

A

# HISTORY OF GREECE.

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VOL. II.

*FROM THE FORMATION OF THE CONFEDERACY  
OF DELOS TO THE CLOSE OF ~~THE~~  
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.*

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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

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## BOOK II.—*continued.*

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### CHAPTER VIII.

#### THE CONFEDERACY OF DELOS.

THE destruction of the Persian power in Europe was followed by the rapid growth of Athenian empire; and in the events which led to the aggrandisement of Athens the most prominent actor is Themistokles. During the months which intervened between the alleged marauding expedition to Andrôs and the siege and fall of Sestos he vanishes altogether from our view; but when the Athenians, conveying their households from Salamis, begin the work of restoring their ruined city and cultivating their wasted lands, we see him moving onwards to the accomplishment of his lifelong task with a sagacity which no enemies can baffle and a firmness which no difficulties can overcome. In the great struggle which, so far as Western Hellas was concerned, had now been brought to an end, the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies had probably been not so slack or so utterly indifferent and selfish as Athenian tradition represented them to have been. The defeat at Thermopylai was probably more serious than the story of Leonidas would lead us to suppose;<sup>1078</sup> and in that defeat Athens may have suffered as well as Sparta. Nor are we on the whole justified in saying that the Spartans were culpably dilatory in sending out their forces under

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The rebuilding of Athens and the fortification of the Peiræus. 479 B.C.

<sup>1078</sup> See vol. i. page 516.

BOOK  
II.

Pausanias: <sup>1079</sup> but whatever their shortcomings may have been, it is but fair to admit that they may have been exaggerated in the Athenian stories as the faults of Athens in her relations with her allies were undoubtedly exaggerated by the Corinthians and the Spartans. But the old vices of disunion and tribal jealousy had at best been only smothered; and with the feeling of relief from danger they lapsed into their former habits. That their barbarian invaders had made shipwreck by their lack of order and military discipline, and that thus the catastrophe was mainly of their own causing, <sup>1080</sup> they were well aware: but the Spartan view was too narrow to measure the risk which they would have run, if with a better military system the Persians had been animated by a common interest and a spirit of voluntary obedience to law. The danger of Persian conquest to the west of the Hellespont was now practically at an end; but the Spartans spoke and acted as if the chance of Persian invasion should determine the policy and relations of the Peloponnesian and extra-Peloponnesian states. Sparta had no walls; and the Corinthian isthmus might be made at any time to serve as a common screen for the defence of the whole peninsula. The fortifications of Thebes had indefinitely strengthened the hands of the invaders; and they chose to infer that the fortification of any other city might lead to the same mischief. In the present state of Hellas these fears were probably real: but Spartan stupidity seems to be betrayed in the notion that the conditions of war would remain unchanged, and that the Peloponnesos would at all times be a sufficient defence and refuge for the inhabitants of all the Hellenic cities. Spartans, however, seldom analysed their own feelings: and when they heard that the Athenians were preparing to rebuild their shattered walls, they had some justification for thinking that a people who had sacrificed so much for the common cause might be induced to forego that which they affected to regard rather as a luxury for thieves and pirates than a necessity for honest freemen. But Themistokles had made up his mind that Athens should be great; and he knew that she

<sup>1079</sup> See vol. i. page 567 *et seq.*

<sup>1080</sup> ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῶ τὰ πλείω σφαιλέντα. Thuc. i. 69.

could not be great unless she were also wealthy. Until the wave of barbarian conquest swept over the land, Attica had attracted to itself a singularly large population of foreigners, whose capital and skilled workmanship were fast enriching the country. It was of the utmost moment, if Athens was ever to hold her own, that this population of *Metoikoi* who had been driven out on the approach of Xerxes should be induced to return; <sup>1081</sup> but although the temporary remission of the *Metoikion*, or tax imposed on foreign residents, could not be without its attracting influence, yet this influence would be but small, if security for property were wanting. Hence not merely for the sake of her navy, but for the sake of her trade and commerce, it was indispensably necessary that Athens should be itself fortified and should also possess an impregnable harbour; and Themistokles set himself to supply both these wants with a quiet resolution which carried him over all obstacles. Of the Spartan request, that the Athenians should not only abstain from rebuilding their own walls but should join them in dismantling the walls of all other cities to the north of the Corinthian isthmus, he took no notice: and by his advice the Spartans were dismissed with the promise that the Athenians would send their own ambassadors to discuss the matter. No sooner had they departed than Themistokles at his own wish was intrusted with the mission, his colleagues being *Abronychos*, the son of *Lysikles*, and *Aristeides* the victorious general of *Plataiai*. Themistokles set out at once on his errand, charging his countrymen to strain every nerve in rebuilding the walls, and not to dispatch his colleagues until the walls had reached a height which would enable them to bid defiance to attack. Young and old, women and children, must all take part in the great work, and hand down to coming generations the memory of efforts which were needed to secure not merely their power but their very existence as a state. For the accomplishment of this task nothing was to be spared. The gods themselves would not grudge the stones of their temples for a work without which they might lack both worshippers and offerings. In short, to raise these walls as if by the speed of magic, every-

<sup>1081</sup> *Died.* xi. 43.

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thing else might be thrown down. But while at Athens the people outdid themselves in their eagerness to achieve the task, Themistokles at Sparta declined all official audiences until he could be supported by his colleagues, of whose early arrival, whatever might be the cause of their delay, he professed to have no doubt. The feeling of friendship for the victor of Salamis was still strong at Sparta. But it underwent a severe strain when tidings came, in all likelihood, if not certainly, from the Aiginetans, that the walls of Athens had already been raised to a formidable height; and Themistokles felt that he must take one step further. To the charge brought against the Athenians he gave a positive denial; but he urged the Spartans, if they doubted his words, to send ambassadors to ascertain the facts. These messengers lost no time in making their way to Athens; but before they could reach it, the Athenians had received from Themistokles the charge to detain these Spartans until his colleagues who had now reached Sparta should with himself have returned home. No sooner was he assured that his countrymen held these men as hostages for his safety than he made to the Spartan ephors a full confession of his motives and his plans. The walls of Athens, he told them, had been raised to a height which would enable the Athenians to undergo a blockade without fear: and Athens, he insisted, had a full right to be girt about with walls, unless this right was to be denied to every city in the Peloponnesos. Anything like freedom of speech and independence of action would be impossible, if any one member of the confederacy stood on a vantage-ground with respect to the rest; and if Athens now happened to be without walls, it was only because she had chosen to suffer all that could befall her rather than abandon the common cause. Athens, moreover, had done nothing to forfeit the independence which she had long since won: and her allies must extend to her that perfect freedom of counsel and action which, if thwarted by Athens, they would assuredly claim for themselves. In short, the work of Themistokles was done. If the Spartans had dreamed of hoodwinking the Athenians, they were fairly caught in their own trap. They had professed to offer only friendly advice; and they could not with

decency express anger when that advice was rejected. But they felt keenly the vexation to which for the time they dared not give vent; and the ambassadors on each side returned to their several homes without a formal recall. On his return to Athens, Themistokles found the whole city walled in, not indeed to the full height which he had desired: but his wishes were at least realised to the half of what he looked for. The work exhibited ample evidence of the haste with which it had been raised. Columns from tombs and wrought stones from temples were worked in with the unhewn and unshapen materials of which they were content to avail themselves for the foundations.<sup>1082</sup>

But Athens had been saved by her wooden walls; and Themistokles, who had insisted that they could withstand the barbarians effectually only within these floating bulwarks, now insisted that nothing must be left undone to make her navy irresistible. We cannot doubt that in his eyes the most judicious plan would have been the total abandonment of Athens. Between the city and its nearest sea-coast lay a space of more than four miles; and twice within the limits of a single year the inhabitants had been compelled to leave their homes and seek a refuge elsewhere. Such forced migrations ought at all costs except that of freedom and independence to be avoided; but the Athenians could never be insured against them so long as they remained in a spot where they could not fall back upon their fleet; and if Themistokles could not venture in so many words to advise the abandonment of the old city with all its sacred and time-honoured associations, he gave them counsel which, if followed, would bring about much the same result. During his year of office, shortly before the Persian invasion,<sup>1083</sup> he had begun

The public works of Themistokles.

<sup>1082</sup> Another version of the tale represented Themistokles as bribing the ephors into conniving at his plans. The absurdity of the supposition may enable us to measure the truth of these charges of bribery in those instances in which they are urged with greater plausibility. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 334, thinks this bribery not improbable. In all likelihood, the ephors would belong to those Spartan families whose jealousy of Athens would be most obstinate. Again, though Hellenic probity in the matter of money may not stand high, we are scarcely justified in regarding a whole board as open to bribery. No such charge was ever urged against the whole body of Athenian archons.

<sup>1083</sup> The words of Thucydides, i. 93, do not specify either the nature of his office or the exact date at which he filled it. Nor is any further light thrown on it by the Scholiast, who simply says that before the Median invasion Themistokles ἤρξεν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα. These words cannot be made to mean 'the year before the capture of Athens, and the office of Strategos was annual as well as the Archonship: but as the Scholiast



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to fortify the harbour of Peiræus, a safe haven on the western side of the promontory which on its eastern side is indented by the two basins of Mounychia. The open waters of Phaleron he regarded as practically useless for his purpose; but in the three harbours of Peiræus and Mounychia he discerned the stronghold of a greater maritime power than any which the world had yet seen, and these were now by his advice inclosed within a wall nearly seven miles in circuit. This wall in its height and strength was to be so nearly impregnable that even in time of war old men and children would suffice to guard it; and in such seasons of danger they could in the vast space which it inclosed leave their families in perfect safety while they themselves carried on by sea the struggle which would assuredly end in victory, whoever might be their assailant. When he added that for this purpose the old city would be of little use or none, he was only saying in other words that it would be well to leave the Akropolis with its temples as the Romans left the temple of Jupiter on the Alban mount. As regards the height of the wall, the design of Themistokles was only half carried out; but even thus his purpose was effectually achieved. Its width, it is said, was such that two carts crossed each other, depositing stones on the outer side of each,<sup>1084</sup> leaving between the two walls thus raised a space which was filled up not with clay or rubble after the usual fashion, but with large squared stones clamped together with lead and iron. The ruins of this mighty rampart attest to this day the exactness of the historian's description.<sup>1085</sup>

Change in  
the conduct  
of Pau-  
sanias.

The result of their last attempt at interference had probably taught the Spartans that it would be well to keep silence until they could enforce attention to their advice. As it must also have convinced Themistokles that for the present

in the same passage speaks of him as having been *ἡγεμῶν*, he probably understood him to have been one of the generals. Themistokles was Strategos both at Artemision and at Salamis; and if the fortification of the Peiræus was begun during this year of office, it must have been taken in hand only to be immediately abandoned.

<sup>1084</sup> Thucydides clearly means that the width of the wall was such as to allow the passage of two carts. Dr. Arnold, *Thucydides*, i. 93, thinks that two carts, continually meeting one another, were passing along the wall. Such crossing would, however, be rendered necessary only if the materials were found at both ends, and if each cart was loaded at the two ends alternately: but surely, whether they met or moved side by side, a long line of carts would be needed, if the work was to be brought to an end within any reasonable time.

<sup>1085</sup> Leake, *Topography of Athens*, 343; Arnold, *Thuc.* i. 91.

he needed to fear no opposition in that quarter, he imposed on himself a superfluous task, if he sent to Sparta ambassadors who were charged to say that the Peiræus was being fortified only to serve as an impregnable station for all the Hellenic fleets in case of renewed Persian invasion.<sup>1086</sup> The Spartans had been tricked once already about the fortification of Athens, and, like Xerxes, they were not likely to be hoodwinked by a second message which they would assuredly interpret by contraries. Nor were they more likely for the present to protest against the fortification of the Peiræus than against the alleged annual addition of thirty ships to the Athenian navy.<sup>1087</sup> Whether with such additions or without them, this fleet had yet more work to do before it could be said that the barbarians had been fairly driven back into Asia. Sestos had fallen: but Byzantion and the Thracian Doriskos, with Eion on the Strymon and many other places on the northern shores of the Egean,<sup>1088</sup> were still held by Persian garrisons, when, in the year after 478 B.C. the battle of Plataiai, Pausanias, as commander of the confederate fleet, sailed with 20 Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships to Kypros (Cyprus) and thence, having recovered the greater part of the island, to Byzantion. The resistance here was as obstinate perhaps as at Sestos; but the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood for the moment at the head of a triumphant confederacy. It was now in her power to weld the isolated units, which made up the Hellenic

<sup>1086</sup> The story of this embassy is given by Diodoros, xi. 42, who says that, fearing Spartan opposition, Themistokles, instead of putting his plan clearly before the people, asked them to name two counsellors to whom he might divulge a scheme likely to be of vast benefit to Athens, and that when Xanthippos and Aristekides, who were appointed expressly on the ground of their general antagonism to Themistokles, supported his judgement, and when further the Boulé, on being intrusted with the secret, had approved the plan, full powers were given to him for carrying out the work whatever it might be. This story of Diodoros is manifestly one of many growths from the tradition that Themistokles achieved some great work or other, not long after the battle of Salamis, by means of a trick or stratagem. What this trick was, the narrative of Thucydides sufficiently explains: and the story adopted by Diodoros is so far nearer the facts than the tale of Plutarch, as it is concerned with the building of walls and not with the burning of ships. The extravagance of Diodoros lies in the supposition that Themistokles, wishing to keep the fortification of the Peiræus a secret from the Spartans, would create a popular ferment at Athens by refusing to reveal the nature and object of his plan until he had received sanction for carrying it out, and at the same time send an embassy to Sparta to let the cat out of the bag by saying that he was going to fortify a harbour which might serve as an impregnable station for all the Greek navy. See further Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 398.

<sup>1087</sup> Diod. xi. 43.

<sup>1088</sup> Herod. vii. 106. Herodotos here asserts that down to the time when he wrote this portion of his history Doriskos still remained a Persian fortress.

world, into something like an organised society, and to kindle in it something like national life. But to do her justice, her present position had been rather thrust upon her by circumstances than deliberately sought. Her systematic discipline and the stability of her constitution, which, though rigidly oligarchical, presented a striking contrast to the tyranny of Peisistratos or Polykrates, pointed her out as the one city in which the Hellenic states might find an efficient aid against a common enemy. But she had no statesman capable, like Themistokles, of seizing on a golden opportunity, while in her own generals she found her greatest enemies. At Plataiai, if we may believe the tale, Pausanias had expressed his amazement at the folly of the luxurious tyrant who cared to conquer a barren land and a hardy people: but even while he spoke, he was, it would seem, dazzled by Persian wealth and enamoured of Persian pleasures. He had roused the indignation of his own people by having his name inscribed, as leader of all the Greek forces, on the tripod which was to commemorate the victory of Plataiai:<sup>1089</sup> and now his arrogance and tyranny were to excite at Byzantion a discontent and impatience destined to be followed by more serious consequences to his country as well as to himself. On the fall of Byzantion he sent to the Persian king the prisoners taken in the city, and spread the report that they had escaped. He forwarded at the same time, it is said, by the hand of the Eretrian Gongylos a letter in which he informed Xerxes that he wished to marry his daughter and to make him lord of all Hellas, adding that with the king's aid he felt sure of success, and requesting that some trustworthy agent should be sent down to arrange the details of the scheme.<sup>1090</sup> The spirit of Cyrus or Dareios would have been

<sup>1089</sup> His name was erased; and in place of it were substituted the names of the cities whose troops had taken part in the battle. Thuc. i. 132.

<sup>1090</sup> This letter is brief enough to come even from a Spartan, and Pausanias may have been a Spartan of more than ordinary education: but the genuineness of the letter is another matter, and a matter of serious importance in its bearing on the case of Themistokles. Conspirators do not usually keep about their persons dangerous papers, when these papers are moreover quite unnecessary. A Spartan conspirator would least of all be tempted to do so. As no good could come of it to himself, it is not to be supposed that Pausanias would keep copies of his own letters to the Persian king; and on the whole it seems unlikely that he would preserve letters from the king which, if discovered, must bring about his condemnation. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 368, asserts that when the Argilian slave by whom Pausanias was finally made known laid the case before the ephors, he gave them at the same time copies of those letters between Pausanias and

roused to rage at the presumption of the petty chief who aspired to an alliance with the royal house of Persia on the score not of what he had done but of what he hoped to be able to do by and by. But the spuriousness of the letter may not necessarily discredit the fact that some message was sent to which Xerxes returned an answer telling Pausanias that his name was enrolled in the list of his benefactors for his good deed in freeing the Byzantian prisoners and beseeching him to spare neither time, men, nor money for the immediate accomplishment of his schemes.<sup>1091</sup> The gratitude of Xerxes was easily earned if the deliverance of a few captives from Byzantion could wipe out the memory of the carnage at

Xerxes which Thucydides has embodied in his text, adding that 'in no other way can they have become public.' This, however, is incredible. This slave was certainly the bearer of one letter, which he placed in the hands of the ephors. But in that letter there was the strict charge that the bearer should be put to death; and according to his account not one of the previous messengers of Pausanias had ever returned from Sousa,—in other words, they had all been put to death. How then were the contents of the letters which they carried made known? They could be recovered only from the archives of Sousa, and apart from the unlikelihood that such documents would be preserved at all there is the greater unlikelihood that they would ever be given up to the king's enemies. The conclusion to which we are driven is that the letters from Pausanias to Xerxes are forged; and if these are forged, then beyond a doubt the alleged letters of Themistokles to the Persian king are forgeries also. It does not, however, hence follow that these men had no communications with the Persian sovereign; but, in order to form a right judgement in the case of Themistokles, it is indispensably necessary to know the precise terms of the communication; and this the replies of the Persian king do not enable us to ascertain. These replies might certainly be preserved by Pausanias and Themistokles, although the prudence of the latter at least seems strangely belied by the preservation of documents at once so dangerous and so useless.

The two stories are, in short, full of inconsistencies, to use the mildest phrase. The Argilian slave of Pausanias asserts that all the previous messengers had been murdered. But Gongylos of Eretria had been one of these messengers, and had carried the first letter, Diod. xi. 44, Thuc. i. 128; and Gongylos was not slain, if we can form any judgement from the general tenor of the narrative. It is, of course, possible that the letters containing the injunctions that the bearer should be killed may have been written after the return of Gongylos; but Thucydides draws no distinction between one set of letters and another, and the assertion of the Argilian, Thuc. i. 132, is unqualified.

Speaking of the first letters, Thucydides, it is true, says *ἐνεγύραστο δὲ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ, ὡς ὕστερον ἀνευρέθη*. But these words cannot at the utmost prove more than that the historian had seen a paper which was alleged to be the original letter of Pausanias or a copy of it, although even this meaning can be extracted only by straining them. He does not say that he had himself seen the letter; and we cannot extract from his words any assurance of its genuineness. The historical criticism of Thucydides, however keen in the scrutiny of oral testimony, was probably but little extended to the examination of written documents.

As the spuriousness of the letter from Pausanias to Xerxes, given by Thucydides, has been sufficiently proved on other grounds, it is scarcely necessary to notice the style or the length of the document. But there is no reason to suppose that Pausanias was himself able to write: and it is strange that his scribe should exhibit a power of writing altogether beyond that of the secretary of Mindaros who, seventy years afterwards, announced in eleven words the death of his master and the destruction of the fleet at Kyzikos. Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. v. 19. Who again was this trusty scribe who could be made acquainted not merely with his treacherous schemes, but with the injunctions that the bearers of his letters should be put to death?

<sup>1091</sup> It must not be forgotten that the terms of this letter, even if its genuineness be granted, do not prove that the proposal of Pausanias was sent in the form of the letter given by Thucydides.

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Plataiai. But while he tarried himself at Sousa, he had no scruple in sending down Artabazos, the hero of the hasty retreat from Plataiai to the Hellespont, to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Daskyleion and to carry out to the best of his power the plans proposed by Pausanias. The head of this miserable man was now fairly turned. Clad in Persian garb, he aped the privacy of Asiatic despots; and when he came forth from his palace it was to make a royal progress through Thrace, surrounded by Median and Egyptian life guards, and to show his insolence to men who were at least his equals.<sup>1092</sup> The reports of this significant change in the behaviour of Pausanias led to his recall. He was put on his trial; but his accusers failed to establish the personal charges brought against him, while his Medism also was dismissed as not fully proved. The suspicion, however, was so strong that he was deprived of his command.<sup>1093</sup> But, like Demaratos, Pausanias, although not king, could not brook degradation from a power which Spartan kings had rarely enjoyed. We soon find him again at Byzantion which he had reached in a Hermionian ship. Here it would seem that he took up a fortified position from which he was forcibly dislodged by the Athenians; and crossing the strait, he carried on at Kolônai in the Troas his traitorous dealings with the Persian satrap.

Formation  
of the con-  
federacy of  
Delos.

All these events were tending to alienate the Asiatic Greeks and the islanders of the Egean from a state which showed itself incapable of maintaining its authority over its own servants; nor were other signs wanting to convince the Spartans that the bravery of her kings and generals was no proof of their political rectitude and that the wisdom of Sparta would best be shown by tacitly resigning a supremacy which she could not retain with credit. After his return from Mykalê, Leotychides had been sent from Sparta to subdue Thessaly,<sup>1094</sup> in other words, to put down the Aleuad chiefs and their medising partisans. For so able and successful a commander the task was easy; but Leotychides betrayed his trust for the sake of money, and being caught red-handed,

<sup>1092</sup> The story of Kleonikê, Paus. iii. 17, 8, may be true: but the oral tradition of Byzantion cannot be accepted as an exact report of what may have taken place.

<sup>1093</sup> Thuc. i. 95.

<sup>1094</sup> Herod. vi. 72. Paus. iii. 7, 8.

he was banished from Sparta, and his house razed to the ground. He fled to Tegea; and on his death he was succeeded by his grandson Archidamos, a name associated with the fatal war which ended in the humiliation of Athens. At Byzantion the insolence of Pausanias was leading to more serious results. Even before his recall the Asiatic Greeks had intreated Aristeides the Athenian commander to admit them into direct relations with Athens;<sup>1095</sup> and the same change of feeling had passed over all the non-medising Greek states with the exception of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. In short, it had become clear that all Hellas was divided into two great sections, the one gravitating as naturally to Sparta, the great land power, as the other gravitated to Athens with her maritime preponderance.<sup>1096</sup> When therefore a Spartan commission headed by Dorkis arrived with a small force to take the place of Pausanias, they were met by passive resistance where they had looked for submission; and their retirement from the field in which they were unable to compel obedience left the confederacy an accomplished fact. They had, in truth, no means of carrying on a war at this distance from home, if the struggle with Persia was indeed to be continued or renewed; and they felt or affected satisfaction in the thought that Athens was able and willing to carry on a task which to them had become irksome and costly.<sup>1097</sup>

477 B.C. |

It now fell to the lot of Aristeides to regulate the terms of the new confederacy. The work before it was not merely that of self-defence. The mischief done to Hellas was to be requited upon the barbarians. It became necessary, therefore, to determine the proportions in which the allies should contribute men, ships, and money for the com-

The assess-  
ment of  
Aristeides.

<sup>1095</sup> The story of Plutarch, *Arist.* 23, that at the suggestion of Aristeides some Ionian ships attacked the ship of Pausanias in the harbour of Byzantion, and thus made the idea of reconciliation impossible, is altogether inconsistent with the position of the Athenians who could not afford to run into open quarrel with Sparta.

<sup>1096</sup> Thuc. i. 19.

<sup>1097</sup> *Ib.* i. 95. Diodoros, xi. 50, speaks of serious intentions on the part of the Spartans to go to war for the possession of a maritime supremacy, the loss of which would leave their hegemony lame,—a state of things against which an ancient oracle had warned them to be carefully on their guard. From this purpose they were diverted by the eloquence of Hetoimaridas, who convinced them that they could never derive any good from the command of the sea, even if they could get or keep it. Like the counsel of Artemisia and Demaratos, the speech of Hetoimaridas expresses the sentiment of a later age; and the debate is plainly fictitious.

mon cause. The sum total of this assessment on the allies amounted to 460 talents; but the items are not given. As the management of this fund was intrusted to Hellenotamiai, treasurers elected by the allies generally, and as they met on terms of perfect equality in the sacred island of Delos, we must suppose that the distribution of burdens was accepted by all as just and equitable.<sup>1098</sup> In truth, the fairness of the arrangement is conclusively proved by the mere fact of its acceptance. Athens had not at this time means of compulsion more formidable than those of Sparta, while the help which she was able to afford told more immediately for the benefit of the exposed members of the confederacy than for herself. But as only union could enable them to hold their own, so union implied some sort of central government, and such a government involved subordination.<sup>1099</sup> The allies were free; but their circumstances differed indefinitely. Some who could not contribute ships or men would have escaped all burdens if they had not been called on for contributions in money; and the option of refusal would have secured to those who gave nothing all the advantages enjoyed by the most earnest and self-sacrificing of the allies. Nothing could more promote the interests of the Persian power than the complete isolation of all the Greek cities. This isolation might assume the specious title of autonomy; and three generations later the satrap who dictated the peace of Antalkidas<sup>1100</sup> had learnt that Greek autonomy

<sup>1098</sup> The assessment of Aristides was emphatically pronounced to be fair and just in the treaty of peace for 50 years between Athens and Sparta, drawn up in the twelfth year of the Peloponnesian war, 421 B.C. Thuc. v. 18, 5. It seems to have been based on the amount of tribute which the cities on the eastern shores of the Egean had paid to the Persian king. This tribute for the Nomos which included the Ionians, Magnesians, Aiolians, Lykians, and some others, was assessed at 400 talents in silver. See vol. i. page 368.

There was, therefore, nothing offensive at first in the term *Phoros* assigned to these contributions. The change of meaning was, as we shall presently see, the result of the altered conditions of the allies under the growing power of Athens.

<sup>1099</sup> The truth is that the notion of complete autonomy for all the cities included in the alliance really deprived this combination of any claim to the title of a confederation in the strict meaning of the word. There can be no genuine confederacy where the several members do not consent to the limitation of their independence in some directions for the sake of a more powerful common action. The Greek states never advanced so far in their political education.

Another and a better opportunity for combining the Greek cities into a true confederacy presented itself after the victory of Sparta at Aigospotamoi: but that opportunity also was allowed to slip. The history of the Athenian confederacy formed after the revolution of Thebes, 379 B.C., followed the same course. In fact the Greek language had no word for a wider society than the *Polis*. Beyond this there could be only compact and alliances, of whatsoever kind, for definite purposes.

<sup>1100</sup> 388 B.C.

was the useful independence which the old lion recommended to the herd of oxen. The Greeks were but too ready to follow the suggestions of their enemies: and the history of the Athenian empire only exhibits the selfishness and disunion of tribes who were destined never to grow into a single nation.

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But for the time in the presence of a common danger Athens appeared as a tower of strength not only for the inhabitants of the Hellenic cities on the Asiatic coast and in the Egean islands, but for the Greek towns in Makedonia and Thrace where the Persians still held their ground.<sup>1101</sup> In truth, the perils which threatened the alliance were not confined to the chances of barbarian invasion. The disposition of the Thessalian and Boiotian chiefs was as unsatisfactory as it had been before the coming of Xerxes; and the cases of Leotyichides and Pausanias might seem to show the existence of a wide-spread and virulent poison. The latter was busy at Kolônai, thwarting the plans of Aristides; and to him probably might be traced the mission of Arthmios of Zeleia to the Greek towns generally for the purpose of bribing the citizens with Persian gold.<sup>1102</sup> The constant complaints brought against him at length wearied out the patience of the Spartans who charged him to follow their messenger on pain of being declared the enemy of the people. If he put little trust in their kindly feeling, he had more confidence in the power of money; and relying on the effects of bribes, he returned to Sparta where the ephors threw him into prison. But on these magistrates he so pressed their lack of evidence against him that he was set free: and his next step was an instant challenge to his accusers to prove their charge. No proof, it would seem, was forthcoming, for a descendent of Herakles and the regent for the young son of Leonidas was not to be condemned except on testimony beyond suspicion. All that could be ascertained amounted to presumption and no more, for Spartan law could trust nothing less than the actual confession of the prisoner. Helots came forward who said that Pausanias had been

The treason  
and death  
of Pau-  
sanias.

<sup>1101</sup> These cities are named in the treaty of the peace of Nikias. Thuc. v. 18, 5. See note 1088.

<sup>1102</sup> See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 364.



tampering with the whole body of their fellow-slaves, promising them not freedom merely but the rights of citizenship, if they would only give their help in making him a despot: but he had not been heard to tempt them, and their testimony went for nothing. These were followed by an Argilian slave, a man who had won such affection as Pausanias had to offer in an utterly infamous relationship, and to whom he had intrusted his latest letters for Artabazos. This slave, remembering, it is said, that no previous messenger (Gongylos, it would seem, excepted) had ever come back, opened the letter, intending to close it again with a forged seal and to carry it to its destination if it involved no danger to himself. But the letter contained a strict charge to kill the bearer, and the Argilian carried it not to Artabazos but to the ephors, who, staggered though they were by this further evidence of his treachery, could not rest content until they had the testimony of their own ears. By their advice the slave took refuge as a suppliant in the Temenos of Poseidon at 'cape Tainaron in a hut with double walls between which some of the ephors hid themselves. No long time had passed before Pausanias came to ask what had led the Argilian to a step so strange. Then recounting all his services, the slave asked in his turn what he had done to deserve the treachery with which Pausanias had sought his death for adding yet one more to the boons which he had received from him. Soothing him as well as he could, Pausanias admitted his offence, but assuring him solemnly that no mischief should happen to him begged him to lose not a moment in setting out on his errand. The ephors departed, all of them satisfied of his guilt and some of them with their minds made up to arrest him in the city. The rest were not so earnest in the matter; and as they approached Pausanias in the street, one of them contrived by a glance or sign to apprise him of his danger and then pointed to the shrine of Athênê of the Brazen House (Chalkioikos). Their kindly offices, it would seem, could be carried no further. Pausanias had taken refuge in the little cell of the temple: but he was absolutely without the means of sustaining life, and his partisans could not with-

hold the magistrates from taking off the roof, walling up the doors,<sup>1103</sup> and then waiting patiently until thirst and hunger should have done their work. As the end drew near, he was taken, still breathing, from the sanctuary. Their first intention was to hurl his body into the Kaiadas or chasm into which the bodies of criminals were cast: but they changed their mind and buried him not far from the sanctuary.<sup>1104</sup> The ephors, however, had now placed themselves in the wrong by removing a suppliant of the gods; and the order came from Delphoi not only that the body of Pausanias must be taken up and buried where he died, but that the deity of the Brazen House must be appeased with two bodies in place of one. At an earlier time this would have been followed by the slaughter of two human victims. The scruples of a more merciful age were satisfied by offering two brazen statues. But even thus the guilt of the profanation was supposed to be not wholly washed away; and the Spartans heard of it again when they sought to procure the banishment of Perikles on the plea that he was tainted with the curse of Kylon.<sup>1105</sup>

For nearly ten years from the time of his first recall Pausanias had been allowed to spin the web of treason, before his sluggish or conniving countrymen chose to cut short his course. But the consequences of his fall were not confined to Sparta. At Athens now, as before the Persian invasion, the two foremost men were Themistokles and Aristides. But their relative positions had greatly changed. The latter had learnt the lesson which the general course of Athenian history from the expulsion of the Peisistratidai could not fail to inforce on all candid and disinterested minds. The events of recent years had given a vast impulse to the growth of democratic feeling. They had brought continually into greater prominence the naval multitude; and it was impossible to make the men who had been the

Developement of the Kleisthenean constitution

<sup>1103</sup> The story was told, Diod. xi. 45, that while the ephors were yet doubting what they should do, the mother of Pausanias without uttering a word brought a brick which she placed at the door of the building, and then departed as silently as she came.

<sup>1104</sup> In the *Protomenisma*, or neutral ground in front of the *Temenos* or close. Thuc. i. 134. The death of Pausanias cannot have taken place before the ostracism of Themistokles, 471 B.C. (for the latter was living at Argos when Pausanias sought to get him as an ally in his treasons), and not later than 466 B.C., when Themistokles made his escape into Asia.

<sup>1105</sup> Thuc. i. 128.

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chief agents in winning the victories of Salamis and Mykalé content with the measure of political privilege which even the Kleisthenean constitution accorded to them. That constitution had extended to all citizens the right of voting in the election of magistrates, and had opened the way for the judicial education of the people by the arrangement of the *Dikasteria* belonging to the *Heliaia*; but the members of the fourth or lowest class,—in other words, by far the greater number of the citizens,—were still held ineligible for the archonship. The removal of this restriction the once oligarchical *Aristeides* now came forward to propose.<sup>1106</sup> He had seen in fact that the functions of the archons had been gradually reduced to a level suited to the capacities of ordinary citizens; and he was prepared perhaps for the further change which should determine the election of the archons by lot. At *Marathon* the polemarch *Archón* retained a power which made the *Strategoi* his subordinates. After the Persian invasion, his duties became practically those of the Roman *Prætor Peregrinus*, the judge in disputes arising between the citizens and *Metoikoi* or alien residents. Henceforth the conduct of military affairs was left wholly to the *Strategoi*, while the internal administration was made more and more a public concern by the multiplication of boards intrusted with such duties as the police of the markets and the streets, the sale of corn, and the inspection of weights and measures,<sup>1107</sup> the plain principle throughout being that officers whose duties called for nothing more than the capacities of average citizens should be taken by the lot, while those from whom the state demanded the exercise of special powers must be appointed by election. In truth, it is not easy to see how any man could more thoroughly adapt himself to the times than the general who had led the Athenian forces at *Plataiai* and had assessed the contributions to be furnished by the several members of the *Delian confederacy*.

How far the splendid reputation which *Aristeides* enjoyed among his friends represented the opinion of the people

Ascend-  
ency of  
*Themis-*  
*tokles*.

<sup>1106</sup> See vol. i. page 228.

<sup>1107</sup> These were the *Agoranomoi* and *Astynomoi*, the *Sitophylakes* and the *Metronomoi*. There were others who acted not only in Athens but in the *Peiraieus*, which since its enlargement by *Themistokles* had become scarcely less important than the old city.

generally, we are unable to determine. If his general popularity seems to be implied by the stories told of the later years of Themistokles, it is assuredly discredited by the words in which Diodoros speaks of the singular love felt for his rival by the main body of the citizens. It is true that in the same passage <sup>1108</sup> he says that, partly through fear, partly through envy, the Athenians forgot the good services and eagerly sought the humiliation of the conqueror of Salamis: but it is both possible and likely that this envy and fear may have been felt not by the people but by a faction which set itself first to humiliate him and then to blacken his memory. The tale must, however, be told as it has been handed down by those who had the making of a history, the chronology of which is by no means clear.

At Sparta Themistokles after the victory of Salamis had been welcomed with such honours as in that city no stranger whether before or after him ever received. The determination with which he maintained the right of the Athenians to fortify their city and to manage their own affairs turned their admiration into hatred; and their diligence in spying out the weak points in his character and conduct was not surpassed by that of some who were watching him in Athens. These charged him with dedicating near his own house a chapel to Artemis Aristoboulê, the goddess of good counsel, and with speaking much of the good deeds which he had done for Athens. He was called a lying and unjust traitor by the Rhodian poet Timokreon,—a man who had once been his friend but whom he had allowed to remain in exile on the score of Medism because he had received a bribe of three talents from the poet's enemies. He was accused by the Spartans of complicity in the schemes of Pausanias, because the Spartans could not endure that, while one of their generals was charged with Medism, the Athenians should be free of the same disgrace, and because they bribed some Athenians to bring the charge.<sup>1109</sup> The time, however, was not yet ripe for his conviction; and for the present he not only escaped but was more popular than ever. The next incident in his life is his ostracism, which, it must be remembered,

Traditional narrative of the later history of Themistokles.

471 B.C.

<sup>1108</sup> Diod. xi. 54.

<sup>1109</sup> Ibid.

points not to personal accusations but to a mere trial of strength in which the partisans of Themistokles may have fully counted on a majority over those of Aristides. After his ostracism, while he was living in exile at Argos, he was again charged by the Lakedaimonians with having shared the treasons of Pausanias. Themistokles, learning that the Athenians had issued orders for his arrest, fled to Korkyra, an island over which he is said to have had the claims of a benefactor. Unwilling to give him up but afraid to defend him, the Korkyraians conveyed him over to the mainland, where in his perplexity he found himself driven to enter the house of the Molossian chief Admetos, to whom at some previous time he had given just cause of offence. Admetos was not at home; but his wife placed her child in his arms, and bade him take his place as a suppliant at the hearth. When the chief returned, Themistokles put before him candidly the exact state of his fortunes, and appealed to the generous impulses which restrain brave men from pressing hard on fallen enemies. Admetos at once forgave the old wrong, and then conveyed him safely to Pydna; a stronghold of the Makedonian Alexandros. Here he took passage in a merchant-ship going to Ionia; but a storm carried the vessel to Naxos which was then being besieged by an Athenian force. Themistokles at once revealed himself to the captain, and said that he would charge him with shielding traitors for the sake of a bribe, unless he kept his men from landing until the weather should suffer them to proceed on their voyage. In about thirty-six hours the wind lulled; and the ship made its way to Ephesos, where Themistokles rewarded him liberally out of moneys which his friends had sent over to him from Athens.<sup>1110</sup> Journeying on thence into the interior, he sent to Artaxerxes, who had just succeeded the murderer of Masistes, a letter, it is said, thus worded, 'I,

<sup>1110</sup> The property of Themistokles, we are told, was confiscated when he was proclaimed a traitor: but his friends conveyed to him not only the money which he had left at Argos but much of the wealth which he had left at Athens. Still after all these deductions the property belonging to Themistokles actually seized is stated by Theophrastos to have amounted to 80 talents, by Theopompos to 200. We may, if we please, draw distinctions between property which may be hidden and that which may not be hidden: but practically the wealth of Themistokles must have consisted of money or land; and if we may suppose that his money was conveyed away by his friends, we can scarcely suppose that he held real property to the value of 80 or 100 talents.

Themistokles, have come to thee,—the man who has done most harm to thy house while I was compelled to resist thy father, but who also did him most good, by withholding the Greeks from destroying the bridge over the Hellespont while he was journeying from Attica to Asia: and now I am here, able to do thee much good, but persecuted by the Greeks on the score of my good will to thee. But I wish to tarry a year and then to talk with thee about mine errand.’ The young king, we are told, at once granted his request; and when Themistokles, having spent the year in thoroughly learning Persian, went up to the court, he acquired over the monarch an influence far surpassing that which Demaratos had exercised over Xerxes. This influence rested, it is said, on the promise that he would make the Persian ruler monarch of all Hellaş. After a time, we know not how long, he returned to Asia Minor, to do what might be needed to fulfil his promise to the king. Here he lived in great magnificence, having the three cities, Magnesia, Lampsakos, and Myous, to supply him with bread, wine, and vegetables. At Magnesia, so the story runs, he died, whether from disease or from a draught of bull’s blood which he drank because he knew that he could not accomplish what he had undertaken to do for the king. His bones were brought away by his kinsmen and buried secretly in Attica, because the bones of a traitor had no right to the soil which he had betrayed: but the Magnesians asserted that they still lay in the splendid sepulchre in their market-place, which they exhibited as the tomb of Themistokles.

469 B.C. (?)

Such was perhaps the most popular form of a story of which other versions related that, far from regarding him as a benefactor to the royal house, the Persian king had put a price of two hundred talents upon his head; and that when Themistokles reached Ionia, he found it impossible to get to Sousa except by availing himself of the offer of Lysitheidēs who, pretending that he was conveying to Sousa a stranger for the king’s harem, brought thither in this strange disguise the conqueror of Salamis and the founder of the maritime empire of Athens. In short, the story of Themistokles is pre-eminently one on which the fancy of the people fastened

A leged  
journey of  
Themistokles to  
Sousa.

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itself with special eagerness; and thus it was said that Mandane, the sister of Xerxes, in her grief and rage for the loss of her sons who fell at Salamis, demanded him for a purpose not much more merciful than that for which Amestris insisted on the surrender of the wife of Masistes; that he was actually put upon his trial to answer the accusations of Mandane; and that owing to the skill which he had acquired in the use of the Persian language he was triumphantly acquitted. It was easy, by way of illustrating these changes in his life, to frame stories which exhibited him as undergoing instruction in the methods of oriental prostration or which represented the Persian king as rendered sleepless by the excess of his joy at having Themistokles the Athenian in his possession, and as bestowing upon him a beautiful Persian wife by way of showing his gratitude for past benefits and his confidence for the future.

Uniform  
policy of  
Themis-  
tokles.

Of these versions of the popular tradition the one is perhaps as trustworthy as the other. In a case such as this the authority of Thucydides goes for little. He certainly cannot be considered the contemporary of a man who died perhaps during the year in which he was born. But whatever difference of opinion there may be on this point, the absence of all evidence which may tend to show that the people generally approved the judgement passed upon Themistokles is especially striking. In all the accounts, preserved by the several writers (not one of whom, it must again be remarked, is a contemporary witness), there is not a word to show that the common people shared the opinions of the knot of his persecutors, while expressions are not lacking which show the strength of their affection for him. The existence of this feeling sufficiently justifies a careful examination of the narrative, which professes to relate the course of his treasons, —an examination for which the way has been in great measure cleared in the history of Pausanias. If in the story of his life and teaching we trace little or nothing of that kind of fiction which is busy with the history of Kroisos or Cyrus, of Xerxes or Polykrates, it does not hence follow that the narrative of his actions is free from fiction of another kind. In the period which passed between the end of the Persian

and the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the mythical form of thought, which made historical truth subordinate to the illustration of a religious belief or the maintenance of an ethical principle, was displaced by that keen analysis of human motives and that singular insight into social and political causes which seem almost to make the age of Thucydides our own. But the process which brought about this change gave a new force to many sentiments whose action, unless controlled by a strictly contemporary history, must prove not less fertile in fiction than the religious or mythical sentiment of the age which was passing away. It was the fiction which springs from personal or political jealousy, the exaggeration which assumes the certainty of guilt when at the worst there is but scant ground for suspicion. But for the life of Themistokles we have no strictly contemporary history; and when Thucydides was old enough to form a judgement upon it, nearly a quarter of a century had passed from the time of his ostracism, a period during which his opponents had done their best to heighten the prejudice which delights in exaggerated contrasts. Themistokles began life in poverty: he closed it in wealth and dishonour. Aristeides was pre-eminent for the purity of his motives, and his justice was proved by the absolute want which left his family dependent on the public bounty. A bribe had for Aristeides no temptation: but the lust of gold served to account in Themistokles for a simultaneous action of contradictory motives such as no other man ever exhibited. This feeling had received its direction while the rivalry between these two great men was not a thing of the past: it had grown into a deeply-rooted conviction, before they had learnt to submit to a careful and impartial criticism the evidence on which it rested. The result produced by the working of this prejudice is not disproportioned to the vehemence of the sentiment. The absence of a pure and lofty unselfishness, to which perhaps he never laid a claim, made his political opponents, not the people, ready to believe of him any degree of personal corruption; and the charge of such corruption was taken, without evidence, as proof that he was prepared to undo the work of his whole life for the sake of that of which



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he had already an abundance. Yet nothing less than this are we called upon to believe with regard to a man who displayed a fixity of purpose and a concentration of will, which a few perhaps may have equalled but none certainly have surpassed. How much he had done and how thoroughly he succeeded in doing that which he had resolved to do, the history of the Persian invasion has made clear. So mighty had been the impulse which he gave to Athenian enterprise, so completely had it strengthened the Athenian character, that his great rival gave his aid in the working of that maritime policy, the introduction of which he had opposed. In this business of his life he had displayed wonderful powers,—a rapidity of perception which gave to his maturest judgements the appearance of intuition,—a fertility of resource and a readiness in action which were more than equal to every emergency. He had shown a courage rising in proportion to the dangers which he had to face, a calmness of spirit which turned to his own purpose the weakness and the selfish fears of other men. He had kept those about him in some degree true to the common cause, when a blind and stupid terror seemed to make all possibility of union hopeless. These were great qualities and great deeds: they argued much love of his country and more appreciation of her real interests. They were the virtues and the exploits of a man who discerned all the strength and flexibility of her political constitution and the mission which his city was charged to fulfil. But this indomitable energy in her service implies no fastidious integrity of character. His patriotism was not hostile to his self-love. His political morality allowed him to make use of the fears or the hopes of others to increase his own wealth while they furthered the interests of his countrymen. He was a great leader, but not the most uncorrupt citizen: a wise counsellor, but no rigid and impartial judge: a statesman formidable to the enemies of his country, but not especially scrupulous in the choice of the weapons to be employed against them. And yet of this man, whose character thus strikingly resembles that of Warren Hastings, we are asked to believe, not that he yielded to some mean temptation,—not that he began his career in poverty and

ended it in ill-gotten wealth,—not that he made use of his power sometimes to advance his own fortune and sometimes to thwart and oppress others; but that from the beginning he distinctly contemplated the prospect of destroying the house which he was building up, and of seeking a home in the palace of the king on whose power and hopes he was first to inflict a deadly blow. We are told that at the very time when by an unparalleled energy of character and singleness of purpose he was driving the allies into a battle which they dreaded, he was sending to the Persian king a message which might stand him in good stead when he should come as an exile to the court of Sousa; that he deceived his enemy to his ruin in order to win his favour against the time of trouble which he knew to be coming; that he looked indulgently on the guilt of Pausanias, although he despised the weakness of his intellect; and that on the death of the Spartan regent he took up, or carried on, the work of treachery which in his hands had come to nothing. We are asked further to believe that in the Persian palace he actually found the refuge which he had contemplated,—that his claim to favour was admitted without question,—that he pledged himself to enslave his country, and for twelve or fourteen years received the revenues of large towns to enable him to fulfil his word; and yet that he died, not having made a single effort to fulfil even a part of the promise which he had made to the Persian king.<sup>1111</sup> It is a conclusion which cannot be admitted without satisfactory evidence.

To the fortunes of Themistokles after the time at which his history ends Herodotos makes but one passing reference; <sup>1112</sup> but his words seem to show that in common with the admirers or partisans of Aristides he had prejudged his character. It must have been no faint prepossession which led him to see a deliberate piece of double dealing, not in the second message sent to Xerxes by Sikinnos, but in his advice to the Athenians after the flight of the king that they should

Alleged  
sojourn of  
Themis-  
tokles at  
the Persian  
court.

<sup>1111</sup> According to Plutarch Themistokles lived for two-and-twenty years after his ostracism. That the Persian king should allow him for more than half this period to be in the receipt of vast revenues without his putting his hand to the work for which these revenues were bestowed is, if that work was the subjugation of Hellas, absolutely incredible.

<sup>1112</sup> viii. 109.

postpone further efforts against the barbarian to the more necessary work of restoration at home. It is a rare instance of partiality in a writer who is singularly strict in acknowledging the merits even of those men and states to whom he might be least attracted whether by their general character or by his own personal sympathies.<sup>1113</sup> But on this point it is unnecessary to say more than that the advice can never have been given and that the secondary motive therefore vanishes.<sup>1114</sup> From Thucydides we have received a sketch of the public life and policy of Themistokles after the flight of Xerxes and the death of Mardonios. In a few sentences also he has summed up his own estimate of his character and genius; and his judgement with all its terseness and brevity brings before us a clearer and more real image of the man than that which is presented in the more detailed and pictorial narrative of Herodotos. But his words furnish no conclusive evidence of the extent or the nature of his guilt. The first charge of treachery, made during the lifetime of Pausanias, was successfully repelled: before his second accusation by the Spartans he was already in exile at Argos. The Lakedaimonians referred to proofs of his complicity with Pausanias; but Thucydides does not say that these proofs were exhibited to the Athenians, or that they were such that they could be exhibited. What may have been the contents of the last letter carried to the ephors by the Argilian slave, we are not told: but this letter, if genuine, sufficiently proves the spuriousness of the paper by which Pausanias is said to have conveyed his first proposals to the Persian king, and proves still more clearly that the letter of Themistokles placed in the hands of Thucydides is a forgery.<sup>1115</sup> His pledge for the subjugation of Hellas is mentioned by the historian in words which leave it uncertain whether he construed it as intended treachery to the Greeks, or as a wilful deception of the sovereign whose bounty loaded him with princely riches: but it is manifest that, at most, he could have no more than hearsay evidence for the compact. Of the secret burial of his bones in Attic ground, he speaks as a

<sup>1113</sup> See especially his lenient criticism on the conduct of the Argives, vii. 152. Note 890.

<sup>1114</sup> See vol. i. page 449.

<sup>1115</sup> See note 1090.

popular report, which must to himself have furnished anything but a proof of lifelong double-dealing.<sup>1116</sup> The statements of such writers as Diodoros or even Plutarch are of little value when they contradict, either expressly or by implication, the assertions of Thucydides. Frequently inconsistent or contradictory in themselves, they spring sometimes from a total misconception of historical facts, sometimes from the mere love of producing a highly-coloured picture. The tale of Plutarch that Themistokles designed to burn the allied fleet at Pagasai is absurdly opposed to the whole line of policy which he is known to have been carrying out at this time.<sup>1117</sup> His mysterious secrecy with regard to this design is transferred by Diodoros with an extravagance of absurdity to the building of the walls of Athens.<sup>1118</sup> From the many personal anecdotes which illustrate his arrogance before his exile or serve to convict him of treason after it, no positive conclusions can be drawn with safety. Some are utterly incredible; others, if true, prove very little. To discern an intolerable pride in his dedication of an altar to Artêmis Aristoboulê was a hard interpretation: but the wise Themistokles must have fallen into a second childhood before he could have even thought of comparing himself to a plane-tree which the men who had sought its shelter during the storm were now cutting down. The whole story of his adventures after his departure from the Asiatic coast must be not less cautiously received than the narratives which Herodotos and Æschylos give of the retreat of Xerxes from Attica. In these tales we leave the known Hellenic world and enter a land of romantic or malicious fiction: and if it be not easy to understand the feeling which could delight in representing the victor of Salamis as painfully learning the intricate ceremonies of oriental servility, it is still more difficult to believe that the memory of his ancient greatness could suggest to him nothing better than a loathsome satisfaction in his present utter degradation.<sup>1119</sup>

<sup>1116</sup> Thuc. i. 138.

<sup>1117</sup> Plutarch, *Themist.* 20. *Arist.* 22. The Greek fleet could not have wintered at Pagasai, at a time when Pagasai was Thessalian and hostile to the allies: and the Athenians would only have weakened themselves by destroying the ships of all the other cities, while it was yet uncertain whether they might not be again attacked by the Phœnician navy of Xerxes.

<sup>1118</sup> See note 1086.

<sup>1119</sup> Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 389, rejects the anecdote in which Plutarch represents

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Amount of  
evidence  
against  
Themis-  
tokles.

If after sweeping away the tales which fall before the ordinary tests of historical criticism a scanty foundation seems to be left for so great a charge of long-planned yet ineffectual treason, it has nevertheless sufficed to establish a general conviction of his guilt. In some minds this conviction is deepened by reflexions on the common tendency of Greek leaders and statesmen to yield to temptations of wealth and power. So strong and so common was this miserable tendency that a reputation for personal integrity served to keep up public confidence in men who were in every other respect quite undeserving of it: and in Themistokles there was unquestionably a self-consciousness and an eager love of money, perhaps also an ostentation, which it is unnecessary to palliate and which makes it ridiculous to speak of him as a man of strict and discriminating equity. On the other hand, his whole career exhibits an unbroken and uniform line of conduct to the time of his expulsion by the vote of ostracism. In spite of the wealth which he amassed and the acts of personal injustice which are laid to his charge, there is no proof that he had abandoned the policy of his life, not a shade of evidence that he had given to his countrymen any counsel which he believed likely to do them harm: and the problem which remains to be solved is not that such a man, thus driven into banishment, should fall indefinitely lower in his personal morality, but that, without an effort to resist it, he should yield to the temptation to undo that which had been thus far the aim and the passion of his life, nay that years before, when he had scarcely more than begun that work, he foresaw that temptation and calmly made his preparations for yielding to it.

Motives  
and policy  
of Themis-  
tokles.

The treasonable intrigues of Pausanias furnish no real parallel to the treachery imputed to Themistokles. It is impossible, except on the clearest proof, to believe that anyone who had really loved and served Athens could descend to a depth of double dealing which on due evidence we may be less reluctant to admit in a Spartan king or leader. It is hard to think that one who prized that magnificent polity

Themistokles as telling his children that they would have been losers indeed if they had not been ruined.

which grew with the growth of Athenian freedom, could forget his old devotion with the ease of a man whose country was to him simply a school of rigid and perhaps hateful military discipline. The example of Alkibiades proves nothing. He had neither loved nor served his country; and he was conscious that the one enterprise which he had vehemently urged was precisely one of a class which the wise foresight of Perikles had utterly condemned.<sup>1120</sup> But, apart from all such previous considerations, we have in Pausanias and Themistokles two men who stand in entirely different positions. Intrusted with the kingly power owing to the minority of his nephew, Pausanias had to look forward to a descent from his high authority at no very distant day; and the ascetic discipline of Spartan club-life had probably long been to him unspeakably irksome. But even if we suppose him not to have been influenced by such thoughts and feelings, he was yet only a man who had to carry out the traditional system of his country and who fought at Plataiai with perhaps the bravery of his ancestors and certainly with no sounder judgement. But Themistokles had given a new direction to Athenian energy.<sup>1121</sup> He had shaped the future fortunes of his country; and he lived to strengthen and secure the empire which his own wisdom and courage had called into being. The work of Pausanias was ended with his victory in the field: the mind of Themistokles after the defeat of Xerxes at Salamis was turned to the harder task of building up the Athenian confederacy and of imparting something like a fixed principle of union to a mass of atoms which were ready at any time to part asunder. Throughout his whole career his work, it must specially be noted, was such as to need the fullest concentration of mind and will. It was one which had to be carried on in the face of overpowering difficulties, and which a divided heart and wavering purpose could never have accomplished.

Yet the facts of his exile and of his flight into Asia cannot be called into question. It is possible that his ready wit might devise some plan of winning the favour of Artaxerxes: nor is it altogether unlikely that the revenues bestowed upon

STORIES  
with the  
Persian  
king.

<sup>1120</sup> Thuc. ii. 65, 7.

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<sup>1121</sup> Ib. i. 93.

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him, if they were bestowed at all, may have been granted on no other profession than that of a general desire to further the Persian interests. His voluntary submission might stand in the place of defeat in war: his very banishment was something like a sign that the temporary union of Hellas and the confederacy of Delos would soon be broken up. For the rest, his mere presence at Sousa, if ever he went thither, was no slight honour to the Persian king who might well suppose that other Hellenic leaders might be led to follow his footsteps. If this may be taken as sufficiently explaining his welcome in Persia, the idea of a deeper and more deliberate treachery must be modified or abandoned. The charges of mean and undignified selfishness, of unscrupulous equivocation or even lying, may yet remain: but there will be no need to suppose that while he arranged the positions of the ships at Salamis he was looking forward to the day when he should befriend the barbarian king as heartily as he was then aiding the free land of his birth.

Alleged <sup>1</sup> personal  
corruption  
of Themistokles.

If the evidence before us fails to warrant a harsher judgment, it appears without difficulty to fall in with this one. That the alleged compact of the Euboians with Themistokles rests on the slenderest grounds, we have already seen;<sup>1122</sup> and with the rejection of the fact the charge of corruption vanishes. It is not, however, easy to see how it can be sustained even if the agreement with the Euboians be regarded as historical. A man cannot with truth be said to be either bribed or persuaded into doing that which he had already made up his mind to do; and it seems almost a contradiction in terms to assert that by this bribe Themistokles was tempted to do that which he had wished and tried to accomplish without the money.<sup>1123</sup> The corruption lay with the Spartan and Corinthian leaders; and if the lust of gain may be charged upon Themistokles, it is a charge which probably he would not have cared to disclaim. In the first message which he is said to have sent by Sikinnos to the Persian generals or to Xerxes himself no one professes to see a double motive. The stratagem seems at first sight a masterly

<sup>1122</sup> See vol. i. page 519

<sup>1123</sup> I am unable, therefore, to agree with the remarks of Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr* v. 134.

device for bringing about the destruction of the Persian fleet : but its value is not a little impaired, when we see that it is practically superfluous. Nothing in the previous history of the war justifies the supposition that Xerxes was likely to retreat from Salamis without fighting or that he intended to delay the battle. Still the disposition of Adeimantos and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta may have made it indispensably necessary to deprive them at once of all chances of escape ; and the message of Themistokles was admirably framed to effect this purpose. For the second message the several accounts assign different objects, the most circumstantial affirming that for himself Themistokles sought by means of it to win the gratitude of the king and a refuge in the time of trouble which even then he anticipated. Assuredly such a fact, if proved, would be one of the most astonishing in all history ; for we are asked to believe that a man, engaged in saving his country from dangers apparently overwhelming, and struggling with the jealousy, or selfishness, or disaffection of his confederates, was actuated at one and the same moment by two entirely distinct and conflicting motives. With his whole soul he was bent on setting his country free : and yet not less earnestly was he bent on securing a place of retreat among the very enemies whom he was driving out. Such a condition of mind could, assuredly, have produced nothing but distraction of purpose and utter weakness in action, a turmoil of contrary desires with which the calm judgement and profound energy of the man stand out in incomprehensible contrast. Such treachery it is perhaps beyond our power to realise. Some notion of it may be formed if we should suppose that when Nelson before the fight at Trafalgar warned every man that England looked to him to do his duty, he had already done his best to secure the future good will of the tyrant Bonaparte whose fleets he was advancing to encounter. But if Herodotos represents Themistokles as holding out to Xerxes the prospect of an unmolested march, there were other, and seemingly more popular, versions which spoke of him as terrifying the king by a warning that he might be intercepted on the road. With statements so inconsistent, the double meaning which is said to lie in the



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message must be rejected.<sup>1124</sup> It may indeed be said that the sending of this second message may be accounted for by the love which a man like Themistokles would feel for the arts in which he excelled, for their own sake, and that the delight of conducting an intrigue might be in itself a sufficient motive for action. Such a supposition would impute to him a childishness scarcely less than that which he is said to have shown in his inordinate vanity : but here again it is needless to say more, for with almost complete assurance it may be asserted that this second message was never sent.<sup>1125</sup>

Relations  
of Pau-  
sanias with  
Themis-  
tokles.

The treachery of Pausanias led directly or indirectly to the downfall of the great Athenian statesman. In his conduct to the confederate allies of Athens Themistokles had not acquired a reputation which would of itself suffice to repel the charge of complicity with the Spartan. Still, in spite of the efforts of Aristides, of Kimon, and Alkmaion, the first accusation was repelled with success; and the influence of Themistokles was strengthened only to embitter the animosity of his opponents. Both he and his rivals were probably not unwilling to resort to the test of ostracism; and the remembrance of his ancient triumph, as well as of his more recent acquittal, might inspire Themistokles with a natural confidence in its issue. But the tide had turned against him; and he went into exile, not unprepared to consult more exclusively his own interests, since he was precluded from advancing further the interests of his country. There is however no evidence that he took any active part in the schemes of Pausanias,<sup>1126</sup> or that any documents were discovered after the death of the latter which established the guilt of Themistokles. Still probably neither the remembrance of his own failings nor his consciousness of the unrelenting hostility of his opponents would tempt him to await at Argos the arrival of the men who had been sent to seize him; and after a series of strange adventures and, as it is said, of narrow escapes he found a refuge in the dominions of the

<sup>1124</sup> Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 314, rejects it on the ground that 'such a conjecture might very naturally be formed after the event, but would scarcely have been thought probable before it.' For the opposite view see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 191.

<sup>1125</sup> See vol. i. page 549.

<sup>1126</sup> Diodoros, xi. 54, says that he refused to have anything to do with them, but at the same time promised that he would not reveal them.

great king. Yet from these dominions the Spartan Pausanias had been compelled to return home by the threat that in case of refusal he would be treated as a common enemy. The fact that similar measures were not held out against Themistokles would seem to disprove the statement that he remained for a year near the coast, and so within the reach of his enemies, before he went to Artaxerxes at Sousa.<sup>1127</sup>

But while he sojourned near the coast, he is said to have sent to the despot of Persia a letter couched in terms of intolerable insolence. This letter, as we have seen, is a manifest forgery; and it is therefore scarcely necessary to say that, if the epistle which the Eretrian Gongylos conveyed from the Spartan regent was too presuming and boastful to be altogether palatable to an Eastern king, it was yet free from the falsehoods which formed the substance of this letter of Themistokles. The plea that the instinct of self-preservation alone had led him to resist and repel the invasion of Xerxes must to his son, who was not altogether ignorant of the phenomena of Medism, have appeared not less ridiculous than false: the boast that as soon as he could safely do so he had compensated his injuries with greater benefits must have seemed an extravagant and shameless lie. But whether this letter was sent or not, the details of his journey to Sousa as well as of his sojourn in the palace are purely fictitious; and hence we cannot venture to determine the motives which led Artaxerxes to befriend the Athenian exile, or the terms on which he extended to him his lavish bounty, if lavish it was. The mere fact that during his long residence at Magnesia he made no effort to fulfil the promise which he is said to have given,<sup>1128</sup> must go far to prove that no direct enterprise against the freedom of the Hellenic world could have been involved in it. The supposition of such an engagement gave rise to the tale that his death was caused by taking poison; but this story obtained no credit with Thucydides whose account would seem to justify the inference drawn from his in-

Extent of  
the guilt of  
Themistokles.

<sup>1127</sup> Thuc. i. 137, 138.

<sup>1128</sup> Mr. Grote infers from the words of Thucydides that he promised to Artaxerxes a long series of victorious campaigns against Hellas. *Hist. Gr.* v. 390. It cannot be said that this is the obvious meaning of the historian's language. Themistokles might at the time of the supposed paction have preferred diplomatic to military conquests.

activity at Magnesia. By a version scarcely less extravagant than his tale of the rebuilding of the Athenian walls, Diodoros represents his death as a crowning stratagem to preclude all further attacks from Persia on the liberty of his country.<sup>1129</sup> There can be no doubt that if he had entered into any such compact with the Persian king with any intention of fulfilling it, he had it in his power to inflict enormous damage on the growing empire of Athens. That not a single injurious act can be laid to his charge would seem to prove, not that he cheated the king by a series of gratuitous falsehoods, but that Artaxerxes imposed no such obligations as the price of his hospitality. His degradation was great enough already without adding to it a larger measure of infamy. He had prostrated himself, if we believe the story, before the footstool of a despot, and received the wages of a slave: and as he looked back on the days of Marathon, of Salamis, and Plataiai, as he thought of the new field which his own wisdom and strength of purpose had opened to his countrymen, as he dwelt on the image of Athenian freedom and of a supremacy exercised with equal benefit to the most unwilling as to the most willing members of the great confederacy of Athens, he may have felt that his punishment was equal to his sin. But the thought may perhaps force itself upon us that his guilt would not have appeared so deep, and that the issue of his rivalry with Aristides would not have been so disastrous, had there existed in his day the historical tribunal before which the life and acts of Perikles were passed in strict and impartial review. We may see that the absence of restraining influences may have added strength to party faction and bitterness to personal jealousy,—that the want of full available evidence may have encouraged the growth of slander and falsehood, while it infinitely increased the difficulty of weakening or removing a general impression. We may understand how with a consciousness of much demerit and with a yet keener consciousness of his unparalleled greatness, he may not have cared to confront his accusers, or have felt that a second accusation was a virtual condemnation before his

<sup>1129</sup> Diod. xi. 58. Compare a stratagem, very similar in its spirit, though with a different object, by the Persian satrap Harnozan, when brought before Omar. Gibbon, *Roman Empire*, ch. li. vol. v. p. 97, ed. Miltian.

cause could be heard. We may learn how he might depart into exile with enough of indignation against his countrymen to make him careless of his own reputation and of their esteem, yet with not enough of hatred to tempt him to move hand or foot against that country which owed to him her very existence, her freedom, and her greatness. He had saved Athens from dangers such as have rarely fallen to the lot of any people; but his hands were not quite clean nor his heart very pure; and in his later years the dross had sadly hidden the fine gold. Yet his vices were not darker than those of Francis Bacon or Warren Hastings; and the failings of the man must not be suffered to detract unduly from the glory of his work. It is no light thing to have solid grounds for believing that Themistokles was not guilty of the inveterate treachery which has given to the story of his life a character of inexplicable mystery; that, with much to mar its ancient strength, he yet carried the love of his country to the grave; and that no pledge to work the ruin of that country laid on him the guilt of superfluous hypocrisy towards the despot who is said to have given him a home in his unworthy and dishonoured old age.

Long before the life of Themistokles had reached its close in his splendid Magnesian retreat, Aristeides the righteous had died in poverty, either at Athens, or in battle somewhere on the coasts of the Black Sea,—in short, where or how, we know not. Stories were not lacking which called even his incorruptibility into question; and it was maintained that he too, being unable to pay a heavy fine on a conviction for bribery, took refuge in the land where Themistokles had found a shelter, and that there he died. There were other tales which represented his poverty as verging so nearly on beggary that he failed to leave even money enough to pay the costs of his funeral. He was therefore buried at the public expense, it is said, at Phaleron; and a large sum was granted to his son, as well as dowries to his daughters. But if we are to believe the story, the family of Aristeides had a genius for poverty. Some five generations later, a man named Lysimachos, who, tracing his descent to the Athenian Strategos at Plataiai, made his livelihood by interpreting

The death  
of Aris-  
teides.  
458 B.C. (?)

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dreams, begged a pittance for his mother from the Phalerean Demetrios. The wealth of Themistokles on the other hand, it seems, would not take to itself wings and flee away. His sons dedicated in the Parthenon a painting which commemorated his achievements; and his descendent Themistokles was still a rich man in the days of his friend Plutarch. But the personal fortunes of their late posterity throw little light on the moral character whether of Themistokles or of his rival.<sup>1130</sup>

<sup>1130</sup> Plut. *Arist.* c. 26, 27; *Themist.* c. 5-32.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE GROWTH OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

A PERIOD of less than half a century separates the close of the struggle with Persia from that disastrous strife between the two foremost states of Hellas which prepared the way first for Makedonian and then for Roman conquest. Nay, although that brief period saw the rise and culmination of Athenian empire and even the first stages of its downward course, we cannot speak of the beginning of it as marking the close of the struggle with Persia except in so far as the issue of it was virtually decided in the waters of Salamis and under the heights of Kithairon and Mykalé. \* The Persian despot himself the Græeks might fairly count on never seeing again: but the fear of Persian armies except perhaps in central Hellas was not yet a thing of the past. Persian garrisons still remained in towns along the Thrakian coasts: and repeated efforts failed to dislodge Maskames from Doriskos down even to the time when Herodotos was writing the later books of his history.<sup>1131</sup> Persian fleets still threatened to renew the contest by sea, and Persian armies still hung behind the scanty strip of land which had been the brightest jewel in the empire of Kroisos. Sparta might feel herself safe and care little to prolong a strain from which she could hope for no direct advantage. It was otherwise with Athens, unless she could make up her mind once more to abandon to Persian dominion the cities which she regarded as her own colonies on the eastern shores of the Egean. Such a course was for her impossible. Her own victories had brought about another revolt of Ionia from the Persian power; and whether on the Asiatic continent or in the Egean islands the Hellenes looked to her for the further conduct of a war in which they

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confeder-  
ation.<sup>1131</sup> See notes 4088, 1101.

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were ready to give such help as might be in their power. But more particularly Athens saw that her interest as well as her duty lay in placing herself at the head of the cities which were willing to submit to her guidance while they utterly rejected the supremacy of Sparta. The whole history of the war thus far had made it abundantly clear that her power was based upon her fleet, and that this power was capable of indefinite expansion. The security of Attica, which was bringing back to the city the wealthy and skilled population of alien residents, could be maintained only by her command of the sea, and this command secured further for Athens the benefits arising from the whole commerce of the Egean together with the trade which streamed from the Black Sea through the gates of the Hellespont. But it can scarcely be said that the brilliant vision of Athenian empire, as contrasted with the headship of a free confederacy, had yet dawned on the minds of Athenian statesmen. The most far-seeing of these, beyond doubt, was Themistokles: and the whole policy of Themistokles was shaped by the conviction that, if Athens was ever to be great, she must be great by sea. When he told his fellow-citizens that with their ships they might bid defiance to all assailants, but that in such struggles their old city under the rock of the Virgin goddess would be of little use or none,<sup>1132</sup> we cannot suppose that he was looking forward to a time when the dominion of Athens should stretch from Megara and its harbours to the pass of Thermopylai, or that he would have failed to deprecate efforts designed to bring about such a result as mischievous, if not fatal, to her real welfare. With him it is evident that the maritime dominion of Athens could be achieved only by giving up all ideas of supremacy by land; and the mere fact that Delos was chosen as the centre of the new confederacy is of itself the proof that no such schemes were entertained by others.

Change in  
the rela-  
tions of  
Athens  
with her  
allies.

Yet within a few years Athenian energy brought about results which, while the victories of Salamis and Plataiai were fresh, would have been set down as extravagant dreams. The events which led to these results were shaped by circum-

<sup>1132</sup> See page 6.

stances which could not have been anticipated; and of the course of these events we have unfortunately a singularly bare and meagre record. It is not that the history of this most important time has been lost, but that it never was written; <sup>1133</sup> and our knowledge of the course of events must be derived from a comparison of the statements of Thucydides with those of Herodotos. From the former we learn that the confederacy of Delos, when first formed after the fall of Byzantion, was an association of independent states whose representatives met in the synod on a footing of perfect equality, and that an arrangement was made by which the necessary burdens for carrying on the war were equitably distributed among the members. By the latter we are told that, when Sestos and Byzantion had fallen, a vast amount of work still remained to be done before Europe could be rid of the barbarian: and thus when during the ten years following the battles of Plataiai and Mykalê Thucydides notices only two or three events, we are justified in thinking that he has marked in a long series of operations only those which are most important or which most closely affected the interests of Athens. Lastly we learn from Thucydides that at the end of this time a change became manifest in the attitude of Athens towards the other members of the confederation; that at first all contributed ships and men for the common service, whether with or without further contributions in money; <sup>1134</sup> and that the change in the relative positions of

<sup>1133</sup> This is distinctly asserted by Thucydides, in a passage, i. 97, which seems to imply his acquaintance with the Histories of Herodotos. His meaning seems further to be that the only other writer who had said anything about the period immediately following the invasion of Xerxes was Hellanikos and that his brief notices were full of chronological mistakes,—in other words, that Hellanikos had followed an untrustworthy oral tradition.

Although it would seem that Thucydides must be referring to Herodotos when he speaks of writers who had treated τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικά ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά, it is very remarkable that he writes as if in perfect ignorance that Herodotos had related the history of Peisistratos. Taking his language, vi. 53, 55, 60, strictly, we should suppose that the Athenians of his day had no knowledge of the events of that time except from a tradition which was still oral. See note 416.

<sup>1134</sup> Something has already been said, p. 11, about this assessment which bears the name of Aristides. The only facts ascertained with regard to it are (1) the sum total of the assessment, and (2) its distribution among all the members. We can scarcely avoid the conclusion that at first all states composing the league were called upon to furnish ships and men as well as money. It was obviously impossible to allow any state to shirk the duty of bearing its proper share of the common burden, for states thus exempt would have the full benefit of the confederation without trouble or cost to themselves. But if any states were from the first allowed to compound in money for their quota of ships and men, we cannot speak of a change of system, when we mean merely that a practice already legitimate in some cases is allowed in a larger number. If at



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Athens and her allies was brought about wholly by the acts of the latter. It may be true, as Thucydides asserts, that Athens was firm, even to harshness, in insisting that all should discharge to the full their duties as confederates. In the presence of a common and formidable danger she was bound to be so even at the cost of much hardship to the poorer and weaker members of the league; but if all had continued to display, or had displayed at all, the vigour and zeal of the Athenians, the latter could never have acquired a power which Kleôn, rightly perhaps, called a tyranny. But with the Ionians it was the old story. The demands of Athens seemed hard only because they loathed the idea of long-continued strenuous exertion.<sup>1135</sup> They were acting again the part which they had played during the revolt of Aristagoras, and justifying the policy which according to the old tradition Cyrus had adopted at the suggestion of Kroisos.<sup>1136</sup> But they were dealing now with men who were not to be trifled with like the Phokaian Dionysios;<sup>1137</sup> and as in some shape or other they must bear their full measure of the general burden, the thought struck them that their end might be gained if they paid more money and furnished fewer ships and men, or none. Their proposal was accepted; and its immediate result was to enhance enormously the power of Athens while in case of revolt they became practically helpless against a thoroughly disciplined and thoroughly

the first personal service was an indispensable condition, then the introduction of a system of compounding would be a radical change in the constitution of the league. I believe, therefore, that at first all were compelled to pay and to serve alike, and that the substitution of an additional payment in place of personal service, Thuc. i. 97, was a change introduced by the desire not of the Athenians, but of some of their allies. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Thuc. ii. 13, the tribute paid by the Athenian allies amounted to 600 talents, about 138,000*l.*,—clearly a contribution in money. Hence it becomes likely that the 460 talents of the original assessment represented the total of the money payments made by the several allies over and above their quotas of men and ships, and exclusive of the expenditure of the Athenians themselves, for clearly Athens in the days of Perikles contributed nothing towards the Phoros of the allies. The difference between the 460 and the 600 talents of the two periods would be accounted for by the change to a system of composition for personal service on the part of some of the allies, and partly by the enrolment of some new states in the confederacy. We have no grounds for thinking that any change was made in the scale of the assessment.

It is scarcely necessary to add that not only would all the members be bound to contribute, but that all the states lying within the geographical range embraced by the league would be compelled to become members. It would be even more dangerous to allow states to retain an independence which would enable them, if they pleased, to play into the hands of the Persian king than to have members of the confederation exempt from all burdens.

<sup>1135</sup> Ἀθηναῖοι . . . Λυπηροὶ ἦσαν, οὐκ εἰωθῶσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις τάλαιπῶρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. Thuc. i. 99, 1.

<sup>1136</sup> See vol. i. page 316.

<sup>1137</sup> See vol. i. page 404.

resolute enemy. To this end they were rapidly hastening; and the measure in which they were freed from the fear of Persian exactions marked the degree of their impatience under a confederation of which they felt themselves to be no longer voluntary members. But the very fact of this growing impatience is proof enough that the need of strenuous exertion was extended over years and that this need lay in the likelihood of new Persian aggression, so long as the barbarian retained a foothold in Europe or commanded the waters of the Egean or Pamphylian seas.

This consummation was not achieved in a day. Sestos and Byzantion had fallen: but Boges the governor of Eion on the mouth of the Strymon offered to the assaults of the allies a resistance as desperate, it is said, as that of the Jews at Massada.<sup>1138</sup> The capture of Eion was either preceded or followed by the reconquest of Lemnos;<sup>1139</sup> and probably the convenience of Skyros as a station on the voyage to Lemnos led to the attack of that island and the reduction of its people to slavery.<sup>1140</sup> Here, with a luck equal to that of Lichas at Tègea or of Henry II. when he laid bare the tomb of Arthur at Glastonbury, Kimon discovered the bones of the hero Theseus;<sup>1141</sup> and another memorial of a glorious time was added to the Athenian city in the sanctuary where these relics were henceforth inshrined. From Skyros Thucydides takes us to the Euboian Karystos which was treated with the same severity; but of the quarrel which led to this attack or of the causes which, at a somewhat later time, brought about the revolt of Naxos, we know nothing. The blockade of this island, we are told, was going on while Themistokles was making his way to the

Athenian operations to the battles of the Eurymedon.

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<sup>1138</sup> According to Herodotos, vii. 107, he refused all terms, and when food wholly failed, he raised a huge pyre on which he placed the bodies of his wives, children, concubines and servants, whom he had murdered, and then, having thrown all his money into the Strymon, flung himself on the burning pile. Nothing is here said of the Persian garrison, unless (which is not likely) Herodotos includes them under the head of slaves or domestics. We can scarcely suppose that these would allow themselves to be killed off, to humour the whim of a desperate fanatic. We are dealing, it must be remembered, with events for which we have no contemporary records. Thucydides, i. 98, speaks of the Athenians as reducing the place to slavery. This can scarcely refer to the inhabitants, unless these were actively on the Persian side, and may therefore refer to the garrison.

<sup>1139</sup> See vol. i. page 383. Xenophon, *Hellen.* v. 1, 31.

<sup>1140</sup> Thuc. i. 98.

<sup>1141</sup> The same myths have crystallised round both these names. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 309, &c. *Popular Romances of the Middle Ages*, 17, &c.

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Asiatic coast: and here, as elsewhere, the Athenians were the conquerors, and inflicted a terrible punishment on the islanders. In the days of Aristagoras Naxos had, it is stated, a large fleet and a force of 8,000 hoplites. The fleet at least went to swell the numbers of the Athenian navy, which was now to strike another great blow on the maritime power of the Persian king. The victory of Kimon destroyed, it is said, on one and the same day the Phœnician fleet of 200 ships at the mouth of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, and the land-forces with which it was destined to co-operate. The pages of Diodoros and Plutarch are enlivened by minute details of these engagements: but if their accounts are taken from writers who lived at least a century later than the events of which they speak, we must be content to accept or to reject these according to their likelihood or improbability.<sup>1142</sup>

The Delian  
Synod;  
and the  
revolt of  
Thasos.

The history of the Delian confederation was determined by the character of the Asiatic Greeks. The continued struggle with Persia after the battle of Mykalé involved the need of strenuous exertions: and for this the Ionians were not prepared. The Athenians on the other hand were not less resolved that the efforts should be made; and as soon as this radical difference of view began to find expression, the Delian synod was doomed. Its members could no longer meet as equals; its deliberations became a mere waste of time; and Delos was obviously no longer a fit place for the common treasury. Hence the synod ceased to meet, and the funds were transferred to Athens,—at what precise time we know not, although the change had probably been made before the open revolt of any of the allies. The days of Athenian Hegemonia, or leadership, were now ended: the empire or tyranny of Athens had begun,<sup>1143</sup> and whether in

<sup>1142</sup> According to Thucydides, i. 100, it would seem that the Phœnician fleet at the Eurymedon amounted to no more or not much more than 200 ships, for this fleet ran ashore to be within the protection of the Persian land-force. When this was dispersed, the ships would necessarily fall into the hands of the conquerors. See Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 419, vii. 571. Arnold, note to *Thuc.* i. 100. Plutarch mentions that the Phœnicians expected a reinforcement of 80 ships, and that Kimon sailing to Kypros (Cyprus) fell in with them before they had heard of the battle and destroyed them. The statement accounts for the comparatively small number of the ships first opposed to Kimon.

<sup>1143</sup> The distinction between the two is carefully drawn by Thucydides. The word *ἀρχή*, which is used to denote the later supremacy of Athens, is never applied to the Spartans in their relations with the Eastern Greeks; and Byzantion is mentioned as

laying its foundations or in raising the fabric the Athenians assuredly cannot be charged with any lack of promptitude. Not many months after the conquest of Naxos and the victories of the Eurymedon a quarrel with the Thasians about their mines and trade on their Thracian settlements<sup>1144</sup> was followed by open war. Not content with blockading Thasos, the Athenians, to make all further rivalry impossible, sent 10,000 men as settlers to the spot called the Nine Roads,<sup>1145</sup> the site of the future Amphipolis. This post they succeeded in occupying; but in an evil hour they were tempted by the hope of large profits from mines to advance further inland towards the northeast, and at or near Drabeskos their whole force was practically swept away by the Edonian Thracians to whom the Milesian Aristagoras had fallen a victim.<sup>1146</sup> This terrible disaster brought no relief to the Thasians. The Athenians still blockaded their port, and maintained their lodgement on the island: but although the siege had lasted for two years, the spirit of the Thasians was not yet broken. They saw that the quarrel between themselves and the Athenians was one which must be decided in a struggle between Athens and Sparta. From Sparta therefore they besought aid in their distress: and the Spartans entered into a secret engagement to invade Attica, which proved that, apart from specific causes of offence, the mere greatness of Athens was a wrong which they could not forgive. To this fear of Athens and to this alone we must trace the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. The disputes connected with Corinth and Korkyra were themselves the results of a cause which had predetermined the deadly struggle between

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falling during their Hegemonia. Thuc. i. 94. Again when the Ionians are disgusted with the Spartans, they ask the Athenians, Thuc. i. 95, to be their Hegemones; but when the allies revolt and are subdued, the historian speaks at once of the change from leadership to dominion or empire as in process of accomplishment. i. 97. This condition of things was maintained, more or less strictly, down to the fatal battle of Aigospotamoi, 405 B.C.: and if we take the suppression of the Naxian revolt as marking roughly the beginning of this empire, we have for its duration a period of sixty years. But it became a habit with the orators and writers of a later age to represent this empire as beginning with the first formation of the Delian confederacy, while some assigned to it a duration which would carry it back to the battle of Marathon. The latter notion was not more groundless or absurd than the former. Thucydides, it is true, i. 76, represents the Athenian ambassadors at the congress of Sparta, in 432 B.C., as speaking of the voluntary assignment of empire to Athens by her allies, ἀρχὴν δεδομένην ἰδεξάμεθα. This, of course, is a mere oratorical subterfuge. The speaker had only a few sentences before asserted that the Athenians were at first only Hegemones.

<sup>1144</sup> See vol. i. page 414.<sup>1145</sup> Thuc. i. 100. See vol. i. page 165.<sup>1146</sup> See vol. i. page 394.

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the two leading cities of the Hellenic world. But for the present their power to aid the Thasians was not equal to their will; and the islanders were at last subdued. They were compelled to raze their walls, to give up their ships, their mines, and their Thracian settlements, and to make good the sums due for the contributions which they would have paid, if they had not revolted.

The revolt  
of the  
Helots  
and the  
alliance of  
Athens  
with Argos.  
464 B.C.

While the Thasians were holding out against the fleet and army of Athens, their Spartan friends were busied in blockading Ithômê. A terrible earthquake, which had shaken the city of Sparta and its neighbourhood, was ascribed to the vengeance of Poseidon for the impious withdrawal of the dying Pausanias from his sanctuary; and to the Helots it seemed a call to rise against their masters. Breaking out into open revolt, they marched or were gradually pushed back, with a large body of Perioikoi who had joined them, to the old Messenian stronghold, and were there blockaded by the Spartans. Fearing that the siege might in length rival that of Eira, the Spartans besought help not only from their Peloponnesian allies but from the Athenians against whom they had made a secret pact with the Thasians. Their application at Athens was opposed, it is said, by Perikles and Ephialtes, but warmly seconded by Kimon who besought his countrymen not to see Hellas lamed of one leg or Athens drawing the cart without her yokefellow. The arguments of Kimon prevailed, and he was himself sent with a large force to take part in the reduction of Ithômê. But the place was too strong to be carried even by the most skilful of the Greeks in the conduct of blockades: and the consciousness of their own premeditated treachery led them to ascribe the like double-dealing to the Athenians and the Plataians who accompanied them, and to dismiss them on the plea that their services were no longer needed.<sup>1147</sup> The indignation stirred up in the Athenians by this manifest falsehood was no mere feeling of the moment. The policy of Kimon and his philo-Lakonian adherents was cast to the winds: and proposals for a treaty of alliance were at once made to Argos the ancient rival and enemy of Sparta. This

<sup>1147</sup> See Thuc. i. 102, 4

city had not only recovered from the blow with which Kleomenes had smitten her,<sup>1148</sup> but had reduced to subjection or slavery the cities which had once been her peers and which had dared to send their contingents to Pylai and Plataiai while she held herself aloof in an inglorious neutrality. Tiryns, Orneai, Midea and other towns were all conquered. Mykenai resisted more stoutly, and underwent a harder fate. Its fortifications were dismantled, or rendered useless, its people sold as slaves; and nothing but the ruins of its ancient walls remained from that day forth of a city which had been great when Homeric rhapsodists told the story of Ilium and Helen.<sup>1149</sup> Argos was thus greater than she had ever been since she lost the territory of Thyrea;<sup>1150</sup> and an alliance with Athens might go far towards the recovery of her old supremacy. The fire thus kindled spread swiftly. 461 B.C. The Thessalians were brought into the new alliance; and Megara, tired out with Corinthian incroachments on her boundaries, flung herself into the arms of Athens. Her friendship was eagerly welcomed, for the Athenians thus became possessed of the two Megarian ports, Nisaia on the Saronic gulf and Pegai on that of Corinth, while their occupation of the passes of Geraneia rendered Spartan invasions of Attica practically impossible. Still further to strengthen their hold on Megara, they joined the city by long walls to its southern port of Nisaia, and within the fortress thus made they placed a permanent garrison. These walls probably suggested the greater enterprise which was soon to make Athens, so far as she could be made, a maritime city. Meanwhile the siege of Ithômê went on; but the end of the long struggle was, happily, to be less disastrous than the catastrophe of Eira in the days of Aristomenes.<sup>1151</sup> The Helots and Perioikoi came to terms with their besiegers. 455 B.C. They were to leave the Peloponnesos, under the pain of becoming the slaves of any who might catch them if they dared to set foot there again. On these terms men, women, and children all departed in peace, and found a refuge in Naupaktos,<sup>1152</sup> which the Athenians had lately taken from

<sup>1148</sup> See vol. i. page 419.<sup>1150</sup> See vol. i. page 65.<sup>1149</sup> Diod. xi. 65. Paus. ii. 16, 4.<sup>1151</sup> See vol. i. page 90.<sup>1152</sup> See vol. i. page 47.

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the Ozolian Lokrians. Thus at the northern entrance of the Corinthian gulf a population was established bitterly hostile to Sparta and devoted to the interests of Athens, while the enrolment of Megara in the new league roused the fiercest wrath of the Corinthians and of their allies of Epidaurus and Aigina.

Siege of  
Aigina.  
Building of  
the Long  
Walls of  
Athens.  
459-8 B.C.

The Corinthians had not to wait long for an occasion of open strife. The Athenians had landed a force in the territory of the Fishermen (Halieis), who occupied the south-western corner of the Argolic peninsula. The Corinthians aided by the Epidaurians attacked them and won a victory. In a second engagement off Kekryphaleia, an islet to the west of Aigina, they were defeated. The Aiginetans now resolved to measure themselves in earnest with the men who had robbed them of their ancient maritime supremacy. They went into battle, relying probably on the tactics which had destroyed the Persian fleets at Salamis and Mykalê: they came out of it, utterly ruined as a maritime power, and dreading Athenian strategy as much as they had dreaded the armaments of Xerxes two-and-twenty years before. Seventy of their ships were taken, and Aigina itself was blockaded by sea and land. The Spartans had now another opportunity, as they had had before during the siege of Thasos, for striking a blow at Athens, while her main armies were busied elsewhere; but the Helots were not yet conquered, and they could not stir from Ithômê. This time it was not merely the people of a neighbouring island who were anxious to have the Athenians drawn away from their territory. A large Athenian fleet and army had gone to aid the Egyptians in their revolt against Artaxerxes; and Megabazos, as the envoy of the great king, had come to Sparta, to enforce with large bribes the immediate invasion of Attica. His money was spent in vain; <sup>1153</sup> but the Corinthians by an attack on Megara and by occupying the heights of Geraneia thought to achieve that which the Spartans had not been able to attempt. To their surprise no forces were withdrawn from the army of Leokrates at Aigina; but a force consisting of the oldest and the youngest men who had been left to guard

460 B.C.

the city marched from Athens to Megara under the command of Myronides. The battle which followed was indecisive; but the Athenians set up a trophy on the departure of the Corinthians who were received at home with jeers for retreating from a rabble of old men and boys. Smarting under the abuse, they hastened back to the field, and there as they were setting up a trophy on their side they were attacked by the same force and defeated. Unhappily in their retreat a large body found their way by the only entrance into a piece of private ground inclosed by a deep trench. Myronides instantly blocked up the entrance with his hoplites, while his light-armed troops shot down all who had fallen into this fatal snare till not a man remained alive. The day was a black one for the Corinthians although the bulk of their army returned home in safety. On the Athenian side the history of this time with its rush of events and its startling changes exhibits a picture of astonishing and almost preternatural energy. One Athenian army was besieging Aigina; another was absent in Egypt. Yet this was the time chosen by Perikles for carrying out at home the plan which on a very small scale had been adopted at Megara. To join Athens with Peiraieus on the one side and Phaleron on the other, one wall was needed of about  $4\frac{1}{2}$ , and another of about 4 English miles in length. Such an enterprise could not fail to excite to the utmost the jealous fears of the Peloponnesian cities, and to create a deep anxiety amongst the conservative statesmen of Athens who wished to keep on good terms with Sparta at all costs except that of dishonour to their country. But it was the necessary result of the policy of Themistokles; and the great man on whom his mantle had fallen united with his wisdom and courage the personal integrity which his teacher lacked. There was therefore nothing to withhold him from adopting the only means by which Athens might bid defiance to all invaders: and it became evident to the Spartans that if her growth was to be arrested, it could be done only by setting up a counterpoise to her influence in northern Hellas. Hence for the sake of checking Athens they overcame their almost invincible dislike of regularly organised federations, and they set to work to restore the



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supremacy of the city which had been most disgracefully zealous in the cause of Xerxes. If we may believe Diodoros,<sup>1154</sup> a formal paction bound the Thebans, in return for the good offices of the Spartans, so to keep Athens in check in time of war as to render unnecessary any invasion of Attica from the Peloponnesos.

Battles of  
Tanagra  
and Oino-  
phyta.  
The fall of  
Aigina.

457 B.C.

The fortress of Ithômê had not yet fallen when the Spartans sent across the Corinthian gulf a force of 1,500 Spartan hoplites and 10,000 of their allies under the command of Nikomedes who was then acting as regent for the young king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias. Their nominal errand was to rescue from the Phokians one of the three Dorian towns which formed the Lakedaimonian metropolis.<sup>1155</sup> The task was easily accomplished, and we are told that they had already begun their homeward march when they found that an Athenian fleet was stationed in the Krissaian gulf to prevent their crossing by sea, while an Athenian garrison occupied the passes of Geraneia. But it can scarcely be supposed that a force of nearly twelve thousand hoplites was needed to deliver a Dorian village from a clan of mountaineers; and it is possible that Thucydides places too much in the background the intrigues of some Athenians who prayed them to remain in Boiotia for the purpose of upsetting the Athenian democracy and of hindering the erection of the Long Walls. Hither also hastened this unwearied Demos, aided by a thousand Argives as well as by other allies. The battle was fought at Tanagra, within sight of the Euripos: and the Athenians were defeated after a severe and bloody fight. But the victory did little more for the Spartans than open for them the passes of Geraneia, through which they returned home, doing some mischief to the Megarid by the way. On the sixty-second day<sup>1156</sup> after the battle (the exactness of the chronology shows how firmly these incidents had fixed themselves in the memory of the people) Myronides marched into Boiotia, and by his splendid victory among the vineyards of Oinophyta raised the empire of Athens to the greatest height which it ever reached. Utterly defeated, the Boiotians and Phokians became the subject allies of

<sup>1154</sup> xi. 81.

<sup>1155</sup> Thuc. i. 107. See vol. i. page 60.

<sup>1156</sup> Ib. i. 108, 2.

the Athenians who set up democracies everywhere, taking a hundred hostages from the Lokrians of Opous as pledges of their fidelity. Thus from Megara and its harbours to the passes of Thermopylai Athens was supreme; and this great exaltation was followed almost immediately by the humbling of her ancient foe Aigina. The walls of this ill-fated city were razed, her fleet was forfeited, and the conquest crowned by the imposition of the tribute for maintaining the Athenian confederacy. Nor was this all. In a few sentences Thucydides records the completion of the Long Walls, the voyage of Tolmides round the Peloponnesos, the burning of the Spartan docks at Gytheion,<sup>1157</sup> the capture of the Corinthian Chalkis, and the defeat of the Sikyonians.<sup>1158</sup> In the following year he speaks of another attack made on Sikyon by Perikles, but with no more decisive result,<sup>1159</sup> and of a vigorous effort to establish Athenian supremacy in Thessaly by the restoration of the Thessalian king or chieftain Orestes. Advancing as far as Pharsalos, they found themselves checked by the cavalry which had gone over to the enemy on the field of Tanagra. But the failure of this scheme did not deter them from a more distant expedition, nor did the unsuccessful blockade of the Akarnanian Oiniadai<sup>1160</sup> leave them without spirit for further enterprise. The Achaians had been united with the Athenian confederacy; and this was a sufficient compensation for many reverses.

Of these reverses the most terrible was the disaster which befell the fleet dispatched to the aid of the Libyan Inaros, the son of Psammetichos, who, coming forth from the fens of Mareia near the western base of the Delta, had, on the death of Xerxes, excited the greater part of Egypt to revolt against the power of Persia.<sup>1161</sup> Two hundred Athenian triremes happened at the time to be on their way to Kypros (Cyprus); and these were ordered to make their way at once to Egypt. Sailing up the Nile to Memphis, the Athenians at once became masters of the whole city with the exception of the quarter known as the White Town or Castle,<sup>1162</sup> in which they blockaded the

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455 B.C.

Disasters  
of the  
Athenians  
in Egypt.  
455 B.C.

<sup>1157</sup> Diodoros, xi. 84, says that Tolmides took both Methone and Gytheion, but he does not speak of the former as being destroyed by fire.

<sup>1158</sup> Thuc. i. 108.

<sup>1160</sup> *Ib.* i. 111.

<sup>1162</sup> Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 363.

<sup>1159</sup> *Ib.* i. 111.

<sup>1161</sup> *Ib.* i. 104. Diod. xi. 71.

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Persian garrison with such of the Egyptians as remained faithful to the Persian despot. So grave in the judgement of Artaxerxes was the state of affairs, that, as we have seen, he dispatched Megabazos to Sparta on an errand to which the Spartans, pre-occupied with the siege of Ithômê, were unable to attend. Far from being depressed by their remissness or neglect, Artaxerxes was roused to greater exertion, and Megabyzos the son of that Zopyros who plays a prominent part in the conquest of Babylon<sup>1163</sup> was dispatched with a large force to put down the Egyptian rebels. The open nature of the country, which had thus far aided the Greeks, now enabled the Persian general to seize those portions of Memphis which they had occupied, and, in conjunction with the garrison which he now set free in the White Town, to drive the Hellenes to Prosopitis, an island lying probably at the head of the Delta. In a few words Thucydides relates the sequel of this ill-fated enterprise, telling us simply that for eighteen months the Athenians in the islet underwent a siege by Megabyzos who then diverted the surrounding waters. The stranded ships were now useless, and of the crews, who were borne down by overwhelming numbers, a few only made their way through Libya to Kyrênê. The Libyan Inaros was betrayed to the Persians and crucified; and a reinforcement of fifty triremes from Athens, having reached the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, was attacked and almost wholly destroyed by a combined armament of Phœnician ships and Persian land-forces. But although the revolt was thus practically put down, resistance to Persian rule was not altogether at an end, and Amyrtaios still remained king in the marsh-lands of the Delta.<sup>1164</sup>

There is something perplexing in the very completeness of

<sup>1163</sup> See vol. i. page 359.

<sup>1164</sup> The uncertainties connected with the accounts of this Egyptian revolt are the necessary result of a merely traditional history. Hence in spite of the arguments of Dr. Arnold, *Thucydides*, i. 110, note 11, it must remain an open question whether this Amyrtaios was or was not the chief who forty years later raised the standard of rebellion against Dareios Nothos and, having reigned six years, was succeeded by the four remaining kings of the so-called twenty-ninth dynasty. As a lifetime of sixty-six years would explain the chronology, it cannot be said that the dates involve any insuperable difficulty. Of Amyrtaios Thucydides says only that all the efforts of the Persians to seize him were fruitless. Herodotos, on the other hand, iii. 15, speaking of the Persian practice of setting up the legitimate heir in the place of sovereigns whom they deposed, says that Pausiris was thus made king in place of his father Amyrtaios, who is mentioned along with the Libyan Inaros as having done great mischief to the Persians: but we have no direct statement that they were both concerned in the same revolt.

this catastrophe. In the Sicilian expedition the Athenians were opposed to Greeks. In Egypt they were confronted with enemies over whom they had won a series of decisive victories; nor can they be charged here with the grave fault of which they were guilty when they sent a scanty squadron of twenty ships to aid the Ionians in their first revolt against the power of Persia. They had not taken in hand a great enterprise with inadequate means; and hence we may feel a natural temptation to think that in this instance Diodoros has preserved the truer narrative. The disaster is at least in some measure accounted for when we read that on the stranding of the ships round Prosopitis the Egyptians smitten with panic fear deserted to the Persians, while its extent is lessened by the statement that the determined front still presented by the Athenians induced Megabyzos to make with them a treaty for their quiet departure to Kyrênê. We can say no more than that Thucydides is not here a contemporary historian, and that Diodoros must have received his information from some writer later even than Thucydides.<sup>1165</sup> The loss of so great a fleet might justify the strong expressions of Thucydides, even though a large proportion of the army may have returned home. In any case, the Athenians, far from being dismayed by previous disasters, dispatched a force of 60 triremes five years later to the aid of Amyrtaios in the fens; but the conditions of Egyptian warfare rendered their presence useless and they returned soon to join the Athenian fleet off Kypros (Cyprus).<sup>1166</sup>

450 B.C.

About the time of their great defeat in Egypt the Athenians offered a refuge in Naupaktos to the subdued Helots and Messenians. The Spartans, pre-occupied with the wearying siege of Ithômê, had done nothing to check the progress of Athenian supremacy after the battle of Oinophyta; and when the fortress at length fell, their rivals were in possession of

Final vic-  
tories and  
death of  
Kimon.

455 B.C.

<sup>1165</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 452, holds that this account of Diodoros, xi. 77, 'is contradicted by the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them' in xii. 3; but in this latter passage he speaks only of the total loss of the ships at Prosopitis, not of any slaughtering of Athenians. The account of Diodoros may be worth little; but it is here quite consistent. He does not, however, mention the Athenian reinforcement of which Thucydides, i. 110, speaks as cut off at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile.

<sup>1166</sup> Thuc. i. 112.

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452 B.C.

the Geraneian passes, and they were themselves perhaps too much exhausted to make any serious efforts to dislodge them. Three years later they even entered into a truce for five years, and thus enabled the Athenians to give their whole mind to operations against the Persian king.<sup>1167</sup> The carrying on of this war was the great work of Kimon's life. At home he could do little against the ascendancy of Perikles: at the head of a fleet he might not only strike fresh terror into an enemy often already defeated but enrich both his country and himself. We may be sure therefore that he went on a welcome errand when with 200 ships he sailed for Kypros. Among these vessels were the 60 triremes whom he there detached for the help of the Egyptian Amyrtaios. With the remainder he besieged the city by whose name the island generally was known to the Semitic traders.<sup>1168</sup> Here, again, Thucydides tells us in few words that while the blockade was still going on Kimon died; that the Athenians were then from lack of food compelled to withdraw from Kition; that, sailing to Salamis about 70 miles further to the east, they there obtained a victory both by sea and land over the Phenicians and Kilikians; and that after this success the Athenian fleet returned home together with the 60 ships which had been sent to help Amyrtaios in Egypt. According to Diodoros<sup>1169</sup> Kimon not merely blockaded but succeeded in taking both Kition and Malos, and then engaging the combined Phenician and Kilikian fleets chased to the Phenician coast the ships which escaped from the conflict, while in another battle the Athenian commander Anaxikrates fell fighting bravely against the Persians. Nay more, in the following year, Kimon resolved to strike a more decisive blow by besieging Salamis, where the Persians had stored their corn and their munitions of war. Unable to stand out against this series of disasters Artaxerxes sent to Athens ambassadors charged with proposals for peace, and the Athenians, dispatching their own envoys to Sousa headed by Kallias the

<sup>1167</sup> Thuc. i. 112. See also note 1173.<sup>1168</sup> Kition, Chittim. It was, seemingly, a great depôt for the slave trade with Phenicia.<sup>1169</sup> xii. 3.

son of Hipponikos, concluded the treaty which bears his name. By this convention the Persian king bound himself to send no ships of war westward of Phaselis or the Chelidonian islands, in other words, beyond the eastern promontory of Lykia, and to respect the Thrakian Bosphoros as the entrance to Hellenic waters; nor did the death of Kimon take place, if we may follow Diodoros, until after this treaty had been ratified.

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IX.

This convention is left unnoticed by Thucydides. By the orators of later generations it was regarded as among the most splendid of Athenian achievements. According to Demosthenes it pledged the Persian king to approach no nearer to the Egean than a day's journey for a horse; in the more ideal picture of Isokrates it bound him to regard the Halys as the limit of his empire. Demosthenes adds that in the conduct of this embassy Kallias was brought under suspicion of bribery and that, although he escaped with his life, he had to pay a fine of fifty talents. The circumstantial narrative is unhappily no conclusive proof of fact in the lack of a well-attested contemporary record; and the inflated expressions of later writers, together with the silence of Thucydides, have gone far towards banishing the treaty itself within the regions of falsification and forgery. The question, happily, is one in which to some extent we may be guided by admitted facts. The last campaign of Kimon is in the pages of Thucydides the end of Athenian warfare against the Persian king; and the return of the squadron from Egypt along with the fleet which Kimon had led to Kypros seems to point significantly to some agreement by which hostilities were to be at once and definitely terminated. Nor can we well suppose that the embassy of Kallias to Sousa mentioned by Herodotos<sup>1170</sup> refers to any other convention than that which followed the siege of Kition. It is, further, scarcely a matter of doubt that from this time down to the failure of the Sicilian expedition no attempt was made on the part of the Persians to exact from the Greek cities in Asia the tribute for which nevertheless they stood assessed in the

Alleged  
convention  
of Kimon  
or Kallias.  
449 B.C.

<sup>1170</sup> vii. 151. Herodotos adds that the Argives sent ambassadors at the same time to renew the close alliance which Xerxes had made with their city before the battle of Salamis.

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king's book according to the Domesday of Dareios; <sup>1171</sup> and thus we are brought to the conclusion that, whether the treaty of Kallias be a reality or not, the conditions said to be prescribed by it were actually observed for nearly forty years. The convention wrought no change; it simply gave a formal sanction to arrangements which seemed advantageous to both parties. To the Athenians living at the time it was, in itself, of extremely slight importance; to those of later generations it became the evidence of political conditions which had become things of the past, and to which they looked back with a jealous and sensitive pride; and thus the silence of the former and the exaggerated rhetoric of the latter are at once accounted for. <sup>1172</sup> But it is altogether less likely that Kimon had anything to do with it. The cessation of the war would have been not much to his interest and very little to his liking; and the vague phrases of Diodoros cannot overbear the positive statement of the historian with whom Kimon was personally connected, that his death took place during the siege of Kition. <sup>1173</sup> Had he lived, Kimon would have been probably not the promoter but the strenuous opponent of a peace which would reduce him to political insignificance.

Thus had Athens reached the zenith of her greatness,

<sup>1171</sup> The words of Herodotos, vi. 42, establish this fact: but they cannot be held to establish more. After the Athenian disasters in Sicily, but not till then, a formal demand was made on the satrap Tissaphernes for the tribute of the Asiatic Greeks, and for this tribute he was from that time held a debtor to the royal treasury. The fact thus plainly stated by Thucydides, vii. 25, clearly implies that during the preceding period no such demand had been made, and, consequently, that no tribute had been paid while Athens maintained her supremacy in the Egean.

<sup>1172</sup> The terms of this treaty were engraved on a pillar and set up in Athens; but this fact does not necessarily prove the genuineness of the monument. Mr. Grote is at least justified in saying that the reality of the convention is more likely than that the orators fabricated it with a deliberate purpose, with the false name of an envoy conjoined. *Hist. Gr.* v. 461. On this hypothesis, their cleverness is shown in choosing the name of a man whom Herodotos incidentally mentions as having been an Athenian ambassador at Sousa at some time or other during the period between the siege of Sestos and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.

<sup>1173</sup> The discrepancy between the accounts of Thucydides and Diodoros relating to this time may be compared with the differences in the narratives of the Helot war given by these two writers. Thucydides says that the Spartans asked the help of the Athenians specially for the reduction of Ithômê, their own unskilfulness in siege works being notorious, and that when the Athenians failed to reduce it, they were summarily dismissed. Diodoros, xi. 64, states not merely that they were invited at a much earlier time but that their brilliant successes in the field roused the jealousy of the Spartans, who got rid of them before the Helots retreated to Ithômê.

In the same way, the five years' truce between Sparta and Athens three years after the Helot war is said by Æschines and Andokides to have been made by Miltiades the son of Kimon instead of Kimon the son of Miltiades. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 454.

not by an unbroken series of victories such as may be recorded in the career of mythical conquerors, but by the persistent resolution which will draw from success the utmost possible encouragement, while it refuses to bend even beneath great disasters. The destruction of her fleet in Egypt had not withheld her from giving further aid to Amyrtaios; and the defeat of Tanagra was but the prelude of her most splendid triumph. On a foundation of shifting and uncertain materials she had raised the fabric of a great empire, and she had done this by compelling the several members of her confederation to work together for a common end,—in other words, to sacrifice their independence, so far as the sacrifice might be needed; and refusal on their part had been followed by prompt and summary chastisement. In short, she was throughout offending, and offending fatally, the profoundest instinct of the Hellenic mind, that instinct which had been impressed on it in the very infancy of Aryan civilisation. Whatever might be the theories of her philosophers or the language of her statesmen, Athens was doing violence to the sentiment which regarded the city as the ultimate unit of society: and of this feeling Sparta availed herself in order to break up the league which threatened to make her insignificant by land as it had practically deprived her of all power by sea. The temper of Sparta was indeed sufficiently shown in her readiness to restore to her ancient dignity the city which had been most zealous in the cause of Xerxes: the designs of Athens were manifested by the substitution of democracy for oligarchy in the cities subjected to her rule. These democracies, it is clear, could not be set up except by expelling the Eupatrid citizens who might refuse to accept the new state of things; and as few were prepared to accept it, a formidable body of exiles furious in their hatred of Athens was scattered through Hellas, and was busily occupied nearer home in schemes for upsetting the new constitution. Nine years after the battle of Oinophyta the storm burst on the shores of the lake Kopais. The banished Eupatrids were masters of Orchomenos, Chaironeia, and some other Boiotian cities: and against these an Athenian army, aided by their allies, marched under Tolmides, a

CHAP.  
IX.

Evacuation  
of Boiotia  
by the  
Athenians.

447 B.C.



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general whose zeal outran his discretion. He had taken Chaironeia, and having left a force to guard it, was marching southwards when he was attacked in the territory of Koroneia by a body of Boiotian exiles from Orchomenos, with others from Lokris and Euboia. The result was a ruinous defeat for the Athenians, those who survived the battle being for the most part taken prisoners. Roman feeling would probably have left these unhappy men to their fate, as it refused to ransom the prisoners taken at Cannæ. The Athenians could not afford thus to drain their strength, and to recover them they made no less a sacrifice than the complete evacuation of Boiotia, the immediate consequence being the return not only of all the Boiotian exiles but also of those which belonged to Phokis, Lokris, and Euboia.<sup>1174</sup>

The revolt  
of Euboia  
and Me-  
gara.  
The thirty  
years'  
truce.  
446 B.C.

The land-empire of Athens was doomed to fall as rapidly as it rose. The revolt of Euboia was the natural fruit of revived oligarchy; but scarcely had Perikles with an Athenian army landed in the island, when the more terrible tidings reached them that Megara also was in revolt, and that the Athenian garrison had been massacred, a few only making their escape to Nisaia. A Peloponnesian army was already in Attica and was ravaging the fruitful lands of Eleusis and Thrious, when Perikles returned in haste with his army from Euboia. For whatever reason, the king Pleistoanax advanced no further. It is more than possible that he found his force inadequate to the task before them;<sup>1175</sup> but at Sparta the belief was that he had been vanquished by Athenian bribes, and he atoned for his sin or his misfortune by years of banishment at Tegea.<sup>1176</sup> The retreat of the Peloponnesians left Perikles free to deal with the Euboians as he thought fit; and certainly it cannot be said that he contented himself with half measures. The whole island was subdued, and definite treaties were made with all the cities except Histiaia. The inhabitants of this town were all expelled, and Athenian Klerouchoi, or

<sup>1174</sup> Thuc. i. 113.

<sup>1175</sup> Archidamos was compelled to be equally cautious in his invasion of Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Thuc. ii. 18 *et seq.*

<sup>1176</sup> Iliis restoration was brought about by means of intrigues with the Delphian priestess, similar to those by which the Alkmaionidai insured the overthrow of the Peisistratidai. Thuc. v. 16.

settlers,<sup>1177</sup> introduced in their place. But although it was thus made clear that Athens had lost nothing of her ancient spirit, it was not less certain that the idea of an Athenian empire by land must take its place in the ranks of dreams which are never to be realised. Her hold on the Peloponnesos was to all intents already gone, although she still held Nisaia and Pegai, the two ports of Megara; and hence, like the so-called treaty of Kimon and Kallias, the thirty years' truce between Sparta and Athens which followed the re-conquest of Euboia gave only a formal sanction to certain accomplished facts. As things had now gone, the Athenians gave up little when they surrendered Troizen and Achaia together with the Megarian harbours.<sup>1178</sup> But it was easier to evacuate Megara, as Biotia had been evacuated already, than to forgive the Megarians to whom ten years of friendship had given the power of inflicting a deadly blow on the imperial city with which of their own free will they had allied themselves. During those ten years Athens had done them no wrong and had conferred on them many benefits. We hear nothing of political changes in Megara which might account for this sudden desertion. For some unexplained reason they had chosen to abandon the alliance which then they had so eagerly embraced, and they roused in the Athenian mind a feeling of hatred which exacted a stern vengeance in after years.

445 B.C.

In the days of the old Eupatrid tyranny as well as under the despotism of the Peisistratidai the most marked characteristic of the Athenians generally was a political indifference almost amounting to apathy. This besetting sin Solon denounced by his law or proclamation against neutrality in times of sedition;<sup>1179</sup> but it was not until the tyrants had been driven out from the Akropolis that the sudden outburst of energy in the Athenian demos showed the wholesome and bracing effects of freedom.<sup>1180</sup> This impulse was greatly strengthened by each fresh departure from that exclusive Eupatrid polity which derived its spirit from the days when the primitive Aryan was little better than the wild beast in

Gradual  
develop-  
ment of  
Athenian  
Democracy.

<sup>1177</sup> See vol. i. page 236.  
<sup>1179</sup> See vol. i. page 207.

<sup>1178</sup> See page 43.  
<sup>1180</sup> Herod. v. 78. See vol. i. page 236.

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his den.<sup>1181</sup> The struggle with Persia had supplied a fresh impetus, and the spur thus given led to an activity still more marvellous, when the formation of the Delian confederacy insured to Athens the supremacy of the sea. Hence the periods in which Athens was most aggressive abroad were the periods in which the principles of democracy were being most rapidly developed at home. But even while she was busy in building up her short-lived land-empire, there was still a party which would have hailed the overthrow of the reformers as the oligarchic partisans of Isagoras had rejoiced at the fall and banishment of Kleisthenes. Still the gain in the mean season had been great, and the most obstinate conservatives of the generation which was growing up during the public life of Themistokles aimed only at retaining without further changes a constitution which in the eyes of the old Eupatrid nobility would have appeared only an organised rebellion against the gods. The first great blow was struck on the religious exclusiveness of these ancient houses when Solon gave to the peasant cultivators a permanent interest in the land,<sup>1182</sup> and when he followed up this momentous reform by introducing a classification of citizens based not upon religion and blood but upon property. The stone had been set rolling, but it had not yet moved far. Only the members of the first class could be elected to magistracies or to the Probouleutic Council, and those only of the first class were eligible who were members of a tribe. The Archon now might not be an Eupatrid, but he could not belong to that class of the population whose fellowship in public offices brought with it a religious profanation. Hence Kleisthenes found himself summoned to a warfare in which he had still to fight against the old enemies. If only members of the religious tribes could fill the public offices, Athens must remain as insignificant as she had been before the days of Solon, while other cities might go beyond her and leave her in the third or fourth rank of Hellenic states. Kleisthenes cut the knot by enrolling all the citizens into ten new tribes, against the local aggregation of which he made most careful provision.<sup>1183</sup> But although the religious exclu-

<sup>1181</sup> See vol. i. page 13.<sup>1182</sup> See vol. i. page 202.<sup>1183</sup> See vol. i. page 222.

siveness of the old Eupatrids could no longer be maintained, another oligarchic influence remained in the preponderance of wealth. All the citizens might become members of the council of Five Hundred; and if, as seems likely, these councillors were chosen by lot, even poor citizens might be admitted to a share in the administration of the state, while they would assuredly be called upon to take their turn of service in the annual *Dikasteria*.<sup>1184</sup> But the constitution thus modified still left room enough for oligarchic ascendancy to satisfy even the oligarchs of a former generation. As a matter of fact, it was unlikely that even if all restrictions were removed poor men would except in rare instances be chosen to fill high public offices: but by the constitution of Kleisthenes the members of the fourth class, in other words, the main body of Athenian citizens, were declared ineligible for the Archonship, and it was reserved for the conservative Aristeides to propose the removal of this restriction, when the growth of a large maritime population at the Peiraieus, animated by a hearty obedience to law, and exhibiting a marked contrast to the turbulence of the wealthier Hoplites, proved the wisdom of abolishing it.<sup>1185</sup> The result showed that eligibility was not always or often followed by election, while the course of events continued to bring the functions of the archon more and more to the level of the capacities of ordinary Athenian citizens. It was certain, therefore, that the party of progress would seek to devise some means for securing to the poorer citizens the privileges and powers of which they had shown themselves deserving, while the conservative statesmen would seek to keep things as they were. The former party was headed by Perikles and Ephialtes; at the head of the latter stood Kimon, the son of the victor of Marathon.

The fine of fifty talents which Kimon paid for his father Miltiades may for the time have straitened his means; but he amassed abundant wealth by his victories, and his wealth was freely used for the purpose of courting popularity, whether in the form of decorations for the city or of gifts for the poorer citizens. To men of his own rank his society was

The rivalry  
of Kimon  
and  
Perikles.

<sup>1184</sup> See vol. i. page 206.

<sup>1185</sup> See vol. i. page 228. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5, 18.

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perhaps not the less welcome because his life was not over strict, and because he cared little for refinements of education. In short there was in Kimon not a little of the Spartan, for in the seemingly austere system of the great Dorian city personal bravery, as we have seen, might be combined with sensuality and dislike of learning. Through life, therefore, he remained the head and the representative of that which may be termed the party of Sparta, and the constant and strenuous opponent of Perikles. This illustrious man was endowed with all the wisdom and foresight of Themistokles, and with a personal integrity of which we should be saying little if we spoke of it as altogether beyond that of his great master. If the smallest chink had been left in his armour, his enemies would not have failed to pierce it. It is enough that amongst venal men slander itself shrank from charging Perikles with corruption. Having little in common with the political temper of Kimon, he had about him even less of the spirit of the demagogue. A dignity somewhat cold and repellent might with more reason be ascribed to a man whose time and thoughts were given chiefly to his work as a statesman and whose leisure was reserved for the pleasures of philosophy and art. The friend or pupil of Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Zenon and Pythokleides, of the musician Damon and the sculptor Pheidias, Perikles became possessed of a wisdom and eloquence which few statesmen have equalled in any land, and a judicial calmness of mind which rose far above the prejudices and superstitions of the age. Seeing clearly from the first that Themistokles had taken the true measure of the capabilities of his countrymen and that he had turned their energies in the right direction, Perikles set himself to the task of carrying out his policy with an unflinching and unswerving zeal; and thus when the conqueror of Salamis was ostracised, a younger statesman was at hand to take up his work and complete the fabric of which he had laid the foundations and gone far towards raising the superstructure. Like Themistokles he saw that Athens must keep hold of the sea, and the Long Walls which he built made her practically a maritime city. Like Themistokles, also, he could see when the bounds had been reached beyond which

Athenian empire ought not to pass ; and he enforced on himself and urged with all the strength of his eloquence on others the principle that only at the peril of her existence could Athens enter on a career of distant conquests.

The form of Ephialtes is overshadowed by the commanding figure of Perikles : but it is no light praise to say of him that he was both poor and trustworthy. With an earnestness equal to that of his great ally, he joined a keener sense of political wrongs and a more vehement impatience of political abuses. The legislation of Aristides had made all citizens eligible for the Archonship : but the poorer citizens were little the nearer to being elected archons, and the reforms both of Aristides and of Kleisthenes had left in the large judicial powers of public officers a source of evils which became continually less and less tolerable. All such officers and magistrates, with the exception, of course, of the Council of Areiopagos with its life-membership, were accountable to the people at the end of their year of office ; and instances are not wholly lacking of their deposition before the end of their term : but while they held office, they exercised an indefinite judicial power from which there was no appeal. The Strategoi, as well as the archons, dealt with all cases of disobedience to their own authority ; and the practically irresponsible Court of Areiopagos, while it possessed a strictly religious jurisdiction in cases of homicide, exercised also a censorial authority over all the citizens, and superseded the Probouleutic council by its privilege of preserving order in the debates of the Ekklesia. This privilege involved substantially the determination of the subjects to be discussed, as inconvenient questions might for the most part without difficulty be ruled to be out of order. Around this time-honoured court were gathered all the associations of the old patrician houses. Statesmen like Isagoras, Aristides, and Kimon looked to it as to a tower of strength ; and, as a necessary consequence, it came to be regarded by the demos of the Pnyx as the great barrier to the free developement of the Kleisthenean constitution. To Ephialtes first, and to Perikles afterwards, it became evident that attempts to redress individual cases of abuse arising from this state of

The re-  
forms of  
Ephialtes

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things were a mere waste of time. The public officers must be deprived of their discretionary judicial powers; the Arei-opagos, retaining its functions only in cases of homicide,<sup>1186</sup> must lose its censorial privileges and its authority in the public assembly of the citizens, while the people themselves must become the final judges in all criminal as well as civil causes. To carry out the whole of this scheme they had a machinery ready to hand. The Heliaia in its Dikasteries had partially exercised this jurisdiction already; and nothing more was needed now than to make these Dikasteries permanent courts, the members of which should receive a regular pay for all days spent on such service.<sup>1187</sup> The adoption of these measures would at once sweep away the old evils; and Ephialtes with the support of Perikles carried them all. The Athenian constitution thus reached its utmost growth; and the history of the times which follow tells only of its conservation or of its decay.

The  
murder of  
Ephialtes.

These measures were preceded, as we might expect, by the ostracism of Kimon. A charge of bribery brought against him after the reduction of Thasos was set aside by his acquittal; but when the Athenian hoplites were ignominiously driven from the task which Kimon had most earnestly besought them to undertake, the indignation of the people found vent in taking a vote of ostracism. The vote was eagerly welcomed by Kimon and his adherents; but their hope that it might fall on Perikles was dispelled by the banishment of Kimon, and all hindrances were removed from the path of Ephialtes. The formidable jurisdiction of the archons was cut down to the power of inflicting a small fine, and they became simply officers for managing the preliminary business of cases to be brought before the Jury Courts. The majesty of the Arei-opagos faded away, and, retaining its jurisdiction only in cases of homicide, it became an assembly of average Athenian citizens who had been chosen archons by the lot.<sup>1188</sup> In short, the old times were gone; and the rage of the oligarchic

<sup>1186</sup> Even this has been denied by Böckh, O. Müller, and Meier; but the history of the Thirty Tyrants, 404 B.C., seems to render this hypothesis untenable. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 498, note, and vii. 572.

<sup>1187</sup> For the method by which these Dikasteries were annually supplied with Jurymen see vol. i. page 226.

<sup>1188</sup> See vol. i. page 227.

faction (for such it must still be termed) could be appeased only with blood. Ephialtes was assassinated,—by a murderer hired, it is said, from the Boiotian Tanagra. Kimon was in banishment: and it is pleasant to think that this brave and able general had no hand in a dastardly crime, happily rare in Athenian annals.<sup>1189</sup> This despicable deed served only to strengthen the influence of Perikles, under whose guidance Athens reached her utmost glory, and after whose death she would have remained practically invincible if she had not in an evil hour ceased to follow his counsel.<sup>1190</sup>

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IX.  
456 B.C. (?)

<sup>1189</sup> The generous zeal with which Kimon hurried from his place of exile to take part in the battle of Tanagra may be taken as evidence of his disgust with the men who had wrought this horrible deed. Kimon himself, we are told, was not allowed to fight in the Athenian ranks, but he besought his friends to show themselves worthy of their country: and their heroic conduct so won the admiration of their comrades that Kimon was soon afterwards recalled from exile. Henceforth we can trace no positive antagonism between him and Perikles. Kimon, it would seem, was content to serve as a military leader, while he left to his rival the administration of the state.

<sup>1190</sup> See Appendix II.



## B O O K III.

*THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.*

## CHAPTER I.

## THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE.

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III.

The city  
and em-  
pire of  
Athens.

THE common interests which combined some tribes of Persian mountaineers insured to Cyrus a splendid career of conquest. The gathering of unwieldy hordes, kept together by no other constraint than that of fear, ended in the ignominious flight of Xerxes and the catastrophe of Mardonios at Plataiai. The generous devotion of the Athenians to the common good of Hellas, and their unflinching persistence when all others seemed to be paralysed with fear, had raised a barrier against which the barbarian dashed himself in vain; but the lessons which this history should have taught the countrymen of Themistokles were at best only half learnt. Aristides and his colleagues had willingly received the representatives of the allies as their equals in the synod of Delos, while all alike still felt the need of strenuous exertion in a common cause. It was no longer possible to do so, when some of these allies wished to shirk all further toil and when the Athenians were determined that the struggle should go on. The Delian synod vanished; and the Samians, it is said, urged the removal of the Confederate treasury to Athens, as its retention in Delos would involve the need of a constant guard round the island. Henceforth Athens behaved as a mistress, not as an ally. Two or three of the most important cities, such as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos, might keep their fleets and direct their own military concerns; the rest had yielded

up their navy to Athens and compounded by an increase of tribute for immunity from personal service. The duties which in her judgement the league imposed upon her Athens faithfully and effectually discharged. She suffered no Persian ships to enter the waters of the Egean; she maintained the freedom of the cities on the Asiatic coast; and she stored up a large reserve fund to meet the possible needs of future warfare. But that she desired between her allies and herself that intimate union which would cement them into a single people, there is no sign whatever. Their judgement was not asked in any course of action on which she had resolved, and their unwillingness to take part in it was overborne by force or treated as rebellion; and neither Themistokles nor Perikles, keenly though each could see her immediate interests, perceived the radical weakness of an empire which must rest on physical constraint. Perikles had, indeed, his Panhellenic theories, but these theories were to be carried out rather by magnifying Athens than by treating the allies as if they also were Athenians. Athens with him was to be the school of Hellas,<sup>1191</sup> by uniting within her walls all that was greatest in science, all that was most brilliant in culture, all that was most magnificent in art. Nor, if we look on that which Athens had done during the short period of six-and-thirty years, can we deny that she had exhibited imperial energy and earned a title to something like imperial power. Scarcely a generation had passed away since her lands had been ravaged, her temples burnt, her towns left desolate. In that brief time she had not only cleared the Egean waters of Persian fleets, secured the freedom of the Asiatic Hellenes, and united them in a permanent confederacy; but in spite of Spartan jealousy she had girt herself anew with walls which took away all fear of sudden attack, she had fortified her splendid harbour of Peiræus, and provided there a home for a large population whose life was bound up with the life of the

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<sup>1191</sup> Thuc. ii. 41. According to Plutarch, Perikles made an effort to gather a Panhellenic Congress at Athens, to consider measures for restoring the temples ruined during the Persian invasion, and for securing the safety of maritime trade for the Greek cities generally. Plutarch gives no date for this plan which came to nothing owing to the opposition of the Peloponnesian cities: but Mr. Grote places it somewhat after the beginning of the thirty years' truce, in opposition to O. Müller who assigns it to a time preceding the battle of Tanagra. *Hist. Gr.* vi. 35.

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democracy. Nay more, while she made herself practically a maritime city by carrying the walls of Peiraieus and Phaleron to the circuit of the ancient town, she had won for herself a land empire which made her mistress of Megara, Boiotia, Phokis, Lokris, and Thessaly. This dominion had, indeed, withered away like the gourd which comes up and dies in a night; but the achievement must be taken into account if we wish to realise the full strength of the impulse which spurred on the Athenians after the battle of Salamis. They had won many victories; but they had shown even greater firmness amid difficulties and disasters on the field of Tanagra and among the marsh lands of the Egyptian Delta. This great career of political conquest had been accompanied by a rapid and steady growth of democratic sentiment which had found expression in the reforms of Ephialtes and called forth the virulent opposition of the strictly conservative party. This opposition, which had not shrunk from employing the weapon of assassination, became even more intense, as Perikles matured his designs for the embellishment of the imperial city. The place of Kimon was now filled by his kinsman Thoukydides the son of Melesias, who, like Kimon, held that the revenues of Athens should still be used in distant enterprises against the power of Persia. This policy was resisted by Perikles, whose influence with the people was probably strengthened by the remembrance that he had likewise opposed the rash expedition of Tolmides into Boiotia. The political atmosphere at Athens was now again so far clouded and threatening that both parties turned instinctively to the remedy of ostracism. Like Kimon, Thoukydides fully thought that the vote would send his great rival into exile. The result was his own banishment; and the way was cleared for the carrying out of the vast public works on which Perikles had set his mind. The long walls which joined Athens with her harbours inclosed between them a large space of ground which, if occupied by an enemy, might be a source of serious danger as well as of annoyance. Hence a third wall was carried from the city parallel to the western or Peiraic wall, at a distance of 550 feet, turning to the south about 400 yards before it reached Mounychia, for the

purpose of defending that harbour.<sup>1192</sup> But the costliest works of Periklēs were confined within a much narrower circuit. A new theatre, called the Odeion, rose in the city, as a worthy home for the drama in the great Panathenaic festival, while under the name Propylaia gigantic portals guarded the entrance to the summit of the rock on which art of every kind achieved its highest triumphs.<sup>1193</sup> The Erechtheion, or shrine of Athênē Polias, which had been burnt during the Persian occupation of the city, rose to more than its ancient grandeur, in spite of the vow that the ruined temples should be left as memorials of the invader's sacrilege.<sup>1194</sup> But high above all the surrounding buildings towered the magnificent fabric of the Parthenon, the home of the virgin goddess, whose colossal form, standing in front of the temple, might be seen by the mariner as he doubled the cape of Sounion. The worshipper, who passed within its massive walls, saw before him a statue of the goddess still more glorious, the work of the great sculptor whose genius embodied in gold and ivory at Olympia the majesty of Zeus himself. Placed in command of imperial wealth, Pheidias guided the minds of architects whose powers were

<sup>1192</sup> When Thucydides, i. 107, speaks of the building of the long walls, he mentions only two, the Peiraic and the Phaleric walls. In his description of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, he distinctly names three,—the Phaleric wall, 35 stadia in length, and two long walls to the Peiraieus each 40 stadia in length. Modern exploration has found remains of only two walls running precisely parallel to each other at a distance of 550 feet; and thus Colonel Leake was led to the conclusion that Thucydides must have been careless in his language when he spoke of three walls,—in other words, that the Phaleric wall never had any existence. Dr. Arnold, *Thucydides*, ii. 13, replies that on this hypothesis the historian was not merely negligent in expression but absolutely infatuated, and urges that the restoration of Konon, far from implying that all the three walls were restored, explains the disappearance of the Phaleric wall, the stones of which may have been needed to repair breaches in the other walls. Further researches may perhaps throw more light on the matter.

<sup>1193</sup> The idea of the Panathenaic procession brings before us commonly a picture in which we see a long array of chariots and horsemen winding through the Propylaia and careering round the Parthenon. But the approach to the Propylaia, being at an angle of at least twenty degrees, was such as to preclude the ascent, much more the descent, of any vehicles; and moreover, the main entrance through the Propylaia was so narrow that the slightest accident or deviation from the path must have done irreparable mischief to costly works of art which were closely ranged on either side. We have, further, no written statements of this fact; nor is there any sign of a track such as must have been caused by the passage of vehicles. The horsemen, we must conclude, followed the ship which bore the Peplos, and which, we are distinctly told, was not carried up the Akropolis.

<sup>1194</sup> Of the blocks of marble employed in this restoration of the Erechtheion many are at least fifteen feet long. M. Beulé, in his valuable work on the Akropolis, maintains that these blocks could not possibly have been conveyed through the Propylaia, and that they were craned up. He holds further that the Propylaia could not have been erected for purposes of defence. Porticos, columns rising in tiers, friezes and pediments exquisitely sculptured, equestrian statues, a temple and a chamber for paintings placed in front of the fortifications, seem certainly strange barriers against a hostile force.

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scarcely inferior to his own. Of most of these men our knowledge is scanty indeed. Mnesikles, Iktinos, Kallikrates and Alkamenes, are but a few with whom time has dealt more gently than with others once not less illustrious; yet even these to us are little more than a name. Pheidias alone stands forth with greater distinctness; and in his history, so glorious in its course, so disastrous in its close, we see the working of that strange spell which lured the countrymen of Perikles to reject and dishonour the most eminent of their race in philosophy and art as in civil government. The workman died dishonoured: but his work remained to win for Athens an undisputed supremacy. The choice of the Sage Goddess, of which ancient tradition told the tale, was fully justified. The statesman and the sculptor had now made her city a pride and a wonder for all ages. They left to their children a magnificent inheritance: and the summit of a craggy rock, scarcely more than nine hundred feet in length and four hundred in breadth, sufficed to contain it.<sup>1195</sup>

The  
Athenian  
revenue.

These splendid works involved an outlay which can scarcely have fallen short of 3,000 talents, a sum not much less than 700,000*l.* of our money.<sup>1196</sup> When Perikles at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war summed up the resources of Athens, he did not forget to mention that the gold placed round the statue of Athênê amounted to 40 talents, and that this golden robe had been so disposed that it could be taken off whenever the metal became needed. The saving of 40 out of 3,000 talents may seem a matter too insignificant to be noted; but even the money which could not be recovered had not been spent altogether in vain. The devotion of so much wealth to the service of the gods was held to be a work which they would assuredly reward; and thus this lavish outlay fed the religious sentiment of the Athenians, while throughout

<sup>1195</sup> So far as we may judge from the meagre or inconsistent records which have come down to us, Pheidias executed the chryselephantine statue of Zeus at Olympia after he had finished the statue of Athênê in the Parthenon. Returning from Elis to Athens, he was thrown into prison, and there he died; but of the charges brought against him or of the mode of his death we have no positive knowledge.

<sup>1196</sup> This fact seems sufficiently to show that when Perikles told the Athenians that their love of what was beautiful was combined with economy, *φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας*, Thuc. ii. 40, 2, he cannot have meant to praise them for the mere wish of saving money. He meant probably that, unlike the Spartans, they were accustomed to get money's worth for money: and in this sense it might fairly be said that the money spent on the Akropolis produced far more than its value.

Hellas it left an impression of Athenian greatness which was not the less useful to the imperial city, because it was vague and disagreeable. But, if the matter be regarded from the point of view of Perikles, the yearly revenue and the reserved funds of Athens amply justified this outlay. The tribute from the allies had risen, according to Thucydides, from 460 to 600 talents.<sup>1197</sup> What the yearly returns may have been from the mines of Laureion and other public properties, from customs and judicial fines, from the taxes on slaves and resident aliens, Thucydides does not say. If we accept the statement of Xenophon<sup>1198</sup> that the whole Athenian revenue at this time amounted to 1,000 talents, 400 talents would represent the returns from imports and other sources at home.<sup>1199</sup> But in spite of the magnificent works which now embellished Athens, so carefully had the great resources of the city been administered, and so little had the alleged insatiable greed of the Demos subtracted from them, that Perikles could speak of the treasury in the Akropolis as still containing 6,000 talents (1,400,000*l.*),

<sup>1197</sup> Thuc. ii. 13. Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 707, speaks of the tribute-paying cities as 1,000 in number, possibly in the same spirit which led the Persians to rate at that number the war-ships in the fleet of Xerxes. We have already seen that the assessment of Aristides seems to have been based on the contributions paid by the Asiatic Hellenes to the Persians and probably also to their Lydian masters, and that the increase of 140 talents may be accounted for by the admission of new members and the extension of the system of composition. But unfortunately we have no statements in detail. We know that a tribute of four talents was imposed on the island of Kythera when taken from Sparta in 425 B.C., Thuc. iv. 57: and on some inscriptions we find certain towns mentioned as paying certain sums, which seem to be greatly below the amount at which they must have been assessed. But these inscriptions are too imperfect to enable us to reach any general conclusion: and Mr. Grote well remarks that the assertions of men like Æschines and Andokides cannot justify the belief that some years after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war the tribute of the allied cities was suddenly doubled. *Hist. Gr.* vi. 10, note. When an orator speaks of Alkibiades as taking a vote of ostracism at Athens some ten months after the massacre at Melos, that is, at a time when he was either in Sicily or in voluntary exile after receiving his summons to appear before the Dikastery, no grounds are left for accepting on his authority the story of this huge increase of burdens on the allies, about which Thucydides is silent. If the tribute had been thus doubled before the northern expedition of Brasidas, 424 B.C., Thucydides must have mentioned the fact as telling enormously in favour of his plans, since it must have given a substantial cause of grievance to a large number of cities which would not have been slow to avail themselves of it. That an increased tribute was exacted as the difficulties of the Athenians became more pressing in the later years of the war, there can be little doubt; but even then self-interest would dictate the prudence of making the increase gradual, so far as it might be possible to do so. Mr. Grote, who differs *Hist. Gr.* vi. 8, from the conclusion reached by Böckh in his *Public Economy of Athens* as to the heavy pressure of the annual tribute on the allies, refers to the statement of Thucydides, vii. 28, that the total tribute was something less than a duty of 5 per cent. on imports and exports.

<sup>1198</sup> *Anab.* vii. 1, 27.

<sup>1199</sup> No stress can be laid on the statement of Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 660, that the yearly revenue was 2,000 talents. It is an exaggeration, like the one already cited, note 1197.

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although a sum of 3,700 talents (830,000*l.*) had been spent chiefly on the public fortifications and buildings and on works of art. For grave emergencies there remained not only the gold on the statue of Athênê, but the wealth stored up in the temples in the form of votive offerings or Median spoils or the plate and ornaments used in the religious festivals.

Extension  
of Athenian  
settlements.

The great aim of Perikles was to strengthen the power of Athens over the whole area occupied by her confederacy. The establishment of settlers or *Klerouchoi*, who retained their rights as Athenian citizens, had answered so well in the Lelantian plain of Eubœia<sup>1200</sup> that it was obviously good policy to extend the system. The territory of Hestiaia in the north of Eubœia, and the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, were thus occupied; and Perikles himself led a body of settlers to the Thracian Chersonesos where he repaired the old wall at the neck of the peninsula,<sup>1201</sup> and even to Sinôpê which now became a member of the Athenian alliance.<sup>1202</sup> A generation had passed from the time when Athens lost 10,000 citizens in the attempt to found a colony at the mouth of the Strymon.<sup>1203</sup> The task was now undertaken successfully by Hagnon,<sup>1204</sup> and the city came into existence which was to be the cause of disaster to the historian Thucydides<sup>1205</sup> and to witness the death of Brasidas and of Kleon. Of less importance to the interests of Athens, yet notable in other ways, was the revival of the ruined Sybaris under the name of Thourioi, about seven years before the founding of Amphipolis. Coming back from their retreats at Laos and elsewhere, such of the Sybarites as still survived welcomed the Athenian settlers who arrived under the guidance of Lampon and Xenokritos. But the old curse

437 B.C.

443 B.C.

<sup>1200</sup> See vol. i. p. 236.

<sup>1201</sup> See vol. i. p. 217.

<sup>1202</sup> Here, as in many other places, the plans of the Athenians were furthered, it is said, by the great body of the people, who were eager to be rid of their despot Timesilaos. We do not yet hear of Koryora or Trapezous which Xenophon on his return from Persia with the Ten Thousand found as dependencies of Sinôpê.

<sup>1203</sup> See page 41.

<sup>1204</sup> Thuc. iv. 102.

<sup>1205</sup> Thucydides was among the number of Athenian citizens who had already taken up their abode in these regions and had amassed great wealth by mining and by forming alliances with families of native Thracians. Hegesipylê, the daughter of the Thracian chief Oloros, had been married to Miltiades the victor of Marathon, see vol. i. p. 218; and the historian who also married a Thracian wife or an Athenian woman settled in Thrace was connected with the family both of this chief and of Miltiades and Kimon.

clave to the place.<sup>1206</sup> The Sybarites insisted on exclusive privileges and on the possession of the best lands round the city. The result was an insurrection and a massacre, followed by a redivision of all the land among the motley gathering of colonists, who could not be induced to accept anyone as their Oikistes except Phoibos himself.<sup>1207</sup> The new city had risen from the plans of the Milesian Hippodamos, who had already laid out the streets and buildings in the Athenian port of Peiræus. Among its citizens was the rhetor Lysias, and one far more illustrious man. Here Herodotus found a home for his latter years: here he wrote much, if not all, his invaluable history; and here, after a life spent in the honest search of truth, he died.

Two years before the founding of Amphipolis Samos revolted from Athens. In one sense it is true to say that this revolt was caused by a feeling of impatience under Athenian supremacy, and quite true also that Athenian citizens sometimes spoke of their relations with their allies as those of a tyrant with his subjects, and even made a parade of exercising over them a despotic authority.<sup>1208</sup> But it is not the less true that this radical opposition of feeling and interest was confined for the most part to a small, although always powerful and sometimes preponderant, party in the subject cities. It is not indeed likely that even in the absence of this party there would have been any great enthusiasm for Athens, for the inborn and ineradicable yearning of the Greeks for the autonomy of individual cities must be necessarily opposed even to the amount of centralisation indispensable for maintaining any confederacy whatsoever. But apart from this there was in every city a class which had not only no positive grievance against Athens, but a strong community of interest with her: and

The revolt  
of Samos.  
440 B.C.

<sup>1206</sup> See vol. i. p. 155.

<sup>1207</sup> Diod. xii. 35.

<sup>1208</sup> This sentiment is put by Thucydides into the mouth both of Perikles and of Kleon. ii. 63; iii. 37. But Perikles is speaking simply of the necessity of maintaining with a strong hand an authority which they cannot afford to lay down,—a proposition which can scarcely be disputed. Kleon himself practically says no more. If he had kept himself to the assertion that rebels must be punished, there could have been no reply: but he advised an indiscriminate punishment without attempting to measure the guilt or to determine the innocence of the several persons whom he doomed to death, and it is on this point that Diodoros joins issue with him. But we have to remember that these speeches are not put forth as accurate reports of what was actually said, although they may be substantially correct.



this class, necessarily, was the Demos. In almost every case, therefore, we shall find the people passive or indifferent under Athenian supremacy so long as there was no opposition between the subject city and its mistress, but that when the oligarchy broke out into open rebellion, the demos not unfrequently took the first opportunity of going over to their natural protectors.<sup>1209</sup> In this revolt of Samos the overt action comes from the oligarchs<sup>1210</sup> who had seized upon the Ionian town of Priênê, and defeated the Milesians who opposed them. The latter appealed to the Athenians, and received not only their aid but that of the Samian demos. The latter now became the ruling body in the island, fifty men and fifty boys being taken from the oligarchic families and placed as hostages in Lemnos, which, as we have seen, was now wholly occupied by Athenian Klerouchoi. But the Samian exiles (for many had fled rather than live under a democracy) entered into covenant with Pissouthnes the Sardinian satrap, crossed over to Samos and seized the chief men of the demos, then falling on Lemnos succeeded in stealing away the hostages, and, having handed over to Pissouthnes the Athenian garrison at Samos, made ready for an expedition against Miletos. The tidings that Byzantium had joined in this revolt left to the Athenians no room to doubt the gravity of the crisis. A fleet of sixty ships was dispatched to Samos under Perikles and nine other generals, of whom the poet Sophokles is said to have been one. Of these ships sixteen were sent, some to gather the allies, others to watch for the Phœnician fleet which they believed to be off the Karian coast advancing to the aid of the Samian oligarchs. With the remainder Perikles did not hesitate

<sup>1209</sup> This is emphatically asserted by Diodotos whose argument, Thuc. iii. 47, is that the proposal of Kleon is not only unjust but most impolitic, as it confounds friends with foes. At present Athens, he urges, may in every case of revolt count on having the Demos strongly in her favour. If innocent and guilty be alike punished, they must expect to find their friends converted into enemies.

<sup>1210</sup> Samos was at this time, like Chios and Lesbos, a free or independent ally of Athens,—that is, it retained not only its fortifications but its fleet; and so long as it fulfilled the terms of the alliance, it might employ its naval and military force as it pleased.

If originally all the members of the confederacy shared (as they seem to have shared, *χρήματα τοῖς πᾶσι τάξαντες φέρειν*, Thuc. i. 19, 1) in the assessment of Aristeides, the allies which are spoken of by Thucydides, as not liable to tribute, must have obtained exemption from money payments at some time when other cities compounded to make such payments in place of personal service. See note 1133. A contemporary history of the formation of the Delian confederacy would probably have cleared up this difficulty with many other points which must now remain obscure or uncertain.

to engage the Samian fleet of seventy ships which he encountered on its return from Miletos off the island of Tragia. The Athenians gained the day; and Samos was blockaded by land and sea. But no sooner had Perikles sailed with sixty ships to meet the Phœnician fleet, than the Samians, making a vigorous sally, broke the lines of the besiegers and for fourteen days remained masters of the sea. The return of Perikles changed the face of things. Soon after the resumption of the siege the arrival of sixty fresh ships from Athens under five Strategoi in two detachments, with thirty from Chios and Lesbos, damped the energy of the Samian oligarchs; and an unsuccessful effort at sea was followed by their submission in the ninth month after the beginning of the revolt, the terms being that they should raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their ships, and pay the expenses of the war. Following their example, the Byzantines also made their peace with Athens.<sup>1211</sup> The Phœnician fleet never came; and possibly this fact may attest the reality of the convention of Kallias, which Pissouthnes in spite of his promise shrank from formally violating. The Athenians escaped at the same time a far greater danger nearer home. The Samians, like the men of Thasos,<sup>1212</sup> had applied for aid to the Spartans, who, no longer pressed by the Helot war, summoned a congress of their allies to discuss the question. For the truce which had still five-and-twenty years to run Sparta cared nothing: but she encountered an opposition from the Corinthians which perhaps she now scarcely expected. In the synod at which Hippias had pleaded his cause the Corinthians had raised their voice not so much against the restoration of the despot, as against the principle of interference with the internal affairs of an autonomous city. They now insisted in a like spirit on the right of every independent state to deal as it pleased with its free or its subject allies. The Spartans were compelled to give way; and there can be no doubt that when some years later the Corinthians claimed the gratitude of the Athenians for this decision,<sup>1213</sup> they took credit for an act of good service singularly opportune. Had they voted as Sparta wished, Athens might by the extension of revolt amongst her

<sup>1211</sup> Thuc. i. 117.<sup>1212</sup> See page 41.<sup>1213</sup> Thuc. i. 40.

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allied cities have been reduced now to the condition to which, in consequence perhaps of this respite, she was not brought until the lifetime of a generation had been spent in desperate warfare.

Relations  
of the  
Athenians  
with their  
allies.

But although Samos was now placed in the rank of the subject allies, the Athenians, it seemed, abstained from direct interference with its domestic concerns. At the least, the Athenian party in that island showed itself unable to cope with their opponents, for when Samos again becomes conspicuous, we find the demos in rebellion against the oligarchic Geomoroï whose slaughter or expulsion was followed by a close alliance with Athens.<sup>1214</sup> This moderation on the part of the imperial city goes far towards proving that her yoke, although perhaps somewhat roughly imposed, involved no special or very sensible hardship. Still the existence of some hardship was strongly affirmed by those who felt that their interests lay in absolute separation from Athens. How slight in reality this hardship was, or rather to what degree it existed only in the minds of those who found in the grievance a political luxury, we can scarcely fail to gather from the speech which Thucydides<sup>1215</sup> puts into the mouth of the Mytilenaian envoys at Olympia before their revolt. If the picture which they draw be a true one, there was a complete absence of positive injuries. For such as might choose to think it an indignity there was the degradation of being subject to the first city in Hellas, although even this could not be urged with good taste by an equal and armed ally. There remains nothing but the mere iteration of their loss of freedom; and for the real grievances of the subject allies we must look elsewhere. That no wrong was necessarily involved in the payment of tribute, we have already seen. That Athenian officers or settlers may have behaved with great harshness and even cruelty to the subject cities, is more than possible: and it would have gone hardly with these cities if the acts of injustice done to them had come up either in number or in intensity to the wrongs committed by Englishmen in India. But whatever may have been the offences of Athenian officers

<sup>1214</sup> Thuc. viii. 21.

<sup>1215</sup> Ib. iii. 12.

or citizens in their dependencies, the remedy for these evils was provided by that interference of the Athenian *Dikasteries* which was sometimes regarded as the greatest hardship of all. Unable to inflict the punishment of death, the subject allies were compelled to carry all grave indictments for trial to Athens; and on the surface of the matter it was a hard thing to expect the citizen of Sinôpê to undertake a voyage to the Peiraieus if he was accused of treason, or corruption,\* or any other great crime, either by some Athenian officer or by the citizen of any neighbouring community. These two classes of offences alone were the Athenians anxious to submit to the adjudication of their own courts, because these alone affected the welfare of the confederacy. It is not to be supposed that they were stirred by any lofty desire or abstract love of furthering the pure administration of justice for its own sake, or that in the first instance they had sought this jurisdiction of their own free will. In the earlier days of the confederation all such cases would be tried and settled before the synod of Delos. When this synod ceased to exist, its judicial functions were necessarily transferred to the courts of Athens. Nor could it be said that the chances of substantial justice to the allies were in any way diminished. It would undoubtedly have been altogether better, if such disputes could have been referred to an assembly composed of representatives of all the confederate cities meeting on equal terms, as it would have been better still if these autonomous and centrifugal societies could have been welded into a single nation. But as this could not be,<sup>1216</sup> no alternative could be found so free from objections as that which was in fact adopted. The officials of a dominant power may be guilty of gross injustice among those whom they are sent to govern; but it by no means follows of necessity that these wrongs will not be vehemently resented by the jury courts of the ruling people.<sup>1217</sup> So great was the indignation of the Athenian *Dikasts* when two Lesbian women appeared before them to charge

<sup>1216</sup> See page 12.

<sup>1217</sup> A remarkable instance in which hard and unfeeling arrogance on the part of an advocate rouses the honest indignation of an English jury in a case of oppression at Minorca is cited by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 66, from Sir G. C. Lewis's *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*.

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Paches with the murder of their husbands and with outrage to themselves that the offender drew his dagger and slew himself before their eyes.<sup>1218</sup> In all this Athens exhibited a remarkable contrast to Sparta. In the dependencies of the latter magistrates called Harmostai presided over a Dekarchia, or committee of ten, chosen from among the citizens,—of course, oligarchs, from whose decisions there was practically no appeal. Cases not less flagrant and loathsome than that of Paches were carried to Sparta, only to be contemptuously cast aside. But even if no such wrongs had been ever committed, still this system could not touch questions connected with disputes between different cities or between the allies and the dominant state. The Athenian provided a court to which all the allies might under either of these circumstances betake themselves, and admitted them by so doing to all his own judicial privileges. If he might, as an officer of the confederacy or as a private settler, summon a citizen of Chios or Byzantion before the Athenian Heliaia, these in their turn had the same remedy against him; and thus he might say with justice that the downfall of Athenian empire would-soon convince the world not of the cruelty but of the moderation with which they had exercised their imperial authority.<sup>1219</sup> As the struggle between Athens and Sparta in the Peloponnesian war became more exasperated, the conduct of the Athenians towards their allies beyond doubt underwent a change for the worse: but it is not the less clear that before these fiercer passions were roused, the subject allies of Athens might find in the Athenian law-courts a protection at least equal to that which the parliament of England afforded to the natives of India in the days of Warren Hastings.

<sup>1218</sup> This was the Paches who had subdued the revolted Mytilenaians. The epigram on Hellanis and Lamaxis, the two women who accused him, may be found in the *Anthologia Græca*, No. 604. There seems to be no reason to question its genuineness; and it is perfectly consistent with the account of Plutarch. The lines

δάμω δ' ἀγγελέτην ἀλιτήμονος ἔργα Πάχηςος  
μέσφα μὲν εἰς ὄλοῦν κῆρα συνηλασάτην

can hardly point to anything but his suicide.

<sup>1219</sup> παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις. Thuc. i. 77. These trials Thucydides calls *ἑμβολαῖαι δίκαι*. They clearly mean trials conducted according to the ordinary forms of Athenian procedure without reference to any contracts or covenants between the parties who resort to them. Hence Mr. Grote insists that they are to be carefully distinguished from *δίκαι ἀπὸ ζυμβόλων*. See his note, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 60.

When the Corinthians asserted that the Athenians had an absolute right to punish the Samians or any other allies who might be in revolt, it is possible that their motives may have been more selfish than when they protested against interference with the affairs of autonomous cities in the days of Hippias. They had important interests to guard on the coasts of Epeiros,<sup>1220</sup> Makedonia, and Thrace; <sup>1221</sup> and they were fully aware that their own navy in point of efficiency remained where it had been two generations ago, while the Athenians had by long experience attained a skill in naval war which no Peloponnesian state had yet put to the test of experience. The dread of such an ordeal averted for a time the inevitable conflict: but unhappily this fear was at length overpowered by feelings which left little room for the exercise of sober reason. We have seen some results of oligarchical intrigues amongst the Athenian allies in the East: we have now, as the scene shifts to Western Hellas, to follow the actions of states which exhibit the worst features of the Greek character. Elsewhere we can at least understand the motives which prompt the policy of statesmen: here we find little more than a profound and systematic immorality, to which law and government are matters of complete indifference. The tradition which asserted that the first sea-fight among Greeks was a battle between the Corinthians and their colonists of Korkyra forecasts exactly the relations of these two great maritime states. The fierce hatred which divided them may have sprung from jealousies of trade; <sup>1222</sup> but it certainly cannot be traced to any deep political convictions. The city of Epidamnos had been founded, as we have seen, by settlers from Korkyra: but even hatred for the mother city could not embolden them to dispense with the rule which compelled them to go to her for the Oikistes or leader of the colony. Corinth had thus certain parental rights over the Epeirotic city; but Corinth was now ruled by an oligarchy, while the Demos was supreme at Korkyra. Whether the constitution of Korkyra had undergone a change since the foundation of the colony, we know not; but if the Korkyraian oligarchy had been put down before that time, then either the oligarchie

<sup>1220</sup> See vol. i. p. 159.<sup>1221</sup> See vol. i. p. 165.<sup>1222</sup> See vol. i. p. 158.

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families of the island welcomed the opportunity of finding a more congenial home elsewhere, or colonists belonging to the demos in Korkyra became an oligarchy in their new abode. With a people so notorious for their political immorality there is in this nothing surprising. Certain it is that the demos of Epidamnos could point to no evidences of kinship with the demos of Korkyra; and thus it may have grown up from a concourse of aliens from many lands. At first the colony seems to have been prosperous; but some defeats sustained in a struggle with their barbarous neighbours the Taulantians broke the strength of the oligarchic faction, and the demos rising to power drove many of their opponents into banishment. These exiles took their revenge by allying themselves with the Taulantians and ravaging the lands of the rival faction. The mischief done was so great that the Epidamnian demos sent ambassadors to Korkyra to beg for aid in their distress. But they could point to no tombs of common ancestors. In other words, the instinct of the old Aryan civilisation was still all-powerful among the Korkyraians: and the prayer of the Epidamnians was contemptuously rejected. But to remain without help was to be ruined: and the question put to the Delphian god whether in this strait they might betake themselves to the Corinthians drew forth his distinct permission. The haughty oligarchs of Corinth can have found little to their taste in the motley commonalty of Epidamnos; but they could swallow much that was unpalatable, if by so doing they might strike a telling blow on their own ungrateful or rebellious colony. A Corinthian army accordingly marched by land to Apollonia, to avoid the risk of an encounter with the Korkyraian fleet, and thence made its way to Epidamnos into which they were admitted by the demos. In great wrath the Korkyraians sailed thither with a fleet of five-and-twenty ships, and by a message couched in terms of studied insult insisted on ingress for themselves as well as on the expulsion of the Corinthian garrison. On the refusal of the Epidamnians the Korkyraians, with a fleet now amounting to forty triremes, prepared to blockade the isthmus on which the city was built, at the same time sending word that any Epidamnians or strangers who might wish to leave the

place should be suffered to depart in peace, but that all who remained should be treated as enemies. The Corinthians by way of retaliation invited a fresh emigration to Epidamnos, those who were not ready to go at once being allowed to retain their rights as settlers by laying down a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Undeterred by the risk, many came forward both for immediate service and as depositors of money; and a fleet of 40 Corinthian ships with 3,000 hoplites, supported by 38 ships of their allies,<sup>1223</sup> made ready to convey or escort them to their new homes. To avert the storm gathering over their heads, the Korkyraians now sent envoys to Corinth, insisting on the withdrawal of the Corinthian garrison from Epidamnos and expressing their willingness to submit matters to the arbitration whether of Peloponnesians chosen by the two contending parties or of the Delphian god. To the reply of the Corinthians that they could not even debate the point unless the siege of Epidamnos were first raised the Korkyraians answered that the siege should be raised, if the Corinthians would themselves quit the place, or that, failing this, they would leave matters as they were on both sides, a truce being entered into until the arbiters should decide whether Epidamnos should belong to Corinth or Korkyra. However unprincipled the conduct of the Korkyraians may have been, they had now, technically at least, put themselves in the right: and the Corinthians were without excuse in the declaration of war by which they replied to these proposals. Their armament had already reached Aktion<sup>1224</sup> when a Korkyraian herald, sent in a small skiff, forbade them to advance further. This command was, of course, unheeded; and the Korkyraian fleet of eighty ships, advancing to the encounter, put the enemy to flight with the loss of fifteen vessels. The prisoners were taken to the Korkyraian promontory of Leukimmê, where the Corinthians were kept alive for ransom, all the rest being mercilessly slaughtered. On the very day of this battle Epidamnos was surrendered, the only conditions being that the Corinthians should be kept as prisoners, and all strangers found in the place sold as slaves. The retreat

<sup>1223</sup> Of these vessels the Megarians furnished 8, and the Palians of Kephallene 4. Epidaurus sent 5, Hermionê 1, Troizen 2, the Leukadians 10 and the Ambrakists 8.

<sup>1224</sup> See vol. i. p. 158.



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435-433 B.C.

of the Corinthian fleet had left the Korkyraians masters of the sea; and these now took their revenge by ravaging the Corinthian colony of Leukas and burning Kyllene the port and dock of the Eleians who had taken part in the recent expedition. Two years now passed away without any decisive or important operations. Misery enough, doubtless, was caused by Korkyraian raids on Corinthian colonies; and on their side the Corinthians were busied in getting together a powerful and well-manned fleet. Their strenuous efforts had already alarmed the Korkyraians who no longer hesitated to take the course which at the outset of the strife they had threatened to adopt, when they found that the Corinthians had enlisted as mercenaries a large number of seamen from cities belonging to the Athenian confederacy. The gathering of a force which must crush them could be arrested only by an alliance with Athens; and there accordingly Korkyraian envoys appeared to plead the cause, not of justice or truth, but of expediency and self interest. But the Corinthians had been well informed of what was going on, and their ambassadors also hastened to Athens in the hope of turning the scale against their enemies.

433 B.C.

Proposals  
for an  
alliance  
between  
Korkyra  
and Athens.

The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra was no work of the Athenians; nor can these be blamed if, on resolving to act at all, they resolved to act wholly with regard to their own interests. Korkyra, again, was free to take such measures as the instinct of self-preservation might suggest: and to the credit of her envoys it must be admitted, that their speech, if the historian faithfully gives its substance, is confined solely to the principles of commercial exchange. They were in need of accommodation, and they argued that it was in their power to make an adequate return for it. To any gratitude for benefits done to the Athenians they could lay no claim. They had carefully kept out of the way when their fleet was sorely wanted at Salamis; <sup>1225</sup> and since the flight of Xerxes they had not less carefully avoided all alliances. The result of this policy, they admitted, was not pleasant. They had drawn down on themselves the full power of the Corinthians and their allies aided by a large force enlisted in cities

<sup>1225</sup> See vol. i. p. 493.

belonging to the Athenian dominion; and with these enemies they were wholly unable to cope single-handed. They were, of course, in the right and their opponents in the wrong, and injured men are always steadily grateful to those who help them; but it was more important to remember that Korkyra had a navy second only to that of Athens, and that the struggle for life and death between the two great confederacies of Hellas could not long be averted. If any counted on the continuance of peace, they were cheating themselves with dreams. Corinth had attacked Korkyra only because she wished to be rid of a formidable enemy before the great war should begin nearer home; and she was as much the enemy of Athens as if this war had been already declared. On their own wrongs they would lay no great stress. The iniquities of the Corinthians had turned into gall and wormwood the affection which Korkyra would otherwise have cherished for the mother city: and to the old wrongs they had now added a refusal to submit the matter in dispute to arbitration. In short, there were no moral considerations to restrain the Athenians from entering into the alliance, for the terms of the Thirty Years' Truce allowed the Athenians and Spartans severally to admit into their confederacy cities which had thus far belonged to neither, and the dictates of interest would bid them seize the opportunity of alliance with a state whose fleet, if the Athenians should fail to aid them, would in the immediately impending war be found in the ranks of their enemies.<sup>1226</sup>

In their reply the Corinthians naturally tried to blacken their enemies and to whitewash themselves. In the latter task they achieved at best a very partial success. By rejecting arbitration under conditions which were undoubtedly fair they had put themselves in the wrong; and to get rid of this difficulty they could only resort to hair-splitting. The arbitration, they urged, was proposed too late; it should have been offered before the Korkyraian blockade of Epi-

Counter-  
argu-  
ments of  
the Cor-  
inthians.

<sup>1226</sup> Thuc. i. 32-36. Thucydides, further, represents the Korkyraians as dwelling on the advantages involved in the geographical position of their island as lying on the highway to Italy and Sicily. Athens, if allied with Korkyra, would thus be able to cut the Peloponnesians off from the aid of their Italian or Sicilian colonies. If they so spoke, they were very far-sighted; but it is possible that the words of Thucydides may reflect the history of later years when the policy here recommended had led to the disastrous Sicilian expedition.

