or Panhellenic affairs, even if it had not been his fortune to impeach an Eratosthenes or to address the Greeks at Olympia. But, with the progressive divergence of Society from the State, the separation of the man from the citizen naturally expressed itself, not merely in apathy or in organized frivolity, but also, and with a graver meaning, in the clearer definition of all those pursuits which could be called professional. 'Let the ekklesia be the care of the statesmen—my profession is to write for the courts';—this is what the life of Isaeos, by the fact that it is almost hidden, declares. That change has set in which is to lead, without a break, from the old life of the republics to a cosmopolitan Hellenism, and thence to the modern world.

*Probable
date of
birth.*

The date of his birth can only be guessed from the dates of his works. Of those extant speeches which can be placed chronologically, the earliest (Or. v., On the Estate of Dikaeogenes) may be assigned to 390 B.C.; the latest (Or. vii., On the Estate of Apollodoros) to 353. In 366 his reputation was fully established. The conjecture which places his birth about 420 B.C. is probably not far wrong¹. One account represents Isaeos as a Chalkidian², another as an Athenian³; and the

Parentage.

¹ Hermann Weissenborn, in his excellent article on Isaeos in Ersch and Gruber's *Encyclopaedia*, sect. II., part 38, pp. 286—310, takes Ol. 90 (420—417 B.C.)—assuming (rightly, I think) that Or. v. belongs to 390 B.C. Independently of

that assumption, however—since at all events we have Or. x. in 384 B.C.—420 must be near the mark.

² [Plut.] *vit. Isae.* and *vit. Demosth.*: Demetrios *ap. Suid.* and Harpokr.: Photios *cod.* 263.

³ Suidas *s.v.* 'Ισαῖος: Hermippos

theory which harmonises these statements by supposing the family to have migrated from Chalkis to Athens becomes something more than a mechanical compromise when it is recollected that, in 411, Euboea (except Oreos) revolted from Athens, and that at such a time, residents in Euboea whose sympathies were Athenian might well have crossed the Euripos¹. About 509 B. C.², after an Athenian victory over the Chalkidians, the lands of the Chalkidian Hippobotae, or Knights, had been shared among four thousand Athenian kleruchs³. If the family of Isaeos was descended from one of these settlers, the account which represents Isaeos as 'an Athenian by descent' would be justified, and the fact that the name Diagoras⁴, attributed to his father, is not Athenian, would be explained. It might, indeed, be argued that the case of Isaeos is analogous to that of Deinarchos, who was certainly a resident alien, and who yet was represented by one account as an Athenian citizen⁵. But the cases would be really parallel only if the foreign birthplace

The revolt of Euboea.

Was Isaeos a citizen?

(see above, p. 12) *ap.* Harpokr.—Dionysios gives the preference to this account: *de Isae.* c. 1 Ἀθηναῖος ἦν τὸ γένος· ὡς δὲ ἔτεροι γράφουσι, Χαλκιδεύς. The anonymous Γένος Ἰσαίου is taken almost wholly from Dionysios, our earliest source, to whom the Plutarchic Life also owes much: but the Γένος says merely κατὰ μὲν τινὰς Ἀθηναῖος, κατὰ δὲ τινὰς Χαλκιδεύς.

¹ Schömann *praef.* vi.: Weissenborn *l. c.* Curtius approves: v. 172 (Ward.) For the revolt of Euboea, see Thuc. VIII. 95. Chalkis

was the place where the remnant of the Athenian ships sought refuge. Athenian kleruchs had held Oreos since the reconquest of Euboea by Perikles. Thuc. I. 14: Cox *Hist. Gr.* II. 494.

² The exact date is uncertain: but see Cox I. pp. xiv. and 236.

³ Her. v. 77.

⁴ Anon. Biogr. For Διαγόρας Meier (*ap.* Weissenborn *l. c.*) proposed Ἰσαγόρας.

⁵ [Plut.] *Vit. Din.* ὡς μὲν τινες, ἐγχώριος, ὡς δὲ τισι δοκεῖ, Κορίνθιος.

assigned to Deinarchos had been the seat of an Athenian settlement. Nor can abstention from political life be urged as disproving citizenship in the case of one who had a distinct and an engrossing occupation¹.

His Education.

In 400 B. C.—when Plato was twenty-nine years old, Isokrates thirty-six, and Lysias fifty-nine (or, according to the modern view of his birth-date, forty-four at most²), Isaeos was probably about twenty. That subtle and eager mind, destined to a narrow field, may well have had its early place in the most liberal converse that Athens could afford³. But the only master to whom Isaeos is given as pupil by a tradition at once definite and trustworthy is Isokrates. Their intercourse may be referred to the years 393—390, when Isokrates was just beginning to teach, or when Isaeos was about to enter on

Isokrates.

¹ Westermann and Weissenborn think that Isaeos was somehow a citizen. Schäfer assumes the reverse, when he says (*Dem. u. seine Zeit*, i. 255) that to Isaeos 'as an alien, the public career was closed': and Blass favours the latter view (*Att. Ber.* II. 454).

² Vol. I. p. 144.

³ *συνεγένετο δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν φιλοσόφων*, Hermippos *ap.* Dionys. *Isae.* I. I should certainly hesitate to infer—as Weissenborn and Meier do—that Isaeos had been a disciple of Sokrates.

Curtius says that Isaeos '*connected himself with Plato*' (v. 172, Ward) and so Weissenborn. The authorities for this (so far as they are known to me) are (1) Phot.

cod. 265, p. 1472 R, and (2) [Plut.] *vit. Demosth.*, whence Photios gets it.

Now, I strongly suspect that Photios has mis-constructed the passage in the Plutarchic Life. It says of *Demosthenes*:—*σχολάζων Ἰσοκράτει, ὃς τινες ἔφασαν, ὡς δὲ οἱ πλείστοι, Ἰσαίῳ τῷ Χαλκιδεῖ, ὃς ἦν Ἰσοκράτους μαθητῆς, διάγοντι ἐν Ἀθήναις, ζηλῶν Θουκυδίδην καὶ Πλάτωνα, ᾧ τινες εἶπον προηγουμένως αὐτὸν σχολάζουσαι.* Grammatically, the clause *ζηλῶν, κ.τ.λ.*, might, of course, be connected with *ὃς ἦν, κ.τ.λ.*: Photios so took it; and hence the error. Manifestly *ζηλῶν, &c.*, is meant to refer back to *Demosthenes*. *He* is the 'student of Plato and Thucydides.'

his own career as a writer of speeches for the law-courts. Both these facts—that the teacher's manner was not matured, and that the discipleship must have been comparatively short—may help to explain why Isaeos kept so few traces of Isokratic expression. As we shall see, however, the Isokratic influence on Isaeos may clearly be traced in another province—in his handling of subject-matter¹. Isokrates asserts that, of all the numerous writers of speeches for the courts, no one was ever honoured with pupils². If Isaeos had been the pupil of Lysias, at least one *Lysias*. notable exception would have been established. It is worth observing, however, that the best authority speaks of Isaeos, not as the scholar, but as the student of Lysias; and this is undoubtedly the true account³.

Isaeos, like Antiphon and Lysias, was a profes- *Forensic*
sional writer of forensic speeches. But a comparative *work of*
Isaeos—

¹ The authorities for Isaeos having been the pupil of Isokrates are Hermippos (a strong witness) in his book on the disciples of Isokrates (Harpokr. s. v. Ἰσαῖος, Dionys. *Isae.* 1): [Plut.] *vit. Demosth.*,—in *vit. Isaevi* the text is doubtful: and Suid. s. v. Δημοσθένης.—Schäfer (I. 255) questions the tradition, noticing the dubious ὡς δὲ τινὲς φασι in [Plut.] *vit. Isocr.*—Benseler (p. 192), applying the hiatus-test, puts the discipleship only a little before 360, when Isaeos was past 50: but, as we shall see below, that test breaks down.

² *Antid.* (Or. xv.) § 41: *παμπληθεῖς εἰσιν οἱ παρασκευάζοντες τοὺς*

λόγους τοῖς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀγωνιζομένοις. τούτων μὲν τοίνυν τοσούτων ὄντων οὐδεὶς πώποτε φανήσεται μαθητῶν ἡξιωμένους.

³ Dionys. *Isae.* 2, *χαρακτῆρα δὲ τὸν Λυσίου...ἐξήλωσε* (copied in the *Γένος Ἰσαίων*): c. 20, *ζηλωτῆν*. In [Plut.] *vit. Isae.* the ordinary reading gives *σχολάσας Λυσία*, but should perhaps be emended to *σχολάσας [μὲν Ἰσοκράτει, ζηλώσας δὲ] Λυσίαν*, as Schäfer suggests (*Dem.* I. 256 n.: *οἱ σχολάσας [Ἰσοκράτει, ἔοικε μάλιστα] Λυσία*). From the pseudo-Plutarch Photios *cod.* 263 took his *Λυσίου δὲ ἐγένετο μαθητῆς, οὗ καὶ μαθητῆς ἐχρημάτισε*.

See Blass, *Att. Ber.* II. 456.

*almost
wholly in
Private
Causes.*

survey of their work brings out one striking difference. Antiphon was occupied chiefly, Lysias largely, with Public Causes. Isaeos was occupied almost exclusively¹ with Private Causes. These Private Causes were, moreover, principally of the class with which Demosthenes also was so much engaged, and for which Isokrates reserves his principal contempt,—claims to property or money between man and man². The Practical Rhetoric, at first busied chiefly with the graver interests of the civic life, had thus in the course of its development come to embrace the smaller interests so completely that it could find in these a distinct and definite field. Among the twelve extant Speeches of Isaeos—since the fragment ‘For Euphiletos’ is now counted as the twelfth—four are of uncertain time. The remaining eight may conveniently be arranged in two groups, as they precede or follow the central event in the life of Isaeos—his connexion with Demosthenes. The first group will comprise the Fifth Oration, On the Estate of Dikaeogenes, 390 B.C.; the Tenth, On the Estate of Aristarchos, 377—371 B.C.; the Eighth, On the Estate of Kiron, 375 B.C.; and the Ninth, On the Estate of Astyphilos, 369 B.C. The second group will comprise the Sixth Oration, On the Estate of Philoktemon, 364—363 B.C.; the Eleventh, On the Estate of Hagnias, 359 B.C.; the Second, On the Estate of Menekles, 354 B.C.; and the Seventh, On the Estate of Apollodoros, 353 B.C.

*First group
of Speeches.*

*Second
group.*

¹ See below, ch. xxi. *ad init.*

συμβολαίων: so *Antid.* [xv.] § 3,

² Isokr. *Paneg.* [Or. iv.] § 11,

&c.

τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἰδίων

The First and Third Orations, On the Estates of Kleonymos and Pyrrhos, may probably be referred to the later period.

Demosthenes was born in 384, and came of age ^{Isaeos and Demosthenes.} in 366. Before attaining his majority he had resolved on the contest with the guardians who had abused their trust. The two orations Against Aphobos belong to 363 B.C.; the two orations Against Onetor to 362. Now, in 366, Isaeos must have been known for upwards of twenty years as a successful writer of forensic speeches, and also as a master of Attic law, especially in the department of claims to property. No one could be better fitted to arm Demosthenes for his first encounter. There is no doubt whatever that Demosthenes had recourse to the aid of Isaeos. Afterwards, when that relative obscurity in which the critics left the elder orator was hardly broken save by this stray gleam from the glory of the younger, friendly biographers naturally welcomed everything that could add brightness to the borrowed ray¹. It is due quite as much to Isaeos as to Demosthenes that we should be on our guard against exaggerations. According to one story, Demosthenes, on coming of age, took Isaeos into his house, and studied with him for four years². He is further said to have paid Isaeos 10,000 drachms (about £400) on condition that the

¹ Even Dionys. begins: Ἰσαῖος δέ, ὁ Δημοσθένους καθηγησάμενος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα γενόμενος περιφανής.

² Ἰσαῖον ἀναλαβὼν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τετραετῆ χρόνον αὐτὸν διεπόνθησε, μι-

μούμενος αὐτοῦ τοὺς λόγους: [Plut.] *vit. Dem.* The same author represents these studies with Isaeos as having *begun* while Demosthenes was yet a minor and living in his mother's house: and so

teacher should withdraw from a school of Rhetoric which he had opened, and should devote himself wholly to his new pupil¹. 'It was a close personal relation,' writes a brilliant historian, 'into which they entered, an intellectual armed alliance, in order with their united strength to carry on the contest of vengeance which Demosthenes, like the Heroes of ancient mythology, undertook against the desolators of his paternal home².' It would be agreeable thus to conceive Isaeos,—as a Pylades divided by nothing but, perhaps, thirty-six years from his young partner in the chastisement of a triple Aegisthos. Plutarch, however, says merely that Demosthenes—'employed Isaeos as his master in Rhetoric, though Isokrates was then teaching, either (as some say) because he could not pay Isokrates the prescribed fee of ten minae; or because he preferred the style of Isaeos for his purpose, as being vigorous and astute' (*δραστήριον καὶ πανούργον*)³. The school of Isaeos is nowhere else mentioned⁴, nor is the name of any other pupil recorded.

Plutarch, *vit. Demosth.* c. 5: Libanios *vit. Dem.* p. 3 (Reiske): Suidas s. v. *Δημοσθένης*, &c. Schäfer (*Dem.* i. 257) would date the relation only from 366. It was only after attaining his majority and receiving the guardians' account that Demosth. could have resolved on the law-suit.

¹ [Plut.] *vit. Isae.*: Phot. *cod.* 263. Curtius adopts the tradition (v. 221, Ward). Schäfer suggests that it may have arisen from Demosthenes having made some present to Isaeos on winning the cause

against Aphobos (*Dem.* i. 257).

² Curtius v. 220 (Ward).

³ Plut. *vit. Dem.* [not the pseudo-Plutarch in the lives of the X. Orators] c. 5.

⁴ Plutarch, no doubt, mentions *τοὺς Ἰσοκράτους καὶ Ἀντιφώντας καὶ Ἰσαίου* among *τοὺς ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τὰ μενάρκια προδιδάσκοντας* (*de glor. Athen.* p. 350 c): but this is vague; and need mean no more than that he knew an Art of Rhetoric (see ch. XXI. *ad init.*) to be extant under the name of Isaeos.

The Sixth Oration, On the Estate of Philoktemon (364—363 B. C.), falls in the midst of those years (366—362) which the tradition supposes Isaeos to have reserved for Demosthenes; showing that, if Isaeos had no other disciples, he had at least concurrent occupations. Then another version claims for Isaeos the credit of having taught Demosthenes gratis¹. But the decisive argument is furnished by the speeches Against Aphobos and Onetor. These are not the compositions of one who had given himself wholly to the guidance of Isaeos, who was sitting at the master's feet, who was working under the master's eye. On the contrary, these earliest speeches of Demosthenes have a stamp of their own as marked as it is original. Some valuable hints Demosthenes unquestionably got from Isaeos, and an attempt will be made presently to show what these were. But the limits of the influence forbid us to think that the intercourse between Isaeos and Demosthenes as teacher and learner can have been either very intimate or of very long duration².

The death of Isaeos is conjecturally placed about 350 B. C. In a general view of his career, we are irresistibly struck with a resemblance and a contrast. Antiphon and Isaeos are brothers in accomplishment, in calling, in bent of genius, in subjection to the general disfavour which recognized but survived

¹ Suidas s. v. Ἰσαῖος: ἐπανείηται ... ὡς Δημοσθένης ἀμισθὶ προαγαγών. Weissenborn (Ersch. and Gruber, *Encycl.* II. xxxviii. 286) adopts this account.

² The enemy—Pytheas, as Di-

onys. *Isae.* c. 4 conjectures—who reproached Demosthenes with having 'swallowed Isaeos bodily' (τὸν Ἰσαῖον ὄλον σεστίσται) paid a bad compliment to the discernment of his audience.

Date of death, Antiphon and Isaeos.

their success. Each was deeply versed, not only in rhetoric, but in law; each, too, was eminent in a branch—Antiphon in the law of homicide, Isaeos in the law of property. Each used his art for his client, not; indeed, without some attempt at persuasive simplicity, but with a masterful force which rendered the attempt little more than a tribute to usage. Each had a sinister reputation; Antiphon ‘lay under the suspicion of the people through a repute for cleverness,’ and never came before the people when he could help it; Isaeos, too, was deemed ‘clever in elaborating pleas for the worse part¹,’ and, with the exception of the Greek Argument to his Oration On the Estate of Nikostratos—and that Argument is a worthless authority²—there is no evidence that he ever spoke in a law-court³. Each was the object of a public satire which reflected this unpopularity; Antiphon figured in the *Peisandros* of Plato Comicus, Isaeos in the *Theseus*⁴ of Theopompos. But, if thus far the personal analogy is close, there is a strange divergence of fates beyond it. Antiphon worked patiently, indeed, at his disliked and suspected calling through long years of judicious abs-

¹ Dionys. *Isae.* 4.

² See the note on it below, ch. XXI.

³ Schömann *praef.* vi. (where his ‘fortasse’ seems to leave the question as to Or. iv. open; but see p. 269 of his Commentary): Schäfer *Dem.* i. 254. Curtius observes that Demosthenes could learn little as to *delivery* from Isaeos, ‘who himself never came forward in public’ (v. 226, Ward).

⁴ [Plut.] *vit. Isae.*—The idea of

the comedy was that Theseus, expelled from Athens, goes to Persia. We have two lines of a mock-heroic speech; predicting the wanderings of the hero, as those of Io are foretold by Prometheus:—

ἦξεῖς δὲ Μήδων γαῖαν, ἔνθα καρδά-
μων
πλείστων ποιεῖται καὶ πράσων
ἀβυρτάκη,

Meineke, *Frag. Com.* p. 306.

tention from every battle-field of the civic life. But his climax was political; the strife of parties was the focus on which his disciplined powers were finally concentrated; and when the keen weapon which had so often served others was at last bared in his own hand, it was for no single combat, but for the encounter of oligarchy with democracy, for a struggle which filled Athens with bitterness, as it drowned his own life in blood. Isaeos, subtle and patient, but not, like Antiphon, passionate also, was congenially placed in days when an Athenian had ceased to be primarily a citizen. The early application of rhetorical art to politics—so natural, even so necessary, yet so crude—had long given place to a conception of the rhetorical province in which politics made only one department. With this department Isaeos recognised—probably with the indifference of the time—that he had nothing to do; the intellectual ardour which he clearly had was of a kind that his tasks at once satisfied and limited—making it enough for him to live and die the laborious, successful, rather unpopular master of Attic Law; not the first at Athens who had followed a calling, but perhaps the earliest Athenian type of a professional man.

CHAPTER XX.

ISAEOS.

STYLE.

AT the conclusion of his essay on Isaeos¹, Dionysios explains the principle of selection which has guided him in this and in the two other criticisms which are properly its companions, the essays on Lysias and Isokrates. He has chosen men who are not merely interesting in themselves but who have a certain typical significance. Lysias is the representative of those who cultivate terse, closely-reasoned discourse with a view to real contests, deliberative or forensic; and, having made a study of Lysias, he has felt himself exempted from discussing in detail the austere Antiphon, the frigid, inane and ungraceful Polykrates, the correct and subtle Thrasymachos, who, though inventive and forcible, is still a merely scholastic writer, the artificial Kritias and Zoilos, to whom, in different ways, the same general observation would apply. Isokrates, again, stands for all who have succeeded in the poetical, the elevated and stately manner; and, in like sort, absolves the critic from discussing

¹ Dionys. *Isae.* c. 19.

Gorgias, 'who lapses from moderation and is everywhere childish'; Alkidamas, his pupil, who is 'somewhat coarse'; Theodoros of Byzantium, whose technical inaccuracies are not adequately compensated by ability, deliberative or forensic, and who, moreover, is antiquated; Anaximenes of Lampsakos, who aims at completeness, who would fain stand four-square to rivalries from every quarter, but who, in every kind, is weak and devoid of persuasive charm; or, lastly, those contemporary imitators of Isokrates, in regard to expression, who are confessedly his inferiors, such as Theodektes, Naukrates, Philistos, Kephisodoros, Ephoros, Theopompos. But what or whom does Isaeos represent except himself? Might not he, if any man, he, an exclusively forensic writer, and that in the 'plain' manner, he, the close student and direct imitator of Lysias, have been taken as characterised when Lysias had been criticised? This is the answer of Dionysios:—'As to the third—Isaeos—if anyone were to ask me why I added him (to Lysias and Isokrates), being, as he is, an imitator of Lysias, I should assign this reason;—Because I think that the oratorical power (δεινότης) of Demosthenes—power which everyone deems to have reached an incomparable perfection—*took its seeds and its beginnings from Isaeos*¹.'

Distinction of Isaeos, according to Dionysios.

The significance of Isaeos, when looked at closely,

The estimate needs qualification.

¹ Dionys. *Isae.* 20, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος, ἣν οὐθεὶς ἐστὶν ὃς οὐ τελειωτάτην ἀπασῶν οἴεται γενέσθαι, τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ παρσχέιν. Cp. *ib.* c. 3, where he

says that the composition of Isaeos, in respect of the power, the impressiveness, of its embellishment (τῇ δεινότητι τῆς κατασκευῆς) 'is in truth a fountain (πηγή τις) of the faculty of Demosthenes.'

will prove to be something more independent and substantive than this judgment seems to make it. But here, at least, are two cardinal points for an attempt to estimate the place of Isaeos in the development of Attic oratory. We must endeavour to determine, first, his relation to Lysias; secondly, his relation to Demosthenes.

Isaeos compared with Lysias.

A comparison of Isaeos with Lysias may begin in the province of expression, with its two departments of diction and composition, and thence pass to the province of subject-matter.

Diction.

As regards diction, the resemblance is close. Isaeos, emulous of that persuasive 'plainness' (ἀφέλεια) in which Lysias was so consummate an artist, takes the first step towards attaining it by imitating Lysias in the correctness, the conciseness, the simplicity of his language. When some errors of the manuscripts have been amended¹, few blemishes remain discernible in the purity both of grammar and of idiom with which Isaeos writes Attic². The

¹ I. § 1, βοηθεῖν τε τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ποιησαμένῳ με καὶ ἐμαντῷ, where we should probably read βοηθεῖν τῷ τε: and so in VIII, § 1, οὐτοί τε τοῦ κλήρου λαγχάνουσιν ὡς ἐγγυτάτω γένους ὄντες, ἡμᾶς τε ὑβρίζουσιν. Similarly, in I. § 48, a false reading is καὶ νῦν μὲν ἐβούλετο ἡμᾶς, instead of καὶ νῦν ἐβ. ἡμᾶς μὲν: in II. § 26, μὲν αὐτῷ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ μὲν: in VI. § 18, Εὐκτῆμων μὲν γὰρ ἐβίω ἔτη for Ἐ. γὰρ ἐβίω μὲν ἔτη, κ.τ.λ.—In VI. § 10, ἐπειδὴ δὲ προδιαμεμαρτύρηκεν ὡς υἱὸν εἶναι γνήσιον Εὐκτῆμονος τοῦτον, Blass (*Att. Ber.* II. 469) would read for ὡς υἱὸν εἶναι γνήσιον

Ε. τοῦτον, υἱὸς εἶναι γνησίους—τοῖσδε. In XI. § 10, ἡμεῖς δέ, ἐγὼ καὶ Στράτιος καὶ Στρατοκλῆς—παρεσκευάζοντο, the 1st pers. plur. is no bold change.

Priscian XVIII. c. 25 says:—*Attici ὅταν ἔλθῃ de futuro dicunt. Isaeus etiam de praeterito: ὅταν ἔλθῃ, εἰώθει παρ' ἐκείνῳ κατάγεσθαι. Et iterum: ὅταν ἔλθῳ, παρ' ἐκείνῳ κατηγορῆν. Antiquiores tamen ὅτε ἔλθοι de praeterito dicunt.* These impossible solecisms must have been mere blunders of the copyist for ὅτε ἔλθοι, ὅτε ἔλθοιμι.

² One or two instances of incor-

true exceptions to his conciseness are equally rare¹; and, if anyone would see how remote is Isaeos from a really inartistic diffuseness, he need only compare the oration On the Estate of Hagnias with two speeches, one of them concerning the same inheritance, which have wrongly been ascribed to Demosthenes—the speech Against Makartatos and the speech Against Olympiodoros². In the combination of brevity with clearness, Isaeos stands, indeed, next to Lysias. In the avoidance of rare or poetical expressions, of tropes, of novel compounds, or of phrases akin to comedy, the nearest rival of Lysias is Isokrates; but Isaeos follows at no long interval³. Lastly, the diction of

rectness or inelegance may be noticed. (1) VII. § 36, ἐγὼ τοίνυν ἔν γε τῶν ὑπ' ἐκείνου δοκιμασθέντων πεποίηκα: 'I have done one at least of the things *about which he had satisfied himself*'—i. e., which he felt sure that I would do [the speaker had been saying that he had been approved by his actions, δεδοκιμασμένος, to the testator, as likely to do public services]: where we should have expected πιστευθέντων. (2) VIII. § 6, λόγων ἀκοῇ καὶ μαρτύρων—objective and subjective genitives harshly joined. (3) I. § 41, διαθήκας... ἀψευδεῖς ἀπέφηναν, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ παράπαν οὐ γενομένας, ἐνίων δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλευμένων. (4) III. § 35, οὐ χαλεπὸν γινῶναι ὅτι φαίνεται περιφανῶς, κ.τ.λ.

¹ The clumsy wordiness of a few passages seems to come from the wish of ἀφέλεια: e. g. II. § 38, Βούλομαι ὑμῶν καὶ αὐτοὺς τούτους μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι, καὶ ἐμοὶ μαρτυ-

ρῶντας ἔργα καὶ οὐ λόγῳ, ἐξ ὧν ἔπραξαν αὐτοί, ὅτι ἐγὼ τάληθῆ λέγω, cf. *ib.* § 18: VII. § 14, Ἀπολλοδώρῳ γὰρ ἦν υἱός, ὃν ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἥσκει καὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας εἶχεν, ὥσπερ καὶ προσῆκον ἦν. On the other hand, Isaeos never repeats himself, as Lysias sometimes does, through the desire of parallelism.

² XLIII. πρὸς Μακάρτατον: XLVIII. κατὰ Ὀλυμπιοδώρου βλάβης. See Schäfer, *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, III. Append. 5, 6, pp. 228—241: who thinks that they are by the same hand. The *Hagnias* of Isaeos and the *Makartatos* have to do with the same inheritance. Isaeos begins (XI. § 8) 'Hagnias, Eubulides, Stratios (uncle of Hagnias), and myself, are sons of cousins':—the pseudo-Demosthenes goes through the entire stemma of the Buselidae (§§ 19—21). Cf. Blass, II. 470.

³ A few exceptions may be noticed:—1. Rare or poetical expres-

Isaeos, like that of Lysias, has vividness—*ἐνάργεια*—aptitude for ‘bringing under the senses what is narrated’¹. It is when we turn from diction to composition, from the choice of words to the way of putting them together, that the marked unlikeness begins.

*Composi-
tion.*

Lysias, as we have seen, had exchanged the rigid monotony of the old periodic writing for a manner better suited to real contests, for a style more flexible and more various, in which the periods are relieved by sentences not periodic, and the proportion borne by one element to the other is determined by the scale of the subject. Lysias was, however, fond of antithesis; and the result is that, while his composition as a whole has variety, the structure of his periods themselves is apt to be too stiff and uniform². Now Isaeos is exempt from this desire of formal antithesis, and, as a consequence, from this rigidity. His non-periodic passages have much of the old ‘running’ style; the use of *τε* in linking clause to clause is archaic³; and the pursuit of free movement is occa-

sions: *σχέλιος* (XI. § 5), *ἀνάινεσθαι* (II. § 25), *ὁ ἐν Ἄιδου* (II. § 45): *ἀποσυλᾶν* (V. § 30): *λυμαίνεσθαι* (VI. 18).—2. Tropes: *καταφυγή τῆς ἐρημίας καὶ παραψυχῆ τοῦ βίου*, said of Adoption (II. § 13): *βραβευτάς* in sense of *δικαστάς* (IX. § 35): *μαρτύρια*, = *μνημεία ἀρετῆς*, V. § 41: *δοκιμασία* in general sense of ‘test’, VII. § 34, and so *βάσανος*, IX. § 29: *παρανοίας αἰρεῖν, τὸ convict* (the dead) of folly, *ib.* § 36: *ἵνα αὐτῶν ἐκκόψαιμι ταύτην τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν*, ‘that I might radically frustrate this their sacrilege’ (*i. e.* this attempt to rob the dead, VIII. § 39):

ἃ παρακαταθέμενος ὑμῖν, ‘deposited in your memories’ (XI § 32). 3. Novel compounds: *καθηποτρόφηκας, κατεζευγοτρόφηκας* (V. § 43): *ὑποπαρωθῶν* (VIII. § 38): *καταπεπαιδραστηκέναι* (X. § 25).—4. Phrases akin to Comedy: *ἐπὶ τὰ Νικοστράτου ἄξαντες* (IV. § 10): *ἐν τοῖς λιθοργείοις κυλιθεῖται* (VI. § 44): *ὑποπεπτωκότες τῇ ἀνθρώπων, of legacy-hunters* (VI. § 29): *οὐκ ἐτόλμησε γρύξαι* (VIII. § 27).

¹ Vol. I. p. 172.

² Vol. I. pp. 166, 170.

³ *e. g.* II. § 11, VI. § 7, VII. § 39, VIII. § 18.

sionally carried even to an ungraceful negligence¹. Yet, on the whole, the composition of Isaeos is mainly distinguished from that of Lysias by the stamp of art. The composition of Isaeos tends to keep the hearer's mind at strain by a continual sense, not merely of earnestness, but of trained and confident skill; it cannot be quite content to forego the advantage resigned by Demosthenes and the great deliberative speakers—of seeming comparatively artless; at the same time, its own eager strength renders it profoundly incapable of suppressing tones which are militant and aggressive. It is important to see clearly the general distinction between the two orators;—that, while Lysias is secure in a modest art of his own, Isaeos is halting between this indirect art, in which he is too sophisticated and morally not fine enough really to excel, and the direct, masterly art of eloquence to which he has not perfectly attained. Good illustrations are afforded by those 'proems,' or openings, of Lysian and Isaeian speeches which Dionysios has compared². In the speech of Lysias

*Proems of
Lysias and
Isaeos com-
pared.*

¹ See, e.g., VII. § 5: *τούτοις οὐσίαν ὁ πατήρ κατέλιπε πολλήν, ὥστε καὶ λειτουργεῖν ἕκαστον ἀξιοῦσθαι παρ' ὑμῖν. ταύτην ἐκείνοι τρεῖς ὄντες ἐνείμαντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τούτων τῶν δύο τελευτησάντων, κ.τ.λ.* VIII. § 7: *καὶ ἐκείνην τε ἔτρεφε παρὰ τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης παίδων, ἐκείνων τε ἔτι ζώοντων.* In the following places, the extreme abruptness has the air of an affectation: VI. § 3, *Φιλοκλήμων γὰρ ὁ Κηφισιεὺς φίλος ἦν Χαιρεστράτῳ τουτωῖ· δούς δὲ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ υἱὸν αὐτὸν ποιησάμενος*

ἐτελεύτησεν: IX. § 1, *ἀδελφός μοι ἦν ὁμομήτριος, ὃ ἄνδρες, Ἀστυφίλος, οὗ ἔστιν ὁ κλήρος ἀποδημήσας οὖν μετὰ τῶν εἰς Μιτυλήνην στρατιωτῶν ἐτελεύτησεν*: X. § 3, *Ἀρίσταρχος γὰρ ἦν, ὃ ἄνδρες, Συπαλλήτιος. οὗτος ἔλαβε Ξεναίουτου Ἀχαρνείως θυγατέρα, κ.τ.λ.*

² The three pairs of proems which follow are given by Dionysios *De Isaeo*, cc. 5—11, in this order:—(1) c. 5, Isaeos 'For Eumathes,' c. 6, Lysias 'For Pherenikos'; c. 7, comments. (2) c. 8, Isaeos 'Defence of a Guardian,' Lysias

‘For Pherenikos¹,’ an Athenian citizen thus prefaces his defence of his Theban friend:—

^{1.} *Lysias,*
‘For Phe-
renikos.’

‘I think, judges, I must first tell you of my friendship with Pherenikos, lest some of you should wonder why I, who have never been any man’s advocate before, am his now. His father Kephisodotos was my friend, judges; and when we were exiles at Thebes I stayed with him—I, and any other Athenian who would; and many were the good offices, public and private, that we received from him before we came home. Well, when he and his son had the like fortune, and came to Athens banished men, I thought that I owed them the fullest recompense, and made them so thoroughly at home in my house that no one coming in could have told, unless he knew before, whether it belonged to them or to me. Pherenikos knows as well as other people, judges, that there are plenty of better speakers than I, and better experts in affairs of this kind; but still he thinks that my close friendship is the best thing he can trust to. So, when he appeals to me and asks me to give him my honest help, I think it would be a shame to let him be deprived, if I can help it, of what Androkleides gave him.’

Now take the opening of a speech by Isaeos².

‘Against the sons of Hippokrates’; c. 9, comments. (3) c. 10, Isaeos ‘Against the Demesmen,’ Lysias ‘Against Archebiades’; c. 11, comments.

Speaking of Lysias and Isaeos, Sir W. Jones says in his *Prefatory Discourse* (xl.) that it is ‘almost impossible to convey in our lan-

guage an adequate notion of the nice distinction between the different originals’; but this is too strong; and the *ethical* contrast in the specimens taken by Dionysios lessens the difficulty.

¹ Vol. i. p. 312.

² For a notice of these and the

The speaker, Xenokles, is asserting the liberty of a freedman named Eumathes whom the heirs of his former master claimed as a slave :—

‘Once, judges, on a former occasion, I proved Isaeos, ‘For Eumathes.’ useful to Eumathes the defendant; and, on this, I shall be justified in aiding you, as best I can, to rescue him. Allow me, however, to say a few words to guard against any of you fancying that it is in a petulant spirit, or in any mood of aggression, that I have meddled with his concerns. When I was trierarch in the archonship of Kephisodoros, and tidings came to my kinsfolk that I had been killed in the sea fight,—property of mine being then in the hands of Eumathes,—he sent for my relations and friends, produced the property which I had entrusted to him, and restored the whole amount correctly and honestly. When I returned in safety, I therefore became still more intimate with him; and, when he proposed to establish a bank, I made him a farther advance. When, subsequently, Dionysios claimed him, I vindicated his freedom, knowing that he had been made free in a lawcourt by Epigenes.’

Lysias wrote a defence¹ for a guardian whom his wards had accused of abusing the trust :—

‘It is not enough, judges, for guardians to have 2. Lysias, ‘Against the sons of Hippokrates.’ all the trouble they have from their office, but, for keeping their friends’ properties together, they are vexatiously accused by the orphans in many cases; and such is my case now. I was appointed trustee, judges, of the estate of Hippokrates, I managed the

two following fragments of Isaeos, see ch. XXI. *ad finem*.

¹ The speech ‘Against the sons of Hippokrates,’ vol. I. p. 313.

property till the sons came of age, I handed over to them the money which had been left in my keeping, and now they bring a vexatious and unjust law-suit against me.'

Isaeos, too, wrote a defence for a guardian against his ward :—

*Isaeos, 'De-
fence of a
Guardian.'*

'I could have wished, judges, that the plaintiff's tendencies, where money is concerned, had not been so discreditable as to engage him in designs on the property of others and in law-suits such as the present. With better reason still might I have wished that my own nephew, the master of a patrimony ample enough for the discharge of public services, a patrimony of which you placed him in possession, had looked after his own fortune instead of grasping at mine. Thrift might have given him a better name with all men; and a larger liberality would have made him a better citizen for you. Now, however, as he has squandered, mortgaged, disgracefully and miserably wrecked his own property, and trusting to cabals and clap-trap, has assailed mine, there is nothing for it, I suppose—however much one may deplore such a character in a relation—but to meet his charges or his irrelevant slanders with the most energetic reply that I can address to you.'

Lysias supplied a defence¹ to a young Athenian who had lately succeeded to his paternal estate, and who was sued by one Archebiades for a debt alleged to have been contracted by the defendant's father :—

*3. Lysias,
'Against
Archebia-
des.'*

'As soon as Archebiades brought this action against me, judges, I went to him, represented that

¹ The speech 'Against Archebiades,' vol. I. p. 314.

I was young, unskilled in such affairs, and not at all desirous of entering a law-court. ‘I appeal to you, then,’ I said, ‘not to make capital out of my inexperience, but to take my friends and your own into council and explain to them how the debt arose. If they think your story true, you shall have no more trouble, you shall get your money and go your way. You ought, however, to give the full and complete story,—since the transaction was before my time,—in order that we may learn any facts that we do not know before we discuss your case, and so determine, if possible, whether you are making a dishonest attempt on my property, or are trying to get back your own.’ This was my challenge;—but he would never consent to have a meeting, or to talk over his claims, or refer them to arbitration, until you enacted the law concerning arbitrators.’

Isaeos wrote a speech for a man who claimed from his demesmen a farm which he had pledged to them; the speaker is supposed to be young and untrained (*ιδιώτης*); and he begins thus:—

‘I should have wished, judges, if possible, not to be injured by any of my fellowcitizens—or, at least, to have found adversaries with whom my controversy would have caused me less disquietude. But now I am in a very painful situation; I am wronged by the men of my own deme, whom I can scarcely allow to rob me, yet with whom it is distressing to quarrel, seeing that our common rites must be celebrated in their society. It is hard, of course, to hold one’s own against a multitude; numbers are no small help to plausibility; nevertheless,

*Isaeos,
Against
the Demes-
men.*

as I felt confident in my case, though a host of trying circumstances beset me, I resolved that I would not shrink from the endeavour to obtain my rights by your aid. I ask you, then, to be indulgent if, youthful as I am, I have ventured to address a court. It is through the fault of those who wrong me that I am compelled to take a part so alien from my character. But I will attempt to set the case before you from the outset, and in the fewest words.'

*Êthos in
Isaeos.*

These examples will illustrate what it is needful to see clearly—that, in matter of expression, the difference between Lysias and Isaeos is one, not of diction, but of composition. They will always show how far, and in what sense, Isaeos sacrifices êthos to his more trenchant and metallic emphasis: it is the portrayal of the ingenuous youth or the plain man, the *ιδιώτης*, that is damaged in point of art. So far from its being true that êthos is wanting in the speeches of Isaeos, there is perhaps only one of them—the third—in which it is not an effective element; and, in the third speech, the reason of its absence is simple—there is no room for it: all is argument. In the moral persuasion of vigorous insistence, of reasoned remonstrance, or of just indignation, Isaeos is at least equal to Lysias. It is in the attraction of a guileless and gracious simplicity that he is inferior. Where Lysias would have said, *It is shameful*, Isaeos says, *It is absurd*¹.

¹ VI. § 1, δεομένων τούτων καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ εἰ ἐκέῖνα μὲν ὑπέμενον, συνεξέπλευσα καὶ συνεδυστήχησα νῦν δὲ οὐ πειρόμην συνειπεῖν. καὶ ἐάλωμεν εἰς τοὺς πολέμους.