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damnos was begun. This plea might have been reasonable if arbitration were a means for preventing the commission of wrongs rather than of redressing them when committed. With more of truth they painted the Korkyraians as men who had kept aloof from all association with other Hellenic states because their geographical position favoured the course of piracy and plunder which was most congenial to them. Alliances would be disagreeable to men who were anxious, like the wild beast in his den, to keep the fruits of their robberies to themselves.<sup>1227</sup> Ungrateful as colonists, and treacherous in their friendships, they were now tempting the Athenians to a direct breach of the Thirty Years' Truce, the terms of which were never intended to include the case of states which sought admission into one confederacy for the deliberate purpose of injuring a city belonging to the other. The request of the Korkyraians was moreover backed by slander and falsehood. There was peace now between Athens and Sparta; and its continuance would best be promoted by fair dealing on both sides. To their own conduct, as showing a friendly spirit to Athens, they appealed without fear. They had aided the Athenians in their war with Aigina.<sup>1228</sup> They might have turned the scale in favour of the revolted Samians: they had not only refused to do this, but had grounded their refusal on the broad principle that there ought to be no interference between an imperial city and her free or subject allies; and all that they demanded now was that this principle should be observed by the Athenians in their turn.

Defensive  
alliance  
between  
Athens and  
Korkyra.

Such was the great question submitted to the general assembly of Athenian citizens who, for two days, debated a point which modern custom reserves for the decision of the sovereign or the executive government.<sup>1229</sup> An offensive alliance with the Korkyraians was impossible, unless they were prepared at once to break the truce, as they

<sup>1227</sup> Nothing less than this can be involved in the charges which Thucydides, i. 88, represents them as making.

<sup>1228</sup> Herod. vi. 89.

<sup>1229</sup> This is only one of the many instances in which, as we have seen, vol. i. p. 10, ancient notions and practice were diametrically opposed to our own. See, further, Arnold, *Hist. Rome*, i. 267: and Gibbon, *Roman Empire*, ch. xlv. (vol. iv. p. 217, ed. Milman), on the 'insolent prerogative of primogeniture.'

would break it if at the summons of their new allies they should attack Corinth or any of her settlements. But they could not prudently suffer a navy second only to their own to be absorbed by a hostile confederacy; and by entering into a strictly defensive alliance they might hope to weaken Corinthians and Korkyraians alike, and thus to enter with the greater advantage into the coming strife, if come it must. At first the assembly was inclined to reject the proffered alliance, from a wish to keep the peace at all costs. Their decision was determined by Perikles who saw as clearly as the Korkyraians that the great struggle with Sparta could not now be very far off:<sup>1230</sup> but although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to her aid under Lakedaimonios<sup>1231</sup> the son of Kimon and his colleagues Diotimos and Proteas was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements.

The Corinthians lost no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of 150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by the Eleians, Megarians, Leukadians, Ambrakiotes, and Anaktorians, they sailed to the harbour of Cheimerion near the lake through which the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra. The Korkyraians with the ten Athenian ships took up their position off the islands of Sybota, thus blocking the strait between Korkyra and the mainland, their land-forces being incamped at Leukimmê. Here they waited until the Corinthian fleet came in sight, and then drew up in line of battle, the Athenian ships being placed to the right of the Korkyraian vessels. The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt. They had

Battle between the Corinthian and Korkyraian fleets off the islands of Sybota.

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<sup>1230</sup> It may be said that with an amount of forbearance which would not be regarded as wonderful in nations at the present day, the Peloponnesian war might have been avoided. This is perhaps true: but under the conditions and tendencies of Greek society it was assuredly inevitable; and regard being had to those conditions he was fully justified in the advice which he gave to his countrymen.

<sup>1231</sup> This name alone is sufficient evidence of the Spartan leanings and sympathies of Kimon.

learnt from long experience that the ship itself should be the real instrument in a sea-fight and the most effective of all weapons in crippling the enemy. It was this discovery which so revolutionised their naval system that they came to dread a combat within a narrow space as much as they had shrunk at Salamis from fighting in open waters. Their object then had been to come to close quarters with the enemy and thus to bring into action the hoplites and bowmen who crowded the decks of the triremes; and the Korkyraians and Corinthians still fought after this old fashion. With the Athenians the war-ship discharged practically the functions of the modern ram, but with a delicacy and rapidity of manœuvre scarcely attainable with the more bulky vessels of our own day. By skilful feints of attack they sought to distract or weary their enemy, and then the beak of the trireme was dashed with a fearful impact against his ship, and as suddenly withdrawn. Hence they must have surveyed with some feelings of wonderment the confused throng of ships in which the battle was reduced to much the same conditions with a fight on land: and they may have felt some pride in seeing the impression which their mere approach made on the antagonists of the Korkyraians. According to the letter of their instructions they were not justified in threatening even thus to interfere in the conflict, so long as no attempt was made to land on Korkyraian ground: and for some time it seemed as though no interference would be needed. After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open interference of the Athenians who now dashed into the fight without scruple and came into direct conflict with the Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships, they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes but of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they conveyed their

disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and, still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle-cry, had already rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians, supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force, hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own kinsfolk.<sup>1232</sup> On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service, supported by the thirty Athenian ships,—a fact, which, if admitted, must be taken as proof that of the ten vessels which had fought in the battle of the previous day not one had been disabled. But the Corinthians, far from wishing to come to blows with the new-comers, were anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what they meant to do; and some Corinthians, sent in a pinnace without a herald's staff (the equivalent of our flag of truce),<sup>1233</sup> asked them if they intended to break the truce by preventing them from sailing to Korkyra or to any other place whither they might wish to go. The answer of the Athenians was plain and decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to her. This declaration implied that the Corinthians were free to return home unmolested; and they were not slow to avail themselves of the permission. First, however, they raised a trophy in Sybota on the mainland, as having been victorious until the Athenian reinforcements appeared upon the scene, while the Korkyraians went through the same ceremony on one of the Sybota islands, as having after the arrival of the

<sup>1232</sup> Thuc. i. 50, 2.

<sup>1233</sup> The displaying of the herald's staff would have implied that the truce was actually broken. Cf. Thuc. ii. 1.

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Athenians challenged the Corinthians to a combat which they had declined. For the present the conflict was at an end; but it was to be followed by terrible consequences at a later time. Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Corinthians. Of these eight hundred were slaves who were again sold: the remaining two hundred and fifty they conveyed to Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard to their own interests. Their object was to send these prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted to put down the Demos and thus to insure the hearty alliance of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic city.

The revolt  
of Poti-  
daia.

From this time the Corinthians regarded the Peloponnesian truce with Athens as virtually at an end. At Korkyra their schemes had failed; but they might strike perhaps a still heavier blow at her dominion elsewhere. The Corinthian town of Potidaia,<sup>1234</sup> although now a tributary ally of Athens, had still some connexion with the mother city from which she received annually magistrates called Epidemiourgoi. The undisguised enmity of Corinth at once convinced the Athenians of the need of keeping a close watch on all Corinthian colonies from which any danger might be feared; and in the neighbourhood of Potidaia Athens had other enemies with whom the Corinthians might make common cause. The professions of friendship made by the Makedonian chief Alexandros to the Athenian generals at Plataiai<sup>1235</sup> may not have been profoundly sincere; but his son Perdikkas valued the Athenian alliance less than he hated his brothers Philip and Derdas who ruled over territories higher up the valley of the Axios.<sup>1236</sup> These chiefs had no sooner entered into covenant with Athens than Perdikkas began to intrigue against them, courting the friendship of Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of Potidaia, stirring up the Spartans to an invasion of Attica in order to keep the Athenians busied at home, and striving to sow the seeds of revolt among

<sup>1234</sup> See vol. i. p. 165.

<sup>1235</sup> See vol. i. p. 579.

<sup>1236</sup> Thuc. ii. 100.

the Hellenic cities generally on the northern shores of the Egean. To foil these plots, a fleet was sent from Athens under Archestratos<sup>1237</sup> with orders to insist on obedience to commands by which the Potidaiatans had been already ordered to pull down their seaward walls, and to give hostages for their good behaviour. An embassy was at once sent from Potidaia to Athens probably with no great hope of obtaining a remission of the sentence, while another went to Sparta on the more likely errand of stirring up the Spartans to open war with the Athenians. At Athens, of course, they failed. From the Spartans they received a positive promise that any attack made on Potidaia should be followed by an immediate invasion of Attica; and thus for the third time Sparta either pledged herself to break the truce with Athens or showed her readiness to do so.<sup>1238</sup> This pledge was followed by the immediate revolt not only of Potidaia, but of the Chalkidians and Bottiaians who were persuaded by Perdikkas to dismantle their exposed settlements and concentrate themselves at Olynthos, while to those who chose to accept his offer he gave lands round the lake of Bolbe lying in the line which forms the base of the great Makedonian peninsula. Against this combined revolt the Athenian commanders felt that until reinforcements should reach them they could do little; but their resolution to transfer the war to Makedonia where they could be aided in their operations against Perdikkas by his brothers Philip and Derdas involved the imprudence of leaving Potidaia unguarded. Nor did the Corinthians fail to seize

<sup>1237</sup> Thucydides, i. 57, says that Archestratos had ten colleagues. But according to the Kleisthenean constitution there were only ten Strategoi, one for each of the Tribes; and it can scarcely be supposed that Athens would employ all her generals on an expedition consisting of only one thousand hoplites. But Dr. Arnold remarks that fifteen generals were employed in the war with Samos after its revolt (pp. 70, 71), Perikles being first sent with nine colleagues, and five more following with two subsequent detachments. We can scarcely avoid his conclusion that the title Strategos was used to denote other officers as well as the ten Strategoi representing the Kleisthenean tribes.

<sup>1238</sup> We do not know what Sparta did in the congress summoned to consider the application of the Samians, page 71; but in all likelihood the opposition of the Corinthians made any decision on her part superfluous, and the mere summoning of the congress is sufficient proof of her disposition in the matter. To the Thasians they made a distinct promise of help, which the Helot war prevented them from fulfilling. See page 41. In the speech put into the mouth of the Mytilenaiian ambassadors at Sparta before the revolt Thucydides, iii. 13, represents them as reminding the Spartans of an application which they had made for help 'long ago while the peace was not yet broken.' The date is not more definitely fixed; but it must belong probably to a time preceding the interference of Athens in the affairs of Korkyra. In this instance the applicants were sent away with a refusal,—in all likelihood because the Corinthians still adhered to the principle which they had laid down when dealing with the proposals of the Samians. See page 71.



the opportunity of throwing into it a force of 1,600 hoplites and 400 light-armed troops under the command of Aristeus, the son of Adeimantos,<sup>1239</sup> a man especially popular with the Potidaiatans. These reinforcements entered the city on the fortieth day after its revolt; but another Athenian fleet under Kallias and four other generals had previously reached the Chalkidian coast to find that Archestratos had already taken Thermê and was now engaged in the siege of Pydna. Instead of hastening to Potidaia the whole force joined in the blockade of Pydna; nor was it until Aristeus had entered Potidaia that they felt the need of changing their plans. Perdikkas had been so far pressed by the Athenians on one side and his brothers on the other, that he was constrained to accept the peace which the Athenians felt that they must make on any terms. Thus left free to move against their revolted subjects, the Athenians marched from Pydna to Beroia, where they made a vain attempt to take the city, and then after an easy march of three days reached Gigonos, their fleet of 70 ships advancing at the same time along the coast.<sup>1240</sup> Meanwhile Aristeus was awaiting their arrival in the neighbourhood of Olynthos on the isthmus of the peninsula, his plan being to allow the Athenians to attack him, while Perdikkas, who had already broken his covenant, should advance from Olynthos and take them in the rear, thus placing the Athenians between two armies. The Athenians on their side sent the Makedonian horsemen of Philip and Pausanias to prevent any movements from Olynthos while they themselves marched for Potidaia. Having reached the isthmus,

<sup>1239</sup> Probably the doughty Adeimantos of the days of Themistokles.

<sup>1240</sup> Great stress must be laid on this assertion of Thucydides who probably had a thorough personal knowledge of the geography of the country. But the Beroia known in later history lay far from the coast to the northwest, and the journey from this Beroia or from Pydna to Gigonos certainly would not be described as an easy march of three days, a period which must be reckoned either from Beroia or Pydna. Dr. Arnold, assuming that the city here mentioned must be the Beroia on Mount Bermios, denounces this attempt of the Athenians as treacherous, although this fact cannot be inferred from any expression of Thucydides. Mr. Grote, naturally regarding it as strange that the Athenians, unable to hold the maritime town of Pydna, should diverge 20 miles inland to attack a mountain stronghold which they could not keep, holds that the Beroia here named must be a place of which later geographers mention the name without noting the site. *Hist. Gr.* vi. 98. But if even this clue had been lost, we should be fully justified in placing reliance on the distinct statement of Thucydides who gives not merely the order of the places reached but the chronology of the march. An easy journey of three days would not exceed 45 miles; and Beroia must thus have been a town lying somewhere to the east of the Axios. From the Bermian Beroia the march according to Leake would occupy four days at 20 miles a day; and Mr. Grote regards even this as under the real reckoning.

they encountered the forces of Aristeus; and the result of the battle which then followed was much like that of the recent conflicts off Korkyra. Aristeus with the Corinthians on his wing put to flight the forces opposed to them, and chased them for some distance.<sup>1241</sup> In the meanwhile the Athenians, having defeated the Potidaiatans and their other Peloponnesian allies, had driven them back to the city; and Aristeus on his return found that he must either betake himself to Olynthos or force his way into Potidaia. He resolved to take the latter course. Under a shower of spears he made his way through the sea along the mole, and succeeded in entering the city without much loss. Indeed, the conquerors may almost be said to have suffered more than the conquered. The Potidaiatans and their allies had lost less than 300 men; the Athenians had lost 150 with their general Kallias, the pupil of the Eleatic Zenon. The city was now blockaded on the northern side and thus cut off from all communication with Olynthos; but the Athenians could not venture to divide their forces in order to blockade it on the side of the peninsula. The arrival of Phormion with fresh troops from Athens supplied the force which was needed for the complete investment of the place; and Aristeus saw at once that the safety of Potidaia could be insured only by the departure of all who were not absolutely needed for its defence. His proposal to remain himself with the 500 chosen for this service was set aside; and watching his opportunity, he succeeded in making his escape from the harbour. This lessening of their numbers enabled the Potidaiatans to stand out for two years; and before its fall Athens and Sparta had begun the fatal war which was to end in the ruin of the great imperial city.

432-430  
B.C.

In truth, men's minds were becoming exasperated on both sides. The Corinthians, far from interfering between Sparta and Athens as they had done before the Korkyraian troubles, were now doing all that they could to hurry the Spartans into war; and the Megarians were smarting under the chastisement inflicted by the Athenians on enemies who had once been friends. By joining her confederacy Megara had

Congress of  
the Peloponnesian  
allies at  
Sparta.

<sup>1241</sup> Thuc. i. 62, 6.

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conferred on Athens a most important benefit. She had made her mistress of the highway into Peloponnesos and rendered all thought of a Spartan invasion of Attica superfluous. By deserting this alliance she dealt a fatal blow on the land empire of Athens; and the Athenians were resolved that the Megarians should feel that this blow could not be struck with impunity. Causes of complaint were soon forthcoming. Runaway slaves from Athens found, it was said, an asylum at Megara: and the Megarians had dared to till the pasture land which was sacred to the Eleusinian goddesses and which formed also a common or neutral ground between the two states.<sup>1242</sup> For these offences a decree was passed excluding the Megarians from all Athenian ports; and so keenly was this prohibition felt by them that they insisted upon it at Sparta as a direct breach of the truce. But although in this matter Athens may have shown not much of forbearance or generosity, she had done nothing which she had not a full right to do. Sparta banished strangers summarily at her will; and the morality of the ancient world at least had not reached a stage in which it could fairly profess to be shocked by acts not in accordance with modern theories of free trade.<sup>1243</sup> Nor can it with any justice be said that Athens had done actual wrong to the Peloponnesian confederacy in any of the other matters laid to her charge. The quarrel between Korkyra and Corinth was a quarrel between two single cities, and affected the Spartan league by the mere accident that Corinth happened to belong to it; and, whether by the terms of the truce or by the international morality of the time, Athens was justified

<sup>1242</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 104, holds that the sacred ground and the common border land were not the same, in opposition to Dr. Arnold, in *Thuc.* i. 139, who makes no distinction between them. It is true that inclosures sacred to deities could not be cultivated; but this was a fact so obvious that it would have been superfluous to charge the Megarians with doing more than tilling the sacred soil. Thucydides, however, says pointedly that they were charged with *ἐπεργασία τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου*. Certainly the form of the expression seems to imply that they were not the same.

Dr. Arnold, in *Thuc.* i. 139, adopts the opinion of some commentators that the slaves received at Megara were the servants of Aspasia. These, according to Aristophanes, were two in number, and were stolen by the Megarians from Athens. According to Thucydides they were not stolen, but simply found a harbour at Megara, after escaping from their masters. There is thus no agreement between the two accounts; nor can we suppose that the Athenians would have cared much, or at all, about the abduction of two women of this class. The asylum given to runaway slaves was a much more serious matter, which pressed more severely upon the Athenians later on in the Peloponnesian war after the establishment of the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. *Thuc.* vii. 27.

<sup>1243</sup> See Appendix I.

in making a strictly defensive alliance with a state not included in the Spartan confederacy. Nay, if in fulfilling this engagement her triremes were brought into conflict with those of Corinth, this would be a matter with which the Peloponnesian confederacy would have no direct concern and with which they were assuredly in no way bound to meddle. That this view was for a long time the Spartan view, may be inferred from the stress which the Corinthians laid on the indifference with which their wrongs had been treated by the Spartans.<sup>1244</sup> On the other hand, by bringing about the revolt of Potidaia the Corinthians had done to Athens a wrong which came directly within the terms of the Thirty Years' Truce. They had interfered between her and a city which had been included in the Athenian alliance, and had striven to detach from her the other allied cities on the northern shores of the Egean. In other words, they had made a deliberate effort to break up the Athenian empire; and thus in the council summoned by the Spartans for the purpose of ascertaining the grievances of their allies,<sup>1245</sup> the Corinthians could only slur over the injustice done by themselves and misrepresent the conduct of the Athenians. \*This they did in one short sentence which affirmed that the Athenians had seized Korkyra for the sake of its fleet, and were holding it by force, while they had blockaded Potidaia as being a most useful station for their dealings with the Thrace-ward settlements. The statement clearly implied that in both cases the action came from the Athenians and that Potidaia in particular had done nothing to provoke the blockade. The rest of their speech resolves itself into a series of pictures vigorously contrasting Athenian energy, versatility, and foresight with Spartan dilatoriness, obstinacy, and stupid self-complacency, and assumes or insists throughout that the question is no longer one of choice between peace and war, and that the honour of Sparta was concerned in taking up a struggle which had already begun.

<sup>1244</sup> Thus the Corinthians charge the Spartans with asserting that they had no mind to be drawn into private quarrels, and that the Corinthians wished to drag them into such disputes, τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ὑπεισοῖτε ὡς ἔνεκεν τῶν αὐτοῖς ἰδίᾳ διαφόρων λέγουσι. Thuc. i. 68, 2. This charge is followed by the imputation of wilful neglect of Corinthian, or as they would have it, of confederate interests, μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι. Ib.

<sup>1245</sup> Thuc. i. 67.

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It transfers, in short, to the Athenian people at large all the characteristics of Themistokles and Perikles, all the keenness of wit and readiness of resource which baffled and fooled the Spartans while Athens and her harbours were being girt with their mighty ramparts, as well as the aggressive spirit which drove them to seek for fresh gains abroad while Spartan conservatism shrunk from stepping beyond the door-stone for fear of losing the household goods within.<sup>1246</sup> It painted in strong colours the courage of a people whom no defeats could render submissive, and who, while they looked on their high mental powers as endowments to be used in the interests of their country, regarded their bodies as things to be flung away, if need be, in her service. To such men as these the failure of a scheme brought with it a sense of loss as keen as if they had been robbed of things long possessed, and even roused in them a more insolent ambition. Unwearied in enterprises from which they felt sure of reaping substantial fruits, they could afford to look with contempt on the laborious idleness of the Spartans: and thus they fulfilled the purpose of their birth by never resting themselves or leaving their neighbours at peace. Such was the state which the Spartans should have crushed in its infancy: and if its powers had not already been put forth for the enslavement of the Peloponnesian cities, this was owing to fortunate accidents and not to any checks which Sparta had placed in her path. Whatever might be the truth of the picture thus drawn, the speech, so far as the existing truce was concerned, was invective, not argument. Hence the Athenian envoys, who happened to be present on some other errand, having received permission to speak, pointedly disclaimed the intention of defending Athens against the accusations of the Corinthians, and addressed themselves to the task of explaining her real position and the motives of her policy. Passing briefly in review the history of the last sixty years, they asserted that in the invasions whether of Datis or of Xerxes the safety of Hellas had been mainly insured by the resolution and energy of Athens, and that the flight of the Persian king

<sup>1246</sup> Thuc. i. 70, 4.

immediately after the fight at Salamis showed the wisdom of hazarding everything on the issue of a battle by sea. But they reminded the Spartans that after Salamis, Plataiai, and Mykalê, there was still much work to be done, and that they had deliberately declined the task, which the Asiatic Hellenes had of their own free will besought the Athenians to undertake. They bade them remember that great schemes begun in pure self-defence cannot always be laid aside when their immediate purpose has been attained, and that if Athens had maintained in her own interests a league to which her allies owed their freedom and their very existence, Sparta in like manner took good care to regulate in accordance with her own notions her confederation of Peloponnesian cities. But they insisted more particularly that, although the states belonging to the Athenian alliance must feel in greater or less degree the pressure of a common burden, yet the solid benefits secured to them far outweighed this annoyance. The Athenians might have chosen to rule by force only, and to place their subjects under irresponsible rulers like the Spartan Harmostai: but instead of this they had placed the allies on a level with themselves, and even to their own disadvantage, by suffering them to carry all complaints whether against their fellow-allies or against Athenian citizens before the law-courts of the imperial city.<sup>1247</sup> It was, of course, true that the allies had been constrained to sacrifice in some measure their independence. This was inevitable if the confederation was to be preserved at all; and Athens could not afford to let it be broken up, when she knew that by a necessary consequence the cities now in alliance with her would all gravitate to Sparta and make her absolute despot of Hellas. The subjects of Athens might chafe at the slight constraint imposed on them as her allies: but the yoke was light indeed in comparison of that which they had borne as subjects of the Persian king, or of that which would be laid upon them, if Sparta should succeed in ruining her rival. They would then feel how vast was the difference between the system which allowed to all the allies whether against

<sup>1247</sup> See page 74.

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bate of the  
Spartans.

each other or against their rulers an appeal to a common law, and a system which, like that of Sparta, placed every city under the iron rule of an autocratic oligarchy.

This speech, it must be admitted, stands out in striking contrast with the malignant sophistry of the Corinthians. It was not the business of the envoys to rebut the particular charges brought against their city, although to do so they needed only to assert that in allying herself defensively with Korkyra she had acted strictly within the terms of the truce, whereas Corinth by stirring up Potidaia and other cities to revolt had as manifestly broken them. But if we may take these speeches as fairly representing what was actually said in this open debate, we must feel greater hesitation in accepting the speeches which follow as a substantially correct report of the secret council from which not merely all strangers but even the allies were excluded. In any case the fact would become known that Archidamos had earnestly deprecated the course on which the Corinthians had set their hearts; and the arguments by which he sought to postpone, if not to avert the struggle, were those which would be used by a man whose political life began about the time when Themistokles was ostracised, and who had not allowed the military conceit of his countrymen to blind his eyes to the real state and tendency of things. Without noticing the accusations and arguments of the Corinthians, this wise and sober-minded prince is said to have placed side by side the strong and the weak points in the system and resources of Sparta. In ships, in money, in population and extent of empire, she was no match for her great rival; and the preparation which might place her on a level with Athens must be a work of time. On a Peloponnesian city they could lay their hands at once: and though they might cross the isthmus and devastate the fertile lands of Attica, this would be of little avail so long as Athens should remain mistress of the sea, for not only would she obtain from other countries all that could be needed for the support of her people, but she would continue to draw from her allies ample revenues for the maintenance of a navy overwhelming in its strength and unequalled in its discipline. Unless her maritime empire

could be put down, it would be mere folly to look for the speedy ending of a war which in all likelihood they would leave as a legacy to their children. Prudence, therefore, would dictate delay until they could begin the struggle with a reasonable hope of soon winning the victory; and in their task of preparation they would not hesitate to invite the aid even of the barbarian against a tyranny which was fast becoming unbearable.<sup>1248</sup> In the meanwhile, the Athenians had offered to submit all disputes to arbitration; and to that tribunal it would be wise for the present to leave the issue. The effect of this wholesome advice, if the account of the historian may be trusted, was at once neutralised by a speech of the ephor Sthenelaïdas, who without much more verbosity than that of the secretary of Mindaros<sup>1249</sup> did his best to hound on his countrymen to take a leap in the dark. Sneering at the Athenians as praisers of themselves, he charged them with making no defence against the accusation of wrongs done to the Peloponnesian confederacy, although he knew that these were topics on which the envoys who were present on other business had no authority to enter. It was no part of his purpose to suggest that it might be well to learn what the Athenian people had to say in the matter. Assuming that the wrongs had been committed, he insisted that the good behaviour of the Athenians during the Persian wars was only a reason for visiting their recent iniquities with double chastisement. That they had more money, more ships, and more men, was a fact beneath the notice of Spartans, whose allies had received insults calling not for deliberation but for vengeance. It was for wrong-doers to consider beforehand the effect of the crimes which they intended to commit: it was for the Spartans to decree without further thought a war in which the gods would defend

<sup>1248</sup> Thuc. i. 82, 2. Among the inducements for immediate war urged by the Corinthians on the Spartans was the fear that, if Sparta failed to aid her, Corinth might be driven 'to some other alliance.' Thuc. i. 71, 5. Probably this threat points to the step which Archidamos seems to take as a matter of course. If we assume the truth of the report, nothing can show more conclusively the absolute hopelessness of any efforts to combine into a single nation with a constitutional representative government tribes in whom the centrifugal tendency was so vehement and even savage. It is but fair to add that this tendency comes out in its most exaggerated and offensive form amongst the Dorians, not amongst the Ionians,—in the oligarchical states and not in the cities where democracy had secured equal rights for all the citizens.

<sup>1249</sup> Xen. H. i. 1, 23.



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the right. This doughty speech was followed by the cries of Aye and No by which, like the English House of Commons, the Spartans pronounced their decision on the questions submitted to them. Feeling or affecting inability to determine whether the Ayes or Noes had it,<sup>1250</sup> Sthenelaidas ordered a division. Possibly some who had cried out in the negative did not care to be known personally as opposing the popular sentiment; and a large majority went over to the side of the chamber assigned to those who approved of war.

432 B.C.  
Autumn

Second  
congress of  
the allies  
at Sparta.

Thus was taken the first step which Spartan usage called for in questions of foreign policy, for as the Spartan constitution internally reflected still the practice of the so-called Heroic Agora, so it allowed to the allies of Sparta no wider functions than those of the Achaians assembled under the presidency of Agamemnon or Menelaos. The proposal of all measures rested with the chiefs alone; it was the business of the people to say simply whether the measure should be adopted or rejected. It follows that if the chiefs themselves decided against any given course of action, the people would not be consulted about it at all; and thus if the complaint of the Corinthians had appeared to the Spartans unworthy of attention, a second synod of allies would not have been summoned. But Sthenelaidas had turned the scale in favour of war, and it now became competent for the allies to say whether they would have war or not. The debates in this synod seem to have been protracted; but Thucydides takes no notice of any speech except that of the Corinthians, beyond saying that the greater part were for war. The arguments of the Corinthians in this second harangue may be lightly passed by. Whatever they were, they had been diligently urged by Corinthian deputies sent specially to canvass all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy.<sup>1251</sup> If they are faithfully reproduced by the historian, they began with falsehood, and ended in equivocation and sophistry. They knew as well as the Athenians themselves that the battle of Koroneia<sup>1252</sup> had scattered to the winds the idea of a land-empire for Athens, and that no conquests had been attempted

<sup>1250</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 124, thinks that the Ayes were in a manifest majority. Thucydides certainly does not say so.

<sup>1251</sup> Thuc. i. 119, 2.

<sup>1252</sup> See page 54.

during the years which had passed away since the great defeat of Tolmides. They knew also that, although in a single instance the sting of a special injury had driven the Athenians to pronounce a sentence of exclusion from her ports and harbours, it was not to the interest of Athens to shut out the products of inland states from the sea or to check the imports which these states needed in return. Yet they could tell the representatives of the central Peloponnesian cities that the ascendancy of Athens would deprive them of their markets and cut them off from all foreign supplies.<sup>1253</sup> In short, now that personal hatred had led them to abandon the principle of non-interference on which they had so long insisted, they felt that it would be foolish to stick at anything. It is possible that we may owe to the historian the contradictions which may be found in some of their remarks. At least the Corinthians could not have rated highly the intelligence of their hearers, if they could assure them first that they stood at an enormous advantage in respect both of numbers and of military experience,<sup>1254</sup> and then warn them that Athens was fully a match for the whole Peloponnesian confederacy, and that against any smaller power her force would be overwhelming.<sup>1255</sup> The rest of their speech was intended to encourage them with convenient hopes and to quicken their energies by wholesome terrors. The Delphian god had promised that if they went to war vigorously they would be conquerors and that he himself would aid them with all his might;<sup>1256</sup> and lastly they had a sacred mission to fulfil, nothing less, namely, than the liberation of Hellas from an all-embracing despotism. The dread of this supremacy is the key-note of the speech:<sup>1257</sup> but the answer to these terrible forebodings is furnished by the pithy remark of the Athenian envoy that the allies of Athens had been worse off before they were enrolled in the Delian league, than they were now under her dominion, and that they would be worse off again if they should pass under the still more real and search-

<sup>1253</sup> Thuc. i. 120, 3.<sup>1254</sup> Ib. i. 121, 2.<sup>1255</sup> Ib. i. 122, 3.<sup>1256</sup> Thucydides, i. 118, 4, carefully guards himself against the conclusion that this answer was delivered at all. If it was given, it was not the first instance of a response extorted by political influence or bribery. See vol. i. pp. 275, 421, 491.<sup>1257</sup> Thuc. i. 120, 3. *καὶν μέχρι σφῶν* (the central Peloponnesian states) τὸ δεινὸν προσελθεῖν. They had practically nothing to fear at all.

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ing despotism of Sparta.<sup>1258</sup> It is possible that in the minds of the Corinthians there may have been a hope that another combined effort might inflict on the power of Athens a blow as serious in its effects as the defeat which had led to the evacuation of Boiotia. But if they felt this hope, they gave no expression to it. It would scarcely have suited their purpose to do so, for a reference to the downfall of Athenian empire by land would have pointed too clearly to the vastly different conditions of Athenian empire by sea. It was needless to say more. The spirit and the fears of the representatives had been excited to the necessary point; and the decree of the Spartan assembly was accepted by a large majority.

Beginning  
of 431 B.C.

Efforts of  
the Spar-  
tans to  
bring about  
the down-  
fall of  
Perikles.

But neither the Spartans nor their allies were yet ready to go to war; and the time during which they were making ready for the struggle was further occupied in efforts to introduce disunion in the Athenian councils, and, if possible, to deprive them of their master-spirit, Perikles. These efforts were well seconded in Athens itself, for the old oligarchical temper was not so far extinct as to render the idea of Spartan hegemony intolerable to the Lakedaimonian party; and this party was not unnaturally animated by a vehement personal hatred of Perikles. No formal declaration of war had been yet sent to Athens. Indeed, it was never sent at all; but the Athenians must have been more or less fully informed of what had taken place at the last congress in Sparta, when the first blow was struck against the ascendancy of the great Athenian leader. Perikles was an Alkmaionid; and the curse of Kylon, as the Spartans chose to say, still clave to that illustrious family.<sup>1259</sup> This curse they now called on the Athenians to drive out: in other words, Perikles must be banished. The demand was met by the rejoinder that the Spartans must first drive out the curse which brooded over Tainaron for the murder of some Helots torn from the sanctuary of Poseidon, and more especially the curse which rested on them for the removal of Pausanias from the Brazen House of Athênê.<sup>1260</sup> A second embassy insisted that the Athenians should raise the blockade of Potidaia, leave Aigina independent, and withdraw the decree of

<sup>1258</sup> Thuc. i. 77, 6-7.

<sup>1259</sup> See vol. i. p. 233.

<sup>1260</sup> See page 15.

exclusion passed against the Megarians. To the last of these three requests the Athenians replied by specifying the grounds on which the Megarians had been thus punished;<sup>1261</sup> the other two they peremptorily refused. A third embassy demanded briefly the autonomy of all Hellenes now included in the Athenian confederacy: and on the receipt of this sweeping demand, to which was added the expression of a wish on the part of the Spartans for the maintenance of peace on this one indispensable condition, a general assembly was convened for the final reconsideration of the whole question. The issue of the debate was determined by Perikles. To his adherents the stress laid on the withdrawal of the Megarian decree was perhaps no matter of surprise. They could scarcely fail to know that the abandonment of the blockade of Potidaia was a matter far more closely touching the interests of Corinth and of the Peloponnesians generally; but they knew also that the Spartans insisted on the less important affairs of Megara as those on which they could most count on the support of the Athenian oligarchs. This was a point of which Perikles could take no notice; and in his speech he simply expressed his unshaken conviction that the withdrawal of the decree would not have the slightest effect on the controversy, far less, as some supposed, that it would remove all risk of war. The Spartans had persistently refused to submit to arbitration, and even to look at facts as they really were; and these demands were made merely in the temper of a bully who wishes to learn how far he may go. Sparta was at best no more than the equal of Athens, and the concession of even the slightest demand from an equal not on the score of justice but at his arbitrary fiat involved a subjection as complete as if they surrendered everything at once.<sup>1262</sup> It was more befitting the dignity of Athens that they should bear in mind the marked differences between the two great Hellenic confederations. To the centralised empire of Athens they could oppose only a number of units without any cohesive power beyond that which was furnished by the fancy or the desire of the moment.<sup>1263</sup> Depending for sup-

<sup>1261</sup> See page 55.<sup>1262</sup> Thuc. i. 141, 1. See also Dr. Arnold's note on the passage.<sup>1263</sup> Ib. i. 141, 6.

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port almost wholly on the cultivation of their territories, they had no great reserved funds without which long wars could not be maintained. The establishment of a hostile settlement on Attic ground might be threatened:<sup>1264</sup> but such a settlement would probably suffer far greater harm than it could ever inflict. To the Spartans moreover and to their allies the lack of naval experience was a want which they could not supply while Athens retained her present mastery of the sea. The treasures of Olympia and Delphoi might furnish means for hiring mercenaries: but Athenian subjects, knowing that the imperial city could and would smite surely and severely, would think twice before they suffered themselves to be tempted by the bait of larger pay. Lastly, the Peloponnesians might invade Attica, and devastate territories whose fertility and splendid cultivation were at once the delight and the pride of their owners. Attica was not an island, and to this risk they must remain liable; but happily neither these lands nor their produce were essential to their welfare. Athens from her colonies and allies could obtain with ease more than all that she might need, while her fleets would swoop down on the Peloponnesian coasts and leave desolate whole districts whose devastation would mean famine and death to their inhabitants. So clearly had Athens in this respect the vantage that the counsel of Perikles to the owners of the lands which lay between Athens and the Megarian border would be to leave them stripped and bare before a Spartan army could cross the isthmus, and thus to teach their enemies that the loss of crops and of farm buildings would in no way affect the issue of the struggle. But although he thus sought to encourage a confident and even a fearless temper, Perikles was to the last careful that no provocation should come from Athens; and by his advice an answer was given to the Spartan demands as moderate as it was dignified. The Athenians were as fully justified by Hellenic interpolitical law in excluding the Megarians from

<sup>1264</sup> Five years later the Spartans founded Herakleia in Trachis to check the Thessalians. Thuc. iii. 92. Megara itself was said to have been founded to repress the growth of Athens: but the Roman colonies generally are familiar illustrations of this practice. Later on in the war the Athenians suffered severely from the establishment of a Spartan garrison in Dekkeleia.

their ports, as were the Spartans in intrusting to the ephors the power of driving all strangers from Sparta at their will without assigning any reason for their decrees. If they would give up these Xenelasiai or expulsions of strangers, the decree against the Megarians should be withdrawn. The allies of Athens should also be left wholly free or autonomous, if they were in this condition at the time when the Thirty Years' Truce was made, and also if the Spartans would leave to their own allies generally the power of settling their internal affairs after their own inclinations; <sup>1265</sup> and lastly Athens was as ready now, as she had ever been, to refer the whole dispute to the judgement of arbiters approved by both the cities.

In the conduct of Perikles at this decisive crisis it is difficult to determine whether we should admire most the determined energy with which he prepared to meet a conflict assuredly terrible in its course even if it should be happy in its issue, or the generous and unselfish patriotism which could stir him to efforts thus sustained in spite of personal wrongs not easily to be forgotten. His own integrity was beyond attack; <sup>1266</sup> but he might be assailed through those

Prosecutions of Anaxagoras, Pheidias, and Aspasia.

<sup>1265</sup> We have already seen that Athens did not maintain democracies where the general opinion of a city went in another direction. See page 72. Her influence was, of course, thrown into the scale on the side of democracy. It would be absurd to suppose that it could be otherwise. But from the very force of the word it follows that the form of government which was most to her liking could be maintained only where it fell in with the desires of the main body of the people. This could very rarely, perhaps never, be said of Sparta; and it was obviously a monstrous iniquity that Sparta should retain the power of forcing one peculiar system on all cities of her alliance, while Athens should be debarred from exercising over her allies even that amount of authority, which, without interfering with their internal affairs, was absolutely necessary for keeping her confederation together at all.

<sup>1266</sup> Plutarch in his *Life of Perikles* mentions a proposal made by Drakontides that the great statesman should be put upon his trial for embezzlement of public moneys, but he says nothing of the result of the trial or of its taking place at all. If he was brought before the Dikastery, he must have been acquitted; but Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 141, urges very forcibly that Thucydides could not have ventured to speak as he has spoken of the incorruptibility of Perikles, if he knew that such a charge had been brought against him, and still more that the accusation is virtually set at nought by Aristophanes himself who tells us that Perikles precipitated the war with Sparta in order to escape being put upon his trial. The conduct of the Athenians in the case of Alkibiades is of itself proof that he would never have been allowed thus to escape like a cuttlefish by muddying the waters round him; and the whole history shows that neither Perikles nor the Megarian decree was in any way the cause of the war. Diodoros, xii. 38-40, gives quite another version in which he is represented as hurrying the Athenians into war by the advice of Alkibiades who, when Perikles spoke of the fears which he felt about his account of moneys shortly to be made to the people, suggested that he should devise some means for not making it at all. These conflicting versions prove with sufficient clearness that we are dealing simply with the gossip of the day; and, as it so happens, Aristophanes treats the notion that Perikles 'blew up the war' from such personal motives, as mere gossip which must be taken for what it may be worth. *Peace*, 614-618.

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whom he honoured or loved. Among these friends were the philosopher Anaxagoras, the rhetor Damon, the sculptor Pheidias and the beautiful Hetaira who became the mother of his son Perikles. Of the first of these we are told that his doctrines had excited among the people a vague feeling of suspicion and dislike; that he was tried twice, first for impiety, then for Medism; that on his first trial, which was urged on with special zeal by the opponents of Perikles, the influence of that statesman obtained a verdict punishing him with fine and exile instead of death; and that when at Lampsakos he had shown himself to be engaged in treasonable correspondence with Persia, he was sentenced to death. According to the story, the sentence was not carried out: but the traditions are so inconsistent that little can be gathered from them beyond the facts of his prosecution and his exile.<sup>1267</sup> Nor have we any surer evidence in the case of Pheidias, who on his return from Olympia after finishing his splendid statue of Zeus was thrown into prison on the charge of defrauding the public, and there died before the time of trial came on. The tale went that a slave of the great sculptor revealed his master's iniquities, and that Perikles put the matter to the simple test of weighing the gold round the statue of Athênê; that he had excited the jealousy of many for flaunting portraits of himself and of Perikles on the friezes of the Parthenon; and lastly that he was poisoned in order to bring his friend into greater suspicion. The trial of Aspasia brings before us one of the most repulsive and loathsome aspects of Athenian life and society. In the attachment of Perikles to a woman so brilliant in person, so commanding in intellect, there is nothing wonderful

<sup>1267</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 181, thinks that Perikles, dreading the issue of a case which touched the religious feeling of the people, prevailed on Anaxagoras to leave Athens before his trial. Mr. Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, i. 74, rejects altogether the notion that the prosecution of the philosopher was prompted by a wish to lessen the influence of Perikles, and holds that the supposition 'belongs rather to the ingenuity of modern scholarship than to the sober facts of history.' The notion may be absurd, but it is certainly not confined to modern writers. Whether apart from his connexion with Perikles his doctrines would have attracted sufficient attention to justify a charge of impiety, we cannot say. His doctrine of Nous or Intelligence, as shaping the Universe, might be taken as affirming the government of the Kosmos by fixed laws, not by the action of living and personal agents, and, if so taken, would be highly offensive to the theological sentiment of the day. But to the people generally his philosophy would probably carry with it no sharp or definite meaning. The case of Sokrates was wholly different.

or surprising: but the cause which led him to take refuge in her society betrays the working of a disease which has its root in the first principles of Aryan civilisation,—in other words, in the absolute subjection of the members of a household to the father of the family, as its priest and its king. From this root sprang the institutions of caste and of slavery, and the subservience, if not the degradation, of women. At Rome the old exclusive instinct was satisfied with placing the wife in the power or the hand of her husband, who made her in a certain sense his companion and the mistress of his household as well as the mother of his children. At Athens society must from a very early age have tended to shut up women belonging to free Athenian families, that is, to degrade permanently the whole class which could alone furnish legitimate wives for Athenian citizens; and when we reach the age of Perikles, we find that the home of an Athenian has assumed a character little better than that of a Turkish harem. Home life, in short, has practically ceased to exist. The Nausikaas and Andromaches of simpler times have been displaced by women rendered mindless and soulless by inherited ignorance and apathy. The result was frightful in two ways. It fostered first the horrible and disgusting sentiment which threw a ghastly halo over unnatural crimes, and, secondly, it drove even the better class of men to the society of Hetairai for that companionship which they could not find in their wives. It would be absurd to represent these women as the cold, heartless, and treacherous schemers who made a mock of all goodness and bade defiance to law in the days of Lewis XIV. of France or Charles II. of England. Gifted in many instances with powers of mind far beyond the graces of their persons, they cultivated these powers to the utmost, knowing that, if they could please the most educated and the most refined men of the time, they needed to fear no rivals in the unhappy women who were their wives. The counsel which Sokrates gives to the Hetaira Theodote<sup>1268</sup> is rendered doubly mournful by the reflexion that even he would not have thought it worth while to give it either to his own wife or to that of any other man.

<sup>1268</sup> Xen. *Memor.* iii. 11, 10.



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It would have been useless to advise the wife of Perikles to throw herself into his mind, to enter into his work, to rejoice in his success, and to sympathise in his failures. The legitimate wife might tend him in sickness; but the gentleness and care which might lighten the hours of pain would be doubly soothing when they came from Aspasia. It could not be otherwise. Nature will take her revenge for all wrongs done to her. It is the function of woman to heighten the joys and add to the happiness of life. She cannot do this unless she is free, and she is not free unless she can be mentally the companion, if not the equal, of her husband. Such a woman Perikles found in Aspasia; and the result was the dissolution of his marriage with the mother of his sons Xanthippos and Paralos.<sup>1269</sup> Departing with her own consent, his legitimate wife became the wife of another, while Aspasia, though she might be the associate, could not by Athenian law become the wife of Perikles.<sup>1270</sup> In this union the comic poets found a fruitful source of slander, which exhibited her as an accomplice of Anaxagoras in undermining the faith of the people. She was put upon her trial, and Perikles defended her with a vehement earnestness which attested the depth of his affection. So far as we may judge from the vague and contradictory statements which have come down to us, the evidence was worth little; and in this instance Perikles was enabled to secure a verdict of acquittal.

General  
policy of  
Athens in  
reference to  
the alleged  
causes of the  
Pelopon-  
nesian war.

When a man who has thus suffered from the attacks of his political antagonists can devote himself to the interests of his country with the single-minded generosity of Perikles, we can understand in some degree the fulness with which Athens satisfied the highest aspirations of her most gifted children. With a man like Perikles we may safely say that she could not have satisfied them, if devotion to her service had involved the sacrifice of truth. We have seen the Corinthians resorting to systematic misrepresentation of facts; we have seen the ephor Sthenelaidas plunging, or blundering,

<sup>1269</sup> Plut. *Perikl.* 24.

<sup>1270</sup> It must be remembered that in Perikles and Aspasia we see these social conditions in their most favourable aspect. But as the seclusion of women led to unnatural vice on the one hand, it also encouraged gross licentiousness on the other.

into positive falsehood; but in the case of Athens we can trace no actual wrongs done to the Peloponnesian confederacy, nor can we impute to her the shuffling and disingenuous conduct of her adversaries. Beyond all doubt, she had at no time entertained any desire of reducing Sparta or her confederate cities to the condition of her own subject allies. It was rather a happy accident than the result of a long-sighted policy which made her for a short time supreme from the Corinthian isthmus to the Gates of Thessaly; and when with the battle of Koroneia this supremacy passed away, she confined herself resolutely to the task of maintaining her empire by sea. This empire in no way endangered the position of Sparta; nor could it be said that it had either directly or indirectly done her any harm. The real breach of the peace had come not from Athens but from Corinth, and the revolt of Potidaia, stirred up by Corinthians, was a formal violation of the terms of the Thirty Years' Truce. The Athenians might therefore enter on the war with a good conscience; and after the disaster at Sphacteria the Spartans were ready to admit that in the controversy which preceded the outbreak of the strife Athens was in no way to blame.<sup>1271</sup> Her strict, perhaps even her fastidious, moderation was shown by the steadiness with which to the last she refrained from doing anything which might be construed as an act of war. Between the gathering of the second Congress at Sparta and the first act of open conflict nine or ten months, perhaps, passed away. During these months Athens might have anticipated matters with her unprepared enemies, and crushed them when they were comparatively powerless. She could not do this without making herself as unjust as her rival; and this she would not do. Sparta had promised repeatedly to aid the enemies of Athens if she could; and one of these promises she made while Athenian citizens were helping her against the revolted Helots. Athens had been guilty of no such double dealing with Sparta, and she refused to avail herself of the opportunity of striking her down, when she could have done so without danger or even risk to herself.

<sup>1271</sup> Thuc. iv. 21; vii. 18.

## CHAPTER II.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE SURPRISE OF PLATAIAI  
TO THE CLOSE OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF PERIKLES.BOOK  
III.

Night  
attack on  
Plataiai  
by the  
Thebans.  
431 B.C.

IF, as soon as the Athenians learnt informally the decision given by the second congress of allies at Sparta, Perikles could have made up his mind to commit a slight formal wrong and strike a heavy blow while the Peloponnesians were still unprepared, it is possible that a very different turn might have been given to the course of the war. The fleets of Athens might have ravaged all the fertile lands along the enemy's coasts, and an Athenian army might have dealt to the Megarians a harder measure than a decree of commercial excommunication. The steady passiveness of the Athenians can be explained only by a conscious resolution on their part to remain, as they were, in the right. But it is possible also that a greater alertness might without any formal breach of the truce have prevented some losses and have even alleviated the great calamity which struck them down in the second year of the war. The special danger of Athens lay everywhere in the virulent opposition of the oligarchical factions. Even in Plataiai <sup>1272</sup> which had now for nearly eighty years been in the closest friendship with Athens this party was on the look-out for any means of escaping from the alliance: and Plataiai was little more than eight miles distant from Thebes, the stronghold of that reckless oligarchy which after the fall of Mardonios had deliberately preferred death to the abandonment of the cause of despotism. Such an opportunity these Plataian oligarchs now discovered in a month of festival during which even usual precautions were disregarded.<sup>1273</sup> A plan was accordingly concerted with the

<sup>1272</sup> See vol. i. p. 234.

<sup>1273</sup> Thuc. iii. 56.

Boiotarchs, through the agency of Eurymachos, a man belonging to one of the most powerful families of Thebes; and a force of about three hundred Thebans was admitted on a dark and rainy night into Plataiai by Naukleides and his oligarchic adherents. The citizens were asleep, and the invaders encountered no resistance on their way to the Agora, where they grounded their arms and by the proclamation of a herald invited the Plataians to arm themselves and take their stand by the side of their ancient allies<sup>1274</sup> according to the good old Boiotian customs. Roused from their slumbers to learn that an armed force was in possession of their city, and thinking that all opposition would be useless, the chief Plataian citizens accepted these terms, or in other words renounced the alliance of Athens.<sup>1275</sup> But the course of the negotiation showed the scanty numbers of the assailants, and the Plataian demos, loathing the convention which had been made, set to work to barricade with waggons their narrow and crooked streets and then by piercing the internal walls of their houses to provide the means of combined action without rousing the suspicions of the Thebans. The town was wrapped in that blackest darkness which goes immediately before the dawn, when the Plataians burst upon them. The Thebans resisted stoutly, and even gained some small advantage over their enemy; but showers of stones and tiles hurled on them from the roofs by screaming women and howling slaves filled them with dismay, and their want of acquaintance with the town left them like a flock of routed sheep. If any made their way to the gate by which they had entered, it was only to find it barred by a javelin pin which closed it as effectually as a nail spikes a gun.<sup>1276</sup> Others

<sup>1274</sup> This invitation to the Plataians, *τιθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα*, must have the same meaning with the phrase *θέμενοι τὰ ὄπλα* which Thucydides, ii. 2, 5, has just applied to the Thebans. It can scarcely mean that the Thebans stood for the moment defenceless, their arms being piled like those of troops off duty; but, although the words sometimes denote the piling of arms, they denote perhaps even more frequently the position of men standing at ease with their arms in their hands. See Thuc. vii. 3, where Gylippos makes his troops stand armed near the Athenians to whom he sends a herald, and iv. 68, where the invitation to the Megarians can only be to join armed ranks.

<sup>1275</sup> Nothing less than this can be involved in the words *δεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους*. Thuc. ii. 3, 1.

<sup>1276</sup> The pin, or *βάλανος*, thrust into the bar of a gate was extracted by a key whose pipe was made of the precise diameter needed to take a firm grip of it. This key would not fit the javelin spike, and thus the gate could not be opened. See further the note of Dr. Arnold on the passage, where he mentions the tricks suggested for taking the measure of these pins before attacking a city, in order to be ready with false keys.

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in their terror rushed to the walls and threw themselves over, mostly to an instant death. Some few escaped through an unguarded gate, the bar of which they had hewn off with an axe given to them by a woman; but the greater part, hurrying through the open doors of a building which formed part of the city wall, found themselves in a prison when they had expected to find egress on the other side, and were compelled to surrender themselves without conditions. Meanwhile the reinforcement which was to support the assailants had been detained on the road partly by the darkness and the rain and still more by the swollen stream of the Asopos, and they arrived before Plataiai only to learn that their scheme had utterly miscarried. Their first impulse was to seize every Plataian found without the walls; but giving them no time for deliberation, the Plataians sent a herald to warn them that if they did any harm to person or property in Plataian territory, the prisoners should be instantly slain, but that, in spite of their shameful breach of the truce, their departure should be followed by the restoration of their countrymen.

Slaughter  
of the  
Theban  
prisoners.

On this promise, ratified, as they declared, by a solemn oath, the Thebans returned home. The Plataian version of the story was that they made no positive pact, but merely said that the prisoners should not be killed, until negotiations for a fitting settlement should have failed. The equivocation was contemptible; but the Plataians even thus stand convicted out of their own mouth. They entered into no negotiations; and no sooner had the Theban reinforcement turned their backs on the city, than every man who had been seized within it was put to death.<sup>1277</sup> The fate of Eurymachos who was among the number calls for no pity; but the Plataians had lied on their own showing, and the flood-gates were opened for that exasperated warfare which was,

<sup>1277</sup> Thuc. ii. 5. Diodoros, xii. 42, states that the Plataians had prisoners and that the Theban reinforcement had booty, and that they made an interchange. The disappointment, therefore, of the Athenians on reaching Plataiai, was not at finding the men killed, but at learning that they were safe at Thebes and beyond their reach. Whence Diodoros obtained this version of the affair, we cannot say. Demosthenes in his speech against Neaira, p. 1370 R, affirms with Thucydides that the Plataians killed their prisoners. For the differences between the accounts of the orator and the historian see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 160.

it might almost be said, to leave Hellas little rest so long as it continued to have any history at all.

One messenger had been sent to Athens when the Thebans entered the town. Another had followed when the surprise had failed and the surviving Thebans had been made prisoners. On receiving these tidings the Athenians at once issued orders for seizing all Boiotians found in Attica, and sent a herald to the Plataians begging them to do nothing with their prisoners until they could well consider the matter with their old allies. Perikles, it cannot be doubted, saw at once that these prisoners furnished a hold on Thebes and through Thebes on Sparta which was worth far more than their weight in gold. The capture of Spartan citizens in Sphakteria later on in the war practically paralysed the policy of their countrymen: but the Athenian messenger reached Plataiai only to find that the Plataians had thrown away a splendid opportunity to satisfy a savage rage. The act of the Plataians was as absurdly impolitic as it was grossly immoral; but it is gratifying to find even here the evidence that Athens was not yet thus blinded to self-interest as well as to justice. The mischief could not, however, be undone; and the Athenians, taking away all Plataians unfit for military service together with the women and children, left the town provisioned simply as a fortified post.

The die was now cast: and both sides prepared vigorously for the conflict. Not content with their Hellenic allies, the Spartans did not shrink from inviting the aid even of the Persian king. So thoroughly had the self-sacrificing energy of Athens during the Persian wars failed to make any permanent impression on the Greek mind, that a feeling of regret may almost be pardoned for the refusal of the Athenians to accept the proffered alliance of Mardonios. A convention, anticipating the treaty which bears the name of Kallias, might have offered to the Persian monarch terms which, without involving degradation even for the Asiatic Hellenes, would have so far advanced his interests as to justify their acceptance. But in this step of the Spartans we have at the least further evidence of the selfishness and the lack of patriotism which characterise the rule of

CHAP.  
II.

Impolicy  
and im-  
morality of  
this act.

Spartan  
overtures to  
the Persian  
king.

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oligarchical bodies. Had Athens chosen, she might long ago have enslaved the whole Hellenic world; but her warfare was not with the constitutions of individual states, but against a common enemy, and she could not do that which Spartans felt that they might do without shame.

The allies  
of Athens  
and of  
Sparta.

On both sides it was a time of fierce excitement. The Corinthians at least had shown that they were acting from the impulse of an unreasoning fury; and at Athens a large population had grown up which knew nothing of warfare carried on at their own doors. Soothsayers and oracle-mongers came forward in crowds to fan the flame; and even earthquakes which had taken place half a century ago were cited as forebodings of the now pending struggle.<sup>1278</sup> But the historian admits that the general feeling of the Hellenic states ran against Athens. The mere desire for change made them willing victims of Spartan claptrap, and led them to indulge in golden visions of the time when Hellas should be really free, in other words, should find itself under the paternal rule of Eupatrid oligarchs. At the outset, the Spartan alliance included all the Peloponnesian states, except the neutral Argives and Achaians, Pellênê being the only Achaian city which joined them at first. Among their allies beyond the isthmus were the Megarians, Phokians, Lokrians, Boiotians, Ambrakiot, Leukadians and Anaktorians. The Athenians could reckon on hearty co-operation from the Korkyraians and the Helots of Naupaktos; <sup>1279</sup> but Plataiai was now rather a burden than a help. The efforts of Athens against Peloponnesos would be seconded further by the Akarnanians<sup>1280</sup>

<sup>1278</sup> Thuc. ii. 8. See vol. i. p. 424.

<sup>1279</sup> See p. 43.

<sup>1280</sup> The origin of this alliance is mentioned by Thucydides, ii. 68, who says that the Amphiloehian Argos was founded by Amphiloehos the son of Amphiaraios, that is, by a Hellen, because he was dissatisfied with the state of things at the Peloponnesian Argos on his return from the Trojan war; that these Amphiloehian Argives afterwards invited Ambrakiot settlers to share their city; and that from these new-comers they adopted the Hellenic language. Dr. Arnold, in his note on the passage, speaks of this as a change in which a Hellenic dialect superseded the Pelasgic dialect of the chiefs of the Trojan expedition. We have already seen that the means are lacking for coming to any positive conclusion on this point. See vol. i. p. 53.

Thucydides adds that these Ambrakiot new-comers expelled the Amphiloehians who allied themselves with the Akarnanians, and on the request of both these peoples an Athenian fleet under Phormion sailed to the Ambrakian gulf, took Argos, and enslaved the inhabitants. This raid caused a feud between the Akarnanians and Ambrakiots, which led to reprisals later on in the war.

This alliance must have been made during the interval between the operations of Korkyra in the spring of 432 B.C., and the expedition of Phormion to Chalkidike in the autumn of the same year.

and Zakynthians. But her main strength lay in the great body of allies which had formed the Delian confederacy. Of these the Chians and Lesbians were still free; but Samos had since her revolt been reduced to the ranks of those which were merely tributary, her fleet having been forfeited to Athens.<sup>1281</sup> Kypros (Cyprus) had been abandoned to the Persians by the convention of Kallias;<sup>1282</sup> but over the Karians, Dorians, and Ionians of the Asiatic coast, and over all the Egean islands to the north of Krete, except Melos and Thera, Athens was still supreme.

At length a force consisting of two-thirds of the contingents demanded from the Peloponnesian allies was gathered at the isthmus; and Archidamos in a short speech sought to moderate the high-wrought expectation of the men who served in it. He was leading them forward, he said, in the firm conviction that they would meet with a terrible resistance in the open field, for, if he knew the Athenians at all, they were not men who would look on tamely while their highly cultivated lands were being turned into a desert. His general estimate of Athenian valour and perseverance was right: in this particular anticipation he was wrong. But it needed all the influence of Perikles, supported by the most impassioned eloquence, to falsify the hopes or the fears of the Spartan king. It had been his great effort to induce the Athenians to adopt the one settled plan, the old plan of Themistokles, of resisting the enemy by sea, and leaving him to do much as he might please on land. By bringing within the Long Walls which joined Athens with Peiraieus and Phaleron their women, their children, and their movable goods and even the wooden framework of their farmhouses, and by sending away their beasts and cattle to Euboa and the neighbouring islands,<sup>1283</sup> they might weary out any enemy. Archidamos, it was true, was his family friend; and it was therefore possible that he might except the lands of Perikles from the general devastation through a feeling of personal kindness, or that the Spartans might order them to be spared for the mere sake of bringing him into suspicion with his countrymen. These lands therefore Perikles made

The resources of Athens.

<sup>1281</sup> See page 71.

<sup>1282</sup> See page 51.

<sup>1283</sup> Thuc. ii. 14.




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III.

over to the state, and he was thus free to enter into the war with the same burdens and the same responsibilities as the other citizens. Like them, he might approach it with some forebodings and with much greater reluctance; but on the whole there was vastly more to encourage than to depress them. Their yearly revenue and their large reserve funds<sup>1284</sup> far exceeded the resources of their enemies; and their land-forces were at the least sufficient for their wants. Thirteen thousand picked hoplites were ready for service in the field in addition to the 16,000 heavy-armed troops who were stationed on outposts or employed on garrison duty within the walls of Athens and her harbours. They had further 1,200 horsemen, and 1,600 archers; but the real power of the city lay in her ships, and 300 triremes in the highest state of equipment and furnished with ample and thoroughly disciplined crews were ready to do her bidding. But with all these grounds for confidence it was with a heavy heart that the dwellers in the country broke up their pleasant homes. Fifty years before, their farms had been left desolate by the Persians; since that time, their skill and energy had again converted them into a garden such as could be seen perhaps nowhere else. These must now be left again to the mercies of enemies more un pitying than even Persians, while they sought a shelter in the houses of friends within the city, if they were lucky enough to have any, or in vacant spaces within the walls as well as in the temples and shrines of the heroes, except only in those which, like the Akropolis and the Eleusinion with a few others, were carefully guarded from all profanation. The pressure of numbers so far constrained them that many took up their abode in the Pelasgic ground beneath the Akropolis, in spite of the warning contained in an old Delphian response that it would be well if this land were uninhabited.<sup>1285</sup>

<sup>1284</sup> For these see page 67.

<sup>1285</sup> Thucydides, i. 17, adds that the people interpreted this as an absolute prohibition, and dreaded the results of disregarding it. In his own belief it was not disrespect for the oracle which brought about the subsequent calamities, but the war which rendered this disrespect inevitable. The oracle said nothing about the war; but the Pythia clearly foresaw the evils which would follow or attend the war, and therefore said that it would be an evil sign when this ground came to be occupied. The historian exalts her foresight in order to soften down the superstitions of his countrymen.





**ATHENS**  
and its Neighbourhood



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This mournful and irksome task was not yet finished, perhaps it was not far advanced, when Archidamos made a last effort to avert war by dispatching to Athens the herald Melesippos; but the Athenians had already made up their minds by the advice of Perikles to receive no overtures when once the Peloponnesian army had set out on its march. He was therefore sent back without an audience, under strict orders to be beyond the Attic border before sundown; and attended by an escort of men who were to see that he spoke to no one by the way. From these he parted with the warning words that that day would be the beginning of great evils to the Hellenes,—a speech which might concern the wrong doers, that is, his own countrymen, but which could not be expected to carry weight with men who, whatever may have been their shortcomings, were in the present controversy blameless.

The return of the herald convinced Archidamos that nothing further could be looked for from negotiation; and he at once advanced to Oinoë near the little stream of Kephisos and beneath the great mass of Kithairon. This place, as being on the border, had been strongly fortified; and Archidamos spent many days before it in vain attempts to carry it by assault, with no further result than to increase the suspicion of the Spartans that he was playing into the hands of their enemies. During the time which he had wasted here the Athenians had not only finished their work of migration into the city, but had given no sign that they were prepared to make the least concession. Eighty days had passed from the night attack on Plataiai, and the corn was fully ripe, when Archidamos led his men on to ravage Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. Close to Eleusis lie the lakes called Rheitoi through which some streams of salt water find their way to the sea. Here, hard by the Sacred Road which ran at the head of the lakes, the first conflict of this war on Athenian soil ended in the defeat of a small body of Athenian horsemen sent out to check them. Archidamos now moved northwards, passing between the hills of Korydallos and Aigaleos on the eastern side of the Eleusinian bay, and at once put to the test the endurance of the sturdiest and

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II.

Final  
attempts at  
negotiation  
on the part  
of the  
Spartans.

Attack of  
Oinoë, and  
invasion of  
Attica.

most excitable of the Athenian Demoi.<sup>1286</sup> They had now reached the old Kekropian land, the home of the earth-born founder of the Athenian city;<sup>1287</sup> and the Spartan king felt assured that a demos which furnished 3,000 hoplites would never remain passively within the walls of Athens while their luxuriant fields were being made a desert. They did so remain, but only at the cost of a terrible struggle which taxed the influence and the powers of Perikles to the utmost. The city was in a state of fierce tumult. The few who could remember in their childhood the ravaging of Attica by the Persians were men now more than sixty years of age; and the younger men winced as under a deadly insult at the sight of enemies in lands tended and enriched with a care which they had never known before the coming of Xerxes. Their corn was being reaped by the hands of other men; and their rage was turned against the statesman who withheld them from taking summary vengeance. For the moment the sceptre seemed to have fallen from his hands, and he became to them the cause of all the evils which had befallen them. Still Perikles would not swerve from the course which he had marked out for himself. His office as Strategos gave him, it seems, the power of prohibiting the assemblies of the people which in times of peace were convened by the Prytaneis of the Probouleutic Council;<sup>1288</sup> and he hesitated not to avail himself of it. Applying all the force of his eloquence to charm and soothe them, he yielded to their wishes no further than by sending out one company of Athenian horsemen supported by their Thessalian allies, who with some loss to themselves inflicted as much, if not more, on the enemy. These now busied themselves in ravaging the districts between mounts Parnes and Brilessos; but the time was at length come when Perikles could furnish elsewhere an outlet for the pent-up energies of his countrymen. The Spartans were moving to the coast-

<sup>1286</sup> According to Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 180, the Acharnians are men made of ilex and maple,—tough as oak.

<sup>1287</sup> See note 388. The reading of the best MSS. in this passage gives the name Kroepeia; but Dr. Arnold, thinking that Thucydides would scarcely have thought it worth his while to mention the insignificant place of that name known to us only through Stephanos Byzantinos, holds that the historian wrote Kekropia, the name of the old division of Attica lying between Athens and Eleusis, and that the phrase thus denotes the profanation of the home-territory of Athens by invaders.

<sup>1288</sup> See vol. i. page 225.

land <sup>1280</sup> of Oropos, whence, probably through the passes of Phylê, they retreated homewards, when an Athenian fleet of a hundred ships, having on board 1,000 hoplites and 400 archers, sailed from Athens to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesos. Joined by 50 Korkyraian vessels, the Athenians, having reached Methonê on the southwesternmost promontory of Messênê, landed in order to carry the place by storm. Not only were the walls weak, but men were lacking to guard them; and the town must speedily have been captured, had not Brasidas the son of Tellis, who held a Spartan outpost in the neighbourhood, dashed through the Athenian force and with some little loss to his men thrown himself into the city. The Athenians were scattered carelessly about the place, not looking for such sudden and impetuous movement; but the promptitude now displayed by this young officer was an earnest of military exploits such as no other Spartan general ever equalled. Of men like Leonidas and Archidamos there had never been any lack; Brasidas was perhaps the first Spartan in whom a rigid discipline had sharpened instead of repressing a genius of no mean order, and to the credit of the Spartans it must be said that they fully appreciated his merits.

Having failed at Methonê, the Athenians, sailing northwards, succeeded, with the aid of the Messenians from Naupaktos, in taking the Eleian town of Pheia between the river Sellêis and the promontory of Ichthys; and while these were doing what hurt they could on the Peloponnesian shores, <sup>1290</sup> another Athenian fleet under Kleopompos sailed

The expulsion  
of the  
Aiginetans.

<sup>1289</sup> Stephanos Byzantinos mentions Graia as a town on the coast near Oropos; and thus Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 182, is led to prefer the reading Γραϊκήν in Thuc. ii. 23, 3, to Πειραικήν. It is strange that the territory of Oropos should be known by the name of a place much more insignificant than itself, and Dr. Arnold, in his note on the passage, remarks further that the participle καλουμένην is seldom applied to a city or territory unless it describes its geographical position. We have the name Πειραική apparently in Peiraieus, a place which stands to Aigina much in the position of Oropos in reference to the opposite Euboian coast. The name may thus be compared with the trans-Jordanic Peraia. But the fact that Thucydides himself speaks elsewhere, iii. 91, 3, of the land about Oropos as ἡ πέραν γῆ, seems to be conclusive proof that he here wrote Πειραική.

<sup>1290</sup> Before they began their homeward voyage the Athenians took the Corinthian fort of Sollion, in which they placed some Akarnanian settlers; from Astakos, near the mouth of the Achelôos, they expelled the tyrant Euarchos, and made the city a tributary ally of Athens; and lastly they gained over to the confederacy the Kephallenian tetrapolis, consisting of the Palians, Kranians, Samaians, and Pronaians. Thuc. ii. 30. The despot Euarchos was restored during the following winter by the Corinthians, Thuc. ii. 33; but their efforts to gain the rest of Akarnania as well as Kephallenia were fruitless.

round Sounion and up the Euboian sea, until, having reached the Lokrian territory, it took the towns of Alopê and Thronion, which lay to the east and the west of the little strip of Phokian land containing the city of Daphnous. A permanent garrison was at the same time established in the islet of Atalantê in the bay of Opous to prevent the ravaging of Eubœia by Lokrian privateers.<sup>1291</sup> But the Athenians were bent on doing sterner work before the summer should draw to its close. Aigina had long been called the eyesore of Peiraieus; and so long as its old people were suffered to dwell in it, it would remain an eyesore still. The decree went forth for their banishment; and the wretched inhabitants, powerless after the forfeiture of their fleet and the dismantling of their walls, were cast out upon the Peloponnesian coast, to find such refuge as the Spartans might give them in gratitude for their help in the war which had ended in the settlement of the Helots in Naupaktos. This refuge some of them found in Thyrea; and thus it came to pass that the Spartans had a bitterly hostile population at the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, and the Athenians a population not less resentful on the march lands of Lakonia and Argolis.<sup>1292</sup> But to the Athenians this expulsion of the islanders was for the present a gain. They got rid of a people between whom and themselves no love was wasted, and in their place they were enabled to plant settlers from the number of their own citizens, like those whom they had in earlier days placed in the lands of the Chalkidian Hippobotai. Lastly, their hand fell without compunction on the Megarians who had done so much first to help and then to thwart them. The work of devastation had already begun, when the fleet which was on its homeward voyage from the Corinthian gulf effected a junction with the land army, and thus exhibited the largest Athenian force ever brought together before the outburst of the terrible plague which saddened the last years of the life of Perikles. Ten thousand Athenian and three thousand Metoikian hoplites carried fire and sword through the lands of Megara: and every year this terrible chastisement was inflicted

<sup>1291</sup> Thuc. ii. 32.<sup>1292</sup> Ib. ii. 27.

down to the capture of Nisaia by the Athenians. The frightful sufferings of this wretched folk are scarcely exaggerated in the description given by the comic poet of the Megarian father who seeks to sell his children as Megarian pigs.<sup>1293</sup>

It was now obvious that a struggle had begun which might bring either side to desperate straits before it came to an end. Hence the Athenians determined not only to take effectual measures for guarding Attica by land and sea, but to put aside a large reserve fund not to be touched before they found themselves face to face with a supreme necessity. The form under which they chose to set apart this fund of 1,000 talents in the Akropolis was a solemn sentence that any citizen, asking a vote to dispose of this money for any other purpose than that of a maritime attack by the enemy on the Peiraieus itself, should be punished with instant death. The anathema carries us back to the stories of Kyrtilos or Lykidas;<sup>1294</sup> and much pains have been spent in the effort to convict the Athenians of utter barbarism for so much as thinking of such a measure. To this charge we have a sufficient answer in the fact that it was a mere form and that it was known to be nothing more. Probably of those who passed the decree there was not a man who dreamed that a day would come when Spartan ships should be anchored, except as prizes, in the Peiraieus; and certainly none was ignorant that if anyone should at any time wish to divert the fund to other uses, he had nothing more to do than to propose the repeal of the existing Psephisma, or decree. Doing thus, he could suffer no damage himself, and if he failed to get the obnoxious statute repealed, it would be sufficient proof that the necessity of the change was not apparent to the popular mind. In the meanwhile the effect of the anathema, even though confessedly it could not be carried out, would be to mark with the strongest condemnation of the state anyone who might even dream of using the money except as a resource in the last resort for the salvation of the city. The act was one not of barbarism, but of the clearest foresight and of the most judicious adjustment of means to ends.

Measures  
for the  
safety of  
Attica and  
Athens.

<sup>1293</sup> Arist. *Acharn.* 760 *et seq.*

<sup>1294</sup> See vol. i. page 564.



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Alliance  
 of the  
 Athenians  
 with the  
 Thrakian  
 chief  
 Sitalkes.

But there were other dangers to be provided against on the Thrakian and Chalkidian shores. Perdikkas was still the enemy of Athens because Philip and Derdas were her friends; and Potidaia still held out obstinately. Hence the Athenians embraced eagerly an opportunity for securing the alliance of the powerful Odrysian chief Sitalkes, which now offered itself through a citizen of Abdera named Nymphodoros. The services of Nymphodoros, whose good will had thus far been a matter of doubt, were secured by making him a Proxenos;<sup>1295</sup> and Nymphodoros during a visit to Athens agreed to secure not merely the alliance of Sitalkes but the reconciliation of the fickle, if not treacherous, Perdikkas. Of these two chiefs the former was the head of one of those short-lived empires which a man of strong will and a genius for command may raise on shifting or uncertain foundations and which in the hands of feeble successors fall again to pieces. His father Teres<sup>1296</sup> had succeeded in so far overcoming the savage isolation of many of the Thrakian clans, as to weld them for the time into something like a coherent polity;<sup>1297</sup> and the son seemed fully equal to the task of maintaining and extending the power which he had inherited. Sadokos, the son of Sitalkes, was made an Athenian citizen; and Nymphodoros pledged himself to use his utmost influence with the Thrakians so as to bring the Chalkidian war to an immediate end. He succeeded so far as to bring back Perdikkas to the alliance of Athens and to secure the more trustworthy friendship of Sitalkes.

Public  
 burial at  
 Athens,  
 and funeral  
 oration of  
 Perikles.

The first year of the fatal struggle between Athens and Sparta was now drawing towards its end. To the Athenians, apart from the disaster of war itself, it had been a year of no great reverses and no great victories; but some of her citizens

<sup>1295</sup> The Proxenoï of the Hellenic states answered, roughly, to the consuls of modern governments, the chief difference being that now the consuls of a country belong to the country which they represent, not to that in which they exercise their office. The Proxenoï were, also, unpaid. They had, however, a definite legal status, if they were recognised by the state in whose interests they exerted themselves. Such a recognition was granted to Nymphodoros. Had he acted (as many did) without this sanction from mere feelings of kindness for Athenians, he would have been an Etheloproxenos. Probably the proxenos of a wealthy and powerful state like Athens found that his unpaid office was by no means a drawback to the advancement of his own interests.

<sup>1296</sup> Thucydides is careful to show that this Teres, whose name was spelt differently from that of Tereus, was not of kin with the mythical father of Prokne and Philomela, the swallow and the nightingale.

<sup>1297</sup> See vol. i. page 163.

had already fallen in the service of their country; and these deserved the honours of a public funeral as much as if they had fallen at Marathon or Salamis. According to the usual custom in times of war the bones<sup>1298</sup> of the dead, placed in ten chests, one for each tribe, with one empty bier for those of the slain whose bodies could not be found, were carried in procession to the Kerameikos, the most beautiful suburb of the city; and there in sight of the precipitous rock from which the Virgin Goddess in her gleaming armour seemed to extend her protecting spear over the land, the citizen chosen for the purpose addressed to the assembled throng such words of encouragement and comfort as the time and the circumstances of the mourners seemed to call for. The citizen chosen on this occasion was Perikles: and Perikles determined to speak to them as he would have spoken if they had been fresh from battles as momentous as those of Plataiai and Mykalê. Later writers<sup>1299</sup> charged him with making too much of a small matter, and of launching into a strain which might have been suitable if the Sicilian expedition had ended in success instead of ruin. The criticism has slight foundation or none. It was of the first importance that now at the beginning of the contest the Athenians should know what they were fighting for, and wherein lay the radical difference between the polity of Athens and that of her enemy. Nor was this all, for although there had been no room yet for brilliant achievements, the Athenian people during the year which was now coming to an end had made efforts greater even than those which had marked the struggle with Persia. Now, as then, the Athenians living in the country had abandoned their homes; and the difficulties of the task had increased with the growth not less of population than of wealth. There was more to remove, and more to be lost; and the mere fact that the task had been accomplished bore witness to a spirit of self-sacrifice which called for all the encouragement that the most eloquent and far-seeing of statesmen could hold out to them. If ever there

<sup>1298</sup> The word *ὄσρα*, bones, can scarcely mean more than the residue of bones remaining after burning. No one chest or coffin would contain the whole skeletons of large numbers of men slain in a battle in which the losses were serious.

<sup>1299</sup> Dionysios, *de Thuc. Jud.* 18.

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was a time when the Athenians needed to be reminded of the efforts of their forefathers in order that they might be spurred on to fresh efforts for themselves, that time was the present: and accordingly Perikles passed in rapid review the course by which the Athenians had created their empire, and the results which had been thus far achieved. In all likelihood, as with an eloquence all the more impressive from its lack of rhetorical ornament Perikles drew a picture which almost astonishes us in its splendour, he thought that the children's children of those who now heard him would be able to look back upon a history still more magnificent. But Athens had reached her highest point; and his description, as it would not have been true of the Athens of Themistokles, can be applied with no greater truth to the Athens of Demosthenes. If the picture be true at all,<sup>1300</sup> it is one which holds up to us much that Englishmen have attained with the efforts of centuries and much that still remains to be realised in the future, if it be realised ever. Yet at Athens the main part of the work had been done in little more than half a century. Not eighty years had passed since the tyrant Hippias had departed with his followers into exile: and the reforms of Kleisthenes, although they insured the growth of the commonwealth, did little at first towards breaking the apparent ascendancy of the oligarchical houses. Within the space of fifty years Athens had pushed back the power of Persia beyond the limits of Asiatic Hellas, had raised up against the barbarian the permanent barrier of her maritime empire, and had developed at home a genius in art, in science, and in government such as the world had never seen. Fifty years before, this developement was a thing of the future; but the Athenian people were animated by the nerve and energy which rendered it possible. Fifty years later, the fruits of this developement in the many phases of Athenian civilisation were almost as splendid as ever; but the old spirit of indomitable perseverance was gone. In the age of Perikles alone could the union of the two be found: and thus his funeral oration becomes

<sup>1300</sup> Thucydides probably heard the speech himself; and the pledge of accuracy which he gives for the substantial though not verbal correctness of his reports must be taken as applying with special force to an oration of which he would have no temptation to misrepresent the general bearing.

an invaluable picture of a state of things, realised for a few years, which it would in some respects at least be well for us if we could realise now. If the ideal happiness of man is to be found in a polity which with a strict enforcement of the laws gives the fullest scope to the tastes, fancies, and peculiarities of each citizen, then, unless the historian has wholly misrepresented the orator, Athens in the days of Perikles approached nearer to this ideal than we approach it now; and we can well understand the high-strung enthusiasm which the speaker unquestionably felt, and which most of his hearers probably shared with him, as he dwelt on the real freedom and splendid privileges of Athenian citizens. The polity of Athens was no importation from foreign lands. It had grown with her growth, and each step towards the repression of the old Eupatrid exclusiveness had brought her nearer to the happier time in which all her citizens, the poor not less than the rich, could take part in the great work of governing themselves. Thus far it was called, and truly called, a democracy; but the rule of the people had nothing in common with that modern philosophy in which a dead level is looked on as progress, and a common slavery is regarded as the guarantee of that progress.<sup>1301</sup> This rule was maintained by a spirit of voluntary obedience to law,<sup>1302</sup> and by a severe repression of wrong-doing, while the life of the citizens was embellished with all the resources of a refined civilisation. The richest among them had no better title than the poorest to the highest pleasures which Athenian art could afford. The temples of the city and the Akropolis were their common property, and all alike might gaze on the pictures of Poly-

<sup>1301</sup> I quote the emphatic words of one of the most illustrious of French thinkers of the age now passing away. There are some disagreeable signs that even England may be slowly drifting towards that centralised despotism 'which never dies and which parades its irresistible and pitiless level on a bed of human dust.' M. de Montalembert was speaking of that despotism of the Bonapartes which had sought to crush him and with him all that was free and great in France; but the despotism of class may be as stern and as intrusive as that of a Napoleon, and hence it becomes more than ever necessary to bear in mind the axiom which underlay the policy of Perikles, that so soon as legislation or public opinion interferes with the private life of citizens beyond the point at which interference becomes necessary for the safety and well-being of the state, that legislation or opinion is wrong. The vigour and spirit of the great mediæval monks led Montalembert to think that this freedom was realised in the Monastic system. At best it was realised only for a few.

<sup>1302</sup> In the term law Perikles is careful to say that he wishes to denote the unwritten as well as the written law,—all those rules, in fact, the breach of which causes a sense of shame in the transgressor, or involves the contempt of society.

gnotos or the statues of Pheidias; all could take part in the splendid festivals which were associated with the loftiest triumphs of tragic or comic poets. Nor did they grudge even to strangers a share in these the highest and purest pleasures of which the human mind is capable. Athens knew nothing of those churlish expulsions of strangers<sup>1303</sup> by which Sparta sought to support her rigid system. The Athenian citizen could cultivate to the utmost his sense of beauty and grandeur without incurring any personal cost; and he could submit himself to a thorough philosophical training without being thereby rendered effeminate. All this, moreover, was done without any legislation which imposed the same education, the same mode of life, the same habits and fashions upon all the citizens. The one characteristic which pre-eminently distinguished Athens from all other states was the perfect freedom which it accorded to all in the indulgence even of their whims and fancies. Peculiarities of taste or feeling called forth no malignant comments, and the citizen who would not mould himself quite to the temper of his fellows was not met with frowning looks or treated to the cold shoulder.<sup>1304</sup> Even if the picture be somewhat over-coloured, it is still one which must put Englishmen to shame; and Englishmen have less reason in this respect to blame themselves than some at least of the nations of Europe. It followed from these general principles

<sup>1303</sup> The Xenelasiai. See page 99.

<sup>1304</sup> It is obvious that this toleration would tend very powerfully to maintain and strengthen the true democratic feeling, while the lack of this toleration in the society of Rome made the way easier for the rise of imperial power. In fact, it might be said roughly that Rome never had any freedom except in so far as the arbitrary power of one magistrate was checked and controlled by the not less arbitrary power of another. Hence the Roman constitution cannot be regarded as at any time an uncongenial bed for the growth of despotism. See further Arnold, *Later Roman Commonwealth*, vol. ii. p. 327 *et seq.*

The picture of the ideal Polis as drawn by Aristotle in his ethical and political treatises, and still more as drawn by Plato, differs widely from the description of Athenian society as given by Perikles: and our notions of Hellenic commonwealths in general are far too much moulded by their views. Aristotle was far from insisting on the real despotism of the Platonic Outopia where geometry occupied the highest seats while poetry was wholly shut out: but in his Polis the state exercises a minute supervision over the daily life of the citizen, prescribing the books which he is to read or not to read, the sciences which he is to learn, the age at which he is to marry. It is the function of πολιτική to determine τίνας εἶναι χρεῖων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μαθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνας. *Eth. Nik.* i. 1, 6. Unless Thucydides is wholly wrong, this would not be an accurate description of Athenian polity, and we have no right to conclude that it fairly exhibits the system of Hellenic states in general. It is of great importance that this fact should be noted, for the idea that Greek civilisation paid no heed to the individual is deeply rooted and widely spread. If we may believe Perikles, it is we who are behind Athens in the large scope given to individuals.

that Athens trusted rather to the spirit and the patriotism of her citizens than to a rigid and unbending discipline. In the assurance that when the time for effort and sacrifice should come they would be found fully equal to the needs of the moment, she could afford to dispense with the network of rules and the inquisitorial system which tormented the Spartan from his cradle to his grave. In the great conflict into which Athens was now plunged Perikles found comfort in the thought that the efficiency of Athenian troops on the field of battle was fully equal to that of the Spartans, and that they were thus gainers by the lack of the eternal drill in which their enemies passed their lives. In this he was mistaken. In bravery the Western Ionian was a match for the Western Dorian; but the system of Athenian land-service certainly did not make each individual man as thoroughly at home in his work as the Spartan hoplite was rendered by the mathematical precision of his training.<sup>1305</sup> The strength of Athens lay mainly in her fleet: and here discipline and technical education had brought about results which filled the whole Hellenic world with mingled admiration and fear. Still the Athenians might without shame, nay with an honest pride, avow that with them the highest culture involved no neglect of duty, no shrinking from danger, no reluctance to make the most costly sacrifices. If he fell on the field of battle, the Athenian lost infinitely more than the Spartan. The latter scarcely knew the feeling of home; for the former his home was associated with all that could fill his life with beauty and delight, and inspire him with the most earnest patriotism. From early manhood he was not only able to take part in the great counsels of the people, to give his vote in the carrying or rejection of laws, and his help in the administration of justice; but the attempt to shirk these duties was regarded as both inexcusable and disgraceful. He had received therefore the highest political and judicial education, and the result was a happy versatility which in no way dissipated his powers when it became needful to concentrate them on a definite task. Yet more he found himself the member of an imperial society whose greatness took away

<sup>1305</sup> See vol. i. page 95.

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from its subjects all the bitterness of servitude and whose splendour needed not the glorifications of a Homer. If it was worth while to die for such a state, the sacrifice was altogether more costly than that of the Spartan who gave up nothing more than the dull monotony of a monastic barrack, and who knew nothing of the larger sympathies and wider aims developed by the extended empire and trade of a power like Athens.<sup>1306</sup> Perikles therefore might well rise to a strain of enthusiasm when, after his sketch of their political and social life, he addressed himself to those who were mourning for brothers and kinsfolk fallen in battle. These had shown themselves worthy of the men by whose efforts the fabric of Athenian empire had been reared, and had left to their survivors the task of following their example, or, if age had ended their active life, a memory full of quiet and lasting consolation.<sup>1307</sup>

The plague  
at Athens.  
430 B.C.

With this picture of Athens assailed by vehement enemies, and confronting them with the sober resolution arising from the consciousness of a substantially righteous cause, the history of the first year in this momentous struggle comes to an end.<sup>1308</sup> The narrative of the second year opens with the story of disasters utterly unlooked for, and of miseries after which Athens was never to be again quite what she had been before. Thus far she had been dealing with dangers of which she could take full account, and with enemies before whom she had no need to tremble. She was now to be attacked by a foe against whom scientific skill and generous

<sup>1306</sup> We have already seen that those Hellenic states were most early developed whose citizens were driven by geographical position to make themselves at home on the sea; and familiarity with the sea must involve the growth of maritime trade. The strength of the Athenian democracy lay in the nautic crowd of the Peiræus whose submission to law stood out in strong contrast with the comparative turbulence of the hoplites. Hence Dr. Arnold was fully justified in speaking of Athenian civilisation as the child of commerce and of liberty. See his note on *Thuc.* ii. 42, 1.

<sup>1307</sup> Perikles made only the announcement usual on these occasions when he said that the state would take upon itself the education of the children of those who had fallen in battle until they should reach manhood.

On the few words which he addresses to the widows of the slain it is unnecessary to say much here. The curt remark that the glory of women is to be utterly unknown to all men except those who are members of their own families jars terribly on all our convictions; the wretched results which this theory produced in Athenian life have been noticed already, see page 101, and must be noticed again when we come to survey generally the social growth of the Hellenic states.

<sup>1308</sup> The year of Thucydides is divided into two equal portions, his summer extending from the vernal to the autumnal equinox, the remaining six months being regarded as winter, that is, as the rainy season which swells into raging torrents the scanty rivulets of Hellas.

self-devotion could seemingly avail little or nothing ; and the proof of astonishing fortitude in the Athenian people or at least in their rulers is seen in the fact that this great calamity failed to divert the mind of Perikles from his well-considered scheme, or to stir up popular discontent to a fever which even Perikles could not hope to keep in check. Immediately after the vernal equinox the Spartan army again appeared in Attica, and after ravaging the Eleusinian plain passed on to the Paralian or southeastern portion of the land as far as the silver mines of Laureion.<sup>1309</sup> But they had not been many days in the land when they learnt that their enemies were being smitten by a power more terrible than their own. For some time, we are not told how long, a strange disease had been stalking westwards from its starting-post in Nubia or Ethiopia. It had worked its way through Egypt and Libya ; it had ranged over a great part of the Persian empire, and now just as the summer heats were coming on, it broke out with sudden and awful fury in the Peiræus. In the general state of the city there was little to check, and everything to feed it. The houses in Athens itself were filled with country folk to whom their owners had given hospitality ;<sup>1310</sup> and in the empty spaces within the walls a vast population was crowded with no shelter beyond tents and stifling huts, in which the conditions necessary for the preservation of health were either wilfully or inevitably neglected. Happily the cattle and horses belonging to the country estates had been removed not to Athens but to Eubœia. Had they been brought into the city, the triumph of the Peloponnesians might have been assured in six months. Thus far their efforts had been rewarded by no substantial results. The Athenians still maintained the blockade of Potidaia, and the policy of Perikles deprived the Spartans of all opportunity for striking a decisive blow on the battle-field. But if they had thus far baffled and disappointed their enemies, they had now to cope with a foe against which skill and courage furnished no protection. The physicians hastened to the aid of the

<sup>1309</sup> This portion of Attica formed a triangle which had Sounion for its apex and the coast lines facing Eubœia and the Peloponnesos for about ten miles as its sides. For the Paralians of the days of Peisistratos, see vol. i. page 188. Thuc. ii. 55.

<sup>1310</sup> Thuc. ii. 17, 1.



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sufferers: and they were the first to fall victims to the plague.<sup>1311</sup> The season, it is said, was singularly free from all other diseases; but so fearfully rapid was the spread of this fatal malady that even the boldest and the most self-sacrificing fled from it or yielded to it in despair. Friends and kinsfolk who tended the suffering caught and carried about the contagion, until all learnt to accept as their death-warrant the first sensations of sickness. Then followed scenes such as no Hellenic city had ever witnessed before. In the crowded space between the walls lay men, women, and children, some in a state of passive stupor, others racked with the fearful pains which attended the early stages of the disease, others whom an intolerable thirst had fevered into madness. Entangled with the dying and the dead, these wretched sufferers fought their way with frantic vehemence to the rain-water tanks, into which they flung themselves. Of birds of prey there were few or none to be seen. Experience had taught them to shun the plague-stricken spot: and dogs which were venturesome enough to mangle the corpses paid for their rashness with their lives. The evil had indeed become almost too great for human endurance; and a people to whom at other times seemliness in all social and religious offices was the first concern now cared nothing for decencies of ritual, and flung their dead, as they passed along, on funeral pyres raised for others. But the dead were to be envied by comparison with the wretched men who survived with memory so effectually destroyed that henceforth they retained no longer the sense of personal identity. In the midst of all this suffering there were not wanting, as there never are wanting, some who carried out with a literal zeal the precept which bade them eat and drink because on the morrow they should die. Of the penalties which human law attached to their misdoings they took, it is said, no heed;

<sup>1311</sup> The disease must have been an eruptive typhoid fever, with many of the characteristics both of smallpox and of scarlet fever. It is by some supposed to be the same as the pestis Antoniniana, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 211; but the exact type, it is said, is now no longer known. The description of Thucydides, who himself had the disease, is a wonderful record of accurate observations taken in an age in which even professed physicians were almost irresistibly tempted to run off into theories. There was no lack of such theories to explain the origin of this great calamity: but Thucydides set himself steadily to the task of noting the phenomena, and having done this, he is content to leave his narrative to posterity, in the hope that greater experience might be more successful in devising a remedy.

but what special iniquities they wrought, we are not told. It is right, however, to remember that of some of the worst horrors which have attended plagues of modern times we hear nothing during this terrible summer at Athens. At Milan or in London human nature was disgraced by the cruelty which hunted men to death on the groundless suspicion that they had anointed doors and walls or smeared benches in order to keep alive and to spread the pestilence. At Tyre or at Carthage human victims would have been roasted by hundreds in order to appease the angry gods. At Athens some, it is said, thought when the sickness began that the Spartans had poisoned the tanks; but it is not added that the charge was urged against anyone within the city walls.<sup>1312</sup> In the midst of all these horrors there was but one alleviation. Those who had recovered from the plague were safe from a second attack; but we could not be over-severe in our condemnation, if after thus passing through fire and water they had abandoned themselves to an inert selfishness. Far from doing this, they exhibited a noble rivalry in kindly offices; and unwearied in their tender care for those who were less happy than themselves, they showed that consciousness of good already attained may be a more powerful stimulus to well-doing than the desire of conquering a crushing evil. It would have been strange indeed if this great calamity had not been traced by some to the special anger of the gods. There was no difference in sound between the Greek words which denoted plague and famine; and many quoted a verse said to be old which spoke of a Dorian war and of the plague which would come with it. The historian remarks briefly that the verse would apply just as well, if in later days another Dorian war should come with famine in place of pestilence. But there were others who could refer to the promise which, as the story went, Apollon had given not many months before to the Spartans; and here was the visible proof that the god was in truth fighting on their behalf with all his might.<sup>1313</sup>

For forty days Archidamos with his troops ravaged the

<sup>1312</sup> The charge of poisoning water had, we are told, been brought against Solon. See vol. i. page 119.

<sup>1313</sup> Thuc. ii. 54, 5.

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of the  
Athenian  
people.

soil of Attica; and although some would have it that he hastened home sooner than he would have done if Athens had been free from plague, still during the remainder of the war no Spartan army remained in the country so long. But even before he could reach the Paralian land, Perikles had a fleet of one hundred ships made ready for another expedition against the Peloponnesos. Nor was it long before the territories of Epidauros and Troizen, of Haliai and Hermioné, were ravaged by the hands of the spoiler; and the capture of the Lakonian fortress of Prasiai taught the Spartans that they might even yet feel the power of Athens not far from their own homes. Returning to Athens, the men who had thus far served under Perikles and who during their voyage round the Peloponnesos had lost many of their number from the plague were dispatched under Hagnon and Kleopompos to aid in the reduction of Potidaia. The result was disastrous. In spite of all the appliances which even Athenian skill could bring against it, the city still held out, while the infection brought by the troops of Hagnon spread with terrific speed amongst the Athenians who had preceded them in besieging the place. In less than six weeks 1,500 died out of 4,000 hoplites, and Hagnon returned with his crippled force to Athens. Here the old energy which had been ready to encounter the severest hardships and to make the most costly sacrifices seemed to be gone utterly. While envoys were sent to Sparta on a vain errand to sue for peace, the people with vehement outcries laid all their sufferings at the door of Perikles. Probably even now the majority felt no moral assurance that he really was the author of their troubles; but in their state of overwhelming physical depression they were carried away by the rhetoric of his political opponents. Whether the disease had already begun to desolate his own home, we cannot say; but if he was at this time bearing the burden of personal grief, his firmness under this outcry becomes the more wonderful. Summoning the assembly by the authority which he possessed as general, he met the people with a more direct rebuke of their faint-heartedness and a more distinct assertion of his own services than any to which he had in more

prosperous times resorted. In a few pointed sentences he showed them that they were committing themselves to a false issue. It had been beyond their power to avert the war; and as soon as the struggle became inevitable, the safety of the state became by the conditions of ancient warfare the one object to be aimed at, whatever suffering the task might involve for individual citizens. For these defeat or submission meant the loss of freedom, of property, or of life, while victory would give them the means of more than repairing all their losses.<sup>1314</sup> To a certain extent he had foreseen this outburst of anger. He knew that the dwellers in the country would be sorely chafed by being compelled to exchange their pleasant homes for a cramped and wretched hut within the city walls. He knew that the sense of personal loss when they saw their fruit trees cut down and their farmsteads dismantled must swell the ranks of his opponents and give a welcome handle to his enemies; but he had not foreseen the terrible disease whose ravages were worse than those of hostile armies, and he could take no blame for this disaster unless they were ready to give him credit for every piece of unexpected good luck which might befall them during the war. He was ready indeed to make full allowance for their feelings of distress and dismay. Sudden calamities must shake the strongest mind; and a painful effort is needed to restore its balance. For Athenians such an effort was not merely their duty, but it would assuredly bring with it its own reward. There was in truth no excuse for their losing heart. Their country homes and their rich farms were mere ornaments or superfluities which they might well afford to lose, so long as Athens still remained mistress of the sea. Here no force could encounter their trained and disciplined crews with the faintest chance of success, and their fleets would draw from the lands of their enemies full compensation for all damages inflicted on Athenian citizens. Far from having any fears for the result, they were fully justified in facing their foes with a lofty sense of superiority,<sup>1315</sup> while there was only one

<sup>1314</sup> Thuc. ii. 60. Macaulay, *Essays*, i. 47.

<sup>1315</sup> καταφρονήματι. Thuc. ii. 62, 3.

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danger which they could not afford to encounter,—the danger involved in the abandonment of their imperial power over their allies.

Close of the  
career of  
Perikles.

The Athenians had listened probably to many embittered harangues against Perikles before he opened his mouth; but neither the arguments of the speakers nor their own feelings of anger could withstand the reasoning of the great statesman. They resolved at once to make no more proposals to the Spartans, and to carry on the war with vigour; but Thucydides adds that his enemies were still powerful enough to induce the people to fine him.<sup>1316</sup> Their irritation against him was not long continued. The plague had now laid its hand heavily on his house. His sister and his two sons Xanthippos and Paralos were dead: and his grief when he had to place the funeral wreath on the head of his younger son showed that at length the iron had entered into his soul. There remained still the son of Aspasia who bore his own name; and the people, impressed more than ever by his firmness and his wisdom, not only chose him again as one of their Strategoi, but allowed him, in contravention, it is said, of a law passed by himself,<sup>1317</sup> to inroll this surviving child amongst the number of Athenian citizens. Thucydides merely mentions his re-election as Strategos, and adds that he lived for two years and a half after the attack of the Thebans on Plataiai. But his work was now done, and from this time we hear no more of the statesman who more than any other man saw what the capabilities of his countrymen

<sup>1316</sup> Thucydides, ii. 65, does not mention the grounds on which the fine was inflicted, nor the amount of the fine, which in Diodoros, xii. 45, is swelled from 15 according to some versions to 80 talents. Diodoros, however, merely says that the charges were trifling, μικρὰς τινας ἀφορμὰς ἐγκλημάτων. According to Plato, *Gorgias*, ch. 71, it was theft, κλοπή,—which must mean malversation of public moneys. The charge seems inconsistent with the strong and unqualified language in which Thucydides always speaks of the personal integrity of Perikles, and which he always represents Perikles as using about himself, χρημάτων κρείσσω, ii. 60, 5. It is, however, certain that the Strategoi passed out of their year of office about midsummer: and there can be little doubt that the opponents of Perikles succeeded in preventing his re-election. In the case of a man who had so often been re-elected this break might easily be regarded as the removal from office which is mentioned by Diodoros. The fine, it is said, was remitted,—a measure not likely if it was inflicted for aggravated embezzlement. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 228.

<sup>1317</sup> This law restricted Athenian citizenship to the children born of parents who both were Athenians. The law was bad; but it shows the strength of that ancient exclusiveness which thus survived the blows inflicted on it by the reforms of Solon, Kleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Perikles himself. In short, there could be no remedy for this deep-seated and deadly disease until the notion of Poleis or cities with their interpolitical law, see vol. i. p. 12, should be displaced for our idea of a nation.

were, and seized the best means for bringing out their best qualities.<sup>1318</sup> He lived long enough to hear of the first and possibly of the second of the two great naval victories by which after the fall of Potidaia Phormion rendered himself illustrious; but if he heard the tidings of the latter, his last hours must have been darkened by forebodings sadder than any which he had ever felt since the outbreak of the war. The ships sent to reinforce the scanty fleet of Phormion were diverted to the attack of an insignificant Kretan town, at a time when on their presence at Naupaktos depended perhaps the salvation of Athens: and Perikles must have seen how sorely a guiding hand like his was needed, and how slight the likelihood was that such guidance would always be forthcoming. He had told his countrymen all along that they could not hope to be winners in the struggle unless they steadily withstood all temptations to undertake useless expeditions and distant conquests; and here was evidence that men were not lacking on whom his teaching had made no impression.

Thus ended amid dark shadows the life of a man, about whom two facts are established beyond all doubt by the admission of his bitterest enemies. No Athenian according to their testimony ever carried such weight in the councils of his countrymen or more powerfully directed their policy; and none ever eschewed more the arts by which demagogues sought to win popularity. He was the haughty statesman, seldom seen in public, not easily approachable,—the Olympian Zeus who hurled his thunderbolts from his cloud-covered throne. In the more sober speech of philosophers like Plato he was the man of consummate wisdom, gifted with more than the persuasion of Nestor. For such a man bribery and corruption were supererogatory tasks. He would have risen

Character  
of Perikles.

<sup>1318</sup> It is absurd to speak of Perikles as creating the Athenian character. The notion is ludicrous, if it be applied even to Themistokles: nor is this said with any implication that the latter was the greater statesman. The differences between Herodotos and Thucydides as historians are vast indeed; but we have seen that the intellectual character of each was determined by the character of the age, and that Thucydides exhibits the full effects of an intellectual revolution to the influence of which Herodotos was perhaps never fully subjected, and from which during his earlier years he was perhaps wholly free. The change which made the career of Themistokles and Perikles possible was already at work when they appeared on the political stage; but more than all other Athenians they possessed the power of placing themselves at the head of the movement and enormously adding to its impetus.

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to power not less easily without them, and have retained it with far less risk. Still the charge was brought, and it was made to rest on three distinct assertions, two reflecting on him during his whole career, the third ascribing this unworthy action to him only in his earlier years. The last may be the soonest dismissed. If, in his day, as Thucydides affirms, the government of Athens, although popular, was really administered by one man,<sup>1319</sup> it was impossible that that man could exert over the people at the outset of his course the full authority which Perikles afterwards exercised without fear; nor would a statesman in the situation of Perikles be sorry to avail himself of the influence which he might derive from association with men popular among the Demos. How far the reforms which were carried during the lifetime of Ephialtes were directly suggested by Perikles, we are not told; but there is no evidence that he disapproved or would have discountenanced any one of them. These reforms by the payment of the dikasteries and by the distribution of money for festivals<sup>1320</sup> among the poorer classes might be held up as attempts to win popular favour by improper means; but in the time of Perikles neither charge could be substantiated. The jurors at best received but scant compensation for their time; and if the mental education of the citizens through the poetry and the art which graced the public festivals was regarded as a work in which the state was directly interested, the money bestowed to enable the poorest citizen to share in this education was most fitly spent. There remained the magnificent public works on which the highest human genius had placed its stamp; and these the strictly conservative or Lakonian party might with greater plausibility, but scarcely with greater justice, denounce as an inordinate bribe to the whole body of Athenian citizens. If it be a bribe to make men legitimately proud of their country, Perikles might have gloried in the charge: and it would be monstrous to affirm that a state may not spend money on public works, so long as it retains a reserve fund fully capable of meeting extraordinary and unforeseen emergencies. The ample resources

<sup>1319</sup> ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. Thuc. ii. 65.

<sup>1320</sup> On the subject of the Theorikon more will be said hereafter, when we come to discuss the influence of the drama on the thought and the religious feeling of Athenians.

thus reserved at Athens furnished Perikles with one chief ground of encouragement, as he contrasted her position with that of Peloponnesian states barely able to pay their way. But the picture broadly drawn<sup>o</sup> by Thucydides admits no divergence between the earlier and later conduct of this illustrious man; and according to this picture his career from beginning to end was that of a leader who has no reason to fear, and nothing to hide from, his countrymen, and whose policy was throughout justified by results. Like Themistokles, he had insisted that they must cling to the sea;<sup>1321</sup> but although this must be always the basis of Athenian empire, he was not reluctant to extend the limits of the confederacy by land. His proposal for a Panhellenic congress points to the hope which he felt that all the Greek states might in some sort be welded into a single commonwealth; but his anxiety to spread the influence or the dominion of Athens never overcame his habitual caution. When the Persian fleets had been fairly driven from the Egean, he firmly resisted the party which would still engage Athens in distant enterprises against the great king, although that party could appeal to the instinct which would rejoice in taking vengeance for recent disasters.<sup>1322</sup> If, further, we may believe Plutarch, the defeat of Tolmides, which at Koroneia undid the work of Myronides at Oinophyta, would never have taken place, and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war might have been averted, or indefinitely delayed, if his counsels had been implicitly followed. In short, the key-note of his policy was the indispensable need of sweeping away all private interests, if these should clash with the interests of Athens in this great struggle. The resources of the state were not to be wasted or risked in enterprises which at best could tend only to the benefit of individuals, and enterprises to which the state was committed were not to be starved or mismanaged in order to further the purposes of factious politicians. Nothing can be more severely simple and emphatic than the few sentences in which Thucydides insists that on these two rocks the Athenians made shipwreck. The absurd expedition to the Kretan Kydonia showed how little they could resist the first of these

<sup>1321</sup> Thuc. i. 93.<sup>1322</sup> See p. 50.



temptations, even while Perikles lay on his death-bed: and the result of the Sicilian expedition was only one of many instances in which rival statesmen deliberately sacrificed the safety of the state to their own ambition. Perikles had worked for the welfare of Athens and for that alone. Those who came after him were bent first on securing each the first place for himself; and the inevitable consequences followed. Their powers and the resources of the city were not concentrated on great tasks which without such concentration could never be accomplished. The expedition to Sicily ought, according to the policy of Perikles, never to have been undertaken. When once undertaken, it ought to have been carried out manfully. Instead of this the interests of the fleet and army were put out of sight by factious generals at home, while they were ruined by the fatal choice of a general; and the great catastrophe of Nikias and Demosthenes availed nothing to check these miserable rivalries. But in spite of all this wretchedness Athens held out for nine years longer against the whole confederacy of Sparta, against the determined rebellion of her own allies, against lavish subsidies from Persia to her enemies; and even in these dire straits it is the conviction of the historian that Athens would not have fallen, if her very heart had not been riven by the desperate feuds of her own children.<sup>1323</sup> If then the true greatness of Athens began with Themistokles, with Perikles it closed. Henceforth her course was downward. The splendid discipline which enabled Phormion to crush the Peloponnesian fleet at tremendous odds wanes away after the great disaster of Syracuse; and the Athenian trireme no longer remains the instrument, almost instinct with life, which had given to Athens the lordship of the sea. The social and political conditions which made Athens what she was in the days of Perikles were such as must arise, when

<sup>1323</sup> Thuc. ii. 65, 13. The historian meets by implication any charge which may be brought against Perikles on the score of sacrificing the landed interest of Athens to the maintenance of her maritime supremacy. The charge can be brought home only by proving that he could have prevented the war, or, as the comic poets would have it, that he deliberately blew it up. We have seen that the whole history contradicts and excludes this notion. If then the war could not be avoided, then neither could the property of the Attican country folk have been preserved from ravage except by risking the strength of the city in land battles. The course of the war fully justified the policy which insisted that this risk should not be run.

the theory of the independent Polis or city, educating and training all her citizens to the utmost, was carried to its logical results, aided by the genius of a people wonderfully versatile and keenly sensitive to all impressions of art and science, of poetry, music, painting, and rhetoric. But they were conditions which could not be combined again with the like intensity. Hence the age of Perikles stands pre-eminent as the most brilliant phase in the history of mankind, and the genius of this splendid age is embodied in Perikles himself.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE CLOSE OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF PERIKLES TO THE DESTRUCTION OF PLATAIAI.

BOOK  
III.Execution  
of Spartan  
envoys at  
Athens.

THE usages of Greek warfare were at all times cruel. In this internecine struggle between the two great Ionian and Dorian states of Hellas exasperation of feeling on both sides had its fruit in a horrible inhumanity. That privateers issuing from Megara<sup>1324</sup> and from the Peloponnesian ports generally should strive to cripple Athenian commerce to the utmost, is no more than we should look for. But to lawful captures of property the Megarians and Peloponnesians added the crime of wholesale murder. Not merely were all merchants whether belonging to Athens and her allies, who might be seized in ships sailing round Peloponnesos, slaughtered without distinction; but the Spartans acted on the sweeping rule of killing all whom they might seize (even if these were citizens of states taking no part in the war), and hurling their bodies into clefts or gullies near the shore.<sup>1325</sup> It was not long before Spartan short-sightedness furnished Athens with the means of making terrible reprisal. Utterly dead to all care for Hellenic freedom, the Spartans were now bent on securing the aid of the barbarian who fifty years ago had been beaten back chiefly by Athenian energy. On this disgraceful mission they dispatched Nikolaos the son of Boulis and Aneristos the son of Sperthias.<sup>1326</sup> With them was joined a more notorious and probably a much abler man; but even the foresight of the Corinthian Aristeus failed to calculate fully the risks which they might run by the way.

<sup>1324</sup> Thuc. iii. 51.<sup>1325</sup> Ib. ii. 67.<sup>1326</sup> Sperthias and Boulis were the ambassadors who, as it is said, were sent to Xerxes to be put to death by him by way of compensation for the ill-treatment of the Persian heralds at Athens and Sparta. See vol. i. p. 416. The office of herald was hereditary at Sparta.

By bringing about the revolt of Potidaia and the Chalkidian towns Aristeus had immediately brought about the Peloponnesian war. But his scheme had thus far been abortive. Wearied with the protracted siege and thinned in numbers by the pestilence, the Athenian army still kept its ground before Potidaia; and it was the great aim of Aristeus to detach from them not only Perdikkas who spent his time in an alternation of treasons, but the powerful Odrysian chief Sitalkes. To the court of this prince accordingly they went, taking little count of the strength of the attachment which his son Sadokos, the Athenian citizen,<sup>1327</sup> might feel for Athens. Here they pleaded their cause in vain, probably because the ear of the Thracian king was pre-occupied by two Athenian envoys who chanced to be with him at the time. Aristeus and his colleagues had placed themselves in the lion's jaws. They were making their way to the ship which was to carry them over to Asia, when at Bisanthe<sup>1328</sup> they were seized by the orders of Sadokos and handed over to the Athenians Learchos and Ameiniades. By these envoys they were taken at once to Athens, and there without listening to what they wished to say in their behalf, the Athenians put all three to death. A few months later the Athenians suffered in their turn through an attempt to put down Peloponnesian privateering in the southern waters of the Egean. Six ships were dispatched under Melesandros who was charged further with the collection of the tribute due from Karian and Lykian cities. Venturing rashly to march against one of the inland towns, he was himself slain and a large part of his force cut off.<sup>1329</sup>

By the death of Aristeus the Potidaians lost a man whom they knew to be unwearied in his efforts to relieve them. The knowledge that they could look for nothing more from him weighed heavily on men who had been reduced by famine to straits so frightful that they had even eaten the bodies of their dead. It was impossible to hold out longer; but a little more firmness on the part of the besiegers would have insured an unconditional surrender. Happily for the Potidaians the full extent of their sufferings was not known

The sur-  
render of  
Potidaia.

<sup>1327</sup> See p. 116.

<sup>1328</sup> Herod. vii. 137.

<sup>1329</sup> Thuc. ii. 69.

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to the Athenian general Xenophon and his colleagues, and they were allowed to leave the place under a convention that the men should depart with one garment and the women with two, and a fixed sum of money to enable them to reach some refuge. The tidings of this surrender were received at Athens with very mingled feelings. The savage instinct latent in the Greek mind might have chafed at being balked of an opportunity for wholesale slaughter; but the more prudent Athenians felt specially indignant at the loss of so many men, women, and children who might have been sold to defray the costs of the siege on which 2,000 talents had been expended. For a time Xenophon was in disgrace; but the property seized within the place made up in some measure for the money spent on the blockade, and Potidaia further furnished a home for the 1,000 Athenian settlers who were sent to occupy it.

Attack on  
Plataiai by  
the Spartans  
under  
Archidamos.  
B.C. 429.

Two invasions of Attica had failed thus far to bring about the end aimed at by Sparta and Corinth. At the beginning of the third year of the war the invading force was sent not into Attica but into the little strip of territory which even Spartan sentiment regarded as in some sense sacred ground. Association with Athens for eighty years had utterly alienated the Plataians from the oligarchic league which even before the days of Kleomenes they had learnt to hate; but the persevering malignity of the Thebans could not leave to itself the little city which had won a splendid name for its heroic devotion to the Hellenic cause. In the eyes of Boiotian nobles this devotion was an unpardonable offence; but it is perhaps more a matter for surprise that Thebes should be able to divert the Peloponnesian army from a field where they might really do hurt to Athens to an enterprise in which success could have no appreciable effect on the course or the issue of the war. The Plataians were, in fact, offered up as victims on the altar of Theban hatred and cruelty; and the tragedy began when Archidamos incamped with his army on the territory which the Spartans had sworn to protect against all assailants. In a few words the Plataian heralds who were at once sent out to him bade him remember the oaths solemnly sworn after the rout of the

Persians under Mardonios, and in the name of the gods who had sanctioned the covenant called upon him to respect them. In reply the Spartan king told them that he was come only to set them free. Athens had built up a tyranny in Hellas; and her subjects, rescued from her clutches, must be made to feel the blessings of oligarchic liberty. If the Plataians could not duly appreciate these blessings and take part in the good work, they must remain neutral, and a promise of neutrality would be followed by the departure of the invaders. But neutrality as defined by Archidamos meant the reception of both sides as friends, and the Plataians felt that the gates of their city were thus practically thrown open to their worst enemies. To the fears thus expressed Archidamos replied by pledging himself and the Spartan confederation to restore to the Plataians without loss or damage at the end of the war their houses, their lands, their fruit trees and all other property which might be numbered, if in the meantime the Plataians would leave them in trust to the Spartans,<sup>1330</sup> and themselves find a refuge elsewhere. The proposal was obviously one with which under the circumstances it would be wise to close, and the Plataians were manifestly inclined to accept it. But since the night attack on the city their wives and their children had been transferred to Athens, and without the consent of the Athenians they could do nothing. Plataian envoys were accordingly sent under truce to Athens, and brought back the simple message that the Athenians had never yet betrayed Plataiai and that they would never abandon her to her enemies. It was an unfortunate answer. The entreaty to the Plataians that they should hold out against all attacks insured their ruin, while it pledged the Athenians to a course of action which was either impossible or too costly. In fact, no attempt was made to relieve Plataiai; and their decision left to the tender mercies of Sparta the devoted allies whose presence at Athens or in the fortified outposts of Attica would have been infinitely more useful. At Plataiai they

<sup>1330</sup> This proposition may be compared with the proposal made by the English envoy at Copenhagen in 1807 that the whole Danish fleet should be given up to the British government, to be retained in trust, and restored, as soon as this could be done with prudence and safety.

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were of no avail; and their doom was sealed when with a solemn invocation of the gods and heroes of the Plataian land and an emphatic protest that he was acting against his will, Archidamos on learning the decision of the Plataians gave orders for surrounding the town with a stockade made from the fruit trees which were cut down. Probably he would never have undertaken the task, had he not felt assured that a place containing less than 600 in all<sup>1331</sup> could not long hold out against a force overwhelming in numbers. The history of the siege shows how little numbers availed in a blockade under the rude conditions of ancient warfare both for attack and defence. The forests of Kithairon supplied timber for wooden walls constructed matwise and carried at right angles from the city wall to a distance which gave a practicable inclination for the ascent of armed men. The space between these timber ramparts the Spartans strove for seventy days and nights to fill with mud, clay, or other matter on which they might lay hands. As the mound rose, the Plataians on their side raised a hoarding protected against fire by skins and raw hides, along the part of the wall assailed by this mound, and behind the hoarding built on the old wall a new wall of bricks taken from houses broken up for this purpose. Still further to tire out the besiegers they excavated the base of the wall against which the mound abutted, and carrying in the loose clay or earth left a gap between the wall and the mound. To defeat this plan, the Spartans rammed the mud and clay into baskets of wicker work, and the pressure of these masses compelled the Plataians to resort to another device. Digging a mine which enabled them to get beneath the middle of the mound, they carried the soil into the city, and the Spartans found that with all their efforts their work remained stationary. Still the Plataians felt that the enemy might overcome even these difficulties; and from two points chosen on either side of the portion of wall assailed by the Spartans they raised with materials from the dismantled houses a crescent-shaped wall to the height of the old city wall, so that when the enemy

<sup>1331</sup> Besides the 400 Plataian citizens who remained in it, there were 80 Athenians and 110 women to bake bread. Thuc. ii. 78.

should have carried the outer wall, they would find precisely the same task before them still in a more cramped and exposed position. Tired out with this fruitless toil, the besiegers applied battering engines; but these the Plataians turned aside by means of nooses, or cut off their heads before the moment of impact by heavy beams dropped after the fashion of the guillotine from chains fastened to two horizontal poles stretched out from the wall. At length Archidamos saw that he had no other means of reducing the place than by famine, unless fire could be made to do the work. This also he tried, but tried in vain. The bundles of wood heaped up between the old wall and the new crescent-shaped wall and thence thrown into the town as far as they could reach were kindled by means of fire, aided by sulphur and pitch. Happily there was no wind to carry the furious flames which rose from the burning pile. There were some, the historian adds, who averred that the gods were as kind to the Plataians as Phoibos had been to Kroisos, and that a deluging thunder shower put out the fire and saved the city. The summer was now wearing on, and orders were therefore given for the complete circumvallation of the city, a sufficient Spartan force being left to guard half the circle, while the Boiotians undertook to guard the other half. This blockading wall<sup>1332</sup> was finished, it is said, shortly before the autumnal equinox,<sup>1333</sup> and the main body of the besiegers returned home.

While the Spartans were thus engaged at Plataiai, the Athenian general Xenophon who had been pardoned for his generosity to the Potidaians was dispatched with two colleagues at the head of a force intended to advance the interests of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula. Their first step was to ravage the lands of the Bottiaian Spartolos, within which an Athenian party was working for the surrender of the city to the invaders. But there were others who would not hear of this plan, and these summoned aid from Olynthos. The battles which followed showed the superiority

Defeat of  
the Athen-  
ians in  
Chalkidike.

<sup>1332</sup> See Appendix K.

<sup>1333</sup> *περὶ ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς*. Arcturus rises shortly before sunrise close upon the autumnal equinox. Thus Sophokles, *Oid. Tyr.* 1136, speaks of the six months' interval between the spring and the rising of Arcturus. Thucydides had no other means of definitely marking the time, as the names of the months differed in different parts of Greece. See Dr. Arnold's note on the passage, and also Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 258.



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of the Athenian hoplites on the one side and of the Chalkidian light-armed troops<sup>1334</sup> on the other. The latter in these engagements had the advantage. Their attacks could be repeated without effort, and as they fell back on the advance of their enemies, so they harassed them with showers of javelins whenever they retreated. In the end the Athenians fled to Potidaia, leaving 430 men with all their generals dead upon the field.<sup>1335</sup>

Invasion of Akarnania by the Spartans, aided by Chaonians, Molossians, and other mountain clans.

These disasters were compensated by brilliant successes elsewhere. During the preceding winter Phormion had been stationed with 20 triremes at Naupaktos to block the entrance of the Corinthian gulf.<sup>1336</sup> The events of the following year showed that in him the Athenians had found the ablest of all their naval commanders. Two years before this time he had taken the Amphiloehian Argos from the Ambrakiots and added the Akarnanians to the Athenian confederacy. Not long after an ineffectual effort of the Spartan admiral Knemos to reduce Zakynthos<sup>1337</sup> in the summer of the second year of the war, the Ambrakiots made an effort to recover Argos from the Amphiloehians to whom Phormion had restored it. Aided by the Chaonians and other wild tribes of the neighbouring country they ravaged its lands, but the city defied all their attempts to take it.<sup>1338</sup> In the following summer these wild clans concerted with the Spartans a much more formidable enterprise. With the aid of an adequate Peloponnesian force they undertook to reduce the whole of Akarnania and to insure the conquest of Zakynthos and Kephallenia. The execution of this plan, which was strongly favoured by Corinth the mother city of the Ambrakiots, was intrusted to Knemos, who managed to cross the gulf with his thousand hoplites without the knowledge of Phormion, the fleet belonging to Leukas, Anaktorion, and Ambrakia being already stationed off Leukas. The main object of the expedition was the town of Stratos on the right bank of the Achelôos and about twenty miles from its mouth. The reduction of this place, it was thought, would be followed at

<sup>1334</sup> Among these troops are mentioned the Peltastai, men armed with a light shield called a Pelta, and with a short spear or javelin. The Peltastai in strictness of speech stood between the heavy-armed Hoplite and the light-armed Psilos.

<sup>1335</sup> Thuc. ii. 79.

<sup>1336</sup> Ib. ii. 69.

<sup>1337</sup> Ib. ii. 66.

<sup>1338</sup> Ib. ii. 68.

once by the submission of the Akarnanians generally. With the forces of Knemos were combined the troops of the Chaonians and Thesprotians headed not by kings but by chiefs chosen for a definite time out of the royal house;<sup>1339</sup> and their numbers were swelled by Molossians and Atintanes under Sabylinthos who acted as deputy for the young king Tharypas then a child, and lastly by the clansmen of the Orestai and Parauaioi. The ever-shifting Perdikkas sent 1,000 Makedonians without the knowledge of the Athenians; but these arrived after Knemos, marching through the land of the Amphilochian Argos, had plundered the village of Linnaia at the southeastern bend of the Ambrakian gulf, and thence advanced southwards. The tidings of their approach at first struck terror into the Stratians, who sent to Phormion an urgent message for aid. But that general answered that he dared not leave Naupaktos unguarded, and the Stratians made ready to defend themselves as best they might. Their enemies were moving in three parallel columns, so far separated from each other as often to be out of sight, the Leukadians and Anaktorians being on the right, the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots on the left. These marched warily and in good order, taking all precautions when they incamped at night. The Chaonians, hurried on by their habitual impetuosity, thought of nothing but a headlong onset which should carry Stratos by storm. The Greeks thought that their barbarian allies were hastening onwards merely to find a good place for their night station. To the Stratians their disorderly haste suggested the idea of ambuscades to take their assailants in flank while their main body should sally forth from the city gates. The plan was crowned with thorough success, and the Greeks saw nothing of their friends until they beheld them rushing back in wild confusion. Hellenic discipline at once checked this tumultuous flight; but for the remaining hours of the day the Stratian slingers caused serious annoyance to the Spartans by compelling them to wear their heavy armour in the camp.

<sup>1339</sup> According to Thucydides, ii. 80, the Chaonian chiefs held office only for one year. The historian speaks of them as barbarians; but their leaders bear the Greek name Photyos and Nikanor. We have seen that the division of Hellen and non-Hellen or barbarian tells us very little as to the dialects of given tribes or their relations to one another. See vol. i. p. 53.

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Night had no sooner closed in than Knemos fell back on the Anapos, a stream flowing into the Achelôos about ten miles below Stratos. Thence, retreating first into the land of the friendly Oiniadai, he made the best of his way home.<sup>1340</sup>

Victory of  
Phormion  
over the  
Corinthian  
fleet.

Meanwhile a far heavier disaster had befallen the reinforcement which should have reached him from Corinth and other cities of the allies. The narrow strait barely one mile in width which forms the entrance to the Krissaian or Corinthian gulf is locked in by two promontories, the southern known simply as Rhion or the Ness, and the northern as the Rhion of Molykreion, a town about three miles to the west, facing Patrai which lies about five miles to the southwest of the Achaian Rhion. At about equal distances from the northern Naze or Ness lay Naupaktos on the east and the little territory of Chalkis near the mouth of the river Euênos to the west. Hence it is obvious that a leader who wished to avoid a fleet stationed at any point between the Molykreian Rhion and Naupaktos would keep his ships on the southern coast of the gulf and having doubled the cape would strike from Patrai for Chalkis. This course, accordingly, the Corinthians took in full assurance that with five-and-forty ships they needed to fear no attack from Phormion who had only twenty. But neither the Corinthians nor their allies had as yet any real experience of the skill and discipline of Athenian sailors. In the engagements off Korkyra, which preceded the outbreak of the war, the Athenians acted under orders which precluded all untrammelled action, and their numbers were too few to justify them in encountering any serious risk. Hence, when on their doubling the southern cape they saw that Phormion also had passed the entrance of the gulf on the northern side, the Corinthians still thought that their way would be undisputed. But no sooner had they moved from Patrai than they saw the Athenian triremes bearing directly upon them from Chalkis. The day was drawing to an end, and the Corinthians, to put their enemy off his guard, pretended to take up their station for the night off the Achaian shore, their intention being to steal across the passage under cover of darkness. But Phormion was not

to be thus cheated. The Corinthians had hoped that when they had come to anchor he also would fall back to his own ground; but Phormion kept the sea all night, and at break of day his triremes confronted the Corinthian ships which were then creeping across the gulf.<sup>1341</sup> The conditions of the conflict were precisely those which he could most desire. The Corinthian fleet consisted of vessels awkwardly built, poorly equipped, and manned by crews with little or no experience in rowing; and when these ships formed themselves into a circle with their prows outward, leaving just space enough for five of their best ships reserved within the circle to dart out upon the enemy, but not enough to give room for the terrible manœuvre known as the Diekplous,<sup>1342</sup> Phormion saw that the issue of the day was in his own hands. Soon after sunrise the breeze blows strongly from the gulf, and he knew that this alone would render impossible the task of keeping a steady position which even in still water is full of difficulty for unskilful seamen. To distress the enemy yet more, he sailed round their fleet with his ships in single line, gradually contracting his circle, and threatening attack from moment to moment. The Corinthians, thus confined within a narrowing space, were already in great confusion when the wind came down upon them, and at once their ships were dashed against each other, whilst the cries and shouts of their crews wholly drowned the voice of the Keleustes who

<sup>1341</sup> There can be no doubt that this is the meaning of Thucydides in this passage, ii. 83, 3. Apart from the usual ruggedness of his language the only difficulty in the sentence lies in the word ὑφορμισάμενοι, which cannot mean to slip anchor secretly. The conjecture that Thucydides may have written ἀφορμισάμενοι is a conjecture, and nothing more. Nor will the natural meaning of ὑφορμίζεσθαι, 'to come secretly to anchor,' or 'to bring a ship secretly to the harbour or the shore,' suit the context. The Corinthians were far from wishing to keep their preparations for taking their night station a secret. Their object was to make these as conspicuous as possible, so that Phormion might depart to his own ground with the conviction that he would find them in the morning where he had last seen them in the evening. Hence Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 268, interprets the word as meaning that they only pretended to take up a night station, and that Phormion saw through the pretence. Whatever may be said of the phrase, the order of the incidents is perfectly clear. See also Arnold's note on the passage.

<sup>1342</sup> The excellence of Athenian naval tactics lay in extreme rapidity as well as precision of movement: and the special work of the trireme was to strike the enemy's ship in some weak or dangerous part, avoiding all contact with the armed prow or beak. Hence wherever there was room, the triremes darted through gaps in the enemy's line, and then turning suddenly round struck his ship in the stern or the side, thus instantly disabling or sinking her. For this operation free space was indispensable; and thus the revolution in Athenian naval warfare since the days of Salamis and Mykalê is fully explained. The Peloponnesians now found it to their interest to keep in those closed and shallow waters from which the Athenians also dreaded to be drawn during the Persian wars

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gave time to the rowers.<sup>1343</sup> In the midst of this dreadful tumult Phormion gave the order for attack to his crews who knew well the vast advantage of keeping strict silence<sup>1344</sup> during naval engagements. What followed was not battle but rout. At every onset from an Athenian trireme a Peloponnesian ship went down. Twelve were taken with most of their crews. The few which were not taken or sunk fled to the Eleian docks at Kyllene, where they were joined by Knemos and his troops on their return from Akarnania. The Athenians sailed with their prizes to Molykreion and there set up a trophy for the victory.

Athenian  
expedition  
to Krete.

The tidings of this exploit were received at Sparta with unmingled indignation. Without bestowing a thought on the possible superiority of Athenian tactics, the Spartans could ascribe the result to nothing but cowardice or sluggishness on the part of their allies; and peremptory orders to bring on at once a fresh engagement were sent to Knemos by three commissioners, Brasidas, Timokrates, and Lykophon, who were to form his standing council. Phormion on his side added to the dispatch announcing his success an earnest request for immediate reinforcements. Perikles was now dying, and the Athenians had already brought themselves to think that they were doing rightly by sending this force first on a contemptible errand to Krete.<sup>1345</sup> The men of Polichna, having a quarrel with the men of Kydonia, enlisted the services of a Gortynian named Nikias who undertook with the help of an Athenian fleet to bring the Kydonians into the Athenian alliance. Nothing, it seems, was done beyond the ravaging of their lands; and when this was over, the winds would not allow them to pursue their voyage.

<sup>1343</sup> If we bear in mind the arrangement of the ancient trireme with its three banks of oars of unequal lengths, we shall see that only perfect harmony of movement could insure efficiency in battle. As soon as the Keleustes ceased to be heard, the movements of the rowers must become irregular.

<sup>1344</sup> This fact alone exhibits in a striking light the consummate discipline of the Athenian navy at this time.

<sup>1345</sup> See page 129. It is strange that throughout this narrative we hear nothing of the Korkyraian fleet. Phormion, while he begs for more help from Athens, makes no effort to get aid from the nearer Korkyra, and Korkyra offers none of her own accord. Thus far the Athenians had gained nothing from their alliance with this worthless state beyond a co-operation of fifty Korkyraian vessels with their own fleet on the Peloponnesian coast in the first year of the war. Thuc. ii. 25. See page 113. The fact of this co-operation is of itself proof that the relations of Korkyra with Athens had gone far beyond the mere defensive alliance at first existing between them. Thuc. i. 44. There was therefore no political reason to prevent their helping Phormion.

CHAP.  
III.The battle  
of Naupak-  
tos, and  
second  
victory of  
Phormion.

Phormion was thus left with his twenty triremes to take his chance against any fleet which the Spartans might send against him. In hourly expectation of being reinforced he kept his ships off the Ness of Molykreion, while seventy-five Peloponnesian triremes watched him from the opposite promontory of Achaia. The Spartans knew now the dangers against which they had to guard; and for six or seven days not a movement was made on either side, the Peloponnesians being afraid of encountering the enemy in the more open waters to the west, the Athenians dreading some manœuvre on the part of the enemy to draw them within the strait gate of the gulf. But although the delay was useful to the Spartans as giving them time for practice, yet the fear that at any moment the numbers of the Athenian fleet might be doubled by new arrivals determined them to bring on an engagement at once. Their men, however, were still much depressed by the results of the last battle; and if Thucydides was rightly informed, the Spartan commanders sought to cheer them by dwelling on the experience which they now had of Athenian tactics and on the preparations which they had made for meeting them. Their superiority in numbers was immense, and on shore they were supported by an array of heavy-armed troops. The Athenians had no such force to fall back upon, and were in fact thoroughly isolated, and burdened further with the responsibility of guarding Naupaktos. Their harangue was brought to an end with a significant promise of reward for those who did well and of severe punishment for those who might behave ill. Brasidas at least would scarcely have used such language, if he had seen in them a well-grounded confidence of success. On the other side Phormion justly insisted that in the present position of the Athenians ample space was more than ever necessary for the conflict, and promised that he would do everything in his power to secure this condition. But his power was now not equal to his will. On the seventh or eighth day the Peloponnesian fleet began at daybreak to move in lines four-deep from Panormos to the northern coast of the gulf,<sup>1346</sup> the right

<sup>1346</sup> It will probably be admitted that ἐπὶ τῆν γῆν cannot mean 'along the land or the coast,' or even 'in the direction of the coast.' It must denote a point to which a definite

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wing leading the way, headed by twenty of the swiftest and stoutest of their ships, which were to turn sharply round and pin the fleet of Phormion to the shore if, thinking that the movement was against Naupaktos, he should enter the gulf. Their plan was successful. Phormion felt that he dared not suffer so large a force to attack Naupaktos, and hastened to the defence of that city. But he had advanced only a little way to the east of the Molykreian Rhion when the whole Peloponnesian fleet faced about, their vanguard hurrying to cut off retreat in the direction of Naupaktos, while the main body of the ships sufficiently blocked escape to the west. The safety or destruction of the Athenian triremes depended wholly on the rapidity of their movements; and such was the promptitude of the trierarchs and so great the swiftness of their vessels that eleven ships escaped even from this supreme peril, and outstripping the enemy hastened towards Naupaktos. The remaining nine were driven ashore, such of their crews as could not swim being all slain. Some of the triremes the Spartans began to tow away empty; one they managed to seize with its whole crew. The battle seemed to be ended by a decisive victory, for the rescuing of some of the ships by Messenian hoplites who dashed into the sea and leaped upon their decks was a matter of not much moment. But another turn was to be given to the day by the Athenian triremes who had outsailed the Spartan vanguard. Ten of them, having reached the Apollonion or temple of Phoibos near Naupaktos, took up a

movement is made. It is also certain that the Peloponnesians were anxious to give Phormion as little space as possible. Had they sailed along the southern coast from Rhion to Drepanon, they would then have had to cross a wider space than if they steered straight from Rhion for Naupaktos; and the far greater speed of the Athenian triremes would have enabled Phormion to be beforehand in getting to Naupaktos, and in taking a station which would have been quite as convenient for himself as the open water to the west of the entrance of the gulf. There can therefore be no doubt that the movement of the Peloponnesians was almost due north, and hence also that the text of Thucydides, ii. 90, 2, which makes them *γο ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου* cannot be right. They were not going to their own land, for they had none on the northern side of the gulf, whereas the Athenians might very fairly be said to hold the land within the triangle formed by a base line drawn from Naupaktos to Chalkis with the Molykreian Rhion as its apex. In other words, the coast stretching for two or three miles to the northeast and the northwest of the Antirrhion might be called the land of the Athenians, but in no sense the land of the Spartans. But if so, then certainly the eastern side of this coast line, i.e. the part within the entrance to the gulf, would be described as *ἡ γῆ ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου*, while the line to the northwest from Antirrhion would be called the land outside the gulf towards Chalkis. Hence it must, I think, be admitted that Mr. Grote is right in regarding *ἑαυτῶν* as a clerical error for *αὐτῶν*. See his appendix to ch. xlix. part ii. of his *History of Greece*, and vol. vii. p. 679.

defensive position. One was sailing up in the rear, chased by a single Leukadian vessel far in advance of the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet which came onwards to the chant of the Paian or pæan hymn of victory. Some way in front of this Athenian ship a merchant vessel was lying at its moorings. Sweeping swiftly round it, the Athenian trireme dashed into the broadside of its pursuer and forthwith disabled it. This exploit so dismayed the Spartan admiral Timokrates who was on board, that he slew himself, and his body fell into the sea. It also damped the courage of the Peloponnesians who were coming up behind. The victory which they had just won seemed to render strict order unnecessary; and in a fatal moment the crews of some of the ships ceased from rowing, to enable the others to join them, while some from ignorance of the soundings found themselves among shoals. Seizing instantly the favourable moment, the ten Athenian ships flew to the attack. The conflict was soon over. Disorder had already half done their work; and in a little while the Peloponnesian ships were seen in flight for Panormos near the Achaian Rhion from which they had advanced in the morning. Six of their vessels fell into the hands of the Athenians who also recovered their own triremes which had been taken by the Spartans earlier in the day. One solitary ship the Peloponnesians still retained, and this they dedicated at the Achaian Ness as a memorial of the victory for which in a few hours they paid so dear a price.<sup>1347</sup>

The great plan of the Spartans which was to drive the Athenians from the Corinthian gulf had thus failed utterly; but before they dismissed the contingents of the several cities, the Peloponnesian leaders thought that a blow might be struck at Athens herself by a sudden attack on Peiræus. No one had supposed that there was any need to guard the harbour of a city whose fleets had no rivals; and not even a chain had been placed to bar the entrance. Hence when the Megarians suggested the enterprise, Brasidas and Knemos at once gave orders to their men to hasten each with his oar<sup>1348</sup> to the Megarian port of Nisaia, and there to man the

Proposed  
night at-  
tack on  
Peiræus.

<sup>1347</sup> Thuc. ii. 92.

<sup>1348</sup> In the belief of Dr. Bishop, whose remarks on this passage of Thucydides, ii. 93, 2, are inserted in the Appendix to the second volume of Dr. Arnold's edition, this order



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forty triremes, now scarcely seaworthy, which were lying high and dry in dock. Thus far their commands were obeyed; but when they were fairly at sea, the desperate risk involved in carrying out their scheme led them or their men to substitute the easier task of a raid on Salamis. The excuse that they were kept by an unfavourable wind was probably a mere pretence. It was in fact safer to attack the three ships which kept guard at the promontory of Boudoron for the purpose of barring access to the harbour of Megara. The capture of these vessels and the landing of Peloponnesian plundering parties was made known at Athens by means of fire-signals, and excited extreme alarm.<sup>1349</sup> In the city the impression was that the enemy's fleet had entered Peiraieus, while the inhabitants of the port believed that Salamis was taken and that an attack might be made on the harbour at any moment. No sooner had day dawned than the Athenians hurried in full force to Peiraieus, and launching a number of triremes rowed off to Salamis. But the Spartans were already gone, taking with them a large amount of plunder and many prisoners, together with the three guard-ships from Boudoron. The Athenians had been taught a severe lesson, and Peiraieus was never left unguarded again.<sup>1350</sup>

Operations  
of Phormion in  
Akarnania.

The timely arrival of the Athenian squadron which wasted its time in Krete would have prevented the disaster which preceded the second victory of Phormion. When at last the ships reached Naupaktos, not much was left for them to do. Still Phormion thought it well to take further precautions in Akarnania, and sailing to Astakos, a town about 20 miles to

was rendered necessary by the fact that the Greek oarsman was inseparable from his oar,—in other words, that it was precisely adjusted to his muscular power, and that the substitution of any other oar might place him at a disadvantage. With his oar each man took also his Hypëresion, a cloth or cushion for his seat used for the purpose of preventing unnecessary friction and the waste of force which this friction would cause. On the subject of the *Tropôtēr* Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 285, is at issue with Dr. Bishop. Whatever may have been the precise arrangement, it was certainly a thong attached to the oar to keep it from slipping downwards.

<sup>1349</sup> Thucydides, ii. 94, 1, says that no other incident in the war caused greater anxiety at Athens. He must mean, clearly, the war down to the peace of Nikias, just as the same period must be meant by the phrase *ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε*, iii. 98, 3. The loss of Demosthenes in Aitolia was as nothing to the catastrophe at Syracuse. It was not until Thucydides reached a later stage in his history that he began to regard the Dekeleian war as a part of the Peloponnesian war. v. 26.

<sup>1350</sup> Thuc. ii. 94. Forty years later, in the year preceding the peace of Antalkidas, Teleutias actually sailed into the Peiraieus, and departed safely after doing a vast amount of mischief. Ten years later, b.c. 379, the Spartan harnost Sphodrias made an attempt to attack it with a land force from the side of Megara: but his movements were not so rapid as those of Brasidas, and his enterprise failed.

the northwest of the mouth of the Achelôos, he marched thence to Koronta and Stratos and expelled from those places many citizens whose good faith he suspected. Against Oiniadai, the only Arkarnaniân town or canton not favourable to Athens, he could do nothing. The winter floods of the Achelôos, which were gradually silting up the space between its mouth and the islets called Echinades,<sup>1351</sup> had already made the lands around this settlement a network of marshes and lagoons. For the remainder of the winter Phormion kept guard off Naupaktos, and as it drew to its end he sailed to Athens with his prizes and his prisoners, of whom all who were not slaves were man for man exchanged for prisoners taken by the Spartans and their allies.<sup>1352</sup>

It had been the earnest wish of the Athenians to bring down upon Perdikkas or rather upon the Chalkidian towns the great but unwieldy power of Sitalkés, before the winter should render the task either difficult or impossible. Although the alliance with non-Hellenic tribes for the purpose of keeping Hellenic cities in check or subjection may reflect little credit on Athens, yet it cannot be regarded as balancing the deliberate scheme entertained by Sparta and her allies of crushing Athens by means of Persian money and Persian ships. The ill-cemented empire of the Thrakian chief involved no serious or standing danger to the Hellenic world; nor had the lord of these rugged highlanders advanced a formal claim to the possession of all Hellenic soil, or at the least of all that lay within the furthest limit reached by Mardonios.<sup>1353</sup> The military genius and strong will of his father Teres had brought into some sort of subjection the tribes inclosed between the mighty barriers of Mount Haimos on the north, and Rhodopê on the west. In other words, he had made himself master of the vast regions watered by the Hebros and its tributary streams; and his dominions stretched from Abdera, near the mouth of the Nestos (the

Expedition  
of Sitalkes  
against  
Makedonia  
and Chalki-  
dike.

<sup>1351</sup> Thucydides speaks of this process as going on rapidly in his own day. Almost all of them have been long since attached to the mainland. But although the course of the Achelôos near its mouth has been so far altered that the site of Oiniadai cannot be fixed with any certainty, there is no doubt that these Echinades lay to the southeast of the islands known as the Oxiai, and must therefore still less be confounded with other islands lying to the north of the Oxiai. See further the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* ii. 102, 3.

<sup>1352</sup> *Thuc.* ii. 103.

<sup>1353</sup> See vol. i. page 570.

drain of the valleys lying between the chains of Rhodopê and Pangaios), to the mouth of the Istros or the Danube. He was thus able to set in motion the Odrysaï and Haimoi to the south of the great Balkan range, the clans of the Dioi who dwelt on Rhodopê, and the Paionian tribes as far as the Strymon on the west and the river Oskios on the north.<sup>1354</sup> Beyond the range of Haimos his summons to war was obeyed by the tribes of the Getai and other clans ranging to the Scythian border. Thus in extent at least his dominions were second to none in Europe after those of the Scythian hordes, whose union in the belief of Thucydides would have involved an omnipotence which Herodotos thought that the Thracian tribes, if really united, could not fail to achieve.<sup>1355</sup> But this great empire had been founded with no definite political aim. Revenue in the form of tribute, and gifts answering closely to the blackmail of the Scottish Highland chiefs, were the great objects of ambition to the Odrysonian prince; and the treasury of his successor Seuthes was replenished yearly by 400 talents levied by definite assessment. The amount flowing in in the shape of presents may have been even larger. In short, the administration of the Thracian chief was marked by all the venality of the Roman empire: and without gifts, Thucydides tersely remarks, nothing could be done. A power thus extended over a vast tract of country could not soon or easily be brought to a head. Sitalkes had indeed a double motive for taking the field early. The Athenians had subsidised him well for his Chalkidian campaign, and he had his own private quarrel to settle with Perdikkas. This wily and treacherous chief had by a definite compact induced Sitalkes to give up the cause of his brother Philip, and he had refused to fulfil his promise. Philip was

<sup>1354</sup> The source of the Oskios marks the centre of the St. George's Cross, to which Dr. Arnold, *Thuc.* ii. 96, compares the configuration of the mountain chains to the south of the Danube. The huge mountain wall which stretches from the shores of the Adriatic to those of the Euxine under the names Skardos, Orbelos, Skomios and Haimos is divided nearly midway by the chain of Rhodopê which cuts it almost at right angles. Near this point of intersection the Oskios, or, as Herodotos, iv. 49, calls it, the Skios, now the Isker, takes its rise and flows northwards into the Istros.

Among the Paionian tribes here mentioned are the Graiaioi, a name which is only another form of Graiai, Agraioi, and perhaps Agrianes, another Paionian tribe. The Oskios, from which the initial vowel has been abraded in the form Skios, is one of the many Esks and Usks, with which our own land makes us familiar. Another Oskios, modified into Axios (Axe, Exe), is the great Makedonian river running parallel to the Strymon. See note 93.

<sup>1355</sup> *Thuc.* ii. 98, 7. *Herod.* v. 3. See vol. i. page 163.

now dead; but the Odrysian king was resolved that his son Amyntas should be restored to his inheritance.<sup>1356</sup> At last, the gathered mass was set in motion, to swell in size as it went onwards, like a rolling snowball. Its course lay across the chain of Kerkinê to the Paionian Doberos.<sup>1357</sup> Thence marching southward, Sitalkes took Eidomene, Gortyna, and some towns in the country which Perdikkas had wrested from Philip, and after an unsuccessful attack on Europos advanced through Mygdonia to Anthemous. The approach of an army of 150,000 men might well strike terror among the peoples which lay in its path. The Makedonians fled to their fortresses; and although their cavalry, when able to act, beat back the mountaineers opposed to them, they dared not to run the risk of being surrounded by overwhelming numbers. The tidings of this expedition spread dismay not only among all Hellenic tribes to the north of Thermopylai, but among the states now in league against Athens. Their fears were groundless. The winter was now come; the supply of food, in spite of the plunder obtained from Bottiaia, Makedonia, and Chalkidike, was running short; and Perdikkas found that bribes and promises carried more weight than his cavalry. The offer of his sister Stratonike in marriage with a large dowry secured the friendship of Seuthes, who had accompanied his uncle Sitalkes, and Seuthes found a strong argument for retreat in the absence of the Athenian ships which were to have co-operated with them. So much time had been wasted since the campaign was first planned, that the Athenians had given up the coming of Sitalkes as hopeless. They had sent him envoys with large gifts; but their failure to fulfil the rest of the compact made the pleadings of Seuthes for immediate retreat irresistible. Thirty days had gone by since Sitalkes had left his own dominions, when the order was given for the homeward march. Perdikkas felt that in Seuthes he had found an ally whom it was not

<sup>1356</sup> Thuc. ii. 95.

<sup>1357</sup> The geography of the lesser mountain ranges to the south of the Danube is a subject of much uncertainty. Dr. Arnold, note to *Thucydides*, ii. 98, thinks that Kerkinê must have branched off to the southeast from the main ridge of Skardos, now Egrisou, and formed the water-shed between the Axios and the Strymon: Doberos would therefore be high up the valley of the Axios or one of its confluent, above Eidomene.

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The revolt  
of Lesbos.  
B.C. 428.

safe to cheat, and he kept his promise in the matter of Stratonike.

The fourth year of the war brought with it for the Athenians not only another Spartan invasion, but a crisis so sudden and so serious that for a time their power of action was almost paralysed. At no time had Athens so greatly needed the help which only the highest political and military genius could give her; and now she could look neither to Perikles nor to Phormion. This great naval commander whose victories in the Corinthian gulf had won him a pre-eminent reputation had returned home only to die, or to fall into sickness which cut him off from all active service; and when, after the Spartan army had begun its work of ravage, the Athenians sent out a fleet of thirty ships, his son Asopios was placed in command at the special request of the Akarnanians that the general dispatched to the Naupaktiah station might be a near kinsman of the leader to whom they owed so much.<sup>1358</sup> This fleet, as it sailed round Peloponnesos, inflicted on its coast lands perhaps not less mischief than the Spartan army was causing in Attica; but, probably before he reached the Messenian shores, Asopios sent home all his ships but twelve. With these he sailed to Naupaktos. His first effort, after leaving this place, was to reduce Oiniadai: but, although he was aided by the whole land force of the Akarnanians, it was unsuccessful. His next attempt was a descent with his fleet on the Leukadian Nerikos. Here he landed to attack the town; but being compelled to retreat by numbers far greater than his own, he was himself slain with many of his men. The power of Athens was thus weakened by a reverse which, coming at this time, might well be regarded as a disaster,<sup>1359</sup> for all Lesbos was in revolt, with the exception of the one town of Methymna in the north-eastern corner of the island. Together with Chios Lesbos alone now retained the privileges of free members of the Delian or Athenian confederacy: but light as were the

<sup>1358</sup> This statement seems to set aside that of the Scholiast on Aristophanes, *Peace*, 347, who says that Phormion could not serve legally as being under a heavy fine which he was unable to pay, but that the people contrived some means for evading the penalty and so let him go. According to Thucydides Asopios certainly went instead of his father.

<sup>1359</sup> Thuc. iii. 7.

burdens and constraints laid even on the subject allies, the Lesbian oligarchs who there ruled over the Demos hated utterly any state of things which interfered in the slightest degree with their dearly loved exclusiveness. We have already had ample evidence that while Athenian ascendancy was resented as an intolerable burden wherever the old Eupatrid houses remained supreme, Athens still had in the demos an ally, if not a zealous friend. But even here the demos would, if left to itself, have preferred to keep its interpolitical independence,—so deep had the roots pierced of that centrifugal feeling which in the oligarchical states had long since become a deadly and incurable vice. Hence even before the outbreak of the war the nobles of Mytilene, the great city of the eastern coast of Lesbos, had, like the men of Thasos, Samos, and Potidaia, besought aid from Sparta in the revolt which they meditated.<sup>1360</sup> We are not told at what time the application was made: and it is possible that it may have come at a time when the attitude taken by Corinth compelled the Spartans to refuse the request of the Samian envoys.<sup>1361</sup> Still the Mytilenaian oligarchs persevered in their scheme; and Methymna was the only town which resisted a change not unlike that which Theseus is said to have effected for Attica. Antissa, Eresos, and Pyrrha, the two first lying on the northwestern shore of Lesbos, the third sheltered within a bay which ran into the heart of the island a few miles more to the southeast, were induced to become simply Demoi of Mytilene, and to hold here their common Prytaneion;<sup>1362</sup> and the work of blocking up harbours, of building walls, of laying in stores and hiring mercenary archers from tribes lying beyond the gates of the Euxine, was carried on with zeal. But the greatest of all luxuries to Hellenic oligarchs was the power of indulging in feuds, quarrels, and acts of tyranny; and if we may believe Aristotle,<sup>1363</sup> these plans were betrayed to the Athenians by a citizen named Doxandros who had been irritated by a refusal of the government to give certain heiresses in marriage to his sons. His information was probably anticipated by the

<sup>1360</sup> Thuc. iii. 2, 1.<sup>1361</sup> See pp. 71, 95.<sup>1362</sup> See further the note of Dr. Arnold on Thuc. iii. 2, 3.<sup>1363</sup> Polit. v. 4, 6.

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men of Tenedos as well as by the Methymnaians, who warned the Athenians that, unless they acted promptly, the island would be lost. The tidings seemed to lay upon them a burden against which they could not bear up. The plague had terribly thinned their numbers and weakened the power and the will for action; and for a time they could not bring themselves to look upon news so terrible as true. But when the envoys sent to dissuade the Mytilenaians from reducing the other towns to the condition of *demoi* had returned home unsuccessful, they instantly dispatched to Lesbos forty ships which happened to be ready for an expedition to the Peloponnesian coasts. The orders given to the general Kleippides and his colleagues were to surprise and seize Mytilene, if possible during the absence of citizens while keeping the feast of Apollon Maloeis, or, failing in this, to summon the oligarchs to surrender their fleet and pull down their walls. Happily there were in the Peiraieus ten Lesbian triremes according to the terms of the alliance. These ships the Athenians seized, and guarded their crews as hostages; but their public debates and resolutions placed them at a disadvantage with states like Sparta and Corinth which could plot and plan with secrecy. The tidings of the mission of Kleippides were carried to Lesbos in three-days by a Mytilenaiian spy who crossing over to the Euboian Geraistos there found a merchant vessel to carry him on at once. The festival of Apollon was put off; and when the Athenians arrived, they were met by open opposition. But the ships which ventured out of the harbour were chased back again, and the Mytilenaiian leaders resolved to temporise. Kleippides, with a fleet which he deemed far too scanty to cope with the combined forces of the Lesbian towns, was easily persuaded to give time for the sending of a Lesbian embassy to Athens. These envoys had no further errand than to ask for the withdrawal of the Athenian squadron, and to give a general promise that the Mytilenaiian government meant no harm. Conscious that a trick so transparent must fail, they sent ambassadors at the same time to Sparta with an appeal for aid more earnest and pressing than ever. These men were dispatched in a trireme which escaped by the southern

entrance of the harbour, while Kleippides kept guard only at Malea on the north of the town.<sup>1364</sup> Their voyage to Sparta was by no means smooth and easy; and the comparative sluggishness of the Mytilenaian rulers further tended to strengthen the hands and raise the spirits of the Athenians. They, not less than the Chians and the subject allies of Athens, had expected on the part of the Mytilenaians a prompt and vigorous action, which might shake the Athenian empire to its very foundations; but when the Lesbian envoys returned from Athens with no good report and the island had openly revolted, even a victory gained over the Athenians who had landed to blockade the city was followed by a retreat within the walls, and by the sending of a second embassy to Sparta. Awaiting the return of this second batch of envoys the Mytilenaian oligarchs remained inactive; and the Athenians, who seldom failed to seize a favourable opportunity, at once sent to summon aid from their allies. The same remissness which had cheered the Athenians had also convinced the Chians and other members of the confederacy that not much was to be expected from the Lesbian rebellion, and with their help, now readily afforded, Mytilene was blockaded from the south as well as the north.<sup>1365</sup>

If Thucydides had inserted in his history no speeches which could not have been uttered by the persons to whom they are ascribed, we might lay greater stress on the language of the Mytilenaian envoys when about midsummer of this year they appeared to plead their cause before the Hellenes assembled to celebrate the great Olympian festival. But the report of the Melian controversy leaves room for some suspicion that here also we may be dealing with representations which would be rather those of an Athenian statesman than of allies who wished to shake off all relations with Athens. At the least, if his report can be trusted, the Mytilenaians stand practically self-condemned. The most zealous advo-

Audience  
of the Les-  
bian en-  
voys at  
Olympia.

<sup>1364</sup> The Lesbian Malea of Strabo is the southeastern promontory of Lesbos, now known as cape Zeitoun. The Malea of Thucydides is not less positively stated by him to lie north of the city: there must therefore have been two spots so called. Like Syracuse, Mytilene had come into existence on an islet, answering to Ortygia, which was afterwards connected with the mainland, and thus the harbour of Mytilene had two entrances.

<sup>1365</sup> Thuc. iii. 6.



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cate of the imperial city could scarcely have framed an harangue more completely justifying her policy, or exhibiting in a clearer light the general moderation and equity of her rule. It is enough to say that for themselves these Lesbian envoys have no grievance whatever to urge. Far from having been either oppressed or even unfairly used, they admit that they had been treated with marked distinction;<sup>1366</sup> and all that they could say for themselves was first that the idea of revolt had been forced on them by the slavery to which other members of the Delian confederation had been reduced, and secondly that they had been compelled to carry out their plan prematurely. The latter plea turned on a question of fact which they were perhaps not likely to misrepresent. On the first the historian exhibits them partly as suppressing facts of which they were well aware, and partly as suggesting a false interpretation of the facts which they thought fit to mention. Of the real relations of Athens with her free and her subject allies they said not a word. There was no intimation that the Athenian law-courts were open to receive and decide all complaints brought by one ally against another ally or by the citizens of any confederated city against Athenian officials or residents or settlers, and that these courts certainly could not be accused of perverting justice in favour of Athenian criminals. On the real independence of the allies in the management of their internal affairs they kept careful silence: but the checks which were put on quarrels and wars between two or more allied cities were resented as involving loss of freedom.<sup>1367</sup> With even greater unfairness they charged the Athenians with deliberately abandoning all operations against the Persian king and confining themselves to the subjugation of their allies. The history of the years immediately following the battle of Mykalê has shown that the Athenians could have adopted no other course than that which they actually followed, unless Hellas was to be left once more exposed to Persian aggression;<sup>1368</sup> and, whatever their faults

<sup>1366</sup> Thuc. iii. 93.<sup>1367</sup> The relations of Athens with her allies have been examined already. See page 72.<sup>1368</sup> See page 89.

may have been, the charge of a betrayal of trust cannot be proved against them. It is true that Kimon had seen a way towards furthering his own interests or increasing his own popularity in distant and perilous expeditions, that these enterprises were favoured by Thoukydides the son of Melesias, and that they were discountenanced by the more sober judgement of Perikles.<sup>1369</sup> But if the steady protection of the Asiatic and Egean Hellenes against Persian exactions and the banishment of all Persian ships from the waters of the Greek archipelago may be regarded as the duties imposed on her by the allies, or assumed by herself, then it cannot be said that Athens ever slackened in her hostility to the enemy, far less that she ever gave it up.<sup>1370</sup> The kings of Persia had never abandoned their claims of tribute on all the cities which had once been subject to the sovereigns of Lydia; and these claims were held in abeyance until Athens fell partly from the assaults of her enemies and still more, in the judgement of Thucydides, from the unworthy ambition and personal rivalries of her own citizens.<sup>1371</sup> In short, if the picture drawn by the historian be in any degree a true one, the revolt of Lesbos was the work of a faction with which the main body of the people had no active sympathy, and which they seized the first occasion for defeating.

It had been the special prayer of the Lesbian envoys that the Spartans should invade Attica for the second time this year, the inducement held out for this fresh toil being the likelihood that the Athenians would thus be compelled to withdraw their fleets both from Lesbos and from the shores of the Peloponnesos. The Athenians, they urged, had not only been prostrated by the plague but had spent all their reserve funds. This last statement was true. Of the six thousand talents which were stored in the treasury at the beginning of the war, one thousand only remained,—that sum, namely, of which under pain of death no citizen was to propose to make use except for the defence of the city itself or its harbours against invading armies or fleets. The former assertion was refuted in a way which the Spartans little anticipated. They

Measures taken by the Athenians for the suppression of the revolt.

<sup>1369</sup> See page 64.

<sup>1370</sup> τὴν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας. Thuc. iii. 10, 4.

<sup>1371</sup> See Thuc. iii. 83.

had accepted the Lesbians as their allies, and having promised a second invasion of Attica, they made preparations for dragging their ships across the Corinthian isthmus to the Saronic gulf, sending round a summons at the same time for the immediate presence of their allies. These were in no hurry to obey the order. They were busy carrying their harvest; and the Athenians resolved to show, that in spite of all depressing causes they were able to meet their enemies on equal terms without taking away any portion of their fleet from Lesbos. The squadron of thirty triremes sent out with Asopios was already ravaging the Peloponnesian coasts. Forty triremes were blockading Mytilene. A hundred more were guarding Attica, Euboeia, and Salamis, when a fresh hundred issued from the mouth of the Peiræus to convince the Peloponnesians that Athens was still able to make them feel her power in their own land. The Spartans at once fell back; but orders were issued for the formation of a fleet of forty ships, of which Alkidas was to be the admiral. Meanwhile the Mytilenæian oligarchs had been able to do but little. Their attack on Methymna had failed; but an attempt to retaliate was followed by a severe defeat of the Methymnæians. They had in fact full command of the land, although the harbours of Mytilene were under strict blockade. On learning this fact, the Athenians sent out a force of a thousand hoplites under Paches, and the revolted city was at once completely invested. Still the rocky bed of a winter torrent so far broke the work of circumvallation that a Lakedæimonian named Salaithos managed to scramble up it into the town. He had started on his errand before the Spartan design of a second invasion of Attica had come to nothing, and his tidings cheered the Mytilenæians with hopes some of which had been already falsified.<sup>1372</sup> But if the Lesbian oligarchs had no solid grounds for encouragement, the Athenians were on their side sorely pressed for money. The sum of 200 talents was therefore levied at Athens itself, and with twelve ships Lysikles was dispatched, with four colleagues, for the purpose of collecting tribute. Strangely enough, his fate was precisely that of Melesandros.<sup>1373</sup> He marched from Myous along the

<sup>1372</sup> Thuc. iii. 25.<sup>1373</sup> See page 135.

valley of the Maiandros, and having reached the Sandian hill was there attacked by Karians and slain.

CHAP.  
III.

So ended the fourth year of the war. - Soon after the equinox of the following spring a Peloponnesian army again invaded Attica. Archidamos was perhaps still living; but his long reign was well-nigh ended; and the leader of this expedition was Kleomenes who acted as the deputy of his nephew the young king Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax. Their ravages were even more merciless than those of the earlier inroads. They were expecting daily to hear news from Lesbos, to which Alkidas had been dispatched with the forty ships ordered during the preceding winter together with two vessels contributed probably by the Spartans themselves. But at length their food was all gone, no tidings had come, and they were reluctantly driven to retreat. In fact the Lesbian oligarchs had no successes to report. For some unknown reason Alkidas failed to make his appearance with his fleet; and Salaithos, looking on his arrival as hopeless; armed the Demos as hoplites (they had thus far served only as light-armed troops) in order to sally out from the city against the besiegers. The step was fatal. The commons, instead of obeying the orders given to them, insisted on an immediate distribution of corn to alleviate the famine which already pressed hard upon them,<sup>1374</sup> or threatened in default of this to throw open the gates to the Athenians. Making a virtue of necessity, the oligarchs at once made a convention with Paches who pledged himself neither to imprison, inslave, nor slay any Mytilenaian until the Athenian people had given their judgement in the matter. Struck with terror, the prime movers of the revolt took sanctuary: but without doing them any harm Paches, pending the decision of the Athenians, placed them for safe keeping in the island of Tenedos. Seven days after this surrender the fleet of Alkidas, which had wasted its time through the whole voyage, entered the little harbour of Embaton on the southern shore of the territory of Erythrai beneath the Korykian mount, not twenty miles to the east of the Phanaian or southernmost promontory of

Surrender  
of Mytilene  
to Paches.

B.C. 427.

<sup>1374</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 323, attributes to the Demos a mistaken belief that the oligarchs had hidden stores of corn which they deliberately withheld from the people. Thucydides seems to imply that the corn really was so hidden.

Chios. Here a council was held, and Teutiaplos of Elis strenuously insisted on the duty of making an immediate attempt for the recovery of Mytilene while the disorder and carelessness which generally followed success in war gave them promise of an easy victory. To this exhortation Alkidas remained deaf, nor did he pay greater heed to the Ionian exiles,—oligarchs without doubt,—who besought him to seize either some Ionian city or the Aiolic Kymê, and to use this as a base for further operations against the dominion of Athens. The occupation of such a post by the Spartans would indefinitely increase the difficulty of the Athenians in gathering their tribute and the chances that the satrap Pissouthnes would openly ally himself with the Peloponnesians.<sup>1375</sup> But Alkidas had had more than enough of the business, and he was determined to return home. For fifty miles, sailing to the southeast, he carried with him the prisoners whom he had seized in the merchant vessels which had approached his fleet without suspicion. No one had thought that a Spartan force would venture into waters over which Athens had thus far been supreme, and when the ships of

<sup>1375</sup> This is apparently the meaning of the passage, Thuc. iii. 31, 1; but the text seems to be impracticable. See Dr. Arnold's note.

Thucydides here mentions that Alkidas was accompanied not merely by the Lesbian envoys, but by some men belonging to a party of Ionian exiles. From a statement in iv. 75, it seems that these exiles were Samians who had established themselves at Anaia, a few miles to the south of Ephesos, where they did all that they could to advance the interests of the Peloponnesians and to annoy the people whom they had left at home. Thucydides adds that they were specially useful to the enemies of Athens by serving as pilots on board their ships, and in all likelihood it was in this capacity that they accompanied Alkidas; but unfortunately he does not mention to what party they belonged. We have seen that Athens never adopted the Spartan policy of subverting by violence the form of government established in a state which might be a free or subject ally; and therefore the mere fact that after the suppression of the revolt, see p. 71, Samos had been placed in the class of tributaries, is not necessarily a proof that the oligarchy was put down and the demos placed in power. The revolution which broke out in the island later on in the war, Thuc. viii. 21, was the rising of a commonalty against a knot of oligarchs by whom they felt themselves to be betrayed; and there is no evidence of any marked change in the political condition of the island between the rebellion of 440 B.C. and this revolution. But if it cannot be supposed that men belonging to the Samian demos would be thus zealous against Athens, the conclusion is forced upon us that these exiles belonged to the oligarchic families. Why then were they in exile, if the oligarchy was in power? This has appeared to Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 14, so great a difficulty that he finds himself compelled to maintain that they were not in power, that during the interval between the rebellion and the revolution the oligarchic families were kept down by the demos, and that the revolution was caused by an attempt of the oligarchic faction to seize on power. But the language of Thucydides is clear and precise; and if he is to be believed, it was the demos which rose against the dominant oligarchy. Lacking a distinct statement of the historian, we must suppose that the exiles at Anaia may have been men who belonging to the oligarchic houses could not endure to see the government carried on in the interests of Athens (as it undoubtedly and necessarily was), and therefore preferred the freedom of voluntary exile, in which they might hope to do her substantial mischief.

Alkidas were seen, they were naturally supposed to be Athenian. So large a body of men had fallen into the trap that Alkidas now felt his movement of retreat seriously hampered. That men not engaged in hostilities on either side, and belonging possibly to cities which were only against their will in alliance with Athens, deserved a different treatment, never entered into his mind; and on the promontory of Myonnesos in the Teian territory he landed for the horrible purpose of lightening his cargo by a wholesale butchery. The greater number of the prisoners were thus slain; but this ruthless barbarity roused the indignation even of the oligarchic refugees at Anaia. They told Alkidas in few words that the repetition of acts so shameful would win him few friends and would change most of his friends into enemies. Shamed by the sarcasm which hailed the would-be deliverer of Hellas with the title of butcher, Alkidas set free those whom he had not slaughtered, and hastened a retreat which it was now needful to convert into flight. At Klaros, a few miles to the northwest of Ephesos,<sup>1376</sup> he knew that he had been seen by the Paralian and Salaminian triremes, the fastest ships in the Athenian navy, and that Paches would be stirred up to the task of chasing him not only by messages from cities decidedly opposed to Sparta but by the manifest need of getting rid of an enemy whose mere presence might excite to revolt the disaffected allies of Athens. In fact, nothing but extreme haste saved him from Paches who pursued him as far as Patmos, and then, as the Spartan fleet was not in sight, turned back, congratulating himself that Alkidas had not taken refuge in some harbour where it would have been necessary to blockade him.

From the butcheries of Alkidas we have to turn to the lies

<sup>1376</sup> As all the MSS. of Thucydides give Klaros, the conjectural emendation of Ikaros cannot be admitted except on the most cogent reasons. There can be little doubt that the words *τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀθηναίους* in ch. 29, 1, do not denote the crew of the Salaminian and Paralian triremes mentioned in ch. 53, 3. While the fleet of Alkidas was off the coast of the Peloponnesos or in the Saronic gulf, there would be a risk of its being intercepted by ships from Peiræus. After passing Delos he would run greater risk from ships belonging to Paches. It was on his outward voyage, on touching at Mykonos and Ikaros, that he heard of the fall of Mytilene, iii. 29. Had he been then seen by the two sacred triremes, the news would have been carried to Paches quicker than it could have been conveyed to him from Erythrai, and Paches would in that case have assuredly overtaken him long before he could have sailed from Ikaros to Embaton and thence to his place of slaughter at Myonnesos. But if Alkidas first knew himself to be discovered while he was off Klaros, his eagerness to get away as fast as he could is at once explained.

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III.

Internal  
factions in  
Kolophon  
and Notion.

and massacres of Paches. About the time of the second Spartan invasion of Attica the Persians, by the aid, it would seem, of the oligarchic faction, had obtained possession of the city of Kolophon; and the expelled inhabitants betook themselves to their harbour of Notion. Here after a time fresh quarrels broke out, and the Medising citizens of Kolophon were easily induced to send a force of Persians and Arkadian mercenaries to occupy Notion, while the men driven out from Notion sent to ask for the help of Paches. This general on reaching the town invited Hippias, the leader of the mercenaries, to a conference, under the pledge that, if no terms could be agreed upon, he should be restored safe and sound to his fortress.<sup>1377</sup> Hippias fell into the snare, and was kept a prisoner, although not in chains, while the fortress was carried by assault, all armed men within it being slain. Hippias was then led back within the wall and having been allowed for a moment to stand safe and sound, was then shot to death by a shower of arrows. So was the compact of Paches carried out with a literal exactness worthy of the Egyptian Amasis and the half-Libyan Pheretimê.<sup>1378</sup> The town was now handed over to the non-medising party, and soon afterwards the Athenians sent a body of settlers who entered the place with the formalities by which the founding of colonies was always marked.

Condemnation of the Mytilenaian people by the Athenian assembly.

On his return to Lesbos Paches reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresos, and seized the Lakedaimonian Salaithos who tried in vain to keep himself hidden within the walls of Mytilene. With the Mytilenaian (in number about 1,000) who had been placed for safe keeping in Tenedos this zealous agent of revolt was sent to Athens, a large portion of the force under Paches returning home at the same time. Salaithos could scarcely have expected to be treated with greater mercy than the Corinthian Aristeus.<sup>1379</sup> With what likelihood we have no means of determining, probably with little, he promised to draw off the besiegers from Plataiai, if his life were spared; but the Athenians would listen to no

<sup>1377</sup> The διατείχισμα in which Hippias was lodged was a portion of the town walled off from the rest as a sort of intrenched fort, serving in this instance to maintain the ascendancy of the oligarchical faction. The Athenians employ a διατείχισμα to aid them in effecting their retreat from Syracuse. Thuc. vii. 60, 2.

<sup>1378</sup> See vol. i. page 173.

<sup>1379</sup> See page 135.

excuses, and he was instantly slain. They had indeed deeper grounds for indignation against Salamis and the Lesbians than they had had even against Aristeus and the Potidaians. By their own showing, if the report of Thucydides be correct, the Mytilenaians, far from having any definite cause of complaint, had been treated with special indulgence and respect; and they had rewarded Athens by bringing a Peloponnesian fleet within waters which should have been closed to all armed vessels except those of the Athenian confederacy. No event had yet happened so seriously affecting her dignity and so greatly endangering her empire; and at no time therefore had the feeling of resentment and the desire of vengeance run so high. Moved by this mastering passion, the Athenians were in no mood for drawing distinctions between the guilty and the innocent. Their one longing was to inflict a punishment which should be a warning to her subjects for all time to come; and this longing found utterance in the plan of murdering the whole adult male population of Mytilene. One thousand Mytilenaians were already in Athens; probably six thousand more were in Lesbos. All these were to be butchered, and the women and children sold as slaves. Of the orators who, in the assembly called together to decide on this question, spoke most vehemently in favour of this proposition the most violent, if we may believe Thucydides, was Kleon. The severity of the historian's judgement might be set down to a stern moral indignation at the inhumanity of Kleon's counsel, were it not that he has just related the treason of Paches without a word of comment, and if we could also forget that his judgement of character is not always determined by the morality or immorality of the men of whom he speaks. Not only does he relate the worst iniquities of Athenians and Spartans without saying what he thinks or feels about them; but he can hold up as one of the best of Athenian citizens a man rendered infamous by a series of dastardly assassinations.<sup>1380</sup> Hence when we find that the unimpassioned impartiality of language which marks his history is disturbed only when he speaks in praise of a man like Antiphon or in blame of a man like Kleon, we

<sup>1380</sup> Thuc. viii. 68.



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cannot but ask whether there may not be a cause for so strange a difference. To this question the absolute honesty of the man happily furnishes the answer. He lauds the virtues of Antiphon, but he takes care to note the murders in which he had a share; he never mentions Kleon without a disparaging epithet, but he makes no attempt to conceal the fact that for Kleon he had a strong feeling of personal enmity and that his own character was bound up with that of the noisy and audacious leather-seller. But our admiration of the man as a historian must be heightened when we find that the hatred which could distort his judgment could not tempt him to suppress or misrepresent a fact.<sup>1381</sup> While then we may fairly test his comments by his history, we may happily follow his narrative with implicit trust; and his narrative taken with this reservation will exhibit in a full and true light the real position of a man whose portrait has been generally drawn in caricature.

Influence  
and cha-  
racter of  
Kleon.

Although Kleon is here first mentioned by Thucydides, he had long since gained some notoriety, if not fame, by his opposition to Perikles. He had been concerned in the accusation of the philosopher Anaxagoras, and he had taken part in the measures which were followed by the fining of his illustrious disciple. But his career calls for notice chiefly as marking a new phase in the political growth of Athens. Kleon is popularly known as the Demagogue; and for those who will not take the trouble to ascertain its meaning, the word involves some strange misconceptions. In the broad and coarse pictures of Aristophanes Kleon is the unprincipled schemer who gains influence by pandering to the vices of the people and cajoling them with the meanest and most fulsome flattery. No picture could be more untrue; and the false colours with which the comic poet can bedaub the low-born leather-seller may warn us how to take the slanders which he retails about the great Alkmaionid statesman whom Kleon made it his business to oppose. Kleon may have acquired power by blustering rhetoric and boundless impudence: he may have held his ground by dealing strong blows against men who fought him with his own weapons; but if we may

<sup>1381</sup> See further, Freeman, *Historical Essays*, ii. 98.

trust the narrative of an enemy, adulation of the Demos is not a sin which can be laid to his charge. He was a demagogue, not as leading the people by honeyed words, but as belonging to a class of statesmen whose activity was confined to the popular assemblies, or who were more likely to fail than to win distinction if they ventured to play the part of military leaders. In earlier ages this class had been unknown; it was only now becoming strongly marked.<sup>1382</sup> The reformers and statesmen of the times immediately preceding the Persian wars were as much in their place on the battlefield as in the great gatherings of the people. In Perikles Athens found a man whose real work lay in guiding and shaping her policy, and whose success as a general never eclipsed his glory as a statesman. In Kleon she encountered one who was little fitted to head armies in the field, whatever might be the soundness of his judgement as to the military measures which he might recommend. If a man so placed, without any advantages of birth or fortune, rose to such power as Kleon at length attained by availing himself of the popular or dominant feeling, it may fairly be answered that he could scarcely rise in any other way. All citizens at Athens were now eligible to all offices: but in fact the meanly born and the poor seldom filled any offices except those for which election went by the lot. If a man belonging to the lowest class and meaner families in the state wished to obtain a hearing, he could do so only by enlisting popular feeling on his side and by presenting a firm front to the aristocratic and oligarchic orators who would seek to brow-beat and to silence him. In other words, he must to some extent have the public sympathy, or else he could do nothing; and then he must trust to impudence or violent invective to make good the position which he had reached. But even here we must not forget that the coarsest and most unmeasured abuse was not held to disgrace the most illustrious orators of Athens; and it is hard to see why weapons which Demosthenes might handle without shame should not be used by Kleon.

<sup>1382</sup> Mr. Grote notes the analogy between this change and that which took place in the cities of mediæval Europe when the members of guilds came to compete with and to supplant the noble families which had thus far been supreme. *Hist. Gr.* vi. 331.

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Second  
debate, and  
withdrawal  
of the  
sentence  
against the  
Mytil-  
enaian  
people.

It is then undoubtedly true that the rudeness and grossness of the leather-merchant who came forward to resist or to accuse Perikles were forgiven by the aristocratic party to whom the policy of Perikles, was utterly distasteful. In other words, Kleon had in his favour a powerful sentiment in their dislike of the great Alkmaionid statesman who had dealt the deathblow to their ancient privileges. In the case of the Mytilenaians he had on his side a feeling still more powerful. The maintenance of their maritime supremacy was for all Athenians a matter which admitted no questioning: and the very foundations of this supremacy had been assailed by men, who, revolting without cause, had dared to bring Spartan war-ships into Athenian waters. According to Thucydides, it was Kleon who determined the issue of the debate; <sup>1383</sup> it is far more likely that a vast majority came to the debate vehemently eager to take the vengeance to which Kleon gave the name of justice. But the massacre which he and they desired was on so vast a scale that the feeling of burning anger was speedily followed by a feeling of amazement at the ocean of blood which was to be shed in order to appease it. Not a few of those who had voted for the slaughter felt, as they went home, or in the quiet of their houses, that they were making themselves responsible for a gigantic and savage iniquity. <sup>1384</sup> The manifest symptoms of this change of feeling revived the courage of the Mytilenaiian envoys, and rendered it possible to bring about a reconsideration of the question. Whatever risk might be involved in summoning the assembly for the purpose of repealing a Psephisma passed only a few hours ago, the Prytaneis felt that the circumstances of the case justified the irregularity, and they took the step without hesitation. <sup>1385</sup> It was early

<sup>1383</sup> The phrase *ἐνερικῆκε ὥστε ἀποκτείναι* could hardly be said of a man merely because he had been a speaker on the winning side. Thuc. iii. 36, 5.

<sup>1384</sup> *ὤμων τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα.* Thuc. iii. 36, 3.

<sup>1385</sup> A case somewhat similar occurred when Nikias proposed to consider as an open question the scheme of the Sicilian expedition which had already been determined on by the people. Addressing the Prytanis, he told him that any fears which he might feel about putting the matter once more to the vote might, with the large numbers of those who took the same view, be safely dismissed. The phrase here used *τὸ λυεῖν τοὺς νόμους*, Thuc. vi. 14, has been taken by some interpreters and among them by Mr. Grote as conclusive proof that such a proposal made the propounder liable to impeachment. There can be no doubt that the reconsideration of Psephismata was irregular, but there seems to be no evidence that it was against any actual law. Probably no definite practice existed on the subject; and the prosecution of the citizens who might urge such a

morning when Kleon found himself once more face to face with the men who, the day before, had tried in vain to resist the influence of his furious oratory. Without pausing to reflect on the risk which he might himself incur as the author of a measure which must rouse the indignation of the whole Hellenic world,<sup>1386</sup> he stood up again to administer a stern rebuke to the Demos and to urge with savage persistency the paramount duty of giving full play to the instinct of resentment. This passion, he argued, was apt to grow weak with time, and their business was to throw themselves back as much as possible into the feeling stirred within them when first they heard of the deadly wrong done by the Mytilenaians.<sup>1387</sup> This course he held to be that of strict justice, and as he demanded no more than justice, so neither would he take less. That against the Lesbians he had a terrible indictment, it is impossible to deny. They had been allowed to keep their fortifications and their fleet. At sea they had to fear only the enemies of Athens, and these dared not enter the waters of the Egean. They had not even the pretence of ill-treatment to palliate conduct which was rather rebellion than revolt. They had gained no experience from the punishment of Thasos or Samos; they had not been deterred by the certainty of losing special privileges and sacrificing the wealth and prosperity of the island; and in carrying out their causeless treachery they had not scrupled to admit within Athenian waters the deadliest enemies of Athens. But Kleon, if the report of Thucydides may be trusted, uttered a direct falsehood when he asserted that the oligarchs and the demos had been guilty of the same crime and therefore deserved the same punishment. The plea was palpably untrue. The demos was armed only when the oligarchs felt that thus only could they escape imminent ruin; and no sooner had they grasped their weapons, than they used the power, thus gained, in the interests of Athens.

measure would depend much on the temper of the people, and would have to be brought on general grounds. See the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* vi. 14, and Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 340.

<sup>1386</sup> The readiness of the Athenians to thrust off upon others a responsibility which was really their own and could not be shifted has been already noticed in the case of Miltiades. On this tendency Diodotos, the opponent of Kleon, lays special stress. *Thuc.* iii. 43, 5.

<sup>1387</sup> *Thuc.* iii. 40, 10.

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To this vehement outburst Diodotos, who had strenuously resisted the proposal carried on the preceding day, replied in a speech which, if we may accept the summary of Thucydides as substantially correct, is among the most remarkable ever uttered at Athens. It is the speech of a man comparatively humane, who yet feels that undue stress laid on the duty of mercy might defeat his purpose. It was unnecessary to enjoin as a duty that which was demanded imperatively on the score of mere policy and expediency. There was no need to gloss over the iniquities of the Lesbians, far less to attempt any formal apology for them, when the question turned not on the wickedness of the rebels but on the wisdom of slaughtering them in a mass. If they were indefinitely worse than even Kleon had painted them, the case would be in no wise altered, for they were assembled not to try the Mytilenaian people, but to determine the measures which the welfare of Athens might render necessary or desirable. Nay, he would take Kleon on his own ground, and he would meet by a direct contradiction the plea that Athenian interests would be advanced by ruthless massacre. It was absurd to found expectations of future gain on the mere severity of punishment. Human action was determined not by pains and penalties which might possibly never be inflicted but by desires or passions which bear down all constraints of prudence, law, or fear. The black codes which punished all offences with death had not been specially successful in lessening the number or the atrocity of offences.<sup>1388</sup> But if the results of merciless revenge were uncertain in one direction, they were clear enough in another. The massacre of a whole people for the misdoings of a small section of that people would clog with insuperable difficulties a task already anxious and delicate. Far from being tempted, as they were now, to surrender betimes in the hope of moderate treatment, the knowledge that no heed would be taken of shades of guilt would goad revolted allies to desperate resistance, and even

<sup>1388</sup> The multiplication of capital offences led Diodotos, or Thucydides, iii. 45, 2, to the theory that punishments had in primitive ages been very light and that they only gradually become more severe and bloody. All the evidence at our command seems to run counter to this notion. The increased severity noticed by Diodotos was the result of reaction; and at the present day assuredly we cannot shut our eyes to the force which such reactions may acquire.

success would mean for the Athenians a woeful waste of time and money in blockades and the possession of a heap of ruins when the siege was ended. If Kleon really had the welfare of his country at heart, he would wish to see her the mistress or the ally of states capable of bearing their full share of common burdens; but he was insisting on a line of action which in place of the great Athenian confederacy would leave useless heaps of ruined cities. Nay, even this would not be the whole mischief wrought by this ill-judged vindictiveness. In all the states of her alliance Athens now had beyond all doubt a body of stanch friends: and even in Lesbos these friends had only been overborne by the selfish violence of the oligarchic faction. By following the advice of Kleon they would deal the deathblow to this friendship, and would encounter everywhere an ominous monotony of hatred and disgust.

When at length the question was put to the vote, the amendment of Diodotos that the prisoners then at Athens should be put upon their trial and that the lives of the Mytilenaians in Lesbos should be spared was carried by a very small majority. But although the decree of the preceding day was thus rescinded, there was little chance that the more merciful decision would take effect. The trireme carrying the death-warrant of six or seven thousand men had had the start of nearly twenty-four hours: but the errand on which they were dispatched was not so cheerful as to call for any special tension of muscle, and the second trireme was sent forth with far greater inducements for the most strenuous exertion. The Lesbian envoys stocked the ship with an ample supply of wine and barley meal, and they promised the crew rich rewards if they reached the island in time. Possibly the desire of saving Athens from a great crime and a great disgrace may have influenced them even more powerfully, and the men pushed onwards with a zeal which happily was not damped by adverse weather. Taking their meals as they sat on their benches, and working in relays of men relieved at very short intervals, they reached Lesbos, not indeed before the first trireme, but before Paches had begun the execution of the decree which he had already published.

The subjugation of Lesbos.

Here ended the repentance and the mercy of the Athenians. They had narrowly escaped the odium of a massacre not much more sweeping than those which attended the suppression of the Indian mutiny; and the thousand Mytilenaian prisoners sent by Paches to Athens were put to death with the deliberate method which marked the blowing of sepoy from batteries of English cannon.<sup>1389</sup> The walls of Mytilene were pulled down, its fleet was forfeited, and a definite annual tribute imposed upon the city. The whole island, with the exception of the Methymnaian territory, was further divided into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were consecrated to the gods,<sup>1390</sup> Athenian Klerouchoi being settled on the rest as owners of the land for which the Lesbians belonging to each lot paid a yearly rent of two minai.<sup>1391</sup> The Mytilenaian possessions on the mainland were seized at the same time, and henceforth formed part of the empire of Athens. Throughout all these operations Paches had shown himself to be a general of more than common power, if not gifted with the genius of Phormion; but either he did not care to keep his passions in check or he thought that his official position would insure him impunity in indulging them. He was altogether mistaken. The courts of Athens were open, not in name only but really, to the citizens of allied states whether subject or free; and Paches, charged before an

<sup>1389</sup> The necessity of the act in either case is a distinct question. These Mytilenaians, it is true, were no longer in the scene of their misdoings; but there can be little doubt that most of them were virulent enemies of Athens, and it was obviously impossible to prevent them from doing further mischief except by keeping them in prison, by selling them as slaves, or by putting them to death. Probably the last of these alternatives was the most merciful; the first, to a state in the position of Athens at this time, would certainly be too costly.

<sup>1390</sup> This consecration was recommended by policy as well as by religion. Land so devoted remained scarcely less useful than land sheltered by no such sanction. It could not be tilled nor inclosed; but it might be used for pasture, subject to the maintenance of the temples and their worship; and so long as these conditions were observed, the religious dedication added greatly to the security and the value of the possession. The reservation which the Samian Maiandrios wished to make of the priesthood of Zeus Eleutherios, Herod. iii. 142, see vol. i. p. 366, is thus easily accounted for.

<sup>1391</sup> According to the usual practice, followed by the settlers placed on the lands of the Chalkidian Hippobotai, see vol. i. p. 236, these Klerouchoi ought, like the members of the Roman colonies, to have been resident at Lesbos. It is strange that we hear nothing more of them. When in the eighth year of the war it became needful to take measures against the Mytilenaian exiles on the Asiatic coast, the force employed consists not of these Klerouchoi but of the crews of the tribute-gathering triremes. Thuc. iv. 75. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 350, notes further that Antiphon speaks of Lesbian citizens as still after this time paying a direct tax to the Athenian treasury. If the usual order of the Klerouchiai had been adhered to, they would have paid rent to a Klerouchos, not tribute to the imperial state. Probably these settlers were sent out strictly as a garrison, and were withdrawn when it was found that their presence, no longer needed in Lesbos, was indispensably necessary elsewhere.

Athenian Dikastery with a monstrous crime, slew himself in the presence of his judges.<sup>1392</sup>

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The de-  
struction of  
Plataiai.

The subjugation of Lesbos preceded only by a few days or weeks the destruction of Plataiai. A year and a half had passed away from the first appearance of Archidamos before the devoted town, when by the counsel of the prophet Theainetos and the general Eupompidas the Plataians resolved to force their way through the lines of the besiegers. From Athens there was clearly no hope of help, and their store of food was rapidly failing them. But as the time for carrying out the plan drew nigh, not much more than half the number could muster courage to go on with the scheme. Two hundred and twenty still persevered, and the event showed the wisdom of their choice. The task before them was formidable; and almost the only point in their favour was the fact that on rainy nights the guards withdrew from the open walk on the top of the wall to the towers which spanned its whole width at intervals which left space for ten battlements.<sup>1393</sup> On either side of the blockading wall, as it is called, was a deep trench, the wall itself being double, while the intervening space of sixteen feet was roofed over so as to afford quarters underneath for the besiegers when off duty and a level walk above for the men on guard. As the towers which rose above this floor were pierced by a covered passage, the guards could maintain an unbroken communication round the whole circuit of the wall while the towers being of the same width with the double wall made it impossible to move from one part of the wall to another except through these covered ways. The Plataians were compelled therefore to provide against all the dangers which they knew that the conditions of the enterprise must involve. The preparation

<sup>1392</sup> See page 74. With this may be contrasted the action of the Old Bailey Grand Jury in throwing out the Bill in the case of a late governor of Jamaica. I quote the words of Mr. Mill. 'It was clear that to bring English functionaries to the bar of a criminal court for abuses of power committed against negroes and mulattoes was not a popular proceeding with the English middle classes.' *Autobiography*, p. 298.

<sup>1393</sup> These ἐπάλξεις or battlements were erections, probably about six feet in length and three or four in height, built of brick roofed with tiles. If the space between these battlements was equal to their length, the distance between any two of the towers would be about 120 feet.

I give this narrative as it has been handed down to us by Thucydides. The fact that the Plataians made their escape cannot be questioned; the mode in which they effected it may perhaps be impossible to ascertain. The narrative is examined in Appendix K.



of ladders for climbing and descending the besiegers' wall was, it is said, the easiest part of their task, their length being determined by counting carefully the layers of bricks from the base of the wall to the battlements. The risk which they ran from discovery was a matter for much deeper anxiety. They could not hope to escape the notice of the watchmen in the two towers between which they might choose to climb the wall: these must therefore be overpowered and slain, and they must further trust to the din of a roaring storm to drown the noise caused by the work of slaughter, and thus to avoid disturbing the men beneath the floor. A peril even greater lay in the fire-signals by which they felt sure that the discovery of the attempt would be announced to the Thebans: but their knowledge of the Spartan method of using them justified a hope that counter-signals raised from within the town might deprive them of their meaning. Thus provided, they resolved to make the attempt during a fierce storm of wind and rain which happened about mid-winter. The roaring of the gale saved them from discovery as they approached the wall and set the ladders; and they advanced with the less noise, as they took care to move far enough away from each other to prevent all clatter from the contact of their arms. The danger of slipping in the mud was lessened by having their left feet shod.<sup>1394</sup> No sooner had the ladders been placed than Ammeas the son of Koroibos with eleven light-armed men ascended the wall, and succeeded, it would seem, in killing the guards of the two towers without alarming the other besiegers. Their scanty force, which held the passages under these towers, was soon strengthened, as other light-armed soldiers, receiving their shields from those who were coming up behind, joined them in their watch. Many more had mounted to the top before any discovery was made. At last the tile-work covering of one of the battlements gave way beneath the grasp of a Plataian who caught at it; and the noise summoned to the wall at once the main body of the besiegers.<sup>1395</sup> But from their station they dared not move.

<sup>1394</sup> If the unshod foot were less liable to slip, the Plataians would surely have shod their right feet, for men engaged in fighting need to have their left feet specially firm.

<sup>1395</sup> From the words of Thucydides, iii. 22, 6, it would seem that there was an incampment without the walls. His expressions in iii. 21, 3, imply apparently that there was none. See further Appendix K.

The night was pitchy dark. The roaring of the storm made it well-nigh impossible to learn where the danger lay; and the Plataians who had refused to share in the enterprise distracted the attention of the besiegers by an attack made on another part of the wall. Fire-signals were raised to summon aid from Thebes, but these were rendered meaningless by the counter-signals of the Plataians; and the few Spartans who happened to be near at hand were smitten by an enemy whom they could not see. At length all had descended on the outer side, the men who had to cover the movements of their comrades undergoing necessarily the greatest peril. Before them lay the wide outer ditch, full of water on which lay a thin coating of ice. As they struggled across the moat, the reserve of 300 Spartans, patrolling the space without the wall, rapidly approached them. Happily they carried torches, and thus furnished a mark for the Plataian spearmen, while these were shielded by the darkness. The besiegers now felt the need of hunting after their enemies, and the light of their torches showed that they were hurrying up the heights of Kithairon. The Plataians, thinking that they would scarcely be suspected of running towards the lion's den, marched straight for nearly a mile on the road to Thebes, and hastening thence from scenes associated with the heroic devotion of earlier days, took the mountain road which led through Erythrai and Hysiai to Athens. Two hundred and twenty men had issued from the besieged city. Seven turned back from the foot of the wall, and spread the tidings that all the rest had been slain. One was taken prisoner at the outer moat: the remainder found a welcome in Athens which had done nothing to help them against the blockading force. At daybreak the Plataians within the city sent a herald to ask for the bodies of the dead and then learnt that the boldness of their comrades had been crowned with success. For some months longer they held out against an enemy more terrible than man; but as the summer wore on, the Spartan leader found that his assaults on the wall were met with steadily diminishing force. Famine was fast doing its work; but there was a special reason for arresting it before its close. If the

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Plataians could be induced to make a voluntary surrender of their city, there would be no need, in the event of either truce or peace, to give up the places along with others which had been forcibly occupied.<sup>1396</sup> The proposal therefore made to them was that they should submit themselves to the judgement of the Lakedaimonians who would give them a pledge that the guilty only should be punished. The Plataians were in no condition to refuse these terms; but they could at once foresee the issue when on the arrival of the five special commissioners dispatched from Sparta they were put upon their trial, or rather were called upon to answer the single question whether during the present war they had done any good to the Spartans and their allies. The very form of the question showed that no reference would be suffered to their previous history; but only by such reference was it possible to exhibit in its true light the injustice of their present treatment. In fact, unless the Spartans were prepared to throw over their alliance with Thebes, the case of the Plataians was hopeless, for the Thebans were resolved that, nothing less than their blood should be the price of continued friendship with Sparta. The Plataians might insist that their alliance with Athens was the direct result of Spartan advice, that from that time down to the treacherous inroad of the Thebans into their city they had never failed to do Sparta such good service as had been in their power, and that their sacrifices during the struggle with Persia had been followed by zealous aid given to the Spartans during the long Helot war.<sup>1397</sup> They might dwell on the iniquity of the Thebans in assailing their city in time not only of truce but of festival. They might appeal to the bravery and magnanimity which had won for the Spartans a name not to be lightly sullied by compliance with the dishonourable demands of their allies. They might invoke the deep religious instinct which still regarded the unbroken worship of ancestors as of primary importance; they might argue that the maintenance of this worship had by the common oath of all the non-

<sup>1396</sup> When before concluding the treaty for the peace of Nicias the Athenians demanded the restoration of Plataiai, and were met by the plea of its voluntary surrender, they in their turn applied the same argument to justify their retention of the Megarian port of Nisaiia; and the Spartans were thus caught in their own trap. Thuc. v. 17, 2.

<sup>1397</sup> See page 42.

medising Hellenes been committed as a sacred trust to the Plataians, and that, if these were destroyed, the Spartans would be depriving their own forefathers of the careful reverence which Thebans as the vehement allies of the Persian king could not even dare to offer. They might remind them, further, of the compact under which the surrender of the town was made; that they had submitted themselves to the Spartans and to the Spartans alone; and that if they had suspected the least collusion with the Thebans, they would rather have all died by famine than open the gates of their city. They might insist that, if they were not prepared to do them justice and to set them free, they should allow them to go back within the walls of their town, and there take their chance whether of death by famine or of succour from their allies. All this they might urge, and from the report of Thucydides we have every reason for thinking that they did urge; but to each and all of these pleas the Plataians well knew that the Thebans had their answer ready. The very question to which Kleomenes replied by bidding them seek the alliance of Athens<sup>1398</sup> was in itself a crime. It was their duty to abide in the confederacy of their countrymen, and they had chosen from the first to assume an attitude of schismatical and bitter opposition. This spirit of opposition alone had made them strenuous in their efforts against the Persian king, at a time when, as they knew, Thebes was governed not by a constitutional oligarchy which respected law but by a knot of unscrupulous chiefs who drove the citizens like sheep to fight in a bad cause against their will. It led them now to misrepresent all the circumstances connected with the entry of the Thebans at the invitation of Naukleides and his adherents. The surprise of a city with which they were not at war might be wrong: the case was wholly altered when they came at the wish of the first men in the town who desired only to bring back their fellow-citizens to their ancient allegiance. The appeal to the religious feelings of their judges the Thebans dismissed with contempt. The question before them was one not of sentiment but of fact. The charge of Theban medism

<sup>1398</sup> See vol. i. page 234.

long ago might be retorted by the heavier-accusation of virulent Atticism which was now making the Plataians willing and even servile instruments of Athenian tyranny. They had aided Athens in enslaving Aigina, in enslaving their own kinsfolk; and if their course were not at once cut short, they would go on to aid her until there should remain not a single free state in Hellas. Nay, they had been guilty of even a worse crime. They had been invited by the Thebans, who came with Eurymachos,<sup>1399</sup> to join the Boiotian confederacy of their own free will. No wrong had been done and the invitation was accepted; but the compact was no sooner made than it was broken, and in breach of a solemn promise all the men who had fallen into their hands were slain. The retort brings us back to the monster evil of this horrible war,—the exasperated and vindictive spirit which forgot prudence; reason, and sound policy in the blind longing for revenge. It matters not whether we take the version of the Thebans or that of the Plataians. These by their own mouth stand on this point self-condemned. By their own admission they had promised that the fate of their prisoners should depend on the result of future negotiation, and the men were killed before a word more could be said on either side. If one crime was to serve as the justification of another, the Thebans had full warrant for demanding the death of the Plataians. But there was no need to urge a request with which the Spartans had already made up their minds to comply. In few words the commissioners reminded the Plataians that Archidamos had pledged himself to see that, if they would but hold aloof in the war, their neutrality should be respected, and that their refusal to accept the stringent guarantees which he offered<sup>1400</sup> absolved the Spartans from all obligations with regard either to the citizens or the territory of Plataiai. The last scene in this dismal tragedy now followed. The prisoners were again asked, one by one, the same question to which their speech had evaded a direct answer; and as each man replied in the negative he was led away and killed. So were slain two hundred Plataians and twenty-five Athenians who had been shut up

<sup>1399</sup> Thuc. ii. 5, 9.<sup>1400</sup> See page 137.

in the town; and so fell the city of Plataiai in the ninety-third year of its alliance with Athens, to rise again once more and to be once more destroyed. The women were, of course, sold as slaves;<sup>1401</sup> and for a year the town was given over by the Thebans to some Megarian exiles and to such Plataians as had preferred Boiotian oligarchy to alliance with the demos of Athens. But even thus the Thebans could not rest satisfied. They razed the town to its foundations, and with the materials built up a huge barrack, occupying a square with sides two hundred feet long. The brass and iron found within the houses served to make a couch for the Lady Hêrê, and the better to secure her good will a large chapel was added to the shrine which already graced her sacred close. The Theban conscience was set at rest by a compact akin to that of Camillus with the Veientine Juno.<sup>1402</sup> The Plataian territory was declared to be public land, and was let out for ten years to Boiotian graziers. The play was played out, as the Thebans would have it. The phrase is strictly justified, for awful though the drama may be, the existence or the fall of Plataiai could have no serious issue or meaning in reference to the war. Thebes would scarcely be a gainer by recovering the little town to the Boiotian confederacy: Athens would be in no way the weaker for losing her ancient and devoted ally. From first to last they were sacrificed to the vindictive meddlesomeness of the Thebans; and it must be admitted that in some measure they helped to sacrifice themselves. If the prisoners taken on the night of the surprise had been sent, as Perikles would have had them sent, to Athens, the possession of these hostages would have had a sobering effect upon the Thebans and would have extorted a very different verdict from the five commissioners of Sparta.

<sup>1401</sup> It is likely that these women were slaves already, although the phrase γυναῖκες σιτροποιοί, Thuc. ii. 78, does not decide the point.

<sup>1402</sup> Liv. v. 22. The gods would naturally feel offended at being robbed of their worshippers, and it was necessary either to propitiate them on the spot or to find them a home elsewhere.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION IN KORKYRA TO THE CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA BY DEMOSTHENES AND KLEON.

BOOK  
III.State of  
parties in  
Korkyra.

427 B.C.

THE defensive alliance of Korkyra with Athens had been followed, it would seem, by something like peaceful and orderly government in that unhappy island. The quarrel which led to that alliance was a feud between the Korkyraian demos and the people of Epidamnos on behalf of oligarchs whose fathers had themselves belonged to the demos of Korkyra.<sup>1403</sup> But the zeal which the Korkyraians displayed in their interest implied no increased love of oligarchical polity for its own sake; and the connexion with Athens, while it established the power of the demos, introduced a certain moderation and forbearance between the two orders. On the other hand, it had called for no special exertions on the part of either. Whether tacitly or by explicit agreement the defensive alliance had been extended to one for offence; but the change had been followed by no further result than the co-operation of a Korkyraian fleet with that of Athens on the Peloponnesian coast in the first year of the war.<sup>1404</sup> From them Phormion had received no reinforcement, nor even in his critical position had he asked their help. Korkyra was thus practically left to herself, and things remained comparatively quiet until the Corinthians sent back the prisoners whom they had taken in the battles off the island.<sup>1405</sup> Nominally they were set free under a promise to pay 800 talents as their ransom. Really their freedom was to be earned not by money but by severing the island from all connexion with Athens, in other

<sup>1403</sup> See page 76.<sup>1404</sup> See page 113 and note 1345.<sup>1405</sup> See page 84.

words by transferring power from the demos to an oligarchy.

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These men, in fulfilment of their compact, set to work to kindle a flame which was to consume not their enemies only but themselves. The time which followed was marked by a series of frightful crimes, of pitiless massacres, and an iron inhumanity, worthy of the worst days of the first French revolution. In Korkyra, as in France, the end was a thorough confusion of all political and social morality and the substitution of a new standard of right and wrong.<sup>1406</sup> The animosity of the contending orders was embittered by resentment for terrible injuries, and all generous impulses were repressed by a blind and furious desire for revenge. In such a state of things truthfulness, sobriety, and moderation were loathed as the contemptible vices of cowards, while the men who hounded their comrades on to the bloodiest measures were worshipped as the only true friends of the people, that is, of the dominant party. The secret destruction of enemies became the great end to be aimed at, and they who were foremost in the race of iniquity won a reputation for pre-eminent wisdom. In this horrible rivalry the interests of faction supplied the one motive for every measure; and the ties of kindred and friendship went for nothing. Promises and oaths were used as convenient instruments for cheating and ruining an opponent. Children were slain by their fathers,<sup>1407</sup> and suppliants dragged from the temples to be put to death. In short, men on all sides acted solely from an all-absorbing selfishness,<sup>1408</sup> and earth for the time became a hell. Whether then we look to the horrors and miseries of this Korkyraian tumult or the more horrid and wholesale atrocities of the French revolution, the loathsome and revolting picture can for us have only two points of interest. There can be little instruction in the contemplation of men who act like malignant demons, in determining the measure of their iniquity, or appreciating

Intrigues  
of the  
prisoners  
set free by  
the Cor-  
inthians.

<sup>1406</sup> τὴν εἰωθίαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοῦσει. Thuc. iii. 82, 5.

<sup>1407</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 375, takes this statement as meaning simply that at Korkyra 'in one case a father slew his own son.' There is nothing in the words of Thucydides, iii. 81, 5, to limit his meaning to a single instance.

<sup>1408</sup> πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἰτίων ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν. Thuc. iii. 82, 16.



BOOK  
II

the ingenuity of their tortures. The true interest of these dismal tragedies lies in the ascertainment first of their cause and, next, of the conditions which at any given place or time involve a likelihood of their recurrence. Unless a state has reached that happy balance in which the animosity of parties and orders within it is reduced to zero, or at least that degree of toleration and forbearance which absolutely insures the employment of none but constitutional measures for the righting of wrongs, the liability to these violent outbursts must remain, until, in the words of the historian, human nature shall cease to be what it is.<sup>1409</sup> Animosity and divergence of interest carried beyond a certain point and combined with a certain amount of power cannot fail to bring about the same sequel.

Revolutionary spirit in Korkyra.

This point had now been reached for the Greek states generally; and this result was to be traced distinctly to the attack made by Sparta and her allies on Athens. This attack was certainly not the cause of faction in Hellenic cities; but their besetting sin was henceforth aggravated by foreign interference, the demos in each town inviting the help of Athens, while their opponents relied on that of Sparta. It was so now in Korkyra, and the revolution here was noteworthy chiefly as being the first, and perhaps the fiercest and most bloody, of these movements. It marked, in short, the beginning of a great change; and Thucydides, in that spirit of foresight which is the most prominent characteristic of the man, traces its origin and course with the same calmness which marks his description of the phenomena and consequences of the great plague. In this case the flood-gates of evil were opened by the enemies of the demos; but the stage may soon be reached in which the party assailed becomes more in the wrong than the aggressor. From this point, the details of carnage and useless crimes may be passed lightly over; but the fact that in Hellas these dreadful revolutions were at the outset the work of oligarchical factions carries with it a significant political lesson.

The first step of the Korkyraians sent back from Corinth

<sup>1409</sup> Thuc. iii. 82, 2. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 515, contends that these remarks do not apply to Athens. On this more will be said hereafter.

was a personal canvassing of the citizens generally for the purpose of breaking off the alliance with Athens. It was so far successful that on the arrival of envoys from Athens and Corinth a decree was passed confirming the Athenian alliance but re-establishing the ancient friendship with the Peloponnesians,—an arrangement which defeated itself. Their next act was the accusation of Peithias, a prominent member of the demos and Etheloproxenos<sup>1410</sup> of Athens, on the general charge of betraying Korkyra to the Athenians. The trial (how carried on, we know not) ended in his acquittal: and Peithias in his turn, picking out five men of the wealthiest families, charged them with cutting stakes for vine props from the Temenos of Zeus and Alkinoös. The offence had probably thus far been winked at, and a charge founded upon it may have brought odium less on the offender than on the man who made it. But Peithias could disregard this odium, when he sought only to deal a political blow. The men were condemned to pay the appointed fine of a stater, or four drachmas, for each stake cut. The vastness of the amount drove them to take sanctuary and to pray for permission to pay by instalments. But the demon of vindictiveness was busy at work; and Peithias prevailed on the people to let the law take its course. He was about to propose the renewal of an offensive alliance with Athens, when the oligarchic faction resolved to take the matter into their own hands. Breaking suddenly into the council chamber, they slew with their daggers Peithias and sixty of his fellow-senators, and then carried a decree that neither Spartans nor Athenians should be received except with a single ship. Envoys were at the same time sent to Athens to announce this resolution and to warn the Korkyraians who had sought a refuge there against making any attempts to disturb the order of things thus established. These envoys had already succeeded in gaining some of their exiles over to their side,<sup>1411</sup> when they were seized by the Athenians and placed with their converts on the island of Aigina which might now be safely used as an Athenian prison-house.<sup>1412</sup> Meanwhile, at Korkyra the

Open enmity of the populace and the aristocratic factions.

<sup>1410</sup> See note 1295.

<sup>1411</sup> ὄρους ἐπεισαν. Thuc. iii. 72, 1.

<sup>1412</sup> See page 114.

arrival of ambassadors from Sparta and Corinth encouraged the oligarchs to fresh acts of violence. The discomfited demos fled to the Akropolis and occupied the Hylleic or southern harbour, while their enemies held the Agora and the harbour facing the coast of Epeiros. Both alike now made efforts to enlist the services of the slaves by the promise of freedom. The slaves for the most part joined the people: the oligarchs were strengthened by 800 mercenaries from the mainland. A battle which took place two days later ended in the defeat of the oligarchs, who, caring not at all whether they destroyed their own houses in that quarter, set fire to the Agora. Had the flames been carried by the wind, the whole town must have been burnt. As it was, the tide of fortune had so far turned against the oligarchs that the Corinthian ship sailed away with the envoys, and most of the mercenaries slunk away to Epeiros. At this moment, when the demos was most fiercely excited, the Athenian fleet of twelve triremes under Nikostratos reached Korkyra with 500 Messenian hoplites from Naupaktos. The wish of the Athenian admiral was to effect an offensive alliance between Athens and Korkyra, and, having done this, to pour oil on the troubled waters. This task he thought that he had accomplished when he had persuaded the Korkyraians to content themselves with bringing to trial ten of the most conspicuous and intemperate of the oligarchic party; and he was about to return to Naupaktos when the demos begged him to leave five of his ships and to take in their stead five triremes which they would themselves man. The consent of Nikostratos was followed, as we might expect, by an attempt to man these ships with crews taken from the aristocratic faction. But the going into vessels under the command of an Athenian general was much like going to Athens, and the going to Athens was death. The fear of being thus carried away drove them to take sanctuary in the temple of the Dioskoroï. Nikostratos tried in vain to disabuse them of their terrors; but the people were now in a state of feverish irritation, and construing their reluctance to serve on shipboard as evidence of some hidden plot, they deprived their enemies of their arms, and made fresh attempts to destroy them which were again

baffled by Nikostratos. Four hundred oligarchs now took refuge at the Heraion; and the demos, seriously alarmed, carried them over to the opposite islet, and sent to them thither their daily supplies of food. While things were in this state, a new turn was given to affairs by the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet of 53 triremes off Sybota. The tumult in Korkyra was terrible when in the early morning Alkidas, with whom Brasidas was joined as a counsellor, was seen bearing down upon the island. In wild confusion the Korkyraians set to work to man 60 triremes, which they sent out one by one as they were filled instead of allowing Nikostratos to follow his plan of keeping Alkidas in check until the Korkyraians could advance in a compact body. There was, in short, no authority and no law. Two Korkyraian ships at once deserted to the enemy, and the scattered groups of the remainder seemed to the Spartans so contemptible that twenty ships only were kept back to oppose them, while the remaining thirty-three prepared to encounter the twelve Athenian triremes. But Nikostratos was a general scarcely less formidable than Phormion. By a successful charge of one of his triremes he sunk one of the Peloponnesian ships, and then, while the Korkyraians were fighting rather among themselves than with their enemies, he so pressed upon the Spartans by sweeping rapidly round them, that the twenty ships reserved to deal with the islanders were drawn off to the aid of Alkidas. In face of this overpowering force Nikostratos was obliged to retreat; but he did so with perfect calmness and with a leisurely movement which might give the Korkyraians ample time to get back to their own harbour. By sailing straight to Korkyra Alkidas might now have carried everything before him; but to the disgust of Brasidas he contented himself with going to Sybota after the battle and with ravaging the lands near Leukimmê for a few hours the next morning. Still fearing another attack the Korkyraian demos made overtures to the four hundred oligarchs whom they had brought back to the Heraion, as well as to others, and prevailed on some of them to aid in manning thirty triremes which were hastily made ready.

But the Peloponnesian fleet departed about midday, in all

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Massacres  
at Korkyra.

likelihood because they knew that large reinforcements might soon be expected for Nikostratos. Night was closing when fire-signals warned Alkidas that Eurymedon with 60 Athenian triremes was sailing up from Leukas. Escaping under cover of darkness, the Peloponnesians dragged their ships across the Leukadian isthmus,<sup>1413</sup> and so avoided an encounter. At Korkyra the approach of Eurymedon gave a vent to the pent-up fury of the demos who now felt that they might requite their assailants tenfold. They sent their ships round to the Hylleic harbour, as being the quarter where the demos was strongest; but before the vessels could reach the haven, the work of bloodshed had begun. Those of the oligarchic party who had been induced to serve on shipboard were taken out and slain. The suppliants at the Heraion were invited to come forth and take their trial. Fifty obeyed, and were all condemned to instant death, and executed within sight of their comrades. These chose rather to kill themselves than to be butchered by others: and the silence of death soon reigned in the Temenos of Hêrê. For seven days the massacre went on, and Eurymedon lifted not a finger to check or repress it.<sup>1414</sup> Suppliants were dragged from temples, or, like Pausanias at Sparta, walled up and left to starve within them. Nay, the merest private grudge served as an excuse or a full justification for putting a man to death. On the departure of Eurymedon five hundred only of the oligarchic faction remained alive. These, like the Samian exiles at Anaia,<sup>1415</sup> seized the Korkyraian forts on the mainland, and by frequent raids from these strongholds did so much mischief to the island, that the demos soon found itself pinched by famine. But their efforts to obtain aid from Sparta and Corinth were fruitless; and with a desperate resolution they landed on the island, burnt their ships to make retreat impossible, fortified themselves on the heights of Istônê to the north of the city, and made the surrounding country a desert.<sup>1416</sup> They had maintained this post for nearly two years, when an Athenian fleet on its way from Pylos

427 B.C.

425 B.C.

<sup>1413</sup> See vol. i. p. 159.<sup>1414</sup> We have seen that the influence of Nikostratos was used with some success to calm the excitement; but he is not mentioned in this narrative of Korkyraian affairs after the battle which preceded the arrival of the mean and merciless Eurymedon.<sup>1415</sup> See note 1375.<sup>1416</sup> Thuc. iii. 85.

to Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophokles, son of Sostratides,<sup>1417</sup> came to the aid of the demos, who were thus enabled to storm the fort and to bring to terms the garrison which had fallen back on a lofty and precipitous peak.<sup>1418</sup> By the covenant then made the oligarchic Korkyraians agreed to submit themselves to the judgement of the Athenians, and to give up their allies to the will and pleasure of the conquerors. Stripped of their weapons, they were taken to the islet of Ptychia, to be thence conveyed to Athens; but it was specially agreed that the attempt of any one man to escape would nullify the whole treaty and leave them at the mercy of their enemies. The demos or their chiefs were resolved that the treaty should be nullified, for they feared that at Athens the prisoners might be treated with ill-timed mercy, and they were sure that if life and freedom were spared to them these would be used only in furtherance of their old plans of crushing their former subjects. Emissaries were accordingly sent by these men to the prisoners, to cheat them into breaking the letter of the bond. They told them that the risk involved in an attempt to escape was at least to be preferred to the certainty of betrayal by the Athenians into the hands of merciless enemies, and they offered to provide boats to carry them to the mainland. The dismal ceremony went on. The boat was sent; the men got into it, and were taken; and the treaty was broken. The demos had gained their point, and to their lasting shame the Athenian generals had gained theirs also. These men were under orders to go on to Sicily; and to Eurymedon at least massacre was as nothing in comparison with the annoyance of sending home a body of prisoners in the charge of a deputy who would carry off all the honours of the victory.<sup>1419</sup> The lie which was to cheat the prisoners to their ruin was thus deliberately concocted between the Athenian generals and the chiefs of the Korkyraian demos, who now shut up their victims in a large building, from which they were taken,

<sup>1417</sup> Thuc. iii. 115.<sup>1418</sup> Ib. iv. 45.<sup>1419</sup> Mr. Grote lays this most monstrous crime to the charge of Eurymedon alone. *Hist. Gr.* vi. 487. Thucydides makes no distinction between the two. iv. 47, 2. It is possible and even likely that Eurymedon may have been the master spirit in this iniquity; but it is clear that Sophokles made no resistance and offered no protest, and thus far he must share the infamy of his more inhuman colleague.

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twenty at a time, and made to run the gauntlet between the swords and spears of their personal enemies. They came out under the impression that they were merely to be taken to some other place for safer keeping, and they found themselves in the hands of men to whom the power of torturing their enemies had become the greatest of all luxuries. Sixty had thus met their doom, when they who remained within the building found out what was going on. Then followed a scene far more fearful than that which crowned the achievements or iniquities of the madman Kleomenes.<sup>1420</sup> The Spartan king released his victims by the more merciful death of fire: the Korkyraians took off the roof of the building and began to shoot their prisoners down with tiles and arrows. The horrors which had already been witnessed at the Heraion were now seen here on a larger scale. All night long the work of murder and suicide went on, and in the morning the dead bodies were laid mat-wise on wagons and carried away from the city. The oligarchic faction was destroyed; and, like fire dying out for lack of fuel, the awful feuds which had drenched Korkyra in blood ceased, necessarily, to rend the island asunder.<sup>1421</sup> The narrative brings before us the picture of an unspeakably vindictive and savage people; nor is there any use in attempting to discriminate shades of guilt in criminals whose iniquities are all of so deep a dye. But one fact stands out, nevertheless, with singular clearness. The island was in orderly condition, when the oligarchic prisoners from Corinth came back with the deliberate purpose of stir-

<sup>1420</sup> See vol. i. page 419.

<sup>1421</sup> We hear no more of the internal condition of Korkyra until the time of the battle of Kyzikos, B.C. 410, when, if Diodoros, xiii. 48, may be trusted, fresh troubles broke out, and the demos, becoming aware of an oligarchic conspiracy for making the Spartans supreme in the island, sent to ask help from the Athenian admiral Konon then stationed at Naupaktos. Konon brought to Korkyra 600 Messenians, whom he left in the city while with his ships he took up his post near the temple of Hêrê. With these Messenians the demos surprised the oligarchic party, killing some and banishing more than a thousand. The slaves, we are told, were set free, and the resident foreigners admitted to citizenship. A few days later, a party friendly to the exiles seized the Agora, and on the return of these exiles another conflict took place, which ended in a compromise. If Diodoros be right in his dates, then the phrase of Thucydides, iv. 48, 5, ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε must refer to the war which was supposed to be ended with the peace of Nîkias, although elsewhere, v. 26, he rejects this distinction. See note 1849.

After this, the affairs of Korkyra are not brought before us again until B.C. 373, when the Spartans find the island in the highest state of luxurious prosperity, Xen. *H.* vi. 2, 6. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 161, thinks that the manumission of slaves and the admission of foreigners to citizenship contributed to this result. But Xenophon says that Mnasippos found an immense multitude of slaves in the island. If Diodoros be right, these must have been introduced subsequently.

ring up trouble within it. It was these, who, failing to win the verdict of a court of law, first resorted to the knife and the dagger. It was these who, after the departure of Alkidas, could not bear manfully the fortune which war had brought them, and who by a pitiless occupation of two years had so roused the fury of their enemies, that, when these had the upper hand, their vengeance burst forth with the fierceness of a winter flood and swept everything away before it. It is enough to say that in both parties the sense of patriotic union was dead, that the demos was at the least an apt disciple in that school of iniquity in which the oligarchic factions in Hellas generally had distanced all competitors, and lastly that the crimes of these oligarchic factions were the crimes of men who called themselves pre-eminently gentlemen, nobly born, nobly bred, generous and refined, yet not less superstitious and altogether more hard-hearted, selfish, and cruel than the men of less splendid ancestry on whom they looked down with infinite contempt.

The summer of the fifth year of the war brought to the Athenians some success nearer home than Korkyra. The islet of Minoa, now long since joined to the mainland, was used by the Megarians as a post to defend their neighbouring harbour of Nisaia. A narrow passage, between two moles jutting out into the sea and armed each with a tower at the end, was the only channel for ships. These towers were destroyed by battering machines placed on the Athenian triremes; and thus the Athenians were enabled to advance their blockading force from the Salaminian Boudoron almost to the entrance of the Megarian port.

The general in command of the successful force was Nikias the son of Nikeratos, a man who is said to have filled the office of Strategos even as a colleague of Perikles, but who is at this time first brought before our notice by Thucydides. From this moment he becomes one of the most prominent actors on the stage of Athenian politics, until his career closes under conditions thoroughly abhorrent to a nature singularly unenterprising and cautious. Utterly lacking military genius, possessed of not much power as an orator, caring more for the policy of his party than for the wider interests of his

Capture of  
Minoa by  
Nikias.

Summer of  
427 B.C.

Character  
and influ-  
ence of  
Nikias.



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country, this strictly conservative and oligarchic statesman gained and kept an ascendancy at Athens which might almost be put into comparison with that of Perikles. With both it rested in great part on the same foundation. In all that related to money Nikias, like Perikles, was incorruptible; and this fact alone, joined with careful decency of life, secured for him an influence with the people which from every other point of view was utterly undeserved, and which put it into his power ultimately to do to Athens mischief far more than counterbalancing any good which had been wrought by Perikles. The facts of his life are related by Thucydides with the innate truthfulness which marks his whole history; but, as we have already seen, the case of Kleon is not the only one in which his judgement of a man is not borne out by the evidence of his narrative. The crimes of Antiphon failed to modify his eulogy of the assassin whose political views he shared. Nikias was not guilty of the same offences: but if he had committed them, in the eyes of the historian he would still have been a man pre-eminent in the practice of every virtue.<sup>1422</sup> He had in truth much to recommend him to the affections of his countrymen. Endowed with ample wealth, he made use of his riches not for indulgence in luxury and pleasure but chiefly for the magnificent discharge of the Liturgies imposed on the wealthiest citizens. The munificence with which at such times he exceeded the obligations of law or custom answered a double purpose. It soothed a sensitive conscience as a religious offering to the gods: and it procured for him a general respect which the purity of his life heightened into admiration. Belonging to a family as illustrious as any in Athens, he was free not only from the supercilious insolence of men like Alkibiades and Kritias, but from the cold and stately reserve of Perikles. Generous in the gifts which were to increase his popularity, he was careful in husbanding and extending the resources which enabled him to make them. He was a speculator in the silver mines of Laureion, and he gained a large revenue

<sup>1422</sup> τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν. Thuc. vii. 86, 5. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 480, prefers the reading which gives the phrase as διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἐπιτήδευσιν. The difference of meaning, between the two is not unimportant: but it does not affect the fact that the influence of Nikias was due to a moral not to an intellectual cause.

by letting out slaves to work in these mines. He was perhaps a humane and kindly master; but a harshness which exacted from these involuntary workmen the very last mite would not have called forth from comic poets the sarcasms with which they assailed men who, like Kleon and Hyperbolos, lived on profits gained from meaner trades. In no way tainted with the philosophical tastes of Perikles, Nikias spent his leisure time in listening to the discourses of prophets whom he kept in his pay, while both his temper and the need of attending to his property made him either unambitious of public offices or even averse to filling them. Here again a carefulness which took the form of modesty increased the eagerness of the people to place him in positions which he wished rather to avoid, and to comply even with unreasonable demands which he made in the hope of avoiding them. But although his birth, his wealth, his character, and, perhaps more than all, the support of the oligarchical *Hetairiai*,<sup>1423</sup> tended to secure for Nikias an influence greater than that which Kleon ever attained, as well as a more frequent tenure of office, we must not suppose that he could count at all times on the steady majorities by which modern English administrations are supported. Such majorities could not be maintained under a constitution like that of Athens. At any moment Kleon might carry a decree, opposed to all oligarchical interests, which the oligarchical *Strategos*, still retaining his office, would be compelled to execute. But a state of things like this could last only so long as Athens remained practically what she had been in the days of Perikles,—in other words, while the oligarchical element in the state could venture on nothing beyond a modified opposition carried on by legal means. With the great catastrophe at Syracuse the Athens of Perikles passed away, and the political clubs at once began to exhibit themselves in their true character, as repressors of popular freedom

<sup>1423</sup> These clubs were well defined by Thucydides as conspiracies for securing a monopoly of office and the perversion of justice by overawing the tribunals. *ἑνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*. viii. 54. They all equally sought to trample on the *Demos*, but this common object was not allowed to be a hindrance to violent feuds between themselves. The existence of these clubs under such a constitution as that of Kleisthenes, strengthened by the reforms of later statesmen, shows the tenacity of the old aristocratic families and the force of that centrifugal sentiment against which the Athenian polity was the strongest protest ever made by any Hellenic state.

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Second out-  
break of  
the plague  
at Athens.

B.C. 426.  
Sixth year  
of the war.

and assertors of a right to quarrel as they pleased among themselves.

The summer in which Nikias captured Minoa was marked by the first interference of the Athenians in the affairs of Sicily. The autumn was darkened by the reappearance of the plague which after a lull of some time burst out with extreme violence for a twelvemonth. Some idea of the ravages of this fearful pestilence may be formed from the fact that of the heavy-armed troops furnished by the class of the Zeugitai <sup>1424</sup> not less than 3,400 died. The Hippeis or Horsemen lost 300, and of the victims from the main body of the people no reckoning could be made. But the earthquakes which took place in rapid succession in Attica and Euboea and especially in the Boiotian Orchomenos during the following winter and spring <sup>1425</sup> were so far a benefit to the Athenians that they prevented the invading army of the Peloponnesians from advancing any further than the isthmus. Soon after the retreat of Agis two fleets issued from Peiræus, one of thirty ships under Demosthenes, to retaliate on the coasts of Peloponnesos, the other of sixty ships carrying 2,000 hoplites under Nikias who was ordered to bring the island of Melos into the Athenian confederacy. <sup>1426</sup> The people of Melos and Thera, the two southernmost of the great central group of Egean islands, claimed to be Spartan colonies, and, as such, had steadily refused to join an Ionian league. They had, however, taken no part in the war, and their subjugation could scarcely have repaid the cost of the enterprise. But the attempt was unsuccessful; and after ravaging the island Nikias sailed to Oropos, and thence dispatched the 2,000 hoplites to the Boiotian Tanagra where they were met by the full force of the Athenians under Hipponikos the son of that Kallias who is said to have concluded with the Persian king the treaty which bears his name. Here the Athenians ravaged the land and incamped for the night, while Nikias with his ships devastated the Lokrian coasts. On the next

<sup>1424</sup> See vol. i. p. 203.

<sup>1425</sup> Thucydides, iii. 89, notices the phenomenon of an extraordinary ebbing of the sea at the Euboian Orobiai and at Atalante, followed by a rapid return of the tide which permanently submerged some portions of land. He expresses his belief that these results could be produced only by earthquakes.

<sup>1426</sup> Thuc. iii. 91.

day an unimportant victory over the Tanagraians and some Thebans who had come to their aid was followed by the retreat of the Athenian army and the return of the fleet to Peiræus.

Another enterprise which the Spartans undertook this year caused at Athens a greater alarm than the invasion of their own territory would have excited. The Trachinians of the Malian gulf, annoyed by the mountaineers of Oita, had thought at first of asking help from the Athenians. But the fall of Plataiai or the recollection that the power of Athens was practically confined to the sea led them to apply to Sparta; and their prayer was seconded by the men of the little Dorian tetrapolis which the Spartans regarded as their parent state, and which, like the Trachinian territory, had suffered from the forays of the neighbouring mountain clans. This alone would probably have sufficed to win for the ambassadors a favourable hearing; but the Spartans saw in this petition an opportunity for inflicting permanent and serious mischief on Athens. A military post not far from the well-known pass associated with the exploits and the death of Leonidas and his comrades might serve the double purpose of threatening the Athenian border, and of furnishing ready access both to Eubœia and to Thrace. The neighbouring forests would supply abundance of timber for building, and ten thousand colonists, among whom no Ionians or Achaïans<sup>1427</sup> were suffered to have a place, would suffice to protect the docks and harbours of the new city. Thus sprung into existence the town of Herakleia, from which friends and foes expected great things, and which hereafter was to attain some importance. But for the present a blight fell on the new colony. The habitual insolence and tyranny of Spartan officials alienated and dispirited many of the settlers, leaving them but little energy to resist the attacks of open enemies. Such enemies they encountered in the Thessalians who claimed as their own<sup>1428</sup> the land on which the city was built, and who feared the permanent establishment of a foreign power

Foundation  
of Hera-  
kleia by the  
Spartans.

<sup>1427</sup> The Achaïans were now no longer subject to Athens, and professed no friendship for her; but in the eyes of the Spartans they were too closely akin to the Helots to make association with them a pleasant or desirable thing.

<sup>1428</sup> See vol. i. p. 61.

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within their borders. Under their persistent attacks the numbers of the settlers melted away, and the Athenians found that nothing was to be feared from a colony which had started with high hopes, as under the special protection of Herakles.<sup>1429</sup>

Defeat of  
Demosthenes in  
Aitolia.

Tidings of a more alarming kind reached them from a quarter to which they had looked without forebodings of evil. The most signal triumphs of the Athenian navy had been achieved in the waters of the Corinthian gulf or in the more open Ionian sea; nor had the results of home operations in Akarnania been such as to justify expectations of disaster among the rugged mountain regions to the north of Nau-paktos. The thirty ships of Demosthenes, which left Peiraeus when Nikias set off for Melos, had reached the island of Leukas and there, joined by the troops of all the Akarnanian towns except Oiniadai, as well as by the Zakynthians and Kephallenians and fifteen ships from Korkyra,<sup>1430</sup> made a combined attack on the city. Overwhelmed by a fleet and an army far more powerful than any which they could oppose to them, the Leukadians remained passive within their walls: and the Akarnanians were urgent with Demosthenes that he should begin a blockade which they felt sure would soon bring about the fall of the place. But Demosthenes had formed other designs. The Messenians of Naupaktos had impressed on him the necessity of assailing in their fastnesses the savage clans of the Aitolian caterans, who, as living in scattered hamlets, could be attacked in succession and subdued long before they could combine their forces. So little did Demosthenes dread a conflict with wild mountaineers, some of them so savage as to be eaters of raw flesh, and all of them protected by impregnable fastnesses, that he looked forward not only to an easy conquest, but to making use of the Aitolians in further conquests beyond their borders. Second in ability as a naval commander only to Phormion, Demosthenes allowed himself to be carried away into schemes which Perikles assuredly would never have sanctioned. The caution which led the great statesman to oppose the expedi-

<sup>1429</sup> The name Herakleia was suggested partly by the local associations of mount Oita, and in part by the prominence of Herakles in the mythical genealogies of Sparta.

<sup>1430</sup> See note 1345.

tion of Tolmides to Tanagra <sup>1431</sup> would have resisted still more strenuously the daring but impracticable plan of restoring the supremacy of Athens in Boiotia by an attempt made not from Attica but from the passes of the Aitolian mountains. Yet such was the plan for which Demosthenes at the request of the Messenians abandoned the siege of Leukas and thus gave dire offence to his Akarnanian allies. With their aid as well as with the bands of mountaineers whom he intended to conquer, he would be able to descend into the little state of Doris, and being further strengthened by the forces of the Phokians (who, if ancient friendship failed to bring them of their own will, must be compelled to follow him), he would encounter the Boiotian confederacy and render Athens as formidable by land as she now was by sea. But his eyes must in some measure have been opened to the difficulties of his task, when on reaching Sollion the Akarnanians flatly refused his request for their help. Still, undeterred by their desertion, he set out from Oineôn, a town of the Ozolian Lokrians about fifteen miles to the east of Naupaktos, and with the 300 heavy-armed troops from his thirty triremes <sup>1432</sup> and his Kephallenian, Messenian, Zakynthian, and Lokrian allies, he incamped near the temple of Zeus Nemeios, associated with the traditions of the death of Hesiod, and on the following morning began his march towards the rugged sides of Oita. The villages of Potidania, Krokyleion, and Teichion were easily stormed; but the mountain tribes were now astir, and even the clans-called Bomians and Kallians inhabiting the valleys watered by the tributary streams of the Spércheios <sup>1433</sup> hurried to the aid of their kinsfolk. Still

<sup>1431</sup> See p. 64.

<sup>1432</sup> These heavy-armed men serving on board ship were called Epibatai. According to this passage, and to others in Thucydides, ii. 92, iv. 76, &c., there were ten for each trireme. Commonly they were taken from the fourth or Thetic class of citizens, the Hoplites serving on land belonging to the Zeugitai or second class. Before and probably during the Persian wars the number of Epibatai for each ship was forty, Herod. vi. 15; and this fact would of itself show that the conditions of a sea-fight then were much those of a land battle, the main object being to bring the ships together and to let the men fight it out. The anxiety of the Greek leaders to avoid engagements in the open sea is thus at once explained. When the Athenians learnt to employ a tactic more purely naval, the number of the Epibatai was necessarily lessened. See further the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* iii. 95, 2.

<sup>1433</sup> Thucydides, iii. 96, speaks of these classes as extending to the Malian Gulf. Dr. Arnold thinks that these words must not be taken as meaning that their lands stretched actually to the shore. Yet as Thucydides says it, he must, it would seem, have thought that they did. He may have been under a wrong impression; but in any case these tribes from their mountain homes would have a view of the gulf distant not more than eight or ten miles.

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the Messenians insisted that the enterprise was not merely practicable but easy: and without waiting for the Lokrian light-armed troops, of which he had the greatest need, he advanced to Aigion, a town not more than ten miles from the sea, and carried it by storm. But leaping down from the surrounding crags the Aitolians hurled showers of darts on the Athenians, falling back when these came forward, and harassing them as they again retreated. Everything depended now on the bowmen (probably belonging to the Messenians and Kephallenians) in the army of Demosthenes; but their captain was presently killed, his men scattered, and the retreat became a rout. Hurrying away from the Aitolian javelins, the Athenians fell into chasms worn down by the winter torrents, or were entangled in difficult ground from which only an experienced guide could extricate them. Unhappily the Messenian Chromon, who had thus far served them, was among the slain: and the mountaineers hastened to fire the woods in which these fugitives were caught. A few only found their way to the Lokrian Oineón, whence they had set out; and the triremes which had brought them from Leukas departed on their cheerless voyage to Athens. Demosthenes, not daring to face the people, remained in the neighbourhood of Naupaktos.

Attempt  
of the  
Aitolians  
and Spartans  
on  
Naupaktos.

But the Aitolians were now spurred on by the desire of further vengeance against the authors of the recent mischief; and when the envoys of the Ophioneis, Eurytanes, and Apódotoi appeared at Sparta, they spoke to no unwilling hearers. It was now autumn; but a force of 2,500 hoplites at once set off for Delphoi where they were joined by 500 from the newly-planted colony of Herakleia. Here Eurylochos, the Peloponnesian general, made an effort to detach from their alliance with Athens the Lokrian tribes through whose lands he must pass on his way to Naupaktos. Nor was he unsuccessful. The Amphissians, about ten miles to the west of Delphoi, were the first to give hostages for their fidelity, and to prevail on most of the Lokrian tribes to follow their example. The reason for their eagerness was not far to seek. They were in constant feud with the Phokians, and they were afraid that these would use their new allies to

crush them utterly in case of resistance. The hostages were sent to the Dorian town of Kytinion; and Eurylochos marching through the Lokrian lands took Oineôn and Eupalion. Keeping on in a westerly direction, he also took the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, now subject to Athens, and then turned round upon Naupaktos. But he had here a more formidable enemy to deal with. Undeterred by his last rebuff, Demosthenes went in person to Akarnania, and by persistent intreaty prevailed on the Akarnanians to come to the aid of the Messenian city. A thousand hoplites were embarked on board the fleet, and Naupaktos was saved. The long circuit of its walls could scarcely have been defended by the inhabitants alone; but Eurylochos, feeling that the presence of Demosthenes and his allies cut off all hope of a successful blockade, fell back to the west on the Aitolian town of Kalydon, the scene of the mythical boar hunt of Meleagros, and thence on Pleuron beneath the heights of Arakynthos. Here, having sent the Aitolians home, he tarried for a while at the request of the Ambrakiots who eagerly desired to make a third attempt to recover the Amphiloichian town of Argos.<sup>1434</sup> The winter season had begun when 3,000 Ambrakian hoplites seized Olpai, a fortress about three miles to the north of Argos. The Akarnanians hurried at once, some to the aid of Argos, others to occupy the spot known as Krenai or the Wells (about the same distance to the east of the city), for the purpose of preventing a junction of the forces under Eurylochos with the Ambrakiots at Olpai. They sent also urgent messages to Demosthenes who no longer seemed to them a person to be slighted, and to the leaders of the Athenian fleet of twenty ships then coasting off the Peloponnesos. Eurylochos was the first to move. Setting out from the Aitolian Proschion, not far from Pleuron, he crossed the Áchelôos, and marching unopposed through Akarnania which had sent her whole force northwards, left Stratos to the right and passed on through Phytia, Medeon, and Limnaia into the friendly territory of the Agraians. Descending from the Thyamian hill into the Argive land as the night came on, he made his way under

<sup>1434</sup> See note 1280.



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cover of the darkness between Argos and the Akarnanian army at Krenai, and so joined the Ambrakiots at Olpai. The combined forces then moved about two miles still further north and intrenched themselves at the spot called Metropolis.<sup>1435</sup> Soon afterwards the Athenian fleet sailed into the Ambrakian gulf and took up a position off Olpai, while Demosthenes, who was now chosen general of the Akarnanians, advancing with 60 Athenian bowmen, 200 Messenian hoplites, and his other allies, incamped on ground separated from that which Eurylochos occupied by the bed of a winter torrent of more than usual width. Five days passed without any movement, probably for the same reason which kept the Persians and Hellenes inactive at Plataiai.<sup>1436</sup> On the sixth day both sides made ready for battle. From the superiority of their numbers the Peloponnesian were able so to extend their line as well-nigh to surround their enemies: and Demosthenes resolved to adopt again the plan which had brought about the discomfiture of the Ambrakiots with Knemos at Stratos.<sup>1437</sup> Some broken ground covered with brake and brushwood afforded abundant room for an ambush of four hundred heavy and light armed troops who were to take in the rear whatever portion of the enemy's force might seem to be gaining the day. In the fight which followed the Peloponnesians under Eurylochos on the left wing were turning the flank of the Messenians under Demosthenes, when the Akarnanians starting from their hiding-place attacked them in the rear. Smitten with panic terror they not only fled themselves but carried most of their allies along with them. The death of Eurylochos and of the best amongst his men added to their dismay. In the meanwhile the Ambrakiots and others on the right wing had chased the enemy opposed to them as far as Argos. Returning to the battlefield, they found the day irretrievably lost, and made their way to Olpai in a disorderly retreat which added to the number of the slain, the Mantineians alone maintaining the steady discipline of Peloponnesian troops.

<sup>1435</sup> The hill of Olpai was used by the Akarnanians as their national court of justice. The northern part of this hill may have been known as the Metropolis rather as being the traditional site of their oldest settlement than because any town had been built there. It was, in short, the religious ground set apart for the tribal sacrifices.

<sup>1436</sup> See vol. i. p. 577.

<sup>1437</sup> See page 14.

Darkness was closing in when the battle ended. During the night Menedaios, who, having been third in command, had now taken the place of Eurylochos, convinced himself that his first duty was to escape from a difficult if not a desperate intanglement. It was his wish, of course, to extricate all who had fought on his side. When on the following day he made overtures to Demosthenes for a truce which should give them time for retreat, he was met by a refusal to all appearance peremptory; but he was privately informed that if he and his Peloponnesians chose to withdraw quietly and secretly, the Akarnanian generals would take care that their retreat should be unmolested. These ignominious terms were not refused; and the design of Demosthenes for discrediting them among the allies whom they abandoned and among the Greeks generally was thoroughly successful. While they were making ready for their secret flight, the Athenian general sent a large body of men to occupy strong positions and to lay ambuscades on the line of march from the city of Ambrakia to Olpai. The whole force of the Ambrakiots, knowing nothing of the defeat of Eurylochos, was on its way to join their kinsmen and allies; and their destruction would crown the achievements of Demosthenes. As the day wore on, the Peloponnesian troops under Menedaios began to steal away under pretence of gathering firewood or vegetables. The discovery of their retreat led the Ambrakiots to follow their example; and when the Akarnanians interfered to prevent them, they were informed by their generals that no hindrance must be placed in the way of the Peloponnesians, but that they might deal as they would with all others. It now became a nice question to determine whether any given man of the enemy was a Peloponnesian or an Ambrakiot: but, whether rightly or wrongly, two hundred were slain as Ambrakiots, and the rest found a refuge with Salynthios the king of the Agraians.

About twelve miles to the north of Olpai rose two precipitous hills, known as Idomenê.<sup>1438</sup> The higher of these two summits was occupied by the troops sent by Demosthenes to intercept the Ambrakiots, who, having already

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Retreat of  
the Peloponnesians  
after the  
defeat at  
Olpai.

Destruction  
of the Ambrakiots  
at Idomenê.

<sup>1438</sup> For the geography of this district, see the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* iii. 112, 1.

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posted themselves on the lower hill, yet knew not what had taken place. Demosthenes himself marched during the night towards Idomenê, leading one-half of his force up the pass, while the other half worked its way round over the Amphilocheian hills. At dawn of day the Ambrakiot sentinels heard themselves hailed in the familiar Dorian dialect by men whom they naturally took to be their friends. The spokesmen were Messenians whom Demosthenes had purposely placed in the van, and who now began the work of slaughter on men practically unarmed and defenceless. The Ambrakiots were in every way at a disadvantage. They were roused suddenly from their slumbers by enemies who had taken care to cut off all chances of escape. They knew little of the country: the Amphilocheians were intimately acquainted with it. Their enemies were lightly armed; they themselves were hoplites. For them the roads were blocked up; the men opposed to them had perfect freedom of movement. The necessary result followed. Many of the Ambrakiots rushed into the gullies and watercourses and thus into the ambuscades there set for them. Others hastened to the sea, and seeing the Athenian ships lying off the shore, thought that, if die they must, it would be better to be slain by Athenians than by barbarians<sup>1439</sup> whom they despised as well as hated. A few stragglers only returned to the Ambrakian city, while the Akarnanians, having plundered the dead and set up their trophies, betook themselves to Argos. Thither on the following day came a herald from the Ambrakiots who after the previous engagement had fled into the land of the Agraians. On the huge pile of arms taken from the men slain at Idomenê he gazed with such evident astonishment that a bystander asked him the reason of his wonder, and the number of the bodies which he demanded for burial. To his reply that they were at the most two hundred, his questioner answered by pointing out the obvious fact that the arms before him were those of at least a thousand men. 'Then,' said the herald, 'these are not the arms of the men who fought with us.' 'But

<sup>1439</sup> The Amphilocheians were supposed to be Pelasgians, and the Pelasgians were sometimes said to speak a barbarous dialect, and to be barbarians themselves. See vol. i. page 53.

they must be,' retorted the Akarnanian, 'if you fought at Idomenê yesterday.' 'We fought with none yesterday,' was the answer; 'the battle was on the day before when we were retreating from Olpai.' 'It may be so,' said the other; 'but these are the arms of the Ambrakiots whom we defeated yesterday on their way from the city.' The herald understood at once that the whole force of Ambrakia had been routed, if not cut to pieces, and with a loud and bitter cry of agony he departed without giving further heed to the errand on which he had come. So thoroughly was the strength of the Ambrakiots broken that the Corinthians were obliged to send for their protection a force of three hundred hoplites who with difficulty accomplished their march by land from the shores of the Corinthian gulf. In short, Ambrakia lay at the mercy of the enemy; and if the Akarnanians had chosen to attack it, they would have carried the town on the first assault. To this step they were vehemently urged by Demosthenes: but they had now gained their immediate end, and reverting to the old grudge they refused to follow his counsel. So ended the most fearful carnage of the war which was brought to a close with the peace of Nikias.<sup>1440</sup> The campaign had done little for Athens, but more for Demosthenes. Without calling on the state to aid him he had achieved a victory which insured to him the condonation of his previous mistakes; but the Athenians had gained nothing beyond a pledge on the part of the Ambrakiots that they would take no part in any operations directed against Athens. Even this gain was balanced by the engagement which bound the Akarnanians to abstain from all movements against the Peloponnesians,<sup>144</sup>

<sup>1440</sup> Thuc. iii. 113, 11. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 419, note. It was not until after the beginning of the Dekeleian war that the great Athenian historian began to regard the whole struggle from the attack of the Thebans on Plataiai down to the surrender of Athens to Lysandros as one continuous war. See notes 1349 and 1421. Thucydides purposely withholds the numbers of the slain for fear that his statement would not be believed: but he tells us that of the spoils one-third portion was assigned to the Athenians. What this portion was, he does not say: but if we may suppose that it was at least six times as great as the share reserved to Demosthenes as the general the share of the Athenian people would consist of the panoplies of 1,800 warriors. On this hypothesis the number of the Ambrakiots killed would be 5,400; nor would this represent the total of the slain. Of the panoplies reserved to the Athenians those only which were given to Demosthenes reached Athens and were dedicated in the temple of the city; the ship which was bearing the rest was taken on its homeward voyage.

<sup>1441</sup> See Appendix L.

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and which guaranteed to Menedaios and his troops a safe-conduct from the territories of Salynthios to Oiniadai: The Ambrakiots on their side were further bound to restore all forts or hostages taken from the Amphilochians, and to give no help to the men of Anaktorion in their feuds with the Akarnanians.<sup>1442</sup> The result was precisely that which these conditions would lead us to expect. Towards the end of the following summer the Athenians at Naupaktos joined the Akarnanians in an attack on Anaktorion. The inhabitants knew themselves to be absolutely cut off from all help, and the treachery which opened the city gates is easily accounted for. The Akarnanians expelled the Corinthians, and put in their stead settlers taken from their several tribes.<sup>1443</sup>

Purification  
of Delos,  
and re-  
newal of  
the Delian  
festival.

The war had cut the Athenians off from those great religious gatherings which formed the pride and delight of Hellenic life; and their memory turned to the old traditions which celebrated the ancient splendours of the Panionic festival of Delos.<sup>1444</sup> Amidst the troubles brought by war and pestilence the popular mind was easily fixed on any measures which might avert the anger of the gods and win their favour: and among the first of such duties would be the purification from all profaning things of that island in which Phoibos Apollon was born and to which he returned always with unabated joy. The tyrant Peisistratos had removed all dead bodies from the ground overlooked by the temple: the Athenians now decreed that henceforth neither births nor deaths should happen within its sacred limits, and the ashes of the dead were carried to Rheneia, an islet so close to Delos that Polykrates, it is said, had attached it by a chain to the holy island when he wished to dedicate it to Phoibos. Having thus fulfilled the duty imposed on them by an oracle,<sup>1445</sup> the Athenians went on to revive the ancient feast with a magnificence which they hoped might surpass that of former ages. At intervals of four years the wealth, beauty, strength, and skill of the Ionic tribes was to be exhibited in chariot races and other contests rivalling, if not

<sup>1442</sup> Thuc. iii. 114.

<sup>1443</sup> Ib. iv. 49.

<sup>1444</sup> See vol. i. page 116.

<sup>1445</sup> Thucydides, iii. 104, 1, dismisses the subject with the contemptuous words *κατὰ χροσμὸν δὲ τινα*. From Herodotos we should have had, probably, not merely the oracle itself but a circumstantial narrative of its origin.

surpassing, those of Olympia itself. The miseries which followed the renewal of the war after the peace of Nikias dispelled effectually these beautiful dreams.

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The seventh year of the war began with the usual invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesian army under Agis, the son of Archidamos; but the time of the inroad was earlier. The corn was still green, and a singularly cold and stormy spring added to the discomfort of the invaders while it increased the difficulty of getting food. But scarcely a fortnight had passed since they crossed the Attic border, when Agis received tidings which caused him to hurry homewards with all speed. The ill-success of the Aitolian campaign had not damped the courage of Demosthenes, or deterred him from forming elaborate schemes for bringing the war to a happy issue. His plan for restoring the supremacy of Athens over Boiotia by an invasion from the northwest was suggested by the Messenians of Naupaktos; in his present design he followed the advice of the same counsellors. He was in this case justified in doing so. He knew that they were intimately acquainted with the coast of the country which had once been their own and along which their privateers exercised their craft; and he knew also that the occupation of a strong post on Lakedaimonian territory would give to Athens an advantage immeasurably greater than any which she could secure by more distant conquests. In short, his present plan was one in thorough agreement with the policy of Perikles, and the high reputation which he had won through his victories at Olpai and Idomenê insured him a favourable hearing when he asked the sanction of the people for employing in any operations along the coasts of Peloponnesos the fleet of forty ships which they were sending first to Korkyra<sup>1446</sup> and then to Sicily. His request was granted; and the fact that he was not one of the Strategoi for the year<sup>1447</sup> attests the thorough confidence which his countrymen felt in his genius. But the generals with whom he sailed were less disposed to listen when on doubling the promontory of Mothonê he suggested that Pylos might serve

Occupation  
of Pylos by  
Demosthenes in  
the seventh  
year of  
the war.  
425 B.C.

<sup>1446</sup> The Korkyraian demos was at this time still annoyed by the oligarchical exiles who occupied mount Istônê. See page 181.

<sup>1447</sup> Thuc. iv. 2, 3.

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well for the purposes of his scheme. They may have remembered the peril into which Phormion was brought in the Corinthian gulf, because time was wasted in meddling with the affairs of Kretan cities;<sup>1448</sup> but although they insisted on sailing onwards, a storm brought them back to Pylos, and Demosthenes again urged the advantages of occupying a spot not much more than fifty miles from Sparta, well supplied with wood and stone for fortification, and surrounded by a practically desert country. Their reply was that many such spots might be found on the Peloponnesian coasts, if he chose to waste public money upon them; nor had he any better success either with the subordinate officers<sup>1449</sup> or with the men, although he insisted on the vast difference which the presence of a harbour and of Messenians speaking the same dialect with the Spartans made in favour of this particular spot. But the storm lasted on for days, and the men, wearied with idleness, began of their own accord to fortify the place by way of passing the time. They had come unprovided with iron tools for shaping stone, or vessels for carrying mortar; and they were thus compelled to build their walls after the old Cyclopean fashion. The blocks were laid together, so far as was possible, without mortar, smaller stones being thrust into the interstices; and in parts where cement was indispensable, the men carried the mortar on their backs with their hands folded over the burden. They soon took a serious interest in the work which they had begun almost in sport, and toiled hard to strengthen the comparatively small extent of ground which was not sufficiently fortified by nature, before a Peloponnesian army could be marched against them. Six days sufficed to complete the wall on the land side, and Demosthenes was left with five ships to hold the place, while the rest went on to Korkyra.

The bay of  
Sphakteria.

The spot thus chosen, associated with the traditional glories of Nestor, is described by Thucydides as a rocky

<sup>1448</sup> See page 148.

<sup>1449</sup> These are the Taxiarchoi,—not the ten officers so named who were chosen, one for each tribe, to command the infantry when all the forces of the state were called out for service, but the officers placed in charge of the Taxeis or elementary divisions which answered to the Spartan Lochoi (see note 158) and the Roman centuria, consisting, like these, in theory at least, of 100 men, although the numbers varied according to circumstances. See, further, Dr. Arnold's note on *Thuc.* iv. 4, 1.

promontory, known also under the name Koryphasion, separated from the island of Sphakteria by a passage wide enough to admit two triremes abreast. This island, fifteen furlongs in length or in superficial size (for his expression is not decisive on this point), stretched from northwest to southeast, a passage capable of admitting eight or nine war-ships abreast dividing it from the mainland. Within this break-water lay the spacious harbour of Pylos, in which Demosthenes hoped to raise to a higher point than ever the reputation of the Athenian navy.<sup>1450</sup>

The tidings that the Athenians were masters of Pylos had brought Agis and his men away from Attica. But when the invading army reached the Peloponnesos, the allies were not nearly so ready as the Spartiatai to go on at once to the scene of action. Their zeal may not impossibly have been cooled by a knowledge of the secret treaty by which Menedaios had secured his own safety while he abandoned his Ambrakiot allies. Still the Spartans sent orders to all their confederates to appear at Pylos with as little loss of time as possible; and a large force of infantry had assembled to attack the fortifications on the land side, before the sixty Peloponnesian ships, dragged over the Leukadian isthmus to avoid the Athenian squadron at Zakynthos, could return from Korkyra. Their plan was simple, and of its success they felt no doubt, if only the work could be done before Demosthenes received any reinforcements. The ships from Zakynthos might arrive at any moment; and in the interval it was indispensably necessary that the Athenians in Pylos should be crushed by a simultaneous attack by land and sea. Triremes lashed together with their heads facing seawards were to block up, it is said, both entrances to the harbour, while a body of Spartan hoplites, landed on Sphakteria, would not only make it impossible for the Athenians to use that island as a military post, but would support the fleet in its attack on the fortification. The former part of this plan was not carried out; but the hoplites, drafted by lot from all the Lochoi or centuries, were placed on the islet under the command of Epitadas. Demosthenes on his side had done

Attack of  
Brasidas  
on Pylos.

<sup>1450</sup> See Appendix M.



all that an able and brave leader could do. Before the Peloponnesian fleet entered the harbour, he had sent off two ships to summon with all speed the whole squadron from Zakynthos; and drawing up his own five triremes on the shore under the walls of his fort, he hedged them in with a stout stockade. Their crews he armed with such shields (for the most part of wicker work) as could there be got or made; and the few weapons which he placed in their hands were obtained from a Messenian privateer of thirty oars and a pinnace, from which he received also the not less welcome aid of forty hoplites. The greater part of his force he reserved for the defence of the landward wall against any attacks of the Spartan infantry, while with sixty hoplites and a few archers he himself went down to the rough and stony beach, where the weakness of his walls seemed likely to provoke the fiercest assaults of the enemy from their ships. In a few pithy sentences he told his men that in a condition like their own long-sighted calculations could do no good, and that their wisest course was to meet without thinking about them such dangers as they might have to encounter. At the same time he pointed out to them that, so far as he could see or judge, they had altogether the advantage of their enemies, and that even if they should be compelled to give way, there was no reason why retreat should not be followed by victory, if only they took care to fall back in good order. The day went precisely as he had anticipated. On the land side Peloponnesian besiegers were not much to be feared; and we are only told that they achieved nothing. The attack made by the fleet of 43 ships under Thrasymelidas is related with greater detail. In detachments of four or five vessels at a time the Spartans strove to effect a landing on some of the narrow openings by which alone they could approach the fort. The Athenians were already here to encounter them: but they had a powerful ally in the rocks and reefs which girt this dangerous promontory, and the captains of the ships exhibited a natural reluctance to risk the destruction of their vessels. Furious at the sight, Brasidas asked them whether they meant for the sake of saving some timber to allow the enemy to establish himself

in their country, while on the allies he urged the duty of sacrificing, if need be, every ship belonging to them as a small return for the long series of good deeds which they had received from Sparta. Then, insisting that his own ship should be driven straight upon the beach, he took his stand on the gangway ready to spring on land, feeling sure that a Spartan force, having once gained a footing on the shore, would at least take care to enter the fort along with the Athenians whom they would drive back, and there decide the matter in a hand-to-hand combat. But in this position he was exposed, before he could strike a blow or even attempt to leap on shore, to showers of darts and arrows. Struck down with many wounds, he fell back fainting into the fore-part of the vessel with his left arm hanging over the side, and his shield slipped off into the water. Dashed up presently by the waves on the beach, it was seized by the Athenians who with it crowned the trophy raised after the battle. The Spartans were completely baffled; and evening closed on the strange victory of Athenians on the Peloponnesian coast over Peloponnesians who sought in vain to effect a landing from their own ships on their own shores. Two days more were spent in futile efforts on the part of the Lakedaimonians to obtain a footing on the beach. On the third day they sent for wood for the construction of battering engines; but their schemes were disconcerted by the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthos. For that night the Athenian commanders were compelled to sail back to the islet of Protê, for Sphakteria was full of hoplites, the Spartan army held the ground beyond the fortifications of Demosthenes, and their ships lay just within the entrance to the harbour. On the following morning the Athenian generals advanced in order of battle, with the intention of forcing their way within the passage, unless the enemy should come out to meet them in the open sea. With a strange infatuation the Lakedaimonians quietly awaited their attack within the harbour; and the Athenians sweeping in at both entrances dashed down upon their ships, disabling many and taking five, with the whole crew of one, and running into those vessels which had fled to the shore. Others were seriously injured before they

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could be manned and put to sea; and others again, deserted by their crews, were towed away empty. The Spartans saw with dismay and grief that their hoplites were now cut off in the island, and putting forth their utmost strength, they rushed into the water, and seized these vessels with their hands. After a desperate struggle these empty ships were dragged back to the land, but the others were lost beyond hope of recovery.

Embassy of  
the Spar-  
tans to  
Athens for  
the negoti-  
ation of a  
peace.

The Athenians had won another and a decisive victory; and something must at once be done, if the hoplites in Sphakteria, many of them belonging to the first families of Sparta, were to be saved from starvation or from the imminent risk of being taken prisoners by an overwhelming force. Roman selfishness would have left them to their fate, as the senate refused to ransom the prisoners taken at Cannæ; but Hellenes had not reached this lofty standard of indifference or barbarism, and the ephors themselves at once hurried from Sparta to Pylos to effect a truce until envoys should have returned from Athens with the decision of the people whether for peace or for continued war. The terms on which this truce was arranged were sufficiently stringent. Every ship of the Lakedaimonian fleet, wherever it might be, was to be brought to Pylos and surrendered to the Athenians who were to yield them up again at the end of the truce in the condition in which they had received them; and no attack whether by land or sea was to be attempted against the Athenian fortifications. On the other hand the Athenians, while they agreed that the Spartans should under strict inspection send in a daily allowance of food and wine for the men imprisoned in Sphakteria, reserved to themselves the right of keeping a constant guard round the island, under the one condition that they should make no attempt to land upon it. The ratification of this covenant, the infraction of any one clause of which was to nullify the whole, was followed by the surrender of about sixty ships; and the envoys set off for Athens, while two Athenian triremes began the task of watching the island, after the fashion of the English ships round St. Helena during the imprisonment of Napoleon Bonaparte. Not very many days had passed since the Athenians had witnessed the

premature retreat of the invading army; and nothing was further from their minds than the thought that the next scene in the drama would be the sight of Spartan ambassadors suing for peace with a tone of moderation, if not of humility, in little harmony with their general character. The blockade of the hoplites in Sphacteria had suddenly opened the eyes of the Spartans to the exceeding value of forbearance and kindness, and indeed to the general duty of the forgiveness of injuries. They had learnt, if we may believe the report of Thucydides, the wholesome lesson that it is dangerous to carry a quarrel too far, and that a generous use of unexpected good luck was the surest means for converting an enemy into a steadfast friend. Such good luck had now fallen to the fortune of the Athenians: and it had therefore become their duty to improve the chance to the uttermost by granting a peace, which, as founded on feelings of genuine gratitude on the one side and of Hellenic brotherly kindness on the other, could not fail to be lasting. The Hellenic world, they added, was sorely in need of rest, and the boon would be not the less welcome because they knew not now who had begun the quarrel, and had at best a vague notion as to what they were fighting for;<sup>1451</sup> and lastly they hinted that a haughty rejection of their proposal would carry with it a new and terrible danger. Thus far Sparta was actuated by no feelings of uncompromising enmity towards Athens; but the loss of her hoplites in Sphacteria and still more their massacre if taken prisoners by the Athenians would make the Spartans their bitter and relentless foes in a war which must end in extermination on one side or the other.

Mephistopheles in trouble is an excellent preacher; but truth is not the less truth though it may come from the lips of a liar, and the Spartans were no doubt perfectly sincere in their professions of kindly feeling towards the Athenians. Adversity often teaches some very wholesome lessons, and the Spartans never spoke more to the purpose than when they said that the time for ending the war had come. They had

Debate at Athens on the propositions of the Spartan envoys.

<sup>1451</sup> We cannot tell how far this speech may be coloured by the historian: but if his report be correct, their words on this subject reflect vividly the selfish feelings which prompted the abandonment of the Ambrakiots by Menedaios and his men. See page 197.

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indeed forgotten, or they did not care to dwell on the fact, that when Athens was down under the scourge of the great pestilence, they had dismissed with contempt the Athenian envoys who had come to sue for peace;<sup>1452</sup> but many of the more moderate citizens were content to overlook this inconsistency in their wider regard for the permanent interests not of Athens only but of Hellas. Unfortunately among these moderate citizens not one was to be found who could venture to force these interests on the attention of the people. Had Perikles been alive and in the full vigour of his mental powers he would have insisted that the honour of Athens must be amply asserted; but he would have insisted not less earnestly that no unnecessary hindrances should be placed in the way of a settlement which Athenians might make not only with satisfaction but with self-respect. Not improbably he would have urged that the time was come for fresh attempts to bring about a Panhellenic union,<sup>1453</sup> although not much was to be expected from such attempts amongst a people radically incapable of getting beyond the life of cities. But Perikles was dead, and Kleon was living with a spirit unchanged from the day when he hounded on his countrymen to slaughter the friendly demos as well as the rebellious oligarchy of Mytilene. The account which Thucydides gives of the interference of Kleon in the debate is short and marked by his personal animosity to the man. Introduced with all the particularity of a first notice,<sup>1454</sup> Kleon is represented as saying that the Athenians could not honourably demand less than the surrender of the hoplites in Sphakteria with all their arms, and that after these men should have been brought as prisoners to Athens, the Spartans might make a further truce pending negotiations for a permanent peace, on the one condition of giving back to the Athenians Nisaia, Pegai, Troizen, and Achaia which had been extorted from them under constraint long before the beginning of the war.<sup>1455</sup> In making this demand it would be very hard to say that Kleon was either wrong or unjust. The possession of Achaia was a matter

<sup>1452</sup> See page 126.<sup>1453</sup> See page 63.<sup>1454</sup> The introduction in Thucydides, iv. 21, 2, is clearly superfluous after the very similar terms in which he is introduced, iii. 36, 5, before the second debate about the Mytilenaians.<sup>1455</sup> See page 55.

about which the Athenians could afford to be indifferent, so long as they had in Naupaktos the key of the Corinthian gulf; but they were fully justified in insisting on the surrender of the Megarian ports. The justification was in fact twofold. The Megarians had voluntarily sought their friendship, and they had requited the good services of the Athenians with a signal ingratitude which might well deserve the name of treachery;<sup>1456</sup> and further, as Megara could never stand alone, the state which held it in subjection would hold the key of the isthmus. It was not therefore to be expected that the Athenians would allow the Spartans to retain the privilege of throwing their armies into Attica at will; and freedom from the risk of invasion was the least that Athens could demand not only for her own credit but in the interests of her country population which had suffered so terribly during these six fearful years of war.

To these demands the Spartan envoys made no direct reply; but no rejection of the proposal was implied in their request for the appointment of commissioners to discuss the terms with them and submit the result, as it must necessarily be submitted, to the people. This step would not yield an inch of the great advantage which Athens had so unexpectedly gained. The Spartan fleet was in their hands; the Spartan hoplites had no means of escape from Sphakteria; and the movement of a Peloponnesian army against Pylos would not only vitiate the armistice but practically insure the destruction of the men for whose safety they were most anxious. But in the case of the Mytilenaians Kleon had availed himself of the popular feeling which was smarting under the sense of a causeless revolt on the part of a state which had been treated with exceptional kindness; and he now availed himself of the popular sentiment which sprang from a natural elation on success which had come as suddenly as it was unlooked-for and decisive. In turning this feeling to the recovery of Troizen and the Megarian ports he was using it for a thoroughly justifiable purpose: but the case was altered when, on hearing the request of the Spartan ambassadors, he burst out into loud and indignant denunciations

Rupture of  
the truce.

<sup>1456</sup> See page 54.

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of their double-dealing. He had suspected from the first that they had come with no good intent: he was now sure that they wished only to cheat and mislead the people, before whom he bade them speak out anything which they had to say. The envoys were taken by surprise. Popular debates were things unknown at Sparta; and the uncultured discipline under which their lives had been passed made them but little fit to cope with the bluster of loud-tongued speakers or to plead their cause before a vast assembly. Nor had any citizen of the moderate party, from Nicias downwards, the courage to demand that the request of the envoys should be submitted to the decision of the people.<sup>1457</sup> It was the duty of such citizens to deny the right of Kleon to impute evil motives to the ambassadors for requesting that they might be allowed to confer with commissioners or even to assume that questions of this kind could be fitly discussed in a large popular assembly. They might have insisted that although the people must in the last resort sanction or condemn the conclusions reached by the men whom they might appoint as commissioners, the preliminary stages would be far better left to the counsels of a few citizens selected specially for the task. Nicias, or those who agreed with him, might have urged further that of these citizens Kleon himself should be one; nor in such case could Kleon have repeated his impudent assumption, when it must have called forth the obvious retort that his words must be made good by some show of proof. But while the citizens of Athens were thus woefully remiss in

<sup>1457</sup> This was a matter with which they were as competent to deal as with the question whether the Mytilenaian people should or should not be massacred. Hence it is, to say the least, extremely difficult to understand the remark of Mr. Grote that 'the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defence for themselves; which Nicias might effectively second, but could not originate: and as they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair broke down.' *Hist. Gr.* vi. 447. Whether the envoys had as little skill in making a speech as the secretary of Mindaros, Xen. *H. i.* 1, 23, had in writing a letter, we are in no way bound to examine. They had committed no offence; and there was no reason why they should defend themselves. But beyond all doubt, it was as much within the competence of Nicias to assert that their request for the appointment of a commission was a proof of their good faith, as it was in the power of Kleon to hold it up as evidence of their duplicity. If it be answered that the popular sentiment was too clearly against such a concession to make it prudent to take such a course, this only proves that the Athenian people had advanced far towards that state in which the uttering of smooth things and the prophesying of deceits confer a stronger title to favour than the telling of the truth. But there is nothing in the narrative of Thucydides to warrant such a supposition: and Nicias might have gone against Kleon without administering to the people rebukes so severe as those which Kleon dealt to them in the matter of the Mytilenaians.

their duty, the Spartan envoys might well be deterred from saying anything further from the fear lest in case of failure their words should be misconstrued and their motives misrepresented among the allies of Sparta. The debates in which Kleon was opposed to Diodotos have shown him to be no mere fawner or flatterer of the people; and the sequel of the strange drama of Pylos will show that he is not chargeable with rash or presumptuous confidence. But it does not follow of necessity that the bold and bluff speaker is in the right; and Kleon in bringing about the contemptuous dismissal of the envoys was emphatically in the wrong. The Athenian people chose to follow him; but nations living under very different governments have been misled not less seriously and without more difficulty.<sup>1458</sup>

With the return of the envoys to Pylos the truce ended, and the Spartans demanded the restoration of their fleet. But the Athenians alleged against them some attack on their fortification; and as the slightest infraction of any one part of the agreement was to vitiate the whole, they refused, on this excuse, which the historian admits to be paltry, to surrender the Lakedaimonian ships. Protesting against the iniquity, the Spartans made ready to carry on the war. They did so at a great disadvantage: and the circumstances of the case generally make it more than possible that the double-dealing which Kleon imputed to the Spartan envoys was distinctly contemplated by Demosthenes and the Strategoi when the Lakedaimonian fleet was committed to their charge. Whatever may be said of the former, Eurymedon had shown at Korkyra a profound skill in the arts of treachery, and could well appreciate the advantage of insisting upon terms the violation of which he meant to bring about. Their one great object now was to cut off all possibility of escape from the hoplites in Sphakteria; and the most effectual way of preventing the Spartans from getting at them would be to deprive them of their ships. Nothing but the extreme value which the Spartans placed on the citizens thus cooped up in the island could have blinded their eyes to the risk which they were running if the Athenians should refuse to restore

Resump-  
tion of  
the war;  
blockade of  
Sphakteria.

<sup>1458</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 449, lays great stress on this fact.



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their fleet. It would then be impossible for them to relieve Epitadas and his men unless they could first storm the fortifications of Demosthenes and forcibly recover some portion at least of their fleet in the midst of a crowd of Athenian triremes. In other words, they could not hope to relieve them at all, except by stealthily conveying food into the island, nor could they look for any escape from the dilemma except to the slender chance that Epitadas might be able to hold out against a long blockade. That the blockade would be a strict one, the Spartans were well assured. The two Athenian guard-ships were sailing cross-ways round the island all day, and except when the wind blew strong on shore, their whole fleet kept watch round it on all sides, the front to the bay being guarded in all weathers.

Causes  
tending to  
prolong the  
siege.

But at first it seemed as though, in spite of these vast advantages, the Athenians would find that they had undertaken a task beyond their powers. Their slender garrison was itself besieged by an army which occupied the land on all sides: and one solitary spring on the summit of the little peninsula furnished a scanty supply of water for them and for the crews of the triremes. Compelled to land whether for sleeping or eating from ships which had no accommodation for either purpose, they scraped aside the pebbles on the beach to get such water as they might find underneath, and after a short time for rest returned on board to make room for others to land. On the other hand the hoplites in Sphacteria were well supplied from a spring in the centre of the island; and the Spartans on shore promised freedom to Helots and large rewards to freemen who might succeed in bringing ground corn, cheese, wine, or other provisions into the island. The storms which prevented the Athenians from keeping guard on the sea-side were chosen for the passage of light boats for which the Spartans had agreed to pay their value and which were run aground without scruple at the landing-places where the hoplites were on the look-out. Strong swimmers also contrived for some time without discovery to make their way to the island dragging by a rope sacks filled with food or wine; and Epitadas, looking to the possible failure of negotiations, had from the first husbanded

most carefully the abundant allowances which had been sent in with the sanction of the Athenians during the truce.<sup>1459</sup>

In short, the prospects of Demosthenes and Eurymedon were singularly dark and gloomy; and they were at once felt to be so at Athens when the tidings came not that Sphacteria was taken but that the hoplites within it were in no lack of food while their own men were beginning to be in want. The winter season would soon make it impossible for the fleet to remain on a coast where the crews could not land at night;<sup>1460</sup> and when the fleet was gone, the hoplites would soon escape in the boats which now brought them food, while Demosthenes and his men would remain to be starved into surrender. The feeling of elation caused by the coming of the Spartan envoys as humble suitors was followed by dark forebodings, and the popular feeling ran strongly not, as it should have done, in the channel of self-accusation, but, according to the Athenian fashion of shifting all responsibility upon advisers, against Kleon. The leather-seller was indeed sorely perplexed, and in the spirit of selfishness which characterises all sides in this fearful war<sup>1461</sup> his opponents were in the same measure delighted. At the spur of the moment he charged the messengers from Pylos with falsehood: but he felt that he had made a false move when they asked that commissioners should be sent to test the truth of their report, and when he himself was chosen along with Theogenes to discharge this duty. If he went, he must either eat his own words, if their account should be correct, or be soon convicted of a lie, if he ventured to put a better face upon the matter. Then followed a scene which singularly illustrates that state of political feeling in the oligarchic party at Athens which was afterwards to lead to signal disaster. In bringing about the dismissal of the Spartan envoys Kleon was distinctly both foolish and wrong. But the question now was how to insure the safety of the garrison and fleet at Pylos; and the question was one which concerned all Athenians alike, and in which banter and levity must be dangerously near the borders of treachery.

Mission of  
Kleon  
with rein-  
forcements  
for Pylos.

<sup>1459</sup> Thuc. iv. 39, 2.

<sup>1460</sup> It follows from this statement that either there was no entrance at this time into the lake now known as that of Osmyn Aga on the north end of the present peninsula of Paleokastro, or the Spartans had taken care to line its shores with troops.

<sup>1461</sup> See page 180.

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With all his faults and with all his recklessness in imputing falsehood to others, Kleon was none the less right in telling the Athenians, that if they believed the news just brought to them, their business was to sail without a moment's delay to help their countrymen and seize the hoplites in Sphakteria; that if the Strategoi then present were men they would at once do so; and that if he were in their place not an hour should be wasted before setting off. The reference to himself was at the worst only indiscreet; but Nikias, instead of feeling that Kleon was doing no more than pointing out his clear duty as Strategos, answered at once that, if the task seemed to him so easy, he would do well to undertake it himself. Kleon was again guilty of indiscretion, perhaps, in answering that he was ready to go; but he can be charged with nothing more, and his fault was more than atoned when on seeing that Nikias really meant to yield up his authority to him he candidly confessed his incompetence for military command. With incredible meanness, if not with deliberate treachery, Nikias called the Athenians to witness that he solemnly gave up his place to Kleon; and the eagerness of the demos to ratify the compact was naturally increased by the wish of Kleon to evade it. Except in language which Macaulay hesitated to apply to Cranmer, it would not be easy to speak as the conduct of a general deserves who, regarding the matter as a joke and a fair trap for catching a political opponent, could calmly propose to endanger the existence of his country by dispatching on an impossible errand a man whom he believed to be incompetent even for common military work. Either Athens was able to extricate Demosthenes and Eurymedon from their difficulties and so to bring their enterprise to a successful issue, or she was not. If Nikias believed that she was not, his duty was to state the fact: if he believed that the task was within her powers, he acted the part of a traitor in recommending as a substitute for himself a man who, as he thought, would depart only to his ruin. Noisy and arrogant as he may have been, Kleon yet was a man who, like Varro, refused to despair of the commonwealth; <sup>1462</sup> and he at once said that, if he must go,

<sup>1462</sup> Livy, xxii, 61. For the unfairness with which Varro has been treated see Ihne, *Hist. Rome*, ii. 229, 231, 243.

he should set out on his errand without any fear of the Lakedaimonians under the full assurance that within twenty days he would return home either having slain, or bringing with him as prisoners, the hoplites now shut up in Sphacteria. He added that he would take with him only the force of Lemnians and Imbrians then in the city with the peltastai from Ainos and four hundred archers.

The bitter animosity of Thucydides to the man who was mainly instrumental in bringing about his own banishment could not tempt him to suppress facts; but it led him to indulge in feelings which apart from this ground of irritation he would have scouted as unworthy of an Athenian. Kleon had done no more than assert that Athens was well able to do what Nikias held to be impossible; and Thucydides stigmatises this assertion and his confident anticipation of success as tokens of madness.<sup>1463</sup> Kleon had further taken care that his colleague should be the man whose genius had not merely planned the enterprise at Pylos but had successfully achieved a far more difficult task among the Akarnanian and Amphilochean mountains. He could scarcely have shown sounder sense or greater modesty in his arrangements: and yet Thucydides can tell us without a feeling of self-condemnation that Kleon's speech was received by the Athenians with laughter and that sober-minded men were well pleased with an arrangement which could not fail to insure one of two good things, either the defeat and ruin of Kleon or a victory over the Lakedaimonians which might open the way for peace. Still more astounding is his statement that the ruin of Kleon was what these sober-minded men especially desired.<sup>1464</sup> In the judgement of Englishmen these sober-minded men would be mere traitors: but it is hard, if not impossible to believe, that the words of Kleon were received with laughter by the whole body of the Athenians,<sup>1465</sup> and we are driven to the conclusion that in this instance personal jealousy has betrayed Thucydides into a distortion or at least into the exaggeration of fact. The laughter came probably only from the members

Attitude of  
Nikias and  
the oligar-  
chic party.

<sup>1463</sup> iv. 39, 3.

<sup>1464</sup> iv. 28, 5.

<sup>1465</sup> τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε κ.τ.λ. iv. 28, 5.

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Sphakteria  
by the  
Athenians.

of the oligarchic clubs and from those who were afraid of offending them.

Thus ended a scene infinitely disgraceful to Nikias and his partisans. But Kleon found himself at Pylos among men who were not less ready than the Athenians at home to fall in with his plan of immediate and decisive operations. They were thoroughly tired of being besieged themselves while they were professedly blockading others: and a fire accidentally kindled by Athenians who were compelled to land in parties on the island and dine under a guard had burnt down most of the wood in Sphakteria and greatly lessened the risks and the difficulty of landing. The Spartan hoplites could no longer shoot them down from behind impenetrable coverts, while they in their turn lay now exposed to the arrows of the Athenian bowmen, and the island could with comparative ease be traversed by a hostile force. These were points on which his disasters in Aitolia had made Demosthenes doubly cautious; but the accident further revealed the fact that the number of men in Sphakteria was much larger than he had taken it to be. Hence on the arrival of Kleon there seemed to be the more likelihood that the Spartans on the mainland would listen to the proposal which was at once made to them for the surrender of the hoplites who should be well treated until terms of peace could be arranged. But the Spartans would not hear of it; and with the full consent of Kleon Demosthenes arranged the plan of attack. On the evening of the next day their whole force of hoplites was placed on board the ships which began what the Spartans in Sphakteria supposed to be the ordinary night-circuit round the island. But before the day broke the 800 hoplites were disembarked both on the landward and seaward sides of the island, and hastened to surprise the outpost of thirty men who kept guard at its south-eastern end, and who were all slain before they could seize their arms. As the day dawned, the crews of all the ships, more than seventy in number, were, with the exception of the men belonging to the lowest tier of rowers,<sup>1466</sup> landed,

<sup>1466</sup> These men, the least efficient in the crew of a trireme, were probably without weapons of any kind, and hence could not go into action. See further Arnold's note on *Thuc.* iv. 82, 2.

together with 800 bowmen, 800 peltasts, all, in short, whether Messenians or others who chanced to be in Pylos; leaving only those who were absolutely needed to defend the landward wall against the besieging army. The great aim of Demosthenes was to do his work by means of the light-armed troops. An encounter of Athenian with Spartan hoplites could lead only to terrible slaughter in which not only would the Athenians probably be the greater sufferers but a large number of the enemy would be slain whom he especially wished to take alive. This end he hoped to achieve by surrounding them with numbers so manifestly overwhelming as to convince them that their only course was to surrender; nor could it be said that a slur was cast even on Spartan bravery if 390 men with their attendants<sup>1467</sup> yielded up their weapons to an army falling not much, if at all, short of 10,000. This vast force was distributed in parties of 200 on every eminence and on every spot of ground which offered the least advantage in attack whether in the front, rear, or flanks of the main body which under Epitadas maintained its ground by the spring in the centre of the island. From the first the Spartans had no chance. The stones and arrows shot from the slings and bows of their enemies told on them from a distance at which their own heavy spears were useless; and if they made a charge, the force in front fell back while others advanced to annoy them in the rear. Before them stood motionless the compact mass of Athenian hoplites; but all attempts to reach them were baffled by showers of weapons from the light-armed troops on either side. All, it is true, who came within their reach were borne down by the strokes of the most redoubtable warriors in the world; and at the outset the light-armed troops of Demosthenes, even at a safe distance, gazed, we are told, with feelings of wonder bordering almost on dismay upon men whose bravery, strength, and discipline had won for them a terrible reputation. But the discovery that at a little distance they were comparatively powerless so far restored their self-

<sup>1467</sup> It is not likely that these Spartans were attended in Sphakteria by the full number of Helots attached to each hoplite. See vol. i. pages 513 and 566. But on the supposition that there were three or four to each of the Spartiatai the whole force would be to that of the Athenians in the proportion of about one to five.

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possession, that rushing simultaneously from every side they ran with loud cries and shoutings on the devoted band. The dust from the lately burnt wood rising in a dense mass added to the perplexity of men already annoyed with a mode of fighting utterly strange to them. Unable in the fearful din purposely raised by their assailants to hear the orders given, they at length began to fall back slowly to the guard-post at the northwestern end of the island where the ground is highest: but the very fact of their retreat insured their doom. They had abandoned the only spring of water on the islet, and in a few hours more or less thirst alone would do all that Demosthenes could desire. But in the meanwhile they were comparatively safe. Their rear was covered by the sea, and the Athenians now as vainly strove to dislodge them from their position as the Spartans had thus far sought in vain to come to close quarters with the Athenian hoplites. Demosthenes and Kleon were, however, soon relieved of their perplexity. The leader of the Messenian allies, pledging himself to find a track which should bring them to the rear of the enemy, led his men round from a spot not within sight of the Spartans, and creeping along wherever the precipitous ground gave a footing, suddenly showed himself above them. The traditional story of Thermopylai seemed to repeat itself in this incident: but Demosthenes was specially anxious that the surprise should not be followed by another slaughter of the Three Hundred. Summarily checking all further attack, he sent a herald to demand their unconditional surrender; and the dropping of their shields as their hands were raised aloft showed that the inevitable terms were accepted. Epitadas was amongst the slain: Hippagretes who as second in command had taken his place was just alive and no more; but Styphon who acted in his stead made the seemingly superfluous request for permission to consult his countrymen on the mainland before taking any decisive step. The decisive step had been already taken: and the Athenians were not more likely to give them an opportunity of renewing the fight than they had been willing to restore their ships after the rupture of the truce. Nevertheless his prayer was granted, and after

two or three messages the final answer came that Styphon and his men were left to act according to their judgement, provided only that they did nothing to disgrace themselves. Under such circumstances surrender could carry with it no disgrace, and on receiving this last message they at once gave up their arms, and the men were distributed among the several trierarchs for safe conveyance to Athens. Four hundred and twenty hoplites had been cooped up in Sphacteria when Kleon arrived with his reinforcements.<sup>1468</sup> Of these 292 lived to be taken prisoners, and of these again not less than 120 were genuine Spartiatatai of the noblest lineage. The loss of the Athenians was trifling.<sup>1469</sup>

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Seventy days had passed away since the victory of the Athenian ships in the harbour of Pylos had cut off the hoplites in Sphacteria from all communication with the army on land: but so carefully had Epitadas husbanded the provisions brought in during the three weeks of truce, or so successfully had the Peloponnesian boatmen and swimmers evaded the Athenian guard-ships, that the besieged were in no danger of famine when Demosthenes and Kleon determined to cut short the contest. The work was now done. Within twenty days from the time of his departure Kleon re-entered the harbour of Peiræus, bringing with him the costliest freight which had ever been landed on its shores. If Herodotus had been writing the history of this stirring drama, he would have given us a series of vivid pictures and anecdotes, illustrating the proud and enthusiastic welcome which the demos gave to the man who had not been infected with the fears or the treachery of the oligarchic faction, the bright hopes of a coming peace which should soon obliterate all marks of recent ravage from the pleasant fields of Attica, and the firmness with which in spite of their anxiety to be rid of the war they were resolved to maintain the dignity and the honour of Athens. From Thucydides we have nothing more than the curt comment that the mad pledge of Kleon had thus been literally redeemed; but it is possible

Return of  
Kleon with  
the Spartan  
prisoners to  
Athens.

<sup>1468</sup> Thuc. iv. 8, 9, and 38, 5.

<sup>1469</sup> Nothing is said of the Helots during the whole time of the action; and we must suppose that they had neither slings nor bows, and thus could do nothing to call for any notice.



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that the harsh and ungenerous question<sup>1470</sup> which he mentions as being put to some of the Spartan prisoners may have been asked by some Athenian citizen as in the full flush of triumph he saw them pass on the road from Peiraiæus to the city. The convention by which Menedaios had not long since sacrificed his Ambrakiot allies to secure the safety of his Peloponnesian troops had done much to lower the pre-eminence of Sparta; and the traditions of past generations rather favoured the belief that they would die fighting to the last gasp, than warranted the anticipation of their surrender. But only a hard and narrow spirit could have prompted the question which asked of the prisoners whether the brave and noble among them<sup>1471</sup> had been all slain. The retort that the arrow must be precious indeed which could distinguish between the good and the base showed something of the readiness of Dienekes.<sup>1472</sup> On the verdict of Thucydides little needs to be said. Disgraceful though it may be, it is not nearly so disgraceful as the conduct of Nikias and his partisans in not merely suffering but compelling Kleon to undertake a work which they regarded as fit only for a madman. The judgement of the historian is, in short, the judgement of his party; and it proves not the insanity of Kleon but the political immorality of those who would have it that 10,000 Athenians, under a general singularly fertile in expedients, popular with his men, and supported by precisely the kind of force which he most needed, could not hope to capture 400 Spartans who were cut off from all possibility of escape by a hedge of the enemy's ships and the forfeiture of their own navy.<sup>1473</sup> It would have been happy indeed for Athens, happy, perhaps, for the Hellenic world in general, if at Syracuse Demosthenes had had as his superior in command not Nikias but Kleon.

<sup>1470</sup> Thuc. iv. 40, 2.<sup>1471</sup> *Ib.*<sup>1472</sup> Herod. vii. 226. See vol. i. page 510.<sup>1473</sup> The representations of the comic poets may be dismissed in a few words. In strict justice they deserve no notice at all. That the comedies of such a poet as Aristophanes are wonderful not only for their wit and brilliance but as illustrations of Athenian life, manners, and modes of thought, no one could be so infatuated as to deny; but if the characters of men are to be blackened, we may at the least demand that the picture drawn by the accuser shall be consistent with facts actually known to us from other sources. Now we know that the elaborate picture drawn of Sokrates is not only a distortion or an exaggeration of facts, but, to speak judicially, is an absolute lie. At the outset he may possibly have used language which might give some coun-

tenance to the imputations of Aristophanes; but the repetition of these insinuations at a later time would be as near to the truth as a biography which should represent Strafford as to the last an uncompromising opponent of despotism. Except at the outset of his career, of which we know but little, Sokrates, far from being a dreamy and absent star-gazer, spent his life in protesting against all astronomical speculations and indeed against all physical inquiries generally. We are therefore at once acquitted of all obligation even to examine personal charges brought against any other men whom he chooses to hold up to ridicule; but there are few instances in which an examination would fail to exhibit his statements as worthless gossip or deliberate slander. We have already seen the absurd contradictions involved in his references to Perikles, see Appendix I. He is not less inconsistent in what he says of Kleon. The gist of his remarks in the *Knights* is that Kleon first thrust himself into the office of general and then reaped another man's harvest. Thucydides hated Kleon more vehemently perhaps than Aristophanes can have hated him; but from Thucydides we learn (1) that the office was thrust upon him, sorely against his will by men who wished to make a joke of the destruction of an Athenian fleet and army, and (2) that, far from wishing to rob Demosthenes of his credit, Kleon chose that general specially as his colleague, and left to him both the plan and the execution of the attack. Between these two men there is every appearance of cordial co-operation: but from the moment of his arrival at Pylos Kleon is wholly subordinate to the more experienced and gifted commander who had planned the enterprise. The modest position thus assumed by him is more creditable than anything else that is related of him.

## CHAPTER V.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE CAPTURE OF  
SPHAKTERIA TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS.BOOK  
III.

Change in  
the popular  
feeling at  
Athens.

THE success of Demosthenes and Kleon had a marked effect on public feeling at Athens. The occupation of Pylos, bringing with it the hope of capturing the hoplites shut up in Sphakteria, had not only removed the depression which till then had been very generally felt, but had awakened in the party of which Kleon was the most prominent speaker a desire of recovering for Athens the supremacy which she had won and lost before the thirty years' truce. But there were nevertheless many to whom such schemes appeared impracticable; and it was only the personal influence of Kleon which turned the scale in favour of carrying on the war. Now, it would seem, no voice was raised on behalf of peace; and Nikias had brought on himself so much disgrace by his behaviour in the matter of Sphakteria that he could not venture on warnings which would now have been both seasonable and wholesome. The utter disgust for the war which marks the 'Acharnians,' a comedy exhibited by Aristophanes about six months before the victory of Kleon, had given way before the more confident and resolute temper shown in his play of the 'Horsemen' or 'Knights.' The Athenians could now make peace whenever they might choose to do so; but without offering for the present any terms to the Spartans they placed a permanent garrison at Pylos, and the exiled Messenians returning eagerly from Naupaktos began to lay waste the Lakonian territories and to invite those desertions of their kindred Helots which soon afterwards, it is said, tempted the Spartans into a crime as frightful as any recorded in the long and blood-stained

annals of slavery. To them it seemed as if the very foundations of their state were giving way. The selfish convention of Menedaios with Demosthenes, the readiness with which they had undertaken practically to coerce their allies into the peace by which they wished to recover the prisoners in Sphakteria, had lowered them greatly in their own self-esteem and in the eyes of the Hellenic tribes generally. The people whom they had vanquished and driven away centuries ago were now flocking back to plague them with a warfare of the most harassing kind. Their serfs were hastening to make common cause with these roving plunderers: and well-nigh 300 Spartan hoplites were in chains at Athens, ready to be brought out and slain in sight of any Peloponnesian army which might dare to cross the Athenian border. They were, in truth, greatly and unexpectedly humbled; and their humiliation was shown in more than one fruitless embassy for peace. The Athenians met each proffer by a larger demand, and there was no Perikles at hand now to convince them that they were acting unwisely in pressing good fortune too far.

The northern portion of the Peloponnesos was now to suffer from their activity. A fleet of eighty ships with 2,000 hoplites, 200 horsemen in transports, and a body of Milesian, Andrian, and Karystian allies, issued from Peiræus under cover of night, and before dawn the army had disembarked on the beach beneath the hill on which stood the unfortified village of Solygeia distant about six miles from Corinth and two from the isthmus. Tidings of the intended expedition had reached the Corinthians from Argos; but they had not calculated on a night voyage, and the Athenians under Nikias landed without opposition. Fire-signals announcing the event called forth the whole available Corinthian force. One-half was stationed at Kenchreia to prevent any movement of the enemy on Krommyon, a town to the east of the isthmus. Battos with one Lochos or company occupied the height of Solygeia, while the other general Lykophon advanced to give battle to Nikias. The fight was one at close quarters throughout; but the issue of the obstinate contest, after a temporary repulse of the Athenians, was

Campaign  
of Nikias on  
the coasts of  
the Saronic  
gulf.

determined by the Athenian cavalry. The Corinthians, destitute of horsemen, were at length made to give way, and they took up a strong position on the summit of Solygeia.<sup>1474</sup> Lykophon himself was killed, along with 212 Corinthians: the Athenian loss did not exceed 50. The Oneian hill had cut off the other half of the Corinthian army at Kenchreia from the sight of the battle; but clouds of dust showed them what was going on, and the approach of this large reinforcement convinced Nicias of the prudence of a retreat to the islets lying off the coast. Leaving these, the Athenians sailed on the same day to Krommyon, and ravaged its lands. On the next day turning southwards and making some descents as they went along, they occupied the peninsula between Epidauros and Troizen, on which lay the city of Methone, and building a wall across the isthmus, made it a permanent post from which raids might be made on the coast lands of the neighbourhood.<sup>1475</sup>

Capture of  
the Persian  
envoy Ar-  
taphernes  
on his way  
to Sparta.

The history of this momentous year was not yet closed. An Athenian fleet had yet to make its way to Sicily, and on its voyage Eurymedon was to bring about by his detestable treachery the slaughter which marked the end of the bloody struggles at Korkyra.<sup>1476</sup> An incident on the shores of the Egean brought the Athenians into momentary contest with the Persian power. Artaphernes, an envoy from Artaxerxes to the Spartans, was seized at Eion<sup>1477</sup> on the mouth of the Strymon by Aristides the son of Archippos, the commander of one of the tribute-gathering Athenian ships, and was brought to Athens with his dispatches. The gist of these lay in the complaint that with all his efforts the king could not make out what the Spartans wanted. Their ambassadors had come each with a different story, and if they wished to make their meaning clear, they must send with Artaphernes

<sup>1474</sup> Thuc. iv. 44, 1. The phrase here used is *ἔθεντο τὰ ὄπλα*, translated by Dr. Arnold as 'they piled their arms' after the fashion of hop-poles in winter time, 'a certain sign that they were not going to move again.' We have already seen that the phrase cannot always bear this meaning, see note 1274; but if it was so sure a sign that they would move no more, then Thucydides needed not to trouble himself to add the words *καὶ οὐκέτι κατέβαινον ἀλλ' ἠσούχαζον*.

<sup>1475</sup> Thuc. iv. 45.

<sup>1476</sup> See page 184.

<sup>1477</sup> Thucydides, iv. 7, speaks of Simonides the Athenian general as taking during this same year the Mendaian colony of Eion, which he soon afterwards lost. This is certainly not the Strymonian Eion, which had long been an Athenian possession. But the name, meaning simply a shore, may have been common to many places.

men who could speak intelligibly. The Athenian assembly listened probably with a smile to this courtly rebuke of the stupidity or disingenuousness of a people so aristocratic that they could not do without a brace of kings: but the perplexity of Artaxerxes points to the radical evil of a government which allows no open discussion, which intrusts to its magistrates an undefined and arbitrary power, and which by changing these magistrates every year runs the risk of having the secret policy of one thwarted or defeated by the secret policy of another. The dispatch of Artaxerxes never reached Sparta. Artaphernes was sent back to Ephesos with some Athenian envoys to the great king. About the objects of their mission nothing is said; but if we may fairly infer that they aimed at detaching Persia from all alliance with Sparta, we may be quite sure that they were guiltless of the treachery which led the Spartans to call down the force of an Asiatic despot to aid them in crushing an Hellenic city. To them the absurdity of bringing a Persian fleet or army to the Peloponnesos was manifest: and in the East their only interest was to keep the Persian king within the bounds which for nearly half a century he had been compelled to respect. But the object of the Athenians, whatever it may have been, was frustrated by the death of the king.<sup>1478</sup> The envoys heard the tidings at Ephesos, and returned straight to Athens.

The building of a new wall to their city by the Chians seemed to the Athenians to forebode a rebellion such as that which they had already had to crush in Samos and Lesbos, and a peremptory order was at once sent to them to pull it down. The oligarchs protested that the thought of revolt had never entered their minds: but the Athenians had learnt caution, and the destruction of the wall on which they had

Order to the Chians to pull down the new wall of their city.

<sup>1478</sup> The annals of Persia have happily at this time little to do with the history of Greece. The cowardly Xerxes had been murdered in the year of Kimon's victories on the Eurymedon, 465 B.C.; and Artabanos, one of his assassins, having succeeded in inducing his son Artaxerxes to put his brother Dareios to death as an accomplice in the crime, tried next to murder Artaxerxes himself. But he was foiled in this, and was put to death. The reign of Artaxerxes the Longhanded, μακρόχειρ, lasted for 40 years, to B.C. 425. His son and successor Xerxes was killed after a reign of a few weeks or months, and the same fate befell another son named Sogdianos, who was followed by a third son, Ochos, who, known as Dareios Nothos, reigned for about 20 years, to B.C. 404. His sons Artaxerxes Mnemon and the younger Cyrus, the children of Parysatis, will become prominent in the later history.

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toiled during the summer gave the Chians occupation during the winter which closed the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war. The decision of the Athenians was soon justified by the hostile movements of Lesbian exiles on the opposite mainland. These in the following spring with the aid of some Peloponnesian mercenaries seized Rhoiteion and gave it up again for 2,000 Phokaian staters, and then having occupied Antandros set about making it a permanent post for annoying Lesbos and other allies of Athens.<sup>1479</sup>

Athenian  
occupation  
of Kythera.  
424 B.C.

The Spartans had been already more than vexed by the settlement of a hostile force on the little peninsula of Pylos; but within sight of the southeastern promontory of Lakonia lay an island, of which according to an old story the sage Chilon had said that it would be well for the Spartans if they could sink it to the bottom of the sea.<sup>1480</sup> So long as this island of Kythera was not in the hands of an enemy, it was to them doubly a source of profit. Thither came fleets of merchant ships from Egypt and Libya, and here the Spartans had a post from which they could with ease keep off all privateers from the Lakonian coasts; for except in the bay at the head of which lay the port of Gytheion a mighty wall of cliff rose sheer from the coast, leaving for the most part no foothold even for the bravest and the most skilful mariner. The island was inhabited by Lakedaimonian Perioikoi governed by a magistrate sent annually from Sparta: but whatever precautions the Spartans may have taken (and Thucydides tells us that they guarded Kythera with more than usual care), they were ineffectual against the energetic attacks which Nikias and his colleagues, with a fleet of sixty ships carrying 2,000 hoplites and some horsemen, made simultaneously upon the two towns in the island. Skandeia, probably on the southern or western coast, was taken at once: Kythera, facing the Malean promontory, was carried after a short engagement. In fact, the resistance was more nominal than real; and the enterprise had been in part con-

<sup>1479</sup> Thuc. iv. 52. This fortress was seized some months later by Demodokos and Aristeides the admirals of the Athenian tribute-gathering ships. Thuc. iv. 75. They had no mind to allow the growth of another Anaxia, from which the Samian Demos had received so much annoyance and the Spartan Alkidas so much help.

<sup>1480</sup> Herod. vii. 235. See vol. i. page 511. This portion of the history of Herodotos must, it would seem, have been written before the descent of Nikias on the island.

certed with a friendly body among the people who wished to be rid of the oligarchic rule of Sparta. But for these allies the Athenians would without hesitation have dealt with Kythera as they had dealt with Aigina.<sup>1481</sup> As it was, some few were sent to take their trial at Athens, under promise, however, that they should not be put to death; and the Athenians set to work to show the Spartans how they meant to use their new conquest. Athenian ships made descents on Asine, Helos, and other places on the Lakonian gulf. The garrison on duty at Kotyrta and Aphrodisia, having first repulsed some light-armed troops of the enemy, fell back before their hoplites. The lands of Epidauros Limera on the eastern coast were then ravaged, and lastly the Athenian fleet appeared before Thyrea where the expelled Aiginetans had found a home. Retreating from the port on the coast to the upper city somewhat more than a mile inland, the Aiginetans prepared to defend themselves as best they could without the help of a Lakedaimonian force which, refusing to run the risk of blockade, remained inactive without the walls, while the Athenians carried Thyrea by storm. The Aiginetans captured within it were all taken to Athens and were all there put to death. Thus was swept away the remnant of that people who had shared with the Athenians the glory of Salamis, and a second catastrophe as horrible as that of Plataiai attested the strength of the fatal disease which rendered impossible the growth of an Hellenic nation. The Spartan commander Tantalos, captured with these victims of ancient and exasperated feud, was kept a prisoner along with the hoplites surrendered in Sphakteria.<sup>1482</sup>

It was at this time, it would seem, that the Spartans committed a crime, the reality of which we can accept only on the assertion of an historian with whose veracity even personal hatred was not allowed to interfere. Among those who risked life and limb to convey food to the men shut up in Sphakteria the most prominent were the Helots to whom the Spartans had promised freedom as the reward of their good service; and we have not the slightest evidence that the men thus freed were among the number of the serfs who

Massacre  
of Helots  
by the  
Spartans.

<sup>1481</sup> See page 114.

<sup>1482</sup> Thuc. iv. 57.



joined the Messenians re-established in Pylos. In spite of all the darkness which shrouds the history of this unfortunate people, we know at the least that they did not belong to the class which the wretched dichotomy of Aristotle set down as natural slaves. If any trust is to be put in the old traditions, the Achaians who were trampled under foot by the Dorian invaders had been the freemen whose chiefs had a voice in the Agora of Menelaos and Agamemnon; and the Messenians who had been reduced to the degradation of Helots were, not less than the Spartans, sprung from the vaunted stock of conquerors who entered Peloponnesos with Temenos, Kresphontes, and the twin sons of Aristodemos. There was, therefore, no ground for surprise if these Helots showed themselves determined to recover the freedom which had its immortal champion in Aristomenes; and if to obtain this right they were ready to risk life itself in the interests of their present masters, this was at once a proof that what they sought was liberty for themselves, and not the ruin of the people who had robbed them of it. But, if Thucydides may be believed, the eyes of the Spartans were blinded to everything except the fact that Helots (probably those who had not been manumitted) were deserting to the Messenians at Pylos, and that the success of Nikias had opened for them another refuge at Kythera. Happily for the lasting interests of mankind the most strenuous preachers of the gospel of slavery have never hesitated to act towards the slaves of other men on the hypothesis that of all evils slavery is the worst; and even Aristotle himself who would concede to his own 'animated machines'<sup>1483</sup> the right of rebellion no more than he would concede it to his horses or his asses would without scruple, if he wished to ruin the citizen of another state, teach that man's 'breathing instruments' that they had fully as much right to be free as their master. The panic fear caused by the dread of such teaching has led to some crimes the enormity of which staggers our powers of belief; but these crimes have in their turn sealed the doom of that accursed system which received an execrable sanction from philosophers like Aristotle and Plato. Goaded on by such

<sup>1483</sup> ἔμψυχον ὄργανον. *Polit.* i. 4, 2.

unreasoning terrors, the Spartans, it is said, made use of the good services done to them by the Helots at Sphacteria as the trap for insnaring to their destruction the most high-spirited and able of these unhappy bondmen. They issued a proclamation that all who felt that their exploits on behalf of Sparta gave them a title to freedom might at once come forward and claim it, under the assurance that if their claim should be found to rest on good evidence the boon should be conferred upon them. How many came forward we are not told: two thousand, it is said, were selected as worthy of liberty, and with garlands on their heads went the round of the temples in which they now stood on a level with the highest born Dorian. But the Spartans never meant that the gift should be really enjoyed. A few days later, of these 2,000 men not one remained to be seen. How they had disappeared, no one ever could say: but if they lived at all, their place literally knew them henceforth no more. If we hold that the crime was committed, there seems to be no other time to which we can possibly assign it: but there is a strange inconsistency in the readiness of the Spartans to employ the surviving Helots on foreign service after wreaking on them cruelties which might waken a desperate resistance in the meanest-minded of mankind. If there was danger in setting helots free, there was greater danger in placing arms in the hands of their kinsfolk after a massacre more ruthless than any other of which we hear even in Greek history. Yet Helot hoplites not many months later are dispatched with Brasidas to Thrace; and no catastrophe follows. The question must remain wrapped in obscurity; but if the facts are truly stated, the free Spartiatæ must have been possessed of coercive powers of which we can form no adequate idea.<sup>1484</sup>

The Spartans, in the judgement of Thucydides, were suffering under a paroxysm of selfish fear which had its natural fruit in cowardly and atrocious cruelty. They contrasted their own feeble policy with the energetic activity of the Athenians, and sunk lower in their own esteem by the

Proposed  
expedition  
of Brasidas  
to Thrace.

<sup>1484</sup> Assuredly Spartan secrecy might point to this as its crowning achievement. The Venetian Council of Ten would be but poor rivals of the Spartan ephors. The state of feeling which in speaking of the conspiracy of Kinadon leads Xenophon, *Hell.* iii. 3, 6, to ascribe it to the Helots and other slaves in Lakonia is much more intelligible.

comparison. They knew that the spell which once lay in their name had been rudely touched, if not broken; they felt that the good fortune which they regarded as their birth-right was gone for ever; and thus they went to battle with confident anticipations not of victory but of disaster. Whether such a state as Sparta was worth the saving, is a question with which we need not concern ourselves; but we can scarcely doubt that it must have fallen but for the singularly un-Spartan genius and energy of Brasidas. The larger mind of this eminent man saw that only a diversion of the Athenian forces to a distant scene would loosen the iron grasp in which they now held the Peloponnesos. Such a diversion was rendered practicable by invitations which came from the towns of the Chalkidic peninsula and from the habitually faithless Perdikkas who now wished to be aided in settling a quarrel with the Lynkestian chief Arribaios.<sup>1485</sup> These invitations came at a most suitable moment, and were accompanied by the welcome offer of maintenance for any army which might be sent to aid the cities in their plans of revolt from Athens. The Spartans were well pleased to intrust the task to Brasidas, whose coming the Chalkidians made a special condition in the compact: and they were still more pleased at the opportunity of getting rid of another large body of Helots by sending them on foreign service. Seven hundred of these bondmen were armed as hoplites;<sup>1486</sup> and the fact that after the slaughter of the 2,000 they could fail to take dire vengeance as soon as they had crossed the Lakonian border and before Brasidas had levied the 1,000 Peloponnesian hoplites<sup>1487</sup> which accompanied him on his march through Thessaly into Thrace, is one which might tempt us to think that the story of that fiendish massacre was a wild distempered dream. For these Helot hoplites, if they knew anything of those secret murderings or if they were aware of the mysterious disappearance of their kinsmen, nothing was easier than to join the Athenians instead of encountering them in battle order before the walls of Megara. That they preferred to cling to their chains is one of those perplexing things which must remain perplexities always.

<sup>1485</sup> Thuc. iv. 73<sup>1486</sup> Ib. iv. 80, 4.<sup>1487</sup> Ib. iv. 78, 1.

Brasidas on his part was none the less eager to measure himself against the enemy where he would be supreme in command, because the Spartans, paralysed by the catastrophe of Sphakteria, refused to let any more of their own hoplites run the risk of swelling the number of captives at Athens.

But before he could complete his levies, his interference was needed nearer home. Probably even when Megara revolted from the great city with which she had chosen to ally herself,<sup>1488</sup> there was a minority which felt that union with Athens was better than independence under an oligarchy. This minority had gained strength both from the bitter lessons of a protracted war and from the raids of the oligarchical exiles who on their expulsion from Megara had established themselves in the port of Pegai.<sup>1489</sup> Twice a year the Athenians landed on their coast and ravaged their ground, while a permanent garrison held the islet of Minoa hard by their southern harbour of Nisaia which was occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison. The miseries caused by years of starvation may be over-coloured in the pictures of Aristophanes; but with all allowances they must have been severe enough to justify the conviction that they could not be borne much longer. This conviction found utterance first in a proposal to admit the exiles from Pegai within the city and so to get rid of at least one of their enemies. To the demos the restoration of these men seemed worse than subjection to Athens; and their chiefs had to fear personally the revenge of the exiles against whom the demos would not dare to defend them. Their minds were soon made up; and a plan for the surrender of the city was concerted with the Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes. Sailing under cover of night to Minoa, Hippokrates with 600 hoplites took up his position in a trench from which brick clay had been dug, while Demosthenes placed himself near a neighbouring temple of Ares Enyalios. Thus far none but their accomplices had seen them. The next step was to get them within the Long Wall without fighting. The Athenian garrison at Minoa effectually closed the Saronic gulf to all

Attempts  
of the  
Athenians  
on Nisaia  
and Me-  
gara.

<sup>1488</sup> For the alliance see page 43; for the revolt, page 54.

<sup>1489</sup> Thuc. iv. 66.

Megarian vessels ; but at night some Megarians had been in the habit of bringing a boat in a cart and carrying it to the sea along the trench now filled with the troops of Hippokrates. Before dawn the gates were opened to readmit the marauders with their boat and cart. When the warders threw them open this morning, they were cut down by the Megarian conspirators while the hoplites of Hippokrates rushed in and made themselves masters of the entrance. The Peloponnesian guards were at first disposed to resist, but as they drew near to the enemy, they heard an Athenian herald, who spoke without orders, inviting all Megarians to come forth and make common cause with the invaders ;<sup>1490</sup> and gathering from this that the Megarians generally were not to be trusted, they retreated hastily into Nisaia. The next effort of the conspirators was to open to the Athenians the gates of Megara itself. Smearing themselves over with oil, to be distinguishable from the rest, they insisted on the duty of sallying forth at once to repel the enemy ; but one of them had betrayed the plot to the oligarchic faction, and the oligarchs, planting themselves at the gate, protested against the folly of going out to attack men with whom in the days of their greatest strength they would never have ventured to cope. It was their wish to appear ignorant of the treason ; but they added significantly that any who should attempt to withstand them would have to fight not without the gates but within them. Inferring the failure of this part of the scheme from the delay of their accomplices in the city, the Athenian commanders turned themselves to the reduction of the place. A few hours sufficed to bring tools and workmen from Athens, and before two days were ended Nisaia was all but completely walled in. To the Peloponnesian garrison, impressed with the notion that the Megarians generally had taken sides with the Athenians, resistance seemed hopeless ; and thus they were as ready to offer, as the Athenians were ready to grant, terms which allowed all to go free on a fixed ransom, with the exception of the Spartan commander or any other Spartiatai who might be serving with him, these being reserved for the judgement of the Athenian people. But to Brasidas then

<sup>1490</sup> *θησόμενον τὰ ὄπλα.* Thuc. iv. 68. See note 1274.

levying troops in the neighbourhood of Sikyon and Corinth the opportunity of baffling the Athenian generals was one which was not to be thrown away without a struggle. Sending messengers to the Boiotians requesting them to meet him without loss of time at the village of Tripodiskos under the heights of Geraneia, he marched first towards Nisaia in hopes of reaching it before it could be taken by the Athenians. On hearing of its fall, he presented himself at the gates of Megara and demanded admittance; but in this matter the Megarian factions were arrayed against each other. The demos feared that the restoration of the oligarchs would be followed by their own expulsion, while the oligarchs feared, that, if the Spartans were admitted, the demos might seek by insurrection to anticipate the harsh measures which might otherwise be dealt to them. Both sides were thus agreed that they should admit no one within the walls, until one or other party should have gained a decisive victory. The arrival of the Boiotians at Tripodiskos did little towards turning the scale. Their aid was neither slack nor niggardly; but although their sudden and unexpected attack at first threw into confusion the light-armed troops of the Athenians, this temporary reverse was soon redeemed by the Athenian horsemen.<sup>1491</sup> But when Brasidas, ascribing to its right cause the refusal of the Megarians to open the gates to his army, advanced nearer to the sea and offered battle to the enemy, the Athenian generals began to question whether they could run the risk of a defeat, which would be most severely felt, in order to encounter a force composed simply of detachments levied from many Peloponnesian cities which would lose at the worst only a small fraction of their troops. They had moreover already gained Nisaia and cut off the connexion of Megara with its long walls. As soon therefore as they discovered that Brasidas had no intention of acting on the offensive, they abandoned any further attempt on Megara itself, and the gates were at once opened to admit the army of Brasidas. But this fiery Spartan had more important work to do elsewhere; and on his departure the Megarians most deeply implicated in the recent plots fled

<sup>1491</sup> Thuc. iv. 72.

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from the city, while the demos remained under a solemn pledge of amnesty on the part of the oligarchs. These kept their promise only until both Spartans and Athenians were fairly out of the way, and then selecting about 100 citizens for trial, insured their condemnation by dikastai who were compelled to give their votes in public. The men thus sentenced were, of course, executed; and a strict oligarchy was set up, which lasted, the historian remarks, far longer than most governments set up by a minority both numerically and personally insignificant.<sup>1492</sup> Before the close of the year the Megarians gained possession of their long walls, and levelled them with the ground; <sup>1493</sup> and thus was demolished a work by which the Athenians had hoped to maintain on the isthmus a hold as firm as that which they kept on their own harbour of Peiræus.<sup>1494</sup>

Schemes of  
the Athenians for the  
recovery of  
their su-  
premacy in  
Boiotia.

Unconscious of the dangers which were threatening them from the north, the Athenians not only did nothing to prevent Brasidas from passing onwards to kindle the flame of revolt in Chalkidike, but were bent on making another attempt to recover the supremacy which had been lost by the defeat at Koroneia. Demosthenes, it seems, was still enamoured of the plan which he had attempted to carry out by a march across the Aitolian mountains; <sup>1495</sup> but the double attack now to be made on the Boiotian confederacy involved no perilous threading of savage passes or still more dangerous association with savage mountaineers. The scheme sketched out was far more simple, and the confident temper of the Athenian people at this time made them especially eager to carry out the enterprise with the whole power of the state. In spite of the strong oligarchical constitution of the Boiotian cities there were in many places not a few who would gladly have rid themselves of the heavy yoke of the Eupatrid houses: and these men, wherever they might be, were the natural allies of Athens. Foremost among these was the Theban Ptoiodoros, with whose help it was arranged that Demosthenes should sail from Naupaktos to Siphai, a town about 25 miles to the southwest of Thespiæ. By the betrayal of this place the Athenians would obtain a footing in the south. In the

<sup>1492</sup> Thuc. iv. 74.

<sup>1494</sup> See page 6.

<sup>1495</sup> Ib. iv. 109.

<sup>1495</sup> See page 194.

north they would have the like advantage by their admission within the walls of Chaironeia, while in the east they would gain a still stronger base of operations by fortifying the ground round the Delion, which has already come before us in the traditions of the Persian wars.<sup>1496</sup> The success of this plan depended obviously on the simultaneous execution of these several schemes. Unpunctuality would give the Boiotarchs time to encounter their enemies in detail, and only the confusion and perplexity caused to the oligarchs by the need of meeting many dangers at once would encourage the demos in the Boiotian cities to declare themselves openly on the side of Athens. Unluckily the Athenian commanders were not punctual. In the Corinthian gulf Demosthenes, having taken Oiniadai and brought over Salynthios and his Agraiian tribes to the Athenian alliance, sailed to Siphai, only to find that the plot had been betrayed by a Phokian from Phanoteus and that both Siphai and Chaironeia were held by the Boiotians in full force.<sup>1497</sup> We might have supposed that the failure of Demosthenes and the consequent inaction of the Athenian partisans in the Boiotian towns would have led the Athenians to question the prudence of risking their whole military force in operations which would certainly be resisted with the undivided strength of the Boiotian confederacy. Not less, it seems, than 25,000 men<sup>1498</sup> set out from Athens to fortify the Temenos of Delion. On the earth thrown up from the moat which was dug all round it they fixed as strong a palisading as they could make from the vines which grew round the place, eked out by brickwork taken from any buildings in the immediate neighbourhood. In five days their work was practically done, and the light-armed force marched about a mile on the road to Athens, while Hippokrates remained at Delion with the hoplites. But these five days were fatal to his enterprise.

Gathering from all the cities, the troops of the Boiotian

Battle of  
Delion.

<sup>1496</sup> Herod. vi. 118.

<sup>1497</sup> Thuc. iv. 89.

<sup>1498</sup> According to Thucydides, iv. 93, the Boiotians who came to encounter Hippokrates had 7,000 hoplites and more than 10,000 light-armed, together with 1,000 horse and 500 peltastai,—probably, 19,000 in all. The Athenian light-armed, he says, exceeded this whole number, although he admits that generally they were not nearly so efficient, or indeed efficient at all. Hence with hoplites, bowmen, and peltasts the Athenian force would probably be not less than 25,000.



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confederacy <sup>1499</sup> hurried towards Delion, to find that the main body of the enemy had passed across the Athenian border. At first, their resolution was to risk no engagement on Attic soil; but this decision was stoutly opposed by the Theban Boiotarch Pagondas. He professed that he could not understand the subtle distinction which forbade encounter with an enemy on his own ground. The Athenians were their enemies, wherever they might be. Their main army had but an instant ago profaned the Boiotian soil: their hoplites under Hippokrates were not merely profaning it still, but were defiling the temple of the lord of Delos. Far therefore from hesitating to attack them, they should remember the achievements of their fathers at Koroneia, and teach the Athenians that men who love freedom will not part from their inheritance without at the least striking a blow to retain it. The words of Pagondas removed all scruples; and although it was now late in the day, they resolved to fight at once. Between the two armies rose a small hill, which determined the issue of the struggle. On either side were drawn up the two opposing masses, the Boiotians being arranged after a sort which marked a change in military tactic not less important than that which had raised the Athenian navy to its undisputed pre-eminence. The Theban hoplites were drawn up 25 men deep: <sup>1500</sup> the Athenian front had a depth of only 8 men. The arrangement points to a growing consciousness that with opposing forces consisting of men equal in discipline, bravery, and personal strength, weight must decide the contest. The battle of Delion showed them that this expectation was well grounded: and the lesson bore its fruit at Leuktra.<sup>1501</sup> There is no evidence that the Athenians foreboded any disaster from this difference of tactic, and Hippokrates in the few words which he addressed to his men as he rode along the lines reminded them chiefly

<sup>1499</sup> See vol. i. page 64.

<sup>1500</sup> Thucydides, iv. 93, adds that the hoplites of the other cities were drawn up after the fancy of the Boiotarchs belonging to those cities. The statement illustrates the want of cohesion which is the most marked characteristic of all the Hellenic states, and more especially of those whose constitution was oligarchic. According to Diodorus, xii. 70, the Theban hoplites were headed by a picked body of 300 men, called *Heniochoi* and *Parabatai*. In later Theban history these men, serving in pairs associated in an unspcakably infamous intimacy, appear as the *Hieros Lochos* or Sacred Band.

<sup>1501</sup> It is, of course, obvious that the best hoplites, while standing in the hinder ranks, could be of no use except as adding to the impetus of a charge or the obstinacy of resistance. The spears of men even in the fifth or sixth rank could not be thrust beyond

of the power which they had won by their victory at Oinophyta, and of the glory which would be theirs, if by another victory they could restore the supremacy of the imperial city. The battle which followed was fiercely contested. The left wing of the Boiotian army was outflanked by the Athenians who in carrying out the movement were brought face to face with their own men, thus causing the death of some before they found out their mistake. But this advantage was more than balanced by the ill fortune of the Athenian left wing which in spite of the bravest resistance was borne down by the tremendous wall of Theban hoplites; and even the defeated Thespians, Tanagraians, and Orchomenians were relieved by the appearance of a body of men whom Pagondas had sent secretly round the little hill, and who, suddenly showing themselves to the Athenians, threw them into a confusion which soon became irretrievable. Scattered in different directions, some fled to Delion and the sea, some towards Oropos, some to the heights of Parnes; and so fierce was the pursuit that probably nothing but the approach of darkness prevented the complete destruction of the Athenian army. Nearly a thousand Athenian hoplites with their general Hippokrates lay dead upon the field.<sup>1502</sup> On this ground the Boiotians were careful to leave an adequate guard before they retreated for the night to Tanagra, there to make ready for the final attack on Delion. On the next day only an Athenian garrison remained to defend the intrenchments round the temple. The rest of the survivors were sent home by sea.

The occupation of the sacred Temenos had awakened a singularly bitter feeling in the minds of the Thebans. Their victory at once gave them an opportunity for indulging it. The laws of war among all the Hellenic tribes required from the victor the surrender of the dead without any conditions to the kinsmen who might claim them; but as the Athenian herald was on his way to the enemy's camp, he was met by a Boiotian herald, who, hurrying back with him to Delion, charged the Athenian garrison with wanton profanation of a sacred site, and added that the bodies of the dead

Refusal of  
the Boio-  
tians to  
yield up  
the Athen-  
ian dead.

the heads of their comrades in front. But the arrangement had the advantage not only of increasing the momentum but of providing a large reserve of the best men to take the place of the wounded or the slain.

<sup>1502</sup> Thuc. iv. 101.

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should not be restored to them so long as the temple or its close should be occupied by an invading force. Unfortunately the Athenians failed to urge the obvious answer, that, whatever their own guilt might be, the Boiotians were disingenuously shirking a duty for which Hellenic morality recognised no evasion and admitted no exceptions. Although such a rejoinder must have driven them to comply with the Athenian demand, the invaders took the short-sighted course of denying that they were invaders. The Boiotians, they argued, had gained their present territories by the conquest of the tribes more anciently in possession of them, and the possession of the temples was involved in the possession of the ground on which they were built. The extent of this ground was a matter of no consideration. It might stretch over miles and include the sanctuaries of many gods, or it might be so small as to contain little more than the shrine of a single deity. In either case conquest transferred the land from one state to another: and as Hippokrates had fortified this temple of Phoibos, it ceased by his act to form part of Boiotia. The Athenians were thus in their own territory, and they could not be asked to abandon it. To this absurd plea it would have been enough to reply that the conquest of a whole country, carrying with it, of course, the possession of all the temples within its borders, was a very different thing from the forcible occupation of an isolated sanctuary as a basis of operations against the territory to which it belonged. But the temptation to repay the Athenians in their own coin was too strong to be resisted; and the Boiotians retorted that, if they spoke the truth, there was an end of all debate. Athenians in Attica might do what they willed with their own, and being within their own borders they might bury their dead without asking permission of any one. Even here, the Athenians might have answered that according to their own theory the limits of Attica extended no further than their own intrenchments, and thus the Boiotians were bound to give up the dead without further speaking; but the reply did not suggest itself to their herald, whose departure was followed by an immediate attack on the intrenchments.

Two thousand Corinthian hoplites, together with the Peloponnesians and Megarians set free from Nisaia, took part in this assault which on the seventeenth day after the battle was brought to a successful end by a rude but effective contrivance. A long beam sawn asunder and hollowed out in the middle served as a tube through which a current of air was forced from a huge pair of bellows at one end to a caldron containing lighted charcoal, sulphur, and pitch, and fastened by strong iron chains at the other end. The fierce flame thus produced soon set the stockade on fire. The garrison fled, and the fort was taken; and when the Athenian herald again came to ask for the bodies which still remained unburied, his request was granted unconditionally. There was no longer any Boiotian territory which the Athenians could claim as their own by the right of the strongest. So ended a scheme which, so long as Brasidas was at large, ought never to have been undertaken.<sup>1503</sup> It gave a rude shock to the feelings of pride and confidence which the capture of the Spartans at Sphakteria had awakened, and but for the possession of these prisoners the Athenians would have passed at once to that state of extreme depression which led them to make Perikles their scapegoat. But the fall of Delion was only the beginning of a series of troubles which were to lower the Athenians in the eyes of Hellenes generally as much as the events of Sphakteria had damaged the reputation of the Spartans. Foiled in his attempt on Siphai, Demosthenes made a descent on the territory of Sikyon; but before all his ships could reach the land, the Sikyonians had fallen upon the men who were already disembarked, and had either slain or taken them prisoners.<sup>1504</sup> In the north, as an omen of the coming storm, the Athenians lost a friend in the Odrysian chief Sitalkes who was slain

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Assault  
and capture  
of Delion.

<sup>1503</sup> This disastrous expedition is associated with the history of Sokrates, who served here not merely with great bravery but with a steadiness which did much to maintain the discipline of the retreating army. His good conduct both here and previously at Potidaia was exaggerated into something like the heroism of Homeric heroes, and was then by a natural result called into question and denied. The facts seem to exhibit Sokrates as among the best of the Athenian hoplites, and give a thorough contradiction to the absurd caricatures with which much about the same time Aristophanes was amusing his countrymen. The necessity of marking these inconsistencies of the comic poet with historical fact has been already noted, see notes 1323, 1358, nor would it be easy to lay too much stress upon it.

<sup>1504</sup> Thuc. iv. 101.