Mention must be made once more of the technical distinction between ‘figures of language’ and ‘figures of thought’. A ‘figure of language’ is a combination of words for the artificial expression of an idea—as by antithesis. The object of such a figure is rhetorical ornament; and, if the form of expression is changed, the figure of language is destroyed¹. A ‘figure of thought’ consists in the suggestion of an idea which is itself artificial, having for its object, not ornament, but *êthos* or *pathos*—moral persuasion or the excitement of emotion². If the speaker prefaces a statement by asking the question which he is himself about to answer: if he feigns perplexity for the sake of giving the greater effect to his own solution: if, instead of relating what other persons have said, he introduces those persons as speaking with their own mouths: if he imagines his adversaries as raising an objection which he goes on to refute—these and the like devices are ‘figures of thought’. Unlike the figures of language, these figures of thought are independent of any form of words; the form of words may be changed without affecting them. Their general tendency

*His use of
Figures.*

¹ This is even the *criterion* taken by the rhetor Alexander Numenius (*flor. circ.* 120 A.D. under Hadrian) in his treatise *περὶ τῶν τῆς διανοίας καὶ τῆς λέξεως σχημάτων*, c. 1 (*Rhet. Graec.* vol. III. p. 10, Spengel):—*τὸ μὲν τῆς λέξεως κινήσεως τῆς συσχούσης τὸ σχῆμα ἀπόλλυται... τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας σχήματος, κἂν τὰ ὀνόματα κινή τις, κἂν ἑτέροις ὀνόμασιν ἐξενέγκη τις, τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα μένει.* He gives

this instance:—the sentence, *ἀλλ’ ἢ τοῦτους μεταπεμπτέον ἢ ἄλλην μὴ ἐλάττω στρατιὰν ἐπιπεμπτέον*, the ‘figure of language’ (*paronomasia*) would be destroyed by the mere change of *ἐπιπεμπτέον* into *ἀποσταλτέον*.

² Volkmann, *die Rhet. der Griech. u. Rom.*, pp. 395, 416. For his whole analysis of the figures in both kinds, pp. 396—430.

is to give animation. The elder school of Attic oratory was too grave and too stately to admit this animation; Antiphon, who uses the figures of language sparingly, uses the figures of thought hardly ever¹. That Andokides uses the figures of thought so much, is a strong mark of his comparative modernism and of his detachment from the art of his day². Lysias, the founder of a style free from the old rigour, had a reason of his own for still using the figures of thought with moderation,—namely, because they are too suggestive of thrust and parry, and, though they may serve *êthos*, tend to mar the special *êthos* at which he chiefly aimed, since they present the speaker too much as a combatant. Isaeos, while still desirous of a persuasive plainness, is also bent on exerting the essential vigour of his art. He has no longer, then, the same motive as Lysias for declining aids to vivacity or even vehemence; and accordingly—while he usually avoids the figures of language³—he uses the figures of thought⁴ with a freedom which brings him decidedly

¹ Vol. I. p. 29. ² *ib.* p. 99.

³ Such 'figures of language' as occur are chiefly—Antithesis, as I. § 15, x. § 1,—with parison, v. § 39,—with parison and paromoion, v. § 44; cf. VII. § 44: anaphora (*ἀφείλετο δὲ τὴν Δημοκλέους γενομένην γυναικα, ἀφείλετο δὲ καὶ τὴν Κηφισοδότου μητέρα*) v. § 9, VI. § 43, XI. § 9: asyndeton [unlike Lysias] VI. § 62, VII. § 41, XI. § 41: polysyndeton, VII. § 42.

⁴ *e.g.* II. 21. *ἤδέως δ' ἄν μοι δοκῶ τούτου πωθῆσθαι τοῦ φάσκοντος εἰ φρονεῖν, τίνα ποιήσασθαι ἐχρήν ἀπὸ*

τῶν συγγενῶν; πότῃρα τὸν υἱὸν τὸν τούτου; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἔδωκεν, κ.τ.λ. ('hypophora'—suggested objection which the speaker solves); —so v. § 45, VII. § 33, XI. 25.—v. 13, *πείθει Μενέξενον, τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τε καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράττοντα, ἃ ἐγὼ αἰσχυρόμενος ἀναγκάζομαι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου πονηρίαν λέγειν,—τί ποιήσῃ (rhetorical question, ἐρώτησις);* so VI. §§ 36, 63.—VI. § 53, *πῶς ἂν τις περιφανέστερον ἐξελεγχθείη τὰ ψευδῆ μεμαρτυρηκῶς ἢ εἰ τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο* 'Ανδρόκλεις, πῶς οἶσθα, κ.τ.λ. (prosopopoiia): so VIII. § 24.

nearer than any of his predecessors to the practice of their greatest master¹, Demosthenes. When Photios says that Isaeos ‘set the example of using figures’, *πρώτος σχηματίζειν ἤρξατο*—a statement strange at first sight in reference to one who came after Isokrates—this, it can hardly be doubted, is the meaning².

It remains to notice one minor trait of the Isaeian *Hiatus*. composition which is not without historical interest. Isokrates, as we saw, studiously shuns allowing a vowel at the end of one word to be followed by a vowel at the beginning of the next³. The fashion thus set seems gradually to have found a modified

¹ Cic. *Orator* xxxix. § 136, *Sed sententiarum ornamenta* [τὰ τῆς διανοίας σχήματα] *maiora sunt; quibus quia Demosthenes frequentissime utitur, sunt qui putent idcirco eius eloquentiam maxime esse laudabilem. Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam conformatione sententiae dicitur, &c.*

² Phot. *cod.* 263. After observing that it is hard to discern the work of Isaeos from that of Lysias, πλὴν κατὰ γε τοὺς σχηματισμούς, Photios adds—καὶ γὰρ πρῶτος Ἰσαῖος σχηματίζειν ἤρξατο καὶ τρέπειν ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν τὴν διάνοιαν. Spengel (*συναγωγή τεχνῶν*, p. 181) explains the *σχηματίζειν* by that variety and subtlety in the *distribution and arrangement* of all the elements (including figures) of the speech on which Dionysius dwells (*de Isae.* c. 3), and which will be noticed presently. But this explanation, though ingenious, is strained. Photios rather means that Isaeos

was the first who really used the *σχήματα* of civil oratory—the *σχήματα διανοίας*. This is exactly confirmed by the striking remark that Isaeos was the first who turned his mind ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικόν. Blass (*Att. Ber.* II. 465) seems to render the words of Photios:—‘He was the first to give his thought an artistic form (*σχηματίζειν διάνοιαν*) and to dress it in tropes (*τρέπειν*),:—quoting, for *τρέπειν*, Phot. *cod.* 259 (of Antiphon), *μὴ κεχρῆσθαι τὸν ῥήτορα τοῖς κατὰ διάνοιαν σχήμασιν, ἀλλὰ κατευθῆν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλάστους τὰς νοήσεις ἐκφέρεσθαι, τροπὴν δὲ καὶ ἐνάλλαξιν οὕτε ζητῆσαι τὸν ἄνδρα.* κ.τ.λ. But surely *σχηματίζειν* does not govern *διάνοιαν*,—it is used absolutely; and *τρέπειν* means simply ‘to turn’.—As Blass notices, *πολιτικός* [add *ἀγωνιστικός*] *λόγος* is opposed by Aristeides to *ἀφελής, ἀπλοῦς*: *Ars. Rh.* I. 1. Speng. *Rh. Gr.* II.

³ *Supra* p. 66.

acceptance in contemporary or later prose. In the earliest speech of Isaeos—the fifth—there is no trace of it: and in seven others (II., III., IV., VI., IX., X., XII.) there is very little. On the other hand, the avoidance of hiatus is marked in VIII. (375 B.C.), XI. (359 B.C.), VII. (353 B.C.), and I., as well as in two of the longer fragments¹; though it is nowhere so systematic as with Isokrates².

*Treatment
of Subject-
matter.*

That divergence of Isaeos from Lysias which thus widens at each step from the starting point of a common diction is found complete when we turn from the formal to the real side of his work. It is in the treatment of subject-matter that the distinctive art of Isaeos is fully manifested. Lysias adheres strictly to the simple fourfold partition—proem, narrative, proof, epilogue. Sometimes a narrative, properly so-called, may not be needed; sometimes the narrative may be in itself the proof; but, where the four parts are present, Lysias keeps them distinct and in their proper order³. Isaeos shows the most daring and dexterous ingenuity, the most consummate generalship, in every novel adjustment or interfusion of these elements that can help the case in hand; his forces are moved with a rapidity and combined with an original skill which swiftly throws the stress of the assault precisely on the enemy's weakest point and assails it with blow upon blow.

*Variety of
Arrangement.*

¹ Those of the Speech 'Against the Demesmen', and of the 'Defence of a Guardian against his Wards'—1 and 2 of the Fragments noticed in Ch. XXI.

² Oration I. is, on the whole,

as careful as any in the avoidance of hiatus; yet, even there, in § 3 we read—*εἴ τι ἡμῖν ἢ τῷ πατρὶ ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ, ἀπεκρίνατο.*

³ Vol. I. pp. 179 f.

Everything varies with the occasion; nothing is managed by rule, yet all is done with art—art of which the artist is not the servant but the master¹.

Sometimes there is an ordinary proem, much in *Proem.* the manner of Lysias, explaining the friendship of the speaker for the litigant² or seeking to prepossess the court against the adversary³. Sometimes there is no proem, properly so called. Thus the third and ninth speeches open at once with the briefest possible statement of the case,—followed, in ix., by a sketch of what the speaker will go on to prove (*πρόθεσις*, § 1),—in iii., by a preliminary argument (*προκατασκευή*, §§ 1—6). The same sort of preliminary argument forms the opening of Or. v., §§ 1—4; and immediately follows the recitation of laws which introduces Or. xi.⁴ This bold abruptness is characteristic of Isaeos. The genuine forensic speeches of Demosthenes show not a single instance in which he ventured to dispense with a proem.

The narrative is sometimes short⁵, and followed *Narrative.* by a separate argument; more often it is a long and elaborate statement divided into sections, of which the proofs—from witnesses, from documents or from laws—are given, not collectively at the end, but

¹ The *general* characteristics of Isaeos, as compared with Lysias, in regard to treatment of subject-matter, are briefly noticed by Dionysios *De Isae.* c. 3: the *special* characteristics, in regard to (1) narrative, (2) proof, in cc. 14—18.

² *e.g.* Or. iv. (Nikostratos) § 1; very brief: Or. vi. (Philoktemon) §§ 1—2: and the fragment For Eumathes.

³ *e.g.* Or. i. (Kleonymos) §§ 2—7: Or. viii. (Kiron) §§ 1—5.

⁴ See, too, the fragment 'Against Aristogeiton and Archippos', ch. xxi. *ad fin.*

⁵ *e.g.* Or. x. (Aristarchos) §§ 4—6. So it was (Dionys. *Isae.* 14) in the lost speeches Against Medon and Against Hagnotheos, and in that speech Against the Demesmen of which the proem remains.

section by section¹. The sixth speech, On the Estate of Philoktemon, is a good example. Here the adversaries (1) denied that the testator had adopted a son, (2) asserted that he had sons of his body; and there is a corresponding division of the narrative into two distinct parts (§§ 5—7, §§ 18—42), with the proofs subjoined. Will-cases would often, of course, involve such a long and intricate narrative; it would be difficult or impossible for the judges to follow the chapters of an argument detached from the corresponding chapters of facts; but Isaeos, in obeying a necessity, made it a virtue, and carried to a high perfection the combination of luminous recital with perspicuous reasoning. ‘Reading the narratives of Lysias,’ says Dionysios, ‘one would suppose that nothing was said artificially or insidiously, but everything in accordance with the dictates of nature and of truth,—forgetting that the imitation of nature was the chief task of his art. The narratives of Isaeos are apt to give the opposite sensation, and to make one fancy that nothing is spontaneous or unpremeditated, even when things are related as, in fact, they happened. All seems the result of artifice; all seems contrived to deceive, or to secure some sort of underhand advantage. Lysias will be believed even when he lies; Isaeos will not be heard without suspicion even when he tells the truth².’ Dionysios greatly over-

¹ *e.g.* Or. III. (Pyrrhos) §§ 1—56: Or. v. (Dikaeogenes) §§ 5—24: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) §§ 5—28. So it was (Dionys. *Isae.* 14) in the lost speeches Against Hermon, and

Against Eukleides, and in that speech For Euphiletos of which a large fragment remains.

² Dionys. *Isae.* 4.

colours the contrast,—as he sometimes does through that solicitude for ‘the meanest capacity’ which belongs to his eager and genial interpretation; but the main point is clear—the consummate and victorious art which he finds in the narrative of Isaeos. Now here we may almost certainly recognise a practical lesson which Isaeos owed to Isokrates—whose teaching in the matter of expression had influenced him so little. The *Aeginetikos* is perhaps the earliest example of narrative interwoven with proof in the manner which Isaeos perfected¹.

In regard to proof, whether massed or sectional, *Proof.* the characteristic difference between Isaeos and Lysias is fairly represented by the remark of the same critic, that Lysias uses *enthymeme*, Isaeos uses also *epicheireme*². By *enthymeme*, Aristotle meant a *Enthymeme and Epicheireme.* rhetorical syllogism: that is, a syllogism drawn, not from the premisses (*ἀρχαί*) proper to any particular science—such, for instance, as medicine—but from propositions relating to contingent things in the sphere of human action³, which are the common property of all discussion; propositions which he classifies as general (*εἰκότα*) and particular (*σημεῖα*); and accordingly *defines* an *enthymeme* as ‘a syllo-

¹ Cf. Dionys. *De Isocr.* c. 4: vol. i. p. 180. In the *Aeginet.* (vol. vi. p. 218) we have—(1) narrative, §§ 5—9: proof, §§ 10—15: (2) narrative, §§ 16—33: proof, §§ 34—46.

² Dionys. *Isae.* 16, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς διαλλάττειν ἂν δόξειεν Ἰσαῖος Λυσίου τῶ μὴ κατ’ ἐνθύμημά τι λέγειν ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἐπιχείρημα.

³ See Arist. *Rh.* i. 1—3. Rhetoric, like Dialectic, deals with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. But, while Dialectic deals with *all* such things, Rhetoric deals only with a certain class of them, viz. τὰ βουλευέσθαι εἰωθότα, τὰ πραττόμενα, things of which men can influence the course: in short, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὄντα.

gism from probabilities and signs¹. A misapprehension of Aristotle's meaning had, as early as the first century B.C., led to the conception of the enthymeme as not merely a syllogism of a particular subject-matter, but also as a syllogism *of which one premiss is suppressed*². The term *epicheireme* was then brought in to denote a rhetorical syllogism which is stated in full—an 'essay' to deal thoroughly with the issue at stake³. Dionysios means, then, that Lysias is content with a sketching style of proof, a proof which is not formally complete, whereas Isaeos, aiming at a precise development, goes through every step of his argument. In other phrases

¹ Arist. *An. Pr.* II. 27, συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων.

² Quint. v. 10 § 3: this is what Juvenal means, *Sat.* VI. 449, by *curtum* enthymema. That the suppression of one premiss was *not* essential to Aristotle's conception of the Enthymeme, has been shown unanswerably by Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Logic*, xx. vol. III. pp. 386 f. He observes: 1. That Aristotle, who regards the syllogism, not in relation to expression, but as an exclusively mental process (*An. Post.* I. 10 § 7), would not have distinguished a class of syllogisms by a verbal accident: 2. That, having *defined* the enthymeme as a syllogism of a peculiar matter (*An. Pr.* II. 27), he cannot have defined it by another difference (the suppression of a premiss) which has no analogy to the former. I would add: 3. That in Arist. *Rh.* I. 2, where the enthymeme is said to consist ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ

ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμὸς, the *πολλάκις* can be explained on no other view. As to the interpolation *ἀρελῆς* in *An. Pr.* II. 27, see Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*, pp. 153 f.

³ On the *epicheireme*, see Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* (1872), pp. 153 f.—Sir W. Jones (*Prefatory Discourse*, p. x) describes it with substantial correctness as 'that oratorical syllogism where the premises are respectively proved by argument before the speaker draws his conclusion:' but it was enough to constitute the *epicheireme* that the premisses should be *stated*. See Quint. v. 10 § 5, *Propria eius appellatio et maxima in usu est posita certa quaedam sententiae comprehensio, quae ex tribus minimum partibus constat*. Cicero rendered it by *ratiocinatio*, which Quintilian likes better than *ratio* or *aggressio*: he himself keeps *epicheirema*.

of Dionysios himself, Lysias proves ‘briefly’ and ‘generally,’—Isaeos, ‘at length,’ and ‘accurately’ (διεξοδικῶς—ἀκριβῶς¹). The difference between epicheireme and enthymeme is well exemplified in the seventh speech. The question is whether Apollodoros, the testator, had really adopted the speaker. The speaker first proves the adoption by direct testimony, and then says that he will bring, further, some indirect testimony. At this stage, Lysias would probably have been content with an enthymeme to the following effect:—‘Thrasylbulos, the nephew of the female claimant, has made no claim, though his right is better than hers.’ Isaeos, however, will be satisfied with nothing less than a systematic and rigorous demonstration. Eupolis had two daughters,—the claimant, and another, who has left a son. Now there is, indeed, a law which gives brother and sister equal claim to the estate of a brother. But, where the kinship is less near, men precede women. Hence, if the adoption is invalid, this daughter of Eupolis has no claim, while her nephew, Thrasylbulos, has a right to all. But Thrasylbulos has raised no claim. Presumably, therefore, he recognises the adoption as valid². Isaeos, as Sir William Jones well says, lays close siege to the understandings of the jury. His reasonings, generally based on positive law, are constraining even when they are not persuasive. Often, again, an

Example:
Or. vii.

¹ Dionys. *Isae.* 16. The necessary *amplitude* of epicheirematic, as compared with enthymematic, proof, is well expressed by the phrase of Dionys. *Dinarch.* c. 6

(of Hypercides as compared with Lysias)—πιστοῦται δ' οὐ κατ' ἐνθύμημα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἐπιχειρημα πλατύνων.

² Or. vii. §§ 18—21.

argument is founded on the feeling or conduct of the testator towards the speaker and the adversary respectively¹: on the conduct of the adversary, as being inconsistent with his assumption²: on the services rendered by the speaker's client to the deceased³ or to the State⁴: on the demerits of the adversary as regards general character⁵, on his omission to perform public services⁶, or on his anxiety to obtain the estate while he is content that the testator's house should be left desolate⁷. The example which the Greek critic selects is, for us, the only considerable specimen of the orator's work in a cause not testamentary⁸. Euphiletos had been struck off the list of his deme on the ground that he was not a trueborn citizen, and has appealed to a jury:—

Isaeos, 'For Euphiletos.'

'You have now heard, judges, not only our evidence but the testimony of all the kinsfolk that Euphiletos the plaintiff is our brother. Consider, first, what motive our father could have had for telling an untruth, or for adopting this man if he had not been his son. You will find that all who act thus

¹ *e.g.* Or. I. (Kleonymos) §§ 30—33: Or. III. (Pyrrhos) § 75: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 8: Or. VIII. (Kiron) § 18: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) §§ 16 f., 31.

² *e.g.* Or. I. (Kleonymos) § 22: Or. II. (Menekles) § 39: Or. VI. (Philoktemon) § 46: Or. VIII. (Kiron) §§ 21 f.

³ To the deceased: *e.g.* Or. II. (Menekles) §§ 18, 36: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 37: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) § 27.

⁴ To the State: *e.g.* Or. VI. (Philoktemon) § 60: Or. VII. (Apol-

lodoros) § 41: Or. VIII. (Kiron) §§ 35, 40 f.

⁵ *e.g.* Or. II. (Menekles) § 37, Or. IV. (Nikostratos) § 28, Or. VI. (Philoktemon) *passim*.

⁶ *e.g.* Or. V. (Dikaeogenes) §§ 35 f., 43: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 39.

⁷ *e.g.* Or. II. (Menekles) §§ 26, 37: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) §§ 31 f., 44.

⁸ On the fragment For Euphiletos—now ranked as Or. XII.—see ch. XXI.

are constrained either by the want of trueborn sons or by poverty, hoping for benefits from the persons who by their means have become Athenians. Neither condition applies to our father. He has, in us, two legitimate sons, so that childlessness could not have prompted the adoption. Nor, again, did he look to Euphiletos for maintenance or wealth; he has substance enough; further, it has been deposed before you that he maintained the plaintiff from infancy, educated him, enrolled him in his clan—and these are no light expenses. Our father, then, was not likely, judges, to attempt anything so unjust when it could do him no good. Nor, again, will I be suspected of such madness as bearing false witness for the plaintiff in order to have my patrimony divided among a larger number. Hereafter, of course, I could not for a moment dispute the relationship; no one of you would endure the sound of my voice, if I, who now, standing in peril of the law, testify that he is our brother, should be found contradicting that statement. The probability is, judges, that true testimony has been borne, not only by us, but by the other kinsmen too. Reflect, in the first place, that the husbands of our sisters would never have perjured themselves in the cause of the plaintiff: his mother was the stepmother of our sisters, and somehow stepmothers and the daughters of a former marriage are wont to disagree: so that, if the plaintiff had been our stepmother's son by another than our father, our sisters, judges, would never have allowed their husbands to be witnesses. Again:—our maternal uncle, being, of

course, no relation of the plaintiff, would not have gratified the plaintiff's mother by making a false deposition fraught with the manifest injury to us involved in our adoption of a stranger as our brother. Further, judges, how could any of you impute perjury to Demaratos, who stands there, or to Hege-sippos, or Nikostratos—men whose whole lives will show a stainless record, and who, being our intimate friends and knowing us all, have severally testified their kinship with Euphiletos ?

‘I should be glad, then, to learn from the most respected of our adversaries whether he could establish his Athenian citizenship by any other proofs than those which we have brought for Euphiletos. For my part, I do not think he could do more than show that both his parents are Athenians, and adduce the testimony of his relatives to the truth of that assertion. Then again, judges, supposing our adversaries were in peril, they would expect you to believe their friends rather than their accusers ; as it is, though we have all that testimony on our side, shall they require you to put faith in their own story rather than in Euphiletos, in me and my brother, in our clansmen, in our entire family ? Moreover, the adversaries are acting from private enmity, without personal risk to one of their number ; we, who give our evidence, stand, one and all, within the peril of the law.

‘In addition to these testimonies, judges, the mother of Euphiletos, whom the adversaries allow to be an Athenian, was willing to take an oath before the arbitrator at the Delphinion that she and our

father are the parents of Euphiletos; and who should know better? Then our father, judges, who ought to be the next best authority, was and is willing to swear that Euphiletos is his son by his wedded Athenian wife. If this is not enough, judges, I was thirteen years old, as I said before, when Euphiletos was born, and I am ready to swear that Euphiletos is the son of my father. Justly then, judges, might you deem our oaths more trustworthy than the adversaries' assertions; we are willing to make oath on a matter of which we have accurate knowledge, while they retail hearsay from the plaintiff's ill-wishers, or inventions of their own. We, moreover, bring our kinsmen as witnesses before you as before the arbitrators,—witnesses who have a claim to be believed; while, since Euphiletos brought his first suit against the corporation and its demarch now deceased, the adversaries have failed to find any evidence that he is not my father's son, though the case was before the arbitrator for two years. To the conductors of the arbitration these facts afforded the strongest presumption of falsehood, and both of them decided against the adversaries.—(Read the evidence of the former award.)—You have heard that the former arbitration went against them. I claim, judges, that just as the adversaries would have urged an award favourable to themselves in evidence of Euphiletos not being the son of Hegesippos, so the opposite result should now be testimony to the truth of our story, since they were adjudged guilty of having erased the name of Euphiletos, an Athenian citizen, after it had been duly registered. That,

then, Euphiletos is our brother and your citizen, and that he has been subjected by the conspirators in his deme to injurious and outrageous treatment, sufficient proof, judges, has, I think, been laid before you.'

Iteration in argument.

A striking trait of Isaeos in the province of argument is iteration; and the preference of emphasis to form which this implies is worth notice as suggesting how the practical view of oratory was beginning to prevail over the artistic. Sometimes the repetition is verbal—an indignant question or phrase occurs again and again, where Isokrates would have abstained from using it twice¹. More often, it is an argument or a statement which the speaker aims at impressing on the hearers by urging it in a series of different forms and connexions². Or even a document, cited at the outset, is read a second time, as if to make the jury realise more vividly that a circle of proof has been completed³.

Epilogue.

The epilogue in Isaeos is usually a brief recapitulation, often concluding with an appeal in which the judges are urged to remember their duty to the dead⁴, whose house must not be left without some one who can make offerings at the grave: or there is a prayer for indulgence⁵ on account of inexperience,—though this is sometimes, and more naturally, placed

¹ See (*e.g.*) Or. III. (Pyrrhos) §§ 37, 39: and §§ 45, 49, 51.

² Thus in Or. III.—the longest of all, and for this very reason, since there is no narrative proper—the argument that, if Philé had been the true-born daughter of Pyrrhos, her relations would have acted differently, is drawn out in regard

(1) to Nikodemos, (2) to Endios, (3) to the uncles of Pyrrhos: §§ 45—80.

³ Thus the argument, §§ 1—4, in Or. V. begins and ends with the reading of the *ἀντροποσία*.

⁴ *e.g.* Or. II. (Menekles) § 47: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) § 36.

⁵ *e.g.* Or. IX. § 35.

in the introduction¹. The third speech ends no less abruptly than it opens—by the speaker calling on the clerk of the court to read a deposition; the eighth has the like ending, with this further peculiarity, that the testimony called is to a fact stated in the epilogue. A remark which applies to all the work of Isaeos applies especially to the epilogue; Isaeos represents the emotions more generically² than Lysias,—that is, with less attention to a special or personal propriety.

Dionysios sums up the relation of Isaeos to Lysias in one of those illustrations which he loves to draw from painting or sculpture. ‘There are some old pictures, simply wrought as to colouring, with no variety of tints, but accurate in drawing, and thereby delightful; while the later paintings are inferior in drawing, but more elaborate, with variety of light and shade, and derive their effectiveness from the multitude of their hues³.’ Lysias is compared with such correct and conscientious draughtsmen as Polygnotos and Aglaophon; Isaeos with such subtle chiaroscurists or colourists as Zeuxis and Parrhasios⁴. The estimate agrees

Isaeos and Lysias compared to schools of painting.

¹ e. g. Or. x. (Aristarchos) § 1.

² Dionys. *Isae.* 16, τὰ πάθη ποιεῖν γενικώτερον. It is easy and tempting to conjecture γενικώτερον, ‘with more spirit.’ But the true meaning of γενικώτερον is shown by another passage in Dionysios—*de Demosth.* c. 39, where ἡ γενικὴ ἀρμονία is a manner of composition which does not stoop to petty neatnesses,—μὴ τὸ κομψὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἐπιτηδεύουσα, as he

elsewhere puts it (§ 37): and so γενικώτατοι χαρακτήρες, *ib.* Ernesti (*Lex. Techn.*) is mistaken in rendering γενικὴν ἀρμονίαν by ‘characterem orationis naturalem.’

³ Dionys. *Isae.* 4.

⁴ See Overbeck, *Die Antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der Bildenden Künste bei den Griechen* (1868), esp. pp. 67, 110, 204. Cf. Quint. XII. 10 §§ 1—6.—Can it be that, when Dionysios used this

substantially with the judgment of Hermogenes¹,—
Hermogenes
on Isaeos. delivered in his own technical dialect:—‘In Isaeos, besides the other things which constitute Political Oratory in the proper sense² (*i.e.* Forensic and Deliberative speaking), the element of *fiery earnestness*³ is large,—bringing him near, indeed, to the noblest type of civil eloquence. His *finish*, again, is consummate beyond the measure of Lysias. Complete, too, is his skill in *amplifying*, and in the other constituents of *grandeur*⁴, especially in a certain striking *vigour*; so that, in these respects, though he is not a little inferior to Demosthenes, he is far superior to

illustration, he had in his mind that place of the *Poetics* (I. 6) where Aristotle speaks of poets related to each other as Zeuxis to Polygnotos—*ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὐδὲν ἔχει ἥθος*—a comparison which so exactly and curiously suits the relationship between Lysias and Isaeos?

¹ Hermog. *περὶ ἰδεῶν* B. c. 11 (Spengel *Rh. Gr.* II. 411).

² *ἀπλῶς*: as opposed to the sense in which it includes the *πατηγυρικὸς λόγος*: vol. I. p. 90.

³ As to ‘fiery earnestness’ (*γοργότης*), ‘finish’ (*ἐπιμέλεια*) and ‘amplification’ (*περιβολή*), in the language of Hermogenes, see vol. I. p. 91 f.

⁴ ‘Grandeur’ (*μέγεθος*, for which *ἀξίωμα* or *ὄγκος* is sometimes a synonym) denotes, for Hermogenes, one of those seven cardinal excellences of oratory which he finds in Demosthenes, his canon of eloquence: *περὶ ἰδ.* A. 1. This *μέγεθος* is, in its turn, composed of

six specific qualities (*ιδέαι*): and all of these, says Hermogenes, Isaeos has. They are:—1. *σεμνότης, majesty*. 2. The power of ‘amplifying’ (*περιβολή*) just mentioned;—by which Hermog. means sometimes *generalisation*, sometimes *development of an idea*. 3. ‘Vigour,’—*ἀκμή*,—a quality which springs, as a rule, from the union of the two next (see *περὶ ἰδ.* A. 10). *ἀκμαῖος λόγος* is a robust, sinewy eloquence, which presses the adversary hard. 4. *τραχύτης, asperity*: 5. *λαμπρότης, brilliancy*: 6. *σφοδρότης, vehemence*. [On the distinction between 4 and 6 see *περὶ ἰδ.* A. 7: *τραχύτης* is properly said of rebuking superiors—*e.g.* judges or ekklesiasts: *σφοδρότης*, of rebuking (real or assumed) inferiors, *e.g.* *ἀντιδικοί*, or those whom the hearers like to hear censured: it is *σφοδρότης* when Demosth. assails Philip.]

Of these, 2 and 3 are *named* in the text: but we must bear in mind that the other four are *understood*.

Lysias. That power which is shown in *method* is considerable in Isaeos,—but less than in Lysias.' The last remark might seem disputable; for, as Dionysios truly says¹, Isaeos greatly excels Lysias in arrangement (*οἰκονομία*): by 'method,' however, Hermogenes means the faculty of seizing 'the proper moment'² for each oratorical artifice; and his estimate, therefore, amounts to this—that Isaeos, compared with Lysias, is superior in *power*, but inferior in *tact*. The result, obtained by too rigid and mechanical a process, is incomplete; but it is interesting for its careful and respectful estimate of an orator whom (with the great exception of Dionysios) the criticism of the Roman age neglected³; and it is not, so far as it goes, incorrect.

In diction, Isaeos has, then, like Lysias, purity, *Isaeos and Lysias—Summary.*

¹ *Isae.* 14.

² *καρὸς ἴδιος*: Hermog. *περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* c. 1: above, vol. i. 91.

³ 'After all, one cannot help wondering, that, although Dionysius lived in the very age of Cicero, and was copied almost too closely by Quintilian, yet the name of Isaeus is not so much as mentioned in the rhetorical pieces of the two Romans' (Sir W. Jones, *Pref. Discourse*, p. vi).

Cicero, it is true, never mentions Isaeos. Quintilian, however, does *once* mention him—and then in not very select company. Speaking of the 'Attici,' he says (XII. 10 § 22), 'Transeo plurimos, Lycurgum, Aristogitona, et his priores Isaeum, Antiphontem: quos, ut homines, inter se similes, differentes dixeris specie.' The style of

Lykurgos was not highly esteemed by the Augustan or later critics; he is *ἀξητικός* and *σεμνός*, says Dionysios, but not 'elegant or pleasing' (*ἀστέιος—ἡδύς*), *vet. scrip. cens.* 3. As to Aristogiton, the adversary of Demosthenes (see [Dem.] Orr. xxv. xxxvi. and Deinarchos Or. ii.), he was of small repute every way. Maximus Planudes speaks of that *syncopant* oratory, *ἡ συκοφαντικὴ, ἣς ἠγάσαντο Ἀριστογείτων καὶ Ἡγήμων* (Proleg. in Walz *Rh. Gr.* v. 214): and he is mentioned, with Phrynon and Philokrates, among the *ἄδοξα πρόσωπα* by the scholiast on Hermog., *ib.* iv. 90. The truth is that Quint. made no careful study of the Greek orators, except Isokrates, Demosthenes, and (in a measure) Lysias: but this treatment of Isaeos is especially remarkable.

conciseness, clearness, simplicity and vividness; in composition, while still aiming at 'plainness,' he uses, on the whole, a more open and more vigorous art, and has, if not less ethical power, less of ethical charm; he abstains, like Lysias, from the more elaborate figures of language, but uses far more largely the figures of thought: in regard to subject-matter, his arrangement is not, like that of Lysias, uniform, but varies with each case, and is especially marked by the frequent interfusion of proof with narrative, and by the completeness with which the proof is worked out.

Isaeos and Demosthenes.

Now let us ask what is the meaning of that statement—so brief, so general, yet so strikingly emphatic—in which Dionysios embodies his reason for regarding the work of Isaeos, not as a mere result of Lysias, but as possessing a substantive and permanent interest. In what sense is it true that the oratorical power of Demosthenes took its 'seeds and beginnings' from Isaeos? The first point to observe is that, besides such special limitations of this statement as Dionysios himself elsewhere furnishes, there is a general qualification which from the outset we must supply for ourselves. Like other ancient critics

Criticism of Dionysios—subject to a reserve.

less excellent in detail than he, Dionysios tends to test the criticism of oratory too much on literary grounds. To one who reads Lysias, Isaeos and Demosthenes successively, it must be manifest that, in certain important respects of literary development, Isaeos stands between the other two. This was the sense to which Dionysios—reading the orators, three centuries after they spoke, as literature—has given ex-

pression in a phrase of which the emphasis is exaggerated by the vagueness; but of which it need not, perhaps, be very difficult to define the proper bearing.

Isaeos was, through life, a professional writer of speeches for the lawcourts, and this, so far as appears, almost exclusively in private causes. Demosthenes, after the lawsuit with his guardians, sought to repair the fortunes which they had brought low by working in the calling which such men as Antiphon, Lysias and Isaeos had followed before him. A host of private speeches, not his, are given to him in the collection of Kallimachos. But, to take those only of which the genuineness is tolerably certain, we have proof that he wrote for private causes from 361 to 345 B.C. After the two speeches Against Aphobos in 363 and the two Against Onetor in 362, we have, probably in 361, the speech Against Spudias (XLI.) and the speech Against Kallikles (LV.); in 356 (probably) the speech Against Konon (LIV.); in 352, the speech For Phormio (XXXVI.); in 350, the speech Against Boeotos concerning the Name (XXXIX.); in 345, the speech Against Pantaenetos (XXXVII.), and probably the speech Against Nausimachos (XXXVIII.)¹. But, meanwhile, he had another occupation, a higher,

*Careers of
Isaeos and
Demo-
sthenes.*

*Demosthenes en-
gaged in
Private
Causes:*

¹ On the Private Speeches of Demosthenes, cf. Schäfer i. 311—315, and the Appendices to vol. III. Blass would seem to leave the question of genuineness open as to the *πρὸς Σπουδῖαν* and the *πρὸς Καλλικλέα*: *Att. Ber.* II. 465. In the *παραγραφὴ πρὸς Ζηνόθεμιν*, Demon, the speaker, quotes his cousin Demosthenes as thus excusing himself for not appearing

as advocate:—*ἐμοὶ συμβέβηκεν, ἀφ' οὗ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν λέγειν ἠρέξάμην, μηδὲ πρὸς ἐν πρᾶγμα ἴδιον προσεληλυθέναι.* Mr G. A. Simcox, in the able *Life of Demosthenes* prefixed to 'Demosthenes and Aeschines On the Crown,' takes this to be a clue given us by Demosthenes himself. In that case, it would follow that Demosthenes had written for no private cause after

*in Public
Causes:*

and one which, for him, made a stepping-stone to the highest. During the years 355—350 B.C. he was concerned with four public causes—Against Androtion, Against Leptines, Against Timokrates, Against Aristokrates,—the object in each case being to obtain the repeal of a new decree or law which had been carried by corrupt influences and which was dangerous to the public interests. Each of these four speeches is at once an interpretation of positive right and a vindication of political morality—a protest against the civic apathy which was suffering the resources of the State to be crippled, its powers to be abused for personal ends, its safeguards against foreign foes to be broken down.

in Politics.

The same five years saw Demosthenes enter on that direct participation in public life for which this concernment with public causes formed a preparation; his speech On the Navy Boards was delivered in 354, the First Philippic in 351. Thus, while continuing to exercise the profession of Isaeos, Demosthenes had already passed through a second phase of activity, and had even made trial of that crowning sphere in which the great work of his life was to be done. Almost from the first, therefore, Demosthenes exerted his force under more liberal conditions than those prescribed by the narrow scope of the writer for private causes; almost from the first his natural intensity was free to ally itself with the oratorical

*Resulting
difference.*

354. But Schäfer has shown, I think (*Dem. u. seine Zeit*, III. App. VII. pp. 296 f.), that the *πρὸς Ζηρόθεμιν* is certainly not by Demosthenes: and that it must be later than

336 B.C. Whether the author was Demon himself—as Schäfer thinks—or not, the statement about Demosthenes loses much of its authority.

bent of the age, and, instead of refining on the art which hides itself, to wield the art which triumphs and commands. A comparison of the two orators cannot reach far; but, within its limits, it will serve to warn us against doing wrong to either.

As regards composition, the likeness consists in *Likeness of Demosthenes to Isaeos—in Composition:* adaptation to real contests by the blending of terse, vigorous, and not too formal periods with passages of more lax and fluent ease¹; in vividness of presentment²; and in that dramatic vivacity which is given by rhetorical question, by irony, and, in general, by the 'figures of thought³.' As regards treatment of *in Treatment of Subject-matter:* subject-matter, Demosthenes has borrowed the versatile arrangement of Isaeos; he shifts or interweaves the divisions according to the case; though his more temperate art nowhere copies his master in discarding the proem. That, however, in which the discipleship of Demosthenes to Isaeos is most surely and most strikingly seen is in his development and elaboration *especially of Proof.* of systematic proof—depending sometimes on a chain of arguments, sometimes on a single proposition illustrated and confirmed from several points of view, but always enforced by keen logic and apt law⁴. Closely connected with this is the most distinctive single trait which the younger man took

¹ See, e.g., Dem. Or. xxxvi., For Phormio. The case of Isacos sometimes tends to be slipshod; that of Demosthenes, never.

² Cf. Plut. Δημοσθένους και Κικέρ. σύγκρισις, c. 1: Δημοσθένης... ὑπερβαλλόμενος ἐναργεία μὲν και δεινότητι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγῶνων και τῶν δικῶν συνεξισταζομένους.

³ See above, p. 285.