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Brasidas  
through  
Thessaly.

in a foray into the land of the Triballoi, and whose power passed into the hands of his treacherous nephew Seuthes.<sup>1505</sup>

But while the Athenians were thus wasting their energies on plans from which at best no great good could be gained, they left a pathway open to the most able and the most vigilant of their enemies to strike a blow at the very heart of their maritime empire. Demosthenes was perhaps still sailing from Naupaktos to Siphai, when from the Spartan colony of Herakleia in Trachis Brasidas sent to his partisans at Pharsalos a message bidding them to furnish him at once with guides for his march through Thessaly. That he was undertaking a perilous task, he was well aware. In Thessaly, as in Boiotia, the oligarchic chiefs of clans carried matters their own way; but they could not repress the friendly feelings with which the main body of the people regarded the Athenians in their great struggle with Sparta. In short, the same elements were working here as in the allied cities whose revolts had already been suppressed; and Brasidas knew that nothing but a promptness which should leave no room for reflexion or discussion could possibly enable him to carry out his plan. At no time was it easy for a foreign force to make its way through Thessaly without a guide; in the present temper of the people it would be doubly dangerous. As it so turned out, the whole power of the oligarchic governments barely sufficed to carry him through. Setting out from the Phthiotic town of Melitia on the banks of the Enipeus a few miles below its source and under the shadow of the mighty range of Othrys, he had not reached Pharsalos, a town near the point where the Apidanos joins the Enipeus in the centre of the great Thessalian plain, when he was met by a large body of the people who seemed resolved to bar his further progress. To their plea that no stranger could pass without the consent of the commonwealth the guides of Brasidas at once answered that they would not think of leading him any further against their will, and that they had brought him thus far only because his sudden appearance had taken them by surprise and they knew not what else they could do. Brasidas himself came forward

<sup>1505</sup> See page 150.

and, with that singular power of adapting himself to the temper of his hearers which no Spartan had ever yet displayed, assured them that, if they wished it, he would at once turn back, but added that he should regard it as churlish treatment if he were sent back, since he had come not to hurt the Thessalians with whom the relations of Sparta were both peaceful and friendly, but merely to carry out plans which he had devised for the humiliation of the Athenians with whom they were at open war. These words, it is said, disarmed the opposition of the Thessalians; but the readiness with which they allowed him to pass onwards showed that their friendly feeling for Athens was a sentiment rather than a principle. Freed thus from a serious danger, Brasidas lost not a moment in hurrying forwards. On the day following that on which he had left Melitia, he reached Phakion and incamped in the evening in the territory of the Peraibians who guided him to Dion in the dominions of Perdikkas.<sup>1506</sup> Here, standing in safety beneath the mighty ramparts of Olympos and the Pierian hills, Brasidas looked forward with eager impatience to the immediate prosecution of the enterprise which had drawn him thither. His only wish was to cripple Athens; but the wily Makedonian who had lured him by the promise of maintaining half his army looked upon him as a hired instrument for doing any work which he might have in hand. Sorely against his will Brasidas was dragged off to the mountain-pass<sup>1507</sup> which shut in the territory of Arribaïos the chief of the Makedonian clan of the Lynkestai. With a mission so sharply defined he was more likely to convert the Lynkestian prince than to be himself converted to the theories of Perdikkas; and when Arribaïos expressed a wish to submit himself to arbitration and to become the ally of Sparta, Brasidas obstinately refused to carry the quarrel further, and in spite of prayers and protests withdrew his forces. Perdikkas was compelled to depart with him, but he showed his anger by supplying henceforth the wants of only a third portion of his troops.

Not until Brasidas had passed the Thessalian border were

<sup>1506</sup> Thuc. iv. 78.

<sup>1507</sup> This pass probably lay in the line of the later Roman road known as the Via Egnatia. See further the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thucydides*, iv. 83, 2.

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of the  
Athenians.

the Athenians awakened to a sense of their danger; and even when they learnt that something must be done, they acted with a tardiness and hesitation in singular contrast with the vehemence and promptitude of the Spartan champion. The only step denoting anything like energetic action was a declaration of war against Perdikkas; and even this was a mistake in dealing with a prince whose life was passed in betrayals or desertions of all his allies in turn. Nothing can show more clearly the fatal loss sustained by Athens in the death of Perikles than the weakness now displayed in maintaining that which they knew to be the very foundation of their empire. That Perikles would have countenanced either of the recent attempts to re-establish the supremacy of Athens in Boiotia, we may very confidently question; that he would have staked the whole power of the state in encountering and crushing Brasidas, we cannot doubt at all. The preservation of the subject allies on the coasts of Thrace was a matter to be carried through at all costs; but instead of striving with the energy of men struggling for their lives they content themselves with simply increasing their garrisons<sup>1508</sup> in the cities threatened by Brasidas. Even the disasters caused by their carelessness failed to rouse them to greater vigour; and a scanty addition to their forces was all that they carried out after the loss of Amphipolis itself.<sup>1509</sup> Men like Nicias and his partisans were just the men who would urge the flimsy excuse of winter as a plea for fatal inactivity.

Revolt of  
Akanthos.

The ripe grapes were all but ready for the gathering, and the whole produce of the year was therefore at his mercy, when Brasidas appeared before the gates of the Andrian colony of Akanthos at the base of the great peninsula of Aktê or Athos, near the so-called canal of Xerxes. The oligarchic Chalkidians at whose invitation he had come had led him to look for an eager and even an enthusiastic welcome. He was unpleasantly surprised to find that the gates were guarded and that he could do no more than pray for permission to plead his cause before them in person. Even with this request the demos reluctantly complied; but their whole substance was practically in the hands of the

<sup>1508</sup> Thuc. iv. 82.<sup>1509</sup> Ib. iv. 108, 6.

stranger, and they had in the matter much that amount of freedom which a traveller enjoys with the pistol of a highwayman held at his ears. Once admitted, Brasidas was to employ again those arts of persuasion which might tempt the ignorant into thinking that Sparta was training up a body of citizens like the adroit orator who now exhibited himself as the apostle of absolute freedom and of perfect happiness for everybody. His moderation had thus far won him golden opinions wherever he had gone; but it must be remembered that intemperance or severity would have brought about the immediate and ignominious failure of his plans, and that the independence which he preached was a mere Will-of-the-wisp, which would leave his victims floundering in the bogs of Spartan despotism. His business now was to convince the Akanthians that they could secure their own welfare only by revolting from Athens; and he proceeded to convince them after this fashion. Reminding them of the wholly disinterested motives which had led Sparta into the war, he assured them that the state which had sent him was honestly anxious to confine itself to the one definite task of putting down an iniquitous tyranny. He had come to set them free: he was amazed at not finding himself welcomed with open arms. Their coolness caused him even greater grief and alarm; but although he took care not to tell them at this point in his speech that it excited in him some feelings of a harsher kind, he explained to them that their adhesion was indispensable for the success of his plan. Their refusal would tempt the other allies of Athens in these Thrace-ward regions to think that the freedom which Brasidas promised was Utopian, or that his power to insure it to them was not equal to his will; and he could not allow such thoughts to be awakened in them. The power of Sparta he brought home to them by telling a flat lie,<sup>1510</sup> a lie which he repeated wherever he went. When Nikias under the walls of Megara determined not to risk a battle with the army of which the forces of Brasidas formed a scanty part, his resolution was taken simply on the ground that he was

<sup>1510</sup> I cannot qualify these words, which are, in fact, the words of Thucydides, τὸ Βρασιδίου ἐφοικᾶ καὶ οὐ τὰ οὐτὰ λέγοντος κ.τ.λ. iv. 108, 5.



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bound not to endanger the best troops of Athens in a struggle with men gathered from a number of cities, each of which risked but little.<sup>1511</sup> Of this fact it is barely possible that Brasidas may have been unaware; but he knew himself to be deliberately lying when he spoke of his own troops as being the whole force which the generals of Athens dared not encounter, and urged this as a ground for thinking that the Athenians could not send to the coasts of Thrace a larger army by sea. Their confidence he sought to gain for Sparta by assuring them that he had bound the ephors by the most solemn oaths that the cities which might join him should remain absolutely autonomous.<sup>1512</sup> It perhaps may not have occurred to him that the need of imposing such oaths might leave on others the impression that the Spartan magistrates were not much to be trusted without them; but he did not tell them that some of the men in his own force were the kinsfolk of bondmen who had risked their lives to succour Spartan hoplites in Sphakteria, who had been invited to claim freedom as the reward of their generous self-sacrifice, and who, having thus shown themselves to be men whom it would be dangerous to keep in slavery, had every one been mercilessly murdered.<sup>1513</sup> Two further arguments he had yet in store. The one was addressed to that centrifugal instinct which pre-eminently marked the Hellenic race in general: the other to their purses or their stomachs. He assured them that when he spoke of freedom and independence, his words were to be taken in their literal meaning, and not as denoting merely liberation from the yoke of Athens. They were to be left absolutely to themselves, as unconstrained as the oxen which parted company by the advice of the lion who hungered after their flesh. They were to live after oligarchic or democratic fashion, as they might prefer; and if they chose to walk in the ways of the Korkyraians, Sparta certainly would not step in to hinder them. They would be free, after joining Sparta, to manage their own matters to their own

<sup>1511</sup> See page 233.

<sup>1512</sup> Thuc. iv. 85, 6.

<sup>1513</sup> I must repeat my doubts of the truth of this horrible story, at least on the vast scale of massacre assigned to it by Thucydides. But unless the story is to be rejected (and it is accepted without question both by Dr. Thirlwall and Mr. Grote), too great stress cannot be laid on the infamous treachery of the Spartan ephors.

liking; they were perfectly free to decide now whether they would or would not join Sparta. Only they must remember that, as things then were, a large amount of money went yearly from Akanthos in the form of tribute for the support of a tyranny which his conscience would not allow him to tolerate; and, further, they saw his army outside their walls. He would leave them to their deliberations: but if they should say him nay, their ripe grapes would be trampled under foot, their vineyards ravaged, and they must make up their minds to face poverty, perhaps famine, perhaps also a blockade. This forcible special pleading carried so much weight, that a majority of the citizens voting secretly decided on revolt from Athens. The Akanthians were not men of heroic mould, and they could not bring themselves to sacrifice their crops; but they were so lacking in enthusiasm for their new ally that they insisted on his taking in their presence the same oaths which, as he said, he had imposed on the ephors at Sparta. The wretched farce of free debate and free voting was ended, and Akanthos revolted from Athens.<sup>1514</sup> Brasidas had begun his work well, and Stageiros, another Andrian colony a few miles more to the north, soon followed the example of Akanthos.<sup>1515</sup>

Not many weeks after achieving this success Brasidas appeared before the walls of Amphipolis.<sup>1516</sup> The possession of this place would remove all difficulties from his path, and it was his object to detach it, if possible, from Athens without the toil of a siege in which he might very probably fail, and which could not in all likelihood be brought to an end before the arrival of an Athenian army. The post was as strong and as easily defensible as it was important. Above the city the lake Kerkinitis, through which the Strymon flows, was a formidable barrier for those who had not the command of the sea. Below this lake a squadron of Athenian triremes was permanently on guard; and the city itself was at a moderate distance from the bridge which furnished the only means of

Surrender  
of Amphipolis.

<sup>1514</sup> I must confess myself wholly unable to look at this business from the point of view of Mr. Grote. The Akanthians were as free as the juries over which Jeffreys exercised sway, or the men who at the dictation of Scroggs murdered innocent men as criminals in an imaginary Popish plot.

<sup>1515</sup> Thuc. iv. 88.

<sup>1516</sup> For the founding of this colony see page 68.

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communication between Makedonia and Thrace. On two sides of it flowed the broad stream, embracing the town for which it thus determined the name,<sup>1517</sup> and leaving only the chord of an arc which Hagnon the founder fortified with a strong wall along its whole length. On no object could time, care, and money have been better bestowed than on insuring the safe keeping of this key to two vast regions; by a mournful infatuation it was allowed without a struggle to fall into the hands of Brasidas. At Argilos, a town lying about midway between Stageiros and the Strymonian port of Eion, he had received a welcome which the relations of this city with Athens rendered no matter for surprise; and with Argilians as guides he advanced to the bridge across the river, and of course slew the scanty garrison to which alone the fatal sluggishness of the Athenians had intrusted the momentous duty of guarding it. So sudden was the attack and so sweeping the slaughter, that no alarm could be given to the citizens of Amphipolis who on a stormy and snowy night learnt that the army of Brasidas was without their walls, and that their lands and all who happened to be without the city were wholly at his mercy. So great was the confusion that in the judgement of the historian Brasidas might with ease have carried the place by assault: but he allowed his men to plunder the land instead, and so gave time to the citizens who were not on his side to recover their self-possession. These now found that they were still in a numerical majority, and they not only insisted that the gates should be kept shut, but that the Athenian general Eukles should send a request for immediate aid to his colleague Thucydides, the historian, who was then with his fleet off the island of Thasos about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. With a feeling, probably, of deep misgiving and self-accusation Thucydides hastened to the post which he ought never to have quitted after the arrival of Brasidas in Makedonia. Trusting that he might reach Amphipolis in time to save it from falling into his hands, he hoped that at the worst he should be able to rescue Eion. But Brasidas was beforehand with him. He knew that for a large proportion of the

<sup>1517</sup> Thuc. iv. 102, 4.

citizens alliance with Sparta had no attractions, and that in these men the presence of a general so wealthy and powerful as Thucydides<sup>1518</sup> would raise hopes of further and more effectual succour from Athens or Thrace, and stir them up to more stubborn resistance. He therefore offered terms by which he hoped to determine their action in his favour. All who chose to remain should have the full rights of citizenship. To those who preferred to depart he gave five days for conveying away their property. Such terms as these were not likely to be withstood. The Athenians in the city were but few in number, the population of the city being mainly mixed. Many, again, of this mixed race had their kinsfolk prisoners in the keeping of Brasidas, and the Athenians were depressed by the manifest remissness of their countrymen in the whole matter. In this state of things Eukles lost his power, and the proposals of Brasidas were accepted. Amphipolis was gone, and within twenty-four hours the Spartans would have been masters of Eion: but on the evening of the same day the seven ships of Thucydides entered the mouth of the Strymon, and this fresh humiliation was avoided. The care with which he points out the imminence of the peril from which his arrival saved the city clearly indicates the anxiety of a man who wishes to place himself right with a world whose severer judgement he has good cause to fear.

Thus in these two cities of Akanthos and Amphipolis we have a greater and a less degree of opposition to the wishes of Brasidas: but in both cases the majority of the people is disinclined to ally itself with him, and in neither case is really free debate or free voting allowed. The most enthusiastic Athenian could not have desired more conclusive evidence in favour of the imperial city than that which is furnished by the whole history of this campaign. The arguments of Brasidas are addressed mainly to that instinctive desire for city autonomy which was the bane of Hellenic national life; and by denouncing as despotism any power which insisted on the centralisation needed for the attainment

Lightness  
of the  
Athenian  
imperial  
yoke.

<sup>1518</sup> He was the owner of large gold mines on the Thracian coast near Abdera. It is needless to say that this account of himself may be fully trusted. He would naturally make the best of disasters caused by his own negligence; and his narrative fully suffices to show the true state of the case and to justify his condemnation.

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of a given common end, he held out a bait from which Hellenes generally would not readily turn away. But even thus, although he insisted again and again that with their internal concerns there should be no interference whatever, the opposition in Akanthos and Amphipolis was with great difficulty overcome. The conclusion follows irresistibly that apart from the passion for interpolitical independence the subject allies of Athens had no substantial grievance calling for redress. Had they been oppressed by a tribute beyond their means to pay, had they been preyed on systematically by collectors who drew from them sums beyond the defined assessment, had the means of obtaining redress for injuries committed been either denied to them or rendered difficult, they would at once have thrown themselves into the arms of Brasidas with a feeling of thankful relief that no change could under such circumstances be a change for the worse. But we have already seen that the empire of Athens pressed on them more as a sentimental than as a real grievance, and their behaviour on the arrival of Brasidas is precisely that which we should have looked for.<sup>1519</sup> Men whose feelings have been offended are not likely to regard the offender with any warm or eager affection; but so long as they feel that their connexion with him is on the whole to their own benefit, they are not likely to be carried away by enthusiastic admiration of a stranger who simply wishes to leave them in a state of complete isolation. It was precisely thus at Akanthos and Amphipolis. There was no positive love for Athens: but indifference towards the imperial city implied no longing to be severed from her confederacy, and the introduction of Brasidas was due not to the action of the main body of the citizens who in both these towns were thoroughly well disposed to Athens, but to the intrigues of a small but overbearing faction, which, because it could not hope for the voluntary adoption of its plans, resolved to take the people by surprise and hurry them into revolt under pain of absolute ruin in case of refusal. Even thus, it is asserted, Amphipolis would have remained steadfast in her

<sup>1519</sup> See page 156.

allegiance, if there had been good reason for thinking that a few hours would bring to them the aid of Thucydides.

The tidings of the fall of Amphipolis came upon the Athenians almost as an omen of doom. The place was important for them not only as a source of tribute and as a port for the shipment of timber for ship-building, but more especially as being the key to their Thracian possessions. Thus far Thessalians or Makedonians might guide their enemies to the banks of the Strymon: but so long as an Athenian garrison held the bridge of Amphipolis, they could go no further. The loss of this position increased the readiness of the allies to revolt as much as it lowered the reputation of Athens; and the studied moderation of Brasidas was rewarded with voluntary offers of adhesion from cities which had convinced themselves that they needed not to fear anything from the vengeance of Athens. Among the cities which thus joined him after his ineffectual attempt upon Eion was the Edonian Myrkinos which Dareios bestowed on the Ionian Histiaios,<sup>1520</sup> and the Thasian colonies of Galepsos and Oisymê. The urgency of the peril seemed rather to paralyse the Athenians than to rouse them. Nothing was done beyond dispatching a few troops to reinforce the garrisons in the Thrace-ward cities; and disasters still more terrible were averted only by the jealousy felt at Sparta for a man whose achievements might bring with them quite as much of annoyance as of glory. Their chief wish now was to recover the prisoners taken in Sphakteria and so to bring the war to an end. For Brasidas the continuance of the war was the continuance of life itself; and while he set to work to build triremes on the banks of the Strymon, he asked them for more troops to aid him in carrying out his schemes. The Spartans cared little for his plans, and his request was refused.<sup>1521</sup>

For twenty years after the loss of Amphipolis Thucydides lived in exile. The story went<sup>1522</sup> that Kleon brought against him a charge of incapacity or wilful mismanagement, and that the historian, failing to defend himself, was formally sentenced

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Effects of  
the fall of  
Amphipolis  
on the  
Athenians  
and the  
Spartans.

The exile  
of Thucy-  
dides.

<sup>1520</sup> See vol. i. p. 382.

<sup>1521</sup> Thuc. iv. 108.

<sup>1522</sup> See the life of Thucydides by Markellinos, p. xix. in the edition of Arnold.

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to banishment. From his own words<sup>1523</sup> we do not learn that he was sentenced at all; still less do we learn the nature or amount of the punishment or the name of his accuser.<sup>1524</sup> It is more than possible that the sense of personal injury may have intensified his feelings of dislike or disgust for the noisy leather-seller: but his silence on the share of Kleon in this matter seems to attest the self-condemnation of the general. Had he felt that the charge and the sentence were alike unjust, Thucydides was not the man to rest quiet under an iniquitous imputation. Without attempting to acquit himself, he leaves the facts to speak for themselves, and it cannot be said that they speak in mysterious or unintelligible language. By his own showing he was one of the generals appointed to watch over the interests of Athens in Makedonia and Thrace: <sup>1525</sup> he was aware that Brasidas had made his way through Thessaly, and unquestionably he knew that Brasidas had not come for nothing. His duty imperatively demanded his presence at Amphipolis or at the least at Eion, which was only three miles further to the south; but he is found with his squadron off Thasos, an island which Brasidas could not attack because he had no ships. In short, Thucydides had nothing to call him to this distant station apart from his own interests: and unhappily it cannot be denied that his interests attracted him to the Thrakian gold mines of which he was a proprietor. That on hearing of the loss of Amphipolis he made what haste he could to prevent the further loss of Eion, is really no excuse at all; nor does the historian attempt to acquit himself on this score. He states indeed that Eion was all but taken, and that he came just in time to prevent this fresh disaster; and he would have been more than human if he had forborne the record of a fact which at the least showed that his transgression

<sup>1523</sup> Thuc. v. 26.

<sup>1524</sup> Certainly his language cannot be taken to mean that a sentence of banishment for the precise period of 20 years was passed upon him: but the expressions of Pausanias, i. 23, 11, do not prove conclusively that it was not passed. Whether, as Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 288, thinks likely, Thucydides was sentenced not to banishment but to death, we have no means of ascertaining. But in this case Oinobios, before he proposed the vote for the recall of Thucydides, would have had to propose the repeal of the Psephisma ordering the capital sentence; and we can scarcely suppose that Pausanias would have failed to state this fact. If the same sentence was passed upon Eukles, we must suppose that both he and Thucydides allowed judgement to go by default, and that consciousness of ill desert kept both of them away from Athens. Eukles is not heard of again.

<sup>1525</sup> Thuc. iv. 104, 8. In v. 26, 5, he says that he was expressly intrusted with the care of Amphipolis.

sprang from no lack of love for his country. But no man knew better than Thucydides that a general, who has failed to keep a post intrusted to him when with common diligence he might have maintained it with ease, is in no way more deserving of acquittal because he succeeds in preserving another post which but for his own previous remissness would never have been endangered. If Thucydides was banished, we may fairly conclude that Eukles was banished also : but we cannot conclude that the accusation of Kleon was either frivolous, vexatious, or unjust. The generals knew, not less than Kleon, that the maintenance of the bridge across the Strymon would insure the safety of Amphipolis ; and they knew perhaps better than Kleon the long-standing dislike of the Argilians to Athens, and the readiness with which they might therefore be expected to take the part of Brasidas. Nevertheless, no effort was made to guard the bridge ; and while one general remains inactive in Amphipolis, the other is cruising about among the northernmost islands of the Egean. These facts were, it seems, notorious throughout the cities on the northern coasts of the Egean ; nor can we doubt that the unfriendly relations of the Argilians with Athens had much to do with the choice of the line of operations by which Brasidas proposed to make himself master of the cities of the Chalkidic peninsula. With Thucydides as an historian we have here no concern. It is quite likely that his long exile had much to do with quickening in him the judicial spirit which distinguishes his history among all the writings of his contemporaries and of all later times. But while he was serving as a general, his countrymen knew nothing of his powers as an historian : and if they had known them ever so well, they would have been making themselves partakers of his guilt, had they passed over his offence without punishment or notice. In this instance Kleon, if he had anything to do with the matter, was perfectly right. Amphipolis and Akanthos were lost only through the carelessness of Thucydides and his colleague ; and the absence of Thucydides from his post must, it is to be feared, be set down to a preference of his own interests over those of his country.<sup>1526</sup>

<sup>1526</sup> See further, Mure, *Critical History of Greek Literature*, book iv. ch. 8, § 8. Colonel Mure's estimate of Kleon is founded on an assumption. He argues that Kleon



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Capture of  
Torone by  
Brasidas.

The year was closing with a series of misfortunes and discouragements for the Athenians. Their garrisons still held the island of Kythera; their troops aided by the Messenians still harassed the Spartans from the side of Pylos; the Megarian islet of Minoa was still an Athenian outpost; and, above all, the hoplites from Sphakteria were still within the walls of Athens. But they were now daily feeling more and more that wars are wont to take turns not wished for by those who make them. Their attempt on Megara had been followed by very partial success: their campaign in Boiotia had ended in utter discomfiture; and their whole empire was threatened by the operations of Brasidas in Chalkidike. Nor had they yet seen the end of Spartan successes and Athenian failures. While from one side the tidings came that the Megarians had gained possession of their Long Walls and had thrown to the ground the bulwarks which had been designed to keep Megara in perpetual alliance with Athens,<sup>1527</sup> on the other they learnt that Sanê and Dion were the only towns in the peninsula of Athos which had refused to receive Brasidas within their walls.<sup>1528</sup> But it was not worth his while to spend time in catching so poor a prey, and he hurried away to Torone whither, again, he had been invited not by the main body of the people but by a small band of conspirators working with careful secrecy. Lying at the extreme point of the Sithonian peninsula, Torone was built on the slope of a steep hill, the summit being held by an Athenian garrison. So well had the traitors laid their plan that Brasidas was able to occupy the temenos of the Dioskoroi barely half a mile distant from the city without rousing the suspicions of the Toronaïans. From this temple seven light-armed men with daggers in their hands (thirteen shrunk back from the perilous service) managed to creep through

was not unjustly judged by Thucydides, because the part which Kleon plays in the assemblies held before his departure for Sphakteria is contemptible. When we come to look more closely into the matter, we find that Kleon's part is not contemptible at all. The really contemptible men are Nikias and his partisans or abettors; and on their deliberate readiness to sacrifice their country in order to gratify a personal freak, Colonel Mure is as silent as Thucydides.

<sup>1527</sup> Thuc. iv. 109.

<sup>1528</sup> These towns were inhabited by a mixed population which would have little in common with Athens. According to Thucydides, iv. 110, they were chiefly Pelasgic; but we have seen already that this term conveys no very definite information. See vol. i. page 53. For the geography of the peninsula see vol. i. p. 164.

some opening in the sea-wall, and then climbing up to the summit of the hill slew the garrison. Their next work was to open the postern gate facing the promontory of Kanastraion on the opposite peninsula of Pallene; and partly through this entrance as well as through the gates opening on the Agora, which the conspirators forced open after shattering the bar, a hundred peltastai sent forward by Brasidas burst into the town, while a fire-signal set the remainder of the Spartan force in motion. Of these some rushed in through the gates: others climbed up by some planks placed for the raising of stones on a portion of the wall which had fallen and was under repair. Brasidas himself with his men hastened to the higher ground which would enable him to command the city; the rest of his followers were scattered through the place. About fifty Athenian hoplites were sleeping in the Agora. Of these a few were slain at the moment of surprise: the others made their way to Lekythos, a fort cut off from the town by a narrow neck of land. Hither also fled those Toronaïans who could not make up their minds to join Brasidas: but their resolution was shaken when on the next day they were invited to return under an assurance that they should enjoy the full rights of citizenship. The Athenians were ordered to quit a fortress which belonged not to Athens, but to the Chalkidians. To their refusal to obey this charge they added a prayer for one day's truce for the burial of the dead. Brasidas granted them two days which were spent on both sides in preparations for the coming contest. To disarm any remaining opposition Brasidas in a public assembly made a speech much after the fashion of his harangue at Akanthos, insisting that the men who had introduced him within the city were to be regarded not as traitors but as benefactors and saviours of their country. So disinterested were his motives that he was come to set them free whether they liked it or not, and those who had opposed him should share the blessing not less than his most ardent partisans. Nay, he should think none the worse of the former for their friendly leanings towards Athens, for he knew that they would soon entertain a heartier friendship for the Spartans. Over the past he was willing to draw a veil. Thus

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far they had not been in any true sense free agents : <sup>1529</sup> for the future they would lie under the responsibility of free men, and faithlessness to Sparta would be followed by righteous punishment. The attack on Lekythos was made on the third day, but owing to the stout resistance of the Athenians was made ineffectually. On the next day a machine was brought up much like that which had set on fire the stockade at Delion ; and in order to quench the flames the besieged stood ready with pitchers and buckets of water on a tall scaffolding hastily run up for the purpose. Unable to support the weight, the structure fell, causing more pain than terror to those who were thus thrown to the ground ; but the noise and dust caused by the accident so dismayed the bystanders that they fled under the impression that the fort was taken. Brasidas saw his opportunity, and laying aside the engine he resumed the assault. The place was soon stormed, and all who were found within it were put to death ; but the greater number of the garrison escaped in the two Athenian guard-ships to the peninsula of Pallene. To quicken the energies of his men Brasidas had promised thirty minai to the man who should first enter the fort ; but he chose to look on the fall of the scaffolding as a direct interposition of Athênê on his behalf and he bestowed the money on the goddess whose temple stood hard by. The fort itself was demolished, and the little peninsula on which it stood was consecrated as the Temenos of her shrine.

Truce for  
a year  
between  
Athens and  
Sparta.  
B.C. 423.

Amid these and other operations in Chalkidike the eighth year of the war came to an end. The ninth found both the Spartans and the Athenians more than ever disposed to rid themselves of the growing burdens of the strife. For his countrymen generally the political schemes and theories of Brasidas had no attraction. His glowing reports of successes already attained not only failed to draw from them the reinforcements for which he prayed, but filled them with forebodings that the full tide of victory might be followed by disasters as great and as unlooked-for. The object nearest to their hearts was the rescue of the hoplites taken in Sphakteria ; and the achievements of Brasidas might for the pre-

sent be used for the extortion of favourable terms from the Athenians. Left to himself, Brasidas might venture on a larger stake; and it was a mere truism that in these wider plans he must either succeed or fail. But success would bring them little more perhaps than they could secure now without further risk, while failure would consign the prisoners at Athens either to death or to hopeless captivity.<sup>1530</sup> In short, Brasidas was unconsciously raising or striving to raise a huge fabric on a foundation of sand. In toiling for Sparta he was really working for nothing. The empire of Athens had grown up for a definite purpose which it admirably carried out; the freedom which Brasidas promised was a freedom which it was quite certain that the Spartans would set aside with contempt, so soon as they found it convenient to do so. Little difficulty therefore was found in arranging the terms of a truce as a preliminary measure for a permanent settlement. Eager to conclude the matter at once, the Spartans drew up and signed a document which they forwarded for the approval of the Athenians with the assurance that they would readily make any equitable changes which the Athenians might consider necessary. This document, having secured to both sides equal access to the Delphian temple from which the Athenians had been excluded during the

<sup>1530</sup> Here, as in many other passages, it is more easy to determine what Thucydides cannot have meant than to give a clear and consistent interpretation of language culpably obscure and inaccurate as it now stands. It is, of course, possible that its present form may be very different from the original text; but if it be so, the attempt to extract a meaning from it must be mere waste of toil. Whatever he may have written, assuredly he never meant to say that while the successes already achieved by Brasidas justified the Spartans in looking forward to the redemption of the Sphakterian prisoners on easy terms, successes on a much larger scale would deprive them of that hope altogether. Such triumphs could only make their way easier; but their fear was that the tide of success might be followed by another catastrophe like that which had already cost them so dear at Pylos. In other words, they were afraid that Brasidas might risk everything on the hazard of a single cast, and that he might be a loser. It may be possible to draw some such meaning as this from this sentence, Thuc. iv. 117, 2; but all interpretations must be made at the cost of a strange twisting of words. We may explain *ἐπι μείζον χε ρήσαντος αὐτοῦ* by a reference to the larger plans which Brasidas might go on to form, while we may regard the words *ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος* as denoting the supreme venture, *ἀντίπαλα* agreeing with a noun *ἐντοχῆματα* extracted from the previous phrase *ὡς ἐπι Βρασιδάς εὐτύχει*. In this case we should refer the words *τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι* to the successes already achieved by him, while the remaining clause *τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν καὶ κρατήσκειν* would point to the possibility of defeat in the future. Mr. Grote refers the reading *κινδυνεύσειν* and takes the particle *καὶ* as a disjunctive, citing among other instances the passage in Thucydides, i. 118, *καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἀκλητος*, where the two epithets expressly exclude each other. *Hist. Gr.* vi. 586. It is enough to say of this passage that Thucydides felt the need of a double use of *καὶ* to express this meaning,—while in the phrase *κινδυνεύειν καὶ κρατήσκειν*, iv. 117, 4, the last two words are superfluous. Either issue is involved in the one word *κινδυνεύσειν*. The other passages cited by Mr. Grote cannot be regarded as exhibiting a precisely

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war,<sup>1531</sup> laid down practically the rule that during the year of truce each side should retain its present possessions. This stipulation secured Akanthos, Amphipolis, and Torone to Sparta, while Athens kept her garrisons in Kythera (no communication being allowed between the island and the mainland), in Koryphasion or Pylos between the points of Bouphras and Tomeus, in Nisaia and Minoa, and in the peninsula of Methana near Troizen. But Troizen itself remained with the Peloponnesians not only on the principle laid down for the present truce but by the terms agreed to by the Athenians for the thirty years' truce after the reconquest of Euboia.<sup>1532</sup> The naval interests of Athens were provided for by a clause which forbade to the Spartans all use of war-ships, or of merchant vessels beyond a burden of 500 talents. The other provisions of the treaty bound each party to receive no deserters who might be subjects or confederates of the other. Sparta was thus assured that the Helots would no longer find a refuge at Pylos, while the Athenians thought that it would put an end to the operations of Brasidas in Thrace. The covenant lastly was acknowledged to be a mere temporary measure, leaving room for more deliberate discussions for the permanent ending of the strife; and ample arrangements were made for the safe conduct of envoys to and fro between Athens and Sparta. This peace was sworn to in the month of the vernal equinox. It is dated on the twelfth day of the Spartan Gerastios, and on the fourteenth of the Attic Elaphebolion.<sup>1533</sup> It may have been sworn to at Sparta two days before it was ratified at Athens: but the irregularities of the Hellenic calendar must leave the precise interval uncertain. On the side of the Spartans appear the signatures of envoys from Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, and Epidauros.

parallel use of *καί*: their meaning is better given by Dr. Arnold in his note on *Thuc.* i. 143, 3, and v. 74, 1.

<sup>1531</sup> The Boiotians and Phokians were no parties to this truce. The Spartans therefore pledge themselves only to employ persuasion to get this concession carried out. The Amphiktyonic council has seemingly no voice in the matter. For their inaction in this case as in others, see vol. i. page 56.

<sup>1532</sup> See the full and decisive note of Dr. Arnold on this point, *Thuc.* iv. 118, 3.

<sup>1533</sup> The peace concluded two years later was also ratified in the Attic month Elaphebolion, *Thuc.* v. 19, 1; but Elaphebolion here answers to the Spartan Artemisios. The difference arises probably from the system of intercalation in calendars which differed indefinitely in different states. See further the note of Dr. Arnold, *Thuc.* iv. 119, 1.

The hopes which the Athenians had formed of a time of repose among their subject allies on the coasts of Makedonia and Thrace were soon rudely disturbed. Two days after the ratification of the truce Brasidas received the adhesion of Skiônê, a city near the extremity of the Pallanian peninsula, and standing, in the eyes of the Athenians, practically on an island, cut off from the rest of Chalkidike by the city of Potidaia at the isthmus. In spite, however, of the special risks thus incurred the faction in favour of Brasidas managed to coerce those who were opposed to the revolt,<sup>1534</sup> and to send him an invitation which he accepted with natural eagerness. Under cover of a convoying trireme which would divert the attack of any Athenian ship which they might encounter, Brasidas in a small pinnace sailed to the town, and was there welcomed by his partisans. It is not pretended that the subject allies of Athens were drawn to the imperial city by any other considerations than those of sound reason and sober judgement; and reason and judgement are the first to lose their power over a people dazzled by schemes which appeal to sentiments thus far kept under control, and that not without difficulty and irksome self-restraint. The campaign of Brasidas had now acquired a romantic character, and the politic harangue in which he lauded the boldness of the Skionaïans in defying the efforts of Athens made them look on themselves as fellow-crusaders with him in the sacred cause of liberty. When he told them that their conduct would be rewarded with the special confidence and esteem of the Spartans, their enthusiasm burst away the slender barriers of prudence behind which some had wished thus far to shelter themselves. In the place of public assembly a golden diadem was placed on the head of the Deliverer of Hellas; in private houses he was crowned with fillets and honoured as an athlete who had reached the highest standard of Hellenic humanity. In the midst of these rejoicings, while Brasidas was meditating the capture not only of Mendê, an Eretrian colony, in the same peninsula with Skiônê, but of Potidaia, the commissioners from Sparta and Athens arrived to announce the truce. A

Revolt of  
Skiônê and  
Mendê  
from  
Athens.

<sup>1534</sup> οἷς μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα. Thuc. iv. 121, 1,

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reckoning of the time showed that the revolt of Skiônê had taken place since the ratification of the covenant, and the Athenian Aristonymos refused to recognise this acquisition of Brasidas as coming within the terms of the treaty. Time pressed, and Brasidas boldly lied. His false message went to Sparta and there received credit. The true account stirred up at Athens a vehement wrath which refused to listen to the Spartan proposal to submit the matter to adjudication. The revolt of people in the position of the Skionaians was a deliberate defiance of Athens; and Kleon, encountering, it would seem, little opposition or none, carried a decree dooming the Skionaians to the sentence which had been all but carried out after the revolt of Mytilene.<sup>1535</sup> It was not long before the town of Mendê followed the example of Skiônê,<sup>1536</sup> and Brasidas, who had been naturally disgusted with a truce which cut short his career of conquest, received the city without hesitation into the Spartan confederacy. Some colour he sought to give to this measure by charging the Athenians with breaking the terms of the truce; but how they are supposed to have broken it, we are not told. With so ready a liar<sup>1537</sup> as Brasidas it is at the least possible that the only infraction of it may have been the refusal of Aristonymos to acknowledge that Skiônê had revolted a few days before the event really took place. But although he professed to regard the open revolt of the Mendaians after the news of the truce had been received as a justification of his own conduct, he felt that the pleas which satisfied himself would not withhold the Athenians from instant efforts to recover both these cities. He accordingly transferred the women and children from both towns to Olynthos, a few miles to the northeast of Potidaia. But although he sent 500 hoplites and 300 Chalkidian peltastai

<sup>1535</sup> Thuc. iv. 122. The historian is careful to state that these propositions in the matter of Mytilene and of Skiônê came from Kleon or were vehemently urged by him. The Melian massacre, v. 116, was altogether more discreditable: but he does not name anyone as proposing it.

<sup>1536</sup> Too much stress can scarcely be laid on the fact that here also, in spite of the enthusiasm which had greeted Brasidas in Skiônê, the main body of the people was altogether averse to the revolt. Thucydides, iv. 123, says plainly that the rebellion was carried out only because the conspirators, when they had once proposed the scheme, did not like to abandon it and to own themselves beaten; and when an opportunity offered for abandoning the Peloponnesians, the demos availed themselves of it without hesitation. Thuc. iv. 130, 4.

<sup>1537</sup> See page 243.

under the command of Polydamidas to guard them in case of an attack by an Athenian army,<sup>1538</sup> he did not enter Mendé himself, and therefore he was unable to awaken in the citizens that feeling of personal attachment which gave his cause a fictitious strength in the cities which he had already visited. Possibly a soothing speech from his lips might have prevented the collapse which followed the arrival of the Athenian generals during his absence in Makedonia.

Brasidas was now to pay the penalty of dallying with habitual traitors. The invitation of Perdikkas and his promise of support for half his army had had much to do with his northward expedition; and now, when both duty and inclination kept him within the limits of Chalkidike, he received a summons (which we must suppose that he could not afford to disobey) to march once more against the Lynkestian chief, with whom on the previous expedition he had patched up a hasty peace. With the 3,000 Hellenic hoplites gathered together by Brasidas, with 1,000 Makedonian and Chalkidian horsemen, and a large and mixed throng of barbarians, Perdikkas advanced to the passes of Lynkos.<sup>1539</sup> In the battle which followed Arribaïos was defeated; but the desire of Brasidas to succour the revolted allies of Athens damped his ardour for a campaign among the Lynkestian mountains. In addition to his longing for vengeance, Perdikkas had a further reason for seeking to carry out his enterprise. He was looking out for a mass of Illyrian mercenaries whom he had hired to slaughter the people of Arribaïos. He was dismayed when he learnt that the men whom he had engaged as murderers on his own side had been induced to transfer their services to his enemies; and so thoroughly were his terrors shared by his people that they resolved on immediate flight. The quarrel with Brasidas led to the pitching of two separate camps for the Peloponnesians and the Makedonians; and thus in the confusion caused by the lack of a central authority Perdikkas was hurried away before he could even catch sight of Brasidas, while the latter was left to face not only the Lynkestian prince but a horde of savages whose very name chilled the blood of the some-

Difficulties  
of Brasidas  
in Make-  
donia.

<sup>1538</sup> Thuc. iv. 123.

<sup>1539</sup> See note 1507.



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what less ferocious Makedonian clansmen. Without losing his self-possession for an instant, Brasidas formed his hoplites into square, placing the light-armed troops in the centre, while with three hundred picked men he brought up the rear himself. Addressing them in a short speech, he told them that only the peculiar circumstances of the case would have drawn from him any words at all. It was the duty of Peloponnesians to face any enemy, however overwhelming might be their numbers: but as these Illyrians had gained an exceptional name for savagery and cruelty, he thought it right to remind them that barbarians generally knew nothing of strict discipline, or of the duty of standing each by the other to the last. Their warfare, he said, was that of men who fought for themselves alone, and who were as free to run away as they were to fight. He might have added that they were thus far in the condition of the Achaian warriors who followed Agamemnon and Menelaos to Ilion: but he took care to impress upon them that the polity of Sparta itself sufficed to show how a few men, holding their lands by the right of the strongest, could keep down immense multitudes,<sup>1540</sup> and that men so trained and disciplined had no reason to dread the attack of savages who trusted more to the din of their yells and war-cries than to stoutness of arm and steadiness of aim. In this instance the expectations of Brasidas were verified. The Illyrians, coming in sight of his insignificant numbers, rushed on with their usual clamour: but they found that their shoutings had no effect on the iron ranks of the Peloponnesian rear-guard. Their onslaughts were so vigorously repulsed that they speedily found it more profitable to chase and kill the followers of Perdikkas, and then to hasten onwards in hopes of occupying the sides of the pass through which Brasidas must march to reach the open country. But the quick eye of the Spartan leader soon saw on which of the two heights the barbarian force was weaker,

<sup>1540</sup> It must be remembered that some of those whom Brasidas addressed under the general title of Peloponnesians were kinsmen of the Helots who are said to have been murdered for their good services at Sphakteria. Such language seems to tell against the truth of the story. See page 227. The feeling of fellowship between a conquering and a conquered race may grow up in the course of generations; but that Helots could thus in a few months identify their own interests with those of the Spartans, when they had not the slightest warrant that they themselves might not be served after precisely the same fashion, verges closely on the bounds of credibility.

and he gave the order to his Three Hundred to charge up the hill, as they best could, without caring to keep their ranks and to dispossess the Illyrians by main force and weight. The success of this vigorous measure seems to have convinced the barbarians that further pursuit was useless. The way was thus left open for the Peloponnesians, who during the rest of the march wreaked their wrath on Perdikkas by appropriating the baggage wagons which his followers in their haste had left behind them, and by the useless slaughter of the beasts of burden which with greater profit they might have appropriated also. This absurd revenge thoroughly alienated Perdikkas, who, wearied out with Brasidas and his men, resolved to seek once more the alliance of the Athenians whom he had more than once betrayed.

The events which followed the departure of Brasidas on the errand of the Makedonian chief fully justified the reluctance with which he marched against Arribaios. While he was still intangled in the passes of Lynkos, an Athenian fleet of 50 ships under Nikias and Nikostratos, with 1,000 hoplites, 600 bowmen, and 1,000 Thracian mercenaries, sailed from Potidaia against the Mendaïans, who with a Skionaiian force had taken up their position under the Spartan Polydamidas on a strong hill without the city. In his efforts to dislodge them from this post, Nikias was disabled by a wound, and Nikostratos, attempting to carry the hill from another side, so far lost his presence of mind as to endanger the whole Athenian army. For the present the Athenians seemed to be baffled; but the weak side in the system of Brasidas was now to be brought into clear light. He had come as the apostle of freedom; it was now to be seen that the natural consequence of his preaching was dissension and sedition. The arrival of Nikias and his colleague had thrown the Mendaïans into such a state of agitation that the 300 Skionaiians who had come to help them hastened hurriedly homeward. On the next day Nikias ravaged the lands to the borders of Skiônê, while Nikostratos kept watch without the gates of the city. Impatient to put an end to these movements, Polydamidas drew out his own troops in order of battle and summoned the Mendaïans to sally out against the

Recovery  
of Mendê  
by the  
Athenians.

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enemy. But the spell of Spartan authority was broken; and in an evil hour Polydamidas ordered the arrest of a citizen who cried out that he had no intention of serving against the Athenians, and that the war was merely a luxury for the rich. This insult drove the demos to seize their arms, and to surprise their antagonists who had conspired to bring the Peloponnesians upon them. The Spartan garrison thus attacked fled to their former post in the Akropolis, while the Athenians burst into Mendê with an eager thirst for revenge which could be satisfied with little less than the blood of all the townsmen. Bidding the Mendaians to retain their old constitution, the Athenians left to their judgement those citizens whom they suspected to be the authors of the revolt. These had probably taken refuge with Polydamidas in the Akropolis, which the Athenians now walled in. Leaving men enough to carry on the siege, the main force marched against the Skionaians who with their Peloponnesian allies had taken up their position on a strong hill close to their city. So long as they held this ground, the circumvallation of the place was impossible: but a vigorous assault dislodged them, and the Athenians set to work to shut them in. Before this task could be finished, the garrison blockaded in the Akropolis of Mendê managed to make their escape by night, and the greater number of them succeeded in entering Skiônê unnoticed by the Athenians.

Arrival of  
Ischagoras  
and other  
Spartan  
commis-  
sioners.

The incessant shiftings of Perdikkas had in some degree taught his enemies and his friends how he might best be dealt with; and when during the blockade of Skiônê he proposed to Nikias to renew the old alliance, the answer was that he must give some substantial evidence that he really meant what he said. Happily for the Athenians he was able to do this and to gratify his resentment against Brasidas at the same time. Ischagoras was known to be on his march from Sparta with the reinforcements for which Brasidas had so eagerly and thus far vainly intreated; and a message from Perdikkas to the Thessalian chiefs in his alliance rendered this scheme abortive. The army was compelled to return home: but Ischagoras went on with Ameinias and Aristeus as commissioners appointed to act in conjunction with Bra-

sidas. They were probably associates less welcome than the young men whom, contrary to the Spartan custom which had thus far employed only the aged in positions of authority, they brought with them to act as governors in the cities which Brasidas had taken under his protection. In Klearidas to whom he intrusted Amphipolis and in Pasitelidas who was placed in charge of Torônê the allies of Sparta received the first of these ingrained tyrants whom her iron system naturally produced, so soon as its restraints ceased to be felt. In an earlier generation Pausanias had shown that a rigid discipline by no means killed the instincts of a luxurious sensuality and overbearing pride; and the Harmostai whose tender mercies the subjects of Sparta were soon to feel showed themselves apt pupils in the same iniquitous school.

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V

An ineffectual attempt of Brasidas on Potidaia<sup>1541</sup> closed the operations of this unwearied leader for the winter. But some weeks earlier in the year the Thebans had done a deed which in point of ingratitude, though not in heinousness, might be compared with the requital dealt out by the Spartans to the Helots who had done them good service at Sphakteria. At the battle of Delion the Thespians, in the brief phrase of the historian, had lost the whole flower of their people.<sup>1542</sup> Their readiness to suffer in the cause of the Boiotian confederacy could not have been better attested, whatever may have been their lack of enthusiasm: but the very losses which they had undergone were seized as an excuse for charging them with Attikism and for levelling the walls of the city to the ground. Apart from this act of gross injustice and the accidental burning of the temple of Hêrê in Argos<sup>1543</sup> the summer passed away without any event more important than a feud between the Mantineians and Tegeatans of Arkadia, which ended for the present in a drawn battle.

Demolition  
of the walls  
of Thespiæ<sup>1541</sup> Thuc. iv. 135.<sup>1542</sup> Ib. iv. 133, 1.

<sup>1543</sup> The temple was probably built of wood; and the fire was caused by the priestess Chrysis falling asleep, after placing a candle too near some fillets in the shrine. She had been, we are told, Thuc. ii. 2, priestess for 48 years when the Peloponnesian war began with the attempt of the Thebans on Plataia. If then she was chosen to the office at an age as early as 15 or 16, she must now have been nearer to 80 than to 70 years. It was a hard lot which compelled a woman, who had seen nearly three generations pass away since she vowed herself to the service of the goddess in the days of her girlhood, to fly for refuge to the neighbouring city of Philous.

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Expedition  
of Kleon to  
Makedonia.  
B.C. 422.

With the beginning of the tenth year from the surprise of Plataiai the twelve months' truce drew towards its close. But while in the continuance of the war by Brasidas in Thrace both the Spartans and Athenians had a valid reason for resuming the old strife if they had wished to do so, the mere fact that no positive step was taken on either side before the close of the Pythian games,—in other words, for more than four months beyond the time agreed on for the truce,—shows not merely the anxious desire for peace on both sides but the indifference of the Spartans for the theories and schemes of Brasidas.<sup>1544</sup> But in truth, if the Spartans were anxious to recover the hoplites lost at Sphakteria, the Athenians were vexed by the fear that they had grievously offended the majesty of Phoibos Apollon; and their anxiety found relief in the expulsion of the Delians from the sacred island which they had recently purified.<sup>1545</sup> Thus far they had supposed that the sun-god would be appeased if neither births nor deaths were allowed to take place on the island. But now they had discovered that nothing less would content him than the expulsion of the whole people; and the Delians thus banished were suffered by the Persian Pharnabazos to take up their abode at Adramyttion.<sup>1546</sup> The same religious scruples which led to this treatment of the Delians were further satisfied by participation in the Pythian games; and the desire to share once more in this great Hellenic festival kept the Athenians from taking any vigorous measures for recovering the revolted cities of Chalkidike. But the feast had no sooner come to an end than we find Kleon in command of an army and fleet which Perikles would have dispatched or led thither before Brasidas had crossed the Thessalian border. That this appointment was not made without strong opposition, there can be not the least doubt; but the debates which preceded it are not noticed by Thucydides who merely tells us that Kleon per-

<sup>1544</sup> There can be no question that the truce expired at the end of the twelve months from the day on which it was ratified,—that is, in the month of March (the Spartan Gerastios for this year, and the Attic Elaphebolion). If then we have no grounds for supposing that any actual warfare began before the close of the Pythian games, we must conclude that the interval between the vernal equinox and the celebration of the games was a period of tacit truce, ἀνακωχὴ ἀσπονδος,—neither side being willing to commit itself to the decision of war, although both were free to do so.

<sup>1545</sup> See page 200.

<sup>1546</sup> Thuc. v. 1.

suaded the Athenians to put out their strength more vigorously against Brasidas, and was himself sent on the errand.<sup>1547</sup> When after telling the story of the battle of Amphipolis he passes judgement on the two men whom he regarded as the main hindrances to a peace, Brasidas is represented as wishing to keep the war alive from the simple and natural motive that in no other way could he carry out his plans and add to his great military reputation, while the warlike policy of Kleon is put down to the fear that in a time of peace his villanies would be more easily detected and the falsehood of his slanders more readily exposed.<sup>1548</sup> But the facts which we have specially to note are these, that after an interval of nearly three years a man, who had never put himself forward as fitted for military command, and who had been successful in a task of no special difficulty because he had the good sense to subordinate himself to a leader of real genius, is now sent on a far more dangerous service without the aid of such a colleague as Demosthenes. Why this distinguished general was not sent with him, we are not told. After the failure of the Boiotian campaign which ended in the catastrophe at Delion, the name of Demosthenes does not again appear until we find it in the list of Athenian signatures attached to the treaty for peace after the battle of Amphipolis. It is possible that he may now have been employed on his old station at Naupaktos, and the Athenians may have felt that they could not afford to send him away from a post where they could most have the benefit of his long and tried experience. In such a matter guesses are worth but little; but if Demosthenes was thus absent, the state of things at Athens becomes clear enough. If Perikles had been living, he would have insisted that the recovery of Amphipolis and the neighbouring towns was just one of those objects for the attainment of which the full strength of Athens should be put forth without a moment's hesitation or delay. But during the whole sojourn of Brasidas in Thrace Nikias and his adherents had been throwing cold water on a policy which would have been prudent as well as vigorous, and urging that the career of the Spartan champion would be

<sup>1547</sup> Thuc. v 2.<sup>1548</sup> Ib. v. 15.

best cut short not by sending out armies to fight him but by making peace with Sparta. In all likelihood Kleon insisted that the futility of such a course had already been made plain. Brasidas had utterly disregarded the truce: and the Spartans had been unable to coerce him into keeping it. What ground had they for thinking that Brasidas would care more if the truce were made for a longer time and called a peace? In short the condition of things strangely resembled that which had gone before the Sphakterian enterprise. Now, as then, there was an obnoxious man to be got out of the way; now, as then, there was a work to be done, in which success would be for the benefit of Athens, while failure would bring comfort to the men who hated Kleon. We are doing no injustice to Nikias and his partisans, if we say boldly that the old trick was employed again, and that they deliberately thrust Kleon into an office in which they hoped and thought that he would not fail to ruin himself. This shameful and treacherous policy, we are told, had been openly avowed before Kleon's departure for Pylos; we have no ground whatever for questioning that they were prompted by the same disgraceful motives now. The fact that Kleon had not been employed in the interval is conclusive evidence that he had not sought employment, and it is to the last degree unlikely that he would now eagerly seek an office to which he had no other title than a sincere and hearty desire to maintain the honour and the true interests of his country. In the first flush of victory after his return from Pylos Kleon, had he been so minded, could, we can scarcely doubt, have had himself elected as one of the Strategoi in the campaign which ended so disastrously at Delion. The fact that he did not propose himself as a candidate may be taken as proof that he had generously and truthfully relinquished to Demosthenes the credit for the success at Sphakteria. But while we may confidently ascribe to his opponents a repetition of the old stratagem, we may with equal confidence set aside the judgement which Thucydides passes on Kleon as untrue in fact. It would indeed be well if we knew a little more about the iniquities and slanders of the leather-seller; but if, as it is possible, the sting of his oratory lay in charges of feebleness

or supineness urged against the wealthy and high-born Nikias or his abettors, we must at the least allow that their conduct went far to provoke, if not wholly to justify, such uncourtly comments. But it is not true to say that for a man such as Kleon is here asserted to have been war involved a state of things more convenient than peace. War tends to encourage not political slander but military genius: and Kleon was thoroughly aware that very little military genius was needed to eclipse his own. He had indeed protested against the remissness which would have left Demosthenes unaided at Pylos, and his protest was perfectly right without reference to the result: but it cannot be said that his policy was uniformly in favour of war. Before the beginning of the struggle which had now lasted nine years Kleon was strenuous in his efforts to maintain peace in opposition to the plans of Perikles. In insisting now on a vigorous prosecution of the war in Thrace Kleon was taking a line in which he would have had the cordial support of that great man; and we may most safely infer that he went himself to Thrace only because Nikias would not go. Throughout the whole controversy the conduct of Nikias ominously forebodes the crimes and the misery of which oligarchical selfishness was soon to yield at Athens an abundant and fatal harvest.<sup>1549</sup>

The summer solstice had long passed when Kleon sailed from Peiræus with a force of 1,200 hoplites, 300 horsemen, and a larger number of allies, in a fleet of 30 triremes. Touching first at Skiônê, he took away some of the heavy-armed men belonging to the blockading force, and sailing on to the Kolophonian<sup>1550</sup> harbour of Torônê learnt the welcome news that Brasidas was not within the city and that the garrison was scarcely adequate to the maintenance of the place. But the ruin of Torônê was due not so much to this fact as to the anxiety of Brasidas to insure its safety. In order to inclose the Proasteion or suburb and the city itself within the circuit of a single wall, he had thrown down a part of the old wall at the point of

Capture of  
Torônê by  
Kleon.

<sup>1549</sup> The conduct of these aristocratic opponents of Kleon illustrates generally the working of that change which Thucydides, iii. 82, 17, traces to the effect of this miserable war. See page 213. To put down Kleon was of more importance than to save Amphipolis or even Athens.

<sup>1550</sup> Why it was so named, we do not know.



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junction, and the breach had not been made good, when the forces of Kleon advanced to the assault, the fleet at the same time sailing into the harbour. Leaving the unfinished wall in the hands of the enemy, Pasitolidas and his Peloponnesians strove in vain to throw themselves into the city before the Athenians could reach it. But he was too late. The men from the fleet were already in possession of the place; and those of the Peloponnesians and Toronaïans who were not slain in the struggle were kept as prisoners to be sent to Athens. The tiger-like rules of ancient warfare made every home in Torônê desolate; and while fathers, husbands, and brothers went into captivity, mothers and wives with all the children were sold as slaves. These henceforth disappear wholly; so little is the history even of a city the history of its inhabitants. The Peloponnesian prisoners were exchanged on the ratification of the subsequent peace. The Toronaïans were ransomed by the Olynthians, to return to homes where the voices of those whom they had loved, if Hellenes are to be supposed capable of loving, were to be heard no more.

The battle  
of Amphipolis.  
Death of  
Brasidas  
and Kleon.

The next attempt of Kleon, on Stageiros, failed: but the Thasian colony of Galepsos was taken by storm. Kleon, however, felt that he could not venture to advance upon Amphipolis with his present forces, and he sent to the Makedonian Perdikkas for aid according to the terms of his alliance, while he requested the Odomantian chief Polles to bring him a body of Thrakian mercenaries. While Kleon to the disgust of his men waited at Eion, Brasidas for the purpose of guarding Amphipolis took up his post on the hill of Kerdylion on the western bank of the river facing the city, and commanding a view of all the land around it. His army consisted of 2,000 hoplites, and 300 Hellenic horsemen, in addition to 1,500 Thrakian mercenaries and a large number of Edonian, Myrkinian, and Chalkidian allies. Fifteen hundred men surrounded Brasidas on Kerdylion: the rest Klearidas commanded in Amphipolis. The Spartan leader, knowing the character of the man with whom he had to deal, left time to do its work. He had heard, probably, that the Athenians had little confidence in their general, that

they despised his timidity, and resented his inaction: and his task clearly was to watch for an opportunity of surprising him when discontent and want of discipline had thrown his army into sufficient disorder. Blunder after blunder followed; but the disgrace of these blunders lies less with Kleon than with those who sent him on a task which he would far rather have seen in abler hands. Whatever they were, we see them at their worst, for he had a merciless critic in the historian whom he helped to drive away from his country: Kleon, it is manifest, was wholly at a loss how to act. His men were becoming impatient, and he was driven at last to the course which had led him to success at Pylos.<sup>1551</sup> This course was seemingly nothing more than marching up a hill for the purpose of marching down again; and even this manoeuvre, the historian adds with supreme contempt, Kleon regarded as a trick worth knowing.<sup>1552</sup> The wall of Amphipolis, forming the chord of the arc within which the city lay, ran across the ridge which rises to the eastward until it joins the Pangaian range. This ridge Kleon, for the sake of doing something, felt himself compelled to ascend. No sooner was the Athenian army in movement than Brasidas, seeing from the heights of Kerdylion how things were going, hastened down the hill and entered the city across the bridge over the Strymon, which by carrying a rampart and stockade from the main wall to a point on the river some one or two hundred yards further eastward, he had included within the fortifications of the city.<sup>1553</sup> Of this change of position Kleon can

<sup>1551</sup> Thucydides, v. 7, 3, asserts that both at Pylos and at Amphipolis Kleon did not expect to meet with any resistance. This is, beyond question, untrue in the matter of Sphacteria; and we have no satisfactory reason for ascribing to him any such fancy at Amphipolis. At Pylos Kleon knew that he had a sufficient force to overcome any opposition that might be made, and that in Demosthenes he had a colleague far more able and experienced than himself. At Amphipolis Kleon had no such colleague and he knew that he had on his side no overwhelming superiority of numbers, while he also felt that of his men many were not well disposed towards himself. His fault here was not over-rashness, but a culpable remissness in neglecting the discipline of his army, and in failing to put his troops in strict order of battle before he began his retreat.

<sup>1552</sup> Thuc. v. 7, 3.

<sup>1553</sup> When Brasidas first made his way to Amphipolis, the bridge was altogether unconnected with the town; and the separation of the two reflects great discredit on the Athenians for leaving so important a post exposed to surprise from an enemy. In his account of the battle of Amphipolis Thucydides does not distinctly state that the bridge was included within the fortifications of the city; but his whole story implies that it was. It is nowhere hinted that Kleon could attack the bridge without assaulting the town, as he might easily have done if the two had been disconnected. The defence an isolated bridge needs, moreover, a stronger guard and involves more anxiety than

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scarcely have been unaware: it is more likely that from the scanty numbers of the men who entered with Brasidas he did not attach much weight to it. He knew little probably of the theory of strategy; he knew practically nothing of it by experience. It was therefore an easy matter to dupe him by that semblance of inactivity and of inability to act, which to a wary and able general would carry with it the strongest suspicion. On reaching the top of the ridge from which he had an unbroken view of the city at his feet and of the river as it flowed out of the Lake Kerkititis and sweeping round the city ran into the sea at Eion, he was impressed by the silence and quiet of the scene. Through the vast extent of country over which his eye ranged no bodies of men were to be seen in motion: not a man was visible on the walls; not a sign betokened preparation for battle. Even the entrance of Brasidas seemed to make no change in the aspect of things, for that leader had seen enough to convince himself that he could hope for victory only if he could dupe Kleon by a simulation of extreme weakness. In point of numbers his own force was equal to that of the enemy; but his men were for the most part badly armed, some perhaps scarcely armed at all, while the Athenian hoplites were all in the very vigour of manhood, and with them were associated the best troops which Lemnos and Imbros could furnish. Still, if a blow was to be struck at all, it must be struck at once, for the reinforcement of Kleon's army would seriously add to his difficulties. Summoning, therefore, all his men together, Brasidas, if we may believe the report of Thucydides, bade them remember the inherent superiority of Dorians over Ionians,<sup>1554</sup> and, having explained to them

the maintenance of a line of wall inclosing the bridge. A bridge so guarded would naturally be the first object for attack: but Kleon evidently has no option, and his regret at having come to Amphipolis without besieging engines has reference only to an attack of the walls. Thuc. v. 7. Lastly, the movements of Brasidas are on this point decisive. If Kerdylion was separated from Amphipolis by a bridge which an enemy might by possibility seize without first taking the town, Brasidas, whatever might be his contempt for his enemy, would have been guilty of an inexcusable error in remaining on the hill at all. But on this point he shows no anxiety: in other words, he had the power of entering Amphipolis whenever he might wish to do so. Clearly, then, when the stockade or *σταύρωμα* was erected, the city wall was pierced by a gate opening into the triangular space thus inclosed, *αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλαι*, Thuc. v. 10, 6; and there was probably another gate through the *σταύρωμα* itself, through which travellers not wishing to enter the city might pass from the bridge to the road leading to Myrkinos.

<sup>1554</sup> We may perhaps be doing injustice to Brasidas in supposing that he used this

the simple order of the coming engagement, offered sacrifice before sallying forth against the enemy. This ceremony was seen by the scouts of Kleon who also told him that under the city gates they could see the feet of horses and men ready to issue out for battle. Having satisfied himself, by personal inspection, that their report was true, Kleon resolved not on maintaining his ground, which he might have done with little less than the certainty of success, but on a retreat to Eion. He must await, he said, the reinforcements which he expected from Thrace, and thus his army, wheeling to the left, began their southward march with their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy. 'These men will never withstand our onset,' said Brasidas. 'Look at their quivering spears and nodding heads. Men who are going to fight never march in such a fashion as this. Open the gates at once that I may rush out on them forthwith.' The sudden onslaught at once broke the Athenian ranks, and Klearidas issuing from the Thracian gates further to the north completed the disorder. In the pursuit of the Athenian left wing Brasidas fell, mortally wounded; but his people bore him away without suffering the Athenians to know what had happened. On the right wing the resistance of the Athenians was more firm; but Kleon, we are told, had come without any intention of fighting, and he made up his mind at once to run away. Flight, however, is more easily planned than executed, and Kleon hurrying away from the men whom he had undertaken to lead was intercepted and slain by a Myrkinian peltast. The event, it is possible, may have taken place as Thucydides has related it; but, although he has nowhere suppressed facts or introduced falsehoods, the history of Kleon in his pages is so coloured that we may be pardoned for questioning whether the end of this loud-voiced and unrefined politician was as ignominious as he describes it to have been. Their leader was dead: but the Spartans under Klearidas were none the more able to crush the Athenian right wing, which gave way only under the showers of arrows poured in upon them by the Myrkinian

language. In any case, it must be remembered that the Spartan dread of Ionians (Athenians) on the sea was fully equal to their confidence in the presence of Ionians on land.

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peltastai and the assaults of the Chalkidian horsemen. The left wing, we are told, had fled precipitately on the first attack of the enemy; and it seems at the least possible that this wing may have consisted of those men who, as being politically opposed to Kleon, had disliked the idea of serving under him, and had shown their disgust by the insubordination which had always been the besetting sin of the oligarchic hoplites.<sup>1555</sup> Brasidas lived just long enough to know that the Athenians were defeated; and the romantic career of this thoroughly un-Spartan champion of Sparta was closed with a public funeral in the Agora of Amphipolis, where he received yearly henceforth the honours of a deified hero. The buildings raised by Hagnon were thrown down, and Brasidas was venerated as the founder; or Oikistes, of the city. The contrast between the decision and energy of the Spartans and the irresolute and uncertain conduct of their enemies is crowned by the remark that on the Spartan side seven only were slain while the Athenians lost six hundred.

Compara-  
tive merits  
of Brasidas  
and Kleon.

The historian remarks that the battle of Amphipolis removed the two great hindrances to a pacific settlement between Athens and Sparta; but he makes no effort to show that peace at the cost of sacrifices which Kleon was not willing to offer was at this time to be desired for Athens. Of Brasidas his judgement is more indulgent: it is even enthusiastic. His moderation, his affability to the citizens of revolted towns, his reputation for universal excellence,<sup>1556</sup> his sagacity, and decisive promptitude, are all carefully noted.<sup>1557</sup> The blunders and shortcomings of Kleon, his

<sup>1555</sup>-For the contrast between these and the Nautic Crowd of Peiraieus see note 1306.

<sup>1556</sup> *δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθός.* Thuc. iv. 81, 3.

<sup>1557</sup> In noting all these qualities of the great Spartan leader he was doing Brasidas no more than justice; and we may fairly say that his death was a misfortune rather than a gain for Athens. Anything which would keep her from wasting her strength on distant enterprises would be directly to her interest; and the check supplied by the operations of Brasidas on the northern coasts of the Egean might have prevented the disastrous expedition to Sicily. But so far as Brasidas himself was concerned, the effect which the extension of his career might have produced might be a subject of curious speculation. His whole history seems to show that he was toiling on behalf of an impracticable theory, and that the result of his efforts was likely only to furnish a wider field for the exercise of Spartan tyranny. With Brasidas the autonomy of isolated cities was probably an object, the attainment of which would bring with it something like the perfection of humanity: but it is at the least possible that he might himself have become a tyrant after the stamp of the ordinary Spartan Harmostes, as soon as he found that absolute autonomy was in no sense a safeguard against faction, sedition, or anarchy.

bluster, his arrogance, his incompetence as a military leader, are not less exactly registered; but whether the energetic prosecution of the war in Thrace was or was not necessary, whether the line taken by Nikias and his partisans was one which Perikles would have approved, or whether it was one against which he would have protested as involving virtual treason, he takes care never to ask. From first to last, in fact, in his account of the career of Kleon, we have not a trace of that judiciously balanced criticism which marks his sketch of Themistokles; and we are left to discover for ourselves whether and how far in the several stages of his course Kleon was right or wrong. We have not a word to show that he was less justified in his treatment of the Spartan ambassadors who came to Athens immediately after the occupation of Pylos by Demosthenes, than he was in urging the immediate reinforcement of that general's army after the rupture of the truce. Happily the unswerving honesty which never allows him to suppress facts has shown us that, when Kleon charged the first envoys with deliberate lying and duplicity, he was disgracing himself and running a risk of fatally injuring Athens; that, when the truce was once broken, he was perfectly right in insisting that at whatever cost the Spartan hoplites in Sphakteria should be brought prisoners to Athens; that he was again wrong when, after they had been so brought, he hindered the settlement of peace by imposing conditions too exacting and severe, but that in this instance his mistake was shared seemingly by Nikias and the oligarchic party who at this moment were all run away with by the war fever; and, finally, that he was from first to last more than justified in the policy by which he held that Brasidas must be encountered and put down in Thrace. That he was left to carry out this policy himself, was his misfortune, not his fault; that he was feebly supported at Athens and sent without competent colleagues to Thrace, redounds not to his own shame but to that of his adversaries.<sup>1558</sup>

<sup>1558</sup> It is unnecessary to say more here on the picture drawn of Kleon by Aristophanes. We have seen that some of his most telling portraits go far beyond the bounds of caricature, and, regarded morally, are deliberate falsehoods. If this was the case with his descriptions of Sokrates, we have not much more grounds for giving credit to his drawings of Perikles and Kleon. See notes 1323, 1358, 1503. See also the re-

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peace.

The death of Brasidas and of Kleon left the way clear for those statesmen at Athens and Sparta who had regarded their policy with suspicion and dislike. Nikias and his followers were now free to urge that Sparta might fairly be trusted to fulfil her engagements: and at Sparta the peace party had a strongly interested advocate in the king Pleistoanax, whose retreat from Attica shortly before the ratification of the Thirty Years' Truce had been ascribed to personal corruption,<sup>1559</sup> and had been punished by a sentence of exile. To bring about his restoration he adopted the plan by which the Alkmaionidai brought about the expulsion of the family of Peisistratos.<sup>1560</sup> The Delphian priestess duly bribed bade the Spartans bring home again the child of Herakles the son of Zeus under penalty of ploughing with a silver ploughshare<sup>1561</sup> if they should fail to do so. The stratagem succeeded: and Pleistoanax after a banishment of 19 years was brought back to Sparta with honours which had been paid only to the earliest of their kings. But, as in the cases of Kleisthenes or Kleomenes and Demaratos,<sup>1562</sup> no long time passed before the

B.C. 426.

marks of Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. liv. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, ii. 105. Colonel Mure, *Cred. Hist. Gr. Lit.* book iv. ch. viii. § 9, tries to set aside Mr. Grote's conclusions by the plea that the opinion of Aristophanes was shared by his contemporaries generally: but this rejoinder leaves the inconsistency of the Aristophanic picture with the facts stated as historical by Thucydides, just where it was. The truth is that a poet who can draw pictures not more accurate than those which might represent Copernicus and Isaac Newton as fanatical supporters of the Ptolemaic system of astronomy is in no case to be trusted in questions of historical fact unless his words are borne out by clear statements of contemporary historians. The charges of corruption brought against Kleon are effectually disposed of by Mr. Grote, *ibid.*, who insists that we must take our choice between these charges and those which accuse him of slandering innocent and righteous persons. The two cannot be sustained together; neither may we forget that it was far easier for the comic poet to satirise and libel a statesman than for that statesman to make a practice of falsely accusing citizens whom he knew to be guiltless of the crimes alleged against them. If the accuser failed to obtain the votes of one-fifth of the jurors, a severe fine was the consequence; and one or two such failures would bring any man to ruin. There is, however, no doubt that Kleon did accuse Aristophanes of putting forth before the allies present at the celebration of the great Dionysian festival matters which ought never to be discussed or noticed in their hearing. The Areiopagos could inflict only a small fine; and Kleon, it would seem, did not carry the matter before a Dikastery. But Aristophanes felt that the step taken by Kleon with regard to his comedy of the *Babylonians* was not uncalled for, for the plays which immediately followed it were exhibited at the Lenaian festival in mid-winter when few or no allies would be in Athens.

<sup>1559</sup> See page 54.<sup>1560</sup> See vol. i. page 219.

<sup>1561</sup> Thucydides, v. 16, makes no remark on this phrase. Herodotos would have sought and probably would have found some popular tradition in which the prediction or threat would be converted into a fact. The expression has been compared with the Latin saying 'aureo hamo piscari,' which according to Dr. Arnold denotes the gaining of a small profit at a large cost. But in this case according to the Pythia there was in the event of disobedience no profit to be gained at all; and the prophecy would seem rather to point to a famine in which the price of corn would answer to the value not of an iron but of a silver ploughshare. See vol. i. page 272.

<sup>1562</sup> See vol. i. page 422.

trick was found out: and although no attempt apparently was made to banish Pleistoanax for the second time, every reverse and disaster which henceforth befell the Spartan arms was sedulously laid to his charge. Wearied out with such incessant imputations, he determined to do all that lay in his power to put an end to a war in which he was made a scapegoat for the offences or blunders of other men. Peace would leave no room for military failures, and the return of the Sphakterian prisoners would be the removal of a thorn from his own side.

There was nothing therefore to stand in the way of immediate negotiations. The defeated Athenian army had returned home from Amphipolis: and the reinforcements sent to Brasidas under the command of Ramphias had also made their way back to Sparta partly because they had been checked by the Thessalians and in part because on hearing of the death of Brasidas they felt that it was useless to persist in an enterprise which they knew to be regarded with extreme dislike at home.<sup>1563</sup> Both sides were depressed, and each side had its own special causes of anxiety. The recent disasters at Delion and Amphipolis, the loss of that confidence which had led them to reject the Spartan offers made after the victory at Pylos, the fear of further revolts among their allies, all tended to sicken the Athenians with the struggle. The protraction for ten years of a war which they had hoped to end at the most in two or three, the catastrophe at Pylos, the desertions of Helots who fled to the Messenians at Koryphasion and whom they suspected of secret dealings with their enemies, the approaching end of the truce or peace with Argos, and the refusal of the Argives to ratify another unless they received possession of Kynouria, had long since brought the Spartans to the conclusion that everything must be done to end the war and to recover the hoplites held as hostages or prisoners at Athens. Still it was only after some little difficulty that the contending parties agreed each to give up what they had acquired during the war. This arrangement may have been proposed by Nikias, by whose name this peace is generally known; it is, at the least,

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V.

Terms of  
the treaty.  
B.C. 420.

<sup>1563</sup> Thuc. v. 13.



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thoroughly in accordance with the policy which had prompted his opposition to Kleon. By this stipulation the Athenians supposed that they would regain Plataiai; but they found themselves mistaken. The Thebans availed themselves of the shuffle that the Plataians had voluntarily yielded themselves, and the morality of the day had not learnt to regard capture after a storm and surrender by capitulation forced on by a blockade as merely different forms of the same thing. But the Athenians remembered that if this plea gave the Boiotians the right to hold Plataiai, they had precisely the same title to retain the Megarian port of Nisaia, and they insisted on keeping it accordingly. The treaty for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with her allies thus pledged the latter to restore Amphipolis, while Athens was bound to leave autonomous all towns in Chalkidike which had put themselves under the protection of Brasidas, the obligation of paying to Athens the tribute imposed on them by the assessment of Aristides still continuing in force. By this rule the cities of Argilos, Stageiros, Akanthos, Skôlos, Olynthos and Spartôlos were to be regarded as neutrals, allied neither with Athens nor with Sparta; but with the towns which, like Torônê, the Athenians had stormed or otherwise captured, they were to deal as they might think fit. The inhabitants of the other towns might, if they pleased, depart unmolested, taking their property with them. The last concession to the Athenians was Panakton, a fort at the foot of Kithairon, which the Boiotians had seized in the preceding year.<sup>1564</sup> On their part the Athenians, who were to receive back all prisoners in the hands whether of the Spartans or their allies, were bound to restore all captives belonging to Sparta or any city in her confederacy, as well as to surrender Koryphasion (Pylos), Kythera, Methana (Methone), and Atalantê.<sup>1565</sup>

Ten years had passed away since the surprise of Plataiai by the Thebans when this peace, signed among others on the Spartan side by Tellis the father of Brasidas, was ratified by the commissioners of Sparta and Athens. To their proposals

<sup>1564</sup> Thuc. v. 3, 5.

<sup>1565</sup> The text of Thucydides inserts between these two last-named places the name of Pteleon, a town not mentioned before. It is unlikely that he would name between Methone and Atalantê a place on the borders of Messênê and Elis. See further the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* v. 18, 6.

for a treaty, when Demosthenes had first blocked up their hoplites in Sphacteria, the Spartans had added the promise that they would be responsible for the acceptance by all their confederates of any terms which might be agreed upon between themselves and the Athenians.<sup>1566</sup> It was now to be seen that their powers fell far short of their professions. The Boiotians as being constrained to give up Panakton, the Megarians as not recovering Nisaia, the Corinthians as not receiving Anaktorion and Sollion, would have nothing to do with the treaty; and the provision, on which the Athenians would lay most stress, was contemptuously disregarded by Klearidas. The Chalkidians would not give up Amphipolis, and he had, he said, not the means of compelling them to do so.

<sup>1566</sup> Thuc. iv. 20, 5.

## CHAPTER VI.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO  
THE MASSACRE AT MELOS.BOOK  
III.

Separate  
treaty of  
alliance  
between  
Athens and  
Sparta.  
B.C. 421.

EVER since the victory of Demosthenes and Kleon the great desire of the Spartans had been to recover the hoplites taken prisoners in Sphakteria. Whether these prisoners should be surrendered at once or not, would depend on the order in which the stipulations of the treaty might be carried out. The lot which was to decide this question was drawn by the Spartans, who had now to fulfil their part of the compact in order to bind the Athenians to the performance of their engagements. Their love for Athens was not great; but to their wish for the recovery of the Spartans was added another anxiety nearer home. The thirty years' truce which the Argives had refused to renew except on the cession of Kynouria was drawing to its close; and an alliance of Argos with Athens might restore her to her ancient supremacy in the Peloponnesos. The friendship of Athens had therefore become a matter of importance for the Spartans who at once set free all Athenian prisoners in their possession, and sent orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis forthwith. In the hope that it might still be possible to obtain some lighter terms, that officer returned with the envoys to Sparta and reported the determination of the Chalkidians not to give up the city. He was sent back with the peremptory mandate to carry out his orders or to withdraw the whole Peloponnesian garrison. The troops were accordingly withdrawn, for Klearidas still insisted that the Chalkidians were steadily set against submission. Nay more, the envoys of the confederate cities renewed their protest against the injustice of the peace, and this protest left slender hope that the other

stipulations of the treaty would be fulfilled. The Spartans were thus discredited with their allies; and they had to dread a formidable enemy in Argos, if she should become the head of a new Peloponnesian confederacy, at a time when Sparta was exhausted with a ten years' war and when Argos had full command of a large population and great wealth. It was clearly, therefore, the policy of Sparta to separate Athens from Argos, and as this could only be done by binding her to a private alliance with herself, a covenant was proposed and forthwith signed, pledging Athens and Sparta to defend each the other's territories against all invaders, and placing the Athenians especially under an engagement to put down all risings of the Helots. The Athenian garrison, pending the restoration of Amphipolis, still occupied Pylos in conjunction with their Messenian allies: and the special check on Sparta involved in this occupation was thus signed away, for the Messenians must now be restrained from spreading disaffection among their kindred Helots. This alone would have been a concession altogether beyond the value of the practically worthless alliance which in mere fear of Argos Sparta offered to Athens; but so great was the worth of this alliance in the eyes of Nikias and his followers that by a tacit agreement Sparta received as her reward the prize which she most eagerly coveted. The Sphakterian hoplites were all given up; <sup>1567</sup> and in this barren exchange Athens received the firstfruits of the philo-Lakonian policy of her oligarchic citizens. Kleon had been guilty of manifest injustice when he charged with deliberate falsehood the Spartan envoys who came to ask for the release of the Sphakterian prisoners,—offering it must be noted, the same recompense then for which they now succeeded in winning the boon, <sup>1568</sup>—their friendship, namely, and their alliance, what-

<sup>1567</sup> Anxious as they had been to recover these prisoners, the Spartans after regaining them regarded them with so much suspicion, that they deprived them of eligibility to all offices, and reduced them to the condition of foreigners, see vol. i. page 19. Some of these men had already been elected to offices. Of the grounds on which they were suspected by the Ephors we know nothing. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 31, thinks that the Ephors may have feared their tampering with the Helots and organising revolt among them. Such a combination can only be explained by the not very likely hypothesis that these Sphakterian prisoners had expressed their horror and disgust at the massacre of the Helots who had risked their lives to save them, and their determination to prevent such iniquities for the future. After some time they were restored to their full privileges. Thuc. v. 34.

<sup>1568</sup> Thuc. iv. 19, 1.

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ever these might be worth. But in insisting after the rupture of the truce that the enterprise at Pylos should be carried out with energy, and still more that every nerve should be strained for the recovery of Athenian supremacy on the coasts of Makedonia, he was simply discharging his bounden duty as an Athenian citizen, a duty which the oligarchic party shamefully betrayed. But Kleon was no longer living to maintain a policy not lacking the spirit and foresight of Perikles; and the lamp-maker Hyperbolos can scarcely be said to have taken his place. Athens was now practically ruled by those who prided themselves on being nobly born and nobly bred; and these statesmen who, like Hekataios, could trace their generations back to the ancestral god set to work to strip her of one advantage after another, offering her in their stead apples of the Dead Sea. Nothing can excuse the credulous weakness which could dispense with all tests for trying the sincerity of the Spartans. The continued detention of the Pylian prisoners and a demand that a combined Athenian and Spartan force should undertake the reduction of Amphipolis would at once have compelled the Spartans to display themselves in their true colours, or, as is far more likely, have secured to Athens all that she wanted. As it was, the terms of the peace were not kept on either side, and the period which followed until the open resumption of the war was at best no more than a time of truce.<sup>1569</sup>

Scheme for setting up a new Peloponnesian confederacy under the presidency of Argos.

The clause in the treaty of peace which gave the Spartans and Athenians power to modify any of its terms at will had grievously offended the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.<sup>1570</sup> The confederate cities were thus, it seemed, of no account; and their consent to any changes was not even to be formally

<sup>1569</sup> This fact impelled Thucydides to regard the whole period from the surprise of Plataiai by the Thebans to the surrender of Athens and the destruction of the Long Walls as taken up with one persistent struggle, lasting for 27 years,—the only matter in which the prophecies in vogue among the people happened to hit the fact. He states his own acquaintance with these predictions from the beginning of the war, and adds that the reckoning was exceeded only by a few days. v. 26. Of this period he spent not less than 20 years in exile, for reasons already noted, see page 249; and however much we may deplore the failure in duty which led to his banishment, we cannot regret the fact that he was thus enabled to acquire the wide and varied experience which his sojourn in Peloponnesos and elsewhere gave him of the motives of the several actors in the strife, and of the light in which the same facts were regarded on both sides. In iv. 48, 5, Thucydides seems to recognise the distinction which in v. 26 he rejects, see notes 1349, 1421, 1440. Probably he forgot to alter the former passage in the revision of his History.

<sup>1570</sup> Thuc. v. 29, 2.

asked. The Corinthians, who had been aggrieved first by not obtaining Sollion and Anaktorion<sup>1571</sup> and then at the private treaty between Sparta and Athens, gladly availed themselves of this irritation to carry out their own plans. Instead of returning straight home, their envoys went to Argos, and there said that on the Argives lay the duty of saving Peloponnesos from a combination which might enslave them as effectually as the Athenians had enslaved the islanders of the Egean. Such language was naturally pleasant to men who had not been accustomed to be flattered or courted. The Argives agreed readily to issue a proclamation inviting the alliance of any autonomous Peloponnesian cities, and appointed commissioners with full powers to treat with the chief men of each city in private, and thus to save the latter from public disgrace if in any case the negotiation should come to nothing. For some time past<sup>1572</sup> they had chosen a thousand young men from their greatest and wealthiest families, and, releasing them from all other obligations, had inrolled them in a standing regiment, which was conspicuous in the battle of Mantinea. This aristocratic band afterwards did its natural work by joining the Spartans and upsetting the democratic constitution of their country; but for the present the stars in their courses seemed to be fighting to bring back to Argos the glory of her old heroic days. The Peloponnesian cities generally were deeply stirred, and needed only some decent pretext for gathering round her; some because they regarded with dislike and suspicion the clause relating to future modifications in the treaty for peace, and others because they had their own private reasons for wishing to keep clear of Sparta. The democratic city of Mantinea had in the course of the war subdued some of the neighbouring Arkadian towns, and fearing that the Spartans, now at leisure to attend to such concerns, would insist that these towns should be left to their old autonomy,<sup>1573</sup> was the first to throw itself into the new

<sup>1571</sup> Thuc. v. 30, 2.

<sup>1572</sup> Thucydides, v. 67, states it as ἐκ πολλοῦ; but we may compare his use of the phrase δαίμον προ τούτων as an indication of time. See note 786. Diodoros, xii. 75, assigns it to this time and there is no reason to question the fact. See the note of Dr. Arnold on Thuc. v. 67, 2.

<sup>1573</sup> Thuc. v. 29.

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alliance.<sup>1574</sup> But so manifest were the tokens of disturbance elsewhere that the Spartans sent envoys to protest against the course taken by the Corinthians and to insist on the duty of accepting the peace heartily and with good faith, unless some religious hindrance stood in the way. As these envoys came while their allies were present in the city, they did not choose to say that the cession of Sollion and Anaktorion would settle all difficulties. They therefore asserted boldly that there was a religious impediment in the oath by which, when the invitation to Brasidas came from Chalkidike, they had sworn never to betray their allies on the northern coasts of the Egean. But if it was impossible for them to break this pledge, they should hold themselves free to accept or refuse an alliance with Argos. The Spartan envoys went home baffled. The Argives thought that Corinth would at once give her decision; but these also were put off for another season. Their hesitation was removed when the Eleians came forward to join the new confederacy. Down to the breaking out of the war they had received, as stewards for the Olympian Zeus, from the town of Lepreon, a few miles to the north of the river Neda, a yearly tribute of a talent for services performed in some private war of a former age. Since that time it had not been paid; and when the Eleians now repeated the demand, the Lepreatans appealed to the arbitration of Sparta. The Eleians replied by ravaging the lands of Lepreon; the Spartans, protesting against the iniquity of the Eleians, decreed that Lepreon must be independent; and the Eleians, wroth at this interference, renounced their alliance.<sup>1575</sup> The accession of Corinth and

<sup>1574</sup> The Spartans, later on in the season, attacked the fort of Kypsela, which the Mantineians had occupied, at the request of the Parrhasians, subjects of the Mantineians, who were thus restored to independence, after the demolition of the fortress. Thuc. v. 33.

<sup>1575</sup> The Eleians are here said, Thuc. v. 31, 5, to refer to an agreement made before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, that each city in alliance with Sparta should retain its possessions as they were when the war began. This is the first notice which we have of this agreement.

A few weeks or months later the Spartans sent to Lepreon the Helots who had served with Brasidas in Thrace and who were on this account enfranchised without being murdered. These Helots numbered 700 at the time of the mission of Brasidas, Thuc. iv. 80, 4: they had probably not suffered seriously in the battles which they had fought. Thucydides states that with these Helots the Spartans sent 'the Neodamodes.' We must therefore suppose that the whole body of Neodamodes was sent. If these Neodamodes were sons of enfranchised Helots, they would answer in some degree to the Roman Libertini as sons of Liberti. This is the first mention made of this class, which was

Elis to the new confederacy was followed by that of the Chalkidians among whom Brasidas had toiled and died. But the Boiotians and Megarians, although utterly dissatisfied with the terms of the treaty of peace, held aloof. Alliance with Sparta was more congenial to their feelings than the friendship of democratic communities.

While these political movements were stirring the Peloponnesos, the Skionaians paid the terrible penalty to which they had long since been sentenced.<sup>1576</sup> The men were slain; the women and children sold into slavery; and the city with its lands was given to the Plataians who had made their escape to Athens during the siege of the town by the Spartans. The restoration of the Delians who had found a refuge in Adramyttion,<sup>1577</sup> and a local war between the Phokians and Lokrians,<sup>1578</sup> are the only incidents which draw attention from the course of Peloponnesian politics. Exulting in the good fortune which had attended their efforts, the Corinthians made an attempt to detach the powerful city of Tegea from its alliance with Sparta. But the constitution of Tegea was oligarchic: and the firm refusal of their request rudely shook the confidence of the Corinthians, who, fearing that they had already reached the limits of their success, sought once more to gain the Boiotians over to their side. Between these and the Athenians there was a truce terminable on either side at ten days' notice; and the Corinthians now asked the Boiotians to go with them to Athens, and to throw up this covenant, if the Athenians should refuse to enter into a like engagement with the Corinthians. Here also they were foiled. The Athenians replied that there was already peace between themselves and the Corinthians, if the latter were allies of Sparta: and the Boiotians refused to withdraw from their own covenant with Athens.

Refusal of  
Tegea to  
join the  
new con-  
federacy.

Meanwhile the feelings of the Athenians towards the Spartans were undergoing a change. The latter had signally

Intrigues  
for bring-  
ing about

probably still very small, although it rapidly increased afterwards. Thuc. vii. 58, 3. Xenophon, *Hellen.* iii. 1, 4.

<sup>1576</sup> See page 258.

<sup>1577</sup> See page 264. The Delians had been removed from their island under the notion that their expulsion would be pleasing to Phoibos. The military disasters which had since befallen the Athenians were taken as evidence that this notion was wrong; and they were accordingly brought back.

<sup>1578</sup> Thuc. v. 32, 2.



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an alliance  
between  
Sparta and

failed to fulfil their promises. They had not restored Amphipolis, and they had not constrained their allies to accept the peace, although they had wheedled Athens out of the one possession which gave her a real hold upon them. But they had learnt that words went a long way with the philo-Lakonian party at Athens: and so, putting them off with undefined promises of undertaking with them a joint expedition to coerce the Corinthians and Boiotians, they had the assurance to demand either that the Athenians should give up Pylos or that they should withdraw all the Messenians and Helots who might be in the place, leaving only Athenians as the garrison. Wearied out by piteous professions of inability in a case in which the Spartans were bound to take the true measure of their powers, the Athenians at first firmly refused to take either step; but the Spartans were not to be thus repulsed. They were well aware that they had strenuous allies in Athens; and these allies worked so well on their behalf, that the Helots and other deserters in Pylos were taken from Peloponnesos and lodged in Kephallenia. The patience of the Athenians was to be still more severely tried. In the following winter deputies from Athens, Boiotia, and Corinth met in vain debate at Sparta. With a fickleness equal to that of any democratical commonwealth the policy of Sparta was changed. Of the new ephors two, Kleoboulos and Xenares, were vehemently opposed to Athens, and with the Corinthian and Boiotian envoys they concocted the scheme that the latter should first make an alliance with Argos and then should bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. One condition only they attached to the working of this round-about plan. The Boiotians must surrender Panakton, that by giving it up to the Athenians the Spartans might bring about the evacuation of Pylos. Even this the Boiotians were ready to agree to: and their willingness was still further increased when on their homeward journey they were accosted by two of the most distinguished of the citizens of Argos who expressed an extreme anxiety that Boiotia and Argos might be united in the same confederacy. With the report thus brought from Sparta the Boiotarchs were highly gratified, and they never for a moment supposed that the Four

Boiotian Senates <sup>1579</sup> would refuse to ratify a decree sanctioning an alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and the Chaldikians of Thrace, and thus opening the way for an alliance of all these states with Argos. But the idea of alliance with Argos was so new to the people that the Boiotarchs never ventured to reveal the plot, and to tell them that the step which they proposed was eagerly desired at Sparta. The Boiotians only knew that Corinth had abandoned her old alliance, and they at once declared that they durst not offend Sparta by entering into covenant with her enemies. Thus foiled at the threshold of their task, the Boiotarchs could go no further; and for a time the spinning of these complicated webs seemed altogether at an end. <sup>1580</sup>

But the Spartans could not rest without regaining Pylos; and as the Boiotians refused to yield up Panakton with which the exchange was to be made, unless the Spartans would make with them a separate alliance like that into which they had entered with the Athenians, the latter ended the eleventh year of the great struggle with a piece of deliberate treachery to the Athenians, to whom they were pledged to make no engagements without their knowledge and consent. But the bait was too enticing; and the followers of Kleoboulos and Xenares were eager to avail themselves of any means for cutting short a peace which they hated. <sup>1581</sup> The Boiotians, however, were resolved that no Athenian force should occupy the border fortress, and they spent the winter in levelling its walls with the ground.

Separate  
alliance  
between  
Sparta  
and the  
Boiotians.  
B.C. 420.

The demolition of Panakton was an act of marked hostility to Athens. The Spartan treaty with the Boiotians was a direct violation of their covenants with the Athenians. To the Argives the two events looked very like the results of a conspiracy designed to leave them powerless amongst a multitude of foes. The old alliance still subsisted between Corinth and Sparta, while Sparta had her private agreements with the Athenians and Boiotians between whom a ten days' truce was still renewed, and Tegea had refused to desert her old ally. The visions of supremacy in Peloponnesos with which the Argives had been solacing themselves seemed thus

Efforts of  
the Argives  
to form an  
alliance  
with  
Sparta.

<sup>1579</sup> Nothing is known of the constitution of these bodies.

<sup>1580</sup> Thuc. v. 38.

<sup>1581</sup> Ib. v. 39.

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to fade away, and in fear almost for their existence they hurried off their envoys Eustrophos and Aison to Sparta to get the best terms which could be granted. One condition only they attached to the negotiation. They could not bring themselves to abandon their title to the Kynourian land, from which, as the story ran, their two champions had returned home alive, leaving Othryades the solitary watchman on a field cumbered with five hundred and ninety-seven corpses. Their proposal that the question should be submitted to arbitration the Spartans rejected with contempt: but when the Argives said that they would be satisfied with a clause empowering the two states to fight the duel again at some convenient time on the old ground with the same number of champions on either side, the Spartans, anxious all along to include Argos in their confederacy, agreed to an arrangement which seemed to them childishly foolish or even mad.<sup>1582</sup> The terms of the treaty were drawn out, and the Argive envoys were sent home to get the consent of their countrymen to its provisions.

Dismissal  
of the Spar-  
tan ambas-  
sadors from  
Athens.

The demolition of Panakton had naturally annoyed the Spartans who feared the difficulty of getting a living lion in exchange for a dead dog; but in the hope that the excuse which had served them in the matter of Amphipolis might stand them in good stead here; Andromedes was sent with two colleagues to Athens to demand the surrender of Pylos on the ground that the surrender of the site of Panakton fulfilled the stipulation. But the Athenians were not in the mood for further fooling. They were wearied out with talking which had now gone on for twelve months to little purpose or to none, and the Spartan envoys were dismissed after a reception which showed the depth of their indignation.

Intrigues  
of Alkibi-  
ades.

This feeling was sedulously fostered by Alkibiades, the son of Kleinias who fell at Koroneia and the grandson of that Alkibiades who had been one of the most strenuous opponents of the Peisistratidai, who had served with a ship of his own at Artemision,<sup>1583</sup> and who had thrown up a standing friendship with Sparta on purely political grounds. This friendship Alkibiades had sought to renew. Special attention paid to

<sup>1582</sup> Thuc. v. 41. See vol. i. page 93.

<sup>1583</sup> Herod. viii. 17.

the comfort of the hoplites taken at Sphakteria would win for him, he hoped, the office of proxenos for Sparta; and he was honestly convinced, if honest conviction can be associated at all with his name, that for such an office no man had a better title. The blood of Zeus and Aiakos was flowing in his veins; and the gods had endowed him with a bodily beauty equal to that which the touch of Helen had bestowed on the mother of Demaratos.<sup>1584</sup> To the possession of vast wealth he added a readiness of wit, a fertility of invention, a power of complaisance, which invested his manner, when he wished to please, with a singular and almost irresistible charm. Magnificent in his tastes, splendid in the lavishness of his Liturgies,<sup>1585</sup> revelling in the elegance of the most refined Athenian luxury, Alkibiades shrunk from no hardship in war, and faced danger with a bravery never called into question. At the siege of Potidaia under Phormion he had been severely wounded; but his life was unfortunately saved by the philosopher Sokrates then serving among the Athenian hoplites. In the battle of Delion he had repaid the obligation by saving the life of Sokrates. With the qualifications which, as he hoped, might commend him to Spartan favour, he combined a spirit of oligarchical exclusiveness which might have satisfied the most rigid disciples of the school of Lykourgos. But in their eyes his youth was an offence (he was now a little over thirty years of age, the age at which an Athenian became eligible for the Boulê or Senate); and Spartans, although they were oligarchs, had respect for oligarchical law. Alkibiades had respect for none. Without a conscience, without a heart, caring for nothing but his own grandeur, as ready to make oligarchs his tools as to cheat and dupe a demos, taking no thought for the disasters or miseries which his schemes might involve, defying the magistrates, insulting the law, Alkibiades presents an image of violent selfishness and ingrained treachery, standing very near the pinnacle of human wickedness. He has been compared with Themistokles. Few comparisons could be more unjust. Professing no austere righteousness, seeking his own good perhaps not less than that of his country, Themistokles yet from first

<sup>1584</sup> See vol. i. page 421.<sup>1585</sup> See vol. i. page 204.

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to last promoted her best interests with an unswerving steadiness; from first to last he carried out one uniform policy which had laid the foundations of the Athenian empire and continued to sustain its greatness. Alkibiades had no policy. Hating a demos in his heart with the supercilious arrogance which looks on human blood as a vile fluid when it runs in the veins of men who boast no pedigree, he was still as ready to destroy an oligarchy as he was to uproot a free constitution, and he was therefore justly dreaded by men of all political parties as a man treading in the paths of the old Hellenic despots. The welfare of Athens was the one end and object of Themistokles: Alkibiades cared no more for Athens than he cared for Argos or for Sparta. He could pretend to love each or all, so long as it suited his purpose to do so. He could dress up in attractive guise any scheme by which he might increase his own importance; and he felt no scruple in casting to the winds every rule which had guided the policy of Perikles. To commit the people to his plans, he could act or utter a lie with only a feeling of self-complacence at his own cleverness. His life had been saved by the man whose life and teaching have remained from that time to the present a subject of absorbing interest: but he sought the company of Sokrates for no higher purpose than to learn the trick of leading his opponents by Eironeia (Irony) or pretended ignorance to contradict themselves, as well as to acquire with a certain adroitness of language and readiness of illustration an insight into the characters and motives of men, the better to make use of them as tools in the execution of his own plans.<sup>1586</sup> In the heart of the philosopher his brilliancy, his physical vigour, his bodily beauty, the grace and charm of his manner awakened a natural but irrational affection; but on the moral being of his pupil the influence of the teacher produced no effect whatever. Utterly selfish and unscrupulous, Alkibiades in company with scoundrels like Kritias sought the society of Sokrates, and still more steeped in selfishness he departed. If the character of his doctrine was to be measured by his success, the name of Sokrates would stand among the

<sup>1586</sup> Xen. *Mém.* i. 2.

lowest in the profession of sophists. But to judge him thus would be as iniquitous as to ascribe deliberate corruption to the sophists as a class, or to suppose that the studied design to make the worse appear the better cause was entertained by the whole class of teachers to one of whom we are indebted for perhaps the most beautiful apologue in the literature of any age or country. Assuredly a class generally corrupt could not produce a teacher like Prodikos, and the story of the Choice of Herakles <sup>1587</sup> is sufficient evidence that, while some sophists rose far above the popular morality of the day, not many sank very far below it. But for a man like Alkibiades sophists who pandered to vice would have but slender attractions. Such mercenary ethics are always feeble; and the impetuous and sensual youth felt himself drawn towards Sokrates by an intellectual power. The society of this wonderful man tended only to make him more dangerous; and if we are to believe the stories told of him, his career from first to last was one unbroken course of gilded sensuality and of barbarous ruffianism scantily hid by a veil of superficial refinement. Under any circumstances such a man must be infamous: but Alkibiades had opportunities of committing crime on a vast scale, and he availed himself of them to the uttermost. In supreme disregard of any interests but his own, in utter carelessness of the misery which his deeds might cause, and in the absence of all remorse for cruelties which might be necessary for the attainment of his ends, he may perhaps find a peer in the Norman Conqueror of England; but William had the mind of a statesman and a ruler, and he strengthened the nation which he crushed. Alkibiades had no fixed plan: and he was successful only in ruining his country. <sup>1588</sup>

To such a man a slight was a deadly offence; and Alkibiades had received a marked slight from the Spartans. His courtesies to their prisoners had not only called forth no

Treachery  
of Alkibi-  
ades to the  
Spartan  
envoys.

<sup>1587</sup> Xen. *Mem. S.* ii. 1, 21. *Tales of Ancient Greece*, 71. It is unnecessary to say that the mythical characteristics of Herakles would lend themselves as readily for purposes of corruption as for those of edification. *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ii. 45. The use made of the myth by Prodikos may, therefore, be the more taken as illustrating the method of the sophists, of whom Sokrates not less than Prodikos was one.

<sup>1588</sup> Some samples of the iniquities of Alkibiades are given by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. lv. The anecdotes are not pleasant, nor do they tend to modify materially the judgement which the records of his political career compel us to form of the man,

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public recognition but had seemingly been forgotten by the ransomed men, or had served only to bring them into suspicion and to deprive them of their privileges. Alkibiades therefore ceased to be a philo-Lakonian; and he now discovered that an alliance with Argos would secure to Athens her old preponderance. There is much to be said in favour of a vast number of alternative political schemes; and it may fairly be urged that in deserting the party of Nicias he was consulting the true interests of Athens. No one could see the faults of others more clearly than Alkibiades, whenever he wished to see them; and for the present it suited his purpose to submit the policy of the Spartans to a keen and rigorous scrutiny. The arrival of the ambassadors to surrender to the Athenians not the fortress of Panakton but its site enabled him to make with decency the change which had become necessary. While he inveighed in the assembly against Spartan duplicity, shuffling, and dilatoriness, he sent a message to Argos urging the need of sending envoys at once to propose an alliance with Athens and of joining with them representatives from Mantinea and Elis. The Argives had desired nothing better. Here was a way opened for a covenant with the imperial city whose fleets were still supreme on the seas but whose maritime empire could not affect the preponderance of Argos within the Peloponnesos. The embassy was accordingly sent, and the mission of Eustrophos and Aison was left to its fate. But the tidings of this movement had reached Sparta, and no time was lost in sending a counter embassy consisting of men personally popular at Athens. Even in this desperate strait they charged their envoys, with an obstinacy almost praiseworthy, to insist that the ground on which Panakton had stood was a fitting equivalent for Pylos, and that no harm whatever was meant by the private agreement of Sparta with the Boiotians. To all this the Athenians might have turned deaf ears: the case was altered when the envoys said in the Senate that they had come with full powers for the immediate settlement of all differences. Alkibiades at once saw that such a statement, made before the assembly, might jeopardise his proposed alliance with Argos. It must not, therefore, be made:

and he found the means of prevention in one of the envoys named Endios, whose surname of Alkibiades denoted the intimate connexion between the two families. Through Endios he gained access to his colleagues and persuaded them that their profession of full powers before the assembly might expose them to demands and importunities which they might find it difficult to resist, adding that if they would claim no further mission than that of envoys charged only to report the wishes of the Athenians he would pledge himself to secure for them the surrender of Pylos and to plead their cause in person before the people. The Spartans fell into the snare. On their introduction to the assembly on the following day Alkibiades, we are told by Plutarch,<sup>1589</sup> rose and asked them with his most courtly manner with what powers they came. The answer was given according to his prompting, and roused the instant and deep indignation of hearers who could hardly believe their senses. Far from saying a word in their favour, Alkibiades joined vehemently in the outcry against Spartan shuffling and lying, and was proposing that the Argive envoys should at once be admitted to an audience when a shock of earthquake caused the adjournment of the assembly to the following day.<sup>1590</sup> So ended a scene in which the descendant of Zeus and Aiakos, the refined and cultured gentleman, played a part infinitely more disgraceful for its unblushing impudence and unscrupulous lying than any in which the coarsest leather-seller or lamp-maker among the demos had ever been an actor. The comic poets had jested about the shiploads of lies brought from Perdikkas to Athens;

<sup>1589</sup> *Alkib.* 14. Thucydides, v. 45, 4, does not mention this fact; but it is obvious that no one else would ask the question. In all likelihood Alkibiades gave no one time to speak; otherwise they would probably have informed the people that they saw before them the plenipotentiaries of Sparta.

<sup>1590</sup> An important question turns on the source from which Thucydides obtained his knowledge of this intrigue. As Alkibiades took care, we may suppose, to have no Athenian witnesses of his conference with the Spartan envoys, it would have been useless for the latter to explain the facts of the case. They would not have been believed and Alkibiades would have stoutly denied the charge. For the same reason the Spartans after the return of the envoys could take no official notice of the matter. It is possible that Alkibiades may have boasted of the trick which he had practised on them; but it is not likely, for Nikias would at once have been furnished with an argument in favour of alliance with Sparta far more powerful than any which he employed on the following day. But the envoys would make no secret of his treachery after their return to Sparta; and Thucydides during his Peloponnesian sojourn, v. 26, 5, may have heard the story from their own lips.



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III.Alliance  
between  
Argos and  
Athens.

the falsehoods of Alkibiades would have formed the cargo of a fleet.

But when the assembly met again, Nikias insisted with greater success that important interests were not to be thus hastily and rashly thrown aside, and that if alliance with Sparta was to the interest of Athens, it was their business, whatever they might think of the conduct of the envoys, to send commissioners to Sparta to ascertain their real intentions. One of these commissioners, as we might expect, was Nikias himself. They were charged to demand the restoration not of the site but of the fort of Panakton and the rescinding of their private alliance with the Boiotians, unless these should accept the peace; to repeat further the several grounds of the dissatisfaction felt by the Athenians; and finally to warn them that an alliance between Athens and Argos would be the consequence of their refusal. Nikias found that his words made little impression. The anti-Athenian Xenares was for the time in the ascendant, and their answer was that although they could not give up their compact with the Boiotians, they were ready to renew the oaths of their covenant with the Athenians. This, Nikias knew, was a superfluous and useless ceremony; and he returned home, well aware of the blame which would attach to himself for the arrangement of a treaty thus steadily disregarded by one of the two contracting parties. So great was the irritation against him that Alkibiades found no difficulty in effecting with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, a defensive alliance which distinctly recognised the imperial character of each of those states, thus introducing into the Peloponnesos relations among the allies or former subjects of the Spartans which they could not consistently tolerate and the existence of which they would prefer not to acknowledge.<sup>1591</sup> The system of city communities had thus brought about a network of complications such as had certainly never been seen before. There was a nominal peace between the confederacy or empire of Athens and the confederacy or empire of Sparta, and yet this peace was not accepted by the Corinthians, Megarians, and Boiotians. There was further a

<sup>1591</sup> Thuc. v. 47.

private compact between the Athenians and the Spartans, and again another between the Spartans and the Boiotians. To these must be added the ten days' truce between Athens and Boiotia; the new confederacy of Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea; and lastly the compact between this new confederacy and the Athenians. This last-named alliance the Corinthians would not join; and thus we have another swaying of the pendulum bringing Corinth nearer to Sparta.<sup>1592</sup>

The Olympian festival of this year was marked not only by the presence of the Athenians and their allies who had been shut out for eleven years, but by the exclusion of the Spartans for the first time since the games themselves had been instituted. The exhaustion of Athens, it had been supposed, was so great that not much competition might be looked for from her citizens. Alkibiades was resolved that this notion should be signally falsified. He had little hesitation in straining his own resources for this purpose to the utmost, for he knew that his money would be well laid out politically: he had none in availing himself of the aid of the Chians, Lesbians, and Ephesians. The result was a splendour of display on the part of the Athenians which dazzled even eyes long accustomed to the magnificence of Panhellenic feasts; and the enterprise of Alkibiades in sending seven four-horsed chariots to the lists, when few had ever sent more than one, was rewarded by a first and a second prize, while another chariot was placed in the fourth rank.<sup>1593</sup> The man who had brought about the ignominious dismissal of the Spartan envoys from Athens was thus twice proclaimed conqueror by the Olympian heralds and twice crowned with wreaths of the sacred olive. While Alkibiades was thus glorified, the Spartan Lichas underwent a signal humiliation. The Eleians had sentenced the Spartans to a fine of 2,000 minas for sending to Lepreon a force of 1,000 hoplites and assaulting the fort of Phyrkos after the proclamation of the sacred truce. Whether the Spartans or the Eleians were nearer to the truth in their versions of the story, we are unable to say: and the question is of little interest or none. Neither side, of course, would allow itself to be in the wrong; and as the Spartans would

Exclusion  
of the  
Spartans  
from the  
Olympian  
games.

<sup>1592</sup> Thuc. v. 48, 3.

<sup>1593</sup> Ib. vi. 16.

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III.

neither pay nor accept the compromise offered by the Eleians, they were formally excluded from the solemnity. But the judges dreaded the consequences of their verdict. A body of Athenian cavalry was posted at Argos, while a thousand Argives, and the same number from Mantinea, kept guard, along with the younger men of the Eleians, to suppress any attempt which the Spartans might make to escort their Theoroi under arms to the altar of sacrifice in the temple. No such attempt was made; and the Spartans for the first time in their history kept the feast at home, making no movement even when they heard that their countryman Lichas, who, as formally shut out, had been compelled to enter his chariot in the name of the Boiotians, had been beaten by the officials because, when his chariot won the race, he could not refrain from rushing forward and crowning the charioteer with the olive sprigs, thus betraying himself as the owner of the chariot.<sup>1594</sup>

Failure of  
the Spartan  
colony of  
Herakleia.

The winter following this notable feast was marked by the downfall of the Spartan colony of Herakleia. The neighbouring tribes, Thessalians, Dolopians, Ainianes, and Malians, had all along resented the foundation of a city which was designed to be a curb upon themselves, and now they ventured on an open assault in which Xenares the Lakadaimonian governor was killed. His place was taken by Hegesippidas, who held it only for a few months. The Spartans were unable to interfere, and in the following summer the Boiotians, urging that their own occupation must be better than the abandonment of the colony to the rude mountain clansmen, seized the city and expelled Hegesippidas on a charge of misgovernment seldom falsely brought against Spartan officials. The excuse of the Boiotians failed to pacify the Spartans, but against them they could do nothing. The insult of the Eleians they carefully kept in memory, and they took ample revenge for it not many years later.

B.C. 419.

Operations  
of Alkibi-  
ades in  
Argos and  
Epidauros.

Under the guidance of Alkibiades Athens was now rapidly committing herself to schemes which completely reversed the policy of Perikles. The ill-fated expedition which ended in

the catastrophe at Delion aimed only at the recovery of a power which had for a time belonged to her; but new conquests alone could satisfy Alkibiades, and the paramount duty of the Athenians to re-establish their empire in Chalkidike was put aside for the establishment of a new supremacy in the Peloponnesos. In the carrying out of this plan his genius was gratified by a series of new combinations, while his personal comfort was secured by avoiding the cold and frosty winters of the Thrace-ward regions. It cost him less exertion to make a progress through Peloponnesos with all the pomp of war than to spend months in sieges which, like that of Potidaia, had exhausted the reserved funds of Athens. He saw probably not less clearly than Kleon that Amphipolis could be recovered only by force, but he chose to say nothing of the duty of putting forth the full power of the state for this purpose. While he should have been preparing to depart for the banks of the Strymon, the Achaians of the Peloponnesos were astonished to see an Athenian general journeying through their lands on Athenian business: but when by his advice the people of Patrai began to build long walls which would bring their city within the protection of an Athenian fleet, and when further Alkibiades set to work to raise on the Achaian Rhion a fortress which threatened to become another Pylos, the Corinthians and Sikyonians took alarm, and put an end to both these enterprises.<sup>1595</sup> But Alkibiades at once found another scene for active work. The Argives had some religious quarrel with the Epidaurians connected with the service of the Pythian Apollon; and the occupation of Epidauros would, he believed, be greatly to the advantage of Athens. It would tend to keep the Corinthians quiet; and still more it would enable the Athenians to land their armies on the coast opposite to Aigina without sailing round the Skyllaian promontory and along the coasts of Hermione. The Argives, however, although urged on by Alkibiades, hesitated to strike a blow while the Spartans were in the field. They had heard that Agis was advancing towards the border town of Leuktra; they were soon reassured by the tidings that unfavourable sacrifices had com-

<sup>1595</sup> Thuc. v. 52.

elled him to return home, and that no further movement would be made before the end of the holy Karneian month. But four days were still to run before this time of truce binding on all members of the Dorian race would begin; and the Argives determined not only to invade Epidaurus at once but to secure themselves ample time by the readjustment of their calendar. The lunar system adopted by the Greeks generally needed constant intercalations to bring it even roughly into accordance with solar time; and these intercalations were not made by any method accepted by the Greek states in common. Each city had its own months, and we have already seen <sup>1596</sup> a Spartan month answering within two or three years to two Athenian months. A more convenient season for the needful intercalation could not be found. It was the twenty-sixth day of the month when the Argives set off, and it remained the twenty-sixth day of the month so long as their work of invasion went on.<sup>1597</sup> This task was cut short not by the allies whom the Epidaurians summoned to their aid (for some of these pleaded in excuse the obligations of the sacred month while others advanced as far as the border and there pitched their camp), but by the remonstrances of the Corinthians who, in a synod gathered at Mantinea by the wish of the Athenians, pointed out the glaring inconsistency of discussing terms of peace, while a war was being openly carried on within the limits of Peloponnesos itself. The Argives were, accordingly, constrained to withdraw; but a second synod did nothing more towards the settlement of any new alliance. The Spartans again advanced as far as Karyai, and were again turned back by unfavourable sacrifices at the border. The summer ended with a second invasion of the Epidaurian territory by the Argives, aided by Alkibiades and 1,000 Athenian hoplites. Irritated with this warfare which really broke, while it nominally respected, the peace, the Spartans during the winter contrived to smuggle 300 men under Agesippidas

<sup>1596</sup> See notes 1533, 1544.

<sup>1597</sup> It seems impossible to assign any other meaning to Thuc. v. 54, 3, than that which has been given to it by Mr. Grote, not only on account of the ordinary usages of the Greek language, but on the evidence of other tricks played at other times with the calendar. Mr. Grote's interpretation, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 90, note, is fully approved by Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, *Astron. Ancients*, p. 116.

into Epidaurus; and the Argives urged the grievance at Athens in terms which could not fail to gratify the pride of the imperial city. It had been agreed between them that neither side should allow hostile forces to pass through their territory; but the Spartans had conveyed these men by sea, and the sea was specially the dominion of Athens. They demanded therefore that by way of atoning for their remissness the Athenians should bring back to Pylos the Messenians and the Helots whom they had placed in the Kephallenian Kranioi. The request was complied with, a note being added to the inscription on the pillar of peace at Athens ascribing this step to the violation of the covenant by the Spartans. The winter was spent by the Argives in desultory and unsuccessful attempts on Epidaurus.

But the Spartans were now fully awake to the dangers of their position. They saw that there was disturbance, if not disaffection, everywhere, and that only a vigorous effort would prevent their confederacy from melting away. This effort they made in the following summer when the full force of the Lakedaimonians with their Helots set out for the invasion of Argos. With them were joined the troops of the Tegeatans and other Arkadian allies, while the Corinthians with the troops of other cities and with their extra-Peloponnesian allies awaited them in formidable force at Phlious. Advancing with the Eleians and Mantineians, the Argives took up their position on a hill near the Arkadian Methydriion about 15 miles to the west of Mantinea. Here they were directly in the path of Agis on his march to join the allies at Phlious. The Spartans were posted on an opposite hill: and the Argives made ready for battle on the morrow. But Agis had no intention of fighting here, and in the night the Spartans left their ground and hastened on to Phlious. The Argives, finding the enemy gone, hurried back to Argos, a distance of about 40 miles, and thence marched on the road to Nemea by which they supposed that Agis would lead his army. They were again foiled, and no long time had passed before they saw behind them on the plain of Argos the Spartan force, which had worked its way over the mountain tracts to the west. By another road not less rugged the Corinthians,

CHAP.  
VI.

Invasion of  
Argos by  
the Spar-  
tans unde  
Agis.  
B.C. 418.

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Pallenians, and Phliasians were pouring down into the low ground, while along the pass of Tretos in their front were advancing the Boiotians, Megarians, and Sikyonians. Hastening back towards Argos when they saw Agis ravaging the lands about Saminthos hard by the ancient and royal city of Mykenai, the Argives found themselves hemmed in by the Spartans in their rear, and by two other armies in front and flank. Unlike the men who had departed for Ilion from the horse-feeding Argos, they had no cavalry, and the Athenian horsemen had not yet arrived. Under such circumstances their destruction was certain : but with an astonishing blindness the Argives saw in their position only an opportunity for taking ample revenge upon the Spartans. Two men alone seemed not to share their madness ; and almost at the moment of onset these two, Alkiphron, the Lakedaimonian proxenos,<sup>1598</sup> and Thrasyllus, one of the five Strategoi, sought an interview with Agis, and on their own responsibility asserted that, if he would withdraw his army, the Argives would submit all matters in dispute to arbitration. Taking counsel for a moment with one of his officers only, Agis granted them a truce of four months, and without explaining his reasons gave the order for retreat. With their habitual obedience, but in utter amazement, the Spartans witnessed the breaking up of the finest Hellenic army which had ever been gathered together,<sup>1599</sup> and set out on their homeward journey in deep indignation against the leader who had snatched the prey from the very claws of the lion. To crown the series of wonders, the Argives, far from feeling any gratitude to the men who had saved the city from utter ruin, burst out in frantic wrath against them for suffering their enemies to escape ; and on reaching the Charadros, or gorge for military trials just without the city, began to stone Thrasyllus, who happily escaped by taking refuge at the altar.

Surrender  
of Orcho-  
menos to  
the Man-  
tineians  
and their  
allies.

After the departure of the Spartans a thousand Athenian hoplites arrived with three hundred horsemen under Laches and Nikostratos. They were informed of the truce and commanded to depart : nor would the intreaties of Alkibiades,

<sup>1598</sup> See note 1295.

who accompanied the troops as an envoy, have availed to win him an audience in the public assembly, had not his prayer been vigorously seconded by the Mantineians and Eleians. Having obtained leave to speak, he urged briefly the illegality of a covenant made by the Argives without the consent of their allies, and dwelt on the good fortune which had brought the Athenians to Argos at the fitting time for disavowing an unrighteous bargain. The allies he easily persuaded to join him in an expedition against the Arkadian Orchomenos; and in spite of a dread of Sparta which kept them back at first, the Argives soon followed, and the pact with Agis was broken. The siege of Orchomenos was speedily ended by its surrender. Its walls were weak; there was no sign of coming help; and the victors who compelled the Orchomenians to give hostages for themselves took also those Arkadian hostages which the Spartans had placed here for the sake of safety. This success brought out the difficulty of keeping together a number of independent cities. The Eleians wished to bring the force of the confederacy to bear against Lepreon: the Mantineians, supported by the Athenians, were not less anxious to attack the more powerful town of Tegea in which there was a minority in favour of renouncing the alliance with Sparta. The latter would not give way, and the Eleians went home.

The fall of Orchomenos filled the cup of wrath against Agis to the brim; and the Spartans were with difficulty withheld from razing his house to its foundations and from sentencing him to a fine of 100,000 drachmas.<sup>1600</sup> Agis simply asked that he might be allowed an opportunity of redeeming his past error before the infliction of the punishment: and the message which now came from the Tegeatans to say that only instant help could prevent the loss of the city to the Spartan confederacy brought the occasion which he desired. With a rapidity never in the judgement of Thucydides yet matched, and probably equalled only by the promptness of the expedition led by Pausanias to Plataiai,<sup>1601</sup>

The battle  
of Man-  
tinea.

<sup>1600</sup> This sum was considerably short of thirty Euboic talents. Miltiades was sentenced to pay fifty, see vol. i. page 413; and the Spartan kings with their private estates and their public maintenance were amongst the wealthiest men in Greece.

<sup>1601</sup> See vol. i. page 566.



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III.

Agis set out at the head of the whole Spartan force, attended by ten commissioners who by a new decree were appointed to accompany the kings on all military expeditions. From Orestheion<sup>1602</sup> he sent back for the defence of Sparta itself a sixth part of his forces, consisting of the oldest and the youngest men. With the rest he reached Tegea where he was soon joined by the Arkadian allies. For the Corinthians, Boiotians, Phokians, and Lokrians the task of effecting a junction with him was not so easy, as the enemy lay between them. Without waiting for support which must be long in coming Agis advanced into the Mantineian territory, and began to ravage it. Posted on a steep and precipitous eminence the Argives waited his attack in order of battle, and the Spartan, eager to wipe out his disgrace, was anxious only to order the onset. So manifest was his rashness that a Spartan veteran could not help citing the old proverb on the healing of evil by evil.<sup>1603</sup> Struck by the truth of the man's words, or possibly making the discovery for himself at the same moment, Agis drew off his men when they were almost within javelin's cast of the enemy, and leading them back to the territory of Tegea began to turn off the water upon the lands of Mantinea. As with the lands drained into the lake Kopais in Boiotia, the high plateau of Mantinea loses its surplus waters only through Katabothra or subterranean channels through the limestone, which usually carried them off at the Tegeatan or southern end. At the northern end the passages are smaller, and the turning off of the waters from Tegea northwards would be followed by an inconvenient flooding. Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the Spartans, the Argives soon began to grow weary of inaction in their strong and almost impregnable position, and to accuse their generals of a trick like that which they had resented at the hands of Alkiphron and Thrasyllus. To the Argive leaders these threats came with a force not to be resisted, and they at once brought their men down from the hill and drew them out in order of battle on the open plain. On the following day the Spartans returning northwards

<sup>1602</sup> See the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* iv. 134, 1.

<sup>1603</sup> This proverb is found in Sophokles, *κακὸν κακῷ διδοῦς ἄκος.* *Aias*, 363.

from Tegea suddenly came in sight of the whole Argive army in full fighting array and almost within the range of archers. Spartan discipline alone preserved them from the panic which under such circumstances would have seized Hellenic troops generally; but while the generals of the Mantineians and their allies were going through the speeches by which the courage of the men was wound up to battle pitch,<sup>1604</sup> the Spartans also had formed their battle order and were ready for the attack.<sup>1605</sup> On the left wing stood the Skiritai,<sup>1606</sup> with the soldiers of Brasidas and the Neodamodes on their right. In the centre came the whole body of the Lakedaimonians, next to whom stood their Arkadian allies, the Tegeatans occupying the extreme right as the post of honour, while both the wings were covered by a detachment of Spartan cavalry. On the other side the

<sup>1604</sup> According to Thucydides, the Mantineians were urged to fight bravely as members of an imperial state whose privileges must be maintained; the Argives were bidden to do their best to regain for their country its old supremacy in the Peloponnesos, or at the least that equality with Sparta which she long enjoyed; and the Athenians were reminded that if they conquered the Lakedaimonians within the isthmus Attica would be permanently safe from invasion. On the Spartan side, the historian adds, there were no speeches, these harangues being regarded as a superfluous ceremony. He has already told us that Brasidas thought otherwise in Chalkidike; but the circumstances under which he fought were not precisely similar.

<sup>1605</sup> Thucydides here, v. 66, lays special stress on that subordination of ranks in the Spartan army which gave to each man a definite relation to his comrades. In this respect the Spartan system was much that of modern European armies. In the other Greek armies orders were given by the general to the heralds who with a loud voice proclaimed them to the ranks; among the Spartans they were conveyed in comparative silence and almost instantaneously from the king to the polemarchs, from these to the Lochagoi or captains of Lochoi or centuries, who sent it on through the captains of the Pentekostyes to those of the Enomotiai or smallest division of troops, consisting generally of 24 men with one commander, although at Mantinea Thucydides, v. 68, 3, seems to say that the number was doubled. Hence the subordinate divisions were twice as many in number as usual: but the number of Lochoi remained the same. At Mantinea Thucydides seems to say that the Enomotiai were, generally, eight in file, four in rank: at Leuktra, to withstand the force of the Theban phalanx and the tactics of Epaminondas, the three files were made twelve deep, and the company consisted therefore of 36 men. Thucydides adds that although the numbers in the ranks of the Enomotiai were always four, their depth might be made to vary according to the will of the Lochagos. But if we have the number of the men in front, and the number of companies in each Lochos, the depth of the companies is at once determined, supposing the ranks to remain throughout the same. Either then the numbers in the company might be altered by the Lochagos, or he had the power of increasing or lessening the number of the companies, provided only that he left the usual number in rank. But as we have no positive evidence of this, we are landed at once in the region of conjecture: in other words, we have to confess the slenderness of our knowledge of the constitution of the Spartan army. Thucydides, again, seems to know no larger division than the Lochos, according to Xenophon, four Lochoi made up one Mora. See note 158; also Grote; *Hist. Gr.* vii. 111, and the note of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* v. 68, 3.

<sup>1606</sup> These were men from the wild district on the east of the Eurotas near its source. Their name, like that of the Trachinians and Thracians, denotes the ruggedness of their country. These were, in short, men of the wilds or woods. The Spartans were charged with pushing them into posts of danger, not from cowardice, but simply from that careful economy of the life of Spartiatas which made them ready to stake almost everything on the recovery of the hoplites taken at Sphakteria.

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III.

Mantineians, holding the right wing as fighting on their own soil, faced the Skiritai and the soldiers of Brasidas: next to them stood their Arkadian allies, then the Thousand Regiment with the other Argives, the left wing being occupied by the men of Kleonai and Orneai and the Athenians with their horsemen. The orders for onset were given. The Spartans had already begun to move slowly to the measured music of their pipers, and the enemy, advancing with the hasty charge of the Athenians at Marathon, was almost upon them, when Agis commanded the Skiritai and the Brasideians to detach to the left a force sufficient to prevent the wing from being outflanked by the Mantineians, while the two polemarchs Hipponoides and Aristokles were commanded to fill up the space thus left in the ranks of the Skiritai and their companions.<sup>1607</sup> For whatever reason the order was disobeyed;<sup>1608</sup> and when Agis, withdrawing his order to the Skiritai, bade them return to their old place, it was no longer possible to do so. The enemy was already upon them. Rushing into the space left open by the flank movement of the Skiritai, the Mantineians supported by the Argive regiment of One Thousand broke in upon their ranks, outflanked them, and drove them back to their baggage wagons where some of the old men stationed to guard them were slain. But if the Spartans were here beaten, Agis with his Three Hundred Knights and his hoplites<sup>1609</sup> on the right wing was decisively and almost instantaneously victorious. The steady march of the iron wall seems to have resumed its old terrors, for the Spartans

<sup>1607</sup> Thucydides assigns as the reason for this order a habit common to all Hellenic troops. Each man was naturally anxious to expose his right, or unshielded, side as little as possible to the enemy; and thus the right-hand man in the wing sought by a slanting movement to the right to get a little beyond the adversary to whom he was opposed. The same movement was thus imparted to the whole body, and the danger was that on either side the left wing might be outflanked. Agis was right in wishing to provide against this danger: but he ought to have done so earlier in the day.

<sup>1608</sup> The polemarchs were afterwards banished on the score of cowardice. The punishment may have been deserved; but the offence might have been more accurately defined.

<sup>1609</sup> Thucydides says that these Three Hundred were only called Horsemen, the men actually serving on horseback being stationed, as he has already noticed, on either wing. They represented the chiefs who had fought round the ancient kings in their chariots, and were Spartans in the full flower of their age between 20 and 30. The three hundred who accompanied Leonidas to Thermopylai probably did not belong to this body, as Herodotus, vii. 203, speaks of them as chosen specially for the occasion: but it was this band of the Three Hundred Knights which escorted Themistokles on his triumphal march from Sparta after the battle of Salamis. Herod. viii. 124. See further Dr. Arnold's note on *Thuc.* v. 72, 4.

conquered almost without a conflict, and vast crowds of fugitives were trampled down in the vain effort to escape from the pursuers who were on them. For the Athenians the worst danger was averted partly by the efforts of their cavalry, but still more by the order which Agis was obliged to issue that the pursuit of the enemy must be abandoned for the defence of his left wing from the onslaught of the Mantineians: The deliverance of the routed Skiritai and Brasideians was soon achieved. The mere approach of Agis chilled the courage of the enemy; and in their hurried flight the Mantineians were far greater sufferers than the Argive regiment of One Thousand. But on the whole the slaughter was not great, for it was not the Spartan custom to spend much time on the chase of a flying foe. Seven hundred men belonging to the forces of Argos, Orneai, and Kleonai were among the slain: the Mantineians lost two hundred, the Athenians the same number with both their generals, Laches and Nikostratos. The Spartans and their allies suffered little, and their loss was given at 300: but the historian adds that the habitual secrecy of the Spartan government in great measure deprives such reports of their trustworthiness.<sup>1610</sup> So ended the great battle in which little was done by the skill of the general, but everything by the bravery and discipline of his men.<sup>1611</sup> It did away with the impression which the surrender of the hoplites at Sphakteria and the subsequent sluggishness of the Spartans had almost everywhere created; and it was at once acknowledged that although they may have been unfortunate, Spartan courage was as great and Spartan discipline as effective as ever. Before the battle was fought Pleistoanax had set out from Sparta with the old and the young men whom Agis had sent home for the protection of the city. On reaching Tegea he received tidings of the victory and turned back. The Karneian month was come; and the Spartans gave

<sup>1610</sup> Thucydides does not state explicitly that he was an eye-witness of this battle: but few probably will read his description without receiving the impression that he must have been. We have his own admission that he spent a considerable portion of his long exile in the Peloponnesos; and it seems unlikely that an account so singularly minute and clear could be the result of anything but the personal observation of the writer. This conclusion seems to be confirmed by the emphasis with which he insists on the exact accuracy of his description, v. 74, 1.

<sup>1611</sup> Thuc. v. 72, 2.

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themselves up to the inactivity which it imposed upon them. This inaction enabled the Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians to inflict some punishment on the Epidaurians who had availed themselves of the absence of the Argive army to invade and ravage the Argive lands. The allies resolved to wall in and besiege the town; but all grew weary of the task except the Athenians who fortified the rock on which stood the temple of Hêrê. To guard the fort thus raised the allies severally left a detachment, while the main body went home.

Treaties  
between  
Sparta and  
Argos

We have seen that in the cities which Brasidas detached from the Athenian empire, and in those which the Athenians reconquered after revolt, the demos generally was averse to the revolution, and in many instances counteracted it as soon as it was possible to do so. It was not less natural that the oligarchical section of the citizens should be anxious to escape from a connexion which must be irksome and might become intolerable: nor is it surprising that such a victory as that of Mantinea should raise the hopes of the oligarchic body at Argos. But the course now taken by the Spartans speaks volumes on the utter futility of the promises made by Brasidas to the subject allies of Athens. Far from encouraging the theory of absolute independence which according to that fiery leader lay at the root of her foreign policy, Sparta made it clear that freedom, as interpreted by her, meant only the liberty of modifying constitutions so as to suit her fancy, or of adopting the form of government which she might dictate. The Argive conspirators were a formidable body; their plans were promptly drawn out; and the Thousand Regiment was ready to throw off all disguise. In the fight at Mantinea the demos had been shamefully beaten, while they had been really victorious. In casting their lot in with the Spartans, they were thus consulting at once their interests and their dignity: and with their sanction Lichas, the Argive proxenos, arrived from Sparta with an ultimatum, offering the Argives either war or the treaty which he brought with him ready written. This covenant pledged Sparta only to the restoration of such hostages as she might have in her keeping: it bound the Argives not merely to this

measure but to the evacuation of Epidaurus and to a common action against any, whether allies of Argos or not, who might place any hindrance in the way of its surrender. The quarrel respecting the victim said to be due to the temple of Apollon Pythaeus was to be settled by the oath of the Epidaurians. The acceptance of this covenant was followed by the withdrawal of the Spartan force, and probably by the departure of Alkibiades. The tide had now turned against the influence of Athens; and the Argive oligarchs soon brought about the ratification of a treaty of alliance which declared the autonomy of all allies whether of the Argives or of the Spartans, while questions of peace or war were to be decided by the common vote of Argos and Sparta which was to be binding on their allies. This treaty cut at the root of the imperial theory for any state except that of Sparta really, and nominally that of Argos. Mantinea could no longer hope to enforce her claim to supremacy over her allies; and accepting her position, she acknowledged herself once more a member of the confederacy of Sparta.<sup>1612</sup> At Argos a resolution was passed to receive no more embassies from the Athenians, unless they first abandoned all their forts in the Peloponnesos and agreed to act in unison with the Argives and the Spartans. Half-measures were impatiently rejected. The old oaths of alliance with the Chalkidian cities were renewed, and fresh oaths taken; and the traitorous Perdikkas for the hundredth time was invited to change sides. The barbarian was flattered by the proffer of friendship from the city which he or others chose to regard as the birthplace of his forefathers.<sup>1613</sup> The oaths were readily sworn: but the formal abandonment of the alliance with Athens was put off for a convenient season. At the same time a summons was sent to the Athenians, bidding them to evacuate their fort in Epidaurus forthwith. The intention of the Argives manifestly was that it should be surrendered to themselves. Left without allies in Peloponnesos the Athenians had no alternative: but Demosthenes whom they sent on the mission was bent on foiling the Argive oligarchs. On reaching the fort, he ordered some gymnastic contests to be carried on without

<sup>1612</sup> Thuc. v. 81.<sup>1613</sup> See note 319.

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its walls. The rest of the garrison marched out to witness them. The Athenians, instructed by their general, remained behind. Demosthenes shut the gates, and then handed the place over to the Epidaurians.<sup>1614</sup>

Interference of Sparta at Sikyon.

At Argos the oligarchs could now carry out their designs unhindered. In flagrant contradiction with the policy sketched out by Brasidas, the Spartans not only interfered to put down the democratic constitution of Argos, but, aided by the Argive Thousand regiment, they established in Sikyon a stricter oligarchy than that which thus far prevailed there. With these political changes, according to the view of Thucydides, the fourteenth year of the great struggle between the two foremost states of Hellas came to an end.

Restoration of democracy at Argos. B.C. 417.

But the fabric of oligarchy thus raised stood on an uncertain foundation. The revolt of Dion in the peninsula of Athos in the following summer seemed to show that the movement furthered by Brasidas had not yet lost its force; and the Spartans had modified to their own liking the constitutions of the Achaian cities.<sup>1615</sup> But, like the Jews, the Spartans suffered not a little from their system of religious celebrations. The Argive demos waited until the time came when the people at Sparta busied themselves in watching the dances of naked men and boys,<sup>1616</sup> and then rising up against the oligarchs slew some and drove others out of the city. The wanton insolence of the Thousand regiment had become insufferable,<sup>1617</sup> and after such provocation the bearing of the demos seems to have been singularly moderate. They were fortunate in the time chosen for their rising. The Spartans had refused to stir on the first invitation of the oligarchs; and when at length they were persuaded to put off the games, it was too late. Their army had only reached Tegea

<sup>1614</sup> Thucydides, v. 80, 3, says that this was not done until the Epidaurians had renewed the treaty which they had made with the Athenians. This must, it would seem, refer to the covenant for the twelve months' truce, two years before the peace of Nikias, which bears the signature of the Epidaurian Amphias. Thuc. iv. 119. No other treaty between Athens and Epidauros is mentioned.

<sup>1615</sup> Thuc. v. 82.

<sup>1616</sup> These games, known as the *Gymnopaïdai*, had some likeness to the Latin *Lupercalia*.

<sup>1617</sup> The revolution is ascribed by Pausanias, ii. 20, 1, to a crime of their commander Bryas rivalling in iniquity the outrage of Appius Claudius in the matter of Virginia. The story of Virginia may not stand the test of historical criticism: but no one has disputed the tendency of Roman or any other patricians to trample on law and justice for the gratification of their passions. It is not likely that Bryas would stand alone in such misdeeds.

when they heard that the oligarchy was crushed. Returning home, they received an embassy from the Argive demos who thus showed that their revolution had not been effected in concert with Athens. These envoys and the envoys of the discomfited party pleaded severally their cause before the Spartans; but although the verdict was that the demos had done wrong and must be punished, still no step was taken to coerce them. The delay gave time for renewed negotiations with the city from which alone Argos might hope to receive prompt and effectual aid. The Argives again became allies of Athens, and gave themselves to the task of connecting their city by long walls with the sea not less earnestly than the Athenians had undertaken like tasks in the days of Themistokles and Perikles. Free citizens and their wives with the children and the slaves all shared the toil, while skilled carpenters and masons sent from Athens insured the soundness of the fortifications. If this design could have been completed, Argos might have defied the attacks of any land force, as the Athenians could pour in from the sea any supplies needed for the people; but the oligarchical party was not wholly rooted out, and when the summer was ended the Spartans received promises of aid from the faction within the city if they would once more put down the demos and destroy the unfinished long walls.<sup>1618</sup> These promises they were unable to fulfil: but when Agis with his army departed baffled from Argos itself, he levelled the long walls to the ground, and then seizing Hysiai slew all the free inhabitants. The Argives retaliated by devastating the lands of the Phlians who had given shelter to most of the expelled oligarchs.

The feebleness of Athenian policy is shown by the course which in the winter of this year the Athenians found themselves constrained to adopt towards the Makedonian Perdikkas. Their long experience of his lying and treachery had not yet convinced them of the folly of trusting to him for the furtherance of any scheme whatever or of forming any plans with reference to his help. Yet it seems that Nikias and his adherents, who now saw that Amphipolis, if it was

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Failure of  
an Athenian  
expedition  
for the  
recovery of  
Amphi-  
polis.

<sup>1618</sup> Diodoros, xii. 81, speaks of these walls as finished, ᾠκοδομηθέναι. The statement is worth as much and as little as his story of the exploits of Brasidas before he falls back fainting in his ship at Pylos. See Arnold, *Thuc.* iv. 12, 1.



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ever to be recovered at all, must be recovered by force, urged an expedition for this purpose which was nevertheless to be made dependent on the co-operation of a chief whose only gifts to Athens had been confined to shiploads of lies. Perdikkas, of course, failed to keep his engagements, and the enterprise was abandoned. It was, perhaps, after they had been thus left in the lurch, that they heard of the new alliance or rather of the new oaths between Perdikkas and the Spartans; and they took a revenge for which Perdikkas may not have much cared, by putting his ports under blockade and declaring him a public enemy.

The massacre of  
Melos.  
B.C. 416.

But the policy of Athens was as misdirected as it was feeble. In a struggle such as that in which she was now engaged it was of the utmost importance that no enterprise should be undertaken in which success would not be fully worth the time, labour, and cost bestowed upon it; nor had any events happened to justify a doubt of the assertion of Perikles that new conquests generally would fall under this list, while conquests at a distance could add only to the weakness of the Athenian empire. For the retention or the recovery of positions essential to the safety of Athens no efforts could be too great and no measures too prompt; but at the same time no condemnation would be too strong for the policy which would waste the strength of the city in schemes in which success could bring no profit, and would involve a lasting shame. Such a scheme was the expedition undertaken in the sixteenth year of the war and in the sixth year after the so-called peace of Nikias against the island of Melos, which, like the neighbouring island of Thera, had been colonised from Sparta. Thirty Athenian triremes with six from Chios and two from Lesbos, carrying about 2,700 hoplites, besides light-armed troops, sailed to the attack of a city, which, as a source of wealth or power to Athens, was utterly insignificant. Two motives only could have prompted this measure. Athenian pride might be irritated by the obstinacy with which these Spartan colonists refused to cast in their lot with the imperial city to which the other islands in the same group were subject, while the instinct of revenge might be gratified by the thought of wounding the Spartans

through their kinsmen. The second feeling was unworthy of the countrymen of Perikles: the first resolved itself into a lust of acquisition as petty as that of the farmer who could not sleep until he had squared his field by getting a corner of his neighbour's land. The story of the expedition is soon told. The request of the islanders to be allowed to remain, as they had been, neutral in the contest was peremptorily refused: and the demand of the Athenians that they should become allies of Athens was refused also. On receiving this decision the invaders applied themselves diligently to the task of the siege. The city of Melos was completely walled in, while the fleet blockaded it by sea. Twice in the course of the siege, after the main body of the Athenian troops had returned home, the Melians overpowered the guard at certain portions of the investing wall, and thus recruited their failing stock of food: but the arrival of a fresh Athenian force under Philokrates, while no help reached them from Sparta, greatly depressed them. Plots for betraying the place to the Athenians were also discovered; and the Melians determined to anticipate them by unconditional surrender. The islanders underwent the fate which the Mytilenaians had all but suffered and which the Skionaians had actually undergone. The grown men, including even those who had betrayed or wished to betray the place to the Athenians, were all slain;<sup>1619</sup> the women and children sold as slaves, and five hundred Athenians were brought into the island, not as Klerouchoi retaining their political rights at home but as colonists. On the brutal and loathsome savagery of the ancient laws of war it is useless to say a word; but it must be noted that the case of Melos was utterly unlike that of either Mytilene or Skione. The Melians had done to the Athenians no specific wrong; nor have we, it would seem, any valid reason for supposing that they would have refused to contribute an equitable portion of their revenue to meet the expenditure of an empire from which they themselves derived now or had derived direct and important benefits. But this would not

<sup>1619</sup> Xenophon, *Hellen.* ii. 2, 9, speaks of Lysandros as bringing back Melians to their island, at the time when he restored such Aiginetans as he could find to Aigina. Either then some must have escaped the massacre, or some of the children sold into captivity must have been redeemed.

satisfy the Athenians. The Melians must become their subject allies, and, as such, must take part in the struggle against their mother city. This they naturally refused: and the strength which might have recovered Amphipolis was put forth to convince them of their folly. Nor can we doubt that an attempt to awaken them to this conviction had been made in words before the final appeal was made to force; and this attempt assumes in the narrative of Thucydides the form of a conference which forms one of the most singular, if not perplexing, portions of his history. It is true that both by Perikles and by Kleon the supremacy of Athens over her allies is represented as in some respects resembling a tyranny; but we have seen that this phrase denotes nothing more than that amount of centralisation which was indispensably necessary if the confederacy was to be maintained at all. We have seen not only that the changes which led to the establishment of the maritime empire of Athens were unavoidable but that this empire had secured to all its subjects certain solid and substantial benefits which they could not have obtained for themselves, and without which they must assuredly have passed under the domination of Persia. We have seen that the members of such a confederacy could not be suffered to abandon it at will, and thus either to endanger its existence or to continue to share the advantages resulting from it without cost or trouble to themselves; and further we have seen that under the Athenians the allies enjoyed an amount of independence which Brasidas upheld as a vision before the Chalkidian cities who were thus being cheated by a shadow into giving up a substance already in their possession. If in every city the main body of the people felt themselves attracted to Athens, this was not her fault, and had certainly not been brought about by any direct efforts for this end. In no case had they any wish to be her subject allies: in many more they would have preferred to be free from all connexion with her whatsoever; but in no allied city had the feeling of indifference towards her passed into that of positive hatred. Wherever Brasidas went, he was met by an opposition, more or less strenuous and serious, grounded on this very conviction that they had

no actual grievances to resent and that, if they revolted, they were revolting for the sake of an idea or a fancy. That this idea or fancy was the very bane of their social life, that its absence would have given room for the growth of a nation whose power would have rendered the empires of Carthage, Makedonia, and Rome impossible, they were of course profoundly unconscious; but they knew that Athens nowhere interfered with the action of their own law courts, and that if they were injured—whether by the citizens of other allied states or by Athenian officers sent to gather the annual tribute, they had the right of appeal to the Athenian dikasteries, and that these dikasteries had been found by no means indisposed to visit the offences of their own citizens in the allied states with swift and exemplary punishment.<sup>1620</sup> For the truth of these facts the conduct of the revolters whether in Lesbos or Chalkidike would of itself furnish sufficient evidence. The speech of the Mytilenaians at Sparta sets forth no one tangible ground of complaint; and even if it be alleged (although it could not be alleged with justice) that an Athenian historian would be likely to soften down as much as might be possible the picture really drawn, the astonishment of Brasidas at not being received with open arms by men to whom he came as the apostle of freedom sets the question wholly at rest. Real oppression or injustice long endured would have made them eager enthusiasts in his cause. As it was, bullying and intriguing oligarchs had much difficulty in getting Brasidas admitted within the gates of Akanthos, and Brasidas, when admitted, had to point out to them the superior advantages of liberty over a slavery which they would have to retain at the cost of losing all their vintage.<sup>1621</sup> In this growth and history of their empire the Athenians might have found arguments against the Melians which it would have been almost impossible to answer. If these arguments could not justify to a morality higher than the Hellenic the atrocious cruelty of their punishment, it is not easy to see that they lay open to any other retort than that they should have been urged long ago. It was perfectly competent to the Athenians to plead that the Melians had no right to

<sup>1620</sup> See pages 72, 156.<sup>1621</sup> See page 243.

enjoy the tranquil waters of a sea cleared of Persian cruisers and tribute-gatherers at a cost in which they took no share; but this would have been a reason for compelling them to join the confederacy in the days of Aristēides, not for straining the strength of Athens in reducing them now when a long war with Sparta had, at least for Spartan colonists, given a very different complexion to the case. Still it is to such arguments as these that Athenians would be tempted to resort for the materials of their indictment against the Melians. We may grant that they shrank no more perhaps than average Greeks from acts of patent injustice and wrong; but then even average Greeks sought to cast over these acts, wherever and so far as it was possible to do so, a veil of decency, even if they could not boldly pass them off as righteous and equitable. The open avowal that might makes right was one which would not be made by Greeks generally. Least of all would it be made by Athenians whose sophists were, whether justly or unjustly, credited with a singular skill in making the worse appear the better cause. The temper which glories in the exertion of naked brute force and delights to insult and defy the moral instincts of mankind is the growth of not every condition of society; and we should least of all look for it amongst a people who were always disposed to call ugly things by pretty names.<sup>1622</sup> But in the conference which precedes the Melian massacre we have a rude and wanton trampling on all seemliness of word or action, a haughty assertion of an independence which raises them above all law, an impudent boasting that iniquity to the weak can do the strong no harm, of which we have had as yet no example and no sign in Athenian history.<sup>1623</sup> The Melians instead of introducing the Athenian envoys to their popular assembly had confronted them with a few chosen commissioners, and they are warned that, as they must have done this to prevent the people from being cheated by delusive hopes, so it was their duty to be on their guard against such delusions themselves. It was not, the Athenians insisted,

<sup>1622</sup> τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἀμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους. Plut. *Alk.* 16.

<sup>1623</sup> On this ground Dionysios, *de Thuc. Jud.* 39, regards this conversation as fabricated by Thucydides in order to bring discredit upon his countrymen.

a question of right or wrong, nor did they care to go into the circumstances attending the establishment of the Athenian confederacy or the growth of Athenian empire. They would not listen to any pleas founded on their obligations as colonists of Sparta or on their careful abstinence from conduct injurious to Athens. They must know very well that the strong act according to their inclination and their power, and that the weak yield to them as best they may. To the answer of the Melians that the power even of the mightiest was sometimes broken and that the penalties paid in such cases were apt to be most severe, they replied that even if they should fall they had no fear of a people, who, like the Spartans, had their own confederacy to maintain and who for their own sakes would be careful how they pressed too hard on an imperial city. But this was a wandering from the present question. The Melians must either submit or suffer, and submission would insure to them safety. To their answer that it would also insure their slavery they added the doubt whether such submission could be to their interest.<sup>1624</sup> The Athenians settled it by answering that the Melians would save their lives and property, while the invaders would be spared the disagreeable task of putting them all to death.<sup>1625</sup> The Melians urged that they would rather remain on friendly terms with both the contending parties. The answer was that their enmity would do the Athenians more good than their friendship: the former might furnish evidence of their power, while Melian neutrality would in the eyes of subject allies be only a sign of Athenian weakness.<sup>1626</sup> When the Melians on this asked whether the subjects of Athens could place in the same ranks cities which were her colonies, and some of which had been subdued after revolting, with others which had never had anything to do with her, they were told that it was even so, for that in their eyes the moral rights of all were equal, and that if the Melians were left free, this would be regarded as a sign of weakness in the Athenians.<sup>1627</sup> But when the Melians answered that there were other neutral states besides their own, and that a gross wrong to one might cause the active resistance of all the

<sup>1624</sup> Thuc. v. 92.<sup>1625</sup> Ib. v. 93.<sup>1626</sup> Ib. v. 95.<sup>1627</sup> Ib. v. 97.

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others, they were told that the Athenians had more apprehensions of revolt from islanders who necessarily felt the pressure of the yoke, and that the continental cities might for the present be left to themselves.<sup>1628</sup> Other pleas were met after the same fashion. When the Melians expressed a trust in the goodwill of the gods and in the help of their mother city, the Athenians alleged their own careful worship of the former and their conviction that the latter, in spite of all the fine words which the Spartans might use, acted only on the doctrine of expediency,—a doctrine which carried little comfort for the Melians. Moreover, the Spartans seldom undertook expeditions alone; and they were least of all likely to venture away from their own shores to the aid of a remote and insignificant island city.<sup>1629</sup> To the hint of the Melians that there were other modes of helping them than by the direct agency of a fleet, that the plans of Brasidas might be carried out systematically, and the lands of Attica again laid waste, the Athenians replied that all this was miserably beside the present question. The mere recounting of possibilities would not draw off the invading fleet from their harbour: and it was for the Melians to decide whether they would or would not submit to an imperial city which called for an insignificant sacrifice on their part and held out to them real and permanent benefits on her own.

Historical  
authority  
of the  
Melian con-  
ference

In its whole spirit and form this conference stands out in glaring inconsistency not only with the previous history of Athens but with the language whether of her own statesmen, of her subject allies, or of her open adversaries. It is still more completely at variance with the principles and methods ascribed with justice perhaps to some sophists, most unjustly to the sophists as a class. It gives the impression that the Athenians wished to be regarded as bidding a studied farewell to all honourable or even human motives and instincts, and as pledging themselves henceforth to a new mode of dealing with those who might be weaker than themselves. But if their earlier history does not prepare us for such an outburst, so neither is their philosophy here borne out by the history which follows it; and we are thus driven to ask

<sup>1628</sup> Thuc. v. 99.

<sup>1629</sup> Ib. v. 109.

whether any explanation of so perplexing a phenomenon be forthcoming. We are not told that any distinction is to be made between the report of this conference and the reports of other speeches found in the narrative of Thucydides; and yet we cannot put out of sight the fact that of the two parties to the conference, a few Melian commissioners on the one side and a few Athenian envoys on the other, one was removed by death on the fall of the city, and Thucydides had to trust to the memory of a few of his countrymen, who, if they reported to him the general tenor of the conference, could scarcely give so minute and exact an account of a long series of arguments and questions, couched in language as astonishing as is the tone of this discourse. But when we remember, further, that the massacre at Melos was a political crime greater certainly and more atrocious than any of which the Athenians had yet been guilty, that it brought them no gain while it insured to Athens a bitter harvest of hatred and brought down upon her a terrible revenge, and that this wanton, inexcusable, and infatuated crime preceded only by a few months that ill-fated Sicilian expedition which was to seal her doom, we can have little doubt that the historian has for once dropped his function of recording facts rigidly as they occurred, and that he has left us in this so-called Melian conference an ethical picture like that which Herodotus has drawn of the Persian despot in his overweening arrogance and pride.<sup>1630</sup> From this time forwards the strength of Athens was to be turned aside to impracticable tasks in which unqualified success could alone bring a gain proportionate to the outlay, and the affairs of the city were to be conducted in the gambling spirit which stakes a continually increasing sum in the hope of recovering past losses. The expedition to Melos marks the turning-point beyond which the policy of Perikles is lost to sight, and full play is given to the policy of Alkibiades. The supposed conference most vividly inforces this contrast; and we do the historian no injustice when we conclude that the desire of inforcing it has led him here rather to frame a picture than to report an actual debate. But whatever on this point may be our

<sup>1630</sup> See vol. i. page 250 *et seq.*



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judgement, the crime remains a horrible reality; and we turn from it with the suspicion that the general disgraced by his failure at Amphipolis would not have been sorry to lay the guilt of it at the door of Kleon. But Kleon was dead; and no man is named as the adviser of the most shameful deed in the chequered history of Athens.<sup>1631</sup>

The ostracism of Hyperbolos.

If in the massacre and enslavement of a people we see the Athenians in their most repulsive and loathsome aspect, the ostracism of a lamp-maker exhibits the ignoble use to which an instrument, fashioned for better purposes, may be at length applied. By no other means than the temporary banishment of citizens whose presence endangered the safety of the state could the gravest political dangers be avoided, while the forms of the constitution were still in process of development, and time was still needed to place on a permanent basis the legal safeguards against the factions and ambition of the old Eupatrid houses.<sup>1632</sup> In all the instances in which it had thus far been applied, it had been applied not merely with a fair show of reason, but on grounds decently, if not fully, satisfactory.<sup>1633</sup> It is possible also that the antagonism between Nikias and Alkibiades may have involved a danger to the state calling for a vote of ostracism to clear the political atmosphere. But it is practically certain that if Alkibiades could have returned home triumphant after the complete conquest of Sicily, his predominance would so nearly have bordered on despotism and might so easily have been used for the establishment of a tyranny, that the ostracism would have been even more needed than it was even in the days when Themistokles and Aristides were rivals. Still at all times it was an instrument which might be abused, and which, if applied when there was no need of it, would assuredly be brought into discredit. From Thucydides<sup>1634</sup> we learn only the fact that Hyperbolos was ostra-

<sup>1631</sup> Probably Plutarch found in the so-called speech of Andokides against Alkibiades the statement that this high-born and refined oligarch vehemently urged on the massacre. The writer of the speech must have given it as the current opinion of his day. If, as Mr. Grote thinks, there is no reason to question the fact, the silence of Thucydides becomes still more significant.

<sup>1632</sup> See vol. i. page 230.

<sup>1633</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 146, is fully justified in his suspicion that Damon, the sophist and friend of Perikles, was banished either by sentence of a Dikastery, or owing to non-appearance at a trial,—not ostracised at all.

<sup>1634</sup> viii. 73.

cised. By Plutarch<sup>1635</sup> we are told that the challenge came from Nicias and his adherents to Alkibiades and his followers, but that before the time for voting came these two parties had changed their plans and formed a combination to bring about the banishment of the lamp-maker who is said to have taken the place of Kleon. The combination was, of course, successful; and Hyperbolos lived as an exile at Samos where some years later he fell a victim to the daggers of oligarchic conspirators. The historian adds that he was a pestilent man, exiled not on account of any fears of his political genius or influence but simply because his madness and violence reflected disgrace upon the city. Thucydides was well aware that ostracism was never devised to be a punishment for such men, and in all likelihood he meant his statement to be taken as an expression of this conviction. The matter was regarded in the same light by the people, and ostracism was never again resorted to against an Athenian citizen. Of Hyperbolos himself we know little; nor have we any other real evidence against him than this judgement of Thucydides. Like Kleon, he is the butt for the jests and satire of comic poets: but we have had ample reason for refusing to these poets any authority as historians, however vividly they may bring before us the popular feelings of the time.<sup>1636</sup> Whatever he may have been, he belonged to a class with which Thucydides would have little sympathy; and we may be sure that if Hyperbolos had suggested the expedition to Melos, his name would have been associated with it not less prominently than that of Kleon with the punishment of the Mytilenaians.<sup>1637</sup>

The general condition of Hellas at the time of the Melian expedition presents an astonishing picture of the complications which may arise from the conflicting interests of

Position of  
the chief  
Hellenic  
states.

<sup>1635</sup> *Alk.* 13. *Nik.* 11.

<sup>1636</sup> See notes 1323, 1358, 1558.

<sup>1637</sup> The ostracism of Hyperbolos must have taken place between B.C. 420 and 416. It can be placed later,—as it is by Dr. Thirlwall in the winter or spring immediately preceding the dispatch of the expedition to Sicily,—only on the authority of the so-called oration of Andokides against Alkibiades. But according to its own statements, this oration could not have been spoken until at least nine or ten months had passed away after the massacre of Melos: but at that time, Alkibiades was already an exile, having refused to obey the summons of recall from Sicily. In other words, it was not spoken at all, but is the spurious composition of some later day. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iii. Appendix 3, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 203; vi. 10; vii. 144.

independent city communities.<sup>1638</sup> Formally the treaty of peace between Athens and Sparta was still in force: nor had these two cities renounced their private treaty of alliance made after the peace. The Spartans still had their own private agreement with the Boiotians, and the Boiotians their ten days' truce with the Athenians. But so far as war could be carried on without a formal infringement of these covenants, the struggle went on without interruption. At the request of the Argives the Messenians and Helots had been brought back from Kephallenia to Pylos;<sup>1639</sup> and while the Athenians were blockading Melos, the Pylian garrison made destructive inroads into the Lakonian territory. The Corinthians also had their own grounds of quarrel with the Athenians: but they had no formal covenants to restrain them from open strife. They had refused to accept the peace of Nikias, and they were free to act openly. The Spartans were not yet prepared to destroy the pillar which bore witness to their compact with Athens; but they determined to requite the ravages of the Messenians from Pylos by issuing licenses, or in modern phrase letters of marque, to those who might be willing to retaliate as privateers on the coasts of Attica or on the mercantile fleets of Athens.

<sup>1638</sup> See page 292.<sup>1639</sup> See page 297.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.—THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

THE democratic reaction which brought about the fall of the Gelonian and other dynasties in Sicily seemed to lead only to a fresh series of internal commotions. Yet it is said to have marked the beginning of a period of singular prosperity for the Hellenic cities generally, which lasted for nearly fifty years until Dionysios succeeded in once more establishing a tyranny. Nothing can show more clearly the happy influence of soil and climate in modifying the effects of violent political changes than the rapidity with which these Hellenic towns recovered from disaster and even from apparent ruin. Having made himself master of Syracuse, Gelon had transferred to that city the inhabitants of Kamarina which he demolished. On the fall of the dynasty there was a general rush of exiles to the cities from which they had been transported and expelled, while the demos in Syracuse and Gela felt not less eager to drive out the partisans of the fallen tyrants. For the latter a refuge was provided in the territory of Messêné: for the returned exiles a redistribution of lands became necessary. These lands would be granted either in their old homes, or in new settlements, and in either case in some proportion answering to the amount of property of which the despots had deprived them.<sup>1640</sup> The exiles belonging to Gela, who could not be provided with lands in the territory of that city, were settled among the ruins of Kamarina; and the wealth of some among these new settlers soon obtained for the restored city the glory of victories at the Olympic games recorded in the triumphant strains of Pindar.

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Changes following the downfall of the Sicilian tyrants.

<sup>1640</sup> This fact alone sets at rest the notion that that redistribution involved an equal division of land. Assuredly the partition left the distinctions between rich and poor much as they had been before, Diod. xi. 86; nor does the language of Diodoros anywhere imply that the shares of all were equal. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 164.

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of the Sikel  
chief Don-  
ketios.

But, although for the present the demos was predominant, the political atmosphere continued to be disturbed; and a constant state of faction seemed likely to favour the ambition of men who might wish to walk in the paths of Gelon and his kinsfolk. An attempt to follow their example was made at Syracuse by Tyndarion<sup>1641</sup> who, by bribes, it would seem, bestowed freely on the poor (so little had the recent redistribution of land to do with equal division), surrounded himself with a troop of mercenary partisans. But these men were too few in number or too undisciplined to withstand the force of their opponents. Tyndarion was condemned, and a vain attempt to rescue him on the way to execution involved his adherents in the same fate. Nor was this, if we may believe Diodoros, the last instance of such conspiracies which had the establishment of despotism as their real or avowed object. So constantly indeed was the public peace disturbed that the Syracusans resolved to meet the danger by resorting to a measure which had some likeness to the Athenian ostracism. It would be rash to say that a device for getting rid of dangerous citizens or rather of putting an end to rivalries which might threaten the safety of the constitution was less needed at Syracuse than at Athens: but at Athens the plan worked well; at Syracuse it seems to have had the effect of driving the best men of the city into political indifference or inaction. Nor can we wonder at this result, if the description given of its working by Diodoros is to be taken strictly. No Athenian could be sent into banishment unless the votes of at least one-fourth of the whole body of citizens were given against him. At Syracuse the man whose name was written on the greatest number of olive leaves became an exile.<sup>1642</sup> Hence not only was the penalty invariably inflicted whenever resort was had to petalism, as it was called, but every citizen felt that over his head a sword was hanging which an insignificant minority might at any moment bring down upon him. At Athens ostracism fell into discredit and was given up only when it was abused for the purpose of putting down a mere nuisance, not of counteracting a serious political danger; at Syracuse it could not but be abused from the first, and

<sup>1641</sup> Dioid. xi. 86.<sup>1742</sup> Ib. xi. 87.

its speedy suppression became inevitable. But in spite of all retarding causes the power of Syracuse steadily increased, and was shown in more than one attempt to clear the sea of Tyrrhenian privateers or pirates. Phayllos, the admiral first sent, ravaged the island of Aithalia,<sup>1643</sup> but was withheld by bribes from doing anything more. His return to Syracuse was followed not only by his banishment but by the dispatch of another expedition under Apelles who acting with greater vigour completely subdued Aithalia and, having attacked the pirates in Kyrnos (Corsica), sailed home with abundant booty and a large number of prisoners. This political growth of the Greek colonies awoke some feeling of émulation among the Sikelian tribes, and seems to have inspired the Sikel chief Douketios not with the vain hope of getting rid of their Hellenic neighbours but with the more reasonable confidence of establishing a Sikelian community which might be able to hold its ground against them. His success in capturing the Hellenic town of Morgantine<sup>1644</sup> enabled him with greater ease to establish a general confederacy of the Sikel tribes<sup>1645</sup> and to transfer his seat of government from Menai to a spot near the Temenos of the gods called Palikoi.<sup>1646</sup> In honour of these deities he gave the name Palike to his new city, which was destined to destruction after a short time of great prosperity.<sup>1647</sup> His power was further increased by the recovery of Ennesia, a town which since its occupation by the Hieronian citizens driven out from Aitna<sup>1648</sup> had been known by the name Aitna. His next venture was against the Akragantine fortress of Motyon: and to the people of Akragas the danger seemed so serious that they sent to Syracuse for aid. The general first sent, named Bolkon, fell justly or unjustly under the same suspicion which cut short the career of Phayllos, and was put to death. A more determined effort in the following summer under another commander was followed by a severe defeat of Douketios in the field and the dispersal of most of his followers among the Sikelian fastnesses. The fall of Motyon which he still con-

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B.C. 453. •

B.C. 451

<sup>1643</sup> Elba.

<sup>1645</sup> Diod. xi. 88.

<sup>1646</sup> For these Phallic deities see *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ii. 114.

<sup>1647</sup> Diod. xi. 90.

<sup>1644</sup> Diod. xi. 78.

<sup>1648</sup> See vol. i. page 181.

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tinued to hold for a time caused his influence to decay as rapidly as it had grown. His numbers were thinned by constant desertion, while those who remained began to plot against his life. Discovering the conspiracy in time, Douketios resolved to forestall them by throwing himself on the mercy of the Syracusan people. Setting out alone at night on horseback, he entered Syracuse while it was still dark; and in the morning the Sikel chief was seen sitting as a suppliant by the altar in the Agora. An assembly was summoned to decide what should be done with him. Some of the speakers contended that they should deal with him as the Megarians had treated Thrasydaios;<sup>1649</sup> but the sight of the humbled chieftain, pointing possibly the lesson that they were not free from liability to like disasters, so affected the main body of the people that with one voice they cried out that the suppliant must be spared. Douketios was sent to Corinth, under a pledge that he would not attempt to make his escape: but he soon broke his promise. The Delphian god had bidden him, he said, to found a settlement on the Kalê Aktê or Fair Shore on the northern coast of Sicily, and thither he sailed with a large body of colonists.<sup>1650</sup> The return of Douketios brought to a head the quarrel between Akragas and Syracuse. The Akragantines had resented the mercy shown to him, and in the prospect of future troubles they resolved to punish those who had suffered him to live. A battle was fought on the banks of the Himera between the Syracusans and Akragantines with their respective allies; and the men of Akragas with the loss of a thousand men paid the penalty for interference in a matter which in a little while would have settled itself. The schemes of Douketios for restoring the Sikel confederacy were cut short by his sickness and death; and there was manifestly no one to take his place. Morgantine was retaken,<sup>1651</sup> and the city of Trinakia

B.C. 440.

<sup>1649</sup> See vol. i. p. 182.<sup>1650</sup> Diodoros, xii. 8, does not say whence these colonists came. It seems at the least possible that they may have been Corinthians. Such a fact would at once explain his escape. Without some such co-operation he could scarcely have got away. There is nothing in the language of Diodoros which gives the slightest countenance to the notion that the Syracusans had a hand in bringing him back, or gave encouragement to his projects.<sup>1651</sup> Thuc. vi. 65.

after a desperate resistance was stormed and razed to the ground.<sup>1652</sup>

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With the suppression of this movement among the Sikeli tribes Syracuse remained the first Hellenic city in Sicily, and seemed unlikely to tolerate long even a distant rivalry in Akragas. Flushed with success and with the growth of wealth, the Syracusans built a hundred fresh triremes, doubled the number of their cavalry, gave special attention to the efficiency of their infantry, and imposed a heavier tribute on the conquered Sikels.<sup>1653</sup> The material prosperity of Akragas was even more splendid. Amongst a multitude of less conspicuous buildings the great temple of Zeus, 430 feet in length, 60 in width, and 110 feet in height, with its massive piers and sumptuous sculptures, was advancing towards completion. The roof only was needed when about 30 years later the great catastrophe came which left Akragas a mere wreck—with ruins to excite the astonishment of future ages. An artificial lake without the city, nearly a mile in circuit, and twenty cubits in depth, stocked with abundance of the choicest fish and of the most beautiful water-fowl, attested the luxury and taste of the inhabitants; and the victories of Gellias in the Olympic games were celebrated with the lavish splendour of boundless wealth.<sup>1654</sup> Nor was Akragas behindhand in the intellectual activity of the age. In philosophy and rhetoric Empedokles and Polos were not inferior to the philosophers of Elea,<sup>1655</sup> to the Leontine Gorgias, or the Syracusan Tisias and Korax. To Empedokles the Akragantines owed the advanced democratic constitution established after the overthrow of the senate of One Thousand. These two great cities were Dorian, and as such were, with other Dorian towns in Sicily, the natural allies of Sparta. The Ionic element, not nearly so strong, yet not insignificant, would as naturally gravitate to Athens;<sup>1656</sup> but

Condition of the Hellenic cities in Sicily at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.  
B.C. 437.

B.C. 406.

<sup>1652</sup> Diodoros, xii. 29, speaks of this as the first of all the Sikelian cities, and asserts that with its reduction the reduction of all the Sikeli strongholds was completed. That this was not the case, we learn from Thucydides, vii. 2: nor can any reliance be placed on the vague descriptions of sieges and battles by Diodoros. There is exaggeration every where; and how much misrepresentation there may be, we cannot say.

<sup>1653</sup> Diod. xii. 30.

<sup>1654</sup> Diodoros makes the population of Akragas 200,000 or more; but no reliance can be placed in his computations. See Niebuhr, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. note 147.

<sup>1655</sup> See vol. i. page 134, &c.

<sup>1656</sup> For the proportion of Dorian and Ionian elements in the Sicilian settlements, see vol. i. p. 143 *et seq.*



in the earlier years of the Peloponnesian war there was no tendency on the part of Athens to drag the Sicilian Greeks into the great struggle between herself and Sparta, nor was there any chance that such a disposition would receive the least encouragement so long as the influence of Perikles should continue to predominate. No Sicilian cities are mentioned as among her allies at the beginning of the war, while the Spartans are represented as forming a gigantic scheme for crushing her by means of the resources to be furnished by their Sicilian friends. These were to bear their part in building a fleet of 500 ships which should sweep away the navy of Athens,<sup>1657</sup> and in the costs of a struggle with which they had no direct concern: nor, apart from their own disinclination to take this burden on themselves, was there anything to prevent them from thus co-operating with Sparta except the alliance of Korkyra with Athens.

First interference of the Athenians in the affairs of Sicily.

B.C. 427.

So great was this disinclination that little or nothing was done towards carrying out the orders received from Sparta;<sup>1658</sup> but the fact that Athens would have her hands fully occupied elsewhere encouraged the project of an attack upon the Ionian cities of Sicily. In the year which witnessed the disgraceful revolution at Korkyra, the rhetor Gorgias headed an embassy from Leontinoi to ask the aid of Athens against the Syracusans, who were at open war not only with them but with Naxos and Katanê. In this strife Syracuse had the aid of all her Dorian neighbours except the men of Kamarina who threw their force into the opposite scale. On her side also appeared the troops of the Epizephyrian Lokrians, while the men of Rhegion necessarily took the side of Leontinoi.<sup>1659</sup> Whatever power the eloquence of Gorgias may have exercised over the Athenian assembly, no more constraining argument probably was adduced than the warning that if the Sicilian Dorians should be suffered to subdue their Ionian kinsfolk, the Spartans would assuredly receive from Sicily the succours on which the Corinthians especially had eagerly counted. The fact may be doubted; and had Perikles still been in his place in the assembly, he would in all likelihood have told his countrymen that they could find

<sup>1657</sup> Thuc. ii. 7, 2.

<sup>1658</sup> Ib. vi. 84, 8.

<sup>1659</sup> Ib. iii. 86.

more effectual means of aiding the Ionians of Sicily than by diverting their forces to operations in that distant island. But neither was Perikles living, nor was his policy in reference to foreign conquests taken up by Kleon, although when vigorous efforts were needed for the recovery of revolted cities the line taken by the leather-seller was more spirited and creditable than that of the high-born Nikias and his followers. The Leontine envoys had thus little difficulty in obtaining the promise of help, and towards the end of summer Laches and Charoiades with twenty Athenian triremes took up their position off Rhegion and did what they could to break the maritime blockade of the Ionic cities. In the winter these commanders, aided by ten ships from Rhegion,<sup>1660</sup> ravaged Lipara and the other islands which bore the name of the god Aiolos. In the following summer Charoiades was slain, and Laches, now in sole command, assaulted the Messenian fort of Mylai. So successful was he in avoiding an ambush laid for his men, and in his onslaught on the walls, that the garrison not only surrendered their post but agreed to join him in his operations against Messênê. The Messenians, however, after the fall of Mylai had little spirit left for resistance, and they were glad to become subject allies of Athens, and to give hostages for their fidelity.<sup>1661</sup> Laches was further successful in a descent on the Lokrian territory as well as in the attack of a fortress on the river Halex;<sup>1662</sup> but he was less fortunate in his attempt during the ensuing winter on the Sikelian stronghold of Inessa. His somewhat severe losses during the retreat were in some measure compensated by a victory over a Lokrian force under Proxenos:<sup>1663</sup> but on his return to Rhegion from an expedition to the territory of Himera and the Aiolian islands he found Pythodoros his successor in command. This general, on the urgent request of the Sicilian Ionians, the Athenians had hastily dispatched with a few ships, intending to send Sophokles and Eurymedon with a larger fleet more at their

B.C. 426.

<sup>1660</sup> Thuc. iii. 86, 88. In the narrative of Diodoros, xii. 54, the 20 Athenian ships and the 10 Rhegine vessels, each, become 100, and thus they sail to the Liparian islands with a fleet of 200 ships. Such exaggerations sufficiently show how little reliance is to be placed in his statements where these are not borne out by the words of trustworthy contemporary writers.

<sup>1661</sup> Thuc. iii. 90.<sup>1662</sup> Ib. iii. 99.<sup>1663</sup> Ib. iii. 103.

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Revolt of  
Messênê  
from  
Athens.  
B.C. 425.

leisure. The first operations of Pythodoros were not brilliant. He was defeated in an engagement with the Lokrians near the fort already taken by Laches.<sup>1664</sup>

The squadron commanded by Eurymedon and Sophokles was intended to reach Sicily early in the following summer. It was delayed for several months on its way, partly by the circumstances which led to the occupation of Pylos or Koryphasion by Demosthenes, and partly by the Korkyraian butcheries in the contrivance of which Eurymedon seems to have taken credit to himself for singular ingenuity.<sup>1665</sup> To Athens nothing was lost by this delay, unless success in Sicily was to be regarded as the indispensable condition for a triumphant ending of the war. It would have been well if Eurymedon could have been convinced that his true field of action lay elsewhere; and the extreme uncertainty of the course of events in Sicily must in some degree have been forced upon him when on reaching the island he found that Messênê, surrendered to Laches but a few months before, was again in the hands of the Syracusans.<sup>1666</sup> Not only here, but at Rhegion, there was a party opposed to Athens. At Messênê this party succeeded in introducing their own allies: from Rhegion the Lokrians who had assailed it were obliged to retreat with some loss. But the position was one of too much importance to be given up without further effort. If the Syracusans and their allies could obtain full possession of the strait between Italy and Sicily, the progress of the Athenians would in all likelihood be effectually barred. Hence the Lokrians were most anxious to bring on a naval engagement before any fresh fleets could arrive from Athens. The battle took place sooner perhaps than they had expected. The Athenians with sixteen ships of their own and with eight vessels belonging to Rhegion had advanced to the capture of a merchant-ship passing through the strait, when the Syracusan fleet of thirty ships interfered to prevent it. The conflict began late in the day; but sufficient space for Athenian seamanship soon decided the contest. The Syracusans and Lokrians, each having lost a ship, fled in some disorder to their several stations. But when the Athenians attacked

<sup>1664</sup> Thuc. iii. 115.<sup>1665</sup> Ib. iv. 48. See page 184 *et seq.*<sup>1666</sup> Ib. iv. 1.

their enemies who had posted themselves near the Pelorian promontory, they in their turn lost a vessel; and a subsequent engagement near Messênê was followed by a like disaster.<sup>1067</sup> At this moment tidings came of plots to deliver Kamarina also to the Syracusans. The departure of the Athenian fleet to that city left the Messenians free, and they used the opportunity for a raid with all their forces against Naxos, while their ships ravaged the lands on the banks of the Akesines. But their plan wholly failed. The Sikel tribes came down from their hills to aid the Naxians, who, taking them at a distance to be Leontine Greeks, sallied out vigorously and slew more than a thousand of the enemy. The rest suffered terribly on their way home at the hands of the non-Hellenic tribes; but even in this state of exhaustion they were still able to hold out against the Athenian fleet which attacked their city after their return. The Athenians, it is true, gained some advantages; but their lack of confidence in their own powers was shown by their retreat to Rhegion.

The great success of Demosthenes at Sphakteria produced in the public opinion of Sicily a change not less marked than that which it brought about at Athens. If the Athenians were led by it not only to insist on harder terms from the Spartans but even to engage in schemes for regaining their short-lived supremacy in Boiotia, the Sicilian Greeks began to feel that their incessant quarrels and wars might leave the whole island at the mercy of a people who had shown a power of resistance and a fertility of resource far beyond any with which at the beginning of the war their enemies would have credited them. The necessity of making common cause against Athens was first felt by the citizens of Kamarina and Gela, and was first expressed probably by the men of the weaker city. The truce between these two cities was followed by a congress at Gela in which before

Congress of  
Sicilian  
Greeks at  
Gela.  
B.C. 424.

<sup>1067</sup> Thuc. iv. 24. Whatever meaning is to be given to the words ἀποσιμωσάντων καὶ προεμβαλόντων as applied to the Syracusans, we have no grounds for thinking that at this time the Sicilian commanders would seek for their manœuvres that open space which Athenian admirals always sought for their fleets. The Syracusan ships were being towed alongshore by a tow-rope. If, as Dr. Arnold supposes, they suddenly slipped the ropes and made their way out to sea by a lateral movement so as to exchange the defensive for the offensive, this is seemingly just what the Athenians would have desired. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 184, admits his inability to understand exactly what was done.

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the general body of Sikeliot envoys.<sup>1668</sup> the Syracusan Hermokrates stood forward for the first time as the uncompromising antagonist of Athens. Aiming at the establishment of a single confederacy of all the Sicilian Greeks, he naturally slurred over the aggressive and ambitious temper which had characterised their more powerful cities, and made the least of the centrifugal impulse which tended to sever Dorians from Ionians into opposing bodies. For the present it was to his interest to urge that such distinctions, never profitable or even reasonable, were now especially pernicious, when a struggle was in all likelihood impending with a power which never hesitated to enslave a people because they might chance to be Ionians. For such considerations the Athenians cared nothing. The independence of their allies was radically inconsistent with their theory of empire; and if the Sikeliot Ionians wished to avoid slavery, they could do so only by laying aside their private differences with the Sikeliot Dorians, and by submitting all disputes to arbitration. That the Syracusans were animated by this generous and forgiving disposition, he could not but earnestly maintain. Facts were somewhat against him; but he was drawing still nearer to the borders of fiction when he represented the readiness of the Athenians to aid the Chalkidian cities as out of all proportion to the entreaties made to them for help. His argument would have lost all force, had he reminded his hearers that the beginning of the great struggle between Athens and Sparta was seized by the Sikeliot Dorians as a convenient time for making an attack upon their Ionian neighbours, and that it was only the consciousness of a danger menacing Dorians and Ionians alike which had induced the natural rulers in Hellas to make common cause with those who should rightfully be their subjects. If Hermokrates spoke as Thucydides represents him to have spoken (and there is no reason for questioning the substantial correctness of his report<sup>1669</sup>), this would have been the truer commentary on

<sup>1668</sup> It is scarcely necessary to say that the Sicilian Hellenes spoke of themselves as Sikeliotai, thus marking the distinction between themselves and the native Sikeloi.

<sup>1669</sup> At the time of this congress, the Athenian fleet consisting of the ships brought by Eurymedon after leaving Demosthenes at Pylos, Thuc. iv. 48, 5, together with those already under the command of Pythodoros, cannot have fallen short of fifty triremes.

the recent history of the island : and although Hermokrates may have been more truthful than Brasidas, we cannot forget that a Dorian could not understand and therefore could not describe fairly the real relations of Athens with her allies, or take the measure in which the objects of her confederacy interfered with the independent action of its members.<sup>1670</sup>

The decision sought for by Hermokrates was attained ; and it was agreed that a general peace should be made between the several cities which should retain each its present possessions, Morgantine only being given to Kamarina on the payment of a fixed sum of money. The Athenian commanders were at once informed of the treaty to which, it was added, they might, if they pleased, become a party.<sup>1671</sup> For the time being they had scarcely an option ; and the Athenian fleet was accordingly withdrawn. But since the departure of Eurymedon from Pylos and Korkyra the mad promise of Kleon, as some chose to call it, had been fulfilled ; and the admirals on reaching Athens found themselves to their amazement objects of general and vehement indignation. In the present temper of the people they were regarded as men who had abandoned a task not merely practicable but easy ; and their action was at once imputed to the besetting Hellenic sin of personal corruption. They would have it that bribery only could explain the facts : and on this theory Pythodoros and Sophokles were banished, while Eurymedon, the infamous hero of the Korkyraian massacre, was fined.

The pacification brought about by the efforts of Hermokrates was short-lived. It was not, indeed, likely to last longer than the general fear of Athenian ambition ; and the disasters of the Boiotian campaign, crowned by the catastrophe of Delion, speedily dispelled this fear. But in spite of all the fair words of the Syracusan envoy some at least of

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Punishment of the Athenian commanders

Renewed dissensions in Leontinoi, B.C. 423;

No Sicilian could possibly have spoken of these as 'a few ships : ' and this phrase put into the mouth of Hermokrates, Thuc. iv. 60, 1, shows that the speech must have been brought into its present shape when the gigantic expedition under Nikias, Lamachos, and Alkibiades was a thing of the past. We may note here the careful way in which Hermokrates is made to ascribe to the Athenians the habit of veiling evil deeds and evil schemes under fair and high-sounding names, iv. 60, 1 ; 61, 4, without the slightest hint of that audacious effrontery which Thucydides some years later attributes to the Athenians in the conference at Melos.

<sup>1670</sup> Thuc. iv. 65.

<sup>1671</sup> The Epizephyrian Lokrians alone refused to agree to this covenant. Thuc. v. 5, 3.

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the weaker towns could not rid themselves of the suspicion that in the city which Hermokrates represented they had a neighbour more dangerous than Athens. The men of Leontinoi resolved accordingly to increase the number of their citizens, a measure which would be necessarily followed by a re-arrangement of the land.<sup>1672</sup> To this the oligarchical party could not bring themselves to submit; and they had power enough to expel the demos, and to dismantle the city. They now became possessed of all the lands, which they continued to occupy although they had taken up their abode at Syracuse. But their new home disappointed the hopes of some among them, who went back and posted themselves in a spot called Phokeai and a fortress named Brikinniai in the Leontine territory. Here, joined by many of the banished demos, they withstood the attacks made on them by the men whom they had deserted at Syracuse; and a fresh case was at once provided for the intervention of the Athenians. A pressing entreaty from Leontinoi brought out Phaiax, who was charged to excite the Sicilian Greeks generally to a common attack on the oppressive and ambitious Syracusans. His proposal was readily accepted by the Kamarinaians and Akragantines; but the strenuous opposition offered to him at Gela convinced him of the impracticability of his mission. Marching across the island through the Sikel country, he encouraged the Leontines at Brikinniai to hold out with the hope of speedy aid from Athens, and re-embarking at Katanê returned home.<sup>1673</sup>

B.C. 422.

Quarrel  
between  
Selinons  
and Egesta.

The promises of Phaiax were followed by no real benefit to Leontinoi. The citizens who held Phokeai and Brikinniai

<sup>1672</sup> Thucydides, v. 4, 2, gives no details of the measure; and we can scarcely venture to infer these details from analogies drawn from the real or supposed history of the Roman Ager Publicus. That some disturbance of property would be involved in the step, cannot, of course, be doubted: but Thucydides speaks only of re-division, ἀναδασμός, not of equal partition. If the new citizens thus added to the state were penniless, then the portions of land assigned to them must have been bestowed on them gratuitously. If they were persons possessing some means, the owners disturbed in their possessions would at the worst be compelled only to sell at a fixed price. In either case there is no reason to suppose that they would go without a certain compensation, as the state might pay for lands given to men too poor to buy them. It is especially unfair to say that the re-division of the land was the first thing aimed at,—the new citizens being brought in for the purpose of carrying out this change,—when Thucydides gives precisely the reverse order. According to his account, the Leontinoi felt that their numbers were dangerously small. The deficiency could be remedied only by increasing them; and they could not be increased without assigning land to the new citizens. The re-division was therefore the last thing thought of or desired.

<sup>1673</sup> Thuc. v. 4 and 5.

were sooner or later driven out, and the town utterly dismantled.<sup>1674</sup> Some of the exiles may have gone to Athens in the hope of rousing her to take up their cause effectually; but the complication of affairs in Peloponnesos after the peace of Nikias, the intrigues of Alkibiades to secure the supremacy of Athens by means of a new Argive confederacy, the short struggle which ended in the defeat at Mantinea, and the expedition for the recovery of Amphipolis which was begun only to be frustrated by the remissness or treachery of Perdikkas, left to the Athenians no time for any thoughts of interference in Sicily. The abandonment of the northern expedition was followed immediately by no more important business than the infamous enterprise against Melos; but the task of blockading and butchering the inhabitants of an insignificant island city furnished occupation for a very small portion of the Athenian people; and thus when in the beginning of the year in which the Melians were massacred an embassy reached Athens from Egesta, one of the two cities of the Elymoi, in Sicily,<sup>1675</sup> the envoys were far more graciously received than the poor exiles of Leontinoi. These had appealed simply to their feelings of compassion: the Egestaians enforced their claim on the more constraining grounds of expediency and good policy. They asked for help against the men of Selinous in a quarrel which had arisen from some merely local dispute; and probably they would not have cared to deny the insignificance of its cause. But they pointed simply to the policy of Syracuse, and to the likelihood that, when she had made herself the imperial city of Sicily, she would come forward openly to the help of the great Dorian state of Continental Hellas. She had already wiped Leontinoi out of the number of Sicilian towns; and unless her course was cut short, Egesta would suffer the same fate. But although the envoys were quite willing to admit that they could not stand by themselves, they were

B.C. 416.

<sup>1674</sup> The restoration of such of its citizens as might still chance to survive is given as one of the subordinate reasons for the great Athenian expedition to Sicily. The generals were ordered to carry out this purpose, if they should be able to spare time for doing so. Thuc. vi. 8, 2.

<sup>1675</sup> Thuc. vi. 2, 3. The other town belonging to this non-Hellenic tribe was Eryx, about fifteen miles to the west of Egesta. A line drawn between the two cities cuts off to the north the peninsula of mount Eryx, the northwestern corner of the three-pointed island.



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not less strenuous in asserting that their power, if combined with that of Athens, was not to be despised. Reminding the Athenians that they were already their allies by virtue of the treaty made ten years ago with Laches, they pledged themselves not merely to bring their own men into the field but to take on themselves the whole costs of the war.

Resolution  
of the  
Athenians  
to maintain  
the cause  
of the  
Egestaians.

The picture, as it was drawn and coloured by the envoys in repeated audiences before the public assembly, was sufficiently seductive; nor can we doubt that among the citizens there were many who were ready to dress it out in still more enticing colours. So far were the people charmed by the new influence that, instead of pausing to think whether under any circumstances further interference in Sicily would be either wise or profitable, they resolved to send ambassadors to test the resources of the Egestaians and their prospects of success in their war with Selinous.<sup>1676</sup> The Egestaians turned out to be mere impostors: but unhappily the cheat was not discovered until the Athenian fleet had reached Rhegion.<sup>1677</sup> The envoys returned from Sicily in the spring of the following year with glowing accounts of the wealth which they had seen there, not only in the temples and public buildings, but in the houses of the citizens; the crew of the trireme which conveyed the ambassadors were loud in expressions of wonder and admiration at the magnificent hospitality with which they had been entertained during their whole stay at Egesta. But the treasures of the temples were of silver, not gold; and the ornaments which made their feasts so splendid represented the collective wealth not only of Egesta but of other cities from which they were borrowed, the whole being transferred secretly from house to house for each successive entertainment. A trick like this clearly points to bribery: but it is scarcely practicable to corrupt a whole people, and somewhat costly to corrupt the crew of a ship of war. It was manifestly to the interest of the Egestaians that neither the crew nor the Athenian demos should be let into the secret; but if we allow that these were sincere in their words and in their acts, the conclusion is the more strongly forced on us that either the

B.C. 415.

<sup>1676</sup> Thuc. vi. 6.

<sup>1677</sup> Ib. vi. 46.

envoys themselves were bribed or were men who were resolved to commit the city to the venture of a Sicilian expedition, or that possibly their convictions were quickened by thoughts of the profit to be derived from acting in accordance with them. The crew of the trireme were, as we might expect, overcome by the friendliness of their reception at Eggesta, and the Athenian people felt assured that the Eggestaians had told the simple truth, when the envoys laid before them sixty talents of uncoined silver as a month's pay in advance for a fleet of sixty vessels. The popular enthusiasm had been wrought up to the requisite pitch, and a decree was passed appointing Alkibiades, Nicias, and Lamachos commanders of an expedition charged with maintaining the cause of Eggesta against the men of Selinous, with the restoration of Leontinoi, and with the general furtherance of Athenian interests in Sicily. Five days later the assembly was to meet again to discuss more fully the details of the expedition.

Nicias, we cannot doubt, had done what he could, or felt that he could do, to knock the whole scheme on the head. We are expressly told that his appointment to the command was made against his will; and the statement implies that he had made no secret of his opinion. But whatever may have been his suspicion of the ambassadors, he may have hesitated to throw a doubt on the sincerity of the men who had accompanied them on their mission: and in such circumstances his language was not likely to be either forcible or impressive. He was, in fact, doing some violence to his conscience, if he is represented with truth in a subsequent speech as expressing his assurance that in the matter of their wealth and their power of bearing the costs of the war the Eggestaians had simply lied.<sup>1678</sup> The life of Nicias, born though he was to high station and abundant wealth, was not particularly fortunate: but of all his misfortunes none was greater than his strange inability to discern the road which almost at any given time would have led him out of his difficulties. If in his reply to the fiery harangue of Alkibiades Nicias merely repeated what he had already said about the supposed resources of the Eggestaians, it is

Opposition  
of Nicias.

<sup>1678</sup> Thuc. vi. 22.

even more astonishing that he should not insist on being sent himself to test the truth of their words than that he should allow himself to be appointed general against his will to carry out a scheme based avowedly on reports which he knew or vehemently suspected to be false. It was also his misfortune that his habitual hesitation, caution, or timidity (whatever be the name which should be given to it), deprived his words of all force in cases where reserve or prudence became the highest wisdom. The expedition to Sicily was not much more to his mind than the enterprise of Demosthenes at Pylos. In the former case he pronounced success to be difficult: in the latter he asserted it to be impossible. Had he chosen, when replying to the sarcasms of Kleon, to adopt the line which he took in opposition to Alkibiades in reference to the Sicilian invasion, he might with the aid of Demosthenes have secured a victory far more brilliant than that which Demosthenes and Kleon achieved on the island of Sphakteria. But Nikias opposed himself to resolute action under all circumstances: and his words failed to carry due weight when, as in the present instance, they were fully borne out by facts. Most of all, it was his misfortune, if not his fault, that he had never drawn out in his mind a definite policy founded on the real interests of his country, so far as these could be known to him whether by his own experience or through that of previous generations. Of such an effort he was perhaps constitutionally incapable. It may possibly never have struck him that when he preferred negotiations with Sparta to a vigorous effort to cut short the career of Brasidas in Thrace, or rather to prevent his entering upon it, and again when he threw cold water on the vehement rhetoric of Kleon and his 'mad promise' about Sphakteria, he was going in the teeth of the whole policy of Perikles. Had he been able to realise the distinction, he might have told his countrymen that, if in discouraging the enterprise of Demosthenes he was recommending a course which would not have the sanction of the great Athenian statesman, yet in setting his face against any further interference in Sicilian affairs he would have had his unqualified approval. \*But with the death of Perikles his very name

seems almost to have passed away; nor is anything in the history of the Peloponnesian war more astonishing than the rapidity with which one system of foreign policy seems to follow another without any apparent consciousness of change on the part of the people. Far from keeping steadily in view the objects at which they professed to aim when the struggle began, they do not even refer to the maxims of Perikles and boldly ask themselves whether those maxims were right or wrong. Even to that illustrious man the historian ascribes but scanty reference to the work of Themistokles. There was the less need to do so because his own work carried out systematically the designs of the great founder of Athenian maritime supremacy. But if ever an opportunity was needed by a weaker leader for strengthening himself under the authority of a more distinguished name, we might have supposed that this need would be felt by Nikias at a time when above all others his advice caught both the form and the spirit of that of Perikles. When he inveighed against the folly of plunging into a distant war, while tasks of paramount importance nearer home remained unfinished, he was only enforcing a warning which the Athenians had received from Perikles years before. Yet, although he puts forth his counsel as his own, his judgment loses nothing of its value. If on the day of this second assembly he spoke at all as Thucydides represents him to have spoken, his words may be compared with those of Artabanos speaking as the good genius of Xerxes. He was fully justified in asserting that Athens owed no duties to barbarian inhabitants of a distant island,<sup>1679</sup> while she owed the strongest duties to her own citizens and to the members of her great confederacy; that the Spartans were only nominally at peace with her, and that her first disaster would be to them a welcome opportunity for giving vent to a wrath long pent up;<sup>1680</sup> that their example would be followed by other states which had either openly repudiated the peace or had contented themselves with a ten days' truce periodically renewed; and that if Athens was bent on righting wrongs, her business was to redress her own. The

<sup>1679</sup> Thuc. vi. 9, 1.<sup>1680</sup> Ib. vi. 9, 2.

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Thrace-ward Chalkidians were still in revolt; and until these were again brought under obedience, it was madness to dispatch fleets and armies to aid the Eggestaians.<sup>1681</sup> In short, there was absolutely no reason for going, and every reason for refusing to go. The plea of the Eggestaians that Syracuse was seeking to make herself mistress of all Sicily was one to which it was absurd to listen. The success of Syracuse in any such scheme would be to the interest of Athens, not to her injury. In their present state of isolation, the several Dorian cities of that island might be tempted to take part with the Dorian states to which they traced their origin: but if Syracuse became an imperial power, she would be less likely to risk her empire in a contest with a city whose strength was equal to her own.<sup>1682</sup> A far more serious danger threatened Athens from the Spartan itch for subverting democratical constitutions and setting up oligarchies in their place,<sup>1683</sup> and from the selfish ambition of men who far outran their fortunes in the extravagant luxury of their private lives, in the ostentatious magnificence of their liturgies, and in the splendour of the chariots and horses with which they competed for the prizes in the great Hellenic festivals. If such men urged on the expedition, they had the twofold motive of wishing to increase their own importance and making good the ruinous costs of their lavish and iniquitous display, and on this account they were utterly unfitted to be intrusted with any command in such an enterprise. Expressing honestly the dread with which he saw this knot of disaffected citizens grouped together in the assembly,<sup>1684</sup> he besought the older men to discharge their duty to their country by putting an effectual check on their destructive folly, and lastly intreated the Prytanis, or President, to put the whole question once more to the vote under the full assurance that the irregularity of the step would at the least be condoned.<sup>1685</sup>

The speech of Nikias roused the vehement indignation of Alkibiades. This daring and unscrupulous man had long

<sup>1681</sup> Thuc. vi. 10.<sup>1682</sup> Ib. vi. 11, 3.<sup>1683</sup> Ib. vi. 11, 5. Nikias belonged, it is true, to the oligarchical party at Athens; but no one will charge him with any complicity in the violent counsels which disgraced this party a few years later.<sup>1684</sup> Thuc. vi. 13, 1.<sup>1685</sup> Compare Xen. *Hellen.* i. vii. 11-15.

since given the rein to a selfishness fertile in schemes of aggression and conquest. Compelled to give up the idea of domination in the Peloponnesos, he turned with eagerness to a war which seemed to promise a more tempting prize in the island of Sicily; and, if we may believe Thucydides, his fancy strayed already onwards to the dream of an Athenian empire which should embrace Carthage herself within its borders.<sup>1686</sup> The adoption of the policy whether of Nikias or of Perikles would be for him a sentence of poverty and disgrace: and he could not afford to lose a moment in weakening or destroying the force of his arguments. Making a virtue of necessity, he gloried in the acts which had called forth the strongest censures of Nikias. It was true that he had competed for the Olympian prize with seven chariots of four horses each; and that he had sought to make his Liturgies as splendid as he could. But his victories at Olympia had impressed the whole Hellenic world with a sense of the power and wealth of Athens in which they had well-nigh ceased to believe, while the richness of his public services had tended greatly to attract and reassure her subjects and her allies. He had even the effrontery to boast of his Peloponnesian intrigues and of the strait to which he had reduced Sparta when she was obliged to stake everything on a single throw at Mantinea; and he crowned his avowal with the impudent falsehood that, although Sparta won the stake, she had not yet recovered the haughty confidence of the times preceding the disasters of Sphakteria. It was true also, he added, that he was young, and that Nikias had the experience of maturer years: but this was only a reason for turning to the good of the state the youth of the one and the wisdom of the other. As to the power of the Sicilian cities, Nikias was scaring them with imaginary terrors. They were but solitary units without power of cohesion, on whom the barbarous tribes of the Sikels would be glad to wreak the enmity of ages. But, as Athenians, they were bound to remember their own wants and their own honour. The former would lead them to cut off from the Peloponnesians all hopes of drawing stores whether of men or of

<sup>1686</sup> Thuc. vi. 15. It is more likely that this was the mere boast of a later time.

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money from Sicily; the latter they would consult by persisting in the courses which had had for their result the maritime supremacy of Athens. That empire had been attained by the bestowal of ready help on all whether Hellenes or Barbarians who chanced to ask for it; and slackness now in aggressive movements would be virtually an abandonment of the old imperial tradition. The very life of Athens depended on energetic action. Sicily would supply a field for such action. The refusal to occupy this field would be followed by stagnation, and stagnation would end in death.<sup>1687</sup> It was the old argument of Asiatic conquerors, which Herodotos puts into the mouth of Xerxes; <sup>1688</sup> and it was worthy alike of the Persian despot and the selfish Athenian oligarch.

Daring falsehoods and misrepresentations of his speech.

We may, if we please, give Alkibiades the benefit of any doubts which we may feel about the genuineness of this speech as given by Thucydides; but if we accept the report as substantially correct, we stand aghast at the audacious assumptions and shameless lies with which he sought to cheat and succeeded in cajoling the Athenian people. The falsehood of his insinuations or assertions that Athens must be devoured by idleness if she would not decree the expedition to Sicily had already been met by Nikias; but Nikias may well have despaired of convincing men who could be seduced by such transparent sophistry, that Athens had ready to hand quite as much work as she could manage on the northern shores of the Egean. Unhappily his own remissness in all that concerned Amphipolis deprived him here of a strong vantage-ground; but probably all arguments would have been thrown away upon an assembly which could listen with patience to the wretched travesty put forth by Alkibiades as the history of the Athenian empire. The assertion that that empire had been acquired by indiscriminate aid bestowed on every applicant for her help was a mere lie; the inference that her dominion and even her existence could be preserved only by a pursuance of the same course was a daring assumption which low-born leather-sellers and lamp-makers would probably never have had the courage to make. The supre-

<sup>1687</sup> Thuc. vi. 18.

<sup>1688</sup> See vol. i. page 453.

macy of Athens had in the first instance been forced upon her; and the confederation which had alone made her dominion possible had sprung up from definite needs, and was confined within fixed limits. As head of the Delian league, Athens had a certain work to do, which could not possibly lead her on to an interminable series of aggressions. With the protection of the Asiatic Hellenes from the Persian power it began: and with the maintenance of their safety and welfare it ended. None knew better than Alkibiades, if he had chosen to reflect, that the greatness of his country had not sprung from mere lust of conquest, and that even Egean islands like Thera and Melos had been allowed to remain independent until men like himself insisted on their subjugation, not on the reasonable ground that they had no right to share the benefits of the Athenian confederacy without bearing their part of the burden, but on the plea that there could be no peace until the whole Egean had been turned into an Athenian lake.

The speech of Alkibiades was followed by addresses from other orators and by renewed intreaties from the Eggestaian envoys; and the effect of all was so powerful that Nikias, feeling himself already practically defeated, resorted to a device by which he hoped to disgust them with the enterprise. Assuming that the expedition would be voted, he insisted that it must be made on a scale which might fairly justify confidence in its success. In the way of help in Sicily itself not much was to be looked for. In the reported wealth of the Eggestaians he put no faith whatever.<sup>1689</sup> Their enemies the men of Selinous he knew to be far richer. Besides the Eggestaians their only allies would be found in Naxos and Katanê: Leontinoi existed only in the memory of its exiled citizens. On the other side were seven important and wealthy cities, strong especially in their cavalry. Against such foes mere fleets with their ordinary crews would be of little or no avail. They must carry with them hoplites, bowmen, and slingers, and must go amply provided with a convoy of grain-bearing vessels, and with everything that could insure the well-being of the army under all possible accidents of war.

Attempt of Nikias to disgust the people by insisting on the vast effort needed to carry out the enterprise.

<sup>1689</sup> Thuc. vi. 21, 2.



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Compliance  
of the  
Athenian  
people with  
all the de-  
mands of  
Nikias.

These were for him no matters for doubt or controversy ; and if any viewed them as such, he would resign to them a command which had been thrust upon him against his will.

This manœuvre on the part of Nikias was followed by a result precisely opposite to that which he had hoped for. Far from inducing the people to give up the enterprise as one wholly beyond their strength, he united all parties by proposing a course which seemed to make failure impossible. The enthusiasm of those who were most eager for the expedition was increased tenfold, while the more sober-minded were led to think that what Athens undertook with a superfluity of resources, she would assuredly be able to accomplish. To both Sicily now became an El-Dorado, from which a stream of perennial wealth would be poured into Athens ; and in face of the fever of excitement thus produced the minority who still felt the folly and evil of the scheme preferred silence to the imputation whether of cowardice or of treachery.<sup>1690</sup> When then one of the citizens started up and insisted that instead of further preface Nikias without multiplying words should say precisely what he wanted, the unfortunate general was caught in his own trap. Like one passing sentence of death, not on himself (for his personal bravery was never questioned, nor can he be charged with setting too high a value on his own life), but on the high-spirited, although mistaken, men whom he feared that he should be leading to ruin, Nikias said that he must have at least a hundred triremes, and, if possible, more than five thousand hoplites, with light troops in proportion. Not only was his request instantly complied with, but with his colleagues he received full powers over all arrangements for the expedition. The die was cast. Orders were sent to the allies of Athens, whether free or subject, to send their naval contingents, and the Argives and Mantineians were invited to take their part in the great work. The efforts of Nikias to chill the ardour of the people had secured to Alkibiades a victory far greater than any which he had hoped for, and staked almost the existence of the state on the issue of the enterprise. But in justice to Nikias it must be remembered that his dis-

suasions were not founded on the mere anticipation of disaster. He went with no high hopes; he was weighed down perhaps with some heavy misgivings: but unquestionably he had not made up his mind that the scheme would inevitably end in failure. We can scarcely doubt that, had he felt thus assured, he would have refused to serve as general as steadily as he had declined to take charge of the reinforcements for Pylos. Nicias needed not to fear imputations of cowardice; and at the worst he might have insisted on serving in the ranks of an army for whose ill-fortune he dared not to make himself responsible, or have intreated the Athenians to send him on any other errand, however dangerous, in which disaster would not endanger the safety of the state itself. Nicias went to Sicily, because on a general view of the case he felt that he might hope to return home in triumph; but he condemned the whole scheme emphatically on the ground that in such an enterprise victory would be not much less a calamity than defeat. The latter might cripple Athens for years; but success would extend her empire to an unmanageable size, would involve her in an inextricable network of difficulties, and would lead to further schemes of aggression which would be avenged in her speedy downfall.<sup>1691</sup>

The prospect for the present was singularly bright and alluring. The ravages of the plague had long since been repaired;<sup>1692</sup> the exhaustion of the former war was no longer felt; and the treasury of the Akropolis which had been emptied of its reserve fund after the siege of Potidaia was now replenished with the goodly store of 3,000 talents.<sup>1693</sup> But a fatal wound had, nevertheless, been dealt to the Athenian empire: and the blow had come not from noisy demagogues, such as Kleon and Hyperbolos are represented to have been, but from men of the noblest blood and of the highest refinement and culture in the city. The decisive step was taken, not with the haste which we are tempted to impute to a democratic community spurred on in the ex-

The mutilation of the Hermai.

<sup>1691</sup> Thuc. vi. 11 *et seq.*

<sup>1692</sup> So little countenance does the history of Athens present to the theory that great epidemics permanently weaken a people. See *Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art*, s. v. Plague.

<sup>1693</sup> Böckh, *Corp. Inscr. Att.* No. 76. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 225.

citement of the moment by a few violent and selfish leaders, but after a series of anxious debates preceding and following a mission to Eggesta which filled up a period of many months. That the people were finally duped partly by the Eggestaians and in part by those of their own commissioners who were in collusion with them, is scarcely open to doubt: but the same thing might have happened with the most oligarchical communities of Hellas. That their respect for Nikias should have induced them to carry out the expedition on a scale altogether beyond that of the first design and at a cost far exceeding that which Alkibiades could have persuaded them to incur, is a fault on which aristocratic politicians ought not to be too severe. It was the regard paid to the personal integrity of Nikias which roused the vehement enthusiasm of the Athenians, and brought forward an eager crowd of volunteers where the generals had feared that they might have to constrain men to an irksome service. With the same ardour the trierarchs vied with each other in the lavishness with which they provided everything necessary for the comfort of their crews and of the troops whom they were to convey to the scene of action. In addition to the pay offered by the state they added bounties in order to secure the most skilful and sturdy oarsmen. The cheerfulness and energy of the people generally were sustained at the highest pitch by the prophets and soothsayers who either assured them of victory in unequivocal terms or cheated them with the ambiguous language which might be reconciled with any result.<sup>1694</sup> The vehement impulse thus imparted was at its height, when the citizens awoke one morning to find that the figures of Hermes, busts standing on quadrangular pedestals which bore the phallic sign, had with scarcely an exception<sup>1695</sup> been mutilated and defaced. These Hermai, or statues of the Master Thief,<sup>1696</sup> stood in the Agora, before the temples, the

<sup>1694</sup> From Herodotos we should have had specimens of these vaticinations: Thucydides, viii. 1, merely says that the Athenians after the catastrophe at Syracuse were very angry with the prophets who had promised them success. It would seem then that there were some who found it not easy to get off under the plea that their words had been as much misunderstood by the people as the Delphian responses had been misinterpreted by Kroisos. See vol. i. page 274.

<sup>1695</sup> According to Andokides one only escaped, and that was the one which the conspirators had supposed that he would himself deface.

<sup>1696</sup> *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, i. 119; ii. 226.

public buildings, and private houses; and the people comforted themselves with the thought that the reverence which they paid to him enlisted the god on their side, and pledged him to protect them against the robbers of whom he was the most adroit and subtle. The event produced a profound sensation. There was no part of the city which was free from the profanation thus offered to the god; and therefore all Athens had at once forfeited all right to the goodwill of the deity. Hermes at least might be expected to resent the indignity with the severest judgements: nor was it possible to say how far his feelings might be shared by the great company of the gods. Nay, it was impossible to feel assured that some or all of these had not been insulted already. The religious fears of the Athenians had been roused; and no people perhaps were ever on this point more sensitive.<sup>1697</sup> It was clear that there lurked in the city a body of men for whom religion, law, and duty had no constraint, men who did not scruple to wage war against the gods and to involve the guiltless in the punishment due for their own iniquities. But the presence of such men in the city involved a political not less than a religious danger. The one in fact could not be separated from the other. The sacrilege committed on the Hermai was the act of men belonging to an organised body; and hence the Athenians had in their midst a secret society who hated the existing constitution of their country. Men who had any respect for law and decency could never have become partakers in such evil deeds, and hence the suspicion of political conspiracy was necessarily roused by the discovery that a gross insult had been offered to one of the divine protectors of the city. This inference would be fully justified in most of the states even of modern Europe; and the condition of mind which compelled the Athenians to draw the inference must be accepted as an ultimate fact. The religions of the ancient world were intensely local, nor is the popular Christianity whether of the East or the West at the present day free from this all-pervading characteristic. The statues of the Virgin Mother have replaced the statues of Hermes; but

<sup>1697</sup> This characteristic, known as their *δεισιδαιμονία*, is specially noted in the speech of St. Paul on the hill of Areiopagos.

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in the one case as in the other the mind of the people fastens itself on the local presence of the protecting powers. The educated men and still more the minority of real thinkers in Europe may have risen into a higher and more serene region, and see clearly the folly of a superstition which springs from a cramped and undiscerning mind; but it is absurd to treat as ridiculous religious instincts with which we may have no sympathy, and to regard as trifles matters which to men in whom these instincts are strong must be of supreme importance.

Accusa-  
tion of  
Alkibiades.

Respecting the mutilation of the Hermai at Athens two things only are certain. There is not the least doubt that a conspiracy existed, whatever may have been its objects, and that with this conspiracy Alkibiades had nothing to do. To the last very little was known of this strange business; but the supposition is ludicrous that a man should set in motion schemes which would involve his own life in imminent danger, and that he would do this just when he was setting off on an expedition on which he had set his heart, and to which the discovery was likely to be fatal. We may advance one step further, and maintain confidently that the end at which most of the conspirators aimed was the ruin of Alkibiades. It is also possible that with this motive was combined a desire to bring about the abandonment of the Sicilian expedition altogether. It is perhaps even not unlikely that among the conspirators may have been some who were actuated by the latter motive alone; and these, knowing how earnestly Nikias had spoken against the scheme, may have felt that an appeal to his religious fears would be the means of re-opening the question and rousing a more determined opposition on the part of men who were thus far afraid to break silence. But that the whole career of Alkibiades whether as a statesman or a private citizen had raised up against him a band of bitter enemies, there is no doubt at all. He was hated more especially by wealthy men of the oligarchical party, whom he insulted by his arrogance and eclipsed by the ostentation and extravagant costliness of his Liturgies. An oligarchical society may display towards the inferior classes a supercilious haughtiness scarcely surpassed

even by that of Alkibiades, but oligarchs generally have no mind that this haughtiness should be exhibited towards themselves by one who is only their peer. They had no security that Alkibiades might not at any time adopt the tactics by which oligarchic as well as democratic constitutions had been subverted in former days; and there were good grounds for thinking that if Alkibiades returned a conqueror from Sicily, he would return with an ascendancy so prodigious as to render the possibility of a despotism renewed in his person no idle dream. The great thing then was to prevent him from going: and in this they very nearly succeeded. But, strangely enough, the charge brought against Alkibiades had nothing to do with the mutilation of the Hermai. As soon as the sacrilege was discovered, rewards were offered for the apprehension of the conspirators: but to these offers were added promises of immunity from punishment to all, whether citizens, metoikoi, foreigners, or slaves, who might give evidence of any irreligious acts which now or recently had been committed in the city. Commissioners were appointed for receiving information; and it was to offences of this latter class that their attention was first called. Slaves came forward to say that they had seen Alkibiades with other young and rich men mimicking in private houses the ceremonies of the Eleusinian mysteries, and perhaps proved their assertions by showing the acquaintance which they had thus gained with those sacred rites. The preparations for the departure of the fleet were all but finished, and if we may believe Andokides, the trireme of Lamachos was already moored in the outer harbour, when in the public assembly Alkibiades was charged with this intolerable profanation. There is no reason to suppose him innocent; but his political opponents had no justification for inferring his guilt in the matter of the Hermai because he had put on the garments of the Hierophant and addressed his boon companions as persons initiated in the sacred mysteries.<sup>1698</sup> The lawless extravagance of the conduct ascribed to him might warrant a belief in his guilt, whenever the offence was not manifestly against his own interests; but apart from direct evidence to

<sup>1698</sup> Thuc. vi. 28, 2.

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the contrary it would be unjust to impute to him a deliberate political suicide. The demeanour of Alkibiades in this crisis was straightforward and commendable. He insisted on being brought to trial before he sailed, and protested against the injustice of allowing him to depart in charge of an army while at home an accusation impended over him which his enemies by slanders spread about during his absence might indefinitely aggravate. Asserting his innocence, he nevertheless professed his willingness to submit to any penalty if he should be found guilty; and so far as the plot of the Hermokopidai or mutilators of the Hermai was concerned, he assuredly spoke the truth. Nor must we forget the wide distinction which lies between the private mimicry of rites which the profaners regard as absurd, or the private derision of doctrines which they hold to be false, and the studied violence done to the popular faith by hacking and hewing its emblems in the streets. In the popular opinion the two acts would stand necessarily much on the same level; but the perpetrator might reconcile his conscience to the one far more easily than he could to the other.<sup>1699</sup> In demanding an immediate trial Alkibiades was therefore acting wisely. His opponents saw that a large proportion of the troops were on his side, and they feared that his condemnation might send home in wrath or disgust the Argive and Mantineian allies who by his influence had been induced to take part in the expedition. It was indispensable that the fleet should not be detained; and the speakers who now followed the instructions of his personal enemies urged that the trial should be postponed until a definite time should have passed after his recall, whenever the latter step should be resolved on.

The departure of the fleet from Peiraiæus.

It was now midsummer, and the fleet was ready for sea; and never did a more magnificent force issue from Athens than when the hoplites left the city to embark on board the ships which were to bear them away to Sicily. Its splendour

<sup>1699</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 290, makes some citations from French lawyers on the subject of Treason against God, or, as English law would term it, blasphemy. Their language is frightfully severe, and the punishments which they assign to the offence are as terrible as any which could be inflicted on the most daring profaners of temples or mutilators of images: But in the one set of cases the actors would rather be giving vent to their own unbelief or disgust without intending to insult their countrymen: in the other they would be declaring war against the dominant faith and practice of the age.

lay not so much in the numbers whether of the men or of the triremes. Almost as many had gone with Hagnon to Potidaia or with Perikles to Epidaurus. But in these instances the voyages were short, and the equipments of the men were poor. Now all that the wealth and energy of Athens could procure was bestowed without stint on the armament of the ships and to insure the efficiency of the men. They who served at their own cost strove with an ambitious rivalry to do honour to the city by the excellence of their arms, while the state supplied weapons and armour for the seven hundred citizens of the poorest or Thetic class who served as Epibatai on board the triremes.<sup>1700</sup> But impressive as the sight was when the 1500 picked hoplites reached the Peiraeus, the full strength of the force designed to subjugate Sicily could not be seen. The allies, with the corn-vessels and other ships, were to meet them at Korkyra, thence to cross the Ionic gulf to the Iapygian promontory. But on the shores of the great Athenian harbour the day was made memorable not so much by the brilliancy of military array as by the high hopes, troubled by some transient misgivings, which filled the hearts of all who had accompanied their friends from the city and were now to bid them farewell. Almost the whole population of Athens had come down to Peiraeus. Foreigners were there, gazing in wonder at the sumptuousness of the armament, while fathers, brothers, wives, and children felt their bright hopes fading away as they were brought face to face with the stern realities of parting. Thus far they had buoyed themselves up with the thought that the power of Athens was fully equal to the achievement of any scheme on which she had set her mind; but now the length of the voyage, their scanty knowledge of the great island which they were going to conquer, and the certainty that in any case many were departing who would never see their homes again, threw a dark veil over the future, and many burst into bitter weeping. The trumpets gave the signal for silence, and while some prayed to a God and Father neither local nor changeful, the voices of the heralds rose in invocation of the gods of the city. From golden and silver

<sup>1700</sup> Thuc. vi. 43. See note 1432.



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goblets the libations were poured to appease the deities of the heavens and the earth, of the land and the sea. The Pæan shout echoed over the waters, and the long line of triremes swept in file from the harbour. Having reached the open sea, each ship's crew put out its full strength, and strove for victory in the race to Aigina.<sup>1701</sup> When at length all were gathered at Korkyra, the fleet numbered 134 triremes, 100 of which were supplied by Athens alone, 60 of these being picked vessels both for speed and for general efficiency in battle. Rhodes supplied two Pentekonteroi, or vessels of fifty oars. Among the 5,100 hoplites were 500 Argives and 250 Mantineians and mercenaries. To these were added 280 archers, of whom 80 were Kretan, 700 Rhodian slingers, and 100 Megarian exiles who served in light armour. A single transport carried the thirty horsemen who composed the whole cavalry force of the invaders.<sup>1702</sup>

Public debate at Syracuse.

Even in Sparta with its habitual wariness and secrecy a plan so vast could not have been formed, nor a force so great brought together, without giving rise to rumours which would reach the state against which these preparations were being made. At Athens, where no step could be taken except after public debate, such secrecy would be impossible. During the many weeks spent by the Athenians in getting their armament together, tidings of the coming invasion were from time to time brought to Syracuse: but they were received for the most part with a stubborn incredulity against which Hermokrates in vain raised his voice. Ten years before at the synod of Gela he had striven earnestly to form a confederacy of all the Sicilian Greeks, whether Dorians or Ionians, avowedly as a check on the boundless aggressiveness of Athens. Now he came forward in the public assembly at Syracuse to tell his countrymen that the danger which he had feared was no longer distant. The Athenians, having taken up the absurd quarrel of the Egestaians and the ruined Leontinoi, were already

<sup>1701</sup> Thuc. vi. 32.

<sup>1702</sup> *Ib.* vi. 43. On the other hand, the apparent size of the fleet was greatly increased by the large number of trading ships which accompanied it in hopes of gain. *Ib.* vi. 44. The thirty transports which carried the bakers needed for the force conveyed also a body of skilled masons and carpenters with all the tools needed for the exercise of their craft. The sum total of the forces finally engaged at Syracuse was vastly increased by subsequent reinforcements. The composition of this great army is given by Thucydides in the thrilling chapters which relate the final catastrophe.

on the way upon their errand of conquest. There was little time for deliberation; but if there was need of energetic action, there was no cause for fear. The very magnitude of the armament which was brought against them would constrain all the Sikeliots to make common cause with Syracuse, the only possible results being the ignominious retreat of the invaders or their utter ruin. All history taught the same lesson. Schemes for distant conquest were rarely successful, and the brightest page in Athenian annals was the humiliation of Xerxes and the destruction of Mardonios with forces vastly larger than any which Athens could bring against Sicily. Nothing more, then, was needed than timely caution. The Syracusans must not only be ready for the struggle themselves: they must rouse all the Hellenes of Sicily and Italy to common action in a time of common jeopardy. They must ask the aid even of Carthage, which, in spite of her wealth and her maritime enterprise, still dreaded the naval power and restless ambition of Athens,<sup>1703</sup> and must further insist on the invasion of Attica by the armies of Sparta and Corinth. Nay, were it not for their habitual inactivity or sluggishness, he would urge upon them the adoption of more vigorous and decisive measures. If they were of his mind, provisions for two months would be placed on every Syracusan trireme, and the Athenians should learn that they must fight on the shores of Italy, before they could make their way to those of Sicily. In his judgement the mere knowledge that they must face their enemies at Taras or off the Iapygian promontory would so damp their ardour that little energy would be left for the prosecution of the enterprise, while it would probably determine Nikias, whose dislike of the scheme was no secret, to abandon it altogether.

The position of Hermokrates as an oligarchical leader

<sup>1703</sup> This proposal is ascribed to him by Thucydides, vi. 34. The substantial accuracy of his report is not impugned, even if this portion of it be called into question. If it be taken as a fact, it betrays the same determined centrifugal tendency which led the Spartans to court the alliance, it might almost be said, the patronage, of the Persian despot in order by his aid to destroy the empire of Athens. Hermokrates was at the least short-sighted if he thought that there could be any permanent friendship between the Carthaginians and the Sicilian Greeks. The ruin of the Athenian armament in Sicily was followed by a vehement outburst of Carthaginian hatred against the Sikeliots. We cannot be far wrong in supposing that the one event was the cause of the other; but it is hard to think that with so vast a fleet as that which a few years later they sent to Sicily the Carthaginians would so greatly have dreaded the Athenian naval force, or even have feared it at all. See, further, Arnold, *History of Rome*, i. 459.

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Athena-  
goras to  
Hermo-  
krates.

could scarcely fail to impart a political complexion to his censures on the character of the Syracusan people. At least it might be turned to a political account by speakers belonging to a different school. The arguments urged by Nikias against the whole scheme from first to last and under any conditions were so strong and at the same time so obvious that we need feel no surprise if they suggested themselves to the Syracusan Athenagoras. We lack indeed sufficient evidence to assert positively that he employed these arguments as reasons for discrediting the reality of an expedition for the prevention of which they had been urged by Nikias; but if we give him credit for the speech ascribed to him by Thucydides, his emphatic assertions that the Athenians, noted as they were for sobriety of judgement, would never be frantic enough to leave a war unfinished in Chalkidike in order to undertake a war on a huger scale in Sicily attest the strength of the madness which had been growing in the Athenian people ever since they deviated from the policy of Perikles. If the future might be inferred from what a people, on a review of their past history, might be expected to do, Athenagoras would have been fully justified in representing the Athenians as congratulating themselves on having escaped invasion by the Syracusans rather than as themselves contemplating an invasion of Sicily. Looking at the matter thus, he could treat their coming as a bare possibility, very much to be desired, indeed, because their coming could lead only to their complete destruction; but until he had for the fact of their approach evidence which he believed not to be forthcoming, he must regard these reports as the malicious fabrications of men who for their own oligarchical purposes were bent on keeping the city in a state of continual ferment. These traitorous citizens allowed her no rest, hoping that the excitement of the public mind might be used as a means for securing to themselves a degree of power which would enable them to subvert the constitution. The persons, therefore, to be punished were not the Athenians whom they would never see, but the orators who for their own selfish ends sought to scare them with imaginary terrors, and to shut their eyes to more real perils at home,

The harangue of Athenagoras would have been followed, we cannot doubt, by an angry controversy, had not the Strategoi or generals interposed their authority. Rising up at once, one of them insisted that these personal arguments and retorts must come to an end, and that as they were responsible for the safety of the city, so they would take the measures most likely to insure it.<sup>1704</sup> But, if the debate was thus carried on and thus ended, it tends to upset many notions which have almost assumed the character of settled axioms in politics. Democracies are pretty widely credited with turbulence and warlike impetuosity, and democratic leaders are supposed to have a special interest in fanning the flame. The history of Athens and of Syracuse lends no countenance to these ideas. Athenagoras in the one state answers to Kleon in the other. But if Kleon, the so-called bully and braggart, sought to maintain the struggle at Pylos and Amphipolis, he had opposed himself to the war when Perikles was insisting that the struggle was inevitable; and, earlier still, the aristocratic or oligarchical Kimon had done his best to prolong the war with Persia, while Perikles, the champion of the demos, set his face steadily against it. Here also, at Syracuse, the war policy comes from the oligarchic leader, while the demagogue is a strenuous advocate for peace, on the ground that his opponents seek to stir up strife in the hope of ultimately putting the people down. These seeming inconsistencies prove only the danger of generalisations not founded on a sufficient basis of fact. They tell us little positively about the nature of either form of government; but they show that the same opinions and the same conduct may be expected, from members whether of the one or of the other, from causes which are rarely known to us fully and which sometimes we may be wholly unable to ascertain. But if here we are dealing with doubtful points, we reach surer ground when we come to the proposal of the oligarchic Hermokrates for an alliance with the barbarians of Carthage. Whether the fact imply praise or blame, it still remains a fact that a far larger amount of toleration marks the foreign policy of Hellenic democracy than of

<sup>1704</sup> Thuc. vi. 35-41.

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Hellenic oligarchical governments. In no case did democratic Athens interfere with the constitutional forms to which the people of any place were found to be attached; and in no case did the grievances of her allies or subjects, slight or imaginary as in most instances they were, include any annoyances on this score. With Sparta, whatever Brasidas might say to the contrary, such interference was incessant. In short, if Sparta may be taken as a fair sample of oligarchical polity, it follows that, wherever the oligarchic influence prevailed, it would foster the Greek centrifugal spirit in its most extravagant form; it would tend to keep the several Greek cities in absolute isolation; it would render impossible that common action founded on common interests which distinguishes a nation from a mere aggregate of clans. The only determined resistance to Persian aggression comes from the democratic leaders of Athens; and no sooner has Corinth stirred up the strife between the two leading states of Greece, than Sparta seeks to bring upon Ionian Hellas the arms of the Persian king, as Hermokrates at Syracuse urges his countrymen to seek the alliance of an African city which was and which remained their natural enemy. So far as the theory of autonomy universally accepted by the Greeks rendered it possible for her to do so, Athens by her maritime empire welded her subjects into a nation. Sparta undid her work, and the result was that both fell prostrate first before the Makedonian and then before the centralising power of Rome.<sup>1705</sup>

Progress of  
the Athen-  
ian arma-  
ment to the  
straits of  
Messene.

While with the Syracusans the coming of the enemy was a matter of doubt and controversy, the tidings, no longer questionable, were received that the Athenian armament had already reached Rhegion. At Korkyra, in order to avoid difficulties in procuring supplies of food and water, the fleet had been divided into three portions, one being intrusted to each of the three commanders. These divisions followed at fixed intervals the three ships which had been sent to

<sup>1705</sup> How far the speech of Athenagoras may be historical in its details, we cannot say with certainty; but as a description of the working of oligarchical factions, it has a high historical value. If the facts were as he is said to have stated them, Syracuse was incurring precisely the same danger which Argos had to face when she set up, or allowed the setting up of, the regiment of One Thousand. See page 304.

ascertain the intentions of the Italian and Sicilian cities.<sup>1706</sup> The bright hopes with which they started were damped almost at the outset. Nowhere would the people of the towns which they passed allow them more than mooring ground and liberty of watering; and even this boon was refused to them by the Tarantines and the Lokrians. The friendliness of the men of Rhegion in former days and their kinship with the Leontines led them to expect a more genial welcome at that city; but the Rhegines insisted on maintaining a strict neutrality until they should learn the wishes of their fellow-Italians. The Syracusans had now been awakened to a full sense of their danger; and were strengthening their outposts with strong garrisons, when the ships, sent forward by the Athenian commanders before the fleet, returned with the news that the pretended wealth of Eggesta was a mere cheat, and that the whole contents of its treasury amounted to no more than the modest sum of thirty talents.<sup>1707</sup> To Nikias this was no disappointment; but the rude shock to his bright dreams greatly depressed and disconcerted Alkibiades. The commissioners who, whether bribed or not, had by their first report excited and fed these brilliant hopes had now to undergo no gentle censure; but the generals had to face the graver duty of determining the course to be taken under the circumstances. The mind of Nikias was soon made up. He had been sent to bring to an end the quarrel between Eggesta and Selinous, and further to see whether the restoration of Leontinoi were possible, and whether anything more might be done to promote the interests of Athens generally. He proposed to act according to the letter of these instructions, and having displayed the power of Athens before the cities on the coasts of Sicily, to return home unless any fresh events should open the way for further operations. Counsel so tame and prudent as this could have no attractions for Alkibiades, who contended that envoys should at once be sent to all the Sikeliot cities in the hope of detaching them from Syracuse, and to the Sikel tribes in the hope of securing their alliance for Athens, and that if these things could be done they should then attack Selinous and Syracuse, unless the

<sup>1706</sup> Thuc. vi. 42.<sup>1707</sup> Ib. vi. 46.

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former would agree to a reconciliation with Egesta and the latter to the restoration of Leontinoi. With a sharpness and precision equal to that of Nikias Lamachos urged the view of the mere general as distinguished from the statesman. Not a moment in his opinion was to be lost, while the impression made on the mind of the Sicilians by the sudden arrival of the Athenian fleet was still fresh. Either complete victory or an important success would follow an immediate attack on Syracuse. The inhabitants of that city were as yet quite unprepared for the struggle: many were still on their farms in the country; and while the process of removal into the town was being carried on, the Athenians would have a chance of securing many prisoners and much booty. Yet more a decisive advantage gained over the Syracusans would be followed by a proportionate depression of the adverse Sikeliotes who would thus in their own interests be tempted to make their peace with Athens or even to become her active allies. Lastly, the deserted city of Megara, distant scarcely more than a day's march, should be occupied as a naval station during the blockade of Syracuse.

Plans of  
the Athen-  
ian com-  
manders.

Of these three plans that of Nikias was the best from the statesman's point of view. From that of the general the counsel of Lamachos was both bold and able: that of Alkibiades was utterly unworthy both of the soldier or the statesman. Looking to the political interests of Athens, we can scarcely imagine a more prudent and business-like course than that of Nikias; and the result would have been a return home, if not after brilliant success, yet without disgrace, and without that exasperation of feeling both in central and Sporadic Hellas which would have followed the triumphant execution of the plan of Lamachos. But that of Alkibiades was a trimming and vacillating compromise which boded no good issue to the campaign, and showed him to be as deficient in true military genius as he was prominent for the audacity and arrogance of his demeanour. Unhappily it was the plan which the adhesion of Lamachos made it necessary to adopt. This brave and gifted military leader was a poor man to whom neither birth nor culture gave an adventitious importance; and when he found himself in a minority, he

naturally felt, as a soldier, that it was better to run the chance of victory with Alkibiades than at once to abandon it with Nikias. It would have been happy for Athens if the two generals who had her welfare sincerely at heart could by arranging their own differences have thwarted the selfish policy of a man who from first to last sought to advance only his own interests. But this was not the first nor the last instance in which political and military views came into conflict, to the ultimate injury of the cause which each was intended to serve.

The first step of Alkibiades after carrying his point against Nikias was to cross over in his trireme to Messênê in the hope of securing its alliance: but here too he was foiled. The Messenians would allow him nothing more than a market beyond the walls of their city. Taking with them only sixty ships, the Athenian generals then sailed to Naxos, where they first found the people well disposed: but the hospitality of the Naxians was followed by a rough reception at Katanê where the Syracusan party was uppermost, and the Athenians were compelled to take up their night station on the banks of the Terias. On the next day the whole fleet, the remaining triremes having joined them from Rhegion, advanced in file to Syracuse. Ten ships sailed into the great harbour, and a proclamation was made inviting the Leontines within the city to join their friends the Athenians who were come to restore them to their homes. Nothing further was accomplished, however, beyond a survey of the fortifications; but on their return to Katanê, although the army was still kept shut out of the city, the generals were allowed an audience before the public assembly. Alkibiades was still speaking, when some Athenians succeeded in effecting an entrance into the town through a postern which had been imperfectly walled up, and made their way to the Agora. The sight of the enemy thus seemingly in possession of the place frightened away the small minority which constituted the Syracusan party. In their absence the men of Katanê passed a decree of alliance with the Athenians and invited the generals to bring thither the portion of the forces which had been left at Rhegion. The news that Kamarina also

Occupation  
of Katanê,  
and alli-  
ance with  
the Katan-  
ians.



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might be expected to join them seemed to disclose for the moment a brighter prospect; but the whole Athenian fleet, passing by Syracuse, doubled the Pachynian promontory, only to find that the Kamarinaians were resolved to abide by the treaty which bound them to admit no more than a single war-ship at a time into their harbour. On their return voyage to Katanê, they committed some ravages on Syracusan territory, and routed a small body of Syracusan horse. The plunder was insignificant; but the evidence to the enemy was complete that the vast force arrayed against them was in the hands of men who were not prepared to act with promptitude, and to whom time would probably be found the most powerful antagonist.

Recall of  
Alkibiades.

At Katanê the Salaminian trireme was awaiting them. This ship had brought a summons to Alkibiades and some others who were named with him, to return at once to Athens and take their trial on the charge of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries. The excitement attending the departure of the fleet had quieted only for a moment the popular feeling which had been sorely wounded by the mutilation of the Hermai and the disclosures, whether true or false, which followed it: and when the splendid armament dispatched for the conquest of Sicily had faded from their sight, they turned with the greater anxiety to the task of appeasing the divine powers which might otherwise mar the enterprise. Promises of immunity and of rewards in money produced the usual crop of informers and the circumstantial stories of these worthless men fed the credulity and the terror of the multitude.<sup>1708</sup> On their bare unsifted charge men of the highest character were thrown into prison, and in order to discover the plots of the existence of which they felt assured they were sorely tempted to repeal the Psephisma which forbade the application of torture to Athenian citizens. But while their alarm grew daily more intense, evidence of the quality which they felt to be indispensable was for some time not forthcoming. The allegations of *Metoikoi* or of slaves might justify the imprisonment even of most respectable men, but it could not set at ease the troubled mind of the people; nor is it too much to say that justice and fair dealing were for the time paralysed. The

<sup>1708</sup> Thuc. vi. 53, 2.

circumstantial story of Diokleides was rewarded with a wreath of honour and a public entertainment in the Prytaneion; the circumstantial story of Andokides whom along with more than forty others he had denounced contradicted his graphic tale, and Diokleides was put to death. At last the Athenians breathed freely. An Athenian citizen had come forward to accuse himself while he laid bare the iniquities of the Hermokopidaï. Of the men thrown into prison on the information of Diokleides those who were not accused by Andokides were discharged with the informer: the rest were put upon their trial, and the language of Thucydides implies that they were convicted on evidence as slender or absurd as that which sent Lord Stafford and his fellow-sufferers to the scaffold. Others who had made their escape before they could be seized were condemned in their absence, and a price was put upon their heads.<sup>1709</sup> But although the punishment of these victims had, as it was supposed, appeased the wrath of Hermes, nothing had been brought out to connect Alkibiades with the plot. Still his enemies were resolved that if he could not be convicted of mutilating statues he should be found guilty of profaning the mysteries. In the accusation laid against him by Thessalos, the son of Kimon, he was charged not with any share in the matter of the Hermai or even in political plots of any kind but simply with mimicking the Eleusinian ceremonies in his own house, and with appearing before his guests, whom he addressed as Eoptai or Mystai, in the garb of the Hierophant, supported by a Dadouchos or Torch-bearer and a Herald. By such acts he would naturally rouse the resentment of these great officers; and the crime even in the eyes of the people at large would necessarily appear one of the deepest dye. But unfortunately the march of a small Spartan force to the isthmus for the purpose of concerting some measures with the Boiotians caused in the public mind a fresh paroxysm of suspicion and terror. In this movement they saw plain evidence of a deep-laid plot on the part of Alkibiades for the subversion of the democracy; and in their agony the whole force of the city slept with their arms in the Temenos of Theseus near the gates which opened on the roads to Eleusis

<sup>1709</sup> Thuc. vi. 60.

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and Corinth. About the same time they received tidings of oligarchical plots in Argos, and without making any attempt to sift the charges brought against the partisans of Alkibiades in that city, they at once delivered to the Argive demos, to be put to death at their will, the hostages which in the preceding year they had placed in islands belonging to their dominion.<sup>1710</sup> The feeling against Alkibiades had now been raised to a height which satisfied his enemies that they might safely insist on his recall; but if they urged the people to send orders for his apprehension, they failed to win their assent to a measure which, it was felt, would alienate or drive away the Mantineian and Argive allies and stir up a dangerous discontent even among the Athenian troops themselves. The commander of the Salaminian trireme received therefore no other charge than to deliver to Alkibiades an order to return home in his own ship along with certain others who were to take their trial along with him. But there can be no doubt that the trireme which carried this summons brought him also information of the efforts which his enemies had made to poison the mind of the people against him and of the success with which these efforts had been rewarded. His resolution was at once taken, and with it the doom of the Athenian demos was sealed. He accompanied the Salaminian trireme as far as Thourioi; but when the ships were to sail onwards from that place, he was nowhere to be seen. All attempts to find him were fruitless. The ships returned to Athens without him, and with the rest who had shared his flight he was sentenced to death.<sup>1711</sup>

Excite-  
ment of the  
Athenian  
people.

So ended one of those miserable episodes in the history of a people which necessarily occur whenever their religious fears are aroused, or their prejudices offended. The disgraceful and humiliating features which society in such times of panic terror never fails to exhibit are peculiar to no one form of government, and the conduct of the Athenian people in this crisis may be contrasted favourably with that of other states whether in ancient or in modern times. The readiness with which they listened to stories of informers is more than matched by the eagerness with which impossible

<sup>1710</sup> Thuc. vi. 61; v. 84, 1.

<sup>1711</sup> See Appendix N.

charges have in times of pestilence been credited in Milan<sup>1712</sup> or in London; but if the Athenians imprisoned many on weak or inadequate evidence, Italians and Englishmen have on grounds weaker still not merely put hundreds to death, but have subjected them first to excruciating tortures. If the Athenians, after listening to the self-accusation of a citizen, were driven to some unjust executions, their conduct was so far justified by the fact that there was a real plot, whatever may have been its nature, and that they saw before them results which could be produced only by a systematic combination. In England innocent men tried by juries guided by chief justice Scroggs were hurried to the gallows or the scaffold as accomplices in a plot which existed only in the brains of the scum and offscouring of mankind. But it is to the credit of the Athenians that they refused to believe the charges which implicated Alkibiades in the plot of the Hermokopidai, and in no way to their discredit that they condemned him to death when he allowed judgement to go against him by default. The fact that all attempts to connect him with the plot signally failed may be fairly taken as proof that he was guilty of the profanation for which he was summoned to take his trial. He may, indeed, have feared and justly feared that in their present temper he might find it hard to escape a capital sentence for the offence which he had committed; but if he had known that nothing more could be proved against him in the one case than in the other, we can scarcely doubt that he would have faced his accusers with a haughty assurance which would have gone far towards securing his acquittal. He felt, however, that he had no such vantage-ground; and if we assume that the mutilators of the Hermai deliberately planned their crime in order to excite against Alkibiades a fever of indignation which they feared that a mere charge of private profanity would fail to rouse, then it must be allowed that political hatred has seldom been carried to greater excess and that its ends have been rarely worked out with a more loathsome ingenuity. But there is no evidence of this direct connexion; and if the Hermokopid plot

<sup>1712</sup> See the remarks of Mr. Grote on Manzoni's *Storia della Colonna Infame*, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 274. See also page 125.

can be accounted for on other grounds, it is unsafe to infer more. If the conspirators knew, as they must have known, that Alkibiades had nothing to do with them, their object must have been simply to arrest an enterprise the abandonment of which would be a deathblow to his ambition. They could scarcely have counted beforehand on the eagerness with which on discovering one act of systematic profanation the Athenians would listen to charges of irreverence or impiety under other forms; but when, although their efforts to stop the fleet failed, the people remained as excited as ever, his opponents then resolved to charge him with an offence which could be proved, and to which recent events had imparted a more malignant aspect. Their manœuvre was successful, and its success involved the ruin of Athens.

Victory of  
the Athenians on the  
shores of  
the Great  
Harbour of  
Syracuse.

The departure of Alkibiades left to Nikias and Lamachos the joint command of the whole expedition; but if the latter still insisted on immediate and decisive operations against Syracuse, he probably hesitated to place himself in open antagonism with a colleague whose influence with the army far exceeded his own. Instead of sailing southwards, the whole fleet steered through the Messenian strait, and then along the northern shores of the island. The generals wished to visit both Eggesta and Selinous,<sup>1713</sup> for the purpose of obtaining money from the former, and bringing about a peace between the two cities. They had hoped to be received at Himera, the only Hellenic town on this coast; but their exclusion here was in some degree compensated by the capture of the Sikanian fortress of Hykkara, which they gave over to the Eggestaians, while the captives taken in the place brought to them the sum of 120 talents, in addition to the thirty obtained from the inexhaustible treasury of Eggesta. From Hykkara the army returned through the Sikel country to Katanê, while one-half of the fleet made an ineffectual attack on the Geleatic Hybla. So ended the summer, the bright hopes with which they left Peiræus still remaining dreams for the future which were rapidly vanishing away. To the Syracusans on the other hand the indecision of the Athenians, their ill-success in gaining

<sup>1713</sup> We have no reason for supposing that they went on to this latter city.

allies in Sicily, and the failure of their attack on Hybla changed the first feelings of awe and depression into one of positive contempt, and Syracusan horsemen riding up to the Athenian lines asked them if they were come as new colonists to Sicily or for the purpose of restoring the city of Leontinoi. This insult suggested to Nikias a plan for effecting a landing near Syracuse without the danger of a battle. The Athenians had no cavalry, and an attempt to force their way by land in the face of the horsemen of Syracuse might end in an ominous failure at the beginning of their task. A Katanaian on whom Nikias could thoroughly depend was therefore sent to Syracuse. Availing himself of his own previous reputation and that of the Syracusan partisans in Katanê whose names he mentioned, this man told them how easily the Athenian army might be destroyed. If a day were definitely fixed for the attempt, the Katanaians would shut up in their town those Athenians who were in the habit of sleeping within the walls, and would also set fire to the Athenian fleet, while the Syracusans, attacking the Athenian lines, would carry everything before them. The Syracusans caught eagerly at the bait, and their whole force of cavalry and infantry was dispatched at the time agreed upon to Katanê, only to find a deserted camp and to suspect that their presence was needed most of all at home. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet had sailed round the island of Ortygia into the great harbour, and had landed the troops at leisure on its western shore near the inlet known as the bay of Daskon. Here they were protected from the attacks of cavalry by many walls and dwellings as well as by the broken character of the ground, which was in part precipitous and in part marshy. The bridge across the Anapos near the temple of the Olympian Zeus was immediately broken; the trees felled in the neighbourhood supplied a strong palisade for the ships, while a fort of wood and stone was hastily run up on the shore of the bay of Daskon. To all these operations no opposition was offered by the Syracusans within the city: but the army on its return from Katanê showed its unabated confidence by at once offering the Athenians battle. For

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that day it was declined; but on the following morning Nikias placed the Argives and Mantineians on the right wing, and the other allies on the left, while the Athenians occupied the ground in the midst. All these, constituting one-half of the whole force, were drawn up eight deep:<sup>1714</sup> the other half, ranged in a square also eight deep, protected the baggage, and formed a reserve which might give aid in the battle where it might most be needed. The Syracusans, with a force of cavalry amounting to 1,200 on their right wing, were drawn up sixteen deep for the same reason which determined the arrangement of the Boiotian army in the battle of Delion. The short address which Nikias made to his men before the engagement contains, if it be accepted as historical, a humiliating confession of the evil effects produced by his own hesitating strategy; and the Syracusans are now represented as men needing a severe lesson from enemies whom they despise, while the Athenians are spurred on by the sense not of their own intrinsic superiority but of the difficulties of their position which courage alone would enable them to surmount.<sup>1715</sup> The previous indecision of Nikias had led the Syracusans to think that they might choose their own time for the attack. In this they were mistaken. Nikias had no sooner ended his speech than he ordered a sudden and rapid charge, and the Athenian hoplites were on the enemy almost before the latter could seize their arms. But in spite of this surprise the struggle was obstinate, and the result might have been indecisive but for a heavy storm of rain and thunder which discouraged the Syracusans, while the Athenians, not having as yet anything to dismay them, ascribed the incident to the season of the year.<sup>1716</sup> Thus dismayed, their infantry fled; but the Syracusan horse so effectually protected their retreat that the Athenians were soon compelled to give up the task of pursuing them. Two hundred and fifty had been slain on the side of the Syracusans: the Athenians and their allies had

<sup>1714</sup> See page 236; also Dr. Arnold's note on *Thuc.* iv. 93, 4.

<sup>1715</sup> *Thuc.* vi. 68.

<sup>1716</sup> We shall see that the Athenian army might have been saved even after the failure of the siege of Syracuse, if Nikias and his troops could have regarded an eclipse of the moon with equal calmness.

lost fifty. The results of the battle were confined, it would seem, to the erection of a trophy. A large treasure lay in the Olympieion; but the Athenians made no attempt to take it, and the Syracusans threw a strong garrison into the Temenos.<sup>1717</sup> A decisive defeat might have led Nikias at once to give up the enterprise, to the unspeakable benefit of Athens; his insignificant success furnished him with an excuse for spending the winter in comparative idleness and for sending to Athens for troops and munitions of war with which, if his former speeches at Athens are to be taken as historical, it was disgraceful not to come fully provided at the first.<sup>1718</sup> Even now, although some three months had passed since their arrival in Sicily, the general prospect was almost as favourable as it had been at the first. Between the great harbour and the bay of Thapsos lay the inner city on Ortygia joined by a bridge to the mainland, and the outer city on Achradina to the north, each with its own encircling walls.<sup>1719</sup> Between the two the little harbour afforded an unwallied landing-place: and there was no reason why the Athenians should not at once have drawn their besieging lines far within the circuit of the wall which, during the winter now beginning, the Syracusans threw up from the shore of the Great Port, taking in the precincts of

<sup>1717</sup> Thuc. vi. 71, 1. Diodoros, xiii. 6, and Pausanias, x. 28, 3, both say that the Athenians were masters of the temple, the latter adding that Nikias would not disturb the priest in the guardianship of its treasures. Plutarch, *Nik.* 16, improves upon this by saying that he would not even allow the Temenos to be invaded.

<sup>1718</sup> Thuc. vi. 21, 2.

<sup>1719</sup> On this point there seems to be no room for doubt. Speaking of the commotions which followed the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodoros, xi. 73, speaks of Achradina and the Island (Ortygia) as having each its own separate fortifications. It is true that he considers these as parts of one city; but this looseness of language cannot be taken as weakening his assertion of a fact which is borne out by recent explorations. These explorations show that the landward walls of Achradina, beginning from the steep, although not lofty, cliffs which rendered it practically impregnable for ancient warfare from the sea-side, ran in a southwesterly direction from near the cleft now known by the name of Santa Bonagia at the southern end of the bay of Thapsos (Magnisi) until it reached the broken ground now called the quarries of the Capuchins. Here instead of going on southwards until it reached the Great Harbour, it turned sharply to the east, until it again joined the eastern cliffs which defended Achradina on the sea-side. The space thus left open between the walls of Achradina or the Outer City and those of the Inner City on Ortygia, was certainly used as a burying-place (it is now full of tombs), and may have been also used for the religious ceremonies which constituted so important a feature in Hellenic life. The new wall erected by the Syracusans during the fatal inaction of Nikias first inclosed the Inner and Outer city within a single line of fortification. Had this step been taken for the sake of enlarging the ground available for dwellings, offence would have been given to the religious instinct which revolted at the thought of burying the dead within the walls of a city; but the Syracusans could set their consciences at rest by pleading the necessities of war, and by continuing to treat the open ground between the two quarters of the city as if it still lay without the walls.



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Apollon Temenites, to the eastern extremity of the ground afterwards occupied by the suburb of Tychê.<sup>1720</sup> But now, as before, the golden hours were wasted. The fleet sailed away to Katanê, and thence to Messênê in the hope that that town would be betrayed to them. Here they had the first practical experience of the hatred of Alkibiades. His countrymen had sentenced him to death: he had sworn that they should feel that he was alive. His first act was to warn the Syracusan party in Messênê of the intended betrayal of the town; and the partisans of the Athenians were put to death. For thirteen days the fleet lingered in vain hope before the place, and then withdrew to winter quarters at Naxos.<sup>1721</sup>

Activity of  
the Syra-  
cusans  
during the  
winter.

The conduct of Hermokrates in Syracuse was as prompt and statesmanlike as that of Nicias was feeble and silly. Taking the true measure of the situation, that sagacious leader told his countrymen that the result was fully as encouraging as he had dared to hope that it might be. Even in battle they had undergone nothing more than an insignificant reverse at the hands of the most experienced troops in Hellas; and better discipline for the future would soon make up for past want of skill. But he told them candidly that they were suffering from the evil of having too many masters. The large number of fifteen Strategoi would do more harm than good: three would amply suffice, if they were invested with adequate powers. His advice was taken, and he himself was appointed to be one of the three with Herakleides and Sikanos as his colleagues. Envoys were sent to Corinth and Sparta to urge the adoption of vigorous measures against Athens. The wall which might have formed the line of Athenian circumvallation was advanced rapidly to the needful height, and if the slopes of Epipolai to the northwest had been garrisoned as well as the deserted town of Megara and

<sup>1720</sup> This suburb was so known from the temple of Tychê, or Fortune, which it contained; but there is little doubt or none that the name Sykê, mentioned by Thucydides, vi. 98, as that of a position seized by the Athenians after occupying Labdalon, is not another form of Tyche. There is no reason for supposing that the Syracusans said Sycha for Tycha; and, had they done so, the fact must have been noticed by historians. Syche is said by Stephanos Byzantinos to have been a place near Syracuse, so called from the fig-trees which grew there. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 559, agrees with Dr. Arnold, *Thucydides*, vi. 98, in placing Sykê on the middle of the southern slope of Epipolai, exactly to the southward of Targetta, a name which along with the neighbouring Targia seems to exhibit traces of the ancient name Trogilos.

<sup>1721</sup> Thuc. vi. 74.

the Olympieion, the great catastrophe of the Athenian army might have been prevented by the impossibility of attempting the siege. Further, all places on which a hostile force might find it easy to land were strongly palisaded by stakes thrust into the sea bottom; and lastly the empty camp of the Athenians at Katanê was burnt and the neighbouring country ravaged.

Still more to counteract the feeble efforts of Nikias, the Syracusans sent envoys to Kamarina the alliance of which place with Laches<sup>1722</sup> had induced the Athenians to make fresh overtures. The envoys of both parties were introduced together before the assembled citizens, and Hermokrates on the part of the Syracusans sought to draw them into a closer friendship or a more hearty co-operation by dwelling on the restless and aggressive temper and habits of the Athenians. The plea of aiding the Eggestaians or of restoring Leontinoi was a mere pretence, and the fall of Syracuse, if that event should occur, would show them in their true colours as wolves ravening after sheep whom they had taken care to keep thoroughly jealous and suspicious of each other. But if that should be the fate of Syracuse, it would have been brought about by the culpable negligence or neutrality of the cities which should have supported her, and their selfish conduct would be followed by a repentance which would come too late. On the other hand, if the Syracusans gained the day, they would know how to recompense the inaction of those who left them to their own resources in the hour of supreme danger. The reply of the Athenian ambassador Euphemos is noteworthy chiefly as inviting the alliance of the Kamarinaians on the very grounds which Nikias in the first debates at Athens had urged as reasons for abandoning the enterprise altogether, and as ascribing the expedition to motives which must have wholly failed to awaken the enthusiasm of the Athenian people. They were not come to effect any permanent settlement in Sicily, or to make the island a part of their empire. They indulged in no such wild dreams. The distance was far too great, the impossibility of maintaining such distant conquests far too obvious,<sup>1723</sup> to justify any fears

Debate at  
Kamarina.

<sup>1722</sup> Thuc. vi. 75.

<sup>1723</sup> Ib. vi. 86, 3.

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on this score, on the part whether of the Syracusans or of their allies. Their objects were twofold. The one they would be glad to attain; the other must at all hazards be achieved. They earnestly hoped to win the friendship of Kamarina and other Sicilian cities; but they could not afford to leave the Dorians of Sicily in a position which would enable them to interfere actively on behalf of the Dorians of Peloponnesos. This plain confession, he urged, was a sufficient answer to all the arguments or assertions of Hermokrates. He was quite ready to meet the Syracusan orator on his own ground. Hermokrates had charged the Athenians with maintaining a system based on mere selfishness and with an habitual defiance of all justice. He would admit the truth of the charge; but the assumption that the Athenians acted only in self-interest would itself show that they had no thought of subjugating the cities of Sicily. They had dealt and were still dealing with their subjects or allies according to the circumstances of each. Some still served in their own ships; others furnished only men and money for the fleets of Athens; others were on terms of perfect equality with the imperial city. But, further, Athens had found herself after the Persian wars in a state of inevitable rivalry with Sparta. If self-defence was permissible for all, what would Hermokrates or the Kamarinaians have wished the Athenians to do? Would they have had them submit themselves to Sparta as to their natural mistress? Such a doctrine no one, not even the Spartans themselves, had ventured to propound; but this humiliation could be avoided only by the establishment of the maritime empire of Athens as a counterpoise to the military preponderance of Sparta.

Neutrality  
of the Ka-  
marinaians.

As we read the speech of Euphemos, we can scarcely help feeling how easily that portion of it which relates to the growth of the Athenian empire might be translated into language thoroughly harmonising with our own notions of national unity and freedom. The Athenian empire was a standing protest against the suicidal policy of isolation on which Sparta for her own selfish purposes found it convenient to act; and the Athenians, whether consciously or unconsciously, felt that the Hellenic theory of autonomy tended

first to keep up a dead level of insignificance and then to leave the feeble units thus produced at the mercy of one great military state. Euphemos would have been speaking the truth, had he said that Athens had been striving to weld the Ionic tribes into a nation; but the Greek language had no word to express the idea, nor could he have dared so far to wound the strongest instincts of the Hellenic, and more especially of the Dorian, mind. But the very truthfulness of this assertion would have laid him open to the retort that on his own showing he was advocating a policy of isolation for the Sicilian cities which he deprecated as mischievous or fatal nearer home. Euphemos might have appealed further to the history of Athens and of Sparta, and challenged his hearers to adduce instances, on the part of Athens, of that violent interference with the constitutions of allied cities, which characterised the conduct of Sparta. But the fact still remained that the Athenians had no reason to fear aggression even from Syracuse, and that therefore the motives alleged by Euphemos for their presence in Sicily were not those which had really brought them. Euphemos could not confess that the expedition was from first to last opposed to the principles which had guided the most illustrious Athenian statesmen, and he could not therefore remove the suspicions with which the Kamarinaians, in spite of their friendly leanings and their habitual distrust of the Syracusans, still regarded the undertaking. Both the envoys were therefore dismissed with courtesy, and Kamarina remained professedly neutral,<sup>1724</sup> when the prompt action recommended by Lamachos might have secured her hearty alliance for Athens. In fact, during this winter, the plan of action, so far as it deserves the name, was that of Nikias; and throughout it showed his incompetence as a general not less than his previous career had shown his incompetence as a statesman. Only in the matter of this expedition had he sought to inforce on the people the policy of Perikles; and this was a mere accidental result of the timidity, not personal but political, which led him to set his face against all energetic enterprise. He had thrown cold water on the enthusiasm of his countrymen when

<sup>1724</sup> Thuc. vi. 88.

Perikles would have striven to kindle it into a fierce flame ; and now, when Alkibiades proposed the expedition to Sicily, he suddenly fell back on the far-sighted policy of that illustrious man. This fact alone should have sufficed to show that for a work which he disapproved Nikias was the most useless of leaders and might be the most mischievous. He was unable to draw a line between the functions of the general and those of the politician. So long as the plan was still a subject for debate, he was more than justified in urging every argument against it ; but so soon as he had accepted a command which a more sensitive morality would have led him steadily to refuse, all political considerations should have been cast to the winds, and he should have hastened to Sicily with the fixed purpose of bringing to an end as soon as possible the work which he had been sent to do. The fate of Athens at this time was indeed hard. Her aggressive instincts led her to put faith in the most profligate and lawless of men : the reverence which she paid to personal incorruptibility seduced her even into the more fatal error of trusting great things to a citizen whose only merit was his respectability. She had still generals who were fairly worthy of being compared with Perikles and Phormion. Of these she sent out one in subordinate command with Nikias and Alkibiades ; the other was dispatched with fresh troops and money, when Nikias had used to little purpose or to none the vast resources which he had declared adequate to the task. Whether success in this expedition would have been better for Athens and better for the world in general, is a question into which we need not enter ; but there can be no doubt that had Demosthenes and Lamachos been sent out at the first, Syracuse would have fallen in the first summer, nay the conquest of all Sicily would in all likelihood have been achieved, while Nikias was frittering away time in seeking to patch up alliances with Sikel tribes who fell away as soon as their chief Archonides was dead<sup>1725</sup>. and in humiliating petitions for aid addressed to the Phenicians of Carthage, from whom he received only a rebuff, or to Tyrrhenian cities which professed a willingness to help him perhaps

<sup>1725</sup> Thuc. vi. 88, 4 ; vii. 1, 4.

because they saw in descents on the Sicilian coasts a means for enriching themselves. He was also, it is true, collecting horses, together with bricks, iron, and other siege instruments; but it is quite possible that these might not have been needed by a more energetic general, and we almost blush for the determined sluggishness which insists on remaining idle in the luxurious temperature of a Sicilian winter when Brasidas could work hard through the frosts and icy winds of the Thrace-ward Chalkidike.

Meanwhile the evil genius of Athens was busily at work elsewhere. From the Thourian territory Alkibiades found his way in a trading vessel to the Eleian port of Kyllene; but probably before he left Italy he had made overtures to the Spartans in which he claimed for himself the power as well as the will of destroying the Athenian empire. He knew, however, that the remembrance of Mantinea would not tell much in his favour at Sparta, and not until he had received a solemn pledge for his safety did he dare to venture thither. But it would seem that he was already there when the Corinthians came with the Syracusan envoys to plead the cause of the Sicilian Dorians and to urge them to an open resumption of the war with Athens. The ephors were contenting themselves with the placid expression of a hope that the Syracusans would not submit to Nikias, when Alkibiades broke in upon the debate with a vehement eagerness for which he felt that some apology was needed. The apology which he offered, if the report of Thucydides be accurate, brands him with an infamy even deeper than that which the deep malignity of his suggestions would deserve. It was made up of a string of lies. No Athenian citizen had ever so systematically defied the law and insulted its officers as himself; no Athenian noble had so excited the wrath and the jealousy of his peers; none had found it more convenient to use democracy as an instrument for maintaining and extending his own power. He had now the effrontery to take credit to himself for an exceptional moderation and sobriety,<sup>1726</sup> for the prudence of his public counsels, for his real love of oligarchy in which he asserted that all well-educated Athen-

Traitorous  
schemes of  
Alkibiades.

<sup>1726</sup> Thuc. vi. 89, 5.

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ians sympathised and which he had made up his mind to set up in the place of democracy on the first convenient opportunity. Having thus lied about himself, he went on to spin a web of falsehoods about his countrymen. The fatal enterprise in which they were now engaged had been his own special creation; and even in the speech by which he had striven to rouse their lust of conquest and had most succeeded in exciting it he held out to them no higher hope than that victory in Sicily might lead in the end to a supremacy over all Hellas.<sup>1727</sup> But now speaking at Sparta, he said not a word about his own share in the business, while he ascribed to the Athenians a boundless scheme of aggression and conquest which had taken shape in his own brain since he made his escape from the Salaminian trireme at Thourioi. The man who, as general, had deliberately rejected the straightforward and soldier-like plan of Lamachos for a hesitating policy scarcely worthy even of Nikias, could now tell the Spartans that schemes which even he had not ventured to put forth before the Assembly were familiar to the minds of his countrymen generally, that they contemplated not only the reduction of Sicily but the subjugation of the Carthaginian empire and of Carthage itself, and that finally they intended to swamp the Peloponnesos with hordes of Iberians and thus establish their supremacy as lords paramount of Hellas. These schemes would almost certainly be carried out, if Syracuse should be suffered to fall, and even in the field the Syracusans had shown themselves already inferior to their assailants. A Spartan force should be sent out at once to aid them; the presence of a Spartan general to organise their resistance was even more needful; but it was most of all necessary that the Athenians should be crippled at home. The one measure which the Athenians regarded with unmingled dread their enemies, happily for them, had not yet tried. The maintenance of a permanent garrison<sup>1728</sup> within the borders of Attica would weight them with a burden which they would be hardly able to bear; and the Spartans would find in the lower ground between Parnes and Pentelikos a post than which none could

<sup>1727</sup> Thuc. vi. 18, 4. See p. 337 and Appendix O.

<sup>1728</sup> Compare the suggestion put into the mouth of the Corinthians, Thuc. i. 122, 1.

be more convenient. The occupation of Dekeleia would give them the command of the silver mines of Laureion, while it would do to the Athenians mischief more serious than the loss of a few cartloads of precious metal. The calls of incessant military service would not only paralyse the administration of the Athenian law-courts but would deprive the poorer citizens of a revenue which had become to them almost a necessity of life. Still more, it would break the spell of Athenian authority over their allies who would see that their masters were at length unable to hold their own at home, and would seize the opportunity for sending their tribute-ships away empty.

When we remember that Athens lay exposed to this deadly wound only because the flower and strength of the people had been drafted away on a distant expedition which Alkibiades himself had planned and urged on with frantic passion, we shall feel that, whatever may have been his wrongs, treachery more dastardly and inhuman can scarcely be found in the annals of mankind. But what were his wrongs? His life at Athens had been one of unparalleled license; yet even thus he had been able to repel an accusation for which the evidence of facts was not forthcoming. His recall had nothing to do with the mutilation of the Hermai; he had not even to answer any charge of political conspiracy. But of profaning the religious mysteries he knew himself to be guilty, and, fearing that the personal enmity which his insolence had roused might make the matter go hard with him, he resolved to defy his countrymen by flight. His conduct left them no option but to sentence him either to banishment or to death; and the one penalty would have roused his vengeance not less than the other. But so great was the charm of his manner and such were his powers of persuasion that had he chosen, when first charged with complicity in the plots of unknown conspirators, to make a clean breast of it, and, while he asserted his absolute ignorance of those plots, to express his regret for acts of profanity and irreverence which were never designed to be more than a private jest and which ought not therefore to be regarded as an offence against the Athenian people or the public gods.

Mission of  
Gylippos to  
Sicily.  
414 B.C.



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the minor transgression would in all likelihood have been condoned, and, promising greater care for the time to come, Alkibiades would have departed for Sicily free from all accusations and from all suspicion. But it is scarcely credible that he could now at Sparta justify the astounding malignity of his treachery by a doctrine which his hearers could not fail to regard as a weapon capable at any time of being turned against themselves. Thucydides was in exile, and he may possibly have heard the speech himself; but as he does not claim for it any special<sup>1729</sup> accuracy, we may fairly infer that he explained his present zeal on the Spartan side by professing a conscientious attachment to oligarchical government. The assertion that no man was bound to look upon a state as his country any longer than he received from that state the treatment which he looked on as his due<sup>1730</sup> could be tolerated nowhere, and least of all perhaps by the state which had cut short the sensual and licentious career of Pausanias.<sup>1731</sup> But he may easily have clothed in more seemly form the sentiment which the report of the historian exhibits in all its naked ugliness. For the present his work was done. The slow current of Spartan blood was quickened by the stimulus of his fiery rhetoric. It was decreed that a Spartan army should seize on Dekeleia, and that Gylippos should at once be sent to take the command at Syracuse. This general was the son of Kleandridas who had been condemned to death thirty years before as a sharer in the corruption of Pleistoanax,<sup>1732</sup> and had probably fled with his father to Thourioi. His sojourn in Italy gave him a knowledge of the country which probably recommended him for this mission. The choice was fully justified by the event. Gylippos at once requested the Corinthians to send two ships to convey him from the Messenian port of Asinê, and to make ready the rest of their fleet with the utmost speed.<sup>1733</sup> While the enemies of Athens were thus stirred

<sup>1729</sup> See note 1300.<sup>1730</sup> Thuc. vi. 92.<sup>1731</sup> Isokrates, *de Bigis*, 5, makes the son of Alkibiades claim indulgence for his father on the ground that the leaders of the Demos, when acting against the Thirty Tyrants, ravaged Attica and carried on war against them. The Athenian people could scarcely be cheated by this absurd confusion between civil war and the action of an individual citizen, the pardoning of which would justify any form of treachery or brigandage.<sup>1732</sup> Thuc. i. 114, 4. Diodoros, xiii. 106, calls his father Klearchos. Plut. *Perikl.* 22, *Nik.* 28.<sup>1733</sup> Thuc. vi. 93.

to more vigorous action in the Peloponnesos, the trireme dispatched by Nikias for more troops and more money reached Athens. Both were granted without a word to express the disappointment which the Athenians must have felt, and the strength of the state was more dangerously committed to an expedition which it would have been infinitely better if they had from the outset starved.

From the level land adjoining Achradina the ground to the west of Syracuse rises by an ascent almost imperceptible except where it is broken by four slopes or ledges of rock, narrowing gradually to the northwest until it reaches an apex at the point now known as the Belvedere, which marks the site of the Euryelos of Thucydides. The northern and southern sides of this triangle break off into precipitous cliffs seldom exceeding twenty or twenty-five feet in height, leaving access only through the gaps which occur in them to the table-land of Epipolai.<sup>1734</sup> To this rising ground with the higher table-land behind it the new wall built by the Syracusans inclosing the ground to the east of the temple of Apollon Temenites<sup>1735</sup> had given a sudden and great importance. From the table-land of Epipolai the inner and the outer city was seen stretched out on the level ground at the foot of the long and gentle slope which began from Euryelos. The possession of this slope by the Syracusans must in all likelihood have led the Athenians to abandon a task which would thus have become impracticable; its occupation by the Athenians would give them the command of all the ground as far as the Syracusan wall, the capture of which would at once enable them to cut off Achradina from Ortygia and to blockade the outer and the inner city separately both by land and sea. This discovery may have been made simul-

Surprise of  
Epipolai by  
the Athenians.

<sup>1734</sup> These ways of approaching Epipolai are the *προσβάσεις* of Thucydides, vi. 96, 1. There may have been some paths to the summit on the northern side from the Thapsian plain: but the chief approach was by the road which ran to the apex by the gap in the ridge under Euryelos, separating the line of Epipolai from the low range of the Hyblaian hills. See the note of Dr. Arnold *ad loc.*

The four breaks in the slope of this triangle towards the city are marked, the first by the ground about the theatre, the second at the spot known as the Latoniæ or stone quarries, the third by Mongibellisi which may be taken roughly as the site of Labdalon, the fourth being the conical rock of the Belvedere itself. See the Memoir on the Map of Syracuse in the Appendix to Arnold *Thuc.* vol. iv.

<sup>1735</sup> We have no means of determining how far up the slope this wall was carried: but in proportion to its distance from the city the importance of the higher land which commanded it would be increased.

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taneously by the Syracusans and the Athenians, but to their ultimate ruin the latter were the first to take advantage of it. In a review of their whole force on the low ground bordered by the river Anapos the Syracusans had told off 600 picked hoplites under an Andrian exile named Diomilos for the special purpose of occupying and holding the range of Epipolai; but for whatever reason the order was not at once carried out. In the meanwhile the whole Athenian army had landed unnoticed at a spot facing a hill or rock known as the Lion,<sup>1736</sup> while the fleet was drawn up on the peninsula of Thapsos which was strongly palisaded on the land side. No sooner had the troops disembarked than they advanced at a run on the road leading to Euryelos, and they were already in possession of the summit before Diomilos and his hoplites caught sight of them and began to move from the plain of the Anapos.<sup>1737</sup> These had nearly three miles of uphill ground to get over before they could even reach the enemy, and they arrived out of breath and in a disorder which left them no chance of success. Diomilos was killed with one-half of his band: the rest retreated to the city. The Athenians on the next day advanced to the Syracusan wall, and offered battle which the Syracusans declined. Their next step was to build a fort on Labdalon.<sup>1738</sup> This was followed by the erection of another work with a rapidity which astonished and alarmed their enemies. Hard by the spot known as the Sychê the Athenian generals ordered the construction of a strongly fortified inclosure, whether circular<sup>1739</sup> or quadrangular, which might serve as a stronghold for the army and as a centre and starting-point for

<sup>1736</sup> Thucydides merely says that Leon was distant about three-fourths of a mile from Epipolai; but he does not say that it was on the sea-shore or how far it was from the sea. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 558, thinks that it was probably somewhere to the north of the peninsula of Thapsos.

<sup>1737</sup> From the words of Thucydides, vi. 98, 2, it seems that the Syracusans had a review of their forces on two successive days.

<sup>1738</sup> See note 1719.

<sup>1739</sup> Thucydides, vi. 98, calls it simply the Circle, κύκλος; and as he speaks of it as finished, there can be no doubt that the word does not mean the whole circuit of the intended Athenian circumvallation which was never finished. See the note of Dr. Arnold *ad loc.*, and the remarks of Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 559. The expression of Thucydides, vii. 2, 4, where he speaks of the completion of the western double wall, and of the unfinished state of the wall between the κύκλος and Trogilos, is strange. What he manifestly means is that the materials were provided and laid for the rest of the wall to the northeast of the κύκλος, but were only in part used. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 341, 584, thinks that the words may be so construed; but it is unfortunate that the historian should put his interpreters to such shifts. His facts are clear in spite of the darkness of his language.





the blockading walls which were to run thence eastward to Trogiolos and westward to the Great Harbour. So marvellous was the speed with which this fortification was raised that the Syracusans advanced for the purpose of summarily arresting the work. But the horsemen sent from Athens had now been provided with Sicilian horses, and about four hundred more had been got together from Egesta, Naxos, and the friendly Sikel tribes. As the preparations for battle went on, the Syracusan generals, contrasting the lack of discipline and order on their own side with the compact array of the Athenians, determined on retreat. Their cavalry for some time hindered the Athenians in their work, but were presently attacked and beaten. Nicias might profess to see in this victory the earnest of still greater results to be achieved by a force the lack of which he had pleaded as his excuse for his long inaction: but it is one of the difficulties in a narrative of events which the historian himself may to some extent have misconceived, that we do not hear of the Athenian cavalry again, until they are mentioned as undergoing a defeat in the engagement which preceded the final conflict in the great harbour.<sup>1740</sup>

This reverse convinced Hermokrates that the strength of the city must not be hazarded in open fight with the enemy. Starting from some point in their new wall probably not far from Temenites, the Syracusans carried, as rapidly as they could, a strong palisading, behind which they erected a wall, reaching to the cliffs of Epipolai, thus cutting the extended line of the Athenian wall and also depriving the enemy of the power of turning these defences and attacking them in flank. The wood for the stockade was provided by cutting down the olive-trees of the Temenos; and as the Athenian fleet was still at Thapsos, the whole population of the city could be spared for the speedy completion of this intersecting wall. To this work Nicias offered no interruption. The Athenians had enough to do in building their blockading wall on both sides from the circle, so far as their course was clear, and in destroying the aqueduct which supplied the city with water from the springs of Epi-

Destruction of the Syracusan first counter-work.

<sup>1740</sup> Thuc. vii. 51, 2.

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polai. The generals probably preferred to take the chance of surprising the defenders of the intersecting wall to wasting time and force in desultory efforts to hinder its progress; nor had they long to wait for an opportunity. The stockade with its wooden towers and the wall behind it were no sooner finished than the Syracusans retreated within their new line of defence, leaving the troops of one tribe to guard them: and of these some during the heat of the day took refuge in the city, while others went to sleep in their tents and none kept a careful watch. Of such improvidence the Athenian generals quickly took advantage. By their orders 300 picked hoplites with a certain proportion of light-armed troops assailed the intersecting wall, while one-half of the Athenian army was held in readiness to move towards the city, the other half advancing to the stockaded gate which probably opened from the Temenos of Phoibos. The palisade of the intersecting wall was soon taken by the 300 hoplites, and the defenders, abandoning their post, sought refuge within the new city wall. So quickly were they followed by the enemy that many of these forced their way in along with the fugitives but were beaten back with some loss by the Syracusans within. Still the enterprise was thoroughly successful. The intersecting wall was destroyed, and the materials of the palisade were used by the Athenians in their work of circumvallation.<sup>1741</sup>

Destruction of the second Syracusan

The Athenian generals were now resolved that the Syracusans should not have the opportunity of throwing out fresh counterworks running like the last to the cliffs of Epipolai

<sup>1741</sup> Such is in substance the narrative of Thucydides. It involves difficulties for which no adequate explanation seems forthcoming. The Athenian position is clear enough. They could not advance to the southward beyond the intersecting wall of the Syracusans, nor to the northeast of Syracuse beyond the new wall which Thucydides calls the *προτείχισμα*. The only gate which he mentions in this wall is one which must have been somewhat to the east of the point at which the intersecting wall, *ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος*, jutted out from the *προτείχισμα*. One half of the Athenian army could not have been sent to watch or seize a gate which was on the western side of the intersecting wall, and which therefore they could not reach. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 349, holds the stockaded gate watched by half the Athenian army to be the same gate by which the fugitives from the *ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος* entered the *προτείχισμα*. Thucydides does not say so. To reach a gate to the east of their cross wall, they would have had to run in front of it,—in other words, they would have been crushed before they could reach it. We may fairly infer that there were two gates, one on each side of the point from which the cross wall started, and that the fugitives were pursued not by any portion of the army sent to watch the stockaded gate, but by the picked hoplites who had dislodged them from their position. We must also infer the existence of other gates in the *προτείχισμα*, for Thucydides can mean only this wall when he says that half the Athenian army was ordered to move *πρὸς τὴν πόλιν*. They would never have been sent against a blank wall.





**ATHENIAN OPERATIONS**  
before  
**SYRACUSE**

Plate II

Trogilos.

Bay of


Thapsos



**Second Syracusan Counter Work**

- AA Aetradina, Outer City
- BB Ortygia, Inner City
- C Ephyrae
- 1 Kerkiras Central Athenian fortification
- 22 Athenian blockading lines
- 333 Syracusan MACEY (City of the new City Wall)
- 44 Second counterwork of the Syracusans
- 55 Road to Heloros
- 666 River Anaptes

500 1000 1500 2000 2500 yards



and thus defying the enemy to turn them. The cliffs were themselves fortified, and the Athenians thus started with an immense advantage in their further task of carrying their southward wall to the great harbour. But while this work was going on, the Syracusans were busy in preparing a fresh stockade, defended by a deep trench, from the new wall of the city across the low and marshy ground which stretched to the banks of the Anapos; and by the time that the walls on the cliffs were finished, the Athenians found themselves opposed by a fresh obstacle in their progress to the sea. Lamachos determined to make himself master of this counter-work at once. The fleet was ordered to sail round from Thapsos into the great harbour; and an attack on the trench and stockade at daybreak was rewarded by the capture of almost the whole of it. The Athenians had to make their way across the marshy ground by making a sort of causeway with planks and boards: and thus the rest of the counter-work was not taken until later on in the day. The real purpose of Lamachos was now accomplished. The Syracusans had not only been driven from their counter-work, but had been defeated in open battle. Their right wing had fled to the city: the left wing was in retreat for the river, and it would have been to the advantage of the Athenians if these had been allowed to cross and so been cut off from re-entering Syracuse. But at this point the three hundred picked hoplites who had done their task so well at the first counter-work brought about a disaster which carried the whole Athenian army many steps nearer to its ruin. Hurrying towards the bridge in order to cut off the fugitives, they were attacked by a body of Syracusan horse and thrown back on the Athenian right wing in such disorder as to disturb the ranks of the tribe<sup>1742</sup> with which they came into contact. Lamachos saw the danger, and hurried to their aid from the left wing with the Argive allies and a small force of archers. In his haste he advanced with a few companions and crossing a trench was for a moment separated from his followers. In an instant he was struck down and killed. Five or six died with him, and their bodies were

<sup>1742</sup> See note 444.

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carried off by the enemy. But the main body of the Athenian army had now come up, and the Syracusans were again compelled to retreat. Meanwhile those of them who had fled from the stockade to the city, encouraged by the repulse of the Three Hundred and the disorder of the Athenian right wing, issued again from the walls; and while they remained in sufficient numbers to retain the enemy on the former battle-ground, a detachment was sent to take the great central fortification from which the Athenian siege walls had started. They had hoped to find it empty, and they succeeded in taking and destroying the redoubt of one thousand feet in length raised for the protection of the builders; but when they advanced beyond it, they found themselves suddenly facing a wall of flame. Nikias was lying sick within the fort, and as soon as he knew that the enemy was approaching, he ordered his attendants to set on fire all the woodwork within their reach. The assailants at once retreated; the day had, indeed, again turned against them. The Athenian army, startled by the sudden outburst of flame round the fortress, was hurrying up from the lower ground; and at the same moment the magnificent Athenian fleet with all its splendid appointments was seen sweeping round into the great harbour which it was destined never to leave. For the present there were no tokens of the coming catastrophe, and the doom of Syracuse seemed to be sealed when the whole army retreated within the city, leaving the Athenians to finish their blockading wall without interruption.<sup>1743</sup>

Prospects  
of the  
Athenians  
and Syra-  
cusans.

Once more Nikias had everything in his favour, and prompt action would have been as certainly followed by success now as when his army first landed near the Olympieion. Some weeks were yet to pass before Gylippos could attempt to enter Syracuse; and the one thing of vital moment was that the city should be completely invested before that attempt should be made. A single wall carried from the great harbour to the central fort and thence to the sea at the northern extremity of Achradina would have amply sufficed for this purpose. But instead of urging on this work with the utmost speed, he wasted time in building the

<sup>1743</sup> Thuc. vii. 101.

southward wall double from the first,<sup>1744</sup> while much of the ground which should have been guarded by the eastward wall was left open. The Syracusans were therefore able still to bring in supplies by the road which passed under the rock of Eurýelos; but even thus their prospects were sufficiently gloomy. The entrance of the enemy's fleet into the great harbour had cut them off from the sea; the failure of their second counterwork made it impossible for them to use the Heloríne road; and there seemed to be no further hope of help from Peloponnesos. They were, in fact, beginning to feel the miseries of a state of siege, and their irritation was vented first upon their generals whom they suspected either of gross neglect of duty or of wilful treachery. Hermokrates and his colleagues were deprived of their command, and Herakleides, Eukles, and Tellias put in their place. Even this measure of success was fully enough to lull Nikias into a feeling of fatal security: and the temptation to abandon himself to an inactivity which a painful internal disease made doubly agreeable was at this time for other reasons yet stronger. From the first a party in Syracuse had been at work to make him master of the city, and later in the siege, when the Athenians had begun to feel that their chances of success were becoming very small, these partisans induced him to linger on when retreat had become a matter of urgent need.<sup>1745</sup> By these men he was now told that the utter dejection of the Syracusans foreboded their almost immediate surrender; and the near prospect of this unconditional submission probably made him turn a deaf ear to the proposals which were actually made to him for a settlement of the quarrel.<sup>1746</sup> But, further, the Athenians seemed to be floating on the full tide of good fortune. They could draw supplies from all parts of Italy: Tyrrhenian ships were hastening to join their fleet, and Sikel tribes which had thus far kept aloof were pressing forward to their aid.

<sup>1744</sup> The plan being perhaps the same as that which Archidamos is said to have adopted at Plataiai. But see Appendix K.

<sup>1745</sup> Thuc. vii. 49 and 86. The language of Thucydides, vii. 55, seems to imply that the Syracusans were saved from conquest owing to their democratic constitution; that a dominant oligarchy would have thrown the gates of the city open to the Athenians; and that the Demos opposed to their policy of surrender a passive resistance which was not easily to be overcome. It is most unlikely that any but oligarchs would be in communication with Nikias.

<sup>1746</sup> Thuc. vi. 103.

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Voyage of  
Gylippos to  
Italy.

Three or four months at least had passed away since the synod at Sparta in which Alkibiades propounded his infamous treachery, before Gylippos found himself able to advance beyond Leukas. Even the fiery eloquence of the lawless Athenian could not stir the Spartans to real energy, and the Corinthians scarcely liked to avow the misgivings which they felt in venturing near to the Athenian fleet in Sicily. The hopes of Gylippos himself had, indeed, been greatly sobered down. Day after day tidings, purposely falsified, reached him, representing the position of the Syracusans as far more desperate than it really was; and from the idea of checking the progress of Athenian conquest in Sicily he turned to the nearer task of counteracting their influence among the Hellenic cities of Italy. At length with two Lakonian ships and two Corinthian vessels commanded by Pythên he crossed over to Taras, and thence went on to Thourioi in the vain hope that the Thourians would be glad to aid him for the sake of his father Kleandridas.<sup>1747</sup> Far from giving him any help, they probably sent to Nikias the information that a Spartan general was making his way to Sicily more in the guise of a pirate or a privateer than as the leader of a force which should command respect. The contempt implied in the phrase soothed the vanity of Nikias who showed his sense of his own superiority by failing to send, until it was too late, so much as a single ship to watch the movements of his enemy and to prevent his landing in Sicily.<sup>1748</sup> Gylippos had already passed through the straits of Messênê on his way to Himera, before the four triremes dispatched by Nikias on learning that Gylippos was already in Lokroi reached Rhegion. At Himera he received ready promises of aid, both in troops and in armour and weapons for the crews of his ships. But probably a fortnight or more had passed before he could venture to undertake an overland march to Syracuse. A few men were to join him from Selinous and Gela, and he had to ascertain the disposition of the Sikel tribes whom the death of Archonides had rendered much less friendly to Athens. But even when Gylippos had set out on his march with a force of nearly 3,000 men, Nikias still remained as uncon-

<sup>1747</sup> See page 372.

<sup>1748</sup> Thuc. vi. 104.

cerned within his lines as though the approach of a general bringing with him the influence of the Spartan name were a thing wholly beneath his notice. He had only to block now the roads by which he had himself seized Epipolai, and Gylippos must have fallen back to devise some other means for succouring Syracuse.

The time demanded indeed all the energy and the caution of which an Athenian army was capable. An assembly had already been summoned in Syracuse to discuss definitely the terms for a pacification when the Corinthian Gongylos in a single ship made his way into the city and told them that the aid of which they had despaired was almost at their doors. All thoughts of submission were at once cast to the winds, and they made ready forthwith to march out with all their forces to bring Gylippos into the town. Nikias was doing all that he could to make his way smooth before him. The materials for the new wall to the east of the central fort were lying for the most part ready for the builders: but the workmen were busy on the few furlongs which still remained unfinished at the end of the southern wall where for the present there was no danger whatever, and Gylippos entered Syracuse almost as a conqueror. The Athenians were at once made to feel that the parts of the actors had been changed. The Spartan general offered them a truce for five days, if they would spend this time in leaving not merely Syracuse but Sicily. The terms were treated with contemptuous silence; but the very fact of their being offered was not less significant than the refusal of Nikias to accept battle when Gylippos led the Syracusans into the open space before his lines. The next day was marked by the loss of the fortress of Labdalon, which seemed to have gone from the mind of Nikias because it was out of his sight, and by the seizure of an Athenian trireme in the harbour.<sup>1749</sup> Event followed event with astonishing speed. A night attack made by Gylippos on a weak part of the southern blockading wall was frustrated by the vigilance of the besiegers, who were now fast taking the place of the besieged; and the Athenian watches were in this portion of their work henceforth dis-

Entry of  
Gylippos  
into Syra-  
cuse.

<sup>1749</sup> Thuc. vii. 3.

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posed with something like effectual care. But these precautions were of little avail or none. On the land side the struggle turned on the possession of the ground between the central fort of the Athenians and the northeastern extremity of Achradina; and Nikias felt that to all intents and purposes this ground was lost already. A third Syracusan counterwork was steadily advancing which would cut the northern blockading wall at a point about 500 yards to the east of the central fort; and the passing of this spot would render the whole work spent on the blockading walls mere labour lost. It seemed to him plain that the contest must be decided in the great harbour, and Nikias resolved, while there was yet time, to fortify the promontory of Plemmyrion which with Ortygia, from which it is one mile distant, formed the entrance to the port. Here he stationed his large transport and merchant vessels with the swiftest of his triremes, while the stores for the army generally were deposited in three forts erected on the cape; and undoubtedly, as commanding the entrance to the bay, the post had great advantages. Convoys could enter the harbour without risk, and the Athenian fleet could intercept any vessels seeking entrance on the enemy's side: but as a set-off to these benefits, Plemmyrion had no water, and the Syracusan horsemen, having full command of the country,<sup>1750</sup> harassed or destroyed the foraging parties which were compelled to seek supplies from long distances. More fatal than all was the admission, implied by this change of position, that the Athenians were rather defending themselves than attacking. Henceforth their seeming victories were to do them no good: their slightest failures or blunders were to do them infinite harm, and the former were indeed few and far between. No attempt had been made to stop Gylippos before he reached the Epizephyrian Lokroi; but twenty triremes were now sent to intercept the approaching Corinthian fleet under Erasinides. In a few days the enemy's ships reached Syracuse without having even come into contact with the Athenian squadron.

<sup>1750</sup> A third portion of their whole force was stationed as a permanent garrison at the Olympieion.






# ATHENIAN OPERATIONS before SYRACUSE


Plate III

Bay of  
Thapsos



*Third Syracusan counterwork & final siege works*

- A Adradina
- B Ortygia
- C Epipolai
- D Penionion
- 1 KUSXOS Central Athenian fort
- 2 Athenian lines completed
- 3 Athenian lines unfinished & the materials used by the Syracusans
- 4.4 Third Syracusan counterwork
- 5.5.5 Syracusan cross wall near Ortygia
- 6 Outer fort built by Gylippus for the defence of Epipolai
- 7.7.7 Forts *τροχιώματα* for the protection of the cross wall
- 8.8.8 Night march of Demosthenes on Epipolai
- 9 Athenian naval station



A faint gleam of hope seemed to light up the prospect for the besiegers, when Gylippos, having led out his army to battle many times without being attacked, determined himself to become the assailant. The ground which he had chosen for the action near the new counterwork was too much cramped and broken up with walls to allow free action to his horsemen and archers; and he was punished by a defeat in which the Corinthian Gongylos was slain. Of this defeat he took the whole blame on himself. He would take care on the next day that they should fight under no such physical disadvantages, and the thought was not to be borne that Dorians from Peloponnesos should be unable to drive out the jumbled crowd of an Ionian army. In this second battle the Syracusan horsemen did their work with fatal success. The Athenian left wing was immediately broken, and the whole army driven back to their lines,—not an attempt being made by their cavalry to avert or to lessen the disaster. Nikias had fought only to hinder the progress of the counterwork which had all but reached his wall. In the night which followed the fight the point of intersection was passed, and all hope of blockading Syracuse except by storming the counter-wall faded finally away. But Nikias still had it in his power to guard the entrances to the slopes of Epipolai; and thus to keep the ground open for the work which the new force to be presently summoned from Athens must inevitably have to do. It would have been better even to abandon the whole line of siege works and concentrate the army on the high ground which overlooked the city, thus maintaining full communication with the interior of the island, and to trust to the effect of main force for dislodging the enemy, so soon as the new army from Athens should arrive. But there was no need to do even thus much. If an adequate detachment had occupied this ground now, Demosthenes would have encountered no opposition until he reached the third Syracusan counterwork. But Nikias again let the opportunity slip: and the crews of the Corinthian fleet which had just reached Syracuse took part in the construction of the further works without which Gylippos saw that the city could not be safe, if an army of sufficient strength should

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occupy the heights under Euryelos. These works consisted of a strong fort,<sup>1751</sup> seemingly not far from Labdalon, which was joined with the third counterwork by a long single wall which, stretching down the slopes, thus formed with the counterwork a continuous, though not a straight, line.<sup>1752</sup> On the north side of this long wall, and therefore out of the reach of the Athenians on the other side, were built three forts to serve as guard posts in the event of an attack on the long wall, as the wall itself being single could furnish shelter only for the few sentries who kept watch along it.<sup>1753</sup> So passed away the precious days, while the idleness of Nikias added to the colossal burden under which even the genius of Demosthenes broke down.

Letter of  
Nikias to  
the Athen-  
ians,

Meanwhile, Gylippos had left Syracuse for the purpose of stirring her allies to greater efforts in her behalf, and of inducing other cities to abandon their neutrality and to join in crushing the invaders. Envoys were also sent to Sparta and to Corinth, to urge the immediate adoption of every measure which might cripple the strength and cut off the resources of Athens. To this unfortunate city a messenger was now bearing a letter in which Nikias professed to give a plain unvarnished report of all that had thus far befallen the fleet and army. It is, to say the least, a marvellous specimen of the ingenuity with which a religious man may deceive himself about the motives and consequences of his own actions. Strict truth would have called upon him to confess the facts that the first three months of his time in Sicily had been absolutely wasted; that the winter which followed had been thrown away in thinking about a work which, if begun at the first, would probably by that time have been brought to a successful issue; that he had by his inaction allowed the Syracusans to build a new city wall,

<sup>1751</sup> This is the *τείχισμα* which was surprised by Demosthenes, Thuc. vii. 43, 3.

<sup>1752</sup> This long wall is the *παρατείχισμα*, Thuc. vii. 42, 4, and 43.

<sup>1753</sup> These three forts, *προτειχίσματα*, Thuc. vii. 43, 4, were occupied by the Syracusans and by their Sikeliot and Peloponnesian allies respectively.

Thucydides speaks of all these fortifications as completed at the time when Demosthenes landed. They had to be erected between the time of the victory of Gylippos and the attacks on Epipolai by the Athenians: and there can be no doubt that Thucydides had these remaining works in his mind when he said of the Corinthians, *ξυντείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἑγκαρσίου τείχους*. vii. 7, 1. The subject of this verb is *αἱ τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες*, but *νῆες* is used in the sense of the crews of ships in iii. 17, 4; and in the present sentence the insertion of a short parenthesis would give Thucydides quite time enough to forget that he had written *νῆες* and not *Κορινθιοί*.

thus rendering necessary an enormous extension of the besieging lines; that he had utterly failed to turn to account the success achieved by Lamachos in the destruction of the second Syracusan counterwork; that he had stirred neither hand nor foot to prevent Gylippos from entering Syracuse, and entering it with a formidable reinforcement; that he had got together the body of cavalry which he considered indispensable to the success of the siege, and that except on the first occasion on which they were employed this cavalry had done nothing at all; that he had allowed a Corinthian fleet to sail into Syracuse, and had made no effort to hinder the construction of the final works and forts of the enemy which rendered the successful prosecution of the siege even by the best appointed army an almost hopeless task; that he had brought with him a fleet of unparalleled efficiency, that he had dispirited the crews partly with inactivity and partly by employing them on fruitless or trivial errands, and that the ships themselves<sup>1754</sup> from being constantly in the water without refitting were fast becoming unseaworthy. But whatever allowances we may be disposed to make for a man in a position calling for the exercise of faculties of which he was destitute, this much at least we cannot fail to see, that in the only two passages in his letter in which Nikias blames anyone he blames not himself but the men under his command and the Athenians who had sent him as their commander.<sup>1755</sup> He can complain of the difficulty of managing his seamen, forgetting the zeal with which they had carried on the work of the siege under the brave and soldierlike Lamachos. He can apologise for uttering unpleasant truths in the ears of a people who cannot endure to have their bright hopes crossed and who impute to their servants the blame of results brought about by circumstances wholly beyond their control. The charge was in his case wholly inapplicable. It would have been well for him, and happy for themselves, had the Athenians long since put him aside as a thoroughly worthless general, and had they

<sup>1754</sup> The ancient triremes were built mostly of unseasoned timber, owing to the ease with which such timber might be bent into the desired shape. Hence the necessity of frequently hauling up the ships, which began to rot by constant immersion in the water.

<sup>1755</sup> Thuc. vii. 14, 2 and 4.

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insisted long ago on some small performance in place of vague and delusive promises. To their misfortune they believed him when he extended the scale of the armament intended for the expedition to Sicily: to their utter ruin they believed him now, and took his letter as a picture not of things as Nikias saw them but of things as they were in themselves. Nikias told them in substance that at first they had been uniformly victorious and that they had finished their besieging walls,<sup>1756</sup> when Gylippos came with an army from Peloponnesos and from some towns in Sicily; but he never told them that common care would have made his entrance impossible. He told them that his first victory over Gylippos had been followed by a defeat caused by the Syracusan horsemen and archers; but he added not a word to explain the lack or absence of cavalry and bowmen on his own side. He told them of the Syracusan counter-walls which had crossed his own, forgetting that he was thus contradicting his previous assertion that his own wall had been finished, and that the success of the Syracusans with this counterwork was his own fault. He told them that not merely the splendid appearance but the usefulness of their ships was wretchedly impaired, forgetting that only through his own resistance to the counsels of Lamachos they had failed to do and to finish their work long ago. He told them that the change in their fortunes had been followed by discontent and some insubordination among the troops and by desertions both among their allies and among their slaves; but he did not tell them whether to this or to what cause they were to ascribe the disappearance or inaction or carelessness of his cavalry. He told them that either the present army must be withdrawn, or another army of equal strength sent to reinforce it, adding the expression of his own wish to be relieved from his command, for which he was now incapacitated by disease of the kidneys. He had always been incapacitated for it; but although for his unconsciousness of this fact he must not perhaps be too severely judged, yet it would be hard to count up the many benefits which, as he

<sup>1756</sup> τὰ τείχη οἰκοδομησάμενον. Thuc. vii. 11, 1. Taken strictly, this assertion was not true.

said, the Athenians had derived from his generalship. In their infatuation they thought that they would derive more still. Whether when this ominous letter was read in the assembly there were any who had the wisdom to see and the courage to denounce the monstrous misconduct of the expedition from the very first, the historian has not told us. If any voices were raised in protest against the popular frenzy, they availed nothing.<sup>1757</sup> The resignation of Nikias was not received, but two of his officers Menandros and Euthydemos were appointed his colleagues, until the new generals Demosthenes and Eurymedon should reach the scene of action. About the time of the winter solstice Eurymedon was dispatched with ten ships and 120 talents of silver, to tell them that the other generals would come with the spring bringing more effectual succour.<sup>1758</sup> Twenty ships were at the same time dispatched to the Peloponnesian coasts to see that no Spartan or Corinthian fleets should depart thence for Sicily.

But troubles greater than any which they had experienced in the earlier years of the war were impending over the Athenians nearer home. The disaster of Sphakteria had convinced the Spartans that they and their allies were under divine displeasure for the way in which they had brought about the war, and they acknowledged that in the crisis which preceded the outbreak of the struggle the Athenians were in the right and themselves wholly in the wrong.<sup>1759</sup> Hence they were especially anxious that the blame of renewing the strife should attach distinctly to the Athenians; and such a manifest breach of the peace seemed to be furnished by the mission of an Athenian fleet which about the time when Gylippos departed for Sicily was sent to aid the Argives. The desultory warfare carried on by the Helots and Messenians from Pylos did not in terms break the com-

Outbreak  
of the so-  
called  
Dekeleian  
war.

<sup>1757</sup> Mr. Grote very earnestly insists that the absurd confidence which the Athenians placed in Nikias sufficiently disproves the charges of fickleness and ingratitude sometimes brought against them. *Hist. Gr.* vii. 391, &c. Unquestionably they were neither fickle nor ungrateful towards Nikias; and the influence which he attained attests the power of the charm which a decorous and respectable life could exercise over the Athenian people. But it is dangerous to draw general conclusions from special instances, and their conduct in the case of Nikias must be contrasted with their behaviour in that of Miltiades. See vol. i. page 446.

<sup>1758</sup> Thuc. vii. 16.

<sup>1759</sup> *Ib.* vii. 18, 2. See also p. 89.

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compact inscribed on the brazen pillars which still stood in Athens and in Sparta: but when Athenian ships landed their crews to ravage the territories of Epidaurus, Limæra, Prasiæ, and other cities,<sup>1760</sup> they held that no room was left for further hesitation;<sup>1761</sup> and they set diligently to work to get together materials for the permanent garrisoning of Dekeleia. Alkibiades was still at Sparta, hatching this wretched treason;<sup>1762</sup> and in the early spring his favourite scheme was carried out by the march of a Spartan army which not only renewed openly a war only nominally interrupted, but seemingly without opposition<sup>1763</sup> built the fortress which gave its name to the ten years' struggle which followed its erection. Once more after an interval of twelve years the fertile farms of Attica were ravaged and dismantled, while from the very walls of their city or from the Eleusinian plain the Athenians could now see in the clear distance the mountain-gap marking the site of the fortress which was to be a thorn in their side until the gates of Athens should be thrown open to admit a Spartan conqueror.

Peloponnesian and Athenian reinforcements for Sicily.

Twenty-five Corinthian ships kept watch over the squadron of twenty Athenian triremes stationed at Naupaktos, while a fleet of merchant vessels set off for Sicily with the Peloponnesian reinforcements for the Syracusans. The greatness of the Athenian navy had sadly gone down since the days of Phormion, who would have disdained to be kept in check by ships not much more numerous than his own while a large force was being dispatched on an errand which might bring grave disaster to Athens. Among the troops so conveyed was a body of 300 Boiotian hoplites who turned the issue of the fight against the Athenians in the fatal night attack of Demosthenes on Epipolai. More than 2,000 heavy-armed soldiers thus left the Peloponnesian shores. The armament taken by Demosthenes was far more imposing, and if it could have been used for any other purpose than that of repairing a series of fatal blunders would doubtless have been far more efficacious. Sixty Athenian triremes and five

<sup>1760</sup> Thuc. vi. 105.

<sup>1761</sup> They chose to forget that their own part of the compact relating to Amphipolis and some other points had never been fulfilled.

<sup>1762</sup> Thuc. vii. 18.

<sup>1763</sup> *Ib.* vii. 19, 1. For the position of Dekeleia see Arnold on Thuc. *ibid.*

from Chios sailed in a state of almost as complete equipment as the splendid fleet now rotting at Plemmyrion, and carried with them almost all that remained of the life and strength of Athens, to intensify the horrors of the sacrifice soon to be offered up on the shores of the great harbour and the banks of the Assinaros.

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While Athens was thus making ready more victims for the slaughter, Gylippos was urging the Syracusans boldly to attack the Athenians on the element which they regarded as their own. The necessities of the Median invasion, he told them, had made Athens for the first time a naval power; the Sikeliots from their insular position had a far longer familiarity with the sea. The astonishment of their enemies at the sudden and unlooked-for attack of their fleet would, he insisted, far more than counterbalance any advantages which the Athenians might derive from their nautical skill and experience. With his usual promptness he arranged that five-and-thirty ships should issue from the great harbour at the moment when five-and-forty from the dock in the lesser harbour should double the islet of Ortygia, the one to attack the Athenian fleet in the harbour, the other to assail the naval station at Plemmyrion, and thus to cover the attack on the forts which was to be made simultaneously by the land-forces of Gylippos. It was a fight to determine which side should command the entrance to the harbour; and with common care the Athenians might have retained it to the great discomfiture of their enemies. Five-and-twenty Athenian triremes advanced hastily from their station at the extremity of the blockading wall to meet the five-and-thirty ships of the enemy; but at first the day went against them, not only here, but also in the battle off Plemmyrion, until the Syracusan fleet becoming disordered from their own success furnished the Athenians with an opportunity for the employment of a tactic in which they were unrivalled. With a loss of three triremes they sunk eleven ships of the enemy, the crews of three being made prisoners, the rest slain. But a victory which might otherwise have at least insured the ultimate safety of the besiegers was rendered worthless by the loss of Plemmyrion. With an imprudence

Naval victory of the Athenians, and capture of Plemmyrion by Gylippos.



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against which it was the business of Nikias to guard, the garrison of the three forts on the cape went down to witness the sea-fight from the shore where they could do no good, leaving a few only of their number to keep watch at their post. On these Gylippos fell with overpowering force. After a short and sharp conflict the first fort was in his hands, and the fugitives found some difficulty in escaping to the merchant and transport vessels, for the Syracusan fleet was thus far victorious. With the other two forts he had even less difficulty: but when these had been taken, the fortune of the day had changed on the sea. It mattered little. The Athenian garrison escaped; but Gylippos was master not only of the entrance to the harbour, but of the Athenian forts and of the vast quantities of corn and money, some belonging to the military chest, some to private merchants, which had been placed there for safety. With these the Athenians lost three triremes which had been drawn up for repairs, and the sails and tackle of not less than forty ships. But worse than this, they saw two of their forts permanently occupied by their enemies, while the Syracusan fleet kept guard off Plemmyrion. Henceforth convoys could be introduced into the harbour only after a fight, and they were made to feel on how slender a thread the very existence of the whole armament was hanging.

Indecisive  
Athenian  
operations  
in the  
great  
harbour.

Blow after blow now fell upon the besieging force. The idea of their maritime supremacy had led the Athenians to think that supplies of money for the army might be safely intrusted to merchant vessels even without a convoy. Eleven ships were thus sent with a vast amount of treasure: almost all of them fell into the hands of the Syracusan cruisers off the coast of Italy. A large quantity of timber for ship-building lay ready for the Athenians in the Kaulonian territory: it was all set on fire by the Syracusans. An Athenian squadron of twenty triremes watched off Megara for the return of the ships which had done them so much harm; it succeeded in intercepting only one of them. Nor were they more fortunate within the great harbour. Much time, money, and toil was spent in the useless effort to pull up or to saw off the stakes which the Syracusans had planted

in the water in front of their old docks; but while they were thus working to no purpose, the Syracusans were maturing their larger scheme for the destruction of the Athenian fleet before any reinforcements should reach them. It was to the misfortune of Athens that this scheme was not wholly successful, for the ruin of the navy of Nikias would have furnished to Demosthenes a sufficient justification for taking off the army and forthwith returning home.

Meanwhile Demosthenes was approaching with his new force from Athens. On his way he had joined a squadron of thirty ships under Charikles who was cruising along the Peloponnesian coast,<sup>1764</sup> and with him he had fortified a post on the Lakonian promontory opposite to the island of Kythera, by which he hoped to annoy the Spartans not less than they had been annoyed by the Helot asylum at Pylos.<sup>1765</sup> From this point Demosthenes sailed on, leaving Charikles to finish the fort and to return home. At the Eleian port of Pheia he found and destroyed a transport ship ready to take the Corinthian contingent for Syracuse; but the destruction of the vessel was all that he achieved. The men who had escaped found another ship and reached their destination.<sup>1766</sup> At Kephallenia and Zakynthos he took in the hoplites furnished by those islands, and thence went to the Akarnanian towns of Alyzia and Anaktorion, there for the last time to gather slingers and javelin men near the scene of the brilliant campaigns which had marked his earlier career.<sup>1767</sup> It was here, where every spot reminded him of happier times, that Eurymedon met him, bringing not merely the disheartening report of what he had himself seen but the tidings which he had received on his voyage of the disastrous loss of Plemmyrion. Hither also came Konon, the commander at Naupaktos, to make a confession which to Phormion would have seemed intolerably humiliating but which was extorted by a stern necessity. The eighteen ships which formed his squadron were unable to cope with the

Voyage of  
Demosthenes to  
Korkyra  
and  
Italy.

<sup>1764</sup> Thuc. vii. 20 and 26.

<sup>1765</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 397, thinks that this post was on the island of Kythera itself. The words of Thucydides, vii. 31, 1, leave no room for this supposition; and it is not easy to see how Helots without ships or boats could desert to an island. When the Athenians occupied the island, page 226, they could keep vessels stationed off the Lakonian coast for the reception of fugitives; but this was now no longer possible.

<sup>1766</sup> Thuc. vii. 31.

<sup>1767</sup> See p. 197 *et seq.*

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Corinthian fleet of twenty-five ships which were manifestly making ready to attack him. Ten ships were detached to reinforce him: and Eurymedon went on to Korkyra, where for the last time he appeared as an Athenian general on the island where he had won a fame less enviable than that of his colleague.<sup>1768</sup> The Korkyraians who, before this weary struggle between Dorian and Ionian began, had drawn dazzling pictures of the invincible power of Athens and Korkyra combined, furnished fifteen triremes and some hoplites for the fleet which now crossed the Ionian gulf to the Iapygian promontory. From the Messapian chief Artas, an old ally, and from the Metapontines they received some troops of javelin men. At Thourioi they found the philo-Athenian party dominant, and a resolution was taken to aid the Athenians with 700 hoplites and 300 light-armed troops.<sup>1769</sup> From Thourioi their intention was to march southwards by land while the fleet advanced along the coast: but on the Krotoniat border they were met by envoys who forbade them to enter their territory. The men were therefore placed on board the ships at the mouth of the river Hylias, and they went onwards touching at all the cities which they passed, except Lokroi, until they reached the Rhegian town of Petra.

Arrival of  
Demos-  
thenes at  
Syracuse.

At Syracuse the attack on the Athenian fleet had been delayed by a disaster which befell some reinforcements of Syracusan allies. These were marching across the territory of Sikel tribes, whose chiefs had been warned by Nikias to do what they could to cut short their journey. Had he taken this step, when he heard that Gylippos was marching from Himera, the issue of the siege might have been different. As it was, eight hundred of these Syracusan allies were slain by Sikels who lay in ambush for them, together with all the envoys but one: but this one, the representative of Corinth, led the remaining 1500 to Syracuse, and the delay thus caused served only to involve the second Athenian army in the ruin which might otherwise have been confined to the first. Of the Sikeliot cities Akragas alone insisted on remaining neutral: the rest felt the need of abandoning the sinking

<sup>1768</sup> See pages 184, 224.

<sup>1769</sup> Thuc. vii. 33 and 35.

ship, and came forward to take active part with the Syracusans. From Gela came five triremes, four hundred javelin men, and two hundred horse, while Kamarina alone sent 500 hoplites and 600 light-armed troops.<sup>1770</sup> In short, the Syracusans were not merely gaining strength by additions to their numbers. They were fast acquiring that power of making the best of circumstances, which had marked the Athenians in their most vigorous days. They were well aware that the fleet of Nikias was miserably out of repair, and that, even if it still retained its original efficiency, it would be formidable only under the conditions which had enabled Phormion to win his splendid victories. The Athenian trireme; made not to crush its enemy by sheer weight but to sink it by dealing a fatal wound in some weak part near the water-line, needed ample sea-room, and in a confined space was practically worthless. Happily for the Syracusans the Athenian fleet was cooped up at one end of the great harbour, and they had no need to fear the manœuvres which had rendered the very name of Phormion terrible. The bulk and awkwardness of the Syracusan ships would tell only in their favour, so long as the Athenians were debarred from using their peculiar tactics; and they had no hesitation in so arming the prows of their triremes and reducing their projection as to render them in fact fatal to the lighter ships which under other conditions had won for Athens her command of the sea.<sup>1771</sup> The entrance to the great harbour was only one mile in width, and after the loss of Plemmyrion the Athenian fleet had been cooped up in that part of the harbour whence their blockading wall ran northward to Epipolai. The Syracusans counted therefore on a certain victory, if an attack were made simultaneously both by sea and by land. Unhappily for the Athenians, their hopes were disappointed. The advance of the Syracusan army against the blockading wall led the Athenians to think that their work for the day would be confined to the land; and the sudden appearance of 80 Syracusan ships advancing

<sup>1770</sup> Thuc. vii. 33.

<sup>1771</sup> A reference to the conditions under which the Athenians had achieved their maritime supremacy will at once account for the disasters which befell them in the great harbour of Syracuse. See p. 82.

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up the harbour at first amazed them. Hastily manning 75 triremes, the Athenians hurried to meet them; but the day was spent in desultory and indecisive movements. On the following day the Syracusans did nothing, and Nikias spent the time in placing his transports before the stockade of his naval station in such wise that any trireme hard pressed by the enemy might retreat through the openings left between them and return to the battle in good order.<sup>1772</sup> The battle which began early on the next day was following much the same course with the last engagement, when the Corinthian Ariston suggested that the Syracusan crews should take their mid-day meal on the shore, and then immediately renew the struggle. Arrangements were accordingly made for this purpose; and the Athenians, seeing their enemies retreat about noon, thought that their work for the day was done. They were soon undeceived. Most of them were still fasting, when the Syracusan fleet was seen again advancing in order of battle. Even thus, in spite of the disorder in which the Athenian ships were manned, neither side had any decisive advantage until the Athenians, wearied out with hunger, determined to bring the matter to an issue, and advanced rapidly against the enemy. The result instantly verified the calculations of the Syracusans. The slender prows of the Athenian triremes were crushed by the heavily-weighted bows of the enemy's ships; their crews were sorely annoyed by the javelin men who shot at them from the decks of the Syracusan ships, and their oars were broken by men who boldly assailed them in small boats, and showered their darts on the rowers through the apertures for the oars. The loss of three Syracusan ships was more than compensated by the sinking of seven Athenian triremes and the disabling of many more;<sup>1773</sup> and the Syracusans were counting on the complete destruction of the fleet and army of Nikias, when seventy-three Athenian triremes,<sup>1774</sup> bringing with them a force of 5,000 hoplites with a proportionate number of light troops,

<sup>1772</sup> Thuc. vii. 38.

<sup>1773</sup> Ib. vii. 41. Diodoros, xiii. 10, says that this action was brought on against the will of all the Athenian commanders. Plutarch, *Nik.* 20, asserts that the opinion of Nikias was overborne by that of Menandros and Euthydemos. The means for verifying the fact are wanting.

<sup>1774</sup> Of these triremes 56 were Athenian, 15 Korkyraian, and 2 Metapontine. See further the note of Arnold, *Thuc.* vii. 42, 1.

swept into the great harbour. The feeling first excited in the minds of the Syracusans was one of consternation. They knew that the Spartans had made up their minds to set at naught the treaty which bore the name of Nikias, and that they had not merely invaded Attica, but were establishing a permanent garrison at Dekeleia; and the appearance of this magnificent fleet seemed to carry with it the evidence of power and resources of which the enemies of Athens had no conception. For a moment the relative position of the antagonists was reversed. The Athenians at once issued from their lines and ravaged the lowlands of the Anapos without any resistance except from the garrison in the Olympieion; but Demosthenes saw at a glance that this must go for nothing unless some decisive advantage could be gained which would fairly justify a continuance of the siege. At present the very name of blockade was an absurd misnomer, unless the Athenians were to be regarded as the blockaded party. The forces of Nikias were in part demoralised, in part worn out by marsh fever caught in the lowlands of the Anapos; nor was it of the least use to prolong operations near the sea unless the position of the Syracusans could be turned on the northern side of Epipolai. If the Syracusan cross wall could be taken, and the guards in the three forts fronting it disarmed or slain, there might be some hope of storming their counter-wall, and so of once more effectually investing Syracuse. But it was soon evident that attacks by day had little chance of success; and with the consent of his colleagues Demosthenes resolved on a night assault.

With the whole disposable force of the camp Demosthenes with Menandros and Euthydemos set out upon a moonlit night on their march to Euryelos. By day the movement would have been at once discovered, and it would have been happier for the Athenians if at the time chosen for their departure the paler light of the moon had at once betrayed their enterprise to the enemy. But Demosthenes felt that everything depended on the work of that night, and his men, in spite of all the sufferings and disasters which had thus far attended the expedition, were full of hope and even of confidence. They were now acting under a general whose sagacity in council

Night attack by the Athenians on the Syracusan cross wall.

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and energy in the field had won him the highest reputation. They were carrying with them everything which might be reasonably expected to insure a successful surprise. Carpenters and masons were ready with their tools both to destroy the enemy's walls and to construct their own. Archers and other light troops went to support the hoplites in their onslaught, and all carried provisions for five days during which they trusted to exchange discouragement and depression for an assurance of final triumph. It wanted about two hours of midnight when Demosthenes, leaving Nikias to command in the camp, marched along that portion of the slope of Epipolai which still remained in the possession of the Athenians:<sup>1775</sup> and not only did he succeed in making his way under Euryelos, but the cross wall itself was taken before any alarm was given. Some of the garrison were slain; but the greater number, feeling that the post was no longer tenable since the enemy was on the northern side, fled in haste and roused the picked body of Six Hundred who had suffered so severely under Diomilos when the Athenians first surprised Epipolai. They were now not less hardly handled by Demosthenes, when they hurried from the forts in front of the cross wall to the recovery of the wall itself; and the Athenian generals, thus far victorious, led on a large proportion of their forces towards the Syracusan counter-wall, while others began the task of demolishing the cross wall. The Syracusans were now fully alarmed; but even Gylippos with all the forces at his command was at first driven back by the determined energy of the Athenian assault. In fact the work of Demosthenes was already done, if he could only maintain his present position; and had he set out two or three hours before dawn instead of two or three hours before midnight, he would in all likelihood have succeeded in doing so. He had turned the Syracusan lines; and the daylight would now be rather to his advantage than to that of the

<sup>1775</sup> The Athenians, beyond doubt, still occupied the fortified *κύκλος* or Circle, and the line of wall which led up to it. Had it been otherwise, they would have had to fight their way along the whole slope of Epipolai; in other words, there could have been no surprise at all. For it is not to be supposed that, if the Athenians had already abandoned these lines and retreated to the plain of the Anapos, the Syracusans would have failed to seize the heights, and thus effectually prevent all chances of attack on their counter-wall or forts.

enemy. But he was himself anxious to push the Syracusans at once as far back as possible; and success had excited in his army a confidence which with Greek troops generally led to a dangerous neglect of discipline. The Athenians in front were already in some disorder when they were thrown into confusion by the sudden charge of heavy Boiotian hoplites, who had been recently brought to Sicily. From this moment the battle became a wild jumble, in which all authority was lost. The light of the moon, which was shining brightly, revealed the general features of the scene, but left it difficult or impossible to distinguish at a distance one body of men from another; and the Athenians, as they were driven back, became separated from the columns which were pressing forward in full confidence that they were still victorious. As the disorder increased, the Athenians were no longer able to see in what direction their movements should be made, and in the uproar the words of command could not be distinguished. In this fearful din they began to regard as enemies every body of men which was seen advancing towards them; and as these bodies were now frequently their own fugitives, the horrors of conflict with their own people were added to the fierce onsets of the Syracusans, while the watchword repeatedly asked for and given became known to the enemy. The discovery was fatal. Small parties of Syracusans, if brought into collision with a larger Athenian force, could now escape as being able to give the password, while Athenians in the like case were at once slaughtered. The presence of Dorians in the Athenian army completed the catastrophe. The war-cry of the Argives, Korkyraians, and other Dorian allies could not be distinguished from the Syracusan pæan; and the Athenians, dismayed already, were hopelessly bewildered by the horrible suspicion that the enemy was in their rear, was among them, was everywhere.<sup>1776</sup> Attacking all who raised the Dorian war-shout, they not unfrequently fell on their friends, nor were they easily convinced of their mistake. The defeat had in fact become utter rout. The one thing for which the Athenians now strove was to reach their lines on the plain of the Anapos;

<sup>1776</sup> Thuc. vii. 45. 7



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but the slopes which led to them were bounded by precipices over which vast numbers were pushed by their pursuers, and either grievously maimed or killed. Even when they had reached the lower level, all danger was not yet surmounted. The new comers belonging to the reinforcements of Demosthenes knew nothing of the ground, and many of them strayed away into the country where they were found on the coming day by the Syracusan horsemen and cut to pieces. The loss to the Athenians was fearful; but the number of the shields which fell into the hands of the enemy was greater even than that of the slain. Many who had safely reached the camp had been compelled to throw down their arms before venturing on the terrible leap over the crags of Epipolai.

Refusal of  
Nikias to  
retreat or  
to allow the  
fleet to  
leave the  
great  
harbour.

The folly or the iniquity of Nikias was now to inflict on Athens a deadlier mischief than any which Alkibiades had striven to do to her. The well-laid enterprise of Demosthenes had failed more disastrously than his attempted march into Boiotia across the Aitolian mountains thirteen years ago; <sup>1777</sup> and to him it was now plain that, do what they would, the siege must be abandoned or end in their utter destruction. Syracuse was wild with excitement; Sikanos was at once dispatched in the hopes of at last enlisting the Akragantines on the winning side; Gylippos went to gather fresh recruits in other parts of Sicily; and while the victory on Epipolai was stirring the Syracusans to a mighty attack on the Athenian camp near the harbour, their enemies, overwhelmed by the long series of their calamities, were being wasted by the marsh fever which becomes most malignant in the autumn, and were possessed by the one absorbing desire to be quit of a task which brought them nothing but deadly and ignominious defeat. In circumstances such as these Demosthenes was a man not likely to hesitate. He owed a duty not to himself only but to Athens, and he discharged it with a manly frankness sullied by no mean or selfish feelings. All that he could do as an assailant had been done: and he was bound to preserve lives on which the very salvation of their country depended. The Spartans were established in permanent garrison on a spot visible from the

walls of Athens: and he was not justified in keeping her best troops in a distant land where they could do no good. For the present the new fleet which he had brought with them made them once more masters of the sea; and it was his business to remove the army while the path was open. The reply of Nikias betrays an imbecillity, an infatuation, or a depravity which has seldom been equalled, perhaps never surpassed; and we have to remember that it is given to us by an historian who reviews his career with singular indulgence and who cherished his memory with affectionate but melancholy veneration. If he might reasonably deprecate the carrying of an open vote for retreat which might become known to the enemy (and on a point like this he knew that he had no opposition to fear from Demosthenes), it is scarcely possible that he could believe himself to be telling the truth when he spoke of the circumstances of the Syracusans as being even more desperate than their own. The party in Syracuse which had been all along in communication with him may still have urged him not to abandon the siege. By these men he may have been informed that the Syracusans had already spent 2,000 talents on the war, that they owed a heavy debt besides, and that it would be beyond their power to maintain the contest much longer;<sup>1778</sup> but it was impossible for him not to see that while the strength of the Athenians was daily becoming less, that of his enemies was enormously increasing. The truth is that, if the report of his speech may be trusted, his resolution was taken on other considerations. The Athenians, he asserted, were a people under the dominion of loud-voiced and bullying demagogues, and of the men who were now crying out under the hardships of the siege the greater number would join eagerly in charging their generals with treachery or corruption, if ever they should again take their seats in the Athenian assembly. Nothing therefore should induce him to consent to a retreat until he received positive orders from Athens commanding his return: death at the hands of the enemy would in every

<sup>1778</sup> Thucydides, vii. 49, 1, speaks of the knowledge which Nikias had of Syracusan affairs as being exact and accurate. It may have been so, so far as the mere financial facts on the Syracusan side are concerned; but Nikias knew well and ought to have remembered that men are not likely to slacken in their efforts when they have reason to think that the enemy's ship is sinking.

way be preferable. In plain English, Nikias was afraid to go home; and he was a coward where Demosthenes, in spite of his failure, was honest, straightforward, and brave. Nay more, he was ungenerous as well as cowardly. He had no right whatever to slander his soldiers who had patiently submitted to his mischievous inaction and had done their duty admirably under Lamachos: least of all was he justified in ascribing an exacting severity to a people whose crying sin it had been to place unbounded confidence in his mere respectability.<sup>1779</sup> His absurd delusion found no favour with Demosthenes who insisted again that the siege ought at once to be given up, but that, if on this point they must wait for a dispatch from Athens, they would be grossly disregarding their duty to their country if they failed to remove their fleet at once either to Katanê or to Naxos. To linger in the great harbour was to court ruin. In that comparatively small basin Athenian triremes were worthless, and all the care, discipline, and skill, which had won for Athens her empire and her glory, absolutely thrown away. At Katanê or Naxos their navy would be quite as much a check on the operations of the Syracusans, while they would be able to command abundant supplies from all parts of Sicily. Above all, there was time now to carry out this change. Soon it might be too late: Even to this wise and generous counsel Nikias opposed a front so firm that his colleague began to think that he had some private grounds for his resolution which time in the end would justify. He had none; and when Gylippos (Sikanos was unsuccessful) returned to Syracuse with reinforcements which might deserve the name even of an army, and with the Peloponnesian hoplites which had found their way to Sicily from the shores of Libya,<sup>1780</sup> he at once saw that any attempt to speak of the resources of Syracuse as failing would be utterly vain, and only requested that the order for retreat should be privately circulated through

<sup>1779</sup> Mr. Grote, commenting on his conduct at this crisis, speaks of Nikias as 'a perfectly brave man.' *Hist. Gr.* vii. 430. I am unable to see what meaning this phrase may bear beyond that of the bravery which will not allow a man to shrink in actual battle. When Mr. Grote says that Nikias was induced to withhold the order for departure because life at Athens had for him no longer either honour or charm, he is ascribing to him a motive which is thoroughly selfish, and in the strictest sense of the word cowardly.

<sup>1780</sup> See Appendix O.

the army, not formally decreed in a council of war.<sup>1781</sup> He is represented as having made the same request, when after the failure of the attack on Epipolai Demosthenes insisted on the abandonment of the enterprise:<sup>1782</sup> but the mere assertion that Nikias expressed this wish furnishes no ground for thinking that his colleagues would have taken any other course, or at least that in this respect they would feel any desire to thwart him. They would probably regard it as a matter of great indifference, well knowing that the secret decision or the open proclamation would soon be known to Hermokrates.

Days and weeks of most precious time had Nikias thus wasted, while Gylippos was gathering his reinforcements in other parts of Sicily. But although all hope of taking Syracuse was gone, the mischief done to Athens was not yet irreparable. In numbers her fleet was still superior to that of the Syracusans; and the Athenian army was still capable of holding its ground against an attacking force, while they either embarked on board the ships or effected their retreat by land. The consent of Nikias, even now reluctantly extorted, had come to Demosthenes as a reprieve for which he had almost ceased to hope; and the preparations for departure were far advanced when an eclipse of the moon, filled Nikias with an agony of religious terror. The fears of the Athenians generally were probably not much less than his own; but we have no reason for thinking that they were bent on any one method of appeasing the divine wrath of which this eclipse was regarded as the sign. We cannot doubt that Demosthenes, had he been in the place of Nikias, would have devised some interpretation of the portent which would soothe the prejudices or superstitions of his countrymen without interfering with the plans necessary to insure their safety.<sup>1783</sup> But to the grovelling devotee one course

The eclipse  
of the  
moon.

<sup>1781</sup> Thuc. vii. 50, 3.

<sup>1782</sup> Ib. vii. 48, 1.