⁴ Theon celebrates the legal learning of Demosthenes, referring to him as an exemplar of argument for the abrogation (*ἀνασκευή*) of laws—e.g. in the Speeches Against Timokrates, Aristokrates and Leptines (*προγμν.* II. p. 166, Sp. Rh. Gr. II. 69): again in I. 150 (*ib.* p.

from the elder, and which is the more noticeable because it is perhaps the chief Isaeian lesson which Demosthenes was able to carry from the Forensic field into the Deliberative: what in Greek would be called τὸ ἐναγώνιον, and in English might be paraphrased as 'the art of grappling.'

The art of grappling.

It was the secret of waging an oratorical contest, not, in the more stately manner of an elder school, as from contrary stages, but at close quarters, with the grip as of wrestlers, with the instance of pleaders who urge their case, point by point, on critics as exact as themselves, with the intensity of a prosecutor or prisoner, a plaintiff or defendant, who knows that the imminent award will be given by men whom the habit of listening to acute discussion has led to set their standard high, for whom the detection of sophistry has become a pastime and its punishment a luxury, and whose attention can be fixed only by a demonstration that the speaker is in earnest. Since the time when Kleon¹ described that keen and brilliant fencing in the ekklesia at which the majority of the citizens delighted to assist as at a spectacle, the fitness for such encounter had been becoming more and more important to deliberative oratory: but its peculiar sphere was forensic, and in that sphere Isaeos was its earliest master. As an example of the 'agonistic' quality of Isaeos—the new manner of strenuous and cogent assault—take this passage, in which the speaker is

61) he adds to these the *De Corona* and *Androtion* as proofs that οἱ κάλλιστοι τῶν Δημοσθενικῶν λόγων

εἰσιν, ἐν οἷς περὶ νόμου ἡ ψηφίσματος ἀμφισβητεῖται.

¹ Vol. I. p. 39.

pressing home his argument¹:—"What, in the name of heaven, are the guarantees of credibility for statements? Are they not witnesses? And what are the guarantees of credibility for a witness? Are they not tortures? Yes: and on what ground are the adversaries to be disbelieved? Is it not because they shrink from our tests? Assuredly. You see, then, that *I* am urging this inquiry and bringing it to the touch of proof; the plaintiff is shifting them to a basis of slanders and hearsays—precisely the course that would be taken by a grasping adventurer. If he meant honestly, and was not trying to delude your judgments, obviously this was not the way for him to set to work: he ought to have given us figures and brought witnesses: he ought to have gone through each several item in the account, examining me thus—'How many payments of war-tax do your books show?'—'So many.'—'What sum was paid on each occasion?'—'This.'—'In accordance with what decrees?'—'With these.'—'Who received the money?'—'Persons who are here to certify it.'—He ought to have examined the decrees, the amounts imposed, the amounts paid, the persons who collected them, and then, if all was satisfactory, he ought to have accepted my statement; or, if it was not, he ought *now* to have brought witnesses regarding any false item in the outlay which I charged to my wards' account." It is the same kind of close and vehement insistence that gives their stamp to such passages as this in the Third Olynthiac²: 'What—do you

*Example
from ISAEOS.*

*Example
from Demo-
sthenes.*

¹ Dionys. *Isae.* 12. The extract is from that same 'Defence of a Guardian' from which he quotes

in c. 8: see ch. XXI.

² Dem. *Olynth.* III. §§ 34—35.

mean a paid army?' I shall be asked. Yes—and the same arrangement forthwith for all, Athenians, that each, getting his dividend from the State, may be what the State requires. Is peace possible? Then you are better at home, removed from the temptation to act dishonourably under the stress of want. Is there such a crisis as the present? Better to accept such allowances as I have described, and to be a soldier, as you ought, in your country's cause. Is any one of you beyond the military age? What he now gets by an anomaly, and without doing any good, let him receive under a regular system in return for supervising and managing necessary affairs. In a word—without taking away anything or adding anything, but simply by abolishing anomalies, I bring the city into order, I establish a uniform system of remuneration for service in the army, for service on juries, for general usefulness in accordance with the age of each citizen and the demands of each occasion.' It is a peculiarity of Isaeos that he loves to make the epilogue, not an appeal to feeling or to character, but the occasion for grappling with the adversary in a strict and final argument; there could scarcely be a better example of τὸ ἐναγώνιον than this ending of the speech *On the Estate of Philoktemon*.—

*Agonistic
Epilogue
in Isaeos—
Or. vi.*

'I ask you, then, judges,—in order that you may not be deceived,—to take note of the affidavit on which you have to give the verdict. Insist that his defence, like our plaint, shall be relevant to that affidavit. He has stated that Philoktemon did not give or bequeath the estate to Chaerestratos;

this has been proved to be a falsehood : he gave and bequeathed it, and those who were present are the witnesses. What more ? He says that Philoktemon died childless. Now, in what sense was he 'childless' who had left his nephew as his adopted son and heir, an heir to whom the law allows the succession just as to the issue of the body ? The provision in the law is express—that if a son is *born* to a man who has already *adopted* a son, both sons shall share alike in the inheritance. Let the defendant prove then, as anyone of you would prove, that his clients are legitimate. Legitimacy is not demonstrated by stating the mother's name, but by a proof that the statement is true, supported by the evidence of the kinsfolk, of those who knew the woman to be Euktemon's wife, of the demesmen and of the clansmen, to these points:—whether they have heard, or are aware, that Euktemon ever discharged a public service on account of his wife's property : where, or among what tombs, she is buried ; who saw Euktemon performing the rites at her grave ; whither her sons still repair with offerings and libations for the dead ; and what citizen or what servant of Euktemon has seen it. These things together will give us—not abusive language, but—a logical test. If you keep him to this, if you bid him give his proof in conformity with his affidavit, your verdict will be religious and lawful, and these men will get their rights.' The First and Second Speeches Against Onetor were written just at the time when the influence of Isaeos on Demosthenes was probably most direct and mature. They

*Epilogues of
the Speeches
Against
Onetor.*

have no mark more specially Isaeian than this, that both conclude, not, like the two earlier speeches Against Aphobos, with a peroration of the more ordinary type, but with a keen argument swiftly thrust home¹.

*Demosthenes
essentially
manifold.*

Isaeos influenced Demosthenes directly and decisively in the forensic province, and, through this, in the deliberative also. But Demosthenes himself is manifold; it is his very distinction that he is of no one character, the exclusive disciple of no one master²; he excels the elder 'lofty' school in clearness, the 'plain' school in nerve, in gravity, in penetrating and pungent force, the 'middle' school in variety, in symmetry, in felicity, in pathos,—above all, in true propriety and in effectual strength³; taught by nature and practice, he saw that the crowds who flow together to festivals or schools demand another style than the audiences in a law-court or in the ekklesia; that, for the former, there is need of glitter and of entrancement; for the latter, of exposition and help; that too much pedantry is as little suited to epideictic speaking, as a style too diffuse or too florid to practical oratory⁴. Sometimes, accord-

¹ Πρὸς Ὀνήτορα A (Or. xxx.) §§ 37—39: and B, §§ 10—14.—The comparison in Dionys. *Demosth.* c. 17—22 between Isokrates *De Pace* §§ 41—50 (355 B. C.) and the *Third Olynthiac* §§ 23—32 (348 B. C.) exhibits in its perfection that which Demosthenes derived from Isaeos,—heightened in effect by the strongest contemporary contrast that could have been found.

² ἐνὸς μὲν οὐδενὸς...οὔτε χαρακτῆρος οὔτ' ἀνδρὸς ζηλωτήν,...ἐξ ἀπάντων δὲ τὰ κράτιστα ἐκλεξάμενον: Dionys. *Demosth.* 33.

³ *ib.* 34.

⁴ *ib.* 44. The word which I represent by 'glitter' is ἀπάτη,—a term used here like τὸ ἀπατηλόν in c. 45, merely of theatrical effect. In c. 45, again, Forensic Oratory is said to require ἡδονή—χάρις—

ingly, he has slowly-moving and spacious periods; sometimes his periods are close and compact; sometimes he stings, sometimes he soothes, the mind of the listener, sometimes he appeals to *êthos*, sometimes to passion¹; in Deliberative Speeches, he makes most use of the ‘stately harmonies;’ in Forensic, of the ‘smooth;’ yet, here again, in differing measures according as it is a public or a private cause, and with this further discrimination, that simplicity and grace predominate in proem and narrative, dignity and more austere power in proof and epilogue². Even in that single field of private causes which Isaeos and Demosthenes share, Demosthenes proves the compass of his resources. The logical fineness of the two speeches Against Onetor, the moral dignity of the defence For Phormio, the vivid delineations of character in the speeches Against Pantaenetos and Konon, could have met in no other man of the age.

*Various
colouring of
his Private
Speeches.*

Relatively to the history of Attic Oratory, it is, for us, the unique interest of Isaeos that he represents the final period of transition. His profession was to write speeches which others were to speak in the law-courts, and this almost wholly in private causes. He takes account, therefore, of the pattern first made clear by Lysias; he tries somewhat to make it seem as if the private person his client, and not an expert, were speaking; he aims at plainness,

*between
ἀφέλεια*

ἀπάτη, where the last means artful *ψυχολογία*. It is very important to discriminate both these more innocent senses from that in which there is said to have been *δόξα*

γοητείας καὶ ἀπάτης about Isaeos: *de Isae.* 4.—‘Florid’ is *τὸ λιγαίνεον*—exactly what we mean by an operatic style.

¹ *ib.* 43.

² *ib.* 45.

ἀφέλεια. But, since the time of Lysias, the expert's art itself has been growing more complete, more confident, more irrepressible. By the side of the Lysian 'plainness' there has arisen, in its full strength, *and δεινότης*. technical mastery, *δεινότης*,—no longer haughty, distrustful, self-secluding, as in the days of Antiphon, but now each day more frankly and fearlessly triumphant. If Isaeos had been an artist of genius, he would have made his choice, even if he had not widened his scope, and probably would have hastened by one generation the maturity of civil eloquence. But, confined almost wholly to private causes, he did not dare altogether to forsake the Lysian simplicity for which he had no real gift, or decisively to assume that open, energetic art towards which his inborn strength drew him. He hesitated : *His meaning,* and he remains, therefore, an able compromise—the first advocate who was at once morally persuasive and logically powerful, without either entrancing by the grace of his ethical charm or constraining by the imperious brilliancy of his art ; one from whom Demosthenes learned the best technical lessons that Antiphon or Thucydides could teach, in a form, at once strict and animated, serviceable under conditions which they had not known ; a contributor, by these means, to the success of Demosthenes both in the forensic and in other fields, but no more the author of his victories than he is the kindler of his enthusiasm : *relatively to Demosthenes,* yet, for the modern world, not the less, but the more, a man who speaks with his own voice and stands for his own work—the earliest *and in himself.* master of forensic controversy.

CHAPTER XXI.

ISAEOS.

WORKS.

SIXTY-FOUR speeches bearing the name of Isaeos—of which fifty were allowed as genuine—and an Art of Rhetoric, are mentioned by the writer of the Plutarchic Life¹. At least the accredited fifty appear to have been extant in the middle of the ninth century². Eleven³, with large part of a

¹ [Plut.] *Vit. Isaei*, καταέλοιπε δὲ λόγους ἐξήκοντα τέσσαρας, ὧν εἰσι γνήσιοι πενήκοντα, καὶ ἰδίας τέχνας. This is the only definite mention of the *Art of Rhetoric*: though Dionysios *ad Ammaeum* I. 2 speaks generally of 'Theodektes, Philiskos, *Isaeos*, Kephisodoros, Hypereides, Lykurgos, Aeschines,' as being παραγγελμάτων τεχνικῶν συγγραφεῖς as well as speakers. Blass (*Att. Ber.* II. 458) suggests that it may have been a collection of commonplaces.

² The words of Photios (*cod.* 263) are: ἀνεγνώσθησαν Ἰσαίου διάφοροι λόγοι, οὗτοι δέ, ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, εἰς δ' καὶ ξ' (64) συναριθ-

μοῦνται. τούτων δὲ οἱ τὸ γνήσιον μαρτυρηθέντες ν' (50) καταλείπονται μόνον. Both the ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν and the συναριθμοῦνται as opposed to καταλείπονται seem clearly to imply that 64 were not then (*circ.* 850 A.D.) extant. The last sentence may obviously be rendered in two ways:—(1) 'Of this number, those which, being attested as genuine, are extant are only 50';—implying that others not so attested were extant. (2) 'Of this number, only those 50 which have been attested as genuine are extant.' I prefer the latter version.

³ The Second Oration ('On the Estate of Menekles') was first dis-

twelfth¹, have come down to us; forty-two more—of which three were suspected by Harpokration—are known from their titles; and we have thus a record of fifty-four imputed, or fifty-one unquestioned, works².

*Speeches of
Isaeos
wholly
forensic*

So far as can now be judged, the orations of Isaeos were exclusively forensic³. It is a striking fact that

covered in the Laurentian Library in 1785, and was first edited by Robert Tyrwhitt in that year. In the MSS. known before that date all was wanting from the words ἡ ἐκεῖνον in Or. I. § 22 to ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀφίεται in Or. II. § 47. These concluding words of Or. II. had, as Tyrwhitt notices (p. 21), been wrongly tacked on to the imperfect first part of Or. I. In the Translation of Isaeos by Sir William Jones (1779) we find this arrangement followed. The last paragraph of Or. I. in his Translation [To conclude; since this cause...conformably to the laws'] is a version of ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ...ψηφίσασθε, the concluding words, in reality, of Or. II.,—which oration was then, of course, unknown to him. In Or. I. all from μὴ ποιήσαντες in § 22 to the end was first found by Mai in the Ambrosian Library at Milan and published by him in 1815.

¹ The large fragment of the ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου preserved by Dionysios (*de Isae.* 17) is printed as Or. XII. by recent editors, as by Baiter and Sauppe in their *Orationes Attici*, and by Scheibe in his edition of Isaeos (Teubner, 1860).

² For the titles and probable subjects of the lost speeches see

Sauppe's digest of the Fragments of Isaeos, *Or. Att.* II. pp. 228—244. It will be seen that Sauppe reckons 44 lost speeches. He supposes a lost speech κατ' Ἀριστοκλέους, his No. IV., which Blass, rightly, I think, identifies with the κατὰ Στρατοκλέους (XL. in Sauppe). Further, Sauppe reckons the ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου—already printed in his Vol. I. with the Orations—among the Fragments also, as No. XVII. Omitting, then, No. IV. and No. XVII., we get a total of 42. Blass reckons 43 lost speeches (*Att. Ber.* II. 459 ff.). But I agree with Sauppe in thinking that the πρὸς Ἀνδοκίδην ἀποστασίον (No. 30 in Blass) was the work of Lysias, to whom Harpokration twice assigns it, and that the ascription of it to Isaeos by Pollux was a carelessness or at least a mistake: see Sauppe *Or. Att.* II. 174.

The three lost speeches to which Harpokration adds εἰ γνήσιος are: 1. κατὰ Στρατοκλέους [*s. v.* ὑπερήμεροι, if indeed, as seems probable, κατ' Ἀριστοκλέους there is a false reading for κατὰ Στρατοκλέους: the latter, it must be owned, is mentioned by Harpokr. *without* suspicion *s. v.* ὀθνεῖος]; 2. κατὰ Μεγαρέων: 3. πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικόν.

³ The titles of the lost speeches

only three of them appear to have dealt with Public Causes¹. All the rest were concerned with Private Causes. These may be classified as bearing on (1) cases of claim to an inheritance; (2) cases of claim to the hand of a heiress; (3) cases of claim to property; (4) cases of claim to the ownership of a slave; (5) an action brought against a surety whose principal had made default; (6) a special plea; (7) appeals from one jurisdiction to another².

In the ancient collection of an orator's works, the largest or the most distinctive class of his speeches stood first. For Antiphon, this class consisted of the speeches in cases of homicide, the *φονικοί*; and these alone have been preserved,—the last of them (Or. vi. 'On the Choreutes') being apparently defective at the end, where the manuscript broke off³. For Isaeos, this class comprised the speeches in will-cases, the *κληρικοί*: and so, here too, these alone have been saved, with a like defect at the end of the speech (xi.) On the Estate of Hagnias⁴.

confirm the statement of Dionysios (*Isae.* 2)—*γένους λόγων ἐνὸς ἀσκητῆς ἐγένετο, τοῦ δικανικοῦ*. Yet one conceivable exception should be noticed—the speech thrice cited by Harpokration (*s. v.* 'Αλκίας, 'Επικράτης, πέπλος) under the title *περὶ τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ῥηθέντων*. But this too was probably forensic—being concerned with a *παραπροσβείας γραφή*, possibly arising out of the negotiations regarding Amphipolis in 358 B.C.: cf. Sauppe II. 238.

¹ 1. *Κατὰ Διοκλέους ὕβρεως* (viii. in Sauppe): 2. *περὶ τῶν ἐν Μακε-*

δονίᾳ ῥηθέντων (xxvii.): 3. *περὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων* (ii.). [Possibly the *ἀποφάσεις* or reports made by the Areiopagos to the ekklesia: see Deinarchos Or. i. §§ 53 ff.] The doubt as to the authenticity of the *κατὰ Μεγαρέων* has already been noticed.

² (1) *κληρικοί*: (2) *ἐπικληρικοί*: (3) *διαδικασίας* [properly a general term, including will-cases]: (4) *ἀποστασίου*: (5) *ἐγγύης*: (6) *ἀνθρωμοσία* [as = *παραγραφή*]: (7) *ἔφεσις*.

³ Vol. i. p. 64.

⁴ That Or. xi. is imperfect seems certain from § 44 of that speech.

*The κληρικοί
classified
by legal
form.*

In these extant speeches the connexion with the will-case is sometimes direct, sometimes indirect. From the literary point of view, they belong to one class, the Testamentary. From the Attic legal point of view, they require to be further classified thus:—

I. *Trials of Claim to an Inheritance* (διαδικασίαι¹).

1. On the Estate of Kleonymos. [Or. I.]
2. On the Estate of Nikostratos. [Or. IV.]
3. On the Estate of Apollodoros. [Or. VII.]
4. On the Estate of Kiron. [Or. VIII.]
5. On the Estate of Astyphilos. [Or. IX.]
6. On the Estate of Aristarchos. [Or. X.]

II. *Actions for False Witness* (δίκαι ψευδομαρτυριῶν).

1. On the Estate of Menekles. [Or. II.]
2. On the Estate of Pyrrhos. [Or. III.]
3. On the Estate of Philoktemon. [Or. VI.]

III. *Action to compel the discharge of a Suretyship* (ἐγγύης δίκη).

On the Estate of Dikaeogenes. [Or. v.]

IV. *Indictment of a Guardian for maltreatment of a Ward* (εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶ).

On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI.]

V. *Appeal* (ἔφεσις) *from Arbitration to a Dikastery.*

For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]

The speeches of Isaeos are the oldest documents in the world which illustrate with minuteness of

*Peculiar
interest
of these
speeches.*

¹ Such a claim was ἐπιδικασία (σίαν): the trial of claims, διαδικασία. (Or. XI. § 15, τὴν ἐμὴν ἐπιδικασίαν.)

detail the workings of a Testamentary Law¹. It has been shown beyond reasonable doubt that the idea of a man's legal existence being prolonged in his heir, or in a group of co-heirs, sprang from the attribution to the individual of that perpetuity which is the characteristic of the family². The idea of continuing the family is that in which the testament begins. Now, in primitive societies, religious rites are the symbols and warrants of the family's continuity. The father of the Indo-European house was its priest as well as its master: the sacrifices which, in life, he offered at the hearth could, after his death, be offered only by the son in whom his personality survived³. These sacrifices were at once the most solemn obligations of his successor and the most sacred pledges of an inviolable succession. What, then, was to happen if there was no heir duly qualified by nearness in blood? To meet this case, primitive society invented Adoption, that is, the authorized fiction of kinship. The faculty of adoption was the germ of testamentary power. But there is no proof that any ancient society, except the Roman, got beyond the faculty of adoption to a true power of testation. The Athenian Will was only an inchoate Testament. Permission to execute a will was first given to Athenian citizens by the laws of Solon⁴. But it was expressly restricted

*Origin of
testation.*

*The Faculty
of Adoption.*

*Athenian
law of suc-
cession.*

¹ It is scarcely necessary to except, with Sir W. Jones (*Commentary*, p. 165), the *Aeginetikos* of Isokrates (Or. xix. 394-3 B.C.)—which throws no light on legal points.

² Maine's *Ancient Law*, ch. vi. on 'The Early History of Testamentary Succession.'

³ See Cox's *Hist. of Greece*, Vol. i. pp. 14 ff.

⁴ Grote, c. xi. vol. iii. 186.

to those citizens who had no direct male descendants. Those illustrations of Athenian testamentary succession which are supplied by the speeches of Isaeos have one general characteristic of striking interest, and it is in this, more than in the light which they throw on Attic details, that their great and lasting value resides. The Hindoo system of succession shows the primitive religious element completely predominant. When the childless Hindoo adopts a child, it is with a view to 'the funeral cake, the water, and the solemn sacrifice¹.' The Roman testamentary law of Cicero's time, on the other hand, has broken free of religion; the *sacra* have passed under the separate jurisdiction of the Pontifical College; the obligation imposed by the Civil Law has become independent of the theological sanction². The Athenian system belongs essentially to the same stage as the Hindoo system. It has not, like the Roman law of Cicero's time, passed that point of development at which testation proper begins. But, in spirit, the Athenian system, may be regarded as intermediate between the Hindoo and the Roman. The Athenian exercise of adoptive power retains, indeed, as its nominal first principle, the religious continuity of the family. 'Succour him who is with the dead,' cries the speaker to the jurors,—'do not allow him—

The Hindoo system.

The Roman.

Relation of the Athenian to these, in form.

in spirit.

¹ Maine, *l. c.* p. 192.

² Gaius II. § 57, in speaking of the case where Roman law allowed possession to be taken of a vacant inheritance by the usucaptive title called *pro herede*, suggests this explanation—*quod voluerunt veteres maturius here-*

ditates adiri, ut essent qui sacra facerent: quorum illis temporibus summa observatio fuit: et ut creditores haberent a quo suum consequerentur—showing how far back in the past the old religious feeling was to him.

I beseech you by the gods and the immortal spirits—to be treated with contumely by these men:’ ‘think,’ he exclaims, ‘for what you will become responsible if you are persuaded by Kleon to give a different verdict:—first of all, you will send the worst enemies of Astyphilos to celebrate the rites at his grave.’ It would be an utter mistake to suppose that these pathetic or stately commonplaces are altogether hollow. The sentiment is real enough. But, at the same time, there is a difference between the Hindoo and the Athenian feeling. The Hindoo adopts a son *primarily* in order that his departed spirit may enjoy higher spiritual benefits than it could enjoy if the offerings at the grave were made by a relative less near than a son¹. The Athenian of the days of Isaeos adopted a son *primarily* because he wished to leave his property to a person who would not otherwise get it. For the Hindoo, that religious motive in which adoption originated is still foremost. For the Athenian of the days of Isaeos, the faculty of adoption, though necessarily associated with religion, is chiefly significant in its civil aspect, as a limited form of testamentary power.

The following are the chief rules which, at Athens, governed succession and bequest:—

*Athenian
rules of
inheritance.*

¹ Isae. Or. II. § 47: IX. § 36. rites, *delivers the father from*
See the *Tagore Law Lectures* torment, has been partly lost
for 1870, by Mr Herbert Cowell, sight of; but it is still held that
(formerly Tagore Law Professor,) the son can thus admit the father
Lect. IX., *On the Rite of Adop-* to some particular heaven which
tion, pp. 208 f. The original idea, no other sacrificer could open to
that the son, by performing funeral him.

I. When a citizen died leaving sons, they shared the inheritance equally, the eldest having priority of choice.

II. Failing sons and sons' issue, daughters and daughters' issue succeeded¹.

III. But a daughter was never, in our sense, an heiress. She was, strictly, *a person who went with the estate* (ἐπίκληρος). The heir, properly speaking, was either (1) her nearest kinsman, who was bound to marry her; or (2) that person to whom her father had devised the property on condition of marrying her.

IV. Failing lineal descendants, the succession passed to collateral kinsfolk on the paternal side, as far down as to children of first-cousins², with a preference to males. Failing these, it passed to the maternal side, with the like limit and preference. It then returned to the paternal side.

V. A man could not disinherit his son. Nor could he separate his estate from his daughter, though he could select the person whom she was to marry.

VI. A childless man might, either during his life or by testament, adopt any Athenian citizen as his son and heir.

¹ Cf. *Ar. Av.* 1651—1666.


² It has sometimes been held (as by Sir W. Jones in his *Commentary*, p. 191) that *second-cousins* were in the succession. Now the law, as quoted with perhaps intentional ambiguity in *Or. xi.* § 2, said μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν

παίδων: meaning that A, B's son, is in the succession to C, if B and C were ἀνεψιοί, first-cousins. But the quibbling speaker there makes it mean that A is in the succession, not only to C, but to C's son. Hence the fallacy.

VII. Mothers¹ certainly, fathers² probably, could not inherit from their children. But an inheritance could ascend collaterally; *e.g.* an uncle could inherit, or could marry the daughter with whom the estate went.

I. TRIALS OF CLAIM TO AN INHERITANCE (διαδικασίαι).

1. *On the Estate of Kleonymos.* [Or. I.]



Polyarchos left two children, Kleonymos, and the mother of the claimants. On the death of their father the claimants became the wards of their paternal uncle Deinias³. They were heirs-at-law of their maternal uncle Kleonymos (§ 4). But Kleonymos, having quarrelled with Deinias, resolved to spite him by disinheriting his wards. He therefore made a will in favour of some remoter kins-

¹ *1. On the Estate of Kleonymos.*

¹ Of the relationship between mother and son it is said expressly (Or. xi. § 17)—ὁ συγγενέστατον μὲν ἦν τῇ φύσει πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀγχιστεταῖς (degrees recognised by the law) ὁμολογουμένως οὐκ ἔστιν.

² Cf. C. R. Kennedy in the *Dict. Ant.* s. v. *Heres*, p. 595 a.

³ From § 9, it is clear that Deinias was not the brother of Kleonymos. In § 4 it is expressly said that Kleonymos was the son of Polyarchos.

men,—Poseidippos (§ 4), Diokles (§ 14), Pherenikos and his brothers (§ 45)¹. After the death of Deinias, however, Kleonymos relented. He took charge of his nephews; and in his last illness resolved to cancel his will. With this purpose he sent for the magistrate (ὁ ἀστυνόμος § 15); but he died before he had seen him.

The claimants contend that the will had been virtually cancelled, and claim as next of kin (κατὰ τὴν ἀγχιστείαν, § 6). The defendants rely on the will (κατὰ διαθήκην ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, § 41). The eldest claimant is the speaker.

Date.

Benseler places the speech below 360 B.C., and indeed regards it as one of the latest, because hiatus is avoided with a care, foreign, he thinks, to the earlier manner of Isaeos². In the case of Or. VIII., at least, as we shall see, this test hardly holds good. This, however, is a much stronger instance, and the speech may safely be referred to the years 360—353.

Analysis.

‘Kleonymos had intended us to be his heirs: now we are in court with not only his legacy but our whole fortune at stake. The friends of the defendants recognise our right to at least a share of the legacy; but the defendants themselves, so far from admitting this, seek to deprive us of our very patrimony, on account of alleged debts to Kleonymos (§§ 1—5). We shrink from appearing against kinsmen; the defendants have no such feeling; they have mustered all their forces as against enemies (§§ 6—8).

¹ Scheibe seems right in assuming that Diokles and Poseidippos are *not* brothers of Pherenikos. It is by an oversight that the author of the Greek Argument

has included among the defendants Simon, named as a friend of Deinias in § 31,—where ἀστὺφ = Φερενίκφ.


² Bens. *De hiatus*, p. 192.

[Then comes a narrative of the facts, §§ 9—14, supported by witnesses, §§ 15—16.]

‘It is pretended that Kleonymos sent for the magistrate not to cancel but to confirm his will. If, being then on the best terms with us, his nephews, he wished to clinch the wrong which, in a fit of anger, he had once meant to do us, he was mad, and his will ought to be set aside. But that this was not his purpose,—that he meant, not to revise, but to revoke his will,—was shown by the unwillingness of Posidippos and Diokles to admit the magistrate (§§ 17—24). Besides, a mere correction or addition might have been made on a new tablet; by sending for the original document Kleonymos showed that he desired some substantial alteration (24—26). Not only on grounds of kinship but also on grounds of friendship Kleonymos was more likely to have left his property to us than to the defendants (§§ 27—38). There is always a presumption for claimants by blood as against claimants by will (§§ 41—43). Again, take the test of reciprocal obligation: if Kleonymos had died leaving daughters unprovided for, we, not the defendants, would have been liable to provide for them (§§ 39, 40). Or, if the defendants and we had alike died without issue, Kleonymos would have been heir, not to them, but to us (§§ 44—47). Either the testator was of unsound mind, or we are the heirs’ (§§ 48—51).

2. *On the Estate of Nikostratos* [Or. IV.]

STEMMA.



Nikostratos, an Athenian citizen, had died abroad, after an absence from Athens of eleven years (§ 8), during part of which he seems to have been doing

I. 2. *On the Estate of Nikostratos.*

military service (§§ 18—26.) His first cousins, Hagnon and Hagnotheos, claimed his property as next of kin (*κατὰ γένος*). Their claim is disputed by one Chariades, who says that it is his under an express bequest (*κατὰ δόσιν*). Chariades had been absent from Athens for seventeen years before the death of Nikostratos (§ 29), and professed to have been intimate with him abroad.

In this speech, a friend (§ 7) of Hagnon and Hagnotheos recapitulates the points of their case. Hagnon (or, as he and his brother were boys, *νεανίσκοι* § 26, some one for them) had, probably, already spoken. That this speech is the second (*ἐπίλογος*) for the defence is clear from the fact that no witnesses are called. There is no ground for supposing, with the author of the Argument, that the speaker was Isaeos¹. The date is uncertain.

Analysis.

‘Witnesses cannot be brought, nor false statements easily refuted, in regard to transactions abroad. But the case of Hagnon and his brother can be proved from what has occurred at Athens. First,—Chariades calls Nikostratos the son of Smikros. Hagnon and his brother claim the property of Nikostratos, son of Thrasymachos. But for this discrepancy, the judges would have had to ask merely, Did or did not Nikostratos leave a will? Clearly Chariades wanted to

¹ Ἰσαῖος οὖν ὁ ῥήτωρ, says the author of the Argument—and the οὖν is very characteristic of his airy assumptions—ὡς συγγενῆς ὦν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀγωνα, λέγει συνηγορῶν αὐτοῖς. He has taken his συγγενῆς simply from § 1, where the word ἐπιτήδευοι *μαγ*, of course, mean ‘relations,’ as it does in § 18, but seems rather to mean merely

‘friends’:—Hagnon and Hagnotheos are my ἐπιτήδευοι, the speaker says, ‘as their father was before them.’ Schömann (p. 269) remarks that the author’s authority may have been Didymos, whose commentaries on Isaeos are mentioned by Harpokr. s.v. *γαμηλία*—a flattering supposition, I fear.

perplex an issue, otherwise simple, by raising a question of identity (§§ 1—6).

‘Six other persons besides Chariades have put forward, and withdrawn, claims to the inheritance¹. Chariades himself in the first instance claimed it on the ground of kinship. Then, shifting his ground, he claimed it under a will (§§ 7—10). Such claimants, when defeated, ought to be fined, not merely in proportion to their assessed property (*κατὰ τὸ τέλος*), but in the whole amount of the estate claimed. A claim under a will which sets aside the natural succession requires scrutiny. Witnesses can prove only the fact of a will, not the identity of one will with another. Then the law requires that the testator should have been of sound mind.

‘Universally the presumption is strong in favour of claimants by kinship as against claimants under a will (*κατὰ δόσιν*, §§ 11—18). In this case Chariades was not on such terms with Nikostratos as make the bequest probable. Chariades was not the messmate (*σύσσιτος*) of Nikostratos. He

¹ The passage in § 7 still offers an exercise to the ingenuity of critics. No sooner was the large property of the deceased Nikostratos sent home, than everyone shaved his head,—all Athens went into mourning for its relative. *τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπεκείρατο, ἐπειδὴ τὸ δύο ταλάντω ἑξάκις ἦλθετον;* The *ἑξάκις* is the puzzle. I. Reiske would *understand* *εἰς κρίσιν* with *ἦλθετον*: ‘when the two talents *came six times into dispute*’: but (1) the grief would have been counterfeited *before* the contest: and (2) the ellipse of *εἰς κρίσιν* is utterly impossible. II. Schömann suggests, *ἐπειδὴ τὸ δύο ταλάντω ἐξέκεισθον*—*i. e.* ‘as soon as the two talents *were announced for competition*’—*ἐκκείσθαι* referring to notice given by the magistrates

that claimants of the estate should come forward. III. Valeknär, *ἐξ Ἀκης*—which Scheibe, adopting his emendation, properly writes *ἐξ Ἀκῆς*. The Phoenician town Ἀκή is mentioned by Harpokration. The emendation is one of those which, when confirmed by the evidence of facts, are certain, but which, in the absence of such evidence, are only brilliant.


May not *ἑξάκις* be simply a marginal gloss by some one who, having counted up the claimants (other than Chariades) enumerated in §§ 8, 9, found that their number was *six*? The annotator may either, like Reiske, have taken *ἦλθετον* to mean ‘were contested’ and have meant his note for that word; or he may have mentally supplied his verb.

was not even in the same company (*τάξις*) with him. He did not pay him the last offices (§§ 18—20). The property of persons dying abroad has often been claimed by strangers. On grounds both general and particular the probabilities are in favour of the defendants.

‘Certain supporters of Chariades pretend that they are themselves the next of kin to Nikostratos. In that case it is their interest to claim the estate on their own account. If defeated they will be able to try again: whereas, if Chariades once obtains the estate under an alleged will, no claim founded on kinship can afterwards be entertained (§§ 21—26).

‘Lastly:—contrast the antecedents of the parties to the cause. Thrasippos, father of the defendants, was a patriotic citizen, and his sons have always borne a good name. Chariades—who has been absent from Athens for 17 years—has been imprisoned for theft and indicted as a malefactor. Let the judges decide as the evidence and their oaths enjoin’ (§§ 27—31).

3. *On the Estate of Apollodoros* [Or VII.]



1. 3. *On the Estate of Apollodoros.*

Eupolis, Mneson and Thrasyllos were brothers. Mneson died childless. Thrasyllos was killed in the Sicilian expedition, and left his son Apollodoros I. to

the guardianship of Eupolis. Eupolis abused the trust. He intercepted, by a pretended will, half of Mneson's property; and also embezzled much of his nephew's patrimony. Apollodoros I. found a friend, however, in his mother's second husband, Archedamos, who supported him in an action against Eupolis. Archedamos died, leaving a daughter who was married and had a son, Thrasyllus II. When Apollodoros lost his only son, he determined to adopt this Thrasyllus as his son and heir.

At the death of Apollodoros, his estate was claimed by his first-cousin, the elder of the two daughters of Eupolis, and wife of one Pronapes. She denied that Thrasyllus II. had been adopted by Apollodoros I. In this speech Thrasyllus defends his right.

The date must be about 353 B. C. For:— *Date.*

1. Apollodoros I., when about to set forth on a campaign to Corinth, made a will, and directed that his daughter, the speaker's mother, should marry one Lakratides (§ 9). The campaign was probably that of Ol. 96. 4, 393 B. C., or Ol. 97. 1, 392 B. C. At this time, then, the speaker's mother was unmarried. Her marriage—not to Lakratides, but to the speaker's father, Archedamos—may be put four or five years later: in 388 or 387 B. C.—2. The speaker, when adopted by Apollodoros, had already been a thesmothetes (§ 34); i. e. was at least thirty. But he cannot have been much more, for he is still a young man (§ 41).—3. Soon after his adoption, he went on a sacred embassy to the Pythian festival (§ 27). The first Pythiad after the speaker had

reached the age of thirty was that of Ol. 106. 3, 354 B. C.—4. From §§ 14, 15 it may be inferred that Apollodoros I. did not live long after the adoption; and the contest for the property must have followed soon after his death. The adoption may, then, be placed early in 354; the trial, in 353¹.

Analysis.

The speaker, Thrasyllus, was adopted by Apollodoros during the latter's lifetime. This kind of adoption is always less open to suspicion than adoption under a will. The speaker might have barred the claim of Pronapes by an affidavit (*διαμαρτυρία*): but, confident in his cause, he has preferred a direct trial (*εὐθυδικία*, §§ 1—4).

Gratitude to Archedamos had prompted Apollodoros to adopt the speaker; who, at the Thargelia, was duly received into the family and the clan (§§ 5—17). Had there been no such adoption, however, the next heir would have been, not the wife of Pronapes, but her nephew, Thrasybulos. The silence of Thrasybulos is evidence to the adoption (§§ 18—26); which was ratified by the demesmen of Apollodoros. At their meeting to choose the officers of the deme (*ἐν ἀρχαιρεσίαις*), they placed Thrasyllus on their register (*ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον*: §§ 27, 28)².

The wife of Pronapes and her sister had already inherited the property of their brother; but had ignored the obligation to constitute one of their children his representative before the law (*εἰσποιεῖν υἱὸν αὐτῶ*, § 31); and thus his line had become extinct (*ἐξηρήμωται ὁ οἶκος*, *ib.*). This would have been warning enough to Apollodoros. He would never have left his property to the wife of Pronapes


¹ The allusion in § 38 to the discharge of the trierarchy by companies instead of individuals (*οὐκ ἐκ συμμορίας τὴν ναῦν ποιησάμενος ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν*) would alone prove the speech to be later than 358 B. C.

² From §§ 26—28 it appears that ratification by the deme was necessary before enrolment by the *γενῆται* and *φράτορες* could entitle the adopted person even to family rights; see Schäfer *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, III. ii. 27.

(§§ 29—32). On the other hand, no one had stronger claims on Apollodoros than the speaker (§§ 33—36).

The public services of Apollodoros and his father, Thrasyllos I., are contrasted with those of Pronapes¹. The speaker has already served the state as far as his years allowed, and hopes to serve it more (§§ 37—42). Summary: §§ 43—45.

4. On the Estate of Kiron [Or. VIII.]



Kiron married his first-cousin, by whom he had one daughter. This daughter was married, first, to Nausimenes; secondly, to another husband by whom she had two sons, of whom the eldest is the speaker.

After the death of his first wife, Kiron married the sister of one Diokles, and had by her two sons, both of whom died young.

¹ In § 39 it is said that Pronapes ἀπεγράψατο μὲν τίμημα μικρόν, ὡς ἱππᾶδα δὲ τελῶν ἀρχεῖν ἡξίου τὰς ἀρχάς, ‘returned his income as small, but claimed to hold magistracies, as if he paid the tax of a knight’—showing that the

names, at least, of the Solonian classes were kept up. Schömann suggests that the offices for which the census of a knight was required may have been such as were concerned with the administration of the public money (p. 373).

At the death of Kiron, his estate was claimed by his daughter's eldest son. But the son of Kiron's brother, instigated by Diokles¹, set up a counter-claim on two distinct grounds: 1. That Kiron's grandson is illegitimate: 2. That, supposing him legitimate, a brother's son has a better claim than a daughter's son². This speech is the defendant's answer.