<sup>1783</sup> There were not wanting later interpreters who maintained that Nikias was led astray by the blundering of his professional soothsayers, who put upon the portent the very reverse of its real meaning, inasmuch as for persons wishing to fly from an enemy or to do anything in secret an eclipse was of all signs the most encouraging. But all history goes to show that even the most superstitious interpret according to their present temper and circumstances tokens which they hold to be supernatural. While the Athenians were in the first flush of hope after their arrival in Sicily, they were quite willing to ascribe to purely natural causes the thunderstorm which struck terror into the Syracusans, see p. 362; and the records of every people afford instances of encourage-

only was open. The prophets must be consulted, and their decision scrupulously obeyed. Unhappily his own prophet Stilbides had recently died, and the soothsayers whose opinion was taken declared that the Athenians must remain where they were until thrice nine days should have passed away.<sup>1784</sup> Nikias accordingly insisted that during this period the question of retreat should not even be mooted; but he had sealed the doom of the army and the doom of his country, and long before the seven-and-twenty days were ended this once magnificent armament had been utterly destroyed. Twice, if not thrice, he had deliberately thrown away opportunities which, if properly used, must have led to victory: and now when men abler and more honourable than himself were anxious at this eleventh hour to snatch the victims from the sacrifice, this miserable man, if we may believe Plutarch, calmly put aside his duty as a general and sought refuge and comfort in the round of religious ceremonies which were to avert the anger of heaven and the consequences of his own misdoings.

Defeat of  
the Athenian  
fleet,  
and death  
of Eury-  
medon.

Through Syracuse the tidings flew like fire that the Athenians had resolved to sail away, and that their resolution had been changed by the eclipse. The former decision was a virtual confession both of defeat and hopelessness; the second gave the Syracusans ample time to prepare the net for seizing the prey. They knew the character of Nikias too well to fear that he would move of his own accord before the allotted time had run out. When at length they were ready, the first attack was made by land upon the enemy's lines. A force of Athenian hoplites and horsemen advanced to meet them, but was soon driven back with the loss of seventy horses<sup>1785</sup> and some hoplites. On the following day the

ment derived from signs which might seem to portend disaster. From the fall which cost him a tooth Hippias drew the conclusion that no other part of him would ever receive burial on Attic soil: an accident of much the same kind was interpreted by William the Conqueror as a sure presage that he would become king of England. See vol. i. p. 43. Nikias was now less hopeful than Hippias, and his terrors were in proportion more abject. It was nothing less than the duty of an Athenian general to be ready with favourable interpretations of all signs to which the popular temper would allow a favourable interpretation to be given.

<sup>1784</sup> Diodoros says that the prophets required no more than the usual delay of three days. Plutarch affirms that in insisting on a delay of 27 days Nikias went beyond the demands of the soothsayers. If this story be true, the infatuation of Nikias assumes a blacker character; but we may safely follow Thucydides, and acquit him of this monstrous and criminal extravagance.

<sup>1785</sup> Thuc. vii, 51, 2. Before the first surprise of Epipolai, the Athenians, we are told,

attack on the lines was renewed, while 76 triremes issued from the city and sailed straight to the Athenian naval station. The Athenians hastened to meet them with 86 ships, and learnt that even with superior numbers Athenian science and skill were of no avail under the circumstances in which Nikias had placed them. Forgetting for a while that he was not in the open sea, Eurymedon with a division of eighteen ships made an effort to outflank the enemy. The movement isolated him from the rest of the fleet and brought him dangerously near to the shore. The Athenian centre was already broken, and the Syracusans at once bore down upon Eurymedon. Eighteen ships, driven back upon the land, were taken and all their crews slain; and the life of Eurymedon closed in a massacre more dreadful than that to which he had condemned the oligarchs of Korkyra. The rest of the Athenian fleet narrowly escaped the same fate: but Gylippos, seeing the ships nearing the shore beyond the protection of the naval station, hurried down to the causeway which, running out from the city wall, shut off the sea from the low ground known as the Lysimeleian marsh. His force advanced in some disorder, and the Tyrrhenian allies who kept guard in this quarter of the Athenian lines hastened to engage them. The Syracusans, soon thrown into confusion, were pushed back into the marshy ground behind the causeway, and the arrival of a large Athenian force compelled them to retreat with some little loss. The rules of Greek warfare constrained the Athenians to treat this check as a victory: but they probably felt that the setting up of their trophy was but as the last flash of the sinking sun which gives a more dismal and ghastly hue to the pitch-black storm-clouds around him. They had recovered all their ships except the eighteen belonging to the division of Eurymedon, and had further saved them from the risk of

Thuc. vi. 98, 1, had a force of 650 cavalry. It is not said that they lost any in their first engagement with the Syracusan horsemen, vi. 98, 3. In the night attack on Epipolai by Demosthenes they are not mentioned at all. It might seem therefore that 580 would be left at this time; but we have perhaps to take into account not merely the marsh fever, but the frequent desertions of which Nikias complained in his letter to the Athenians. Thuc. vii. 13. The remnant thus left would be too feeble to produce any effect against the compact masses of the Syracusan cavalry; and in the retreat from Syracuse they are only once mentioned. Thuc. vii. 75, 5. They were probably too much weakened and disorganised to do any effectual service.

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being burnt by a fire-ship which the Syracusans sent in amongst them: but they were well aware that they had undergone a ruinous defeat on the element which they had long regarded as their own. It was true that the massive prows of the Syracusans had done them enormous mischief in the battle which was brought to an end by the entrance of Demosthenes into the great harbour; but they had hoped that the arrival of his seaworthy triremes with their healthy crews would do more than restore the balance, and this hope too had failed them. They were utterly cast down. Superiority of force had done nothing for them, and the generals could hold out no bait which might excite a political reaction in their favour. The demos was supreme in Syracuse as in Athens; and Athens was not the city to which oligarchical factions were prone to look for aid.<sup>1786</sup>

Effects of  
victory on  
the Syra-  
cusans.

For the Syracusans their great naval victory had changed the whole character of the struggle. A little while ago they had been fighting in the mere hope of compelling the enemy to abandon the siege. From this hope they had passed to a desire of so crippling the Athenians as to remove all cause for fearing a renewal of the war in any other part of Sicily. But now their thoughts turned with a feeling of bewildered exultation to the contrast between their present position and the splendour of the Athenian armament when it first approached their shores. Whatever dreams of further conquest may have floated through the brains of adventurers like Alkibiades, they knew that at the least the mission of Nicias was to win for Athens in Italian waters that supremacy which she had now for three generations exercised over the islands of the Egean and the Hellenic cities of Asia Minor. In their view the Athenians had come to enslave Sicily; and the issue of the contest had opened to the Syracusans the prospect of sweeping away her empire. With the intoxication of men who from mountain summits seem to look down on a world beneath them, they abandoned themselves to the conviction that henceforth they must fill a foremost place in the history of

Hellas. The great struggle between the Dorian and Ionian races must be virtually settled on their soil, for it was incredible that after the destruction of her fleet and her army and amid the defection of her allies who would hasten to throw off her yoke Athens would be able to make head against the flood of enemies who would rush to satiate the hatred of generations. But as yesterday they were about to discuss in their public assembly the terms of an agreement with Nikias. Now they held a position even prouder than that which either Sparta or Athens had ever attained; and few things in history are more impressive than the change which passes over the language of Thucydides, as he describes this mighty revolution in the thoughts and aims of the Syracusans. These were now leaders, along with Spartans, Corinthians, Arkadians, and Boiotians, against the relics of the most splendid and efficient armament which had ever left the harbours of Athens or had ever been brought together throughout her wide-spread empire. The epical conception which had led him to ascribe to the Athenians before the massacre at Melos language which utterly belies their general reputation now leads him to enumerate with a solemnity full of pathos the tribes which were to face each other in the last awful struggle. Here, as at Marathon, the Plataians were present in the hope perhaps of avenging themselves on the Boiotian allies of Syracuse, but prompted still more by a devotion to Athens which had never for an instant wavered. Here Aigina was represented not by the descendants of those who had conquered at Salamis but by the Athenian citizens who had been thrust into their place. Here were the ships of her free allies from Chios and Methymna. Here were Rhodians who, perhaps against their will, were to fight against their colonists of Gela, and Korkyraians who were anxious to settle scores with the men of their mother city. Here with the Dorian allies of Athens were Messenians from Pylos and Naupaktos, and Akarnanians who were now to follow to their death the standard of their favourite general. Here also was the crowd of mercenaries some of whom were fighting for pay against their kinsfolk, while others felt something more of enthusiasm for the cause which they had



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taken in hand. On the Syracusan side were enrolled the Kamarinaians for whose friendship Eupheimos and Hermokrates had bidden largely, and the men of Selinous who were to play their part in the closing scenes of the stupendous drama which had grown out of their petty quarrel with the barbarians of Egesta.

Closing of  
the mouth  
of the  
great  
harbour  
by the  
Syracusans.

In the enthusiasm created by their victory the Syracusans resolved that the whole Athenian armament should be destroyed like vermin in a snare: and they proceeded with calm deliberation to set the trap. So clear was the helplessness of the Athenian fleet while it remained pent up in the petty bason which Nikias had chosen for the great tragedy, that without the least misgiving they set to work to convert the bason into a lake. Triremes, trading ships, and vessels of all kinds were anchored lengthwise across the whole mouth of the harbour from Plemmyrion to Ortygia, and strongly lashed together with ropes and chains. This was all that Nikias had gained by fostering silly scruples for which the men to whom Athens owed her greatness would have felt an infinite contempt. The indignation with which Demosthenes had protested against any delay after the failure of his great night attack must have burned still more fiercely when he saw the supreme result of the besotted folly of his colleague. Their very food was running short, for before the eclipse a message had been sent to Katanê to announce the immediate return of the fleet and to countermand all fresh supplies. But regret and censure were now alike vain. No longer insisting on the supreme authority with which the Athenians had invested their generals, Nikias summoned a council of war in which all present admitted the stern necessity of abandoning the whole length of their lines on Epipolai; of retaining just so much of their fortifications as would suffice for the shelter of their sick and the protection of their baggage and of the stores which were fast dwindling away; and finally of staking everything on a gigantic effort to break the barrier which now lay between them and safety. If this effort should fail, the ships were to be burnt and the army was to retreat by land.

A hundred and ten triremes still remained, some scarcely

seaworthy, others still strong and in good trim; and we must not press hardly on Athenian generals' who shrunk at the first from a sacrifice so costly. Yet it can scarcely be doubted that its postponement was an error in judgement, not on the part of Nikias (for he had no judgement to exercise) but of the firm and sagacious Demosthenes. Past experience had taught them the bitter lesson that in encountering the solid prows of the enemy's ships in a cramped space they were setting themselves the task of cutting wood with a razor. The barrier which hemmed them in could be broken, they fully knew, only at a tremendous loss, whereas their lines on Epipolai gave them free access to the country beyond and the power of effecting a deliberate and orderly retreat. The loss of ships, a large proportion of which had now only a nominal value, was as nothing to the ruin of an army which could never be replaced: but it might well seem that over this devoted force an Atê was brooding as awful as that which rested on the house of Agamemnon. A few only of the seven-and-twenty days had passed when Nikias told them that all had been done which could be done to insure success in the struggle which must bring them to their doom, if it failed to furnish some hope of escape. Archers and javelin-men were to aid the hoplites on the decks, and grappling irons were to fall on the enemy's prows and to keep the ships locked in a fatal embrace until the combatants on one side or the other should be swept into the sea. In short, they were charged with a task most distasteful to Athenian instincts; but a hard necessity compelled them to make the fight as much as possible a land-battle on the water. He reminded the countrymen of Phormion, who had shattered fleets as large again as his own, that they still had many more ships than the Syracusans; he warned them that certain destruction awaited them if they allowed themselves to be pushed back on the shore lined with the forces of the enemy; and he besought them to show that in spite of bodily weakness and unparalleled misfortunes Athenian skill could get the better of brute force rendered still more brutal by success. He sought to stir the enthusiasm of the allies by reminding them of the benefits

Preparation for the final conflict in the great harbour.

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which they had reaped from association with the imperial city; to the Athenians he said plainly that they saw before them all the fleet and all the army of Athens. Her docks were empty, her treasury was exhausted, and, if they should now fail, her powers of resistance were gone. A speech more disgraceful to himself and less likely to encourage his men has seldom been uttered by any leader; for Nikias himself was the whole and sole cause of all the shameful facts which he was now compelled to urge as reasons for a last and desperate effort. It was his fault that Syracuse had not been taken a year ago; it was his fault that everything went wrong after the death of Lamachos; it was his fault that Gylippos had entered the beleaguered city; it was his fault that they had not retreated when retreat was first urged by Demosthenes; and it was his fault, lastly, that they had not left the harbour before the barrier of ships had made departure almost impossible. Yet this was the man who could beseech his soldiers to remember that on the issue of this fight depended the great name of Athens and the freedom which had made her illustrious.<sup>1787</sup> How far the speech of Gylippos or even that of Nikias answered to the words actually spoken, we cannot say. It is natural that in the pages of the historian the exhortation of the Spartan leader should be in complete contrast with the humiliating confessions of the Athenian general, that it should dwell on the utter despondency of the enemy, and on the duty of taking a revenge which should make the ears of all who heard it tingle. But Gylippos is further represented as insisting on the more dreadful fate which the Athenians had designed for them, a fate involving death or slavery for the men, the most shameful treatment for their wives and children, and the most ignominious stigma for their city.<sup>1788</sup> If he so spoke, he knew that he was uttering lies. The conditions of ancient warfare were horrible indeed, and the Athenians were not especially tender in their treatment of the conquered; but the history of their dealings with their own revolted allies would show that the fears of Gylippos were groundless. To adopt the language of the Athenians at Melos, such cruelties

<sup>1787</sup> Thuc. vii. 64.<sup>1788</sup> Ib. vii. 68, 2.

would have been highly inexpedient. They had come to Sicily to extend their maritime empire, and as the occupation of the island was not to be thought of, this object could be attained only by attaching the Sicilian cities to the Athenian confederacy whether as free or as subject allies. In neither case could they afford to indulge in barbarities which might be practised on enemies whom there was no need to conciliate. But although Gylippos knew that the Athenians were commanded by a man whose Spartan partialities had led his countrymen to give up the Sphakterian prisoners without any adequate equivalent, it is more than likely that he would speak of them as beasts to be hunted to death without mercy and without compunction.

The time for the last great experiment had come, and the men were all on board, when Nicias in his agony determined to make one more effort to rouse his men not to greater courage, for this had never failed, but to greater confidence. Passing in his ship in front of the triremes,<sup>1789</sup> he called up the trierarch of each, and addressing him not only by his own name but by that of his father and his tribe, he conjured them to think of things which must have been only too painfully present to their thoughts, of all their home affections, and of that free and unshackled life which Athens bestowed as the dearest of all gifts upon her children. He cared nothing whether he repeated himself or dwelt on topics which might be thought weak or stale.<sup>1790</sup> They were in fact, neither the one nor the other, and they had furnished the substance of the great funeral oration of Perikles; but it may be doubted whether he was acting judiciously in drawing to this extreme tension, at a time when steadiness of eye and hand was most of all needed, the nerves of a people so highly sensitive as the Athenians. At length the signal was given, and the fleet made straight for the narrow passage which the Syracusans had left for ingress and egress in the barrier of ships across the harbour. In the desperate force of their onset the Athenians mastered the ships which were here keeping guard; but they had not succeeded in break-

Destruction of the Athenian fleet.

<sup>1789</sup> Diod. xiii. 15. This fact is not mentioned by Thucydides; but it could hardly have occurred in any other way.

<sup>1790</sup> ἀρχαιολογεῖν. Thuc. vii. 69, 2.

ing the chains when the Syracusan fleet starting from all points of the harbour attacked them in the rear; and the harbour soon presented the sight of groups of ships locked in a deadly struggle, three or four sometimes being fastened upon one. To Athenians trained in the school of Phormion and Demosthenes the conflict was utterly bewildering. Their decks were crowded with archers and javelin men who had no room for the free use of their weapons, and who frequently did more harm than good. The terrible din rendered all orders unintelligible, and the sounds which presently reached them from the shore had the effect rather of paralysing than of encouraging them. Within their own lines the Athenian army, advancing to the water's edge, surveyed with alternations of passionate hope and fear the fortunes of a fight on which the lives of all depended. Elsewhere the beach was lined with Syracusans ready to help their own people if they should be beaten or to slaughter the crews of the enemy's ships which might be driven to land within their reach. Not at Artemision, at Salamis, or at Mykalê was seen a sight so fearful as this conflict in the quiet waters of the Syracusan bay under the deep blue Sicilian heaven. Unshrouded by the dark pall which falls over modern battles, Athenians and Syracusans might severally be seen, here vanquished, there victorious. So long as the two sides seemed nearly equal, only the usual sounds of combat were audible; but the defeat or destruction of a ship called forth from the Athenians the loud wail which expresses the grief of southern peoples. All, however, were not looking in the same direction; and as the fortune of the fight varied greatly in different quarters, there might be seen in the Athenian camp some who in the intensity of feverish suspense were keeping time with their bodies to the swayings of the battle, others who were abandoning themselves to a paroxysm of agony on witnessing some disaster, others carried away by an unreasonable hope on seeing their own men driving back the enemy. At last brute force prevailed, and the weight of the Syracusan charge became in the excitement of the moment irresistible. Borne on with a fury of rage and revenge, they pushed the Athenians further and further back until their whole fleet was

driven ashore. Amidst the piercing shrieks and bitter weeping of the troops who hurried down to give such help as they could, the crews of the shattered ships were landed, while some hastened to the defence of their walls and others bethought themselves only of providing for their own safety.

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The sun sank down on a scene of absolute despair in the Athenian incampment, and of fierce and boundless exultation within the Syracusan walls. The first care of the Greek after a sea-fight was to recover, if he could, the wrecks of his ships, and in any case to demand permission under truce for the burial of the dead. The supreme misery of the hour left no heart for any task except that of preparing for instant flight. Demosthenes was still anxious that one more effort should be made to break the barrier at the mouth of the harbour. Of the hundred and ten ships which had that day been engaged about sixty were still fit for use; of the Syracusan fleet of seventy-six ships more than six-and-twenty had been disabled.<sup>1791</sup> The advantage of numbers therefore still lay with the Athenians: but, although Nicias assented to the plan of Demosthenes, the men would not stir, and they were right. Every hour left them more powerless for lack of food; every hour added to the strength and the spirit of the enemy, while the conditions of the struggle would remain unchanged except for the worse. They therefore determined to retreat by land at once; and had they acted on this resolution, the whole of this still mighty armament would have been saved. But Nicias was to be their evil genius to the end. The disasters of the expedition had been caused wholly by his own indecision; and this indecision was either caused or greatly fostered by the absurd negotiations which he kept up with a contemptible minority in Syracuse and which fatally fed his sense of his own sagacity and importance. The false report of some Syracusan horsemen who professed to be sent by this Athenian party within the city now led to a resolution which sealed the doom of the army as that of the fleet had been sealed by the occurrence of the eclipse. Feeling sure that the Athenians would attempt immediate flight, Hermokrates spent the afternoon in trying to persuade the generals to send out at

Stratagem  
of Hermo-  
krates to  
delay the  
retreat of  
the Athen-  
ian army.

<sup>1791</sup> Thuc. vii. 72. The Syracusans in both the battles had brought out the same number of ships, vii. 52, 1, and 70, 1.

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once a force which might break up and guard the roads on the probable lines of march. Their answer was that for the present their power was not equal to their will. A great sacrifice was on that day offered to Herakles, and the whole city was so given up to a frenzy of wild delight that the carrying out of the scheme proposed by Hermokrates was simply impossible. Foiled here, Hermokrates resolved to try the effect of a stratagem not unlike that by which Nicias had drawn the Syracusans away to Katanê,<sup>1792</sup> and dispatched the horsemen to the Athenian lines with the tidings that the roads were already blocked and guarded and that a careful and deliberate retreat on the following day would be better than a hasty departure during the night. The tidings, we are told, were implicitly believed, and we are left to infer that Demosthenes was as thoroughly tricked as Nicias: but the language of the historian<sup>1793</sup> is too concise to warrant our assertion of the fact. Either the inference is untrue, or the judgement of that excellent officer was at last over-clouded and weakened by the long series of his misfortunes. The message was almost transparently false, and under a less grievous weight of misery he must have seen that, even if its truth were granted, every hour's delay would only make matters worse instead of better. It is far more likely that Nicias caught eagerly at any excuse which seemed to justify inaction; and Demosthenes may have yielded after a short and feeble resistance. Having remained over the first night, they now thought it best to tarry yet another day and make preparations for a more orderly retreat. By the Syracusans in the city it was spent in dragging into their ports those of the enemy's triremes which had been stranded within their reach or were floating in the harbour, while within the Athenian lines the flames which rose from burning ships told that on the sea the war was already at an end. But early in the morning their troops had set out into the country, and long before the day was done the roads, the fords, and the hill passes were broken up, or carefully occupied and guarded.

<sup>1792</sup> See p. 361.

<sup>1793</sup> Thuc. vii. 74, 1. Diodoros throws no light on this incident, but he assigns a ridiculous reason for the refusal of the Syracusan generals to entertain the request of Hermokrates. xiii. 18.

The departure of the Athenians from their fortified camp.

With the morning of the second day after the battle the retreat which was to end in ruin began with unspeakable agony. Forty thousand men were to make their weary and desolate journey, they scarcely knew whither, with a vague notion of reaching the country of some friendly Sikel tribes. They were to carry the miserable pittance of food which still remained to them, and this office even the hoplites and the horsemen <sup>1794</sup> were obliged to perform for themselves. Their slaves either were not to be trusted or had already deserted to the enemy. The cup of bitterness was in truth filled to the brim and running over. Not until now had the history of Hellenic states exhibited such an appalling contrast of overwhelming misery with the lavish splendour and high-wrought hope which had marked their departure from Peiraiæus. They had looked their last on the rock and shrine of the virgin goddess with the expectation that they were going to make Athens the centre and head of a Panhellenic empire; they were now marching ignominiously after irretrievable defeat, perhaps to slavery or to death. But although they could take their food (its weight now would be no oppressive burden), they could not take their sick. Hundreds were pining away with the wasting marsh fever; hundreds were smitten down with wounds received in the recent battles. All these must now be left, and left, not, as in the less savage warfare of our own times, with the confidence that they would be treated with something like mercy and humanity, but to the certainty of slavery, tortures, or death. As the terrible realities of departure broke upon them, the whole camp became a scene of unutterable woe. Brothers and sons were here to be forsaken, whom parents and kinsmen had accompanied with affectionate pride from the gates of Athens to the triremes at Peiraiæus. Comrades in the same tent were now to be separated, happy if after a brief pang here they should be reunited in the world unseen. In the agony of the moment the fever-stricken sufferers clung to their companions as these set out on their miserable march, and mangled wretches crawled feebly on, intreating to be taken with them, until strength failed and they sank down

<sup>1794</sup> See note 1785.



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by the way. The sight of the still unburied dead might well in a superstitious age rouse dark forebodings in minds more superstitious, if such there could be, than even that of Nikias. To these vague terrors and to the awful wrench of parting was added the dire humiliation of the catastrophe; and the men lost all heart as they contrasted the splendour of the morning with the utter darkness of the night which was coming on.

Exhortations of Nikias on the march.

In this desperate crisis Nikias did his best to cheer and encourage the men whom his own egregious and obstinate carelessness had brought into their present unparalleled difficulties. If the substance of his exhortations be rightly given (and in this instance we can have little doubt that it is), his words were singularly characteristic of the man. He told them indeed that such precautions as were within the power of the generals for shortening the retreat and insuring the safety of the men had been already taken, and that messages had been sent to summon the Sikel tribes to their aid with injunctions to bring ample supplies. But his words were chiefly a comment on the homely saying that the lane must be long which has no turning. If when they set out on this ill-starred enterprise they had incurred the wrath of any of the gods, they had surely been amply punished, and they might therefore now reasonably hope for gentler treatment at the hands of the offended deity. In any case the evils which they might still have to suffer must in some degree be lightened by the consciousness that they were shared alike by all. Suffering now from a painful malady, accustomed during his life to the graceful ease and luxury of a high-born and wealthy Athenian, and, more than this, scrupulously exact in his religious worship, and blameless in his private conduct, he had now to bear up under the same toils and privations with themselves. This is not the language of a man who dreads the physical dangers of war: but it is the language of one who even in the direst extremity cannot be brought to see that the misery which he is striving to alleviate is the result of his own folly in wasting a series of golden opportunities.

History of the retreat to the surrender of Demosthenes.

In the order of march the division of Nikias led the way, followed by that of Demosthenes. Each was drawn up in square, or rather in oblong parallelogram, to cover the baggage

carriers placed within it. At the bridge of the Anapos they found the way blocked by a Syracusan force ; but this was defeated, and the army passed on, harassed throughout the day by the cavalry and light troops of the enemy, until at the close of the day they incamped on a rising ground about four miles from their fortified post on the shores of the great harbour. Early on the following day the march was resumed ; but after advancing about two miles, they incamped on a plain in the hope of obtaining some supply of food from the neighbouring houses or villages, and of laying in a store of water to carry them through the drier region which lay before them. During their ill-timed sojourn here the Syracusans built a wall across the road which passed under the Akraian cliff with a torrent-bed on either side. This barrier on the next day the Athenians found themselves unable even to reach, and they returned sadly to their incampment of the night before. On the fourth day they made a desperate but vain attempt to force the pass. Not only was the enemy too strongly posted, but a violent storm of thunder and rain convinced the Athenians that they were still the special objects of divine displeasure.<sup>1795</sup> So greatly had their spirit and temper been changed since the time when precisely the same incident had dismayed their enemies while it failed to terrify themselves.<sup>1796</sup> Gylippos, however, was in his turn foiled in an attempt to block up the way in the rear of the Athenians, who took up their station for the night not much above the level of the plain beneath the pass. At the end of the fifth day the Athenians, having had to gain every inch of the way by sheer hard fighting, found themselves only half a mile further from Syracuse ; and this fact that in five days they had accomplished a distance which without hindrance they could have traversed easily in two hours, convinced the generals that the line of march must be changed. They resolved therefore to give up the idea of attempting any further advance towards Katanê, and to make for the Helorine road leading to the southern coast of Sicily. In the dead of night, under cover of many fires which they had kindled to put the enemy off his guard, they set forth on their

<sup>1795</sup> Thuc. vii. 79, 3.<sup>1796</sup> See p. 362.

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southward march. It was safely accomplished, in spite of a panic which separated the division of Nikias from that of Demosthenes. The two leaders had taken counsel together for the last time: but having reached the road to Heloros early in the morning,<sup>1797</sup> they pressed on to the fords of Kakyparis. A Syracusan force which was already raising a wall and stockade across the channel was beaten off, and the Athenians having crossed the stream pursued their march to the Erineos.<sup>1798</sup> Demosthenes was never to reach it. We might suppose that the energy of this indefatigable but not always successful general had been gradually impaired by constant and fruitless opposition to Nikias; but the panic from which his division had not yet recovered was assuredly not his fault, and we have to remember that, marching in the rear, he had to think more of keeping his men in order of battle than of getting over ground.<sup>1799</sup> Thus constrained to mass his troops, he was exposed to the danger of being surrounded; and in fact he was driven into a position as fatal as that in which Myronides imprisoned the Corinthians in the early days of Athenian developement.<sup>1800</sup> Hemmed in between walls in an olive garden with a roadway on either side his men could here be shot down by an enemy who needed not to expose himself to any danger. It was not the policy of the Syracusans so to expose themselves. They were too anxious to reap the mature fruits of the victory which they had already gained, and they knew that men who had given themselves up as lost might be butchered like sheep in the shambles. So the work of slaughter went on; but as the day drew towards its close, Gylippos made proclamation that the islanders who chose to desert the Athenians might do so without prejudice to their freedom. Not many were found to accept the invitation; but later on in the evening the Syracusans invited the

<sup>1797</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 467, holds that Demosthenes never crossed the Kakyparis, inasmuch as the two divisions were separated during the night, and the division in the rear could not be said to approach the sea about the same time with the other, ἀμα ἔω, Thuc. vii. 80, 4. But Nikias was only five miles ahead of Demosthenes, and if the former reached the spot at dawn, Demosthenes would reach it not more than an hour later, — a difference which an historian is scarcely bound to take into account. Mr. Grote thinks that Thucydides is speaking only of Nikias and his troops when he says that they got near to the sea: but the word ὅμως seems to be fatal to this supposition.

<sup>1798</sup> Thuc. vii. 80, 5.

<sup>1799</sup> Ib. vii. 81, 3.

<sup>1800</sup> See p. 45.

surrender of Demosthenes and his troops under the covenant that none should be put to death either by violence or by bonds or by lack of the necessaries of life.<sup>1801</sup> The summons was obeyed, and four shields held upwards were filled with the money still possessed by the troops of Demosthenes, who were now led away to Syracuse.

Nikias, five miles further to the south, knowing nothing of the catastrophe which had befallen his colleague, had crossed the Erineos and incamped his men on some sharply rising ground. He had well-nigh reached the end of his march, and the incessant toil of a whole week had left this great army within two or three hours' distance of Syracuse. Early on the following day Syracusan messengers informed him of the surrender of Demosthenes with his whole division, and summoned him to follow the example of his colleague. Incredulous at first, Nikias was convinced, when the horsemen whom he received permission to send under truce returned to confirm the wretched tidings. He lost no time in proposing to Gylippos that in exchange for the men under his command Athens should pay to the Syracusans the whole cost of the war, hostages being given at the rate of one man for each talent until the whole sum should be paid off. Terms more advantageous to Syracuse could not well have been obtained, and, as things turned out, the public treasury would have been much richer, had they been received. But the Syracusans were now filled with the absorbing delight of the savage in trampling a fallen enemy under foot. The proposals of Nikias were rejected, and all day long the Athenians were worn down with the incessant attacks of their pursuers. In the dead of night they took up their arms, hoping that they might be able to cross the next stream before their flight was discovered; but the war-shout which instantly rose from the Syracusan camp showed the vanity of this hope, and with a feeling of blank dismay all remained where they were, except three hundred who succeeded in forcing their way through the troops opposed to them.<sup>1802</sup>

Defeat  
and sur-  
render of  
Nikias.

<sup>1801</sup> Thuc. vii. 82, 2. The compact includes Demosthenes not less than his men.

<sup>1802</sup> These unfortunate men obtained only a brief respite from suffering. They were overtaken after the surrender of Nikias, and brought back. Thuc. vii. 85, 2.

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On the following morning the miserable scenes of the preceding days were renewed for the last time. Not far in front ran the stream of the Assinaros; and fainting with exhaustion the Athenians dragged themselves on in the hope partly of quenching a thirst which from lack of water had now become unbearable, and partly of obtaining on the other side of the river some respite from tortures fast exceeding the powers of human endurance. But the end was come. The sight of the sparkling and transparent stream banished all thoughts of order and discipline, all prudence and caution. Instead of turning round to the enemy and so covering the passage of those who had to cross first, each man sought only to plunge into the water himself, to quench his thirst, and gain the other side. In an instant all was hopeless confusion and tumult; and the stream, fouled by the trampling of thousands, was soon after reddened with their blood. Still the Peloponnesians with merciless fury drove the masses before them upon the crowds already struggling in the water, and still the men drank on almost in the agonies of death, while the Syracusans from a safe distance on the heights commanding the river overwhelmed them with storms of missiles. To put an end to slaughter which had now become mere butchery, Nikias surrendered himself to Gylippos personally, in the hope that the Spartan might remember the enormous benefits which in times past Sparta had received from him. He submitted himself, he said, to the pleasure not of the Syracusans but of the Spartans, and requested only that the massacre of his men should cease. The order was accordingly issued to take the rest alive; but the number of prisoners finally got together was not great. By far the larger number were stolen and hidden away by private men, and the state was at once defrauded of wealth which an acceptance of the offers of Nikias would have insured to it.<sup>1803</sup> Of the prisoners thus surreptitiously conveyed away not a few made their escape, some almost immediately, others after having spent some time in slavery.

But this slight alleviation fails to affect the completeness of the catastrophe. Forty thousand men had left the Athenian

Sufferings  
and treat-  
ment of  
the prison-  
ers.

lines on the great harbour; a week later seven thousand marched as prisoners into Syracuse.<sup>1804</sup> If we assume that twice this number were stolen away into private slavery, nearly half of this great multitude had in seven days perished after the most intense and exquisite suffering alike of body and mind. What became of the sick and wounded who were left in the camp, we are not told: but we can scarcely doubt that all were murdered, and murder was mercy in comparison with the treatment of the 7,000 prisoners who were penned like cattle in the stone quarries of Epipolai. Without shelter from the sun by day and from the increasing chills of the autumn nights, never suffered to quit for a moment the dungeon into which they were thrust, these miserable captives had to live as best they might amidst noisome stench which by breeding deadly fevers relieved many from their miseries, with no liquid whatever beyond the daily allowance of half a pint of water and with half the portion of flour usually given to slaves. Thus passed away seventy days of unspeakable wretchedness to the living and of shameful indignities to the dead which were literally piled in heaps to rot away.<sup>1805</sup> At the end of that time their sufferings were somewhat lessened. All who were not Athenians or citizens of Sikeliot or Italiot cities were taken out and sold. Their own lot could not be made worse, while that of the men who still remained shut up in the quarries became less intolerable. For nearly six months longer were these men kept within their loathsome prison, with deliberate and most unselfish wickedness.<sup>1806</sup> The sale of these men brought to the state probably not a tithe of the sum for which Nikias offered to pledge the credit of Athens, while the way in which they were treated exhibits the Syracusans with their allies as a race of savage and bloodthirsty liars. They had promised to Demosthenes that no man belonging to his division should suffer a violent death or die

<sup>1804</sup> Thuc. vii. 87, 3.

<sup>1805</sup> Ib. vii. 87, 1.

<sup>1806</sup> If any iniquities may be cited in proof of Bishop Butler's assertion that men are too little instead of too much guided by self-love, it must surely be the cruelties of men who more or less impoverish themselves in order to gratify a dominant passion. Self-love, according to Bishop Butler, *Sermons*, xi. xii., would not only have led the Syracusans to get hard money in place of prisoners whose maintenance must cost something, but would have taught them that men are not happier for being inhuman.

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from bonds or for lack of necessary food;<sup>1807</sup> and they insured the death of hundreds or of thousands as certainly as Suraj-ud-Doulah murdered the victims of the Black Hole of Calcutta.<sup>1808</sup> The English exacted a terrible retribution from this fiendish tyrant; the morality of the ancient world looked with more indulgent eyes on the unspeakably greater infamy of men who rejoiced in making themselves drunk with the blood of myriads.<sup>1809</sup>

Death of  
Nikias and  
Demosthenes.

The Athenian generals were happily spared the sight of these prolonged and excruciating tortures. Unless the terms of the convention were to be kept, Demosthenes could, of course, expect no mercy. Next to Perikles and to Phormion there was no leader to whom Athens in this great struggle owed so much, and none therefore whom the Spartans and their allies regarded with a more virulent hatred. In flagrant violation of a distinct compact the doom of the victor at Sphakteria was sealed, and he died, as he had lived, without a stain on his military reputation, the victim of the superstition and the respectability of his colleague. Gylippos may not have cared to save the life of Demosthenes; but he would have had him put to death, if at all, at Sparta, not at Syracuse, and he was bitterly disappointed when he found that he could not hope to carry home the two generals in a triumph which would have more than counterbalanced the victory of the leather-seller Kleon. The Syracusans were determined on the instant death not of Demosthenes only whose life they were pledged to spare;

<sup>1807</sup> Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 470, interprets the convention thus, 'that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation.'

<sup>1808</sup> Of this atrocious crime Macaulay says that 'nothing in history or fiction . . . approaches the horrors which were recounted by the few survivors of that night.' See *Essay on Clive*. Superlatives are always more or less dangerous, and the question of numbers has nothing to do with the intensity of the sufferings of individuals; but Suraj-ud-Doulah's victims were tortured for a few hours, the Syracusans prolonged the agony of the Athenians for eight months. For later writers the conduct of the Syracusans became a subject for essays or romances. Such a romance may be found in the debates reported at prodigious length by Diodoros, xiii. 20-33. The historical value of the story may be estimated from the fact that, while Hermokrates and Nikolaos are represented as desirous of saving the lives of the generals and of treating all the prisoners with magnanimous generosity, Gylippos breaks in with a savage demand for extreme severity and especially insists on the immediate execution of Nikias and Demosthenes.

<sup>1809</sup> Thucydides does not tell us what became of the prisoners who lingered out the full term of eight months in the quarries. We must suppose that they were all sold. Some, it is said, obtained their freedom by reciting verses from the dramas of Euripides, and it was added that this fact especially gratified the poet, who received in person the thanks of those who thus indirectly through his means were restored to their country.

but of Nikias.<sup>1810</sup> The friends of the latter were now become his fiercest enemies. They were afraid that tortures might compel him to betray their intercourse with him, and they were eager to bury their secret in his grave. The Corinthians too, it is said, were sorely troubled by the fear that his great wealth might regain him his freedom and that his freedom would be used to involve them again in a struggle like that which had now reached its close. Their fear was absurdly thrown away. Had they voted to him a golden crown with a public maintenance for life in their Prytaneion as the destroyer of Athens and the benefactor and saviour of Syracuse and Sicily, their decree would have been not too severe a satire on his political and military career.

Of this career the history of this memorable expedition furnishes a picture for which no further touches can be needed. There is something of absurdity, perhaps of presumption, in speaking of retributive sufferings; and any feeling of satisfaction in the fact that this miserable man ended his days in protracted agony is closely akin to the horrible malignity of those who rejoiced in inflicting it. Such a feeling might tempt us to see in the miseries of the Roman siege of Syracuse by Marcellus a recompense for the frightful tortures which had there been inflicted on thousands of sensitive and highly-cultured Athenians.<sup>1811</sup> It might tempt us to discern the work of the avenging Nemesis in the ruin which not many years after the destruction of the Athenian armament was to overwhelm the splendours of Akragas. But, contemptible and wrong though such a feeling would be, we may yet be forgiven and even justified if we feel a natural indignation when we find the historian, who has so truthfully recorded the fatal blunders of Nikias, noticing the death of Demosthenes without a word of comment, but adding that Nikias least of all deserved his fate

Judgement  
of Thucy-  
dides on the  
character  
of Nikias.

<sup>1810</sup> Later historians speak of Hermokrates as giving them an opportunity of escaping execution by a voluntary death, as well as of the exposure of their bodies before the city. These details have neither value nor interest. The end is reached with their condemnation and the infamous breach of the compact made with Demosthenes. See note 1801.

<sup>1811</sup> The miseries of the Syracusans in the merciless grip of the Roman conqueror are exhibited with wonderful power in the narrative of Dr. Arnold, *History of Rome*, iii. 309 *et seq.*; but our sympathy with the wrongs of the later generation cannot lessen the loathing with which we must regard the evil deeds of their forefathers.



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because he was such an excellent and religious man.<sup>1812</sup> The political judgements of Thucydides are unfortunately not always to be trusted. Least of all are they to be trusted in the cases of Nikias and of Kleon; but it is the happiest thing that his exact and scrupulous truthfulness has in each case preserved to us the facts which show how far or why his censures and his praises are undeserved.

Effect of  
the expedi-  
tion on the  
subsequent  
history of  
Greece.

So ended an expedition which changed the current of Athenian history and therefore, in more or less degree, of the history of the world. In the Athenian people the mere entertainment of such a project as the conquest of Sicily was a grave political error. They had been warned against it by the man who saw most clearly what under the political conditions of the Hellenic states the course of Athens ought to be: they had been enticed into it by one of the most insolent and lawless statesmen with which any country was ever cursed. They had allowed their plans to be enormously extended by a man who wisely advised them not to go to Sicily, and who did them a deadly mischief by undertaking to go himself against his will. They had hazarded on this distant venture an amount of strength which was imperiously needed for the protection of Attica and the recovery of Amphipolis; and instead of a starvation which, as things turned out, would have been wise, they fed the expedition with a bounty so lavish that failure became utter ruin. In short, from first to last, everything was done to court disaster and to play into the hands of their enemies; but unless we are to maintain the doctrine that things have always happened as it is best that they should happen, it would have been distinctly better for Syracuse and better for the world, if the success of Athens had been only somewhat less complete

<sup>1812</sup> Thuc. vii. 86, 5. The variation of reading in this passage makes no practical difference. See note 1422. Nikias himself refers, Thuc. vii. 77, 2, not merely to his piety but also to his blameless social life, as a reason for expecting the favour or at least the mercy of the gods.

Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 483, has forcibly remarked that the pertinacity with which Thucydides, after telling his miserable story, can still keep his mind fixed on 'the private morality and decorum' of Nikias may explain the infatuation of the Athenians who from that very cause over-estimated him from the first, and refused to be roused from their delusion until it was too late. In a case like this the demagogic influence of a man like Kleon might, he urges, have been of immense service in breaking the 'overweening ascendancy of such decorous and pious incompetence.' I may refer the reader to Mr. Grote's masterly chapters on the Sicilian expedition: it is an impertinence to praise them.

than her catastrophe. The power of trampling on Sicily as Gylippos and his allies trampled on the defeated armament would have done no good either to Athens or to the world; but if the isolating policy which seeks to maintain an infinite number of autonomous units be in itself an evil, then it is unfortunate that the victory of Gylippos insured the predominance of this policy. Athens had done what she could to weld into a coherent body a number of such centrifugal units. Her work may have been imperfect, but so far as it went, it was real, and, as we have seen, it involved no substantial injustice.<sup>1813</sup> The freedom which even Brasidas promised was a sham; and the supremacy of Sparta implied violent interference with the internal affairs of confederate cities. The empire of Athens, if it could have been maintained, might have prevented the wars of many generations, might have made the vast extension of the Makedonian power impossible, and might have kept within narrower bounds the empire of Rome itself. To a vast extent she could offer to her allies or her subjects common interests and common ends. Sparta could offer none; but the system of Sparta fell in with instincts in the Hellenic mind which may have been weakened but were never eradicated, and against this instinct the wisdom and prudence of Athenian statesmen strove in vain. How deeply this instinct was offended by the Sicilian expedition, may be seen in the invectives of Hermokrates who speaks of the Athenians as having come not merely to extend the limits of the dominion of Athens but to treat the people of all the Sikeliot and Italiot cities which might venture to resist her as shamefully as he was resolved to treat the Athenians if he should be victorious. The maliciousness of the slander proves of itself the futility of attempting to raise with such materials the fabric which perhaps rose before the vision of Perikles; but the feelings with which the story of Athenian ruin and Syracusan brutality must always be read cannot be much modified by the thought that in seeking to knit Hellenic cities in a confederation more just and more beneficial to its members than that of Sparta Athens was undertaking a task for which the world was not yet

<sup>1813</sup> See page 72 *et seq.*

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ripe. The military history of the expedition has a painful and terrible interest of its own: but the Athenians who were led to death or slavery in Sicily were not mere professional soldiers, and the horrors of the catastrophe are heightened by the intense political emotions with which they undertook to fight the battles of their country. Never had they behaved more gallantly, never had they undergone privations so cheerfully, never had they nerved themselves so zealously to renewed efforts after frightful disasters, as in this fatal expedition. Had they left Peiræus under the command of Lamachos and Demosthenes, they would have returned home in triumph a year before the time when they were brought to utter ruin by the folly and obstinacy of one man.<sup>1814</sup>

<sup>1814</sup> When the ruin wrought by Nikias was complete, the Athenians seem to have been awakened from their dream; and his name was omitted from the pillar which commemorated the other generals who fell in this expedition. Pausanias, i. 29, 9, following Philistos, assigns a reason for this omission which cannot be reconciled with the history of Thucydides, and which is, indeed, almost ridiculous.

## CHAPTER VIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN) WAR FROM THE CATASTROPHE AT SYRACUSE TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE OLIGARCHY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

WHILE the walls of Dekeleia, daily gaining height and strength, showed that the enemy was permanently established on Attic soil, the Athenians still fed themselves on bright hopes of Sicilian conquest. Spartan horsemen and hoplites were ravaging their land; but even with the thorn thus thrust into their side, they may have taken comfort from the assurance of Perikles that the establishment of a garrison in the enemy's country was a game at which two could play, and that in this game Athens with her command of the sea had an enormous advantage.<sup>1815</sup> There was, in truth, need of encouragement. Previous invasions had left the land at rest after a raid of five or six weeks at the utmost; now the whole country lay at the mercy of the enemy. The rising crops were swept away, the farm buildings ruined, the cattle and beasts of burden stolen or killed. Each day they felt the sting of the monster evil of slavery. Twenty thousand men, whom Greek philosophy delighted to regard as animated machines, deserted to the enemy and left Athens almost destitute of skilled workmen. Each day the Athenian cavalry was employed in repelling the assaults or keeping back the forces of the enemy: and each day its strength and usefulness were impaired by the laming or the wounding of horses on ground utterly unfitted for their operations. Thus far, even during the yearly invasions of the enemy, the pressure had been comparatively slight. If the Eleusinian plain was wasted, still abundant supplies could be brought

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Effects of  
the Spartan  
occupation  
of Dekeleia.

<sup>1815</sup> Thuc. i. 142.

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into the city by way of Oropos. But this way was now blocked by the Spartan garrison: and the fiery energy of Agis, in marked contrast with the slower movements of Archidamos, made the idea of forcing it hopeless. Everything must now be conveyed round Sounion in merchant ships which lay exposed to the attacks of Peloponnesian privateers. Athens had, indeed, ceased to be a city. It was now nothing more than a garrison in which the defenders were worn out with harassing and incessant duty. During the day they could relieve each other in guard along the walls; at night all, except the horsemen who had come in wearied from toil or battle, were compelled to keep watch, or slept with their arms by their side ready for instant action. The very magnitude of their tasks involved a charge of something like madness or infatuation. Athens was herself practically in a state of siege: and all her fleet with the flower of her forces was besieging a distant city of equal size and power. Their expenses were daily rising at a ruinous rate, while their revenues were melting away, or proved themselves wholly inadequate to bear the strain put upon them. Something, it was thought, might be done by substituting a fixed duty of five per cent. on imports and exports for the tribute thus far imposed on the allies; and a decree was accordingly passed to carry out this change.<sup>1816</sup> But for real relief from overwhelming burdens and from anxieties almost beyond human endurance they looked to Sicily; and they had yet to learn that the fleets which had taken out two magnificent armies should with those armies never be seen again. Such is the terrible picture the horrors of which are crowned by the historian's reference to the strife of opinion which was fast creating hostile camps where the last hope of safety lay in union.<sup>1817</sup>

The mas-  
sacre of  
Myka-  
lessos.

Nor was this the end of the evils involved in the lack of means brought about by this deadly war. A body of 1,300 Thracian mercenaries reached Athens after Demosthenes had sailed for Sicily; and as it was impossible to send them after

<sup>1816</sup> Thuc. vii. 28, 4; Arist. *Frogs*, 363. There is no evidence that this change was systematically carried out. The fact that it is not mentioned among the grievances of the allies seems to be sufficient proof that it was not.

<sup>1817</sup> Thuc. vii. 27-8.

him, so sheer poverty prevented the Athenians from keeping them in Attica for a service in which they would probably have been especially useful. But each man was to receive a drachma daily; and there was no help but to send them back at once to their own country. They were accordingly dismissed under the command of Diitrephes who was charged to do the enemy a mischief, if he could, as he went along. Landing them first near Tanagra, he ravaged the territories of that city, and then passing over to Eubœia recrossed the Euripos at night, and thence in the early morning made his way to Mykalessos, distant about two miles from their night post at the Hermaion. The town was small; the walls were weak and for the most part in ruins; and the gates were wide open. An attack from enemies was the last thing which the inhabitants looked for, when the troop of bloodthirsty savages burst in upon them and a massacre began to which even the frightful annals of Hellenic warfare could furnish no parallel. The old and the young, men, women, children, infants, were all mercilessly cut down by the barbarians, who spent their fury by slaughtering every beast that crossed their path. The boys of the town were assembled in the school for their daily work; not one escaped alive. Not less than eight or nine hours could pass before tidings of the catastrophe could bring help from Thebes: and when the Thebans reached Mykalessos, the Thracians had departed with their booty. But success had made them incautious; and their enemies were upon them before they had traversed the short distance which separates the town from the sea. Few or none of them knew how to swim; and many now paid with their lives the penalty for the misdeeds of the morning, for as soon as the conflict began on the land, the Athenians moved the transport ships beyond the range of the arrows. Two hundred and fifty were killed: the rest got on board and sailed homewards. The Boiotarch Skirphondas; but the Athenians sustained a greater injury in the deep and universal indignation excited against them by this frightful massacre.<sup>1818</sup>

<sup>1818</sup> Thuc. vii. 30.

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Engage-  
ment be-  
tween the  
Athenian  
and Cor-  
inthian  
fleets in the  
Corinthian  
gulf.

The result of an indecisive action which took place in the Corinthian gulf while Demosthenes was on his way to Syracuse might have warned the Athenians of the dangers incurred by their larger armaments. So much had the relative position of the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets been changed that Konon had refused to encounter the twenty-five Corinthian war-ships, which watched his movements, with his own eighteen triremes. He had therefore asked for and received from Demosthenes a reinforcement of ten ships; <sup>1819</sup> and with these his successor Diphilos advanced from Naupaktos to engage the enemy whose ships lay between two promontories which bounded at either end the bay of Erineos in the territory of Rhytai. On the land at each end was drawn up a large body of hoplites, thus showing the Athenians that they could find no safety on shore. In the battle which followed three Corinthian ships were destroyed: but although no Athenian trireme was sunk or became water-logged, seven were rendered unserviceable from the injuries which their high and sharp prows had sustained from the broader and more solid heads and ear-caps of the Corinthian ships. Both sides, we are told, set up a trophy, the Corinthians because they had disabled more vessels than they had themselves lost, and the Athenians because they had lost none and because the wind had enabled them to seize the enemy's wrecks. But it was felt that the apparent victory of the Athenians was a defeat which augured ill for their superiority at sea.

State of  
Athens  
when the  
catastrophe  
in Sicily  
became  
known.

Scarcely more than three weeks later the Athenians must have received the dispatch which informed them of the failure of the night attack on Epipolai and taught them that success was no longer to be hoped for. The Athenians would have done no more than their duty, if as soon at these tidings came they had sent to the generals an order for the immediate return of the army and fleet. For a full month longer such an order would have averted the last terrible catastrophe; nor can they be acquitted of a most culpable remissness except on the ground, that, although their confidence in Nikias was egregiously misplaced, they had ample reason

<sup>1819</sup> See page 392.

for trusting the judgement as well as the bravery of Demosthenes. The history even of his failures had shown that he could extricate an army from positions of far more serious difficulty than any with which they had to contend immediately after the great defeat on Epipolai. They could therefore well believe that every measure needed for the safety of the army would be promptly taken; nor can we blame them if they failed to see to what ruinous lengths the obstinacy, weakness, and superstition of Nikias could be carried. During the month which followed the night attack no dispatch probably was sent after the one which announced its failure; and if any was sent along with the order countermanding further supplies from Katanê, it preceded only by a few days the events which sealed their doom. Of those last awful hours no official record ever reached Athens; and the story that the great disaster was first announced by a stranger who talked of it in a barber's shop<sup>1820</sup> as of a well-known event may point at least to the means by which the dreadful truth was first hinted, before the jubilant dispatches at Sparta and Corinth revealed the facts to the whole Hellenic world. Not merely foreigners but the few miserable Athenians who had escaped death and slavery would find their way to Athens, and tell the people how utterly their schemes of conquest had been brought to naught: but it needed probably the exultation which was soon manifested by their enemies to convince them of the infinitude of the ruin. In the first burst of despairing grief they turned angrily on the speakers who had urged on the expedition, and on the soothsayers and diviners who had augured success for the enterprise: but such revenge was a poor consolation for the utter failure of a scheme which they had themselves decreed.<sup>1821</sup> Their

<sup>1820</sup> Plut. *Nik.* 30.

<sup>1821</sup> ὡς περ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, Thuc. viii. 1. There can be no doubt that by this expression Thucydides meant to imply that by sanctioning the expedition they had debarred themselves from throwing blame on those who had advised it. I am bound to express my conviction that in this instance the judgement of the historian is fully justified. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 497, note, denies this, urging that 'the adviser of any important measure makes himself morally responsible for its justice, usefulness, and practicability; but he admits that it was hard upon them 'that—from the total destruction of the armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in the execution, not in the plan conceived.' This reasoning would be more plausible if the Athenians had been drawn into a scheme of which they had generally disapproved but to which they had given their sanction in defiance of their better judgement. But in fact, they had as a people



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thoughts were soon drawn away to more practical matters. The strength and flower of their army had been cut off: their fleet was either burnt or in the enemy's hands: their docks were almost empty of ships, and their calamity had rendered their adversaries irresistible. They looked for nothing less than an immediate attack from the Syracusan and Peloponnesian fleets. There was nothing to hinder them from coming or to keep the subjects of Athens from joining them. But although the heavens seemed laden with their doom, one feeling only pervaded the people. The idea of submission crossed no man's mind. The struggle must be carried on vigorously and economically: and the second consideration was as important as the first. The harassing duties imposed upon them by the establishment of a hostile garrison at Dekeleia had already set free much money which would otherwise have paid the citizens for their services in the Jury Courts; <sup>1822</sup> but more might be gained by reducing the costliness of their Liturgies and substituting seemly decency for the magnificence of their public festivals. They resolved at once to provide wood for ship-building, and to watch closely all movements among their subject allies, and especially in Eubœia. A board of old men was at the same time appointed, whose business it was to suggest such measures as in the present crisis might seem to them to be either necessary or useful. <sup>1823</sup> The dockyards were again busy with workmen, and with the rapidity which had

committed themselves to the enterprise with a vehemence which would listen to no remonstrance or warning; and it is unfair to Nikias to forget that he had both disapproved of the expedition and expressed his disapproval. But the whole history shows that the scheme was perfectly practicable, and that the Athenians had had two or three opportunities which, properly and promptly used, would have insured their success. There is, indeed, no difficulty in coming to a definite judgement about the matter. The Athenians sinned not by sending their fleets and armies on an impracticable errand, but in adopting the policy of which this scheme was a natural result, and against which they had been solemnly warned by Perikles. See the speech of Euphemos at Kamarina, p. 365. This was their first offence. Their second was in sending Nikias to command the expedition. His conduct during the debates before the departure of Kleon for Sphakteria should have opened their eyes to his absolute unfitness for such a trust. In both cases he insisted on the need of an enormous armament: the completeness with which his predictions were falsified at Pylos should further have taught them that his opinion was not one which should be blindly followed in any case, least of all in one where compliance would stake well-nigh the existence of the state on a perilous hazard.

<sup>1822</sup> See vol. i. p. 227.

<sup>1823</sup> Thuc. viii. 1, 3. The historian does not say that the functions of the Probouleutic Council were transferred to them; nor is there any reason to draw this inference. The members of the Board were probably bound to devote their whole time to their work,—an obligation which could not be imposed upon the larger body. The advantages of having such a Board in a time of emergency is manifest.

astonished the Syracusans<sup>1824</sup> the promontory of Sounion was strongly fortified to protect the passage of merchant vessels, while a further force was rendered available by abandoning the fort on the Peloponnesian coast facing the island of Kythera.<sup>1825</sup>

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The calamities which had thus strung the nerves of the Athenians to a pitch of desperate resolution roused in their enemies a vehement enthusiasm which regarded the struggle as all but ended. One more blow only was needed; and if this blow should be struck quickly and firmly, Athens would experience the fate which she had designed for all the Hellenic tribes. It had taken long to shatter the fabric of her empire: but now it was falling to pieces of itself, and the golden age in which every Greek city should be absolutely autonomous had all but begun. Such at least, seemed the prospect to the oligarchical factions which were more or less powerful in the cities belonging to the Athenian confederation.<sup>1826</sup> These men, to whom the coherence of a nation was a thing incomprehensible or hateful, felt sure that the coming summer would see the Peloponnesian fleets in the harbour of Peiræus, and a Peloponnesian garrison in possession of the Akropolis, while the Spartans rejoiced as though they already saw all Hellas basking in the sunshine of their benignant hegemony. The first movements of Agis were directed against the Oitaians who had troubled the military colony of Herakleia,<sup>1827</sup> and who were now compelled to purchase at a heavy price the cattle which Agis had surprised in their mountain pastures. From the Achaians of Phthiotis and other subjects of the Thessalians he exacted hostages who were sent for safe keeping to Corinth; but his efforts to induce them to join the Spartan confederation were crowned with no great success. Orders were issued for the building of a hundred ships, of which the Spartans and Boiotians should each furnish twenty-five, fifteen being furnished by the Corinthians and the same number by the Phokians and

State of feeling in Peloponnesos and among the oligarchical factions in the cities subject to Athens.

<sup>1824</sup> See p. 374.

<sup>1825</sup> See note 1765. Thuc. viii. 4.

<sup>1826</sup> Thucydides, viii. 2, 2, says sweepingly that the subjects of the Athenians were most of all eager to revolt, thus implying unanimity of thought and action. We shall see that this statement is as untrue now as it was when Brasidas went on his errand to Chalkidike. See page 247 *et seq.*

<sup>1827</sup> See page 294.

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Lokrians together, while ten were required from the Arkadians, Pellenians, and Sikyonians, and ten, again, from Megara, Troizen, Epidauros and Hermione.<sup>1828</sup> But the winter had not passed away before some of the allies of Athens made efforts to transfer their allegiance to Sparta, for the idea of securing real freedom by such a step was a mere dream. The first deputation came from Eubœia: and Agis at once summoned Alkamenes and Melanthos from Sparta to undertake the government of the island. Before they could accomplish their journey a second deputation came from Lesbos; and the influence of the Boiotians, who insisted on the paramount need of securing that island, induced Agis to leave Eubœia for the present to itself, while Alkamenes was sent as Harmostes to Lesbos. This change of plan he made on his own responsibility and without any reference to the home government of Sparta. He had a force at his command which enabled him to do as he pleased; and he therefore felt himself free to act over again the part of Pausanias.

Overtures  
of Tissaphernes  
and Pharnabazos  
to the  
Spartans.

At Sparta the drama soon became more complicated. The oligarchic factions in Chios and Erythrai<sup>1829</sup> were anxious to avail themselves of the prostration of Athens in order to realise their dreams of autonomy. With their envoys, whom they sent not to Agis but straight to Sparta, appeared ambassadors from Tissaphernes. The Persian satrap of the province which lay to the south of the gulf of Adramyttion had received notice from the great king<sup>1830</sup> that the tributes due from the Hellenic cities within his jurisdiction must be paid into the treasury. It can scarcely be supposed that any attempt was made or even thought of to enforce the royal claim for the arrears of half a century; but the mere fact that the weakness of Athens should at once call forth such a claim might have taught them that in seeking to be

<sup>1828</sup> Thuc. viii. 3.

<sup>1829</sup> Thucydides, viii. 5, 4, says boldly that the application came from 'the Chians and Erythraians.' By his own showing the statement is false. The large majority of the Chians knew nothing of the intrigues which had revolt from Athens for their object: and it was this ignorance which compelled the conspirators, for such they were, to proceed with the utmost caution. viii. 9, 5. They knew that if the people should become acquainted with what was going on, their schemes would be hopelessly frustrated. It is of the utmost importance to keep this fact steadily in view.

<sup>1830</sup> The Persian throne was now filled by Ochus, more commonly known as Darius Nothos, who had first cheated and then murdered his half-brother. B.C. 434. At the least he could plead that if he had not done so, his half-brother would have murdered him, note 1478. Niebuhr, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* ii. 182.

free of the Athenian yoke they were but wishing, like the frogs, to change king Log for king Stork. It is possible that this circumstance may even then have somewhat dimmed their eager anticipations of a golden future; but for the present they were willing to look rather on the help which Tissaphernes offered than on the slavery which loomed in the distance. Both sides were indeed much like thieves who needed each the aid of the other. The oligarchic conspirators, for such they literally and strictly were, felt that they dared not run the risk of revolt unless they could have the support of an adequate force of allies, and they knew that Sparta would not stir unless it could be made clear that it was to her interest to do so. Tissaphernes, again, on his side knew that without Spartan aid he could not break up the Athenian empire, and that until this result could be achieved, he must remain a debtor to the king for a sum the magnitude of which was every day increasing. He had further to fight with some men who should have been his friends. Amorges, the son of Pissouthnes, was in revolt against the king and in alliance with the Athenians; and Tissaphernes had received strict orders that the rebel must be slain or sent a prisoner to Sousa. To extricate himself from these difficulties he tempted the Spartans by the offer to take the whole cost of the expedition on himself. But Tissaphernes did not stand alone in his wish to make alliance with Sparta. The same demand which pressed so heavily upon him had been forwarded from Sousa to the satrap of the Hellespont, or the province lying to the north of the Adramyttian bay. While the envoys of Tissaphernes were pleading the cause of the Chians, Kalligeitos and Timagoras, exiles the one from Megara, the other from Kyzikos, appeared as representatives of Pharnabazos to pray that the Hellespont might be made the scene of the first operations. Thus was presented the singular sight of two Persian satraps beseeching the Spartans to undo the work which they had left Athens to carry out and which she had ably and successfully done for nearly seventy years. That the satraps should each be anxious to win the royal favour by being foremost in pulling down the Athenian empire was perfectly natural; that the Spartans

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who in the day of need had adjured the Athenians by all law and justice human and divine not to betray their kinsfolk to the barbarian should now deliberately re-open the way for Persian aggression was an unnatural and a dastardly treason against the liberties not only of Hellas but of Europe. But looking merely to the mode in which treachery might be made to yield its fruits most readily, we cannot doubt that the Spartans were right in inclining rather to the side of Tissaphernes than to that of Pharnabazos. The contest was decided by Alkibiades who with all his strength urged the claims of the Chians<sup>1831</sup> as being the highest bidders. For the moment he had everything in his favour. His ancestral friend Endios<sup>1832</sup> was one of the ephors: Tissaphernes had promised to furnish all the pay: and Pharnabazos without binding himself by any such definite pledge had sent by Kalligeitos twenty-five talents as an earnest of greater things to be done hereafter.<sup>1833</sup> But, more than all, Alkibiades was basking in the full sunshine of success. The success involved, it is true, unspeakable infamy: but for that this heartless man cared nothing. The mission of Gylippos had saved Sicily, and this mission had been suggested and passionately urged by himself. He was in a special sense the hero of Dekeleia and Syracuse: and his verdict turned the scale in the councils of Sparta.<sup>1834</sup>

Determina-  
tion of the  
Spartans to  
assist the  
Chian con-  
spirators.

But there was yet much to be done. The Spartans had no mind to be tricked by the Chians as the Athenians had been cheated by the men of Egesta; but the Perioikian<sup>1835</sup> Phrynīs, who was sent to test their resources, came back with a report more trustworthy than an inventory of gold and silver plate. Sixty triremes were ready for service in the Chian harbour; and it was at once decreed that this number should be raised to a hundred by the dispatching of forty ships from Peloponnesos. Melanchridas was ordered to set out with an instalment of ten: but before he was ready to depart, an earthquake roused the superstitious fears of the Spartans; and in place of Melanchridas with his ten ships they determined to send Chalkideus with five.

<sup>1831</sup> Thuc. viii. 6.

<sup>1835</sup> Thuc. viii. 8, 1.

<sup>1835</sup> See vol. i. page 78.

<sup>1852</sup> See p. 291.

<sup>1854</sup> Ib. viii. 8, 3.

So passed away the winter which ended the nineteenth year of the war. The spring had come; and the Chian conspirators<sup>1836</sup> still waited impatiently for the promised succour. At last three Spartan envoys were sent to Corinth with a request that the nine-and-thirty ships then lying in the port of Lechaion should be hauled over the isthmus and all be dispatched to Chios together with the twenty ships which Agis had promised to send to Lesbos.<sup>1837</sup> The prospect was not altogether encouraging. The Chian oligarchs were in a fever of anxiety lest their secret devices should become known to the Athenians, while the envoys of Pharnabazos went off in disgust, vowing that they would have nothing to do with Chios, and carrying back with them the money which they had brought. Agis, however, threw himself heartily into the scheme of Alkibiades: and a synod was held at Corinth, in which it was resolved that Chalkideus should strike in Chios the first blow at the Athenian empire, that Alkamenes should then carry on the enterprise at Lesbos, and that finally the work should be brought to an end at the Hellespont by Klearchos. But to distract the attention of the Athenians and to divide the scanty fleet which still remained to them, they determined that only one-and-twenty ships should be brought across the isthmus. These were launched without an attempt at concealment, as in the utter prostration of Athens secrecy seemed both superfluous and absurd. This confidence was not wholly justified. The refusal of the Corinthians to sail before the celebration of the Isthmian games gave the Athenians time to verify in some measure the suspicions which they had already formed, and which during the celebration of the festival were converted almost into certainty.<sup>1838</sup> Aristokrates was accordingly sent to Chios, and on being assured by the government that they had

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Synod of  
the Spartan  
allies at  
Corinth.  
412 B.C.

<sup>1836</sup> I am compelled to use this term, because no other will express the facts of the case. Thucydides, viii. 7, 1, says simply 'the Chians: ' but his own subsequent statements convict this expression of falsehood. See note 1829.

<sup>1837</sup> Thuc. viii. 5, 2, and 7.

<sup>1838</sup> *Ib.* viii. 10, 1. Corinth and Athens were now openly at war: but this was the first Isthmian festival which had been held since the renewal of the struggle, and the heralds who announced the truce may not have received formal instructions to exclude Athens. The reluctance to do this may have been increased by the fact that the Athenian Theseus was the great hero of these games. But the circumstances of the time lead the historian to state distinctly that the Athenians received an invitation to the festival.

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no intention of revolting, he demanded a contingent of ships by the terms of the alliance and as a pledge of their fidelity. The demand was complied with, we are told, only because the conspirators dared not to call the people into their council. Seven Chian triremes sailed for Athens; and curses not loud but deep were probably imprecated on the Spartans whose remissness had brought this ignominy upon them.<sup>1839</sup>

Defeat and  
death of  
Alkamenes  
at Peiraion.

When therefore the Peloponnesian fleet under Alkamenes set out from Kenchreai, an Athenian squadron of equal strength advanced to meet them in the hope of provoking a conflict on the open sea. The Peloponnesians declined the risk; and the Athenians also retreated, feeling that they could place no confidence in the Chian ships which accompanied them.<sup>1840</sup> On the following day the Athenians again came on in order of battle as soon as the enemy began their voyage, and drove them back on the desolate harbour of Peiraion<sup>1841</sup> near the Epidaurian border. One Peloponnesian ship was sunk at sea; the rest were moored on the beach. But the Athenians attacked them both by sea and land, and with some loss to themselves disabled most of the enemy's ships and killed the admiral Alkamenes. It had been agreed that as soon as the fleet began its voyage from Kenchreai, Chalkideus should be dispatched with his squadron of five, taking Alkibiades with him. This squadron had actually set sail, when a second messenger brought the tidings of the defeat and death of Alkamenes; and the Spartans saw in this disaster an evil omen for their fortunes in a struggle which was now rather an Ionian than a Peloponnesian war. They at once recalled Chalkideus and resolved on issuing orders for the return of some ships which had set out before him. In this resolution Alkibiades saw the deathblow to the whole scheme. Chios could be added to the Spartan confederacy only by the success of the oligarchic plot: and Alkibiades with his partisans had to contend not only with the certain opposition of the demos but

<sup>1839</sup> Thuc. viii. 9, 3.

<sup>1840</sup> It seems strange that the Athenians did not at once take the precautions which they adopted a little later. Thuc. viii. 15.

<sup>1841</sup> This can scarcely be the headland of Speiraion. Colonel Leake holds that Peiraion is the harbour now known as Frango Limiona. See the note of Dr. Arnold, *Thuc.* viii. 10, 3.

with the wariness of the conspirators who were ready to revolt from Athens but not at all ready to run the risk of ruining themselves. If these oligarchic plotters should learn not merely the disaster at Peiraion but the recall of the squadron of Chalkideus, they would at once seek to disarm the suspicion of the Athenians by an increased profession of zeal for their service and probably by the offer of some more solid security. He insisted that the original plan should still be carried out, and he pledged himself that, if once he reached the Ionian coast, he would bring about the revolt not only of Chios but of the other cities in alliance with Athens. For his friend Endios he had other arguments. The man who should be the foremost in breaking up the Athenian empire and cementing a friendship between the Spartans and the Persian king would win a name second perhaps only to that of Brasidas; and unless Endios hastened to do this work himself, the honour of it would fall to his rival and enemy Agis. The influence of Endios united with his own gained the day: but the hasty departure of Alkibiades and of Chalkideus with his five triremes left the Spartans not less rich in the number of ships at their command. The twenty-seven Athenians triremes under Hippokles, which kept guard off Leukas, had succeeded in destroying only one of the fleet of sixteen ships which Gylippos was bringing back from Syracuse. The rest made their way safely to Corinth.<sup>1842</sup>

It was necessary now to hoodwink the conspirators at Chios not less than the Chian demos: and Alkibiades accordingly compelled every vessel which he met or overtook to accompany his triremes, until they reached the peninsula of Korykos or Erythrai. Eight Athenian ships taken from the blockading force at Peiraion had been dispatched in pursuit under the command of Strombichides; but they started too late and were compelled to return to their former position without success. Thus no tidings of the defeat of Alkamenes reached the oligarchs, who advised the Spartans to enter the Chian harbour without giving any notice of their approach. The plan of proceeding had been carefully arranged. The council was assembling when to the dismay and bewilder-

Revolt of  
Chios, Ery-  
thrai, and  
Klazo-  
menai from  
Athens.

<sup>1842</sup> Thuc. viii. 10-13.



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ment of the Chian people the Spartan triremes approached the landing-place; and Alkibiades at once appeared before the senate. Lying after the fashion of Brasidas at Akanthos,<sup>1843</sup> he assured them that the little squadron which had brought himself and Chalkideus to their harbour was but the van of a larger fleet already on its way, while of the incidents at Peiraion he said nothing. The plotters were completely snared. They felt now that they might rely on prompt and efficient aid from Sparta, and they resolved to risk the solid benefits of a prosperity unbroken for half a century for the sake of gratifying the unreasoning instinct of isolation,—an instinct which made even the demos prize but lightly a connexion from which they yet knew that they had received much good and no harm. The decisive step was taken. Chios revolted from Athens, and her example was followed first by Erythrai and then by Klazomenai, the citizens of which at once left the islet on which their city was built to strengthen their fortified post of Polichna on the neighbouring shore of the Hermaic gulf.<sup>1844</sup> Thus had Alkibiades once again changed the history of his country. Spartan tardiness would have allowed the Chian conspirators to learn the real state of the case, and to take in the full extent of the risk which they were running; and their refusal to revolt would have insured the fidelity of the other allies of Athens. The energy of the traitor turned the scale; and the voyage of Chalkideus with his five ships bore its fruit in the final catastrophe of Aigospotamoi.

Employment of the Athenian reserve fund to meet this crisis.

Having once committed themselves to the venture, the Chian oligarchs espoused the cause of their new friends with impetuous ardour; but there is no reason for thinking that the demos shared their zeal. The whole history of the Athenian empire shows that but for the miserable oligarchic factions which regarded subordination to a central power as the worst of evils, the confederacy would have formed a permanent as well as an effectual barrier to Persian aggressiveness and prevented the growth of the Makedonian power. The oligarchic faction at Chios was not blind to the benefits which they had reaped from their connexion with Athens;

<sup>1843</sup> See p. 258.

<sup>1844</sup> Thuc. viii. 14.

and while they wished to weaken the imperial city, they had no desire to impoverish themselves. The interference of Tissaphernes was no good omen for the future; but they would cherish the trust that Sparta would know how to maintain the dignity as well as the interests of Hellas. They were utterly mistaken: but for the present their act had produced all the results which could have been looked for. It had given a new and startling impulse to the centrifugal instincts of the Athenian allies; and it had filled Athens with a dismay bordering on sheer despair. With her present resources she was wholly unable to make way against the difficulties which were overwhelming her: but there remained still the reserved fund of one thousand talents which under solemn sanctions Perikles had stored up in the Akropolis.<sup>1845</sup> These sanctions were now removed, and a decree was passed that the sum should be used for the needs of the state. A new fleet, probably of inferior ships, was at once manned and sent to take the place of the blockading squadron off Peiraion. Of this squadron eight ships commanded by Strombichides were dispatched to Chios, while the seven Chian ships were taken to Athens where the free men among the crews were imprisoned and the slaves belonging to them set free. In addition to these, thirty more triremes were to be equipped and manned.<sup>1846</sup>

Meanwhile Strombichides had reached Samos. Sailing thence to Teos, he insisted on the neutrality of the Teians if he could not have their active help. But the approach of a land-force from Erythrai and Klazomenai warned him to stand out to sea, where presently the three-and-twenty triremes of Chalkideus hove in sight from Chios. Against such a number his own small fleet was useless, and retreat now became flight. While Chalkideus was chasing him to Samos, the Teians were induced to admit the Erythraian and Klazomenian forces whom they had refused to receive so long as the Athenians maintained their ground. The strangers, having vainly waited a while for the return of Chalkideus, set to work to demolish the wall which the Athenians had built on the landward side of the city, and Stagês the deputy of

Revolt of  
Miletos;  
and treaty  
between  
Sparta and  
Persia.

<sup>1845</sup> See p. 115.

<sup>1846</sup> Thuc. viii. 15.

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Tissaphernes hurried up with a body of troops to take part in the pleasant task. But Alkibiades was impatient to strike a harder blow on the falling power of Athens. The crews of the Peloponnesian ships were landed at Chios to serve as hoplites;<sup>1847</sup> and with fresh crews he hastened with Chalkideus to Miletos. He was specially anxious that the revolt of this still great city should be achieved before any further reinforcements should be sent from Sparta and while his friend Endios still remained in office. With the good fortune which had thus far marked his course, he continued to escape the notice of Strombichides whose scanty fleet had been strengthened at Samos by the arrival of Thrasykles with twelve ships. His arrival at Miletos was followed by the immediate revolt of the city and the ratification of a treaty between the Persian king and the Lakadaimonians. This compact not only bound either party to carry on the war so long as the other should desire its continuance, but declared the great king to be the rightful owner of all lands which he or his predecessors had at any time possessed.<sup>1848</sup> The promises which Brasidas had made to the revolted towns of Chalkidike had been kept with no great strictness: but now the Spartans, who had sworn to maintain the autonomy of every Hellenic city, had declared a barbarian despot the master not only of the lands lying to the east of the Egean, but of Boiotia, Thessaly, Attica, and Megara,<sup>1849</sup> and the charge of treachery can be met only by ascribing to them the deliberate intention of cheating their new ally.

Failure of  
the block-  
ade off  
Peiraion,  
and general  
depression  
of the  
Athenians.

The Athenian commanders, on discovering that Alkibiades had evaded them, hastened to Miletos with all speed. But they came too late, and with their nineteen triremes they took up their station off the islet of Ladê facing the city to the west. Eager to spread rebellion, the Chian oligarchs had sailed to Anaia, the old post of the Samian oligarchical exiles,<sup>1850</sup> when they received from Chalkideus an order to re-

<sup>1847</sup> This would be a gain, as the islanders could furnish no heavy-armed troops to compete with those of Sparta.

<sup>1848</sup> Thuc. viii. 18.

<sup>1849</sup> The territory of Megara or a part of it had been held for a few days by Mardonios, see vol. i. p. 569: and any such occupation served in the eyes of the great king as a title to possession.

<sup>1850</sup> See p. 440.

treat, as Amorges was approaching with a land army. Falling back to the Temple of Zeus about five miles to the west of Kolophon on the northern shore of the Kaÿstrian gulf, they saw a fresh squadron of sixteen Athenian triremes approaching under the command of Diomedon, and fled, one ship making its way to Ephesos, the rest hurrying westward in the direction of Teos; but although four ships the crews of which had escaped fell into the hands of the Athenians, the tide of affairs was not really changed. Not only were Lebedos and Erai induced by the Chians to join the revolt,<sup>1851</sup> but the blockade off Peiraion was broken by the beleaguered ships, who, making a sudden onset, seized four Athenian triremes, and made their way to Kenchreai. Here they were joined by the Spartan high-admiral Astyochos, who at once made his preparations to sail for Chios.<sup>1852</sup> There was, in fact, nothing to cheer and everything to depress the Athenians. An attack of Diomedon on Erai failed to reduce the place: and the exaction of a bare neutrality from the Teians brought with it but a poor satisfaction.

But, while the prospect seemed daily to grow darker and more hopeless, an event occurred which for a time averted the final catastrophe and seemed even to make it likely that Athens might yet be victorious over her enemies. A revolution took place in Samos not against her but in her favour. So little had Athens interfered with the domestic affairs of the island since the suppression of the first revolt,<sup>1853</sup> that the Geomoroi, or oligarchical landowners, whom we have met in the history of Syracuse,<sup>1854</sup> had contrived to regain their preponderance and to deprive the demos of all right of intermarriage with the dominant class. Of the time when or the mode in which this change occurred we know nothing: but it is certain that when the rising of the demos took place, Samos was strictly under local government. The presence of three Athenian ships at the time of the revolution was accidental:<sup>1855</sup> nor can the operations of the Samian exiles at Anaia be regarded as proving that even at the time when they were being carried on the government of Samos

Rising of  
the Samian  
Demos  
against the  
Geomoroi.

<sup>1851</sup> Thuc. viii. 19.

<sup>1853</sup> See p. 71.

<sup>1855</sup> Thuc. viii. 21.

<sup>1852</sup> Ib. viii. 20.

<sup>1854</sup> See vol. i. p. 177.

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was democratical. The change may very possibly not have taken place so soon; but if it had, it would still be enough for these exiles that Samos had been reduced from the rank of an autonomous to that of a subject ally and that the oligarchy was content to rule in the interests of Athens. This alone would be a sufficient reason for doing all that might be in their power to thwart and hamper the government. Still less can it be maintained that if Samos had now been subject to an oligarchy, it would have been foremost in revolting from Athens. The history of the Chian revolt, were other instances wanting, would be enough to show, that, however much the oligarchs might wish to be rid of the connexion, they would still take no decided step until they could reasonably calculate on success. The Chian oligarchs felt that the favourable moment was come when Alkibiades told them that the five ships then present would be immediately followed by a larger fleet. The Samian oligarchs had no such encouragement, and they were further kept in check by the Athenian ships which chanced to be in the harbour and still more by the consciousness that the attempt to revolt would be opposed by the great mass of the people. But finally it is scarcely possible to suppose, that when Thucydides speaks of an uprising of the people against the dominant order, he can mean a conflict in which a self-governing people have to fight with a class which seeks to put them down.<sup>1856</sup> The demos had probably been for some time watching an opportunity for deposing their rulers, and the presence of the Athenian ships determined them to act at once. The oligarchy was in all likelihood taken completely by surprise; but they made an obstinate resistance. Two hundred were slain in the struggle: four hundred were driven into exile; and their property, both real and personal, was divided amongst the demos, who with a studied irony treated the Geomoroi as an inferior class by forbidding the people, on whom they had thus far looked down with infinite contempt, from contracting any marriages with them. These

<sup>1856</sup> The phrase ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις [ὑπὸ] τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς clearly implies that the people at the time were not in possession of power. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 524, note, has brought together a number of instances to prove a point which cannot reasonably be called into question.

were sweeping, if not hard, measures; and the Samians must be severely condemned, if the acts cannot be justified. But there cannot be a doubt,—indeed it is admitted even by historians who are least disposed to favour Athens,—that these oligarchs intended to follow the example of their brethren at Chios: and unless it can be maintained that the people were bound to be passive while a foreign enemy was being brought in, and a yoke put upon them far harder than the mere sentimental grievance which formed their one ground of complaint against the Athenians, then it must be granted that they took the only course open to them. The violence of the struggle was owing to the power of the dominant party; and the punishment dealt out to them after their defeat was certainly not so heavy as that which they would have inflicted on a demos against which they might themselves have risen in successful revolt. That the Athenians should feel both pleasure and gratitude towards the Samian people, is only what we should look for. The Samians had given signal proof of their fidelity, and Athens rewarded them by raising them at once to the rank of an autonomous ally.

The effect of this revolution soon became felt. If the Athenians were to continue the struggle at all, their base of operations must be secure: and such a post they now had in Samos. Nor was it long before they were able to check the eager zeal of the Chian oligarchs who dreaded most of all to stand alone in revolt, and who now made a strong effort to detach Lesbos from Athens. This island was now divided among the five governments of Mytilene on the eastern side, of Methymna on the northern, of Antissa and Eresos at the western extremity of the island, and of Pyrrha in the deeply-indented bay which runs up from the southern side. Of the constitutions of these cities at this time we know nothing: but the Athenian Klerouchoi sent after the suppression of the Mytilenaian revolt fifteen years before must have long since disappeared. Thirteen Chian ships sailed to Lesbos, while a land-force of Peloponnesians and their allies marched towards Klazomenai and Kymê, on their road to the Hellespont, if the revolt of Lesbos should leave the way open. Methymna and Mytilene at once threw off their

Revolt and  
recovery of  
Lesbos.

allegiance to Athens; but three days after the arrival of the Spartan high-admiral Astyochós at Chios, five-and-twenty Athenian triremes under Léon and Diomedon sailed to the island. Learning this fact, Astyochos with his four Peloponnesian ships and one Chian vessel followed them late in the day, and sailed to Pyrrha and thence to Eresos, where he learnt that the Athenians had taken the Mytilenaians completely by surprise and occupied their city almost without a blow. The men of Eresos showed their courage, if not their wisdom, by revolting after they heard this news; and Astyochos sailed on to Antissa and Methymna in the hope of retrieving losses and gaining fresh ground. But his efforts were vain. The Athenians were soon masters of the whole island. The Peloponnesian land-force was broken up, and the idea of immediate operations at the Hellespont in conjunction with Pharnabazos was abandoned. The tide had for the present turned, and the capture of the Klázomenian Polichna, with the restoration of Klazomenai itself to the Athenian alliance, was an earnest of greater successes elsewhere.<sup>1857</sup>

Defeat and death of Chalkideus. Athenian ravages in Chios.

On the suppression of the Mytilenaiian revolt in the days of Kleon the whole male population of the city was condemned to death. If the Lesbians now escaped, as it would seem, without any pains and penalties except those which are involved in actual warfare, their good fortune may be ascribed rather to the weakness of the conquerors than to their magnanimity. The Athenians could not afford to do now as they had done at Skione or at Melos: but there was nothing to prevent them from retaliating on their enemies at least those evils which the fortification of Dekeleia had so bitterly aggravated for themselves; and their vengeance was directed first against the conspirators of Chios. In an attack which they now made on the Milesian Panormos the Spartan commander Chalkideus was slain: and then the storm burst upon the Chians simultaneously from Lesbos, from the Oinoussian islets off the northern promontory of their own island, and from Sidoussa and Pteleon on the opposite territory of Erythrai. A series of defeats at Kardamylé and Bolissos, at Phanai and Leukonion reduced the Chians to a

state of siege within their walls, and compelled them to look passively upon the ravaging of those fruitful and happy lands on which no invader had trod since the days of Xerxes. This was all that the plotters had gained by intrigues warily carried on and by schemes carefully matured. During the whole period of Athenian supremacy the Chian government had displayed a singular prudence and caution, which in the historian's mind stood out in marked contrast with the impolitic eagerness and miserable mismanagement of the Athenian expedition to Sicily. Thucydides, indeed, tries hard to show that if the Chian oligarchs (or, as he is pleased to call them, the Chians) had committed an error of judgement, it was one which might be readily pardoned. To all appearance the power of Athens was irretrievably shattered at Syracuse; and they were backed, as they thought, with a sufficient body of supporters.<sup>1858</sup> But unless it be maintained that a feudal nobility would be justified in bringing foreign enemies into the land against the known wishes of a whole people, these Chian oligarchs must stand condemned. The demos throughout had had no desire to join them; and the blockade of the city naturally re-awakened the activity of the Athenian party, that is, of the great body of the people. The demos must surely have known that they at least had little to look for in the way of benefit from Spartan Harmostai and from the Persian tribute-gatherers with whom these Spartans seemed to maintain so suspicious a friendship. The singular and unbroken prosperity of the island from the time when Athens became the head of the Delian confederacy furnished indisputable proof that the islanders not only had no real grounds of complaint against the administration of the imperial city but were indebted to it for happiness and wealth which in like measure they would never know again. It is unnecessary to palliate those enormous crimes of the Athenian people which stand out in their naked hideousness from the more decent tenor of their general history: nor need we even ask for any arrest of judgement on the ground that the crimes of Spartans, Boiotians, Korkyraians, and Syracusans were immeasurably more loathsome and disgusting. There was enough in the conduct of the Chian government to excite

<sup>1858</sup> Thuc. viii. 24, 5.



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the deepest indignation of Englishmen at the present day. Had it not been for Athens they must have remained subject to the degrading yoke and the arbitrary exactions of the Persian king. Under her protecting arm they had passed more than half a century in perfect safety, and as her free allies they had been called upon only to furnish their yearly quota of ships for the maintenance of an order from which they derived benefits fully equal to any which Athens herself received. It is not, indeed, too much to say that this order was the greatest political blessing which the world had yet seen. It reflected on the humblest members of this great confederacy the lustre of the most considerable states enrolled in it; and the inhabitants of insignificant Egean islands were thoroughly aware and not a little proud of the importance thus attached to them both in the Hellenic and even in the barbarian world. If they were injured by the men of other cities, they could appeal to the great assembly of the Athenian citizens, in whose law courts, as they well knew, there was little difficulty in obtaining justice even against Athenian tribute-gathering generals.<sup>1859</sup> To this order in spite of the sentimental grievances shaped by diseased dreams of autonomy the people in most of the allied or subject cities were honestly attached: and in Chios their attachment was so strong that the oligarchs had to work in fear and trembling lest their plots should come prematurely to the knowledge of the demos. It would not be in the nature of Englishmen now to look passively upon destruction so wanton and revolt so utterly unprovoked; and if we may judge from the history of the Indian mutiny, — a mutiny which, however frightful and inhuman the atrocities with which it was begun and carried on, had deeper causes than the groundless discontent of Chian oligarchs, — the punishment of Chios at the hands of England would have been far more severe than the chastisement inflicted by Athens.

Victory of  
the Athenians and  
Argives  
over Astyo-  
chos and  
Tissaphernes at  
Miletos.

While Astyochos was seeking, by taking hostages or in other modes, to keep down the philo-Athenian party in Chios,<sup>1860</sup> a fleet of 48 ships under the command of Phrynichos, Onomakles, and Skironides was conveying from Athens to Miletos a force of 1,000 Athenian and 1,500 Argeian

<sup>1859</sup> See page 170.

<sup>1860</sup> Thuc. viii. 24, 6.

hoplites (500 of these having received their panoplies at Athens), together with 1,000 furnished by the allies. This force had incamped on Milesian ground, before the Milesians aided by the Peloponnesians under Chalkideus and by Tissaphernes himself with a body of Persian cavalry came out to meet them. The Dorian Argives advanced with the carelessness of contempt against the Ionians of Miletos who were opposed to them; but their disorder was punished by a defeat which cost them 300 men, while the Ionians of Athens were not less decisively victorious over the Dorians of Sparta. The astonishment caused by this strange result might have been especially useful to the Athenians in their intended investment of Miletos, had not tidings come that a fleet of 55 ships from Peloponnesos and Sicily might at any moment be looked for. Of these ships twenty were from Syracuse and two from Selinous; and Hermokrates, by whose urgent advice they had been sent, was himself in command of them.<sup>1861</sup> That eager statesman was as earnestly bent on breaking up the maritime empire of Athens in the Egean as he had been on destroying her forces on the soil of his own city. The whole armament reached the islet of Leros, about 30 miles to the southwest of Miletos, under the command of Theramenes who was charged to hand it over to Astyochos. Thence, hearing that the Athenians were at Miletos, he sailed eastwards to the gulf of Iasos; and here at Teichioussa, Alkibiades who had fought in the last battle told him in few words that unless Miletos could be relieved their whole work in sapping the empire of Athens must be frustrated. A resolution was taken to go at once to its aid; but their mere approach had attained the object in view. The Athenian commanders were at first anxious to meet the Peloponnesians in open fight: but they were opposed by Phrynichos with a determined energy which, if displayed by Demosthenes, might have conquered the obstinacy even of a Nikias and made the revolt of Chios and Miletos impossible. Defeat, he insisted, was the one thing which Athens in her present need could not afford to incur. This need was so great that even with full preparation they were not justified in risking a battle, unless they were absolutely compelled to fight; but here there was

<sup>1861</sup> Thuc. viii. 26, 1, and 29, 2.

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no such necessity, and he assuredly would not allow the safety of Athens to be imperilled from any fancied notions of honour or self-respect. From Samos, they might at a more convenient season become assailants in their turn. In the meanwhile it was their clear duty to carry away their wounded men, not burdening their ships with the spoil which they may have taken in the Milesian territory. This advice of Phrynichos calls forth the warm praise of Thucydides.<sup>1862</sup> But neither here nor in the later scenes of his career is it easy to determine the character of his motives. We are now approaching the time in which the constitutional life developed in Athens from the days of Solon, or rather perhaps those of Kleisthenes, was to be disastrously interrupted; and the acts of Phrynichos were not such as to vindicate for him the trust reposed whether in Perikles or in Aristeides.

Retreat of the Athenians to Samos; and capture of Amorges

To Samos accordingly the Athenians retreated; but with wretched negligence or selfishness their commanders failed to send notice of their departure to their Persian friend Amorges, who on seeing the Peloponnesian fleet enter the Iasian gulf took them naturally to be Athenian ships, and found out his mistake only when it was too late. The unfortunate man was sent to Sousa to be tortured to death; the Greek mercenaries in his service, transferred to the Spartan ranks, were dispatched to Chios under the command of Pedaritos the son of Leon; and Philippos was left as Harmostes at Miletos. From Samos the Argive allies of the Athenians insisted on returning home. A defeat at the hands of Ionians was an offence which their Doric pride could not forgive.

Dispute between Tissaphernes and Herakrates.

The summer passed away without the excitement of angry feeling between the Peloponnesians and their allies. In the autumn the payment of the fleet at the rate of a drachma daily for each man, together with a notice that for the future he could not except on direct orders from the king pay more than the half drachma, showed the working of a secret influence which afterwards led to more important results. By Theramenes, who was only in temporary command, the

notice was received with indifference; but the loudly expressed indignation of Hermokrates convinced Tissaphernes of the wisdom of compromising the matter, and he agreed to furnish a rate of pay which should enable all to receive the half drachma, while the crew of one ship in rotation would be paid at the old rate.<sup>1863</sup> The events of the winter, on the whole, told more for the Athenians than for their enemies. A fresh force of five-and-thirty ships under Charminos, Strombichides, and Euktemon, joined the fleet already at Samos, thus raising the whole number of efficient ships on that station to 104, in scarcely more than a year from the time when the catastrophe of Syracuse left her practically without a navy. A squadron of thirty ships, together with a body of hoplites in transports, was sent to Chios: the remainder made preparations for a renewed attack on Miletos. On the Spartan side Astyochois was mortified by a failure first at Pteleon and then at Klazomenai where the citizens refused to banish to Daphnous the philo-Athenian party. From Klazomenai he went to Phokaia and Kymê, where a deputation of Lesbian oligarchs besought his help for a second revolt. Astyochois was eager to comply with their request; but the failure of the last attempt had convinced the Corinthians and the other allies that the Athenian interest in that island was too strong to be shaken, and they steadily opposed the scheme. Still persevering, Astyochois went himself to Chios, and strove to prevail on Pedaritos by the argument that even their failure would do far more mischief to the Athenians than to themselves. Pedaritos answered briefly that he would neither go himself nor allow the Chian ships to be taken on this errand; and Astyochois, vowing that he would not return to aid the Chians if they should need his help ever so much, departed for Miletos, and took up his night station on the northern side of mount Korykos. At the southern end of the same peninsula was drawn up the Athenian fleet on its way to Chios: and a meeting between the two would have been inevitable, had not Astyochois been called back by a false alarm to Erythrai.

<sup>1863</sup> This is probably the meaning to be put on the words of Thucydides, viii. 29, 2. See further Arnold, *ad loc.*, and Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 536.

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By thus turning back he escaped not only a battle-but a great storm which overtook the Athenian fleet off cape Arginos while in chase of three Chian ships. These managed with some difficulty to make their way into their harbour: but three of the pursuing squadron were driven ashore and the crews either taken prisoners or slain. The rest found shelter in the harbour under mount Mimas which forms the northern cape of the Erythraian peninsula as Korykos forms the southern.<sup>1864</sup>

Unsuccessful operations of the Athenians at Knidos.

Returning to Lesbos the Athenians hurried on their preparations for the blockade of Chios: but their attention was for a time diverted in part to Knidos at the southern extremity of the Keramic gulf. Here a Peloponnesian force was stationed, consisting of twelve ships which had lately arrived under the command of the Rhodian Dorieus. Of these one was Peloponnesian, one Syracusan, while the rest were from Thourioi where a revolution had crushed and expelled the philo-Athenian party. Six of these ships were now guarding Knidos which had revolted and placed itself under the protection of Tissaphernes: the remaining six were keeping watch off the neighbouring promontory of Triopion for Athenian-vessels returning with corn from Egypt. This division the Athenians surprised. The ships were all taken, but their crews escaped. At Knidos itself they were less successful. The town had no sea-wall:<sup>1865</sup> and on the first assault they all but took it. During the night the Knidians cast up some rude defences, and as they were further reinforced by the crews which had escaped from the ships captured at Triopion, they were enabled to offer so stout a resistance that the Athenians deemed it prudent to return to Samos after ravaging the Knidian territory.

Second treaty between Sparta and Persia.

In the powerful Spartan fleet assembled at Miletos Astyochos, it would seem, read the condemnation of the disgraceful treaty made by Chalkideus with Tissaphernes. It was not that he had any definite grievance. The rich spoils taken

<sup>1864</sup> Thuc. viii. 33 and 34.

<sup>1865</sup> The phrase of Thucydides, viii. 35, 3, implies that it had no walls at all, and Sir G. C. Lewis asserts on the strength of it that the polygonal walls of which the ruins still remain belong to a later age. *Astronomy of the Ancients*, 443. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 543 thinks that it was fortified on the land side.

at Iasos had made the troops wealthy; the Milesians had espoused the cause of Sparta with a zeal bordering on vehemence; and the pay furnished by Tissaphernes was at least adequate. Nevertheless the covenant made with Chalkideus appeared to Astyochos, as well as to Theramenes, to be too much in the interests of the Persian king; <sup>1866</sup> and accordingly before the departure of Theramenes <sup>1867</sup> he insisted on a revision of the terms. The result was a compact which formally bound the Spartans not to injure whether by invasion or in any other way any country or city which may at any time have belonged either to the reigning Persian monarch or to any of his predecessors. From such territories or towns they were forbidden to exact any tax or tribute whatsoever. In return for these concessions the barbarian despot graciously condescended to give the Spartans such help as he might be persuaded to afford, and to guarantee them to the best of his power from invasion on the part of any of his subjects. <sup>1868</sup> It may be seen at a glance that this treaty simply substitutes an absurdity in place of an insult. The former covenant had secured to the king all lands or cities which he or his forefathers might at any time have possessed, and thus owned him as lord of Thessaly, Boiotia, Athens, and Megara: the latter pledged the Spartans to do no mischief to any of these lands or cities. But there was no clause declaring that Athens was in a state of rebellion and must be brought back to her allegiance: and therefore this treaty formally pledged the Spartans to immediate peace with the enemies against whom they were now fighting to the death. It is impossible that either side can have failed to see the utter mockery of this paction; and the fact proves abundantly the hollowness of a league to which neither side intended to adhere so soon as it had become inconvenient to do so.

Meanwhile the Chians had been feeling in its full effects the angry declaration of Astyochos that in their hour of need

Fortifica-  
tion of  
Delphin-  
ion; and

<sup>1866</sup> This is probably the exact meaning of the phrase of Thucydides, viii. 36, 2.

<sup>1867</sup> Thucydides, viii. 38, 1, says that immediately after the ratification of this treaty Theramenes set sail for Sparta in a pinnace and disappeared (*ἀφανίσθη*). Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 22, Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 545, infer that he was lost at sea. Dr. Arnold, note *ad loc.*, holds that it means no more than that he disappeared from the scene of action; but although Theramenes had sufficient reasons for wishing to avoid notice, the meaning of Thucydides can be scarcely a matter of doubt.

<sup>1868</sup> Thuc. viii. 37.

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ravaging of  
Chios by  
the Athen-  
ians.

they should seek his aid in vain. Having finished their preparations in Samos, the Athenians sailed to Chios and established themselves in a fortified camp at Delphinion somewhat to the north of the city. From this sheltered harbour they could harass the island by sea, and ravage the country at their will. Nor is it surprising that the losses thus occasioned roused again the indignation of the demos against a struggle to which they had never given a voluntary sanction. The measures taken by the oligarchs and their Spartan protectors were not marked by much forbearance. Tydeus, the son of the Chian poet Ion, and many others were put to death on the charge of Atticism; but so great was the disorder that the government knew not in whom they might place any trust. To Astyochos appeals were vainly made: he had told them already that he had no intention of listening to them; and Pedaritos relieved himself by forwarding to Sparta a formal accusation of the High Admiral as a traitor. For the Chians this measure did nothing; and they began to feel the sting of slavery even more poignantly than the Athenians had been made to feel it after the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia. So ancient was the institution of slavery in Chios that the Homeric word Therapontes, which denoted all servants whether bond or free, had been retained as the name of the slaves by purchasing whom from the neighbouring Asiatic nations they had won for themselves a shameful notoriety. So large was the number of these bondmen that great severity became needful to keep them down; and this harshness led many to escape to the mountains and there maintain themselves by systematic plundering. To these men the Athenian occupation of Delphinion furnished a temptation for desertion not to be resisted, and few slaves remained in the city. But these fugitives on whom they had trampled at will knew the country well, and their desertion was followed by calamities which almost reduced the Chian oligarchy to despair. Once more they applied to Astyochos; and the manifest feeling of the allies convinced him that the refusal of their request would be impolitic as well as wrong. He had made up his mind to go at once to that island, when he received the news that a fleet

of seven-and-twenty Spartan ships, having on board eleven men who after Spartan fashion were to give him advice or keep him in check, had reached Kaunos about seventy miles to the east of Knidos on the southern coast of Asia Minor.<sup>1869</sup>

The admiral in command of this fleet was Antisthenes; at the head of the commissioners was Lichas the son of Arkesilaos; and they were charged to do all that might be in their power to further the wishes not of Tissaphernes but of Pharnabazos, to whose emissaries Kalligeitos and Timagoras the departure of this fleet about the time of the winter solstice was chiefly owing. Further, they were authorised to remove Astyochos from his command and to put Antisthenes in his place, if the complaints made by Pedaritos should seem to them to be well founded. On their voyage from the Peloponnesos they had fought ten Athenian ships off Melos, capturing three and putting the rest to flight.<sup>1870</sup> The arrival of these ships at Kaunos was a circumstance which in the judgement of Astyochos fully justified him in abandoning for the present the thought of helping the Chians.<sup>1871</sup> Sailing to Kos, he found the city of that island helpless, the walls having been thrown down by an earthquake; but this was a sufficient reason for ravaging the city and for selling those among the prisoners who had been slaves. On reaching Knidos they would have preferred to land and rest: but the Knidians insisted that he should sail at once against the twenty triremes with which Charminos was looking out for the Peloponnesian reinforcement off Symê, Chalkê, Rhodes, and the coast of Lykia. On his way to the islet of Symê a storm with heavy rain and fog dispersed his fleet; and at daybreak his left wing was sighted by Charminos who, supposing that this was the squadron under the command of Antisthenes, attacked it at once. He was fast gaining the day, three of the enemy's ships being sunk and others being disabled, when he found himself thoroughly hemmed in by the rest of the ships belonging to the force of Astyochos. In their flight the Athenians lost six vessels: the rest made their way first to the island of Teutloussa, and thence to

Defeat of  
Charminos  
by the  
Spartan  
admiral  
Astyochos.

<sup>1869</sup> Thuc. viii. 41, 1.

<sup>1870</sup> Ib. viii. 39, 3.

<sup>1871</sup> Ib. viii. 41, 1.



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Rupture  
between  
Lichas and  
Tissaphernes.

Halikarnassos, while the two divisions of the Peloponnesian fleet effected a junction and sailed together to Knidos.

The possession of so mighty an armament justified the assumption of a little more dignity in their dealings with the Persian satrap, who was now invited to a conference with the Spartan commissioners. Speaking for his colleagues, Lichas passed in review the provisions of the former covenants, and told Tissaphernes flatly that he had not the least intention of abiding by pactions so shameful and humiliating not merely to Sparta but to the Hellenic states generally. If the Persian king thought that Sparta would own him as lawful master of Thessaly, Lokris, and Boiotia (it might with equal reason have been added, of Attica and even Megaris), he was much mistaken. Either then a new treaty must be drawn up, or the existing covenant must be regarded as waste parchment, for under the present agreement Sparta would not condescend to accept Persian subsidies. Taken aback by language utterly unlooked for from men, who, so long as they crushed Athens, seemed to care for nothing, Tissaphernes turned away and went off in a rage.<sup>1872</sup>

Revolt of  
Rhodes  
from  
Athens.

The retreat of the Athenians to Samos left Rhodes exposed to the full force of Spartan influence. The three cities of this island, Lindos, Ialysos, and Kamiros, (the fourth city, Rhodes, not having yet been formed,) were all inhabited by a Dorian population: and it might be supposed that they would thus bitterly resent their subordination to an Ionian power and be eager to shake off the yoke. But it was not so; and the fact speaks volumes for the general spirit of the imperial administration of Athens. Here, as elsewhere, revolt was the work not of the people but of the oligarchs. When the Peloponnesian fleet of ninety-four ships entered the harbour of Kamiros, the demos, dismayed as well as astonished, fled hurriedly to the mountains; and the conspirators, now able to manage things in their own way, summoned the representatives of the other cities, unfortified like Kamiros, to a conference, in which Rhodes was declared to be a member of the Spartan confederacy. On receiving these tidings, the Athenian fleet set sail from Samos; but

the mischief could not be undone, and they were compelled to content themselves with making occasional descents on Rhodian territory, while the Peloponnesian fleet remained for nearly three months drawn up on shore in the harbours of the island.

This strange and injudicious inactivity was in some measure the result of the irritation which had prompted the remarks of Lichas to Tissaphernes. The Spartans had chosen Rhodes as their winter station to be more out of his way; and in the hope that they might be able to carry on the war without Persian money they levied a tribute of thirty-two talents on the Rhodians, who thus found that autonomy was a blessing which must at least be paid for. But their inaction was owing far more to the intrigues of Alkibiades. For him there was emphatically no choice between pre-eminence and ruin: and pre-eminence could be secured and retained only by brilliant, if not unbroken, success. It was childish to look for gratitude from the Spartans even for the most splendid services when he had told them plainly that he held himself acquitted of all duty to any state which treated him ill,<sup>1873</sup> that is, to one in which his treatment was not according to his own notion of his deserts and dignity. His suggestions had manifestly brought about the misery which the fortification of Dekeleia was inflicting upon the Athenians in their own land, as well as the destruction of their armaments in Sicily. But in the waters of the Egean things began to assume a different aspect. Either he had already done them all the good which he was capable of doing, and this of itself would be a sufficient reason for discarding him: or he was trading on his genius elsewhere, and this would be a reason for putting him out of the way altogether. It was true that the persistency with which he had urged the need of sending himself with the small squadron of Chalkideus to Chios had secured that island to Sparta, when the delay proposed by the Corinthians would have rendered the task hopeless. It was true that the success of the oligarchic conspiracy in Chios had led to the revolt of other cities both insular and continental; but these revolts had produced little

Intended  
murder of  
Alkibiades  
by the  
Spartans.

<sup>1873</sup> See p. 372.

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in the way of substantial profit, and they had and could have no guarantee that their reverses had not been in greater or less degree caused by his deliberate treachery. Chios itself was miserably ravaged; Lesbos had rebelled and had been reconquered, and everywhere they had had to suppress the opposition of a people who were sadly indifferent to the freedom which Sparta promised them. They forgot that the conditions of the conflict were not now what they had been at Syracuse: and perhaps Hermokrates alone saw that in spite of all their troubles both financial and military the Athenians had the advantage of standing on the defensive with the popular feeling of the allied cities strongly on their side, while the Peloponnesians had committed themselves to aggressions as vast as those of which the Athenians were guilty in Sicily. But they were irritated by such unlooked-for events as the rising of the people in Samos and the disagreeable air of superiority assumed towards them by the Persian satrap; and they chose to regard Alkibiades as responsible for the failure and death of Chalkideus. His friend Endios was no longer ephor, and at the instance of his personal enemy Agis an order was sent out to Astyochos to kill the Athenian exile; but that keen-sighted schemer was still more than a match for the stupid cunning and treachery of Spartans. Contrasting possibly the secret assassination of a refined oligarchic community with the open courts and the straightforward decrees of the vulgar Athenian demos, Alkibiades, warned of his intended murder, shook the dust off his feet and made his way to Tissaphernes. Against his own countrymen he had vowed vengeance merely because he was summoned to take his trial on a charge from which, if innocent, he could certainly have procured a triumphant acquittal; his rage would probably be deeper against the half-savage Dorians who had wished to get rid of him by midnight slaughter.

Growing  
influence of  
Alkibiades  
with Tissa-  
phernes.

But like other able and unscrupulous men, Alkibiades seldom failed to overreach himself. He had been a most convenient instrument in the eyes of the Spartans; and Tissaphernes now stood in need of just such an agent in his dealings with the Greeks. So far as his advice tended to

increase their difficulties, he was ready to avail himself of it and to act upon it promptly: so far as it concerned himself, he would believe and adopt as much as he pleased. It was from this new counsellor that the suggestion came for reducing the pay of the Peloponnesians from a drachma to half a drachma daily; but Tissaphernes could scarcely have given credit to his statement that the Athenians paid at the lower rate not from poverty but because they did not wish their seamen to spend money upon enervating luxuries or to put inefficient substitutes on board the ships while they enjoyed themselves on shore. He knew probably that at the present time even the half drachma was beyond the resources of the Athenian treasury; but he felt greater confidence in the result of another suggestion made by Alkibiades for bribing the generals and trierarchs belonging to the Peloponnesian force. Too much stress can scarcely be laid upon the fact that the plan succeeded with all except the Syracusan Hermokrates. Personal corruption has often been alleged as the special vice of democracies; and in Athens it is supposed to have found a singularly congenial soil. But in Athens its growth is but dwarfish in comparison of the gigantic proportions which it reached in the pure Doric oligarchy of Sparta and the haughty and refined nobility of her allies. We have further to note that in these blue-blooded Athenian Eupatridai bribery was not merely a sin committed to advance their own interests or heighten their own pleasures: it was direct treachery to the state whose aims and policy they thus effectually thwarted and defeated.

The acceptance of these bribes by the Peloponnesian officers at once enabled Alkibiades to come forth as the accredited agent of Tissaphernes, and to adopt towards them and others a tone which he knew that they dared not openly resent. Greek cities came to ask for aid in money: they were dismissed with the answer that they had paid tribute to Athens while they were her subjects, and that they must expect to find freedom a luxury even more costly. But his keenest shafts were aimed at the Chians, the richest of all the Hellenes, whose impudence led them to think that their allies were to maintain them and to pay for them while they sat with their

Suggestions of Alkibiades for prolonging the war.

hands folded before them.<sup>1874</sup> He added, however, with lofty condescension that there were bounds to the resources even of a satrap; that Tissaphernes had thus far met the expenses of the war with his own money; and that if the means for so doing should be furnished by the royal treasury, all deficiencies of pay or subsidies should be made up to the several cities. For Tissaphernes himself Alkibiades, it is said, had further advice. It was to his interest, he urged, and to that of his master that the movement of the war should be slow, and that it should be clogged with hindrances and annoyances which should be equally wearisome and depressing to both sides. The cause of Persia could not be furthered by the victory either of Sparta or of Athens; nay the victory of the latter would be by far the lesser evil. Her object was to bring the islanders of the Egean into absolute subjection to herself, and to leave to the great king the same absolute power over the Hellenic cities within the limits of his dominion. To these cities the Spartans promised freedom, and although for the present they signed treaties which seemed to attest their indifference to the matter, yet success would compel them to throw off the mask, or would make the Hellenic cities strong enough to compel the Spartans to go on with the work which they had begun. Lastly the very zeal which the Spartans displayed in securing the autonomy of Greek cities subject to Athens would lead them to even greater exertions in order to secure the independence of Greek cities subject to the Persian king. To this string of glibly uttered lies Tissaphernes listened probably with a calm incredulity to which he took care that his countenance should give no expression. He was perfectly aware that he was himself in debt to the king because for more than half a century Persian tribute-gatherers had been shut out from the continental not less than the insular cities by this state which was now represented as bent on multiplying Persian slaves; and he knew also that even Lichas in his angry review of previous treaties had made no reservation in favour of the Asiatic Hellenes. In short, he knew well that the Athenian empire was a substantial power, based on a certain order, which must from its very nature carry out a

<sup>1874</sup> Thuc. viii. 45.

definite policy, and that the autonomy promised by Sparta was a painted toy which would be flung aside so soon as the time should be come for doing so. But while he saw through these flimsy falsehoods, he was none the less ready to follow the advice which protected his purse or increased his power. Acting on his counsel, the satrap allowed his payments to become irregular, while he insisted on the near approach of the Phœnician fleet as a reason for not venturing a battle with the Athenians in the present efficiency of their navy,—a navy which but twelve months before had no existence. It was thus that weeks and even months passed away while the Peloponnesian ships lay hauled ashore in the Rhodian harbours; and the Spartans began to suspect that Tissaphernes had made up his mind to look on while the two contending parties wore each other out.<sup>1875</sup> Nor could the discontent of the army at large have been kept within safe limits but by the influence of the officers who had been bought by the gold of Tissaphernes. This was one part of the work which Alkibiades set himself to do, while he abode with Tissaphernes in that Magnesia in which fifty years ago Themistokles had found a shelter.<sup>1876</sup>

But Alkibiades had no intention of remaining long the mere agent or instrument of a Persian satrap. He had brought the Athenian army to ruin at Syracuse; he was resolved to arrest at Athens itself the even growth of that political life which had done so much for the people since the days of Kleisthenes. Scarcely a year ago it had seemed that Athens must soon lie at the mercy of her enemies: now by an unparalleled effort she was able to keep at bay the navies of Peloponnesos and Sicily aided by the gold of Persia. Nor can there be a reasonable doubt that she would have outridden the storm without damage to her political constitution, had it not been for the vile machinations of one of the worst of traitors acting on a knot of Athenian citizens

Overtures  
of Alki-  
biades to  
the Athen-  
ian officers  
at Samos.

<sup>1875</sup> Thuc. viii. 46.

<sup>1876</sup> Mr. Grote speaks of the earlier exile as 'equally unprincipled, yet abler' than Alkibiades. *Hist. Gr.* viii. 6. I must refer the reader to a previous chapter for the reasons and the facts which seem to show conclusively the unfairness and injustice of such expressions, while I content myself here with repeating that in the whole career of Themistokles even Mr. Grote has been not sufficiently exact in the examination of evidence and not sufficiently on his guard against the influence of popular prejudices and misconceptions.

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almost as treacherous and as unprincipled as himself. It was not to be expected that the growth of democracy should extinguish the old Eupatrid or Patrician feeling which whether at Athens or at Rome looked upon the people as a profane herd whose touch carried profanation. This feeling had led to the bitter antagonism between Themistokles and Aristides; it had shown more fully in the murder of Ephialtes the crimes of which it might be the source; it had been compelled to content itself with more seemly modes of opposition, until the fierce jealousies excited by Alkibiades burst out in the mutilation of the Hermai; and probably after the Sicilian disasters it tempted many of the aristocratic Athenians to think that the maintenance of democracy would be the ruin of Athens, although these disasters had all been caused by the oligarchic Nikias. But none of them had thought seriously of making a systematic effort to overthrow the existing constitution, until Alkibiades stirred the smouldering embers into flame. This miserable victim of his own cleverness spent his life in spinning webs of intrigues which seem to have brought him no rest and little satisfaction. To win the favour of the Spartans he had not only suggested two measures which had done deadly mischief to Athens, but he had professed a hatred of democracy although in his own case it had shielded him in a career which probably would otherwise have been soon cut short. The result of the Sicilian expedition had made his influence for the moment paramount at Sparta; but as soon as things went wrong in the Egean, he was made to feel that traitors can be tolerated only so long as they are successful. He had been driven to take refuge with Tissaphernes; and he saw clearly that he must soon get ready a place of retreat elsewhere. The task of tracing the career of a man who surrounds himself with an atmosphere of falsehood must always be repulsive; but the history of this worthless schemer is instructive as showing how nearly a systematic liar may succeed in achieving a reputation which less daring offenders vainly seek to attain. His advice to Tissaphernes had been practically confined to the suggestion that the Spartans and Athenians should be played off against

each other, until both should be exhausted. In other words, he had taught him that his interest and the interest of his master lay in befriending neither side; and the lesson was one which Tissaphernes was not likely to forget. If anything in the life of Alkibiades could be amazing, we might be astonished at the impudence of the message which he now sent to those of the oligarchic party who were serving in the armament at Samos. He was wholly guiltless of the mutilation of the Hermai; but no one knew better than himself that that crime had been perpetrated by oligarchs provoked by his own unbearable insolence. He knew also that if he had been innocent of the crime for which he was summoned from Syracuse to take his trial, or if he had honestly confessed his guilt and promised that the offence should not be repeated, his influence with the demos would not have been impaired. But knowing all this, he could yet, while calling himself to the remembrance of the best men of Athens (to oligarchs in all ages their fellows are always the cream of the cream), dare to say that he owed his banishment to the demos, and that so long as this vagabond society continued to exist at Athens, he would never set foot in the streets of his native city. Nor did he shrink from adding that, if he could return to an oligarchical Athens, he would secure for her the active friendship of Tissaphernes,<sup>1877</sup> while but for him the wealth of Persia would be thrown into the Peloponnesian scale. Nothing more was needed to rouse the enthusiasm of the oligarchic party in the Athenian army at Samos. The resources of Athens were almost exhausted; and the democratic constitutions of the cities in alliance with or in subjection to her had brought them, as they supposed, into a deadly struggle with the general sentiment of all the other Hellenic states. It was therefore more than possible that the root of the evil might lie in democracy, while it seemed certain that without foreign subsidies a successful prosecution of the war was not to be thought of. So far as these Eupatrids were actuated by these motives, we may give them credit for some love of their country: but we shall see presently that the real motive of the most prominent among



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them was an absolute selfishness which regarded the most execrable treachery as a matter of no moment in comparison with the attainment of their own ends. Taking the more favourable view, we can scarcely fail to see the completeness of the self-deception by which men bent simply on their own gratification can make treachery assume the characteristics of patriotism. Some envoys went from the camp of Samos to Alkibiades, who now had better things to tell them. He had promised them, before, the friendship of Tissaphernes: he now assured them that he would bring them into alliance with the great king himself, if they would put down the democratical constitution which made it impossible for the king to put any trust in Athenian citizens. The envoys were completely duped. Instead of asking for some solid warrant for all these fine assertions, and especially for evidence that the Persian despot felt this deep interest in the domestic concerns of Athens, they hastened back to Samos, eager to deliver themselves of the tidings that the friendship and treasures of the Persian king were within their grasp, on the small conditions that the banishment of Alkibiades should be annulled, and that the democracy of Athens should be put down. To the great mass of the army and fleet the conditions were intolerable, but their feelings of anger and vexation were repressed because they knew not how without some subsidies from foreign states they could carry on the war at all. But the essence of Greek oligarchy was a boundless selfishness; and there were both at Athens and in the camp at Samos many who in strictness of speech were thorough traitors, men who were resolved on having a certain political constitution, and who in order to gain this object would without remorse or scruple upset everything. For such men it mattered comparatively little whether Alkibiades could or could not fulfil his promises. Even if he should fail to do so, the assumption of his ability would in the meantime vastly strengthen their hands and enable them to intimidate the people; and for this purpose the organisation of the oligarchical clubs furnished the most efficient means.<sup>1878</sup>

One man only, it would seem, saw through the transparent lies of Alkibiades; and this was the general Phrynichos, who had already won himself no mean reputation by the advice which he gave to his colleagues after the victory at Miletos.<sup>1879</sup> With the vast majority of the Athenians at Samos the subsidies of the great king were the one object to be aimed at; and they never cared to inquire whether they might not be led blindfold to their ruin. But Phrynichos detected the fallacies underlying the statements of Alkibiades, and dwelt on the absurdity of supposing that Dareios would at all care whether Athens was or was not governed by a democracy. The manifest fact was that the Persian king could not trust Athens, and that he must feel attracted towards the Peloponnesians who had never done him any harm; nor could the warnings enforced by the experience of three generations be effaced from his mind by the occurrence of a political revolution of which he did not know the cause and could not forecast the results. With an earnestness which seemed to indicate a hearty attachment to the existing constitution of Athens Phrynichos sought further to dispel the miserable delusion that the establishment of oligarchy at Athens would tend to maintain and strengthen her maritime empire. The utter selfishness of Greek oligarchical feeling is in nothing more clearly shown than in the calmness with which these Athenian conspirators counted on retaining for their own benefit a system the suppression of which was the one end and aim of the enemies of Athens. Nothing less than autonomy, in other words, nothing less than complete freedom to disregard the interests of the many for the supposed advantage of the few, would satisfy the oligarchical instinct: but while the members of the Athenian *Hetairiai* or Clubs were quite willing thus to make the Athenian *demos* subservient to their own comfort, they were not at all willing to forego the benefits of a revenue derived from confederate cities. The idea that they could keep this revenue under an oligarchical government in the imperial city Phrynichos treated as an absurd and fatal mistake. The revolution would bring back not

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of Phrynichos.

<sup>1879</sup> Thuc. viii. 48, 2. See page 447.

one single revolted city to its allegiance, or render any one of the allies more trustworthy. Speaking from his own personal experience, he assured them that under the regimen of gentlemen<sup>1880</sup> the allied cities would be only more troublesome and unruly, for these refined and highborn rulers were just the men who were most of all bent on securing what they were pleased to call their freedom, while they also hounded on the people to acts of violence and bloodshed which they hoped to turn to their own profit. Nay more, he knew that, whatever might be the desire of the allies for autonomy, it was the Athenian demos alone which had held or would hold them together at all. The citizens of the allied states were well aware that from an oligarchical government they had nothing to expect but capital sentences without fair trial or hearing, or perhaps the more ready methods of secret assassination: and even those which were already under oligarchies rejoiced most of all in the thought that the Athenian demos was for them a haven of refuge against their own masters who stood in wholesome terror of an arraignment before the tribunal of the sovereign people.<sup>1881</sup> No more triumphant or emphatic eulogy of the imperial government and of the political constitution of Athens could have been pronounced than the simple statement of facts by which Phrynichos sought to warn the assembled oligarchs against a step likely to involve them and the whole state in ruin. The very object of government is the maintenance of order and of the absolute sovereignty of Law; and according to Phrynichos it was the demos and the demos alone which maintained both order and law not only at Athens but throughout her whole confederation. It might be supposed that Phrynichos belonged to the school of Perikles or Ephialtes. The fact that he did not adds only to the strength of his words and makes his warning more memorable. If we may take the account of Thucydides as an exact report of the case, Phrynichos opposed the revolution only because he was determined that Alkibiades should not return to Athens; and the protest with which he wound up his speech did not prevent him from joining and furthering

<sup>1880</sup> Thuc. viii. 48, 5.<sup>1881</sup> Ib. viii. 48, 6. See pages 72, 156 *et seq.*

the oligarchical movement, when he had no longer any reason to fear his rivalry. The self-deceit of Balaam is not peculiar to the inhabitants of any one country.

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His warning was thrown away. The conspirators were resolved to make the venture, and it was determined that Peisandros should be sent with other envoys to Athens to bring about the ruin of the demos and the restoration of Alkibiades by holding out the boon of Persian help without which according to their creed neither the city nor the empire could be saved. Feeling assured that this offer of foreign help would in the present impoverishment of the city come with an irresistible force, Phrynichos determined, if possible, to cut short the intrigues of Alkibiades by informing the Spartan Astyochos of his plots for transferring to the Athenians the active co-operation and the money of Tissaphernes.<sup>1882</sup> But he was probably not aware that the officers of the Peloponnesian army were all for sale with the exception of the Syracusan Hermokrates, and that the price at which they rated themselves had been paid by the satrap. The only answer of Astyochos was to go straight to Magnesia and lay the letter before Alkibiades and his patron; and Alkibiades in his turn wrote to his friends at Samos, desiring peremptorily that Phrynichos should be put to death. Why the deed was not done at once, we are not told. Possibly

Counter-  
intrigues of  
Phrynichos  
against  
Alkibiades.

<sup>1882</sup> According to Thucydides, viii. 50, 2, Phrynichos expressed a hope that he might be treated with indulgence for seeking to get rid of an enemy even at the risk of involving some disadvantage to the state. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 16, speaks of his letter as 'a treasonable communication,' 'prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy.' It is, to say the least, extremely difficult to reconcile this apology with his speech before the council of the conspirators. He had then said that it was absurd to look for the alliance and friendship of the Persian king who would naturally gravitate to the side most congenial to him. He could not, therefore, suppose that by speaking of Alkibiades as plotting to win Tissaphernes over to the Athenian side, he was doing any injury to Athens, for by the terms of the case he knew already that the object for which Alkibiades was intriguing was unattainable. He was further convinced that the establishment of oligarchy could do no good at Athens while it would assuredly make the empire fall in pieces; and finally he knew that but for Alkibiades the plot would not have been formed. While then he did not stand in the way of any advantage for the city, the removal of Alkibiades would, so far as Athens was concerned, be a palpable benefit. I cannot see, therefore, that there was anything treasonable in his communication: and all that can be said is that Phrynichos did not scruple to get rid of an enemy by private murder if he could not put him down in any other way. In other words, he acted after the fashion of Greek oligarchs generally. It becomes, therefore, very doubtful whether Phrynichos in his letter to Astyochos made use of the phrase on which Mr. Grote founds the charge of treason. Thucydides does not say that he had seen the letter: and such inexactness would in no way impair the trustworthiness of a narrative which has this guarantee of truth that it tells against his friends and against his own political opinions.

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the conspirators may have felt that the time had scarcely come for the summary measures in which oligarchs delighted; and Phrynichos availed himself of the respite by writing again to Astyochos. Upbraiding him for his past conduct, he offered now to betray the whole Athenian armament into his hands, and so to put an end to the war. Entering into the details of this enterprise, and pointing out the ease with which it might be carried out while the camp remained unfortified, he added that this or any other treachery might be forgiven to a man whose life was threatened by his enemies. This letter he felt sure that Astyochos would also show to Alkibiades. Waiting therefore until he knew that a second message from Alkibiades might soon be looked for, he announced to the army that the enemy was about to attack the camp and that it was indispensably necessary to fortify it with all speed. As general he had power to order the immediate execution of the work: and the walls were finished when a letter from Alkibiades announced that Phrynichos had betrayed the army and that the enemy would immediately be upon them. The only result of his letter was the complete acquittal of Phrynichos from the charge on which in his previous letter Alkibiades had insisted that he should be put to death.

Reception  
of Peisan-  
dros and  
the envoys  
from Samos  
at Athens.

But, although he had thus screened himself, Phrynichos could not arrest the progress of the conspiracy; and Peisandros, with his fellow envoys, having reached Athens disburdened himself of his message in the assembly of the citizens, telling them in few words that without foreign help ruin was inevitable, and that they might have this help from Persia, if they would consent to receive Alkibiades and to change their constitution. The proposal was met by vehement opposition. Of the speakers some addressed themselves to the proposed political change: others exclaimed against the restoration of a man who had defied the laws, while the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes or Heralds<sup>1883</sup> denounced it as a profanation and an insult to the gods. Disregarding the clamour, Peisandros went up to each speaker and quietly asked him how he proposed to carry on the war

with an enemy whose fleet now far outnumbered that of Athens, if the whole weight of Persia should further be placed in the scale against them. The speakers were silenced, and Peisandros added that the establishment of oligarchy would win for them the confidence of the Persian king; that Alkibiades was the only man who could do the work for them; that constitutional forms were a matter of small moment compared with the safety of the state; and that if they did not like oligarchy when they had fairly tried it, why,—then it would be very easy to restore the democracy.<sup>1884</sup>

Impudence of assertion will go a long way with men who are worn down by a seemingly endless series of crushing disasters coming upon a struggle which had now lasted for nearly a generation. The Athenians had spent their reserve fund, and still their ships were fewer in number and unhappily not more efficient than those of their enemies, while of their allies some were in actual revolt, and few could be really depended on. Still, unless they were to succumb, means must be provided for carrying on the contest. It seemed tolerably clear that they could not furnish these means themselves; and the dulness which is the common result of protracted and overwhelming anxiety led them to believe the mere word of a man who told them that the resources so much needed would be supplied by Persia. No one asked what grounds there were for believing that the influence of Alkibiades with Tissaphernes was what he represented it to be, or whether the Persian king would hold himself bound by the bargain of this satrap, even if that bargain should be made. Still less did any ask what reasons there were for ascribing to the king so strange a hankering after a good understanding with a state which had destroyed Persian fleets and armies, had effectually checked the course of Persian conquest, and taken away for more than fifty years the tribute which would have found its way into the royal coffers at Sousa. In this unreflecting temper they resolved to send Peisandros with ten commissioners authorised to settle matters as they might think fit with Alkibiades

Appointment of Athenian commissioners for settling affairs with Alkibiades and Tissaphernes.

<sup>1884</sup> Thuc. viii. 53.

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Organisa-  
tion of the  
oligarchic  
conspiracy  
at Athens.

and Tissaphernes, and to put Leon and Diomedon in place of Skironides and Phrynichos whom Peisandros charged with the loss of Iasos and the betrayal of Amorges.<sup>1885</sup>

But before he could return to Samos Peisandros knew that he had still much to do at Athens. Like Perikles, Kleon, and Sokrates, he had been a butt for comic poets; and the special mark at which they aimed their shafts was his cowardice. Nothing in the history of Thucydides gives any countenance to this charge, while his account ascribes to him both zeal and sagacity in the performance of a very dangerous task.<sup>1886</sup> The Demos was not yet put down; the army at Samos was strongly opposed to any constitutional change; and there was no guarantee that the old energy of the Athenian people might not at any moment be roused against the oligarchic conspirators. It was necessary therefore to set in order the oligarchic machinery without which the foundations of the democracy could not possibly be thrown down. The polity of Athens rested on freedom of speech; and if this could be summarily repressed; the constitutional forms and the modes of legal procedure to which they were so much attached would be found most useful in riveting their chains. Well knowing how the mouths of the citizens must be gagged, Peisandros went round to all the political Clubs, and concerted with them a plan of action to be carried out by the leaders who should remain behind him. At the head of these was the Rhetor Antiphon, a man in whose favour the moral judgement of Thucydides is as much perverted as it is in the case of Nikias. The career of this infamous traitor may be summed up in a few words. Gifted with great natural powers sharpened by a singular acuteness, he had taken to a calling which made it hard, if not impossible, for him to attain to a position like that of Perikles in the public assembly. The professed rhetorician was one who, it was supposed, had given his whole mind to devising tricks of debate and advocacy and with whom ordinary citizens stood at

<sup>1885</sup> Thuc. viii. 54.

<sup>1886</sup> In short, it would be almost a safe inference that any given man held up to ridicule by the comic poets was notable for qualities the very reverse of those which we find in their caricatures. We have seen already, notes 1323, 1503, 1558, how egregiously unjust many of their pictures were, easy enough though it may be to account for their origination.

an unfair disadvantage. But if the occupation of Antiphon interfered with his popularity, it added largely to his gains. The sagacity of his advice, the eloquence of the discourses which he wrote for others, and the success attained by his clients, made him greatly sought after; and his school of oratory, the first set up in Athens, carried his reputation beyond the bounds of the city. \* Disliking the demòs partly perhaps because popular feeling had debarred him a public career, but more probably from a general leaning to oligarchy, he threw himself into the conspiracy for upsetting the Athenian constitution with an energy equal to his ability, and for this end worked with consummate skill the machinery of assassination. But in private life, we are told, he was a man of genial character, sober, perhaps, and religious, kindly in his relations with his family, and affectionate in his intercourse with his friends. He had, in short, the estimable qualities of Nikias; and for the oligarchic Thucydides this was enough. Antiphon becomes in his eyes a man 'second to none of his age in virtue.'<sup>1887</sup> This employer of murdering bravoes was ably seconded not only by Theramenes, the son of Hagnon founder of Amphipolis, but by Phrynichos who seems to have convinced himself that a man may do anything to save his life, and who, when it became clear that Alkibiades had lost his chance of returning with the oligarchs, began to fear his enmity as leader of the democracy. Under the pressure of this fear he hesitated not to inflict upon Athens a system which according to his own previous warning must be fatal to her empire and could not be beneficial to himself.<sup>1888</sup>

A gleam of brightness seemed to fall on the arms of Athens after the departure of Leon and Diomedon for the Egean. Their first descent was on Rhodes where they found the Peloponnesian fleet still drawn up on shore. After a victory over the Rhodians who came out to encounter them, they

Victories of the Athenians at Rhodes and Chios.—Death of Pedaritos.

<sup>1887</sup> It is unnecessary to press too hardy even on a man like Antiphon. Hundreds or thousands of Christian statesmen have been supposed to have redeemed the infamy of their public acts by the amiability of their private character; and Dr. Arnold, in his remarks on the life of Antiphon, asserts with a force which unhappily cannot even be qualified that very few indeed 'even in Christian countries have ever understood practically that even a good man's virtue is shown not so much in his behaviour towards his friends, or men of his own party, as in his right appreciation of those less generally acknowledged ties which bind him to persons indifferent to him or hostile—to his country—to the whole race of mankind—and to God.' Thuc. viii. 68, note.

<sup>1888</sup> Thuc. viii. 68, 3.



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made Chalkê their naval station in preference to Kos, as furnishing a better look out for the enemy's fleet in case it should put to sea. Meanwhile the Athenian fortress of Delphinion was fast approaching its completion, and urgent messages were sent to Rhodes for immediate help. But before it could arrive, Pedaritos with the whole force of the Chians, aided by some allies, fell upon the stockade around the Athenian ships and succeeded in taking part of it, together with some vessels which were drawn up on shore. The arrival of the Athenians changed the fortunes of the day. Pedaritos was slain: and the loss to the Chians was heavy both in men and arms.

Abortive  
negotiation  
of the  
Athenian  
commis-  
sioners  
with Tissa-  
phernes.

It was at this moment when the Chians were still more strictly blockaded than they had been, and when they already felt keenly the pressure of famine, that Peisandros and the commissioners from Athens reached Magnesia with their proposals for the alliance of Persia with the now oligarchical city. Alkibiades saw at once that he was caught in a trap, the plain fact being that Tissaphernes had no intention of making any definite covenant with the Athenians. The satrap was quite ready to play the contending parties against each other, more especially as he began to dislike and to fear the growing preponderance of the Peloponnesians at sea; but to all further hints he turned a deaf ear. One course only remained open to Alkibiades. To confess plainly that he could not get Tissaphernes to do what he wished would be fatal, for it would destroy his chance of returning to Athens under any form of government, and he already began to see that in the democracy he had a second string to his bow, if the oligarchic plot should fail. By some means then he must make it appear that the failure of the negotiation was the work not of the satrap but of the Athenians themselves; and he sought to effect this by raising the terms for Tissaphernes at each conference. The first demand was for the surrender of all Ionia to the king: the second involved the cession of all the islands lying off the eastern shores of the Egean, and was carried even further. With both these demands the commissioners expressed their willingness to comply; and Alkibiades was almost at his

wits' end to devise conditions more humiliating, when it struck him that they might be less complaisant if in a third conference the king should insist on maintaining in the Egean as large a fleet as might suit his purposes. The point beyond which Athenian oligarchs would refuse further to abase themselves and to dishonour their country was not easily reached; but Alkibiades had reached it at last by proposing terms which contemptuously swept away the real or so-called convention of Kallias.<sup>1889</sup> The commissioners, now thoroughly angry, departed with the feeling that they had been both insulted and cheated by Alkibiades. Unfortunately, the Athenian army at Samos drew their own inference from this rebuff of the oligarchic envoys: and this inference was that in his heart Alkibiades leant to the democracy, and that he might be induced to bring Tissaphernes into active alliance with it. His ability to do this was questioned by neither side.

But the satrap in his turn began to fear that he had been going too far in his efforts to hold an even balance between the combatants. The Peloponnesians, if either starved or lacking money, might become dangerous neighbours to his satrapy; and they might in despair venture on an open fight in which victory for the Athenians would re-establish their maritime supremacy. He therefore of his own accord provided them with supplies, and proposed a convention which simply assigned to the king such of his possessions as were in Asia, while he added that he was free to take such measures about his own country as might seem to him best. Virtually these terms were less humiliating to the Spartans than those of the cancelled treaties; but the real state of things remained practically unchanged. The sovereign of Persia was free, if he chose so to put it, to consult the true interests not only of Attica (for here the Spartans would interpose no hindrance) but of Thessaly, Lokris and even of

Third  
treaty of  
Tissa-  
phernes  
with the  
Spartans.

<sup>1889</sup> See pages 51, 81, 87. The indignation excited by this proposition seems to tell strongly for the reality of that treaty, or of some convention which practically enforced the same conditions. These complaisant oligarchs might perhaps reconcile it to their consciences to give up the Greek cities on the mainland and even the islands lying nearer to them, by the plea that so long as Persian ships were debarred from entering the Egean these concessions might hereafter be withdrawn and the Athenian empire extended to its old bounds. But with a Persian fleet in these waters this hope would fail, while the presence of the enemy's navy would furnish a constant temptation to the allies to revolt.

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Boiotia. In other words, he was at liberty at any time to invade them, the implied compact being that in this work the Peloponnesians would not attempt to hinder him. The covenant further stated that on the arrival of the Phœnician fleet the combined navies of the Persians and Peloponnesians should prosecute the war against Athens: but no time was specified for its arrival, nor were orders really issued for setting it in motion. All that the satrap wished was that his preparations for this great event should be generally known; and of these he took care that the Spartan commander should have abundant information.<sup>1890</sup>

Betrayal of  
Oropos to  
the Boio-  
tians.

The losses of the Athenians for this miserable winter were not yet ended. An Athenian garrison occupied Oropos; but the town was betrayed to the Boiotians, it is no injustice to suppose, by the oligarchic party within it, who were further acting in concert with a band of Eretrian citizens for the revolt of Eubœia. So long as Oropos on the other side of the strait was held by Athens, the hands of the Eretrians were shackled; but no sooner was this treason consummated than they hastened to Rhodes to beg for Peloponnesian aid in carrying out the revolt. Astyochoſ felt, however, or professed to feel, that his first call was to Chios, and for the relief of Chios the whole fleet now advanced from Rhodes. But they had barely rounded the Triopian cape before they saw the Athenian ships on the watch off Chalkê. The commanders on both sides felt that they dared not risk a general battle; and the Peloponnesians made their way to Miletos while the Athenians returned to their station at Samos.<sup>1891</sup>

Revolt of  
Abydos  
and Lamp-  
sakos.  
411 B.C.

The spring of the next year, the twenty-first of this weary war, was ushered in by no good omens for the endurance of Athenian empire. While Astyochoſ remained inactive at Rhodes, the Chians after the death of Pedaritos had chosen as their commander a Spartan named Leon who had come out as a hoplite serving on board the fleet of which Antisthenes was the admiral.<sup>1892</sup> With him they received a reinforcement of twelve ships which were keeping guard off Miletos, five being Thourian, four from Syracuse, one from

<sup>1890</sup> Thuc. viii. 58, 59.

<sup>1891</sup> Ib. viii. 60.

<sup>1892</sup> Ib. viii. 61, 2. See p. 453.

Anaia, one from Miletos, and one the ship of Leon himself. They were thus enabled to oppose six-and-thirty ships to the two-and-thirty triremes of the Athenians; and in the fight which followed they were now for the first time not defeated. In short, the tide had begun to turn in their favour, while their enemies were almost daily harassed by fresh distractions. Marching by land from Miletos Derkyllidas made his way first to Abydos, then two days later to Lampsakos. Both these cities on his arrival revolted from Athens: but Lampsakos was unfortified, and Strombichides, hastening up with four-and-twenty ships, carried the place without resistance. The slaves in the town were sold; the freemen were allowed to remain unmolested. But his efforts to win back Abydos whether by persuasion or by force were unsuccessful; and he was compelled to content himself with placing a garrison in Sestos to watch the Hellespontine cities generally.<sup>1893</sup> There was enough in these events to furnish solid encouragement both to the Chians and their allies; and when Strombichides set out for the north, Astyochos hastened with his ships to Chios and then advancing with the whole Chian fleet to Samos, challenged the Athenians to battle.<sup>1894</sup>

The challenge was unheeded. The Athenians had other things to attend to, and Astyochos as he sailed back to Miletos was little aware how diligently a set of traitors were doing the work of Sparta within the Athenian camp. The return of Peisandros and his fellow envoys after their ignominious dismissal by Alkibiades<sup>1895</sup> had convinced them that no aid was to be looked for from Tissaphernes, and that the relation of Alkibiades himself with the Athenian oligarchs was one of open war. They affected to feel special satisfaction in being rid of a man so little likely to work in harmony with them; and they resolved only the more determinately to do by themselves what they had hoped to achieve by his aid. Their first step was to make overtures to such of the present Samian government as might seem favourably inclined to oligarchy.<sup>1896</sup> It was true that they had risen to power by

Progress of  
the oli-  
garchic  
conspiracy  
in Samos.

<sup>1893</sup> Thuc. viii. 62.

<sup>1894</sup> Ib. viii. 63.

<sup>1895</sup> Ib. viii. 56.

<sup>1896</sup> Ib. viii. 63, 3. We have seen that Thucydides takes little care to distinguish

the popular revolution effected ten months before: but it was quite possible that many who in their hearts clung to the old oligarchy may have joined the demos in the hope of profit for themselves. No injustice is involved in this inference. The oligarchs openly professed that the great object of government was the benefit of the rulers; and the history of the Athenian oligarchs at this time especially shows that from seeking this personal advantage they would be turned aside not even by the ruin both of Athens and of her empire. We do but repeat the judgement of Aristotle<sup>1897</sup> when we say that they determined to carry on by violence a work which had been begun with lies. They had extorted from the people an unwilling sanction for political change by false promises of foreign help; and they resolved that the demos should be held to the terms of surrender, although this aid was not forthcoming. In fact, they knew that they had set out in a path from which there was no retreat; and in all justice it must be admitted that they showed no disposition to shrink from any storm which their acts might raise against them. Shortsighted as well as treacherous, they still fancied that oligarchy would advance the interests of Athens; and as by this they meant enrichment and license for themselves<sup>1898</sup> they were ready to carry on the war from their own private resources. Their activity, in short, was the result of an absorbing and pitiless selfishness, in strange contrast with that nobler energy which in the stirring words of Herodotos<sup>1899</sup> the Athenians had displayed when, just a hundred years before, they had risen up against the Peisistratidai. The parts were now reversed, and the demos at Athens returned to something like the apathetic sluggishness which had specially characterised it in the ages of despotism.

the oligarchical factions from the people. The Chian conspirators are generally spoken of as 'the Chians'; hence we have no sufficient warrant for saying that the Samians who now joined the Athenian plotters had brought about the rising against the faction in power. It is more likely that they joined the movement when its success seemed more probable than its failure.

<sup>1897</sup> *Polit.* v. 4, 13.

<sup>1898</sup> Thuc. viii. 63, 4.

<sup>1899</sup> v. 78. It is true that Herodotos ascribes this increased vigour to the fact that 'when they were free, every man knew that he was working for himself.' But cynicism itself will scarcely dare to denounce as selfish the orderly action of a whole people or nation rising gradually to a deeper appreciation of and reverence for law. The oligarchs intended avowedly to legislate for one class, and in doing this to sweep away the whole constitution which, as they knew, expressed the will of the people generally.

There was, in truth, no end to their folly and madness; and in so saying, we are but repeating the judgement of one of their own number whom Thucydides especially praises for his sagacity and practical wisdom.<sup>1900</sup> They would have it that oligarchy must strengthen an empire which Phrynichos had solemnly warned them that it would most assuredly dissolve; and in this frenzy they dispatched Peisandros with five of the commissioners to Athens to complete the work of revolution there, and to establish oligarchies in any towns which they might visit on their way. With the remaining five Diotrophes was sent as general to operate in the Thrace-ward regions. His first exploit was to suppress the government of the people in Thasos and to place the oligarchs in power. Two months later the oligarchs showed their gratitude for the boon by fortifying the town and openly joining the enemies of Athens. To his statement that the same result followed this notable experiment in many other places the historian adds a remark which from a different point of view agrees closely with the warning of Phrynichos. The sobriety of temper, which was created by the government of gentlemen, inspired (so he tells us) a desire for true freedom and not for the rotten sham of liberty which was all that the Athenian oligarchs had destined for them.<sup>1901</sup> In other words, the latter, in the judgement of Thucydides, were traitors to their own principles; and their duty was at once to release all the allies of Athens from their allegiance and to carry back Athens herself to the political state from which she first began to rise in the days of Solon.

With the aid of some hoplites which he gathered as he went along Peisandros did his errand well. In the several cities<sup>1902</sup> which he passed the few were enabled to thrust aside the many; and when he reached Athens, he found that there was little more for him to do. He had probably sent to his partisans full tidings of the breach with Alkibiades, and the conspirators were perhaps not sorry to be quit of his interference and to carry on their work purely as a political revolution without reference to any foreign aid.

Political  
assassina-  
tions at  
Athens by  
the oligar-  
chic con-  
spirators.

<sup>1900</sup> See page 463.

<sup>1901</sup> Thuc. viii. 64.

<sup>1902</sup> These were probably Andros, Tenos, Karystos, and Aigina. Thuc. viii. 69.

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They boldly attacked the citadel, and for the time freedom of speech was at an end. The first blow fell upon Androkles, a man who had been prominent among the accusers of Alkibiades before his departure to Sicily; and by a strange irony, while that restless schemer was throwing his influence into the opposite scale, this unhappy victim was offered up for the special purpose of winning his favour and with it the money of Tissaphernes.<sup>1903</sup> The work of assassination once begun was not allowed to flag until it had achieved its purpose. Not many murders, however, were needed to silence the people. In the assembly the conspirators asserted loudly that no pay ought under any circumstances to be issued to any citizens except while they were actually serving in war, and that not more than five thousand must be allowed to retain the franchise, the principle being that they only should have a vote who could contribute substantially to the needs of the state. Even this was a cheat. The conspirators had no intention of sharing power, if they should secure it, with others; and they took their measures accordingly. Not a subject was proposed for discussion except after their dictation; the men who rose to speak on these subjects belonged to their faction, and the very words of their speeches were pre-arranged. At the same time beyond the walls of the assembly young men, hired as bravoës and murderers, struck down citizens whose presence might be inconvenient, and picked off especially all the popular speakers. The man who ventured to oppose a measure or utter a protest against revolution disappeared soon and for ever; and with the silencing of all opposition followed perfect impunity for the assassins. The order of society was for the time broken up. No man could put trust even in those whom he had looked upon as his friends. Among the ranks of the oligarchs were some who, as it had been supposed, were firmly attached to the existing constitution of the state; and if these could change sides, of whom could anyone be sure? A knot of men striking swiftly and surely had brought about a collapse of authority and that extreme depression of the people which must follow this collapse; and their number was commonly

exaggerated by citizens who dared not stir to bring an offender to justice lest by so doing they should sign their own death-warrant. While Antiphon with his partisans took advantage of these vague and indefinite terrors, he availed himself, with even greater ingenuity, of the existing constitutional forms for the more effectual subjugation of the people. The Council of the Five Hundred still held their meetings; and if there were some who had spirit enough to absent themselves from the Senate-house, there were others who would feel that even their absence might tell as much against them as a speech in opposition to oligarchic innovations. We can scarcely explain in any other way the appearance of citizens honestly attached to the existing constitution in assemblies where that constitution except in the dead letter was utterly set at naught. Their presence was all that Antiphon wanted, for if they were present, they must vote; and by their vote they must be bound. The revolution, in short, was practically accomplished; and it was achieved the more rapidly and effectually because the public assembly still met and the Probouleutic council of five hundred still went through the form of proposing the subjects to be discussed. Whatever was done therefore was done by the act of the people: and if the people chose to pass decrees without debate, the responsibility of so doing must rest with themselves. Thus was the highest and best characteristic of the Athenian people—their respect for law and order—ingeniously used as an instrument for establishing and keeping up a reign of terror.<sup>1904</sup> While this terror was at its height, Peisandros with his colleagues arrived. They set themselves at once to complete the work which a series of dastardly murders had brought so nearly to a successful issue. Their first proposal was to appoint ten commissioners, Peisandros seemingly being one of them, with absolute powers, charged to be ready by a given day with a plan for the better government of the city. On the day named, the assembly was summoned, not, as usual, to the Pnyx within the walls, where the interference of the *Metoikoi* or alien residents and even of the slaves might be inconvenient or dangerous, but to the *Temenos*

<sup>1904</sup> Thuc. viii. 66.



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of Poseidon at Kolonos about a mile beyond the city gates. Without preface or comment the commissioners at the suggestion of Peisandros proposed that every citizen should be left perfectly free to bring forward any measures whatsoever, and that any attempt to punish him by means of the *Graphê Paronomôn* or writ for illegal procedure<sup>1905</sup> should be visited by heavy pains and penalties. One great bulwark of Athenian polity was thus thrown down without a protest, for the citizens now knew well that the assassins were ready with their daggers; and the next proposition swept away all existing offices and all pay except for military service, while it gave the commissioners power to choose five men who should in their turn choose one hundred, these hundred again nominating each three. It was further agreed that these Four Hundred, invested with absolute powers, should take their place in the council chamber and carry on the government after their will and pleasure, taking counsel, whenever they might wish to do so, with the Five Thousand, citizens not of Athens but of *Nephelokokkygia*.<sup>1906</sup> With this transparent cheat they set upon the city the iron yoke of an utterly selfish despotism. Not a word was said about the qualifications which would intitle a man to take his place in this mysterious company; no list was published of men who might be included in it; no attempt was made to define the checks which they might exercise on the acts of the Senate, or to regulate the times of meeting. The whole thing was meant to be an insolent mockery, and it was received, as such, with the silence which oligarchs loved as the best sign of popular docility. Such were the blessings which Athens received from conspirators who prided themselves on being gentlemen, brave, refined and honourable, and who regarded plain-spoken demagogues (if the word must be

<sup>1905</sup> See Appendix H.

<sup>1906</sup> The purpose of Peisandros in putting forth this phantom company is distinctly stated by Thucydides when he speaks of the commissioners sent to pacify the army at Samos, viii. 72, and again viii. 86, 3, of the second attempt to hoodwink them, and of the attempt of Theramenes, viii. 89, to turn the fiction into something like a reality. But still more clearly after the demolition of the fort at Eetionia, Thucydides, viii. 92, 11, says that the 5,000 were simply a stalking horse, which might be used for the double purpose of giving a sanction to the acts of the oligarchy, and of impressing the people generally with the notion that the government was really supported by this large body of enfranchised citizens. The more intelligent must surely have seen through this device.

used) as the very scum and offscouring of the earth. For the noisy arguments of these vulgar debaters they had substituted the point of the dagger; and a large measure of success had rewarded a graceful change singularly befitting men of careful culture and ancient lineage.

All that remained now to be done was the installation of the tyrants into the chamber of the senate which represented the Kleisthenean tribes. The work was soon done. All Athens was now one vast garrison. The dismal pleasantry of comic poets drew pictures of citizens buying food in full armour and carrying it off to their homes. Hence it was easy for the conspirators to instruct their braves to remain near at hand after the dispersal of the citizens (few probably in number and utterly cowed in spirit) from the place of meeting at Kolonos. These instruments of despotism were men from Andros, Tenos and Karystos, with whom were mingled some Athenians who had been sent as settlers to Aigina, duped probably into joining the plot by the notion that they would have the aid of the Persians against the deadly enmity of the expelled islanders and their Spartan friends.<sup>1907</sup> Attended by this goodly band of four hundred and twenty assassins<sup>1908</sup> carrying each his hidden dagger, the four hundred marched from Kolonos to the senate house, and commanded the senators to depart, tendering them at the same time their pay for the fraction of their official year which was still to run out. The money was taken; the democracy of Kleisthenes died with self-inflicted ignominy; and in its place was set up the religious association of the old Eupatrid polity.<sup>1909</sup> The work begun by Solon and ended by Perikles was swept away to make room for the intolerance of the old Aryan civilisation which had proved a very upas-tree to all healthy political growth.<sup>1910</sup>

Expulsion  
of the  
Council of  
the Five  
Hundred.

The selfish and heartless traitors who had thus undone the work of a century were to receive some hard and wholesome lessons. The faithless demos, which by the confession of Phrynichos had alone kept the empire together, had been

Overtures  
of the Four  
Hundred to  
Agis.

<sup>1907</sup> See page 114.

<sup>1908</sup> The new association consisted of 300: but the conspirators had already organised a band of 120 young men, gathered seemingly from various Greek cities, for carrying out the sentences of their Vehmlic tribunal. Thuc. viii. 69, 4.

<sup>1909</sup> See vol. i. p. 18.

<sup>1910</sup> See vol. i. p. 21.

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effectually silenced and put down. The trusty oligarchs, who found assassination a vastly more convenient instrument than long and troublesome trials in courts of law, were now supreme. There could therefore be no difficulty in adjusting the quarrel with Sparta, and no hindrance to the enjoyment of a peace sadly needed to recruit the exhausted powers of Athens. The message was accordingly sent in full confidence to Agis at Dekeleia, and by him treated with contempt.<sup>1911</sup> The Spartan king could not bring himself to believe that their work was quite so well done as they asserted it to be, and he suspected that the presence of a Spartan army under the walls of the city would stir up the slumbering fires. Sending therefore for a large reinforcement to Sparta, he allowed sufficient time for their march to the Athenian border and then advanced from Dekeleia in the hope that the present confusion within the city might even enable him to carry the walls by storm. He found himself completely mistaken. There was no slackening in the watch, and some of the enemy who approached too close paid a heavy penalty for their rashness, while a body of Athenian hoplites, bowmen, and light-armed troops, sallying out, caused him some loss. Agis therefore after awhile sent his Peloponnesian reinforcement home, and returned to his border fortress whither a fresh embassy from the Four Hundred soon followed him. These were more graciously treated, and received his sanction to send envoys to make their wishes known at Sparta.

Attempted  
oligarchic  
revolution  
at Samos.

But the tyrants felt that their work was but half done, rather was not done at all, so long as they failed to secure the co-operation of the army of Samos. They knew that opposition there would soon stir up the nautic crowd of Athens and Peiræus to decided action,<sup>1912</sup> and it was high time therefore to soothe men whose discontent could not but be dangerous. Envoys were accordingly sent to assure them that the oligarchical conspirators had acted from a disinterested generosity which looked only to the interests of the city and the empire; that they had done away with a cumbrous and impracticable franchise, securing at the same time a great saving in the public expenditure; but that the

<sup>1911</sup> Thuc. viii. 71.

<sup>1912</sup> Ib. viii. 72.

governing body, being still five thousand, fully represented the whole mass of the people. Before they could reach Samos, the traitors in that island had set in motion the machinery which Antiphon had worked so successfully at home. Some few of the Samians, who scarcely a year ago had taken part in the democratic revolution, were induced to join the plot.<sup>1913</sup> The brave work was begun by the murder of Hyperbolos who had been ostracised by the combined partisans of Alkibiades and Nicias certainly six, and perhaps even ten, years earlier.<sup>1914</sup> During this long period he had lived, it would seem, inoffensively at Samos; nor can the invective of Thucydides<sup>1915</sup> be taken as involving the least reflexion on his moral character. He was, there can be no doubt, a man rude and blustering in speech, who made no secret of his horror of oligarchs and all their wicked ways; and this was a very sufficient reason for picking him out as the first victim for the slaughter. The Samian traitors were ably seconded in this crime by the general Charminos and some other Athenians associated with them in the conspiracy.<sup>1916</sup> Sundry other like things they did, the historian tells us; and they were fast maturing their scheme for putting down the opposition of the adverse majority. In all likelihood, their plans might have been carried out, had it not been for the precautions taken by Leon and Diomedon, the commanders sent out on the suggestion of Peisandros to supersede the oligarchic Phrynichos.<sup>1917</sup> Honestly attached to the law and constitution of Athens, these men never

<sup>1913</sup> Thucydides, viii. 73, 2, says that 'they of the Samians who had risen up against the men in power and were now demos, now changed their minds and were persuaded, to the number of 300, to join the Athenian conspiracy and put down the rest as demos.' We have seen that Thucydides, in speaking of oligarchic plots, habitually uses expressions which on a careless or hasty reader might leave the impression that the plotters represented the people generally, see notes 1836, 1896. But there is no reason whatever for supposing that more than the 300 joined the Athenian conspirators, and these may, it is more than possible, have been men of oligarchic sympathies who had joined the revolution only because, come what might, they were resolved to be on the winning side. This excellent rule was very widely acted upon by the Hellenic oligarchs. The phrase *οἱ τες δῆμος* merely means that they were members of the *demos* and not that they constituted the *demos*.

<sup>1914</sup> See note 1657.

<sup>1915</sup> Thucydides is not a man of many words and he is by no means lavish of epithets. When then he attributes *μοχθηρία* and *πονηρία*, or pestilent rascality, to a political opponent, without telling us what he had done to deserve these names, we may fairly set down his language as invective. We have to remember that for the murders of Antiphon he has no censures whatever, while Antiphon himself is eulogised as a very pattern of all that is excellent.

<sup>1916</sup> Thuc. viii. 73. 3

<sup>1917</sup> Thuc. viii. 54.

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quitted Samos without leaving behind them some ships to keep guard against oligarchical intriguers; and they were ably and zealously seconded by the trierarch Thrasylos and by Thrasyboulos then serving as a hoplite in the army. The murders which followed the assassination of Hyperbolos taught all who were not traitors that it was high time to be up and stirring. Roused by the earnest requests made to them, Thrasyboulos and Thrasylos canvassed the army personally, praying them not only to guard the laws of Athens, but not to let go their hold on Samos which had now become the mainstay of her empire. The sincerity of the men whom they addressed was attested by the heartiness of their answers; and foremost with their pledges of fidelity were the picked crew of the Paralian trireme, all free citizens, to whom the very thought of oligarchy was intensely repulsive. When, then, the three hundred ventured to trust the issue to the dagger or the sword, they were met by a resistance which cost them the lives of thirty of their number. Thus, by a righteous Nemesis this conspiracy against law and order was suppressed by leaders sent out to supersede a man who, on being deprived of his command, had joined the ranks of the plotters. The victors were more generous than the vanquished deserved, more generous than sound policy required that they should be. Three only of those who were most guilty were banished; the rest were allowed to remain unmolested under the rule of the demos which they had sought to subvert. In the enthusiasm of the moment the Paralian trireme with Chaireas, the son of Archestratos, was dispatched to Athens with a report of what had taken place. They sailed ignorantly into the lion's den. As soon as they landed, some few of the men were imprisoned by the Four Hundred; the rest were placed in another ship and ordered to cruise about Euboa. Chaireas contrived to make his escape, and hastening to Samos, informed the army that Athens was in the hands of tyrants who were scourging the citizens and insulting their wives and children, and whose intention was to imprison and to put to death those of their kinsfolk who were not prepared to submit to their dictation. The picture was possibly overcoloured, although how far and

in what respects overcoloured, we cannot say. Of the secret murders it seems to take even too little count; and the previous history of Hellenic despotism furnishes slender warrant for denying the likelihood of the crimes ascribed by Chaireas to these heartless and violent men, unless we are to make an exception in favour of the excellent and virtuous Antiphon. But the historian who has not a word of censure for the murderers of Androkles and Hyperbolos charges Chaireas indignantly with heaping lie on lie,<sup>1918</sup> because his tidings were not as scrupulously exact as in a man who wished to leave materials for history they certainly should have been.

The escape of Chaireas was followed by results which showed that the tyrants had committed a blunder in not putting him to death. The first impulse of the army in Samos was to punish the conspirators whom after the defeat of the recent attack they had let off so cheaply: and if they listened soberly to the advisers who warned them of the folly of intestine quarrels while the enemy only awaited an opportunity for crushing them, they became only the more earnestly bent on arresting the madness before it should go further. An oath enforced by the most solemn sanctions was taken by every soldier in the army that he would maintain harmony under the ancient constitution of Athens, that he would vigorously carry on the war, and that he would have no dealings with the Four Hundred whom they denounced as public enemies. By taking this oath the Samians cemented their alliance with Athens, thus showing that for both there must be the same friends and the same enemies in a sense far higher than that of the formal compact inserted in ordinary treaties. The members of the oligarchical party were made to bind themselves by the same pledges, although past experience tended to show that when their strength returned these pledges would share the fate of the withs and shackles bound round the limbs of Samson.

But the citizens assembled at Samos did even more. In a formal assembly it was ruled that as the Demos at Athens had been forcibly put down the lawful administration of government devolved upon themselves, and that they in fact

Determination of the Athenians in Samos to maintain the constitution.

Resolution of the citizens at Samos to treat Athens as a revolted city.

<sup>1918</sup> Thuc. viii. 74, 3.

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constituted the true Athens. Exercising thus their undoubted rights of citizenship, they deposed such of their generals and trierarchs as were suspected of being concerned with the oligarchical conspiracy, Thrasyboulos and Thrasylos being among the officers chosen in their place. The assembly was one worthy of that great name of Athens which Nikias knew better how to invoke than to defend.<sup>1919</sup> Unlike the contemptible or starving senators who consented to abandon their trust for a pittance held out to them by traitors, the speakers in the Samian council declared with memorable terseness that Athens had revolted from them, and that this fact could not humiliate and should not discourage those who had had nothing to do with her apostasy. A lawless minority was in rebellion against the established law and polity of Athens; and although they might fancy it otherwise, they stood at a terrible disadvantage with the citizens at Samos. Here was gathered the whole force of the imperial city in an island which in the time of its revolt had done more than any other ally to shake the foundations of her empire. There was no need to change their position in order to carry on the war. Nay because her army and fleet had found a sure refuge in Samos and friends to be trusted to the uttermost in the Samians, therefore and only therefore was the mouth of the Peiraieus kept open for the conveyance of supplies to a town which must otherwise soon be starved out. The traitors of Athens were thus really in their power, for they might at any moment sail from Samos and block up the harbour themselves. If again their thought was for money, the city since the Sicilian disasters had been able to do but little for them. The citizens in Samos were serving practically at their own cost: and the city which had failed to send them gold was now unable to send them even that good counsel which alone intitles a city to rule over a camp. In few words, the conspirators at Athens had sinned by setting at naught the laws of their fathers; it was the business of the citizens at Samos to keep those laws and to compel these traitors to keep them. It was unhappy that the simple majesty of these words should be marred by a reference to the

<sup>1919</sup> Thuc. vii. 64, 2. See page 408.

arch-traitor who had brought all these woes upon Athens, and still more unhappy that this reference should express the hope of obtaining through his influence the alliance and support of the Persian king. But the better conviction expressed itself when they added that so long as they possessed a fleet they might carry Attica with them to other lands, and make for her a new history.<sup>1920</sup>

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Such was the attitude of the Athenians in Samos when the ten envoys of the Four Hundred reached Delos and heard the report that the citizens serving in Samos would have nothing to do with the oligarchic usurpers. They naturally hesitated to go further, fearing probably most of all that the influence of Alkibiades might be set in the scale against them. At first it seemed unlikely that their fears would be realised. The main body of the citizens at Samos was greatly opposed to his restoration: and it needed all the eloquence and energy of Thrasyboulos to induce them to consent to his recall.<sup>1921</sup> But Thrasyboulos was as firmly convinced, as the oligarchic envoys had been, that Alkibiades could do what he pleased with Tissaphernes, and that the salvation of Athens depended on her obtaining foreign aid, or at the least in detaching Persia from the alliance with Sparta. Under this conviction he went to Magnesia and brought back Alkibiades to Samos. The narrative of his introduction to the assembly is painful not so much for the glibness of the lies strung together by this consummate traitor as for the pitiable credulity of his hearers. To the oligarchs he had said that on no consideration would he again set foot on Attic soil until the demos which had driven him into exile should be put down:<sup>1922</sup> speaking to the people, he laid the blame of his calamities not upon them but upon his own unhappy destiny. He had told the oligarchs that the suppression of the democratic constitution was the one indispensable condition for winning the thorough confidence of the Persian king: to the people he not only uttered no hint that any such condition was required, but he described in moving terms the absorbing

Election of Alkibiades as general by the citizens at Samos.

<sup>1920</sup> Nicias expressed the same feeling, when at the beginning of the fatal retreat from Syracuse he said that men made the city, and not walls or ships which had no crews to man them. Thuc. vii. 77, 7.

<sup>1921</sup> Thuc. viii. 81.

<sup>1922</sup> See page 461.



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anxiety of Tissaphernes to secure the close friendship of democratic Athens. The restoration of Alkibiades would remove the only barrier that separated them; and when this was thrown down, there was no sacrifice which he would regard as too great to be made in their favour. So long as a Dareik remained in his purse, they should never lack food: nay, he would provide money by turning his silver couch into coin; and the Phœnician fleet which, as he declared, was already at Aspendos should be brought up to their aid instead of that of the Peloponnesians. Not one, it would seem, asked why, if Tissaphernes was thus pining for the friendship of Athens, he should be so late in expressing his desire. All who heard him were too much carried away by the heated fancies of the moment to question the facts stated by Alkibiades or to see that he had a triple motive in thus parading his supposed influence with the Persian satrap. If his statements could only be credited, they would strike terror into the oligarchs at Athens and paralyse the action of the Clubs in the city, while they would encourage the army in Samos and impress them with a due sense of his importance. Lastly they would have the effect of sowing mistrust between Tissaphernes and his Peloponnesian allies, and of disappointing the bright hopes of the Spartans. So greedily were his words received by his hearers that before the assembly dispersed he was appointed general, and a strong wish was expressed to sail at once to the Peiraieus and punish the men who had subverted the constitution. From this course Alkibiades strongly dissuaded them. He had a part to play with Tissaphernes, and in order to get away he promised to return so soon as he should have concerted with him the necessary measures for carrying on the war. For the moment possibly he was sincere in his wish to help his countrymen; but he was much more eager to impress on the satrap his own greatness as an Athenian general: and the dangers of the future could do little to damp his satisfaction in being able to play on the fears of the Athenians for Tissaphernes and to terrify the satrap by exaggerating the power and the resources of Athens.<sup>1923</sup>

But before the return of Alkibiades to Magnesia, the oligarchic envoys, who had felt their bravery oozing away at Delos, ventured on presenting themselves to the assembly of the citizens at Samos. They were received with a storm of indignation which threatened their lives; but when at length they were allowed to speak, they delivered themselves of the comforting message with which they had been charged,<sup>1924</sup> adding some comments which recent incidents seemed to call for. The manifest hatred of the army for government by a club of tyrants drew forth the assurance that all the Five Thousand would take their place in turn in the Council of the Four Hundred: and the vehement charges of treachery were met by the rejoinder that, if they had wished to betray the city, they would have had an excellent opportunity for so doing, when Agis appeared with the Peloponnesian army before the walls. But with special earnestness they inveighed against the monstrous lies with which, as they insisted, Chaireas had cheated the citizens in Samos. There was no intention whatever of doing the least harm to their wives, their children, or their kinsfolk; nor could the charges of past ill-treatment be sustained. The assassination of men who were honestly attached to the constitution of Athens was a subject on which it was best to be silent; and about this therefore they said nothing. Their lame and stumbling apology rather inflamed than soothed the angry feelings of their hearers, of whom a large majority insisted on immediate return to Peiraieus to punish the traitors and to undo their work. The situation was indeed one of overwhelming difficulty. The conspirators at Athens had already humbled themselves at the feet of the Spartan king; how soon they might be brought to make an unconditional surrender of the city, no one could tell. In this same assembly were present envoys from Argos who had come to offer their help for the maintenance or restoration of the democracy. These envoys had accompanied the crew which had been taken out of the Paralian trireme and which, having been sent first to cruise about Euboeia, had been afterwards with singular want of caution charged to convey to Sparta a

<sup>1924</sup> See p. 480.

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second embassy from the Four Hundred. The result was such as might have been looked for. On reaching the Argive coast they seized the envoys, Laispodias, Aristophon, and Melesias, and delivered them as prisoners to the Argives with whose ambassadors they sailed straight to Samos.<sup>1925</sup> These determined efforts to close the war justified the suspicion that the oligarchs were determined to have peace at any cost. On the other hand, if the fleet sailed from Samos to put down the oligarchy at Athens, the insular and continental cities subject to Athens would be left at once at the mercy of the enemy; nor could it be denied that this danger was the more immediate and the more glaring. Against this plan Alkibiades threw the whole weight of his influence; and the people accordingly gave it up. The historian who believes that in this instance at least the advice of Alkibiades was thoroughly wise and beneficial adds that at the moment no other man would have had the least chance of dissuading the people from the enterprise. Pacifying the assembly as well as he could, Alkibiades bade the envoys of the Four Hundred go back and tell their masters that they must yield up their power to the Five Hundred whom they had thrust out of the Senate-house; that to the rule of the Five Thousand, if these were a reality and not a sham, no objection would be made; and that for any retrenchments which should leave more means for carrying on the war vigorously the Athenians at Samos could feel only gratitude to their kinsmen at home. The Argive envoys were dismissed with thanks and with the expression of a hope that their help might be ready when it should be called for.

Opposition  
of Thera-  
menes in  
the council  
of the Four  
Hundred.

The tidings carried from Samos by the envoys soon brought to the surface those elements of disunion which Thucydides admits to be the bane of oligarchical governments built on the ruins of a democracy.<sup>1926</sup> It was clear that the people at home were only waiting for an opportunity to shake off the yoke of their tyrants: it was still more clear that in the people at Samos the Four Hundred had to deal with a force of resolute and uncompromising enemies. The dangers involved in this

<sup>1925</sup> Thuc. viii. 86, 9. How these envoys were treated by the Argives, we are not told.

<sup>1926</sup> Thuc. viii. 89, 3.

position of things weighed with special force on those who had already begun to think that for themselves personally oligarchy had been not quite so profitable as they had thought that it would be. Among the most prominent in the active work of the conspiracy had been Theramenes and Aristokrates; but their share of power and of the fruits of power was by no means on the same scale, and they could not but remember that they belonged to a society in which each man avowedly was strictly for himself. It was only natural therefore that the eyes of these men and of others like them should now be opened to the vast importance of making the Five Thousand a reality,—in other words, of restoring practically the old democracy, for as these Five Thousand had been thus far an indefinite quantity, so an indefinite quantity they would remain. It was at the least as logical that they should include the whole demos as that they should be only another and a more convenient name for the Four Hundred. In short, the oligarchy seemed to be falling; and it was to their interest to make themselves at once leaders of a popular opposition.<sup>1927</sup>

The tactics of Theramenes warned those of their colleagues who were hopelessly committed to the usurpation of the Four Hundred, that the resistance with which they were threatened must be put down at once, and, if need be, put down by force. One attempt to send ambassadors to Sparta had miscarried through their own folly in committing them to men who had delivered them as prisoners to the Argives. It was therefore only the more necessary to send off others charged peremptorily to conclude a peace on whatever terms

Fortifica-  
tion of  
Ectonia  
by the Four  
Hundred

<sup>1927</sup> Thucydides here uses an expression, *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*, which he applies nowhere else to any Athenian citizens, but which he uses in describing the relations of the Syracusan Athenagoras to Hermokrates, and in speaking of the Korkyraian Peithias, iii. 70, and of the popular leaders at Megara, iv. 66. See the note of Dr. Arnold on Thuc. vi. 35, 2. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 85.

Thucydides remarks that an opposition like that of Theramenes and his followers is precisely what may be looked for in oligarchical societies. Few feelings carry with them more pain and irritation than those of mortified personal ambition. In a popular government this mortification lies in the general sense of disappointment; but where the act which causes this disappointment is the act of the people, in other words of a large body with few of whom the mortified man may have personal acquaintance, there can be not much room for feelings of personal resentment. It is far otherwise when a man looks upon himself as slighted by a small body of men who are professedly his equals: and to be constantly kept in the background by a clique is exceedingly likely to drive an able and unscrupulous man into open opposition. This, there can be little doubt, is the meaning of Thucydides, viii. 89, 3. See Arnold's note on this passage, and the remarks of Mr. Grote, who dissents from his opinion, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 80.

and at whatever cost.<sup>1928</sup> On this errand, loathsome to the ruder feelings of the demos, yet grateful, it would seem, to the refined and cultured tastes of Eupatrids, Phrynichos and Antiphon departed with ten others, while their accomplices at home set to work to prepare a place for the enemy, if, after all, the subjugation of the people could not be accomplished without force. As in many other harbours, the mouth of the Peiraiæus was artificially narrowed. A mole starting on the north side from the point where the land-wall of the town touched the natural coast was extended southwards until it left only a narrow passage, across which chains could be thrown, between the northern side and the point called Alkimos. On either side of the entrance thus formed stood the two towers which commanded the access to the port. But the mole itself, known by the name Eetionia, presented an open space capable of fortification. To the Four Hundred it was especially convenient, not merely because strong works erected here would enable them to admit a Spartan fleet into the harbour, but because they might be made not less serviceable against the far greater danger of assault from within. On this mole then rose the fortress by which it was hoped that the enslavement of Athens would be effectually achieved. Guarded by a wall of great strength on the harbour side, it was furnished on the sea-side with gates and every apparatus for the admission of an enemy. A further precaution was taken by running a wall through a large covered space, open perhaps on both sides, the greater portion of which was thus included in the oligarchical stronghold. Into the part thus shut off all corn brought to the harbour was carried by the order of the Four Hundred; and the city became dependent on their goodwill for the daily purchase of food.

Destruction of the fort on Eetionia with the sanction of Theramenes.

There remained, in truth, for the Spartans nothing more to do but to take possession on their own terms. It is more than possible that the very abjectness of the envoys may have made the ephors fearful of being caught in some trap; but whatever may have been the cause the traitors were dismissed with nothing more than a promise that a fleet,

<sup>1928</sup> Thuc. viii. 90, 2.

including some vessels from Taras, Lokroi, and Sicily, then lying off the Lakonian port of Las, somewhat to the south of Gythion, should pass the Athenian harbour on its way to Eubœia. The Four Hundred were naturally anxious that their fortress should be finished before this fleet should appear; but the secret of its coming could not be kept from Theramenes who publicly inveighed against the erection of the fort as part of a scheme arranged in concert with the Spartans. The historian makes no attempt to deny the existence of this treason, and plainly confesses that the oligarchs wished, if they could, to retain the empire (it would have been strange if they had not); that, if the empire went, they hoped to keep their ships and their walls; but that, rather than again suffer the people of Athens to govern themselves, they would give up everything on the one condition that their own lives should be spared.<sup>1929</sup> The return of the ambassadors stirred the people still more deeply; and the oligarchs were now to learn that others besides themselves could use their favourite weapons. In the open market-place and in the middle of the day Phrynichos was struck down by a man belonging to the force of hoplites employed in the garrison duty of Attica. The murderer escaped; and from his accomplice, an Argive, nothing could be extracted even by torture beyond a vague account of meetings held at the house of the Peripolarchos or captain of the police. Rendered bolder by the impunity which attended this crime, Theramenes insisted that the Spartan fleet which had now come to Aigina and thence fallen back on Epidaurus could not possibly be going straight to Eubœia. His language roused an ungovernable excitement. The hoplites employed in building the fort of Eetionia had all along hated their work and had toiled under the conviction that they were by it enslaving themselves. But they were working under the orders of the general Alexikles: and furious oligarch though he was, Alexikles had for them the authority

<sup>1929</sup> Thuc. viii. 91, 3. The existence of this traitorous compact is also admitted in his report of the movements of Agesandridas, 94, 2; but for this deliberate and systematic treachery he has not a word of censure, while Chaireas who overcolours a picture (we know not how far) against the oligarchs is charged with heaping up a mass of lies. See pages 483, 487.

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of a law which they were bound to obey. Their patience, however, had now reached its limits: and possibly they were told by Aristokrates<sup>1930</sup> that they had obeyed him far too long. Alexikles was seized and shut up in a house by the hoplites who were aided by the police at Mounychia under their captain Hermôn. Receiving the tidings of this outrage as they sat in their council-chamber, the Four Hundred roundly charged Theramenes with having brought it about. Theramenes replied that, if they wished, he would go at once and rescue the prisoner. To the Peiraieus accordingly he went with one of the strategoi whom he could trust. Thither also went Aristarchos, a furious partisan of the oligarchy, with a body of young Horsemen. Athens and Peiraieus were now both in tumult. In the former it was rumoured that Peiraieus was taken and Alexikles slain: in the latter the people believed that the oligarchs were coming down to take summary vengeance for the insult done to their authority. A battle was prevented only by the interference of some of the more aged citizens and especially of Thoukydides, the proxenos of Athens in his city of Pharsalos, who warned the people against the desperate madness of civil strife while the enemy was almost at their gates. Meanwhile Theramenes, having reached Eetionia, addressed the people in pretended anger. Aristarchos reviled them in more real rage. But the fear of attack grew less with every moment's delay; and the hoplites boldly asked Theramenes to tell them plainly whether it would not be well to demolish the fortress. There was no need to affect scruples here which he had cast aside even in the Senate-house; and the general by his side was ready to sanction the demolition to which Theramenes would interpose no hindrance. With impetuous eagerness the hoplites set to work to throw down the walls which they had been compelled to raise, and all were invited to join in the task who wished that the Five Thousand should be put in place of the Four Hundred. Even now, when the usurpation was well-nigh at an end, it was needful to use this mysterious formula, for it might be rash to deny positively the existence

of this unseen company, and thus to create antagonists where the demos hoped to have only friends.

In fear and trembling the Four Hundred assembled on the following day in their council-chamber, while the hoplites from Peiraiæus, dismissing Alexikles unhurt after the destruction of the fort,<sup>1931</sup> assembled first in the theatre of Dionysos at Mounychia, and thence marching to the city took their station in the Anakeion or sacred ground of the Dioskouroi, Kastor and Polydeukes, at the base of the Akropolis on its northern side. Here they were joined by some emissaries of the Four Hundred, who mingling freely with the hoplites besought them to keep order and promised that the list of the Five Thousand should be published, still falsely implying that this list had really been drawn up. They renewed, further, the pledge that the appointment of the Four Hundred should be in the hands of the larger body. With singular moderation the people accepted the compromise, without insisting that the religious distinction implied in the revival of the Solonian senate should be at once and finally dropped. A day was fixed for an assembly of the people in the theatre of Dionysos at the southern end of the wall of the Akropolis; and on that day the citizens were gathered and the debate had all but begun when it was announced that the Spartan fleet was off the coast of Salamis. At once and by all present the fact was coupled with the warnings of Theramenes, and, rushing down to Peiraiæus, some hurried into the triremes already launched, while other ships were hauled down to the water. But it was no part of the plan of the Spartan commander Agesandridas to risk a battle off Peiraiæus; and seeing that a surprise was not to be thought of he went on his way, spending one night on the coast, between Thorikos and Prasiai to the east of Sounion, and on the next day reaching Oropos. At once the Athenians saw that this squadron was intended to cover the revolt of Euboia; and now that Attica itself was beleaguered, Euboia was to them everything. At all risks then they must hasten to its defence: and with heavy hearts

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Defeat of  
Thymochar-  
es and  
revolt of  
Euboia.

<sup>1931</sup> A prisoner taken under like circumstances by an oligarchic faction would assuredly have been put to death.



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they must have felt that the risk was indeed appalling. Their ships were badly equipped: the crews had not been trained to act together, and the miserable treachery and heartless usurpation of the Four Hundred had cut them off from the aid of that noble army of Samos which would have rejoiced to strike a blow for the city now restored to its right mind. Such as it was, the squadron now dispatched under Thymochares made up with the triremes already guarding Euboia a fleet of six-and-thirty ships. Reaching Eretria a few hours after Agesandridas had disembarked at Oropos, Thymochares hoped that he might have time to refresh his wearied and hungry crews. But the Agora of the Eretrians was purposely empty; and while the men in their search for food straggled even to the ends of the town, a signal raised at Eretria warned Agesandridas that the time for attack was come. His own men were fresh and well-fed, and his ships had crossed the narrow strait while the Athenians were still scattered through the city. It is miserable to watch that paralysis of Athenian science and prostration of Athenian energy which present so painful a contrast with the sober confidence of conscious strength and skill which achieved the victories of Phormion. As disaster follows on disaster, we are tempted to hurry over a narrative which seems to present only the monotony of ruin. Six-and-thirty ships hastened as best they could to encounter the Spartan fleet: two-and-twenty fell into the hands of the enemy, their crews being all slain or taken prisoners. Even of the rest some were driven ashore; and the crews of these vessels were slaughtered by the Eretrians. A miserable remnant found refuge in the Athenian fort established in the Eretrian territory, while a few made their way to Chalkis. The Athenian fleet was, in fact, destroyed; and the revolt of all Euboia except Oreos, which was still held by Athenian Klerouchoi,<sup>1932</sup> crowned the work of the murderers who looked down calmly from their council-chamber on their awful handiwork.

According to their own philosophy oligarchs might afford

<sup>1932</sup> These Klerouchoi had held Histiaiotis from the time of the reconquest of the island by Perikles. Thuc. i. 114.

to do so. Men who professed to act solely from regard to their own interest, and who to avoid sharing the work of government with the people were ready to sacrifice the maritime empire of Athens, her fleet, and even the autonomy which they idolised, might rejoice in the ruin which had not touched their own persons or perhaps greatly lessened their opportunities of plundering and insulting others.<sup>1933</sup> But for the people whose life-blood they had poured out like water the revolt of Eubœia seemed to bring with it the day of doom. The fleet at Samos could not desert its post, even if the Four Hundred could be thrust aside; and scarcely a trireme now remained in the desolate harbour of Peiræus. Even had there been a plethora of ships, men were lacking to man them; and Athens herself was torn by factions which at any moment might be locked in bloody conflict. The town was indeed defenceless: and for a second time in the space of a few weeks a Spartan fleet and army might have crushed the once imperial city almost without a struggle. An attack on Athens would have added fuel to the dissensions already raging within it, while the blockade of Peiræus must have withdrawn the fleet and army from Samos and left all that still remained of her maritime empire at the mercy of the Persian king and his Hellenic allies.<sup>1934</sup> But the great catastrophe was to be delayed yet a little longer, and the respite came through that singular slowness and dulness which, in the emphatic words of the historian, made the Spartans the most convenient of all enemies for the quick-witted and prompt Athenians, who

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Consternation at Athens on the defeat of Thymocharès.

<sup>1933</sup> This descending scale in the systematic treachery of these wretched men has been already noticed, p. 491. Thuc. viii. 91, 3. It is impossible to lay too much stress upon it.

<sup>1934</sup> Mr. Grote discusses three times the position of the army at Samos. Speaking of the opposition of Alkibiades to the proposal for hastening to Athens, when first it was made, he says, that if we look to the natural fears of the men for their families at home and to the risk of the betrayal of Athens itself to a foreign enemy, 'we shall be disposed to conclude that the impulse of the armament was not merely natural, but even founded on a more prudent estimate of the actual chances, and that Alkibiades was nothing more than fortunate in a sanguine venture.' *Hist. Gr.* viii. 76. The same remark is repeated, when he notes the Spartan slackness after receiving the embassy of Phrynichos. *Ib.* 89. Lastly, speaking of the revolt of Lesbos and the consequent dismay at Athens, he says that this was 'the second occasion on which Athens was on the brink of ruin in consequence of the policy of Alkibiades in retaining the armament at Samos.' *Ib.* 101. Yet only a few lines before, he had insisted that the 'mere transfer' of the fleet 'from Samos to Athens would have left Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Lacedæmonians and Persians and would have caused the loss of all the Athenian empire.' The two judgements clearly exclude each other; and in this last-cited opinion Mr. Grote is supported by the emphatic verdict of Thucydides, viii. 96, 4.

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The sup-  
pression of  
the tyranny  
of the Four  
Hundred.

found in the Syracusans foes not much less energetic than themselves and suffered at their hands accordingly.<sup>1935</sup>

Twenty ships only were the Athenians able to bring together,<sup>1936</sup> but happily they were not called upon to encounter any enemy. Agesandridas allowed the opportunity to slip; and the Athenians were enabled to fix their minds on the restoration of order and law. In an assembly held in the Pnyx, surrounded by the time-honoured associations of the days of Perikles and of those who had gone before him in building up the great fabric of Athenian polity, the Four Hundred were solemnly deposed and the elastic company of Five Thousand substituted in their place. No attempt was made to publish any list of the men included in this number. All who supplied their own arms or who furnished arms for others could claim to be reckoned among them; and the phrase by which the oligarchical conspirators had thought to rivet their own authority was made to cover the whole body of the people. The miserable conspiracy was at last put down; and Athens once more lived under the polity of Kleisthenes and Perikles. On two points only was there a formal difference between the arrangements now made and those which the Four Hundred had swept away. The suffrage belonged professedly to only five thousand citizens; and only men actually engaged in military service could receive any payments from the public treasury. But the latter was manifestly a temporary measure, rendered necessary indeed by the unparalleled pressure on the resources of Athens, yet even at the worst of times not interfering with the distribution of the two oboloi to needy citizens on the occasion of great religious festivals.<sup>1937</sup> Nor is there any reasonable doubt that within a few months after the deposition of the Four Hundred the fiction of the Five Thousand was swept away, and the whole body of Athenian citizens restored to the franchise. The Psephisma of Demophantos decrees the oath to be taken by all Athenian citizens without exception before the festival of the Dionysia; and it is impossible to suppose that this Psephisma can have

<sup>1935</sup> Thuc. viii. 96, 5.

<sup>1936</sup> Ib. viii. 97, 1.

<sup>1937</sup> But although this payment was still made, the occasions calling for such distribution may have been and were probably made less frequent. See note 1320.

been passed while the franchise was limited to the comparatively small body of Five Thousand. All earthly good, it is said, has its alloy. The alloy in this case was the sanction given to the recall of Alkibiades;<sup>1939</sup> but in all other respects the work of the assembly was simply to restore the constitutional machinery as it existed before Peisandros came from Samos to hatch his conspiracy at Athens. The Archons, the Nomothetai,<sup>1940</sup> the Dikasteries, all resumed their old functions under the restored Probouleutic council representing not the old Eupatrid clans but the purely political tribes of Kleisthenes.

Thus was accomplished, seemingly amidst the death-throes of the state, a change which re-asserted the supremacy of law: and it was accomplished with a sobriety and calmness which calls forth the enthusiastic eulogy of Thucydides.<sup>1941</sup> Why he should be thus vehement in his praise, it is not easy to see, unless it be that the mere nominal limitation of the suffrage to five thousand citizens constituted the difference between good and bad government. Whatever may be the grounds of his judgement, that judgement is the more valuable not only as coming from a man who would rather not praise a democratic constitution if he could help

Restoration  
of the  
Kleisthenian  
democracy.

<sup>1938</sup> The oath imposed by this psephisma bound every Athenian citizen to kill with his own hand any who should attempt to subvert the democracy of Athens or who should hold any public office after its subversion. He is further pledged to sell the property of such traitors, and to make over one-half of the proceeds to the slayer. It is clear that the terms of the oath were intended rather to cultivate a certain temper and disposition in the person taking it than to justify in particular instances the practical exercise of these vague and dangerous powers. The courts of Athens could never allow individual citizens to decide whether this or that given man was a subverter of the commonwealth, and give to him individually the power of putting up his goods to public auction. We may compare with this oath the formal sanction which punished with death any who might propose to deal with the fund reserved in the Akropolis by Perikles for special emergencies. Page 115. It is scarcely necessary to say that this psephisma fully recognises the principle of slaying the wife and family of Achan for sins of which Achan alone was guilty; but happily we have not enough of evidence to justify our asserting that this principle was frequently or generally acted upon. So long as such promises strengthened the fidelity of those who made them, their purpose was fully accomplished. See further Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 110.

<sup>1939</sup> Thuc. viii. 97, 3.

<sup>1940</sup> There is no reason for supposing that the name as used in this passage, Thuc. viii. 97, 2, was intended to convey any other than its ordinary meaning. See Appendix H. Thucydides never uses the word when he means to designate special commissioners. Arnold, *ad loc.* Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 103.

<sup>1941</sup> Thuc. viii. 97, 2. See the note of Dr. Arnold on this passage, and Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 448, and vii. 572. This passage cannot be taken as asserting that a new constitution was now called into being. All that the words necessarily mean is that for the first time the relations of parties in the state were marked by the forbearance and harmony which are indispensable to good government: and it must be noted that this forbearing and forgiving spirit comes wholly from the people.

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it, but as fastening especially on the moderation with which this restoration (a revolution it would be monstrous to call it) was brought about. Nor, if we survey the whole circumstances of the time, can we say that his praise was undeserved. The conspirators whose usurpation was now righteously brought to an end had begun their work with lies, had carried it on by assassination, had consummated it by treachery infinitely more detestable than that of Strafford against the liberties of England. They had murdered men against whom they could have no private grudge: and the people on whom they trampled had exhibited perhaps only too much forbearance in dealing with men for whom faith and justice were mere toys. Phrynichos, it is true, had been struck down at mid-day by the dagger of one of the armed police of Attica;<sup>1942</sup> but otherwise none of the oligarchs had been slain except in open fight provoked by their own violence. If the citizens at Samos deserve any censure, they are to blame for taking no further guarantees from the oligarchs whom they had mastered than the mere banishment of two or three of their number. If again the hoplites of the Peiraieus are to be blamed, it would be for letting Alexikles go instead of putting Aristarchos along with him into safe durance and taking good care that their fellow-conspirators should not escape to renew their mischief at Athens or to carry on their intrigues and treachery elsewhere. They were altogether too willing to treat as citizens men who by a system of dastardly outrages had put themselves beyond the pale of law and all title to mercy. It was only through the almost incredible sluggishness of the Spartans that Athens was not now held by a Peloponnesian garrison; and if after treachery which, if committed by the peers and gentlemen of England, would rouse in the whole mass of the English people an implacable wrath, the Athenians showed themselves ready to live peaceably with their tormentors, this is assuredly one of the most astonishing facts recorded in any history.

<sup>1942</sup> The fancies of a later time made out that he had been slain by night, the spot being carefully specified; but some of the statements made by Lykourgos are so manifestly false, that none can be accepted as evidence against the definite assertions of Thucydides. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 115.

Except for this over-indulgence the conduct of the people seems to have been blameless. But this credit cannot be claimed for Theramenes and Aristokrates with the others who helped to undo a work in which, so long as they saw a fair chance of success, they had taken a prominent and active part. Whatever be their guilt, it must be borne by themselves; and, to say the least, the crime of bringing fellow-conspirators to punishment is less heinous than the deliberate attempt to throw down all law and betray a country into the hands of foreign enemies. So long as they worked along with the Four Hundred, they were acting in defiance of the highest of all duties; in now charging them with treachery they were infringing the principle which is popularly known as honour among thieves, and on this infringement the thieves may be left to pass their judgement. Honest men will rate at its true value the support which such men may give to law and order; but this is no reason why that support should be refused. For the Four Hundred, indeed, it was a fortunate thing that their usurpation was repressed in some part by the co-operation of men belonging to their own side. If Theramenes and his helpers had not been concerned in restoring the democracy, the people would have been free to search out and punish the murderers of Androkles and of all later victims of the oligarchic bravoës. As it was, the one act laid to their charge was the sending of the last embassy to Sparta to offer a peace clogged by no conditions; and on this charge Theramenes to his own future cost came forward as the accuser. But of the men thus accused, one had passed beyond the reach of earthly law. Phrynichos, the man who with the clearness of Balaam saw his duty and deliberately defied it, had paid the penalty of his crimes with his life; others with the most prominent leaders of the oligarchy had taken flight when they saw that their house was falling. Three only, Antiphon, Onomakles, and Archeptolemos, remained at Athens. The two last may have thought that their sins might be condoned; the hardihood of Antiphon who must have known that he at least had sinned unpardonably is scarcely consistent with his sagacity and practical wisdom. The decree was passed for

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VIII.Trial and  
execution  
of Anti-  
phon.

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their apprehension and for their trial which was to be conducted according to all the forms of the polity of Perikles; but before the writ could be executed Onomakles, who had been a colleague of Phrynichos at Samos,<sup>1943</sup> made his escape.<sup>1944</sup> The other two were brought before the tribunal of the people, were condemned and executed. Their houses were razed, their property confiscated, their children deprived of citizenship; and any citizen who might adopt any of their descendants was to lose at once his own franchise. The injustice done to the guiltless may rouse a righteous indignation; but the harshness of Athenian law was not worse than the tender mercies of an English attainder. At the least the criminals themselves were fairly tried; nor can the *Dikasteries* which condemned them on overwhelming evidence be compared with the slavish juries which sanctioned a series of judicial murders at the bidding of Jeffreys or Scroggs. Many a speech delivered before Athenian tribunals had been written by the illustrious rhetorician who now stood at their bar. The first speech which he delivered in his own person was that in which he pleaded for his life. It was more than worthy of his great reputation, and Thucydides asserts that eloquence so magnificent had never marked the defence of a criminal on a capital charge. The poet Agathon, it is said, expressed to Antiphon his enthusiastic admiration of his splendid oratory, and was assured by the condemned man that his verdict more than compensated him for the adverse judgement of the people. The satisfaction which a man like Antiphon could feel at intellectual praise which did not touch his morality places a dismal crown on a life in which amiability in private was balanced by contemptuous disregard of his duties as a citizen and by the habitual use of hired-assassins. His eloquence may have impressed, it failed to convince his judges: and if ever an orator deserved that his words should not convince his hearers, that orator was Antiphon.

<sup>1943</sup> Thuc. viii. 25.

<sup>1944</sup> This must have been the case, if it be this Onomakles who was afterwards one of the Thirty. According to one of the anonymous *Lives* of Thucydides Onomakles shared the condemnation of Antiphon and Archeptolemos. Some have therefore supposed that these were two different men; and the authority of the anonymous biographer must go for what it is worth.

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VIII.Betrayal of  
Oinoë to the  
Boiotians  
by Aris-  
tarchos.

With Onomakles or before him Peisandros had left Athens, never, it would seem, to return to the city where he had so zealously organised the action of the oligarchic clubs for the destruction of the work of Kleisthenes. He was accompanied to Dekeleia by a knot of tyrants who felt that their interests would best be consulted by flight. Among these men was Alexikles, the general who had been seized and imprisoned by the hoplites at Eetionia, but who did not choose to employ his authority for wreaking further mischief on the commonwealth. One man only there was whose refinement rose above such plebeian scruples.<sup>1945</sup> Like the rest, Aristarchos, the man who had threatened the hoplites at Peiraieus with the vengeance of the Four Hundred, knew that he could save himself only by flight; but he was resolved that his countrymen should have cause to remember his departure. Taking with him a body of barbarian archers in the employment of the state, he betook himself not to Dekeleia but to Oinoë, a border fortress on the road which led by Eleutherai through the passes of Kithairon to Plataiai. The garrison of this fortress was now undergoing a blockade by a body of Corinthian volunteers, aided by some Boiotian allies who wished to take vengeance for losses sustained at their hands by troops on their way to the Peloponnesos or Boiotia from Dekeleia. Having first concerted measures with these besiegers, Aristarchos entered Oinoë, and informed the garrison, who had been cut off from all communication with Athens and therefore could not contradict him, that peace had been made with the Spartans, and that one of the conditions attached to this covenant was the surrender of Oinoë to the Boiotians.<sup>1946</sup> The lie was believed, and the garrison, marching out under a truce, left

<sup>1945</sup> Thuc. viii. 98. Alexikles was certainly not less Strategos than Aristarchos, and might have abused his authority for similar treachery. The fact that he did not, justifies the contrast here drawn between the two men.

<sup>1946</sup> This act of treachery sufficiently disproves the story told by the orator Lykourgos that Aristarchos was put to death along with Alexikles for defending the bones of Phrynichos which were dug up and brought to trial. Neither of them was at Athens when the decree was passed for accusing the envoys who had accompanied Phrynichos to Sparta.

The reference to Aristarchos in the speech of Euryptolemos on behalf of the unfortunate commanders at Argennoussai cannot be taken as proving that Aristarchos underwent his trial. Xen. *H.* i. 7, 28. All that it says is that the legal forms of accusation were in his case complied with while they were disregarded in the case of the six generals.



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the enemy in quiet possession of a stronghold from which they could inflict on the country an amount of mischief not less than that which it had sustained at the hands of the Spartans in Dekeleia. So ended, as it began, in unspeakable infamy, the scheme which was to confer upon Athens the blessings of government by men of high birth and exquisite culture.<sup>1947</sup>

Indecisive  
movements  
of the  
Athenian  
and Peloponnesian  
fleets.

While Athens was thus convulsed by the usurpations and violence of a knot of traitors, the history of Tissaphernes and his Spartan allies exhibited the working of suspicion on the one side and of discontent fast passing into indignation on the other. For eighty days the Peloponnesian fleet had been in absolute inaction in Rhodes; and the men became daily more and more convinced that the promise of a Phœnician fleet to reinforce them was a mere lie and cheat. They had heard of the contentions between the oligarchic faction and the main body of the Athenians at Samos; and they were the more indignant that their hands were thus tied, while the dissensions among their enemies gave them so vast an advantage in attack. So formidable indeed seemed the attitude of the Peloponnesians and their allies, and so loud the complaints of the Syracusans especially against the slender and infrequent pay doled out to them, that Astyochos was compelled to move his fleet from Miletos and again challenge the enemy to battle. But as they approached the promontory of Mykalê with 112 ships, the Athenians with their 82 triremes stationed off Glaukê thought themselves not justified in risking a general engagement. The days of Phormion and Demosthenes were past, and the Athenian fleet fell back on Samos, while the Peloponnesians landed for the night off Mykalê where the Milesian land force was

<sup>1947</sup> The Athenian people would have miserably failed in their duty had they not compelled the Four Hundred, as being according to their own profession Athenian magistrates, to undergo the usual examination on quitting their office. This was accordingly done; and those who remained to take their trial were either acquitted or sentenced to fines and partial civil disabilities. The former class was by far the larger,—owing to the bribery, it was said, of the Logistai, or officers to whom magistrates going out of office had to submit their accounts. Those who had fled from Athens and allowed judgement to go against them by default were placed in a class by themselves, and were exempted from the amnesty accorded after the catastrophe of Aigospotamoi by the psephisma of Patrokleides.

For the efforts made to obtain a commutation in the case of Polystratos who was enrolled among the Four Hundred only a few days before they were driven from the Senate-house, see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 120.

also incamped. On the next day the return of Strombichides, to whom an urgent message had been sent, raised the Athenian fleet to 110 ships; and thus, nearly matched in numbers, they advanced in order of battle against the Spartans who now in their turn declined the contest.<sup>1948</sup>

If even this poor and negative check brought some comfort and encouragement to the Athenians, it caused in the Peloponnesian camp still greater indignation against the neglect or treachery of Tissaphernes, and led the Spartans to think of the more generous promises made to them by the Hellespontine satrap Pharnabazos. To him accordingly a squadron of 40 ships was sent under Klearchos who had received his commission at Sparta for this very service.<sup>1949</sup> He set out with the hope not only of abundant pay for his men, but of detaching Byzantion from its connexion with Athens. At first this result seemed little likely. The necessity of avoiding the Athenian fleet compelled him to keep out at sea, and a severe storm drove most of the ships to Delos whence they made their way back to Miletos. Klearchos, not to be thus baffled, went to the Hellespont by land, and the Megarian commander Helixos, sailing with ten ships to Byzantion, brought about the revolt of that city. The Athenians heard of his movements too late to prevent this loss, and an indecisive action of eight ships on either side<sup>1950</sup> before Byzantion did nothing to remedy the mischief.

The departure of Klearchos and Helixos for the Hellespont in no way improved the state of things in the Peloponnesian camp at Miletos. Not only had Tissaphernes become still more slack in his payments since they had refused the challenge of the Athenian fleet; but the Athenians themselves had become far more formidable from the patriotic enthusiasm awakened by the suppression of the oligarchic conspiracy. The discontent of the army was no longer expressed by mere murmurs. Astyochoḥ was flatly told not only by Hermokrates but by others whose silence had thus far been secured by bribes that, if the men were not paid,

Revolt of  
Byzantion  
from  
Athens.

Tumults in  
the Spartan  
camp at  
Miletos.

<sup>1948</sup> Thuc. viii. 79.

<sup>1949</sup> Ib. viii. 39.

<sup>1950</sup> Ib. viii. 80, 4. In the preceding sentence Thucydides had spoken of ten ships under the command of Helixos. Why the other two were not engaged, we are not told.

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they must, in the state of starvation to which they were reduced, inevitably desert. The Sicilian allies showed that they were no longer to be cajoled: and Astyochos made the blunder of lifting his stick to strike the Thourian commander Dorieus.<sup>1951</sup> In an instant the troops nearest at hand made a rush upon the admiral who saved his life only by taking refuge at a neighbouring altar. With the full approval of the Syracusans the Milesians further showed their irritation against Tissaphernes by seizing the fort which the satrap had built in their city and expelling the garrison. The citizens of this still considerable place had looked for something like real freedom when they cast in their lot with the Spartans. They had counted on autonomy,—that is, on a more thorough independence than that which Athens had allowed to them; and full protection against Persian tax-gatherers was an essential condition of this independence. With these views the Syracusans heartily agreed, and against them the Spartan Lichas as heartily protested. So long as the war lasted, they must in his judgement even truckle, if need be, to the Persian satrap. He had money, they had none; and the Asiatic Hellenes generally must fawn on the man who could pay them if he would, until they had put down the empire of Athens. The expression of these opinions concentrated on Lichas the vehement hatred of the Milesians. Indignant at the cheat put upon them, and still more wroth that under the men who preached the gospel of autonomy they were practically abandoned to the barbarians against whom at least Athens had effectually protected them, they refused to allow the body of Lichas, when some time afterwards, he died, to be buried in the spot which the Spartans had chosen for it; and the last scene connected with his career was marked by an indignity as great as that which, nine years before, had turned towards him the eyes of the spectators at Olympia.<sup>1952</sup> But the Spartans at home were also wearied out with the lethargy which seemed to have come over their army in the East; and Mindaros was sent to take the place of Astyochos. In Astyochos Tissaphernes felt that he was losing a friend

<sup>1951</sup> Dorieus himself was a Rhodian. Thuc. viii. 35, 1. See page 450.

<sup>1952</sup> Thuc. v. 50, 4. See page 293.

whose departure might be most inconvenient to him, and whose recall showed that not much reliance could be placed on his influence at Sparta. The satrap, therefore, sent with him a special envoy, the Karian Gaulites,<sup>1953</sup> both to lay a complaint against the Milesians for destroying his fort in their city, and more particularly to counteract the indignant remonstrances of the Milesians and the Syracusan Hermokrates by explaining his position and his motives.<sup>1954</sup> The mere fact that a Persian satrap could thus defend himself before a distant people with whom he had no direct connexion may serve to show how far more effectual and widely felt must have been the restraining influence of imperial Athens.

But Tissaphernes felt that something more was needed than the dispatch of an envoy to Sparta. He knew that the Phœnician fleet either had reached or would soon reach Aspendos, and he therefore invited Lichas to accompany him thither and come back with the force which was to turn the scale decisively against Athens. Mindaros, not yet versed in the artifices of the game in which the satrap thought himself an adept, saw with satisfaction the departure of Lichas, while Tamôs remained as the deputy of Tissaphernes to furnish regular payments to the Peloponnesians and their allies. The voyage to Aspendos, it needs scarcely to be said, was only a fresh trick to gain time and to exhaust both the Athenians and their enemies. Mindaros and Lichas were thoroughly fooled. As a paymaster Tamôs was even worse than Tissaphernes, while Tissaphernes himself, having brought the Phœnician fleet to the Pamphylian coast, kept it there for a while and then sent it home again. Some ingenious theories were devised to account for conduct so astonishing; but the historian rightly cares but little for the explanation that the whole thing was a stratagem to get money out of the Phœnicians who, either as feeling no interest in the contest or as fearing to encounter the fleets of a people who had treated them so roughly at Salamis and Mykalê, would

Dismissal  
of the  
Phœnician  
fleet from  
Aspendos.

<sup>1953</sup> The phrase of Thucydides that Gaulites was a man 'of two languages,' διγλωσσος, clearly implies that he belonged to a people to whom the use of Greek and Karian was habitual.

<sup>1954</sup> Thuc. viii. 85.

gladly compound by heavy payments for actual service in which they would otherwise be immediately engaged.<sup>1955</sup> It is quite possible that Tissaphernes may thus have swept some talents into his coffers, while he had the further satisfaction of convincing Lichas that the Phenician fleet had a real existence: but his main object was to prolong the contest to the utmost, and he saw that the two parties to it were for the time so evenly matched that he himself had nothing more to do than to hold the balance even between them. The very reason which he gave for dismissing the fleet transparently betrayed this motive. Had it pleased him to do so, he might, the historian insists, have finished the war at once; and the plea that a force of 147 ships represented inadequately the dignity and power of the great king was except as a studied insult to the Spartans utterly ludicrous. Persian despots might love pomp: but they would prefer to get the business of putting down the Athenians done for a thousand talents to spending upon it nine or ten thousand; and in proportion to his economy the satrap would have a higher place among the royal benefactors.<sup>1956</sup> But if Tissaphernes cheated Mindaros still further by receiving Philippos who had been sent by Mindaros with two triremes to join Lichas, he was in turn overreached himself. It was no part of his plan to exasperate the resentment already felt against him in the Spartan camp, if such a result could be avoided; but Alkibiades was resolved that it should not be avoided. This unwearied schemer was well aware that Tissaphernes had no intention of bringing the Phenician fleet into action; and therefore he eagerly availed himself of the opportunity by promising the Athenians at Samos that he would either bring up the Phenician fleet to their help or prevent it from coming to the help of their enemies. Sailing to Aspendos with thirteen triremes, he took care to parade ostentatiously his close intimacy with the satrap; and as the Phenician fleet was not allowed to take part in the war, the Athenians believed that this supposed change of plan was due to the influence of Alkibiades. The Peloponnesians, assigning it to the same reason, were more furiously indig-

<sup>1955</sup> Thuc. viii. 87, 3<sup>1956</sup> Ib. viii. 87, 5.

nant at the treachery of Tissaphernes; and for the time Alkibiades remained the most important personage in the theatre of the war.

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The patience of Mindaros reached its limit, when a message from Philippos told him that the Phenicians were actually on their way home. Not tied by the bribes which had corrupted Astyochos, he resolved at once to close with the more tempting offers of Pharnabazos who promised to detach from Athens all the Hellenic cities in his satrapy. Sixteen Peloponnesian ships from the fleet of Mindaros had already reached the Hellespont and overrun a great part of the Chersonesos which had once been ruled by Miltiades;<sup>1957</sup> and thither Mindaros himself now prepared to make his way with 73 triremes.<sup>1958</sup> He succeeded in escaping the notice of the Athenian guard-ships off Samos: but a severe storm carried him to Ikaros and kept him there for nearly a week before he could sail to Chios. Here his position became known to the Athenian commander Thrasylos, who on hearing of his movement from Miletos hastened with 55 ships to intercept him before he should reach the Hellespont. Taking it for granted that he would sail northwards between Lesbos and the mainland, Thrasylos placed his scout-ships off the southeastern promontory of the island and the opposite mainland:<sup>1959</sup> but his own presence was needed on the western side of Lesbos. A body of oligarchic exiles from Methymna, with fifty hoplites from Kymê and some mercenaries, had failed in an attack on their own city, but had succeeded in making Eresos revolt again from Athens.

Revolt of  
the Lesbian  
town of  
Eresos  
from  
Athens.

<sup>1957</sup> Thuc. viii. 99.

<sup>1958</sup> According to the enumeration given in Thuc. viii. 80, 4, these 73 ships must have included the two with Philippos. This is at least uncertain. The whole fleet at Miletos, viii. 79, 1, consisted of 112 ships. Of these ten had been sent to the Hellespont under Helixos, viii. 80, 3; and sixteen had followed them, viii. 99, 2. But Diodoros, xiii. 38, says that the Thourian commander Dorieus had been sent to put down some disturbances at Rhodes, where probably the Athenian party threatened a revolution. This would make the remaining fleet to consist of 73 ships. In this case Dorieus, who is mentioned by Xenophon, *H.* i. 1, 2, as reaching the Hellespont about the autumnal equinox, cannot have come back to Miletos when Mindaros left. But if we correct Thucydides by Diodoros, we have to remember that Diodoros speaks of Mindaros as setting off for the Hellespont with 83 ships. The exactness of these numbers is happily a matter of no great importance; and they must remain more or less uncertain. See the notes of Dr. Arnold on *Thuc.* viii. 80 and 99.

<sup>1959</sup> Mr. Grote holds that the expression of Thucydides, ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἡπειρῷ, viii. 100, means the mainland opposite the northwestern promontory of Chios and not the southeastern cape of Lesbos. If both sides of the strait between Lesbos and the mainland had been guarded, the movements of Mindaros must have become known. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 137, note.

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III.Voyage of  
Mindaros  
to the  
Hellespont.

Hastening hither, he found Thrasyboulos already there with five ships from Samos, which together with two triremes returning from the Hellespont and five belonging to Methymna raised his fleet to 67 vessels.

In full confidence that the movements of Mindaros would be carefully and speedily reported to him, Thrasylos made his preparations for carrying out the siege of Eresos with the utmost vigour. But his calculations were disappointed. Aware that the Athenians were on the look-out in the channel between Lesbos and the mainland, Mindaros resolved to keep out of their sight; and having reached the islets of Argennoussai unnoticed, he was at Rhoiteion at the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight of the next day.<sup>1960</sup> Beacon fires kindled by friends and foes warned the Athenian squadron of eighteen ships at Sestos that the enemy's fleet had passed the mouth of the strait off Sigeion. To be thus caught in a trap by a force perhaps three or four times as large as their own would be certain ruin; but this ruin they could not by whatever speed or skill have escaped, had it not been that the orders of Mindaros kept at their post the 16 ships which were on guard at Abydos. The commander of this squadron had been charged to confine himself wholly to co-operating with the main Peloponnesian fleet so soon as he should have heard that it had set out from Chios.<sup>1961</sup> The

<sup>1960</sup> The course taken by Mindaros must depend chiefly on the text of Thucydides, viii. 101, 1. But without any reference to the change adopted by Dr. Arnold with other commentators, we know that the Athenians had a fortified post at Delphinion, whence any fleet passing along the channel must have been seen; and we can scarcely suppose that such a fortress would at any time be without guardships or quick-sailing vessels which might be sent off on any emergency. If Mr. Grote be right in thinking that the scout-ships of Thrasylos were placed off mount Mimas in the Erythraian peninsula, the chances of an enemy passing unnoticed would be still further lessened. It seems difficult then to resist the conclusion that in order to avoid these dangers Mindaros must have doubled the southern promontory of Chios and then have sailed northwards until he reached the middle channel between the southern coast of Lesbos and the northern shore of the peninsula of Erythrai, when he turned his course to the southeast and made the land at the harbour of Karteria in the territory of Phokaia. Thence he sailed, we are told, right along the chord of the gulf of Elaia to the Argennoussai islets; and having escaped notice thus far, he had nothing further to fear. At the least it can scarcely be doubted that if Mindaros had sailed northwards, keeping Chios on his left hand, he would have followed the course which Thrasylos expected that he would take: nor can it be questioned that if Thucydides wrote ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγια, he meant that Mindaros sailed along the side of Chios facing the open sea,—in other words, that he doubled the southern promontory and then steered north. If this fact be accepted, the emendation of the text by the insertion of the negative after Χίου is an error. That the letters *ou* should have fallen out of manuscripts is exceedingly likely: but it is by no means so likely that they would fall out of all the manuscripts. In this instance it is enough to say that no MS. authority can be adduced for a change which rests, accordingly, on pure conjecture.

<sup>1961</sup> If the sentence of Thucydides, viii. 102, 2, means merely what the Scholiast asserts

Athenian triremes were thus enabled to make their way unmolested to Elaious. Here they still were when morning made them visible to the ships of Mindaros; and the four hindermost vessels were cut off from the main body, while three were driven ashore near the temple of the hero Protesilaos which in years long since gone by had been profaned by the Persian Artajktes.<sup>1962</sup> From two of these triremes the crew managed to escape: the men belonging to the third fell into the hands of the enemy: and the fourth was run aground and burnt at Imbros.

By the combined Peloponnesian fleet of eighty-one ships the day was spent in an ineffectual attempt to reduce Elaious, from which place they sailed to Abydos. Soon afterwards the Athenian fleet of Thrasylos, strengthened by the 14 ships which had succeeded in escaping from Sestos, took up its station at Elaious, numbering now 76 triremes.<sup>1963</sup> Five days were spent in preparations for the battle, the story of which may be dismissed in a few words. The decay of Athenian power and science is strikingly proved by the mere choice of the scene of conflict. Pent up in the narrow waters of a strait nowhere two miles in width, they now proposed to fight with nearly eighty ships in a space which Phormion would have regarded as wholly inadequate for the proper manœuvring of twenty; and the details of the battle are, as we might expect, much on a par with those which were natural to the early tactics of the Persian wars. In single line the Athen-

The battle  
of Kynos-  
sema.

it to mean, all that there would be any need to say would be that the Spartan commander at Abydos grossly neglected his duty and disobeyed his orders. According to this interpretation, this officer had been charged to keep a strict look-out and to cut off the Athenian squadron in case they should attempt to sail out of their station. In point of fact he makes no attempt to do so. It becomes therefore altogether more likely that he should have had some reason for this astonishing inaction; and this motive would be supplied, if he had received an order from Mindaros telling him to reserve himself for co-operation with the main body of the fleet. At Abydos it would be impossible for him to know what might be happening at the mouth of the strait, or for what purpose and in what quarter his aid might be called for. If this be so, the words ἢν ἐκπλεῶσι must apply to the departure of Mindaros from Chios. If the phrase προεισημένῃς φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλω mean, as Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 144, holds it to mean, that orders had been given to the officer at Abydos to keep 'a look-out for the arrival of the Peloponnesians,' or 'to watch for the approaching voyage of their friends,' we must content ourselves with comparing Thucydides to the despot who said, 'Ego sum rex Romanus et super grammaticam.'

<sup>1962</sup> See vol. i. page 598.

<sup>1963</sup> The five ships of Thrasyboulos, Thuc. viii. 100, 4, had raised to 62 the fleet with which Thrasylos had set out from Samos; and the 14 vessels which escaped from Lesbos completed the number. The five Methymnaian ships had been left at Lesbos. See further, Arnold, *Thuc.* viii. 104.



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III.

ian fleet advanced from Élaios along the coast of Chersonesos, and drew up between Ídakos and Arrhianoí, unknown places lying between Elaios and Sestos, when the Spartan fleet advanced to meet them along the coastline lying between Abydos and Dardános, the Athenian right wing under Thrasyboulos being opposed to Mindaros with the best sailing vessels on the Spartan left, while Thrasylos on the left encountered the Syracusans on the right wing of the hostile fleet. On both sides the main object was to outflank the enemy. The action was begun by Mindaros who sought to work round the Athenians to the west: but Thrasylos anticipated his movement, and at the same time Thrasybotulos in his effort to outflank the Syracusan squadron had doubled the headland of Kynossema, or the Hound's Grave,<sup>1964</sup> and thus passed out of sight of the battle which raged to the west of the promontory. But this extension of the Athenian left wing to the west and of their right wing to the east left the centre dangerously weak; and on the ships left thus exposed the Peloponnesians fell with a vehemence which became the means of punishing them later in the day. For the moment they were completely successful. The Athenian centre was driven back upon the shore, while Thrasyboulos was unable to help them and Thrasylos was hidden from them by the projecting headland. But the former soon saw the disorder into which the Peloponnesian centre had fallen in their eagerness to push the enemy ashore; and a tolerably even fight was by a vigorous assault changed into a decisive advantage which enabled him to attack the scattered vessels of the enemy's centre. Meanwhile Thrasylos had defeated the Syracusans opposed to him, teaching Hermokrates that it was not always so easy to vanquish Athenian seamen as he had found it in the great harbour of his own city; and thus the whole Peloponnesian fleet was driven back, leaving in the hands of the enemy eight Chian ships, five from Corinth, two belonging to the Ambrakiots and Boiotians, and one to each of the several states of Leukas, Sparta, Syracuse, and Pêllêne,—twenty-one in all. But the Athen-

<sup>1964</sup> The hound here buried is Hekabê the wife of Priamos. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*, ii. 447.

ians had lost fifteen vessels, and thus were gainers only by six.<sup>1965</sup>

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VIII.

Moral  
effects of  
the victory  
on the  
Athenians.

Compared with the great exploits of Phormion and Demosthenes, the victory was poor indeed; but to the Athenians it came at a time when their spirit was almost crushed by a seemingly infinite series of disasters, and it exercised on them a moral influence scarcely less than that which the victory of Mantinëia had exercised over the Spartans.<sup>1966</sup> In either case a people whose ancient reputation had been lowered and discredited were restored to their self-respect; and to the Athenians the result was the more encouraging, as it seemed to be the first fruits of the restored polity of Athens after the murderous usurpation of the Four Hundred. The trireme sent home with the tidings was received with unbounded delight. The depression which had so long hung about them as with the darkness of death was suddenly dispelled; and they felt that the hope of a successful issue to the war was no longer a presumptuous and unreasonable delusion.<sup>1967</sup> But so slight was the fear inspired by this success on the part of the Athenians that four days later they were compelled to sail against the unfortified town of Kyzikos on the southern shore of the Propontis, which had revolted from them. Being without defences, the place was soon taken and a contribution of money imposed upon it. But on their way thither the Athenians had seized the eight guard-ships stationed at Byzantion; <sup>1968</sup> and with still greater satisfaction they learnt soon afterwards that Hippokrates and Epikles had been sent by Mindaros to bring away the fleet stationed at Eubœia.<sup>1969</sup>

<sup>1965</sup> It cannot with fairness be said that the narrative which Diodoros, xiii. 39-40, gives of this battle is a history of the same event which is recorded by Thucydides. The two stories have not a point in common beyond the fact that the Spartans were defeated. In Diodoros the victory of the Athenians is made to turn partly on the force of the current down the strait, and more especially on the sudden appearance of twenty-five Athenian ships, the sight of which determined their enemies to retreat. Of these incidents Thucydides, the contemporary historian, knows nothing. It seems rash, therefore, to assert on the authority of Diodoros that on the Athenian side the skill of the pilots was balanced by the superiority of the Epibatai on that of the Spartans. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 149, note.

<sup>1966</sup> See page 308.

<sup>1967</sup> Thuc. viii. 106.

<sup>1968</sup> See note 1959.

<sup>1969</sup> Thuc. viii. 107. According to Diodoros, xiii. 41, not one of these ships joined the fleet of Mindaros, and of the crews of all the fifty ships only twelve men escaped shipwreck in an awful storm which overwhelmed them as they were rounding cape Athos. The inscription which he quotes from the temple of Athênê at Koroneia seems certainly to bear out his assertions; but inscriptions of this kind can rarely, if ever, be taken on their own authority, and we know that Hippokrates lived to send to Sparta

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On the other hand they were unable to retain the ships taken in the battle of Kynossema, all of which were recovered by the Spartans except some which the people of Elaious burnt as being unserviceable. Nor were they able to prevent the far more important step by which Euboia lost its insular character. With thirty ships, if we may trust the narrative of Diodoros,<sup>1970</sup> Theramenes was sent, but sent in vain, to interrupt the joint work of the Boiotian cities, which had determined that the narrow strait of the Euripos should be made the entrance of a harbour fortified after the fashion of Peiraieus. On either side a mole was carried into the sea, and on the opposite extremities rose two towers between which space was left for the passage of only one ship at a time, even this passage being secured by a chain.

after the battle of Kyzikos the memorable epistle which throws a strange light on the nature and extent of Spartan education.

<sup>1970</sup> xiii. 47.

## CHAPTER IX.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR, FROM  
THE BATTLE OF KYNOSSEMA TO THE BATTLE OFF THE  
ISLANDS OF ARGENNOUSSAI.

THE battle of Kynossema was not the last victory won by Athenian fleets in the war which was now gradually drawing to its close. But the whole history of the struggle after the Sicilian expedition shows with mournful clearness that Athens had reached a point after which the most resolute efforts and the most brilliant successes cease to produce any permanent results. She was, in fact, involved now in a contest in which victory was impossible. It was not merely that her fleets and armies had been destroyed, and her revenues become precarious. Against such difficulties as these she might have struggled successfully; and in spite of all discouragements and hindrances the energy with which she surmounted them during the year following the catastrophe at Syracuse was astonishing. She might even have repaired the mischief arising from the decay of that nautical science and skill which had enabled her for half a century to keep all Persian ships from the waters of the Egean and made her name dreaded from the Hellespont to Sicily and Kyrênê. But she could not do this unless she was seconded by the hearty good will of the great body of her allies; and if these were not honestly convinced that alliance with Athens was to their own interest, there could clearly be, sooner or later, but one issue to the struggle. This conviction, existing in but a few of the cities belonging to her confederacy, was strong only in Samos; and the principle of isolation against which her confederacy was a protest had even for democratic communities the charm which brings

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Change in  
the Athen-  
ian cha-  
racter.

the moth to the flaming candle. But in all the allied states there was a party which hated as well as feared her, a party which knew that her courts would give redress for the crimes which they dearly loved to commit, and which was ready to cast off her yoke at any cost. This alone would have sufficed to shake her empire to its very foundations; but all hope of preserving it was gone when Athenians themselves became traitors to their own constitution, when they set at defiance the laws which dealt out equal justice to all citizens, and employed the dagger to put down opposition in a city for which freedom of speech was the very breath of life. Through the resolute resistance of the Athenians at Samos, aided by the determined friendship of the Samian people, this infamous conspiracy had been put down; but the wounds left behind it were never healed, and among the most fatal of these was the lessening of that respect for forms and processes of law which in earlier days had most notably distinguished Athens from every other Hellenic city, —in other words, from every other city in the world. The condition of Athens was, in short, morbid;<sup>1971</sup> and the people was infected with a disease of which the frenzied outburst after the battle of Argennoussai was only what the keen foresight of a Perikles might readily have anticipated. In truth Athens was at a hopeless disadvantage in the race; but it was neither Persian gold enriching her enemies, nor the energy of the younger Cyrus, nor the unscrupulous warfare of Lysandros which determined the catastrophe. Against such difficulties as these she made way for eight years, and sometimes with a vigour which seemed to promise better things. Had this promise been realised, she might have maintained her ground for eight years more, and have put down triumphantly the combination of her

<sup>1971</sup> In his conclusive vindication of the Sophists from charges at once carelessly and pertinaciously urged against them; Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 511-515, reaches perhaps too sweeping a conclusion when he denies that between the battle of Marathon and the surprise at Aigospotamoi any change for the worse is discernible in the Athenian character. Everything depends on the terms which may be employed in speaking of such changes. It is, on the whole, undoubtedly true 'that the people had become both morally and politically better and that their democracy had worked to their improvement:' in other words, this belief is justified, if we regard this whole period of nearly ninety years. But the facts that the Athenians under the advice of Peisandros suppressed their own constitution, and that they broke through the established legal forms in the cases of the six generals and of Kleophon, cannot be gainsaid; and, so far, the assertion of improvement cannot be made good.

enemies. But her strength lay in following the counsels of Perikles; and when she left the path which he had marked out for her, she was as the shorn Samson in the arms of the Philistines. From the first, indeed, the idea of the Athenian empire was one which could not be realised without reversing the most cherished principles of the ancient Hellenic and Aryan civilisation; and for this change the Hellenic tribes assuredly were not prepared. Athens, therefore, fell, and the story of her fall is one in which the temptation to pass hastily over the several stages may well be forgiven. But she had exhibited to the world a polity which might be the means of overcoming the miserable feuds of scattered clans, and of cementing into a single nation the inhabitants of cities spread over many lands. She had sown seed which was to bear fruit in commonwealths yet unborn; and the work of the great founders of her empire was therefore not wrought in vain.

The departure of Mindaros for the Hellespont convinced Tissaphernes at last that he had overdone his part. Even if his policy should not give the Athenians too great an advantage, it would assuredly secure to his brother satrap Pharnabazos the position and influence which he coveted for himself and which he regarded as his right. His province itself was exposed to dangers which might threaten serious consequences. His general Arsakes had treacherously massacred the Delians at Adramyttion; and the neighbouring people of Antandros, with some Spartan troops which Mindaros gladly detached to their aid, expelled the Persian garrison then occupying their Akropolis.<sup>1972</sup> His garrisons in Miletos and Knidos shared the same fate;<sup>1973</sup> and he resolved to go in person to the Hellespont, both to complain of these wrongs and to make an effort for recovering the influence which was fast slipping away from him.

For the present the crafty schemes of Tissaphernes told in favour of Alkibiades. The homeward return of the Phœnician fleet enabled him to go back to Samos and say not only that this part of his promise was fulfilled but that the satrap was better inclined to the Athenian cause than he

Departure  
of Tissa-  
phernes for  
the Helles-  
pont.

Defeat of  
Dorieus  
and Min-  
daros in  
the bay of  
Dardanos.

<sup>1972</sup> Thuc. viii. 108.

<sup>1973</sup> Ib. viii. 109.

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III.

had ever been. From Samos he sailed with 22 ships first to Halikarnassos on which he imposed a heavy fine, and thence to Kos where he left an Athenian garrison in a fortified post.<sup>1974</sup> From Kos he sailed to the Hellespont, which he reached just in time to decide a battle which had begun in the early morning by the defeat of Dorieus in the bay of Dardanos and which had been continued during the day by the fleet of Mindaros. This commander had seen the disaster from the hill of Ilion where he was sacrificing to Athênê, and had hurried down to bring out his ships. The zeal of Pharnabazos who rode into the water among the land troops cheered the Peloponnesians and modified the seriousness of their defeat: but thirty ships fell into the hands of the Athenians who, having recovered their own captured triremes, sailed away to their station at Sestos.<sup>1975</sup> Here however they kept only 40 ships: the rest were sent to gather money, where they might and as they could. The necessities of war had displaced the orderly collection of a fixed tribute for a system of arbitrary and indefinite exactions; and the indifference and even the friendly feeling of the allies gave way to active dislike or a fiercer indignation.

Escape of  
Alkibiades  
from im-  
prisonment  
at Sardeis.  
B. C. 410,

Twenty years earlier a victory even such as this might have changed the face of the war. All that Thrasylos could now do was to go to Athens to ask for more help both in ships and men.<sup>1976</sup> A force of thirty triremes was immediately sent out under Theramenes who was ordered to interrupt, if he could, the building of the bridge across the Euripos. Foiled here, as we have seen, he roved about among the allied or other cities, exacting contributions or seizing plunder, for scruples of legality were now flung aside. Among those who were thus punished were the oligarchs of Paros, who, having been placed in power by Peisandros, were now compelled to give way to the demos whom they had supplanted.<sup>1977</sup> From Paros Theramenes sailed to help the Makedonian chief Archelaos in his siege of Pydna and probably to live upon his pay. The city was reduced at last and the inhabitants were removed to a spot about two miles from

<sup>1974</sup> Thuc. viii. 108.  
<sup>1976</sup> Xen. H. i. 1, 8.

<sup>1975</sup> Xen. H. i. 1, 7. Diod. xiii. 46.  
<sup>1977</sup> Diod. xiii. 47.

the sea : but before its fall Theramenes had been compelled to sail away to the Athenian naval station which in fear of the large fleet now being collected by Mindaros had been transferred from Sestos to Kardia on the northern side of the Chersonesos, at a distance of not more than twenty miles by land. To this place Alkibiades had found his way, no longer as a friend of Tissaphernes or of his master, but as a fugitive from his power. A month earlier he had gone to the satrap at Sardeis with the customary gifts, in the hope either of winning his active help or of making capital out of his indifference or neutrality : but Tissaphernes, professing now to have received orders from the king to carry on war vigorously against the Athenians, threw him into prison from which he contrived to escape with another Athenian prisoner named Mantitheos.

CHAP.  
IX.

The tidings that Mindaros was engaged in the siege of Kyzikos made the Athenian generals, who had now been joined by Thrasyboulos after a money-gathering expedition to Thasos,<sup>1978</sup> resolve upon attacking him at once with their whole fleet of 83 triremes. Having contrived by sailing past Abydos at night to evade the notice of the Peloponnesian guard-ships, they rested at the island of Prokonnesos, a few miles to the northwest of the peninsula of Kyzikos, taking the precaution of seizing every vessel that passed by, to prevent the news of their arrival from reaching the ears of Mindaros. On the next day Alkibiades told the men that they must undertake simultaneously the tasks of a sea-fight, a land-battle, and a siege. The old pretence of Persian help was gone. They had no money, and they must win the day or be ruined, while their enemies were abundantly supplied from barbarian coffers. The first measure was to disembark the hoplites on the mainland with orders to advance upon the town. According to Diodoros<sup>1979</sup> the issue of the day was decided by a trick of Alkibiades, who by a pretended flight concerted with his colleagues lured the squadron of Mindaros to some distance from the rest of the fleet and then turned fiercely round on the hoisting of a signal. Finding themselves between two forces, the seamen of

Battle of  
Kyzikos.

<sup>1978</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 1, 12.

<sup>1979</sup> xiii. 50.



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III.

Mindaros had no option but to fly to a place called Kleroi where the army of Pharnabazos was placed for co-operation by land. Of this stratagem Xenophon takes no notice; but whether we take the reckoning of Diodoros who makes the Spartan fleet consist of 80 triremes, or that of Xenophon who gives it as 60, the destruction was complete. Mindaros was slain, bravely fighting on shore. All the Peloponnesian ships fell into the hands of the Athenians with the exception of the Syracusan triremes which the crews themselves set on fire, and still more important in the exhaustion of all resources was the enormous plunder in slaves and other booty taken in the camps of the Spartans and the Persians. On the day after the fight the victors found Kyzikos evacuated by the enemy, and were received into the city which underwent no harder fate than heavy fines in money. Three weeks later Alkibiades sailed first to Perinthos where his force was admitted into the town, and then to Selybria where he could do no more than extort a contribution. But no real benefit could accrue from the victory unless the Athenians could command the gates of the Black Sea as well as those of the Egean. Byzantion and Chalkedon on the opposite side of the strait were both in revolt, and the latter city was so effectually protected by the troops of Pharnabazos that an attack upon it at once failed. But its unfortified port of Chrysopolis was seized and converted into a fortified post from which the Athenians levied tolls on all ships entering the Propontis, Theramenes and Eumachos being left with 30 triremes to guard the place and to injure the enemy in other ways so far as it might be in their power.<sup>1980</sup> They were thus again masters of the most important road for the introduction of supplies to Athens, for the transit of corn from Egypt was probably now becoming from day to day more difficult, dangerous, and uncertain.

Alleged  
embassy of  
Endios to  
Athens.

A few hours after the battle of Kyzikos Hippokrates, the admiral's secretary, addressed to the ephors the following letter: 'Our glory is gone: Mindaros is dead: the men are hungry: we know not what to do.'<sup>1981</sup> The dispatch was

<sup>1980</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 1, 22.

<sup>1981</sup> *Ib.* p. i. 1, 23. See note 1090. Such a dispatch as this brings up the question

intercepted and carried to Athens where the people had received the tidings with a tumult of joy which found expression in magnificent religious processions and displays. To Sparta the news may have found its way by the informal modes in which the story of the Syracusan catastrophe reached Athens. What may have been the precise effect produced upon the Spartans, we cannot say with certainty. The history of Thucydides here fails us, and we are made at once to feel the irreparable want of a guide so incorruptibly truthful, so unwearied in his search for evidence, and so exact in his discrimination of it. That Xenophon should say nothing about an unsuccessful embassy from Sparta, is no matter for surprise; nor is it in itself more unlikely that the Spartans should seek peace after the destruction of their whole fleet at Kyzikos, than that they should have been eager to close the war after the capture of their hoplites in Sphakteria. But the silence of Xenophon is scarcely a sufficient reason for supposing that the formal embassy which according to Diodoros<sup>1982</sup> was sent with Endios at its head was a mere voluntary enterprise on the part of the friend of Alkibiades to ascertain the wishes and thoughts of the Athenian people. Loose and inaccurate as Diodoros may be, it is unlikely that he should have framed this circumstantial narrative, if that of Theopompos had not at least furnished a foundation for it.<sup>1983</sup> But it is scarcely possible that immediately after such a victory as that of Kyzikos Endios could tell the Athenians that, while they had corn only from a mere fraction of Attica, the Spartans could reap the fruits of all Peloponnesos.

of Spartan education generally. It is unnecessary, happily, to enter into it, as it has been examined by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vol. ii. appendix, p. 661, with an exhaustiveness which leaves no room for doubt. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire has sagaciously discovered indisputable evidence, that the Iliad was from the first a written poem, in the passage which speaks of Aias as recognising his own scratch or mark on the lots thrown into the urn. *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, vol. i. Appendix A. Next to the merit of discovering the evidence not only of writing but of written poems, 20,000 lines in length or more, in verses which do not speak of writing at all, the praise of keensightedness is due to those who in such a letter as that of Hippokrates discover the proofs of a large and varied culture which made the Spartans familiar with other languages as well as with their own. Mr. Grote has well said that, for all the evidence that we have to the contrary, the art of writing could not well be in a more rudimentary state than it seems in the age of the Peloponnesian war to have been in Sparta.

<sup>1982</sup> xiii. 52.

<sup>1983</sup> The battle of Kyzikos took place about 30 years before the birth of Theopompos who would therefore have had opportunities for intercourse with men who had themselves taken part in the long struggle. But his position in an age rich in historical documents would be very different from that of Herodotos in sifting the traditions of the Persian wars, or even from that of Thucydides in certain portions of his great task.

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He must have known that the victory which had brought him on his errand had thrown open to Athenians the cornlands of the Euxine with which her intercourse had been only for a month interrupted, and that this mode of putting the case was not likely to win the ear of a people habituated to regard the resources of other lands as the products of their own.<sup>1984</sup> But it is quite in accordance with Spartan usage that even now they should ask all and offer nothing.<sup>1985</sup> The propositions of Endios were confined, we are told, to a mere exchange of prisoners and the withdrawal of hostile garrisons on either side,—in other words, that the Athenians should abandon Pylos and the Spartans quit Dekeleia. But even if the Athenians had been willing to listen to these terms and, by the condition that each side was to keep its present possessions, to yield up her claim to the allegiance of the most valuable members of her maritime confederacy, they knew by bitter experience that Sparta, even if willing, was unable to coerce her allies. It could not be expected that Athens should forego the restoration of Oinoë<sup>1986</sup> and Oropos;<sup>1987</sup> and they knew that Boiotians and Corinthians would find their way again, as they had found it before, to evade the performance of contracts to which by virtue of their Hegemonia the Spartans had bound them. They knew further that at the present time the Spartans were under covenant with the Persian king not to make peace without his consent; and they had no reason for thinking that the necessities of Sparta would be to him a constraining motive for coming to terms with her enemy and his own. If then Kleophon, who is said to have played at this moment the part of Kleon, exposed the hollowness of the Spartan proposals and flatly denied the statements of Endios about the comparative slightness of the sufferings which the war entailed on Sparta, he was saying only what was fully borne out by facts. He might have held up before Endios the candid confessions of Hippokrates in the intercepted dispatch, and dismissed the whole thing as a trick for gaining time while the hands of

<sup>1984</sup> Thuc. ii. 38, 2. ^

<sup>1985</sup> See the negotiations after the return of Kleon from Sphakteria, and again the tortuous diplomacy which ended in winning from Athens the liberation of the hoplites without securing to them even Amphipolis.

<sup>1986</sup> See page 501.

<sup>1987</sup> See page 472.

Athens were tied by a covenant which Sparta would break as soon as it might suit her to do so. But when Diodoros, either following Theopompos or making his own comments, adds that Kleophon, as a Demagogos, belonged to a class which traded on war and made the troubles of the people a source of pecuniary profit to themselves, he makes a statement which, as we have seen, was a mere libel in the days of Kleon, and which after the catastrophe at Syracuse was not merely libellous but absurd. Athens was no longer receiving the riches of other lands: her reserved fund was long since exhausted: her revenues by revolt after revolt had dwindled away almost to nothing, and her fleets were able to carry on the war only by a system which had become little better than organised plundering. She was manifestly approaching the end of a struggle which must end in the ruin of one side or the other, and every sign seemed to tell that that ruin would be her own; nor was it necessary to teach even demagogues that the victory of Sparta would involve for them confiscation, slavery, or death. The charge of corrupt motives falls, therefore, at once to the ground; and on the merits of the case it becomes plain that, however much they might long for peace, they had no reason for thinking that they would secure the boon by accepting the proposals of Endios. Unhappily these Demagogues (if the word must be used) were tempted to think that their duty ended with the refutation or exposure of their opponents. In imputing corrupt motives to the Spartan envoys Kleon had grievously sinned.<sup>1988</sup> There is no proof that Kleophon committed any like offence; but he would the better have performed the part of a good citizen, had he stated clearly the basis on which Athens might treat for peace without indignity. If he made any such definite proposal, history has done him wrong by suppressing the mention of it.<sup>1989</sup>

<sup>1988</sup> See page 210.

<sup>1989</sup> In the case of Kleophon, not less than in that of Kleon the leather-seller, we have to bear in mind the caution with which the statements of comic poets are to be received. We have, in fact, seen that they are not to be received at all unless some corroborative testimony can be adduced for them. By Isokrates he is compared to Hyperbolos; and we have seen what in his case is the value of epithets by which even an historian so candid as Thucydides has stigmatised him. See page 317, and note 1915. Of Sokrates we have from Aristophanes a picture which is flatly false: and the good name of Kleophon is not to be taken away on the strength of a single foul word in a comedy. Aristoph. *Thesm.* 805. Like Kleon, he may have been mistaken in his counsels; but

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of the  
Spartan  
Harmost  
from  
Thasos

Whatever may have been the discouragement of the Spartans, Pharnabazos felt none. Comforting the troops of Mindaros with the promise of unbounded supplies of ship-timber from the forests of Ida, he gave them each a garment together with provisions for two months, and distributed the seamen as guards throughout the coast cities of his province, while orders were given for building at Antandros a number of ships equal to that of the triremes lost at Kyzikos. Athens, indeed, was a troublesome enemy to put down, and the annoyances arising from popular leanings to her cause were not yet at an end. In the hope of attaching the island more firmly to Athens, Peisandros had set up an oligarchy in Thasos, which set to work at once to sever the connexion with the imperial city.<sup>1990</sup> But the victory of Kyzikos had raised the hopes and the courage of the Demos, and the Lakonian harmost Eteonikos was expelled with his adherents. In this movement Eteonikos and his friends professed to see the handiwork not only of the discontented Tissaphernes, but of the Spartan admiral Pasippidas. The charge was believed, and Pasippidas was sentenced to banishment, his command being transferred to Kratesippidas.<sup>1991</sup>

Repulse of  
Agis before  
the walls of  
Athens.

At Dekeleia the effects of the victory of Kyzikos were more visible than at Sparta. From his lofty stronghold Agis could see the corn-ships from the Euxine sailing into the Peiraieus, and he felt that, until this stream could be cut off, his occupation of Athenian soil was to little purpose. An inroad to the very walls of Athens had been tried and had failed; <sup>1992</sup> and Agis thought it best to dispatch Klearchos with fifteen ships from Megara and other allied cities to the Hellespont. Of these vessels three were taken and destroyed by the Athenian guard-ships: the rest made their way first to Abydos,<sup>1993</sup> then to Byzantion.

Fortifica-  
tion of  
Lampsakos  
B.C. 409.

The events of the following year made no essential change in the position of the combatants in this weary war. On the

we have no grounds for charging him with dishonesty, and if Andokides chose to regard himself as disgraced because during his exile his house was inhabited by Kleophon the harp-maker, he is only convicted of that false pride which was the very bane and pest of all ancient society.

<sup>1990</sup> See page 475.<sup>1992</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 1, 33.<sup>1991</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 1, 32.<sup>1993</sup> Xenophon, *H.* i. 1, 36, says that they went to Sestos: but as Sestos was the Athenian naval station, this would be going into the lion's den.

coast of Attica Thorikos was fortified for the protection of the corn-ships sailing to Peiræus from the Hellespont; <sup>1994</sup> and Thrasylos at the beginning of summer set out with his fleet of fifty triremes for Samos. In a descent on Milesian territory a slight defeat of their light-armed men was avenged by their hoplites; and the reduction of Kolophon was followed by a raid into Lydia, which, made at harvest time, rewarded them with abundant booty. <sup>1995</sup> At Ephesus they sustained a more serious reverse, in which five-and-twenty Syracusan ships <sup>1996</sup> took the most prominent part. But this defeat, again, was compensated, when not long afterwards Thrasylos, from his station at Methymna, espied this Syracusan squadron sailing out from Ephesus, to which all the triremes were driven back with the exception of four which were taken with their crews. These were dispatched as prisoners to Athens where, in remembrance probably of the treatment which Athenians had undergone in the Latomiai of Syracuse, they were shut up in the stone quarries of Peiræus. The sufferings of these captives may not have been so severe: they were certainly not so protracted. Before the autumn was well ended, they had succeeded in excavating a way out of their prison-house, and in making their escape, some to Dekeleia, some to Megara. <sup>1997</sup> Meanwhile the whole Athenian fleet had been brought together at Lampsakos, where the troops of Alkibiades protested against the society of the men under Thrasylos who had just been defeated on Milesian territory. Happily an attack from Pharnabazos gave both an opportunity for defeating the Persians together. The animosity in the camp was exchanged for the kindest feeling, and the fortification of the city was carried on vigorously, while the army was maintained by plundering forays into the surrounding country.

But in spite of all fluctuations the tide was running strongly against Athens. Fifteen years ago Sparta had been utterly humbled by the shutting in of a number of

Recovery  
of Pylos  
by the  
Spartans.

<sup>1994</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 2, 1.

<sup>1995</sup> *Ib.* *H.* i. 2, 4.

<sup>1996</sup> As it is said that all the Syracusan ships in the fleet of Mindaros were burnt by the crews, page 518, all these 25 vessels must have arrived since the defeat at Kyzikos; and thus the distinction drawn by Xenophon, *H.* i. 2, 8, cannot be sustained. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 173, note.

<sup>1997</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 2, 14.

hoplites on the island of Sphakteria. During those years the Messenian garrison at Pylos had been to the Spartans an annoyance only less serious than that which Dekeleia was causing to Athens. But the strong efforts which the Athenians were making to restore their shattered empire in the East led them to think that a determined attack on this post might be successful; and the tidings soon reached Athens that their Messenian allies were being blockaded by a fleet of fifteen ships and besieged by a large land force the divisions of which kept up a series of assaults upon the fortress. In spite of the drain both of men, ships, and money in the direction of the Hellespont, the Athenians managed to send out thirty ships under Anytos, the son of Anthemion, the future accuser of Sokrates. He was sent to no purpose. Stormy weather, he said, had prevented him from doubling cape Maleai, and the ships came back to Athens. Indignant at his failure, the people brought him to trial; but Anytos was acquitted. It is possible that he may have proved the impracticability of the task; but the suspicions of many found utterance in loud charges of treachery, and his escape, we are told by Diodoros,<sup>1998</sup> was attributed to the corruption of the Dikastery by bribes. Such an attempt, it is added, had never been made before. The statement is one which we have no means of testing. Poverty may so have pressed on the Heliastic body generally that a comparatively small sum may have gone a long way, while the absence of so many citizens on foreign service may have reduced the numbers in each Dikastery within limits not unmanageable for bribers. The fact that the charge could be brought and believed, if such was the case, goes to prove that declension of Athenian character which was to show itself in so fearful a form after the battle of Argennoussai. Thus deserted by their ancient friends, the Messenians of Pylos held out stoutly for a time: but their numbers were sorely thinned in conflicts with the enemy and so wasted by actual famine, that they were at last compelled to make terms for the surrender of the place. It is a satisfaction to learn that these stout-hearted Helots could so maintain their ground as

to secure their safe departure from a land which, if the Spartans could have had their will, they would never have left alive. The fact of this treaty is the only incident noticed by Xenophon<sup>1999</sup> who dismisses in a single sentence the recovery of a place which, to soothe the vanity of his Spartan friends, and to put out of sight the exploits of Demosthenes, he takes care to call not Pylos but Koryphasion. The loss of this outpost was followed or accompanied by that of Nisaia.<sup>2000</sup> If, as Diodoros<sup>2001</sup> asserts, the Megarians reconquered this post while Anytos was vainly trying to double cape Maleai, we are astonished at the resolution which could provide and send out under Leotrophides and Timarchos a force of 1,000 foot and 400 horse. The harbour, however, was not re-taken, and we may question the details of a battle which Diodoros describes as being ruinous to the Megarian army. These losses told on Athens with far heavier effect than the betrayal of the colonists in the Trachinian Herakleia at this time told upon the Spartans.<sup>2002</sup>

The events of the following year seemed to point still more clearly to a good issue for Athens from the troubles which had well-nigh crushed her. The whole Athenian fleet took up its position off Byzantion and Chalkedon, while the land force besieged the latter city, shutting it in all round with a wooden wall which, so far as it was practicable, blocked the river also. Warned of the coming attack, the Chalkedonians had placed their movable property in the hands of the neighbouring Bithynian Thrakians.<sup>2003</sup> Their labour was wasted, for Alkibiades marched into the Thrakian territory and told the people that they must either fight or yield up the goods. They chose the latter alternative, and Alkibiades returned to the camp with a welcome increase to the resources of the army, which was called on now to repel a vigorous assault by Pharnabazos. The satrap was anxious to break their lines, while Hippokrates, who was then harriest within the city, made a vehement sally from the gates. The attempt wholly

Reduction  
of Chal-  
kedon by  
the Athen-  
ians.  
B.C. 408.

<sup>1999</sup> *H. i. 2, 18.*

<sup>2000</sup> See page 276.

<sup>2001</sup> τούτων πρατομένων, xiii. 65.

<sup>2002</sup> By some means or other the Phthiotic Achaians contrived to place them in the power of the semi-barbarous clans of Oita; and 700 were slain together with the harriest Labotas. *Xen. H. i. 2, 18.*

<sup>2003</sup> See *Xen. H. i. 3, 2.*



failed. The troops of Pharnabazos were beaten off, Hippokrates himself was slain, and his men pushed back within the walls. The reduction of the place now became a mere question of time; and on the advice of Pharnabazos the Chalkedonians agreed to surrender under covenant that they should become, as they had been, tribute-paying allies of Athens, making up all arrears for the time during which they had been in revolt against her.<sup>2004</sup> But the satrap seemed now to be convinced that Athens was not so easily to be put down as he had hoped that she would be, and that he had made a mistake in assuming towards her so determinately hostile an attitude. He therefore made with the Athenians a convention on his own behalf by which he agreed to send up their envoys to Sousa to arrange a treaty with the king, while the Athenians pledged themselves to do no mischief during their absence in the territories of the satrap.<sup>2005</sup> Alkibiades was absent, raising money for the fleet and army, when this convention was agreed upon; and until it should have been sworn to by him, Pharnabazos refused to act upon it. The oaths were therefore taken by Alkibiades in Chrysopolis and by Pharnabazos in Chalkedon, and the Athenian envoys met the satrap at Kyzikos, where they were joined by an embassy from Sparta under Pasippidas and by the Syracusan Hermokrates whom a grateful city had rewarded with the boon of exile.<sup>2006</sup>

Surrender  
of Byzantion.

At Byzantion the Athenians might very possibly have been defeated; had it not been that popular feeling still ran in their favour. So thorough was the confidence of the Spartan harmost Klearchos in the new order of things, that, regarding any revolution as impossible, he went to Pharnabazos to get money and to bring together the scattered Peloponnesian fleet, leaving the care of the city to the

<sup>2004</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 3, 9. This statement seems to tell conclusively against the supposition that the proposed change from an annual fixed tribute to an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. on imports and exports was ever carried out. See page 426. Up to the time of the revolt Chalkedon had, clearly, paid only its assessed tribute.

<sup>2005</sup> According to Xenophon, *H.* i. 3, 9, they bind themselves not to make war on the Chalkedonians during this period. This is a manifest absurdity. Chalkedon had surrendered and was now a subject ally of Athens. Plutarch, *Alk.* 31, says that they promised not to hurt the country of Pharnabazos, which is clearly the stipulation that he would exact.

<sup>2006</sup> The narrative of Sicilian affairs after the destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse will be resumed in the chapters of the third volume relating the career of Dionysios.

Megarian general Helixos and the Boiotian chief Koiratadas. He departed with the full hope of soon bringing back a force which would compel the Athenians to raise the siege: but in the town were many who were exasperated by his severities and by the calmness with which he sacrificed the interests of the citizens to those of his troops. These men opened the gates and admitted Alkibiades and his men to the quarter called the Thrakion, whither Helixos and Koiratadas hurried with the whole force at their command. But the enemy was now in complete possession, and surrender was the only alternative to death. Helixos and Koiratadas were both sent to Athens: but Koiratadas contrived to make his escape in the confusion of the landing at Peiræus, and made his way to Dekeleia.<sup>2007</sup> Athens was thus once more mistress of the great high road which brought to her harbours the wealth of the corn-growing districts bordering on the Black Sea; and she had shown that the rude buffetings which she had undergone had still left to her the power of enforcing her claims and striking down those who had fancied themselves to be altogether beyond her reach.

Had the Athenian envoys been allowed to make their journey to Sousa, the issue of the war would, it is more than likely, have been in favour of Athens. Want of money alone was crippling her; and the sober report of a man like Pharnabazos who had thrown himself heartily into the Spartan cause could not fail to carry weight with a despot to whom after all money was the chief object. From Pharnabazos or his envoys he would learn that even with Persian subsidies the Spartans were losing rather than gaining ground in the struggle, and that even if they were victorious, it would still be very doubtful whether the king would get what he wanted. Sparta might be willing to yield up to him absolute dominion over all Hellenic cities in Lesser Asia; but it was not clear that these Asiatic Hellenes would on that account become less troublesome as subjects or more profitable as payers of tribute. A revulsion in favour of Athens was no unlikely result even of that absurd longing for autonomy

Arrival of  
Cyrus the  
younger in  
Ionia.

<sup>2007</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 3, 22. Diodoros, xiii. 67, relates an elaborate stratagem for which the far more probable narrative of Xenophon furnishes no authority.

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which had led them for the time to abandon the Athenian confederacy for alliance with Sparta. The great delight of Persian kings was an overflowing treasury; but the protracted war was doing much towards emptying it, nor did its history furnish much assurance that this lavish expenditure would be to any good purpose. Unhappily for Athens the ambassadors after spending the winter in the Phrygian Gordion were met on their way to Sousa by Spartan envoys headed by Boiotios who boasted of having obtained from the king all that they wanted. Their words were borne out by a letter, bearing the royal seal, which declared that Cyrus, the younger son of Dareios and his cruel wife Parysatis, was sent down as lord of all the armies gathered at Kastolos. Far from allowing the Athenians to advance further, Cyrus demanded their surrender from Pharnabazos; but the satrap, disappointed though he might be, was not willing to break his pledge by abandoning them to certain death. For three years these unfortunate men were detained in his province, and when the war had ended in the surrender of Athens to Lysandros, they were at length allowed to return home.<sup>2008</sup>

Intrigues  
and opera-  
tions of  
Lysandros.  
407 B.C.

Before Cyrus reached the coast, the Spartan admiral Kratesippidas had been succeeded by Lysandros. During his tenure of office he had done little; but the aid which he gave to one section of the oligarchical party in Chios against the other shows how little the cause of order and law had gained by the breach with Athens. On his side there was, as we might suppose, corruption, on the other violence; and six hundred Chian exiles, establishing themselves at Atarneus<sup>2009</sup> a little to the northeast of the Argennoussai islets, maintained for years a desultory war against the Chian government like that which the Samians had carried on against their own island from Anaia.<sup>2010</sup> His successor

<sup>2008</sup> Xenophon, *H.* i. 4, 7, says that they returned from the Mysian Kios to the Athenian camp: but there was at that time no camp. He also says that Cyrus wished them to be detained in order that the Athenians might not know what was being done. The secret was one which could not long be kept, or rather could not be kept at all. The very object which led Lysandros to ask for an increase of pay to the men was that the Athenian seamen on hearing of the increase might desert: and obviously both for the king and for the Spartans the sooner that the arrival of Cyrus could be made known the better.

<sup>2009</sup> Diod. xiii. 65.

<sup>2010</sup> See note 1375. Such intestine quarrels tend to show how little reason there is for supposing that the demos was in power at Samos at the time when the oligarchy

Lysandros was a man to whom this shaping of governments in the interests of oligarchy was thoroughly congenial. A liar more unscrupulous, if such a thing might be possible, than Alkibiades himself, he was determined that the services which he performed for his country should make his own continuance in power indispensable. Inaccessible to bribes, he found refreshment in a cruelty which, when unnecessary for his purpose, would to Alkibiades have been abhorrent. In the Persian prince now sent down to the coast he found not merely an ally but a friend. On their meeting at Sardeis the hope expressed by Lysandros that the war might now be carried on with real vigour was sustained by the assurance that if the 500 talents which Cyrus had brought with him should not suffice, he would drain his own private resources, and in the last resort he would according to the Persian metaphor turn his silver-gilt throne into coin. Promises thus large emboldened the Spartan to urge, on the score not only of justice but of mere economy, that the pay of the men might be raised to a drachma daily. A bait like this, he said, would soon empty the Athenian triremes: but on this point the young prince was firm. He had no power to depart from his father's instructions, and the treaties had stated that thirty minai monthly should be the pay for each ship, whatever might be their number.<sup>2011</sup> Lysandros was silenced; but when towards the end of the banquet at which he was entertained by the prince, Cyrus asked what he might do to gratify him, he answered promptly that the best favour to himself would be the addition of an obolos daily to the pay of the men. Cyrus granted the request, and at the rate of four oboloi daily the troops received a month's pay in advance together with all unpaid arrears. This generosity excited in the army an enthusiasm which Lysandros directed to the refitting and strengthening of a fleet now seriously out of condition, while for himself the friendship of the Persian prince was secured

was put down. See note 1856. Ten years later these Chian exiles were still maintaining themselves by plunder at Atarneus. Xen. *H.* iii. 2, 11.

<sup>2011</sup> If Cyrus said this, and if the treaties are given rightly by Thucydides, viii. 18, 87, 58, he was mistaken. They contain no such definite bargain. Tissaphernes first offered the drachma, and having paid it for a while, reduced it to the half drachma and was finally prevailed on to give four oboloi. Thuc. viii. 45.

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by conduct which showed that in the matter of money the Spartan admiral walked in the ways of Perikles and Nikias. But while he was thus repairing his ninety ships at Ephesos, he took care to send for the chiefs of the oligarchical factions in the several cities allied with Athens and formed them into clubs pledged to act by his orders, under the assurance that so soon as Athens should be put down they should be placed in power.<sup>2012</sup> He thus became the centre of a widely ramified conspiracy, which he alone was capable of directing, and which had its fruit after the fall of Athens in the Dekarchiai, or the despotic rule of Committees of Ten.

Return of  
Alkibiades  
to Athens.

Meanwhile Alkibiades had been working for his return to Athens. With a hundred talents, the proceeds of exactions from the cities on the Keramic gulf, he sailed to Samos, while Thrasyboulos with thirty ships was occupied in the reduction of Thasos, Abdera, and other revolted Thrace-ward towns. When with another squadron<sup>2013</sup> Thrasylos had departed for Athens, Alkibiades sailed to Paros and thence to the Lakonian port of Gytheion, to ascertain, if he could, what amount of ship-building might be going on there. He was still hesitating as to his future course, when he received the tidings that the Athenians had elected him Strategos with Thrasyboulos and Konon among his colleagues. He was thus no longer a banished man, and the fears which he could not yet wholly shake off were quieted by assurances from personal friends that the way before him was both open and safe. With twenty triremes, not with the fleet which convoyed to Athens the vast multitude of vessels captured at Kyzikos, he arrived at Peiraiæus, still doubting whether he might trust himself among his countrymen. Instead of the triumphant landing which later writers invested with imaginary colours, the exile whose memory must have recalled the long series of his treasons stood for a time on the deck of his trireme, not venturing to land until he saw that his cousin Eurypolemos with other friends was waiting to greet him and to guard him on his way to the city. He had chosen, some said,<sup>2014</sup> an ill-omened day for his return. It was

<sup>2012</sup> Diod. xiii. 70.

<sup>2013</sup> Xenophon, *H.* i. 4, 10, speaks of him as taking the rest of the fleet. This is unlikely.

<sup>2014</sup> Xenophon, *H.* i. 4, 12, is careful thus to limit his statement: but we cannot say from his words how widely this opinion may have extended.

the festival of Plynteria, when the statue of Athênê was veiled from sight and reverently washed by the Praxiergidai. His mind was perhaps too much occupied with weightier things to think of this coincidence. His friends would probably lose no time in letting him know the temper of the vast multitudes from Athens and Peiraiæus there gathered to look upon the man who seven years before had sailed from that harbour with the most magnificent armament ever sent forth by the imperial city. They could scarcely conceal from him the fact that some with candid courage denounced him as the cause of all the disasters which Athens had undergone since his departure and of all the dangers which still threatened her safety.<sup>2015</sup> But they would dwell with more satisfaction on the sophistry and falsehood which had half-convinced the majority of his innocence and thoroughly assured them that to him alone they were indebted for the victories which had turned their despair into something like cheerful confidence. Some of these arguments might in truth call up a blush on the cheek even of Alkibiades. The self-possession of the hardest traitor could scarcely put forth for him the excuse that during his years of exile he had been the unwilling slave of men at whose hands his life was daily in danger, and that through the whole of this weary time his one grief arose from his inability to do for Athens the good which he would gladly have achieved for her. We can but mark with amazement the effrontery of the shameless partisans who could speak thus of one who had done what he could to destroy the Athenian fleets and armies at Syracuse, who had fixed a hostile force on Athenian soil, and who had lit the fire which burst into flame in the usurpation of the Four Hundred. That this language did not represent the spirit of the Athenian people generally, we may be quite sure. The men who would speak of him according to his deserts might not be many. There were not many in England who throughout the long despotism of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte never wavered in their judgement of the man who by lies and bloodshed placed his yoke on the necks of his countrymen. But however black the crimes of Alkibiades may have been,

<sup>2015</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 4, 17.

the fact could not be denied that, whether rightly or wrongly, he had been suffered by the Athenian army, or rather by the Athenian people, at Samos, to take part not only in the war as one of their generals but in the suppression of the Four Hundred, and that for a year or two his efforts had been for the welfare and not for the mischief of Athens. It was true that his past career afforded no guarantee for his future conduct; but unless he was still to be treated as an enemy, that career must not be thrown in his teeth. If they could place no real trust in him, they ought at least to put no hindrances in his path so long as he continued rightly to do his duty as a citizen, a statesman, and a general. Such, we cannot doubt, was the temper of a large body of moderate and sober-minded men; but for the present the majority was carried away by a weak sympathy with the sufferings which he took care to parade in his speeches before the senate and the assembly. In moving words he protested his innocence of all impiety, and with brazen impudence declared himself an injured man. Boldness was, indeed, now his wisest course. There was no alternative between these assertions and the admission of his guilt: and it was too late now to plead his innocence in the matter of the Hermai, which was certainly real, and to confess his parody of the mystic ceremonies of Eleusis,<sup>2016</sup> as he assuredly might have done with little risk or none before his departure for Sicily. So well did he play his part and so well was he supported by his friends that before the assembly dispersed he found himself once more general with full powers. His confiscated property was given back to him: the tablets on which were engraved the decrees condemning him to death were thrown into the sea, and the Eumolpidai were ordered to remove the curse which they had passed on him for his impiety.<sup>2017</sup> But if he had landed, as some would have it, on an unlucky day, the recurrence of the mysteries of the Great Mother furnished an opportunity of which a man like Alkibiades would avail himself with eager delight. For seven years, that is to say, since the time when on his own vehement advice Agis had been sent to fortify and hold Dekeleia, the

<sup>2016</sup> See page 345 et seq.<sup>2017</sup> Diod. xiii. 69.

procession along the sacred road to Eleusis had been necessarily given up, and the communicants with their sacred vessels had been conveyed thither, as best they might, by sea. It should now be said that under the man who had been charged with violating these mysteries this procession should follow its ancient path as quietly and safely as in a time of profound peace. The pomp issued from the gates of Athens, guarded by all the citizens of military age; but no attack was even threatened by the garrison of Dekeleia. Alkibiades had made his peace with the mighty goddesses, and he could now depart with cheerfulness to meet the enemies of Athens elsewhere. With a fleet of 100 triremes, carrying 1500 hoplites and 150 horse, over whom Aristokrates and Adeimantos were appointed generals,<sup>2018</sup> he sailed to Andros. Having defeated the Andrians and their Spartan allies in the field, he shut them up in the city, and departed leaving Konon with twenty ships to blockade it.<sup>2019</sup>

Alkibiades had left Athens with a head completely turned by the kindness and even enthusiasm with which he had been received; and immunity from punishment restored the carelessness which laughed at the notion of duty and responsibility. He reached Samos, to experience a series of disappointments brought about partly by his tortuous policy in the past and in part by the almost incredible folly which led him to intrust a whole fleet to a pilot who may have been an excellent boon companion but who utterly lacked all the qualities of a commander. The first tidings which he received at Samos informed him of the arrival of Cyrus and of the energy with which the young prince had espoused the cause of Sparta. The promise of securing for Athens either Persian help or Persian neutrality had been the very foundation of his new influence with his countrymen; and under the conviction that this influence would be imperilled if the hope should turn out a delusion, he besought Tissaphernes to impress on Cyrus the need of acting on his old counsel and holding an even balance between the contending parties.

Defeat and death of the pilot Antiochos at Notion.

<sup>2018</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 4, 21. Diodoros substitutes the name of Thrasymboulos for that of Aristokrates; but neither his authority nor that of Nepos can outweigh that of Xenophon.

<sup>2019</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 5, 18.



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But neither this policy nor the man who recommended it was much to the liking of Cyrus; and Alkibiades, reduced to comparative inaction, gave himself up to his pleasures. Sailing presently from Samos, he joined Thrasyboulos who was fortifying Phokaia, having left the pilot Antiochos in command of the fleet with a strict charge to avoid all engagements with the enemy until he should return. He was not to see again this man who had won his friendship in the Athenian assembly by catching a quail which on his first appearance in that great council had escaped from the folds of his garment. The notions of Antiochos on the subject of duty were on a par with those of his master; and Alkibiades had not long been out of sight before his deputy sailed out with only two triremes and passed insultingly before the prows of the Spartan fleet at Ephesos. Lysandros came out and chased him with a few ships, and the conflict began which Antiochos so eagerly desired. As he had previously arranged, more Athenian ships joined the battle, and more were brought out by Lysandros until his whole fleet was ready for action. The plan of Antiochos gave his enemy an immense advantage. The Athenian ships advanced carelessly and in disorder; the Spartan triremes maintained the strict array of battle. The result was the loss of fifteen Athenian triremes<sup>2020</sup> and the death of Antiochos himself. The news of this disaster brought Alkibiades at once back to Samos, whence with the whole Athenian fleet he sailed to challenge Lysandros to battle off Ephesos: but it no longer suited the Spartan to fight, and Alkibiades returned baffled to Samos. A little later Athens sustained another loss in the capture of the fortified post of Delphinion which for three years had been to Chios what Dekeleia for a much longer time had been to Attica.<sup>2021</sup>

Attack on  
Kymê by  
Alkibiades.

Thus had a serious reverse been sustained through his own fault. He had not indeed been himself defeated: but it was he and he alone who had placed in the hands of a man like Antiochos the power of bringing this disgrace upon Athens.

<sup>2020</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 5, 14. Diodoros, xiii. 71, says that they lost 22 ships.

<sup>2021</sup> Xenophon, *H.* i. 5, 15, says that Eion was taken at the same time as Delphinion. Diodoros, xiii. 76, has Teos, and ascribes the capture of both these places to Kallikratidas, the successor of Lysandros.

Nor was this the only count in the new indictment for which he was now furnishing the materials. Compared with her wealth in the days of Perikles, Athens was now poor indeed; and the crews of her fleets had long been compelled to maintain themselves in great part by plunder seized on the lands of the enemy, or by exactions from hostile or revolted cities. But it was reserved for Alkibiades to make a foray on a friendly town, and, so far as his power extended, to make the name of Athens odious to all the members of her confederacy. What offence the people of Kymê may have given to him, we know not. Diodoros says simply that the charges urged against them were false; and the splendid Alkibiades exhibits himself in a form not more dignified than that of Caleb Balderstone in his raid on Wolfshope to maintain the honour of the house of Ravenswood. The Kymaians, subject allies of Athens, resented the inroad as vehemently as Gibbie Girder. Alkibiades and his people were driving to the shore a large body of prisoners when they fell upon them suddenly with all their forces and compelled them to yield up their captives and fly to their ships. Enraged at this defeat, Alkibiades sent to Mytilene for hoplites, and supported by these gave the Kymaians a challenge to fight which they wisely refused to accept. Instead of fighting the Athenian general, they preferred to carry their complaints to the Athenian assembly; nor can there be a doubt that, had the circumstances of Athens been the same, they would have received a justice not less full and prompt than that which they would have dealt upon Paches, if he had not anticipated the verdict of the dikastery.<sup>2022</sup> But although the demos was no longer, as Phrynichos had described them,<sup>2023</sup> a refuge for the oppressed and a terror to the evil-doer, it could still show its hatred for lawless plunder and unprovoked aggression. The story of the misdeeds of Alkibiades at Kymê came upon the tidings of the disaster of Notion; and the significance of these incidents was indefinitely enhanced by the accusations of Athenian citizens at Samos who charged him with a deliberate scheme for betraying the fleets and armies of Athens to Pharnabazos or the Spartans, and for sheltering himself in his

<sup>2022</sup> See page 171.<sup>2023</sup> See page 464.

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forts on the Chersonesos until by the help of his allies he could realise the true object of his life by making himself despot of Athens.

Removal of  
Alkibiades  
from his  
command.

The biter is not unfrequently bit: and against such a charge as this Alkibiades with all the keenness of his wit and all his readiness of resource was absolutely powerless. He had been guilty of treason against his country more heinous almost than any of which history has preserved a record; he had heaped lies on lies with a skill and a resolution infinitely beyond that of Chaireas;<sup>2024</sup> and he had left himself at the mercy of enemies, so soon as his partisans or they who had been duped by his partisans opened their eyes to the real facts. He had not been put upon his trial: he had been treated with the utmost forbearance. Nothing had been said of past misdeeds, and no disappointment had been expressed at the slender results achieved by him as compared with the glowing promises which he had made on the strength of the coming alliance with Persia. In one sense he was less happy than Nikias: in another, it would have been happier for Athens, if the moral character of Nikias had been as bad as that of Alkibiades. That unfortunate general retained the misplaced confidence of his countrymen to the day of his death, because he was supposed to be a good man. The revived ascendancy of Alkibiades came suddenly to an end, because his character was infamous: but the strict morality of Nikias wrought infinitely more mischief to the state than the profligate wickedness of his colleague. In this case no charge of fickleness can be maintained against the Athenian people. Their guilt in the case of Miltiades was manifest, as unhappily it will be manifest in the case of some generals presently to be named; but in this instance they were not asking for the performance of an impracticable task, they were not even bent on holding Alkibiades to the bargain which he had deliberately made. They were ready to forego the Persian alliance which he had presented to them in a light so alluring: but they were not prepared to see their fleets handed over to incompetent revellers, or their subjects and allies visited with treatment fitted only for

<sup>2024</sup> Thuc. viii. 74 and 86. See page 483.

enemies or barbarians. The disaster at Notion had been caused by his neglect: the sufferings of the Kymaians were the result of his own crimes. There was nothing to do but to send others to take his place; and a melancholy interest attaches to the names of most of the commanders thus appointed. In the pages of Xenophon<sup>2025</sup> Konon heads the list with Diomedon, Leon, Perikles (the son of the great Perikles and Aspasia),<sup>2026</sup> Erasinides, Aristokrates, Archedstratos, Protomachos, Thrasylos, and Aristogenes. The tidings of his deposition convinced Alkibiades that he had quitted Athens for the last time. With a single trireme he left Samos, and made his way to his fortified posts on the Chersonesos. Konon at the same time was withdrawn from Andros to Samos, while Phanosthenes was sent with only four ships to keep up the blockade of Andros.

On his voyage this officer fell in with two Thourian triremes commanded by the Rhodian Dorieus, and captured both with their crews. The prisoners were all placed in confinement with the exception of Dorieus. But in Dorieus the Athenian assembly before which he appeared saw a man who had achieved by exploits most of all impressive to the Hellenic mind a peerless renown. Tracing his descent from the heroic stock of Aristomenes,<sup>2027</sup> he was sprung from men whose names were widely known for victories won at the great Hellenic festivals; and of all these conquerors he was himself the most illustrious. At three successive celebrations of the Olympic games he had gained the prize for the Pankration; at the Corinthian isthmus he had won eight victories, at Nemea seven. In these achievements he had a title to the respect and even the veneration of Hellenes to which kings with a thousand ancestors could lay no claim; and the Athenians were the last of the Hellenes to disregard such a title. But Dorieus had made himself not less formidable as a citizen than as a wrestler; and the representative of the haughty Diagoridai, who had thrown himself into the Spartan cause with all the energy of his character, had been compelled to fly from his native city with a sentence of death hanging over his head, passed probably by the demos then in alliance

Capture  
and libera-  
tion of  
Dorieus.

<sup>2025</sup> Xen. *II.* 4. 5, 16.

<sup>2026</sup> See page 100.

<sup>2027</sup> See vol. i. page 90.

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with Athens. But banishment could not weaken his zeal. Making his way to Thourioi, he returned after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse with thirty ships to take part in putting down the empire of the city which he heartily hated. His influence had had much to do with the revolt of Rhodes from Athens; and when the demos of that island had again made an effort to suppress the oligarchic rule, he had hastened to crush the movement. Injuries immeasurably less than these would according to all the notions of Greek warfare have fully justified the Athenians in putting him to death. But as they looked upon his magnificent form, they remembered only his Panhellenic victories, and they not only let him live, but suffered him to depart unransomed. He returned to maintain over Rhodes the supremacy of Sparta; but when thirteen years later the demos re-asserted its right to self-government and the Athenian admiral Konon made the island his naval station, Dorieus again became an exile and a wanderer. The Spartans, it might have been supposed, would be his friends; but he was at length seized and brought to Sparta, where a life of devotion to her service was rewarded with death.<sup>2023</sup>

Arrival of  
Kallikratidas to  
supersede  
Lysandros.  
406 B.C.

On reaching Samos Konon was struck by the great depression of the men whom he was sent to command. Their ships were becoming daily less and less efficient, and for pay they had little to depend on except plunder. He therefore cut down the number of his triremes from one hundred to seventy, and dismissing the rest of the crews picked out for these ships the strongest and most skilful oarsmen,<sup>2029</sup> who found ample exercise in roving expeditions for the purpose of raising money or extorting supplies. It was well for Konon that he was saved from some great disaster by the fact that the naval command of Lysandros expired about this time. It was not the Spartan custom to retain their generals in office for more than a year, or to send the same man out twice in the same capacity. But Lysandros was resolved

<sup>2028</sup> Pausanias, who tells this story, vi. 7, 2, compares the measure dealt out to Dorieus with the treatment of the generals at Athens after the battle of Argeninoussai; but he assigns no reason for this crime, and probably he knew of none.

Xenophon, *H.* i. 5, 19, merely mentions his liberation by the Athenians without ransom, taking no notice of the Panhellenic exploits which gained him this distinction.

<sup>2029</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 5, 20, and 6, 16. Diod. xiii. 77.

that his successor should repose on no bed of roses. By organising his clubs in the various cities he had attached the oligarchic factions to himself personally, and he had further succeeded in exciting among his troops a strong dislike for service under any other commander. He took care that this dislike should be heightened by the pressure of want. When after the fall of Athens he returned home in triumph with the beaks of the fleet destroyed in Peiraiæus, he carried with him to Sparta 470 talents, the residue of Persian moneys contributed expressly for the purpose of carrying on the war.<sup>2030</sup> This sum it was his duty to restore to Cyrus; but he felt in no wise called upon to do so then. Now, when he was leaving to his successor a post full of difficulties which he had himself created, his conscience could not rest until he had placed in the hands of the Persian prince every drachma not yet paid out to the troops;<sup>2031</sup> and when that successor arrived, he told him with studied insolence that he yielded up his place while lord of the sea. His claim to the proud title was founded on the defeat of the pilot Antiochos; and perhaps Kallikratidas at whom this insult was pointed may have known that this victory was followed by the deliberate refusal of the challenge offered by the fleet of Alkibiades. But when Kallikratidas assured him that he would give full credit to his words if, setting out from Ephesos and having passed the Athenian station at Samos, he would hand the ships over to him at Miletos, Lysandros replied that he could not possibly think of interfering with the command of another. For such petty annoyances Kallikratidas may have cared little. The case was altered, when he found throughout the fleet a general spirit of contemptuous resistance to his authority with openly expressed complaints against the Spartan rule of yearly change.

In this labyrinth of difficulties Lysandros left a young man in comparison with whom he was as Mammon in the presence of the archangel Michael. Untrained in the school of lies in which his predecessor was so renowned a proficient, Kallikratidas had not even learnt the sophistry with which Brasidas

Character  
of Kalli-  
kratidas.

<sup>2030</sup> Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 8.

<sup>2031</sup> *Ib.* i. 6, 10.

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cheated the Thrace-ward allies of Athens: nor had he convinced himself that the ruin of Athens would be cheaply purchased at the cost of prostration before the throne of the Persian despot. More than this, he had actually learnt that the Hellenic states had something better to do than to tear each other in pieces for the benefit of barbarians against whom scarcely eighty years ago they had pledged themselves to maintain a perpetual warfare. Why with such a spirit as this he should have accepted a command which brought him into open conflict with Athens, it would be hard to say, unless it be that Spartan discipline could admit no scruples on the part of citizens for the discharge of duties imposed upon them: but a singular interest attaches to the brief career of a man who with more than the bravery of Lysandros and immeasurably more than the honesty of Brasidas was determined that, so far as his power might carry him, the deadly quarrel between Sparta and Athens should be ended by a permanent friendship, and who with even greater nobleness of soul resolved that his example at least should remain as a perpetual protest against the ferocious and inhuman usages of Hellenic warfare.

Insubordination in the Spartan fleet and army.

Thus deploring the miserable strife which had now dragged itself on through four-and-twenty years, Kallikratidas found himself face to face with men who practically refused to obey him. He met the difficulty with the courage of a righteous man. Summoning the officers together, he told them that he was there by no will of his own; that, having come, he must do the bidding of the state which had sent him; but that, if they thought otherwise, they had only to tell him so, and he would at once go back to Sparta and report the state of matters at Ephesos. An appeal so manly and straightforward could be met only by the answer that his work must be done and his authority must be obeyed. Thus freed from one trouble, Kallikratidas betook himself to the Persian prince and demanded the pay needed for the seamen. Cyrus kept him two days waiting; and Kallikratidas in the agony of humiliation deplored the wretched fate of the Hellenes who for the sake of silver and gold were compelled to crouch before Persian tyrants, and declared that if he should be

spared to return home he would do all that he could to bring to an end the quarrel between his own city and Athens.<sup>2032</sup>

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Speech of  
Kallikratidas to the  
Milesians.

Sending some triremes to Sparta to bring the money which he had failed to get from Cyrus, he sailed to Miletos, and there, having summoned an assembly of the ruling oligarchy, he addressed them in a speech which was a melancholy commentary on their abandonment of the Athenian alliance. Living in the midst of barbarians, they ought, he told them, to be animated by a double zeal against enemies who had already done them vast mischief, and who, by a necessary inference, might do them much more. Nothing less than this he expected from them; and this zeal would lead them to contribute sums equal to that which he had already requested the ephors to send him. They should be repaid so soon as this money reached him; but he could not bring himself to haunt the doors of a Persian prince, to obtain funds which the Greeks ought to be able to provide for themselves, unless, failing this, they were ready to admit that the whole war was a mistake and therefore to end it by any reasonable compromise. If they were not prepared to do this, it was their business to show the Persians that without reference to them the Hellenes were well able to finish any work which they might take in hand. Such was the degradation, veiled under the specious guise of a pretended gain, which Miletos had drawn down on herself by withdrawing from the Athenian confederacy. For more than half a century its harbours had not been profaned by the entrance of a Persian ship, nor its streets vexed by the visits of Persian tax-gatherers; and now the getting rid of a yoke, the pressure of which was rather a sentiment than a reality, had left them exposed to difficulties more annoying perhaps and worse than those from which the Delian alliance had been framed to rescue them.

The manliness of Kallikratidas put his hearers to shame; and at once they produced from their private purses a supply of money which enabled him, with further help obtained at Chios, to win over or reduce Phokaia and Kymê<sup>2033</sup> and to

Capture of  
Methymna  
by Kalli-  
kratidas.

<sup>2032</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 6, 7. Diod. xiii. 76.

<sup>2033</sup> Not many months previously Phokaia had been in the hands of Thrasyboulos, Xen. *H.* i. 5, 11; but after the disaster at Argenoussai Phokaia becomes a place of



advance against the Lesbian Methymna. Here his overtures for alliance were bluntly rejected. The demos was firm in its attachment to Athens; and Kallikratidas, ordering an assault, carried the place by storm. The captives were all brought into the market-place, and the allies insisted that every one should be sold, the Methymnaians themselves not less than the Athenian garrison whom they had so firmly supported. The demand was met by a noble protest against the frightful code by which all warfare was conducted then and by which it continued to be conducted for a long series of centuries afterwards. The infamous practice which justified the slaying or enslaving of prisoners at the will of the conqueror was really war not against states but against private homes, against women and children; and although Kallikratidas may not fully have seen this, his soul revolted against the murderous policy which must in the end leave Hellas at the mercy of any powerful invader. With solemn earnestness he declared that so long as he held command and so far as his power might carry him no Hellen should ever be reduced to slavery. The citizens of Methymna and Athens were all set free:<sup>2034</sup> and by this act Kallikratidas won a place in that company of merciful men whose righteousness shall

refuge for the Spartan ships, *H.* i. 6, 33. Diodoros, xiii. 99, says that others of the defeated fleet fled to Kymé. If his statement be true, then Kymé must have joined the Spartan alliance at the time of this voyage of Kallikratidas to Lesbos. After the treatment to which it had been subjected by Alkibiades, Kymé was not likely to resist vigorously any attempts which might be made to detach her from Athens.

<sup>2034</sup> Xenophon, *H.* i. 6, 15, does not mention that any conditions were attached to their freedom. If none were made, then Kallikratidas was going too far in the other direction. The object of war is to cripple the opposing power and compel it to offer or accept terms of peace suitable to the wishes of the victorious party. This end is defeated if captured armies are at once to be set free. Hellenic, and indeed all other, warfare dealt with the difficulty by leaving the prisoners at the absolute disposal of the conqueror. If he could not keep them, he killed them, thus effecting a great saving of trouble and money. If he had the means of guarding them, he sent them to the slave-market, and thus effected a still greater economy. If he had prisons in which they might be kept, and money enough or food enough to support them, he held them in reserve for exchange against an equal number of his own side who might fall into the hands of the enemy. It was clearly the duty of Kallikratidas to see that these prisoners should take no further part in the war; but the miserable untruthfulness of the Hellenic world imparted to parole a very slender guarantee. Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 117, says that the Athenian garrison was sold along with the slaves found in the place. Mr. Grote denies this. The soundness of the text is doubtful; but if Kallikratidas had said already that he would do his best, as soon as he was free, to reconcile Athens and Sparta, it is unlikely that he would forego this opportunity of showing that he was in earnest. The preceding sentence of Xenophon, *H.* i. 6, 14, lays a stress on the demand that the Methymnaians should be sold along with the rest. About these there might be some doubt, as it might be held that they had been led astray by the Athenians: and it is more likely that Kallikratidas settled the difficulty by saying that neither should be sold, than that he should half stultify his previous words by yielding the point in the case of the Athenians.

not be forgotten. The deed was in truth heroic. It set him in opposition with the general sentiment of the age, and to his troops it must have seemed but a one-sided generosity. Kallikratidas was triumphant now; but on the next day the victor might be Konon, and they had no guarantee that they who were now letting others go free might not be enslaved or slain themselves.

Thus generous in his warfare, Kallikratidas was not less vigorous as a general. His first act was to chase to Mytilene the fleet of Konon whom he had warned that the sea was now the bride not of Athens but of Sparta. With all his speed Konon was unable to enter the harbour before the enemy was upon him, and a conflict at the entrance cost him not less than thirty out of his seventy triremes. Happily their crews escaped ashore, and the remaining ships were drawn up and guarded by a stockade. But Kallikratidas remained master both of the northern and southern gates of the harbour between the islet on which Mytilene had been originally built and the coast of Lesbos itself.<sup>2035</sup> Konon had not been prepared to stand a siege.<sup>2036</sup> Without relief he must soon surrender: and relief could not be looked for, while his situation remained unknown at Athens. The attempt to break out of the harbour by force was as hopeless as the task which had ended in the destruction of the fleet at Syracuse; all that could be done was to evade the Spartan guard-ships and thus to get the news conveyed to Athens. Picking out the best rowers from all his triremes, he placed them on board two of his quickest vessels, and for four days waited vainly for an opportunity which might justify him in giving orders for attempting the forlorn enterprise. On the fifth day at the time of the noontide meal the dispersion of the Spartan crews and the slackness of the guard seemed to promise success; and the two triremes started, making with the utmost haste the one for the

Blockade of  
the fleet of  
Konon at  
Mytilene.

<sup>2035</sup> See note 1364. Archestratos seems to have been shut in with Konon.

<sup>2036</sup> The narrative of Diodoros certainly cannot be considered a report of the events sketched out by Xenophon. The two accounts have scarcely a feature in common. That of Xenophon, although miserably meagre, is thoroughly probable and consistent: that of Diodoros is evidently the growth of the elaborate and cumbrous fictions of later writers, and may be compared with the circumstantial stories told of the Messenian wars. See vol. i. pages 85, 91.

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southern and the other for the northern entrance of the harbour. With all their efforts one only escaped. Hurrying to their ships the Spartans cut their anchor-ropes, if they could not at once haul them up, and gave chase to the fugitives. Before the day was done, one trireme with its crew had been brought back to Mytilene; the other first announced the strait of Konon to Diomedon at Samos<sup>2037</sup> and then hastened on to Athens. With twelve ships, a dangerously inadequate force for such a service, Diomedon sailed to the entrance of the inlet which, indenting the coast immediately to the west of the Malean cape, runs inward to a point distant scarcely an hour's walk from Mytilene. At the gate of this Euripos he was met by the ships of Kallikratidas. There could be but one issue of an encounter so unequal. Ten of his triremes were taken, his own ship being one of the two which escaped.<sup>2038</sup>

The battle  
of Argen-  
noussai.

At Athens the tidings brought by the trireme from Mytilene roused only a more vehement spirit of resistance. By a vote to which no opposition, it would seem, was made, the assembly decreed that all persons within the military age, whether free or slaves, should be drafted into one hundred and ten triremes: and in thirty days this prodigious force was on its way. Strengthened at Samos by ten ships, and in their onward voyage by thirty more contributed by allied cities, the Athenian generals took up their station off the islets of Argennoussai with a fleet of not less than 150 triremes. Hearing of their approach, Kallikratidas had posted himself with 120 vessels off the Malean cape, distant ten miles to the west of Argennoussai, leaving Eteonikos with fifty triremes to maintain the blockade at Mytilene. He had not been there long, before the camp-fires on the opposite coast announced the presence of the enemy. His plan was to attack at once and so to take them by surprise; but the attempt which he made to set out at midnight from Malea was frustrated by a severe storm with thunder and heavy rain. Early in the morning the Spartan fleet advanced to the encounter, by which, if we may believe Dio-

<sup>2037</sup> Diomedon could in no other way have obtained information that Konon needed his help.

<sup>2038</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 6, 23.

doros,<sup>2039</sup> both sides felt convinced that the issue of the war would be decided. Of the battle itself not much is to be said. From Diodoros we have a pictorial sketch in which the colours are daubed on with the coarseness of a dull and sluggish mind; from Xenophon we receive a meagre statement of the relative positions of the eight Athenian generals, which has little interest except perhaps in its bearing on the terrible incidents which followed the battle at Athens. The only fact of importance recorded by Xenophon reveals the completeness with which the parts of Sparta and Athens in naval warfare had been reversed since the days of Phormion. Then an Athenian commander felt that everything depended on the free space which should give room for the skill and activity of his seamen; and the trial was one not of brute force but of the science which with comparatively little weight should waterlog vessels more bulky and less manageable than their own. This skill was now transferred to the Spartans: and we read that the great effort of the Athenian officers was to prevent the enemy from performing those manœuvres which in times past had secured the most brilliant victories of the Athenian fleets. If Xenophon be right, there were some in the Spartan force who did not like the thought of encountering 150 triremes with 120; and Hermon, the Megarian sailing-master in the ship of Kallikratidas, openly suggested the prudence of retreat. Kallikratidas replied briefly that flight would be shameful, and that Sparta would be none the worse inhabited if he were himself slain.<sup>2040</sup> Soothsayers also, according to Diodoros,<sup>2041</sup> assured Kallikratidas that his death-day was come; but the warning only stirred up in him a keener desire to do his duty to his country. For a time the battle was carried on by the two fleets, each with its whole force massed. Afterwards, as in the last terrible conflict in the harbour of Syracuse, the combatants were broken up into detached groups. In one of these groups the ship of Kallikratidas came into contact with the enemy with such force that the Spartan

<sup>2039</sup> xiii. 99.<sup>2040</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 6, 32.<sup>2041</sup> xiii. 99. He also relates a dream of Thrasylos which looks much like a prophecy after the event.

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admiral was hurled into the water and never seen again.<sup>2042</sup> At length the left wing of the Spartan fleet gave way, and the flight soon became general. The fugitives hastened some to Chios, some to Phokaia, and some, if Diodoros may be trusted, to Kymê.<sup>2043</sup> The Peloponnesian fleet was practically destroyed. Of the ten ships furnished by Sparta herself one only escaped; of the vessels contributed by her allies more than sixty were lost. On their side the Athenians lost five-and-twenty ships with their crews,<sup>2044</sup> a few more being driven on the land without further injury to their men.

Death of  
Kallikratidas.

So died in the first bloom of youthful manhood<sup>2045</sup> the only Hellen who had yet learnt practically that the duty of men, sprung from the same stock, speaking the same language, and loving the same equality of law and freedom of speech, was to make as little as possible of points of difference, and as much as possible of all that they had in common. Had he lived, he would assuredly have fulfilled his promise to bring about by every means in his power the end of the dreadful struggle which had compelled Athenians and Spartans, the conquerors of Xerxes, to fawn and crouch for the money of his successors; and thus far it was unhappy for Athens even more than for Sparta that his career was prematurely cut short. But we have no adequate reason for thinking that Athens even now was incapable of an amount of resistance which would have secured to her not only her freedom but even the substantial integrity of her confederation. Athens was conquered not by Sparta, but by the treachery of some among her own citizens; and of this treachery the growing disregard for law and constitutional order which had marked her history from the time of the disasters in Sicily was a natural, if not a necessary, cause.

<sup>2042</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 99, tells a different story. Whether he got it from Theopompos, we know not. According to his version, the death of Kallikratidas was not caused by his falling into the water. He fell, literally cut to pieces by wounds.

We may compare with this narrative the picture which he draws of the adventure of Brasidas at Pylos. See the note of Dr. Arnold, *Thuc.* iv. 21, 1.

His statement, that the ship with which the trireme of Kallikratidas was locked at the moment of his death was that of Perikles, may perhaps be historically true.

<sup>2043</sup> See note 20:3. v

<sup>2044</sup> It must be inferred that, if some might be sunk altogether, others would be water-logged and unmanageable; and that of these the crews might be recovered by friendly ships, or, if they were within accessible distance, might save themselves, as they frequently did, by swimming ashore.

<sup>2045</sup> νέος παντελώς. Diod. xiii. 76.

Whether the Athenians spent any time in chase of the flying enemy, we know not.<sup>2046</sup> According to Xenophon the generals intrusted the trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasyboulos with the charge of recovering from the wrecked and disabled ships such of the crew as might still be living, while they themselves were anxious to sail at once and destroy the blockading squadron of Eteonikos at Mytilene. A heavy tempest of wind and rain, it is said, compelled them to give up this enterprise; but if they had wasted many hours in pursuing the flying ships of the enemy, they would have found him already gone. As soon as the fate of the battle was decided, the admiral's pinnace conveyed the tidings to Eteonikos, who bade the crew hold their peace, go back again to sea, and then to return with garlands on their heads and singing the pæan of victory for the complete destruction of the Athenian fleet. His command was obeyed; and Eteonikos having gravely offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving for a triumph which he knew to be achieved by the enemy, ordered his crews to take their meal at once, and then sail to Chios convoying thither the merchants with their trading-ships. He then set his camp on fire, and withdrew with his land force to Methymna.<sup>2047</sup> The wind was blowing fair, that is, from nearly due north, when they set out for Chios; but with what strength, we are not told. That the breeze must have been violent, may be inferred from the statement that, although Konon found the blockading fleet and the besieging army thus suddenly withdrawn, he could not venture to join the Athenians on their return from Argennoussai, until the force of the storm had somewhat subsided. Having at length effected a junction, the combined fleet sailed to Mytilene, and thence went to Chios in the hope of mastering that stronghold by the aid of which the Spartans had so seriously shaken and so nearly destroyed the Athenian empire. The attack was wholly unsuccessful; and the failure shows how great in truth was the exhaustion on both sides. Lysandros could do nothing after his victory over Antiochos; and now in the full flush of victory the

<sup>2046</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 100, asserts the fact of the pursuit. Xenophon does not.

<sup>2047</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 100, makes him go to Pyrrha.

crews of the combined fleets <sup>2048</sup> of Konon and the officers who had fought at Argennoussai were so inefficient in besieging and storming fortresses that they were compelled to return practically beaten to Samos. But so far as the general conduct of the war was concerned, Athens since her overwhelming losses at Syracuse had maintained the struggle with a spirit and success as astonishing as any of which history gives a record. At Kynossema and Kyzikos, at Chalkedon and Argennoussai the Athenians had dealt hard blows which had made their enemies stagger; and the only substantial defeat which they had undergone was the disaster brought upon them by the folly of Alkibiades in trusting an incompetent man with the command of an important fleet. There was assuredly nothing in the outward appearance of things to justify the expectation of her immediate downfall; and yet the last act of the great drama was now begun.

<sup>2048</sup> The number of triremes can scarcely have been less than 150. The Athenian fleet at Argennoussai numbered at least 150 triremes: twenty-five were lost or disabled in the action: some were run ashore. There would remain, probably, not less than 120: and Konon had with him 40 triremes, of which two were dispatched to carry information to Athens. These would bring the whole number up to 158.

## CHAPTER X.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR, FROM THE  
BATTLE OF ARGENNOUSSAI TO THE SURRENDER OF  
ATHENS.

IN the terrible scenes which followed the victory of the Athenians at Argennoussai we cannot but feel the greatness of the loss which has deprived us of the guidance of Thucydides. Of these events in their broad outlines we know little beyond the fact that of the eight generals who won the battle six were condemned and put to death for failing to save the crews of the disabled ships, and that the plea of severe weather as preventing the discharge of this duty was emphatically rejected by the demos. On this cardinal point our informants furnish us with no adequate testimony. The strength of the wind, we are told, had made it impossible for Kallikratidas to surprise the enemy in the morning; and although after the battle the fleet of Eteonikos was able to make its way due south to Chios with a fair breeze, it is at least possible that triremes might sail with a wind astern which it might be dangerous to encounter directly. Nor did Konon venture, even when the course was clear before him, to leave the harbour of Mytilene until the strength of the breeze was somewhat lulled. It is also possible, and even likely, that the pinnace of Kallikratidas may have set off on its way to Mytilene as soon as the issue of the day was decided, but while the Athenians were still compelled to do what might be needed to make the victory complete. We cannot therefore from this narrative determine whether before the Athenians could reach Argennoussai after the fight (if they returned to it at all before the orders were given for attempting the rescue of the distressed seamen) the

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The  
tempest  
after the  
battle of  
Argen-  
noussai.



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Measures  
taken  
by the  
Athenian  
generals  
for rescuing  
the crews  
of the  
disabled  
ships.

wind may not have risen to such a height as to make a return to the scene of action impracticable.

Beyond this a greater or less degree of uncertainty hangs over all the facts. If we follow the narrative of Xenophon, we shall perhaps infer that the generals returned to Argennoussai as soon as the battle was over; <sup>2049</sup> that they there held a council to determine their course of action; that Diomedon urged the immediate return of the whole fleet for the purpose of rescuing the crews of the disabled ships, while Erasinides insisted that all should sail at once to the relief of Konon; <sup>2050</sup> that Thrasylos proposed a division of the fleet for the accomplishment of both objects at once; that accordingly it was agreed that while the rest should sail forthwith to Mytilene, thirty-seven triremes, including three ships from each of the divisions commanded by the eight generals, should go to the help of the disabled vessels; that among the officers told off for the latter duty were the trierarchs Thrasyboulos and Theramenes; that while these arrangements were being made and the ships from the several squadrons collected, the wind was rapidly rising, and that when at last they were ready to set off the storm was so violent that they could do nothing. The remissness and inhumanity implied in this narrative in great part disappear, if we can give credit to the story of Diodoros. If, as he seems to state, the council of commanders took place on the scene of action, and if before there was any time for carrying out their decision the force of the rising wind compelled them all to return hurriedly to Argennoussai, <sup>2051</sup> they are chargeable with no other fault than that of debating at all where a generous and kindly feeling should have rendered all debate superfluous. But the Hellenes generally were, if not a cruel, yet a grossly selfish people. There was little or nothing in the polity even of Athenians to make them otherwise, and the touchstone whether of success or disaster seldom failed to exhibit this selfishness in its true colours. It is useless, therefore, to repeat the emphatic condemnation which applies to the commanders at Argennoussai no more perhaps than to Athenian or Spartan leaders generally; and that they were

<sup>2049</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 6, 33.

<sup>2050</sup> *Ib.* *II.* i. 7, 29.

<sup>2051</sup> Diod. xiii. 100.

bound in the first place to make their victory decisive, will probably be disputed by none.

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But the fact remains that twenty-five vessels belonging to the Athenian fleet were more or less disabled in the course of the action; and by the admission of Euryptolemos twelve of these ships were still above water when the order was issued for sending the seven-and-forty triremes to their rescue.<sup>2052</sup> It would follow that in the interval between the beginning of the battle and the issuing of this order thirteen ships had disappeared altogether; but we cannot infer either that it had been possible to aid the crews of these vessels or that none of them escaped. A large proportion of these ships might go down bodily in the battle: from others the crew might escape by swimming. Nor can we perhaps assume that of the 2,400 men who formed the complement of the twelve ships mentioned by Euryptolemos more than 1,800 remained alive after the battle; and it would be rash to infer that of these 1,800 not one succeeded in reaching the shore. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that at the lowest possible reckoning 1,500 men were allowed to die who might without much difficulty have been saved, if the generals after the final dispersion of the enemy had instead of debating set to work to rescue them. Comparisons of Greek warfare with that of our own day are unhappily useless, and most useless of all are comparisons of Athenian with British sailors. English fleets are provided with the means of rescue and help in some fair proportion to their awful powers for destruction; the ancient triremes had no such provision. The English seaman in the hour of victory would despise himself if he could bestow a thought on his own success while it was

Numbers of  
the men  
lost in the  
disabled  
triremes.

<sup>2052</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 7, 30. Diodoros, xiii. 100 and 101, speaks of the anger of the Athenians as excited only because the generals neglected the burial of the dead. But, although the Athenians were sensitive enough on this point, the cause here assigned for the subsequent excitement is inadequate to the results produced.

Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 239, note, says that Diodoros speaks only about picking up 'the floating dead bodies.' I am unable to find any statement about floating dead bodies. He certainly asserts that the sea-shore near Kymè and Phokaia was full of wrecks and corpses; xiii. 100. This might easily be the case, if the ships were knocked to pieces near the beach and the bodies washed up by the force of the waves; but he is here speaking of the lost vessels of the Peloponnesian fleet. The Athenian ships were, it seems, in deeper water. In this case the corpses on board the triremes might be taken out and buried; but there could be no floating bodies on the open sea. Drowned bodies cannot float until they are distended by a sufficient quantity of gas; and this result is not produced in an hour or in a day. Moreover, if the men were drowned in their armour, their bodies would not float at all.

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possible to save a drowning comrade: for Athenians or for their enemies self-congratulation could lead them without an effort to the revelry of conquerors, whatever might be the condition of some who had helped them to gain the victory. Lastly, the very fact that an order could be needed for such a task as this shows the vast gulf which separates the Athenians at Argennoussai from British mariners at St. Vincent or Trafalgar. Far from waiting for a command to undertake the rescue of their comrades, the seamen of an English fleet would be roused to a dangerous insubordination if they were withheld for an hour from the discharge of a manifest duty. All that can be said is that no such feeling had been awakened in the Athenian mind, and that it is unfair to judge the generals at Argennoussai by the standard of Rodney, Howe, or Nelson.

Charges  
brought  
against the  
generals.

A few more points relating to this disastrous inquiry seem to be brought out with sufficient clearness. The first dispatch of the generals gave the tidings of the victory and stated the amount of loss on the Athenian side, adding that the severe storm immediately following the battle had put it out of their power to rescue the crews of the disabled triremes.<sup>2053</sup> The report caused at Athens both joy and grief. For the victory they received the thanks of the people who at the same time deplored the disaster caused by the storm. But there were many who were not disposed to let the matter drop with mere censure; and the indignation thus fanned into flame led the generals, it is said, to send a second dispatch in which they stated that the task of visiting the wrecks had been deputed among others to Theramenes and Thrasyboulos.<sup>2054</sup> This dispatch, we are told, sealed their doom. These two men had already come to Athens while the generals, having left Mytilene, had established themselves in Samos and were making plundering excursions in the neighbourhood.<sup>2055</sup> By Theramenes and perhaps also by Thrasyboulos the second dispatch was treated, it is said, as a mere trick on the part of the generals to transfer to others

<sup>2053</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 7, 4.

<sup>2054</sup> Diod. xiii. 101. We cannot be sure that Diodoros has not invented this second dispatch from the answer of the generals to the accusation in the Assembly mentioned by Xenophon, *H.* i. 7, 5.

<sup>2055</sup> Diod. xiii. 100.

the blame of inaction for which they themselves were wholly responsible. They boldly denied the fact of the storm, and denied at the same time the fact that they with others had been commissioned to rescue the drowning men.<sup>2056</sup> The inquiry therefore resolves itself into the one question whether certain men, Theramenes and Thrasyboulos among them, were ordered to visit the wrecks or whether they were not; in other words, it becomes a question of the trustworthiness of these men and their partisans against the credibility of the generals. If the officers of 47 ships received this command, the responsibility of the generals was at an end; and if any punishment was needed, it should fall upon those who had failed to obey their orders. But the issuing of this order was not mentioned in the first dispatch of the generals: and we cannot be sure that the alleged second dispatch was ever sent. The generals probably knew nothing of the storm which was brewing at Athens, until at Samos they received a peremptory order to return home after handing over their command to Konon, to whom Adeimantos and Philokles were sent as colleagues.<sup>2057</sup> Suspecting mischief, Protomachos and Aristogenes followed the example of Alkibiades when recalled from Sicily. The other six went back with the confidence of men who have done nothing to deserve ill-treatment at the hands of their countrymen. According to Xenophon the first step in the matter was taken by Archedemos, a popular orator, who, as demarch, it would seem, of Dekeleia, charged Erasinides with neglecting to bury the dead belonging to his own demos. This charge, coupled with an accusation of embezzlement, was brought in regular form before the dikastery, which ordered the imprisonment of Erasinides. His colleagues were now introduced to the Senate of Five Hundred; but their answers, we must infer, were regarded as unsatisfactory, for on the motion of Timokrates they were all imprisoned to await their trial before the people. Thus far, it would seem according to Xenophon,

<sup>2056</sup> Both these denials are distinctly implied in the statement of Xenophon, *H. i. 7, 4*. Theramenes could not have appealed to the letter of the generals about the storm as leaving them self-convicted, unless he denied the reality of the storm; nor could he have charged the generals with being the only guilty party, if he allowed it to be supposed that he had been himself charged with the duty and had failed to perform it.

<sup>2057</sup> *Diod. xiii. 101. Xen. H. i. 7, 1.*

no mention had been made of Theramenes and Thrasyloulos as having had anything to do in the business ;<sup>2058</sup> but in the assembly which followed their appearance before the senate the generals were allowed to speak each in his own defence, and all, it seems, agreed in asserting that these men had with the other trierarchs been charged to rescue the distressed crews, adding also that they would not suffer the accusation brought by Theramenes to tempt them into a lie. They had no intention of retorting on him the imputation of guilt which he so loudly urged against them. The storm had rendered all action impossible, and neither the generals nor the trierarchs who were their deputies were to be blamed for results wholly beyond their power.<sup>2059</sup> In proof of this assertion they relied on the evidence of their pilots and of many others who were present in the fight ; nor are we told that Theramenes and his partisans had the hardihood to deny again before the assembly the fact of the commission with which they had been charged.<sup>2060</sup> This simple and straightforward answer, backed by the testimony of witnesses whose trustworthiness there were no grounds for calling into question, produced its natural effect. The people were fast becoming convinced of their innocence ; many were eager to offer bail on their behalf ; and Theramenes, as having denied the fact of his commission, stood convicted of a lie. But it was now late in the day, and it was resolved to postpone the discussion to the next assembly, the Senate in the meanwhile being ordered to consider how the trial of the accused should best be conducted. Theramenes, however, was resolved that they should not escape, and he employed the interval in maturing his conspiracy.

We need surely go no further before attempting to deter-

<sup>2058</sup> This conclusion is in no way contradicted or weakened by the statement of Xenophon, *H.* i. 6, 35. He is there merely stating historically the fact that these men were with others charged to visit the wrecks, and he speaks of it as a fact, the certainty of which could not be disputed. But the generals had said nothing about this commission in their first letter : and if they were satisfied with the reasons which led them to keep silence about it, it was not likely that they would speak of it until they felt themselves compelled to do so.

<sup>2059</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 7, 6.

<sup>2060</sup> If they repeated their denial of the commission said to have been given to them by the generals, the fact is not recorded. They persisted in denying the reality or the severity of the storm, and thus left the people to infer that the failure of duty was to be charged on the generals.

mine the measure of belief to be accorded to the generals and to their accusers. It is not a question of their magnanimity or their self-devotion. They clearly possessed and exhibited neither the one nor the other. They regarded as a matter for debate a duty which English commanders would eagerly discharge at the peril of their lives; and we may surely be satisfied with saying that tried in this scale they are found grievously wanting. But in their dispatches and their answers we can trace no contradictions, not even any equivocation. They stated in their first letter that the storm had prevented the rescue of the wrecked seamen. In their second letter (which, if sent at all, was written, according to Diodoros, to counteract the efforts of enemies of whose activity they had been informed) they named two of the men to whom among others the charge of visiting the ships had been by them intrusted. In their answer before the assembly they repeated the statement and only added that neither before nor then were they accusing anyone of neglecting duty which it was not in human power to fulfil, and that the desire to avoid the semblance of such an imputation had alone led them to keep silence about the arrangements which the severity of the storm prevented the trierarchs from carrying out. But how stands the matter with Theramenes? It would need a reputation for truthfulness, such as few men have ever attained to warrant a belief that a body of generals, not all agreed as to the course which they ought to take, would combine to invent and maintain a lie which could be brought home to them by hundreds and by thousands. In truth the fact of the commission having been given was not doubted; nor can we find in all history many things more astonishing than the change which came over the Athenian people after the first assembly and which led them not merely to punish the guiltless but to acquit or rather deliberately to screen the guilty. If Theramenes denied, as he undoubtedly denied, the alleged difficulty of the storm, still, having received the commission, he and his colleagues were alone to blame if they failed to do their duty; and on his own statement that there was no storm to hinder them he and they were doubly and trebly guilty. But for the new

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Intrigues  
and conspiracy of  
Theramenes.

direction into which the popular feeling was driven in the second assembly, we can scarcely doubt that this failure to carry out orders would have been closely looked into. The one question would have been to determine whether the commission was given or not, and with the answer to this question the trial, so far as it concerned the generals, would have come to an end. As it was, the trial turned on this amazing issue, that there was a delay in going to the rescue of the wrecked seamen, that this delay was not due to any danger arising from stormy weather, that a number of ships with their officers and men were told off for this duty, and because these failed to do their duty, therefore the generals were to be put to death, while their accusers, the very men who had thus failed to obey orders, were to be regarded as benefactors to the state. Nor is this all. The whole career of Theramenes absolutely reeked of villainy. He had been a traitor to the constitution and laws of his country. He had been the willing and the able instrument of Antiphon and his fellow-conspirators in their plans of organised assassination; <sup>2061</sup> and because he had failed to reap from their crimes and his own the fruits which he had desired, he had betrayed his confederates and for the sake only of his personal interests had thrown in his lot with men whom he despised or hated. He was now bent on murdering men whom he had accused at first only perhaps in order to enhance his own importance: but the story which he told now was not the last version for which we are indebted to his fertile fancy. When, in the last struggle which closed the tragedy of his life, Kritias reviled him as the murderer of the six generals, Theramenes replied vehemently that he had never come forward as their accuser, but that, having laid on himself and others the duty of rescuing the drowning men, they had charged him with disobedience to orders for their failure. They had failed, he pleaded, but only because the storm had made it impossible not merely to visit the wrecks but even to leave their moorings; and he charged the generals with deliberately laying a plan for their destruction by insisting on the practicability of the task and then taking their departure. If we may

<sup>2061</sup> See page 469.

assume that his apology has been correctly reported, (and there seems to be no reason for disputing it,) we shall see in it the boldness, if not the ingenuity, of the practised liar. Not only had he before the assembly denied the reality of the storm, but he had charged the generals with inventing it and resting upon it as the sole excuse for their inaction. Both in their dispatch and in their answers before the people the generals had pointedly refrained from throwing blame on anyone, and were even careful to acquit Theramenes of neglect of duty in a matter wherein compliance was out of his power. Yet in the gathering of murderers with whom after the second destruction of the Kleisthenean polity he had not hesitated to associate himself, he could calmly speak of the trap which the generals had laid for his ruin, forgetting that, if the storm had been so frightful as he now chose to represent it, they could not have left him to his fate in case of failure to obey orders, and then at once sailed away themselves over the raging waters.<sup>2062</sup> Kritias, in all likelihood, saw through the lie, but it was not worth his while to expose it. He was about to encounter him with other weapons; and the schemer brought to bay by his comrades becomes almost an object of compassion which yet must not be suffered to shut our eyes to the fact that from beginning to end his testimony in the matter of the six generals is steeped in falsehood. Putting aside, therefore, his evidence as absolutely worthless, we are brought at once to the definite conclusion that the statements of the generals are consistent and substantially true; that they were to blame for holding council on a matter in which action should have been spontaneous and immediate; that their debate ended in telling off a large number of men and ships for the rescue of the distressed crews; and that before these could set off on their task, the wind which had been gaining strength from a time probably preceding the end of the battle had become a tempest which the triremes could not face. If these facts may be regarded as practically certain, it is further likely that the council of the generals was held in the immediate neighbourhood of the scene of battle, and not, as Xenophon seem-

<sup>2062</sup> Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 35.



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ingly implies, after their return to Argennoussai. If, again, this be so, the time of inaction is greatly circumscribed, and it becomes likely that the wind increased to a storm almost immediately after the battle. If, lastly, the statement of Diodoros be true that Theramenes with his party was busy at Athens inflaming the public feeling against the generals before their arrival from Samos, we can scarcely avoid the conclusion that he had returned home deliberately bent on bringing about their disgrace and death. What his full motive may have been, we may not perhaps be able to determine. The old constitution of Athens had been in form restored; but what degree of power the oligarchical faction may have retained in the Council of Five Hundred, we know not. It was easier to exercise undue influence over a jury-court than over a senate; easier, again, to work upon a senate than upon a whole people: and it is significant that the judgement both of the Dikastery and of the Boulê is adverse to the accused, while the feeling of the assembly on hearing the answers of the generals is decidedly and strongly in their favour. On Theramenes the liar not the slightest dependence can be placed: and we cannot therefore tell how far he may have looked upon these generals or upon some of them as hindrances to his own future career. In any case, his own position would be indefinitely raised and his influence vastly increased, if the people could be made to believe that to him they were indebted for the vindication of their deepest affections at a time when their generals had openly and studiedly insulted them. Such an object was enough for Theramenes; and his plan was wonderfully helped on by an accident which perhaps he may have foreseen but of which assuredly he eagerly availed himself.

Violations  
of Athenian law in  
the proceedings  
against  
the six  
generals.

The postponement of the discussion from the first assembly had this result,—that the matter could not be opened again until after the festival of Apatouria. When we say that this feast was most closely intertwined with the polity of Solonian and pre-Solonian Athens, we assert in effect that the sentiments which it was likely to awaken ran in a groove altogether different from that of the Kleisthenean and Perikleian constitution. Popular tradition, which never failed to invent false

etymologies, ascribed its foundation to the treacherous murder of the Boiotian Xanthias, by the Athenian Melanthos; but the name points with sufficient clearness to the unions of the ancient Eupatrid phratriai.<sup>2063</sup> In this festival, then, there was all that could bind the citizen to the old order of things, nothing to attach him to the new. In it he was carried back into a region of sentiment which from the first the statesmen of Athens had found it necessary to circumscribe but which they dared not directly invade. It inspired in him feelings which took no account of public interests and national duties, and to which the family was everything, the state nothing.<sup>2064</sup> Here as they met in the phratrion or common chamber of the clan, or gathered round the banquet spread out in the house of the wealthiest clansman, the talk of the guests turned necessarily on their own interests and on the fortunes of their kinsmen. All signs of prosperity were eagerly welcomed, and every injury was resented as a personal wrong,—in other words, was dressed out in colours which could scarcely fail to exaggerate its proportions. Here then was the hearth on which Theramenes might kindle the flames which should devour his victims; and his emissaries<sup>2065</sup> were everywhere busied in the unhallowed task. Athenians were not to be done to death with impunity; and their clansmen would be bringing shame on their ancient homes if they failed to stand forth as avengers of murder. The generals must die; and the kinsfolk of the men whom they had slain must besiege the assembly clad in the garb of mourning and with their heads shorn,<sup>2066</sup> until the great sacrifice should be decreed to

<sup>2063</sup> The name *ἀπαρῳπία*, thus mistakenly connected with *ἀπαρῶν*, to cheat, but denoting the children sprung from a common sire, may be compared with the nouns *ἀδελφός* and *ἀμαζών*, as applied to children of the same mother.

<sup>2064</sup> See vol. i. ch. ii. page 14 *et seq.*

<sup>2065</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 7, 8. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 264, rejects emphatically as ‘unnatural and preposterous’ the supposition that the ‘violent and overruling emotion of the Athenian public’ was created by the bribes and intrigues of Theramenes, and speaks of Xenophon as countenancing this idea of bribery. But Xenophon merely says that he got the real or pretended mourners together and that he persuaded Kallixenos. Nothing is said of his having done so by means of money. But Diodoros, xiii. 101, seems to imply even more clearly than Xenophon that Theramenes was at Athens busied in stirring up this excitement even before the generals were summoned home.

<sup>2066</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 101, asserts that these men were really the kinsfolk of mariners lost in the disabled ships. Xenophon, *H.* i. 7, 8, says that they only passed themselves off for such. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 262, emphatically rejects this supposition. Impostors, he thinks, might put on black clothes for the day, but the shaving of their heads would stamp upon them the evidence of the fraud until the hair had grown again. There is more force in his argument that the subornation of impostors was superfluous while

appease the dead. The drama was well got up. Kallixenos, one of the Five Hundred, was to play his part in the council chamber, while others would work on the religious instincts of the assembly. In the senate all went smoothly; and seemingly without opposition Kallixenos carried his monstrous proposal that without further discussion the demos should at once proceed to judgement, on the ground that the accusers and the accused had been heard when last they met together. Two vessels placed for each tribe should receive the secret votes of unsworn citizens deciding the question of life and death for six generals of the commonwealth. When the hour for the assembly came, the dark-robed mourners were there, like beasts of prey thirsting for the blood of their victims; and the excitement created by their cries and tears was aggravated to fury when a man came forward to say that he too had been among the drowning seamen, till he had contrived to escape upon a meal-tub, and that as he floated away, the last sounds which he could hear were intreaties that he would, if saved, tell the Athenians how their commanders had treated the bravest and best of their countrymen. In the false issue thus given to the inquiry, if such it can any longer be termed, there is something which would have been scarcely less loathsome to Athenians of the days of Perikles than it is to us. In this horrible outcry not a voice is raised in behalf of justice and truth. Not an attempt is made to determine the only two points which called for a judicial decision,—these points being the reality of the commission given to the trierarchs, and the severity of the storm which made it impossible for them to obey orders. The first being proved, the generals stood blameless: if the second were disproved, the persons to be punished would be not the generals but Theramenes and his colleagues. We cannot

real kinsmen were at hand who might be actuated by no pretended wrath. But the history of Theramenes and the Four Hundred shows that the iniquity of the imposture would add zest to the performance, while the fact that Theramenes and his emissaries found it necessary to go round to the different phratræi and stir up the clan feeling shows that the sentiment excited was in great part factitious. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 263, asserts that no such influence could have prevailed on the Athenian public to desecrate such a festival as the Apatouria by all the insignia of mourning. Xenophon does not say that they did so desecrate it. What he says is that at the Apatouria Theramenes arranged, not with the whole Athenian public but only with some of them, that they should after the feast appear before the assembly in mourning robes. We are not told that they put on the black dress before they went to the assembly.

doubt that this unscrupulous liar saw before him the rock on which he might yet go down, and that his fear suggested a treason to the law of Athens as flagrant as any in which he had been partaker in the days of the Four Hundred. Athenian law demanded that no citizen should be tried except before a court of sworn jurymen; that the accused should receive due notice of trial; and that, having had time for the preparation of his defence, he should be brought face to face with his accusers. All these forms, of vital moment for the due administration of justice, were summarily set aside by the propositions of Kallixenos. But there were yet some, although every moment left them in a more fearful minority, who were determined that if the law was to be defied it should be defied under protest from them and that they would not be sharers in the guilt. The proposer of unconstitutional measures (and no measure could be devised more opposed to all the principles of Athenian law than that of Kallixenos) was liable to indictment under the writ *Graphê Paranomôn*;<sup>2067</sup> and Euryptolemos with some others interposed this check to the madness which was coming over the people. Unless this difficulty could be overruled, the trial of the generals must be conducted according to the constitutional forms; in other words, the acquittal of all must be insured, for it would be grossly unjust to except Erasinides from the benefit of the decision to which he had given his assent; although he had at first proposed that in order to relieve Konon at Mytilene the crews of the wrecked ships should be left to take their chance. But it was too late. The shaven mourners in their black raiment raised the cry, taken up by the majority of the citizens present, that the demos must be allowed to do what they like and that any attempt to defraud them of this undoubted right was monstrous.<sup>2068</sup> Theramenes had, indeed, triumphed. This was the people of whom Herodotos had said with a happy and legitimate pride that their strength lay in obedience to law, and that in this strength they were more than a match for the whip-driven slaves of the Persian king.<sup>2069</sup> The historian

<sup>2067</sup> See Appendix H.<sup>2068</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 7, 12<sup>2069</sup> Herod. v. 78. See vol. i. p. 236.

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was happy in not living to see the day which falsified his proud avowal; but the frenzy which Euryptolemos could not stay was the natural result of the deadly teaching of Peisandros.<sup>2070</sup> They had learnt from him that constitutional forms were a matter of small moment compared with the safety of the state; it was not surprising that they should in a time of excitement come to regard them as of not much more moment when they interfered with their own whims and humours. A spirit was abroad in the assembly which was determined that, all laws and usages to the contrary notwithstanding, the six generals should drink the hemlock juice that day after the going down of the sun. They were not to be deterred by threats of prosecution on the score of unconstitutional proposals: and Lykiskos bluntly and tersely informed Euryptolemos that unless he withdrew his menace, he with his aiders and abettors should share the deadly draught with the generals. It was easy to add their names to the list of the doomed men, and one vote would dispose of them all. Obviously Euryptolemos could do no more, unless he made up his mind to assert the majesty of law and die. By a devotion to justice thus noble he would have compelled the people to wade through a still deeper slough of infamy, if they acted on the threat of Lykiskos; but it was possible that other checks might yet be interposed, and Euryptolemos was anxious to avail himself of every chance to the last. It was decided that the proposition of Kallixenos was one which might be submitted to the people; but the question could not be put without the consent of the Prytaneis or ten presiding senators, and of these some (we are not told how many) protested against its shameful illegality. The partisans of Theramenes were not to be thus baulked. Kallixenos assured the protesters that opposition would end only in their own inclusion in the number of the proscribed (no other term can with strict truth be used), while others with loud shouts insisted on the names of these senators being made known. Of these senators one only was prepared, if need were, to sacrifice his life for the vindication of

<sup>2070</sup> See page 467.

law, and that one was Sokrates.<sup>2071</sup> For him the clamour of the multitude had no terrors, and he returned to his home unhurt. His opposition was simply overruled; nor could the senators who withdrew their protest have felt sure that even at this stage the bark of a mob (for to the level of a mob the assembly had now degraded itself) might not be worse than its bite. It was decided that the question should be put; and when it had been formally submitted to the demos, Euryptolemos rose to avail himself of the last resource left to him by the laws which had been thus grossly outraged, and to urge its rejection. Of the accused generals Perikles was his kinsman, and Diomedon his intimate friend; and on their behalf as well as on that of the state he felt bound to lay before them his honest convictions. These two, so he asserted, had dissuaded their colleagues from informing the people about the commission given to Theramenes and his fellow-trierarchs;<sup>2072</sup> and for this he held them to be deserving of censure, but this censure must be directed not against their neglect of duty, for, having delegated it to competent hands, they were on this score guiltless, but against their good-natured desire to screen the officers charged with the execution of their order.<sup>2073</sup> For the rest, he intreated them to take no step for which they could not adduce the distinct sanction of law, far less to take one which, being irrevocable, could be followed only by a repentance as unavailing as it would be bitter. They were now, he warned them, eager to set at naught laws which in times past it had been their pride and their joy to maintain and to obey; and more especially they were defying the old Psephisma which bore the name of Kannonos,<sup>2074</sup> and which, while it provided the

<sup>2071</sup> In the *Memorabilia* of Sokrates, i. 1, 17, iv. 4, 2, Xenophon speaks of the philosopher as being on this day the president or Epistatēs of the Prytaneis; but he speaks also of the condemnation not of six but of nine generals. He is probably inaccurate in the one, as he is certainly wrong in the other.

<sup>2072</sup> Xen. *H.* i. 7, 17. It is possible that Erasimides might have been specially anxious that this circumstance should be introduced into the dispatch, if only to cover his own previous opposition to the making of any effort for the rescue of the drowning crews.

<sup>2073</sup> Euryptolemos was speaking as an advocate; and this sentence, if he uttered it, was not a happy one. The generals had said all along that no one was to blame, as the decision had been no sooner arrived at than the storm rendered all action impossible; and Euryptolemos would have done more wisely, had he confined himself to their statements.

<sup>2074</sup> Nothing is known of Kannonos: and some have suggested that the name should be Kanobos, others that it has been substituted for that of Charondas. On the whole, there is little doubt that this psephisma directed that each prisoner should have the benefit

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severest penalties for those who were convicted of injuring the Athenian people, still insured to each defendant a separate trial. From these penalties he had no wish to save even his dearest friends if these should be found guilty of a well-defined crime against the state. He was even willing and anxious that his kinsman Perikles should be tried first, and, if convicted, punished; but in the name of law and constitutional usage he demanded that a day should be given to the consideration of each case separately. One day alone was all that he asked for: and by dividing it into three parts time would be given for determining whether there was reason for going into the matter at all as well as for the accusation and for the defence. From these legal forms they had not departed even in the case of the oligarch Aristarchos who had first subverted the constitution and crowned his iniquities by the betrayal of Oinoê to the Boiotians.<sup>2075</sup> To his warnings he added a short account of the facts as in his belief they had really taken place, and his conviction that the violence of the storm had not been exaggerated. This could be proved not only by those who were in the ships of the victorious fleet, but by many who had managed to escape from the wrecks. Among those who were thus saved was one of the generals themselves who now stood before them charged with the crime of abandoning others to the death which he had well-nigh shared with them. Lastly, he reminded them that they were about to pronounce judgement on men who had won for them a victory which had all but settled the war at a stroke and which might easily be made to lead to the re-establishment of the Athenian empire; and these men, he emphatically asserted, deserved not to be put to death but to be crowned as conquerors and honoured as benefactors of the city.