Date.

The only indication of the date is that the speaker and his brother were born after the archonship of Eukleides³, Ol. 94. 2, 403 B.C. (§ 43). The speech cannot, then, be put before 383 B.C. On the other hand, the speaker's plea of 'utter inexperience' (§ 5) implies youthfulness. Now, if he was a young man, the date cannot be much below 383⁴,

¹ This Diokles of Phlya is the same against whom Isaeos wrote the lost speeches, *κατὰ Διοκλέους ὕβρεως* (possibly in the *γραφὴ* mentioned at § 41 of our speech), and *πρὸς Διοκλέα περὶ χωρίου*: fragments VIII. and IX. in Sauppe *O. A.* II. p. 230 ff. Diokles was 'surnamed Orestes' (§ 3, cf. § 44)—a nickname for any violent character, borrowed from the robber mentioned by Aristophanes—not without an Euripidean allusion. See *Acharn.* 1166, *εἶτα κατάξειέ τις αὐτοῦ μεθῶν τῆς κεφαλῆς Ὀρέστης μανόμενος*.

² 'According'—says the author of the Greek Argument—'to the well-known law (*κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἐκείνον*) which prescribes that descendants in the male line shall be preferred to descendants in the female line.' The writer was evi-

dently thinking of Or. VII. § 20. But (1) the reference there is to *ἀνεψιαδοῖ*: (2) the question here is between lineal and collateral kinship. The nephew's claim on this second ground was baseless.

³ Observe the argument which, in § 43, is founded upon this fact. Diokles, says the speaker, imperils not only our fortune but our citizenship. If our mother was not a citizen, neither are we citizens: 'for we were born after the archonship of Eukleides.' This alludes to the law carried in 403 by Aristophon the Azenian,—that the son of a citizen shall be illegitimate, if his mother (as well as father) was not a citizen: *ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀστῆς γένηται, νόθον εἶναι* (*Athen.* XIII. 577 B).

⁴ On account of the avoidance of hiatus, Benseler would put Or.

since otherwise it would have been superfluous for him to tell the judges that he was born after 403. The date is probably about 375 B.C.

The speaker denounces the impudence of this attempt *Analysis.* to defraud himself and his brother,—an attempt which has been organised by Diokles; but expresses his confidence of being able to defeat it (§§ 1—5).

I. First, he will show that his mother was the legitimate daughter of Kiron (§ 6). He states the facts as to Kiron's second marriage (§§ 7—9); and proves, in support of them, that he had challenged the other side to give up Kiron's slaves for torture, which challenge had been refused (§§ 9—14). He and his brother were always treated by Kiron as his nearest kinsmen (§§ 15—17). His mother was treated as Kiron's daughter both by her husband and by the women of Kiron's deme: he and his brother were formally enrolled by Kiron in his phratría (§§ 18—20). Lastly, Diokles himself allowed the speaker and his brother to assist at the funeral of Kiron—thus recognising the relationship (§§ 21—29).

II. Secondly, he will show that, as son of Kiron's daughter, he has a better claim than the son of Kiron's brother. Descent (*γένος*) is a nearer tie than collateral kinship (*συγγένεια*): descendants (*ἐκγονοί*) inherit before collateral relations (*συγγενείς*). This is illustrated by the law on the maltreatment of parents (*ὁ περὶ κακώσεως νόμος*, § 32). According to that law, the obligation to maintain relatives descends lineally. The corresponding right to inherit from relatives must descend lineally too (§§ 30—34).


An account of the property of Kiron and of the intrigues of Diokles (§§ 35—39) is followed by a personal attack on

VIII (with I, VII, and XI) below 360 sthenes in the two Speeches.
B.C.: *De hiatu* 192. But, as Blass Against Aphobos would of itself
points out (II. 523), the large use forbid us to go below 363.
of this oration made by Demo-

Diokles (§§ 40—42). This attack is resumed in the epilogue; and the speech concludes with the calling of evidence to show that Diokles had been guilty of adultery (§§ 43—46).

5. *On the Estate of Astyphilos* [Or. IX.]

STEMMA.



I. 5. *On the Estate of Astyphilos.*

Euthykrates and Thudippos were brothers. Thudippos had a son named Kleon. Euthykrates had a son Astyphilos and a daughter. On the death of Euthykrates, his wife married a second husband named Theophrastos, by whom she had a son.

Astyphilos died on military service at Mytilene. As soon as the news of his death reached Athens, Kleon took formal possession of his estate¹ (ἐνεβάτευσε, § 3) in the name of his own son, who, as he alleged, had been adopted by Astyphilos, and in evidence of whose claim he produced a will.

¹ Direct possession could thus be taken only (1) by children or grandchildren of the testator: (2) by an adoptive son who had been adopted *during the lifetime* of the testator. A son adopted *by will* had, like remoter kinsfolk, to *put*

in a claim to the inheritance (ἐπιδικάζεσθαι). Kleon therefore must have appealed to the will, not to prove the adoption, but merely to prove that the adopted son was also the heir.

Presently the son of Theophrastos—who had been serving abroad—returned to Athens, and claimed¹ the estate of his half-brother Astyphilos. In this speech he contends that the will alleged by Kleon is a forgery.

The date—a difficult point—is probably about *Date.* 369 B.C. Astyphilos (§ 14) ‘first went on a campaign to Corinth—then to Thessaly—then he served through the whole Theban War—in short, wherever he heard of an army being raised, he was off to it with a company (λοχαγῶν).....and this expedition to Mytilene was his last.’ The allusions to Thessaly² and Mytilene³ cannot be fixed. The others are to the Corinthian War of 394—387 and the Theban War of 378—371⁴.

¹ By the form of παρακαταβολή (Schöm. p. 404) in the strict sense—literally ‘deposit of security for costs.’ The term ἀμφισβητεῖν was used of any claimant in a will-case: παρακαταβάλλειν was properly said of one who (as here) asserted his right to the whole estate.

² From about 395 to 374 dynastic feuds were rife in Thessaly: see Thirlwall c. 38, v. p. 65. Jason of Pherae kept a large standing army of mercenaries.

³ I can, however, conjecture the occasion of this expedition to Mytilene. In 373 Timotheos was named commander of the fleet which was to help Corcyra. Not being able to man his fleet at Athens, he went on a cruise in the Aegean, to get men and money from the allies (Xen. *H.* vi. ii. 12:

Grote x. 199). Now we know that, in 390 at least, Mytilene was the only Lesbian town not favourable to Sparta (Xen. *H.* iv. viii. 28). A levy of troops and money on Lesbos might easily give the laconising towns of the island a pretext for attacking the one notoriously philathenian town. The expedition in which Astyphilos was killed may have been sent to support Mytilene. Does not the phrase in § 1, οἱ εἰς Μυτιλήνην στρατιῶται, imply a *succour*?

⁴ Dobree (*Adv.* i. 305) puts the speech in 374—1 B.C.; but does not give his reasons. Weissenborn (Ersch. and Gruber’s *Encycl.* p. 300) puts it about 369 B.C. Blass (*Att. Ber.* ii. 525) says, ‘some time after 371 at earliest.’

Schömann’s view is widely different, and as, I think, indefensible.

Analysis.

Kleon and his son have already been adopted into another family; and have thus forfeited their claim as *kinsmen* to the estate of Astyphilos¹. Hence they resorted to the fiction of a will: and Hierokles, uncle of the speaker, pretends that this will was left with him. Astyphilos did not even receive the last rites from the man who pretends to have been his adopted son (§§ 1—6).

If Astyphilos had intended such an adoption, he would have called kinsmen or intimate friends as witnesses. But the witnesses now produced are strangers (§§ 7—13). Again, Astyphilos served in many expeditions before that to Mytilene. Is it likely that he should have delayed making his will—if he was going to make one—till just before the last campaign? (§§ 14, 15.) Astyphilos hated Kleon, because Euthykrates had died of injuries received from Thudippos, Kleon's father (§§ 16—21). Hierokles, ungrateful to the speaker's father Theophrastos, has plotted this fraud with

He puts the speech in 390 B.C., 'or not much later,' and holds that (1) The *Theban War* means the invasion of Boeotia by Sparta in 395, when Athens helped Thebes, and Lysander was killed at Haliartos: (2) The expedition to *Thessaly* refers to 394, when Agesilaos marching through Thessaly, routed the Thessalian allies of Thebes, who may have been supported by Athenians: (3) The expedition to Mytilene is the visit of Thrasybulos and his fleet in 390—389 B.C.

I should object:—(1) that the order in § 14,—*Corinth, Thessaly, Theban War*, which the context shows to be chronological, is thus changed to *Theban War, Thessaly, Corinth*: (2) that the phrase τὸν Θηβαϊκὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα clearly implies more than a single campaign: (3) that in 394 it is very unlikely that Astyphilos or an Athe-


nian force should have met Agesilaos in Thessaly, since the allied forces, including Athenians, were waiting for Agesilaos in Boeotia: (4) that Mytilene—as Blass has observed—was never the immediate object of Thrasybulos: cf. Xen. *H.* iv. viii. 25.

¹ Had Kleon and his son *not* been thus adopted into another family, their claim to the estate of Astyphilos would have been better than that of the speaker. Of collateral kinsfolk, the law called to the succession, *first*, kinsfolk on the father's side down to the ἀνεψιῶν παῖδας (or ἀνεψιαδούς), *i. e.* children of the children of a father's brother or a father's sister; *secondly*, in default of such, kinsfolk on the mother's side—a son of the same mother by another marriage ranking first among these. See Or. vii. § 20, and Schömann, p. 405.

Kleon (§§ 22—26). The speaker and Astyphilos were close friends from boyhood; and Theophrastos treated Astyphilos as a son (§§ 27—30). It is unlikely, then, that Astyphilos should have preferred Kleon's son to the speaker. The relatives of Astyphilos have never recognised the alleged adoption by admitting Kleon's son to the family sacrifices (§§ 31—33). Epilogue: §§ 34—37.

6. *On the Estate of Aristarchos* [Or. x.]

STEMMA.



Aristarchos I. had two sons and two daughters. ^{I, 6. *On the Estate of Aristarchos.*} Kyronides, the eldest son, was adopted, during his father's lifetime, into the family of his maternal grandfather Xenaenetos I. At the death of Aristarchos I. the property went, therefore, to the second son, Demochares. Demochares died in youth. One of his sisters had died, without issue, before him. The other sister was thus left heiress to her father's estate; and might have been claimed in marriage by one of her near kinsmen. Her nearest kinsmen were, her uncle Aristomenes, brother of Aristarchos I., and his son Apollodoros. Neither of them claimed her hand. Aristomenes, as her guardian, gave her in marriage, with a small dowry, to a stranger: he

then put her brother, now his son-in-law, Kyronides in possession of the estate of Aristarchos I.—to which Kyronides had forfeited all right by adoption into the house of Xenaenetos. Kyronides and the daughter of Aristomenes had two sons,—Aristarchos II. and Xenaenetos II. Aristarchos II. was made adopted son of Aristarchos I. in accordance with an alleged will by which the latter left his property to his grandson. At the death of Aristarchos II. his brother Xenaenetos II. was, under his will, declared his adopted son and heir.

The claim of Xenaenetos II. is now opposed by the grandson of Aristarchos I. He claims the estate on behalf of his mother as daughter of Aristarchos I.,—not as sister (by adoption) of Aristarchos II.; though, at the preliminary inquiry (§ 2), legal form had required him to describe her in the latter manner.

Date.

Aristarchos ‘has been killed in the war,’ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τέθνηκε (§ 22); words which imply both that his death is recent and that the war continues. Now this war is clearly not the Corinthian War (394—387), which, with the peace that closed it, is mentioned as something long past (§ 20). The war in which Aristarchos fell is probably the Theban War of 378—371. The speech may be placed between 377 and 371¹.

¹ Schömann refers the speech to 384 at latest. For (1) he takes the war of § 22 to be the Corinthian: (2) he takes the πολλὸς χρόνος of § 18 to be the interval between the death of Aristarchos—

say in 388—and the bringing of the action. Now this interval could not exceed five years, since that was the limit (προθεσμία, *praescriptio*) set by the law to the time within which an estate could

After contrasting his own want of nerve and fluency *Analysis.* with the practised skill of the adversaries, the speaker explains why the *form* of his claim is inconsistent with its *substance*. He has been obliged to describe his mother, not as the daughter of Aristarchos I., but as the sister of Aristarchos II., although he denies the validity of the adoption on which the latter title depends (§§ 1—3).

He relates the facts (§§ 4—7); and then argues that Aristarchos II. could not have been adopted (1) by Aristarchos I., while the latter had a legitimate son, Demochares, living; nor (2) by Demochares, who died before he was competent to adopt; nor (3) by Kyronides, who had passed out of the family; nor (4) by Aristomenes or his son Apollodoros (§§ 8—14).

Xenaenetos II., the defendant, does not, however, rely only on the alleged adoption of Aristarchos II. He says that his father, Kyronides, had already acquired a right to the estate by discharging debts with which it was encumbered. But, the speaker replies, (1) the person liable for these debts was not Kyronides but the speaker's mother¹: and (2) had the estate really been so encumbered, Aristomenes and Kyronides would not have been in such haste to procure the inheritance for Aristarchos II. (§§ 15—17).

The speaker answers the objection that his claim ought to have been made long ago. His father was deterred from taking proceedings by the fear of losing his wife, whom the next of kin threatened that they would claim at law (*ἐπιδικάζεσθαι*), if he claimed the estate. The plaintiff himself has hitherto been prevented by military service, and then

be claimed *when its holder was not the first heir, but that heir's successor*. Here Xenaenetos II. was the heir of Aristarchos II., who was the heir of Aristarchos I. The estate of Aristarchos I must therefore be claimed from Xenaenetos within five years from the death of Aristarchos II. But it

could have been claimed from Aristarchos II. *at any time while he lived*. The *πολὸς χρόνος* of § 18 means, however, as I think with Blass, the time during which Aristarchos had wrongfully possessed the estate.


¹ A *petitio principii*—that she was the *ἐπίκλητος*.

by a debt to the Treasury¹, from bringing an action (§§ 18—21).

The personal worth of Aristarchos II. cannot excuse the fact that the property which he bequeathed was not his own. The holder of disputed lands is bound to produce the mortgager (*θέτης*), the seller, or the legal decision under which he occupies². Just so the adversaries must prove their title to this estate. Kyronides and his family already possess the property of Xenaenetos I. They now seek to deprive the speaker of his patrimony. As a citizen of good character, public and private, he claims the protection of his rights (§§ 22—26).

II. *Actions for False Witness* (δικαί ψευδομαρτυριῶν).

1. *On the Estate of Menekles* [Or. II.]



II. 1. *On the Estate of Menekles.*

At the death of Menekles, his estate was claimed by his brother³. But Menekles had left an adopted

¹ A citizen who, on any account whatsoever, owed money to the Treasury, suffered total suspension of civic rights until the debt was paid. Cf. Isokr. *Antid.* § 10, ἀτιμότεροι... τῶν ἀφειλότων τῷ δημοσίῳ.

² § 24. ὥσπερ τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων χωρίων δεῖ τὸν ἔχοντα ἢ θέτην

ἢ πρατῆρα παρέχεσθαι ἢ καταδικασμένον φαίνεσθαι. Here θέτης = ὁ θεῖς, the mortgager (the mortgagee being ὁ θέμενος): and καταδικασμένος 'having got a verdict' against the opposing claim.

³ The author of the Argument says, ἀδελφῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων. The source of his mistake is plain.

son ; this son entered a protest that the estate, being his, could not be so claimed (*διεμαρτύρησε μὴ ἐπίδικον εἶναι τὸν κληῖρον*, § 2) ; and produced, as witness, his father-in-law (§ 36) Philonides. The brother of Menekles then brought an indictment for perjury (*γραφὴ ψευδομαρτυρίας*) against Philonides. In this speech, Philonides is defended by his son-in-law, the adopted son of Menekles.

The adoption had come about thus. Eponymos, a friend of Menekles, had four children :—the speaker of this speech ; another son ; and two daughters. The younger daughter was, for about two years (§ 6), the wife of Menekles ; but, their marriage proving childless, they separated, and she took a second husband, Eleios. At some later time Menekles became anxious to adopt a son. His brother—the prosecutor in this case—had only one son. Menekles decided, therefore, to adopt one of the two sons of his friend Eponymos (§§ 3—12).

The date is probably about 354 B. C. (1) The *Date.* speaker says (§ 6) :—‘ Having given our sisters in marriage, and being of the full age, we betook ourselves to military service, and went with Iphikrates on an expedition to Thrace.’ This might refer to 389 B. C., when Iphikrates was sent to guard the Hellespont and the regions about it¹. But the tone implies that Athens was not then waging a great war. The reference is more probably to 383 B. C., when Iphi-

Throughout, the prosecutors are spoken of in the plural ; and in § 38 we read, *ἀμφότεροι οἶδοι*. But § 21 shows that Menekles had but

one brother. The plural, and the *ἀμφότεροι*, mean this brother and his son, the nephew of Menekles.

¹ Xen. *Hellen.* iv. viii. § 34.

krates began hostilities against Kotys, who had then just got the chief power in Thrace¹. (2) The adoption of the speaker by Menekles must have taken place about six years later (cf. §§ 7—19), in 377. (3) Menekles died 23 years after the adoption, § 15—*i.e.* in 354: and this cause must have soon followed.

Analysis.

After a narrative of the facts (§§ 1—12), it is shown (1) by the citation of a law, that a man without male issue can devise his property as he pleases: (2) by witnesses, that Menekles had adopted the speaker in due form, enrolling him among the members of his phratria, his gens, and his deme² (§§ 13—16). At the desire of Menekles the speaker took a wife, the daughter of Philonides; and was in all respects treated as the son of his adoptive father (§§ 17—18).

The adversaries suggest that Menekles, when he adopted the speaker, was not in his right mind, and was influenced by his wife, the speaker's sister. It is replied that his sister was the wife of Eleios when the adoption took place; that she had two children of her own, in whose favour her influence would rather have been used; and that the speaker was the natural person for Menekles to adopt (§§ 19—22). The prosecutor's real complaint is that Menekles exercised the right of adoption—a right allowed by Greeks and barbarians alike, and one which the prosecutor would have used in a like case (§§ 23—26).

The prosecutor has no reason to be jealous; the speaker has inherited from his adoptive father little but the name of son. Menekles owed about £268 (§ 29) to the son of a deceased creditor (τῷ ὀρφανῷ, § 27). In order to pay this,

¹ See Schäfer, *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, III. Append. p. 142.


² § 16, φράτορας—ὀργεῶνας—δημότας. ὀργεῶνες has generally been taken as = γεννήται. Schömann has an ingenious note, (*Isae.* pp. 208 f.) in which he contends that ὀργεῶνες, here, at least, mean an *inner* circle of γεννήται, connected, not merely

by a civil or conventional tie (such as he thinks that of the γεννήται to have often been), but by a tie of real blood-relationship. Possibly, however, ὀργεῶνες, the sharers of common ὄργια, may have been the members of a sacred brotherhood, independent of any civil or gentile tie.

he had resolved to sell a certain farm; but his brother, the prosecutor, maliciously laid claim to part of this farm, in order to delay the sale; hoping that thus it would be seized for debt (*κατόχιμον γένηται*, § 28), and that Menekles would be forced to resign the whole. Menekles, however, at once sold that part of it to which his right was clear; discharged the debt; and then brought an action against his brother for having interdicted the sale of the whole farm (*δίκεν ἀπορρήσεως*, § 29). The matter was referred to arbiters; and these decided that Menekles should resign the piece of land claimed by his brother, who thus gained about £40; while property to the value of about £15 was all that remained for the speaker to inherit (§§ 27—37).

The validity of the act of adoption was acknowledged by the prosecutor and his brother themselves; for, on their reconciliation with Menekles, they exchanged the oaths of amity not with Menekles, but with the speaker as his son (§§ 38—40). The speaker would not have resisted the prosecutor's claim—there being, in fact, no property at stake—did he not deem it base to allow the name of his adoptive father's house to perish (§§ 41—43). Briefly recapitulating the points of his case, he implores the judges not to deprive the dead Menekles of the only kinsman who can do the sacrifice at his grave (§§ 44—47).

2. *On the Estate of Pyrrhos.* [Or. III.]



Scheibe, in his stemma (p. xix.), makes Lysimenes, Chaeron and Pylades *paternal* uncles of Pyrrhos. Blass points out that §§ 71, 30 and 32 show them to have been *maternal* uncles (*Att. B.* II. 502).

II. 2. *On
the Estate
of Pyrrhos.*

Pyrrhos had bequeathed his estate to his adopted son Endios, the elder of his sister's two sons. Endios enjoyed the inheritance for more than twenty years. At his death it reverted, according to law, to his mother, as sister of Pyrrhos¹. But her claim was disputed by Xenokles on behalf of his wife Phile. Phile, as this speech asserts, was the illegitimate daughter of Pyrrhos; but Xenokles made an affidavit (*διαμαρτύρησε*) of her legitimacy. The brother of Endios, acting as legal representative (*κύριος*) of his mother, then brought against Xenokles an action for perjury (*δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν*, § 4); and gained it. He now brings a like action against Nikodemos—brother of Phile's mother—who had, in the former cause, been a witness for Xenokles. The date is uncertain; but the speech cannot, at least, be one of the earliest. Diophantos of Sphêttos (§ 22) was a witness for Demosthenes against Aeschines in 343 B.C.²: and Dorotheos of Eleusis (*ib.*) seems to have been living in 349 B.C.³

Date.

Analysis.

The plaintiff states the facts; argues that the proved perjury of Xenokles establishes the perjury of Nikodemos; and cites three documents:—(1) *διαμαρτυρία*—the affidavit made by Xenokles in the former action: (2) *ἀπωμοσία*—his own counter-affidavit in that action: (3) *μαρτυρία*—the evidence then given by Nikodemos (§§ 1—7).

¹ A mother had no succession to her son's property. It was because no legitimate children, nor brothers, nor brother's children of Pyrrhos were living, that his sister, the mother of Endios, inherited. Cf. [Dem.] *in Leoch.* § 68. The brother of Endios could not claim the estate, because the adoption of

Endios by Pyrrhos cancelled the natural right of succession. 'We,' in this speech—when it does not (as in § 2) mean the speaker and Endios—means the speaker and his mother.

² Dem. *de Falsa Legat.* § 198.

³ [Dem.] *in Neaer.* § 39.

Nikodemos says that his sister was the lawful wife of Pyrrhos. I would ask him these questions:—1. What dowry did he give with his sister to Pyrrhos, the possessor of a property of three talents (*τριτάλαντος οἶκος*)? 2. Did she leave Pyrrhos before his death? 3. At the death of Pyrrhos, did Nikodemos recover her dowry; or, failing to recover it, bring an action for it, or for the maintenance of the widow (*δίκην σίτου*, § 9), against Endios? 4. The sister of Nikodemos had other lovers. Was she ever lawfully betrothed—*ἐγγυητή*—to any other of them (§§ 8—10)? Evidence to show that she was an *ἐταίρα* (§§ 11—15).

Her antecedents do not, indeed, prove that Pyrrhos did not marry her. But the story of the betrothal is improbable. According to Nikodemos, it took place in presence of a single witness, Pyretides; whose deposition, taken out of court (*ἐκμαρτυρία*, § 18), is adduced. But this deposition is disowned by Pyretides himself; and it is strange that Xenokles should have taken it before two persons only (§§ 16—26). The three maternal uncles of Pyrrhos—Lysimenes, Chaeron, and Pylades—are said to have been present at the betrothal: but this is improbable (§§ 26, 27); and, moreover, *they* say that the daughter of Pyrrhos was named Kleitarete, not Phile (§§ 30—34)¹. It is strange, too, if Nikodemos gave no dowry, since a dowry would have bound Pyrrhos more firmly to his sister (§§ 28, 29); or that, if he gave any, he did not record the amount; since no dowry given without specification of value (*ἀτίμητος*) can afterwards be recovered² (§§ 35—39).

If Phile was legitimate, there were at least three earlier moments at which her legitimacy ought to have been asserted:—1. When, at the death of Pyrrhos, Endios claimed the estate (*ἐπεδικάζετο*). 2. When Endios gave Phile in

¹ As to the *naming-day* (*δεκάτη*), when, on the tenth day after the child's birth, the father acknowledged it by naming it, cf. [Dem.] *Boeot.* II. § 28, &c.

² § 35, *ἐάν τις τι ἀτίμητον δῶ*:

i. e., as Schömann says, comparing Demosth. *Euerg.* p. 1156, *μὴ ἐν προικὶ τετιμημένον*, not *valued*, with a view to restitution (*ἀποτίμημα*) by the husband on the dissolution of the marriage.

marriage to Xenokles. Nikodemos, by an information laid before the archon (*είσαγγελία*), might then have vindicated the rights of the heiress. 3. When, in the first instance, Pyrrhos adopted Endios with a view to making him his heir¹ (§§ 40—56).


Xenokles and Nikodemos seem to ignore the adoption of Endios by Pyrrhos. Phile ought to have brought an action against Endios within five years of her father's death (§ 58); or, at the death of Endios, have claimed the property as her brother's. On any supposition, the course of procedure has been irregular. A legitimate child does not *claim* (*ἐπιδικάζεται*, § 59) a parent's property, but simply enters upon it (*βαδίζει εἰς τὰ πατρῶα*, § 62). This is what Phile should have done. A rival claimant would have opposed her at his peril (§§ 57—62).

Pyrrhos, if he had had a true-born daughter, would have had no motive for adopting Endios. It can be shown that, at the time of his alleged marriage, he neither gave a wedding-feast to his clansmen (*γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκε*, § 76), nor provided the women of his deme with the means of celebrating the Thesmophoria.—Witnesses: brief recapitulation (§§ 72—80).

If Phile had been legitimate, Endios, as merely the *adoptive* son of Pyrrhos, must have married her before he could legally take the inheritance (§ 69). And, if Endios and his brother had declined to marry her, the maternal uncles of Pyrrhos at least could not have suffered Phile to marry Xenokles, a stranger in blood: one of them must have married her himself (§§ 63—71).

¹ § 42. οὔτε γὰρ διαθέσθαι οὔτε δοῦναι οὐδὲν οὐδὲν ἕξεισι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν θυγατέρων, ἐάν τις καταλιπὼν γνησίας τελευτᾷ: 'Since a man can neither *make an heir by adoption* (*διαθέσθαι*), nor bequeath any part of his property to any one, irrespectively of (*ἄνευ*) such legitimate daughters as he

may leave behind him.' Schömann (p. 250), quoting Bunsen, *de iure hered.* p. 55, observes that *διαθέσθαι* is *properly* said of him 'qui aliquem heredem simul et filium instituit,' while *δοῦναι* is of course the general term; though *διαθέσθαι* and *διαθήκη* are often used of *any* testament.

3. *On the Estate of Philoktemon.* [Or. VI.]

Euktemon and his wife, the daughter of Mixiades, II. 3. *On the Estate of Philoktemon.* had three sons,—Philoktemon, Hegemon and Ergamenes; and two daughters, of whom one married Phanostratos, the other Chaereas. Euktemon, when an elderly man, formed an attachment to a freed-woman named Akte, who managed a lodging-house belonging to him in the Kerameikos. At last he left his home, divorced his wife, and lived altogether there. Akte had two sons,—the children, according to the speaker, of one Dion, a freedman. She persuaded Euktemon to enrol the eldest of these boys in his phratría, as his own son. Philoktemon protested; but was at length induced to consent, on the condition that Akte's son was to inherit only one of Euktemon's farms. Soon afterwards Phil-

oktemon was killed in a battle at Chios, leaving a will by which his nephew, the son of Phanostratos, was declared his adopted son and heir. Several years later (§ 27), Euktemon drew up a will, embodying the terms on which Akte's son had been adopted, as agreed on between himself and Philoktemon, and deposited this with a friend Pythodoros.

About two years later (§ 29), Androkles and Antidoros, kinsmen of Euktemon, conspired with Akte. They persuaded Euktemon to cancel the will deposited with Pythodoros, and to sell his land and house-property. They even alleged that the sons of Akte had been adopted by Ergamenes and Philoktemon; and, as guardians of the youths, called upon the archon to administer their ward's property: but the relations exposed the fraud to the court, and the plot was defeated. Euktemon died at the age of 96. As he left no legitimate sons, nor grandsons by Ergamenes or Hegemon, Chaerestratos, as adopted son of Philoktemon, claimed Euktemon's estate. Chaerestratos was opposed by Androkles and Antidoros. Androkles had at different times put forward two different and inconsistent claims:—

1. That he should receive in marriage, as nearest kinsman, the widow of Chaereas, with $\frac{1}{5}$ th of Euktemon's estate:
2. That the two sons supposed to be Akte's were legitimate sons of Euktemon by Kallippe, daughter of Pistozenos; that the will of Philoktemon, adopting Chaerestratos, was a fiction; and that, therefore, the whole estate both of Euktemon and of Philoktemon should go to these sons of

Kallippe. On this second ground, Androkles put in a protest (*διαμαρτυρία*) against the claim of Chaerestratos. Chaerestratos then indicted Androkles for perjury. The speaker here is supporting the indictment. But his speech contains the whole case. Chaerestratos appears to have been hindered by diffidence, or by a grandson's piety, from saying more than a few prefatory words.

It is now fifty-two years since the Athenian *Date.* armament sailed for Sicily in the archonship of Arimnestos (§ 14). Arimnestos was archon Ol. 91. 1—from July, 416 B. C., to July, 415. The expedition sailed in May, 415. The date is therefore Ol. 104. 1, 364—3.

The inner chronology requires attention. Philoktemon, when trierarch, was killed in battle 'near ^{Allusion in § 27.} (*περί*) Chios' § 27. Dobree suggests the battle of Arginusae, 406 B. C.¹ Sir William Jones suggests one of the engagements which followed the revolt of Chios in 412 B. C.² Now, the elder of Akte's two sons is said (§ 14) to be, in 363, 'not more than twenty.' But this was the boy whose admission into Euktemon's phratria had been opposed by Philoktemon (§ 22). 'Not more than twenty'—*οὐπω ὑπὲρ εἴκοσιν ἔτη*—sounds suspicious. But, on the other hand, we can hardly suppose that the youth was forty-three or forty-nine. Neither 406 nor 412 B. C., therefore, is admissible. What, then, was this fight 'near Chios'? In the latter part of 390 B. C. Thrasybulos the Steirian was sent out with forty ships against Teleutias. He went first to the Helles-

¹ *Advers.* I. 298.

² Xen. *Hellen.* v. viii. § 30.

pont: then to Lesbos: then, descending the coast of Asia Minor, 'he brought over some of the cities, and, plundering money for his soldiers from those which did not come over, he hastened to Rhodes¹.' May it not have been then—early in 389—in some skirmish near Chios, that Philoktemon was killed? Akte's eldest son was therefore, in 363, really about 27. The annals of the speech will stand thus:—

460 B. C.? Birth of Euktemon.

415. The speaker goes with Phanostratos² on the Sicilian expedition (§ 1).

389. Death of Philoktemon.

378. 'Long after' Philoktemon's death (*ὑστερον χρόνῳ*) Phanostratos sails as trierarch with Timotheos² (§ 27).

376. Two years later (§ 29), Euktemon is persuaded to cancel the will deposited with Pythodoros in 378.

¹ So far as I know, the objection to the views of Dobree and of Sir W. Jones regarding the time and occasion of Philoktemon's death has not before been noticed. I should prefer to my own suggestion any which gave a *later* year, while keeping a distance above 378 B. C. sufficient for the *ὑστερον χρόνῳ* of § 37. But I can find no place for hostilities 'near Chios,' in which Athenians were likely to have been engaged, between 389 B. C. and the siege of Chios by Chares in 357.

² In § 1 the vulgate has *ὅτε γὰρ εἰς Σικελίαν ἐξέπλει τριηραρχῶν*

Χαιρέστρατος. For *Χαιρέστρατος* read *Φανόστρατος*. This, Reiske's emendation approved by Dobree (*Adv.* i. 298) and Scheibe (p. xxix.), is, I think, certain. Plainly the Sicilian expedition of 415 B. C. is meant; and Chaerestratos, who is still a young man (§ 60), would thus be made, like the speaker, upwards of seventy. Two MSS. give *Μενέστρατος*—a mere error: cf. Schöm. p. 323. H. Weissenborn proposed to alter *Σικελίαν* into *Θεσσαλίαν* or *Μακεδονίαν*. The replacement of *Φανόστρατος* makes this needless.

364? Death of Euktemon, aged 96 (§ 18).

363. This trial.

After explaining that he appears as a friend of Chaere- *Analysis.*
stratos and his father Phanostratos, the speaker shortly states
the case. He calls witnesses to prove that Philoktemon had
made a will in favour of Chaerestratos, and cites a law
to show that he was entitled to do so (§§ 1—9).

Androkles and Antidoros pretend that the two youths,
their clients, are legitimate sons of Euktemon by his second
wife, Kallippe. This story is refuted (§§ 10—16). These
youths are the sons of a freedwoman named Akte—as she
said, by one Dion. The eldest of them was, indeed, enrolled
by Euktemon among his phratores; but after opposition¹,
and under conditions (§§ 17—26). The various intrigues by
which Akte and her accomplices sought to obtain Euktemon's
property are related in detail² (§§ 27—42).

Androkles has at different times made two assertions:—
1. That his clients were legitimate sons of Euktemon:
2. That they were adopted sons of Philoktemon and Erga-
menes. Now this alleged adoption would exclude them from
succession to Euktemon's estate. The law forbids an adopted
son to *return* (*ἐπανιέναι*) into the family out of which he was
adopted; though, if he leave a legitimate son, that son may
so return (§ 44). Again:—Androkles has claimed in mar-
riage the widow of Chaereas, with one-fifth of her father
Euktemon's estate. But this claim is inconsistent with the
heirship of his clients (§§ 43—61). Epilogue (§§ 62—65).

¹ § 22. At first the phratores did not receive him, ἀλλ' ἀπηνέχθη τὸ κουρεῖον, 'the victim was taken away.' *i. e.* Euktemon was not allowed to offer the sheep which he had brought with him for sacrifice on the *κουρεῶτις*, or third day of the Apaturia, when new phratores were enrolled.

² § 36. While Euktemon still lived, the archon was asked by the


conspirators to *let* (*μσθοῦν*) the house-property, as if *their clients were orphans*. When the archon and the guardian of an orphan let the orphan's estate, the person to whom it was let was required to mortgage as security a piece of ground or other real property. This was called *ἀπορίμμημα*, and on it were set up *slabs* (*ᾠροί*), bearing the orphan's name.

III. Action to compel the discharge of a Suretyship (ἐγγύης δίκη).

On the Estate of Dikæogenes. [Or. v.]

STEMMA.

Dikæogenes I.



¹ In § 26, according to the vulgate, Dikæogenes III. betroths to Protarchides τὴν ἀδελφὴν τῆν ἐαυτοῦ. The context favours the emendation of H. Weissenborn, adopted by Scheibe, τὴν ἀδελφίδην τῆν ἐαυτοῦ: but this cannot have been the speaker's sister.—Reiske proposed τὴν ἀδελφὴν τῆν ἐμαυτοῦ: Schömann, τὴν ἀδελφὴν τῆν τοῦτοῦ (Kephisodotos) or τῆν τοῦτοῦ, supposing the brother's name lost.—For a complete table of the House of Menexenos I, see Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, III, Part 2, p. 212.

Dikaeogenes, son of Menexenos—who, for distinction from his grandfather, of the same name, we call Dikaeogenes II.—had four sisters. These, when he died childless, shared among them two-thirds of his estate. The other third went to his first-cousin, Dikaeogenes III., son of his uncle Proxenos, in accordance with a will produced by Proxenos, in which the deceased declared Dikaeogenes III. to be his adopted son, and heir to one-third of his estate (*υἱὸς ποιητὸς ἐπὶ τρίτῳ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας*, § 6). III. *On the Estate of Dikaeogenes.*

Twelve years later (§ 7), Dikaeogenes III. alleged that this first will was invalid. Under a *second* will, he said, he was heir, not to a third only, but to the whole of the estate. He gained his cause. The sisters of the testator were deprived of their shares, and the whole was transferred to Dikaeogenes III.

Ten years more elapsed (§ 35). Meanwhile the nephews of the testator had grown up. They now resolved to seek redress for their mothers and themselves. They began by bringing an action against one Lykon, who had been called by Dikaeogenes III. as a witness to the second will. Lykon was convicted of perjury.

The state of things was now this:—Dikaeogenes III. had himself declared the first will—which gave him $\frac{1}{3}$ rd—to be invalid. The judges of Lykon had declared the second will—which gave him all—to be false. Accordingly, the nephews (with the exception of Menexenos II., who had deserted their cause) now sued Dikaeogenes III. for the *whole* estate. One Leochares interposed a protest (*διαμαρτυρία*) that their claim was inadmissible. They indicted Leo-

chares for perjury. Leochares was certain to be convicted. Dikaeogenes III. therefore made a compromise. He was to keep his original one-third, and leave his adversaries in secure¹ possession of the other two-thirds. Leochares and Mnesiptolemos became his sureties for the performance of this engagement.

*Form of
the Cause.*

Leochares is now sued (by an ἐγγύης δίκη) to discharge his liability as surety, since his principal Dikaeogenes III. has made default. The speaker, son of Polyaratos (§ 5), is one of the nephews of the testator, and is supported by his first cousin Kephisodotos (§ 2).

Date.

The question of the date—a most difficult and, for the chronology of Isaeos, a most important question—turns mainly on one point. Dikaeogenes II., when commanding the Paralos, was killed in battle ‘at Knidos’ (§§ 6, 42). Does this refer to the sea-fight off Knidos in 412 B.C.; or to the more famous battle in 394 B.C.? If to the former, then the date of the speech is about 390 B.C.—earlier, by at least 12 years, than any other Isaeian work of which we can approximately fix the time. If to the latter, then the date is about 372 B.C. The former view is the more probable. The annals will then stand thus:—

412 B.C., Ol. 92. 1. Dikaeogenes II. killed in the sea-fight off Knidos². *First will* produced,

¹ ἀναμφισβήτητα, § 18 (=καθὰ καὶ ἀνέπαφα, Argum.), ‘freed from all claims;’—whereas, in fact, he sold these two-thirds to other persons.

² Thuc. VIII. 42; cf. Cox, *H. Gr.* II. 453: (for we must think of this sea-fight, in which the Athenians lost six ships, rather than of the unsuccessful attack on Knidos no-

making Dikaeogenes III. heir to one-third of the estate.

400 B. C. Twelve years (§ 7) after the first will, Dikaeogenes III. alleges a *second will*, which makes him heir to the whole estate; and gains his cause. Meanwhile Athens had suffered calamity, sedition, and civil strife¹ (*ib.*: *i.e.* the defeat at Aegospotami, the tyranny of the Thirty, and the Anarchy).

393 B. C. Lechaeum, the western port of Corinth, is taken (§ 37) by the Lacedaemonians in the second year of the Corinthian War (394—387 B. C.).