Condemnation of the generals.

To this speech the multitude (the name of Demos they do not deserve) were willing to listen with patience, if not with attention.<sup>2076</sup> It needed no special sagacity to see which

of a separate trial. For the arguments on either side I must refer the reader to Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* vol. iv. appendix ii., and Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 267, note.

<sup>2075</sup> See page 501.

<sup>2076</sup> I can but express my amazement at the terms in which Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 272, speaks of this change from noisy uproar to quietness. Those who had raised the clamour he regards as now resuming 'their behaviour of Athenian citizens,' and as

side had the majority in the assembly; and the partisans of Theramenes knew that, if only the proposition of Kallixenos were put to the vote, it must be carried. This end was insured so soon as Euryptolemos was compelled to withdraw his threat of indicting the proposer under the *Graphê Paranomôn*. When, then, the amendment of Euryptolemos was put to the vote, and the show of hands declared by the Prytaneis to be in its favour, they could even yet wait patiently. It was not likely that the presiding senators, some or many of whom had protested against the measure of Kallixenos as illegal, would not avail themselves of every means for preventing its adoption; and so conscious were they of the trick by which they had hoped to save the people from the commission of a great crime that when Menekles rose to insist that the amendment should be put to the vote again, they made no opposition to the demand.<sup>2077</sup> The proposal put forth by the senate was adopted, and there remained only the task of judging all the generals by one vote. But in a case like this judgement must be carefully distinguished from trial;<sup>2078</sup> and without hearing any further

being careful, 'so soon as the discussion was once begun,' to avoid the appearance of carrying the resolution by force. They had no motive to do otherwise; and discussion there was, in strictness of phrase, none. Euryptolemos might be allowed to make a long speech; but they had made up their minds that under no circumstances would they allow his amendment to be carried, and the effort to shout him down was a mere waste of breath.

<sup>2077</sup> Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iv., believes that the motion of Euryptolemos 'was carried probably by a very small majority.' Surely, if there had been a real majority, the Prytaneis would have been encouraged to resist the demand of Menekles; and a bold front, justified by a real though small majority, might and not improbably would have stayed the current of the popular madness. Besides, this statement implies that, when the amendment was put a second time, some who had voted for it before now voted against it, and in sufficient numbers at least to convert a small majority into a decided minority. Now these citizens, who were simply holding up their hands amongst a multitude, were personally safe, and had no motive for changing their minds and their votes. The Prytaneis had a very strong motive for wishing that the amendment of Euryptolemos should be carried. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 275, thinks that the two propositions were put to the vote, one after the other; and that the Prytaneis decided, after witnessing two shows of hands, that there was a majority for that of Euryptolemos, and a minority for that of Kallixenos. But although it is just possible that a large minority might in the one case be represented as a majority, it is impossible to believe that on the first voting more hands were held up against the proposal of Kallixenos than for it, or that the Prytaneis would have dared to represent as a minority that which was a real majority in favour of the scheme of Kallixenos. The whole history of this fatal day shows that from the first a considerable majority of the people had abandoned themselves to the clan feeling which set all law and order at defiance.

<sup>2078</sup> As Xenophon, *H.* i. 7, 34, phrases it, *μὴ ψήφω ἀπαντας κρίνειν*. If anything more followed except the voting, he is silent about it; but it is to the last degree unlikely that anyone was allowed to speak after the proposition of Kallixenos had been adopted. The very reason given for deciding it in this way was that the generals and the witnesses had been heard in the previous assembly. The statement was utterly false; but so long as they chose to assert it, it made further examination superfluous.



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witnesses or any defence from the prisoners the Athenians proceeded to give their decision by placing their votes whether for acquittal or condemnation in the two urns belonging to each of the ten tribes. The result was, of course, that for which Theramenes and his fellow-conspirators had so earnestly striven. The six generals were condemned and on that night they were murdered; and thus Athens requited the lifelong labours of Perikles by slaying his son. To show still further the impartiality of the massacre, the same sentence was passed on Diomedon who had urged that everything should be postponed to the rescue of the shipwrecked crews, and on Erasinides who had held that everything must give way to the aiding of Konon at Mytilene.<sup>2079</sup>

Infamous  
conduct of  
the Athenian  
demos.

A feeling of disgust, if not of loathing, may fairly be forgiven, when we read that no long time passed before the Athenians repented of their madness and their crimes, but that, yielding still to their old besetting sin, they insisted on throwing the blame not on themselves but on their advisers. As they had done in the days of Miltiades, and as they had done after the catastrophe at Syracuse, so did they now. They, the sovereign people, who almost from their cradles had received the highest political education then anywhere attainable, who had been trained in a spirit of obedience to law, and to the independent exercise of their own judgement, were, when it came to matters of censure, to be regarded as little children for whose misdeeds the teachers only are to be punished.<sup>2080</sup> It was easy to decree that these evil counsellors should be brought to trial; but the Athenians were falling on days in which they were no longer to do as they liked. Kallixenos with some of his partisans was bailed by friends who did what they could to secure their presence at the time appointed for the trial; but they contrived to make

<sup>2079</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 102, represents Diomedon as coming forward before the assembly after the sentence was passed, and as expressing in the ears of the then silent audience his hope that the decision of that day might be for the good of the city, and his desire that they would offer up to Zeus the Saviour, to Apollon, and the Awful Goddesses to whom they had made their vows before the battle, the service of thanksgiving which it was now out of their power to perform. He may have so spoken to the Eleven who were charged with the execution, but the Assembly was at an end when the proposition of Kallixenos was accepted. Each man as he gave his vote went home, and nothing remained to be done except that the officers should count the votes and report the result.

<sup>2080</sup> See vol. i. page 418, and pages 213, 429 of this volume.

their escape during the tumults which attended the illegal prosecution of Kleophon.<sup>2081</sup> Kallixenos returned to Athens after the end of the war, and hated of all men died of hunger. Very wicked he may have been; but all who had voted for the murder of the six generals were not less guilty than he and should be not less deeply disgraced.<sup>2082</sup>

The Athenians had repented; but all their sorrow could not do away with the fact that the growing habit of tampering with law and constitutional forms had lowered their character and the character of their servants. The remembrance of Argennoussai might deter Chabrias, a generation later, from following up a victory which might have ruined the enemy's fleet;<sup>2083</sup> but the punishment of the generals had earlier and more disastrous consequences. The people were losing confidence in those whom they employed, and their officers were compelled to feel more and more that no benefits which their services might secure to the state would insure them against illegal prosecutions and arbitrary penalties. Corruption was eating its way into the heart of the state, and treason was fast losing its loathsomeness in the eyes of many who thought themselves none the worse for dallying with it. By a natural result it became the interest of such men to keep up underhand dealings with the enemy, nor could any feel confident that the man whom he most trusted might not be in secret one of the traitors. For the moment Athens was again mistress of the sea; but the crime committed against the generals who conquered at Argennoussai was speedily avenged at Aigospotamoi. One thing only we have to remember throughout this terrible history. The execution of these ill-used men was not the work of demagogues; and the assertion of Diodoros<sup>2084</sup> that they alone brought about these judicial murders is a libel. The excitement was stirred up and the flames fanned by men who were

Moral  
effect of the  
execution  
of the  
generals.

<sup>2081</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 103, says that Kallixenos with some others escaped by undermining the prison walls.

<sup>2082</sup> Of the amount of blame which the generals deserved enough has perhaps been said already, p. 555. The whole question turns on the trustworthiness of Theramenes as compared with that of the generals and their witnesses; and this has also been fully examined, p. 556. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 283, &c., writes at one time as if he believed, at other times as if he disbelieved Theramenes. We have seen that from first to last he lied.

<sup>2083</sup> Diod. xv. 35.

<sup>2084</sup> xiii. 102.

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oligarchs at heart, who had subverted the constitution once, who were going to subvert it again, and who in the mean season found it convenient to use the demos as an instrument for attaining their own ends.

Difficulties  
of Eteonikos  
in Chios.

Such was the sequel of the last battle in the Peloponnesian war. Of the victorious generals two were in banishment, six were dead; and this was all that Athens had gained from a victory more decisive than that of Kyzikos. Whatever the Spartans may have done after their disaster at Kyzikos, we have no grounds for supposing that they now repeated the proposals which Endios is said to have made to the Athenians for the ending of the strife.<sup>2085</sup> The Athenian fleet had fallen back upon Samos; and with this island as its basis the generals occupied themselves with movements not for crushing their enemies but for obtaining money. These leaders were now six in number: for to Philokles and Adeimantos who had been sent out as colleagues of Konon there had been added Kephisodotos, Tydeus, and lastly Menandros who with Euthydemos had helped by clogging the hands of Demosthenes to bring about the catastrophe at Syracuse. According to Xenophon<sup>2086</sup> they plundered the king's country: and the king's country in the eyes of this Sparta-loving historian included all the lands of Lesser Asia. Such employment as this, which could obviously have little bearing on the issue of the war, is humiliating indeed: but if in part it may have been forced upon them by mere lack of resources, we can scarcely doubt that the treatment of the victors of Argennoussai had much to do with the paralysis of Athenian energy. The shooting of one admiral may perhaps be a convenient mode of encouraging the rest; but if the judicial murder of Byng had been accompanied by the execution of a batch of his colleagues, the experiment would probably have been followed by a dangerous decline in the zeal both of officers and seamen. It was not in human, far less in Athenian, nature, that the six generals now serving in the Eastern waters of the Egean should not feel their ardour damped by a consciousness of the gross injustice with which

<sup>2085</sup> The reasons which tell against this notion are summed up by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 286, note.

<sup>2086</sup> *II.* ii. 1, 16.

their countrymen were ready to treat them, even if nothing be said of the deliberate treachery with which some of them were afterwards charged. But if the Athenians were thus miserably employed, not much at first was done on the other side. Having with singular presence of mind made his escape from Mytilene where he was besieging Konon, Eteonikos established himself at Chios, where the oligarchs felt that at whatever cost their revolt against Athens must be maintained. But his resources were miserably deficient. He could neither pay nor clothe his men, and during the summer these were content to support themselves by field labour: but when the crops were all gathered and they again felt the pressure of want, they resolved to turn their arms not against their enemies but against their friends. A straw carried on the person was to point out to each other the men who were prepared to take part in attacking and plundering the Chians. Such friends had Chios gained in exchange for the protection which while they were allies of Athens had never failed them. Sorely troubled by the discovery of this conspiracy, Eteonikos at first knew not what to do. Suppression by force was not to be thought of. The attempt might leave him powerless in the hands of armed mutineers: but inaction on his part, if it led to the execution of the plan, would bring on Sparta a disgrace which at the present time would be most unfortunate. He resolved by a swift blow to appeal to the personal fears of the conspirators. Attended by fifteen men carrying daggers he walked down the street of the city, and seeing a straw on the dress of a man who, suffering from ophthalmia, was returning from the house of his physician, he gave the signal for putting him to death. To the crowd which gathered round eagerly asking the reason for this summary execution the simple answer returned was that he was wearing a straw. Each straw-bearer, as he heard the news, flung away the sign which might at any moment bring on him the same doom: and the plot being thus broken up, Eteonikos, summoning the Chian oligarchs, pointed out to them frankly the dangers involved in military discontent if it should pass a certain limit, and the absolute need of relieving the wants of the men by an immediate and

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large contribution. His advice was taken, and having ordered his men to man their triremes he sailed round his fleet, distributing in Chian money a month's pay to each man, without uttering a word or making a sign which implied knowledge of the conspiracy.

Appoint-  
ment of  
Lysandros  
as secretary  
of Arakos.

The policy of Lysandros now worked as he had intended that it should work. If the war was to be carried on to any purpose, the Spartan commander must be a man capable not merely of coping with difficulties as they might arise but of directing all the forces of the confederates to one common end; and in the judgement of his club-men the only Spartan who could do this was Lysandros. Eager embassies sent not only by the members of those clubs but by Cyrus himself demanded therefore the re-appointment of the officer who had beaten the pilot Antiochos off Notion, and who possessed both the confidence and the friendship of the Persian prince. Refusing to grant their request in form, the ephors complied with it in substance. Spartan custom forbade the appointment of the same man more than once to the office of admiral; but Arakos might be sent out nominally in the command which should be really exercised by his scribe Lysandros.<sup>2087</sup> Early in the year the secretary took zealously in hand the work of reconstruction. To the ships of Eteonikos he appointed trierarchs whom he could trust. The vessels still remaining from the fleet which had been worsted at Argennoussai were brought together, while many new ships were put on the stocks at Antandros in the Adramyttian gulf. All this could not be done without ample supplies; and even Lysandros had some difficulty in getting the money from Cyrus who sent for him before his departure for Media whither he had been summoned on the illness of his father Dareios. The young prince had told him before that the funds intrusted to him by the king for his Peloponnesian allies had all been spent, and that even more had been expended: but as he had then granted him further supplies, so now he assured him that neither the friendship nor the treasures of Persia should fail him. His own unbounded trust in his incorruptibility was displayed by making the Spartan secretary

B.C. 405.

<sup>2087</sup> Xen. *H.* ii. 1, 7. The vice-admiral held office under the title Epistoleus,

master of all his private revenues and of all his reserved funds. One condition only, not altogether in accordance with the spirit of earlier days, he imposed upon him. Lysandros must promise not to engage the Athenian fleet unless the advantage of numbers was decidedly on his own side.<sup>2088</sup>

Before the departure of Lysandros for the Hellespont the narrative of Xenophon, studiously meagre except when it suits his purpose to give more life to his picture, relates no incident of any importance except the storming of the Karian town of Kedreai in the Keramic gulf and the enslaving of its inhabitants who were allies of Athens.<sup>2089</sup> According to Diodoros<sup>2090</sup> the town thus sacked was the Karian Thasos, by which probably we must understand Iasos. Thus uncertain are the materials from which the history of the closing scenes of this fearful war must be pieced together. If the details of Diodoros be true, the mercy of Lysandros was shown by the deliberate slaughter of the men in the city, 800 in number. But Diodoros and Plutarch both tell us further of movements in Miletos and other cities which would show that with Lysandros political considerations outweighed all others. Five years had now passed since Miletos had been severed from its dependence upon Athens. The revolution of which Diodoros speaks as a rising of the oligarchs against the ruling demos must therefore have been a struggle between two oligarchical bodies, one of which had supported Kallikratidas and wished to maintain his policy. Against these more moderate men their antagonists employed both secret assassination and public massacre. About forty of the most prominent, we are told, were murdered privately; and three hundred of the wealthiest were cut down in the Agora at the busiest time of the day. A thousand more, seeing the treatment in store for them, sought refuge with the satrap Pharnabazos who placed them in Klauda; and Miletos thus remained completely in the hands of the clubmen of Lysandros.<sup>2091</sup>

Strife of  
oligarchical  
factions in  
Miletos.

The activity of this commander stands out in singular

<sup>2088</sup> Xen. *II.* ii. 1, 14.

<sup>2089</sup> Xenophon, *H.* ii. 1, 15, speaks of this town as inhabited by a mixed population of barbarians and Hellenes.

<sup>2090</sup> xiii. 104.

<sup>2091</sup> Diod. xiii. 104. Plut. *Lys.* 8.

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Surprise  
and capture  
of the  
Athenian  
fleet at  
Aigos-  
potamoi.

contrast with the slowness or even idleness of the Athenian generals, to two of whom at least this inaction must have been both galling and humiliating. While Lysandros was busied in the cities of the Asiatic coast and while he even found time for a hurried voyage to the coast of Attica to concert measures with Agis at Dekeleia, they were doing nothing. Borne down by the majority of their colleagues, Konon and Philokles perhaps never suspected that the vast resources placed by Cyrus in the hands of Lysandros might be better employed in corrupting Athenian admirals than in building ships and assaulting cities; but they must have felt with a sinking of heart that the political condition of Athens even more than the failure of her revenues and the breaking up of her confederacy was chilling the zeal of her children, if not fostering treachery in her camps and fleets. At last when from Rhodes Lysandros sailed to the Spartan station at Abydos and thence, joined by Thorax the harmost of that place, advanced to the assault of Lampsakos, the Athenian fleet followed him, keeping on the seaward side of Chios. They had reached the entrance to the Hellespont and were taking their morning meal at Elaious, when they received the tidings that their allies of Lampsakos had been conquered and the town plundered. Their next meal was taken at Sestos, their evening meal at Aigospotamoi, the Goat's Stream, whence that goodly fleet of 180 triremes was never to return. At daybreak on the following day Lysandros gave orders to his men to man the ships with all speed, but in no case to break the order of battle by advancing to attack the enemy. Lysandros was a man not likely to be unaware that success or the confidence of success was the worst foe to the discipline of Hellenic troops generally and of Athenians in a special degree. Indeed he could not have been ignorant of the cause which defeated the great enterprise of Demosthenes on Epipolai and determined the issue of the Athenian campaign in Sicily; <sup>2092</sup> and assuredly, if he knew the character of the men with whom he had to deal, he could not have laid his trap better, even if in the Athenian camp he had none to play into his hands. The Spartans

<sup>2092</sup> See page 397.

would not attack; and if Konon and Philokles would have ventured to begin the fight, they were overborne by their colleagues. The orders of Lysandros made it impossible to repeat the tactics of Alkibiades at Kyzikos;<sup>2093</sup> but it was manifestly a case in which nothing could be gained and much might be lost by delay. Such, however, was not the opinion, or at least not the expressed opinion, of Adeimantos, Menandros, Tydeus, and Kephisodotos. The evening was closing in when, having faced its enemy to no purpose all day, the Athenian fleet fell back on Aigospotamoi, followed by a Peloponnesian squadron under strict orders not to return until the crews of the Athenian triremes were all fairly landed; and not until he received these tidings, did Lysandros allow his own men to leave their ships and take their evening meal. The monotony of this ceremony, useless for the Athenians but eminently useful for the plans of Lysandros, was unbroken for four successive days. The Spartan fleet was supplied from Lampsakos, and its triremes could be manned almost at a moment's warning. The Athenian station was merely on the open beach, and the nearest town, Sestos, was distant nearly two miles. Over this wide extent of ground the men were daily scattered in order to get their food, and the fleet was left dangerously unguarded. From his forts on the Chersonesos Alkibiades could see distinctly the rashness and perils of these dispositions. Going down to the camp<sup>2094</sup> he remonstrated with the generals for retaining their ships in a place where they had not the protection of a harbour and a base of supplies from a city close at hand, and earnestly intreated them to fall back on Sestos, from which they could at their pleasure advance to attack or to engage the enemy.<sup>2095</sup> His advice was rudely rejected, and Tydeus and Menandros dismissed him with the re-

<sup>2093</sup> See page 517.

<sup>2094</sup> The narrative of Xenophon, *H.* ii. 1, 25, implies a personal interview.

<sup>2095</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 105, ascribes to Alkibiades a demand to share the power of the Athenian generals, and a promise that, if they would comply with his request, he would bring to their aid the troops of the Thracian chiefs Medokos and Seuthes who were very anxious that Athens should come the winner out of the struggle. With these men he undertook either to compel Lysandros to fight or to attack him by land. As these tasks were both beyond his power, since nearly two miles of water lay between, it is not likely that any proposal was made with which the Athenian generals could not comply without instructions from home. No man is wholly evil: and in this instance we may give Alkibiades credit for disinterested counsel in the manifest interests of his country. He had, indeed, at the time no motive for giving any other.



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buff that they were now generals, not he. On the fifth day Lysandros resolved to carry out the plan for which we can scarcely doubt that he had been making his preparations on both sides of the strait. Each day had increased the confidence and added to the carelessness of the Athenian army; and if there were traitors among their leaders, these would take care to encourage to the utmost that contempt for the enemy which led them thus rashly to neglect discipline. Each day also after the challenge the Athenians may have retreated earlier and earlier to their naval station, thus leaving to Lysandros more time for dealing the final stroke. On the fifth day the order given to the squadron which, as usual, followed the Athenian fleet to Aigospotamoi was to wait until the enemy was thoroughly dispersed over the country, and then, as they came back, to hoist a shield as a signal. At the sight of this token the order was issued for instant and rapid onset, and every man was at once in his place and the whole fleet in motion. In a few minutes the work was done. Konon alone was at his post. Philokles perhaps was also close at hand: but these could do little or nothing. Such as were within reach hurried back to their ships; but of the triremes thus manned some had only two banks of rowers, some only one, while by far the greater number were empty. It is absurd to speak of this surprise as a battle. A few blows may perhaps have been struck: but of these no account was taken. The army of Athens had been cheated, and their whole fleet was insnared. Konon saw at a glance that nothing could be done; and while the Spartans were busied in capturing the ships and surrounding the prisoners on the shore, he hastened with eight vessels besides his own, the sacred Paralian trireme being one of them, to Abarnis the promontory to the east of Lampsakos and thence took away the large sails of the Peloponnesian fleet. He thus greatly lessened their powers of pursuit, and then making his way down the Hellespont while Lysandros was still employed at Aigospotamoi, he hastened to his friend Euagoras in Kypros (Cyprus), while the Paralian ship went on its miserable errand to Athens.<sup>2096</sup> With greater speed

<sup>2096</sup> Diodoros, xiii. 106, gives an account of this surprise which absolutely excludes

the Milesian privateer Theopompos set off on his voyage to Sparta, charged by Lysandros to convey the good news to the ephors; and almost before eight-and-forty hours were passed, he had reached the Lakonian coast. Not long after him Gylippos followed with the spoils. Fifteen hundred talents of silver were placed in his keeping, put up in sacks, each of which furnished the ephors with the means for ascertaining the amount deposited in them. Knowing nothing of this Gylippos unripped the bags, and having taken out thirty, some said three hundred, talents, handed over the rest, as the full amount intrusted to him; and the career of the man who had ruined the Athenians at Syracuse closed with a sentence of death for theft.<sup>2097</sup>

The Athenian triremes and their crews, with the exception of those who contrived to escape to Sestos and some neighbouring forts, were carried to Lampsakos; and there Lysandros summoned a council to determine how the prisoners should be dealt with. At once all tongues were let loose against the Athenians. Not only were their iniquities in times past laid again to their charge, but terrible things were said of mutilations which in the event of their being victorious at Aigospotamoi they intended to inflict upon their enemies. After a fashion hitherto unheard of in the Hellenic world and assuredly never yet known at Athens all who might be taken in the battle were to lose their right hands and bear in their persons marks of vengeance like those by which Christian kings, and magistrates delighted for ages to exhibit their justice. There is absolutely no justification for a charge which in the absence of all proof may be dismissed as a horrible calumny. Of another accusation brought especially against Philokles, who with Adeimantos was among the prisoners, it is unnecessary to say much. These two generals had caught, it was urged, a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel, and in spite of the opposition of Adeimantos Philokles had thrown the whole crew of each overboard.<sup>2098</sup> In short, it

Treatment  
of the  
Athenian  
prisoners  
by Lysan-  
dros.

the narrative of Xenophon. The latter is both clear and likely: the former is confused and utterly improbable, and really deserves no examination.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>2097</sup> It was said that he died by starvation: but whether the story of Pausanias in his case repeated, or whether he died in exile, we cannot say. Diod. xiii. 106. Plut. *Nik.* 28. *Lys.* 16-17. Athen. vi. p. 234.

<sup>2098</sup> Xen. *H.* ii. 1, 31. Dr. Thirlwall and Mr. Grote both take the verb κατακρημ-

was decreed that Philokles with all the Athenian prisoners, 4,000, we are told, in number,<sup>2099</sup> should be put to death. The general arrayed himself in white garments, and having heard the question by which Lysandros asked him what a man deserved who had opened the gates to lawless wickedness against Hellenes,<sup>2100</sup> was taken away at the head of the long procession to the ground of slaughter. The language of Xenophon implies that to the question of Lysandros Philokles vouchsafed no answer; but whatever reply he might have made would assuredly have been suppressed by the historian who wrote in the interests not of truth but of Sparta. It is

*vίαιαν* as meaning that they were thrown from the top of a high cliff and so killed; but when Polybios, iii. 116, 12, applies the same phrase to people who are pulled off nothing higher than their horses, the supposition seems needless; nor is it easy to see why Philokles should take the trouble of removing the prisoners from the ships and carrying them up a hill when the sea was at hand to do the work without this toil. As to the atrocity of throwing men over a cliff the less said, perhaps, the better. The more instantaneous the death, the greater clearly is the mercy to the victim, whatever may be the motive of the executioner; and death by being flung from a cliff of sufficient height would be more speedy and less painful than death by drowning, and certainly less horrible than the spear thrusts which left prisoners mortally wounded on the battlefield to linger for hours before they died. No one can speak of the Hindu mutineers who were blown away from guns as being more cruelly treated than those who were hanged. They were dealt with, in fact, more mercifully. The motives of Philokles may have been savage enough; but no crimes committed by Athenians in their worst moods ever approached in intensity of horror the enormities perpetrated both by the government and the citizens of Sparta.

<sup>2099</sup> Paus. ix. 32, 6. The proportion of genuine Athenians to their allies seems very small, if their numbers are correctly given. The crews of 180 triremes would amount to 36,000 men. According to Xenophon not many escaped, *H.* ii. 1, 28; by Diodoros we are told that most of them got away to Sestos, xiii. 106. This statement certainly seems more likely. A certain number would, of course, return to their ships at the summons of Konon; but the tidings would soon spread that the triremes were hopelessly lost, and then the Athenians and their allies would have the start of their pursuers whose first object was to secure the ships and who would necessarily be detained for some time in the task. The distance again between the camp and Sestos, although ruinously great for the discipline of the fleet, was yet so small that many must have been already in the town before the alarm was given. \*Again, we are told that almost all the triremes were empty when seized by the Spartans. A few had two banks of oarsmen, that is, about 120, on board,—some only one bank, or about 60 men. If we put the former at 20 ships, and the latter at 10, the number of prisoners taken with the triremes would be about three thousand; and probably they were not nearly so many. Nor is it likely that of the 33,000 who would remain over and above these 3,000 only a few would manage to escape into Sestos. They were, it must be remembered, unarmed: and, therefore, seeing the hopelessness of any resistance which they might offer, they would naturally trust at once to their feet to carry them out of danger. By the hypothesis, they were on their way to Sestos before the Spartan fleet had started from Lampsakos on the raising of the shield signal. It was not the object of Lysandros to fight a battle. It seems, then, on the whole, most unlikely that the number of prisoners exceeded six or seven thousand; nor can we be sure that the number of Athenians captured amounted to 4,000, merely because we are told so by Pausanias. As most deeply interested in the safety of the fleet, they would probably be nearer at hand than their allies; but if Adeimantos was with some of his colleagues a traitor, he and they would take care that their men should be well out of the way of offering any resistance. For this very reason, however, they would be nearer to a place of refuge. Philokles doubtless did what he could to prevent the mischief, and the greater number of the prisoners belonged probably to his division. The only commander who was at all sufficiently on his guard got away with nine ships, that is, with at least 1,800 men.

<sup>2100</sup> ἀρξάμενος εἰς Ἑλλάδας παρανομεῖν. Xen. *H.* ii. 1, 32.

almost impossible to believe that Philokles can have kept silence on hearing this question put to him. The statement involved in it was false. All Hellenic usage gave the conqueror absolute power over his prisoners, whether to kill or to liberate them or put them to ransom. He was in no way more bound to take the latter course than the former. If he had had a spear thrust through the bodies of these Corinthian and Andrian captives, he would have done nothing more than Spartan commanders were in the habit of doing in every war and not unfrequently in times of peace. He chose in fact, whatever may have been his motive, a less painful mode of putting them to death: and he was charged with offending against the military usage of Hellas by the man, who had just massacred the whole male population of Kedreai, merely because they were in alliance with Athens; who must have remembered that by the murder of the helots infranchised for their zeal and devotion during the blockade of Sphakteria. Sparta had placed herself for all time on the very pinnacle of infamy; and who was about to insult the universal religious instincts of all the Hellenic tribes by refusing burial to the three or four thousand men who were still standing alive before him.<sup>2101</sup> The fact is that, with little kindness, probably, and with less mercy, Philokles was faithful to his country. His name is therefore blackened. Adeimantos was spared from the slaughter because he had, as many felt sure and some openly said, betrayed the Athenian fleet to Lysandros; and as it was needful to cloke his treachery and to assign a decent pretext for suffering him to live, it was said that he opposed himself to the alleged brutality of his colleague.<sup>2102</sup> Lastly Xenophon has carefully drawn a veil over the details of this shameful catastrophe. If the surprise was accomplished by Persian gold on the one side and Athenian greed on the other, the result might bring a blush even to the cheek of the conqueror: but if it be so, then the

<sup>2101</sup> Paus. ix. 32, 6. The geographer adds that the Athenians, in contrast with the savagery of Lysandros, buried the Persian dead at Marathon. A struggle lasting through a generation had now drawn a wider gulf between Hellen and Hellen than between Hellenes and barbarians.

<sup>2102</sup> It is obvious that Xenophon could have no authority for this alleged fact beyond that of Adeimantos himself. We could not believe Adeimantos, even if he had solemnly sworn to the fact; nor can we believe the historian in a matter which must be represented to the credit of Lysandros.

treachery could not be confined to one man alone. If Adeimantos only had been acting in the interests of Lysandros, he would have been in an impotent minority, and his constant and factious opposition to his colleagues could scarcely have failed to throw suspicion on his motives and his conduct. But if the number of the traitors were nearly equal to that of the faithful generals, the energy of the latter might be paralysed without any appearance of dishonesty or disaffection. A still better colour might be thrown over their advice or suggestions, if they should happen to be in the majority; and this good fortune seems to have befallen Adeimantos. Of the six generals Philokles and Konon are beyond suspicion; of none of the others have we any evidence that they were put to death after the battle. Of Adeimantos it is expressly said that he was saved from the massacre. Xenophon, who says that others were taken besides Adeimantos and Philokles, is specially careful to avoid saying that they took all their colleagues (with the exception, of course, of Konon): nor does he any more than Diodoros distinctly speak of the execution of any other general than Philokles. According to Pausanias Tydeus was bribed not less than Adeimantos; <sup>2103</sup> and Lysandros could scarcely afford to keep his faith, such as it was, with one and to break it with the other. There remain only Menandros and Kephisodotos: and it is significant that of these two the former should have associated himself with Tydeus in his insolent rejection of the counsel of Alkibiades immediately before the betrayal of the fleet was accomplished. Of Kephisodotos nothing can be said, because nothing has been recorded; but we are assuredly not justified in asserting that he was slain along with Philokles without a distinct warrant for the statement. If we take the language of Xenophon strictly, he may have been the one whose escape made it impossible for him to say that Lysandros took all the colleagues of Philokles except Konon: and it was manifestly more to the interest both of Lysandros and of the traitors that the latter should be taken and saved under some decent pretext than that they should escape. In the former case they might at the least urge

<sup>2103</sup> PAUS. iv. 17, 2; x. 9, 5.

that they had been found at their post, and that their lives had been spared because they would not share in the cruelties on which Philokles had set his heart. It was the conviction of Konon<sup>2104</sup> that Lysandros planned and Adeimantos deliberately wrought the destruction of the Athenian fleet. If his conviction was right (and while everything seems to tell in its favour, assuredly nothing tells against it), the whole narrative of this horrible and disgraceful catastrophe becomes luminously clear. On any other supposition it is an astounding and insoluble riddle. It is incredible that six generals, however much their ardour may have been cooled by the atrocious conduct of the Athenians to the murdered victors of Argennoussai, should with a fleet of 180 ships have rushed straight into the trap set for them by the enemy. It is even ludicrous to suppose that two men, one of whom never came under suspicion even of lukewarmness in his country's service, while the other is charged with even too vehement a zeal in her cause, could have been, as they certainly were, thwarted and frustrated in every undertaking, had it not been that the majority of their colleagues consisted of men who were determined that the campaign should end with the total destruction of the naval power of Athens.

Treachery on a scale so vast can be the fruit only of a wide and deeply ingrained corruption. If out of six officers intrusted with the command of the whole Athenian force three, if not four, could be found to betray that force to the enemy, then Athens was no longer the Athens of Aristeides or of Perikles. Personal corruption was the sin to which Athenian statesmen had always been most prone; nor would there have been much cause for surprise if after a long and wearying war, with the degrading influences inseparable from such a strife, one amongst a body of generals should be found unfaithful to his trust. Nor in such a circumstance would there have been any great danger. Adeimantos either would have made no paction with Lysandros if he had been obliged to act alone, or he would have been practically powerless if he had done so. The only possibility of success lay in his being joined by a sufficient number of his com-

Treachery  
of Adei-  
mantos,

<sup>2104</sup> Dem. *de fals. Leg.* p. 401.

rades to paralyse the more energetic schemes of some of their colleagues without drawing on themselves a dangerous suspicion ; and in this instance he seems to have been fortunate enough to win over a majority. Nothing more was needed now except to place the Athenian fleet in a position of extreme danger under the pretence of holding at bay an enemy who was cowed by the consciousness of his own weakness. The challenge ostentatiously given every day by the whole Athenian fleet and with so much seeming timorousness refused by the Peloponnesians would be used by the traitorous leaders as a theme for self-laudation and for exciting in their hearers a profound contempt for the enemy which, beaten in every great battle, had won a contemptible advantage only over the hare-brained Antiochos. The fatal confidence thus fostered in the Athenian army would in a few days bring about a state of things most convenient for the wolves to whom the hirelings had bargained to betray the fold. For the general corruption without which such a scheme could never have been matured many causes were at work : but all may be resolved into that neglect of law and that disregard of constitutional forms which had marked the history of Athens since the catastrophe in Sicily. The Athenian demos had itself been persuaded into decreeing away its own powers on the very ground that forms of government were of little consequence in comparison with the independence of the state from foreign coercion ; and when they had put down the tyranny which had convinced them that government by an oligarchy meant simply submission to Sparta, they remained impressed with the not less fatal delusion that the demos was free from the duty of obedience to law and could in fact do as it might please them. Under this impression they had trampled justice and decency under foot in the mock trial of the victors at Argennoussai, while their own atrocious unfairness had weakened still further the bonds which should attach every citizen to his country. Regarded thus, the treachery of Adeimantos and his colleagues, if it cannot be palliated, is at least explained. The oligarchic faction had all along felt that the government by the people was worse than

dependence upon Sparta, and they had come more and more to regard dependence upon Sparta either as not an evil at all or even as a good thing to be desired in itself. Such men would necessarily feel further that the continuance of the war was a mere waste of strength and money; and as the people could not be brought to decree their own extinction, they might hold themselves excused for putting the demos into a position which would make further resistance hopeless. We turn with disgust from the picture of their treachery: but in the true interests of Athens it was not to be wished that her citizens should continue disciples in the evil school which substituted inclination for duty and arbitrary resolutions for law. So long as this unrighteous disposition continued to prevail, the Athens of Kleisthenes and Ephialtes was dead; and the sooner that she could be re-awakened to her true life, the better for herself and for her neighbours. But there was no reason why this re-awakening should be brought about by her utter humiliation, no reason why, having made an honourable peace with Sparta, she should not set diligently to work to cast out the evil spirit of disobedience and self-will which was threatening to gain complete possession of her. If Konon and Philokles had been supported by colleagues like themselves, we can scarcely doubt that the defeat of Lysandros would have been as signal as that of Kallikratidas; and the second destruction of her fleet would not only have convinced Sparta of the folly of attempting to 'crush' Athens by sea but would probably have taught Cyrus that in supporting the enemies of Athens he was playing a losing game. There would then have remained only the war by land; and Athens with her fleet would so have pressed the Peloponnesians on their own coasts that the fort of Dekeleia must have been abandoned. It was clear that whether on the one side or the other one more defeat would end the war in the Egean and the Hellespont. Athens could not produce another fleet; it was most unlikely that the Persian king would go on lavishing his treasure upon men who failed to show anything for it; and it was certain that without his aid neither Sparta nor her allies could have maintained the contest by sea, if the result



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at Aigospotamoi had only repeated, perhaps on a larger scale, the disaster at Argennoussai. Either Athens or Sparta must go down at once. The treachery of Athenian generals decided that the lot should fall upon Athens, and this treachery was the goodly fruit of the judicial murders to which Theramenes had hounded on his countrymen.

Utter  
dismay at  
Athens on  
receipt of  
the tidings  
from Aigos-  
potamci.

The news of the ruin wrought at Syracusæ was conveyed by no official dispatch, and its terrors were in some slight degree lessened by the gradual awakening of the people to the knowledge of their loss. Then too in all the intensity of their sorrow and their anxiety they had still an empire which, if weakened, was not lost; they had allies from whom they could obtain ships, men, and money; they had harbours to which without any insuperable difficulty merchant ships could bring all that might be needed not merely for the support but for the comfort of the people; they had triremes still lying in the docks at Peiraieus; they had still a reserved fund for building and manning more; and above all they had not yet to contend against the combined power of Sparta and of Persia. The tidings of the catastrophe at Aigospotamoi came upon them with the suddenness of a thunderbolt. When the men of the Paralian trireme, sailing into the harbour, told their dismal story, the cry of agony and despair, as it passed along the double line of walls, rose into a piercing wail when it reached the city. All that night the mourning went up to heaven, for none could close their eyes in sleep. Nothing more could be done. There remained only the fearful expectation of a doom very soon to be inflicted on them by an enemy not likely to forgive or to deal kindly with prostrate foes absolutely in their power. For in their power they felt themselves already. They might still be able to close their harbour gates; they might still man their walls and hold out within the city: but famine would do the work of Lysandros far more effectually than it could be accomplished by fleets or armies. In this hour of overpowering dismay, through the blackness of which not a ray of light could pass, their thoughts turned with terrible distinctness to their own misdeeds in the days that were past, to iniquities which they had ruthlessly committed and to others which they had all

but wrought. The wide prospect revealed not a gleam of comfort. Those frightful usages of war on which in their time of strength they had acted without scruple forbade the hope that their enemies would bestow a thought on all the good which in spite of much evil Athens might have done to Hellas.<sup>2105</sup> But if they could no longer hope that endurance might be rewarded by victory, an unconditional surrender which would enable the Spartans to slay every Athenian citizen and to send their wives and children into slavery was still out of the question. An assembly held on the day after the arrival of the Paralian trireme decreed that the entrances to the harbours should be blocked up, one only remaining open, and that every preparation should be made for undergoing a siege.

Meanwhile Lysandros had better things to do than to hasten with his fleet to the doomed city. He knew that Athens must yield or starve, and it was his business to see that the pressure of famine should make itself felt at once. The submission of Chalkedon and Byzantion over which Sthenelaoq was appointed Harmostes followed of necessity the disaster at the Goat's River, and the Athenian garrisons in these or in other towns Lysandros sent straight to Athens, telling them that their lives would be spared only on the condition that they should take up their abode within the city walls. His own immediate work was the establishment of that Spartan supremacy to which the members of the Athenian confederacy had been exhorted to look as the greatest of blessings. Now indeed he had no hindrances in his path. The fabric of Athenian empire had crumbled wholly away. While Eteonikos with ten triremes was completing in the Thrace-ward cities the work which Brasidas had begun with greater earnestness than success, Lysandros set up in the cities of Lesbos the despotism to which Sparta chose to give the name of freedom. Nowhere was the least opposition offered except in Samos, where the citizens, feeling themselves too deeply compromised by their suppression of the oligarchy, determined to hold out against him.<sup>2106</sup>

Operations  
of Lysan-  
dros and  
Eteonikos  
in the  
Egean  
and the  
Hellespont.

<sup>2105</sup> Xenophon, *H.* ii. 2, 3, takes care to bring out their evil doings into glaring prominence.

<sup>2106</sup> The 'massacre of the important men' which Xenophon, *H.* ii. 2, 6, ascribes to

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famine at  
Athens.

In Athens the pressure of famine was daily becoming more dreadful. Imports indeed there were; but these were their own Klerouchoi or settlers established in the Chersonesos, in Melos, Aigina and elsewhere, their possessions in these places being restored to such of the old inhabitants as Lysandros was able to find and send thither, or granted to Spartan citizens whether with or without purchase. To Athens also hastened those of her friends in Byzantion and Thasos who had aided in restoring those cities to her confederacy.<sup>2107</sup> The misery would have passed the bounds of endurance, had not some encouragement been given by the restoration of greater harmony among the citizens. The Psephisma of Patrokleides embodied the wholesome lessons taught by extreme suffering. By this measure a complete amnesty was given to all except those of the Four Hundred who had gone into exile in order to avoid trial and to those who were lying under sentences passed by the court of Areiopagos. For all others it was decreed that the documents relating to their condemnation or recording their disgrace should be destroyed; and the restoration of a large number of dishonoured citizens to their full rights was followed by a kindly feeling and sympathy between all classes in the city which seemed to promise that, though the day must go against Athens, it yet should not close in utter shame.<sup>2108</sup>

Siege of the  
city, and  
negotia-  
tions for  
peace.

At last Lysandros set out for the city. To the ephors at Sparta and to Agis at Dekeleia he sent messages announcing his approach with a fleet of 200 ships. The tidings were followed by the hasty departure of the full Peloponnesian force under the Spartan king Pausanias, the Argives alone refusing to take part in the enterprise. Having crossed the isthmus, they advanced straight along the Eleusinian road and took up their position in the Akademia close to the city gates; and shortly afterwards, Lysandros, having ravaged Salamis, appeared before Peiraieus with 150 ships and blocked

the Samian demos, cannot mean any violent change effected after the surprise at Aigopotamoi. When in the following year they were compelled to surrender, Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 6, Lysandros allowed them to depart with one garment each. Assuredly they would not have received such terms, had they committed a fresh slaughter after the total ruin of the power of Athens.

<sup>2107</sup> These Byzantine exiles had first taken refuge in Pontos. Xen. *II.* i. 2, 1. Dem. *c. Lep.* p. 474.

<sup>2108</sup> Xen. *H.* ii. 2, 11. Andok. *de Myst.* s. 76.

up the entrance to the harbour. Scarcely more than ten years before, there had issued from this harbour that fleet (more magnificent and more splendidly equipped, if not so large) which was to establish the supremacy of Athens over Sicily and to win for her, as it was hoped, a Panhellenic empire. Now it was a question of days which should determine whether Athens could insist on any terms at all, or whether she must submit without conditions to the conqueror. The first embassy sent to Agis, when famine had begun to reap its dismal harvest of death, offered free alliance with Sparta, reserving to Athens the possession of Periaieus and the Long Walls. By Agis they were referred to the ephors who on hearing from the envoys at Sellasia on the Lakonian frontier what they had to offer bade them go home again and, if they cared to have peace, to return with more reasonable conditions. This rebuff seemed to crush such spirit as still remained in the hearts of the beleaguered people. It was taken as a sign that the Spartans would be satisfied with nothing less than their complete destruction: but whatever doubt there might be on this point, there was none that hundreds or thousands must die of starvation before any terms could be proposed and accepted. One condition there was on which the Spartans had declared their readiness to treat; but no man dared to urge compliance with this requisition for pulling down one mile in length of each of the Long Walls, until Arcestratos urged that it was better to do this than that all the people should die.<sup>2109</sup> To this shame they could not yet bow themselves. Arcestratos was imprisoned, and Kleophon carried a decree that this subject should not again be broached before the people. It was his last political victory. The increasing intensity of the famine convinced them that something must be done: and if Theramenes dared not propose the demolition of the walls, he could offer to go to Lysandros, and ascertain whether this condition was demanded simply as a guarantee of fidelity on the part of the Athenians or whether it was to be used as the means for reducing them to slavery. The question was superfluous. If peace and independence were promised on a

<sup>2109</sup> Xen. *H.* ii. 2, 15.

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given condition, even Sparta would be held bound to secure them that independence if this condition should be accepted. The mere putting of the question was indeed a virtual admission that, if the Spartans insisted on it simply as a pledge of good faith, the walls should be pulled down. But in their distress the Athenians chose to shut their eyes to the obvious fact, and Theramenes departed on his mission. Three months of frightful misery had passed before he was seen again. He then came to say that during all this time he had been detained by Lysandros who had now sent him back with the answer that terms of peace could be taken into consideration only by the ephors. There could now be no longer any holding back. The victims of famine were lying unburied throughout the city; and the few statesmen who after the departure of Theramenes had urged resistance to the last were among the dead. The harmony produced for a time by the decree of Patrokleides could not stand before the assaults of hunger, and the judicial murder of Kleophon added another crime to the catalogues of misdeeds done in violation of constitutional forms.<sup>2110</sup> But these iniquities had nothing to do with the final result. An enemy was within the walls which could not much longer be resisted; and it was better, while time permitted, to obtain, if they could, something better than slavery from the enemy without.\*

The sur-  
render of  
Athens.

Intrusted with full powers, Theramenes set out with nine colleagues on the mission which was to decide the fate of Athens. At Sellasia they were called upon to answer the question which had been put to the envoys of the previous embassy; but on the announcement that the Athenians would be bound by the stipulations of their commissioners, whatever these might be, they were allowed to go on to Sparta. Here they were brought face to face with the representatives of the great confederacy to which the power of Athens had long been a rock of offence: and along with many others the voices of the Corinthians and Thebans were raised for

<sup>2110</sup> Xenophon, *H.* i. 7, 35, places the death of Kleophon before the escape of Kallixenos; but Kleophon was put to death during the siege, and it is not likely that Kallixenos could have made his escape so short a time before the fall of Athens, or that he should have been kept in prison so long before trial. The death of Kleophon seems to have been brought about by oligarchic influence in the Senate of Five Hundred. *Lys. c. Nikom.* p. 184; *c. Agor.* p. 130.

her utter destruction. Against this savage demand that no terms should be made with their ancient enemy the Phokians made a noble protest;<sup>2111</sup> and the point was overruled by the Spartans who declared that they would never allow a city to be enslaved which had done so much good to Hellas in the season of her greatest need. It may be fairly doubted whether, as they said this, they thought so much of the benefits conferred by Athens at Marathon, Salamis, and Mykalé as on advantages which they might receive from her in times yet to come. It might for the present suit Sparta to set up her Harmostai with their dependent committees in the several towns of her confederation: but none knew better than the Spartans that the materials with which they had to deal were not the most manageable in the world, and it was possible that at no very distant day the existence of Athens might be of more value to them than that of Thebes, even if Athens should not be needed to help them against Thebes. The discussion ended with the decree (it can scarcely be called by any other name) that the Athenians must pull down their walls, must yield up all their ships except twelve, must consent to receive back their exiles, and must follow implicitly the biddings of Sparta. As Theramenes and his colleagues made their way with these tidings from Peiræus, crowds thronged round him to learn whether their miseries were now to end or to be borne until none should be left to bear them. They were told, doubtless, that their lives and their freedom were safe; but not until on the following day the citizens were met in their assembly were the precise terms imposed on them made known. These terms, Theramenes briefly told them, they must accept; none others were to be had. A few still raised their voices against this last humiliation; but they were borne down by the vast majority. The submission of Athens was made; and the long strife which, dating from the surprise of Plataiai by the Thebans, had lasted for seven-and-twenty years, was at an end. Into that harbour from which had issued but a little while before the fleet which Adeimantos decoyed to its own ruin and the ruin of Athens Lysandros now entered

<sup>2111</sup> Dem. *de fals. Leg.* p. 361.

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with the fleet of Sparta, bringing with him those exiles whose crimes had made their names infamous for all time. Of these exiles some had been employed by himself;<sup>2111</sup> others had aided Agis, or at least sojourned under his protection, at Dekeleia. They probably showed their gratitude by taking a part in the great festival by which the Spartans celebrated the downfall of Athens. While the arsenals were dismantled and the unfinished ships in the docks burnt, the demolition of the Long Walls was begun to the music of flute-players and the measured movements of dancing women. In the first flush of their triumph the Spartans were willing to help the conquered in the task of dismantling the great works of Themistokles and Perikles; but they soon grew weary of the toil, and the Athenians themselves had not brought the business to an end within the allotted time. Their remissness was forgiven. They were no longer in a condition to inspire fear. Twelve ships only remained in the desolate and dismantled harbour: and so began, according to Spartan phrase, the first day of freedom for Hellas.<sup>2113</sup>

Character  
of Athenian  
and Spartan  
polity as  
determining  
the  
issue of the  
war.

Thus passed away the first and the most splendid phase of Athenian history. The great work which Themistokles had shaped and which Perikles sought to surround with impregnable safeguards was for the time utterly brought to naught. No other end could be looked for, so soon as it became clear that the great Dorian state with its allies was determined to resist and, if need were, to fight against the idea which underlay the polity of Athens. This polity even in its crudest and most imperfect form was a protest against that spirit of isolation under which the old Eupatrid houses had sprung up to power.<sup>2114</sup> To the form of society thus created the Spartan clung with vehement tenacity, and in this attitude he had the sympathy of the Hellenic world generally. Even when the Athenian empire had reached its greatest extension and her power seemed most firmly cemented, when moreover her allies felt that they received from her benefits and rights which they could never have secured for themselves, they still felt a certain soreness at her interference with those

<sup>2112</sup> One, Aristoteles, is mentioned by Xenophon, *H.* ii. 2, 18, as sent by Lysandros to tell the ephors that he had referred the Athenian envoys to them.

<sup>2113</sup> Xen. *H.* ii. 2, 23.

<sup>2114</sup> See vol. i. page 23.

autonomous instincts which they invested with an inviolable sanctity. These allies, although they could prove no distinct or positive grievances,<sup>2115</sup> could never be brought to rejoice in the good fortune which had connected them with Athens and they regarded the idea of separating from her with cool indifference, if not with a more active desire. Their dependence upon her, although they might be utterly unable to defend themselves, was still to whatever an extent an evil and only when after allowing oligarchical factions to seduce them into revolt they found that the freedom with which they had been lured onwards was but a specious name for grinding tyranny, did the demos in many cities set itself sedulously to undo the mischief and make common cause with the imperial city which had proved itself the only bulwark against the despotism of an exclusive order. But the empire of Athens was aggressive. It could not be otherwise. The same political instincts which have welded Great Britain and Ireland into a single kingdom and which still maintain the union of England with her vast and scattered colonies led the statesmen of Athens to build up that coherent fabric which, so far as it was carried, exhibited a singular likeness to the polity of our own country. The necessities which gave birth to the Delian confederacy and which through this led to the more highly-developed supremacy of Athens<sup>2116</sup> compelled the imperial city to interfere to a certain extent with the freedom or rather the license of states which although they might be able to do little good, could yet be powerful for mischief, and which, if they did nothing, would reap the same benefits with those members of the confederacy who did everything. How slight on the whole that interference was, how jealously Athens guarded the liberty and rights of her allies against her own citizens, how great a protection her courts afforded to these allies in their disputes with one another, and how carefully she shielded them against the attacks of foreign powers, the whole course of this history has shown. It has shown also the mistakes and blunders of Athenian statesmen when they swerved from the line of action marked out for them by Perikles, and the

<sup>2115</sup> See page 70.<sup>2116</sup> See page 58.



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speed with which they hastened on the downward path when in addition to the war nearer home they resolved to undertake a not less gigantic war in Sicily, instead of re-establishing their supremacy in those Thrace-ward regions where Brasidas had so seriously shaken it. Athens lavished her whole strength on the Sicilian expedition, and she failed; but it must always be remembered that for the Sicilians themselves it would have been a great, perhaps an incalculable, blessing if she had succeeded.<sup>2117</sup> Nor can we say how much better the world of Europe might not have been now, if the miserable feuds, the incessant jealousy, the selfish isolation, the cramping despotism which marked and disgraced the civilisation of the Dorian tribes generally, had been effectually checked and crushed. Briefly,—with all their faults and with crimes the stains of which no tears could ever wash out, the Athenians were fighting for a law and an order, which, they felt, could not be maintained at all, if it was to be confined within the bounds of a single city. So far as they went, they were working to make a nation: but into a nation the Hellenic tribes and cities were determined that they should not be moulded. The resistance which Athens encountered compelled her to keep her allies more closely under control, and imparted to her government an appearance of despotism which, however, was at its worst a slight yoke indeed, when compared with the horrors of Spartan rule. She had attempted great things for which the world was not yet ripe; and the states which had been induced to band themselves against her awoke for the most part to the conviction that they had suffered themselves to be cheated by a lie. In her relations with her allies Athens exhibited a dignity and a justice which, if they have marked the dealings of any other people, have marked those only of England.

The social  
and  
domestic  
life of  
Hellas.

But from the tragic drama which we have now traced to its catastrophe we cannot turn without the feeling (more painful far than that with which we read of the last fearful days of the Athenians at Syracuse), that we have gone through the history not of the people but only of the smallest fraction of it. From the narrative of political events, of a

<sup>2117</sup> See page 422.

real and for the most part wholesome political growth, the curtain is from time to time lifted to reveal a picture so horrible that duty alone can constrain us to keep our eyes fixed upon it at all. We have had to watch the growth of a civilisation founded on that instinct of isolation and despotism which marks the beast in his den;<sup>2118</sup> and this stamp, even in the midst of the splendour, the grace, the learning and wisdom, of the age of Perikles and Plato, Greek life even at Athens never loses. In the time of the Phalerean Demetrios Attica had, it is said, 20,000 citizens, 10,000 metoikoi, and 400,000 slaves, the female domestic slaves not being included in this number.<sup>2119</sup> When Aristagoras visited Athens, he found there three myriads of citizens not indisposed to take up his cause.<sup>2120</sup> What the proportion may have been in his day between the numbers of the free citizens, the resident foreigners, and the slaves, we know not; but for all the vast throng except the men who possessed the franchise and ordered the state history keeps an ominous silence. For their occupations, their pleasures, and their pains, the free citizen had a profound disregard or contempt; and to them were abandoned as coarse and degrading those tasks of commerce and manufacture which constitute the very kernel of modern English and European prosperity. If comic poets pointed their jests at lamp-makers and leather-sellers, it was probably because these men delegated to their slaves employments in themselves not so seemly as those by which the high-born and refined Nikias drew a revenue from his bondmen.<sup>2121</sup> Defeat in battle and the sack of cities may exhibit to us thousands of men slaughtered in cold blood on the field, or departing into a hopeless slavery. Athenian gentlemen, refined and delicate, nurtured amongst all the glories of the highest art, trained in the schools of the highest science, were thrown to rot in the quarries of Syracuse, and taken out to be classed henceforth among those whom wise men like Aristotle vouchsafed to regard as

<sup>2118</sup> See vol. i. page 13.

<sup>2119</sup> Athen. vi. p. 2. Döllinger, *The Jew and the Gentile*, i. 227.

<sup>2120</sup> Herod. v. 97. See vol. i. page 389.

<sup>2121</sup> For the *βάρυτοι τέχνηαι*, see Döllinger, *The Jew and the Gentile*, ii. 225. The horrible evils of Hellenic slavery generally are brought out with sufficient clearness in the *Charikles* of Bekker, Excursus to Scene vii., on the Slaves.

animated machines. Based really on the tiger-like system which limits action strictly by power, Greek slavery was only in the false and ridiculous philosophy of a later age made to rest on distinctions to which nature was every day giving the lie. With the refutation of the monstrous falsehoods which characterise the special pleadings of Aristotle on this subject we are not here concerned: but it is the business of the historian to note that of all the inhabitants of a given land nineteen-twentieths are never heard of, or that, if they appear at all, it is only to be tortured in courts of justice for the benefit of free citizens. Behind this same dark and almost impenetrable veil are hidden the wives, sisters, and daughters of the men whose names are familiar sounds in every land. Of these women scarcely one is known to us, even in Athens: and the few instances which furnish exceptions exhibit the questionable reputation of women like Elpinikê the daughter of Miltiades,<sup>2122</sup> while in Sparta we have that infamous polyandry which formed one of the most prominent characteristics of Spartan life.<sup>2123</sup> Nowhere among the Hellenic tribes was the idea conceived which Englishmen attach to the life of the family. The state of things was less disgraceful at Athens than elsewhere; but even at Athens the father was but the lord of his house, the wife his deputy for the management of the household, and wife and daughters were alike incapable of passing out from the state of lifelong pupilage. The quiet happiness of well-ordered English homes had never dawned upon the Hellenic mind. In its place there was the degrading companionship of female slaves, the more refined but not less sensual society of the Hetairai, and, most prominent of all, the loathsome and unnatural debauchery which drew down the scathing condemnation of the great Apostle of the Gentiles.<sup>2124</sup> So deeply had this canker eaten into the heart of Athens that for Plato the very name of love was associated not with the relation of husband and wife but with the foul and abominable lust of man for man. It is shameful to be driven even to speak of such things; but we have no real grasp on

<sup>2122</sup> Plut. *Kim.* 4, 14.<sup>2123</sup> See note 26.<sup>2124</sup> Rom. i.

the history of the people, if we fail to see that in the days of Perikles and even earlier those dreadful evils were at work of which Polybios bitterly deplored the results in the decay and the extinction of families, in the desolation of the country, and the degeneracy of its soil.<sup>2125</sup> Compared with a picture so loathsome as this, the society of the so-called heroic age, as represented in the Iliad and Odyssey, presents a refreshing and wholesome contrast; and of Athens, whose political growth must always be regarded with a legitimate pride, all that can be said is that these evils, horrible as they were even there, were far worse elsewhere. All this we have to bear in mind, as we follow the history of Athenian society from the age of Solon to the time when it reached its highest development under Perikles,—from the age when in the great Panionic festival at Delos men and women seem to meet in equal and pure companionship<sup>2126</sup> to the time when the men of the Sacred Band which fights at Delion are bound to each other in an alliance unspeakably shameful.<sup>2127</sup>

The lessons of wisdom, truth, and justice, which we learn from the history of Athens, (for in all that relates to the growth of the mind and the higher life of man<sup>2128</sup> Athens must always stand pre-eminent amongst Hellenic cities,) are neither few nor unimportant; and the great gulf which intervenes between their highest knowledge and that which we have inherited as the collective experience of mankind, may yet show that on the whole our merits are not much

Comparison of the civilisation of Athens with that of modern Europe.

<sup>2125</sup> It is unnecessary for me to do more than refer the reader to the more minute and on the whole very faithful examination of Hellenic society by Dr. Döllinger, *The Jew and the Gentile*, book ix. chaps. i. and ii. Roman society was, on the whole, vastly worse. See also Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ch. lxvi.

<sup>2126</sup> See vol. i. page 116.

<sup>2127</sup> See note 1500.

<sup>2128</sup> Among these higher and more wholesome influences a chief, if not the foremost place, must be assigned to the drama. Attic tragedy was essentially the child of Attic democracy. It could neither be produced nor live except in a state which not only allowed all its citizens to take part in the work of government but insisted on their doing so, which trained them from their earliest years to habits of self-dependence and free discussion, and required from all readiness of speech as well as promptness in action. Thus in the theatre the Athenian was educated for the debates of the Ekklesia or for the functions whether of the defender or the accuser in the Jury Courts. But this education is so closely connected with the more direct training imparted by the teachers of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and again this rhetorical and dialectical instruction carries us so immediately to the work of the Sophists, that it becomes almost impossible to treat any one of these subjects without reference to the rest. They must all come under review in estimating the causes which shaped the career of Sokrates and produced the opposition which ended in his trial and death. I reserve therefore for my third volume the resumption of this subject on which something has been said already in chapter vii. of Book I.

greater than theirs. All or almost all that has been said of Hellenic slavery applies to English slavery half a century ago and to the slavery of the United States but as yesterday; and of the other crimes laid to the charge of the Hellenic tribes there are among us signs which may well teach us to speak with the sobriety needed to temper a righteous indignation. The teaching of history must embrace every phase of human life; and that teaching, while it may in part depress and sadden us, must assuredly bring before us in clearer light the wisdom of Him Who knows all His work from the beginning to the end.

# APPENDICES.



## APPENDIX II. (Pages 61, 497, 561.)

### JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AT ATHENS.

By the reform of Ephialtes the superintending powers of the Areiopagos were transferred to a body of seven magistrates called Nomophylakes, Law-guardians. It was their business to see that no illegal steps were taken in the proposition of new laws, or in the prosecution of public offenders. Of these magistrates we know but little. Their functions were practically superseded by the institution of the Graphê Paranomôn: nor do we hear of their attempting to arrest the grossly illegal measure by which the six generals were condemned to death on their return from Argennoussai.

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Another safeguard for Athenian legislation was provided by the appointment of officers called Nomothetai. These officers were taken from the sworn jurymen or Dikastai; but they formed no permanent court. If the annual examination of the existing laws by the Thesmothetai showed that any given law was inconsistent with others, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the Prytaneis of the first month of the Attic year determined in their third meeting the number who should be summoned as Nomothetai, and made provision for their payment during the time over which the business before them would probably be extended. Before these officers the proposer of a new law urged the benefits to be obtained from his measure, while a paid advocate pleaded the cause of any law of which the repeal was demanded. Only in such a court could a Nomos or Law be passed, the general assembly being empowered only to enact decrees, Psephismata, which applied commonly to one particular case and were in force only for one year.

This jealous care for the consistency of the Athenian code of laws was still further attested by the suit of Graphê Paranomôn, which might be brought against the proposer of any law, if his measure should be found to be in antagonism with any existing law. Thus the burden was laid upon the legislator not only of taking care that his own measure was good and wholesome, but of seeing that it contradicted no existing

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enactments. The enforcement of this principle in England would have rendered impossible the massing of vast mountains of legislation, of which few may say how much is in force, how much obsolete, how much formally repealed. It would also have done away with that not very grateful portion of the labours of English judges, which consists in so far explaining away inconsistencies and contradictions between existing laws as to give to the general body of statutes an appearance of harmony which they do not possess. At Athens the application of this principle involved some hardship to the legislator, and implied a certain shrinking from responsibility on the part of the Demos which is one of the least creditable features of the Athenian character. See vol. i. page 448, and pages 213, 429, 566 of this volume. If within a year after the passing of a law the enactment was found to be thus out of agreement with some previously existing law, the proposer might be summoned before the Dikastery in an Agôn Atimêtos, see note 818, in which the accuser proposed a certain penalty, and the accused proposed another as the alternative, the Dikastai having no power but to choose one of these two. If the charge was not brought within the year, the proposer was scathless, but his law might be indicted and condemned, the distinction being drawn by the preposition employed before the name of the accused, *κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους* denoting a suit in which the proposer was personally liable, *πρὸς Δεπτίην* marking a prosecution brought after the lapse of more than one year. This term, indeed, was sometimes allowed purposely to elapse, when there was a wish not to hurt the proposer but only to get rid of his law, which was at once swept away by an adverse sentence without any necessity on the part of the accuser to propose a new law, as he would be compelled to do if he urged his objections to the law, merely as a law, before the Nomothetai. There can be no doubt that the original intention was to confine these suits to causes of formal contradictions between new and old enactments; and thus far not much can be said on the hardship inflicted on the proposers of new laws. The case was altered when the inconsistency was said to lie not in the letter but in the spirit of the two laws, and when, further, the plea of illegality in the carrying of a law was made an excuse for running off into general reviews of the political career of statesmen, and holding them up as fit objects for the contempt or hatred of the people. Such an abuse of this charge of illegal legislation brought by the orator Æschines nominally against Ktesiphon called forth from Demosthenes the most splendid speech of his own or of any other age; but it is not a little to the discredit of the professedly legislative processes at Athens that such an occasion should have been furnished at all.

† The pay given to the Nomothetai or the Dikasts may seem at first sight an insignificant matter: but we shall view it in a truer light when

we remember that the great dangers to be guarded against in a Greek city were venality and intimidation. Where justice or so-called justice was administered by a single magistrate or by small boards, there were always good grounds for fearing either that the judges might be bribed, or that the accused, if belonging to a family sufficiently powerful, might bid defiance to the law. Against this risk the most obvious safeguards lay in giving an adequate recompense to all concerned in the administration of justice, in multiplying their numbers so as to make attempts to bribe them both dangerous and unprofitable, and more especially in providing that the men should never know, until they were summoned to the Dikasterion, in what cause they were to be employed. All these safeguards were furnished abundantly by the reforms of Perikles and Ephialtes. The pay, we may assume, was regarded as an adequate recompense for the time of ordinary citizens; and among 5000 men, not one of whom could be counted upon to judge in any particular case, the briber would toil to little purpose. But a still greater benefit was secured in lessening the chances of escape for powerful criminals. It was practically as impossible to intimidate as to bribe these vast numbers of jurymen whose votes were given in secret; but the swaggering violence of men like Alkibiades and Kritias even under the fully developed democracy of Athens may well teach us how slight a chance by comparison a solitary magistrate, or even a small board of magistrates, would have of coping with offenders of this class. On the other hand the very numbers of the jurymen inspired them with self-respect. The decision of each jury court was the decision of the Heliaia, that is, of the whole people; and to impart to their verdicts a greater solemnity in serious and important cases, their numbers were sometimes doubled or trebled.

The comparison of these Athenian jury courts and jury trials with the character and history of jury trial in England is a subject on which I must confine myself to a few words. It is easy to speak of either in inflated or exaggerated language; and we can only do ourselves a mischief if we shut our eyes either to their merits or to their defects. The average Englishman is perhaps as liable to be carried away by prejudice as an average Athenian; and perhaps the prejudice or prepossession of a jury consisting of 500 or 5000 men is likely to be stronger than the prejudices of a jury of 12 men. But if we look to independence of personal judgement, there can be little doubt that the Athenian Dikast had the advantage of the English jurymen. The latter is taught systematically that his business is not with the law but only with the facts, and he is so accustomed to take the interpretation of the judge as to the line at which the law ends and the facts begin, that his decision, influenced as it can scarcely fail to be by the judicial summary of evidence which precedes their verdict, might without any gross in-



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justice be regarded as coming as much from the judge as from himself. The Athenian jurymen were the citizen of a state which had few laws in comparison with the unwieldy codes of modern nations; and these laws were expressed in that clear and simple language which, to use Butler's phrase, *Sermons*, iv., may be taken as evidence that the speaker or writer has the rare virtue of being able to govern his tongue. Lastly, we have seen with what persistent care the Athenians guarded against contradictions between any of the laws included in their statutes. The Athenian jurymen were, therefore, in the strict sense of the word, judges, and were thus far more likely to take a wider and more dispassionate view of a case, and so to administer substantial justice, than a jury of average Englishmen. On the other hand, the procedure of the Athenians lay open to some serious objections. A large number of men is more likely to be run away with by sentiment than a small body: and Athenian practice brought the speeches of orators into the foreground and thrust the evidence into the background. Speaking roughly, we might say that the Athenian jurymen knew no more of the evidence than that which the accuser or the accused chose to put before them,—in other words, that they judged not unfrequently from evidence warped to serve a purpose. But if there was sometimes risk of miscarriage of justice, still, as instruments of popular education, these jury-courts were of inestimable value. Here the Athenian citizen was brought into a school where his task was to reach a decision based, not upon bewildering technicalities like those of Roman and perhaps some other systems of law, but on principles clear and intelligible to the average honest man. It was a school which exercised his highest powers, and in which the lack of education might be the cause of disastrous failure. For, here, the accuser and the accused were compelled to plead in person. No hired professional orator could appear to conduct their cause; and hence, as any man might at any time be called on to accuse another or to defend himself, a training which would fit him to go through this ordeal became a matter of paramount necessity. Of course, this practice had its drawbacks not less than our own; and if the professional orator could not plead for another in the court, he might write his speech for him out of it, or fill his head with a series of common-places, by aid of which he might under any circumstances seek to make the worse appear the better cause. Thus grew up a class of men who, travelling from city to city, found in the training of citizens for public debates or judicial pleadings a popular and profitable vocation. But if these Rhetores and Sophistai, or rhetoricians and sophists (for the two names might be applied to the same person in different aspects of his work), obtained much wealth, they became objects of some dislike and of more suspicion. In the age of Herodotus the name Sophist was applied as a term of the highest praise to the Athenian Solon, *Herod.* i.

29. A few years later Sokrates, himself called a Sophist by Æschines, condemns severely the dishonest and mercenary spirit by which the Sophists of his time were actuated: and it is perhaps possible that the prohibition of the Thirty Tyrants against the teaching of the art of words, λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν, Xen. Mem. i. 2, 31, may have been called forth not by the Sokratic conversation to which it is ascribed by Xenophon, but by a desire to put down a body of men for whom only a democracy likè that of Athens could find abundant and profitable business.

In these remarks I have touched only on those portions of the subject, a knowledge of which is essential to a right comprehension of the problems with which they had to deal and to some of which we have not yet found a completely satisfactory answer. It is scarcely necessary for me to add that the reader who may wish to go further into these questions will find all that he can need in the pages of Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. chap. xlvi.

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APPENDIX I. (Page 88.)

THE PRIVATE CHARACTER OF PERIKLES.

THERE WAS NO lack of personal anecdotes connected with this decree; and, as we may suppose, these stories assigned different causes for the exclusion. According to one account, Paus. i. 36, 3, the Megarians killed a herald, named Anthemokritos, who had been sent to them from Athens: and this tale is repeated in the letter of Philip to the Athenians, Demosthenes, p. 159 R. That this belief existed in the days of Demosthenes, cannot be doubted. Yet if the fact had been proved in the time of Perikles, it must have been urged in reply to the complaints grounded on the decree of exclusion, and indeed we may feel sure that neither Megarians nor Spartans would soon have heard the last of it. But it is not noticed by Thucydides who does not even mention Anthemokritos. Hence it would follow either that Perikles and the Athenians generally disbelieved the tale (and it is incredible that they should do this without sifting it first and refuting it), or that Thucydides deliberately suppressed a fact which he knew to be the real cause of the decree in order to substitute a false reason. It is perhaps well that this accusation can be brought against him on a ground which does not touch the source of a fouler slander. There are, it seems, some who take a pleasure in tracing great political movements to the workings of mere lust. During ten long years Achaians and Ilians fought for Helen: during nearly thirty years Spartans and Athenians filled the land with bloodshed and misery for the sake of Aspasia and of women immeasurably worse than Aspasia. Such is the charge brought against Perikles

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by the great master of Athenian comedy; and it is certainly urged with sufficient plainness of speech. Some Athenians, it was alleged, stole from Megara an Hetaira named Simaitha; and by way of retaliation the Megarians stole from Athens two of the women on whose infamous gains Aspasia grew wealthy.<sup>2130</sup> These reprisals touched Perikles to the quick; and in his Olympian rage he flashed his lightnings and hurled his thunderbolts in the shape of decrees excommunicating the Megarians by bell, book, and candle. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 523-530. This story is repeated by Plutarch who may have gleaned it from this passage of Aristophanes. It is difficult, and happily in this instance unnecessary, to refute statements made chiefly to amuse an audience. It is possible that the private life of Perikles may have been worse than even the comic poet has painted it; but he had obviously no means of shaping the course of public affairs except through the decisions of the general assembly of the citizens, and large masses of men not held down by a feudal or despotic system are influenced only by reasons which may seem to them to justify prompt and vigorous action. It is ludicrous to suppose that, if the reasons assigned by Aristophanes had been the true and the only causes of the decree, the Athenians would have bestowed two thoughts upon the matter: but we know that the decree was both passed and acted on, and therefore we must search for the cause elsewhere. Yet the silence of Thucydides on these scandals of the time has been urged against that great historian as implying a defective view of the duties imposed on a man who undertakes to relate facts, and with it a systematic purpose of keeping out of sight a set of causes of a certain kind which yet he knew to be most powerful, if not paramount. His method in this respect is contrasted with that of Herodotos who is supposed to ascribe the design of the invasion of Hellas to the desire of Atossa for Dorian and Ionian slaves. See vol. i. page 371. Hence the historian who is said to trace the movements of nations to personal and private motives is placed above the writer who seems to think that the world's history turns on somewhat larger hinges. In short, all great wars spring from trifles, these trifles being the lust of men for unprincipled women; and as Thucydides had a supreme contempt for such trifles, he has therefore written 'a great defective history.' Mahaffy, *Prolegomena to Ancient History*, i. 15. The inference is that the true causes of the Persian wars are to be found in those personal anecdotes with which the narrative of Herodotos is so lavishly embellished. The examination of that narrative has shown that any such idea is wholly without foundation. We

<sup>2130</sup> This interpretation assumes that the word *ἀσπασίας* in this passage of Aristophanes; *Acharn.* 523-530, is the genitive case of the proper name Aspasia. It may also be the accusative plural of the adjective denoting the charms of these Hetairai. Probably the poet intended the word to be taken in both ways. We have no better testimony than that of the comic poet that Aspasia at any time made her gains by letting out Hetairai; she certainly cannot have done so when she was living with Perikles, as she was at the time when the decree of exclusion against the Megarians was passed at Athens.

have seen that of these anecdotes some are absurd, some superfluous, some impossible, while others absolutely exclude each other or contradict grave historical statements which no critic or historian has ever thought of calling into question. Of these grave statements one of the most important relates to the incessant importunities of the Peisistratidai at the court of Sousa for an immediate invasion of Hellas by the Persian king, Herod. v. 96, see vol. i. page 452. Yet when Dareios receives the tidings that the temple of Kybebe at Sardeis has been burnt by Athenians and Ionians, he asks who the Athenians may be, and then enjoins his slaves to bid him every day before dinner to remember these offenders against the majesty of his name. It would be scarcely more absurd to represent Louis XIV. as asking who the English might be, years after James II. had taken up his abode at St. Germain's. We cannot, therefore, reject the fact that the Peisistratidai were present at Sousa with a definite political purpose; and therefore we reject unhesitatingly the story of the theatrical indignation of Dareios on hearing of the burning of Sardeis. There is probably not a single personal anecdote in Herodotos on which greater reliance can be placed. There is none for which we have more clearly his own personal authority than the story of the feast of Attaginos: yet we have the most cogent reasons for thinking that Thersandros spoke to the historian under a mistaken impression. See vol. i. page 571. Herodotos therefore cannot in this respect be brought forward to the disadvantage of Thucydides.

But the description which Aristophanes gave of Perikles differs widely from that of the historians who have dealt with the history of this time. See notes 1323, 1475, 1503, 1989. These pictures represent him as concealing under his cold and reserved manner the dispositions of a selfish sensualist, led away by any who would pander to his vices. 'The Peloponnesian war,' says Mr. Mahaffy, *Proleg. Anc. Hist.* 12, 'had its deep causes in the jealousy of race and the collision of larger interests according to both these authors and Thucydides' [*i.e.* according to the comic poets and to the historian], 'yet they' [the comic poets and other writers of the day] 'asserted the flame to have been kindled, not by the Korkyraean dispute, but by a much smaller and meaner one, nearer home, and affecting the interests, not of nations, but of one individual, Aspasia. They persisted in asserting that the great man was led against his better reason by the charms of this able and fascinating woman. They regarded her as a power in the state. When Perikles defended her, he was moved, as he was moved but once again in his life. When she allied herself to a low fellow after his death, she at once made him one of the leaders in the state.'

Now, whatever may have been the motives by which Perikles was guided, his whole policy, as it has been described to us, is clear, definite, and unswerving. He started with certain ideas: and he worked

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these out steadily and consistently to the end. There is not the faintest shadow of ground for thinking that he was led against his better reason by Aspasia or by anyone else : and to assert that the mind of Aspasia was so exalted as to suggest to Perikles this deep and comprehensive policy would not suit Mr. Mahaffy's purpose. The agitation of Perikles in defending Aspasia was remarkable only because it was Perikles who was agitated. The Athenian Dikastai were habituated to such scenes, and counted upon seeing them. The marriage or union of Aspasia with Lysikles seems to rest on the slender authority of Aristophanes, who represents the man as a kind of Kleon ; but if Aspasia made him one of the leaders of the state, then it must be admitted that he was a leader who fulfilled his duty by doing nothing. But seriously it may be asked whether we are to look to the comic poets of any age for true estimates of the public or private life of the men whom they may hold up to ridicule for the amusement of their hearers. Sokrates may have been a very poor philosopher, and may have followed a mistaken method : but he was not the absent-minded stargazer which Aristophanes asserts him to have been. Note 1475. We know that this description of him is the very reverse of the truth ; nor from a comic poet can we well expect much more. Not many delusions respecting the value of alleged historical evidence have been more mischievous than the notion that the statements of comic poets are to be taken seriously, as representing the real facts of the time, unless we have actual testimony to outweigh them. It would be far safer to lay down the reverse of this rule and to say that they may in all cases be rejected except where we have positive collateral testimony in their favour. Without the slightest authority the comic poets of Athens have been exalted into conscientious teachers of disinterested morality who in the midst of a hard and unbelieving generation were compelled to adopt the only means by which they could hope to win the public ear. Thus the idea has been formed that when Aristophanes says anything about Perikles, Sokrates, or any other prominent citizen, he is *prima facie*, and failing distinct proof to the contrary, to be believed. Rather we may say that, apart from the clearest corroborative testimony, he is not to be believed. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 454, has rightly insisted that the comic poets were never ' regarded at Athens in the light in which they are presented to us by modern criticism.' The judgement passed by Aristophanes on Sokrates is treated with contemptuous silence by Cicero, who, *Tusc. Quæst.* v. 4, describes the system of the great philosopher in terms diametrically contradicting the libels of the Athenian comic stage. If the Aristophanic picture of Sokrates is to be put aside as worth little or nothing, we cannot attach more worth to what Aristophanes says of Perikles. In fact, these things are the mere work of scandal-mongers ; and if history is to be drawn up from

and after their reports, the reputation of no man can be safe. But there must have been, it may be said, some source for the slanders of Aristophanes. Mr. Grote finds this source in Xanthippos, the son of Perikles. 'It was from that worthless young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Perikles, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day obtained the pretended revelations which served them as matter for scandalous libel on the privacy of this distinguished man.' *Hist. Gr.* vi. 137. By giving credence to such slanders we may easily bring ourselves to believe that all men are filthy and all the purposes of life ridiculous; but we shall scarcely succeed in taking that broad and impartial view which shall assign to each set of causes its own proportionate value. It is unnecessary to paint Perikles as in any way better than he was; but we must take into account the political constitution under which Athenian citizens lived and the intellectual and moral training by which their lives and their judgements were moulded, before we can pronounce an opinion on the secondary motives by which they may have been influenced. If for any given act we have an adequate, much more if we have any constraining, cause, it is a mere waste of time to seek out and parade an inadequate one.

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APPENDIX K. (Pages 139, 171, 172, 379.)

THE INVESTING LINES OF THE SPARTANS AT PLATAIAI.

I HAVE given in the text the narrative of this escape as it has been related by Thucydides. This narrative seems to be full of difficulties, and these we are bound to look fairly in the face, even though the means may be lacking for determining the real course of events.

Plataiai was invested by a joint force of the Spartans and their allies. Thuc. ii. 71, 1. Unfortunately we are not told what the numbers of this army may have been; but it is said that for seventy days and nights consecutively, the whole force, working in relays, ii. 75, 3, was occupied in throwing up the mound by which they purposed to ascend the wall and so to storm the city. How large a portion of the circumference of the city wall this mound may have embraced, the historian does not say. Probably it may not have exceeded an eighth part.

Having tried in vain to attain their end in this way, Archidamos, it would seem, determined to withdraw the main part of his army, which would be needed at home to gather in the harvest; and the words of Thucydides, μέρος μὲν τι καταλιπόντες τοῦ στρατοπέδου περιετείχιζον τὴν πόλιν κύκλῳ, ii. 78, 1, clearly imply that the rest of the army had departed before those who were left behind even began the task of circumvallation which was now before them.

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This task was finished about the timé of the autumnal equinox ; and unless the circle was complete, it is obvious that the work would be practically useless. The Plataians would certainly have made their attempt in the direction in which they would be spared the trouble and risk of climbing the blockading wall.

How many of the Spartan and Theban troops were left to carry out this work, we cannot say positively. In Thucydides μέρος τι means always a considerable portion of any given whole ; but it probably denotes some part less than the half.

By less than half, then, of the force with which some two months and a half earlier Archidamos had invaded the Plataian territory and which had worked on the mound day and night during the whole of that time to very little purpose, a double investing wall was raised round the whole circle of the city, and raised in little more than two months.

The number of fighting men blockaded in the city was 480 : but of these 80 were Athenians. To get at the population of the city before the old men, the women, and the children, had been sent away, we should probably have to multiply these 400 by 10 ; and to the total of 4000 thus obtained we can scarcely add less than 1500 or 2000 slaves. The circuit of a city containing some 6000 inhabitants would certainly not be small : and that of Plataiai, so far as it can be ascertained by an examination of the ground, was probably not less than a mile and a half.<sup>2131</sup> The circumference of the investing wall would, of course, be indefinitely larger.

That such a wall could have been begun and finished in two or three months by less than half the army which had attacked Plataiai in the spring, seems of itself almost incredible, even if we suppose that the wall was built in the rudest way and with just strength enough to enable the besiegers to hold their ground against any sally from the city or any attack from without. But, far from contenting themselves with any such imperfect defence, they carry round the whole city two concentric walls inclosing a space sixteen feet in width. This open space was covered over, the roof furnishing a walk for the troops on guard. This upper way was defended by battlements, ἐπάλλξεις (erections of brick roofed with tiles), while at intervals of every ten battlements rose a tower, likewise roofed, spanning the whole wall, and leaving no passage except through a covered way or corridor in the centre of the tower.

That Spartans of all people should ever attempt to build such a wall is to the last degree unlikely ; that they should finish such a work in three months, seems altogether impossible.

<sup>2131</sup> Colonel Leake, *Travels in Upper Greece*, vol. ii. ch. xvi. speaks of the wall of the present city as two and a half miles in circumference, but he thinks that old Plataiai was perhaps confined to the southern part.

The space roofed in between the two investing walls was used as a place of abode by the blockaders, *τοῖς φύλαξιν*, iii. 21, 3. But what did Thucydides mean by the word *φύλακες* as used here? In ii. 78, 2, he distinctly says that none remained of the original invading force except the *φύλακες τοῦ τείχους*, half of whom were Spartans, half Thebans. If then, as it would seem, these *φύλακες* all had quarters assigned to them in the covered space between the walls, it would follow that no force was incamped outside the blockading wall.

But when the falling of the tile work from one of the battlements betrays the attempt of the Plataians, the army, we are told, rushed to the wall, *τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐπὶ τὸ τείχος ὤρμησεν*, iii. 22, 6. It is scarcely possible to suppose that this phrase merely means that the men who had been sleeping below went up to the open walk between the battlements on the wall. The words imply the incampment of the main besieging force at some spot without the investing wall,—a fact which seems altogether inconsistent with iii. 21, 3. Whether the 300, mentioned in iii. 22, 8, came from the camp, or issued from the covered space between the walls, we are not told.

In short, the more closely we examine the narrative, the less distinct does it appear. There can be no doubt that the city wall would have without it a trench or moat, which supplied the earth for the bricks of which the wall was built. That the besiegers raised their concentric walls with a trench or moat on either side, we are expressly told, the outer one, on the night of the Plataian adventure, being full of water, while the others, strangely enough, were, it would seem, dry. If this double moat increased the difficulty of the task undertaken by the Plataians, it also involved serious danger for the besiegers,—for, if, as Thucydides implies, these were all lodged within their walls, and if they were too few to maintain a post without this circle, it is obvious that they might be shut in by any attacking force from Athens, and would then be between two fires.

But if these three lines of concentric trenches were ever excavated, it must be possible to trace them still. This is, apparently, not the case; and it becomes therefore the more likely that the narrative of Thucydides is the result of a strange confusion between the city wall of Plataiai and blockading lines. The description of the defences raised by the besiegers is precisely that of the ordinary walls of Greek or mediæval German towns: and it is quite possible that the mistake of Thucydides was caused by wrong information. We have no reasons for supposing that he himself visited Plataiai, like those which make it almost certain that he was an eyewitness of the battle of Mantineia.

The growth of the story which Thucydides has followed is no matter for surprise. The successful conquest of the difficulties thrown in their way by the double-besieging wall would indefinitely enhance the glory



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of the little band which found its way to Athens; and it is no injustice to Thucydides, if we say that he did not much care to submit his information in this case to minute scrutiny. He has made the most of the Plataian episode, and it is clear that he would gladly avail himself of any incidents which would bring into stronger relief the awfulness of the tragedy.

It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that, whatever may have been the way in which the Plataians made their escape, the besiegers never built the concentric walls described by Thucydides in iii. 21.

But if his account is to be rejected, it is no necessary duty of the modern historian to say how the events took place. If the besiegers were really masters of such a double wall as is here described, then it would seem that in some way or other they had managed, whether before or after the departure of Archidamos, to get possession of the city wall,—the Plataians being cooped up within a narrower circle in the town, and protected only by their streets and houses. These would, therefore, be practically at the mercy of the enemy, if the latter chose to finish the work of destruction: but the Spartans, we are told, were especially anxious that the city should be surrendered voluntarily, to avoid the necessity of having to give it up in the event of a peace being made with Athens on anything like equal terms. They would thus be naturally unwilling to run the risk of useless loss to themselves by descending to attack the Plataians, while these would have as much difficulty in getting over that which had been their own wall, as if it had been built by the enemy.

For many of the remarks in this Appendix I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. F. A. Paley, by whom, as I gladly acknowledge, my attention was specially called to the subject.

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APPENDIX L. (Page 199).

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE AKARNANIANS AND THE AMBRAKIOTS.

SUCH were the terms of the convention made by the contending parties after the departure of Demosthenes to Athens. The statement of Thucydides, iii. 114, 4, that this convention was made in the territory of Oiniadai, has led some to suppose that the Ambrakiots who with the Peloponnesians had taken refuge with Salynthios had marched through the whole territory lying between the Ambrakian gulf and the mouth of the Achelôos, and that on reaching Oiniadai the Peloponnesians found themselves without ships for crossing the strait while the Ambrakiots were cut off from their own homes by the intervening lands of two hostile tribes. This fact is inferred from the words *οὔτερ καὶ*

μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίου, the last word being moreover a conjectural emendation for Σαλύνθιον: but in addition to this change it becomes necessary to construe the aorist as a pluperfect, while the relative, dislocated from its antecedent, is made to do duty for the conjunction 'whither.' This is doing a violence to language far beyond the ordinary use even of Thucydides; but in truth the clause is wholly unnecessary, and there are more instances of glosses thus introduced than of the substitution of aorists for pluperfects. But there seems to be very little reason for supposing that the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots were at Oiniadai when the convention was made. The former might perhaps be protected in their retreat from the Agraian land by the terms of the convention between Menedaios and Demosthenes, although even this is doubtful, as the Akarnanians might very well insist that they applied only during the time necessary for reaching the first friendly territory: but even if these were thus protected, the Ambrakiots were especially exempted from the truce, and would be liable to attack from the enemies who had already killed 200 of them on the road from Ólpai. To escape this danger they would have to march in the centre of the force; and then comes the difficulty, if not the absurdity, of supposing that the Ambrakiots would leave the lands of a friendly tribe not more than 30 miles from their own home to march through a hostile country only in order to reach a point some 70 miles distant from Ambrakia, and to go through the superfluous ceremony of the return march. It was, further, more likely that the Akarnanians would allow the Ambrakiots to depart unmolested from the Agraian land than from Oiniadai where they could crush them at will, and where the Peloponnesians would be compelled to abandon them, unless they carried them over to Peloponnesos. For all these reasons I cannot help thinking that the convention was made while the fugitives were still with Salynthios, and that the words ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν apply only to the Peloponnesians. This would be an awkwardness of expression of which Thucydides is constantly guilty. Having stated that a convention was made guaranteeing a safe retreat to both, he added the words which show that for the Peloponnesians it included a safe conduct to the mouth of the Achelôos. I believe therefore that the Ambrakiots went northwards to their own home, while the Peloponnesians marched southwards. The very fact of the convention being made at all seems to prove that the truce agreed on with Demosthenes was held to be at an end when the Peloponnesians reached the Agraian territory. If it was meant to last until Menedaios and his followers were fairly at sea from whatever part of the coast they might set out, there was no need of any fresh convention at all. If again there was need of a fresh agreement, then we may be sure that the Peloponnesians would never have been allowed to march unmolested, after a crushing

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defeat, through the whole length of Akarnania, carrying with them, moreover, the remnant of the enemy against whom the Akarnanians were so embittered. Lastly, if new terms were needed, it is ludicrous to suppose that the Ambrakiots would have consented to march 30 or 40 miles further away from Ambrakia only to march back again. But for the Peloponnesians the permission to go to Oiniadai would be very necessary. Escape from the Ambrakian gulf would involve the risk of encountering Korkyraian ships, even if Peloponnesian vessels could make their way thither for the purpose of taking them off. At Oiniadai they would probably not be detained long before the arrival of ships to carry them home.

Whatever Thucydides may have meant to say, this passage is a marked instance of the trouble which a man gives when he will not take pains to express his meaning clearly.


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#### APPENDIX M. (Page 203.)


##### GEOGRAPHY OF PYLOS AND SPHAKTERIA.

THUCYDIDES, iv. 8, speaks only of one harbour and one island; and he especially notes, iv. 13, that the Athenian fleet on returning to the aid of Demosthenes was compelled to retreat to Proté, an islet distant about five miles, because, being unable to enter the harbour in face of the Peloponnesian ships, they could find no nearer shelter.

According to Thucydides, the passage at the northern end of Sphakteria would be about 70 yards in width, the southern passage being 300 yards or perhaps more. If the word *μέγιστος* as applied to this island means its length, it should be not two miles long; if it denotes its circumference, its length would be greatly diminished. Now the breakwater of the present harbour of Navafino is formed by the island of Sphagia which is nearly three miles in length. The northern channel, instead of being about 70 yards in width, is 150 yards wide: the southern entrance, which to admit eight or nine triremes abreast needed at the utmost to be little more than 300 yards wide, is 1300. But across the northern passage between Sphagia and the mainland lies a bar with only eighteen inches of water upon it; and its depth must have been much greater in the time of Demosthenes to allow a trireme to pass over it. Thucydides, further, speaks, iv. 8, 7, of the intention of the Spartans to close both the channels by lashing together the broadsides of triremes with their heads facing the sea. This could be done easily in a channel 70 yards wide, and without much difficulty in one of which the width is 150 yards; but it could scarcely be attempted when the width extends to 1300 yards.



Plan of the  
**HARBOUR OF NAVARINÓ**  
 to illustrate the operations of Demosthenes  
 at Pylos





Here, then, we have a number of measurements in which the description of Thucydides cannot be reconciled with the harbour of Navarino and the island now called Sphagia. This harbour may be spoken of; roughly, as being four miles in length and breadth,—a size seemingly quite out of proportion with the phrase of the historian who simply says that it was ‘not small.’ On this point not much stress can be laid on the language of a writer who is in the habit of expressing positive ideas by negative phrases, and who can speak of events as recent which took place at least 50 years ago; see note 786.

But Demosthenes chose Pylos specially as a harbour; and the main entrance into the harbour of Navarino is often dangerous with a south or southwest wind, while the northern channel is exposed to a continual surf. Hence Dr. Arnold asks whether Demosthenes could have considered this a harbour, or have been tempted to establish himself within it; but it is possible that with a deeper northern channel the surf would be neither so continuous nor so formidable.

If then the harbour of Pylos was the present bay of Navarino, it must have undergone vast changes during the last four-and-twenty centuries. Some of these changes need not surprise us. An accumulation of sand might easily have reduced the water in the northern channel to the depth of a few inches, while the depth of the southern channel might be greatly increased. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to account for the changed dimensions both of the island and the bay. According to Thucydides the whole distance between the promontory of Koryphasion and the mainland to the southeast would not exceed two miles: the distance between Paleokastro and the land opposite to the southern end of Sphagia is not less than four miles. It is, of course, possible, or even likely, that Thucydides who probably never saw the place may not have been accurately informed: and Dr. Arnold notes that modern writers have been not less inaccurate than Thucydides, the width of the entrance to the harbour of Navarino being given in James's *Naval History* as 600 yards, whereas it is at least 1200. But we cannot assume without adequate reason that the basin of Navarino in the time of Demosthenes was ‘not so large as now we find it,’ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vi. 437. The depth of water through the whole bay is too great to account for any such enlargement as would bring the description of Thucydides into agreement with the existing geography of Sphagia and Navarino. All that can be said is that in the relative position of the several objects mentioned his account is fairly in harmony with that geography. But this may be said of Paleokastro and the lake which lies to the east of it. Here we have a promontory the circumference of which agrees tolerably with the size (*μέγεθος*) which he assigns to Sphakteria. At the southern end of this promontory a narrow channel connects this lake or fishery of Osmyn Aga with the

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bay of Navarino; and if ever there was a northern channel, this has been entirely closed by ridges of sand. But it is at the least possible that such a channel may have existed, and that it may have been wide enough to admit two triremes abreast, while the narrowing of the southern channel is precisely what we should expect, if the opinion be correct that the lake of Osmyn Aga, instead of being of recent formation, as Colonel Leake supposed, is gradually filling up. Thucydides moreover describes Sphakteria as sloping towards the west, while it was precipitous towards the north and east. The same may be said of Paleokastro; and a more minute scrutiny would be needed before it could be asserted of this promontory that it cannot have had in its centre the spring of water on which the Spartans depended in Sphakteria.

But if in the time of Thucydides Paleokastro was an island, it follows that the present geography of Sphagia and Navarino was repeated precisely in that of Pylos and Sphakteria. There were thus two islands and two harbours, of which the northern island and the northern harbour were alone occupied by the Spartans. On this hypothesis it seems impossible to explain why Thucydides speaks only of one island and one harbour, and why he sends the Athenian fleet to Protê as the nearest place of shelter, when they could at once sail through the northern channel of the southern harbour at less than one-fourth of the distance. A death-blow seems to be thus dealt to the theory which regards Paleokastro as the Sphakteria of Thucydides.

On the other hand Strabo says that the island in which the Spartan hoplites were taken by Demosthenes and Kleon was called Sphagia or Sphakteria indifferently: but Pliny speaks of three islands named Sphagia as lying in front of Pylos. We may evade this difficulty by holding either that two of these three were mere rocks, or that Pliny is here making a mistake.

On the whole, the balance of likelihood seems to incline towards the identification of the bay of Pylos with that of Navarino; but if this conclusion should be accepted, we must regard the measurements given by Thucydides as not merely inaccurate but glaringly wrong. The intention of the Spartans to close up the southern channel by lashing triremes together is the most perplexing of all the facts connected with this narrative. The average depth of this passage is at least 25 fathoms. What amount of change in the physical features of the surrounding country would be effected by the reduction of the water to a depth which would leave a channel wide enough only for eight or nine triremes to enter abreast? and what grounds are there for supposing that the depth of water then was much what it is now, but that the difference in the width of the channels has been caused by the abrasion of the land? If the width and depth of the channel were at all

what they are now, then Thucydides was either misinformed or wholly mistaken as to the intention of the Spartans to block it up with triremes lashed together.

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APPENDIX N. (Page 358.)

EVIDENCE OF DIOKLEIDES AND ANDOKIDES.

THUCYDIDES dismisses the whole affair of the Hermokopid plot with the emphatic assertion that neither at the time nor at any subsequent period was anything known with certainty about it, vi. 60, 2. He does not condescend to notice the story of Diokleides or the fate of that informer. He does not (whatever be his motive) even name Andokides, whose confession led to the execution of Diokleides. The stories of these two informers are examined minutely by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Part II. ch. lviii.; but there is no great interest and except from a judicial point of view no great profit in bringing home particular falsehoods to so-called witnesses who are all proved to be liars. There can be no doubt that Andokides is the witness to whom Thucydides ascribes the final revelations, such as they were, about the Hermokopid plot, vi. 60: but all that the historian says of him is that one of his fellow-prisoners, believing that he had good grounds for thinking him guilty, begged him to quiet the people by giving his own version of the affair, whether true or false, pointing out to him at the same time that it was better to secure immunity by confessing guilt even if he were innocent than to be put to death for denying his complicity in the plot, though his denial be ever so true. Thucydides adds that this prisoner (Andokides) charged himself with the crime and named as his accomplices a certain number of the prisoners against whom Diokleides had given information, and that the men thus accused by him were put to death while he and those whom he had not accused were set at liberty. In his oration on the Mysteries, delivered some 14 or 15 years later, Andokides told a story which denied his own guilt. As both the stories cannot be true, we may very safely regard both as false. The tale of Diokleides is on the face of it incredible. A powerful band of conspirators is not likely to bribe into silence a man who has become possessed of their secret. Still less, failing to give him the money which they had promised, are they likely to let him go and inform against them. In one point only is the story of Diokleides borne out by Andokides. The former in drawing his picture of the midnight company issuing out into the streets for the purpose of defacing the Hermai said that he could plainly see their faces and distinguish their features by the light of the full moon. Plutarch, *Alk.* 20, and Diodoros, xiii. 2,



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both assert that the informer thus stands self-convicted, as at the time in question it was new moon. Now, however little faith is to be put in the testimony of Andokides, we may give him credit for doing his best to upset that of Diokleides: and Andokides nowhere contradicts him as to the state of the moon. But this proves nothing for the general correctness of the narrative of either of these men.

Mr. Grote seems to accept as historical the narrative of Andokides, *de Myst.* 41—46, that the Athenians were led to attach vast importance to the revelations of Diokleides from the appearance of a Boiotian force on the borders of Attica; that all the citizens were put under arms; that the senate remained all night in the Akropolis, while the Prytaneis occupied the building called the Tholos. This looks very much like an exaggeration of the incidents which Thucydides, vi. 61, 2, ascribes to a time immediately following the confession of Andokides; and as Thucydides nowhere hints at two alarms of the same kind, we are scarcely justified in believing that there was more than one on the authority of a man so worthless as the orator, who, if not formally banished, was constrained from the infamy attaching to his conduct to leave Athens and to remain in exile for many years.

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#### APPENDIX O. (Page 370.)

##### ATHENIAN IDEAS OF CONQUEST.

THAT Alkibiades felt or expressed an absolute assurance of the success of the expedition to Sicily is beyond question. But if the speech which Thucydides puts into his mouth, vi. 16—18, is to be taken as representing his utterances before the assembly, the scheme of aggression which he proposed is certainly not boundless. It involves, in fact, very little more than the purpose of Athenian policy as set forth by Euphemos in his speech at Kamarina, page 365 *et seq.* Thucydides, it is true, speaks, vi. 15, 2, of the hope which Alkibiades entertained that the Athenians might through him become masters of Carthage as well as of Sicily; but from the pages of the historian we have no evidence that he expressed any such hope at Athens, or, at least, in the Assembly. The enterprise, if regarded as directed against Sicily alone, was vast enough to justify all that Aristophanes may be supposed to say about it in his comedy of the Birds. The Carthaginians, more especially in the description of the comic poet, represented by the Libyan cranes, seem to work on the side of Athens rather than against her. *Birds*, 1136. There remains only the statement of Plutarch, *Alk.* 17, that Alkibiades, parading his distempered dreams of African conquest, described Sicily as a land which would supply inexhaustible

resources for carrying on the war. But the report of his speech by Thucydides lends no countenance to this assertion; and the heated talk of Alkibiades and his fraternity in private cannot be taken as a measure of the general opinion of Athenian statesmen or of Athenian citizens. The picture which Plutarch draws, *Nik.* xii., must, it would seem, in the lack of any distinct corroboration from Thucydides, be referred to these private conversations, about which Thucydides may have heard much in his exile from Alkibiades himself, or from his companions. The Athenians meditated great things, but so far as our evidence carries us, they did not meditate the conquest of the great Phœnician power in Africa.

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## APPENDIX P. (Page 400.)

## VOYAGE OF THE PELOPONNESIAN HOPLITES TO LIBYA AND SICILY.

NIEBUHR, *Lect. on Anc. Hist.* ii. 130, speaks of these hoplites as sailing from Peloponnesos to the African shore, because the nature of the ancient galleys required them to sail along the coast, and because, if they had sailed along the coasts of Epeiros and Italy, they would have fallen into the hands of the Korkyraian and Athenian ships near Nau-paktos and Korkyra. But in the first place the history of this year shows that the Peloponnesians were not deterred from venturing across the Ionian sea from fear of the Athenian fleets, see pages 382, 388, &c.; and in the next place if the ancient galley could not go far from shore, the way from Peloponnesos to Sicily, taking Kyrênê on their voyage, would have been the last which they would think of adopting. From cape Tainaron, whence these troops set out, the nearest point of the African coast is not less than 300 miles distant, and from Krete not less than 200 miles; and Spartans now were not likely to regard so long a passage across the open sea with much less terror than the Theraians are said to have regarded it before the foundation of Kyrênê. See p. 163. But the narrative of Thucydides is plain enough. He tells us, vii. 19, 3, that, while a Spartan army was busy in fortifying Dekeleia, a force of 1,200 hoplites, half Helot, half consisting of Neodamodes, was dispatched from Tainaron under the command of Ekkritos together with 300 Boiotians under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon and the Thespians Hegesandros. These were soon followed by 500 Corinthian hoplites with 200 from Sikyon; the total force sent amounting thus to 2,200 men. But in this chapter Thucydides merely says that they struck across the open sea, ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἀφῆκαν, without stating when they reached Sicily. The Boiotians, we know, were there before the great attack of Demosthenes on the cross wall of the Syracusans, for it was owing to them that the success of the Athenians was turned into a

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disastrous defeat. Speaking of the Spartan hoplites now brought in by Gylippos, he says that they had been dispatched early in the spring from Tainaron; that they had been carried away to Libya, ἀπενεχθέντων ἐς Λιβύην, vii. 50, 1; that they received two triremes from the Kyrenaïans together with pilots; that they helped the Euesperitai, Herod. iv. 171, to beat their Libyan enemies; and that from the Carthaginian mart of Neapolis they again struck across the Mediterranean and succeeded in reaching Selinous. It is clear that the merchant ships were parted in a storm; that the vessels bearing the Boiotians managed to keep their course, while the Lakonian hoplites were driven southwards; and that it was no part of their plan to cross over to Africa in order to avoid Athenian cruisers between the coasts of Peloponnesos and Sicily, although the risk seemed sufficiently great to justify their steering straight from Lakonia for Sicily, that is, due west.

# ADDENDA.

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213, note 423.

The Provost of Eton, Dr. Goodford, to whose kindness I am indebted for much excellent criticism, and for many valuable remarks and corrections, of which I have gratefully availed myself, suggests that the personal history of Thucydides may supply a link explaining the passage in Herodotos i. 65, the interpretation of which by Mr. Grote he finds himself unable to accept. The Thracian property of Thucydides brought him into disgrace and trouble; and his connexion with the family of Peisistratos, note 419, is more than a surmise. If this connexion may be regarded as fact, the statement of Herodotos becomes plain enough.

364, note 708.

It is possible, and even likely, that the real motive of Oroites, as with many another satrap, was the desire to make himself an independent sovereign.

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28, note 1123.

I should add that in this instance I am not only unable to take Mr. Grote's view, but that I question his statement of the facts. In his belief, Themistokles employed the money of the Euboians 'adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiades, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs.' Hist. Gr. v. 134. These words certainly imply that the Hellenic leaders generally were bribed. It is true that Plutarch, speaking of this money, says that Themistokles, having received it, *τοῖς περὶ τὸν Εὐρυβιάδην ἔδωκε*. *Them.* vii. But he distinctly states that his authority for this alleged fact is Herodotos, and Herodotos asserts not less distinctly that the gifts were confined to Eurybiades and Adeimantos.

But whatever may have been the extent to which the Hellenic chiefs were corrupted, the term 'corruption' is here quite misapplied to Themistokles, while the words of Hallam in his remarks on Algernon Sidney's case are precisely to the point. 'There is, I presume,' he says, 'some moral distinction between the acceptance of a bribe to desert or betray our principles, and that of a trifling present for acting in conformity with them.' *Const. Hist. Engl.* ch. xii. vol. ii. p. 408. The amount of money bestowed on Themistokles may not have been trifling: but the moral distinction turns on the temper of the recipient.

30, line 28.

No qualification of this statement seems to be called for by the words of Thucydides, i. 135, *ὡς εὕρισκον ἐκ τῶν περὶ Πανσαντίου ἐλέγχων*. This phrase points, I think, in this case not to documentary but to oral evidence. In short, it refers to that which was considered at Sparta

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- the most satisfactory and conclusive evidence: but we know from the narrative of the trial, p. 13 *et seq.*, that the evidence most highly valued there was oral, not documentary.
- 65, note 1193. On this subject Dr. Wordsworth, *Athens and Attica*, ch. xv., differs from M. Beulé.
- 83, line 17. I should have added, as Dr. Goodford has pointed out, that the Athenian ships, although not disabled, had still suffered some damage, if the words of Thucydides, i. 52, 2, are meant to apply to them as well as to the Korkyraian fleet. There is no doubt that 'the sound (*ἀκραυβείς*) ships from Athens' are here contrasted with the Korkyraian as well as the Corinthian vessels; but whether the contrast was meant to be extended further to the Athenian ships which had taken part in the previous fight, seems not so certain.
- 94, side-note, 'Second congress of the allies at Sparta.' In strictness of speech this was perhaps the first congress. Although Thucydides in i. 67 and 119 uses the same expression with reference to both the meetings, *παρακαλίσαντες* or *προσπαρακαλίσαντες τοὺς ξυμμάχους*, the first meeting was so far informal that Athenian envoys who happened to be present at Sparta were allowed to be present at it and to speak. The order of events is sufficiently clear. At the first or less formal meeting the question to be discussed was whether the Athenians had or had not broken the thirty years' truce. In their private meeting which followed this debate the Spartans decided that there had been a breach of the truce: and having thus decided, they summoned a formal synod of their allies for the purpose of ascertaining whether this breach of the truce was to be regarded as justifying an immediate appeal to arms.
- 146, note 1346. Dr. Goodford thinks that the reading of *αὐτῶν* for *ἐαυτῶν* fails to remove the difficulty, as the ordinary Greek usage would require *ἐκείνων*. The fault, it is to be feared, lies rather with Thucydides than with the transcribers of his history.
- 148, line 6. I have, I fear, not much warrant for qualifying this sentence. The Spartan leaders may have chosen to say that the wind was too strong; but Thucydides states positively that if they had chosen to carry out their plan, there was nothing in the weather to hinder them, *οὐκ ἂν ἄνεμος ἐκόλυσε*, ii. 94, 2. Unfortunately truthfulness was not among the virtues of Brasidas, or indeed of Spartans generally.
- 158, note 1372. Thucydides in this passage is speaking distinctly of a war tax levied on the property of all the citizens according to the Kleisthenean classification, and not of the Liturgies or Public Services which the wealthier citizens were called upon to perform. Whether he meant to say that this was the first levying of a property tax in Athens, or only that it was the first instance in which so large an amount as 200 talents was levied, it is not easy to determine. Coming from a more perspicuous writer, the words would certainly be held to affirm the former of these two propositions; and thus his statement would be inconsistent with earlier notices which occur of the

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- Eisphora. It must be remembered that, so long as citizens served in war at their own cost, military service would, in strictness of speech, be only a kind of Liturgy, and that the need of assessing a war tax on property arose partly from the employment of mercenaries and partly from the greatly increased costliness of the protracted wars which far exceeded the resources of private citizens.
- 159, note 1374. In fact, the words of Thucydides leave no room for doubt. The people, he says, insisted that the governors should bring out the corn for public distribution, τὸν σίτον ἐκέλευον κ. τ. λ. iii. 27, 2. They may have been wrong, but they clearly believed that the corn was hidden away.
- 166, note 1383. It is perhaps, more likely from the phrase used that Kleon proposed the measure as well as carried it.
- 179, note 1407. Dr. Goodford insists, and I believe rightly, that the words of Thucydides cannot be limited to a single instance, as, if he had wished to convey this meaning, he must have said πατήρ τις τὸν παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε.
- 196, line 36. Thucydides remarks, iii. 107, 7, that the Mantineians were the only Peloponnesians who stood in a separate mass from their allies. In the rest of the force Peloponnesian and Ambrakiots were mixed up at haphazard, ἀναμιξτέταγμένοι. This confusion, it can scarcely be doubted, led to the catastrophe, for the troops under the command of Eurylochos himself are said to have been the flower of the whole army, ὁ περ κρᾶτιστον ἦν.
- 253, line 17. The name Lekythos was suggested by the shape of a bottle or flask with a narrow neck.
- 282, line 11. They referred further, we are told, Thuc. v. 30, to an earlier compact made with these allies at the time of the revolt of Potidaia.
- „ line 25. The Eleians had gone through the ceremony of assenting to the arbitration of Sparta: but thinking that they had no chance of being fairly treated, they gave the Spartans no time to pronounce a judgement before they took the law into their own hands.
- 292, line 21. It is true that Nikias, Thuc. v. 46, 4, requested them to renew the oaths, his wish being to avoid returning to Athens with the appearance of having done nothing, ἐφοβᾶτο μὴ πάντα ἀτελῆ ἔχων ἀπέλθῃ; but the very expression betrays his consciousness that the renewal of the oaths was a mere pretence to hoodwink the Athenians.
- 297, line 10. Thucydides, v. 56, 3, adds that these measures were taken by the advice of Alkibiades.
- 315, line 7. I have spoken of the Melian commissioners as among the victims of the massacre. It can scarcely be doubted, I think, that the Athenians would allow none of these to escape, whoever the Melians may have been who are said to have been brought back by Lysandros, note 1619.
- 332, line 9. The phrase of Thucydides, τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς, vi. 6, 3, probably implies nothing less than guilty collusion.
- 487, line 11. I have followed Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 73, in his interpretation of Thuc. viii. 86, 3, τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν. Dr. Goodford agrees with Dr. Arnold in his note on the passage: and it must, I think, be admitted that less violence is done to the words of Thucydides, if we take them as meaning ‘that all the

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- citizens should be of the Five Thousand in their turn.' In order to retain power, the oligarchs would naturally bid largely for the favour of those who might still hanker after the rule of the people. At first the ranks of the Five Thousand were to be opened only to the wealthiest citizens, viii. 65. From this restriction it seems a sudden and almost incredible leap to the concession not only that all citizens should be eligible to the larger assembly, but that they should all actually in turn have seats in it. Not a word is said about the details which would be needed to carry out the scheme; but perhaps they may have felt that no smaller promises would serve their turn. As they had no intention of fulfilling any of them, it would not matter to what or to how many pledges they stood committed in words.
- 491, line 26. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 86, speaks of these Peripoloi as forming the chief police of the country. They consisted of young men under the age of twenty; but, although they were chiefly used for garrison duty in Attica, they were sometimes sent beyond the border. Thucydides, iv. 67, 1. See Dr. Arnold's note on this passage.
- 563, note 2071. Dr. Goodford thinks that Sokrates was actually Epistatês, as he is twice named so by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*. He adds, 'I think it much more likely that his pen or his memory, or the pen or memory of his copyists slipped once in writing the numeral 9 for 6 than that he blundered twice in the word Epistatês. It is true that in his *Hellenics*, Xenophon speaks of Sokrates only as a Prytanis. But the Epistatês was always a Prytanis, and sometimes, as in *Thuc.* vi. 14, was spoken of and to simply as Prytanis.'
- 565, note 2077. It is, of course, possible, as Dr. Goodford suggests, that the majority in favour of the proposition of Euryptolemos may on the second putting of the question have been converted into a minority by the fact that in the interval the quiet folk who voted for it had gone home, leaving the ground open to the noisy and lawless partisans of Theramenes. But it is difficult to imagine how any could have been so selfish and heartless as thus to depart, so long as there was the bare possibility that their presence might help to vindicate order and law.

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? 559	209	<i>Athens</i> . . Death of Solon.
? 550	216	Miltiades, son of Kypselos, leaves Athens and establishes himself as tyrant of the Thracian Chersonesos.
?	217	Miltiades, son of Kimon, sent by Hippias as governor of the Thracian Chersonesos.
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?	327	<i>Babylon</i> . . Siege and capture of Babylon by Cyrus.
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? 525	345	<i>Egypt</i> . . Invasion of Kambyses.
	348	Failure of the Persian expedition to Amoun, and abandonment of the expedition against Carthage.
? 522	364	<i>Samos</i> . . Death of Polykrates tyrant of Samos. Despotism of Maiandrios and Syloson.
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		423	Banishment of Leotyichides, and death of Kleomenes.
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		409	<i>Athens</i> . . . Phrynichos punished for his drama of the <i>Taking of Miletos</i> .
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		176	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Gelon tyrant of Gela.
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489		441	<i>Paros</i> . . . Expedition of Miltiades to Paros. On its failure he is sentenced to a fine of fifty talents, but dies before it is paid.
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		452	<i>Persia</i> . . . Death of Dareios who is succeeded by Xerxes. Xerxes makes preparations for the invasion of Egypt.
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		456	<i>Persia</i> . . . The invasion of Hellas, suggested, it is said, by Mardonios and opposed by Artabanos, resolved upon by Xerxes who marches to Sardeis.
481		488	Dismissal of the Greek spies from the camp at Sardeis.
483		485	<i>Athens</i> . . . Ostracism of Aristеides.
481		483	Two hundred ships built by the advice of Themistokles.
			Panhellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth.
		493	Mission to Gelon tyrant of Syracuse.
481		178	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Ineroachments of Gelon on Carthaginian ground.
480		460	<i>Hellespont</i> . . . Construction of the bridges of boats for the passage of the army.
		467	<i>Thrace</i> . . . Review of the Persian army at Doriskos.
		477	March from Doriskos to the Nine Roads.
		478	Hellenic and other cities laid under forced contributions.
		480	<i>Thessaly</i> . . . Xerxes at Tempe.
		496	Abandonment of the pass of Tempe by the Greeks, and consequent Medism of the Thessalians.
		498	<i>Sparta</i> . . . June. Departure of Leonidas for Thermopylai.
		499	<i>Thermopylai</i> Numbers of the Greek army at Thermopylai.
		502	<i>Skiathos</i> . . . The Greek scout-ships surprised by some fast sailing vessels of the Persian fleet.
		503	<i>Magnesia</i> . . . Destruction of a large portion of the Persian fleet by a storm on the Magnesian coast.

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480	I.	504	<i>Artemision</i> . The Greek fleet takes up its station on the northern coast of Eubœia.
		505	<i>Thermopylai</i> March of Hydarnes over Anopiaia for the purpose of cutting off the Greek army.
		509	<i>Thermopylai</i> Victory of the Persians, and death of Leonidas.
		518	<i>Eubœia</i> . . A Persian squadron sent round Eubœia to take the Greek fleet in the rear.
		519	In the first action off Artemision the Greeks take 30 Persian ships.
		520	A second storm does further damage to the Persian fleet.
			In a second sea-fight the Greeks have the advantage, but resolve to retreat to Salamis.
		523	Fortification of the Corinthian isthmus.
		524	<i>Attica</i> . . Migration of the people to Troizen, Salamis, and Aigina.
		525	<i>Phokis</i> . . Devastation of Phokis by the Persians, who are defeated, it is said, at Delphoi.
		530	<i>Athens</i> . . Occupation of Athens by Xerxes.
		535	<i>Salamis</i> . . Themistokles, by sending a message to Xerxes or the Persian generals, prevents the intended retreat of the allies.
		541	Battle of SALAMIS.
		546	Xerxes determines to go home, leaving Mardonios to carry on the war.
		547	Departure of the Persian fleet.
		550	March of Xerxes through Thessaly and Thrace to the Hellespont.
		179	<i>Sicily</i> . . Invasion of Sicily by Hamilkar son of Hannon. Defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera.
		554	<i>Thrace</i> . . Siege and capture of Olynthos by Artabazos, who fails in his attempts on Potidaia.
		556	<i>Andros</i> . . Siege of Andros by Themistokles.
479		559	<i>Aigina</i> . . Gathering of the Greek fleet at Aigina under Xanthippos and Leotyehides.
		560	<i>Attica</i> . . Mardonios offers specially favourable terms to Athens.
		563	• On their rejection he occupies Athens, but abstains from doing any injury to the city or the country, until he learns, from the entrance of the Spartan army into Attica, that there was no hope of carrying out his plans successfully.
		567	<i>Boiotia</i> . . Burning of Athens, and retreat of Mardonios to Thebes.
		573	Advance of the allies into the territory of Plataiai.
		584	Battle of PLATAIAI. Defeat and death of Mardonios.
		585	Retreat of Artabazos.
		588	The Persian camp stormed.
		592	Siege of Thebes. The Theban prisoners put to death at the Corinthian isthmus.
		594	<i>Mykalê</i> . . Probably midsummer. The allied fleet sails first to Samos, then to Mykalê.
			<i>Mykale</i> . . Battle of MYKALÊ. Ruin of the Persian fleet.
		596	Foundation of the Athenian empire.
		597	<i>Sestos</i> . . Siege of Sestos. Crucifixion of Artayktes.
	II.	1	<i>Athens</i> . . Rebuilding of the city and fortification of Peiræus.
		3	Mission of Themistokles to Sparta.
		6	Building of the walls of Themistokles.
478		7	<i>Asia Minor</i> . Victories of Pausanias at Kypros (Cyprus) and Byzantion.

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478	II. 8	<i>Byzantion</i> . Pausanias sends to Xorxes the prisoners taken in the city.
	10	Pausanias recalled to Sparta and deprived of his command.
477	11	<i>Sparta</i> . . Banishment of Leotychides.
	<i>Asia Minor</i>	Dorkis and the Spartan commissioners withdraw from all interference in the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and leave the ground open for the formation of the Athenian confederacy.
	12.	<i>Asia Minor</i> . Assessment of tribute by Aristides on the members of the Delian confederacy.
	13	Treason and death of Pausanias (note 1104).
476	15	<i>Athens</i> . . . Development of the Kleisthenean constitution.
	<i>Eion</i> . . .	Capture of Eion by the Athenians and reconquest of Lemnos.
	182	Reduction of Skyros and Karystos.
? 472	182	<i>Sicily</i> . Expulsion of Thrasydaios, tyrant of Akragas (Agrigentum), who seeks refuge at Megara, and is there tried, condemned, and put to death.
471	17	<i>Athens</i> . . Ostracism of Themistokles.
? 468	33	Death of Aristides.
467	182	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Death of Hieron, son of Gelon. Expulsion of Thrasyboulos, brother of Hieron, and fall of the Gelonian dynasty.
466	39	<i>Naxos</i> . . Revolt and subjugation of Naxos.
465	41	<i>Thasos</i> . . Revolt of Thasos, which is conquered at the end of two years.
464	42	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Revolt of the Helots. Dismissal of the Athenian troops by the Spartans. Alliance between Athens and Argos.
461	43	Alliance of Megara with Athens. Building of the Long Walls of Megara.
? 460	136	<i>Athens</i> . . Visit of Parmenides.
?	137	Zenon, inventor of the Dialektik method.
	44	<i>Athens</i> . . The Athenians send a fleet and army to aid the Egyptians in their revolt against Artaxerxes. Embassy of Megabazos to Sparta.
	<i>Aigina</i> . .	Siege of Aigina by the Athenians.
	45	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Defeat of the Corinthians by Myronides.
	<i>Athens</i> . .	Building of the Long Walls of Athens.
457	46	<i>Boiotia</i> . . Defeat of the Athenians at TANAGRA. Victory of the Athenians at OINOPHYTA. Greatest extension of the Athenian empire.
?	60	<i>Athens</i> . . Banishment of Kimon.
? 456	51	Murder of Ephialtes.
455	<i>Peloponnesos</i>	The expelled Helots placed by the Athenians in Naupaktos.
	47	<i>Aigina</i> . . . Siege and conquest of Aigina by the Athenians.
	47	<i>Egypt</i> . . . Destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Memphis and in the fens.
453	321	<i>Sicily</i> . . . The Syracusans subdue Aithalia (Elba). Douketios establishes a confederacy of Sikel tribes at Palikê.
451	322	Defeat of Douketios, who takes refuge at Syracuse, and is sent to Corinth. Return of Douketios to Sicily.
	<i>Egypt</i> . .	Battle between the Syracusans and Akragantines.
450	49	<i>Egypt</i> . . Sixty Athenian triremes dispatched to the aid of Amyrtaios.
	50	<i>Kypros (Cyprus)</i> Final victories and death of Kimôn.
449	51	Alleged convention of Kallias.

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447	II.	19	<i>Magnesia</i> . . . Death of Themistokles.
		53	<i>Boiotia</i> . . . Defeat of the Athenians at KORONEIA under Tolmides: Evacuation of Boiotia.
446		54	<i>Euboia</i> . . . Revolt of Euboia from Athens. Megara follows the example of Euboia.
			<i>Sparta</i> . . . Banishment of Pleistoanax.
? 443		59	<i>Athens</i> . . . Reforms of Ephialtes, followed by his murder.
		64	Banishment of Thoukydides, son of Melesias. Building of the third wall, parallel to the western or Peiraic wall.
		65	Great public works at Athens.
?		66	Accusation and death of Pheidias.
		68	Extension of Athenian settlements to Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros, and Sinope.
443		68	<i>Thourioi</i> . . . Revival of Sybaris under the name Thourioi.
440			<i>Sicily</i> . . . Death of Douketios.
		69	<i>Samos</i> . . . Revolt of Samos, effected by the oligarchical party, is followed by the revolt of
		70	Byzantion.
		71	The Samians ask help from the Spartans who summon a congress of their allies, in which the Corinthians insist on the right of every independent state to the management of its own affairs.
437			<i>Amphipolis</i> . . . Founding of Amphipolis by Hagnon.
	323		<i>Sicily</i> . . . The Syracusans increase their army and navy, and impose a heavier tribute on the Sikeloï.
436		76	<i>Korkyra</i> . . . The Korkyraians refuse to help the demos of Epidamnos, who apply to the Corinthians. A Corinthian army admitted into Epidamnos.
		77	The Korkyraians express their readiness to submit to arbitration; the proposal is rejected by the Corinthians.
			Surrender of Epidamnos.
433		78	The Korkyraians seek to effect an alliance with the Athenians. A Corinthian embassy strives to prevent the arrangement: but the Athenians decide on a defensive alliance with Korkyra, and send a force of ten ships under Lakedaimonios, son of Kimon.
432		81	
		82	These ships take part in a sea fight in which the Corinthians defeat the Korkyraians. Hence the

## FIRST ALLEGED CAUSE OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

	84	On the arrival of a second Athenian squadron the Corinthians return home, taking with them 250 Korkyraian prisoners to be used hereafter as political instruments.
		<i>Potidaia</i> . . . Alliance of the Athenians with Philip and Derdas, brothers of Perdikkas, the Makedonian chief, who tries to stir up revolt in Potidaia against the Athenians.
		The Athenians dispatch Arcestratos with a fleet to Potidaia.
	85	Embassies from Potidaia to Athens, to ask permission to retain their walls, and to Sparta to beg for help against Athens. The Athenians refuse the permission, and the Spartans promise to invade Attica.
	108	<i>Akarnania</i> Alliance between the Athenians and the Akarnanians (note 1280).

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	86	<i>Chalkidikê</i> Revolt of the Chalkidians and Bottiaians from Athens. The Corinthian Aristous forces his way into Potidaia. Blockade of Pydna by the Athenians. In a battle near Olynthos the victorious Athenians lose their general Kallias. Blockade of Potidaia. Hence the

## SECOND ALLEGED CAUSE OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

	88	<i>Megara</i> . . The Athenians pass a decree excluding the Megarians from all Athenian ports.
	90	<i>Sparta</i> . . In an assembly of Peloponnesian allies the Corinthians insist on war with Athens. Counter-arguments of Athenian ambassadors who happen to be present in Sparta.
	91	In a secret debate the ephor Sthenelaidas puts aside the pacific arguments of Archidamos, and a majority in the assembly decides for war with Athens.
	94	Autumn. In a congress held at Sparta the question is put to the allies, and is answered in the affirmative by a large majority.
431	96	Efforts of the Spartans to bring about the banishment of Perikles.
	99	Final demands of the Peloponnesians as conditions for the maintenance of peace. These demands are rejected by the Athenians, who express their readiness to submit to arbitration.
	100	<i>Athens</i> . . Prosecutions of Anaxagoras, Pheidias, and Aspasia.
	104	<i>Plataiai</i> . . Surprise of Plataiai by a party of Thebans who are admitted into the city by Naukleides.
	105	The Thebans in their turn surprised by the Plataians, who, in breach of their promise to the Theban reinforcement, slay all their prisoners.
	106	The Plataian women and children removed to Athens.

## PELOPONNESIAN WAR. FIRST YEAR.

	111	<i>Attica</i> . . The Spartan herald Melesippos dismissed from Athens without an audience. The Peloponnesian forces, assembled at the Isthmus, are led on into Attica by Archidamos, and attack Oinoê.
	112	Ravaging of the demos of Acharnai.
	113	<i>Peloponnesos</i> The Athenians, aided by the Korkyraians, attack Methônê. Brasidas, the son of Tellis, throws himself into the city.
	114	<i>Aigina</i> . . The inhabitants of Aigina expelled by the Athenians are allowed by the Spartans to settle in the Thyreatis.
	115	<i>Megara</i> . . The Athenians ravage the Megarian territory. <i>Athens</i> . . A reserve fund of 1000 talents placed in the Akropolis.
	116	<i>Thrace</i> . . Sitalkes chief of the Odrysai becomes an ally of Athens, with which Perdikkas again makes peace.
	117	<i>Athens</i> . . Funeral oration of Perikles.

## PELOPONNESIAN WAR. SECOND YEAR.

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430	II. 122	<i>Athens</i> . . Second invasion of Athens.
	126	Outbreak of the plague at Athens. Unpopularity of Perikles consequent on the ravages of the disease. He is fined, but re-elected Strategos.
	126	<i>Potidaia</i> . . Terrible losses by the plague in the Athenian camp.
	136	Surrender of Potidaia to Xenophon.
	136	<i>Athens</i> . . The Spartan envoys, Nikolaos and Aneristos, who on their journey to the Persian court had been intercepted in Thrace by Sadokos, son of Sitalkes, are brought to Athens, and there put to death along with the Corinthian Aristeus.

## THIRD YEAR.

429		<i>Plataiai</i> . . The Spartan army under Archidamos with their Boiotian allies invades the territory of Plataiai. On the rejection of his proposals for neutrality Archidamos invests the place.
	139	<i>Chalkidikê</i> . . Defeat of the Athenians under Xenophon.
	140	<i>Akarnania</i> . . The Spartan Knemos, wishing to detach Akarnania from Athens, determines to attack Stratos in conjunction with a force of Chaonian, Molossian, and Thesprotian allies.
	141	Disorderly advance of the mountaineers against Stratos. Defeat of the clans, and retreat of Knemos.
	142	<i>Naupaktos</i> . . Phormion intercepts the Corinthian fleet, and wins a splendid victory.
	144	Brasidas, Timokrates, and Lykophron sent from Sparta to act as commissioners with Knemos.
		<i>Krete</i> . . Fruitless Athenian expedition to Krete.
	145	<i>Naupaktos</i> . . The Peloponnesian fleet contrives to entice Phormion into the Corinthian gulf; but the triumph of the Spartans is turned into a second victory for Phormion. •
	147	<i>Salamis</i> . . Brasidas and Knemos, being compelled to give up a proposed night attack on Peiræus, make a raid on Salamis and carry off the Athenian guardships.
	151	<i>Makedonia</i> . . Sitalkes, the Odrysian chief, advances through Mygdonia to Anthemous; but through the intrigues of Perdikkas with Sentes he is constrained to retreat.

## FOURTH YEAR.

428	152	<i>Leukas</i> . . Asopios, son of Phormion, defeated and slain at Nerikos.
		<i>Lesbos</i> . . Revolt of all Lesbos from Athens, with the exception of the town of Methymna.
	154	Kleippides, sent with forty ships to reduce the island, allows the Lesbians to send envoys to Athens.
	155	On the prayer of the Lesbian ambassadors who appear at the Olympic festival a fleet of forty ships under Alkidas is ordered to support the revolt.
	159	• The Lakedaimonian Salaithos contrives to enter Mytilênê and encourages the oligarchs to hold out.
	158	Death of Lysikles on a tribute-gathering expedition, in Karia.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. FIFTH YEAR.

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427	II. 159	<i>Attica</i> . . Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians under the Spartan Kleomenes, guardian of his nephew Pausanias the son of Pleistoanax.
		<i>Lesbos</i> . . The oligarchs incautiously arm the demos who insist on a distribution of corn, threatening in default to throw open the gates to the Athenians. The Mytilenaian oligarchs make a convention with Paches.
161		Alkidas arrives too late, and being resolved to return home, massacres his prisoners on the way at Myonnesos.
162		<i>Notion</i> . . Treacherous execution of Hippias by Paches.
		<i>Athens</i> . . The Mytilenaian prisoners, about 1000 in number, are sent to Athens along with Salaithos who is at once put to death.
163		In the debate which follows, Kleon proposes the summary execution of the whole Mytilenaian people. The sentence is passed, but is revoked on the next day chiefly through the strenuous exertions of Diodotos. The Mytilenaian prisoners at Athens are slain; but the trireme, sent to arrest the execution of the sentence against the people at Lesbos, arrives just in time.
170		
169		
171		<i>Plataiai</i> . . Upwards of 200 Plataians manage to effect their escape from the city. The rest are compelled to surrender through famine, and in accordance with the Theban plan are all put to death.
324		<i>Sicily</i> . . Embassy of Gorgias from Leontinoi to Athens to ask help against Syracuse. The Athenian generals Laches and Charoiades take up their position off Rhegion.
178		<i>Korkyra</i> . . The prisoners sent from Corinth carry a decree re-establishing the ancient friendship with the Peloponnesians.
181		They bring a charge of Attikism against Peithias who, being acquitted, retaliates by accusing the nobles of cutting stakes in the grove of Zeus and Alkinoös.
		Murder of Peithias.
182		Nikostratos, the Athenian admiral, seeks to allay the feud between the oligarchs and the demos.
183		Indecisive victory of Alkidas.
184		Arrival of Eurymedon from Athens on his way to Sicily.
		Eurymedon connives at the massacre of the oligarchs.
		The remnant of the faction, after spending some time on the mainland, return to the island, and establish themselves on Istônê, where they maintain their ground for two years.
187		<i>Megara</i> . . Conquest of Minoa by Nikias.
		<i>Athens</i> . . Second outbreak of the plague in the summer.
		<i>Melos</i> . . Unsuccessful expedition of Nikias to the Spartan colonies of Melos and Thera.
191		<i>Trachis</i> . . Foundation of the Spartan colony of Herakleia.



## PELOPONNESIAN WAR. SIXTH YEAR.

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426	II. 192	<i>Akarnania</i>	The Akarnanians beseech Demosthenes to blockade Leukas. Demosthenes resolves on a campaign in Aitolia, with the view of advancing into Boiotia and there restoring the supremacy of Athens.
194			His defeat, and return to Naupaktos.
195			The Ambrakiots seize Olpai.
196			Defeat and death of the Spartan general Eurylochos, followed by the ignominious retreat of the Peloponnesians under Menedaios.
197			The Ambrakiot reinforcements cut off at Idomene. Conquest of Anaktorion by the Akarnanians.
325		<i>Sicily</i>	Death of Charoiades. Laches takes Mylai and Messênê, but fails in an attack on Inessa.
200		<i>Delos</i>	Purification of the island by the Athenians, and restoration of the Panionic festival.
SEVENTH YEAR.			
425	185	<i>Korkyra</i>	On the arrival of an Athenian fleet under Eurymedon, the demos gain the upper hand. The oligarchs are tempted into breaking the terms of the truce, and are all massacred.
186			
202		<i>Pylos</i>	Demosthenes occupies Pylos, from which Brasidas tries in vain to dislodge him. The Spartan fleet beaten by the Athenians in the harbour of Sphakteria. Blockade of the Spartan hoplites in the island. Terms of truce arranged on the surrender of the Spartan fleet to the Athenian generals.
326		<i>Sicily</i>	Revolt of Messênê from Athens. Victory of Eurymedon off Rhegion.
207		<i>Athens</i>	Unsuccessful attempt of the Messenians on Naxos. Spartan envoys appear at Athens to negotiate a peace. Kleon demands the surrender of the hoplites, and the restoration of Nisaia, Pegai, Troizen and Achaia, and brings about the ignominious dismissal of the Spartan ambassadors.
210			
211		<i>Pylos</i>	On the ending of the truce the Athenians refuse to restore the Spartan fleet.
212			Distress of the besieging force.
213		<i>Athens</i>	The news from Pylos causes great dissatisfaction at Athens. Nikias treacherously abandons his command to Kleon, who promises to return victorious in twenty days.
214			
216		<i>Pylos</i>	Kleon leaves the arrangement of the plan of assault to Demosthenes. Attack on Sphakteria. Death of Epitadas and Hippagretes, and capture of 292 hoplites who are conveyed to Athens.
219			
222			Establishment of a permanent Athenian garrison. Ravages caused by Messenians from Naupaktos.
223		<i>Solygeia</i>	Defeat of the Corinthians by Nikias, who occupies the peninsula between Epidauros and Troizen.
225		<i>Athens</i>	Artaphernes, the Persian envoy to Sparta, is caught at Eion and brought to Athens, whence he is sent back to Ephesos with Athenian envoys. These envoys are compelled to return on the death of Artaxerxes.
		<i>Chios</i>	The Chians are ordered by the Athenians to pull down the new wall of their city.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. EIGHTH YEAR.

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424	II. 226	<i>Peloponnesos</i> The Athenians establish a garrison in Kythera, and take Thyrea by storm. The Aiginetans captured within it are taken to Athens and put to death.
	227	
	229	Alleged massacre of 2,000 Helots by the Spartans, who receive overtures from Perdikkas and the Chalkidic towns for combined operations against the Athenian empire.
	•	
	230	Brasidas is sent in command of the expedition into Thrace.
	232	The Athenians get possession of Nisaia, but retreat from Megara, when Brasidas offers battle.
	234	The Megarians demolish their Long Walls.
	328	<i>Sicily</i> . . In the CONGRESS OF SICILIAN GREEKS AT GELA Hermokrates inreighs against the aggressiveness of the Athenians. General peace between the Sikeliot cities.
	329	<i>Athens</i> . . Banishment of Pythodoros and Sophokles, and fining of Eurymedon for agreeing to the terms imposed by the congress at Gela.
	•	
	235	<i>Boiotia</i> . . Failure of the plan concerted between Demosthenes and Hippokrates for the subjugation of Boiotia. The Athenians fortify the Temenos of the Delion.
	236	• BATTLE OF DELION; decisive victory of the Thebans under Pagondas. Death of Hippokrates. The Boiotians refuse to yield up the Athenian dead.
	239	Assault and capture of the Delion.
	240	<i>Thrace</i> . . Brasidas, having marched with the utmost speed through Thessaly, is compelled by Perdikkas to invade the territory of Arrhibaaios, chief of the Lynkestai. Brasidas accepts the offer of Arrhibaaios for an alliance, and withdraws his forces. He appears before Akanthos, where the people are averse to the idea of revolt from Athens.
	241	
	244	THE REVOLT OF AKANTHOS is brought about by the eloquence and the threats of Brasidas, supported by the oligarchic faction.
	245	Revolt of Stageiros.
	247	Surrender of AMPHIPOLIS to Brasidas. Thucydides arrives on the same day at Eion.
	249	Extension of the revolt to Myrkinos and other cities.
	250	• For his remissness in failing to save Amphipolis Thucydides is banished or goes into voluntary exile.
	253	Brasidas takes Torônê, and discourses to the people on the blessings of Spartan freedom.
	254	The Athenian garrison escape to Pallênê.

NINTH YEAR.

423		<i>Sparta</i> . . The Spartans draw up terms for a year's truce, which is accepted by the Athenians, the basis being generally the maintenance of the <i>status quo</i> .
	256	
	330	<i>Sicily</i> . . Dismantling of Leontinoi by the oligarchs who expel the demos and transfer themselves to Syracuse.
		Some of these oligarchs, quarrelling with their brethren, occupy Phokeai and Brikinniai.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. NINTH YEAR, (*continued*).

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423	II. 257	<i>Thrace</i> . . Brasidas is received into Skiônê against the wishes of the party favourable to Athens, and by his eloquence wins for himself an enthusiastic welcome.
	258	The commissioners arrive to announce the truce. Brasidas insists that Skiônê revolted before it began.
	259	Revolt of Mendê from Athens. Brasidas transfers the women and children to Olynthos.
	261	Expedition of Brasidas and Perdikkas against Arrhibaios, who is defeated.
	263	Perdikkas resolves to ally himself again with the Athenians.
		Recovery of Mendê by the Athenians under Nikias and Nikostratos.
		Ineffectual attempt of Brasidas on Potidaia.
		<i>Boiotia</i> . . The Thebans demolish the walls of Thespiæ.
TENTH YEAR.		
422		<i>Delos</i> . . The Athenians expel the inhabitants of Delos who are placed by Pharnabazos in Atræmyttion.
	330	<i>Sicily</i> . . Mission of Phaiax from Athens to counteract the policy of the Syracusans.
	264	<i>Athens</i> . . Kleon is placed in command of an army for operations in Thrace.
	268	<i>Thrace</i> . . Recovery of Torônê by Kleon, who fails in his attempt on Stageiros.
	271	BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS. Death of Brasidas and of Kleon.
ELEVENTH YEAR.		
421	276	<i>Athens</i> . . Ratification of the peace of Nikias. The peace is not accepted by the Boiotians, Corinthians, and Megarians; and the Chalkidians refuse to give up Amphipolis.
	277	
	278	<i>Amphipolis</i> Klearidas withdraws the Peloponnesian garrison.
	279	<i>Athens</i> . . Separate treaty between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians surrender the prisoners taken at Sphakteria.
	281	<i>Peloponnesos</i> The Argives, on the invitation of envoys from Corinth, invite adhesions to their confederacy, which is joined first by the democratic city of Mantinea, and after some hesitation by the Corinthians.
	282	The Eleians renounce the alliance of Sparta and join the Argives. The Chalkidians of Thrace follow their example; but the Tegeatans refuse to do so.
	283	<i>Skiônê</i> . . Punishment of the city for its revolt. The Plataians who had escaped during the siege of their town are placed in it by the Athenians.
		<i>Boiotia</i> . . The Boiotians refuse at the request of the Corinthians to give up their private truce with the Athenians.
	284	<i>Peloponnesos</i> The Athenians are induced to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from Pylos and place them in Kephallenia.
		The ephors Kleoboulos and Xenares arrange with the Boiotian and Corinthian envoys a scheme by which the latter are to make alliance with Argos, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. The scheme fails through the opposition of the Boiotarchs.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. TWELFTH YEAR.

B.C.	VOL. PAGE	
420	II. 285	<i>Peloponnesos</i> The Spartans make a separate treaty with the Boiotians in violation of the terms of their agreement with the Athenians.
	286	The Argives make alliance with Sparta, reserving the right of fighting over again the duel of Othryades.
		<i>Athens</i> . . The Athenians refuse to give up Pylos in exchange for the site of the demolished fort of Panakton.
		Alkibiades stirs up their feelings of displeasure against the Spartans.
	290	Alkibiades, having induced the Argives, Mantineaans, and Eleians to send envoys to Athens, cheats the Spartan ambassadors into a denial of the powers with which they had been intrusted.
	292	Defensive alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, on the return of Nikias from an ineffectual mission to Sparta.
	293	<i>Olympia</i> . The Athenians present at the games. Victories of Alkibiades, and humiliation of the Spartan Lichas, the Spartans being excluded by sentence of the Eleians for sending a force to Lepreon.
		<i>Herakleia</i> . The Thessalians with their allies attack Herakleia, and kill the governor Xenares. A few months later

THIRTEENTH YEAR,

419		the Boiotians expel his successor Hegesippidas, and occupy the city.
	295	<i>Peloponnesos</i> Alkibiades makes a progress through Achaia, but is foiled at Patrai and Rhion by the Corinthians.
	296	Invasion of Epidauros by the Argives, who are compelled to withdraw, but return later on in the year.
		Synod at Mantinea.
	297	The Athenians bring back to Pylos the Helots and Messenians whom they had placed in Kephallenia.

FOURTEENTH YEAR.

418	298	• Invasion of Argos by the Spartans under Agis. Desperate danger of the Argive army, from which they are rescued by the offer of their generals Alkiphron and Thrasyllus to submit all matters to arbitration.
		Agis grants a truce of four months.
		Indignation of both sides.
	299	Alkibiades persuades the allies of the Argives to join him in attacking Orchomenos, which is taken. As the Argives after a while join Alkibiades, the truce is broken.
	300	The Tegeatans ask help from Sparta. Agis, appointed to go to their aid, advances into the territory of Mantinea. The Argives abandon an impregnable position, and come down into the plain.
	302	BATTLE OF MANTINEIA. Complete victory of the Spartans who thus regain their old position. The Athenians lose their generals Laches and Nikostratos.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. FOURTEENTH YEAR, (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL.	PAGE	
418	II.	303	<i>Peloponnesos</i> The Athenians fortify a post at Epidaurus. Oligarchical conspiracy at Argos by the Thousand and others. Lichas sent from Sparta to impose the terms of the treaty with Argos.
		304	
		305	
		306	
FIFTEENTH YEAR.			
417		307	Rising of the Argive demos against the oligarchs. Building of the Long Walls of Argos, which in the following winter are destroyed by Agis.
			<i>Makedonia</i> The Athenians plan an expedition for the recovery of Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, who plays them false and frustrates the scheme.
SIXTEENTH YEAR.			
416		308	<i>Melos</i> . . Expedition of the Athenians to coerce Melos into their confederacy. After a long siege the Melians surrender unconditionally. The men are put to death, the women and children sold, and Athenian Klerouchoi introduced into the island.
		316	<i>Athens</i> . . Ostracism of Hyperbolos.
		331	
SEVENTEENTH YEAR.			
415		332	The envoys sent to Eggesta to ascertain the extent of its resources, return with a glowing account of its wealth.
		333	The Athenians appoint Alkibiades, Nikias, and Lamachos, generals, to conduct an expedition to Sicily to maintain the cause of Eggesta against Selinous, to restore Leontinoi, and to further Athenian interests generally in Sicily.
		333	The expedition is opposed by Nikias, and vehemently urged on by Alkibiades.
		336	
		340	The scale of the enterprise increased owing to the requirements of Nikias.
		341	Mutilation of the Hermai.
		345	Accusation of Alkibiades for profanation of the mysteries: his trial postponed until after his recall from Sicily.
		345	Midsummer. Departure of the fleet from Athens.
		347	
		348	
		349	<i>Syracuse</i> . Hermokrates warns the Syracusans of the coming invasion. His statements are contradicted by Athenagoras.
		350	<i>Italy</i> . . . The Athenian fleet reaches Rhegion. The Tarentines, Lokrians, and others refuse to receive them; and the wealth of Eggesta is discovered to be a mere cheat.
		351	
		355	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Alkibiades fails in an attempt to gain the alliance of Messêné.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. SEVENTEENTH YEAR, (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL. PAGE	
415	II.	<i>Sicily</i> . . The Athenian fleet sails to Syracuse, and makes proclamation to the Leontines within the city to come out and join their friends. The Athenians occupy Katané, and make alliance with the people.
	356	After a vain effort to win over the Kamarinaians, the generals return to Katané, where they find the Salaminian trireme come to summon Alkibiades home to take his trial.
	357	<i>Athens</i> . . Excitement caused by the revelations of Diokleides and Andokides. The Athenians deliver over to the Argive demos the hostages taken from the oligarchical houses.
	358	Alkibiades, who had fled away at Thourioi, is sentenced to death in his absence.
	360	<i>Sicily</i> . . The Athenians take Hykkara and return to Katané.
	361	By a stratagem Nikias draws off the Syracusan force to Katané while the Athenian fleet effects a landing in the great harbour.
	362	The Athenians win a victory which is turned to no account. Nikias loses the golden opportunity for investing Syracuse while yet imperfectly fortified.
	364	The Athenian party in Messéné put to death by the advice of Alkibiades. The fleet takes up its winter quarters at Naxos.
	365	Hermokrates appointed general of the Syracusans, with Herakleides and Sikanos as his colleagues.
	367	After hearing Hermokrates the Syracusan envoy and the Athenian Euphemos the Kamarinaians determine to remain neutral.
	368	Nikias seeks in vain to get help from the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians.
	369	<i>Sparta</i> . . Alkibiades urges the active resumption of the war against Athens, the mission of a Spartan general to Syracuse, and the establishment of a permanent garrison in Attica.
		<b>EIGHTEENTH YEAR.</b>
414	374	<i>Syracuse.</i> Landing of the Athenian army at Leon. Surprise of Epipolai; defeat and death of Diomilos. The Athenians build a fort on Labdalon.
	375	The Syracusans raise their first counterwork, which is taken by the Athenians. Capture of the second Syracusan counterwork. Lamachos is killed. The Athenian fleet enters the great harbour of Syracuse.
	378	The Athenians again have everything in their favour. Nikias loses the golden opportunity.
	379	The Syracusans depose Hermokrates from his command.
	380	Gylippos crosses over to Taras. Neglect of Nikias to intercept him.
	381	Gylippos enters Syracuse. His offer of a truce for the evacuation of Sicily is rejected by the Athenians. He takes the fortress on Labdalon.
	382	Nikias fortifies Plemmyrion. Arrival of a Corinthian fleet under Erasinides.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. EIGHTEENTH YEAR. (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL.	PAGE	
414	IL.	383	<i>Syracuse</i> . The Syracusans, being first beaten, defeat the Athenians.
		384	Nikias writes for further help from Athens. His resignation is not received, but Menandros and Euthydemos are appointed his colleagues, until the arrival of reinforcements.
		387	
			NINETEENTH YEAR.
413		388	<i>Attica</i> . . The Peloponnesians ravage Attica and by fortifying Dekeleia begin the so-called
			DEKELEIAN WAR.
		389	<i>Syracuse</i> . A naval victory of the Athenians is made worthless by the loss of Plemmyrion which is taken by Gylippos.
		390	The Syracusans intercept an Athenian treasure-fleet off the coast of Italy.
		391	<i>Peloponnesos</i> Demosthenes fortifies a post opposite to the island of Kythera. He is joined off the Akarnanian coast by Eurymedon, who brings him news of the disasters in Sicily. Ten ships are left to strengthen the force of Konon off Naupaktos.
		392	The Korkyraians contribute 15 ships to the Athenian fleet for Sicily.
			<i>Syracuse</i> . Some reinforcements for Syracuse are cut off by the Sikel chiefs in the interior.
		394	The destruction of the fleet of Nikias prevented by the arrival of Demosthenes with 73 triremes.
		395	Demosthenes determines to make a night attack by Epipolai to break the Syracusan counter wall. The attempt, at first successful, ends in total rout.
		399	Nikias refuses to follow the advice of Demosthenes for immediate retreat or even for the withdrawal of the fleet to Katanê or Naxos.
		400	
		401	After resolving on retreat he retracts his consent owing to an eclipse of the moon, and refuses to move for 27 days.
		403	Defeat of the Athenian fleet, and death of Eurymedon.
		406	The Syracusans close up the mouth of their great harbour.
		409	Destruction of the Athenian fleet in the battle fought to break through the barrier.
		411	The Athenian retreat delayed by a stratagem of Hermokrates.
		417	After a retreat of terrible suffering extended over seven days, the division of Demosthenes is compelled to surrender on the promise that the lives of all should be safe.
		418	Destruction of the force of Nikias on the banks of the Assinaros. Nikias surrenders himself to Gylippos. The prisoners are thrown into the quarries of Epipolai. Demosthenes, in defiance of the compact made with him, is put to death along with Nikias.
		425	<i>Attica</i> . . The Athenian slaves desert in large bodies to the Spartans at Dekeleia.

PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR.  
NINETEENTH YEAR, (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL. PAGE	
413	II. 427	<i>Attica</i> . . Dismissal of the Thracian mercenaries who massacre the people of Mykalessos.
		<i>Corinthian Gulf.</i> } Indecisive action of the Athenians under Diphilos with the Corinthian fleet.
431		The catastrophe in Sicily aggravates the dislike of the oligarchical factions for Athens.
432		<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i> } The Euboians and Lesbians ask help from Sparta in their meditated revolt against Athens.
		Tissaphernes sends an embassy to Sparta.
		The Persian king, Darioios Nothos, claims the tribute assessed on the Asiatic Greeks.
433		Pharnabazos seeks to induce the Spartans to transfer the war to the Hellespont.
434		By the influence of Alkibiades, the Spartans determine to aid the Chians first.
		• TWENTIETH YEAR. (IONIAN WAR.)
412	435	Mission of Aristokrates from Athens to Chios. He insists that the Chian oligarchs shall send a squadron of ships to Athens.
	436	<i>Western Hellas</i> } Victory of the Athenians over the Peloponnesians under Alkamenes, who is killed at Peiraion.
	437	<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i> } Alkibiades sails with Chalkideus for Chios, and brings about the revolt of the island. Lebedos and Erai follow the example of Chios. On receiving the tidings of these revolts the Athenians resolve to make use of the reserve funds in the Akropolis. Page 115.
	438	
	439	Revolt of Miletos. First treaty between the Spartans and the Persians.
	441	Insurrection of the people in Samos against the oligarchical government: 200 of the oligarchic party killed, 400 banished, and their property confiscated.
	442	
	443	REVOLT IN LESBOS. The Athenians storm Mytilênê, and reduce the whole island.
	444	• Death of the Spartan commander Chalkideus at the Milesian Panormos.
		The Athenians ravage Chios.
	445	• Victory of the Athenians over the Dorians under Astyochos, their Dorian allies from Argos being defeated by the revolted Ionians of Miletos.
	446	Retreat of the Athenians to Samos. Amorges taken and sent to Sousa.
	448	
	449	The Athenians muster a fleet of 104 triremes in Samos.
		Astyochos, thwarted in his wish to stir up revolt again in Lesbos, declares that he will not assist the Chians.
	450	Unsuccessful attempt of the Athenians on Knidos.
	451	Second treaty between the Spartans and Tissaphernes.
	452	The Athenians fortify Delphinion and ravage Chios.
	453	Defeat of the Athenian general Charminos by • Astyochos.



PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR.  
TWENTIETH YEAR, (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL. PAGE		
412	II. 454	<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i> }	Lichas repudiates the two treaties made between the Spartans and the Persians.
	455		The revolt of Rhodes from Athens brought about by the oligarchic faction.
	459		Alkibiades, learning that an order has been issued for his assassination, takes refuge with Tissaphernes, and makes overtures to the Athenian officers at Samos, promising them the help of the Persian king, if the Athenian democracy is put down.
	462		The envoys sent to Alkibiades from Samos return with assurances which make the oligarchs eager to carry out their schemes.
	463		The arguments of Alkibiades are strongly opposed by Phrynichos who outmanœuvres Alkibiades.
	466	<i>Athens</i> . .	Poisandros comes as an envoy from Samos, saying that the Persian king will supply them with money, if the Athenians will receive Alkibiades and change their constitution.
	467		The Athenians appoint ten commissioners to settle matters with Alkibiades and Tissaphernes.
	468		Poisandros organises the conspiracy, in which Antiphon eagerly takes part, aided by Theramenes and Phrynichos.
	471	<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i> }	Victory of the Athenian fleet under Leon and Diomedon at Rhodes.
			Alkibiades baffles the Athenian commissioners by demanding that the Persian king shall maintain a fleet in the Egean.
			Tissaphernes makes a third treaty with the Spartans.
	472	<i>Attica</i> . .	Oropos is betrayed to the Boiotians. The Eretrians send to ask aid in their proposed revolt from Athens.
			•
			•
			TWENTY-FIRST YEAR.
411	473	<i>Asia Minor</i>	Derkyllidas brings about the revolt of Abydos and Lampsakos.
	475		Lampsakos is retaken by Strombichides.
			Diotrephes sets up an oligarchy in Thasos, which soon afterwards revolts from Athens.
		<i>Athens</i> . .	By a series of assassinations the oligarchical conspirators set up a reign of terror.
	478		In an assembly held at Kolonos the demos is made to vote for the government of the Four Hundred and the Five Thousand.
	479		Expulsion of the Kleisthenean council of Five Hundred.
	480		The first overtures of the Four Hundred are rejected by Agis, who fails in an attempt to surprise Athens and allows a second set of envoys to go to Sparta.
	481	<i>Samos</i> . .	The Athenian oligarchical conspirators assassinate
			• Hyperbolos and Charminos.
	482		The Athenian army resolve to maintain the Kleisthenean constitution, and send Chaireas to Athens, where he is seized by the Four Hundred.
			• Making his escape, he returns to Samos.

PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR.  
 TWENTY-FIRST YEAR, (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL.	PAGE	
411	II.	483	<i>Samos</i> . . The Athenians and Samians join in solemn oaths to maintain the old laws of Athens, and declare Athens in revolt from the people.
		485	Thrasybulos brings Alkibiades to Samos, where he is elected strategos by the citizens.
		487	The envoys from the conspirators at Athens are sent back with the answer that the Four Hundred must be put down.
		489	<i>Athens</i> . . Theramenes insists that the Five Thousand shall be made a reality.
		490	The Four Hundred send envoys to Sparta, proposing unconditional submission, and fortify Ectonia for the purpose of consummating their treason.
		491	The hoplites destroy the fortification with the sanction of Theramenes and one of the Strategoi.
		492	The Four Hundred propose a compromise.
		493	<i>Eubœia</i> . . Total defeat of the Athenian fleet under Thymochares. All Eubœia revolts from Athens except Oreos.
		496	<i>Athens; and Attica</i> . . { The Four Hundred are suppressed, and the Five Thousand put in their place. Practical restoration of the Periklean polity.
		500	• Trial, condemnation, and execution of Antiphon and Archeptolemos.
			Aristarchos, one of the fugitives of the Four Hundred, betrays the fort of Oinoë to the Boiotians.
		503	<i>Asia Minor</i> Klearchos, having vainly tried to take his ships, goes by land to the Hellespont, where the Megarian general Helixos brings about the revolt of Byzantion.
		504	Owing to the discontent in their army and fleet the Spartans send Mindaros to supersede Astyochos.
		505	Mission of Gaulites as envoy from Tissaphernes to Sparta.
		506	Tissaphernes fools Lichas and Mindaros and sends back the Phenician fleet from Aspendos.
		507	• Mindaros resolves to accept the offers of Pharnabazos, and having managed to escape the notice of the Athenian ships reaches the Hellespont.
			Revolt of the Lesbian town of Eresos from Athens.
		509	Victory of the Athenians under Thrasybulos and Thrasylos off KYNOSSEMA.
		511	Revolt and reduction of Kyzikos.
		512	<i>Eubœia</i> . . The erection of moles connects the island with the mainland.
		515	<i>Asia Minor</i> Tissaphernes follows Mindaros to the Hellespont.
		516	Defeat of Doreius and Mindaros in the bay of Dardanos.

TWENTY-SECOND YEAR.

410		517	Theramenes sails to the Athenian naval station at Kardia, where he is joined by Alkibiades after his escape from prison at Sardeis.
			Battle of Kyzikos. Death of Mindaros; destruction of the Peloponnesian fleet.
		518	• By seizing Chrysopolis, the port of Chalkedon, the

PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR.  
 TWENTY-SECOND YEAR, (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL. PAGE	II.	
			Athenians again become masters of the highway of the Hellespont.
	521	<i>Athens</i>	The people on the advice of Kleophon reject the terms for peace offered by the Spartan envoy Endios.
	522		Agis marches from Dekeleia to Athens, but to no purpose.
		<i>Thasos</i>	The people expel the oligarchs and the Spartan har- most Eteonikos.
TWENTY-THIRD YEAR.			
409	523	<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i>	Thrasylus cuts off the Syracusan squadron, and sends his prisoners to Athens. Fortification of Lampsakos by the Athenians.
	524	<i>Pylos</i>	
			Attack of the Spartans on Pylos. • The Athenian Anytos fails to succour the besieged Messenians, who are compelled to surrender.
	525	<i>Megara</i>	The Megarians recover the town of Nisaia.
TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR.			
408	526	<i>Asia Minor</i>	The Athenians reduce Chalkedon, and make a con- vention with Pharnabazos, by which it is agreed that their envoys shall go to Sousa.
	527		The Athenians reduce Byzantion.
	528		Their envoys are stopped on the way to Sousa by the younger Cyrus, who is sent down as the Persian commander-in-chief in Asia Minor.
TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR.			
407	530		Lysandros organises a system of Clubs as a means of increasing his own power.
	531	<i>Athens</i>	Return of Alkibiades to Athens, where he is elected general, and conducts the Eleusinian procession along the Sacred Road.
	533		• •
		<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i>	Antiochos, the pilot of Alkibiades, disobeys orders, challenges Lysandros, and is defeated off Notion.
	534		
			Alkibiades attacks and plunders Kymê, a town of the Athenian confederacy.
	535		On the complaint of the Kymaians, he is deposed from his command, the generals now chosen being Konon, Diomedon, Leon, Perikles, Erasinides, Aristokrates, Arcestratos, Protomachos, Thra- sylus, and Aristogenes.
	537		Phanosthenes captures the Thourian commander Dorieus, who is set free without ransom by the Athenians.
TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR.			
406	538		Kallikratidas, having succeeded Lysandros, is com- pelled, failing to obtain money from Cyrus, to impose heavy contributions on the Milesians. He storms Methymna, and insists that the prison- ers shall all be set free.
	543		He blockades Konon and Arcestratos in Mytilene.
	544		An Athenian trireme conveys the news to Athens, from which a fleet of 110 ships is sent to his aid.

PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR.  
 TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR, (*continued*).

B.C.	VOL. PAGE			
406	II. 545 546 547 550  552  558 561  563 565 566  569 570	<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i> }	BATTLE OF ARGENNOUSSAI. Complete victory of the Athenians. Death of Kallikratidas.	
			Departure of Eteonikos from Mytilênê for Chios.	
			The Athenian generals commission Theramenes and Thrasymboulos to rescue the crews of the disabled vessels. A storm prevents the execution of the order.	
			A dispatch from the generals makes known these facts; and Theramenes resolves to destroy the generals, six of whom, returning to Athens, are charged with neglecting to save the crews.	
			Theramenes avails himself of the festival of Apaturia to increase the feeling against them.	
			The proposal of Kallixenos, that the people shall proceed at once to pronounce judgement on all the six together, is carried.	
		Protest of Sokrates. Euryptolemos vainly tries to secure for them a legal trial.		
		Murder of the six generals, Diomedon, Leon, Perikles, Aristokrates, Erasinides, and Thrasymboulos.		
		<i>The Egean and Asia Minor</i> }	Eteonikos suppresses a conspiracy among his troops, and compels the Chians to pay for their support.	
		Appointment of Lysandros as secretary to Arakos.		
		TWENTY-SEVENTH YEAR.		
		405	572 574 576  575 583  584  587	<i>Athens</i> . .
Escape of Konon to Kypros (Cyprus).				
Lysandros orders the Athenian garrisons in all the conquered towns to go straight to Athens.				
The pressure of famine is thus increased; but some political relief is obtained by the Psephisma of Patrokleides.				
Lysandros blocks up the entrance to Peiraieus with 160 ships.				
Surrender of Athens, followed by the dismantling of the Long Walls, and the forfeiture of her whole fleet with the exception of twelve ships.				