390 B. C. Ten years (§ 35) after the establishment of the second will, Dikaeogenes III. is sued by the testator's nephews. A great war is still going on, in which—while *he* has never served—‘Olynthians and islanders are dying (*ἀποθνήσκουσι*) for this land in battle with the enemy’: § 46².

It is true that, in the Olynthian War of 382—379 B. C., Olynthians were, in a sense, fighting the

ticed in c. 35, which does not seem to have been attended with any loss). The *Paralos*, it may be observed, is heard of soon afterwards as being with the army at Samos; Thuc. VIII. 74, 411 B. C.

¹ Note the language of § 7:—*ἐκέκτιτο ἕκαστος δώδεκα ἔτη ἃ ἔλαχε· καὶ ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ οὐσῶν δικῶν οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἤξιωσε τὰ πεπραγμένα εἰπεῖν ἀδίκως πεπραχθαι, πρὶν δυστυχῆσάσης τῆς πόλεως καὶ στάσεως γενομένης καγῶνος οὐτοσὶ πεισθείς...ἡμφισβήτει.*

This does not say that the *στάσις* was going on at the time when the false claim was made. No doubt a slip of three years would not be

impossible for what Schömann calls ‘*oratoria magis quam historica fides*’; but the apology is not needed here.

² Schömann would boldly alter *Ὀλύνθιοι* to *Κορίνθιοι*. Sir W. Jones (p. 159) actually proposed *Ὀπούντιοι*. But the context itself defends *Ὀλύνθιοι*. The meaning is:—‘You, an Athenian, have not served, while aid has been coming to Athens in this crisis from the uttermost parts of her confederacy.’ The great city of Olynthos, as well as the insular allies, doubtless furnished some troops in the course of a seven years’ war which held all Greece in suspense.

battle of Athens. It is also true that, in 374 B. C., war had been renewed between Athens and Sparta; and that the mention of 'islanders' might be explained by the fact that Corcyra was a centre of the hostilities. But the πόλεμος of § 46 cannot well cover the whole intermittent struggle against Sparta. Clearly it refers to the Corinthian War (394—387 B. C.)¹.

Analysis.

The speaker defines his case by quoting his own affidavit (*ἀνωμοσία*, § 1). He then refers to a register (*ἀπογραφή*) of the property left by his uncle, to prove that Dikaeogenes III. has not refunded the due amount, and that Leochaeres has therefore not discharged his suretyship (*τῆν ἐξεγγύην ἀπέδωκεν*, §§ 1—4).

A narrative of the facts above stated follows—stress being laid on the conduct of Dikaeogenes III. to his own

¹ I long held that 372 B.C. was the date, and that the difficulties could be overcome, (1) by referring *στάσις* to the strife of factions at Athens between the partisans of Sparta and the partisans of the Theban patriots in 382 B. C. (see Xen. *Hellen.* v. iv. 19)—the year in which the Kadmeia was seized, and in which Athens, stripped of nearly all her possessions abroad and nearly destitute of allies, might be said *δυστυχήσαι* (cf. Boeckh, *Publ. Econ.* i. 417): (2) by explaining Ὀλύνθιοι...καὶ νησιῶται ἀποθνήσκουσι of the Olynthian War, 382—379, and of the renewed hostilities in 374 between Athens and Sparta, of which Corcyra was a centre. But *στάσις* most naturally refers to the Anarchy.

The consideration, however,

which, for me, has finally turned the scale in favour of 390 is one which, so far as I know, has not been noticed—the tone of §§ 37, 38. Clearly the details set forth there are comparatively *recent*. They could not have been used thus effectively after 21 years. The great war of § 46 must be identical with the great war of § 37—the Corinthian. [For 391, 390 or 389 are Schäfer, *Dem. u. s. Z.* i. 255, cf. III. App. 211: Blass, *Att. Ber.* II. 508 ff.: Schömann, *Isae.* 290 ff.: Weissenborn, *Ersch and Gruber's Encycl.* II. xxiv. 295. For 372 are Benseler, *De hiatu*, p. 186; and (on second thoughts) Dobree, *Adv.* i. 297. Krüger—who takes 384—381—would have been for 372 if he had not overlooked the 10 years of § 35.]

cousins, one of whom he made a sort of servant to his brother Harmodios (§§ 5—18).

Dikaeogenes had covenanted, not only to resign his claim to two-thirds of the estate, but to give the plaintiffs undisputed possession of them. He now pretends that he had agreed only to resign his claim. This would mean nothing, as he had already sold these two-thirds to other persons. He was bound to refund the price to the purchasers, and to explain that he could not warrant (*βεβαιοῦν*) their ownership. So far from doing this, he had allowed the plaintiffs to incur the cost of an unsuccessful attempt to eject (*ἐξάγειν*) one of these purchasers (§§ 19—24). To prove that Leochares was surety for Dikaeogenes, it is shown that Leochares had, on that very pretext, induced Protarchides, the husband of one of his nieces, to resign some property (§§ 25—27).

The plaintiffs have made fair allowance for the improvement of the property by Dikaeogenes III.; and arbitrators, half of whom were chosen by him, have recognised the justice of their claim (§§ 28—34). Dikaeogenes deserves no sympathy on the ground of patriotism. His public services have been ill done; and he has paid no war-tax (*εἰσφορά*). Once, indeed, after Lechaëum was taken, he promised a subscription; but he never paid it, and his name was posted as a defaulter at the statues of the Eponymi (§§ 35—38).

His private and public life is contrasted with that of the speaker's ancestors—whose great-grandfather, Dikaeogenes I., fell fighting for Athens at Eleusis¹; as his grandfather Menexenos fell at Spartolos², and his uncle, Dikaeo-

¹ § 42, ὅτε ἡ ἐν Ἐλευσίνοι μάχη ἐγένετο. This battle at Eleusis has been referred (1) by Palmer, ap. Schöm. p. 342, to Ol. 80. 4, 457 B.C., when there were hostilities in the Megarid between the Athenians and the Corinthians: (2) by Reiske to Ol. 83. 4, 445 B.C., when the Lacedaemonians, invading Attica under Pleistonax, advanced to

Eleusis; Thuc. i. 114. But on neither occasion is a battle at Eleusis recorded.

Read, with Dobree, ἐν Ἀλαεῦσι. Having made a descent on the coast of Argolis, the Athenians were defeated by the Corinthians and Epidaurians at Halicis, Ol. 80. 4, 457 B.C.: Thuc. i. 104.

² § 42. φυλαρχῶν (ἀπέθανε) τῆς

genes II., at Knidos. Nor can the defendant take credit for his ancestors Harmodios and Aristogeiton. He renounced them, and the privileges which their descendants enjoy—maintenance at the Prytaneion, places of honour (*προεδριῶν*), freedom from taxes—in order to be adopted by his cousin¹ (§§ 39—47).

IV. *Indictment of a Guardian for maltreatment of a Ward (εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶν).*

IV. *On the Estate of Hagnias.*


On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI.]—Theopompos, the speaker and defendant, possesses the estate of Hagnias. Half of this estate is claimed from Theopompos on behalf of his own nephew, the son of Stratokles. The form of the prosecution is an *Information for maltreatment (εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως)*; the son of Stratokles being considered as an orphan whom his uncle, Theopompos, has wronged².

Ὀλυνθίας ἐν Σπαρτώλῳ, as Scheibe rightly follows Palmer in reading. In Ol. 87. 4, 429 B.C.; when the Athenians were defeated by the Chalkidians at Spartolos on the Chalkidic peninsula: Thuc. II. 79. The vulgate Ὀλυσίας was actually taken by Sir W. Jones with *φυλαρχῶν*—‘*captain of the Destructive cohort.*’ Reiske’s Ὀδρυσίας, Ὀδυσσεΐας (the latter as name of a cohort) were not much better. Thuc. (II. 79) mentions Spartolos as belonging to the Βορτιαῖοι. But now, in 389, it had come under the control of Olynthos: cf. Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2. 11.

¹ Scheibe (praef. xxviii.) says ‘videtur deesse epilogus’: but, as Blass rightly remarks, the rather abrupt ending is Isaeian and does not prove that anything has been lost.

² The *εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως* was a special form of the *γραφὴ κακώσεως*. Any Athenian citizen might lay before the archon an Information regarding alleged wrong done to parents, women, or orphans; might address the court without limit of time; and, if defeated, suffered no fine. There was no fixed penalty for *κάκωσις*: but as, in some cases, it might be *ἀτιμία*,

STEMMA.



Before it came into the possession of Theopompos, the estate of Hagnias had been the object of other claims. It is from the history of these former claims that the complexity of the case arises.

Failing lineal heirs, Attic law called collateral kinsfolk to the succession in this order :—

(1) brothers, being sons of the same father as the deceased :

(2) such brothers' children, males and females having an equal right :

(3) sisters by the same father :

(4) such sisters' children, males and females having an equal right :

(5) first-cousins (*ἀνεψιοί*) on the paternal side, males being preferred to females :

(6) children of such first-cousins (*ἀνεψιαδοῖ*), with a like preference.

In default of the above, the succession reverted to the maternal side, and the next heirs were

(7) brothers born of the same mother as the deceased : and so on.

Reference to the accompanying table of the Buselidae will show that Philagros married his own paternal first-cousin Phylomache I. Their son, Eubulides II., was thus the paternal *first-cousin* of Hagnias, being sister's son of the father of Hagnias.

I. Hagnias died, leaving his estate to his sister's

Theopompos speaks of himself here as *κινδυνεύων ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος* (§ 35). He observes that the adversary, instead of prosecuting

him by this form of *γραφή*, ought properly to have sued him for the estate in a *δίκη* (§§ 28, 32, 35).

daughter. At her death, it was claimed by Glaukon, son of the mother of Hagnias by a second marriage. Glaukon's claim was contested by Eubulides II., and, on the death of Eubulides, by his daughter Phylomache II. The will alleged by Glaukon was declared false, and the estate was adjudged to Phylomache II.

This decision was just. Phylomache, as the daughter of a paternal first-cousin, had a better claim in kinship than any living relative of Hagnias. Glaukon, of course, had no claim until the paternal kinsfolk should be exhausted.

II. Phylomache's possession of the estate was, however, contested (1) by the mother of Hagnias, who, as sister of Stratios II., was *second cousin* of her own son: (2) jointly by Stratios II. and the brothers Stratokles and Theopompos—all three likewise second cousins of Hagnias. Stratios II. and Stratokles died before the case came on. Theopompos then claimed the whole estate for himself. He succeeded. The estate was taken from Phylomache II. and adjudged to Theopompos—though only by three or four votes¹.

This was manifestly unjust. Phylomache II. was the daughter of the first cousin of Hagnias. Theopompos was son of the first cousin of Hagnias's father². The claim even of Glaukon was, therefore,

¹ [Dem.] *adv. Macart.* § 10.

² The artifices by which Theopompos got this decision in his favour are noticed in the speech *Against Makartatos* §§ 29 f. Compare § 10 of our speech, where

Theopompos calls himself ἀνεψιῶν παῖς of Hagnias—a quibble meant to mislead inattentive judges, as it implies that the father of Theopompos was first cousin, not of Polemon, but of Hagnias himself.

better than the claim of Theopompos. On the other hand, the son of Stratokles, as son of the second cousin of Hagnias, had still less than Theopompos any natural claim on the estate. His case rested solely on the alleged covenant between his father and Theopompos.

Date.

Theopompos gained this cause. Long afterwards¹, his son Makartatos was sued by Eubulides III., son of Phylomache, for the estate of Hagnias. The pseudo-demosthenic speech *Against Makartatos* cites (§ 31) a deposition (*μαρτυρία*) stating that Phylomache obtained the estate from Glaukon in the archonship of Nikophemos—*i.e.* in Ol. 104. 4, 361 B.C. The *Depositions and Laws* quoted in the Demosthenic speeches are now usually held to be, in a large measure, interpolations². But that this particular deposition in the speech *Against Makartatos* is spurious, or that, if it is so, it is incorrect, is unproved; whereas the authenticity of the law quoted in § 57 of the same speech has recently been confirmed³. If we allow about two years between the first and the second trial, the speech *On the Estate of Hagnias* will belong to 359 B.C.⁴

¹ [Dem.] *adv. Macart.* § 67.

² See the introduction to the text of Demosthenes by Baier and Sauppe, *Or. Att.* i. vi.

³ By an inscription published in the *Hermes*, II. 28, by U. Köhler: see Blass, *Att. Ber.* II. 531 *note.*—Schäfer (*Dem. u. s. Z.* III. App. 234) rejects the *μαρτυρία*: Dobree adopts it (*Adv.* I. 309, 'post archontem Nicophemum').

⁴ To 360, according to Clinton

sub ann., Schömann, p. 452, and Scheibe, p. xliii.: but I agree with Blass that we want a longer interval.

In § 48 it is said that people still remember how Makartatos, brother-in-law of Theopompos, fitted out a trireme and sailed to Krete,—thereby causing some alarm at Athens lest the peace with Lacedaemon should be disturbed. Schäfer (*l. c.*) observes

Theopompos reads the law for the succession of collateral kinsfolk to an estate; and shows that the son of Stratokles is excluded (§§ 1—7). *Analysis.*

He then relates the previous history of the estate—the dispossession of Glaukon by Phylomache, and of Phylomache by himself—and comments on the claim made, simultaneously with his own, by the mother of Hagnias (§§ 8—19).

He next refutes three assertions made by the prosecutor:—

1. First—that, in the action against Phylomache, there had been a bargain between Theopompos and his deceased brother Stratokles for the division of the estate. Such a bargain, Theopompos answers, would have been aimless. It would not have given them two chances instead of one; since, being related in the same degree to Hagnias, they were claimants on the same ground, and must win or lose together (§§ 20—23).

2. Secondly—that Theopompos had agreed to give his nephew half the estate (§§ 24—35).

3. Thirdly—that Theopompos is rich and his nephew poor; and that Theopompos, not content with defrauding his nephew, has failed to dower his nieces, the four daughters of Stratokles (§§ 36—39). In reply, Theopompos details the property left by Stratokles (§§ 40—43), and his own (§§ 44—46). He ends by challenging his nephew to halve with him the total of their joint properties (§§ 47—50).—*Conclusion wanting.*

that this points to a time before the revival of the Athenian power at sea in 378 B.C. But the incident may well have been 20 years past. Nothing can be fixed by the embassy of Hagnias in § 8.

Harpokration (*s. v.* 'Αγνίας) adds that Hagnias was seized and put to death by the Lacedaemonians. This, as Blass says (II. 531), may have been in the Theban War, 378—371 B.C.

V. *Appeal (ἔφεσις) from Arbitration to a Dikastery.*V. For
Euphiletos.

For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]—This speech—or rather fragment¹—is the only extant specimen of its author's work which is not concerned with the law of inheritance. It belongs to a case of Appeal (ἔφεσις) from the decision of demesmen to an ordinary heliastic jury².

*Revision of
deme-regis-
ters.*

Every Attic deme from time to time revised the register of its members (ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον)³. At such revision, the name of each member was subjected to a separate scrutiny (διαψήφισις). If the voting decided that he was to be struck off the register (ἀποψηφίζεσθαι)—in other words, that he was not a true-born citizen—he had an appeal to a law-court,—at peril, however, of being sold as a slave and having his goods confiscated if the decision on the appeal went against him.

Euphiletos, son of Hegesippos (§ 12) by a second wife, had been struck off the register of the deme of

¹ Preserved by Dionysios *de Isaco*, c. 17. As the most recent editors of Isaeos—Baiter and Sauppe in their *Oratores Attici*, and Scheibe in the Teubner series—print this large extract as Oration XII., instead of placing it among the fragments, it seemed best, for convenience of reference, to follow that example.

² Schömann (p. 479) understands the appeal to be made *by the demesmen* from the decisions of the Arbitrators; but here I should agree rather with the author of

the Greek Argument and with Dionys. *de Isaco*, c. 14, by the latter of whom this speech is described as ἡ ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλίτου πρὸς τὸν Ἐρχιέων δῆμον ἔφεσις.

³ The earliest recorded instance of such a revision belongs to 445 B.C. (Plut. *Pericl.* c. 37). Schömann (p. 478), on the other hand, would date the practice from a law of Demophilos passed in 419 B.C., therein following Harpokration *s.v.* διαψήφισις: whose notice, however, refers, not to 419, but to 346 B.C.

Erchia on the ground that he was illegitimate. He then brought an action against the deme, represented by its demarch or president, and the issue was referred to one of the Public Arbitrators. The case was pending for two years; and during that time nothing was proved against the legitimacy of Euphiletos. A second Arbitration—in which the deme was represented by a new president—had the same result¹. Redress being still refused, Euphiletos has now appealed to an ordinary court. The speaker is the son of Hegesippos by his first wife, and is therefore half-brother of Euphiletos, who was thirteen years his junior (§ 11). The extant part of the speech opens after the facts have been stated and the witnesses called. Dionysios seems to connect this cause *Date.* with a general revision of deme-lists throughout Attica². The only such general revision of which we know belongs to the year of Archias, Ol. 108. 3, 346 B.C. On this view, the speech would fall in

¹ That there were two distinct Arbitrations is clear: see § 11, τῆς προτέρας διαίτης—κατεδήτησαν ἀμφότεροι. But two questions occur: 1. How could an issue once tried by arbitration be submitted to a second arbitration? Schömann's explanation seems probable:—In the former arbitration, Euphiletos was acquitted in the absence, perhaps through illness, of his adversary, who died soon afterwards (§ 11); and the new demarch, on the ground that judgment had gone by default, applied for a second hearing (ἀντιλήξις τῆς μὴ οὐσης)—which could be done within

ten days after the first decision: Pollux viii. 60.—2. Public arbitrators held office for one year only. How then shall we explain δύο ἔτη τοῦ διαιτητοῦ τὴν διαίταν ἔχοντος, § 11? To read τῶν διαιτητῶν...ἐχόντων would be a rough remedy. Schömann suggests that, as the cause could not be decided within the year, the arbitrator was *speciallly* reappointed for a second year (p. 481).

² *De Isae.* c. 16: but in ἐγγράφη νόμος he *may* be referring only to the original institution of the rule.

343,—ten years later than any other work of Isaeos known to us. Probably, however, the revision meant in the speech was not general, but merely local and ordinary. In that case, we have no clue to the date.

Analysis. All the kinsmen of Euphiletos have now borne witness to his legitimacy,—his father—his brother, the speaker—the husbands of the speaker's sisters—his uncle: friends, too, have testified: and all these are trustworthy (§§ 1—6). How could any member of the deme prove his legitimacy better? (§§ 7—8). Further, the mother of Euphiletos has offered to take an oath; and his father and the speaker are ready to do the same (§§ 9—10). The arbitrators to whom the case was formerly referred gave it for Euphiletos (§ 11). As a different decision would have told against him, so ought their actual decision to be taken as evidence that his name has been removed from the register by a conspiracy¹ (§ 12).

Remarks. There is perhaps no Attic writer, certainly no orator, of whom it is more true than of Isaeos that his work, to be understood, must be viewed as a whole. The monotony of subject in his extant speeches is seldom relieved by such picturesque glimpses of Attic life as abound in Lysias. Such monotony might certainly be forgiven to a series of illustrations so valuable for a province of ancient law, showing, as they do, how the practice of Adoption worked in a society now developed beyond the conceptions in which that limited testation begins,

*Character
of the Col-
lection as
regards
matter:*

¹ § 12. ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συστάτων. This is well illustrated by the Demosthenic speech (Or. LVII.) in a similar cause—that *Against Eubulides* (345 B.C.?) who

is accused by Euxitheos of having intrigued to remove his name from the register of the deme—Cf. Schäfer, *Dem. u. s. Z.* III. App. 262 f.

though not yet arrived at the ideas embodied in the civil law of Rome. If, however, we turn from matter to form, the character of the speeches is not monotony but variety. In the first, the second and the ninth oration, we have reproduced, in no slight measure, the dignified and austere pathos of Antiphon. In the seventh and twelfth, there is much of the *êthos*, the attractive simplicity and winning grace of Lysias; while in the third, the sixth, the eighth, and the eleventh, on the other hand, this moral charm is hardly less conspicuous by its absence. Excellences of narrative are prominent in the second, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh speech. Argument excludes everything else in the third. The fourth oration surprises us with something like the lighter humour of Lysias, if only in a single gleam¹. But, of the twelve, there are three which stand out from all the rest, and which, taken together, symbolize their author's place in the progress of Athenian oratory. The fifth is Lysian, the eleventh is Demosthenic, the eighth is distinctively Isaeian. The fifth recalls Lysias by the graceful and persuasive management of the narrative—for here argument has a subordinate part—by the general simplicity of the language, and not less by the skill which, in the epilogue, indulges itself with pointed and lively antithesis. The eleventh, renouncing everything like a semblance of artlessness, glorying, rather, in technical power, pours a torrent of indignation and contempt on an adversary who is in the wrong; and,

and as regards form.

*The typical Speeches—
v., XI., VIII.*

¹ Or. iv. § 7, relating how many persons became mourners for the deceased Nikostratos—'when the two talents arrived.'

alone among the speeches of Isaeos, has the stamp of Demosthenes in this, that from beginning to end it is the outcome of a single impulse. But the eighth oration is Isaeos himself; it is the very image of his faculty, displaying its several sides at their best, the old plainness with the modern force, artistic narrative with trenchant proof; and these, too, in the right proportions, for here the logical division dominates the rhetorical, and the department in which Isaeos was an imitator yields to that in which he was a master.

FRAGMENTS.

A hundred and seventy-two fragments of Isaeos, or notices of phrases or words used by him, have been collected by Sauppe¹. Of these, 128 represent 42 speeches of known title. Three of the 42 were, however, suspected by Harpokration². Three others, and only three, are represented by fragments which are at all considerable. In each case it is Dionysios who has preserved the extract in his comparison of Isaeos with Lysias³.

¹ *Against the Demesmen.*

1. *Against the Demesmen, concerning the Farm* (πρὸς τοὺς δημότας περὶ τοῦ χωρίου: VII. in Sauppe, III. in Scheibe). This is the proem of a speech in

¹ *Or. Att.* II. 228—244.

² *Viz.* 1. κατὰ Στρατοκλέους, 2. πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικόν, 3. κατὰ Μεγαρέων:—IV., XV. and XXVIII in Sauppe.

³ Dionysios compares 1. Isaeos *Against the Demesmen* with Lysias

Against Archebiados:—*De Isaeo*, c. 10: 2. Isaeos, *Defence of a Guardian*, with Lysias *Against the Sons of Hippokrates*:—*ib.* c. 8. 3. Isaeos *For Eumathes* with Lysias *For Pherenikos*:—*ib.* c. 5.—*See* vol. I. pp. 313 f.

which the plaintiff claims back from the men of his deme—perhaps that of Sphettos¹—a farm which he had just pledged to them—probably as security for some land of the deme which he had rented². In form, the action would be either an Action for Ejectment (ἐξούλης δίκη) or a Trial of a claim to property (διαδικασία). The avoidance of hiatus suggests a *Date*. work later than 360 B. C.

2. *Defence of a Guardian against his Wards* ^{2. Defence of a Guardian.} (ἐπιτροπῆς ἀπολογία: x. in Sauppe, vi. in Scheibe). Dionysios has given us two fragments of this lost speech³. Its title is a point which has illustrated *its title*. the ingenuity of critics. Sauppe identifies it with the lost speech *Against Diophanes*⁴. More probably, however, it is to be identified with that *Against Hagnotheos*. The latter is mentioned by Dionysios (*Isae.* c. 14), though not in connection with either of the fragments. Now the first fragment (c. 8) begins with these words:—ἐβουλόμην μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μὴ λίαν οὕτως ἀγνοηθέντα πρὸς χρήματ' ἔχειν αἰσχροῦς. Schömann, whom Sauppe follows, was for altering ἀγνοηθέντα to ἀπονοηθέντα. Dobree saw that the corrupt word concealed a proper name. He

¹ It is *s.v.* Σφηττός that Harpokration names the speech.

² As Schömann suggests (p. 491), referring to Boeckh, *Publ. Econ.* II. 337.

³ For the first fragment, see Dionys. *Isae.* c. 8: for the second, *ib.* c. 12. Schömann, Sauppe, Scheibe and Blass agree in referring both fragments to the same speech.

⁴ Harpokration, *s.v.* παρηγγύησεν, quotes *Isaeos ἐν τῇ πρὸς Διοφάνην ἐπιτροπῆς ἀπολογία*. The fact that the guardian is represented by Dionysios as ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν κρινομένων (*De Isae.* c. 8) is, of course, no objection, as Diophanes might have represented the rest; but the identification seems unsafe.

suggested Ἀγλαοσθένη: it was reserved for Cobet to give Ἀγνόθειον¹.

*Its relation
with the πρὸς
Καλυδῶνα.*

Another puzzle remains. Harpokration quotes a speech of Isaeos, ἐξούλης Καλυδῶνι πρὸς Ἀγνόθειον ἀπολογία², and elsewhere another, πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐπιτροπῆς³—the latter also as πρὸς Καλυδῶνα simply. Combining these notices, Scheibe⁴ infers that Isaeos wrote (1) For Hagnotheos, a πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐπιτροπῆς: (2) For Kalydon, a πρὸς Ἀγνόθειον ἐξούλης. Blass vindicates the loyalty of our orator by suggesting that Harpokration is to be emended; that we should read, *s. v.* Κεφαλῆθεν, πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐξούλης (not ἐπιτροπῆς, for which ἐπιστολῆς is a variant), and *s. v.* ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἐν τῇ ἐξούλης πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἀπολογία, (καὶ ἐν τῇ) πρὸς Ἀγνόθειον⁵. It would follow that Kalydon and Hagnotheos have nothing whatever to do with each other, and have been brought into relation by no depravity except that of a text. The character of the two fragments, especially in regard to the êthos, suggests a comparison with Oration XI.

*3. For
Eumathes.*

3. *For Eumathes: an Assertion of a Slave's Freedom* (ὑπὲρ Εὐμάθους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαίρεσις: XVI. in Sauppe, XII. in Scheibe). Eumathes had been the slave of Epigenes, but had received his liberty from his master.

On the death of Epigenes, one of his heirs, Dionysios, acting for the rest⁶, claimed Eumathes as a

¹ Schömann, *Isae.* 488: Dobree, *Adv.* I. 311: Cobet, *Var. Lect.* 271.

² *s. v.* ἐπισημαίνεσθαι.

³ *s. v.* Κεφαλῆθεν: cf. *s. r.* Ἀν-

θεμόκριτος, ἀφ' Ἐστίας μείσθαι, κτλ.

⁴ *Præf.* p. xlvii.

⁵ *Att. Ber.* II. 538.

⁶ Harpokration *s. r.* ἄγοι cites

slave. Xenokles came forward and asserted Eumathes to be a freedman. Dionysios then brought against Xenokles an action¹ for this assertion (ἐξαιρέσεως δίκη). In this speech Xenokles defends himself, and reasserts the freedom of Eumathes.

The speaker says that he was trierarch in the *Date.* archonship of Kephisodotos² (Ol. 105. 3, 358 B.C.); and mentions a sea-fight in which he was engaged. This was probably the battle at Chios in the first year of the Social War—357 B.C.—in which Chabrias was killed. The speech *For Eumathes* may probably be referred to 356 B.C.

4. Lastly, Dionysios has briefly analysed, though without quoting extracts, a speech ‘Against Aristogeiton and Archippos on the Estate of Archepolis³.’ The speaker is the brother of the deceased Archepolis. Aristogeiton had already taken possession of the estate. The speaker had summoned him to make

these words of Dionysios (as quoted by Xenokles in our speech)—
 ἔβλαψέ με Χενοκλής ἀφελόμενος
 Εὐμάθην εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, ἄγοντος
 ἐμοῦ εἰς δουλείαν κατὰ τὸ ἐμὸν
 μέρος. Schömann (p. 485) points
 out the inference.

¹ In such an action the jury could inflict what fine they pleased (*i. e.* it was τιμητή); and half the τίμημα went to the treasury: cf. [Dem.] *Against Theokrines* (LVIII.) § 21.

² In one place, Dionysios has ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώρου ἄρχοντος (*De Isaeo*, c. 5); in another, ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώτου ἄρχοντος (*ib.* c. 7). The latter is now adopted by Sauppe and Scheibe. Kephisodoros was

archon in Ol. 103. 3, 366 B.C., a year which gives no probable clue to the sea-fight. Kephisodotos was archon in Ol. 105. 3, *i. e.* from July 358 to July 357; and the battle at Chios may, as Clinton suggests, have fallen within his year. But I would observe that it is only the beginning of the speaker's trierarchy which *must* have fallen within it.

³ Dionys. *Isae.* c. 15. Sauppe shows by a comparison of 3 fragments (*Or. Att.* II. 229) that Westermann and Weissenborn err in supposing a speech πρὸς Ἀρχιππον distinct from that πρὸς Ἀριστογείτονα.

restitution (εἰς ἐμφανῶν κατάστασιν). Aristogeiton had then entered a special plea (παραγραφὴ), asserting that the property was his under a will: and it was at the hearing of the special plea that this speech was delivered. The issue (ἀμφισβήτησις) was thus twofold,—(1) whether the will is genuine, (2) whether Aristogeiton was justified in taking possession before a legal decision. Isaeos first dealt with (2); and then, in a narrative, showed that the will was fictitious. The speech is cited by Dionysios as an example of Isaeian arrangement. One characteristic is the treatment of the second issue in a discussion *prefixed* to the narrative (προκατασκευή): another is the artistic division of the narrative itself into sections, with the proofs subjoined to each.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE MATURED CIVIL ELOQUENCE.

WHILE a literary prose was being shaped, and while, on the other hand, a series of forensic writers were perfecting a series of types in their own branch, no artistic development that can be traced with the like clearness had been going forward in deliberative oratory. When, with Demosthenes and his contemporaries, deliberative oratory first comes clearly into view, its masters are found to owe their several excellences as artists to models taken from the other two departments, to a Thucydides or an Isokrates, to a Lysias or an Isaeos. Not only have we no evidence of their obligation, in point of art, to previous speakers in the same kind, but we are able to see for ourselves that the limits of such obligation would necessarily have been narrow. Now this is the reverse of what might have been anticipated. The ekklesia, considering its place in the democracy, might have been expected to be the great school, no less than the great field, of oratory. Further, the popular Dialectic, which, more than anything else, prepared the Athenian taste for artistic speaking, was far more favourable to the deliberative than to the forensic branch. The general profession of the

*Deliberative
Oratory as
an art—*

*moulded on
the Forensic
and Epi-
deictic.*

Sophists was to teach men τὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν, to speak and to act in the affairs of the city. Protagoras would have regarded the Sicilian rhetors, such as Korax or Tisias, whose concern was chiefly with the law-courts, much as Isokrates regarded the merely forensic writers of his own day. Nor did the earliest artists cultivate one practical branch to the exclusion of the other. Antiphon was able to help those who were fighting a cause in a law-court or in the assembly¹. The thirty-fourth oration of Lysias was composed for delivery in the ekklesia². Nevertheless it was not in the assembly, but in the law-courts or the schools, that oratorical prose was developed; and, when we are able to observe the political eloquence of Athens at its height, we see that what it has owed to the assembly is only the inspiring opportunity, not the discipline which has chastened it nor the secret of its strength.

Reasons for this:

It is worth while to consider the principal causes of this phenomenon. They may, perhaps, be reduced to three.

I. Relation of Oratory to Rhetoric.

I. It was of the essence of Greek oratory, as will be seen most clearly when we come to the days of its decline, that its practice should be connected with a theory. Art is the application of rules, generalised from experience, for the production of results; and the Greek conception of speaking as an art implied a Rhetoric. This Rhetoric grew only gradually into a complete system; but from the first there was the fixed tendency to regard oratorical

¹ Thuc. viii. 63.

² Vol. i. p. 211.

composition as susceptible of a regular analysis. Now, those rules of technical Rhetoric which were the earliest to be formulated could be applied with more precision and more effect in a speech for the law-courts than in a speech for the ekklesia. The true reason of this is not that given derisively by Aristotle¹, that, in forensic speaking, chicanery (τὸ κακοῦργον) has the larger scope; the reason is that, in forensic speaking, the subject is fully and accurately known beforehand to the speaker; the utmost clearness of division is imperative, and is obtainable by a uniform method; and the problem is, how best to use all the resources of persuasion in a limited space of time. The two things to which the technical Rhetoric first addressed itself were, partition, and the treatment of probabilities. The law-courts, then, were the natural field of Rhetoric; and, owing to the closeness of the alliance between the theory and the practice, they were also for a long period the chosen field of Oratory.

II. In the true Greek conception the citizen was at once general and statesman. So long as this identity lasted, the men at the head of the State neither had leisure for the laborious training necessary to eminence in artistic oratory, nor felt its attainment to be of paramount importance. It was the separation of military from political functions that enabled some men to become finished speakers while others became accomplished soldiers. Perikles spoke the epitaph of those whom he had led

*II. Union of
military
and political
functions.*

¹ *Rhet.* i. 1.

to battle; but he had neither opportunity nor inducement to cultivate the art of war with the exactness of an Iphikrates, or the art of oratory with the exactness of a Demosthenes¹. Yet the division of labour, when it came, was a proof that the civic life of Athens was decaying. Kleon's disaster at Amphipolis was enough, indeed, to indicate that such a division would thenceforth be the rule. The versatility of Alkibiades combined the two parts with a success which had no later parallel. But the definite and recognised separation of military from political leadership cannot be put much above the days of Timotheos and Kallistratos².

III. *Outer
history of
Athens.*

III. The outer history of Athens, from the disaster in Sicily to the battle of Chaeroneia, presents but two moments favourable to a great political eloquence. One is the struggle with Philip of Macedon. The other is the restoration of Athens, in 378, to the headship of a Naval League, followed by the contest at Athens between the Boeotian and anti-Boeotian parties. Around this contest cluster the greatest names in deliberative oratory that appear before the reign of Philip. Kallistratos of Aphidnae,

¹ Macaulay, observing that the rise of Athenian oratory was contemporaneous with the decline of Athenian character and power, argues that this division of labour was the chief cause. (*On the Athenian Orators: Miscellaneous Writings* I. 137 f.) As regards political oratory, it was certainly one of the chief causes. Macaulay's remark there, as to the silent and rapid downfall of Sparta having

been due to the cultivation by others of scientific warfare, had been anticipated. The old advantage of Sparta in war and athletics—then lost—was due, says Aristotle, simply to Sparta studying these while her rivals did not: τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν, *Arist. Polit.* v (viii) iv § 4.

² See Freeman, *Historical Essays* (Second Series) iv. 'The Athenian Democracy,' p. 138.

the leader of the anti-Boeotian party, was probably the most eloquent statesman between Perikles and Demosthenes¹. His opponents, Aristophon of Azenia, Leodamas of Acharnae, Thrasybulos and Kephalos of Kollytos,—especially the two first—were powerful speakers. The meagre notices of their oratory warrant only two general inferences. First, that bold and vigorous illustration of argument was their characteristic merit. Secondly, that they had little or no pretension to artistic completeness of form².

Apart from the scantiest fragments,—preserved chiefly by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*, and handed down to him mainly, it would seem, like the sayings of Perikles, by oral tradition—the extant literature of Attic Political Oratory begins with the speech of Demosthenes on the Navy Boards, in 354 B.C., and ends with the speeches of Deinarchos against Demosthenes, Aristogeiton and Philokles in 324 B.C.

In this period of thirty years, our concern, as defined by the scope of our inquiry, is no longer with details either of style or of work. It is, here, with tendencies or characteristics, considered

¹ On Kallistratos, see Schäfer, *Dem.* I. 11 f. *Dem. de falsa legat.* § 297, πολλοὶ παρ' ὑμῶν ἐπὶ καιρῶν γεγόνασιν ἰσχυροί, Καλλίστρατος, αὐθις Ἀριστοφῶν, Διόφαντος (the proposer of the decree in 352 for sending a force to hold Thermopylae): *de Cor.* § 219, πολλοὶ παρ' ὑμῶν...γεγόνασι ῥήτορες ἔνδοξοι καὶ μεγάλοι πρὸ ἐμοῦ, Καλλίστρατος ἐκείνος, Ἀριστοφῶν, Κέφαλος, Θρασύβουλος, ἔτεροι μυρίοι.

² A figure quoted by Arist.

Rhet. II. 6 from the orator Kydias—who used it in dissuading the division of the lands at Samos, 350 B.C.—is very remarkable for being just in the boldly imaginative style of Perikles—not at all in the manner of Demosthenes or his contemporaries:—ἡξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὡς ὀρώντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἀ ἀν ψηφίσωνται.

Deinarchos. as showing in what general relation the perfecters stand to the inventors. Now, in the first place, *Deinarchos* may be set aside as being, for this purpose, valueless. The reason of *Dionysios* for not giving him a separate treatment is equally good for us. He was neither an inventor nor a perfecter¹. He has, indeed, been called the best among the imitators of *Demosthenes*². But the praise would be faint, even if the epithets³ with which antiquity qualified it, did not attest a coarseness in the copy which is not less evident to modern readers. *Hermogenes*, his too lenient judge, admits his want of finish⁴. A more serious defect is his dependence on imitation or on plagiarism; and it follows that he has nothing to show us which is not incomparably better shown by *Demosthenes*.

¹ *Dionys. de Dinarch.* 1, μήτε εὐρετήν ἰδίου γεγονέναι χαρακτήρος τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὸν Λυσίαν, καὶ τὸν Ἰσοκράτην, καὶ τὸν Ἰσαΐον, μήτε τῶν εὐρημένων ἐτέροις τελειωτήν, ὥσπερ τὸν Δημοσθένην καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνην καὶ Ὑπερίδην ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν. *ib.* c. 5. οὐδὲν οὐτε κοινὸν οὐτ' ἴδιον ἔσχεν—'no one stamp of his own—no distinctive trait'.

² *ib.* c. 8 τούτων (= τῶν τὸν Δημοσθένη προχειρισμένων) ἄριστον ἂν τις θείη Δείναρχον γενέσθαι.

³ *Deinarchos* was called ὁ ἄγροικος Δημοσθένης, *Dionys. l. c.* c. 8. Also, ὁ κρίθινος Δημοσθένης, *Hermog. περὶ ἰδ.* B. 11, *Speng. Rh. Gr.* II. 413. This curious epithet has been taken to mean (1) 'coarse', as barley opposed to fine wheat, *Schol. in Walz Rh. Gr.* v. 560 = οὐ σίτινος: (2) 'skittish', like a

κριθῶν πῶλος, *Ruhnken, Hist. crit. Or. Gr.*: (3) 'like beer compared with wine', *Donalds. contin. of Müller Hist. Gr. Lit.* II. 369, comparing *Aesch. Suppl.* 930, ἀλλ' ἄρσενάς ται τῆσδε γῆς οἰκίτορας εὐρήσειτ' οὐ πίνοντας ἐκ κριθῶν μέθυ. The last is probably right. Α κρίθινος Δημοσθένης is one whose strength is rougher, and who has neither the flavour nor the sparkle. As *Hermog.* says, *l. c.*, he has τὸ τραχὺ καὶ γοργὸν καὶ σφοδρὸν, ὥσ τ' ἤδη τιμές—and so they call him κριθίνος. Cf. *hordearius*.

⁴ *Hermog. l. c.* ἦττον ἐπιμελῆς ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ. The same critic, in allowing him 'fiery earnestness' and 'vehemence', observes, with truth, that the latter quality depends rather on his thoughts and method than on his diction.

Lykurgos, Hypereides, Aeschines, Demosthenes are the four men who illustrate the maturity of civil eloquence. Each has an interest of his own, and each serves, in his own way, to show the unity of the whole Attic development.

Lykurgos is indeed a striking and a noble figure *Lykurgos.* in the Athens of Philokrates. He came of a house that, after the Persian war, had given a colleague to Kimon in his Thracian campaigns, and, in the next generation, a distinguished victim to the Thirty Tyrants. The stock of the Eteobutadae, claiming to spring from Erechtheus, were hereditary priests of Poseidon Erechtheus; from their house, too, was chosen the priestess of Athena Polias; and their services to the State, recognised for generations by public honours in life and in death, were thus enhanced by the most sacred dignities that Athens could revere. The special work that Lykurgos did for the city was to serve it as a steward of the public treasury for a period of office which was thrice renewed¹. During twelve difficult years, from 338 to 326, he so managed the finances as to make them suffice both for the armament and for the embellishment of Athens. But, besides this task, there was a yet graver one that he had made his own. In the ancestral spirit of the great Athenian houses, he raised the voice of a hereditary priest and statesman in fearless reproof of the selfish apathy or luxury which threatened to merge both patriotism and morality. As his biographer² ex-

¹ The *ταμίης τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου* was appointed for one *πενταετηρῆς* only. The twelve years of Lykurgos have been differently

placed; I follow Schäfer, *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, chronol. table to Vol. III.: cf. *ib.* II. 298—304.

² [Plut.] *vitt. X. oratt.*

pressively says, Lykurgos was *παρρησιαστής διὰ τὴν εὐγένειαν*, outspoken because he was noble. Nor did he stop at words. By restoring the festivals of the gods, by cherishing a faithful tradition of the great poets¹, by enacting sumptuary laws, and, above all, by facing the bitterly invidious task of prosecuting disloyal citizens, he made his name to be, like that of Drakon, a symbol for severity; probably with better reason, certainly in a more urgent cause². His character is the best comment on his oratory. Of his fifteen speeches, only one is now extant. It was spoken, probably about 332 B.C., against Leokrates, an Athenian citizen. Lykurgos brought against this man an indictment for treason (*εἰσαγγελία προδοσίας*), because, in 338, he had fled from Athens on the day that brought the fatal news of Chaeroneia.

*His speech
Against
Leokrates.*

This speech is a solemn and earnest protest on behalf of public spirit. There is not a trace of personal feeling, there is no attempt to disparage the man's private life. But the tone throughout is that of a lofty and inexorable indignation. And the form of expression is not less distinctive. Lykurgos was scarcely a born orator. The ancient

*Character of
his Oratory.*

¹ The negligence or caprice of actors had already begun to deprave the works of the great tragedians. It was Lykurgos, as is well known, who sought to arrest this process by the formation of those authoritative texts which afterwards passed into the library of Alexandria. This reverence for the elder dramatists—shown further by statues raised to Aeschylus, Sophokles and Euripides (337

B.C.)—is most characteristic of the man.

² [Plut.] *vitt. X. oratt.*: (Lykurgos was so severe) 'that some of the sophists said that he dipped his pen, not in ink, but in death, when he drew laws against evil-doers.' Demâdes had said of Drakon *ὄτι δι' αἵματος, οὐ διὰ μέλανος τοὺς νόμους ἔγραψεν*, Plut. *Sol.* 17; cf. Tzetzes *chil.* 5. v. 348 in Sauppe *O. A.* II 316.

critics were right in denying to him elegance or charm, in blaming the harshness of his diction or his metaphors and his tendency to repeat or to digress¹. The structure of his sentences is, indeed clear-cut; he has a certain impressive majesty, due chiefly to his intense earnestness; and, as Dionysios says, he is powerful in denunciation². But his peculiar interest for the history of Attic oratory depends on the union of two elements.

Two elements of his style.

Lykurgos had been the pupil of Isokrates; and the basis of his style is essentially Isokratic. But his moral and intellectual affinities with the elder Athens assert themselves. Engrafted on the smooth luxuriance of Isokrates, we meet once more the archaic, somewhat rigid stateliness of Antiphon: raised, however, above Antiphon's ordinary tone by the speaker's intimate sympathy with the elder poets, especially with the tragedians. The combination of these manners, the Isokratic and the archaic, has an effect which is not harmonious—Lykurgos lacked the force to fuse them—but which for that very reason is of much interest for a comparison between the elder and the later prose. In the following passages it has been attempted to keep something of the tone. The flight of Leokrates is thus described:—

¹ Dionys. *vet. script. cens.* v. 3 (after describing the power of Lykurgos), οὐ μὴν ἀστεῖος οὐδὲ ἡδύς, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖος. The harshness of his diction, and his tendency to digress, Hermog. *περὶ ἰδ.* B. 11. Lykurgos was conscious of the last fault: *κατὰ Δεωκρ.* § 100.

² Dionys. *l. c.*, ἀξητηκός...διηρημένος...σεμνός...κατηγορικὸς...φιλαληθής...παρρησιαστικὸς...τούτου χρῆζηλοῦν μάλιστα τὰς δεινώσεις. In Ep. i. *ad Ammaeum* 2 he names Lykurgos between Hypereides and Aeschines among the ἀγωνισταὶ λόγων ῥητορικῶν.

*Extracts
from the
speech
Against
Leocrates:*
§§ 16—18.

‘After the battle of Chaeroneia, when you all rushed to the ekklesia, the people decreed that the children and women in the country should be brought within the walls, and that the generals should assign the duties of the defence to the Athenians and other residents as they pleased. Leocrates, however, without a thought for all this, packed up his property and put it, with his servants, on board the boat—the ship was already at moorings off-shore—and, late in the afternoon, passed with Eirenis through the gate to the public beach, rowed out to the ship, and was gone; neither pitying those harbours of Athens from which he was putting forth, nor ashamed before those walls of his native city which, for his part, he was leaving defenceless; nor was he afraid when he saw afar, as he forsook them, the temples of Zeus the saviour and Athena who saves, whom anon he will invoke to save him from his perils. And having come into port at Rhodes, as if he were bringing glad tidings of great blessings on his country, he began to announce how the town had been taken before he left, the Peiraeos blockaded—and he alone left to tell it; nor did he blush to name in one breath his country’s fall and his own deliverance. So thoroughly did the Rhodians believe this, that they told off crews for their triremes, and set about launching the vessels; while the merchants or shipmasters who were ready to sail for Athens were led by this man to discharge their corn and other cargoes on the spot.’

Presently he describes the panic at Athens after Chaeroneia :—

§§ 39—42.

‘In those days, Athenians, who would not have pitied the city—what citizen, aye, or what stranger that had visited it formerly? Who was then so bitter against the democracy or against Athens that he could have endured to find himself without a place in the ranks of the defenders, when the news came of the defeat and the disaster that had befallen the people, when the city was all excitement at the tidings, when the hopes of public safety had come to rest on the men past fifty, when you might see free-born women crouching in terror at the house-doors, asking *if he is alive*—the

husband, the father, or the brother—a sight humiliating for the city and for her daughters; while men decrepit of frame, well-stricken in years, released by the laws from service under arms, men on the threshold that leads from age to death, might be seen hurrying helplessly through the city, with their mantles pinned in double folds around them? But, many as were the miseries in the city, great as was the ruin that had come on all the citizens, the keenest grief, the bitterest tears were due to the fortunes of the city itself—when the edict, declaring slaves to be free men, aliens to be Athenians, the disfranchised to be reinstated, was read by any man who once, perhaps, had prided himself on being a freeborn son of the Attic soil. The reverse that had befallen the city was even this; formerly she had vindicated the freedom of the Greeks—*then* she thought it enough if she could successfully defend her own existence; formerly she had ruled far and wide over the land of barbarians—*then* she was battling with Macedonians for her own; and the people whose aid was once invoked by Lacedaemonians, by Peloponnesians and by the Greeks of Asia was driven to seek succour for itself from the men of Andros, of Keos, of Troezen, of Epidaurus.’

The peroration is, however, the most characteristic passage, not merely for its matter, but also for its form. While the resemblance to Antiphon is marked, there is a strain that surpasses him; but the speaker does not soar; he rises with effort, and shows at the end how his cultivated gift of speech laboured to utter his high enthusiasm:—

‘Be sure, judges, that each of you, by the vote which he now gives in secret, will lay his thought bare to the gods. And I deem that this day, judges, you are passing a collective sentence on all the greatest and most dreadful forms of crime, in all of which Leokrates is manifestly guilty; on treason, since he abandoned the city to its troubles and brought it under the hand of the enemy; on subversion of the democracy, since he did not stand the ordeal of the

struggle for freedom ; on impiety, since he has done what one man could to obliterate the sacred precincts and to demolish the temples ; on illtreatment of parents,—for he sought to destroy the monuments, and to abolish the liturgy, of the dead ; on a soldier's desertion of his post and avoidance of his duty—for he did not place his personal service at the disposal of the Generals. Who, then, will acquit this man,—who will condone misdeeds which were deliberate ? Who is so foolish as, by saving this man, to place his own safety at the mercy of cowardly deserters,—who will show compassion to this man, and so elect to die unpitied at the hands of the enemy ? Who will conciliate the gratitude of his country's betrayer, in order to make himself obnoxious to the vengeance of the gods ?

'In the cause of my country, of the temples and of the laws, I have fairly and justly set forth the issue, without disparaging or vilifying the defendant's private life or bringing any irrelevant accusation. You must reflect, every one of you, that to acquit Leokrates is to pass sentence of death and enslavement on your country. Two urns are before you ; and the votes which you give are, in the one case, for the overthrow of your city, in the other, for its safety and its domestic welfare. If you absolve Leokrates, you will vote for betraying the city, the temples, and the ships—if you put him to death, you will exhort men to cherish and preserve their country, her revenues and her prosperity. Deem, then, Athenians, that a prayer goes up to you from the very land and all its groves, from the harbours, from the arsenals, from the walls of the city, deem that the shrines and holy places are summoning you to protect them, and, remembering the charges against him, make Leokrates a proof that compassion and tears do not prevail with you over solicitude for the laws and for the commonweal.'

*Significance
of the result.*

Each urn was found to contain the same number of votes ; and Leokrates benefited by the precedent of Orestes. But that the voices should have been equally divided when the prosecution could have

been so easily represented as vexatious, and when the common temper of the city was with the accused, is a remarkable testimony to the character and to the eloquence of the accuser.

The most complete contrast to Lykurgos, in *Hypereides*, everything except firm patriotism, is presented by his younger contemporary. Hypereides, son of Glaukippos, of a good Athenian family, had begun life as a forensic speech-writer. At an early age, in 360, he had prosecuted Autokles, a general charged with treason in a Thracian command. He had afterwards appeared as accuser against men so eminent as Aristophon of Azenia—whose oppression of the allies he exposed—and Diopieithes of Sphettos. From the Peace of 346 to the affair of Harpalos in 324 Hypereides stood by the side of Demosthenes as a leader in the struggle against Macedon. The Lamian War was especially his work; and he paid for it with his life. But while in the political sphere Hypereides was a loyal and fiery patriot, in his private character he was a true son of the new Athens. His philosophy was expressed in his own saying—*μη δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, μη μαθὼν τὰ καλὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ*¹: he could not live beautifully until he had learned what beautiful things there were in life. Perikles might have said that; but not in the sense of Hypereides; the study of the beautiful was ceasing to be combined either with frugality or with spiritual chastenment.

Hypereides was, like Lykurgos, a pupil of Iso-

¹ Ὑπερίδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔφη μη δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, κ.τ.λ., Stob. Sauppe, *O. A.* II. 305. *append. florent. p. 41, frag. 239 in*

krates. But while the measured and stately flow of Isokratic numbers was in unison with the character of Lykurgos, the basis of whose style is taken from his master, it was not truly congenial to Hypereides. The chief lesson which Hypereides has learned from Isokrates is the large development of the periodic sentence. As might have been expected, Hypereides is far more Isokratic in the Epitaphios than in anything else of his that we have. The reason is, however, not so much that his diction and composition are there modified by the epideictic form; rather it is that Hypereides has thoroughly caught from Isokrates the tone of elevated panegyric, and that, in the treatment of this really noble theme, the disciple unconsciously breathes the master's spirit.

His relation to Isokrates.

But the essential tendencies in the style of Hypereides are those of Lysias: and this arises from no accident, but from the natures of the men. Both men united energy in public action with an easy-going, pleasure-loving, humorous temper in social life, which made them peculiarly sensitive to the niceties of social idiom in their day, and peculiarly alive, too, to the real advantages which a public speaker can derive from tact, from wit, and from personal or literary allusion. What Athenian Tragedy was to Antiphon and Aeschines, that was Athenian Comedy to Lysias and Hypereides. The description by Lysias of a persistent borrower has been noticed as illustrating the reference of Demetrius to the 'somewhat comic graces' of Lysias¹.

His relation to Lysias.

Sympathies of Lysias and Hypereides with Comedy.

¹ Vol. I. p. 184.

Hypereides had the same kind of affinity with the Middle Comedy; but he went further; he took words or turns of phrase from it; and unquestionably one great secret of his success as a speaker was his art of making a lively Athenian audience feel that here was no austere student of Thucydides, but one who was in bright sympathy with the everyday life of the time. It has been truly remarked¹ that the author of the 'School for Scandal' may be recognised in the accuser of Warren Hastings:—

'He remembered to have heard an honourable and learned gentleman remark that there was something in the frame and constitution of the Company which extended the sordid principles of their origin over all their successive operations; connecting with their civil policy, and even with their boldest achievements, the meanness of a pedlar and the profligacy of pirates—alike in the political and military line, could be observed auctioneering ambassadors and trading generals;—and thus we saw a revolution brought about by affidavits; an army employed in executing an arrest; a town besieged on a note of hand; a prince dethroned for the balance of an account. Thus it was, they exhibited a Government which united the mock majesty of a bloody sceptre, and the little traffic of a merchant's counting-house, wielding a truncheon with one hand, and picking a pocket with the other.'

Hypereides was the Sheridan of Athens.

Dionysios says²:—'Hypereides hits his mark neatly, but seldom lends grandeur to his theme. In embellishment of his diction he has surpassed Lysias; in the astuteness with which he disposes his subject-matter he has surpassed all. Then he keeps

*Style of
Hypereides,
as character-
ised (1) by
Dionysios:*

¹ *Quarterly Review*, vol. 132, p. 447.

² *Dionys. vet. script. cens.* v. 6.

to the issue throughout, and insists on the really strong points of his arguments. He commands the resources of a large intelligence; he has an exquisite charm; and while he appears simple, is no stranger to consummate art. He is especially to be imitated for the subtlety and symmetry of his narratives, as well as in respect to the avenues (ἔφοδοι) by which he approaches his case.' Elsewhere¹ he names (1) strength of diction, (2) simplicity of composition, (3) tact in the handling of subject-matter, and (4) avoidance of tragic pomp, as the marks of Hypereides. This criticism seems just in the main. Hypereides resembles Lysias in general simplicity, in grace, and in tact: but has a richer vocabulary, more subtlety of arrangement, and the ampler Isokratic period.

(2) by Hermogenes;

Hermogenes puts the masters of civil oratory in this order: Demosthenes, Lysias, Isaeos, Hypereides. Observing that Hypereides has 'very little finish', and that his special characteristic is a want of temperance and of elegance in his diction, he instances these words — μονώτατος, γαλεάγρα, ἐκκοκκίζειν, ἐστηλοκόπηται, ἐπήβολος². Clearly Hermogenes judges Hypereides harshly because he could not forgive his abundant colloquialisms and his borrowing from comedy or from any literary source that would furnish a point. With this judgment it is instructive to compare that of the so-called Longinus. It is the fullest, and in one respect the best, of the ancient notices. Dionysios does not mention the wit, the sarcasm or the irony of Hypereides; and in Hermogenes

(3) by the author of the *περὶ ὑψους*.

¹ Dionys. *de Dinarch.* 7.

² Hermog. *περὶ ἰδ.* B. 11.

the omission is not surprising. The treatise *On Sublimity* does justice to these qualities¹:—

‘If merits were to be counted, not weighed, Hypereides would stand far before Demosthenes. He has more tones in his voice than Demosthenes, and a greater number of special excellences. In fact, like the pentathlete, Hypereides is second-best all round; for the prize in any given branch, he comes after the specialists, but before the laymen. Besides imitating the merits of Demosthenes in everything except composition, Hypereides has further mastered in an eminent degree the excellences and the graces of Lysias. He expresses himself in the ‘plain’ manner, where it is fitting,—not with the sustained, unvarying tension of Demosthenes; and he has moral persuasiveness, with the flavour of an un-studied suavity. Incomparable wit plays about him; his sarcasm is in perfect keeping with political oratory; he is adroit with the weapons of irony; his jokes are not jarring, ill-bred, or importunate, in the ‘Attic’ manner of that generation; when he does pull people to pieces, he does it neatly, with much humour, and with the pungency of well-aimed banter; and with all this, there is a beauty of style beyond imitation. He has great power of pathos; in relating legends, he has a certain luxuriance, and a facile inspiration that wafts him most smoothly from point to point on his way;—for instance, he has managed Leto’s story² more artistically than any one

¹ [Long.] *περὶ ὑψους* c. 34.

² Alluding to the lost *Δηλιακός*.
From 422 to 346 there was a stand-

ing dispute between the Delians and the Athenians about the presidency of the Delian temple. In

else; and, in the Funeral Oration, has perhaps surpassed all in the panegyric manner. Demosthenes, on the other hand, has no gift for delineation of character; his style is not liquid, flexible, or adapted to display; and he is comparatively deficient in each and all of the qualities just mentioned. Again, where Demosthenes strives to be jocose or witty, he makes us laugh rather at him than with him; nor is he ever so far from graciousness as when he courts it. For instance, if he had tried to write the elegant defence of Phryne or of Athenogenes he [would have shown the superiority of Hyperides] still more. The beauties of Hyperides, though many, are yet wanting in grandeur; they are of a sober character, without energy, and allow the hearer to remain placid. No reader of Hyperides feels terror. But Demosthenes is of the greatest nature. He has lofty eloquence, intensity, living passion, copiousness, rapidity of thought. Above all, that which is his own—unapproachable mastery and force of oratorical art. These are heaven-sent, astonishing gifts—human they may not be called—and, having these in their fulness, he prevails over all other orators—even over those who, like Hyperides, have beauties which he lacks. His thunders, his fire, vanquish the speakers of every age; one might as soon face with steady eyes a descending thunder-bolt, as oppose a calm front to the storm of passions which Demosthenes can arouse.’

The two points to which exception may be taken in this otherwise good criticism are, the denial to

346—5 Hyperides pleaded the phictyons, and prevailed. See Athenian cause before the Am- Sauppe, *O. A.* II. 286 f.

Demosthenes of power happily to relax his style, or to delineate character; and (so far as we can judge) the denial to Hypereides of energy. As a whole, however, the estimate is probably just. Some ancient critics placed Hypereides before Demosthenes; this was preposterous; but, on the other hand, there are good grounds for believing that, among political orators, Hypereides was second to no one except Demosthenes.

The work of Hypereides is now represented by ^{*Essential work of Hypereides.*} (1) fragments of a speech for Lykophron—probably earlier than 349 B.C.: (2) the speech for Euxenippos, nearly complete, about 330 B.C.: (3) fragments of the speech against Demosthenes in the Harpalos trial, 324 B.C.: (4) the Funeral Oration over Leosthenes and the comrades who fell with him in the Lamian War, 322 B.C.: (5) several small fragments.

It is unfortunate that these remains nowhere illustrate what was especially characteristic of Hypereides—his lighter and more playful grace. But the Epitaphios is a noble monument of his graver eloquence. And the Speech Against Euxenippos—which shall first be noticed—shows his power of scathing reproof.

After the battle of Chaeroneia, Philip had restored Oropos to the Athenians. The territory con- ^{*Speech Against Euxenippos.*} sisted of five hills, one of which was assigned to every two of the ten Athenian tribes. A religious scruple arose about the hill assigned to the tribes Hippothontis and Akamantis: had it not been already consecrated to the god Amphiaraios? It was resolved to ask the god himself for a sign. The ekklesia directed

Euxenippos and two others to pass a night in the temple of Amphiaraios at Oropos. It does not appear what vision they reported. Polyeuktos, however—a well-known citizen—proposed a decree directing the two tribes to restore the hill to the god, and the other eight tribes to compensate them. This proposal was adjudged to be unconstitutional, and Polyeuktos was fined. He then impeached Euxenippos for reporting falsely to the people. Lykurgos was the accuser and Hypereides the defender. Hypereides shows that Polyeuktos is illogical; that his motive is merely vindictive; and proceeds:—

Col. xxx -
xxxiv.
(ed. Bloss.)

‘So, if you had been acquitted on that indictment, Euxenippos would not have been guilty of perjury against the god; but, since it happened that you were convicted, Euxenippos must be ruined! For you, the proposer of such a decree, the penalty was laid at five and twenty drachmas; but he who, by the order of the people, passed the night in the temple must not even be buried in Attic ground!

“Yes,’ you say: ‘he behaved monstrously in allowing Olympias to dedicate that cup in the temple of the Goddess of Health!’ You introduce the name of Olympias to speed you on your course, you charge Euxenippos with a fictitious flattery, and you fancy that this will expose him to the hatred and anger of the judges.

‘My good friend, you should not invoke the names of Olympias and Alexander on your attempts to hurt your fellow-citizens; no, but when Olympias and Alexander lay unrighteous and improper commands on the Athenian people, then you should get up, and, on behalf of the city, protest, and argue for your rights with their emissaries, and go before the general assembly of the Greeks to uphold your country’s honour. In that assembly you never rose: you never mentioned such things; but *here* you hate Olympias for the sake of Euxenippos, and say that he is a flatterer of her and of the Macedonians. If you can show that he ever

visited Macedonia, or received any Macedonian into his house, or that he admits any one from that country to his intimacy or even to his conversation, or that he has expressed any views whatever of such matters either in a workshop or in the marketplace or anywhere else, or that he has not lived decorously and soberly, minding his own affairs, like any other citizen,—then let the judges do what they will to him.

‘If these charges were true, they would have been on other lips than yours,—they would have been the talk of Athens; just as all the other advocates or agents of Macedonia are well-known to the rest of their fellow-citizens, aye, to the children in the schools, even as they are known to their own consciences—the orators who draw Macedonian pay, the entertainers who open their houses to Macedonian visitors, and go to meet them on the roads when they approach. Here, again, you will find that Euxenippos has kept clear of all such association.’

The Funeral Oration belongs to a year hardly so memorable for the catastrophe of the Lamian War as for the death of Hypereides himself, of Demosthenes, and of Aristotle. Hypereides, as has been noticed, had been a chief mover in the last effort of Greek freedom against Macedon. After the death of Leosthenes before Lamia a gleam of good fortune had come to the Greeks. Antiphilos had won a battle at Meliteia against Leonnatos. When Hypereides spoke the epitaph of Leosthenes and his comrades, the hopes inspired by this victory were still fresh. In August, 322—perhaps a month later than the speech—these hopes had been shattered by the battle of Krannon:—

‘Leosthenes, aware that all Hellas was abased, panic-stricken, ruined by those who take bribes from Philip and Alexander against their native cities,—that Athens was in

The Funeral Oration.

Col. :—VII.

need of a man, and all Hellas in need of a city, capable of exercising leadership,—gave himself as an offering to Athens, and Athens as an offering to the freedom of Greece. Then, having organised a force of mercenaries, and put himself at the head of the citizens, he saw the first who took the field against Hellenic freedom—Boeotians, Macedonians, Euboeans and their allies—fall before him on a Boeotian plain. Thence he went to the Gates,—seized those passes through which of old barbarians marched against Greeks, arrested the Greece-ward progress of Antipater, found Antipater himself in those regions, beat him in a battle, imprisoned and besieged him in Lamia; made allies of the Thesalians, Phocians, Aetolians and other people of the country; and, where Philip and Alexander had gloried in an extorted submission, received the tribute of a voluntary loyalty. His, indeed, it was to perform the cause that he had taken in hand; but not to evade the doom of destiny. And in justice we must give Leosthenes our gratitude, not merely for all that he did himself, but also for the victory won after his death, and for the other benefits which the campaign has brought to Greece; for it is on the foundations laid by Leosthenes that the achievements of his successors are arising.’

Then he imagines the greeting that awaits Leosthenes and his comrades in the place of the departed :—

Col. XIII—
XIV.

‘With us, and with all the living, as we have seen, they shall ever have renown; but in the dark under-world—suffer us to ask—who are they that will stretch forth a right hand to the captain of our dead? May we not deem that Leosthenes will be greeted with welcome and with wonder by those half-gods who bore arms against Troy,—he who set himself to deeds germane with theirs, but in this surpassed them, that while they, aided by all Hellas, took one town, he, supported by his own city alone, humbled the power that ruled Europe and Asia? *They* avenged the wrong offered to one woman; *he* stayed the insults that were being

heaped on all the cities of Hellas—he and those who are sharing his last honours—men who, coming after the heroes, wrought deeds of heroic worth. Aye, and there, I deem, will be Miltiades and Themistokles, and those others who made Hellas free, to the credit of their city, to the glory of their names—whom this man surpassed in courage and in counsel, seeing that *they* repelled the power of the barbarians when it had come against them, but *he* forbade its approach; *they* saw the foemen fighting in their own country, but *he* worsted his enemies on the enemy's soil. And surely they who gave the people trusty proof of their mutual love, Harmodios and Aristogeiton, will count no friends so near to themselves, or so faithful to you, as Leosthenes and those who strove beside him, nor will they so consort with any dwellers in the place of the dead. Well may it be so, since these have done deeds not less than theirs, but, if it may be said, even greater; for *they* put down the despots of their own city, but *these* put down the despots of Hellas. O beautiful and wonderful enterprise, O glorious and magnificent devotion, O soldiership transcendant in dangers, which these offered to the freedom of Greece!

The closing sentences are addressed to the kins-
folk of the dead; but here there is no frigid conven-
tionalism of topics; there is a genuine, and therefore
reticent, sympathy; above all, there is a tenderness
which, though not Christian, is almost more than
pagan; and it should be remembered that these
words were spoken, over almost the last martyrs of
Greek freedom, by one who himself was very soon
to suffer torture and death in that cause:—

'It is hard, perhaps, to comfort those who are in such a sorrow; grief is not laid to rest by speech or by observance; rather is it for the nature of the mourner, and the nearness of the lost, to determine the boundaries of anguish. Still, we must take heart, and

*Epilogue of
the Epi-
taphios.*

lighten pain as we may, and remember not only the death of the departed but the good name also that they have left behind them. We owe not tears to their fate, but rather great praises to their deeds. If they came not to old age among men, they have got the glory that never grows old, and have been made blessed perfectly. Those among them who died childless shall have as their inheritors the immortal eulogies of Greece; and those of them who have left children behind them have bequeathed a trust of which their country's love will assume the guardianship. More than this,—if to die is to be as though we had never been, then these have passed away from sickness and pain and from all the accidents of the earthly life; or, if there is feeling in the under-world, and if, as we conjecture, the care of the Divine Power is over it, then it may well be that they who rendered aid to the worship of the gods in the hour of its imminent desolation are most precious to that Power's providence.'

*Lykurgos
and Hypereides.—
Summary.*

Lykurgos and Hypereides are men with opposite faults, but of characters essentially generous,—with very unequal gifts for language, but alike men of cultivation and of deep sensibility,—who show the chief tendencies of Attic oratory, as already developed, in new combinations. Lykurgos is a thorough Isokratic who, by a natural affinity, reverts to the school of Antiphon. Hypereides is an Isokratic in the chief traits of composition only, who reverts, much more decidedly, to the school of Lysias, but in whom the Lysian manner becomes holder and more various.

In relation to Demosthenes and the orators contemporary with him, the significance of Aeschines is closely similar to that which Andokides has for the age of Antiphon. Andokides is an amateur, not uninfluenced by what the artists are doing, but with no complete theory of his own. Just such an amateur is Aeschines in comparison with (for instance) Hypereides. On the other hand, the positive superiority of Aeschines to Andokides, as an orator, is immense. Scarcely more than Andokides did Aeschines possess the *art*, τέχνη, of speaking; but he had, in a far greater measure than Andokides, the *practice*, μελέτη, which, even without art, can do much to serve the need of the hour—this practice including both the habit of composition and skill in declamation. Lastly, he had in an extraordinary degree, the third and supreme requisite—*faculty*, φύσις. His natural gift was most brilliant. If we look to that conception of himself as an orator which Aeschines puts forward when he desires to appear at the greatest advantage over against Demosthenes, we shall find that it has two chief traits. First, Aeschines gives it to be understood that he is the man of spontaneous eloquence, while Demosthenes is the laborious rhetor. Secondly, Aeschines piques himself on his *culture*, meaning by this partly his familiarity with the standard poets, such as the old tragedians; partly a general sense of propriety or refinement, which, for instance, leads him to imitate the decorum (εὐκοσμία) of the old orators, like Solon or Perikles, by speaking with his hand within his robe, instead of using vehement

*Aeschines**compared with Andokides.**Aeschines the orator as conceived by himself.*

action;—and which helps to guard him, again, from such faults of taste in expression as he imputes to his rival¹. This second pretension, in both its parts, is originally the tragic actor's; Aeschines is usually at his worst when he puts it forward; and at the end of his career it comes in as his evil genius in the disastrous peroration against Ktesiphon. As for his other pretension—of representing natural as against laboured oratory—Aeschines was too shrewd to have made this claim if it had not been roughly like the truth. We may be quite sure that a great many people thought it true. Pytheas, too, could taunt Demosthenes with his speeches smelling of the lamp: a taunt of evil augury for all Greek art. Aeschines had had no systematic training. One account, indeed, made him the pupil of Isokrates and Plato; others hint that he had imitated Leodamas or studied Alkidamas². But the best answer is the concise description of his style quoted by his scholiast from Greek critics³. It has not finish, purity, or beauty of rhythm: it is blatant (*κεχηρνυῖα*), inartistic, headlong (*προπετής*), easily betrayed into coarse abuse ill-becoming an orator;

Aeschines untrained in Rhetoric.

His style.

¹ At the end of his essay on the *λεκτικὴ δεινότης* of Demosthenes, Dionysios examines these accusations made by Aeschines; cc. 55—58. As to the particular examples cited by Aeschines (*ἀμπελουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν*, and the rest), Dionys. says he cannot find one of them in the extant work of Demosthenes. The speeches *falsely* ascribed to Demosth.—*e. g.* *κατ' Ἀριστογέιτορος β'*, *κατὰ Νεαίρας*, &c.

—are, sometimes, *ἀηδεῖς, φορτικοί, ἄγροικοί*. The charge against Demosthenes, however, he characterises as not only calumnious but amazing. Those who seem inclined to adopt it ought well to consider this testimony of Dionysios.

² Demetrios Phalereus—Caecilius—Suidas: Schäf. *Dem.* i. 229.

³ In the scholia to Aeschines, Sauppe, *O. A.* ii. p. 26

but it has a stamp of power and of facility such as would come of nature *and of private study*—*μελέτης ἀφανούς*, *i.e.* not under a master. When the Rhodians asked him to teach them Rhetoric, he said that he did not know it himself.

If, however, Aeschines was no rhetorical artist, ^{*His training as an actor:*} he brought to public speaking the twofold training of an actor and a scribe. He had a magnificent voice, under perfect musical control: 'he compares me to the sirens,' says Aeschines of his rival. As tritagonist, he had often to play showy parts, such as Kreon, Kresphontes, Thyestes; and the pose which he adopted when speaking, in contrast with the then customary 'action,' had been studied in the right stage-parts. In his rank of tritagonist, he was probably a good actor. A protagonist, when he had been assigned to the poet by lot, chose his two colleagues; and so eminent a protagonist as Theodoros would not have associated Aeschines with Aristodemos if Aeschines had not been efficient. Demosthenes represents Aeschines as having failed on the boards: the fact seems to be rather that he was ruined by an accident. The *Oenomaos* of Sophokles was being played at Kollytos. Aeschines was *Oenomaos*: in hurrying after Pelops, he stumbled and fell, and was helped to his feet by the leader of the chorus. Modern life has probably no adequate parallel for such a fiasco. If one could conceive the sum of all disasters that can mar a solemnity, or an opera, occurring before five thousand attentive Parisians, it might be easier to comprehend why Aeschines left the Attic stage. After

as a scribe. having been clerk to some minor official, Aeschines was secretary to the statesmen Aristophon and Eubulos, and then, with his brother Aphobetos, for two years secretary to the ekklesia. He thus learned thoroughly the forms of public business, and gained that knowledge of laws and recorded decrees which, next to natural eloquence, was his chief weapon.

*Character
of Aeschines
as an orator.*

Without the intensity of Demosthenes, Aeschines has a certain fluent vehemence; his diction, when neither low nor turgid, has that splendour¹ which both Dionysios and Cicero recognised; and if his descriptions are sometimes tedious or pointless, he is certainly strong in exposition and narrative. The fatal hindrance to his greatness in oratory is the contrast, which never fails to reveal itself in any ambitious passage of much length, between his brilliant impetuosity and his profound want of earnest conviction and of moral nobleness. It is not the occasional coarseness of his style, it is the vulgarity of his soul that counteracts his splendid gift for eloquence: of Aeschines as a speaker it might indeed be said *ἦθος ἀνθρώπου δαίμων*. Had he become an artist, his character would not therefore have risen to the height of his faculty; but his faculty would have been better restrained to the level of his character; the contrast just noticed would have been rendered less conspicuous; and if he would not have come so near to supreme success,

¹ τῆ τῶν λέξεων ἐκλογῆ πομπικὸς ἄμα καὶ δεινός, Dionys. *vet. script. cens.* v. 5; Cic. *Orator*

§ 110 says that the distinctions of Aeschines are *veritas et splendor verborum*.

at least he would not have been so utterly overthrown.

Demosthenes belongs to the plan of the present work only in so far as his style has a definite relation to the historical growth and development of Attic oratorical prose. The first and principal question is—Has Dionysios conceived this relation rightly? Dionysios sets out from the three types distinguished by Theophrastos. The archaic type, with its harsh dignity, is represented by Antiphon and Thucydides; the type of plain elegance, by Lysias; the middle or normal type, by Thrasymachos, Isokrates and Plato. Demosthenes, says Dionysios, joins the excellences of these three types. He uses the middle style ordinarily, and applies the other two where they are fitting: but in each one of the three types he excels its special masters¹. Demosthenes thus represents the final stage in the development of Attic prose. For Thucydides, language is not as yet a plastic material; for Lysias, it is more plastic, indeed, but not perfectly so, and the treatment is one-sided; for Isokrates it is perfectly plastic, but the treatment is again one-sided. Demosthenes comes to find a middle prose mature, indeed, but limited; he enfranchises it by working in older tendencies native to Attic prose; and the result is the most complete organ of speech into which the elements were capable of being wrought. The same conclusion had been reached by others before Dionysios; but no one had so thoroughly worked out the process. Both the conclusion and

Demosthenes
—his place
in the deve-
lopment

as viewed by
Dionysios.

¹ Dionys. *Demosth.* 1—46.

*Dionysios
is right, and
by the right
process.*

the method will bear scrutiny, and may be accepted as sound. The doctrine involves two leading notions—that of a normal prose, and that of an eclectic and recombining genius. The first will be illustrated in the next chapter. The second appears to describe correctly what Demosthenes did in the province of expression considered as an art. The moral characteristics of his eloquence, the individual tone of the soul which he breathed into the form thus modelled, belong to another field of inquiry: though, since his art was essentially one with his enthusiasm, it must be attempted presently to suggest what the distinctive stamp of that enthusiasm was.

*Aeschines
and Demo-
sthenes—the
Speeches on
the Crown.*

The last great picture of political life at Athens is an oratorical contest in which, so far as eloquence is concerned, art, allied with genius, wins the day against clever empiricism. The theory of Greek eloquence had its final and its most splendid illustration in that trial which brought forth the two speeches On the Crown: nor could this part of our discussion conclude more fittingly than with an endeavour to call up some faint image of Demosthenes as in that great cause he stood opposed to Aeschines.

*Origin of
the case
against
Ktesiphon.*

In 338, after Chaeroneia, Demosthenes had been an active and liberal member of the Commission for the fortification of Athens; he had also been a trustee and a supporter of the theorikon. About March, 336¹, Ktesiphon proposed that Demosthenes should for these services receive a golden wreath

¹ The spurious *ψήφισμα* in Dem. (beginning of Nov.) 337: on this *De Cor.* § 118 gives Πυανepsion 9 error see Schäfer, *Dem.* III. 77 n. 2.

of honour from the State, and that the proclamation of his merit should be made in the theatre at the Great Dionysia. This proposal was adopted by the Senate, and deposited as a bill (*προβούλευμα*) among the public records. But before the bill could become an act (*ψήφισμα*) it must be passed by the *ekklisia*. Aeschines, to hinder this, gave notice in 336 that he intended to proceed against Ktesiphon for having proposed an unconstitutional measure: because (1) The accounts of Demosthenes, as trustee, had not been audited when the proposal was made, and no person liable to render such account could receive a public honour: (2) the proclamation should be made in the *ekklisia*, and could not lawfully be made in the theatre: (3) to record a bill describing Demosthenes as a public benefactor was to deposit a lying document among the public archives.

The first point was legally good. The second was a quibble. The third was the gist of the case. Had that policy towards Macedon which Demosthenes had pursued since 351 been condemned by Chaeroneia? Or, in spite of its failure, had it been right and patriotic?

Mere notice of the action against Ktesiphon was enough to stop the passage of the bill into an act. For six years Aeschines found it easy to shirk bringing the action. Alexander's strength was growing: in 334 he crossed the Hellespont, and in October, 331, the series of his victories culminated at Arbela. In 330, however, Agis raised war against Macedon in the Peloponnesos. In the spring of 330, probably,

when there were still hopes of the Spartans prevailing, the patriotic party were emboldened to renew the bill of 337, now a dead letter. Aeschines was driven into a corner. He must again give notice of his action, or the bill will become law. And, having given notice, he must this time follow it up, or suffer the public judgment to go against him by default. So, in the summer of 330, the action was brought.

Extraordinary interest of the cause.

No public cause had ever drawn so great a concourse, not merely of Athenians, but of Greeks from all parts of Hellas. Thirteen years before, the contest between Demosthenes and Aeschines on the Embassy had attracted a crowd. But, since then, the reputation of both men had greatly risen. And this was to be something more than a dazzling display or an exchange of personalities. It was to be a public verdict, after full hearing, on an issue which came home, for good or evil, to every Greek city, to every hearth, almost to every conscience: and for this verdict all Greece was in suspense.

The antagonists.

Aeschines was now fifty-nine. Fifteen years earlier—when he spoke against Timarchos—he says that he was already grey, and looked more than his age. He was not tall, but was exceedingly handsome, and of a robust frame,—in contrast with his rather younger rival (Demosthenes was now fifty-four) who, as a youth, had neglected the ordinary physical education. With his splendid voice, his trained elocution, and his practice in the statuesque manner which best suited him, Aeschines must have had an advantage over his opponent in many acces-

sories of effect. Near him in the court stood a group of men who came to speak for him or to support him by their presence;—‘oligarchs’, as the other side called them,—leading members of the Macedonizing party. Round Demosthenes were gathered friends and advocates of the opposite politics—chiefly generals or men distinguished in other offices of the State. The dikasts who formed the court were probably at least a thousand in number. There was, besides, a throng of Athenian and other Greek spectators.

Aeschines, as accuser of Ktesiphon, opens the case. He warns the court not to be influenced by the strength of the cabal on the other side. He shows that a crown could not be given to an official whose audit was pending. He argues that the proclamation could not lawfully be made in the theatre. Then he comes to the great point. Demosthenes is not a public benefactor. He reviews the conduct of Demosthenes in four periods—from the Amphipolitan war to the peace of Philokrates; from the peace to the renewal of war; from that renewed war to Chaeroneia; lastly, the present. It was only when Philip had passed Thermopylae, when the Phocians were ruined and Thebes strengthened, and when the makers of the peace began to be reproached, that Demosthenes became the opponent of Macedon. It was Demosthenes who brought on the new war; who was the cause of the Amphictyonic Council attacking Amphissa, and thereby of Philip being called in: and all this in face of divine portents:—

‘Did not the gods send us warnings and signs to be on our

*Aeschines
in Ctes.
§§ 130—134.*

guard, aye, were they not eloquent with all but the voices of men? If ever I saw a city which the gods were seeking to save, and which certain talkers were bent on ruining, it was ours. Was not the occurrence at the Mysteries enough to enjoin watchfulness—the death of the initiated celebrants? Did not Amciniades warn us to heed this, and to send to Delphi and ask the god what should be done, and did not Demosthenes object, pretending that the Pythian priestess ‘had Macedonian proclivities’—the ribald, the insolent, revelling in the license that you allowed him? Last of all, did he not send out the soldiers—before sacrifices had been consummated or accepted—to a peril which he foresaw? Yet the other day he hazarded the assertion that Philip’s reason for not marching upon our territory was that the sacrifices had not been favourable. What do you deserve, then, Demosthenes, you who have the blood of Hellas upon your head? If the conqueror forbore to enter the country of the conquered because the sacrifices were against him, and you, when you could not tell what might happen, sent out the troops before the sacrifices had given a good omen, ought you to be crowned in honour of the city’s disasters, or ought you long ago to have been cast beyond her borders?

‘And, accordingly, what paradox or what portent is there that has not come to pass in our time? Our days have not fallen on the common chances of the mortal life: we have been set to bequeath a story of marvels to posterity. Is not the king of Persia, he who cut through Athos and who bridged the Hellespont, he who demands earth and water from the Greeks, he who, in his letters, presumes to style himself lord of all men from the sunrise to the sunset, is he not struggling at this hour—no longer for authority over others—but for his own life? Do you not see the men who delivered the Delphian temple invested not only with that glory but with the leadership against Persia? While Thebes—Thebes, our neighbour city, has in one day been swept from the face of Greece,—justly, it may be, in so far as her general policy was erroneous, yet in consequence of a folly which was no accident, but the judgment of Heaven. The unfortunate Lacedaemonians, though they did but touch

this affair, in its first phase, by their occupation of the temple,—they who once claimed the leadership of Greece,—are now to be sent to Alexander in Asia to give hostages, to parade their disasters, and to hear their own and their country's doom from his lips, when they have been judged by the clemency of the master whom they have provoked. Our city, the common asylum of the Greeks, to which of old embassies used to come from all Greece to obtain deliverance for their several cities at our hands—is now battling, no more for the leadership of Greece, but for the ground on which it stands. And these things have befallen us since Demosthenes took the direction of our policy. The poet Hesiod well interprets such a case. There is a passage, meant to educate democracies and to counsel cities generally, in which he warns us not to accept dishonest leaders. I will recite the lines myself,—the reason, I think, for our learning the maxims of the poets in boyhood is that we may use them as men:—

‘Oft hath the bad man been the city’s bane,
And scourged his sinless brethren for his sin :
Oft hath the all-seeing Father vexed their town
With dearth and death, and brought the people low,
Slain their strong host, cast down their fenced wall,
Broken their ships upon the stormy sea.’

‘Strip these lines of their poetical garb, look at them closely, and I think you will say that these are no mere verses of Hesiod’s;—they are a prophecy of the Demosthenes Administration; for, by that Administration’s agency, our ships, our armies, our cities have been swept from the world.’

He then contends that Demosthenes is to blame for the league with Thebes, for the miseries of the present, and for the neglect of three successive opportunities to rise against Alexander: Demosthenes is ready to seek bribes, but not to do manly deeds:—

‘Oh, yes,’ it will be replied: ‘but then he is a friend of §§ 163—170. the Constitution.’ If, indeed, you have regard only to his

delicacy—which stops at words—you will be deceived, as you were before; but not if you look at his character and at the facts. I will help you to estimate the characteristics which ought to be found in ‘a friend of the Constitution,’ in a sober-minded citizen; I will oppose to them the character that may be looked for in an unprincipled revolutionist; then you shall draw your comparisons, and consider on which part he stands—not in his language, remember, but in his life. Now all, I think, will allow that these attributes should belong to ‘a friend of the Constitution,’—first, he should be of free descent by both parents, so that the disadvantage of birth may not embitter him against those laws which preserve the democracy; secondly, he should be able to show that some benefit has been done by his ancestors to the people, or, at the worst, that there has been no enmity between them which could prompt him to revenge the misfortunes of his fathers on the State. Thirdly, he should be virtuous and temperate in his private life, so that no profligate expense may lead him into taking bribes to the hurt of the people. Next, he should be sagacious and able to speak—since our ideal is that the best course should be chosen by the intelligence, and then commended to the hearers by the trained eloquence, of the orator—though, if we cannot have both, sagacity must needs take rank before eloquence. Lastly, he must have a stout heart, or he may play his country false in the crisis of danger or of war. The friend of oligarchy must be the opposite of all this. I need not repeat the points. Now consider—How does Demosthenes answer to these conditions? The scrutiny shall be strictly just.’

In the passage which follows, the speaker’s hatred breaks out with an intensity which betrays conscious weakness. By half his parentage, Demosthenes is ‘a Scythian, Greek in nothing but language, and hence showing, in his very wickedness, the character of the alien’ :—

§§ 173—176. ‘But in his private life, what is he? The trierarch sank, to rise a pettifogger, a spendthrift ruined by his own follies.

Then, having got a bad name in this trade too by showing his speeches to the other side, he bounded on the stage of public life, where his profits out of the city were as enormous as his savings were small. Now, however, the flood of royal gold has floated his extravagance. But not even this will suffice. No wealth could ever hold out long against vice. In a word, he draws his livelihood not from his own resources but from your dangers. What, however, are his qualifications in respect to sagacity and to power of speech? A clever speaker—an evil liver. And what is the result to Athens? The speeches are fair—the deeds are vile. Then, as to courage, I have a word to say. If he denied his cowardice, or if you were not aware of it, the topic might have called for discussion; but since he himself admits it in the assemblies, and you know it, it remains only to remind you of the laws on the subject. Solon, our ancient law-giver, thought that the coward should be liable to the same penalties as the man who refuses to serve, or who has quitted his post. Cowardice, like other offences, is indictable. Some of you will perhaps ask in amazement—Is a man to be indicted for his temperament? He is. And why? In order that every one of us, fearing the penalties of the law more than the enemy, may be the better champion of his country. Accordingly, the lawgiver excludes alike the man who declines service, the coward, and the deserter of his post, from the lustral limits of the market-place, and suffers no such person to receive a wreath of honour or to enter places of public worship. But you, Ktesiphon, exhort us to set a crown on the head to which the laws refuse it: you, by your private edict, call a forbidden guest into the forefront of our solemn festival, and invite into the temple of Dionysos that dastard by whom all temples have been betrayed!

The peroration is notable in the history of oratory:—

‘Remember, then, that the city whose fate rests with you §§ 256—260. is no alien city, but your own. Give the prizes of ambition

by merit, not by chance ; reserve your rewards for those whose manhood is truer and whose characters are worthier ; look at each other and judge, not only with your ears but with your eyes, who of your number are likely to support Demosthenes. His youthful companions in the chase or the gymnasium ? No, by the Olympian Zeus ! He has not spent his life in hunting or in any healthful exercise, but in cultivating rhetoric to be used against men of property. Think of his boastfulness, when he claims, by his embassy, to have snatched Byzantium out of the hands of Philip, to have thrown the Acarnanians into revolt, to have astonished the Thebans with his harangue ! He thinks that you have reached a point of fatuity at which you can be made to believe even this—as if your fellow-citizen were the Goddess of Persuasion, instead of a pettifogging mortal. And when, at the end of his speech, he calls as his advocates those who shared his bribes, imagine that you see on this platform, where I now speak before you, an array drawn up to confront their profligacy—the benefactors of Athens ; Solon, who ordered the democracy by his glorious laws, the philosopher, the good legislator, entreating you, with that gravity which so well became him, never to set the rhetoric of Demosthenes above your oaths and above the law ; Aristides,—who assessed the tribute of the Confederacy, and whose daughters, after his death, were dowered by the State,—indignant at the contumely threatened to Justice, and asking, *Are you not ashamed ? When Arthmios of Zeleia brought Persian gold to Greece, and visited Athens, our fathers well-nigh put him to death, though he was our public guest, and proclaimed him expelled from Athens and from all territory that the Athenians rule ; while Demosthenes, who has not brought us Persian gold, but has taken bribes for himself, and has kept them to this day, is about to receive a golden wreath from you !* And Themistokles, and they who died at Marathon and Plataea, aye, and the very graves of our forefathers—do you not think that they will utter a voice of lamentation, if he who covenants with barbarians to work against Greece shall be—crowned ?

This was the true climax. But Aeschines felt the pressure of the Attic rule. He must not *end* thus. The storm must be laid in a final harmony. And so he passed on to the most tremendous failure that ever followed so close upon a triumph :—

‘O Earth and Sunlight! O ye influences of Goodness, of Intelligence, of that Culture by which we learn to distinguish things beautiful or shameful—I have done my duty, I have finished. If the part of the accuser has been performed well and adequately to the offence, then I have spoken as I wished, —if defectively, yet I have spoken as I could. Judge for yourselves from what has been spoken or from what has been left unsaid, and give your sentence in accordance with justice and with the interests of Athens.’

Apart from all faults of form, the hearers must have felt that this speech had one signal fault of *Fatal weakness of the Speech.* matter. Aeschines had not dared to show his colours. He had not dared to say—‘I maintain that it was expedient to be friendly with Macedon, and therefore I deny that Demosthenes was a patriot’. He had tried to save appearances. He had dealt in abuse and in charges of corruption. But he had left the essence of the Demosthenic policy absolutely untouched.

Ktesiphon, as ostensible defendant, introduced the defence. Demosthenes then spoke. He stands, he says, in a greater danger than Aeschines—his whole political existence is at stake. After noticing irrelevant changes made by his adversary, he draws a picture of Greece at the end of the Phocian war. The results of the Peace of Philokrates were due to Athens being misled by the Macedonian party. Having given the judges a firm basis for an estimate *Reply of Demosthenes.*

of his policy, he turns to the two legal points. Then he comes to the great point. Has he deserved well of Greece? He describes the Hellenic policy which he, on the part of Athens, had represented; he recalls the course of events down to the moment before Philip seized Elateia; and he proceeds:—

*Demosth.
De Cor.
§§ 168-191.*

‘Having by these means brought the cities into such dispositions towards each other, Philip, encouraged by these decrees and these replies, came in his strength, and seized Elateia—sure that, happen what would, we and the Thebans could never more conspire. Enough—you all know what a storm then awoke in the city. Yet listen to me for a moment, suffer me to give you the barest outline.

‘It was evening when a courier came to the presidents of the assembly with the news that Elateia had been seized. The presidents instantly rose from table—they were supping at the moment: some of them hastened to clear the market-place of the shopmen, and to burn the wickerwork of the booths: others, to send for the Generals and order the sounding of the call to the Assembly. The city was in a tumult. At dawn next day the presidents convoked the Senate, you hurried to the Ekklesia, and before the Senate could go through its forms or could report, the whole people were in assembly on the hill. Then, when the Senate had come in, when the presidents had reported the news that they had received, and had introduced the messenger, who told his tale, the herald repeatedly asked, *Who wishes to speak?* But no one came forward. Again and again he put the question—in vain. No one would rise, though all the generals, though all the public speakers were present, though our Country was crying aloud, with the voice that comes home to all, for a champion of the commonwealth—if in the solemn invitation given by the herald we may truly deem that we hear our Country’s summons. Yet, if they should have come forward who wished Athens safe, every man in this court, aye, every man in Athens, would have risen and moved towards the platform. Every man of

you, I know well, wished the city to be saved. Or, if it was a time for the capitalists, there were our three hundred richest men; or if for the representatives of patriotism and wealth combined, there were the men who, a little later, proved at once their loyalty and their opulence by giving such large benevolences. But no—it seems that that crisis, that hour, demanded not merely a patriot, not merely a capitalist, but a man who had followed the train of events from the beginning, who had accurately reasoned out why and wherefore Philip was acting thus. A man who did not know this, who had not made it the subject of long and thorough research, might be ever so loyal, might be ever so rich, but he was not the man to see what should be done or to direct your course. Such a man was found that day in *me*. I came forward and spoke words to which, for two reasons, I now claim your attention; first, that you may see how I was the only one of the speakers or the statesmen who, in danger, did not desert the patriot's post, but brought myself to the proof by proposing and framing measures for your welfare in the very hour of panic; secondly, because this bestowal of a few moments will place you in a much better position for estimating the future of your entire policy.

‘What I said was this:—‘They who are so much alarmed by the belief that Philip has already got the Thebans do not, I think, comprehend the situation; I feel convinced that, if this was the case, we should have been hearing of him, not at Elateia, but on our frontiers. That he has come, however, to make things ready at Thebes, I am certain. Look (I said) how it stands. Every Theban that could be bribed or blinded has been made a tool by Philip: those who withstood him from the first, and who oppose him now, he can *never* win. What does he mean? Why has he seized Elateia? He means, by displaying his power and planting his camp close at hand, to cheer and embolden his own friends, and to strike terror into his opponents, so that they may either concede from fear what they now refuse, or may be compelled to the concession. Now, if we choose (I said) to make this a time for remembering any unpleasantness that the

Thebans may have brought into their relations with us, and to distrust them as if they were to be classed with enemies, then, in the first place, we shall be doing what Philip would pray for; in the next, I am afraid that those who are now his adversaries may open their arms to him, and so, with one accord, they will all become Philip's men, and he and they will march on Attica together. If, however, you will listen to me, and will give yourselves to thinking, instead of wrangling, over my suggestions, I believe that I shall be pronounced to be in the right, and shall avert the danger impending over Athens. What, then, do I advise? First, that we should remit our present fear: next, that we should transfer it to another object, and tremble, as one man, for the Thebans—they are much nearer to the danger than we, and must bear its first brunt:—then, that you should march out to Eleusis, all of you that are of the age for service, as well as the Knights, and show the world that you, too, are in arms, so that your friends at Thebes may be at no disadvantage for making their protest on behalf of justice, but may know that, even as the men who are selling their country to Philip have a power hard by at Elateia to help them, so they who are ready to do battle for freedom are secure of prompt aid from you, if they are attacked. Next, I would have you elect ten ambassadors and empower them, in conjunction with the Generals, to fix the time and the strength of the expedition. The ambassadors once at Thebes, what line are they to take? Mark my words here. They must not ask the Thebans for anything—it would be discreditable at such a time— but must promise to afford aid if it should be required, since the Thebans are in extremities, and our view of what may come is less disturbed than theirs. Then, if the Thebans accept these offers and listen to us, we shall have compassed our own desires, and at the same time shall come before the world in an attitude worthy of Athens; or if, by any chance, the diplomacy should miscarry, they will have themselves to blame for any error they may commit now, and we shall stand guiltless of everything dishonourable or craven.'

‘Thus, or to this effect, I spoke, and left the platform. Everyone approved—there was not a dissentient; and what then? I did not make a speech and leave others to move a resolution. I did not move a resolution, and leave others to go on an embassy. I did not go on an embassy, and leave others to persuade the Thebans. No. I went through with the business from the beginning to the end; I gave myself to you without reservation in face of the perils that encompassed the city.—[Read me the decree that was made that day.]

* * * * *

These were the first steps towards the adjustment of our relations to Thebes, at a time when enmity, hatred and distrust had been sown between our cities by yonder men.

‘The people gave their voice, and the danger that hung upon our borders went by like a cloud. *Then* was the time for the upright citizen to show the world if he could suggest anything better:—*now*, his cavils come too late. The statesman and the adventurer are alike in nothing, but there is nothing in which they differ more than in this. The statesman declares his mind before the event, and submits himself to be tested by those who have believed him, by fortune, by his own use of opportunities, by everyone and everything. The adventurer is silent when he ought to have spoken, and then, if there is a disagreeable result, he fixes an eye of malice upon *that*. As I have said, *then* was the opportunity of the man who cared for Athens and for the assertion of justice. But I am prepared to go further:—If anyone can *now* show a better course, or, in a word, can point out any precaution which was possible and which I did not adopt, I plead guilty. If anyone has had a new light as to something which it would have been expedient to do then, I protest that this ought not to be concealed from me. But if there neither is nor was any such thing; if no one to this very hour is in a position to name it; then what was your adviser to do? Was he not to choose the best of the visible and feasible alternatives? And this is what I did, Aeschines, when the herald asked, *Who wishes to speak?* His question was not, *Who wishes to rake up old accusations?*

or, *Who wishes to give pledges of the future?* In those days, you sat dumb in the assemblies. I came forward and spoke. Come now—it is better late than never: point out what argument should have been discovered—what opportunity that might have served has not been used by me in the interests of Athens—what alliance, what policy was available which I might better have commended to our citizens?’

Having shown that the course taken by his party was the most advantageous open to loyal Athenians, the speaker goes on to take yet higher ground. This course failed. But it is not therefore to be regretted. By it alone could honour have been saved :—

§§ 199—203.

‘As, however, he bears so hardly upon the results, I am ready to make a statement which may sound startling. I ask every man, as he fears Zeus and the gods, not to be shocked at my paradox until he has calmly considered my meaning. I say that, if the event had been manifest to the whole world beforehand, if all men had been fully aware of it, if you, Aeschines, who never opened your lips, had been ever so loud or so shrill in prophecy or in protest, not even then ought Athens to have forsaken this course, if Athens had any regard for her glory, or for her past, or for the ages to come. *Now*, of course, she seems to have failed; but failure is for all men when Heaven so decrees. In the other case, she, who claims the first place in Greece, would have renounced it, and would have incurred the reproach of having betrayed all Greece to Philip. If she had indeed betrayed without a blow those things for which our ancestors endured every imaginable danger, who would not have spurned, Aeschines, at *you*? Not at Athens—the gods forbid!—nor at me. In the name of Zeus, how could we have looked visitors in the face if, things having come to their present pass—Philip having been elected leader and lord of all—the struggle against it had been sustained by others without our help, and this, though never once in her past history our city had preferred inglorious safety to the perilous vindication of honour? What Greek, what barbarian does

not know that the Thebans, and their predecessors in power, the Lacedaemonians, and the Persian King, would have been glad and thankful to let Athens take anything that she liked, besides keeping what she had got, if she would only have done what she was told, and allowed some other Power to lead Greece? Such a bargain, however, was for the Athenians of those days neither traditional nor congenial nor supportable. In the whole course of her annals, no one could ever persuade Athens to side with dishonest strength, to accept a secure slavery, or to desist, at any moment in her career, from doing battle and braving danger for preeminence, for honour and for renown.

‘You, Athenians, find these principles so worthy of veneration, so accordant with your own character, that you praise none of your ancestors so highly as those who put them into action. You are right. Who must not admire the spirit of men who were content to quit their country, and to exchange their city for their triremes, in the cause of resistance to dictation; who put Themistokles, the author of this course, at their head, while as for Kyrtilos, the man who gave his voice for accepting the enemy’s terms, they stoned him to death, yes, and his wife was stoned by the women of Athens? The Athenians of those days were not in search of an orator or a general who should help them to an agreeable servitude. No. They would not hear of life itself if they were not to live free. Each one of them held that he had been born the son, not only of his father and his mother, but of his country also. And wherein is the difference? It is here. He that recognises no debt of piety save to his parents awaits his death in the course of destiny and of nature. But he that deems himself the son of his country also will be ready to die sooner than see her enslaved. In his estimate, those insults, those dishonours which must be suffered in his city when she has lost her freedom will be accounted more terrible than death.

‘If I presumed to say that it was *I* who thus inspired you with a spirit worthy of your ancestors, there is not a man present who might not properly rebuke me. What I do maintain is that these principles of conduct were your own;

that this spirit existed in the city before my intervention, but that, in the successive chapters of events, I had my share of merit as your servant. Aeschines, on the contrary, denounces our policy as a whole, invokes your resentment against me as the author of the city's terrors and dangers, and, in his anxiety to wrest from me the distinction of the hour, robs you of glories which will be celebrated as long as time endures. For, if you condemn Ktesiphon on the ground that my public course was misdirected, then you will be adjudged guilty of error: you will no longer appear as sufferers by the perversity of fortune.

'But never, Athenians, never can it be said that you erred when you took upon you that peril for the freedom and the safety of all! No, by our fathers who met the danger at Marathon, no, by our fathers who stood in the ranks at Plataea, no, by our fathers who did battle on the waters of Salamis and Artemision, no, by all the brave who sleep in tombs at which their country paid those last honours which she had awarded, Aeschines, to all of them alike, not alone to the successful or the victorious! And her award was just. The part of brave men had been done by all. The fortune experienced by the individual among them had been allotted by a Power above man.'

*Tone of the
Speech.*

The nobility of this great speech declares itself not least in this, that the inevitable recital of personal services never once sinks into self-glorification. It is held above that by the speaker's proud consciousness that he has wrought, not for himself, but for Athens and Greece, not for ambition, but for sacred things, for duty and for honour, and that he can show this by proofs the most triumphant. When, at the end, he offers himself for comparison with any other counsellor, his right to do so has been so luminously established that this is felt to be no vaunt by which his dignity is lowered. On the

contrary, it is a self-vindication demanded by respect alike for himself and for those by whom his counsels had been adopted. In relation to the Attic theory of eloquence, it is most instructive to compare the perorations of Aeschines and Demosthenes. Aeschines, not being a true artist, stands in awe of the art. *The two perorations compared.* He does not venture to be original and to stop at his real climax. He must needs conform with the artistic usage of a final harmony ; and he mars all. Demosthenes, the master, can make his art obey him. With true instinct, he feels this to be the rare case which the rule does not fit. The emotions of the hearers have been stirred beyond the point of obedience to the pulses of an ordered music. His intense appeal to the memories of his countrymen ends in a storm of imprecation and of prayer :—

‘Here is the proof. Not when my extradition was demanded, not when they sought to arraign me before the Amphictyonic Council, not for all their menaces or their offers, not when they set these villains like wild beasts upon me, have I ever been untrue to the loyalty I bear you. From the outset, I chose the path of a straightforward and righteous statesmanship, to cherish the dignities, the prerogatives, the glories of my country : to exalt them : to stand by their cause. I do not go about the marketplace radiant with joy at my country’s disasters, holding out my hand and telling my good news to anyone who, I think, is likely to report it in Macedon ; I do not hear of my country’s successes with a shudder and a groan and a head bent to earth, like the bad men who pull Athens to pieces, as if, in so doing, they were not tearing their own reputations to shreds, who turn their faces to foreign lands, and, when an alien has triumphed by the ruin of the Greeks, give their praises to that exploit, and vow that vigilance must be used to render that triumph eternal.

‘NEVER, POWERS OF HEAVEN, MAY ANY BROW OF THE IMMORTALS BE BENT IN APPROVAL OF THAT PRAYER! RATHER, IF IT MAY BE, BREATHE EVEN INTO THESE MEN A BETTER MIND AND HEART; BUT IF SO IT IS THAT TO THESE CAN COME NO HEALING, THEN GRANT THAT THESE, AND THESE ALONE, MAY PERISH UTTERLY AND EARLY ON LAND AND ON THE DEEP: AND TO US, THE REMNANT, SEND THE SWIFTEST DELIVERANCE FROM THE TERRORS GATHERED ABOVE OUR HEADS, SEND US THE SALVATION THAT STANDS FAST PERPETUALLY.’

Two thousand years have challenged a tradition which lives, and will always live, wherever there is left a sense for the grandest music which an exquisite language could yield to a sublime enthusiasm—that, when Demosthenes ceased, those who had come from all parts of Greece to hear, that day, the epitaph of the freedom which they had lost, and a defence of the honour which they could still leave to their children, had listened to the masterpiece of the old world’s oratory, perhaps to the supreme achievement of human eloquence. But this wonderful speech, though the greatest, is not the most characteristic work of its author. The speech *On the Crown* is a retrospect: Demosthenes was a prophet. His genius as an orator takes its peculiar stamp from the concurrence of two conditions which have seldom been united with an equal completeness, which are not likely, perhaps, to be completely united again, but which, whenever they have so met, have made an epoch of poetry or of oratory. The first is that a free and highly civilised race should be threatened with the overthrow of its civil liberties; the second, that this political

The enthusiasm of Demosthenes—its character

disaster should have, at the same time, the aspect of a religious defilement. When the national peril is also a menaced pollution, when the cause of altars and of hearths is not only formally or nominally, but in the inmost feelings of the people, one, then the two mightiest inspirations of humanity co-operate, and they who arise to warn, to counsel or to reprove seem both to others and to themselves most like the interpreters of Heaven. The Greeks were, in their own view, something even more than a chosen people; they were, as they conceived, a race primarily and lineally distinct from all the races of men, the very children of the gods, whose holy separation was attested by that deep instinct of their nature which taught them to loathe the alien. No one can ever understand Demosthenes who does not continually keep in mind how Demosthenes regarded Philip—not as the descendant of Herakles, not as a prince of the Argive house who, in a royal exile like that of Teukros, happened to reign over foreign highlanders, but as the personal embodiment of barbarian violence, as the type and the head of those aliens whose foul swarms threatened to break the pure circle of Hellas and to obliterate, or contaminate, everything which Greeks regarded as a sacred distinction of their life. If, as has been complained, his eloquence, instead of flowing, rushes, if his intensity is found monotonous, if he is perceived to be deficient in ease and clearness, let it be remembered that, Greek and artist as he is, things stronger than blood give him his affinity with Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Once only, perhaps, in the history of the world has

a man of Indo-Germanic race, with something like the same gifts, stood in something like the mental attitude of Demosthenes, and this in the city which of all cities has most resembled his own. Florence, with its active and conscious citizenship, its intelligence and curiosity, its fickleness, its patriotism for Italy, was the Athens, as steady and somewhat rigid Venice was the Sparta, of the Italian republics; and the Athens of Eubulos had more ignoble analogies with the Florence of Lorenzo¹. When invasion was threatening from the North, when political freedom was in danger, and when it seemed that the Church also must be scourged before it could be regenerated, a prophet arose whose one hope was of a resurrection for the spirit of his people and whose passionate denunciations sought to burst, while there was time, the fatal bonds of a cynical lethargy. 'O Italy! O Rome! I give you over to the hands of a people who will wipe you out from among the nations! I see them descending like lions. Pestilence comes marching hand in hand with war. The deaths will be so many that the buriers shall go through the streets crying out: Who hath dead, who hath dead? And one will bring his father and another his son. O Rome! I cry again to you to repent! Repent, Venice! Milan, repent!'² The soul of Demosthenes was among men when, in the Dome of Florence, above the sobs and wailings of a great multitude, the anguish of Savonarola went forth on words that were as flame.

¹ See the '*Renaissance in Italy*, Symonds, pp. 169 f.
Age of the Despots,' by Mr J. A.

² *ib.* p. 448.

CHAPTER XXIII.

RETROSPECT.

It will now be useful to look back on the whole development from Antiphon to Demosthenes, and to trace the main lines of its course.

The ground for an artistic Athenian oratory was prepared partly by the popular Dialectic of the eastern Sophists, partly by the Sicilian Rhetoric. Intermediate between these stood the earliest artist of oratorical prose, Gorgias; differing from the eastern Sophists in laying more stress on expression than on management of argument, and from the Sicilian Rhetoricians in cultivating his faculty empirically, not theoretically.

Two principal tendencies appear in the beginnings of Attic oratory. One of these sets out from the forensic Rhetoric of Sicily, in combination with the popular Dialectic of the Sophists, and is but slightly affected by Gorgias. It is represented by the writers of the 'austere' style, of whom Antiphon and Thucydides are the chief. From Thucydides to Demosthenes this manner is in abeyance, partly because it

Two early tendencies—the Rhetorical and the Gorgian.

Outline of development.

is in itself unsuited to forensic purposes, partly because its grave emphasis has come to seem archaic. The second tendency is purely Gorgian, and, after having had several obscure representatives, is taken up by Isokrates, who gives to it a corrected, a complete and a permanent form. From a compromise between this second tendency and the idiom of daily life arises the 'plain' style of Lysias. The transition from Lysias to a strenuous political oratory is marked by Isaeos. Then comes the matured political oratory, giving new combinations to types already developed, and, in its greatest representative, uniting them all.

*Antiphon
and Thucy-
dides.*

Antiphon and Thucydides have been strongly influenced, as to arrangement and form of argument, by Dialectic and Rhetoric. In regard to expression, they have been influenced by the synonym-lore, such as that of Prodikos, but hardly at all by the oratory of Gorgias. In expression, they are essentially pioneers. Those things which they have in common are to a great extent the necessary traits of early Greek prose, before the language was a perfectly flexible material, when that prose was wrought by a vigorous and subtle mind. Such traits are, however, numerous enough and strong enough to justify us in holding that they constitute a style. The characteristics of this 'austere' style have been analysed in reference to Antiphon. Such a manner could not possibly keep its place in the forensic field. Legal controversy, growing subtle, terse and eager, would become as uncongenial to the prose of Antiphon as to the prose of Milton. A concep-

*The 'aus-
tere' style
not forensic.*

tion of the general effect will be assisted, perhaps, by a rough English parallel. In 1626 the Judges were called in to assist the House of Lords regarding a claim to the earldom of Oxford, and Chief Justice Crewe delivered an address in which this passage occurred¹:—

‘This great honour, this high and noble dignity, hath continued ever since in the remarkable surname of De Vere, by so many ages, descents, and generations, as no other kingdom can produce a peer in one of the self-same name and title. I find in all this length of time but two attainders of this noble family, and those in stormy and tempestuous times, when the government was unsettled and the kingdom in competition. I have laboured to make a covenant with myself that affection may not press upon judgment; for I suppose there is no man that hath any apprehension of gentry and nobleness, but his affection stands to the continuance of so noble a name and house, and would take hold of a twig or a twine-thread to uphold it. And yet Time hath its revolutions; there must be a period and an end to all temporal things—*finis rerum*, an end of names, and dignities, and whatsoever is terrene, and why not of De Vere? For where is Bohun? where is Mowbray? where is Mortimer? Nay, which is more and most of all, where is Plantagenet? They are entombed in the urns and sepulchres of mortality. And yet let the name and dignity of De Vere stand so long as it pleaseth God!’

The ‘austere’ manner is, in one respect, better *Thucydides*: represented by Thucydides than by Antiphon. Its *αὐθάδεια*, or haughty independence, finds a larger scope in the work of the philosophical historian. We are concerned here, not with the individual genius of Thucydides, but with the rhetorical prose-writer

¹ I quote this from Mr Forsyth’s *Hortensius*, p. 315, who selects it as an example of early forensic oratory in England, before the modern eloquence of Erskine.

as influenced by his age: and for us, therefore, the *his speeches.* speeches are most significant. These are the essays of Thucydides himself in an oratory which is dramatic as regards the sentiment, but not as regards the form. They may be taken, then, as indicating his relation both to the practice and to the theory of his day. Out of forty-one speeches (excluding the two dialogues) one is panegyrical—the Epitaphios: thirty-eight are hortatory: and two are forensic—those, namely, of the Plataeans and the Thebans before their Lacedaemonian judges¹. The Epitaphios, the forensic speeches, and (*e. g.*) the deliberative speeches of Hermocrates and Athenagoras in Book VI., all bear the impress of the Sicilian Rhetoric in their conscious partition. Proem, prothesis, narrative, proof, epilogue succeed each other—with more or less completeness according to circumstances—as distinct parts. Figures, whether of thought or of language, are avoided even more than by Antiphon. The influence of Gorgias is seen only faintly and generally in attention to parallelism or symmetry: his distinctive ornaments—parison and the like—are eschewed. Nothing is more Thucydidean than the determination to express each idea, or part of an idea, in the way that best suits *it*, regardless of what has gone before or what is coming: hence his changes of construction. His freer, though rougher, handling of the periodic style, as compared with Antiphon's, arises from his effort to present a complex idea as an organic whole. He will not make his sentence a bed of Prokrustes for his thought. This

Influence on them of Sicilian Rhetoric.

Bent of Thucydides in expression.

¹ III. 53—59; 61—67.

alone would explain the sympathy with Thucydides felt by the intense Demosthenes, who saw that the 'austere' style had something more than an antiquarian interest—that it meant a certain set of capacities in the organ which he wished to perfect; and who studied these capacities, not in Antiphon, but in Thucydides.

Kritias and Andokides stand together as cultivated amateurs of the phase when this earlier manner of Antiphon and Thucydides was already felt to be too rigid for practical life, but when, nevertheless, an alternative manner had not yet been artistically shaped. Kritias, like Andokides, appears to have avoided the poetical diction as well as the figures of Gorgias; and is named along with Andokides as a witness to the currency of the idiom used by Lysias¹.

Thrasymachos of Chalkedon gave a new turn to the progress of Attic prose. The modern world knows him best from the *Phaedros*, where he figures as a puerile pedant of the Sicilian Rhetoric. To Aristotle and Theophrastos, however, he was known less as a theorist than as an orator, and as an orator, moreover, of original and remarkable merits. These merits were chiefly three. First, he was the founder of a 'middle' style: intermediate, not between the Gorgian and the Lysian—for the Lysian had not yet arisen—but between the Gorgian, or poetical, and the colloquial. Secondly, he matured that terse, compact period (*στρογγύλη, συνεστραμμένη*), fittest for real contests, which in Antiphon is still

¹ Dionys. *de Lys.* c. 2.

rude, but which is found in the more artistic speeches of Lysias. Thirdly, he corrected the Gorgian idea of rhythmical beauty (*εὐρυθμία*) in prose, by moderating the effort to frame prose in the strict rhythms of verse, and, according to Aristotle—though the fragments of Thrasymachos do not illustrate that statement—by introducing the paeon¹. The significance of Thrasymachos is twofold. In respect to rhythm and to his conception of a middle style, he may be considered as the forerunner of Isokrates. In respect to his development of the terse period, to his training in the forensic Rhetoric, and to the practical bent of his work, he is the pioneer of Lysias and of those orators, whether forensic or deliberative, who are in contrast with the Gorgians and Isokraties.

His place in the history.

Lysias.

Lysias now completes the reaction from the poeticism of Gorgias and the stateliness of Antiphon. He boldly takes as his material the diction of the private citizen who has had the ordinary Athenian education; and, being an artist of true genius, Lysias shapes out of this a singularly beautiful prose. The conception was fortunate; it was in essential harmony with the spirit of Attic Greek; and, if a Lysias had not arisen, the world would not have known some most delicate felicities of that idiom. It was a faculty of the language developed once for all, committed to an exquisite record, and thus secured against the possibility of being missed by anyone who hereafter should aim at mastery over all the resources of Attic speech. Nor was the lesson

¹ Above, p. 61.

lost on Demosthenes and Hypereides any more than on the Augustan Atticists.

It might have seemed that a finished simplicity *Isokrates.* so congenial to the Attic spirit had for ever superseded the ideal of Gorgias. But, just as the influence of that ideal was declining, a pupil of Gorgias came forward to show that his master's theory, though deformed by extravagances, was grounded in truth. Isokrates proved that, without loss of ease and fluency, prose may be artistically ornate in the general sense of Gorgias, (that is, with the aid of certain embellishments proper to poetry,) if only these are rightly chosen and are temperately used. The great difference between the work of Lysias and the work of Isokrates is this:—Lysias did perfectly *His work compared with that of Lysias.* what could be done to such perfection in pure Attic alone: Isokrates did excellently, though not faultlessly, a thing from which the finest instincts of Attic Greek were averse, but which, on the other hand, could be reproduced with fair success in any language that was sufficiently flexible and polished. Lysias traced the canon of Attic subtlety. Isokrates sent his influence from Greece into modern Europe *He founds a Normal Prose.* by founding a norm of literary prose.

Two circumstances especially favoured his aptitude for such a task. The first was that, until after the time of Aristotle, epideictic oratory, the branch of Isokrates, had a higher dignity in general estimation than either the forensic or the deliberative. *Estimation of the Epideictic branch.* A forensic or a deliberative speech had served its purpose when it had been spoken; it might be published, for students or for statesmen; but it was not

intrinsically a part of the national literature in the same sense as (for instance) the *Panegyrikos*. Aristotle, who had probably heard Demosthenes, notices him only cursorily. Theophrastos, in tracing the development of Attic prose, stopped at Isokrates. It was only later Greek critics who could see things in a more just perspective. Secondly, Isokrates is the only considerable Attic writer who was also a popular teacher of composition. He could affirm that all the men formed in his school had the same stamp of style: and, so far as the statement can be tested, it seems to be strictly true. The Isokratic prose was meant to be read rather than to be spoken. This is the basis of its character, distinguishing it from the earlier rhetorical prose, and fitting it to influence the literary prose of the modern world. To the conservative section of the Gorgian school this seemed, of course, an error. When Alkidamas¹ attacked Isokrates in his essay against the composers of 'written discourses' (*γραπτοὺς λόγους*),—meaning, by that phrase, discourses composed, not to be spoken, but to be read,—he was loyal to the genuine tradition of his master. The object of Gorgias was to cultivate the faculty of oral and extemporary eloquence. But Isokrates, moved partly by his own want of voice and nerve, partly by the desire of teaching all Greece and of doing permanent work, resolved that epideictic oratory should have a

*The School
of Isokrates.*

*The Iso-
kratic Prose
—meant
chiefly for
readers.*

¹ Sauppe (*O. A.* II. 156) and others reject the *περὶ τῶν τοῦς γραπτοὺς λόγους γραφόντων ἢ περὶ σοφιστῶν*. Blass (*Att. Ber.* II.

327 f.), reviewing the arguments, pronounces—rightly, to my thinking—for its genuineness.

literary form. For these purposes, as he saw, the composition of Gorgias and Thrasymachos, with its short clauses, was not sufficiently copious: that of Thucydides was now too rough. He sought, then, to give speech a fuller flow and a softer tone: and he moderated the use of every ornament which disturbs this flow or violates this tone. The chief marks of Isocratic prose are,—the avoidance of poetical diction; the ampler period; evenness, obtained especially by systematic care against the collision of vowels; and the sparing admission of anything like a declamatory or passionate strain. These essential characteristics, to judge from fragments and from notices, were common to the Isocratic school. Epideictic Rhetoric, in application to its old subjects, was doomed. The first generation of Isocratics already felt that it could not last out their time, and were led, therefore, to widen their range. The application of Epideictic Rhetoric to History was a gain for Rhetoric, and, on the whole, a decided gain for the popular culture of that day: it was even so far a gain to History that much good work was done by men like Theopompos who, fifty years before, would have left nothing but a collection of panegyrical discourses. On the other hand, the vice of an origin from the Rhetoric of display became disastrously apparent when lesser men than Theopompos began to think that they must be accurate if they could, but brilliant at all costs. This evil tendency, however, did not fully set in until the style itself was declining: and it ought not to mislead us into underrating the value to literature of

Its broad characteristics.

Its influence on History-writing.

Theopompos. the Isokratic prose. Theopompos was a thoroughly Isokratic composer, but, as might be expected in the disciple who 'needed the curb,' had more force and passion. Ephoros, emulating the smooth copiousness of his master, was languid and diffuse. Such a contrast of personal temperaments and faculties is the best possible evidence to the definiteness of that common type which could still be recognised in both. The same type was equally clear in Theodektes, who seems to have had some dialectical training; and in *Kephisodoros.* Kephisodoros, who shared the orthodox hostility of his school to dialectic. In short, there was now a literary method, not to be obscured by individualities of culture or of aptitude, in virtue of which its possessor could be called Isokratic.

The Isokratic Type becomes the standard of prose.

Its rivals.

Its influence—how far felt by Plato.

By 350 B.C. this method had no longer any serious rival in its claim to be considered as the normal prose. A writer like the so-called Antisthenes might popularise his dialectic in such a piece as the controversy between Ajax and Odysseus. Alkidamas might defend, and Lykophron illustrate, the principles of Gorgias. Polykrates and Zoilos might show that something of Lysian elegance could be carried into other fields than the forensic. But, for the general uses of literature, the Isokratic style had been accepted as the standard. This may be seen from the way in which its influence grew upon writers outside the school. Plato's style has no law but itself; it has its unique place in the border-land between poetry and prose, being, as a rule, at its highest when it is nearer to the former. For our present purpose, it would scarcely be profitable to

dwell on the *Menexenos*. The general marks of its style are manifest; the easy, irregular structure of dialogue interferes with the management of the unwonted oratorical period; the ornament is in the immature manner of Gorgias, not at all in that of Isokrates or Lysias; the diction shows occasional redundance, and even what a modern reader can agree with ancient Greek criticism in regarding as of doubtful correctness; the habit of irony slips into a homeliness which, here, is grotesque; and a few phrases are 'not far from dithyrambs.' But then it might always be answered that, at worst, the *Menexenos* is an imperfectly elaborated joke. The influence of the new prose, in so far as it was felt by Plato, must be sought on a surer and broader ground. Two general characteristics of his later work seem to afford such ground. First: the later, as compared with the earlier, dialogues—*e.g.* the *Laws*, *Timaeos*, *Kritias* as compared with the *Republic*—have less of short question and answer, and more of continuous exposition. The style of oral dialogue is passing over into a finished literary prose. Secondly: the strongest single peculiarity of the new prose—avoidance of hiatus—becomes more and more marked the later down we go. The instances of hiatus in the *Phaedros* are not one half so numerous as in the *Republic* or the *Symposium*, and the rate of decrease is (approximately) progressive in the *Laws*, *Philebos*, *Timaeos*, *Kritias*, *Sophistes*, *Politikos*¹; suggesting that an emendation which,

¹ See a rough estimate of the averages in Blass, *Att. Ber.* II. 426 f.

in these dialogues, introduces hiatus is, so far, improbable *a priori*.

*Isokrates
and Xeno-
phon.*

Xenophon was no trained rhetor. The natural eloquence which did good service in the Retreat was of the rough and ready kind; nor, in writing, did he consciously or systematically aim at art. If he had studied expression, he would probably have become Lysian: as it is, in his manner of neither seeking nor declining ornament, he is sometimes like Andokides. Xenophon, living away from Athens, did not come under the direct influence of the Isokratic school. But there are indications, which a sober criticism can scarcely reject, that in his later years he was strongly influenced as a writer by his fellow-demesman and early friend, whose works were then read throughout Greece. Xenophon was engaged on the *Hellenika* to the end of his life; and the *Agésilaios*, of which the genuineness seems certain, was one of his very latest writings. In both these there is a distinct dualism of style. The last five books of the *Hellenika* are decidedly smoother and more copious than their predecessors: they have something of the Isokratic manner which just then was coming into history. The *Agésilaios* is thoroughly Xenophontic in diction: the structure of the sentences is, on the whole, rather stiff and uniform: there are characteristic oddities—*e. g.*, the frequency of *γε μήν, ἀλλὰ μήν*—as in the *Hipparchikos* and elsewhere. But the historical portion—a narrative of the hero's deeds, partly adapted from the *Hellenika*—is separate from the rest in its greater smoothness of flow.

Unquestionably it was more as a practical teacher than as a theorist, and more as a writer than as a teacher, that Isokrates was important for Attic prose. Earlier contributors to the Art of Rhetoric had collected materials which Isokrates worked up into something like a system. Anaximenes, who, like Isokrates, conceived political Rhetoric as a culture, drew up the best practical treatise on Rhetoric which has come down to us in Greek; it would have been the best in Greek or Latin, if the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* were not extant. But, if a philosophical treatment is required, neither Anaximenes nor the writer to Herennius can be accepted. Aristotle stands alone. Yet the school of Aristotle—in which Rhetoric was both scientifically and assiduously taught—produced not a single orator of note except Demetrios Phalereus; the school of Isokrates produced a host. Why was this so? Clearly because Isokrates, though inferior in his grasp of principles, was greatly superior in the practical department of teaching. It was not mainly by his theory, *τέχνη*, it was rather by exercises, *μέλῃται*, for which his own writings furnished models, that he formed his pupils. At the same time, his theory, so far as it went, was definite. Aristotle's philosophy of Rhetoric proved comparatively barren, not at all because Rhetoric is incapable of profiting materially by such treatment, but because such treatment can be made fruitful only by laborious attention to the practical side of the discipline. Had Aristotle's Rhetoric been composed a century earlier, it would have been inestimable to oratory. As it was, the right thing was done too late.

*Isokrates
and Aris-
totle as
theorists.*

The Political Oratory is eclectic:

In the political eloquence contemporary with Demosthenes, earlier types are continued, combined and perfected. The Lysian tradition, which Isaeos had striven to ally with the frank strength of technical mastery, is joined by Hypereides to the Isokratic. The Isokratic manner is united, in Lykurgos, to that of the long neglected school of Antiphon. That same archaic style, studied in a greater master, Thucydides, reaches, in Demosthenes, a final harmony with both the Lysian and the Isokratic; while Aeschines, the clever and diligent amateur, shows, by his failures, how much patient science was needed to bring a faultless music out of all the tones which had now made themselves clear in Attic speech.

but fundamentally Isokratic.

But, among these various elements, one is dominant. The Isokratic style has become the basis of the rest.

Isokrates and modern prose.

That style, in its essential characteristics of rhythm and period, passed into the prose of Cicero; modern prose has been modelled on the Roman; and thus, in forming the literary rhetoric of Attica, Isokrates founded that of all literatures.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE DECLINE AND THE REVIVAL.

At the moment when the theory of oratory had been raised from a technical to a scientific form, its practice began to decline: the great analyst who gave a philosophy to Rhetoric was also the master of Demetrios Phalereus. It is commonly said that the declension of Attic oratory dates from the loss of political freedom. The fact is certain: but those who have tried to see what this oratory in its essence was, will be the first to feel that the connexion between the two things is not altogether self-evident. As to the Deliberative branch, that, clearly, was doomed to decay when the questions which the ekklesia could discuss with a practical result came to be hardly more than municipal. A good notion of the manner in which the province of debate was now restricted may be got from a speech¹ made eight years after Chaeroneia, when Alexander was in the mid-career of his Asiatic victories. An Athenian citizen of the Macedonian party had tried to damage his adversary in a law-suit by insinuating that this

Loss of Political Freedom—how far a cause of the decline.

Deliberative Oratory:

¹ Hypereides ὑπὲρ Εὐξενίππου.

adversary had flattered Olympias and Alexander. Hypereides retorts that it would be more to the purpose if, instead of making such charges, Polyeuktos could muster courage to go and denounce the injurious dictation of Macedon before the Panhellenic Congress: but the very way in which this is put implies that it was more than could be expected of ordinary patriotism; and the merit claimed for Euxenippos is not that *he* has done anything of the kind, but simply that he has shunned association with the active Athenian agents of Alexander. As Aristotle says, no one deliberates about the impossible; and, in regard to independent action, the limits of the possible for Athens had become narrow. Nor was the Forensic branch exempt from similar influences. Macedonian blandishments could reach jurors as well as debaters: the art of persuasion, pure and simple, would count for less and less; and the aim of the Athenian writer for the law-courts would become more and more like that of the speaker whose first object is the display of his faculty.

Granting all this, however, why, it may be asked, should not Attic oratory, being essentially a fine art, have found at least one secure refuge in this very department of display; especially since the Epideictic branch had become so closely identified with the national literature? As long as there were such writers as Theopompos, or even Ephoros, a tolerably pure Attic style might surely be preserved, even though there were no longer political inspirations for the deliberative speaker, or, for the advocate, the opportunities of a real equality before the law. After

Forensic.

Epideictic.

all, the deliberative branch itself had developed its best types chiefly from the epideictic.

This question might fairly be raised. And as-^{*Ultimate cause of the decline.*} suredly a true answer to it is not to be found merely in the political circumstances of the time when Athens had just come under the leadership of Macedonia. We must go further back, and look deeper into the conditions under which the best work of Greek art was done. In the Ionian republics, and especially at Athens, while their life was still healthy, letters and the fine arts entered into the education which was received by all citizens alike. Letters and the fine arts were therefore subject to the opinion, not of a class, but of the entire city. The artist, whether sculptor or architect, painter,^{*The great Greek Art was popular:*} poet or orator, received the impress of the national mind, and reflected it from his own. He worked for all the citizens, and he knew that he would be judged, not by a few critics, but by the whole civic body. The Greek genius, in its purest and brightest form, tended of itself to fix its attention on what is essential and typical in nature, and to suppress those mere accidents of which the prominence is always disturbing and at last grotesque. Here was a further safeguard for the artistic worker who began with this inborn tendency. Mannerism and exaggeration may be made the fashion of a clique, but, where public opinion is really free, they will never be popular. The Greek artist who, in rivalry with brother artists, sought for the approbation of his fellow-citizens gathered in the theatre, or going about their daily work amid gracious forms of marble or

*but not
therefore the
less ideal.*

living shapes still more beautiful, in the clear air of Attica and close to the foam and freshness of the sea, knew that no refinements of the study could save him if he was false to nature, and knew, also, that his loyalty to nature would be surely recognised just in proportion as he brought out, not the trivial or transient things, not such things as depend for their interest on an artificial situation, but those lineaments of nature which have the divine simplicity of permanence. It cannot be too often repeated, it is a thoroughly vulgar misconception, more fatal than anything else to the comprehension of all Greek things, to suppose that the Athenian statesmen or cobblers who went to the theatre of Dionysos in the days of Perikles found the art of Sophocles cold because it was ideal, and would have thought the demonstrative and rhetorical pathos of Euripides more 'human.' Their feeling, happily, was very different, or the Parthenon would have been very different too. They felt that the immortal things of humanity are more human than its accidents; and therefore, the poorest of them, they could rise out of the mean or grievous things of daily life into a contemplation which educated the passions that it moved and resolved the anguish of pity or of terror in a musical and chastened joy. The festive disposition of the Greeks is a perpetual snare to modern writers who cannot dissociate the love of dinner-parties from a tone either mildly cynical or at all events the reverse of transcendental, and who hasten to the conclusion that an inquirer exempt from academical sentiment or pedantry will study

the real Greeks in their comedians or their cooks. It was not until the moral unity of the State was broken, and men began to live a life of thought or pleasure apart from the life of the city, that the artists began to work for the few, and that the taste of the many sank below the power of appreciating the highest beauty. Philip, Alexander and their Successors were indeed the apostles of Greek language, Greek art, Greek social civilisation: but between Hellas and Hellenism there was a spiritual separation which no force of the individual mind could do away. Literature and art had been sacred energies and public delights to the citizens of free Athens: to the writers or artists of Antioch or Alexandria they were agreeable industries, inviting reward or awaiting correction from aristocratic patrons, whose artificial canons encouraged either an elaborate vagueness of expression or the pretence of an occult profundity¹. The lapse of literature and art into the depths of affectation is only a matter of time when the judges on whom recognition depends are a capricious and absolute oligarchy. There is no lasting security for truth in artistic creation except an intelligent public, pronouncing with authority and not intimidated by the prescriptions of a coterie or a caste. In this sense, it may justly be said that nothing is so democratic as taste; nor could there be a better illustration than a compari-

*Gulf between
Hellas and
Hellenism.*

*The artists
of Hellen-
ism.*

*Art depends
on a judi-
cious and
candid
public.*

¹ See some admirable observations on this subject in *Greece under the Romans*, pp. 9 f. and 229 f., by Mr George Finlay—a

writer whom, it may be hoped, his countrymen will yet come to know more widely than they did while he was living.

son between the Athens of Perikles and the Alexandria of the Ptolemies.

While, then, the loss of political independence had a certain immediate effect in deteriorating deliberative and forensic oratory, the primary cause of their decline was one which lay deeper, which had begun its slow workings before Philip had a footing in Greece, and which affected the literary form of artistic prose even more strongly than the other two forms. This cause was the same which gradually vitiated every other branch of Greek art, and which prepared the downfall of Greek independence itself—the decay of the citizen-life of the Greek republics, whereby Greek art in every kind lost that popular character which was the external safeguard of the Greek artist's instinct for truth. It is important, therefore, to get rid of the notion that, when 'Asianism' is opposed to 'Atticism', the meaning is that Attic simplicity was overlaid by the tawdry taste of the Orientals among whom Greek letters were diffused by the conquests of Alexander. It is true that, in the new Hellenic settlements of Karia, Mysia and the Hellespont, Greek nationality was less pure, and that when the Augustan Atticists wished to stigmatise their opponents they loved to call them Phrygians¹. But the depravation began in Athens itself: it became universal, because the de-

*Meaning of
'Asianism.'*

¹ A lost treatise of Cæcilius—who also wrote on the question, *τίμη διαφέρει ὁ Ἀττικὸς ζῆλος τοῦ Ἀσιανοῦ*—was called *κατὰ τῶν Φρυγῶν*—being a polemical introduction to his Lexicon of Attic

phrases: Suidas s. v. *Κακίλιος*. Cf. Cic. *Orat.* § 25, *Itaque Caria et Phrygia et Mysia, quod minime politae minimeque elegantes sunt, asciverunt opimum quoddam et tanquam adipatae dictionis genus.*

moralisation of the Greeks was universal: it passed over to Asia with the literature of the emigration, and there it grew worse: but it grew worse everywhere else too. Kallisthenes of Stageiros, Timaeos of Tauromenion, had the 'Asiatic' tendency as distinctly as any son of Tralles or Alabanda. 'Asiatic', as applied to Greek oratory, is properly a geographical term only. It expresses the fact that, from about 320 to about 280 B.C., the new Greek settlements in Asia Minor were the parts of Hellas in which oratory and prose literature were most actively cultivated. The general character of this prose was the same as the general character of prose in Sicily, at Athens, and in every other part of Hellas. 'Asianism' versus 'Atticism' means the New versus the Old Oratory. The essential difference between them is this. The Old Oratory was an art, and was therefore based upon a theory. The New Oratory was a knack, *τρίβη*, and was founded upon practice, *μέλῃτη*. Atticism was technical and, in its highest phase, scientific. Asianism was empirical. The flourishing period of Asianism was that during which the whole training of the rhetor consisted in declamation. The revival of Atticism dates from the moment when attention was recalled to theory.

Essential difference between Atticism and Asianism.

From 300 to about 250 B.C. the general course of the decline can be made out with tolerable clearness. From 250 to about 150 B.C. all is dark. When light comes again, Asianism is seen fully developed and wholly triumphant; but a reaction to Atticism is setting in. This reaction may be considered as beginning with Hermagoras of Temnos, about

Course of the Decline and the Revival.

110 B. C.¹, and as completed at Rome by Dionysios of Halikarnassos, about 20 B. C.

The general character of Asianism, or the New Prose, results from the fact that it is founded on no theory of prose-writing as an art. The prose composition, whether history or oration, is not contemplated as a whole, and consequently no care is taken to preserve a symmetry of parts. Hence arises exaggeration; and this exaggeration is usually in one of two principal directions. Sometimes it is an exaggerated desire of grandeur or splendour which leads the writer to say all things in a diction which should have been kept for the great things. Sometimes it is an exaggerated desire of point which makes him heedless whether the thought which he is expressing is obscured or made ridiculous by the turn which he gives to it. Asianism oscillates between bombast and importunate epigram. The fresh currents of public criticism in the Athens of Perikles would have blown such tricks to the winds: in schools or palaces their sickly growth was sheltered:—

and not the Sun-god's fire,

Not heaven's pure dew comes there, nor any wind.

These tendencies universal, 320—250 B. C.

During the first half century or so of the decadence—to about 250 B. C.—we are able to see this, at least, clearly, that the new tendencies are at work in all schools alike. Not even the definite Isokratic type,

¹ See Blass in his book on Greek Oratory from Alexander to Augustus, p. 85. From Cic. *de Invent.* i. § 8 it is clear that Hermagoras

the technician had then been long dead. As Blass says, he must at least belong to the 2nd century B. C.

or the scientific Rhetoric founded by Aristotle, is proof against them. Aristotle's pupil Demetrios of Phaleron is named by Cicero as the first who impaired the strength of Attic oratory, 'preferring his own sweetness to the weight and dignity of his predecessors'¹. His style, like his life, was elegantly luxurious; but in becoming ornate it became nerveless; there is no longer, says Cicero, 'sucus ille et sanguis incorruptus', the sap, the fresh vigour, which had hitherto been in oratory; in their place there is 'fucatus nitor', an artificial gloss². In the school of Isokrates, the decline is represented by Kallisthenes of Stageiros, who accompanied Alexander to the East, and who, in a memoir, described the Pamphylian Sea as lashing its shores for joy at the hero's approach. Timaeos of Tauromenion, also an imitator of Isokrates, did not err on this side, but had the taste for verbal conceits in a measure which the Middle Comedy would not have tolerated. Kleitarchos, son of the historian Deinon, was more like Kallisthenes; as the author of the treatise *On Sublimity* observes³, 'His pipe is small, but he blows it loud'; and the criticism is justified by a specimen of his manner which another writer has preserved. Kleitarchos, describing the habits of a bee, said, *κατανέμεται τὴν ὀρεινῆν*,—just, the critic complains, as if he had been speaking of the Erymanthian boar⁴. But the new tendencies are more strongly exemplified by Hegesias of Magnesia, (about 270 B. C.), who has sometimes been called, in a

¹ Cic. *Brut.* § 38.² Cic. *Orat.* § 92.³ *περὶ ὑψους* III. 2.⁴ Demetr. *περὶ ἐρμηνείας* § 304.

misleading phrase, the founder of Asianism. Hegesias was deliberately opposed to everything that Isokrates had introduced and Demosthenes had perfected. In diction, he was a coarse imitator of Lysias; in composition, he adopted a style of short clauses which was his own. Dionysios¹ pronounces him 'finnikin' (*μικρόκομψον*), 'languid,' and blames especially his 'ignoble rhythms'—meaning thereby especially the trochee and the tribrach as opposed to the paeon and the dactyl. But the chief characteristic of his style must have been the curious combination of jerkiness and magniloquence, of which the following is a specimen²:—*ὁμοιον πεποιήκας, Ἀλέξανδρε, Θήβας κατασκάψας, ὡς ἂν εἰ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐκ τῆς κατ' οὐρανὸν μερίδος ἐκβάλοι τὴν σελήνην. τὸν γὰρ ἥλιον ὑπολείπομαι ταῖς Ἀθήναις. δύο γὰρ αὐταὶ πόλεις τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦσαν ὄψεις. διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐτέρας ἀγωνιῶ νῦν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμὸς ἢ Θηβαίων ἐκκέκοπται πόλις.* Within fifty years after the death of Demosthenes, Hegesias could be a favourite. Gorgias of Athens, Cicero's master, took his examples from Hegesias as well as from Demosthenes and Hypereides; Varro³ and Strabo⁴ praised him; and it was reserved for Cicero and Dionysios to discover that he was an example of what is to be avoided.

*Period from
250 to 150
B.C. obscure.*

From 250 to 150 B.C. the history of Greek oratory is as obscure as the names which represent it. But, as appears from the sequel, such general tend-

¹ *De comp. verb.* p. 122.

² Phot. *cod.* 250, pp. 446 f., who quotes it from Agatharchides, a geographer who flourished about

130 B.C.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* XII. 6.

⁴ Strabo, p. 396.

encies as those represented by Timaeos on the one hand, and by Kallisthenes or Hegesias on the other, had been gaining ground. 'There are,' says Cicero, Cicero on the two kinds of Asianism. 'two kinds of the Asiatic style. One is aphoristic, pointed, with turns of thought which have less weight or moral dignity than neatness and elegance. . . . The other kind is not studded with such points; rather it rushes with an impetuous stream, and this is the manner now universal in Asia (50 B. C.). But it is not merely fluent; its language is also ornate and polished. This was the style used by Aeschylus of Knidos and by my contemporary, Aeschines of Miletos. They were distinguished by rushing eloquence, not by epigrammatic turns of thought¹.'

The first of these two manners, the epigrammatic, was represented, according to Cicero, by the brothers Hierokles and Menekles of Alabanda, about 120 B. C. The second manner, that of ornate declamation, is represented by Aeschylus of Knidos and Aeschines of Miletos, about 80 B. C. It may be observed that why one was earlier, the other later. the full development of the declamatory manner naturally came later than the other; for it was the last result of those declamatory exercises on which Asianism was founded². In the progress of the decadence Hegesias was to Aeschylus of Knidos much what Antiphon was to Demosthenes.

At the time when Asianism of the sententious Atticism prepared by Hermagoras.

¹ *Brut.* § 325.

² Aeschines opened a school at Rhodes when he left Athens in 330 B. C.: [*Plut.*] *vitt. X. oratt.*

This ῥοδιακὸν διδασκαλεῖον was undoubtedly a school of declamation: Aeschines did not profess to teach the art of Rhetoric.

kind was prevalent, the first step towards the revival of Atticism was taken by Hermagoras of Temnos.

*Revival of
a Theory.*

The art of Rhetoric, which now for a century and a half had exercised little influence on oratory, had

*Phases of
Rhetoric—
the Practical:*

passed at Athens through two phases. First, the Practical Rhetoric founded in Sicily by Korax had been perfected by Anaximenes and Isokrates. This could not exist without a practical object; it perished before Athens had become what Athens was in the days of Polybios. ‘The sea is there and the headlands and the everlasting hills; Athênê still stands spear in hand, as the guardian of her chosen city; Dêmos still sits in Pnyx; he still chooses Archons by the lot and Generals by the uplifted hand; but the fierce democracy has sunk into the lifelessness of a cheerless and dishonoured old age; its decrees consist of fulsome adulation of foreign kings; its demagogues and orators are sunk into beggars who wander from court to court to gather a few talents of alms for the People which once received tribute from a thousand cities¹.’ But, just as the Practical Rhetoric was about to perish because its occupation was gone, Aristotle claimed Rhetoric for philosophy.

*The Philoso-
phical:*

The Philosophical Rhetoric necessarily aimed, of course, at forming practical orators; but, unlike its predecessor, it had a reason for existing independently of results. In the schools of the philosophers accordingly, and chiefly in the Peripatetic school, it had lived on. Hermagoras now worked up the treatises both of the Practical and of the Philosophi-

¹ Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, vol. 1. p. 221.

cal Rhetoric into a new system. His object was practical; but he followed the philosophers in giving his chief care to the province of Invention. Erring on the side of too much subtlety, he founded a Rhetoric which, as distinguished from the Practical and the Philosophical, may be called the Scholastic¹. For Greek oratory this could do little directly. But for Roman oratory Hermagoras and his followers did very much what the school of Isokrates had done for Athens. And both to Greece and to Rome they did good service by reviving the conception of oratory not as a knack but as an art, and so preparing men once more to discern between the true artists and the false. It is not a mere coincidence, it is one illustration more of the close bond between oratory and the other arts that, just about the time when the Atticist revival was beginning, there are traces of a renaissance in Greek sculpture. From about 300 to 150 B.C. the school of Lysippos had prevailed—a school which substituted the real for the ideal, selecting the basest subjects if in these a frigid technical skill could be shown forth. In sculpture, as in oratory, ingenuity or pretension had marred simplicity, dignity and beauty; and the generation that began to revolt from Hegesias began also to revolt from Lysippos.

It may have been Cicero who paid a compliment to his teacher Molon by setting the fashion of distinguishing a Rhodian School from the Attic and the Asiatic. Such a school is unknown to Dionysios,

¹ For the system of Hermagoras, see Volkman, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*: esp §§ 3—4, pp. 20—30.

*The Scholastic.
Its uses to
Greece and
to Rome.*

*Revival of
Sculpture
contemporary
with
Atticism.*

*Reaction
from and
School of
Lysippos.*

*So-called
Rhodian
School:*

Caecilius or Strabo. It is, in fact, confusing to treat it as separate. The Rhodian orators, so far as they had a common stamp, were eclectics, borrowing from the epigrammatic Asianism, but, on the whole, inclined to Atticism of the type represented by Hypereides. Under the Successors of Alexander, Rhodes had become important, first, politically, and then, as a result of this, in a literary and scientific sense. The oratorical school does not seem to have been famous before 100 B.C. Apollonios and Molon were both Karians of Alabanda, who, like many other men whose names illustrated Rhodes, migrated thither for a career. Cicero is no impartial panegyrist of a school to which he probably owed many faults; and, in the judgment of Dionysios, the Atticism of the Rhodians was perverse. Yet, in its degree, it must have done good service at a time when florid declamation was almost universally popular; and, through Cicero, it brought the better of two rival influences into the mighty stream of Roman life.

a mere compromise in favour of Atticism.

Rhodes under the Diadochi.

*Fame for oratory—
from circ.
100 B.C.*

*Estimate of
the Rhodian
merits.*

*Roman view
of Oratory.*

*Progress of
the Greek
view at
Rome.*

Before Roman oratory could be even indirectly influenced by Greek, there was an obstacle to be removed. The Roman mind, unlike the Greek, did not instinctively conceive the public speaker as an artist. It conceived him strictly as a citizen, weighty by piety, years, or office, who has something to say for the good of the other citizens, and whose dignity, hardly less than the value of his hearer's time, enjoins a pregnant and severe conciseness. Cato detested Greek rhetoric. The Gracchi, on the other hand, were more Hellenic in their tastes; and before

100 B.C. the florid Asianism had admirers and perhaps imitators at Rome. Declamations in Greek on abstract questions (*θέσεις, quaestiones*) were first introduced: then, about Cicero's time, came exercises on definite cases founded in fact (*ὑποθέσεις, caussae*), either forensic or deliberative—the latter being *suasoriae*. In Cicero's time, or a little later, there were also *controversiae*—dealing with special situations, but not with special persons; *e.g.*, what a brave man is to do in such or such circumstances; and these at once recall the nature of the exercises which Aeschines is said to have founded at Rhodes. Lastly, under the Empire, we have declamations on poetical or fancy themes. Now, all these declamatory exercises were in the interest of Asianism. *favourable to Asianism.*

What was necessary to give Atticism a future at Rome was that the theory of Rhetoric should have a place there. It was a great step gained when, about 92 B.C., L. Plotius and others opened schools for the teaching of Rhetoric in Latin. *Roman schools of Rhetoric.* The censors, as might have been expected, opposed this: in the last days of the Republic, Rome was rather scandalised by the first instance of a Knight teaching Rhetoric; but learners were numerous from the first.

As early as 90 B.C., then, the Greek conception of oratory was established at Rome. Roman oratory was to be, in some way, artistic. The question remained, Was this way to be the 'Asiatic' or the 'Attic'? *Asianism versus Atticism.*

About 95 B.C. Hortensius began to be the Latin representative of Asianism. *Hortensius.* It was his dis-

inction that he combined its two manners, sententious point and florid declamation. His vivacity was probably his best quality: it is characteristic of the man that he studied all aids to theatrical effect, and also that, when he had reached the consulship, his oratorical ambitions were fulfilled. Cicero now comes forward as the representative of the Rhodian eclecticism. His success, though not exactly a victory for the Attic school, was, at least, a sure sign that the Atticists would finally prevail. Cicero, like his Rhodian masters, is by no means emancipated from Asianism; and, in a comparison with Demosthenes, his faults of form are made more conspicuous by the usual absence of great thoughts and of really noble feeling. The force of the recent and surely extravagant reaction against Cicero comes from the habit of regarding him as the great Roman orator, not as the great Roman master of literary rhetorical prose. His proper Greek analogue is not Demosthenes but Isokrates. As a practical orator, Cicero can scarcely be placed in the second rank by those who know the Attic models. As a stylist in the epideictic kind, though he has not consummate art, he joins versatile strength to brilliancy and abundance in a degree which has never been equalled.

Calvus. The pure Atticism of Rome may be dated from about 60 B. C. Its best representative was the poet and forensic orator, Gaius Licinius Calvus (82—48 B. C.), who imitated Lysias in a field of work as limited as the Greek writer's own, but who, like Lysias, was not untouched by a generous sympathy

with the great political interests of his day. Next to Calvus probably came Messalla Corvinus, who translated the defence of Phryne by Hypereides, and who is said to have been not unsuccessful in reproducing something of the master's eloquence. Atticism was the return, not to a school, but to a phase of the Greek mind: and, as the men who represented this phase were most various, it was inevitable that the revival should have factions. One sect of the earlier Roman Atticists worshipped Xenophon; another, Thucydides; another, Lysias and Hypereides. To adopt Xenophon as an oratorical standard was a mere mistake: in style, he is an unpractical Andokides: and for the advocate, at least, no model could be less suitable¹. Thucydides, again, is at once transitional and unique: to imitate him in another language was therefore a twofold error. The Lysians and Hypereideans could have shown far better reason for their choice, if only the distinctive excellence of Lysias and Hypereides, their *χάρις* or grace, had not been the very thing which no Greek had succeeded in reproducing, and which manifestly could not be translated into an idiom which was not its own. At last Dionysios came forward to maintain that the excellences of Thucydides, of Isokrates, of Lysias, and if these, then the excellences of Xenophon and Hypereides too, meet in Demosthenes.

It must be borne in mind that the practical benefits to be derived from Atticism by Rome were of a different order from those which could be derived

*Messalla
Corvinus.*

*The sects
of Roman
Atticism;*

Xenophonics:

Thucydideans:

*Lysians
and Hypereideans.*

Demosthenics.

*Fruits of
Atticism
for Rome
and for
Greece.*

¹ *A forensi strepitu remotissimus: Cic. Orat. § 32.*

from it by Greece. Rome was only developing her artistic literature: Greece had seen hers pass through maturity to decay. The sapling might be trained to lines of growth in which it should bear fruit hereafter; the withered tree could blossom no more. The Atticist Revival gave Rome true canons for living work. It gave Greece, not this, but the only thing now possible, a standard for the appreciation of the past. The representative of the revival, as it affected Rome, is Cicero. The representative of the revival, as it affected both Rome and Greece, is Dionysios of Halikarnassos, the greatest critic of the ancient world who was not a philosopher. Philosophical criticism began with Aristotle; and, for antiquity, may be said to have ended with him. But the literary criticism of the ancient world was never so thorough as in Dionysios. He and his friend Caecilius, those two men who, in the reign of Augustus, gave a complete expression to all the tendencies and energies of the reaction which had been growing for nearly a century, had this for a common characteristic,—they were determined not to lose themselves in the subtleties of the new Scholastic Rhetoric: they saw that there was better work to be done. They did not try to strike out a new path through these technical mazes, like Apollodoros of Pergamos or his antagonist Theodoros of Gadara just before them, or like Hermogenes after them. On technical points, Dionysios generally goes back to Aristotle or Theophrastos. He and his friend saw that the revival of theory had performed its part, by recalling atten-

Dionysios

*the literary
critic of
antiquity.*

*Scope
of work
chosen by
him and by
Caecilius.*

*Technical
Rhetoric not
their field.*

tion to those works of true art by which the theory was illustrated. What was now needed was not a more minute analysis but a better aesthetic criticism. For Cicero's teacher at Athens, Demosthenes and Hegesias were alike classical. This must not be. Men must be taught to feel, and not merely to recognise by a mechanical test, that Hegesias and Demosthenes are of different orders. This desire of clearer insight into the things which make the Attic excellences was necessarily connected with the task of separating genuine from spurious works. In the catalogues of the orators (*ῥητορικὸν πίνακες*) at Pergamos or Alexandria the librarian had merely to register the traditional authorship. He could not enter upon critical inquiries. Such inquiries were undertaken by Dionysios and Caecilius. The paper of Dionysios on Deinarchos exemplifies his method. The evidence used is external as well as internal: the rhetor's life is sketched; his models are indicated; the tradition is tried by its warranty, by that conception of the writer's style which the critic has formed for himself, and by the subject-matter. Dionysios was, however, preeminently the literary critic, Caecilius was preeminently the scholar and grammarian. The treatment of the Attic orators by the two men respectively suggests the greater independence and greater subtlety of Dionysios in this field. On the other hand, Caecilius was the first to cultivate a province on which Dionysios does not seem to have entered. The register of Attic phrases compiled by Caecilius—who probably wrote a rhetorical lexicon also—stood, as the first of its kind,

Aesthetic criticism now needed.

Discrimination of true and spurious writings.

Special work of Dionysios.

and of Caecilius.

between the glossaries of Alexandria and such later lexicons as those of Harpokration.

*Asianism as
viewed by
Cicero and
by Greek
Atticists.*

The spirit which animated all this various work came from a certain way of looking at the whole development of Greek prose since Alexander. Cicero, the Roman, conceives Atticism as an unbroken tradition, which was merely adulterated and debased by those influences which are called Asiatic. In one sense this is most true. Athens made once for all the conquest of Hellenic prose. The forms of the Attic dialect became once for all the standard forms of Greek literature, and are so in the newspapers of today. From Polybios to Trikoupes the literary supremacy of Athens has been acknowledged by men who have written in a dialect which they did not speak. It has been truly said that the latest Byzantine was, in language, nearer to Xenophon than Xenophon was to Herodotos¹. On the other hand, just as a Roman could scarcely comprehend the feeling with which Demosthenes regarded Philip, so a Roman could scarcely comprehend the feeling with which Dionysios and Caecilius regarded Hegesias. To those Greek scholars living in Augustan Rome, Asianism, when they looked back on it and compared it with the art of better days, seemed not merely a debasement, but an extinction, of the soul by which that art had lived. Attic forms might be retained; but without the Attic spirit they were dead. The continuity had been merely outward. Let us hear Dionysios say this in his own vivid words. 'Great thanks might justly be given to our days, most

*Dionysios
on the De-
cline and the
Revival.*

¹ Freeman, *Unity of History*.

excellent Ammaeus, as well for an improvement in other branches of culture, as particularly for the signal advance that has been made by the study of Civil Oratory. For, in the times before ours, the old scientific Rhetoric was threatened with abolition by the contumelies and outrages that it suffered. From the death of Alexander of Macedon it began to yield up its spirit and gradually to fade; and in our own generation it was all but totally extinguished. A stranger crept into the other's place—immodest, theatrical, ill-bred, intolerable, imbued neither with philosophy nor with any other liberal discipline; stealthily she imposed on the ignorance of the multitude; and, besides living in greater wealth, luxury, splendour than her predecessor, drew into her own hands all those threads of political power and influence which should have been held by her wiser sister. Utterly vulgar and meddlesome, the usurper at last made Greece like to the households of misguided profligates. For, even as in such houses the true wife, freeborn and virtuous, sits powerless over all that is her own, while a giddy paramour, a presence fatal to the home, claims to govern its fortunes, heaping scorns and threats on their rightful queen; even so in every city—aye, and worst of all, in the seats of culture no less than elsewhere—the Attic Muse, daughter of the land and of its memories, had been disinherited and made a mockery, while the abuse that had come but yesterday from some barbarians of Asia, an outlandish baggage from Phrygia or Karia, presumed to rule the cities of Greece, when, by her, the other had been driven

from their councils—the wise damsel by the foolish, the modest by the mad¹.

*Permanent
results of the
revival.*

Atticism could not quicken the dead things of Greece, nor could it permanently guard Rome against the intrusions of a false taste. Two things, however, it did, and for these it deserves the gratitude of mankind. It set correct models before those great Roman writers who, in their turn, have been examples to the modern world. It founded a Greek criticism of Greek literature in which the perspective was just, and recorded the reasons of men, whose qualifications and opportunities were complete, for comparative estimates which the sense of posterity has approved, but to which posterity alone could not have given so authoritative a sanction. Greek lived on, to be the tongue in which Marcus and Julian, by the Danube or the Rhine, asserted the late supremacy of a wisdom that carried the seeds of death, to bring the message of a hope beyond the grave and to bear on a strenuous tide the voices of men whom that promise made sublime, to be the record of empire in the city of Constantine, to write its legends on the stones of Ravenna or to blazon them on the apses of Venice and Torcello, even to keep bright the memories of civil freedom where, in a northern isolation, in the Tauric land washed by the harbourless sea, the fire once taken from Megara burned for centuries on the last altar of the hearth that had a Greek commonwealth for its shrine, and at last, in our own age, after a second deliverance from the barbarian, most happily to be-

¹ Dionys. *περὶ τῶν ἀρχ. ῥητόρων*, proem.

come once more the language of a free Greek people ; but never under any sky to recover that balance of its native qualities which had been so perfect and so transient. Yet the writers and speakers who had moulded Attic speech were to have an influence which should be world-wide and perpetual even when it was unfelt. After that long night for Greek art which began with the death of Alexander, when the cold dawn of a new day was breaking on the earth silent under the dominion of Augustus, men of Greek race rekindled an instinct for the best things that Greece had done in the half-forgotten morning of her gladness, her glorious strength, her beauty made musical by intelligent and gracious self-mastery. As the little band of Xenophon's comrades, hemmed in by barbarians and fighting their way back to Hellas out of the heart of Asia, burst into a cry of joy as they saw from the hill-top the first light of the waves of the Euxine, so these loyal workers were rejoiced afar off by a gleam from the sunlit surface of that clear sea which ripples at the feet of a pure and an immortal Aphrodite. They strove on, and won their way to their goal : for they brought the Athenian spirit once more into the central current of human life by communicating it to the genius of Rome.